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Transformational analysis of metaphor Angel, Leonard Jay 1967

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A TRANSFORMATIONAL ANALYSIS OF METAPHOR by LEONARD JAY ANGEL B.A., McGill University, 1966 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS i n the department of Philosophy We accept t h i s thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA October, 1967 In p r e s e n t i n g t h i s t h e s i s i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t o f t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r an a d v a n c e d d e g r e e a t t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a , I a g r e e t h a t t h e L i b r a r y s h a l l m a k e i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r r e f e r e n c e a n d s t u d y . I f u r t h e r a g r e e t h a t p e r m i s s i o n f o r e x t e n s i v e c o p y i n g o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r s c h o l a r l y p u r p o s e s may be g r a n t e d by t h e H e a d o f my D e p a r t m e n t o r by h i s r e p r e s e n -t a t i v e s . I t i s u n d e r s t o o d t h a t c o p y i n g o r p u b l i c a t i o n o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r f i n a n c i a l g a i n s h a l l n o t be a l l o w e d w i t h o u t my w r i t t e n p e r m i s s i o n . D e p a r t m e n t o f Philosophy  T h e U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a V a n c o u v e r 8 . C a n a d a D a t e A p r i l 4 . 1 9 6 8 . ABSTRACT In t h i s study i t i s assumed that we can, roughly speak-ing, d istinguish metaphors from non-metaphors. A representa-t i v e l i s t of metaphors i s examined. It i s found that syntactic parsing reveals no marks of metaphor, and that semantic parsing, though more ill u m i n a t i n g , cannot help us in the analysis of a l l cases, due large l y to the importance of contexts as well as semantic content. To re-focus our attention on the relat i o n s h i p between metaphors i n general, t h e i r contexts, and discursive language, the question of whether metaphors are di s c u r s i v e l y paraphrasable i s d i s -cussed. It i s argued that a simile can always be constructed out of the key terms i n a metaphor, and that such constructed similes are paraphrases, though not 'unique1' paraphrases of the metaphor. A transformational system i s offered i n which metaphors are generated from si m i l e s . It i s suggested that the d i f f i c u l t y of paraphrasing metaphors i s due to the d i f f i c u l t i e s of reversing the d i r e c t i o n of the transformation, from simile metaphor, to metaphor simile. In order to make the transformational system workable, a d i s t i n c -t i o n i s made out between similes and other comparisons i n terms of the kind of features shared by the terms i n the comparison. This d i s t i n c t i o n not only makes the transforma-t i o n a l system workable, but also provides the necessary grounding for specifying the s u f f i c i e n t as well as necessary-conditions of metaphor. It further allows for the introduc-t i o n of the concept of the "scope" of a metaphor, a concept which i s instrumental i n accounting f o r the spe c i a l function and u t i l i t y of the device of metaphor. TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER PAGE I. PRELIMINARY REMARKS 1 I I . ARE THERE ANY GRAMMATICAL MARKS OF METAPHOR? 4 II I . ARE THERE ANY SEMANTIC MARKS OF METAPHOR? . 8 IV. ARE METAPHORS PARAPHRASABLE DISCURSIVELY? . 16 V. METAPHORS AS TRANSFORMS OF SIMILES . . . . 3 5 VI, THE UTILITY OF THE METAPHOR TRANSFORMATION . L$ BIBLIOGRAPHY 56* I. PRELIMINARY REMARKS The object of t h i s study i s to answer the following questions: 1. (a) Are there any s y n t a c t i c a l marks of metaphor? • (b) Are there any semantic marks of metaphor? (c) What are the necessary and s u f f i c i e n t conditions of metaphor? 2 . Are metaphors paraphrasable discursively? 3. What i s the u t i l i t y of the device of metaphor? •d*- «•'.- >U 0« -r* T" *v* "f -i** -i - *r* A. Answering these questions presupposes that we can, in general, distinguish between a metaphor and a non-metaphor. It does not presuppose that we can distinguish i n a l l cases (answering question 1 might help us to enforce a d i s t i n c t i o n i n what might otherwise be indeterminate cases). To answer these questions, i t i s convenient to begin with a l i s t of t y p i c a l metaphors. For obvious reasons i t i s preferable f o r the l i s t to be as heterogeneous as possible, that i s , with examples exhibiting as d i f f e r e n t grammatical and semantic make-ups as possible, and, i f anything, on the ganerous rather than the parsimonious side i n including examples into the l i s t . I f we can f i n d a u n i f i e d account f o r a l l of these 2 examples, so much the better; i f not, we w i l l t r y r e s t r i c t -ing u n t i l a suitably consistent and u n i f i e d account can be constructed. For the purposes of t h i s study i t w i l l be useful to consider only single sentences as instances of metaphor. This i n i t i a l l y excludes from the discussion what might be c a l l e d extended metaphors or "metaphor-systems," l i k e whole poems, novels, a l l e g o r i e s . Also i n i t i a l l y excluded from the discussion are models, l i k e scale models, chemical diagrams, atomic-structure models, pictures, and maps. F i n a l l y , the d i s t i n c t i o n between metaphors and similes i s f o r the moment preserved. It i s worth noting that whereas there i s a simple and straightforward way of distinguishing a metaphor from a s i m i l e , namely on the grounds of whether or not " l i k e , " " i s l i k e , " "as . . . i s to . . . so . . . i s to . . . .", or some such e x p l i c i t comparative device i s present, there i s no s i m i l a r straightforward way to distinguish metaphors from non-metaphorical sentences. This i s very l a r g e l y what question 1 asks a f t e r . b. L i s t I: Representative Metaphors: 1. You are a pig. 2. L i f e i s a walking shadow. 3. Nature abhors a vacuum. 5. The sea of l i f e i s deep and stormy. 5 , Necessity i s the mother of invention. 6. History weaves complex patterns. 3 7. The scum r i s e s to the top of the pond. 8. L i f e never knows the r e t u r n of s p r i n g . 9. Death the reaper cuts w i t h a me r c i l e s s scythe. 10. To decide i s to e x t i n g u i s h oneself. 11. L i f e i s made of b a t t i n g averages, not of p e r f e c t scores. 12. John's h i s f a t h e r ' s son. 13. This counterexample gums up the gears of the argument. 14. The b a l l o o n of e x i s t e n t i a l i s m i s easy- to puncture. 15. Big f i s h eat l i t t l e f i s h . 16. The poor are the negroes of Europe. 17. He i s a l i o n among men. 18. A l l men are animals (though women are ki n d and g e n t l e ) . 19. He's had l o t s of mud i n h i s eye. 20. Don't t r y t w i s t i n g my arm. 21. The law i s an ass. I I . ARE THERE ANY GRAMMATICAL MARKS OF METAPHOR? a. Examination of L i s t I c l e a r l y reveals that there i s no one grammatical mark which distinguishes a l l metaphors from non-metaphors; and further, that f o r most metaphors, the grammatical form bears no mark of metaphor. To show t h i s we need only show that i n general, changing some semantic elements of metaphors while preserving the syntactic structure w i l l eliminate the metaphor. Consider, f o r example, the metaphor: You are a pig. The syntactic parsing of t h i s sentence i s : noun + verb + a r t i c l e + noun And t h i s syntactic form i s the syntactic form of a t y p i c a l non-metaphor l i k e : You are a doctor. Or consider the metaphor: Nature abhors a vacuum. Its syntactic parsing i s : Noun + verb + a r t i c l e + noun which i s also the parsing of the non-metaphor: Parliament passes the laws. The test has the same res u l t s with the other cases of metaphor as well. The syntactic parsing of t y p i c a l metaphors provides no mark by which one might distinguish metaphors from non-5 metaphors. This i s a function of two things: (a) that i n cases l i k e "You are a p i g , " i t i s the p a r t i c u l a r noun phrase chosen which makes the difference between a metaphor and a non-metaphor, and (b) that most metaphors are not sgntacti-c a l l y deviant i n any way. (These two points are c l e a r l y i n t e r r e l a t e d : (b) i s simply another way of saying that the parsing of most metaphors w i l l also be the parsing of at least some non-metaphors.) b. Are there any metaphors which are s y n t a c t i c a l l y deviant, and perhaps marked as metaphors through the s p e c i a l i t y of the syntactic deviance? There are metaphors which are s y n t a c t i c a l l y deviant, although i t should be noted that these metaphors are the exceptional and unusual cases. The metaphor: A rose i s a rose i s a rose i s s y n t a c t i c a l l y deviant; the sentence i s not well-formed. Other examples of s y n t a c t i c a l l y deviant metaphors, and perhaps more t y p i c a l examples at that, are found i n recent and contemporary poetry. The s y n t a c t i c a l aberrations of E.E. Cummings are p a r t i c u l a r l y f a s c i n a t i n g , e.g., They sowed t h e i r i s n t they reaped t h e i r same"'" Or: as freedom i s a breakfast food or truth can l i v e with right and wrong or molehills are from mountains made long enough or just so long g w i l l being pay the rent of seem "'"E.E. Cummings, Selected Poems, Grove Press, 1959, #61, p. 73. 2 I b i d . , #60, p. 72. In both these cases a syntactic deviance i s due to the use of a verb or an adjective i n the place of a noun. However, i t i s e n t i r e l y inconclusive to merely note that there are s y n t a c t i c a l l y deviant metaphors. We must now ask: (a) Can we eliminate the metaphor by changing a semantic element, yet preserving the syntactic deviance? (b) Does correcting the syntax eliminate the metaphor? If the answer to (a) i s "yes" and to (b) i s "no," then i t i s not the syntactic deviance which makes the sentence a meta-phor. Consider: . . . w i l l being pay the rent of seem. Here we can eliminate the metaphor by changing a semantic element. Change, e.g., "pay the rent" to "be the opposite of." We now have the t y p i c a l s y n t a c t i c a l l y deviant non-metaphorical sentence (fragment): . . . w i l l being be the opposite of seem. At the same time, correcting the syntactic deviance does not eliminate the metaphor. I f we change "seem" to "seeming" we preserve the metaphor yet eliminate the syntactic deviance, as we are l e f t with the s y n t a c t i c a l l y sound metaphor: . . . w i l l being pay the rent of seeming. These two tests have the same res u l t s on the other cases (with the possible exception of "a rose i s a rose i s a r o s e " — a very a t y p i c a l metaphor, and one which we w i l l only be able to account f o r l a t e r ) . 