CICERO AND THE FALL OF THE REPUBLIC
49 B.C. to 43 B.C.

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CICERO AND THE FALL OF THE REPUBLIC 49 B. C.—43 B. C.

Chapter I

The Cursus Honorum.

"Homo vere natus ad prodessendum hominibus"

Marcus Tullius Cicero has always been revered wherever men have striven to gain freedom from tyranny. On December seventh, 43 B. C., the grim sight of his head and right hand nailed up in the Rostra mutely proclaimed to the people of Rome that tyranny once more was their master; down through the ages the work of that great head and hand was to be the inspiration and incentive to men working towards political liberty. Yet no one has ever suffered more from extravagant praise or undeserved criticism.

Cicero, the first of his family to enter political life at Rome, was born on January 3, 106 B. C. on his father's estate outside Arpinum. His father was a Roman knight and was financially able to bring his family to Rome and to provide the best training and education for his son. Cicero was fortunate in having the two outstanding orators of the day, Lucius Crassus and Marcus Antonius, interest themselves in his education.

His student days were interrupted in the year 89 B. C. when he took part in the Social War. After his year of service, he applied himself again to his training, visiting the

lawcourts and listening intently to the debates. His father introduced him to Quintus Mucius Scaevola, the greatest lawyer of the day. From him young Cicero gained a practical background of law. He was fortunate too, in being able to study voice production and the more technical side of oratory with Molo, the eminent rhetorician of Rhodes, who was visiting Rome in 88 B.C.

From 88 until 81 B.C. Rome was subjected to Civil War characterized by confiscations and proscriptions. After the struggle between the two leaders Marius the Democrat and Sulla the Optimate ended in the triumph of Sulla, Cicero entered upon his career in the law courts and established himself as a great advocate in his successful defence of Sextus Roscius. In undertaking this defence he showed great courage in openly attacking Sulla's Chrysogonus, and Strachan-Davidson writes of him as follows:

"He left the court a man of mark in Rome. He had done more than save his client; he had given voice to feelings which all the world must needs smother in silence; he had struck a keynote which vibrated in a thousand hearts, sick of bloodshed and robbery and terror." 2

Shortly afterwards Cicero left Rome for Greece to recuperate and to continue his studies. In 76 B.C., the year following his return, he entered into active political life by his election as quaestor. His pro-quaestorship of Sicily was distinguished by its freedom from extortions and by the fairness of its administration. There followed the

2. Strachan-Davidson, "Cicero" p. 17, lines 13-18
regular succession of public offices: curule aedile in 70, praetor in 67, culminating in the consulship in 63 B.C.

During his praetorship Cicero made his first political speech to the people in support of the Manilian Law. This bill which proposed to give Pompey supreme command of the forces in the East to inflict a speedy defeat on Mithridates and Tigranes was opposed by the conservatives or Optimates. They, in accordance with Roman tradition, were opposed to one man having extraordinary military powers beyond those held by the consuls. At first it seems strange that Cicero, later the champion of the Senate, should support a bill placing such unprecedented power in the hands of one man; but he is not yet the champion of the Senate. He is here clearly the defender of his own order, the equites, who had large investments in the province of Asia, and the supporter of the cause of a great soldier whom he idolized.

The Manilian Law and its predecessor the Gabinian Law were important not only because of the powers conferred by them but also because these powers were granted to Pompey by the people against the wishes of the Senate. Thus the effect of the concessions made by Pompey and Crassus in 71 B.C. to the popular party in order to win the consulship, namely the restoration of the tribunate and of the equites on the judicial courts, was clearly seen. A single individual, then, through compliant tribunes could attain mastery

of the state. Cicero supported Pompey against the Sullan constitution in 71 B.C. because that constitution had given the Senate too much power. It was then that we see his admiration of the Scipio administration of 134 B.C. with its balance of power: the Senate, the equites, and the people, each playing its part. In this connection W. A. Oldfather states:

"His best wish was to have a great man in a prominent station, the servant but also the guardian of the state"..........." and he felt he might best function as adviser to the great man and the public exponent of his enlightened policies."

Cicero was easily head of the polls at the consular elections. The conservative nobles supported the "novus homo" not so much because of his own worth but because they were alarmed by the corruptness of the opposing candidates. As the hypercritical Mommsen sneeringly remarks, the nobility gave "their votes to a candidate who, although not acceptable to them, was at least inoffensive". His platform, in so far as he could be said to have one, was "a coalition of the equites with the moderate Senatorial party" or the "concordia ordinum" linked with the approval of the people, the "consensus Italiae". To Cicero the Roman people did not just mean the city mob which could be bribed or incited by an unscrupulous leader but it meant the people of the whole of Italy.

5. Classical Journal, March 1928, "Cicero, A Sketch"
The first obstacle he had to face was the move by the democrats through their tribune to put through an extensive agrarian bill, its provisions to be presided over by a board of ten commissioners. By means of this bill the democrats hoped to be on an equal footing with Pompey, the conqueror of the East. The implied infringement on Pompey’s prestige caused Cicero to stand fast for his champion and at the same time to appear as a defender of the propertied class. In bringing about the defeat of the bill, Cicero revealed that the extensive powers of the board of ten commissioners for five years and the exclusion of Pompey from the board, were the work of the democrats who stood behind Rullus.

To Cicero, however, the crowning achievement of his consulship was his defeat of the Catilinarian conspiracy, a move by desperate men to overthrow the government and to restore their depleted fortunes in the ensuing confusion. It was the hope of Catiline and his associates to copy Marius and Sulla with their proscriptions, massacres and confiscations of property. When these arch traitors had been taken into custody, the senate met to discuss their punishment. The majority of the senate was in favour of the death penalty, but Caesar proposed life imprisonment instead. Cicero’s friends favoured Caesar’s proposal, for by it Cicero would have less personal risk, but in his fourth speech against

9. De Lege Agraria Contra Rullum
Catiline, Cicero stated that he was ready to enforce whatever punishment the senate desired, without regard to his own safety. Cato then delivered a passionate address and so whipped the wavering senate into action that the death penalty went through. Later we are to see how Cicero's ill-wishers would come back to this execution in order to turn the people against him, but, at the moment, all classes hailed him as the saviour of the state.

Chapter II
Disillusionment 62 B. C. to 49 B. C.

Cicero's achievements as consul now gave him a leading place in the senate. His efforts and the fear of revolution had knit together the Equites and the Senators. His next hope was to reconcile the civil and military powers through the leadership of Pompey; but when he wrote to Pompey telling him of his suppression of the Catilinarian conspiracy and of his desires to be associated with Pompey, the great man paid scant attention to his letter. It has been felt that Pompey was hurt that he had not been recalled to Rome to settle the matter and wrongly put the blame on Cicero; he would not commit himself in favour of Cicero's measures.

Meantime Pompey made his way home from the East in the manner of a royal progress, and reached Brundisium in December 62 B. C. He disbanded his army, thus indicating that he was not going to use military power to get what he wanted; but, after that decisive move he did not follow up with a close alliance with and leadership of the constitutional party. The senators, themselves, did not rally round their hero but did everything possible to drive him over to Caesar's side. They refused to ratify the land grants for his troops as a whole, and subjected him to petty questionings. They made him feel that in disbanding his army he was at their

15. Att. I: 14, 1, 2.
mercy, and thus, in their short-sighted jealousy, they drove him to use unconstitutional methods to gain his demands. This alienation of Pompey from the Senate could not but have greatly disturbed Cicero.

Cicero's hopes about the rebuilding of the government on a sound constitutional basis received another setback by the alienation of the Senate and the Equites over the scandal of the lawcourts revealed in the acquittal of Clodius. Cato proved himself to be no practical statesman by the way he hindered all means to win Pompey and to reconcile the Equites and the Senators.

When Caesar returned from his triumphs in Spain in June 60 B.C., he found a disgruntled Pompey. Thus, when he secured election as consul for 59 B.C., he knew he could win Pompey away from the Senate. Crassus, too, would be on his side. Cicero, also, was invited to join them in a quattuorvirate, and if he had accepted he would have saved himself. A practical politician would have embraced the opportunity: that Cicero did not do so is strong evidence of his sincerity, as well as of his courage. Thus, according to Sihler, the triumvirate was launched, unhampered by the scruples of an idealist, who, although rebuffed by the Senate at this time, did not desert their cause. Cicero, as a statesman, was eclipsed by the workings of the triumvirate and he did not

17. Strachan-Davidson "Cicero" p. 203
18. J. C. Rolfe "Cicero and His Influence".
come into his own again until after the death of Caesar.

