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UBC Theses and Dissertations

Cicero and the fall of the republic Walker, Day 1943

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CICERO AND THE FALL OF THE REPUBLIC 49 B.C. to 43 B.C. #—55-—>A—K—» THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF CLASSICS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS L,; ' BY DAY WALKER, B.A. APRIL 1 9 4 3. CONTENTS: CICERO AND THE FALL OF THE REPUBLICV 49 B. C. TO 43 B. C. Chapter Page I . Cursus Honorum a. Cicero's t r a i n i n g 1. b. His praetorship 3. c. His consulship 4. I I . D i s i l l u s i o n m e n t 62 B. C. to 49 B. C. a. Weakness of s e n a t o r i a l party b. F i r s t t r i u m v i r a t e c. Cicero's e x i l e and r e c a l l d. Conference at Luca e. The f i f t i n the t r i u m v i r a t e f . Cicero's proconsulship of C i l i c i a g. The eve of h o s t i l i t i e s I I I Cicero's D e c i s i o n 49 B. C. a. D e c l a r a t i o n of war by senate b. Rome abandoned by Pompeians c. Clemency of Caesar d. Cicero's stand e. Cicero and Caesar. f. Cicero's departure f o r Dyrrachium IV. A Dark Outlook 48 B. C. to September 47 B. C. • - / -a. Pompeians defeated i n Spain 31. b. Defeat and death of Pompey 32. c. Cicero's r e t u r n to Brundisium 32. d. His a t t i t u d e to the Pompeians _. 34. V. Cicero Under a D i c t a t o r . a. Caesar's generosity 36. b. Cicero's retirement 36. c. Hope of r e s t o r a t i o n of r e p u b l i o 38. d. Death of T u l l i a 38. e. Caesar's de s i r e t o be k i n g 40. f . Murder of Caesar 41. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13 14. 16.. 18. 18. 81. 28. VI. Cicero as Leader of the S t a t e . a. C i c e r o T s r e a c t i o n to the murder of Caesar 42. b. General amnesty 43. c. Antony's treachery 44. d. Octavius. 46. • e. Lack of plan among L i b e r a t o r s 47. f . Cicero attacks Antony 49. g. V i c t o r y at Mutina 53 e h. Second t r i u m v i r a t e 56. i . Cicero proscribed 56. V I I . A Personal Tribute , . 57. Y I I I . Abbreviations 60. IX. Bibliography 61. CICERO MP THE FALL OF THE REPUBLIC 49 B. C.—-43 B; C. ' Chapter I The Cursus Honorum. ,1 **Homo vere natus ad prodessendum hominibus" . " ' '• j '"• ' • • • Marcus T u l l i u s Cicero has always been revered wherever men have s t r i v e n to gain freedom from tyranny* On December seventh, 43 B. C., the grim s i g h t of h i s head and r i g h t hand n a i l e d up i n the Rostra mutely proclaimed, to the people of Rome that tyranny once more was t h e i r master; down through the ages the work of that great head and hand was to be the i n s p i r a -t i o n and i n c e n t i v e to men working towards p o l i t i c a l l i b e r t y . Yet no one has ever -suffered more from extravagant p r a i s e or undeserved c r i t i c i s m . C i c e r o , the f i r s t of h i s f a m i l y to enter p o l i t i c a l l i f e at Rome, was born' on January 3, 106 B. C, on h i s f a t h e r ' s estate outside Arpinum. His f a t h e r was a Roman knight and was f i n a n c i a l l y able to b r i n g h i s f a m i l y to Rome and to pro-vide the best t r a i n i n g and education f o r h i s son.- Cicero was fortunate i n having the two outstanding orators of the day, Lucius Crassus and Marcus Antonius, i n t e r e s t themselves i n h i s education. His student days were i n t e r r u p t e d i n the year 89 B. C. when he took part i n the S o c i a l War. A f t e r h i s year of ser-v i c e , he a p p l i e d himself again to h i s t r a i n i n g , v i s i t i n g the 1. Leonardo B r u n i , quoted i n Z i e l i n s k i , " C i c e r im Wandel der Jahrhunderte" and r e f e r r e d to by W. A. Oldfather i n C l a s s i c a l Journal, Mar. 1928, V o l . X H I I , p. 424. lawcoarts and l i s t e n i n g i n t e n t l y to the debates. His fa t h e r introduced him to Quintus Mucius Scaevola, the greatest law-yer of the day. From him young Cicero gained a p r a c t i c a l background of law. He was fortunate too, i n being able to study voice production and the more t e c h n i c a l side of oratory with Molo, the eminent r h e t o r i c i a n of Rhodes, who was v i s i t -i n g Rome i n 88 B. C. From 88 u n t i l 81 B. C. Rome was subjected to C i v i l War characterized by c o n f i s c a t i o n s and p r o s c r i p t i o n s . A f t e r the struggle between the two leaders Marius the Democrat and S u l l a the Optimate ended i n the triumph of S u l l a , Cicero entered upon h i s career i n the law courts and es t a b l i s h e d himself as a great advocate i n h i s s u c c e s s f u l defence of Sextus Roscius. In undertaking t h i s defence he showed great courage i n openly a t t a c k i n g S u l l a ' s Chrysogonus, and Strachan-Davidson w r i t e s of him as f o l l o w s : "He l e f t the court a man of mark i n Rome. He had done more than save h i s c l i e n t ; he had given voice to f e e l i n g s which a l l the world must needs smother i n s i l e n c e ; he had struck a keynote which v i b r a t e d i n a thousand hearts, s i c k of bloodshed and robbery and t e r r o r . " 2 Sh o r t l y afterwards Cicero l e f t Rome f o r Greece to recuperate and to continue h i s s t u d i e s . In 76 B. C., the year f o l l o w i n g h i s r e t u r n , he entered i n t o a c t i v e p o l i t i c a l l i f e by h i s e l e c t i o n as quaestor. His pro-quaestorship of S i c i l y was d i s t i n g u i s h e d by i t s freedom from e x t o r t i o n s and by the f a i r n e s s of i t s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . There followed the 2. Strachan-Davidson, "Cicero" p. 17, l i n e s 13—18 regular succession of p u b l i c o f f i c e s : curule a e d i l e i n 70, praetor i n 67, culminating i n the consulship i n 63 B. C. During h i s praetorship Cicero made h i s f i r s t p o l i t i c a l speech to the people i n support of the M a n i l i a n Law. This b i l l which proposed to give Pompey supreme command of the forces i n the East to inflict-^a-speedy-defeat on Mi t h r l d a t e s and Tigranes was opposed by the conservatives or Optimates. They, i n accordance w i t h Roman t r a d i t i o n , were opposed to one man having extraordinary m i l i t a r y powers beyond those held by the consuls. At f i r s t i t seems strange that C i c e r o , l a t e r the champion of the Senate, should support a b i l l p l a c i n g such unprecedented power i n the hands of one man; but he i s not yet the champion of the senate. He i s here c l e a r l y the defendero of h i s own order, the equites, who had l a r g e investments i n the province of A s i a , and the supporter of the cause of a great s o l d i e r whom he i d o l i z e d . The M a n i l i a n Law and i t s predecessor the Gabinian Law were important not only because of the powers conferred by them but a l s o because these powers were granted to Pompey by 3 the people against the wishes of the Senate. Thus the e f f e c t of the concessions made by Pompey and Crassus i n 71 4 B. C. to the popular party i n order to win the consulship, namely the r e s t o r a t i o n of the t r i b u n a t e and of the equites on the j u d i c i a l courts, was 3 c l e a r l y seen. A s i n g l e i n d i v i d -u a l , then, through compliant tribunes could a t t a i n mastery 3. P l u t . Pompey 27; 32. 4. P l u t . Pompey 24. of the s t a t e . Cicero supported Pompey against the S u l l a n c o n s t i t u t i o n i n 71 B. C. because that c o n s t i t u t i o n ha& given the Senate too much power. I t was then that we see h i s admira~ t i o n of the S c i p i o a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of 154 B. C. wit h i t s balance of power: the Senate, the equites, and the people, each p l a y -5 ing i t s p a r t . In t h i s connection W. A. Oldfather s t a t e s : "His best wish was t o have a great man i n a prominent s t a t i o n , the servant but also the guardian of the s t a t e " " and he f e l t he might best f u n c t i o n as adviser to the great man and the p u b l i c exponent of h i s enlightened p o l i c i e s . " Cicero was easil y - head of the p o l l s at, the consular e l e c t i o n s . The conservative nobles supported the "novus homo'9 not so much because of h i s own worth but because they were alarmed by the corruptness of the opposing candidates. As the h y p e r c r i t i c a l Mommsen sneeringly remarks, the n o b i l i t y gave " t h e i r votes to a candidate who, although not acceptable to • 6 .: them, was at l e a s t i n o f f e n s i v e " . His platform, i n so f a r as he could be s a i d to have one, was n a c o a l i t i o n of the equites 7 8 with the moderate S e n a t o r i a l p a r t y " or the "concordia ordinum" . f" . . . . • 8 l i n k e d with the approval of the people, the "consensus I t a l i a e " . To Cicero the Roman people d i d not j u s t mean the c i t y mob which could be bribed or i n c i t e d by an unscrupulous leader but i t meant the people of the whole of I t a l y . 5. C l a s s i c a l J ournal, March 1928, "Cicero. A Sketch*? 6. "Hi st o ry of-Rome , Book- V-,. Chapter 5,1 p. 159 . 7. (i. P. Baker. "Twelve Centuries of Rome", p. 313. 8. How, Int r o d u c t i o n to Cicero's L e t t e r s . p. 39. if The f i r s t obstacle he had to face was the move by the il democrats through t h e i r tribune to put through an extensive I " •• • ; ' .:• • ' • ; - . • . ' . ' agrarian b i l l , i t s p r o v i s i o n s to be presided over by a board f- of ten commissioners. By means of t h i s b i l l the democrats i hoped to be on an equal f o o t i n g with Pompey, the conqueror of the East. The implied infringement on Pompey's p r e s t i g e caused Cicero to stand f a s t f o r h i s champion and at the same 10 time to appear as a defender of the prope r t i e d c l a s s . I n bring i n g about the defeat of the b i l l , Cicero revealed that j the extensive powers of the board of ten commissioners f o r f i v e years and the e x c l u s i o n of Pompey from the board, were . . 11 the work of the democrats who stood behind R u l l u s . To C i c e r o , however, the crowning achievement of h i s con-s u l s h i p was h i s defeat of the C a t i l i n a r i a n conspiracy, a move by desperate men to overthrow the government and to restore t h e i r depleted fortunes i n the ensuing confusion.. I t was the hope of C a t i l i n e and h i s associates to copy Marius and S u l l a w i t h t h e i r p r o s c r i p t i o n s , massacres and c o n f i s c a t i o n s of property. When these arch t r a i t o r s had been taken i n t o oustody, the senate met t o discuss t h e i r punishment. The maj o r i t y of the senate was i n favour of the death penalty, 12 but Caesar proposed l i f e imprisonment in s t e a d . Cicero's f r i e n d s favoured Caesar's proposal,for by i t Cicero would have l e s s personal r i s k , b u t i n h i s f o u r t h speeoh against 9. De Lege A g r a r i a Contra Rullum 10. De Leg. Agr. i i i , 2. 11. De Leg. Agr. i i , 6, 15; 10,25. 12. P l u t . Caes. W, 6 Catiline.;, Cicero stated that he was ready tfco ren£qree what-ever punishment the senate d e s i r e d , without regard to h i s own 13 safety. Cato then d e l i v e r e d a passionate address . and so whipped the wavering senate i n t o a c t i o n that the death penalty went through. L a t e r we are to see how Cicero's i l l - w i s h e r s would come back to t h i s execution i n order to t u r n the people against him, but, at the moment, a l l classes h a i l e d him as the saviour of the s t a t e . 13. P l u t . Cato Minor 23. Chapter I I Dis i l l u s i o n m e n t 68 B. C. to 49 B. C. Cicero's achievements as consul now gave him a leading place i n the senate. His e f f o r t s and the fear of r e v o l u t i o n had k n i t together the Equites and the Senators. His next hope was to r e c o n c i l e the c i v i l and m i l i t a r y powers through the leadership of Pompey; but when he wrote to Pompey t e l l i n g him of h i s suppression of the C a t i l i n a r i a n conspiracy and of h i s desires to be associated w i t h Pompey, the great man paid scant 14 a t t e n t i o n to h i s l e t t e r . I t has been f e l t that Pompey was hurt that he had not been r e c a l l e d to Rome to s e t t l e the matter: and wrongly put the blame on C i c e r o ; he would not commit him-15 s e l f i n favour of Cicero's measures. Meantime Pompey made h i s way home from the East i n the 16 manner of a r o y a l progress, and reached Brundisium i n Decem-ber 62 B. C. He disbanded h i s army, thus i n d i c a t i n g that he was not going to use m i l i t a r y power to get what he wanted; but, a f t e r that d e c i s i v e move he d i d n6t f o l l o w up wi t h a close a l l i a n c e w i t h and leadership of the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l party. The senators, themselves, d i d not r a l l y round t h e i r hero but d i d everything p o s s i b l e to d r i v e him over to Caesar's s i d e . They refused to r a t i f y the land grants f o r h i s troops as a whole, and subjected him to petty questionings. They made him f e e l that i n disbanding h i s army he was at t h e i r 14. Fam. V: 7, 2. 