c.1

PUBLIC SECTOR RESTRAINT AND THE SOCIAL SERVICES: THE CASE OF THE VOLUNTARY SECTOR PROVISION OF PERSONAL SOCIAL SERVICES IN BRITISH COLUMBIA

by

JOHN R. BUTCHER

B.A., The University of British Columbia, 1982

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF

THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

MASTER OF ARTS

in

THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

Department of Geography

We accept this thesis as conforming

to the required standard

THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

January 30, 1986

© JOHN R. BUTCHER, 1986

95

In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission.

Department of GEOGRAPHY

The University of British Columbia
1956 Main Mall
Vancouver, Canada
V6T 1Y3

Date JULY 21, 1986

DE-6 (3/81)

ABSTRACT

Restraint by government in the area of social service spending in the 1980's has become an issue of grave concern for social service practitioners, planners, and administrators. The emergence in North America of neo-conservative economic policies has engendered a body of critical and provocative literature which examines the effects of "restraint economics."

The neo-conservative construction of a "post welfare State," propelled by economic crises, has involved a redefinition by the State of its mandate for the redistribution of the "public wage." The "privatisation" of services through reduction or cancellation of programs, the increasing use of contracted services, and through deinstitutionalisation and deregulation may obviate the redistributive aims of the welfare State and create instead a basis for more pervasive social and geographical inequity.

The voluntary sector (non-government) human services have been challenged to "fill the gaps" left by government cutbacks, often in the face of declining levels of government support for that sector. It is the intent of this thesis to address the political economy of social services policy in British Columbia through an examination of the relationship between the Provincial government and the voluntary sector. This policy critique uses the voluntary

sector as a window onto the political, economic and ideological agenda of the British Columbia government with special emphasis on social and economic legislation during the period 1983-1985.

It will be argued that both the ideological bases and the social impacts of B.C.'s restraint legislation are reflections of neo-conservative challenges to the collectivistic principles of the welfare State observed in the United States and Great Britain.

The thesis will proceed through two principal avenues:

1) a discussion of the teleology of neo-conservativism and its relationship to social and economic policy in B.C.. This section will provide the context against which the remainder of the thesis will be cast; and, 2) a detailed discussion of the nature of the voluntary sector and a comparison of the effects of public sector restraint upon voluntaristic social services in the United States and British Columbia. The latter will be accomplished through the juxtaposition of a sizeable literature on the effects of restraint in the U.S. with the findings of a province-wide questionnaire survey of voluntary agencies conducted by the author in January 1985.

It is posited that social and economic policy in B.C. is a Canadian manifestation of the anti-welfare-statism implicit in Reaganomics of the U.S. and Thatchernomics of the U.K. On the basis of theoretical and empirical

reflections on the effects of ideologically-informed restraint measures, the author will conclude by assessing the future prospects for Canadian social policy.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter I		The Welfare State, Personal Social Services and the Voluntary Sector: An Introduction	p. 1
	1.1	The Welfare State in Crisis? The Emergence of the Neo-Conservative Challenge in the United States, the United Kingdom and British Columbia	p. 7
	1.2	Structure of the Thesis	p. 18
Chapter II		The Political Context and the Hermeneutics of Restraint	p. 22
	2.1	Restraint Economics, the "New Reality" in B.C.	p. 36
	2.2	The Legislative Package	p. 39
	2.3	Restraint and the New Right - A Case of State Managed Capitalism	p. 56
	2.4	Social Services, the State, and the Imperatives of Capital Accumulation	p. 61
	2.5	Social and Economic Policy: Goals and Constraints	p. 68
Chapter III		Voluntary Sector-State Relations: Economic Nature and Function of the Voluntary Sector	p. 76
	3.1	Agency Types and Government Funding Arrangements	p. 89
	3.2	Funding Dependency and Interor-ganisational Relations - Some Limiting Factors in Voluntary Sector Provision	p. 101
	3.3	The Voluntary Sector: A Duality of Roles and Images	p. 110

Chapter IV		The Effects of Fiscal Restraint Upon Voluntary Sector Services - The Canadian and U.S. Experience	p. 115
	4.1	Some Anticipated Impacts Upon NGO's of Government Cutbacks	p. 115
	4.2	Reaganomics - The Effects of Cutbacks Upon the Social Service Sector in the United States	p. 124
	4.3	Some Empirical Reflections on the Impacts of Budgetary Restraint on the Voluntary Sector in the U.S.	p. 131
	4.4	Effects Upon Clients of Agency Decline in the U.S.	p. 138
	4.5	The Non-Profit Sector and Purchase of Service Contracting	p. 144
	4.6	Organisational and Management Factors in Quality and Accountability of Service	p. 160
Chapter V		Restraint and the Voluntary Sector in B.C. - Findings From Three Communities	p. 170
	5.1	The Social Context	p. 170
	5.2	Impacts Upon Agencies and Clients in B.C. - A Survey of Professional Opinion	p. 176
	5.3	Cutbacks and Personal Social Service Delivery by NGO's: The Experience of Three B.C. Communities	p. 185
	5.3.1	The Effects of Cutbacks in Richmond	p. 186
	5.3.2	The Effects of Cutbacks in Vancouver	p. 188
	5.3.3	The Effects of Cutbacks in Victoria and the Capital Regional District	p. 190
Chapter VI		The Voluntary Sector in British Columbia - The Effects of Restraint and Agency Responses	p. 196

6.1	Research Methodology	p. 196
6.2	Composition of Agency Personnel	p. 199
6.3	Factors in Agency Organisation and Structure	p. 203
6.4	Informational Capabilities of NGO's	p. 207
6.5	Interorganisational Relationships	p. 210
6.6	Success in Obtaining Information	p. 214
6.7	Service Types and Target Groups Represented in the Sample	p. 217
6.8	Agency Sources of Funding	p. 221
6.9	Patterns of Funding Increase and Decline from Provincial Government Sources	p. 225
6.10	The Use of Purchase of Service Contracts Among Responding Agencies	p. 229
6.11	Effects Upon Non-Profit Agencies of Provincial Government Restraint	p. 237
6.12	Agency Directors' Perceptions of the Social Policy Environment in B.C.	p. 244
6.13	Strategies for the Enhancement of Social Service Delivery	p. 251
Chapter VII	Social Policy, Social Change and the Future of Voluntarism in B.C.	p. 254
7.1	Voluntarism in the New Reality	p. 254
7.2	The Need for Organisational and Managerial Change in the Voluntary Sector	p. 261
7.3	The Future of Social and Econcomic Policy in Canada	p. 273
7.4	Social Policy: Costs, Goals, Prospects	p. 270
7.5	Conclusion	p. 275

Bibliography		p. 277
Appendix A	Reference Maps of Human Resources Regions in British Columbia	p. 292
Appendix B	Covering Letter and Questionnaire Used in the Survey	p. 295
Appendix C	Histograms of Selected, Annotated Variables from the Questionnaire Survey	p. 304
Appendix D	A Complete Listing of 517 Voluntary Agencies Contacted for this Survey	p. 318

LIST OF TABLES

Table 2:1	Typology of Political Decisions	p. 75
Table 6:1	Breakdown of Agency Response by Location	p. 198
Table 6:2	Number of Paid Personnel and Volunteers Employed by Non-Profit Agencies	p. 200
Table 6:3	Frequencies of Ranked Services	p. 217
Table 6:4	Frequencies of Ranked Target Groups	p. 218
Table 6:5	Service Types and Target Groups Undifferentiated According to Importance by Responding Agencies	p. 219
Table 6:6	Provincial Sources of NGO Funds	p. 222
Table 6:7	Federal Sources of NGO Funds	p. 223
Table 6:8	Sources of NGO Funding - Non-Provincial, Non-Federal	p. 224
Table 6:9	Increases in Funding by Source	p. 225
Table 6:10	Decreases in Funding by Source	p. 226
Table 6:11	Increase and Decline in Funding from Provincial Government Sources by Location	p. 227
Table 6:12	Ministries or Departments Employing POSC's	p. 231
Table 6:13	Proportion of Agency Services Delivered Through Contract to Government	p. 232
Table 6:14	Services Provided Through POSC's	p. 233
Table 6:15	Client Groups Targetted by POSC's	p. 234

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

All theses, no matter how novel the topic or theme, are the products of some degree of collective effort. Whether through collusion, counsel or emotional support, the contributions of others to the final product is a fundamental aspect of any scholarly endeavour. This is no less true for this thesis, and I would like to take this opportunity to thank those who saw me through to its completion.

First, I would like to thank my father, whose garrulous remonstrations on behalf of the worker, and whose outspoken views - good or ill - helped to inform and shape my own social conscience. Dad, I wish you could be here to share this small victory with me. To my mother I owe much. To me she has always represented a bastion of patience, compassion and a love of learning. If I share any of these qualities, she is the obvious source. The love and support of my family during the course of my academic adventure has been of immeasurable importance - they may not always have known what I was doing, but ofttimes, neither did I.

Of the many friends whose company I have enjoyed in the course of my labours, I would like to offer special thanks to two. With Paul Steer and Peter Daniels I have had the good fortune to enjoy extraordinary friendships - to say nothing of the excesses of young men rendered sublime through mateship. Paul, your contrariness and bluster have provided a steady challenge to my reason. Peter, your friendship and humour (not to mention your guitar!) were critical in helping me to survive my academic travails. Thank-you both!

To my supervisor, Dr. Marwyn Samuels, thank-you for the confidence you showed in me - at times your trust in my ability surely exceeded my own. To Prof. Jack MacDonald (UBC School of Social Work), I am indebted for your perceptive and careful review of my first draft - your comments and advice contributed greatly to the final product. Special thanks are also in order for Dr. Terry McGee, who generously gave of his time and energy to give me some needed feedback, and to Dr. Olav Slaymaker, for his kind assistance with the logistics involved in getting a copy of my thesis to Nanjing.

Thanks are also in order for Dr. David Ley for his sagacious advice and for serving as my "foster supervisor" during Marwyn's absences. I wish to acknowledge also the support of Dr. Philip Resnick and Mr. Richard Morley who through the auspices (respectively) of the Pacific Group for Policy Alternatives and Gordon Neighbourhood House, provided


generous support for the empirical portion of this thesis. Without their support, the thesis in its present form would not have been possible. Thanks too to the staff, volunteers and clients of the Vancouver Crisis Intervention-Suicide Prevention Centre who taught me so much.

My special thanks have been left till last. To Helen I owe more than can ever be properly expressed here. Your love and confidence have proved a constant source of comfort, strength and inspiration. Without you this last rocky bit of track would have been rough going indeed. Thank-you for keeping me safe, keeping me sane and for keeping me working.

So many helping hands and helping hearts and minds. I extend my sincere gratitude to all who helped me toward this goal.



VANCOUVER SUN, JANUARY 6, 1986



THE VANCOUVER SUN, MAY 28, 1986

CHAPTER I

THE WELFARE STATE, PERSONAL SOCIAL SERVICES AND THE VOLUNTARY SECTOR: AN INTRODUCTION

The welfare State as it exists in most advanced capitalist nations is a social and political institution that most Canadians take for granted. While many Canadians, possibly a majority, do not usually perceive themselves as the direct or indirect beneficiaries of social welfare programs, virtually all will be touched by some aspect of the welfare State.

All persons who have received family allowance payments for themselves or their children, or who have availed themselves of public education, or medical care, or who when unemployed have received unemployment insurance or worker's compensation benefits, or who upon retirement have received a government pension, have been directly affected by welfare State institutions. Nor is the welfare State characterised solely in terms of payments or transfers to individuals or by the provision of services accepted as being "universal" in character (such as education and health). The welfare State encompasses a broad mandate for social redistribution and may include transfers, to or between regions of the country (from the "haves" to the "have-nots"), or legislated protections for individuals or groups perceived to have limited life-chances owing to their position in society.

Mistakenly viewed as being synonymous with income assistance programs, "welfare" is often regarded as being residual in character - in other words, the last resort for the feckless and indigent in our society who cannot (or will not) see to their own needs and cannot survive solely on the basis of charity from Church or family. In reality, however, the welfare State seeks to provide not only for the most needy, but offers a wide range of universal (where eligibility is conferred on the whole population or whole age groups) as well as selective (targetting specific individuals or groups) programs and services.

The welfare State is a relatively recent and continually evolving institution which displays considerable geographic variability. Social welfare, as a social product, is subject to distributional constraints such as cost, distance, or logistics. As with other types of products, there are economies of scale associated with the provision of some social welfare programs which means that welfare State inputs are not equally (nor, necessarily, equitably or efficiently) distributed through space. Subject to distributional constraints, the accessibility to many welfare State programs will also be subject to spatial or social variation.

The social and spatial variability of the welfare State and the services it provides is contingent also on political processes. The welfare State was conceived, and

aspects of it entrenched through the political articulation of the repsonsibility of the State for the provision of social well-being and an appropriate quality of life for its citizens. The parameters of entitlement, the definition of social problems and social needs - as well as the means through which these are to be addressed - are subject to the political mobilisation of group interests and the expression in policy of political accommodations as expressed in co--optation, compromise and consensus. One may appreciate, therefore, that social welfare and social services exist very much within the bounds of a political economy, where the technical-level questions of how a given program may best be implemented are contingent upon political decisions and the philosophical predilections of the decision-makers.

Thus, while the institutions of the welfare State are at least as pervasive as death and taxes, they cannot rightly claim the same certainty as these two villains of the old adage. There are countervailing political and economic pressures from without which militate against the extension of social and economic intervention by government, just as there are systemic dysfunctions within the welfare State bureaucracy which impede the achievement of the ostensible goals of social welfare programs or policy. In addition, the expression of the welfare State in social and economic policy, as a creature of the political process, is a regional, and therefore an inherently geographical phenomenon. Thus,

particular regions, depending on factors such as the economy, the structure of the State and the philosophical leanings of government, will demonstrate greater or lesser propensities to accord priority or legitimacy to social welfare functions.

Commitment on the part of governments to the extension and consolidation of the welfare State is not immutable: changes in government may augur changes in levels of social provision, ergo, changes in social well-being. Political and economic changes in British Columbia over the past ten years have brought the Province's social services network from a pinnacle in the 1970's, when the Provincial welfare system was regarded by many as the most innovative and progressive in North America (Clague et al, 1984; Hepworth, 1975, vol. 7), to a critical point in the 1980's where social policy in B.C. has been portrayed as the most regressive in the country (BCGEU, 1985; Magnussen et al, 1984; Redish, 1984; Marchak, 1984).

Since 1975, the Province of British Columbia has been under the continuous leadership of Premier William Bennett and the Social Credit Party, during which time changes in the orientation of social policy and the structure of service delivery have had a significant effect on programs and clients. This thesis will not examine developments in social services policy over the entire period from 1975 to 1985; this has been done elsewhere and to a degree that cannot be

adequately reproduced here (see Clague et al, 1984). Instead, this thesis will concentrate on social policy changes taking place in the period from 1983 to 1985.

It is the purpose of this thesis to offer an analysis and critique of social policy in British Columbia since 1983. It is posited that the orientation of social policy in B.C. is a reflection of similar policy choices adopted in the United States and in the United Kingdom. It will be argued that, as in the U.S. and the U.K., the articulation of social policy in B.C. expresses a neo-conservative bias which is anti-collectivist and anti-welfare-statist in philosophical outlook. Cutbacks in social services in the U.S. and the U.K. have resulted in greater hardship for users of services while the net savings of restraint may well be offset by hidden or deferred costs. This thesis will demonstrate that the effects upon the community of the application of neo-conservative social philosophies has evoked the same potentially debilitating effects in B.C. that have been documented elswhere.

As it would be an enormous undertaking to produce a comprehensive review of British Columbia's social welfare system this thesis will present a detailed examination of only one component of the total service network - the voluntary sector. In the mixed economy of social services, governments are the primary agent of funding while service delivery involves a combination of government and private

sector auspices. The Federal and Provincial governments are responsible for income security programs or other universal services in British Columbia, while the responsibility for some selective programs is shared by non-governmental agencies. The not-for-profit, or voluntary sector in particular is a significant component in the delivery of personal social services. At varying times in different jurisdictions, the voluntary sector has undergone a shift from an autonomous provider of charitable relief to the role of an adjunct to publicly-mandated social services.

The expansion of the welfare State has often led to the incorporation of non-governmental agencies as almost an extension of public auspice, either through regulation, tied funding, or, in some cases, outright takeover. As a focal point for an analysis of the social services network, the voluntary sector provides a useful vantage from which to discern patterns in policy and policy outcomes. Unlike the more bureaucratised and obscured realm of public social service agencies, voluntary sector agencies and the services they provide are relatively accessible for study. Also, as an integral component of the statutory provision of personal social services (services which are distinct from, but often complementary and supplementary to, other social services such as income maintenance, health, housing, and education - Hepworth, 1975, p. 24) participants in the voluntary sector through their relations with both statutory agencies and

clients often possess insights into the policy environment which are invaluable to the researcher.

Voluntary sector agencies in British Columbia are funded primarily by the provincial government. In the wake of policies aimed at fiscal restraint, however, the viability of many non-governmental agencies and, consequently, the well-being of the persons they serve, has been placed in some jeopardy. Non-profit agencies experience stress not only as a result of direct cuts in their funding base - cutbacks in and rationing of public sector services have also led to greater demands upon non-profit agencies for their services. Among the additional effects of restraint experienced by agencies are growths in caseloads, increased rationing of services, higher staff turn-overs and a less stable economic environment in which to function.

1.1 THE WELFARE STATE IN CRISIS? THE EMERGENCE OF THE NEO-CONSERVATIVE CHALLENGE IN THE UNITED STATES, THE UNITED KINGDOM AND BRITISH COLUMBIA

The 1980's may aptly be characterised as an era of challenge and change in the area of social and economic policy. The modern welfare State - confronted with economic crises and still grappling with the political realities of pluralism - has been confronted with what some political observers have termed a "new reality." This new reality - the emergence of an invigorated economic conservatism and the

polarisation of political and intellectual faith regarding the future of the welfare State - has been expressed in Canada, the United States and Britain (and elsewhere) as an attempt to redefine government mandates for social provision. Regarded by many analysts as a repudiation of the "social contract" (Gough, 1982; Adams and Freeman, 1982) the social and economic policies of national and subnational governments have sought to reverse economic decline through the embrace of a traditional tenet of liberal capitalism: the belief that the self-regulating forces of the market are all that is necessary to ensure individual (and, therefore, national) well-being.

The new reality has been articulated through a set of doctrines referred to by proponents and critics alike as neo-conservatism, or the New Right, which trace their intellectual underpinnings back to Adam Smith's "An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations" (1776) and David Ricardo's "On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation" (1817). These two authors, re-interpreted in the context of the modern capitalist economy, are often excoriated or lionised (depending on one's philosophical predilection) as the primary sources of inspiration for the various proponents of the New Right. Embracing a fundamental belief in the sustaining and self-regulating powers of a market unfettered by State or bureaucratic control, the modern heirs of Smith and Ricardo - monetarists and supply-side theorists

- have witnessed the ascension of governments who are favourably disposed towards their views.

While monetarists and supply-siders together advocate policies which favour the dismantling of many aspects of the State's bureaucratic superstructure (particularly those relating to universal social welfare programs), and although both may be termed neo-conservative or New Right in orientation, they are not one and the same. While monetarist influences focus on the manipulation of interest rates and money supply limitations, the supply-side influence focusses on putting additional funds into the hands of private investors and entrepreneurs through the taxation system (Social Planning Council of Metropolitan Toronto, 1985, p. 54). Still, even though the neo-conservative doctrine is far from a monolithic body of theory, elements of both monetarist and supply-side prescriptions have been borrowed from and fused into ecclectic hybrids which have since passed into the conventional economic argot as "Reaganomics" and "Thatchernomics."

These two hybridisations of monetarist and supply--side theory, to borrow from George Orwell, comprise the "newspeak" of neo-conservatism, and, through their expression in policy, have become national doctrines. To the extent that the fundaments of these doctrines are shared by the leaderships of governments other than those of President Ronald Reagan and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher,

Reaganomics and Thatchernomics have inspired other governments to pursue similar courses. The emulation of the policies of the U.S. and Britain is not restricted to national governments, for, as will be argued in chapter two of this thesis, the government of the Province of British Columbia has appropriated elements of the neo-conservative agenda in the formulation of social and economic policy at the sub--national level.

It will be argued also that the expression in social and economic policy of the neo-conservative agenda involves measures to reduce government intervention in some spheres - particularly in the social welfare functions of the State - as well as parallel measures to remove impediments to entrepreneurial activity. It is significant in this regard, that to varying degrees, proponents of the New Right regard the welfare State as an impediment to economic prosperity and growth. For government leaders in Britain, the United States and British Columbia, the welfare State, its bureaucracies, and the consumers of its services, represent an economic burden which cannot be reconciled with the needs of the economy. As a consequence, the new reality - the awakening of economic exigency - demands the rejection of collectivistic ideals of unversalism in social provision and an end to the "totalitarian" pervasiveness of the welfare State as luxuries that society cannot presently afford (Booth, 1982, p. 210).

The welfare State encompasses a variety of forms and permutations. While it is inappropriate here to engage in a lengthy discussion of the evolution and form of the welfare State, it should be noted that the provision of social welfare by the State is a fairly recent phenomenon, beginning with the German social insurance legislation of the 1880's (Therborn, 1984, p. 7; Blain, 1984, p. 63). The major institutions of the welfare State have evolved unevenly and uneasily in the advanced capitalist nations and exist as a corpus of statutory protections and legal entitlements with the ostensible aim of creating social well-being. In Canada, the welfare State is a more recent development, beginning in 1909 in Quebec with a law on workmen's compensation. The expansion of welfare State institutions at the national level, however, did not seriously get under way until the establishment of unemployment insurance in 1940, and it was not until 1961 and 1971 respectively that both hospital and health insurance had been instituted across the country (Blain, 1984, p. 63).

The welfare State in Canada has a patchwork quality (Djao, 1983): it has evolved gradually and incrementally. This has resulted in a complex web of laws and institutions which often admits of redundancy, contradiction and a lack of comprehensiveness. To this end, while the Canadian welfare State has been supported in principle by most federal

or provincial governments since 1945, in fact, it has yet to be consolidated.[1]

It comes as some surprise that the welfare State, only one hundred and three years old (only fifty years old in Canada) should so soon have reached a point of crisis. However, as pointed-out by Therborn:

> The current crisis of the welfare state is something that has broken out, not because of gerontological ailments, but right after a quiet but historically unique acceleration of welfare state developments throughout the Western world. The crisis is one of maturity and rigour, not of old age. (Therborn, 1984, pp. 35-36).

The present crisis of the welfare State is characterised by Blain (1984) as "double-headed," being both financial and administrative in nature. The financial crisis is linked to the sluggishness of economic growth in which the State is faced with diminished revenues and increases in social welfare disbursements. A second reason for the financial crisis is said to be the "revolt of the taxpayer," expressed as the unwillingness of citizens to finance expenditures for social welfare (Blain, 1984, pp. 64-65).

[1]There is not the time, nor the space to permit an extensive discussion of the Canadian welfare State: this has been treated fully by Armitage (1975, Djao (1983), and Guest (1982) - it is to these authors that the interested reader should turn.

A second source of crisis, which Blain links to a "crisis of confidence," is administrative. Administrative crisis with respect to the welfare State bears on two points: its effectiveness (does it achieve its goals?) and its efficiency (at what cost are goals achieved?) (Blain, 1984, p. 65). In terms of effectiveness, critics of the welfare State remark on the failure of the State to achieve equity, equality of opportunity and security. They point to the political marketplace of social services, claiming that organised lobbies or pressure groups obviate the egalitarian principles ostensibly embodied in the welfare State. Furthermore, it is argued that the economic interventionism employed by the welfare State may run counter to its redistributive goals (Blain, 1984, pp. 65-66). With regards to efficiency, there are those who argue that the costs of services provided by the State are excessive, and far beyond what similar services would cost if provided by private enterprise (Blain, 1984, p. 66). In its painful adolescence the welfare State has come under attack from all sides; according to Blain, it has been criticised by the radical left as "the crutch of capitalism" (for not going far enough) and by the radical right as "the ersatz of socialism" (presumably for going too far) (Blain, 1984, pp. 66-67).

The strongest challenges to the welfare State have come from the governments of the United States and Great Britain. Although pressures to constrain both the extension and the expenditures of social welfare institutions have

been a continuous and significant component of the political economy of the welfare State, there is general agreement among analysts from a wide variety of fields that Reaganomics and Thatchernomics represent the most vigorous assault on the welfare State since its inception.

In Britain, Thatchernomics has emphasised monetarist strategies in an effort to produce a social and economic climate which is favourable to capitalist enterprise (Adams & Freeman, 1982, pp. 71-72; Gough, 1982, pp. 49-50). Attempts in Britain to restructure the welfare State represent a return to some of the precepts of nineteenth-century liberalism: a limited role for government; an emphasis on the responsibilities of the individual, the family, and the local community, and; a reversal of the collective social provision of the postwar era through cuts in the social wage (Gough, 1982, pp. 50-52).

In the United States, Reaganomics has emphasised supply-side approaches to roll-back the growth of social service expenditures (although elements of both monetarist and supply-side approaches have been incorporated into the national strategies of both governments). While the American welfare State has never had such a universalistic character as the British, the reduction and the restructuring of public spending is perceived as a necessary tonic for the labour market and investment (Adams & Freeman, 1982, pp. 74--75). In both these nations the devolution and the redefini-

tion of the mandates for social provision have been accompanied by programmatic cuts in social services. At the same time, there have occurred redefinitions of eligibility for social services provided by the State. Redefinitions of eligibility have been accompanied by changes in the level of federal support for programs mandated through lower levels of government and voluntary sectors. It has been inferred by many of the authors to be reviewed in this thesis that the scale of these changes augurs a return to residualism - meaning that the State may tend to serve only those who cannot be helped by families, the church or charitable organisations.

In the neo-conservative policies of the U.S. and the U.K., the primacy of the private marketplace is asserted not only for entrepreneurial activities, but also for the provision of social services (Austin, 1983, p. 357). To this extent the doctrines of Reaganomics and Thatchernomics advocate the reprivatisation of the welfare State through a much greater emphasis on the non-governmental provision of social services. In both the U.S. and the U.K., an increased reliance on the voluntary sector for the provision of personal social services has been accompanied by reduced levels of funding for this sector, in spite of the fact that the preponderance of funding for voluntaristic social service agencies comes from national, state and local governments. Crises of the welfare State, therefore, have in recent years constituted crises for the voluntary sector and its clients.

The tough policies enacted by President Reagan and Prime Minister Thatcher in the 1980's were, of course, a continuation of attempts at restraint begun by previous administrations (Gough, 1982; Adams & Freeman, 1982; Austin, 1983). They were, however, unprecedented in their vigour and intent, and the bold promises of the New Right encouraged governments in other regions to follow suit. Although the Federal Government in Canada had been attempting for some time to control social expenditures (through the devolution of responsibility to the Provinces, through monetarist policies aimed at controlling interest rates and the availability of capital, as well as through the use of rationing mechanisms such as means testing) it remained ostensibly committed to the principle of universalism, regional equity and some measure of redistributive justice.[2]

In Canada the clearest example of the neo-conservative challenge to the welfare State occurred not within the Federal government, but at the provincial level with the government of Premier William Bennett. In 1983 the

[2]This is in part because of the particular relationship between the Canadian Federal State and the governments of its constituent regions as defined in the British North America Act of 1867. (For a more complete discussion see Hepworth, 1975, volume 9; Armitage, 1975, and; Guest, 1982.) Also see the Constitution Act (1982), Part III (Section 36) which commits federal and provincial governments to provide equal opportunities for the well-being of Canadians; reduce disparities; and promote comparable levels of public service.

government of British Columbia capped three years of incremental cuts in social services with a radical legislative program aimed at reducing the size of government and providing a favourable climate for capital investment. Significant components of these policy agenda were: the containment of social service expenditure; the elimination of some social service programs; restrictions on the eligibility for service, and; an increased reliance on local, informal and voluntary agents for the delivery of personal services.

That such initiatives should have been undertaken at the provincial level is not surprising (a fuller accounting of this legislation is given in chapter two): in Canada, responsibility for social service policy lies primarily within provincial jursidiction, although revenue-sharing by the Federal government has played a part in determining the direction of policies in social security, health, and personal social services (Hepworth, 1975, vol. 9, p. 9). Still, under the Canadian Constitution, the provinces retain considerable autonomy from the Federal government in the setting of social policy within the provincial legislative sphere. Differing fiscal and jurisdictional capabilities between Ottawa and the provinces have meant that British Columbia's approach to economic management has tended to emphasise the supply-side route, as opposed to a monetarist approach.

Still, there are elements, ideological and technical,

of both Reaganomics and Thatchernomics expressed in British Columbia's social and economic policy. From the U.S., British Columbia has incorporated tax incentives for business; from the U.K., the Premier has sought to emulate what Gough refers to as the "authoritarian populism" of Prime Minister Thatcher (Gough, 1982, pp. 49-50). On the inspiration of both, the British Columbia government has endeavoured to downsize government and to effect a devolution of responsibility for social provision. From the doctrines of the New Right also, the government of British Columbia has appropriated the assumption that individuals, families and the voluntary sector can and must bear a greater responsibility for the meeting of social needs. It is precisely this latter assumption that this thesis intends to address.

1.2 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS

This introductory chapter has attempted to provide an overview of the broader issues surrounding the performance and viability of the voluntary sector in British Columbia. It has been presumed that the reader will have some knowledge of the structure and provision of social welfare in Canada: the foregoing discussion is intended to provide the context for the ensuing analysis of the voluntary sector under restraint in B.C.

This thesis will be developed through seven chapters, the remainder of which are as follows:

Chapter two, the Political Context and the Hermeneutics of Restraint: this chapter begins with a discussion of the ontology of the supply-side so that the reader may better appreciate the philosophical underpinnings of British Columbia's restraint legislation. This is followed by a summary of the basic components of the "restraint package" introduced by the Social Credit government in 1983. While this summary of the government's legislative package goes beyond those aspects of policy directly affecting the voluntary sector, it is difficult to fully appreciate the ramifications of the "new reality" with reference to the voluntary sector alone. Finally, social and economic policy in B.C. is discussed with reference to the needs of the capitalist economy and the objectives of public policy formulation.

Chapter three, Voluntary Sector - State Relations: Economic Nature and Function of the Voluntary Sector: this chapter offers a detailed analysis of the voluntary sector, its evolution and contribution; the variety of forms and functions it may assume, and; the relationship of voluntary sector agencies to government and publicly provided services.

Chapter four, The Effects of Fiscal Restraint Upon Voluntary Sector Services - the U.S. Experience: chapter four examines the effects of cutbacks in social services upon the voluntary sector and clients who use voluntary sector and public sector services. These impacts are discussed with reference to a number of studies conducted in the United States. Also examined in this chapter are issues surrounding the government purchase of services from the voluntary sector and problems of monitoring standards of service delivery.

Chapter five, Restraint and the Voluntary Sector in B.C. - Findings From Three Communities: this chapter summarises the findings of surveys of the effects of restraint on voluntary sector agencies and their clients in three Lower Mainland communities. These findings are set against a discussion of social and economic indicators for B.C. which are suggestive of the pervasiveness of stress in the community.

Chapter six, The Voluntary Sector in British Columbia - The Effects of Restraint and Agency Responses: this chapter presents the findings of a province-wide survey of 179 non-profit, voluntaristic agencies providing personal social services in British Columbia. This questionnaire, conducted by the author in January 1985 sought to identify parameters of agency structure related to service delivery; sources of increase or decrease in agency funding; changes in the soci-

al services environment experienced by the voluntary sector, and; the perceptions of agency directors of the social policy environment in B.C. as well as their assessments of strategies for agency survival.

Chapter seven, Social Policy, Social Change and the Future of Voluntarism in B.C.: this, the concluding chapter returns to first principles, established in chapters one and two. It encapsulates the findings of preceding chapters, offers a prognosis for the voluntary sector in British Columbia and a commentary on the direction of social policy in Canada.

CHAPTER II

THE POLITICAL CONTEXT AND THE HERMENEUTICS OF RESTRAINT

What has been happening in British Columbia under the Social Credit government is an example of what many observers have termed the "crisis of the Welfare State" (Stoez, 1981, Glennerster, 1983, Mishra, 1984). Neo-conservative challenges to the welfare State, impelled by economic stress nationally and internationally, have been attributed by some to "crises of capitalism" resulting from the inability of the State to manage the contradictions of the capitalist mode of production (Alexander, 1982, Dear & Clark, 1981, Peet, 1983, Soja et al, 1983). These challenges have arisen, in British Columbia as elsewhere, in response to a growing divergence of government receipts and outlays which threaten to make the 1980's an era of huge national deficits (Tarschys, 1983, pp. 206-207, Wittrock, 1983: 195). Fiscal crisis has been accompanied by a weakening of ideological support for the Keynesian welfare State and waning public confidence in the political system (Tarschys, 1983, p. 208).

The backlash against the welfare State reflects a changing philosophy towards some social programs and levels of government intervention in general. Public frustration over reduced economic opportunity and social uncertainty has been harnessed politically into a wave of voter support for government cutbacks (Jones, 1984, p. 49). This frustration

has given a new political and populist expression to the tensions that prevail between traditional constructs of Keynesian intervention and the axioms of the free-market economy. The present challenge of social and economic policy is to control unemployment and its effects and to stimulate economic growth. To the extent that the welfare State has been villified for its preoccupation with the former, the neo-conservatives have been chastised for their obsession with the latter.

The neo-conservative critique of the welfare State may be broadly described as anti-collectivist (George & Wilding, 1976) and has emanated from monetarist (Friedman) and supply-sided theorists (Gilder, Laffer) who espouse the free enterprise ethic of orthodox neo-classical economics. Both the monetarist and the supply-side view hold that the regulation of production and distribution is best left to the market and that, if the market system is functioning satisfactorily, there is no need for State intervention (Taylor-Gooby & Dale, 1981, p. 145, p. 147). The assumption here is that the private-sector market will respond to individual needs (Ross R., 1983, p. 34) and that the market fails to do so now because of the weight of government intervention and regulation.

The writings of neo-conservative economists are suffused with references to democracy, freedom, liberty and individualism. Often, there is an almost evangelical tone to

their economic philosophy. George Gilder, a proponent of the neo-conservative view, writes:

> The source of the gifts of capitalism is the supply--side of the economy. The problem of contemporary capitalism lies not chiefly in a deterioration of physical capital, but in a persistent subversion of the psychological means of production - the morale and inspiration of economic man - undermining the very conscience of capitalism: the awareness that one must give in order to get, supply in order to demand (Gilder, 1982, p. 15).

In Gilder's view, and the view of other neo-classical economic thinkers, the entrepreneur is the key figure in ensuring all gains to be had from economic growth. Furthermore such growth will first reduce and then ultimately eliminate poverty - what inequalities that arise are the inevitable and tolerable result of social freedom and personal initiative (Bosanquet, 1983, p. 11, p. 13).

Certain political expressions of the welfare State, particularly universal suffrage, are viewed with grave reservations. For neo-conservatives, the only legitimate social force is the expression of consumer choice through the market. The political process, on the other hand, permits the expression in policy and legislation of interests and biases which subvert market-place democracy. Says Bosanquet of this view:

> Society is a battle ground between the forces of light working in the longer term through the economy

> and the forces of darkness working through the political process. Choices made freely in the economic sphere will nearly always be in society's interest - even if they turn out to be wrong they are the price of risk. But politics presents extreme dangers: attempts to bring about improvements through conscious design however well intentioned will almost always go wrong (Bosanquet, 1983, p. 7).

The State is seen as being under continual pressure from the civil service, political democracy, leftists, trade unions and other powerful lobbies to raise public expenditure to the ruination of the free and competitive market (Bosanquet, 1983, pp. 14-24, Burton, 1983, p. 315). Egalitarianism in the economy, says George Gilder, promotes greed and downplays the sources of supply (entrepreneurs) to "favour the diffuse and sterile clamor of demand" (Gilder, 1983, p. 15). The "deceptive supremacy" of demand has been achieved only through our "deluded politics" (Gilder, 1983, p. 315).

Demand-orientated politics, according to Gilder, Burton, Friedman and others, in "the thrall" of public opinion, end in promoting unemployment and dependency, a more rigid political order and a less accessible economy (Gilder, 1983, p. 25). Of course, before the New Right vision can be expressed in policy, its proponents must enter into the political process. However, according to Gilder, supply "can create its own demand, even in the political realm" (Gilder, 1983, p. 15). Successful leaders create the views of their larger constituencies more than follow them, he says; they are engaged not in passive response to public demand, but in

the active supply and marketing of ideas (Gilder, 1983, p. 15). However, having acceded to power through the political process, neo-conservative governments also find themselves constrained by that very process. John Burton, referring to the Thatcher experience in the U.K., remarks on the difficulty of translating political philosophy into political practise:

> It is easy to talk supply-side economics - cutting government expenditure and taxation, deregulation, the freeing of markets. The difficulty, it appears is in trying to do it, because of powerful lobbies (who) virulently oppose any such moves (Burton, 1983, p. 302).

Difficulties arise for the supply-side in countries or regions characterised by a civil service tenured through public service unions and collective agreements, and by special interest lobby groups who favour government programs that confer substantial benefits on them (Friedman, 1984, p. 165). According to Friedman, the "tyranny of the status quo" militates against conservative change through an "iron triangle" formed by "three powerful tyrannies" which are: the direct beneficiaries of a law; legislative committees and their staffs; and, the bureaucracy administering the law (Friedman, 1984, p. 42). The first refers to the costs of compensating vested interests, the second echoes Gilder's "thrall" to public opinion and the latter alludes to the centralisation and enlargement of government (Friedman, 1984, pp. 42-51).

The foregoing discussion of supply-side economic philosophy, of necessity, has been rather simply drawn. The neo-conservative movement, if it can be called that, is far from monolithic and has been subject to both strident denunciation on the left and rapturous uncritical praise on the right. The central tenets, however, permeate much of what is regarded as New-Right or neo-conservative ideology. Thus, some hermeneutical understanding of the monetarist and supply-side ontology is necessary for any conscientious analysis of the social and economic policies of governments which align themselves with the supply-side view. Not only does this philosophical inclination affect the form of policy, but it affects every phase of the policy process, from definition to legislation to implementation.

As has been noted above, the New Right sometimes expresses a cynical contempt for the political process and for welfare Statists' conceptions of political representation. Their view of political process becomes somewhat more ambivalent, however when seeking political office. This has been seen in the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada and on a regional scale in British Columbia, as parties and politicians engage in appeals to and manipulations of concepts of freedom, democracy, and the welfare burden of government. This was no less the case when William Bennett was returned to office for his third consecutive term as Premier of British Columbia on May 5, 1983. In a province

numbed by the experience of recession, the Social Credit Party pursued a campaign based on the promise of "restraint and recovery." An uncertain and apprehensive public, already strongly polarised between the Social Credit and New Democratic Parties, was swayed by Bennett's use of the media, sloganeering, and sophisticated polling techniques.

The government's platform was based on reduced government expenditures (in part, through measures to restrain public sector wages), an attempt to curtail the deficit, and the stimulation of private sector growth as a means to create employment opportunities. After the election, Premier Bennett's Social Credit Party held a thirteen seat majority with 49.7 percent of the popular vote (up 1.47 percent from 1979) compared to the N.D.P.'s 44.9 percent (down 1.09 percent from 1979). The other two major parties were virtually eclipsed from the provincial scene (Vancouver Sun, May 6, 1983). "The New Reality," which was to become one of the catch phrases of the Social Credit government augured the province's plan for "renewed prosperity" (Vancouver Sun, October 21, 1983). In a televised address to the province (October 20, 1983) Premier Bennett set out the government's agenda:

> To reach beyond our borders, for new investments, new industries, and new technologies, requires a coordinated strategy. Because we cannot spend our way out of the recession, we will have to earn our way out of it ... We must encourage risk-taking (Vancouver Sun, October 21, 1983).

The "coordinated strategy" was set into motion almost immediately and was comprised of a program to reduce government spending on a wide range of social, educational and consumer services, to reduce the number of public sector employees by at least 25 percent, and to abolish a number of politically sensitive commissions. While the electorate had approved the principle of restraint, the province was largely unprepared for the severity of government "cutback" policies, as evidenced by the aftermath of anti-government demonstrations. On July 7, 1983, the government brought down 26 pieces of legislation along with a new budget. Characterised by the government as a "restraint package" the budget and attendant legislation had the expressed aim of accomplishing economic recovery through the provision of an environment attractive to private investors.

The Social Credit government, in a Party publication entitled "Recovery '83" (T. Segarty, MLA (Member of Legislative Assembly), 1983), perceives itself as responding to the "fierce competition for world markets" by long-term expansion of the "window of opportunity" for the province. In this same publication, a very telling assertion typifies the neo-conservative leanings of the Social Credit Party vis-à-vis the collectivist stance of the opposition New Democratic Party. Regarding the elimination of "Child Abuse Teams" which operated under the auspices of the Ministry of Human Resources, this "information" publication says:

> We know the N.D.P. thrives on human misery. They'd like everybody to be dependent on government because when people are dependent, they're more susceptible to their brand of fear tactics.
> (T. Segarty, 1983, p. 15)

On the other side of the debate, critics of the government labelled its policies as "revenge," claiming that the legislation was, in part, an effort to punish public sector unions and dismantle programs introduced by the former N.D.P. government (Vancouver Sun, October 15, 1983). Dr. Paul Tennant, Professor of Political Science at the University of British Columbia, suggested that "ideological vengeance" was a major motive behind the legislative package. Tennant referred to the legislation as a "reorganisation of priorities," given an economic rationale, and noted that while money was being saved on programs the government does not like, significantly more money was being directed into programs the government does like (Vancouver Sun, October 25, 1983).

The rhetoric arising out of B.C.'s political turmoil has not lacked for its measure of vitriol. Still, for all the polemical excesses of the Left and Right, the theatrics behind the debate serve to define the roles of the various actors. New Democratic Party MLA Gordon Hanson referred to the Social Credit proposals as "ideological provocations" which would have damaging repercussions for both the pro-

vince and those disadvantaged sectors of the population who can least withstand the effects of cutbacks in services (Vancouver Sun, October 21, 1983). Professor T.T. Paterson of the School of Business Administration, Simon Fraser University, wrote:

> The government has turned to a procedure of eliminating several services... that would be regarded as of considerable public value: helping the poor, the infirm, the unfortunate.
>
> That method of reducing government, "cutting out unprofitable lines," is typical of business practise, where it is rightly applied. But the public service is not a business, and its "lines" shouldn't be measured in money terms. To that extent government is failing in its public duty and has failed to follow up its first approach on productivity.
>
> (Letter to the Editor, Vancouver Sun, October 15, 1983).

NDP Human Resources critic, Rosemary Brown, viewed the restraint program as a sign of further moves against public sector workers in the rest of Canada:

> My fear is that B.C. is not only an aberration but a hint of things to come... The B.C. government is clearly reactionary and anti-unon, anti-elderly, anti--disabled, anti-women and anti-people in general.
>
> (Vancouver Sun, October 27, 1983).

Federal Liberal Party President, Iona Campagnola also regarded the "politics of the right" with some alarm:

> B.C. is the political distant early warning line for Canada just as surely as California has been the birthing place for Reaganite extremism in the United States. (Vancouver Sun, October 27, 1983).

On the other side, party supporters at the Social Credit annual convention in October labelled the persons behind "Operation Solidarity," a coalition of public sector unions, community, labour and political groups, as "communist infiltrators" (Vancouver Sun, October 15, 1983). In the same vein, an address by outgoing president of the Social Credit Women's Auxiliary, Barbara Foxwell, regarded opposition to the government's legislation as a "battle" which, if lost, "will mean the destruction of democracy as we know it." (Vancouver Sun, October 14, 1983).

The government attempted what many analysts regarded as "legislation by exhaustion," forcing the legislature through all-night sittings and invoking "closure" on more than 20 occasions, thereby restricting all debate on bills before the House. The sitting culminated in the physical ejection of the Leader of the Opposition on the directive of the Deputy Speaker and his subsequent banning from the Legislature for the remainder of the sitting. Three days following the October 28 adjournment of the House, "Operation Solidarity" began a program of escalating strikes which lasted for two weeks - the most serious test of the Provincial government's legitimacy to date. The strike was

called-off on November 13, 1983 with promises by the government for more open consultation on matters of policy, but the fruits of those promises have not been fully realised.

Throughout the confrontation, the government claimed a mandate from the "people" of British Columbia for the restraint program, yet there were and continue to be indications that the electorate would not have sanctioned the severity of the policies introduced. Milton Friedman commented on the public expression of dissatisfaction in a conservative tract "Tyranny of the Status Quo":

> Now, Mr. Bennett could have introduced these measures before the election instead of immediately thereafter. Why didn't he?... Had Premier Bennettt spelled out his intention to cut personnel and funds before the election, he would have aroused immediate and vocal opposition from the special interest groups affected... By waiting until after the election to spell out his program, Premier Bennettt could hope that the bad effects on the concentrated groups would dissipate before the next election... (Friedman, 1984, p. 7).

Friedman comments also that if informed of the government's intent before the election, the "minorities" specifically affected would have mounted a "propaganda barrage" to ensure that the majority were "not well informed" (Friedman, 1984, p. 7). Despite such assertions the effects of restraint have not been as selective and discrete as Friedman would have us believe. The implications of broadly-based negative effects of cutbacks in social services in B.C. have been addressed

by service professionals (Anguish, 1983, MacDonald, 1983) and economists (Redish, 1984, Rosenbluth & Schworm, 1984), and are comparable to social impacts described in other jurisdictions (Doyle et al, 1979, Abramovitz & Hopkins, 1983).

Consultation with community groups, local governments, labour and social service professionals was not part of the B.C. government's overall policy process. The Premier adopted a tough stance on his government's policies, telling delegates to a Social Credit annual convention:

> You and I didn't fight so hard to bring our policies to government to be afraid to implement them (Vancouver Sun 15:10:83).

The legitimacy and rationality of the government's restraint program has been seriously questioned by social welfare and labour advocates. In the face of dissent, Premier Bennettt has sought an adversarial position as opposed to one of conciliation in the definition of social and economic policy:

> We will listen to every British Columbian and listen to their advice... but we will never back down on the policies that we advocate (Vancouver Sun, October 15, 1983).

The intransigence of the government in B.C., demonstrated by its unwillingness or inability to manage (and thereby reduce or resolve) conflict with public and private sector unions,

teachers, doctors, and municipalities, raises serious questions about the government's commitment to representing multiple interests. A development observed in a number of capitalist States which may have repercussions for representative policy choices is an ongoing process of "deparliamentarianisation" of public policy through the displacement of parliamentary process by administrative or "corporatist" decision-making (Offe, 1983, p. 234). The advantages for the government of such "functional" forms of representation resides in their informal, inconspicuous and non-public procedures and as such, corporatist arrangements work at the expense of parliament and the competitive party system (Offe, 1983, p. 234).

Dobell (1983) attributes to British Columbia government policy an attempt to reduce the power of the legislature and increase government by regulation. In so doing, the Province removes impediments to action and reduces accessibility to government (Dobell, 1983, p. 19). According to Dobell, the government has cut away the perceived barriers between the political decision and administrative action with the effect that the public service may be more responsive to the political will of the Cabinet than to the professional mandate of planners and management personnel in the various agencies (Dobell, 1983, p. 20). As evidence of such a trend the sittings of the legislature have declined steadily from a high of 137 days in 1977 to just 57 days in 1984. Critics

have charged that the government is trying to bypass the legislature to stifle or avoid criticism (Vancouver Sun, December 12, 84).

The social policy process in B.C., as with other "corporatist" governments, is obscured within the bureaucracy (Offe, 1983) or oversimplified when analysed in public (Gustafsson, 1983, p. 279). To resort to policy choices which appeal to simplistic solutions and which do not adequately address the long-range implications of current dilemmas cannot be easily reconciled with the intellectual tradition of the policy sciences. The economic "bottom line" in policy definition cannot, by itself, be considered a virtue. Whatever the intellectual underpinnings of the New Right, the tradition of governance in Canada is still guided by the principles of universal suffrage and the ideal of pluralism.

2.1 RESTRAINT ECONOMICS: THE "NEW REALITY" IN B.C.

The cutbacks implemented by British Columbia's Social Credit government over the past two years comprise an example of neo-conservative ideology expressed in practise. The principal agenda of social and economic policy in B.C. is to reduce constraints on private sector investment through tax breaks as well as through reductions in

regulation and intrusion by government. The latter has been expressed also as an effort to control government spending on "non-productive" sectors of the public service and has resulted in radical changes in the overall social services network. This has occurred as a conscious effort to redress what the government apparently sees as the debilitating emphasis given to the demand side of the equation. Like governments in other parts of Canada, the U.S. and the U.K., B.C. is seeking to reassert the primacy of supply as the axial principle of the economic and social environment. In the view of fiscally conservative governments, such as the Social Credit government in B.C., this cannot be achieved through Keynesian demand management but only through measures which stimulate the rate of output thus raising the rate of growth in the economy (Burton, 1983, p. 301). In B.C., these concerns have the policy effect of giving business a freer hand in the belief that the general well-being of the province can only be ensured through an "invigorated" private sector.

The government's social and economic policy is an eclectic assemblage of supply-side and monetarist economic approaches. The Premier and his Cabinet have been well tutored in the field of supply-side economics, and have consulted extensively with the Fraser Institute, a conservative economic "think-tank." The ideological leanings of the Fraser Institute are implicit in the views of its director, Dr.

Michael Walker, who has suggested that: "if the price of being an unmarried mother was higher, there would be fewer unmarried mothers." (Vancouver Sun, December 20, 1984). The Social Credit government has also been advised by monetarist Milton Friedman, and the Finance Minister recently conferred with supply-side economist, Arthur B. Laffer (Vancouver Sun, December 12, 1984). The manner in which policy is defined and applied, however, is not suggestive of a commitment to rational planning. Rather, the core of B.C.'s social and economic policy emerges as a hybrid of philosophies and selective interpretations of ideological mentors which are then applied like a "miracle tonic" to the economy.

