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On barbarians : the discourse of ’civilization’ in international theory Salter, Mark B. 1999

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O N BARBARIANS T H E DISCOURSE OF 'CIVILIZATION' IN INTERNATIONAL THEORY b y M A R K B. SALTER B . A . (HONS), BROCK UNIVERSITY, 1994 M . S c . , LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS, 1995 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (DEPT. OF POLITICAL SCIENCE) W E ACCEPT THIS THESIS AS CONFORMING TO THE REQUIRED STANDARD: THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA SEPTEMBER?, 1999 © M A R K B . SALTER, 1999 In presenting t h i s t h e s i s i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t of the requirements f o r an advanced degree at the U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree that the L i b r a r y s h a l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r reference and study. I f u r t h e r agree that permission f o r extensive copying of t h i s t h e s i s f o r s c h o l a r l y purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by h i s or her r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . I t i s understood that copying or p u b l i c a t i o n of t h i s t h e s i s f o r f i n a n c i a l gain s h a l l not be allowed without my w r i t t e n permission. The U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia Vancouver, Canada Department 11 O N B A R B A R I A N S : T H E D I S C O U R S E O F ' C I V I L I Z A T I O N ' IN I N T E R N A T I O N A L T H E O R Y M A R K B . S A L T E R Unsatisfied with critical responses to Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations?" this dissertation attempts to trace two central elements of his argument. First, "On Barbarians" traces the evolution of the civilized/ barbarian dichotomy from its origins in the nineteenth century to its recent incarnations in International Relations theory. The relevance of Europe's imperial heritage is emphasized, along with certain thematic threads in popular discourse: demography, surveillance, and the distinction between popular and elite culture. The ubiquitous self/other dichotomy, which is central to political identity, has been understood in European imperial discourse to mean European civilization and barbaric others. This rhetoric remains powerful, even in current IR discourse. By reinscribing this civilized/barbarian dichotomy, Huntington in effect uses International Relations theory as a form of identity politics. Second, this dissertation analyzes the presence of culture and identity in the discipline of International Relations theory. Despite specific empirical considerations, Huntington's underlying interest in culture and identity is well-founded, which this dissertation attempts to demonstrate using material from the history of International Relations, post-colonial, and critical theorists. In sum, "On Barbarians" illustrates the critical benefit of studying culture and identity to LR through a critical examination of the civilized/barbarian discourse. i i i T A B L E OF CONTENTS Abstract i i Acknowledgments v I. Introduction 1 II. Concepts 21 A. Identity 21 B. Culture 30 C. Civilization 41 D. Barbarians 45 III. Long Nineteenth Century 1798-1914 61 A. Philosophical Context 66 B. Violence in the Imperial Order 73 C. Visuality and the Imperial Order 84 D. European Exhibitions 93 E. Demography 99 E. Race, Class, and Gender in the Imperial Order 102 IV. The First Forty Years: A Civlized or Barbaric Europe? 119 A. Philosophers of Barbarism 120 B. The First World War: Europe's First Barbaric War 140 C. Interwar Years: The Great Disillusion 159 D. Europe's Un-Civil War 173 V. New Barbarians: The Loss of Europe's "Civilized" Status 176 A. Barbaric by Any Measure: Nazism and the Holocaust 177 B. Barbarous Utopia: Nazism and Nolkgemeinshaft 180 C. A Barbaric Empire and the Un-Civilizing Mission 187 D. Decline of the Civilizing Mission 197 VI. Decolonizing the Discipline 203 A. Schuman, Morgenthau, and Waltz 204 B. Decolonization and the Discipline 212 VII. The Expansion of International Theory 233 A. English School: The Legacy of Imperial Thinking 234 B. Culture, International Relations, and Critical Theory 259 iv VIII. New Barbarians, Old Barbarians: Post-Cold War IR Theory 277 A. Huntington: Barbarians at the Gates 280 B. Preparing for the 19th and/or the 21st Century 292 C. The Real Clash: America's Clash of Cultures 300 D. Popular Accounts of the 'Two Worlds' Model 307 E. The Real Clash of Identity Politics 322 IX. Conclusion 325 Bibliography 337 V ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to acknowledge the support of my supervisor, Prof. K . Holsti, and my research committee, Rob Walker and Brian Job. This dissertation was written with the support of a Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada doctoral fellowship. I would like to thank especially my family for their enduring support. They have been unwavering in their encouragement, and I would not be here without them. Mum and Dad have provided everything from dental care to telephone calls and I appreciate all of their love and support. Emma and Phillip have been encouraging - while reminding me to stay grounded. I would like to thank Patricia, Hunter, Kay, and Doug who, in addition to trusting me with Kate, have made me feel like a part of their family. Finally, I would like to thank my partner Kate - for her understanding, her patience, her thoughtfulness, her caring and careful editorial eye, her treats, and asking me to marry her. 1 C H . I: INTRODUCTION "On Barbarians" is a critical intervention in the growing "clash of civilizations" debate. Briefly, Huntington argues that 'civilizations' have replaced states as the main actors in international relations, and that culture has become the chief axis of conflict in the post-Cold War order. This intervention stems, in part, from dissatisfaction with critical reflections on Samuel Huntington's seminal article that focus on the empirical dimensions of civilizations, rather than a deeper critique of the policies he advocates. This dissertation also reflects a wider project concerned with the relevance of culture and identity to International Relations. This dissertation has two primary aims: first, it aims to situate a criticism of Huntington's use of the 'civilization/ barbarian' rhetoric, and aspects of the imperialist discourse of which it is a part, in the historical context of European colonial and post-colonial politics; second, it aims to illustrate the importance of the concepts of culture and identity to our understanding of world politics. Although, as I argue below, the usage and reification of the stereotypes of 'barbarians' and 'civilization' are hazardous, it is impossible to trace the evolution of the discourse without using the terms. Hereafter, the terms 'civilization' and 'barbarian' should be taken to be in single quotation marks. "On Barbarians" is chiefly chronological in its structure. It stresses the shifts, disruptions, and displacements in the 'civilization/barbarian' discourse. By concentrating on these discursive shifts, we see how the identities of Europe/the West/TR theory also shift in turn. The introduction indicates some of the theoretical conversations to which this project contributes. The second chapter explores the meanings and etymology of several key concepts to the argument: civilization, barbarians, culture, and identity. The third chapter, the Long Nineteenth Century, examines some important ideational aspects of European imperialism after 1798. It argues that imperial expansion was a central part of European identity, and that the civilized/barbarian dichotomy was an essential part of colonial discourse.1 The civilized/barbarian dichotomy was coded in racial, class, and gendered terms and was applied both to colonial and metropolitan populations. This chapter also looks at several important themes in nineteenth century European culture that mobilize the 'civilization/barbarian' dichotomy, namely surveillance, demography, and the civilizing mission. The fourth chapter, the First Forty Years, plots how the tensions endemic to Europe at the turn of the twentieth century are reflected in the 'civilization/barbarian' discourse. In addition to a growing philosophical scepticism expressed by Friedrich Nietzsche, Europe began to lose its confidence in its imperial rhetoric as evidenced by the work of Oswald Spengler and Sigmund Freud. The civilizing mission began to show signs of strain. Because the discipline of International Relations emerged at this time, special attention will be paid to the study of culture and identity during the discipline's 'First debate.'2 The fifth chapter, the New Barbarians, examines the unravelling of the civilized Europe/ barbaric others discourse. Hitler's self-proclaimed 'barbaric' German state barbarized Europe during the Second World War. The connection that Nazi thought drew between International Relations and imperialism 11 adopt Said's distinction between imperialism and colonialism: '"[IJmperialism' means the practice, the theory, and the attitudes of a dominating metropolitan center ruling a distant territory, 'colonialism,' which is almost always a consequence of imperialism, is the implanting of settlements on distant territory." Edward W. Said, Culture and Imperialism. New York: Random House, 1993, p.9 2 Following common practice, International Relations (IR) refers to the study of world politics; international relations refers to the object of study. 3 is of particular interest. This chapter also looks at how Nazi atrocities influenced anti-colonial writers such as Aime Cesaire and Frantz Fanon who disrupted the 'civilization/barbarian' rhetoric. The sixth chapter, Decolonization of the Discipline, examines the presence of the Third World in International Relations theory during the era of decolonization. The 'civilization/barbarian' dichotomy was, from one point of view, undone by decolonization. However, the persistence of the stereotypes of the 'barbarian' and the persistence of imperial modes of conceiving, representing, and theorizing the 'Third World' during the 1960s and 1970s is interesting. While figured primarily as a site for Cold War conflict, decolonization had a number of interesting effects on International Relations, not the least of which was an interest in racial politics. The seventh chapter plots the interventions of scholars working from the English School tradition and from a non-Western perspective. Bull, Watson, Vincent, Bozeman, and Jackson have examined the evolution of contemporary international society in its historical and imperial context. Non-Western scholars such as Mazrui, Said, and Nandy, have also contributed to scholarship on the non-Western world - either through LR directly, or through cultural studies and post-colonial theory. The eighth chapter, Everything Old Is New Again, intervenes in the critical debate surrounding Huntington's "clash of civilizations." In addition to tackling Huntington's empirical claims, this chapter also charts the popular analogues of Huntington's argument in Benjamin Barber and Robert Kaplan. The conclusion evaluates some recent writings on culture and identity, and indicates the potential for the study of popular culture and identity in LR. This dissertation engages a quickly growing body of work by International Relations scholars who have charted the analytical potential of the concepts of culture 4 and identity for understanding world politics. The vanguard of this group, scholars such as R.B.J. Walker, Richard K. Ashley, David Campbell, James Der Derian, and Michael Shapiro, base these interventions from a post-structural theoretical position.3 An important source of this perspective is Michel Foucault, who remains a touchstone for many of these theorists. In contrast to traditional approaches in IR, Foucault proposes an alternate conception of power. He asks, "why [has] the West insisted for so long on seeing the power it exercises as juridical and negative rather than as technical and positive?"4 Foucault proposes an understanding of power as productive or as a "general matrix of force relations^" rather than as merely a repressive or deterrent force.5 Theorists such as William Connolly have extended this understanding of power into political theory -connecting Foucault's notion of power to the politics of identity formation. Connolly argues that the institutional and ideational construction of identity presupposes otherness: "once we see that the self was not designed to be a [political] subject, we are in a position to see that the formulation of subjectivity must subjugate that which does not fit neatly into its confines."6 Connolly thus explores the dynamic relationship between 'self and 3 Post-structural theory is a wide school, which embraces a number of different perspectives and varied methodologies. For the purposes of this chapter, I take post-structural theory to represent a philosophical position which emphasizes: "the instability of meanings and of intellectual categories, and [seeks] to undermine any theoretical system that claimed to have universal validity... [post-structural theorists] set out to dissolve the fixed binary oppositions of structuralist thought..." Chris Baldick, The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Literary Terms. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1990, pp.175-76. 4 Michel Foucault, "Truth and Power," Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings. 1972-1977. Colin Gordon ed. Colin Gordon, Leo Marshall, John Mepham, and Kate Soper Trans. Brighton: Harvester Press, 1980, p.62. 5 Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics. 2nd ed., Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983, p. 186. 6 William E. Connolly, "Taylor, Foucault, and Otherness," Political Theory. 13,3. 1985, p.374. 5 'other,' which he argues is central to both domestic and international politics.7 The self/other relationship is the focus of much of this body of work. Foucault suggests a genealogical method of inquiry, which has been adopted by LR scholars such as Bartelson, Campbell, and Der Derian.8 A genealogical method does not aim to find the 'origins' of its subject. Rather, "it will cultivate the details and accidents that accompany every beginning... its jolts, its surprises, its unsteady victories and unpalatable defeats."9 In short, the post-structural perspective from which this project departs aims to excavate the discourses and institutions which constitute meaning in the realm of politics, and aims to disturb the foundations of those discourses and institutions. For International Relations theory specifically, this post-structural position has several implications. First and foremost is an assertion of the personal responsibility of the scholar. As Mark Neufeld argues: "The study of world politics has always been informed by political agendas, and it is time that the content of these agendas be brought out into the open and critically assessed."10 The form that this scholastic responsibility takes is shaped by the discipline's epistemological consensus of the time. As such, during the first debate, for example, responsibility implied a reading of international politics that would lead to peace, or the avoidance of war.11 During the second debate, LR 7 William E. Connolly, Identitv\ Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991, p.21. 8 Jens Bartelson, A Genealogy of Sovereignty. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. 9 Michel Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," Language. Counter-Memory. Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews. Donald F. Bouchard ed. Trans. Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1977, pp.p. 144-145. 1 0 Mark Neufeld, "Reflexivity and International Relations Theory," Millennium: Journal of International Studies. 22,1. 1993, p.76. 1 1 Alfred Zimmern, The Study of International Relations: An Inaugural Lecture delivered before the University of Oxford on 20 February 1931. Oxford: Clarendon, 1931, p.27. 6 scholars figured responsibility in terms of historical accuracy or methodological strictness.12 During the third debate, critical theorists interpret this responsibility to imply, in Foucauldian terms, as the "resurrection of subjugated knowledges" and the disruption of dominant forms of discourse.13 While some have criticized the proliferation of theoretical perspectives in IR which this ethic engenders, it reflects a larger trend towards "methodological pluralism" in all of the social sciences.14 Second, the analytical value of Foucault's notion of power has led to a concentration on the 'discourse' of international politics. George defines 'discourse' as "a broader matrix of social practices that gives meaning to the way that people understand themselves and their behaviour."15 Because our imagination of world politics is conditioned, at least in large part, by the discipline of International Relations, scholars like Ashley, Campbell, and Der Derian plot the meanings, and power implications, of International Relations theory itself. Theoretical paradigms describe what is important and what is unimportant in world politics - which in the post-structuralist view is an arbitrary, political choice.16 Campbell argues, international relations as a discipline, because of its propensity to [rely discursively on] the state as the organizing identity in the face of both Hedley Bull, "International Theory: The Case for a Classical Approach," Contending Approaches to International Politics. K. Knorr and J. Rosenau eds. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969, pp.20-38. 1 3 Michel Foucault, "Two Lectures," Power/Knowledge, pp. 80-82. 1 4 Yosef Lapid, "The Third Debate: On the Prospect of International Theory in a Post-Positivist Era." International Studies Quarterly. 33,3. 1989, p. 246. 1 5 Jim George, Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical (Re")Introduction to International Relations. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994, p.29. 1 6 See Kuhn on the nature of paradigms. Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolution. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1962. 7 empirical and theoretical assaults, might be better understood as a particular though powerful theory of identity politics...17 A number of prominent scholars have used this post-structural perspective with great benefit. Ashley has charted some of the political implications of the discourse of realism.18 Campbell has used this perspective to analyze how American foreign policy discourse constitutes, in part, American national identity.19 Der Derian has written an interesting genealogy of inter-state diplomacy.20 These scholars focus, in one way or another, on the implications of the 'self/other' dichotomy.21 Shapiro explores how these identity narratives are represented in popular culture, using what he terms "the political imaginary."22 I will return to this in the next chapter, and the concept of a "political imaginary." In sum, these scholars argue that the discourse of international relations and International Relations has ideational and material effects, and as such warrants critical attention. "On Barbarians" examines two themes in the discourse of International Relations: civilization and barbarians, and culture and identity. By examining the persistence of the civilized/ barbarian trope23, this dissertation plots how the 'other' of David Campbell, "Politics Prosaics, Transversal Politics and the Anarchical World," Challenging Boundaries: Global Flows. Territorial Identities. Michael J. Shapiro and Hayward R. Alker eds. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996, p. 19. 1 8 Richard K. Ashley, "The Geopolitics of Geopolitical Space: Toward a Critical Social Theory of International Politics," Alternatives. 12,3. 1987. 1 9 David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity. 2nd ed. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998. ' 2 0 James Der Derian, On Diplomacy: A Genealogy of Western Estrangement. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987. 2 1 Iver B. Neumann and Jennifer M. Welsh, "The Other in European self-definition: an addendum to the literature on international society," Review of International Studies. 17,1. 1991, p. 328. 2 2 Michael J. Shapiro, The Politics of Representation: Writing Practices in Biography. Photography, and Policy Analysis. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988, p.7. 2 3 Hayden White. Tropics of Discourse: Essays in Cultural Criticism. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1978, p.2. White describes tropes as persistent metaphors. 8 Europe and the West is represented over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Another theoretical influence of this dissertation is post-colonial theory. Post-colonial theory emerged from the study of English and Commonwealth literature.24 Under the post-structuralist and post-modern influence, contemporary post-colonial theory has come to be concerned with questions of identity, culture, and discourse.25 Cesaire, Fanon, and other anti-colonial writers also theorized similarities in the position of the colonized subject. Under this influence, post-colonial theory "[brings] to the forefront of concern the interconnection of issues of race, nation, empire, migration and ethnicity with cultural production."26 The relations between the academic discipline of Orientalism, popular European stereotypes, and colonial identity is the subject of Edward Said's Orientalism, which is seminal in this field of study and has recently been discovered in IR. 2 7 Said applies Foucault's account of discourse to representations of the non-European world. 2 8 He argues that the academic and popular representations of the Orient were "a political vision of reality whose structure promoted the difference between the familiar (Europe, Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin, The Empire Writes Back: Theory and Practice in Post-Colonial Literatures. New York: Routledge, 1989, pp.2-13. 2 5 Stuart Hall, "When was the 'Post-Colonial'? Thinking at the Limit," The Post-Colonial Question: Common Skies. Divided Horizons. Iain Chambers and Lidia Curti eds. New York: Routledge, 2 6 Bart Moore-Gilbert, Postcolonial Theory: Contexts. Practices. Politics. New York: Verso, 1997, p.6. 2 7 R.B.J. Walker, "East Wind, West Wind: Civilizations, Hegemonies, and World Orders," Culture. Ideology and World Order. R.B.J. Walker, ed. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984; Pal Ahluwalia and Michael Sullivan, "Edward Said and the World," Paper presented at the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Toronto, March 1997; Jacinta O'Hagan, Conceptions of the West in International Relations Thought: From Oswald Spengler to Edward Said. Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation at Australia National University, 1998. 2 8 Edward Said, Orientalism. New York: Random House, 1978, p.3. 9 the West, 'us') and the strange (the Orient, the East, 'them')."29 Representations about the Orient acted to reify European identity.30 Postcolonial theory attempts both to chart and disrupt this aspect of imperialist discourse. A leading work in this field, Anne McClintock's Imperial Leather, is an excellent study of the discourse of domesticity, in which she illustrates the larger connections between identity, race, class, and gender.31 Stoler's Race and the Education of Desire provides another important example of the intersection between racial, class, and gender stereotypes in the colonial context.32 "On Barbarians" follows a similar aim by tracing a specific discourse - in this case 'civilized-barbarian' - t o show one historic instance of the interconnectedness of identity, culture, race, and imperialism. Another group of scholars concentrates on the implications of imperialism and the 'post-colonial' condition on international relations. Postcolonial theory, or postcolonialism, is concerned with "imperialism, orientalism, and culture," and, more specifically, with the roots and implications of imperial forms of domination.33 Postcolonialism and International Relations theory often speak past each other, although they are concerned with similar relations of power and domination.34 Phillip Darby illustrates the utility of combining post-colonial theory's occupation with culture and 2 9 Ibid., p.43. 3 0 Said, in return, essentializes 'The West,' for which he has been criticized in Walker (1984), Stoler (1995), Moore-Gilbert (1997) among others. 3 1 Anne McClintock, Imperial Leather: Race. Gender and Sexuality in the Colonial Contest. New York: Routledge, 1995, p. 5. 3 2 Ann Laura Stoler, Race and the Education of Desire: Foucault's History of Sexuality and the Colonial Order of Things. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1995. 3 3 Darby and Paolini, op cit. p.378. 10 ideas and International Relations' concern with power and material domination.35 Scholars such as Roxanne Lynn Doty, Phillip Darby and A.J. Paolini, and David Blaney and Naeem Inyatullah have endeavoured to illustrate the impact of these concerns on contemporary world politics.36 Darby and Paolini show the utility of some concepts from post-colonial theory in the evaluation of world politics.37 Doty takes a similar tack, arguing that contemporary LR theory that uses the North/South dichotomy uncritically has the effect of reproducing colonial categories and stereotypes.38 "On Barbarians" continues this argument, applying a similar analysis to the civilized/barbarian dichotomy. This thesis attempts to use some historically based (rather than textually based) postcolonial criticism to add depth to the traditional LR representation of imperial and post-colonial international relations. There are five authors whose work engages specifically with the discourse of 'civilization' and 'barbarians' within contemporary LR theory. After looking at each of these authors, I will conclude by delineating precisely the contribution of this project. Gerrit Gong published The Standard of'Civilization' in International Society in 1984, based on his doctoral dissertation written under the supervision of Hedley Bull. Gong is interested in legal standard of 'civilization' that promulgated in international law Phillip Darby, The Fiction of Imperialism: Reading Between International Relations and Postcolonialism. London: Cassel, 1998, p.3. 3 5 Phillip Darby and A.J. Paolini, "Bridging International Relations and Postcolonialism," Alternatives. 19,1. 1994, pp.394-395. 3 6 Albert Paolini, Navigating Modernity: Postcolonialism. Identity, and International Relations. Anthony Elliot and Anthony Moran eds. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999. 3 7 Ibid., p.375. 3 8 Roxanne Lynn Doty, Imperial Encounters: The Political Representation in North-South Relations. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996a, p. 168. 11 during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. He argues that the juridical standard of 'civilization' articulated previously implicit norms in European international society.39 In this, the standard of 'civilization' not only delimits the boundaries of European international society but also constitutes the identity of European international society. Working from the historicist perspective of the English School, Gong elaborates the standard of 'civilization' as a crucial symbolic tool in the expansion of international society from Eurocentric to global in scope. In concentrating on the legal/juridical discourse, he does not pay close attention to the wider discourse of 'civilization,' 'barbarians,' and 'savages.' While this abstraction is useful in determining the norms of European international society that become explicit in the colonial context, certain ideological tensions - such as the tension between cosmopolitan and nationalist colonial aims - are elided into a coherent, unified discourse. Gong's interest in European identity is represented in terms of the norms and ideas embodied within European international society.40 Gong's careful treatment of the standard of 'civilization' makes his work a classic within the English School and an essential touchstone for those interested in the discourse of 'civilization.' Iver Neumann's Uses of the Other presents a critical approach to the evolution of the identity of Europe. Focusing on the centrality of the 'self/other' dichotomy, Neumann uses several examples - the Ottoman Empire, Russia, Northern Europe, Eastern Europe - to explore how European identity is conditioned by its relationship to Gerrit Gong, The Standard of'Civilization' in International Society. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984, p.3. 4 0 Ibid., p.23. 12 and representations of its others. In each of the case studies, Neumann illustrates how the symbolic 'uses' to which Europe's others are put vary over time. However, whether reviled as barbaric or grudgingly accepted as 'the sick man of Europe,' Europe's others are never completely accepted or assimilated into the core identity. The Ottoman Empire was slowly incorporated into European international society, but was stopped from being completely integrated into the European community on cultural, rather than economic, grounds.41 Russia was represented as 'in Europe, but not of Europe' - even when it occupied half of Europe's physical space. Germane to this project, Neumann refers to the 'civilized/barbarian' discourse as a "master dichotomy" that represents the 'self/other' in a series of corresponding alternatives: "European/Asian, free/unfree, market/plan, West/East, defensive/offensive."42 Uses of the Other represents the leading edge of critical LR theory, which investigates several particular cases of the 'self/other' dichotomy in order to politicize contemporary IR discourse. Neumann's earlier contribution to this debate is worth revisiting. Along with Jennifer Welsh, Neumann traces the role of the 'other' in international society and LR theory.43 Like this thesis, Neumann and Welsh argue first that culture and identity are crucial to International Relations. They combine the historical tendency of the English School with critical theories on the self/other relationship. While the focus of this article is the relationship of the Ottoman Empire to Europe, they lay the theoretical foundations Iver B. Neumann, The Uses of the Other: "The East" in European Identity Formation. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999, p.40. 4 2 Ibid., 103. 4 3 Iver B. Neumann and Jennifer M. Welsh, 'The Other in European self-definition: an addendum to the literature on international society,' Review of International Studies. 17,1. 1991, pp. 327-348. 13 for this study. Neumann and Welsh argue that, "the very idea of what Europe was from the beginning defined partly in terms of what it was not. In other words, the Other, i.e. the non-European barbarian or savage, played a decisive role in the evolution of European identity and in the maintenance of order among European states."44 While Neumann and Welsh do not elaborate this statement, this dissertation elaborates how the 'barbaric' Other plays a role in the evolution of European identity. Roxanne Lynn Doty's Imperial Encounters invokes contemporary critical debates in her discussion of American foreign policy and the discourse of 'North/South' relations. Doty's emphasis on discourse "calls our attention to an economy of abstract binary oppositions that we routinely draw upon and frame our thinking."45 Doty, like Neumann, lists pairs of dichotomies now familiar to critical IR scholars: core/periphery, modern/traditional, real states/quasi states, "first world"/ "third world," civilized/barbarian, us/them, self/other. Similar to Neumann's master dichotomies, Doty argues that these divisions "remain widely circulated and accepted as legitimate ways to categorize regions and peoples of the world. Thinking in terms of representational practices highlights the arbitrary, constructed, and political nature of these [oppositions... ] that have enabled and justified certain practices and policies."46 Doty's work, while focusing on the representation of 'North' and 'South,' has a clearly political intent - which is to provide a critical analysis of 'Northern' foreign policy. Doty uses the discourse of gender relations, and specifically American manhood, to clarify 4 4 Ibid., p.329. 4 5 Doty, op cit., 1996a, p.2. 4 6 Ibid., p.3. 14 representational practices in the American occupation of the Philippines and the British occupation of Kenya. Darby also pays serious attention to representations of gender in order to illustrate the racial and national discourses at stake in the colonial scene in his most recent effort.47 Doty speaks to the discourse of civilized/barbarian discourse specifically, i f tangentially: "through a process of repetition, U.S. and British discourses constructed as natural and given the oppositional dichotomy between the uncivilized, barbarian 'other' and the civilized, democratic 'self even while they both engaged in the oppression and brutalization of 'others.' The spector of the 'other' is always within the 'self.'"4 8 In deconstructing representations of the South, which she argues are inextricably linked to the political practices of imperialism, Doty politicizes the division between North and South. Neumann and Doty both invoke the work of Tzvetan Todorov, and specifically his Conquest of America: The Question of the Other. While Todorov does not speak to IR specifically, Conquest of America is a leading work on the subject of self/other relations. Todorov suggests that the self/other relationship has three important dimensions: etiological, the extent to which the other is equal/inferior, or valued as good/bad; praxeological, the extent to which the other is submitted to or is made to submit; epistemic, the extent to which the other is known.4 9 These three dimensions are theoretically valuable in adding much-needed context to contemporary analyses of specific self/other relationships. Precisely, it is this tripartite understanding of the Darby, 1998, p.66. Doty, op cit. 1996a, p. 168. 15 self/other relationship which allows Todorov to analyse how Columbus, to take one example, is able to both exoticize and denigrate, praise and damn, value and enslave the native 'Americans' he meets. This model of the self/other relationship is an extremely useful analytical tool. Todorov's model separates the value judgements which a society or individual may make from the political reaction to their other - be it assimilation, extermination, or any other possible relationship. He also suggests scholars should be mindful of the degree that a self/other discourse is based on knowledge or fantasy - a warning that is especially germane in the European colonial context. This model adds much needed analytical depth to the study of specific identity relationships. A recent addition to analysis of 'civilization' is Jacinta O'Hagan's Conceptions of the West in International Relations Thought.50 O'Hagan combines the more classical framework with a critical view by examining several important theorists of'the West.' She examines Spengler, Toynbee, the International Society school, Fukuyama, Huntington and Said. By parsing the position these important thinkers take on 'civilizations,' O'Hagan tries to indicate the centrality of culture to LR theory. She also indicates the importance of understanding the 'West' as a cultural entity in order to understand its international relations. One of the important targets of O'Hagan's insightful analysis is Huntington's formulation of the 'clash of civilizations' argument.51 O'Hagan argues that Huntington attempts to replace states with civilizations within a Tzvetan Todorov, The Conquest of America: The Question of the Other. Trans. Richard Howard. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999 [1984], p. 185. 5 0 Jacinta O'Hagan, Conceptions of the West in International Relations: From Oswald Spengler to Edward Said. Doctoral thesis submitted to Australian National University, July 1998. 5 1 Jacinta O'Hagan, "Civilisational Conflict? Looking for cultural enemies," Third World Quarterly. 16,1. 