15. A t t . I : 14, 1, 2. 16. P l u t . Pompey 35. mercy, and thus, i n t h e i r short-sighted jealousy, they drove him to use u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l methods to gain h i s demands. This a l i e n a t i o n of Pompey from the Senate could not hut have g r e a t l y disturbed Cicero. Cicero's hopes about the r e b u i l d i n g of the government on a sound c o n s t i t u t i o n a l b a s i s received another setback: by the a l i e n a t i o n of the Senate and the Equites over the scandal of the lawcourts revealed i n the a c q u i t t a l of Cl o d i u s . Cato proved himself to be no p r a c t i c a l statesman by the way he hindered a l l means to win Pompey and to r e c o n c i l e the Equites and the Senators. When Caesar returned from h i s triumphs i n Spain i n June 60 B. C , he found a d i s g r u n t l e d Pompey. Thus, when he se-cured e l e c t i o n as consul f o r 59 Bv C , he knew he could win Pompey away from the Senate. Crassus, too, would be on h i s si d e . C i c e r o , a l s o , was i n v i t e d to j o i n them i n a auattuor-17 . v i r a t e , and i f he had accepted he would have saved himself. MA p r a c t i c a l p o l i t i c i a n would have embraced the opportunity: that Cicero d i d not do so i s strong evidence of h i s s i n c e r i t y , 18 as w e l l as of h i s courage." Thus, according to S i h l e r , the tr i u m v i r a t e was launched, unhampered by the scruples of an i d e a l i s t , who, although rebuffed by the Senate at t h i s time, 19 d i d not desert t h e i r cause. C i c e r o , as a statesman, was ecl i p s e d by the workings of the t r i u m v i r a t e and he cdid not 17. Strachan^-avidson "Cicero" p. 203 18. J . C. Rolfe "Cicero and His Influence". 19. S i h l e r , "Marcus T u l l i u s Cicero of Arpinum", p. 189 H *••••.• -; . . • • • . . fl - " ' ' - ".. - • ' ' ?! come i n t o M s own again u n t i l a f t e r the death of Caesar. ! The t r i u m v i r s now went ahead w i t h t h e i r land-scheme, (the usual way of gaining popular favour), and Pompey and Caesar j Became more c l o s e l y associated through Pompey's marriage to j J u l i a , Caesar's daughter. Pompey deserted Cicero and permitted Clodius, Cicero's enemy, to "become a plebeian so that Clodius might run f o r the t r i b u n e s h i p . Clod i u s , as t r i b u n e , c a r r i e d through a b i l l outlawing Cicero because he had put to death Roman c i t i z e n s without 30 t r i a l . Pompey and the* senators did nothing to save C i c e r o . With a heavy heart he l e f t Rome and h i s persecutor burned h i s home on the P a l a t i n e . Clodius seized a l l a v a i l a b l e property and -harassed-. Cicero's wife T e r e n t i a . Cicero's misery and unmanly g r i e f have been severely censured by h i s c r i t i c s . I t i s d i f f i c u l t f o r us to appreciate the extent of h i s s u f f e r i n g s beoause to him e x i l e was harder to bear than death. Indeed, he regrets that he d i d not choose 21 death r a t h e r than endure the l o s s of honour i n h i s banishment. He must have been t o r t u r e d by the thought that he y i e l d e d to the advice of Hortensius and other l e a d i n g senators that he should leave Rome instead of standing h i s ground against C l o d i u s . The oonsul f o r 57 B. C , Lentulus Spinther, f i n a l l y seoured the r e c a l l of Ci c e r o . His journey home was l i k e a 22 triumphal procession,for he was congratulated on every hand. 20. App. B. C. I I , 3 21. Fam. XIV: 4, 5. A t t . I l l : 10, 2. 22. A t t . IV: 1, 5. 10 23 Cioero found that he was s t i l l the leader of the Bar. His r e t u r n to Rome brought to the people a hope that the con-s t i t u t i o n , shattered by Caesar's attacks on i t , might be res -tored. The,Optimates again played i n t o the absent Caesar's hands by t h e i r d i s t r u s t of Pompey i n the matter of the corn 24 supply. They did not see that to o f f s e t the growing power of the conqueror of Gaul, they should give Pompey s u f f i c i e n t power to act as a check. Cicero's attack on the land b i l l made Caesar r e a l i z e that he must have a meeting w i t h h i s associates or c i v i l war would break out before he was ready f o r i t . Thus Pompey and Crassus met him at L*ca: ( A p r i l 56 B. C.), and the c o a l i t i o n became stronger than ever. Caesar secured the extension of hi s pro-consulship of Gaul, and Pompey and Crassus were to be consuls i n 55. Following the consulship Pompey was to be gov-ernor of Spain and Crassus governor of S y r i a . As a r e s u l t of t h i s conference a w r i t t e n order came from Pompey t e l l i n g Cicero to suspend a c t i o n against the Campanian land b i l l . Pompey made i t quite c l e a r that Cicero's r e c a l l had been based on h i s brother Quintus' guarantee that Cicero • • •• ' 25 would not oppose the t r i u m v i r a t e . Cicero now found that he had to favour Caesar because •: :^ p o s i t i o n was l i n k e d w i t h that 26 of Pompey. Hence Cioero was bound by f e e l i n g s of gr a t i t u d e 23. A t t . IV: 1, 3. 24. A t t . IV: 1, 7. 25. ]?am. I : 9, 9. 26. Earn. I : 9, 9; I : 9, 12. 11 f o r h i s r e s t o r a t i o n t o stand by Pompey, and to make good the pledges given the t r i u m v i r s by h i s brother. I f e e l that Cicero's support of the regents was based on the r e a l i z a t i o n - that he could not make headway against them at present. He would be ready to unite Pompey and the Senate whenever a break should occur i n the c o a l i t i o n . This ^etbaclb: does not i n d i c a t e any change i n h i s p o l i c y but i n d i c a t e s an i n e v i t a b l e surrender of h i s p o s i t i o n at the moment. A f t e r a l l , the Senate's short-sighted, narrow outlook had p r e c i p i t a t e d t h i s t r i u m v i r a t e , and i t had not helped Cicero i n h i s time of need or supported h i s e f f o r t s to make Pompey a powerful leader on t h e i r s i d e . The defeat and murder of Crassus near Carrhae on June 9, 53 deprived Caesar of h i s most powerful a l l y , i f the s t r a i n e d r e l a t i o n s h i p now e x i s t i n g between Caesar and Pompey since the death of J u l i a , should r e s u l t i n c i v i l war. Crassus' son Publius was k i l l e d a day or so before h i s f a t h e r , and i n h i s place Cicero was chosen augur. This honour gave Cicero much pleasure. The year 53 had ended without the e l e c t i o n of consuls owing to the i n t r i g u e s of the candidates. Cicero set aside any advantages which might accrue t o him through support of a candidate backed by the t r i u m v i r s and gave h i s support to 27 MilOj who had championed him against C l o d i u s . I n the r i o t s e a r l y i n January, Clodius was k i l l e d by the r e t a i n e r s of M i l o 27. S i h l e r , "Marcus T u l l i u s Cicero of Arpinum". p. 259 12 and i n the stormy days that followed the Senate proclaimed m a r t i a l law and c a l l e d on the i n t e r - r e x , Pompey and other magistrates to provide f o r the safety of the country. Pompey was elected sole consul, permitted t o r e t a i n h i s governorship of Spain, and became i n r e a l i t y , d i c t a t o r . Here we see him breaking o f f from Caesar and once more becoming a l l i e d to the Senate. I t was i n t h i s year, too, that Caesar broke the l a s t e f f o r t of the Gauls to recover t h e i r l i b e r t y . The f o l l o w i n g year saw Cicero c a l l e d on to take the governorship of C i l i c i a i n accordance w i t h Pompey's law which stated that f i v e years had to elapse between the holding of o f f i c e at Rome and the governorship of a province. In order then to f i l l the vacancies abroad the former consuls, who had not served as governors, had to serve i n the provinces. Cicero was u n w i l l i n g to leave Rome, and made sure that h i s term of o f f i c e should not be extended. However, as governor, he d i d a l l he could f o r the C i l i c i a n s , h e lping them to recover 28 from h i s rapacious predecessor, Appius Claudius. He put down a border r a i d w i t h such success that he was h a i l e d as "Impera-t o r " by h i s troops and henceforth e n t i t l e d to sign that t i t l e a f t e r h i s name and permitted to wreathe h i s fasces w i t h l a u r e l . The next step i n the honour would be the granting of a triumph by the senate on h i s r e t u r n to Rome. Cicero reached Brundisium on November 23, 50 B. C., to f i n d t r o u b l e again i n the p o l i t i c a l arena. The main contention 28. A t t . V: 16. 13 was with regard to Caesar's desire to r e t a i n h i s province u n t i l 29 he should enter on h i s second consulship beginning 48 B. C. His opponents, however, wanted an i n t e r v a l to elapse between "his pro-consulship and h i s consulship i n order to b r i n g him to t r i a l f o r c e r t a i n i l l e g a l acts of h i s f i r s t consulship of 59 B. C. Towards the close of the year, the consul Marcellus moved that Caesar should r e s i g n but opposed a motion a f f e c t i n g 30 Pompey i n the same way. Caesar had a staunch supporter i n Curio, the t r i b u n e , who vetoed the motion and proposed that both Caesar and Pompey should r e s i g n t h e i r commands at the 31 same time. The passing of the motion placed Pompey i n an awkward p o s i t i o n because he was not sure what Caesar would do. The senate were a f r a i d that Caesar and Pompey would unite again and that that would s p e l l the end of the nobles as a governing c l a s s . They must be kept apart. A few days l a t e r , a well-chosen, f a l s e rumour reported that Caesar had crossed the A l p s , and Marcellus moved that Caesar be declared an enemy 32 and that Pompey be placed i n charge o£ the s t a t e . Pompey accepted the commission and ordered a general l e v y . Meantime Curio sped to Caesar's headquarters at Ravenna. 29. App. B. C. I I , 25, Earn. V I I I : 3. 30. Caes. B. C. i , 2. P l u t . Pompey, 63. 31. P l u t . Caesar f 30. 32. P l u t . Pompey. 64. App. B. C. I I : 4. 14 Chapter I I I Cicero's D e c i s i o n 49 B. C. The senate, convoked on January f i r s t 49 B. C. under the shadow of c i v i l war, was tense ••with, stormy debate -and--curbed^ emotion. Caesar had very c l e v e r l y made the Pompeians take the i n i t i a t i v e i n c i v i l s t r i f e and Rome was f u l l of rumours about 33 Caesar's i n t e n t i o n s . Curio, Caesar's v e r s a t i l e agent, a f t e r a strenuous three days' journey from Ravenna had ju s t reached Rome w i t h a l e t t e r s t a t i n g Caesar's o f f e r to r e s i g n a l l but Ci s a l p i n e Gaul and two leg i o n s i f Pompey would go to Spain; or, he would give up h i s e n t i r e command i f Pompey would do 34 l i k e w i s e . Mommsen f e l t here that Caesar knew he would not be c a l l e d on to make good t h i s o f f e r because the Pompeians were ' 35 • already too f a r committed against him. Lucius Lentulus, the pr e s i d i n g consul, although forced by the Caesarian tribunes Antonius and Cassius to permit the reading of the l e t t e r , was so incensed by h i s hatred toward the Caesarians that he would not s u f f e r any motion a r i s i n g out of the l e t t e r . R e a l i z i n g Caesar's peace o f f e r at the c r u c i a l moment had made a strong impression on the t i m i d senate, he, i n a f u r y , forced the brow-beaten senate to pass the r e s o l u t i o n that Caesar should give up h i s province on a s p e c i f i e d date. Antony's suggestion, made the f o l l o w i n g daj, that both Caesar and Pompey should 33. A t t . VXI: 7 f . 34..Appian, B. C. i i , 32. 35. Mommsen. "History of Rome". Bk. V, Chapter ftf, p. 336. 