A TRANSFORMATIONAL ANALYSIS OF METAPHOR

by

LEONARD JAY ANGEL

B.A., McGill University, 1966

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS

in the department
of
Philosophy

We accept this thesis as conforming to the
required standard

THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

October, 1967
In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by his representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission.

Department of Philosophy
The University of British Columbia
Vancouver 8, Canada

Date April 4, 1968.
ABSTRACT

In this study it is assumed that we can, roughly speaking, distinguish metaphors from non-metaphors. A representative list of metaphors is examined. It is found that syntactic parsing reveals no marks of metaphor, and that semantic parsing, though more illuminating, cannot help us in the analysis of all cases, due largely to the importance of contexts as well as semantic content. To re-focus our attention on the relationship between metaphors in general, their contexts, and discursive language, the question of whether metaphors are discursively paraphrasable is discussed. It is argued that a simile can always be constructed out of the key terms in a metaphor, and that such constructed similes are paraphrases, though not 'unique' paraphrases of the metaphor. A transformational system is offered in which metaphors are generated from similes. It is suggested that the difficulty of paraphrasing metaphors is due to the difficulties of reversing the direction of the transformation, from simile $\rightarrow$ metaphor, to metaphor $\rightarrow$ simile. In order to make the transformational system workable, a distinction is made out between similes and other comparisons in terms of the kind of features shared by the terms in the comparison. This distinction not only makes the transformational system workable, but also provides the necessary
grounding for specifying the sufficient as well as necessary conditions of metaphor. It further allows for the introduction of the concept of the "scope" of a metaphor, a concept which is instrumental in accounting for the special function and utility of the device of metaphor.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. PRELIMINARY REMARKS</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. ARE THERE ANY GRAMMATICAL MARKS OF METAPHOR?</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. ARE THERE ANY SEMANTIC MARKS OF METAPHOR?</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. ARE METAPHORS PARAPHRASABLE DISCURSIVELY?</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. METAPHORS AS TRANSFORMS OF SIMILES</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. THE UTILITY OF THE METAPHOR TRANSFORMATION</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
I. PRELIMINARY REMARKS

The object of this study is to answer the following questions:

1. (a) Are there any syntactical marks of metaphor? 
   (b) Are there any semantic marks of metaphor?
   (c) What are the necessary and sufficient conditions of metaphor?
2. Are metaphors paraphrasable discursively?
3. What is the utility of the device of metaphor?

* * * * * * *

A. Answering these questions presupposes that we can, in general, distinguish between a metaphor and a non-metaphor. It does not presuppose that we can distinguish in all cases (answering question 1 might help us to enforce a distinction in what might otherwise be indeterminate cases). To answer these questions, it is convenient to begin with a list of typical metaphors. For obvious reasons it is preferable for the list to be as heterogeneous as possible, that is, with examples exhibiting as different grammatical and semantic make-ups as possible, and, if anything, on the generous rather than the parsimonious side in including examples into the list. If we can find a unified account for all of these
examples, so much the better; if not, we will try restricting until a suitably consistent and unified account can be constructed.

For the purposes of this study it will be useful to consider only single sentences as instances of metaphor. This initially excludes from the discussion what might be called extended metaphors or "metaphor-systems," like whole poems, novels, allegories. Also initially excluded from the discussion are models, like scale models, chemical diagrams, atomic-structure models, pictures, and maps. Finally, the distinction between metaphors and similes is for the moment preserved. It is worth noting that whereas there is a simple and straightforward way of distinguishing a metaphor from a simile, namely on the grounds of whether or not "like," "is like," "as . . . is to . . . so . . . is to . . . .", or some such explicit comparative device is present, there is no similar straightforward way to distinguish metaphors from non-metaphorical sentences. This is very largely what question 1 asks after.

b. List I: Representative Metaphors:

1. You are a pig.
2. Life is a walking shadow.
4. The sea of life is deep and stormy.
5. Necessity is the mother of invention.
6. History weaves complex patterns.
7. The scum rises to the top of the pond.
8. Life never knows the return of spring.
9. Death the reaper cuts with a merciless scythe.
10. To decide is to extinguish oneself.
11. Life is made of batting averages, not of perfect scores.
12. John's his father's son.
13. This counterexample gums up the gears of the argument.
14. The balloon of existentialism is easy to puncture.
15. Big fish eat little fish.
16. The poor are the negroes of Europe.
17. He is a lion among men.
18. All men are animals (though women are kind and gentle).
19. He's had lots of mud in his eye.
20. Don't try twisting my arm.
21. The law is an ass.
II. ARE THERE ANY GRAMMATICAL MARKS OF METAPHOR?

a. Examination of List I clearly reveals that there is no one grammatical mark which distinguishes all metaphors from non-metaphors; and further, that for most metaphors, the grammatical form bears no mark of metaphor. To show this we need only show that in general, changing some semantic elements of metaphors while preserving the syntactic structure will eliminate the metaphor.

Consider, for example, the metaphor:

You are a pig.

The syntactic parsing of this sentence is:

noun + verb + article + noun

And this syntactic form is the syntactic form of a typical non-metaphor like:

You are a doctor.

Or consider the metaphor:

Nature abhors a vacuum.

Its syntactic parsing is:

Noun + verb + article + noun

which is also the parsing of the non-metaphor:

Parliament passes the laws.

The test has the same results with the other cases of metaphor as well. The syntactic parsing of typical metaphors provides no mark by which one might distinguish metaphors from non-
metaphors. This is a function of two things: (a) that in cases like "You are a pig," it is the particular noun phrase chosen which makes the difference between a metaphor and a non-metaphor, and (b) that most metaphors are not syntactically deviant in any way. (These two points are clearly interrelated: (b) is simply another way of saying that the parsing of most metaphors will also be the parsing of at least some non-metaphors.)

b. Are there any metaphors which are syntactically deviant, and perhaps marked as metaphors through the speciality of the syntactic deviance?

There are metaphors which are syntactically deviant, although it should be noted that these metaphors are the exceptional and unusual cases. The metaphor:

A rose is a rose is a rose

is syntactically deviant; the sentence is not well-formed. Other examples of syntactically deviant metaphors, and perhaps more typical examples at that, are found in recent and contemporary poetry. The syntactical aberrations of E.E. Cummings are particularly fascinating, e.g.,

They sowed their isnt they reaped their same

Or:

as freedom is a breakfast food
or truth can live with right and wrong
or molehills are from mountains made
long enough or just so long
will being pay the rent of seem

1E.E. Cummings, Selected Poems, Grove Press, 1959, #61, p. 73.
2Ibid., #60, p. 72.
In both these cases a syntactic deviance is due to the use of a verb or an adjective in the place of a noun. However, it is entirely inconclusive to merely note that there are syntactically deviant metaphors. We must now ask:

(a) Can we eliminate the metaphor by changing a semantic element, yet preserving the syntactic deviance?

(b) Does correcting the syntax eliminate the metaphor?

If the answer to (a) is "yes" and to (b) is "no," then it is not the syntactic deviance which makes the sentence a metaphor. Consider:

... will being pay the rent of seem.

Here we can eliminate the metaphor by changing a semantic element. Change, e.g., "pay the rent" to "be the opposite of." We now have the typical syntactically deviant non-metaphorical sentence (fragment):

... will being be the opposite of seem.

At the same time, correcting the syntactic deviance does not eliminate the metaphor. If we change "seem" to "seeming" we preserve the metaphor yet eliminate the syntactic deviance, as we are left with the syntactically sound metaphor:

... will being pay the rent of seeming.

