ON BARBARIANS
THE DISCOURSE OF ‘CIVILIZATION’ IN
INTERNATIONAL THEORY

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Unsatisfied with critical responses to Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations?" this dissertation attempts to trace two central elements of his argument. First, "On Barbarians" traces the evolution of the civilized/barbarian dichotomy from its origins in the nineteenth century to its recent incarnations in International Relations theory. The relevance of Europe's imperial heritage is emphasized, along with certain thematic threads in popular discourse: demography, surveillance, and the distinction between popular and elite culture. The ubiquitous self/other dichotomy, which is central to political identity, has been understood in European imperial discourse to mean European civilization and barbaric others. This rhetoric remains powerful, even in current IR discourse. By reinscribing this civilized/barbarian dichotomy, Huntington in effect uses International Relations theory as a form of identity politics. Second, this dissertation analyzes the presence of culture and identity in the discipline of International Relations theory. Despite specific empirical considerations, Huntington's underlying interest in culture and identity is well-founded, which this dissertation attempts to demonstrate using material from the history of International Relations, post-colonial, and critical theorists. In sum, "On Barbarians" illustrates the critical benefit of studying culture and identity to IR through a critical examination of the civilized/barbarian discourse.
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CH. I: INTRODUCTION

"On Barbarians" is a critical intervention in the growing “clash of civilizations” debate. Briefly, Huntington argues that ‘civilizations’ have replaced states as the main actors in international relations, and that culture has become the chief axis of conflict in the post-Cold War order. This intervention stems, in part, from dissatisfaction with critical reflections on Samuel Huntington’s seminal article that focus on the empirical dimensions of civilizations, rather than a deeper critique of the policies he advocates. This dissertation also reflects a wider project concerned with the relevance of culture and identity to International Relations. This dissertation has two primary aims: first, it aims to situate a criticism of Huntington’s use of the ‘civilization/barbarian’ rhetoric, and aspects of the imperialist discourse of which it is a part, in the historical context of European colonial and post-colonial politics; second, it aims to illustrate the importance of the concepts of culture and identity to our understanding of world politics. Although, as I argue below, the usage and reification of the stereotypes of ‘barbarians’ and ‘civilization’ are hazardous, it is impossible to trace the evolution of the discourse without using the terms. Hereafter, the terms ‘civilization’ and ‘barbarian’ should be taken to be in single quotation marks.

"On Barbarians" is chiefly chronological in its structure. It stresses the shifts, disruptions, and displacements in the ‘civilization/barbarian’ discourse. By concentrating on these discursive shifts, we see how the identities of Europe/the West/IR theory also shift in turn. The introduction indicates some of the theoretical conversations to which this project contributes. The second chapter explores the meanings and etymology of
several key concepts to the argument: civilization, barbarians, culture, and identity. The third chapter, the Long Nineteenth Century, examines some important ideational aspects of European imperialism after 1798. It argues that imperial expansion was a central part of European identity, and that the civilized/barbarian dichotomy was an essential part of colonial discourse. The civilized/barbarian dichotomy was coded in racial, class, and gendered terms and was applied both to colonial and metropolitan populations. This chapter also looks at several important themes in nineteenth century European culture that mobilize the ‘civilization/barbarian’ dichotomy, namely surveillance, demography, and the civilizing mission. The fourth chapter, the First Forty Years, plots how the tensions endemic to Europe at the turn of the twentieth century are reflected in the ‘civilization/barbarian’ discourse. In addition to a growing philosophical scepticism expressed by Friedrich Nietzsche, Europe began to lose its confidence in its imperial rhetoric as evidenced by the work of Oswald Spengler and Sigmund Freud. The civilizing mission began to show signs of strain. Because the discipline of International Relations emerged at this time, special attention will be paid to the study of culture and identity during the discipline’s ‘First debate.’ The fifth chapter, the New Barbarians, examines the unravelling of the civilized Europe/barbaric others discourse. Hitler’s self-proclaimed ‘barbaric’ German state barbarized Europe during the Second World War. The connection that Nazi thought drew between International Relations and imperialism

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1 I adopt Said’s distinction between imperialism and colonialism: “‘[I]mperialism’ means the practice, the theory, and the attitudes of a dominating metropolitan center ruling a distant territory, colonialism,” which is almost always a consequence of imperialism, is the implanting of settlements on distant territory.” Edward W. Said, Culture and Imperialism. New York: Random House, 1993, p.9

2 Following common practice, International Relations (IR) refers to the study of world politics; international relations refers to the object of study.
This dissertation engages a quickly growing body of work by International Relations scholars who have charted the analytical potential of the concepts of culture...
and identity for understanding world politics. The vanguard of this group, scholars such as R.B.J. Walker, Richard K. Ashley, David Campbell, James Der Derian, and Michael Shapiro, base these interventions from a post-structural theoretical position. An important source of this perspective is Michel Foucault, who remains a touchstone for many of these theorists.

In contrast to traditional approaches in IR, Foucault proposes an alternate conception of power. He asks, "why has the West insisted for so long on seeing the power it exercises as juridical and negative rather than as technical and positive?" Foucault proposes an understanding of power as productive or as a "general matrix of force relations," rather than as merely a repressive or deterrent force. Theorists such as William Connolly have extended this understanding of power into political theory - connecting Foucault's notion of power to the politics of identity formation. Connolly argues that the institutional and ideational construction of identity presupposes otherness: "once we see that the self was not designed to be a [political] subject, we are in a position to see that the formulation of subjectivity must subjugate that which does not fit neatly into its confines." Connolly thus explores the dynamic relationship between 'self' and

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3 Post-structural theory is a wide school, which embraces a number of different perspectives and varied methodologies. For the purposes of this chapter, I take post-structural theory to represent a philosophical position which emphasizes: "the instability of meanings and of intellectual categories, and [seeks] to undermine any theoretical system that claimed to have universal validity... [post-structural theorists] set out to dissolve the fixed binary oppositions of structuralist thought..." Chris Baldick, The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Literary Terms. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1990, pp.175-76.