7 In these cases, as with the others, the syntactic structures whether deviant or non-deviant do not distinguish between metaphors and non-metaphors. I I I . ARE THERE ANY SEMANTIC MARKS OF METAPHOR? a. Is a category mistake i n a sentence either necessary or s u f f i c i e n t f o r the sentence's being a metaphor? (i) The presence of a category mistake i s not suf-f i c i e n t f o r a sentence's being a metaphor; not a l l category mistakes are metaphors. Consider: I can f i n d the chemistry building, the math building, the students' union, the administration building, but I can't f i n d the university. This i s one of Ryle's paradigm examples of the category 3 mistake, but there i s no metaphor involved. To speak of "finding the u n i v e r s i t y " i s a perfectly legitimate non-metaphorical way of t a l k i n g . The category mistake consists i n someone's having mistaken the university's category by tkking i t to be a building. And the same i s true of other t y p i c a l and paradigm category mistakes. ( i i ) The presence of a category mistake i n a sentence i s not necessary f o r the sentence's being a metaphor; some metaphors are not category mistakes ( i f not a l l metaphors). Consider: The balloon of existentialism i s easy to puncture. This metaphor can only be thought a category mistake i f some-^Gi l b e r t Ryle, Concept of Mind, Barnes & Noble, 1949, Chap. 1. one i s actually mistaken i n what he believes to be the category which attaches to balloons and the category which attaches to existentialism. But i n making the metaphor no one need or w i l l think that balloons are not physical objects or that they are philosophical positions, nor w i l l anyone think that e x i s t e n t i a l i s m i s a physical object and not a philosophical position. Metaphors do not necessarily involve confusing or mistaking i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s of cate-gories. Ryle has suggested that some metaphors have led to category mistakes;^ even i f t h i s i s so, these cases are the exceptions. The point can be put more strongly. A sentence w i l l only become a category mistake when i t i s taken " l i t e r a l l y , " that i s , on the very occasions when i t i s not functioning as a metaphor. I f categories are crossed i n a metaphor, we are at least aware of the crossing. A category cross i s a category mistake only when we are not aware of the cross. Moreover, i t i s not f r u i t f u l , on independent grounds, to think of metaphor i n terms of category mistakes. Think-ing i n terms of category mistakes w i l l prevent us from explaining how and why metaphors are so c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y the vehicles of insights. A category mistake i s something we want to avoid; whereas a metaphor i s something we want to use, and to the best advantage. b. This suggests, however, that, even i f the notion of ^"Loc. c i t . 10 the category mistake w i l l not do, the notion of a category cross may be to the point. Is the presence of a category cross either necessary or s u f f i c i e n t f o r a sentence's being a metaphor? 5 The category cross as a mark of metaphor carries with i t much i n i t i a l p l a u s i b i l i t y . In those paradigm examples of metaphor with which i t was shown that standard cases of metaphor bear no s y n t a c t i c a l marks, the demonstration i n -volved substituting a word of a category appropriate to the subject f o r the noun phrase i n the predicate. Category crossing also seems to be a key notion i n other standard though more complex cases of metaphor, e.g.: Necessity i s the mother of invention. Following Katz' terminology, we might want to say that a se l e c t i o n r e s t r i c t i o n f o r the combination of mother has been broken on two sides: both i n i t s combination with "necessity" and i n i t s combination with "invention." Another way of putting i t i s t h i s : there are several semantic markers of By category cross I mean the combining of semantic elements i n a sentence i n ways which constitute v i o l a t i o n s of semantic rules f o r the combining of terms such as Sommers offers i n The Ordinary Language Tree, or Katz offers i n The  Philosophy of Language. Thus, a sentence with a category cross i s one which contains a v i o l a t i o n of a s e l e c t i o n r e s t r i c t i o n , i n Katz' terminology, or one which v i o l a t e s rules f o r combining terms on Sommers' tree. Naturally, d i f -ferent formulations of rules for the combining of terms w i l l r e s u l t i n some d i f f e r e n t assignments of category crossing. Most cases w i l l coincide, however, and t h i s i s s u f f i c i e n t to enable us to discuss category i n a general way without being committed to the assignments of only one semantic theory. 11 "mother" none of which are markers of either "necessity" ot "invention," and t h i s creates the category cross i n the metaphor. c. The notion of category crossing, however, though of central importance, i s s t i l l too r e s t r i c t e d . (i) The presence of a category cross i n a sentence i s not a necessary condition of the sentence's being a metaphor; some metaphors do not contain a category cross. S y n t a c t i c a l l y deviant metaphors may or may not involve a category cross. Some more standard cases of s y n t a c t i c a l l y deviant metaphors did involve category crosses when the s y n t a c t i c a l l y sound metaphor was recovered, e.g.: . . . w i l l being pay the rent of seeming. However there was a case (and perhaps a case too a t y p i c a l to warrant as much attention as i t ' s getting) which con-tained no category cross, namely: A rose i s a rose i s a rose. ( i i ) There i s a more standard group of metaphors which do not contain category crosses. These sentences are, i n terms of semantic parsing, indistinguishable from tautologies. (In f a c t "A rose i s a rose i s a rose" may be only a corrup-t i o n of t h i s kind of metaphor.) Examples of t h i s group are: He i s his father's son. Men are animals. Boys w i l l be boys. 12 Compare the two metaphors: John i s a pig. John i s his father's son. In both cases we are not i n doubt about the categories to which John belongs. In the f i r s t we know that John i s not a pig but a man; i n the second we do not doubt that John i s the son of h i s father. In the f i r s t the metaphor consists i n v i o l a t i n g or crossing the category-system; i n the second, the metaphor only repeats what we already know, by r e i n f o r c -ing or emphasizing the category-system. Category-locating i s s t i l l of central importance, but category-crossing i s too l i m i t e d . We must t r y to f i n d an analysis to cover both cases. ( i i i ) There i s an even more standard and important group of metaphors which does not involve v i o l a t i n g or crossing categories. (Max Black argues that these are not metaphors on the grounds that these are sentences i n which there i s no contrast between words which are being used metaphorically and other words which are not; he says i f they are metaphors, they are metaphors i n which a l l the words are being used metaphorically. However t h i s hardly seems to be adequate grounds f o r saying they are not metaphors. His r e j e c t i o n of them as metaphors seems to ignore the obvious approach that these are metaphors or not metaphors depending on the context i n which they occur.) ^Max Black, "Metaphor," i n Models and Metaphor, Cornell University Press, 1 9 6 2 . 13 In these metaphors, l i k e those described i n ( i i ) , only one system of categories i s employed i n drawing the metaphor. These are s t i l l distinguished from those described i n ( i i ) i n that they are not i n terms of semantic parsing i n d i s t i n -guishable from tautologies. These are i n terms of semantic parsing indistinguishable from empirical generalizations (or observations). Examples of t h i s group are: Seekers a f t e r gold dig up much earth and f i n d l i t t l e . Big f i s h eat l i t t l e f i s h . The scum always r i s e s to the top of the pond. S t i l l waters run deep. It's impossible to trap moonlight i n a b a r r e l . There's no dark cloud on the horizon today. These sentences, l i k e sentences l i s t e d i n ( i i ) can be either metaphors or not metaphors depending on context. An ecologist might be interested i n the movement of scum i n a pond, and say "The scum always r i s e s to the top of the pond," but i f someone i s t a l k i n g about the r i s e to power of an opportunist, and then comments "The scum always r i s e s to the top of the pond," the sentence i s a metaphor, and not just an empirical truth. The metaphor illuminates and relates i m p l i c i t l y two category systems, but again i t does not cross any categories. (iv) The presence of a category cross i s not a suf-f i c i e n t condition f o r a sentence's being a metaphor, f o r some category crosses are category mistakes and not mefeaphors. Moreover, merely to eliminate category mistakes i n formulat-ing the s u f f i c i e n t condition would be to provide a t o t a l l y 14 uninformative or even c i r c u l a r c r i t e r i o n , since we make out the d i s t i n c t i o n between category mistake and metaphor very l a r g e l y on the grounds of whether or not we tend to "take the sentence l i t e r a l l y . " d. There i s an important point to be educed from ( i i ) , ( i i i ) and ( i v ) , and we can formulate i t as a general problem which w i l l invariably prevent semantic parsing from provid-ing a viable c r i t e r i o n f o r a sentence's being a metaphor. An important fa c t o r for a sentences's being a metaphor i s the r e l a t i o n i t holds to i t s context. (i) Category crossing as a necessary condition f o r metaphor f a i l e d because there are cases of metaphor i n which there i s no category cross. In these cases the context of  the sentence determines whether the sentence i s a tautology or an empirical generalization on the one hand, or a meta-phor on the other hand. ( i i ) Category crossing as a s u f f i c i e n t condition f a i l e d because there are cases of sentences with a category cross i n which i t i s (again) the context of the sentence that determines