These two tests have the same results on the other cases (with the possible exception of "a rose is a rose is a rose"--a very atypical metaphor, and one which we will only be able to account for later).
In these cases, as with the others, the syntactic structures whether deviant or non-deviant do not distinguish between metaphors and non-metaphors.
III. ARE THERE ANY SEMANTIC MARKS OF METAPHOR?

a. Is a category mistake in a sentence either necessary or sufficient for the sentence's being a metaphor?

(i) The presence of a category mistake is not sufficient for a sentence's being a metaphor; not all category mistakes are metaphors. Consider:

I can find the chemistry building, the math building, the students' union, the administration building, but I can't find the university.

This is one of Ryle's paradigm examples of the category mistake, but there is no metaphor involved. To speak of "finding the university" is a perfectly legitimate non-metaphorical way of talking. The category mistake consists in someone's having mistaken the university's category by taking it to be a building. And the same is true of other typical and paradigm category mistakes.

(ii) The presence of a category mistake in a sentence is not necessary for the sentence's being a metaphor; some metaphors are not category mistakes (if not all metaphors). Consider:

The balloon of existentialism is easy to puncture.

This metaphor can only be thought a category mistake if some-

---

3 Gilbert Ryle, Concept of Mind, Barnes & Noble, 1949, Chap. 1.
one is actually mistaken in what he believes to be the
category which attaches to balloons and the category which
attaches to existentialism. But in making the metaphor no
one need or will think that balloons are not physical
objects or that they are philosophical positions, nor will
anyone think that existentialism is a physical object and
not a philosophical position. Metaphors do not necessarily
involve confusing or mistaking interrelationships of cate­
gories. Ryle has suggested that some metaphors have led to
category mistakes; even if this is so, these cases are the
exceptions.

The point can be put more strongly. A sentence will
only become a category mistake when it is taken "literally,"
that is, on the very occasions when it is not functioning
as a metaphor. If categories are crossed in a metaphor, we
are at least aware of the crossing. A category cross is a
category mistake only when we are not aware of the cross.

Moreover, it is not fruitful, on independent grounds,
to think of metaphor in terms of category mistakes. Think­
ing in terms of category mistakes will prevent us from
explaining how and why metaphors are so characteristically
the vehicles of insights. A category mistake is something
we want to avoid; whereas a metaphor is something we want
to use, and to the best advantage.

b. This suggests, however, that, even if the notion of

4Loc. cit.
the category mistake will not do, the notion of a category cross may be to the point. Is the presence of a category cross either necessary or sufficient for a sentence's being a metaphor?

The category cross as a mark of metaphor carries with it much initial plausibility. In those paradigm examples of metaphor with which it was shown that standard cases of metaphor bear no syntactical marks, the demonstration involved substituting a word of a category appropriate to the subject for the noun phrase in the predicate.

Category crossing also seems to be a key notion in other standard though more complex cases of metaphor, e.g.:

Necessity is the mother of invention.

Following Katz' terminology, we might want to say that a selection restriction for the combination of mother has been broken on two sides: both in its combination with "necessity" and in its combination with "invention." Another way of putting it is this: there are several semantic markers of

---

5By category cross I mean the combining of semantic elements in a sentence in ways which constitute violations of semantic rules for the combining of terms such as Sommers offers in The Ordinary Language Tree, or Katz offers in The Philosophy of Language. Thus, a sentence with a category cross is one which contains a violation of a selection restriction, in Katz' terminology, or one which violates rules for combining terms on Sommers' tree. Naturally, different formulations of rules for the combining of terms will result in some different assignments of category crossing. Most cases will coincide, however, and this is sufficient to enable us to discuss category in a general way without being committed to the assignments of only one semantic theory.
"mother" none of which are markers of either "necessity" or "invention," and this creates the category cross in the metaphor.

c. The notion of category crossing, however, though of central importance, is still too restricted.

(i) The presence of a category cross in a sentence is not a necessary condition of the sentence's being a metaphor; some metaphors do not contain a category cross. Syntactically deviant metaphors may or may not involve a category cross. Some more standard cases of syntactically deviant metaphors did involve category crosses when the syntactically sound metaphor was recovered, e.g.:

... will being pay the rent of seeming.

However there was a case (and perhaps a case too atypical to warrant as much attention as it's getting) which contained no category cross, namely:

A rose is a rose is a rose.

(ii) There is a more standard group of metaphors which do not contain category crosses. These sentences are, in terms of semantic parsing, indistinguishable from tautologies. (In fact "A rose is a rose is a rose" may be only a corruption of this kind of metaphor.) Examples of this group are:

He is his father's son.

Men are animals.

Boys will be boys.
Compare the two metaphors:

John is a pig.

John is his father's son.

In both cases we are not in doubt about the categories to which John belongs. In the first we know that John is not a pig but a man; in the second we do not doubt that John is the son of his father. In the first the metaphor consists in violating or crossing the category-system; in the second, the metaphor only repeats what we already know, by reinforcing or emphasizing the category-system. Category-locating is still of central importance, but category-crossing is too limited. We must try to find an analysis to cover both cases.

(iii) There is an even more standard and important group of metaphors which does not involve violating or crossing categories. (Max Black argues that these are not metaphors on the grounds that these are sentences in which there is no contrast between words which are being used metaphorically and other words which are not; he says if they are metaphors, they are metaphors in which all the words are being used metaphorically. However this hardly seems to be adequate grounds for saying they are not metaphors. His rejection of them as metaphors seems to ignore the obvious approach that these are metaphors or not metaphors depending on the context in which they occur.)

---

In these metaphors, like those described in (ii), only one system of categories is employed in drawing the metaphor. These are still distinguished from those described in (ii) in that they are not in terms of semantic parsing indistinguishable from tautologies. These are in terms of semantic parsing indistinguishable from empirical generalizations (or observations). Examples of this group are:

Seekers after gold dig up much earth and find little.
Big fish eat little fish.
The scum always rises to the top of the pond.
Still waters run deep.
It's impossible to trap moonlight in a barrel.
There's no dark cloud on the horizon today.

These sentences, like sentences listed in (ii) can be either metaphors or not metaphors depending on context. An ecologist might be interested in the movement of scum in a pond, and say "The scum always rises to the top of the pond," but if someone is talking about the rise to power of an opportunist, and then comments "The scum always rises to the top of the pond," the sentence is a metaphor, and not just an empirical truth. The metaphor illuminates and relates implicitly two category systems, but again it does not cross any categories.

(iv) The presence of a category cross is not a sufficient condition for a sentence's being a metaphor, for some category crosses are category mistakes and not metaphors. Moreover, merely to eliminate category mistakes in formulating the sufficient condition would be to provide a totally
uninformative or even circular criterion, since we make out the distinction between category mistake and metaphor very largely on the grounds of whether or not we tend to "take the sentence literally."

d. There is an important point to be educed from (ii), (iii) and (iv), and we can formulate it as a general problem which will invariably prevent semantic parsing from providing a viable criterion for a sentence's being a metaphor. An important factor for a sentence's being a metaphor is the relation it holds to its context.

   (i) Category crossing as a necessary condition for metaphor failed because there are cases of metaphor in which there is no category cross. In these cases the context of the sentence determines whether the sentence is a tautology or an empirical generalization on the one hand, or a metaphor on the other hand.

   (ii) Category crossing as a sufficient condition failed because there are cases of sentences with a category cross in which it is (again) the context of the sentence that determines whether the sentence is a category mistake or a metaphor.

   In order to provide a general analysis of metaphor we have to look at the problem afresh, and consider the way a metaphor functions in its context. This first will enable us to provide general conditions for a sentence's being a metaphor, and secondly will directly lead to an analysis
of the utility of metaphor. The functioning of a metaphor in terms of its context will be most clearly revealed when we turn to the question, "Are metaphors paraphrasable discursively?"
IV. ARE METAPHORS PARAPHRASABLE DISCURSIVELY?