‘other,’ which he argues is central to both domestic and international politics.7 The self/other relationship is the focus of much of this body of work. Foucault suggests a genealogical method of inquiry, which has been adopted by IR scholars such as Bartelson, Campbell, and Der Derian.8 A genealogical method does not aim to find the ‘origins’ of its subject. Rather, “it will cultivate the details and accidents that accompany every beginning... its jolts, its surprises, its unsteady victories and unpalatable defeats.”9 In short, the post-structural perspective from which this project departs aims to excavate the discourses and institutions which constitute meaning in the realm of politics, and aims to disturb the foundations of those discourses and institutions.

For International Relations theory specifically, this post-structural position has several implications. First and foremost is an assertion of the personal responsibility of the scholar. As Mark Neufeld argues: “The study of world politics has always been informed by political agendas, and it is time that the content of these agendas be brought out into the open and critically assessed.”10 The form that this scholastic responsibility takes is shaped by the discipline’s epistemological consensus of the time. As such, during the first debate, for example, responsibility implied a reading of international politics that would lead to peace, or the avoidance of war.11 During the second debate, IR

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scholars figured responsibility in terms of historical accuracy or methodological strictness. During the third debate, critical theorists interpret this responsibility to imply, in Foucauldian terms, as the “resurrection of subjugated knowledges” and the disruption of dominant forms of discourse. While some have criticized the proliferation of theoretical perspectives in IR which this ethic engenders, it reflects a larger trend towards “methodological pluralism” in all of the social sciences.

Second, the analytical value of Foucault’s notion of power has led to a concentration on the ‘discourse’ of international politics. George defines ‘discourse’ as “a broader matrix of social practices that gives meaning to the way that people understand themselves and their behaviour.” Because our imagination of world politics is conditioned, at least in large part, by the discipline of International Relations, scholars like Ashley, Campbell, and Der Derian plot the meanings, and power implications, of International Relations theory itself. Theoretical paradigms describe what is important and what is unimportant in world politics – which in the post-structuralist view is an arbitrary, political choice. Campbell argues,

international relations as a discipline, because of its propensity to [rely discursively on] the state as the organizing identity in the face of both


13 Michel Foucault, “Two Lectures,” Power/Knowledge. pp.80-82.


empirical and theoretical assaults, might be better understood as a particular though powerful theory of identity politics...17

A number of prominent scholars have used this post-structural perspective with great benefit. Ashley has charted some of the political implications of the discourse of realism.18 Campbell has used this perspective to analyze how American foreign policy discourse constitutes, in part, American national identity.19 Der Derian has written an interesting genealogy of inter-state diplomacy.20 These scholars focus, in one way or another, on the implications of the ‘self/other’ dichotomy.21 Shapiro explores how these identity narratives are represented in popular culture, using what he terms “the political imaginary.”22 I will return to this in the next chapter, and the concept of a “political imaginary.” In sum, these scholars argue that the discourse of international relations and International Relations has ideational and material effects, and as such warrants critical attention. “On Barbarians” examines two themes in the discourse of International Relations: civilization and barbarians, and culture and identity. By examining the persistence of the civilized/barbarian trope23, this dissertation plots how the ‘other’ of

Europe and the West is represented over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Another theoretical influence of this dissertation is post-colonial theory. Post-colonial theory emerged from the study of English and Commonwealth literature. Under the post-structuralist and post-modern influence, contemporary post-colonial theory has come to be concerned with questions of identity, culture, and discourse. Césaire, Fanon, and other anti-colonial writers also theorized similarities in the position of the colonized subject. Under this influence, post-colonial theory "[brings] to the forefront of concern the interconnection of issues of race, nation, empire, migration and ethnicity with cultural production." The relations between the academic discipline of Orientalism, popular European stereotypes, and colonial identity is the subject of Edward Said's Orientalism, which is seminal in this field of study and has recently been discovered in IR. Said applies Foucault's account of discourse to representations of the non-European world. He argues that the academic and popular representations of the Orient were "a political vision of reality whose structure promoted the difference between the familiar (Europe,
the West, 'us') and the strange (the Orient, the East, ‘them’)." Representations about the Orient acted to reify European identity. Postcolonial theory attempts both to chart and disrupt this aspect of imperialist discourse. A leading work in this field, Anne McClintock’s *Imperial Leather*, is an excellent study of the discourse of domesticity, in which she illustrates the larger connections between identity, race, class, and gender. Stoler’s *Race and the Education of Desire* provides another important example of the intersection between racial, class, and gender stereotypes in the colonial context. "On Barbarians" follows a similar aim by tracing a specific discourse – in this case ‘civilized-barbarian’ – to show one historic instance of the interconnectedness of identity, culture, race, and imperialism.

Another group of scholars concentrates on the implications of imperialism and the ‘post-colonial’ condition on international relations. Postcolonial theory, or postcolonialism, is concerned with “imperialism, orientalism, and culture,” and, more specifically, with the roots and implications of imperial forms of domination. Postcolonialism and International Relations theory often speak past each other, although they are concerned with similar relations of power and domination. Phillip Darby illustrates the utility of combining post-colonial theory’s occupation with culture and

29 Ibid., p.43.
30 Said, in return, essentializes 'The West,' for which he has been criticized in Walker (1984), Stoler (1995), Moore-Gilbert (1997) among others.
33 Darby and Paolini, op cit. p.378.
ideas and International Relations' concern with power and material domination. Scholars such as Roxanne Lynn Doty, Phillip Darby and A.J. Paolini, and David Blaney and Naeem Inyatullah have endeavoured to illustrate the impact of these concerns on contemporary world politics. Darby and Paolini show the utility of some concepts from post-colonial theory in the evaluation of world politics. Doty takes a similar tack, arguing that contemporary IR theory that uses the North/South dichotomy uncritically has the effect of reproducing colonial categories and stereotypes. "On Barbarians" continues this argument, applying a similar analysis to the civilized/barbarian dichotomy. This thesis attempts to use some historically based (rather than textually based) postcolonial criticism to add depth to the traditional IR representation of imperial and post-colonial international relations.