15 r e t i r e was strenuously opposed. Cicero reached the neighbourhood of Rome on the f o u r t h 36 and worked hard to t r y to preserve the peace. On the f i f t h or s i x t h a f u r t h e r o f f e r by Caesar i n response to Cicero's e f f o r t was to r e t a i n only C i s a l p i n e Gaul, I l l y r i c u m and one l e g i o n 37 instead of two. But owing to the general frenzy which pre-vented the s e n a t o r i a l party from a c t i n g prudently, extreme measures p r e v a i l e d on January seventh. Lentulus declared the senate would take a vote on the "senatus consultum ultimum", and warned the tribunes to i n t e r f e r e at t h e i r p e r i l , Antony and Cassius protested t h i s threatening of the people's t r i -bunes, and f l e d to Caesar along with Curio and C a e l i u s . The senate then c a l l e d on the magistrates of the people to defend the s t a t e . This rashness i n threatening a d e c l a r a t i o n of war shows that the l i n k between Pompey and the senate i s none too f i r m even at t h i s important juncture, and each side i s anxious 38 to commit the other i r r e v o c a b l y . Cicero's dream of a union between the Senate and Pompey was achieved at l a s t but under circumstances that must have caused him to despair. Looking at the strength of. the troops on each side we see that Caesar had ten or eleven veteran legions and some a u x i l i a r i e s of G a l l i c and German horse, but only one l e g i o n i n 39 Northern I t a l y . Pompey had seven le g i o n s i n Spain, as many 36. Ad Jam. XVI; 12, 2. 37. P l u t a r c h : Caesar 31. 38. Caesar: B. C. i , 1-5. 39. A t t . : V I I : 7, 6. 16 40 a u x i l i a r i e s and f i v e thousand cavalry; i n I t a l y he had ten 41 l e g i o n s , but of these only the two legions taken from Caesar were veterans. He l e v i e d three legions i n the province of As i a and could count on the Eastern princes f o r cavalry; from 42 the East, too, he obtained a superior naval f o r c e . What Caesar lacked i n quantity of troops he made up i n the q u a l i t y of h i s forces and h i s rapid action.. On January eleventh, Caesar crossed the Rubicon and marched on Ariminum and sent forces ahead to occupy Pisaurum, Eanum, and Ancona. This r a p i d i t y caught the Pompeians by sur-p r i s e , but was no excuse f o r l e a v i n g the untenable c i t y of Rome January 17 so h u r r i e d l y that the treasury was l e f t f o r Caesar. Ci c e r o , who had been w a i t i n g outside Rome w i t h h i s l i c t o r s f o r a triumph t o be decreed by the senate, decided to abandon h i s triumph* I n a - l e t t e r to A t t i c u s he revealed h i s f a i l u r e to understand why the Pompeians had acted so r a s h l y and stated t h a t , as matters stood, he was wit h Pompey i f Pompey made a 43 stand i n I t a l y , but beyond that he could not say. He f e l t that Caesar i n launching h i s attack on I t a l i a n c i t i e s should be considered an enemy not a c i t i z e n claiming to be a c t i n g 44 honourably. The only immediate gain that Cicero could see i n Pompey's l e a v i n g Rome was that the people were sympathetic to Pompey f o r that reason. He, himself, was given a t r i f l i n g 40. Caesar, B. C. i , 39 41* Caesar, B. C. i , 15 f . 42. Caesar, B. C. i i i , 4, 5. 43. A t t . V I I : 10. 44. A t t . V I I : 11, 1. 17 commission, the charge of the r e c r u i t i n g i n Campania. I t was so l i g h t a duty that l a t e r he could say without fear of over-45 stepping the t r u t h , "neque negotium suscepisse." About the end of January came a peace o f f e r from Caesar. That Caesar, the aggressor, should o f f e r terms to Pompey, seemed to Cicero an i n s u l t i n i t s e l f . The terms were that i f Pompey went to Spain and disbanded h i s troops, Caesar would t u r n over Further Gaul to Domitius and C i s a l p i n e Gaul to Considius Nonianus, and would stand f o r the consulship i n 46 person. The senators seem not to have placed much confidence i n the o f f e r f o r many f e l t that a l l Caesar was doing was h i n -dering t h e i r preparations f o r war. Even i n the e a r l i e s t stages of the war Pompey was hampered by the conceit and i n e f f i c i e n c y of h i s o f f i c e r s . Thus, although Pompey had urged Domitius Ahenobarbus, who was i n charge of Picenum and Umbria, to hasten south with a l l the s o l d i e r s he could muster, Domitius chose to make a stand against Caesar at Corfinium. Pompey's fears about t h i s attempt were w e l l -founded, and from h i s l e t t e r to Domitius on February 17 he made the d i f f i c u l t i e s of the s i t u a t i o n c l e a r to Domitius, and pointed out to h i s o f f i c e r what a chance Caesar had to sever 47 communications between them. Pompey could not go north to help Domitius as h i s newly r e c r u i t e d s o l d i e r s would be no 45. A t t . ¥11: 17, 4 46. Earn. XVI: 12, 3. 47. A t t . V I I I : 12 C, 1 and 2. 18 match f o r Caesar's veterans. - When the town f e l l to Caesar on the t w e n t y - f i r s t , Caesar took the opportunity to thank Domitius f o r disobeying Pompey by sending him wi t h h i s f e l l o w - o f f i c e r s back to Pompey. This noble gesture won Caesar much popular favour,and may have been a source of amusement to him to send Domitius back where he could s t i l l be an annoyance to Pompey. Meanwhile, a f t e r a b r i e f v i s i t to Capua, Cicero returned to Formiae near the end of January and made h i s head-quarters there f o r about two months. In r e p l y to a l e t t e r from Caesar, he thanked Caesar f o r the compliments paid him and also praised 48 Pompey to Caesar. He.was, however, g r e a t l y disturbed about Pompey's plan to leave I t a l y . To Cicero's mind, i t would have 49 been more g l o r i o u s f o r Pompey to have died i n I t a l y . Although he f e l t that there was no hope f o r the safety of the state i n Pompey's present course of a c t i o n , yet he. would g l a d l y die f o r 50 him. He d i d not agree w i t h A t t i c u s , at t h i s p o i n t , that i f Pompey l e f t he was bound to go; he could not see that such a c t i o n would help e i t h e r the state or h i s f a m i l y . He f e l t 51 he must stay i n I t a l y to help i n discussions f o r peace. In a l e t t e r from Cales, w r i t t e n February 18 or 19, he ou t l i n e d the arguments f o r and against l e a v i n g I t a l y and j o i n -52 ing Pompey. Here we have revealed the inner workings of h i s 48. A t t . V I I I : 2,1. 49. A t t . V I I I : 2,2. 50. A t t . V I I I : 2,4. 51. A t t . V I I I : 2,4. 52. A t t . V I I I : 3. 19 quick mind. The argument f o r j o i n i n g Pompey which was based on a sense.of g r a t i t u d e f o r Pompey Js part i n Cicero's r e c a l l v/as counterbalanced by the f a c t t h a t , as p r e s i d i n g augur, Pompey permitted the adoption of the notorious Clodius i n t o a plebeian f a m i l y , thus enabling C l o d i u s , a f t e r being elected t r i b u n e , to have h i s revenge on Cicero by e x i l i n g him. Then, again, Pompey's recent actions were l a c k i n g both i n courage and i n f o r e s i g h t ; he had neglected Cicero's advice; he had opposed Marcellus when he had t r i e d to l i m i t Caesar's G a l l i c tenure at March f i r s t , - 49. The c h i e f argument, however, 53 against f o l l o w i n g Pompey, was Pompey's f l i g h t from Rome. Cicero looked on Pompey's r a l l y i n g point at A p u l i a as having nothing to recommend i t but i t s access t o the sea. The Pom-peians had no p o l i c y or plan f i t t i n g f o r those who wanted to save I t a l y . L a t e r , h i s comment on Pompey's f a i l u r e to support Domitius at Corfiniurn was that that f a i l u r e crowned h i s d i s -54 grace. Cicero concluded h i s arguments w i t h the remark that although he had more reasons on one side ( f o r remaining i n 55 I t a l y ) , he had more reason on the other. In the l e t t e r s from February twenty-fourth to March eleventh when Cicero received a message that Pompey had crossed 56 to Greece on March f o u r t h , many c o n f l i c t i n g thoughts troubled h i s peace of mind. The d i s g r a c e f u l conduct of the Pompeians, 53. A t t . V I I I : 3, 3. 54. A t t . V I I I : 7, 1. 55. A t t . V I I I : 3, 6. "..res verbosior haec f u e r i t , i l i a v e r i o r . " 56. A t t . IX: 6, 3. 20 namely, the r e f u s a l of peace, l a c k of preparation f o r war and 57 the l e a v i n g of Rome, weighed h e a v i l y upon him. Caesar, i n h i s r o l e of a generous v i c t o r , seemed to be the saviour of h i s 58 enemies, whereas Pompey seemed a t r a i t o r to h i s f r i e n d s . Caesar had asked Lentulus, the consul, to remain i n I t a l y to f i n i s h out h i s term of o f f i c e , o f f e r i n g him a province at the 59 completion of h i s year. Caesar a l s o made overtures to Cicero saying that he was pleased Cicero had remained n e u t r a l and 60 hoped he would continue to remain n e u t r a l , Cicero r e c a l l e d h i s p o r t r a i t u r e of the i d e a l statesman 61 and deeply regretted that Pompey had not acted the p a r t . He f e l t there was r e a l l y no choice between Pompey and Caesar as le a d e r s , because both wanted to be r u l e r s ; n e i t h e r was 62 i n t e r e s t e d i n the welfare of the s t a t e . Pompey's one desire was t o act the part of S u l l a and. b r i n g barbaric eastern troops to ravage I t a l y . Cicero shuddered at the threats coming from L u c e r i a , t h r e a t s not merely of p r o s c r i p t i o n but of u t t e r 63 extermination. In c o n t r a s t , Caesar's 'studied clemency and 64 moderation had won him many supporters. The people of the country towns were i n t e r e s t e d only i n t h e i r p a l t r y farms and 57. A t t . V I I I : 8. 58. A t t . V I I I : 9, 3. 59. A t t . V I I I : 9, 4. 60. A t t . V I I I : 11, 5. 61. A t t . V I I I : 11, 1. 62. A t t . V I I I : 11, 2. 63. A t t . V I I I : 11, 4. 64. A t t . IX: 7G. SI fortunes. Now that there seemed to he no immediate danger of l o s i n g t h e i r property, they had changed t h e i r a t t i t u d e : the •one they t r u s t e d before, they now £Sared; :and:' tiiey.-loved the.cone 65 whom they feared before. I n a c t i n g the beneficent t y r a n t Caesar had earned as much gra t i t u d e f o r the wrongs"he di d not commit :: 66 as i f he had stopped someone e l s e from committing.them. Not only A t t i c u s , but Balbus and Oppius, agents of Caesar, wanted Cicero to look to h i s own s a f e t y . They would l i k e Cicero to be the mediator f o r peace, while there might s t i l l be a chance of n e g o t i a t i n g peace; but, even i f Caesar should war against Pompey, they urged Cicero not to take part i n the 67 struggle but to remain n e u t r a l . They gave him d e f i n i t e assur-ances that Caesar was very eager to be re c o n c i l e d w i t h Pompey, had no cr u e l thoughts against anyone, and esteemed Cicero h i g h l y . C i c e r o , however, could not believe that Caesar would be moderate, as h i s former conduct, h i s associates and h i s 68 present e n t e r p r i s e d i d not point that way. Caesar, neverthe-l e s s , i n a l e t t e r to Cicero w r i t t e n from the neighbourhood of Brundisium about March 7, asked Cicero to meet him on h i s r e t u r n to Rome and to give him the b e n e f i t of h i s advice and 69 experience i n p u b l i c a f f a i r s . Although, at f i r s t glance, one might say that Cicero 65. A t t . V I I I : 13, 2. n . . i l i u m quo antea confidebant metuunt, .hunc amant quern timebant". 66. A t t . V I I I : 16,2. 67 .Att. IX: 7A. 68. A t t . IX: 2A, 2. 69. A t t . IX: 6A. •| 2 2 i d i d not seem to know h i s own mind f o r one l e t t e r was f u l l of i desire to j o i n Pompey and another was f u l l of c r i t i c i s m of j Pompey, yet that v a r i a b i l i t y was not wit h regard to general j purpose. He d i d not e n t e r t a i n the thought that he should sup-I port Caesar instead of Pompey. This seeming f a i l u r e to make I a d e c i s i o n q u i c k l y and act upon i t , was adequately explained i n a l e t t e r to A t t i c u s i n which he stated that he was t a l k i n g to A t t i c u s as i f he were t a l k i n g to himself. Anyone faced with such an issue at a c r i t i c a l time had to consider a l l pos-70 s i b i l i t i e s before making a d e c i s i o n . Many senators were by t h i s time on t h e i r way back to Rome; others again had d e f i n i t e 71 reasons and commissions to f o l l o w Pompey. Cicero had to con-si d e r the i n t e r e s t s of h i s f a m i l y ; f o r example, h i s brother . 7 2 . Quint us was set on j o i n i n g Pompey.' When the report a r r i v e d that Pompey had crossed over to 73 . Greece, Cicero regretted that he was not w i t h him. Two things had kept him from being w i t h Pompey; f i r s t , he hoped peace terms would be arranged; second, when he discovered that Pompey was entering on a war of d e s t r u c t i o n , he f e l t that i t d i d not 7.4 become a good c i t i z e n to have a share i n such a t r o c i t i e s . F e r r e r o , commenting w i t h reference to the f i r s t reason sa i d that i f Cicero had taken a more a c t i v e part and had been at Brundisium before Pompey had l e f t , he might have accomplished 70. A t t . V I I I : 14, 2. 