We start afresh with this question with the hope that it will both re-focus our attention on the aspects of metaphor which the semantic parsings could not handle (i.e., the importance of the context) and at the same time direct us forward towards framing a theory of the utility of metaphors. The utility of a linguistic device like metaphor is comprised of its unique capacities as a linguistic device, and these are at least partially evidenced in how completely or adequately metaphors can be paraphrased discursively.\(^7\)

The problem of finding criteria for paraphrase in general is a very difficult one, and one which bears heavily on the issues involved here. The scope of this study, however, does not permit as full a discussion of the problems of paraphrase as the analysis requires to be complete. To this extent, this study is still exploratory; however it might be in place to mention, first, that it is hoped the terms of the answers are more specific and less controversial than the terms of the question; secondly, and more concretely, that at this stage in asking "Can metaphors be paraphrased discursively?" we are, roughly speaking, trying to establish whether we tend to be as satisfied that a sentence like "Life is insubstantial" carries the sense and information

\(^7\)Discursively, i.e., non-metaphorically.
of a sentence like "Life is a walking shadow," as we are, I think, that a sentence like, "He is an unmarried man" carries the information and sense of "He is a bachelor"; and if not, why not, and under what circumstances, if any, might we be satisfied with a direct substitution of the non-metaphor for the metaphor.

a. There are some prima facie grounds for suspecting that metaphors are not totally unparaphrasable discursively, and as well that metaphors are not entirely adequately paraphrasable discursively.

(i) There is frequently intimate link-up between metaphors and non-metaphor sentences. Philosophers, e.g., frequently build a complicated argument and then finish by saying their point is captured in some metaphor or other, or by presenting a metaphor. (Two good examples of this in modern philosophy occur in Wittgenstein and Strawson.\(^8\))

This suggests that the discursive sketching of a relationship may be in some way or other a paraphrase of the relationship embodied in the metaphor. Secondly, writers, when faced with the problem of a vocabulary inadequate to some task or other often introduce a new term via a metaphor. Thirdly, some metaphors are explained to those unfamiliar with the metaphor through some discursive paraphrases.

---

\(^8\)Wittgenstein, The Tractatus, Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1961, #6, p. 54; Strawson, Individuals, UPI Paperbacks, p. 211.
(ii) On the other hand, if discursive paraphrases were entirely adequate, the utility of the metaphor would be somewhat undercut. The feeling is often expressed that the charm of a metaphor as well as its value is due to the uniqueness and unparaphrasability of the metaphor.

These points are not offered as arguments but as intuitions; whatever analysis of metaphor is provided should be able either to counter them and explain why we have them if these intuitions are found to be misguided, or, preferably, to accommodate them. A certain amount of attention has been paid to the problem of whether or not metaphors are paraphrasable discursively and it will be useful to examine the arguments that have been advanced.

b. Istvan Meszaros in his article "Metaphor and Simile" argues that not only is it impossible to translate all metaphors discursively, but also that it is impossible to translate any metaphor discursively. He argues that:

- In no metaphor of the form "x is y" will it make sense to say "x is like y."
- This is because one of the two terms is "unreal."
- Therefore the metaphor is "self-referential," viz., x is defined in terms of y and vice-versa.
- This explains why a metaphor cannot be placed in discursive contexts. It can only function in the context of other metaphors.

Despite the highly non-sequitur feel of all this, this characterization is not an unfair one. He explicitly argues

---

these points. His arguments collapse for a variety of reasons, and these reasons suggest some interesting points to follow up.

(i) His own examples do not bear out α in the least. In fact, close examination of them leads, if anything, to the opposite conclusion. He takes a song and selects two sentences from it for the purpose of contrast:

A Youth's the season made for joys.
B Beauty's a flower, dispised in decay.

Meszaros correctly notes a contrast: in A it makes little or no sense to insert "like" after "is"; in B it does make sense to insert "like" after "is." From this, however, he infers that A is a genuine case of metaphor, whereas B is a simile, not a metaphor. The example, however, suggests a very different conclusion. B is a genuine metaphor, and whether or not the insertion of "like" is possible won't change that. In fact the usual distinction between metaphor and simile is simply along the lines of whether or not "like" actually appears in the sentence. A, however, is a much weaker metaphor. Consider:

C Youth's the period of time made for joys.

C, though very similar to A, is not a metaphor at all; the substitution of "season" for "period of time" is not a metaphorically rich one. The reason "like" cannot be inserted into A is the reason it cannot be inserted into C:
the predication is not metaphorical enough. (We will later see how it is possible to insert "like" into A in order to capture the metaphor based on the relation between stages of life—youth, maturity, middle age, old age—on the one hand, and the seasons of the year—spring, summer, fall, winter—on the other.) If anything B is a stronger metaphor than A.

This suggests that it may be useful to examine a number of metaphors of the form "x is y" to see whether the insertion of like always makes sense in metaphors.

(ii) Secondly, eliminating B as a metaphor on the grounds of \( p \) would entail the elimination of most metaphors, for it is simply false that our distinction between metaphor and simile reflects the distinction between relating "x," a *real* entity to "y," an *unreal* entity, and comparing "x," a *real* entity to "y," another *real* entity. Many, if not most cases of metaphor, in fact, are based on physical-object terms and abstract nouns (like "youth," which Meszaros classifies as "real.") His point would involve narrowing our notion of metaphor to a pointlessly small class of metaphors (of which A would not even be an example in any case).

---

The phrase "not metaphorical enough" presupposes degrees of metaphor, a notion which has initial plausibility because of the frequent absorption of metaphorical uses of words into the literal meaning of a word. We will later try to give a deeper account of why there are degrees of metaphor.
(iii) With the collapse of \( \beta \) goes the collapse of \( \gamma \). For most metaphors, since they are of the B-type, are not self-referential. And it is very dubious whether there is any fruitful distinction to make along the lines of 'real' versus 'unreal,' considering the hopeless vagueness of the terms and the unsuitability of the presumably paradigm case.

However, points (ii) and (iii) still suggest that it might be useful to explore the differences between metaphors of the form of B, i.e., "x is y" and other metaphors, like "Nature abhors a vacuum," with the aim of seeing whether the notion of simile could be useful in explaining metaphors in general.

(iv) And \( \alpha \) is the oddest point of all. We do not want to explain why metaphors cannot be placed in discursive contexts; if any explanation is due, it is to explain how they do function in both discursive and non-discursive contexts. We do not want to say metaphors have no place outside the context of metaphors, as this would be a restriction as artificial as it is untrue to the flexibility of language.

Point (iv) suggests that it might be useful to focus on the metaphors which function smoothly in discursive contexts to see to what extent metaphors are discursively paraphrasable. Thus it will be particularly useful to examine the insight contained in "A proposition unfolds into a fact" or "Necessity is the mother of invention," rather
than to only examine metaphors like "My love/ thy hair is one kingdom/ the king whereof is darkness." which may be more difficult or simply more complicated to paraphrase discursively.

c. Max Black in his article "Metaphor" argues a weaker point than Meszaros: not that it is impossible to successfully undertake an analysis such as was suggested by points (i), (ii) and (iii) in the preceding section, but that:

Viewing metaphors as condensed or elliptical similes is too vague to be of any help in understanding the function of metaphors.

