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Public sector restraint and the social services : the case of the voluntary sector provision of personal… Butcher, John 1986

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c •i PUBLIC SECTOR RESTRAINT AND THE SOCIAL SERVICES: THE CASE OF THE VOLUNTARY SECTOR PROVISION OF PERSONAL SOCIAL SERVICES IN BRITISH COLUMBIA by JOHN R. BUTCHER B.A., The University of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1982 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES Department of Geography We accept t h i s thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA January 30, 1986 © JOHN R. BUTCHER, 19 86 In p r e s e n t i n g t h i s t h e s i s i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t of the requirements f o r an advanced degree at the U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree t h a t the L i b r a r y s h a l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r r e f e r e n c e and study. I f u r t h e r agree t h a t p e r m i s s i o n f o r e x t e n s i v e copying of t h i s t h e s i s f o r s c h o l a r l y purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by h i s or her r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . I t i s understood t h a t copying or p u b l i c a t i o n o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r f i n a n c i a l gain s h a l l not be allowed without my w r i t t e n p e r m i s s i o n . Department of GEOGRAPHY  The U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Columbia 1956 Main Mall Vancouver, Canada V6T 1Y3 Date JULY 21. 1986 DE-6 (3/81) i i ABSTRACT R e s t r a i n t by government i n the area of s o c i a l s e r v i c e spending i n the 1980's has become an i s s u e of grave concern f o r s o c i a l s e r v i c e p r a c t i t i o n e r s , p l a n n e r s , and a d m i n i s t r a -t o r s . The emergence i n North America of neo-conservative economic p o l i c i e s has engendered a body of c r i t i c a l and pro-v o c a t i v e l i t e r a t u r e which examines the e f f e c t s of " r e s t r a i n t economics." The neo-conservative c o n s t r u c t i o n of a "post w e l f a r e S t a t e , " p r o p e l l e d by economic c r i s e s , has i n v o l v e d a r e d e f i -n i t i o n by the State of i t s mandate f o r the r e d i s t r i b u t i o n of the " p u b l i c wage." The " p r i v a t i s a t i o n " of s e r v i c e s through r e d u c t i o n or c a n c e l l a t i o n of programs, the i n c r e a s i n g use of c o n t r a c t e d s e r v i c e s , and through d e i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s a t i o n and d e r e g u l a t i o n may o b v i a t e the r e d i s t r i b u t i v e aims of the wel-f a r e State and c r e a t e i n s t e a d a b a s i s f o r more p e r v a s i v e s o c i a l and g e o g r a p h i c a l i n e q u i t y . The v o l u n t a r y s e c t o r (non-government) human s e r v i c e s have been c h a l l e n g e d to " f i l l the gaps" l e f t by government cutbacks, o f t e n i n the face of d e c l i n i n g l e v e l s of govern-ment support f o r t h a t s e c t o r . I t i s the i n t e n t of t h i s t he-s i s t o address the p o l i t i c a l economy of s o c i a l s e r v i c e s p o l i c y i n B r i t i s h Columbia through an examination of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the P r o v i n c i a l government and the v o l u n t a r y s e c t o r . T h i s p o l i c y c r i t i q u e uses the v o l u n t a r y i i i s e c t o r as a window onto the p o l i t i c a l , economic and i d e o l o g i c a l agenda of the B r i t i s h Columbia government with s p e c i a l emphasis on s o c i a l and economic l e g i s l a t i o n during the p e r i o d 1983-1985. I t w i l l be argued t h a t both the i d e o l o g i c a l bases and the s o c i a l impacts of B.C.'s r e s t r a i n t l e g i s l a t i o n are r e f l e c t i o n s of neo-conservative c h a l l e n g e s t o the c o l l e c t i -v i s t i c p r i n c i p l e s of the w e l f a r e State observed i n the Uni-t e d S t a t e s and Great B r i t a i n . The t h e s i s w i l l proceed through two p r i n c i p a l avenues: 1) a d i s c u s s i o n of the t e l e o l o g y of n e o - c o n s e r v a t i v i s m and i t s r e l a t i o n s h i p t o s o c i a l and economic p o l i c y i n B.C.. T h i s s e c t i o n w i l l p r o v i d e the context a g a i n s t which the remainder of the t h e s i s w i l l be c a s t ; and, 2) a d e t a i l e d d i s c u s s i o n of the nature of the v o l u n t a r y s e c t o r and a comparison of the e f f e c t s of p u b l i c s e c t o r r e s t r a i n t upon v o l u n t a r i s t i c s o c i a l s e r v i c e s i n the U n i t e d States and B r i t i s h Columbia. The l a t -t e r w i l l be accomplished through the j u x t a p o s i t i o n of a s i z e a b l e l i t e r a t u r e on the e f f e c t s of r e s t r a i n t i n the U.S. with the f i n d i n g s of a province-wide q u e s t i o n n a i r e survey of v o l u n t a r y agencies conducted by the author i n January 1985. I t i s p o s i t e d t h a t s o c i a l and economic p o l i c y i n B.C. i s a Canadian m a n i f e s t a t i o n of the a n t i - w e l f a r e - s t a t i s m i m p l i c i t i n Reaganomics of the U.S. and Thatchernomics of the U.K. On the b a s i s of t h e o r e t i c a l and e m p i r i c a l i v r e f l e c t i o n s on the e f f e c t s of i d e o l o g i c a l l y - i n f o r m e d r e s t r a i n t measures, the author w i l l conclude by a s s e s s i n g the f u t u r e p r o s p e c t s f o r Canadian s o c i a l p o l i c y . V TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter I The Welfare S t a t e , Personal S o c i a l S e r v i c e s and the V o l u n t a r y S e c t o r : An I n t r o d u c t i o n p. 1 1.1 The Welfare State i n C r i s i s ? The Emergence of the Neo-Conservative Challenge i n the United S t a t e s , the U n i t e d Kingdom and B r i t i s h Columbia p. 7 1.2 S t r u c t u r e of the T h e s i s p. 18 Chapter II The P o l i t i c a l Context and the Hermeneutics of R e s t r a i n t p. 22 2.1 R e s t r a i n t Economics, the "New R e a l i t y " i n B.C. p. 36 2.2 The L e g i s l a t i v e Package p. 39 2.3 R e s t r a i n t and the New Right -A Case of State Managed C a p i t a l i s m p. 56 2.4 S o c i a l S e r v i c e s , the S t a t e , and the Imperatives of C a p i t a l Accumulation p. 61 2.5 S o c i a l and Economic P o l i c y : Goals and C o n s t r a i n t s p. 68 Chapter I I I V o l u n t a r y S e c t o r - S t a t e R e l a t i o n s : Economic Nature and F u n c t i o n of the V o l u n t a r y Sector p. 76 3.1 Agency Types and Government Funding Arrangements p. 89 3.2 Funding Dependency and I n t e r o r -g a n i s a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s - Some L i m i t i n g F a c t o r s i n V o l u n t a r y S e c t o r P r o v i s i o n p. 101 3.3 The V o l u n t a r y Sector: A D u a l i t y of Roles and Images p. 110 v i Chapter IV The E f f e c t s of F i s c a l R e s t r a i n t Upon Vo l u n t a r y Sector S e r v i c e s - The Canadian and U.S. Experience 4.1 Some A n t i c i p a t e d Impacts Upon NGO's of Government Cutbacks 4.2 Reaganomics - The E f f e c t s of Cutbacks Upon the S o c i a l S e r v i c e Sector i n the Unit e d S t a t e s 4.3 Some E m p i r i c a l R e f l e c t i o n s on the Impacts of Budgetary R e s t r a i n t on the V o l u n t a r y Sector i n the U.S. 4.4 E f f e c t s Upon C l i e n t s of Agency D e c l i n e i n the U.S. 4.5 The N o n - P r o f i t Sector and Purchase of S e r v i c e C o n t r a c t i n g 4.6 O r g a n i s a t i o n a l and Management F a c t o r s i n Q u a l i t y and A c c o u n t a b i l i t y of S e r v i c e Chapter V R e s t r a i n t and the Volu n t a r y Sector i n B.C. - F i n d i n g s From Three Communities 5.1 The S o c i a l Context 5.2 Impacts Upon Agencies and C l i e n t s i n B.C. - A Survey of P r o f e s s i o n a l Opinion 5.3 Cutbacks and Personal S o c i a l S e r v i c e D e l i v e r y by NGO's: The Experience of Three B.C. Communities 5.3.1 The E f f e c t s of Cutbacks i n Richmond 5.3.2 The E f f e c t s of Cutbacks i n Vancouver 5.3.3 The E f f e c t s of Cutbacks i n V i c t o r i a and the C a p i t a l Regional D i s t r i c t Chapter VI The Vo l u n t a r y Sector i n B r i t i s h Columbia - The E f f e c t s of R e s t r a i n t and Agency Responses p. 115 p. 115 p. 124 p. 131 p. 138 p. 144 p. 160 p. 170 p. 170 p. 176 p. 185 p. 186 p. 188 p. 190 p. 196 v i i 6.1 Research Methodology p. 196 6.2 Composition of Agency Personnel p. 199 6.3 F a c t o r s i n Agency O r g a n i s a t i o n and S t r u c t u r e p. 203 6.4 I n f o r m a t i o n a l C a p a b i l i t i e s of NGO's p. 207 6.5 I n t e r o r g a n i s a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s h i p s p. 210 6.6 Success i n Obta i n i n g Information p. 214 6.7 S e r v i c e Types and Target Groups Represented i n the Sample p. 217 6.8 Agency Sources of Funding p. 221 6.9 P a t t e r n s of Funding Increase and D e c l i n e from P r o v i n c i a l Government Sources p. 225 6.10 The Use of Purchase of S e r v i c e C o n t r a c t s Among Responding Agencies p. 229 6.11 E f f e c t s Upon N o n - P r o f i t Agencies of P r o v i n c i a l Government R e s t r a i n t p. 237 6.12 Agency D i r e c t o r s ' P e r c e p t i o n s of the S o c i a l P o l i c y Environment i n B.C. p. 244 6.13 S t r a t e g i e s f o r the Enhancement of S o c i a l S e r v i c e D e l i v e r y p. 251 Chapter VII S o c i a l P o l i c y , S o c i a l Change and the Future of Vo l u n t a r i s m i n B.C. p. 254 7.1 V o l u n t a r i s m i n the New R e a l i t y p. 254 7.2 The Need f o r O r g a n i s a t i o n a l and Managerial Change i n the Vo l u n t a r y Sector p. 261 7.3 The Future of S o c i a l and Econcomic P o l i c y i n Canada p. 273 7.4 S o c i a l P o l i c y : Costs, Goals, Prospects p. 270 7.5 C o n c l u s i o n p. 275 v i i i B i b l i o g r a p h y Appendix A Appendix B Appendix C Appendix D Reference Maps of Human Resources Regions i n B r i t i s h Columbia Covering L e t t e r and Q u e s t i o n n a i r e Used i n the Survey Histograms of S e l e c t e d , Annotated V a r i a b l e s from the Q u e s t i o n n a i r e Survey A Complete L i s t i n g of 517 V o l u n t a r y Agencies Contacted f o r t h i s Survey p. 277 p. 292 p. 295 p. 304 p. 318 ix L I S T OF TABLES Table 2:1 Table 6:1 Table 6:2 Table 6:3 Table 6:4 Table 6:5 Table 6:6 Table 6:7 Table 6:8 Table 6:9 Table 6:10 Table 6:11 Table 6:12 Table 6:13 Table 6:14 Table 6:15 Typology of P o l i t i c a l D e c i s i o n s Breakdown of Agency Response by L o c a t i o n Number of P a i d Personnel and Vo l u n t e e r s Employed by N o n - P r o f i t Agencies Frequencies of Ranked S e r v i c e s Frequencies of Ranked Target Groups S e r v i c e Types and Target Groups U n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d According t o Importance by Responding Agencies P r o v i n c i a l Sources of NGO Funds F e d e r a l Sources of NGO Funds Sources of NGO Funding - Non-P r o v i n c i a l , Non-Federal Increases i n Funding by Source Decreases i n Funding by Source Increase and D e c l i n e i n Funding from P r o v i n c i a l Government Sources by L o c a t i o n M i n i s t r i e s or Departments Employing POSC's P r o p o r t i o n of Agency S e r v i c e s D e l i v e r e d Through C o n t r a c t t o Government S e r v i c e s P r o v i d e d Through POSC's C l i e n t Groups T a r g e t t e d by POSC's p. 75 p. 198 p. 200 p. 217 p. 218 p. 219 p. 222 p. 223 p. 224 p. 225 p. 226 p. 227 p. 231 p. 232 p. 233 p. 234 „x ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS A l l t heses, no matter how novel the t o p i c or theme, are the products of some degree of c o l l e c t i v e e f f o r t . Whe-th e r through c o l l u s i o n , counsel or emotional support, the c o n t r i b u t i o n s of others t o the f i n a l product i s a fundamen-t a l aspect of any s c h o l a r l y endeavour. T h i s i s no l e s s t r u e f o r t h i s t h e s i s , and I would l i k e t o take t h i s o p p o r t u n i t y t o thank those who saw me through t o i t s completion. F i r s t , I would l i k e t o thank my f a t h e r , whose g a r r u -lous remonstrations on b e h a l f of the worker, and whose out-spoken views - good or i l l - helped to inform and shape my own s o c i a l c o n s c i e n c e . Dad, I wish you c o u l d be here t o share t h i s s m a l l v i c t o r y with me. To my mother I owe much. To me she has always r e p r e s e n t e d a b a s t i o n of p a t i e n c e , compassion and a love of l e a r n i n g . I f I share any of these q u a l i t i e s , she i s the obvious source. The love and support of my f a m i l y d u r i n g the course of my academic adventure has been of immeasurable importance - they may not always have known what I was doing, but o f t t i m e s , n e i t h e r d i d I. Of the many f r i e n d s whose company I have enjoyed i n the course of my l a b o u r s , I would l i k e t o o f f e r s p e c i a l thanks t o two. With Paul Steer and Peter D a n i e l s I have had the good f o r t u n e to enjoy e x t r a o r d i n a r y f r i e n d s h i p s - to say not h i n g of the excesses of young men rendered sublime through mateship. Paul, your c o n t r a r i n e s s and b l u s t e r have p r o v i d e d a steady c h a l l e n g e t o my reason. Peter, your f r i e n d s h i p and humour (not to mention your g u i t a r ! ) were c r i t i c a l i n h e l p i n g me to s u r v i v e my academic t r a v a i l s . Thank-you both! To my s u p e r v i s o r , Dr. Marwyn Samuels, thank-you f o r the c o n f i d e n c e you showed i n me - at times your t r u s t i n my a b i l i t y s u r e l y exceeded my own. To P r o f . Jack MacDonald (UBC School of S o c i a l Work), I am indebted f o r your p e r c e p t i v e and c a r e f u l review of my f i r s t d r a f t - your comments and advice c o n t r i b u t e d g r e a t l y t o the f i n a l product. S p e c i a l thanks are a l s o i n order f o r Dr. T e r r y McGee, who generously gave of h i s time and energy to g i v e me some needed feedback, and to Dr. Olav Slaymaker, f o r h i s k i n d a s s i s t a n c e with the l o g i s t i c s i n v o l v e d i n g e t t i n g a copy of my t h e s i s t o Nanj i n g . Thanks are a l s o i n order f o r Dr. David Ley f o r h i s sagacious advice and f o r s e r v i n g as my " f o s t e r s u p e r v i s o r " dur i n g Marwyn's absences. I wish t o acknowledge a l s o the support of Dr. P h i l i p Resnick and Mr. R i c h a r d Morley who through the auspices ( r e s p e c t i v e l y ) of the P a c i f i c Group f o r P o l i c y A l t e r n a t i v e s and Gordon Neighbourhood House, p r o v i d e d xi generous support f o r the e m p i r i c a l p o r t i o n of t h i s t h e s i s . Without t h e i r support, the t h e s i s i n i t s p r e s e n t form would not have been p o s s i b l e . Thanks too t o the s t a f f , v o l u n t e e r s and c l i e n t s of the Vancouver C r i s i s I n t e r v e n t i o n - S u i c i d e P r e v e n t i o n Centre who taught me so much. My s p e c i a l thanks have been l e f t t i l l l a s t . To Helen I owe more than can ever be p r o p e r l y expressed here. Your love and conf i d e n c e have proved a constant source of com-f o r t , s t r e n g t h and i n s p i r a t i o n . Without you t h i s l a s t rocky b i t of t r a c k would have been rough going indeed. Thank-you f o r keeping me s a f e , keeping me sane and f o r keeping me working. So many h e l p i n g hands and h e l p i n g h e a r t s and minds. I extend my s i n c e r e g r a t i t u d e t o a l l who helped me toward t h i s g o a l . x i i VANCOUVER S U N , JANUARY 6 , 1986 THE VANCOUVER SUN, MAY 28, 1986 CHAPTER I THE WELFARE STATE, PERSONAL SOCIAL SERVICES AND THE VOLUNTARY SECTOR: AN INTRODUCTION The w e l f a r e State as i t e x i s t s i n most advanced c a p i -t a l i s t n a t i o n s i s a s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n t h a t most Canadians take f o r granted. While many Canadians, pos-s i b l y a m a j o r i t y , do not u s u a l l y p e r c e i v e themselves as the d i r e c t or i n d i r e c t b e n e f i c i a r i e s of s o c i a l w e l f a r e programs, v i r t u a l l y a l l w i l l be touched by some aspect of the welfar e S t a t e . A l l persons who have r e c e i v e d f a m i l y allowance pay-ments f o r themselves or t h e i r c h i l d r e n , or who have a v a i l e d themselves of p u b l i c education, or medical c a r e , or who when unemployed have r e c e i v e d unemployment insurance or worker 1s compensation b e n e f i t s , or who upon r e t i r e m e n t have r e c e i v e d a government pension, have been d i r e c t l y a f f e c t e d by welfa r e State i n s t i t u t i o n s . Nor i s the we l f a r e State c h a r a c t e r i s e d s o l e l y i n terms of payments or t r a n s f e r s t o i n d i v i d u a l s or by the p r o v i s i o n of s e r v i c e s accepted as being " u n i v e r s a l " i n c h a r a c t e r (such as education and h e a l t h ) . The welfar e State encompasses a broad mandate f o r s o c i a l r e d i s t r i b u t i o n and may i n c l u d e t r a n s f e r s , t o or between r e g i o n s of the country (from the "haves" t o the "have-nots"), or l e g i s l a t e d p r o t e c t i o n s f o r i n d i v i d u a l s or groups p e r c e i v e d t o have l i m i t e d l i f e - c h a n c e s owing t o t h e i r p o s i t i o n i n s o c i e t y . 2 M i s t a k e n l y viewed as being synonymous with income a s s i s t a n c e programs, "welfare" i s o f t e n regarded as being r e s i d u a l i n c h a r a c t e r - i n other words, the l a s t r e s o r t f o r the f e c k l e s s and i n d i g e n t i n our s o c i e t y who cannot (or w i l l not) see t o t h e i r own needs and cannot s u r v i v e s o l e l y on the b a s i s of c h a r i t y from Church or f a m i l y . In r e a l i t y , however, the w e l f a r e State seeks t o pr o v i d e not o n l y f o r the most needy, but o f f e r s a wide range of u n i v e r s a l (where e l i g i -b i l i t y i s c o n f e r r e d on the whole p o p u l a t i o n or whole age groups) as w e l l as s e l e c t i v e ( t a r g e t t i n g s p e c i f i c i n d i v i d u -a l s or groups) programs and s e r v i c e s . The w e l f a r e State i s a r e l a t i v e l y r e c e n t and c o n t i n u -a l l y e v o l v i n g i n s t i t u t i o n which d i s p l a y s c o n s i d e r a b l e geo-gr a p h i c v a r i a b i l i t y . S o c i a l w e l f a r e , as a s o c i a l product, i s s u b j e c t t o d i s t r i b u t i o n a l c o n s t r a i n t s such as c o s t , d i s -tance, or l o g i s t i c s . As with other types of products, there are economies of s c a l e a s s o c i a t e d with the p r o v i s i o n of some s o c i a l w e l f a r e programs which means t h a t w e l f a r e State i n p u t s are not e q u a l l y (nor, n e c e s s a r i l y , e q u i t a b l y or e f f i -c i e n t l y ) d i s t r i b u t e d through space. Subject t o d i s t r i b u t i o -n a l c o n s t r a i n t s , the a c c e s s i b i l i t y t o many w e l f a r e State programs w i l l a l s o be s u b j e c t t o s p a t i a l or s o c i a l v a r i a t i o n . The s o c i a l and s p a t i a l v a r i a b i l i t y of the we l f a r e State and the s e r v i c e s i t pr o v i d e s i s c o n t i n g e n t a l s o on p o l i t i c a l p r o c e s s e s . The we l f a r e State was conceived, and 3 aspects of i t entrenched through the p o l i t i c a l a r t i c u l a t i o n of the r e p s o n s i b i l i t y of the State f o r the p r o v i s i o n of s o c i a l w e l l - b e i n g and an a p p r o p r i a t e q u a l i t y of l i f e f o r i t s c i t i z e n s . The parameters of e n t i t l e m e n t , the d e f i n i t i o n of s o c i a l problems and s o c i a l needs - as w e l l as the means through which these are to be addressed - are s u b j e c t to the p o l i t i c a l m o b i l i s a t i o n of group i n t e r e s t s and the e x p r e s s i o n i n p o l i c y of p o l i t i c a l accommodations as expressed i n co-- o p t a t i o n , compromise and consensus. One may a p p r e c i a t e , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t s o c i a l w e l f a r e and s o c i a l s e r v i c e s e x i s t very much w i t h i n the bounds of a p o l i t i c a l economy, where the t e c h n i c a l - l e v e l questions of how a given program may best be implemented are c o n t i n g e n t upon p o l i t i c a l d e c i s i o n s and the p h i l o s o p h i c a l p r e d i l e c t i o n s of the decision-makers. Thus, while the i n s t i t u t i o n s of the w e l f a r e State are at l e a s t as p e r v a s i v e as death and taxes, they cannot r i g h t -l y c l a i m the same c e r t a i n t y as these two v i l l a i n s of the o l d adage. There are c o u n t e r v a i l i n g p o l i t i c a l and economic p r e s -sures from without which m i l i t a t e a g a i n s t the e x t e n s i o n of s o c i a l and economic i n t e r v e n t i o n by government, j u s t as there are systemic d y s f u n c t i o n s w i t h i n the w e l f a r e State bureaucracy which impede the achievement of the o s t e n s i b l e goals of s o c i a l w e l f a r e programs or p o l i c y . In a d d i t i o n , the e x p r e s s i o n of the w e l f a r e State i n s o c i a l and economic p o l i -cy, as a c r e a t u r e of the p o l i t i c a l p r o c e s s , i s a r e g i o n a l , and t h e r e f o r e an i n h e r e n t l y g e o g r a p h i c a l phenomenon. Thus, 4 p a r t i c u l a r r e g i o n s , depending on f a c t o r s such as the econo-my, the s t r u c t u r e of the State and the p h i l o s o p h i c a l l e a n -ings of government, w i l l demonstrate g r e a t e r or l e s s e r pro-p e n s i t i e s t o accord p r i o r i t y or l e g i t i m a c y t o s o c i a l w e l f a r e f u n c t i o n s . Commitment on the p a r t of governments t o the exten-s i o n and c o n s o l i d a t i o n of the we l f a r e S t a t e i s not immut-a b l e : changes i n government may augur changes i n l e v e l s of s o c i a l p r o v i s i o n , ergo, changes i n s o c i a l w e l l - b e i n g . P o l i -t i c a l and economic changes i n B r i t i s h Columbia over the past ten years have brought the Province's s o c i a l s e r v i c e s net-work from a p i n n a c l e i n the 1970's, when the P r o v i n c i a l wel-f a r e system was regarded by many as the most i n n o v a t i v e and p r o g r e s s i v e i n North America (Clague et a l , 1984; Hepworth, 1975, v o l . 7), to a c r i t i c a l p o i n t i n the 1980's where so-c i a l p o l i c y i n B.C. has been p o r t r a y e d as the most r e g r e s -s i v e i n the country (BCGEU, 1985; Magnussen e t a l , 1984; Redish, 1984; Marchak, 1984). Since 1975, the Province of B r i t i s h Columbia has been under the continuous l e a d e r s h i p of Premier W i l l i a m Bennett and the S o c i a l C r e d i t Party, d u r i n g which time changes i n the o r i e n t a t i o n of s o c i a l p o l i c y and the s t r u c t u r e of s e r -v i c e d e l i v e r y have had a s i g n i f i c a n t e f f e c t on programs and c l i e n t s . T h i s t h e s i s w i l l not examine developments i n s o c i a l s e r v i c e s p o l i c y over the e n t i r e p e r i o d from 1975 to 1985; t h i s has been done elsewhere and to a degree t h a t cannot be 5 a d e q u a t e l y r e p r o d u c e d h e r e (see C l a g u e e t a l , 19 8 4 ) . I n s t e a d , t h i s t h e s i s w i l l c o n c e n t r a t e on s o c i a l p o l i c y c h a n -ges t a k i n g p l a c e i n t h e p e r i o d f r o m 1983 t o 1985. I t i s t h e p u r p o s e o f t h i s t h e s i s t o o f f e r an a n a l y s i s and c r i t i q u e o f s o c i a l p o l i c y i n B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a s i n c e 1983. I t i s p o s i t e d t h a t t h e o r i e n t a t i o n o f s o c i a l p o l i c y i n B.C. i s a r e f l e c t i o n o f s i m i l a r p o l i c y c h o i c e s a d o p t e d i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and i n t h e U n i t e d Kingdom. I t w i l l be a r g u e d t h a t , as i n t h e U.S. and t h e U.K., t h e a r t i c u l a t i o n o f s o c i a l p o l i c y i n B.C. e x p r e s s e s a n e o - c o n s e r v a t i v e b i a s w h i c h i s a n t i - c o l l e c t i v i s t and a n t i - w e l f a r e - s t a t i s t i n p h i -l o s o p h i c a l o u t l o o k . C u t b a c k s i n s o c i a l s e r v i c e s i n t h e U.S. and t h e U.K. have r e s u l t e d i n g r e a t e r h a r d s h i p f o r u s e r s o f s e r v i c e s w h i l e t h e n e t s a v i n g s o f r e s t r a i n t may w e l l be o f f -s e t by h i d d e n o r d e f e r r e d c o s t s . T h i s t h e s i s w i l l demon-s t r a t e t h a t t h e e f f e c t s upon t h e community o f t h e a p p l i c a -t i o n o f n e o - c o n s e r v a t i v e s o c i a l p h i l o s o p h i e s has e v o k e d t h e same p o t e n t i a l l y d e b i l i t a t i n g e f f e c t s i n B.C. t h a t have been documented e l s w h e r e . As i t w o u l d be an enormous u n d e r t a k i n g t o p r o d u c e a c o m p r e h e n s i v e r e v i e w o f B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a ' s s o c i a l w e l f a r e s y s t e m t h i s t h e s i s w i l l p r e s e n t a d e t a i l e d e x a m i n a t i o n o f o n l y one component o f t h e t o t a l s e r v i c e n e t w o r k - t h e v o l u n -t a r y s e c t o r . I n t h e m i x e d economy o f s o c i a l s e r v i c e s , g o v e r n m e n t s a r e t h e p r i m a r y a g e n t o f f u n d i n g w h i l e s e r v i c e d e l i v e r y i n v o l v e s a c o m b i n a t i o n o f government and p r i v a t e 6 s e c t o r a u s p i c e s . The F e d e r a l and P r o v i n c i a l governments are r e s p o n s i b l e f o r income s e c u r i t y programs or other u n i v e r s a l s e r v i c e s i n B r i t i s h Columbia, while the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r some s e l e c t i v e programs i s shared by non-governmental agen-c i e s . The n o t - f o r - p r o f i t , or v o l u n t a r y s e c t o r i n p a r t i c u l a r i s a s i g n i f i c a n t component i n the d e l i v e r y of p e r s o n a l s o c i a l s e r v i c e s . At v a r y i n g times i n d i f f e r e n t j u r i s d i c -t i o n s , the v o l u n t a r y s e c t o r has undergone a s h i f t from an autonomous p r o v i d e r of c h a r i t a b l e r e l i e f t o the r o l e of an adjunct t o publicly-mandated s o c i a l s e r v i c e s . The expansion of the we l f a r e State has o f t e n l e d to the i n c o r p o r a t i o n of non-governmental agencies as almost an ex t e n s i o n of p u b l i c auspice, e i t h e r through r e g u l a t i o n , t i e d funding, o r, i n some cases, o u t r i g h t takeover. As a f o c a l p o i n t f o r an a n a l y s i s of the s o c i a l s e r v i c e s network, the v o l u n t a r y s e c t o r p r o v i d e s a u s e f u l vantage from which t o d i s c e r n p a t t e r n s i n p o l i c y and p o l i c y outcomes. U n l i k e the more b u r e a u c r a t i s e d and obscured realm of p u b l i c s o c i a l s e r -v i c e agencies, v o l u n t a r y s e c t o r agencies and the s e r v i c e s they p r o v i d e are r e l a t i v e l y a c c e s s i b l e f o r study. A l s o , as an i n t e g r a l component of the s t a t u t o r y p r o v i s i o n of p e r s o n a l s o c i a l s e r v i c e s ( s e r v i c e s which are d i s t i n c t from, but o f t e n complementary and supplementary t o , other s o c i a l s e r v i c e s such as income maintenance, h e a l t h , housing, and education -Hepworth, 1975, p. 24) p a r t i c i p a n t s i n the v o l u n t a r y s e c t o r through t h e i r r e l a t i o n s with both s t a t u t o r y agencies and 7 c l i e n t s often possess insights into the p o l i c y environment which are invaluable to the researcher. Voluntary sector agencies i n B r i t i s h Columbia are funded primarily by the p r o v i n c i a l government. In the wake of p o l i c i e s aimed at f i s c a l r e s t r a i n t , however, the v i a b i -l i t y of many non-governmental agencies and, consequently, the well-being of the persons they serve, has been placed i n some jeopardy. Non-profit agencies experience stress not only as a r e s u l t of di r e c t cuts i n t h e i r funding base - cut-backs i n and rationing of public sector services have also led to greater demands upon non-profit agencies for t h e i r services. Among the additional e f f e c t s of r e s t r a i n t experi-enced by agencies are growths i n caseloads, increased rationing of services, higher s t a f f turn-overs and a less stable economic environment i n which to function. 1.1 THE WELFARE STATE IN CRISIS? THE EMERGENCE OF THE NEO-CONSERVATIVE CHALLENGE IN THE UNITED STATES, THE UNITED KINGDOM AND BRITISH COLUMBIA The 1980's may aptly be characterised as an era of challenge and change i n the area of s o c i a l and economic p o l i c y . The modern welfare State - confronted with economic c r i s e s and s t i l l grappling with the p o l i t i c a l r e a l i t i e s of pluralism - has been confronted with what some p o l i t i c a l ob-servers have termed a "new r e a l i t y . " This new r e a l i t y - the emergence of an invigorated economic conservatism and the 8 p o l a r i s a t i o n o f p o l i t i c a l and i n t e l l e c t u a l f a i t h r e g a r d i n g t h e f u t u r e o f t h e w e l f a r e S t a t e - has been e x p r e s s e d i n Canada, t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and B r i t a i n (and e l s e w h e r e ) as an a t t e m p t t o r e d e f i n e government mandates f o r s o c i a l p r o v i -s i o n . R e g a r d e d by many a n a l y s t s as a r e p u d i a t i o n o f t h e " s o c i a l c o n t r a c t " (Gough, 1982; Adams and Freeman, 1982) t h e s o c i a l and e c o n o m i c p o l i c i e s o f n a t i o n a l and s u b n a t i o n a l g o v e r n m e n t s have s o u g h t t o r e v e r s e e c o n o m i c d e c l i n e t h r o u g h t h e embrace o f a t r a d i t i o n a l t e n e t o f l i b e r a l c a p i t a l i s m : t h e b e l i e f t h a t t h e s e l f - r e g u l a t i n g f o r c e s o f t h e ma r k e t a r e a l l t h a t i s n e c e s s a r y t o e n s u r e i n d i v i d u a l (and, t h e r e f o r e , n a t i o n a l ) w e l l - b e i n g . The new r e a l i t y has been a r t i c u l a t e d t h r o u g h a s e t o f d o c t r i n e s r e f e r r e d t o by p r o p o n e n t s and c r i t i c s a l i k e as n e o - c o n s e r v a t i s m , o r t h e New R i g h t , w h i c h t r a c e t h e i r i n t e l -l e c t u a l u n d e r p i n n i n g s b a c k t o Adam S m i t h ' s "An I n q u i r y i n t o t h e N a t u r e and C a u s e s o f t h e W e a l t h o f N a t i o n s " (177 6) and D a v i d R i c a r d o ' s "On t h e P r i n c i p l e s o f P o l i t i c a l Economy and T a x a t i o n " ( 1 8 1 7 ) . T h e s e two a u t h o r s , r e - i n t e r p r e t e d i n t h e c o n t e x t o f t h e modern c a p i t a l i s t economy, a r e o f t e n e x c o r i -a t e d o r l i o n i s e d ( d e p e n d i n g on one's p h i l o s o p h i c a l p r e d i l e c -t i o n ) as t h e p r i m a r y s o u r c e s o f i n s p i r a t i o n f o r t h e v a r i o u s p r o p o n e n t s o f t h e New R i g h t . E m b r a c i n g a f u n d a m e n t a l b e l i e f i n t h e s u s t a i n i n g and s e l f - r e g u l a t i n g powers o f a m a r k e t un-f e t t e r e d by S t a t e o r b u r e a u c r a t i c c o n t r o l , t h e modern h e i r s o f S m i t h and R i c a r d o - m o n e t a r i s t s and s u p p l y - s i d e t h e o r i s t s 9 - have witnessed the ascension of governments who are favourably disposed towards t h e i r views. While monetarists and supply-siders together advocate p o l i c i e s which favour the dismantling of many aspects of the State's bureaucratic superstructure ( p a r t i c u l a r l y those r e l a t i n g to universal s o c i a l welfare programs), and although both may be termed neo-conservative or New Right i n orienta-t i o n , they are not one and the same. While monetarist i n -fluences focus on the manipulation of in t e r e s t rates and money supply l i m i t a t i o n s , the supply-side influence focusses on putting additional funds into the hands of private inves-tors and entrepreneurs through the taxation system (Social Planning Council of Metropolitan Toronto, 1985, p. 54). S t i l l , even though the neo-conservative doctrine i s far from a monolithic body of theory, elements of both monetarist and supply-side prescriptions have been borrowed from and fused into e c c l e c t i c hybrids which have since passed into the con-ventional economic argot as "Reaganomics" and "Thatcher-nomics." These two hybridisations of monetarist and supply--side theory, to borrow from George Orwell, comprise the "newspeak" of neo-conservatism, and, through t h e i r expres-sion i n p o l i c y , have become national doctrines. To the ex-tent that the fundaments of these doctrines are shared by the leaderships of governments other than those of President Ronald Reagan and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, 10 Reaganomics and Thatchernomics have i n s p i r e d other govern-ments t o pursue s i m i l a r c o urses. The emulation of the p o l i -c i e s of the U.S. and B r i t a i n i s not r e s t r i c t e d t o n a t i o n a l governments, f o r , as w i l l be argued i n chapter two of t h i s t h e s i s , the government of the P r o v i n c e of B r i t i s h Columbia has a p p r o p r i a t e d elements of the neo-conservative agenda i n the f o r m u l a t i o n of s o c i a l and economic p o l i c y at the sub-- n a t i o n a l l e v e l . I t w i l l be argued a l s o t h a t the e x p r e s s i o n i n s o c i a l and economic p o l i c y of the neo-conservative agenda i n v o l v e s measures to reduce government i n t e r v e n t i o n i n some spheres -p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the s o c i a l w e l f a r e f u n c t i o n s of the State -as w e l l as p a r a l l e l measures t o remove impediments to e n t r e -p r e n e u r i a l a c t i v i t y . I t i s s i g n i f i c a n t i n t h i s regard, t h a t t o v a r y i n g degrees, proponents of the New Right r e g a r d the w e l f a r e State as an impediment t o economic p r o s p e r i t y and growth. For government l e a d e r s i n B r i t a i n , the United States and B r i t i s h Columbia, the w e l f a r e S t a t e , i t s b u r e a u c r a c i e s , and the consumers of i t s s e r v i c e s , r e p r e s e n t an economic burden which cannot be r e c o n c i l e d with the needs of the economy. As a consequence, the new r e a l i t y - the awakening of economic exigency - demands the r e j e c t i o n of c o l l e c t -i v i s t i c i d e a l s of u n v e r s a l i s m i n s o c i a l p r o v i s i o n and an end t o the " t o t a l i t a r i a n " p e r v a s i v e n e s s of the w e l f a r e State as l u x u r i e s t h a t s o c i e t y cannot p r e s e n t l y a f f o r d (Booth, 1982, p. 210). 11 The w e l f a r e State encompasses a v a r i e t y of forms and permutations. While i t i s i n a p p r o p r i a t e here t o engage i n a l e n g t h y d i s c u s s i o n of the e v o l u t i o n and form of the w e l f a r e S t a t e , i t should be noted t h a t the p r o v i s i o n of s o c i a l wel-f a r e by the State i s a f a i r l y r e c e n t phenomenon, beginning with the German s o c i a l insurance l e g i s l a t i o n of the 1880's (Therborn, 1984, p. 7; B l a i n , 1984, p. 63). The major i n s t i -t u t i o n s of the w e l f a r e State have evolved unevenly and unea-s i l y i n the advanced c a p i t a l i s t n a t i o n s and e x i s t as a c o r -pus of s t a t u t o r y p r o t e c t i o n s and l e g a l e n t i t l e m e n t s with the o s t e n s i b l e aim of c r e a t i n g s o c i a l w e l l - b e i n g . In Canada, the w e l f a r e State i s a more re c e n t development, beginning i n 1909 i n Quebec with a law on workmen's compensation. The expansion of w e l f a r e State i n s t i t u t i o n s at the n a t i o n a l l e v e l , however, d i d not s e r i o u s l y get under way u n t i l the e s t a b l i s h m e n t of unemployment insurance i n 1940, and i t was not u n t i l 1961 and 1971 r e s p e c t i v e l y t h a t both h o s p i t a l and h e a l t h insurance had been i n s t i t u t e d across the country ( B l a i n , 1984, p. 63). The w e l f a r e State i n Canada has a patchwork q u a l i t y (Djao, 1983): i t has evolved g r a d u a l l y and i n c r e m e n t a l l y . T h i s has r e s u l t e d i n a complex web of laws and i n s t i t u t i o n s which o f t e n admits of redundancy, c o n t r a d i c t i o n and a l a c k of comprehensiveness. To t h i s end, while the Canadian wel-f a r e State has been supported i n p r i n c i p l e by most f e d e r a l 12 or p r o v i n c i a l governments s i n c e 1945, i n f a c t , i t has yet t o be c o n s o l i d a t e d . ^ I t comes as some s u r p r i s e t h a t the w e l f a r e State, o n l y one hundred and three years o l d (only f i f t y years o l d i n Canada) should so soon have reached a p o i n t of c r i s i s . However, as pointed-out by Therborn: The c u r r e n t c r i s i s of the w e l f a r e s t a t e i s something t h a t has broken out, not because of g e r o n t o l o g i c a l a i l m e n t s , but r i g h t a f t e r a q u i e t but h i s t o r i c a l l y unique a c c e l e r a t i o n of w e l f a r e s t a t e developments throughout the Western world. The c r i s i s i s one of m a t u r i t y and r i g o u r , not of o l d age. (Therborn, 1984, pp. 35-36). The present c r i s i s of the w e l f a r e State i s c h a r a c t e r i s e d by B l a i n (1984) as "double-headed," being both f i n a n c i a l and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e i n nature. The f i n a n c i a l c r i s i s i s l i n k e d t o the s l u g g i s h n e s s of economic growth i n which the State i s f a c e d with d i m i n i s h e d revenues and i n c r e a s e s i n s o c i a l wel-f a r e disbursements. A second reason f o r the f i n a n c i a l c r i s i s i s s a i d t o be the " r e v o l t of the taxpayer," expressed as the u n w i l l i n g n e s s of c i t i z e n s t o f i n a n c e expenditures f o r s o c i a l w e l f a r e ( B l a i n , 1984, pp. 64-65). There i s not the time, nor the space t o permit an e x t e n s i v e d i s c u s s i o n of the Canadian w e l f a r e S t a t e : t h i s has been t r e a t e d f u l l y by Armitage (1975, Djao (1983), and Guest (1982) - i t i s t o these authors t h a t the i n t e r e s t e d reader should t u r n . 