Rod Dobell of the Institute for Research into Public Policy has criticised government social and economic policy on the grounds of bad management, noting that in the absence of a comprehensive policy, planning structure or consultative process, participatory and co-operative planning of organisational changes has been obviated (Dobell, 1983, p. 15):

> In their haste to get results, those responsible for this program undercut any basis for co-operative employee involvement... they have destroyed the preconditions for any effective organisational change or productivity improvement (Dobell, 1983, p. 16).

For that matter, even the economic foundations of the B.C. government's restraint program - the ostensible desire to

reduce the deficit and enhance the government's abilty to pay - when subjected to economic scrutiny have been found wanting (Kesselman, 1984, P-84-1; Rosenbluth & Schworm, 1984, 4-84-4; 1984, P-84-2; 1984, P-83-3). There is real concern in British Columbia that the economic and ideological foundations of the management of the economy are not sound and that whatever the positive consequences of these policy choices, insufficient consideration has been given to the negative impacts that may result.

2.2 THE LEGISLATIVE PACKAGE

What follows is a breakdown of the principal components of "restraint economics" in B.C. The characteristics of these changes will be discussed briefly as will be their postulated effects. The order of discussion does not attempt to reflect the level of priority given to these measures by government.

1) There has been a general constriction of funding by the provincial government for non-profit societies offering a broad range of personal human services. Funds come to non-profit agencies in the form of grants or contracts primarily from the Ministry of Human Resources and to lesser degrees from the Ministries of Health, Labour and Attorney

General. A large number of non-profit agencies (the terms non-profit society, non-profit agency, non-government organization (NGO) or voluntary sector agency can be used interchangeably in this context) date from the early 1970's when they were funded by Community Chests, the United Way, charity or, in the halcyon days of Federal programs, by OFY, LIP or CYC grants. In 1974 the then NDP provincial government attemped to integrate voluntary sector services with public programs while providing mechanisms for local control (BCGEU 1981, Clague et al, 1984). The creation of the Community Resource Boards (CRB's) and the Community Human Resources and Health Centres (CHRHC's) was a daring experiment in the integration and democratisation of health and personal services (Clague et al, 1984). As such, they oversaw an expansion of provincial government funding for non-profit societies and a pattern of increased dependency upon government for support (United Way SPAR/SPARC Joint Committee, 1980, #1). When Social Credit formed the government in 1975, they disbanded most of the CRB's and CHRHC's. They were strongly distrustful of the elected boards of these bodies, fearing them to be enclaves of NDP and left-wing elements (Clague et al, 1984). The government felt that community-defined needs represented excessive demands on government and in the furtherance of this belief, advocacy groups and lobby-groups were denied access to public funds (Clague et al, 1984).

The new pattern of dependency upon government for operating or project funds meant that non-profit agencies were especially vulnerable to cutbacks in funding announced by the provincial government in 1983. Cutbacks of 10 and 20 percent for 1983 and 1984 respectively seriously affected agencies already operating on shoestring budgets. While most agencies receive money from a number of sources including all three levels of government, a survey of NGO's by Willms in 1980 found that 42 percent of agencies surveyed receive over 80 percent of their funding from the provincial government (Willms, 1980). Failure to index funds to inflation in 1983 and 1984 has led to an impaired viability even of those agencies which did not experience a direct reduction of funding. While the Ministry of Human Resources counters that the absolute amount of dollars made available to NGO's has increased, there has also been an increase in the number of agencies competing for funds and the number of clients served by those agencies, hence, the relative share of funding has declined (BCGEU, 1981, pp. 15-16).

Retrenchment in the public sector has created a need for retrenchment in the private sector services. The ability of small agencies to respond to a shrinking pool of resources, however, is limited in many cases by a lack of organisational sophistication and by the loss of supports in other parts of the system. While some agencies have folded, many are forced to lay-off staff, rely increasingly on

volunteers, cancel specific programs and/or ration services. A greater reliance on volunteers has serious implications for service quality and continuity; rationing may mean that clients are deflected to other non-profit agencies, inappropriate services or even back to the public sector. While the provincial government has asked the voluntary sector to fill the gaps created by retrenchment in the public sector, the ability to do so is undermined by the simultaneous withdrawal of government support for voluntary organisations.

There are anticipated impacts for the potential users of such services as well. Dependency on government support by NGO's places serious constraints on the traditional advocacy function of the voluntary sector, and as such this may have consequences for innovation in treatment or programs. Fewer resources and staff in the public sector moreover, will mean increased caseloads for private agencies already struggling to meet rising levels of need in the community. There are fears among staff in NGO's that there may be increasing levels of exclusion through the "creaming" of clients requiring fewer inputs, leaving some stuck in a "revolving door" between agencies (personal communication). Another possible outcome, particularly for persons with social or behavioural problems or the more difficult-to-handle clients, is that they may experience more frequent hospitalisations in psychiatric wards or even

be routed through the courts. Programs for persons with special needs, or problems for which there is not much public awareness or sympathy might become more vulnerable to cutbacks. Of course, an effect that has potential impacts for all clients is the growing propensity for "worker burnout" in the non-profit services. Low wages, low staff morale and higher caseloads make program continuity a problem.

The above represents a collage of the impacts upon the voluntary sector of government cutbacks. The impacts upon clients may vary from region to region, depending on the funding base of the voluntary sector and the amount of the total services provided. Much of the detailed literature enumerating the impacts upon the non-profit sector services and their clients has come out of the United States, (Tapper, 1982; United Way of the Bay Area, 1982; United Way of Santa Clara County, 1982; Demone & Gibelman, 1984). Still, the author's empirical research in Vancouver bears out the general trends observed in this literature.

2) Government austerity has also proceeded through changes in eligibility for and reductions in GAIN (Guaranteed Available Income for Need) benefits. The 1984/1985 provincial budget has redefined the needs of the recipients of income assistance (Redish [4-8403], 1984, p. 3). Ministry of Human Resources staff now have less discretion to provide

assistance to unemployment insurance applicants - newly unemployed persons will be expected to exhaust available income or assets, including available lines of credit, before being eligible for assistance (Vancouver Sun, March 22, 23, 1984). The Ministry has reduced support allowances paid to single persons and couples without children by $25 for the first month of assistance. For singles and couples under the age 26, a reduction of $25 per month will be deducted for the first eight months of eligibility.

This latter cut is based on the Ministry's assumption that the young are more mobile and better able to relocate to find work, however, in a province experiencing high youth unemployment, relocation offers little promise. For young people in the metropolitan areas, relocation to rural parts of the province (assuming such persons could afford to relocate, having few if any liquid assets) would probably not avail them much owing to even higher relative rates of unemployment in these regions. Should such persons relocate and yet still be unable to find employment, they may be classified as "transients" and may be ineligible for all but emergency or hardship assistance. It has been suggested in the media that such measures are meant as a disincentive for potential welfare recipients coming to B.C. (Vaughn Palmer, Vancouver Sun, March 22, 1985). An implicit agendum of these changes, however, might be to encourage young unemployed British Columbians to leave the province.

There are other, less obtrusive forms of retrenchment and rationing in the public service. One of these, described by Lipsky (1984), is "bureaucratic disentitlement." This refers to the manner in which social welfare obligations to beneficiaries are reduced and circumscribed through the largely obscure "bureaucratic" actions and inactions of public authorities (Lipsky, 1984, p. 3). This is a mode of "fiscal and programmatic retrenchment" which takes place through routine actions or inactions and which has distributive consequences. Furthermore, because bureaucratic disentitlement is less visible and more indirect as a cutback tool, it is difficult to discern and is thereby unavailable for public inspection or review (Lipsky, 1984, pp. 3-5). There are a number of factors influencing bureaucratic disentitlement such as constricting the resources or staff levels of public agencies. One point, however, deserves mention; cutback politics is a process through which the relationship of the State to social welfare beneficiaries becomes attenuated - bureaucratic disentitlement permits the expression of structural biases against social welfare clients while maximising the likelihood that they will remain quiescent (Lipsky, 1984, p. 22). Glennerster observes that informal types of rationing tend to penalise "those who are most easily deterred, least articulate, worst acquainted with the service, least able to wait, or who fall outside the conventional categories of eligibility (Glennerster, 1975, pp. 13-14).

3) Another central theme of social and economic policy in British Columbia is the "downsizing" of government. This is predicated upon a conservative theme of "big government is bad government." Says Robert Heilbroner of this trend:

> ... supply-siders want to roll back government, not merely to get it off our backs, but also because government is perceived as essentially a wasteful, not a productive, use of resources (Heilbroner, 1982, p. 86).

Toward this end, the government has sought a 25 percent reduction of public sector employees through the Public Sector Restraint Act (Bill 3) which provides very broad employee termination conditions (Magnusson et al, 1984, p. 281). In addition to employees terminated directly by the provincial government, school boards, hospitals and universities have been forced to make staff reductions as a result of the provincial government's enforcing lower budgets for these areas.

This is suggestive of a more general problem - the reduced capability of government. Downsizing government has no necessary correlation in increased productivity, especially as reductions occur in an era of rising demands. To assess the efficiency of government with a purely "fiscal" accounting is misleading - public services exist in a complex socio-economic system (Glennerster, 1975, p. 12) and are therefore unlike any other private market activity in both form and organisational mission (Glennerster, 1975, pp.

168-169; Doyle, 1979, p. 53). Lack of staff and resources may give rise to organisational or informational decline in the public services. Persons may be required to assume duties for which they are untrained and have no experience. Less time will be spent per client and service will be more crisis-oriented and sustaining as opposed to preventive and enabling. Reduced staff capability also means a reduced capability to monitor clients or non-public services, thereby reducing client safeguards.

There is also a more stringent application of discipline in the public sector in British Columbia. This has reduced public accessibility to government as employees are reluctant to divulge even such basic informaton as the number of persons served by their ministry. One can see in British Columbia that in periods of economic and political instability, the State is least willing to tolerate or manage dissenting values either within the public sector or in its lines of communication with the citizenry. Similarly, government commitment to research or accessibility to information declines. Because of this the functioning of the voluntary sector becomes strained, particularly as their communications with government have become more tenuous due to the loss of personnel who served an "interface" function between the public sector, the community and government.

4) Downsizing has meant the government divesting itself of certain functions through the cancellation or curtailment of services provided by a number of ministries. Among the programs elminated by the Ministry of Human Resources were the Family Support Worker Program, Mental Retardation Co-ordinators, and Child Abuse Assessment Teams. (Redish [4-8403], 1984, pp. 14-16). Other services lost as a result of restraint were Post Partem Counsellors, Child Care Workers providing counselling in public schools and the Provincial Inservice Resource Team (PIRT) which provided training to parents of severely mentally handicapped and autistic children to enable them to remain in their natural and foster homes (Kesselman [P-84-1], 1984, pp. 2-3). The loss of these services has not only resulted in hardship for the persons affected, but will probably lead to greater long-term social and economic costs (Anguish 1983, Currie & Pishalski 1983, Macdonald, 1983). Ironically, the above programs, aimed at the facilitation of community-based care, have been convincingly argued to be cost-effective, obviating the more costly and dehumanising recourses of institutionalisation and chronic dependency (Kesselman [P-84-1], 1984, pp. 2-4). Calculating savings to the Province becomes even more problematic when one is reminded that many of these services are eligible for cost-sharing by the Federal government through the Canada Assistance Plan (CAP).

The Ministry of Human Resources, while perhaps the hardest hit (because human services are more labour intensive), is not the only ministry suffering a loss of services. The application of restraint in hospitals or other health-related institutions has affected the capacity and capability of the health sector through queueing, the reduction of available beds or the curtailment of some procedures or programs. Loss of staff and funds for education, Worker's Compensation, legal aid and programs offered by the Ministry of Labour increase the potential social and economic risk to women, the handicapped, children, immigrants, seniors and persons on low incomes, in other words, those persons who may be least able to participate through the "market."

5) The provincial government has pursued a policy of deregulation by reducing impediments to entrepreneurial activity thus limiting the intervention of government in areas of social and economic relations. Deregulation has occurred through a number of bills which, among other things, include the dissolution of a number of regulatory boards and commissions; the repeal of rent controls and the abolition of the Office of the Rentalsman; the dismantling of the Human Rights Branch and Commission; and legislation which restricts the rights of organised labour (Magnussen et al, 1984, pp. 283-285).

The effects of these moves will be to give business and government a freer hand in establishing labour and business practises while at the same time reducing or eliminating avenues of citizen redress for discrimination or unfair treatment. Cutbacks in legal aid and reduced access to information will make redress for persons on low incomes extremely difficult. Deregulation will also occur informally within the bureaucracy as staff and ministerial budgets are reduced.

6) Deinstitutionalisation and privatisation are two more policy courses pursued by the B.C. government in its austerity drive. In 1983 the Ministry of Human Resources announced its intention to phase down three residential institutions that care for the mentally handicapped by working towards more community-based resources (Redish [P-8403], 1984, p. 15). A co-ordinated strategy for such a move, however, has been hampered by the loss of the Mental Retardation Co-ordinators whose role was to assist mentally handicapped persons in their transition from institutions to the community (Redish [P-8403], 1984, p. 15). Deinstitutionalisation has proceeded in concert with privatisation which essentially refers to the transfer of functions or services from the public to the private sector (Rosenbluth & Schworm [P-84-3], 1984, p. 4). Here we are referring to direct forms of privatisation through the use

of purchase of service contracts (POSC); other, indirect forms of privatisation are services "picked-up" by the voluntary sector but without government support (such as food banks) (Butcher, 1984, p. 55). In other words, privatisation may be seen as a further effort by government to divest itself of responsiblity for the direct provision of certain types of services. In this light, the shift of public responsibility occurring in British Columbia is far from promising. Serious technical questions concerning the implementation, quality and continuity of contracted services have arisen in other jurisdictions (Jansson 1979; Ghere, 1981); Kramer, 1983; Reamer, 1983), and there is no reason to expect that the problems experienced elsewhere will not be repeated in B.C..

As with other areas in which the province has shifted responsibility to the private sector for certain types of services, the increased use of purchase of service contracts suffers from a lack of planning, consultation, co-ordination and research. There are serious problems of accountability, monitoring and review of contracted services which the province has not met in the past and cannot meet now in the face of organisational decline. The use of the "for-profit" sector in the delivery of contracted services is an issue of particular concern for human service professionals in B.C.; a recent paper by Gilbert (1984) suggests a number of structural and institutional differences between non-profit

and profit-making agencies which, for certain types of services, make the latter less desirable as providers. The existing literature on the use of POSC's suggests an agenda for more research will be necessary to instill a greater degree of rationality in the policy process (see Chapter 4.5).

7) As has been alluded to earlier, centralisation of decision-making within the government is an important feature of the Social Credit Party's approach to policy-making. Within the government, power over budgeting and policy initiation has shifted from ministries to the Cabinet and the Premier's office largely through informal procedural changes (Rosenbluth & Schworm, P-84-3, 1984, p. 6). The trend towards increased centralisation has been evidenced in the willingness of the Provincial government to exercise its executive authority to usurp the planning, financial and regulatory powers of lower levels of government and public institutions (as in the dismissal of the elected Vancouver School board in 1985: also, see Dobell, 1983, pp. 18-19).

It is interesting to note that while governments invoking restraint economics often seek a devolution of responsibility for social provision, there is an inverse relationship with regard to physical and economic planning and development. It has been recognised in the social planning and administration literature that under conditions of

financial or organisational crisis, the dominant form of authority structure is centralised decision-making (Jones, 1984, p. 60). Glennerster has commented that where policy decisions become centralised the policy-makers are inevitably found to oversimplify the policy environment in order to grapple with the complex range of issues they must decide; where decisions are made centrally, planners will probably not use highly complex methods to account for all the possible consequences (Glennerster, 1975, p. 30).

8) While aspects of the provincial government's social and economic program have stressed the "downsizing" of government and the selective retrenchment of government intervention, there is another expression of policy that has overseen massive growth in expenditures. The government which has so fervently espoused the doctrine of free--enterprise, the tyranny of the public sector and the perils of government intervention in the market place, has created a new bureaucracy alongside the old welfare bureaucracy it seeks to downsize. This has emerged as a vigorous commitment to State capitalism and State-managed capitalism. Not only has the State sought to make British Columbia a safe place to invest but the government has engaged in speculative and entrepreneurial activities through its Crown Corporations as well as committing massive amounts of resources for construction of infrastructure as a lure for private capital.

Most of these public entrepreneurial structures exist in a symbiotic relationship with private corporations. Some are Crown Corporations and enjoy some autonomy from the Legislature and have broad powers of financing and borrowing guaranteed by the Crown. One thing they have in common with the private sector is a desire to show profit. Examples of Crown Corporations are the Insurance Corporation of B.C. (begun, ironically, by the NDP to counter what was in 1973 regarded as a usurious monopoly by private auto insurance firms), B.C. Place Crown Corporation, and Expo 86 Crown Corporation. B.C. Place Ltd. was established by an Act of Legislature in 1980 in the expectation of a potential market for housing and commercial space in the city core of Vancouver. To take advantage of this market and to help direct its growth, the Provincial government through its agent B.C. Place, will provide service and infrastructure on 200 acres near the core of Vancouver which will then be leased on a 99 year basis to private developers. Revenues accruing to the Corporation will be used to pay for the B.C. Place Stadium and other site amenities as well as provide funds which may be allocated for public developments elsewhere in the province.

In the case of B.C. Place we see the State acting as entrepreneur; assuming the means to production (by developing and holdng the B.C. Place site) and using that entrepreneurial structure as an organ of redistribution, thus inte-

grating capital investment with redistribution in a market-oriented public corporation. A more vigorous commitment to the market principle, however, foreshadows a declining public commitment to the welfare functions of the State. The inference one draws, therefore, is that entrepreneurial, market-oriented structures are intended to fulfill a social welfare function. The underlying thread of both Crown Corporation development and huge public works programs suggests the attempted manipulation by the State of micro- and macro-scale economics. Here the government uses its financial and intervention powers to supercede normal market relations and institutional barriers to influence the economic order of the metropolis and the province. The government is, in a sense, influencing the demand structure by creating a surface of locational advantage for private setor investment; essentially a demand-side approach to development and job creation!

Heilbroner suggests that State-owned or State-dependent organisations will emerge as the leading agents of accumulation. Such a trend will combine the "capital-mobilisation and competition-buffering abilities of the State with the independence and drive of private management" (Heilbroner, 1982, p. 90). In Offe's analysis, the availability of State-provided resources to "help to avoid or delay adaptation" to the pressures of a changing market system "cannot but lead to unprecedented levels of public debt and

to constant efforts of governments to terminate or reduce welfare State programs" (Offe, 1983, p. 240). The premise of conservative administrations that corporate welfare in the form of tax breaks and subsidies will create social welfare in the private sector has not been, and possible cannot be, demonstrated. The distributional and employment effects flowing to the community from projects such as Expo 86 tend to be spatially and temporally limited. Costs for Expo 86 and other developments will be borne by the entire province while the remunerative effects will not be as widely shared. In an era of structural and social change, investment in physical resources (fixed capital) at the expense of human resources has more in common with a 19th century industrial conception of society than with the emergent realities of the post-industrial age.

2.3 RESTRAINT AND THE NEW RIGHT - A CASE OF STATE MANAGED CAPITALISM

There is a pivotal contradiction inherent in government policies which advocate the "privatisation of services," the "filter-down" of the public wage or "service for fee." The contradiction lies in the fact that government, while divesting itself of the responsibility for welfare security, nevertheless seeks to perpetuate the kinds of

economic and political relations which contribute to social crisis and economic dysfunction. Governments of the "right" hold that the onus for the maintenance of social services (other than those seen as essential to maintaining social order) should devolve onto the private sector or the individual and yet, as a body which actively seeks to legitimise social and economic relations, the State assumes little part in fostering a social milieu in which the private sector can develop, or is inclined to develop, this role.

In British Columbia, we see a State which selectively "disgoverns" certain sectors of society while actively promoting or abetting other sectors which embody many of the re-distributive injustices endemic to the polity. In concert with these strategies, the State which decries "big government" and bemoans bureaucratic incursions into the private sector is actively engaged in consolidating and centralising its decision-making functions and subverting normal consultative mechanisms. Governments, such as that in B.C., are increasingly engaged in the effort to restructure the capital dynamics of the local or national economy. This may occur as a result of explicit policy, through tax breaks or even through the manipulation of interest rates (in the case of national governments). Governments may even turn "State capitalist" and seek to employ public entrepreneurial structures to fulfill redistributional aims. This may take the form of State monopolies (in Canada, Crown Corporations),

mega-projects, or re-development schemes. All of these have an incarnation in B.C. However, while State investment in "profit-making" sectors is encouraged, social welfare expenditures are subject to greater restrictions.

Cox (1977) makes it clear that in the capitalist State, the social welfare of the worker depends upon the investment of capital by capitalists. At the same time, he argues, the investment of capital is contingent upon the provision by the State of conditions amenable to investment. Therefore, the social welfare of the worker is dependent upon the provision by the State of conditions suitable for capital investment (Cox, 1977, pp. 10-11). Taking this analysis a step further, Broadbent (1977) holds that the mandate of the State to maintain profits and accumulation and at the same time manage a welfare economy often translates into a tendency to spend more tax dollars on the work force and less on industry. This leads to a dilemma in which industry and the population each require increasing State intervention, each on their own and often contradictory terms: one to maintain profits and reduce costs and the other to improve living standards and hence increase private sector costs (Broadbent, 1977, p. 30).

For the Social Credit government, the dilemma is less clear. Hearkening to the advice of monetarist and supply-side mentors such as Milton Friedman and the Fraser Institute, those in government believe that the "market" will

respond to individual needs. Others, however, regard the ideal of a self-regulating economic system as unworkable. Some writers contend that monetarist or supply-side approaches represent a conservative mythology (Niell, 1983, p. 2). For them, monetarist policy is one which routes money from lower socio-economic status (SES) groups who do not save and redirects it to those who do save (Neill, 1983, p. 2). This contributes to disinvestment and increased economic marginality among the lower SES groups and an increased polarisation of economic power in favour of capital interests.

This observation is reaffirmed by Doyle (1979), who questions government belt-tightening measures imposed upon persons who are least able to bear the hardships incurred through a shrinking pool of public resources. These persons he identifies as:

> The poor, senior citizens, natives, the unemployed, citizens in rural, northern communities and decaying urban areas (Doyle, 1979, p. 53).

For Doyle, many of the trends so far mentioned signal a diminishing role of the State in the area of social policy. He is concerned that such an abdication means that political interests outweigh social need in the government's scale of priorities (Doyle, 1979, p. 53). He suggests that restraint economics is simply a perpetuation of the old theme that the poor have moral defect and that the social system is basically sound (Doyle, 1979, p. 54).

The neo-conservative view, on the other hand, holds that the welfare State retains a monopoly on welfare services and that such a monopoly impairs the accountability of the State to consumers (Stoesz, 1981, p. 399). Yet the argument for privatisation, as a means to reduce expenditures and enhance consumer control over services, illustrates yet another set of contradictions inherent in the neo--conservative ethic. The "New Right" often claims that they wish to "empower people" by removing the "totalitarian" constraints of government or they wish to make services more accountable to people or make delivery more innovative through competition. Yet, in all the rhetoric, the point has been lost that the broadening of political awareness and the ability to articulate social concerns now enjoyed by formerly (and recently) "marginal" groups has been a direct result of the enabling and redistributive legislation of the welfare State.

The neo-conservatives do not reveal in their rhetoric (but, one suspects are keenly aware of) the basic postulates about the nature of power and privilege in our society. In whose interests do recession economics act? In the interests of those sectors of the population who already enjoy positions of political and economic advantage.

2.4 SOCIAL SERVICES, THE STATE AND THE IMPERATIVES OF CAPITAL ACCUMULATION

Throughout this discussion, we have ranged over a number of questions and issues regarding restraint economics and social services. We have alluded to the State and have inferred some of its motives but to this point, we have not addressed the State in a theoretical sense, nor have we examined some of the broader structural forces which impel it. In Canada, a number of recent measures by both the Federal and Provincial governments are indicative of a concern for fiscal restraint and government downsizing. Most have, to some degree, involved limitations on public sector wage increases and tighter controls on collective bargaining and public sector job action.

Such measures, says Gordon Pape (1983), are, in part, responses to a two-decade long period of public sector union militancy which has won generous wage and benefit concessions from government (Pape, 1983, pp. 88-89). Pape cites two precipitating events which spurred confrontation between government and public sector unions, both occurring in 1981. The first was U.S. President Ronald Reagan's firing of all U.S. Air Traffic Controllers who refused to end an illegal strike. The second was the beginning of the Canadian recession. The former was suggestive of the possible future of federal and provincial policies, while the latter brought the social and economic problems of the nation into a much sharper political focus. British Columbia introduced

Canada's first public sector restraint program in 1982, signalling many provinces to follow suit (Pape, 1983, p. 89). The weakening of public sector unions (long the exponents of union militancy) which has ensued has become a warning to the trade unions that the State is prepared to take direct and assertive action to achieve its goals.

How can one analyse the State as a legitimating, enabling or coercive structure? How and why does it act? In their essay, "The State in Capitalism and the Capitalist State," Dear and Clark (1981) attempt to focus not solely upon the functions of the State in a given society (the State in capitalism) but also upon the form of the capitalist State, in other words, how a given social organisation gives rise to a particular State structure or apparatus (Dear and Scott, 1981, p. 43). In so doing, the authors refer to the "central epistemological distinction in Marxist theory" between the "level of appearances" and the underlying social reality which gives rise to those appearances (Dear and Clark, 1981, p. 47).

The authors outline a theory of the State as a political entity which may on the one hand act in favour of crisis-free stabilisation and integration while, at the same time, "the extended functions of the State may themselves be a source of dysfunction and crisis" (Dear and Clark, 1981, p. 55). In this model, the State may assume many, often contradictory, roles: it may act in the interests of all

classes of capitalist society with many policies which do not directly serve the interests of the capitalist class. The State, therefore, acts continually in the interests of crisis avoidance. Crises result from class antagonisms and may be regarded as crises of "output and input:"

> Output crises, relating to the State's administrative decisions, take the form of crises of rationality. Input crises take the form of crises in legitimation - the system simply does not succeed in maintaining the necessary level of mass loyalty (Dear and Clark, 1981, p. 56).

Current fiscal crises are intimately linked with such crises of legitimacy and ratonality and are manifested as the contradiction between the maintenance of conditions suitable for capital accumulation while at the same time seeking to maintain social harmony (Dear and Clark, 1981, p. 56). In this light, the situation in B.C. may be seen in terms of the government's restraint program as precipitating a crisis of rationality and the subsequent public protest and strike action forming the core of a crisis in legitimacy, for as Dear and Clark observe:

> ... the capitalist State which openly uses its coercive power to enable one class to profit at the expense of others loses its legitimacy and risks undermining the basis of mass support. This structural contradiction is compounded during inflationary periods when rising costs and public expenditure cutbacks cause State output to fall below expectations. A crisis in legitimacy is thus initiated which imposes increased pressure upon the rationality crisis, and so on (Dear and Clark, 1981, p. 56).

Richard Peet, as special guest editor of Economic Geography (Vol. 59, No. 2, April 1983), says of "The Global Geography of Contemporary Capitalism:"

> The movement of capitalism into a new phase creates crises which interact with old crises versions of the same contradiction, create wholly new sequences of crisis, and intersect and interact in the ever-changing pattern of historical events (Peet, 1983, p. 110).

Chauncey A. Alexander (1982), too, relates the effects of the recession to "reruns of the periodic crises of a capitalist economy" (Alexander, 1982, p. 63). Alexander regards the market-place mentality as a threat to the value system of social welfare and, ultimately, to participatory democracy whose goal is that of the common good. Accountability has shifted from the addressing of human needs to the standards of fiscal restraint (Alexander, 1982, p. 64). In Alexander's analysis, restraint emerges as a concise political strategem in which:

> ... the reduction of social services serves several ends simultaneously. It shrinks the sharing requirement on private and corporate wealth; it adds to the marginal labour pool for combatting labour demands, and it opens the door to private exploitation of social needs (Alexander, 1982, p. 64).

Soja, Morales and Wolff (1983) contend that structural changes in the social and economic geography of regions have affected the organisation of the labour process, the

composition of the work force, the location of industry and the sectoral distribution of employment (Soja et al, 1983, p. 195). The global recomposition of capital is a result of capitalist crisis and "urban restructuring" - a process of world-wide change in the organisation of capital. In their analysis, the authors relate unemployment levels in the U.S. and Canada to the maintenance of "labour reserve armies" in the Third World. The decline and displacement of North American manufacturing sectors and the consequent redundancy of vast sectors of the work force represent a devaluation of labour power and is tantamount, in their view, to "labour disciplining" (Soja et al, 1983, p. 195).

In a system which the authors typify as "State--managed capitalism," the State facilitates the increased flexibility of capital, allowing it to more easily mobilise cheap labour supplies and avoid labour militancy and organisation. Commenting on the global system of capital organisation, Robert J.S. Ross (1983) observes that the current economic decline results from capital outflow which is the aggregate effect of the locational decisions of firms and investors (Ross, R., 1983, p. 144). Such locational decisions are influenced by a consideration of: 1) wages; 2) the discipline of the labour force, and; 3) public policy perceived to be favourable to capital (Ross, R., 1983, p. 144).

The State reacts to the discretionary power of capital with strategic policy designed to attract and keep

investment. Ross identifies three broad policy areas where decisions are made which affect the positions of labour and capital: 1) policies which affect the reproduction of labour through wages and the social wage (i.e., benefits, worker protection, legal rights - all that comprises the social security of labour); 2) policies intended to attract capital by the provision of subsidies or through the provision of infrastructure; 3) tax policies and incentives (Ross, R., 1983, p. 146). Ross also speculates that there is a linkage between anti-union legislation and social service policy for:

> Higher rates of unionisation are associated with public policies which contribute to the social wage (Ross, R., 1983, p. 146).

Examples of this are workers' compensation awards, employer--borne insurance costs, welfare benefits, or unemployment compensation (Ross, R., 1983, p. 147). He notes also that higher levels of social benefits contribute indirectly to labour's ability to bargain by providing a "social safety net." Also, such policies contribute to a set of perceptions which define what may be loosely called the "business climate." In the eyes of capital, States whose policies reflect a higher social wage are often considered to have poor business climates. Ross observes that nations perceived by capital as favourable "enterprise zones" are characterised by

authoritarian governments whose policies maintain strict wage and labour control while offering "tax forgiveness" and "permissive regulation" (Ross, R., 1983, pp. 154-155).

On both the local and the national scale in Canada, these patterns of capital mobility and labour restructuring are evidenced in the spatial reorganisation of economic functions in the urban, national and the supra-national context. Restructuring is also evidenced in changes in the composition of labour and the professions, the "flight" of capital and the efforts of the State to respond to capital imperatives through legislation designed to reduce the social wage and detract from the power base of labour. In this light, one may appreciate Ross's observation that reductions in both the personal and the social wage in the West are induced by the control of labour in newer industrial areas such as Singapore or Taiwan (Ross, R. 1983:155). It is interesting to note, against the backdrop of restraint legislation in British Columbia, Ministers for the government publicly speculate about the creation of "special enterprise zones" which would be exempt from many restrictions on trade as well as freedom from the strictures of labour legislation.

2.5 SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC POLICY: GOALS AND CONSTRAINTS

In most western capitalist nations, the Keynesian welfare State has served to define the economic struggles and expectations of a generation and as such, "the pervasiveness of State welfare makes it part of the ideological context of our lives" (Taylor-Gooby & Dale, 1981, p. 8). The welfare State is far from a mere philosophical construct - it is not, as some would have it, an organ of revolutionary social change (Marxist scholars see the welfare State as a form of oppression and social control: Ginsburg, 1979; Djao, 1983) nor is it a purely technical exercise in allocation that can be easily tinkered with. The welfare State comprises a set of legal entitlements of highly mixed and heterogeneous origins which provides citizens with claims to transfer payments as well as to State organised services for a wide variety of defined cases of need and contingency (Offe, 1983, p. 238). The means by which the State intervenes are bureaucratic rules and legal regulations, monetary transfers and professional expertise (Offe, 1983, p. 238).

The nature of social welfare - the pattern of organised activities carried out by the State - is characterised as an attempt to address the overall well-being of a society according to collectively recognised needs such as health, housing, education, social security and social work (Spicker, 1984, p. 1). The definition of social problems and needs

does not occur exclusively (or even primarily) as a product of rational definition. As the socio-political environment is perceived differently by different groups, so too are social problems and public responsibilities perceived and defined differently. Conflict over the agenda of social intervention and provision suggests that at least on a broad scale social needs are defined in a political context (Taylor-Gooby & Dale, 1981, p. 8; York, 1982, p. 50).

In their analysis of conflicts between the objectives of social and economic policy in the United Kindgom, Davies and Piachaud observe that a common factor in both post--Thatcher and pre-Thatcher Britain is that the "economy is indissolubly linked with social policy" (Davies & Piachaud, 1983, p. 40). There are broad areas of correspondance between the goals of social and economic policy: for example, economic policies intended to stimulate industry or investment may serve to alleviate unemployment, in itself a social problem. Similarly, social policies aimed at improving health and education may assist in economic development and innovation as well as offsetting the economic and political costs of social insecurity and conflict. Distinctions between the goals of social and economic policy are arbitrary, nevertheless, economists and social policy makers have often defined goals on their own and increasingly uncompromising terms (Davies & Piachaud, 1983, p. 41). To meet the demands of an increasingly complex environment, however, one area of

policy must recognise the constraints of the other - social policy defined without reference to economic constraints is as potentially dysfunctional as economic policy defined without reference to social outcomes (Davies & Piachaud, 1983, p. 41).

It is incumbent upon the policy sciences, says Wittrock, to consciously forge a link between policy processes and societal macro-analysis: to avoid the dangers of "narrowly rationalistic management," policy scientists must pursue the analytical task of relating policy analysis to social and political theory (Wittrock, 1983, p. 201). Rationality as opposed to political discretion in the planning, formulation and implementation of policy has been largely assumed. There is, however, no clear separation between the technical and ideological functions of policy; every policy and program has a foundation in the political articualtion of values among a variety of actors (Djao, 1983). In capitalist society the task of economic and social policy is to discern and augment the sources of economic growth. While physical capital may have been the most important determinant of growth in industrial society, in the post-industrial era, human capital and technical progress have been considerably more salient (Toffler, 1970; Bell, 1976; Allen, 1984). These reflections bring into serious question the economic and social assumptions underlying various neo-conservative constructions of policy (Allen, 1983; Schworm, 1984).

Policy is an expression of the principles and intent of the State; it forms the basis of the conduct of government and seeks to legitimise its own goals and those of its natural constituency. At the same time, the State, through its policy may actively seek the delegitimation of other goals or conduct. In the modern bureaucratic State, policies may be defined at lower levels of the organisational hierarchy and may thereby come into conflict. This is a problem that centralisation of the policy process is sometimes able to address, although across-the-board applications of policy may lead to inefficiency or dysfunction in some organs of the State. For instance, what might the effect be of a broad superimposition of public policies that generate unemployment upon a public agency whose organisational mission is to alleviate the causes and effects of joblessness?

There are a number of political and technical traps into which any administration might fall when formulating and implementing policy. In recognition of these traps Wallin (1972) identifies a number of problems which a systematic appraisal of policy alternatives should strive to avoid. The first major problem, which has already been alluded to, is that of "cross-purposes." This describes a situation in which programs in various parts of government have not been subjected to systematic scrutiny and as a result may duplicate or nullify each other. "Incrementalism" is another common failing of the policy process and is expressed as a

tendency to follow up on prior programs without a rigorous evaluation of results or alternative courses. Another obstacle to rational program management is the problem of the "squeaky-wheel." This is the tendency to allocate resources to pressure groups while ignoring silent or unorganised, yet deserving constituents. Programmatic dysfunction may also occur through "ignorance" of the effects of public programs in terms of who benefits and to what extent policy may pose serious rationality and legitimacy problems for government. A final problem described by Wallin is that of "locking-in." Locking-in occurs through a failure to anticipate the financial or resource implications of budget decisions thus incurring social or economic costs through a single-minded pursuit of policy. The costs of such an approach may be reduced by multi-year planning (Wallin, 1972, pp. 11-12).

Of course there are also political constraints affecting the conduct of evaluative research. Constraints may arise through a lack of issue consensus within or between the administrative structure of the public service, the elected policy-makers and/or constituent interest groups. The degree of government commitment to evaluative research may depend on how well the results of research are likely to accord with its orienting policy values. Glennerster (1975) observes that if planning is to take place, there have to be political incentives for government to undertake it. Taking note of the criticism that governments rarely plan ahead,

Glennerster observes that any decision on long-term planning involves a set of complex political and economic trade-offs. Planning is perceived as time-consuming and expensive and may entail political costs in that difficult choices must be made earlier than would otherwise be necessary (Glennerster, 1975, pp. 24-25). Rationality in program formulation and planning is therefore responsive not only to technical-level criteria, but is perhaps even more germane to the internal logic of the "political market place."

This tendency has been observed also by Doyle who argues that in the "political economy of social services," so-called rational budgeting approaches are based more on satisfying the needs of the system (supplier) than on the needs of the consumer (Doyle, 1979, p. 54). System needs and the character of the relationship between the system and its constituents are contingent upon the framing of the policy process. There are a number of possible permutations of the structure of decision-making. Incrementalism, already discussed as an obstacle to effective policy formulation is also a dominant strategy for government initiative (Glennerster, 1975; York, 1982). Linked to the prevalence of "muddling through," ad-hocery and satisficing, incrementalism seeks to "get by" rather than maximise or optimise and comprises efforts at simplification and conflict avoidance (Glennerster, 1975, p. 80). Other planning structures which may be employed are "limited rationality" and comprehensive rationality. Limited rationality strives to compare a

limited range of alternatives in the recognition that the time needed to compare all possible alternatives would be prohibitive. Comprehensive rationality, on the other hand, involves the systematic analysis of all possible alternatives, but is seriously limited by a lack of knowledge regarding consequences and a basic inability to manage what data is available (York, 1982, pp. 19-20). Because of a lack of coherent understanding of the operations of economic and social reality and because of the introduction of political variables into the policy process, policy makers are often forced to "muddle through," before their decision-making environment becomes even more pressurised (Gustafsson, 1983, p. 270).

If there is a political need to buy time for rethinking or to avoid conflict, muddling through may be served by policies of a "symbolic" or "pseudo" type which for the time being will not significantly affect the existing distribution of goods and services (Gustafsson, 1983, p. 271). Symbolic policy refers to decisions which are never intended to be fully implemented while pseudo policies are those decisions which "are not based on available knowledge regarding preconditions for successful implementation and (are) therefore very hard to execute" (Gustafsson, 1983, p. 275).

Gustafsson sets out a useful table for distinguishing policy types:

		Are decisions intended to be implemented?	
		YES	NO
Are decisions based on available knowledge regarding preconditions for implementation?	YES	A Real	B Symbolic
	NO	C Pseudo	D Nonsense

TABLE 2:1 Typology of political decision (From Gustafsson, 1983, p. 276).

The typology in Table 2:1 is, of course, too simplistic to fit the empirical reality of public decision-making, but as a broad illustration, it serves as a useful springboard for analysis. Rather than conforming to four ideal types, public policies are characterised by a mixture of real, symbolic, pseudo and even nonsense components in different proportions (Gustafsson, 1983, p. 276). It is also necessary to caution that policy may have two distinct rationales: one for public consumption and one which is ratified by the decisional agenda of the State. What appears as a pseudo, symbolic or nonsense policy in the public arena may serve a set of rational objectives in the political sphere.

CHAPTER III

VOLUNTARY SECTOR - STATE RELATIONS: ECONOMIC NATURE AND FUNCTION OF THE VOLUNTARY SECTOR

Before one can properly discuss the effects of fiscal restraint by government upon voluntary human service agencies, their programs and clients, a clearer definition of the nature and contribution of the voluntary sector in both social and economic terms is required.

To begin, the voluntary sector is non-profit in nature; agencies within this sector are often classed as charitable associations or societies. They are typically governed by a community-based board of directors and are structurally independent of government although some may be reliant upon government for funding of their operational needs (Labatt, 1980). The voluntary sector has historically reflected the political and economic context of society. It arose in response to social and technological revolutions which impaired the ability of the family and the community to absorb and meet the needs of a larger, more disparate population (Labatt, 1980). In concert with this massive social and technological change, the emergence of the voluntary sector was propelled by the 19th century laissez-faire ethic of the free market and the inability, or the unwillingness of government to assume responsibility for individual well-being (Labatt, 1980, p. 3-4).

In the modern context, the voluntary sector has evolved as a broker between government and its constituents, fiscally mandated by government for the delivery of services. In the recent experience of British Columbia (and to a greater extent in the United States particularly during the Reagan administration), government has increasingly sought to redefine the role of the voluntary sector from one of broker-partnership to adjunct - a redefinition which renders the voluntary sector more vulnerable to lapses of government commitment. A complex matrix of historical events and political shifts in power and ideology led to the transfer of social service responsibilty from the private to the public sector.

One salient feature of this shift is that with increasing organisational complexity and the growing recognition of social and political pluralism, government has been perceived as the only logical auspice with the enabling power and resources to secure progressive and innovative change through service delivery. However, with the advent of the recession in the late 1970's and the consequent restructuring of the economies of many western capitalist nations, political economic pressures have come to bear on governments such that social policy is increasingly marked by a shifting onus of responsibility for social well-being back to the private sector. However, the intellectual rationale for such a transfer begs the question of whether the

voluntary sector is able or willing to assume such a burden, and also belies the overall importance of this sector to the economy of the nation.

In large part, the attitude of some policy-makers that the voluntary sector is not assuming its full share of responsibility for social provision arises as a function of the nebulous character of the voluntary sector and the character of boh its workers and its product. Hawrylyshyn (1978) has explored the economic nature and value of volunteer activity in Canada in response to a perceived need for an economic definition of volunteer services. He observes that volunteer participation involves "service" to persons other than the volunteer, and further, that the benefits of these activities accrue to persons other than the volunteer. Because these activities typically take place outside of the traditional cash market, Hawrylyshyn employs the concept of the "third person market criterion" to give some shape to a definition of 'economic volunteer services,' where:

> Economic Volunteer Services are those activities which were done by a person outside the market but may have been accomplished by a third person from the economic market; they are distinguished from household work by the fact that the benefits accrue to someone other than the volunteer or the volunteer's immediate family (Hawrylyshyn, 1978, p. 3).

To give further clarity to this concept, he asks:

> ... could the same activity yield equivalent results if performed by a Third Person hired upon the market at a price? (Hawrylyshyn, 1978, p. 3).

In his schema, Hawrylyshyn distinguishes between "social-benefit" actions and "self-benefit" actions, the former being the proper subject of study, although he recognises that, in some cases, a range of benefits may accrue to the volunteer through his service to others (Hawrylyshyn, 1978, p. 7). He also distinguishes between charitable donations which merely transfer already existing economic value from one person to another, and economic volunteer services (EVS) which create a new kind of value. This distinction, he contends, is directly analogous to economic distinctions between transfers of wealth and the production of new goods and services (Hawrylyshyn, 1978, p. 10).

There are two basic types of breakdown required in Hawrylyshyn's analysis: breakdown by agency type, and breakdown of the nature of the task or input performed by the volunteer (Hawrylyshyn, 1978, pp. 13-14 & 20-21). Hawrylyshyn cites data which demonstrate that low or unskilled inputs comprise slightly less than half of the total volunteer requirement. He also suggests that higher skill-level categories (ie managerial, medical, legal) are probably under-represented in the data (Hawrylyshyn, 1978, pp. 27-

-29). It is also important to note that some services are more labour-intensive than others and, conversely, some are more skill-intensive, or demanding of greater expertise.

While it is inappropriate here to reproduce Hawrylyshyn's breakdown of agency type and work classifications it is important to understand that these two factors weigh heavily in his determination of the "dollar value" of volunteer services. Hawrylyshyn employs a measure of "market replacement cost" to derive this value, and he expresses this value as the cost of replacing "performed services with equivalent labour hired at a current market rate" (Hawrylyshyn, 1978, p. 49). Using data from the Metro Toronto Volunteer Centre on the number of volunteers and volunteer hours tendered and using estimates of the dollar-value equivalents for tasks performed, Hawrylyshyn found:

> ... if we take the $1000 (per annum, per volunteer, as an approximate valuation of service tendered - my parentheses) as a lower bound and approximately representative for 1975, the gross value of volunteer services performed by the 5,334 people referred via the Metro Toronto Volunteer Centre in 1975 ... is $5,334,000 - a major operation if it were counted as a market activity (Hawrylyshyn, 1978, p. 60).

In a previous study (O. Hawrylyshyn, Estimating the Value of Household Work in Canada, 1971; 1978), using a conservative estimate of the number of volunteers for Canada in 1971, Hawrylyshyn placed the total value of volunteer services (based on 1.26 million volunteers) at about $1,045 million,

or 1.1% of Canada's GNP for that year ($93,307 million) (Hawrylyshyn, 1978, p. 60).

Clearly, this constitutes an important aspect of Canada's total economy, indeed, increased attrition in the public sector and rising unemployment in the intervening years may have led to an overall rise in volunteer participation in service agencies. There are, however, few information sources on volunteer activity in Canada; imprecise and imperfect information can lead to significant differences in findings.

Although it is difficult to deny the importance of the voluntary sector as an economic activity, there are specific gaps in information which preclude a precise formulation of volunteer input:

1) There are no conventions or classification schemes for agencies or for types of volunteer work.

2) There is no uniform system of recording volunteer time.

3) There is no data from the Canadian Census or any other census-like information to provide, in some base-year, a benchmark of the magnitude of volunteer action, nationwide.

4) Surveys and case studies providing hard data are few and far between.

5) There is no consistent data resource in any of the urban centres - some city volunteer centres have better files and information than others.

6) General time-use surveys presently define volunteer action too broadly.

7) There is little literature of a theoretical or other non-empirical nature which addresses the question, "what do volunteers do and how much is it worth?"

8) No comprehensive studies exist of apparently available job descriptions.

9) No systematic analysis exists of the quantitative role played by volunteer centres in the total volunteer recruitment picture.

10) No studies exist on the effectiveness of volunteer work as compared to paid labour in equivalent jobs. (Hawrylyshyn, 1978, pp. 68-70).

Although Hawrylyshyn's analysis of the economic value of volunteer work is suggestive of the overall importance of non-public provision of services, it is an incomplete measure, both for the reasons cited and because the voluntary sector, broadly defined, includes also some aspect of paid labour, transfers, services for fee, and re-allocation of resources - physical as well as monetary. Thus we add yet another set of unknowns to the questions of the total range and scope of the voluntary sector, whose very name does not connote the full extent of its reach. Also, Hawrylyshyn's analysis yields little insight into the increasingly politicised environment within which the voluntary sector must function. One result of the emergence of a bureaucratised welfare State has been the weakening of the brokerage role of the non-public human service sector - now, non-profit agencies look to government, as much as they look to their constitutents, for definition of their role and function.

With the growth of corporate capitalism, industrialisation is no longer the leading edge of social and technological change. Increasingly, the polity is dominated by large-scale organisations, public and private (Labatt, 1980 pp. 9-10). As Labatt has observed:

> Government and corporate interdependence is increasing and government decisions favour bureaucratic self--interest over individual need (Labatt, 1980, p. 10).

In the face of this corporatist domination of socio-economic relations and the attendant changes in the occupational structure of the society at large, the extent of individual access to the social wage may, in the face of social and economic restructuring, afford individuals greater or lesser opportunity to benefit. Dysfuction, or disjuncture in the organisational web could lead to a broadening and deepening of social disparity. Crises of capitalism and the so-called crisis of the welfare State are in part organisational crises which are manifested as a failure to effectively mediate class and capital relations.

The voluntary sector is predominantly composed of small-scale, fragmented, and isolated member agencies, and according to Labatt:

> is in an inferior position to government and corporate sectors when it comes to influencing the nature and scale of social reform (Labatt, 1980, p. 11).

In fact, what have popularly been regarded as the traditional strengths of the voluntary sector -innovation, pluralism, the promotion of volunteerism, and social change through advocacy, have been seriously impaired through the advent and growth of public provision (Labatt, 1980; Kramer, 1979; Schorr, 1970). Still, it is not reasonable to suggest, as do many neo-conservative writers, that the wholesale devolution of public welfare systems and deregulation of the private sector alone will lead to a resumption of these traditional roles. In fact, as will be discussed further, it has been suggested that the voluntary service sector is so inextricably tied, fiscally and ideologically, with government(s) through dependence or regulation, that it could never again take on any but an augmenting role within the political economy of social services.

There are linkages between the fiscal policies of government and the presence and form of the voluntary sector. In the United States, multiple funding mechanisms for the voluntary sector have left little room for program consistency on the national level. Competition for grants in an uncertain economic environment has led to a voluntaristic sector that is more opportunistic, competitive, entrepreneurial, and political (Labatt, 1980, p. 15). In Canada, the role of the voluntary sector within the overall field of provision is strongly tied to Federal and Provincial mandates relating to social and health services, a well as to

prevailing political ideologies. Thus, the importance of the voluntary sector within the overall service network may vary greatly, depending on which party or individuals are in power (Labatt, 1980, p. 16). Inherent in the relations between the public and the voluntary sector are issues of the accountability, relevance, and autonomy of voluntary agencies. For example, the predisposition of governments to provide deficit financing for agencies in the face of a general reduction in community funding may affect the capacity of agencies to maintain standards or create new programs (Labatt, 1980, p. 16). In addition, these issues are further complicated through the tensions which exist between non-profits and proprietary agencies. One facet of this tension is expressed as a shift in focus from "how" a service is provided to "who" provides the service (Labatt, 1980, p. 15).