The triumvirs now went ahead with their land-scheme, (the usual way of gaining popular favour), and Pompey and Caesar became more closely associated through Pompey's marriage to Julia, Caesar's daughter. Pompey deserted Cicero and permitted Clodius, Cicero's enemy, to become a plebeian so that Clodius might run for the tribuneship.

Clodius, as tribune, carried through a bill outlawing Cicero because he had put to death Roman citizens without trial. Pompey and the senators did nothing to save Cicero. With a heavy heart he left Rome and his persecutor burned his home on the Palatine. Clodius seized all available property and harassed Cicero's wife Terentia.

Cicero's misery and unmanly grief have been severely censured by his critics. It is difficult for us to appreciate the extent of his sufferings because to him exile was harder to bear than death. Indeed, he regrets that he did not choose death rather than endure the loss of honour in his banishment. He must have been tortured by the thought that he yielded to the advice of Hortensius and other leading senators that he should leave Rome instead of standing his ground against Clodius. The consul for 57 B.C., Lentulus Spinther, finally secured the recall of Cicero. His journey home was like a triumphal procession, for he was congratulated on every hand.

20. App. B. C. II, 3
22. Att. IV: 1, 5.
Cicero found that he was still the leader of the Bar. His return to Rome brought to the people a hope that the constitution, shattered by Caesar's attacks on it, might be restored. The Optimates again played into the absent Caesar's hands by their distrust of Pompey in the matter of the corn supply. They did not see that to offset the growing power of the conqueror of Gaul, they should give Pompey sufficient power to act as a check.

Cicero's attack on the land bill made Caesar realize that he must have a meeting with his associates or civil war would break out before he was ready for it. Thus Pompey and Crassus met him at Luca (April 56 B.C.), and the coalition became stronger than ever. Caesar secured the extension of his pro-consulship of Gaul, and Pompey and Crassus were to be consuls in 55. Following the consulship Pompey was to be governor of Spain and Crassus governor of Syria.

As a result of this conference a written order came from Pompey telling Cicero to suspend action against the Campanian land bill. Pompey made it quite clear that Cicero's recall had been based on his brother Quintus' guarantee that Cicero would not oppose the triumvirate. Cicero now found that he had to favour Caesar because Caesar's position was linked with that of Pompey. Hence Cicero was bound by feelings of gratitude.

23. Att. IV: 1, 3.
25. Fam. I: 9, 9.
26. Fam. I: 9, 9; I: 9, 12.
for his restoration to stand by Pompey, and to make good the
pledges given the triumvirs by his brother. I feel that
Cicero's support of the regents was based on the realization
that he could not make headway against them at present. He
would be ready to unite Pompey and the Senate whenever a
break should occur in the coalition. This setback does not
indicate any change in his policy but indicates an inevitable
surrender of his position at the moment. After all, the
Senate's short-sighted, narrow outlook had precipitated this
triumvirate, and it had not helped Cicero in his time of need
or supported his efforts to make Pompey a powerful leader on
their side.

The defeat and murder of Crassus near Carrhae on June 9,
53 deprived Caesar of his most powerful ally, if the strained
relationship now existing between Caesar and Pompey since the
death of Julia, should result in civil war. Crassus' son
Publius was killed a day or so before his father, and in his
place Cicero was chosen augur. This honour gave Cicero much
pleasure.

The year 53 had ended without the election of consuls
owing to the intrigues of the candidates. Cicero set aside
any advantages which might accrue to him through support of
a candidate backed by the triumvirs and gave his support to
Milo, who had championed him against Clodius. In the riots
eyearly in January, Clodius was killed by the retainers of Milo

27. Sihler, "Marcus Tullius Cicero of Arpinum", p. 259
and in the stormy days that followed the Senate proclaimed martial law and called on the inter-rex, Pompey and other magistrates to provide for the safety of the country. Pompey was elected sole consul, permitted to retain his governorship of Spain, and became in reality, dictator. Here we see him breaking off from Caesar and once more becoming allied to the Senate. It was in this year, too, that Caesar broke the last effort of the Gauls to recover their liberty.

The following year saw Cicero called on to take the governorship of Cilicia in accordance with Pompey's law which stated that five years had to elapse between the holding of office at Rome and the governorship of a province. In order then to fill the vacancies abroad the former consuls, who had not served as governors, had to serve in the provinces. Cicero was unwilling to leave Rome, and made sure that his term of office should not be extended. However, as governor, he did all he could for the Cilicians, helping them to recover from his rapacious predecessor, Appius Claudius. He put down a border raid with such success that he was hailed as "Imperator" by his troops and henceforth entitled to sign that title after his name and permitted to wreath his fasces with laurel. The next step in the honour would be the granting of a triumph by the senate on his return to Rome.

Cicero reached Brundisium on November 23, 50 B.C., to find trouble again in the political arena. The main contention

was with regard to Caesar's desire to retain his province until he should enter on his second consulship beginning 48 B. C. His opponents, however, wanted an interval to elapse between his pro-consulship and his consulship in order to bring him to trial for certain illegal acts of his first consulship of 59 B. C. Towards the close of the year, the consul Marcellus moved that Caesar should resign but opposed a motion affecting Pompey in the same way. Caesar had a staunch supporter in Curio, the tribune, who vetoed the motion and proposed that both Caesar and Pompey should resign their commands at the same time. The passing of the motion placed Pompey in an awkward position because he was not sure what Caesar would do. The senate were afraid that Caesar and Pompey would unite again and that that would spell the end of the nobles as a governing class. They must be kept apart. A few days later, a well-chosen, false rumour reported that Caesar had crossed the Alps, and Marcellus moved that Caesar be declared an enemy and that Pompey be placed in charge of the state. Pompey accepted the commission and ordered a general levy. Meantime Curio sped to Caesar's headquarters at Ravenna.

30. Caes. B. C. i, 2; Plut. Pompey, 63.
Chapter III

Cicero's Decision 49 B. C.

The senate, convoked on January first 49 B. C. under the shadow of civil war, was tense with stormy debate and curbed emotion. Caesar had very cleverly made the Pompeians take the initiative in civil strife and Rome was full of rumours about Caesar's intentions. Curio, Caesar's versatile agent, after a strenuous three days' journey from Ravenna had just reached Rome with a letter stating Caesar's offer to resign all but Cisalpine Gaul and two legions if Pompey would go to Spain; or, he would give up his entire command if Pompey would do likewise. Mommsen felt here that Caesar knew he would not be called on to make good this offer because the Pompeians were already too far committed against him. Lucius Lentulus, the presiding consul, although forced by the Caesarian tribunes Antonius and Cassius to permit the reading of the letter, was so incensed by his hatred toward the Caesarians that he would not suffer any motion arising out of the letter. Realizing Caesar's peace offer at the crucial moment had made a strong impression on the timid senate, he, in a fury, forced the brow-beaten senate to pass the resolution that Caesar should give up his province on a specified date. Antony's suggestion, made the following day, that both Caesar and Pompey should

34. Appian, B. C. ii, 32.
retire was strenuously opposed.

Cicero reached the neighbourhood of Rome on the fourth and worked hard to try to preserve the peace. On the fifth or sixth a further offer by Caesar in response to Cicero's efforts was to retain only Cisalpine Gaul, Illyricum and one legion instead of two. But owing to the general frenzy which prevented the senatorial party from acting prudently, extreme measures prevailed on January seventh. Lentulus declared the senate would take a vote on the "senatus consultum ultimum", and warned the tribunes to interfere at their peril. Antony and Cassius protested this threatening of the people's tribunes, and fled to Caesar along with Curio and Caelius. The senate then called on the magistrates of the people to defend the state. This rashness in threatening a declaration of war shows that the link between Pompey and the senate is none too firm even at this important juncture, and each side is anxious to commit the other irrevocably. Cicero's dream of a union between the Senate and Pompey was achieved at last but under circumstances that must have caused him to despair.

Looking at the strength of the troops on each side we see that Caesar had ten or eleven veteran legions and some auxiliaries of Gallic and German horse, but only one legion in Northern Italy. Pompey had seven legions in Spain, as many

36. Ad Fam. XVI: 12, 2.
38. Caesar: B.C. i, 1-5.
auxiliaries and five thousand cavalry; in Italy he had ten
41
legions, but of these only the two legions taken from Caesar
were veterans. He levied three legions in the province of
Asia and could count on the Eastern princes for cavalry; from
the East, too, he obtained a superior naval force. What Caesar
lacked in quantity of troops he made up in the quality of his
forces and his rapid action.