He asserts that even if it is true that when we say "Richard is a lion" we are elliptically saying "Richard is like a lion," this translation is entirely uninformative since the aspect of the comparison is still as open as it was with the original metaphor. However we should note that:

(i) This particular example does not counter an analysis which attempts to explain metaphors in terms of similes, for it merely implies that the scope for interpretation of this metaphor is identical with the scope for interpretation of the simile. Black does not see how such an explanation could possibly be helpful. But it would be helpful, e.g., if a detailed analysis would show how the scope of a metaphor does or can change with the transformation of simile into metaphor—and that is a detailed analysis he does not

---

11A formal account of the "scope" of a metaphor and the "scope" of a simile will be provided later.
undertake.

(ii) A stronger argument would be that it is too difficult or perhaps impossible to construct similes out of all metaphors, and so our first task is then to examine all our different examples of metaphor to see whether similes can be constructed with them. Our second task is to see whether the construction of similes in the cases where it is possible is of help in interpretation of the metaphor; and the final task is to see what changes take place when a simile is transformed into a metaphor.

(iii) Finally, in describing the relation between simile and metaphor, we need not say—in cases where similes can be constructed—that the metaphor is just an elliptical simile. We may want to claim that for the metaphor to succeed a simile is presupposed, or that for a metaphor to succeed it must be possible to construct a simile with the terms of the metaphor. Thus, if the construction of similes can be undertaken, it might be able to help us analyze metaphors more fully than Black believes to be possible—one of the necessary consequences of his analysis is:

There is in general . . . no blanket reason why some metaphors work and other metaphors fail.

d. Are metaphors paraphrasable in terms of similes?

(i) Let us begin with some relatively simple cases of metaphors which function in discursive contexts. Consider:
John is a pig. He keeps his room in a state of filth, never bathes, and seems to enjoy living in squalid conditions.

Compare it with the same paragraph reading "John is like a pig" for "John is a pig." The substitution does not involve any further changes in the paragraph, nor does it substantially alter the information being transmitted about John. Meszaros (mistakenly) would say there that "John is a pig" is not a metaphor because of its paraphrasability in terms of the simile, whereas Max Black would say the paraphrase of the simile for the metaphor is merely unhelpful. If it is unhelpful perhaps it is because it is too simple a paraphrase to make.

(ii) But the cases where it is possible to merely insert "like" to produce a simile are the least interesting and instructive cases. Often more than the mere insertion of "like" is required. Consider the metaphor:

Youth's the stuff will not endure.

If we try inserting "like" after "is" the sentence reads awkwardly:

Youth's like the stuff will not endure.

Here paraphrasing involves making some changes besides the insertion of "like." The first change is:

Youth's like the stuff which will not endure.

This is a minor change (one that the metaphor invites as well as the simile, in any case). A difficulty still remains.
"The stuff" still gives problems because of the article "the." The simile reads more smoothly if the article is omitted altogether or replaced with another term:

Youth's like stuff which will not endure.
Or: Youth's like any stuff which will not endure.

And that change is a more important one.

Such changes (for this as well as other metaphors) can be formulated in terms of grammatical rules (e.g., change "the" to "a" or "any," or eliminate "the" under conditions x, y, z). Without going into the actual formulation of these grammatical rules (later we will be able to account for why they are necessary) we can turn to the more important problem: Will grammatical rules be sufficient to cover changes necessary in constructing similes out of metaphors?

(iii) Constructing similes out of metaphors sometimes involves the introduction of new semantic elements. This is true of a great number, perhaps even a majority of metaphors. Consider:

Necessity is the mother of invention.

The metaphor is built upon three terms, "necessity," "mother," and "invention." However, if any simile is presupposed or buried in the metaphor, three terms will not be able to express it. If we say the contained simile is simply:

Necessity is like a mother

(note again the substitution of "a" for "the") a key element
of the metaphor is eliminated, namely the relationship of invention to necessity. If a simile is going to be able to function as a paraphrase of the metaphor, it will have to compare one relationship (that between necessity and invention) to another relationship (e.g., that between a mother and her offspring). So that capturing the information contained in the metaphor we will have to introduce a fourth term with which to complete the comparison between two relationships, thus:

The relationship between necessity and invention is like the relationship between a mother and her offspring.

In cases like these, if similes are paraphrases at all, they are at best approximate ones; and what is important is that the approximation is a necessary consequence of having to supply some fourth term in constructing the simile. Moreover any one paraphrase which is given will be only one of a number of possible paraphrases, the number of possible paraphrases being the number of possible fourth terms. In this example, the possible fourth terms include: offspring, progeny, child, foetus, baby. Thus constructing a simile often involves "focusing" the metaphor or fixing it in only one of a necessarily indefinite number of directions. We will say of these cases that the metaphor cannot be "uniquely paraphrased." It should be noted that in other paraphrases, e.g., "He is an unmarried man" for "He is a bachelor" though the paraphrase naturally involves the introduction
of new semantic elements, these semantic elements are found in the list of semantic markers entered for the terms in the original sentence, whereas the new terms in the construction of a simile from a metaphor are not found in the list of semantic markers for terms in the metaphor.

What restricts our choice of implicit or presupposed fourth terms? Partly the context of the metaphor, but more important, the selection is restricted by the third term itself. The fourth term is almost invariably related to the third term qua what the third term is. A foetus, e.g., is related to a mother qua mother, whereas, say, a husband is not related to a mother qua mother but qua wife. This is an idea which will have to be developed later in greater detail.

(iv) We have now seen a case which involves supplying one missing term in order to construct a simile from the metaphor. In some cases, more than one term must be supplied. Consider:

Nature abhors a vacuum.

Here the constructed simile compares the relationship between nature and a vacuum on the one hand to the relationship between someone and something he abhors. Again there are a number of possible paraphrases, the number being the number of possible combinations of third and fourth terms.

(v) It should be observed that the sentences which
were or were not metaphors depending on their context do lend themselves to the construction of similes. In these cases the context supplies us with the left hand side of the simile. Thus in some contexts the simile constructed from the metaphor:

The scum rises to the top of the pond

is:

The achievement of high offices by incompetent individuals is like the rising of the scum to the top of the pond.

e. Paraphrases of the metaphors in list I in terms of similes can now be undertaken.

(i) In d we found that any theory which attempts to paraphrase metaphors in terms of similes will have to recognize two kinds of changes which the paraphrasing involves:

1. Grammatical changes on the terms contained in the metaphor.

2. The introduction of terms into the simile which were not present in the metaphor.

Because of these changes, especially those covered by 2, the paraphrase is at best approximate. Later we will have to consider the effects of this on the paraphrase. We can generalize the conclusion very briefly in this way: the more frequently used a metaphor, the less original the metaphor, the more idiomatic, and the more conventional the metaphor, the more readily it will lend itself to paraphrase and vice
versa; the more original, and less conventional the metaphor, the more (a) context-bound and (b) difficult to paraphrase it tends to be. It might seem at first that a metaphor's being context-bound ought not be associated with difficulty of paraphrase; it should be noted, however, that when metaphors are strongly context-bound the context tends to relate one metaphor to another (as most characteristically in poetry) and we are concerned with discursive paraphrases, the difficulty of which tends to be increased. Bearing these changes in mind, we can construct similes based on the metaphors in List I, and tentatively approach them as approximate paraphrases, or similes out of which approximate paraphrases can be easily built.

(ii) List II: Similes constructed from the metaphors in List I.

1. You are like a pig; a pig is dirty, wallows in mud, etc.
2. Life is like a walking shadow; the shadow of a walking person is insubstantial, fleeting, ungraspable, ephemeral.
4. Life is like a sea; a sea is deep and stormy, in constant action, with currents and countercurrents.
5. Necessity: invention: mother: (offspring), (foetus), (child): a mother bears her child (nourishes the foetus) (pampers her offspring).
6. History is like a loom; a loom weaves complex patterns on a rug.