1995, pp. 19-39. 16 traditional neo-realist paradigm. This position has a number of empirical and theoretical weaknesses that O'Hagan enumerates. Unlike Neumann, O'Hagan concentrates on the discourse of the West about itself and does not examine its 'others.' Patrick Thaddeus Jackson is interested in the discourse of 'civilization' as part of symbolic vocabulary that supports American reconstruction of Germany after the Second World War. 5 2 In pursuit of this goal, he has described two broad approaches to theorizing civilizations. The "substantialist" approach takes civilizations as given cultural entities, and attempts to understand their inter-relations. Huntington epitomizes the 'substantialist' approach in his desire to describe the 'essence' of civilizations, and describe their (conflictual) relations. The "processual/relational" approach takes civilizations to be ever evolving identity groups, whose most interesting characteristic is in the maintenance of its boundaries.53 Jackson identifies Christopher Coker's Twilight of the West and Martin Lewis and Karen Wigen's The Myth of Continents as exemplary of this approach. Jackson argues that the 'processual/relational' approach to studying civilizations holds more promise, a conclusion with which I heartily agree. This dissertation follows a 'processual/relations' approach by tracing precisely the shifts - as opposed to the essence - of the meanings of 'civilization' and 'barbarian' in the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Given this constellation of work which are interested in the notion of 'civilization' and its 'barbaric' others, where does this work fit in? The object of On Barbarians is Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, Occidentalism: The Symbolic Technology of German Reconstruction. Unpublished doctoral dissertation at Columbia University, 1999. 17 precisely to elaborate what role this 'master dichotomy' plays in the articulation of EuropeanAVestern/international identity and what, if any, impact it has had on international relations. This dissertation provides a fresh perspective on the discourse of 'civilization' and 'barbarians.' While various scholars, from different disciplines, have touched upon the 'civilization/barbarian' dichotomy in their exploration of either imperialism, race, culture, or identity, this is the first study to chart the evolution of the discourse. This project follows one strand of European discourse: the division between civilized and barbarian. This discourse is more prominent in popular culture than it is in the policy archive that is the traditional scope of LR theory. However, this discourse casts a large shadow on the international imaginary of elite and popular culture alike. This project attempts to trace a specific set of ideas on LR theory. It focuses primarily on popular representations of the 'civilized' and 'barbaric,' rather than foreign policy. Much in the vein of Todorov, Doty, and Neumann, "On Barbarians" attempts to elaborate some political implications of the self/other relationship and representational practices by constructing a critical genealogy of one particular discourse. Though the term 'barbarian' has been in use since Herodotus, the juxtapositioning of civilization and barbarism first occurs in the mid-eighteenth century and reaches full maturity by the beginning of the nineteenth century. The dichotomy of 'civilized/barbarian,' and the stereotype of the barbarian, are mobilized at a number of crucial times in European history, specifically: 19 th century imperial expansion and colonial rule, First and Second 51 1 Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, "'Civilization' on Trial," Millennium: Journal of International Studies. 28,1. Spring 1999, pp.141-153. World Wars, decolonization, and the post-Cold War world. Following this emphasis on popular culture, I have chosen texts that were popular in their own time- i.e. these texts were widely circulated, read, and discussed. Travelogues and world exhibitions were extremely popular during the nineteenth century, and constitute a primary source of 'facts' about the international realm for the metropolitan populations of Europe. Nietzsche, Spengler, and de Gobineau were widely read by literate Europeans, and their political ideas were circulated even more widely in the popular press. While Freud may not have been popular in the same way, his work is both reflective and constitutive of the modern understanding of consciousness. Hitler is a touchstone of evil in the twentieth century, and his textual works give a plain statement of his beliefs. Cesaire and Fanon were both extremely popular in France during the period of decolonization. Their impact has endured in post-colonial theory. The discourse of 'civilization/barbarians' does not circulate as widely during the Cold War period, though I examine some seminal textbooks which shape more precisely the academic imaginary of International Relations. I look at those scholars who connect IR to imperialism, and to the discourse of 'civilization.' Bull , Watson, Gong, and Jackson have shaped our understanding of the impact of imperialism on contemporary international society when the study of imperialism reappears on the academic scene, during the 1980s. In the 1990s, Huntington, Kaplan, Barber, and Kennedy reintroduce the concept of'civilization' and 'barbarians' into both academic and popular culture. Kaplan and Barber have had a profound impact on the popular international imaginary -in both magazines and popular press books. Huntington, in particular, is a touchstone for theorizing about the post-Cold War world order. Huntington and Kaplan represent a 19 confluence of popular culture and academic theorizing about post-Cold War world politics, and connect the two perspectives in this project. By investigating the discourse of 'civilization/barbarians' at each of these pivots of history, we can see how the nature of the stereotype of the 'barbarian' changes and what impact this shifting 'other' has on the constitution of the 'civilization' of Europe or of the West. The imperialist implications of the civilized/barbarian dichotomy are overlooked in Huntington's argument. Popular and academic writings in the post-Cold War era have resurrected without critical reflection a large measure of imperial tropes, stereotypes, and rhetoric.54 Huntington is not alone in this imperialist dichotomization of world politics into zones of peace and zones of conflict.55 Specifically, we find in Huntington, Robert Kaplan, Paul Kennedy, and Benjamin Barber some traditionally 'imperial' concerns with Third World demographic trends, nature itself, and the 'return of the repressed.'56 While all of these themes have been present in the rhetoric of the civilizing mission from its inception, the anxiety of the 'return' of colonialism to the imperial centre is expressed only during times of crisis. Situated in its historical context, the renewed interest in 'civilization' and 'barbarism' appears less benign. Benjamin R. Barber, "Jihad vs. McWorld," Atlantic Monthly. 269,3. March 1992; Jihad vs. McWorld: How Globalism and Tribalism are Reshaping the World. New York: Ballantine Books, 1995; Robert D. Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy," Atlantic Monthly. Feb 1994; The Ends of the Earth: From Togo to Turkmenistan. From Iran to Cambodia - a Journey to the Frontiers of Anarchy. New York: Vintage Press, 1996. 5 5 James M. Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, "A Tale of Two Worlds: Core and Periphery in the . Post-Cold War Era," International Organization. 46,2, 1992; Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky, The Real World Order: Zones of Peace and Zones of Turmoil. Chatham: Chatham House Press, 1993. 20 Scholars from both mainstream and critical perspectives have indicated their interest in ideas, values, cultural and identity politics.57 Unfortunately, the simplistic, essentialist, dualistic understanding of identity upon which Huntington and many other mainstream scholars base their analyses does not take advantage of recent writings, especially from a post-colonial perspective.58 I will use the theory of more recent writings on culture and identity to provide a more nuanced understanding of the self/other relationship and the place of culture in international relations. Using these two theoretical perspectives, "On Barbarians" aims to contribute to critical debates on the "clash of civilizations" and discussions about identity and culture. By situating the civilized/barbarian discourse in its historical context, it contributes a specific genealogy of one theme within European identity politics. This dissertation also adds to current writings on imperialism, culture, and identity in International Relations theory. Christopher Coker, "A New World (Dis)order," The International System After the Collapse of the EastAVest Order. A. Cleese, R. Cooper, Y. Sakamoto eds. London: Martinus Nijhoff, 1994a; Twilight of the West. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998. 5 7 Yosef Lapid. "Culture's Ship: Returns and Departures in International Relations Theory," The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory. Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil eds. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996, p.3. 5 8 David Blaney and Naeem Inayatullah, "Prelude to a Conversation of Cultures in International Society? Todorov and Nandy on the Possibility of Dialogue," Alternatives. 19, 1994; Stuart Hall, "Who Needs Identity?" Questions of Cultural Identity. Stuart Hall ed. London: Sage, 1996. 21 C H . II: CONCEPTS CIVILIZATION, BARBARIANS, CULTURE AND IDENTITY This dissertation speaks to two controversies in International Relations: the 'clash of civilizations' argument inaugurated by Samuel Huntington, and the aspect of the Third Debate that focuses on identity and culture. These key terms - identity, culture, civilization, and barbarian - are hotly contested. They are also interrelated: the definition of culture was initially connected to the definition of civilization, which was defined as the opposite of barbarity.1 As R.B.J. Walker points out, the terms 'civilization' and 'culture' have themselves "been the site of serious philosophical and political dispute."2 Culture and identity have become politically charged terms in Western public debates about multiculturalism and immigration, and more specifically in the so-called Third Debate in International Relations.3 In this chapter, I will lay out some of the etymology of these key concepts, indicating the politics at stake in their definition. Identity The concept of 'identity' is clouded in epistemological battles, academic wrangling, and definitional ambiguity. Despite this conceptual ambiguity, 'identity' is clearly a central theme in political discourse, and warrants serious analysis. Because individual and group identities are formed "in relation to a world beyond themselves," 1 Robert C.J. Young, Colonial Desire: Hybridity in Theory. Culture and Race. London: Routledge, 1995, p.31. 2 R.B.J. Walker, "The Concept of Culture in the Theory of International Relations," Culture and International Relations. Jongsuk Chay ed. New York: Praeger, 1990, p.4-5. 3 David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity. 2n d ed. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998, p. 212. 22 identity politics are of prime concern to international relations.4 Madan Sarup describes two models of identity: "The 'traditional' view is that all the dynamics (such as class, gender, 'race') operate simultaneously to produce a coherent, unified, fixed identity. The more recent view is that identity is fabricated, constructed, in process, and that we have to consider both psychological and sociological factors."5 I will focus chiefly on the latter view. Yosef Lapid argues that, at root, "the problem is not the absence, but the over supply of potentially rewarding definitions [of identity]. The challenge, in other words, is not to push energetically to some consensual but arbitrary reduction, but to reflectively match suitable definitional assets to declared theoretical missions."6 This section will attempt to lay out some of the debates about 'identity,' thereby indicating the potential value of its use and some possible pitfalls. Huntington provides a provisional definition of identity which acts as a starting point for his argument: "people define themselves in terms of ancestry, religious, language, history, values, customs, and institutions, [they] use politics not just to advance their interests but also to define their identity. We know who we are only when we know who we are not and often when we know whom we are against."7 Huntington offers a definition of identity that is singular, static, unchanging, and based on a simplistic dualist structure of self/ other. Huntington makes an important conceptual distinction between 'identity' and 'interest.' On the one hand, 'identity' is understood as who individuals 4 Naeem Inayatullah and David L. Blaney, "Knowing Encounters: Beyond Parochialism in International Relations Theory," The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory, p. 81. 5 Madan Sarup, Identity. Culture and the Postmodern World. Tasneem Raja ed. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1996, p. 14. 6 Lapid, 1996, p.7. 23 believe they are and the limits of their community. On the other hand, 'national interest' - a slippery term at best - is understood as the goals and aims of a community. While these goals may include the protection of identity, Huntington defines identity as more than a conglomeration of interests. He also highlights positive and negative aspects of the process of identification, which I will elaborate below. While there may be a range of reactions to the 'other' or outsider - from xenophobia to orientalism - the 'other' is by definition marginalized within or excluded from the community. Huntington continues: "Psychologists generally agree that individuals and groups define their identity by differentiating themselves from and placing themselves in opposition to others."8 Post-structural and post-colonial theorists have taken up this view of identity as difference. Alexander Wendt, a mainstream IR scholar, describes two important aspects of 'identity:' corporate and social. Corporate identity "refers to the intrinsic qualities that constitute actor individuality."9 Social identity, or social roles, "are sets of meanings that an actor attributes to himself while taking the perspective of others - that is as a social object."10 It is this second social aspect of identity that most concerns International Relations. Wendt also argues that "identification is a continuum from negative to positive, from conceiving the other as anathema to the self to seeing it as an extension of 7 Huntington, 1996, p.21. 8 Samuel P. Huntington, "The Erosion of American National Interests," Foreign Affairs. 76,5. September 1997, pp.30-31. 9 Alexander Wendt. "Identity and Structural Change in International Politics," The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory, p.50-51. 1 0 Ibid., p.50. 24 the self."11 While this moves away from the dualist position of Huntington, Wendt still assumes that 'identity' is stable and knowable. William Bloom is one of the first scholars to trace the importance of the social psychological process of identification for LR. However, while his analysis of identification provides an interesting venue for studies of nationalism, Bloom uses social psychology as a "norm-free analysis which takes account of, indeed is based in, human nature."12 This epistemological position clouds the utility of his analysis: biological essentialism has been discredited by Kenneth Waltz's critique of "First Image" explanations in Man, the State, and War. 1 3 However, Bloom does point to one dynamic of identification that seems to express a consensus amongst scholars: threats to the self or community and the exclusion of others consolidate identity.14 This process of identification through exclusion is of prime interest to many post-structural scholars. William Connolly lays out the post-structural position: "difference requires identity and identity requires difference... doubts about self identity are posed and resolved by the constitution of an other against which that identity may define itself."15 The assertion of a group sameness or national 'identity' requires some elision or exclusion of difference. Communities are never homogenous, and their populations are never 1 1 Ibid., p.52. 1 2 William Bloom, Personal Identity. National Identity and International Relations. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 117. 1 3 Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis. New York: Columbia University Press, 1959. 1 4 Bloom, op cit, pp.39-42. 1 5 Connolly, 1991, pp. x. 25 obvious, stable, or completely knowable.16 McClintock expressed the empirical concerns about the definition of identity as homogeneity: representations of identity and difference often do not reflect empirical or material 'sameness' or 'difference.'17 There is a large body of recent theory that is concerned with the relationship with the 'other.' Often influenced by psychoanalysis, critical theorists have argued that while the 'other' is excluded from the 'self,' the 'self requires the presence of the 'other' to define its boundary.18 Hall argues, Directly contrary to the form in which they are constantly invoked, identities are constructed through, not outside, difference... it is only through the relation to the Other, the relation to what it is not, to precisely what it lacks, to what has been called its constitutive outside that the "positive" meaning of any term - and thus its "identity" can be constructed.19 Because definition is determined by limits, at least in part, the 'other' is a necessary component of the ' s e l f Roxanne Lynn Doty summarizes the post-structural position for IR: "identity is [conceptualized] as a practice and an effect that is always in the process of being constructed through signifying processes that expel the surplus meanings that would expose the failure of identity as such... The spectre of the other is always within the 'self.'"2 0 Consequently, for critical theorists, the 'other' is both required and excluded in the process of identification. 1 6 Etienne Balibar, "Racism and Nationalism," Race. Nation. Class: Ambiguous Identities. Trans. Chris Turner. London: Verso, 1990, p.49. 1 7 McClintock, op cit., pp.61-65. 1 8 Shapiro and Hall provide the most accessible explanations of this dynamic: Hall, 1996, pp.2-5; Shapiro, 1997, pp.94-96. 1 9 Stuart Hall, "Introduction: Who Needs 'Identity'?" Questions of Cultural Identity. Stuart Hall. Ed. London: Sage, 1996, p.4. 2 0 Doty, 1996a, p. 168. The 'self defines its boundaries in relation to some 'other.'21 That 'other' may be multiple, benign, or inconsequential. The 'other' may be portrayed as inferior or fetishized as superior. The boundaries may be territorial, juridical, economic, or social. However, the 'other' remains outside of the community and accordingly is not granted the same rights as the 'self inside.22 Much critical theory in the fields of geopolitics, security studies, political, human, and cultural geography concentrate on the spatial aspect of identity.23 A prominent scholar in Cultural Studies, Stuart Hall, expresses this dynamic: "identities... are more the product of the marking of difference and exclusion, than they are the sign of an identical, naturally-constituted unity."24 Because of the different representations of the 'other,' and the myriad of material consequences these representations may have - from assimilation to genocide - it is imperative that scholars be specific about the identity-discourse and historical context that they are studying.25 Critical theorists in LR have also examined the self/other dynamic. Michael Shapiro provides an excellent explanation of Hegelian and Lacanian version of identity formation.26 David Campbell summarizes a post-structural position of identity and identity formation succinctly: 2 1 Said, 1977, p.54. 2 2 Walker, 1993, p.66. 2 3 John Agnew and Stuart Corbridge, Mastering Space: Hegemony. Territory and International Political Economy. London: Routledge, 1997; Martin Lewis and Karen Wigen, The Myth of Continents: A Critique of Metageography. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997; Said, 1977, pg. 54; Michael J. Shapiro, Violent Cartographies: Mapping Cultures of War. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997. 2 4 Hall, 1996, p.4. 2 5 McClintock has criticized post-colonial scholars for not over-generalizing the relationship between the self and the other: McClintock, 1995, pp. 61-65. 2 6 Shapiro, 1997, pp.41-44. 27 the problematic of identity/difference contains no foundations that are prior to, or outside of, its operation... the constitution of identity is achieved through the inscription of boundaries that serve to demarcate an "inside" from an "outside," a "se l f from and "other," a "domestic" from a "foreign."27 Post-structural theory's interest in power leads scholars to investigate the operations of power in and on identity structures. Michel Foucault describes how identity-positions come to be constituted by psychiatric, medical, judicial, and sexual discourses. However, he does not explore how individuals come to occupy these positions.28 Thus, for example, there is a difference between thinking one's self is a doctor and being a doctor, thinking one's self a judge and being a judge. While identity may be constituted by representation, we cannot ignore the institutional and discursive context in which identities are legitimized. This leads us to question the location of the 'operations' of identity. The representation of certain identities produced within specific historical and institutional contexts becomes a central analytical focus, in part because they define the cultural forms which identity may take. In addition, the specific textual and material occupation of those subject positions becomes equally important.29 Thus, many post-structural analyses are not concerned with the empirical definition of a particular identity, but rather with how that identity is represented, performed, and reified through social and 2 7 Campbell, 1998, p.9. 2 8 Hall, op cit. p. 13. 2 9 Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity. New York: Routledge, 1990, p.25. 28 political practices.30 This notion of identity practices is connected to the practices of boundary policing, which is central to current thinking on the subject.31 In an illuminating work, Iver B. Neumann provides an extremely valuably typology of the varied perspectives taken by different disciplines all concerned with the same dynamic. He suggests four paths along which theorizing of the self/other relationship has been developed: The ethnographic path: based in studies of "in-group" and "out-group," this path is represented by scholars who study nationalism and the constitution of ethnic groups in LR; 3 2 The psychological path: similar to Bloom's analysis of social psychology, this path applies psychoanalysis to inter-group dynamics and ethnocentrism;33 The Continental philosophical path: largely tangential to LR, this path outlines philosophical contributions by Habermas, Taylor, and other philosophers on the relationship between 'self and 'other' in the Western tradition;34 The "Eastern Excursion:" following Said, this path constitutes the majority of Neumann's argument on the identity of Europe and its specific exclusion of one of the many "Easts" - Turkey, Russia, and Northern Europe. 3 5 Roxanne Lynn Doty, "Sovereignty and the Nation: Constructing the Boundaries of National Identity," State Sovereignty as a Social Construct. Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber eds. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996b, pp. 166-68. 3 1 Daniele Conversi, "Reassessing Current Theories of Nationalism: Nationalism as Boundary Maintenance and Creation," Nationalism and Ethnic Politics. 1,1. Spring 1995, pp.77-79; Doty, 1996b. 3 2 Neumann, op cit, p. 5. 3 3 Ibid., p.8; Bloom, op cit.; Vamik D. Volkan, The Need to Have Enemies and Allies: From Clinical Practice to International Relations. Northwale, NJ: Jason Aronson Press, 1988; Psychodynamics of International Relationships: Vol. I: Concepts and Theories. Vamik D. Volkan, Demetrios A. Julius, Joseph V. Montville eds. Toronto: Lexington Books, 1990. 3 4 Ibid., p. 10; Michael Dillon, Politics of Security: Towards a Political Philosophy of Continental Thought. London: Routledge, 1996. 3 5 Ibid., p. 15. 29 These four paths represent the best contemporary summary of disparate fields which tackle the same general theme, although it should be noted that scholars working within postcolonialism, feminist studies, and human/cultural geography have also engaged this problematic. "On Barbarians" follows Neumann's fourth path, focusing on the colonial or imperial East.36 It works from the assumption that the identity of a group claiming the status of 'civilized'—in this case Europe - requires barbarians against which to define themselves - in this case the colonial subjects. The status of 'civilization' is meaningless without 'barbarians' against which to compare one's self.37 Shapiro's notion of the "political imaginary" comes into view in the context of this project. Because identities have no basis outside of discourse, from the post-structuralist perspective, individuals and groups must 'imagine' and 'act out' or 'perform' their identities. Thus an individual may identify herself as being Canadian even though she may not spatially, legally, or socially occupy that position. In an important way, a society is who it imagines itself to be and how it acts. Identity involves an understanding of the place of the self in the world - which is clearly relevant to JR. The 'international imaginary' is defined as the field of beliefs, values, histories, and assumptions that a group holds about the international realm. The 'international imaginary' can be understood as the cultural, historical, and ideational precursors to national performance in the international realm. I will elaborate this concept in the chapters to follow. By tracing a specific permutation of the self/other dichotomy, "On Barbarians" will elaborate a specific instance in which identity is defined contingently and relationally. Ibid., p.207. 3 0 The ascription of civilized or barbarian is not a neutral, objective description. Rather, the civilized/barbarian discourse has specific, imperialist overtones that should not be overlooked. Walker plots some of the relations between identity, culture, and the civilization/barbarian dichotomies: "culture, like civilization, becomes something we have, distinguishing us from the barbarians outside. ... The possession of 'civilization' justifies the conquest of 'barbarism.'"38 Culture As argued by Raymond Williams, culture is one of the most contested and complex words in the English language.39 Within the context of traditional LR literature, culture refers to a "stock of interlocking beliefs, ideas, understandings, perceptions, identities, or what I would call 'knowledge' held by members of [a] system."40 By exploring the contesting definitions of culture, I will illuminate some of the political stakes specific scholars have in the term's definition. Culture as soft power The most traditional manner in which to conceptualize 'culture' in LR is as 'soft power.' 'Soft' power is described as the power over opinion, usually in contrast to the 'hard' power of military and economic resources.41 Also known as 'prestige,' soft power stands for the history, ideals, and values that a country represents. This prestige, or soft 3 / Neumann and Welsh, op cit. p.329. 3 8 Walker, op cit. pp.4;9. 3 9 Young, op cit. p.30. 4 0 Wendt, op cit. p.49. 4 1 Edward Hallet Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis. 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations. 2nd ed. Toronto: Macmillan, 1966, p. 132. 31 power, was seen to be especially important during the two world wars and the period of decolonization.42 The power of 'culture' is also displayed, in this view, from the promulgation of Western ideas into non-Western societies.43 Westernization is seen as a reflection of the inherent power of Western ideas, independent of any hard power considerations. Huntington has most recently expressed this view of culture, although with a more pessimistic conclusion.44 'Culture' is also studied in analyses of 'national character.' More popular with traditional realists than contemporary scholars, 'national character' comprises the influence of national identity on international behaviour. Hans J. Morgenthau argues that: National character cannot fail to influence national power; for those who act for the nation in peace and war, formulate, execute, and support its policies, elect and are elected, mold public opinion, produce and consume - they all bear to a greater or lesser degree the imprint of those intellectual and moral qualities which make up the national character.45 Such a study may rely on national stereotypes, rather than 'culture.' Generalizations about the characters of other international actors are often implicated in nationalist political discourse - either as allies or enemies. E.H. Carr points out that to depict one's enemies or one's prospective victims as inferior beings in the sight of God has been a familiar technique at any rate since the days of the Old Testament. Racial theories, ancient and modern, belong to this category; for the rule of one people or class over another is always justified by a belief in the mental and moral inferiority of the ruled. In 4 2 Frederick L. Schuman, International Politics: The Western State System and the World Community. 6th ed. Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1958, p. 103. 4 3 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. 2n d ed. New York: Alfred E Knopf, 1954, p.335; Schuman, op cit. p.315. 4 4 Huntington, 1996,310. 4 5 Morgenthau, op cit., p. 122. 32 such theories, sexual abnormality and sexual offences are commonly imputed to the discredited race or group.46 As such, studies of national character cannot be studied apart from the political, not to say ideological, context in which they are circulated. The study of national character finds its institutional position in the sub-field of foreign policy analysis.47 During the Interwar period, world public opinion was thought by the Idealists school of LR theory to be a sufficient deterrent to war, in part because of the mass mobilization necessary for modern total warfare. Following this, culture is often equated in the realist tradition with what Carr terms the "power of world opinion."48 However, the failure of world opinion to prevent war discredited the study of popular opinion until the end of the Cold War.4 9 Studies of popular opinion within LR were also figured as studies of propaganda, the process by which the government attempts to shape public opinion.50 Works by Walter Lippmann and Harold Lasswell are seminal to this sub-field. However, the study of propaganda, in large part, is marginal to the discipline.51 In sum, the realist concern with power encompasses 'culture' to the extent that it is understood as an expression of the 'power' of'national' ideas over both domestic and international opinion. It is not surprising, also, that realist theory should figure 'culture' in terms of nations and states. However, this definition of 'culture' limits the analytical 4 6 Carr, op cit. p.71. 4 7 Valerie M. Hudson. "Culture and Foreign Policy: Developing a Research Agenda." Culture and Foreign Policy. Valerie M. Hudson ed. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1997, p. 13. 4 8 Carr, op cit. p. 140. 4 9 Morgenthau, op cit. p.236. 5 0 Philip M. Taylor, Munitions of the Mind: A History of Propaganda from the Ancient World to the Present Day. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995. 33 potential of the concept, in particular because it relies on figuring the state as a 'natural' entity and national culture as an outgrowth of that political entity. 'Culture' is thus understood solely as a hegemonic discourse, without any consideration of the multiple, political discourses which shape cultural production. A l i Mazrui has argued that an effect of describing culture as soft power has been the division of the world into one that" is often define[d] in cultural rather than economic terms."52 Walker concurs that the implication of the formulation of 'culture' as Westernization is the notion that "culture, like civilization, becomes something we have, distinguishing from the barbarians outside."53 As such, 'culture' in this configuration can be seen as lending itself to the imperial project, or, at the very least, a component of ethnocentric rhetoric.54 Culture as ideas and/or values Most recent scholarship on culture has taken the perspective that 'culture' represents the ideas and values - or norms - of the actors within a social system.55 Based on empirical concerns, scholars who subscribe to this definition seek the 'objective' evidence of culturally conditioned behaviour.56 Peter Katzenstein defines culture as a "collective model of nation-state authority or identity carried by custom or law. Culture 5 1 Harold Lasswell, Propaganda Technique in the World War. New York: Alfred E. Knopf, 1927; Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion. Toronto: Simon Schuster, 1997 [1922]. 5 2 Ali A. Mazrui, "The Moving Cultural Frontier of World Order: From Monotheism to North-South Relations," Culture. Ideology and World Order, p.25. 5 3 Walker, 1984, p.4. 5 4 This ethnocentrism is not unique to the West. Said argues, "All cultures tend to make representations of foreign cultures the better to master or in some way control them." Said, 1993, p. 100. 5 5 Gary Goertz, Contexts of International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994. 5 6 Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics." International Organization. 41,2. 1987. 34 refers to both a set of evaluative standards (such as norms and values) and a set of cognitive standards (such as rules and models) that define what social actors exist in a system, how they operation, and how they relate to one another."57 James Rosenau's tripartite division of the bases of international order on ideas, behaviour, and institutions is characteristic of this view. 5 8 This understanding of culture is bound up with the general epistemic realist position, which has faced numerous post-structuralist critiques.59 Defining 'culture' as ideas and values has the effect of being reductionist - in assuming an ideational or value consensus treats 'culture' as a product. However, 'culture' is more productively construed as a process. To avoid criticism that 'culture' is not a homogenous, unified ideological field, we must admit the perseverance of resistant discourses in the cultural field. As such, within this position, the object of study is most often the dominant discourse - rather than the dialogue, which surrounds the issue. For example, most studies of strategic culture focus on the consensus of strategic beliefs which specific, national elites display.60 In doing so, these studies neglect the popular strategic culture of nations.61 One cannot explain cultural change without reference to both exogenous factors, such as material or power relations, Peter J. Katzenstein, "Introduction: Alternative Perspective on National Security," The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics. Peter J. Katzenstein ed. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996, p.6. 5 8 James N. Rosenau, "Governance, Order and Change in World Politics," Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics. James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel eds. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 14. 5 9 Campbell, 1998, p.218. 6 0 Ken Booth, "The Concept of Strategic Culture Affirmed," Strategic Power: USA/USSR. Carl Jacobsen ed. New York: Macmillan, 1990; Alastair Iain Johnston, "Thinking About Strategic Culture," International Security. 19,4. 1995. 