There are five authors whose work engages specifically with the discourse of 'civilization' and 'barbarians' within contemporary IR theory. After looking at each of these authors, I will conclude by delineating precisely the contribution of this project.

Gerrit Gong published The Standard of ‘Civilization’ in International Society in 1984, based on his doctoral dissertation written under the supervision of Hedley Bull. Gong is interested in legal standard of ‘civilization’ that promulgated in international law

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37 Ibid., p.375.

during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. He argues that the juridical standard of 'civilization' articulated previously implicit norms in European international society.\textsuperscript{39} In this, the standard of 'civilization' not only delimits the boundaries of European international society but also constitutes the identity of European international society. Working from the historicist perspective of the English School, Gong elaborates the standard of 'civilization' as a crucial symbolic tool in the expansion of international society from Eurocentric to global in scope. In concentrating on the legal/juridical discourse, he does not pay close attention to the wider discourse of 'civilization,' 'barbarians,' and 'savages.' While this abstraction is useful in determining the norms of European international society that become explicit in the colonial context, certain ideological tensions – such as the tension between cosmopolitan and nationalist colonial aims – are elided into a coherent, unified discourse. Gong’s interest in European identity is represented in terms of the norms and ideas embodied within European international society.\textsuperscript{40} Gong’s careful treatment of the standard of 'civilization' makes his work a classic within the English School and an essential touchstone for those interested in the discourse of 'civilization.'

Iver Neumann’s \textit{Uses of the Other} presents a critical approach to the evolution of the identity of Europe. Focusing on the centrality of the ‘self/other’ dichotomy, Neumann uses several examples – the Ottoman Empire, Russia, Northern Europe, Eastern Europe – to explore how European identity is conditioned by its relationship to

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\item \textsuperscript{40} Ibid., p.23.
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and representations of its others. In each of the case studies, Neumann illustrates how the symbolic ‘uses’ to which Europe’s others are put vary over time. However, whether reviled as barbaric or grudgingly accepted as ‘the sick man of Europe,’ Europe’s others are never completely accepted or assimilated into the core identity. The Ottoman Empire was slowly incorporated into European international society, but was stopped from being completely integrated into the European community on cultural, rather than economic, grounds.41 Russia was represented as ‘in Europe, but not of Europe’ – even when it occupied half of Europe’s physical space. Germane to this project, Neumann refers to the ‘civilized/barbarian’ discourse as a “master dichotomy” that represents the ‘self/other’ in a series of corresponding alternatives: “European/Asian, free/unfree, market/plan, West/East, defensive/offensive.”42 Uses of the Other represents the leading edge of critical IR theory, which investigates several particular cases of the ‘self/other’ dichotomy in order to politicize contemporary IR discourse.

Neumann’s earlier contribution to this debate is worth revisiting. Along with Jennifer Welsh, Neumann traces the role of the ‘other’ in international society and IR theory.43 Like this thesis, Neumann and Welsh argue first that culture and identity are crucial to International Relations. They combine the historical tendency of the English School with critical theories on the self/other relationship. While the focus of this article is the relationship of the Ottoman Empire to Europe, they lay the theoretical foundations

42 Ibid., 103.
for this study. Neumann and Welsh argue that, “the very idea of what Europe was from
the beginning defined partly in terms of what it was not. In other words, the Other, i.e.
the non-European barbarian or savage, played a decisive role in the evolution of
European identity and in the maintenance of order among European states.” While
Neumann and Welsh do not elaborate this statement, this dissertation elaborates how the
‘barbaric’ Other plays a role in the evolution of European identity.

Roxanne Lynn Doty’s Imperial Encounters invokes contemporary critical debates
in her discussion of American foreign policy and the discourse of ‘North/South’ relations.
Doty’s emphasis on discourse “calls our attention to an economy of abstract binary
oppositions that we routinely draw upon and frame our thinking.” Doty, like Neumann,
lists pairs of dichotomies now familiar to critical IR scholars: core/periphery,
modern/traditional, real states/quasi states, “first world”/ “third world,”
civilized/barbarian, us/them, self/other. Similar to Neumann’s master dichotomies, Doty
argues that these divisions “remain widely circulated and accepted as legitimate ways to
categorize regions and peoples of the world. Thinking in terms of representational
practices highlights the arbitrary, constructed, and political nature of these
[oppositions...] that have enabled and justified certain practices and policies.” Doty’s
work, while focusing on the representation of ‘North’ and ‘South,’ has a clearly political
intent – which is to provide a critical analysis of ‘Northern’ foreign policy. Doty uses the
discourse of gender relations, and specifically American manhood, to clarify

\[44\] Ibid., p.329.
\[45\] Doty, op cit., 1996a, p.2.
\[46\] Ibid., p.3.
representational practices in the American occupation of the Philippines and the British occupation of Kenya. Darby also pays serious attention to representations of gender in order to illustrate the racial and national discourses at stake in the colonial scene in his most recent effort. Doty speaks to the discourse of civilized/barbarian discourse specifically, if tangentially: “through a process of repetition, U.S. and British discourses constructed as natural and given the oppositional dichotomy between the uncivilized, barbarian ‘other’ and the civilized, democratic ‘self’ even while they both engaged in the oppression and brutalization of ‘others.’ The spector of the ‘other’ is always within the ‘self.’” In deconstructing representations of the South, which she argues are inextricably linked to the political practices of imperialism, Doty politicizes the division between North and South.

Neumann and Doty both invoke the work of Tzvetan Todorov, and specifically his *Conquest of America: The Question of the Other*. While Todorov does not speak to IR specifically, *Conquest of America* is a leading work on the subject of self/other relations. Todorov suggests that the self/other relationship has three important dimensions: *axiological*, the extent to which the other is equal/inferior, or valued as good/bad; *praxeological*, the extent to which the other is submitted to or is made to submit; *epistemic*, the extent to which the other is known. These three dimensions are theoretically valuable in adding much-needed context to contemporary analyses of specific self/other relationships. Precisely, it is this tripartite understanding of the

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self/other relationship which allows Todorov to analyse how Columbus, to take one example, is able to both exoticize and denigrate, praise and damn, value and enslave the native ‘Americans’ he meets. This model of the self/other relationship is an extremely useful analytical tool. Todorov’s model separates the value judgements which a society or individual may make from the political reaction to their other – be it assimilation, extermination, or any other possible relationship. He also suggests scholars should be mindful of the degree that a self/other discourse is based on knowledge or fantasy – a warning that is especially germane in the European colonial context. This model adds much needed analytical depth to the study of specific identity relationships.