71. A t t . IX: 6, 4. 72. A t t . IX: 1, 4. 73. A t t . IX: 6, 3 and 4. 74. A t t . IX: 6, 5; A t t . IX: 10, 3. 23 75 a r e c o n c i l i a t i o n between the leaders and arranged peace. Now as matters stood, Cicero d e f i n i t e l y resolved to f o l l o w Pompey because Pompey was supporting the r i g h t cause although he was using the wrong method. The Pompeian programme included the blockading of I t a l y so that the country would be starved i n t o submission; then would come a r e i g n of t e r r o r w i t h d e s t r u c t i o n 76 and c o n f i s c a t i o n s . As f a r as Cicero could foresee, a s i m i l a r 77 fate would b e f a l l I t a l y i f Caesar were the v i c t o r . Caesar, a f t e r brushing aside lawcourts, j u r i e s , and senate, would not be able to r e s t r a i n the extravagance and requests of h i s 78 daring a s s o c i a t e s . Cicero resented the la c k of respect f o r the o f f i c e of consul Caesar was showing i n proposing that Lepidus, a praetor, 79 should preside over the consular e l e c t i o n s . In r e p l y to Caesar l e t t e r asking him to come to Rome, Cicero made i t very c l e a r that he would only be there i f he were to act as a mediator between Caesar and Pompey. He was eminently s u i t e d f o r that 80 undertaking as he had not taken up arms,, i n the war. Cicero f u l l y r e a l i z e d that Caesar wanted him i n the Senate at Rome i n the capacity of an ex-consul and as a member of the college of augurs to sanction a praetor holding consular e l e c t i o n s or 81 naming a d i c t a t o r , both of these being u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a c t s . 75. F e r r e r o , "The Greatness and Decline of Rome". V. 2, p. 240. 76. A t t . IX: 7, 2; A t t . IX: 9, 2. 77. A t t . XX: 7, 2. 78. A t t . IX: 7, 3. 79. A t t . XX: 9, 3. 80. A t t . XX: 11A, 2. 81. A t t . XX: 15, 1. 24 Cioero was troubled about h i s coming meeting w i t h Caesar 82 on March twenty-eighth. Nevertheless, a f t e r the meeting was over, he f e l t more pleased w i t h h i s own conduct than he had fo r a long time. Although he f e l t that he had l o s t Caesar's - 83 regard, he had won esteem i n h i s own eyes. The meeting was a d i f f i c u l t one f o r Caesar i n s i s t e d that i f Cicero d i d not attend the meeting of the Senate on A p r i l f i r s t many other senators 84 would be l e s s ready to come. When Caesar t r i e d to tempt him to change h i s mind by asking him to attend the senate to d i s -cuss peace terms, Cicero s a i d that he would have to make the f o l l o w i n g statements i n the house: f i r s t , t hat he disapproved of Caesar's e x p e d i t i o n to Spain or any transport of troops to Greece; second, that he would have to express sympathy with Pompey. N a t u r a l l y , Caesar disapproved of those statements being made, but asked Cicero to give the matter f u r t h e r oon-85 s i d e r a t i o n . Caesar's associates at that time were apparently 86 a desperate crew, and d i d not impress Cicero favourably. As a r e s u l t of that meeting, Cicero r e a l i s e d that he must act 87 more q u i c k l y since he had l o s t Caesar's favour. Cicero celebrated h i s son's coming of age at Arpinum as Rome was out of bounds f o r him. The p o l i t i c a l events s t i r r e d 82. A t t . IX: 17, 1. 83. A t t . IX: 18, 1. 84. A t t . LX: 18, 1. 85. A t t . LX: 18, l i . 86. A t t . IX: 18, 2. 87. A t t . LX: 18, 3. 25 him deeply and i n h i s next few l e t t e r s we f i n d him i n a r e f l e c t i v e mood. The r e c r u i t i n g of men, at a l l times a hard-ship, seemed even more unendurable when i t was c a r r i e d out by ; ' 88 desperate men i n a wicked c i v i l war. He thought that Pompey might welcome him at t h i s stage of a f f a i r s more than i f he had been w i t h him from the s t a r t , because, p r e v i o u s l y , the Pompeians had great hopes.but now they had none. Cicero solemnly declared that he was not j o i n i n g Pompey f o r the sake of the Republic, f o r , to h i s mind, i t was u t t e r l y destroyed; but he . was going over to Pompey from a sense of gratitude to the man who had e x t r i c a t e d him from the d i f f i c u l t i e s i n t o which he had helped to put him. Moreover, he dreaded the horrors that were to f o l l o w i n I t a l y . I l l that the l o y a l i s t s had l e f t was l i f e , 89 and even that had no longer any a t t r a c t i o n f o r Cicero. He was now, more than ever, eager to be o f f to Greece because he 90 f e l t h i s p o s i t i o n i n I t a l y was not honourable. In pondering on h i s l i f e and comparing i t w i t h that of Pompey and of Caesar, he found comfort i n the fact- that he tiad not deserted or en-91 slaved h i s country but had always served i t l o y a l l y and w e l l . Although Caesar had acted w i t h moderation - a t . f i r s t , Cicero d i d not f e e l that Caesar was n a t u r a l l y adverse to c r u e l t y but had merely r e s t r a i n e d himself to win popular favour. At hi s short stay at Rome from A p r i l f i r s t , Caesar showed h i s 88. A t t . IX: 19, 1. 89. A t t . IX: 19, 2. 90. A t t . XX: 19, 3; A t t . X; 1,4; A t t . X: 2, 2. 91. A t t . X: 4. I contempt of the Senate by pers o n a l l y bestowing on Curio s i x j l i c t o r s and l a u r e l fasces instead of that honour coming from i the Senate. He thus i n d i c a t e d that a l l a u t h o r i t y would proceed 92 j from him not the senate. Another inci d e n t showed the people j the other side of Caesar's nature. Before h i s departure f o r j Spain, when he wanted the money "out of:* the treasury, he sent s o l d i e r s and blacksmiths to get i t . However, Metellus, the tr i b u n e , opposed t h e i r a c t i o n and only gave way when Caesar a r r i v e d i n person and threatened him w i t h death i f he did not y i e l d . Here was the ty r a n t ' s hand. Caesar had posed as the protector of the r i g h t s of the tribunes of the people e a r l y i n January, but now that one of them opposed h i s wishes he had no scruples about threatening him. Thus h i s b r i e f stay i n Rome seemed rat h e r to have harmed than helped h i s cause, and h i s violence toward the tribune overshadowed h i s clemency e a r l i e r i n the year. Cicero's f r i e n d C a e l i u s , a l o y a l Caesarian, was g r e a t l y alarmed by Cicero's opposition to Caesar i n r e f u s i n g to attend 94 the senate at Rome. He reminded Cicero that he had h i s son, 95 h i s home, and the career of h i s son-in-law to consider. He warned Cicero that Caesar's p o l i c y would not remain generous. Now Caesar was thoroughly roused against the senate there would 96 be no place f o r p e t i t i o n s to a v i c t o r i o u s Caesar. Caelius 92. A t t . X: 4, 5. 93. P l u t . Caesar. 35. 94. Earn. V I I I : 16, 1. 95. Earn. VXII: 16, 2. 96. lam. V I I I : 16, 1. 27 fu r t h e r argued that the Pompeians would be d i s t r u s t f u l of Cicero's a t t i t u d e because he had delayed so long, and stated that i f Cicero could not endure the threats of the Pompeians and the insolence of the Caesarians, he should r e t i r e to some remote place u n t i l the war was over, Caesar's own l e t t e r , 97 w r i t t e n en route to Spain, r e i t e r a t e d C a e l i u s ' arguments. He suggested to Cicero that a l o y a l c i t i z e n and peaceful man could w e l l keep out of c i v i l disturbance. Cicero, however, could not r e c o n c i l e honour wi t h i n a c t i v i t y , and displayed great courage i n r e f u s i n g to be n e u t r a l . As he declared, he was not i n t e r e s t e d i n p l a y i n g a clever r o l e ; he had made up hi s mind to go to Pompey whatever the outcome i n Spain should 98 be. 99 I n a l e t t e r to A t t i c u s of May 2, Cicero made an adequate defence against those c r i t i c s who have c a l l e d him a p o l i t i c a l trimmer. Since i t was no longer p o s s i b l e t o save the Republic, h i s main des i r e was to f u l f i l . ' ; , h i s debt of gra t i t u d e to Pompey. Once he was resolved on going, no pleas could deter him. Both h i s daughter and A t t i c u s wanted him to wait u n t i l the outcome of the b a t t l e i n Spain was known, and then to adopt a plan i n keeping w i t h that r e s u l t . Cicero had, of course, only one wish w i t h regard to S p a i n — t h e defeat of Caesar, Cicero pre-f e r r e d to abandon Caesar when Caesar was a v i c t o r not when h i s p o s i t i o n was more d o u b t f u l . Again, Caesar's v i c t o r y would 97. A t t . T i l l : 6. 98. A t t . X: 6, 1. 99. A t t . X: 8, 2. 28 mean slaughter, the c o n f i s c a t i o n of property, r e t u r n of e x i l e s , c a n c e l l a t i o n of debts, men of the lowest repute i n p u b l i c a f f a i r s , and a kind of tyranny more l i k e Eastern despotism 100 than Roman government. He reminded A t t i c u s of the duty placed on a l l magistrates and ex-magistrates at the beginning of the 101 year, the duty to see that the state should come to no harm. How could he then take part w i t h those against whom the state 102 had armed him? He stated h i s own resolve f i r m l y that since there was danger whether he went or stayed he preferred the 103 more honourable course. During the re s t of May, Cicero's time was occupied w i t h h i s preparations f o r departure. His main d i f f i c u l t y was avoid-in g contact w i t h Antony,who had w r i t t e n t o him to emphasize 104 the f a c t that Cicero was not to leave. Cicero pretended to be compliant, but, a f t e r arranging f o r h i s f a m i l y to stay at Arpinum, he eluded Antony's scouts and s a i l e d f o r Pompey's 105 headquarters on June seventh. In order to c l a r i f y Cicero's stand w i t h regard to the .•.republican form of government I th i n k i t i s w e l l t o review c e r t a i n "facts.; which determined h i s ultimate d e c i s i o n . In the f i r s t p l a c e , since Cicero had been absent from I t a l y from May 51 B. C. to November 50 B. C. as governor of C i l i c i a , he 100. - A t t . X: 8, 2. 101. Earn. XVI: 11. 102. A t t . X: 8, 8. 103..Att. X: 8, 5. 104. A t t . X: 10, 2. 105. Earn. XIV: 7., 2. 29 had not f i r s t hand information about the recent developments i n Rome. As he t r a v e l l e d , nearer to Rome he gained a more complete p i c t u r e of events. E a r l y i n December i n w r i t i n g to A t t i c u s from Trebulanum, he s a i d he was behind Pompey and the 106 government even i f Pornoey were to blame f o r Caesar's present 107 power. His main e f f o r t s , hone the l e s s , would be di r e c t e d 108 toward the preservation of peace. When he reached Eormiae a few days l a t e r , h i s fears were roused, f o r the l o y a l i s t s or 109 supporters of the government were not i n agreement. He d i d not grasp f u l l y what A t t i c u s meant i n saying that there was 110 need that he (Cicero) should support the r i g h t party. The way matters stood at that point he stated that there would be one course open to him, namely, the support of Pompey and the 111 senate against Caesar the invader. The f i r s t duty of the l o y a l i s t s should be the defence of the c a p i t a l ; then, i f i t would be necessary, they might leave the c a p i t a l i n order to cut o f f Caesar's s u p p l i e s . This suggestion seems t o me to be i n the nature of a planned evacuation w i t h the s p e c i f i c pur-pose that Cicero mentions and not a hasty departure from the c i t y . On Cicero's a r r i v a l at the o u t s k i r t s of Rome he at : 112 once began to s t r i v e to prevent the outbreak of war. However, when Pompey and h i s associates f l e d from Rome at the news of 106. A t t . V I I : 3, 2, T5. 107. A t t . VII: 3, 4. 108. A t t . V I I : 6. 109. A t t . V I I : 5, 4. 110. A t t . V I I : 7, 5. 111. A t t . V I I : 7, 5. 7. 112. Ad Earn. XVI: 12, 2. Caesar's advance, Cicero f a i l e d to see why f l i g h t was necessary and stated d e f i n i t e l y that he would support Pompey as long as . 