6 1 Der Derian, 1989; Bradley Klein, "The Textual Strategies of the Military: Or Have You Read Any Good Defense Manuals Lately?" International/Intertextual Relations. 35 and to endogenous factors, such as counter-cultures, micro-cultures, or minority viewpoints. 'Culture' is not a single hegemonic discourse, but the interaction of dominant and minority discourses. The notion of 'culture' as an expression of value consensus amongst actors is also essential to the English School's conception of international society.62 Adda Bozeman illustrates the degree to which the English School takes cultural interaction seriously as a distinct realm of international relations.63 Bozeman takes a view, indebted to Arnold Toynbee, that cultures dialogue and compete - the stronger values winning at the "bar of history."64 Post-structural critics view this teleological view of history as progress with great scepticism. In short, defining 'culture' as the values and ideas of a set of given actors evidences the power of beliefs in world politics. However, this conception is largely static, and product-oriented rather than process-oriented. It takes 'culture' to be an established social condition, rather than a dialogue or conversation. There is also a bias towards elite culture at the expense of popular culture.65 By this I do not mean that IR takes opera seriously but not film. However, there is a tendency in studies of foreign policy analysis and strategic culture to analyze the State Department or the Foreign Ministry etc., before studying popular films or news reports. Recent analysis in critical IR, notably by Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics. London: Macmillan, 1977, p.316. 6 3 Adda B. Bozeman, "The International Order in a Multicultural World," The Expansion of International Society. Hedley Bull and Adam Watson eds. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984. 6 4 Adda B. Bozeman, Politics and Culture in International History. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960, p.58. 36 Shapiro, Der Derian, and Klein, attempt to redress this imbalance by focussing on popular representations of the international imaginary, which I will explore below. Culture as Nation As Walker points out, 'culture' "has been the site of serious philosophical and political dispute" in European political and social discourse.66 On the one hand, 'culture' is seen as the inheritance of centuries of European excellence. During the late Victorian era, culture was represented by Matthew Arnold as the 'civilization' of the upper, educated classes against the 'anarchy' of the lower and emerging middle classes.67 Said is specifically indebted to this definition. On the other hand, Kutlur is understood as a local, particular, nationalist identity.68 Framed within a debate about the national identity of Germany, Kultur was described as the natural, folk-ish historical particularity of the German people, often against an emerging technical, sterile, and universal zivilisation.69 Herder is one of the first philosophers to argue for the existence of multiple civilizations, instead of the theory of one single European civilization, a view which was popularized by Spengler.70 As a consequence, there is a certain historical tension between the claims of particularistic culture and universalist civilization. In many ways, Walker argues, "culture remains associated with the insistence on diversity, fragmentation and relativism, 6 5 R.B.J. Walker, "Culture, Discourse, Insecurity," Towards a Just Peace: Perspectives from Social Movements. Saul Mendlovitz and R.B.J. Walker, eds. Toronto: Butterworths, 1987, pp. 175-6. 6 6 Walker, 1990, pp.4-5. 6 7 Arthur Herman, The Idea of Decline in Western History. Toronto: Free Press, 1997, p.259. 6 8 Ibid., p. 6. 6 9 Modris Eksteins, Rites of Spring: The Great War and the Birth of the Modern Age. Toronto: Lester and Orpen Dennys, 1989, pp.77-79 37 on the celebration of traditions arising from particular communities against the claim of a universalizing humanity - claims that have tended to arise from particular, though dominant, communities."71 Said understands culture to mean "all those practices, like the arts of description, communication, and representation, that have autonomy from the economic, social, and political realms and that often exist in aesthetic forms, one of whose principal aims is pleasure... [and] each society's reservoir of the best that has been known and thought."72 Said has been criticised for this focus on elite, national culture.73 In sum the definition of culture as national identity is tied to a larger philosophical debate surrounding umversalism and particularism that is quite contentious. Culture often stands as code for particularism and relativism - perhaps suggesting the source of traditional discomfort with the concept. Culture, especially in Matthew Arnold's terminology, is also taken to represent the 'best' a society has to offer, and is coded in racial, class, and gendered terms. Specifically, the academic tendency has been to concentrate on elite rather than popular culture. However, post-colonial and cultural studies have indicated the importance of popular culture to identity and political discourses. 7 0 Oswald Spengler, The Decline of the West. Helmut Werner ed. Trans. Sophie WilkinsNew York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962, p.24; Young, op cit., p.37. 7 1 Walker, 1990, p.6. 7 2 Said, 1993, pp.xii-xiii. 7 3 Moore-Gilbert, op cit., pp.8-9. 38 Culture as Field In much recent critical theory, 'culture' is understood as the field of representations in which power and identities are constructed, reified, negotiated, and resisted. Sarup reminds us that "the reality-construction of a common culture or national character is not something that happens once. Rather there is a constant process of asserting, questioning and redefining of national identity."74 This understanding of'culture' as a field of representation in which rival identities, discourses, and meanings vie for allegiance seems to me the most analytically productive. In the first instance, this notion encompasses the previous definitions of culture -understanding the field of representations to comprehend the abstract ideas, history, and values of a particular group but also the specific textual and institutional ways these ideas are practised. It also widens the scope of analysis so that national, subnational, and international cultural fields might be understood. As Sujata Pasic argues, "a cultural approach enables us to leave behind unitary state actors, purely interactionist accounts, and unnecessarily limiting conceptual boundaries such as domestic versus international and state versus society."75 In the second instance, this notion of 'culture' emphasizes the process of cultural dialogue over the assumed cultural consensus or 'product.' This prompts the theorist to analyze cultural practices within their specific historical, political, and economic context. Seeing 'culture' as a dialogue also prompts us to "resurrect subjugated knowledges," Sarup, op cit. p. 140. 7 5 Sujata Chakrabarti Pasic, "Culturing International Relations Theory: A Call for Extension," The Return of Culture and Identity to IR Theory, p.97. 39 seeking those voices which resist the dominant discourse. This view of 'culture' as a field of representations also enables scholars to see identity formations - such as self/other and civilized/barbarian - in their discursive context. The discourses of race, class, gender, and imperialism are mutually constituting, and mutually implicating.76 Studying the entire field of cultural productions allows us to see these connections. The study of popular culture is an important component of this position. Popular culture, it is argued, offers more discursive space for the analysis of resistance to dominant discourses.77 Phillip Darby highlights the importance of popular culture to LR specifically. He argues, "The need to elevate culture as a subject of study in international relations directs attention to people as a neglected dimension of the discipline ... what has been missing is people outside the circles of official power; people who in some way are expressive of their society and carry its values into other societies and the international arena."78 While not disputing the importance of diplomatic and state elites, the international imaginary of the population, the "popular international imaginary," is also central to the International Relations. What I mean by 'popular international imaginary' is the popular beliefs about the world outside of the state, the nature of that 'outside' — the international society, and the place of the state in that society. This is a slight modification of a term both Said and Shapiro use: "international imaginary."79 An 7 6 McClintock, op cit. 7 7 JohnFiske, Reading the Popular. Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989, pp.2-4. 7 8 Darby, 1998, p.13. 7 9 Said, 1993, p.310. 40 international imaginary is understood as the structural and symbolic framework that gives meaning to, and perpetuates the configuration of sovereign states and their international relations.80 Shapiro continues, To analyze how things in the world take oh meanings, it is necessary to analyze the structure of imaginative processes. The imaginative enactments that produce meanings are not simply acts of a pure, disembodied consciousness; they are historically developed practices which reside in the very style in which statements are made, of the grammatical, rhetorical, and narrative structures that compose even the discourses of the sciences. I plan to use histories, travel writings, and IR theories, which use the discourse of civilization/barbarian to explain and justify imperialism, as reflections of the popular imaginary. This too marks a departure from traditional international relations which, for the most part, has concentrated on elite perceptions of the international realm. Given this focus on popular culture and popular international imaginary, I will concentrate on histories that are exemplary of their cultural milieu, supported by other literary and popular texts. Culture and identity are central to this project, and from this perspective, to the study of international relations. However, this dissertation does not take the position that culture or identities are fixed, stable, or natural. Consequently, "On Barbarians" will examine how the civilized/barbarian dichotomy comes to represent an imperial dualism between Europe and its (post)colonial others in popular representations. 8 0 Michael J. Shapiro, "Introduction to Part I," Challenging Boundaries: Global Flows. Territorial Identities. Michael J. Shapiro and Hayward R. Alker eds. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996, p.3. 8 1 Shapiro, 1988, p.7. 41 Civilization 'Civilization' has stood for several different ideas in its history. Pasic argues mindful of the previous discussion about post-structuralist notions of identity construction that "exact meanings for terms such as civilization must be context-specific. As a category in understanding world politics, it is more important to see civilization as informal organization, a mythological cognitive construct like 'race,' 'ethnicity,' 'nation,' or 'state' that enables the perception of social unity upon which social organization is always grounded."82 From it's inception, civilization was defined as similar to culture and the opposite of 'barbarism.' In its first incarnations, 'civilization' stood for a process of 'cultivation' (linked to both manners and agriculture) and for European identity. The term first appears in English in 177283, in opposition to barbarity, and in French in 1767.84 The term was quickly mobilized in the imperial context— as both endorsement and critique of the process of European expansion.85 In the nineteenth century, 'civilization' was taken to represent a mission of homogenization and 'improvement.'86 Thus, the rhetoric of 'civilization' was quickly appropriated by imperial ideology to mean the 'civilizing mission.' It also came to represent European states as a group. Pasic, op cit., p.99. 8 3 Young, op cit., pp.30-31. 8 4 Alice L. Conklin, A Mission to Civilize: The Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa. 1895-1930. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997, p. 14. 8 5 Spengler, op cit., p.28. 8 6 I'd like to thank Dr. Edward Keene for first pointing this out to me. 4 2 For most of this part of its history, civilization was a political term that was used to elide the differences within European communities, in comparison to those savage and barbaric communities outside Europe, I will elaborate the differences between 'savage' and 'barbarians' in the next section. European civilization was defined, in part, as the technologically superior, universal standard portrayed by Enlightenment thinkers. The term 'civilization' was also defined against groups within Europe who were labelled 'barbaric' and 'savage.'87 The distinction between 'civilization' and 'savagery' and 'barbarism' was also mobilized to distinguish classes within European nations. Walker writes, "'civilization' in particular encompassed all kinds of notions which we now see as characterizing the development of a new kind of society... The most familiar of these are the conception of progress, the distinction between civilization and barbarism, secular rationalism, and individualism: the world enshrined in the Universal Histories of Enlightenment."88 In sum, 'civilization' has been a contested term used by both proponents and critics of the civilizing mission and the imperialism of which it was a vital part. However, 'civilization' has always been a characteristic that 'we' have, in contradistinction to 'them' - the barbarians.89 Gerrit Gong adds to this understanding of the term that 'civilization' represented an expression of a single European identity, based on a notion of secular - rather than See McClintock on Irish and Welsh racism and the parallels to the discourse of the lower classes in Britain, pp. 52-60. 8 8 Walker, 1984, p. 199. 43 religious - unity.90 He argues that, as a standard, 'civilization' reflected European culture's dominance over other societies. Just as identity is involved in the policing of boundaries, European civilization was also figured as a 'standard' in international law. The European standard of civilization, of course, conflicted with other societies that had their own sense of 'civilization' and 'barbarian.'91 Said argues that, indeed, "all cultures tend to make representations of foreign cultures the better to master or in some way control them."92 What is of particular interest, then, is how the European standard of civilization came to prevail over all others.93 Gong explains how the standard of 'civilization' was mobilized to distinguish those states that could expect sovereignty and those that could expect domination.94 This juridical boundary between Western and non-Western states was patrolled earnestly. As Neumann and Welsh argue, the border between civilized Europe and the barbarous outside was integral to the European notion of self and other.95 The only non-European powers of account within nineteenth century international discourse were those which imitated Europe: the Ottoman Empire (1856), Egypt (between 1801 and 1882), Japan, Silvia Federici, "The God that Never Failed: The Origins and Crises of Western Civilization," Enduring Western Civilization: The Construction of the Concept of Western Civilization and Its 'Others.' Silvia Federici ed. London: Praeger, 1995, p.65. 9 0 Gerrit W. Gong. The Standard of'Civilization' in International Society. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984, p.23. 9 1 Ibid., p.8. 9 2 Said, 1993, p. 100. 9 3 Ibid., 107; Michael Harbsmeier, "Early Travels to Europe: Some remarks on the magic of writing," Europe and Its Others. Vol. I. Proceedings of the Essex Conference on the Sociology of Literature, July 1984. Francis Barker, Peter Hulme, Margaret Iverson, Diana Loxley eds. Colchester, University of Essex, 1985, p.72. 94Gong, op cit., p. 10. 9 5 Neumann and Welsh, op cit., p.348. 44 and the United States.96 The incorporation of these pseudo-western states into the international society of Europe was the exception that proved the rule of 'civilizing,' proving that it was possible for those that were not yet members to attain the status of 'civilized.' 9 7 This distinction between civilized and barbarian spheres of international relations had serious implications for the conduct of imperial powers in the non-European world. A resurgence of the term 'civilization' can be found in Europe during the First and Second World Wars. 'Civilization' was mobilized in wartime propaganda as a characteristic that separated 'us' from 'them' - regardless of which side employed the rhetoric. There are some interesting uses of the rhetoric that will be examined in chapters four and five. A decline of the use of the term 'civilization' in popular and academic culture accompanied the process of decolonization and the loss of European self-confidence.98 Civilizations have received some attention by World Systems theorists, but this perspective is chiefly concerned with the expansion of global capital. Huntington's now (in) famous "Clash of Civilizations" in 1993 represents the resurgence of the interest in 'civilizations.' While Huntington's use of the civilizational concept has been recently examined,99 the imperialist echoes of this move have been largely unexamined.100 In sum, though the meanings of 'civilization' have shifted according to the prevailing ideological needs of the dominant groups, it has always represented a standard Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Capital. 1848-1875. New York: Random House, 1975, p. 80. Gong, op cit. pp.29-30. Mazrui, op cit., p.35. O'Hagan, 1998. 45 that determines the boundary of a particular, often European, community. However, the specific permutations of this rhetoric illuminate the structure of the changing European identity over the past two hundred years. Also, because so much of the civilized/barbarian rhetoric has been aimed at a popular audience, tracing the changing meanings of'civilization' illustrates the potential of popular representations of international relations for critical LR theory. Barbarians Etymologically, the term 'barbarians' has its origins in the Greek description of foreigners whose speech was incomprehensible to them.101 'Barbarians' could not participate in Greek speech, which was the foundation of logic, philosophy, and politics -nor could they participate in the polis.102 Aristotle describes barbarians as "slaves by nature,"103 and this description has remained a vital part of the definition to the present day.1 0 4 'Barbarians' are always described in relation to a standard of civilization, and are always defined in relation to a 'lack' of civilization. Barbarity is the mirror to civilization. As such, the 'barbarian' is gendered (as either masculine, androgynous, or feminine), sexualized (a lack of sexual restraint), capitalized (as ignorant of capitalism 1 0 0 Mazrui, op cit., p.39. 1 0 1 Harbsmeier, op cit., p.7. 1 0 2 Julia Kristeva, Strangers to Ourselves. Trans. Leon S. Roudiez. New York: Columbia University Press, 1991, p.51. Kristeva traces the history of the term 'barbarian,' with extremely interesting results. Specifically, the meaning of'barbarian' varies with Greek politics, and is coded from its inception in gendered terms. 1 0 3 Aristotle, "Politics," Basic Works of Aristotle. Richard McKeon ed. New York: Random House, 1941, Bk.I, Ch.2. p.1128. 46 and the class system, but wily and dishonest once introduced), surveyed (inscrutable but controllable through counting, demography, and surveillance), indistinguishable (numerous and lacking individuality), and dangerous (both through open revolt and covert subversion of individuals). These standards may be implicit or explicit, but conditioned much imperial and metropolitan behaviour. As yet, no scholar has investigated the discourse of barbarians specifically. In this section, I will trace some of the history of the term 'barbarian,' and distinguish it from the similar discourse of the 'savage.' During the Middle Ages, following ancient Greco-Roman symbolism, 'barbarians' were equated with the 'other' of Christendom. This dichotomy was reified during the Renaissance, most often using the stereotype of the 'Turk' in exhortalio ad helium contra barbaros. In Neumann's analysis of the evolution of the 'Turk' in the European imaginary, he notes a common feature of this rhetoric is that "a logic of culture exists and must take precedence over a logic of raison d'etat."105 Renaissance thinkers drew distinctions between Scythian barbarians of Central Asia and the 'monsters' internal to the wilds of Europe (or outside Europe), but used both terms.106 It is important to remember that 'barbarians' and 'monsters' that the 'others' of Europe are not just external. Jews, Sinti and Roma [Gypsies], Eastern Europeans are each constituted as 'other' from mainstream European 1 0 4 Said, 1978, p. 56. 1 0 5 Neumann, 1999, p.47. The connection to Huntington - who attempts to connect a logic of culture with a logic of raison d'etat - is particularly interesting 1 0 6 David Fausett, Images of the A Amsterdam: Rodopi B.V., 1994, pp.11-13 ntipodes in the Eighteenth Century: A Study in Stereotyping. 47 identity, and, as such, are often the object of the 'barbarian' or 'savage' stereotypes.107 Neumann and Wolff both provide excellent historical studies of how Eastern Europeans, in particular, are constituted as marginal members of European society and how that marginal identity functions to shore the identity of Europe itself.108 In part the separation of the 'barbaric' from the 'savage' coincided with the growing secularization of the European states system, and of European states themselves. The term 'savages' first came to be applied in the sixteenth century. The 'other' of Europe ceased to be defined primarily in religious terms during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.109 The terms 'barbaric' and 'savage' are used all but interchangeably from the 16 t h century until the 18 t h century. In the 18 th century, we see 'savage' and 'barbarian' come to represent different 'others.' Information and images about non-European societies proliferated in Utopias, distopias, fiction, plays, and epistolary novels and became extremely popular throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.110 The exotic 'East' became a receptacle for European ideas - both about itself and its 'others.' In describing its 'other,' either as superior or inferior to Europe, representations of the 'East' were used to elaborate the identity of Europe. The distinction between 'savages' and 'barbarians' has two chief Neumann, op cit., p.39. Harbsmeier, 1985. 1 0 8 Neumann, 1999, Ch.5; Larry Wolff, Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994, Chs. 7-8. 1 0 9 Gustav Jahoda, Images of Savages: Ancient roots of modern prejudice in Western Culture. New York: Routledge, 1999, p. 16. 110Michael Harbsmeier, 'Early Travels to Europe: Some remarks on the magic of writing,' Europe and Its Others. Vol. I. Proceedings of the Essex Conference on the Sociology of Literature, July 1984. Francis Barker, Peter Hulme, Margaret Iverson, Diana Loxley eds. Colchester, University of Essex, 1985. p.78. 48 sources. The first is the growth of knowledge about other non-European civilizations and societies and the systematization of that knowledge. The second comes from a 'four-stages' model of societal development, based on subsistence relations, popularized by Scottish and French theorists in the 18 century. Though tangential to this particular project, I will look at the evolution of the notion of the 'savage.' While 'barbarian' has been a staple - i f not stable - stereotype since Herodotus, the stereotype of the 'savage' is of recent origin. 'Savages,' coming from the Roman word for woods [silva], was first used to represent [men] who lived in the German forests without any organized society. The 'savage' was conceived as either 'noble' or 'ignoble' - as either uncorrupted by 'civilized' manners and thus closer to the natural state or as entirely unrestrained by 'civility' and thus closer to an animal state.111 Whether 'noble' or 'ignoble' - peaceful or violent - the 'savage' lived without the benefit of society and European 'civility.' The 'ignoble' savage was viewed as justification for the civilizing mission. The Romantics used the position of the 'noble' savage to criticize European civilization. 1 1 2 The 'savage' was represented both as an ancestor of the European and as an internal part of the psyche of a European. Europe did not have a long-standing relationship to America, in the way that Asia had existed in its historical imaginary. As such, with the discovery of the New World, the 'savages' which the first explorers encountered were symbolically sui generis. This is not to imply that Europe did not have a source of images to project on the native 1 1 1 Bernard W. Sheehan, Savages and Civility: Indians and Englishmen in Colonial Virginia. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980, p.2. 49 Americans. The description of 'savages' in the New World often coincided with ancient descriptions of 'monsters' - mermaids, dog-headed men etc.113 Todorov's Conquest of America looks precisely at representations of native Americans to elaborate a general theory of 'otherness' because it was an "extreme, and exemplary, encounter" with the Other.114 However, we should note that American 'savages' was an ideal, that is to say not over-determined, site on which to project the European view of itself. Accordingly, those thinkers who regarded European 'civilization' well condemned the 'savagery' of the Native Americans. Those thinkers, like Rousseau, Montaigne, and Montesquieu who viewed the benefits of 'civilization' with more scepticism were more laudatory of society with civilized decadence. Montaigne's "On cannibals" and "On the custom of wearing clothes," published in French in 1580 and in English in 1603, illustrate the critical potential of'savages.'1 1 5 In "On cannibals," Montaigne argues that "we are justified in calling these [cannibals] barbarians by reference to the laws of reason, but not in comparison with ourselves, who surpass them in every kind of barbarity."116 Exemplary of 'positive' Orientalism, Montaigne says "I do not believe... that there is anything barbarous or savage about them, except that we all call barbarous anything that is contrary to our own habits."117 As 1 1 2 Hayden White, "The Noble Savage Theme as Fetish," Tropics of Discourse. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1978. 1 1 3 Fausett, op cit., p.193; Todorov, 1999, pp.16-17. 1 1 4 Todorov, 1999, p. 5. 1 1 5 Michel de Montaigne, Essays. Trans. J.M. Cohen. London: Penguin Books, 1958 [English, 1603], pp.105-119. 1 1 6 Ibid., p. 114. 1 1 7 Ibid., p.108. 50 Gong points out, this observation is lost on nineteenth century international lawyers.118 This relativist theme was recurrent in 16 t h and 17 t h century Europe.1 1 9 Montaigne specifically equates 'savages' with 'barbarians' in "On cannibals." However, we should note that even while Montaigne praises the natives of Brazil, he does by representing them as markedly 'other' - different from Europeans. He says, "there is a special savour and delicacy in some of the uncultivated fruits of those regions that is excellent even to our [corrupt] taste, and rivals our own." 1 2 0 Montaigne represents 'cannibals' as noble savages, who are free from the corruption of decadent society. It is also interesting to note that Montaigne distinguishes the savages of America to the Scythians, the barbarians described in Herodotus, Pliny, and Gibbon's Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire. Montaigne says that the cannibals do not eat the flesh of their enemies "for nourishment as the ancient Scythians did, but as a measure of extreme vengeance."121 Consequently, we see the tension between the discourse of the noble savage and the Scythian barbarian, even at a time when the terms were used all but interchangeably. Further, Montaigne argues that the contemporary corporal punishments popular in France were more barbarous than the cannibals' were. 'Savage' and 'barbaric' customs provide a ground from which to criticize contemporary French customs at which Montaigne was taking aim. 1 1 8 Gong, op cit. p. 8. 1 1 9 Las Casas [1528] cited in Todorov, op cit. p.190-191. 1 2 0 Montaigne, op-cit, p. 109. 1 2 1 Ibid., p.113. 51 Montesquieu's "Persian Letters," first published in 1721 [ten editions in the first year, the precursor to the "Spirit of the Laws"], is an interesting blend of self-critique and projection. By putting his critique of contemporary France in the letters of 'Persians,' Montesquieu the author insulates liimself from dangerous political retribution.122 The "Persian Letters" is representative of the popularity of the 'East,' and of the Oriental stereotypes which were to dominate the European imagination for centuries to come. Montesquieu sketches the different 'essences' of Europe and the 'East:' science v. religion, reason v. mysticism, restraint v. erotic, masculine v. feminine, industrious v. indolent. Montesquieu illustrates the ambivalent relationship of the barbarian to Europe. The barbarians hordes at once encircle and threaten Europe, at the same time the invaders have long-since been seen as a source of innovation, strength, and vigour. He exhorts the Tartar, who he claims "truly dominates the universe [...] in every period of history it has proved its power across the earth, and in every age it has been the scourge of nations."123 The Turk, the barbarian, lurks outside the borders of Europe — the barbarians define Europe's border, and act both as a threat to, and a catalyst for, European civilization. 1 2 4 Descriptions of the 'barbarians' can be mobilized to simultaneously reify Europe's position as superior and criticize its values, mores, and institutions as inferior. Jean-Jacques Rousseau describes the life of the savage in Emile: "Attached to no place, without prescribed task, obeying no one, with no other law than his will, [the Lisa Lowe, Critical Terrains: French and British Orientalisms. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991, p.56. 1 2 3 Montesquieu, Persian Letters. Trans C.J. Betts. London: Penguin, 1993.p. 160, [Ltr. 81], 52 savage] is forced to reason in each action of his life. He does not make a movement, not a step, without having beforehand envisaged the consequences. Thus, the more his body is exercised, the more his mind is enlightened; his strength and his reason grow together and one is extended by the other."125 In fact, Rousseau's work on education can be seen as a 'antidote' to the decadence of French civilization. 1 2 6 Rousseau's Discourse on the Origin of Language reiterates this point. He argues, "Eventually all men become similar, but the order of their progress is different."127 In this essay, Rousseau also repeats the assumption that climate determines character, which becomes a staple of colonial rhetoric. Several dissertations could be written regarding the role of the 'savage' in the Enlightenment. In this section, it will suffice to indicate the wide range of scholarship on the topic.1 2 8 In the mid-nineteenth century, a model of societal development was developed by French and Scottish philosophers.129 The development of a 'four stages' model of the progress of human societies marks a formal distinction between 'savage' and 'barbarous' societies. Societies were placed within a hierarchical taxonomy based on their method of subsistence. 'Savage' societies - which were the most primitive - consisted primarily of 1 2 4 Ibid. p.66. [Ltr. 19] 1 2 5 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile: or On Education. Trans. Allan Bloom. New York: Basic Books, 1979, p. 118. 1 2 6 Should there be any doubt about the sexualized/gendered notion of'civilization,' one need only compare Emile's education with Sophie's. 1 2 7 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "Essay on the Origin of Languages," On the Origin of Language. Trans. John M. Moran and Alexander Gode. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966 [1749], p.46. 1 2 8 See also: V.G. Kiernan, "Noble and Ignoble Savages," Exoticism in the Enlightenment. G.S. Rousseau and Roy Porter eds. New York: Manchester University Press, 1990, pp86-l 16. 1 2 9 Ronald L. Meek, Social Science and the Ignoble Savage. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976, pp. 14-23. 53 hunter-gatherers. 'Barbarian' societies - which were more developed than 'savage' peoples - consisted of shepherds. The third stage of society was the development of agriculture. The final stage of society - which in this case represents a description of European society - is the institution of a commercial, not to say capitalist, market. However, even though other 'civilizations,' such as Arabic, Turkic, Indian, Chinese, Japanese, could each be considered to be as evolved as Europe in this taxonomy, divisions between European and non-European civilizations remained important in popular discourse. In 1750, Montesquieu specifically distinguishes between 'savage' and 'barbarians' in the "Spirit of the Laws." 1 3 0 By 1777, Burke writes: now the Great Map of Mankind is unrolld at once; and there is not state or Gradation of barbarism and no mode of refinement which we have not at the same instant under our View. The very different Civility of Europe and China; The barbarism of Tartary, and of arabia. The Savage State of North America, and of New Zealand.131 This excellent quotation illustrates several important points. First, by this time, it is well established that civilization, barbarism, and savagery represent different stages of societal evolution. Second, it admits China may have status as a civilization, portraying an attitude that was later imbued with European ethnocentrism. However, as Said argues, even when European authors praised the 'East,' they did so within the discursive structure of Orientalism, which implies a power/knowledge structure that does not allow for symbolic equality between East and West.132 Thus, the developmental model of evolution exists in the same discursive space as 16 t h and 17 t h century ideas about the 1 3 0 Ibid., p.33. 1 3 1 P.J. Marshall and Glyndwr Williams, The Great Map of Mankind: British Perceptions of the World in the Age of Enlightenment. Toronto: J.M. Dent & Sons, 1982, p.ii. 1 3 2 Said, 1978, p. 177. 54 'Turk.' The confluence of these two streams of discourse lead to an over-determination of the stereotype of the barbarian. 'Barbarians' are distinguished in a double move - not 'us' (i.e. European), and not 'them' (i.e. savages). The division of humanity corresponds to the central themes in European identity: theology (Christianity vs. monotheism/polytheism vs. animism); judicial structures (rule of law vs. presence vs. absence); governance (democracy vs. despotism vs. familial); civility (European manners vs. clothes vs. nakedness); sexuality (restrained vs. exotic vs. animalistic). For example, this table illustrates some dimensions upon which 'barbarians' are placed in-between 'civilization' and 'savages.' 'Civilized' 'barbarian' 'savage' Christian poly/ monotheistic [abstract] animism rule of law presence of laws absence of rules Democracy despotism familial European manners clothes nakedness Cooked food spicy food [raw] humans as food Adult adolescent childish Masculine feminine • childlike Restrained sexuality exotic sexuality animalistic sexuality Sovereignty indirect rule direct colonial domination high culture low culture nature In making this division, I mean only to delineate my own discussion. The 'savage' - both 'noble' and 'ignoble' - have an important place in the political imaginary of Europe. In particular, the notion of a state of nature - a philosophical and anthropological 'first position' - has played a central role in European thought regarding property and property relations. Vittoria [1527], Hugo Grotius [1625], John Locke [1690] have all used the 'savages' of North America as examples of their theories of 55 property.133 Recent work by Edward Keene has examined the importance of property relations to IR. 1 3 4 However, as I have indicated above, the discourse of'barbarians' is somewhat different. In this project, I will concentrate on 'imperial' or 'colonial' barbarians. Within the European imperial context, 'barbaric' societies were viewed as lacking the conditions of European civilization. 