Demone and Gibelman remark that government social policy in the U.S. has sought to expand the use of voluntarism as a vehicle for social service delivery. In 1964 the proportion of all agencies using volunteers was 72 percent; by 1981 the proportion had risen to 76 percent. The absolute increase in the number of volunteers during the period from 1964 to 1981, however, was 69 percent, matched by a proportional growth in the numbers of services and clients (Demone & Gibelman, 1984, p. 424). Not only have volunteers increased in number, but they have changed in function as

well, performing duties that are more demanding of the volunteer's skill levels and experience. In 1964, the proportion of volunteers used in direct service delivery was 17 percent. By 1981, however, the proportion of volunteers involved in direct services was 51 percent. This latter figure is down from a peak reached in the mid-1970's, a reversal which may be attributed to a number of factors such as the feminist movement, or the movement of more women into the labour force (Demone & Gibelman, 1984 p. 424).

In the case of the United Kingdom, Norman Johnson writes that the policy of the Thatcher government of cutting social expenditure (as with the Reagan administration in the U.S., and the Bennett government in B.C.) forces an even greater public reliance upon voluntary social services (Johnson, 1981, p. 4). Johnson observes that in Britain, paid workers in social services are greatly outnumbered by unpaid volunteers. From this observation two issues arise immediately: a) once again, the assertion by government that the community-at-large ought to be responsible for social services implicitly ignores the scope and importance of the voluntary sector; and b) increased reliance on the voluntary sector will put greater pressure on agencies to secure skilled (hence, paid) personnel - this in spite of the fact that the financial commitment of government is diminished. As Johnson says:

> ... the policy of the present government seems to assume either that voluntary social services have spare capacity at present or that they can increase their capacity fairly readily (Johnson, 1981, p. 5).

For Johnson, the question is whether the voluntary sector is both willing and able to accept the greatly augmented role expected of them (Johnson, 1981, p. 5). He suggests, rather, that voluntary agencies do not want to take over large areas of statutory provision and, furthermore, that most would rather see an expansion than a contraction of the mandate of the State (Johnson, 1981, p. 5-6). Important to consider also in this discussion are issues of equity and accessibility to public services which are a part of the mandate of the welfare State. If the State is to pass the onus for provision of specific services over to the private sector, will it yet retain the regulatory powers which enable it to ensure equity? One assumes that governments recognise the necessity to maintain some residual welfare function for those whose needs cannot be met in the private sector. In addition, there is a broad range of publicly-provided welfare and health services which would be an unfeasible undertaking for any private sector concern - social security transfers, hospitals, public education - all must remain within the domain of the State in order to assure universality and accessibility.

One problem of voluntary provision in this regard is its uneven distribution. This is apparent both in the geographical spread of voluntary social services and in the distribution of voluntary effort among different areas of need (Johnson, 1981, p. 5). Privatisation, if it is to proceed with a modicum of rationality, will have to incorporate tandem functions of co-ordination and planning. This poses an interesting dialectic for the policy-makers of so-called "free enterprise" governments. On the one hand, there is some impetus for the retraction and contraction of government, spurred, in part, by an ideological commitment to reducing government intervention in certain areas of human activity.

On the other hand, given the limitations imposed by a diminished resource base and the simultaneous extension of government control, the voluntary sector is subjected to even greater constraints upon its service and advocacy functions. While neo-conservative theorists argue that the coercive power of the State is thus reduced, so too is the enabling power of the State working through the voluntary sector reduced. The contradiction is that governments, while extolling the virtues of voluntarism and self-help, simultaneously exert a degree of economic and political control which may impair the organisational mission of the voluntary sector. Recognising the contradictions inherent in the public and private provision of services, Johnson has provided

a succinct framing of the planning imperatives which arise from this dialectic:

> A balance has to be struck between the need for independence and the need for accountability when government funds are being spent, and between the need for greater uniformity in the provision of voluntary social services and the need for innovation and spontaneity. Finally, the desire to cut out waste by reducing the amount of overlapping and duplication has to be set against the desire to provide consumers with a choice (Johnson, 1981, pp. 124-125).

3.1 AGENCY TYPES AND GOVERNMENT FUNDING ARRANGEMENTS

There exist four broad sectors concerned with meeting human needs: 1) the informal sector, comprising family and close relatives, friends and neighbours; 2) non--governmental, not-for-profit agencies, which may or may not rely on volunteer inputs and which may be organised under charitable or professional auspices; 3) the commercial, or proprietary sector which consists of individuals or agencies who supply service to consumers for a profit; 4) the public or statutory sector, involving, in some way, all three levels of government - federal, municipal and provincial (United Way, SPAR/SPARC Joint Committee, 1980, Report #1, p. 5; Hatch, 1980, p. 14).

There are some basic similarities among voluntaristic social service agenices, although it is difficult to

generalise about voluntary organisations as a whole as there are many types of agencies providing different types of service. The essential characteristics shared by agencies in the voluntary sector are:

a) they are organisations rather than informal groups;

b) individual agencies are not established by statute or statutory authority, although they are to a degree subject to statutory and often fiscal control by government;

c) they are not commercial in the sense of profit--making (Hatch, 1980, p. 15).

Also, voluntariness is not a diagnostic feature of voluntary organisations. They are not necessarily smaller, more informal or spontaneous, or less hierarchical than statutory services and may be dependent on paid staff (Hatch 1980 p. 28). Non-governmental organisations (NGO's) have assumed a number of forms - both for-profit and non-profit in orientation. For the purposes of this thesis, all reference to NGO's except where explicitly stated, are concerned with the voluntary or non-profit sector. While profit-making agencies have their niche in the planning and co-ordination matrix for social services, there are special problems associated with them which will be drawn-out in the course of this study.

Over the years, what were originally charitable service organisations have increasingly become agents in the

delivery of government social services, especially after the enactment of the Canada Assistance Plan (CAP) in 1966 (Social Planning Council of Metro Toronto/United Way of Greater Toronto 1983 p. 1). The broad objectives of the Canada Assistance Plan were "the lessening, removal or prevention of the causes and effects of poverty, child neglect, or dependence on public assistance" (Armitage, 1975, p 149). The CAP marked the entry for the first time (apart from Veterans Services) of the Federal government into the funding of social services. Although the entry of the Federal government into this field was at the residual level of services to those on social assistance, child welfare services, and community development services, the introduction of cost-sharing with Provincial governments assured a Federal presence in the area of State-delivered social services,formerly the sole jurisdiction of the Provinces (Djao, 1983, p. 132).

The economic presence of the Federal government in the provision of social services was important in establishing the existing network of social services and enabled a greater extension by the Provinces into the realm of personal and community services. It also enabled the extension of public funding to private service organisations who previously depended upon philanthropic donors, community-chests and volunteerism for support. The provision of operating grants for non-profit organisations combined with the

Canadian public's growing sense of urgency about social problems in the late 1960's and early 70's, created the basis for the rapid expansion in both number and capability of the voluntary sector during the period from 1966 to 1975. Government support of non-profit agencies found justification in a number of ways:

a) it permitted an extension of services into service fields or communities which could not be accommodated within the structure of the statutory authority;

b) it allowed the statutory authority to maintain an arms-length relationship from client groups or problem types for whom a precedent of statutory provision was not desired;

c) it reinforced the traditional ethos of community self-reliance and community responsibility for some types of social services;

d) the delivery of statutory and non-statutory services through non-profit, non-governmental agencies is less expensive and ensures greater citizen involvement and latitude for direct fiscal control than is afforded by the public sector bureaucracy;

e) the satisfaction of the specialised needs of a delimited group may be regarded as best assured by specialised agencies rather than through generic social programs;

f) governments may support the non-government sector when the form of provision is experimental or innovative. The voluntary sector thereby becomes a proofing-ground for alternative intervention strategies.

Labatt identifies five types of voluntaristic or non-profit agencies, each, with its own organisational structure:

1) Private service agency (e.g. a family service agency): this type of agency is accountable to itself through a self--perpetuating board of directors. Their use of clients in policy-making roles is minimal. They typically rely on a multiple-funding base and take part in annual fund-raising drives. In British Columbia and Saskatchewan such agencies have had to rely on deficit financing from government to meet their annual budgets. Although accountable to itself, the autonomy of such an agency is ensured only so long as community-based funds are greater than those of government. Some problems with the private service agency are the dangers of irrelevance, elitism, and institutionalisation arising out of its narrow scope, specialised function, and its bureaucratic professional structure.

2) Contemporary service organisations (CSO): these are community-based information and referral centres and street clinics. For the most part they assume the role of alternative agencies with the aim of narrowing the gap between official programs and client-identified needs. Their humanistic and voluntaristic emphasis has enabled them to exist for some time on voluntary financial and labour contributions, however, Labatt points out that continued success depends on securing government funds. Because of this, such organisations are inherently unstable - their continued existence involves a struggle to survive without being co-opted and formalised. Always on the fringe of being a necessary service, CSO's are usually the first to suffer attrition in times of economic restraint.

3) Quasi-governmental organisations (eg. the Greater Vancouver Mental Health Service): These are non-profit in nature and operate under the authority of a community-based board of directors. Quasi-governmental organisations, or Quango's, as they are sometimes called, are funded exclusively by government. The agency is an instrument of the Provincial and municipal governments and exists to serve their public purposes. The agency's goals, structure, function and degree of citizen participation are prescribed at the time of contracting for service. The agency board may decide "how" service is to be delivered, but "what" service is delivered

is beyond agency control. In this respect, the advocacy function of the agency is impaired, as both the purpose and funding of the agency could be held in jeopardy should the agency run counter to the interests of the funding body.

4) Private public service providers: These are probably the most secure of all voluntary service organisations. They are similar to the private agency in structure, but rely almost exclusively on government funds (eg. non-statutory child--care agencies and institutions for the aged). They are often considered an essential, on-going service but are subject to minimal standards in the hopes of keeping costs down. Because of this, problems of goal-deflection (from service or the client to the organisational needs of the agency) arise when threats of government take-over or discontinuation of funding looms in the background.

5) Voluntary self-help and community education associations: These may be service-oriented, but exist primarily to promote policies and effect changes through social awareness programs (eg. Parents without Partners and disease & disability groups). They may provide social activities for their membership as well as the core tasks of promoting research and education (Labatt, 1980, pp. 30-33).

Voluntary agencies have often been regarded as less permanent and rigid than governmental organisations and this

quality has, traditionally, suited the voluntary sector for a "vanguard" role in terms of initiative, response and advocacy (United Way, SPAR/SPARC, Report #1, 1980 p. 5). However, a dual system of provision such as that in Canada, which has seen a proliferation of both public and voluntary service delivery, while potentially dynamic, is at the same time more difficult to manage and control . The weaknesses of a dual system include problems of fragmentation, discontinuity, poor accountability and inaccessibility. Fragmentation here refers to an agency's organisational characteristics and relationships, especially the location, co--ordination, specialisation and duplication of services. Inaccessibility arises through obstacles to individual and family access to the network of local social services, while discontinuity relates to obstacles to appropriate movement and referral through an incomplete network (characterised by "gaps" in service) (United Way, SPAR/SPARC Report #1, 1980, p. 7). Also, the proliferation of agencies and programs hinders the development of coherent social policy, involves complex problems of co-ordination, and presents difficulties for the development of standards (United Way, SPAR/SPARC Report #1, 1980, p. 7). Still, given the prevailing service delivery environment, the search for solutions to these problems must form the core agenda for service professionals, administrators and planners.

In planning for a rational service delivery system, issues of agency co-ordination and the concurrent

co-ordination of auspice must be addressed. This could involve some systematic restructuring and redefinition not only of public agency mandates, but also of the jurisdictional mandates of each level of government. Although cutback management on the part of government has entailed some restructuring and jurisdictional shifts, such management has proceeded with fiscal concerns, rather than the interests of the client, as the primary organisational focus. What is needed, is some coherent definition of what constitutes an appropriate range and mix of services within a co-ordinated structure that would produce minimum strain and maximum co-operation among individual units. As a cautionary note, however, it must be stressed that co-ordination ought not proceed at the cost of diversity or at the expense of a recognition of a plurality of interests (United Way, SPAR/SPARC Report #1, 1980, p. 9).

To employ a euphemism, it may well be said that if NGO's have an "Achilles Heel," it is in the area of funding. Organisations which carry-out aid and welfare activities which might otherwise be direct government responsibilities are heavily reliant on government funds (Elkin, 1978, pp 13--14). In a survey of National Voluntary Associations in Canada, Elkin (1978) observes that during the period from 1962-1972, NGO's have moved toward greater dependence on government for financial support (Elkin, 1978, p. 12). Following upon the dramatic increases in levels of government

support in the late 1960's, the current instability of the voluntary sector has resulted from the subsequent contraction of that support in the late 1970's (Social Planning Council of Metro Toronto, (SPCMT), 1981, p. 2). By this time, agencies found themselves in the situation of possessing less control over their futures and the services they deliver than ever before. Agencies now had to implement service cutbacks in the face of declining resources. During the period of 1978-1980, for example, total revenues for NGO's increased at only two-thirds the rate of inflation (SPCMT, 1981, p. 2). The report by the Social Planning Council of Metro Toronto entitled, The Voluntary Sector at Risk (1981) concluded that further government cutbacks and increased levels of deficit financing will put much of the voluntary social service sector, as well as many of its clients, "at risk."

The preponderance of public funding of voluntary agency services in British Columbia comes from the provincial government; although, in many cases, costs are shareable with the Federal government under the Canada Assistance Plan (CAP). Public funding of the voluntary sector occurs through three sets of arrangements:

1) a grant-in-aid, or project grant, which supports a service or program but does not normally contain any overhead allowance or "core" funding. These tend to be short term and

lacking in continuity, nevertheless, such grants create dependency;

2) purchase of service contracting (POSC), which defines units of service "bought" by government under specified terms. Usually of one year's duration (although they may be renewed) POSC's may include overhead costs, but they do not provide fixed capital costs (ie. premises);

3) Core-funding grants: here, some degree of permanence or continuity is implied. These grants provide basic organisational monies for supervision, support, and adminstration of an agency. This is usually the preferred type of public funding (United Way, SPAR/SPARC, Report #1, 1980, p. 32).

There is considerable latitude on the part of public sector funders to allocate resources to non-governmental organisations on the basis of political criteria as opposed to criteria of need. Voluntary agencies are keenly aware of this and as a consequence may be more quiescent and less openly critical of public policy lest their actions jeopardise their continued funding. This point has been made by Labatt who observes that:

> Government grants are either based on their own perception of need or are allocated due to the political feasibility of doing so. Not all voluntary organisational types receive the same treatment (Labatt, 1980, p. 37).

In times of restraint, government favours those who are representative of consitutencies who are either blatantly in need, or who are organised and politically active (Labatt, 1980, p. 37). Labatt also points out that in terms of fund--raising, some "cause groups,' can generate more dollars than low key campaigns (Labatt, 1980, pp. 35-36). Services to high profile groups such as the mentally or physically handicapped are favoured over the low-profile, largely non--visible, population undergoing severe stress due to economic, social or familial instability. Also, groups that are not a recognisable constituent of the population or who are unorganised, are frequently left out (Labatt, 1980, p 37).

In this respect, State support of voluntary social service activities may be seen as a realm of policy-making parallel to the legislative realm where the recognition of needs and the articulation of modes of intervention may occur with relatively greater ease and fluidity than in the more formalised, legalistic milieu of the statutory services. Fiscal support of voluntary agencies is a more transient form of recognition for certain needs or needs groups which at once addresses a social (and possibly political) problem but creates no legal or statutory precedent for continuing to meet those needs in the future. Fiscal support, and therefore political and social legitimacy, may be bestowed or withdrawn through the vehicle of lower-order bureaucratic decisions because the support of such activities

is considered "extra-statutory," and as such cannot be appealed through the courts or the legislature. In this way the legitimacy of some needs or client groups may vary not only through time (as they fall in or out of favour with politicians or bureaucrats) but also through space as this type of fiscal support carries with it no mandate for universality in provision or access. Thus we may find situations where one area of the province may have one or more funded agencies providing support for battered women and children while another locale with an equal or possibly greater incidence of domestic violence may have none. Such a situation could arise: 1) if there were no group willing to provide the service in the affected area; 2) if such groups as did exist were inexperienced in lobbying for support or in applying for funds; 3) if local needs were perceived as being adequately met by existing statutory services; or 4) if local politicians and bureaucrats did not recognise the legitimacy of the problem or the needs group or those persons or groups willing to provide the service.

3.2 FUNDING DEPENDENCY AND INTERORGANISATIONAL RELATIONS - SOME LIMITING FACTORS IN VOLUNTARY SECTOR PROVISION

Sharon E. Willms, in a 1980 Masters thesis (Willms 1980, MSW U.B.C. School of Social Work) set out a research project aimed at assessing the need and ability of NGO's to

form and maintain inter-organisational relationships (IOR's) in a turbulent environment of restraint, accountability crises, and insecure funding. One premise of her research is that the exchange of information in the interorganisational (IO) field plays a vital role in gaining the co-operation of constituencies in the environment and in eliciting support to accompany funding requests (Willms, 1980, p. 1). Willms based her research on the assumption that impaired information linkages, as a barrier to securing adequate funding, threaten continued agency viability and further, that the arbitrariness in allocation and distribution that ensues precludes rational planning for most service agencies (Willms, 1980, p. 3).

What follows is a summary of Willms' findings, gleaned from her questionnaire survey of voluntary personal social service agencies in Metropolitan Vancouver in 1979. It is important to review these findings for a number of reasons:

1) there is in British Columbia a dearth of contemporary empirical research dealing with non-governmental social services in terms of their structure, organisation and funding base. As such it forms an important benchmark for the empirical portion of this thesis;

2) many of the findings of this research parallel the empirical findings to be presented later in this thesis while other findings demonstrate parameters of the voluntary sector not directly addressed by this thesis;

3) Willms' work permits a discussion of trends in the attitudes of non-governmental agencies towards government and other NGO's from 1979 to 1985;

4) it permits an assessment of trends in the viability and potency of inter-organisational relationships among NGO's.

Willms' study ascertained that the most common source of funds for agencies covered by her survey was the provincial government. The least common source was corporate donors while the second least common was the Federal government. Twenty-five percent of her survey group (based on 176 questionnaires, 70 of which were returned, marking a return rate of 40%) received more than 80% of their dollars from the Provincial government while 17% received more than 90% of their funding from the Province. Less than half the agencies in her Vancouver sample receive any money from municipal government; 70% of her sample receive less than 20% of their funding from City Hall. Seventy-five percent of the sample receive less than 10% of their total funds from either individual donors or membership fees, in fact, only 40% of those agencies responding use either of these avenues to raise money. In addition, only 35% of the survey group reported using funding campaigns as a source of revenue. Of those who did, however, 50% raised less than 15% of their total requirements (note: it is not clear in the study whether this refers to United Way campaigns or individual campaigns). Observing that government vastly outweighs all other funding bodies on a scale of agencies supported, Willms writes:

> ... these findings, if they would be generalised, have implications for the control of the social welfare field by government. As the major funder, the government may have command over the whole voluntary sector. (Willms, 1980, p. 80).

In terms of agency success in gaining funding, Willms found that nearly 1 in 4 received less than 75% of their request. Forty percent received less than 85%, while 23% of agencies responding indicated that they received 95-100% of funds requested (Willms, 1980, p. 85). Willms notes that these data may be variously interpreted:

a) NGO's are getting less resources than they in fact require;
b) NGO's tend to ask for more than they need in the first place;
c) NGO's are concentrating their requests for money in a single source that does not respond adequately (Ibid pp. 85-87).

The reality is most likely an amalgam of all of these interpretations. Still, we are left with a voluntary sector under strain. If such a condition is to continue, Willms and others in the social services field, see a danger of attrition among members of a social service agency network through inadequate funding resources, eventually leading to a reduced potency of the network. Says Willms:

> NGO's should be concerned not only about their own funding position, but also that of other NGO's in the network of agencies. In systems terms, the individual strength of the sub-systems contributes to the overall vigor of the social service delivery system (Willms, 1980, p. 3).

In her analysis, Willms stresses the need for more data collection and analysis and a concerted effort to develop information-sharing systems in which information exchange becomes a key factor in a collaborative strategy of interorganisational relationships (Willms, 1980, p. 41). Information is crucial in demonstrating accountability to consumers, the public and funders. The types of information required by these constituencies fall into 3 main areas:

a) the documentation of need for proposed services;
b) demonstrating adequate management of programs and services;
c) facilitating the evaluation of services delivered (Ibid., p. 41).

Information exchange is increasingly being seen as a vehicle for the enhancement of agency accountability and legitimacy, and thus augurs well for continuing agency relevance, viability and ultimately, for the net well-being of the client population.

Willms asserts that NGO's face, basically, two options in the 1980's:

a) to join another system (eg. the government social service system);

b) to work together to maintain their own system (Ibid p. 43).

Willms' data reveal that, although information-sharing with other agencies ranked low in priority among the executive directors responding, priority was given to information items related to funding (Willms, 1980, pp. 92-95). The seeming lack of co-operative effort in the voluntary services field may be due to a number of factors, such as the subjective perceptions of agency personnel and their attitudes toward sharing information in an increasingly competitive environment (Willms, 1980, pp. 89-90).

The suggestion here is that in an economic environment characterised by fiscal restraint and increased competition among agencies for funds the essentially fragmented, localised and ad hoc nature of much of the voluntary sector means that the organisational self-interest of agencies takes precedence over any co-ordinative strategy for tapping government and community resources. Willms offers another possible explanation for the low priority given by voluntary agencies to IOR's. She suggests that given gaps or lags in system response and individual consciousness vis à vis the political/economic environment, it may be that the critical moment in which the importance of IOR's might have been realised had, at the time of writing, been avoided (Willms, 1980, p. 90).

There exists a rather curious paradox between the voluntary sector and its public funders (principally the Ministry of Human Resources, although some agencies may receive funding from the Ministries of Labour, Health, or the Attorney General) in which the dearth of information-gathering systems among NGO's is paralleled by informational gaps in the public sector agencies. In fact, a 1980 BCGEU report contends that neither the MHR, nor any other Ministry, has a complete list of NGO's receiving funds. In 1980, 55% of NGO's receiving funds for the delivery of services had not filed a return with the Registrar of Companies. In addition, of the 251 agencies listed in MHR's Annual Report for 1980, only 137 (54.6%) appeared in the public accounts list of 626 agencies receiving government funds - 114 agencies listed in MHR's 1980 report did not appear in the public accounts (BCGEU, 1980, Summary ii).

What the foregoing suggests is that fiscal accountability has been jeopardised not only by gaps in the information system of the voluntary sector itself, but also through informational inefficiency on the part of the funding body. The BCGEU report labels this lack of co-ordination and planning as fiscal mismanagement and further charges that the MHR assumes no responsiblity for performance review, future planning, or setting the standards for the provision of service and the inspection of non-profit agencies:

> ... the report finds the Ministry of Human Resources has no centralized overview of the agencies it funds and has not established any clear jurisdiction between the operation of government and non-government agencies for the delivery of social services (BCGEU, 1980, Summary iii).

In view of the BCGEU, this has amounted to a simultaneous failure to develop a system of financial accountability; a system of quality of service standards; a system of jurisdictional assignment; and a system of long-term planning for the rationalising of non-government service delivery (BCGEU 1980, Summary V).

Provincial government responses to the voluntary sector since 1975 have not reflected a commitment to the rational development of the non-governmental social service delivery system. Support for NGO's has continued, but often at lower levels and without any demonstrated willingness or desire to create an integrated network of statutory and voluntary services (such as was attemped by the NDP government from 1972 to 1975 - for a full treatment of this period in the development of B.C.'s social services see Clague et al, 1984). This apparent lack of co-ordinated strategy on the part of the Provincial government has not only preserved the parochial character of some of the agencies so funded but has also resulted in serious inconsistencies of policy and outcome.

For example, although in 1980 more money was allocated to NGO's for the delivery of services than in previous years, increases in the number of agencies funded meant less than the rate of inflation increases for individual voluntary agencies. Thus while the provincial government could claim an increased level of total expenditure, the effect of an increased number of NGO's in receipt of funding constituted a declining level of support on an agency by agency basis. The anticipated outcomes of reduced support - the deterioration of services, higher rates of staff turn-over, low morale, lower rates of pay and less than adequate training for personnel - reflect a degree of dissonance with the increased expenditure.

The current pattern of providing only minimal core funding to NGO's could have very real and deleterious effects upon the quality of staff and service in terms of client-worker ratios, program continuity, and long-term planning (Shields, 1981, pp. 6 & 11-12):

> Small, annual, ad hoc grants to agencies provide no guarantees of continued existence and frustrate the need to plan for long term development of service delivery, program modification, or personnel training. Clients and users cannot rely on the continuation of the service and as a result cannot commit themselves to long-term rehabilitation in therapeutic programs (Shields 1981, p. 6).

Problems also arise with respect to standards of service, client eligibility, and the qualifications of professionals

which may vary from agency to agency. Time and fiscal lags in securing funding and the consequent difficulties in maintaining personnel may also impair the responsiveness of community-based agencies (Shields, 1981, p. 7), or even contribute to an unequal distributional surface of provision through highly localised responses (Shields, 1981, p. 8).

3.3 THE VOLUNTARY SECTOR: A DUALITY OF ROLES AND IMAGES

A view of the voluntary sector commonly espoused by fiscally conservative watchdogs is one of a heterogenous mixture of agencies, representing a variety of cause groups (some of which may be popularly considered to be socially or economically marginal), clamoring for public funds. Often, funding provided to such agencies is treated by politicians as a reflection of government largesse. At the same time, while politicians remark on the luxury of funding NGO's, public sector unions and their representatives interpret the support of the non-government sector social services as an evasion of government responsibility for assuring the social wage and a least-cost effort for social provision which puts clients at risk (BCGEU, 1980; Shields, 1981; Commission Interim Report, 1982). Each of these views reflects a level of self-interest on the parts of government and public sector employees - neither offers a dispassionate appraisal.

Government, in an effort to manage demands upon the system and demonstrate the competence of its agencies may be compelled to minimise the importance of the voluntary sector to the total service network while public sector unions may interpret the support of NGO's as a threat to the job security of their members.

What these opposing viewpoints serve to underscore is the importance of the voluntary sector within the total service network. NGO's are delivering services deemed worthy of funding by government and regarded by public sector unions as the proper domain of statutory authority. According to Djao (1983) the State derives a tremendous economic advantage from the use of voluntaristic agencies directly or in ancillary services. In the direct delivery of services, adminstration and public education, the contributions of the voluntary not-for-profit sector are vital to the continuing operations of many programs. If voluntaristic activities were withdrawn, says Djao, the State would be faced with even greater costs of welfare programs (Djao, 1983, p. 158). While there exists in the voluntary sector a mix of the philanthropy motive and the social change motive there is little question that advocacy and social change are considered as traditional strengths of the voluntary sector. As such the voluntary sector not only serves the vested interests of the State in social provision, but inculcates an ethic of "service" both towards their natural constituents (i.e. clients) and to the community as a whole.

The voluntary sector has had and continues to play an advocacy role - albeit in varying degrees depending on the sensitivity of the issue, agency relations with statutory authorities (including funding dependency) and the philosophical predilection of agency directors. Voluntary sector services respond also to perceived "gaps" in statutory provision by providing services which the State cannot (or will not) provide, by gaining public recognition of unmet needs and by providing information and advice to potential consumers of services. The voluntary sector is, in part, a consumers' movement through which "social entrepreneurs" can campaign for the recognition of the legitimacy of needs constituencies (Hatch, 1980, pp. 67-68, 94-102). The advantage offered by voluntary agencies is the opportunity for consultative participation on the part of constituents and the consequent capacity for an organised as opposed to informal articulation of need (Hatch, 1980, p. 94-95, 118-119).

In spite of these traditional strengths, however, the dependence of NGO's on government for funding constitutes a countervailing potential for the management by the State of expressions of dissent, or criticisms of social policy on the part of voluntary sector agencies or their workers. As such, State support and management of voluntarism through funding and licensing may have the effect of blunting social criticisms and neutralising social change objectives (Djao, 1983; Labatt, 1980; Hatch, 1980). This has implications for

the mode of service delivery as well. Demonstrations of effectiveness and service efficiency may of necessity be required to mirror the orthodoxy of practice embodied within the statutory services thus attenuating some avenues for innovation and alternative forms of intervention. Voluntary social service agencies may become so identified with the statutory authority that in the absence of complete knowledge on the part of the consumers or beneficiaries of the service, the status or auspice of the organisation may not always be clear. Users may think the NGO is an arm of the State and may regard it as one would a statutory service (this is particularly true of secular organisations).

In fact, this degree of identification with the statutory authority may have undesirable effects, among them:

a) it could result in a decline of philanthropic donations on the assumption that the service is already fully funded by government thereby making the service even more dependent upon public funds;

b) persons who would be unwilling to deal with a statutory service because of a perceived social stigma or mistrust of bureaucracy will be similarly unwilling to deal with private agencies whom the user cannot distinguish from the public authority;

c) the voluntary agency may serve to deflect criticism of statutory auspices and act as a buffer between consumers of service and the responsible public agency thus impairing the accountability of government.

CHAPTER IV

THE EFFECTS OF FISCAL RESTRAINT UPON VOLUNTARY SECTOR SERVICES - THE CANADIAN AND U.S. EXPERIENCE

4.1 SOME ANTICIPATED IMPACTS UPON NGO'S OF GOVERNMENT CUTBACKS

In the 1980's the welfare State and the range of social programs which comprise it have been described by a number of authors in the social welfare field as existing in a state of siege. There have been a great many calls to arms over the issues inherent in the support of social welfare services by both the political left and right: the former calling upon the faithful to resist the erosion of the social safety net in times of economic uncertainty, the latter arguing the necessity for the reduction of expenditures on programs whose efficiency cannot be demonstrated so that society may optimise expenditures of existing resources.

This struggle, if it may be called that, is a struggle not only over the purse strings, it is a struggle over hearts and minds. The combatants in the debate (to the limited extent that there has been any true debate) over the auspice and provision of social services have clearly drawn lines, rhetorical conventions and political dicta. The struggle takes place on many fronts: between unions and capital; between social service agencies (private and public) and the Provincial government; and even between levels of government. Yet, through all of this, the social

services have almost always been the besieged faction - often forced by circumstance into wary alliances with the labour union movement and the political left; submerging their differences in the face of trends towards economic restraint.

The reduction of spending on social programs is neither a recent nor a geographically unique phenomenon. Although the most visible cutbacks on social services spending have occurred at the Provincial level, social spending on the part of the Federal government has declined as well:

> Social program spending by the Federal government declined from 9.7 to 9.2 percent GNP from 1975 to 1979. In the two years from 1979 to 1981 it declined to 8.0 percent of GNP. (Social Planning Council of Metro Toronto, 1983, p. 3).

Referring to government spending at all levels, the Social Planning Council of Metro Toronto (SPCMT) concluded that:

> Declines for real spending levels for human service programs were ... a part of the overall decline in commitment by government to the social security net and to full employment. Wage controls, tight money supply management, reduced social spending and tax expenditures form the basis for a new era of government management of the economy (SPCMT, 1981, p. 57).

Reductions in social service expenditures affect a broad range of clients, programs and delivery systems. If we may employ an analogy from the physical siences, restraint

in public spending has a propensity to seek the path of least resistance. In this way, activities and organisations perceived to be peripheral to institutionalised services and systems present important opportunities for savings in public expenditure. Whether such short-term gains represent real savings in the long-term is a matter for conjecture and will be discussed later.

The Social Planning Council of Metro Toronto notes several manifestations of government spending restraint with regard to the voluntary sector. Restraint has occurred as the elimination of, or major cuts in, government programs delivered by the voluntary social service sector. In addition, fees-for-service for programs were restrained in such a way that fee increases failed to match inflation in costs. Budgetary reductions have led to voluntary agencies adopting a variety of coping strategies such as the curtailment of the least necessary program components, increased staff work loads or restrained staff wage increases (SPCMT, 1981, p. 1). There has also been a tendency to shift program emphasis towards programs with clients who can afford to pay, or to increase rapidly the fees for existing programs. One ultimate effect of such measures is a reduced accessibility on the part of the voluntary sector's traditional working class clients (SPCMT 1983, p. i & ii). Of course, many of the projected results of restraint have not manifested themselves as agencies absorb reductions through deficit financing (SPCMT, 1981, p. 1).

While the most visible effect of restraint is the reduction in scale or the complete elimination of programs, the Social Planning Council report (1981) regards as potentially more harmful the reduction of services through worker attrition which may entail a reduction in the quality of service (SPCMT 1981, p. 3). Another major issue subsumed under the quality of service debate is the growth of purchase of service contracting (POSC) which is being used by government to get more for less out of the voluntary agencies (SPCMT, 1981, p. 4). The report also observes disproportionate growth in some service sectors, seemingly due either to political exigencies or social vogue (SPCMT, 1981, pp. 4-5). This often takes the form of a return to a residualist approach to social services which emphasises the primacy of the market-place and the use of market models of cost accountancy for the "evaluation" of social services. As the Social Planning Council report remarks:

> It is more than noteworthy that agencies providing planning, co-ordinating, and information services, services which often point out social problems and service needs, have languished, while agencies providing crisis services have grown (SPCMT, 1981, p. 5).

The vagaries of government spending may be contingent not only on the type of service provided by an agency, but also upon the organisational type an agency represents. This is suggestive of the social and political control inherent

in funds spent by government: advocacy or citizens' rights groups may be passed-over in favour of some less-threatening entity.[3] Services to groups who are not cohesive or politically articulate are more easily cut than services to groups who are visibly organised. Agencies such as "quangos" may be favoured over private service agencies because the latter can be too autonomous from government in terms of ideology and delivery (Labatt, 1980, p. 37-38). It should be noted as well that new agencies and non-United Way agencies on the whole fare worse than the older and United Way agencies (SPCMT, 1981, p. 3). This is partly because older agencies tend to be more politically astute. Their boards and directors are experienced lobbyists and may be politically "connected." Also, groups incorporated under the umbrella of the United Way or some other broad coalition of NGO's, often have a more mixed funding base and expanded organisational capabilities, as well as having the legitimacy and credibility that comes with tenure in the social services field.

There are major forces which constrain the roles and the performance of voluntary sector agencies. These are the same forces which can affect any type of organisation,

[3]In British Columbia a major policy change by MHR in the late 1970's eliminated advocacy and social action organisations from eligibility for community grants funding. This policy is set forth in the MHR Policy and Procedures Manual (see Clague et al, 1984, pp. 181-212).

public or private, profit or non-profit: the first is dependence, upon a funding authority, a political constitutency or governing body; the second is co-optation, which may be consequent to dependency relationships and may involve issues of goal-deflection, the reprioritisation of values or the compromising of agency philosophy; the last is institutionalisation, which may occur as agencies become older, more diverse in function and extensive in organisational capability. As agencies grow larger or as they move closer to government through dependence or co-optation, they become more bureaucratised in structure. The organisational inertia which results can affect agency responsiveness and impair the lines of communication with its natural constituents (United Way, SPAR/SPARC 1980, Report #1, p. 44). All of these forces, to some extent, can have a noticeable effect on the nature and function of the voluntary sector, and ultimately, upon the well-being of the clients served.

The above mentioned forces, however, are still contingent to some degree upon the level of funding provided by government. In one way or another, government as funder, legislating authority or designator of clients and services, wields enabling or inhibiting power over the voluntary sector. A United Way, SPAR/SPARC report (#2, 1980) identifies three broad concerns associated with government funding:

a) Government funding of the voluntary sector tends to be biased in favour of direct services. Funding criteria usually give inadequate recognition to such

essential functions as program planning and development, financial management, control and accountability, staff supervision and development, and service record, monitoring and evaluation.

b) The reporting and accounting requirements connected with government funding tend to discourage innovation and experimentation in the voluntary sector and may inhibit agency responsiveness to changing client and community needs.

c) Government funding introduces an additional focus of accountability to other constitutents such as boards, volunteers, clients and the community. Unless a genuine partnership arises between government and the voluntary sector, a situation of mutual distrust and suspicion may prevail. In the longer run this could lead to a significant erosion of voluntary sector autonomy. (United Way, SPAR/SPARC 1980, Report #2 pp. 8-9).

In more general terms, government programs of funding tend to create feelings of instability and unpredictability among voluntary agencies who lack the assurance of continuity necessary for effective projections and control of budget and staffing. Without such assurance, the energy and attention of agency boards and senior staff tends to be drawn into annual or even more frequent scrambles for essential funds. Long range planning and staff or program development are either neglected or assigned a lower priority (United Way, SPAR/SPARC Report #2, 1980, p. 4). The dependence on public funds has created a preoccupation with the drafting of funding proposals in order to make them compatible with government funding guidelines.

This preoccupation may jeopardise the "critic" role of agencies and leave the voluntary sector prone to a form

of grantsmanship which reflects political and ideological changes in the political environment (United Way, SPAR/SPARC Report #1, 1980, p. 37). To some extent, the granstsmanship game could be reduced by more co-operation among both private and public actors in terms of joint planning and decision-making aimed at enhancing the social service network (United Way SPAR/SPARC Report #1, 1980, p. 39). It is possible, too, that such conditions could enhance the lobbying base of NGO's and restore some of the autonomy lost through dependence on government funds.

There are yet other structural impediments which must be dealt with by NGO's in their search for funding. For instance, problems may arise due to a lack of clarity and consistency with respect to funding criteria and procedures which may cause delays in the application process. Delays in formal approval of requests may lead to the diversion of scarce resources to program maintenance, or necessitate having to weather the first few months of the fiscal year through deficit financing, or, being more cautious, laying--off staff pending approval for funding requests. Agencies may also, as a result of structural or administrative delays within government for funding approval, be forced into the position of having to waste precious resources on loan interest accrued as a result of delayed reimbursement of approved expenditures (United Way SPAR/SPARC Report #2, 1980, pp. 6-7).

Problems of inadequate funding levels are exacerbated by periodic adjustments in funding formulae that do not keep pace with inflation, forcing agencies to cut corners in essential system maintenance in order to balance their budgets. The cumulative effect may well be to cut back on the overall level of service to clients. Another set of problems arises through a lack of clarity and specificity concerning the prioritisation of programs and services eligible for government funding. The resulting confusion and ambiguity may produce actual or perceived inequities in the distribution of, or access to services. Services or programs which do not seem to fit into conventional categories or classification systems may "fall between the cracks" of government funding policies, or agencies may expend considerable time and effort negotiating the "system" (United Way SPAR/SPARC, report #2, 1980, pp. 5-6).

Overall, the level of government funding to NGO's suffers in comparison to government funding of roughly equivalent programs and services in the public sector. Low wages and benefits spell difficulties in attracting and keeping qualified staff (United Way SPAR/ SPARC, report #2, 1980, p. 4). This may, in effect, reflect fairly minimal program and service standards: in the face of limited funding an emphasis on economy may work to the detriment of acceptable, never mind optimal, service standards (United Way SPAR/SPARC report #2, p. 3).

4.2 REAGANOMICS - THE EFFECTS OF CUTBACKS UPON THE SOCIAL SERVICE SECTOR IN THE UNITED STATES

There is a growing concern among Canadians in the social welfare field that recession economics, cutback management, and the major vehicle of each, privatisation, may have potential destabilising and debilitating effects for social services, agencies and clients. The Canadian consciousness, habituated through a long history of public provision, socialised healthcare, and social security programs, has largely been insulated from the experience of government cutbacks. While Federal spending on social programs (excluding Unemployment Insurance and Income Assistance) has declined as a proportion of GNP since 1975, Provincial expenditures have grown and program reduction, until recently, has been minimal. The United States, however, has experienced a protracted decline in Federal and State commitment to social services. Since the mid-seventies the U.S. has experienced an extensive re-prioritisation of service provision and shifting public and private mandates for human services. The impacts upon the social service network which are only guessed at in British Columbia have, therefore, been well documented in the United States. It is to the U.S. experience that we must now turn in order to make some inferences about the likely impacts of restraint upon Canadian services (public and private) and more importantly, to try to anticipate the organisational and structural imperatives for a social safety net under strain.

Until recently in the U.S., contemporary management systems within government have predicated their planning on an assumption of economic growth. Financial management tended to anticipate budgeting requirements by incremental additions to a secure economic base (Levine, cited in Kramer & Specht 1983, p. 57). Levine (1983) describes a process of organisational decline in the face of financial crises and increasing resource scarcity:

> The death and decline of government organisations is a symptom, a problem and a contingency. It is a symptom of resource scarcity at a societal, even global, level that is creating the necessity for governments to terminate some programs, lower the activity level of others, and confront trade offs between new demands and old programs rather than to expand whenever a new public problem arises. It is a problem for managers who must maintain organisational capacity by devising new managerial arrangements within prevailing structures that were designed under assumptions of growth. (Levine, 1983, p. 57).

A constricted pool of resources may necessitate zero growth or even declining growth strategies and these may pose many potential problems, such as:

a) the disaggregation and cutback of programs which indicate a high degree of integration within the policy matrices of an organisation may serve to jeopardise "the functioning and equilibrium of an entire organisation";

b) a lack of resources may impair the ability of the organisation to secure the control and the analytic tools which help to minimise the risk of making mistakes. Similarly, organisations will find it increasingly difficult to produce consensus-building

solutions and will have difficulty innovating and maintaining flexibility;

c) organisational decline may create personnel problems; agencies may experience difficulty in keeping talented personnel, attracting new talent and ideas, or spurring initiative. (Levine, 1981, p. 58).

Levine attributes much of organisational decline in the public sector to four factors:

1) problem depletion and problem re-definition which is indicated by a shift in public attitudes and professional doctrine, leading ultimately to policy termination (for example, the deinstitutionalisation of the mentally ill);

2) environmental entropy, which occurs "when the capacity of the environment to support the public organisation at prevailing levels of activity erodes". This is linked to a declining resource base: diminished revenues may force service reduction even though demands for and need for those services remain high;

3) political vulnerability: linked to the age, adaptive skills and the base of expertise within an organisation, this may limit the capacity to resist budget decrements and demands to contract;

4) organisational atrophy: internal atrophy and declining performance may be signalled by internal dissent, differentiation without integration, a decentralised authority with vague responsibility, obsolescence, and the lack of self-evaluating and self-correcting capacity. (Levine, 1981, pp. 60-61).

These and other organisational dysfunctions which sometimes typify public sector service agencies have been used by conservative administrations to critique the welfare State and to argue for the downsizing of government. The

welfare State, however, is not fundamentally in opposition to free enterprise or the private sector. The welfare State facilitates capitalist enterprise by cushioning the effects of the free market (Zimmerman, 1983, p. 462). Zimmerman characterises the welfare State as a symbiotic relationship between the public and private sectors:

> The government relies on the private sector to generate jobs to produce tax revenues for financing programs; similarly, the private sector relies on the public sector for the expenditure of tax revenues to generate the economic activity necessary for producing jobs (Zimmerman, 1983, p. 463).

Because of reciprocal and cyclical shifts in the roles of each of these sectors, government attempts to manage the economy by increasing or decreasing public expenditures for social or other programs, by increasing or decreasing taxes or through regulation or deregulation of the market (Zimmerman, 1983, p. 463). Zimmerman points out that the welfare State has always sought to ensure social control and the social reproduction of labour through the auspices of the family (Zimmerman, 1983, p. 464). However, the enabling and facilitating power of the State is attenuated through cutbacks in social provision. While ensuring the reproduction of labour and capital, the State weakens its commitment to the economic security of families, in spite of a simultaneous inability of the market economy to provide for it (Zimmerman, 1983, p. 465).

In the U.S. and elsewhere the social service environment is characterised by increased budget deficits, rising inflation and unemployment coupled with the problems of allocating limited resources to clients whose numbers are growing and whose needs are becoming more compelling (Reamer, 1983, p. 451). The "supply-side" agenda of the Reagan government has led to two responses: 1) to shift responsibility for social programs to State and local governments through the use of revenue sharing and block grants; and, 2) concentrated efforts to reduce dependence on the public sector and seek solutions within the private sector (Reamer, 1983, p. 451). These shifts in policy have placed considerable burdens on social work practitioners making allocation decisions; burdens which have been exacerbated by the fact that declines in funding have been accompanied by a rise in demand (Reamer, 1983, p. 452). Reamer States that the position of the U.S. Department of Health and Social Services is that "the well-being of the public is primarily a responsibility of individuals, families, and the communites in which they live" (Reamer, 1983, p. 452). Such a view reflects a decentralisation and a devolution of the extent of government accountability and responsibility.

With the appropriation and authorisation levels of government lowered by the pursuit of supply-side economics, new incentives are needed to induce proprietary and

non-profit agencies to generate and provide social services (Reamer, 1983, p. 453). Two mechanisms are generally favoured by supply-siders:

1) State and local governments contracting for services: the rationale is that the "invisible" hand of the free market will sustain high levels of service provision and through competition the control of costs and levels of service will occur naturally, without "complex and burdensome government regulations" (Reamer, 1983, p. 453);

2) social welfare clients or "consumers" should be encouraged to shop for services supplied to them. The belief is that promoting consumer choice will ensure quality control (Reamer, 1983, p. 453). The consumer is, however, usually by-passed in decisions regarding POSC's, while the shrinking numbers and mandates of agencies limit the range of choices.

Reamer cautions that it is dangerous to embrace uncritically the mechanisms and goals of supply-side economics (Reamer, 1983, p. 453). Supply-side economics have, in fact, attracted a host of critics. Hardly revolutionary, Bill Jamieson Jr. (1982) comments that the "new" supply-side economics hearkens more to the philosophy of Adam Smith than to the pressing needs of the 1980's. He goes further in asserting that it was the failure of supply-side economics that

brought Keynesian, or demand-side economics, into vogue (Jamieson, 1982, p. 10). Jamieson says that the success of supply-side/ trickle-down theories relies heavily on the "you gotta believe" theory of government:

> ... it says to business, 'you gotta believe'; it says to the consumer, 'you gotta believe'; it says to the hungry, 'you gotta believe.' Then, if it does not work it is because business, the consumer, and the hungry did not believe hard enough. (Jamieson, 1982, p. 11).

Reamer (1983) feels that increased reliance on POSC's could lead to a resurrection of the ideal of government as the agent of "last resort," meaning that government will provide assistance only when all other options have been exhausted. Reamer fears a re-emergence of the ethic of social problems as matters of "individual failure rather than as a function of cyclical and structural defects in the larger society" (Reamer, 1983, p. 458). Reamer has observed that, while organisations such as the Child Welfare League of America and the United Way of America have demonstrated through studies that the largest portion of the budgets of their member agencies came from government, and despite government assurances that the "most needy" are accorded first claim on public services, more than 50 percent of the reductions made by the Reagan administration came out of direct services to people in desperate need (Reamer, 1983, p. 454). This underscores the philosophical and political

values of an administration whose definition of need and "deserving" do not extend to many persons whose plight may be "structural" as opposed to "existential." Political philosophies of the right seem to be predicated upon an "individual pathology" concept of poverty or social insecurity. The minimalist State philosophy, expressed in policy, seems to minimise the mandate of the State for social provision while simultaneously assuming an even more pervasive role in the legitimising of social needs and the manner in which need is met.

4.3 SOME EMPIRICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE IMPACTS OF BUDGETARY RESTRAINT ON THE VOLUNTARY SECTOR IN THE U.S.

The effects of budgetary restraint on the not-for--profit sector in the United States have been addressed by a number of authors in a variety of forums. There is a strong base of empirical research exploring the impacts upon agencies and their clients conducted by regional and national organisations, among them the United Way of America (these are regional studies conducted in Texas, Indiana, California and Connecticut), Family Service America (1981, 1983), the Community Council of Greater New York (1982, 1983), the Child Welfare League of America (1981), the United Community Planning Corporation of Boston Massachussets (1981, 1983) and an important national survey of NGO's conducted by the

Urban Institute (1983). These studies have been reviewed by Demone and Gibelman in a 1984 paper which questions the ability of voluntary sector agencies to assume more financial as well as programmatic responsibility in the wake of government cutbacks. The authors examine "Reaganomics" in relation to a number of variables, such as:

1) the level and types of service offered by NGO's;

2) their use of professional personnel;

3) the reliance on POSC's between public and private agencies;

4) patterns of financing;

5) compensatory responses by NGO's to decreases in federal funding;

6) NGO's use of volunteers.

In distilling the essence of this varied research, Demone and Gibelman attempt to assess the impact of budget cuts on the voluntary not-for-profit sector and thereby offer some comment on the future status of voluntarism. Theirs is a valuable compendium of this research and for that reason a summary of the major points in the paper will be presented.

In 1982 and 1983 the Urban Institute, based in Washington D.C., conducted a mailed questionnaire survey of 8,294 organisations in twelve metropolitan and four non-metropolitan areas of the United States, for which a 49.7 percent response rate was achieved. The survey focused on

charitable service agencies (excluding funding organisatons, religious bodies or groups providing services primarily to their own members, labour unions, hospitals and universities) and its intent was to assess the range of factors affecting the impacts of cutbacks upon NGO's. Forty-four percent of the agencies surveyed reported an increase in requests for services (especially in the areas of legal aid, advocacy, employment training, and mental health services) while only 8 percent reported a decrease in requests for services. Demone and Gibelman point to this finding as offering support for the relationship between adverse economic conditions and the need for health and social services (Demone & Gibelman, 1984, p. 422).

For fiscal year 1982 - the first full year of Reagan administration budget cuts - government provided 39 percent of revenues for voluntary agencies with 58 percent (2037 agencies in the Urban Institute sample) receiving some level of public support. For those agencies receiving government financial assistance, two-thirds of their income came from government (note: levels of government are not distinguished in Demone and Gibelman's summary). Of agencies receiving public support, 57 percent reported reductions in government funding in the period 1981-82. Thirty-five percent reported no change in public support (discounting inflation) and only 8 percent reported increased funding, ranging from a low of 3 percent (legal services and advocacy) to 15 percent

(mental health agencies). Decreases in funding for the same period range from 72 percent (legal service agencies) to 45 percent (institutional and residential care agencies). Among NGO's identified as social service agencies, 62 percent reported a reduction in funding from 1981 to 1983. Twenty--eight percent claimed no change in their levels of funding and 10 percent reported increases. Of health and mental health agencies, 57 percent and 59 percent respectively reported decreases while 9 percent and 15 percent indicated increases.

