A STUDY OF A REGIONAL PEACE MACHINERY IN THE PACIFIC

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Regionalism and universalism are two general methods of approach to the creation of an international authority. The former can be reached through a tight organization in a limited region, while the latter may be attained by a loose or tight organization covering a wide area. The League of Nations, set up in 1920, was an attempt at the latter approach. It had to be loose because it was designed to include a large number of states. At one time, it did have fifty-three members including all the great powers in the world except the United States.

It is generally admitted that there are some advantages of a universal international organization over a regional system. First, it does not divide the world on a simple basis of balance of power into armed camps which sooner or later operate against each other and thus provoke rather than prevent war. Secondly, it provides a common basis and generally a more effective one for non-political activities in which practically all nations have a common interest. Thirdly, it does not exclude by reason of geo-
graphic location any state that wishes to join. And fourthly, it would give better protection to its members because of its very size.

The chief weakness of the universal system like the League of Nations lies in the fact of its diffusion of responsibility. The problems presented themselves to an organization which includes a large member of states with differences in interest and in form of government are inevitably confusing with one another. It is very difficult for member states to take action in dealing with a conflict arising among them. When war or threat of war takes place, a distant member cannot be expected to undertake the same burden as near-by nations in stopping the aggressor. Even on non-political matters, remote control would be handicapped by distance and unfamiliarity.

Regionalism was introduced by nations with a view to free from such defects within the universal system. The origin of it was motivated primarily by considerations of national security and particular local circumstances, and it was also nearly always based on the desire to exploit more fully the political, economic and social possibilities presented by the physical propinquity of organized people or sovereign states living or located within a particular area. In the postwar period of World War I, advocates of the regional plan differed in their interpretations of the term. But it was generally conceded that regional organizations would not be completely independent of the universal
system and it would be within the framework of the world structure. Within the latter organization group of nations located in a particular region should bind themselves still more closely together for mutual safety and aid.

Regionalism may tend to make a tighter and a more efficient organization and also have a stronger executive power which would enable it to do many things that the looser universal organization is unable to do. It is more easily organized because of the proximity of its members, as well as a greater likelihood of common interest between them. Moreover, regionalism would not only contribute peace and security to the area in which it has been organized, but also to the world as a whole, because it provides a possible starting point for a better wider union. When the advantages of a limited regional pact become apparent, other pacts might be formed elsewhere till eventually all nations might be drawn together to form a universal organization.

In the history of world politics, regionalism is not a new idea. In the latter part of the nineteenth century, the world began to have experience on this type of organization for promoting international understanding and mutual benefit in areas where this great novelty was introduced. The best known illustration of it representing the oldest regional system in the world was the Inter-American Conferences which were held periodically by twenty-one American Republics ever since 1890 and resulted
in a network of treaties and agreements for their common interest. In 1910 the Conference changed its name to Pan-American Union. It is directed by a Governing Board consisting of representatives of all the American Republics who annually elect their own Chairman and appoint a Director General and an Assistant Director. The greatest success that has been achieved by the Union has mostly been in non-political fields, such as cooperation for social or intellectual purposes. Development of really close political relations among the twenty-one American States was slow, until the threat from Germany and Japan and the outbreak of the present war made it clear that the nations of the western hemisphere must act together in self-defense. This Inter-American machinery, set up to meet quite specific needs arising from the trend of events, proves to be the first and a good example of regional organizations in the world.

During the postwar period, in view of the inadequacy of the League of Nations to meet the specific demand of security in some definite areas, attempts were made to form regional organizations within Europe to supplement the League in the maintenance of peace. They included the Little Entente, the Balkan Union, the Cooperation of the Scandinavian States and the Baltic Pact.

The Little Entente was organized in 1920 and 1921 by Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Rumania for the purpose of keeping intact the Treaty of Trianon. In March 1921, more-
over, Rumania signed a treaty of alliance with Poland. Each signatory agreed to give military aid to the other in case of unprovoked attack from abroad. In 1933, permanent organizations which included a Permanent Council of Foreign Ministers, a Permanent Secretariat and an Economic Council were established in order to strengthen their cordial relations and furnish a concrete basis for mutual assistance. The Little Entente succeeded in a remarkable degree of political cooperations, but, in the economic field, it showed no real accomplishment. (1)

The Balkan Conference afforded another example of the regional system in Europe. The Balkan Union is not a new idea. Even before the First World War, vain attempts were made to secure a Balkan Cooperation. But it was not brought into being until 1934 when four Balkan nations-Greece, Turkey, Rumania and Yugoslavia - signed a non-aggression pact. It was the result of a growing recognition that the Balkan states were dependent on each other, and their agreeing in effect to let bygones be bygones in their former disputes and to deal with each other as friends in the future. (2)

Just like the Balkan countries, the Scandinavian nations contended with one another in the past centuries.

Their cultural similarity did not prevent wars among them. During the period of the World War of 1914-1918, there were many elements that forced them to approach each other. Then they began to develop a fine regional international cooperation. Through the efforts of the Foreign Ministers of Scandinavian countries, the regional understanding enabled them to advance not only in political cooperation but in economic, legal and cultural relations as well. (3)

The Baltic Pact was signed by the three Baltic countries, Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia in 1934 in order to cope with the precarious situation after the advent of Hitler in Germany and for the purpose of meeting their common needs in the Baltic areas. It provided conferences to meet at regular intervals by their representatives and a joint council to be set up.

All the regional organizations in Europe did spendid work within their respective regions. Nevertheless, the complicated conditions and instability in European politics and the unsound foundation of the League made the regional system play only a limited part.

Apart from the regional organizations which had been formed by the European nations, there were many projects

which were designed by statesmen or publicists with a view to bringing about a regional organization of Europe for certain political and economic objects. Duc de Sully, one time French Superintendent of Finance in the seventeenth century, set out in his memoirs a great plan of European organization which he claimed to have advised with his royal master, Henry IV. It has always been known as "The Grand Design of Henry IV", and combines regional and general organization in much the same way as many plans produced in our own time. (4)

After the establishment of the League of Nations, there were many Europeans whose passionate desire for security was still not satisfied. Not only did successive French governments press for supplementary guaranties, but unofficial groups also sprang up to urge a close and stronger union. In 1922, Count Coudenhove-Kalergi founded at Vienna an association devoted to the cause of Pan-European Union. Aristide Briand was an Honorary President of the association, and in 1925 Herriot, then Prime Minister of France, gave the association his approval in the Chambre. At its present headquarters in Berne, it still continues its work.

Briand made a proposal for a United States of Europe and laid it before the League of Nations in 1929. The proposal known as "The Memorandum on the Organization of

a System of European Federal Union" is a curious mixture of a draft constitution and mere suggestions to be worked out by proposed series of constituent conferences. It speaks of "future Federal Union", "the European Commonwealth", etc. It advocates a European Conference composed of representatives of all the European members of the League of Nations to act as "the primary directing body", and an executive body consisting of a certain number only of the members of the European Conference. But it leaves the powers, the exact composition, the organization of these bodies and the procedure to be followed by them to be settled by future meetings of the states of Europe. (5)

None of these plans was put into practice, but they aroused a great interest in Europe. At the present time they are already of some historical significance.

Shortly before and during the period of the present war, regionalism is still interested in the world. In Great Britain and the United States, the idea of federalism has prevailed. Some of the federal plans work out a federation of the whole world, others advocate a limited regional federation, such as a federation of Anglo-American countries, a federation of democracies, and a federation of Europe or a federation of Western Europe excluding Soviet Russia. Among the thinkers of federalism, two of them are the most well-known at present; one is Lionel Curtis

5. Ibid., pp. 29-30.
who was an English lawyer and spent much of his life for building constitutions in the British Commonwealth. In his well-known book "Civitas Dei", he selects Great Britain, Australia and New Zealand to form a federal union which would have a joint legislature and executive operating always upon the individual citizen and collecting tax for federal purposes. (6) The other one is Clarence Streit, an American correspondent at Geneva who watched at close hand the crumbling of the League. Streit writes in his book "Union Now" a federal plan urging the immediate federation of fifteen democracies. Only democracies, according to Streit, are chosen, because the preservation and increase of man's freedom is the prime objective of world government and totalitarianism cannot cooperate in its realization. (7)

Simultaneously, regionalism has played its part not only in theory but in real politics of Europe. Some of the Governments in exile are giving considerable thought to larger political integration in Europe. Their planning runs along the line of a regional association. On November 4, 1941, representatives of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Yugoslavia and Greece, in the Conference of the International Labour Office in New York, signed a declaration in favour of establishing a conference of the Central European and Balkan states which would act not only as an economic

unit, but also as a union of defense against any resurgence of German imperialism.

This was followed by an agreement between Greece and Yugoslavia, signed in London on January 15, 1942. The exiled Governments of the two are to serve as "General foundation for the Organization of the Balkan Union". Other Balkan states, ruled by governments freely and legally constituted will be invited to join. (8)

Eight days later, on January 23, 1942, the Governments of Poland and Czechoslovakia agreed on the broad lines of their "Future Confederation". These include common policy in foreign affairs, defense, economic and financial matters, social questions, transport and posts and telegrams. (9)

The Polish-Czechoslovakia agreement concludes with an article mentioning of what has been made in the previous week by Greece and Yugoslavia and promises collaboration with the Balkan Union. "Only the cooperation of the two regional organizations" runs the text "can assume the security and develop the prosperity of the vast region stretching between the Baltic and Aegean Seas". (10)

In the Far East, since the nineteenth century, the

10. Ibid.
government of the United States has tried to secure international cooperation in the Far Eastern affairs. In 1899 Secretary of State John Hay addressed his famous "Open Door" note to the great powers in attempting to prevent China from partition by the powers. The Washington Conference in 1922 set up for the maintenance of peace in the Pacific a diplomatic machinery which was the first regional organization in the Far East and would be discussed in detail in the next chapter.

Moreover, the general systems of the collective security, such as the League of Nations and the Kellogg-Briand Pact have covered the Far East, so the regional machinery operates hand in hand with the general systems. For some time, the Far Eastern states, especially China, resorted to the regional as well as the general organizations in an attempt to settle their disputes. Since the Mukden Incident, Chinese government submitted the Sino-Japanese disputes to the League and appealed over and over again to the League Powers to fulfill their obligations under the Covenant against the aggressor. The League with its capital in Europe was primarily European and European-minded, and the major Powers backing it like Great Britain and France being European Powers were not interested in the Far Eastern imbroglio. Therefore, the League failed once more to curb the arrogant aggressor, and the collective security was displayed as an empty formula.
With the experience of the League in handling international controversies in the Pacific, it was proposed to strengthen the regional structure in the Far East. In 1931, at the Hangchow and Shanghai Conferences of the Institute of Pacific Relations, there were different proposals to improve or to create a new diplomatic machinery of the Pacific. Furthermore, at the Banff Conference 1933, two Japanese professors recommended a regional organization in the Pacific with a treaty of security, non-aggression and arbitration. (11) Among western writers similar ideas were not lacking and Raymond Leslis Buell was the first one of them to make suggestions for the reorganization of the regional machinery in the Pacific. (12)

After Pearl Harbour, there has been a growing tendency among the United Nations to plan a better world for the future. Some thinkers have paid their attention to the Pacific to make blueprints of peace conditions and regional machinery through which a lasting peace can be attained. All these provide ample evidence of the need for a special Pacific organization. Even though the United Nations are ready for a powerful general organization of the world, (13) the peculiar and complex problems of the Far Eastern area

12. Infra. note 25, p. 36.
13. The Declaration of the Moscow Conference by the four great United Nations at November 1, 1943, provides that they recognize the necessity of establishing "a general international organization on the principle of sovereign equality of all peace-loving states and open to membership by all such states" for maintaining peace.
would require a regional machinery decentralized and adopted
to this particular environment.

When the War is over, it seems that there will be an
urgent need to set up a machinery on a regional basis
for the re-establishment of peace in the Pacific. Just as
the Far Eastern crisis was the precursor of the present
world-wide conflict, so restoration of peace in the Pacific
will be a prerequisite condition for a universal peace
of the world. It is due time for us to study the problems
and start peace planning at present in order that the
United Nations will not be caught unprepared for making
peace at the moment when peace conference is opened. What
will be the basic conditions, however, to the peace of the
Far East in advance to the setting-up of a regional machin­
ery? How and when can it be organized? And what will
be China and Japan's position in the postwar world? All
these problems will be discussed in the following chapters
of this thesis.
CHAPTER II

HISTORY OF REGIONAL MACHINERY IN THE PACIFIC

Before we go through the history of regional machinery in the Pacific, it is desirable to become acquainted with some ideas of the peace machinery on bases other than regional in order to understand the general scope of peace structures in the Pacific areas. The contemporary history shows that, in addition to the regional machinery, there was also, in the Far East, organizations set up on bilateral and universal bases. The bilateral machinery is based upon bilateral treaties between the Pacific powers. After the first Hague Peace Conference in 1899 and especially since the inauguration of the League of Nations in 1920, the European as well as American States made a very large number of bilateral arbitration and conciliation treaties. These tended to grow not only in number but also in the comprehensiveness of the obligation to submit disputes to pacific settlements. The United States had arbitration treaties with forty nations and most of the European countries had almost an equal number of such treaties, the obligations in general being more far-reaching than the American type of treaties. China, Japan and Siam made very few such treaties. Japan had only two arbitration treaties,
one with the Netherlands and one with Switzerland. China had conciliation and arbitration treaties with the United States and arbitration treaties with Brazil and the Netherlands. Siam had arbitration treaties with Great Britain and the Netherlands, and old arbitration treaties with Austria, Hungary, Belgium, Italy, Sweden and Norway. (1)

The general treaties providing for a universal machinery fall into three groups, which may be distinguished as the Hague, the Geneva and the American systems. The first group is the Hague system containing some of the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, which though less used since the First World War than formerly, are still in force among a large number of states and have been utilized in some cases since the war.

The first part of the Hague Convention that provides a universal basis for peace machinery is the Hague Convention of 1899 and 1907 for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes which is in force between forty four states. All of the Pacific powers, except the British Empire and the Dominions are parties to the 1907 Convention. This Convention set forth procedures of

mediation, inquiry and arbitration in some detail and establishes the Permanent Court of International Arbitration at the Hague. (2) This is, in reality, only a panel of names and procedure for selecting a tribunal ad hoc in case the parties desire after a dispute has arisen.

The second part of the Convention is the Hague Convention of 1907, respecting the limitation of the employment of force for the recovery of contract debt which was in force between twenty states, including all the Pacific powers except Siam. Under this Convention, the parties agree "not to have recourse to armed force for recovery of contract debts claimed from the government of one country by the government of another as being due to its nationals", unless "the debtor state refuses or neglects to reply to an offer of arbitration, or after accepting the offer, prevents any compromise from being agreed on, or after the arbitration, fails to submit to the award". (3)

The third part is the Hague Convention of 1907, relating to the opening of hostilities which is in force among twenty eight states including all the Pacific powers. (4) This Convention was well observed during the First World War, but it was not observed by Japan in her undeclared war waged against China since 1931 and her subsequent

treacherous attack on Pearl Harbour on December 7, 1941.

The second group of general treaties contains the League of Nations Covenant and other treaties made in pursuance of or to supplement its provisions. The League of Nations Covenant is in effect among fifty eight states including all the Pacific powers except the United States and Japan. The latter gave notice to withdraw from the League according to the terms of article I, paragraph 3 of the Covenant on March 27, 1933, and ceased to be a member on March 27, 1935.

The political obligations of the Covenant relate to disarmament, prevention of war, renunciation of war, pacific settlement of international disputes, sanctions against war, peaceful changes, and regional understandings, Besides, the Covenant still provides activities for economic and social prosperity of the member-states.

After the Sino-Japanese conflict occurred in 1931, the Chinese government relied upon the League of Nations for the settlement of its disputes with Japan. Consequently the League sent in 1931 a Commission of Inquiry headed by Lord Lytton to China to investigate the real situation of Manchuria. After making an inquiry the Commission made a report in which it was recommended that any settlement of Manchurian disputes must be made in accordance with the Covenant, the Nine Power Treaty and the Pact of Paris. (5)

Subsequently, after outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war, China resorted to the League again. As a result, several resolutions were passed to give moral support to China, but no strong measure was adopted to stop the aggressor by the League of Nations.

The American system which is represented by the Kellogg-Briand Pact generally known as the Pact of Paris is in force among sixty three states, practically all the states of the world of any political importance except Argentina, Bolivia, Salvador and Uruguay. Arising out of the American movement for the "outlawry of war" it was formally initiated by the United States and France, and signed originally by fifteen states and dominions.

The preamble of the Pact recognizes that "any signatory power which shall hereafter seek to promote its national interests by resort to war should be denied the benefits furnished by the Treaty". By this Pact, "the Parties solemnly declare in the names of their respective peoples, that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another". (Article I) They "agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means." (Article II) (6)

The first instance of the application of the Pact of Paris to the Far East fell in the case of the Sino-Soviet controversy over Chinese Eastern Railway in 1929. At the height of the crisis the United States and forty-one other co-signatories of the Pact of Paris reminded the Soviet and Chinese governments of their obligation to settle the quarrel by peaceful means. This move apparently had little effect on the parties concerned. (7) During the Sino-Japanese disputes, it was applied again. In identical notes to the Chinese and Japanese governments on January 7, 1932 the United States declared through Secretary of State Stimson that "it does not intend to recognize any situation, treaty or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the Covenant and obligations of the Pact of Paris of August 27, 1928 to which treaty both China and Japan, as well as the United States, are parties." (8) Since the Mukden Incident in 1931, the American government reiterated the obligation under the Pact of Paris to the Tokyo government with no result.

From the above survey of conventions for the establishment of diplomatic machineries, it will be observed that

bilateral treaties do not provide a comprehensive network among the Pacific powers. On the other hand, the general treaties providing a machinery more comprehensive in scope have been widely accepted by the Pacific powers. The Hague Conventions, however, provide only voluntary procedures and have been weakened by comparative disuse since World War I. The Geneva group of treaties provides the most workable machinery, but the United States, Japan and the Philippines are not parties to them, and the effectiveness of these treaties has been weakened by their failure to deal effectively with the Manchurian and other episodes. The American group of treaties is the most far-reaching in their negative obligations to refrain from war or the use of force. In this group, the Pact of Paris has been ratified by all of the Pacific powers, but it lacks definite procedure for enforcement, and its failure to prevent hostilities both in the Far East and elsewhere has weakened the confidence of the public in it.

It is generally recognized that the history of regional machinery in the Pacific started from the Washington Conference in 1922 which resulted in several Washington treaties in connection with military and political problems of the Pacific. The Washington Conference was essentially a disarmament conference aimed to promote the possibilities of peace of the world not only through the cessation of competition in naval armament but also
by the solution of various other disturbing problems which threatened the peace of the world, particularly in the Far East. The background of the Washington Conference may be scrutinized in three aspects: 1. The increasing ambition of Japan in China; 2. The competition of naval armament among the five great powers; 3. American attempt to abolish the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

Japanese ambitions in China during the First World War had endangered American interests and had been contradictory to the traditional policy of the United States in the Far East. The fundamental principle of American foreign policy toward China was the principle of equality of commercial opportunity among all nations in dealing with China and the preservations of China's territorial and administrative integrity. As early as 1899, Secretary of State John Hay had made a formal enunciation of this principle to the Powers as the guiding principle of their policy in dealing with China, which was known as the "Open Door" policy toward China. As a result of the First World War, this policy had been upset and Japan had taken advantage of the situation to establish its predominance in the Orient. On May 11, 1915, Secretary Bryan of the United States protested against the Japanese Twenty-One Demands on China, declining to "recognize" any agreement made by Japan and China in violation of the Open-Door principle. Although the Lansing-Ishii agreement of November 2, 1917 recognized that Japan had "special
interests" in China, the United States never accepted the interpretation given to this phrase by Tokyo, and the agreement itself was cancelled on April 14, 1923. Meanwhile the United States government and American public opinion remained hostile to Japanese ambitions. One of the reasons why the Senate of the United States defeated the Treaty of Versailles was that it turned over to Japan German right in Shantung and the north Pacific Islands Mandates.

During the World War, Japan's expansionist policy, supported by the third largest naval force in the world, had clashed sharply with British and American interests throughout Eastern Asia and the Pacific. As for the United States, President Wilson, demanding "the most adequate navy in the world", had adopted a naval program, the purpose of which was to create a navy second to none. (9) This program was in fact a challenge to the position of Japan in the Orient as well as to the British supremacy of the seas. In the straitened financial circumstances in which the war had left her, England could ill afford to hold up her end in an Anglo-American naval race. Naval supremacy had become such a fetish to her that she would not have relinquished it to any power without a struggle. At the end of the war it was hoped that armaments would generally be reduced by international agreement. In the

United States President Harding and his influential supporters were deeply convinced that competition in armament had been one of the chief causes of the World War and the United States should now take the lead in promoting universal disarmament.

Meanwhile opinion in America and in Canada was aroused over the existence of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, which committed Britain to defend Japan in the event of war. The United States was aware that in 1921 there would come up the question of a renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance that had been extended in 1911 for a decade. Washington had also noticed with considerable disquietude that the Far Eastern policies of Great Britain and Japan were harmonious and that the British were gradually disregarding the principle of Open Door. Thus the American government considered the very existence of the alliance as one of the main factors that served to encourage Japanese expansion. On the part of Canada, she feared the belligerent obligation imposed upon her against the United States should the American-Japanese war occur. It was hoped that the Anglo-Japanese alliance would be cancelled and substituted by a general treaty clarifying the awkward situation among the United States, Great Britain and Canada.

For these purposes, President Harding of the United States issued an invitation in 1921 to eight powers to attend a conference at Washington on the limitation of naval armaments and the settlement of outstanding inter-
national problems in the Pacific and the Far East. The eight powers to whom the invitation to the parley was extended included all states, except Russia, that had interests in the Far East: Belgium, China, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands and Portugal. All governments but that at Tokyo willingly responded to the call. Japan agreed to participate only on condition that there would be no discussion of matters that were "of sole concern to certain particular powers", or that might "be regarded as accomplished fact". (10) The conference sat from November 12, 1921 to February 6, 1922, and concluded seven treaties, the three most important of which were the Four Power Treaty, the Five Power Naval Treaty and the Nine Power Treaty.

The Four Power Treaty was a substitute for the Anglo-Japanese alliance. It was signed by Great Britain, France, Japan, and the United States. In Article I of the Treaty, the Powers pledged themselves "to respect their rights in relation to their insular possessions and insular dominions in the region of the Pacific Ocean". Should these rights be threatened by aggressive action of any other power, the contracting parties agreed "to communicate with one another fully and frankly in order to arrive at an understanding.

as to the most efficient methods to be taken, jointly or separately, to meet the exigencies of the particular situation.

The treaties were to remain in force for ten years, subject to automatic renewal, unless terminated by any signatory on twelve months' notice.

The Five Power Naval Limitation Treaty was one of the most important in international relations because it succeeded in concluding the first naval limitation agreement in modern history. It includes Italy in addition to the parties to the Four Power Treaty. It provides naval ratios, size and total tonnage of capital ships and aircraft carriers, and for the maintenance of the military and naval status quo in the Pacific Islands. The basis of limitation was the 5-5-3 naval ratio accepted by Britain, the United States, and Japan for capital ships and aircraft carriers. Tokyo was willing to accept a position of technical inferiority in accordance with the ratio on condition that Britain and the United States should promise not to build new naval fortifications in the Pacific during the life of the naval treaties. Since then the United States has failed to construct any first-class base west of Hawaii. This provision made it virtually impossible for the American fleet, acting alone, to attack Japan in its home waters.

Moreover, the Powers at the conference signed the Nine Power Treaty which is related to the "principles and

11. With the exception of the limitation of armaments on the Great Lakes as the result of the Rush-Bagot Treaty of 1817
policies to be followed in matters concerning China" by the signatory states. (12) The preamble of the treaty states that the signatories desire "to adopt a policy designed to stabilize conditions in the Far East, to safeguard the rights and interests of China, and to promote intercourse between China and the other powers upon a basis of equality of opportunity." An analysis of the separate articles of the treaty will show the extent to which the signatories defined their objectives and the manner in which they obligated themselves to carry out the principles and policies defined.

Article I, the most quoted article of the treaty, reads as follows:

The contracting powers, other than China, agree:

1. To respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China;

2. To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government;

3. To use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations in the territory of China;

12. The original signatories were: Belgium, China, France, Italy, Japan, Portugal, the British Empire, the Netherlands and the United States. In addition, Bolivia, Denmark, Mexico, Norway and Sweden have adhered to this treaty. Germany signed but did not ratify it.
4. To refrain from taking advantages of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly states, and from countenancing action inimical to the security of such states.

The first paragraph is a restatement of the principle voiced by Secretary of State John Hay in 1899 as a corollary to Open Door. The second paragraph is a declaration of the kind of policy to be followed if the sovereignty, independence, and territorial and administrative integrity of China is to be preserved. Paragraph three is a statement of the Open-Door policy as it was expanded from the original idea of "equal treatment" for trade to that of "equal opportunity" for the commerce and industry of all states in China. The fourth paragraph is a restatement of the secret clause of the Lansing-Ishii notes, a drastic self-denying obligation designed to implement and make effective the Open-Door policy as stated in the preceding paragraph. (13)

To carry out the principles set forth in this article, the parties undertake not to enter into any treaty or agreement which would infringe or impair these principles (Article II); to apply the Open-Door policy of equal opportunity for all by not supporting attempts by their nationals to secure special privileges, monopolies, or preferences in respect of the economic or commercial development of China (Article III); not to support agreements designed to create

spheres of influence (Article IV). China, on the one hand, and Contracting Parties, on the other, agree not to exercise or permit unfair discrimination on the railway system of China (Article V) and the Powers agree to respect the neutrality of China in any war in which she is not involved and China agrees to observe neutrality (Article VI).

This treaty represented a carefully developed and matured international policy intended to assure to all of the contracting parties their rights and interests in and with regard to China and to assure to the people of China the fullest opportunity to develop without molestation their sovereignty and independence. It was a covenant of self-denial among the signatory powers in deliberate renunciation of any policy of aggression which might tend to interfere with that development.

All the three treaties made in the Washington Conference were not independent from one another. They were, according to Secretary Stimson, interrelated and interdependent. In his letter to Senator Borah on February 23, 1932, he pointed out "No one of these treaties can be disregarded without disturbing the general understanding and equilibrium which were intended to be accomplished and effected by the group of agreements arrived at in their entirety - The problems were all interrelated. The willingness of the American government to surrender its commanding lead in battleship construction and to leave its position at Guam and in the Philippines without
further fortifications, was predicated upon, among other things, the self-denying covenants contained in the Nine Power Treaty, which assured the nations of the world not only of equal opportunity for their Eastern trade but also against the military aggrandizement of any other power at the expense of China. One cannot discuss the possibility of modifying or abrogating without considering at the same time the other promises upon which they were really dependent." (14)

The Washington Conference treaties, especially the Nine Power Treaty, met its first test as an effective instrument for maintaining peace in the Far East when the Japanese armed forces occupied Mukden on September 18, 1931. The action that followed resulted in Japanese occupation of the whole Manchuria and the establishment of the so-called Manchukuo. On September 22, while the League was engaged in the matter, American Secretary Stimson summoned the Japanese Ambassador and through him transmitted an "earnest memorandum" to the Japanese government saying "It is not exclusively a matter of concern to Japan and China. It brings into question at once the meaning of certain provisions of agreements, such as the Nine Power Treaty of February 6, 1922 and the Kellogg-

The Japanese did not agree with this view. In one of the Conferences of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Professor Ichihashi who was interpreter at the Conference asserted in a round table, that in his view the Washington Treaties did not form a connected whole; they were independent of each other and did not stand or fall together.
Briand Pact." (15)

Afterwards when it became apparent at the beginning of 1932 that no action of consequence was to be expected of the League of Nations, the United States proceeded to carry further its "moral protest" policy by enunciating the Non-Recognition policy. In a note to Japan and China of January 7, 1932,(16) the United States declared that it did not intend to recognize any treaty or agreement made in violation of the Open Door or the Pact of Paris. Mr. Stimson sent the draft of this note in advance to the British and French Ambassadors, hoping to obtain the endorsement of their governments. Committed to League procedure, London gave the proposal a cool reception.