1 3 5 'Barbarians' were both feared and patronized. The presence of 'barbarians' legitimized the rhetoric of the 'civilizing mission.' However, because the barbarians were never fully civilized, imperial rhetoric had to struggle to reconcile the promise and the realities of colonial rule. Because civilization was often taken to mean civility restraint, the lack of restraint made the 'barbarian' both alluring and frightening. Generally, 'barbarians' have referred in a negative way to individuals and societies whose actions and mores do not accord with Europe's. Post-colonial criticism, led by Said, has indicated that even when the East is described positively in relation to the West, the Western source of this description reflects an inherent Orientalism.136 Lisa Lowe's Critical Terrains provides an insightful and important analysis of the multiple, national orientalisms.137 1 3 3 Gong, op cit., p.36; Meeks, op cit. pp. 12-14; Barbara Arneil, John Locke and America: The Defence of English Colonialism. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996, pp.27-31. 1 3 4 Edward G. Keene, D.Phil London School of Economics. "International Theory and Practice in the Seventeenth Century: A New Interpretation of the Significance of the Peace of Westphalia" Presented at ISA 1997. 1 3 5 Gong, op cit., pp. 14-15. 1 3 6 Said, 1978, pp57-5. 1 3 7 Lisa Lowe, Critical Terrains: French and British Orientalisms. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991. 56 English School scholars provide the only major exploration within LR theory of the transition from a European to a global international society in which the civilized/barbarian discourse played a key role. Martin Wight, C.A.W. Manning, and Hedley Bull were each interested in inter-cultural relations, and mentioned barbarians specifically in their theories of world politics. Wight used 'barbarians' as an object of study in order to distinguish what he terms the three traditions of LR theory. Wight specifically described the centrality of 'barbarians' to all international societies: " A l l other states-systems, including the Western in its earlier chapters, have expanded or had to defend themselves against alien pressures. Hence the designation of those outside of the states-systems as 'barbarians.'"138 The identification of a states-system as 'civilized,' for Wight, depends on the existence or construction of 'barbarians.' Wight, Bull , James Mayall, and Adam Watson recognize that 'barbarians' have a significant role to play in international theory. Within Anglo-Saxon realism Wight identifies positive and negative doctrines which justify imperialism, both of which are represented in popular culture: civilization has the absolute right to expand itself, and barbarians have no rights.139 The rationalist school of international theory usually sees barbarians as underdeveloped states, and thus sees imperialism as part of the 'civilizing mission.' 1 4 0 The revolutionist school of international theory views the barbarians as beyond redemption. Wight makes specific reference to Kant, and the limitations of perpetual peace.141 This illustrates a dynamic 1 3 8 Martin Wight, Systems of States. Hedley Bull, ed. London: Leicester University Press, 1977, p.34. 1 3 9 Martin Wight. International Theory: The Three Traditions. Gabriele Wight ed. Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1991, p. 57-63. 1 4 0 Wight, op cit., p.69. 1 4 1 Wight, op cit., p.42. 57 within international theory, and Western thought in general: dialectic between cosmopolitan and communitarian notions of community. Bull and Watson point to this tension in their introduction; "In the European tradition ideas of a universal law of nations or law of nature were contested by doctrines of a fundamental division of humanity between Greeks and barbarians, Christians and infidels, Europeans and non-Europeans."142 Though the division of 'us' and 'them' remains "common to all forms of human interactions," the status of the 'other' is variable.143 Cosmopolitan thinkers view the world as united in its humanity: communitarians view the world as divided naturally into groups. Cosmopolitans, therefore, believe that all can be educated to cosmopolitanism. The communitarian, however, may believe that the outsiders are often irredeemable. Thus, the distinction between 'savage' and 'barbarian' became important as to the degree of assimilation/integration/marginalizationthe colonial subjects could expect from their European masters. The rhetoric of the 'civilizing mission' shows the result of this tension. On the one hand, the civilizing mission is to enlighten and lift up other peoples to the freedom, knowledge, wealth, and security of Europeans. On the other hand, the barbarian was often represented as so beyond redemption that all efforts to improve his condition would be met with frustration, borne out by his inferior status and his resistance to European civilization. In both cases, acculturation was a major aspect of the transition. Whether acculturation made colonized subjects 'better' or merely 'controllable' does not affect the process of cultural imperialism which accompanied the military expansion. This Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, "Introduction," The Expansion of International Society, p.6. 58 dissertation can be seen as adding to the English school's discussion of the expansion of European international society. Examining the interaction between legal and popular discourse, we can study the field of culture from which the international actors and diplomatic practices arose.144 The site of the 'barbarian' in popular culture reveals a number of intersections of cultural, political, and ideological discourses. Barbarians are most often the locus of anxiety. The lack of restraint which barbarians are represented as possessing in sexual, political, and military realms is assumed to endow them with more power than the restraint of the Europeans.145 Whether or not the 'other' of identity structures may be viewed in benign terms, the 'barbarian' is never afford the same rights as 'insiders.'1 4 6 The barbarian always marks the foreign, dangerous, and threatening. Because the term 'barbarian' is such a powerful image or trope, it is revealing to trace the changing groups which are described in popular and academic discourse as barbaric. In the nineteenth century, the term 'barbarian' was first applied to the 'East.' 1 4 7 However, as the Industrial Revolution created an underclass of disenfranchised newly urbanized European peasants, the term was applied to them - reflecting the fears of the middle and upper classes. The European individual also saw the 'barbarian' within, Neumann and Welsh, op cit., p.328. 1 4 4 Pasic, op cit., p.86. 1 4 5 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy and The Genealogy of Morals. Trans. Francis Golffing. New York: Doubleday, 1956, pp. 174-75. 1 4 6 Kristeva describes how Persians became integral to Ancient Greek society while remaining outsiders. Kristeva, op cit., pp. 54-59. 1 4 7 Lewis and Wigen describe admirably how the geographical location of the 'East' or the 'Orient' has shifted over time. Lewis and Wigen, op cit., pp.53-62. 59 represented by Freud's description of the Id. The rhetoric of the barbarian was mobilized during both world wars, by all sides. The term even came to be used by anti-colonial writers to criticise Western imperial governance. The resurgence of the trope of the barbarian in contemporary discourse, to describe Third World populations repeats this imperial mindset and indicates the direction from which the West perceives its chief threat. The civilized/barbarian discourse is a powerful rhetoric, and the use of this discourse in the post-Cold War era is particularly interesting. While it does highlight the continuity of the (post)colonial condition in contemporary politics, it is also being used as a tool of identity politics. Conclusion The aim of this chapter is not to settle the various academic or cultural debates surrounding the terms culture, identity, or the two chief strands of the civilized/barbarian rhetoric. Rather the aim is to situate the key terms in their historical and political context. While "On Barbarians" is influenced by post-structuralist understandings of culture and more recent writings on the construction of identity, that does not preclude an analysis of other, contending definitions of the terms. In sum, I use a definition of identity which represents a post-structural position: identity is taken to be constructed, contested, and reified through practices of representation and performed in specific sociological, historical and political contexts. While primarily constituted by the self/other dualism, the relationship between the self and the other is not simply exclusion or inclusion but involves a continual negotiation of difference and identity. This negotiation takes place at the boundaries of identity and within the sphere of culture. Following this definition, I take culture to represent the field 60 of representations in which dominant and minority discourses constitute, reify, and contest identities. Using the concept of the 'popular international imaginary,' I emphasize the popular over the elite culture in an attempt to redress a general neglect of the popular in the field's analysis. The remainder of this thesis reflects my exploration of the civilized/barbarian rhetoric. The civilized/barbarian discourse was first developed and circulated in the nineteenth century. This period of imperial expansion also corresponds to a change in both international relations and the development of the 'modern' state. As such, it is an appropriate entry into this dissertation. 61 CHAPTER m : T H E L O N G NINETEENTH CENTURY 1789 -1914 In the nineteenth century, "international" questions were understood as taking place either within the context of the European family of nations or between the civilized European states and 'barbaric' others. At times, the 'other' was portrayed as exotic, alluring, superior to the West, or even internal to the West. However, the category 'barbaric' has almost always been portrayed in negative ways, and always defined in relation to, and as the absence of, 'civilization.' Barbarians are always represented in terms of disorder, threat, and danger. The stereotype of the barbarian also freed Europeans from their own standard of 'civilization' in their dealings with them. Because of the latent anxiety about the unrestrained barbarian, Europeans were loosened from the restraints of civilization in dealing with barbarians, and imposing order upon them. By illustrating the unstable boundary of 'civilized' and 'barbaric' behaviour, we see the ambivalence within the discourse. The identity of Europe became tightly bound up with imperial ideologies, and the trope of the barbarian marked an intersection of several of these discourses. In part, the barbarian was represented as an external threat to European civilization. As such, it had the effect of shoring European identity. The barbaric was also represented as an internal threat - the barbaric lower classes, minorities, or inner demons of Europe. Kiernan reports, "There is a story of the Austrian representative saying to the Hungarian, when the Hapsburg empire was transformed into the Dual monarchy in 1867, 'You look after your 62 barbarians, and we'll look after ours' — meaning Czechs, Serbs, and so on."1 The barbarian, whether in the darkest depths of Africa, the darkest depths of Central Europe, or the darkest depths of London, was coded in terms of race, class, and gender. National, European identities in this period cannot be seen either outside of their imperial context, or outside of their socio-political context. Using the lenses of culture and identity, the discourse of the barbarian complicates the domestic/international divide upon which the glossing of imperialism rests, and disrupts the order/anarchy description of these two realms. The lenses of culture and identity can help complicate the domestic/international dichotomy that also obscured imperialism as an exclusively domestic event in IR theory.2 Traditional narratives of the nineteenth century in IR characterize it as "ninety-nine years of general peace in Europe after the Vienna settlements."3 There was a startling lack of Great Power war between the Congress of Vienna (1815) until the First World War. However, i f violence committed in the periphery is taken into account, the century is not nearly as pacific as portrayed. Another frequently held theory about the nineteenth 1 V.G. Kiernan, The Lords Of Human Kind: Black Man. Yellow Man, and White Man in an Age of Empire. New York: Columbia University Press, 1986, p.28. 2 Lapid, op cit, pp.3. 3 1 found similar statements in Holsti, Vasquez, Clark, Goldgeier and McFaul, and Kissinger- to take a variety of scholars with different theoretical allegiances. Ian Clark, The Hierarchy of States: Reform and Resistance in the International Order. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, pp. 124-125; Goldgeier and McFaul, op cit., p.474-475; K.J. Holsti, "Governance without Government: Polyarchy in Nineteenth Century European International Politics," Governance without Government. James Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel eds. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, p.49; Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy. London: Simon and Schuster, 1994, p.79; John A. Vasquez, The War Puzzle. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p.272. 63 century is that violence in the imperial periphery allowed European conflicts to take place outside of Europe.4 The beginning of the nineteenth century saw the inauguration of several social and ideological trends that fundamentally changed the fabric of European international society. The French revolution developed and spread the political ideals of liberty, equality, and fraternity. The industrial revolution gave rise to the globalization of capitalism, accompanied by a series of technological revolutions which made the world physically more accessible to Europeans.5 And, finally, European international society expanded its influence to encompass the globe. Traditional portrayals of this period in international relations theory focus on the peace within Europe between 1814-1914, and the ability of the Concert of Europe to prevent the outbreak of Great Power, war.6 This peace is explained in classical terms, either as the triumph of balance of power dynamics or the growth of liberal interdependence. Hedley Bull and Adam Watson remind us that: Nor should it be overlooked that the European states, as they evolved this non-hegemonic system in their relations with one another, at the same time established a number of empires which, while they were rival and competing, taken together amounted to a European hegemony over the rest of the world, which in the nineteenth century became an immense periphery looking to a European centre.7 4 Adam Watson, "European International Society and Its Expansion," Expansion of International Society, p.30. 5 Daniel R.Headrick, The Tools of Empire : Technology and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century. New York: Oxford University Press, 1981, p.83. 6 Adam Watson, The Evolution of International Society. A comparative historical analysis. New York: Routledge, 1992; K.J.Holsti, "Polyarchy in the Nineteenth Century Europe," Governance without Government, pp.48-50. 7Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, "Introduction," Expansion of International Society Hedley Bull and Adam Watson eds. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984, p.6 64 A global history, which accounts for European expansion outside of Europe, reflects a much less pacific century.8 In the course of this expansion, Europe marked its boundaries in encounters with cultural and racial others: civilized inside, barbarians outside. This boundary both defined and fortified European identity.9 Gerrit Gong concurs, "the standard of 'civilization' helped define the internal identity and external boundaries of the nineteenth century's dominant international society."10 By looking at the barbarian as the marker of 'civilization' and Europe, I hope to introduce an additional, colonial, perspective of the nineteenth century to International Relations, and illustrate the utility of culture and identity as lenses for understanding international relations. This chapter will explore four prominent sites of the 'civilized/barbarian' discourse. First, I will look at the connection between violence and imperial order, an important aspect of imperialism that is usually overlooked in IR representations of this era. Second, I will trace the portrayal of the stereotype of the barbarian. Because the barbarian is described as dangerous, Europe attempted to impose a "visual order" on their colonies. By 'visual order' I mean the mode of governance was structured along lines of site and according to a geometric systemization of power. Mitchell describes this order as "visible, and thinkable, only as a sense of geometric lines, the equal intervals, Marc Ferro, Colonization: A Global History. Trans. K.D. Prithipaul. New York: Routledge, 1997, (Orig. French 1994). 9 John Agnew and Stuart Corbridge, Mastering Space: Hegemony. Territory, and International Political Economy. New York: Routledge, 1995, p.56. 1 0 Gong, op cit., p.238. 65 the regulated movements of a system of order."11 I will look at the visual order in the practices of imperialism, and trace their path back to the imperial centre: specifically, the so-called exhibitionary order and surveillance. Third, in conjunction with this visual order is a common appeal to demography and population. Fourth, I will look at the linkage made between race, class, and gender in the imperial order.12 Not only are these three discourses interconnected in the nineteenth century, but also the connections explain the distinctions and comparisons made between internal and external barbarians. This section will focus on popular media — notably travelogues and the great exhibitions of the mid- to late-nineteenth century. Popular culture was especially important because, in the nineteenth century, "imperialism [became] a public phenomenon —- which was not the case with expansion in the preceding centuries" - a move which was shored up by increasing literacy and state-sponsored education.13 These representations of the barbarian international realm shaped the imaginary of European publics, which in turn supported imperial violence. The discourse of civilization/barbarians persists in the popular international imagination, and its imperial roots are essential to the understanding of its later permutations. uTimothy Mitchell, Colonising Egypt. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988, p.82. 1 2 There is a rich literature on gender and sexuality in the colonial scene. In this project, I will be using the works of Stoler, McClintock, Doty, and Darby primarily. These scholars represent the cutting-edge of research which intersects International Relations but does not represent the entire field of study. 1 3 Ferro, op cit., p. 14. Philosophical Context At nineteenth century, philosophers, anthropologists, biologists, geologists, and other thinkers began to look at the non-European world as an object of study, not as fantasy or as a vehicle for self-criticism.14 International lawyers, or publicans, had investigated the question of territory, property, and sovereignty since the seventeenth century.15 Jean-Jacques Rousseau and John Locke both used colonial experiences of civilization and property to ground their theories of European society.16 Other thinkers, from a Christian or cosmopolitan perspective, also attempted to undermine imperial rhetoric. A group of specifically anti-colonial or anti-imperial thinkers challenged the prevailing ideology. Karl Marx, J. A. Hobson, and V.I. Lenin attempted to undermine the imperial ideology on economic grounds.18 Economic justifications of expansion had long been central to the imperial ideology. However, in the latter-eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, there was a move from independent trading companies with royal charters to state-sponsored colonialism. Economic advantage was also coupled with the 'civilizing mission,' as Kiernan argues, "[In the nineteenth century] there was again a feeling that expansion ought to have some ideal purpose, a goal beyond sordid greed which came to be expressed in the phrase Harbsmeier, op cit., p.78. 1 5 See Vattel, 'Occupation of Territory,' Imperialism. Philip Curtin ed. New York: Harper and Row, 1971, p.25. 1 6 John Locke, "An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent and End of Civil Government," Treatise of Civil Government and A Letter Concerning Toleration. Charles L. Sherman ed. New York: Appleon-Century-Crofts, 1937 (1688), p.20. 1 7 W E B . du Bois, "To the Nations of the World," W E B , du Bois: A Reader. David Levering Lewis ed. New York: Holt and Company, 1995, pp.639-641; Olson and Groom, op cit., pp.39-42. 'civilizing mission.' Backward lands would be given civilization, in return for the products wanted by Europe."1 9 While economic imperatives were certainly central to European expansion, I will focus in this project on the ideological/ imaginary foundations of the project - the 'master dichotomy' of self/other, civilized/barbarian that supported imperialism. Nineteenth century imperialist ideology was over-determined, meaning that it was situated at the intersection of a number of discourses: racial theories, social Darwinist theories of evolution, economic understandings of imperialism, religious ideas about salvation, and liberal theories of education. These ideas framed the 'civilizing mission' which was the central justification for imperialism. Ashis Nandy argues that, in fact; "colonialism minus a civilizational mission is no colonialism at a l l . " 2 0 This 'civilizing mission' became the touchstone for much imperial activity, but how was this 'civilizing mission' framed? G.W.F. Hegel's lectures on world history and the geographical bases of history are essential to understanding nineteenth century European ideas about the larger world. Hegel argues "The History of the World travels from East to West, for Europe is absolutely the end of History, Asia the beginning."21 A consequence of this geopolitical vision, which was adopted by populace and elite alike, is that Africa is absent from J.A. Hobson, Imperialism: A Study. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1965; William C. Olson and A.J.R. Groom, International Relations Then and Now: Origins and Trends in Interpretation. London: HarperCollins, 1991, pp.38-9. 19Kiernan, 1986, p.23. 2 0 Ashis Nandy, The Intimate Enemy: Loss and Recovery of Self under Colonialism. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1983, p.11. History. Shiraz Dossa argues, "in this grand design of European Reason, [history-less] nations have neither rights nor duties, in fact Hegel characterizes them as 'barbarian' nations." Hegel speaks specifically about Africa: "Africa proper, as far as History goes back, has remained — for all purposes of connection with the rest of the World — shut up; it is the Gold-land compressed within itself — the land of childhood, which lying beyond the day of self-conscious history, [it is] enveloped in the dark mantle of Night." These themes of light and darkness, progress and maturity, historical and history-less, resonated within imperialist ideology for the remainder of the century. Hegel's portrayal of peoples and nations devoid of history legitimated the 'civilizing mission' of the European countries whose superiority was transformed into duty. Hegel's deterministic connection between History and geography shaped the study of IR in the nineteenth century. Dossa contends that Hegel's representations endure in the contemporary IR imaginary: "the Third World was intellectually apprehended and appropriated as weak, chaotic, and primitive; it was assimilated into the European consciousness and practice as a cluster of inferior, exotic cultures right from the start."24 Edward Said provides a cultural perspective to the study of imperialism, from which this study draws: We may thus consider imperialism as a process occurring as part of the metropolitan culture, which at times acknowledges, at other times obscures the sustained business of the empire itself. The important point is how the national 2 1 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Philosophy of History. Trans. J. Sibree, New York: Dover Publications, 1956, p. 103. 2 2 Dossa, op cit. p. 100 2 3 Hegel, op cit. p.91. 2 4 Ibid., p.95. 69 British, French and American cultures maintained hegemony over the peripheries. How within them was consent gained and continuously consolidated for the 25 distant rule of native peoples and territories. This perspective on imperialism, as a cultural and political process, shifts our focus away from elite or Marxist perceptions of the economic expansion of proto-multi-national-corporations or the power balancing among the Great Powers, and towards popular support of imperial ideologies. Roxanne Lynn Doty grounds her important exploration of imperial encounters on the observation that "the question of representation 26 has historically been excluded from the academic study of international relations." As argued above, identity is structured by representation. Doty studies culture as a field of representation. She examines how the imperial power imbalance came to be represented and reinforced in popular discourse.27 The "popular international imaginary" shaped national responses to international stimuli. 2 8 The specific representation of the 'other' as barbaric has specific political effects in the nineteenth century which lay bare the knowledge-power dynamics of imperialism. Egypt This section draws examples from English and French sources on Egypt, although other Anglo-French colonies will also be used.29 Lucie Duff Gordon wrote in 1863: "This country is a palimpsest, in which the Bible is written over Herodotus, and the 2 5 Said, 1993, p.51. 2 6 Doty, 1996a, p.4. 2 7 Ibid., p.8. 2 8 Bloom, op cit, p.80. 2 9 Neumann's recent work provides a brilliant exploration of the interaction between the Ottoman Empire - which also figured largely in Europe's international imaginary. See Neumann, 1999, pp.39-63. 70 Koran over that." And Europe came to be written over that history. Egypt is also important because France and England, the two largest colonial powers of the period, both took considerable interest in Egypt, partially because of its geopolitical position but also because of its resources and economy. Said argues: Most historians [who] speak of empire speak of the 'age of empire' as formally beginning around 1878, with the 'scramble for Africa.' A close look at the cultural actuality reveals a much earlier, more deeply and stubbornly held view about overseas European hegemony; we can locate a coherent, fully mobilized system of ideas near the end of the eighteenth century, and there follows the set of integral developments such as the first great systematic conquests under Napoleon, the rise of nationalism and the European nation-state, and the advent of large-scale industrialization, and the consolidation of the power of the bourgeoisie.31 Napoleon's invasion of 1798 is canonically accepted as the inaugural moment of Orientalism as an academic discipline, and the modern European fascination with the Orient. Alice Conklin states: "in Egypt... the mission was defined - in Napoleon's own. words - as one of emancipation and 'civilization.' This idea was manifest in Napoleon's decision to set off from France not only with troops, but with all the scientific and cultural apparatus for which the expedition is deservedly famous - an apparatus that the French had not deemed necessary for any European state they had conquered."33 Said j U Anthony Sattin, Lifting the Veil: British Society in Egypt 1768-1956. London: J.M.Dent, 1988, p.3. 3 1 Said, 1993, p.58. 3 2 Europe, of course, has had a long-standing fascination with the Orient. Clarke traces the centrality of Oriental ideas and philosophy in the European tradition. J.J. Clarke, Oriental Enlightenment: The Encounter Between Asian and Western Thought. New York: Routledge, 1997. 3 3 Alice L. Conklin, A Mission to Civilize: The Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa. 1895-1930. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997, p. 17. 71 argues, "the [French] occupation gave birth to the entire modern experience of the Orient as interpreted from within the universe of discourse founded by Napoleon in Egypt." 3 4 As several critics have pointed out, Said represents Orientalism as a monolithic academic discourse, which is uncontested and homogenous.35 However, English and French experiences, and English and French orientalisms, are not identical. The differences are the subject of an important work by Lisa Lowe, Critical Terrains.36 She points out that Orientalist discourse changed over time, and is better understood as a multiplicitous discourse which participated in any number of ideological and material struggles.37 For the purpose of this project, however, there remain enough discursive similarities between French and British stereotypes of the 'barbarian' to make this study viable.3 8 The extent to which Egypt emerged into the European imagination is further shown by the attention that Hegel devotes to it. In the Philosophy of History lectures given in 1823, Hegel argued "The Empire of the solitary Nile is only present beneath the ground, in its speechless Dead ... in their majestic habitations; — for what remains above ground 39 is nothing else but splendid tombs." Africa is the continent without History. Asia the continent of History past. Europe is the end of History. Egypt is the fulcrum of the passage of History. Mindful of this notion, the Khedive Ismail announced with the 3 4 Edward W. Said. Orientalism. New York: Random House, 1978, p.87 3 5 Said, 1993, p.98 3 6 Lisa Lowe, Critical Terrains: French and British Orientalisms. Jthica: Cornell University Press, 1991, p.8 3 7 Lowe, op cit. p.ix-xi. 3 8 Nuemann and Welsh, op cit. p.348. 3 9 Hegel, op cit. p. 115. 72 opening of the Suez Canal, "Egypt is henceforth part of Europe, not Africa." 4 0 However, as with all colonial mimicry, it never quite succeeded. V . G . Kiernan argues "Egypt was the theatre of a thorough-going experiment, the first in all the East, in Westernization by decree... There was much debate among foreigners, sharpened by rival interests, as to whether the new Egypt was a bona fide imitation of Europe, or a grotesque travesty of it." 4 1 Huntington will later refer to the tension of a Westernized elite and non-Western populace as a 'torn' country. This early westernization may also give insight into the post-independence dilemma of post-colonial states in the 1960s. Egypt's vicinity to Europe made it accessible, while remaining strange, exotic, and Oriental. Napoleon's invasion was well documented, and became a point of national pride. The British expedition effectively made Egypt an autonomous province of the Ottoman Empire. The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 made Egypt the pivot to India. The occupation in 1882 was coincident with British expansion in Africa. The Suez crisis of 1956 was a catalyst for the first peacekeeping mission of the United Nations. Even with the recent terrorist attacks, Egypt remains present in Europe's imagination, outside and yet familiar; a "land of ruins" which presages the future.42 The concept of 'barbarian' grows to its maturity in Egypt. The European boundary in Egypt is written in racial, class-based, gendered, geographical, and cultural terms — embodied in the image of the barbarian. The chief characteristic of the barbarian stereotype is his propensity for irrational violence, which the Europeans both feared and respected. Arthur Goldschmidt, Jr, Modern Egypt: The Formation of a Nation-State. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1988, p.29. 4 1 Kiernan, op.cit. p.118. 73 Maxims and the Maxim Gun: Violence and the Imperial Order The violence inherent in the colonial project undermines some traditional LR narratives of a pacific nineteenth century. Violence was not only present in the conquest of colonial territories, but also manifest in those already-conquered territories. Political leaders have long been able to refer to palpable threats in the immediate international environment to justify violence in the domestic societies of Europe.4 3 However, a different representation of threat was needed to legitimate war with one's own colonial subjects. There was a pressing need to explain the long, drawn-out resistance to the light of civilization, such as the British defeat in Sudan, the Boer War, the Indian Mutiny, or the Algerian Civi l War and unrest in Indochina. The extent to which imperialism was viewed as continual warfare, either expansive or defensive, is evidenced by the fact that the British government had a single department for the Colonies and War from 1794 to 1854.44 The barbarian stereotype was represented as not merely ignorant of civilization but also as antagonistic and destructive towards it. One of the chief benefits of 'civilization' and imperial rule was the supposed elimination of violence in everyday society — which lies at the root of the discourse of civilization — the principle of civility. 4 5 Kiernan argues, "To be bringing order our of such chaos could be regarded as justification enough for British conquest, i f any were asked for; Order was from first to last the grand imperial 4 2 Robert D. Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy," Atlantic Monthly. 274,2. Feb, 1994, p.54. 4 3 Ashley, op cit. pp.420-422. 4 4 T.O. Lloyd, The British Empire 1558-1995. 2nd ed. Oxford:Oxford UniversityPress, 1996, p. 114-5. 74 watchword" 4 6 In French colonies also, "French imperial ideology consistently identified civilization with one principle more than any other: mastery. Master not of other peoples - although ironically this would become one of civilization's prerogatives in the age of democracy; rather, master of nature, including the human body, and master of what can be called 'social behaviour.'"47 Civi l peace, the hallmark of imperial rule was continually contested by the oppressed and thus necessitated constant policing. It is this unstable balance which I want to highlight here. Within the discourse of imperialism, there is a tension between the violence that was necessary to justify imperial rule and the f omnipresent threat of violence implicit in imperial governance. The image of the barbarian illustrates this tension clearly. Barbarians were, by nature, violent and irrational. Imperial rule, though violent itself, was rational and justified by the 'civilizing mission.' Massacres committed by 'natives' were portrayed as barbaric. Massacres committed by imperial rulers were portrayed as regrettable, but in the final account necessary. Novelists, amongst others in the nineteenth century, popularized the contrast between the violent 'barbaric' violence and 'civilized' violence.48 Conrad's Heart of Darkness shows the limit of this distinction: Kurtz, the pride of Europe, ends his report with the infamous command to "Exterminate the brutes."49 The discourse of civilization represents an attempt to stabilize this tension, through representations of the barbarian. If the 'civilized' administrator and the Gong, op cit. p. 14-5. The rule of law was a requirement of the standard of 'civilization,' and in its original French, civilization was used to describe the condition of civil law in contrast to lawlessness. 