Putting these findings into perspective, Demone and Gibelman observe that data collected a year later from a variety of sources do not evidence a continuing decline of the magnitude of cuts reported by the Urban Institute. The bulk of the cutbacks occurred in the early years of the administration. While the authors remark that regional data on the impacts of cutbacks are thin, some regional variation in the degree of impact can be accounted for by the fact that some areas of the U.S. rely less on public funding than others. The correlation drawn by Demone and Gibelman, and echoed throughout much of the literature dealing with NGO's, is that the severity of impacts experienced as a result of cutbacks varies with the degree of reliance upon public sources for funds. Similarly, agencies with a more varied funding base, or larger, United Way agencies suffered cuts in public funds more easily than most smaller, independent voluntary agencies.

In the wake of cutbacks in public transfers to NGO's, agencies have had to adapt by seeking compensatory sources of funding. The major sources of alternative funding for U.S. voluntary agencies for fiscal years 1980 to 1982 were:

1) earned income (dues, fees, etc.) 49 percent increase
2) gifts (donations, United Way, etc.) 44 percent increase
3) foundations and corporations 38 percent increase

The levels of increase for these funding sources, however, are unlikely to be able to compensate for the loss of public monies. Demone and Gibelman note that in 1983 government provided 74 percent of total funding for NGO's in the U.S. Given the smaller relative weight of agency fund-raising, donations and fees for service as a proportion of total agency income, it is probable that even relatively modest cutbacks cannot be compensated for by these sources. Although Demone and Gibelman have observed a pattern of growth in private support for some services through investments, client fees, contributions from individuals and business, foundations and bequests, or money earned from special events, this still forms a very small portion of the funding base of most agencies, and further, these sources of funding are highly variable and frequently unstable.

Insecure funding has led to other organisational adaptations to cutbacks. Referring to family service agencies in the United States, Demone and Gibelman have identified the following trends:

1) increased use of volunteers (up 84 percent in family service agencies, or FSA's);

2) curtailing services or increasing fees (50 percent of FSA's);

3) increasing staff workloads and reducing administrative staff (circa 50 percent of FSA's);

4) reorganizing the agency (in over 50 percent of FSA's). (Demone & Gibelman, 1984, pp. 421-424).

It must also be noted that each of the above options entails some level of cost in terms of agency viability, survivability, or quality of service to clients.

Demone and Gibelman conclude that for voluntaristic not-for-profit agencies the choices are basically two - reduce costs or increase income. First order alternatives for agency survival could include:

1) tightening management controls;

2) increasing productivity;

3) increasing the number of clients paying for services directly or through third-party schemes;

4) raising fees;

5) improving other fund-raising methods;

6) collaborative cost-sharing arrangements; and
7) lobbying to enhance or protect agency interests.

Second-order strategies involve more drastic measures and may involve:

1) reducing the quantity or quality of services;
2) restraining or rationing admissions for services;
3) closing branches;
4) operating with a deficit budget;
5) merger with other organisations; or, the last resort,
6) closing the agency (Demone & Gibelman, 1984 p. 425).

Hatch (1980) suggests that an essential question regarding the relationship between the State and the voluntary sector is whether voluntary action is merely marginal to State provision, or whether it is an integral part of the service process (Hatch, 1980, p. 124). The growth of the voluntary sector over the last two decades, reflected both in the numbers of agencies and clients served, and in the dramatic increases in public funds allocated to NGO's suggests that the voluntary sector is more than marginal, particularly in the delivery of personal social services. However, the often ad hoc manner of bestowing grants, the degree of political exigency evidenced in the success of some agencies over others, and the lack of a developmental approach on the parts of voluntary and State agencies mean that it is often less than integral (Hatch, 1980, p. 141; Demone & Gibelman, 1984, pp. 424-425).

Voluntary sector social services, while deriving their social and political legitimacy through the mobilisation of resources on behalf of their constituents, are often

unable to act independently due to the constraints placed on them by dependency on government funding. Furthermore, Hatch observes that efforts to support and strengthen the voluntary sector are not an integral part of the statutory services or social policy. As has been suggested by several authors, the State has a vested interest in maintaining the informal character of the voluntary sector. This serves to at once assure the quiescence and malleability of the voluntary sector - relying upon the altruistic mission of its participants to assist in social provision - and to reinforce the ideology of private responsibility for social problems. Voluntary agencies are neither the sole nor the principal beneficiaries of government financial support - governments also benefit, as do the clients of NGO's not to mention the society at large. However, while the voluntary service network remains fragmented and uncoordinated, the probability that all potential benefits of the "mixed-economy" of social services (i.e. public and private provision) will be realised, at any level, is doubtful.

4.4 EFFECTS UPON CLIENTS OF AGENCY DECLINE IN THE U.S.

The long term effects of the Reagan administration's economic policies are uncertain and unpredictable. Communites are scrambling to protect their programs, save their

services, save their jobs, and to provide for the welfare of their citizens with increasingly scarce resources (Wineburg et al, 1983, p. 489). As wage earners lose their jobs, they are putting more strain on a service network already trying to cope with reduced levels of funding (Wineburg et al, p. 489). The capacity of the economic system to meet legitimate demands is confounded by the inability of the political system to aid society in redefining and reallocating these claims (Sarri, 1982, pp. 22-23). Controlling expenditures, increased reliance on the private sector and volunteers, zero-based budgeting and rigorous program evaluation, all hold some potential for organisational enhancement. This enhancement is impaired, however, when such procedures are applied only to reduce resource expenditure without regard to need (Sarri, 1982, p. 23).

Not only are public agencies and NGO's themselves affected in terms of organisation, function and viability, the clients of social service agencies must bear the final burden of restraint. The most heavily government dependent agencies have received the greatest proportional cutbacks in government funds (Tapper, 1982, p. 17). The client groups served by these agencies are often dependent on highly specialised services and are likely to be drawn from socio-economic sectors which are least able to pay for service through donations or user fees, and who may be relatively unable to articulate their needs or advocacy responses. In a

study for the Community Council of Greater New York (Tapper, 1982), among responding agencies the largest reductions in government funds were in the area of:

1) youth employment and training	(62.1%)
2) adult employment and training	(57.5%)
3) information and referral	(32.7%)
4) community safety and justice	(24.9%)
5) advocacy, coordination and planning	(18.2%)

(Tapper, 1982, p. 2).

Changes in government funding had an impact in more than 60 percent of the 122 programs canvassed for the study. Thirteen programs were terminated; staff reductions occurred in 41 programs; 29 programs reduced the level of service provided or planned to do so; 20 programs reported having (or planning) to terminate specific services of their programs. Other programs reported having to raise eligibility or fee requirements (in effect denying service to clients) and limiting hours of service (Tapper, 1982, p. 3). Another study by the United Way of Santa Clara County (UWSCC, 1982) examined agency response to and impacts upon clients of government funding cutbacks. Agencies responded to constricted resources by: a) increasing staff workloads; b) cutting staff; c) tightening fiscal controls; d) acquiring replacement funds from other sources; and e) reducing the quantity and quality of the services provided (UWSCC, 1982, p. 1). The report also found that the groups most severely affected by reductions were the poor, seniors, women, and refugees (UWSCC, 1982, p. 1).

Of special note are seniors who may be disproportionately impacted because they make up a portion of the constituents of almost all the human service fields and are affected by cuts in more than one area - health, rehabilitation, transportation, and other basic needs (UWSCC, 1982, p. 1). Generally, reduced accessibility resulting from increased case loads, client deflection, staff reduction, or the introduction of user fees means that fewer persons will receive less service. Many agencies may have to narrow their mandates for provision by raising eligibility requirements. There has also been a shift away from the prevention and treatment of non-crisis situations although the overall economic and employment environment exacerbates family tensions and stress (UWSCC, 1982, p. 21). The report by the United Way of Santa Clara Country warns that:

> If we continue to retrench from prevention-type services, people's problems will be at the critical level before they receive attention. This is not in the best interest of society or cost-effectiveness. (UWSCC, 1982, p. 38).

There are fears that accessibility will be further reduced as community-based services succumb to attrition as a result of cutbacks (UWSCC, 1982, p. 22). There are other kinds of impacts, however, some of which may be even more pervasive. Wineburg et al (1983) observe that the low-functioning needy (including the elderly and the

chronically mentally ill) find any change in the system difficult and confusing and, therefore, may not be able to access those resources available to them. Similarly, the middle and lower middle class people who, because of unemployment and recession, are being forced to seek public assistance, may experience shock because of their unfamiliarity with the complexities of the system. The trauma of the person in need is often compounded by stigmatisation and lowered self-esteem (Wineburg et al, 1983, p. 493). The issue of client-borne impacts through service reduction is very complex and contingent upon a number of variables. There is no simple correlation between the percentage of funding reduced and the level of service reduction. Impacts will be broad and cumulative and will occur in conjunction with social policy changes at all levels of government (United Way of the Bay Area, 1982, p. 2).

Cutbacks in funding for voluntaristic social services have been paralleled in the United States, Britain, Canada and Australia by simultaneous efforts to contain the level of expenditure for publicly-delivered social services. Statutory services and social security transfers have been subjected to rationing through a variety of mechanisms, most of them formal, as through legislation, and some informal or bureaucratic in nature. Restricting the availability of and accessibility to statutory services may be effected through increased bureaucratic controls, such as the imposition of

more stringent conditions of eligibility for benefits and services; fiscal controls through which funding levels are reduced outright or frozen thus reducing the range of services or benefits available to clients; reducing the numbers of persons employed in the statutory social servies; increased enforcement of rules governing "abuse" of the system, and; reduced access to avenues of appeal on the part of clients or potential clients.

All of these mechanisms offer potential negative impacts for users of services. Caseloads increase, partly as a result of attrition in the publicly-provided services and partly as a result of economic factors. The number of available inputs per client (including the amount of time available for each client) are reduced as a result, to the effect that clients may: a) experience an increasing propensity for social service dependence; b) not receive adequate assistance and thereby experience a state of declining security and well-being; or, c) may be deflected to voluntary not-for-profit services for assistance.

However, because declines in statutory sector funding are accompanied by reductions in transfers to the non-profit sector, the capability of voluntary services to provide for their clients may also be seriously impaired. Also, because a central element of neo-conservative social policy is the concept of privatisation, which embraces the private sector provision of statutory services through contract, NGO's may

become more narrow and exclusionary with respect to their clients and mode of service delivery as they compete for contracts in an effort to compensate for funds lost through cutbacks.

Delivering services through contract may affect the "organisational mission" of not-for-profit organisations, particularly as continuity of service delivery requires stable, even cordial relations with the State and the statutory authority, possibly to the detriment of advocacy responses on behalf of clients. POSC's are an important component of social service delivery systems in Canada and the United States, and they acquire a particular saliency in an era of fiscal restraint. The following discussion explores the issue of contracting-out for services and the problems faced by NGO's, clients and policy-makers in the use of POSC's.

4.5 THE NON-PROFIT SECTOR AND PURCHASE OF SERVICE CONTRACTING

Non-profit organisations, while private in character, are essentially public in function, providing a range of public goods and serving as the major vehicle through which private charitable resources and voluntary efforts are brought to bear on the solving of community problems

(Salamon & Abramson, cited in Palmer & Sanhill, 1982, pp. 219-220). The Reagan policies in the U.S., however, could mean a major redivision of responsibilities between government and NGO's (Morris, 1982, p. 337). Questions therefore arise as to the ultimate mandate of the voluntary sector vis à vis the government. As Morris writes:

> Are governmental/voluntary relationships expected to achieve preventive, curative, and maintenance goals for all persons affected by particular conditions? If full penetration of an at risk population is the objective, then it is unlikely that the philanthropic associatons can independently provide the requisite resources. Conversely, if a residual purpose is adopted by public policy, then the question is merely how to distribute existing public welfare revenues among needs which vastly exceed resources (Morris, 1982, p. 337).

While chosen by the Reagan Administration as a vehicle of the Economic Recovery Program, the voluntary sector, in the face of new opportunities for voluntary activity, is ironically weakened by the implementation of the government's restraint programs (Salamon & Abramson, 1982, p. 220). Non-profits are not an alternative to government, they are, rather, partners of government in many spheres:

> As a result, the same policies that reduce the role of government - and, hence, increase the need for non-profit organisations - also reduce the ability of these organisations to meet this need (Salamon & Abramson, 1982, p. 220).

The conservative view that the growth of government's mandate over areas of service provision has constrained the private sector and limited consumer choice often leads to the conviction that the contraction of government should be enough to revitalise voluntary organisations and other mediating structures (Salamon & Abramson, 1982, p. 224). Salamon and Abramson, however, point out that empirical research so far carried-out tends not to support these assumptions (Salamon & Abramson, 1982, p. 234). Nor is there much hope that the voluntary sector can compensate for funds lost to government - economic insecurity has dampened private sector philanthropy from both foundations and the general public (Morris, 1982, p. 339). Salamon and Abramson assert that the levels of expansion necessary to make up for cuts in government funding constitute a major challenge to the non--government sector (Salamon & Abramson, 1982, p. 228).

Decisions by public agencies and officials over whether and when to provide publicly funded services directly or to contract-out to profit or non-profit agencies in the private sector, is becoming a crucial area of policy choice (Jansson, 1979, p. 362). Purchase of service contracts are one element of a larger spectrum of arrangements pertaining to the transmission of public funds to private bodies. Demone and Gibelman (1983) describe purchase of service as "a set of organised procedures to bring public and private entities into partnership for the acquisistion of goods or

services in the public interest" (Demone & Gibelman, 1983, p. 327). It has been noted by Gibelman (1983, p. 64) that over the last two decades in the U.S. there has been an enormous expansion in the use of public funds to purchase services from the private sector. While fiscal responsibility has become more centralised, the responsibility for the delivery of benefits has become more dispersed through purchase of service contracts with the private sector (Gilbert, 1984, p. 64).

The purchase of service agreement is actuated through a contractual relationship between the governmental agency and another organisation (the provider) and the purpose of the agreement is to purchase care or services provided to individuals or groups for whom there is a predetermined public responsibility (Gibelman, 1983, p. 103). Kramer (1983) notes that POSC practise varies greatly among State and local governments and from one kind of service program to another. Yet, despite the enormous growth of POS contracting and consequent effects on the voluntary sector, there is little available knowledge to guide policy-making and administration (Kramer, 1983, p. 422). In fact, POSC's have led to an even greater dependence on governmental funds, resulting in "a pluralistic, mixed and more competitive economy in the human services, making the future of voluntary, non-profit agencies quite uncertain" (Kramer, 1983, p. 422).

Kramer identifies several potential advantages for government of purchase of service contracting (these have been noted by a number of authors, among them Gilbert, 1984; Gibelman, 1981 & 1983; Demone & Gibelman, 1983 & 1984; Jansson 1979):

1) POSC's are an expedient for extending limited resources because the cost of contracted services is usually less than those provided by the public agency.

2) It is, in the case of the U.S., usually easier for a governmental agency to obtain money for contracting than to extend existing services or to provide additional staff.

3) The utilisation of voluntary agencies and institutions means that government can ensure services without high initial fixed costs as well as without undesired visibility.

4) Government can secure more flexibility through POSC's because services can be initiated and terminated more rapidly. POSC's provide a means of bypassing rigid budgetary and administrative rules and regulations as well as a means for circumventing political constraints.

5) POSC's can provide more tailored, localised services and may reach groups for whom government provision represents fear or stigma by improving geographical and psychological access for clients.

6) POSC's could also be a means for government to divest itself of marginal, troublesome, or highly specialised services.

7) There may be "external relations payoffs," in that through POSC's government may gain opportunities to co-opt and gather the political support of local government constituencies or communities dependent on higher levels of government for services. (Kramer, 1983, p 423).

There are, however, potential disadvantages for government which Kramer outlines:

1) There are inherent difficulties in maintaining standards and in securing adequate accountability of voluntary agencies.

2) Many agencies are "insufficiently bureaucratised and lack suitable information and cost-control systems." Further, smaller and newer agencies have limited managerial capabilities which may be aggravated by diffuse goals and methods and an inability to produce evidence of effectiveness.

3) Under-regulation and the dearth of accountability criteria compounded by insufficient government agency staff mean that public agencies cannot properly oversee a contractor's performance.

4) "Provider pluralism," referring to the dispersed character of the service system, may lead to a loss of equity through fragmentation.
(Kramer, 1983, p. 424).

Kramer also outlines some potential advantages of POSC's for voluntary agencies:

1) The private agency can sometimes expand the scope and range of its service and continue to serve its particular clientele. Government funds through POSC's may be regarded as a more secure source of income.

2) The clientele may receive more individualised, less bureaucratised and more specialised services than those provided by a government agency.

3) Agencies may experience an enhanced community status together with increased access to public decision-making and the opportunity to influence policy.
(Kramer, 1983, p. 424).

There are also several disadvantages for the voluntary agency. According to Kramer, there is usually a gap between the actual costs of a service (assuming they are known) and the rate of governmental reimbursement. This means that the voluntary agency is forced to make up the deficit, possibly through reductions in staff or program components (Kramer, 1983, p. 424). Added to the difficulties of "costing" a service are the hazards of uncertainty of income subject to legislative, political or bureaucratic delays (Kramer, 1983, pp. 424-425).

There is also some question as to whether competitive bidding for contracts may lead to financial difficulties for service providers (Ghere, 1981, pp. 75-76). Reamer (1983) suggests the possibility of "price wars" in social services and the emergence of monopolies in problem treatment which could reduce accessibility to and quality of service (Reamer, 1983, p. 456). Another issue to be addressed is whether POSC's in the human services should be awarded to private-for-profit or solely to non-profit agencies. In part, this is an ethical question, however, there is concern for the quality of service provided if the bottom line of provision is to secure a margin of profit. Reamer, for example, worries that profit-conscious agencies may seek-out persons whose problems will be less demanding on time and resources (Reamer, 1983, p. 455).

Even non-profit agencies, conscious of having to demonstrate program effectiveness and cost-efficiency may become highly selective in their intake policy. Such "skimming" or "creaming" of clients could lead to the creation of service gaps for those who are most vulnerable in our society - the poorer, or more troublesome clients who end-up as cases with governmental agencies (Reamer, 1983, p. 455; Kramer, 1983, p. 424), thus increasing the likelihood that lower-functioning individuals will become wards of the State. A preoccupation with securing contracts could lead to goal-displacement within private sector agencies (Jansson, 1979). Problems may also arise as a contention between two management functions: 1) maintenance management - preparing budgets, reports to boards and political officials and allocating funds; and, 2) service management - ensuring the quality of service provided (Ghere, 1981, p. 67).

Ghere (1981) suggests that in times of constricting resources, one function or the other could suffer (Ghere, 1981, pp. 67-68). A study of municipal government health services in the U.S. (Ghere 1981) revealed that the service management function commands greater priority in public agencies that provide services directly than in those agencies that make extensive use of the contract approach. The former are also more likely to have institutionalised response mechanisms to liase with citizens' interests or groups (Ghere, 1981, pp. 71-73). Also, administrators in

direct service agencies place more emphasis on evaluative, outreach, and staff development activities than do their POSC counterparts (Ghere, 1981, p. 75). The difference, however, may be more a function of the degree of aggressive management and monitoring undertaken by the public agency (Ghere, 1981, p. 77). There is, however, no necessary correlation between POSC's and an increase or lessening of the level of service.

Voluntary agencies do not inevitably lean toward "creaming" of clients, or toward a narrowing of their range of service or a lowering of quality. This conclusion has been borne out in studies by Gibelman (1981, 1983) who has found that private sector agencies providing services through contracts often provide not only an adequate, but a superior level of service. Continued high quality of provision is in no small part a function of sophisticated management by government in the formulation of enabling, monitoring, and evaluative frameworks. In those regions where contracting is a success in terms of program enhancement, Gibelman assumes that:

> ... quality of services to clients is affected by the particular relationship that a State agency maintains with its contractual providers. (Gibelman, 1981, p. 33).

Similarly, Jansson (1979) concludes that differences in the type or quality of services emanating from the

differing organisational missions and capabilities of public agencies and NGO's can and must be addressed when services are offered for contract through the establishment of clear criteria for accountability and monitoring. For public administrators the guiding principal in awarding contracts to NGO's must be whether the organisation will provide services in a manner consistent with public intent. For example, agencies which do not incorporate some management or service aspects commensurate with publicly-mandated services (i.e. if the agency delivering service through POSC "creams" extensively or fails to locate unmet needs in the community or fails to utilise program planning or evaluation or citizen input) may not conform to the public intent (Jansson, 1979, p. 363-364).

From a two year study of 167 social agencies in Los Angeles County (108 non-public agencies and 59 public agencies) Jansson concludes that there are important differences between public and non-profit agencies which are suggestive of the necessity of a clearer articulation of POSC policy. These differences stem from the "organisational missions" or mandates of public and private (non-profit) agencies, the outlooks of agency executives and the structure of agency decision-making.

Public agencies, says Jansson, are more likely than non-profits to serve minority or lower income groups, who come from geographic areas proximate to the agency and who

are largely self-referrals. Private agencies, by contrast, rely heavily on referrals and unlike public agencies who are expected to serve all persons who meet basic criteria for service, appear able to a greater extent to select consumers who fall within their service priorities. Public agencies are also more likely to extend limited organisational resources by providing relatively non-intensive services to a relatively large number of consumers while voluntary agencies generally prefer to provide intensive services to relatively few clients (Jansson, 1979, pp. 365-366). In terms of decision-making, public agencies are more likely than NGO's to make decisions in the context of multiple and contending interests. Public agencies are also more likely to incorporate a formal program planning and evaluation function in their operations. This latter observation, however is probably a function of the lesser fiscal capability of NGO's vis à vis public agencies.

Another point of contention in the debate over purchase of service contracting, especially in jurisdictions where policy is moving toward the "privatisation" or "re--privatisation" of services, is the appropriateness of awarding contracts to private for-profit organisations. The compatability of the profit motive with the delivery of publicly-mandated social services has been explored extensively in the literature, and is currently a matter of concern in British Columbia where a number of services and

facilities (and the clients who use or inhabit them) have been passed from the statutory authority through contract to private sector non-profit and for-profit organisations.

Contracts have been used since the early 1970's to deliver statutory social services in British Columbia, usually in rural areas and/or to specialised client groups (although contracting for service is more common in the health field particularly in the provision of nursing home facilities for the elderly). Other client groups for whom services are provided through contract are (ranked by number of facilities): 1) the mentally handicapped; 2) disturbed children; 3) retarded persons; 4) alcohol and drug users; 5) the physically handicapped; 6) transients; 7) delinquent youth; 8) battered women (in Metropolitan Vancouver 37 percent of the private sector capacity for these groups is offered by for-profits) (BCGEU 1985, Statistics Canada, 1984).

Many of the clients served through contracts may be emotionally and physically fragile. Also, in many cases, the legal competency of the clients prevents them from participating in decision-making processes or exercising a significant degree of choice in selecting services or agencies. These clients, even where they are not wards of the State or suffering diminished legal competence, may nevertheless be socially and economically vulnerable. Contracting-out mandated services is often undertaken with

the rationale that when services are offered by the private sector, potential clients are presented with a "choice" to be made in the context of a social service market place. It is assumed that unsatisfied clients will "vote with their feet," ensuring that only competent agencies with acceptable standards will retain their contracts. In reality, however, the clients' right of choice is exercised by proxy, with the statutory authority selecting the agency to receive the contract (the consumers [clients] do not pay for the service and the purchaser [government] does not receive the service). Even if this were not the case, the assumption of choice based on marketplace principles presumes complete or adequate knowledge on the part of the consumer of services, even though it has been demonstrated that this is rarely the case with the users of social services (Wyers & Holloway, 1983; Catrice-Lorey, 1980).

Just as it is advisable to take into account differences in the organisational missions of public sector and non-profit agencies when awarding contacts, so too should the differences between non-profit and for-profit agencies enter into the decision-making process. Gilbert (1984) cautions that there is little empirical evidence that services are better delivered by non-profit agencies over for--profits. A major obstacle to empirical validation is that social welfare programs often serve "impalpable and multiple" objectives which frequently defy precise measurement.

Gilbert cites Barnet (1982), Gordon (1975) and Wooden (1966) in concluding that the non-profit versus for-profit classification may be less significant for comprehending organisational behaviour than variables such as agency size, goals, location and the regulatory environment (Gilbert, 1984, pp. 66-67). In practise, there are large variations among non--profit agencies and considerable overlap between for-profit and non-profit agencies in many dimensions of organisational life (Gilbert, 1984, p. 71).

Even so, Gilbert feels that the motives and ideological dispositions of the two types of agencies are salient points of distinction. The directorships of for-profit agencies are concerned with protecting the financial interests of the ownership groups. This is not to say that for-profit agencies lack in public spirit, but such abstract considerations rarely take precedence over the bottom line of profit and loss (Gilbert, 1984, pp. 68-69). Therefore, while the legal principle of "caveat emptor" may be appropriate to the spirit of the marketplace, in circumstances where consumers rarely purchase services and are often in vulnerable life--situations, and where quality of service is largely self--regulated, the market principle is not appropriate (Gilbert, 1984, p. 69).

Gilbert suggests four dimensions which should be considered when deciding whether to offer a given service for contract to for-profit as well as non-profit agencies:

1) The nature of the service - does service delivery involve a standardised product or procedure for which it is possible to measure costs and monitor service delivery? If so, the service may be amenable to the business initiative of the for-profit agency and permit the purchase to evaluate performance and control against abuses;

2) the average client's degree of competence - non-profits are the agency of choice for service delivery to vulnerable groups. This is based upon the degree of public accountability (non-profit NGO's may be more responsive to community needs in that governing boards, advisory groups and client groups act to reinforce the mission of the agency) and the charitable ethos of the non-profit agency (because the corporate charter of non-profits prohibits the distribution of generated surplus among organisation members they may be less likely to "exploit vulnerable circumstances" than are for-profit agencies;

3) whether or not the service is vested with coercive powers - where personal liberty is concerned, public accountability is of paramount concern. Such accountability must be immediate and direct;

4) the scope and potency of the regulatory environment - Gilbert suggests that a mix of for-profit and non-profit agencies may be most viable (in terms of service quality and delivery) where the regulatory environment is sufficient to ensure maintenance of standards in the delivery of services (Gilbert, 1984, pp. 71-72).

Gilbert cautions that if profit-making activity in publicly-mandated social services is not embraced selectively and with discretion, the values and communal character of the "social market" may be undermined.

There are a number of parameters of standards of service and the accountability of providers that must be taken into account in the policy process. Purchase of service contracting can be a viable means of extending limited

public resources and ensuring some degree of pluralism and community participation in the planning and delivery of social services. Care must be taken however to protect the public interest both in terms of fiscal accountability and, perhaps most important, in fulfilling the goals of service intervention with regard to affecting positively the well-being of the client-consumer. Where the service goals, or outcomes of intervention are not commensurate with the public interests or the needs of clients (on the part of the public as well as the private sector agency) there should be in place a working framework for evaluation and review which is capable of accommodating programmatic change. Above all, decisions regarding the allocation of public resources to social service functions must proceed on the basis of the best available analysis and with the conscious preservation of the ethos of service to the community and the betterment of the life-chances of those who through chronic or situational debility find themselves in situations of social or economic insecurity.

Kramer outlines six basic principles which could guide the contracting of human services:

1) Provision should be made for full coverage of all persons for whom there is a public responsibility whether provision occurs through government or a private agency.

2) The service and its desired outcomes should be clearly defined; specific clientele designated; and duration of the program detailed.

3) Standards acceptable to both government and voluntary agencies should be explicit as to intake policy, personnel, and service delivery.

4) There must be adequate provision for joint planning on behalf of clients for reporting, review, and audit. There must also be provision for evaluation to ensure accountability for public funds.

5) There should be fair payment up to the full cost of the service as determined by cost analysis. This should reflect qualitative factors as well as incentives for improvement and innovation.

6) Conflicts embodying these considerations should be worked out jointly between the funder and provider and ought to include procedures for conflict resolution.
(Kramer, 1983, p. 426)

The agenda is clear. If organisational dysfunction is to be avoided and if efforts at privatisation are to proceed rationally and coherently while at the same time preserving the integrity of NGO's and their capacity for client advocacy and program innovation; politicians, administrators and agency boards of directors must strive for a more collaborative decisional framework in which public well-being as opposed to the economic bottom-line becomes the axial focus of discussion.

4.6 ORGANISATIONAL AND MANAGEMENT FACTORS IN QUALITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF SERVICE

There are a number of parameters of standards of service and the accountability of providers that must be taken

into account in the assessment and definition of policy encouraging the use of POSC's. The concept of "quality of service" in the setting of service standards entails some judgement as to the adequacy of the services in question. Are they appropriate to the needs of the client? What is the quality of the service setting and what is the skill level or professional standing of the person or persons dispensing the service? How are clients selected or referred? Is the dispensation of the service accessible or equitable? What is the balance of inputs and outputs related to service delivery? Does the benefit accruing to the client reflect, proportionally, the input of manpower and resources into providing the service?

There are many formulations of quality assessment - each of them problematic in some way. Unlike a commodity market, the economics of social service provision cannot be assessed purely in terms of a balance of benefits over costs. Many of the benefits or savings accruing, not only to the client but to the community as a whole, are not readily quantifiable. How, for instance can one enter on an accountant's ledger the costs averted in correctional services through preventive or educational programs for troubled youth? Clearly, more appropriate models of service evaluation are needed, but as yet there is little in the way of consensus about the evaluative criteria to be used.

A British Columbia Government Employees Union (BCGEU) report on non-government services observes that the setting of standards is often a very arbitrary process; norms often become the standards, thereby making the quality of services synonymous with accepted practises:

> ... the area of standard setting and quality of services is a subjective collage of usages, patterns, criteria, goals and values (BCGEU, 1980, p. 11).

The report further notes that the issue of standards of service is growing rapidly in importance, especially as

> ... the scramble for scarce resources has caused agencies to find ways to prove their worth and enhance their opportunities for a slice of the financial pie (BCGEU, 1980, p. 12).

The term "substandard" may be variously interpreted, but a reasonable explanation of a stubstandard service may be that which relates goal attainment to quality (BCGEU, 1980, p. 12). Hence, an agency judged as delivering substandard service is one which is not achieving an acceptable degree of success or accomplishment with respect to service outcomes for clients (BCGEU, 1980, p. 12). A common usage of the term "substandard" is one that connotes an evaluation of the means and methods of service delivery as opposed to goals. This entails some evaluation of the philosophies, treatment techniques, personnel and other aspects of service

delivery with a view to determining the "adequacy" of each. The concept of "adequacy" however, may also be ephemeral - deriving from the point of view and the values of clients, social workers and politicians. The setting of minimum standards, therefore, is problematic; there is a lack of consensus among agencies, practitioners and bureaucrats about appropriate criteria for service or outcomes (BCGEU, 1980, p. 12) and this makes the concept of adequacy malleable and subject to abuses. The licensing of agencies and facilities is one method of establishing minimum standards, however, in practise most licensing deals with physical criteria relating to premises and does not adequately address program standards (BCGEU, 1980, p. 12).

The non-government sector has been attributed, in some quarters, with the delivery of substandard services. In part this could be due to inherent limitations of the organisational structure of NGO's, but of even greater significance are constraining forces external to the agency. A significant factor, pointed out by Willms (1980), is the degree of constraint incurred by agencies who do not adequately exploit inter-agency information sharing. The BCGEU report also suggests a number of factors which could lead to substandard levels of service (bear in mind that operational criteria for the term "substandard" are not altogether clear):

1) The BCGEU draws a correlation between substandard services and substandard wages. Because of limited funding, NGO's are unable to offer comparable wages to the public sector. There is less inducement for applications by more qualified personnel and less encouragement for personnel to stay in the non-government sector for any length of time. In addition to low pay, the lack of benefits and career security may affect staff tenure.

2) Non-government sector positions are seldom viewed as career goals and are regarded, rather, as an interim stage in one's professional development. This aspect of professional transience combined with the inherent insecurity of a year-to-year allocation of dollars, can be correlated with short-term planning and incremental programs.

3) Due to fiscal constraints, NGO's are able to offer little in the way of staff training. Methods of maintaining and enhancing staff quality through courses, workshops or educational leave are limited within the non-government sector and thus inhibit the capability to be adaptive or progressive, such that:

> "The result may be a static service which begins to fall behind the norm and thus be considered sub-standard" (BCGEU, 1980, p. 13).

4) Again, due to funding levels, working conditions may decline as agencies are forced to cut-back on maintenance and costs related to the physical plant of the agency. Not only will the workers be affected by the adverse conditions that result, but physical decline of the premises may negatively affect the agency's image and safety.

5) Because of the popular conception that expertise is directly proportional to the level of remuneration, there may exist misconceptions of volunteer credibility within those agencies who rely on a strong volunteer component.

6) Limited resources affect the amount of on-going monitoring and evaluation of services and this impairs the technical and fiscal accountability of NGO's. Add to this the effects of a lack of evaluative criteria on the capability of agencies to be adaptive to environmental changes, and the lack of monies available for promotion and publicity of programs, and a setting is created for potential negative impacts upon levels of service (BCGEU, 1980, pp. 12-14).

Problems of accountability permeate all of the issues so far discussed. Evaluation and feedback on programs may be positively or negatively affected by the organisational capability of individual agencies; levels of expertise; capacity for data collection and analysis; type of programs offered (i.e. whether preventive or oriented towards intervention) and the standards attached to those programs; or simply by the number of staff and attendant caseloads. Some degree of accountability is crucial to ensure a continued allocation of funds.[3] All funding bodies, public or private, require some demonstration of the need for service and agency effectiveness in meeting that need. The collection of statistics and the documenting of cases and results of service intervention are a vital part of an agency's self-perpetuating activities.

The concept of accountability is enormously complex, however, and many agencies experience problems because of a lack ofstandardisation of service and evaluative criteria, a lack of knowledge or manpower, or the inapplicability of market-based costing models to certain types of programs. Some of these latter problems stem from a failure on the part of funding bodies to articulate, through policy, agency

[3]For a more detailed discussion of costing methods in social services, refer to Jansson, 1979; Lourie, 1979; Miller & Wilson, 1981; Frank, 1981; and Mansen, Higgens & Cass, 1976.

responsibility and criteria for program evaluation. Kramer (1983) points out that the concept of accountability often becomes a definitional maze:

> It has been viewed as both an end or a means; it has been defined in terms of procedures, results, disclosure of information, recourse, and compliance with regulations, and it is often indistinguishable from such concepts as evaluation, efficiency, effectiveness, control and responsibility (Kramer, 1983, p. 428).

Difficulties may also arise through multiple accountability where some agencies may be required to provide qualitatively different types of information to their boards, to the consumer, the community, and ultimately, to the funders. This may give rise to problems of worker overload, replication, and confusion for workers and agency directors.

Because service standards and effectiveness are difficult to ascertain due to a wide range of notions about the types of data to be collected and the manner in which they are analysed and applied, the BCGEU suggests:

> If service accountability is to be relevant to the non-government social service sector, consistent methods for utilisation of statistics keeping and evaluating procedures require delineation and enforcement.
>
> As government is the common denominator in non--government social services and as government is ultimately respnosible for the clientele, monitoring of agency quality via service accountability requires government initiation and enforcement. If, however, government accepts the responsibility for quality of service monitoring, they must also be prepared to

> provide adequate assistance to agencies to maintain government-set standards (BCGEU, 1980, p. 14).

The above may suggest a reason why standard setting for NGO's has not been more vigorously pursued. Because there are added costs inherent in the maintenance of service standards, and because government uses the voluntary sector to augment the more expensive public sector, the setting of standards may serve to increase the government's net commitment of resources. By establishing minimum criteria for services, government may actually be driving-up the per unit cost of service. There are also political costs which must be weighed by government decision-makers: if the standard of service applied is too low and injury or debility results for the client, the public authority may be legally and politically compromised. If the standards set are high, it would be politically difficult for governments to cut back in times of recession or restraint - in either case, the political flexibility of the incumbent authority is reduced. Flexibility, in this case, suggests greater power and control on the part of government with respect to bestowing or withdrawing legitimacy for some service types or groups, but with the larger burden of responsibility for the maintenance of quality of service placed upon public agency bureaucrats and voluntary sector directors and boards. This may, in effect, amount to a diffusion and blurring of political accountability.

Although promoted as a means for expanding the capacity of NGO's for innovation and flexibility and of making programs more responsive to local needs and consumer wishes another, perhaps more important rationale for the use of POSC's is that they offer prospects of cheaper service delivery and greater control over what is delivered to whom while at the same time keeping the liability for service quality at a political arms-length. However, POSC's may pose special problems for service quality:

a) service contracts are, after all, legal documents; voluntary agencies frequently lack the resources to acquire legal knowledge and/or negotiating skills thus leading to an inequality in the negotiating process;
b) year to year contracting is inappropriate to program planning and program management techniques which are essential to effective service delivery and monitoring;
c) relatively short term contracting seems to underrate, if not ignore, the importance of continuity in the core administration of an agency to effective agency operations. This may contribute to low morale and high turnover among staff which may lead to deterioration of service to clients;
d) contracting for service tends to heighten agency competition for scarce resources rather than encourage co-operation and co-ordination among agencies in service planning and delivery (United Way, SPAR/SPARC, 1980 #2, pp. 7-8).

Added to the prevailing lack of negotiating skills among NGO's (in part stemming from a lack of long-term economic strength and stability) POSC's are problematic in that they lack clarity and precise formulations (United Way, SPAR/SPARC, 1980 #1, pp. 42-43). The commitment of the State to the principle of universality is radically altered under these conditions. Without formalised policy criteria for provision under POSC's the decision-making exigencies of government, in both its legislative and administrative arm, may be founded more on political efficacy than on meeting client need. Certain groups of clients may be included or excluded based on their importance to the political requirements of decision-makers; certain locales, harbouring constituents favourable to the government, may receive greater inputs of funds than might areas where no political liability exists. The potential exists (and has to some extent been realised) for negative impacts upon accessibility and availability of services as a result of either social and political exclusion (e.g. reduction of services to minorities, women and children), or an uneven geographical distribution of resources and inputs (e.g. favouring government-held constituencies).

CHAPTER V

RESTRAINT AND THE VOLUNTARY SECTOR IN B.C. - FINDINGS FROM THREE COMMUNITIES

5.1 THE SOCIAL CONTEXT

Social and economic policy at both the national and provincial level, if it is to deal effectively with the demands placed upon it, must be responsive to social and demographic change as well as to structural change in the economy. Structural change has contributed to a broadening experience of unemployment in British Columbia and for Canada as a whole. By the end of 1984, B.C. maintained the third highest unemployment rate in Canada at 14.7 percent (Vancouver Sun, December 7, 1984). The problem is further compounded when estimates of "hidden unemployment" or discouraged workers are added to the Statistics Canada figures (Vancouver Sun, March 9, 1985).

The Canadian Council on Social Development (CCSD) estimates that 2.3 million or 26 percent of Canadian households live below the poverty line (Lesley, 1984, p. 29) and further notes the increasing "feminisation" of poverty with 43 percent of lone-parent mothers and 62 percent of unattached women over the age of 65 living below the poverty line (Lesley, 1984, p. 63). In British Columbia, about one person in ten relies solely on provincial government assistance (GAIN) to survive, with 117,000 monthly cheques

providing basic income assistance for 218,435 persons in October 1984 (Vancouver Sun, December 11, 1984). This, however, is a poor indicator of the extent of poverty as it does not take into account the working poor or persons receiving other forms of income assistance. Working from 1981 data, the CCSD estimated the number of unattached individuals in B.C. living below CCSD poverty lines at approximately 36 percent and the number of families in the same situation at approximately 18 percent of the total population (CCSD, 1984, pp. 85-86).

The propensity for persons to seek provincial assistance may be inferred from unemployment data. For the B.C. -Yukon area as a whole in February, 1984, approximately 10,000 persons per month were exhausting all possible unemployment insurance benefits (November 1983 - 12, 430 persons, December 1983 - 8,956 persons). These figures do not represent persons who have gone back to work and who would re-qualify for benefits at a later time (personal communication, Connie Power, U.I.C., February 1984). The rate of unemployment in B.C. by January 1985 was 16.33 percent compared to 12.19 percent nationally (Statistics Canada, The Labour Force, January 1985). The extent of youth unemployment has also been a major problem in B.C., particularly as opportunities for retraining or tertiary education diminish as educational programs and institutions are cut back and faculty let go. The rate of unemployment for males from

15-24 years of age was 27.3 percent for B.C. in January, 1985, compared to 22.5 percent for Canada. The rates of unemployment for females in the same category and for the same period were 21.2 and 15.8 percent respectively (these rates may be even more drastic due to the possible serious under representation of women registered as unemployed: Ginsberg, 1979, p. 93). In addition, the average duration of unemployment has also increased, from 13.4 weeks in 1976 to 24.9 weeks in January 1985 (Statistics Canada January 1985). Nor has unemployment respected traditional occupational boundaries as evidenced by the emergence of the "non--traditional unemployed" - white collar, technical and professional workers who in other times appeared only marginally in unemployment statistics (Vancouver Sun, July 21, 1984).

Other demographic trends offer more clues to the likely future demands upon our national and provincial social welfare systems. Statistics Canada household and family projections (1981) estimate that by 1991 one-parent families headed by females will comprise 9.8 percent of all families for Canada. Furthermore, women are five times more likely to head a lone parent family than men overall, while women up to the age of 35 are 8.5 times as likely to head lone parent families (based on Statistics Canada estimates for 1976, Statistics Canada Household and Family Projections 1976-2001, 1981). Linked to the growth of lone parent

families is the fact that the total divorce rate for Canada has risen 82 percent from 1972 to 1982 (Statistics Canada Current Demographic Analysis, 1985). This holds implications not just for the contribution to the absolute number of lone parent families, but also for future demands for personal social services for women and children, day care services and income support services.

Another factor which will influence future social and economic policy is the "top down" aging of the population, meaning that the elderly segment of Canada's population will grow proportionally larger over the coming decades. While in 1951, there were 20 people over 65 for every 100 young people (18-64 years - non dependents), the ratio in 1983 was 37 to 100 (Statistics Canada, Current Demographic Analysis, 1985). These people too, especially women, will require special attention in the way of housing, health services, nursing homes, income assistance, education and income security. Many signs, however, point to a more uncertain future, politically and economically. Understanding population dynamics and the development of better methods of forecasting can assist in the planning of future service needs and goals, but without the political will to engage in proactive change, needs will go unmet and the future of a larger share of our population will be uncertain.

The provision of social assistance in British Columbia has also experienced marked increase. From March 31,

1981 to March 31, 1982 the number of cases of persons receiving GAIN benefits in B.C. increased 13.53 percent. From 1982 to 1983, however, the level of increase was 49.88 percent; over three and a half times the previous year's increase. At the same time, the largest share of that increase went to two-parent families (81.73 percent in 1982-1983; from Ministry of Human Resources Annual Reports 1981-1982, 1982-1983). However, while the absolute numbers of persons receiving social assistance has risen, relative levels of assistance remain below the poverty line and are not indexed even to the rate of inflation. Still, inflation is not the only challenge to the adequacy of social assistance - rising public expenditures and the countervailing instability of the economy create significant fiscal and political pressures for the restraint of social expenditure. Even without restraint, there has been little effective redistribution of income in Canada as welfare rates have consistently been pegged below subsistence to discourage indolence (see Ross, 1983, p. 9).

In many areas of British Columbia, food banks have emerged to try and fill the gap between needs and public provision. In 1984 the Vancouver Food Bank distributed 110,000 bags of groceries from six outlets, up from 52,000 the previous year. As of March 30, 1985, the Food Bank was distributing 3000 bags of groceries per week. The demand on the Food Bank is such that a special outlet for single

parents was established in February of 1985. Even with this massive effort, people are often turned away and despite requests for assistance, the Provincial government refuses to become involved, citing food banks as the proper domain of the voluntary sector. Food banks have even come under criticism from other corners of the social service sector for making it easier for governments to implement restraint (Butcher, 1984; BCGEU, 1985). Food banks, conceived by concerned individuals as a temporary measure are becoming an institution within the voluntary sector, and, it is argued, serve as a buffer between the consumer of services and the State effectively diffusing and deflecting conflict.

Thus, the dependent in our society, already economically vulnerable, are rendered even more so by government cutbacks as has been demonstrated in several jurisdictions (Doyle et al, 1979; Ontario Welfare Council, 1981; Levens & Cleathero, 1982, 1984; Wyers & Halloway, 1983). In the main, such cuts have had their most serious impacts on the well--being and life chances of women, children, the disabled and the elderly. Also, because policies of restraint affect a range of public and voluntary sector support services which may be used by persons in situations of "social risk," the impacts of cutbacks on income assistance cannot be considered solely in terms of reduced buying-power. Again, restraint does not affect only those on welfare; the working poor, the near poor and the newly unemployed as well as

persons entering into the job market for the first time are similarly at risk (Deaton, 1983; Mackay, 1983; Rosenblush & Schworm, 1984, pp. 83-84).

5.2 IMPACTS UPON AGENCIES AND CLIENTS IN B.C. - A SURVEY OF PROFESSIONAL OPINION

The levels of retrenchment experienced and documented in the U.S. are portentous of the effects of restraint in British Columbia. Reductions in grants to community-based services (FY 1983-84, 10%; FY 1984-85, 20%) will affect different agencies in different ways; newer and smaller agencies will suffer more than those federated into associations, or affiliated with United Way. Reductions by government will mean increased pressure on other funding sources such as municipal governments, the United Way or philanthropic giving. There exists a danger of reduced levels of service and a reduced administrative capability on the part of agencies due to lack of wage increases and loss of quality staff. Furthermore, a diminished overall capability on the part of the statutory authority through the loss of personnel and the reduction of programs[4] may be a factor in the

[4]The BCGEU reports a loss through attrition and dismissal of 1,897 employees from the Ministries of Human Resources, Health, and Attorney General from April 1983 to April 1985. The report cautions that this figure does not account for workers employed in the B.C. social service delivery system and is based on a sample from the three ministries (BCGEU, 1985, pp. 8-9)

growth of caseloads in the voluntary sector, even though NGO's may not be able to accommodate such growth.

What has been consistently overlooked by the advocates of restraint economics are the costs - personal, social and monetary - of cutbacks in publicly mandated all services. A report prepared by the B.C. Association of Social Workers entitled Loosening the Fabric (1983) examines the public and private costs inherent in the termination of a Family Support Worker Program. The report notes that, while the program, designed to avoid the removal of children from their families, represented only 0.49 percent of the total Ministry of Human Resources (MHR) budget, the costs of replacement services such as special care foster homes, alternative schools, house arrest, detention and court appearances are vastly in excess of the current expenditures for a preventive program (Currie and Pishalski, 1983). Subsidised Legal Aid has also been drastically reduced in B.C., which, when combined with the loss of the office of the Rentalsman, the Human Rights Branch and budget cutbacks in the office of the Provincial Ombudsman, severely limits the accessibility of the poor or the near poor to avenues of appeal or redress.

There is a widely held view among social service professionals in B.C. that the devolution of public responsibility for social services will have several negative effects: 1) privatisation will lead to an overall reduction in the

quality of service; 2) services will become increasingly residual and remedial; 3) agencies will respond increasingly to political rather than social contingencies; 4) patterns of social inequity will broaden and deepen; 5) the availability of adequate service will constrict while the net costs of social problems to the Province and the Federal government will rise as a result of individual problem regression and problem diversion. Jack MacDonald, of the University of British Columbia School of Social Work, has addressed these possible effects with regard to family-oriented programs in the Province:

> In July of this year, it was announced by the Minister of Human Resources that these various Ministry programs of family support would be discontinued as part of the Government's program of fiscal restraint. Our Association has protested this initiative on the basis that it will place more children in jeopardy in the short run and be more costly to society in the longer term. However, we also wish to draw to public attention that the discontinuation of these programs reflects an abandonment of public responsibility for needed child welfare services at a critical period in the history of the Province (MacDonald "Child Protection Services and Privatization: A Proposed Position Statement for B.C.A.S.W.", 1983 - unpublished)

These concerns are suggestive of problems associated with the marketplace model of social service delivery. While governments who espouse the free-market ethic continually exhort the private sector to assume responsibility for service "gaps", they do not provide a framework to facilitate the process. There has, in British Columbia, been a paucity

of rational planning by government and little, if any, research exploring the possible hidden costs of the cessation of programs. The devolution of mandated services and public responsibility has not been accompanied by a decentralisation of decision-making authority and while the government claims that privatisation will enhance the power of the consumer of services, there has been little effort at consultation with client or community groups.

As one begins to look beyond the philosophical rhetoric and beyond the emotional appeals for restraint, one begins to form an impression that the fiscal policy of government is something more than a response to issues of dollars and cents. While there are serious problems with revenue and administration in all government departments, those programs targeted for restraint seem to be assessed more on the basis of philosophical criteria than the imperatives of rational management. There appears to be a pervasive notion among proponents of the "right" that dollars spent on social welfare are lost to the economy. The social returns, for example, of preventive programs for juvenile offenders, seem not to enter into the political or economic accounting of government ministers. Certainly, not all of the organisational or management alternatives for a more rational social service have been explored - many, one might speculate, have not been considered simply because they are ideologically untenable.

In February 1984, as a preparation for the empirical portion of this thesis, a series of interviews was conducted with administrators in eight non-profit NGO's. It was hoped that garnering professional opinion could permit an impressionistic assessment of two areas: 1) the possible extent of impacts upon agencies; and 2) the organisational imperatives for agency survival. Several types of agencies were approached in this informal survey: two community-based neighbourhood houses; one home-makers service; two agencies providing residential care and counselling for the mentally and emotionally handicapped; one umbrella agency which oversees the affairs of a coalition of neighbourhood houses; one family services agency providing counselling and referral services; and one quasi-governmental organisation providing community mental health care. At the outset, it should be observed that the expectations of the persons contacted, with one exception, form a consensus which indicates a bleak future for the voluntary sector and its clients.