In a communique of January 9, the Foreign Office declared that in view of Japanese Statements declaring adherence to the Open Door, it was not deemed necessary to address any note along the lines of the American Statement.(17) The London Times declared that the Foreign Office had acted wisely. (18)

15. Ibid., pp. 46-47.
16. Loc. cit.
18. Sir John Pratt, then in the Foreign Office of the British Government, has given the most authoritative British explanation of this Communique. In a letter published in the London Times of November 30, 1938, Sir John wrote: "I am not revealing any very closely kept secret when I say that the Foreign Office have never attempted to defend this Communique and have always regretted that a slip was made which has, it would seem, proved a real obstacle in Anglo-American relations. The Communique was drafted and approved in haste by the permanent officers at 1 P.M. on Saturday and it was not realized until it appeared in the Press on the following Monday that it read like a rebuff to America. This is really all there is to it". See London Times, Nov. 30, 1938.
Apparently emboldened by this Anglo-American difference, the Japanese attacked Shanghai in January 1932. Secretary Stimson realized that the time might come when he would wish to recommend to Congress the imposition of an embargo on Japanese goods, in co-operation with other countries. And he believed that such a proposal would have more chance of being adopted, to quote his account of this period, "if it were recommended following the invocation of the Nine-Power Treaty than if it had been recommended solely by the League of Nations." (19)

Overlooking his earlier rebuff, Mr. Stimson again approached the British to see whether they would join the United States in invoking Article VII of the Nine Power Treaty in accordance with the provision for "full and frank communication" between the powers whenever a situation arose which in the opinion of any one of them, involved the application of the treaty. In a number of transatlantic telephone conversations with Sir John Simon, then British Foreign Secretary, Mr. Stimson tried to induce the British government to join the United States in making a statement that the Nine Power Treaty still remained in force. Sir John never actually declined the proposal, but discouraged Mr. Stimson from believing that he would accept it. The British government finally assented to the Stimson's proposal only on condition that all the other League powers who were parties to the Nine Power Treaty join in invoking it - a condition which Stimson

deemed impossible to fulfil. (20)

In the renewed Japanese hostilities of July 1937, the Nine Power Treaty was explicitly alluded to in the League of Nations resolutions and the United States Statement. The League Assembly accepted a report of its Far Eastern Advisory Committee on October 6, 1937 showing that Japan had violated its treaty obligations and inviting those members of the League who were parties to the Nine Power Treaty to initiate consultation in accordance with Article VII. On that very day, the United States government through Secretary Hull formally declared that the action of Japan in China was contrary to the Nine Power Treaty and the Pact of Paris.

On the suggestion of Great Britain and supported by the United States, the Belgian government issued invitations for a conference on October 16, to all of the signatories of the Nine Power Treaty, to the five States that had adhered to the treaty, and to Germany and Russia. Japan refused to attend, largely on the grounds that the terms under which it was being called amounted to a condemnation of her action in China, which she regarded as measures taken solely in self-defense and not coming within the scope of her obligations under the Nine Power

20. Ibid., pp. 161-166.
Treaty. (21) Germany also refused to attend, but all the other states that were invited accepted.

In accepting the invitation, the United States government states that the purpose of the meeting was to examine "in conformity with Article VII of the treaty, the situation in the Far East", and to study "peaceable means of hastening an end of the regrettable conflict which prevails there."(22) After the opening of the meeting, the conference made a vain attempt to get Japan to send a representative, but the latter refused to attend again.

Confronted by this attitude, the conference had either to "quarantine" Japan or give way. By this time the United States had no zest to initiate economic sanctions which were very distasteful to the American isolationists at home.

21. The reply stated in part that "The action of Japan in China is a measure of self-defense which she has been compelled to take in the face of China's fierce anti-Japanese policy and practice, and especially by her provocative action in resorting to force of arms; and consequently it lies as has been declared already by the Imperial government, outside the purview of the Nine Power Treaty." See the Conference of Brussels (U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C. 1938) p. 9. The Japanese government always tried to justify its military operation in China as a measure of self-defense, but nobody in the world was deceived by this pretext. For instance, a resolution of the Assembly of the League of Nations on Oct. 6,1937 asserted that "the military operations carried on by Japan against China by land, sea and air are out of all proportion to the incident that occasioned the conflict; that such action cannot possibly facilitate or promote the friendly cooperation between the two nations that Japanese statesmen have affirmed to be the aim of their policy; that it can be justified neither on the basis of existing legal instruments nor on that of the right of self-defense." See League of Nations Official Journal, October 1937, pp. 56-57.

22. Ibid., p. 7.
The Netherlands and other powers made it clear that they would run the risk of an attack on their Asiatic colonies by Japan as a reprisal against sanctions, only if the United States would join in an agreement guaranteeing the security of their possessions. Foreign Minister Eden, who headed the British delegation, made it clear that Britain would go just as far as the Americans in stopping Japan, but no further - thus reversing the British position taken in 1931.

Under such circumstances, there was nothing to be done. All that the Brussels Conference did was to reaffirm the principle of the Nine Power Treaty and to suggest that the settlement ultimately arrived at must be consistent with the principle of the treaty and satisfactory to the conference. (23) On November 24, 1937, the conference suspended its meeting, to be called together again whenever the chairman and two of its members should so desire.

It was a crucial test of the Nine Power Treaty. After that time it was apparent that the treaty had been seriously weakened and could not be regarded as a safe-guard of the principles and policies followed by the Washington Conference. The failure of the powers to use the Washington treaties in attempting to settle the Sino-Japanese conflicts proved the inadequacy of the regional machinery for the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. Some political factors contributed

23. Ibid, pp.76-77.
to the failure of the treaties, but in addition the treaties themselves, in their very foundations, were unsound.

Of the three Washington treaties, the Five Power Naval Treaty was denounced by Japan on December 29, 1934. The denunciation was to take effect according to the terms of the treaty in two years. The remaining treaties still in effect are the Four Power Treaty and the Nine Power Treaty. The Four Power Treaty provides for a vague machinery and the purpose of the treaty is limited. There is in the treaty a consultation article in which it is stipulated that "if the said rights are threatened by the aggressive action of any other, the Parties shall communicate with one another fully and frankly in order to arrive at an understanding." Nevertheless, according to the Declaration accompanying the treaty, consultation shall not be taken to embrace questions which lie exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of the respective powers. Meanwhile, the object of the treaty is limited to insular possessions and insular dominions only. Thus a dispute on the mainland involving Japan with China or the Soviet Union does not come within the scope of the treaty. Moreover, when an aggression takes place, it cannot be expected that the major contracting power of the treaty, the United States, would take arms to defend it, because a statement issued by the government of the United States on ratification of that treaty contains "no commitment to armed force, no alliance, no obligation to
join in defense." (24) And the Four Power Treaty was signed only by Great Britain, the United States, France and Japan, while China and Soviet Russia were not signatories.

The weaknesses of the Nine Power Treaty may be divided into two parts, political and legal. On the political side, the failure of the treaty may be attributed to several factors: First, the importance of the Soviet interests in the Far East was a potential factor in Pacific relations. Though the Soviet position in the Far East was in fact recognized during the Washington Conference and in the League of Nations discussion of 1931-1932, the exclusion of the Soviet Union from the original list of signatories deprived the provisions of the treaty of much reality. In the second place, it was always considered by some American writers that the spirit created at the Washington Conference was destroyed by the government of the United States, when it unilaterally terminated the Gentleman's Agreement and in the Immigration Act of 1924 excluded Japanese from entering the United States, since they were ineligible for citizenship. (25) The Smoot-Hawley tariff of 1930 did further injury. Therefore a distinguished American scholar expressed the opinion to the effect that "if the United States had paid more attention to the moral and economic necessities of Japan, possibly Japanese loyalty to the

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Washington treaties might have been maintained." (26)

In the third place, the revived naval competition among Britain, the United States and Japan after 1930, culminating in the Japanese denunciation of the Five Power Treaty and London Naval Treaty, undermined the psychological value of the Nine Power Treaty (27) and made the political situation even more unstable and strained.

On the legal aspect, the weakness of the Nine Power Treaty is, in the first place, that it provides no permanent organization as an agency to carry out functions of conciliation and inquiry at a time when conflict occurs between the contracting parties. Indeed, it was agreed at the Washington Conference that a Board of Reference was to be established in China, to which any question arising under other provisions of the treaty might be referred for investigation and report and it was resolved furthermore that a special committee with reference to Chinese tariff "shall formulate for the approval of the Powers concerned a detailed plan for the constitution of the Board." A number of difficulties in the way of the smooth functioning of such a Board within reasonable limits of authority had been mentioned in the course of discussion before the resolution was adopted. (28)


Subsequently, the whole scheme fell through, owing to the fact that the tariff conference subsequently held, in 1925, ended in a deadlock, so that no Board of Reference was set up. As a result, no real machinery was established and the powers were made impotent to carry on the functions of the treaty.

Secondly, the Nine Power Treaty is not treaty of guaranty, so the obligation of the powers under the treaty is vague. The Nine Power Treaty does not provide a tribunal for its own interpretation but it does provide "full and frank communication between the Contracting Powers concerned" on any situation involving the application of the stipulation of the treaty. (Article VII). Under the provision, legally it obliges the parties to do no more than exchange views and does not limit their freedom to act independently in any emergency involving the application of the treaty. It has been contended that the parties "are committed of co-operative action"; (29) nevertheless, the scope of the obligation of the parties to the Nine Power Treaty to work in its enforcement has been a matter of controversy and causes the powers concerned to take no definite action in the event of a violation of the treaty.

Finally, the treaty provides no sanction against any party which acts in violation of its terms. It is generally

called a treaty "without teeth". The Nine Power Treaty was drawn in the form of a legislative multipartite treaty. In such a treaty every party is recognized to have a legal interest in the observance of the entire treaty by each of the other parties. Thus a violation of it is a legal injury to each party and entitles it to protest or to invoke any procedure which may be provided by the treaty. The general right of protest, in the event of a violation of a multipartite treaty, does not imply a general obligation to take sanctioning measures unless it is explicitly accepted in the treaty itself. (30). The ambiguity of the Nine Power Treaty on this point may account in large part for the failure of the signatories to cooperate in every case where its violation was alleged.

In view of the apparent inadequacy of the existing international machinery in the Pacific, there were some groups and individuals who devoted their attention to working out a plan to improve or supplement the existing machinery or to create a new one acceptable to all the Pacific powers concerned for the maintenance of peace in the Far East. Since 1929, the Institute of Pacific Relations has held round table conferences in discussing the diplomatic machinery in the Pacific. In most of the round tables there seemed to be a tendency to assume that the existing diplomatic machinery in the Pacific was

30. Wright, op. cit. p. 86.
inadequate and there was a need for new forms of organization. At the Kyoto Conference of 1929, the necessity for some regional organization was stressed. It was argued that the League of Nations' success had been mainly in Europe and in many important respects it might be regarded as a European regional organization, while in the Pacific, due to its particular circumstances, there seemed apparent a need for a regional organization in addition to the League of Nations. (31)

After the outbreak of Manchurian dispute between China and Japan in 1931, much attention was devoted to using the existing machinery to settle the question. In the same year, at the Hangchow and Shanghai Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, the subject that had been presented at the Kyoto Conference was continually discussed. In the former conferences, questions concerning diplomatic machinery came almost last on the agenda, but in the 1931 conference, these questions took precedence and led the discussion into more specific sources of friction.

The main question raised in this section at the conference was whether it would be better to improve, revise and supplement the existing machinery or to create a new machinery. In favour of the first alternative, it was agreed that a multiplication of instruments tended only to weaken their general effect, and that the existing machinery would be adequate provided that steps were taken

to adopt or implement such an instrument to cope with the real situation. On the other hand it was stated that the League organization was viewed in China with some suspicion and that the United States and the Soviet Union were opposed to membership in it. The Washington treaties did not include either China or the Soviet Union, and the procedure provided by them was both vague and limited. While the Pact of Paris might be implemented, it would be better, it was suggested, to devise some form of Pacific pact which would take into account the different political outlook of, for example, China and the Soviet Russia and would be acceptable to the idea of foreign policy in the United States. (32)

The advocates of the improvement of the existing machinery devoted their attention to making suggestions for extending the influence of the League of Nations in the Pacific. To attain this goal, they made four proposals as follows:

First, the appointment of a League of Nations commission of Inquiry to the Far East not only with a view to meeting the immediate emergency but also as a desirable permanent organ was considered by some members, especially by Chinese members. A Chinese member reminded one of the round table conferences that, even before the incident of September 18, China had appealed to the League to send a

commission to Manchuria to study the whole situation. Japanese members, however, voiced an objection against the proposed procedure on the ground that a special inquiry would take on the character of a court. In this respect, another suggestion was that the League Council instead of sending a commission of inquiry from Geneva should appoint a number of foreign ministers already in the Far East to act in that capacity. There were several objections to this proposal. China was suspicious of a body composed of foreign diplomats, primarily as a result of her long experience of adverse decisions on the part of such a diplomatic body. (35)

Next, the possibilities of a standing committee of the League for Far Eastern affairs, with its seat in the Far East, were explored. The League already had adopted the practice, it was pointed out, of appointing particular agencies of the Secretariat to deal with problems of particular areas. It was believed that a branch Secretariat in the Far East would have the advantage not only of keeping the League in touch with Far Eastern affairs, but also that of creating in Geneva itself a gradually increasing personnel of informed officers if staff members were given the opportunity of being detailed to the Far Eastern post for two or three years. (34) It was believed that such an arrangement would go far to offset the

33. Ibid., pp. 259-260.
34. Ibid. pp. 260-261.
remoteness of the League center from the Far East. As to the scope of such an organization, it was felt that probably it would not be wise to limit it only to a single and particular area where at that time acute difficulty was present, but that it might be better to co-ordinate in such an office all the varied activities carried on by the League in the Pacific area. For the location of such a bureau in the Far East, it was considered that it should have no permanent habitat but travel through the whole area wherever its services were most needed at any one time. (35) This suggestion, however, did not seem particularly practical. A question raised was: why should the Far East or the Pacific area be singled out for such a special attention on the part of the League; were not other parts of the world equally in need of it? The reply was not entirely satisfactory.

Chiefly, it seemed that from considerations of prestige and influence on world-opinion many members remained unconvinced that a Secretariat branch office of the League would best answer the purpose in mind. Why should not the Council of the League itself be subdivided, so as to have a permanent international body in the Pacific area, directly appointed by the member-states, to balance the Europe-centered League Council in Geneva? A Chinese member who for many years had worked in behalf of the League said "It is most desirable that a regional council

35. Ibid., pp. 261-262.
or standing committee of the council be established in the Far East - with the United States and the Soviet Union as members." (36) British members objected to this view on the ground that "additional councils", as suggested for this area, would add too great a burden to the League which some of the member-states now have difficulty in helping to support. (37)

As a possible alternative, the relative advantages of occasional Far Eastern meetings of the League Council as a whole were considered. A Chinese member stated that the National Government of China had in earlier stages of its existence held political council meetings in Peking, Wu-han, and other cities; and that these councils were only afterwards united into a central government. Why could not the League once every few years meet in some other place than Geneva? Tokyo, Nanking and Mukden were mentioned by various speakers as suitable localities for an early Far Eastern meeting of the League Council to consider the Manchurian conflicts. (38) The chief difficulty anticipated was that the League at all times had many problems to consider, large and small, which required continuous attention. If council meetings were held at a great distance from Geneva, those most concerned in these

36. Ibid, p. 262.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid., pp. 262-263.
matters might be unable to attend; or important decisions might be held up simply because the time of the council was absorbed by regional affairs.

On the other hand, as to the creation of a new machinery, the Conference paid special attention to Mr. Stephen A. Heald's suggestions which are made in his writing entitled "The Draft Syllabus for the Study of Diplomatic Machinery in the Pacific". In his memorandum he sets forth six proposals for the new machinery in the Pacific. The six proposals are briefly:

1. A Pacific Locarno; an instrument of this nature, i.e. pledge with guarantees, does not appear applicable to the Pacific.

2. A Pan-Pacific Union of governments on the lines of the Pan-American Union provided with mechanisms such as a resolution condemning war, Inter-Pacific treaties of arbitration and conciliation, a Pan-Pacific Court and a procedure for the use of good offices. While such an arrangement might be accepted by other states, the attitude of the United States and the Soviet Russia would be uncertain.


5. Combination of elements in various treaties.

6. A regional agreement for the implementation of the Pact of Paris, providing procedure for calling Pact into operation.

Further, in the Report of the League of Nations
Commission of Enquiry on the Sino-Japanese Dispute, which was in the main adopted by the League Assembly in its own Report on February 24, 1933, the Commission recommended among other things, the conclusion of a Sino-Japanese Treaty of Conciliation and Arbitration, Non-Aggression and Mutual Assistance, in which the U. S. S. R. might participate in part through a separate tripartite agreement. In the Commission's opinion, such a treaty "would provide for a board of conciliation, whose functions would be to assist in the solution of any difficulties as they arise between the Government of China and Japan." "It would also establish an arbitration tribunal composed of persons with judicial experience and the necessary knowledge of the Far East. This tribunal would deal with any disputes between the Chinese and Japanese Governments regarding the interpretation of the declaration or of the new treaties, and with such other categories of disputes as might be specified in the treaty of conciliation". (39) As is generally remembered, the well-meant project of peace machinery failed to materialize, since Japan flatly refused to accept the League's recommendations for the settlement of the Sino-Japanese disputes.

For some years prior to 1937, when Japan resumed hostilities against China, there was still talk of a Pact of Pacific as a regional security system in the Far East. Thus, among the data papers for the Banff Conference of

the Institute of Pacific Relations in 1933 is one entitled "Some Considerations on the Future Reconstruction of Peace Machinery in the Pacific." The authors are Professors Takaki and Yokota of the Tokyo Imperial University. (40) One of the causes to which they attribute the failure of peaceable settlement in the Pacific is the absence there of a society of nations for the prevention of war and they recommend a regional organization with a treaty of security, non-aggression and arbitration.

The principal parties to this treaty would be China, Japan, the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and France. It would be an amalgamation of the Nine and Four Power Treaties, the Briand-Kellogg Pact, and Non-aggression treaties of the type initiated by the Soviet Union. The consultative procedure of the Four Power Treaty of 1922 is improved by the suggested use of conferences to examine disputes or threats of conflict and issue findings which, if concurred in by all members other than the disputants, would bind those members to act in accordance with their terms. The authors are anxious to avoid any sanctification of the status quo, and desire that their consultative process should be used as an instrument of peaceful change removing the causes of disputes before they develop. They, therefore, hope that the conference

may meet periodically. Their treaty would prohibit recognition of any situation brought about by force and would require the submission of all disputes, whatever their nature, to conciliation, arbitration or adjudication. Permanent conciliation commissions are to be set up between each pair of contracting parties for the settlement of any dispute not submitted to an arbitral tribunal or to the Permanent Court of International Justice. (41)

41. Ibid.
CHAPTER III
WAR AIMS AND PEACE AIMS IN THE FAR EAST

As a result of the failure of the regional machinery in maintaining peace in the Pacific, the Far Eastern situation became worse from 1931 onward, and thus gave opportunity and encouragement to ambitious aggressors in Europe to break the European status quo and make the world situation precarious. There is a large body of opinion which thinks that if Japan had been stopped in 1931 there would have been no conquest of Abyssinia, no intervention in Spain, no Austrian annexation, no Munich and no Pearl Harbour. Although there is no ground for arguing that the cause of our present trouble was through the failure of the regional machinery alone, it is certain that its collapse had important consequences upon later international developments, leading to confusion and perplexities in the world at large.

After China had fought alone with the Japanese invaders for four years and five months, there was a sudden attack on Pearl Harbour on December 7, 1941 by the Japanese bombers and submarines. Following this treacherous attack on American territory and the British
Far Eastern colonies, the United States and the British Empire declared war on Japan. So it welded the wars in Europe and in Asia together and produced the greatest conflagration that the world has ever seen.

The ambition of Japan to crush the United States for the purpose of conquering China and Asia was revealed in the Tanaka Memorial which was presented by Premier Baron Giichi Tanaka to the Emperor of Japan on July 25, 1927. It reads, in part, as follows:

"In future if we want to control China, we must first crush the United States just as in the past we had to fight in the Russo-Japanese War. But in order to conquer China we must first conquer Manchuria and Mongolia. In order to conquer the world, we must first conquer China. If we succeed in conquering China, the rest of the Asiatic countries and the South Sea countries will fear us and surrender to us. Then the world will realize that Eastern Asia is ours and will not dare to violate our rights. This is the plan left to us by Emperor Meiji, the success of which is essential to our national existence."(1)

If we trace the history of Japan's expansion, we may find that the Tanaka Memorial was not an innovation in 1927. It resulted from Japanese militarism which occupies a conspicuous place in both Japanese history and their national culture. The influence of militarism in Japan may be understood from a work of Iwasaki, a Japanese scholar. In his book entitled "Working Force in Japanese Politics", he said: "From the ninth to the nineteenth cent-

Japan was ruled by the sword. The power of the state was the military power. The ruling classes were the military classes. The sword was a symbol of God. For ten centuries the nation was engulfed in this tradition." (2) Again, it is claimed by Dr. Hu Shih that historically Japan was always totalitarian in political organization, militaristic in training and imperialistic in aspiration. (3)

Japan's policy of imperialistic expansion dates back three and one half centuries. In 1590, Hideyoshi, the great military hero of medieval Japan, sent letters to Korea, China, the Philippines and the Liuochu Islands to inform them that he was planning to embark on a program of world conquest. In his letter to King of Korea instructing the latter to join the Japanese campaign, Hideyoshi said that he was destined to extend his authority to all parts of the world where the sun shines and that in starting his conquest he planned to send the Japanese forces to China and to compel the people there to adopt Japanese customs and manners. (4)

Two years later Hideyoshi mobilized an army of 305,000 men and sent that huge force across the sea to invade Korea. At the end of May 1592, his army occupied Korea and from there he sent a letter to a friend disclosing a

3. Hu Shih, Conditions in China and the Outlook, (An address before the Union League Club, February 6, 1941) p. 4.
detailed timetable of his campaign. According to his timetable his army was to proceed from Korea onward to take Peking, the capital of China, before the end of 1592. By June 1593 the Imperial Regent would proceed to Peking to assume the title of the Imperial Regent of China. Although his timetable was upset by the combined forces of Korea and China and the war lasted for seven long years, Hideyoshi has continued to be the idol and ideal of the Japanese nation. (5)

Three hundred years later, Hideyoshi's dream of world conquest were revived by the Japanese militarists in their war against China 1894-1895 on the pretext of securing independence for Korea from China. (5) At the end of the war, the Japanese began to talk about "Illo Junjang" (which means Russo-Japanese war) and "Ilmi Junjang" (which means American-Japanese war). Ten years later the Russo-Japanese War was really fought on the territory of China. As a result of the war Russia was defeated.

The victory for Japan in the Sino-Japanese War enhanced Japan's position from a minor country to a big power of the Far East, while the result of the Russo-Japanese War made her one of the world powers. After 1904 the reputation of the militarists was enormously increased, and the military prestige of Japan was so high that there was no question on the policy of world

conquest. In 1915 Japan, taking advantage of the European War, presented to China the notorious Twenty-One Demands designed to subdue China with the threat of force as the first step towards world domination.

The Nine Power Treaty had postponed the outbreak of the "Far Eastern crisis" for about ten years, but the Japanese militarists regarded it as a great obstacle to Japan's imperialistic design and they always tried to abolish it by action. It was asserted by Tanaka: "The Nine Power Treaty is entirely an expression of the spirit of commercial rivalry, and it was the intention of England and America to crush our influence in China with their power of wealth." (6) Then there came in 1931 the Mukden Incident, which was the first step of Tanaka's continental policy "to conquer China, first to conquer Manchuria and Mongolia."

Events following the Mukden Incident sufficiently showed that the Japanese ambition was not limited to seizing Manchuria but went so far as to invade China proper. On March 1st, 1934, Japan made a puppet regime in Manchuria and Henry Pu Yi was proclaimed at Changchun "Emperor of Manchukuo." Meanwhile Japan steadily pushed forward. beyond the Great Wall into China. Thus, following the barbaric destruction of Chapei, Shanghai, in 1932, Japan advanced into Jehol and North Chahar in 1933,

6. Ibid., pp. 29-30.
established puppet regimes in East Hopei and Chahar in 1934-1935, invaded Suiyuan in 1936 and on one pretence after another, attempted to wrest from China's control a huge area of North China including the five northern provinces of Hopei, Chahar, Suiyuan, Shansi and Shangtung, to organize them into a separate political and economic unit dependent on Japan.

Apart from her military actions, Japan employed diplomatic pressure compelling China to co-operate with Japan; in other words, to accept the latter's military and political domination in China. In a speech to the Japanese Diet on 21st January 1936, Hirota, then Japanese Foreign Minister, stated that the Japanese policy was based upon three fundamental principles: First, a cessation of all anti-Japanese activities in China; second, co-operation between Japan, China and "Manchukuo"; and third, an understanding for joint Sino-Japanese co-operation against communism in China. (7)

Although the Chinese reply to this statement was conciliatory to a marked degree, yet the National Government of China realized that performance of the first principle would be a boon to Japanese trade in China and meant economic and financial control by Japan over China. The second principle necessarily involved a formal

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recognition by China of existence and independence of "Manchukuo". The third principle would permit Japan to
send armies to any province in China which, in the opinion
of the Japanese army leaders, might be menaced by Chinese
Communist armies. Whether this principle would also
involve joint Sino-Japanese military action against Russ­
ian Communists was never made verbally explicit, but
there was no doubt that Japan's real intention was to
compel China to adopt an anti-Soviet policy under Japan's
direction. In a word, if China accepted these three
principles to co-operate with Japan, she would become
a protectorate under Japan. Undoubtedly, it would not
be acceptable to the Chinese Government.

At the end of 1936, the negotiations reached a
deadlock. The Chinese government still resorted to every
possible means to keep the peace. Generalissimo Chiang
Kai-shek exercised such inimitable forbearance that even
on the eve of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, which
took place on July 7, 1937, he declared, "While there is
the slightest hope for peace we will not abandon it; so
long as we have not reached the limit of endurance, we
will not talk lightly of sacrifice." (8) But, bent on
her program of conquest, Japan deliberately precipitated
the fateful incident. It was the second step of Tanaka's

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8. An address delivered by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek
before the Kuo Min Tang Congress on March 2, 1935,
translated from the Chinese text.
expansion policy to conquer China after the conquest of Manchuria.

Japan justified her aggression on China on the pretext that Japan's purposes with respect to the campaign in China were "to establish a new order in East Asia in order to bring about peace and stability to that region of the world." (9) On November 3, 1938, Premier Konoye issued the following statement announcing the establishment of the so-called new order in East Asia:

What Japan seeks is the establishment of a new order that will insure the permanent stability of East Asia. In this lies the ultimate purpose of our present military campaign. (10)

What does the "new order of East Asia" mean? No body can find any precedent in the history of international relations. It is a new term created by Japan to justify her unlawful actions in China. Interpretation of it by Japan was made in statements by both Premier Konoye and Arita. In a statement issued by the Premier on December 22, 1938, the so-called new order in East Asia includes three major points: First, China should recognize "Manchukuo"; second, China should join the anti-Comintern agreement concluded between Japan, Germany and Italy; third, China and Japan should promote economic co-operation. (11) In a press interview of December 14, 1938, Konoye also said that the end of the China incident

lies not only in military success but also in the rebirth of China and the creation of a new order in East Asia. The foundation of the new order will be laid after the rebirth of China and upon the cooperation between Japan, "Manchukuo" and China. (12)

Moreover, Arita referred to the "new order of East Asia" in his statement on December 19, as that it means political, economic and cultural cooperation between Japan, "Manchukuo" and China, suppression of communism, protection of the status of China from a semi-colonial state to full statehood, and stabilization of the Far East. (13)

What is the real intention of Japan's new order behind her public utterances, and what is the Chinese attitude towards the "new order"? To answer these questions, it will be sufficient to cite a statement issued by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek on December 26, 1938, in which he discloses the Japanese intrigues in creating the so-called new order:

We must understand that the rebirth of China is taken by the Japanese to mean destruction of an independent China and creation of an enslaved China. The so-called new order is to be created after China has been reduced to a slave nation and linked up with made-in-Japan Manchukuo. The aim of the Japanese is to control China militarily under the pretext of anti-communism, to eliminate Chinese culture under the cloak of protection of Oriental culture and to expel European and American influences from the Far East under the pretext of breaking down economic walls.

12. Tokyo Gazette, p. 16.
The formation of the "tripartite economic unit" or "economic bloc" is a tool to control the economic life-line of China. In other words, creation of a new order in Asia means destruction of international order in the Far East, enslavement of China and domination of the Pacific and the whole world. (14)

After the first shock of the Lukouchiao incident, the heroic resistance of the Chinese army to the "new order" of Japan, quite unexpected by the Japanese militarists, broke the timetable of the aggressor. Impatience and over-ambition made the Japanese Navy drive southward. On February 10, 1939, the occupation of Hainan Island, lying off the coast of Indo-China, was the beginning of Japan's vast drive southward. Shortly after, on March 31, the Japanese government announced again the annexation of the Spratley Islands. With the German invasion of Holland on April 15, 1940, Japanese Foreign Minister Arita made an important statement, indicating Japan's interests in and concern with the Dutch East Indies. After the defeat of France in Europe in July 1940, Japan forced the Vichy government to accept her demands of naval, military and air bases in Indo-China, and subsequently her influence penetrated to Siam through mediation of frontier conflicts between Siam and Indo-China.