113 Pompey made a stand i n I t a l y . Then, when i t "became evident that Pompey was planning to leave I t a l y and organize Eastern forces w i t h which to invade h i s country, Cicero could not f e e l 114 that Pompey was a c t i n g as the defender of the s t a t e . The lack of plan f o r the defence of I t a l y became evident. Pompey, then,was i n no wise d i f f e r e n t from Caesar, i n that he, too, was i n t e r e s t e d i n power f o r himself and not i n saving c o n s t i t u -115 t i o n a l government. Cicero shrank from the threats of the Pom-116 peians against t h e i r country and t h e i r countrymen. Thus, Cicero stayed i n I t a l y a f t e r Pompey l e f t i n order to be ready i n case h o s t i l i t i e s could- be prevented, and when he d i d go over t o Pompey, he went from a sense of personal gratitude to 117 Pompey. He had no hope that the c o n s t i t u t i o n was to be saved. Thus, i t w i l l be seen l a t e r , that a f t e r P h a r s a l i a Cicero d i d ' not j o i n the Pompeians i n t h e i r prolongation of the war, because he was not i n sympathy wi t h t h e i r stand. He returned to I t a l y to be ready to use whatever inf l u e n c e he might have w i t h Caesar to restore some form of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l government. 113. A t t . V I I : 10. 114. A t t . V I I I : 2, 2. A t t . V I I I : 7, 1. A t t . V I I I : 11, 4. 115. A t t . V I I I : 11, 2. 116. A t t . IX: 7, 2. 117. A t t , IX: 19, 2. 31 Chapter IT A Dark Outlook 48—47 B. C. A f t e r having t o use threats against the tribune Metellus 118 i n order to gain access to the treasury, Caesar was more anxious than ever to b r i n g the campaign i n Spain to a success-f u l conclusion to o f f s e t the r e v e r s a l of popular favour, and 119 so he l e f t Rome about A p r i l 6 (49 B. C.) Owing to the h o s t i l e a t t i t u d e of the people of M a s s i l i a , Caesar was delayed there 120 f o r about a month. This unexpected rebuff caused Caesar to carry out a daring p l a n . He l e f t the siege of M a s s i l i a to Gaius Trebonius and Decimus Brutus and hastened to Spain him-s e l f . There, a f t e r one serious repulse, he compelled the Pom-121 peians to surrender on August 2, When he a r r i v e d back at M a s s i l i a , he learned that at Rome Lepidus, a praetor, had 122 named him d i c t a t o r . Then hurrying back to Rome, he presided over the consular e l e o t i o n s and was himself elected consul f o r 123 the coming year. Hence, at the close of the year, he was ready to d i r e c t the off e n s i v e against Pompey i n Greece. E a r l y i n 48 B. C , Caesar crossed the A d r i a t i c and pre-pared not only to atta c k the Pompeians, but a l s o , as l e g i t i m a t e 124 oonsul,to propose peace terms. However, peace was out of the question. The campaign between the two s k i l l e d generals was 118. A t t . X: 8, 6. 119. A t t . X: 8, 6. 120. Caes. B. C. i , 34—36. 121. Caes. B. C. i , 41—87 122. Caes. B. C. i i . 21. 123. Dio Cass. 42. 124. Caes. B. C. i i i , 10. 32 on In earnest. Strachan-Davidson ably describes the combat as 125 f o l l o w s : "The strategy was admirable on both s i d e s , f a l l of daring and genius on the part of Caesar, and of s k i l l and prudence on the part of Pompey." I f Pompey could have exercised a f i r m enough c o n t r o l over h i s a r i s t o c r a t i c associates and pursued that p o l i c y of prudence, he might hot have suffered defeat, although h i s troops were hardly a match f o r Caesar's seasoned veterans. As i t was, he allowed himself to be persuaded to abandon h i s own p o l i c y . Thus, at P h a r s a l i a , the d i s c i p l i n e d western s o l d i e r s triumphed 126 over the eastern l e g i o n s and Pompey f l e d to Egypt where he was murdered. Eor some time before the b a t t l e of P h a r s a l i a Cicero had 127 N been at Dyrrachium i n poor h e a l t h . When the news of Pompey•s defeat reached Dyrrachium, Cato, who had a f l e e t and consider-able f o r c e s , wanted Cicero, the senior consular, to take com-mand. When Cicero refused to do so, he narrowly escaped being 128 k i l l e d by young Snaeus Pompey. Cicer o , i n accordance with h i s own p o l i c y , a r r i v e d back at Brundisium i n October, not very w e l l s a t i s f i e d with h i s own d e c i s i o n and hoping he would not regret h i s r e t u r n . He was to be at Brundisium f o r ten weary months i n a 125. -Strachan-Davidson, "Cicero", p. 339. 126. Caes. B. C. i i i , 8 5—89. 127. P l u t . P i c . 39 * 128. P l u t . C i c . 39. 129. Earn. XIV: 12. 33 wretched state of mind -and body. His correspondence during that period was mainly on domestic matters; whenever he d i d touch on p o l i t i c a l a f f a i r s he was u t t e r l y dejected. To begin with, Quintus had shown great i l l - w i l l towards him a f t e r Phar-s a l i a , and l a t e r sent h i s son to Caesar not only to gain fav-iso our but also to accuse h i s brother Marcus to Caesar. Another shadow clouding h i s s p i r i t s was the t a l k of the Pompeians before P h a r s a l i a of the f a r - r e a c h i n g p r o s c r i p t i o n s and c o n f i s c a -t i o n s planned against those who had remained i n I t a l y . Cicero grimly reminded A t t i c u s that h i s name was c e r t a i n l y on the l i s t 131 of persons whose property was to be confiscated. Now that these men were r a l l y i n g i n A f r i c a they would be looking to that 132 booty again. Cicero was troubled, too, about h i s l i c t o r s and wrote to Balbus and Oppius to see i f he might come nearer Rome. They were both confident about Caesar's goodwill to Cicero but could not give permission on t h e i r own a u t h o r i t y . In that same l e t t e r we f i n d a t r i b u t e to the deceased Pompey. 133 Cicero had kept h i s high personal regard f o r h i s hero. At t h i s time Cicero was subject to many c r i t i c i s m s ; the c r i t i c i s m of those who had joined Caesar, and that'of those who were 134 -now making a stand i n A f r i c a . The beginning of the year 47 showed no l i g h t e n i n g of the burden of Cicero's problems. Throughout i t a l l , however, he 130. A t t . X I : 8, 1. 131. A t t . X I : 6, 2. 132. A t t . X I : 6, 2. 133. A t t . XI: 6. 134. A t t . X I : 7, 3. A t t . X I : 8. 34 135 " blames only himself. The f a c t i o n against Caesar both i n 136 Spain and i n I t a l y had grown so that i t looked as i f the Pompeians were going to be able to reassert themselves. In -Rome Caesar's representatives were having d i f f i c u l t y i n t r y -ing to keep things running smoothly. A l l these f a c t s made 137 Cicero f e e l that he should have gone to A f r i c a and not con-cluded that the issue had been decided with the defeat of Pompey. Many of the l o y a l i s t s had already crossed over so 138. that he had no one to share h i s predicament. Notwithstanding h i s own troubles and the harm h i s brother Quintus had been doing him, he wrote to Caesar asking him to overlook Quintus' part i n the war. He was anxious, too, about T u l l i a ' s h e a l t h 139 and about Do l a b e l l a ' s a c t i v i t i e s i n Rome. He looked f o r Caesar's departure from Alexandria eagerly so that he might 140 obtain the s o l u t i o n f o r some of h i s d i f f i c u l t i e s . 141 In a l e t t e r to Cassius Longinus w r i t t e n just before Caesar's return, i n September, Cicero set f o r t h h i s reasons f o r not j o i n i n g the group i n A f r i c a : ..he f e l t that the quarrel between Caesar and Pompey should have been determined by the issue of the one major b a t t l e ; he a l s o preferred t o t r y to r e b u i l d the s t a t e out of the fragments of the o l d , rather than pursue a p o l i c y which meant the prolonging of the war 135. - A t t . X I : 9, 1. A t t . X I : 15, 2, 136. A t t . X I : 10, 2. 137. A t t . X I : 11, 1. 138. A t t . X I : 14, 1. 139. A t t . XI: 12, 3. 140. A t t . X I : 17, 3. A t t . X I : 18, 1. 141. Fam. XY: 15. 35 and of the s u f f e r i n g s of the people and which, perhaps, involved the u t t e r d e s t r u c t i o n of the s t a t e . Hence, Cicero had hu r r i e d to I t a l y a f t e r P h a r s a l i a to see what he could do about the s t a t e , but, since Caesar had not yet returned from the East, he had been unable to put any of h i s plans i n t o a c t i o n . 36 Chapter V Cicero Under a D i c t a t o r September 47—March 44 B. C. Just before Caesar returned to I t a l y , Cicero received a l e t t e r from him saying that he might r e t a i n h i s l i c t o r s and 142 hi s t i t l e of Imperator. When Caesar a r r i v e d at Tarentum about September 25, Cicero went to meet him and was k i n d l y ree~ ceived. As Cicero gained permission to l i v e where he wished, 143 he set out f o r h i s Tusculan v i l l a and spent the remainder of the year near Rome. Caesar a l s o rewarded h i s own supporters. Fuf i u s Calenus and Publiu s V a t i n i u s were elected consuls f o r the coming year. In order to give s p e c i f i c rewards to others Caesar increased the number of praetors from eight to ten, and f i l l e d many of 144 the vacancies i n the senate. He showed, too, that he would l i k e to have the co-operation of some of the moderate Pom-peians: Servius S u l p i c i u s was made governor of Greece, Gaius Cassius was made a legate and Majfcus Brutus, governor of C i s -145 alp i n e Gaul. In the year 46, Cicero acted as a mediator between Caesar and h i s associates and the e x i l e d Pompeians, as the greater part of h i s correspondence r e v e a l s . He devoted much of h i s time to philosophy and some of Caesar's f r i e n d s came to him -146 to study declamation. 142. Pro L i g a r i o 3: 7. 143. Fam. XIV: 20. 144. Dio Cass, x l i i , 51. 145. Fam VI: 6, 10. 146. P l u t . C i c . Fam. IX: 18. 1, 3. Gicero's r e a c t i o n to the actions of Caesar's associates was set f o r t h i n h i s correspondence w i t h Yarro. I n r e p l y i n g to Yarro's i n v i t a t i o n to v i s i t him at Baiae, Cicero s a i d he j f e l t he could not do so when the State was i n such a condition 147 and those i n power degraded hy every sort of crime and excess. Men l i k e Cicero were out of..favour not only- with the Caesar-ians but also w i t h the Pompeians. The former looked on Cicero and h i s f r i e n d s as defeated men; the l a t t e r , whose fr i e n d s had l o s t t h e i r l i v e s i n the c o n f l i c t or were e x i l e d , regarded them as having no r i g h t to.be a l i v e . In s p i t e of t h a t , Cicero f e l t that men such as Yarro and himself should hold themselves i n readiness to be of se r v i c e to the s t a t e , because much would 148 depend on Caesar's course of a c t i o n . As i f i n answer t o the c r i t i c i s m d i r e c t e d against him, he stated that those who had followed Pompey from a sense of duty and had withdrawn when the s i t u a t i o n became hopeless, were more honourable than those who had never l e f t I t a l y at a l l , and were not so bigoted i n t h e i r views as those who d i d not r e t u r n to I t a l y when t h e i r o pposition was without a v a i l . The c r i t i c i s m , however, of those who had done nothing at a l l themselves, was the hardest 149 to bear. I n t h i n k i n g back to the beginning of the C i v i l war, Cicero r e a l i z e d that r i g h t from the s t a r t the Pompeians wanted war, whereas Caesar d i d not so much desire i t , as not dread 150 i t . Caesar s t i l l maintained a f r i e n d l y a t t i t u d e to Cicero 147. Fam. IX: 3, 1. 148. Fam. IX: 2, 4. 149. Fam. LX: 5, 2. 150. Fam. IX* 6,2. 58 but Cicero could make no d e f i n i t e p r e d i c t i o n s as to the actions 151 of a man who had once made a departure from law and order. Towards the l a t t e r h a l f of 46 B. C , Cicero was more o p t i m i s t i c about Caesar's a t t i t u d e toward the s t a t e . On sev-e r a l occasions he I n s i s t e d to h i s correspondents that Caesar himself showed d i g n i t y , good sense and a desire to see j u s t i c e 152 done, but that he was hindered by the demands of h i s associates. Caesar's moderation was more s u r p r i s i n g day by day, and i t seemed that i t was v i c t o r y i t s e l f and not the v i c t o r that i n -153 f l i c t e d the harsh measures on the defeated. One occasion, the r e s t o r a t i o n of Marcus Marcellus by Caesar, an act c a l l e d by Cicero the most d i g n i f i e d enactment of Caesar's senate, made Cicero hope that once again the c o n s t i t u t i o n would come 154 to l i f e . Cicero was so moved that he broke the r e s o l u t i o n he had made to remain s i l e n t i n Caesar's senate and thanked Caesar f o r that r e s t o r a t i o n . Meantime Cicero's f a m i l y troubles were by no means over. 155 E a r l y i n 46 he had divorced Terentia * and i n December he 156 married h i s r i c h young ward P u b i l i a . This marriage was not a happy one, f o r Cicero had no a f f e c t i o n f o r her and resented her a t t i t u d e to h i s daughter T u l l i a . Perhaps the severest blow he s u f f e r e d was the death of h i s beloved T u l l i a i n Feb-151. Fam. IX: 16, 3. 