13 A second source of c r i s i s , which B l a i n l i n k s t o a " c r i s i s of c o n f i d e n c e , " i s a d m i n i s t r a t i v e . A d m i n i s t r a t i v e c r i s i s with r e s p e c t t o the welfar e State bears on two p o i n t s : i t s e f f e c t i v e n e s s (does i t achieve i t s goals?) and i t s e f f i c i e n c y (at what c o s t are goals achieved?) ( B l a i n , 1984, p. 65). In terms of e f f e c t i v e n e s s , c r i t i c s of the wel-f a r e State remark on the f a i l u r e of the State t o achieve e q u i t y , e q u a l i t y of o p p o r t u n i t y and s e c u r i t y . They p o i n t t o the p o l i t i c a l marketplace of s o c i a l s e r v i c e s , c l a i m i n g t h a t o r g a n i s e d l o b b i e s or pressure groups o b v i a t e the e g a l i t a r i a n p r i n c i p l e s o s t e n s i b l y embodied i n the w e l f a r e S t a t e . Fur-thermore, i t i s argued t h a t the economic i n t e r v e n t i o n i s m employed by the we l f a r e State may run counter t o i t s r e d i s -t r i b u t i v e g o als ( B l a i n , 1984, pp. 65-66). With regards t o e f f i c i e n c y , there are those who argue t h a t the c o s t s of s e r -v i c e s p r o v i d e d by the State are e x c e s s i v e , and f a r beyond what s i m i l a r s e r v i c e s would c o s t i f p r o v i d e d by p r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e ( B l a i n , 1984, p. 66). In i t s p a i n f u l adolescence the w e l f a r e State has come under a t t a c k from a l l s i d e s ; ac-c o r d i n g t o B l a i n , i t has been c r i t i c i s e d by the r a d i c a l l e f t as "the c r u t c h of c a p i t a l i s m " ( f o r not going f a r enough) and by the r a d i c a l r i g h t as "the e r s a t z of s o c i a l i s m " (presumab-l y f o r going too f a r ) ( B l a i n , 1984, pp. 66-67). The s t r o n g e s t c h a l l e n g e s t o the we l f a r e State have come from the governments of the United S t a t e s and Great B r i t a i n . Although pressures t o c o n s t r a i n both the ext e n s i o n and the expenditures of s o c i a l w e l f a r e i n s t i t u t i o n s have 14 been a continuous and s i g n i f i c a n t component of the p o l i t i c a l economy of the w e l f a r e State, t h e r e i s g e n e r a l agreement am-ong a n a l y s t s from a wide v a r i e t y of f i e l d s t h a t Reaganomics and Thatchernomics r e p r e s e n t the most vig o r o u s a s s a u l t on the w e l f a r e State s i n c e i t s i n c e p t i o n . In B r i t a i n , Thatchernomics has emphasised monetarist s t r a t e g i e s i n an e f f o r t t o produce a s o c i a l and economic c l i m a t e which i s fa v o u r a b l e t o c a p i t a l i s t e n t e r p r i s e (Adams & Freeman, 1982, pp. 71-72; Gough, 1982, pp. 49-50). A t -tempts i n B r i t a i n t o r e s t r u c t u r e the w e l f a r e State r e p r e s e n t a r e t u r n t o some of the precepts of ni n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y l i b e r a l i s m : a l i m i t e d r o l e f o r government; an emphasis on the r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of the i n d i v i d u a l , the f a m i l y , and the l o c a l community, and; a r e v e r s a l of the c o l l e c t i v e s o c i a l p r o v i s i o n of the postwar e r a through c u t s i n the s o c i a l wage (Gough, 1982, pp. 50-52). In the Un i t e d S t a t e s , Reaganomics has emphasised s u p p l y - s i d e approaches t o r o l l - b a c k the growth of s o c i a l s e r v i c e expenditures (although elements of both monetarist and s u p p l y - s i d e approaches have been i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o the n a t i o n a l s t r a t e g i e s of both governments). While the American w e l f a r e State has never had such a u n i v e r s a l i s t i c c h a r a c t e r as the B r i t i s h , the r e d u c t i o n and the r e s t r u c t u r i n g of pub-l i c spending i s p e r c e i v e d as a necessary t o n i c f o r the labour market and investment (Adams & Freeman, 1982, pp. 74--75). In both these n a t i o n s the d e v o l u t i o n and the r e d e f i n i -15 t i o n of the mandates f o r s o c i a l p r o v i s i o n have been accompa-n i e d by programmatic cuts i n s o c i a l s e r v i c e s . At the same time, t h e r e have o c c u r r e d r e d e f i n i t i o n s of e l i g i b i l i t y f o r s o c i a l s e r v i c e s p r o v i d e d by the S t a t e . R e d e f i n i t i o n s of e l i g i b i l i t y have been accompanied by changes i n the l e v e l of f e d e r a l support f o r programs mandated through lower l e v e l s of government and v o l u n t a r y s e c t o r s . I t has been i n f e r r e d by many of the authors t o be reviewed i n t h i s t h e s i s t h a t the s c a l e of these changes augurs a r e t u r n t o r e s i d u a l i s m -meaning t h a t the State may tend t o serve o n l y those who cannot be helped by f a m i l i e s , the church or c h a r i t a b l e o r g a n i s a t i o n s . In the neo-conservative p o l i c i e s of the U.S. and the U.K., the primacy of the p r i v a t e marketplace i s a s s e r t e d not only f o r e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l a c t i v i t i e s , but a l s o f o r the p r o v i -s i o n of s o c i a l s e r v i c e s ( A u s t i n , 1983, p. 357). To t h i s ex-t e n t the d o c t r i n e s of Reaganomics and Thatchernomics advo-cate the r e p r i v a t i s a t i o n of the we l f a r e State through a much g r e a t e r emphasis on the non-governmental p r o v i s i o n of s o c i a l s e r v i c e s . In both the U.S. and the U.K., an i n c r e a s e d r e l i -ance on the v o l u n t a r y s e c t o r f o r the p r o v i s i o n of p e r s o n a l s o c i a l s e r v i c e s has been accompanied by reduced l e v e l s of funding f o r t h i s s e c t o r , i n s p i t e of the f a c t t h a t the pre -ponderance of funding f o r v o l u n t a r i s t i c s o c i a l s e r v i c e agen-c i e s comes from n a t i o n a l , s t a t e and l o c a l governments. C r i s e s of the w e l f a r e S t a t e , t h e r e f o r e , have i n rec e n t years c o n s t i t u t e d c r i s e s f o r the v o l u n t a r y s e c t o r and i t s c l i e n t s . 16 The tough p o l i c i e s enacted by P r e s i d e n t Reagan and Prime M i n i s t e r Thatcher i n the 1980's were, of course, a c o n t i n u a t i o n of attempts at r e s t r a i n t begun by p r e v i o u s ad-m i n i s t r a t i o n s (Gough, 1982; Adams & Freeman, 1982; A u s t i n , 19 83). They were, however, unprecedented i n t h e i r v i g o u r and i n t e n t , and the b o l d promises of the New Right encouraged governments i n other r e g i o n s to f o l l o w s u i t . Although the F e d e r a l Government i n Canada had been attempting f o r some time t o c o n t r o l s o c i a l expenditures (through the d e v o l u t i o n of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o the P r o v i n c e s , through monetarist p o l i -c i e s aimed at c o n t r o l l i n g i n t e r e s t r a t e s and the a v a i l a b i l i t y of c a p i t a l , as w e l l as through the use of r a -t i o n i n g mechanisms such as means t e s t i n g ) " i t remained osten-s i b l y committed t o the p r i n c i p l e of u n i v e r s a l i s m , r e g i o n a l 2 e q u i t y and some measure of r e d i s t r i b u t i v e j u s t i c e . In Canada the c l e a r e s t example of the neo-- c o n s e r v a t i v e c h a l l e n g e to the w e l f a r e State o c c u r r e d not w i t h i n the F e d e r a l government, but at the p r o v i n c i a l l e v e l with the government of Premier W i l l i a m Bennett. In 1983 the 'This i s i n p a r t because of the p a r t i c u l a r r e l a t i o n s h i p between the Canadian F e d e r a l State and the governments of i t s c o n s t i t u e n t r e g i o n s as d e f i n e d i n the B r i t i s h North America Act of 1867. (For a more complete d i s c u s s i o n see Hepworth, 197 5, volume 9; Armitage, 197 5, and; Guest, 1982.) A l s o see the C o n s t i t u t i o n Act (1982), Part I I I ( S e c t i o n 36) which commits f e d e r a l and p r o v i n c i a l governments t o p r o v i d e equal o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r the w e l l - b e i n g of Canadians; reduce d i s p a r i t i e s ; and promote comparable l e v e l s of p u b l i c s e r v i c e . 17 government of B r i t i s h Columbia capped three years of i n c r e -mental c u t s i n s o c i a l s e r v i c e s with a r a d i c a l l e g i s l a t i v e program aimed at r e d u c i n g the s i z e of government and p r o v i d i n g a f a v o u r a b l e c l i m a t e f o r c a p i t a l investment. S i g n i f i c a n t components of these p o l i c y agenda were: the containment of s o c i a l s e r v i c e expenditure; the e l i m i n a t i o n of some s o c i a l s e r v i c e programs; r e s t r i c t i o n s on the e l i g i b i l i t y f o r s e r v i c e , and; an i n c r e a s e d r e l i a n c e on l o c a l , i n f o r m a l and v o l u n t a r y agents f o r the d e l i v e r y of p e r s o n a l s e r v i c e s . That such i n i t i a t i v e s s hould have been undertaken at the p r o v i n c i a l l e v e l i s not s u r p r i s i n g (a f u l l e r accounting of t h i s l e g i s l a t i o n i s given i n chapter two): i n Canada, r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r s o c i a l s e r v i c e p o l i c y l i e s p r i m a r i l y w i t h i n p r o v i n c i a l j u r s i d i c t i o n , although revenue-sharing by the F e d e r a l government has p l a y e d a p a r t i n determining the d i r e c t i o n of p o l i c i e s i n s o c i a l s e c u r i t y , h e a l t h , and per-s o n a l s o c i a l s e r v i c e s (Hepworth, 1975, v o l . 9, p. 9). S t i l l , under the Canadian C o n s t i t u t i o n , the p r o v i n c e s r e t a i n c o n s i -d e rable autonomy from the F e d e r a l government i n the s e t t i n g of s o c i a l p o l i c y w i t h i n the p r o v i n c i a l l e g i s l a t i v e sphere. D i f f e r i n g f i s c a l and j u r i s d i c t i o n a l c a p a b i l i t i e s between Ottawa and the p r o v i n c e s have meant t h a t B r i t i s h Columbia's approach t o economic management has tended t o emphasise the s u p p l y - s i d e r o u t e , as opposed t o a m o n e t a r i s t approach. S t i l l , t h e r e are elements, i d e o l o g i c a l and t e c h n i c a l , 18 of both Reaganomics and Thatchernomics expressed i n B r i t i s h Columbia's s o c i a l and economic p o l i c y . From the U.S., B r i -t i s h Columbia has i n c o r p o r a t e d tax i n c e n t i v e s f o r bu s i n e s s ; from the U.K., the Premier has sought t o emulate what Gough r e f e r s t o as the " a u t h o r i t a r i a n populism" of Prime M i n i s t e r Thatcher (Gough, 1982, pp. 49-50). On the i n s p i r a t i o n of both, the B r i t i s h Columbia government has endeavoured t o downsize government and t o e f f e c t a d e v o l u t i o n of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r s o c i a l p r o v i s i o n . From the d o c t r i n e s of the New Right a l s o , the government of B r i t i s h Columbia has a p p r o p r i a t e d the assumption t h a t i n d i v i d u a l s , f a m i l i e s and the v o l u n t a r y s e c t o r can and must bear a g r e a t e r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the meeting of s o c i a l needs. I t i s p r e c i s e l y t h i s l a t t e r assumption t h a t t h i s t h e s i s intends t o address. 1.2 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS T h i s i n t r o d u c t o r y chapter has attempted t o provide an overview of the broader i s s u e s surrounding the performance and v i a b i l i t y of the v o l u n t a r y s e c t o r i n B r i t i s h Columbia. I t has been presumed t h a t the reader w i l l have some know-ledge of the s t r u c t u r e and p r o v i s i o n of s o c i a l w e l f a r e i n Canada: the f o r e g o i n g d i s c u s s i o n i s intended t o p r o v i d e the context f o r the ensuing a n a l y s i s of the v o l u n t a r y s e c t o r under r e s t r a i n t i n B.C. 19 T h i s t h e s i s w i l l be developed through seven chapters, the remainder of which are as f o l l o w s : Chapter two, the P o l i t i c a l Context and the Hermeneutics of R e s t r a i n t : t h i s chapter begins with a d i s c u s s i o n of the on-t o l o g y of the s u p p l y - s i d e so t h a t the reader may b e t t e r ap-p r e c i a t e the p h i l o s o p h i c a l underpinnings of B r i t i s h Colum-b i a ' s r e s t r a i n t l e g i s l a t i o n . T h i s i s f o l l o w e d by a summary of the b a s i c components of the " r e s t r a i n t package" i n t r o -duced by the S o c i a l C r e d i t government i n 1983. While t h i s summary of the government's l e g i s l a t i v e package goes beyond those aspects of p o l i c y d i r e c t l y a f f e c t i n g the v o l u n t a r y s e c t o r , i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o f u l l y a p p r e c i a t e the r a m i f i c a -t i o n s of the "new r e a l i t y " with r e f e r e n c e t o the v o l u n t a r y s e c t o r alone. F i n a l l y , s o c i a l and economic p o l i c y i n B.C. i s d i s c u s s e d with r e f e r e n c e t o the needs of the c a p i t a l i s t ec-onomy and the o b j e c t i v e s of p u b l i c p o l i c y f o r m u l a t i o n . Chapter t h r e e , V o l u n t a r y Sector - St a t e R e l a t i o n s : Economic Nature and F u n c t i o n o f the V o l u n t a r y S e c t o r : t h i s chapter o f f e r s a d e t a i l e d a n a l y s i s of the v o l u n t a r y s e c t o r , i t s evo-l u t i o n and c o n t r i b u t i o n ; the v a r i e t y of forms and f u n c t i o n s i t may assume, and; the r e l a t i o n s h i p of v o l u n t a r y s e c t o r agencies t o government and p u b l i c l y p r o v i d e d s e r v i c e s . 20 Chapter f o u r , The E f f e c t s of F i s c a l R e s t r a i n t Upon V o l u n t a r y S e c t o r S e r v i c e s - the U.S. Experience: chapter f o u r examines the e f f e c t s of cutbacks i n s o c i a l s e r v i c e s upon the v o l u n t a -r y s e c t o r and c l i e n t s who use v o l u n t a r y s e c t o r and p u b l i c s e c t o r s e r v i c e s . These impacts are d i s c u s s e d with r e f e r e n c e t o a number of s t u d i e s conducted i n the United S t a t e s . A l s o examined i n t h i s chapter are i s s u e s surrounding the govern-ment purchase of s e r v i c e s from the v o l u n t a r y s e c t o r and pro-blems of m o n i t o r i n g standards of s e r v i c e d e l i v e r y . Chapter f i v e , R e s t r a i n t and the V o l u n t a r y S e c t o r i n B.C. -F i n d i n g s From Three Communities: t h i s chapter summarises the f i n d i n g s of surveys of the e f f e c t s of r e s t r a i n t on v o l u n t a r y s e c t o r agencies and t h e i r c l i e n t s i n three Lower Mainland communities. These f i n d i n g s are s e t a g a i n s t a d i s c u s s i o n of s o c i a l and economic i n d i c a t o r s f o r B.C. which are suggestive of the p e r v a s i v e n e s s of s t r e s s i n the community. Chapter s i x , The V o l u n t a r y Sector i n B r i t i s h Columbia - The E f f e c t s of R e s t r a i n t and Agency Responses: t h i s chapter p r e s e n t s the f i n d i n g s of a province-wide survey of 179 n o n - p r o f i t , v o l u n t a r i s t i c agencies p r o v i d i n g p e r s o n a l s o c i a l s e r v i c e s i n B r i t i s h Columbia. T h i s q u e s t i o n n a i r e , conducted by the author i n January 1985 sought to i d e n t i f y parameters of agency s t r u c t u r e r e l a t e d t o s e r v i c e d e l i v e r y ; sources of i n c r e a s e or decrease i n agency funding; changes i n the s o c i -21 a l services environment experienced by the voluntary sector, and; the perceptions of agency directors of the s o c i a l p o l i -cy environment i n B.C. as well as t h e i r assessments of s t r a -tegies for agency s u r v i v a l . Chapter seven, Social Policy, Social Change and the Future of Voluntarism in B.C.: t h i s , the concluding chapter returns to f i r s t p r i n c i p l e s , established i n chapters one and two. It encapsulates the findings of preceding chapters, offers a prognosis for the voluntary sector i n B r i t i s h Columbia and a commentary on the d i r e c t i o n of s o c i a l p o l i c y i n Canada. 22 CHAPTER II THE POLITICAL CONTEXT AND THE HERMENEUTICS OF RESTRAINT What has been happening i n B r i t i s h Columbia under the S o c i a l C r e d i t government i s an example of what many obser-v e r s have termed the " c r i s i s of the Welfare S t a t e " (Stoez, 1981, G l e n n e r s t e r , 1983, Mishra, 1984). Neo-conservative c h a l l e n g e s t o the we l f a r e S t a t e , i m p e l l e d by economic s t r e s s n a t i o n a l l y and i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y , have been a t t r i b u t e d by some t o " c r i s e s of c a p i t a l i s m " r e s u l t i n g from the i n a b i l i t y of the State t o manage the c o n t r a d i c t i o n s of the c a p i t a l i s t mode of p r o d u c t i o n (Alexander, 1982, Dear & C l a r k , 1981, Peet, 1983, Soja e t a l , 1983). These c h a l l e n g e s have a r i s e n , i n B r i t i s h Columbia as elsewhere, i n response t o a growing divergence of government r e c e i p t s and o u t l a y s which t h r e a t e n t o make the 1980's an e r a of huge n a t i o n a l d e f i c i t s (Tar-schys, 1983, pp. 206-207, Wi t t r o c k , 1983: 195). F i s c a l c r i s i s has been accompanied by a weakening of i d e o l o g i c a l support f o r the Keynesian w e l f a r e State and waning p u b l i c c o n f i d e n c e i n the p o l i t i c a l system (Tarschys, 1983, p.. 208). The b a c k l a s h a g a i n s t the we l f a r e State r e f l e c t s a changing p h i l o s o p h y towards some s o c i a l programs and l e v e l s of government i n t e r v e n t i o n i n g e n e r a l . P u b l i c f r u s t r a t i o n over reduced economic o p p o r t u n i t y and s o c i a l u n c e r t a i n t y has been harnessed p o l i t i c a l l y i n t o a wave of v o t e r support f o r government cutbacks (Jones, 1984, p. 49). T h i s f r u s t r a t i o n 23 has given a new p o l i t i c a l and p o p u l i s t e x p r e s s i o n to the t e n s i o n s t h a t p r e v a i l between t r a d i t i o n a l c o n s t r u c t s of Key-n e s i a n i n t e r v e n t i o n and the axioms of the free-market econo-my. The p r e s e n t c h a l l e n g e of s o c i a l and economic p o l i c y i s t o c o n t r o l unemployment and i t s e f f e c t s and t o s t i m u l a t e economic growth. To the extent t h a t the w e l f a r e State has been v i l l i f i e d f o r i t s p r e o c c u p a t i o n with the former, the n e o - c o n s e r v a t i v e s have been c h a s t i s e d f o r t h e i r obsession with the l a t t e r . The n e o - c o n s e r v a t i v e c r i t i q u e of the w e l f a r e State may be b r o a d l y d e s c r i b e d as a n t i - c o l l e c t i v i s t (George & W i l d i n g , 1976) and has emanated from monetarist (Friedman) and s u p p l y - s i d e d t h e o r i s t s ( G i l d e r , L a f f e r ) who espouse the f r e e e n t e r p r i s e e t h i c of orthodox n e o - c l a s s i c a l economics. Both the m o n e t a r i s t and the s u p p l y - s i d e view h o l d t h a t the r e g u l a t i o n of p r o d u c t i o n and d i s t r i b u t i o n i s best l e f t t o the market and t h a t , i f the market system i s f u n c t i o n i n g sa-t i s f a c t o r i l y , t h e r e i s no need f o r State i n t e r v e n t i o n (Taylor-Gooby & Dale, 1981, p. 145, p. 147). The assumption here i s t h a t the p r i v a t e - s e c t o r market w i l l respond t o i n d i -v i d u a l needs (Ross R., 19 83, p. 34) and t h a t the market f a i l s t o do so now because of the weight of government i n t e r v e n t i o n and r e g u l a t i o n . The w r i t i n g s of neo-conservative economists are s u f -f u s e d with r e f e r e n c e s to democracy, freedom, l i b e r t y and i n -d i v i d u a l i s m . Often, there i s an almost e v a n g e l i c a l tone to 24 t h e i r economic p h i l o s o p h y . George G i l d e r , a proponent of the n e o - c o n s e r v a t i v e view, w r i t e s : The source of the g i f t s of c a p i t a l i s m i s the supply-- s i d e of the economy. The problem of contemporary c a p i -t a l i s m l i e s not c h i e f l y i n a d e t e r i o r a t i o n of p h y s i c a l c a p i t a l , but i n a p e r s i s t e n t s u b v e r s i o n of the psycho-l o g i c a l means of p r o d u c t i o n - the morale and i n s p i r a -t i o n of economic man - undermining the very conscience of c a p i t a l i s m : the awareness t h a t one must g i v e i n order t o get, supply i n order t o demand ( G i l d e r , 1982, p. 15). In G i l d e r ' s view, and the view of other n e o - c l a s s i c a l econo-mic t h i n k e r s , the entrepreneur i s the key f i g u r e i n e n s u r i n g a l l gains t o be had from economic growth. Furthermore such growth w i l l f i r s t reduce and then u l t i m a t e l y e l i m i n a t e poverty - what i n e q u a l i t i e s t h a t a r i s e are the i n e v i t a b l e and t o l e r a b l e r e s u l t of s o c i a l freedom and p e r s o n a l i n i t i a -t i v e (Bosanquet, 1983, p. 11, p. 13). C e r t a i n p o l i t i c a l e x p r e s s i o n s of the w e l f a r e State, p a r t i c u l a r l y u n i v e r s a l s u f f r a g e , are viewed with grave r e s e r v a t i o n s . For n e o - c o n s e r v a t i v e s , the o n l y l e g i t i m a t e s o c i a l f o r c e i s the e x p r e s s i o n of consumer c h o i c e through the market. The p o l i t i c a l p rocess, on the other hand, permits the e x p r e s s i o n i n p o l i c y and l e g i s l a t i o n of i n t e r e s t s and b i a s e s which subvert market-place democracy. Says Bosanquet of t h i s view: S o c i e t y i s a b a t t l e ground between the f o r c e s of l i g h t working i n the longer term through the economy 25 and the f o r c e s of darkness working through the p o l i t i -c a l p r o c e s s . Choices made f r e e l y i n the economic sphere w i l l n e a r l y always be i n s o c i e t y ' s i n t e r e s t - even i f they t u r n out to be wrong they are the p r i c e of r i s k . But p o l i t i c s p r e s e n t s extreme dangers: attempts to b r i n g about improvements through conscious design however w e l l i n t e n t i o n e d w i l l almost always go wrong (Bosanquet, 19 83, p. 7). The State i s seen as being under c o n t i n u a l p r e s s u r e from the c i v i l s e r v i c e , p o l i t i c a l democracy, l e f t i s t s , t r a d e unions and other powerful l o b b i e s t o r a i s e p u b l i c expenditure t o the r u i n a t i o n of the f r e e and c o m p e t i t i v e market (Bosanquet, 1983, pp. 14-24, Burton, 1983, p. 315). E g a l i t a r i a n i s m i n the economy, says George G i l d e r , promotes greed and down-p l a y s the sources of supply (entrepreneurs) t o "favour the d i f f u s e and s t e r i l e clamor of demand" ( G i l d e r , 1983, p. 15). The "deceptive supremacy" of demand has been achieved only through our "deluded p o l i t i c s " ( G i l d e r , 1983, p. 315). Demand-orientated p o l i t i c s , a c c o r d i n g t o G i l d e r , Bur-ton, Friedman and o t h e r s , i n "the t h r a l l " of p u b l i c o p i n i o n , end i n promoting unemployment and dependency, a more r i g i d p o l i t i c a l order and a l e s s a c c e s s i b l e economy ( G i l d e r , 1983, p. 25). Of course, b e f o r e the New Right v i s i o n can be ex-p r e s s e d i n p o l i c y , i t s proponents must enter i n t o the p o l i -t i c a l p r o c e s s . However, a c c o r d i n g to G i l d e r , supply "can c r e a t e i t s own demand, even i n the p o l i t i c a l realm" ( G i l d e r , 1983, p. 15). S u c c e s s f u l l e a d e r s c r e a t e the views of t h e i r l a r g e r c o n s t i t u e n c i e s more than f o l l o w them, he says; they are engaged not i n p a s s i v e response t o p u b l i c demand, but i n 26 the a c t i v e supply and marketing of ideas ( G i l d e r , 1983, p. 15). However, having acceded t o power through the p o l i t i c a l p r o c e s s , neo-conservative governments a l s o f i n d themselves c o n s t r a i n e d by t h a t very p r o c e s s . John Burton, r e f e r r i n g t o the Thatcher experience i n the U.K., remarks on the d i f f i c u l t y of t r a n s l a t i n g p o l i t i c a l p h i l o s o p h y i n t o p o l i t i -c a l p r a c t i s e : I t i s easy to t a l k s u p p l y - s i d e economics - c u t t i n g government expenditure and t a x a t i o n , d e r e g u l a t i o n , the f r e e i n g of markets. The d i f f i c u l t y , i t appears i s i n t r y i n g t o do i t , because of powerful l o b b i e s (who) v i r u l e n t l y oppose any such moves (Burton, 1983, p. 302) . D i f f i c u l t i e s a r i s e f o r the s u p p l y - s i d e i n c o u n t r i e s or r e g i o n s c h a r a c t e r i s e d by a c i v i l s e r v i c e tenured through p u b l i c s e r v i c e unions and c o l l e c t i v e agreements, and by s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t lobby groups who favour government programs t h a t c o n f e r s u b s t a n t i a l b e n e f i t s on them (Friedman, 1984, p. 165). A c c o r d i n g t o Friedman, the "tyranny of the s t a t u s quo" m i l i t a t e s a g a i n s t c o n s e r v a t i v e change through an " i r o n t r i a n g l e " formed by "three powerful t y r a n n i e s " which are: the d i r e c t b e n e f i c i a r i e s of a law; l e g i s l a t i v e committees and t h e i r s t a f f s ; and, the bureaucracy a d m i n i s t e r i n g the law (Friedman, 1984, p. 42). The f i r s t r e f e r s t o the c o s t s of compensating v e s t e d i n t e r e s t s , the second echoes G i l d e r ' s " t h r a l l " t o p u b l i c o p i n i o n and the l a t t e r a l l u d e s t o the c e n t r a l i s a t i o n and enlargement of government (Friedman, 1984, pp. 42-51). 27 The foregoing discussion of supply-side economic philosophy, of necessity, has been rather simply drawn. The neo-conservative movement, i f i t can be c a l l e d that, i s far from monolithic and has been subject to both strident denun-c i a t i o n on the l e f t and rapturous u n c r i t i c a l praise on the r i g h t . The central tenets, however, permeate much of what i s regarded as New-Right or neo-conservative ideology. Thus, some hermeneutical understanding of the monetarist and supply-side ontology i s necessary for any conscientious ana-l y s i s of the s o c i a l and economic p o l i c i e s of governments which align themselves with the supply-side view. Not only does t h i s philosophical i n c l i n a t i o n a f f e c t the form of pol i c y , but i t affects every phase of the p o l i c y process, from d e f i n i t i o n to l e g i s l a t i o n to implementation. As has been noted above, the New Right sometimes expresses a c y n i c a l contempt for the p o l i t i c a l process and for welfare S t a t i s t s ' conceptions of p o l i t i c a l representa-t i o n . Their view of p o l i t i c a l process becomes somewhat more ambivalent, however when seeking p o l i t i c a l o f f i c e . This has been seen i n the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada and on a regional scale i n B r i t i s h Columbia, as parties and p o l i t i c i a n s engage i n appeals to and manipulations of con-cepts of freedom, democracy, and the welfare burden of government. This was no less the case when William Bennett was returned to o f f i c e for his t h i r d consecutive term as Premier of B r i t i s h Columbia on May 5, 1983. In a province 28 numbed by the experience of r e c e s s i o n , the S o c i a l C r e d i t P a r t y pursued a campaign based on the promise of " r e s t r a i n t and r e c o v e r y . " An u n c e r t a i n and apprehensive p u b l i c , a l r e a d y s t r o n g l y p o l a r i s e d between the S o c i a l C r e d i t and New Democratic P a r t i e s , was swayed by Bennett's use of the me-d i a , s l o g a n e e r i n g , and s o p h i s t i c a t e d p o l l i n g t e c h niques. The government's p l a t f o r m was based on reduced go-vernment expenditures ( i n p a r t , through measures to r e s t r a i n p u b l i c s e c t o r wages), an attempt t o c u r t a i l the d e f i c i t , and the s t i m u l a t i o n of p r i v a t e s e c t o r growth as a means t o c r e a t e employment o p p o r t u n i t i e s . A f t e r the e l e c t i o n , Premier Bennett's S o c i a l C r e d i t Party h e l d a t h i r t e e n seat m a j o r i t y with 49.7 percent of the popular vote (up 1.47 percent from 1979) compared t o the N.D.P.'s 44.9 percent (down 1.09 per-cent from 1979). The other two major p a r t i e s were v i r t u a l l y e c l i p s e d from the p r o v i n c i a l scene (Vancouver Sun, May 6, 1983). "The New R e a l i t y , " which was to become one of the c a t c h phrases of the S o c i a l C r e d i t government augured the p r o v i n c e ' s p l a n f o r "renewed p r o s p e r i t y " (Vancouver Sun, October 21, 1983). In a t e l e v i s e d address to the p r o v i n c e (October 20, 1983) Premier Bennett s e t out the government's agenda: To reach beyond our borders, f o r new investments, new i n d u s t r i e s , and new t e c h n o l o g i e s , r e q u i r e s a coor-d i n a t e d s t r a t e g y . Because we cannot spend our way out of the r e c e s s i o n , we w i l l have t o earn our way out of i t ... We must encourage r i s k - t a k i n g (Vancouver Sun, October 21, 1983). 29 The " c o o r d i n a t e d s t r a t e g y " was s e t i n t o motion almost immediately and was comprised of a program t o reduce govern-ment spending on a wide range of s o c i a l , e d u c a t i o n a l and consumer s e r v i c e s , t o reduce the number of p u b l i c s e c t o r employees by at l e a s t 25 percent, and to a b o l i s h a number of p o l i t i c a l l y s e n s i t i v e commissions. While the e l e c t o r a t e had approved the p r i n c i p l e of r e s t r a i n t , the p r o v i n c e was l a r g e l y unprepared f o r the s e v e r i t y of government "cutback" p o l i c i e s , as evidenced by the aftermath of anti-government demonstrations. On J u l y 7, 1983, the government brought down 2 6 p i e c e s of l e g i s l a t i o n along with a new budget. C h a r a c t e r -i s e d by the government as a " r e s t r a i n t package" the budget and attendant l e g i s l a t i o n had the expressed aim of accom-p l i s h i n g economic recovery through the p r o v i s i o n of an e n v i -ronment a t t r a c t i v e t o p r i v a t e i n v e s t o r s . The S o c i a l C r e d i t government, i n a P a r t y p u b l i c a t i o n e n t i t l e d "Recovery '83" (T. Segarty, MLA (Member of L e g i s l a -t i v e Assembly), 1983), p e r c e i v e s i t s e l f as responding t o the " f i e r c e c o m p e t i t i o n f o r world markets" by long-term expan-s i o n of the "window of o p p o r t u n i t y " f o r the p r o v i n c e . In t h i s same p u b l i c a t i o n , a very t e l l i n g a s s e r t i o n t y p i f i e s the neo- c o n s e r v a t i v e l e a n i n g s of the S o c i a l C r e d i t P a r t y v i s -- a - v i s the c o l l e c t i v i s t stance of the o p p o s i t i o n New Demo-c r a t i c P a r t y . Regarding the e l i m i n a t i o n of " C h i l d Abuse Teams" which operated under the auspices of the M i n i s t r y of Human Resources, t h i s " i n f o r m a t i o n " p u b l i c a t i o n says: 30 We know the N.D.P. t h r i v e s on human misery. They'd l i k e everybody t o be dependent on government because when people are dependent, they're more s u s c e p t i b l e t o t h e i r brand of f e a r t a c t i c s . (T. Segarty, 1983, p. 15) On the other s i d e of the debate, c r i t i c s of the go-vernment l a b e l l e d i t s p o l i c i e s as "revenge," c l a i m i n g t h a t the l e g i s l a t i o n was, i n p a r t , an e f f o r t t o punish p u b l i c s e c t o r unions and dismantle programs i n t r o d u c e d by the f o r -mer N.D.P. government (Vancouver Sun, October 15, 1983). Dr. Paul Tennant, P r o f e s s o r of P o l i t i c a l Science at the Univer-s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, suggested t h a t " i d e o l o g i c a l ven-geance" was a major motive behind the l e g i s l a t i v e package. Tennant r e f e r r e d t o the l e g i s l a t i o n as a " r e o r g a n i s a t i o n of p r i o r i t i e s , " g i v e n an economic r a t i o n a l e , and noted t h a t while money was being saved on programs the government does not l i k e , s i g n i f i c a n t l y more money was being d i r e c t e d i n t o programs the government does l i k e (Vancouver Sun, October 25, 1983). The r h e t o r i c a r i s i n g out of B.C.'s p o l i t i c a l t u r m o i l has not l a c k e d f o r i t s measure of v i t r i o l . S t i l l , f o r a l l the p o l e m i c a l excesses of the L e f t and Right, the t h e a t r i c s behind the debate serve t o d e f i n e the r o l e s of the v a r i o u s a c t o r s . New Democratic P a r t y MLA Gordon Hanson r e f e r r e d t o the S o c i a l C r e d i t p r o p o s a l s as " i d e o l o g i c a l p r o v o c a t i o n s " which would have damaging r e p e r c u s s i o n s f o r both the pro-31 v i n c e and those disadvantaged s e c t o r s of the p o p u l a t i o n who can l e a s t w i t h s t a n d the e f f e c t s of cutbacks i n s e r v i c e s (Vancouver Sun, October 21, 1983). P r o f e s s o r T.T. Paterson of the School of Business A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , Simon F r a s e r U n i v e r s i t y , wrote: The government has turned t o a procedure of e l i m i -n a t i n g s e v e r a l s e r v i c e s . . . t h a t would be regarded as of c o n s i d e r a b l e p u b l i c v a l u e : h e l p i n g the poor, the i n -f i r m , the u n f o r t u n a t e . That method of reducing government, " c u t t i n g out u n p r o f i t a b l e l i n e s , " i s t y p i c a l of bus i n e s s p r a c t i s e , where i t i s r i g h t l y a p p l i e d . But the p u b l i c s e r v i c e i s not a b u s i n e s s , and i t s " l i n e s " shouldn't be measured i n money terms. To t h a t extent government i s f a i l i n g i n i t s p u b l i c duty and has f a i l e d t o f o l l o w up i t s f i r s t approach on p r o d u c t i v i t y . ( L e t t e r t o the E d i t o r , Vancouver Sun, October 15, 1983). NDP Human Resources c r i t i c , Rosemary Brown, viewed the r e s t r a i n t program as a s i g n of f u r t h e r moves a g a i n s t p u b l i c s e c t o r workers i n the r e s t of Canada: My f e a r i s t h a t B.C. i s not o n l y an a b e r r a t i o n but a h i n t of t h i n g s t o come... The B.C. government i s c l e a r -l y r e a c t i o n a r y and anti-unon, a n t i - e l d e r l y , a n t i -- d i s a b l e d , anti-women and a n t i - p e o p l e i n g e n e r a l . (Vancouver Sun, October 27, 1983). F e d e r a l L i b e r a l P a r t y P r e s i d e n t , Iona Campagnola a l s o r e -garded the " p o l i t i c s of the r i g h t " with some alarm: 32 B.C. i s the p o l i t i c a l d i s t a n t e a r l y warning l i n e f o r Canada j u s t as s u r e l y as C a l i f o r n i a has been the b i r t h -i n g p l a c e f o r Reaganite extremism i n the U n i t e d S t a t e s . (Vancouver Sun, October 27, 1983). On the other s i d e , p a r t y supporters a t the S o c i a l C r e d i t annual convention i n October l a b e l l e d the persons behind "Operation S o l i d a r i t y , " a c o a l i t i o n of p u b l i c s e c t o r unions, community, labour and p o l i t i c a l groups, as "communist i n f i l -t r a t o r s " (Vancouver Sun, October 15, 1983). In the same v e i n , an address by outgoing p r e s i d e n t of the S o c i a l C r e d i t Women's A u x i l i a r y , Barbara Foxwell, regarded o p p o s i t i o n t o the government's l e g i s l a t i o n as a " b a t t l e " which, i f l o s t , " w i l l mean the d e s t r u c t i o n of democracy as we know i t . " (Vancouver Sun, October 14, 1983). The government attempted what many a n a l y s t s regarded as " l e g i s l a t i o n by exhaustion," f o r c i n g the l e g i s l a t u r e through a l l - n i g h t s i t t i n g s and i n v o k i n g " c l o s u r e " on more than 20 o c c a s i o n s , thereby r e s t r i c t i n g a l l debate on b i l l s b e f o r e the House. The s i t t i n g c u lminated i n the p h y s i c a l e j e c t i o n of the Leader of the O p p o s i t i o n on the d i r e c t i v e of the Deputy Speaker and h i s subsequent banning from the L e g i s l a t u r e f o r the remainder of the s i t t i n g . Three days f o l l o w i n g the October 28 adjournment of the House, "Operation S o l i d a r i t y " began a program of e s c a l a t i n g s t r i k e s which l a s t e d f o r two weeks - the most s e r i o u s t e s t of the P r o v i n c i a l government's l e g i t i m a c y t o date. The s t r i k e was 33 c a l l e d - o f f on November 13/ 1983 with promises by the government f o r more open c o n s u l t a t i o n on matters of p o l i c y , but the f r u i t s of those promises have not been f u l l y r e a l i s e d . Throughout the c o n f r o n t a t i o n , the government claimed a mandate from the "people" of B r i t i s h Columbia f o r the r e s -t r a i n t program, yet there were and continue t o be i n d i c a -t i o n s t h a t the e l e c t o r a t e would not have s a n c t i o n e d the se-v e r i t y of the p o l i c i e s i n t r o d u c e d . M i l t o n Friedman commented on the p u b l i c e x p r e s s i o n of d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n i n a conserva-t i v e t r a c t "Tyranny of the Status Quo": Now, Mr. Bennett c o u l d have i n t r o d u c e d these mea-sures b e f o r e the e l e c t i o n i n s t e a d of immediately t h e r e -a f t e r . Why d i d n ' t he?... Had Premier Bennettt s p e l l e d out h i s i n t e n t i o n t o cut personnel and funds before the e l e c t i o n , he would have aroused immediate and v o c a l o p p o s i t i o n from the s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t groups a f f e c t e d . . . By w a i t i n g u n t i l a f t e r the e l e c t i o n t o s p e l l out h i s program, Premier Bennettt c o u l d hope t h a t the bad e f f e c t s on the c o n c e n t r a t e d groups would d i s s i p a t e b e f o r e the next e l e c t i o n . . . (Friedman, 1984, p. 7). Friedman comments a l s o t h a t i f informed of the government's i n t e n t b e f o r e the e l e c t i o n , the " m i n o r i t i e s " s p e c i f i c a l l y a f f e c t e d would have mounted a "propaganda barrage" to ensure t h a t the m a j o r i t y were "not w e l l informed" (Friedman, 1984, p. 7). Despite such a s s e r t i o n s the e f f e c t s of r e s t r a i n t have not been as s e l e c t i v e and d i s c r e t e as Friedman would have us b e l i e v e . The i m p l i c a t i o n s of broadly-based negative e f f e c t s of cutbacks i n s o c i a l s e r v i c e s i n B.C. have been addressed 34 by s e r v i c e p r o f e s s i o n a l s (Anguish, 1983, MacDonald, 1983) and economists (Redish, 1984, Rosenbluth & Schworm, 1984), and are comparable t o s o c i a l impacts d e s c r i b e d i n other j u r i s d i c t i o n s (Doyle et a l , 1979, Abramovitz & Hopkins, 1983). C o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h community groups, l o c a l govern-ments, labour and s o c i a l s e r v i c e p r o f e s s i o n a l s was not p a r t of the B.C. government's o v e r a l l p o l i c y p r o c e s s . The Premier adopted a tough stance on h i s government's p o l i c i e s , t e l l i n g d e legates t o a S o c i a l C r e d i t annual convention: You and I d i d n ' t f i g h t so hard t o b r i n g our p o l i c i e s t o government t o be a f r a i d t o implement them (Vancouver Sun 15:10:83). The l e g i t i m a c y and r a t i o n a l i t y of the government's r e s t r a i n t program has been s e r i o u s l y q u estioned by s o c i a l w e l f a r e and labour advocates. In the face of d i s s e n t , Premier Bennettt has sought an a d v e r s a r i a l p o s i t i o n as opposed t o one of con-c i l i a t i o n i n the d e f i n i t i o n of s o c i a l and economic p o l i c y : We w i l l l i s t e n t o every B r i t i s h Columbian and l i s t e n t o t h e i r a d v i c e . . . but we w i l l never back down on the p o l i c i e s t h a t we advocate (Vancouver Sun, October 15, 1983). The i n t r a n s i g e n c e of the government i n B.C., demonstrated by i t s u n w i l l i n g n e s s or i n a b i l i t y t o manage (and thereby reduce or r e s o l v e ) c o n f l i c t with p u b l i c and p r i v a t e s e c t o r unions, 35 t e a c h e r s , d o c t o r s , and m u n i c i p a l i t i e s , r a i s e s s e r i o u s ques-t i o n s about the government's commitment t o r e p r e s e n t i n g m u l t i p l e i n t e r e s t s . A development observed i n a number of c a p i t a l i s t S t a t e s which may have r e p e r c u s s i o n s f o r r e p r e s e n -t a t i v e p o l i c y c h o i c e s i s an ongoing process of "deparliamen-t a r i a n i s a t i o n " of p u b l i c p o l i c y through the displacement of p a r l i a m e n t a r y process by a d m i n i s t r a t i v e or " c o r p o r a t i s t " decision-making (Offe, 1983, p. 234). The advantages f o r the government of such " f u n c t i o n a l " forms of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n r e s i d e s i n t h e i r i n f o r m a l , inconspicuous and non-public pro-cedures and as such, c o r p o r a t i s t arrangements work at the expense of p a r l i a m e n t and the c o m p e t i t i v e p a r t y system (Offe, 1983, p. 234). D o b e l l (1983) a t t r i b u t e s t o B r i t i s h Columbia govern-ment p o l i c y an attempt to reduce the power of the l e g i s l a -t u r e and i n c r e a s e government by r e g u l a t i o n . In so doing, the P r o v i n c e removes impediments to a c t i o n and reduces a c c e s s i -b i l i t y t o government ( D o b e l l , 1983, p. 19). A c c o r d i n g to Do-b e l l , the government has cut away the p e r c e i v e d b a r r i e r s be-tween the p o l i t i c a l d e c i s i o n and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a c t i o n with the e f f e c t t h a t the p u b l i c s e r v i c e may be more respo n s i v e t o the p o l i t i c a l w i l l of the Cabinet than to the p r o f e s s i o n a l mandate of p l a n n e r s and management personnel i n the v a r i o u s agencies ( D o b e l l , 1983, p. 20). As evidence of such a t r e n d the s i t t i n g s of the l e g i s l a t u r e have d e c l i n e d s t e a d i l y from a high of 137 days i n 1977 to j u s t 57 days i n 1984. C r i t i c s 36 have charged t h a t the government i s t r y i n g t o bypass the l e g i s l a t u r e t o s t i f l e or a v o i d c r i t i c i s m (Vancouver Sun, December 12, 84). The s o c i a l p o l i c y process i n B.C., as with other " c o r p o r a t i s t " governments, i s obscured w i t h i n the bureau-c r a c y (Offe, 1983) or o v e r s i m p l i f i e d when ana l y s e d i n p u b l i c (Gustafsson, 1983, p. 279). To r e s o r t t o p o l i c y c h o i c e s which appeal t o s i m p l i s t i c s o l u t i o n s and which do not ade-q u a t e l y address the long-range i m p l i c a t i o n s o f c u r r e n t dilemmas cannot be e a s i l y r e c o n c i l e d with the i n t e l l e c t u a l t r a d i t i o n of the p o l i c y s c i e n c e s . The economic "bottom l i n e " i n p o l i c y d e f i n i t i o n cannot, by i t s e l f , be c o n s i d e r e d a v i r t u e . Whatever the i n t e l l e c t u a l underpinnings of the New Right, the t r a d i t i o n of governance i n Canada i s s t i l l guided by the p r i n c i p l e s of u n i v e r s a l s u f f r a g e and the i d e a l of p l u r a l i s m . 