whether the sentence i s a category mistake or a metaphor. In order to provide a general analysis of metaphor we have to look at the problem afresh, and consider the way a metaphor functions i n i t s context. This f i r s t w i l l enable us to provide general conditions f o r a sentence's being a metaphor, and secondly w i l l d i r e c t l y lead to an analysis 15 of the u t i l i t y of metaphor. The functioning of a metaphor i n terms of i t s context w i l l be most c l e a r l y revealed when we turn to the question, "Are metaphors paraphrasable d i s c u r s i v e l y ? " IV. ARE METAPHORS PARAPHRASABLE DISCURSIVELY? We sta r t afresh with t h i s question with the hope that i t w i l l both re-focus our attention on the aspects of metaphor which the semantic parsings could not handle ( i . e . , the importance of the context) and at the same time d i r e c t us forward towards framing a theory of the u t i l i t y of metaphors. The u t i l i t y of a l i n g u i s t i c device l i k e metaphor i s comprised of i t s unique capacities as a l i n g u i s t i c device, and these are at least p a r t i a l l y evidenced i n how completely 7 or adequately metaphors can be paraphrased d i s c u r s i v e l y . The problem of finding c r i t e r i a f o r paraphrase i n general i s a very d i f f i c u l t one, and one which bears heavily on the issues involved here. The scope of t h i s study, how-ever, does not permit as f u l l a discussion of the problems of paraphrase as the analysis requires to be complete. To t h i s extent, t h i s study i s s t i l l exploratory; however i t might be i n place to mention, f i r s t , that i t i s hoped the terms of the answers are more s p e c i f i c and less controversial than the terms of the question; secondly, and more concretely, that at t h i s stage i n asking "Can metaphors be paraphrased d i s c u r s i v e l y ? " we are, roughly speaking, t r y i n g to establish whether we tend to be as s a t i s f i e d that a sentence l i k e " L i f e i s i n s u b s t a n t i a l " carries the sense and information 7 Discursively, i . e . , non-metaphorically. 17 of a sentence l i k e " L i f e i s a walking shadow," as we are, I think, that a sentence l i k e , "He i s an unmarried man" carrie s the information and sense of "He i s a bachelor"; and i f not, why not, and under what circumstances, i f any, might we be s a t i s f i e d with a direct substitution of the non-metaphor f o r the metaphor. a. There are some prima f a c i e grounds f o r suspecting that metaphors are not t o t a l l y unparaphrasable d i s c u r s i v e l y , and as well that metaphors are not e n t i r e l y adequately para-phrasable d i s c u r s i v e l y . (i) There i s frequently intimate link-up between metaphors and non-metaphor sentences. Philosophers, e.g., frequently b u i l d a complicated argument and then f i n i s h by saying t h e i r point i s captured i n some metaphor or other, or by presenting a metaphor. (Two good examples of t h i s i n modern philosophy occur i n Wittgenstein and Strawson.) This suggests that the discursive sketching of a r e l a t i o n -ship may be i n some way or other a paraphrase of the rel a t i o n s h i p embodied i n the metaphor. Secondly, writers, when faced with the problem of a vocabulary inadequate to some task or other often introduce a new term v i a a metaphor. T h i r d l y , some metaphors are explained to those unfamiliar with the metaphor through some discursive paraphrases. _ Wittgenstein, The Tractatus, Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1961, §6, p. 54; Strawson, Individuals, UPI Paperbacks, p. 211. 18 ( i i ) On the other hand, i f discursive paraphrases were e n t i r e l y adequate, the u t i l i t y of the metaphor would be somewhat undercut. The f e e l i n g i s often expressed that the charm of a metaphor as well as i t s value i s due to the uniqueness and unparaphrasability of the metaphor. These points are not offered as arguments but as i n t u i t i o n s ; whatever analysis of metaphor i s provided should be able either to counter them and explain why we have them i f these i n t u i t i o n s are found to be misguided, or, preferably, to accommodate them. A certain amount of attention has been paid to the problem of whether or not metaphors are para-phrasable d i s c u r s i v e l y and i t w i l l be useful to examine the arguments that have been advanced. 9 b. Istvan Meszaros i n his a r t i c l e "Metaphor and Simile" argues that not only i s i t impossible to translate a l l metaphors d i s c u r s i v e l y , but also that i t i s impossible to translate any metaphor d i s c u r s i v e l y . He argues that: oi In no metaphor of the form "x i s y" w i l l i t make sense to say "x i s l i k e y." (? This i s because one of the two terms i s ;*unreal.» ~l Therefore the metaphor i s ''self-referential,' ; v i z . , x i s defined i n terms of y and vice-versa. °f 0 This explains why a metaphor cannot be placed i n discursive contexts. It can only function i n the context of other metaphors. Despite the highly non-sequitur f e e l of a l l t h i s , t h i s characterization i s not an unfair one. He e x p l i c i t l y argues o 7Istvan Meszaros, "Metaphor and Simile," Proceedings  of the Aristoteiean Society, 1967. 19 these points. His arguments collapse f o r a variety of reasons, and these reasons suggest some int e r e s t i n g points to follow up. (i) His own examples do not bear out i n the l e a s t . In f a c t , close examination of them leads, i f anything, to the opposite conclusion. He takes a song and selects two sentences from i t f o r the purpose of contrast: A Youth's the season made for joys. B Beauty's a flower, dispised i n decay. Meszaros correctly notes a contrast: i n A i t makes l i t t l e or no sense to insert " l i k e " a f t e r " i s " ; i n B i t does make sense to i n s e r t " l i k e " a f t e r " i s . " From t h i s , however, he i n f e r s that A i s a genuine case of metaphor, whereas B i s a sim i l e , not a metaphor. The example, however, suggests a very d i f f e r e n t conclusion. B i s a genuine metaphor, and whether or not the i n s e r t i o n of " l i k e " i s possible won't change that. In fact the usual d i s t i n c t i o n between metaphor and simile i s simply along the l i n e s of whether or not " l i k e " a c t ually appears i n the sentence. A, however, i s a much weaker meta-phor. Consider: C Youth's the period of time made f o r joys. C, though very s i m i l a r to A, i s not a metaphor at a l l ; the substitution of "season" f o r "period of time" i s not a metaphorically r i c h one. The reason " l i k e " cannot be i n -serted into A i s the reason i t cannot be inserted into C: 2G the predication i s not metaphorical enough.*^ (We w i l l l a t e r see how i t i s possible to insert " l i k e " into A i n order to capture the metaphor based on the r e l a t i o n between stages of l i f e — y o u t h , maturity, middle age, old age—on the one hand, and the seasons of the y e a r — s p r i n g , summer, f a l l , w i n t e r — o n the other.) I f anything B i s a stronger metaphor than A. This suggests that i t may be useful to examine a num-ber of metaphors of the form "x i s y" to see whether the ins e r t i o n of l i k e always makes sense i n metaphors. ( i i ) Secondly, eliminating B as a metaphor on the grounds of p would e n t a i l the elimination of most metaphors, fo r i t i s simply f a l s e that our d i s t i n c t i o n between metaphor and simile r e f l e c t s the d i s t i n c t i o n between r e l a t i n g "x," a *real"- entity to "y," an '"unreal* en t i t y , and comparing "x" a * r e a l t f entity to "y," another T ireal' ; e n t i t y . Many, i f not most cases of metaphor, i n f a c t , are based on physical-object terms and abstract nouns ( l i k e "youth," which Meszaros c l a s s i f i e s as *real.*') His point would involve narrowing our notion of metaphor to a p o i n t l e s s l y small class of metaphors (of which A would not even be an example i n any case). "^The phrase "not metaphorical enough" presupposes degrees of metaphor, a notion which has i n i t i a l p l a u s i b i l i t y because of the frequent absorbtion of metaphorical uses of words into the l i t e r a l meaning of a word. We w i l l l a t e r t r y to give a deeper account of why there are degrees of metaphor. 21 ( l i r ) With the collapse of f goes the collapse of } . For most metaphors, since they are of the B-type, are not ;T s e l f - r e f e r e n t i a l . A n d i t i s very dubious whether there i s any f r u i t f u l d i s t i n c t i o n to make along the l i n e s of "re a l * versus " u n r e a l , c o n s i d e r i n g the hopeless vagueness of the terms and the u n s u i t a b i l i t y of the presumably paradigm case. However, points ( i i ) and ( i i i ) s t i l l suggest that i t might be useful to explore the differences between metaphors of the form of B, i . e . , "x i s y" and other metaphors, l i k e "Nature abhors a vacuum," with the aim of seeing whether the notion of simile could be useful i n explaining metaphors i n general. (iv) And ^ i s the oddest point of a l l . We do not want to explain why metaphors cannot be placed i n discursive con-texts; i f any explanation i s due, i t i s to explain how they do function i n both discursive and non-discursive contexts. We do not want to say metaphors have no place outside the context of metaphors, as t h i s would be a r e s t r i c t i o n as a r t i f i c i a l as i t i s untrue to the f l e x i b i l i t y of language. Point (iv) suggests that i t might be useful to focus on the metaphors which function smoothly i n discursive con-texts to see to what extent metaphors are d i s c u r s i v e l y paraphrasable. Thus i t w i l l be p a r t i c u l a r l y useful to examine the insight contained i n "A proposition unfolds into a f a c t " or "Necessity i s the mother of invention," rather 22 than to only examine metaphors l i k e "My love/ thy hair i s one kingdom/ the king whereof i s darkness." which may be more d i f f i c u l t or simply more complicated to paraphrase d i s c u r s i v e l y . c. Max Black i n his a r t i c l e "Metaphor" argues a weaker point than Meszaros: not that i t i s impossible to success-f u l l y undertake an analysis such as was suggested by points ( i ) , ( i i ) and ( i i i ) i n the preceding section, but that: (X Viewing metaphors as condensed or e l l i p t i c a l similes i s too vague to be of any help i n understanding the function of metaphors. He asserts that even i f i t i s true that when we say "Richard i s a l i o n " we are e l l i p t i c a l l y saying "Richard i s l i k e a l i o n , " t h i s t r a n s l a t i o n i s e n t i r e l y uninformative since the aspect of the comparison i s s t i l l as open as i t was with the o r i g i n a l metaphor. However we should note that: (i) This p a r t i c u l a r example does not counter an analy-s i s which attempts to explain metaphors i n terms of similes, f o r i t merely implies that the scope f o r interpretation of t h i s metaphor i s i d e n t i c a l with the scope"*""*" for interpreta-t i o n of the si m i l e . Black does not see how such an explana-t i o n could possibly be h e l p f u l . But i t would be h e l p f u l , e.g., i f a detailed analysis would show how the scope of a metaphor does or can change with the transformation of simile into metaphor—and that i s a detailed analysis he does not "^A formal account of the "scope" of a metaphor and the "scope" of a simile w i l l be provided l a t e r . 