4 6 Kiernan, op cit. p.33. 4 7 Conklin, op cit. p.5-6. 4 8 Darby, 1998, p.25. 75 barbarian were inherently different, then their violence could have different values.50 Indeed, that tension was present from the beginning. Kiernan argues that while British and French armies began under the sign of 'civilization,' the European also learned barbarism.51 "If conquest was doing something to civilize the outer world, it was also doing something to barbarize Europe... One sinister omen was a recrudescence in Europe of police torture, whose taproots in colonial warfare and repression can scarcely be missed."52 This ambivalence, uncertainty, and insecurity was characteristic of the colonial experience. Homi Bhabha's postcolonial theory has usefully explored this ambivalence to provide a more nuanced [if dense] understanding of the material and 53 psychic conditions of colonialism. The insecurity was expressed in terms of the stereotype of the barbarian: the threat of violence, indolence, and sexual/racial mingling. The barbarian was seen as a threat not only to order, but also to the regimes of capitalism and race. Stoler details the regimens of hygiene and manners that were put in place to prevent Englishmen and English women from 'going native' in India.5 4 In another study, she also details how racial (im)purity Joseph Conrad, The Heart of Darkness. Toronto :Bantam Books, 1969 [1910], 5 0 During decolonization this ambiguity would be exploited to resist imperialism — citing that the violence necessary to the rule of the colonies was in itself barbaric. (Cesaire, 1972 , p.59.) 5 1 Kiernan, op cit. p.216-7. 5 2 V.G. Kiernan, Colonial Empires and Armies. 1815-1960. Kingston: McGill Queen's, 1998, p.178. 5 3 Homi K. Bhabha, "Of Mimicry and Man: The ambivalence of colonial discourse," The Location of Culture. New York: Routledge, 1994, p. 86. 5 4 Ann Laura Stoler, "Rethinking Colonial Categories: European Communities and the Boundaries of Rule," Colonialism and Culture. Nicholas B. Dirks ed. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992, p.321. 76 became a barrier to Dutch citizenship, colonial government posts, and inheritance.55 The same point is made, although through the literary portrayal of the social restrictions of colonial life in Orwell's Burmese Days, E . M . Forster's Passage to India, and Graham Greene's Heart of the Matter. Barbarism was also seen as a threat to the European, either as the administrator-gone-native or as the barbaric lower classes who were portrayed in racial terms. However, through policing, regulation, and surveillance, the colonies were constructed as special, intermediate zones of controllable violence, where order could be imposed — however tenuously — by a more civilized culture. The traditional narrative of international theory and the realities of colonial rule seem to be at odds. At the very moment of a consolidation of a European identity, colonies were more violent than 'anarchic' European international space. Even when the European rule in the colonies was 'secure,' the threat of violence was omnipresent.56 Ronald Hyam cites an anonymous writer in 1898; "there was no power in the hands of those that governed India or Africa ... to resist a general effort of the population to throw the white races out. In such a situation the only course was 'to rule, as completely and with as little repentance, as if we were angels appointed to that task.'"57 This general fear of war, or the threat of war, necessitated constant 58 preparedness. This anxiety was a result of the 'barbarity' of the colonial subjects, a point to which I will return later in the dissertation. Traditional IR explanations of Ann Laura Stoler, Race and the Education of Desire: Foucault's History of Sexuality and the Colonial Order of Things. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1995, p. 108. 5 6 Kiernan, 1998, p i l l . 5 7 Ronald Hyam, Britain's Imperial Century. 1815-1914: A Study of Empire and Expansion. London: Macmillan, 1993, p.301. international anarchy map well onto descriptions of imperial rule. Citing Hobbes, Kenneth Waltz sets out that anarchy is not only the actual state of war between units, but "with each state deciding for itself whether or not to use force, war may break out at any time." 5 9 International Relations traditionally distinguishes between the anarchy of the international and the peace of the domestic.60 I would suggest that in the context of nineteenth century Europe the divide between international anarchy and imperial 'peace' is even more problematic. Between the Great Powers, there was exceedingly little conflict between 1814-1914.61 As a consequence, the balance of power system embodied in the Concert of Europe is hailed with keeping the peace.62 This is not to deny that some European conflicts were violent or barbaric in themselves. It is only to argue that LR neglects to portray imperialism as a violent process or colonial governance as institutionalized violence. It also downplays the 'anarchical' condition of European rule in the colonies. While there was not continual violence in the colonies, there was certainly the continual threat of violence. Colonial rule was never absolute; imperial security was always uncertain. Imperial governments were always preparing for war against their native subjects, in addition to preparing for war against other European ™ Lloyd, op cit. p. 178. 5 9 Kenneth N. Waltz, "Anarchic Orders and Balances of Power," Neorealism and Its Critics. Robert O. Keohane ed. New York:Columbia University Press, 1986, p.98. 6 0 Jackson has shown how problematic this description is in the post-colonial world. Robert H. Jackson, "Quasi-states, dual regimes and neoclassical theory: International Jurisprudence and the Third World." International Organization. 41,4. 1987, pp.526-28. 6IHolsti, 1991. 6 2 Gregory F. Trevorton. "Finding an Analogy for Tomorrow." Orbis. 37,1. 1993; Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security and the Future of Europe," International Security. 16,1, 1991, p 115. 78 states. Of course, the threat of violence of the international realm and the threat of violence in the colonial realm are not identical, but certain parallels are compelling. There are two relevant aspects to imperialist strategy in the nineteenth century: the acquisition of 'new' territory, and the control of occupied territory. The acquisition of 'new' territory was seen as an entirely European game, regulated by European rules and played out in non-Western space. Gong argues the practice of bothering at all to create international legal agreements with "uncivilized" countries was justified as necessary to maintain law and order in the "civilized" international society ... when a 'civilized' power makes a legal agreement concerning "uncivilized" peoples, its title is an affair between the 63 occupying European state and the rest of the "civilized" states of the world. The Berlin Conference of 1884-85 is emblematic of this structure, though the Brussels Conference of 1889-90 and the League of Nations Mandate system continued it. 6 4 The European powers convened in Berlin to divide Africa in order to prevent conflict among them, which reversed nearly two centuries of viewing the space beyond Europe as entirely war-ridden.65 Watson mistakenly infers a "remarkable achievement" from a lack of European war to indicate of a lack of war generally in the nineteenth century.66 In fact, Watson ignores colonial violence in what we now recognize as wars of a 'third kind. ' 6 7 The 'remarkable achievement' of the reduction of intra-European war b i Gong, 1984. p.58 6 4 Hedley Bull, "European States and African Political Communities," The Expansion of International Society. 6 5 Lloyd, op cit. p.4 6 6 Adam Watson, "European International Society and Its Expansion," The Expansion of International Society, p. 30. 6 7 K.J. Holsti, The State. War, and the State of War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p.21. 79 was predicated on the externalization of violence to the non-European world. With the inclusion of colonial wars, the record of the nineteenth century becomes far less peaceful. The legal norms surrounding 'civilized' warfare did not apply in the barbarian, non-European world. The mobilization of the civilized/barbarian discourse makes the difference between European and colonial wars clear. Jurgen Osterhammel argues, "colonial wars were viewed as wars to spread 'civilization' to adversaries who were said to lack civilized rules of conduct...Methods of warfare that in Europe were morally and legally barred were considered legitimate in the face of an enemy who did not seem to subscribe to the same cultural code."68 Kiernan concurs, Europe was fond of parading its concept of "civilized warfare," but in contests overseas it was "scientific warfare" that was being talked of more and more... As conquest quickened, a book on it would introduce Africa as a continent delivered from native barbarism by breech-loaders, Maxims, etc... and go on to hail any mass slaughter by the latest weapon as a "deadly blow dealt at barbarism; a triumph gained for humanity and civilization." Civilization drove forward in a 69 mortuary cart. The notorious Maxim gun or dumdum bullet or the French Coloniale bomber, developed specifically for colonial use, were technologies considered too horrific to use on Europeans.70 This, of course, was to prove a major aspect of the disillusionment brought about by the First World War. There are many examples of the 'uncivilized' behaviour of European troops in the colonies. Two notable incidents indicate the 'barbarity' of Europeans: the asphyxiation of over 500 men, women, children in the Jurgen Osterhammel, Colonialism. A Theoretical Overview. Trans. Shelley L. Frisch. Princeton: Markus Wiener, 1997 (German 1995), p.44. 6 9 Kiernan, 1998, pp.155-65. 7 0 Chris Hables Gray, Postmodern War:.The New Politics of Conflict. New York: Guilford Press, 1997, p.131; Headrick, op cit., pp.102-03. 80 Dahra caves by Pelissier in 1845,71 and the massacre, and subsequent desecration, of the Sudanese Madhi and his forces, who had slaughtered Gordon of Khartoum From both the colonized and colonizer points of view, the threat in the colonies was dispersed and continual: the colonized feared state and extra-governmental violence as the colonizers feared uprising and rebellion. Michael Mann explores the extent to which militarism was a part of the civil society in the European colonies. In the colonies, there was not a 'governmental' monopoly on the legitimate use of force. He argues, "most atrocities were committed in a series of irregular, decentralised waves organised in paramilitary forms by vigilante or volunteer units of the local [white] population itself, with states turning a blind eye or with its local agents complicit because they too belonged to 'White' civil society."72 War in the colonies substituted the 'civilizing mission' for raison d'etat, which liberated Europeans from the restraints of the rules of 'civilized' warfare. And so, warfare in the non-European world became far more 'barbaric' than 'civilized' warfare within Europe. The expansion of European society was not a uniform or uncontested process. The resistance of indigenous peoples to European domination continues to this day, and that uneven expansion determined the political culture of much of the globe. This violent history, though it may have been legalistically domestic to each of the European empires, resonates in the international imaginary of the Third World. The prosecution of colonial 7 1 Kiernan, 1998, p.163. 7 2 Michael Mann, "Authoritarian and Liberal Militarism: A Contribution from Comparative and Historical Sociology," International Theory: Positivism and Beyond, p.234-35. 7 3 Gong, op cit. p.247; Shapiro, 1997, pp. 1-16. 81 wars entailed innumerable slaughters, and speaks to the power of beliefs in international relations. The violence, however, did not end with the acquisition of territory. The uncertain rule of the colonies made violence and the threat of violence an integral part of European imperial relations. However, the rule of colonies took place with a different tenor than European governance. The control of conquered territories was different, i f only because the legitimacy that the European state had fostered domestically was uncertain in the colonies. In India, "The British [saw] themselves as a garrison in a country which could still explode into disorder and revert to the civil war of the eighteenth century if their central power was removed."74 In Algeria, the French rarely achieved complete control of the territory they claimed. In Egypt, passports and model villages were used to attempt to monitor and control the colonial population.75 Order was the goal of colonial rule, but constant policing was required because its application was so incomplete. The image of the barbarian helped resolve this paradox; the barbarian could only be partially tamed and educated, but racially he was still closer to savage than the European. The colonizer was, then, constantly on his guard from insurrection, and degradation. This siege mentality would persist until independence, and lead to methods of control, which were later exported back into the European metropolis. This connection between order and violence is also seen in the connection of scientific and military operations in the empire. The projects of Orientalism as an Lloyd, op cit. p. 178. Mitchell, 1988, p.82. 82 academic discipline and imperialism as a political practice were intertwined; just as violence and order were intertwined. Some of the first descriptions of Egypt came from Napoleon's invasion and the Institute de Kaire that he founded. Marc Ferro argues, "Bonaparte's expedition to Egypt represents the change from one type of expansion to another. Bonaparte wanted to show that he was landing with an army which represented 76 civilization.'" Denon published his Travels in Upper and Lower Egypt in 1803, which preceded the larger, twenty-three-volume work of the Institute by several years (1809-1823). The Descriptions de L'Egypte heralded a new era of 'authenticity' about the East, rather than fantasy. However, it should be noted that the illustrations of Egyptian monuments are all but devoid of 'real' Egyptians and resemble empty theatrical stages waiting for European players. The extent to which early writers were complicit in military and governmental structures is striking. In the preface, Vivant Denon writes how his position as observer was often forgotten in the heat of battle. Being aware that the aim of my travels was to visit the monuments of Upper Egypt, [Napoleon] sent me with the division which was to achieve the conquest of that territory... In short, I made so truly a part of the battalion it formed, and within which I had in a manner taken up my abode, that I was frequently in the heat of action without recollecting myself, and without reflecting that war was foreign to my avocations.78 In fact, war was not foreign to the Orientalist. The British, in their expedition to liberate Egypt from the French, were quick to publish their own account of Egypt. Thomas Walsh snidely remarks on the relative security of his own position as observer in relation to Denon. Ferro, p.66. Said, 1993, p. 118-19. 83 The work is accompanied by forty-one plates, including upwards of fifty subjects, most of them Drawing made by the Author with the utmost attention to correctness. Taken in perfect security, and with all the necessary deliberation; they are, at least, not the hasty sketches of a solitary traveler, who holds pencil with a trembling hand , : ' 7 9 This fear for personal safety resonated for the length of colonial occupation, as did the connection between Orientalism and colonial rule. The threat of violence was also implicated in several other realms of European colonial life: sexual threat, indolence, racial mixing, and cultural contamination. The threat of disorder was also seen as the threat of cultural contamination, and consequently a threat to European identity. Insecurity and disorder were conditions of colonial rule. The relationship of order to disorder in the colonies is not a straightforward presence/absence dichotomy, but is similar to the IR formulation of anarchy as the threat of war. Disorder is not solely the absence of order, just as peace is not solely the absence of violence. Disorder is the state of being threatened with disrupted order. As such, order is not a transitory condition, but a structure that regulates expectations and behavior. The imperial threat of violence and disorder was not the fear of specific instances, but that perpetual fear of uprising which stemmed from the colonizer's tenuous physical position.80 Conklin argues that the 'civilizing mission' was instrumental in dealing with this problem: Vivant Denon, Travels in Upper and Lower Egypt. Vol. I-III. Trans. Alan Aikin, New York: Arno Press, 1973, [First English Translation 1803], [Preface] p.iii-iv. 7 9 Thomas Walsh. Journal of the Late Campaign in Egypt: including descriptions of that country. London. Hansard, 1803. [Republished by Gregg Int'l Publishers, Weastmead, England, 1972], [Preface] p.vii. 8 0 Lowe, op cit. p.78. Administrators - vastly outnumbered, and equipped with little more than their prejudices - relied upon the familiar categories of'civilization' and its inevitable opposite, 'barbarism,' to justify and maintain their hegemony overseas. These categories served to structure how officials thought about themselves as rulers and the people whom they ruled, with complex and often contradictory consequences for French colonial policy - and French republican identity - in the twentieth century.81 Disorder, like the threat of violence, was a condition of imperial rule. I have suggested in this section that the problem of violence in the imperial order complicates the domestic/international divide with its descriptions of order and anarchy, and that violence was implicit in Europe rule. In the next section, I will look at one of the primary ways in which French and English rulers in the empire attempted, never completely successfully, to maintain order through the application of surveillance and visual order to the barbarians, and eventually, to the civilized as well. I spy, I spy, with my little eye: Visuaiity and the Imperial Order Regimes of governance in the nineteenth century took a decidedly visual turn, but which I mean that seeing was believing, and the structure of space to enable seeing became a central motif of the nineteenth century. The application of visuaiity as a principle of colonial rule helps make clear the relationship between cultural practices and political power. The primary mechanism that England and France used to combat the uncertainty of colonial rule and the constant threat of violence was an economy of space structured around the principle of surveillance. This shift can be seen in through two themes, demography and surveillance. 1 Conklin, op cit. p.2. 85 The modern state was developed in conjunction with, and was partially a function of, mechanisms of surveillance. A surveillance regime has the goal of the policing action of the state internalizing in the mind of the citizen. Crime is conceptually linked to punishment, and thus state governance becomes centered on deterrence rather than punishment. Foucault charts this development: When you have thus formed the chain of ideas in the heads of your citizens, you will then be able to pride yourselves on guiding them and being their masters. ... a true politician binds [his slaves] by the chain of their own ideas... on the soft fibers of the brain is founded the unshakable base of the soundest Empires.8 2 Surveillance entails the ordering of social space along the lines of authoritative sight, as seats bolted to face the lecturer in a classroom. This policing through a visual ordering of bodies on a Cartesian plane is illustrated in Foucault's exemplary institution the panopticon. Jeremy Bentham designed the panopticon to be the perfection of surveillance. The institution, which can be used for prisons, schools, or factories, applies utilitarian principles of maximization of utility to lines of sight. The surveyed are arrayed in perfectly transparent cells, displayed before an obscured guard in an opaque tower. Bentham argues that the power of the panopticon is in the indeterminacy of the observer: since the observed never know when they are watched, they will assume that they are always watched. Thus, surveillance can be understood as an economy of power, the end result of which is self-policing. Foucault states "the perfection of power should tend to render its actual exercise unnecessary... hence the major effect of the Panopticon: to induce in the inmate a sense of consciousness and permanent visibility that assures the Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. Trans. Alan Sheridan. New York: Vintage, 1977, p. 102-3. 86 R3 automatic functioning of power." The panoptic principle was generalized to society as a rule, creating what Foucault terms the disciplinary society,84 This metaphor has clear applications to the models of balance of power in international relations, wherein Great Power regulation becomes self-regulation in the context of international institutions and globalization. The concept of 'discipline' also supplements theories of deterrence which rely on intent and rationality,85 For the moment, I will concentrate on the application of this surveillance regime to the colonies, and to European, imperial metropolises. The genealogy of the panopticon is particularly interesting, with respect to v imperialism. Bentham's brother first discovered a panoptic institution in the Ottoman Empire. 8 6 It is ironic that the architectural configuration, which epitomized European power for Foucault, was found in the Sultan's Palace of Justice.87 Further, panoptic institutions were most often constructed in the colonies. Colonial power used this economy of power through lines of sight and the ordering of space to make the natives police themselves. It was an extension of European modes of dealing with the poor, the insane, the perverse, and the criminal, to the colonial races. The strangeness of the Orient was refracted through this prism of perspective and order. Part of what distinguished barbarous from civilized spheres was the visual disorder that presented itself to Europeans. This theme of visuaiity is reinforced by what 8 3 Ibid, p.201. 8 4 Ibid, p.212-15. 8 5 Thomas C. Shelling, The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963, pp.9-13. 8 6 Mitchell, 1988, p.35. 87 Timothy Mitchell terms the "exhibitionary order:" the presentation of the world through pictures, artifacts, tours, and world exhibitions in ways that naturalize structures of surveillance. Foucault himself did not trace this principle to the colonies,88 but Mitchell has applied this framework to Egypt.8 9 The disorder of the colonies was seen as further justification for imperial rule, and Europeans imposed a Cartesian order on colonial space. One of the other legalistic markers of the standard of civilization, in addition to the rule of law, was "an organized bureaucracy with some efficiency in running state machinery..."90 Visual disorder, or chaos, was seen as a marker of barbarism. Denon travelling with the French army, Walsh who chronicled the British campaign, Lane during the 1830s, Gustav Flaubert, and Richard Burton in the middle of the century, all describe approaching Cairo from the Nile in the same way, chaotic and unseeable, and consequently described as politically, culturally, and racially unstable. Elevated perspective, either racial or spatial, was the only remedy to chaos: In our present position we saw numerous minarets surrounding Mount Katam, and proceeding from the gardens on the banks of the Nile, whilst Old Cairo, Bulac and Roda, appearing as part of the town gave it an appearance of verdure and freshness, and added to its magnificence. As we approached, however, the illusion vanished; every object returning as it were to its proper place, we only saw a heap of villages collected near an arid rock.9 1 The streets are unpaved, and most of them are narrow and irregular... By a stranger who merely passed through the street Cairo would be regarded as a very I'd like to thank Daniel Nexon for pointing out the geographical source, which Mitchell fails to do. Gulru Necipoglu, Architecture. Ceremonial, and Power: The Topakapi Palace in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991. 8 8 Ann Laura Stoler, Race and the Education of Desire: Foucault's History of Sexuality and the Colonial Order of Things. Durham: Duke University Press, 1995, p. 98; Said, 1978. 8 9 Timothy Mitchell, "Orientalism and the Exhibitionary Order," Colonialism and Culture, op cit., p.289-90. Mitchell, op cit, 1988. 9 0 Gong, op cit., p. 14. 9 1 Denon [Vol. I, Ch. VTfl] p.257-258. 88 close and crowded city, but that this is not the case is evident to a person who overlooks the town from the top of a lofty house or from the minaret of a mosque.92 The numerous villages on both banks... have at a distance a very pretty appearance; and the minarets of the mosques, with which they all abound, improve the prospect, from their light and airy structure. But, as you approach nearer, the beauty gradually disappears; and when you arrive opposite them, they offer nothing to the view but an assemblage of miserable half-ruined houses.93 Each detail reaches out to grip you; it pinches you; and the more you concentrate on it the less you grasp the whole. Then gradually all this becomes harmonious and the pieces fall into place themselves, in accordance with the laws of 94 perspective. In the face of such disorder, Europeans sought to impose the visual order of Europe onto the chaotic colonies. At the same moment Haussman was constructing the boulevards of Paris, the Egyptians were doing the same in Cairo. It was a natural outgrowth of the visual nature of security that the British and French made the disorder of the colonies observable and thus controllable. Mitchell writes, the disorder of Cairo and other cities had suddenly become visible. The urban space in which Egyptians moved had become a political matter, material to be organised by the construction of great thoroughfares radiating out from the geographical and political centre. At the same moment Egyptians themselves, as they moved through this space, became similarly material, their minds and bodies thought to need discipline and training. The space, the minds, and the bodies all materialised at the same moment, in a common economy of order and discipline.9 5 Edward William Lane, An Account of the Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians Written in Egypt during the years 1833-1835. London: East-West Publications, 1978, p. 15. 9 3 Walsh [7Sept.l801]p.236. 9 4 Gustave Flaubert, Flaubert in Egypt: A Sensibility on Tour. Trans, and ed. Francis Steegmuller. Toronto: Bodley Head, 1972, [15 Jan. 1850] p.79. 9 5 Mitchell, 1988, p.68. 89 The visual chaos of the East obscured the inhabitants. Colonial space itself undermined European rule. The attempt to render the colonies and their inhabitants visible was, of course, incomplete. The corollary implication of this visual order was the obsession with obscured bodies, people who could not be seen. Or, as Foucault argues, "Visibility is a trap."96 The un-surveilled, the uncharted, the uncatalogued, were not under the control of the empire, and were thus a source of disorder. The notion of barbarians being invisible accompanied this anxiety. Portrayed as wild and uncivilized, colonies were not safe i f the barbarian could not be seen. As such, "in the second quarter of the nineteenth century the people of Egypt were made inmates of their own villages."9 7 The use of passports both to certify racial heritage and to control movement illustrates the dangers of differences that could not be seen by Europeans. Ann Laura Stoler notes how a discourse of 'degeneracy' connected race and culture to citizenship (the signified of the passport).98 It is interesting to note that by the middle of the nineteenth century, the passport had faded from use in Europe, but was resurrected in the colonies as a means of controlling the native population.99 The passport as a marker of identity also made it unnecessary for the European administrator to differentiate between colonized individuals — which reaffirmed his own identity as a differentiated member of the white, ruling class. 9 6 Foucault, op cit., p.200. 9 7 Mitchell, 1988, p. 34. 98Stoler, 1995, p.32, 102-106 "Richard F. Burton. Personal Narrative of a Pilgrimage to Al-Madinah and Meccah. Ed. Isabel Burton. New York: Dover Publications Inc. 1964 [1893, memorial edition; 1863, first edition] [Part I, Ch. II] p. 18 90 A common comparison between the colour of the natives' skin and the earth invokes the danger of the unobserved or uncharted, and the hostility ascribed to nature itself. Flaubert observes, "the color of the earth is exactly that of the Nubian women I saw in the slave market."100 The use of the skin as racial marked is picked up by Fanon, Bhabha, and other post-colonial theorists. Cartographic expeditions were an attempt to fix unknown spaces, taming the earth as quinine tamed nature.101 Said argues, "the geographical space of the Orient was penetrated, worked over, taken hold of. The cumulative effect of decades of... Western handling turned the Orient from alien into colonial space."102 Anderson links map-making to this larger discourse of order: European-style maps worked on the basis of a totalizing classification ... the entire planet's curved surface had been subjected to a geometrical grid which squared off empty seas and unexplored regions in measured boxes. The task of "filling in" the boxes was to be accomplished by explorers, surveyors, and military forces. They were on the march to put space under the same surveillance which the census-makers were trying to impose on persons.103 The imposition of geometric orders onto the towns, houses, and institutions in the colonies was an effort to make the entire population visible. "The legible order of the model village would overcome this kind of inaccessibility, this problem of a population and a way of life invisible to the observation of police. As Foucault has written, 'in such ways the architecture of distribution and the art of policing can acquire a hold over 1 U U Flaubert [7 February 1850] p. 103. 10IBurton [Part I, Ch. I] p l . "In the autumn of 1852[... ] I offered my services to the Royal Geographic Society of London, for the purpose of removing that opprobrium to modern adventure, the huge white blot which our maps still notes the Eastern and the Central regions of Arabia." 1 0 2 Said, 1993, p.211. N.B.: I will look at the sexual metaphors of'discover' and 'possession' in the next section, in addition to the connection between racial, gendered, and class-based discourses. 1 0 3 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. 2nd ed. London:Verso, 1991, p.173. 91 individuals not simply by confining them but by opening up and inscribing what is hidden, unknown, and inaccessible.'"1 0 4 It was the condition of empire that this effort always be incomplete. The discourse of surveillance/obscurity had an interesting side effect. By the middle of the century, Europeans had begun to perceive Lower Egypt as 'civilized' and thus inauthentic. The European in search of the 'authentic' experience took to disguising himself as 'Oriental' to get to the true Orient, hidden from the tourist eyes of the European. A l i Behdad calls this attitude 'sentimental' orientalism, which despairs at the proliferation of tourists in favour of the 'true' Orient. 1 0 5 The European use of disguise has a tradition stemming from the first chroniclers of Egypt through to the present day: Burckhardt (1788), Lane (1834), Burton (1852), and even Kaplan (1994). Being unseen as Europeans to the natives allowed a freedom from civilized moral codes, which allowed European travelers to revel in their Orientalist fantasies. These fantasies were markedly sexual for Flaubert,106 and cartological for Burton: "[I sought a place] which no vacation tourist has yet described, measured, sketched, and photographed."107 Flaubert elaborates the tension between his desire for authenticity and the desire for safety: "We look quite the pair of Orientals [however] considerations of our safety limit our sartorial splurges: in Egypt the European is accorded greater respect than the native, so we won't 1 0 4 Mitchell, op cit. 1988, p.46. ' 1 0 5 Ali Behdad, Belated Travelers: Orientalism in the Age of Colonial Dissolution. Durham: Duke University Press, 1994, p. 13-14. 1 0 6 Behdad, op cit. pp.68-69; Lowe, op cit. pp.75-86. 1 0 7 Burton [Part I, Ch.I] p.2. 92 dress up completely until we reach Syria." It must be mentioned that this ability to disguise as the cultural and racial 'other' is a function of the power relationship of European occupation. While Europeans could pass as native, natives could never pass as European.109 Just as Egypt was not seen as a western nation but rather a grotesque travesty of Europe, Europeanized Egyptians were considered objects of mimcry.110 This was certainly true of Frantz Fanon's personal experience, and is described by Homi Bhabha as "almost the same, but not quite."111 Bhabha also explores the ambivalence of mockery and imitation as a practice of resistance to colonial rule.112 Post-colonial theorists argue this power dynamic and consequent prejudice is present in contemporary race relations. The way in which world exhibitions were used to represent the colonies and the colonized to the metropolitan population provides further evidence of the power of this discourse.113 The world exhibitions displayed the world for consumption by the metropolitan citizens, in terms of race, geography, and capitalism. 1 U 8 Flaubert [1 Dec. 1849] p.42. 1 0 9 See "Colonial Passing." McClintock notes that the privilege of colonial passing is uniquely male. McClintock, op cit, pp. 69-71. 1 1 0 Anderson, op cit. p. 122. 1 1 1 Cited in McClintock, op cit. p.62-3. 1 1 2 Bhabha, op cit. 1 1 3 ft should be noted that the Wor/d Exhibitions took place chiefly within France, England, and America and not other European colonial powers. Yengoyan argues this is due to differences in worldview, best shown in the difference between French 'civilization' and German 'kultur.' "A culture model is bounded, limited, not expansive, and hardly universalistic in scope ... A civilization model is the basis of universalistic exhibitions... The civilizing process which is the basis of western civilization in theory is not contained, bounded or limited." For a deeper exploration of this division between German and Anglo-French notions of civilization, Patrick Thaddeus Jackson's doctoral thesis: "Occidentalism: The Symbolic Technology of German Reconstruction." 93 European Exhibitions The extension of this visible, exhibitionary order is also apparent within metropolitan European culture. World Exhibitions were displays of industry, culture, and empire for the imperial population. The exhibitions were representations of the world on a grand scale, global in scope, nationalist in tone, and pedagogical in intent. They reflected the mutually-constituting ideologies of consumerism, nationalism, and imperialism. Pedagogically, the exhibitions were intended to educate the public in the products of the industrial revolution and imperial expansion, both of which had negative side-effects that needed to be obscured. Also, the exhibitions had a nation-building intent — to represent the nation to itself.1 1 4 The civilizing mission was central to the display of cultures in hierarchical fashion, Europeans representing the end of progress and other races representing earlier evolutionary epochs.115 McClintock argues that this exhibitionary order displays peoples as evidence of a Hegelian progression of history. "The axis of time was projected onto the axis of space and history became global. With social Darwinism, the taxonomic project, first applied to nature, was now applied to cultural history. Time became a geography of social power."1 1 6 And, the metropolitan masses flocked to see the spectacle. Eric Hobsbawm marks a convergence between the expansion of tourism within European countries for the poor and to the Orient for the rich: Eric Hobsbawm, "The Invention of Tradition," Nationalism. John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith eds. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994, pp.76-78. 1 1 5 Aram A. Yengoyan, "Culture, Ideology and World's Fairs," Fair Representations: World's Fairs and the Modern World. Robert W. Rydell and Nancy Gwinn eds. Amsterdam: VU University Press, 1994, p.82. 94 The day trip for the masses ... was the child of the 1850s — to be more precise of the Great Exhibition of 1851... Thomas Cook himself, whose name was to become a by-word for organized tourism in the next twenty-five years, had begun his career arranging such outings and developed it into big business in 1851. The numerous International Expositions each brought its army of sightseers and the rebuilding of capital cities encouraged the provincials to sample their wonders. In this way, we see a parallel in the imperialist representation of colony to metropolis and the nationalist representation of rural to urban. The nationalist intent of these exhibitions connected to class-based and race-based discourses. These strategies of exhibition helped to describe the imperial project to its participants and its objects. Mitchell argues, "The new apparatus of representation, particularly the world exhibitions, have a central place to the representation of the non-Western world, and several studies have pointed out the importance of this construction of otherness to the manufacture of national identity and imperial purpose."118 David Strang continues that, "imperial propaganda was directed at the colonial official and the metropolitan population, aiming to make the public resources of Western societies available for overseas adventure and administration."119 As Marilyn Wan argues more specifically, "... the colonial exhibit at the 1889 Exposition Universalle was useful in representing France as a formidable imperial power to its international rivals, it was also instrumental in convincing a skeptical domestic public of the benefits of colonialism." 1 2 0 Burton Benedict expands on this international competition in the realm of prestige: "Major McClintock, op cit. p.37. 1 1 7 Hobsbawm, 1975. p.204. 1 , 8 Mitchell, 1992, p. 290. 1 1 9 David Strang, "Contested Sovereignty: The Social Construction of Colonial Imperialism," Sovereignty as a Social Construct. Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber eds. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p.35. 1 2 0 Marilyn Wan, "Naturalized Seeing/ Colonial Vision: Interrogating the Display of Races in Late Nineteenth Century France." Master's Thesis, Fine Arts, University of British Columbia, 1992, p.20. 95 powers [vied] with each other to present fairs ... Among the tokens of rivalry were colonies and their peoples. World's fairs showed the power of the imperial nation and were meant to impress both foreigners and the home population."121 World Exhibitions were designed with two audiences in mind: first, other countries with whom the hosts vied for prestige; second, domestic populations in whom the organizers tried to instill a sense of national pride. This national pride was constructed, in part, through the description of its success in 'civilizing' barbarians — who were portrayed as opposite and inferior to national characteristics. There is an interest split in how 'savages' and 'barbarians' were differently represented at these exhibitions. Savages were displayed in their "natural habitat." Their performance was merely living. However, 'barbarians' -like Egyptians, Japanese, Turks - were displayed in interactive modes. One could not only observe the 'other,' but also buy goods, ride donkeys, or pay for dancing girls. Thus, i f Britain and France were defined, in part, by sexual restraint, education, Christianity, and racial homogeneity, then the barbarians were displayed as either overly-erotic, uneducated, anti-Christian, and racially heterogeneous or as the product of a Western 'civilization,' in which they approximated - though never reached - European ideals. McClintock argues that the exhibition is an extension of the panoptic principle of surveillance. In this formulation, the national public becomes the surveyor of the whole world. "Implicit in the [Great Exhibition of 1851] was the new experience of imperial progress consumed as a national spectacle. At the exhibition, white British workers 1 Burton Benedict, "Rituals of Representation: Ethnic Stereotypes and Colonized Peoples at 96 could feel included in the imperial nation, the voyeuristic spectacle of racial 'superiority' compensating them for their class subordination."122 Wan also illustrates how one aspect of the discourse of visuaiity, "seeing as education," was a prominent theme in the planning of the Exposition, and she details the way in which space was configured to represent the whole world to the masses.123 Allan Pred combines, this pedagogical aspect with the exhibitions spatial characteristics, As a public space designed to manufacture private desires; as a space suggesting an unlimited profusion of commodities; as a space where the commercial, the political, and the cultural were ideologically melted together; the space of such exhibitions was a precursor to the "society of the spectacle" [and] the ultimate spectacle of an ordered reality. 1 2 4 The colonies, and colonial peoples, were displayed as national products, and as evidence of European superiority. The planned order of the exhibitions made a stark contrast to the contrived chaos of the colonial peoples inhabiting 'indigenous' buildings. In an illuminating juxtaposition of visual order and Oriental chaos, the only disorderly part of the Exposition Universalle in Paris was the Cairo exhibit: The Egyptian exhibit has been built by the French to represent a street in medieval Cairo, made of houses with overhanging upper stories and a mosque like that of Qaitbay. "It was intended," one of the Egyptians wrote, "to resemble the old aspect of Cairo." So carefully was this done, he noted, that "even the paint on the buildings was made dirty." The exhibit had also been made carefully chaotic. In contrast to the geometric layout of the rest of the exhibition, the imitation street was arranged in the haphazard manner of the bazaar. World's Fairs," Fair Representations, p.28. 1 2 2 McClintock, op cit. p.59. 1 2 3 Wan, op cit. pp.29-50. 1 2 4 Allan Pred, ^Cognizing European Modernities: A montage of the present. New York: Routledge, 1995, 37. '"Mitchell, ibid, p.291. 97 However, visitors could still pay for coffees in a cafe, pay for a ride on a Cairo donkey, buy a souvenir, or watch a belly-dancer. Imperial products, shows, and natives on display were illustrative of three popular discourses. The display of goods inculcated the promise of the industrial revolution, in counterpoint to its detrimental societal effects. Global capitalism celebrated the production of consumer products as the return on investment overseas and the export potential of new markets. National pride in cultural traditions was embodied in displays of artwork, architecture, and empire. The scope of rule and the character of the rulers were presented as triumphs of administration as manliness. The cult of the explorer, and the honor of public servants administering the empire, entwined notions of masculinity in the colonizer and femininity in the colonized. The display of actual barbarians, gave a face to the stereotype, and bolstered evidence of the success of the imperial civilizing mission. Walking through the exhibition, the upper, middle, and lower classes walked through the world, viewing each other, as well as the exhibit. 1 2 7 The universal expositions of the nineteenth century were intended as microcosms that would summarize the entire human experience ... In their carefully articulated order, they also signified the dominant relations of power. Ordered and characterization ranked, rationalized, and objectified different societies. The resulting hierarchies portrayed a world where races, sexes, and nations occupied fixed places...128 Hyam, op cit., p.280.-292; McClintock, op cit. p.23-30. 1 2 7 Wan, op crt. p.60. 1 2 8 Leila Kinney and Zeynep Celik, "Ethnography and Exhibitionism," Assemblages. 13, 1990, p.38. [In Said, 1993].' 98 This world claimed to be an authentic representation of the outside, but was in fact implicated in the legitimization of imperialism through capitalist, nationalist, and imperialist ideologies. Just as popular culture identified external and internal barbarians [colonized peoples and the poor or the criminal], the exhibitions also reinforced European stereotypes.129 Public commitment to the imperial project wavered, especially during the crises of the Indian Mutiny and the Algerian Civi l War, 1 3 0 so these representations were political to the extent that they conveyed an image of the international imaginary that supported the imperial project. The markedly pedagogical intent of world exhibitions illustrates the importance of culture and representation to the popular international imaginary. What I want to emphasize is that these domestic representations about the colonial world functioned to construct an image of what international relations constituted. Because domestic support was necessary to support the imperial, civilizing mission, these political representations act as early propaganda and illustrate the importance of popular culture on world politics. Faced with continual threat of violence within the colonies, European administrators developed regimes of surveillance techniques. Geometric spatial orders were a sign of 'civilization' that made barbarian visible, and created the illusion of imperial security.131 The colonized was a body to regulate, order, and control — though always imperfectly. This panoptic visual order was applied equally in the colonies and in the imperial center to observe and contain threatening populations, the criminal, the insane, children, the See McClintock's discussion of Irish racism, op cit. p.52-54. "Hobsbawm, 1975, p.125. 1 Anderson, op cit. p. 184. 99 poor— the internal barbarians. This return of colonial governance mechanisms to the imperial centre helps complicate the civilized/barbarian dichotomy. Both global and domestic underclasses were feared, and similar mechanisms of control were used to control both internal and external barbarians. This resonates with the most recent writings on the civilized/barbarian dichotomy. Demography: The Rising Tide of Numbers Foucault best describes the connection between this visual turn and the rise of demographics. He identifies a general shift in the pattern of European governance in the late eighteenth-early nineteenth centuries from a regime which claimed to protect a "people" to a regime which aimed to control a "population."1 3 2 Demography - the study of populations - was a central part of the power/knowledge structure of the modern state. Demography was used to describe domestic and international populations. Thomas Malthus and Charles Darwin became popular at the end of eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth century.133 The anxieties they expressed became popular currency throughout the period of imperial expansion. This discourse of racial anxiety connected Darwin's notion of 'survival of the fittest' with Europe's own struggle against the other races.134 After briefly indicating how Malthus Michel Foucault, "Governmentality," The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality. Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller eds. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991, pp. 101-2 1 3 3 Darwin' theory of evolution was, in fact, inspired by Malthus' Essay Concerning Population. Torbjorn L. Knutsen, A History of International Relations Theory: An Introduction. New York: Manchester University Press, 1992, 177. 1 3 4 Darwin's Origin of the Species was first published in 1859. operates at this intersection, I will chart some of the ways in which this anxiety was manifest. Malthus wrote A n Essay on the Principle of Population in 1798, and it was published again in 1826. In it, he argues that while food production technology grows at an 135 arithmetic rate, population grows at a geometric rate. However, there are several important social and political assumptions that make Malthus' diagnoses less objective than it first appears. First, Malthus assumes that 'the poor' cannot improve their own condition, and the their position cannot be improved from outside. He argues, "the poor laws of England tend to depress the general condition of the poor in these two wars. Their first obvious tendency is to increase population without increasing the food for its support... Secondly, the quantity of provisions consumed in workhouses ... diminishes the shares that would otherwise belong to more industrious, and more worthy 136 members..." Thus, the poor are not only responsible for their own condition, but are morally inferior, because their poverty is due to their lack of 'industriousness.' As Anderson argues with relation to the census, the representation of class changed over the course of the nineteenth century: "the census categories became more visibly and exclusively racial." 1 3 7 Second, Malthus distinctly separates the degree of progress or civilization from its population 'carrying capacity.' This sets the stage for critics of imperialism to connect Thomas Robert Malthus, "An Essay on the Principle of Population (1798)," The Works of Thomas Robert Malthus. Vol. I. E.A. Wrigley and David Souden eds. London: William Pickering, 1986, p.9. 1 3 6Ibid., p.33. 1 3 7 Anderson, op cit. p. 164. 101 population growth in barbarian colonies to a decline of European civilization. He argues that the proportionate rates of growth between food production and technology are most efficient in the colonies.1 3 8 This sets the stage for the stereotype of the fecund barbarian in the face of a declining European population. Restraint characterized the difference between the barbarian and the European. The barbarian's sexuality - and thus fertility -was unrestrained, while the European's sexuality - and thus fertility were restrained. These figures of population imbalance have remained constant throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, but are only invoked during times of crisis and self-doubt. While migration to the colonies may decrease the metropolitan population, releasing some of the inherent pressure of a growing lower class, the colonies represent a much more productive site of lower class population growth. Malthus argues that the basics of 'civilization' enable the fecundity of the colonies. Savage population growth is limited 139 naturally by the trials of living without society. Barbarians are described as being 'naturally' more fertile, but that their uncivilized condition limits the gross population. However, with the benefits of civilization, population explodes in the colonies as fertility is translated into numbers with the restraining of 'natural' mortality. The chief point for this thesis of Malthus' work, and the science of demography which it spawned, is that the underclass - whether national or global - is more numerous, less industrious, less moral, and consequently a threat to the social order. This fear of the lower classes is translated by the turn of the nineteenth century into a fear of the Ibid, p.39. Ibid, pp. 18-20. 102 colonized as a kind of global lower class. 1 4 0 Malthus represents the beginning of a souring of the 'civilizing mission.' The civilizing mission is perceived from this view as having the effect of making the barbarians more populous, more educated, healthier, and, in sum, more dangerous. Demography is used throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, which 1 will explore below. I want next to elaborate the connections between race, class, gender, and empire that mobilize these notions of threat and surveillance within and without Europe. Race, Class, and Gender in the Imperial Order The rhetoric of civilized and barbarian was mobilized not only in imperial discourse, but it was also applied to the internal 'others' of European society. The lower classes, the criminal, the perverse, and women were all labeled barbaric, or described using exactly the same rhetoric. The relationship between internal and external barbarians complicates the essentialist inside/outside, self/other dualism, which I will elaborate below. Lowe argues, "nineteenth-century orientalism provided a means of displacing, while obliquely figuring, both domestic instability and colonialist conflicts; orientalism supported a coherent notion of the 'nation' — the 'one' — while subsuming and veiling a variety of social differences in the figuration of the Orient as Other."1 4 1 In the face of 1 4 0 Michael S. Teitelbaum and Jay M. Winter, The Fear of Population Decline. Toronto: Acadmic Press, 1985, pp.36-40. 1 4 1 Lowe, op cit. p.78. 103 other races, Europeans were all similar - despite religious, class, or ethnic differences. National identity must be constructed, and the representation of the nation to itself was instrumental in making national characteristics paramount over other characteristics.143 The sexual stereotype of the barbarian was coupled to the national identity figured in terms of race and class. McClintock makes this argument powerfully in Imperial Leather. Britain and France were figured as masculine nations, while the colonies were figured as feminine peoples. Women were also regarded as a "degenerate" race.1 4 4 However, women were also held up as the virginal, ignorant vulnerable, promise of civilization - as is 'the Intended' of Conrad's Heart of Darkness. Kiernan notes how the popular headlines in the Boer War depicted women as the victims of barbarity.145 Darby argues that gender relations often stand in for colonial relations, and makes an excellent analysis of this dynamic. He argues, Gender is a means of shaping and signifying relationships of power internationally as well as in the domestic sphere. It has thus played a major part in the construction and deconstruction of the relationship between ruler and ruled. Function is a key site of gender representations and it is important both discursively and for the complex and often contradictory ways in which gender as metaphor is deployed.1 4 6 There is a rich literature on colonialism and gender, to which I can only refer here. McClintock, Stoler, and Spivak have canvassed the relationship between colonial discourse and gender/sexuality in particular. The stereotype of the barbarian is often cast Stoler explores how imperialism was represented as a bourgeois practice, but in fact required members from every class and the tension this endows. Stoler, 1995, Ch. IV. 1 4 3 Anderson, op cit. p.80; 113-14; Balibar, op cit. 1 4 4 McClintock, op cit, p.54-55. 1 4 5 V.G. Kiernan, European Empires from Conquest to Collapse: 1815-1960. Leicester: Leicester University Press 1982, p. 156. in gendered/sexualized terms. However, as representations of gender within 'Western' culture are complex and unstable, so too are representations of the gendered barbarian. On the one hand, male barbarians are often characterized as hyper-masculine. This corresponds to the notion of the barbarian being creatively violent, sexually rapacious, and unmannered ~ which, ironically, make him more powerful than the restrained European. On the other hand, female barbarians are characterized as hyper-feminine ~ most often as over-sexualized and undomestic. The gendering of the barbarian stereotype can be viewed as a mirror of gendering of the stereotype of the Europe. The barbarian is represented in relation to the European stereotype of itself. These stereotypes are not stable either within Europe or across the colonial scene. African males were often portrayed as masculine, whereas Asian and South Asian men were often portrayed in feminine terms. Amazonian women, 'Oriental' belly dancers, and bare-breasted women of the South Pacific were all staples of popular culture. These examples are provided to indicate how gender and sexuality are mobilized within the 'barbarian' stereotype and not to exhaust the subject. It must be noted that the description of the gendered/sexualized barbarian often reflects more upon the identity of the European than it does on the 'others.' The British and French were as superior in race as the aristocrats were in class. Benedict Anderson attributes empire with the "shoring up" of class structure: " i f English lords were naturally superior to other Englishmen, no matter: these other Englishmen Phillip Darby, The Fiction of Imperialism: Reading Between International Relations and Postcolonialism. London: Cassell, 1998, p.66. 105 were no less superior to the subjected natives."147 These intertwining discourses, which connected race, class, and gender, generated a series of dualities that were mapped on to imperial and metropolitan cultures alike. "The regulatory mechanisms of the colonial state were directed not only at the colonized, but as forcefully at the 'internal enemies' within the heterogeneous population that comprised the category of Europeans themselves."148 Imperial discourses did not merely mirror class and gender discourses of the nineteenth century, but were constitutive of them. Class relations were represented in terms of race relations: for example, the lower classes were portrayed on the scale of 'humanity' upon which barbarians and savages were placed. Thus, the upper classes were depicted as more 'evolved' than the lower classes. Race relations were understood in terms of class relations: in Egypt, the ethnic division of labour was translated for European audiences into classes (farmers, bourgeois, aristocracy, etc.). Sexual and gender characteristics were portrayed in racial terms: racial characteristics were portrayed in terms of sexuality and gender. These connections were not made explicitly by the framers of the discourse, as Foucault shows with respect to Victorian sexuality. Vincent also shows this connection with respect to race.1 4 9 To understand imperial relations, we need to understand how the discourse of civilization and barbarians was applied within Europe, as well as outside Europe. Anderson, op cit. p. 150. 1 4 8 Stoler, 1995, p. 96. 1 4 9 R.J. Vincent, "Race in International Relations." Culture. Ideology and World Order. R.B.J. Walker, ed. Boulder, CO: Wesrview Press, 1984, p.44-46. 106 McClintock, in her pioneering work Imperial Leather, argues that the discourses of race, gender, and class were connected in the ideology of imperialism. 1 5 0 This also relates the Victorian chain of being to the racialist theories which also propped up the imperial ideology. R.J. Vincent argues "m the popular mind the notion of racial superiority was woven into the pattern of European empire ... and when the problem was not seen as one of ordering the lesser breeds, but of coping with the 'rising tide of colour' that threatened to engulf the white world demographically and economically, then it was necessary to construct a white redoubt to preserve higher civilization." 1 5 1 Thus, the 'civilizing mission' was coupled to racial threats. Stoler also argues that racial dynamics were central to popular nineteenth century culture and European identity: race becomes the organizing grammar of an imperial order in which modernity, the civilizing mission and the 'measure of man' were framed. And with it, 'culture' was harnessed to do more specific political work; not only to mark difference, but to rationalize the hierarchies of privilege and profit, to consolidate the labor regimes of expanding capitalism, to provide the psychological scaffolding for the exploitative structures of colonial rule. 1 5 2 This exteraalization of class theory also had the internal effect of racializing the classes of the metropolitan populations. So, to parallel Stanley's In Darkest Africa, there was published a year later In Darkest England (1890) by the founder of the Salvation army. 1 5 3 Kiernan argues, "in the European mind the affinity between race and class is equally palpable. In innumerable ways his attitude to his own 'lower orders' was identical with that of Europe to the 'lesser breeds' ... Much of the talk about the 1 5 0 McClintock, op cit. 1996. pp. 22-56. 1 5 1 R.J. Vincent, "Racial Equality," The Expansion of International Society, p.240. 1 5 2 Stoler, 1992, p.27. 1 5 3 John Laffey, Civilization and Its Discontented. Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1993, p.70. 107 barbarism or darkness of the outer world, which it was Europe's mission to route, was a transmuted fear of the masses at home." 1 5 4 Two excerpts from travelogues illustrate the conflation between Egyptian races, and classes. Lastly [of the races in Egypt] the Arab cultivator, the most civilized, the most corrupted, the most degraded, in consequence of the state of bondage in which he is held, and the most varied in person and character, as may be remarked in the heads of the sheiks, or chiefs of villages, in those of the fellahs or peasants, in those of the beggars, and finally, those of the artisans, who constitute the most abject class. 1 5 5 Egypt is inhabited by several races of people, all differing greatly in their manners, customs, religions... Besides these four classes [Mamelukes, Bedoween, Arabs, Fellahs], which constitute the chief population of the country, there are several others, as Turks, Greeks, Jews, etc. that are settled in the towns, and follow different employments.156 Because these two discourses were mutually-constituting, the fact that they evolved not only at the same time but using the same vocabulary, class relations could be used to explain racial relations and vice versa. Thus, race and class were conflated in the colonies, where colonial administrators tried to assign class positions to different races. Bourgeois thinkers marshaled social Darwinism to justify class relations within Britain and France. They applied the theory of survival of the fittest to explain the social and economic disparity that the industrial revolution brought to the fore of the popular imagination. Because this social Darwinist view became especially prominent at the turn of the century, I will explore it in greater depth in the next chapter. Ascribing the Kiernan, 1993, p.316. Denon, [Vol. I, Ch. VI] p.210. Walsh, [11 September 1801] p.257, 261. 108 'underclass' the same characteristics, whether the domestic poor or the foreign barbarian, this rhetorical move relates foreign experiences to the domestic population in a language they can understand. The imperial discourses of racial hierarchy and the capitalist understandings of free trade and the subsequent class relations were intertwined. Justifications of imperialism cannot be understood except with reference to internal tension within European societies. Also, the maintenance of colonial rule was informed by the class experience. The 'creation' of ethnic categories, which paralleled domestic classes, and the subsequent empowerment of collaborators made for a complex social system. In addition to the colonial civil service, the army was a main vehicle of acculturation in the colonies. Kiernan notes that the use of native troops "started as soon as white men began to find their way overseas. In the course of their classes in India the French and British pioneered the system of 'sepoy armies,' from then on an indispensable part of Europe's ability to go on conquering. Afro-asia was taught to conquer itself for foreign pay, most of it taken out of Afro-asian pockets."158 Thus, the stereotype of the barbarian was mobilized to marshal forces against internal and external classes or races. The characteristics of these barbarians were usually linked to ideas about capitalism, order, and sexuality. Barbarians, be it colonized peoples or the poor, were indolent, violent, licentious, and, above all, dangerous. Lowe, op cit. p.8. Kiernan, 1998, p.16. 109 The writings of Flaubert, Lane, and Denon all point to the sexual fantasies which dominated popular notions of the Orient. In addition to these cultural stereotypes, the actual interaction between colonizers and colonized is central to imperial and post-colonial culture. Fanon, Said, McClintock, and others would all study the sexual dynamics in colonial rule. Sex in any case formed an important area of contact between societies. Impressions of foreign lands owed much to men's impressions of their women, and vice versa, and also of the way their men and women behaved to each other.159 While it is difficult to fix the specific stereotype of the libidinous Oriental, textual sources point to how powerful the stereotype was. Denon's first impressions of Egyptian women illustrate the stereotype. While enamored of their beauty, he states, "I also deferred the pleasure of drawing the Egyptian women, until we should, by our influence over the manners of eastern nations, remove the veil by which they are covered."1 6 0 The Egyptian belly-dancer was to be a primary image of the Orient, representing its lasciviousness, its accessibility, and its strangeness.161 "At the commencement of the dance [it] was voluptuous: it soon after became lascivious, and expressed, in the grossest and most indecent way, the giddy transports of passion."1 6 2 Lane authenticates his own writing through living in disguise in Cairo for five years. "The women of Egypt have the character of being the most licentious in their feelings of all females who lay any claim to 9 Kiernan, 1986, p.317. 0 Denon [Vol. I, Ch. VI] p.219-220. 1 Said, 1993, p i l l . 2 Denon [Vol. I, Ch. W ] p.232-33. 110 be considered as members of a civilized nation."1 6 3 Lane clearly marks a tension between licentiousness and civilization, suggesting later that the libidinous character of the generality of the women of Egypt, and the licentious conduct of a great number of them, may be attributed to many causes — partly to the climate, and partly to their want of instruction and of innocent pastimes and employments, but it is more to be attributed to the conduct of husbands themselves.164 Geography and character are connected in a manner that echoes Hegel and Rousseau. Further, licentiousness is coupled with a lack of domesticity, which was understood as the racial purview of the colonizers. Flaubert's travel notes and letters home are extremely frank about the sexual nature of his Oriental tour. 1 6 5 Bhedad argues that by the mid-eighteenth century the thrill of discovery had waned with the popularization of tourist package tours. As such, "what brings the tourist to the Orient is not the 'lordly' attempts of earlier orientalists to understand and 'make sense' of the internal dynamics of Oriental culture and to gain 'new' knowledge about them, but the desire to identify the already defined signs of exoticism as erotic."1 6 6 The representations of the Orient had sufficiently been imbued to Europeans that, in Flaubert's words, "anyone who is a little attentive rediscovers here much more than he discovers."167 However, this does not stop Flaubert from rediscovering a great number of sexual delights. He writes "the oriental woman is a machine, and nothing more; she doesn't differentiate between one man and another. As 1 6 3 Lane, op cit. p.297. 1 6 4 Lane, op cit. p.298. 1 6 5 Said, 1978, p. 188. 'Woven through all of Flaubert's Oriental experiences, exciting or disappointing, is an almost uniform association between the Orient and sex.' 1 6 6 Behdad, op cit. p.49. I l l for physical pleasure, it must be very slight since they cut off that famous button, the very place of it, quite early on. And for me, this is what renders this woman so poetic, that she becomes absolutely one with nature."168 Lowe admonishes post-colonial critics that the stereotype of the Oriental woman is not unidimensional, or uncontested.169 Stoler also argues that the sexual policing in the colonies prefigured the policing of perversion in Europe that Foucault explores in work on sexuality.170 The stereotype represents the frightening lack of restraint - to which the white (male) administrator was susceptible. The (inevitable) product of the unions between white administrators and 'native' women were treated as a challenge to the racial order. The discourse of Oriental sexuality was not unambiguous, but certainly reflected the power difference between colonizer and colonized. Burton, known as "Dirty Dick," 1 7 1 is quite plain in his coupling of sexual and class relations in Europe and the Orient alike. "How often is it our fate, in the West as in the East, to see in bright eyes and to hear from rosy lips an implied, i f not an expressed, 'Why don't you buy me?' or, worse still, 'why can't you buy me?'" 1 7 2 The anxiety of sexual liberty or racial degradation is transmuted into a consumer's anxiety of insufficient buying power, and the consolation of the security of property relations. Whether the difference was figured as titillating, threatening, or incidental, the sexualized stereotypes of the colonized played a formative role in the representation of Flaubert, [15 January, 1850] p.81. Flaubert [ 1853] in Lowe, op cit. p.75. Lowe, op cit. p.76. Stoler, 1995, p.42. Said, 1978, p. 190. 112 the colonial world. McClintock argues that specifically sexual metaphors were used to reify colonial relations. Women are the earth that is to be discovered, entered, named, inseminated, and, above all, owned... linked symbolically to the land, women are relegated to a realm beyond history and thus bear a particular vexed relation to narratives of historical change and political effect. Even more importantly, women are figured as property belonging to men and hence as lying, by definition, outside the male contests over land, money, and political power.1 7 3 This connection between Hegelian notions of African geography and female characteristics is important to the deconstruction of the rhetoric of empire. The threat of racial degradation is central to Stoler's application of Foucault into the colonial context. The constant allure of "going native" or "growing black" undermined the superiority of the colonizer.1 7 4 Contemporary critics and postcolonial scholars comment upon this reliance on markers of race connected to the skin, the body, and the sexual organs extensively. Hyam argues, "Endless emphasis on the differences between 'natives' and themselves was one of the necessary props of empire. They could have only ruled subject peoples, especially when hopelessly outnumbered, by honestly believing themselves to be racially superior, and the subject race to be biologically different."175 This illustrates Foucault's fascination with notions of'bio-power.' 1 7 6 Burton continues this point: Phrenology and physiognomy, be it observed, disappoint you often amongst civilised people, the proper action of whose brain upon the features is impeded by the external pressure of education, accident, example, habit, and necessity. But ' Burton [Part I, Ch. IV] p.60. ' McClintock, op cit. p.31. 'Burton, [Part I, Ch. IV] p.58. ' Hyam, op cit. p. 103. ' Michel Foucault, "Body/Power" Power/Knowledge, pp. 55-62. 