On January eleventh, Caesar crossed the Rubicon and
marched on Ariminum and sent forces ahead to occupy Pisaurum,
Fanum, and Ancona. This rapidity caught the Pompeians by sur­
prise, but was no excuse for leaving the untenable city of Rome
January 17 so hurriedly that the treasury was left for Caesar.
Cicero, who had been waiting outside Rome with his lictors for
a triumph to be decreed by the senate, decided to abandon his
triumph. In a letter to Atticus he revealed his failure to
understand why the Pompeians had acted so rashly and stated
that, as matters stood, he was with Pompey if Pompey made a
stand in Italy, but beyond that he could not say. He felt
that Caesar in launching his attack on Italian cities should
be considered an enemy not a citizen claiming to be acting
honourably. The only immediate gain that Cicero could see in
Pompey's leaving Rome was that the people were sympathetic
to Pompey for that reason. He, himself, was given a trifling

40. Caesar, B. C. i, 39
41. Caesar, B. C. i, 15 f.
42. Caesar, B. C. iii, 4, 5.
44. Att. VII: 11, 1.
commission, the charge of the recruiting in Campania. It was so light a duty that later he could say without fear of overstepping the truth, "neque negotium suscepisse."

About the end of January came a peace offer from Caesar. That Caesar, the aggressor, should offer terms to Pompey, seemed to Cicero an insult in itself. The terms were that if Pompey went to Spain and disbanded his troops, Caesar would turn over Further Gaul to Domitius and Cisalpine Gaul to Considius Nonianus, and would stand for the consulship in person. The senators seem not to have placed much confidence in the offer for many felt that all Caesar was doing was hindering their preparations for war.

Even in the earliest stages of the war Pompey was hampered by the conceit and inefficiency of his officers. Thus, although Pompey had urged Domitius Ahenobarbus, who was in charge of Picenum and Umbria, to hasten south with all the soldiers he could muster, Domitius chose to make a stand against Caesar at Corfinium. Pompey's fears about this attempt were well-founded, and from his letter to Domitius on February 17 he made the difficulties of the situation clear to Domitius, and pointed out to his officer what a chance Caesar had to sever communications between them. Pompey could not go north to help Domitius as his newly recruited soldiers would be no

45. Att. VII: 17, 4
46. Fam. XVI: 12, 3.
47. Att. VIII: 12 C, 1 and 2.
match for Caesar’s veterans. When the town fell to Caesar on the twenty-first, Caesar took the opportunity to thank Domitius for disobeying Pompey by sending him with his fellow officers back to Pompey. This noble gesture won Caesar much popular favour, and may have been a source of amusement to him to send Domitius back where he could still be an annoyance to Pompey.

Meanwhile, after a brief visit to Capua, Cicero returned to Formiae near the end of January and made his head-quarters there for about two months. In reply to a letter from Caesar, he thanked Caesar for the compliments paid him and also praised Pompey to Caesar. He was, however, greatly disturbed about Pompey’s plan to leave Italy. To Cicero’s mind, it would have been more glorious for Pompey to have died in Italy. Although he felt that there was no hope for the safety of the state in Pompey’s present course of action, yet he would gladly die for him. He did not agree with Atticus, at this point, that if Pompey left he was bound to go; he could not see that such action would help either the state or his family. He felt he must stay in Italy to help in discussions for peace.

In a letter from Cales, written February 18 or 19, he outlined the arguments for and against leaving Italy and joining Pompey. Here we have revealed the inner workings of his

48. Att. VIII: 2,1.
49. Att. VIII: 2,2.
50. Att. VIII: 2,4.
51. Att. VIII: 2,4.
52. Att. VIII: 3.
quick mind. The argument for joining Pompey which was based on a sense of gratitude for Pompey's part in Cicero's recall was counterbalanced by the fact that, as presiding augur, Pompey permitted the adoption of the notorious Clodius into a plebeian family, thus enabling Clodius, after being elected tribune, to have his revenge on Cicero by exiling him. Then, again, Pompey's recent actions were lacking both in courage and in foresight; he had neglected Cicero's advice; he had opposed Marcellus when he had tried to limit Caesar's Gallic tenure at March first, 49. The chief argument, however, against following Pompey, was Pompey's flight from Rome. Cicero looked on Pompey's rallying point at Apulia as having nothing to recommend it but its access to the sea. The Pompeians had no policy or plan fitting for those who wanted to save Italy. Later, his comment on Pompey's failure to support Domitius at Corfinium was that that failure crowned his disgrace. Cicero concluded his arguments with the remark that although he had more reasons on one side (for remaining in Italy), he had more reason on the other.

In the letters from February twenty-fourth to March eleventh when Cicero received a message that Pompey had crossed to Greece on March fourth, many conflicting thoughts troubled his peace of mind. The disgraceful conduct of the Pompeians,
namely, the refusal of peace, lack of preparation for war and the leaving of Rome, weighed heavily upon him. Caesar, in his role of a generous victor, seemed to be the saviour of his enemies, whereas Pompey seemed a traitor to his friends.

Caesar had asked Lentulus, the consul, to remain in Italy to finish out his term of office, offering him a province at the completion of his year. Caesar also made overtures to Cicero saying that he was pleased Cicero had remained neutral and hoped he would continue to remain neutral.

Cicero recalled his portraiture of the ideal statesman and deeply regretted that Pompey had not acted the part. He felt there was really no choice between Pompey and Caesar as leaders, because both wanted to be rulers; neither was interested in the welfare of the state. Pompey's one desire was to act the part of Sulla and bring barbaric eastern troops to ravage Italy. Cicero shuddered at the threats coming from Luceria, threats not merely of proscription but of utter extermination. In contrast, Caesar's studied clemency and moderation had won him many supporters. The people of the country towns were interested only in their paltry farms and

57. Att. VIII: 8.
58. Att. VIII: 9, 3.
60. Att. VIII: 11, 5.
61. Att. VIII: 11, 1.
63. Att. VIII: 11, 4.
64. Att. IX: 7C.
fortunes. Now that there seemed to be no immediate danger of losing their property, they had changed their attitude: the one they trusted before, they now feared; and they loved the one whom they feared before. In acting the beneficent tyrant Caesar had earned as much gratitude for the wrongs he did not commit as if he had stopped someone else from committing them.

Not only Atticus, but Balbus and Oppius, agents of Caesar, wanted Cicero to look to his own safety. They would like Cicero to be the mediator for peace, while there might still be a chance of negotiating peace; but, even if Caesar should war against Pompey, they urged Cicero not to take part in the struggle but to remain neutral. They gave him definite assurances that Caesar was very eager to be reconciled with Pompey, had no cruel thoughts against anyone, and esteemed Cicero highly. Cicero, however, could not believe that Caesar would be moderate, as his former conduct, his associates and his present enterprise did not point that way. Caesar, nevertheless, in a letter to Cicero written from the neighbourhood of Brundisium about March 7, asked Cicero to meet him on his return to Rome and to give him the benefit of his advice and experience in public affairs.

Although, at first glance, one might say that Cicero

65. Att. VIII: 13, 2. "..illum quo antea confidebant metuunt, hunc amant quem timebant".
67. Att. IX: 7A.
68. Att. IX: 2A, 2.
69. Att. IX: 6A.
did not seem to know his own mind for one letter was full of
desire to join Pompey and another was full of criticism of
Pompey, yet that variability was not with regard to general
purpose. He did not entertain the thought that he should sup-
port Caesar instead of Pompey. This seeming failure to make
a decision quickly and act upon it, was adequately explained
in a letter to Atticus in which he stated that he was talking
to Atticus as if he were talking to himself. Anyone faced
with such an issue at a critical time had to consider all pos-
sibilities before making a decision. Many senators were by
this time on their way back to Rome; others again had definite
reasons and commissions to follow Pompey. Cicero had to con-
sider the interests of his family; for example, his brother
Quintus was set on joining Pompey.