23 undertake. ( i i ) A stronger argument would be that i t i s too d i f -f i c u l t or perhaps impossible to construct similes out of a l l metaphors, and so our f i r s t task i s then to examine a l l our d i f f e r e n t examples of metaphor to see whether similes can be constructed with them. Our second task i s to see whether the construction of similes i n the cases where i t i s possible i s of help i n interpretation of the metaphor; and the f i n a l task i s to see what changes take place when a simile i s transformed into a metaphor. ( i i i ) F i n a l l y , i n describing the r e l a t i o n between simile and metaphor, we need not s a y — i n cases where similes can be constructed—that the metaphor i s just an e l l i p t i c a l s i m i l e . We may want to claim that for the metaphor to succeed a simile i s presupposed, or that f o r a metaphor to succeed i t must be possible to construct a simile with the terms of the metaphor. Thus, i f the construction of similes can be undertaken, i t might be able to help us analyze metaphors more f u l l y than Black believes to be p o s s i b l e — one of the necessary consequences of his analysis i s : $ There i s i n general . . . no blanket reason why some metaphors work and other metaphors f a i l . d. Are metaphors paraphrasable i n terms of similes? (i) Let us begin with some r e l a t i v e l y simple cases of metaphors which function i n discursive contexts. Consider: 24 John i s a pig. He keeps his room i n a state of f i l t h , never bathes, and seems to enjoy l i v i n g i n squalid conditions. Compare i t with the same paragraph reading "John i s l i k e a pig" f o r "John i s a p i g . " The substitution does not involve any further changes i n the paragraph, nor does i t substan-t i a l l y a l t e r the information being transmitted about John. Meszaros (mistakenly) would say there that "John i s a pig" i s not a metaphor because of i t s paraphrasability i n terms of the s i m i l e , whereas Max Black would say the paraphrase of the simile f o r the metaphor i s merely unhelpful. If i t i s unhelpful perhaps i t i s because i t i s too simple a para-phrase to make. ( i i ) But the cases where i t i s possible to merely insert " l i k e " to produce a simile are the least i n t e r e s t i n g and i n s t r u c t i v e cases. Often more than the mere ins e r t i o n of " l i k e " i s required. Consider the metaphor: Youth's the s t u f f w i l l not endure. If we t r y i n s e r t i n g " l i k e " a f t e r " i s " the sentence reads awkwardly: Youth's l i k e the s t u f f w i l l not endure. Here paraphrasing involves making some changes besides the i n s e r t i o n of " l i k e . " The f i r s t change i s : Youth's l i k e the s t u f f which w i l l not endure. This i s a minor change (one that the metaphor i n v i t e s as well as the s i m i l e , i n any case). A d i f f i c u l t y s t i l l remains. "The s t u f f " s t i l l gives problems because of the a r t i c l e "the." The simile reads more smoothly i f the a r t i c l e i s omitted altogether or replaced with another term: Youth's l i k e s t u f f which w i l l not endure. Or: Youth's l i k e any s t u f f which w i l l not endure. And that change i s a more important one. Such changes (for t h i s as well as other metaphors) can be formulated i n terms of grammatical rules (e.g., change "the" to "a" or "any," or eliminate "the" under conditions x, y, z ) . Without going into the actual formulation of these grammatical rules (later we w i l l be able to account f o r why they are necessary) we can turn to the more important problem: W i l l grammatical rules be s u f f i c i e n t to cover changes neces-sary i n constructing similes out of metaphors? ( i i i ) Constructing similes out of metaphors sometimes involves the introduction of new semantic elements. This i s true of a great number, perhaps even a majority of metaphors. Consider: Necessity i s the mother of invention. The metaphor i s b u i l t upon three terms, "necessity," "mother," and "invention." However, i f any simile i s presupposed or buried i n the metaphor, three terms w i l l not be able to express i t . I f we say the contained simile i s simply: Necessity i s l i k e a mother (note again the substitution of "a" f o r "the") a key element 26 of the metaphor i s eliminated, namely the relat i o n s h i p of invention to necessity. If a simile i s going to be able to function as a paraphrase of the metaphor, i t w i l l have to compare one relat i o n s h i p (that between necessity and inven-tion) to another r e l a t i o n s h i p (e.g., that between a mother and her offs p r i n g ) . So that capturing the information con-tained i n the metaphor we w i l l have to introduce a fourth term with which to complete the comparison between two rel a t i o n s h i p s , thus: The r e l a t i o n s h i p between necessity and invention i s l i k e the re l a t i o n s h i p between a mother and her offspring. In cases l i k e these, i f similes are paraphrases at a l l , they are at best approximate ones; and what i s important i s that the approximation i s a necessary consequence of having to supply some fourth term i n constructing the simile. Moreover any one paraphrase which i s given w i l l be only one of a number of possible paraphrases, the number of possible para-phrases being the number of possible fourth terms. In t h i s example, the possible fourth terms include: offspring, progeny, c h i l d , foetus, baby. Thus constructing a simile often involves "focusing" the metaphor or f i x i n g i t i n only one of amecessarily i n d e f i n i t e number of directions. We w i l l say of these cases that the metaphor cannot be "uniquely paraphrased." It should be noted that i n other paraphrases, e.g., "He i s an unmarried man" f o r "He i s a bachelor" though the paraphrase naturally involves the introduction 27 of new semantic elements, these semantic elements are found in the l i s t of semantic markers entered for the terms i n the o r i g i n a l sentence, whereas the new terms i n the construction of a simile from a metaphor are not found i n the l i s t of semantic markers f o r terms i n the metaphor. What r e s t r i c t s our choice of i m p l i c i t or presupposed fourth terms? Partly the context of the metaphor, but more important, the se l e c t i o n i s r e s t r i c t e d by the t h i r d term i t s e l f . The fourth term i s almost invariably related to the t h i r d term qua what the t h i r d term i s . A foetus, e.g., i s related to a mother qua mother, whereas, say, a husband i s not r e lated to a mother qua mother but qua wife. This i s an idea which w i l l have to be developed l a t e r i n greater d e t a i l . (iv) We have now seen a case which involves supplying one missing term i n order to construct a simile from the metaphor. In some cases, more than one term must be supplied. Consider: Nature abhors a vacuum. Here the constructed simile compares the re l a t i o n s h i p between nature and a vacuum on the one hand to the rela t i o n s h i p be-tween someone and something he abhors. Again there are a number of possible paraphrases, the number being the number of possible combinations of t h i r d and fourth terms. (v) I t should be observed that the sentences which 28 were or were not metaphors depending on t h e i r context do lend themselves to the construction of similes. In these cases the context supplies us with the l e f t hand side of the si m i l e . Thus i n some contexts the simile constructed from the metaphor: The scum r i s e s to the top of the pond i s : The achievement of high o f f i c e s by incompetent individuals i s l i k e the r i s i n g of the scum to the top of the pond. e. Paraphrases of the metaphors i n l i s t I i n terms of similes can now be undertaken. (i) In d we found that any theory which attempts to paraphrase metaphors i n terms of similes w i l l have to recognize two kinds of changes which the paraphrasing involves: 1. Grammatical changes on the terms contained i n the metaphor. 2. The introduction of terms into the simile which were not present i n the metaphor. Because of these changes, especially those covered by 2, the paraphrase i s at best approximate. Later we w i l l have to consider the effects of t h i s on the paraphrase. We can generalize the conclusion very b r i e f l y i n t h i s way: the more frequently used a metaphor, the less o r i g i n a l the metaphor, the more idiomatic, and the more conventional the metaphor, the more re a d i l y i t w i l l lend i t s e l f to paraphrase and vice 29 versa; the more o r i g i n a l , and less conventional the metaphor, the more (a) context-bound and (b) d i f f i c u l t to paraphrase i t tends to be. It might seem at f i r s t that a metaphor's being context-bound ought not be associated with d i f f i c u l t y of paraphrase; i t should be noted, however, that when metaphors are strongly context-bound the context tends to relate one metaphor to another (as most c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y i n poetry) and we are concerned with discursive paraphrases, the d i f f i c u l t y of which tends to be increased. Bearing these changes i n mind, we can construct similes based on the metaphors i n L i s t I, and t e n t a t i v e l y approach them as approximate paraphrases, or similes out of which approximate paraphrases can be e a s i l y b u i l t . ( i i ) L i s t I I : Similes constructed from the metaphors i n L i s t I. 1. You are l i k e a pig; a pig i s d i r t y , wallows i n mud, etc. 2. L i f e i s l i k e a walking shadow; the shadow of a walking person i s i n s u b s t a n t i a l , f l e e t i n g , ungraspable, ephemeral. 