A recent addition to analysis of ‘civilization’ is Jacinta O’Hagan’s Conceptions of the West in International Relations Thought. O’Hagan combines the more classical framework with a critical view by examining several important theorists of ‘the West.’ She examines Spengler, Toynbee, the International Society school, Fukuyama, Huntington and Said. By parsing the position these important thinkers take on ‘civilizations,’ O’Hagan tries to indicate the centrality of culture to IR theory. She also indicates the importance of understanding the ‘West’ as a cultural entity in order to understand its international relations. One of the important targets of O’Hagan’s insightful analysis is Huntington’s formulation of the ‘clash of civilizations’ argument. O’Hagan argues that Huntington attempts to replace states with civilizations within a

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traditional neo-realist paradigm. This position has a number of empirical and theoretical weaknesses that O'Hagan enumerates. Unlike Neumann, O'Hagan concentrates on the discourse of the West about itself and does not examine its ‘others.’

Patrick Thaddeus Jackson is interested in the discourse of ‘civilization’ as part of symbolic vocabulary that supports American reconstruction of Germany after the Second World War. In pursuit of this goal, he has described two broad approaches to theorizing civilizations. The “substantialist” approach takes civilizations as given cultural entities, and attempts to understand their inter-relations. Huntington epitomizes the ‘substantialist’ approach in his desire to describe the ‘essence’ of civilizations, and describe their (conflictual) relations. The “processual/relational” approach takes civilizations to be ever evolving identity groups, whose most interesting characteristic is in the maintenance of its boundaries. Jackson identifies Christopher Coker’s *Twilight of the West* and Martin Lewis and Kären Wigen’s *The Myth of Continents* as exemplary of this approach. Jackson argues that the ‘processual/relational’ approach to studying civilizations holds more promise, a conclusion with which I heartily agree. This dissertation follows a ‘processual/relations’ approach by tracing precisely the shifts – as opposed to the essence – of the meanings of ‘civilization’ and ‘barbarian’ in the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Given this constellation of work which are interested in the notion of ‘civilization’ and its ‘barbaric’ others, where does this work fit in? The object of *On Barbarians* is

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precisely to elaborate what role this 'master dichotomy' plays in the articulation of European/Western/international identity and what, if any, impact it has had on international relations. This dissertation provides a fresh perspective on the discourse of 'civilization' and 'barbarians.' While various scholars, from different disciplines, have touched upon the 'civilization/barbarian' dichotomy in their exploration of either imperialism, race, culture, or identity, this is the first study to chart the evolution of the discourse.

This project follows one strand of European discourse: the division between civilized and barbarian. This discourse is more prominent in popular culture than it is in the policy archive that is the traditional scope of IR theory. However, this discourse casts a large shadow on the international imaginary of elite and popular culture alike. This project attempts to trace a specific set of ideas on IR theory. It focuses primarily on popular representations of the 'civilized' and 'barbaric,' rather than foreign policy. Much in the vein of Todorov, Doty, and Neumann, "On Barbarians" attempts to elaborate some political implications of the self/other relationship and representational practices by constructing a critical genealogy of one particular discourse. Though the term 'barbarian' has been in use since Herodotus, the juxtapositioning of civilization and barbarism first occurs in the mid-eighteenth century and reaches full maturity by the beginning of the nineteenth century. The dichotomy of 'civilized/barbarian,' and the stereotype of the barbarian, are mobilized at a number of crucial times in European history, specifically: 19th century imperial expansion and colonial rule, First and Second

World Wars, decolonization, and the post-Cold War world. Following this emphasis on popular culture, I have chosen texts that were popular in their own time—i.e. these texts were widely circulated, read, and discussed. Travelogues and world exhibitions were extremely popular during the nineteenth century, and constitute a primary source of 'facts' about the international realm for the metropolitan populations of Europe. Nietzsche, Spengler, and de Gobineau were widely read by literate Europeans, and their political ideas were circulated even more widely in the popular press. While Freud may not have been popular in the same way, his work is both reflective and constitutive of the modern understanding of consciousness. Hitler is a touchstone of evil in the twentieth century, and his textual works give a plain statement of his beliefs. Césaire and Fanon were both extremely popular in France during the period of decolonization. Their impact has endured in post-colonial theory.

The discourse of 'civilization/barbarians' does not circulate as widely during the Cold War period, though I examine some seminal textbooks which shape more precisely the academic imaginary of International Relations. I look at those scholars who connect IR to imperialism, and to the discourse of 'civilization.' Bull, Watson, Gong, and Jackson have shaped our understanding of the impact of imperialism on contemporary international society when the study of imperialism reappears on the academic scene, during the 1980s. In the 1990s, Huntington, Kaplan, Barber, and Kennedy reintroduce the concept of 'civilization' and 'barbarians' into both academic and popular culture. Kaplan and Barber have had a profound impact on the popular international imaginary—in both magazines and popular press books. Huntington, in particular, is a touchstone for theorizing about the post-Cold War world order. Huntington and Kaplan represent a
confluence of popular culture and academic theorizing about post-Cold War world politics, and connect the two perspectives in this project.

By investigating the discourse of 'civilization/barbarians' at each of these pivots of history, we can see how the nature of the stereotype of the 'barbarian' changes and what impact this shifting 'other' has on the constitution of the 'civilization' of Europe or of the West.