2.1 RESTRAINT ECONOMICS: THE "NEW REALITY" IN B.C. The cutbacks implemented by B r i t i s h Columbia's S o c i a l C r e d i t government over the past two years comprise an example of neo-conservative i d e o l o g y expressed i n p r a c t i s e . The p r i n c i p a l agenda of s o c i a l and economic p o l i c y i n B.C. i s t o reduce c o n s t r a i n t s on p r i v a t e s e c t o r investment through tax breaks as w e l l as through r e d u c t i o n s i n 37 r e g u l a t i o n and i n t r u s i o n by government. The l a t t e r has been e x p r e s s e d a l s o as an e f f o r t t o c o n t r o l government s p e n d i n g on " n o n - p r o d u c t i v e " s e c t o r s o f t h e p u b l i c s e r v i c e and has r e s u l t e d i n r a d i c a l c h a n g e s i n t h e o v e r a l l s o c i a l s e r v i c e s n e t w o r k . T h i s has o c c u r r e d as a c o n s c i o u s e f f o r t t o r e d r e s s what t h e government a p p a r e n t l y s e e s as t h e d e b i l i t a t i n g e m p h a s i s g i v e n t o t h e demand s i d e o f t h e e q u a t i o n . L i k e g o v e r n m e n t s i n o t h e r p a r t s o f Canada, t h e U.S. and t h e U.K., B.C. i s s e e k i n g t o r e a s s e r t t h e p r i m a c y o f s u p p l y as t h e a x i a l p r i n c i p l e o f t h e ec o n o m i c and s o c i a l e n v i r o n m e n t . I n t h e v i e w o f f i s c a l l y c o n s e r v a t i v e g o v e r n m e n t s , s u c h as t h e S o c i a l C r e d i t government i n B.C., t h i s c a n n o t be a c h i e v e d t h r o u g h K e y n e s i a n demand management b u t o n l y t h r o u g h mea-s u r e s w h i c h s t i m u l a t e t h e r a t e o f o u t p u t t h u s r a i s i n g t h e r a t e o f g r o w t h i n t h e economy ( B u r t o n , 1983, p. 3 0 1 ) . I n B.C., t h e s e c o n c e r n s have t h e p o l i c y e f f e c t o f g i v i n g b u s i n e s s a f r e e r hand i n t h e b e l i e f t h a t t h e g e n e r a l w e l l - b e i n g o f t h e p r o v i n c e c a n o n l y be e n s u r e d t h r o u g h an " i n v i g o r a t e d " p r i v a t e s e c t o r . The g o v e r n m e n t ' s s o c i a l and e c o n o m i c p o l i c y i s an e c l e c t i c a s s e m b l a g e o f s u p p l y - s i d e and m o n e t a r i s t e c o n o m i c a p p r o a c h e s . The P r e m i e r and h i s C a b i n e t have been w e l l t u -t o r e d i n t h e f i e l d o f s u p p l y - s i d e e c o n o m i c s , and have c o n -s u l t e d e x t e n s i v e l y w i t h t h e F r a s e r I n s t i t u t e , a c o n s e r v a t i v e e c o n o m i c " t h i n k - t a n k . " The i d e o l o g i c a l l e a n i n g s o f t h e F r a -s e r I n s t i t u t e a r e i m p l i c i t i n t h e v i e w s o f i t s d i r e c t o r , Dr. 38 M i c h a e l Walker, who has suggested t h a t : " i f the p r i c e of being an unmarried mother was h i g h e r , t h e r e would be fewer unmarried mothers." (Vancouver Sun, December 20, 1984). The S o c i a l C r e d i t government has a l s o been a d v i s e d by monetarist M i l t o n Friedman, and the Finance M i n i s t e r r e c e n t l y c o n f e r r e d with s u p p l y - s i d e economist, Arthur B. L a f f e r (Vancouver Sun, December 12, 1984). The manner i n which p o l i c y i s d e f i n e d and a p p l i e d , however, i s not s u g g e s t i v e of a commitment to r a t i o n a l p l a n n i n g . Rather, the core of B.C.'s s o c i a l and economic p o l i c y emerges as a h y b r i d of p h i l o s o p h i e s and s e l e c t i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of i d e o l o g i c a l mentors which are then a p p l i e d l i k e a "miracle t o n i c " t o the economy. Rod D o b e l l of the I n s t i t u t e f o r Research i n t o P u b l i c P o l i c y has c r i t i c i s e d government s o c i a l and economic p o l i c y on the grounds of bad management, n o t i n g t h a t i n the absence of a comprehensive p o l i c y , p l a n n i n g s t r u c t u r e or c o n s u l t a -t i v e p r o c e s s , p a r t i c i p a t o r y and c o - o p e r a t i v e p l a n n i n g of o r g a n i s a t i o n a l changes has been o b v i a t e d ( D o b e l l , 1983, p. 15) : In t h e i r haste t o get r e s u l t s , those r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h i s program undercut any b a s i s f o r c o - o p e r a t i v e emplo-yee involvement... they have destroyed the p r e c o n d i -t i o n s f o r any e f f e c t i v e o r g a n i s a t i o n a l change or pro-d u c t i v i t y improvement ( D o b e l l , 1983, p. 16). For t h a t matter, even the economic foundations of the B.C. government's r e s t r a i n t program - the o s t e n s i b l e d e s i r e t o 39 r e d u c e t h e d e f i c i t and enhance t h e g o v e r n m e n t ' s a b i l t y t o pay - when s u b j e c t e d t o e c o n o m i c s c r u t i n y have been f o u n d w a n t i n g ( K e s s e l m a n , 1984, P-84-1; R o s e n b l u t h & Schworm, 1984, 4-84-4; 1984, P-84-2; 1984, P - 8 3 - 3 ) . T h e r e i s r e a l c o n c e r n i n B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a t h a t t h e e c o n o m i c and i d e o l o g i -c a l f o u n d a t i o n s o f t h e management o f t h e economy a r e n o t s o u n d and t h a t w h a t e v e r t h e p o s i t i v e c o n s e q u e n c e s o f t h e s e p o l i c y c h o i c e s , i n s u f f i c i e n t c o n s i d e r a t i o n has been g i v e n t o t h e n e g a t i v e i m p a c t s t h a t may r e s u l t . 2.2 THE L E G I S L A T I V E PACKAGE What f o l l o w s i s a breakdown o f t h e p r i n c i p a l compo-n e n t s o f " r e s t r a i n t e c o n o m i c s " i n B.C. The c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f t h e s e c h a n g e s w i l l be d i s c u s s e d b r i e f l y as w i l l be t h e i r p o s t u l a t e d e f f e c t s . The o r d e r o f d i s c u s s i o n does n o t a t t e m p t t o r e f l e c t t h e l e v e l o f p r i o r i t y g i v e n t o t h e s e measures by g o v e r n m e n t . 1) T h e r e has been a g e n e r a l c o n s t r i c t i o n o f f u n d i n g by t h e p r o v i n c i a l government f o r n o n - p r o f i t s o c i e t i e s o f f e r i n g a b r o a d r a n g e o f p e r s o n a l human s e r v i c e s . Funds come t o non-p r o f i t a g e n c i e s i n t h e f o r m o f g r a n t s o r c o n t r a c t s p r i m a r i -l y f r o m t h e M i n i s t r y o f Human R e s o u r c e s and t o l e s s e r de-g r e e s f r o m t h e M i n i s t r i e s o f H e a l t h , L a b o u r and A t t o r n e y 40 General. A l a r g e number of n o n - p r o f i t agencies (the terms n o n - p r o f i t s o c i e t y , n o n - p r o f i t agency, non-government organ-i z a t i o n (NGO) or v o l u n t a r y s e c t o r agency can be used i n t e r -changeably i n t h i s context) date from the e a r l y 1970's when they were funded by Community Chests, the U n i t e d Way, cha-r i t y o r, i n the halcyon days of F e d e r a l programs, by OFY, LIP or CYC g r a n t s . In 1974 the then NDP p r o v i n c i a l govern-ment attemped t o i n t e g r a t e v o l u n t a r y s e c t o r s e r v i c e s with p u b l i c programs while p r o v i d i n g mechanisms f o r l o c a l c o n t r o l (BCGEU 1981, Clague e t a l , 1984). The c r e a t i o n of the Com-munity Resource Boards (CRB's) and the Community Human Resources and Health Centres (CHRHC's) was a d a r i n g e x p e r i -ment i n the i n t e g r a t i o n and d e m o c r a t i s a t i o n of h e a l t h and p e r s o n a l s e r v i c e s (Clague e t a l , 1984). As such, they over-saw an expansion of p r o v i n c i a l government funding f o r non-- p r o f i t s o c i e t i e s and a p a t t e r n of i n c r e a s e d dependency upon government f o r support (United Way SPAR/SPARC J o i n t Commit-tee , 1980, #1). When S o c i a l C r e d i t formed the government i n 1975, they disbanded most of the CRB's and CHRHC's. They were s t r o n g l y d i s t r u s t f u l of the e l e c t e d boards of these bodies, f e a r i n g them to be enclaves of NDP and l e f t - w i n g elements (Clague e t a l , 1984). The government f e l t t h a t community-defined needs r e p r e s e n t e d e x c e s s i v e demands on government and i n the f u r t h e r a n c e of t h i s b e l i e f , advocacy groups and lobby-groups were denied access to p u b l i c funds (Clague e t a l , 1984). 41 The new p a t t e r n of dependency upon government f o r o p e r a t i n g or p r o j e c t funds meant t h a t n o n - p r o f i t agencies were e s p e c i a l l y v u l n e r a b l e t o cutbacks i n funding announced by the p r o v i n c i a l government i n 1983. Cutbacks of 10 and 20 percent f o r 1983 and 1984 r e s p e c t i v e l y s e r i o u s l y a f f e c t e d agencies a l r e a d y o p e r a t i n g on s h o e s t r i n g budgets. While most agencies r e c e i v e money from a number of sources i n c l u d i n g a l l t h r e e l e v e l s of government, a survey of NGO's by Willms i n 1980 found t h a t 42 percent of agencies surveyed r e c e i v e over 80 percent of t h e i r funding from the p r o v i n c i a l govern-ment (Willms, 1980). F a i l u r e t o index funds to i n f l a t i o n i n 1983 and 1984 has l e d t o an impaired v i a b i l i t y even of those agencies which d i d not experience a d i r e c t r e d u c t i o n of funding. While the M i n i s t r y of Human Resources counters t h a t the a b s o l u t e amount of d o l l a r s made a v a i l a b l e t o NGO's has i n c r e a s e d , t h e r e has a l s o been an i n c r e a s e i n the number of agencies competing f o r funds and the number of c l i e n t s served by those agencies, hence, the r e l a t i v e share of fund-i n g has d e c l i n e d (BCGEU, 1981, pp. 15-16). Retrenchment i n the p u b l i c s e c t o r has c r e a t e d a need f o r retrenchment i n the p r i v a t e s e c t o r s e r v i c e s . The a b i l i t y of s m a l l agencies t o respond t o a s h r i n k i n g p o o l of r e s o u r -ces, however, i s l i m i t e d i n many cases by a l a c k of o r g a n i -s a t i o n a l s o p h i s t i c a t i o n and by the l o s s of supports i n other p a r t s of the system. While some agencies have f o l d e d , many are f o r c e d t o l a y - o f f s t a f f , r e l y i n c r e a s i n g l y on 42 v o l u n t e e r s , c a n c e l s p e c i f i c programs and/or r a t i o n s e r v i c e s . A g r e a t e r r e l i a n c e on v o l u n t e e r s has s e r i o u s i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r s e r v i c e q u a l i t y and c o n t i n u i t y ; r a t i o n i n g may mean t h a t c l i e n t s are d e f l e c t e d t o other n o n - p r o f i t agencies, i n -a p p r o p r i a t e s e r v i c e s or even back t o the p u b l i c s e c t o r . While the p r o v i n c i a l government has asked the v o l u n t a r y sec-t o r t o f i l l the gaps c r e a t e d by retrenchment i n the p u b l i c s e c t o r , the a b i l i t y t o do so i s undermined by the simultane-ous withdrawal of government support f o r v o l u n t a r y o r g a n i s a t i o n s . There are a n t i c i p a t e d impacts f o r the p o t e n t i a l users of such s e r v i c e s as w e l l . Dependency on government support by NGO's p l a c e s s e r i o u s c o n s t r a i n t s on the t r a d i t i o n a l advo-cacy f u n c t i o n of the v o l u n t a r y s e c t o r , and as such t h i s may have consequences f o r i n n o v a t i o n i n treatment or programs. Fewer re s o u r c e s and s t a f f i n the p u b l i c s e c t o r moreover, w i l l mean i n c r e a s e d caseloads f o r p r i v a t e agencies a l r e a d y s t r u g g l i n g t o meet r i s i n g l e v e l s of need i n the community. There are f e a r s among s t a f f i n NGO's t h a t t h e r e may be i n c r e a s i n g l e v e l s of e x c l u s i o n through the "creaming" of c l i e n t s r e q u i r i n g fewer i n p u t s , l e a v i n g some stuck i n a " r e v o l v i n g door" between agencies (personal communication). Another p o s s i b l e outcome, p a r t i c u l a r l y f o r persons with s o c i a l or b e h a v i o u r a l problems or the more d i f f i c u l t - t o - h a n d l e c l i e n t s , i s t h a t they may experience more fre q u e n t h o s p i t a l i s a t i o n s i n p s y c h i a t r i c wards or even 43 be routed through the courts. Programs for persons with sp e c i a l needs, or problems for which there i s not much public awareness or sympathy might become more vulnerable to cutbacks. Of course, an e f f e c t that has potential impacts for a l l c l i e n t s i s the growing propensity for "worker burnout" i n the non-profit services. Low wages, low s t a f f morale and higher caseloads make program continuity a problem. The above represents a collage of the impacts upon the voluntary sector of government cutbacks. The impacts up-on c l i e n t s may vary from region to region, depending on the funding base of the voluntary sector and the amount of the t o t a l services provided. Much of the detailed l i t e r a t u r e enumerating the impacts upon the non-profit sector services and t h e i r c l i e n t s has come out of the United States, (Tapper, 19 82; United Way of the Bay Area, 1982; United Way of Santa Clara County, 1982; Demone & Gibelman, 1984). S t i l l , the author's empirical research i n Vancouver bears out the general trends observed i n t h i s l i t e r a t u r e . 2) Government austerity has also proceeded through chan-ges i n e l i g i b i l i t y for and reductions i n GAIN (Guaranteed Available Income for Need) benefits. The 1984/1985 provin-c i a l budget has redefined the needs of the recipients of i n -come assistance (Redish [4-8403], 1984, p. 3). Ministry of Human Resources s t a f f now have less d i s c r e t i o n to provide 44 a s s i s t a n c e t o unemployment insurance a p p l i c a n t s - newly unemployed persons w i l l be expected t o exhaust a v a i l a b l e income or a s s e t s , i n c l u d i n g a v a i l a b l e l i n e s of c r e d i t , b e f o r e being e l i g i b l e f o r a s s i s t a n c e (Vancouver Sun, March 22, 23, 1984). The M i n i s t r y has reduced support allowances p a i d t o s i n g l e persons and couples without c h i l d r e n by $25 f o r the f i r s t month of a s s i s t a n c e . For s i n g l e s and couples under the age 26, a r e d u c t i o n of $2 5 per month w i l l be deducted f o r the f i r s t e i g h t months of e l i g i b i l i t y . T h i s l a t t e r cut i s based on the M i n i s t r y ' s assumption t h a t the young are more mobile and b e t t e r able t o r e l o c a t e t o f i n d work, however, i n a p r o v i n c e e x p e r i e n c i n g high youth unemployment, r e l o c a t i o n o f f e r s l i t t l e promise. For young people i n the m e t r o p o l i t a n areas, r e l o c a t i o n t o r u r a l p a r t s of the p r o v i n c e (assuming such persons c o u l d a f f o r d t o r e l o -c a t e , having few i f any l i q u i d a s s e t s ) would probably not a v a i l them much owing t o even h i g h e r r e l a t i v e r a t e s of unem-ployment i n these r e g i o n s . Should such persons r e l o c a t e and yet s t i l l be unable t o f i n d employment, they may be c l a s s i -f i e d as " t r a n s i e n t s " and may be i n e l i g i b l e f o r a l l but emergency or h a r d s h i p a s s i s t a n c e . I t has been suggested i n the media t h a t such measures are meant as a d i s i n c e n t i v e f o r p o t e n t i a l w e l f a r e r e c i p i e n t s coming t o B.C. (Vaughn Palmer, Vancouver Sun, March 22, 1985). An i m p l i c i t agendum of these changes, however, might be to encourage young unemployed B r i t i s h Columbians to leave the p r o v i n c e . 45 There are other, l e s s o b t r u s i v e forms of retrenchment and r a t i o n i n g i n the p u b l i c s e r v i c e . One of these, d e s c r i b e d by L i p s k y (1984), i s " b u r e a u c r a t i c d i s e n t i t l e m e n t . " T h i s r e -f e r s t o the manner i n which s o c i a l w e l f a r e o b l i g a t i o n s t o b e n e f i c i a r i e s are reduced and c i r c u m s c r i b e d through the l a r g e l y obscure " b u r e a u c r a t i c " a c t i o n s and i n a c t i o n s of pub-l i c a u t h o r i t i e s (Lipsky, 1984, p. 3). T h i s i s a mode of " f i s c a l and programmatic retrenchment" which takes p l a c e through r o u t i n e a c t i o n s or i n a c t i o n s and which has d i s t r i b u -t i v e consequences. Furthermore, because b u r e a u c r a t i c d i s e n -t i t l e m e n t i s l e s s v i s i b l e and more i n d i r e c t as a cutback t o o l , i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o d i s c e r n and i s thereby u n a v a i l a b l e f o r p u b l i c i n s p e c t i o n or review (Lipsky, 1984, pp. 3-5). There are a number of f a c t o r s i n f l u e n c i n g b u r e a u c r a t i c d i s -e n t i t l e m e n t such as c o n s t r i c t i n g the r e s o u r c e s or s t a f f l e v e l s of p u b l i c agencies. One p o i n t , however, deserves mention; cutback p o l i t i c s i s a process through which the r e l a t i o n s h i p of the State t o s o c i a l w e l f a r e b e n e f i c i a r i e s becomes a t t e n u a t e d - b u r e a u c r a t i c d i s e n t i t l e m e n t permits the e x p r e s s i o n of s t r u c t u r a l b i a s e s a g a i n s t s o c i a l w e l f a r e c l i e n t s w h i l e maximising the l i k e l i h o o d t h a t they w i l l remain q u i e s c e n t (Lipsky, 1984, p. 22). G l e n n e r s t e r observes t h a t i n f o r m a l types of r a t i o n i n g tend to p e n a l i s e "those who are most e a s i l y d e t e r r e d , l e a s t a r t i c u l a t e , worst acquainted with the s e r v i c e , l e a s t able t o wait, or who f a l l o u t s i d e the c o n v e n t i o n a l c a t e g o r i e s of e l i g i b i l i t y ( G l e n n e r s t e r , 1975, pp. 13-14). 46 3) Another c e n t r a l theme of s o c i a l and economic p o l i c y i n B r i t i s h Columbia i s the "downsizing" of government. T h i s i s p r e d i c a t e d upon a c o n s e r v a t i v e theme of " b i g government i s bad government." Says Robert H e i l b r o n e r of t h i s t r e n d : ... s u p p l y - s i d e r s want t o r o l l back government, not merely t o get i t o f f our backs, but a l s o because go-vernment i s p e r c e i v e d as e s s e n t i a l l y a w a s t e f u l , not a p r o d u c t i v e , use of resources ( H e i l b r o n e r , 1982, p. 86). Toward t h i s end, the government has sought a 2 5 percent r e -d u c t i o n of p u b l i c s e c t o r employees through the P u b l i c Sector R e s t r a i n t Act ( B i l l 3) which p r o v i d e s very broad employee t e r m i n a t i o n c o n d i t i o n s (Magnusson et a l , 1984, p. 281). In a d d i t i o n t o employees terminated d i r e c t l y by the p r o v i n c i a l government, s c h o o l boards, h o s p i t a l s and u n i v e r s i t i e s have been f o r c e d t o make s t a f f r e d u c t i o n s as a r e s u l t of the p r o v i n c i a l government's e n f o r c i n g lower budgets f o r these areas. T h i s i s s u g g e s t i v e of a more g e n e r a l problem - the reduced c a p a b i l i t y of government. Downsizing government has no necessary c o r r e l a t i o n i n i n c r e a s e d p r o d u c t i v i t y , espe-c i a l l y as r e d u c t i o n s occur i n an e r a of r i s i n g demands. To assess the e f f i c i e n c y of government with a p u r e l y " f i s c a l " a c c o u n t i n g i s m i s l e a d i n g - p u b l i c s e r v i c e s e x i s t i n a com-p l e x socio-economic system ( G l e n n e r s t e r , 1975, p. 12) and are t h e r e f o r e u n l i k e any other p r i v a t e market a c t i v i t y i n both form and o r g a n i s a t i o n a l m i s s i o n ( G l e n n e r s t e r , 1975, pp. 47 168-169; Doyle, 1979, p. 53). Lack of s t a f f and reso u r c e s may gi v e r i s e t o o r g a n i s a t i o n a l or i n f o r m a t i o n a l d e c l i n e i n the p u b l i c s e r v i c e s . Persons may be r e q u i r e d t o assume d u t i e s f o r which they are u n t r a i n e d and have no experience. Less time w i l l be spent per c l i e n t and s e r v i c e w i l l be more c r i s i s - o r i e n t e d and s u s t a i n i n g as opposed t o p r e v e n t i v e and e n a b l i n g . Reduced s t a f f c a p a b i l i t y a l s o means a reduced c a p a b i l i t y t o monitor c l i e n t s or non-public s e r v i c e s , t h e r e -by r e d u c i n g c l i e n t safeguards. There i s a l s o a more s t r i n g e n t a p p l i c a t i o n of d i s c i -p l i n e i n the p u b l i c s e c t o r i n B r i t i s h Columbia. T h i s has r e -duced p u b l i c a c c e s s i b i l i t y t o government as employees are r e l u c t a n t t o d i v u l g e even such b a s i c informaton as the number of persons served by t h e i r m i n i s t r y . One can see i n B r i t i s h Columbia t h a t i n p e r i o d s of economic and p o l i t i c a l i n s t a b i l i t y , the State i s l e a s t w i l l i n g t o t o l e r a t e or ma-nage d i s s e n t i n g v a l u e s e i t h e r w i t h i n the p u b l i c s e c t o r or i n i t s l i n e s of communication with the c i t i z e n r y . S i m i l a r l y , government commitment t o r e s e a r c h or a c c e s s i b i l i t y t o i n f o r m a t i o n d e c l i n e s . Because of t h i s the f u n c t i o n i n g of the v o l u n t a r y s e c t o r becomes s t r a i n e d , p a r t i c u l a r l y as t h e i r communications with government have become more tenuous due t o the l o s s of personnel who served an " i n t e r f a c e " f u n c t i o n between the p u b l i c s e c t o r , the community and government. 48 4) Downsizing has meant the government d i v e s t i n g i t s e l f of c e r t a i n f u n c t i o n s through the c a n c e l l a t i o n or c u r t a i l m e n t of s e r v i c e s p r o v i d e d by a number of m i n i s t r i e s . Among the programs elmi n a t e d by the M i n i s t r y of Human Resources were the Family Support Worker Program, Mental R e t a r d a t i o n C o - o r d i n a t o r s , and C h i l d Abuse Assessment Teams. (Redish [4-8403], 1984, pp. 14-16). Other s e r v i c e s l o s t as a r e s u l t of r e s t r a i n t were Post Partem C o u n s e l l o r s , C h i l d Care Workers p r o v i d i n g c o u n s e l l i n g i n p u b l i c schools and the P r o v i n c i a l I n s e r v i c e Resource Team (PIRT) which p r o v i d e d t r a i n i n g t o parents of s e v e r e l y m e n t a l l y handicapped and a u t i s t i c c h i l d r e n t o enable them t o remain i n t h e i r n a t u r a l and f o s t e r homes (Kesselman [P-84-1], 1984, pp. 2-3). The l o s s of these s e r v i c e s has not o n l y r e s u l t e d i n hardship f o r the persons a f f e c t e d , but w i l l probably l e a d t o g r e a t e r long-term s o c i a l and economic c o s t s (Anguish 1983, C u r r i e & P i s h a l s k i 1983, Macdonald, 1983). I r o n i c a l l y , the above programs, aimed at the f a c i l i t a t i o n of community-based c a r e , have been c o n v i n c i n g l y argued t o be c o s t - e f f e c t i v e , o b v i a t i n g the more c o s t l y and dehumanising recourses of i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s a t i o n and c h r o n i c dependency (Kesselman [P-84-1], 1984, pp. 2-4). C a l c u l a t i n g savings t o the P r o v i n c e becomes even more probl e m a t i c when one i s reminded t h a t many of these s e r v i c e s are e l i g i b l e f o r c o s t - s h a r i n g by the F e d e r a l government through the Canada A s s i s t a n c e Plan (CAP). 49 The M i n i s t r y of Human Resources, while perhaps the hardest h i t (because human s e r v i c e s are more labour i n t e n -s i v e ) , i s not the only m i n i s t r y s u f f e r i n g a l o s s of s e r v i -c e s . The a p p l i c a t i o n of r e s t r a i n t i n h o s p i t a l s or other h e a l t h - r e l a t e d i n s t i t u t i o n s has a f f e c t e d the c a p a c i t y and c a p a b i l i t y of the h e a l t h s e c t o r through queueing, the r e d u c t i o n of a v a i l a b l e beds or the c u r t a i l m e n t of some procedures or programs. Loss of s t a f f and funds f o r educ a t i o n , Worker's Compensation, l e g a l a i d and programs o f -f e r e d by the M i n i s t r y of Labour i n c r e a s e the p o t e n t i a l so-c i a l and economic r i s k t o women, the handicapped, c h i l d r e n , immigrants, s e n i o r s and persons on low incomes, i n other words, those persons who may be l e a s t able t o p a r t i c i p a t e through the "market." 5) The p r o v i n c i a l government has pursued a p o l i c y of d e r e g u l a t i o n by re d u c i n g impediments t o e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l a c t i v i t y thus l i m i t i n g the i n t e r v e n t i o n of government i n areas of s o c i a l and economic r e l a t i o n s . D e r e g u l a t i o n has oc c u r r e d through a number of b i l l s which, among other t h i n g s , i n c l u d e the d i s s o l u t i o n of a number of r e g u l a t o r y boards and commissions; the r e p e a l of r e n t c o n t r o l s and the a b o l i t i o n o f the O f f i c e of the Rentalsman; the d i s m a n t l i n g of the Human Rights Branch and Commission; and l e g i s l a t i o n which r e s t r i c t s the r i g h t s of o r g a n i s e d labour (Magnussen e t a l , 1984, pp. 283-285). 50 The e f f e c t s of these moves w i l l be t o g i v e b u s i n e s s and government a f r e e r hand i n e s t a b l i s h i n g labour and b u s i -ness p r a c t i s e s w h ile at the same time r e d u c i n g or e l i m i n a t -i n g avenues of c i t i z e n r e d r e s s f o r d i s c r i m i n a t i o n or u n f a i r treatment. Cutbacks i n l e g a l a i d and reduced access t o i n f o r m a t i o n w i l l make r e d r e s s f o r persons on low incomes extremely d i f f i c u l t . D e r e g u l a t i o n w i l l a l s o occur i n f o r m a l l y w i t h i n the bureaucracy as s t a f f and m i n i s t e r i a l budgets are reduced. 6) D e i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s a t i o n and p r i v a t i s a t i o n are two more p o l i c y courses pursued by the B.C. government i n i t s auste-r i t y d r i v e . In 1983 the M i n i s t r y of Human Resources announced i t s i n t e n t i o n t o phase down th r e e r e s i d e n t i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s t h a t care f o r the men t a l l y handicapped by working towards more community-based res o u r c e s (Redish [P-8403], 1984, p. 15). A c o - o r d i n a t e d s t r a t e g y f o r such a move, however, has been hampered by the l o s s of the Mental R e t a r d a t i o n C o - o r d i n a t o r s whose r o l e was to a s s i s t m entally handicapped persons i n t h e i r t r a n s i t i o n from i n s t i t u t i o n s t o the community (Redish [P-8403], 1984, p. 15). D e i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s a t i o n has proceeded i n c o n c e r t with p r i v a t i s a t i o n which e s s e n t i a l l y r e f e r s t o the t r a n s f e r of f u n c t i o n s or s e r v i c e s from the p u b l i c t o the p r i v a t e s e c t o r (Rosenbluth & Schworm [P-84-3], 1984, p. 4 ) . Here we are r e f e r r i n g t o d i r e c t forms of p r i v a t i s a t i o n through the use 51 of purchase of s e r v i c e c o n t r a c t s (POSC); other, i n d i r e c t forms of p r i v a t i s a t i o n are s e r v i c e s "picked-up" by the v o l u n t a r y s e c t o r but without government support (such as food banks) (Butcher, 1984, p. 55). In other words, p r i v a t i s a t i o n may be seen as a f u r t h e r e f f o r t by government t o d i v e s t i t s e l f of r e s p o n s i b l i t y f o r the d i r e c t p r o v i s i o n of c e r t a i n types of s e r v i c e s . In t h i s l i g h t , the s h i f t of p u b l i c r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o c c u r r i n g i n B r i t i s h Columbia i s f a r from p r o m i s i n g . Serious t e c h n i c a l q u e s t i o n s concerning the implementation, q u a l i t y and c o n t i n u i t y of c o n t r a c t e d s e r v i c e s have a r i s e n i n other j u r i s d i c t i o n s (Jansson 1979; Ghere, 1981); Kramer, 1983; Reamer, 1983), and t h e r e i s no reason t o expect t h a t the problems experi e n c e d elsewhere w i l l not be repeated i n B.C.. As with other areas i n which the p r o v i n c e has s h i f t e d r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o the p r i v a t e s e c t o r f o r c e r t a i n types of s e r v i c e s , the i n c r e a s e d use of purchase of s e r v i c e c o n t r a c t s s u f f e r s from a l a c k of p l a n n i n g , c o n s u l t a t i o n , c o - o r d i n a t i o n and r e s e a r c h . There are s e r i o u s problems of a c c o u n t a b i l i t y , m o n i t o r i n g and review of c o n t r a c t e d s e r v i c e s which the p r o v i n c e has not met i n the past and cannot meet now i n the f a c e of o r g a n i s a t i o n a l d e c l i n e . The use of the " f o r - p r o f i t " s e c t o r i n the d e l i v e r y of c o n t r a c t e d s e r v i c e s i s an i s s u e of p a r t i c u l a r concern f o r human s e r v i c e p r o f e s s i o n a l s i n B.C.; a r e c e n t paper by G i l b e r t (1984) suggests a number of s t r u c t u r a l and i n s t i t u t i o n a l d i f f e r e n c e s between n o n - p r o f i t 52 and p r o f i t - m a k i n g agencies which, f o r c e r t a i n types of s e r v i c e s , make the l a t t e r l e s s d e s i r a b l e as p r o v i d e r s . The e x i s t i n g l i t e r a t u r e on the use of POSC's suggests an agenda f o r more r e s e a r c h w i l l be necessary t o i n s t i l l a g r e a t e r degree of r a t i o n a l i t y i n the p o l i c y process (see Chapter 4.5) . 7) As has been a l l u d e d t o e a r l i e r , c e n t r a l i s a t i o n of decision-making w i t h i n the government i s an important f e a -t u r e of the S o c i a l C r e d i t P a r t y ' s approach t o p o l i c y - m a k i n g . W i t h i n the government, power over budgeting and p o l i c y i n i -t i a t i o n has s h i f t e d from m i n i s t r i e s to the Cabinet and the Premier's o f f i c e l a r g e l y through i n f o r m a l p r o c e d u r a l changes (Rosenbluth & Schworm, P-84-3, 1984, p. 6). The t r e n d towards i n c r e a s e d c e n t r a l i s a t i o n has been evidenced i n the w i l l i n g n e s s of the P r o v i n c i a l government t o e x e r c i s e i t s e x e c u t i v e a u t h o r i t y t o usurp the p l a n n i n g , f i n a n c i a l and r e g u l a t o r y powers of lower l e v e l s of government and p u b l i c i n s t i t u t i o n s (as i n the d i s m i s s a l of the e l e c t e d Vancouver School board i n 1985: a l s o , see D o b e l l , 1983, pp. 18-19). I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o note t h a t while governments i n v o k i n g r e s t r a i n t economics o f t e n seek a d e v o l u t i o n of r e s -p o n s i b i l i t y f o r s o c i a l p r o v i s i o n , there i s an i n v e r s e r e l a -t i o n s h i p with r e g a r d t o p h y s i c a l and economic p l a n n i n g and development. I t has been r e c o g n i s e d i n the s o c i a l p l a n n i n g and a d m i n i s t r a t i o n l i t e r a t u r e t h a t under c o n d i t i o n s of 53 f i n a n c i a l or o r g a n i s a t i o n a l c r i s i s , the dominant form of a u t h o r i t y s t r u c t u r e i s c e n t r a l i s e d decision-making (Jones, 1984, p. 60). G l e n n e r s t e r has commented t h a t where p o l i c y d e c i s i o n s become c e n t r a l i s e d the policy-makers are i n e v i t a b -l y found t o o v e r s i m p l i f y the p o l i c y environment i n order t o grapple with the complex range of i s s u e s they must decide; where d e c i s i o n s are made c e n t r a l l y , planners w i l l probably not use h i g h l y complex methods t o account f o r a l l the pos-s i b l e consequences (Gl e n n e r s t e r , 1975, p. 30). 8) While aspects of the p r o v i n c i a l government's s o c i a l and economic program have s t r e s s e d the "downsizing" of government and the s e l e c t i v e retrenchment of government i n t e r v e n t i o n , t h e r e i s another e x p r e s s i o n of p o l i c y t h a t has overseen massive growth i n ex p e n d i t u r e s . The government which has so f e r v e n t l y espoused the d o c t r i n e of f r e e -- e n t e r p r i s e , the tyranny of the p u b l i c s e c t o r and the p e r i l s of government i n t e r v e n t i o n i n the market p l a c e , has c r e a t e d a new bureaucracy a l o n g s i d e the o l d w e l f a r e bureaucracy i t seeks t o downsize. T h i s has emerged as a vi g o r o u s commitment t o State c a p i t a l i s m and State-managed c a p i t a l i s m . Not only has the State sought t o make B r i t i s h Columbia a saf e p l a c e t o i n v e s t but the government has engaged i n s p e c u l a t i v e and e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l a c t i v i t i e s through i t s Crown C o r p o r a t i o n s as w e l l as committing massive amounts of reso u r c e s f o r con-s t r u c t i o n of i n f r a s t r u c t u r e as a l u r e f o r p r i v a t e c a p i t a l . 54 Most of these p u b l i c e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l s t r u c t u r e s e x i s t i n a symbiotic r e l a t i o n s h i p with p r i v a t e c o r p o r a t i o n s . Some are Crown C o r p o r a t i o n s and enjoy some autonomy from the L e g i s l a t u r e and have broad powers of f i n a n c i n g and borrowing guaranteed by the Crown. One t h i n g they have i n common with the p r i v a t e s e c t o r i s a d e s i r e t o show p r o f i t . Examples of Crown C o r p o r a t i o n s are the Insurance C o r p o r a t i o n of B.C. (begun, i r o n i c a l l y , by the NDP t o counter what was i n 1973 regarded as a u s u r i o u s monopoly by p r i v a t e auto insurance f i r m s ) , B.C. P l a c e Crown C o r p o r a t i o n , and Expo 86 Crown C o r p o r a t i o n . B.C. Place L t d . was e s t a b l i s h e d by an Act of L e g i s l a t u r e i n 1980 i n the e x p e c t a t i o n of a p o t e n t i a l market f o r housing and commercial space i n the c i t y core of Vancouver. To take advantage of t h i s market and t o help d i r e c t i t s growth, the P r o v i n c i a l government through i t s agent B.C. P l a c e , w i l l p r o v i d e s e r v i c e and i n f r a s t r u c t u r e on 200 acres near the core of Vancouver which w i l l then be l e a s e d on a 99 year b a s i s t o p r i v a t e d e v e l o p e r s . Revenues a c c r u i n g t o the C o r p o r a t i o n w i l l be used t o pay f o r the B.C. P l a c e Stadium and other s i t e amenities as w e l l as p r o v i d e funds which may be a l l o c a t e d f o r p u b l i c developments elsewhere i n the p r o v i n c e . In the case of B.C. Place we see the State a c t i n g as entrepreneur; assuming the means to p r o d u c t i o n (by develop-i n g and holdng the B.C. Place s i t e ) and u s i n g t h a t e n t r e p r e -n e u r i a l s t r u c t u r e as an organ of r e d i s t r i b u t i o n , thus i n t e -55 g r a t i n g c a p i t a l investment with r e d i s t r i b u t i o n i n a market-- o r i e n t e d p u b l i c c o r p o r a t i o n . A more vi g o r o u s commitment t o the market p r i n c i p l e , however, foreshadows a d e c l i n i n g pub-l i c commitment t o the w e l f a r e f u n c t i o n s of the S t a t e . The i n f e r e n c e one draws, t h e r e f o r e , i s t h a t e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l , m a r k e t - o r i e n t e d s t r u c t u r e s are intended t o f u l f i l l a s o c i a l w e l f a r e f u n c t i o n . The u n d e r l y i n g t h r e a d of both Crown Corpo-r a t i o n development and huge p u b l i c works programs suggests the attempted m a n i p u l a t i o n by the State of micro- and macro-- s c a l e economics. Here the government uses i t s f i n a n c i a l and i n t e r v e n t i o n powers t o supercede normal market r e l a t i o n s and i n s t i t u t i o n a l b a r r i e r s t o i n f l u e n c e the economic order of the m e t r o p o l i s and the p r o v i n c e . The government i s , i n a sense, i n f l u e n c i n g the demand s t r u c t u r e by c r e a t i n g a s u r f a c e of l o c a t i o n a l advantage f o r p r i v a t e s e t o r i n v e s t -ment; e s s e n t i a l l y a demand-side approach t o development and job c r e a t i o n ! H e i l b r o n e r suggests t h a t State-owned or S t a t e --dependent o r g a n i s a t i o n s w i l l emerge as the l e a d i n g agents of accumulation. Such a t r e n d w i l l combine the " c a p i t a l -- m o b i l i s a t i o n and c o m p e t i t i o n - b u f f e r i n g a b i l i t i e s of the State with the independence and d r i v e of p r i v a t e management" ( H e i l b r o n e r , 1982, p. 90). In O f f e ' s a n a l y s i s , the a v a i l a b i -l i t y of S t a t e - p r o v i d e d resources t o "help t o a v o i d or delay-a d a p t a t i o n " t o the p r e s s u r e s of a changing market system "cannot but l e a d to unprecedented l e v e l s of p u b l i c debt and 56 t o constant e f f o r t s of governments to terminate or reduce welfare State programs" (Offe, 1983, p. 240). The premise of conservative a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s that corporate welfare i n the form of tax breaks and su b s i d i e s w i l l create s o c i a l welfare i n the p r i v a t e sector has not been, and p o s s i b l e cannot be, demonstrated. The d i s t r i b u t i o n a l and employment e f f e c t s f l o w i n g to the community from p r o j e c t s such as Expo 86 tend to be s p a t i a l l y and temporally l i m i t e d . Costs f o r Expo 86 and other developments w i l l be borne by the e n t i r e province while the remunerative e f f e c t s w i l l not be as widely shared. In an era of s t r u c t u r a l and s o c i a l change, investment i n p h y s i c a l resources ( f i x e d c a p i t a l ) at the expense of human resources has more i n common with a 19th century i n d u s t r i a l conception of s o c i e t y than with the emergent r e a l i t i e s of the p o s t - i n d u s t r i a l age. 2.3 RESTRAINT AND THE NEW RIGHT - A CASE OF STATE MANAGED CAPITALISM There i s a p i v o t a l c o n t r a d i c t i o n inherent i n govern-ment p o l i c i e s which advocate the " p r i v a t i s a t i o n of s e r v i -ces," the " f i l t e r - d o w n " of the p u b l i c wage or " s e r v i c e f o r fee." The c o n t r a d i c t i o n l i e s i n the f a c t that government, while d i v e s t i n g i t s e l f of the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r welfare se-c u r i t y , nevertheless seeks to perpetuate the kinds of 57 economic and p o l i t i c a l r e l a t i o n s which c o n t r i b u t e to s o c i a l c r i s i s and economic d y s f u n c t i o n . Governments of the " r i g h t " h o l d t h a t the onus f o r the maintenance of s o c i a l s e r v i c e s (other than those seen as e s s e n t i a l t o m a i n t a i n i n g s o c i a l order) should devolve onto the p r i v a t e s e c t o r or the i n d i v i -d ual and y e t , as a body which a c t i v e l y seeks t o l e g i t i m i s e s o c i a l and economic r e l a t i o n s , the State assumes l i t t l e p a r t i n f o s t e r i n g a s o c i a l m i l i e u i n which the p r i v a t e s e c t o r can develop, or i s i n c l i n e d t o develop, t h i s r o l e . In B r i t i s h Columbia, we see a State which s e l e c t i v e l y "disgoverns" c e r t a i n s e c t o r s of s o c i e t y while a c t i v e l y pro-moting or a b e t t i n g other s e c t o r s which embody many of the r e - d i s t r i b u t i v e i n j u s t i c e s endemic t o the p o l i t y . In c o n c e r t with these s t r a t e g i e s , the State which d e c r i e s " b i g govern-ment" and bemoans b u r e a u c r a t i c i n c u r s i o n s i n t o the p r i v a t e s e c t o r i s a c t i v e l y engaged i n c o n s o l i d a t i n g and c e n t r a l i s i n g i t s decision-making f u n c t i o n s and s u b v e r t i n g normal c o n s u l -t a t i v e mechanisms. Governments, such as t h a t i n B.C., are i n c r e a s i n g l y engaged i n the e f f o r t t o r e s t r u c t u r e the c a p i -t a l dynamics of the l o c a l or n a t i o n a l economy. T h i s may occur as a r e s u l t of e x p l i c i t p o l i c y , through tax breaks or even through the manipulation of i n t e r e s t r a t e s ( i n the case of n a t i o n a l governments). Governments may even t u r n "State c a p i t a l i s t " and seek to employ p u b l i c e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l s t r u c -t u r e s to f u l f i l l r e d i s t r i b u t i o n a l aims. T h i s may take the form of State monopolies ( i n Canada, Crown C o r p o r a t i o n s ) , 58 mega-projects, or re-development schemes. A l l of these have an i n c a r n a t i o n i n B.C. However, while State investment i n " p r o f i t - m a k i n g " s e c t o r s i s encouraged, s o c i a l w e l f a r e expen-d i t u r e s are s u b j e c t t o g r e a t e r r e s t r i c t i o n s . Cox (1977) makes i t c l e a r t h a t i n the c a p i t a l i s t S t a t e , the s o c i a l w e l f a r e of the worker depends upon the i n -vestment of c a p i t a l by c a p i t a l i s t s . At the same time, he a r -gues, the investment of c a p i t a l i s c o n t i n g e n t upon the pro-v i s i o n by the State of c o n d i t i o n s amenable t o investment. T h e r e f o r e , the s o c i a l w e l f a r e of the worker i s dependent up-on the p r o v i s i o n by the State of c o n d i t i o n s s u i t a b l e f o r c a -p i t a l investment (Cox, 1977, pp. 10-11). Taking t h i s analy-s i s a step f u r t h e r , Broadbent (1977) holds t h a t the mandate of the State t o maintain p r o f i t s and accumulation and at the same time manage a welf a r e economy o f t e n t r a n s l a t e s i n t o a tendency t o spend more tax d o l l a r s on the work f o r c e and l e s s on i n d u s t r y . T h i s leads t o a dilemma i n which i n d u s t r y and the p o p u l a t i o n each r e q u i r e i n c r e a s i n g State i n t e r v e n -t i o n , each on t h e i r own and o f t e n c o n t r a d i c t o r y terms: one to maintain p r o f i t s and reduce c o s t s and the other to improve l i v i n g standards and hence i n c r e a s e p r i v a t e s e c t o r c o s t s (Broadbent, 1977, p. 30). For the S o c i a l C r e d i t government, the dilemma i s l e s s c l e a r . Hearkening t o the advice of monetarist and supply-- s i d e mentors such as M i l t o n Friedman and the F r a s e r I n s t i -t u t e , those i n government b e l i e v e t h a t the "market" w i l l 59 respond to i n d i v i d u a l needs. Others, however, r e g a r d the i d e a l of a s e l f - r e g u l a t i n g economic system as unworkable. Some w r i t e r s contend t h a t monetarist or s u p p l y - s i d e approa-ches r e p r e s e n t a c o n s e r v a t i v e mythology ( N i e l l , 1983, p. 2). For them, monetarist p o l i c y i s one which routes money from lower socio-economic s t a t u s (SES) groups who do not save and r e d i r e c t s i t t o those who do save ( N e i l l , 1983, p. 2). T h i s c o n t r i b u t e s t o disinvestment and i n c r e a s e d economic margin-a l i t y among the lower SES groups and an i n c r e a s e d p o l a r i s a -t i o n of economic power i n favour of c a p i t a l i n t e r e s t s . T h i s o b s e r v a t i o n i s r e a f f i r m e d by Doyle (1979), who questions government b e l t - t i g h t e n i n g measures imposed upon persons who are l e a s t able t o bear the hardships i n c u r r e d through a s h r i n k i n g p o o l of p u b l i c r e s o u r c e s . These persons he i d e n t i f i e s as: The poor, s e n i o r c i t i z e n s , n a t i v e s , the unemployed, c i t i z e n s i n r u r a l , northern communities and decaying urban areas (Doyle, 1979, p. 53). For Doyle, many of the trends so f a r mentioned s i g n a l a d i -m i n i s h i n g r o l e of the State i n the area of s o c i a l p o l i c y . He i s concerned t h a t such an a b d i c a t i o n means t h a t p o l i t i c a l i n t e r e s t s outweigh s o c i a l need i n the government's s c a l e of p r i o r i t i e s (Doyle, 1979, p. 53). He suggests t h a t r e s t r a i n t economics i s simply a p e r p e t u a t i o n of the o l d theme t h a t the poor have moral d e f e c t and t h a t the s o c i a l system i s b a s i -c a l l y sound (Doyle, 1979, p. 54). 