3. Nature: vacuum: abhorrer: abhorred; the abhorrer shuns, avoids, repels, r a r e l y possesses, what he abhors.12 L . L i f e i s l i k e a sea; a sea i s deep and stormy, i n constant action, with currents and countercurrents. 5 . Necessity: invention: mother: (offspring), (foetus), ( c h i l d ) : a mother bears her c h i l d (nourishes the foetus) (pampers her o f f s p r i n g ) . 6 . History i s l i k e a loom; a loom weaves complex patterns on a rug. "A:B :: C:D" stands f o r "the rela t i o n s h i p between A and B i s l i k e that between C and.D" Brackets indicate several p o s s i b i l i t i e s . 30 7. Incompetent i n d i v i d u a l s : high o f f i c e s :: scum: top of the pond; the scum r i s e s quickly to the top of the pond, more quickly than anchored plants; remains at the top whereas heavy, substantial objects are c a r r i e d down. 8. L i f e : youth :: year: spring; there i s only one spring to the year. 9. Death: men :: a reaper: sheaves of wheat; a reaper reaps a l l sheaves, i s i n d i f f e r e n t with respect to which stalks he cuts, w i l l make no exceptions, stores i t a l l i n a granary. 10. Deciding: oneself :: extinguishing a candle; when a candle i s extinguished, there i s no more flame, no more l i g h t . 11. L i f e i s l i k e a game of baseball; a baseball player i s a top player i f his batting average i s high, and not necessarily perfect. 12. John i s l i k e h i s father; his father i s (moody) (kind) (unkind). 13. The argument: counterexample :: machine: gum i n the gears; gum i n the gears slows down the machine; can break i t down e n t i r e l y ; may necessitate repairing the machine. 14. E x i s t e n t i a l i s m i s l i k e a balloon; a balloon i s easy to puncture; makes a big noise when punctured; i s f i l l e d with a i r ; (is empty i n s i d e ) . 15. Powerful agents ( r i c h ) : weak agents (poor) :: big f i s h : l i t t l e f i s h ; big f i s h eat l i t t l e f i s h , thrive on l i t t l e f i s h , grow fat while the l i t t l e f i s h die, need the l i t t l e f i s h to maintain themselves f a t and healthy. 16. Poor: Europe :: negroes: America; negroes are maligned i n American, discriminated against made to suffer. 17. He: men :: l i o n ; (beasts of prey) ( a l l animals) (prey); the l i o n i s feared by a l l animals (stronger than other beasts of prey) ( has no trouble catching his prey). 18. Men are l i k e other animals; animals are c r u e l , s e l f i s h , unkind. 19. (The obstacles one faces) (The i n s u l t s one receives) are l i k e mud i n the eye; mud i n the eye prevents one from seeing c l e a r l y , moving normally; causes pain, tears. 20. Persuading someone) ( Blackmailing someone)(Persuading someone u n f a i r l y ) i s l i k e twisting his arm; someone's 31 arm forces him to do what one wants, puts him at one's mercy. 21. Laws are l i k e an ass; an ass does not respond quickly to s i t u a t i o n s , i s sleepy, sluggish, d i f f i c u l t to waken, but occasionally rambunctious and mean, and can kick to i n f l i c t pain i f i t wants. f. We have found that similes can be constructed out of a l l the metaphors i n the o r i g i n a l l i s t . If t h i s point w i l l have any use to us i n distinguishing metaphors from non-metaphors , we must: 1. Try to imagine or to f i n d a metaphor from which a simile cannot be constructed along the l i n e s f o l -lowed i n e. 2. Examine t y p i c a l non-metaphor sentences to see whether similes can be constructed out of them i n the way that they can be constructed out of metaphors. At t h i s stage we s h a l l not develop f i n a l arguments concern-ing either 1 or 2, but i t i s i n place to make some tentative suggestions. (i) Try to imagine a metaphor for which a simile can-not be constructed. Consider, f o r example: Man i s the musician of pears. What i s the simile? The form suggested by our previous analysis would have the simile f i l l e d by: Man: Pears :: musician: But how do we f i l l i n the fourth term? Is t h i s a metaphor out of which a simile cannot be constructed? The mere fact that we cannot immediately f i l l i n the 32 fourth term, however, does not detract from the value of constructing the simile. We cannot f i l l i n the fourth term unless we know the context of the poem, or can guess possible contexts, or think of things which are related to a musician qua musician. If we do t h i s we can f i l l i n the fourth term; moreover, u n t i l we can f i l l i n the fourth term, the metaphor i s more than l i k e l y u n i n t e l l i g i b l e . Once we know that, e.g., other metaphors i n the poem compare aesthetic to non-aesthetic experiences, or that sounds are related to a musician as a musician i t i s no longer d i f f i c u l t to supply the fourth term—and coincidentally to make the metaphor i n t e l l i g i b l e , t'hus: ,„ . . man ) (pears ) Man : pears : : musician : sounds : . . { . ) j ( J~ \ ~Zu I' 'musician) treat (sounds) as aesthetic objects. Moreover, t h i s fact suggests that the metaphor w i l l f a i l f o r a reader unless he can f i l l i n a simile of t h i s form. This example i s , of course, not conclusive, but i t i s a t e l l i n g fact that a metaphor l i k e t h i s one w i l l remain obscure or u n i n t e l l i g i b l e u n t i l we can construct a simile of the suggested form. ( i i ) Can similes be constructed out of t y p i c a l non-metaphor sentences? Consider the t y p i c a l sentence: Johnny goes to the store. Constructing a simile out of t h i s sentence would res u l t i n something l i k e : 33 Johnny : store :: someone who goes : where he goes: But t h i s , of course i s not a bona f i d e comparison since John's being l i k e someone who i s going would preclude h i s being some-one who i s going, which he i s . When a simile of the form A : B :: C : D i s constructed out of a metaphor, "A i s B" i s either f a l s e or neither true nor f a l s e , whereas here "A i s B" ("Johnny i s someone who goes") i s true. Consider another t y p i c a l non-metaphor: John i s a doctor. The presupposed si m i l e , i f there were one, would be: John i s l i k e a doctor. However, John's being l i k e a doctor precludes his being a doctor since we only compare him to a doctor when he i s not one. Again the simile cannot be a paraphrase or presupposi-tionuof the non-metaphor because the o r i g i n a l sentence i s true or f a l s e and not neither as i t would be i f the o r i g i n a l sentence i s a metaphor. But what about a sentence l i k e : This b a l l i s blue. Mightn't i t be thought that a comparison can be constructed out of the statement, namely between the colour of the b a l l and the colour of whatever object i s the vehicle f o r our ostensive d e f i n i t i o n of "blue"? The comparison would be something l i k e : 34 The colour of t h i s b a l l (as i t appears now) i s l i k e the colour of the object x (as i t appears under certain standard conditions). Comparisons also seem to be presupposed by other sen-tences, l i k e : Both John and Dick are 21 years old. the comparison being: John i s l i k e Dick i n the respect of his age. If the analysis of metaphors i n terms of similes i s to hold up as a s u f f i c i e n t as well as necessary condition of metaphor, we w i l l have to distinguish between similes and other comparisons. At t h i s point i t i s s u f f i c i e n t to simply note that to complete the analysis such a d i s t i n c t i o n has to be made out, and to leave the task aside f o r the moment. V. METAPHORS AS TRANSFORMS OF SIMILES We have found that: 1. Similes can be constructed out of metaphors, but: 2. Metaphors cannot be uniquely paraphrased by similes. While 2 prevents us from treating the presupposed similes as e n t i r e l y adequate paraphrases, i t does not prevent us from tr e a t i n g the metaphors as transforms of the similes. To treat a l l metaphors as transforms of similes we need only to show that: A. Given a s i m i l e , certain grammatical transformations on i t w i l l always produce a metaphor. B. Given a metaphor and a simile constructed from the metaphor, the grammatical r e l a t i o n between the two i s s p e c i f i e d i n one of the transformations (in combination, perhaps, with other transformations). The f i r s t of the two tasks i s the simpler, since i t does not involve stating an exhaustive l i s t of the transformations, and i t may be that the second i s not possible because any grammatical form can house a metaphor. The basic task, A, can be undertaken without too much d i f f i c u l t y . a. A l i s t of metaphor transformations. L i s t I II (A): Transformations on similes of the form "A i s l i k e B"; BP ' P JP i s a predicate; the subscript n b n r e s t r i c t s the range of predicates to predicates with a sp e c i a l r e l a t i o n -ship to the noun-phrase "B". The necessity and the 36 1 . A i s B. 2. The B of A Pfe. 3 . The B i n A Pfe. 4 . A P b. 5. A the B.P b. 6. B P, . (+ suitable context) b L i s t III (B): Transformations on similes of the form "A : B :: C. : D : C P d.D;{A & C}P{B & Djrespectively." 1 . A i s the C of B. 2. A P ^ B. 3 . C P c d D suitable context). 