The imperialist implications of the civilized/barbarian dichotomy are overlooked in Huntington's argument. Popular and academic writings in the post-Cold War era have resurrected without critical reflection a large measure of imperial tropes, stereotypes, and rhetoric. Huntington is not alone in this imperialist dichotomization of world politics into zones of peace and zones of conflict. Specifically, we find in Huntington, Robert Kaplan, Paul Kennedy, and Benjamin Barber some traditionally 'imperial' concerns with Third World demographic trends, nature itself, and the 'return of the repressed.' While all of these themes have been present in the rhetoric of the civilizing mission from its inception, the anxiety of the 'return' of colonialism to the imperial centre is expressed only during times of crisis. Situated in its historical context, the renewed interest in 'civilization' and 'barbarism' appears less benign.


Scholars from both mainstream and critical perspectives have indicated their interest in ideas, values, cultural and identity politics. Unfortunately, the simplistic, essentialist, dualistic understanding of identity upon which Huntington and many other mainstream scholars base their analyses does not take advantage of recent writings, especially from a post-colonial perspective. I will use the theory of more recent writings on culture and identity to provide a more nuanced understanding of the self/other relationship and the place of culture in international relations.

Using these two theoretical perspectives, "On Barbarians" aims to contribute to critical debates on the "clash of civilizations" and discussions about identity and culture. By situating the civilized/barbarian discourse in its historical context, it contributes a specific genealogy of one theme within European identity politics. This dissertation also adds to current writings on imperialism, culture, and identity in International Relations theory.

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CH. II: CONCEPTS

CIVILIZATION, BARBARIANS, CULTURE AND IDENTITY

This dissertation speaks to two controversies in International Relations: the 'clash of civilizations' argument inaugurated by Samuel Huntington, and the aspect of the Third Debate that focuses on identity and culture. These key terms—identity, culture, civilization, and barbarian—are hotly contested. They are also interrelated: the definition of culture was initially connected to the definition of civilization, which was defined as the opposite of barbarity.¹ As R.B.J. Walker points out, the terms 'civilization' and 'culture' have themselves "been the site of serious philosophical and political dispute."² Culture and identity have become politically charged terms in Western public debates about multiculturalism and immigration, and more specifically in the so-called Third Debate in International Relations.³ In this chapter, I will lay out some of the etymology of these key concepts, indicating the politics at stake in their definition.

Identity

The concept of 'identity' is clouded in epistemological battles, academic wrangling, and definitional ambiguity. Despite this conceptual ambiguity, 'identity' is clearly a central theme in political discourse, and warrants serious analysis. Because individual and group identities are formed "in relation to a world beyond themselves,"

identity politics are of prime concern to international relations. Madan Sarup describes two models of identity: "The ‘traditional’ view is that all the dynamics (such as class, gender, ‘race’) operate simultaneously to produce a coherent, unified, fixed identity. The more recent view is that identity is fabricated, constructed, in process, and that we have to consider both psychological and sociological factors." I will focus chiefly on the latter view. Yosef Lapid argues that, at root, "the problem is not the absence, but the oversupply of potentially rewarding definitions [of identity]. The challenge, in other words, is not to push energetically to some consensual but arbitrary reduction, but to reflectively match suitable definitional assets to declared theoretical missions." This section will attempt to lay out some of the debates about ‘identity,’ thereby indicating the potential value of its use and some possible pitfalls.

Huntington provides a provisional definition of identity which acts as a starting point for his argument: "people define themselves in terms of ancestry, religious, language, history, values, customs, and institutions, [they] use politics not just to advance their interests but also to define their identity. We know who we are only when we know who we are not and often when we know whom we are against." Huntington offers a definition of identity that is singular, static, unchanging, and based on a simplistic dualist structure of self/other. Huntington makes an important conceptual distinction between ‘identity’ and ‘interest.’ On the one hand, ‘identity’ is understood as who individuals

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4 Naeem Inayatullah and David L. Blaney, "Knowing Encounters: Beyond Parochialism in International Relations Theory," The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory, p. 81.


believe they are and the limits of their community. On the other hand, ‘national interest’ – a slippery term at best – is understood as the goals and aims of a community. While these goals may include the protection of identity, Huntington defines identity as more than a conglomeration of interests. He also highlights positive and negative aspects of the process of identification, which I will elaborate below. While there may be a range of reactions to the ‘other’ or outsider – from xenophobia to orientalism – the ‘other’ is by definition marginalized within or excluded from the community. Huntington continues: “Psychologists generally agree that individuals and groups define their identity by differentiating themselves from and placing themselves in opposition to others.”

Post-structural and post-colonial theorists have taken up this view of identity as difference.

Alexander Wendt, a mainstream IR scholar, describes two important aspects of ‘identity:’ corporate and social. Corporate identity “refers to the intrinsic qualities that constitute actor individuality.” Social identity, or social roles, “are sets of meanings that an actor attributes to himself while taking the perspective of others – that is as a social object.”

It is this second social aspect of identity that most concerns International Relations. Wendt also argues that “identification is a continuum from negative to positive, from conceiving the other as anathema to the self to seeing it as an extension of

10 Ibid., p.50.
the self.”¹¹ While this moves away from the dualist position of Huntington, Wendt still assumes that ‘identity’ is stable and knowable.

William Bloom is one of the first scholars to trace the importance of the social psychological process of identification for IR. However, while his analysis of identification provides an interesting venue for studies of nationalism, Bloom uses social psychology as a “norm-free analysis which takes account of, indeed is based in, human nature.”¹² This epistemological position clouds the utility of his analysis: biological essentialism has been discredited by Kenneth Waltz’s critique of “First Image” explanations in Man, the State, and War.¹³ However, Bloom does point to one dynamic of identification that seems to express a consensus amongst scholars: threats to the self or community and the exclusion of others consolidate identity.¹⁴ This process of identification through exclusion is of prime interest to many post-structural scholars.

William Connolly lays out the post-structural position: “difference requires identity and identity requires difference… doubts about self identity are posed and resolved by the constitution of an other against which that identity may define itself.”¹⁵ The assertion of a group sameness or national ‘identity’ requires some elision or exclusion of difference. Communities are never homogenous, and their populations are never

¹¹ Ibid., p.52.


¹⁴ Bloom, op cit., pp.39-42.