113 they are tolerably safe guides when groping your way through the mind of man in his so-called natural state, a being of impulse, in that chrysalis condition of mental development which is rather instinct than reason.177 Stoler points out that this discourse of difference was mobilized not only between metropolis and colony, but also within classes and races in each community. She contrasts the myth of imperial unity to the actuality of class and racial division in the East Indies. We are still left to explain the pervasive anxiety about white degeneration in the colonies, the insistent policing of those Europeans who fell from middle-class grace, the vast compendium of health manuals and housekeeping guides that threatened ill-health, ruin, and even death, i f certain moral prescriptions and modes of conduct were not met.1 7 8 Those 'others' of mixed race or low status were seen as dangerous because they undermined the supposed unity of the colonizers. The relations between colonial rulers, almost universally men, and indigenous women lays bare an important vector of imperial power. Multi-racial relations, and their progeny who often claimed colonizer status, complicated clear simple racial divisions. This effort reflects a change in public opinion regard sexual morals in the colonies. At first, the colonies were seen as realms exempt from sexual mores. Hyam argues: The regulation of sexual relations with indigenous peoples was inherently a central feature of the colonial relationship, and it was fundamental to the construction of racial perceptions and misperceptions. As race relations became less relaxed in the later nineteenth century, so missionaries and memsahibs insisted on tighter controls. Sexual contacts thus became more depersonalized, and prostitution was preferred as politically safer.'79 Burton, [Part I, Ch. IT] p. 17. Stoler, 1995, p. 102. Hyam, op cit. p.292. 114 This convergence of discourse is specifically interesting. The formerly racially-dangerous sexual consort becomes 'safe' once she is bought, and incorporated into European structures of consumerism and the sexual politics of domesticity. The uncertainty of racial relations is reconfigured in terms of 'safe' class relations, similar to Burton. This change in popular morality is seen to have had the effect of solidifying racial boundaries, which had been previously been more fluid. Lloyd argues, "It has been suggested that part of the reason why British attitudes to Indians became more hostile after the Mutiny was that British women came to India in larger numbers as the Suez route became less troublesome and were more concerned about keep a due and proper distance between Indians and themselves than man had ever been."1 8 0 This convergence of gendered, racial, and class discourses illustrates the pervasiveness of imperialism as a way of understanding European imperial culture. Wandering the exhibition grounds in Paris or London the public was educated towards, and made complicit in, the national, consumerist, and imperial project. Not only were the colonies, their products and peoples on view, but the nation was on view to itself. Anderson's constructivist account of nationalism defends the notion that the production of a seeming homogenous nation from heterogeneous populations requires the I Q 1 representation of the people to themselves. At the exhibition, classes viewed each other. Races were viewed, and souvenirs were bought. Class and racial hierarchies were reaffirmed through spectacle. The chaos of the crowd contrasted the ordering of the architecture. The ordering of the races was coincident with the ordering of classes. The Lloyd, op cit. p. 178. 115 barbarians, both internal and external, were on display. The hyper-sexualized Orientals were tamed by their participation in consumer capitalism, and by the architecture of spectacle. Masculine Europe was seen as the father of the family of man, paternalistic to the rest of the world through its civilizing mission. Race, class, and gender rhetoric was used to stabilize the image of a national identity, despite the class, sexual, and racial tension. The spectacle of the exhibition was an attempt to educate the metropolitan population of their similarity, in the face of lesser subject races, and their shared consumerism. The decline in the display of colonized peoples after the First World War is indicative of the wane of racism in Britain and France, the rising nationalism in the colonized peoples, and the undermining of the justification for the civilizing mission. However, for the majority of the nineteenth century, racial, class and gender politics were all tied to the imperial project. Conclusion In traditional LR theories, imperialism is portrayed as a uniform process of power accumulation, distinctly international in scope but domestic in nature. However, as this chapter has suggested, nineteenth century imperialism complicates this domestic/international divide. Further, certain prevailing cultural trends cannot be understood without reference to the colonial condition. Rather than isolating European and non-European politics as two separate realms of politics, I have suggested that the civilizing mission was central to European identity, and integral to non-European culture. Europe defined its identity in part by what it was not — and it was not barbarous. The 1 Anderson, op cit. p.6. 116 image of the barbarian implied continual threat and insecurity, descriptions that were also applied to dangerous domestic populations. Thus, the barbarian was implicated in the construction of the disciplinary society, the extension of surveillance to the general metropolitan and imperial populations. The continual state of war between colonizer and colonized resembles traditional definitions of anarchical relations. Imperialism also involved great amounts of violence, which are traditionally downplayed in studies of war in the nineteenth centuries. European identity was constituted in reference to lesser races and the concomitant civilizing mission. The boundary of European identity was policed at cultural and racial levels, often using visible markers and authoritative texts such as the passport and the census. The discursive formation constituting the image of the barbarian attempted to resolve a number of tensions with the ideology of imperialism. Violence against the barbarian was justified in almost every instance. The rules of'civilized' warfare did not apply to barbarians, nor did the rule of civilized governance. To get a full picture of international relations, we must not only investigate both sides of the domestic/international divide, but also look at liminal cases such as colonial rule which were both domestic and international. The reality of colonized peoples is, of course, far more varied. Indeed, Nandy and Cesaire argue that Europe was far more negatively effected by colonialism than the colonies were. However, since the orientalist stereotype of the barbarian 1 8 2 Nandy, op cit. p.32. "They were overwhelmed by the experience of being colonial rulers. As a result, the long-term cultural damage colonialism did to the British society was greater." Cesaire, op cit. p.13. 117 reached its peak in the nineteenth century, a brief mapping of the ideological terrain upon which he stands is useful. The barbarian is irrational, uneducated, and violent. He is libidinous and indolent. She is libidinous and un-domestic. His subjugation must be violent because he cannot understand the benefits of civilization. Once conquered, he must be continually under surveillance because he is always planning sedition or revolt. The barbarian's only chance of redemption is through a European education and acculturation. The barbarian proves his inferiority through his evident under-development, and any reluctance he may show to the imperial project. The barbarian proves the colonizers superiority at the same time. As Said argues about the stereotype of the Oriental, "The Oriental is irrational, depraved, child-like, different, thus the European is rational, mature, virtuous, 'normal.'" 1 8 3 European identity was thus implicated deeply in the colonial project, and the image of the barbarian specifically. "Conscious of this [barbarian] world at his elbow, the Western felt his identity by contrast to it: it was his shadow, his antithesis, or himself in dreams."184 At the close of the nineteenth century, the discourse of civilization collapsed under its own weight. In bringing the light of civilization, Europe had darkened itself. The First World War, in addition to being fostered by the atmosphere of competition for imperial prestige, revealed that Europeans were just as barbaric as any other civilization. The use of colonial troops within the boundaries of Europe marked a change, which led in turn to Said, 1979, p.40. Kiernan, 1986, p. 131. 118 the growth of the nationalist movement. The Second World War saw the barbarizing of Europe and the glorification of violence and barbarism, after which the rhetoric of civilization took a profoundly pessimistic turn. Decolonization was the result of a number of these forces. The discourse of civilization and barbarians brings all of these discourse to the fore. 119 C H . I V : T H E FIRST FORTY YEARS A CIVILIZED OR BARBARIC EUROPE? Like the travel-writers, novelists, and statesmen of the nineteenth century, philosophers and politicians of the new century found the categories of civilization and barbarian useful in their attempts to understand and describe imperial, international, and intra-European relations. The philosophers and intellectuals of the turn of the century -— Arthur de Gobineau, Friedrich Nietzsche, Oswald Spengler, and Sigmund Freud in particular — redefined the terms civilization and barbarian as they reevaluated the ideological principles which had justified inter- and extra-European relations in the previous century's period of rapid expansion. The work of these intellectuals became part of popular political culture, albeit in polarized and simplified terms. This chapter will examine the more serious critical attempts to understand the world order at the turn of the century through the civilization/ barbarian distinction. I will touch upon three illustrative intersections of the 'civilized/barbarian' discourse and the popular international imaginary: four important philosophers and thinkers of the period, the use of imperial troops and strategy, and indicate some interesting points in the development of LR. The chapter will also evaluate the extent to which the then newly formed discipline of International Relations affected and was effected by the circulation of the trope civilization/ barbarian during this period. The change from Idealist to Realist paradigms within LR is also explored, looking specifically at the role of Adolf Hitler in this transformation. This chapter continues the genealogy of the civilization/ barbarian 120 discourse into the twentieth century, reaffirms a methodological commitment to the study of culture and identity, and looks at the presence of imperialism in IR theory. Philosophers of Barbarism: de Gobineau, Nietzsche, Spengler, and Freud To understand fully the cultural mood at the turn of the century, we must first touch upon the intellectuals of this period. Of these, de Gobineau, Nietzsche, Freud, and Spengler are the most important to the general cultural mood of pessimism, from which the inversion of the civilized/barbarian trope develops. While these philosophers and intellectuals may not have been widely read in the original, "many of [Nietzsche's, Freud's, and Heidegger's] ideas were conveyed in popular phrases and political cliches," and their ideas became common currency in political discourse.1 These intellectuals investigated the valuations of 'civilized' and 'barbarian' critically — treating them as constructed, contentious, terms of judgment. I will also look briefly at the racialist theorists who began to circulate and gain public adherents, referring chiefly to de Gobineau and Chamberlain. None of these thinkers left the discourse of civilization/ barbarian unaffected by their analysis, and their work had an impact on the popular imaginary of Europe. De Gobineau, Race, and Conflict Racial competition held a central place in the international imaginary of the period.2 If the international system is perceived as a realm of constant racial competition, the civilizing mission could be interpreted as giving aid to the enemy. These anxieties about 1 Christopher Coker, War and the 20th Century: A Study of War and Modem Consciousness. London: Brassey's, 1994b, p.2. the rising power of the colonized populations were especially prevalent in the pre-First World War and interwar periods. The first Oxford professor of International Relations, Alfred Zimmern described the defeat of the Russians by the Japanese "the most important historical event in our lifetime; the victory of a non-white people over a white people."3 Politicians and theorists began to discuss the impeding "race war."4 Whether cloaked in scientific or imperial discourse, racial inequality was a core pillar of the popular international imaginary of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.5 Of these, de Gobineau is the most popular and egregious.6 De Gobineau's "Essay on the Inequality of the Races" represents physical, anthropological differences as cultural differences.7 He argues that racial 'mixing' is responsible for the general cultural deterioration in Europe, and the world. While written in 1855, it's first English translation during the First World War made a significant impact on the popular imagination.8 Another figure, Houston Stewart Chamberlain, connected fears of racial decline with the fears of cultural decline. "Chamberlain played upon all the diverse anxieties then afflicting Europe's industrial powers - militarism, anticlericalism, 'pan-isms,' the degeneration of political life, the rise of technological and managerial society -2 W.L. Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951, p.85. 3 Hugh Tinker, Race. Conflict and the International Order: From Empire to United Nations. London: Macmiilan, 1977, p.39. "Frank Furedi, The Silent War: Imperialism and the Changing Perception of Race. London: Pluto Press, 1998, pp.18-19. 5 R.J. Vincent, "Race in International Relations," Culture. Ideology, and World Order. R.B.J. Walker ed. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1984, pp.45-47. 6 Allan Chase, The Legacy of Malthus: The Social Costs of the New Scientific Racism. Chicago: University of Illinois Press, pp. 90-92. 7 Arthur Herman. The Idea of Decline in Western History. Toronto: Free Press. 1997. D.54. 122 in an effort to create an integrated theory of race."9 Racialist theories can be seen as an extension of the kultur vs. zivilisation debate prominent in Germany, but was pervasive throughout Europe during this time. Hugh Tinker described the Second World War as a war that was explicitly "racial" from the Nazi perspective, but not perceived as racial from the Western perspective.10 Frank Furedi provides an excellent survey of racial thinking as it pertains to International Relations. Race is often neglected as a concept in the study of LR, and his history is a welcome addition. Furedi argues that racial anxiety was fueled in large part by "perceptions that the white race was under pressure from more fertile others."11 Michael Teitelbaum and Jay Winter have shown that while demographic trends have not changed significantly since Malthus' time, the rhetoric of racial conflict based on population only emerges during times of political tension.12 The stereotype of the barbarian is often mobilized concurrently and complicity with this demographic rhetoric - in part because the barbarian has always been portrayed as fecund, over-sexual, racially threatening, and dangerous. However, at the turn of the century, rather than represent a significant change in the population of the 'others,' European anxiety reflected its own self-doubts. 8 Ivan Hannaford, Race: The History of an Idea in the West. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, p.265 9 Ibid, p.348. 1 0 Tinker, op cit. p.43. 1 1 Furedi, op cit, p.68. 1 2 Teitelbaum and Winter, op cit, pp. 129-133. 123 Nietzsche: The New Barbarian Comes Nietzsche is one of the most complex and challenging figures of the nineteenth century. He "towers above the history of twentieth-century thought. He is the great prophet of 'cultural pessimism.'"13 Nietzsche's ideas became popular throughout the Western world in the twentieth century, and as Arthur Herman notes, "in the realm of the written word, terms such as 'ubermensch,' 'wi l l to power,' 'master-slave morality,' 'transvaluation of all values,' and 'blond beast' became standard parts of the vocabulary of intellectuals and political writers."14 His popularity was such that, during the First World War, Thus Spoke Zarathustra was one of two books in a German soldier's knapsack (the other being the Bible). 1 5 Nietzsche's popularity in Germany in turn caused him to be vilified as the "apostle of German ruthlessness and barbarism" in England and America. 1 6 To elaborate his writings and what has been made of them, ignoring for the moment their obscure style, would require several separate books. Because Nietzsche's writings set out a philosophy of culture in which he praised, rather than condemned, the barbarian, he is central to this project. Consequently, I will focus on two aspects of Nietzsche's considerable corpus: his praise of the barbarian and his writings as a philosopher of culture and prophet of pessimism. 1 3 Arthur Herman, The Idea of Decline in Western History. Toronto: The Free Press, 1997, p.106. 1 4 Ibid., p.224. 1 5 Robert G.L. Waite, The Psychopathic God. Adolf Hilter. NY: Da Capo Press, 1977, p.279. 1 6 Walter Kaufrnann, Nietzsche: Philosopher. Psychologist. Antichrist. Fourth edition. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974, p.8. 124 Nietzsche's praise of barbarism is related to two of his central concepts: the death of God and the will to power. I will look at these in turn to explicate the pessimistic cultural mood that Nietzsche diagnosed and popularized. Nietzsche relates the parable of the madman in The Gay Science, and offers this infamous dialogue, '"Wither is God?' he cried; T will tell you. We have killed him —^ you and I. A l l of us are his murderers... God is dead.""7 While Nietzsche indeed criticizes Christianity on a host of charges,18 he intends a deeper indictment of European thought. God represents an anchor in philosophical - or theological - certainty, which by definition must lay outside of the sphere of uncertain human affairs. Nietzsche believes this foundation has come undone, and has been shown to be an ephemeral psychological convenience. Nietzsche is perhaps the first European anti-foundationalist. His genealogy of moral valuations — and the attempted revaluation of all morals — traces the "all-too-human" origins of moral codes.19 "Nietzsche's fear was that in a secular age men would replace God by their own man-made divinities... shorn of the certainty of religious belief, [man] would crave the certainty of political truth."20 Morals, language, and reason itself are shown to be the inventions of fallible individuals. "Against positivism, which halts at phenomena — 'These are only facts and nothing more' I would say: No, facts are precisely what there are not, only interpretations. We cannot establish any fact ' in itself ... It is our needs that 1 7 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science With a Prelude in Rhymes and an Appendix of Songs. Trans. Walter Kaufmann. New York: Random House, 1974 [1882], p. 181 [125], The brackets refer to original date of publication and section number respectively. 1 8 Kaufman, op cit, pp.337-371. Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil. Prelude of a Philosophy of the Future. Trans. R.J. Hollingdale. London: Penguin, 1990 [1886], pp.74-81. 1 9 Friedrich Nietzsche, "The Genealogy of Morals," The Birth of Tragedy and The Genealogy of Morals. Trans. Francis Golffing. New York: Doubleday, 1956 [1887], p. 151 [3]. 2 0 Coker, 1994b, p.43-44. 125 interpret the world..." 2 1 Against reason and causality, Nietzsche argues "Not 'to know' but to schematize — to impose upon chaos as much regularity and form as our practical needs require. In the formation of reason, logic, and the categories, it was need that was authoritative: the need, not 'to know' but to subsume, to schematize, for the purpose of intelligibility and calculation."22 Thus, all the ideals of the Enlightenment, such as reason, logic, and progress, are various aspects of the human need for order and thus not consistent either with an objective reality, or within themselves. They represent a system of belief that invents the foundation that it requires. This questioning of the very foundation of reason, language, and logic turns on its head the notion of progress and truth: Progress — let us not be deceived! Time marches forward; we'd like to believe that everything that is in it also marches forward — that the development is one that moves forward. The most levelheaded are led astray by this illusion... "Mankind" does not advance... The overall aspect is that of a tremendous experimental laboratory in which a few successes are scored, scattered through the ages, while there are untold failures, and all order, logic, union, and obligingness is lacking.2 3 "Truth": this, according to my way of thinking, does not necessarily denote the antithesis of error, but in most fundamental cases only the posture of various errors in relation to one another. Perhaps one is older, more profound than another... What is truth. Inertia: that hypothesis which brings satisfaction, the smallest expenditure of spiritual force.24 This condemnation of reason, progress, and truth - in short all the ideas of Enlightenment culture - found a surprisingly receptive audience. The lack of objective foundation for reason, calculation, and history meant that individuals created meaning for 2 1 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power: An Attempt at a Revaluation of All Values. Walter Kaufmann ed. Trans. Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale. New York: Vintage, 1967 [1901], p.267 [481], 2 2 Ibid.,p.278 [515]. 2 3 Ibid., p.55 [90], 126 themselves. The lack of foundations induced despair on the one hand, and on the other liberation. The individual is free to create his own truth. Modris Eksteins' evaluation of fin de siecle Paris concludes, "the Nietzschean command 'You ought to become who you are' [became] the supreme moral law." 2 5 Meaning did not come from Church or state (Nietzsche was a notorious enemy of nationalism26), but from within — the will to power. Power created meaning. "You say that it is the good cause that hallows even war? I say unto you: it is that good war that hallows any cause. War and courage have accomplished more things than love of the neighbor."27 Nietzsche argues that the belief in the ideals which acted as the pillars of modern European civilization were corrupt. And, as such, Europe itself is corrupt and declining: "For some time now, our whole European culture has been moving us toward a catastrophe, with a tortured tension that is growing from decade to decade: restlessly, violently..."28 This decline can only be solved by the affirmation of the "noble virtues" through a "wil l to power." Nietzsche contends that the values of weakness, piety, sickness, humility — the so-called "slave morality" — have been valued higher than the "noble" values of strength, will , responsibility.29 The 'solution' to decadence Nietzsche prescribes is the 'will to power:' it was the imposition of one's strength, one's will, onto 2 4Ibid, pp.290-91 [535-37], 2 5 Modris Eksteins, Rites of Spring: The Great War and the Birth of the Modern Age. Toronto: Lester and Orpen Dennys, 1989, p.43. 2 6 Kaufrnann, op cit, p.288. 2 7 Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A book for all and none. Trans Walter Kaufrnann, London: Penguin, 966 [1883], p.47. 2 8 Nietzsche, 1967, p.3 [Preface]. 2 9 Ibid, p.465 [870]. "The root of all evil: that the slavish morality of meekness, chastity, selflessness, absolute obedience has triumphed — ruling natures were thus condemned." 127 the world. For Nietzsche, the slave ethic centered on 'restraint.' The will to power is portrayed as the actualization of instinct, the unshackling of the individual from restraint. In short, the barbarian is represented as the solution to the decadence of European civilization at the end of the nineteenth century.30 Nietzsche exhorts his readers, "Where are the barbarians of the twentieth century? They will be the elements capable of the greatest severity towards themselves, and able to guarantee the most enduring wi l l . " 3 1 Coupled with the Nietzsche's remarks elsewhere, we see that 'barbarians' are not simply not-decadent, not-civilized beings, but rather are individuals that have a vital energy that will regenerate European culture, through the disregard of moral prohibitions. The barbarian is Nietzsche's ubermensch, or overman.32 The iibermenschen is also the most evolved man, the supreme product of civilization [if not zivilization]. He overcomes morality and restraint to impose his will to power on the world, creating his own truth, and re-investing barbaric characteristics with moral value. Spengler elaborates this view of the regenerative power of barbarians to European culture. 3 0 Nietzsche, 1956, p. 174-5 [11]. 3 1 Nietzsche, 1967, p.464 [868]. 3 2 This interpretation runs at odds with Kaufmann's assertion that "Nietzsche thinks of qualitative degrees of power as corresponding to various forms of behaviour and of culture; and the saint I considered the most powerful man. The barbarian, who is uncultured, is the least powerful" (Kaufmann, op cit. p. 196). In testament to Nietzsche's opaque style, Kaufmann provides a tortuous, gymnastic explanation of one aphorism from 'The Dawn' upon which he bases his wholesale repudiation of the barbarian. Kaufmann mistakenly makes a distinction between 'barbarians' and 'new barbarians;' Kaufmann concedes that the 'new barbarians' mentioned in Will to Power are seen not as a descent to bestiality, but an ascent beyond morals to naturalness. Kaufmann argues that the 'new barbarians' are not very barbarous (ibid., p. 362). Nietzsche does not distinguish between the man and his behaviour and so this explanation is strained. The simpler analysis, that Nietzsche does indeed value the barbarian as an individual of strength and will, not only accounts for Kaufmann's misreading but also corresponds more precisely with Nietzsche's praise of the barbarian both new and old. 128 Nietzsche indicts contemporary European culture as decadent, because it values the 'slave' ethics of weakness, sickness, and altruism above the 'noble' ethics of strength, health, and willfulness. Part of Nietzsche's criticism of the 'slave ethics' concerns part of the self/other dynamic of which anti-Semitism is a particularly virulent variety. He argues, "Slave ethics... begins by saying no to an 'outside,' an 'other,' a non-self... Slave ethics requires for its inception a sphere different and hostile to its own. Physiological speaking it requires an outside stimulus in order to act at all; all its action is reaction."33 In short, Nietzsche is suggesting that the modern conception of identity - that identity requires difference - suffers from an internal weakness. The self depends upon the 'other' for recognition, which immediately complicates the difference. This critique prefigures much current critical thinking on identity.34 The only solution Nietzsche foresaw was a revaluation of these characteristics and the rise of a new man. He describes the barbarian as one "who comes from the heights: a species of conquering and ruling natures," who has the power and lack of restraint necessary to obey his natural instincts, and who gives vital energy back to European society.35 While Nietzsche's work proposes a radical change in the terms by which European civilization was to value itself, he shares with his nineteenth century predecessors an interest in seeing Europe as the centre for the dissemination of these (new) values and of power. This perhaps accounts for his popularity and the extent to 3 3 Nietzsche, 1956, p.170-171. 3 4 See Shapiro and Bhabha on Lacan and Fanon. Shapiro, 1997, p.95; Homi K. Bhabha, "The Other Question: Stereotype, discrimination and the discourse of colonialism," The Location of Culture. 1994a, p.77. 3 5 Nietzsche, 1967. p.478-9 [900]. 129 which his cry of decadence and appeal to power were disseminated into European popular culture through literature, music, and philosophy. Nietzsche was not anti-Semitic. Of course, Nietzsche's own dense style lends itself to mis-interpretation. He cites Jewish theology as responsible for the inversion of values: "It was the Jew who, with frigthening consistency, dared to invert the aristocratic value equations good/noble/ powerful/beautiful/happy/favored-of-the-gods and maintain with furious hatred of the underprivleged and impotent that 'only the poor, the powerless, are good; only the suffering, sick and ugly truly, blessed'... it was the Jews who started the slave revolt in morals... " 3 6 However, distinct from Nietzsche's criticism of the 'slave ethic,' he is vociferously anti-Semitic. He writes in a letter, "It is a matter of honor to me to be absolutely clean and unequivocal regarding anti-Semitism, namely opposed, as I am in my writings."37 Ironically, this explicit repudiation of anti-Semitism was directed at his sister -Elizabeth Forster-Nietzsche - who was an adamant anti-Semite and shameless promoter of her brother's work.3 8 After his death, Forster-Nietzsche, Wagner, and Houston Stewart Chamberlain all quoted Nietzsche to support their beliefs. It should be noted that anti-Semitism was rife throughout Europe during this time.39 Nietzsche was also adopted as a i b Nietzsche, 1956, pp. 167-68 [7], 3 7 Nietzsche quoted in Kaufmann, 1974, p.45. 3 8 Kaufmann in Nietzsche, 1967, pp.xvi-xix. 3 9 Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, Hitler's Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1996, p.53-64. 130 patron saint of Nazism. However, as Kaufrnann argues, "Nietzsche could be quoted in support of Nazism only when passages were torn from their context."40 Nietzsche represents a powerful critique of the Enlightenment values, which had been predominant in European culture during the nineteenth century. As part of this critique, he inverts the value ascribed to the civilized/barbarian dichotomy. Nietzsche argues that the barbarian is the saviour of a decadent European civilization. This theme was to be popularized by Spengler, among others. Spengler: Decline of the West Spengler is of chief interest to this project because of his popularity within Germany in the interwar period. He also represents this anti-Enlightenment, Romantic theme of European thought. Spengler is one of the prime proponents of the value of Kultur over zivilisation. Seeing himself as the heir to Nietzsche's prophecy, Spengler actually only came to the German public's attention when Nietzsche's sister awarded him the "Nietzsche Prize." 4 1 Eventually, however, Spengler's influence stretched from Arnold Toynbee to Hitler. His historical epic, The Decline of the West, popularized two ideas that were to become central to interwar German, and European, culture. Spengler is a prophet of decline, and describes all cultures as organic forms. "Cultures, peoples, languages, truths, gods, landscapes bloom and age as the oaks and the pines, the blossoms, twigs and leaves — but there is no aging of 'Mankind.' Each Culture has its Kaufrnann, op cit, pp.300-1. Herman, op cit, p.244-5. 131 own possibility of self-expression which arise, ripen, decay, and never return."42 Spengler elaborates the distinction between Kultur and zivilization, which described 'culture' as the healthy, strong spirit of a people and 'civilization' as the decadent, baroque, decay of the spirit.43 Spengler also popularized the pluralization of civilizations that could be studied comparatively.44 This is part of a larger discourse that is skeptical of 'civilization' and praises the strengths (lack of restraint) of the 'barbarian.' One finds this distinction in Nietzsche, but Nietzsche projects culture as the unrestrained actualization of the spirit of a people, and civilization as the restraint of instincts. He argues, "the great moments of culture were always, morally speaking, times of corruption [of the slave ethics]; and conversely, the periods when the taming of the human animal ('civilization') was desired and enforced were times of intolerance against the boldest and most spiritual natures."45 For both thinkers, civilization is decadent in itself. The restraint of a culture's spirit marks its decline and inevitable collapse. It is interesting to note that Freud, who considered himself cosmopolitan, rejects the distinction between culture and civilization — seeing restraint of the barbaric as a necessary evil. 4 6 Spengler associated civilization with decline and a baroque emphasis on style over substance. Significantly, he also associated civilization with imperialism. "Civilizations 4 2 Oswald Spengler, The Decline of the West. Helmut Werner ed. Trans. Sophie Wilkins. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962 [Vol. I, 1918, Vol. II 1922], p. 17. 4 3 Eksteins, op cit., pp.79-80. 4 4 Spengler, op cit. p.73. 4 5 Nietzsche, 1967, p.75 [121]. 132 are the most external and artificial states of which a species of developed humanity is capable. They are a conclusion, a thing-become succeeding a thing-becoming, death following life, rigidity following expansion... History is not progress, as Hegel argued, but cyclical generation and decay."47 Imperialism, in this view, was taken to be the external direction of both individuals and resources but the 'spirit' of the nation. The national spirit was engaged in 'civilizing' others, rather than developing one's own national character further. Spengler identifies the nineteenth century specifically as the transition point from expansion to rigidity.48 He argues that the civilizing mission has the effect of looking outward rather than inward. The material expansion of European society depends upon the spiritual calcification of European culture. In sum, he says, "The energy of culture-man is directed inwards, that of civilization-man outwards" towards empire.49 The externalization of energy reflects the decline of European culture for Spengler. This rejection of the civilizing mission challenged contemporary justifications of imperialism. In opposition to the altruism of late nineteenth century imperialist ideology, expansion was seen to be the imposition of a people's collective will to power — not just an expression of their moral superiority. Spengler undermines the 'civilizing mission' upon which imperialist ideology had rested in nineteenth century Europe. Imperialism was not seen as Progress; it was only territorial and economic expansion. This 4 6 Sigmund Freud, "The Future of an Illusion," Sigmund Freud: Civilization. Society and Religion. 1985d [1927 Ger., 1928 Eng.), p. 184. 4 7 Spengler, 1962, p.24. 4 8 Ibid., p.25. 4 9 Ibid., p.28. 133 questioning of the civilizing mission was to have a profound effect on Germany after the First World War, and the loss of its colonies.50 The second idea that Spengler helped legitimize, which was certainly circulating among the Front generation, was that of a "Fifth column" responsible for the German defeat in the First World War. German soldiers at the front felt as i f they had been stabbed in the back by the General Staffs surrender in 1918. "Spengler blamed Germany's defeat on the presence of an innere England, the defection of a class that had been contaminated by liberal ideas, a group of which welcomed the defeat as a change to introduce Western parliamentarianism into German political life." 5 1 Within Nietzsche and Spengler, the primitive, instinctual, will-to-power is set up in opposition to decadent civilization. The barbarian culture of expansion and domination is lauded as the remedy for the restraints of civilization. Both are influenced by the racialist views of Joseph de Gobineau that had disseminated into popular culture by the turn of the century. In this view, "Europeans [used] racial or physiological differentiation to explain cultural differences."52 However, it is worth noting that neither of these writers was anti-Semitic. Their work was, however, to be appropriated by Hitler and the Third Reich in the 1930s and 1940s to such ends that barbarism would never again have positive connotations. Thus, while 'noble' savages could be lauded until the G. Kurt Johannsen and H E Kraft, Germany's Colonial Problem. London: Thornton Butterworth Ltd, 1937, pp.24; 27-32. Although the authors argue that a 'colonial guilt lie' accompanies the 'war guilt' lie in the Versailles settlement, they do not justify Germany's claim to colonies on the basis of the civilizing mission. Instead, they cite the economic, demographic, and territorial needs of Germany within Europe. 