4 . C P B. 5. A P D. 6. The A o f c Pur l -ed 7. The A of C P. 8. A the cd 9- A the C P D. 1 0 . The A- cd 1 1 . The A-•C P. 1 2 . The A' c P,d- 1 4 cd 135 A the cd application of the r e s t r i c t i o n w i l l be discussed l a t e r . A t y p i c a l example of a simile of the form "A i s l i k e B; B P^" i s "My love i s l i k e a rose; a rose blossoms i n Spring." And the transforms of the simile are: (1) My love i s a rose; (2) The rose of my love blossoms i n spring; (3) The rose i n my love blossoms i n spring; (4) My love blossoms i n spring; (5) My love the rose blossoms i n spring; (6) A rose blossoms i n spring (+ suitable context). "^A' i s an adjective constructed out of A. 37 IL. A the C P B. 1 5 . C P , B. CQ (This l i s t as i t stands i s c l e a r l y incomplete; i t might be continued almost i n d e f i n i t e l y i n the same vein; or i t might be condensed into a small number of operations: (a) combin-ing some terms on the l e f t side of the simile with the correspondingly other terms of the right hand side (b) trans-forming a noun into an adjective and combining as i n (a), (c) combining corresponding terms into one sentence through an appositive, and of course, (d) using several of the operations at once. Condensing the l i s t i n t h i s way makes the second task, B, more palpably plausible.) b. Limitations On the Transformations Not a l l the transformations l i s t e d produce metaphors on any sentence of-the given simile forms. There are both grammatical and semantic r e s t r i c t i o n s on the transformations. (i) The Grammatical R e s t r i c t i o n s : Some of the l i s t e d transformations cannot be performed on some of the similes because of the u n s u i t a b i l i t y of the grammatical components of the simile. In the s i m i l e : To decide : oneself :: to extinguish : candle the transformations won't always work. Number 1 , f o r example, w i l l not work because "extinguish" w i l l not be preceded by an a r t i c l e (under normal circumstances)"1"^. In order to make — ^In contexts where syntactic deviance can be turned to advantage, these r e s t r i c t i o n s w i l l be ignored. It i s 38 the transformations work "to extinguish" w i l l have to be transformed into a noun l i k e "extinguishing," so that #1 w i l l y i e l d the metaphor: Deciding i s the extinguishing of oneself. I f the noun-phrase A or C already includes "the," some of the transformations w i l l produce one too many "the." Again, #12 can only be performed where A can be transformed into an adjective; and when some of the terms are proper names the transformations won't always work either. There are many other s i m i l a r grammatical r e s t r i c t i o n s and modifications of the transformations. None of these, however, are at a l l c r u c i a l . The more int e r e s t i n g r e s t r i c t i o n s on the similes are the semantic ones. ( i i ) The Semantic R e s t r i c t i o n s : Some terms f o r A and B, or f o r A, B, C and D, i n which A i s l i k e B, or the rela t i o n s h i p between A and B i s l i k e the rel a t i o n s h i p between C and D w i l l not y i e l d metaphors when any of the transforma-tions are performed. Consider, f o r example: This house i s l i k e that house; that house i s a cottage. It i s hard to conceive of: This house i s that house (Transformation 1) as a metaphor, and i t i s surely inconceivable to defend: il l u m i n a t i n g , moreover, to view s y n t a c t i c a l l y deviant meta-phors as metaphors where the presupposed similes are con-structed with the grammatical r e s t r i c t i o n s waived. 39 This house i s a cottage (Transformation 4) as a metaphor. Again, consider: The rela t i o n s h i p between Tom and Dick i s l i k e the r e l a -tionship between Harry and John; Harry i s good friends with John. By no stretch of the imagination i s Tom i s good friends with Dick (Transformation 13) a metaphor. Nor i s : Tom i s good friends with John (Transformation 2) a metaphor. And: Tom i s the Harry of Dick (Transformation 1) although not a normal discursive sentence, i s as surely not a good case of metaphor. In order to see why these do not work, whereas A= necessity, B= invention, C=mother, D=offspring, e.g., does work, i t i s useful to t r y to f i n d cases which are somewhere i n between the two extremes i n terms of whether they lend themselves to the transformation into metaphor. Consider: The re l a t i o n s h i p between Henry Moore and the 20th century i s l i k e the rela t i o n s h i p between Michelangelo and the Renaissance. Here Transformation 1 makes more sense: Henry Moore i s the Michelangelo of the 20th century. This sentence, although not a paradigm case of metaphor, i s 40 nevertheless closer to a metaphor. We might want to say i t i s a borderline case of metaphor. It has already been men-tioned that i t i s not unreasonable to assume that there are degrees of metaphor. We should t r y to see i f i t i s possible to keep one side of the simile fixed and the other changing, so that the r e s u l t i n g transformations form a continuum d i s -playing the degrees of metaphor. Consider: This lean-to i s l i k e a building. This beehive i s l i k e a building. This human body i s l i k e a building. This mathematical proof i s l i k e a building. and the corresponding metaphors of or res u l t s of Transformation 1: This lean-to i s a building. This beehive i s a building. This human body i s a building. This mathematical proof i s a building. Here we can see very c l e a r l y the degrees of metaphor, and t h i s suggests that our semantic r e s t r i c t i o n of terms enter-ing the simile w i l l be one of degree. The same point can be made from a s i m i l a r l i s t of four-termed comparisons and t h e i r corresponding metaphors: Groundsheet : tent :: basement building Tunnel : a n t h i l l :: basement : building Roots : plant :: basement : building Axioms : mathematics :: basement : building 41 And: The groundsheet i s the basement of a tent. A tunnel i s the basement of an a n t h i l l . The roots are the basement of the plant. The axioms are the basement of mathematics. Both pairs of l i s t s suggest that the degrees of meta-phor aris e because of the proximity or distance of the categories of the terms i n the comparison. The closer to-gether i n the table of categories, on the language tree, or of the semantic markers, the two terms i n the comparison are, the weaker the metaphor which results when the transformations are applied w i l l be. Let us then o f f e r the following hypothesis to cover the r e s t r i c t i o n s necessary on terms entering the s i m i l e : I. The more semantic markers the two terms share, the less the transformations w i l l produce metaphors and the fewer semantic markers the two terms share, the more the transformations w i l l produce metaphors. This hypothesis, though i t might cover some of the eases, e.g., our f i r s t two examples, where a house i s being compared to a house, and a person to a person, and though i t may cover degrees of metaphor with some terms, w i l l s t i l l not r e s t r i c t sharply enough to do the job we want i t to do. There are cases of A and B which have few semantic markers i n common, yet do not produce metaphors i n some of t h e i r transformations. Consider: Axiomatic geometry i s l i k e the Parthenon; the Parthenon i s over 2000 years old. 42 Although i t might be that: Axiomatic geometry i s the Parthenon (Transformation 1) i s a metaphor (at least i n some contexts) i t i s f a l s e that: Axiomatic geometry i s over 2000 years old (Transformation 4) i s a metaphor. And yet axiomatic geometry has few semantic markers i n common with the Parthenon. Our f i r s t hypothesis i s , therefore, inadequate. The key to the r e s t r i c t i o n now s h i f t s over from the semantic markers which A has i n common with B to the r e l a t i o n between P^ and B and A. We want to say something l i k e , "P^ must be a predicate which does not l i t e r a l l y apply to A i n order f o r the transformations to produce metaphors" but t h i s , of course, would be e n t i r e l y unhelpful i f not c i r c u l a r . It i s more h e l p f u l to examine the kind of comparison going on when two houses are being compared as to s t y l e , to contrast i t with the kind of comparison going on when Solomon says, e.g., "Your temple i s l i k e a pomegranate." An immedi-ate contrast which comes to mind i s the contrast between assuming that the two houses are being compared qua houses, but not assuming that the temple i s being compared with a pomegranate i n terms of some semantic marker which i s a marker of both temples and pomegranates. (Semantic markers which are markers of a l l or nearly a l l terms, l i k e the semantic marker "discussable thing," are, of course, excluded.) Let us therefore o f f e r a second hypothesis for the semantic r e s t r i c t i o n : 43 I I . The assumption that A i s being compared with B i n terms of F, where F i s a semantic marker of both A and B, prevents the comparison from y i e l d i n g metaphors i n the transformation. This hypothesis would cover a l l the comparisons which do not transform into metaphors which have been presented so f a r . In the f i r s t case, the assumed F i s "houses," i n the second i t i s "person," and i n the l a s t case, i t i s "objects with a beginning i n time." It also seems to distinguish between these cases and the t y p i c a l cases which do produce metaphors, because i n the l a t t e r , P^ w i l l not supply a semantic marker common to both A and B, and to make a simile l i k e , "Your temple i s l i k e a pomegranate," i t i s not necessary to assume that the two are being compared qua some F, a semantic marker common to both. However, the hypothesis does not cut f i n e l y enough. In a case l i k e : My love i s l i k e a rose; a rose P _ , J ' rose' no matter what P _ i s f i l l e d i n with, there i s an F, " l i v i n g rose ' ' ° object" (ignoring the ambiguity of "my love," and taking "my love" to mean, not "my f e e l i n g of love," but "the person I love") which i s a semantic marker of both A and B. Is t h i s F necessarily assumed or not? Certainly t h i s i s assumed. But are A and B being compared i n terms of F? The question i s not clear enough to answer. The r e s t r i c t i o n w i l l have to be made more precise. The contrast must be sought not only on the grounds of the a v a i l a b i l i t y of F, but of the rel a t i o n s h i p between F 44 and P^. In the case of the houses we are comparing two objects knowing they are both houses. Our comparison, there-fore, i s not on the ground of features essential to houses, for that i s assumed by the a v a i l a b i l i t y (here e x p l i c i t i n the names) of F, a semantic marker of both A and B. The comparison i s based, necessarily, on non-essential features of houses, though relevant ones to t h e i r being houses—i.e., cottage, as opposed to duplex or bungalow. This kind of comparison may be contrasted with the kind of comparison i n which essential features of (or features standardly associated with) A are compared with e s s e n t i a l (or standardly associated) features of B. Thus, i t i s not standardly associated with or essential to a house that i t be a cottage, but i t i s essential or standardly associated with a rose that i t have petals which nest i n a cer t a i n way, that i t blossoms i n spring, etc., and these are the features which w i l l f i l l i n P ' rose Let us consider, then, the following hypothesis: II I . "A i s l i k e B; P, " w i l l only transform into metaphors i f there i s no F which i s assumed as a semantic marker fo r both A and B, or i f there i s an F which i s assumed as a semantic marker fo r both A and B, then some features of A are being compared to essential