With the expansion of her conquests to the South Seas the Japanese government extended the application of her doctrine of a "new order" from "East Asia" to

"Greater East Asia" and a new term was soon invented to call most of the South Sea Islands as a "Co-Prosperity Sphere" of Japan. The term "Co-Prosperity" was first used by Arita in his statement made regarding the position of the Dutch East Indies. He said:

With the South Seas region, especially the Dutch Indies, Japan is economically bound by an intimate relationship of mutuality in ministering to one another's needs.... Should the hostilities in Europe be extended to the Netherlands and produce repercussions in the Dutch Indies, it would not only interfere with the maintenance and furtherance of the above-named relations of economic interdependence and co-existence and co-prosperity, but also give rise to an undesirable situation from the standpoint of the peace and the stability of East Asia.(15)

The enunciation of the doctrine of a Co-Prosperity Sphere in the South Seas lends more credibility to the Tanaka Memorial, for it proves the third step of Tanaka's policy to secure the South Sea countries after "conquest of China."

The political domination and economic monopoly under the Japanese policy in the Far East since 1931 were completely inconsistent with the Far Eastern policy of Great Britain and the United States, particularly the United States. The principles of the Far Eastern policy of the United States as represented by the Washington Treaties are Open Door in China and stability in the Pacific. Thus the general shifting in the Far East of force caused by Japan's military actions destroyed the

foundation of the Washington Treaty system. To Japan, the United States represents a political economic and ideological threat to the policy of unlimited expansion. Japanese militarists had foreseen and prepared for a final clash with the United States but they deliberately delayed action as long as they felt their power was not strong enough. Therefore the Japanese government tried at first to convince Western Powers with false stories and statements to justify what her army had done in China, and then it openly repudiated the Open-Door principle through her spokesman.

A statement issued by Amau, a spokesman of the Tokyo Foreign Office, on April 17, 1934, was one serving such a purpose. It reads: "Japan at all times is endeavouring to maintain and promote her friendly relations with foreign nations, but at the same time we consider it only natural that, to keep peace and order in East Asia, we must ever act alone on our own responsibility and it is our duty to perform it. At the same time, there is no country but China which is in a position to share with Japan the responsibility for the maintenance of peace in East Asia..."(16). It was the first official statement of the Japanese government to warn the Western Powers against their upholding of the Open-Door policy under the treaty rights.

The exposure of the "Asiatic Monroe Doctrine" was another example of Japanese spokesmen, both official and unofficial, to defend Japan's actions in China. It is the origin of the current Japanese slogan "Asia for the Asiatics". The argument of the so-called Asiatic Monroe Doctrine is evidently intended principally for American consumption, as a hint to that power to let Japan work out alone her "special mission" in Asia in her own lawless manner. The main principle of the doctrine is worked out in an article entitled "A Discussion on the Asiatic Monroe Doctrine" by Professor Kisaburo Yokoda of the Tokyo Imperial University. The gist of his thesis is as follows:

"There are three main principles underlying the Doctrine. Firstly, as Japan is situated in Asia, she claims priority to Europe and America in special rights and privileges in that continent, particularly in the neighbouring country of China, including the right of intervention.... Secondly, as Europe and America are incapable of understanding the special conditions of Asia, they should be barred from matters and disputes relating to that Continent. Thirdly, Asia is to be disposed of by the Asiatics. The colonies of Europe and America in Asia should be liberated and the races therein made independent." (17)

Since 1931, this doctrine had always been used by the Japanese government in asking the Western Powers to take "Hands Off" policy towards China. After Japan's influence encroached on the South Seas, its application was extended to those areas. On June 29, 1940, Mr. Arita

made a speech in which he claimed that Japan was establishing a Monroe Doctrine for Eastern Asia and the South Seas. "These countries," he said, "are closely related to one another; Japan expects that the Western Powers will do nothing that will exert any undesirable influence on the stability of East Asia." (18)

Meanwhile, since the League of Nations failed to check the Japanese aggression in China and the Western Powers refused to recognize the puppet state of Manchukuo and continually protested against the disregard of their rights and interests by Japan in China, many Japanese became quite outspoken in their threats of war against the United States, Great Britain and Soviet Russia. The following militant statements made by prominent Japanese will show the intention of Japan.

In 1935, General Sadao Araki, Minister of War, in "The Problems of Japan in the Showa Era", restated Japan's mission of world domination in these words: "Now, to fulfill the vision to conquer the world and embrace the universe as our state has been our tradition. If the actions of any of the Powers are not conducive to imperialism, our blow shall descend on that Power. Our Imperial morality must be preached and spread over the whole world." (19)

19. Lin Lin, Japan - Our Common Enemy in Her Own Fight, China Monthly, April, 1942, p. 8.
In his book, "Japan Must Fight Britain", Lieutenant Commander Tota Ishimaru declared: "So long as Japan chooses the right moment for her first act of war, she needs have little to fear from England." (20) Senior Lieutenant Ishimaru Fujita, in his book "Japan's war against the Whole World", also referred to the coming Anglo-Japanese war and predicted that if Japan is victorious, India will be lost to Great Britain forever; and Australia, New Zealand, as well as the Chinese market will pass to Japan. (21)

With regard to Soviet Russia, General Sadao Araki had this to say: "Soviet Russia is for the despotism of the proletariat and is against the monarchical regime. It is clear that her policy is absolutely incompatible with the policy of this country which is ruled by the Emperor. Japan must defend herself against these wolves which are sharpening their fangs and castaway cats showing their teeth for attack." (22)

Prophetically are these words found in Captain Adachi Rukudzo's book entitled: "The East Smells Blood:" "If conflict breaks out with America, it will break out unexpectedly. The Japanese are famous for their military prowess, as well as for their diplomatic skill.

20. Tota Ishimaru, Japan Must Fight Britain, (Maruzen, Tokyo, 1934) p. 3.
22. Ibid.
Therefore, choosing the proper moment they, perhaps, will start the attack." (23) It is of great significance to note that even detailed plans for the invasion of continental America had already been mapped out some time ago. In his work entitled, "The Imminence of a Japanese-American War", Lieutenant General Kiyokatsu Sato outlined Japan's war plans as such: first, to occupy Hawaii Islands; secondly, to destroy the Panama Canal; thirdly, to begin landing of Japanese forces on the American Western Coast. (24)

Indeed, when Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, the Commander in Chief of the Japanese Imperial Navy, wrote to his friend, Ito, on January 24, 1941, that he would not be happy merely to capture Guam and the Phillippines and to occupy Hawaii and San Francisco, but that he was looking forward to dictating peace to the United States in the White House at Washington, (25) he was not boasting, but merely echoing the spirit of Hideyoshi, Meiji and Tanaka.

What did the Western Powers do under such circumstances in the face of these growing dangers? The major powers having interests in the Pacific are the United States, Great Britain and Soviet Russia. Among them the United States played a leading role in the Far East since

23.Ibid.
24.Ibid., p. 9.
the Washington Conference. Especially after the outbreak of the European War in 1939, as Britain and the Soviet Union were preoccupied with the European situation, the United States took more responsibility in the Pacific.

What did the American government do after the Mukden Incident? In the first place, the Government of the United States, by notes and protests, made it clear to Japan from 1931 onward, that there would be no official recognition of the Japanese conquests on the continent. Before the tripartite Pact of Alliance was signed among the three Axis Powers in 1940, protests were the only measures adopted by the United States in dealing with Japan's aggression in the Far East and it was never considered in that country to stop Japan with measures other than peaceful means. There are many people who criticize the American government for what they called a timid policy and argue that economic sanctions should have been imposed upon Japan to bring her to reason. (26)

After the fall of Holland and France in the spring of 1940, the intention of Japan became so clear that the United States immediately took all possible steps to discourage Japan from striking at Southeast Asia. The first measure was to help China more positively, by including China in the Lend-Lease Act, sending an adviser to Generalissimo Chiang and following this with a military mission, so as to make it clear that the

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United States considered China as valuable counter-weight to the Japanese threat to Southeast Asia.

In the second place, the United States assisted the Netherlands Indies in their defense preparations. By conversations with Great Britain and the Dominions, she prepared the way for a joint naval strategy. The Anglo-American-Dutch talk in Manila in April, 1941, seemed to imply that the three powers had plans for joint defense. (27) Furthermore, the United States hastened to build up around Japan a ring of air bases equipped with long-range bombers which, it was hoped, would discourage Japan from aggressive action. Work was rushed on the strengthening of Pearl Harbour, on construction of new naval and air facilities in Alaska, on fortifying Midway, Guam and the Philippines.

In the third place, the American government exerted economic pressure on Japan, a pressure not strong enough to compel her to fight, it was hoped, but sufficient to embarrass her war effort. The more critical became the relations between the United States and Japan, the more pressure was exerted. On July 25, 1940, all trade relations were stopped between the two countries.

Meanwhile, in an endeavour to bring about a satisfactory settlement by peaceful means while there seemed still to be a chance, the United States entered into discussions with Japan. For nine months these

27. Ibid., p. 64.
conversations were carried on. At the last stage a Japanese special envoy, Mr. Kurusu, reached Washington on November 15, 1941 and negotiations were continued until December 7. During that time the Japanese government advanced troops to the Siamese border in Indo-China, and announced that America and Great Britain must accept her policy in Eastern Asia and leave the Chinese to their fate. Nevertheless, the American government struggled to find a means of averting war. Thus, on November 26, Mr. Hull delivered to the Japanese representatives a note setting out the American position. It was extremely conciliatory in tone but steadfastly advocated certain basic principles which should govern international relations.

In spite of the fact that Japan's hostile moves in the Far East continued, the Japanese Cabinet was reported to be studying the American note, and on December 1, it was declared that the Japanese government wished to continue the negotiation for "at least two weeks." The next day, however, President Roosevelt called Japan's attention to the fact that large reinforcements of her forces were reaching Indo-China, and on December 6, he despatched a personal appeal to the Japanese Emperor, urging him to co-operate in removing the menace of war in the Pacific. The reply was delivered from bombers and submarines at Pearl Harbour the following morning.
As was the case of things happening in the Far East following the Mukden Incident, the attack on Pearl Harbour which came as a surprise to many people in the United States, had long been prepared by Japan. The decision to fight America just like that to invade China was no sudden unprepared action carried out by irresponsible younger officers of the Japanese forces. It came as the logical conclusion of many decades of fixed policy even before the Mukden Incident. It was a natural result of the Japanese aggression on China. It was indicated in hundreds of statements by Japanese militarists and politicians. It was a necessary step towards the achievement of aims and ambitions of militarism and expansionism of Japan. The conflict was forestalled and delayed many times by diplomatic pressure, by economic boycott, and by treaty agreement. Unless the United Stated accepted the ways of Japanese expansion and shifted away her treaty obligations, the war was inevitable.

Today we are engaged in a total war of resistance to the toal aggression of the Axis Powers. This is neither a regional battle nor a racial conflict. This is a warfare involving every continent, every man and woman and all the peoples on earth without regard to race, colour or creed. In this war, we may ask what we are fighting for with Japan? In other words, what are the
war aims of the United Nations in the Far East? Are we fighting for independence and anti-aggression? Are we fighting for imperialism or democracy?

As already mentioned, we Chinese engaged in war for the purpose of resistance against aggression, because our territory was invaded by a foreign country without provocation. China's war with Japan was due to the fact that her three Eastern Provinces were occupied and her northern Provinces invaded by armed aggression of Japan. The United States is at war with Japan because Japan attacked Pearl Harbour, and Great Britain because her colonies in the Far East were attacked by Japan. It goes without saying that the primary cause dragging us into war was the foreign aggression; thus our war aims, negatively speaking, are to stop aggression and to defend our national independence and territorial integrity. A complete defeat and destruction of the military force of our enemy will contribute to such a goal.

Nevertheless, this war is a war on a scale unprecedented in history and the United Nations should have lofty ideals and farsighted ideas. There are many things more for the United Nations to do than only to fight for the status quo on the negative side. As for China, the war aims which were announced by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek on November 17, 1942, at the New York Herald Tribune
Forum embrace not only our own independence but also the liberation of every oppressed nation. He said: "When victory comes at the end of this war, we shall have fully achieved national independence.... China not only fights for her own independence, but also for the liberation of every oppressed nation. For us the Atlantic Charter and President Roosevelt's proclamation of the four freedoms for all peoples are cornerstones of our fighting faith..."(28) The same idea was also expressed by Madame Chiang Kai-shek, who in her speech at the American Congress on February 18, 1943, said: "We in China, like you, want a better world, not for ourselves alone, but for all mankind." (29)

President Roosevelt, in his message to the American Congress reviewing American relations with Japan on December 15, 1941 referred among other things to the war aims of the United States as follows:

"We are now at war. We are fighting in self-defence. We are fighting in defence of our national existence, of our right to be secure, of our right to enjoy the blessings of peace. We are fighting in defence of principles of law and order and justice, against an effort of unprecedented ferocity to overthrow those principles and to impose upon humanity a regime of ruthless domination by unrestricted and arbitrary force." (30)

Shortly after this message to the Congress, President Roosevelt made another speech restating the war aims again.

saying that "We are fighting today for security, for progress, and for peace, not only for ourselves but for all men, not only for one generation but for all generations. We are fighting to cleanse the world of ancient evils and ancient ills." (31)

From the above statements of the leaders of the United Nations, it may be concluded that the war aims in the Pacific involve three objects: first, self-defence; second, cleansing the world of ancient evils and ills, making it a better world for all mankind and third, the liberation of every oppressed nation.

To fulfill the war aims only will not finish our jobs. The ultimate object that we are fighting for is peace and the war itself is but a measure used to reach the ultimate object. It is commonly understood that military victory alone will not give us peace and it will be useless unless we do win the peace. Victory, however essential, is chiefly important for the privilege it will give of shaping the era of peace for the world; that is to say, peace is not established by winning the war; winning the war merely clears the path. Then, questions arise: supposing that we have reached the war aims through victory, what then? What shall we do? Shall we win the peace as well as win the war? It is unsound for those to think of winning the war as one thing and of winning the peace as another, quite

31. Ibid., Jan. 6, 1942.
distinct and separate. From an historical point of view, it is clear that war and peace were interwoven with one another. They stand also as cause and consequence of each other. As Mr. Willkie has pointed out: "We shall win in the future peace only what we are now winning in the war". (32) Unless a durable peace can be established after the war, the sacrifice of millions of men and billions of dollars in this war will be wasted and the third tragedy in the history of human beings will be destined to come.

Comparatively speaking, to win the war is easy but to win the peace is difficult. History tells us that it is harder to prepare intelligently for peace than for war. In the First World War, for instance, we won the war but lost the peace. At that time, President Wilson participated in a war in order to "make the world safe for democracy" and to win "the war to end all wars". Those were not merely slogans but high purposes of the President with a hope of achievement through the acceptance of a set of principles known as the Fourteen Points, and the setting up of a full-fledged international structure to be known as the League of Nations. But when the time came to execute it in the Peace Conference of Versailles, selfishness brought conspiracy and intrigue

into full play to serve narrow ends and the net result was the abandonment of most of the purposes for which the war had supposedly been fought. Under the promise of self-determination, the Allies acquiesced in trading millions of European people into Irredentas. They allowed Japan to have Shantung, they imposed heavy indemnity on the German people and they disposed of Germany's and Turkey's territories under the name of mandates. Because those purposes were abandoned, no new idea and new goal rose from the ashes of the sacrifice of millions of people who had lost their lives in the battle-field for the purpose of constructing a better world.

This is a tragic historical lesson that we should never forget. And in the present war, we should win both the war and the peace. If we want to win the peace, we should clearly set forth the peace aims when the war is still being fought. To plan now for the coming peace is becoming a subject of great controversy. Some people are entirely opposed to any plan whether good or bad. In their opinion, the essential job is to win the war and let the peace that is to ensue take care of itself. They fear that discussions about the future may distract efforts from the present gigantic task. Others think that the consideration of different plans on world order may create confusion and disunity among the United Nations. Their argument is that while some kind of
unity exists already around the necessity of winning the war, a debate about what is to follow after the war might serve disunity. A third category believes that it is premature to formulate peace aims, so long as the end of the war is hidden from view, and there is, as a matter of fact, not much that is useful that can be said on this subject. Otherwise, it would only be an expression of wishful thinking on the part of the old incurable idealists who have always dreamed of a world Utopia. The fourth group of those who opposed publicizing the proposed peace terms raises the objection that this will make our enemies fight on with renewed and desperate determination.

For these reasons, some governments of the United Nations, for example, Great Britain, refuse to give any definite peace plan for the post-war world. In spite of the clemour for war aims and for peace aims started quite early in the most enlightened sections of the British opinion, the response from governmental circles was for a long time more than halting. In the United States, the Hearst-Patterson-McCormick Press, Westbrook Pegler and others are now vigorously attacking planning for the post-war settlements on the ground that it distracts attention from the war and that it is idealistic and impractical. (33)

As a New York newspaper editorial put it that thinking about the postwar world and postwar planning is solemn guff by professors on "How to cook your rabbit before you catch it." (34)

In the life and death struggle in which the globe is involved, surely military considerations should come first and it seems to many people that the time is not ripe to talk about winning the peace until war is over. We can agree that detailed peace aims and blueprints for a world government cannot be worked out now when no one can foresee what the situation will be in the future. But what can and should be done is that we attempt to reach agreement on the general principles which will govern our solutions of these postwar problems when the time comes. For if the Allies cannot devise some general structure for international collaboration under the powerful incentive of seeking to defeat a common enemy, there is little reason to hope that they can do so when that incentive has been removed. As Sir Stafford Cripps wrote recently: "During the time of war, when the feeling of co-operation is still strong, is the moment to concert common action for the period after the war. To wait until hostilities have ceased and danger is no longer present, is to miss the chance of common agreement." (35)

Furthermore, if we do not prepare peace planning now, after the war it will be too late. We were told in the last war: "Destroy the Kaiser first. Discuss peace afterwards." Today again, it is "Hitler, Mussolini and Tojo must be first destroyed; we cannot discuss peace until that is done." We went to the Peace Conference of 1919 animated by the loftiest and most disinterested ideals, but we were totally unprepared for the special problems that had to be met at the peace table. We secured neither peace, freedom nor prosperity. It was an historical mistake; we should not make it again. As Messrs. Hoover and Gibson assert: "When the day of the armistice or any other end to military action comes, nations will be exhausted and many of them starving.... The whole world will be crying for haste. There will be little time then to think out the problems of lasting peace. They must begin now." (36)

As to the second contention that planning peace terms now would create controversy and disunity among the United Nations, naturally the complicated and important issues being involved in postwar settlements would inevitably give rise to controversies among the United Nations sooner

or later. But disunity now is not so probable; disunity after the war is more likely. Even disunity now is not so serious in disturbing the cordial relations of the United Nations as that at end of the war. Professor S. R. Chow has pointed out that "Indeed we prefer to see such controversies arise during the war rather than at its end. Interallied controversies in the midst of the war would not result in the breaking up of the bond of the United Nations who are bound to stand together against the Axis powers; while at the end of the war separate national interests may drive nations to take an uncompromising attitude in controversies even at the risk of a rupture". (37)

On the contrary, the fact that we are thinking about the future is in itself a stimulus for the war effort, because we are emphasizing a better world order. It is a political war in the best sense of the word. It is the greatest moral factor at the disposal of the United Nations. Moreover, post-victory planning means that the United Nations will be able to undertake immediately the task of reconstruction; that is to say, no time will be lost in salvaging what will have remained after this terrible war.

To those who believe that it is premature to formulate peace aims and that it would be an expression of wishful

thinking about world Utopia, an answer would be that although the end of war is not in sight, we are going to win and at least, we should have such assumption or determination. If victory is not ours, the question will be answered by the Axis powers. There are indeed many plans now under discussion to preserve the peace. Some are Utopian ideas, for they stimulate thought, imagination, and discussion. Without dreamers, mankind might never have emerged from savagery. The "aims" and "ideals" are not part of the binding words of the peace. They are only background to be expressed in undertaking of concrete character.

Finally, the objection to publicizing the proposed peace terms on the ground that it makes our enemies fight on with renewed and desperate determination can be easily over-ruled. The leaders of Nazism, Japanism and Fascism know that they have either all to gain or all to lose and they will fight on and on so long as their peoples support them. A proclamation of clear and right peace terms may help to convince the people of enemy countries that the end of the war is not so harsh to their future lives. This would upset to some extent the vulnerability in the war of propaganda of the enemy leaders. No one who remembers the effect of Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points inside Germany can deny that such a clarification of peace aims can have the
greatest possible military importance. Such an opportunity exists again this time.

In the Pacific, the war suffers from the attitude which sees Asia and the Pacific as a secondary front. It is a logical consequence from this attitude that the peace in the Pacific is overlooked by most people of the United Nations. Before Pearl Harbour only two or three isolated writers were raising faint protests against the overwhelming preoccupation of the planners with Germany and Europe to the complete neglect of the majority of mankind that live around the Pacific and the Indian Oceans. Today the Far East is beginning to receive some attention from the postwar planners and there is small but steadily growing output of articles and books in which the aims and consequences of the United Nations' struggle in the Pacific are discussed. Such plans, however, are still of minor importance as compared with those concerning the postwar Europe and they do not arouse as much interest as the latter plans do.

It has been generally admitted that the principle of indivisibility of peace is applied to everywhere in the world. World peace would not be possible without peace of the Far East. To most of the Chinese people, neither security nor liberation can be expected from the result of the war unless a durable basis for peace can be laid in the Far East. It must be remembered
that the disregard of the importance of the Pacific affairs in world politics after 1931 was one of the causes of the present world-wide conflict. So the peace of the world can be made possible only when the peace of the Pacific is also brought about.

For practical purposes, it is easier to bring about the peace in the Far East than in Europe. The politics of Europe are so deeply entangled in intellectual, emotional and spiritual problems, and so deeply embedded in the past, that it seems almost hopeless to try to bring order out of chaos that has been solidified by long tradition. It is entirely otherwise in the Far East. There the political problem is not complicated by any long heritage of hatred or memory of ancient wrongs. The causes of war are visible. Once the causes are removed, there is a good prospect of lasting peace which can be made in the Pacific after the War.

Notwithstanding the fact that there are no definite and comprehensive peace aims announced by the governments of the United Nations in connection with the postwar settlement in the Pacific, it is generally considered that the proclamation of the four freedoms declared by President Roosevelt and the Eight-Point Program known as the Atlantic Charter proclaimed by President Roosevelt
and Prime Minister Churchill are the common goal and the peace aims to be achieved by the United Nations in the postwar world. In his message to Congress on January 6, 1941 President Roosevelt stated the principle of four freedoms as follows:

In the future days, which we seek to make secure, we look forward to a world founded upon four essential human freedoms.

The first is freedom of speech and expression—everywhere in the world.

The second is freedom of every person to worship God in his own way—everywhere in the world.

The third is freedom from want—which, translated into world terms, means economic understandings which will secure to every nation a healthy peacetime life for its inhabitants—everywhere in the world.

The fourth is freedom from fear—which, translated into world terms, means a world-wide reduction of armaments to such a point and in such a thorough fashion that no nation will be in a position to commit an act of physical aggression against any neighbour—anywhere in the world.

That is no vision of a distant millennium. It is a definite basis for a kind of world attainable in our own time and generation.(38)

The Atlantic Charter was made on August 14, 1941 as a joint declaration by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill "to make known certain common principles in the national policies of their respective

countries on which they base their hopes for a better future of the world." It contains eight points, as shown below:

First, their countries seek no aggrandizement, territorial or otherwise;

Second, they desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned;

Third, they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them;

Fourth, they will endeavour, with due respect for their existing obligations, to further the enjoyment by all states, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity;

Fifth, they desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field with the object of securing, for all, improved labour standards, economic advancement and social security;

Sixth, after the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny, they hope to see established a peace which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries and which afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want;

Seventh, such a peace should enable all men to traverse the high seas and oceans without hindrance;

Eighth, they believe that all of the nations of the world, for realistic as well as spiritual reasons, must come to the abandonment of the use of force. Since no future peace can be maintained if land, sea, or air armaments continue to be employed by nations.
which threaten, or may threaten, aggression outside of their frontiers, they believe, pending the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security, that disarmament of such nations is essential. They will likewise aid and encourage all other practicable measures which will lighten for peace-loving people the crushing burden of armament. (39)

The Atlantic Charter was proclaimed at the initial stage of the Second World War fifteen months before Pearl Harbour, when the United States was not at war with the Axis Powers. The name "Atlantic Charter" which has been given to this declaration does not refer only to the Atlantic region or to powers having interests in the Atlantic. The Charter derives its name from the place where it was signed. The immediate results of the promulgation of the Charter marked a definite stage in the strategy of the peace and of the war in Europe. In comparison with the Fourteen Points of Woodrow Wilson, it lacks any definiteness of plan to approach. Its ambiguity and mystery are often attacked by the people as a vain promise. Yet others who admire it say that the greatness of the Atlantic Charter lies rather in the sober statement of a complex goal. It is a promise, not a fulfilment, a challenge and not an answer. Everything remains to be done by the people and governments of the United Nations. (40)

39. Ibid., pp. 2-3.
After Pearl Harbour, the Atlantic Charter was endorsed by the United Nations as their common object to be achieved to defeat the enemies and to establish a lasting peace. In the preamble of the United Nations Joint Declaration announced on January 1, 1942, it is stated that the United Nations "subscribe to a common program of purposes and principles embodied in the Joint Declaration of the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland dated August 14, 1941, known as the Atlantic Charter." (41) Since then, the Atlantic Charter has been regarded not only as an Anglo-American joint declaration but also as common charter of the United Nations.

In the Far Eastern countries, notably in China, the declaration of the Atlantic Charter was enthusiastically received without any reservation long before the proclamation of the United Nations Joint Declaration. On August 18, 1941, Dr. Quo Tai-Chi, then Chinese Foreign Minister, issued the following statement:

"The Chinese Government and people wholeheartedly welcome and endorse the Joint Declaration of President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill on the fundamental aims of the democratic powers in resistance to aggression and the aspirations of all peaceful and freedom-loving peoples, including the peoples in the Axis countries themselves, for a real new world order .... China is prepared to make full contribution just as she has for the past four years made untold


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sacrifices of her manpower and national resources toward the democratic cause and continues to play her essential part in the world-wide conflict...." (42)

The question of application of the Atlantic Charter raised by the British government aroused much controversy and disappointment not only in the Far East but also in the United States. From the text of the Charter, it is generally believed that the application is world-wide. As mentioned already, the Charter derives its name from the place where it was signed. There is not any qualification or reservation to limit the regions to which it will be applied. Indeed, in exposition of American policy, responsible American officials, notably Vice-President Wallace and Under-Secretary of State Welles, appeared to give endorsement to the widest possible application of it. "The principles of the Atlantic Charter", declared Mr. Welles, "must be guaranteed to the world as a whole - in all oceans and in all continents"; (43) Vice-President Wallace further said: "Those who write the peace must think the world. There can be no privileged peoples". (44) In a speech to the people of the United States on February 23, 1942, President Roosevelt first emphatically stressed that

42. The Chinese Declaration of War Aims, Contemporary China, November 30, 1942, p. 3.
the Atlantic Charter applies to the whole world; second, he held forth the four freedoms to the people of the Pacific; and finally he declared in all solemnity that a prime objective of this war is the establishment of the right of self-determination for all people. (45)

In spite of the unambiguous statements of the American government as to the scope of application of the Atlantic Charter, a shadow of doubt was cast over it by the speech of Prime Minister Churchill. Three weeks after the signing of the Atlantic Charter on September 9, 1941, Mr. Churchill delivered a speech in the House of Commons, saying:

"At the Atlantic meeting we had in mind primarily the restoration of the sovereignty, self-government and national life of the States and Nations of Europe now under the Nazi yoke, and principles governing any alteration in the territorial boundaries which may have to be made. So that is quite a separate problem from the progressive evolution of the self-governing institutions in the regions and peoples which owe allegiance to the British Crown." (46)

The world was surprised and disappointed by Mr. Churchill's statement. In some quarters, people did not acquiesce in the Churchill reservation. Guenther Stein, reporter of the Christian Science Monitor, wrote from Chungking: "The independence of all other nations of East Asia from colonial rule is generally regarded

as absolutely essential." (47) Wendell Willkie in a
public statement in which he referred to a conversation
with Madame Chiang Kai-shek, voiced a similar view.
A typical and humorous criticism of Mr. Churchill's
reservation was made by Senator Pepper. He said: "How
can I whisper into the ears of the young men we have
sent overseas that, after all, they are fighting for the restoration of the British Empire." (48)

Even if the Atlantic Charter covers Europe as well as Asia, on some vital Pacific questions the Charter has nothing to say and on others it gives only ambiguous guidance. The need of a Pacific Charter in addition to the Atlantic Charter in coping with the particular demand of the Pacific region has been urged for a long time among the intelligent and far-sighted persons in the United Nations. Mr. Willkie is the first one who, after travelling 31,000 miles around the world, gives the real ideas of the people in the East asking for a Pacific Charter. In a radio broadcast to the people of the United States, Mr. Willkie said: "The people of Russia and China are bewildered and anxious. Many of them have read the Atlantic Charter. Rightly or wrongly, they are not satisfied. They ask: What about a Pacific Charter? Is there to be a Charter only for the millions

47. The Christian Science Monitor, September 22, 1941.
of the Western Hemisphere? Is there to be no Charter of freedom for the billions of the East?" (49)

Mr. Hallett Abend, a well-known newspaper correspondent for many years in the Orient, said again in his timely book entitled Pacific Charter, "The urge to nationalism and freedom and the hatred of imperialism felt by hundreds of millions of Asiatics could be turned into a gigantic asset for the United Nations if a specific postwar program for Asia were to be announced at once. The Atlantic Charter, sweeping as are some of its declarations, does not suffice. What is urgently needed is a Pacific Charter." (50) Furthermore, Mr. Joaquin M. Elizalde, the Philippine Resident Commissioner to the United States, in his article, "The Meaning of a Pacific Charter" (51) stresses the need of a Pacific Charter to encourage the people in the Far East to fight for the United Nations. A similar idea is expressed by Mr. Philip F. Jaffe, the Managing Editor of AMERASIA, in an article entitled, "A Charter for Asia". (52)

Judging from all the statements, it may be understood that the reasons for a Pacific Charter are twofold: In the first place, a declaration of principles - a Pacific

Charter - can be worked out, proposing the extension of a liberal, progressive and free democracy to Asia. Such a declaration, paralleling the Atlantic Charter, would be a mighty appeal to the people of lands overrun by the Axis or threatened with invasion. This proposed Pacific Charter should assert unequivocally the right of all people to choose the form of government under which they will live, and should guarantee social and economic justice for all.