60 The neo-conservative view, on the other hand, holds t h a t the w e l f a r e State r e t a i n s a monopoly on w e l f a r e s e r v i -ces and t h a t such a monopoly impairs the a c c o u n t a b i l i t y of the State to consumers (Stoesz, 1981, p. 399). Yet the argu-ment f o r p r i v a t i s a t i o n , as a means t o reduce expenditures and enhance consumer c o n t r o l over s e r v i c e s , i l l u s t r a t e s yet another s e t of c o n t r a d i c t i o n s i n h e r e n t i n the neo-- c o n s e r v a t i v e e t h i c . The "New R i g h t " o f t e n c l a i m s t h a t they wish t o "empower people" by removing the " t o t a l i t a r i a n " con-s t r a i n t s of government or they wish t o make s e r v i c e s more accountable to people or make d e l i v e r y more i n n o v a t i v e through c o m p e t i t i o n . Yet, i n a l l the r h e t o r i c , the p o i n t has been l o s t t h a t the broadening of p o l i t i c a l awareness and the a b i l i t y t o a r t i c u l a t e s o c i a l concerns now enjoyed by former-l y (and r e c e n t l y ) "marginal" groups has been a d i r e c t r e s u l t of the e n a b l i n g and r e d i s t r i b u t i v e l e g i s l a t i o n of the wel-f a r e S t a t e . The neo-conservatives do not r e v e a l i n t h e i r r h e t o r i c (but, one suspects are keenly aware of) the b a s i c p o s t u l a t e s about the nature of power and p r i v i l e g e i n our s o c i e t y . In whose i n t e r e s t s do r e c e s s i o n economics act? In the i n t e r e s t s of those s e c t o r s of the p o p u l a t i o n who a l r e a d y enjoy p o s i -t i o n s of p o l i t i c a l and economic advantage. 61 2.4 SOCIAL SERVICES, THE STATE AND THE IMPERATIVES OF CAPITAL ACCUMULATION Throughout t h i s discussion, we have ranged over a number of questions and issues regarding r e s t r a i n t economics and s o c i a l services. We have alluded to the State and have i n -ferred some of i t s motives but to t h i s point, we have not addressed the State i n a th e o r e t i c a l sense, nor have we examined some of the broader s t r u c t u r a l forces which impel i t . In Canada, a number of recent measures by both the Federal and Pr o v i n c i a l governments are in d i c a t i v e of a con-cern for f i s c a l r e s t r a i n t and government downsizing. Most have, to some degree, involved l i m i t a t i o n s on public sector wage increases and tighter controls on c o l l e c t i v e bargaining and public sector job action. Such measures, says Gordon Pape (19 83), are, i n part, responses to a two-decade long period of public sector union militancy which has won generous wage and benefit conces-sions from government (Pape, 1983, pp. 88-89). Pape c i t e s two p r e c i p i t a t i n g events which spurred confrontation between government and public sector unions, both occurring i n 1981. The f i r s t was U.S. President Ronald Reagan's f i r i n g of a l l U.S. A i r T r a f f i c Controllers who refused to end an i l l e g a l s t r i k e . The second was the beginning of the Canadian reces-sion. The former was suggestive of the possible future of federal and p r o v i n c i a l p o l i c i e s , while the l a t t e r brought the s o c i a l and economic problems of the nation into a much sharper p o l i t i c a l focus. B r i t i s h Columbia introduced 62 Canada's f i r s t p u b l i c s e c t o r r e s t r a i n t program i n 1982, s i g n a l l i n g many pr o v i n c e s to f o l l o w s u i t (Pape, 1983, p. 89). The weakening of p u b l i c s e c t o r unions (long the expo-nents of union m i l i t a n c y ) which has ensued has become a warning t o the trade unions t h a t the State i s prepared to take d i r e c t and a s s e r t i v e a c t i o n to achieve i t s g o a l s . How can one analyse the State as a l e g i t i m a t i n g , en-a b l i n g or c o e r c i v e s t r u c t u r e ? How and why does i t act? In t h e i r essay, "The State i n C a p i t a l i s m and the C a p i t a l i s t S t a t e , " Dear and C l a r k (1981) attempt t o focus not s o l e l y upon the f u n c t i o n s of the State i n a g i v e n s o c i e t y (the State i n c a p i t a l i s m ) but a l s o upon the form of the c a p i t a l -i s t S t a t e , i n other words, how a given s o c i a l o r g a n i s a t i o n g i v e s r i s e t o a p a r t i c u l a r State s t r u c t u r e or apparatus (Dear and S c o t t , 1981, p. 43). In so doing, the authors r e f e r t o the " c e n t r a l e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n i n M a r x i s t theory" between the " l e v e l of appearances" and the u n d e r l y -i n g s o c i a l r e a l i t y which g i v e s r i s e t o those appearances (Dear and C l a r k , 1981, p. 47). The authors o u t l i n e a theory of the State as a p o l i -t i c a l e n t i t y which may on the one hand a c t i n favour of c r i s i s - f r e e s t a b i l i s a t i o n and i n t e g r a t i o n w h i l e , at the same time, "the extended f u n c t i o n s of the State may themselves be a source of d y s f u n c t i o n and c r i s i s " (Dear and C l a r k , 1981, p. 55). In t h i s model, the State may assume many, o f t e n c o n t r a d i c t o r y , r o l e s : i t may act i n the i n t e r e s t s of a l l 63 c l a s s e s of c a p i t a l i s t s o c i e t y with many p o l i c i e s which do not d i r e c t l y serve the i n t e r e s t s of the c a p i t a l i s t c l a s s . The S t a t e , t h e r e f o r e , a c t s c o n t i n u a l l y i n the i n t e r e s t s of c r i s i s avoidance. C r i s e s r e s u l t from c l a s s antagonisms and may be regarded as c r i s e s of "output and i n p u t : " Output c r i s e s , r e l a t i n g t o the S t a t e ' s a d m i n i s t r a -t i v e d e c i s i o n s , take the form of c r i s e s of r a t i o n a l i t y . Input c r i s e s take the form of c r i s e s i n l e g i t i m a t i o n -the system simply does not succeed i n m a i n t a i n i n g the necessary l e v e l of mass l o y a l t y (Dear and C l a r k , 1981, p. 56). Current f i s c a l c r i s e s are i n t i m a t e l y l i n k e d with such c r i s e s of l e g i t i m a c y and r a t o n a l i t y and are manifested as the c o n t r a d i c t i o n between the maintenance of c o n d i t i o n s s u i t a b l e f o r c a p i t a l accumulation while at the same time seeking t o m a i n t a i n s o c i a l harmony (Dear and C l a r k , 1981, p. 56). In t h i s l i g h t , the s i t u a t i o n i n B.C. may be seen i n terms of the government's r e s t r a i n t program as p r e c i p i t a t i n g a c r i s i s of r a t i o n a l i t y and the subsequent p u b l i c p r o t e s t and s t r i k e a c t i o n forming the core of a c r i s i s i n l e g i t i -macy, f o r as Dear and C l a r k observe: ... the c a p i t a l i s t State which openly uses i t s c o e r c i v e power t o enable one c l a s s t o p r o f i t at the expense of others l o s e s i t s l e g i t i m a c y and r i s k s un-dermining the b a s i s of mass support. T h i s s t r u c t u r a l c o n t r a d i c t i o n i s compounded duri n g i n f l a t i o n a r y p e r i o d s when r i s i n g c o s t s and p u b l i c expenditure cutbacks cause State output t o f a l l below e x p e c t a t i o n s . A c r i s i s i n l e g i t i m a c y i s thus i n i t i a t e d which imposes i n c r e a s e d p r e s s u r e upon the r a t i o n a l i t y c r i s i s , and so on (Dear and C l a r k , 1981, p. 56). 64 R i c h a r d Peet, as s p e c i a l guest e d i t o r of Economic Geography ( V o l . 59, No. 2, A p r i l 1983), says of "The G l o b a l Geography of Contemporary C a p i t a l i s m : " The movement of c a p i t a l i s m i n t o a new phase c r e a t e s c r i s e s which i n t e r a c t with o l d c r i s e s v e r s i o n s of the same c o n t r a d i c t i o n , c r e a t e wholly new sequences of c r i -s i s , and i n t e r s e c t and i n t e r a c t i n the ever-changing p a t t e r n of h i s t o r i c a l events (Peet, 1983, p. 110). Chauncey A. Alexander (1982), too, r e l a t e s the e f -f e c t s of the r e c e s s i o n t o "reruns of the p e r i o d i c c r i s e s of a c a p i t a l i s t economy" (Alexander, 1982, p. 63). Alexander regards the market-place m e n t a l i t y as a t h r e a t t o the value system of s o c i a l w e l f a r e and, u l t i m a t e l y , t o p a r t i c i p a t o r y democracy whose g o a l i s t h a t of the common good. A c c o u n t a b i l i t y has s h i f t e d from the add r e s s i n g of human needs t o the standards of f i s c a l r e s t r a i n t (Alexander, 1982, p. 64). In Alexander's a n a l y s i s , r e s t r a i n t emerges as a c o n c i s e p o l i t i c a l strategem i n which: ... the r e d u c t i o n of s o c i a l s e r v i c e s serves s e v e r a l ends s i m u l t a n e o u s l y . I t s h r i n k s the s h a r i n g requirement on p r i v a t e and co r p o r a t e wealth; i t adds t o the margin-a l labour p o o l f o r combatting labour demands, and i t opens the door t o p r i v a t e e x p l o i t a t i o n of s o c i a l needs (Alexander, 1982, p. 64). Soja, Morales and Wolff (1983) contend t h a t s t r u c t u r -a l changes i n the s o c i a l and economic geography of r e g i o n s have a f f e c t e d the o r g a n i s a t i o n of the labour process, the 65 composition of the work f o r c e , the l o c a t i o n of i n d u s t r y and the s e c t o r a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of employment (Soja e t a l , 1983, p. 195). The g l o b a l recomposition of c a p i t a l i s a r e s u l t of c a p i t a l i s t c r i s i s and "urban r e s t r u c t u r i n g " - a process of world-wide change i n the o r g a n i s a t i o n of c a p i t a l . In t h e i r a n a l y s i s , the authors r e l a t e unemployment l e v e l s i n the U.S. and Canada to the maintenance of "labour r e s e r v e armies" i n the T h i r d World. The d e c l i n e and displacement of North Ame-r i c a n manufacturing s e c t o r s and the consequent redundancy of v a s t s e c t o r s of the work f o r c e r e p r e s e n t a d e v a l u a t i o n of labour power and i s tantamount, i n t h e i r view, to "labour d i s c i p l i n i n g " (Soja e t a l , 1983, p. 195). In a system which the authors t y p i f y as " S t a t e --managed c a p i t a l i s m , " the State f a c i l i t a t e s the i n c r e a s e d f l e x i b i l i t y of c a p i t a l , a l l o w i n g i t t o more e a s i l y m o b i l i s e cheap labour s u p p l i e s and a v o i d labour m i l i t a n c y and o r g a n i -s a t i o n . Commenting on the g l o b a l system of c a p i t a l o r g a n i s a -t i o n , Robert J.S. Ross (19 83) observes t h a t the c u r r e n t eco-nomic d e c l i n e r e s u l t s from c a p i t a l outflow which i s the ag-gregate e f f e c t of the l o c a t i o n a l d e c i s i o n s of f i r m s and i n -v e s t o r s (Ross, R., 1983, p. 144). Such l o c a t i o n a l d e c i s i o n s are i n f l u e n c e d by a c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f : 1) wages; 2) the d i s -c i p l i n e of the labour f o r c e , and; 3) p u b l i c p o l i c y p e r c e i v e d t o be f a v o u r a b l e t o c a p i t a l (Ross, R., 1983, p. 144). The State r e a c t s t o the d i s c r e t i o n a r y power of c a p i -t a l with s t r a t e g i c p o l i c y designed t o a t t r a c t and keep 66 investment. Ross i d e n t i f i e s three broad p o l i c y areas where d e c i s i o n s are made which a f f e c t the p o s i t i o n s of labour and c a p i t a l : 1) p o l i c i e s which a f f e c t the r e p r o d u c t i o n of labour through wages and the s o c i a l wage ( i . e . , b e n e f i t s , worker p r o t e c t i o n , l e g a l r i g h t s - a l l t h a t comprises the s o c i a l s e c u r i t y of l a b o u r ) ; 2) p o l i c i e s intended to a t t r a c t c a p i t a l by the p r o v i s i o n of s u b s i d i e s or through the p r o v i s i o n of i n f r a s t r u c t u r e ; 3) tax p o l i c i e s and i n c e n t i v e s (Ross, R., 1983, p. 146). Ross a l s o s p e c u l a t e s t h a t there i s a l i n k a g e between a n t i - u n i o n l e g i s l a t i o n and s o c i a l s e r v i c e p o l i c y f o r : Higher r a t e s of u n i o n i s a t i o n are a s s o c i a t e d with p u b l i c p o l i c i e s which c o n t r i b u t e to the s o c i a l wage (Ross, R., 1983, p. 146). Examples of t h i s are workers' compensation awards, employer--borne insurance c o s t s , w e l f a r e b e n e f i t s , or unemployment compensation (Ross, R., 1983, p. 147). He notes a l s o t h a t higher l e v e l s of s o c i a l b e n e f i t s c o n t r i b u t e i n d i r e c t l y t o labour's a b i l i t y t o b a r g a i n by p r o v i d i n g a " s o c i a l s a f e t y net." A l s o , such p o l i c i e s c o n t r i b u t e to a s e t of p e r c e p t i o n s which d e f i n e what may be l o o s e l y c a l l e d the "business c l i -mate. " In the eyes of c a p i t a l , States whose p o l i c i e s r e f l e c t a h i g h e r s o c i a l wage are o f t e n c o n s i d e r e d to have poor b u s i -ness c l i m a t e s . Ross observes t h a t n a t i o n s p e r c e i v e d by c a p i -t a l as f a v o u r a b l e " e n t e r p r i s e zones" are c h a r a c t e r i s e d by 67 a u t h o r i t a r i a n governments whose p o l i c i e s maintain s t r i c t wage and labour c o n t r o l while o f f e r i n g "tax f o r g i v e n e s s " and "permissive r e g u l a t i o n " (Ross, R., 1983, pp. 154-155). On both the l o c a l and the n a t i o n a l s c a l e i n Canada, these p a t t e r n s of c a p i t a l m o b i l i t y and labour r e s t r u c t u r i n g are evidenced i n the s p a t i a l r e o r g a n i s a t i o n of economic f u n c t i o n s i n the urban, n a t i o n a l and the s u p r a - n a t i o n a l con-t e x t . R e s t r u c t u r i n g i s a l s o evidenced i n changes i n the composition of labour and the p r o f e s s i o n s , the " f l i g h t " of c a p i t a l and the e f f o r t s of the State t o respond t o c a p i t a l i mperatives through l e g i s l a t i o n designed t o reduce the s o c i a l wage and d e t r a c t from the power base of lab o u r . In t h i s l i g h t , one may a p p r e c i a t e Ross's o b s e r v a t i o n t h a t r e d u c t i o n s i n both the p e r s o n a l and the s o c i a l wage i n the West are induced by the c o n t r o l of labour i n newer i n d u s t r i -a l areas such as Singapore or Taiwan (Ross, R. 1983:155). I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o note, a g a i n s t the backdrop of r e s t r a i n t l e g i s l a t i o n i n B r i t i s h Columbia, M i n i s t e r s f o r the govern-ment p u b l i c l y s p e c u l a t e about the c r e a t i o n of " s p e c i a l e n t e r p r i s e zones" which would be exempt from many r e s t r i c -t i o n s on trade as w e l l as freedom from the s t r i c t u r e s of labour l e g i s l a t i o n . 68 2.5 SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC POLICY: GOALS AND CONSTRAINTS In most western c a p i t a l i s t n a t i o n s , the Keynesian w e l f a r e State has served t o d e f i n e the economic s t r u g g l e s and e x p e c t a t i o n s of a g e n e r a t i o n and as such, "the perva-s i v e n e s s of State w e l f a r e makes i t p a r t of the i d e o l o g i c a l context of our l i v e s " (Taylor-Gooby & Dale, 1981, p. 8). The w e l f a r e State i s f a r from a mere p h i l o s o p h i c a l c o n s t r u c t -i t i s not, as some would have i t , an organ of r e v o l u t i o n a r y s o c i a l change (Marxist s c h o l a r s see the w e l f a r e State as a form of o p p r e s s i o n and s o c i a l c o n t r o l : Ginsburg, 1979; Djao, 1983) nor i s i t a p u r e l y t e c h n i c a l e x e r c i s e i n a l l o c a t i o n t h a t can be e a s i l y t i n k e r e d with. The w e l f a r e State compri-ses a set of l e g a l e n t i t l e m e n t s of h i g h l y mixed and hetero-geneous o r i g i n s which pro v i d e s c i t i z e n s with c l a i m s to t r a n s f e r payments as w e l l as to State o r g a n i s e d s e r v i c e s f o r a wide v a r i e t y of d e f i n e d cases of need and contingency (Offe, 1983, p. 238). The means by which the State i n t e r -venes are b u r e a u c r a t i c r u l e s and l e g a l r e g u l a t i o n s , monetary t r a n s f e r s and p r o f e s s i o n a l e x p e r t i s e (Offe, 1983, p. 238). The nature of s o c i a l w e l f a r e - the p a t t e r n of orga-n i s e d a c t i v i t i e s c a r r i e d out by the State - i s c h a r a c t e r i s e d as an attempt t o address the o v e r a l l w e l l - b e i n g of a s o c i e t y a c c o r d i n g to c o l l e c t i v e l y r e c o g n i s e d needs such as h e a l t h , housing, e d u c a t i o n , s o c i a l s e c u r i t y and s o c i a l work (Spick-e r , 1984, p. 1). The d e f i n i t i o n of s o c i a l problems and needs 69 does not occur e x c l u s i v e l y (or even p r i m a r i l y ) as a product of r a t i o n a l d e f i n i t i o n . As the s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l environment i s p e r c e i v e d d i f f e r e n t l y by d i f f e r e n t groups, so too are s o c i a l problems and p u b l i c r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s p e r c e i v e d and d e f i n e d d i f f e r e n t l y . C o n f l i c t over the agenda of s o c i a l i n t e r v e n t i o n and p r o v i s i o n suggests t h a t at l e a s t on a broad s c a l e s o c i a l needs are d e f i n e d i n a p o l i t i c a l context (Taylor-Gooby & Dale, 1981, p. 8; York, 1982, p. 50). In t h e i r a n a l y s i s of c o n f l i c t s between the o b j e c t i v e s of s o c i a l and economic p o l i c y i n the U n ited Kindgom, Davies and Piachaud observe t h a t a common f a c t o r i n both p o s t --Thatcher and pre-Thatcher B r i t a i n i s t h a t the "economy i s i n d i s s o l u b l y l i n k e d with s o c i a l p o l i c y " (Davies & Piachaud, 1983, p. 40). There are broad areas of correspondance be-tween the g o als of s o c i a l and economic p o l i c y : f o r example, economic p o l i c i e s intended t o s t i m u l a t e i n d u s t r y or i n v e s t -ment may serve to a l l e v i a t e unemployment, i n i t s e l f a s o c i a l problem. S i m i l a r l y , s o c i a l p o l i c i e s aimed at improving h e a l t h and e d u c a t i o n may a s s i s t i n economic development and i n n o v a t i o n as w e l l as o f f s e t t i n g the economic and p o l i t i c a l c o s t s of s o c i a l i n s e c u r i t y and c o n f l i c t . D i s t i n c t i o n s be-tween the g o als of s o c i a l and economic p o l i c y are a r b i t r a r y , n e v e r t h e l e s s , economists and s o c i a l p o l i c y makers have o f t e n d e f i n e d goals on t h e i r own and i n c r e a s i n g l y uncompromising terms (Davies & Piachaud, 1983, p. 41). To meet the demands of an i n c r e a s i n g l y complex environment, however, one area of 70 p o l i c y must r e c o g n i s e the c o n s t r a i n t s of the other - s o c i a l p o l i c y d e f i n e d without r e f e r e n c e to economic c o n s t r a i n t s i s as p o t e n t i a l l y d y s f u n c t i o n a l as economic p o l i c y d e f i n e d without r e f e r e n c e to s o c i a l outcomes (Davies & Piachaud, 1983, p. 41). I t i s incumbent upon the p o l i c y s c i e n c e s , says W i t t -rock, to c o n s c i o u s l y forge a l i n k between p o l i c y processes and s o c i e t a l m a c r o-analysis: to a v o i d the dangers of "nar-rowly r a t i o n a l i s t i c management," p o l i c y s c i e n t i s t s must pursue the a n a l y t i c a l task of r e l a t i n g p o l i c y a n a l y s i s to s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l theory (Wittrock, 1983, p. 201). R a t i o -n a l i t y as opposed to p o l i t i c a l d i s c r e t i o n i n the p l a n n i n g , f o r m u l a t i o n and implementation of p o l i c y has been l a r g e l y assumed. There i s , however, no c l e a r s e p a r a t i o n between the t e c h n i c a l and i d e o l o g i c a l f u n c t i o n s of p o l i c y ; every p o l i c y and program has a foundation i n the p o l i t i c a l a r t i c u a l t i o n of values among a v a r i e t y of a c t o r s (Djao, 1983). In c a p i t a -l i s t s o c i e t y the task of economic and s o c i a l p o l i c y i s to d i s c e r n and augment the sources of economic growth. While p h y s i c a l c a p i t a l may have been the most important determi-nant of growth i n i n d u s t r i a l s o c i e t y , i n the p o s t - i n d u s t r i a l e r a , human c a p i t a l and t e c h n i c a l progress have been c o n s i -d e r a b l y more s a l i e n t ( T o f f l e r , 1970; B e l l , 1976; A l l e n , 1984). These r e f l e c t i o n s b r i n g i n t o s e r i o u s q u e s t i o n the economic and s o c i a l assumptions u n d e r l y i n g v a r i o u s neo-- c o n s e r v a t i v e c o n s t r u c t i o n s of p o l i c y ( A l l e n , 1983; Schworm, 1984) . 71 P o l i c y i s an e x p r e s s i o n of the p r i n c i p l e s and i n t e n t of the S t a t e ; i t forms the b a s i s of the conduct of govern-ment and seeks t o l e g i t i m i s e i t s own goals and those of i t s n a t u r a l c o n s t i t u e n c y . At the same time, the S t a t e , through i t s p o l i c y may a c t i v e l y seek the d e l e g i t i m a t i o n of other g o a l s or conduct. In the modern b u r e a u c r a t i c S t a t e , p o l i c i e s may be d e f i n e d at lower l e v e l s of the o r g a n i s a t i o n a l h i e r a r c h y and may thereby come i n t o c o n f l i c t . T h i s i s a problem t h a t c e n t r a l i s a t i o n of the p o l i c y process i s some-times able t o address, although across-the-board a p p l i c a -t i o n s of p o l i c y may l e a d to i n e f f i c i e n c y or d y s f u n c t i o n i n some organs of the S t a t e . For i n s t a n c e , what might the e f f e c t be of a broad s u p e r i m p o s i t i o n of p u b l i c p o l i c i e s t h a t generate unemployment upon a p u b l i c agency whose o r g a n i s a -t i o n a l m i s s i o n i s t o a l l e v i a t e the causes and e f f e c t s of j o b l e s s n e s s ? There are a number of p o l i t i c a l and t e c h n i c a l t r a p s i n t o which any a d m i n i s t r a t i o n might f a l l when f o r m u l a t i n g and implementing p o l i c y . In r e c o g n i t i o n of these t r a p s Wal-l i n (1972) i d e n t i f i e s a number of problems which a systema-t i c a p p r a i s a l of p o l i c y a l t e r n a t i v e s should s t r i v e t o a v o i d . The f i r s t major problem, which has a l r e a d y been a l l u d e d t o , i s t h a t of "cross-purposes." T h i s d e s c r i b e s a s i t u a t i o n i n which programs i n v a r i o u s p a r t s of government have not been s u b j e c t e d to systematic s c r u t i n y and as a r e s u l t may d u p l i -cate or n u l l i f y each other. "Incrementalism" i s another com-mon f a i l i n g of the p o l i c y process and i s expressed as a 72 tendency t o f o l l o w up on p r i o r programs without a r i g o r o u s e v a l u a t i o n of r e s u l t s or a l t e r n a t i v e c o u r s e s . Another o b s t a c l e to r a t i o n a l program management i s the problem of the "squeaky-wheel." T h i s i s the tendency to a l l o c a t e r e s o u r c e s to pressure groups while i g n o r i n g s i l e n t or unor-ganised, yet d e s e r v i n g c o n s t i t u e n t s . Programmatic dysfunc-t i o n may a l s o occur through "ignorance" of the e f f e c t s of p u b l i c programs i n terms of who b e n e f i t s and t o what extent p o l i c y may pose s e r i o u s r a t i o n a l i t y and l e g i t i m a c y problems f o r government. A f i n a l problem d e s c r i b e d by W a l l i n i s t h a t of " l o c k i n g - i n . " L o c k i n g - i n occurs through a f a i l u r e t o a n t i c i p a t e the f i n a n c i a l or resource i m p l i c a t i o n s of budget d e c i s i o n s thus i n c u r r i n g s o c i a l or economic c o s t s through a single-minded p u r s u i t of p o l i c y . The c o s t s of such an approach may be reduced by m u l t i - y e a r p l a n n i n g ( W a l l i n , 1972, pp. 11-12). Of course there are a l s o p o l i t i c a l c o n s t r a i n t s a f -f e c t i n g the conduct of e v a l u a t i v e r e s e a r c h . C o n s t r a i n t s may a r i s e through a l a c k of i s s u e consensus w i t h i n or between the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e s t r u c t u r e of the p u b l i c s e r v i c e , the e l e c t e d policy-makers and/or c o n s t i t u e n t i n t e r e s t groups. The degree of government commitment to e v a l u a t i v e r e s e a r c h may depend on how w e l l the r e s u l t s of r e s e a r c h are l i k e l y t o a c c o r d with i t s o r i e n t i n g p o l i c y v a l u e s . G l e n n e r s t e r (1975) observes t h a t i f p l a n n i n g i s to take p l a c e , t h e r e have to be p o l i t i c a l i n c e n t i v e s f o r government to undertake i t . Taking note of the c r i t i c i s m t h a t governments r a r e l y p l a n ahead, 73 G l e n n e r s t e r observes t h a t any d e c i s i o n on long-term p l a n n i n g i n v o l v e s a s e t of complex p o l i t i c a l and economic t r a d e - o f f s . P l a n n i n g i s p e r c e i v e d as time-consuming and expensive and may e n t a i l p o l i t i c a l c o s t s i n t h a t d i f f i c u l t c h o i c e s must be made e a r l i e r than would otherwise be necessary (Glennerster, 1975, pp. 24-25). R a t i o n a l i t y i n program f o r m u l a t i o n and p l a n n i n g i s t h e r e f o r e r e s p o n s i v e not only to t e c h n i c a l - l e v e l c r i t e r i a , but i s perhaps even more germane t o the i n t e r n a l l o g i c of the " p o l i t i c a l market p l a c e . " T h i s tendency has been observed a l s o by Doyle who a r -gues t h a t i n the " p o l i t i c a l economy of s o c i a l s e r v i c e s , " so-c a l l e d r a t i o n a l budgeting approaches are based more on sa-t i s f y i n g the needs of the system ( s u p p l i e r ) than on the needs of the consumer (Doyle, 1979, p. 54). System needs and the c h a r a c t e r of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the system and i t s c o n s t i t u e n t s are c o n t i n g e n t upon the framing of the p o l i c y p r o c e s s . There are a number of p o s s i b l e permutations of the s t r u c t u r e of decision-making. Incrementalism, a l r e a d y d i s -cussed as an o b s t a c l e to e f f e c t i v e p o l i c y f o r m u l a t i o n i s a l -so a dominant s t r a t e g y f o r government i n i t i a t i v e (Glenner-s t e r , 1975; York, 1982). Linked t o the prevalence of "muddl-i n g through," ad-hocery and s a t i s f i c i n g , i ncrementalism seeks t o "get by" r a t h e r than maximise or o p t i m i s e and com-p r i s e s e f f o r t s at s i m p l i f i c a t i o n and c o n f l i c t avoidance ( G l e n n e r s t e r , 1975, p. 80). Other p l a n n i n g s t r u c t u r e s which may be employed are " l i m i t e d r a t i o n a l i t y " and comprehensive r a t i o n a l i t y . L i m i t e d r a t i o n a l i t y s t r i v e s t o compare a 74 l i m i t e d range of a l t e r n a t i v e s i n the r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t the time needed to compare a l l p o s s i b l e a l t e r n a t i v e s would be p r o h i b i t i v e . Comprehensive r a t i o n a l i t y , on the other hand, i n v o l v e s the systematic a n a l y s i s of a l l p o s s i b l e a l t e r n a -t i v e s , but i s s e r i o u s l y l i m i t e d by a l a c k of knowledge r e g a r d i n g consequences and a b a s i c i n a b i l i t y t o manage what data i s a v a i l a b l e (York, 1982, pp. 19-20). Because of a l a c k of coherent understanding of the o p e r a t i o n s of economic and s o c i a l r e a l i t y and because of the i n t r o d u c t i o n of p o l i t i c a l v a r i a b l e s i n t o the p o l i c y process, p o l i c y makers are o f t e n f o r c e d t o "muddle through," b e f o r e t h e i r decision-making environment becomes even more p r e s s u r i s e d (Gustafsson, 1983, p. 270). I f t here i s a p o l i t i c a l need t o buy time f o r r e t h i n k -i n g or to a v o i d c o n f l i c t , muddling through may be served by p o l i c i e s of a "symbolic" or "pseudo" type which f o r the time being w i l l not s i g n i f i c a n t l y a f f e c t the e x i s t i n g d i s t r i b u -t i o n of goods and s e r v i c e s (Gustafsson, 1983, p. 271). Sym-b o l i c p o l i c y r e f e r s to d e c i s i o n s which are never intended to be f u l l y implemented while pseudo p o l i c i e s are those d e c i -s i o n s which "are not based on a v a i l a b l e knowledge re g a r d i n g p r e c o n d i t i o n s f o r s u c c e s s f u l implementation and (are) t h e r e -f o r e very hard t o execute" (Gustafsson, 1983, p. 275). Gustafsson s e t s out a u s e f u l t a b l e f o r d i s t i n g u i s h i n g p o l i c y t y p e s : 75 Are d e c i s i o n s intended t o be implemented? YES NO YES A Real B Symbolic Are d e c i s i o n s based on a v a i l a b l e knowledge r e g a r d i n g p r e c o n d i t i o n s f o r implementation? NO C Pseudo D Nonsense TABLE 2:1 Typology of p o l i t i c a l d e c i s i o n (From Gustafsson, 1983, p. 276). The typology i n Table 2:1 i s , of course, too s i m p l i s t i c t o f i t the e m p i r i c a l r e a l i t y of p u b l i c decision-making, but as a broad i l l u s t r a t i o n , i t serves as a u s e f u l springboard f o r a n a l y s i s . Rather than conforming to f o u r i d e a l types, p u b l i c p o l i c i e s are c h a r a c t e r i s e d by a mixture of r e a l , symbolic, pseudo and even nonsense components i n d i f f e r e n t p r o p o r t i o n s (Gustafsson, 1983, p. 276). I t i s a l s o necessary t o c a u t i o n t h a t p o l i c y may have two d i s t i n c t r a t i o n a l e s : one f o r p u b l i c consumption and one which i s r a t i f i e d by the d e c i s i o n a l agenda of the S t a t e . What appears as a pseudo, symbolic or nonsense p o l i c y i n the p u b l i c arena may serve a s e t of r a t i o n a l o b j e c t i v e s i n the p o l i t i c a l sphere. 76 CHAPTER I I I V O L U N T A R Y S E C T O R - S T A T E R E L A T I O N S : E C O N O M I C N A T U R E A N D F U N C T I O N O F T H E V O L U N T A R Y S E C T O R Before one can p r o p e r l y d i s c u s s the e f f e c t s of f i s c a l r e s t r a i n t by government upon v o l u n t a r y human s e r v i c e agen-c i e s , t h e i r programs and c l i e n t s , a c l e a r e r d e f i n i t i o n of the nature and c o n t r i b u t i o n of the v o l u n t a r y s e c t o r i n both s o c i a l and economic terms i s r e q u i r e d . To begin, the v o l u n t a r y s e c t o r i s n o n - p r o f i t i n na-t u r e ; agencies w i t h i n t h i s s e c t o r are o f t e n c l a s s e d as cha-r i t a b l e a s s o c i a t i o n s or s o c i e t i e s . They are t y p i c a l l y go-verned by a community-based board of d i r e c t o r s and are s t r u c t u r a l l y independent of government although some may be r e l i a n t upon government f o r funding of t h e i r o p e r a t i o n a l needs (Labatt, 1980). The v o l u n t a r y s e c t o r has h i s t o r i c a l l y r e f l e c t e d the p o l i t i c a l and economic context of s o c i e t y . I t arose i n response t o s o c i a l and t e c h n o l o g i c a l r e v o l u t i o n s which impaired the a b i l i t y of the f a m i l y and the community to absorb and meet the needs of a l a r g e r , more d i s p a r a t e p o p u l a t i o n (Labatt, 1980). In c o n c e r t with t h i s massive so-c i a l and t e c h n o l o g i c a l change, the emergence of the v o l u n t a -ry s e c t o r was p r o p e l l e d by the 19th century l a i s s e z - f a i r e e t h i c of the f r e e market and the i n a b i l i t y , or the u n w i l -l i n g n e s s of government to assume r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r i n d i v i -dual w e l l - b e i n g (Labatt, 1980, p. 3-4). 77 In the modern context, the v o l u n t a r y s e c t o r has ev o l v e d as a broker between government and i t s c o n s t i t u e n t s , f i s c a l l y mandated by government f o r the d e l i v e r y of s e r v i -c e s . In the r e c e n t experience of B r i t i s h Columbia (and t o a g r e a t e r extent i n the United States p a r t i c u l a r l y during the Reagan a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ) , government has i n c r e a s i n g l y sought t o r e d e f i n e the r o l e of the v o l u n t a r y s e c t o r from one of b r o k e r - p a r t n e r s h i p t o adjunct - a r e d e f i n i t i o n which renders the v o l u n t a r y s e c t o r more v u l n e r a b l e t o la p s e s of government commitment. A complex matrix of h i s t o r i c a l events and p o l i -t i c a l s h i f t s i n power and id e o l o g y l e d t o the t r a n s f e r of s o c i a l s e r v i c e r e s p o n s i b i l t y from the p r i v a t e t o the p u b l i c s e c t o r . One s a l i e n t f e a t u r e of t h i s s h i f t i s t h a t with i n -c r e a s i n g o r g a n i s a t i o n a l complexity and the growing r e c o g n i -t i o n of s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l p l u r a l i s m , government has been p e r c e i v e d as the onl y l o g i c a l auspice with the e n a b l i n g power and resou r c e s t o secure p r o g r e s s i v e and i n n o v a t i v e change through s e r v i c e d e l i v e r y . However, with the advent of the r e c e s s i o n i n the l a t e 1970's and the consequent r e s t r u c -t u r i n g of the economies of many western c a p i t a l i s t n a t i o n s , p o l i t i c a l economic pre s s u r e s have come to bear on govern-ments such t h a t s o c i a l p o l i c y i s i n c r e a s i n g l y marked by a s h i f t i n g onus of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r s o c i a l w e l l - b e i n g back to the p r i v a t e s e c t o r . However, the i n t e l l e c t u a l r a t i o n a l e f o r such a t r a n s f e r begs the q u e s t i o n of whether the 78 v o l u n t a r y s e c t o r i s able or w i l l i n g t o assume such a burden, and a l s o b e l i e s the o v e r a l l importance of t h i s s e c t o r t o the economy of the n a t i o n . In l a r g e p a r t , the a t t i t u d e of some policy-makers t h a t the v o l u n t a r y s e c t o r i s not assuming i t s f u l l share of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r s o c i a l p r o v i s i o n a r i s e s as a f u n c t i o n of the nebulous c h a r a c t e r of the v o l u n t a r y s e c t o r and the cha-r a c t e r of boh i t s workers and i t s product. Hawrylyshyn (1978) has e x p l o r e d the economic nature and value of v o l u n -t e e r a c t i v i t y i n Canada i n response to a p e r c e i v e d need f o r an economic d e f i n i t i o n of v o l u n t e e r s e r v i c e s . He observes t h a t v o l u n t e e r p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n v o l v e s " s e r v i c e " t o persons other than the v o l u n t e e r , and f u r t h e r , t h a t the b e n e f i t s of these a c t i v i t i e s accrue to persons other than the v o l u n t e e r . Because these a c t i v i t i e s t y p i c a l l y take p l a c e o u t s i d e of the t r a d i t i o n a l cash market, Hawrylyshyn employs the concept of the " t h i r d person market c r i t e r i o n " t o g i v e some shape to a d e f i n i t i o n of 'economic v o l u n t e e r s e r v i c e s , ' where: Economic Volunteer S e r v i c e s are those a c t i v i t i e s which were done by a person o u t s i d e the market but may have been accomplished by a t h i r d person from the eco-nomic market; they are d i s t i n g u i s h e d from household work by the f a c t t h a t the b e n e f i t s accrue to someone other than the v o l u n t e e r or the v o l u n t e e r ' s immediate f a m i l y (Hawrylyshyn, 1978, p. 3). 79 To g i v e f u r t h e r c l a r i t y t o t h i s c o n c e p t , he a s k s : ... c o u l d t h e same a c t i v i t y y i e l d e q u i v a l e n t r e s u l t s i f p e r f o r m e d by a T h i r d P e r s o n h i r e d upon t h e m a r k e t a t a p r i c e ? ( H a w r y l y s h y n , 1978, p . 3 ) . I n h i s schema, H a w r y l y s h y n d i s t i n g u i s h e s between " s o c i a l - b e n e f i t " a c t i o n s and " s e l f - b e n e f i t " a c t i o n s , t h e f o r m e r b e i n g t h e p r o p e r s u b j e c t o f s t u d y , a l t h o u g h he r e c o g -n i s e s t h a t , i n some c a s e s , a r a n g e o f b e n e f i t s may a c c r u e t o t h e v o l u n t e e r t h r o u g h h i s s e r v i c e t o o t h e r s ( H a w r y l y s h y n , 1978, p. 7 ) . He a l s o d i s t i n g u i s h e s between c h a r i t a b l e dona-t i o n s w h i c h m e r e l y t r a n s f e r a l r e a d y e x i s t i n g e c o n o m i c v a l u e f r o m one p e r s o n t o a n o t h e r , and eco n o m i c v o l u n t e e r s e r v i c e s (EVS) w h i c h c r e a t e a new k i n d o f v a l u e . T h i s d i s t i n c t i o n , he c o n t e n d s , i s d i r e c t l y a n a l o g o u s t o e c o n o m i c d i s t i n c t i o n s b e -tween t r a n s f e r s o f w e a l t h and t h e p r o d u c t i o n o f new goods and s e r v i c e s ( H a w r y l y s h y n , 1978, p . 