5 1 Christopher Coker, Twilight of the West. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998, p. 18. 5 2 Herman, op cit. p.54. 134 present day for being more natural, spiritual, or environmentally conscious, barbarians come to have an uniformly negative connotation.53 Freud: The Barbarian Within Freud is one of the most important thinkers of the twentieth century, and the impact of his work is felt in diverse academic fields. In addition to being the 'father' of psychoanalysis, Freud was a cultural critic—and it is in this capacity that he speaks to the civilization/barbarian discourse and the culture of Europe generally. As such, Freud felt himself to be the heir of the best of the European tradition. He also felt a certain intellectual kinship with Nietzsche. Freud acknowledges his debt to Nietzsche obliquely: "Nietzsche, whose guesses and intuitions often agree in the most astonishing way with the laborious findings of psychoanalysis, was for a long time avoided by me on that very account...."54 Nietzsche's description of the processes of repression and sublimation in The Genealogy of Morals bears an uncanny resemblance to Freud's work.55 Freud, like Nietzsche and Spengler, was skeptical of the supposed progress of European civilization. He considered himself a cultured cosmopolitan, and was horrified at the rhetoric of nationalism stirred up by the First World War and even more horrified at the carnage that ensued.56 Jack Weatherford, Savages and Civilization: Who Will Survive? New York: Crown Publishers, 1994. 5 4 Sigmund Freud, "An Autobiographical Study," Sigmund Freud: Historical and Expository Works on Psychoanalysis. Albert Dickson ed. Trans. James Strachey. London: Penguin, 1986 [1925 Ger, 1927 Eng], p.244. See also, "On the History of the Psychoanalytic Movement," Sigmund Freud: Historical and Expository Works on Psychoanalysis. 1986. p.73. 5 5 Nietzsche, 1956, pp.189-230 [Second Essay]. 5 6 Sigmund Freud, "Thoughts for the Times on War and Death," Sigmund Freud: Civilization. Society and Religion. Albert Dickson ed. Trans. James Strachey. New York: Penguin Books, 1985a [1915 Ger, 1918 Eng], p.61. 135 Freud's psychoanalytic and anthropological work reflects an ambiguous attitude toward both civilization and barbarism — taking the view that both are inevitable forces in the history of humanity. Freud spoke directly to both aspects of the civilization/ barbarian discourse. I will look at his treatment of both civilization and the barbarian within, concentrating on Civilization and Its Discontents and Thoughts for the Times on War and Death. Freud made several attempts at anthropological writing, in which he deduced primeval group structures and contemporary moral prohibitions from psychoanalytic and therapeutic evidence. From his evidence of an "Oedipus complex," in which the developing (male) child wishes to occupy the (authorial and sexual) place of the father in the family, Freud speculates that early society was formed from a similar desire.57 The desire to take the place of the father led to patricide as the first fraternal, community-forming act. The violent act at the core of society is sublimated into guilt. However, the 'barbaric' impulse that fueled the initial patricide remains deep in the structure of society.58 Thus for Freud, "civilization has been attained through the renunciation of instinctual satisfaction, and it demands the same renunciation from each newcomer in turn. Throughout an individual's life there is a constant replacement of external by Sigmund Freud, "Civilization and Its Discontents," Sigmund Freud: Civilization. Society and Religion. 1985b [1930 Ger, 1930 Eng], p.325-29. 5 8 Lacanian psychoanalysis works from this basis to speculate on the universal 'Self / 'Other' structure of all identity. See Jacques Lacan, "The Field of the Other and Back to the Transference," The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis. Jacques-Alain Miller ed. Alan Sheridan Trans. New York: Norton, 1977 [1973]. 136 internal compulsion."59 Civilization is a veneer of restraint over primordial instincts. For Freud, and many Europeans, the First World War showed how fragile that veneer was: The war in which we had refused to believe broke out, and it brought — disillusionment... It tramples in blind fury all that come in its way, as though there were to be no future and no peace among men after this is over.60 Freud views civilization as a precarious "struggle between Eros and Death," in which civilized values demand the repression of instinct and in which those values are internalized as the voice of conscience.61 Freud, like Spengler and Nietzsche, focused on European culture. Unlike Nietzsche, he felt that European civilization was still a productive project. He viewed himself as a citizen of the "wider fatherland" — of Europe — whose work was a part of a pantheon of European accomplishments. Freud's own cosmopolitanism led him to condemn war and its concomitant nationalism and parochialism, as well as the states-system of which it was a fundamental institution. He argues that states have ignored the moral code that they require of individuals — and have thus loosed the restraints of civilization leading to a barbaric war. He argues against realist notion of self-interest as aggression: "It should not be objected that the state cannot refrain from wrong-doing, since that would place it at a disadvantage. It is no less disadvantageous, as a general rule, for the individual man to conform to the standards of morality and refrain from brutal and arbitrary conduct."62 Freud's mix of idealism and pragmatism provide a thoughtful counterpoint to Freud, 1985b, p. 69. Freud, 1985a, p.65. Freud, 1985b, p.314. Freud, 1985a, p.66. 137 parsimonious views of human nature.63 In fact, this statement of Freud's emergent theory of International Relations resembles E.H. Carr's combination of idealism and realism. The attempt to replace actual force by the force of ideas seems at present to be doomed to failure. We shall be making a false calculation i f we disregard the fact that law was originally brute violence and that even to-day it cannot do without the support of violence. There is no use in trying to get rid of men's aggressive inclinations. ... It is enough to try and divert them to such an extent that they need not find expression in war.64 For Freud, civilization is a process of continual restraint and negotiation between instincts and rationality, not of decay or decline. Barbarism is not external to Europe, but internal to Europeans. The barbarian-other is not a type of human or a 'race,' but an indelible aspect of our unconscious. The barbarity of every civilized individual — which is unrestrained in wartime — levels the distinction between colonial-barbarian and European imperialist. The implicit universalism of psychoanalysis implies a uniformity of 'barbarity' within all individuals, which civilization restrains by degrees. Freud, like Nietzsche, argues that the civilized states may feel that 'barbarous' means of warfare are necessary in barbarous times.65 Freud firmly believes that cosmopolitanism and civilization work towards peace.66 But, he also admits that this involves the constant attempt to restrain barbarian instincts within the state and within the individual. While Freud sees psychoanalysis as a tool for the resolution of the tension between instincts and Jean Bethke Elshtain, "Freud's Discourse of War/ Politics," International/ Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics. James Der Derian and Michael J. Shapiro eds. Toronto: Maxwell Macmillan, 1989, p.55. 6 4 Sigmund Freud, "Why War?" Sigmund Freud: Civilization. Society and Religion. 1985c [1933 Eng: Published under the auspices of the League of Nations, correspondence with Albert Einstein; publication forbidden in Germany], p.355-8. 6 5 Nietzsche, 1967, p.487 [922], "What means one has to employ with rude peoples, and that 'barbarous' means are not arbitrary and capricious, becomes palpable in practice as soon as one is placed, with all one's European pampering, in the necessity of keeping control over barbarians, in the Congo or elsewhere." 138 the restraint of civilization, his discourse fits into the wider fear of (racial, sexual, and civilizational) degradation, which was an anxiety endemic to the colonial scene.67 The constant danger to society thus becomes "the return of the repressed" instincts, a term which has recently found its way back into IR with the end of the Cold War. The (re)emergence of ethnic conflict after the supposed peace of the Cold War has been likened to Freud's "return of the repressed."68 Freud also has some interesting insights into the process of identification and group psychology. Since Matthew Arnold's Culture and Anarchy (1869), crowds had been identified as a novel and frightening social phenomenon. Scholarly treatises on the study of crowds began appearing in 1895 with Gustav LeBon's Psvchologie des foules. Freud investigates the crowd and mass psychology in 1922, by which time the crowd had become a fixture in the imaginary of Europe. Indeed, Coker argues that the crowd "dominated the imagination of 20th century Europe."69 This has special relevance as a diagnosis of the spirit of the First World War, which was epitomized by the mass rallies of support when war was declared.70 Freud argues, "by the mere fact that he forms part of an organized group, a man descends several rungs in the ladder of civilization. Isolated he may be a cultivated individual; in a crowd, he is a barbarian — that is, a b b Freud, 1985c, p.362. 6 7 McClintock, op cit., pp.46-51. 6 8 Christopher Coker, "The New World (Dis)Order," The International System After the Collapse of the East-West Order. Armand Cleese, Richard Cooper, and Yoshikazu Sakamoto eds. London: Martinus Nijhoff, 1994a, p.37. 6 9 Coker, 1994b, p.90. 7 0 Eksteins, op cit., p.56. 139 creature acting by instinct."71 The crowd is represented as an individual psyche writ large (with the attendent fears, wishes, instincts, fetishes, neuroses) - the fear of the crows was the fear of one's own instincts. The 'barbaric' crowd is an indication of how close to the psychic surface the barbaric instincts lie. While this analysis of crowd psychology is reminiscent of Nietzsche's condemnation of the "herd instinct," Nietzsche believes that noble and slave mentalities which lead to powerful or weak instincts. Freud and Nietzsche disagree in this respect: whereas Nietzsche sees the natural instincts of the barbarian as 'noble,' Freud considers 'instincts' destructive to society. Psychoanalytic therapy is, in some aspects, the process of reconciling the necessary repression of society with one's instinctual drives. The traumatic experience of war by the individual lays this process bare and psychoanalysis became a popular therapy to treat war neuroses during the First World War.7 2 Like Nietzsche, Freud is extremely critical of nationalism and of German nationalism in particular. However, Nietzsche views struggle as far more positive process for spiritual growth than does Freud. What does not kill me makes me stronger73 These prominent and popular thinkers spread the seeds and cultivated the attitude of cultural pessimism prevalent in Europe during the first forty years of the twentieth century. This widespread nihilistic disposition took two popular forms of interest to this 7 1 Sigmund Freud, "Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego," Sigmund Freud: Civilization. Society and Religion. 1985d (1921 Ger, 1922 Eng), pp. 103-4. 7 2 Elshtain, 1989, p. 54. 140 project: first, the belief that all civilizational values were transient and a matter of politics; and, second, the belief that barbarism was a vital part of the human will-to-power. Nietzsche and Freud insisted that not only was the world unknowable, but "we remain necessarily strangers to ourselves, we don't understand our own substance."74 Barbarians were not 'them,' but 'us.' The barbaric was an integral - i f repressed -component of every European's psyche. This lead to either a fear of degradation or to repression and subsequent psychoanalysis. The killing-zone of the Western Front in the First World War seemed to legitimize this view. It was the site of the loss of a generation, and despite the manic frenzy of the twenties, this loss would haunt Europe until the discovery of even greater horrors. European culture was itself racialized for the first time, as it had racialized its subjects in the colonies. Imperial methods of rule and imperial methods of killing were transplanted to the metropolitan center. The drive to expand one's culture was internalized within Europe. The rhetoric of the civilizing mission began to sound hollow. The First World War: Europe's First Barbaric War The First World War marks a cultural break from the nineteenth to twentieth centuries. It was a war of mass mobilizations in which industrialized, mechanized, depersonalized death became familiar to civilian and soldier alike. Nationalist propaganda was utilized to an unparalleled extent, transforming the popular perception of conflict from a Newtonian 'balance of power' to an existential war of cultures and races. 7 3 Friedrich Nietzsche, "Twilight of the Idols," Twilight of the Idols and The Anti-Christ. Trans. RJ. Hollingdale. New York: Penguin, 1990 [1889], p.33 [8]. 7 4 Nietzsche, 1956, p.149. 141 In fundamental ways, the First World War was, in part, a continuation of the nineteenth century.75 The imperialist, paternalist rhetoric of civilization and barbarism was mobilized to shore domestic identity and vilify the enemy on both sides of the conflict. The discourse of culture and race was used to mobilize popular opinion. Imperial competition was central to a nation's self-image as a world power; and nationalism was a chief determining factor in world politics. By war's end some of the foundations for the twentieth century were also laid down: the birth of modernism76 as a doubting of authority and the power of representation, the eroding belief in rationalism and reason and the growing belief in irrational forces and vitalism, the birth of total war and the subsequent mobilization of entire societies in war, the centrality of technology in war, the rise of democracy, the beginnings of colonial independence movements, and, finally, the beginning of the decline of Europe as the center of international society. The discourse of 'civilization/barbarian' illustrates both the continuous and discontinuous aspects of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Daniel Pick argues: It would be difficult to overestimate the centrality of the notion of "civilisation" in the language of the First World War. A broad distinction between "civilisation" and "barbarism" was used to distinguish the European imperial powers from their colonies; at other times to differentiate sections of the domestic population within a specific state; alternatively, "civilisation" was deployed to contrast the behaviour and genealogy of one European nation with another.77 The persistence of the discourse, and its power in the popular imagination, illustrates the endurance of imperialist world-views in LR. However, the First World War also saw " Coker, 1994b, p.4-5. 7 6 Defining and debating modernism is a cottage industry in itself. In this project, I follow Eksteins, op cit. 7 7 Daniel Pick, War Machine: The Rationalisation of Slaughter in the Modern Age. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993, p. 153. 142 the inversion of the civilization/barbarian discourse. For the first time, Europeans described each other, and even themselves, as barbaric.78 By tracing the shift in the rhetoric of civilization/ barbarian, we see how popular culture shapes identity, and how identity is politicized, especially in cases of war, to shore political support. The simultaneous inversion of the imperialist civilized/barbarian trope also illuminates the inherent ambivalence and instability within discourse, culture, and European identity. I will first look at the First World War as a mass phenomenon, drawing on the development of several tropes prevalent in the nineteenth century. I wil l then describe precisely the way in which the First World War was figured as barbaric, in its use of weapons, tactics, and colonial personnel. First World War as a Mass Phenomenon Two of the most enduring popular photos of the First World War are the massive crowds that gathered to celebrate the outbreak of war (with a jubilant Hitler amongst the sea of faces), and the exotic portrait of Lawrence of Arabia in native dress. The heroic spy is the antithesis of the crowd, but both speak to the First World War as a mass phenomenon. Other wars have, of course, been hotly debated or loomed large in the public imagination — the American Civil , Russo-Japanese and Franco-Prussian wars clearly shaped the public's conception of war. However, the First World War was the first war that required mass mobilization and subsequently mass support in a manner not required of previous conflicts. In this section, I will look at crowds, propaganda, and war itself to illustrate the shift from a nineteenth to a twentieth century culture. Coker, 1998, p.35. 143 One of the important modes of governance that evolves from the colonial context and finds its way back to the imperial metropolis is that of surveillance. The twin concern with seeing and the unseen leads to the geometric, panoptic layout of colonial barracks, schools, prisons, and even, in the case of Haussman's boulevards, cities themselves. The opening of spaces, for both the circulation of people and commerce, has the effect of creating public spaces in which large numbers could gather. The first significant, pan-European, moment of this mass "euphoria, even ecstasy" is the outbreak of the First World War. 7 9 Eksteins argues that "the crowds, in fact, seized the political initiative in Germany. Caution was thrown to the wind. The moment became supreme."80 The young and aimless Hitler claims to have found his purpose in the crowd at Munich celebrating the outbreak of war.81 Freud is also caught up in this initial excitement for the Great War, "For the first time in 30 years, I find myself to be an Austrian," he writes to a friend.82 But, there is a double meaning to these discoveries of national sentiment. Only in the face of an existential struggle with a powerful enemy could either feel included in the national community. Hitler feels German for the first time, instead of the provincial Austrian he was. Freud feels Austrian, despite the extent to which he had hitherto been excluded because of his Jewish heritage. The crowd gives a sense of identity and purpose to the nations at war, in large part, by defining an absolute enemy. 7 9 Brian Bond, War and Society in Europe 1870-1970. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1998, p. 100. 8 0 Eksteins, op cit. pp.63-4. 8 1 Waite, op cit. p.200. 8 2 Coker, 1994b, p.66. 144 The crowd is, in essence, a microcosm of the state and a product of the popular international imaginary. Pick powerfully argues that the propagandists play on national myths and construct a new, national readership of propaganda. The use of propaganda to create a national readership is a specific example of the wider pattern Benedict Anderson puts forward in Imagined Communities.83 In creating a common national geography of enmity and friendship, "internal differences were screened out of the representation [of the nation]; the lines of conflict were treated as purely external."84 Thus, the representation of a common enemy - or 'other' - has the effect of reifying the nation- the ' s e l f Hitler's provincialism, Freud's Jewishness, class antagonisms, political divisions are all subsumed under the grander, more important, national enmity against the enemy — be they British, French, or German. Cate Haste argues, "the essence of propaganda is simplification. In wartime, the intricate patterns of politics are refined into simple and crude messages of right and wrong."85 While this characterization of propaganda is a good starting point, we must recognize that propaganda is not simply the statements of a government, but is "itself an active and often unsettled, a continuing and sometimes uneasy attempt to grasp and define national character."86 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. 2' ed. London: Verso, 1991, pp.33-36. 8 4 Pick, op cit., p. 147. 8 5 Cate Haste, Keep the Home Fires Burning: Propaganda in the First World War. London. Penguin, 1977, p.78. 8 6 Pick, op cit., p. 140. 145 Propaganda can be understood politicized popular culture and international identity made explicitly part of political discourse. Rather than viewing it as a product, Philip Taylor suggests that we view propaganda as "a process for the sowing, germination, and cultivation of ideas."87 As such, propaganda is understood as situated within a field of contested meanings and ambiguous identities. Propaganda makes an effort to portray political conflict in moralistic tones. The 'self is virtuous; the 'other' - the enemy - is evil incarnate.88 This is not to say that propagandistic discourse goes uncontested. Peace groups, in particular, often provide a dissenting view. However, the ways in which propaganda constructs a threat helps to delegitimize other discourses. In short, propaganda is a critical intersection of national identity and popular culture. National identity in the context of the First World War was over-determined, by which I mean that national identity was not merely the result of the propaganda ministry's statements, but that a whole network of institutions and cultural fields reified the same message. Narratives of empire, capitalism, liberalism, and International Relations all circulated the same message.89 The masculine, imperialist, righteous British were united against Godless, Prussian militaristic, barbaric Huns, and Germany. The masculine, cultured, Germans were united against "Asiatic barbarism and Latin indifference."90 The use of the barbarian stereotype to portray both Germans to the 8 7 Philip M. Taylor, Munitions of the Mind: A History of Propaganda from the Ancient World to the Present Era. 2n d ed. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995, p.2. 8 8 Connolly, op cit, p.93. 8 9 It is true that there was a strong pacifist movement during the First World War, but even these pacifists used and reinforced the propagandist language and popular symbols: 'primitive,' 'savage,' 'barbarous,' 'civilized,' cultured'[Pick, op cit. p. 151.] 9 0 Eksteins, op cit, p. 196. 146 British, and the British to the Germans deserves specific attention because of its effect on the attitudes and the actions of those engaged in waging the First and Second World Wars. In many ways, Europe was primed for the First World War. Dating from the end of the Franco-Prussian War, there was a popular fascination for invasion stories in Britain, France, and Germany. These popular novels, often serialized in magazines, described the nation's imminent war with its traditional enemy. IF. Clarke argues that the protagonists of these invasion stories display "a shift in both attitudes and expectations which would come to dominate all future-war fiction from 1871 onwards. Monarchs and their dynasties vanish from these dramas. The whole nation — soldiers, sailors, volunteers, and citizens — become the principal actors in the battle-to-come."91 These stories played a major role in shaping the pre-war imaginary in Britain, France, and Germany. Specifically "William Le Queux's The Invasion of 1910 fill[ed] the public mind with the fear of invasion by a stereotyped enemy, 'The Hun.'" 9 2 Other stories shaped the technological expectations for the next war, including fictional treatises on submarine warfare, aerial warfare, and even the dangers of the Channel Tunnel. These stories fdled the popular imagination with prophecies of defeat and decline, and projected the cultural decadence of Europe into the national and military spheres. The crowds of Europe expected, even anticipated a war with which they had become familiar in contemporary fiction. I.F. Clarke, 'Introduction: The Paper Warriors and their Fights of Fantasy' The Tale of the Next Great War. 1871-1914: Fictions of Future Warfare and the Battles Still-to-come. IF. Clarke ed. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1995, p.8. 147 The crowd sees two chief threats to its identity: the external, knowable enemy, and the internal, seditious enemy. In some cases, the mobilization against this unseen enemy may take more extreme forms than those against the external enemy. In the nineteenth century, European civilization constructed its 'other' in the form of the domestic underclass and the global colonized. This pattern of 'internal' and 'external 'others' was repeated during the First World War. The new 'internal other' was racialized and ascribed many of the characteristics used to portray colonial 'barbarians.' The 'inner-e England* or 'Hun under the bed,' became the prime internal other - which, often, had the effect of minimizing racial, class, and gender differences within the national community. The antithesis of the united, national crowd is its unseen enemy. This image of the power of the 'spy' and his invisibility can be seen as a extension of the fetish for dressing in native costume in the nineteenth century. Hannah Arendt argues that the secret agent is central to colonial governance, dressing up to rule rather than just explore.93 However, what makes the place of the secret agent in the colonies secure is the fiction of the ability of the white to appear non-white, and the inability of the non-white to appear white. This visibility-function makes the white, intra-European spy so dangerous in comparison. The German spy does not have the visible marker of colour to distinguish him/herself from the 'safe' English citizen. As such, spy-paranoia was heightened by the earlier popular images of the Burton-esque imperial travelers. A manic attempt to locate 'actual' national markings ensued. "Letters poured in telling authors and editors [of newspapers] 9 2 Bond, op cit., p.77. 9 3 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism. New York: Harcourt Brace Javonavich, 1973 [1948], pp.216-19. 148 of suspicious behaviour by German waiters, barbers, and tourists which presented an almost exact mirror image of Le Queux's book."94 The suggested reprisals against German nationals in Britain were strikingly totalitarian. It is surprising that the methods used to alienate the Jewish population from Germany were first suggested by the British to be used against the Germans in England. Horatio Bottomley [in May 1915] called for more colourful reprisals against Germans. A l l German property should be confiscated and all Germans locked up. Naturalized Germans should wear a distinctive badge and not be allowed out after dark. Their children should not be allowed to attend schools.95 Without the external signifier of race, the internal, European 'other' is more seditious and thus demands other signs of racial otherness. The use of the barbarian trope in propaganda illustrates exactly the awareness of external and internal 'otherness.' Barbarians, who had heretofore been confined to the non-European world or the lower classes, were suddenly "found" inside Europe's bourgeois populace. The citizen of Britain, for example, became convinced that the citizen of Germany was visibly marked — if not by his/her skin colour, then by his/her unmaskable barbarous behaviour. The appeal to the civilized/barbarian rhetoric started almost immediately: On the 8th of August 1914, The London Evening Standard, shouted "Civilization at Issue," and the theme reverberated ever after. "Guerre contres les barbares," was simultaneously declared in France, while in Germany, the defence and nurture of Kultur became the duty and privilege of all good Germans.96 Bond, op cit, p.77. Haste, op cit, p. 127. Harold D. Lasswell, Propaganda Technique in the World War. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1927, 149 The barbarian stereotype is so strong that it immediately calls to mind danger. Stereotypes are powerful because they simplify, and in doing so minimize ambiguity. They are most readily effective when they agree with previously held opinions.97 Bhabha elaborates, "the stereotype is [colonialism's] major discursive strategy, is a form of knowledge and identification that vacillates between what is already 'in place,' already known, and something that must be anxiously repeated... as if the essential duplicity of the Asiatic or the bestial sexual licence of the African that needs no proof, can never really, in discourse be proved. It is this process of ambivalence, [which is] central to the stereotype."98 V .G . Kiernan argues, In one sphere the colonialists, Britain in the lead, were far better equipped for the propaganda struggle which has been so essential a part of twentieth century warfare. They were well versed in the art of denigrating opponents, in order to justify their own less laudable acts and obviate fault-finding at home or abroad... in 1914-18, passion and prejudice long worked up against other races were diverted against a new target, with Germans in the roles of the "Huns." Once again civilization confronted barbarism.99 The stereotype of the barbarian called forth not only the passionate, irrational, oversexed 'coloured' man from the tropics, but also the atrocities of Attila the Hun and the Asiatic hordes which decimated Europe. Both British and Germans used this rhetoric of the barbarian to identify their enemy. The British reported, and invented, atrocity stories — crimes against women, children, the rule of law, cultural and historic sites- all symbols which represented civilization itself. The British nurse Edith Cavell, who was captured and shot by the Germans in Belgium, was a spy. Her capture and execution, Pick, op cit., p. 140. 9 8 Bhabha, 1994a, p.66. 9 9 V. G. Kiernan, European Empires from Conquest to Collapse. 1815-1960. Montreal: McGill-Queen's Press, 1998. pp. 180-81. however, were portrayed by the British press as an unprovoked assault on a defenseless woman, lending to the reification of the barbarian stereotype.100 Again, we see propagandists linking national identity to other discourses - such as gender and class. The Germans portrayed the Russians as the direct descendants of the Mongols bent on ravaging European culture, and portrayed the English as perpetrating "a kind of treacherous miscegenation, forging an alliance with black- and yellow-skinned people... blurring the lines of division between European and non-European, or between superior and inferior Europeans."101 Both sides of the conflict saw themselves in an existential struggle for European culture, and each side saw itself as its protector of European culture. However, in naming other Europeans as barbaric, the imperialist ideology that was in part based on the palpable differences between civilized Europeans and barbaric non-Europeans began to unravel. Barbaric Warfare Another enduring image in the popular imaginary of Europe is the apocalyptic landscape of First World War battlefields and the faceless silhouettes of troops going 'over the top' into oblivion. First World War warfare was destructive on a scale previously unimagined. It should be recalled, however, that the Spanish flu epidemic of 1919 caused more death than the First World War. In retrospect the worldwide conflict between 1914 and 1918 was widely regarded as a disaster for European civilization. Approximately 10 million men Haste, op cit, pp.89-90. Pick, op cit, p. 157. 151 were killed and twice as many seriously wounded; there were 5 million widows, 9 million orphans, and 10 million refugees.102 Three notable facets of the new, modern type of warfare were specifically considered barbaric: barbaric weapons, barbaric tactics, and barbaric troops. It has been argued that the strategists of the First World War should have foreseen the prospects for a prolonged, costly war in the examples of the American Civi l , Crimean, and Russo-Japanese wars.103 In the American Civi l War, we see the precursors to modern warfare: the first use of railroads for mass mobilization, trench warfare, aerial balloons for surveillance, the destruction of civilian property as a military strategy, and shellshock.104 The Crimean War saw the first photographer, the use of colonial troops, and widespread peace movements in Britain. The Russo-Japanese war saw a majority of casualties occurring from artillery, rather than from sickness or face-to-face combat. The First World War saw the first use of general submarine warfare, toxic gas, the machine gun, and tactical air bombing. The codes of 'civilized' warfare were being undone by technology. Submarine attacks and bombing raids did not discriminate between civilians and combatants, and thus complicated one of the primary customs of warfare. The submarine was incredibly effective when submerged, and when sinking other ships outright, but ineffective when acting as a small warship. International law attempted to restrict the indiscriminate killing of civilians and neutrals by proscribing rules of submarine warfare which neutralized all of the submarine's advantages — giving fair warning, capturing the 1 0 2 Bond, op cit., p. 100. 1 0 3 Coker, 1994b, p.6. 152 ship with a prize crew rather than sinking it, and so on. "Submarine commanders openly refused to act in accordance with this 'absolute duty' pleading military necessity... The only alternative was not to use submarines at all, or to use them ineffectively."105 Whereas in the nineteenth century, the use of technology was unambiguously positive in the advancement of civilization, new technologies at war were considered by all to be barbaric. Technology had outpaced moral/ideology. Aerial bombing was first conducted in a colonial context, but was quickly adapted to the First World War: In October 1911, during the Italian-Turkish War, they bombed Turkish troops and Arab tribesmen in Libya... A year later the French Air Force used terror bombing to put down an anticolonial rebellion in Morocco. Targets included villages, markets, flocks of sheep, and fields of grain. ..Only a few thousand tons of bombs were dropped on strategic targets in World War I, an amount soon matched in various colonial bombing campaigns by France and Britain. The French even developed a fighter-bomber for just such a role, Type Coloniale, while the British initiated in parts of the empire a system of air rule called "Control without Occupation."106 Although a conference was convened, the international agreement on use of airplanes in warfare was never signed. While both Allies and Axis powers denounced these tactics as 'barbaric,' neither could afford to forgo them. The machine gun, which had pacified Africa and Asia, truly consumed a generation on the Western Front. Machine guns made killing an industrial process: "While the infantry remained under cover, the effect of much of this fire was wasted; but when they 1 0 4 Bond, op cit, p. 178 (ft. 33). 1 0 5 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations. New York: Basic Books, 1977, p. 147. 1 0 6 Chris Hables Gray, Postmodern War: The New Politics of Conflict. New York: Guilford Press, 1997, pp. 130-31. 153 rose to advance in attack, [a machine gun] might destroy a battalion of a thousand men in a few minutes."107 "Maxim, the inventor of the first machine-gun, believed that 'only a barbarian general would send his men to certain death against the concentrated power of his new gun.'" 1 0 8 Outdated military tactics fed poorly trained recruits into the maw of the Western Front in orderly lines. The imperial origin of the machine gun and strategic bombing is not insignificant. "The only difference between the battle of the Somme (1916) and that of Omdurman (1898), the last of the great colonial battles, was that both sides in the European war had the same technology."109 It was not the use of these weapons in particular that was considered barbaric, but it was the use of these indiscriminate weapons against other whites. Part of the ob