In the second place, the promulgation of such a Pacific Charter would strike a fatal blow at Japanese efforts to turn aggression into a holy war of Asia against the world. It would serve with notice that the war is not being fought for the furtherance of imperialistic supremacy, but for the principles of liberty and the right of all men to live. Whereas those ideals and principles are established in the lives of the people of Asia, they would be warmly embraced and cherished as fundamental values. Asia can and must be made to understand the simple truth that this war is also its war and that victory would be Asia's victory as well.

Although the need of a Pacific Charter has been demanded by statesmen and authors, yet the concrete proposals for such a charter are still not worked out. Whether it should include principles like those of the
Atlantic Charter to be used particularly in the Pacific is not yet known. At any rate, the proposed Charter should contain certain general principles to be achieved as peace aims for the postwar settlement of the Pacific. Some specialists on the Far Eastern affairs have suggested general principles of the peace of the Pacific which might be termed as proposed Pacific Charters.

Professor S. R. Chow believes that four essential requirements must be met before a permanent order can be built in the Pacific. First, Japan must be completely disarmed after her defeat in the war. Second, there must be a fundamental adjustment in the relationship of China with foreign powers. Third, the racial and national problems of the region must be solved equitably. Fourth, a regional organization must be formed to establish security and maintain peace. (53)

Dr. Hu Shih, formerly Chinese Ambassador to the United States, considers that a just and durable peace in the Pacific area must fulfill the three following basic conditions:

First, it must not result in vindicating any territorial gain or economic advantage acquired by the use of brutal force in open violation of international law and solemnly pledged treaty obligations.

Second, it must satisfy the legitimate demands of the Chinese people for an independent, unified and strong national state.

55. Chow, op. cit., p. 3.
Third, it must restore and greatly strengthen the international order for the Pacific area and in the world at large so that orderly international relationships may always prevail and aggressive war may not recur. (54)

A third proposal as to the peace terms of the Far East is enumerated by Professor Nathaniel Peffer. In his book entitled "Basis for Peace in the Far East", he works out five proposed terms which will assure such a peace. Those are:

First, as a necessary preliminary, Japan must be not only defeated but crushed - maimed and left helpless, beyond possibility of recovery for a long period. It must be returned to the geographical position it occupied when it emerged from seclusion.

Second, China must be made completely independent .... The relation of other powers to China must henceforth be exclusively that of one country trading with another.

Third, such economic arrangement must be made in the Far East as will assure to Japan livelihood on a standard common to the modern industrial people. This means that no artificial obstructions must be interposed against its access to raw materials and markets in Asia on equal terms with any other country.

Fourth, there must be fundamental change in the position of those parts of Eastern Asia that hitherto have been colonies of western Empires. This does not necessarily require complete evacuation or grant of full independence in all instances, but it does require, as a minimum, material concessions in the form of a greater native autonomy and systematic preparation for independence with withdrawal by the empire in stages.

Fifth, China must be not only restored to

full independence but strengthened. This can most effectively be done by way of large scale economic assistance to enable it to industrialize as rapidly as possible. (55)

Finally, Mr. H. J. Timperley, an adviser to the Ministry of Publicity of the Chinese government, insists that any proposal looking towards a settlement in the Far East must conform among other things to the following basic principles:

First, they must provide for a strong and independent China, sovereign in her recognized territory.

Second, they must also provide for a Japan able to take her proper place in the comity of nations. Japan's legitimate economic needs and problems must be recognized and adequate provision made to meet them.

Third, they must deal constructively with the rich but politically undeveloped colonial areas of Southeast Asia. (56)

All these are not official in character. They are just personal opinions expressed by experts with a hope of building a genuine international order in the Far East in the postwar world. They represent high purposes and ideals which must be realized if we want a permanent peace in the Pacific. If power politics is not to dominate the postwar settlement as it did at the end of the First World War, the United Nations should give their consideration to the plans suggested for the realization of peace and security of the Pacific area.

President Chiang Kai-shek, Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt held a conference at Cairo in November 1943. The momentous meeting resulted in a Three-Power Joint Communique in which the three great Allies reaffirmed unconditional surrender of Japan, promised no territorial expansion and agreed to expel Japan from all territories stolen from China or taken by violence and greed. A part of the text of the Cairo Communique concerning the territorial change of Japan runs as follows:

"It is their purpose that Japan should be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the world war in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa and the Pascadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China.

"Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed.

"The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent." (57)

It is the first official document formally declared by the three great United Nations-in connection with the postwar territorial adjustment of the Far East. The announcement of the Cairo decision gave the people great encouragement and they accepted it as what they called a Pacific Charter. Public opinion used the words, "what

might be termed a Pacific Charter", to describe the importance of the Three-Power Communique. No doubt it serves as a very important document in the peace settlement of the Far East. But if we call it a Pacific Charter, it seems that there are still some other important things left undone. It fails to mention anything about disarmament and demilitarization of Japan; it has nothing to say on the problem of security in the Pacific and it keeps silent upon the colonial status of Southeast Asia. In a word, this declaration is by no means a final and complete one to be regarded as a charter for the Pacific region. An Australian paper, The Brisbane Telegraph, asserts that the Cairo Communique falls far short of a Pacific Charter which is becoming increasingly necessary to show the teeming millions of that area our postwar intention. (58)

From the foregoing statements, the declaration of war aims and peace aims is significant to make peoples in Asia rally to our side and shorten the path to victory. Uncounted columns of words have been issued about war aims and peace intentions, yet as a matter of fact war aims and peace intentions have been obscured by the very mist of words. Pronouncement of good intentions, vague promises, ambiguous pledges such as those contained in the Atlantic Charter are

not urgently needed and may not apply in specific cases in the Pacific. What is urgently needed is a fair, clear and complete Pacific Charter. The Cairo Communique is clear enough but not complete enough. Except for some personal suggestions, the most important problem, that of security in the Pacific area, has been almost entirely overlooked in recent years. How to prevent Pacific war from recurring and how to make a permanent Pacific order stable and secure are still left to be worked out by the United Nations.
CHAPTER IV
BASIC CONDITIONS OF THE PEACE
TO THE FAR EAST

Machinery alone cannot maintain peace. International peace organization for the avoidance of war can only be expected to succeed if the conditions existing both within states and between states are not such as to cause international strife. Those conditions contributing towards eliminating all causes of conflict or friction in international relationship as well as towards checking all vicious force which make for war should be made available before any form of international organization is set up. It is believed that one of the causes for the failure of the League of Nations is the fact that no such conditions were made when it was established in 1920 under the Treaty of Versailles. The past experience can be used to prevent the same mistake from occurring again. Once a peace settlement has been made, the United Nations should set down indispensable conditions to the peace of the future before any question of international organization is taken into consideration. So far as the Far East is concerned, the basic conditions of the peace should include at least the following three categories:
First, prevention of the recurrence of Japanese aggression in the Far East; second, Japan's eviction from the continent as well as from the Pacific islands; third, a new order for Southeast Asia and India.

It is evident that the Japanese aggression has been effected by the long-rooted militarism of Japan as stated in the last chapter. The best measure, therefore, to prevent from any recurrence of the Japanese aggression would be to wipe out militarism of Japan within and without. The problem of extinguishing Japanese militarism is very complex and it can be achieved through different ways and by different measures. Military defeat alone of Japan is not enough nor can Japan's unconditional surrender itself be regarded as the ultimate step to reach this goal. The nature of Japan's defeat will be determined not only by the decisiveness of the fighting but also by the complete eradication of Japanese militarism. The meaning of the eradication of the Japanese militarism has been expressed by different writers with various explanations. Walter Lippmann defines "Conclusive defeat" as meaning that Japan must never again be able to seek empire over China and the Indies. (1) Nathaniel Peffer goes further to suggest that Japan must be not only defeated but crushed. (2)

2. Supra. p. 91.
Again, Ambassador Grew made it clear that victory in itself is not enough and the first thing is utterly to crush, discredit and render impotent for the future the Japanese military machine and all its political ramifications. (3)

The first thing that would contribute to crushing Japanese militarism would involve the punishment of the war criminals who have committed crimes in their war conducts in contravention to international law and humanity. To the Japanese militarists, war has been in the last generation an agreeable diversion and since 1905 at least it has been a safe and satisfying adventure. They have enjoyed an exceptional degree of impunity and their past experiences have encouraged Japanese soldiers to do any thing in their war conducts regardless of law or humanity of the civilized nations. During the present war, Japanese forces in many theatres of war have committed inhuman atrocities. The rape of Nanking, the outrages in other parts of China, the barbarous treatment of Chinese, Indian, British, Dutch, American and Filipino civilians and prisoners of war already have a notable place in the long history of wartime cruelty.

There are several proposals for dealing with the problem of punishment of Japanese war criminals. Some persons urge that those Japanese charged with ordering

atrocities should be individually tried by a United Nations tribunal established in Japan and punished in accordance with the tribunal’s findings. It is suggested that the resolution for the post war trial of Nazi criminals, adopted by the European governments in exile, at St. James Palace, London, January 13, 1942, and endorsed by Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union must be applied to Japan. (4) Dr. Sun Fo, president of the Legislative Yuan of China, makes another suggestion to the effect that all the Japanese military officials above the rank of major general must be shot, for the officers of the Japanese army have shown themselves as brutal and cruel arch-criminals and as a body they should be tried and dealt with. (5)

Others claim that instead of adopting the procedure of trying the war criminals by the United Nations, it would be more practical to try them in the national court of the country to which the crime was committed, for the country would know best what the enemy have done in its territory and to its people. The purpose of such a trial is not revenge but a matter of convenience. In the Moscow parley of the representatives of Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union in November 1943, it was agreed by the three powers that those German officers and men and members of the Nazi party who have been

4. The United States in a New World, II Pacific Relations, Fortune, Supplement, August. 1942, p. 16
guilty of atrocities will be taken back to the scene of their crimes after the war and there tried according to the laws of the country concerned. This procedure seems to be favoured in China. It is announced by the Chinese government that a committee has been set up in China to investigate war crimes committed by the enemy in China and the persons who are accused of such crimes will be liable to be tried and prosecuted. The prosecution of any war criminal must be in that place where the crime was committed.

With regard to the prosecution of war criminals, indiscriminate prosecution for all military leaders above some rank as suggested by Dr. Sun Fo is not only unfair but also unwise, for it would present Japan with an array of patriotic martyrs. Those officers to be tried should be tried only for acts whose criminal nature is apparent. They could be martyrs only to the military clique, not to the Japanese people. As soon as the trials of the guilty are over, senior officers still interned and not found guilty should be released.

When a person is found guilty, the penalty imposed on him should be severe in order to teach a lesson to the Japanese people that war is not a diversion and that efforts must be made to prevent its recurrence in the future.
Article 8 of the Atlantic Charter calls for the disarmament of aggressors. It must be applied to Japan as well as to Germany. Dr. Hu Shih insists that this article should be applied specifically to Japan by stating that China would give full support to the disarming of Japan as one of the necessary factors in the maintenance of Peace in the Pacific area. (6) The disarming of Japan has also been demanded by the thinking public of the United Nations and it is considered to be the best way to prevent from any renewal of aggression in the Far East on the part of Japan. In addition to Peffer and Ambassador Grew, Professor Chow asserts that Japan, the age-long aggressor in the Pacific region, should be disarmed after her military defeat. (7) Dr. Sun Fo advocates this measure fervently. The Foreign Minister of Australia, Dr. H. V. Evatt, observes that peace and stability in the Pacific in the postwar period require achievement of disarming of Japan. (8) Furthermore, Sir George Sansom states in his data paper that the first step towards depriving Japan of aggressive power must be to enforce her disarmament. (9)

7. Chow, op. cit., p. 3.
9. George B. Sansom, Postwar Relations with Japan (a data paper submitted to the Eighth Conference of the I. P. R., 1942, mimeographed) p. 2.
Relations held in Mont Tremblant, Canada, 1942, it was agreed that Japan's armed forces should be demobilized and disbanded, and her military and naval establishment wholly destroyed or confiscated. (10)

As to the nature and extent of disarming Japan, opinions differ. Dr. Hu Shih considers that some steps will most probably include the surrender of the remaining Japanese navy, air force and artillery; the international control of the Mandated islands; the destruction of Japanese naval bases and fortifications. (11) Another Chinese writer suggests that the only effective way to hold Japanese militarism in check is to disarm the country completely. That means Japan's air and naval forces should be liquidated except for a limited number of small warships to retain for use by her police and customs services. Naval shipbuilding works and munitions factories should either be closed down altogether or reduced in number and size to the extent in which they will be just sufficient to fulfill ordinary purposes. Moreover, her land forces should be strictly limited to a number necessary to maintain internal order. (12) A similar idea is given by Dr. Sun Fo, but special attention is paid on the detailed plans of disarmament. (13)

11. Ibid., p. 8.
13. Sun Fo, op. cit.
A group of American writers regards the disarmament of Japan as one of the essential terms of capitulation, which should include the surrender of all remaining Japanese warships, all combat planes, tanks and artillery; the dismantling of all naval bases and defensive works on the Japanese islands' coast; the demobilization of all Japanese soldiers and sailors called to colours after July 1, 1937, and the confiscation of their arms, equipment and supplies other than food. (14) On the other hand, while declaring that Tokyo should surrender its war materials and dismantle its arsenals, a British student asks the United Nations to give Japan after disarmament undeserved commercial advantages, as in the case of Germany after 1918, to relieve Japan of the burden of the sudden destruction of her economic structure. At the same time, he considers that harsh peace terms and severe conditions as to disarmament are desirable in the interest of security and for the sake of just retribution. (15)

How long should Japan be kept disarmed? The question was first answered by Dr. Sun Fo that Japan should be kept disarmed for at least fifty years. American writers doubt whether such long-term control of disarmament would be feasible. (16) Mr. Peffer believes that Japan cannot be disarmed permanently and points out that it will be very difficult to tell whether steel mills or automobile
plants are intended for civilian or military purposes. (17) In this connection, it is rather a question of how to prevent Japan from rearming after her complete disarmament.

To the problem of preventing Japan from rearming, there are three plans to be worked out. First, as indicated by Professor Chow, an international commission should, at least temporarily, set up agencies to inspect and investigate Japanese armaments continuously on the spot. Until a general plan of world disarmament is adopted, the importation to Japan of arms and ammunitions, including military planes, should be completely banned. Severe penalties should be set for the violation of any of the disarmament clauses prescribed by the United Nations as a condition of armistice. (18) Second, Dr. Hu Shih thinks that the basic deficiency of Japan in minerals and metals needed for her industries must be considered as almost important factor in any future scheme of collective security. So effective international control of strategical minerals and metals as an integral part of the system of collective security will be another method for the prevention of Japanese rearmament. (19) Third, American thinkers believe that the vital importance of the air arm in modern war does make possible a very

17. Peffer, Basis for Peace, cited, pp. 135-136.
19. Hu Shih, op. cit.,
This factor was also stressed several years ago by Sir Thomas Holland.

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effective check. If, as part of the Japanese capitulation, an American-Chinese-British-Dutch group will be able to take over the Japanese aviation monopoly and its installations under a contract to run for twenty-five or fifty years, its operation can preclude any effective secret Japanese rearmament. (20)

There is a general feeling that military occupation of Japan proper would serve the purpose of preventing Japanese rearmament and visit the Japanese people the humiliation which, it is argued, would impress Japan with the futility of war and the high cost of failure. While most agree that prolonged military occupation of Japan will be impossible and unwise, for it would produce increased hatred and intransigence and obstruct the way to the internal progress of the Japanese people in setting up a non-militaristic regime, there is some opinion in favour of a temporary occupation of Tokyo, strategic points or the six largest cities of Japan. It has been suggested that, if occupation does occur for the purpose of control of disarmament, it should last less than a year and it is also important that any occupation should be directed clearly against Japan's militarists - not against the entire nation - and that there be no manifestation whatever of a spirit of revenge. (21)

It is doubtful whether, in the postwar Japan, military influence will dominate the entire nation; thus military occupation aimed at militarists seems to be unnecessary. To this point, the Institute of Pacific Relations gives its fair opinion that occupation should take place by a United Nations force which would convince the Japanese that all Asia is against them in the war and their military leadership has made a political error in its policy. Even more important, it is asserted, is that it would let troops from the adjacent areas see that Japan is not all-powerful and make it possible for them to return home and say that they themselves have in fact defeated and occupied Japan. (22) From this opinion, the military occupation of Japan is used not only to the Japanese militarists but also to the Japanese nation as a whole. Barring the military significance, it will also have some psychological value to the weary Asiatic people.

The fact that no highly industrialized country is likely to remain disarmed permanently has led one commentator to suggest the complete destruction of Japanese industry, "So that not one brick of any Japanese factory shall be left upon another, so that there shall not be in Japan one electric motor or one steam or gasoline engine, nor a chemical laboratory, nor so much as

22. War and Peace in the Pacific, p. 90.
Another advocates the demolition of Japan's war industry, heavy industries and machine-building industry, or their transfer to devastated areas in Asia as reparation. Japanese light industry would be limited to production for civilian use, preventing quick recovery of the country's military power. (24) A third writer declares that in the prosecution of the war the Allies must destroy the main Japanese cities and Japanese industrial machines from the air. (25)

On the other hand, one writer thinks that it would be wise for the United Nations to allow Japan to retain her entire remaining industry. He bases his opinion on the ground that the destruction of Japanese industry would be to condemn many millions of Japanese to starvation and death, and force Japan to resort to older, inadequate means of livelihood under conditions of indescribable chaos. (26) It would be advisable that the war industries and other kind of heavy industries which will be easily convertible from peace time industry to war industry should be demolished and remaining industry be allowed to retain. Supervision of the output of Japanese industry may be necessary through the operation of United Nations Commissions. Any production of war

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tools should be strictly forbidden.

There is a peculiar problem in connection with the disarmament of Japan, namely, what shall we do with the Japanese emperor? In view of the fact that the Emperor worship has been one of the causes for modern Japanese militarism and that in the postarmistice period the United Nations should assist Japan to create a new government truly representative of the Japanese people after the war, this question assumes an overwhelming importance. Two schools of thought exist. One advocates the prompt annihilation of the Japanese institution, while the other urges its retention in the new regime.

Those who argue that we must keep the Japanese emperor maintain that in the future, as in the past, no regime can hope to function except in his name. They claim that the Emperor as an individual is a thrifty, methodical hard-working person who has been obliged to go along with the militarists, despite frequent disagreement with them. (27) And that, although he is their puppet today, he may be equally suitable as a puppet of non-militaristic group after Japan's defeat. Indeed, there is a belief that, under favourable conditions, Japan may develop a more modern and democratic type of constitutional monarchy. (28)

No less important, it is suggested, is that the Emperor will be the most effective symbol of national

unity and stability in the difficult postwar period, and even more cogent is the fact that the Atlantic Charter allows the people, whether victor or vanquished, to choose the form of government which they desire and the Japanese people should therefore be permitted to make their own choice. (29)

On the contrary, those who object to dealing with the Emperor argue that his personal characteristics and inclination are of little consequence, because the actual role of the Imperial Household since the Restoration has always been to sell the doctrine of militarism to the Japanese people. Both the fanatical zeal of the common man in Japan to sacrifice for his emperor and the Dual government in Japan's politics contribute to the development of Japanese militarism. (30) Moreover, the belief in a divine emperor, descended from the Gods and destined to rule Japan upon age eternal, will always be a stumbling block to the establishment of a regime on which we can place confidence. Attempts to achieve democracy within the framework of the divine-emperor ideology will meet with the same failure as did the attempt to liberalize the throne in the era following World War I. (31)

30. Ibid.
To the statement that the United Nations should permit the Japanese to choose the form of government in accordance with the Atlantic Charter, the reply is made that the right of self-determination included in the Charter does not carry with it the right of any government anywhere in the world to commit wholesale murder or the right to make slaves of its own people or of any other people in the world. (32)

It is difficult to balance the various arguments upon the important issue. Some writers believe it would be better to leave it to the Japanese people for their decision. (33) They do not propose to force the abdication of the Japanese emperor or any other constitutional changes in Japan. If the Japanese people, aroused by defeat, wish to do away with the trappings of the monarchy and the Imperial Dynasty, the United Nations should certainly not stand in their way. (34)

Professor Chow has put the matter cogently in the suggestion that it should be determined by an international judicial commission set up in order to investigate war responsibility and crimes on the part of the Axis civilian and military leaders as well as their rulers. Should it be established that the Emperor has been in

fact personally responsible along with the militarists, then there would be sufficient ground for removing the Emperor from Japanese politics. On the other hand, if it is proven to the contrary, then whether the Japanese emperor should be kept as head of Japan will be determined by the Japanese people. He, like Mr. M. S. Bates, regards the question as purely an internal affair of Japan. (35) This suggestion is very practical and reasonable and may be regarded as a sound answer to the issue for the time being.

Territorial adjustment after the war is the second basic condition to the peace of the Far East. It requires Japanese eviction not only from the Continent of Asia but also from Pacific islands which Japan occupied by violence or by conquest from the latter part of the nineteenth century up to the present. The break-up of the Japanese Empire will constitute one of the most effective measures to prevent future Japanese aggression. To some writers, the loss of Japanese colonial empire will bring about what has been aptly called the "geographical disarmament" of Japan. (36) Since the Japanese militarists have used those territories as bases for further expansion, it is obvious that without a

35. Chow, p. 6.
continental foothold and island bases, the possibilities of aggression will be greatly reduced.

It has been generally agreed that Japan must not only lose all control over territories conquered since 1917, but also over Formosa, seized in 1895 after the war with China; Korea, which was annexed in 1910; the mandated Pacific islands, secured after Germany's defeat in World War I; and "Manchukuo", taken from China in and after 1931. These territories have three things in common; first, they are all inhabited by non-Japanese populations; second, they have all suffered from Japan's harsh colonial policy; and third, they all have played a major role in Japanese expansion.

Although the withdrawal of Japanese control over these territories is generally approved by writers on the subject, different opinions exist as to whom these territories will belong after Japanese eviction. Before the Cairo decisions were announced, the question was not without much controversy. In the case of Manchuria, even after Pearl Harbour, there were still writers who advocated that it not be returned to China and offered suggestions on the status of Manchuria of the future. Some suggested that Manchuria should be a special area of Japan (37) and others recommended an

independent state under international control for a
period of years and later a plebiscite to decide eventual
national allegiance (38) and still another writer pro­
posed that Manchuria should be a separate political
administration from China. (39).

Manchuria is a historical name of the three north­
eastern provinces of China, which include the provinces
of Liaoning, Kirin and Heilunkiang. It was, since
the dawn of history, inhabited by various Tungus tribes,
but colonization by Chinese settlers was practiced at
a very early date. For two thousand years a permanent
foothold has been maintained by the Chinese and Chinese
culture has always been active in Manchuria. In
recent years, the population has exceeded thirty
millions, more than 95 percent of which is Chinese.

For many years, since the Chin Dynasty, Manchuria
has been divided into the three provinces, mentioned
above, each of which constituted a political unit of
China and was governed in the same way as the provinces
in China Proper. Economically, Manchuria has been proved
to be an unseparable area from Chinese economic life.
About 40 percent of China's coal and iron reserves is
in Manchuria; and in addition to the great and fertile

39. Tyker Dennett, Postwar Administration, a comment on
Timperley's summary of postwar settlement in the Pacific,
Asia, August, 1942, p. 465.
plains which produce essential grains like soyabeans, millet and wheat, the Manchurian forests contain nearly 50 percent of all of China's standing timber.

Both politically and economically speaking, Manchuria is an integral part of China, just as New England is an integral part of the United States, or British Columbia of Canada. The Chinese will never give up Manchuria, just as Americans will never concede New England or Canadians concede British Columbia to any foreign aggressor. Accordingly, Chinese will never accept any suggestion of special status on Manchuria after the war as already mentioned. The Chinese position in this matter is best stated by Mr. Owen Lattimore, a political adviser to Generalissimo Chiang, in his recent article which says, "Victory for China is inconceivable without vindication of China's territorial integrity and full sovereignty. This, in turn, is inconceivable if a special position in the northeastern provinces is preserved for Japan or transferred to any other nation or international organ". (40)

Since the Lukouchiao incident, President Chiang has repeatedly said that he will fight on until China regains control of Manchuria and liberates the 35,000,000 people held in Japanese bondage there. In recent years since Pearl Harbour, most writers in the

40. Owen Lattimore, Asia in a New World Order, Foreign Policy Reports, September 1, 1942, p.
United Nations have agreed that Manchuria should be returned unconditionally to China and Japanese investments there must be completely surrendered to her in lieu of an indemnity. (41) The Cairo Conference makes it definite that Manchuria shall be restored to China after the war and the controversy over its future is thereby settled.

Different opinions have arisen as to the status of Formosa too. Formosa was Chinese territory and was extorted by Japan after China's defeat of war in 1895 under the Treaty of Shimonoseki. Actually the Japanese acquisition of Formosa accompanying with Liuchiu Islands was really made by military conquest before 1895. Chinese population was estimated at 2,600,000 when the Japanese came into control; today it has grown to more than 5,000,000 which constitute over 90 percent of the population there. (42) Formosa is not only a rich land in agricultural goods but also in mineral products. Lying along the coast of Fukien and Kwangtung provinces, it is strategically important for national defense of South China.

Formosa will offer no problem involving future status, for the population is overwhelmingly Chinese in blood and in language and China's interests are clearly

41. Abend, op. cit., p. 60 and Timperley p. 396.
42. Andrew J. Grajdanzev, Formosa Today (Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, 1942) p. 5.
predominant. In some quarters of the United States, however, the opinion exists to place Formosa under international control for the sake of utilizing it as an international base in the Pacific. "In recognition of China's predominant interest", according to this view, "Formosa should be included in the Chinese territory seems impolitic in view of the necessity for a United Nations base there." (43) On the contrary, other writers insist that Formosa should not be included in any international arrangement, but should become at once an integral part of China. (44)

The Chinese government and public opinion have never recognized any proposal of the postwar status of Formosa other than its unconditional return to China at the end of the war. To the suggestion to make it an international base, Ta Kung Pao, China's leading independent newspaper, and nearly every articulate person in Chungking have made objection. To a current inquiry (45) whether the strategic value of Formosa in the Pacific defense may not outweigh other considerations, Ta Kung Pao replies: "This line of thought is like this: Why cannot a people's freedom be surrendered for the sake of strategic value." (46)

43. Fortune, p. 11.
44. Abend, op. cit., p. 226.
45. Mr. John K. Jessup, A postwar planner for Time and Fortune magazines of the United States.
46. Translated from Chinese text of Ta Kung Pao, May 15, 1943.
Dr. T. V. Soong, Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, has reiterated that Formosa should be restored to China. At a press conference in Chungking, regarding China's territorial aims at the end of the war, he said: "We will get back Manchuria, Formosa and Riukiu (Liuchiu) Islands. We have no territorial aspirations beyond what is rightfully ours." (47)

The proclamation of the Cairo decision that Formosa and the Pescadores shall be restored to China, roused public opinion both in China and in the other United Nations, to support the reasonable and momentous arrangement. In Chungking, Formosan leaders gave their heartiest welcome to the decision and wired the governments of the United Nations expressing the willingness of Formosans to reunite with China.