10 ) . T h e r e a r e two b a s i c t y p e s o f breakdown r e q u i r e d i n H a w r y l y s h y n ' s a n a l y s i s : breakdown by a g e n c y t y p e , and b r e a k -down o f t h e n a t u r e o f t h e t a s k o r i n p u t p e r f o r m e d by t h e v o l u n t e e r ( H a w r y l y s h y n , 1978, pp. 13-14 & 20-21) . H a w r y l y -s h y n c i t e s d a t a w h i c h d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t low o r u n s k i l l e d i n p u t s c o m p r i s e s l i g h t l y l e s s t h a n h a l f o f t h e t o t a l v o l u n -t e e r r e q u i r e m e n t . He a l s o s u g g e s t s t h a t h i g h e r s k i l l - l e v e l c a t e g o r i e s ( i e m a n a g e r i a l , m e d i c a l , l e g a l ) a r e p r o b a b l y u n d e r - r e p r e s e n t e d i n t h e d a t a ( H a w r y l y s h y n , 1978, pp. 27-80 -29). It i s also important to note that some services are more labour-intensive than others and, conversely, some are more s k i l l - i n t e n s i v e , or demanding of greater expertise. While i t i s inappropriate here to reproduce Hawryly-shyn 1s breakdown of agency type and work c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s i t i s important to understand that these two factors weigh heavily i n his determination of the "dollar value" of volun teer services. Hawrylyshyn employs a measure of "market re-placement cost" to derive t h i s value, and he expresses t h i s value as the cost of replacing "performed services with equivalent labour hired at a current market rate" (Hawryly-shyn, 1978, p. 49). Using data from the Metro Toronto Volun teer Centre on the number of volunteers and volunteer hours tendered and using estimates of the dollar-value equivalent for tasks performed, Hawrylyshyn found: ... i f we take the $1000 (per annum, per volunteer, as an approximate valuation of service tendered - my parentheses) as a lower bound and approximately repre-sentative for 1975, the gross value of volunteer servi ces performed by the 5,334 people referred v i a the Met ro Toronto Volunteer Centre i n 1975 ... i s $5,334,000 a major operation i f i t were counted as a market a c t i -v i t y (Hawrylyshyn, 1978, p. 60). In a previous study (0. Hawrylyshyn, Estimating the Value o Household Work in Canada, 1971; 1978), using a conservative estimate of the number of volunteers for Canada i n 1971, Hawrylyshyn placed the t o t a l value of volunteer services (based on 1.26 m i l l i o n volunteers) at about $1,045 m i l l i o n , 81 or 1.1% of Canada's GNP f o r t h a t year ($93,307 m i l l i o n ) (Hawrylyshyn, 1978, p. 60). C l e a r l y , t h i s c o n s t i t u t e s an important aspect of Canada's t o t a l economy, indeed, i n c r e a s e d a t t r i t i o n i n the p u b l i c s e c t o r and r i s i n g unemployment i n the i n t e r v e n i n g years may have l e d to an o v e r a l l r i s e i n v o l u n t e e r p a r t i c i -p a t i o n i n s e r v i c e agencies. There are, however, few informa-t i o n sources on v o l u n t e e r a c t i v i t y i n Canada; imprecise and imperfect i n f o r m a t i o n can l e a d t o s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e s i n f i n d i n g s . Although i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o deny the importance of the v o l u n t a r y s e c t o r as an economic a c t i v i t y , there are spe-c i f i c gaps i n i n f o r m a t i o n which p r e c l u d e a p r e c i s e formula-t i o n of v o l u n t e e r i n p u t : 1) There are no conventions or c l a s s i f i c a t i o n schemes f o r agencies or f o r types of v o l u n t e e r work. 2) There i s no uniform system of r e c o r d i n g v o l u n t e e r time. 3) There i s no data from the Canadian Census or any other c e n s u s - l i k e i n f o r m a t i o n t o p r o v i d e , i n some base-year, a benchmark of the magnitude of v o l u n t e e r a c t i o n , nationwide. 4) Surveys and case s t u d i e s p r o v i d i n g hard data are few and f a r between. 5) There i s no c o n s i s t e n t data resource i n any of the urban c e n t r e s - some c i t y v o l u n t e e r c e n t r e s have b e t t e r f i l e s and i n f o r m a t i o n than o t h e r s . 6) General time-use surveys p r e s e n t l y d e f i n e v o l u n t e e r a c t i o n too b r o a d l y . 82 7 ) There i s l i t t l e l i t e r a t u r e of a t h e o r e t i c a l or other non-empirical nature which addresses the question, "what do volunteers do and how much i s i t worth?" 8 ) No comprehensive studies exist of apparently available job descriptions. 9 ) No systematic analysis exists of the quantitative role played by volunteer centres i n the t o t a l vo-lunteer recruitment picture. 1 0 ) No studies exist on the effectiveness of volunteer work as compared to paid labour i n equivalent jobs. (Hawrylyshyn, 1 9 7 8 , pp. 6 8 - 7 0 ) . Although Hawrylyshyn's analysis of the economic value of volunteer work i s suggestive of the o v e r a l l importance of non-public provision of services, i t i s an incomplete mea-sure, both for the reasons c i t e d and because the voluntary sector, broadly defined, includes also some aspect of paid labour, transfers, services for fee, and r e - a l l o c a t i o n of resources - physical as well as monetary. Thus we add yet another set of unknowns to the questions of the t o t a l range and scope of the voluntary sector, whose very name does not connote the f u l l extent of i t s reach. Also, Hawrylyshyn*s analysis yields l i t t l e insight into the increasingly p o l i t i -c ised environment within which the voluntary sector must function. One r e s u l t of the emergence of a bureaucratised welfare State has been the weakening of the brokerage role of the non-public human service sector - now, non-profit agencies look to government, as much as they look to t h e i r constitutents, for d e f i n i t i o n of t h e i r role and function. 83 With the growth of co r p o r a t e c a p i t a l i s m , i n d u s t r i a l i -s a t i o n i s no longer the l e a d i n g edge of s o c i a l and t e c h n o l o -g i c a l change. I n c r e a s i n g l y , the p o l i t y i s dominated by l a r g e - s c a l e o r g a n i s a t i o n s , p u b l i c and p r i v a t e (Labatt, 1980 pp. 9-10). As La b a t t has observed: Government and co r p o r a t e interdependence i s i n c r e a s i n g and government d e c i s i o n s favour b u r e a u c r a t i c s e l f -- i n t e r e s t over i n d i v i d u a l need (Labatt, 1980, p. 10). In the face of t h i s c o r p o r a t i s t domination of socio-economic r e l a t i o n s and the attendant changes i n the o c c u p a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e of the s o c i e t y at l a r g e , the extent of i n d i v i d u a l access t o the s o c i a l wage may, i n the face of s o c i a l and economic r e s t r u c t u r i n g , a f f o r d i n d i v i d u a l s g r e a t e r or l e s s e r o p p o r t u n i t y t o b e n e f i t . D y s f u c t i o n , or d i s j u n c t u r e i n the o r g a n i s a t i o n a l web c o u l d l e a d t o a broadening and deepening of s o c i a l d i s p a r i t y . C r i s e s of c a p i t a l i s m and the s o - c a l l e d c r i s i s of the we l f a r e State are i n p a r t o r g a n i s a t i o n a l c r i s e s which are manifested as a f a i l u r e t o e f f e c t i v e l y mediate c l a s s and c a p i t a l r e l a t i o n s . The v o l u n t a r y s e c t o r i s predominantly composed of s m a l l - s c a l e , fragmented, and i s o l a t e d member agencies, and ac c o r d i n g t o L a b a t t : i s i n an i n f e r i o r p o s i t i o n t o government and corpora t e s e c t o r s when i t comes to i n f l u e n c i n g the nature and s c a l e of s o c i a l reform (Labatt, 1980, p. 11). 84 In f a c t , what have p o p u l a r l y been regarded as the t r a d i t i o n -a l s t r e n g t h s of the v o l u n t a r y s e c t o r - i n n o v a t i o n , p l u r a l i s m , the promotion of volun t e e r i s m , and s o c i a l change through ad-vocacy, have been s e r i o u s l y impaired through the advent and growth of p u b l i c p r o v i s i o n (Labatt, 1980; Kramer, 1979; Schorr, 1970). S t i l l , i t i s not reasonable t o suggest, as do many neo-conservative w r i t e r s , t h a t the wholesale d e v o l u t i o n of p u b l i c w e l f a r e systems and d e r e g u l a t i o n of the p r i v a t e s e c t o r alone w i l l l e a d t o a resumption of these t r a d i t i o n a l r o l e s . In f a c t , as w i l l be d i s c u s s e d f u r t h e r , i t has been suggested t h a t the v o l u n t a r y s e r v i c e s e c t o r i s so i n e x t r i c a -b l y t i e d , f i s c a l l y and i d e o l o g i c a l l y , with government(s) through dependence or r e g u l a t i o n , t h a t i t c o u l d never again take on any but an augmenting r o l e w i t h i n the p o l i t i c a l eco-nomy of s o c i a l s e r v i c e s . There are l i n k a g e s between the f i s c a l p o l i c i e s of go-vernment and the presence and form of the v o l u n t a r y s e c t o r . In the Un i t e d S t a t e s , m u l t i p l e funding mechanisms f o r the v o l u n t a r y s e c t o r have l e f t l i t t l e room f o r program c o n s i s -tency on the n a t i o n a l l e v e l . Competition f o r grants i n an u n c e r t a i n economic environment has l e d to a v o l u n t a r i s t i c s e c t o r t h a t i s more o p p o r t u n i s t i c , c o m p e t i t i v e , entrepreneu-r i a l , and p o l i t i c a l (Labatt, 1980, p. 15). In Canada, the r o l e of the v o l u n t a r y s e c t o r w i t h i n the o v e r a l l f i e l d of p r o v i s i o n i s s t r o n g l y t i e d t o F e d e r a l and P r o v i n c i a l man-dates r e l a t i n g t o s o c i a l and h e a l t h s e r v i c e s , a w e l l as t o 85 p r e v a i l i n g p o l i t i c a l i d e o l o g i e s . Thus, the importance of the v o l u n t a r y s e c t o r w i t h i n the o v e r a l l s e r v i c e network may vary g r e a t l y , depending on which p a r t y or i n d i v i d u a l s are i n power (Labatt, 1980, p. 16). Inherent i n the r e l a t i o n s between the p u b l i c and the v o l u n t a r y s e c t o r are i s s u e s of the a c c o u n t a b i l i t y , r e l e v a n c e , and autonomy of v o l u n t a r y agencies. For example, the p r e d i s p o s i t i o n of governments to p r o v i d e d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g f o r agencies i n the face of a g e n e r a l r e d u c t i o n i n community funding may a f f e c t the c a p a c i t y of agencies to maintain standards or c r e a t e new programs (Labatt, 1980, p. 16). In a d d i t i o n , these i s s u e s are f u r t h e r complicated through the t e n s i o n s which e x i s t between n o n - p r o f i t s and p r o p r i e t a r y agencies. One f a c e t of t h i s t e n s i o n i s expressed as a s h i f t i n focus from "how" a s e r v i c e i s p r o v i d e d t o "who" p r o v i d e s the s e r v i c e (Labatt, 1980, p. 15). Demone and Gibelman remark t h a t government s o c i a l po-l i c y i n the U.S. has sought to expand the use of v o l u n t a r i s m as a v e h i c l e f o r s o c i a l s e r v i c e d e l i v e r y . In 1964 the pro-p o r t i o n of a l l agencies u s i n g v o l u n t e e r s was 72 percent; by 1981 the p r o p o r t i o n had r i s e n t o 76 p e r c e n t . The absolute i n c r e a s e i n the number of v o l u n t e e r s d u r i n g the p e r i o d from 1964 t o 1981, however, was 69 percent, matched by a propor-t i o n a l growth i n the numbers of s e r v i c e s and c l i e n t s (Demone & Gibelman, 1984, p. 424). Not o n l y have v o l u n t e e r s i n -c r e a s e d i n number, but they have changed i n f u n c t i o n as 86 w e l l , performing d u t i e s t h a t are more demanding of the v o l u n t e e r ' s s k i l l l e v e l s and experience. In 1964, the pro-p o r t i o n of v o l u n t e e r s used i n d i r e c t s e r v i c e d e l i v e r y was 17 pe r c e n t . By 19 81, however, the p r o p o r t i o n of v o l u n t e e r s i n -v o l v e d i n d i r e c t s e r v i c e s was 51 per c e n t . T h i s l a t t e r f i g u r e i s down from a peak reached i n the mid-1970's, a r e v e r s a l which may be a t t r i b u t e d t o a number of f a c t o r s such as the f e m i n i s t movement, or the movement of more women i n t o the labour f o r c e (Demone & Gibelman, 1984 p. 424). In the case of the United Kingdom, Norman Johnson w r i t e s t h a t the p o l i c y of the Thatcher government of c u t t i n g s o c i a l expenditure (as with the Reagan a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n the U.S., and the Bennett government i n B.C.) f o r c e s an even g r e a t e r p u b l i c r e l i a n c e upon v o l u n t a r y s o c i a l s e r v i c e s (Johnson, 1981, p. 4). Johnson observes t h a t i n B r i t a i n , p a i d workers i n s o c i a l s e r v i c e s are g r e a t l y outnumbered by unpaid v o l u n t e e r s . From t h i s o b s e r v a t i o n two i s s u e s a r i s e immediately: a) once again, the a s s e r t i o n by government t h a t the community-at-large ought t o be r e s p o n s i b l e f o r s o c i a l s e r v i c e s i m p l i c i t l y ignores the scope and importance of the v o l u n t a r y s e c t o r ; and b) i n c r e a s e d r e l i a n c e on the v o l u n t a r y s e c t o r w i l l put g r e a t e r pressure on agencies t o secure s k i l l e d (hence, paid) personnel - t h i s i n s p i t e of the f a c t t h a t the f i n a n c i a l commitment of government i s dimin i s h e d . As Johnson says: 87 ... the p o l i c y of the present government seems t o as-sume e i t h e r t h a t v o l u n t a r y s o c i a l s e r v i c e s have spare c a p a c i t y at present or t h a t they can i n c r e a s e t h e i r c a -p a c i t y f a i r l y r e a d i l y (Johnson, 1981, p. 5). For Johnson, the q u e s t i o n i s whether the v o l u n t a r y s e c t o r i s both w i l l i n g and able t o accept the g r e a t l y aug-mented r o l e expected of them (Johnson, 1981, p. 5). He suggests, r a t h e r , t h a t v o l u n t a r y agencies do not want to take over l a r g e areas of s t a t u t o r y p r o v i s i o n and, f u r t h e r -more, t h a t most would r a t h e r see an expansion than a con-t r a c t i o n of the mandate of the State (Johnson, 19 81, p. 5-6). Important to c o n s i d e r a l s o i n t h i s d i s c u s s i o n are i s s u e s of e q u i t y and a c c e s s i b i l i t y t o p u b l i c s e r v i c e s which are a p a r t of the mandate of the w e l f a r e S t a t e . I f the State i s t o pass the onus f o r p r o v i s i o n of s p e c i f i c s e r v i c e s over t o the p r i v a t e s e c t o r , w i l l i t yet r e t a i n the r e g u l a t o r y powers which enable i t t o ensure e q u i t y ? One assumes t h a t governments r e c o g n i s e the n e c e s s i t y to m a i n tain some r e s i -dual w e l f a r e f u n c t i o n f o r those whose needs cannot be met i n the p r i v a t e s e c t o r . In a d d i t i o n , there i s a broad range of p u b l i c l y - p r o v i d e d w e l f a r e and h e a l t h s e r v i c e s which would be an u n f e a s i b l e undertaking f o r any p r i v a t e s e c t o r concern -s o c i a l s e c u r i t y t r a n s f e r s , h o s p i t a l s , p u b l i c education - a l l must remain w i t h i n the domain of the State i n order to assure u n i v e r s a l i t y and a c c e s s i b i l i t y . 88 One problem of v o l u n t a r y p r o v i s i o n i n t h i s r e g a r d i s i t s uneven d i s t r i b u t i o n . T h i s i s apparent both i n the geo-g r a p h i c a l spread of v o l u n t a r y s o c i a l s e r v i c e s and i n the d i s t r i b u t i o n of v o l u n t a r y e f f o r t among d i f f e r e n t areas of need (Johnson, 1981, p. 5) . P r i v a t i s a t i o n , i f i t i s t o pro-ceed with a modicum of r a t i o n a l i t y , w i l l have t o i n c o r p o r a t e tandem f u n c t i o n s of c o - o r d i n a t i o n and p l a n n i n g . T h i s poses an i n t e r e s t i n g d i a l e c t i c f o r the policy-makers of s o - c a l l e d " f r e e e n t e r p r i s e " governments. On the one hand, there i s some impetus f o r the r e t r a c t i o n and c o n t r a c t i o n of govern-ment, spurred, i n p a r t , by an i d e o l o g i c a l commitment to r e d u c i n g government i n t e r v e n t i o n i n c e r t a i n areas of human a c t i v i t y . On the other hand, given the l i m i t a t i o n s imposed by a d i m i n i s h e d resource base and the simultaneous e x t e n s i o n of government c o n t r o l , the v o l u n t a r y s e c t o r i s s u b j e c t e d to even g r e a t e r c o n s t r a i n t s upon i t s s e r v i c e and advocacy func-t i o n s . While neo-conservative t h e o r i s t s argue t h a t the c o e r -c i v e power of the State i s thus reduced, so too i s the ena-b l i n g power of the State working through the v o l u n t a r y sec-t o r reduced. The c o n t r a d i c t i o n i s t h a t governments, while e x t o l l i n g the v i r t u e s of v o l u n t a r i s m and s e l f - h e l p , s i m u l t a -neously e x e r t a degree of economic and p o l i t i c a l c o n t r o l which may impair the o r g a n i s a t i o n a l m i s s i o n of the v o l u n t a r y s e c t o r . Recognising the c o n t r a d i c t i o n s i n h e r e n t i n the pub-l i c and p r i v a t e p r o v i s i o n of s e r v i c e s , Johnson has p r o v i d e d 89 a s u c c i n c t framing of the pl a n n i n g imperatives which a r i s e from t h i s d i a l e c t i c : A balance has t o be s t r u c k between the need f o r i n -dependence and the need f o r a c c o u n t a b i l i t y when govern-ment funds are being spent, and between the need f o r g r e a t e r u n i f o r m i t y i n the p r o v i s i o n of v o l u n t a r y s o c i a l s e r v i c e s and the need f o r i n n o v a t i o n and sp o n t a n e i t y . F i n a l l y , the d e s i r e t o c u t out waste by reducing the amount of o v e r l a p p i n g and d u p l i c a t i o n has to be s e t ag a i n s t the d e s i r e t o pr o v i d e consumers with a ch o i c e (Johnson, 1981, pp. 124-125). 3.1 AGENCY TYPES AND GOVERNMENT FUNDING ARRANGEMENTS There e x i s t f o u r broad s e c t o r s concerned with meeting human needs: 1) the i n f o r m a l s e c t o r , comprising f a m i l y and c l o s e r e l a t i v e s , f r i e n d s and neighbours; 2) non--governmental, n o t - f o r - p r o f i t agencies, which may or may not r e l y on v o l u n t e e r inputs and which may be o r g a n i s e d under c h a r i t a b l e or p r o f e s s i o n a l a u s p i c e s ; 3) the commercial, or p r o p r i e t a r y s e c t o r which c o n s i s t s of i n d i v i d u a l s or agencies who supply s e r v i c e t o consumers f o r a p r o f i t ; 4) the p u b l i c or s t a t u t o r y s e c t o r , i n v o l v i n g , i n some way, a l l three l e v e l s of government - f e d e r a l , m u n i c i p a l and p r o v i n c i a l (United Way, SPAR/SPARC J o i n t Committee, 1980, Report #1, p. 5; Hatch, 19 80, p. 14). There are some b a s i c s i m i l a r i t i e s among v o l u n t a r i s t i c s o c i a l s e r v i c e agenices, although i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o 3 o 90 g e n e r a l i s e about volu n t a r y o r g a n i s a t i o n s as a whole as there are many types of agencies p r o v i d i n g d i f f e r e n t types of s e r v i c e . The e s s e n t i a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s shared by agencies i n the v o l u n t a r y sector are: a) they are o r g a n i s a t i o n s r a t h e r than i n f o r m a l groups; b) i n d i v i d u a l agencies are not e s t a b l i s h e d by s t a t u t e or s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y , although they are to a degree subject to s t a t u t o r y and o f t e n f i s c a l c o n t r o l by government; c) they are not commercial i n the sense of p r o f i t --making (Hatch, 1980, p. 1 5 ) . A l s o , v o l u n t a r i n e s s i s not a d i a g n o s t i c feature of voluntary o r g a n i s a t i o n s . They are not n e c e s s a r i l y s m a l l e r , more i n f o r -mal or spontaneous, or l e s s h i e r a r c h i c a l than s t a t u t o r y s e r v i c e s and may be dependent on p a i d s t a f f (Hatch 1980 p. 2 8 ) . Non-governmental o r g a n i s a t i o n s (NGO's) have assumed a number of forms - both f o r - p r o f i t and n o n - p r o f i t i n o r i e n t a -t i o n . For the purposes of t h i s t h e s i s , a l l reference to NGO's except where e x p l i c i t l y s t a t e d , are concerned with the v o l u n t a r y or n o n - p r o f i t s e c t o r . While profit-making agencies have t h e i r niche i n the planning and c o - o r d i n a t i o n matrix f o r s o c i a l s e r v i c e s , there are s p e c i a l problems as s o c i a t e d w i t h them which w i l l be drawn-out i n the course of t h i s study. Over the years, what were o r i g i n a l l y c h a r i t a b l e s e r -v i c e o r g a n i s a t i o n s have i n c r e a s i n g l y become agents i n the 91 d e l i v e r y of government s o c i a l s e r v i c e s , e s p e c i a l l y a f t e r the enactment of the Canada A s s i s t a n c e Plan (CAP) i n 1966 (So-c i a l P l a n n i n g C o u n c i l of Metro Toronto/United Way of Greater Toronto 1983 p. 1). The broad o b j e c t i v e s of the Canada A s s i s t a n c e P l a n were "the l e s s e n i n g , removal or p r e v e n t i o n of the causes and e f f e c t s of poverty, c h i l d n e g l e c t , or dependence on p u b l i c a s s i s t a n c e " (Armitage, 1975, p 149). The CAP marked the e n t r y f o r the f i r s t time (apart from Veterans S e r v i c e s ) of the F e d e r a l government i n t o the fund-in g of s o c i a l s e r v i c e s . Although the e n t r y of the F e d e r a l government i n t o t h i s f i e l d was at the r e s i d u a l l e v e l of s e r v i c e s t o those on s o c i a l a s s i s t a n c e , c h i l d w e l f a r e s e r -v i c e s , and community development s e r v i c e s , the i n t r o d u c t i o n of c o s t - s h a r i n g with P r o v i n c i a l governments assured a F e d e r a l presence i n the area of S t a t e - d e l i v e r e d s o c i a l s e r v i c e s , f o r m e r l y the s o l e j u r i s d i c t i o n of the Provinces (Djao, 1983, p. 132). The economic presence of the F e d e r a l government i n the p r o v i s i o n of s o c i a l s e r v i c e s was important i n e s t a b l i s h -i n g the e x i s t i n g network of s o c i a l s e r v i c e s and enabled a g r e a t e r e x t e n s i o n by the Provinces i n t o the realm of person-a l and community s e r v i c e s . I t a l s o enabled the e x t e n s i o n of p u b l i c funding t o p r i v a t e s e r v i c e o r g a n i s a t i o n s who p r e v i -o u s l y depended upon p h i l a n t h r o p i c donors, community-chests and v o l u n t e e r i s m f o r support. The p r o v i s i o n of o p e r a t i n g grants f o r n o n - p r o f i t o r g a n i s a t i o n s combined with the 92 Canadian p u b l i c ' s growing sense of urgency about s o c i a l problems i n the l a t e 19 60's and e a r l y 70's, c r e a t e d the b a s i s f o r the r a p i d expansion i n both number and c a p a b i l i t y of the v o l u n t a r y s e c t o r during the p e r i o d from 1966 t o 1975. Government support of n o n - p r o f i t agencies found j u s t i -f i c a t i o n i n a number of ways: a) i t p e r m i t t e d an e x t e n s i o n of s e r v i c e s i n t o s e r v i c e f i e l d s or communities which c o u l d not be accommodated w i t h i n the s t r u c t u r e of the s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y ; b) i t allowed the s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y t o m aintain an arms-- l e n g t h r e l a t i o n s h i p from c l i e n t groups or problem types f o r whom a precedent of s t a t u t o r y p r o v i s i o n was not d e s i r e d ; c) i t r e i n f o r c e d the t r a d i t i o n a l ethos of community s e l f -- r e l i a n c e and community r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r some types of s o c i a l s e r v i c e s ; d) the d e l i v e r y of s t a t u t o r y and n o n - s t a t u t o r y s e r v i c e s through n o n - p r o f i t , non-governmental agencies i s l e s s expensive and ensures g r e a t e r c i t i z e n involvement and l a t i t u d e f o r d i r e c t f i s c a l c o n t r o l than i s a f f o r d e d by the p u b l i c s e c t o r bureaucracy; 93 e) the s a t i s f a c t i o n of the s p e c i a l i s e d needs of a d e l i m i t e d group may be regarded as best assured by s p e c i a l i s e d agencies r a t h e r than through g e n e r i c s o c i a l programs; f) governments may support.the non-government s e c t o r when the form of p r o v i s i o n i s experimental or i n n o v a t i v e . The v o l u n t a r y s e c t o r thereby becomes a proofing-ground f o r a l t e r n a t i v e i n t e r v e n t i o n s t r a t e g i e s . L a b a t t i d e n t i f i e s f i v e types of v o l u n t a r i s t i c or n o n - p r o f i t agencies, each, with i t s own o r g a n i s a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e : 1) P r i v a t e s e r v i c e agency (e.g. a f a m i l y s e r v i c e agency): t h i s type of agency i s accountable t o i t s e l f through a s e l f -- p e r p e t u a t i n g board of d i r e c t o r s . T h e i r use of c l i e n t s i n policy-making r o l e s i s minimal. They t y p i c a l l y r e l y on a m u l t i p l e - f u n d i n g base and take p a r t i n annual f u n d - r a i s i n g d r i v e s . In B r i t i s h Columbia and Saskatchewan such agencies have had t o r e l y on d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g from government t o meet t h e i r annual budgets. Although accountable t o i t s e l f , the autonomy of such an agency i s ensured o n l y so long as community-based funds are g r e a t e r than those of government. Some problems with the p r i v a t e s e r v i c e agency are the dangers of i r r e l e v a n c e , e l i t i s m , and i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s a t i o n a r i s i n g out of i t s narrow scope, s p e c i a l i s e d f u n c t i o n , and i t s b u r e a u c r a t i c p r o f e s s i o n a l s t r u c t u r e . 94 2) C o n t e m p o r a r y s e r v i c e o r g a n i s a t i o n s (CSO): t h e s e a r e c o m m u n i t y - b a s e d i n f o r m a t i o n and r e f e r r a l c e n t r e s and s t r e e t c l i n i c s . F o r t h e most p a r t t h e y assume t h e r o l e o f a l t e r -n a t i v e a g e n c i e s w i t h t h e aim o f n a r r o w i n g t h e gap between o f f i c i a l p r o g r a m s and c l i e n t - i d e n t i f i e d n e e d s . T h e i r human-i s t i c and v o l u n t a r i s t i c e m p h a s i s has e n a b l e d them t o e x i s t f o r some t i m e on v o l u n t a r y f i n a n c i a l and l a b o u r c o n t r i b u -t i o n s , however, L a b a t t p o i n t s o u t t h a t c o n t i n u e d s u c c e s s depends on s e c u r i n g government f u n d s . B e c a u s e o f t h i s , s u c h o r g a n i s a t i o n s a r e i n h e r e n t l y u n s t a b l e - t h e i r c o n t i n u e d e x i s t e n c e i n v o l v e s a s t r u g g l e t o s u r v i v e w i t h o u t b e i n g c o - o p t e d and f o r m a l i s e d . A l w a y s on t h e f r i n g e o f b e i n g a n e c e s s a r y s e r v i c e , CSO's a r e u s u a l l y t h e f i r s t t o s u f f e r a t t r i t i o n i n t i m e s o f e c o n o m i c r e s t r a i n t . 3) Q u a s i - g o v e r n m e n t a l o r g a n i s a t i o n s ( e g . t h e G r e a t e r V a n c o u -v e r M e n t a l H e a l t h S e r v i c e ) : T h e s e a r e n o n - p r o f i t i n n a t u r e and o p e r a t e u n d e r t h e a u t h o r i t y o f a c o m m u n i t y - b a s e d b o a r d o f d i r e c t o r s . Q u a s i - g o v e r n m e n t a l o r g a n i s a t i o n s , o r Quango's, as t h e y a r e sometimes c a l l e d , a r e f u n d e d e x c l u s i v e l y by go-v e r n m e n t . The a g e n c y i s an i n s t r u m e n t o f t h e P r o v i n c i a l and m u n i c i p a l g o v e r n m e n t s and e x i s t s t o s e r v e t h e i r p u b l i c p u r -p o s e s . The a g e n c y ' s g o a l s , s t r u c t u r e , f u n c t i o n and d e g r e e o f c i t i z e n p a r t i c i p a t i o n a r e p r e s c r i b e d a t t h e t i m e o f c o n -t r a c t i n g f o r s e r v i c e . The a g e n c y b o a r d may d e c i d e "how" s e r v i c e i s t o be d e l i v e r e d , b u t "what" s e r v i c e i s d e l i v e r e d 95 i s b e y o n d a g e n c y c o n t r o l . In t h i s r e s p e c t , t h e a d v o c a c y f u n c t i o n o f t h e agen c y i s i m p a i r e d , as b o t h t h e p u r p o s e and f u n d i n g o f t h e a g e n c y c o u l d be h e l d i n j e o p a r d y s h o u l d t h e a g e n c y r u n c o u n t e r t o t h e i n t e r e s t s o f t h e f u n d i n g body. 4) P r i v a t e p u b l i c s e r v i c e p r o v i d e r s : T h e s e a r e p r o b a b l y t h e most s e c u r e o f a l l v o l u n t a r y s e r v i c e o r g a n i s a t i o n s . They a r e s i m i l a r t o t h e p r i v a t e a g e n c y i n s t r u c t u r e , b u t r e l y a l m o s t e x c l u s i v e l y on government f u n d s ( e g . n o n - s t a t u t o r y c h i l d -- c a r e a g e n c i e s and i n s t i t u t i o n s f o r t h e a g e d ) . They a r e o f -t e n c o n s i d e r e d an e s s e n t i a l , o n - g o i n g s e r v i c e b u t a r e s u b -j e c t t o m i n i m a l s t a n d a r d s i n t h e hopes o f k e e p i n g c o s t s down. B e c a u s e o f t h i s , p r o b l e m s o f g o a l - d e f l e c t i o n ( f r o m s e r v i c e o r t h e c l i e n t t o t h e o r g a n i s a t i o n a l needs o f t h e ag e n c y ) a r i s e when t h r e a t s o f government t a k e - o v e r o r d i s -c o n t i n u a t i o n o f f u n d i n g looms i n t h e b a c k g r o u n d . 5) V o l u n t a r y s e l f - h e l p and community e d u c a t i o n a s s o c i a t i o n s : T h e s e may be s e r v i c e - o r i e n t e d , b u t e x i s t p r i m a r i l y t o p r o -mote p o l i c i e s and e f f e c t c h a n g e s t h r o u g h s o c i a l a w a reness p r o g r a m s ( e g . P a r e n t s w i t h o u t P a r t n e r s and d i s e a s e & d i s a b i l i t y g r o u p s ) . They may p r o v i d e s o c i a l a c t i v i t i e s f o r t h e i r membership as w e l l as t h e c o r e t a s k s o f p r o m o t i n g r e s e a r c h and e d u c a t i o n ( L a b a t t , 1980, pp. 3 0 - 3 3 ) . V o l u n t a r y a g e n c i e s have o f t e n b een r e g a r d e d as l e s s p e rmanent and r i g i d t h a n g o v e r n m e n t a l o r g a n i s a t i o n s and t h i s 96 q u a l i t y has, t r a d i t i o n a l l y , s u i t e d the v o l u n t a r y s e c t o r f o r a "vanguard" r o l e i n terms of i n i t i a t i v e , response and advo-cacy (United Way, SPAR/SPARC, Report #1, 1980 p. 5). How-ever, a dual system of p r o v i s i o n such as t h a t i n Canada, which has seen a p r o l i f e r a t i o n of both p u b l i c and v o l u n t a r y s e r v i c e d e l i v e r y , while p o t e n t i a l l y dynamic, i s at the same time more d i f f i c u l t t o manage and c o n t r o l - The weaknesses of a dual system i n c l u d e problems of fragmentation, d i s c o n -t i n u i t y , poor a c c o u n t a b i l i t y and i n a c c e s s i b i l i t y . Fragmen-t a t i o n here r e f e r s t o an agency's o r g a n i s a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r -i s t i c s and r e l a t i o n s h i p s , e s p e c i a l l y the l o c a t i o n , co-- o r d i n a t i o n , s p e c i a l i s a t i o n and d u p l i c a t i o n of s e r v i c e s . In-a c c e s s i b i l i t y a r i s e s through o b s t a c l e s t o i n d i v i d u a l and f a -m i l y access t o the network of l o c a l s o c i a l s e r v i c e s , while d i s c o n t i n u i t y r e l a t e s t o o b s t a c l e s t o a p p r o p r i a t e movement and r e f e r r a l through an incomplete network ( c h a r a c t e r i s e d by "gaps" i n s e r v i c e ) (United Way, SPAR/SPARC Report #1, 1980, p. 7 ) . A l s o , the p r o l i f e r a t i o n of agencies and programs h i n -ders the development of coherent s o c i a l p o l i c y , i n v o l v e s complex problems of c o - o r d i n a t i o n , and prese n t s d i f f i c u l t i e s f o r the development of standards (United Way, SPAR/SPARC Report #1, 1980, p. 7). S t i l l , g i ven the p r e v a i l i n g s e r v i c e d e l i v e r y environment, the search f o r s o l u t i o n s t o these problems must form the core agenda f o r s e r v i c e p r o f e s s i o -n a l s , a d m i n i s t r a t o r s and p l a n n e r s . In p l a n n i n g f o r a r a t i o n a l s e r v i c e d e l i v e r y system, i s s u e s of agency c o - o r d i n a t i o n and the concurrent 97 co-ordination of auspice must be addressed. This could involve some systematic restructuring and r e d e f i n i t i o n not only of public agency mandates, but also of the j u r i s d i c -t i o n a l mandates of each l e v e l of government. Although cut-back management on the part of government has entailed some restructuring and j u r i s d i c t i o n a l s h i f t s , such management has proceeded with f i s c a l concerns, rather than the interests of the c l i e n t , as the primary organisational focus. What i s needed, i s some coherent d e f i n i t i o n of what constitutes an appropriate range and mix of services within a co-ordinated structure that would produce minimum s t r a i n and maximum co-operation among ind i v i d u a l u n i t s . As a cautionary note, however, i t must be stressed that co-ordination ought not proceed at the cost of d i v e r s i t y or at the expense of a recognition of a p l u r a l i t y of interests (United Way, SPAR/ SPARC Report #1, 1980, p. 9). To employ a euphemism, i t may well be said that i f NGO's have an "Achilles Heel," i t i s i n the area of funding. Organisations which carry-out aid and welfare a c t i v i t i e s which might otherwise be di r e c t government r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s are heavily r e l i a n t on government funds (Elkin, 1978, pp 13--14). In a survey of National Voluntary Associations in Ca-nada, E l k i n (1978) observes that during the period from 1962-1972, NGO's have moved toward greater dependence on go-vernment for f i n a n c i a l support (Elkin, 1978, p. 12). Follow-ing upon the dramatic increases i n level s of government 98 support i n the l a t e 1960's, the c u r r e n t i n s t a b i l i t y of the v o l u n t a r y s e c t o r has r e s u l t e d from the subsequent c o n t r a c -t i o n o f t h a t support i n the l a t e 1970's ( S o c i a l Planning C o u n c i l of Metro Toronto, (SPCMT), 1981, p. 2). By t h i s time, agencies found themselves i n the s i t u a t i o n of possess-i n g l e s s c o n t r o l over t h e i r f u t u r e s and the s e r v i c e s they d e l i v e r than ever b e f o r e . Agencies now had t o implement s e r -v i c e cutbacks i n the face of d e c l i n i n g r e s o u r c e s . During the p e r i o d of 1978-1980, f o r example, t o t a l revenues f o r NGO's i n c r e a s e d at o n l y t w o - t h i r d s the r a t e of i n f l a t i o n (SPCMT, 1981, p. 2). The r e p o r t by the S o c i a l P l a n n i n g C o u n c i l of Metro Toronto e n t i t l e d , The Vo l u n t a r y Sector a t Risk (1981) concluded t h a t f u r t h e r government cutbacks and i n c r e a s e d l e v e l s of d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g w i l l put much of the v o l u n t a r y s o c i a l s e r v i c e s e c t o r , as w e l l as many of i t s c l i e n t s , "at r i s k . " The preponderance of p u b l i c funding of v o l u n t a r y agency s e r v i c e s i n B r i t i s h Columbia comes from the p r o v i n -c i a l government; although, i n many cases, c o s t s are share-able with the F e d e r a l government under the Canada A s s i s t a n c e Plan (CAP). P u b l i c funding of the v o l u n t a r y s e c t o r occurs through t h r e e s e t s of arrangements: 1) a g r a n t - i n - a i d , or p r o j e c t grant, which supports a s e r -v i c e or program but does not normally c o n t a i n any overhead allowance or "core" funding. These tend t o be sh o r t term and 99 l a c k i n g i n c o n t i n u i t y , n e v e r t h e l e s s , such grants c r e a t e dependency; 2) purchase of s e r v i c e c o n t r a c t i n g (POSC), which d e f i n e s u n i t s of s e r v i c e "bought" by government under s p e c i f i e d terms. U s u a l l y of one year's d u r a t i o n (although they may be renewed) POSC's may i n c l u d e overhead c o s t s , but they do not pr o v i d e f i x e d c a p i t a l c o s t s ( i e . premises); 3) Core-funding g r a n t s : here, some degree of permanence or c o n t i n u i t y i s i m p l i e d . These grants p r o v i d e b a s i c o r g a n i s a -t i o n a l monies f o r s u p e r v i s i o n , support, and a d m i n s t r a t i o n of an agency. T h i s i s u s u a l l y the p r e f e r r e d type of p u b l i c funding (United Way, SPAR/SPARC, Report #1, 1980, p. 32). There i s c o n s i d e r a b l e l a t i t u d e on the p a r t of p u b l i c s e c t o r funders t o a l l o c a t e resources t o non-governmental o r g a n i s a t i o n s on the b a s i s of p o l i t i c a l c r i t e r i a as opposed to c r i t e r i a of need. Vo l u n t a r y agencies are keenly aware of t h i s and as a consequence may be more qu i e s c e n t and l e s s openly c r i t i c a l of p u b l i c p o l i c y l e s t t h e i r a c t i o n s jeopar-d i s e t h e i r c o n t i n u e d funding. T h i s p o i n t has been made by Labatt who observes t h a t : Government grants are e i t h e r based on t h e i r own p e r c e p t i o n of need or are a l l o c a t e d due t o the p o l i t i -c a l f e a s i b i l i t y of doing so. Not a l l v o l u n t a r y o r g a n i -s a t i o n a l types r e c e i v e the same treatment (Labatt, 1980, p. 37). 100 In times of r e s t r a i n t , government favours those who are r e -p r e s e n t a t i v e of c o n s i t u t e n c i e s who are e i t h e r b l a t a n t l y i n need, or who are or g a n i s e d and p o l i t i c a l l y a c t i v e (Labatt, 1980, p. 37). Labatt a l s o p o i n t s out t h a t i n terms of fund-- r a i s i n g , some "cause groups,' can generate more d o l l a r s than low key campaigns (Labatt, 1980, pp. 35-36). S e r v i c e s t o high p r o f i l e groups such as the me n t a l l y or p h y s i c a l l y handicapped are favoured over the l o w - p r o f i l e , l a r g e l y non-- v i s i b l e , p o p u l a t i o n undergoing severe s t r e s s due t o econo-mic, s o c i a l or f a m i l i a l i n s t a b i l i t y . A l s o , groups t h a t are not a r e c o g n i s a b l e c o n s t i t u e n t of the p o p u l a t i o n or who are unorganised, are f r e q u e n t l y l e f t out (Labatt, 1980, p 37). In t h i s r e s p e c t , State support of v o l u n t a r y s o c i a l s e r v i c e a c t i v i t i e s may be seen as a realm of policy-making p a r a l l e l t o the l e g i s l a t i v e realm where the r e c o g n i t i o n of needs and the a r t i c u l a t i o n of modes of i n t e r v e n t i o n may oc-cur with r e l a t i v e l y g r e a t e r ease and f l u i d i t y than i n the more f o r m a l i s e d , l e g a l i s t i c m i l i e u of the s t a t u t o r y s e r v i -c e s . F i s c a l support of v o l u n t a r y agencies i s a more t r a n s i -ent form of r e c o g n i t i o n f o r c e r t a i n needs or needs groups which at once addresses a s o c i a l (and p o s s i b l y p o l i t i c a l ) problem but c r e a t e s no l e g a l or s t a t u t o r y precedent f o r c o n t i n u i n g t o meet those needs i n the f u t u r e . F i s c a l sup-p o r t , and t h e r e f o r e p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l l e g i t i m a c y , may be bestowed or withdrawn through the v e h i c l e of lower-order bu-r e a u c r a t i c d e c i s i o n s because the support of such a c t i v i t i e s 101 i s c o n s i d e r e d " e x t r a - s t a t u t o r y , " and as such cannot be ap-p e a l e d through the c o u r t s or the l e g i s l a t u r e . In t h i s way the l e g i t i m a c y of some needs or c l i e n t groups may vary not o n l y through time (as they f a l l i n or out of favour with po-l i t i c i a n s or bureaucrats) but a l s o through space as t h i s type of f i s c a l support c a r r i e s with i t no mandate f o r u n i -v e r s a l i t y i n p r o v i s i o n or access. Thus we may f i n d s i t u a -t i o n s where one area of the p r o v i n c e may have one or more funded agencies p r o v i d i n g support f o r b a t t e r e d women and c h i l d r e n while another l o c a l e with an equal or p o s s i b l y g r e a t e r i n c i d e n c e of domestic v i o l e n c e may have none. Such a s i t u a t i o n c o u l d a r i s e : 1) i f there were no group w i l l i n g t o p r o v i d e the s e r v i c e i n the a f f e c t e d area; 2) i f such groups as d i d e x i s t were i n e x p e r i e n c e d i n l o b b y i n g f o r support or i n a p p l y i n g f o r funds; 3) i f l o c a l needs were p e r c e i v e d as being adequately met by e x i s t i n g s t a t u t o r y s e r v i c e s ; or 4) i f l o c a l p o l i t i c i a n s and bureaucrats d i d not r e c o g n i s e the l e g i t i m a c y of the problem or the needs group or those per-sons or groups w i l l i n g t o p r o v i d e the s e r v i c e . 