¹⁵ Connolly, 1991, pp. x.
obvious, stable, or completely knowable.\textsuperscript{16} McClintock expressed the empirical concerns about the definition of identity as homogeneity: representations of identity and difference often do not reflect empirical or material 'sameness' or 'difference.'\textsuperscript{17} There is a large body of recent theory that is concerned with the relationship with the 'other.' Often influenced by psychoanalysis, critical theorists have argued that while the 'other' is excluded from the 'self,' the 'self' requires the presence of the 'other' to define its boundary.\textsuperscript{18} Hall argues,

Directly contrary to the form in which they are constantly invoked, identities are constructed through, not outside, difference... it is only through the relation to the Other, the relation to what it is not, to precisely what it lacks, to what has been called its \textit{constitutive outside} that the "positive" meaning of any term – and thus its "identity" can be constructed.\textsuperscript{19}

Because definition is determined by limits, at least in part, the 'other' is a necessary component of the 'self.' Roxanne Lynn Doty summarizes the post-structural position for IR: "identity is [conceptualized] as a practice and an effect that is always in the process of being constructed through signifying processes that expel the surplus meanings that would expose the failure of identity as such... The spectre of the other is always within the 'self.'"\textsuperscript{20} Consequently, for critical theorists, the 'other' is both required and excluded in the process of identification.

\textsuperscript{17} McClintock, op cit., pp.61-65.
\textsuperscript{18} Shapiro and Hall provide the most accessible explanations of this dynamic: Hall, 1996, pp.2-5; Shapiro, 1997, pp.94-96.
\textsuperscript{20} Doty, 1996a, p.168.
The 'self' defines its boundaries in relation to some 'other.' That 'other' may be multiple, benign, or inconsequential. The 'other' may be portrayed as inferior or fetishized as superior. The boundaries may be territorial, juridical, economic, or social. However, the 'other' remains outside of the community and accordingly is not granted the same rights as the 'self' inside. Much critical theory in the fields of geopolitics, security studies, political, human, and cultural geography concentrate on the spatial aspect of identity. A prominent scholar in Cultural Studies, Stuart Hall, expresses this dynamic: “identities... are more the product of the marking of difference and exclusion, than they are the sign of an identical, naturally-constituted unity.” Because of the different representations of the 'other,' and the myriad of material consequences these representations may have – from assimilation to genocide – it is imperative that scholars be specific about the identity-discourse and historical context that they are studying.

Critical theorists in IR have also examined the self/other dynamic. Michael Shapiro provides an excellent explanation of Hegelian and Lacanian version of identity formation. David Campbell summarizes a post-structural position of identity and identity formation succinctly:

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24 Hall, 1996, p.4.
25 McClintock has criticized post-colonial scholars for not over-generalizing the relationship between the self and the other: McClintock, 1995, pp. 61-65.
26 Shapiro, 1997, pp.41-44.
the problematic of identity/difference contains no foundations that are prior to, or outside of, its operation... the constitution of identity is achieved through the inscription of boundaries that serve to demarcate an “inside” from an “outside,” a “self” from and “other,” a “domestic” from a “foreign.”

Post-structural theory’s interest in power leads scholars to investigate the operations of power in and on identity structures. Michel Foucault describes how identity-positions come to be constituted by psychiatric, medical, judicial, and sexual discourses. However, he does not explore how individuals come to occupy these positions. Thus, for example, there is a difference between thinking one’s self is a doctor and being a doctor, thinking one’s self a judge and being a judge. While identity may be constituted by representation, we cannot ignore the institutional and discursive context in which identities are legitimized. This leads us to question the location of the ‘operations’ of identity.

The representation of certain identities produced within specific historical and institutional contexts becomes a central analytical focus, in part because they define the cultural forms which identity may take. In addition, the specific textual and material occupation of those subject positions becomes equally important. Thus, many post-structural analyses are not concerned with the empirical definition of a particular identity, but rather with how that identity is represented, performed, and reified through social and

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political practices. This notion of identity practices is connected to the practices of boundary policing, which is central to current thinking on the subject.

In an illuminating work, Iver B. Neumann provides an extremely valuably typology of the varied perspectives taken by different disciplines all concerned with the same dynamic. He suggests four paths along which theorizing of the self/other relationship has been developed:

The ethnographic path: based in studies of “in-group” and “out-group,” this path is represented by scholars who study nationalism and the constitution of ethnic groups in IR.

The psychological path: similar to Bloom’s analysis of social psychology, this path applies psychoanalysis to inter-group dynamics and ethnocentrism.

The Continental philosophical path: largely tangential to IR, this path outlines philosophical contributions by Habermas, Taylor, and other philosophers on the relationship between ‘self’ and ‘other’ in the Western tradition.

The “Eastern Excursion:” following Said, this path constitutes the majority of Neumann’s argument on the identity of Europe and its specific exclusion of one of the many “Easts” – Turkey, Russia, and Northern Europe.

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32 Neumann, op cit, p.5.


35 Ibid., p.15.
These four paths represent the best contemporary summary of disparate fields which tackle the same general theme, although it should be noted that scholars working within postcolonialism, feminist studies, and human/cultural geography have also engaged this problematic. "On Barbarians" follows Neumann’s fourth path, focusing on the colonial or imperial East.\textsuperscript{36} It works from the assumption that the identity of a group claiming the status of ‘civilized’—in this case Europe—requires barbarians against which to define themselves—in this case the colonial subjects. The status of ‘civilization’ is meaningless without ‘barbarians’ against which to compare one’s self.\textsuperscript{37}

Shapiro’s notion of the “political imaginary” comes into view in the context of this project. Because identities have no basis outside of discourse, from the post-structuralist perspective, individuals and groups must ‘imagine’ and ‘act out’ or ‘perform’ their identities. Thus an individual may identify herself as being Canadian even though she may not spatially, legally, or socially occupy that position. In an important way, a society is who it imagines itself to be and how it acts. Identity involves an understanding of the place of the self in the world—which is clearly relevant to IR. The ‘international imaginary’ is defined as the field of beliefs, values, histories, and assumptions that a group holds about the international realm. The ‘international imaginary’ can be understood as the cultural, historical, and ideational precursors to national performance in the international realm. I will elaborate this concept in the chapters to follow.