The one exception was a non-profit agency providing residential care for handicapped adults. This agency provides care under contract for individuals who have extensive experience of institutionalisation. As a result of provincial government commitment to deinstitutionalisation, this agency even anticipated some possible growth, noting that dollars made available for the facilitation of deinstitutionalisation represent "new dollars" for the care of mentally

handicapped persons. Although the agency had not been impacted negatively by budget cuts, and had not articulated any response to proposed cutbacks, there was some concern that cutbacks in ancillary programs, such as sheltered workshops, might affect their clients. There was also concern that restricted dollars could mean limitations on the numbers of persons able to enter into programs aimed at deinstitutionalisation.

The impacts experienced by agencies have not been uniform. Not all NGO's are dependent to the same degree upon direct government funding; some, for example, are funded primarily by the United Way, others by foundation grants or through fund-raising. The most significant impacts, irrespective of funding source, have resulted from the sharply narrowed mandate of the Ministry of Human Resources in terms of direct services provided. Ancillary or supplemental services formerly provided directly by government must now be assumed by the private sector or lost entirely. One agency director ruefully referred to public bureaucrats as "mandate mandarins" whose continual redefinition of service responsibility greatly hampers the planning and co-ordination of NGO activities. Overall reduction of ministry staff will impact services in terms of increased caseloads, possible deflection of clients to a private sector already operating at capacity, and reduced monitoring and informational functions as well as reduced staff morale. One effect of this could be the increasing isolation of agencies from the MHR.

The termination of the Community Involvement Program, a Provincial self-help project which awarded an extra 50 dollars per month to welfare recipients who performed voluntary service work, meant a loss to agencies of support staff and put an increased demand upon paid staff and remaining volunteers. This meant a loss of agency flexibility. Freezes in spending by civic governments amounted to budgetary cutbacks due to inflation, limiting further the funding base of NGO's. In terms of homemaker services, available through contract to civic governments, service is being jeopardised through a lack of standardisation, increasing competition from proprietary agencies, declining levels of funding and unrealistic costing of services. It was observed by one employee of a non-profit homemaker service that as acute or long term care facilities reduce the numbers of persons in care, and if the growth of residential facilities does not keep pace with deinstitutionalisation, homemakers may be forced to deal with a level of service beyond their present mandate of personal care tasks. Staff will, in effect be asked to provide marginal health care which will put greater demands on current skill levels.

One striking point which seems to be common to most of those persons canvassed is that the consumer of social services is being progressively excluded from the decision-making process. Increased competition among NGO's for funding or even competition between public insitutions and

private agencies may result in their overlooking the needs and wishes of clients. Workers in residential programs for the mentally handicapped have reported a certain reluctance on the part of public institutions to lose some of their higher functioning clients. In this case, bodies represent dollars for the institution and job security for staff. In addition jurisdictional squabbles between Ministries of Health and Human Resources over the classification of persons experiencing mental health problems result in clients being deflected from one public agency to another in their search for help. Budget restrictions mean that many higher--functioning clients are not able to move up in the system while some agencies are "dumping" their lower-functioning clients. One mental health agency reported that half of its new referrals are deflections from other agencies. It was also noted that people are travelling further and further in the search for services.

One senior administrator with a community mental health agency remarked that the "revolving door" of social services is getting bigger. The absence of preventive services has led to dramatic increases in the number of client referrals. Many client problems cannot be adequately dealt with and as a result many mental health patients become social service refugees, resurfacing in various part of the social service bureaucracy. This has led to the emergence of what one official calls the "new chronic patient." Such a

person generally has no protracted experience of institutionalisation, instead experiencing short acute stays in a variety of hospitals. In this instance, the community itself is becoming the institution. Not only are community hospitals seeing more of these people, but the court system and police are encountering more handicapped persons. In absence of means, and with reductions in legal aid, many persons with mental or behavioural problems may be incarcerated. Many are simply released when arrested initially and this contributes to a cycle of maladaptive activity by reinforcing unacceptable behaviour.

There are other, organisational and managerial problems which will have to be addressed by NGO's. The opinion of some administrators is that as client deflection continues, there will be a greater demand for personnel demonstrating higher skill levels in terms of counselling and interaction. This could not only dampen the commitment of NGO's to volunteers, but in the absence of resources for training or securing qualified personnel, result in clients receiving inadequate levels of service. Also, changes in the "organisational mission" of the agency may mean that NGO's will become more responsive to the ideological priorities of government than to the treatment priorities of clients. One major concern is that reprioritisation of service needs and reclassification of need groups, may bypass completely persons who are "at risk."

5.3 CUTBACKS AND PERSONAL SOCIAL SERVICE DELIVERY BY NGOs: THE EXPERIENCE OF THREE B.C. COMMUNITIES

Much of the documentation of the effects of restraint upon voluntaristic social service agencies in British Columbia has been anecdotal in nature. There have been some attempts on the part of civic governments and non-profit community advisory committees to evaluate the economic and political situation in B.C. and to address the effects upon NGO's and their clients of government cutbacks. The findings of reports on the impacts on the voluntary sector for three communities will be summarised below. It is intended that the findings of these local studies will serve as a bridge between discussions of the effects of cutbacks in the United States, and the evidence of the Provincial survey to be presented later. Two of the documents examined are products of civic governments in the Lower Mainland region, describing general trends in service continuity and funding in their communities and the concerns of local governments about these trends. The first of these is a 1983 report from the Director of Planning for the Township of Richmond (Corporation of the Township of Richmond, 1983; Statton, 1983) and the second is a report from the Director of Social Planning for the City of Vancouver (City of Vancouver, 1983; 1984).

5.3.1 THE EFFECTS OF CUTBACKS IN RICHMOND

Richmond is a geographically extensive metropolitan community of 96,000 (Census of Canada 1981) located just south of Vancouver city on the Lower Mainland (southwest corner) of B.C.. In September 1983, the Director of Planning for the Township of Richmond submitted a report outlining his concerns for personal social services in Richmond in the face of the reduction or elimination by the Provincial government of public agency programs and funding for NGO's (Corporation of the Township of Richmond, 1983). The report observes that Provincial budget cuts occurred at a time when requests for services are increasing, partly as a result of continued population growth. The cutbacks observed in Richmond appear to involve services with a preventive component (under both public and private auspice). The question posed in the report is whether the termination of statutory intervention/prevention services (such as Family Support Workers and Child Abuse Teams discontinued by the MHR) will result in more significant social problems requiring treatment services which are costlier to provide. Questioned also is the ability of voluntaristic agencies to meet a greatly augmented need, especially where NGO's are also facing cutbacks from the Province as well as from other sources.

With respect to the capacity for NGO response to increased demands, the following factors are introduced for consideration:

1) it is becoming increasingly difficult for agencies to maintain an adequate supply of volunteers;

2) funding cuts affecting agencies' ability to retain paid permanent staff make it difficult to develop a comprehensive service program;

3) an effective and skilled volunteer staff may be obviated by the loss of funds for training and education;

4) cutbacks in staffing indicate that less time is spent in direct service delivery and that more time is spent by line staff on administrative tasks.

There is concern expressed in the report over agency shifts to increased self-sufficiency through the use of user-fees or the formation of for-profit ventures. The fear is that services will be restricted to those who can afford to pay, thus causing hardship for those on limited incomes. It is also expected that demands upon municipalities, private foundations, service clubs, and the United Way will probably increase on the part of NGO's and clients. However, these sources are facing financial constraints themselves and may have their own priorities regarding what they will fund. There is some evidence of (positive) adaptive response on the part of NGO's. Financial pressures appear to be promoting increased dialogue among agencies who are opting to reduce costs by sharing administrative services, sharing office space and through joint community fund-raising.

5.3.2 THE EFFECTS OF CUTBACKS IN VANCOUVER

In October 1983, the Director of the Social Planning Department for Vancouver issued one of a series of reports describing the effects of Provincial government cutbacks on local non-profit agencies (City of Vancouver, 1983; 1984). Vancouver is British Columbia's major metropolitan centre with a population in 1981 of over 414,000. The report expresses concern that the (projected) overall 1984 -1985 community projects budget for the Ministry of Human Resources incurred a 20 percent reduction over 1982-1983. Although the general guideline for reductions is 20 percent, the scale of reductions becomes substantially larger when community project cancellations are taken into account. While the overall losses to the community may be substantial, the net savings to the Ministry and the Province are small, especially as most of the community grants are cost shareable under the Canada Assistance Plan (a similar observation was made in the Richmond report). It is suggested that areas with high concentrations of public and private services and high concentrations of service users may be disproportionately impacted. Vancouver's Downtown and Downtown Eastside are given as examples where a loss of $191,799 in funding to seniors' centres and the cancellation of a $3,524 grant for a prenatal lunch program means a drop of 51% in the region's annual budget for these types of programs in 1984-1985.

The impacts of an across-the-board 20 percent reduction in funding to NGO's will not be uniform. For some agencies the loss of 20 percent of the MHR portion of their funding will be relatively insignificant while for others it will mean severe curtailment of services or closure. The latter effects would prevail for those agencies for whom MHR funding is a major component of total agency income. A loss of 20 percent will have a greater impact relative to the total operations of the agency: losses of paid staff and services will likely result. The City also harbours concerns about reductions or cancellations of funding for prevention services and the effects this might have on low income groups. Similar outlooks prevail for programs operated and funded by the Ministries of Labour, Attorney-General, and Health. In particular the City is concerned about the impacts of service curtailment on specific groups such as seniors, women, the disabled, tenants, families and racial minorities. The City already participates in the provision of health, social and preventive services, but its ability to fill the gaps left by Provincial funding reductions is constrained by its limited tax base.

5.3.3 THE EFFECTS OF CUTBACKS IN VICTORIA AND THE CAPITAL REGIONAL DISTRICT

By far the most detailed survey of community social service agencies (at this writing) has been undertaken by the Community Council of Greater Victoria, a non-profit voluntary organisation based in Victoria. The Council has produced a series of three reports assessing issues of funding and continuity of social service delivery by NGO's in the Capital Regional District (Community Council of Greater Victoria, 1984; 1984, No. 2; 1985, No. 3), the main catchment area for the Provincial Capital Victoria, with a population in 1981 of over 249,000. In March 1984, 39 community service organisations responded to a questionnaire conducted by the Council, the aim of which was to determine trends and patterns in agency funding during times of restraint. Of the 39 responding agencies, 33 percent reported a decrease in funding in March 1984, while 43 percent indicated no change in levels of funding. During the same period total MHR allocations to NGO's in the Victoria Region was $469,159, down 12 percent from $534,633 in 1981-1982. While United Way annual fund-raising has increased each year since 1980 (by 9 percent in 1983) the amount of funds available for disbursement in 1984 was ony 3.13 percent above the previous year, due largely to declining interest rates on reserves.

During the period from 1981-1984 volunteer registration increased by 70 percent and the numbers of agencies requesting volunteers increased by 47 percent. The characteristics of the volunteer market are interesting both in terms of the contributions of volunteers to NGO's and in terms of the parameters of the volunteer population itself. The Council found that of those registering as volunteers in 1983, 72 percent had been unemployed for between 6 months and 1 year while 44 percent indicated having been out of work for over a year. This suggests that the voluntary sector not only serves the needs of the client community but may, as well, provide a respite for the unemployed who may be seeking skills or experience to assist in their search for employment.

Of special interest is the experience of protracted unemployment which, it seems, not only impels persons to seek assistance but to offer assistance as well. The increased demand for volunteers can be traced to three main factors: the increase in clients generally as a result of economic conditions; the constriction of services in the statutory sector and a consequent increase in demands on private sector services, and; the loss or inadequate indexation of funds to NGO's experiencing increased demand. Those agencies most affected by cutbacks have been operating with frozen or reduced funding for several years. Further, the Council reports that reduced Provincial support affects

primarily those services that are preventive in nature to the extent that the responsibility for such services now rests almost entirely with the voluntary sector, school boards and municipal governments.

Of the agencies surveyed, 28 (72 percent) reported that there had been no change in their delivery of services and only 6 (15 percent) reported a decrease in service. Some agencies explained that services are being maintained at the expense of current staff members whose salaries have been frozen or reduced and whose workload and responsibilities have been increasing. Agencies are also exploring other methods of coping with cutbacks, many of which revolve around strategies for cost-replacement, or cost-reduction. Of these strategies, the most common appear to be: turning to fees for service; soliciting foundation grants; special events (fund-raisers); and/or increased volunteer recruitment. Still, these measures may not be enough to maintain present, let alone optimal, levels of service delivery. The agencies surveyed by the Council identified a number of areas of unmet needs in the community: 28 percent suggested a need for more counselling services; 23 percent saw unemployment as the significant problem; 13 percent saw a need for more treatment-oriented programs; 13 percent expressed concern about the state of funding for community services; 8 percent identified housing, and ; 5 percent suggested the co-ordination of services as the main area of unmet need.

The Community Council produced a follow-up survey of 42 Victoria-area agencies in January 1985. The questionnaire was divided into three sections: service to clients; fund--raising and financial management; and agency information/ resource exchange. The 40 agencies responding to the questionnaire provide services to families, children and youth, women, the elderly, ethnic groups, and the handicapped in the areas of education, health, legal services, poverty, employment, drug and alcohol abuse, information and referral and community groups throughout the Capital Regional District. When questioned about caseload change, 29 (73 percent) of responding agencies reported an increase in the number of clients served in 1984. Twenty percent indicated no change in caseloads (giving as reasons limited space, staff and facilities) and two of three agencies indicating decreased caseloads indicated also a diminished capability on the part of the agency due to cutbacks (such as loss of staff or a reduction in agency hours). Staff members have also experienced heavier caseloads (caseloads per worker) and many agencies note an increasing severity of problems presented by clients (50 percent of responding agencies cite an increase in requests for crisis-oriented services). In addition, agencies are seeing more problems dealing with unemployment, as well as encountering clients who are poorer and more desperate at the time of first contact with the agency.

Almost one year after the initial questionnaire survey, in which a number of unmet community needs were idenitified, 73 percent of agencies in the 1985 sample reported receiving requests for services not offered by the agency and (according to the wording of the question), to the best knowledge of agency personnel, not offered elsewhere. Examples offered by responding agencies of needed services are services to youth and "youth at risk" (for example, drug and alcohol treatment; employment and job training), as well as various counselling services, for example, services for: men who batter family members; the elderly; noncustodial parents; immigrants and refugees; abused children and their families; employment counselling, and; comprehensive family counselling services.

Human service agencies in Victoria are expending large amounts of energy and time pursuing funding from various sources, a fact which may seriously affect their ability to concentrate on some service functions. Nineteen (47.5 percent) of responding agencies indicated from four to seven different sources of funding. Funding from community--based sources is a relatively small component of the total funding environment, therefore agencies who receive little or no government funding must seek funding from a number of sources. This requires a considerable expenditure of effort - searching for potential sources for funds and preparing proposals and requests for funds - which organisations with

limited manpower and resources often find onerous. Fifty-three percent of agencies surveyed indicated an increase in funding in 1985, 31 percent reported a decrease and 15 percent reported no change. At the same time, however, 75 percent of responding agencies reported an increase in operating expenses (including expenses such as telephone, electricity, postage and rent). Only 11 (27.5 percent) reported that their increased income met the increase in costs; 29 (72.5 percent) reported undertaking budget-balancing measures; 5 (13 percent) agencies reported reducing the number of staff; 10 agencies (25 percent) reported reducing paid staff hours, and; 15 (38 percent) reported freezing staff salaries (percentages add to more than 100 as some agencies answered in more than one category).

CHAPTER VI

THE VOLUNTARY SECTOR IN BRITISH COLUMBIA - THE EFFECTS OF RESTRAINT AND AGENCY RESPONSE

6.1 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The aim of this research is to ascertain the parameters of the voluntary sector's provision of social services. To accomplish this a mail-out questionnaire survey of 517 non-profit, non-governmental agencies was carried-out in early January, 1985. As no central registry of non-profit societies exists for B.C., respondents were selected from locally-produced directories of community services. The areas of the province covered correspond with 17 Ministry of Human Resources revised administrative regions, within which the responding communities have been grouped. The City of Victoria and the Capital Regional District of Vancouver Island were not included in this survey, primarily for reasons of cost. The effect of this omission is mitigated, however, by similar work done by the Community Council of Greater Victoria during the same period.

As there is no central government directory of non-profit societies and because local directories vary widely in quality and completeness (as they are largely private endeavours) it is not currently possible to ascertain the total number of NGO's providing personal social services in British Columbia. Respondents were selected on

the basis of often meagre information regarding services offered. As such, inferences about agency services and mission were often drawn on the basis of the names of agencies or societies alone. The respondent agencies selected are all non-profit in nature, are for the most part secular in auspice, and provide some level of personal service to individuals or groups. The "organisational mission" of agencies was a particularly important criterion of selection: all responding agencies provide either direct service inputs, or support (mutual "peer" support or advocacy), or information and referral to clients whose needs may be conceived as a "social repsonsibility" or a "social problem." The ethic of service to individuals in need as well as to the community is important in this regard.

Of the 517 agencies surveyed, 179 completed questionnaires were returned and 36 questionnaires were returned undelivered (presumably because the agencies involved had either changed premises or "closed") for a total return sample of 37%. The questionnaire comprises seven pages with 40 questions exploring aspects of agency structure, services and clients, funding and interorganisational relationships and the effects of Provincial government restraint on agency activities. For reasons of limited time and funding, a formal pre-test and call back of the questionnaire were not carried-out. While the questionnaire could have undoubtedly been improved, the high rate of return and the quality of

much of the data are encouraging signs of the overall success of the instrument. Indeed, in view of the length and complexity of the questionnaire, the rate of response is indicative of the degree of concern in the non-profit community for the continuance of their activities.

The breakdown of returns by region is given in table 6:1 below:

TABLE 6:1 BREAKDOWN OF AGENCY RESPONSE BY LOCATION

	Frequency	Percent
Metropolitan Regions		
All Vancouver*	46	25.7
Fraser South	12	6.7
Fraser North	4	2.2
North Shore	14	7.8
Surrey/New Westminster	8	4.5
Coquitlam/Maple Ridge	6	3.4
	90	50.3
Non-Metropolitan Regions		
Okanagan	15	8.4
Kamloops Mainline	8	4.5
Kootenays	8	4.5
Prince George/Cariboo	15	8.4
B.C. North	6	3.4
North Vancouver Island	7	3.9
South Vancouver Island	2	1.1
Fraser Valley	10	5.6
	71	39.7

* note: All Vancouver comprises 4 MHR administrative regions - Vancouver East, Vancouver Burrard, Downtown Strathcona, and Vancouver West & South (amalgamated 1985)

The sample is roughly evenly split between metropolitan and non-metropolitan regions (in this case, those areas coinciding with the Vancouver C.M.A. comprise the metropolitan sample) with 90 agencies reporting from metropolitan regions and 71 agencies reporting from non-metropolitan regions (another 18 agencies indicated serving more than one region).

6.2 COMPOSITION OF AGENCY PERSONNEL

Of the 179 responding agencies, most have been in existence only since the 1970's: 78% have been in operation less than 15 years; 48%, less than 10 years; and 21% less than 5 years. Most agencies are small - 92 of 159 valid responses (58%) indicating from one to ten paid staff of which 59 (37%) employ from one to five paid staff. Ten agencies report no paid staff and are entirely voluntary in nature while 71% (127 of 179) of all responding agencies indicated some use of volunteers to deliver services and 37% of these (47 agencies) reported that 91-100% of their staff is composed of volunteers. Of 124 agencies reporting some use of volunteers, 80 (64.5%) indicated using up to 30 persons (51 or 41% use from 1 to 10 volunteers). The normal length of stay reported for volunteers ranges between 13 and 24 months (see table 6:2).

Paid staff in responding agencies are roughly evenly divided between full-time and part-time personnel, without any clear predominance of one over the other. The specific mix of full-time and part-time staff components will be a

TABLE 6:2 NUMBER OF PAID PERSONNEL AND VOLUNTEERS EMPLOYED BY NON-PROFIT AGENCIES

	# AGENCIES RESPONDING			% AGENCIES RESPONDING	
NUMBER	PAID STAFF	VOLUNTEERS	PERCENT	PAID STAFF	VOLUNTEERS
1-10	92	51	1-10%	29	12
11-20	18	16	11-20%	12	7
21-30	11	13	21-30%	16	8
31-40	5	7	31-40%	9	7
41-50	3	5	41-50%	7	12
51-60	5	5	51-60%	9	3
61-70	3		61-70%	6	10
71-80	3	3	71-80%	8	15
81-90	4	3	81-90%	4	12
91-100		3	91-100%	47	47
over 100	5	18			
TOTAL	149	124	TOTAL	147	133

function of the types of services offered and agency finances and therefore one may expect a high degree of variability among and within agencies. In times of uncertain or unpredictable funding, paid agency staff may experience periodic shifts from full-time to part-time status and back again. Staff may also opt to reduce the paid component of their work in order to contribute voluntarily.

There is also considerable variation in the degree of reliance upon volunteers among the responding agencies. Eighteen agencies reported that they never use volunteers to

deliver services while 20 agencies indicated that 100% of their staff is composed of volunteers (this may or may not include a paid administrator). The most dominant trend, however, is for a lesser proportion of agency staff to be paid personnel with the balance of agency functions performed by volunteers. Fifty-nine agencies (33%) reported that from 1 to 30% of agency personnel are paid staff. However, 47 agencies also indicated that paid staff account for 91 to 100% of agency personnel and this suggests that NGOs can be characterised to some extent by their worker composition - those agencies who rely strongly on volunteer inputs and those whose staff is largely paid (and who may use some volunteer input, but on a much smaller scale).

As can be seen, the parameters of voluntary agency staff are highly variable and it becomes difficult, therefore, to identify the archetypal NGO on this basis. Predominantly, however, non-profit social service agencies employ few paid staff, most use some volunteer input and the majority of agencies for whom comparable data is available (66 of 106 reporting agencies, or 62%) utilise greater numbers of volunteers than paid staff (a normal standard of volunteer commitment is from 4 to 5 hours per week). With respect to the skills and professional competency of paid agency employees, agency directors were asked to indicate their agreement or disagreement with a number of statements related to the education and training of agency employees.

Positive and negative scores from a seven-point scale were tabulated and the following order of salience emerged:

a) most paid staff have taken some skills-enhancing courses (i.e. first aid, sign language, et cetera) or have had some work or volunteer experience in some aspect of service provision (overall score, 118 positive responses or 66% of 179 - calculated on the basis of residuals: total positive less total negative scores);

b) most paid staff have some post-secondary education, although not necessarily in a services-related field (overall, 74 positive responses or 41%);

c) most paid staff have professional qualifications (for example, degrees in social work, counselling, psychology, et cetera) related to social services (overall, 66 positive responses, 37%);

d) most paid staff have no post-secondary education or formal training and have learned "on the job" (overall score 40 positive responses to 76 negative responses or -36 [20%]).

With reference to the above, "a" emerges as the most likely scenario while "d" is the least likely, receiving the most negative overall response. As such, this indicates a high degree of educational competence among the paid personnel of non-profit NGOs which when combined with the more intangible qualities of voluntariness (such as a sense of "mission" or altruistic purpose) may augur well for the quality of services provided (under optimal conditions).

6.3 FACTORS IN AGENCY ORGANISATION AND STRUCTURE

There are a number of additional parameters of non--profit NGOs which are of importance in assessing the overall viability and effectiveness of this sector. As with the composition of agency staff, aspects of the organisational and inter-organisational structure of NGOs such as the propensity to plan, engage in co-operative relationships or to affiliate with umbrella organisations may be crucial for the continuity and survivability of agencies and services. Ninety agencies (50.3%) indicated an affiliation with some umbrella group or coalition or federation of agencies (85 reported no affiliation). Staff members of 73 agencies (41%) are affiliated with, or members of, trade or professional unions or professional associations (89 or 50%, responded that agency members have no such affiliations). Asked if their agencies engage in co-operative relationships with other non-profit social service agencies, 168 agency directors (94%) responded that they do, compared to only 9 that do not.

Eighty-one agencies (45%) incorporate a distinct planning component as a function apart from other service or administrative activities, while 75 agencies (42%) do not. Asked which planning horizon best characterised their agencies, 82 directors (46%) indicated a planning horizon of one year or less; 48 agencies (27%) reported planning horizons

of two to three years; and only 7 agencies reported planning horizons of four to five years. Another 32 agencies (18%) engage in incremental or "ad hoc" planning - dealing with issues as they arise. No trends emerge through the data which would suggest that the ability or propensity to undertake planning or incorporate a distinct planning component is a function of agency location, umbrella group affiliation, years in operation, the use of co-operative relationships or union or professional affiliation. It may reasonably be inferred that the ability and willingness to plan is less a reflection of the internal structure or interorganisational relationships of NGOs than it is contingent upon their general fiscal capabilities and administrative priorities.

With respect to other aspects of agency structure and interorganisational relationships, there is some indication of a positive correlation between agencies with umbrella group affiliations and those agencies engaging in co--operative relationships with other NGOs. The relationship, however, is not a strong one and it cannot be concluded unequivocably that umbrella-group affiliated agencies demonstrate a significantly greater propensity to engage in co--operative relationships (although there may be stronger administrative incentives among affiliated agencies to do so). Umbrella group-affiliated agencies also have a slightly greater propensity to have union or professional

affiliations, although agencies with professional or unionised employees do not by themselves demonstrate a greater propensity to engage in co-operative relationships than those that do not.

While the importance of factors such as the degree of union or professional affiliation and umbrella group affiliation is not strongly brought out in the data, future developments in social services policy in B.C. may give them added salience. Affiliation with umbrella groups such as the United Way offers non-profits a collective voice and may prove a viable vehicle for the mobilisation of agency responses in a changing social welfare environment. Umbrella groups can enhance the fiscal capabilities of member agencies (if they include a fund-raising component) and provide greater opportunities for co-operative responses with regards to cost-sharing or group-purchasing arrangements. Umbrella groups also augment the planning, co-ordination and research capabilities of member (and non-member) agencies, incorporating these activities under one auspice and acting as a clearinghouse for information related to services and funding.

Union or professional affiliation may also have some bearing on the continued viability of agencies. Professional affiliation (such as membership in the British Columbia Association of Social Workers) will have little, if any, effect on an agency's economic viability. The major

contributions of such associations, as with umbrella groups, is the provision of a collective voice - a forum for the articulation of responses to policy - and the setting and monitoring of professional and service standards. Professional or trade unions on the other hand, in addition to providing a forum for agencies and employees, also negotiate the wage levels of agency employees and define the level of volunteer input within member agencies.

In a social welfare "market place" where the ethos of competition among NGOs is ratified through the use of POSCs and reductions in grants, unionised agencies may find that they are not able to provide services "competitively." Wage levels in non-unionised agencies are low and where standards of service provision are not adequately defined, the least--cost option may prevail. The response of unions is that low wages may translate into low standards of service delivery through a lack of stability and continuity resulting from high levels of staff turnover (BCGEU, 1981, 1985). While there is no proven relationship between wage levels and service quality or effectiveness, this issue will likely remain a matter of contention especially if the competitive nature of the social service market place prevails.

6.4 INFORMATIONAL CAPABILITIES OF NGOs

As has been suggested by Willms (1980) the informational capabilities of actors in the social services marketplace are crucial to the efficiency and effectiveness of a social service network. Not only do providers of social services require current and reliable information (about social problems, clients, or demographic trends) in order to plan appropriate service interventions, but the potential clients of social services must themselves have adequate knowledge of the social welfare system in order to make effective choices. In fact, however, neither public or private institutions nor their clients act at all times with adequate, let alone complete information about their environment. Decisions predicated on the basis of incomplete or inadequate information may, therefore, be at best less than optimal or at worst dysfunctional. In the case of non-profit NGOs the task of navigating the complex legal and bureaucratic environment of the social services can be very taxing, especially for small, independent agencies. As such, opportunities to access funding for specific services may be lost, or the well-being of clients may be compromised through lack of awareness on the part of the providing agency.

When agencies were asked if they conduct any independent research, 96 (54%) agency directors responded that they

do and 75 (42%) responded that they do not. In addition, 135 (75%) agency directors indicated that their agencies access research on pertinent problem areas (or gather statistics or other data) while 33 agencies reported that they do not. When asked why no research or data gathering is undertaken, the most common repsonse was the lack of staff, time and money. Agency directors were also asked if their agency periodically offers training, courses, or seminars in an effort to enhance the skills of agency workers. One hundred and forty-seven replied that they do, compared to 32 who do not (82% and 18% respectively). They were also asked if agency members are encouraged to participate in conferences, symposia or other activities aimed at the sharing of ideas and the enhancement of agency effectiveness and accountability. Again, affirmative responses formed the majority with 162 agencies (90.5%) indicating that such encouragement is offered while in 15 agencies (8%) it is not.

What these reponses indicate is that despite financial and staff limitations, a high value is placed upon those functions related to the enhancement of the informational base of agencies. That NGOs endeavour to offer training and opportunities for agency members to network via conferences and symposia suggests a strong commitment to staying abreast of developments in the social welfare field in an effort to compensate for limitations on planning or research functions. This level of commitment augurs well for

the majority of agencies, assuming that the effort is sustainable. Even so, 28 agencies (15.6%) reported having experienced difficulty in supplying information to a funding source, and 15 agencies (8%) reported that this difficulty had at some time resulted directly or indirectly in a loss of funds. The reasons given for this difficulty and consequent loss of funding are, in order of frequency of response:

1) different funding sources requesting different types of information (18 responses);
2) lack of time or resources to comply with all requests for information (15 responses);
3) type of service not conducive to compiling statistics (12 responses);
4) information requested inappropriate or in excess of ability to produce it (11 responses);
5) problems of confidentiality (8 responses).

Although relatively few agencies appear to have experienced difficulties in supplying information, one cannot discount the possibility that the problem is more pervasive than this survey indicates. The questionnaire was long and complex - it may well be the case that agencies who might experience difficulties in generating sufficient or appropriate information for funders would have found the questionnaire itself too demanding of their time and resources.

One consequence of the fragmented nature of funding for non-profits is that agencies are often required to

provide information to a number of different funding bodies, each with their own requirements for fiscal accountability. If a small agency is unable to demonstrate an effective use of funds to even one funding body (either because agency staff have not the time or statistical competency, or because the services offered are not amenable to quantification) a loss of funds may ensue which could result in the closure of the agency. For small, independent agencies, the loss of one funder may be catastrophic. As the funding levels for NGOs decline relative to costs and increased case loads, the experience of informational difficulty on the part of NGOs may become more prevalent.

6.5 INTERORGANISATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS

Agency directors were asked to rank the importance of maintaining liaison relationships with the following auspices: A) other non-profit NGOs who offer similar or ancillary services; B) Provincial government Ministries and their personnel; C) consumers of services or their advocates; D) municipal or city governments and their departments and ;E) local community or citizens' groups. These were ranked along a scale from 1 (very important) to 5 (not important). The aggregate rankings of the degree of importance attributed to each of these groups display the following order of salience (from most to least importance):

1) other non-profit social service agencies;

2) consumers of services or their advocates;

3) Provincial government Ministries and their personnel;

4) local community and citizen's groups;

5) municipal and city governments and their departments.

When agency responses are broken down into their various structural dimensions the order of salience varies somewhat. For the 77 metropolitan agencies responding to this question, service consumers emerged as the most important liaison group, followed by other non-profit NGOs, community groups, and local government. For the 62 responding non--metropolitan agencies, NGOs are the most important liaison group, followed by the Province, consumers, community groups and local government.

These differences may be reflective of differing decision-making environments within which agencies operate. In metropolitan regions where citizens' or community groups form significant lobbies, agencies may experience stronger incentives to seek functional relationships with other voluntarisitic organisations who reflect sympathetic biases. As they are likely to have a greater mix of funding sources and informational inputs, metropolitan agencies may tend to have less direct contact with Provincial government Ministries. Non-metropolitan agencies on the other hand may be less likely to seek to minimise contacts with Provincial government Ministries due to factors of physical isolation

and funding dependency. In non-metropolitan areas NGOs may be involved in the delivery of services which would normally be provided by the statutory authority in urban areas. Also, the number and economic capacity of non-government funding bodies will be limited in many non-metro areas leaving NGOs with a potentially greater dependency upon the Province. Finally, the concentration of NGOs and citizens' groups in non-metropolitan areas will be lower than in metropolitan regions thus affording fewer opportunities to forge liaison relationships.

It is of interest that both metropolitan and non--metropolitan agencies rank relations with local government as of lowest-order importance. This latter observation acquires greater clarity when differences in the proportion of responses between metropolitan and non-metropolitan agencies are compared. Here it may be seen that more metropolitan agencies value relations with local government (37 of 77 agencies indicating local governments as "very important") than do non-metropolitan agencies (13 of 62 agencies). This may be linked to the differing fiscal and organisational capabilities of metropolitan and non-metropolitan governments and their consequent ability to contribute to NGO activity.

When liaison relationships are examined along the dimension of umbrella group affiliation, the following differences between affiliated and non-affiliated agencies

emerged. More umbrella-group affiliated agencies (56 of 76 agencies or 74%) identified relations with other NGOs as being "very important" than did non-affiliated agencies (44 of 74 agencies or 59%). More affiliated agencies (50 of 76 agencies or 59%) than non-affiliated agencies (42 of 74 agencies or 57%) ranked consumers of services as "very important" and more affiliated agencies (47 of 76 or 62%) than non-affiliated agencies (34 of 74 agencies or 46%) view relations with community groups as "very important." While the magnitude of difference is not great between the two types of agency, it suggests that the weighting of priorities may, in part, be a function of affiliation or non-affiliation. This implies that umbrella-group affiliated agencies incorporate as a part of their organisational mission many of the orienting values and priorities of the umbrella organisation.

Their outlook, therefore, may be broader and less parochial in scope. Umbrella group affiliation in this case may mean that member agencies will place greater stress on interagency relationships. Also, because umbrella organisations in their planning, public relations and fundraising capacity must be concerned with, and in some cases mould, community attitudes, it follows that member agencies will place a greater emphasis on relations with community groups than do non-affiliated agencies whose well-being is not directly linked with that of an umbrella organisation.

Overall, affiliated and non-affiliated agencies have similar organisational priorities and requirements, however, the stress placed on interorganisational relationships differs in degree and this may mean that non-affiliated agencies will be less "outward looking" and more concerned with their "core" service functions than their affiliated counterparts.

6.6 SUCCESS IN OBTAINING INFORMATION

Agency directors were asked to indicate the degree of "success" or "lack of success" their agency experiences in obtaining information about clients, programs or funding from various sources. When ranked over all agency types, it was found that agencies experienced greatest success in obtaining information from other non-profit social service agencies. Hospitals, community health services and community mental health centres ranked second overall in terms of success in obtaining information. The remaining information sources are (in declining order of agenices' experience of success): Provincial government Ministries; city or municipal health and social planning departments; local police or R.C.M.P. and; private, for-profit agencies. Non-profit social services exhibited the greatest ratio of success to non-success (approximately 9/1), while for-profit agencies exhibited the lowest (1.5/1). Only seventeen agencies

responded that they never seek informaton from other non--profit NGOs compared to 76 agencies who reported that they never seek information from for-profit NGOs. After for--profit NGOs, Provincial government Ministries exhibited the lowest ratio of success to non-success in providing information (approximately 2.1/1) although they figured as an important source of information overall (only 14 agencies reported never seeking information from Provincial government Ministries). Twenty-one, 42 and 55 agencies, respectively, reported that they never seek information from community health services, city government departments or police. The ratios of success to non-success indicated for these three sources are: community health services - 5.1/1; city planning and health departments - 4.3/1; local police, R.C.M.P. - 3.1/1.

In the light of the above, the overall lack of success experienced by agencies in obtaining information from Provincial sources carries potentially serious implications for non-profit agencies, especially in view of the importance of the Province to the continued operations of NGOs. When agency responses are examined along the dimensions of location, umbrella group affiliation and union or professional affiliations the same general pattern of salience prevails. Non-profit NGOs and community health services are still the sources of greatest success in obtaining information while the least success is experienced with

for-profit NGOs and police (where information is also least sought). Interesting differences emerge when comparing the proportion of agencies indicating that they are "often successful" in obtaining information. For example, only 8 metropolitan agencies reported a high degree of success with Provincial government sources (38 agencies reporting success overall) compared to 18 non-metropolitan agencies (with 49 agencies reporting success overall). This may have a corollary in the importance placed by metro and non-metro agencies on liaison relationships: metropolitan agencies ranked liaison relationships with the Province as of fourth-order importance while non-metropolitan agencies held relations with the Province as of first-order importance - metropolitan agencies demonstrate less success in obtaining information from Provincial sources than do non-metropolitan agencies.

The converse is true with respect to agency experiences with local governments where 16 metropolitan agencies indicate that they are "often successful" (52 agencies indicating success overall) compared to 8 non-metropolitan agencies reporting that they are "often successful" (37 agencies indicating success overall). Again this forms an interesting corollary to the observation that metropolitan agencies value contacts with local government more than do non--metropolitan agencies. Finally, non-umbrella group--affiliated agencies appear to experience greater success than affiliated agencies in obtaining information from

Provincial government Ministries; government public health services and police, but this may in fact reflect a greater propensity to request information from, or to interface with, these sources.

6.7 SERVICE TYPES AND TARGET GROUPS REPRESENTED IN THE SAMPLE

The five service types which appear to be most salient for this sample are: a) referral/information; b) individual or group counselling; c) provision of a direct service (such as homemaking, shelter, transportation); d) preventive services, and; e) crisis intervention. The order of presentation does not necessarily imply order of importance, rather these five service types were those most frequently mentioned in each category ranked from 1-5: a breakdown of service types ranked 1-5 is given below:

TABLE 6:3 FREQUENCIES OF RANKED SERVICES

	Frequency of response for service types ranked 1-5					
Priority Given:	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	Total
1. preventive services	18	22	11	8	3	62
2. public education	5	6	13	13	13	50
3. crisis intervention	15	10	12	10	7	54
4. referral/information	8	26	16	23	8	81
5. interest group/advocacy	5	12	11	8	9	45
6. direct service	46	13	4	3	2	68
7. counselling	22	18	18	9	7	74
8. drop-in/visiting	6	8	11	11	12	48
9. other	15	2	1	3	1	22

The top-ranked recipients of service, overall, are: a) parents and families; b) children and youth; c) the community at large; d) the mentally handicapped or disturbed; e) women, and; f) seniors. Once more the order of presentation does not necessarily imply order of priority but does represent those groups to whom a majority of non-profit social services is directed. The following table offers a breakdown of agency rankings (1-5) of groups targetted for agency services:

TABLE 6:4 FREQUENCIES OF RANKED TARGET GROUPS

	Frequency of response for target groups ranked 1-5					
Priority Given:	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	Total
1. children/youth	25	18	11	2	2	58
2. parents/families	19	28	12	6	1	66
3. physically handicapped	6	12	7	2	3	30
4. mentally handicapped/ disturbed	21	9	3	8	1	42
5. women	15	9	10	3	5	42
6. seniors	23	8	3	3	2	39
7. prisoners/offenders	8	1	2	2	4	17
8. unemployed/low income	9	12	7	6	5	39
9. welfare recipients	-	12	5	4	6	27
10. tenants	1	4	2	3	1	1
11. drug/alcohol problems	7	3	4	7	4	25
12. community at large	18	6	13	11	2	50
13. other	9	2	2	-	1	14

It should be noted that in many cases agencies nominated more than one service type or target group as being of 1st, 2nd or 3rd order importance. Responses in the above tables, therefore, are neither mutually exclusive nor exhaustive. In

addition, some agencies were unwilling to prioritise service types or target groups, instead assigning equal weights to all relevant groups and services (undifferentiated as to order of importance). This fact particularly underscores the pluralistic nature of many voluntary sector social service agencies. A table of those service types and target groups which are undifferentiated as to order of importance is set--out below:

TABLE 6:5 SERVICE TYPES AND TARGET GROUPS UNDIFFERENTIATED ACCORDING TO IMPORTANCE BY RESPONDING AGENCIES

Service Type	Frequency	Target Groups	Frequency
1) preventive	24	1) children/youth	28
2) public education	32	2) parents/families	29
3) crisis intervention	24	3) physically handicapped	23
4) referral/information	36	4) mentally handicapped/ disturbed	19
5) interest group/ client advocacy	30	5) women	25
6) provision of a direct service	28	6) seniors	26
		7) prisoners/offenders	15
7) individual/group counselling	36	8) unemployed/low income	25
		9) welfare recipients	26
8) drop-in, friendly counselling	19	10) tenants	12
		11) persons with drug/ alcohol problems	19
		12) community at large	15

It may be posited further that those client groups who are the primary beneficiaries of NGO-delivered services represent persons who may be socially or economically vulnerable. This observation tends, therefore, to reinforce the traditional image of voluntaristic services (or, as they

were once regarded, "charitable" services) as essentially "protective" or "paternalistic" in nature. Even so, while voluntaristic social service agencies often assume the "protector" role (either deliberately or by default), their clients are not drawn exclusively from the ranks of the poor or near poor. In part, the incorporation of NGOs into the broad network of State-provided services has imbued voluntary agencies with a quasi-official status while maintaining sufficient remove from the statutory sector so as to not incorporate some of the stigmatising aspects of State welfare services.

Thus the socio-economic constituency of the voluntary sector may be much broader than that of public sector services which for many becomes the "agency of last resort" - a repository of worst-cases. In fact, because of the limited economic and organisational capabilities of the non--government sector, many non-profit NGOs cannot, by themselves assume responsibility for so-called "lower functioning" users of services (those who require intensive service inputs). That they are sometimes able to offer services to "lower-functioning" clients is due to the support by the State of these individuals (through GAIN payments or other transfers) and through State support for the services provided (through grants or contracts). Should current levels of State support of these individuals or programs decline significantly, responsibility for their care would relegate almost entirely to the State.

6.8 AGENCY SOURCES OF FUNDING

As has already been mentioned, the funding base of non-profit NGOs is typically fragmented - a condition which has often meant that NGOs are particularly sensitive to changes in the priorities of funding bodies. Agencies responding to the questionaire indicated anywhere from 1-6 funding sources, with the most important source of funds being the Provincial government, in particular, the Ministries of Human Resources (MHR) and Health.[5] MHR provides an average of 58% of funding to 42% of the responding agencies and from 80-100% of funding to 38% of all those funded by the MHR. The Ministry of Health provides an average of 53% of funding to 22% of agencies responding and 80-100% to 36% of all those funded by the Ministry of Health. To lesser degrees, other Provincial Ministries also provide funds for non-profit agencies. The Ministry of the Attorney General and Corrections provides an average of 58.5% of funds to 17 (9%) agenciesand the Ministry of Labour provides an average of 38% of funds to only 3 agencies. Under the heading, "other Provincial government," we find that 40% of agency funding is provided to 21 (12%) agencies from Provincial

[5]N.B. a number of responding agencies reported receiving funds from the sources to be discussed in this section but did not indicate the proportion of funds received from each source. The calculations which follow are based only upon those responses for which values were given.

sources. A table setting out Provincial sources of funding is given in figure 6:6:

TABLE 6:6 PROVINCIAL SOURCES OF NGO FUNDS

Provincial Government Source of Funds	# of Agencies Funded	Average %	Range of Funding Provided
1) Ministry of Human Resources	75	58.3	2-100%
2) Ministry of Health	39	53.8	9-100%
3) Ministry of the Attorney General/Corrections	17	58.5	1-100%
4) Ministry of Labour	3	38.0	3, 11, 100%
5) Other Provincial Government	21	40.4	2-90%

(N.B. It should be noted that individual agencies may receive funds from more than one Provincial or Federal source.)

The Federal government is the next most important source of funds for NGOs, although assessing the total contribution of the Federal Government is problematic because of cost-sharing with the Province under the Canada Assistance Plan (C.A.P.). Direct funding from Federal government departments provides an average range of 10-39% of funds (for a grand mean of 28%) to 74 (41%) agencies. Federal government sources often come in the form of one-time grants for specific programs and emanate from a number of auspices. Federal sources identified in this sample are listed in figure 6:7:

TABLE 6:7 FEDERAL SOURCES OF NGO FUNDS

Federal Government Source of Funds	# of Agencies Funded	Average %	Range of Funding Provided
1) Employment and Immigration Canada	25	27.0	1-100%
2) Health and Welfare Canada	5	39.2	5-70%
3) Secretary of State	9	34.5	1-90%
4) Canadian Mortgage and Housing Corporation	7	10.4	2-25%
5) Other Federal Government	28	27.8	1-100%

Local government is the third most important source of funds but it pales in comparison to the Province and the Federal government, providing an average of 19% to 32% of all agencies, and only 1-5% to 44% of all agencies funded by local government. In declining order of importance as sources of funding, local government is followed by agency fundraising, the United Way, membership fees and fees for service, private donors, and foundation grants. A summary of the contributions of these latter sources of agency funding is provided in figure 6:8:

TABLE 6:8 SOURCES OF NGO FUNDING - NON-PROVINCIAL, NON-FEDERAL

Other Sources of Agency Funding	# of Agencies Funded	Average %	Range of Funding Provided
1) Local government	57	19.0	1-100%
2) Agency fund-raising	67	16.9	1-95%
3) United Way	43	14.1	1-50%
4) Membership fees/fees for service	57	19.2	1-100%
5) Private Donors	55	18.3	1-100%
6) Foundation grants	31	13.0	1-100%
7) Other sources	18	28.7	1-100%

Overall, relatively low levels of funding from sources with limited fiscal capacity makes it doubtful that Provincial government cutbacks of 10-20% for community grants in 1984--85 can be compensated by sources other than the Provincial government.

Some decline in funding has been reported for all sources. The most important agent of declining support has been the Provincial government, particularly the MHR which meted an average decrease of 48% to 22% of all agencies included in the sample, representing 52% of those who receive funding from the MHR. Relatively small cuts in local government and United Way funding probably reflect in part some effort at redistribution to mitigate the effects of Provincial cuts.

The most important sources of increase in funding have come from donations, local governments, and the United Way. This suggests an interesting inverse relationship,

however, the ameliorative impacts of these inceases are limited due to the relative weight of these funders overall. For those agencies who experience neither increase or decline, stable levels of funding may be tantamount to a net decline when inflation and costs related to increasing caseloads are taken into account.

6.9 PATTERNS OF FUNDING INCREASE AND DECLINE FROM PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT SOURCES

The following tables summarise the numbers of agencies reporting increases or reductions in funding from all sources (over a period spanning F.Y. 1981-82 to F.Y. 1983--84) and the average amount of increase or decrease for each source:

TABLE 6:9 INCREASES OF FUNDING BY SOURCE

Increase in Funding by Source	Average % Increase	# Agencies Affected	Total Agencies Reporting Increase
1) Ministry of Human Resources	11.1%	9	10
2) Ministry of Health	33.3	9	11
3) Ministry of the Attorney General	100.0	1	2
4) Ministry of Labour	51.0	2	3
5) Other Provincial Government	13.0	11	15
6) Employment and Immigration Canada	12.8	6	8
7) Health and Welfare Canada	50.0	1	2

(TABLE 6:9 CONT.)

8) C.M.H.C.	100.0	1	3
9) Secretary of State	17.0	1	2
10) Other Federal Government	8.8	6	9
11) Local Government	50.6	20	20
12) United Way	11.9	16	20
13) Donations	67.1	20	26
14) Other sources	98.8	11	14

(N.B. "Agencies Affected" refers to those identifying the % value of funding increases - "Total Agencies" refers to the total number of agencies reporting increases. Absolute values of increased funding cannot be inferred from percentages.)

TABLE 6:10 DECREASES IN FUNDING BY SOURCE

Decrease in Funding by Source	Average % Decrease	# Agencies Affected	Total Agencies Reporting Decrease
1) Ministry of Human Resources	48.2%	33	39
2) Ministry of Health	42.1	13	14
3) Ministry of the Attorney General	28.6	8	8
4) Ministry of Labour	100.0	5	5
5) Other Provincial Government	36.3	8	16
6) Employment and Immigration Canada	60.0	8	8
7) Health and Welfare Canada	45.0	4	5
8) C.M.H.C.	-	-	-
9) Secretary of State	-	-	2
10) Other Federal Government	22.0	5	9
11) Local Government	6.5	2	4
12) United Way	15.2	4	4
13) Donations	35.0	12	12
14) Other sources	50.0	1	1

(N.B. "Agencies Affected" refers to those identifying the % value of funding reductions - "Total Agencies" refers to the total number of agencies reporting reductions. Absolute values of decreased funding cannot be inferred from percentages.)

The absolute numbers of metropolitan and non-metropolitan agencies affected cannot be inferred directly from the data presented above as the majority of agencies will have experienced increases or reductions from more than one source and, therefore, will have been counted twice. The actual number of agencies experiencing increases or reductions in funding from Provincial government sources is as follows:

TABLE 6:11 INCREASE AND DECLINE OF FUNDING FROM PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT SOURCES BY LOCATION

	Increase	Reduction	Combined Increase* and Reduction
Metropolitan	10	43	6
Non-Metropolitan	14	23	4
More than 1 region	1	2	
TOTAL	25	68	10

(* these totals include indications of reduction or increase in differing amounts from more than one Provincial source)

What these numbers suggest is that metropolitan agencies have been favoured over non-metropolitan areas in terms of both funding increase (negatively favoured) and reductions. In some cases agencies have experienced a simultaneous increase and reduction of funding. The conditions under which this could come about are: 1) monies lost under one Provincial program have been substituted by funding from another intiative within the same Ministry (grant monies may

have been replaced by contractual arrangements); 2) funds cut back by one Ministry have been substituted by funds from another Ministry which has assumed responsibility for the funded programs (implying, essentially, a transfer of responsibility), and; 3) programs and services for which monies are no longer available are cut-back in favour of programs and services for which monies are available.