152. Fam. IV: 9, 3; Fam. VI: 6; Fam. VI: 10; F m. X I I : 17,1. 153. Fam. IV: 4, 2. 154. Fam. IV: 4, 2, 3. 155. -Plut. C i c . 41. 156. Fam. IV: 14, 3. 39 ruary 45. His philosophy and the consolation of h i s f r i e n d s 157 were unable to b r i n g him any r e a l comfort, and he r e t i r e d 158 to Astura out of the bustle of Rome. Throughout the year many of h i s l e t t e r s to A t t i c u s contain h i s plans f o r a shrine to T u l l i a ' s memory but we have no record of t h e i r having been f u l f i l l e d . He f e l t that he could never take h i s place again i n 159 p o l i t i c s as he had l o s t the only t i e that bound him to l i f e . 160 He refused to see h i s young wife since he suspected that she r e j o i c e d at T u l l i a ' s death, and some time l a t e r , he divorced 161 her. As the year 45 was overshadowed by h i s great g r i e f , Cicero's a t t i t u d e to p o l i t i c a l a f f a i r s was much l e s s o p t i m i s t i c than i t had been the previous year, and he seemed more resigned 162 to withdraw from p o l i t i c s as he was growing o l d . Caesar, engaged i n a war i n Spain against the forces under Pompey's sons, was absent from Rome the greater p a r t of the year. The d e c i s i v e b a t t l e , fought at Munda, was an overwhelming v i c t o r y f o r Caesar. Pompey's elder son was K i l l e d but the younger 163 made h i s escape. While the war i n Spain was i n progress, Cicero summed up h i s d e c i s i o n about the outcome w i t h the s t a t e -ment that, i f Pompey's sons were v i c t o r i o u s there would be ru t h l e s s massacre; i f Caesar were the v i c t o r , there would be 164 slavery. His l a s t statement shows that he must have now seen that Caesar the conqueror would become Caesar the d i c t a t o r , 157. A t t . X I I : 14, 3, 4. 161. P l u t . C i c . 41. 158. A t t . X I I : 15; A t t . X I I : 21, 4. 162. Fam. VI: 4, 4. 159. A t t . X I I : 23, 1; Fam. V: 15. 163. P l u t . Caes. 56. 160. A t t . X I I : 32, 1. 164. Fam. IV: 14, 1. and h i s chance of introducing some measure of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l government would he s l i g h t . As always, he was opposed to s e t t l i n g c o n s t i t u t i o n a l issues hy means of the sword instead 165 of by c o n s t i t u t i o n a l means. Some time i n May, Cicero wrote a l e t t e r of p o l i t i c a l advice to Caesar but i t was never sent to Caesar because Balbus and Oppius objected to c e r t a i n sug-166 gestions Cicero had made. Cicero refused t o make any changes 167 and withdrew the l e t t e r , p r e f e r r i n g to give up any form of f l a t t e r y and r e t a i n some measure of h i s i n d i v i d u a l l i b e r t y . Toward the close .of the year Caesar openly showed h i s desir e to be k i n g . He had h i s statue set up beside that of 168 Quirinus and then had h i s image c a r r i e d i n a procession among those of the gods. Cicero r e j o i c e d that the people d i d not applaud the statue of V i c t o r y because the statue of Caesar was 169 w i t h i t . However, Cicero d i d not refuse to attend the senate on August f i r s t as he preferred to go rather than to have h i s 170 absence a t o p i c f o r d i s c u s s i o n . Although Cicero had dreaded Caesar's v i s i t to him at P u t e o l i , y e t , on the whole, the v i s i t passed o f f very w e l l . Caesar enjoyed h i s dinner, and the t o p i c s of conversation were i n no way serious as t h e i r d i scussions were on l i t e r a r y t o p i c s 171 not p o l i t i c a l ones. Caesar's subsequent mockery of the con-165. Fam. IV. 14, 2; Fam. VI: 1, 6. 166. A t t . X I I I : 27, 1. 167. A t t . X I I I : 31, 3. 168. A t t . X I I : 45, 2 169. A t t . X I I I : 44, 1. 170. A t t . X I I I : 47 B, 1. 171. A t t . X I I I : 52, 1, 2. 41 s o l ship by having Caninius Rebilus elected f o r a s i n g l e day hurt Cicero deeply f o r he saw i n i t an i n s u l t to the d i g n i t y 172 of the o f f i c e . Caesar had himself elected consul f o r 44 B. C. w i t h Mark Antony as h i s colleague, and spent the e a r l y months of the year 173 preparing to make an expedition against the Parthians. His acceptance of the t i t l e of perpetual d i c t a t o r revealed that he 174 d i d not intend to r e l i n q u i s h supreme power and h i s adoption of h i s nephew Octavius would seem to i n d i c a t e h i s desire to 175 e s t a b l i s h a dynasty. . This passion f o r r o y a l power gained f o r 176 him much hatred and r e s u l t e d i n a conspiracy being formed against him. Thus, when Caesar come to the senate house on 177 March 15, the conspirators took h i s l i f e . 172. Fam. V I I : 30. 1, 2. 173. App. B. C. i i , 110. 174. App. B. C. v i i , 4 — 5 . 175. App. B. C. i i i , 9. 176. P l u t . Caes. 59 . 177. P l u t . Caes". *<^ >1, 1—4. 42 Chapter VI. Cicero as Leader of the State. Cicero's immediate r e a c t i o n to the murder of Caesar was 178 one of joy that the tyrant had been removed. Throughout, he was l a v i s h i n h i s p r a i s e of the conspirators whom he termed 179 as heroes even when he r e a l i z e d that although the tyrant had 180 been k i l l e d , tyranny s t i l l l i v e d on. In no respect had the 181 c o n s t i t u t i o n been restored or freedom recovered^ f o r the con-182 s p i r a t o r s had lacked a d e f i n i t e plan and course of a c t i o n . The conspirators d i d not see the danger of l e a v i n g Antony a l i v e 183 as Cicero d i d , and he had an ex c e l l e n t r e t o r t f o r Antony when Antony accused him of being the ri n g l e a d e r of the p l o t , by s t a t i n g that he f e r v e n t l y wished he had been,for then Antony 184 would not now be a l i v e to troub l e the l i b e r a t o r s . March f i f t e e n t h and si x t e e n t h were days of confusion at Rome. A f t e r Caesar had been murdered, Brutus attempted to address the assembled senators but they, without stopping to 185 hear him, f l e d from the senate i n bewildered f e a r . On the si x t e e n t h the conspirators again made a formal speech to the people; t h i s speech the people l i s t e n e d to r e s p e o t f u l l y 178. Fam.VI: 15 179. A t t . XIV: 4, 2; A t t . XIV: 14, 2; A t t . XIV: 11, 1; Fam. X I I : 3, 1. 180. A t t . XIV: 9, 2; A t t . XIV: 14, 2; Fam. X I I : 1, 1. 181. A t t . XIV: 4, 1; A t t . XIV: 14, 2; A t t . XIV: 18, 3. 182. A t t . XIV: 21, 1. 183. A t t . XIV: 21, 1; A t t . XV: 4. A t t . XV: 11. 184. Fam. X I I : 3, 1. 185. P l u t . Caes. 67: 1. 43 186 without showing any resentment at the deed. Through Decimus Brutus the conspirators began negotiations w i t h Antony and 187 Lepidus. Antony, even as e a r l y as t h i s , seemed to have come forward as a leader of the Caesarians. To him, as the s u r v i v -i n g consul, Caesar's widow Calpurnia gave a considerable sum of money and a l l of Caesar's papers. These papers not only had a record of Caesar's enactments but also contained h i s plans f o r future a c t i o n ; i n Antony's hands such papers would 188 play an important part i n any scheme he might work out. On the seventeenth of March Cicero attended the meeting 189 of the senate i n the temple of T e l l u s and proposed a general amnesty. In so doing, he f e l t he was l a y i n g a sound basis f o r peace. Antony added to t h i s proposal the r a t i f i c a t i o n of Caesar's a c t s , a measure he claimed e s s e n t i a l to the preserva-190 t i o n of peace. Following the meeting of the senate Brutus and Cassius were entertained by Lepidus and Antony respect-i v e l y so that i t seemed that a c i v i c disturbance had been avoided. The province of Crete was assigned to Brutus and 191 that of A f r i c a to Cassius. Meanwhile, i n s p i t e of the opposition of Cassius, Brutus granted to Caesar's f r i e n d s the r i g h t to hold a p u b l i c funeral and to p u b l i s h h i s w i l l . As subsequent events were to show 186. P l u t . Caes. 67, 4. 187. Fam. XI; 1, 1. 188. P l u t . Ant. 15. 189. P h i l . i . I , 1; i i . 35. 89; A t t . XIV: 14, 2. 190. App. B. C. i i , 1 2 6 f . P l u t . Ant. 14 191. P l u t . Brut. 23. 44 Brutus' f i r s t mistake was i n sparing the l i f e of Antony, and hi s second was the granting of the above requests to Caesar's 19S f r i e n d s . The reading of the w i l l , w i t h i t s bequests to the -c i t i z e n s as w e l l as to the s o l d i e r s and to o f f i c i a l s , and Antonj'-'s f u n e r a l speech so roused the i n d i g n a t i o n of the people 193 'against the conspirators that they had to leave Rome. Antony and Lepidus as leaders of the Caesarian party d i d not have a ready plan of a c t i o n so that Antony, to my mind, played f o r time. Before going too f a r w i t h any pr o j e c t he had to f i n d out j u s t what-following the conspirators had and make hi s b i d f o r power according to the varying circumstances. We have already seen h i s e a r l y r e c o n c i l i a t i o n w i t h the conspira-t o r s coupled with h i s subtle a d d i t i o n to Cicero's proposal f o r a general amnesty. Thus, on March seventeenth he refused 194 Decimus Brutus h i s province of C i s a l p i n e Gaul. Decimus f e l t at the time that Antony's r e f u s a l was based on h i s fear of the conspirators gaining too prominent a place i n the state and of /A. having no part himself. Decimus here .warned ABrutus and Cassius that Antony was l i k e l y to be treacherous. A l i t t l e l a t e r , how-ever, Antony proposed that a d i c t a t o r s h i p such as Caesar held should be abolished a l t o g e t h e r . This move seemed to i n d i c a t e that there was s t i l l a chance f o r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l government 195 and Cicero praised h i s a c t i o n . About A p r i l the eighth or 192. P l u t . Brut. 23. 193. P l u t . B ut. 26; Ant. 14; C i c . 42.194. Fam. X I : 1, 1. 195. P h i l . i . 1, 2. 45 ninth. Antony was s t i l l able to conceal h i s r e a l i n t e n t i o n s because he gave the impression of being more i n t e r e s t e d i n 196 banqueting than i n p l o t t i n g against the conspirators. From A p r i l twenty-sixth on, however, Antony's plans became very c l e a r to Cicero. One t h i n g was c e r t a i n : there 197 would be no hope of .remaining n e u t r a l i n t h i s coming st r u g g l e . Antony had declared that he would consider an enemy anyone who 198 had r e j o i c e d at Caesar's death, and Cicero and h i s f r i e n d s had made no secret of t h e i r joy. Antony, meanwhile, had been • making such good use of Caesar's papers that Cicero f e l t that they were more enslaved by Caesar's notes that they had been 199 by Caesar himself. Antony, wi t h Dolabella's help, had see-cured the passage of a law granting to Caesar's veterans the land promised them and he set out f o r Campania to supervise 200 the allotment and c o l o n i z a t i o n of that land. There he c o l -201 l e c t e d a large bodyguard of veterans and others; t h i s body-guard had probably been granted to him by the senate before he 202 l e f t Rome, but Antony's free use of Caesar's papers had made the senate suspicious and they decreed that a commission 203 be appointed t o look i n t o Caesar's a c t s . Before proceeding f u r t h e r , I f e e l that i t i s w e l l to 196. A t t . XIV: 3,2. 197. A t t . XV: 20, 2. 198. A t t XIV: 13. 199. A t t . XIV: 14, 2; Fam. X I I : 1, 1. 200. P h i l . v i i i . 8. 25. 201. App. B. C. i i i . 5f. 202. App. B. C. i i i . 4 f . 203. A t t . XVI: 16A, 6. P h i l , i i . 3 9 . 46 made note of another character, destined to play the leading p a r t i n t h i s straggle f o r power. Young Octavius, a f t e r hear-ing of Caesar's death and of the w i l l which made him Caesar's h e i r , hastened to I t a l y to claim h i s i n h e r i t a n c e . Cicero spoke of h i s being next door to him at P u t e o l i ( A p r i l 21) and 204 of h i s f r i e n d l y a t t i t u d e . When Octavius l e f t to go on to Rome, however, Cicero was hurt that he could go there but not 205 the men who had freed t h e i r country from a t y r a n t , On h i s a r r i v a l there, Octavius made a p p l i c a t i o n to Antony f o r h i s legacy'but Antony was unable to give i t to him, f o r he had spent i t himself. A f t e r t h i s i n c i d e n t and a f t e r being treated con-temptuously by Antony, Octavius borrowed money from h i s f r i e n d s to pay p a r t , at l e a s t , of Caesar's l e g a c i e s to the people and to make preparations f o r the games to honour Caesar's v i c t o r y 206 at Pharsalus. Cicero f e l t anxious about the e f f e c t of the 207 c e l e b r a t i o n of these games, and a month l a t e r , while p r a i s i n g •sc-Oot avian' s w i t and s p i r i t and noting that he seemed w e l l -disposed to M. Brutus and the others, yet he f e l t that he could not wholly t r u s t a young man whose name was Caesar. Octavian's own f a t h e r - i n - l a w was not sure that he could be t r u s t e d . One conclusion that Cicero reached e a r l y was that Octavian must be 208 d i s s o c i a t e d from Antony., Cicero, himself, a f t e r the meeting of the senate on March 204. A t t . XVI: 11, 3. 