By tracing a specific permutation of the self/other dichotomy,"On Barbarians" will elaborate a specific instance in which identity is defined contingently and relationally.

\textsuperscript{36} Ibid., p.207.
The ascription of civilized or barbarian is not a neutral, objective description. Rather, the civilized/barbarian discourse has specific, imperialist overtones that should not be overlooked. Walker plots some of the relations between identity, culture, and the civilization/barbarian dichotomies: "culture, like civilization, becomes something we have, distinguishing us from the barbarians outside. ... The possession of 'civilization' justifies the conquest of 'barbarism.'"38

_Culture_

As argued by Raymond Williams, culture is one of the most contested and complex words in the English language.39 Within the context of traditional IR literature, culture refers to a "stock of interlocking beliefs, ideas, understandings, perceptions, identities, or what I would call 'knowledge' held by members of [a] system."40 By exploring the contesting definitions of culture, I will illuminate some of the political stakes specific scholars have in the term's definition.

_Culture as soft power_

The most traditional manner in which to conceptualize 'culture' in IR is as 'soft power.' 'Soft' power is described as the power over opinion, usually in contrast to the 'hard' power of military and economic resources.41 Also known as 'prestige,' soft power stands for the history, ideals, and values that a country represents. This prestige, or soft

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37 Neumann and Welsh, op cit. p.329.
39 Young, op cit. p.30.
40 Wendt, op cit. p.49.
power, was seen to be especially important during the two world wars and the period of decolonization.\textsuperscript{42} The power of ‘culture’ is also displayed, in this view, from the promulgation of Western ideas into non-Western societies.\textsuperscript{43} Westernization is seen as a reflection of the inherent power of Western ideas, independent of any hard power considerations. Huntington has most recently expressed this view of culture, although with a more pessimistic conclusion.\textsuperscript{44}

‘Culture’ is also studied in analyses of ‘national character.’ More popular with traditional realists than contemporary scholars, ‘national character’ comprises the influence of national identity on international behaviour. Hans J. Morgenthau argues that:

\begin{quote}
National character cannot fail to influence national power; for those who act for the nation in peace and war, formulate, execute, and support its policies, elect and are elected, mold public opinion, produce and consume – they all bear to a greater or lesser degree the imprint of those intellectual and moral qualities which make up the national character.\textsuperscript{45}
\end{quote}

Such a study may rely on national stereotypes, rather than ‘culture.’

Generalizations about the characters of other international actors are often implicated in nationalist political discourse – either as allies or enemies. E.H. Carr points out that to depict one’s enemies or one’s prospective victims as inferior beings in the sight of God has been a familiar technique at any rate since the days of the Old Testament. Racial theories, ancient and modern, belong to this category; for the rule of one people or class over another is always justified by a belief in the mental and moral inferiority of the ruled. In


\textsuperscript{44} Huntington, 1996, 310.

\textsuperscript{45} Morgenthau, op cit., p.122.
such theories, sexual abnormality and sexual offences are commonly imputed to the discredited race or group.\textsuperscript{46}

As such, studies of national character cannot be studied apart from the political, not to say ideological, context in which they are circulated. The study of national character finds its institutional position in the sub-field of foreign policy analysis.\textsuperscript{47}

During the Interwar period, world public opinion was thought by the Idealists school of IR theory to be a sufficient deterrent to war, in part because of the mass mobilization necessary for modern total warfare. Following this, culture is often equated in the realist tradition with what Carr terms the “power of world opinion.”\textsuperscript{48} However, the failure of world opinion to prevent war discredited the study of popular opinion until the end of the Cold War.\textsuperscript{49} Studies of popular opinion within IR were also figured as studies of propaganda, the process by which the government attempts to shape public opinion.\textsuperscript{50} Works by Walter Lippmann and Harold Lasswell are seminal to this sub-field. However, the study of propaganda, in large part, is marginal to the discipline.\textsuperscript{51}

In sum, the realist concern with power encompasses ‘culture’ to the extent that it is understood as an expression of the ‘power’ of ‘national’ ideas over both domestic and international opinion. It is not surprising, also, that realist theory should figure ‘culture’ in terms of nations and states. However, this definition of ‘culture’ limits the analytical

\textsuperscript{46} Carr, op cit. p.71.


\textsuperscript{48} Carr, op cit. p.140.

\textsuperscript{49} Morgenthau, op cit. p.236.

potential of the concept, in particular because it relies on figuring the state as a ‘natural’
entity and national culture as an outgrowth of that political entity. ‘Culture’ is thus
understood solely as a hegemonic discourse, without any consideration of the multiple,
political discourses which shape cultural production. Ali Mazrui has argued that an effect
of describing culture as soft power has been the division of the world into one that “is
often define[d] in cultural rather than economic terms.”52 Walker concurs that the
implication of the formulation of ‘culture’ as Westernization is the notion that “culture,
like civilization, becomes something we have, distinguishing from the barbarians
outside.”53 As such, ‘culture’ in this configuration can be seen as lending itself to the
imperial project, or, at the very least, a component of ethnocentric rhetoric.54

_Culture as ideas and/or values_

Most recent scholarship on culture has taken the perspective that ‘culture’
represents the ideas and values – or norms – of the actors within a social system.55 Based
on empirical concerns, scholars who subscribe to this definition seek the ‘objective’
evidence of culturally conditioned behaviour.56 Peter Katzenstein defines culture as a
“collective model of nation-state authority or identity carried by custom or law. Culture
refers to both a set of evaluative standards (such as norms and values) and a set of cognitive standards (such as rules and models) that define what social actors exist in a system, how they operate, and how they relate to one another."57 James Rosenau’s tripartite division of the bases of international order on ideas, behaviour, and institutions is characteristic of this view.58 This understanding of culture is bound up with the general epistemic realist position, which has faced numerous post-structuralist critiques.59 Defining ‘culture’ as ideas and values has the effect of being reductionist – in assuming an ideational or value consensus treats ‘culture’ as a product.