There are also differences in the degree of change in Provincial government funding between metropolitan and non--metropolitan agencies. For example, 4 metropolitan and 2 non-metropolitan responses reported increases in Provincial funding of between 91 and 100%, however, it is not known whether this represents an increase over funds already allocated by the Province or first-time funds for specific projects or programs. Conversely, 16 metropolitan and 5 non--metropolitan responses reported declines in Provincial government funding of between 91 and 100% (the majority of increase for both metropolitan and non-metropolitan agencies is concentrated in the range of 1 to 35% while the majority of decrease is concentrated in the range of 1 to 50%). As suggestive as these data may be, however, of some disparity between metropolitan and non-metropolitan agencies, neither the magnitude of increase or decreasee (in real dollars), nor the exact number of agencies involved can be inferred directly from the data. Therefore, political or economic interpretations of this seeming disparity cannot be concluded with any certinty.

What remains, however, is the observation that the ratio of funding reduction to increase for metropolitan regions is 4.3 (agencies) to 1, compared to a ratio of 1.6 to 1 for non-metropolitan agencies. In addition, the ratio of metropolitan to non-metropolitan agencies experienceing funding reductions was almost 2 to 1. As such, many questions remain about the relationship between location and patterns of Provincial government funding, and are deserving of further research. Finally, the future of those agencies who received neither increase nor decrease in funding is also open to question. For the 86 agencies whose levels of funding (presumably) will remain relatively stable, increased costs and growth in caseloads may severely constrain agency activities. Stable funding may, therefore, be tantamount to a net decline in fiscal capability.

6.10 THE USE OF PURCHASE OF SERVICE CONTRACTS AMONG RESPONDING AGENCIES

Agencies were asked to indicate whether they offer at present, or have ever offered services through contract to any level of government. In all, 119 of 177 (67%) responding agencies indicated delivering or having delivered services through contract to some level of government. As has been observed in chapter four the use of contracts to provide statutory services became widespread during the

mid-seventies in British Columbia. This observation is no less true for this sample. While one agency indicated offering services through contract as early as 1954-1959, and 9 agencies reported offering services through government contract in the period from 1966 to 1971, the largest number of agencies working through contract report doing so for the first time in the periods of 1972-1977 (40 responses) and 1978-1983 (33 responses), thus coinciding with the major period of expansion for non-profit NGOs in B.C. Eleven agencies offering contracts reported doing so for the first time in 1984, a fact which may augur a new growth period for the use of POSCs. In addition, younger agencies (1-14 years in operation) predominate among those agencies offering contracts (thus reflecting the major age classes of NGOs in B.C.). Even so, agencies who offer, or who have offered, services through contract outnumber those who have not in all age classes.

The Provincial government emerges as the most important body under whose aegis contracts for service are undertaken with non-profit NGOs. The Ministry of Human Resources, particularly, is a significant actor in this regard, participating in POSCs with 43 responding agencies. Interestingly, 42 agencies reported undertaking contracted services from more than one source (these results should be interpreted with caution, however, as some agencies may have confused the term "contract" with the provision of community

grants, although there is no direct evidence that this has indeed happened). Funding bodies using purchase of service contracts to deliver services via non-profit social service agencies are listed in table 6:12 below:

TABLE 6:12 MINISTRIES OR DEPARTMENTS EMPLOYING PURCHASE OF SERVICE CONTRACTS

Source	Number of Agencies	%
1) Ministry of Human Resources	43	24.0
2) Ministry of Health	14	7.8
3) Ministry of Labour	2	1.1
4) Ministry of the Attorney General	4	2.2
5) Other Provincial government	1	.6
6) Employment and Immigration Canada	6	3.4
7) Secretary of State	1	.6
8) Other Federal Government	3	1.7
9) Local Government	2	1.1
10) More than one Ministry or Department	42	23.5
TOTAL	119	66.0

Agencies were asked what proportion of all agency services are offered through contract to government. Surprisingly, a large number of agencies (44) indicated offering from 91 to 100% of all agency services through contracts, and a total of 36 agencies reported offering from 51 to 90% of all services through contracts. These reponses indicated a much higher use of contracts than was expected and may have resulted from ambiguity in the wording of the question. A table of agency responses regarding the

proportion of services offered through contracts is presented in figure 6:13, although these results should be interpreted with caution:

TABLE 6:13 PROPORTION OF AGENCY SERVICES DELIVERED THROUGH CONTRACT TO GOVERNMENT

Percentage of Total Services Offered	Number of Agencies Responding	% of Total
1-10	6	3.4
11-20	5	2.8
21-30	3	1.7
31-40	3	1.7
41-50	9	5.0
51-60	2	1.1
61-70	3	1.7
71-80	16	8.9
81-90	15	8.4
91-100	44	24.6
TOTAL	106	59.2

These data, if they accurately portray the prevalence of the use of POSCs among NGOs in British Columbia, serve to underscore the need to more clearly define the criteria of contract use and standards of provision for contracted services.

Purchase of service contracts are directed to a variety of service types and target groups. A number of agencies (38) offer a mixture of program and service types under contract and 23 agencies report providing contracted services to a mixture of client types. The range of service types and client groups are enumerated in tables 6:14 and 6:15:

TABLE 6:14 SERVICES PROVIDED THROUGH POSCs

Program Types	Agencies Responding	%
1) mixed programs	38	35.8
2) counselling	17	16.0
3) provision of a direct service (i.e. homecare, transportation, etc.)	12	11.3
4) shelter	6	5.7
5) special services to children	4	3.8
6) referral/information	4	3.8
7) crisis intervention	4	3.8
8) special education/training	4	3.8
9) preventive services	2	1.9
10) drop-in/visiting	2	1.9
11) interest group/client advocacy	1	.9
12) other	12	11.3
TOTAL	109	100%

Among the specific service types contracted-out by government, counselling and direct service provision predominate. These do not represent monolithic classes of service, however, and may take a number of forms and be directed to a number of client groups. Among the client groups identified, children/youth, the mentally handicapped, women, and seniors emerge as the most frequently contracted-for groups.

TABLE 6:15 CLIENT GROUPS TARGETTED BY POSCs

Client Types	Agencies Responding	%
1) mixed client types	23	21.7
2) children/youth	19	17.9
3) mentally handicapped	11	10.4
4) community at large	11	10.4
5) women	9	8.5
6) seniors	9	8.5
7) prisoners/offenders	6	5.7
8) parents/families	5	4.7
9) drug/alcohol problems	5	4.7
10) immigrants	2	1.9
11) unemployed/low income	2	1.9
12) tenants	1	.9
13) Native people	1	.9
14) other	1	.9
TOTAL	106	100%

From the above tables one can infer the specificity of services and clients targetted by POSCs. Those agencies who provide more than one type of service to more than one client group are likely those agencies who engage in multiple contracts with more than one contracting body.

Metropolitan and non-metropolitan agencies differ slightly in their use of contracts. For example, 59 (of 90) metropolitan agencies (66%) indicate providing services through contracts whereas 53 (of 70) non-metropolitan agencies (76%) report engaging in POSCs. This difference, while small, suggests some support for the proposition that contracts have been used to permit the extension of statutory

services in rural areas (non-metropolitan regions exhibit ratios of contracting versus non-contracting agencies ranging from 2/1 to 7/1). With respect to differences in client groups provided-for through contract by metropolitan and non-metropolitan agencies, of 59 metropolitan agencies providing contracted services, 6 (10%) reported targetting these services to children/youth compared to 13 of 53 (24.5%) non-metropolitan agencies. Also, no metropolitan agencies reported delivering services through contract to prisoners/offenders while 5 non-metropolitan agencies reported serving this group. Conversely contracted services for immigrants and Native peoples were reported only for metropolitan regions.

Finally, metropolitan agencies displayed a greater propensity to deliver a mixture of contracted services to multiple client groups than did non-metropolitan agencies. These observations reflect the differing service priorities and needs environments of metropolitan and non-metropolitan regions. In metropolitan areas, with greater concentrations of specialised services for a broad range of client groups, the need for government to purchase services for children or offenders may be less than in non-metropolitan areas where the statutory sector does not include highly-specialised inputs as a normal constituent of public sector activities. Similarly, even in metropolitan areas the perceived need for specialised services for immigrants or Native peoples may

not be enough to warrant direct provision by the public sector, and these too will be contracted.

When agencies providing contracted services are examined across the dimensions of umbrella group and union or professional affiliations, differences emerge which, while not large, may offer some insight into the dynamics of POSC procurement. A greater number of agencies with umbrella group affiliations (67 of 90 agencies or 74%) provide services through contract than non-affiliated agencies (52 of 85 agencies, or 61%). Similarly when union or professional association affiliations are considered, 55 of 73 affiliated agencies (75%) reported providing contracted services, compared to 55 of 89 non-affiliated agencies (62%). Although by no means conclusive, these differences may in part reflect differences in the organisational capabilities of affiliated and non-affiliated agencies. Affiliation or membership with larger organisational entities may serve to enhance the access of individual agencies to information, legal advice, or other inputs. Such informational advantages may reflect favourably upon the agency's perceived ability to fulfill the terms of the service contract. Member agencies may also benefit from perceptions of greater stability, greater access to ancillary resources, and possibly greater credibility that such organisational associations may bestow.

The foregoing discussion has offered only a brief sketch of the parameters of purchase of service contracting

in British Columbia. While the data in some cases is limited and of unknown reliability, one may conclude with some confidence that the use of service contracts is extensive, both geographically and in terms of the persons whom they serve. Given the current direction of social policy in British Columbia, the use of POSCs is likely to become even more pervasive than it is today. If the degree of non-profit agencies' participation in the delivery of contracted services as suggested by these data is reliably portrayed, then it is clear that the non-profit social service sector is far from being marginal to the State and, therefore, more research into the use of service contracts is needed. If the data do not accurately portray the parameters of POSC use, then more research is required to provide a clearer picture.

6.11 EFFECTS UPON NON-PROFIT AGENCIES OF PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT RESTRAINT

Much of this thesis has been directly concerned with demonstrating the importance of the voluntaristic sector within the larger framework of the social safety net. In particular, this thesis has attempted to show that not only are non-profit NGOs <u>not</u> merely marginal to the statutory sector, but they are almost completely dependent upon it if they are to adequately fulfil their augmented role within the mixed economy of social services. What has been described is, essentially, a symbiotic relationship between the

non-profit sector and government where each sector requires the other on increasingly uncompromising terms. In this section the effects upon agencies of financial restraint will be discussed, and the potential effects upon clients inferred.

Financial instability has probably existed as a chronic feature of voluntary organisations since long before the advent of the welfare State. In other times, fund-raising and philanthropic giving would have provided a predictable, if limited, flow of funds. There were probably few incentives and fewer opportunities for charitable associations to over-extend their range of provision. The very needy were offered some succor and fervent admonishments about the sanctity of "honest" work and the countervailing evils of indigence. The nascent middle classes were largely left to fend for themselves; both they and the public charities inculcating the Victorian Protestant ethic which dominated late 19th and early 20th century industrial society. Economic stability, however, did not come to the voluntary sector with the provision of public monies. As their funding base grew, so too did the demands placed upon them. Through the political articulation of social need and public responsibility for its provision, the voluntary sector became less exclusionary and more egalitarian in focus, embracing principles of redistributive justice.

Thus, while today's voluntary social service agency has a much larger cash flow than its purely charitable predecessor, the nature and range of services provided have changed fundamentally. Philanthropy has been transcended by an organisational mission that has more in common with contemporary clinical social work practise than with the "goodworks" of turn-of-the-century matrons exercising their social conscience. The demands upon that organisational mission have not abated, and in fact continue to grow. As a consequence, the costs of meeting the demand for services (even nominally) continue to rise as well. The loss of funding from the Province threatens the ability of the voluntary sector to continue to respond to that need.

Agencies in this sample were asked to estimate the percent increase in operating costs for 1985 (due to inflation, rent, added expenses, et cetera). A range of estimates was reported of which the average was 12%. When asked what level of increase would be necessary to operate programs and services at 1981-1982 levels, the average response indicated a needed increase of 22%. Asked if the latter level of funding had been met, 103 agencies (69%) said "no." Asked if 1983-84 levels of funding would be met in the coming fiscal year (1984-85), 44 agencies (25%) said "yes," 40 (22%) said "no," and 81 (45%) answered "maybe." Taken all-together, this suggests a high level of financial uncertainty in the voluntary sector - particularly concerning the actions of

government - and portends a possible decline in the level of service that the voluntary sector is capable of delivering.

As for specific effects on agencies of cut-backs in agency funding:

1) 127 agencies (71% of the total) experienced growth in caseloads since 1982. Of these, 66 agencies (37%) indicated a "substantial growth" in caseloads;

2) 97 agencies (54%) indicated having "picked-up" services or clients previously mandated by government but for which there is now a reduced level of support;

3) 95 agencies (53%) reported an increased use of service rationing (which could include exclusion mechanisms, client deflection or reduced service inputs);

4) 48 agencies (27%) reported having to deflect clients to other public and private agencies while 90 agencies (50%) reported dealing with clients and problem-types not formerly dealt with, in other words, those clients usually dealt with by other public or private agencies. The reasons given by agencies for the above are, in order of salience:
    a) loss of service in other parts of the service network (72 responses);
    b) increased caseloads (39 responses);
    c) losses of staff and/or funds (37 responses);
    d) inability to expand services to meet demand (33 responses).

   Client-deflection and the experience of encountering problem types to which the agency is unaccustomed are, therefore, interdependent. If one or more agencies are unable to meet all the demands for which they are mandated, other public or private agencies (who may already be operating at capacity) will inherit the surplus demand (they may in fact be constrained to pass-on the surplus yet again);

5) agency directors were asked if their agencies had experienced any major shifts in program emphasis since 1981. Examples of program shift were given as changing from preventive to intervention services, or, from the direct

provision of a service to increased referral. In all, 59 agencies (33%) responded affirmatively, thereby suggesting that the organisational mission of voluntary agencies has been affected to some degree by restraint. The types of program shift cited - increased referral and crisis intervention - are suggestive of decline in service intensity;

6) 82 agencies (46%) reported having to reduce or eliminate services offered in or prior to 1982. Lack of staff (69 responses) and lack of funds (45 responses) were given as the major reasons for program reduction. Other, lesser reasons offered for program reduction were: a lack of demand or need for the services dropped (10 responses) and; the programs eliminated were already offered, or taken over, by other private or public agencies (8 responses);

7) in spite of the reported elimination or reduction of services, 118 agencies (66%) were able to indicate having expanded programs. Some caution is required in interpreting responses, however, as the question of expansion was phrased in terms of increased hours, staff, numbers of clients served or improved premises. It is suspected that many respondents will have answered affirmatively on the basis of increased case loads or the numbers of volunteers employed. Some will have responded on the basis of incremental changes such as new premises or staff while others will have experienced an expansion of services through contracts or newly funded programs. Clearly, some agencies have responded affirmatively with respect to both expansion and reduction of services and this suggests the substitution of one program or service type for another. Of course, the magnitude of change (for either expansion or reduction of services) cannot be inferred directly from the numbers of responses for each. Rather, these responses must be qualified within the context of other data relating to funding, caseloads, and the use of volunteers. Taken together, these other data suggest that levels of service expansion are likely to be minimal and nominal for most agencies;

8) 102 agencies (57%) reported having to divert more energy and resources from service functions to fundraising or promotional activities in order to continue in operation, and 92 agencies (51%) have reported an increased reliance on volunteers;

9) in addition, 145 agencies (81%) reported greater demands on the skill-levels of agency workers. This means that workers are expected to provide services to clients in excess of their training or job requirements. This may

portend serious problems with regard to service consistency and continuity and may contribute to a greater incidence of "worker-burnout;"

10) staff composition is also undergoing changes. Although the agencies surveyed have experienced both growth and decline of all staff-types (some experiencing simultaneous growth and decline), 3 of the 4 major staff types identified - clerical, service professionals, and management - have experienced decline overall (more agencies indicate decline than increase for these staff--types). Conversely, support-staff (part-time or temporary workers - basically a "catch-all" class) have undergone marginally greater increase than decline. While the data here are not conclusive, changing staff compositions within agencies may signal structural changes which may affect the ability of NGOs to deliver services.

Individually, the effects upon agencies of declining levels of financial or organisational support could constitute serious (though possibly not crippling) impediments to continued operation. Collectively, they threaten many agencies, and their clients, with the prospects of reduced operations and, in some cases, closure. Whether agencies will be able to respond constructively to the changes they face is not, at this time, known. They have behind them a history of innovative response and are accustomed to functioning under adverse economic conditions. Perhaps the experience of restraint will serve to firm their resolve to weather the fiscal storm. Retrenchment, however, will likely continue to be a fact in agency operations - one of the necessary costs of survival. The ability of non-profit NGOs to mitigate the costs of retrenchment will be conditioned by the social policy environment in which they work. Agency responses to

that environment will in large measure reflect their perceptions of it. It is with this latter consideration that the following section is concerned.

6.12 AGENCY DIRECTORS' PERCEPTIONS OF THE SOCIAL POLICY ENVIRONMENT IN B.C.

In addition to seeking information about specific effects of Provincial funding cutbacks on voluntary agency operations, the questionnaire also surveyed agency directors' perceptions of the social policy environment in British Columbia. The aim was to ascertain whether a consensus exists among agencies regarding the nature and form of social policy in B.C., and if so, how is the policy process characterised by that consensus. In this section, other, functional elements of agency activities are also considered (such as the range and quality of information about social services available to NGOs) as are agency reactions to a number of prospective "survival strategies." The latter question seeks to identify options for organisational change which may enhance the prospects of agency survival.

Agency directors were asked if, in their opinion, there are areas of social service need in their communities not adequately met by existing services, to which 143 agency directors (80%) responded "yes." When asked if, in the opinion of agency directors, there are areas of need which are over-serviced, only 7 answered "yes" compared to 125

answering "no." That agency directors by and large indicated gaps in the social service network is not at all surprising as there will always be unmet need even under optimal conditions - the complete range of needs or wants cannot be satisfied within the strictures of the socio-allocative process. Not only is the capacity of the political and economic system to address the demands placed upon it limited (technically and sociologically) but political and economic systems continuously generate new needs (or variations of old needs) and new demands. However, the parameters of unmet needs identified by agency directors are not suggestive of extravagant demands, especially in the context of advanced capitalist democracies such as Canada's.

In large part the types of services and client groups identified by agency directors are those which would normally be considered as legitimate components of a developed social security system. These include preventive health services; services for battered women and abused children (preventive and intervention); family counselling and support services (including single and teenage parents); legal services (including tenants and debt counselling services); vocational and employment services, and; services for the handicapped. These types of services are already offered in British Columbia, but are not available in sufficient quantity everywhere, especially in non-metropolitan areas. The question for government of course, is not whether these

services are needed, but whether costs warrant their provision. Although we have no reliable methods of ascertaining all potential costs averted by their provision, it has been argued that many of these services are not only cost--effective, but that they contribute significantly to the improvement of the quality of life of the individuals for whom they are targetted (Anguish 1983, Currie & Pishalski 1983, MacDonald & Karpoff 1983, Task Force on Public Legal Services in British Columbia 1984).

Many of the services mentioned above are offered by or have been pioneered by non-profit voluntaristic organisations. NGOs continue to participate in the forefront of the delivery of such services and, for the most part, appear to provide them efficiently and effectively. This much is evidenced by the continued (although sometimes half-hearted) support by the Province of non-governmental organisations as the agents of public provision. Non-profit agencies regard themselves as competent, committed and, sometimes, preferable to the public sector as providers of services. A large number of agency directors in this sample (74 of 130 agency directors responding to the question) feel that there are publicly-delivered services which could be better delivered by non-governmental organisations; examples frequently cited are residental programs, shelter, or long-term or extended care.

When agency directors were asked if they advise limitations on the private "for-profit" sector in the field of service delivery in B.C., their responses were markedly different. In this case 114 (of 141 responses to the question) advised that the for-profit component of non-government service provision be limited. For many, their response rests on a perceived ethical incompatability of social provision and the profit motive. There is also concern that the public benefit, and the well-being of often vulnerable client groups, will be (to quote one respondent) "sacrificed on the altar of efficiency or profit." Among the limitations advised for the for-profit sector by agency directors are: 1) the formulation of explicit standards of service and fiscal accountability; 2) rigorous monitoring of performance and regular evaluation, and; 3) limitations on the proportion of all non-public service activity open to for-profit agencies.

Agencies were asked to indicate their agreement or disagreement with four statements about social policy in British Columbia. The dimensions of social policy alluded to in this question reflect outcomes or goals which would be considered commensurate with the ostensible values of the Canadian welfare State: pluralism, social justice, and the reduction of regional inequalities. The statements presented to respondents were prefaced by the interrogative phrase "does government social policy in British Columbia seem to be:" (the statements and responses are as follows):

a) **increasing levels of political and economic participation on the part of the disadvantaged sectors of the population?** To this statement 81 agency directors (45%) expressed strong disagreement while 118 (66%) expressed disagreement overall;

b) **creating a more rational and planned service delivery system?** Here, 103 agency directors (57.5%) expressed strong disagreement with 150 (84%) expressing disagreement overall;

c) **reducing regional or geographical disparity in overall access to the social service network?** To this statement, 80 directors (45%) indicated strong disagreement with 132 (74%) expressing disagreement overall;

d) **increasing the range of choice among the consumers of services by enhancing social equity and service accessibility?** To this final statement, 98 agency directors (55%) indicated strong disagreement with 141 (79%) expressing disagreement overall.

While agency directors' perceptions of the direction of B.C.'s social policy are not alone sufficient to indict the Provincial government in terms of any of the above-mentioned policy goals, they are, in the least, indicative of strained relations between the Province and the voluntary sector. In another question, agency directors were asked if, given their accountability structure and funding base, they

felt constrained in their ability to criticise the existing social service system or Provincial social policy. To this question 96 agency directors (54%) responded affirmatively (45 agency directors (25%) "strongly agreed"). Further, 54 (30%) of agency directors said that such constraint was linked to concerns for continued funding while 39 (22%) suggested that concerns for continued funding were a part of their quiescence.

Finally, agency directors were asked whether current regulatory, accountability, and review frameworks used to monitor non-government agencies in B.C. are adequate to ensure a high standard of service delivery: 30 (18%) answered "yes," 67 (37%) answered "no," while 72 agency directors (40%) were "not sure." When all of the above responses are considered together, the character of the relationship between the Province and non-profit NGOs emerges as one marked by a lack of trust and credibility, where agencies are fearful of making known their reservations about social policy and the provision of public services.

If agencies are to respond to changes in government the articulation of effective critiques of policy, such responses will have to proceed on the basis of current and reliable information. While most non-profit NGOs possess limited capabilities to communicate their views and needs to the public and to government, their position and security

within the political economy of social services may depend on their remaining "informed" about changes in policy, developments in management or practise, or the availability of alternative sources of funds. Information of all types constitutes a significant resource to be drawn upon by all concerned with the management and delivery of social services. However, the ability to remain adequately informed (regardless of the willingness of sources to dispense information) is contingent in part upon the quality of information available.

To assess this resource, agency directors were asked to indicate their perceptions of the amount and quality of information regarding the social service sector in British Columbia from all sources, private and public. Responding to a set of 5 bi-polar adjectives (separated by a 5-point scale) the following responses were elicited:

a) 101 agency directors (56%) regard available information as "incomplete" (as opposed to 19 (11%) who regard it as comprehensive);
b) 21 directors (12%) regard available information as "geared to planning" (as opposed to 76 (42%) who regard it as "not very useful to planning");
c) 51 agency directors (28.5%) regard available information as "inaccessible" (whereas 43 (24%) regard it as "accessible");

d) 21 directors (12%) regard available information as being "consistent" in terms of content and quality (whereas 79 (44%) regard it as "inconsistent")
e) 21 agency directors (12%) regard available information as "adequate" (compared to 85 (47.5%) who regard it as "inadequate").

From these responses it is clear that the informational base for the planning and delivery of services requires improvement. As such it is incumbent upon all service providers - public and private - to articulate an agenda for research into social problems and their management. It is only upon this basis that the rational planning of an integrated service system can proceed.

6.13 STRATEGIES FOR THE ENHANCEMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICE DELIVERY

Non-profit social service agencies are faced with a confusing array of choices when deciding on appropriate responses to a changing environment. Not only is there a cost--benefit to be calculated for each option, but because of the volatile political environment of social provision, the consequences of agency decisions often cannot be reliably predicted. For many agencies, perhaps the most common response is to do nothing beyond trying to shore-up existing

services and assure (as far as possible) a stable, if diminished flow of funds. There are many other possibilities, however, which could be incorporated at a number of levels in both the private and the public sector which might offer some promise of easing uncertainty in the provision of social services.

The agencies surveyed for this sample were presented with a list of five prospective strategies aimed at enhancing the effectiveness of social services in both the public and private sector. They were then asked to rate these strategies along a 7-point scale ranging from "not effective" to "very effective." The results of these ratings are presented below in order of the most favoured to the least favoured strategy:

a) **improved public education and promotion of services** (134 responses (75%) "effective - 17 responses (9.4%) "not effective");
b) **more attention to the development of improved information-processing systems and greater efforts at long-term planning** (131 responses (73%) "effective" - 21 responses (12%) "not effective");
c) **greater efforts at co-ordinating services and defining service needs** (124 responses (69%) "effective" - 28 responses (16%) "not effective");
d) **more information-sharing and communication among and**

between private and public sector agencies (123 responses (69%) "effective" - 24 responses (13%) "not effective");

e) **better targetting of funds within agencies** (96 responses (54%) "effective" - 35 responses (19.5%) "not effective").

Agency directors were also asked whether co-operative relationships between non-profit social service agencies would enhance the effectiveness, planning and survival of agencies' delivered services. To this question, 137 agencies (76.5%) answered "yes"; 6 agencies answered "no"; while 30 respondents were "not sure."

For the most part, the favourable rankings of these strategy options do not require further elaboration. The inference one draws here is that agency directors largely feel that the monies they receive are allocated efficiently, but that there are effective organisational strategies which may be undertaken at larger scales. It should be noted, however, that one cannot infer from agency directors' endorsement of these strategies the probability of their occurrence or even the willingness of public or private agencies to implement them. Nor can one assume that these are the only, nor necessarily the best options available to the social services sector. Responses to policy, like the articulation of need and provision, will be mediated in the political marketplace, where as has been discussed in other

sections of this thesis, the ostensible goals of organisational behaviour are often not commensurate with the outcomes derived from practise.

CHAPTER VII

SOCIAL POLICY, SOCIAL CHANGE AND THE FUTURE OF VOLUNTARISM IN B.C.

7.1 VOLUNTARISM IN THE NEW REALITY

There is a growing recognition on the part of both left-wing and right-wing critics that the welfare State, as it is presently constructed has not fulfilled its mandate of social change and the attainment of equity through social redistribution. Critics from the Left ruefully note the persistence of poverty and the fact that very little in the way of real redistribution has occurred, while critics from the Right assert that those gains which have been made have entailed economic and social costs which are incompatible with the economic needs of society and the private market. In the view of each of these camps, the welfare State has been subverted or compromised by interest group politics, economic decline, or by the political diversity inherent in a pluralistic, democratic society.

While there remains in the rhetoric of the welfare State, if not precisely mirrored in policy, a commitment to social and economic justice and the maintenance of an environment of social security and well-being, there have been significant efforts to contain or even reverse the advance of welfare State programs and institutions. With the

ascension of the governments of Margaret Thatcher in the U.K. and Ronald Reagan in the U.S. - in concert with the first-felt effects of the world economic recession - policy was informed by a fundamental re-evaluation of the role of the State in the provision of social welfare services.

In British Columbia one facet of a program of fiscal restraint has been a general constriction of funding by the provincial government for non-profit societies offering a broad range of personal human services. The government, through the gradual redefinition and devolution of its mandate for provision has suggested that local governments, the voluntary sector, churches, families and individuals assume an increasing share of the responsibility to meet social needs. The capability and the willingness of the voluntary sector to assume this augmented role has been largely taken--for-granted by political decision-makers, but in fact, lacks empirical or political substantiation.

In the United States studies of agency responses to government funding cutbacks and consequent impacts upon clients indicate that the most common responses to constricted resources are to 1) increase staff workloads; 2) cut staff and services; 3) to reduce the quantity and quality of service provided; 4) to ration services by raising eligibility or fee requirements (in effect denying service to some clients;: and 5) to attempt to tighten fiscal controls and acquire funds from other sources. It has been observed that

the groups most severely affected have been the poor or near-poor, seniors, women, youth, immigrants and refugees (United Way of Santa Clara Country, 1982, p. 1). In general, the constriction of financial resources for social services results in a shift in emphasis away from preventive approaches or the treatment of non-crisis situations although the overall economic and employment environment exacerbates family tension and stress.

Wolch (1983) points out that the dependence of the voluntary sector on government for funding obviates any role they might have as an independent alternative to government (Wolch, 1983, pp. 187-188; Wolch & Geiger, 1983, p. 1079). Furthermore, she cautions that monies lost to the voluntary sector through government cutbacks will not be replaced from private sector sources during periods of recession (Wolch, 1983, p. 185; Wolch & Geiger, 1983, p. 1079). Says Wolch of the capacity of the voluntary sector in the U.S.:

> The reliance of the urban voluntary sector on public funds and indirect subsidies, and the inherent inability of the sector to effectively redistribute resources, belies the myth of voluntarism as a substitute for public action. (Wolch, 1983, p. 187).

"Pure chimera" says Wolch, slogans proclaiming a return to voluntary action in meeting community needs "blind the public's eye to a harsh restructuring of North American political and economic life" (Wolch, 1983, p. 189).

The findings from the U.S. experience are echoed here in British Columbia. A profound concern over similar findings has been voiced by The Community Council for Greater Victoria (1984, 1985), the Social Planning Department for the City of Vancouver (1983, 1984) and the Township of Richmond (1983). The research conducted by these auspices suggests that voluntary social service agencies are surviving, but at a cost to their workers, their programs and their clients.

Retrenchment in the public sector has created a need for retrenchment in the private sector services. The ability of small agencies to respond to a shrinking pool of resources, however, is limited in many cases by a lack of organisational sophistication and by the loss of supports in other parts of the system. While some agencies have undoubtedly folded, many are forced to lay-off staff, rely increasingly on volunteers, cancel specific programs and/or ration services. A greater reliance on volunteers has serious implications for service quality and continuity. Rationing may mean that clients are deflected to other non-profit agencies, inappropriate services or even back to the public sector. Services become more "crisis-oriented" as funds for preventive programs dry-up. Agency resources also become geared to fund-raising efforts possibly at the expense of services while competition for funds may jeopardise what co-operative relations exist among NGO's. While the Provincial government

has asked the voluntary sector to fill the gaps created by retrenchment in the public sector, the ability to do so is undermined by the simultaneous withdrawal of government support.

The findings from regional and community studies of voluntary sector services in the United States and in British Columbia are largely substantiated by the results from the questionnaire study conducted by the author in January 1985. The survey found that NGO's providing personal social services can be highly variable in terms of agency structure, size or staff inputs. Because the nature and quality of service provision may vary according to the specific mix of these functions, and as voluntary sector social services are not evenly distributed in space it follows that, even under conditions of stable funding, the social and spatial distribution of voluntary service inputs will be highly heterogeneous. For the statutory authority to delegate greater responsibility for social care onto non-profit NGO's without sufficient efforts at integration or co-ordination, is to assure an uneven availability and effectiveness of personal social services.

The most significant source of funding for non-profit agencies is the Provincial government, in particular the Ministry of Human Resources. The Provincial government is also the most frequent source of cutbacks in funding for NGO's. Although local governments and fund-raising show some

increase in their levels of funding, the limited financial base of these sources limits their ability to offset declines from Provincial sources. The data also indicate that metropolitan agencies have not fared as well as non--metropolitan agencies with respect to cutbacks and this suggests an affirmation of the importance of the voluntary sector as an extension of statutory auspice in non-metropolitan areas.

Although the data do not indicate that any one client group or service type has been disproportionately affected over all others, the predominance in this sample of agencies serving economically marginal or socially vulnerable groups suggests a potential for negative social impacts as a result of Provincial policy. Agency responses indicate a high degree of financial uncertainty, which when combined with other destabilising influences, may affect the security and well-being of the clients served by NGO's. Agencies also report growths in the numbers of clients requiring their services. In the absence of increases in funding related to agency costs, caseload growth may contribute to declines in organisational capability and quality of service. Many agencies have in fact reported having to ration services or even turn clients away as a result of the excessive demands placed on them. In addition, many agencies reported having to reduce or eliminate services and programs while diverting more energy to fundraising activities in order to maintain

activities. Half of all agencies surveyed report a greater reliance upon voluntary effort in the delivery of services. At the same time, however, many agencies report dealing with a broader range of problem types which represent new demands on the skill-levels of agency workers.

Finally, the social policy process in British Columbia does not appear to have the confidence of the voluntary sector. Agency directors are concerned about what they perceive as unmet needs in their communities. They are also concerned about trends in the delivery of services, particularly with respect to issues of reprivatisation and the participation of the for-profit sector in the delivery of personal social services. Respondents also expressed reservations about the goals of social policy in B.C., noting the absence of commitments to planning, personal enablement, service accessibility and the reduction of regional disparity in the access to services. Although agency directors do not give the Provincial government high marks in the formulation and implementation of social policy, over half of those surveyed reported that they felt constrained in their ability to criticise the emerging policies. For some of these repondents the fear of negative repercussions (such as the loss of funding) contributed to their quiescence.

7.2 THE NEED FOR ORGANISATIONAL AND MANAGERIAL CHANGE IN THE VOLUNTARY SECTOR

One agency administrator interviewed for this study likens the social service network to a living organism. There exists a symbiotic complementarity within the network: there are ripple effects; contractions in one area have impacts on others. As a result, cutbacks which directly impact agencies in the voluntary sector are not necessarily separable from cutbacks occurring elsewhere in the social service network. The loss of public funds is not the only burden borne by many non-governmental agencies; a reduced capability on the part of the public sector signals greater demands for voluntary sector interventions. To the extent that voluntary sector capability exists, it does respond. However, as Wolch has observed in the U.S., that capability is not uniformly distributed, nor does it necessarily coincide with those areas characterised by the greatest need (Wolch, 1983; Wolch & Geiger, 1983).

The initial shock of fiscal restraint in B.C. caused many agencies to fear for their survival[6]. The magnitude and the speed with which the Restraint Package was implemented

[6] as attested by agency workers at a number of conferences convened in 1983, 1984 and 1985 by the United Way, the Social Planning and Review Council of B.C. with the Canadian Council on Social Development, the B.C. Economic Policy Institute, and the Pacific Group for Policy Alternatives - among others.

shocked the volunteer community who were uncertain how policy changes would affect their agencies or how agencies could best respond to the new environment. Adding to the confusion, government ministries, who logically should have provided the technical and managerial leadership to facilitate change, were themselves in a state of internal upheaval through mass-firings and administrative restructuring.

The prevalence in the voluntary sector of crisis--management (in fiscal terms) and muddling-through - both of which may be linked to the nature of funding relationships between NGO's and government - inhibit the ability of voluntary sector agencies to provide services or undertake planning functions related to their delivery. As such, this obviates any hopes that a comprehensive system of community--based, voluntary, social helping networks will arise spontaneously without the active support of government. To the extent that the B.C. government intends to employ the private sector through POSC's as a vehicle for the delivery of social services, there is a need for clearer standards of service quality and agency accountability, especially where such contracts are tendered to for-profit agencies.

In her analysis of the effects of funding cutbacks on NGO's in Greater New York, Tapper (1982) concludes that there is a need for "technical management assistance" to assist voluntary agencies in overcoming the slowness with which they respond to reductions in funding (Tapper, 1982,p.

3). She also points out that the need for organisational sophistication is even greater among smaller, non-affiliated agencies who have neither a sufficient mix of funding sources nor sophisticated managerial skills. The findings of the questionnaire survey of British Columbia NGO's indicate that a majority of agencies are small (meaning limited organisational capability), have limited planning horizons and, particularly in non-metropolitan areas, are highly dependent on a few funding sources. This suggests a mandate for technical assistance, especially if government intends to pursue even further the privatisation of personal social services.

To some extent these needs are being met within the voluntary sector under the aegis of umbrella groups or other organisations. Participants in the voluntary sector recognise the need for information-sharing and some level of co-operative response to changes in the economic or policy environments. The ability to engage in this type of action, however, will be limited by factors of agency isolation - both geographical isolation and the isolation which ensues in an economically competitive environment. In the meantime, agencies are coping, as must their clients, with less support, less security, less certainty, and possibly, less hope for positive change (whatever that may mean in terms of the normative perceptions of those affected).

In the interests of individual NGO's and the persons they serve, the voluntary sector will have to pursue a

public education, public information component to a much greater degree than has been the practise in the past. Public relations, as any seasoned fund-raiser knows, are important not only in their educative aspects, but also for the promotion of low-profile services, the public identification of needs, and for broadening the funding base of NGO's. The "philanthropy market-place," however, to use Wolpert and Reiner's (1984) term is becoming increasingly competitive. The solicitation of philanthropic donations of time and money has reached a level of sophistication that few personal social service agenices can match individually.

There are considerable political, organisational, economic, and geographical obstacles to the coalescence of the voluntary sector. In no small part this is a function of the fragmented, diverse and impermanent character of voluntaristic activities. While there are limited prospects for inter-agency co-operation in weathering the immediate storm, it appears that a truly comprehensive integration of community social services can only occur with the assistance of government. As it would be desirable, in the view of many social service professionals, for such an integrated network of services to be both responsive and accountable to community and/or client-articulated needs, it does not seem likely, given the social policy record of the Social Credit government, that such assistance will be forthcoming.

7.3 THE FUTURE OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN CANADA

The future of the Canadian welfare State will be contingent on the willingness of political and economic actors to engage "welfare economics" in the formulation of social policy. Social policy is described by Booth (1981) as encompassing all policies which affect the distribution of resources and life-chances among individuals, groups and classes in a society (Booth, 1982, p. 197). Welfare economics, according to Walker (1981), refers to the study of the way in which the economic processes of production, consumption and exchange affect the well-being of society (Walker, 1981, p. 13). The aim of welfare economics is to be able to recommend courses of action which will enhance the well--being of members of a society and to provide criteria by which well-being can be judged. Social policy, in seeking social outcomes through the production and distribution of welfare, is measured by its impact on the structure of inequality (Booth, 1982, p. 198).

Moving beyond welfare economics and social policy, Booth then defines social "planning" as the deliberate selection and weighting of policies according to an explicit rationale the aim of which is to steer or guide society along a particular path of social development (Booth, 1982, p. 198). George and Wilding (1976), however, observe that:

> the framing and implementation of social policy are often subordinated to residual liberal ideas about freedom as the absence of restraint (George & Wilding, 1976, p. 110)

In this way, according to Booth, social planning (in the case of Britain) is subverted through measures by government to push-back the "frontiers" of the State:

> After all, who needs to bother with planning if the market, released from the distortions and burden of State intervention, official regulation and bureaucratic red-tape, will by itself maximize national well--being?
> (Booth, 1982, p. 197).

For Booth, the main obstacle to "intelligent" social planning is the subordination of social policy goals to the management of the economy, to the effect that economic ends, narrowly interpreted, displace social purposes (Booth, 1982, p. 209).

The subordination of social goals to economic objectives is a hallmark of policy informed by neo-conservative ideology (Adams & Freeman, 1982, p. 73). This subordination is sustained by a deeply entrenched idea that social progress depends on economic growth (Booth, 1982, p. 210). Such a view invokes a "naive and false segregation" between social and economic policy, which Titmus (1968, cited in Booth, 1982, p. 210) called the "public burden model of

welfare." Booth, however, observes a paradox in which the State, while enforcing restraints on public welfare, permits and even encourages the "hidden welfare state" of tax allowances and occupational benefits - allowing the private market to grow without considering the effect of these decisions on social inequalities (Booth, 1982, p. 210).

The Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops (Canadian Ecumenical News, 1983, pp. 6-7) made similar observations of the Canadian social policy record in January 1983. The Canadian Bishops in their statement "Ethical Reflections on the Economic Crisis" observe that the objective of policy in Canada is the restoration of profitability through the provision of conditions favourable to private investment. They note that "workers wages, government spending, and low productivity" have been singled-out as the primary causes of economic malaise. The Bishops comment that while government austerity has proceeded partly through cut-backs in social spending, there have occurred countervailing measures such as corporate tax reductions and direct investment incentives for industry. Thus, the Canadian Bishops are able to conclude:

> In effect, the survival of capital takes priority over labour in present strategies for economic recovery. At the same time, working people, the unemployed, young people, and those on fixed incomes are increasingly called upon to make the most sacrifice for economic recovery. For it is these people who suffer most from lay-offs, wage restraints, and cut-backs in social services. (Canadian Ecumenical News, 1983, pp. 6-7).

These national trends in social policy have a more extreme counterpart in the social and economic policy directions of the Provincial Government in British Columbia. Clague et al comment that the Provincial government's budget and legislation of 1983 and the subsequent focus on reprivatisation "represent its determination to reduce the size of government and to significantly narrow its scope in social policy" (Clague et al, 1984, pp. 288-289). The approach to social policy in B.C., as observed by the authors, is one which simultaneously restricts statutory responsibilities and increases the responsibilities of the private sector for preventive and rehabilitative services. This is interpreted as a "residual philosophy of government in policy and practise." Furthermore, the authors express concern that the voluntary sector was not consulted with respect to the change in policy direction:

> Changes were announced without consultation with local government, social planning councils, or United Ways. No plan for transition has been established to try to ensure an orderly transfer of responsiblities over a set period of time. The Government has abruptly abdicated its established responsibilities, and has declared that the community, the churches, and the family should assume these responsibilities. (Clague et al, 1984, p. 289).

The effects of the social policy directions alluded to above were addressed by the United Church of Canada in its 59th B.C. Conference, convened in May, 1984, where a

resolution was passed declaring the Church's support for "the efforts of the poor and unprotected, as they struggle for social and economic justice." The resolution noted that "people already socially and economically disadvantaged disproportionately experience the ngeative consequences of current B.C. government 'restraint' policies" (Democrat, July--August, 1984). It is noteable that ecumenical bodies, as traditional auspices of voluntary effort, should stand in clear opposition to the type of service devolution expressed in B.C.'s restraint program. It is not merely the augmented role of the voluntary sector to which the United and the Catholic Churches are responding, but the seeming abdication of principles of social and economic justice inherent in such policies.

The absence of adequate facilitation, consultation and planning in the devolution of social responsibility has not only made the task of the voluntary sector more difficult, but has probably obviated the ostensible goal of a more effective utilisation of public resources. The "false" distinction between social and economic policy pits one against the other and thereby precludes the effective integration of social and economic goals. The Report of the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada (1985, Volume two) observes that the encouragement of voluntary sector participation in the delivery of social services need not result in a reduced

commitment by government, or damage to, social services. The Commissioners of the Report conclude that:

> governments might go on providing financial support for social service agencies and, at the same time, continue to exercise regulatory or supervisory authority over them, while devolving the actual delivery of services to less bureacratic and therefore potentially more responsive, structures. (Royal Commission..., 1985, Vol. II, p. 807).

The Commissioners concluded also that governments:

> must not adopt a totally "hands-off" approach to service delivery, but continue to provide extensive funding for, and careful supervision of this process. We can find no justification for suggesting that the services themselves should be considered a primary hunting ground for reductions in government expenditure. We therefore propose that devolution to the voluntary sector of responsibility for social service delivery be accompanied by the maintenance of public funding levels. (Royal Commission..., 1985, Vol. II, p. 811).

7.4 SOCIAL POLICY: COSTS, GOALS AND PROSPECTS

According to the Canadian Council on Social Development, it is a "mistaken belief" that social spending has mushroomed to the point where it is out of line with Canada's major OECD trading partners (CCSD, "Submission to the Parliamentary Task Force..", 1981, p. 3). This observation has been echoed by the Social Planning Council of Metropolitan Toronto (1985, pp. 56-57) as well as in the Report of the Royal Commission, whose Commissioners observe that:

> Since the overall level of social policy expenditures in Canada is low by OECD standards, there is no strong general case for attacking the deficit by reducing social expenditures (Royal Commission..., 1985, Vol. II, p. 814)

Further, with respect to the devolution of personal social services to the community level and to non-profit associations, the response of the Commissioners is that:

> We strongly recommend... that this devolution not be handicapped by a reduction in funding, and that governments retain sufficient staff to exercise their monitoring responsibilities. The maintenance of funding is particularly important, since we could see no evidence whatsovever that social services, which include support for children, the elderly, the disabled and those with shorter-term social problems, are overfunded. Indeed, considerable evidence of underfunding was presented to us in our hearings. (Royal Commission..., 1985, Vol. II, pp. 826-827).

These observations are not unique to the Canadian experience. Booth observes that the presentation of social welfare programs as a burden to the economy is often built into the British Treasury's model of the economy:

> It is reinforced by the statistical conventions in the preparation of the national income accounts which measure only the inputs or costs of public services and not the value of their outputs (Booth, 1982, p. 210).

Similarly, James Tobin, addressing the Reagan economic plan in the U.S. offers that there is:

> ...precious little evidence in international experience that successful macro-economic management is inversely correlated with size of government, tax burdens, public debt and social transfers. Some countries whose macro--economic performance we envy have much larger public sectors, more generous social welfare programs, greater tax burdens, and higher budget deficits (Tobin, 1983, p. 333)

Thus, the shibboleth of "fiscal restraint" seems to have less to do with the intractable nature of big government and big deficits, and is more a reflection of philosophical and economic values. Thus, as observed by the Royal Commission, while calls for wider access to social services do contradict calls to limit the size of government expenditure, "whether one supports universal free access probably depends on how important one believes those services are, compared to the strength of one's views about limiting the size of government" (Royal Commission..., 1985, Vol. II, pp. 809--910).

What, then is a preferred future for social policy in Canada if we accept the view that the size of social service expenditures is not the crippling factor portrayed by those advocating the dismantling of the welfare State? The United Church of Canada, responding to the "disjointed and unplanned manner" in which the present social welfare system has been created and modified, calls for an "untangling and clarification" of Federal and Provincial responsibilities in areas of social planning and provision (United Church of

Canada, 1985, pp. 174-176). The Royal Commission echoes this concern, arguing that reallocation and restructing (particularly with respect to Federal-Provincial financing arrangements) could greatly improve the system - ensuring that help is provided to those who most need it while containing overall costs (Royal Commission..., 1985, Vol. II, p. 814).

If the broad goals of the welfare State - security, economic viability and equity - are to remain intact, and if the State is to meet the challenge of the future, then social and economic policy requires a "diagnostic agenda" for program planning, the rewards of which may be "deliberate, intentional (and) adaptive social change" (Rosenthal, 1979, p. 31). Rosenthal cautions that no matter how we design public services and policy, we are creating the future: in an environment of shifting values, expectations and requirements, "making things work", is largely a matter of assessing, as early as possible, whether they are working at present and whether or not they are likely to work in the future (Rosenthal, 1979, p. 29). Government and policy--makers are too deeply rooted in the exigencies of the immediate present or the immediate past, and as a result, there is often a "reality gap" which mitigates the postive impacts even of desirable policy.

Viable value-orientations for economic policy might be: a commitment to economic diversity; decentralisation and participatory decision-making; local economic development

through community development corporations (DCD's); appropriate technology; full employment; and responsible environmental stewardship. Broad social policy goals have been suggested by the Canadian Council on Social Development: i) the protection and rehabilitation of individuals and families in crisis; ii) the development of a preventive approach to intervention and support systems for individuals and families; and iii) the enhancement of the quality of life for all individuals and the achievement of equity (CCSD, "Social Policies for the Eighties", 1981, p. 49).

To embark on the above policy directions we would have to "rethink" the basic assumptions underlying the social and economic policy of the welfare State: we would have to overcome what Tarschys refers to as "institutional arteriosclerosis" (Glennerster, 1983, p. 1; Tarschys, 1983, p. 206). The social and economic assumptions of the neo-conservative challenge to the welfare State must also undergo a critical evaluation - policy-makers must be urged not to accept on faith or on the basis of political expediency supply-side prophesies of capitalist cornucopia (see also, United Church of Canada, 1985; Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops, 1985).

7.5 CONCLUSION

Social and economic planning and policy in British Columbia, while showing some degree of commitment to ideological and philosophical first principles, does not illustrate a rational planning process. The policy structure conforms to a managerial approach of centralised decision-making while public consultation and the recognition of the legitimacy of multiple interests is avoided. Within that managerial structure, policy formulation has occurred in an ad hoc, incrementalist mode. The application of the principle of restraint across all sectors of the province's administration has led to organisational and informational decline. "Locking in" on policy choices and the displacement of costs from one sector to another through "cross purposes" leads one to question the apparent contradiction between the ostensible goals of policy and its effects. If cost-saving is a primary goal of policy, then a rationalisation and integration of services provided by different ministries might be more effective than cutbacks: where public agencies are in a state of mutual fiscal and organisational decline, even though their constituences overlap, provision may not even intersect.

Policy in British Columbia lacks a sound basis in coherent and reliable knowledge. The government has favoured simplistic solutions over rational planning; coercion and

conflict over consultation and consensus; immediate and marginal economic savings even in the face of possibly greater displaced costs. Because of this lack of knowledge and in the absence of the political will to secure it, the Provincial government has also demonstrated a propensity for policy with strong pseudo and symbolic dimensions, and policy whose public face diverges sharply from its real economic and political effects. In the name of government downsizing, the Cabinet has vastly increased the profile of the State, and has incurred a simultaneous alignment with corporate and other capital interests.

To the extent that this has occurred there has been a significant redefinition of the social priorities of the State. While selectively "disgoverning" areas of social service provision, the government has pursued a vigorous program of discretionary intervention in the B.C. economy: while privatising many of the social costs of the recession, the public's share of the costs incurred by capital has increased. As such, restraint will have a debilitating effect on the social and economic fabric of the Province. It can only be hoped that the collective costs accruing from this program will be better borne than the individual costs to families, women, young people and others in our province who are or will be "at risk."

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abramowitz, M. & Hopkins, T. (1983), "Reaganomics and the Welfare State", Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare, 10(4), pp. 563-578.