12 "A:B :: C:D" stands for "the relationship between A and B is like that between C and D." Brackets indicate several possibilities.
7. Incompetent individuals: high offices :: scum: top of the pond; the scum rises quickly to the top of the pond, more quickly than anchored plants; remains at the top whereas heavy, substantial objects are carried down.

8. Life: youth :: year: spring; there is only one spring to the year.

9. Death: men :: a reaper: sheaves of wheat; a reaper reaps all sheaves, is indifferent with respect to which stalks he cuts, will make no exceptions, stores it all in a granary.

10. Deciding: oneself :: extinguishing a candle; when a candle is extinguished, there is no more flame, no more light.

11. Life is like a game of baseball; a baseball player is a top player if his batting average is high, and not necessarily perfect.

12. John is like his father; his father is (moody) (kind) (unkind).

13. The argument: counterexample :: machine: gum in the gears; gum in the gears slows down the machine; can break it down entirely; may necessitate repairing the machine.

14. Existentialism is like a balloon; a balloon is easy to puncture; makes a big noise when punctured; is filled with air; (is empty inside).

15. Powerful agents (rich): weak agents (poor) :: big fish: little fish; big fish eat little fish, thrive on little fish, grow fat while the little fish die, need the little fish to maintain themselves fat and healthy.

16. Poor: Europe :: negroes: America; negroes are maligned in American, discriminated against made to suffer.

17. He: men :: lion; (beasts of prey) (all animals) (prey); the lion is feared by all animals (stronger than other beasts of prey) (has no trouble catching his prey).

18. Men are like other animals; animals are cruel, selfish, unkind.

19. (The obstacles one faces) (The insults one receives) are like mud in the eye; mud in the eye prevents one from seeing clearly, moving normally; causes pain, tears.

20. Persuading someone) (Blackmailing someone)(Persuading someone unfairly) is like twisting his arm; someone's
arm forces him to do what one wants, puts him at one's mercy.

21. Laws are like an ass; an ass does not respond quickly to situations, is sleepy, sluggish, difficult to waken, but occasionally rambunctious and mean, and can kick to inflict pain if it wants.

f. We have found that similes can be constructed out of all the metaphors in the original list. If this point will have any use to us in distinguishing metaphors from non-metaphors, we must:

1. Try to imagine or to find a metaphor from which a simile cannot be constructed along the lines followed in e.

2. Examine typical non-metaphor sentences to see whether similes can be constructed out of them in the way that they can be constructed out of metaphors.

At this stage we shall not develop final arguments concerning either 1 or 2, but it is in place to make some tentative suggestions.

(i) Try to imagine a metaphor for which a simile cannot be constructed. Consider, for example:

Man is the musician of pears.

What is the simile? The form suggested by our previous analysis would have the simile filled by:

Man: Pears :: musician:_______

But how do we fill in the fourth term? Is this a metaphor out of which a simile cannot be constructed?

The mere fact that we cannot immediately fill in the
fourth term, however, does not detract from the value of constructing the simile. We cannot fill in the fourth term unless we know the context of the poem, or can guess possible contexts, or think of things which are related to a musician qua musician. If we do this we can fill in the fourth term; moreover, until we can fill in the fourth term, the metaphor is more than likely unintelligible. Once we know that, e.g., other metaphors in the poem compare aesthetic to non-aesthetic experiences, or that sounds are related to a musician as a musician it is no longer difficult to supply the fourth term—and coincidentally to make the metaphor intelligible, thus:

\[
\text{Man : pears :: musician : sounds : } \text{man \quad \{ \text{musician} \quad \text{treat \{ \text{sounds} } \}
\]

as aesthetic objects.

Moreover, this fact suggests that the metaphor will fail for a reader unless he can fill in a simile of this form.

This example is, of course, not conclusive, but it is a telling fact that a metaphor like this one will remain obscure or unintelligible until we can construct a simile of the suggested form.

(ii) Can similes be constructed out of typical non-metaphor sentences?

Consider the typical sentence:

Johnny goes to the store.

Constructing a simile out of this sentence would result in something like:
Johnny : store :: someone who goes : where he goes:

But this, of course is not a bona fide comparison since John's being like someone who is going would preclude his being someone who is going, which he is. When a simile of the form A : B :: C : D is constructed out of a metaphor, "A is B" is either false or neither true nor false, whereas here "A is B" ("Johnny is someone who goes") is true.

Consider another typical non-metaphor:

John is a doctor.

The presupposed simile, if there were one, would be:

John is like a doctor.

However, John's being like a doctor precludes his being a doctor since we only compare him to a doctor when he is not one. Again the simile cannot be a paraphrase or presupposition of the non-metaphor because the original sentence is true or false and not neither as it would be if the original sentence is a metaphor.

But what about a sentence like:

This ball is blue.

Mightn't it be thought that a comparison can be constructed out of the statement, namely between the colour of the ball and the colour of whatever object is the vehicle for our ostensive definition of "blue"? The comparison would be something like:
The colour of this ball (as it appears now) is like the colour of the object x (as it appears under certain standard conditions).

Comparisons also seem to be presupposed by other sentences, like:

Both John and Dick are 21 years old.

the comparison being:

John is like Dick in the respect of his age.

If the analysis of metaphors in terms of similes is to hold up as a sufficient as well as necessary condition of metaphor, we will have to distinguish between similes and other comparisons. At this point it is sufficient to simply note that to complete the analysis such a distinction has to be made out, and to leave the task aside for the moment.
V. METAPHORS AS TRANSFORMS OF SIMILES

We have found that:

1. Similes can be constructed out of metaphors, but:
2. Metaphors cannot be uniquely paraphrased by similes.

While 2 prevents us from treating the presupposed similes as entirely adequate paraphrases, it does not prevent us from treating the metaphors as transforms of the similes. To treat all metaphors as transforms of similes we need only to show that:

A. Given a simile, certain grammatical transformations on it will always produce a metaphor.
B. Given a metaphor and a simile constructed from the metaphor, the grammatical relation between the two is specified in one of the transformations (in combination, perhaps, with other transformations).

The first of the two tasks is the simpler, since it does not involve stating an exhaustive list of the transformations, and it may be that the second is not possible because any grammatical form can house a metaphor. The basic task, A, can be undertaken without too much difficulty.

a. A list of metaphor transformations.

List III (A): Transformations on similes of the form "A is like B"; BP

\[ \text{BP}^b \]

\[ ^{13}P \text{ is a predicate; the subscript } "b" \text{ restricts the range of predicates to predicates with a special relationship to the noun-phrase } "B". \text{ The necessity and the} \]
1. A is B.
2. The B of A P_b.
3. The B in A P_b.
4. A P_b.
5. A the B. P_b.
6. B P_b. (+ suitable context)

List III (B): Transformations on similes of the form "A : B :: C : D ; C P cd D ; \{A & C\} \{B & D\} respectively."

1. A is the C of B.
2. A P_{cd} B.
3. C P_{cd} D (+ suitable context).
4. C P B.
5. A P D.
6. The A of C P_{cd}.
7. The A of C P.
8. A the C P_{cd} D.
9. A the C P D.
10. The A-C P_{cd}.
11. The A-C P.
12. The A' C P_{cd}.\(^{14}\)
13? A the C P_{cd} B.

Application of the restriction will be discussed later. A typical example of a simile of the form "A is like B; B P_b" is "My love is like a rose; a rose blossoms in Spring." And the transforms of the simile are: (1) My love is a rose; (2) The rose of my love blossoms in spring; (3) The rose in my love blossoms in spring; (4) My love blossoms in spring; (5) My love the rose blossoms in spring; (6) A rose blossoms in spring (+ suitable context).