or standardly associated features of B, v i a P, . b The d i s t i n c t i o n between esse n t i a l or standardly associated features on the one hand and non-essential or non-standardly associated features on the other i s not meant to hinge on analytic/synthetic controversies. For our purposes we can hinge the d i s t i n c t i o n on a d i s t i n c t i o n found i n speaker-45 hearer contexts. I f Smith says to Jones, "House A i s l i k e house B" the comparison (normally) w i l l carry with i t no information unless Smith follows through with something l i k e "Because both are (cottages) (painted green)." However, i f he says, "My love i s l i k e a rose," the comparison w i l l carry with i t the intended information even i f he does not follow through with "because a rose blossoms i n spring"—simply because Jones can supply the follow-through on his own. This hypothesis not only w i l l distinguish between terms for A and B which w i l l or w i l l not transform into metaphors, and the conditions under which the metaphor transformations w i l l take place successfully, but also provides grounds f o r establishing an independently inte r e s t i n g d i s t i n c t i o n — a n d one which i s especially important l a t e r on—namely, the d i s t i n c t i o n between a comparison (or a "standard comparison," to avoid confusion, since similes are often, and appropriately, c a l l e d comparisons) and a simile. c. The D i s t i n c t i o n Between Simile and Standard Comparison: De f i n i t i o n I: A sentence of the form "A i s l i k e B" i s a standard comparison i f and only i f i t i s assumed that both A and B are being compared i n terms of F (a seman-t i c marker which they share), and some non-essential features of A and B relevant to F, are being compared. De f i n i t i o n I I : A sentence of the form "A i s l i k e B" i s a simile i f and only i f i t i s not assumed that both A and B are F, of i f i t i s assumed then some features of A are being compared with essential or standardly associated features of B, P, . Hypothesis III and the d i s t i n c t i o n between a standard 46 comparison and a simile i s useful not only i n terms of a c r i t e r i o n for r e s t r i c t i n g the sentences entering the transformations. (i) The d i s t i n c t i o n i s useful to accommodate the f e e l i n g that both similes and metaphors have a d i r e c t i o n (whereas standard comparisons do not) because of the use of a feature of B as a vehicle f o r comparison. ( i i ) It enables us to explain why some of the gram-matical changes employed i n the construction of similes are necessary. The most basic change i s the change of "the" to "a," (e.g., "Necessity i s the mother of invention" becomes "The r e l a t i o n s h i p between necessity and invention i s l i k e the r e l a t i o n s h i p between a mother and her o f f s p r i n g " ) . And t h i s change can be understood i n terms of the d i s t i n c t i o n since "a mother" i s a more convenient vehicle f o r drawing on essential or standardly associated features of mothers than "the mother," since "a" does not- distinguish between p a r t i c u l a r features of one mother as opposed to another, and so c a l l s attention to the features of mothers i n general, while "the" c a l l s attention to the p a r t i c u l a r features of a p a r t i c u l a r mother. ( i i i ) More important, i t provides us with a basis f o r explaining why i t i s we supply the missing fourth term of a metaphor through standard associations with the t h i r d , or essential features of the t h i r d , by l i n k i n g our view of metaphors as transforms of similes with a d i s t i n c t i o n between 47 standard comparisons and similes drawn on these very l i n e s , of whether the compared features are essential or i n e s s e n t i a l . (iv) The d i s t i n c t i o n between simile and comparison w i l l enable us to view "being a transform of a s i m i l e " as both necessary and s u f f i c i e n t for a sentence's being a metaphor. (v) F i n a l l y , the presupposition of a s i m i l e , where simile i s d i s t i n c t from standard comparison, w i l l be of use i n h i g h l i g h t i n g the u t i l i t y of the metaphor transformation. For i t i s only i n terms of essential features or features which are standardly associated with the objects i n the comparison that a metaphor system, or a series of metaphor transformations on a single s i m i l e , can be invoked. VI. THE UTILITY OF THE DEVICE OF METAPHOR We are now i n a position to connect some of the points made e a r l i e r and to explore them more f u l l y . So f a r we have approached the problem of defining the relat i o n s h i p between metaphors, similes and the set of transformations i n L i s t III (which we s h a l l c a l l the M-transformations) from several d i r e c t i o n s . We have been con-cerned with the following four formulations: d Given any s and any t m > then t f f l(s) i s a metaphor. (3 Given any m, then i f t ( s ) equals m, t i s a T . t Given any m, then i f t>m(p) equals m, p i s an S. TGiven any m then there i s some t and some s: t (s) equals m. m m ^ Here n s " i s a si m i l e , "S" i s the class of sim i l e s , " t n i s an ' ' m M-transformation, "T " i s the class of M-transformations, and "m" » m ' i s a metaphor. Of these four formulations we are most interested i n oc and ^  since these define the s u f f i c i e n t and necessary condi-tions of metaphor, respectively; however a l l four have been brought up and are important i n enabling us to understand the u t i l i t y of metaphor, so they s h a l l a l l be dealt with. a. The necessary and s u f f i c i e n t conditions of metaphor: The s u f f i c i e n t condition of metaphor, , has already been established throughout Chapter V. For the problem which Chapter V dealt with was the problem that not a l l comparisons would trans-form into metaphors, and i n Chapter V we attempted to show that introducing the d i s t i n c t i o n between similes and other or standard comparisons would guarantee the y i e l d i n g of metaphors. Of (J i t was said at the very outset of Chapter V that the , • . 49 task of demonstration i s d i f f i c u l t because the l i s t of M-transformations has not been d e f i n i t i v e l y set forward, i . e . , because of i t s open-endedness. However, we can go f u r t h e r now, and say tha t i f 1 can be e s t a b l i s h e d , {? f o l l o w s by d e f i n i t i o n . For i f we know tha t only s i m i l e s are M-transformable i n t o metaphors, then i f we have a tr a n s f o r m a t i o n which transforms a s i m i l e i n t o a metaphor, by d e f i n i t i o n we w i l l i n c l u d e i t i n our l i s t . (3 i s , then dependent on showing -J . To show "\ i s t o show tha t only s i m i l e s are M-transformable i n t o metaphors. Thus, we want to f i n d out whether the d i s t i n c t i o n between standard comparison and s i m i l e , — w h i c h was framed to d i s -t i n g u i s h between comparisons which can and cannot enter the meta-phor t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s — w i l l a l s o serve t o d i s t i n g u i s h between the comparisons constructed out of or recovered from non-metaphor and metaphor sentences, r e s p e c t i v e l y . The d i s t i n c t i o n w i l l c l e a r l y serve t o exclude the compari-sons which presented the d i f f i c u l t i e s i n IV ( f ) , as they are hardly d i f f e r e n t from the examples of comparisons which would not t r a n s -form i n t o metaphors i n V (b). Moreover, i f we t h i n g of the com-parisons which are constructed from non-metaphor sentences, i t i s e n t i r e l y t o be expected t h a t they be standard comparisons r a t h e r than s i m i l e s . T y p i c a l non-metaphorical sentences do not i n v o l v e category c r o s s i n g ( t y p i c a l , t o exclude category mistakes and sentences w i t h s i m i l a r e r r o r s ) ; i t i s to be expected, then, that when we say, f o r example, This b a l l i s blue j u s t as the p r e d i c a t i o n of "blue" t o " b a l l " can be in f o r m a t i v e because "blue" i s not e s s e n t i a l t o " b a l l , " or not standardly a s s o c i a t e d w i t h " b a l l , " whatever comparison i s constructed from 50 the sentence w i l l be framed i n terms of non-essential or non-standardly-associated features of " b a l l . " In the same way i t i s to be expected that when we cross categories, and v i o l a t e some r e s t r i c t i o n s on semantic combinations, as i n : Necessity i s the mother of invention, c a l l i n g necessity a mother can be informative only through our semantic associations with "mother." This gives us reasonable grounds to assert that only s i m i l i e s are M-transformable into metaphors, or D . As f o r ^ , the necessary condition of metaphor, what was said i n Chapter IV (f i ) about the construction of similes also applies to the recovery of similes from the transformation. Be-cause t h i s discussion i s a l l based around L i s t I, the l i s t of t y p i c a l metaphors, we cannot go any farther than to r e l y on L i s t I as being a representative l i s t and to supplement t h i s with the con-side r a t i o n which was already offered with regard to the construction of similes, v i z . , that a metaphor f o r which there i s no apparent simile to be recovered tends to be u n i n t e l l i g i b l e u n t i l some simile i s i n fact recovered. Although neither point i s conclusive we do have s u f f i c i e n t i n d i c a t i o n to te n t a t i v e l y assert ^  . With <K and ^  we have t e n t a t i v e l y established the necessary and suf-f i c i e n t conditions of metaphor. b. Consequences of the transformation from simile to metaphor: An analysis of metaphors such as t h i s one, which holds that metaphors are transformed similes can only be a s a t i s f y i n g account i f i t can answer the question, "Why do we use metaphors instead of similes; why not simply use the similes?" The answer to t h i s question has already been suggested 5 1 but not f u l l y explored. In IV i t was argued that although metaphors can be viewed as transforms of similes, neither the metaphors nor the similes are unique paraphrases of one another. How i s t h i s so? (i) When someone says "A i s l i k e B"—whether to make a standard comparison or a s i m i l e — t h e tendency i s to ask, "In what way i s A l i k e B?" "A i s l i k e B" alone tends to be uninformative, because i t i s the features of A and B which are being compared which carry the burden or contain the information of the comparison or simile. Without continuing on to, "A i s l i k e B because A P a and B P b," "A i s l i k e B" i s not complete. As we have mentioned, however, the requirement that "A i s l i k e B" be followed through i n the case of a simile i s weaker than with a standard comparison. Neverthe-l e s s , there i s a variety of standard associations, some of which a speaker may want to eliminate or de-emphasize, and some of which to reinforce or emphasize, and t h i s i s why there i s s t i l l a tendency to ask with similes as well as with standard comparisons, "In what way i s A l i k e B?" With similes, then, and not with standard comparisons, when "A i s l i k e B" i s a l l that i s provided, i t i s useful to 17 think of scope for interpretation. There are a number of 1 7 It could be suggested that a notion of scope might be useful i n studying standard comparisons since there i s a f a i r l y f i x e d number of aspects relevant, e.g., to two houses being compared as houses, l i k e number of rooms, style of construction, construction material. Whether such a notion i s i n fact useful f o r a study of standard comparisons i s not s t r i c t l y relevant here. It i s s u f f i c i e n t that such scope would not be "scope for interpretation but scope of, e.g., " p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r comparisons." 