Aside from Formosa and Liuchiu Islands, the eviction of Japan from the Pacific islands requires her withdrawal from the Japanese mandated islands which include the Marianas, Carolines and Marshall Islands lying south of the Pacific. All of the islands belonged to Germany before the First World War and were held by Japan under mandate from the League of Nations. Collectively the area is only about 950 square miles and the total population in 1935 was given as 98,500. (48)

Under her mandate from the League, Japan was pledged not to fortify these islands, but this pledge was flouted, League inquiries were snubbed, neutral investigators were denied access to the islands and finally Japan refused to reply to inquiries from Geneva. Although they are tiny islands, their offensive value has been fully demonstrated since the outbreak of the Pacific war.

The declaration drawn up at Cairo provides that Japan is to be "stripped of all islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the First World War in 1914." This raises the question—what is to be done with them after the Japanese have been driven out? One American writer suggests that they should belong to the United States on the ground that the latter shall be assured of safe access to the Philippines.

(49) A similar idea was expressed by American members in the Eighth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations in 1942. (50) Moreover, it is pointed out that Australia and New Zealand are particularly interested in them (51) and consequently one American professor proposes that they should be divided between America and Australia. (52)

On the other hand, there are many writers who insist that the islands should be solely under international

50. War and Peace in the Pacific, p. 44.
52. Peffer, op. cit., p. 68.
administration. (53) The Cairo Communique clearly affirms that none of the three powers has territorial ambitions, so the islands should not come under domination of a single nation. In the light of general welfare of the native population and security of the Pacific, these mandated islands would be better administered under international supervision.

On the continent, it has been already indicated that Japan must be evicted not only from Manchuria but also from Korea. Korea is a peninsula jutting out from the northeastern coast of the Asiatic mainland. It has an area of 85,228 square miles and a population of around 24,000,000, among whom about 250,000 are Japanese. The peninsula has 1,700 miles of coast line, many fine natural harbours and ample wealth and resources. Strategically Korea is of the utmost importance in the Far East. On the west is the Yellow Sea, on the South the China Sea, and on the east the Sea of Japan. The distance from Moji in Japan to Fusan, the great Korean port, is only about 160 miles across the Tsushima Strait.

For many centuries, China exercised some kind of loose suzerainty in Korea and during Hideyoshi's invasion the armies of the Ming Dynasty came to the aid of Korea. It was a dispute over China's right to send troops there to restore order which led to the Sino-

53. See, Chow, p; 5; Rosinger, p. 146; and Fortune, p. 11
Japanese War of 1894-1895. As a result of the war, China was compelled to renounce all claims to Korea, and Japan remained in there in military occupation. At first Japan proclaimed a protectorate over Korea and then in 1910 formally annexed it. For over thirty years, Korea has been under the swords and daggers of the Japanese militarists and the Korean people have undergone terrible experiences of exploitation and slavery under their rule. (54)

In the long history of Japanese rule there has been no evidence of any attempt to placate this helpless and disarmed people by any showing of justice or humanity. The peaceful and unarmed demonstrations in favour of freedom of 1919, when the Koreans placed faith in President Wilson's promise of self-determination, resulted in 7,501 executions and mass killings and in the imprisonment of more than 2,000,000 of the demonstrators. (55) Another hopeless uprising in 1929 was also punished with Draconian severity.

But the Koreans never give up and are still fighting on. Now a de facto exiled government of Korea headed by Mr. Kim Koo has been established in Chungking and General Li Ching-tien has been appointed by that government as commander of the Korean armies in Free

China. These Korean forces fight with the Chinese troops against the Japanese. They are supported partly by donations from patriotic Koreans in the United States and partly by subsidy from the Chungking government.

Article 5 of the Atlantic Charter provides that sovereign rights and self-government will be restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them. Under this article, Koreans have good reason to believe that they will enjoy sovereign rights and self-government after the war. (56) To most thinking persons in the United Nations, Korea would seem to merit the reward of independence for her suffering under Japan's yoke and effort against the common enemy in the present war. Nevertheless, they lack administrative experience as a result of over thirty years under Japanese rule; it might well appear that immediate independence of Korean people at the end of the war would not be advantageous in the interest of Koreans themselves. Accordingly, the suggestion has been put forward to make Korea a mandate under Japan (57) or under the United States. American delegates to the Eighth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations categorically rejected the latter proposal on the ground that this would be a difficult assignment technically for the United States and much more important, it would

56. Syngman Rhee, Freedom for Korea, China at War, April 1942, pp. 9-15.
be regarded by the United States public opinion as an extremely retrogressive step of parcelling out colonies among the victors. (58)

Many people urge independence for Korea at the end of a transitional period in which there should be international aid in rebuilding Korea's national life under the auspices of an international body in the Pacific area. With regard to the character of such an international body, there are three proposals: first, it should be an internationally selected Korean civil service headed by a high commissioner appointed by a Pacific council; (59) second, it should be a commission made up preferably from the minor Powers; (60) third, it should be an organization under some successor to the League of Nations or under a benevolent protectorate of Koreans' own choosing. (61)

The Cairo declaration made it clear that "in due course Korea shall become free and independent." It is a wise policy of the United Nations for the correction of historical mistakes in the Far East and for the liberation of an enslaved people under the Japanese oppression. But what the phrase "in due course" means? There is no official interpretation upon it. One newspaper predicts that it means that Korea will be

58. War and Peace in the Pacific, p. 44.
60. Peffer, op. cit., p. 68.
61. Abend, op. cit., p. 95.
under some kind of protectorate, possibly that of China, until she can be made self-governing. (62) At any rate, it means an indefinite time which the United Nations deem necessary for the completion of an independent and free Korea. Dr. Sun Yat-sen prescribed a period of "political tutelage" for the Chinese people. It seems desirable that the Korean people, too, should receive tutelage before they become independent. Whether the tutelage will be exercised by an international body or by a single advanced neighbouring state remains to be settled by the United Nations at the end of the war. But at least Korea, according to the Cairo agreement, is to be rescued from a predatory empire and brought within the scope of a worldwide reign of law.

The third basic condition of the peace of the Far East is a new order for Southeast Asia and India. This new order is not the "new order" proclaimed by Japan as a pretext for her aggression, but a genuine new order with the object of economic prosperity, social welfare and political freedom of the native peoples as a whole. In the postwar period, peace would not be assured in the Far East, if the United Nations did not take account of the colonial areas in Southeastern Asia and the political status of India. It is commonly conceded that the

disregard by the colonial powers of the national aspirations and economic welfare of the native people after the First World War was one of the causes of the failure of the Allies to resist the invasion of Japan in Southeast Asia. In the Second World War, the same mistake should be avoided in the interests of a durable peace in the Far East.

Southeast Asia is not a single unit but includes French Indo-China, Thailand, Burma, the Philippines, the Netherlands East Indies, British Malaya and British and Dutch Borneos. Here there are about 150,000,000 people, diverse in race and culture and often inextricably intermingled. Politically, except in Thailand, all of them are under the sovereignty or protection of western nations and imperial rule is the general principle invoked in the governments of these areas; while the economy of the region is a typically colonial system, under which the region exports raw materials and imports manufactured goods generally for the benefit of the imperial powers.

All these areas have been occupied by the Japanese troops after Pearl Harbour and at the end of the war following her defeat Japan must relinquish control of all the territories, as already announced by the Cairo Conference. After the eviction of Japan, what shall the United Nations do in disposing of the territories recovered
in Southeast Asia? Will those be returned to the old imperial powers for the restoration of the colonial system or should the United Nations let the native peoples have an immediate independence? To many writers and semi-official quarters, the restoration of the old colonial system is unimaginable for it will be inconsistent with the principles of the four freedoms and the Atlantic Charter. On the other hand, an immediate independence for all the native people seems to be premature in some areas at the end of the war. It is agreed that in none of the colonial dependencies of the region should there be a simple return to the status quo ante bellum. All existing political relations between a colonial power and a native people or between a colony and third parties should be regarded as subject to change; and all existing social and economic relations in the region should be adjusted and improved.

For such changes in the postwar Southeast Asia, some distinctions must be made. It has already been mentioned that Southeastern Asia cannot be regarded as a single unit. It is composed of a number of parts with many variations and to discuss the status of the colonial dependencies in Southeast Asia and of India, each part must be discussed separately.

The case of the Philippine Islands is probably the least complicated of all, for the United States by the
Tydings-McDuffy Act established the Philippine Commonwealth and pledged the grant of independence in 1946. It is a settled policy of the United States towards the Philippines, especially as during this war Filipinos have fought shoulder to shoulder with Americans against the common enemy - Japan. The heroic resistance of the Filipinos in the battle of Bataan inspired American people and although the war has changed the situations and delayed the normal course of events in the Philippines, yet there is no reason why the definite steps provided in the Tydings-McDuffy Act should not be followed after the recovery of the Islands.

There are still persons who are doubtful of the possibility of political independence of the Philippines in view of her economic position. They think that to put the Philippines after independence on the same basis as all other countries with reference to American tariffs would undermine the whole economic structure of the Islands and imperil the position of the government. (63) So they hesitate to consider the problem of absolute independence of the Philippines at the end of the war. But it is not an irreparable obstacle in the way to her independence. The economic difficulty of the Philippines can be solved by a gradual increasing tariff policy of the United States to the imports of the Philippines and

a diversified development on production and foreign trade on the part of the Philippines itself. (64)

The Thailand problem is also relatively simple but not so simple as that of the Philippines. Thailand is the new name adopted in 1939 for Siam which was an ancient kingdom in Southeast Asia. In modern times the territorial rivalries of Great Britain and France alone permitted Siam to be an independent nation; it served as a neutral buffer state between Malaya and Indo-China. The revolution of 1932 transformed Thailand from an absolute monarchy into an oligarchy with a paper constitution somewhat like that of Great Britain. (65)

After that time the Japanese influence in Siam steadily increased. In 1939, encouraged by the Japanese slogan "Asia for the Asiatics", the Government of Thailand cooperated with Japan with a similar slogan "Thailand for the Thais" and through the Japanese influence it succeeded in what it called "the redressing of ancient wrongs", by having a new frontier line drawn at the expense of French Indo-China. After Pearl Harbour, Thailand eventually declared war against the United Nations.

There are several plans for the postwar status of Thailand. One is to destroy Thailand as a nation and to make her a unit of a proposed Indonesian state on the ground that Thai independence has always been more formal than real and that she will have a better chance of self-government inside the Indonesian state. (66) Other suggestions are a condominium government of several powers of the United Nations or a mandate under a single power to be established in Thailand after the war to assume responsibility for bringing about self-government of Thailand. (67) An experienced observer advocates for Thailand a government of political tutelage and guardianship under some kind of international authority until she has been educated sufficiently to preserve freedom. (68)

Peffer rejects the idea of destroying Thailand as an independent state for certain political purposes and asks for the restoration of the status quo ante after the war. He argues that if stability is to be achieved in that crucial part of Asia there should be no talk of penalizing Thailand for having allied herself with Japan, since it would appear that she could not help herself. (69)

In the United States, there is a groundless information that China has favoured a plan for Chinese control of Thailand. Accordingly those who insist upon the

68. Abend, op. cit., p. 140.
69. Peffer, op. cit., p. 508.
destruction of Thailand give as their reason that it would relieve Thailand of the possibility of Chinese control. (70) In fact, there is no such plan favoured either by the government leaders or by the people of China. But as to the ill treatment of three million Chinese in Thailand, the Chinese government has a good reason to demand that necessary arrangement should be made for a just treatment of Chinese in the postwar Thailand. The general public in China hopes to see an independent Thailand rather than as a unit of a big new state in Southeast Asia.

As for Indo-China, the situation is different. For many years the princes and kings of the region paid tributes to the Chinese emperor at Peking and the influence of Chinese culture penetrated into the native people of Annam. French acquisition of Indo-China began about 1860 but actual consolidation was not completed until 1907. French Indo-China was the worst example of the white man's imperialism to be found in all of East Asia and the South Seas. Generally speaking, French policy towards this colony was selfish and greedy. Although there was maintained a pretense of "indirect rule", the administration of all these areas was centralized under a governor-general appointed by the French government. The entire area of Indo-China was

70. Fortune editors' reply to the Thai Minister's protests, Fortune, October, 1942, p. 9.
really ruled by the French completely in the interest of France and French investors. After the collapse of France in Europe, the subsequent submissivenesses of the Vichy proconsuls to brusque commands of the Japanese militarists was not only detrimental to China's defence of her southwest border but also gave a strong foot-hold to Japan for her later invasion in Southeast Asia.

By numerous British statements and the American note of April 13, 1942 the United Nations are pledged to a restoration of French sovereignty over Indo-China in the sense that neither the United States nor Britain intends to seize any former French territory for their own use or expansion but it can scarcely mean that the United Nations will work against themselves by preserving a status quo incompatible with further improvement of colonial system. Undoubtedly no one of the United Nations favors a restoration of old French rule along the line of selfish and greedy policy. At all events, something is needed to change and improve the old colonial structure in Indo-China. The least objectionable way out of the situation is restitution to France but on explicit conditions which would assure local autonomy more educational facilities for the native people and an economic and tariff policy devised with more regard for native welfare.

(71) It is doubtful whether France, emerging from the

war so shattered and so impoverished, would be able to undertake such measures for the benefit of the native people.

To most thinkers an international regime for a certain period with the object of preparing ultimate independence of the native people is desirable. This international regime may take the form of international commission (72) a mandate (73) or condominium of the United Nations.(74) In such an international government, France will be given a large representation on account of her past interests in Indo-China.

Whatever the status in the future of Indo-China, China's outlet to the South China Sea through Haiphong would be a matter not only in the interest of China but also for the development of economic relations of Indo-China itself.

With regard to Burma, her relations with the British government should be surveyed first. For many years Burma was an Indian province under British control, until 1937, when it was partitioned from India and became a separate dependency under the British Imperial government. Burma remained a crown colony but to some extent the Burmese were granted a measure of administrative responsibility. The Burmese long aspired to a

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72. Abend, p. 121.
degree of independence or Dominion Status within the British Empire. The British were convinced that because of native lack of education and training in government, supervision could not be further relaxed.

In recent years, nationalism developed in Burma to a remarkable degree. This situation led to conflicts, repressive measures and sullen resentment. (75) In 1939, the governor was authorized to promise Dominion Status for the future Burma. In the following year, a public demand was put forward that the British government grant to Burma a constitution which would enable her to take at once her due place as a fully self-governing and equal member of any Commonwealth or Federation of free nations that might be established as a result of the war. The governor stated in reply that "the British government would continue to use their best endeavours to promote the attainment of Dominion Status as being the objective of Burma's constitutional progress." (76)

When the terms of the Atlantic Charter were published in 1941, the British government sought for a definite declaration as to its application to Burma and then Mr. Churchill announced: "The Joint Declaration does not qualify in any way the various statements of policy

75. Emerson, op. cit., pp. 159-168.
which have been made from time to time about the development of constitutional government in Burma. Burma is covered by our considered policy of establishing Burmese self-government and by measures already in progress...."(77)

Mr. Amery, the Secretary of State of the British government again stated in November, 1941 that it was the objective of the British government to help Burma to attain Dominion Status as speedily and as fully as may be possible in certain contingencies, immediately after the conclusion of a victorious war.(78)

Thus in the postwar period, there are two alternatives for the status of Burma. The former alternative will be the grant to Burma of a Dominion Status immediately after the end of the war to fulfil the British promise. In principle, the British government has promised a Dominion Status for Burma "as speedily and as fully as may be possible", but as to when the autonomous government will be established, no definite date has been given. I am inclined therefore to propose an immediate autonomy after the conclusion of the war to satisfy the political aspirations of the Burmese people.

If the British government thinks that the time would not be ripe for Burma's autonomy at that date, an alternative is contained in the suggestion that international trusteeship take over the responsibility of government in Burma, i. e. that Great Britain, through

77.Ibid., pp. 19-20.
78.Ibid.
an act of the Imperial Parliament, transfer her rights in Burma to an international commission on which Great Britain, India, China and the United States should be strongly represented and which should undertake the development of education, political tutelage, economic rehabilitation with a view to the eventual establishment of full autonomy and independence of Burma. (79)

Geographically, Malaya has been only a relatively small part of the British Eastern dependencies and the total area of the region is less than a quarter of Burma. Malaya has, however, certain dominating features which have given her a distinctive position among these territories. She is rich in economic resources, of which the most outstanding is rubber and tin. In 1938 she was producing over 30% of the world's tin and 40% of the rubber. (80) The area to which the term Malaya is applied consists of a peninsula and a number of outlying islands. There are four native states, Selangor, Pahang, Negri Sembilan and Perak, formed a joint British protectorate in 1894 under the name of the Federated Malay States. In addition there are five unfederated Malay States - Johore, Kelantan, Kedah, Trenggann and Perlis. In the Federated States, British stationed Residents and the Unfederated States were governed

through advisers. Actually all nine native rulers were bound by treaty to follow the advice of the Governor of the Straits Settlement, who was also High Commissioner and representative of the King of England.

Malaya is not wholly Malay, of a population of more than 5,000,000 the Malays comprise only 47%. The rest is Chinese and Hindu, with almost three times as many of the former as of the latter. The Malays are a people of little or no political consciousness and there exists no strong urge to unity or to nationalism. They have almost no economic capacity or interest in the modern sense of the word. The average native is desperately poor and the wealth has been mostly amassed by foreigners and native rulers.

There are two schools on the question of Malaya in the future. One school suggests that Malaya must be returned to British rule, saying that since Malaya is not a nation, there can be no question of giving her national independence, that if Malaya were to be emancipated from British rule, the government would not necessarily go to the Malayas but probably to the Chinese. Moreover, Malaya is the greatest rubber and tin producing area in the world and as such is of crucial importance to the western nations and to the economy of the modern world; under the circumstances the country cannot be run by Malays. But the advocates
of this school do not propose an unconditional restoration of British rule in Malaya but a return to Great Britain with the qualification that a larger share of the wealth produced there should be turned back into education for the natives, that social services of all kinds should be expanded and that the peasants and workers should be guarded against exploitation. (81)

Another school proposes a plan for the international control of Malaya instead of returning it to Britain, on the ground that the international importance of her tin and rubber, the international character of her mixed population and the small size and strategic position of the peninsula, cause Malaya to stand in particular need of some form of international control. (82)

For the general welfare of the native people and security in the Pacific, Malaya would be better under international control than under the domination of a single colonial power. It is a general tendency to put backward territories under international guardianship for the promotion of material and cultural development. On the question of security in the future Pacific, Singapore and Malaya lie at the center for control of Southeast Asia. It is more important in strategic value for the security of the Pacific Powers.

82. Lasker, op. cit., pp. 32-33.
as a whole than in economic interests for a single
nation.

The Netherlands East Indies will also present many
problems. The Dutch have been in this area for more
than three centuries. They went there first for trade.
As their commerce expanded, political penetration
naturally followed. The people were wild and inamicable.
Most of them were small-scale farmers or lived in
villages. The great bulk of the 70,000,000 people of
the islands are illiterate and entirely devoid of
political training, except for the Javanese of Batavia,
who are the most cultured of the group. The Dutch
have tried to Javanize the rest of the islands with
considerable success.

The Dutch have done much in recent years to
retrieve the unfortunate effects of brutal exploitation
of their earlier imperial colonization. There has been
a real beginning of native representation in local
government. And there has been a managed economic
development with a view to safeguarding native interests
both economic and cultural. Before the Japanese conquest,
the political organization of the Dutch East Indies
was roughly as follows: The Governor-General is in
charge of the administration and is responsible to the
crown; he is assisted by an advisory council of the
Indies and a number of department heads. Laws concerning
domestic matters must pass the People's Council
(Volksraad) and must be approved by the Governor-general.

The Netherlands subscribed to the Atlantic Charter by signing the Joint Declaration of the United Nations early in January 1942, but the leaders of the Netherlands have made it clear that they have no intention of relinquishing any degree of sovereignty over any part of their Empire. Addressing a joint session of the American Congress on August 6, 1942, Queen Wilhelmina referred to the East Indies in the following words:

"Throughout my reign the development of democracy and progress in the Netherlands Indies has been our constant policy.... We want nothing that does not belong to us. We want to resume our place as an independent nation on the fringe of the Atlantic, on the dividing line of the Pacific and Indian Oceans." (83)

To the question of postwar settlement, one writer favours a restitution of the Dutch East Indies to the Netherlands as the only practical course to follow after the war. (84) He thinks there is not yet in the islands which constitute the colony either a sufficiently stout nationalism or a social order which makes independence necessary, feasible or desirable. Others desire to make the islands a unit of a proposed Indonesian state (85) or Malay Federation. (86)

In my opinion, although the Indies will not be ready

85. Fortune, p. 7.
86. Lasker, op. cit., pp. 33-34.
for sudden and complete independence directly after the
war, the way should be opened to the attainment of the
ultimate goal of autonomy. Notwithstanding the fact
that there is no stout nationalism in the Indies, there
has marked a beginning of a nationalist movement in
recent years against the Dutch for their economic
exploitation and political control. To cope with the
nationalist influences in the future, there should be
a new status for the Indies after the war. It would
not be part of the Indonesian state or of Malay
Federation, because time is not ripe for such an
organization and the design which is based upon an old
principle of balance of power is inadequate as a
guiding principle to be pursued in the international
relationship of a new world. It seems better to put
the Indies as a mandate under the Netherlands with a
view to taking the responsibility of political tutelage
for the native people. Under the mandatory system,
there will be at least two advantages; first, the
welfare and progress of the natives become an international
concern against any arbitrary rule of a single country
in the future; second, a provision of a definite date
for the eventual independence of the Indies would be
made clearly in the mandate.

Barring all of the countries in Southeast Asia, the
remaining problem would be that of India. Though India
is not a Pacific country and does not come within the geographical area which the present thesis is discussing, she is a big country in Asia with a population of 393 million and with all the resources for a gigantic industrial development and she is fighting side by side with the United Nations for a common cause against the common enemy. Both in war and in peace, the Pacific problems cannot be well settled without participation of India, thus the Indian problem should be treated in the same way as other places in the Pacific.

Politically India is divided into two parts: the eleven Provinces of British India which were placed directly under the British Crown in 1858 and the 562 Indian states ruled by Princes who have treaty relationship with the British Crown. The Indian states, comprising about two fifths of the area of India and one-quarter of the total population, are scattered all over the subcontinent. The nationalist movement is led by the All-India National Congress Party with leaders as Gandhi and Nehru to achieve the political objectives of independence and unity of India, while the other political group is the Moslems League led by Jannah openly in favour of Pakistan or the partitioning of India between Moslems and Hindus. Apart from the two parties in the Indian politics, there are native Princes who rule by autocratic methods the territory not included in British India.
The present government of India was set up by the India Act of 1935 which provides a step for parliamentary self-government in the Provinces, as well as an all-India Federation comprising both British India and the Indian states. Under the Act special responsibilities are assigned to the British Viceroy in matters of peace and order, finance and minorities, as well as defense and foreign affairs. The Act was not accepted by the Indians, however, as all groups rejected the proposal for an All-India Federation. In the absence of an agreement, the Central Government continued to function as it did before 1935. Authority remains vested in the British Viceroy and his appointed Executive Council.

When the European War broke out in 1939, the Viceroy announced the suspension of that part of the Act which created the Federation with a view to conciliating the Indians. Nevertheless, the Congress Party opposed to taking part in any war, save by the consent of the Indian people. On October 17, the Viceroy issued a White Paper giving the promise of ultimate Dominion Status for India at the end of the war, but all groups were still not satisfied with this statement and the political controversy became more complicated as Mr. Churchill's declaration that the Atlantic Charter was not applying to India in 1941. (87)

87. Supra. p. 86.
When the outbreak of the Pacific war and the rapid Japanese success in Hongkong and Southeast Asia enormously intensified the importance of India in the United Nations' war effort, the London government was made aware that the settlement of the Indian crisis could not be further delayed. After Generalissimo Chiang's visit to India, the British government for the purpose of solving this conflict decided in March 1942 to send Sir Stafford Cripps to India with a hope of reaching a settlement in Anglo-Indian relations. On March 29, the following Declaration was made public as the British policy towards India:

"The object is the creation of a new Indian Union which shall constitute a Dominion, associated with the United Kingdom and other Dominions by a common allegiance to the Crown but equal to them in any aspect of its domestic or external affairs." (88)

After a number of interviews and conversations with the Indian leaders, Sir Stafford's Mission failed. The Congress Party did not accept the proposals of British War Cabinet offered by him for several reasons. First and foremost, the Congress Party desired complete independence of India, not Dominion Status. Second, the British government insisted on observing its treaties with the Rajas or native Princes, which was regarded as involving the duty of maintaining in the Rajas' territories a form of government which is antiquated and often

very bad. Third, the offer allowed any Province to remain outside the Dominion, or to combine with other dissenting provinces to form a separate Dominion. To this point, the Congress leaders insisted that India must be treated as a unit. Finally, the Congress leaders asked the British government the right for Indians to manage their own national defense, which was rejected.

A deadlock then ensued. Following Sir Stafford's return to England, the Congress Party adopted Mr. Gandhi's resolution calling for "the immediate withdrawal of British rule from India" and a civil disobedience movement began. At the height of the riot, Mr. Gandhi was arrested.

There are a number of suggestions by groups and individual writers for breaking the deadlock in India. Since space does not allow me to enumerate each of them, I take the following three as typical opinions representing different viewpoints.

At the Mont Tremblant Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations in November, 1942, the following three steps were proposed: First, three key portfolios in Indian cabinet, namely Finance, Home Affairs and War Transport should be filled by Indians and that the Executive Council, not the Viceroy conduct the Government of India; second, in order to start preparations for postwar independence, an Exploratory Commission including all
Indian political leaders should be set up; third, this Commission should study all the questions requiring consideration in framing a new constitution. A United Nations Advisory Committee set up in the Commission should serve as foreign experts and give assistance and advice. After the Commission has worked for some time and examined methods of adjusting the various differences, it would have a basis for a settlement acceptable by all groups and the next step would be to work out an Indian constituent assembly. (89)

The editor of the New Republic Magazine proposed five points to solve the Indian crisis: First, the reservation by which Mr. Churchill excluded India from some term of the Atlantic Charter should be withdrawn; second, the veto powers of the Viceroy and the Secretary of State for India should be abolished without delay; third, the Indianization of the Viceroy's Council should be completed; fourth, India should be assured that she will be aided at once in building up defense industries, regardless of the effect of this upon the postwar international economic situations; fifth, the United States should pledge again, preferably through President Roosevelt, that India's postwar aspirations will be received without prejudice at the council table and judged there solely in the light of democratic principles. (90)

89. War and Peace in the Pacific, p. 65.
90. Editorial, New Republic, August 17, 1942.
A well-known English thinker gives his opinion on this question with the following suggestions: India should be promised, with a United States guarantee, complete independence of the British Empire after the war and India should be encouraged to raise defense forces not to be employed outside of India and the civilian side of the control of the defense force should, however, be in Indian hands. (91)

In the opinions of most writers, the British government should give a definite date for Indian complete freedom (92) taking the precedent of American procedure of assuring the Philippines independence, in order to secure co-operation of Indian leaders in the war effort. Furthermore, it has been also suggested by Bertrand Russell that all internal questions, such as the position of Rajas, the relations of Hindus and Moslems and the rights of Provinces or groups of Provinces to contract out, should be left to an Indian Constituent Assembly to be convened at the earliest possible moment after the war.