\(^{14}\)A' is an adjective constructed out of A.
b. Limitations On the Transformations

Not all the transformations listed produce metaphors on any sentence of the given simile forms. There are both grammatical and semantic restrictions on the transformations.

(i) The Grammatical Restrictions: Some of the listed transformations cannot be performed on some of the similes because of the unsuitability of the grammatical components of the simile. In the simile:

To decide : oneself :: to extinguish : candle

the transformations won't always work. Number 1, for example, will not work because "extinguish" will not be preceded by an article (under normal circumstances). In order to make

In contexts where syntactic deviance can be turned to advantage, these restrictions will be ignored. It is
the transformations work "to extinguish" will have to be transformed into a noun like "extinguishing," so that \#1 will yield the metaphor:

Deciding is the extinguishing of oneself.

If the noun-phrase A or C already includes "the," some of the transformations will produce one too many "the." Again, \#12 can only be performed where A can be transformed into an adjective; and when some of the terms are proper names the transformations won't always work either. There are many other similar grammatical restrictions and modifications of the transformations. None of these, however, are at all crucial. The more interesting restrictions on the similes are the semantic ones.

(ii) The Semantic Restrictions: Some terms for A and B, or for A, B, C and D, in which A is like B, or the relationship between A and B is like the relationship between C and D will not yield metaphors when any of the transformations are performed. Consider, for example:

This house is like that house; that house is a cottage.

It is hard to conceive of:

This house is that house (Transformation 1) as a metaphor, and it is surely inconceivable to defend:

illuminating, moreover, to view syntactically deviant metaphors as metaphors where the presupposed similes are constructed with the grammatical restrictions waived.
This house is a cottage  (Transformation 4) as a metaphor. Again, consider:

The relationship between Tom and Dick is like the relationship between Harry and John; Harry is good friends with John.

By no stretch of the imagination is

Tom is good friends with Dick  (Transformation 13) a metaphor. Nor is:

Tom is good friends with John  (Transformation 2) a metaphor. And:

Tom is the Harry of Dick  (Transformation 1) although not a normal discursive sentence, is as surely not a good case of metaphor.

In order to see why these do not work, whereas A=necessity, B=invention, C=mother, D=offspring, e.g., does work, it is useful to try to find cases which are somewhere in between the two extremes in terms of whether they lend themselves to the transformation into metaphor.

Consider:

The relationship between Henry Moore and the 20th century is like the relationship between Michelangelo and the Renaissance.

Here Transformation 1 makes more sense:

Henry Moore is the Michelangelo of the 20th century.

This sentence, although not a paradigm case of metaphor, is
nevertheless closer to a metaphor. We might want to say it is a borderline case of metaphor. It has already been mentioned that it is not unreasonable to assume that there are degrees of metaphor. We should try to see if it is possible to keep one side of the simile fixed and the other changing, so that the resulting transformations form a continuum displaying the degrees of metaphor. Consider:

This lean-to is like a building.
This beehive is like a building.
This human body is like a building.
This mathematical proof is like a building.

and the corresponding metaphors of or results of Transformation 1:

This lean-to is a building.
This beehive is a building.
This human body is a building.
This mathematical proof is a building.

Here we can see very clearly the degrees of metaphor, and this suggests that our semantic restriction of terms entering the simile will be one of degree. The same point can be made from a similar list of four-termed comparisons and their corresponding metaphors:

Groundsheet : tent :: basement building
Tunnel : anthill :: basement : building
Roots : plant :: basement : building
Axioms : mathematics :: basement : building
And:

The groundsheet is the basement of a tent.
A tunnel is the basement of an anthill.
The roots are the basement of the plant.
The axioms are the basement of mathematics.

Both pairs of lists suggest that the degrees of metaphor arise because of the proximity or distance of the categories of the terms in the comparison. The closer together in the table of categories, on the language tree, or of the semantic markers, the two terms in the comparison are, the weaker the metaphor which results when the transformations are applied will be. Let us then offer the following hypothesis to cover the restrictions necessary on terms entering the simile:

I. The more semantic markers the two terms share, the less the transformations will produce metaphors and the fewer semantic markers the two terms share, the more the transformations will produce metaphors.

This hypothesis, though it might cover some of the cases, e.g., our first two examples, where a house is being compared to a house, and a person to a person, and though it may cover degrees of metaphor with some terms, will still not restrict sharply enough to do the job we want it to do.

There are cases of A and B which have few semantic markers in common, yet do not produce metaphors in some of their transformations. Consider:

Axiomatic geometry is like the Parthenon; the Parthenon is over 2000 years old.
Although it might be that:

Axiomatic geometry is the Parthenon (Transformation 1) is a metaphor (at least in some contexts) it is false that:

Axiomatic geometry is over 2000 years old (Transformation 4) is a metaphor. And yet axiomatic geometry has few semantic markers in common with the Parthenon. Our first hypothesis is, therefore, inadequate. The key to the restriction now shifts over from the semantic markers which A has in common with B to the relation between P_b and B and A. We want to say something like, "P_b must be a predicate which does not literally apply to A in order for the transformations to produce metaphors" but this, of course, would be entirely unhelpful if not circular.

It is more helpful to examine the kind of comparison going on when two houses are being compared as to style, to contrast it with the kind of comparison going on when Solomon says, e.g., "Your temple is like a pomegranate." An immediate contrast which comes to mind is the contrast between assuming that the two houses are being compared qua houses, but not assuming that the temple is being compared with a pomegranate in terms of some semantic marker which is a marker of both temples and pomegranates. (Semantic markers which are markers of all or nearly all terms, like the semantic marker "discussable thing," are, of course, excluded.)

Let us therefore offer a second hypothesis for the semantic restriction:
II. The assumption that A is being compared with B in terms of F, where F is a semantic marker of both A and B, prevents the comparison from yielding metaphors in the transformation.

This hypothesis would cover all the comparisons which do not transform into metaphors which have been presented so far. In the first case, the assumed F is "houses," in the second it is "person," and in the last case, it is "objects with a beginning in time." It also seems to distinguish between these cases and the typical cases which do produce metaphors, because in the latter, \( P_b \) will not supply a semantic marker common to both A and B, and to make a simile like, "Your temple is like a pomegranate," it is not necessary to assume that the two are being compared \textit{qua} some F, a semantic marker common to both.

However, the hypothesis does not cut finely enough. In a case like:

\[
\text{My love is like a rose; a rose } P_{\text{rose}},
\]

no matter what \( P_{\text{rose}} \) is filled in with, there is an F, "living object" (ignoring the ambiguity of "my love," and taking "my love" to mean, not "my feeling of love," but "the person I love") which is a semantic marker of both A and B. Is this F necessarily assumed or not? Certainly this is assumed. But are A and B being compared in terms of F? The question is not clear enough to answer. The restriction will have to be made more precise.

The contrast must be sought not only on the grounds of the availability of F, but of the relationship between F
and \( P_b \). In the case of the houses we are comparing two objects knowing they are both houses. Our comparison, therefore, is not on the ground of features essential to houses, for that is assumed by the availability (here explicit in the names) of \( F \), a semantic marker of both \( A \) and \( B \). The comparison is based, necessarily, on non-essential features of houses, though relevant ones to their being houses—i.e., cottage, as opposed to duplex or bungalow. This kind of comparison may be contrasted with the kind of comparison in which essential features of (or features standardly associated with) \( A \) are compared with essential (or standardly associated) features of \( B \). Thus, it is not standardly associated with or essential to a house that it be a cottage, but it is essential or standardly associated with a rose that it have petals which nest in a certain way, that it blossoms in spring, etc., and these are the features which will fill in \( P_{\text{rose}} \).