3.2 FUNDING DEPENDENCY AND INTERORGANISATIONAL RELATIONS -SOME LIMITING FACTORS IN VOLUNTARY SECTOR PROVISION Sharon E. Willms, i n a 1980 Masters t h e s i s (Willms 1980, MSW U.B.C. School of S o c i a l Work) s e t out a r e s e a r c h p r o j e c t aimed at a s s e s s i n g the need and a b i l i t y of NGO's to 102 form and maintain i n t e r - o r g a n i s a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s (IOR's) i n a t u r b u l e n t environment of r e s t r a i n t , a c c o u n t a b i l i t y c r i -ses, and i n s e c u r e funding. One premise of her r e s e a r c h i s t h a t the exchange of i n f o r m a t i o n i n the i n t e r o r g a n i s a t i o n a l (10) f i e l d p l a y s a v i t a l r o l e i n g a i n i n g the c o - o p e r a t i o n of c o n s t i t u e n c i e s i n the environment and i n e l i c i t i n g support t o accompany funding requests (Willms, 1980, p. 1). Willms based her r e s e a r c h on the assumption t h a t impaired informa-t i o n l i n k a g e s , as a b a r r i e r t o s e c u r i n g adequate funding, t h r e a t e n c o n t i n u e d agency v i a b i l i t y and f u r t h e r , t h a t the a r b i t r a r i n e s s i n a l l o c a t i o n and d i s t r i b u t i o n t h a t ensues p r e c l u d e s r a t i o n a l p l a n n i n g f o r most s e r v i c e agencies (Willms, 1980, p. 3). What f o l l o w s i s a summary of Willms' f i n d i n g s , gleaned from her q u e s t i o n n a i r e survey of v o l u n t a r y p e r s o n a l s o c i a l s e r v i c e agencies i n M e t r o p o l i t a n Vancouver i n 1979. I t i s important t o review these f i n d i n g s f o r a number of reasons: 1) t h e r e i s i n B r i t i s h Columbia a dearth of contemporary e m p i r i c a l r e s e a r c h d e a l i n g with non-governmental s o c i a l s e r v i c e s i n terms of t h e i r s t r u c t u r e , o r g a n i s a t i o n and funding base. As such i t forms an important benchmark f o r the e m p i r i c a l p o r t i o n of t h i s t h e s i s ; 2) many of the f i n d i n g s of t h i s r e s e a r c h p a r a l l e l the empi-r i c a l f i n d i n g s to be presented l a t e r i n t h i s t h e s i s while other f i n d i n g s demonstrate parameters of the v o l u n t a r y s e c t o r not d i r e c t l y addressed by t h i s t h e s i s ; 3) Willms' work permits a d i s c u s s i o n of trends i n the a t t i -tudes of non-governmental agencies towards government and other NGO's from 1979 to 1985; 103 4) i t permits an assessment of trends i n the v i a b i l i t y and potency of i n t e r - o r g a n i s a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s among NGO's. Willms' study a s c e r t a i n e d t h a t the most common source of funds f o r agencies covered by her survey was the p r o v i n -c i a l government. The l e a s t common source was c o r p o r a t e do-nors while the second l e a s t common was the F e d e r a l govern-ment. Twenty-five percent of her survey group (based on 17 6 q u e s t i o n n a i r e s , 70 of which were r e t u r n e d , marking a r e t u r n r a t e of 40%) r e c e i v e d more than 80% of t h e i r d o l l a r s from the P r o v i n c i a l government while 17% r e c e i v e d more than 90% of t h e i r funding from the P r o v i n c e . Less than h a l f the agen-c i e s i n her Vancouver sample r e c e i v e any money from munici-p a l government; 70% of her sample r e c e i v e l e s s than 20% of t h e i r funding from C i t y H a l l . S e v e n t y - f i v e percent of the sample r e c e i v e l e s s than 10% of t h e i r t o t a l funds from e i -t h e r i n d i v i d u a l donors or membership f e e s , i n f a c t , o n l y 40% of those agencies responding use e i t h e r of these avenues to r a i s e money. In a d d i t i o n , o n l y 35% of the survey group r e -p o r t e d u s i n g funding campaigns as a source of revenue. Of those who d i d , however, 50% r a i s e d l e s s than 15% of t h e i r t o t a l requirements (note: i t i s not c l e a r i n the study whe-th e r t h i s r e f e r s t o United Way campaigns or i n d i v i d u a l cam-p a i g n s ) . Observing t h a t government v a s t l y outweighs a l l other funding bodies on a s c a l e of agencies supported, Willms w r i t e s : 104 ... these f i n d i n g s , i f they would be g e n e r a l i s e d , have i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r the c o n t r o l of the s o c i a l w e l f a r e f i e l d by government. As the major funder, the govern-ment may have command over the whole v o l u n t a r y s e c t o r . (Willms, 1980, p. 80). In terms of agency success i n g a i n i n g funding, Willms found t h a t n e a r l y 1 i n 4 r e c e i v e d l e s s than 7 5% of t h e i r r e -quest. F o r t y percent r e c e i v e d l e s s than 85%, while 23% of agencies responding i n d i c a t e d t h a t they r e c e i v e d 95-100% of funds requested (Willms, 1980, p. 85). Willms notes t h a t these data may be v a r i o u s l y i n t e r p r e t e d : a) NGO's are g e t t i n g l e s s r esources than they i n f a c t r e q u i r e ; b) NGO's tend to ask f o r more than they need i n the f i r s t p l a c e ; c) NGO's are c o n c e n t r a t i n g t h e i r requests f o r money i n a s i n g l e source t h a t does not respond adequately ( I b i d pp. 85-87). The r e a l i t y i s most l i k e l y an amalgam of a l l of these i n t e r -p r e t a t i o n s . S t i l l , we are l e f t w ith a v o l u n t a r y s e c t o r under s t r a i n . I f such a c o n d i t i o n i s to continue, Willms and o t h e r s i n the s o c i a l s e r v i c e s f i e l d , see a danger of a t t r i -t i o n among members of a s o c i a l s e r v i c e agency network through inadequate funding r e s o u r c e s , e v e n t u a l l y l e a d i n g t o a reduced potency of the network. Says Willms: 105 NGO's should be concerned not only about t h e i r own funding p o s i t i o n , but a l s o t h a t of other NGO's i n the network of agencies. In systems terms, the i n d i v i d u a l s t r e n g t h of the sub-systems c o n t r i b u t e s t o the o v e r a l l v i g o r of the s o c i a l s e r v i c e d e l i v e r y system (Willms, 1980, p. 3). In her a n a l y s i s , Willms s t r e s s e s the need f o r more data c o l l e c t i o n and a n a l y s i s and a co n c e r t e d e f f o r t t o deve-lop i n f o r m a t i o n - s h a r i n g systems i n which i n f o r m a t i o n ex-change becomes a key f a c t o r i n a c o l l a b o r a t i v e s t r a t e g y of i n t e r o r g a n i s a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s (Willms, 1980, p. 41). Information i s c r u c i a l i n demonstrating a c c o u n t a b i l i t y t o consumers, the p u b l i c and funders. The types of i n f o r m a t i o n r e q u i r e d by these c o n s t i t u e n c i e s f a l l i n t o 3 main areas: a) the documentation of need f o r proposed s e r v i c e s ; b) demonstrating adequate management of programs and s e r v i -ces ; c) f a c i l i t a t i n g the e v a l u a t i o n of s e r v i c e s d e l i v e r e d ( I b i d . , p. 41). Information exchange i s i n c r e a s i n g l y b e i n g seen as a v e h i c l e f o r the enhancement of agency a c c o u n t a b i l i t y and l e g i t i m a c y , and thus augurs w e l l f o r c o n t i n u i n g agency r e l e v a n c e , v i a b i -l i t y and u l t i m a t e l y , f o r the net w e l l - b e i n g of the c l i e n t p o p u l a t i o n . Willms a s s e r t s t h a t NGO's f a c e , b a s i c a l l y , two op-t i o n s i n the 1980's: 106 a) t o j o i n a n o t h e r s y s t e m ( e g . t h e government s o c i a l s e r v i c e s y s t e m ) ; b) t o work t o g e t h e r t o m a i n t a i n t h e i r own s y s t e m ( I b i d p. 43) . W i l l m s ' d a t a r e v e a l t h a t , a l t h o u g h i n f o r m a t i o n - s h a r i n g w i t h o t h e r a g e n c i e s r a n k e d low i n p r i o r i t y among t h e e x e c u t i v e d i r e c t o r s r e s p o n d i n g , p r i o r i t y was g i v e n t o i n f o r m a t i o n i t e m s r e l a t e d t o f u n d i n g ( W i l l m s , 1980, pp. 9 2 - 9 5 ) . The s e e m i n g l a c k o f c o - o p e r a t i v e e f f o r t i n t h e v o l u n t a r y s e r -v i c e s f i e l d may be due t o a number o f f a c t o r s , s u c h as t h e s u b j e c t i v e p e r c e p t i o n s o f a g e n c y p e r s o n n e l and t h e i r a t t i -t u d e s t o w a r d s h a r i n g i n f o r m a t i o n i n an i n c r e a s i n g l y c o m p e t i -t i v e e n v i r o n m e n t ( W i l l m s , 1980, pp. 8 9 - 9 0 ) . The s u g g e s t i o n h e r e i s t h a t i n an e c o n o m i c e n v i r o n -ment c h a r a c t e r i s e d by f i s c a l r e s t r a i n t and i n c r e a s e d compe-t i t i o n among a g e n c i e s f o r f u n d s t h e e s s e n t i a l l y f r a g m e n t e d , l o c a l i s e d and a d hoc n a t u r e o f much o f t h e v o l u n t a r y s e c t o r means t h a t t h e o r g a n i s a t i o n a l s e l f - i n t e r e s t o f a g e n c i e s t a k e s p r e c e d e n c e o v e r any c o - o r d i n a t i v e s t r a t e g y f o r t a p p i n g g o v e rnment and community r e s o u r c e s . W i l l m s o f f e r s a n o t h e r p o s s i b l e e x p l a n a t i o n f o r t h e low p r i o r i t y g i v e n by v o l u n t a r y a g e n c i e s t o IOR's. She s u g g e s t s t h a t g i v e n gaps o r l a g s i n s y s t e m r e s p o n s e and i n d i v i d u a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s v i s a v i s t h e p o l i t i c a l / e c o n o m i c e n v i r o n m e n t , i t may be t h a t t h e c r i t i c a l moment i n w h i c h t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f IOR's m i g h t have been r e a -l i s e d had, a t t h e t i m e o f w r i t i n g , b e en a v o i d e d ( W i l l m s , 1980, p . 9 0 ) . 107 There e x i s t s a r a t h e r c u r i o u s paradox between the v o l u n t a r y s e c t o r and i t s p u b l i c funders ( p r i n c i p a l l y the M i n i s t r y of Human Resources, although some agencies may r e c e i v e funding from the M i n i s t r i e s of Labour, Health, or the A t t o r n e y General) i n which the dearth of i n f o r m a t i o n -g a t h e r i n g systems among NGO's i s p a r a l l e l e d by i n f o r m a t i o n a l gaps i n the p u b l i c s e c t o r agencies. In f a c t , a 1980 BCGEU r e p o r t contends t h a t n e i t h e r the MHR, nor any other M i n i s -t r y , has a complete l i s t of NGO's r e c e i v i n g funds. In 1980, 55% of NGO's r e c e i v i n g funds f o r the d e l i v e r y of s e r v i c e s had not f i l e d a r e t u r n with the R e g i s t r a r of Companies. In a d d i t i o n , of the 251 agencies l i s t e d i n MHR's Annual Report f o r 1980, o n l y 137 (54.6%) appeared i n the p u b l i c accounts l i s t of 626 agencies r e c e i v i n g government funds - 114 agen-c i e s l i s t e d i n MHR's 1980 r e p o r t d i d not appear i n the pub-l i c accounts (BCGEU, 1980, Summary i i ) . What the f o r e g o i n g suggests i s t h a t f i s c a l accounta-b i l i t y has been j e o p a r d i s e d not o n l y by gaps i n the informa-t i o n system of the v o l u n t a r y s e c t o r i t s e l f , but a l s o through i n f o r m a t i o n a l i n e f f i c i e n c y on the p a r t of the funding body. The BCGEU r e p o r t l a b e l s t h i s l a c k of c o - o r d i n a t i o n and p l a n -ning as f i s c a l mismanagement and f u r t h e r charges t h a t the MHR assumes no r e s p o n s i b l i t y f o r performance review, f u t u r e p l a n n i n g , or s e t t i n g the standards f o r the p r o v i s i o n of s e r v i c e and the i n s p e c t i o n of n o n - p r o f i t agencies: 108 ... the report finds the Ministry of Human Resources has no centralized overview of the agencies i t funds and has not established any clear j u r i s d i c t i o n between the operation of government and non-government agencies for the delivery of s o c i a l services (BCGEU, 1980, Summary i i i ) . In view of the BCGEU, t h i s has amounted to a simultaneous f a i l u r e to develop a system of f i n a n c i a l accountability; a system of qual i t y of service standards; a system of j u r i s -d i c t i o n a l assignment; and a system of long-term planning for the r a t i o n a l i s i n g of non-government service delivery (BCGEU 1980, Summary V). Pro v i n c i a l government responses to the voluntary sec-tor since 1975 have not r e f l e c t e d a commitment to the ra-t i o n a l development of the non-governmental s o c i a l service delivery system. Support for NGO's has continued, but often at lower lev e l s and without any demonstrated willingness or desire to create an integrated network of statutory and vo-luntary services (such as was attemped by the NDP government from 1972 to 1975 - for a f u l l treatment of t h i s period i n the development of B.C.'s s o c i a l services see Clague et a l , 1984). This apparent lack of co-ordinated strategy on the part of the Pr o v i n c i a l government has not only preserved the parochial character of some of the agencies so funded but has also resulted i n serious inconsistencies of p o l i c y and outcome. 109 For example, although i n 1980 more money was a l l o c a -t e d t o NGO's f o r the d e l i v e r y of s e r v i c e s than i n pre v i o u s years, i n c r e a s e s i n the number of agencies funded meant l e s s than the r a t e of i n f l a t i o n i n c r e a s e s f o r i n d i v i d u a l v o l u n t a -r y a g encies. Thus while the p r o v i n c i a l government c o u l d c l a i m an i n c r e a s e d l e v e l of t o t a l expenditure, the e f f e c t of an i n c r e a s e d number of NGO's i n r e c e i p t of funding c o n s t i t u -t e d a d e c l i n i n g l e v e l of support on an agency by agency ba-s i s . The a n t i c i p a t e d outcomes of reduced support - the dete-r i o r a t i o n of s e r v i c e s , higher r a t e s of s t a f f t urn-over, low morale, lower r a t e s of pay and l e s s than adequate t r a i n i n g f o r p ersonnel - r e f l e c t a degree of dissonance with the i n -c r e a s e d expenditure. The c u r r e n t p a t t e r n of p r o v i d i n g o n l y minimal core funding t o NGO's c o u l d have very r e a l and d e l e t e r i o u s e f -f e c t s upon the q u a l i t y of s t a f f and s e r v i c e i n terms of c l i e n t - w o r k e r r a t i o s , program c o n t i n u i t y , and long-term p l a n n i n g ( S h i e l d s , 1981, pp. 6 & 11-12): Small, annual, ad hoc grants t o agencies provide no guarantees of continued e x i s t e n c e and f r u s t r a t e the need t o p l a n f o r long term development of s e r v i c e de-l i v e r y , program m o d i f i c a t i o n , or personnel t r a i n i n g . C l i e n t s and users cannot r e l y on the c o n t i n u a t i o n of the s e r v i c e and as a r e s u l t cannot commit themselves t o long-term r e h a b i l i t a t i o n i n t h e r a p e u t i c programs ( S h i e l d s 1981, p. 6). Problems a l s o a r i s e with r e s p e c t t o standards of s e r v i c e , c l i e n t e l i g i b i l i t y , and the q u a l i f i c a t i o n s of p r o f e s s i o n a l s 110 which may vary from agency to agency. Time and f i s c a l l a g s i n s e c u r i n g funding and the consequent d i f f i c u l t i e s i n main-t a i n i n g p e r s o n n e l may a l s o impair the responsiveness of community-based agencies ( S h i e l d s , 1981, p. 7), or even c o n t r i b u t e t o an unequal d i s t r i b u t i o n a l s u r f a c e of p r o v i s i o n through h i g h l y l o c a l i s e d responses ( S h i e l d s , 1981, p. 8). 3.3 THE VOLUNTARY SECTOR: A DUALITY OF ROLES AND IMAGES A view of the v o l u n t a r y s e c t o r commonly espoused by f i s c a l l y c o n s e r v a t i v e watchdogs i s one of a heterogenous mixture of agencies, r e p r e s e n t i n g a v a r i e t y of cause groups (some of which may be p o p u l a r l y c o n s i d e r e d t o be s o c i a l l y or e c o n o m i c a l l y m a r g i n a l ) , clamoring f o r p u b l i c funds. Often, funding p r o v i d e d to such agencies i s t r e a t e d by p o l i t i c i a n s as a r e f l e c t i o n of government l a r g e s s e . At the same time, while p o l i t i c i a n s remark on the luxury of funding NGO's, p u b l i c s e c t o r unions and t h e i r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s i n t e r p r e t the support of the non-government s e c t o r s o c i a l s e r v i c e s as an e v a s i o n of government r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r a s s u r i n g the s o c i a l wage and a l e a s t - c o s t e f f o r t f o r s o c i a l p r o v i s i o n which puts c l i e n t s at r i s k (BCGEU, 1980; S h i e l d s , 1981; Commission In t e r i m Report, 1982). Each of these views r e f l e c t s a l e v e l of s e l f - i n t e r e s t on the p a r t s of government and p u b l i c sec-t o r employees - n e i t h e r o f f e r s a d i s p a s s i o n a t e a p p r a i s a l . I l l Government, i n an e f f o r t t o manage demands upon the system and demonstrate the competence of i t s agencies may be com-p e l l e d t o minimise the importance of the v o l u n t a r y s e c t o r t o the t o t a l s e r v i c e network while p u b l i c s e c t o r unions may i n t e r p r e t the support of NGO's as a t h r e a t t o the job secu-r i t y of t h e i r members. What these opposing viewpoints serve t o underscore i s the importance of the v o l u n t a r y s e c t o r w i t h i n the t o t a l s e r v i c e network. NGO's are d e l i v e r i n g s e r v i c e s deemed worthy of funding by government and regarded by p u b l i c s e c t o r unions as the proper domain of s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y . Accord-i n g t o Djao (19 83) the State d e r i v e s a tremendous economic advantage from the use of v o l u n t a r i s t i c agencies d i r e c t l y or i n a n c i l l a r y s e r v i c e s . In the d i r e c t d e l i v e r y of s e r v i c e s , a d m i n s t r a t i o n and p u b l i c education, the c o n t r i b u t i o n s of the v o l u n t a r y n o t - f o r - p r o f i t s e c t o r are v i t a l to the c o n t i n u i n g o p e r a t i o n s of many programs. I f v o l u n t a r i s t i c a c t i v i t i e s were withdrawn, says Djao, the State would be faced with even g r e a t e r c o s t s of welfar e programs (Djao, 1983, p. 158). While there e x i s t s i n the v o l u n t a r y s e c t o r a mix of the p h i -l a n t h r o p y motive and the s o c i a l change motive there i s l i t -t l e q u e s t i o n t h a t advocacy and s o c i a l change are c o n s i d e r e d as t r a d i t i o n a l s t r e n g t h s of the v o l u n t a r y s e c t o r . As such the v o l u n t a r y s e c t o r not only serves the v e s t e d i n t e r e s t s of the State i n s o c i a l p r o v i s i o n , but i n c u l c a t e s an e t h i c of " s e r v i c e " both towards t h e i r n a t u r a l c o n s t i t u e n t s ( i . e . c l i -ents) and t o the community as a whole. 112 The v o l u n t a r y s e c t o r has had and continues to p l a y an advocacy r o l e - a l b e i t i n v a r y i n g degrees depending on the s e n s i t i v i t y of the i s s u e , agency r e l a t i o n s with s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t i e s ( i n c l u d i n g funding dependency) and the p h i l o s o -p h i c a l p r e d i l e c t i o n of agency d i r e c t o r s . V o l u n t a r y s e c t o r s e r v i c e s respond a l s o to p e r c e i v e d "gaps" i n s t a t u t o r y pro-v i s i o n by p r o v i d i n g s e r v i c e s which the State cannot (or w i l l not) p r o v i d e , by g a i n i n g p u b l i c r e c o g n i t i o n of unmet needs and by p r o v i d i n g i n f o r m a t i o n and advice to p o t e n t i a l consu-mers of s e r v i c e s . The v o l u n t a r y s e c t o r i s , i n p a r t , a consu-mers' movement through which " s o c i a l e n trepreneurs" can cam-paign f o r the r e c o g n i t i o n of the l e g i t i m a c y of needs c o n s t i -t u e n c i e s (Hatch, 1980, pp. 67-68, 94-102). The advantage o f f e r e d by v o l u n t a r y agencies i s the o p p o r t u n i t y f o r c o n s u l -t a t i v e p a r t i c i p a t i o n on the p a r t of c o n s t i t u e n t s and the consequent c a p a c i t y f o r an o r g a n i s e d as opposed to i n f o r m a l a r t i c u l a t i o n of need (Hatch, 1980, p. 94-95, 118-119). In s p i t e of these t r a d i t i o n a l s t r e n g t h s , however, the dependence of NGO's on government f o r funding c o n s t i t u t e s a c o u n t e r v a i l i n g p o t e n t i a l f o r the management by the State of e x p r e s s i o n s of d i s s e n t , or c r i t i c i s m s of s o c i a l p o l i c y on the p a r t of v o l u n t a r y s e c t o r agencies or t h e i r workers. As such, State support and management of v o l u n t a r i s m through funding and l i c e n s i n g may have the e f f e c t of b l u n t i n g s o c i a l c r i t i c i s m s and n e u t r a l i s i n g s o c i a l change o b j e c t i v e s (Djao, 1983; L a b a t t , 1980; Hatch, 1980). T h i s has i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r 113 the mode of s e r v i c e d e l i v e r y as w e l l . Demonstrations of e f -f e c t i v e n e s s and s e r v i c e e f f i c i e n c y may of n e c e s s i t y be r e -q u i r e d t o m i r r o r the orthodoxy of p r a c t i c e embodied w i t h i n the s t a t u t o r y s e r v i c e s thus a t t e n u a t i n g some avenues f o r i n -novat i o n and a l t e r n a t i v e forms of i n t e r v e n t i o n . V oluntary s o c i a l s e r v i c e agencies may become so i d e n t i f i e d with the s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y t h a t i n the absence of complete know-ledge on the p a r t of the consumers or b e n e f i c i a r i e s of the s e r v i c e , the s t a t u s or auspice of the o r g a n i s a t i o n may not always be c l e a r . Users may t h i n k the NGO i s an arm of the State and may re g a r d i t as one would a s t a t u t o r y s e r v i c e ( t h i s i s p a r t i c u l a r l y t r u e of s e c u l a r o r g a n i s a t i o n s ) . In f a c t , t h i s degree of i d e n t i f i c a t i o n with the s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y may have u n d e s i r a b l e e f f e c t s , among them: a) i t c o u l d r e s u l t i n a d e c l i n e of p h i l a n t h r o p i c donations on the assumption t h a t the s e r v i c e i s a l r e a d y f u l l y fun-ded by government thereby making the s e r v i c e even more dependent upon p u b l i c funds; b) persons who would be u n w i l l i n g t o de a l with a s t a t u t o r y s e r v i c e because of a p e r c e i v e d s o c i a l stigma or m i s t r u s t of bureaucracy w i l l be s i m i l a r l y u n w i l l i n g t o de a l with p r i v a t e agencies whom the user cannot d i s t i n g u i s h from the p u b l i c a u t h o r i t y ; 114 c) the v o l u n t a r y agency may serve t o d e f l e c t c r i t i c i s m of s t a t u t o r y auspices and act as a b u f f e r between consumers of s e r v i c e and the r e s p o n s i b l e p u b l i c agency thus im-p a i r i n g the a c c o u n t a b i l i t y of government. 115 C H A P T E R I V THE EFFECTS OF FISCAL RESTRAINT UPON VOLUNTARY SECTOR SERVICES -THE CANADIAN AND U.S . EXPERIENCE 4.1 SOME ANTICIPATED IMPACTS UPON NGO'S OF GOVERNMENT CUTBACKS In the 1980's the w e l f a r e State and the range of so-c i a l programs which comprise i t have been d e s c r i b e d by a number of authors i n the s o c i a l w e l f a r e f i e l d as e x i s t i n g i n a s t a t e of s i e g e . There have been a great many c a l l s t o arms over the i s s u e s i n h e r e n t i n the support of s o c i a l w e l f a r e s e r v i c e s by both the p o l i t i c a l l e f t and r i g h t : the former c a l l i n g upon the f a i t h f u l t o r e s i s t the e r o s i o n of the so-c i a l s a f e t y net i n times of economic u n c e r t a i n t y , the l a t t e r arguing the n e c e s s i t y f o r the r e d u c t i o n of expenditures on programs whose e f f i c i e n c y cannot be demonstrated so t h a t so-c i e t y may opti m i s e expenditures of e x i s t i n g r e s o u r c e s . T h i s s t r u g g l e , i f i t may be c a l l e d t h a t , i s a s t r u g g l e not on l y over the purse s t r i n g s , i t i s a s t r u g g l e over h e a r t s and minds. The combatants i n the debate (to the l i m i t e d extent t h a t there has been any t r u e debate) over the auspice and p r o v i s i o n of s o c i a l s e r v i c e s have c l e a r l y drawn l i n e s , r h e t o r i c a l conventions and p o l i t i c a l d i c t a . The s t r u g g l e takes p l a c e on many f r o n t s : between unions and c a p i t a l ; between s o c i a l s e r v i c e agencies ( p r i v a t e and p u b l i c ) and the P r o v i n c i a l government; and even between l e v e l s of government. Yet, through a l l of t h i s , the s o c i a l 116 services have almost always been the besieged faction -often forced by circumstance into wary a l l i a n c e s with the labour union movement and the p o l i t i c a l l e f t ; submerging t h e i r differences i n the face of trends towards economic r e s t r a i n t . The reduction of spending on s o c i a l programs i s nei -ther a recent nor a geographically unique phenomenon. Although the most v i s i b l e cutbacks on s o c i a l services spend-ing have occurred at the Provincial l e v e l , s o c i a l spending on the part of the Federal government has declined as well: Social program spending by the Federal government declined from 9.7 to 9.2 percent GNP from 1975 to 1979 In the two years from 1979 to 1981 i t declined to 8.0 percent of GNP. (Social Planning Council of Metro To-ronto, 1983, p. 3). Referring to government spending at a l l l e v e l s , the Social Planning Council of Metro Toronto (SPCMT) concluded that: Declines for r e a l spending levels for human service programs were ... a part of the o v e r a l l decline i n com-mitment by government to the s o c i a l security net and to f u l l employment. Wage controls, t i g h t money supply ma-nagement, reduced s o c i a l spending and tax expenditures form the basis for a new era of government management of the economy (SPCMT, 1981, p. 57). Reductions i n s o c i a l service expenditures aff e c t a broad range of c l i e n t s , programs and delivery systems. If we may employ an analogy from the physical siences, r e s t r a i n t 117 i n p u b l i c spending has a p r o p e n s i t y t o seek the path of l e a s t r e s i s t a n c e . In t h i s way, a c t i v i t i e s and o r g a n i s a t i o n s p e r c e i v e d t o be p e r i p h e r a l to i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d s e r v i c e s and systems prese n t important o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r savings i n pub-l i c e x p e n diture. Whether such short-term gains r e p r e s e n t r e a l savings i n the long-term i s a matter f o r c o n j e c t u r e and w i l l be d i s c u s s e d l a t e r . The S o c i a l P lanning C o u n c i l of Metro Toronto notes s e v e r a l m a n i f e s t a t i o n s of government spending r e s t r a i n t w i t h r e g a r d t o the v o l u n t a r y s e c t o r . R e s t r a i n t has o c c u r r e d as the e l i m i n a t i o n of, or major cu t s i n , government programs d e l i v e r e d by the v o l u n t a r y s o c i a l s e r v i c e s e c t o r . In a d d i t i o n , f e e s - f o r - s e r v i c e f o r programs were r e s t r a i n e d i n such a way t h a t fee i n c r e a s e s f a i l e d t o match i n f l a t i o n i n c o s t s . Budgetary r e d u c t i o n s have l e d to v o l u n t a r y agencies adopting a v a r i e t y of coping s t r a t e g i e s such as the c u r t a i l -ment of the l e a s t necessary program components, i n c r e a s e d s t a f f work loads or r e s t r a i n e d s t a f f wage i n c r e a s e s (SPCMT, 1981, p. 1). There has a l s o been a tendency t o s h i f t program emphasis towards programs with c l i e n t s who can a f f o r d t o pay, or t o i n c r e a s e r a p i d l y the fees f o r e x i s t i n g programs. One u l t i m a t e e f f e c t of such measures i s a reduced a c c e s s i b i -l i t y on the p a r t of the v o l u n t a r y s e c t o r ' s t r a d i t i o n a l work-i n g c l a s s c l i e n t s (SPCMT 1983, p. i & i i ) . Of course, many of the p r o j e c t e d r e s u l t s of r e s t r a i n t have not manifested themselves as agencies absorb r e d u c t i o n s through d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g (SPCMT, 1981, p. 1). 118 While the most v i s i b l e e f f e c t of r e s t r a i n t i s the r e -d u c t i o n i n s c a l e or the complete e l i m i n a t i o n of programs, the S o c i a l Planning C o u n c i l r e p o r t (1981) regards as poten-t i a l l y more harmful the r e d u c t i o n of s e r v i c e s through worker a t t r i t i o n which may e n t a i l a r e d u c t i o n i n the q u a l i t y of s e r v i c e (SPCMT 1981, p. 3). Another major i s s u e subsumed under the q u a l i t y of s e r v i c e debate i s the growth of pur-chase of s e r v i c e c o n t r a c t i n g (POSC) which i s being used by government t o get more f o r l e s s out of the v o l u n t a r y agen-c i e s (SPCMT, 1981, p. 4). The r e p o r t a l s o observes d i s p r o -p o r t i o n a t e growth i n some s e r v i c e s e c t o r s , seemingly due e i t h e r t o p o l i t i c a l e x i g e n c i e s or s o c i a l vogue (SPCMT, 1981, pp. 4-5). T h i s o f t e n takes the form of a r e t u r n to a r e s i d u -a l i s t approach to s o c i a l s e r v i c e s which emphasises the p r i -macy of the market-place and the use of market models of c o s t accountancy f o r the " e v a l u a t i o n " of s o c i a l s e r v i c e s . As the S o c i a l Planning C o u n c i l r e p o r t remarks: I t i s more than noteworthy t h a t agencies p r o v i d i n g p l a n n i n g , c o - o r d i n a t i n g , and i n f o r m a t i o n s e r v i c e s , s e r v i c e s which o f t e n p o i n t out s o c i a l problems and s e r v i c e needs, have languished, while agencies p r o v i d -i n g c r i s i s s e r v i c e s have grown (SPCMT, 1981, p. 5). The v a g a r i e s of government spending may be c o n t i n g e n t not o n l y on the type of s e r v i c e p r o v i d e d by an agency, but a l s o upon the o r g a n i s a t i o n a l type an agency r e p r e s e n t s . T h i s i s s u g g e s t i v e of the s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l c o n t r o l i n h e r e n t 1 1 9 i n f u n d s s p e n t by government: a d v o c a c y o r c i t i z e n s ' r i g h t s g r o u p s may be p a s s e d - o v e r i n f a v o u r o f some l e s s - t h r e a t e n i n g 3 e n t i t y . S e r v i c e s t o g r o u p s who a r e n o t c o h e s i v e o r p o l i t i -c a l l y a r t i c u l a t e a r e more e a s i l y c u t t h a n s e r v i c e s t o g r o u p s who a r e v i s i b l y o r g a n i s e d . A g e n c i e s s u c h as "quangos" may be f a v o u r e d o v e r p r i v a t e s e r v i c e a g e n c i e s b e c a u s e t h e l a t t e r c a n be t o o autonomous f r o m government i n t e r m s o f i d e o l o g y and d e l i v e r y ( L a b a t t , 1 9 8 0 , p. 3 7 - 3 8 ) . I t s h o u l d be n o t e d as w e l l t h a t new a g e n c i e s and n o n - U n i t e d Way a g e n c i e s on t h e whole f a r e worse t h a n t h e o l d e r and U n i t e d Way a g e n c i e s (SPCMT, 1 9 8 1 , p. 3 ) . T h i s i s p a r t l y b e c a u s e o l d e r a g e n c i e s t e n d t o be more p o l i t i c a l l y a s t u t e . T h e i r b o a r d s and d i r e c -t o r s a r e e x p e r i e n c e d l o b b y i s t s and may be p o l i t i c a l l y " c o n -n e c t e d . " A l s o , g r o u p s i n c o r p o r a t e d u n d e r t h e u m b r e l l a o f t h e U n i t e d Way o r some o t h e r b r o a d c o a l i t i o n o f NGO's, o f t e n have a more m i x e d f u n d i n g b a s e and e x p a n d e d o r g a n i s a t i o n a l c a p a b i l i t i e s , as w e l l as h a v i n g t h e l e g i t i m a c y and c r e d i b i -l i t y t h a t comes w i t h t e n u r e i n t h e s o c i a l s e r v i c e s f i e l d . T h e r e a r e m a j o r f o r c e s w h i c h c o n s t r a i n t h e r o l e s and t h e p e r f o r m a n c e o f v o l u n t a r y s e c t o r a g e n c i e s . T h e s e a r e t h e same f o r c e s w h i c h c a n a f f e c t any t y p e o f o r g a n i s a t i o n , I n B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a a m a j o r p o l i c y change by MHR i n t h e l a t e 1 9 7 0 ' s e l i m i n a t e d a d v o c a c y and s o c i a l a c t i o n o r g a n i s a -t i o n s f r o m e l i g i b i l i t y f o r community g r a n t s f u n d i n g . T h i s p o l i c y i s s e t f o r t h i n t h e MHR P o l i c y and P r o c e d u r e s Manual ( s e e C l a g u e e t a l , 1 9 8 4 , pp. 1 8 1 - 2 1 2 ) . 120 public or private, p r o f i t or non-profit: the f i r s t i s depen-dence, upon a funding authority, a p o l i t i c a l constitutency or governing body; the second i s co-optation, which may be consequent to dependency relationships and may involve i s -sues of goal-deflection, the r e p r i o r i t i s a t i o n of values or the compromising of agency philosophy; the l a s t i s i n s t i t u -t i o n a l i s a t i o n , which may occur as agencies become older, more diverse i n function and extensive i n organisational c a p a b i l i t y . As agencies grow larger or as they move closer to government through dependence or co-optation, they become more bureaucratised i n structure. The organisational i n e r t i a which re s u l t s can a f f e c t agency responsiveness and impair the l i n e s of communication with i t s natural constituents (United Way, SPAR/SPARC 1980, Report #1, p. 44). A l l of these forces, to some extent, can have a noticeable e f f e c t on the nature and function of the voluntary sector, and ultimately, upon the well-being of the c l i e n t s served. The above mentioned forces, however, are s t i l l con-tingent to some degree upon the l e v e l of funding provided by government. In one way or another, government as funder, l e g i s l a t i n g authority or designator of c l i e n t s and services, wields enabling or i n h i b i t i n g power over the voluntary sec-t o r . A United Way, SPAR/SPARC report (#2, 1980) i d e n t i f i e s three broad concerns associated with government funding: a) Government funding of the voluntary sector tends to be biased i n favour of d i r e c t services. Funding c r i t e r i a usually give inadequate recognition to such 121* e s s e n t i a l f u n c t i o n s as program p l a n n i n g and develop-ment, f i n a n c i a l management, c o n t r o l and a c c o u n t a b i -l i t y , s t a f f s u p e r v i s i o n and development, and s e r v i c e r e c o r d , monitoring and e v a l u a t i o n . b) The r e p o r t i n g and accounting requirements connected with government funding tend to discourage innova-t i o n and experimentation i n the v o l u n t a r y s e c t o r and may i n h i b i t agency responsiveness t o changing c l i e n t and community needs. c) Government funding i n t r o d u c e s an a d d i t i o n a l focus of a c c o u n t a b i l i t y t o other c o n s t i t u t e n t s such as boards, v o l u n t e e r s , c l i e n t s and the community. Un-l e s s a genuine p a r t n e r s h i p a r i s e s between government and the v o l u n t a r y s e c t o r , a s i t u a t i o n of mutual d i s -t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n may p r e v a i l . In the longer run t h i s c o u l d l e a d to a s i g n i f i c a n t e r o s i o n of v o l u n -t a r y s e c t o r autonomy. (United Way, SPAR/SPARC 19 80, Report #2 pp. 8-9). In more g e n e r a l terms, government programs of funding tend to c r e a t e f e e l i n g s of i n s t a b i l i t y and u n p r e d i c t a b i l i t y among v o l u n t a r y agencies who l a c k the assurance of c o n t i n u -i t y necessary f o r e f f e c t i v e p r o j e c t i o n s and c o n t r o l of bud-get and s t a f f i n g . Without such assurance, the energy and a t -t e n t i o n of agency boards and s e n i o r s t a f f tends to be drawn i n t o annual or even more frequent scrambles f o r e s s e n t i a l funds. Long range p l a n n i n g and s t a f f or program development are e i t h e r n e g l e c t e d or a s s i g n e d a lower p r i o r i t y (United Way, SPAR/SPARC Report #2, 1980, p. 4). The dependence on p u b l i c funds has c r e a t e d a p r e o c c u p a t i o n with the d r a f t i n g of funding p r o p o s a l s i n order t o make them compatible with government funding g u i d e l i n e s . T h i s p r e o c c u p a t i o n may j e o p a r d i s e the " c r i t i c " r o l e of agencies and leave the v o l u n t a r y s e c t o r prone t o a form 122 of grantsmanship which r e f l e c t s p o l i t i c a l and i d e o l o g i c a l changes i n the p o l i t i c a l environment (United Way, SPAR/SPARC Report #1, 1980, p. 37). To some extent, the granstsmanship game c o u l d be reduced by more c o - o p e r a t i o n among both p r i -v ate and p u b l i c a c t o r s i n terms of j o i n t p l a n n i n g and decision-making aimed at enhancing the s o c i a l s e r v i c e net-work (United Way SPAR/SPARC Report #1, 1980, p. 39). I t i s p o s s i b l e , too, t h a t such c o n d i t i o n s c o u l d enhance the lobby-i n g base of NGO's and r e s t o r e some of the autonomy l o s t through dependence on government funds. There are y e t other s t r u c t u r a l impediments which must be d e a l t with by NGO's i n t h e i r search f o r fund i n g . For i n -stance, problems may a r i s e due to a l a c k of c l a r i t y and con-s i s t e n c y with r e s p e c t t o funding c r i t e r i a and procedures which may cause delays i n the a p p l i c a t i o n p r o c e s s . Delays i n formal approval of requests may l e a d t o the d i v e r s i o n of scar c e r e s o u r c e s t o program maintenance, or n e c e s s i t a t e hav-i n g t o weather the f i r s t few months of the f i s c a l year through d e f i c i t f i n a n c i n g , or, being more c a u t i o u s , l a y i n g -- o f f s t a f f pending approval f o r funding r e q u e s t s . Agencies may a l s o , as a r e s u l t of s t r u c t u r a l or a d m i n i s t r a t i v e delays w i t h i n government f o r funding approval, be f o r c e d i n t o the p o s i t i o n of having t o waste p r e c i o u s r e s o u r c e s on loan i n t e r e s t accrued as a r e s u l t of delayed reimbursement of approved expenditures (United Way SPAR/SPARC Report #2, 1980, pp. 6-7). 123 Problems of inadequate funding l e v e l s are exacerbated by p e r i o d i c adjustments i n funding formulae t h a t do not keep pace with i n f l a t i o n , f o r c i n g agencies t o cut corners i n es-s e n t i a l system maintenance i n order t o balance t h e i r bud-g e t s . The cumulative e f f e c t may w e l l be t o cut back on the o v e r a l l l e v e l of s e r v i c e t o c l i e n t s . Another s e t of problems a r i s e s through a l a c k of c l a r i t y and s p e c i f i c i t y concerning the p r i o r i t i s a t i o n of programs and s e r v i c e s e l i g i b l e f o r government fun d i n g . The r e s u l t i n g c o n f u s i o n and ambiguity may produce a c t u a l or p e r c e i v e d i n e q u i t i e s i n the d i s t r i b u -t i o n o f , or access t o s e r v i c e s . S e r v i c e s or programs which do not seem to f i t i n t o c o n v e n t i o n a l c a t e g o r i e s or c l a s s i f i -c a t i o n systems may " f a l l between the c r a c k s " of government funding p o l i c i e s , or agencies may expend c o n s i d e r a b l e time and e f f o r t n e g o t i a t i n g the "system" (United Way SPAR/SPARC, r e p o r t #2, 1980, pp. 5-6). O v e r a l l , the l e v e l of government funding t o NGO's s u f f e r s i n comparison t o government funding of roughly e q u i v a l e n t programs and s e r v i c e s i n the p u b l i c s e c t o r . Low wages and b e n e f i t s s p e l l d i f f i c u l t i e s i n a t t r a c t i n g and keeping q u a l i f i e d s t a f f (United Way SPAR/ SPARC, r e p o r t #2, 1980, p. 4 ) . T h i s may, i n e f f e c t , r e f l e c t f a i r l y minimal program and s e r v i c e standards: i n the face of l i m i t e d f unding an emphasis on economy may work t o the detriment of ac c e p t a b l e , never mind op t i m a l , s e r v i c e standards (United Way SPAR/SPARC r e p o r t #2, p. 3). 124,. 4.2 REAGANOMICS - THE EFFECTS OF CUTBACKS UPON THE SOCIAL SERVICE SECTOR IN THE UNITED STATES There i s a growing concern among Canadians i n the s o c i a l w e l f a r e f i e l d t h a t r e c e s s i o n economics, cutback management, and the major v e h i c l e of each, p r i v a t i s a t i o n , may have p o t e n t i a l d e s t a b i l i s i n g and d e b i l i t a t i n g e f f e c t s f o r s o c i a l s e r v i c e s , agencies and c l i e n t s . The Canadian consciousness, h a b i t u a t e d through a long h i s t o r y of p u b l i c p r o v i s i o n , s o c i a l i s e d h e a l t h c a r e , and s o c i a l s e c u r i t y pro-grams, has l a r g e l y been i n s u l a t e d from the experience of government cutbacks. While F e d e r a l spending on s o c i a l pro-grams ( e x c l u d i n g Unemployment Insurance and Income A s s i s -tance) has d e c l i n e d as a p r o p o r t i o n of GNP s i n c e 1975, Pro-v i n c i a l expenditures have grown and program r e d u c t i o n , u n t i l r e c e n t l y , has been minimal. The U n i t e d S t a t e s , however, has e xperienced a p r o t r a c t e d d e c l i n e i n F e d e r a l and State com-mitment to s o c i a l s e r v i c e s . Since the mid-seventies the U.S. has e x p e r i e n c e d an e x t e n s i v e r e - p r i o r i t i s a t i o n of s e r v i c e p r o v i s i o n and s h i f t i n g p u b l i c and p r i v a t e mandates f o r human s e r v i c e s . The impacts upon the s o c i a l s e r v i c e network which are o n l y guessed at i n B r i t i s h Columbia have, t h e r e f o r e , been w e l l documented i n the United S t a t e s . I t i s t o the U.S. experience t h a t we must now t u r n i n order t o make some i n f e r e n c e s about the l i k e l y impacts of r e s t r a i n t upon Cana-dia n s e r v i c e s ( p u b l i c and p r i v a t e ) and more i m p o r t a n t l y , t o t r y t o a n t i c i p a t e the o r g a n i s a t i o n a l and s t r u c t u r a l impera-t i v e s f o r a s o c i a l s a f e t y net under s t r a i n . 