In the present juncture, although Indian freedom is a primary question to the British government, yet at

the same time it has become the concern of all the United Nations. It is certain that India cannot be properly held without the good will of the people and an easy and speedy victory will not be ours without the collaboration of the 393 million Indian people. As far as China is concerned, we hope that the Indian national aspirations will be realized as soon as possible not only because of historical friendship between our two countries but also because it is an indispensable condition for a durable peace and prosperity of the Far East. President Chiang Kai-shek when he visited India in the Spring of 1942, urged the British to give India real political power, declaring: "I sincerely hope and confidently believe that the British, without waiting for any demand on the part of the people of India, will as speedily as possible, give them real political power so that they may be in a position to further develop their spiritual and material strength and thus realize that their participation in the war is not merely aid to the anti-aggression nations for victory, but also the turning point in their struggle for India's freedom." (93)

Judging from the above facts, the territories in Southeast Asia vary so greatly in internal character and development that they necessarily fall into different categories of treatment. At one end there are communities which have reached an advanced stage of political development; at the other, there are compar-

93. Cited in Chow, op. cit., p. 11.

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atively uncivilized areas in which the people have practically no political conception of their own. In spite of the different circumstances existing in the territories of the region, the ultimate object of policy must be to secure, at the earliest possible moment, conditions that will permit their complete self-government in accordance with Article 3 of the Atlantic Charter. Before the ultimate object is reached, all the colonial powers should observe the following common conditions to be pursued as their guiding principles to rule their respective colony or dependency in Southeast Asia.

First of all, the principle of international authority must be accepted in all areas in which the people have not yet reached the stage of political maturity. Such an international authority may take a form of international commission directly to rule territory in which an original colonial power is deemed inadequate or undesirable to rule the area, or it may exercise its function of international supervision in holding a colonial power to its obligations under the principle of trusteeship or stewardship towards the rest of the powers concerned.

In the second place, a colonial power should be obliged to promote the enjoyment by all states of access on equal terms to the trade and raw materials of the world needed for economic prosperity and the fullest
collaboration between all nations. Henceforth, not only should trade monopoly and tariff restrictions be abandoned but also the quota limitations on export and discrimination in the outflow of strategic raw materials must be relinquished by the colonial powers so as to maintain an "open door" policy in those areas.

In the third place, the primary object of colonialism after the war must not be an imperial exploitation in the interest of an empire but should be the promotion of welfare and prosperity of the native peoples. In this connection the rising of standard of living, the progress of education and the development of economic reconstruction should be regarded by the colonial power as minimum measures to be achieved as speedily as possible. Unless economic and educational progress reaches a certain standard enabling the native people to be independent, political freedom will be an empty promise.

As most of the colonies and dependencies in Southeast Asia were under British or Netherlands rule before Japan's invasion, the achievement of such a new order in those parts of the Far East must largely depend upon the collaboration of those two countries. In spite of numerous statements and editorials in Great Britain urging a new colonial policy of the British government in the postwar period (94) the world has been puzzled by Mr. Churchill's

statements. In an address to the London Lord Mayor's dinner, he said: "I have not become the King's first minister in order to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire." (95) Again he declared in the House of Commons on March 17, 1943, "the government is convinced that the administration of the British colonies must continue to be the sole responsibility of Great Britain." (96) These statements are widely interpreted by commentators to mean that the British government has no intention of changing British colonial policy and will reject any new scheme for the postwar reconstruction of colonies.

As regards the Netherlands, it has been already mentioned that Queen Wilhelmina declared that Holland has no intention of giving up any colonial territory after the war. On the contrary, the Government of the Netherlands is preparing a tight control to make the Dutch East Indies an integral part of the Netherlands Empire. Dr. George Hart, Chairman of the Board for Economic and Financial Affairs of the Netherlands Indies, outlined a program for such a purpose. He made public a plan called the Netherlands Charter according to which the Netherlands East Indies will comprise one of the five component parts incorporated into a newly organized Netherlands Commonwealth. (97) From this fact, there

95. Quoted in Vancouver Daily Province, November 18, 1942.
96. Ibid., March 18, 1943.
seems not much hope that the Netherlands government will adopt any new plan other than her own for the future of the East Indies.

For the peace and stability of the Pacific, colonialism and imperialism should be ended in the future of Southeast Asia. Political domination and economic exploitation must cease to be the main factors of the European rule in the backward areas of Asia. We have disclosed the real meaning of the Japanese slogan exhorting "Asia for the Asiatics" as representing an intention of Asia only for the Japanese, but at the same time no nation in Asia recognizes any idea of Asia for the Europeans. "White men's burden" was the old story of the Europeans' expansion and colonialism was a relic of the nineteenth century. After this war all nations, great and small, must have equal opportunity for development. Exploitation is spiritually as degrading to the exploiter as to the exploited and new ideals should replace the old ones in dealing with colonial relations in the postwar world. As Mr. Willkie has pointed out: "We believe this war must mean an end to the empire of nations over other nations" (98) and Mr. Sumner Welles said: "The age of imperialism is ended. The right of a people to their freedom must be recognized."(99) Liberation of the people in Southeast Asia will be one

98. Supra. p. 72.
of the basic conditions to the peace of the Far East. Without achieving it, there will be neither peace nor security nor economic welfare for the nations of the world.
CHAPTER V

PROPOSED REGIONAL PEACE ORGANIZATIONS IN THE PACIFIC AREA

After the achievement of the basic peace conditions enumerated in the last chapter, a regional machinery should be set up immediately in order that lasting peace be maintained and international co-operation promoted in the Pacific as well as in the Far East. As previously stated, since the Lukouchiao incident and especially after Pearl Harbour, there has been a steadily growing tendency of the United Nations in favour of regionalism in the Pacific. At the Virginia Beach meeting of the Institute of Pacific Relations in December of 1939, it was emphasized that some form of permanent peace machinery should be set up in the Pacific to coordinate the work of postwar adjustments and to provide a means of continuing negotiations among the powers. (1)

Among individual writers, Prof. Peffer gives his view that the setting up of a regional organization in


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the Pacific is one of the prerequisites to the Peace in the Far East. (2) A similar view is given in his book by Mr. Buell. He recommends that for the peace of the Far East there should be a permanent Sino-Japanese conciliation commission, a Pacific conference and a Pacific secretariat, to carry on the duty of promoting peace and co-operation among the Pacific powers concerned. (3) In an unpublished memorandum, Mr. W. L. Holland sets forth a plan of Pacific organization of peace with three stages or circles of groupings and a part of this plan is endorsed by Dean P. E. Corbett. (4)

Statesmen have also advocated regionalism. In a speech given on December 28, 1942, Vice-President Wallace said that the regional principle is of considerable value in international affairs and that purely regional problems ought to be left in regional hands. (5) Dr. Wang Chung-hui, China's eminent international jurist and the Secretary General of the Supreme National Defense Council of China, further develops this idea and suggests the establishment of three regional systems: first for Europe and the Atlantic; secondly for the Western hemisphere;

and thirdly for East Asia and the Pacific. (6) Furthermore Dr. Alexander Loudon, the Ambassador of the Netherlands to the United States, also urges these regional plans, claiming that "Pax Atlantica" and "Pax Pacifica" will best be achieved and maintained in the postwar world by regional organizations of nations whose vital interests are in those spheres rather than through any single international organization similar to the League of Nations. (7)

Except the official or semi-official statements mentioned above in favour of regionalism in the Pacific, there are a number of writers not only advocating it in principle but also working out detailed plans of such a regional organization. Professor Chow, Mr. Bruno Lasker and the editors of the Fortune Magazine have made contributions to the study of the problems.

On the part of some research bodies, the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, in its Preliminary Report, recognizes that there may be regional variations in any practical plan for world society. The Soviet Union, the Far East and the Near East constitute regions with distinctive characteristics. In certain matters variations must be provided within the distinctive regions. (8)

Again, in the Eighth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, the need for a regional devolution of the postwar tasks was mentioned in the opening remarks of Indian, Chinese and American as well as British members. A round table was devoted to a discussion of a regional council in the Pacific and its functions, obligations, composition and detailed problems of the council were also examined. It was generally agreed at the round table that a regional Pacific council within a world-wide political body would be desirable in the postwar world for the maintenance of peace in the Far East. (9)

Even before the war is over, regionalism has played a possibly significant part in the international relations of the Pacific area. In January 1944, Australia and New Zealand formed a regional Empire group in the Pacific and foreshadowed closer association of the Dominions with the colonies and dependencies in close proximity to them. The two Dominions propose to establish a permanent secretariat and means of consultation on all matters of common interest in peace and war and to undertake a full exchange of views on any matter of importance before they engage in discussion elsewhere. It is the first regional association in the Pacific formed by two members of the British Empire with a view to seeking security and promoting their mutual

9. War and Peace in the Pacific, p. 82.
interests.

The character of proposed regional organization since Pearl Harbour differs in various proposals. Some writers prefer a tight organization. For example, Mr. Lin Yutang proposes a federal union formed by China, Russia and India with a view to counter Streit's plan of making a federal union among western democracies. (10) Moreover, many western writers advocate the establishment of an Indonesian Union either as an ultimate formation of the Pacific regional organization or as a sub-unit to form a larger regional grouping in the Far East. On the other hand, some writers prefer a loose organization in the Pacific area, taking the form of a league of nations, (11) a Pacific Council (12) or a Pacific Association of Nations. (13) In an area such as the Pacific in which racial distinctions, economic development, cultural standards and degrees of political consciousness, are at such variance there would seem to be little hope for a tight organization to work satisfactorily for common interests. A successful organization will have to be loosely constituted if it is to bind together the many various elements in the region for their mutual benefit and common purposes.

The scope of a region in which a regional organization

10. Lin Yutang, Union Now With India, Asia, March, 1942.
12. Fortune, p. 5, and War and Peace in the Pacific, p. 82.
is projected to be set up differs in each plan. Some regional plans cover merely one or two parts of the region within the Pacific but not the whole area, on the grounds that the most vulnerable places in the Pacific must of necessity be organized into a regional group for their security against invasion. For example, Kennedy proposes two regional councils for the Far East: one a regional council for Southeast Asia with the Netherlands Indies as a nucleus at first which later will develop into a unified or federated state of Malaysia, including Malaya, the Philippines and the Indies into an Indonesian Union; the other a proposed federation of China, Tibet, Thailand, Indo-China and Korea to form a Greater China. (14) Searle advocates the establishment of some kind of world organization with regional cooperation in the Far East; the latter should effect an Indonesian Union on a federal basis as a framework for the international treatment of Southeast Asia immediately after the war. (15)

To the above writers, the establishment of an Indonesian Union is sufficient to maintain peace in the Pacific without the formation of a larger Pacific Council. They think that it would enable each member to increase its national strength against any unexpected

danger and to be co-existent along with other powers in the Far East. But according to other thinkers, a Pacific Council consisting of all of the Pacific Powers should be organized in addition to the Indonesian Union in order to promote regional co-operation and keep the peace in the Pacific region as a whole. Timperley's view is that in the postwar Pacific, an Indonesian Federation might be developed, which would take its place beside China and Japan as a Far Eastern grouping. Simultaneously, China, Soviet Russia, the United States, Great Britain, Australia and New Zealand, the Netherlands East Indies, India, the Philippine Islands, possibly Indo-China and Burma, to be joined, whenever postwar conditions permit, by Japan, Korea and Thailand, should work out together, within the framework of the global international program, their own specifically regional agreements and organization for the purpose of common welfare and security. (16)

A similar plan is worked out by the editors of "Fortune", which envisages a Pacific Council composed of the United Nations whose interests directly touch the Pacific Ocean. It would be a supreme organization of the Powers in dealing with Pacific affairs. On the other hand, an Indonesian state would be established. It would consist of Thailand, British Malaya, all the British and

Dutch islands in Indonesia and Portugese Timor. The political status of the Indonesian state would be that of an international republic ruled and administered by representatives of the United Nations. (17)

W. L. Holland and Corbett make another contribution to the international organization of the Pacific region. Holland's idea is that the Pacific organization of peace should consist of three stages or circles of grouping of the Netherlands Indies, the Philippines, Burma and British Malaya into an Indonesian Union which both Thailand and Indo-China would be invited to join after the war. Then in the next stage there would be a Far Eastern grouping in which China, Manchuria, Japan, the Indonesian Union and India would be placed. This wider group might be called an Eastern League. As for the interests of such Pacific powers as the Soviet Union or the United States, these might be safeguarded by a still wider Pacific Association which would embrace the United States, the Soviet Union, Canada, Australia, the principal countries on the west coast of South America and all the units of the Far Eastern Group. (18)

Corbett agrees with Holland's suggestion of an Eastern League but doubts whether this wider Pacific Association will be necessary. He assumes that a world-

wide organization will be established with membership and representation open to individual states. Problems involving all countries touching on the Pacific, as distinguished from those peculiar to Eastern Asia, can be adequately handled by the world organization without the further complication of a distinct security system for the Pacific as a whole. He also thinks that the Soviet Union, Australia and New Zealand should find their place in the world organization. Whether these countries should also form part of special regional groupings is a question that may be left to be decided later as these associations develop. The essential nucleus of an Eastern League will be formed by China, Japan, India and the Indonesian Union. (19)

The above plans are based on the assumption of the prospect of a great shifting of balance of power in this region and the potential danger which confronts the rich but weak area of Indonesia. The alleged reason for the establishment of an Indonesian Union, in the first place, is that political division of this rich and highly strategic area would be an invitation to aggression, while a political union would safe-guard their interests against invasion. In the second place, diverse economic interests in this area make the federal union desirable. Actually, these plans are based upon the principle of balance of power in the Far East as already mentioned.

Those who make the plans realize that the age of western imperialism over the Far East is almost past and an Indonesian union would be kept useful in checking any new influence growing there.

After careful study, it would appear that those plans which make a regional and a sub-regional machinery co-existing in the Pacific areas, are not only unnecessary but also overlap to such a degree as to make it difficult to use the structure satisfactorily. Holland's plan, written before Pearl Harbour went so far as to include Manchukuo as one of the members in the proposed Eastern League. This would be absolutely inconsistent with the policy of the United Nations and the Cairo decisions which promise the unconditional return of Manchuria to China. Furthermore, plans for a limited Eastern Group such as suggested by Holland and Corbett fail to meet the real demand of the Pacific region; for they proceed with their project without mentioning the participation of the great Far Eastern Powers, like the Soviet Union and the United States. As Chow comments: "How could a regional organization be in a position to assure peace and security for the Pacific without either the Soviet Union or the United States forming part of the organization? Nor could the scheme of having two organizations, a small Eastern group and a wider Pacific organization, set up side by
To meet the real needs of the Pacific, there should be a single organization whose jurisdiction covers the whole area of the Pacific as well as the Far East. This organization might be called the Pacific Association of Nations as named by Chow. Its membership should include China, Soviet Russia, the United States, Australia, New Zealand, Great Britain, the Netherlands and the Netherlands Indies, the Philippines, Thailand and Korea when she has reached political maturity. Japan would be allowed to join when she becomes a peaceful nation willing to co-operate with other nations for the reconstruction work of the Far East. Other colonial areas would also become members upon attaining independence or other self-governing status.

Most planners agree that the following agencies should be established as the essential institutions to carry out and enforce the decisions of the regional body:

First, a Pacific general conference, composed of

representatives of the member states, meeting regularly once a year and in special session, if necessary. It would be the supreme organ of the Pacific organization with power to discuss and decide upon the policies and the problems of general interest to the region as well as controversial issues between member states. It should act as a legislative authority in matters of common concern, to direct and supervise the whole work of the organization, to enact its budget, scrutinize its expenditure and provide for raising the necessary funds.

There are three different opinions as regards the composition of the General Conference. Buell, preoccupied with the idea of making a new Nine-Power Treaty as an effective means in the maintenance of peace of the Pacific proposes that the General Conference should be composed of delegates of the contracting powers of the treaty. (21) Corbett, on the other hand, insists that it should consist of representatives of every party concerned, but with an equal number of delegates from each party; (22) Chow's view is that member nations should not be represented equally in the General Conference and the relative numbers of the delegations might be fixed according to the areas and population of the respective countries, their economic resources and other political or cultural factors. (23)

Second, a Pacific Council, composed of seven members, four permanent members representing four of the United Nations, namely, China, The United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union, and three members elected at the annual General Conference for a term of one year. The duties of the council should include seeing that the decision and resolutions of the General Conference are carried out by the appropriate agencies and taking any action to meet an emergency or crisis which might occur during the recess of the General Conference. The Pacific Council should meet regularly every three months with extraordinary sessions if necessary.

In some regional plans, there is no such Pacific Council provided in the whole structure of the organization. Corbett and Buell only provide for an assembly and other subordinate agencies to perform the functions of the regional machinery. Chow is content with a Pacific Council. (24) The editors of the Fortune have proposed a supreme authority of the United Nations in the Pacific with judicial power to settle disputes arising among the Pacific Powers. (25)

The relation between the General Conference and the Pacific Council are mainly twofold: first, the General Conference should meet in extraordinary session on the initiative of the Council or at the request of a majority of the member states. Second, the Council

24. Ibid., p. 21.
25. Fortune, p. 5.
should be required to submit regular reports to the meeting of the Conference and be responsible to the duties conferred on it.

Judging by the experience of the League of Nations, unanimous rule has almost always seriously handicapped the organization in taking effective measures for dealing with a crisis. Therefore in the regional organization of the Pacific, it would be unwise to retain the rule in either the Conference or the Council. The necessary number of votes to make a decision valid would depend upon the importance and character of the question. In general matters, a two-thirds majority would probably be enough, but in matters concerning sanctions or other momentous political or military actions, a three-fourths majority excluding the interested parties would be required.

Third, a Pacific Court, composed of from five to seven Judges elected by the General Conference for a term of five years from a list of jurists recommended in equal number by each of the member states. The Court should have compulsory jurisdiction over all justiciable disputes among the member states. It may also give its advisory opinion on matters referred to it by the Conference or the Council.

Corbett suggests that the Judges of the Court be appointed by the General Conference on nomination by
a Judicature Committee, which shall be one of the standing committees of the Conference and contain representatives of all the members. (26) What the other functions of the Committee are except the nomination of the Judges he does not explain. If it is organized merely for the purpose of the nomination of the Judges to the Conference, it can be dispensed with, because it is better to nominate a Judge by respective member states directly to the Conference.

Fourth, a Permanent Colonies and Mandates Commission, appointed by the Conference with ten to fifteen members. It should have power to receive information and to make inspections; to recommend that a particular area is fit for self-government; and to recommend that the conditions of a mandate have been so flagrantly and so persistently violated that a new mandatory authority must be appointed. A recommendation of the Commission should be submitted to the Conference which should have discretion to accept or reject it. But if a resolution has been passed at the Conference upon recommendation of the Commission, it should be executed by the Commission or by other appropriate agencies concerned.

Fifth, a Permanent Military Commission, appointed by the General Conference, with the function of effecting the reduction of national forces and equipment and the

formation of a regional defense and police force. An international force should be formulated and military sanctions should be executed by the Commission.

Sixth, a Permanent Secretariat, appointed by the Council and approved by the Conference and acting under general direction of both these bodies should undertake research studies in the political, economic and social problems of the Pacific; organize intergovernmental committees to make recommendations upon concrete problems and formulate agreement; and prepare for the regular meeting of the Conference and the Council and see that their decisions are executed.

Each member state except the four United Nations with permanent seats in the Council should be entitled to put forward a candidate for election to the Council by the General Conference but not more than one person of the same nationality should be eligible for membership on the Council or the Pacific Court at the same time. This would prevent any single nation from dominating either of these basic institutions of the Association.

The seat of the Pacific Association should be at an internationalized place where the Permanent Secretariat, the Pacific Court, the Military Commission and the Colonies and Mandates Commission should be located permanently. Meetings of the General Conference or the Council may be held at any place deemed necessary and
desirable. The location for the meetings should be recommended by the Secretariat or should be decided by the Conference or Council themselves at the end of every meeting.

The general functions of this regional body, according to the views of the Institute of Pacific Relations, would include the following tasks: first, creating conditions in which threats to the security of the region would not arise, i.e., establishing the conditions of peace; second, resolving disputes at their sources and as soon as they arise by methods of conciliation and arbitration; third, in the exercise, when necessary, of police power. (27) Chow gives a similar view of the general functions of the regional body; it should avert war by exercising joint influence or taking joint preventive measures and in case war does occur, to help the victims and to enforce sanctions against the aggressor; and it should promote such progressive measures as the common interests of the region require. (28)

From the foregoing statements, the object of the regional association is mainly for the maintenance of peace and security and for the promotion of welfare of the member states. Recent history tells us that peace and security are not easily achieved unless states impose upon themselves some limitations on sovereignty.

27. War and Peace in the Pacific, p. 62.
and give international authority power to take preventive measures in case of a conflict which threatens war. To the attainment of the goal of peace and security, the member states of the Association should agree to confer on the regional body adequate power in the matters of disarmament, pacific settlement of international disputes, peaceful change and international police power.

The question of disarmament in the Pacific region will concern not only the Pacific Powers; it will be a world-wide as well as a regional problem. The Atlantic Charter provides that "pending the establishment of a wider and more permanent system of general security, the disarmament of such nations is essential." (29) In the preceding chapter, it has been proposed that a complete disarmament of Japan is one of the basic conditions to the peace of the Far East. The experience after the First World War shows that disarmament of an enemy country cannot be expected to be successful, unless it constitutes the first step to the general disarmament of the world as a whole. Accordingly, one writer asserts: "disarmament of Japan will be most likely to succeed if, after a time, all nations agree to a plan for general limitation of armaments and international inspection of the arms of each country. This would remove from Japan the stigma of being in a subordinate position and would indicate that measures for

29. Supra., p. 83.
its own temporary and partial disarmament were not simply of a punitive character." (30)

Although a regional plan of disarmament should not be envisaged before a general disarmament is worked out it would be helpful if a principle of disarmament could be set forth in advance. The general feeling regarding postwar disarmament is that a drastic disarmament of all states should be carried out by stages fixed in advance and by the end of a certain period that national land and sea armaments should be reduced to the lowest level compatible with the imposition of effective collective military sanctions and internal police functions. National air armaments should be either scrapped or transferred to an International Air Force.

In the postwar world, should this principle of disarmament be carried out by the powers as a general plan for the world, the regional body of the Pacific, taking account of the world armament situation, should adopt a regional plan for the reduction and limitation of armaments. The details of the measure should be left to experts or to a special commission set up for such purpose. Here we just mention it in broad principle only.

With regard to the second measure to keep the peace, 30. Rosinger, op. cit., p. 144.
member states of the Association must undertake an unqualified obligation to settle their disputes by peaceful methods. For this purpose, they should have to make a pact of non-aggression, arbitration and conciliation, solemnly pledging themselves to submit their disputes to arbitration, judicial decision or conciliation. According to the stipulation of the general treaties made since the First World War, both the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Pact of Paris are provided with a provision of general principle of pacific settlement of all disputes. Article 12 of the Covenant binds members to submit their disputes either to arbitration or judicial settlement or to inquiry by the Council. Article 13 is more specific in that it undertakes to indicate what classes of cases are arbitrable or judicable. (31) Article 2 of the Pact of Paris provides that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them shall never be sought except by pacific means. These general principles of pacific settlement of international disputes should be contained and strengthened in the proposed pact of arbitration and conciliation among the Pacific Powers.

31. The classes of cases include disputes as to the interpretation of a treaty, as to the question of international law, as to the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of any international obligation or as to the extent and nature of the reparation to be made for any such breach.
Apart from the general principle, the pact should provide various procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes. These procedures must be made in such a way as to operate automatically and progressively until a final and definite solution of the controversy has been obtained. It has been previously stated that the proposed Pacific Court should have compulsory jurisdiction on justiciable disputes; thus, among the various procedures for the pacific settlement of international disputes, the Pacific Court should be selected as the most desirable organ for the solution of legal disputes. This function of the Court is generally recognized as a fundamental requirement of setting up any effective peace machinery in the Pacific area. (32)

Regarding political or non-legal disputes, it has been a general tendency to use procedure of conciliation for the settlement of such kind of disputes. Since 1918 the principle of conciliation has gained wide treaty recognition. A number of treaties combine arbitration and conciliation, while a dozen or more provide for conciliation alone. (33) Under the latter treaties the parties are bound to refer to a Conciliation Commission.

32. There are opinions that if any effective peace machinery is to be set up in the Pacific area at all, it is absolutely necessary that obligation to submit at least the legal disputes to arbitration or judicial settlement should be accepted by the Pacific Powers, see The Problems of the Pacific, 1933, p. 449.
or Commissioners, all disputes not settled through diplomatic channels or submitted to arbitration or to the Permanent Court of International Justice. Buell before Pearl Harbour suggested a Sino-Japanese treaty establishing a permanent conciliation commission, composed of an equal number of Chinese and Japanese, possibly meeting at regular intervals. (34) It has been mentioned that this organ was also proposed by the League of Nations Commission of Enquiry on the Sino-Japanese Manchurian Dispute in 1933, and by two Japanese professors at the Banff Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations in their hypothetical security pact for the Pacific area. (35)

The conciliation procedure as a peaceful means to settle international disputes will be still useful in the future of the Pacific regional body. It should be provided in the pact discussed above that any disputes arising among the member states, of whatever nature they may be, shall when ordinary diplomatic proceedings have failed and the states concerned do not have recourse to adjudication, by the Pacific Court, be submitted to a Conciliation Commission to be established ad hoc. I do not agree with the suggestions of a Permanent Conciliation Commission to be set up in the Pacific area, (36) because it would encourage the Powers to use the procedure

34. Buell, op. cit., p. 370.
35. Supra., p. 47.
36. Loc. cit.
of conciliation rather than that of adjudication or arbitration, thus obstructing the way of extending the jurisdiction of the Pacific Court over most cases arising among the Powers.

Any disputant state, during or after submission of its disputes to any procedure of pacific settlement, shall not be allowed to resort to violence. In default of obedience by the states concerned to a decision rendered under the provision of arbitration or adjudication, the General Conference or the Pacific Council shall decide what measures shall be taken to stop the violence or to enforce the said decision.

It is understood that one of the reasons advanced for the recognition of war as a legal institution is the absence of an international body with complete authority to make such changes in existing treaties or international relations as demanded by circumstances. The argument is that legalized violence is better from the point of view of expediency and even of morality than a petrified status quo. (37) If war is to be ousted from its place as a regrettable but necessary method of desirable reform, there must be found a substitute device for changing outworn institutions and situations that have become unfair or intolerable.

The principle of peaceful change in international relations has long been recognized as an effective means to keep the international situation from becoming worse and to make relations among states more desirable. (38) Article 19 of the League Covenant provides that "the Assembly may from time to time advise the reconsideration by members of the League of treaties which have become inapplicable and the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world." Under this article, the League as well as the member states were obliged at occasional periods to survey political, legal, economic and social factors among the member states - such factors as helped produce war and to consider measures of adjustment to changing factors. The difficulty of making states accept revisions and modifications of the status quo prevented the League from using this article to settle some disputes between the members. Thus when Bolivia and Chile sought to have the League settle their boundary disputes at the Second Assembly, it was eventually ruled that the League could not "of itself modify any treaty." (39)

The Institute of Pacific Relations has studied the question of peaceful change with a view to working out a plan for the adjustment of international controversies

39. Ibid., pp. 68-71.
in the Pacific region without resort to war. At the Yosemite Conference, 1936, this question aroused much attention of members. An Australian member said: "The main problem in the Pacific, as in other parts of the world, is change and the adjustment of change." (40) A review of the research works undertaken by the Institute during the past years, shows that the problem of peaceful change, insofar as it has been faced, has been considered rather as the culmination of international co-operation and international planning than as a mere device for avoidance of the immediate causes of war. (41) It is sufficient, however, to indicate that the question is no less important among the Pacific nations than among the Western countries.

During the present war, a large number of students of international relations insist that for the future world, peaceful change should be used so widely and so often as to make it more effective as an important element in the community of nations. (42) Mr. Arthur H. Sulzberger, Publisher of the New York Times, asserts: "Change is an invariable law of nature. Nothing that lives is static. If we are to achieve the functioning, effective peace, we must provide the means periodically to adapt the treaty structure of the world to changing...

40. Problems of the Pacific, 1936, p. 182.
42. Dunn, op. cit., p. 46.
conditions." (43) Dr. Evatt expresses the same idea of peaceful change in a coming Pacific order as a means to the attainment of security in that region. (44)

It will be one of the tasks among the member states of the Pacific Association of Nations to devise and carry out a workable method of peaceful change in international relations as well as colonial problems. The changes which would concern the Pacific nations would be changes in the rights and duties of states. The internal changes which affect the well-being of people - changes in the per capita income and the standard of living, changes in political organization, changes in the rights of minorities, the emancipation of subject races, changes in private law - would also include the categories in which the regional body would take action.

Claims by states for changes in the status quo should, in the first place, be made before the Pacific Court, which, after giving an opportunity to all parties concerned to be heard, should make recommendations to the General Conference as to what changes are necessary. The Conference should be free, after hearing the parties either to adopt or not to adopt the recommendations, or to adopt the same with amendments. Adoption by the

Conference of the recommendations ought to be only by a majority consisting of three-fourths in number represented. In default of obedience by the states concerned to a decision duly taken by the Conference that a change in the status quo is necessary, such decision shall be enforced by collective measures of coercion similar to those provided for the suppression of a resort to violence in case of disobedience of a decision of the Pacific Court.