205. A t t . XIV: 12, 3. 206. Fam. XI: 28, 6; A t t . XV: 2, 3. 207. A t t . XV: 2, 3. 208. A t t . XV: 12. -x Octavius' adoption was formerly r a t i f i e d June 44, and hence-f o r t h he was known as Octavian. 47 seventeenth, d i d not have a p u b l i c part i n p o l i t i c s f o r about s i x months and during that time he devoted himself to l i t e r a -209 t u r e . He l e f t Home on A p r i l seventh and d i d not return u n t i l he came back to take up the f i g h t against Antony i n August. We have seen how Cicero's f i r s t joy i n the death of Caesar gave way to regret t h a t , as the conspirators had no d e f i n i t e plans to carry out a f t e r the murder, the c o n s t i t u t i o n was i n no sense re s t o r e d . The conspirators even lacked money and troops to ensure t h e i r personal s a f e t y a f t e r Antony's f u n e r a l speech had 210 roused the people against them. Antony's i n t r i g u e s w i t h the 211 veterans, and the news that he was intending to seize f o r 212 himself the province of C i s a l p i n e Gaul, made Cicero see that 213 once again c i v i l war was to come to I t a l y . He pledged h i s M' 214 support to the cause o f A B r u t u s , but was unable to be of any s p e c i f i c help immediately as Brutus could not make up h i s mind 215 whether to go i n t o e x i l e or not. Death was the e x i l e that appealed to Cicero and he would g l a d l y have sgiv'eh up hi-s: l i f e: to 216 ise.e• -.the;..'constitution:-.roes-torjed'. and' Brutus in' p r o s p e r i t y . I n l o o k i n g f o r support to f u r t h e r h i s plans f o r the much r e s t o r a t i o n of the Republic, Cicero must have been v e r y A d i s -couraged at t h i s time. The co n s u l s - e l e c t , H i r t i u s and Pansa, 209. A t t . XIV: 4. 210. A t t . XIV: 4. 211. A t t . XIV: 21-, 2; 212. A t t . XIV: 14, 4. 213. A t t . XIV: 13, 2. A t t . XIV: 22, 2. 214. A t t . XIV: 15. 215. A t t . X I : 19 A t t . XIV: 18, 3. 216. A t t . XIV: 19, 2. A t t . XV: 3, 1. 48 were not sure of t h e i r p o s i t i o n as yet, Cicero d i d win over H i r t i u s to state t h a t he would support the republican cause; Pansa, however, declared that he was against c i v i l war but '-feared armed a c t i o n from the conspirators as much as he d i d 217 from Antony. The one person i n whom Cicero could f i n d s a t i s -f a c t i o n was Decimus Brutus,who set out f o r h i s province of 218 C i s a l p i n e Gaul and joined h i s troops there. The helplessness o f A B r u t u s and Cassius was f u r t h e r exemplified i n t h e i r i n d e c i -s i o n whether or not to accept the commission Antony offered 219 them, that of supplying I t a l y w i t h g r a i n . Although Cicero resented the i n s u l t Antony was o f f e r i n g them by such a com- . mission, yet he advised Brutus to accept and to keep away from Rome f o r h i s own sa f e t y . He reproved both men f o r t h e i r hesitancy a f t e r the k i l l i n g of Caesar and pointed out that they and not Antony should have summoned the senate and taken 220 complete charge of the s i t u a t i o n . The u t t e r hopelessness of the cause of the s t a t e as revealed by the meeting of the lea d i n g republicans almost convinced Cicero that he should 221 take advantage of the lega t e s h i p offered him by D o l a b e l l a 222 and v i s i t h i s son at the U n i v e r s i t y of Athens. He r e a l i z e d , 223 however, that a f f a i r s were reaching a c r i s i s , and that he 217. A t t . XT: 1A. 218. A t t . XIV: 13, 2. 219. A t t . XV: 11. 220. A t t . XV: 11, 3 221. A t t . XV: 11, 4. 222. A t t . XIV: 16, 3. 223. A t t . XV: 11, 4; A t t . XV: 18, 2; A t t . XV: 19, 1 49 might be c r i t i c i z e d f o r l e a v i n g I t a l y and deserting the cause 224 of the r e p u b l i c . When Cicero f i n a l l y set s a i l from Pompeii on J u l y 17, he knew that he was l e a v i n g I t a l y at peace to return to I t a l y 225 at war. A f t e r reaching Syracuse, he set out f o r Greece but 226 was twice d r i v e n back by unfavourable winds to Leuoopetra. While there, he received word that there was hope that Antony 227 and the conspirators might be r e c o n c i l e d , and so he decided to r e t u r n to Rome to attend the meeting of the senate on Sep-tember f i r s t . On h i s way to Rome, although he learned that a break had occurred between Antony and the conspirators, he continued on h i s journey and reached Rome on August t h i r t y -228 f i r s t . Owing to fa t i g u e a f t e r h i s journey, Cicero d i d not attend the senate on the f o l l o w i n g day. This f a i l u r e to be present caused Antony to threaten to compel' h i s attendance and to 229 speak against C i c e r o . Cicero appeared the next day, and i n h i s s t i r r i n g address ( F i r s t Eliilippdi.©)' he offered leadership and guidance to the senate. He b o l d l y but calmly c r i t i c i z e d Antony's recent p o l i c y , and appealed t o Antony to s t r i v e f o r true g l o r y and not personal power. Antony's r e p l y was a scathing attack on Cicero's whole career; i n p a r t i c u l a r , he 224. A t t . XIV: 13, 4; A t t . XV: 25; A t t . XVI: 7, 1. 225. A t t . XVI: 3. 226. A t t . XVI: 7, 1. 227. Fam. XI : 3, 3. P h i l . i . 3. 228. P h i l . V. 7. 229. P h i l . i . 5. 50 h i m t r i e d to rouse the veterans against Cicero by charging.with 230 the planning of Caesar's a s s a s s i n a t i o n . Cicero's answer, the Second P h i l i p p i c , was not de l i v e r e d but was published i n Nov-ember. In i t , Cicero attacked Antony's p r i v a t e and p u b l i c l i f e and challenged Antony t o do h i s worst to him personally but to be re c o n c i l e d to the r e p u b l i c . Cicero counted h i s own 231 l i f e a small p r i c e to pay f o r the l i b e r t y of h i s country. That Cicero d i d not d e l i v e r the Second P h i l i p p i c while Antony was s t i l l i n Rome does not to me suggest l a c k of courage on Cicero's part nor does i t seem a c o n t r a d i c t i o n of the preced-in g statement. My i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s that Cicero knew that to rouse Antony's wrath at t h i s time would be to s a c r i f i c e h i s l i f e without having a chance to t r y to restore l i b e r t y . I n October young Octavian acted b o l d l y to check the power of Antony by r a l l y i n g to himself the veterans of J u l i u s 232 Caesar. So suc c e s s f u l was he that two of the legions Antony hoped to e n r o l l , the Martian and the Fourth, decided to j o i n 233 Octavian. Thus Antony l e f t Rome November 29, and marched to 234 C i s a l p i n e Gaul to oppose Decimus Brutus, a f t e r he had arranged f o r h i s brother Gaius to be granted the province of 235 Macedonia and C a l v i s i u s the province of A f r i c a * Cicero 230. Fam. X I I : 2, 1; P h i l . i i . 14. 231. P h i l . i i . 46. 232. A t t . XVI: 8, 1. 233. P h i l . i i i . 3, 6f. 234. App. B. C. i i i . 46. 235. P h i l . i i i . 10, 26. 51 p r a i s e d the prompt a c t i o n of Octavian at t h i s juncture and urged that the republicans support him; but, here again he was a s s a i l e d by doubts. How could they f o l l o w so young a 236 .man? His name, tooip was Caesar I Nevertheless, as Octavian wanted to a c t through the senate and have i t s approval, he wrote unceasingly to Cicero to come to him, f i r s t a t Capua, 237 then at Rome, and once more to save the s t a t e . Repeatedly, Cicero temporized, unsure of t h i s young leader, and f e l t that Octavian was presumptuous to b e l i e v e that he could convene 238 the senate before January f i r s t . L a t er, the ominous s t a t e -ment of Octavian that he hoped to be permitted to a t t a i n to 239 the honours of h i s f a t h e r , disturbed Cicero w i t h the thought that i f Octavian met w i t h success, Caesar's acts would be affirmed more f o r c e f u l l y than they were on March 17 (44 B. C.), and that that would be detrimental to the i n t e r e s t s of Mo Brutus and h i s p a r t y . On the other hand, i f he l o s t , Antony would 240 be unbearable. Cicero could not support Octavian whole-heartedly u n t i l he was reasonably sure not only that Octavian would support the cause of the s t a t e , but also that he would 241 be well-disposed to the t y r a n n i c i d e s . On December 20 the tribunes convened the senate to make plans to ensure safety f o r the senate to meet January f i r s t 236. A t t . XVI: 8; A t t . XVI: 9. 237. A t t . XVI: 11, 6. 238. A t t . XVI: 11, 6. 239. App. i i i , 41; A t t . XVI: 15, 3. 240. A t t . XVI: 11, 1. 241. A t t . XVI: 15, 3. 52 under the new consuls, H i r t i u s and Pansa. In h i s speech, C i c -ero, by a passionate appeal to the senate, r e c a l l e d the senate to i t s former v i t a l i t y and l a i d the foundations f o r c o n s t i t u t -242 i o n a l government. On that day he stood as leader of the sen-ate, a post of honour but a l s o one fraught w i t h danger. He proposed that the senate commend Decimus Brutus f o r holding h i s province against the threats of Antony; he also recommended that a vote of thanks be given to Octavian f o r h i s prompti-tude i n r i d d i n g Rome of Antony, and he i n s t r u c t e d the consuls-e l e c t to see that they should be able to hold the meetings of the senate i n s a f e t y . From now on he had a double duty to perform; he had to give leadership to the senate and to keep the rather l o o s e l y - k n i t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l party e n t h u s i a s t i c to i t s cause.. The task before him was overwhelming, f o r , a l -though the Roman people were showing wondrous courage and unanimity i n t h e i r desire f o r l i b e r t y , yet the consulars were 243 e i t h e r weak or d i s l o y a l . Against Cicero's advice, an em-bassy was sent to t r e a t with Antony e a r l y i n January; i t was to demand that he evacuate C i s a l p i n e Gaul, remain two hundred 244 miles from Rome, and obey the senate and the Roman people. I t f a i l e d owing to the want of s p i r i t of i t s members; they hot onlv f a i l e d i n s t r e s s i n g the demands stated but brought . 245 back extravagants demands from Antony. 242. Fam. X: 28; P h i l . i i i . 243. Fam. X I I : 4, 1; Fam. X I I : 5, 2; Fam. X I : 8, 1. 244. Fam. X I I : 4, 1; Fam. X I I : 5, 3; Fam. XI: 8, 1. 245. P h i l . v i i i . i , 25. 55 Cicero had al s o to encourage and cherish the al l e g i a n c e of the governors abroad and give support to the mil i t a r y -l e a ders. Marcus Brutus, a f t e r he l e f t I t a l y , seemed to shake ,- o f f h i s i n d e c i s i o n ; he took over the province of Macedonia from Quintus Hortensius and defeated the small force of Gaius 246 Antonius who had come to claim the governorship, Cassius, 247 too, held the troops i n S y r i a , but when D o l a b e l l a was out-lawed f o r h i s savage k i l l i n g of Trebonius, the governor of A s i a , the senate would not put Cassius i n charge there i n s p i t e of Cicero's e f f o r t s on h i s behalf. Even at t h i s time of emergency petty j e a l o u s i e s and ambitions t i e d the hands of those who genuinely wanted to serve the s t a t e . In t h i s 248 case, the consul Pansa wanted the" post i n A s i a himself. In A f r i c a , Quintus C o r n i f i c i u s r e s i s t e d the attempt of the o f f i c e r s of Antony's nominee to seize the province and won 249 f o r himself the approval of the senate. P o l l i o , w r i t i n g 250 from Spain, declared h i s l o y a l t y t o the senate at t h i s time. Meanwhile, i n Gaul, iBe.dimus:,.Brutus, succeeded pa>h?eskizig Antony's siege of Mutina, bu;t-he lacked troops ^ and equipment 251 f o r further.;action• = • against Antonyvc. This i n i t i a l v i c t o r y at Mutina was c o s t l y because the one consul, H i r t i u s , f e l l i n b a t t l e , and the other, Pansa, died a few days l a t e r from 246. App. B. C. i i i , 79. 