Let us consider, then, the following hypothesis:

III. "\( A \) is like \( B; P \)," will only transform into metaphors if there is no \( F \) which is assumed as a semantic marker for both \( A \) and \( B \), or if there is an \( F \) which is assumed as a semantic marker for both \( A \) and \( B \), then some features of \( A \) are being compared to essential or standardly associated features of \( B \), via \( P_b \).

The distinction between essential or standardly associated features on the one hand and non-essential or non-standardly associated features on the other is not meant to hinge on analytic/synthetic controversies. For our purposes we can hinge the distinction on a distinction found in speaker-
hearer contexts. If Smith says to Jones, "House A is like house B" the comparison (normally) will carry with it no information unless Smith follows through with something like "Because both are (cottages) (painted green)." However, if he says, "My love is like a rose," the comparison will carry with it the intended information even if he does not follow through with "because a rose blossoms in spring"—simply because Jones can supply the follow-through on his own.

This hypothesis not only will distinguish between terms for A and B which will or will not transform into metaphors, and the conditions under which the metaphor transformations will take place successfully, but also provides grounds for establishing an independently interesting distinction—and one which is especially important later on—namely, the distinction between a comparison (or a "standard comparison," to avoid confusion, since similes are often, and appropriately, called comparisons) and a simile.

c. The Distinction Between Simile and Standard Comparison:

**Definition I:** A sentence of the form "A is like B" is a standard comparison if and only if it is assumed that both A and B are being compared in terms of F (a semantic marker which they share), and some non-essential features of A and B relevant to F, are being compared.

**Definition II:** A sentence of the form "A is like B" is a simile if and only if it is not assumed that both A and B are F, or if it is assumed then some features of A are being compared with essential or standardly associated features of B, P_b.

Hypothesis III and the distinction between a standard
comparison and a simile is useful not only in terms of a criterion for restricting the sentences entering the transformations.

(i) The distinction is useful to accommodate the feeling that both similes and metaphors have a direction (whereas standard comparisons do not) because of the use of a feature of B as a vehicle for comparison.

(ii) It enables us to explain why some of the grammatical changes employed in the construction of similes are necessary. The most basic change is the change of "the" to "a," (e.g., "Necessity is the mother of invention" becomes "The relationship between necessity and invention is like the relationship between a mother and her offspring"). And this change can be understood in terms of the distinction since "a mother" is a more convenient vehicle for drawing on essential or standardly associated features of mothers than "the mother," since "a" does not distinguish between particular features of one mother as opposed to another, and so calls attention to the features of mothers in general, while "the" calls attention to the particular features of a particular mother.

(iii) More important, it provides us with a basis for explaining why it is we supply the missing fourth term of a metaphor through standard associations with the third, or essential features of the third, by linking our view of metaphors as transforms of similes with a distinction between
standard comparisons and similes drawn on these very lines, of whether the compared features are essential or inessential.

(iv) The distinction between simile and comparison will enable us to view "being a transform of a simile" as both necessary and sufficient for a sentence's being a metaphor.

(v) Finally, the presupposition of a simile, where simile is distinct from standard comparison, will be of use in highlighting the utility of the metaphor transformation. For it is only in terms of essential features or features which are standardly associated with the objects in the comparison that a metaphor system, or a series of metaphor transformations on a single simile, can be invoked.
VI. THE UTILITY OF THE DEVICE OF METAPHOR

We are now in a position to connect some of the points made earlier and to explore them more fully. So far we have approached the problem of defining the relationship between metaphors, similes and the set of transformations in List III (which we shall call the M-transformations) from several directions. We have been concerned with the following four formulations:

\( \alpha \) Given any \( s \) and any \( t_m \), then \( t_m(s) \) is a metaphor.

\( \beta \) Given any \( m \), then if \( t(s) \) equals \( m \), \( t \) is a \( T_m \).

\( \gamma \) Given any \( m \), then if \( t_m(p) \) equals \( m \), \( p \) is an \( S \).

\( \delta \) Given any \( m \) then there is some \( t_m \) and some \( s \): \( t_m(s) \) equals \( m \).

Here "s" is a simile, "S" is the class of similes, "\( t_m \)" is an M-transformation, "\( T_m \)" is the class of M-transformations, and "\( m \)" is a metaphor. Of these four formulations we are most interested in \( \alpha \) and \( \delta \) since these define the sufficient and necessary conditions of metaphor, respectively; however all four have been brought up and are important in enabling us to understand the utility of metaphor, so they shall all be dealt with.

a. The necessary and sufficient conditions of metaphor:

The sufficient condition of metaphor, \( \alpha \), has already been established throughout Chapter V. For the problem which Chapter V dealt with was the problem that not all comparisons would transform into metaphors, and in Chapter V we attempted to show that introducing the distinction between similes and other or standard comparisons would guarantee the yielding of metaphors.

Of \( \beta \) it was said at the very outset of Chapter V that the
task of demonstration is difficult because the list of M-transformations has not been definitively set forward, i.e., because of its open-endedness. However, we can go further now, and say that if \( \gamma \) can be established, \( \beta \) follows by definition. For if we know that only similes are M-transformable into metaphors, then if we have a transformation which transforms a simile into a metaphor, by definition we will include it in our list. \( \beta \) is, then dependent on showing \( \gamma \).

To show \( \gamma \) is to show that only similes are M-transformable into metaphors. Thus, we want to find out whether the distinction between standard comparison and simile,—which was framed to distinguish between comparisons which can and cannot enter the metaphor transformations—will also serve to distinguish between the comparisons constructed out of or recovered from non-metaphor and metaphor sentences, respectively.

The distinction will clearly serve to exclude the comparisons which presented the difficulties in IV (f), as they are hardly different from the examples of comparisons which would not transform into metaphors in V (b). Moreover, if we thing of the comparisons which are constructed from non-metaphor sentences, it is entirely to be expected that they be standard comparisons rather than similes. Typical non-metaphorical sentences do not involve category crossing (typical, to exclude category mistakes and sentences with similar errors); it is to be expected, then, that when we say, for example,

This ball is blue

just as the predication of "blue" to "ball" can be informative because "blue" is not essential to "ball," or not standardly associated with "ball," whatever comparison is constructed from
the sentence will be framed in terms of non-essential or non-standardly-associated features of "ball." In the same way it is to be expected that when we cross categories, and violate some restrictions on semantic combinations, as in:

Necessity is the mother of invention,
calling necessity a mother can be informative only through our semantic associations with "mother."

This gives us reasonable grounds to assert that only similies are M-transformable into metaphors, or \( \alpha \).

As for \( \beta \), the necessary condition of metaphor, what was said in Chapter IV (f i) about the construction of similes also applies to the recovery of similes from the transformation. Because this discussion is all based around List I, the list of typical metaphors, we cannot go any farther than to rely on List I as being a representative list and to supplement this with the consideration which was already offered with regard to the construction of similes, viz., that a metaphor for which there is no apparent simile to be recovered tends to be unintelligible until some simile is in fact recovered. Although neither point is conclusive we do have sufficient indication to tentatively assert \( \beta \). With \( \alpha \) and \( \beta \) we have tentatively established the necessary and sufficient conditions of metaphor.

b. Consequences of the transformation from simile to metaphor:

An analysis of metaphors such as this one, which holds that metaphors are transformed similes can only be a satisfying account if it can answer the question, "Why do we use metaphors instead of similes; why not simply use the similes?"

The answer to this question has already been suggested
but not fully explored. In IV it was argued that although metaphors can be viewed as transforms of similes, neither the metaphors nor the similes are unique paraphrases of one another. How is this so?