Finally, on the question of international police power, it has been generally agreed that any international body of the future would have to have an armed force in order to impose its will upon member states. Recent history has brought home the painful truth that in the modern world no nation, however powerful, can single-handedly defend itself against determined armed aggression by powerful aggressor states; so mankind must seek peace by means of a system of collective security. The clamour for an international force in the future world order is not only voiced by the thinking public but also by the statesmen of the United Nations as well. In an address to the people of the United Nations, President Chiang Kai-shek said: "to safeguard international justice and collective security and to insure the successful functioning of democratic governments after the war, there must be a postwar world organization with the solid backing of international force." (45)

President Roosevelt revealed this idea too in his speech to the overseas American Forces on December 24, 1943. Sir Stafford Cripps, speaking in a constituency on January 15, 1942, advocated the formation of an international air force of the United Nations to stop aggressors in the future. (46) Subsequently, the British government officially expressed its willingness to establish an international police power after the war. In response to a question in the House of Commons, Foreign Secretary Eden said: "Britain is anxious to co-operate with the United States and other United Nations in the creation of an international police force after the war." (47)

Nearly all the current plans of organized peace designed by writers agree on the need for a police force under supranational authority powerful enough to operate successfully against states resisting the common will. But they differ considerably in their treatment of the matter. Some make sanctions purely regional affairs. (48) Others add to their arrangements for regional police a powerful protective and disciplinary establishment of world-wide scope and responsible ultimately to a single world authority. Thus Buell, having linked up his regional associations in a world society of nations under a world council, gives that council command over a

46. Vancouver Daily Province, January 16, 1942.
47. Ibid., February 24, 1942.
"symbolic and preventive" police force which would be available in addition to the regional forces to check aggression. (49) On the other hand, Chow's view is that a permanent international military force should be formed and placed under the control of the regional organization but the economic and military sanctions of the organization might be reinforced by the co-operation and support of a wider world organization. (50)

How would the international police force be created in the Pacific region after the war? Four possible methods may be used: the coordination of national contingents, the integrated international force, the quota international force and the specialized international force. The national contingent system leaves military forces in the hands of national states but provides for a combined general staff which works out plans for common use and gains their acceptance by national military authorities. At the opposite pole from the system of national contingents is the integrated system which would transfer practically all heavy armaments to an internationalized force under direct control of the international authority. Quota systems are those which are quantitative distributions, leaving the states with armies, navies and air forces of a prescribed size, but giving the international authority a military force including all type of arms.

Practically most peace planners agree with this system for the creation of an international police power in the post-war Pacific. (51) The round tables of the Eighth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations in 1942, when discussing the problem of international police power are almost based upon the system. The fourth system is a specialized system which gives certain types of armament to the world authority, leaving others to the nations. The proposal of the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace for an international air force is of this type. (52)

Whatever kind of system of international police force is created in the postwar Pacific, this force should belong to the regional body under the command of the Military Commission impowered to act within the limits of the Pacific region. The units of the force should wear the United Nations' uniform, thus symbolizing the fact that its authority is derived from the United Nations as a whole. International bases should be created for the stationing and for other military purposes of the force, and the bases of the United Nations should open to it when necessary. It is suggested that the local command would have to possess sufficient authority to take immediate police action in some instances without prior reference even to the regional

52. Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, Security and World Organization, Fourth Report, New York, Nov. 1943, p. 27
body, although in most cases it would act only after deliberation by the regional organization. (53)

Broadly speaking, the international police force should be used for the sole purpose of preventing aggression, that is, to prevent preparation of, threat to use, or actual use, of armed force contrary to international obligations. The League of Nations developed a body of law and practice on the subject and it may be said that the problem of determining aggression did not prove difficult. (54) On each occasion the League members agreed by substantial unanimity as to who was the aggressor, but they lacked the force to prevent aggression. An international police force at the disposal of an international organization would overcome the weakness of the League and make its function of maintaining the peace more helpful.

Peace and the satisfaction of man's material and spiritual wants are so intimately connected that it is almost equally true to say that no lasting peace can be hoped for so long as large masses of people suffer from or fear recurrent privations. Hitherto attempts to organize peace have emphasized the political motive, concentrating on the construction of machinery to settle

53. War and Peace in the Pacific, p. 84
disputes and to prevent aggression in the belief that, given order and security, economic, social, or intellectual relations would look after themselves. The economic organization of the League of Nations was of a fact-finding and advisory nature with no power of decision and execution, while the social justice promoted by the International Labour Office was always handicapped by indifference and preoccupation of national issues of delegates from the member states. In the light of these facts there is now a marked tendency to insist that ways and means of heightening standard of living, and international economic and intellectual co-operation must occupy the forefront of any new effort at international organizations.

Must the Pacific regional organization control economic, social and cultural relations of the member states? To this question, there are two contrasting views. Chow believes that the Pacific regional association should also perform certain positive functions, for peace can be lasting only if it is constructive. In economic and social matters, member states should be obliged to co-operate through international agencies.

On the other hand, J. B. Condliffe claims that, on the economic side, it is impossible to carve out limited area of regional self-sufficiency. Attempts to do so will canalize trade into uneconomic bilateralism.

and bolster up inefficient vested interests in the areas so organized. (56) No doubt, on the economic side, regional blocs have sometimes been regarded as a barrier to the development of international trade, but a regional association in collaboration with a universal body controlling and regulating the economic and social matters within the area will help somewhat the economic relations among the member states as well as outside countries.

It is asserted that an inclusive world organization is too remote to allocate either market or loan or subsidies among a number of neighbouring countries with similar conditions and products and that a regional economic organization, representative of both the world organization and of the separate political units within the region and able to create such facilities and perhaps make them fairly, would be in a position to safeguard the interests of both the member states and of the world at large. (57)

In a region like the Pacific, where its various parts are more competitive with each other, the establishment of a unifying authority over certain aspects of their respective economies could in itself do much to improve the internal economic relations and insure the most advantageous use of the resources of every part of the region. Apart from the promotion of more intra-

56. J. B. Condliffe, Agenda for a Postwar World (W. W. Norton & Co. New York) p. 78
57. Lasker, op. cit., p. 18.
regional trade, it could also soften competition in regulation, in the joint interest, of the output of certain commodities, or import quotas, or allocation of capital, shipping and labor and so forth. It could also introduce new crops and undertake new schemes of settlement and public works.

What are the essential institutions of the economic organization in the Pacific regional association? I propose they should include at least the following three divisions:

First, an Economic and Financial Commission for the joint administration of the special economic interests of the region. Its duty primarily should consist of planning for the development of industry and agriculture and supply capitals for such development. This Commission, like the two following organizations, would work in close collaboration with the corresponding body of a world association and may constitute a regional branch of that body. For this purpose, it would be charged with the special duty of seeing that whatever economic operation it performed in behalf of the world economic organization would result in increased welfare and economic interests for the region as well as for the world at large.

Second, a Pacific Development Commission which should guarantee equal access to all states to the raw
materials of the region and plan the development of the resources of the areas. The natural resources of this area should, except where the Commission decides otherwise, be placed under public ownership or regulation and they should, in any case, be administered primarily for the benefit of the population of the territories. International investments might be made through this Commission and would be used in accordance with the purpose and terms laid down by the Commission.

Third, a Migration and Settlement Commission, to deal with temporary problems like that of the present flux of refugees and with the general movement of population in the Pacific area. The general principles of equality and indiscrimination which should govern migration and settlement should be set forth by the Commission. Henceforth, there should be no racial discrimination in the countries of the Pacific region, especially the attitude of western countries towards Oriental immigrants should be radically changed. The Commission should regulate the issues of Oriental emigration at least in accordance with the following two principles: 1. Orientals should everywhere be admitted on the same basis as other people; 2. there should be no discrimination against residents of Chinese origin once they have been admitted.

With the advancement of industry and other big
enterprises, there must come the labor problems. To avoid the danger of new social difficulties and conflicts, a Commission on Social Legislation and Administration should be set up to devise common measures of public health, labor regulation and control of injurious traffic. The first duty of this Commission would be to protect labor standards in certain colonial areas which provide important raw materials and food-stuffs to the world. International agreements governing wage standards, working conditions and social services should be an integral part of the schemes of the Commission.

There is a strong opinion in favor of achieving intellectual co-operation in the postwar Pacific to advance international understanding and collaboration. It has been pointed out by some writers that a cultural regional organization should be established in the Pacific region, because it would do much to assist the progress of native mental adjustment to the demands of a new era. (58) Intellectual co-operation has proved to be an important activity both in the work of the League of Nations and some regional organizations since the last war. For the future cultural development, there should be a Commission on Intellectual Co-operation in the regional association of the Pacific. The chief task of this Commission would be the control and planning

of education in the colonial areas and intellectual co-
operation between member states, such as to supply ex-
perts in arts and sciences, educational procedure and
exchange students and professors, of books, of musics and
other modes of cultural expression for the promotion of
mutual understanding of the peoples.

The regional organization is projected upon the
assumption that the whole plan is within the framework
of a world organization and the latter organization will
most certainly have to be built on the foundations of
regionalism. Relations between the various regional
groups and between the regional body and the world
organization will form one of the most important and
complicated problems which will confront the world.
Shall coordination of relations between them be given
structural form or be sought merely in the realm of
action or procedure? Shall different regional bodies
subordinate to each other and members of one body be
not allowed to join another regional body? Or shall it
be sought by giving the central organization power to
impose its will upon the regional organization?

Recently, the question of regionalism versus
universalism has become one of the most significant
issues in the problems of the postwar international
reorganization. (59) There is the conflict between the

59. Pitman B. Potter, Universalism versus Regionalism
in International Organization, American Political Science
Review, October 1943, p. 850.
view that the international organization should proceed upon a regional basis and the view that it should proceed upon a world-wide basis. The partisans of these two views are vigorous in their advocacy from both a theoretical and a practical standpoint.

The universalists condemn the regional idea as being tainted with the continentalism of "Geopolitik". Staley has pointed out that a continental neighbourhood is in many cases merely a cartographic illusion. (60) Another professor has noted that the tie that binds people together are common cultural, economic and strategic interests; and these do not by any means depend upon continental proximity. (61) On the other hand, the regionalists criticise universalism as superficial. The idea that all nations, just because they are independent, are substantially alike, is pitifully naive. It is not clear that "democracy" means the same thing in Iowa, Yorkshire, Moscow and Chungking. (62) The regionalists think that territorial propinquity counts for a great deal in inter-state relations, inter-state co-operation and inter-state organization.

In current discussion the two doctrines are often put forward by their advocates as though they are rival

60. Eugene Staley, The Myth of the Continents, Foreign Affairs, April, 1941.
61. Condliffe, op. cit., p. 78.
and irreconcilable principles. But it is not absolutely necessary that the two ideas of regionalism and universalism should clash or come into sharp conflict; indeed, their reconciliation constitutes the main task of world peace and security. If universalism without regionalism is impotent, regionalism without universalism is dangerous. Regional groupings, uncontrolled by a world organization, may lead to the development of continental rivalries, such as Hitler has attempted to incite in Europe against the United States. (63) A centralized world organization without due respect to regional interests would not operate successfully in certain regions. Therefore, a world organization for the coordination and control of regional grouping will be a necessary complement to the regional pattern, and regional groupings would certainly fail to achieve their objectives unless they are a part of the world organization. (64)

Regarding the relationship between different regional groupings and between the regional body to a world organization, no details can be worked out unless the character of the world organization and different regional groupings can be foreseen.

64. Josef Hanc, Regionalism in Central and Eastern Europe (an address delivered at the American University in Washington, D.C., September 11, 1942, Czechoslovak National Council of America, New York) p. 4.
As to the future world organization, there are many projects being advocated by a number of thinkers, such as a reorganized League of Nations, a world Federation, a world State or a world Association of Nations. No one of such plans has been officially accepted by the United Nations as a pattern for the future system of general security. In the Moscow Conference of November 1943, a general principle with regard to the future world organization was set forth by the four powers, i. e., that they recognize the necessity of establishing a general international organization, based on the principle of sovereign equality of all peace-loving states and open to membership by all such states for maintaining peace. (65) From this principle of world organization alone no one can envisage the exact character of the future world peace structure.

Owing to the uncertainty of the future world organization, no hard and fast rules, therefore, can be laid down regarding the exact relationship between the regional association of the Pacific and the world organization. But a general principle has been espoused by some writers. Buell takes the world organization as an appeal machinery of regional unit for political disputes. Any political disputes arising between states within a regional unit should be submitted first to the machinery

of the regional unit, with provision for an appeal from the regional body to a world council in all non-justiciable disputes; other controversies going in the last resort to the Permanent Court of International Justice at the Hague. (66) This arrangement seems to be favored by another writer who looks upon the Permanent Court of International Justice as an agency for the adjudication of disputes involving members of different regional associations. (67)

According to Professor Chow, matters of purely local concern should be left entirely in the hands of the regional organization except for such special advice and assistance as it might formally request. Regarding matters which by their nature tend to affect the interests of the world as a whole, such as access to key raw materials, problems of national or racial freedom, and sanctions against aggressors, the world organization should have the last word. Before taking any decisive action on such questions, therefore, the Pacific Association should, except for necessary precautionary measures, seek the approval and co-operation of the world organization. (68)

In my opinion, these questions should be treated separately. In regard to the relation between

68. Chow, op. cit., p. 23.
different regional authorities, the following may be suggested as general principles. First, the postwar world will have to recognize differences between regional organization; for it will be necessary to have various types of regional set-up, and each regional organization must stand as an equal to other corresponding bodies. A European federation, quite clearly, will differ considerably from the Pacific Association; and the Pan American Union will hardly be identical with that of the Soviet Union. These differences will have to be recognized in the legal system of the postwar international organizations.

Second, it will have to be possible for a country to belong to more than one regional organization. This, of course, is an application of the principle of the necessary flexibility of the regional organisms. America and the Soviet Union for example, will be two separate regional units; but the United States and Soviet Russia will have to be associated in the administration of the problems of the Pacific area.

With regard to the relation between a regional body and the world organization, two general rules will be laid down as follows:

On legislative and judicial side universal competence upon some matters is necessary. Among the problems especially requiring universal treatment are
the limitation of armaments and international violence beyond regional limits, and the prevention of obstruction to international trade and economic co-operation. In the present world, each nation may have controversies with any other; the effects of war are world-wide and no regional limits can be drawn to commercial interdependence. While subordinate regional authorities may be useful in these fields, particularly for organizing military sanctions, a world court, a world organization for limiting armaments and determining aggression, and a world economic authority are still needed.

Administrative authority is by its nature more limited by geographic and cultural condition than is legislative or judicial authority, so it will come within the scope of regional competence. Military and police action is by nature local. Any contingent of an international police would have to be based upon certain points which define its effective radius of action. Much of the work, such as intellectual and technical co-operation, sanitary services, improvement of communication facilities, public works, and so forth, are more within the province of the regional than within the domain of a universal organization.

In a word, excessive concentration of power in the world organization would conduce to inefficiency,
but nothing could prove more disastrous than to let a regional bloc develop in opposition to world interests. Thus there is no detailed rule to be made upon the relation between the regional body to a world organization at present. It will have to be worked out in the future.
It must be borne in mind that the problems of the Far East and the Pacific with which the regional association should deal are many and distinct, but the main one affecting the future Pacific Order is that of China and Japan's position in the Far East. The factors which dominated the history of the Far East for the past century were a weak and rich China contending with a strong and ambitious Japan. It was the ambition of Japan for mastery and exclusive control of China which led the Sino-Japanese conflict into a huge world-wide catastrophe. Throughout history, China and Japan have been the focal point of the Far East and will remain so. If China is secure and stable and if at the same time Japan is subdued but economically sound, there is a solid basis for stability and peace in the Far East.

Since 1937, China has won the respect and admiration of the world, because, ill-armed and with little external aid, she has gallantly fought the Japanese invader for more than six years. It has been
noted that China is fighting for her independence, political freedom and economic justice. Through the more than six year's struggle, though the final victory is still not yet completely won, China has enhanced her national position from the status of a so-called "sub-colony" to be one of the four chief powers of the United Nations. By their "blood, sweat and tears", the Chinese people have been regarded in the eyes of the United Nations as an equal not as an inferior and steps have already been taken by the latter to discard their former unequal and discriminatory treatment towards China. Through the new Sino-American and Sino-British treaties signed on January 11, 1943, a century of extra-territorial system has come to a definite end; thanks to the new Chinese immigration bill passed by the American Congress in November 26, 1943, the attitude of racial inequality of the American people towards Chinese immigrants has been removed; and by the Cairo Communique on November 1, 1943, the restoration of the Chinese territories taken by the Japanese from 1904 has been pledged.

Nevertheless, China is hardly satisfied with such above arrangements, nor has her national aspiration been achieved entirely through them in the minds of every articulate Chinese. Complete freedom and justice for China will by no means have been realized merely
by ousting Japan from Chinese territory and by slackening bondage, national or international, imposed upon her people by treaties or national laws in the past century, but it requires the Powers with interests in the Far East profoundly to modify their policies toward China. It is the first time in modern history, that China has been granted the status of freedom and equality with other nations; so in the postwar world, China’s national aspirations will be, in the first place, the undisputed exercise of sovereignty within her own domain and an equal treatment of the Chinese by the Powers abroad; and, in the second place, China has to be strong, so strong as to become unassailable and as to make possible for her as a great nation to fulfill her duty to maintain enduring peace in the Far East.

In the first category, China expects the return of those territories, still in the hands of her Allies, taken from her by force or by the threat of force during the years of her military weakness. What territories will China want returned? The answer calls for some explanation. Before the Chinese Empire began to disintegrate in 1842, it was an immensely greater country than China is at present. It has been asserted by a Chinese professor that it would be neither practical nor just for China to ask the return of all territories from other countries and of all tributary states now owing allegiance elsewhere(1)

(1) T. S. Chien, New China’s Demands, Foreign Affairs, July 1943, p.694.
What China is justified in demanding are those places which constitute an integral part of China and contribute to the economic development and national security of her future. In this connection, we expect not only the return of Hongkong and Macao but also hope for the complete withdrawal of the influence exercised by the British in Tibet and by the Soviet in Outer Mongolia.

Hongkong remains an outstanding issue in Sino-British postwar relations. It was ceded to Britain in 1842 by the Treaty of Nanking and has been a Crown colony of the British Empire since then. Although the official attitude of the Chinese government regarding this issue remains in abeyance, the Chinese public and most intelligent persons ask that it will be returned to China. The Chinese demand is based upon the following reasons: First, Hongkong is geographically a part of the Province of Kwangtung, and the population is almost entirely Chinese; second, although Hongkong was formerly considered nearly as powerful a fortress and naval base as Gibraltar, the airplane changed Hongkong from an almost impregnable military and naval base to one of extreme weakness and consequently it will be no longer very useful as a British strategic post in the Far East; third, it is a natural port of entry for South China and the natural terminus of the railway connecting Kwangtung with the Yangtze and for the security of South China, it has
tremendous military significance which will affect the national defense of China herself.

The problem of Honkong is somewhat made confusing by the assertion that British control of the port is unrelated to extraterritoriality. But British control of this port and the leased territory of Kowloon has been regarded by the Chinese as part of the system of special foreign privileges exacted from them in the nineteenth century. Indeed, there is no objection in the United Nations, even among the English themselves, to the Chinese demand of returning Hongkong to China. For instance, a recent leading article in the London Times pointed out that any future consideration of the status of this colony would necessarily have regard to the wishes of the Chinese. In the Mont Tremblant Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, the British Institute Group supported the Chinese view. Although there was an argument in the Conference over the use of Hongkong with satellite airfields as an international security base, the idea did not receive much support from the experts present. Chinese speakers stressed the unsuitability of Hongkong (a crowded commercial center) for a defense base. In short, the future

status of Hongkong must be determined by the character of the Chinese national interests established there; so far as there is no fundamentally irreconciliable view on this issue between the Chinese and the British, it should not be difficult to find an equitable solution.

The question of Macao is relatively simple. The Portuguese have been in Macao for nearly four centuries, since they persuaded China to recognize it as a leased territory in 1563. Since the British made Hongkong into one of the great seaports of the world, the political and economic importance of Macao to the Portuguese has steadily declined. For many years, Macao has been a center of vice, smuggling, gambling and the opium trade. It has long been a plague spot in South China and has degraded the moral life of the Chinese there. In such circumstances, the Chinese government has good reasons for asking the return of Macao to China by the Portuguese, not to mention its importance to the security of its Southern frontiers.

Referring to Tibet and Outer Mongolia, these problems are more complicated. Tibet's close association with China stretches back into distant ages. From China, Tibet has derived most of her material civilization and the most fertile districts of her realm lie along the border of western China, whose magistrates governed them for the last two hundred years. (6) Since the British

6. Sir Charles Bell, Tibet's Position in Asia to-day, Foreign Affairs, October 1931, p. 135.
penetration of Tibet at the close of the nineteenth century, China's practical control over Tibet was lost though her suzerain right there was recognized by the British in the Convention 1906. (7) In 1912 China declared Tibet an integral part of China. In recent years, the relations between China and Tibet have been more close than before. In 1940, General Wu Chung-hsin, Chairman of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission, was appointed by the Chinese government to Tibet to conduct the ceremony of enthroning the fourteenth Dalai Lama. In 1943, some Tibetan Monks went to Chungking to pay respects to President Chiang and contributed a large amount of money to the National government.

For many years Mongolia has been a dependency of China and the Mongols have recognized the suzerainty of China. The Tzarist Russian government attempted for a long time to establish its influence over Outer Mongolia and an ostensible autonomous government backed by the Russian's troops was established in Outer Mongolia in 1911. In July 7, 1915, a tripartite agreement was signed between China, Russia and Mongolia.

7. The Article 2 of this convention provides that the Government of Great Britain engages not to annex Tibetan territory or to interfere in the administration of Tibet; and the Government of China also undertakes not to permit any foreign State to interfere with the territory or internal administration of Tibet. See John A. MacMurray, Treaties and Agreements With and Concerning China, Vol. I, (Oxford University Press, New York) p. 575.
In this agreement, Outer Mongolia, though remaining autonomous, recognized the Chinese suzerainty over her. (8) In 1924, there was another agreement, signed by China and the Soviet, providing that the government of the U. S. S. R. recognizes Outer Mongolia as an integral part of China and respects China's sovereignty therein. (9)

To the Chinese Republic, Tibet and Mongolia are inhabited by the two of the five component races which constitute the greater nation of China. For the territorial integrity, China shows her usual tenacity in wishing to regain lost relations whenever the opportunity comes. China believes that if the British and the Soviet influences are lifted from Tibet and Mongolia, neither province will insist on remaining a separate entity. China has consistently avoided raising the issue of either Tibet or Mongolia because the time is not mature. But after this war we expect that both Great Britain and the Soviet Union should give us facilities to resume our historical relations with Tibet and Outer Mongolia. At that time, the Chinese government would adjust its relations towards Tibet and Outer Mongolia and undertake a liberal policy towards all minority people within its borders. If the latter will really desire to be autonomous, the Chinese government might grant them regime of self-government for them provided that it is not incompatible with the Chinese sovereignty.

8. Ibid., p. 1240.
Closely connected with the territorial issues between China and her Allies is the general question of the post-war relations among China and the United Nations, especially the Sino-Soviet relations. An American writer suggests that conflicts of interests in the postwar period are bound to develop possibly between China and Russia. (10) This assertion, we should like to examine. The Sino-Soviet relations in recent years have been quite friendly, particularly since the signing of the Non-Aggression Treaty in 1937 between the two countries. In spite of the fact that Moscow still maintains peace with Japan, and that the Soviet government never declares its intentions about the post-war peace settlement in the Far East, the Russian peace aims, generally speaking, will not necessarily fundamentally contradict those of China, especially as Stalin has endorsed the Atlantic Charter and the principle of the Four Freedoms by signing the United Nations Joint Declaration on January 1, 1942. For the stability and prosperity of the Far East, China and the Soviet not only should not conflict with each other; they should also take some positive steps to promote mutual understanding.

But, across the path of the Sino-Soviet understand-ing, in addition to the Outer Mongolian issue, there still lie problems. First, the problem of the Chinese

Communists who are said to have some connections with the Soviet, is always a source of anxiety to the Chinese government. With the dissolution of the Third International in May 1943, the situation seemed to be clarified. Hitherto this problem has been regarded by the Chinese government as a matter in which no foreign power would be allowed to interfere. (11) And we hope that the Soviet Union will adopt a non-interference policy and let the Chinese government settle this matter without hindrance; the Chinese government will then be able to solve this perplexing problem in a rational way.

Second, it is alleged that the lengthy land frontier between China and Russia may create controversies in their future relations, (12) but this issue also is not absolutely irreconcilable. Dr. Hu Shih has expressed his view on this matter, thus: "With a common frontier extending nearly five thousand miles, China and Russia should work out a permanent scheme of peace, non-aggression, mutual assistance, and general security, somewhat along the same lines as the latest British-Soviet Treaty. The historical example of 3500 miles of undefended common frontier between Canada and the United States can be emulated by China and Russia to our mutual

11. It was announced by President Chiang Kai-shek that "the Chinese communist problem is purely a political problem and should be solved by political means". See New York Times, September 17, 1943.
12. Chow, op. cit., p. 26
benefit." (13) It is true that, if China and Russia seek for peace and co-operation in the Far East, the frontier question should not become an outstanding issue between the two countries in the future. It is asserted by a Chinese professor that China has fought side by side with the United States and Britain, and hopes to collaborate in the same way with Russia before the war in the Far East is over. It is to be hoped that the wartime collaboration between the United Nations will continue into the postwar period, and China is prepared to go more than half-way to meet her Allies; she is confident that, with an equal spirit of willingness on every side, existing differences can in time be ironed out. (14)

Another matter of deep concern to China is the question of migration. This is a general problem but it is peculiarly important to the future of China. During the last six or seven decades overseas Chinese have been subject to a series of discriminatory laws and regulations in Latin America, the United States and the British Commonwealth of Nations. Whatever motives these countries might have had for such measures in the past, their actions have been detrimental to the dignity and the economic life of the overseas Chinese. For a long time, China has hoped that the discriminatory laws

and regulations would be repealed or modified so that the Chinese immigrants and residents in foreign countries would be treated on the same footing as those of other nationalities. On account of this discriminatory treatment, China has been deeply solicitous of the welfare of her overseas people, and this concern is increased because of the great and loyal support that the nation has received from them for over six long years in which she has been fighting Japan.

Of the countries that have passed discriminatory laws against the Chinese Cuba has been the first to abolish them. In the Treaty of Amity between China and Cuba signed on November 12, 1942, it is stipulated that the nationals of each country shall be at liberty to enter or leave each other's territory. (15) Following Cuba, the United States promulgated a law, repealing the Chinese exclusion laws on December 17, 1943, which puts Chinese immigration on a quota basis and makes Chinese eligible for naturalization in the United States. (16) But in Canada, Australia, New Zealand and certain Latin American countries, there are statesmen and public leaders who are opposed to the Chinese exclusion laws, and thus far no legislation has been contemplated.

16. Current History, February 1944, p. 188.
When the war is over, the establishment of a stable government, the change of the social conditions and the industrial development will undoubtedly increase the Chinese population, so that the problem of the Chinese emigration will probably become more acute. It is certain that during the war and in the postwar years China will make every effort to end any discrimination in any part of the world against her nationals on account of race. In short, while not asking for any special favors for them, China will ask that they be treated by other powers on as favorable terms as are other residents or traveling aliens. It is believed that this expectation is in conformity with the general principle of equality treatment of all nations.

As it has been noted, postwar China needs to be strong. How can China become strong? The answer is by the modernization of its economic life so as to bring China into harmony and actual equality with the rest of the advanced Powers. It goes without saying that no country can be politically stable without economic prosperity. In China, economic prosperity in the postwar years will be desperately dependent upon industrialization. The question of China's industrialization will be discussed later in this chapter; here we shall refer to the attitude of some Americans regarding a strong China in the postwar world.
Some writers in the United States fear that China may become too strong, even become imperialistic. Representing this attitude are Professors N. J. Spykman and W. C. Johnstone. Spykman, insisting on a policy of a new balance of power as the basis of world politics after the war, takes the view that a strong and prosperous China is just as much a potential threat to America as a strong and prosperous Japan. Thus he strongly advocates that after Japan is defeated, America should still be on good terms with her and see to it that her military strength is duly restored, thereby serving as an effective check on a resurgent China. (17) Johnstone adheres to the opinion that a new China will develop aggressive tendencies that can be kept in check only by a strong Japan, a strong Russia and a United States willing and able to exercise its power across the Pacific. (18)

Both professors base their views on the principle of a new balance of power in the Far East. It is an old worn-out tune of check and balance sung very much to the refrain of the geopolitic school of thought. If world could have been maintained by a balance of power, we should not have had this catastrophic war, nor the First World War thirty years ago, and if mankind persists in this old way of attempting to find world peace, international situations will never be clarified and power politics will still be a dominating factor in the post-

In the minds of far-sighted people, there is nothing to fear in a strong China; on the contrary they hope China to be strong for the sake of enduring peace in the Far East. Peffer said: "The key to peace in the Far East is a strong China, so strong that it will never again tempt as a prize of conquest and invite rival attempts to capture the prize." (19) Undoubtedly, in the history of international relations of the Far East, it was the competitive aggression of foreign Powers towards China that roiled the politics of the Far East, that led to the establishment of rival outposts designed for future advance, that kept armies and navies in a high state of preparation in the Pacific. But with China united, strong, self-sustaining and under no obligation to any great Powers all these can be prevented in the future. Thus a strong China is not only in the interests of China herself but also for the benefit of the world as well.