Adams, P. & Freeman, G. (1982), "Social Services Under Reagan and Thatcher", in Fanstein, N. & Fanstein, S. (eds.) Urban Policy Under Capitalism, Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, pp. 65-82.

Alexander, Chauncey (1982), "Social Work in the 80's: Issues and Strategies," The Social Worker/Le Travailleur Social, 50(2), summer.

Allen, R.C. (1984), Investment and Education in British Columbia: A Review of the Evidence in "Restraint and Recovery", B.C. Economic Policy Institute, U.B.C., [P-84-4].

Anguish, J. (1983), Commission on Services for Children and Youth: Report on Findings, British Columbia Association of Social Workers, June.

Armitage, Andrew (1975), Social Welfare in Canada, Ideals and Realities, McClelland & Stewart, Toronto.

Austin, David M. (1983), "The Political Economy of the Human Services", Policy and Politics, 11(3), pp. 343-359.

Axinn, J. & Levin, H. (1975), Social Welfare: A History of the American Response to Need, Dodd, Mead & Co., New York.

Bachrach, P. & Baratz, M. (1970), Power and Poverty: Theory and Practise, Oxford University Press, Toronto.

Bell, D. (1976), The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting, Harper Colophon, New York.

Blackstone, T. (1983), "Planning Social Priorities - Nationally", in Glennerster, H. (ed.), The Future of the Welfare State, Heinmann, London.

Blain, Gilbert (1984), "The Decline of the Welfare State?", in Issues in Canadian Social Policy, Volume II, The Canadian Council on Social Development, Ottawa, pp. 62-69.

Booth, T.A. (1982), "Economics and the Poverty of Social Planning", Public Administration, 60(2), pp. 197-214.

Bosanquet, N. (1983), After the New Right, Heinemann, London.

BCGEU (1981), The Non-Government Social Service Delivery System of British Columbia, British Columbia Government Employees Union, Burnaby.

BCGEU (1982), The Public Commission on Social and Community Service Cutbacks: Commission Interim Report, British Columbia Government Employees Union, Burnaby, July.

Broadbent, T.A. (1977), Planning and Profit in the Urban Economy, Methuen & Co. Ltd., London.

Burton, J. (1983), "The Thatcher Experiment: A Requiem?", in Fink, R.H. (ed.) Supply-Side Economics: A Critical Appraisal Alethia, Frederick Md.

Butcher, J. (1984), "Privatization and the Public Trust", in Social Responsibility... To Challenge the Future, Canadian Report to the 22nd International Conference on Social Welfare - CCSD-ICSW, Montreal, Canadian Council on Social Development, Ottawa, pp. 51-63.

Calvert, J. (1983), The Public Sector: Myths and Realities, British Columbia Teachers' Federation, Vancouver, August.

Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops (1983), "Catholic Bishops Speak Out", Canadian Ecumenical News, 8(1), pp. 6-7.

Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops (1985), "Moral Vision and Political Will", in Drache, D. & Cameron, D. (eds.) The Other MacDonald Report, James Lorimer & Co., Toronto, 1985, pp. 208-213.

Canadian Council on Social Development (1984), Not Enough: The Meaning and Measurement of Poverty in Canada, C.C.S.D., Ottawa.

Canadian Council on Social Development (1981), Social Policies for the Eighties, C.C.S.D., Ottawa.

Canadian Council on Social Development (1981), Submission to the Parliamentary Task Force on Federal Provincial-Fiscal Arrangements, C.C.S.D., Ottawa.

Catrice-Lorey, Antoinette (1980), "The Acquisition of Service Values in a Predominantly Administrative Social

Organisation and the Structuring of Staff Function", in Grunow, D. & Hegner, F. (eds.) Welfare or Bureaucracy? Problems of Matching Social Services to Clients' Needs, Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain Publishers Ltd., Cambridge, Mass.

Clague, M. et al (1984), Reforming Human Services: The Experience of the Community Resource Boards in B.C., University of British Columbia Press, Vancouver.

City of Vancouver (1984), Information Report: Ministry of Human Resources Emergency Services - Proposed Reduction in Service, Social Planning Department, August 23.

City of Vancouver (1983), Information Report: Provincial Restraint Program Cutbacks, Report #1: C.I.P. - Community Involvement Program, Social Planning Department, August 10.

City of Vancouver (1983), Information Report: Provincial Restraint Program Cutbacks, Report #2: Community Projects Funding Cuts, Social Planning Department, October 6.

Community Council of Greater Victoria (1984), Social Need and Social Service Provision in Greater Victoria, Planning and Exchange Report #2, C.C.G.V., Victoria.

Community Council of Greater Victoria (1985), Social Need and Social Service Provision, Planning and Exchange Report #3, C.C.G.V., Victoria.

Community Council of Greater Victoria (1984), Impact of Provincial Government Change on the Human Services in the Greater Victoria Area - Fall 1983, C.C.G.V., Victoria, January.

Corporation of the Township of Richmond, The (1983) Memo: Personal Social Services Policy, Provincial Cutbacks - Ministry of Human Resources, Jenkinson, J., Director of Planning, Richmond, September 9.

Cox, Kevin R. (1977), Location and State in Market Societies, Monograph, Department of Geography, Ohio State University.

Currie, J. & Pishalski, F. (1983), Loosening the Fabric: The Termination of the Family Support Worker Program in British Columbia, British Columbia Association of Social Workers, August.

Davies, G. & Piachaud, D. (1984), "Social Policy and the Economy", in Glennerster (ed.) The Future of the Welfare State, Heinmann, London.

Dear, M. & Clark, G. (1981), "The State in Capitalism and the Capitalist State", in Dear, M. & Scott, A. (eds.) Urbanization and Urban Planning in Captialist Society, Methuen, London.

Deaton, R. (1983), "Unemployment: Canada's Malignant Social Pathology", Perception, 6(5), pp. 14-19.

Democrat, The (1984), "Church Hits Socreds", 24(6), July--August.

Demone, H.W. & Gibelman, M. (1983), "Alternative Service Delivery Strategies: Factors in States' Decision--Making", Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare, 10(2), pp. 326-338.

Demone, H.W. & Gibelman, M. (1984), "Reaganomics - Its Impact on the Voluntary Not-For-Profit Sector", Social Work, 29(5), pp. 421-427

DiGiulio, Joan F. (1984), "Funding the Change Process in Family Service Agencies", Social Casework, 64(8), pp. 466-472.

Djao, A.W. (1983), "Constitutional Dilemma and Social Welfare Policy in Canada", Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare, 10(3), pp. 497-515.

Djao, A.W. (1983), Inequality and Social Policy: The Sociology of Welfare, J. Wiley, Toronto.

Dobell, A.R. (1983), What's the B.C. Spirit? Recent Experience in the Management of Restraint, University of Victoria, September (unpublished).

Doyle, R. (1979), "Government Restraint and Social Problems", The Social Worker/Le Travailleur Social, 47(2, 3), pp. 53-61.

Doyle, R. et al (1979), Report of the Task Force on Human Needs and Restraint, Manitoba Association of Social Workers, April.

Drover, Glenn (1983), "Beyond the Welfare State", The Social Worker/Le Travailleur Social, 51(4), pp. 141-144.

Elkin, Frederick (1978), National Voluntary Associations in Canada, Department of Sociology, York University , Toronto, Secretary of State, Ottawa, February.

Finch, Wilbur A. (1982), "Declining Public Social Service Resources: A Managerial Problem", Administration in Social Work, 6(1), pp. 19-28.

Frankfather, Dwight L. (1981), "Welfare Entrepreneurialism and the Politics of Innovation", Social Service Review, 55(1).

Friedman, Milton (1984), Tyranny of the Status Quo, Harcourt, Brace & Jovanovitch, San Diego.

George, V. & Wilding, P. (1976), Ideology and Social Welfare, Routledge & Keegan Paul, London.

Ghere, R.K. (1981), "Effects of Service Delivery Variations on Administration of Municipal Human Service Agencies: The Contract Approach Versus Agency Implementation", Administration in Social Work, 5(1), pp. 65-78.

Gibelman, M. (1981), "Are Clients Better Served When Services are Purchased?", Public Welfare, 39(4).

Gibelman, M. (1983), "Using Public Funds to Buy Private Services", in Dinerman, M. (ed.) Social Work in a Turbulent World, National Association of Social Workers, Silver Spring, Maryland, 1983, pp. 101-113.

Gilbert, N. (1984), "Welfare for Profit: Moral, Empirical and Theoretical Principles", Journal of Social Policy, 13(1), pp. 63-74.

Gilder, G. (1982), "The Supply-Side", in Fink, R.H. (ed.) Supply-Side Economics: A Critical Appraisal, Aletheia Books, Frederick, Md.

Ginsberg, N. (1979), Class, Capital and Social Policy, MacMillan Press, London.

Glennerster, H. (1983), "The Need for Reappraisal", in Glennerster, H. (ed.) The Future of the Welfare State, Henmann, London.

Glennerster, H. (1975), Social Service Budgets and Social Policy: British and American Experience, Allen & Unwin, London.

Gough, Ian (1982), "The Crisis of the British Welfare State", in Fanstein, N. & Fanstein, S. (eds.) Urban Policy Under Capitalism, Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, pp. 43-63.

Guest, Dennis (1982), The Emergence of Social Security in Canada, University of British Columbia Press, Vancouver.

Gustafsson, G. (1983), "Symbolic and Pseudo Policies as Responses to Diffusion of Power", Policy Sciences, 15, pp. 269-287.

Gutowski, M. & Koshel, J. (1982), "Social Services" in Palmer, J. & Sawhill, S. (eds.) The Reagan Experiment, Urban Institute Press, Washington, D.C.

Hatch, Stephen (1980), Outside the State: Voluntary Organisations in Three English Towns, Croom Helm, London.

Hawrylyshyn, O. (1978), The Economic Nature of Volunteer Activity in Canada, 1971, Statistics Canada, Ottawa.

Hawrylyshyn, O. (1978), Estimating the Value of Household Work in Canada 1971, Statistics Canada, Ottawa.

Hazlett, T.W. (1982), "The Supply-Side's Weak Side: An Austrian's Critique", In Fink, R.H. (ed.) Supply-Side Economics: A Critical Appraisal, Aletheia Books, Frederick, Md.

Heilbronner, R.L. (1982), "The Demand for the Supply-Side", in Fink, R.H. (ed.) Supply-Side Economics: A Critical Appraisal, Aletheia Books, Frederick, Md.

Hepworth, H. Philip (1975), Personal Social Services: A Glossary of Terms - Volume 10 of Personal Social Services in Canada: A Review, Canadian Council on Social Development, Ottawa.

Hepworth, H. Philip (1975), Social Services in Canada: An Introduction, Volume 1 of Personal Social Services in Canada: A Review, Canadian Council on Social Development, Ottawa.

Hepworth, H. Philip (1975), Personal Social Service in Context, Volume 9 of Personal Social Services in Canada: A Review, Canadian Council on Social Development, Ottawa.

Hepworth, H. Philip (1984), "Personal Social Services in North America: From Residualism to Universality", in Nair, M., Hain, R. & Draper, J. (eds.) Issues in Canadian Human Services, O.I.S.E., Toronto.

Hirshchorn, Larry (1975), The Social Crisis - The Crisis of Work and the Social Services: An Approach to the Grammar of the Post-Industrial Revolution, Working Paper #252, University of California, Berkeley.

Hirshchorn, Larry (1974), The Social Service Crisis and the New Subjectivity: Social Services in the Post--Industiral Revolution, Working Paper #244, Institute of Urban and Regional Development, University of California, Berkeley.

Hum, Derek P.J. (1983) Federalism and the Poor: A Review of the Canada Assistance Plan, Ontario Economic Council.

Jamieson, Bill (1982), "Surviving the Reagan Onslaught", Public Welfare, 40(1).

Jansson, B.S. (1979), "Public Monitoring of Contracts with Non-Profit Organizations - Organizational Mission in Two Sectors", Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare, 6(3), pp. 362-374.

Johnson, Norman (1981), Voluntary Social Services, Blackwell and M. Robertson, Oxford.

Jones, L.R. (1984), "Phases of Recognition and Management of Financial Crisis in Public Organizations", Canadian Public Administration, 27(1), pp. 48-65.

Judge, Ken (1982), "The Public Purchase of Social Care: British Confirmation of the American Experience", Policy and Politics, 10(4), pp. 397-416.

Kesselman, J.R. (1984), Revenue Sources for Maintaining Social Services in B.C., B.C. Economic Policy Institute, U.B.C., [P-84-1], January.

Kirby, Andrew (1983), "Neglected Factors in Public Services Research: A Comment on Urban Structure and Geographical Access to Public Services", Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 73(2), pp. 289-295.

Kirby, A. and Jones, K. (1982), "Provision and Well-being: An Agenda for Public Resources Research," Environment and Planning, 14, pp. 297-310.

Kramer, R.M. (1983), "Contracting for Human Services: An Organizational Perspective", in Kramer, R. and Specht, H. (eds.) Readings in Community Organization Practise, Prentice-Hall, N.J., pp. 421-432.

Labatt, John G. (1980), The Role of the Voluntary Sector in the Delivery of Social Services and the Community

Based Family Service Agency's Contribution to Social Change, Major Paper, U.B.C. School of Social Work (unpublished).

Lasch, Christopher (1972), "Toward a Theory of Post--Industrialism", in Hancock, M. and Szoberg. G. (eds.) Politics in the Post-Welfare State - Responses to the New Individualism, Columbia University Press, New York, pp. 36-50.

Leman, Christopher (1980), The Collapse of Welfare Reform: Institutions, Policy and the Poor in Canada and the United States, M.I.T. Press, Cambridge Mass.

Ley, David (ed.) (1974), Community Participation and the Spatial Order of the City, Tantalus Research Ltd., Vancouver.

Levens, B. & Cleathero, J. (1982), Low Income Basic Family Budgets, United Way of the Lower Mainland, Social Planning and Research, Vancouver, March.

Levens, B. & Cleathero, J. (1984), The Basic Cost of Living, United Way of the Lower Mainland, Social Planning and Research, Vancouver, November.

Levine, Charles H. (1983), "Organizational Decine and Cut-back Management", in Kramer, R. and Specht, H. (eds.) Readings in Community Organization Practise, Prentice-Hall, N.J., pp. 56-70.

Lipsky, M. (1984), "Bureaucratic Disentitlement in Social Welfare Programs", Social Service Review, 58(1).

Lourie, Norman V. (1979), cited in Wedel, K., Katz, A. & Weick, A. (eds.) Social Services by Government Contract, a Policy Analysis, Praeger, New York.

MacDonald, J. (1983), "B.C. Human Services Cutbacks", Social Work Perspective, 5(4), p. 1.

MacDonald, J. (1983), Child Protection Services and Privatization: A Proposed Position Statement for the British Columbia Association of Social Workers, Vancouver (unpublished).

MacDonald, J. & Karpoff, J. (1983), Privatization and Child Welfare Services in British Columbia: A Proposed Policy for the BCASW, British Columbia Association of Social Workers, Vancouver.

MacKay, H. (1983), "Social Impact of Unemployment", Perception, 6(5), pp. 32-34.

McQuaide, Sharon (1983), "Human Service Cutbacks and the Mental Health of the Poor", Social Casework, 64(8), pp. 497-499.

Madison, Bernice Q. (1980), The Meaning of Social Policy - The Comparative Dimension in Social Welfare, Westview Press Inc., Boulder Colorado.

Magnussen, W. et al (eds.) (1984), The New Reality: The Politics of Restraint in British Columbia, New Star Books, Vancouver.

Mansen, G. & Higgens-Cass, R. (1976), Voluntarism at the Crossroads, Family Service Association of America, New York.

Marchak, P. (1984), The Rise and Fall of the Peripheral State, January (unpublished draft of a paper).

Miller, S. & Wilson, N. (1981), "The Case for Performance Contracting", Administration in Mental Health, 8(3), pp. 185-193.

Mishra, R. (1984), Welfare State in Crisis: Social Thought and Social Change, Wheatsheaf Books, Brighton.

Ministry of Human Resources (1983), Annual Report 1981-82, Province of British Columbia, Victoria.

Ministry of Human Resources (1984), Annual Report 1982-83, Province of British Columbia, Victoria.

Morris, Robert (1982), "Government and Voluntary Agency Relationships", Social Service Review, 56(3).

Mowbray, Martin (1983), "Localism and Austerity: The Political Economy of Community Welfare Services", Community Development Journal, 18(3), pp. 238-246.

Neill, Roger (1983), "Myths and Maxims of the Current Economic Crisis", B.C. Association of Social Workers Newsletter, 26(1).

Offe, C. (1983), "Competitive Party Democracy and the Keynesian Welfare State: Factors of Stability and Disorganization", Policy Science, 15, pp. 225-246.

Ontario Welfare Council and the Social Planning Council of Metropolitan Toronto (1981), And the Poor Get

Poorer... A Study of Social Welfare Programs in Ontario, Toronto.

Pape, Gordon (1983), "What's Ahead for our Troubled Public Services?", Reader's Digest (Canadian Edition), November, pp. 87-91.

Parham, T.M. Jim (1982), "Social Service Issues and Challenges in the 1980's", Administration in Social Work, 6(3 & 3), pp. 91-105.

Patterson, Jeffrey (1983), Voluntary Sector at Risk, Update 1983 - A Background for the Conference, How to Strengthen the Voluntary Sector in Hard Times, Social Planning Council of Metropolitan Toronto.

Peet, R. (1983), "The Global Geography of Contemporary Capitalism", Economic Geography, 59(2), pp. 105-111.

Reamer, F.G. (1983), "Social Services in a Conservative Era", Social Casework, 64(8), pp. 451-458.

Redish, A. (1984), Is There a Social Policy in British Columbia? Who Has Been Hurt and Why, B.C. Economic Policy Institute, University of British Columbia, [4-8403].

Reiner, J. & Wolpert, J. (1981), "The Non-Profit Sector in the Metropolitan Economy", Economic Geography, 57(1), pp. 23-33.

Rosenbluth, G. & Schworm, W. (1984), British Columbia's Budgets and the Need for Restraint, B.C. Economic Policy Institute, University of British Columbia, [4-84-4].

Rosenbluth, G. & Schworm, W. (1984), Does British Columbia Need Fiscal Restraint?, Department of Economics, University of British Columbia, [P-84-2].

Rosenbluth, G. & Schworm, W. (1984), The New Priorities of the Social Credit Government of British Columbia, Department of Economics, University of British Columbia, [P-84-3].

Rosenthal, S.R. (1979), "Managing the Demand for Pubic Service Delivery Systems: Anticipation, Diagnosis and Program Responses", Urban Analysis, 6(1), pp. 15-31.

Ross, David (1983), The Canadian Fact Book on Poverty, The Canadian Council on Social Development, James Lorimer & Co., Toronto.

Ross, David (1982), "New Economics and Old Social Needs", Perception, 5(5), pp. 34-35.

Ross, Robert J.S. (1983), "Facing Leviathan: Public Policy and Global Capital", Economic Geography, 59(2), pp. 144-160.

Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada (1985), Report, Volume II, Minister of Supply and Services, Ottawa.

Russell, Bob (1984), "The Politics of Labour-Force Reproduction: Funding Canada's Social Wage 1917-1946", Studies in Political Economy, 13, pp. 43-73.

Salamon, Lester & Abramson, Alan, J. (1982), "The Non-Profit Sector", in Palmer, J. and Sawill, S. (eds.) The Reagan Experiment, Urban Institute Press, Washington D.C., pp. 219-243.

Sarri, Rosemary C. (1982), "Management Trends in the Human Services in the 1980's", Administration in Social Work, 6(2 & 30), pp. 19-30.

Savas, E.S. (1979), "On Equity in Providing Public Services", Ekistics, 46(276), pp. 144-148.

Schworm, W. (1984), The Economic Impacts of the British Columbia "Restraint" Budget, B.C. Economic Policy Institute, University of British Columbia, [4-84-5].

Seebaran, Roop (1983), "Social Services in B.C.: The Axe Falls", The Social Worker/Le Travailleur Social, 51(3), pp. 89-91.

Seebaran, Roop & Toren, Robert (1979), Community Work in Vancouver: Current Trends, UBC School of Social Work, September.

Segarty, Terry (1983), Recovery '83, Social Credit Party Caucus.

Shields, John (1981), The Broad Grey Line: Government's Response to the Increasing Need for Social Services, British Columbia Government Employees Union, Burnaby.

Silver, L. (1984), "Poverty: The Forgotten Reality of the 1980's", in Social Responsibility... to Challenge the Future, Canadian Report to the 22nd International Conference on Social Welfare - CCSD-ICSW, Montreal, Canadian Council on Social Development, Ottawa, pp. 29-43.

Smith, David M. (1977), Human Geography - A Welfare Approach, Edward Arnold Publishers Ltd., London.

Social Planning Council of Metropolitan Toronto (1985), "The Rise and Fall of the Welfare State", in Drache, D. and Cameron, D. (eds.) The Other MacDonald Report, James Lorimer & Co., Toronto, pp. 51-62.

Social Planning Council of Metropolitan Toronto (1981), Voluntary Sector at Risk - Trends in Government Support of the Voluntary Social Service Sector in Metropolitan Toronto, S.P.C.M.T., Toronto, July.

Social Planning Council of Metropolitan Toronto and The United Way of Greater Toronto (1983), Strengthening the Voluntary Sector in Hard Times, Proceedings of a Conference Held January 31, 1983.

Social Planning Council of Winnipeg (1979), Prescription for Prevention, S.P.C.W., Winnipeg.

Soja et al (1983), "Urban Restructuring: An Analysis of Social and Spatial Change in Los Angeles", Economic Geography, 59(2), pp. 195-230.

Spicker, P. (1984), Stigma and Social Welfare, Croom Helm, London.

Stainsby, C. & Malcomson, J. (1983), The Fraser Institute, The Government and a Corporate Free Lunch, Solidarity Coalition, Vancouver.

Statistics Canada (1983), British Columbia, Census Divisions and Subdivisions, Minister of Supply and Services Canada, Ottawa, 93-x-946.

Statistics Canada (1985), Current Demographic Analysis: Report on the Demographic Situation in Canada, Minister of Supply and Services Canada, Ottawa, 91-209.

Statistics Canada (1981), Household and Family Projections 1976-2001, Minister of Supply and Services Canada, Ottawa, 91-522.

Statistics Canada (1985), The Labour Force, Minister of Supply and Services Canada, Ottawa, January, 71-001.

Statistics Canada (1984), List of Canadian Hospitals and Special Care Facilities, Minster of Supply and Services Canada, Ottawa, 83-201.

Statton, Joyce (1983), Brief to Richmond Municipal Council Regarding the Effects of Provincial Cutbacks on Human

Care Services Available in Richmond, Richmond Community Services Council, September 12.

Stoez, D. (1981), "A Wake for the Welfare State: Social Welfare and the Neo-Conservative Challenge", Social Service Review, September, pp. 398-410.

Tapper, D. (1982), Coping With Cutbacks - A Study of the Differential Impact and Response by Voluntary Social Agencies in New York City to Government Funding Reductions, The Community Council of Greater New York.

Tarschys, D. (1983), "The Scissors Crisis in Public Finance", Policy Sciences, 15, pp. 205-224.

Task Force on Public Legal Services in British Columbia (1984), Report to the Attorney General, Province of British Columbia, Victoria.

Taylor-Gooby, P. & Dale, J. (1981), Social Theory and Social Welfare, Edward Arnold, London.

Therborn, Göran (1984), "Classes and States - Welfare State Development, 1881-1981", Studies in Political Economy, 13, pp. 7-41.

Tobin, J. (1983), "The Reagan Phenomenon: Policy Assessment", in Fink, R.H. (ed.) Supply-Side Economics: A Critical Appraisal, Aletheia Books, Frederick Md.

Trist, Eric (1968), The Relation of Welfare and Develoment in the Transition to Post-Industrialism, Monograph, UCLA.

United Church of Canada, The (1985), "Economic Development and Social Justice", in Drache, D. and Cameron. D. (eds.) The Other MacDonald Report, James Lorimer & Co., Toronto, pp. 169-183.

United Way of the Bay Area (1982), Understanding Public Funding Cutbacks on Human Services, April.

United Way Long-Range Planning Committee & The UBC Centre for Continuing Education (1981), Conference Report: What Holds Tomorrow?, June.

United Way of the Lower Mainland (1983), Proceedings: Human Services Agencies Under Restraint, Social Planning and Management Symposium, October 21.

United Way of the Lower Mainland - Social Planning and Research (1979), Family Violence - Report of the Task

Force on Family Violence, (Flora Mcleod, ed.), Vancouver.

United Way of Santa Clara County (1982), Retrenchment and Transition: An Analysis of the Impacts of Public Sector Funding Reductions on Human Services, Education and the Arts in Santa Clara County, December.

United Way SPAR/SPARC Joint Committee (1980), A Historical and Contemporary Review of the Financing of Social Services in B.C., Report #1, Vancouver, September.

United Way SPAR/SPARC Joint Committee (1980), Commentary and Recommendations Relevant to Emerging Social Service Needs in British Columbia, Report #3, Vancouver, September.

United Way SPAR/SPARC Joint Committee (1980), Public Funding Policies and Procedures in B.C., Report #2, Vancouver, September.

Vancouver Sun, The (1984), "B.C. Maintains Third-Highest Unemployment Rate", December 7, p. A7.

Vancouver Sun, The (1985), "Foodbank Doubles Handouts", March 29, p. A3.

Vancouver Sun, The (1985), "Foodbank Makes Plea", March 30, p. A3.

Vancouver Sun, The (1985), "Foodbanks on Own", February 13, p. A14.

Vancouver Sun, The (1985), "Jobless Figures Doubted - Hidden Unemployment Cited", March 29, p. A9.

Vancouver Sun, The (1985), "One-Parent Food Bank Nears Limit", March 20, p. A18.

Vancouver Sun, The (1984), "Social Safety Net Has Strained Look", November 1, pp. B1-B2.

Vancouver Sun, The (1984), "Welfare a Way of Life for 1 in 10", November 1, p. A1.

Walker, Bruce (1981), Welfare Economics and Urban Problems, Hutchinson, London.

Wallin, J.H. (1972), Evaluating Effectiveness in the Social Services, A General Discussion of Problems, Models, Methods and Recent Efforts, United Community Services of the Greater Vancouver Area, Vancouver, December.

Willms, Sharon E. (1980), Interorganizational Relationships Related to Funding in Non-Government Organizations, Master's Thesis, School of Social Work, University of British Columbia.

Wineburg, et al (1983), "Budget Cuts and Human Services: One Community's Experience", Social Casework, 64(8), pp. 489-496.

Wittrock, B. (1983), "Governance in Crisis and the Withering of the Welfare State: The Legacy of the Policy Sciences", Policy Sciences, 15, pp. 195-203.

Wolch, J.R. & Geiger, R.K. (1983), "The Distribution of Urban Voluntary Resources: An Exploratory Analysis", Environment and Planning A, 15(8), pp. 1067-1082.

Wolch, J.R. (1983), "The Voluntary Sector in Urban Communities", Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 1(2), pp. 181-190.

Wolpert, J. & Reimer, J. (1984), "The Philanthropy Marketplace", Economic Geography, 13(3), pp. 197-209.

Wolpert, J. & Reimer, J. (1984), "Service Provision by the Not-For-Profit Sector: A Comparative Study", Economic Geography, 60(1), pp. 28-37.

Wyers, N.L. & Holloway, R.C. (1983), "Reaganism and the Poor Family: LIfe on the AFDC After the Budget Cuts", Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare, 10(1), pp. 1-11.


York, R.D. (1982), Human Service Planning: Concepts, Tools, and Methods, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill.

Young, W.D. (1979), Politics and Social Services in B.C., Occasional Paper #7, School of Social Work, University of Victoria, July.

Zimmerman, Shirley L. (1983), "The Reconstructed Welfare State and the Fate of Family Policy", Social Casework, 64(8), pp. 459-465.

APPENDIX A

REFERENCE MAPS OF HUMAN RESOURCES REGIONS IN BRITISH COLUMBIA



BRITISH COLUMBIA

REFERENCE MAP OF AREA SAMPLED

(BASED ON MINISTRY OF HUMAN RESOURCES ADMINISTRATIVE REGIONS)

see enlargement of enclosed area on following page

NUMBER OF AGENCIES RESPONDING BY REGION


NON-METROPOLITAN REGIONS	FREQUENCY	PERCENT
7 OKANAGAN	15	8.4
8 KAMLOOPS MAINLINE	8	4.5
9 KOOTENAYS	8	4.5
10 PRINCE GEORGE/CARIBOO	15	8.4
11 B.C. NORTH	6	3.4
12 NORTH VANCOUVER ISLAND	7	3.9
13 SOUTH VANCOUVER ISLAND	2	1.1
14 FRASER VALLEY	10	5.6
	71	39.7

LOWER MAINLAND

REFERENCE MAP OF AREA SAMPLED

(BASED ON M.H.R. ADMINISTRATIVE REGIONS)

1 VANCOUVER
2 North Vancouver
3 West Vancouver
4 Richmond
5 BURNABY
6 DELTA
7 White Rock
8 New Westminster
9 SURREY
10 COQUITLAM
11 Port Coquitlam
12 MAPLE RIDGE
13 Langley
14 Clearbrook
15 Abbotsford
16 Mission
17 Yarrow
18 Chilliwack
19 Sardis
20 Rosedale
21 Agassiz
22 Duncan
23 Sooke
24 Victoria




NUMBER OF AGENCIES RESPONDING BY REGION

METROPOLITAN REGIONS	FREQUENCY	PERCENT
1 ALL VANCOUVER*	46	25.7
2 FRASER SOUTH	12	6.7
3 FRASER NORTH	4	2.2
4 NORTH SHORE	14	7.8
5 SURREY/NEW WESTMINSTER	8	4.5
6 COQUITLAM/MAPLE RIDGE	6	3.4
	90	50.3

* NOTE: ALL VANCOUVER COMPRISES 4 MHR ADMINISTRATIVE REGIONS - VANCOUVER EAST, VANCOUVER BURRARD, DOWNTOWN STRATHCONA, AND VANCOUVER WEST AND SOUTH (AMALGAMATED 1984).

ENLARGEMENT OF METROPOLITAN AREA



APPENDIX B

COVERING LETTER AND QUESTIONNAIRE USED IN THE SURVEY

Questionnaire

This questionnaire is being administered to non-profit personal service agencies in British Columbia. All responses are strictly confidential - no names of individuals or agencies are required. Please read the following questions carefully and answer to the best of your ability by placing a check in the appropriate space or by circling your answer (as directed). Questions requiring a written answer have a space provided for that answer. If a numerical answer is required, and if precise figures are not available, please estimate to the best of your knowledge. Open-ended questions asking for your comments are optional, however, if you wish to make further comment on any aspect of this questionnaire you may do so on a separate sheet of paper. I would be pleased to hear any comments or advice you might care to offer.

---

1) Please indicate the type(s) of service offered by your agency (number in order of importance):

a) Preventive services ____
b) Public education ____
c) Crisis intervention ____
d) Referral/information ____
e) Interest group/client advocacy ____
f) Provision of a direct service (eg. homemaking, daycare) ____
g) Individual or group counselling ____
h) Drop-in or friendly visiting ____
i) Other? _____

2) Are any of your services targeted for the following groups? (number in order of priority):

a) Children or youth (teens) ____
b) Parents/families ____
c) Physically handicapped ____
d) Mentally handicapped, mentally disturbed ____
e) Women ____
f) Seniors ____
g) Prisoners, offenders ____
h) Unemployed/low income ____
i) Welfare recipients ____
j) Tenants ____
k) Persons with drug/alcohol problems ____
l) Community at large ____
m) Other? _____

3) Is your agency a member of the United Way or any other federation or coalition of agencies, national or provincial? (circle) YES NO

If YES, which? _____

4) How long has your agency been in operation as of January 1, 1984?
_____ years _____ months

5) In which city, municipality or regional district is your agency located?

_____

6) Does your agency presently, or has it ever delivered services through contract to any level of government? (circle) YES NO

To which ministry or department? _____

Approximately what proportion of total services offered? ____ %

Year contracts first used? _____ Duration? _____

Types of Programs? _____

7) Give an approximate breakdown of funding sources as a percentage of your total operating budget:

a) United Way _____ %
b) Provincial government:
Ministry _____ _____ %

_____ _____ %

c) Federal Government:
Department _____ _____ %

_____ _____ %

d) Municipal or city government _____ %

e) Private/philanthropic donors _____ %

f) Foundation grants _____ %

g) Agency fund-raising _____ %

h) Service and/or membership fees _____ %

i) Purchase of service contracts with government _____ %

j) Other? _____

8) What proportion of total agency personnel are:

Paid staff? Number? _____, _____ %

Volunteers? Number? _____, _____ %

Of your paid staff, how many are:

Full-time / permanent? Number? _____, _____ %

Part-time / temporary? Number? _____, _____ %

What is the average length of time volunteers remain with your agency? (In months, circle appropriate answer)

1 - 3 mths. 4 - 6 mths. 7 - 12 mths. 13 - 24 mths. more than 24 mths.

9) How would you typify the educational level and qualifications of your paid agency personnel? Please read the following statements and indicate your agreement or disagreement: (circle closest answer)

a) Most have professional qualifications (eg. degrees in social work, counselling, psychology, etc.) related to social services.

strongly agree null answer strongly disagree

3 2 1 0 1 2 3

b) Most have some post-secondary education, although not necessarily in a services-related field.

3 2 1 0 1 2 3

c) Most have either taken some skills-enhancing courses (ie. first aid, sign language, etc.) or have had some work or volunteer experience in some aspect of service provision.

3 2 1 0 1 2 3

d) Most have no post-secondary education or formal training and have learned "on the job".

3 2 1 0 1 2 3

10) Are staff members affiliated with or members of any trade or professional union or professional association? (ie. BCASW, BCGEU, etc.) YES NO NO ANSWER

If YES, which ? _____

11) Has your agency experienced any major shifts in program emphasis since 1981 ? (ie. from preventative to intervention services, or, from direct provision of service to increased referral?) YES NO

12) Has your agency experienced any increase or reduction in funding from any source? Please indicate below:

	%decrease	%increase
a) Provincial government:		
Ministry/program _____	_____	_____
Ministry/program _____	_____	_____
b) Federal government:		
Department _____	_____	_____
Department _____	_____	_____
c) Municipality/ city	_____	_____
d) United Way	_____	_____
e) Private donations	_____	_____
f) Other sources? _____	_____	_____

13) ESTIMATE the per cent increase in operating costs for your agency for the coming year (ie. due to inflation, rent, extra personnel, etc.) _____ %

What per cent increase of funding would be necessary for your agency to operate programs and services at 1981 - 82 levels? _____ %

Has that level of funding been met for the current year? YES NO

Do you expect that current levels of funding will be met in the next fiscal year? YES NO MAYBE

14) Has your agency had to reduce or eliminate any programs offered in, or prior to 1981 - 1982 ? YES NO

Reasons ? (check)

a) Insufficient need or demand ..... _____

b) No funds available ..... _____

c) Programs already offered, or taken over by other private or public agency ..... _____

d) Insufficient staff ..... _____

e) Other? _____

15) Has your agency expanded any of its programs (in terms of hours, staff, improved premises or numbers of clients served?) YES NO

16) Has your agency experienced any paid-staff reductions since 1981 -1982 ? YES NO

Has your agency increased its complement of paid-staff since 1981 - 1982 ? YES NO

What types of positions have experienced some growth or decline?

	decline	growth
a) Clerical/office staff	_____	_____
b) Givers of service (ie. social worker, therapist)	_____	_____
c) Part-time/temporary support staff	_____	_____
d) Management level, agency director	_____	_____
e) Other? _____	_____	_____

17) Has your agency experienced increasing demands on the skill levels or expertise of agency staff (including management skills)? (circle)

much more demands	somewhat more demands	no change	somewhat less demands	far less demands

18) Has your agency experienced:

a) an increased reliance on volunteers _____

b) decreasing use of volunteers _____

c) no change in the use of volunteers _____

d) never use volunteers _____

19) How would you describe your agency's success in acquiring and keeping skilled and experienced staff (in the last year)?

a) no noticable change _____

b) less difficult _____

c) more difficult _____

Would you like to offer any comment? _____

_____

20) Has your agency had to ration services or impose limits on clients served (ie. reduce time spent per client, or change eligibility requirements)?

YES NO

Has your agency experienced any growth in caseloads since 1981 -1982?

substantial decline	some decline	no change	some growth	substantial growth

21) In the last two years has your agency had to refer clients normally handled by your agency to other public or private agencies? YES NO

In the last two years has your agency dealt with types of clients usually handled by other public or private agencies (ie. clients not formerly served by your agency)? YES NO

If you answered YES to either of the above, what would you suggest as the major reasons? (check)

a) increased caseloads; _____

b) inability to expand service to meet demand; _____

c) loss of staff and/or funds; _____

d) loss of services in other parts of the service network; _____

e) other; _____

22) Has your agency, in the last two years, "picked-up" any clients or services previously mandated by government but for whom there is now a reduced level of publicly provided services? YES NO

23) In your opinion, are there areas of social service need in your service region which are not adequately met by existing programs? YES NO

What types of programs? _____

_____

In the converse, are there areas of need which you feel are over-serviced?

YES NO

What areas are these? _____

_____

24) Has your agency had to, or will it have to divert a greater portion of its resources or manpower from service functions to promotional activities or fundraising in order to continue operation? YES NO

25) How would you rate the following as strategies to improve the effectiveness of social services in both the public and private sector? (circle the number which best reflects the weight you give each of these strategies):

a) improved public education and promotion of services;

not effective 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very effective

b) greater efforts at co-ordinating and defining services and service needs;

not effective 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very effective

c) better targeting of funds within agencies;

not effective 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very effective

d) more information-sharing and communication among and between private and public agencies;

not effective 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very effective

e) more attention to developing better information-processing systems and greater efforts at long-term planning;

not effective 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very effective

f) other? _____

_____

26) Does any agency or group in your community regularly publish a COMPREHENSIVE and UP-TO-DATE directory of public and private community services?

YES NO DON'T KNOW

27) In your opinion, are there any publicly-delivered services which are better handled by non-government agencies? YES NO

Such as? _____

_____

28) Would you advise any limitations on the private "for-profit" sector in the field of service delivery in B.C.? YES NO

If YES, what kinds of limitations? _____

_____

If NO, why not? _____

_____

29) In your view, are the current regulatory, accountability and review frameworks currently used to monitor non-government agencies in B.C. adequate to ensure a high standard of service delivery (in terms of effectiveness, accessibility, etc.) NOT SURE YES NO

30) Does government social policy in British Columbia seem to be: (circle)

a) increasing levels of political and economic participation on the part of the disadvantaged sectors of the population?

strongly agree 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 strongly disagree

b) creating a more rational and planned service delivery system?

strongly agree 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 strongly disagree

c) reducing regional or geographical disparity in overall access to the social service network?

strongly agree 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 strongly disagree

d) increasing the range of choice among the consumers of services by enhancing social equity and service accessibility?

strongly agree 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 strongly disagree

31) Given the funding base and accountability structure of your agency, do agency members, directors, or boards feel constrained in their ability to criticize the existing social service system or provincial social policy? (circle)

strongly agree 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 strongly disagree

If you agreed with the last question, is the basis for agreement a concern for preserving your present level of funding? YES NO PARTLY

32) Does your agency incorporate a distinct planning component as a function apart from from other service or administrative functions of the agency?

YES NO

33) Which planning horizon best characterizes your agency? (check)

a) One year or less: limited to immediate fiscal horizon; _____

b) Two - three year: limited long-range planning; _____

c) Four - five year: long-range planning based on an expectation of stable funding levels; _____

d) Incremental or ad hoc planning: (dealing with issues as they arise); _____

e) Other? _____

34) In terms of the planning and service delivery requirements of your agency, how important is it to liaise with: (circle closest answer)

a) other non-profit service agencies who offer similar or ancillary services?

Very Important 1 2 3 4 5 Not Important

b) provincial government ministries and their personnel?

Very Important 1 2 3 4 5 Not Important

c) consumers of services or persons or organisations acting on behalf of consumers or potential consumers of services?

Very Important 1 2 3 4 5 Not Important

d) municipal or city governments and their departments?

Very Important 1 2 3 4 5 Not Important

e) local community or citizens' groups?

Very Important 1 2 3 4 5 Not Important

35) Please indicate the level of success experienced in obtaining information about clients or programs or funding from the following sources: (circle closest answer)

a) Provincial government ministries.

rarely successful 3 2 1 never sought 0 1 2 3 often successful

b) Private, for-profit, agencies.

rarely successful 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 often successful

c) Other non-profit social service agencies.

rarely successful 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 often successful

d) City or municipal health and social planning departments.

rarely successful 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 often successful

e) Hospitals, community health services, community mental health centres.

rarely successful 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 often successful

f) Local police, R.C.M.P.

rarely successful 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 often successful

36) Would you say that, from both the consumer's and the non-profit agency's perspective, the amount and quality of information available about the social service network in British Columbia, from all sources, public and private. is: (circle closest answer)

a) Incomplete	1	2	3	4	5	comprehensive
b) Geared to planning	1	2	3	4	5	Not very useful for planning
c) Inaccessible	1	2	3	4	5	Accessible
d) Consistent (content & quality)	1	2	3	4	5	Inconsistent (content & quality)
e) Adequate	1	2	3	4	5	Inadequate

37) Does your agency:

a) Conduct any independent research? YES NO

b) Access research on pertinent problem areas, or gather statistics or any other analysable data? YES NO

If NO, what are the reasons? _____

_____

38) Does your agency engage in co-operative relationships with other non-profit social service agencies? YES NO

In your opinion, would co-operative relationships between non-profit social service agencies enhance, overall, the effectiveness, planning, and survival of an agency's delivered services? YES NO NOT SURE

39) Does your agency periodically offer training, courses, or seminars in an effort to enhance the skills of agency workers? YES NO

Are agency members/directors encouraged to participate in conferences, symposia, or other activities aimed at the sharing of ideas and enhancement of agency effectiveness and accountability? YES NO

40) Has your agency ever experienced any difficulty in supplying required information to any funding source? YES NO

If YES, has this difficulty ever resulted directly or indirectly in a loss of funds to your agency? YES NO

Reasons for difficulty?

a) Problems of confidentiality. _____

b) Type of service not conducive to compiling statistics. _____

c) Lack of time or resources. _____

d) Information requested inappropriate or in excess of ability to produce it. _____

e) Different funding sources requesting different types of information. _____

f) Other? (please specify) _____

_____

_____

Thank-you very much for taking the time to answer this questionnaire. Your assistance in this important research is appreciated. Please enclose the completed questionnaire in the self-addressed, stamped envelope provided and return immediately. If you have any questions please address them to John Butcher c/o the Department of Geography, 217 - 1984 West Mall, U.B.C.

APPENDIX C

SELECTED ANNOTATED VARIABLES FROM THE QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY OF VOLUNTARISTIC SOCIAL SERVICE AGENCIES IN BRITISH COLUMBIA

EXPLANATORY NOTE ON HISTOGRAMS

For those who have had little experience with statistical analysis this brief introduction should be sufficient to guide your reading of the following figures. Once one knows what to look for, interpretation of these summary statistics is fairly straightforward.

The type of data presentation used here is called a HISTOGRAM. Histograms are simply a means of visually portraying the distribution of observations within a sample. The length of the horizontal bars is determined by the frequency of occurrance of observations within each variable or category. In all cases the variables (i.e. those phenomena we are attempting to measure) are labelled and the number of occurrances for each is given.


Above some of the histograms appears a tabular breakdown of the data gathered for particular variables. The column titled VALUE simply indicates a numerical identification of the possible range of responses available to persons answering the questionnaire. FREQUENCY indicates the number of occurrances for each response and gives a total of all VALID CASES. PERCENT tells us what percentage of total observations is represented by each response. VALID PERCENT, where applicable, offers a percentage calculated after the exclusion of any 'missing cases' (cases where no response was recorded) while the CUM PERCENT gives us the cumulative percentage of the observations recorded.

These histograms have been generated by a statistical software program for the social sciences and appear as they were originally printed by the computer. Hence, they may contain extraneous information which is of no consequence to the reader. The histograms are useful however, in that they offer the reader an immediate visual appraisal of trends in these data. There is a caution, however; as yet the advanced statistical analysis of these data has not been performed (i.e. correlation and regression). These data show frequencies only and therefore the relationships between different variables can onl be inferred at this point.

Fig. 1

GRPTARG RANKED GROUPS TARGETTED FOR SERVICE

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
CHILDREN/YOUTH	1	25	15.5	15.5	15.5
PARENTS/FAMILIES	2	19	11.8	11.8	27.3
PHYS.HANDCAPD	3	6	3.7	3.7	31.1
MENT.HANDCPD./DISTBD	4	21	13.0	13.0	44.1
WOMEN	5	15	9.3	9.3	53.4
SENIORS	6	23	14.3	14.3	67.7
PRISNRS/OFFNDRS	7	8	5.0	5.0	72.7
UNEMPLD/LOW INCOME	8	9	5.6	5.6	78.3
TENANTS	10	1	.6	.6	78.9
DRUG/ALCOHOL PROBS.	11	7	4.3	4.3	83.2
COMMUNITY AT LRG.	12	18	11.2	11.2	94.4
OTHER	13	9	5.6	5.6	100.0
	TOTAL	161	100.0	100.0	



MODE 1.000


VALID CASES 161 MISSING CASES 0

This histogram represents those client groups ranked as being of first order importance to the agencies surveyed. Note that 64% of first order clients are drawn from what may be considered economically and socially vulnerable groups (by frequency of response).

Fig. 2

GRPTARG RANKED GROUPS TARGETTED FOR SERVICE

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
CHILDREN/YOUTH	1	18	14.5	14.5	14.5
PARENTS/FAMILIES	2	28	22.6	22.6	37.1
PHYS.HANDCAPD	3	12	9.7	9.7	46.8
MENT.HANDCPD./DISTBD	4	9	7.3	7.3	54.0
WOMEN	5	9	7.3	7.3	61.3
SENIORS	6	8	6.5	6.5	67.7
PRISNRS/OFFNDRS	7	1	.8	.8	68.5
UNEMPLD/LOW INCOME	8	12	9.7	9.7	78.2
WELFARE RECPNTS	9	12	9.7	9.7	87.9
TENANTS	10	4	3.2	3.2	91.1
DRUG/ALCOHOL PROBS.	11	3	2.4	2.4	93.5
COMMUNITY AT LRG.	12	6	4.8	4.8	98.4
OTHER	13	2	1.6	1.6	100.0
	TOTAL	124	100.0	100.0	



MODE 2.000


VALID CASES 124 MISSING CASES 0

This histogram represents those client groups ranked as of second order importance by responding agencies (by frequency of response).

Fig. 3

GRPTARG RANKED GROUPS TARGETTED FOR SERVICE

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
CHILDREN/YOUTH	1	11	13.6	13.6	13.6
PARENTS/FAMILIES	2	12	14.8	14.8	28.4
PHYS.HANDCAPD	3	7	8.6	8.6	37.0
MENT.HANDCPD./DISTBD	4	3	3.7	3.7	40.7
WOMEN	5	10	12.3	12.3	53.1
SENIORS	6	3	3.7	3.7	56.8
PRISNRS/OFFNDRS	7	2	2.5	2.5	59.3
UNEMPLD/LOW INCOME	8	7	8.6	8.6	67.9
WELFARE RECPNTS	9	5	6.2	6.2	74.1
TENANTS	10	2	2.5	2.5	76.5
DRUG/ALCOHOL PROBS.	11	4	4.9	4.9	81.5
COMMUNITY AT LRG.	12	13	16.0	16.0	97.5
OTHER	13	2	2.5	2.5	100.0
	TOTAL	81	100.0	100.0	



MODE 12.000

VALID CASES 81 MISSING CASES 0

This histogram represents those client groups ranked as of third order importance for responding agencies (by frequency of response). It should be noted that these rankings are the subjective responses of agency directors to a question which constrained respondents to rank their clients and services and should not be interpreted as perceptions of client need or "worthiness".

Fig. 4





Fig. 5



Figures four and five represent (respectively) those service types ranked as being of first and second order priority for responding agencies.

Fig. 6




Figure 6 represents those service types ranked as being of third order priority for responding agencies.

Fig. 7




Fig. 8




Figure 7 shows a breakdown of the age of responding agencies. Nearly half of responding agencies are under 10 years in operation and over 75% are under 15 years in operation. This burgeoning of voluntary sector agencies begins in the 1970's with the growth of government supports for private sector, community-based services.

Figure 8 illustrated a parallel development as government support of non-governmental services in the 1970's extended to the increasing use of purchase of service contracts for the delivery of social services.

Fig. 9




Fig. 10





Figure 9 represents agency estimates of the proportion of total agency services provided through purchase of service contracts. These figures should be interpreted with caution, however, as many agencies may have confused the term "contracts" with grants for the provision of srevices. Many respondents did not respond to the question, possibly because they did not understand it sufficiently.

Figure 10 represents the number of agencies procuring contracts for service provision from a variety of sources. As can be seen, MHR figures very highly in this histogram. Also, it is interesting to note the number of agencies who procure contracts from a variety of sources.

Fig. 11

FUNCHAN2 FUNDING DECREASE

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
MHR	1	39	30.5	30.5	30.5
MIN. OF HEALTH	2	14	10.9	10.9	41.4
ATT. GEN.	3	8	6.3	6.3	47.7
MIN. OF LABOUR	4	5	3.9	3.9	51.6
OTH. PROV. GOVT.	5	16	12.5	12.5	64.1
EMPL.& IMM.	6	8	6.3	6.3	70.3
HEALTH & WELFARE	7	5	3.9	3.9	74.2
CMHC	8	1	.8	.8	75.0
SEC. OF STATE	9	2	1.6	1.6	76.6
OTH. FED. GOVT.	10	9	7.0	7.0	83.6
LOCAL GOVT.	11	4	3.1	3.1	86.7
UNITED WAY	12	4	3.1	3.1	89.8
DONATIONS	13	12	9.4	9.4	99.2
OTHER SOURCES	14	1	.8	.8	100.0
	TOTAL	128	100.0	100.0	




VALID CASES 128 MISSING CASES 0

This histogram represents the number of agencies reporting a decrease in funding by source. As expected, since the MHR is the preeminent funder for this sample, it also figures highly as an agent of funding decline.