When the report arrived that Pompey had crossed over to
Greece, Cicero regretted that he was not with him. Two things
had kept him from being with Pompey; first, he hoped peace
terms would be arranged; second, when he discovered that Pompey
was entering on a war of destruction, he felt that it did not
become a good citizen to have a share in such atrocities.
Ferrero, commenting with reference to the first reason said
that if Cicero had taken a more active part and had been at
Brundisium before Pompey had left, he might have accomplished

70. Att. VIII: 14, 2.
72. Att. IX: 1, 4.
73. Att. IX: 6, 3 and 4.
74. Att. IX: 6, 5; Att. IX: 10, 3.
a reconciliation between the leaders and arranged peace. Now as matters stood, Cicero definitely resolved to follow Pompey because Pompey was supporting the right cause although he was using the wrong method. The Pompeian programme included the blockading of Italy so that the country would be starved into submission; then would come a reign of terror with destruction and confiscations. As far as Cicero could foresee, a similar fate would befall Italy if Caesar were the victor. Caesar, after brushing aside lawcourts, juries, and senate, would not be able to restrain the extravagance and requests of his daring associates.

Cicero resented the lack of respect for the office of consul Caesar was showing in proposing that Lepidus, a praetor, should preside over the consular elections. In reply to Caesar's letter asking him to come to Rome, Cicero made it very clear that he would only be there if he were to act as a mediator between Caesar and Pompey. He was eminently suited for that undertaking as he had not taken up arms in the war. Cicero fully realized that Caesar wanted him in the Senate at Rome in the capacity of an ex-consul and as a member of the college of augurs to sanction a praetor holding consular elections or naming a dictator, both of these being unconstitutional acts.

76. Att. IX: 7, 2; Att. IX: 9, 2.
77. Att. IX: 7, 2.
78. Att. IX: 7, 3.
79. Att. IX: 9, 3.
81. Att. IX: 15, 1.
Cicero was troubled about his coming meeting with Caesar on March twenty-eighth. Nevertheless, after the meeting was over, he felt more pleased with his own conduct than he had for a long time. Although he felt that he had lost Caesar's regard, he had won esteem in his own eyes. The meeting was a difficult one for Caesar insisted that if Cicero did not attend the meeting of the Senate on April first many other senators would be less ready to come. When Caesar tried to tempt him to change his mind by asking him to attend the senate to discuss peace terms, Cicero said that he would have to make the following statements in the house: first, that he disapproved of Caesar's expedition to Spain or any transport of troops to Greece; second, that he would have to express sympathy with Pompey. Naturally, Caesar disapproved of those statements being made, but asked Cicero to give the matter further consideration. Caesar's associates at that time were apparently a desperate crew, and did not impress Cicero favourably. As a result of that meeting, Cicero realized that he must act more quickly since he had lost Caesar's favour.

Cicero celebrated his son's coming of age at Arpinum as Rome was out of bounds for him. The political events stirred

82. Att. IX: 17, 1.
83. Att. IX: 18, 1.
84. Att. IX: 18, 1.
85. Att. IX: 18, 1.
86. Att. IX: 18, 2.
87. Att. IX: 18, 3.
him deeply and in his next few letters we find him in a reflective mood. The recruiting of men, at all times a hardship, seemed even more unendurable when it was carried out by desperate men in a wicked civil war. He thought that Pompey might welcome him at this stage of affairs more than if he had been with him from the start, because, previously, the Pompeians had great hopes but now they had none. Cicero solemnly declared that he was not joining Pompey for the sake of the Republic, for, to his mind, it was utterly destroyed; but he was going over to Pompey from a sense of gratitude to the man who had extricated him from the difficulties into which he had helped to put him. Moreover, he dreaded the horrors that were to follow in Italy. All that the loyalists had left was life, and even that had no longer any attraction for Cicero. He was now, more than ever, eager to be off to Greece because he felt his position in Italy was not honourable. In pondering on his life and comparing it with that of Pompey and of Caesar, he found comfort in the fact that he had not deserted or enslaved his country but had always served it loyally and well.

Although Caesar had acted with moderation at first, Cicero did not feel that Caesar was naturally adverse to cruelty but had merely restrained himself to win popular favour. At his short stay at Rome from April first, Caesar showed his

88. Att. IX: 19, 1.
89. Att. IX: 19, 2.
90. Att. IX: 19, 3; Att. X: 1, 4; Att. X: 2, 2.
contempt of the Senate by personally bestowing on Curio six lictors and laurel fasces instead of that honour coming from
the Senate. He thus indicated that all authority would proceed
from him not the senate. Another incident showed the people
the other side of Caesar's nature. Before his departure for
Spain, when he wanted the money out of the treasury, he sent
soldiers and blacksmiths to get it. However, Metellus, the
tribune, opposed their action and only gave way when Caesar
arrived in person and threatened him with death if he did not
yield. Here was the tyrant's hand. Caesar had posed as the
protector of the rights of the tribunes of the people early
in January, but now that one of them opposed his wishes he
had no scruples about threatening him. Thus his brief stay
in Rome seemed rather to have harmed than helped his cause,
and his violence toward the tribune overshadowed his clemency
earlier in the year.

Cicero's friend Caelius, a loyal Caesarian, was greatly
alarmed by Cicero's opposition to Caesar in refusing to attend
the senate at Rome. He reminded Cicero that he had his son,
his home, and the career of his son-in-law to consider. He
warned Cicero that Caesar's policy would not remain generous.
Now Caesar was thoroughly roused against the senate there would
be no place for petitions to a victorious Caesar. Caelius

94. Fam. VIII: 16, 1.
95. Fam. VIII: 16, 2.
96. Fam. VIII: 16, 1.
further argued that the Pompeians would be distrustful of Cicero's attitude because he had delayed so long, and stated that if Cicero could not endure the threats of the Pompeians and the insolence of the Caesarians, he should retire to some remote place until the war was over. Caesar's own letter, written en route to Spain, reiterated Caelius' arguments. He suggested to Cicero that a loyal citizen and peaceful man could well keep out of civil disturbance. Cicero, however, could not reconcile honour with inactivity, and displayed great courage in refusing to be neutral. As he declared, he was not interested in playing a clever role; he had made up his mind to go to Pompey whatever the outcome in Spain should be.

In a letter to Atticus of May 2, Cicero made an adequate defence against those critics who have called him a political trimmer. Since it was no longer possible to save the Republic, his main desire was to fulfill his debt of gratitude to Pompey. Once he was resolved on going, no pleas could deter him. Both his daughter and Atticus wanted him to wait until the outcome of the battle in Spain was known, and then to adopt a plan in keeping with that result. Cicero had, of course, only one wish with regard to Spain—the defeat of Caesar. Cicero preferred to abandon Caesar when Caesar was a victor not when his position was more doubtful. Again, Caesar's victory would

mean slaughter, the confiscation of property, return of exiles, cancellation of debts, men of the lowest repute in public affairs, and a kind of tyranny more like Eastern despotism than Roman government. He reminded Atticus of the duty placed on all magistrates and ex-magistrates at the beginning of the year, the duty to see that the state should come to no harm. How could he then take part with those against whom the state had armed him? He stated his own resolve firmly that since there was danger whether he went or stayed he preferred the more honourable course.

During the rest of May, Cicero's time was occupied with his preparations for departure. His main difficulty was avoiding contact with Antony, who had written to him to emphasize the fact that Cicero was not to leave. Cicero pretended to be compliant, but, after arranging for his family to stay at Arpinum, he eluded Antony's scouts and sailed for Pompey's headquarters on June seventh.

In order to clarify Cicero's stand with regard to the republican form of government I think it is well to review certain facts which determined his ultimate decision. In the first place, since Cicero had been absent from Italy from May 51 B.C. to November 50 B.C. as governor of Cilicia, he

100. Att. X: 8, 2.
101. Fam. XVI: 11.
102. Att. X: 8, 8.
103. Att. X: 8, 5.
104. Att. X: 10, 2.
105. Fam. XIV: 7, 2.
had not first hand information about the recent developments in Rome. As he travelled nearer to Rome he gained a more complete picture of events. Early in December in writing to Atticus from Trebulanum, he said he was behind Pompey and the government even if Pompey were to blame for Caesar's present power. His main efforts, none the less, would be directed toward the preservation of peace. When he reached Formiae a few days later, his fears were roused, for the loyalists or supporters of the government were not in agreement. He did not grasp fully what Atticus meant in saying that there was need that he (Cicero) should support the right party. The way matters stood at that point he stated that there would be one course open to him, namely, the support of Pompey and the senate against Caesar the invader. The first duty of the loyalists should be the defence of the capital; then, if it would be necessary, they might leave the capital in order to cut off Caesar's supplies. This suggestion seems to me to be in the nature of a planned evacuation with the specific purpose that Cicero mentions and not a hasty departure from the city. On Cicero's arrival at the outskirts of Rome he at once began to strive to prevent the outbreak of war. However, when Pompey and his associates fled from Rome at the news of

112. Ad Fam. XVI: 12, 2.
Caesar's advance, Cicero failed to see why flight was necessary and stated definitely that he would support Pompey as long as Pompey made a stand in Italy. Then, when it became evident that Pompey was planning to leave Italy and organize Eastern forces with which to invade his country, Cicero could not feel that Pompey was acting as the defender of the state. The lack of plan for the defence of Italy became evident. Pompey, then, was in no wise different from Caesar, in that he, too, was interested in power for himself and not in saving constitutional government. Cicero shrank from the threats of the Pompeians against their country and their countrymen. Thus, Cicero stayed in Italy after Pompey left in order to be ready in case hostilities could be prevented, and when he did go over to Pompey, he went from a sense of personal gratitude to Pompey. He had no hope that the constitution was to be saved. Thus, it will be seen later, that after Pharsalia Cicero did not join the Pompeians in their prolongation of the war, because he was not in sympathy with their stand. He returned to Italy to be ready to use whatever influence he might have with Caesar to restore some form of constitutional government.