As to those who fear that a strong China will become imperialistic in the Pacific, their ideas are apparently based upon a groundless suspicion. Throughout the world, it is well known that the Chinese are a most peace-loving people. Irrefutable evidences of this fact can be found not only in the traditional political philosophy of the Chinese people but also, more impressively, in

19. Peffer, Basis for Peace in the Far East, cited, p. 98.
the five thousand years of historical records of the Chinese race. China would not go on fighting for a day if she were not convinced that the very foundations of her survival as a nation were threatened. In the history of China there was no war waged by the Chinese people against other people for territorial expansion or political dominance.

Her leaders have announced that in the post-war years she will cherish not any imperialistic designs on the people of Asia. President Chiang Kai-shek declared on November 18, 1942 with regard to China's position in Asia that:

"... among our friends there has been recently some talk of China emerging as the leader of Asia, as if China wished the mantle of an unworthy Japan to fall on her shoulders. Having herself been a victim of exploitation, China has infinite sympathy for the submerged nations of Asia and towards them China feels she has only responsibilities - not rights. We repudiate the idea of leadership of Asia because the 'Fuehres principle' has been synonymous for domination and exploitation, precisely as the 'East Asia co-prosperity sphere' for a race of mythical supermen lording over groveling subject race." (20)

To some Chinese writers, a strong China will serve not only as a stabilizing factor in the Pacific but also a way leading to democracy in Asia. (21) Economically, it will help to make world economy prosperous by offering a big market to all nations and supplying of their demands. (22)

20. Supra, see note 28, p. 70.
22. Liu, op.cit.
So, positively or negatively speaking, a strong China would do no harm to the American interests as some geopoliticians fear; on the contrary, it would be compatible with the needs of the United States and other United Nations.

The main factor in making China strong will be the accelerated industrialization which will enhance the national strength of China and increase the material welfare of her people. In the last two decades, industrial revolution has really begun in China, but interest was concentrated in developing light industries. Although some attention has been also paid to the development of heavy industries, no heavy industry on a large scale was installed on account of shortage of capital and experts as well as of internal and external limitations.

Early in 1919 immediately after the First World War, Dr. Sun Yat-sen proposed an international development scheme for Chinese economic reconstruction. The proposal was published in 1922 under the title "The International Development of China", the objective of which was to solve "three great world problems, which are international war, commercial war and class war."(23) The schemes that Dr. Sun proposes are along the following lines: 1. Development of a communication system; 2. Development of commercial harbors; 3. Modern cities in all

23. Dr. Sun Yat-sen, International Development of China, translated from the Chinese text, p. 11.

Dr. Sun suggests the three necessary steps which must be taken in order to carry out this project successfully: First, the various governments of the capital-supplying powers must agree to joint action and a unified policy to form an International Organization with their organizers, administrators and experts of various lines to formulate plans and to standardize materials in order to prevent waste and to facilitate work. Second, the confidence of the Chinese people must be secured in order to gain their co-operation and enthusiastic support. If the above two steps are accomplished, then the third step is to open formal negotiation for the final contract of the project with the Chinese government. (24)

Unfortunately, this proposal was not carried out, partly because China was then still under a weak, feudalistic and reactionary government and partly because the Allies after the war were not ready to start such a gigantic international scheme.

24. Ibid., pp. 49-62; 67-78.
During the present war, some factors have contributed to stimulate the development of heavy industry in China. First, being mainly an agricultural country, China has no modern military equipment to resist a strong and industrialized enemy, which forces her to develop some kinds of war industry in the rear to deal with the urgent needs of the war. During the course of the war, China has realized that her military impotence will never be remedied unless heavy industry can be fully developed. Second, the abrogation of the unequal treaties and signing of the new treaties between China and Anglo-American countries convince Chinese that past barriers to her industrial expansion have been removed. It will help to develop her industry in the postwar years without external obstacles. Third, after this war, China is generally expected to be not only an equal member of the postwar society of nations, but a leading member in the Far East. Her ability to play this role clearly depends upon an extensive development of her industrial strength.

The ultimate objective of China's industrial reconstruction, according to the general opinion and the official policy, is to build an adequate defense system and raise the living standards of the masses. At present, Chinese planning for postwar expansion of heavy industry emphasizes the swift development of defense plants, and
of an extensive system of inland transport, rather than projects which might conduce more directly to the welfare of the Chinese people. It is generally agreed that when the existence of a nation has been at stake for many years, the people naturally think that the improvement of civilian livelihood is less important than the guarantee of national security. (25) The last decade has taught China a lesson that is never to be forgotten, namely that she must never be a victim of aggression again under any circumstances in the future.

The above ideas have been crystallized into plans, both official and unofficial, as the principle of China's economic reconstruction. The "Program of Armed Resistance and National Reconstruction" adopted at an Emergency Session of the Kuomintang National Congress on March 29, 1939, laid down that "economic reconstruction shall concern itself mainly with matters of military importance, and incidentally with matters that contribute to the improvement of the livelihood of the people." (Article 17) (26) Furthermore, the Draft Outline of the Principles for China's Postwar Economic Reconstruction" compiled and published by the Chinese Economic Reconstruction.

Society provides that "economic reconstruction shall aim primarily at strengthening national defense and secondarily raising the standard of living." (Article 102)(27)

Such Chinese economic policy should not be wondered at in view of China's futile appeals in the past for assistance from the League of Nations and from the great Powers, and of the harrowing experience she has suffered in consequence of her technological unpreparedness for war. Hence industrial planning in China appears to stress the development of the nation's military potential rather than the improvement of the standard of living. Although we have taken for granted that the system of collective security will be established in the Pacific by the setting-up of the regional peace machinery; yet some Chinese opine that China can rely on the international organization for her national safety and at the same time that China may hope for the best but should be prepared for the worst. That is to say, China should be fully armed against future eventualities. (28)

The immediate task after the war, according to current opinion in China, is the development of such kinds of heavy industry as power and fuel industries, metallurgical industries, machinery industries, and basic chemical industries without which China will ever remain a possible

victim of aggression and without which the living standards of the people cannot be raised appreciably. Of course at the same time, the Chinese will establish many light industries, such as cotton and silk and will improve the methods of agriculture and other enterprises in connection with the development of heavy industries.

What kind of economic system will emerge in China after the war is a question that no one can answer with certainty. The present opinion seems to be in favor of a "planned economy". In the same article of the Draft Outline of the Principle for Postwar Economic Reconstruction of China, it is clearly pointed out that an economic planning program shall be carried out with these objectives in view. (29) But the planned economy is neither complete communism, nor unbridled capitalism, but somewhere between the two extremes. It is certain that China will not be communistic and it is equally certain that China will not develop an economic system that is based purely upon private initiative. Thus it is pointed out by one Chinese economist that "it is most likely that China will develop a sort of mixed economy which would be a compromise between the Soviet pattern on the one hand, and the American or English pattern on the other." (30)

29. K. Y. Yin, op. cit.
In 1919, Dr. Sun Yat-sen laid down the general principle concerning this question. He said: "The international development of China should be carried out along two lines: 1. by private enterprise and 2. by national undertaking. All matters that can be better carried out by private enterprise should be left in private hands. All matters that cannot be taken up by private concerns and those that possess monopolistic characters should be taken up as national undertakings." (31)

The Chinese Economic Reconstruction Society has recently advocated the following principle regarding the demarcation between states-owned or private-owned industries: Key industries, related to the direct need of defense, and other principal industries requiring planning or control by the state shall be state enterprises; leaving the rest to private initiative. (32) The Chinese Economic Reconstruction Society, being a private organization, does not necessarily represent the view of the Chinese government but it does express the opinion of an influential group of bankers, manufacturers, engineers and professors.

The greatest problem of industrialization is capital, for China is a capital-deficient country. Even though the demarcation in industries has been properly made, capital is indispensable for the establishment of state

32. K. Y. Yin, op. cit.
and private enterprises. For the raising of enough capital, it will be necessary to adopt methods of developing national capital and controlling private capital. For the development of national capital, special attention should be paid to taxation and profits made out of state-owned enterprises. The increase of savings among the people and the control of the use of capital are the two methods for the control of private capital. (33)

Past experience has showed that the process of accumulating capital in China has been very slow. If we rely on our own resources alone, the work of industrialization would be greatly retarded. Therefore, negotiations should be started with foreign countries with a view to attracting investments to China. As Dr. Sun Yat-sen was the first one who advocated the use of foreign capital in the development of China, it is very likely that the present government will spare no effort to interest foreign countries in cooperating with China in carrying out our program of industrialization.

Foreign assistance may be accepted to make up for the deficiency in manpower, resources and capital. To complete industrialization in a short period we need the technical personnel and the capital of foreign countries. Immediately after the war, every country will be busy with demobilization. China should utilize this opportunity to accelerate her program of industrialization and should.

negotiate with foreign countries for the purchase of a portion of their machine works, automobile and airplane, to be used as an introduction to China's program of industrialization. At the same time China should take all the machinery and the materials we need for industrialization from Japan as compensation for the destruction that Japan caused us during the war.

The long history of foreign investments in China presents a lively picture of the struggle for special political privileges and advantages. Some ambitious powers, like Japan and Tzarist Russia, which were themselves debtor countries, even went to the length of borrowing heavily from Western States in order to invest in China for purely political reasons. (34) The disintegrating effect of this practice on China's development as an independent nation can hardly be overestimated. Past experience has made such a deep imprint that many Chinese still regard imports of foreign capital with suspicion. Only in the light of this historical and psychological background can one understand, for example, the regulations effective from the early 1930s until recently that, in any joint Chinese-foreign enterprise, foreign capital was not to exceed 49 percent of the total and both the chairman of the board of directors and the general manager were to be of Chinese nationality.

34. Choh-ming Li, China in World Economy, Foreign Policy Reports, November 1, 1945, p. 217.
With the relinquishment of the extraterritorial rights, aliens in China have become subject to and come under the protection of China's law and jurisdiction along with the Chinese citizens. Foreign capital, fearing that investments in China may not enjoy full legal guarantees, might hesitate to enter the China market. On August 11, 1943, the Executive Yuan, the highest executive organ of the Chinese government, ordered the ministries concerned to draft new regulations providing due protection of law so that foreign capital and technique might be utilized fully in China's program of reconstruction. (35) Subsequently, a resolution was passed by the Eleventh Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang on September 18 to serve for such a purpose. The resolution on foreign investment specially eliminates the fixed restrictions on the ratio of foreign capital investment in joint enterprises the designation of the nationality of personnel, except for the chairman, who must be Chinese. (36)

In spite of the encouragement of foreign investment by the Chinese government, foreign loans will be accepted only if they are made on reasonable and mutually advantageous terms. Chinese are unanimous on some of the fundamental principles to which these terms must conform. (37)

In the first place, all postwar foreign investments in China must be purged of "imperialistic" motives. Foreign lending as a means of economic or political exploitation will no longer find any place in China. Second, all foreign capital in China must be subject to Chinese laws and jurisdiction. There will, of course, be no discrimination against foreign investors; indeed, in the new treaties signed with the United States and Britain on January 11, 1943, the Chinese government has promised foreign nationals and enterprises the same treatment as the Chinese in regard to the matter of taxation. (58) Finally, foreign investments must not be taken at any time as a pretext for encroachment or infringement by other nations on China's sovereign rights. Should a clash occur between her sovereign rights and the rights of foreign investors, whether private or governmental, the former must be given precedence in accordance with international law and justice. All these principles, it will be readily observed have long been recognized and practiced by the Western Powers among themselves.

Aside from the problem of capital, China's rapid industrialization will be hampered by a shortage of skilled labor and technical management, although the abundance of unskilled labor, particularly demobilized soldiers, may provide some quantitative compensation.

for this qualitative lack. The bulk of China's require-
moms for skilled workmen and managers must be supplied
by technically trained Chinese, many of whom would
acquire their skill in expanding plants, but some foreign
experts will still be needed, especially at the early
stage of industrial expansion.

Past experience, however, tells us that foreign
experts in China sometimes took a position of quasi-
independent status and quasi-diplomatic function not as
experts giving their technical assistance to the enter-
prises. Hence, in the future of China's industrialization
foreign technicians, whether managing directors of rail-
ways or factory superintendents, must be engaged as
employees of China, subject to the authority of those
who employ them and not as "advisers" with the quasi-
independent status and quasi-diplomatic function.

Closely connected with her industrialization will be
China's trade policy in the future. It is the general
view in China that it should adopt neither the laissez-
faire attitude of the 19th century nor an over-all
protective tariff policy. (39) With available natural
resources and manpower, there will doubtless be developed
a number of industries capable of existing without the
artificial support of tariff. Only in the incipient
stage of their development is a certain amount of

protection necessary. The industries in urgent need of protection will be what are generally called the "light industries", such as textiles, flour, matches, etc. These were precisely the fields in which the Japanese offered the most formidable competition before the war. Thus a protective tariff on these fields in China will not come into direct conflict with the interests of highly industrialized countries in the west, whose exports of machinery and industrial equipment will certainly long be needed by the Chinese.

As China needs foreign help in her postwar reconstruction her general economic policy will be based upon mutual benefit towards foreign countries friendly to us. In the first place, China must follow the Atlantic Charter, the Chinese-American lend-lease agreement and the new treaties between China, the United States and Great Britain. In the second place, China should specify as early as possible at the end of the war what she expects from the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union. Such expectations include the purchase and sale of goods; the purchase of machinery, communication materials; and the employment of foreign technical personnel. Those United Nations themselves, especially the United States, will enter the postwar period with an economy in which consumer-goods industries have been sacrificed in the war production. To a considerable extent the productive capacity in heavy industries,
built up to meet wartime requirements, will be governmental controlled. (40) Domestic demands for such goods would be greatly reduced. China then will expect to be a market for the consumers of those goods, thus helping these nations in a quick conversion of productive plants to peacetime purposes.

On a long-term view, the fruits of industrialization in China will benefit not only the Chinese but also the people of friendly nations as mentioned above. With the increase of Chinese purchasing power, a new and rich market will be opened to foreign products and China will be able to supply certain raw materials as well as special export products for the consumption of other peoples. Besides the benefits from the products themselves, it will improve China's position in regard to international balance of payments.

The advantages of China's industrialization to the Western Powers have been apprehended by some quarters in the United States and in Great Britain. Nathaniel Peffer points out: "as China proceeds with industrialization by means of the capital goods provided by ourselves on credit its national income will rise in equal measure and therefore, its purchasing power.....It is in the industrialization of China that there lies the best prospect for the West's recovery from the ravage of war, for the adjustment from unhealthy war prosperity to

normal productive equilibrium. Still more, therein lies the best hope for the delaying of that more fundamental crisis in Western institutions" (41). Politically an industrialized China in the Pacific is quite welcomed by the United States. It is asserted by the editor of "Fortune": "China, transformed into an industrialized nation of 450 million, must outweigh, once the threat of Japan is removed, any other political unit that could emerge in the western Pacific. This is, in fact, exactly what we expect and what we seek." (42)

In Great Britain, some industrial groups have expressed their opinion on the question of the industrialization of China as affecting the interests of Great Britain. They say: "With the growth of China's industries, Britain may lose much of her 'muck and ruck' trade but as the industries grow and the standard of living in China is accordingly raised, she will become a better customer for high-class goods with a greatly increased purchasing power." (43)

Apart from the problem of the postwar position of China, the position of Japan in the postwar world will constitute another problem which requires discussion.

41. Peffer, op. cit., pp. 210-211.
42. Fortune, p. 18.
It is pointed out by one writer (44) that there are very few Pacific problems which can be treated apart from the problem of the postwar position of Japan. The problems of the postwar Japan will be manyfold, the most important of which will be how Japan can exist as a nation and get subsistence for her people.

Before the present war, Japan's economic structure was seriously out of balance because of her abnormal emphasis upon heavy industry contributing to war aims and her neglect of consumer's goods in both manufactures and imports. In 1941 the standard of civilian living declined to about 50% from what it was in 1936 and 1937. (45) Ultimate defeat in this war would ruin Japanese economy; Japan would become an impoverished nation.

Most of this poverty must be regarded as self-inflicted. Japan made her choice between guns and butter, and the bills for guns cannot be defaulted. In the course of the war, Japan's soil has been depleted of fertile substances that it will take years to replace. Many of her peace time factories have been stripped of equipment, and outside the armament works, technical progress has halted. Japan's domestic transportation system is worn out. A frightful toll has been levied on Japanese manpower: directly, by death on the battle-field or the high seas; indirectly, by the general

44. Sansom, op. cit., p. 2.
45. Fortune, op. cit., p. 17.
impairment of the Japanese people's health. The full bill for the guns will ultimately have to be assessed not in yen but in the loss of millions of lives.

It is suggested in some quarters of the United States that the United Nations should extend to Japan, as soon as fighting has ceased, the benefits of their general program of relief. The excess of frozen Japanese funds in gold, dollars and sterling in America, Britain and Holland against Japan, or the payments for the charter of Japanese ships, should be utilized for such relief. (46)

Without question the general relief works of the United Nations should extend to both countries, victor and vanquished, but a permanent term of economic advantage should be cautiously given and made on certain conditions to Japan. In the interests of lasting peace in the Far East, it is necessary to put Japan out of action and beyond possibility of early recovery as a military menace; therefore it would be unwise to give Japan opportunities for quick economic recovery.

Before the United Nations allow Japan to participate in a new Pacific order, they should do two things which would help to enable the Japanese to become a peaceful nation. First, politically, the United Nations should encourage and support these liberal elements in Japan's

46. Ibid.
internal life which gave support to Japan's membership of the League of Nations. It would seem that such groups would be responsive to the new order of the Pacific. Second, consideration of Japan's educational policies for the past ten or fifteen years shows how closely these have been integrated with the political policies of the present regime. There has been emphasis upon Japanese race superiority; the cult of emperor-worship has been intensified. This educational policy cannot be ignored by the United Nations if the peace of the Pacific is to rest on a firm basis. In the last resort, the problem is one which can only be solved by the Japanese themselves, but much can be done in the immediate postwar period towards the stimulation of Japanese activities by the supply of foreign instructors and insistence upon standards of democratic ideas which are generally accepted by the United Nations. (47)

Should these two things be done effectively, reintegration of Japan with the new Pacific order to follow the second world war will be possible if Japan succeeds in restoring some form of parliamentary popular government; if the preferential position now enjoyed by the army and navy is not revived; if the neighboring countries are convinced that Japan is law-abiding with no idea of aggression. When a government operating along these or similar lines has proved its ability to survive and gain

popular support, the Japanese nation should be permitted to become entitled to international equality. By equality we mean gradual participation in the work of the Pacific regional association and in the international arrangement for the welfare and security of the Far East.

We do not propose to propitiate Japan or to confess that, after all, the Japanese actions at Mukden, at the Marco Polo Bridge, at Shanghai and Nanking, at Pearl Harbor, Hongkong and Manila were not so bad and outrageous as they appear to us now. We shall simply acknowledge the existence of a new Japan. Until the United Nations can be certain that the postwar Japanese government is capable of peaceful cooperation in the maintenance of a stable order in the Far East, they should be free to intervene in Japan's domestic affairs. The form of intervention cannot yet be definitely fixed. It would be unwise to proclaim it now, in a general joint declaration of the United Nations.

A proposal is made by one American writer that, after Japan has been made militarily impotent, political wisdom dictates that certain concession be made to it to assure conditions of livelihood on a standard it can reasonably expect, so that it will not have to resort to force in order to feed, clothe and shelter her people. (48) Others urge that arrangements might be made to facilitate trade between Japan and her former colonies to secure essential

food. (49) These concessions or aggancements can be made only on condition that they should not jeopardize Japan's neighbors in the Far East and help indirectly to a resurgent Japanese militarism.

Hitherto, Japanese apologists claimed that Japan's economics suffered great injustice at the hands of other Powers which imposed restrictions upon her export trade, denied her access to raw materials, or put discriminatory laws on her immigrants so as to prevent outlet for her overpopulation. Indeed, in the past years, the barriers were thrown up against Japan's products and emigration in the Western Colonies in Eastern Asia and in Western countries themselves. By tariffs, quota agreements and other devices Japan was prevented from getting as much trade as it would have obtained in normal competition. By immigration laws the Japanese were practically debarred from entering some Western countries and their colonies.

It is equally true that Japan lacked most of the raw materials essential to industrial production. For cotton, iron, petroleum products, lead, zinc, tin, rubber, aluminum, nickel, chrome, manganese, and other materials and metals, Japan is dependent in large part and in some cases almost wholly on outside sources. Nevertheless, had Japan not over-expanded her munition industries for the preparation of war, import of those materials from outside might

49. Fortune, p. 17.
have been sufficient for the production of goods for civilian use.

From 1931 on, Japan's population problem has become a catchword in all discussion on the Far East, so much so as to falsify the issues. The problem of over-population is one that a country cannot extract from her own soil the produce with which to feed and clothe her people and also cannot fabricate goods or commodities with which to buy from without for feeding and clothing her people. This is to say that primitive lands or even technologically backward countries such as China and India may be over-populated, but not such a country as Japan, which has entered the system of machine industrialism, and is or can be in the world market. In the case of Japan, it cannot be denied that the country's economic basis is insecure, but the explanation lies still in Japanese militarism. If Japan's industrial policy had paid more attention to the production of consumer goods, the problem of over-population might not have become serious. Japan herself is to blame.

Therefore, some students of international relations today are inclined to treat with scepticism the Japanese claim that war was brought about inevitably by the pressure of population upon the means of subsistence and by the struggle for overseas markets. Certainly it can be shown that some of Japan's economic grievances were of her own making. (50) However, with all the false 50. See Sansom, p. 5, Peifer, p. 139.
accentuation and disingenuous apologies stripped off, Japan’s economic difficulties must be taken into account. Japan must be allowed to find a secure basis for her economy. As one American writer said, just curbing her in aggression is not enough. It will break bounds again and have to be curbed once more unless within the limits to which she is confined her people can find a way of life that satisfies their needs. (51)

To the question of satisfying Japanese economic needs, there are three ways which would improve Japanese economic life in the future. First, the United Nations should give Japan an opportunity to buy raw materials essential to machine production subject to the condition that the strategic materials imported to Japan must be made on a quota basis just sufficient for her civil production. Second, the Powers sovereign in the colonies of Eastern Asia must abandon old trade policies. It is necessary to extend better treatment to Japan in each colony or at least in stages to dismantle the tariff barriers raised against Japan. And the quota agreements must be dropped or modified in the direction of greater liberality to Japan. Third, the Powers should allow more Japanese immigrants to enter the colonies of Eastern Asia and also their own countries; thus it will slacken what is called the pressure of the Japanese population problem.

51. Peffer, op. cit., p. 140.
As far as China is concerned, her economic relations with Japan in the postwar years would be based on reciprocity or mutual benefit. China would be no longer an economic colony and an outlet for Japan's so-called overpopulation. If Japan becomes a peaceful nation and really abandons her aggressive policy forever, there might be a prospect of economic cooperation between China and Japan.

For one thing, the economic recovery of Japan to support her people's livelihood will be the ultimate objective of the United Nation's policy towards postwar Japan, but it will not come so immediately after the war. Too quick a recovery would negate the pedagogic effects of the crushing defeat. But Japan can return to normal economic life at a steady, if not fast, pace. The United Nations would allow Japanese recovery merely for purposes of keeping their people alive but not for purposes of resuming a military offensive of Japan.
CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

To sum up, the existing regionalism of the Pacific under the Washington treaty system has failed to fulfil its purpose of maintaining peace and order in the Pacific area. The inadequacy of this regional machinery along with the weak universalism under the League of Nations was at least partially responsible for the war in the Far East as well as for its later development into the Second World War. The hypothetical new regionalism discussed in the present thesis differs from the old one with the following respects: First, it sets forth prerequisite conditions to the peace of the Far East, thus eliminating elements of international strife in the future; second, under the new regionalism, China will never be a mere beneficiary as under the Nine Power Treaty, but will constitute an equal partner with other Pacific Powers in devoting her national strength to an enduring peace in the Pacific; third, the importance of the Soviet Union in the Far East is recognized by being assigned a permanent seat in the proposed Pacific Council of the Pacific Association of Nations; fourth, it is provided with adequate institutions backed by an international police power necessary for the maintenance of peace and for the
promotion of international cooperation.

The fundamental requirement of a successful international organization lies not only in the machinery itself but also in the goodwill and devotion on the part of its principal members. It may be conceded that a common diagnosis of the League's failure is due to the combined stupidity and selfishness of the great powers, rather than the defect of the machinery. It is a truism that, with goodwill and devotion, great ends may be achieved with the weakest organization. In the regional peace organization, the principal members are supposed to be China, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States. What may we expect them to do in the future?

On the part of China, there will be no question of her goodwill and devotion to the new machinery; but the question is that China would not become a stabilizing factor in the Far East unless she had been strong as mentioned above. In other words, what China can devote to the peace of the Pacific depends upon how accelerated and how much aid that China will receive from the Powers for her industrial reconstruction. The more China becomes industrialized the better the Pacific situation will be.

As regards the British, the main contribution which she will be expected to make to the peace of the Far East will be the slackening of her imperial rule in the Far East and granting the political status of her colonies and dependencies, which they desire. Hereafter the British
will not regard the Far East just in terms of rubber, tin and exploitation; for economic exploitation may lead sooner or later to political controversy. If we hope that the future political situation will become clarified, the colonial question should be settled on the basis of economic justice and political freedom. The security of the Pacific demands such a cooperative effort on the part of the British to create in this zone those economic and political conditions which will prevent local causes of friction or conflict, thus making the Far Eastern relation more stable and more secure.

The active participation of the Soviet Union in the new Pacific structure will be absolutely necessary if the regional body of the Pacific is to succeed. Past indifference or hostility to the Soviet in the Far East since 1918 has been proven to be one of the factors to the Japanese expansion, and the regionalism under the Washington treaty was impotent without the Soviet's participation. The active participation does not mean that Moscow will pursue its old-fashioned policy of the Tzarist regime, but it indicates that the Moscow government in cooperation with China, America and the British should do its best for the work of collective security in the Far East. The Soviet Union still remains an unknown quantity in the postwar Pacific, and it is predicted that Russia will more likely choose Europe as the scene of action rather than Eastern Asia. However, peace is indivisible. Although the Soviet needs peace in
Europe, she should not remain aloof from the concert of the Powers in the postwar development in the Pacific.

American devotion in this regional organization will be particularly needed. The degree of accomplishment of the regional security in the Pacific depends largely upon American cooperation. If the United States were ready to take a full share of responsibility with respect to the Pacific, there would be a bright prospect in that area. Before the Fulbright and Connally's resolutions passed at the American Congress, there was genuine fear among the United Nations that American Congress might not accept future commitments. After the American Congress passed the resolutions indicating that the American people intend to participate sincerely in an effort to bring order into the world, the prevailing view seems to be that the strong trend in the United States today is in the direction of participation in a general security system especially in relation to the Pacific and the Far East. It is pointed out by Tyler Dennett that without curtailing any power of Congress, and without placing in peril any national interest, the United States could probably go even farther in the way of an international engagement in the Far East. America will undoubtedly emerge as the strongest military Power in the Far East at the victorious end of the war. There will be no nation with equal power to challenge her leadership in the Pacific. Therefore the American cooperation in the new regional system is regarded by the Far
Eastern nations as most important and desirable.

The regional organization should start its work immediately at the end of the war. No transitional period will be needed for the purpose of cooling off national hatred, because traditional animosity among the Far Eastern nations is not so complicated and so deep as that among the European countries. At that time whether a general security system is formed or not, the regional body should be established in the Pacific. As it has been noted, regionalism provides a possible starting point for a better wider union, so that a good Pacific regional body organized prior to a universal organization might give an advantage in forming a better world union later.

While the war is still going on, a committee representing the Pacific Powers concerned should be set up within the United Nations Council with a view to discussing and exchanging views on the problem of the establishment of the regional machinery, and preparatory work should begin immediately when the Powers agree on the principle governing the setting-up of the organization in the Pacific.
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