247. Earn. H I : 11. 248. Earn. X I I : 7, 1. 249. Earn. X I I : 25, 1. 250. Earn. X: 31, 5. 251. Earn. X I : 13, 1. 54 £58 h i s wounds. The republican party at Rome -.were,.cso-.elated,.with.:the success of Decimus Brutus and Octaviaia over Antony that they forgot that the. danger was not yet over and that Antony was s t i l l a l i v e . They acted as i f they had the f u l l power of the old c o n s t i t u t i o n behind them, and not only rewarded Decimus Brutus w i t h a triumph whereas as Octavian only received an 253 ovation, but also assigned the leadership of the forces of the deceased consuls to Brutus. They angered the s o l d i e r s when t h e i r generals were not given a place on the commission 254 of ten to d i s t r i b u t e the lands granted to the s o l d i e r s . 255 Then, too, since the commands of Marcus Brutus i n Macedonia 256 and Cassius i n S y r i a had been r a t i f i e d , the moderate Caesar-ian party f e l t that everything was being handed over to t h e i r b i t t e r e s t enemies. Octavian could not help cre-al'iz'lrig;*;- that i f he wanted a p u b l i c career, he would not win i t through debates i n the senate but through h i s own achievements. He knew f u l l w e l l how much a man wit h an.army behind him could win. Meantime i n Gaul, Lepidus, who had sent many professions 257 " of l o y a l t y to Cicero, joined forces w i t h Antony. In h i s l e t t e r to the senate he sa i d he was forced to make peace w i t h 252 Fam. X: 33, 4. 253 Brut. I : 15, 9. 254 Fam. X I : 20, 1; Fam. X I : 21, 2. 255 P h i l . X: 11, 26. 256 Brut. I : 5, 1. 257 Fam. X: 34A, 2. 55 Antony by h i s s o l d i e r s , f o r they were u n w i l l i n g to take the l i v e 258 of c i t i z e n s . His excuses were i n va i n and the senate declared 259 him a p u b l i c enemy; Antony and h i s foll o w e r s had already been 260 outlawed. Cicero wrote to Decimus Brutus and Plancus urging them to unite and to defeat Antony and he was heartened by the 261 news that they had joined forces i n June. They were not i n a strong p o s i t i o n , however, as t h e i r repeated requests f o r 262 help and t h e i r r e f u s a l to take the offensive revealed. Oct-avian, who had been w a i t i n g f o r the r i g h t moment, had h i s s o l -263 d i e r s demand the consulship f o r him. Added to t h i s , there was a request that Antony's outlawry should be cancelled. On the r e f u s a l of these demands Octavian. was only too glad to 264 lead h i s men to Rome. :The coincidence- of these requests should have i n d i c a t e d to the senate tthat'.':0ctavian.h.ad been conf e r r i n g with Antony. Then to add to the misfortunes of the republicans, Marcus Brutus, jealous of Cicero's treatment of 265 Octavian, turned a deaf ear to Cicero's e n t r e a t i e s to come with a l l speed w i t h h i s troops to Rome and urge Cassius to do 266 l i k e w i s e . Of the troops that a r r i v e d from A f r i c a i n response to the summons of the senate, three legions went over to Octavian. The senate was now defenceless; there was no 258. Fam. X: 35, 1. 259. Fam. X I I : 10,\1. 260. Brut. L: 3, 4. -261. Fam. X: 23, 3. 262. Fam. X I : 26; Fam. X: 23, 6; Fam. X I : 13, 5. 263. Fam. X: 24, 6. Brut. I : 14 264. App. B. C. i i i : 88 265. Brut. I : 17; Brut. I : 16. 266. Brut. I : 16; Brut. I : 17; Brut. I : 4,-56 a l t e r n a t i v e bat to surrender. Thus a l l Cicero's e f f o r t s to restore c o n s t i t u t i o n a l government had f a i l e d , f o r the whole structure lacked true vigour. He had to. f i g h t c o n t i n u a l l y - against s e l f i s h n e s s , f o r no one had h i s high conception of service to h i s country. One more demand was to be made of h i m — h i s l i f e . 267 Octavian gained h i s consulship i n August and then set out to j o i n Antony and Lepidus. At t h i s meeting of the Second Triumvirate near Bononia toward the end of October plans were made f o r the d i v i s i o n of the western provinces among them and f o r the removal of t h e i r most formidable opponents by pro~-~ . 268 s c r i p t i o n . Their most i l l u s t r i o u s v i c t i m was Cicero, f o r although Octavian t r i e d to save him, he had to give way to 269 Antony's demands. Cioero was at h i s v i l l a i n Tusculum when he received 270 the news of h i s p r o s c r i p t i o n . He made a half-hearted attempt to escape from I t a l y by sea but landed again at C a i e t a . There, when he was being c a r r i e d to the sea An h i s l i t t e r the assassins came upon him. He would not permit h i s servants to f i g h t o f f 271 the assassins and received h i s death blow with great f o r t i t u d e . The head that conceived and the hands that had w r i t t e n out the great speeches against Antony were taken to Rome and n a i l e d up on the Rostra. 267. Dio Cass. I v i . 30. 268. App. B. C. i v . 2f. 269. P l u t . .Ant. 19. 270. P l u t . C i c . 47. 1 271. P l u t . C i c . 48. 57 Chapter VII A Personal Tribute When Antony's emissaries came upon Cicero December 7, 43. B. C.j they found not a man worn out wi t h years and p u b l i c s e r v i c e , but a man of resolute s p i r i t ready to give up h i s l i f e since a l l he cherished i n i t had passed away. I t i s wi t h due h u m i l i t y , then, that I should l i k e to pay a b r i e f t r i b u t e to my f a v o u r i t e L a t i n author. My enjoyment of h i s work f i r s t aroused by the sympathetic and i n s p i r i n g l e c t u r e s of my teacher, has grown as I have become more f a m i l i a r w i t h h i s l i f e and w r i t i n g s . His wide and va r i e d i n t e r e s t s revealed by h i s remarkable achievements i n the realm of l i t e r a t u r e , and h i s a c t i v i t y i n p r a c t i c a l s e r v i c e to h i s country make him one of the world's outstanding f i g u r e s . The large number of l e t t e r s l e f t behind give us a very intimate p i c t u r e of the man himself. In p a r t i c u l a r , i n h i s l e t t e r s to T i t u s Pompomius A t t i c u s we are p r i v i l e g e d to see not only h i s high. Ideals of s e r v i c e , but also a l l the p e t t y vexations, g r i e f s and troubles revealed to h i s intimate f r i e n d . His speeches, which were u s u a l l y of p o l i t i c a l or j u d i c i a l character, may seem f u l l of exaggerations and extravagances according to modern standards, but per s o n a l l y I f i n d great enjoyment i n the majesty of h i s ornate prose s t y l e . He wrote, besides, a number of p h i l o s o p h i c a l and p o l i t i c a l t r e a t i s e s In which he made more r e a d i l y a c cessible to h i s contempor-a r i e s the philosophy and cultu r e of Greece. He took an i n t e r e s t , too, i n o u t l i n i n g the d e t a i l s of r h e t o r i c . Thus, i n 58 t r i b u t e to b i s v a r i e d i n t e r e s t s , S i l l i e r c a l l s him "the f i r s t 254 of the Humanists". But since the preceding pages have dealt not with Cicero, the master of L a t i n prose, but w i t h Cicero the statesman, I would l i k e to emphazise two q u a l i t i e s he possessed as a s t a t e s -man. The f i r s t of these i s h i s courage. This q u a l i t y was revealed e a r l y i n h i s career i n the defence of Sextus Rosoius against the calumnies of the great S u l l a ' s freedman Chryso-gonus, and a l s o , ten years l a t e r , by h i s prosecution of Yerres f o r gross oppression- of S i c i l y . The prosecution of the C a t i l -i n a r i a n conspirators was, he f e l t , the crowning achievement of h i s consulship, and i t required no small degree of courage to take upon himself the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y which the execution of the conspirators involved,, Here he proved that c i v i c oourage 255 was the equal of m i l i t a r y courage. His f o l l o w i n g Pompey, when a l l hope of Pompey's success was l o s t , was yet another example. The supreme act of courage was, however, h i s r e t u r n to p o l i t i c a l s t r i f e a f t e r h i s retirement during J u l i u s Caesar's d i c t a t o r s h i p , to lead the s t a t e i n i t s opposition to Antony, His f i g h t against Antony was unceasing, and he needed every b i t of h i s enthusiasm to keep the senators devoted to the cause. He was quite ready f o r the end when i t came,for he had done h i s duty to the s a t i s f a c t i o n of h i s conscience. 254. S i h l e r , "M. T u l l i u s Cicero of Arpinum". p. 464. 255. De Off. 1: x x i l , 78. 59 The second outstanding q u a l i t y was Cicero's steadfast-ness to h i s i d e a l , of s e r v i c e to h i s country. His administra-t i o n s , f i r s t i n S i c i l y and l a t e r i n G l l l c i a , were both r e -markable f o r t h e i r f a i r n e s s . His i n c o r r u p t i b i l i t y i n p u b l i c a f f a i r s won f o r him the supreme post of consul: as consul, he f u l l y repaid the honour bestowed on him by saving the s t a t e . I t was h i s b e l i e f that a l l persons w i t h a b i l i t y f o r the ad-m i n i s t r a t i o n of p u b l i c a f f a i r s should take p a r t In c i v i c l i f e so that the state might receive f u l l b e n e f i t from t h e i r 256 -t a l e n t s . To him the most honourable death was that won i n 257 the service of one's country. His u n s e l f i s h devotion to what he b e l i e v e d to be h i s duty as a good c i t i z e n stands i n sharp contrast to the s e l f i s h passion f o r power and advancement which characterized so many of h i s contemporaries. 256. De Off. 1: x x i , 72. 257. De Off. 1:1 x v i i , 57. V I I I LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS; Ant. App. A t t . B. C » Brut, Caes. C i c . De Leg. Agr. De Off. Dio Cass. Fam. M. P h i l . P l u t . Antonius. Appian. Ad Atticum. Bellum C i v i l e . Brutus. Caesar. Gicero. De Lege Agraria, De O f f i c i i s . Dio Cassius, Ad F a m i l i a r e s . Marcus P h i l i p p i c . P l u t a r c h . IX 61 BIBLIOGRAPHY ANCIENT SOURCES: Appian Caesar, C. J". Cassius, D. C. Cioero, M. T. P l u t a r c h Be Hum C i v i l e , t r a n s l a t e d by Horace White, Loeb C l a s s i c a l L i b r a r y S e r i e s , Maomillan, 1905. Commentarium. L l b r i I I I B De B e l l o C i v i l i . edited by Du Pontet, Oxford Press, 1901. Roman H i s t o r y , t r a n s l a t e d by Earnest Carry, Macmillan, 1927. The Correspondence of Cicero, edited by R. Y. T y r r e l l and L. C. Purser, Longmans Green and Company, 1914. De O f f i c i i s . t r a n s l a t e d by Walter M i l l e r , Loeb C l a s s i c a l L i b r a r y S e r i e s , Putnam. Pro Lege A g r a r i a Contra P. S e r v i l i u m Rullum, Volume I I , Long's" M. T u l l i i C i c e r o n i s Orationes, Whittaker and Company. Pro L i g a r i o , Volume IV, Long's M. T u l l i i C i c e r o n i s Orationes, Whittaker and Company. L i v e s , t r a n s l a t e d by Bernadotte P e r r i n , Putnam's Sons. 1919. MODERN SOURCES: Baker, G . P. H e i t l a n d , W. E, How, W. W. Twelve Centuries of Rome, B e l l and Sons, London, 1934. The Roman Republic, Volume I I I , Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1909. Cic e r o . S e l e c t L e t t e r s w i t h H i s t o r i c a l I n troductions, Notes and Appendices tOxford, 1934. MODERN SOURCES CONT'D Mommsen, T. Ro l f e , J . C. S i h l e r , E. G. H i s t o r y of Rome, t r a n s l a t e d by W. P. Dickson, Dent and Sons,, 1911. Cicero and His Influence, Harrop and Company Lim i t e d , 1923. M. T u l l i u s Cicero of Arpinum, Yale U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1914. Strachan-Davidson, J". L. Cicero and the E a l l of the Roman Republic, Putnam's Sons, 1894 PERIODICALS: "Cicero: A Sketch", W. A. Oldfather, U n i v e r s i t y of I l l i n o i s , March 1928, C l a s s i c a l Journal, Volume X X I I I , Wisconsin. OTHER BOOKS OF, INTEREST: Bossierj Eerrero, G. Long, G. Merivale, C. Taylor, H. PERIODICALS: Cicero and His Friends, t r a n s l a t e d by A. D. Jones; New York, Putnam. A Short H i s t o r y of Rome, New York, Putnam, 1918—19. The Decline of the Roman Republic Volume V, London, B e l l and Daldy, 1864—74. H i s t o r y of the Romans Under the Empire, London, Longmans, 1862—64. Cicero: A Sketch of His L i f e and Works, Chicago, McClury and Company, 1918. American Journal of P h i l o l o g y , edited by C. W. E. M i l l e r , Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press. Journal of Roman Studies, London, Society f o r the Promotion of Roman Studies. 

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