52 features semantically or through standard associations i m p l i c i t i n B and the scope f o r interpretation i s the range of d i f f e r e n t selections, r e s t r i c t i o n s , and emphases which can be made. Let us then define the scope of the simile i n the following way: D e f i n i t i o n I I I : The scope of a simile i s the number of di f f e r e n t terms for P. i n "A i s l i k e B; P K" or for P . i n "A i s to B as C i s D t o D; C P . D." D c a ' cd What happens to the scope of a simile when i t i s trans-formed into a metaphor? In some eases, notably where the metaphor i s simply a copula with two terms, e.g., "Richard i s a l i o n , " and the simile i s "Richard i s l i k e a l i o n , " the scope f o r interpretation does not seem to be substan-t i a l l y altered. However, t h i s i s not the case f o r almost a l l metaphors involving a more complex interplay of terms, or simply more terms. Take, e.g., Richard i s a l i o n among men. Here, to think of the metaphor as a transform of a simi l e , involves constructing a number of d i f f e r e n t s i m i l e s , including e.g., 1. Richard : men :: l i o n : beasts of prey 2. Richard : men :: l i o n : prey because the metaphor i s a transform of both 1 and 2. How-ever, the scope of 1 i s very d i f f e r e n t from the scope of 2; the two l i s t s f o r P c cj contain few i f any entries i n common. Now although i t i s true that the success of the metaphor i s 53 dependent on our being able to construct at least one simile with the terms of the metaphor, the richness of the metaphor i s l o s t i f we construct only one simile with the terms of the metaphor. In the cases where the transformation of simile into metaphor involves dropping one or more terms of the s i m i l e , the richness of the metaphor i s a by-product of the transformation, since the metaphor can be viewed as the transform of a number of similes. In the same way that i t i s useful to think of the scope of a si m i l e , i t i s useful to think of the scope of a metaphor, and the scope of a metaphor i s a compounded scope. D e f i n i t i o n IV: The scope of a metaphor i s the sum of the scopes of the similes of which the metaphor i s a transform. This helps to understand why we use metaphors instead of simply s t i c k i n g with similes. To unpack a metaphor i s to present not one but many similes. Moreover, there i s no way to f i x the similes or to recover a complete l i s t of similes, because the l i s t of similes changes with the context surrounding the metaphor. It i s true that i n a given context the l i s t of similes i s f a i r l y small (though no water-tight), but part of the richness of metaphors i s that new contexts can so often be found f o r them. Finding a new interpretation to a metaphor i s viewing the metaphor as a transform of a simile other than the simile(s) of which i t was previously regarded as a transform. We have seen the operations of two le v e l s of scope, i t i s in t e r e s t i n g to think of some metaphors which gave us 54 some trouble at the very beginning—the s y n t a c t i c a l l y deviant metaphors—as metaphors which involve a t h i r d l e v e l of scope. Very roughly, we might want to define the t h i r d l e v e l thus: D e f i n i t i o n V: The scope of a s y n t a c t i c a l l y deviant metaphor i s the sum of the scopes of the s y n t a c t i c a l l y sound metaphors of which the s y n t a c t i c a l l y deviant metaphor i s a transform. This d e f i n i t i o n , however, presupposes a theory of syn-t a c t i c deviance which s p e l l s out how s y n t a c t i c a l l y deviant sentences are transforms of s y n t a c t i c a l l y sound sentences, and the detailed workings of t h i s would take us f a r a f i e l d . In terms of t h i s study we need only say that to unpack a s y n t a c t i c a l l y deviant metaphor we eliminate the syntactic deviance i n a number of ways, so that we have a number of s y n t a c t i c a l l y sound metaphors, each of which i n tern can be unpacked i n the standard way, i . e . , i n terms of a number of similes, each of which i n tern has i t s own scope. ( i i ) The analysis of the scope of metaphor takes us a cert a i n distance i n answering the question, "Why, i f metaphors are transforms of similes do we use metaphors i n -stead of similes?" but i t does not account f o r those simple cases l i k e , "Richard i s a l i o n " where the scope of the metaphor i s the scope of the one si m i l e , "Richard i s l i k e a l i o n . " The analysis of metaphor i n terms of simile-transforma-tion s , where we think of the special features of the simile as opposed to the standard comparison i s again f r u i t f u l i n explaining the richness and uneliminability of these 55 metaphors as well as the others. The distinguishing feature of simile i s that A i s being compared to B v i a some essential or standardly associated feature of B. Now the transformation of simile into metaphor i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y the transforma-t i o n of " l i k e " to " i s " ; instead of likening we are predicat-ing. The scope of the simile i s the range of features standardly associated with the B-term, so that instead of likening one thing to another we can now predicate the features standardly associated with the B-term to the A-term. It i s the fact that with similes we have such a range of standardly associated features, combined with the trans-formation of a s i m i l a r i t y to an i d e n t i t y , which enables us to import B-features onto A. Thus we are not r e s t r i c t e d to merely saying, John i s d i r t y , l i k e a pig. Or: Richard i s l i k e a l i o n . We can also say: John wallows. Or: Richard roars. Viewing metaphors as transforms of similes does not involve eliminating metaphors; i t provides us with a means of under-standing why metaphors are passports to the enrichment of our vocabulary. U n t i l the simile i s transformed into a metaphor, the enrichment of vocabulary (nevertheless made possible by the distinguishing aspect of the simile) does not a c t u a l l y take place. 56 c. Metaphor and Three Uses of "Like": We have noted two consequences of the transformation of similes into metaphors, which together comprise an account of the spe c i a l virtues of metaphor as a l i n g u i s t i c device: <^The transformation of simile into metaphor involves a widening of scope, so that metaphors have greater scope than similes. (3 The transformation of simile into metaphor makes possible the enrichment of vocabulary through the transference of features comprising the scope of the si m i l e . In developing both points, much was made of the sp e c i a l features of a simile as opposed to a standard comparison. It i s however also i n place to note the connection between metaphors and a t h i r d kind of like n i n g , v i z . , the use of " l i k e " as an adjustor. The use of l i k e as an adjustor i s a primary, i f not the primary, use of " l i k e . " "Like" i s used to adjust when 18 the existing vocabulary i s inadequate f o r some purpose. Metaphors often come into being under s i m i l a r circumstances, when the vocabulary i s inadequate to some task, so that on independent grounds, viewing metaphors as transforms of statements which l i k e n one thing to another makes sense. However, even t h i s must not be pressed too f a r , since 18 E.g., when we "come across a new kind of animal which looks and behaves very much as pigs do, but not quite as pigs do . . . we . . . say 'It's l i k e a p i g ' . " Jane Austin, Sense  and S e n s i b i l i t y , Galaxy Press, p. 7 4 . 57 we use " l i k e " to adjust only i n those cases where our vocabulary i s (though not quite adequate) not so inadequate that i t requires enrichment with a new term, whereas on t h i s account, we use the metaphor transformation of the simile precisely i n those cases where we want an expansion of our vocabulary to take place. Using " l i k e " as an adjustor prevents us from extending the meaning of a term to cover a vocabulary inadequacy, whereas transforming a simile into a metaphor allows us to extend the meaning of a term to cover an inadequacy of our vocabulary. We do, then, want to keep c l e a r l y i n mind, f o r the purposes of t h i s study, and i n general, the d i s t i n c t i o n between these three kinds of l i k e n i n g : while similes are c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y the vehicles of insights into the i n t e r r e l a t i o n s of objects and/or concepts themselves, • standard comparisons are c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y the vehicles of observations, points of information, and l i k e - • adjustments are the vehicles which keep our vocabulary r e s t r i c t e d and the meanings of terms unextended. BIBLIOGRAPHY Black, Max. "Metaphor," i n Models and Metaphor. Cornell University Press, 1962. Chomsky, N. Syntactic Structures. The Hague: Mouton, 1957. Meszaros, Istvan. "Metaphor And Simile." Proceedings of  the Aristotelean Society, 1967. Katz, Gerald J. Philosophy of Language. New York: Harper and Row, 19bb. 

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