115. Att. VIII: 11, 2.
117. Att. IX: 19, 2.
Chapter IV

A Dark Outlook 48--47 B. C.

After having to use threats against the tribune Metellus in order to gain access to the treasury, Caesar was more anxious than ever to bring the campaign in Spain to a successful conclusion to offset the reversal of popular favour, and so he left Rome about April 6 (49 B. C.) Owing to the hostile attitude of the people of Massilia, Caesar was delayed there for about a month. This unexpected rebuff caused Caesar to carry out a daring plan. He left the siege of Massilia to Gaius Trebonius and Decimus Brutus and hastened to Spain himself. There, after one serious repulse, he compelled the Pompeians to surrender on August 2. When he arrived back at Massilia, he learned that at Rome Lepidus, a praetor, had named him dictator. Then hurrying back to Rome, he presided over the consular elections and was himself elected consul for the coming year. Hence, at the close of the year, he was ready to direct the offensive against Pompey in Greece.

Early in 48 B. C., Caesar crossed the Adriatic and prepared not only to attack the Pompeians, but also, as legitimate consul, to propose peace terms. However, peace was out of the question. The campaign between the two skilled generals was

118. Att. X: 8, 6.
120. Caes. B. C. i, 34--56.
123. Dio Cass. 42.
on in earnest. Strachan-Davidson ably describes the combat as follows:

"The strategy was admirable on both sides, full of daring and genius on the part of Caesar, and of skill and prudence on the part of Pompey."

If Pompey could have exercised a firm enough control over his aristocratic associates and pursued that policy of prudence, he might not have suffered defeat, although his troops were hardly a match for Caesar's seasoned veterans. As it was, he allowed himself to be persuaded to abandon his own policy. Thus, at Pharsalia, the disciplined western soldiers triumphed over the eastern legions and Pompey fled to Egypt where he was murdered.

For some time before the battle of Pharsalia Cicero had been at Dyrrachium in poor health. When the news of Pompey's defeat reached Dyrrachium, Cato, who had a fleet and considerable forces, wanted Cicero, the senior consular, to take command. When Cicero refused to do so, he narrowly escaped being killed by young Gnaeus Pompey. Cicero, in accordance with his own policy, arrived back at Brundisium in October, not very well satisfied with his own decision and hoping he would not regret his return.

He was to be at Brundisium for ten weary months in a

126. Caes. B. C. iii, 85--89.
129. Fam. XIV: 12.
wretched state of mind and body. His correspondence during that period was mainly on domestic matters; whenever he did touch on political affairs he was utterly dejected. To begin with, Quintus had shown great ill-will towards him after Pharsalia, and later sent his son to Caesar not only to gain favour but also to accuse his brother Marcus to Caesar. Another shadow clouding his spirits was the talk of the Pompeians before Pharsalia of the far-reaching proscriptions and confiscations planned against those who had remained in Italy. Cicero grimly reminded Atticus that his name was certainly on the list of persons whose property was to be confiscated. Now that these men were rallying in Africa they would be looking to that booty again. Cicero was troubled, too, about his lictors and wrote to Balbus and Oppius to see if he might come nearer Rome. They were both confident about Caesar's goodwill to Cicero but could not give permission on their own authority. In that same letter we find a tribute to the deceased Pompey. Cicero had kept his high personal regard for his hero. At this time Cicero was subject to many criticisms; the criticism of those who had joined Caesar, and that of those who were now making a stand in Africa.

The beginning of the year 47 showed no lightening of the burden of Cicero's problems. Throughout it all, however, he

130. Att. XI: 8, 1.
blames only himself. The faction against Caesar both in Spain and in Italy had grown so that it looked as if the Pompeians were going to be able to reassert themselves. In Rome Caesar's representatives were having difficulty in trying to keep things running smoothly. All these facts made Cicero feel that he should have gone to Africa and not concluded that the issue had been decided with the defeat of Pompey. Many of the loyalists had already crossed over so that he had no one to share his predicament. Notwithstanding his own troubles and the harm his brother Quintus had been doing him, he wrote to Caesar asking him to overlook Quintus' part in the war. He was anxious, too, about Tullia's health and about Dolabella's activities in Rome. He looked for Caesar's departure from Alexandria eagerly so that he might obtain the solution for some of his difficulties.

In a letter to Cassius Longinus written just before Caesar's return in September, Cicero set forth his reasons for not joining the group in Africa: he felt that the quarrel between Caesar and Pompey should have been determined by the issue of the one major battle; he also preferred to try to rebuild the state out of the fragments of the old, rather than pursue a policy which meant the prolonging of the war.

137. Att. XI: 11, 1.
139. Att. XI: 12, 3.
141. Fam. XV: 15.
and of the sufferings of the people and which, perhaps, involved the utter destruction of the state. Hence, Cicero had hurried to Italy after Pharsalia to see what he could do about the state, but, since Caesar had not yet returned from the East, he had been unable to put any of his plans into action.
Chapter V

Cicero Under a Dictator September 47—March 44 B.C.

Just before Caesar returned to Italy, Cicero received a letter from him saying that he might retain his lictors and his title of Imperator. When Caesar arrived at Tarentum about September 25, Cicero went to meet him and was kindly received. As Cicero gained permission to live where he wished, he set out for his Tusculan villa and spent the remainder of the year near Rome.

Caesar also rewarded his own supporters. Fufius Calenus and Publius Vatinius were elected consuls for the coming year. In order to give specific rewards to others Caesar increased the number of praetors from eight to ten, and filled many of the vacancies in the senate. He showed, too, that he would like to have the co-operation of some of the moderate Pompeians: Servius Sulpicius was made governor of Greece, Gaius Cassius was made a legate and Marcus Brutus, governor of Cis-alpine Gaul.

In the year 46, Cicero acted as a mediator between Caesar and his associates and the exiled Pompeians, as the greater part of his correspondence reveals. He devoted much of his time to philosophy and some of Caesar’s friends came to him to study declamation.

143. Fam. XIV: 20.
144. Dio Cass. xlii, 51.
145. Fam VI: 6, 10.
Cicero's reaction to the actions of Caesar's associates was set forth in his correspondence with Varro. In replying to Varro's invitation to visit him at Baiae, Cicero said he felt he could not do so when the State was in such a condition and those in power degraded by every sort of crime and excess. Men like Cicero were out of favour not only with the Caesarians but also with the Pompeians. The former looked on Cicero and his friends as defeated men; the latter, whose friends had lost their lives in the conflict or were exiled, regarded them as having no right to be alive. In spite of that, Cicero felt that men such as Varro and himself should hold themselves in readiness to be of service to the state, because much would depend on Caesar's course of action. As if in answer to the criticism directed against him, he stated that those who had followed Pompey from a sense of duty and had withdrawn when the situation became hopeless, were more honourable than those who had never left Italy at all, and were not so bigoted in their views as those who did not return to Italy when their opposition was without avail. The criticism, however, of those who had done nothing at all themselves, was the hardest to bear. In thinking back to the beginning of the Civil war, Cicero realized that right from the start the Pompeians wanted war, whereas Caesar did not so much desire it, as not dread it. Caesar still maintained a friendly attitude to Cicero.

147. Fam. IX: 3, 1.
148. Fam. IX: 2, 4.
149. Fam. IX: 5, 2.
150. Fam. IX: 6, 2.
but Cicero could make no definite predictions as to the actions of a man who had once made a departure from law and order.