Fig. 12

FUNCHANG FUNDING INCREASE

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
MHR	1	10	6.9	6.9	6.9
MIN. OF HEALTH	2	11	7.6	7.6	14.5
ATT. GEN.	3	2	1.4	1.4	15.9
MIN. OF LABOUR	4	3	2.1	2.1	17.9
OTH. PROV. GOVT.	5	15	10.3	10.3	28.3
EMPL.& IMM.	6	8	5.5	5.5	33.8
HEALTH & WELFARE	7	2	1.4	1.4	35.2
CMHC	8	3	2.1	2.1	37.2
SEC. OF STATE	9	2	1.4	1.4	38.6
OTH. FED. GOVT.	10	9	6.2	6.2	44.8
LOCAL GOVT.	11	20	13.8	13.8	58.6
UNITED WAY	12	20	13.8	13.8	72.4
DONATIONS	13	26	17.9	17.9	90.3
OTHER SOURCES	14	14	9.7	9.7	100.0
	TOTAL	145	100.0	100.0	




VALID CASES 145 MISSING CASES 0

Funding increase shows a slightly different pattern. While all funders showed some decline in the previous table, the most prominent sources of increase are the smaller funding bodies - possibly a reflection of attempts at a more equitable distribution of funding among member agencies in the wake of declines from the provincial government.

Fig. 13

AGREE CONCERN FOR FUNDING?

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
YES	1	54	30.2	52.4	52.4
NO	2	10	5.6	9.7	62.1
PARTLY	3	39	21.8	37.9	100.0
	0	76	42.5	MISSING	
	TOTAL	179	100.0	100.0	




MODE 1.000

Fig. 14

REVOL USE OF VOLUNTEERS

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
INCREASED RELIANCE	1	92	51.4	52.9	52.9
DECREASING REL.	2	4	2.2	2.3	55.2
NO CHANGE	3	60	33.5	34.5	89.7
NEVER USE	4	18	10.1	10.3	100.0
	0	5	2.8	MISSING	
	TOTAL	179	100.0	100.0	



MEAN	2.023	MODE	1.000	STD DEV	1.138
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	4.000		
VALID CASES	174	MISSING CASES	5		


Figure 13 indicates agency directors' responses to a question asking whether they felt constrained in their ability or willingness to criticise provincial government social policy as a result of concern for continued funding.

Figure 14 illustrates the changing pattern of reliance on volunteers in the face of social and economic change.

Fig. 15

reasons for reducing or eliminating programs

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
LACK OF DEMAND	1	10	7.6	7.6	7.6
LACK OF FUNDS	2	69	52.3	52.3	59.8
PGMS. REDUNDANT	3	8	6.1	6.1	65.9
LACK OF STAFF	4	45	34.1	34.1	100.0
	TOTAL	132	100.0	100.0	




VALID CASES 132 MISSING CASES 0

Fig. 16

IFYES REASONS FOR CLIENT DEFLECTION

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
INCRSD. CASELDS	1	39	19.8	19.8	19.8
CANNOT MEET DEMAND	2	33	16.8	16.8	36.5
LOSS-STAFF/FUNDS	3	37	18.8	18.8	55.3
LOSS OF ANCILL. SVCS	4	72	36.5	36.5	91.9
OTHER	5	16	8.1	8.1	100.0
	TOTAL	197	100.0	100.0	



MODE 4.000

VALID CASES 197 MISSING CASES 0


Figure 15 gives a breakdown of reasons given by agency directors for the reduction or elimination of programs.

Figure 16 gives a breakdown of reasons given by agency directors for deflecting clients to other private or public sector agencies.

Fig. 17

PICKUP ANY SVCS. PICKED-UP?

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
YES	1	97	54.2	56.7	56.7
NO	2	74	41.3	43.3	100.0
	0	8	4.5	MISSING	
	TOTAL	179	100.0	100.0	



MODE 1.000

VALID CASES 171 MISSING CASES 8

Fig. 18

NOTFORM NEW CLIENT TYPES

VALUE LABEL	VALUE	FREQUENCY	PERCENT	VALID PERCENT	CUM PERCENT
YES	1	90	50.3	52.9	52.9
NO	2	80	44.7	47.1	100.0
	0	9	5.0	MISSING	
	TOTAL	179	100.0	100.0	





Fig. 19

CASELOAD CHANGE



MEAN 4.043 MODE 5.000 STD DEV 1.077
MINIMUM 1.000 MAXIMUM 5.000

VALID CASES 162 MISSING CASES 17

Figure 17 shows the responses of agencies to the question of whether or not they have "picked-up" services or clients previously mandated by government but for whom there is now a reduced level of publicly provided services.

Figure 18 gives the responses of agencies who were asked if they are now serving client types usually handled by other public or private agencies.

Figure 19 illustrates the changes in caseload experienced by voluntary social service agencies (by frequency of response).

APPENDIX D

A COMPLETE LISTING OF 517 VOLUNTARY AGENCIES CONTACTED FOR THIS SURVEY

Allied Indian - Metis Society
2716 Clark Drive
Vancouver
V5N 3H6

Alternative Shelter Society
1885 W. 10th Ave.
Vancouver
V6J 2AB

Arbutus Work Incentive Society
1080 W. 7th Ave.
Vancouver V6H 1B3

Aurora Society
2036 West 13th Ave
Vancouver
V6J 2H7

Battered Women's Support Services
301 - 2515 Burrard St.
Vancouver V6H 3J6

Britannia Community Services Centre
1661 Napier St.
Vancouver
V5L 4X4

BC Borstal Association
2 - 5 E. Broadway
Vancouver
V5T 1V4

BC Civil Liberties Assn.
518 - 119 W. Pender St.
Vancouver
V6B 1S5

BC Coalition of the Disabled
P.O. Box 2013
349 W. Georgia St.
Vancouver
V6B 3P8

BC Federation of Women
P.O. Box 24687
Station C
Vancouver
V5T 4E2

BC Neurological Group Homes Society
3812 Osler St.
Vancouver
V6H 2W8

BC Public Interest Advocacy Society
1406 - 207 W. Hastings St.
Vancouver
V6B 1K5

Building Independent Living With the Disabled
201 - 1810 Alberni St.
Vancouver
V6G 1B3

Burnaby Family Life Institute
250 Willingdon Ave.
Vancouver
V5C 5E9

Big Brothers of Greater Vancouver
2288 Kingsway
Vancouver
V5N 5M9

Big Sisters of BC
4512 Main St.
Vancouver
V5V 3R5

Birthright
902 - 207 W. Hastings St.
Vancouver
V6B 1H7

Canadian Mental Health Assn.
BC Division
692 E. 26th Ave.
Vancouver
V5V 2H7

Canadian Schizophrenia Foundation
P.O. Box 35331
Station E
Vancouver V6M 4G5

Canadian Single Parents Association
3119 Waverly Ave.
Vancouver
V5S 1G1

Catholic Community Services
150 Robson St.
Vancouver
V6B 2A7

Cedar Cottage Homemakers
203 - 1437 Kingsway
Vancouver
V5N 2R6

Cedar Cottage Neighbourhood House
4065 Victoria Drive
Vancouver
V5N 4M9

Central City Mission
233 Abbott St.
Vancouver
V6B 2K7

Cheshire Homes Society of BC
820 - E. King Edward
Vancouver
V5V 2E4

Children's Matrix
1811 W. 16th Ave.
Vancouver
V6J 2M3

Coast Foundation Society
295 E. 11th Ave.
Vancouver
V5T 2C4

Columbia Housing Advisory Association
1435 Kingsway
Vancouver
V5N 2R7

Community Homemaker Services Association of Greater Vanc.
400 E. Broadway
Vancouver V5T 1X2

Community Living Board
102 - 395 W. Broadway
Vancouver
V5Y 1A7

Connection Society
1810 West 16th Ave.
Vancouver
V6J 2L9

Crisis Intervention & Suicide Prevention Centre
1946 W. Broadway
Vancouver
V6J 1Z2

CUPAC Services Society
206 - 799 W. Broadway
Vancouver
V52 1J5

Dick Bell-Irving Home
554 West 21st Ave.
Vancouver
V5Z 1Y6

Divorce Lifeline
Low er Level, 690 Burrard St.
Vancouver
V6C 2L1

Downtown Eastside Residents Association
4 - 9 E. Hastings St.
Vancouver
V6A 1M9

Downtown Eastside Women's Centre
219 Dunleavy
Vancouver

Eastside Family Place
1034 Commercial Drive
Vancouver
V5L 3W9

Eastside Seniors Activity Centre
1725 Commercial Drive
Vancouver
V5N 2N4

Elder's Network
105 - 2182 W. 12th Ave.
Vancouver
V6K 2N4

Elizabeth Fry Society
2577 Willow St.
Vancouver
V5Z 3N3

Emotions Anonymous
P.O. Box 4784
Main Post Office
Vancouver
V6B 4A4

Family Services of Greater Vancouver
1616 W. 7th Ave.
Vancouver
V6J 1S5

First United Church (Counselling Services)
320 E. Hastings
Vancouver V6A 1P4

Frog Hollow Neighbourhood House
2617 E. Broadway
Vancouver
V5M 1Y6

Gerontology Association of BC
P.O. Box 58187
Station L
Vancouver
V6P 6E3

Gordon House
1068 Davie St.
Vancouver
V6E 1M3

Gordon House People Place
1705 Nelson St.
Vancouver
V6G 1M6

Greater Vancouver Foodbank Society
11 E. 4th Ave.
Vancouver V5T 1E9

Hatfield Society
863 E. 12th Ave.
Vancouver
V5T 2J3

Canadian Red Cross, Health and Community Services
4350 Oak St.
Vancouver V6H 2N6

Immigrant Services Centre
c/o OASIS
8165 MAin St.
Vancouver
V5X 3L2

Immigrant Services Society of BC
622 Seymour St.
Vancouver
V6B 3K4

Indian Homemakers Assn. of BC
102 - 423 W. Broadway
Vancouver
V5Y 1R4

Inner City Housing Society
201 - 1587 W. 8th Ave.
Vancouver
V6J 1N1

International Society of the Handicapped
2854 Euclid Ave.
Vancouver V5R 5C1

St. James Social Service
333 Powell St.
Vancouver
V6A 1G5

Jewish Family Service Agency
305 - 2025 W. 42nd Ave.
Vancouver
V6M 2B5

John Howard Society of BC
435 W. Broadway
Vancouver
V5Y 1R4

Kettle Friendship Society
940 Commercial Dr.
Vancouver
V5L 3W7

Kitsilano Inter - Neighbourhood Development
104 - 2182 W. 12th Ave.
Vancouver V6K 2N4

Kitsilano Neighbourhood House
2305 - 2325 W.7th. Ave.
Vancouver
V6K 1Y4

Kiwassa Neighbourhood House
600 Vernon Dr.
Vancouver
V6A 3N8

Legal Services Society
Box 3
300 - 1140 W. Pender St.
Vancouver
V6E 4G1

Lesbian Information Line
1501 W. Broadway
Vancouver
V6J 1W6

LIFE Resource Centre
101 - 395 W. Broadway
Vancouver
V5Y 1P8

Little Mountain Neighbourhood House
3981 Main St.
Vancouver
V5V 3P3

Little Mountain Tenant's Assn.
125 E. 37th Ave.
Vancouver
V5W 1E5

Loma Residence Association
1872 W. 10th Ave.
Vancouver
V6J 2A7

Lookout
346 Alexander St.
Vancouver
V6A 1C3

Lower Mainland Society for Residences for the Physically Handicapped
1167 Forge Walk
Vancouver V6H 3R1

Mainstream Society for Integrated Community Living
1585 W. 4th Ave.
Vancouver
V6J 1L6

Marpole - Oakridge Information Centre
8386 Granville St.
Vancouver
V6P 4Z7

Marpole - Oakridge Neighbourhood Place
6970 Oak St.
Vancouver V6P 3Z6

Marpole - Oakridge Services for Seniors and the Handicapped
1305 W. 70th Ave
Vancouver V6P 2Y6

Maternal Health Society
P.O. Box 46563
Vancouver (Station G)
V6R 4G8

Mental Patients Association
2146 Yew
Vancouver
V6K 3G7

MOSAIC
1161 Commercial Dr.
Vancouver
V5L 3X3

Mount Pleasant Family Centre
2910 St. George St.
Vancouver
V5T 4L9

Mount Pleasant Neighbourhood House
535 E. Broadway
Vancouver
V5T 1X4

Munroe House (YWCA)
580 Burrard St.
Vancouver
V7X 1M4

Narcotics Anonymous
P.O. Box 720
Station A
Vancouver
V6C 2N5

Native Courtworker and Counselling Association of BC
219 Main St.
Vancouver
V6A 2S7

Native Women's Family and Cultural Centre
640 E. Broadway
Vancouver
V5T 1X6

NEED Outreach
30 Blood Alley Square
Vancouver
V6B 1C7

New Hope Centre
217 Dunleavy Ave.
Vancouver
V6A 3A5

Owl House Emergency Shelter
909 Thurlow St.
Vancouver
V6E 1W3

Pacific Association for Autistic Citizens
107 - 395 W. Broadway
Vancouver
V5Y 1P8

Pacific Coast Family Therapy Training Association
3590 West 41st Ave.
Vancouver V6N 3E6

Parents Without Partners
P.O. Box 65742
Station F Vancouver
V5N 5K7

Tenant's Rights Action Centre
203 - 96 E. Broadway
Vancouver
V5T 1V6

The 44 Multi-use Centre
44 East Cordova St.
Vancouver
V6A 1K2

Tonari H Gumi - Social & Community Services
573 E. Hastings St.
Vancouver
V6A 1P9

Unitarian Family Life Centre of Vancouver
949 W. 49th Ave.
Vancouver
V5Z 2T1

United Way of the Lower Mainland
1625 W. 8th Ave.
Vancouver
V6J 1T9

Vancouver Christian Counselling Centre
969 Burrard St.
Vancouver
V6Z 1Y1

Vancouver Community Legal Assistance Society
257 E. 11th Ave.
Vancouver
V5T 2C4

Vancouver Community Workshop
8916 Shaughnessy St.
Vancouver
V6P 3Y5

Vancouver and District Public Housing Tenant's Association
12 - 246 E. Broadway
Vancouver V5T 1W3

Vancouver Homesharer's Society
105 - 2182 W. 12th Ave.
Vancouver V6K 2N4

Vancouver Hospice Project
201 - 828 W. 8th Ave.
Vancouver
V5Z 1E2

Vancouver Incest and Sexual Abuse Centre Society
1625 W. 8th Ave.
Vancouver
V6J 1T9

Vancouver Indian Centre Society
1607 E. Hastings St.
Vancouver
V5L 1S7

Vancouver Multi-cultural Women's Association
15 E. Broadway
Vancouver
V5T 1V4

Vancouver Resource Society for the Physically Disabled
4678 Main St.
Vancouver
V5V 3R7

Vancouver Sexual & Marital Development Centre
2607 Alma St.
Vancouver
V6R 3S1

Vancouver Status of Women
400 A w. 5th Ave.
Vancouver
V5Y 1J7

Vancouver Teen Challenge
982 Granville St.
Vancouver
V6Z 1L2

Vancouver Transition House
P.O. Box 35366
Station E
Vancouver
V6M 4G5

Vancouver Women's Health Collective
1501 W. Broadway
Vancouver
V6J 1W6

Victims of Violence Society
P.O. Box 1081
Station A
Vancouver V6C 2T1

Victorian Order of Nurses
Meals On Wheels
1645 W. 10th Ave.
Vancouver V6J 2A2

St. Vincent De Paul Service
150 Robson St.
Vancouver
V4B 2A7

West End Information Centre
839 Bidwell St.
Vancouver
V6G 2J7

West End Tenant's Assn.
4 - 1170 Bute Street
Vancouver
V6E 1Z6

West Side Family Place
2505 Dunbar St.
Vancouver
V6R 3N4

Women Against Violence Against Women
204 - 636 W. Broadway
Vancouver
V5Z 1G2

People's Law School
3466 W. Broadway
Vancouver
V6R 2B3

Rape Relief and Women's Shelter
77 E. 20th Ave.
Vancouver
V5V 1L7

Raycam Family Drop-in
920 E. Hastings St.
Vancouver
V6A 3T1

Reach Community Health Centre
1145 Commercial Drive
Vancouver
V5L 3X3

Red Door Rental Aid Society
200 - 2250 Commercial Dr.
Vancouver
V5N 4B6

Salvation Army Family Service Centre
319 E. Hastings St.
Vancouver V6A 1P3

Sancta Maria House
2056 W. 7th Ave.
Vancouver
V6J 1T4

Senior's Alcoholism & Drug Rehabilitation Society
411 Dunsmuir St.
Vancouver V6B 1X4

Senior's Centre
411 Dunsmuir St.
Vancouver BC
V6B 1X4

Senior Citizen's Outreach Society
1420 Commercial Dr.
Vancouver
V5L 3X9

Shaughnessy-Arbutus-Kerrisdale Community Resources Assn.
5851 W. Boulevard
Vancouver V6M 3W9

Search Community Services
P.O. Box 2259
Vancouver
V6B 3W2

Social Planning and Review Council of BC
109 - 2182 W. 12th Ave.
Vancouver V6K 2N4

Society for Children and Youth of BC
1811 W. 16th Ave.
Vancouver
V6J 3G8

South Vancouver Neighbourhood House
6470 Victoria Dr.
Vancouver V5P 3X5

Stepping Stone
4618 Earles St.
Vancouver
V5R 3R2

SUCCESS
449 E. Hastings St.
Vancouver
V6A 1P5

Sunflower Family Crisis Intervention Centre & Shelter
2759 E. Broadway
Vancouver
V5M 1Y7

Women In Trades Association of BC
400 A W. 5th Ave.
Vancouver
V5Y 1J8

Women's Research Centre
301 - 2515 Burrard St.
Vancouver
V6J 3J6

YMCA of Greater Vancouver
955 Burrard St.
Vancouver
V6Z 1Y2

Alternatives
892 A Marine Drive
North Vancouver
V7P 1R9

Capilano Community Services
Delbroook Community Centre
600 West Queens Road
North Vancouver
V7N 2L3

Chesterfield House
819 Chesterfield Ave
North Vancouver
V7M 2M8

North Shore Association for the Mentally Handicapped
Residential Services
c/o 3 - 431 Mountain Hwy.
North Vancouver V7J 2L1

North Shore Counselling Centre
202 - 145 E. 15th St.
North Vancouver
V7L 2P3

North Shore Crisis Services Society
600 W. Queens Rd.
North Vancouver
V7N 2L3

North Shore Home Support Services Society
350 - 145 W. 17th St.
North Vancouver
V7M 1V5

North Shore Information and Volunteer Centre
1551 Pemberton Ave.
North Vancouver
V7P 2S3

North Shore Living and Learning Centre
2104 Gordon Ave.
West Vancouver
V7V 1V9

North Shore Meals on Wheels
1525 Taylor Way
West Vancouver
V7S 1N5

North Shore Neighbourhood House
225 E. 2nd. St.
North Vancouver
V7L 1C4

North Shore Projects Society for the Low Income & Handicapped
3 - 1538 Marine Dr.
West Vancouver V7P 1T7

North Shore Tenants Association
1900 Larson Rd.
North Vancouver
V7M 2Z6

North Shore Volunteers for Residents in Care Facilities
1538 Marine Drive
West Vancouver
V7V 1H8

North Shore Women's Centre
600 West Queen's Road
North Vancouver
V7N 2L3

Senior Citizen's Special Services
695 - 21st St.
West Vancouver
V7V 4A7

Seycove Information Centre
1204 Caledonia Ave.
North Vancouver
V7G 2A6

Silver Harbour Centre
144 E. 22nd. St.
North Vancouver
V7L 4L5

BC Disabled People's Network
6849 Stride Ave.
Burnaby
V3N 1S9

BC Parents in Crisis
13 - 250 Willingdon Ave.
Burnaby
V5C 4E9

BC Youth Development Centre
3405 Willingdon Ave.
Burnaby
V5G 3H4

Browndale Care Society
4065 E. 1st Ave.
Burnaby
V5C 3W5

Burnaby Association for the Mentally Handicapped
4190 E. Hastings St.
Burnaby

Burnaby Family Daycare Assn.
c/o 1210 Sperling Ave.
Burnaby
V5B 4J5

Burnaby Information and Referral Society
250 Willingdon Ave.
Burnaby
V5C 5E9

Burnaby Meals on Wheels
250 Willingdon Ave.
Burnaby
V5C 5E9

Charlford House
6845 Kitchener St.
Burnaby
V5B 2J8

Employee Assistance Services
150 - 6400 Roberts St.
Burnaby
V5G 4C9

L'Arche, Greater Vancouver
7401 Sussex Ave.
Burnaby
V5J 2A7

Lifeline Society
4443 Irmin St.
Burnaby
V5J 1X8

Lower Mainland St. Leonard's Society
182 - 4664 Lougheed Hwy.
Burnaby
V5C 5T5

Marriage Project
7405 Royal Oak Ave.
Burnaby
V3L 3R7

Project Back Door Citizen's Development Fund
Christ the King Church
4550 Kitchener St.
Burnaby V5C 3M7

Rehabilitation and Counselling Services
3755 Banff Ave.
Burnaby
V5G 3Z9

Western Canada Family Daycare Association of BC
c/o 5373 Meadale Dr.
Burnaby
V5B 2E6

Western Father's Rights Assn.
4611 Kingsway
Burnaby
V5H 2B3

Vancouver Childbirth Assn.
4340 Carson St.
Burnaby
V5J 2X9

Chimo - Richmond Crisis Centre
7120 Westminster Hwy.
Richmond
V6X 1A1

Crescent Beach Community Services
2916 McBride St.
Crescent Beach
V4A 3G2

Delta Family Services Society
11966 - 64th Ave.
Delta
V4E 1C8

Delta Homemaker Service
53 - 4875 Elliot St.
Delta
V4K 2X7

Delta Youth Services and
Crime Prevention Society
4455 Clarence Taylor Cres.
Delta
V4K 3E1

Deltassist Information Centre
4910 Delta St.
Delta
V4K 2V2

Lower Fraser Valley Habilitation
and Vocational Society for
Retarded Persons
3800 72nd St.
Delta V4K 3N2

Mothers Against Drunk Drivers
26 - 4160 Bonavista Dr.
Richmond
V7E 5K1

North Delta Meals on Wheels
11712 - 74 A Ave.
Delta
V4C 1G7

Pacific Family Life Foundation
9317 Kingsley Cres.
Richmond
V7A 4W7

Richmond Community Information
Centre
Richmond Shopping Mall
6551 No. 3 Rd.
Richmond V6Y 2B6

Richmond Family Daycare
Society
7431 Bassett Place
Richmond
V7C 4A8

Richmond Family Place
6560 Gilbert Rd.
Richmond
V7C 3V4

Richmond Food Bank
St. Alban's Church
7251 St. Alban's
Richmond
V6Y 2K4

Richmond Free Clinic
6911 No. 3 Rd.
Richmond
V6Y 2C1

Richmond Oppourtunities
Workshop
2840 F Olafson Ave.
Richmond
V6X 2R3

Richmond Women's Resource
Centre
c/o 6911 No. 3 Rd.
Richmond
V6Y 2C1

Richmond Volunteer
Transportation Society
219 - 3631 No. # Rd.
Richmond
V6X 2B9

Richmond Youth Service Agency
4060 Garden City Rd.
Richmond
V6X 2K1

South Surrey - White Rock
Women's Place
102 - 1548 Johnston Rd.
White Rock V4B 3Z8

White Rock Community Aid Society
P.O. Box 122
White Rock
V4B 4Z7

White Rock Co-ordinating
Centre
15150 Russell Ave.
White Rock
V4B 2P5

White Rock Meals on Wheels
1464 Finlay St.
White Rock V4B 4L5

Act II Society for Assistance
in the Community Today
2278 Kelly St.
Port Coquitlam
V3C 1Z9

BC Friends of Schizophrenics
c/o 1441 Denise Place
Port Coquitlam
V3C 2W4

BC Old Age Pensioners Assn.
891 Thermal Drive
Coquitlam
V3J 6R4

Caritas Hospice Society
202 - 1046 Austin Ave.
Coquitlam
V3K 3P3

Coquitlam Family Centre
P.O. Box 1142
Coquitlam
V3J 6Z4

Coquitlam SHARE Society
P.O. Box 1142
Coquitlam
V3J 6Z4

Coquitlam Women's
Transition House
P.O. Box 213
Coquitlam
V3C 3V7

Families Anonymous
1233 Pipeline Road
Coquitlam
V3B 5C2

Haney Place Clinic
11940 Haney Place
Maple Ridge
V2X 6G1

Kincade Treatment Resource
169 King Edward St.
Coquitlam
V3K 4T3

Maple Ridge Family
Education Centre
11907 - 228th St.
Maple Ridge
V2X 8G8

Maple Ridge - Pitt Meadows
Community Services Council
11907 - 228th St.
Maple Ridge
V2X 8G8

Maple Ridge - Pitt Meadows
Homemaker Service
2 - 22311 McIntosh Ave.
Maple Ridge V2X 3C2

New View Society
2232 Elgin Ave.
Port Coquitlam
V3C 2B2

Port Coquitlam Area Women's
Centre
Box 220
Port Coquitlam
V3C 3V6

Port Coquitlam Family Studies
Centre Society
2472 Chilcott Ave.
Port Coquitlam V3B 1Y3

Port Coquitlam Meals on Wheels
431 Laurier Ave.
Port Coquitlam
V3C 3V4

Pregnancy Problem Centre
405 E North Rd.
Coquitlam
V3K 3V9

Ridge Meadows Association
for Mentally Handicapped
Persons
P.O. Box 111
Maple Ridge V2X 7G2

Ridge Meadows Foodbank Society
p.o. Box 377
Maple Ridge
V2X 5V3

Second Step Society for
Physically Handicapped Adults
2667 Kingsway Ave.
Port Coquitlam V3C 1T5

Simon Fraser Community
Homemakers Services Assn.
220 - 341 North Rd.
Coquitlam V3K 3V8

Third Step
104 - 2331 Marpole Ave.
Port Coquitlam
V3C 2A1

Touchstone Centre
12084 - 211th St.
Maple Ridge
V2X 8K8

All Alone Parents Society
P.O. Box 2293
New Westminster
V3L 5A7

AWARE
411 - 6th St.
New Westminster
V3L 3B1

Burden Bearers of Canada
102 - 10070 King George Hwy.
Surrey
V3T 2W4

CARE Productions
P.O. Box 183
Surrey
V6T 4W8

Colebrook Meals on Wheels
9815 - 140th St.
Surrey
V3T 4M4

Federated Anti-Poverty Groups of BC
106 - 26 Lorne St.
New Westminster
V3M 3L7

Fraser Valley Alcoholism Society
811 Royal Ave.
New Westminster
V3M 1E2

Guilford Home Society
4 - 10318 E. Whalley Ring Rd.
Surrey
V3T 4H4

Lower Fraser Valley Cerebral Palsey Association
9460 - 140th St.
Surrey
V3V 5Z4

National Children's Society
4 - 10318 E. Whalley Ring Rd.
Surrey
V3T 4H4

New Home Theraputic Society
12 - 15300 105th Ave
Surrey
V3R 6A7

New Westminsyer Food Bank
1111 - 6th Ave. West
New Westminster
V3M 2B7

New Westminster Tenants Assn.
105 - 26 Lorne St.
New Westminster
V3L 4Y4

PLURA
106 - 26 lorne St.
New Westminster
V3M 3L7

SANE Society
204 - 604 Blackford St.
New Westminster
V3M 1R6

Semiahmoo House Society
15310 - 24th Ave.
Surrey
V4A 2J1

Seniors and Handicapped Handiman Services
4 - 601 Royal Ave.
New Westminster
V3L 1J5

Sexual Assault Recovery Anonymous
P.O. Box 16
Surrey
V3t 4W3

Single Parents Drop-in Centre
180 - 6th St.
New Westminster
V3L 2Z9

7th Step Society
219 Carnarvon St.
New Westminster
V3L 1B7

Surrey Association for the Mentally Retarded
17949 Roan Place
Surrey
V3S 5K1

Surrey Community Resource Centre Society
13455 0 72nd Ave.
Surrey
V3W 2N7

Surrey Co-ordinating Centre
9815 - 140th St.
Surrey
V3T 4M4

Surrey - Delta Immigrant Services Society
12370 - 98th Ave.
Surrey V3V 2K3

Surrey Food Bank
13900 - 100th Ave.
Surrey
V3T 1J4

Surrey Rehabilitation Society
10694 - 135th St.
Surrey
V3T 4C7

Surrey Single Parents Assn.
P.O. Box 143
Surrey
V3T 4W4

Surrey and White Rock Community Homemaker Service Association
7228 King George Hwy.
Surrey V3W 5A5

Western Society Handidart Services
4 - 601 Royal Ave.
New Westminster
V3M 1J5

Westminster Community Legal Services Society
805 - 12th St.
New Westminster
V3M 4K2

Agassiz Community Services
P.O. Box 564
Agassiz B.C.

Al-Anon & Al-A-Teen
Box 24
Chilliwack B.C.

Alcoholics Anonymous
Box 134
Chilliwack B.C.

Alcoholics Anonymous
Box 3213
Mission BC

Big Brothers
45474 Bernard Ave.
Chilliwack
V2P 1H7

Birthright
34239 Hazel St.
Abbotsford BC

Burden Bearers
2599 Cedar Park
Clearbrook BC

Chilliwack Area Indian Council
Box 73
Sardis BC

Chilliwack Community Services
45845 Wellington Ave.
Chilliwack
V2P 2E1

Chilliwack & District Oppourtunity Workshop
9071 Gibson Rd.
RR#2
Chilliwack BC

Chilliwack Homemaker Service Society
Ste. 23 - 45975 Gore Ave.
Chilliwack V2P 1Z5

Chrisholm Society
460 - 216th St.
Langley
V3A 7R2

Community Services Workshop
31088 Peardonville Rd.
Store 5 , Building 1
Abbotsford BC

Fraser House
33063 - 4th Ave.
Mission City
V2V 1S6

Genesis Society
Box 211
Rosedale BC
V0X 1X0

Homemaker's Services
7440 Hurd St.
Mission BC

Hope Community Services
Box 74
Hope BC

ISHTAR Transition House
P.O. Box 3262
Langley
V3A 4R6

Kinghaven
31250 King Road
RR#1
Abbotsford
V2S 1M2

John Howard Society
Family Services
2420 Montrose Ave.
Abbotsford V2S 3S9

Langley Family Services Assn.
5339 - 207th St.
Langley
V3A 2E6

Langley Homemaker Service
P.O. Box 168
Aldergrove
V0X 1A0

Langley Hospice Society
4130 - 207th St.
Langley
V3A 2E1

Langley Seniors Network
5498 Salt Lane
Langley
V3A 5C7

Legal Aid Society of BC
#5 - 9360 Mill St.
Chilliwack
V2P 4N2

M-2 Man to Man
46051 Larter Ave.
Chilliwack
V2P 6M7

Mission Community Services
33070 5th Ave.
Mission BC

MSA Association for the Retarded
32919 Mill Lake Road
Abbotsford BC

Salvation Army Correctional Services Office
46022 Yale Road West
Chilliwack BC

Senior Citizen's Counsellor
33482 Lynne Ave.
Abbotsford BC

Status of Women
7158 Maitland Ave.
Sardis
V0X 1Y0

United Injured and Disabled Workers Association
P.O. Box 372
Abbotsford BC
V2S 4N9

Upper Fraser Valley Neurological Society
41016 Bellrose Rd.
Yarrow BC

Voice of Women
6210 Ross Rd.
RR#2
Sardis BC

Community Assistance Society
Box 75
Sooke
V0S 1N0

Sooke Community Food Centre
Box 1122
Sooke
V0S 1N0

Sooke Family Resource Society
c/o Mrs. Joyce Barwis
2093 Harbourview
RR#1 Sooke V0S 1N0

Sooke Meals on Wheels
2458 Sooke River Rd.
RR#3 Sooke
V0S 1N0

Aid Crisis Centre
361 Vancouver Ave.
Nanaimo BC

Aid to the Handicapped Committee
285 Prideaux St.
Nanaimo
V9R 2N2

Al-A-Teen Nanaimo
Box 31
Nanaimo BC

Bevan Association
Box 3327
Courtenay
V9N 5N5

Big Brothers
311 Fitzwilliam
Nanaimo BC

Campbell River Area Women's Resource Society
Box 528
Campbell River V9W 5C1

Campbell River Child Care Society
394 Leishman Rd.
Campbell River V9W 3V6

Campbell River & District Adult Care Society
1461 Elm St.
Campbell River V9W 3A5

Campbell River & District Association for the Mentally Handicapped
1153 Greenwood St.
Campbell River BC

Chemical Dependency Centre Society
RR#1 Site A
Nanaimo Island Hwy.
Nanaimo BC

Citizen Advocacy
311 Fitzwilliam St.
Nanaimo
V9R 3A6

Coalition of Vancouver Island Women's Services
Aid Centre
316 Vancouver St.
Nanaimo V9S 4G3

Counselling Service
255 E. Island Hwy.
Parksville BC

Crossroads
1970 Cliffe
Courtenay BC

Family Counselling
Crisis Line
201 - 437 10th Ave.
Campbell River V9W 4E4

John Howard Society
208 - 437 10th Ave.
Campbell River
V9W 4E4

Legal Aid Society
912 Island Hwy.
Campbell River
V9W 5A7

Nanaimo Family Life Assn.
311 Fitzwilliam St.
Nanaimo
V9R 3A6

Nanaimo Rape Relief
361 Vancouver Ave.
Nanaimo
V9S 4G3

Nanaimo Rape Relief Centre
285 Prideaux St.
Nanaimo
V9S 4G3

Nanaimo Transition House
c/o Vancouver Island
Haven Society
Nanaimo
V9R 5L3

Nanaimo Women's Resources
Society
285 Trideau
Nanaimo
V9R 2N2

Native Courtworker &
Counselling Assn. of BC
P.O. Box 841
Duncan
V9L 3Y2

Serena - Nanaimo
2610 Rosstown Rd.
Nanaimo
V9T 3S1

United Appeal Campaign Fund
Box 135
Campbell River
V9W 5A7

United Way of Nanaimo
P.O. Box 304
Nanaimo
V9R 5L3

Vancouver Island Resource
Society
964 Shopper's Row
Campbell River
V9W 5A4

Activators Society
770 - 2nd Ave.
Prince George BC

AIM HI
#100 - 1258 5th Ave.
Prince George BC

Alateen
218 Kinchant St.
Quesnel BC

Alateen & Alanon
561 Beech Crescent
Prince George BC

Alcoholics Anonymous
P.O. Box 1257
Prince George BC

Alcohol & Drug Treatment
Centre
1222 4th Ave.
Prince George BC

Alcoholics Victorious
4532 Bauch Ave.
Prince George BC

Amata Transition House
693 McLean St.
Quesnel BC

St. Andrews Family Life
Committee
3555 5th Ave.
Prince George BC

Attendance Program
#201 - 1378 5th Ave.
Prince George BC

Aurora Industries
966 5th Ave.
Prince George BC

Big Brothers & Sisters
1306 7th Ave.
Prince George BC

Birthright
220 - 1705 3rd Ave.
Prince George BC

Borealis Achievement Centre
611 Anderson Dr.
Quesnel BC

Canadian Mental Health Assn.
Box 4416
Quesnel
V2J 3S4

Canadian Paraplegic Assn.
1306 7th Ave.
Prince George BC

Carefree Society
2832 Queensway St.
Prince George BC

Cariboo Action Training
Society
1306 7th Ave.
Prince George BC

Central Interior Special
Services to Children Society
575 Quebec St.
P.O. Box 1328 Station A
Prince George BC

Cerebral Palsy Assn.
1687 Strathcona St.
Prince George BC

Child Development Centre
324 Hoy St.
Quesnel BC

Civil Liberties Society
7677 St. Patrick Ave.
Prince George BC

Commumity Aid Society
324 Hoy St.
Quesnel
BC

Community Resources Society
1306 7th Ave.
Prince George BC

Crisis Centre
1306 7th Ave.
Prince George BC

Crisis Line
324 Hoy St.
Quesnel BC

Day Care Society
247 Trader Crescent
Prince George BC

Disabled Group Home
2690 Ospika Boulevard
Prince George BC

Doh Day De Claa
Indian Friendship Centre
144 George St.
Prince George BC

Elizabeth Fry Society
1378 5th Ave.
Prince George BC

Foster Parents Association
1268 5th Ave.
Prince George BC

Full Circle Delivery
201 - 2414 Queensway St.
Prince George BC

Homemakers Service Society
201 - 513 Ahbau St.
Prince George BC

Immigrant & Multi-Cultural
Services Society
1306 7th Ave.
Prince George BC

John Howard Society
P.O. Box 386
Station A
Prince George BC

Legal Information Centre
94 - 1st Ave. North
Williams Lake
V2G 1H2

Legal Services Society of BC
201 - 1378 5th Ave.
Prince George BC

Man to Man - Woman to Woman
272 Moran Cresc.
Prince George BC

Mary Harper Achievement Centre
2734 Norwood St.
Prince George BC

Meals on Wheels
1575 Ash St.
Prince George BC

Moms and Kids Drop-in Centre
1585 Strathcona
Prince George BC

Narcotics Anonymous
1222 4th Ave.
Prince George BC

Native Courtworkers &
Counselling Association
#3 - 1150 3rd Ave.
Prince George BC

St. Patrick Halfway House
1735 Yew St.
Prince George BC

Phoenix Transition House
1770 11th Ave.
Prince George BC

Prince George Receiving
Home Society
1777 Yew St.
Prince George BC

Prince George Society
for the Hearing
Handicapped
P.O. Box 566
Prince George BC

Quesnel & District Assn.
for the Mentally
Handicapped
324 Hoy St.
Quesnel BC

Quesnel & District Cerebral
Palsy Association
324 Hoy St.
Quesnel BC

Quesnel Homemaker Service
324 Hoy St.
Quesnel BC

Quesnel Human Rights and
Civil Liberties Assn.
121 Barlow Ave.
Quesnel BC

Quesnel Tillicum Society
319 North Fraser Dr.
Quesnel BC

Quesnel Women's Resource
Centre
466 Reid St.
Quesnel BC

Unemployment Action Centre
466 Reid St.
Quesnel BC

United Way of Prince George
P.O. Box 494
Prince George BC

Women's Equal Rights Assn.
1306 7th Ave.
Prince George BC

Al-A-Teen
Box 137
Kitimat BC

Big Brothers - Big Sisters
10220 101 Ave.
Fort St. John BC

BC Association of Non-Status
Indians
24 Ochwe
Kitimat BC

Burden Bearers
#2 A 9730 - 101 Ave.
Fort St. John
V1J 2A8

Child Development Centre
172 - 3rd St.
Box 191
Kitimat BC

Community Contact Centre
9940 100 St.
Fort St. John BC

Community Learning Centre
Society
10908 100 St.
Fort St. John BC

Community Resources Centre
9708 - 106th St.
Fort St. John BC

Fort St. John Lifeline Society
10220 101 Ave.
Box 6467
Fort St. John BC

Foster Parent Association
9212 115 Ave.
Fort St. John
V1J 2X9

Haida Counselling & Legal
Assistance
Box 130
Masset
V0T 1M0

Homeward Bound
c/o Community Resources Centre
9708 - 106th St.
Fort St. John BC

Keeginaw Friendship Society
10208 95 Ave.
Fort St. John
V1J 1J2

Kitimat Community Services
Society
45 Stein
Kitimat BC

Legal Aid
Box 1137
Fort Nelson
V0C 1P0

Legal Aid
4658 Lazelle
Terrace
V8G 1S6

Legal Aid Society
205A 1200 - 103rd Ave.
Dawson Creek
V1G 2G9

Legal Aid Society
3 221 - 5th St.
Prince Rupert
V8J 3T2

Legal Services
9822 - 101 Ave.
Fort St. John BC

Meahope Transition House
c/o Community Resources
Centre
9708 - 106th St.
Fort St. John BC

Mentally Handicapped Assn
Box 6898
Fort St. John
V1J 4J3

Mothers Time Out
4726 Lazelle
Terrace BC

Native Courtworkers &
Counselling Assn. of BC
10208 95th Ave.
Fort St. John BC

North Peace Homemaker's Assn.
Box 7533
Fort St. John

North West Alcohol & Drug
Counselling Service
5 - 4554 Lazelle Ave.
Terrace BC

Outreach Program
10220 - 101 Ave.
Box 6467
Fort St. John BC

Peace Lutheran Care Home Aux.
9908 - 108 Ave.
Fort St. John BC

Pregnancy Problem Centre
Suite 205 - 10233 100 Ave.
Fort St. John BC

Rape and Sexual Assault
Support Centre
c/o 9940 - 100 St.
Fort St. John BC

Rotary Group Home
c/o Community Resources Centre
9708 - 106th St.
Fort St. John BC

Samaritan Centre
9211 - 100 Ave.
Fort St. John BC

Senior Citizen's Association
Box 6213
Fort St. John BC

Terrace Association for the
Mentally Retarded
Box 264
Terrace BC

Terrace and District
Community Services Society
4711 Lazelle Ave.
Terrace
V8G 1T3

Terrace Kalun Al-A-Teen
Box 564
Terrace BC

Adonis House
476 Battle St.
Kamloops BC

Al-A-Teen
Box 353
Kamloops BC

Alcoholism Counselling Service
523 Victoria St.
Kamloops BC

Armstrong - Spallumacheen
Community Service
Box 322
3450 Okanagan St.
Armstrong V0E 1B0

Birthright
23 - 429 Tranquille Rd.
Kamloops BC

BC Association of Social
Workers
2410 Parkview Dr.
Kamloops
V2B 7J1

BC Borstal Association
805 Pine St.
Kamloops BC

Family Centre
Railway Ave.
Armstrong BC

Golden & District
Homemakers
Box 2216
Golden BC

Golden Social Planning
Council
Box 746
Golden BC

The Haven
59 Mile House
Clinton
V0K 1K0

Homemaker Service
3450 Okanagan St.
Armstrong BC

Interior Indian Friendship
Society
30 - 429 Tranquille Rd.
Kamloops BC

Interior Public Legal
Awareness Society
200 - 142 Victoria St.
Kamloops BC

Kamloops Family Life Assn.
387 - 4th Ave.
Kamloops BC

Kamloops Society for the
Physically Handicapped
128 Don St.
Kamloops BC

Kamloops Society for the
Retarded
145 Briar Ave.
Kamloops BC

Kamloops Youth Resources
Society
1286 River St.
Kamloops BC

Kamloops YM - YWCA
400 Battle St.
Kamloops
V2C 2L7

Legal Aid
P.O. Box 429
Golden
V0A 1H0

Legal Aid
119 Campbell St.
Revelstoke
V0E 2S0

Legal Aid
3639 Shuswap Ave.
Salmon Arm
V0E 2T0

Legal Information Centre
200 - 142 Victoria St.
Kamloops
V2C 1Z7

Native Courtworkers
344 Seymour St.
Kamloops BC

Parents Alert Society
476 Battle St.
Kamloops BC

Princeton Community Services
Society
Box 1960
Princeton V0X 1W0

Revelstoke & District Assn.
for the Mentally Retarded
Box 765
Revelstoke BC

Revelstoke Receiving Home
Society
Box 1541
Revelstoke
V0E 2S0

Salmon Arm Women's Centre
Box 2844
8565 Harris St.
Salmon Arm BC

Shuswap Youth Centre
Box 1854
Salmon Arm
V0E 2T0

Smithers Community Law Centre
P.O. Box 2904
Smithers
V0J 2N0

Smithers Community Services Association
P.O. Box 2684
Smithers BC

Smithers & District Assn. for the Mentally Retarded
c/o P.O. Box 2684
Smithers BC

Special Services to Children
c/o Box 746
Golden BC

United Way of Kamloops
Suite 2 - 219 Victoria St.
Kamloops
V2C 2A1

Westsyde Human Action Movement
156 - 2400 Oak Dale Way
Kamloops BC

Al-A-Teen
Box 2271, Station R
Kelowna BC

Allied Handicap Association
1441 Ellis St.
Kelowna
V1Y 3E3

Big Brothers of Kelowna
#9 - 552 West Ave.
Kelowna BC

Big Sisters of Kelowna
Box 556
Kelowna
V1Y 7P2

Canadian Mental Health Assn.
Box 535
Kelowna BC

Central Okanagan Daycare Society
Box 806
Kelowna BC

The Central Okanagan Foundation
P.O. Box 1233
Kelowna BC

Central Okanagan Indian Friendship Centre
442 Leon Ave.
Kelowna BC

Central Okanagan Planning Society
P.O. Box 307
Kelowna BC

Central Okanagan United Way
1441 Ellis St.
Box 1117
Kelowna BC

Central Registry of Community Resources and Crisis Referral Society
1441 Ellis St.
Kelowna V1Y 2A5

Crossroads Treatment Centre
123 Franklyn Rd.
Kelowna BC

Elizabeth Fry Society
#32 - 436 Bernard Ave.
Kelowna BC

Emotions Anonymous
265 Lawrence
Kelowna BC

Homemaker Service
Robinson Crescent
Summerland BC

Howard House
2307 43rd St.
Vernon BC

International Hostess Service
Helping Hands
Box 936
Kelowna
V1X 7P7

Kelowna Alcohol & Drug Centre
265 LAwrence Ave.
Kelowna BC

Kelowna & District Foster Parents Association
RR#3 Site 3 Comp. 38
Westbank BC

Kelowna & District Society for the Mentally Handicapped
c/o Box 128
Okanagan Mission BC

Kelowna Diversified Industries
555 Fuller Ave
Kelowna BC

Kelowna Family Daycare Society
207 - 1135 Sutherland Ave.
Kelowna BC

Kelowna Homemaker Society
#3 369 Queensway Ave.
Kelowna BC

Kelowna Stress Reduction Centre
#52 - 1851 Kirschner Rd.
Kelowna BC

The Kelowna Women's Emergency Shelter
c/o MHR, Kelowna Centre
532 Leon Ave.
Kelowna BC

Kelowna YM-YWCA
375 Hartman Rd.
Kelowna BC

Legal Aid
3201 30th Ave.
Vernon BC

Legal Aid Society of BC
1262 St. Paul St.
Kelowna BC

Legal Services Society
3109 34th Ave.
Vernon BC

McWilliam's Centre for Special Services
580 Doyle Ave.
Kelowna

Multi-Cultural Society
210 - 1433 St. Paul St.
Kelowna BC

Narcotics Anonymous
Box 364 Station A
Kelowna
V1Y 7N8

North Okanagan Handicapped Association
3300 37th St.
Vernon BC

North Okanagan Neurological Association
2802 - 34th St.
Vernon BC

Okanagan Neurological Assn.
Box 128
Okanagan Mission BC

Okanagan Women's Coalition
P.O. Box 1242
Vernon
V1T 6N6

One Parent Family Centre
#12 - 1638 Pandosy St.
Kelowna BC

People in Need Crisis Intervention Society
Box 96
Vernon BC
V1T 6M1

Rutland Senior Citizen's Activity Centre
765 Dodd Rd.
Rutland BC

Salvation Army Family Services
2803 - 32nd Ave.
Vernon BC

Senior Citizen's Activity Centre
1360 Water St.
Kelowna BC

SHARE Society
1441 Ellis St.
Kelowna BC

Society of the Unemployed
1433 Ellis St.
Kelowna BC

Transition House
Box 625
Vernon
V1T 6M6

Unemployment Action Centre
1435 Ellis St.
Kelowna BC

Unemployment Action Centre
#2 - 2813 30th St.
Vernon BC

United Native Nations
Friendship Society
2902 29th Ave.
Vernon BC

United Way
3700 33rd St.
P.O. Box 533
Vernon V1T 6M4

Venture Training Centre
P.O. Box 1300
Vernon BC

Vernon & District Homemaker
Society
Ste. 203 - 2901 32nd St.
Vernon BC

Vernon Social Planning
Council
3700 33rd St.
Vernon V1T 5T6

Voice of the Unemployed
2417 Highway 97 North
Kelowna
V1X 4J2

Volunteer Co-ordinating
Centre
c/o 3700 33rd St.
Vernon V1T 5T6

ACCESS
385 Baker St. Nelson BC

Alcoholics Anonymous
The Cellar
717A Vernon St.
Nelson BC

Broader Horizons
Anglican Church Hall
723 Ward St.
Nelson BC

The Castlegar Volunteer
Exchange
1215 3rd St.
Castlegar BC

Castlegar Community Services
1215 3rd St.
Castlegar BC

Elk Valley Preventive Social
Services
441 - 2nd Ave.
Fernie
V0B 1M0

Fernie Children's
Committe
P.O. Box 1440
Fernie
V0B 1M0

Fernie & District Homemaker
Services Society
441 2nd Ave.
Fernie
V0B 1M0

Foster Parents Association
801 Glen Drive
Trail BC

Homemaker Service Association
1325 McQuarrie St.
Trail BC

Kootenay Society for the
Handicapped
Box 243
Nelson BC

Kootenay Society for
Handicapped Children
1515 5th Ave.
Trail BC

Legal Aid Society
44 - 12th Ave. South
Cranbrook
V1C 2R7

Legal Aid Society
550 Stanley St.
Nelson
V1L 1N1

Nelson Community Services
Centre
601B Front St.
Nelson V1L 4B6

Nelson Women's Centre
303 Vernon St.
Nelson BC

Salmo Youth Centre
4th St.
Salmo BC

Salvation Army
513 Victoria St.
Nelson BC

Special Services to Children
p.o. Box 1255
Sparwood
V0B 2G0

W.I.N.S. Transition House
Box 153
Trail BC