125 U n t i l r e c e n t l y i n the U.S., contemporary management systems w i t h i n government have p r e d i c a t e d t h e i r p l a n n i n g on an assumption of economic growth. F i n a n c i a l management t e n -ded t o a n t i c i p a t e budgeting requirements by incremental a d d i t i o n s t o a secure economic base (Levine, c i t e d i n Kramer & Specht 1983, p. 57). Levine (1983) d e s c r i b e s a process of o r g a n i s a t i o n a l d e c l i n e i n the face of f i n a n c i a l c r i s e s and i n c r e a s i n g resource s c a r c i t y : The death and d e c l i n e of government o r g a n i s a -t i o n s i s a symptom, a problem and a contingency. I t i s a symptom of resource s c a r c i t y at a s o c i e t a l , even g l o b a l , l e v e l t h a t i s c r e a t i n g the n e c e s s i t y f o r governments to terminate some programs, lower the a c t i v i t y l e v e l of o t h e r s , and c o n f r o n t trade o f f s between new demands and o l d programs r a t h e r than t o expand whenever a new p u b l i c problem a r i s e s . I t i s a problem f o r managers who must maintain o r g a n i s a t i o n a l c a p a c i t y by d e v i s i n g new managerial arrangements w i t h i n p r e v a i l i n g s t r u c t u r e s t h a t were designed under assumptions of growth. (Levine, 1983, p. 57). A c o n s t r i c t e d p o o l of resources may n e c e s s i t a t e zero growth or even d e c l i n i n g growth s t r a t e g i e s and these may pose many p o t e n t i a l problems, such as: a) the d i s a g g r e g a t i o n and cutback of programs which i n d i c a t e a high degree of i n t e g r a t i o n w i t h i n the p o l i c y m a t r i c e s of an o r g a n i s a t i o n may serve t o j e o p a r d i s e "the f u n c t i o n i n g and e q u i l i b r i u m of an e n t i r e o r g a n i s a t i o n " ; b) a l a c k of resources may impair the a b i l i t y of the o r g a n i s a t i o n t o secure the c o n t r o l and the a n a l y t i c t o o l s which help to minimise the r i s k of making mistakes. S i m i l a r l y , o r g a n i s a t i o n s w i l l f i n d i t i n -c r e a s i n g l y d i f f i c u l t t o produce c o n s e n s u s - b u i l d i n g 126 s o l u t i o n s and w i l l have d i f f i c u l t y i n n o v a t i n g and m a i n t a i n i n g f l e x i b i l i t y ; c) o r g a n i s a t i o n a l d e c l i n e may c r e a t e p e r sonnel problems; agencies may experience d i f f i c u l t y i n keeping t a l e n -t e d p e r s o n n e l , a t t r a c t i n g new t a l e n t and i d e a s , or s p u r r i n g i n i t i a t i v e . (Levine, 1981, p. 58). Levine a t t r i b u t e s much of o r g a n i s a t i o n a l d e c l i n e i n the p u b l i c s e c t o r t o four f a c t o r s : 1) problem d e p l e t i o n and problem r e - d e f i n i t i o n which i s i n d i c a t e d by a s h i f t i n p u b l i c a t t i t u d e s and p r o f e s -s i o n a l d o c t r i n e , l e a d i n g u l t i m a t e l y t o p o l i c y t e r m i -n a t i o n ( f o r example, the d e i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s a t i o n of the m e n t a l l y i l l ) ; 2) environmental entropy, which occurs "when the c a -p a c i t y of the environment t o support the p u b l i c orga-n i s a t i o n at p r e v a i l i n g l e v e l s of a c t i v i t y erodes". T h i s i s l i n k e d t o a d e c l i n i n g resource base: d i m i -n i s h e d revenues may f o r c e s e r v i c e r e d u c t i o n even though demands f o r and need f o r those s e r v i c e s remain high; 3) p o l i t i c a l v u l n e r a b i l i t y : l i n k e d t o the age, adaptive s k i l l s and the base of e x p e r t i s e w i t h i n an o r g a n i s a -t i o n , t h i s may l i m i t the c a p a c i t y t o r e s i s t budget decrements and demands t o c o n t r a c t ; 4) o r g a n i s a t i o n a l atrophy: i n t e r n a l atrophy and d e c l i n -i n g performance may be s i g n a l l e d by i n t e r n a l d i s s e n t , d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n without i n t e g r a t i o n , a d e c e n t r a l i s e d a u t h o r i t y with vague r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , obsolescence, and the l a c k of s e l f - e v a l u a t i n g and s e l f - c o r r e c t i n g c a p a c i t y . (Levine, 1981, pp. 60-61). These and other o r g a n i s a t i o n a l d y s f u n c t i o n s which sometimes t y p i f y p u b l i c s e c t o r s e r v i c e agencies have been used by c o n s e r v a t i v e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s t o c r i t i q u e the welfar e State and t o argue f o r the downsizing of government. The 127 w e l f a r e S t a t e , however, i s not fundamentally i n o p p o s i t i o n t o f r e e e n t e r p r i s e or the p r i v a t e s e c t o r . The w e l f a r e State f a c i l i t a t e s c a p i t a l i s t e n t e r p r i s e by c u s h i o n i n g the e f f e c t s of the f r e e market (Zimmerman, 1983, p. 462). Zimmerman cha-r a c t e r i s e s the w e l f a r e State as a symbiotic r e l a t i o n s h i p be-tween the p u b l i c and p r i v a t e s e c t o r s : The government r e l i e s on the p r i v a t e s e c t o r t o gene-r a t e jobs t o produce tax revenues f o r f i n a n c i n g pro-grams; s i m i l a r l y , the p r i v a t e s e c t o r r e l i e s on the p u b l i c s e c t o r f o r the expenditure of tax revenues t o generate the economic a c t i v i t y necessary f o r producing jobs (Zimmerman, 1983, p. 463). Because of r e c i p r o c a l and c y c l i c a l s h i f t s i n the r o l e s of each of these s e c t o r s , government attempts to manage the economy by i n c r e a s i n g or d e c r e a s i n g p u b l i c expenditures f o r s o c i a l or other programs, by i n c r e a s i n g or d e c r e a s i n g taxes or through r e g u l a t i o n or d e r e g u l a t i o n of the market (Zimmer-man, 1983, p. 463). Zimmerman p o i n t s out t h a t the w e l f a r e State has always sought t o ensure s o c i a l c o n t r o l and the s o c i a l r e p r o d u c t i o n of labour through the auspices of the f a m i l y (Zimmerman, 1983, p. 464). However, the e n a b l i n g and f a c i l i t a t i n g power of the State i s attenuated through c u t -backs i n s o c i a l p r o v i s i o n . While en s u r i n g the r e p r o d u c t i o n of labour and c a p i t a l , the State weakens i t s commitment to the economic s e c u r i t y of f a m i l i e s , i n s p i t e of a simultane-ous i n a b i l i t y of the market economy t o p r o v i d e f o r i t (Zim-merman, 1983, p. 465). 128 In the U.S. and elsewhere the s o c i a l s e r v i c e e n v i r o n -ment i s c h a r a c t e r i s e d by i n c r e a s e d budget d e f i c i t s , r i s i n g i n f l a t i o n and unemployment coupled with the problems of a l -l o c a t i n g l i m i t e d resources t o c l i e n t s whose numbers are growing and whose needs are becoming more compelling (Reamer, 1983, p. 451). The " s u p p l y - s i d e " agenda of the Reagan government has l e d to two responses: 1) t o s h i f t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r s o c i a l programs t o State and l o c a l governments through the use of revenue s h a r i n g and b l o c k g r a n t s ; and, 2) co n c e n t r a t e d e f f o r t s t o reduce dependence on the p u b l i c s e c t o r and seek s o l u t i o n s w i t h i n the p r i v a t e s e c t o r (Reamer, 1983, p. 451). These s h i f t s i n p o l i c y have p l a c e d c o n s i d e r a b l e burdens on s o c i a l work p r a c t i t i o n e r s making a l l o c a t i o n d e c i s i o n s ; burdens which have been exa-ce r b a t e d by the f a c t t h a t d e c l i n e s i n funding have been accompanied by a r i s e i n demand (Reamer, 1983, p. 452). Reamer Stat e s t h a t the p o s i t i o n of the U.S. Department of Health and S o c i a l S e r v i c e s i s t h a t "the w e l l - b e i n g of the p u b l i c i s p r i m a r i l y a r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of i n d i v i d u a l s , fami-l i e s , and the communites i n which they l i v e " (Reamer, 1983, p. 452). Such a view r e f l e c t s a d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n and a devo-l u t i o n of the extent of government a c c o u n t a b i l i t y and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . With the a p p r o p r i a t i o n and a u t h o r i s a t i o n l e v e l s of government lowered by the p u r s u i t of s u p p l y - s i d e economics, new i n c e n t i v e s are needed t o induce p r o p r i e t a r y and 129 n o n - p r o f i t agencies t o generate and p r o v i d e s o c i a l s e r v i c e s (Reamer, 1983, p. 453). Two mechanisms are g e n e r a l l y favoured by s u p p l y - s i d e r s : 1) State and l o c a l governments c o n t r a c t i n g f o r s e r v i c e s : the r a t i o n a l e i s t h a t the " i n v i s i b l e " hand of the f r e e market w i l l s u s t a i n h i g h l e v e l s of s e r v i c e p r o v i s i o n and through co m p e t i t i o n the c o n t r o l of c o s t s and l e v e l s of s e r v i c e w i l l occur n a t u r a l l y , without "complex and burdensome government r e g u l a t i o n s " (Reamer, 1983, p. 453); 2) s o c i a l w e l f a r e c l i e n t s or "consumers" should be encou-raged t o shop f o r s e r v i c e s s u p p l i e d to them. The b e l i e f i s t h a t promoting consumer c h o i c e w i l l ensure q u a l i t y c o n t r o l (Reamer, 1983, p. 453). The consumer i s , however, u s u a l l y by-passed i n d e c i s i o n s r e g a r d i n g POSC's, while the s h r i n k i n g numbers and mandates of agencies l i m i t the range of c h o i c e s . Reamer c a u t i o n s t h a t i t i s dangerous to embrace un-c r i t i c a l l y the mechanisms and goals of s u p p l y - s i d e economics (Reamer, 1983, p. 453). Supply-side economics have, i n f a c t , a t t r a c t e d a host of c r i t i c s . Hardly r e v o l u t i o n a r y , B i l l Jamieson J r . (19 82) comments t h a t the "new" s u p p l y - s i d e eco-nomics hearkens more to the p h i l o s o p h y of Adam Smith than t o the p r e s s i n g needs of the 1980's. He goes f u r t h e r i n a s s e r t -i n g t h a t i t was the f a i l u r e of s u p p l y - s i d e economics t h a t 13G brought Keynesian, or demand-side economics, i n t o vogue (Jamieson, 1982, p. 10). Jamieson says t h a t the success of s u p p l y - s i d e / t r i c k l e - d o w n t h e o r i e s r e l i e s h e a v i l y on the "you g o t t a b e l i e v e " theory of government: ... i t says to b u s i n e s s , 'you g o t t a b e l i e v e ' ; i t says t o the consumer, 'you g o t t a b e l i e v e * ; i t says to the hungry, 'you g o t t a b e l i e v e . ' Then, i f i t does not work i t i s because b u s i n e s s , the consumer, and the hun-gry d i d not b e l i e v e hard enough. (Jamieson, 1982, p. 11) . Reamer (1983) f e e l s t h a t i n c r e a s e d r e l i a n c e on POSC's c o u l d l e a d t o a r e s u r r e c t i o n of the i d e a l of government as the agent of " l a s t r e s o r t , " meaning t h a t government w i l l p r o v i d e a s s i s t a n c e o n l y when a l l other o p t i o n s have been exhausted. Reamer f e a r s a re-emergence of the e t h i c of s o c i a l problems as matters of " i n d i v i d u a l f a i l u r e r a t h e r than as a f u n c t i o n of c y c l i c a l and s t r u c t u r a l d e f e c t s i n the l a r g e r s o c i e t y " (Reamer, 1983, p. 458). Reamer has observed t h a t , while o r g a n i s a t i o n s such as the C h i l d Welfare League of America and the United Way of America have demonstrated through s t u d i e s t h a t the l a r g e s t p o r t i o n of the budgets of t h e i r member agencies came from government, and d e s p i t e government assurances t h a t the "most needy" are accorded f i r s t c l a i m on p u b l i c s e r v i c e s , more than 50 percent of the r e d u c t i o n s made by the Reagan a d m i n i s t r a t i o n came out of d i r e c t s e r v i c e s t o people i n desperate need (Reamer, 1983, p. 454). T h i s underscores the p h i l o s o p h i c a l and p o l i t i c a l 131 values of an administration whose d e f i n i t i o n of need and "deserving" do not extend to many persons whose pl i g h t may be " s t r u c t u r a l " as opposed to " e x i s t e n t i a l . " P o l i t i c a l philosophies of the right seem to be predicated upon an "in d i v i d u a l pathology" concept of poverty or s o c i a l inse-c u r i t y . The minimalist State philosophy, expressed i n poli c y , seems to minimise the mandate of the State for so-c i a l provision while simultaneously assuming an even more pervasive role i n the l e g i t i m i s i n g of s o c i a l needs and the manner i n which need i s met. 4.3 SOME EMPIRICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE IMPACTS OF BUDGETARY RESTRAINT ON THE VOLUNTARY SECTOR IN THE U.S. The e f f e c t s of budgetary r e s t r a i n t on the not-for-- p r o f i t sector i n the United States have been addressed by a number of authors i n a variety of forums. There i s a strong base of empirical research exploring the impacts upon agen-cies and t h e i r c l i e n t s conducted by regional and national organisations, among them the United Way of America (these are regional studies conducted i n Texas, Indiana, C a l i f o r n i a and Connecticut), Family Service America (1981, 1983), the Community Council of Greater New York (1982, 1983), the Ch i l d Welfare League of America (1981), the United Community Planning Corporation of Boston Massachussets (1981, 1983) and an important national survey of NGO's conducted by the 132 Urban I n s t i t u t e (19 83). These s t u d i e s have been reviewed by Demone and Gibelman i n a 19 84 paper which questions the a b i -l i t y of v o l u n t a r y s e c t o r agencies t o assume more f i n a n c i a l as w e l l as programmatic r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n the wake of government cutbacks. The authors examine "Reaganomics" i n r e l a t i o n t o a number of v a r i a b l e s , such as: 1) the l e v e l and types of s e r v i c e o f f e r e d by NGO's; 2) t h e i r use of p r o f e s s i o n a l p e r s o n n e l ; 3) the r e l i a n c e on POSC's between p u b l i c and p r i v a t e agencies; 4) p a t t e r n s of f i n a n c i n g ; 5) compensatory responses by NGO's t o decreases i n f e d e r a l funding; 6) NGO's use of v o l u n t e e r s . In d i s t i l l i n g the essence of t h i s v a r i e d r e s e a r c h , Demone and Gibelman attempt t o assess the impact of budget c u t s on the v o l u n t a r y n o t - f o r - p r o f i t s e c t o r and thereby o f f e r some comment on the f u t u r e s t a t u s of v o l u n t a r i s m . T h e i r s i s a v a l u a b l e compendium of t h i s r e s e a r c h and f o r t h a t reason a summary of the major p o i n t s i n the paper w i l l be presented. In 1982 and 1983 the Urban I n s t i t u t e , based i n Wash-in g t o n D.C, conducted a mailed q u e s t i o n n a i r e survey of 8,294 o r g a n i s a t i o n s i n twelve m e t r o p o l i t a n and f o u r non-- m e t r o p o l i t a n areas of the United S t a t e s , f o r which a 49.7 percent response r a t e was achieved. The survey focused on 133 c h a r i t a b l e s e r v i c e agencies ( e x c l u d i n g funding o r g a n i s a t o n s , r e l i g i o u s bodies or groups p r o v i d i n g s e r v i c e s p r i m a r i l y t o t h e i r own members, labour unions, h o s p i t a l s and u n i v e r s i -t i e s ) and i t s i n t e n t was t o assess the range of f a c t o r s a f f e c t i n g the impacts of cutbacks upon NGO's. F o r t y - f o u r percent of the agencies surveyed r e p o r t e d an i n c r e a s e i n requests f o r s e r v i c e s ( e s p e c i a l l y i n the areas of l e g a l a i d , advocacy, employment t r a i n i n g , and mental h e a l t h s e r v i c e s ) while o n l y 8 percent r e p o r t e d a decrease i n requests f o r s e r v i c e s . Demone and Gibelman p o i n t t o t h i s f i n d i n g as o f -f e r i n g support f o r the r e l a t i o n s h i p between adverse economic c o n d i t i o n s and the need f o r h e a l t h and s o c i a l s e r v i c e s (Demone & Gibelman, 1984, p. 422). For f i s c a l year 1982 - the f i r s t f u l l year of Reagan a d m i n i s t r a t i o n budget cuts - government p r o v i d e d 39 percent of revenues f o r v o l u n t a r y agencies with 58 percent (2037 agencies i n the Urban I n s t i t u t e sample) r e c e i v i n g some l e v e l of p u b l i c support. For those agencies r e c e i v i n g government f i n a n c i a l a s s i s t a n c e , two-thirds of t h e i r income came from government (note: l e v e l s of government are not d i s t i n g u i s h e d i n Demone and Gibelman's summary). Of agencies r e c e i v i n g p u b l i c support, 57 percent r e p o r t e d r e d u c t i o n s i n government funding i n the p e r i o d 1981-82. T h i r t y - f i v e percent r e p o r t e d no change i n p u b l i c support ( d i s c o u n t i n g i n f l a t i o n ) and onl y 8 percent r e p o r t e d i n c r e a s e d funding, ranging from a low of 3 percent ( l e g a l s e r v i c e s and advocacy) t o 15 percent 134 (mental h e a l t h a g e n c i e s ) . Decreases i n funding f o r the same p e r i o d range from 72 percent ( l e g a l s e r v i c e agencies) t o 45 percent ( i n s t i t u t i o n a l and r e s i d e n t i a l care a g e n c i e s ) . Among NGO's i d e n t i f i e d as s o c i a l s e r v i c e agencies, 62 percent r e p o r t e d a r e d u c t i o n i n funding from 1981 t o 1983. Twenty-- e i g h t percent c l a i m e d no change i n t h e i r l e v e l s of funding and 10 per c e n t r e p o r t e d i n c r e a s e s . Of h e a l t h and mental h e a l t h agencies, 57 percent and 59 percent r e s p e c t i v e l y r e p o r t e d decreases while 9 percent and 15 percent i n d i c a t e d i n c r e a s e s . P u t t i n g these f i n d i n g s i n t o p e r s p e c t i v e , Demone and Gibelman observe t h a t data c o l l e c t e d a year l a t e r from a v a r i e t y o f sources do not evidence a c o n t i n u i n g d e c l i n e o f the magnitude of cu t s r e p o r t e d by the Urban I n s t i t u t e . The bulk of the cutbacks o c c u r r e d i n the e a r l y years of the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . While the authors remark t h a t r e g i o n a l data on the impacts of cutbacks are t h i n , some r e g i o n a l v a r i a t i o n i n the degree of impact can be accounted f o r by the f a c t t h a t some areas of the U.S. r e l y l e s s on p u b l i c funding than o t h e r s . The c o r r e l a t i o n drawn by Demone and Gibelman, and echoed throughout much of the l i t e r a t u r e d e a l i n g with NGO's, i s t h a t the s e v e r i t y of impacts experienced as a r e s u l t of cutbacks v a r i e s with the degree of r e l i a n c e upon p u b l i c sources f o r funds. S i m i l a r l y , agencies with a more v a r i e d f unding base, or l a r g e r , U n ited Way agencies s u f f e r e d cuts i n p u b l i c funds more e a s i l y than most s m a l l e r , independent v o l u n t a r y agencies. 135 In the wake of cutbacks i n p u b l i c t r a n s f e r s t o NGO's, agencies have had t o adapt by seeking compensatory sources of f u n d i n g . The major sources of a l t e r n a t i v e funding f o r U.S. v o l u n t a r y agencies f o r f i s c a l years 1980 t o 1982 were: 1) earned income (dues, f e e s , e t c . ) 49 percent i n c r e a s e 2) g i f t s (donations, United Way, et c . ) 44 percent i n c r e a s e 3) foundations and c o r p o r a t i o n s 38 percent i n c r e a s e The l e v e l s of i n c r e a s e f o r these funding sources, however, are u n l i k e l y t o be able t o compensate f o r the l o s s of p u b l i c monies. Demone and Gibelman note t h a t i n 19 83 government p r o v i d e d 74 percent of t o t a l f unding f o r NGO's i n the U.S. Given the s m a l l e r r e l a t i v e weight of agency f u n d - r a i s i n g , donations and fees f o r s e r v i c e as a p r o p o r t i o n of t o t a l agency income, i t i s probable t h a t even r e l a t i v e l y modest cutbacks cannot be compensated f o r by these sources. Although Demone and Gibelman have observed a p a t t e r n of growth i n p r i v a t e support f o r some s e r v i c e s through i n v e s t -ments, c l i e n t f e e s , c o n t r i b u t i o n s from i n d i v i d u a l s and b u s i -ness, foundations and bequests, or money earned from s p e c i a l events, t h i s s t i l l forms a very s m a l l p o r t i o n of the funding base of most agencies, and f u r t h e r , these sources of funding are h i g h l y v a r i a b l e and f r e q u e n t l y u n s t a b l e . Insecure funding has l e d t o other o r g a n i s a t i o n a l a d a p t a t i o n s t o cutbacks. R e f e r r i n g t o f a m i l y s e r v i c e agen-c i e s i n the Un i t e d S t a t e s , Demone and Gibelman have i d e n t i -f i e d the f o l l o w i n g t r e n d s : 136 1) i n c r e a s e d use of v o l u n t e e r s (up 84 percent i n f a m i l y s e r v i c e agencies, or FSA's); 2) c u r t a i l i n g s e r v i c e s or i n c r e a s i n g fees (50 percent of FSA's); 3) i n c r e a s i n g s t a f f workloads and redu c i n g a d m i n i s t r a t i v e s t a f f ( c i r c a 50 percent of FSA's); 4) r e o r g a n i z i n g the agency ( i n over 50 percent of FSA's). (Demone & Gibelman, 1984, pp. 421-424). I t must a l s o be noted t h a t each of the above o p t i o n s e n t a i l s some l e v e l of c o s t i n terms of agency v i a b i l i t y , s u r v i v a b i -l i t y , or q u a l i t y of s e r v i c e t o c l i e n t s . Demone and Gibelman conclude t h a t f o r v o l u n t a r i s t i c n o t - f o r - p r o f i t agencies the c h o i c e s are b a s i c a l l y two -reduce c o s t s or i n c r e a s e income. F i r s t order a l t e r n a t i v e s f o r agency s u r v i v a l c o u l d i n c l u d e : 1) t i g h t e n i n g management c o n t r o l s ; 2) i n c r e a s i n g p r o d u c t i v i t y ; 3) i n c r e a s i n g the number of c l i e n t s paying f o r s e r v i c e s d i r e c t l y or through t h i r d - p a r t y schemes; 4) r a i s i n g f e e s ; 5) improving other f u n d - r a i s i n g methods; 6) c o l l a b o r a t i v e c o s t - s h a r i n g arrangements; and 7) l o b b y i n g t o enhance or p r o t e c t agency i n t e r e s t s . Second-order s t r a t e g i e s i n v o l v e more d r a s t i c measures and may i n v o l v e : 137 1) r e d u c i n g the q u a n t i t y or q u a l i t y of s e r v i c e s ; 2) r e s t r a i n i n g or r a t i o n i n g admissions f o r s e r v i c e s ; 3) c l o s i n g branches; 4) o p e r a t i n g with a d e f i c i t budget; 5) merger with other o r g a n i s a t i o n s ; or, the l a s t r e s o r t , 6) c l o s i n g the agency (Demone & Gibelman, 1984 p. 425). Hatch (1980) suggests t h a t an e s s e n t i a l q u e s t i o n r e g a r d i n g the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the State and the v o l u n t a r y s e c t o r i s whether v o l u n t a r y a c t i o n i s merely marginal t o State p r o v i s i o n , or whether i t i s an i n t e g r a l p a r t of the s e r v i c e process (Hatch, 1980, p. 124). The growth of the v o l u n t a r y s e c t o r over the l a s t two decades, r e f l e c t e d both i n the numbers of agencies and c l i e n t s served, and i n the dramatic i n c r e a s e s i n p u b l i c funds a l l o c a t e d t o NGO's suggests t h a t the v o l u n t a r y s e c t o r i s more than m a r g i n a l , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the d e l i v e r y of p e r s o n a l s o c i a l s e r v i c e s . However, the o f t e n ad hoc manner of bestow-i n g g r a n t s , the degree of p o l i t i c a l exigency evidenced i n the success of some agencies over o t h e r s , and the l a c k of a developmental approach on the p a r t s of v o l u n t a r y and State agencies mean t h a t i t i s o f t e n l e s s than i n t e g r a l (Hatch, 1980, p. 141; Demone & Gibelman, 1984, pp. 424-425). V o l u n t a r y s e c t o r s o c i a l s e r v i c e s , w hile d e r i v i n g t h e i r s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l l e g i t i m a c y through the m o b i l i s a -t i o n of r e s o u r c e s on b e h a l f of t h e i r c o n s t i t u e n t s , are o f t e n 138 unable t o a c t independently due t o the c o n s t r a i n t s p l a c e d on them by dependency on government fun d i n g . Furthermore, Hatch observes t h a t e f f o r t s t o support and strengthen the v o l u n -t a r y s e c t o r are not an i n t e g r a l p a r t of the s t a t u t o r y s e r -v i c e s or s o c i a l p o l i c y . As has been suggested by s e v e r a l authors, the State has a ve s t e d i n t e r e s t i n m a i n t a i n i n g the i n f o r m a l c h a r a c t e r of the v o l u n t a r y s e c t o r . T h i s serves t o at once assure the quiescence and m a l l e a b i l i t y of the v o l u n t a r y s e c t o r - r e l y i n g upon the a l t r u i s t i c m i s s i o n of i t s p a r t i c i p a n t s t o a s s i s t i n s o c i a l p r o v i s i o n - and t o r e i n f o r c e the i d e o l o g y of p r i v a t e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r s o c i a l problems. V o l u n t a r y agencies are n e i t h e r the s o l e nor the p r i n c i p a l b e n e f i c i a r i e s of government f i n a n c i a l support -governments a l s o b e n e f i t , as do the c l i e n t s of NGO's not t o mention the s o c i e t y at l a r g e . However, while the v o l u n t a r y s e r v i c e network remains fragmented and uncoordinated, the p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t a l l p o t e n t i a l b e n e f i t s of the "mixed-economy" of s o c i a l s e r v i c e s ( i . e . p u b l i c and p r i v a t e p r o v i s i o n ) w i l l be r e a l i s e d , at any l e v e l , i s d o u b t f u l . 4.4 EFFECTS UPON CLIENTS OF AGENCY DECLINE IN THE U.S. The long term e f f e c t s of the Reagan a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s economic p o l i c i e s are u n c e r t a i n and u n p r e d i c t a b l e . Communi-t e s are scrambling t o p r o t e c t t h e i r programs, save t h e i r 139 s e r v i c e s , save t h e i r jobs, and to p r o v i d e f o r the w e l f a r e of t h e i r c i t i z e n s with i n c r e a s i n g l y s c a r c e r e s o u r c e s (Wineburg e t a l , 1983, p. 489). As wage earners l o s e t h e i r jobs, they are p u t t i n g more s t r a i n on a s e r v i c e network a l r e a d y t r y i n g t o cope with reduced l e v e l s of funding (Wineburg e t a l , p. 489). The c a p a c i t y of the economic system t o meet l e g i t i m a t e demands i s confounded by the i n a b i l i t y of the p o l i t i c a l s y s -tem t o a i d s o c i e t y i n r e d e f i n i n g and r e a l l o c a t i n g these c l a i m s ( S a r r i , 1982, pp. 22-23). C o n t r o l l i n g expenditures, i n c r e a s e d r e l i a n c e on the p r i v a t e s e c t o r and v o l u n t e e r s , zero-based budgeting and r i g o r o u s program e v a l u a t i o n , a l l h o l d some p o t e n t i a l f o r o r g a n i s a t i o n a l enhancement. T h i s enhancement i s impaired, however, when such procedures are a p p l i e d o n l y t o reduce resource expenditure without regard t o need ( S a r r i , 1982, p. 23). Not o n l y are p u b l i c agencies and NGO's themselves a f f e c t e d i n terms of o r g a n i s a t i o n , f u n c t i o n and v i a b i l i t y , the c l i e n t s of s o c i a l s e r v i c e agencies must bear the f i n a l burden of r e s t r a i n t . The most h e a v i l y government dependent agencies have r e c e i v e d the g r e a t e s t p r o p o r t i o n a l cutbacks i n government funds (Tapper, 1982, p. 17). The c l i e n t groups served by these agencies are o f t e n dependent on h i g h l y spe-c i a l i s e d s e r v i c e s and are l i k e l y t o be drawn from s o c i o --economic s e c t o r s which are l e a s t able to pay f o r s e r v i c e through donations or user f e e s , and who may be r e l a t i v e l y unable t o a r t i c u l a t e t h e i r needs or advocacy responses. In a 14 0 study f o r the Community C o u n c i l of Greater New York (Tapper, 1982), among responding agencies the l a r g e s t r e d u c t i o n s i n government funds were i n the area o f : 1) youth employment and t r a i n i n g (62.1%) 2) a d u l t employment and t r a i n i n g (57.5%) 3) i n f o r m a t i o n and r e f e r r a l (32.7%) 4) community s a f e t y and j u s t i c e (24.9%) 5) advocacy, c o o r d i n a t i o n and p l a n n i n g (18.2%) (Tapper, 1982, p. 2). Changes i n government funding had an impact i n more than 60 per c e n t of the 122 programs canvassed f o r the study. T h i r t e e n programs were terminated; s t a f f r e d u c t i o n s o c c u r r e d i n 41 programs; 29 programs reduced the l e v e l of s e r v i c e p r o v i d e d or planned t o do so; 20 programs r e p o r t e d having (or planning) t o terminate s p e c i f i c s e r v i c e s of t h e i r programs. Other programs r e p o r t e d having t o r a i s e e l i g i b i l i -t y or fee requirements ( i n e f f e c t denying s e r v i c e t o c l i -ents) and l i m i t i n g hours of s e r v i c e (Tapper, 1982, p. 3). Another study by the United Way of Santa C l a r a County (UWSCC, 1982) examined agency response t o and impacts upon c l i e n t s of government funding cutbacks. Agencies responded t o c o n s t r i c t e d r e s o u r c e s by: a) i n c r e a s i n g s t a f f workloads; b) c u t t i n g s t a f f ; c) t i g h t e n i n g f i s c a l c o n t r o l s ; d) a c q u i r -i n g replacement funds from other sources; and e) re d u c i n g the q u a n t i t y and q u a l i t y of the s e r v i c e s p r o v i d e d (UWSCC, 1982, p. 1). The r e p o r t a l s o found t h a t the groups most s e v e r e l y a f f e c t e d by r e d u c t i o n s were the poor, s e n i o r s , women, and refugees (UWSCC, 1982, p. 1). 141 Of s p e c i a l note are s e n i o r s who may be d i s p r o p o r t i o -n a t e l y impacted because they make up a p o r t i o n of the con-s t i t u e n t s of almost a l l the human s e r v i c e f i e l d s and are a f f e c t e d by c u t s i n more than one area - h e a l t h , r e h a b i l i -t a t i o n , t r a n s p o r t a t i o n , and other b a s i c needs (UWSCC, 1982, p. 1 ) . G e n e r a l l y , reduced a c c e s s i b i l i t y r e s u l t i n g from i n c r e a s e d case l o a d s , c l i e n t d e f l e c t i o n , s t a f f r e d u c t i o n , or the i n t r o d u c t i o n of user fees means t h a t fewer persons w i l l r e c e i v e l e s s s e r v i c e . Many agencies may have t o narrow t h e i r mandates f o r p r o v i s i o n by r a i s i n g e l i g i b i l i t y requirements. There has a l s o been a s h i f t away from the p r e v e n t i o n and treatment of n o n - c r i s i s s i t u a t i o n s although the o v e r a l l economic and employment environment exacerbates f a m i l y t e n s i o n s and s t r e s s (UWSCC, 19 82, p. 21). The r e p o r t by the Unit e d Way of Santa C l a r a Country warns t h a t : I f we continue t o r e t r e n c h from p r e v e n t i o n - t y p e s e r -v i c e s , people's problems w i l l be at the c r i t i c a l l e v e l b e f o r e they r e c e i v e a t t e n t i o n . T h i s i s not i n the best i n t e r e s t of s o c i e t y or c o s t - e f f e c t i v e n e s s . (UWSCC, 1982, p. 38). There are f e a r s t h a t a c c e s s i b i l i t y w i l l be f u r t h e r reduced as community-based s e r v i c e s succumb t o a t t r i t i o n as a r e s u l t of cutbacks (UWSCC, 19 82, p. 22). There are other kinds of impacts, however, some of which may be even more p e r v a s i v e . Wineburg e t a l (1983) observe t h a t the low-- f u n c t i o n i n g needy ( i n c l u d i n g the e l d e r l y and the 142 c h r o n i c a l l y m e n t a l l y i l l ) f i n d any change i n the system d i f f i c u l t and c o n f u s i n g and, t h e r e f o r e , may not be able t o access those r e s o u r c e s a v a i l a b l e t o them. S i m i l a r l y , the middle and lower middle c l a s s people who, because of unem-ployment and r e c e s s i o n , are being f o r c e d t o seek p u b l i c a s s i s t a n c e , may experience shock because of t h e i r u n f a m i l i a -r i t y with the c o m p l e x i t i e s of the system. The trauma of the person i n need i s o f t e n compounded by s t i g m a t i s a t i o n and lowered s e l f - e s t e e m (Wineburg e t a l , 1983, p. 493). The i s s u e of c l i e n t - b o r n e impacts through s e r v i c e r e d u c t i o n i s v ery complex and c o n t i n g e n t upon a number of v a r i a b l e s . There i s no simple c o r r e l a t i o n between the percentage of funding reduced and the l e v e l of s e r v i c e r e d u c t i o n . Impacts w i l l be broad and cumulative and w i l l occur i n c o n j u n c t i o n with s o c i a l p o l i c y changes at a l l l e v e l s of government (United Way of the Bay Area, 1982, p. 2). Cutbacks i n funding f o r v o l u n t a r i s t i c s o c i a l s e r v i c e s have been p a r a l l e l e d i n the U n i t e d S t a t e s , B r i t a i n , Canada and A u s t r a l i a by simultaneous e f f o r t s t o c o n t a i n the l e v e l of expenditure f o r p u b l i c l y - d e l i v e r e d s o c i a l s e r v i c e s . S t a -t u t o r y s e r v i c e s and s o c i a l s e c u r i t y t r a n s f e r s have been sub-j e c t e d t o r a t i o n i n g through a v a r i e t y of mechanisms, most of them for m a l , as through l e g i s l a t i o n , and some i n f o r m a l or b u r e a u c r a t i c i n nature. R e s t r i c t i n g the a v a i l a b i l i t y of and a c c e s s i b i l i t y t o s t a t u t o r y s e r v i c e s may be e f f e c t e d through i n c r e a s e d b u r e a u c r a t i c c o n t r o l s , such as the i m p o s i t i o n of 143 more s t r i n g e n t c o n d i t i o n s of e l i g i b i l i t y f o r b e n e f i t s and s e r v i c e s ; f i s c a l c o n t r o l s through which funding l e v e l s are reduced o u t r i g h t or f r o z e n thus r e d u c i n g the range of s e r -v i c e s or b e n e f i t s a v a i l a b l e t o c l i e n t s ; r e d u c i n g the numbers of persons employed i n the s t a t u t o r y s o c i a l s e r v i e s ; i n -c r e a s e d enforcement of r u l e s governing "abuse" of the s y s -tem, and; reduced access t o avenues of appeal on the p a r t of c l i e n t s or p o t e n t i a l c l i e n t s . A l l of these mechanisms o f f e r p o t e n t i a l n e gative impacts f o r u s ers of s e r v i c e s . Caseloads i n c r e a s e , p a r t l y as a r e s u l t of a t t r i t i o n i n the p u b l i c l y - p r o v i d e d s e r v i c e s and p a r t l y as a r e s u l t of economic f a c t o r s . The number of a v a i l a b l e i n p u t s per c l i e n t ( i n c l u d i n g the amount of time a v a i l a b l e f o r each c l i e n t ) are reduced as a r e s u l t , t o the e f f e c t t h a t c l i e n t s may: a) experience an i n c r e a s i n g p r o p e n s i t y f o r s o c i a l s e r v i c e dependence; b) not r e c e i v e adequate a s s i s t a n c e and thereby experience a s t a t e of d e c l i n i n g s e c u r i t y and w e l l - b e i n g ; or, c) may be d e f l e c t e d t o v o l u n t a r y n o t - f o r - p r o f i t s e r v i c e s f o r a s s i s t a n c e . However, because d e c l i n e s i n s t a t u t o r y s e c t o r funding are accompanied by r e d u c t i o n s i n t r a n s f e r s t o the n o n - p r o f i t s e c t o r , the c a p a b i l i t y of v o l u n t a r y s e r v i c e s t o p r o v i d e f o r t h e i r c l i e n t s may a l s o be s e r i o u s l y impaired. A l s o , because a c e n t r a l element of neo-conservative s o c i a l p o l i c y i s the concept of p r i v a t i s a t i o n , which embraces the p r i v a t e s e c t o r p r o v i s i o n of s t a t u t o r y s e r v i c e s through c o n t r a c t , NGO's may 144 become more narrow and e x c l u s i o n a r y with r e s p e c t t o t h e i r c l i e n t s and mode of s e r v i c e d e l i v e r y as they compete f o r c o n t r a c t s i n an e f f o r t t o compensate f o r funds l o s t through cutbacks. D e l i v e r i n g s e r v i c e s through c o n t r a c t may a f f e c t the " o r g a n i s a t i o n a l m i s s i o n " of n o t - f o r - p r o f i t o r g a n i s a t i o n s , p a r t i c u l a r l y as c o n t i n u i t y of s e r v i c e d e l i v e r y r e q u i r e s s t a b l e , even c o r d i a l r e l a t i o n s with the State and the s t a -t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y , p o s s i b l y to the detriment of advocacy responses on b e h a l f of c l i e n t s . POSC's are an important component of s o c i a l s e r v i c e d e l i v e r y systems i n Canada and the U n i t e d S t a t e s , and they a c q u i r e a p a r t i c u l a r s a l i e n c y i n an e r a of f i s c a l r e s t r a i n t . The f o l l o w i n g d i s c u s s i o n ex-p l o r e s the i s s u e of c o n t r a c t i n g - o u t f o r s e r v i c e s and the problems f a c e d by NGO's, c l i e n t s and policy-makers i n the use of POSC's. 4.5 THE NON-PROFIT SECTOR AND PURCHASE OF SERVICE CONTRACTING N o n - p r o f i t o r g a n i s a t i o n s , while p r i v a t e i n c h a r a c t e r , are e s s e n t i a l l y p u b l i c i n f u n c t i o n , p r o v i d i n g a range of p u b l i c goods and s e r v i n g as the major v e h i c l e through which p r i v a t e c h a r i t a b l e resources and v o l u n t a r y e f f o r t s are brought t o bear on the s o l v i n g of community problems 145 (Salamon & Abramson, c i t e d i n Palmer & S a n h i l l , 1982, pp. 219-220). The Reagan p o l i c i e s i n the U.S., however, c o u l d mean a major r e d i v i s i o n of r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s between govern-ment and NGO's (Morris, 1982, p. 337). Questions t h e r e f o r e a r i s e as t o the u l t i m a t e mandate of the v o l u n t a r y s e c t o r v i s a v i s the government. As Mo r r i s w r i t e s : Are governmental/voluntary r e l a t i o n s h i p s expected t o achieve p r e v e n t i v e , c u r a t i v e , and maintenance goals f o r a l l persons a f f e c t e d by p a r t i c u l a r c o n d i t i o n s ? I f f u l l p e n e t r a t i o n of an at r i s k p o p u l a t i o n i s the o b j e c t i v e , then i t i s u n l i k e l y t h a t the p h i l a n t h r o p i c a s s o c i a t o n s can independently p r o v i d e the r e q u i s i t e r e s o u r c e s . Con-v e r s e l y , i f a r e s i d u a l purpose i s adopted by p u b l i c p o l i c y , then the q u e s t i o n i s merely how t o d i s t r i b u t e e x i s t i n g p u b l i c w e l f a r e revenues among needs which v a s t l y exceed resources (Morris, 1982, p. 337). While chosen by the Reagan A d m i n i s t r a t i o n as a v e h i c l e of the Economic Recovery Program, the v o l u n t a r y s e c t o r , i n the face of new o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r v o l u n t a r y a c t i v i t y , i s i r o n i -c a l l y weakened by the implementation of the government's r e s t r a i n t programs (Salamon & Abramson, 1982, p. 220). Non-- p r o f i t s are not an a l t e r n a t i v e t o government, they are, r a t h e r , p a r t n e r s of government i n many spheres: As a r e s u l t , the same p o l i c i e s t h a t reduce the r o l e of government - and, hence, i n c r e a s e the need f o r non-- p r o f i t o r g a n i s a t i o n s - a l s o reduce the a b i l i t y of these o r g a n i s a t i o n s t o meet t h i s need (Salamon & Abramson, 1982, p. 220). 1*4 6 The c o n s e r v a t i v e view t h a t the growth of government's mandate over areas of s e r v i c e p r o v i s i o n has c o n s t r a i n e d the p r i v a t e s e c t o r and l i m i t e d consumer c h o i c e o f t e n leads t o the c o n v i c t i o n t h a t the c o n t r a c t i o n of government should be enough t o r e v i t a l i s e v o l u n t a r y o r g a n i s a t i o n s and other medi-a t i n g s t r u c t u r e s (Salamon & Abramson, 1982, p. 224). Salamon and Abramson, however, p o i n t out t h a t e m p i r i c a l r e s e a r c h so f a r c a r r i e d - o u t tends not t o support these assumptions (Salamon & Abramson, 1982, p. 234). Nor i s there much hope t h a t the v o l u n t a r y s e c t o r can compensate f o r funds l o s t t o government - economic i n s e c u r i t y has dampened p r i v a t e s e c t o r p h i l a n t h r o p y from both foundations and the ge n e r a l p u b l i c ( M o r r i s , 1982, p. 339). Salamon and Abramson a s s e r t t h a t the l e v e l s of expansion necessary t o make up f o r cut s i n govern-ment funding c o n s t i t u t e a major c h a l l e n g e t o the non--government s e c t o r (Salamon & Abramson, 1982, p. 228). D e c i s i o n s by p u b l i c agencies and o f f i c i a l s over whe-the r and when t o pro v i d e p u b l i c l y funded s e r v i c e s d i r e c t l y or t o c o n t r a c t - o u t t o p r o f i t or n o n - p r o f i t agencies i n the p r i v a t e s e c t o r , i s becoming a c r u c i a l area of p o l i c y c h o i c e (Jansson, 1979, p. 362). Purchase of s e r v i c e c o n t r a c t s are one element of a l a r g e r spectrum of arrangements p e r t a i n i n g t o the t r a n s m i s s i o n of p u b l i c funds t o p r i v a t e b o d i e s . Demone and Gibelman (1983) d e s c r i b e purchase of s e r v i c e as "a s e t of o r g a n i s e d procedures t o b r i n g p u b l i c and p r i v a t e e n t i t i e s i n t o p a r t n e r s h i p f o r the a c q u i s i s t i o n of goods or 147< s e r v i c e s i n the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t " (Demone & Gibelman, 1983, p. 327). I t has been noted by Gibelman (1983, p. 64) t h a t over the l a s t two decades i n the U.S. there has been an enormous expansion i n the use of p u b l i c funds t o purchase s e r v i c e s from the p r i v a t e s e c t o r . While f i s c a l r e s p o n s i b i l i -t y has become more c e n t r a l i s e d , the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the d e l i v e r y of b e n e f i t s has become more d i s p e r s e d through pur-chase of s e r v i c e c o n t r a c t s with the p r i v a t e s e c t o r ( G i l b e r t , 1984, p. 64). The purchase of s e r v i c e agreement i s actu a t e d through a c o n t r a c t u a l r e l a t i o n s h i p between the governmental agency and another o r g a n i s a t i o n (the p r o v i d e r ) and the purpose of the agreement i s to purchase care or s e r v i c e s p r o v i d e d t o i n d i v i d u a l s or groups f o r whom there i s a predetermined p u b l i c r e s p o n s i b i l i t y (Gibelman, 1983, p. 103). Kramer (1983) notes t h a t POSC p r a c t i s e v a r i e s g r e a t l y among State and l o c a l governments and from one k i n d of s e r v i c e program t o another. Yet, d e s p i t e the enormous growth of POS con-t r a c t i n g and consequent e f f e c t s on the v o l u n t a r y s e c t o r , there i s l i t t l e a v a i l a b l e knowledge t o guide policy-making and a d m i n i s t r a t i o n (Kramer, 1983, p. 422). In f a c t , POSC's have l e d t o an even g r e a t e r dependence on governmental funds, r e s u l t i n g i n "a p l u r a l i s t i c , mixed and more compe-t i t i v e economy i n the human s e r v i c e s , making the f u t u r e of v o l u n t a r y , n o n - p r o f i t agencies q u i t e u n c e r t a i n " (Kramer, 1983, p. 422). 