Towards the latter half of 46 B.C., Cicero was more optimistic about Caesar's attitude toward the state. On several occasions he insisted to his correspondents that Caesar himself showed dignity, good sense and a desire to see justice done, but that he was hindered by the demands of his associates. Caesar's moderation was more surprising day by day, and it seemed that it was victory itself and not the victor that inflicted the harsh measures on the defeated. One occasion, the restoration of Marcus Marcellus by Caesar, an act called by Cicero the most dignified enactment of Caesar's senate, made Cicero hope that once again the constitution would come to life. Cicero was so moved that he broke the resolution he had made to remain silent in Caesar's senate and thanked Caesar for that restoration.

Meantime Cicero's family troubles were by no means over. Early in 46 he had divorced Terentia and in December he married his rich young ward Pubilia. This marriage was not a happy one, for Cicero had no affection for her and resented her attitude to his daughter Tullia. Perhaps the severest blow he suffered was the death of his beloved Tullia in Feb-

151. Fam. IX: 16, 3.  
152. Fam. IV: 9, 3; Fam. VI: 6; Fam. VI: 10; Fam. XII: 17, 1.  
153. Fam. IV: 4, 2.  
154. Fam. IV: 4, 2, 3.  
156. Fam. IV: 14, 3.
ruary 45. His philosophy and the consolation of his friends were unable to bring him any real comfort, and he retired to Astura out of the bustle of Rome. Throughout the year many of his letters to Atticus contain his plans for a shrine to Tullia's memory but we have no record of their having been fulfilled. He felt that he could never take his place again in politics as he had lost the only tie that bound him to life. He refused to see his young wife since he suspected that she rejoiced at Tullia's death, and some time later, he divorced her.

As the year 45 was overshadowed by his great grief, Cicero's attitude to political affairs was much less optimistic than it had been the previous year, and he seemed more resigned to withdraw from politics as he was growing old. Caesar, engaged in a war in Spain against the forces under Pompey's sons, was absent from Rome the greater part of the year. The decisive battle, fought at Munda, was an overwhelming victory for Caesar. Pompey's elder son was killed but the younger made his escape. While the war in Spain was in progress, Cicero summed up his decision about the outcome with the statement that, if Pompey's sons were victorious there would be ruthless massacre; if Caesar were the victor, there would be slavery. His last statement shows that he must have now seen that Caesar the conqueror would become Caesar the dictator,
and his chance of introducing some measure of constitutional government would be slight. As always, he was opposed to settling constitutional issues by means of the sword instead of by constitutional means. Some time in May, Cicero wrote a letter of political advice to Caesar but it was never sent to Caesar because Balbus and Oppius objected to certain suggestions Cicero had made. Cicero refused to make any changes and withdrew the letter, preferring to give up any form of flattery and retain some measure of his individual liberty.

Toward the close of the year Caesar openly showed his desire to be king. He had his statue set up beside that of Quirinus and then had his image carried in a procession among those of the gods. Cicero rejoiced that the people did not applaud the statue of Victory because the statue of Caesar was with it. However, Cicero did not refuse to attend the senate on August first as he preferred to go rather than to have his absence a topic for discussion.

Although Cicero had dreaded Caesar's visit to him at Puteoli, yet, on the whole, the visit passed off very well. Caesar enjoyed his dinner, and the topics of conversation were in no way serious as their discussions were on literary topics not political ones. Caesar's subsequent mockery of the con-

165. Fam. IV. 14, 2; Fam. VI: 1, 6.
166. Att. XIII: 27, 1.
168. Att. XII: 45, 2.
171. Att. XIII: 52, 1, 2.
ship by having Caninius Rebilus elected for a single day
hurt Cicero deeply for he saw in it an insult to the dignity
of the office.

Caesar had himself elected consul for 44 B. C. with Mark
Antony as his colleague, and spent the early months of the year
preparing to make an expedition against the Parthians. His
acceptance of the title of perpetual dictator revealed that he
did not intend to relinquish supreme power and his adoption
of his nephew Octavius would seem to indicate his desire to
establish a dynasty. This passion for royal power gained for
him much hatred and resulted in a conspiracy being formed
against him. Thus, when Caesar came to the senate house on
March 15, the conspirators took his life.

172. Fam. VII: 30. 1, 2.
174. App. B. C. vii, 4-5.
Chapter VI.
Cicero as Leader of the State.

Cicero's immediate reaction to the murder of Caesar was one of joy that the tyrant had been removed. Throughout, he was lavish in his praise of the conspirators whom he termed as heroes even when he realized that although the tyrant had been killed, tyranny still lived on. In no respect had the constitution been restored or freedom recovered, for the conspirators had lacked a definite plan and course of action.

The conspirators did not see the danger of leaving Antony alive as Cicero did, and he had an excellent retort for Antony when Antony accused him of being the ringleader of the plot, by stating that he fervently wished he had been, for then Antony would not now be alive to trouble the liberators.

March fifteenth and sixteenth were days of confusion at Rome. After Caesar had been murdered, Brutus attempted to address the assembled senators but they, without stopping to hear him, fled from the senate in bewildered fear. On the sixteenth the conspirators again made a formal speech to the people; this speech the people listened to respectfully.

178. Fam. VI: 15
179. Att. XIV: 4, 2; Att. XIV: 14, 2; Att. XIV: 11, 1;
Fam. XII: 3, 1.
180. Att. XIV: 9, 2; Att. XIV: 14, 2; Fam. XII: 1, 1.
181. Att. XIV: 4, 1; Att. XIV: 14, 2; Att. XIV: 16, 3.
182. Att. XIV: 21, 1.
184. Fam. XII: 3, 1.
without showing any resentment at the deed. Through Decimus Brutus the conspirators began negotiations with Antony and Lepidus. Antony, even as early as this, seemed to have come forward as a leader of the Caesarians. To him, as the surviving consul, Caesar's widow Calpurnia gave a considerable sum of money and all of Caesar's papers. These papers not only had a record of Caesar's enactments but also contained his plans for future action; in Antony's hands such papers would play an important part in any scheme he might work out.

On the seventeenth of March Cicero attended the meeting of the senate in the temple of Tellus and proposed a general amnesty. In so doing, he felt he was laying a sound basis for peace. Antony added to this proposal the ratification of Caesar's acts, a measure he claimed essential to the preservation of peace. Following the meeting of the senate Brutus and Cassius were entertained by Lepidus and Antony respectively so that it seemed that a civic disturbance had been avoided. The province of Crete was assigned to Brutus and that of Africa to Cassius.

Meanwhile, in spite of the opposition of Cassius, Brutus granted to Caesar's friends the right to hold a public funeral and to publish his will. As subsequent events were to show

187. Fam. XI; 1, 1.
188. Plut. Ant. 15.
189. Phil. i. I, 1; ii. 35. 89; Att. XIV: 14, 2.
Brutus' first mistake was in sparing the life of Antony, and his second was the granting of the above requests to Caesar's friends. The reading of the will, with its bequests to the citizens as well as to the soldiers and to officials, and Antony's funeral speech so roused the indignation of the people against the conspirators that they had to leave Rome.

Antony and Lepidus as leaders of the Caesarian party did not have a ready plan of action so that Antony, to my mind, played for time. Before going too far with any project he had to find out just what following the conspirators had and make his bid for power according to the varying circumstances. We have already seen his early reconciliation with the conspirators coupled with his subtle addition to Cicero's proposal for a general amnesty. Thus, on March seventeenth he refused Decimus Brutus his province of Cisalpine Gaul. Decimus felt at the time that Antony's refusal was based on his fear of the conspirators gaining too prominent a place in the state and of having no part himself. Decimus here warned Brutus and Cassius that Antony was likely to be treacherous. A little later, however, Antony proposed that a dictatorship such as Caesar held should be abolished altogether. This move seemed to indicate that there was still a chance for constitutional government and Cicero praised his action. About April the eighth or

193. Plut. Brut. 26; Ant. 14; Cic. 42.
194. Fam. XI: 1, 1.
195. Phil. i. 1, 2.
ninth Antony was still able to conceal his real intentions because he gave the impression of being more interested in banqueting than in plotting against the conspirators.