(i) When someone says "A is like B"—whether to make a standard comparison or a simile—the tendency is to ask, "In what way is A like B?" "A is like B" alone tends to be uninformative, because it is the features of A and B which are being compared which carry the burden or contain the information of the comparison or simile. Without continuing on to, "A is like B because A P_a and B P_b," "A is like B" is not complete. As we have mentioned, however, the requirement that "A is like B" be followed through in the case of a simile is weaker than with a standard comparison. Nevertheless, there is a variety of standard associations, some of which a speaker may want to eliminate or de-emphasize, and some of which to reinforce or emphasize, and this is why there is still a tendency to ask with similes as well as with standard comparisons, "In what way is A like B?"

With similes, then, and not with standard comparisons, when "A is like B" is all that is provided, it is useful to think of scope for interpretation. 17 There are a number of

17 It could be suggested that a notion of scope might be useful in studying standard comparisons since there is a fairly fixed number of aspects relevant, e.g., to two houses being compared as houses, like number of rooms, style of construction, construction material. Whether such a notion is in fact useful for a study of standard comparisons is not strictly relevant here. It is sufficient that such scope would not be "scope for interpretation but scope of, e.g., "possibilities for comparisons."
features semantically or through standard associations implicit in B and the scope for interpretation is the range of different selections, restrictions, and emphases which can be made. Let us then define the scope of the simile in the following way:

**Definition III**: The scope of a simile is the number of different terms for \( P_b \) in "A is like B; \( P_b \)" or for \( P_{cd} \) in "A is to B as C is to D; \( C P_{cd} D \)."

What happens to the scope of a simile when it is transformed into a metaphor? In some cases, notably where the metaphor is simply a copula with two terms, e.g., "Richard is a lion," and the simile is "Richard is like a lion," the scope for interpretation does not seem to be substantially altered. However, this is not the case for almost all metaphors involving a more complex interplay of terms, or simply more terms. Take, e.g.,

Richard is a lion among men.

Here, to think of the metaphor as a transform of a simile, involves constructing a number of different similes, including e.g.,

1. Richard : men :: lion : beasts of prey
2. Richard : men :: lion : prey

because the metaphor is a transform of both 1 and 2. However, the scope of 1 is very different from the scope of 2; the two lists for \( P_{cd} \) contain few if any entries in common. Now although it is true that the success of the metaphor is
dependent on our being able to construct at least one simile with the terms of the metaphor, the richness of the metaphor is lost if we construct only one simile with the terms of the metaphor. In the cases where the transformation of simile into metaphor involves dropping one or more terms of the simile, the richness of the metaphor is a by-product of the transformation, since the metaphor can be viewed as the transform of a number of similes. In the same way that it is useful to think of the scope of a simile, it is useful to think of the scope of a metaphor, and the scope of a metaphor is a compounded scope.

Definition IV: The scope of a metaphor is the sum of the scopes of the similes of which the metaphor is a transform.

This helps to understand why we use metaphors instead of simply sticking with similes. To unpack a metaphor is to present not one but many similes. Moreover, there is no way to fix the similes or to recover a complete list of similes, because the list of similes changes with the context surrounding the metaphor. It is true that in a given context the list of similes is fairly small (though no water-tight), but part of the richness of metaphors is that new contexts can so often be found for them. Finding a new interpretation to a metaphor is viewing the metaphor as a transform of a simile other than the simile(s) of which it was previously regarded as a transform.

We have seen the operations of two levels of scope. It is interesting to think of some metaphors which gave us
some trouble at the very beginning—the syntactically deviant metaphors—as metaphors which involve a third level of scope. Very roughly, we might want to define the third level thus:

**Definition V**: The scope of a syntactically deviant metaphor is the sum of the scopes of the syntactically sound metaphors of which the syntactically deviant metaphor is a transform.

This definition, however, presupposes a theory of syntactic deviance which spells out how syntactically deviant sentences are transforms of syntactically sound sentences, and the detailed workings of this would take us far afield. In terms of this study we need only say that to unpack a syntactically deviant metaphor we eliminate the syntactic deviance in a number of ways, so that we have a number of syntactically sound metaphors, each of which in tern can be unpacked in the standard way, i.e., in terms of a number of similes, each of which in tern has its own scope.

(ii) The analysis of the scope of metaphor takes us a certain distance in answering the question, "Why, if metaphors are transforms of similes do we use metaphors instead of similes?" but it does not account for those simple cases like, "Richard is a lion" where the scope of the metaphor is the scope of the one simile, "Richard is like a lion."

The analysis of metaphor in terms of simile-transformations, where we think of the special features of the simile as opposed to the standard comparison is again fruitful in explaining the richness and uneliminability of these
metaphors as well as the others. The distinguishing feature of simile is that A is being compared to B via some essential or standardly associated feature of B. Now the transformation of simile into metaphor is characteristically the transformation of "like" to "is"; instead of likening we are predicating. The scope of the simile is the range of features standardly associated with the B-term, so that instead of likening one thing to another we can now predicate the features standardly associated with the B-term to the A-term. It is the fact that with similes we have such a range of standardly associated features, combined with the transformation of a similarity to an identity, which enables us to import B-features onto A. Thus we are not restricted to merely saying,

    John is dirty, like a pig.
Or:
    Richard is like a lion.

We can also say:

    John wallows.
Or:
    Richard roars.

Viewing metaphors as transforms of similes does not involve eliminating metaphors; it provides us with a means of understanding why metaphors are passports to the enrichment of our vocabulary. Until the simile is transformed into a metaphor, the enrichment of vocabulary (nevertheless made possible by the distinguishing aspect of the simile) does not actually take place.
c. Metaphor and Three Uses of "Like":

We have noted two consequences of the transformation of similes into metaphors, which together comprise an account of the special virtues of metaphor as a linguistic device:

1. The transformation of simile into metaphor involves a widening of scope, so that metaphors have greater scope than similes.

2. The transformation of simile into metaphor makes possible the enrichment of vocabulary through the transference of features comprising the scope of the simile.

In developing both points, much was made of the special features of a simile as opposed to a standard comparison. It is however also in place to note the connection between metaphors and a third kind of likening, viz., the use of "like" as an adjustor.

The use of like as an adjustor is a primary, if not the primary, use of "like." "Like" is used to adjust when the existing vocabulary is inadequate for some purpose.\(^{18}\) Metaphors often come into being under similar circumstances, when the vocabulary is inadequate to some task, so that on independent grounds, viewing metaphors as transforms of statements which liken one thing to another makes sense.

However, even this must not be pressed too far, since

\(^{18}\)E.g., when we "come across a new kind of animal which looks and behaves very much as pigs do, but not quite as pigs do . . . we . . . say 'It's like a pig'." Jane Austen, Sense and Sensibility, Galaxy Press, p. 74.
we use "like" to adjust only in those cases where our vocabulary is (though not quite adequate) not so inadequate that it requires enrichment with a new term, whereas on this account, we use the metaphor transformation of the simile precisely in those cases where we want an expansion of our vocabulary to take place. Using "like" as an adjustor prevents us from extending the meaning of a term to cover a vocabulary inadequacy, whereas transforming a simile into a metaphor allows us to extend the meaning of a term to cover an inadequacy of our vocabulary.

We do, then, want to keep clearly in mind, for the purposes of this study, and in general, the distinction between these three kinds of likening: while similes are characteristically the vehicles of insights into the interrelations of objects and/or concepts themselves, standard comparisons are characteristically the vehicles of observations, points of information, and like-adjustments are the vehicles which keep our vocabulary restricted and the meanings of terms unextended.