148 Kramer i d e n t i f i e s s e v e r a l p o t e n t i a l advantages f o r government of purchase of s e r v i c e c o n t r a c t i n g (these have been noted by a number of authors, among them G i l b e r t , 1984; Gibelman, 1981 & 1983; Demone & Gibelman, 1983 & 1984; Jansson 1979): 1) POSC's are an expedient f o r extending l i m i t e d r e -sources because the c o s t of c o n t r a c t e d s e r v i c e s i s u s u a l l y l e s s than those p r o v i d e d by the p u b l i c agency. 2) I t i s , i n the case of the U.S., u s u a l l y e a s i e r f o r a governmental agency t o o b t a i n money f o r c o n t r a c t i n g than t o extend e x i s t i n g s e r v i c e s or t o p r o v i d e a d d i -t i o n a l s t a f f . 3) The u t i l i s a t i o n of v o l u n t a r y agencies and i n s t i t u -t i o n s means t h a t government can ensure s e r v i c e s without high i n i t i a l f i x e d c o s t s as w e l l as without u n d e s i r e d v i s i b i l i t y . 4) Government can secure more f l e x i b i l i t y through POSC's because s e r v i c e s can be i n i t i a t e d and terminated more r a p i d l y . POSC's pro v i d e a means of bypassing r i g i d budgetary and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e r u l e s and r e g u l a t i o n s as w e l l as a means f o r circumventing p o l i t i c a l con-s t r a i n t s . 5) POSC's can pro v i d e more t a i l o r e d , l o c a l i s e d s e r v i c e s and may reach groups f o r whom government p r o v i s i o n r e p r e s e n t s f e a r or stigma by improving g e o g r a p h i c a l and p s y c h o l o g i c a l access f o r c l i e n t s . 6) POSC's c o u l d a l s o be a means f o r government t o d i v e s t i t s e l f of marginal, troublesome, or h i g h l y s p e c i a -l i s e d s e r v i c e s . 7) There may be " e x t e r n a l r e l a t i o n s p a y o f f s , " i n t h a t through POSC's government may g a i n o p p o r t u n i t i e s t o co-opt and gather the p o l i t i c a l support of l o c a l go-vernment c o n s t i t u e n c i e s or communities dependent on hig h e r l e v e l s of government f o r s e r v i c e s . (Kramer, 1983, p 423). 14 9 There are, however, p o t e n t i a l disadvantages f o r government which Kramer o u t l i n e s : 1) There are i n h e r e n t d i f f i c u l t i e s i n m a i n t a i n i n g s t a n -dards and i n s e c u r i n g adequate a c c o u n t a b i l i t y of v o l u n t a r y agencies. 2) Many agencies are " i n s u f f i c i e n t l y b u r e a u c r a t i s e d and l a c k s u i t a b l e i n f o r m a t i o n and c o s t - c o n t r o l systems." F u r t h e r , s m a l l e r and newer agencies have l i m i t e d managerial c a p a b i l i t i e s which may be aggravated by d i f f u s e g o als and methods and an i n a b i l i t y t o produce evidence of e f f e c t i v e n e s s . 3) U n d e r - r e g u l a t i o n and the dearth of a c c o u n t a b i l i t y c r i t e r i a compounded by i n s u f f i c i e n t government agency s t a f f mean t h a t p u b l i c agencies cannot p r o p e r l y over-see a c o n t r a c t o r ' s performance. 4) " P r o v i d e r p l u r a l i s m , " r e f e r r i n g t o the d i s p e r s e d c h a r a c t e r of the s e r v i c e system, may l e a d t o a l o s s of e q u i t y through fragmentation. (Kramer, 1983, p. 424). Kramer a l s o o u t l i n e s some p o t e n t i a l advantages of POSC's f o r v o l u n t a r y a g e n c i e s : 1) The p r i v a t e agency can sometimes expand the scope and range of i t s s e r v i c e and continue t o serve i t s p a r t i -c u l a r c l i e n t e l e . Government funds through POSC's may be regarded as a more secure source of income. 2) The c l i e n t e l e may r e c e i v e more i n d i v i d u a l i s e d , l e s s b u r e a u c r a t i s e d and more s p e c i a l i s e d s e r v i c e s than those p r o v i d e d by a government agency. 3) Agencies may experience an enhanced community s t a t u s t o g e t h e r with i n c r e a s e d access t o p u b l i c d e c i s i o n --making and the o p p o r t u n i t y t o i n f l u e n c e p o l i c y . (Kramer, 1983, p. 424). 15Q T h e r e a r e a l s o s e v e r a l d i s a d v a n t a g e s f o r t h e v o l u n t a r y agen-c y . A c c o r d i n g t o Kramer, t h e r e i s u s u a l l y a gap between t h e a c t u a l c o s t s o f a s e r v i c e ( a s s u m i n g t h e y a r e known) and t h e r a t e o f g o v e r n m e n t a l r e i m b u r s e m e n t . T h i s means t h a t t h e v o l u n t a r y a g e n c y i s f o r c e d t o make up t h e d e f i c i t , p o s s i b l y t h r o u g h r e d u c t i o n s i n s t a f f o r p r o g r a m components (Kramer, 1983, p. 4 2 4 ) . Added t o t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s o f " c o s t i n g " a s e r -v i c e a r e t h e h a z a r d s o f u n c e r t a i n t y o f income s u b j e c t t o l e g i s l a t i v e , p o l i t i c a l o r b u r e a u c r a t i c d e l a y s (Kramer, 1983, pp. 4 2 4 - 4 2 5 ) . T h e r e i s a l s o some q u e s t i o n as t o w h e t h e r c o m p e t i t i v e b i d d i n g f o r c o n t r a c t s may l e a d t o f i n a n c i a l d i f f i c u l t i e s f o r s e r v i c e p r o v i d e r s (Ghere, 1981, pp. 7 5 - 7 6 ) . Reamer (1983) s u g g e s t s t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f " p r i c e w a r s " i n s o c i a l s e r v i c e s and t h e emergence o f m o n o p o l i e s i n p r o b l e m t r e a t m e n t w h i c h c o u l d r e d u c e a c c e s s i b i l i t y t o and q u a l i t y o f s e r v i c e (Reamer, 1983, p. 4 5 6 ) . A n o t h e r i s s u e t o be a d d r e s s e d i s w h e t h e r POSC's i n t h e human s e r v i c e s s h o u l d be awarded t o p r i v a t e - f o r - p r o f i t o r s o l e l y t o n o n - p r o f i t a g e n c i e s . In p a r t , t h i s i s an e t h i c a l q u e s t i o n , however, t h e r e i s c o n c e r n f o r t h e q u a l i t y o f s e r v i c e p r o v i d e d i f t h e b o t t o m l i n e o f p r o v i s i o n i s t o s e c u r e a m a r g i n o f p r o f i t . Reamer, f o r example, w o r r i e s t h a t p r o f i t - c o n s c i o u s a g e n c i e s may s e e k - o u t p e r s o n s whose p r o b l e m s w i l l be l e s s demanding on t i m e and r e s o u r c e s (Reamer, 1983, p . 4 5 5 ) . 151 Even n o n - p r o f i t agencies, conscious of having t o de-monstrate program e f f e c t i v e n e s s and c o s t - e f f i c i e n c y may become h i g h l y s e l e c t i v e i n t h e i r i n t a k e p o l i c y . Such "skim-ming" or "creaming" of c l i e n t s c o u l d l e a d t o the c r e a t i o n of s e r v i c e gaps f o r those who are most v u l n e r a b l e i n our s o c i -e t y - the poorer, or more troublesome c l i e n t s who end-up as cases with governmental agencies (Reamer, 1983, p. 455; Kramer, 1983, p. 424), thus i n c r e a s i n g the l i k e l i h o o d t h a t l o w e r - f u n c t i o n i n g i n d i v i d u a l s w i l l become wards of the S t a t e . A p r e o c c u p a t i o n with s e c u r i n g c o n t r a c t s c o u l d l e a d t o goal-displacement w i t h i n p r i v a t e s e c t o r agencies (Jansson, 1979). Problems may a l s o a r i s e as a c o n t e n t i o n between two management f u n c t i o n s : 1) maintenance management - p r e p a r i n g budgets, r e p o r t s t o boards and p o l i t i c a l o f f i c i a l s and a l l o -c a t i n g funds; and, 2) s e r v i c e management - en s u r i n g the qua-l i t y of s e r v i c e p r o v i d e d (Ghere, 1981, p. 67). Ghere (1981) suggests t h a t i n times of c o n s t r i c t i n g r e s o u r c e s , one f u n c t i o n or the other c o u l d s u f f e r (Ghere, 1981, pp. 67-68). A study of m u n i c i p a l government h e a l t h s e r v i c e s i n the U.S. (Ghere 1981) r e v e a l e d t h a t the s e r v i c e management f u n c t i o n commands g r e a t e r p r i o r i t y i n p u b l i c agencies t h a t p r o v i d e s e r v i c e s d i r e c t l y than i n those agen-c i e s t h a t make e x t e n s i v e use of the c o n t r a c t approach. The former are a l s o more l i k e l y t o have i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d response mechanisms t o l i a s e with c i t i z e n s ' i n t e r e s t s or groups (Ghere, 1981, pp. 71-73). A l s o , a d m i n i s t r a t o r s i n 152 d i r e c t s e r v i c e agencies p l a c e more emphasis on e v a l u a t i v e , outreach, and s t a f f development a c t i v i t i e s than do t h e i r POSC c o u n t e r p a r t s (Ghere, 1981, p. 75). The d i f f e r e n c e , however, may be more a f u n c t i o n of the degree of ag g r e s s i v e management and mon i t o r i n g undertaken by the p u b l i c agency (Ghere, 1981, p. 77). There i s , however, no necessary c o r r e l a t i o n between POSC's and an i n c r e a s e or l e s s e n i n g of the l e v e l of s e r v i c e . V o l u n t a r y agencies do not i n e v i t a b l y l e a n toward "creaming" of c l i e n t s , or toward a narrowing of t h e i r range of s e r v i c e or a lowering of q u a l i t y . T h i s c o n c l u s i o n has been borne out i n s t u d i e s by Gibelman (1981, 1983) who has found t h a t p r i v a t e s e c t o r agencies p r o v i d i n g s e r v i c e s through c o n t r a c t s o f t e n p r o v i d e not o n l y an adequate, but a s u p e r i o r l e v e l of s e r v i c e . Continued hi g h q u a l i t y of p r o v i -s i o n i s i n no smal l p a r t a f u n c t i o n of s o p h i s t i c a t e d manage-ment by government i n the f o r m u l a t i o n of e n a b l i n g , m o n i t o r i n g , and e v a l u a t i v e frameworks. In those r e g i o n s where c o n t r a c t i n g i s a success i n terms of program enhancement, Gibelman assumes t h a t : ... q u a l i t y of s e r v i c e s t o c l i e n t s i s a f f e c t e d by the p a r t i c u l a r r e l a t i o n s h i p t h a t a State agency main-t a i n s with i t s c o n t r a c t u a l p r o v i d e r s . (Gibelman, 1981, p. 33). S i m i l a r l y , Jansson (1979) concludes t h a t d i f f e r e n c e s i n the type or q u a l i t y of s e r v i c e s emanating from the 153 d i f f e r i n g o r g a n i s a t i o n a l m i ssions and c a p a b i l i t i e s of p u b l i c agencies and NGO's can and must be addressed when s e r v i c e s are o f f e r e d f o r c o n t r a c t through the establishment of c l e a r c r i t e r i a f o r a c c o u n t a b i l i t y and m o n i t o r i n g . For p u b l i c admi-n i s t r a t o r s the g u i d i n g p r i n c i p a l i n awarding c o n t r a c t s t o NGO's must be whether the o r g a n i s a t i o n w i l l p r o v i d e s e r v i c e s i n a manner c o n s i s t e n t with p u b l i c i n t e n t . For example, agencies which do not i n c o r p o r a t e some management or s e r v i c e aspects commensurate with publicly-mandated s e r v i c e s ( i . e . i f the agency d e l i v e r i n g s e r v i c e through POSC "creams" e x t e n s i v e l y or f a i l s t o l o c a t e unmet needs i n the community or f a i l s t o u t i l i s e program p l a n n i n g or e v a l u a t i o n or c i t i -zen input) may not conform t o the p u b l i c i n t e n t (Jansson, 1979, p. 363-364). From a two year study of 167 s o c i a l agencies i n Los Angeles County (108 non-public agencies and 59 p u b l i c agen-c i e s ) Jansson concludes t h a t t h e r e are important d i f f e r e n c e s between p u b l i c and n o n - p r o f i t agencies which are suggestive of the n e c e s s i t y of a c l e a r e r a r t i c u l a t i o n of POSC p o l i c y . These d i f f e r e n c e s stem from the " o r g a n i s a t i o n a l m i s s i o n s " or mandates of p u b l i c and p r i v a t e ( n o n - p r o f i t ) agencies, the outl o o k s of agency e x e c u t i v e s and the s t r u c t u r e of agency decision-making. P u b l i c agencies, says Jansson, are more l i k e l y than n o n - p r o f i t s t o serve m i n o r i t y or lower income groups, who come from geographic areas proximate t o the agency and who 154 are l a r g e l y s e l f - r e f e r r a l s . P r i v a t e agencies, by c o n t r a s t , r e l y h e a v i l y on r e f e r r a l s and u n l i k e p u b l i c agencies who are expected t o serve a l l persons who meet b a s i c c r i t e r i a f o r s e r v i c e , appear able t o a g r e a t e r extent t o s e l e c t consumers who f a l l w i t h i n t h e i r s e r v i c e p r i o r i t i e s . P u b l i c agencies are a l s o more l i k e l y t o extend l i m i t e d o r g a n i s a t i o n a l r e s o u r c e s by p r o v i d i n g r e l a t i v e l y n o n - i n t e n s i v e s e r v i c e s t o a r e l a t i v e l y l a r g e number of consumers while v o l u n t a r y agen-c i e s g e n e r a l l y p r e f e r t o pro v i d e i n t e n s i v e s e r v i c e s t o r e l a -t i v e l y few c l i e n t s (Jansson, 1979, pp. 365-366). In terms of decision-making, p u b l i c agencies are more l i k e l y than NGO's to make d e c i s i o n s i n the context of m u l t i p l e and contending i n t e r e s t s . P u b l i c agencies are a l s o more l i k e l y t o i n c o r p o -r a t e a formal program pl a n n i n g and e v a l u a t i o n f u n c t i o n i n t h e i r o p e r a t i o n s . T h i s l a t t e r o b s e r v a t i o n , however i s pro-bably a f u n c t i o n of the l e s s e r f i s c a l c a p a b i l i t y of NGO's v i s a v i s p u b l i c agencies. Another p o i n t of c o n t e n t i o n i n the debate over pur-chase of s e r v i c e c o n t r a c t i n g , e s p e c i a l l y i n j u r i s d i c t i o n s where p o l i c y i s moving toward the " p r i v a t i s a t i o n " or " r e -- p r i v a t i s a t i o n " of s e r v i c e s , i s the ap p r o p r i a t e n e s s of awarding c o n t r a c t s t o p r i v a t e f o r - p r o f i t o r g a n i s a t i o n s . The c o m p a t a b i l i t y of the p r o f i t motive with the d e l i v e r y of publi c l y - m a n d a t e d s o c i a l s e r v i c e s has been e x p l o r e d exten-s i v e l y i n the l i t e r a t u r e , and i s c u r r e n t l y a matter of concern i n B r i t i s h Columbia where a number of s e r v i c e s and 155 f a c i l i t i e s (and the c l i e n t s who use or i n h a b i t them) have been passed from the s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y through c o n t r a c t t o p r i v a t e s e c t o r n o n - p r o f i t and f o r - p r o f i t o r g a n i s a t i o n s . C o n t r a c t s have been used s i n c e the e a r l y 1970's t o d e l i v e r s t a t u t o r y s o c i a l s e r v i c e s i n B r i t i s h Columbia, u s u a l l y i n r u r a l areas and/or t o s p e c i a l i s e d c l i e n t groups (although c o n t r a c t i n g f o r s e r v i c e i s more common i n the h e a l t h f i e l d p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the p r o v i s i o n of n u r s i n g home f a c i l i t i e s f o r the e l d e r l y ) . Other c l i e n t groups f o r whom s e r v i c e s are p r o v i d e d through c o n t r a c t are (ranked by number of f a c i l i t i e s ) : 1) the mentally handicapped; 2) d i s t u r b e d c h i l d r e n ; 3) r e t a r d e d persons; 4) a l c o h o l and drug us e r s ; 5) the p h y s i c a l l y handicapped; 6) t r a n s i e n t s ; 7) de l i n q u e n t youth; 8) b a t t e r e d women ( i n M e t r o p o l i t a n Vancouver 37 percent of the p r i v a t e s e c t o r c a p a c i t y f o r these groups i s o f f e r e d by f o r - p r o f i t s ) (BCGEU 1985, S t a t i s t i c s Canada, 1984) . Many of the c l i e n t s served through c o n t r a c t s may be em o t i o n a l l y and p h y s i c a l l y f r a g i l e . A l s o , i n many cases, the l e g a l competency of the c l i e n t s prevents them from p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n decision-making processes or e x e r c i s i n g a s i g n i f i c a n t degree of ch o i c e i n s e l e c t i n g s e r v i c e s or agencies. These c l i e n t s , even where they are not wards of the State or s u f f e r i n g d i m i n i s h e d l e g a l competence, may n e v e r t h e l e s s be s o c i a l l y and ec o n o m i c a l l y v u l n e r a b l e . C o n t r a c t i n g - o u t mandated s e r v i c e s i s o f t e n undertaken with 156 the r a t i o n a l e t h a t when s e r v i c e s are o f f e r e d by the p r i v a t e s e c t o r , p o t e n t i a l c l i e n t s are presented with a "ch o i c e " t o be made i n the context of a s o c i a l s e r v i c e market p l a c e . I t i s assumed t h a t u n s a t i s f i e d c l i e n t s w i l l "vote with t h e i r f e e t , " e n s u r i n g t h a t o n l y competent agencies with acceptable standards w i l l r e t a i n t h e i r c o n t r a c t s . In r e a l i t y , however, the c l i e n t s ' r i g h t of ch o i c e i s e x e r c i s e d by proxy, with the s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y s e l e c t i n g the agency t o r e c e i v e the c o n t r a c t (the consumers [ c l i e n t s ] do not pay f o r the s e r v i c e and the purchaser [government] does not r e c e i v e the s e r -v i c e ) . Even i f t h i s were not the case, the assumption of cho i c e based on marketplace p r i n c i p l e s presumes complete or adequate knowledge on the p a r t of the consumer of s e r v i c e s , even though i t has been demonstrated t h a t t h i s i s r a r e l y the case with the users of s o c i a l s e r v i c e s (Wyers & Holloway, 1983; C a t r i c e - L o r e y , 1980). J u s t as i t i s a d v i s a b l e t o take i n t o account d i f f e r -ences i n the o r g a n i s a t i o n a l m i s s i o n s of p u b l i c s e c t o r and n o n - p r o f i t agencies when awarding c o n t a c t s , so too should the d i f f e r e n c e s between n o n - p r o f i t and f o r - p r o f i t agencies enter i n t o the decision-making p r o c e s s . G i l b e r t (1984) cau-t i o n s t h a t t h e r e i s l i t t l e e m p i r i c a l evidence t h a t s e r v i c e s are b e t t e r d e l i v e r e d by n o n - p r o f i t agencies over f o r -- p r o f i t s . A major o b s t a c l e t o e m p i r i c a l v a l i d a t i o n i s t h a t s o c i a l w e l f a r e programs o f t e n serve "impalpable and m u l t i -p l e " o b j e c t i v e s which f r e q u e n t l y defy p r e c i s e measurement. G i l b e r t c i t e s Barnet (1982), Gordon (1975) and Wooden (1966) i n c o n c l u d i n g t h a t the n o n - p r o f i t versus f o r - p r o f i t c l a s s i -f i c a t i o n may be l e s s s i g n i f i c a n t f o r comprehending o r g a n i s a -t i o n a l behaviour than v a r i a b l e s such as agency s i z e , g o a l s , l o c a t i o n and the r e g u l a t o r y environment ( G i l b e r t , 1984, pp. 66-67). In p r a c t i s e , there are l a r g e v a r i a t i o n s among non-- p r o f i t agencies and c o n s i d e r a b l e o v e r l a p between f o r - p r o f i t and n o n - p r o f i t agencies i n many dimensions of o r g a n i s a t i o n a l l i f e ( G i l b e r t , 1984, p. 71). Even so, G i l b e r t f e e l s t h a t the motives and i d e o l o g i -c a l d i s p o s i t i o n s of the two types of agencies are s a l i e n t p o i n t s of d i s t i n c t i o n . The d i r e c t o r s h i p s of f o r - p r o f i t agen-c i e s are concerned with p r o t e c t i n g the f i n a n c i a l i n t e r e s t s of the ownership groups. T h i s i s not to say t h a t f o r - p r o f i t agencies l a c k i n p u b l i c s p i r i t , but such a b s t r a c t c o n s i d e r a -t i o n s r a r e l y take precedence over the bottom l i n e of p r o f i t and l o s s ( G i l b e r t , 1984, pp. 68-69). T h e r e f o r e , while the l e g a l p r i n c i p l e of "caveat emptor" may be a p p r o p r i a t e t o the s p i r i t of the marketplace, i n circumstances where consumers r a r e l y purchase s e r v i c e s and are o f t e n i n v u l n e r a b l e l i f e -- s i t u a t i o n s , and where q u a l i t y of s e r v i c e i s l a r g e l y s e l f -- r e g u l a t e d , the market p r i n c i p l e i s not a p p r o p r i a t e ( G i l -b e r t , 1984, p. 69). G i l b e r t suggests f o u r dimensions which should be c o n s i d e r e d when d e c i d i n g whether t o o f f e r a given s e r v i c e f o r c o n t r a c t t o f o r - p r o f i t as w e l l as n o n - p r o f i t agencies: 1) The nature of the s e r v i c e - does s e r v i c e d e l i v e r y i n -v o l v e a s t a n d a r d i s e d product or procedure f o r which i t i s p o s s i b l e t o measure c o s t s and monitor s e r v i c e d e l i v e r y ? I f so, the s e r v i c e may be amenable t o the b u s i n e s s i n i t i a t i v e of the f o r - p r o f i t agency and per-mit the purchase t o e v a l u a t e performance and c o n t r o l a g a i n s t abuses; 2) the average c l i e n t ' s degree of competence - non-p r o f i t s are the agency of c h o i c e f o r s e r v i c e de-l i v e r y t o v u l n e r a b l e groups. T h i s i s based upon the degree of p u b l i c a c c o u n t a b i l i t y ( n o n - p r o f i t NGO's may be more r e s p o n s i v e to community needs i n t h a t govern-i n g boards, a d v i s o r y groups and c l i e n t groups act t o r e i n f o r c e the m i s s i o n of the agency) and the c h a r i t -a ble ethos of the n o n - p r o f i t agency (because the c o r -porate c h a r t e r of n o n - p r o f i t s p r o h i b i t s the d i s t r i b u -t i o n of generated s u r p l u s among o r g a n i s a t i o n members they may be l e s s l i k e l y t o " e x p l o i t v u l n e r a b l e c i r -cumstances" than are f o r - p r o f i t agencies; 3) whether or not the s e r v i c e i s v e s t e d with c o e r c i v e powers - where p e r s o n a l l i b e r t y i s concerned, p u b l i c a c c o u n t a b i l i t y i s of paramount concern. Such account-a b i l i t y must be immediate and d i r e c t ; 4) the scope and potency of the r e g u l a t o r y environment -G i l b e r t suggests t h a t a mix of f o r - p r o f i t and non-- p r o f i t agencies may be most v i a b l e ( i n terms of s e r v i c e q u a l i t y and d e l i v e r y ) where the r e g u l a t o r y environment i s s u f f i c i e n t t o ensure maintenance of standards i n the d e l i v e r y of s e r v i c e s ( G i l b e r t , 1984, pp. 71-72). G i l b e r t c a u t i o n s t h a t i f p r o f i t - m a k i n g a c t i v i t y i n p u b l i c l y --mandated s o c i a l s e r v i c e s i s not embraced s e l e c t i v e l y and with d i s c r e t i o n , the values and communal c h a r a c t e r of the " s o c i a l market" may be undermined. There are a number of parameters of standards of s e r -v i c e and the a c c o u n t a b i l i t y of p r o v i d e r s t h a t must be taken i n t o account i n the p o l i c y p r o c e s s . Purchase of s e r v i c e c o n t r a c t i n g can be a v i a b l e means of extending l i m i t e d p u b l i c r e s o u r c e s and e n s u r i n g some d e g r e e o f p l u r a l i s m and community p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e p l a n n i n g and d e l i v e r y o f s o c i a l s e r v i c e s . C a r e must be t a k e n however t o p r o t e c t t h e p u b l i c i n t e r e s t b o t h i n t e r m s o f f i s c a l a c c o u n t a b i l i t y and, p e r h a p s most i m p o r t a n t , i n f u l f i l l i n g t h e g o a l s o f s e r v i c e i n t e r v e n t i o n w i t h r e g a r d t o a f f e c t i n g p o s i t i v e l y t h e w e l l - b e i n g o f t h e c l i e n t - c o n s u m e r . Where t h e s e r v i c e g o a l s , o r outcomes o f i n t e r v e n t i o n a r e n o t commensurate w i t h t h e p u b l i c i n t e r e s t s o r t h e needs o f c l i e n t s (on t h e p a r t o f t h e p u b l i c as w e l l as t h e p r i v a t e s e c t o r a g e n c y ) t h e r e s h o u l d be i n p l a c e a w o r k i n g framework f o r e v a l u a t i o n and r e v i e w w h i c h i s c a p a b l e o f accommodating p r o g r a m m a t i c c h a n g e . Above a l l , d e c i s i o n s r e g a r d i n g t h e a l l o c a t i o n o f p u b l i c r e s o u r c e s t o s o c i a l s e r v i c e f u n c t i o n s must p r o c e e d on t h e b a s i s o f t h e b e s t a v a i l a b l e a n a l y s i s and w i t h t h e c o n s c i o u s p r e s e r v a t i o n o f t h e e t h o s o f s e r v i c e t o t h e community and t h e b e t t e r m e n t o f t h e l i f e - c h a n c e s o f t h o s e who t h r o u g h c h r o n i c o r s i t u a -t i o n a l d e b i l i t y f i n d t h e m s e l v e s i n s i t u a t i o n s o f s o c i a l o r ec o n o m i c i n s e c u r i t y . Kramer o u t l i n e s s i x b a s i c p r i n c i p l e s w h i c h c o u l d g u i d e t h e c o n t r a c t i n g o f human s e r v i c e s : 1) P r o v i s i o n s h o u l d be made f o r f u l l c o v e r a g e o f a l l p e r s o n s f o r whom t h e r e i s a p u b l i c r e s p o n s i b i l i t y w h e t h e r p r o v i s i o n o c c u r s t h r o u g h government o r a p r i v a t e a g e n c y . 2) The s e r v i c e and i t s d e s i r e d outcomes s h o u l d be c l e a r -l y d e f i n e d ; s p e c i f i c c l i e n t e l e d e s i g n a t e d ; and d u r a -t i o n o f t h e p r o g r a m d e t a i l e d . 160 3) Standards acceptable t o both government and v o l u n t a r y agencies should be e x p l i c i t as t o i n t a k e p o l i c y , p er-sonnel, and s e r v i c e d e l i v e r y . 4) There must be adequate p r o v i s i o n f o r j o i n t p l a n n i n g on b e h a l f of c l i e n t s f o r r e p o r t i n g , review, and a u d i t . There must a l s o be p r o v i s i o n f o r e v a l u a t i o n t o ensure a c c o u n t a b i l i t y f o r p u b l i c funds. 5) There should be f a i r payment up t o the f u l l c o s t of the s e r v i c e as determined by c o s t a n a l y s i s . T h i s s h o u l d r e f l e c t q u a l i t a t i v e f a c t o r s as w e l l as i n c e n -t i v e s f o r improvement and i n n o v a t i o n . 6) C o n f l i c t s embodying these c o n s i d e r a t i o n s should be worked out j o i n t l y between the funder and p r o v i d e r and ought t o i n c l u d e procedures f o r c o n f l i c t r e s o -l u t i o n . (Kramer, 1983, p. 426) The agenda i s c l e a r . I f o r g a n i s a t i o n a l d y s f u n c t i o n i s t o be avoided and i f e f f o r t s at p r i v a t i s a t i o n are t o proceed r a t i o n a l l y and c o h e r e n t l y while at the same time p r e s e r v i n g the i n t e g r i t y of NGO's and t h e i r c a p a c i t y f o r c l i e n t advoca-cy and program i n n o v a t i o n ; p o l i t i c i a n s , a d m i n i s t r a t o r s and agency boards of d i r e c t o r s must s t r i v e f o r a more c o l l a b o r a -t i v e d e c i s i o n a l framework i n which p u b l i c w e l l - b e i n g as opposed t o the economic bottom-line becomes the a x i a l focus of d i s c u s s i o n . 4.6 ORGANISATIONAL AND MANAGEMENT FACTORS IN QUALITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF SERVICE v i c e and the a c c o u n t a b i l i t y of p r o v i d e r s t h a t must be taken There are a number of parameters of standards of s e r -161 i n t o account i n the assessment and d e f i n i t i o n of p o l i c y encouraging the use of POSC's. The concept of " q u a l i t y of s e r v i c e " i n the s e t t i n g of s e r v i c e standards e n t a i l s some judgement as t o the adequacy of the s e r v i c e s i n q u e s t i o n . Are they a p p r o p r i a t e t o the needs of the c l i e n t ? What i s the q u a l i t y of the s e r v i c e s e t t i n g and what i s the s k i l l l e v e l or p r o f e s s i o n a l standing of the person or persons d i s p e n s i n g the s e r v i c e ? How are c l i e n t s s e l e c t e d or r e f e r r e d ? Is the d i s p e n s a t i o n of the s e r v i c e a c c e s s i b l e or e q u i t a b l e ? What i s the balance of i n p u t s and outputs r e l a t e d t o s e r v i c e d e l i v e -r y? Does the b e n e f i t a c c r u i n g to the c l i e n t r e f l e c t , propor-t i o n a l l y , the i n p u t of manpower and resources i n t o p r o v i d i n g the s e r v i c e ? There are many fo r m u l a t i o n s of q u a l i t y assessment -each of them probl e m a t i c i n some way. U n l i k e a commodity market, the economics of s o c i a l s e r v i c e p r o v i s i o n cannot be assessed p u r e l y i n terms of a balance of b e n e f i t s over c o s t s . Many of the b e n e f i t s or savings a c c r u i n g , not o n l y t o the c l i e n t but t o the community as a whole, are not r e a d i l y q u a n t i f i a b l e . How, f o r i n s t a n c e can one e n t e r on an accoun-t a n t ' s l e d g e r the c o s t s a v e r t e d i n c o r r e c t i o n a l s e r v i c e s through p r e v e n t i v e or e d u c a t i o n a l programs f o r t r o u b l e d youth? C l e a r l y , more a p p r o p r i a t e models of s e r v i c e e v a l u a -t i o n are needed, but as yet t h e r e i s l i t t l e i n the way of consensus about the e v a l u a t i v e c r i t e r i a t o be used. 162 A B r i t i s h Columbia Government Employees Union (BCGEU) r e p o r t on non-government s e r v i c e s observes t h a t the s e t t i n g of standards i s o f t e n a very a r b i t r a r y p rocess; norms o f t e n become the standards, thereby making the q u a l i t y of s e r v i c e s synonymous with accepted p r a c t i s e s : ... the area of standard s e t t i n g and q u a l i t y of s e r v i c e s i s a s u b j e c t i v e c o l l a g e of usages, p a t t e r n s , c r i t e r i a , g o a ls and values (BCGEU, 1980, p. 11). The r e p o r t f u r t h e r notes t h a t the i s s u e of standards of s e r v i c e i s growing r a p i d l y i n importance, e s p e c i a l l y as ... the scramble f o r s c a r c e r e s o u r c e s has caused agencies t o f i n d ways t o prove t h e i r worth and enhance t h e i r o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r a s l i c e of the f i n a n c i a l p i e (BCGEU, 1980, p. 12). The term "substandard" may be v a r i o u s l y i n t e r p r e t e d , but a reasonable e x p l a n a t i o n of a stubstandard s e r v i c e may be t h a t which r e l a t e s g o a l attainment t o q u a l i t y (BCGEU, 1980, p. 12). Hence, an agency judged as d e l i v e r i n g substan-dard s e r v i c e i s one which i s not a c h i e v i n g an a c c e p t a b l e degree of success or accomplishment with r e s p e c t to s e r v i c e outcomes f o r c l i e n t s (BCGEU, 1980, p. 12). A common usage of the term "substandard" i s one t h a t connotes an e v a l u a t i o n of the means and methods of s e r v i c e d e l i v e r y as opposed t o g o a l s . T h i s e n t a i l s some e v a l u a t i o n of the p h i l o s o p h i e s , treatment techniques, personnel and other aspects of s e r v i c e 163 d e l i v e r y with a view to determining the "adequacy" of each. The concept of "adequacy" however, may a l s o be ephemeral -d e r i v i n g from the p o i n t of view and the v a l u e s of c l i e n t s , s o c i a l workers and p o l i t i c i a n s . The s e t t i n g of minimum s t a n -dards, t h e r e f o r e , i s p r o b l e m a t i c ; there i s a l a c k of consen-sus among agencies, p r a c t i t i o n e r s and b ureaucrats about a p p r o p r i a t e c r i t e r i a f o r s e r v i c e or outcomes (BCGEU, 1980, p. 12) and t h i s makes the concept of adequacy m a l l e a b l e and s u b j e c t t o abuses. The l i c e n s i n g of agencies and f a c i l i t i e s i s one method of e s t a b l i s h i n g minimum standards, however, i n p r a c t i s e most l i c e n s i n g deals with p h y s i c a l c r i t e r i a r e l a t -i n g t o premises and does not adequately address program standards (BCGEU, 1980, p. 12). The non-government s e c t o r has been a t t r i b u t e d , i n some q u a r t e r s , with the d e l i v e r y of substandard s e r v i c e s . In p a r t t h i s c o u l d be due to i n h e r e n t l i m i t a t i o n s of the orga-n i s a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e of NGO's, but of even g r e a t e r s i g n i f i -cance are c o n s t r a i n i n g f o r c e s e x t e r n a l t o the agency. A s i g n i f i c a n t f a c t o r , p o i n t e d out by Willms (1980), i s the degree of c o n s t r a i n t i n c u r r e d by agencies who do not ade-q u a t e l y e x p l o i t i n t e r - a g e n c y i n f o r m a t i o n s h a r i n g . The BCGEU r e p o r t a l s o suggests a number of f a c t o r s which c o u l d l e a d t o substandard l e v e l s of s e r v i c e (bear i n mind t h a t o p e r a t i o n a l c r i t e r i a f o r the term "substandard" are not a l t o g e t h e r c l e a r ) : 1.64 The BCGEU draws a c o r r e l a t i o n between substandard s e r v i c e s and substandard wages. Because of l i m i t e d funding, NGO's are unable t o o f f e r comparable wages to the p u b l i c s e c t o r . There i s l e s s inducement f o r a p p l i c a t i o n s by more q u a l i f i e d p e r s onnel and l e s s encouragement f o r personnel t o s t a y i n the non--government s e c t o r f o r any l e n g t h of time. In a d d i -t i o n t o low pay, the l a c k of b e n e f i t s and c a r e e r s e c u r i t y may a f f e c t s t a f f t enure. Non-government s e c t o r p o s i t i o n s are seldom viewed as c a r e e r goals and are regarded, r a t h e r , as an i n t e r i m stage i n one's p r o f e s s i o n a l development. T h i s aspect of p r o f e s s i o n a l t r a n s i e n c e combined with the i n h e r e n t i n s e c u r i t y of a y e a r - t o - y e a r a l l o c a t i o n of d o l l a r s , can be c o r r e l a t e d with short-term p l a n n i n g and i n c r e -mental programs. Due t o f i s c a l c o n s t r a i n t s , NGO's are able t o o f f e r l i t t l e i n the way of s t a f f t r a i n i n g . Methods of main-t a i n i n g and enhancing s t a f f q u a l i t y through courses, workshops or e d u c a t i o n a l leave are l i m i t e d w i t h i n the non-government s e c t o r and thus i n h i b i t the c a p a b i l i t y t o be a d a p t i v e or p r o g r e s s i v e , such t h a t : "The r e s u l t may be a s t a t i c s e r v i c e which begins t o f a l l behind the norm and thus be c o n s i d e r e d sub-- s t a n d a r d " (BCGEU, 1980, p. 13). Again, due to funding l e v e l s , working c o n d i t i o n s may d e c l i n e as agencies are f o r c e d t o cut-back on main-tenance and c o s t s r e l a t e d t o the p h y s i c a l p l a n t of the agency. Not only w i l l the workers be a f f e c t e d by the adverse c o n d i t i o n s t h a t r e s u l t , but p h y s i c a l de-c l i n e of the premises may n e g a t i v e l y a f f e c t the agen-cy's image and s a f e t y . Because of the popular c o n c e p t i o n t h a t e x p e r t i s e i s d i r e c t l y p r o p o r t i o n a l to the l e v e l of remuneration, th e r e may e x i s t misconceptions of v o l u n t e e r c r e d i b i -l i t y w i t h i n those agencies who r e l y on a s t r o n g v o l u n t e e r component. L i m i t e d r e s o u r c e s a f f e c t the amount of on-going moni-t o r i n g and e v a l u a t i o n of s e r v i c e s and t h i s impairs the t e c h n i c a l and f i s c a l a c c o u n t a b i l i t y of NGO's. Add t o t h i s the e f f e c t s of a l a c k of e v a l u a t i v e c r i t e r i a on the c a p a b i l i t y of agencies to be adaptive t o en-v i r o n m e n t a l changes, and the l a c k of monies a v a i l a b l e f o r promotion and p u b l i c i t y of programs, and a s e t -t i n g i s c r e a t e d f o r p o t e n t i a l n e gative impacts upon l e v e l s of s e r v i c e (BCGEU, 1980, pp. 12-14). 165 Problems of a c c o u n t a b i l i t y permeate a l l of the i s s u e s so f a r d i s c u s s e d . E v a l u a t i o n and feedback on programs may be p o s i t i v e l y or n e g a t i v e l y a f f e c t e d by the o r g a n i s a t i o n a l c a -p a b i l i t y of i n d i v i d u a l agencies; l e v e l s of e x p e r t i s e ; capa-c i t y f o r data c o l l e c t i o n and a n a l y s i s ; type of programs o f f e r e d ( i . e . whether p r e v e n t i v e or o r i e n t e d towards i n t e r -v ention) and the standards a t t a c h e d to those programs; or simply by the number of s t a f f and attendant c a s e l o a d s . Some degree of a c c o u n t a b i l i t y i s c r u c i a l t o ensure a continued 3 a l l o c a t i o n of funds. A l l funding bodies, p u b l i c or p r i v a t e , r e q u i r e some demonstration of the need f o r s e r v i c e and agen-cy e f f e c t i v e n e s s i n meeting t h a t need. The c o l l e c t i o n of s t a t i s t i c s and the documenting of cases and r e s u l t s of s e r v i c e i n t e r v e n t i o n are a v i t a l p a r t of an agency's s e l f - p e r p e t u a t i n g a c t i v i t i e s . The concept of a c c o u n t a b i l i t y i s enormously complex, however, and many agencies experience problems because of a l a c k o f s t a n d a r d i s a t i o n of s e r v i c e and e v a l u a t i v e c r i t e r i a , a l a c k of knowledge or manpower, or the i n a p p l i c a b i l i t y of market-based c o s t i n g models t o c e r t a i n types of programs. Some of these l a t t e r problems stem from a f a i l u r e on the p a r t of f u n d i n g bodies t o a r t i c u l a t e , through p o l i c y , agency For a more d e t a i l e d d i s c u s s i o n of c o s t i n g methods i n s o c i a l s e r v i c e s , r e f e r t o Jansson, 1979; L o u r i e , 1979; M i l l e r & Wilson, 1981; Frank, 1981; and Mansen, Higgens & Cass, 1976. 166 r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and c r i t e r i a for program evaluation. Kramer (19 83) points out that the concept of accountability often becomes a d e f i n i t i o n a l maze: It has been viewed as both an end or a means; i t has been defined i n terms of procedures, r e s u l t s , d i s -closure of information, recourse, and compliance with regulations, and i t i s often indistinguishable from such concepts as evaluation, e f f i c i e n c y , effectiveness, control and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y (Kramer, 1983, p. 428) . D i f f i c u l t i e s may also arise through multiple accountability where some agencies may be required to provide q u a l i t a t i v e l y d i f f e r e n t types of information to t h e i r boards, to the con-sumer, the community, and ultimately, to the funders. This may give r i s e to problems of worker overload, r e p l i c a t i o n , and confusion for workers and agency d i r e c t o r s . Because service standards and effectiveness are d i f -f i c u l t to ascertain due to a wide range of notions about the types of data to be c o l l e c t e d and the manner in which they are analysed and applied, the BCGEU suggests: If service accountability i s to be relevant to the non-government s o c i a l service sector, consistent methods for u t i l i s a t i o n of s t a t i s t i c s keeping and evaluating procedures require delineation and enforce-ment . As government i s the common denominator i n non--government s o c i a l services and as government i s u l t i -mately respnosible for the c l i e n t e l e , monitoring of agency qua l i t y v i a service accountability requires government i n i t i a t i o n and enforcement. I f , however, government accepts the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for quality of service monitoring, they must also be prepared to 167 ' p r o v i d e adequate a s s i s t a n c e t o agencies to maintain government-set standards (BCGEU, 1980, p. 14). The above may suggest a reason why standard s e t t i n g f o r NGO's has not been more v i g o r o u s l y pursued. Because th e r e are added c o s t s i n h e r e n t i n the maintenance of s e r v i c e standards, and because government uses the v o l u n t a r y s e c t o r to augment the more expensive p u b l i c s e c t o r , the s e t t i n g of standards may serve t o i n c r e a s e the government's net commit-ment of r e s o u r c e s . By e s t a b l i s h i n g minimum c r i t e r i a f o r s e r -v i c e s , government may a c t u a l l y be d r i v i n g - u p the per u n i t c o s t of s e r v i c e . There are a l s o p o l i t i c a l c o s t s which must be weighed by government decision-makers: i f the standard of s e r v i c e a p p l i e d i s too low and i n j u r y or d e b i l i t y r e s u l t s f o r the c l i