From April twenty-sixth on, however, Antony's plans became very clear to Cicero. One thing was certain: there would be no hope of remaining neutral in this coming struggle. Antony had declared that he would consider an enemy anyone who had rejoiced at Caesar's death, and Cicero and his friends had made no secret of their joy. Antony, meanwhile, had been making such good use of Caesar's papers that Cicero felt that they were more enslaved by Caesar's notes that they had been by Caesar himself. Antony, with Dolabella's help, had secured the passage of a law granting to Caesar's veterans the land promised them and he set out for Campania to supervise the allotment and colonization of that land. There he collected a large bodyguard of veterans and others; this bodyguard had probably been granted to him by the senate before he left Rome, but Antony's free use of Caesar's papers had made the senate suspicious and they decreed that a commission be appointed to look into Caesar's acts.

Before proceeding further, I feel that it is well to

196. Att. XIV: 3, 2.
197. Att. XV: 20, 2.
199. Att. XIV: 14, 2; Fam. XII: 1, 1.
200. Phil. viii. 8. 25.
201. App. B. C. iii. 5f.
made note of another character, destined to play the leading part in this struggle for power. Young Octavius, after hearing of Caesar's death and of the will which made him Caesar's heir, hastened to Italy to claim his inheritance. Cicero spoke of his being next door to him at Puteoli (April 21) and of his friendly attitude. When Octavius left to go on to Rome, however, Cicero was hurt that he could go there but not the men who had freed their country from a tyrant. On his arrival there, Octavius made application to Antony for his legacy but Antony was unable to give it to him, for he had spent it himself. After this incident and after being treated contemptuously by Antony, Octavius borrowed money from his friends to pay part, at least, of Caesar's legacies to the people and to make preparations for the games to honour Caesar's victory at Pharsalus. Cicero felt anxious about the effect of the celebration of these games, and a month later, while praising Octavius' wit and spirit and noting that he seemed well-disposed to M. Brutus and the others, yet he felt that he could not wholly trust a young man whose name was Caesar. Octavius' own father-in-law was not sure that he could be trusted. One conclusion that Cicero reached early was that Octavian must be dissociated from Antony.

Cicero, himself, after the meeting of the senate on March

204. Att. XVI: 11, 3.
205. Att. XIV: 12, 3.
206. Fam. XI: 28, 6; Att. XV: 2, 3.
207. Att. XV: 2, 3.
208. Att. XV: 12.

* Octavius' adoption was formerly ratified June 44, and henceforth he was known as Octavian.
seventeenth, did not have a public part in politics for about six months and during that time he devoted himself to litera-
ture. He left Rome on April seventh and did not return until he came back to take up the fight against Antony in August. We have seen how Cicero's first joy in the death of Caesar gave way to regret that, as the conspirators had no definite plans to carry out after the murder, the constitution was in no sense restored. The conspirators even lacked money and troops to ensure their personal safety after Antony's funeral speech had roused the people against them. Antony's intrigues with the veterans, and the news that he was intending to seize for himself the province of Cisalpine Gaul, made Cicero see that once again civil war was to come to Italy. He pledged his support to the cause of Brutus, but was unable to be of any specific help immediately as Brutus could not make up his mind whether to go into exile or not. Death was the exile that appealed to Cicero and he would gladly have given up his life to see the constitution restored and Brutus in prosperity.

In looking for support to further his plans for the restoration of the Republic, Cicero must have been very discouraged at this time. The consuls-elect, Hirtius and Pansa,
were not sure of their position as yet. Cicero did win over Hirtius to state that he would support the republican cause; Pansa, however, declared that he was against civil war but feared armed action from the conspirators as much as he did from Antony. The one person in whom Cicero could find satisfaction was Decimus Brutus, who set out for his province of Cisalpine Gaul and joined his troops there. The helplessness of Brutus and Cassius was further exemplified in their indecision whether or not to accept the commission Antony offered them, that of supplying Italy with grain. Although Cicero resented the insult Antony was offering them by such a commission, yet he advised Brutus to accept and to keep away from Rome for his own safety. He reproved both men for their hesitancy after the killing of Caesar and pointed out that they and not Antony should have summoned the senate and taken complete charge of the situation. The utter hopelessness of the cause of the state as revealed by the meeting of the leading republicans almost convinced Cicero that he should take advantage of the legateship offered him by Dolabella and visit his son at the University of Athens. He realized, however, that affairs were reaching a crisis, and that he

217. Att. XV: 1A.
220. Att. XV: 11, 3.
221. Att. XV: 11, 4.
222. Att. XIV: 16, 3.
223. Att. XV: 11, 4; Att. XV: 18, 2; Att. XV: 19, 1
might be criticized for leaving Italy and deserting the cause of the republic.

When Cicero finally set sail from Pompeii on July 17, he knew that he was leaving Italy at peace to return to Italy at war. After reaching Syracuse, he set out for Greece but was twice driven back by unfavourable winds to Leucopetra. While there, he received word that there was hope that Antony and the conspirators might be reconciled, and so he decided to return to Rome to attend the meeting of the senate on September first. On his way to Rome, although he learned that a break had occurred between Antony and the conspirators, he continued on his journey and reached Rome on August thirty-first.

Owing to fatigue after his journey, Cicero did not attend the senate on the following day. This failure to be present caused Antony to threaten to compel his attendance and to speak against Cicero. Cicero appeared the next day, and in his stirring address (First *Philippics*) he offered leadership and guidance to the senate. He boldly but calmly criticized Antony's recent policy, and appealed to Antony to strive for true glory and not personal power. Antony's reply was a scathing attack on Cicero's whole career; in particular, he

227. Fam. XI: 3, 3. Phil. i. 3.
228. Phil. v. 7.
229. Phil. i. 5.
tried to rouse the veterans against Cicero by charging him with the planning of Caesar's assassination. Cicero's answer, the Second Philippic, was not delivered but was published in November. In it, Cicero attacked Antony's private and public life and challenged Antony to do his worst to him personally but to be reconciled to the republic. Cicero counted his own life a small price to pay for the liberty of his country.

That Cicero did not deliver the Second Philippic while Antony was still in Rome does not to me suggest lack of courage on Cicero's part nor does it seem a contradiction of the preceding statement. My interpretation is that Cicero knew that to rouse Antony's wrath at this time would be to sacrifice his life without having a chance to try to restore liberty.

In October young Octavian acted boldly to check the power of Antony by rallying to himself the veterans of Julius Caesar. So successful was he that two of the legions Antony hoped to enroll, the Martian and the Fourth, decided to join Octavian. Thus Antony left Rome November 29, and marched to Cisalpine Gaul to oppose Decimus Brutus, after he had arranged for his brother Gaius to be granted the province of Macedonia and Calvisius the province of Africa. Cicero

230. Fam. XII: 2, 1; Phil. ii. 14.
231. Phil. ii. 46.
233. Phil. iii. 3, 6f.
234. App. B. C. iii. 46.
235. Phil. iii. 10, 26.
praised the prompt action of Octavian at this juncture and urged that the republicans support him; but, here again he was assailed by doubts. How could they follow so young a man? His name, too, was Caesar! Nevertheless, as Octavian wanted to act through the senate and have its approval, he wrote unceasingly to Cicero to come to him, first at Capua, then at Rome, and once more to save the state. Repeatedly, Cicero temporized, unsure of this young leader, and felt that Octavian was presumptuous to believe that he could convene the senate before January first. Later, the ominous statement of Octavian that he hoped to be permitted to attain to the honours of his father, disturbed Cicero with the thought that if Octavian met with success, Caesar's acts would be affirmed more forcefully than they were on March 17 (44 B. C.), and that that would be detrimental to the interests of M. Brutus and his party. On the other hand, if he lost, Antony would be unbearable. Cicero could not support Octavian wholeheartedly until he was reasonably sure not only that Octavian would support the cause of the state, but also that he would be well-disposed to the tyrannicides.

On December 20 the tribunes convened the senate to make plans to ensure safety for the senate to meet January first.
under the new consuls, Hirtius and Pansa. In his speech, Cicero, by a passionate appeal to the senate, recalled the senate to its former vitality and laid the foundations for constitutional government. On that day he stood as leader of the senate, a post of honour but also one fraught with danger. He proposed that the senate commend Decimus Brutus for holding his province against the threats of Antony; he also recommended that a vote of thanks be given to Octavian for his promptitude in ridding Rome of Antony, and he instructed the consuls-elect to see that they should be able to hold the meetings of the senate in safety. From now on he had a double duty to perform; he had to give leadership to the senate and to keep the rather loosely-knit constitutional party enthusiastic to its cause. The task before him was overwhelming, for, although the Roman people were showing wondrous courage and unanimity in their desire for liberty, yet the consulars were either weak or disloyal. Against Cicero's advice, an embassy was sent to treat with Antony early in January; it was to demand that he evacuate Cisalpine Gaul, remain two hundred miles from Rome, and obey the senate and the Roman people. It failed owing to the want of spirit of its members; they not only failed in stressing the demands stated but brought back extravagants demands from Antony.

242. Fam. X: 28; Phil. iii.
243. Fam. XII: 4, 1; Fam. XII: 5, 2; Fam. XI: 8, 1.
244. Fam. XII: 4, 1; Fam. XII: 5, 3; Fam. XI: 8, 1.
245. Phil. viii. i, 25.
Cicero had also to encourage and cherish the allegiance of the governors abroad and give support to the military leaders. Marcus Brutus, after he left Italy, seemed to shake off his indecision; he took over the province of Macedonia from Quintus Hortensius and defeated the small force of Gaius Antonius who had come to claim the governorship. Cassius, too, held the troops in Syria, but when Dolabella was outlawed for his savage killing of Trebonius, the governor of Asia, the senate would not put Cassius in charge there in spite of Cicero's efforts on his behalf. Even at this time of emergency petty jealousies and ambitions tied the hands of those who genuinely wanted to serve the state. In this case, the consul Pansa wanted the post in Asia himself. In Africa, Quintus Cornificius resisted the attempt of the officers of Antony's nominee to seize the province and won for himself the approval of the senate. Pollio, writing from Spain, declared his loyalty to the senate at this time. Meanwhile, in Gaul, Decimus Brutus succeeded in breaking Antony's siege of Mutina, but he lacked troops and equipment for further action against Antony. This initial victory at Mutina was costly because the one consul, Hirtius, fell in battle, and the other, Pansa, died a few days later from

247. Fam. XII: 11.
248. Fam. XII: 7, 1.
249. Fam. XII: 25, 1.
251. Fam. XI: 13, 1.
his wounds.

The republican party at Rome were so elated with the success of Decimus Brutus and Octavian over Antony that they forgot that the danger was not yet over and that Antony was still alive. They acted as if they had the full power of the old constitution behind them, and not only rewarded Decimus Brutus with a triumph whereas Octavian only received an ovation, but also assigned the leadership of the forces of the deceased consuls to Brutus. They angered the soldiers when their generals were not given a place on the commission of ten to distribute the lands granted to the soldiers. Then, too, since the commands of Marcus Brutus in Macedonia and Cassius in Syria had been ratified, the moderate Caesarian party felt that everything was being handed over to their bitterest enemies. Octavian could not help realizing that if he wanted a public career, he would not win it through debates in the senate but through his own achievements. He knew full well how much a man with an army behind him could win.

Meantime in Gaul, Lepidus, who had sent many professions of loyalty to Cicero, joined forces with Antony. In his letter to the senate he said he was forced to make peace with

252 Fam. X: 33, 4.
253 Brut. I: 15, 9.
254 Fam. XI: 20, 1; Fam. XI: 21, 2.
255 Phil. X: 11, 26.
256 Brut. I: 5, 1.
257 Fam. X: 34A, 2.
Antony by his soldiers, for they were unwilling to take the lives of citizens. His excuses were in vain and the senate declared him a public enemy; Antony and his followers had already been outlawed. Cicero wrote to Decimus Brutus and Plancus urging them to unite and to defeat Antony and he was heartened by the news that they had joined forces in June. They were not in a strong position, however, as their repeated requests for help and their refusal to take the offensive revealed. Octavian, who had been waiting for the right moment, had his soldiers demand the consulship for him. Added to this, there was a request that Antony's outlawry should be cancelled. On the refusal of these demands Octavian was only too glad to lead his men to Rome. The coincidence of these requests should have indicated to the senate that Octavian had been conferring with Antony. Then to add to the misfortunes of the republicans, Marcus Brutus, jealous of Cicero's treatment of Octavian, turned a deaf ear to Cicero's entreaties to come with all speed with his troops to Rome and urge Cassius to do likewise. Of the troops that arrived from Africa in response to the summons of the senate, three legions went over to Octavian. The senate was now defenceless; there was no

259. Fam. XII: 10, 1.
262. Fam. XI: 26; Fam. X: 23, 6; Fam. XI: 13, 5.
264. App. B. C. iii: 88
alternative but to surrender. Thus all Cicero's efforts to
restore constitutional government had failed, for the whole
structure lacked true vigour. He had to fight continually
against selfishness, for no one had his high conception of
service to his country. One more demand was to be made of
him—his life.

Octavian gained his consulship in August and then set
out to join Antony and Lepidus. At this meeting of the Second
Triumvirate near Bononia toward the end of October plans were
made for the division of the western provinces among them and
for the removal of their most formidable opponents by pro-
scription. Their most illustrious victim was Cicero, for
although Octavian tried to save him, he had to give way to
Antony's demands.

Cicero was at his villa in Tusculum when he received
the news of his proscription. He made a half-hearted attempt
to escape from Italy by sea but landed again at Caieta. There,
when he was being carried to the sea in his litter the assassins
came upon him. He would not permit his servants to fight off
the assassins and received his death blow with great fortitude.
The head that conceived and the hands that had written out
the great speeches against Antony were taken to Rome and nailed
up on the Rostra.

270. Plut. Cic. 47. 1
Chapter VII

A Personal Tribute

When Antony's emissaries came upon Cicero December 7, 43 B. C., they found not a man worn out with years and public service, but a man of resolute spirit ready to give up his life since all he cherished in it had passed away. It is with due humility, then, that I should like to pay a brief tribute to my favourite Latin author. My enjoyment of his work first aroused by the sympathetic and inspiring lectures of my teacher, has grown as I have become more familiar with his life and writings. His wide and varied interests revealed by his remarkable achievements in the realm of literature, and his activity in practical service to his country make him one of the world's outstanding figures.

The large number of letters left behind give us a very intimate picture of the man himself. In particular, in his letters to Titus Pomponius Atticus we are privileged to see not only his high ideals of service, but also all the petty vexations, griefs and troubles revealed to his intimate friend. His speeches, which were usually of political or judicial character, may seem full of exaggerations and extravagances according to modern standards, but personally I find great enjoyment in the majesty of his ornate prose style. He wrote, besides, a number of philosophical and political treatises in which he made more readily accessible to his contemporaries the philosophy and culture of Greece. He took an interest, too, in outlining the details of rhetoric. Thus, in
tribute to his varied interests, Sihler calls him "the first of the Humanists".

But since the preceding pages have dealt not with Cicero, the master of Latin prose, but with Cicero the statesman, I would like to emphasize two qualities he possessed as a statesman. The first of these is his courage. This quality was revealed early in his career in the defence of Sextus Roscius against the calumnies of the great Sulla's freedman Chrysonagus, and also, ten years later, by his prosecution of Verres for gross oppression of Sicily. The prosecution of the Catilinarian conspirators was, he felt, the crowning achievement of his consulship, and it required no small degree of courage to take upon himself the responsibility which the execution of the conspirators involved. Here he proved that civic courage was the equal of military courage. His following Pompey, when all hope of Pompey's success was lost, was yet another example. The supreme act of courage was, however, his return to political strife after his retirement during Julius Caesar's dictatorship, to lead the state in its opposition to Antony. His fight against Antony was unceasing, and he needed every bit of his enthusiasm to keep the senators devoted to the cause. He was quite ready for the end when it came, for he had done his duty to the satisfaction of his conscience.

255. De Off. 1: xxii, 78.
The second outstanding quality was Cicero's steadfastness to his ideal of service to his country. His administrations, first in Sicily and later in Cilicia, were both remarkable for their fairness. His incorruptibility in public affairs won for him the supreme post of consul; as consul, he fully repaid the honour bestowed on him by saving the state. It was his belief that all persons with ability for the administration of public affairs should take part in civic life so that the state might receive full benefit from their talents. To him the most honourable death was that won in the service of one's country. His unselfish devotion to what he believed to be his duty as a good citizen stands in sharp contrast to the selfish passion for power and advancement which characterized so many of his contemporaries.

257. De Off. 1: xvii, 57.
### VIII

**LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS:**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ant.</td>
<td>Antonius</td>
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<td>Ad Atticum</td>
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<td>Bellum Civile</td>
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<td>De Leg. Agr.</td>
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<td>De Off.</td>
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<td>Dio Cass.</td>
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<td>Phil.</td>
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<td>Plut.</td>
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