However, ‘culture’ is more productively construed as a process. To avoid criticism that ‘culture’ is not a homogenous, unified ideological field, we must admit the perseverance of resistant discourses in the cultural field. As such, within this position, the object of study is most often the dominant discourse – rather than the dialogue, which surrounds the issue. For example, most studies of strategic culture focus on the consensus of strategic beliefs which specific, national elites display.60 In doing so, these studies neglect the popular strategic culture of nations.61 One cannot explain cultural change without reference to both exogenous factors, such as material or power relations,

and to endogenous factors, such as counter-cultures, micro-cultures, or minority viewpoints. 'Culture' is not a single hegemonic discourse, but the interaction of dominant and minority discourses.

The notion of 'culture' as an expression of value consensus amongst actors is also essential to the English School's conception of international society. Adda Bozeman illustrates the degree to which the English School takes cultural interaction seriously as a distinct realm of international relations. Bozeman takes a view, indebted to Arnold Toynbee, that cultures dialogue and compete – the stronger values winning at the "bar of history." Post-structural critics view this teleological view of history as progress with great scepticism.

In short, defining 'culture' as the values and ideas of a set of given actors evidences the power of beliefs in world politics. However, this conception is largely static, and product-oriented rather than process-oriented. It takes 'culture' to be an established social condition, rather than a dialogue or conversation. There is also a bias towards elite culture at the expense of popular culture. By this I do not mean that IR takes opera seriously but not film. However, there is a tendency in studies of foreign policy analysis and strategic culture to analyze the State Department or the Foreign Ministry etc., before studying popular films or news reports. Recent analysis in critical IR, notably by

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Shapiro, Der Derian, and Klein, attempt to redress this imbalance by focussing on popular representations of the international imaginary, which I will explore below.

*Culture as Nation*

As Walker points out, ‘culture’ "has been the site of serious philosophical and political dispute" in European political and social discourse. On the one hand, ‘culture’ is seen as the inheritance of centuries of European excellence. During the late Victorian era, culture was represented by Matthew Arnold as the ‘civilization’ of the upper, educated classes against the ‘anarchy’ of the lower and emerging middle classes. Said is specifically indebted to this definition. On the other hand, *Kultur* is understood as a local, particular, nationalist identity. Framed within a debate about the national identity of Germany, *Kultur* was described as the natural, folk-ish historical particularity of the German people, often against an emerging technical, sterile, and universal *zivilisation*. Herder is one of the first philosophers to argue for the existence of multiple civilizations, instead of the theory of one single European civilization, a view which was popularized by Spengler. As a consequence, there is a certain historical tension between the claims of particularistic culture and universalist civilization. In many ways, Walker argues, “culture remains associated with the insistence on diversity, fragmentation and relativism,

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66 Walker, 1990, pp.4-5.
68 Ibid., p. 6.
on the celebration of traditions arising from particular communities against the claim of a universalizing humanity – claims that have tended to arise from particular, though dominant, communities.”

Said understands culture to mean “all those practices, like the arts of description, communication, and representation, that have autonomy from the economic, social, and political realms and that often exist in aesthetic forms, one of whose principal aims is pleasure... [and] each society’s reservoir of the best that has been known and thought.” Said has been criticised for this focus on elite, national culture.

In sum the definition of culture as national identity is tied to a larger philosophical debate surrounding universalism and particularism that is quite contentious. Culture often stands as code for particularism and relativism – perhaps suggesting the source of traditional discomfort with the concept. Culture, especially in Matthew Arnold’s terminology, is also taken to represent the ‘best’ a society has to offer, and is coded in racial, class, and gendered terms. Specifically, the academic tendency has been to concentrate on elite rather than popular culture. However, post-colonial and cultural studies have indicated the importance of popular culture to identity and political discourses.

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72 Said, 1993, pp.xii-xiii.
Culture as Field

In much recent critical theory, 'culture' is understood as the field of representations in which power and identities are constructed, reified, negotiated, and resisted. Sarup reminds us that "the reality-construction of a common culture or national character is not something that happens once. Rather there is a constant process of asserting, questioning and redefining of national identity." This understanding of 'culture' as a field of representation in which rival identities, discourses, and meanings vie for allegiance seems to me the most analytically productive.

In the first instance, this notion encompasses the previous definitions of culture—understanding the field of representations to comprehend the abstract ideas, history, and values of a particular group but also the specific textual and institutional ways these ideas are practised. It also widens the scope of analysis so that national, subnational, and international cultural fields might be understood. As Sujata Pasic argues, "a cultural approach enables us to leave behind unitary state actors, purely interactionist accounts, and unnecessarily limiting conceptual boundaries such as domestic versus international and state versus society."

In the second instance, this notion of 'culture' emphasizes the process of cultural dialogue over the assumed cultural consensus or 'product.' This prompts the theorist to analyze cultural practices within their specific historical, political, and economic context. Seeing 'culture' as a dialogue also prompts us to "resurrect subjugated knowledges,"

74 Sarup, op cit. p.140.
75 Sujata Chakrabarti Pasic, "Culturing International Relations Theory: A Call for Extension," The Return of Culture and Identity to IR Theory. p.97.
seeking those voices which resist the dominant discourse. This view of ‘culture’ as a field of representations also enables scholars to see identity formations – such as self/other and civilized/barbarian – in their discursive context. The discourses of race, class, gender, and imperialism are mutually constituting, and mutually implicating.  

Studying the entire field of cultural productions allows us to see these connections.  

The study of popular culture is an important component of this position. Popular culture, it is argued, offers more discursive space for the analysis of resistance to dominant discourses. Phillip Darby highlights the importance of popular culture to IR specifically. He argues, “The need to elevate culture as a subject of study in international relations directs attention to people as a neglected dimension of the discipline ... what has been missing is people outside the circles of official power; people who in some way are expressive of their society and carry its values into other societies and the international arena.”  

While not disputing the importance of diplomatic and state elites, the international imaginary of the population, the “popular international imaginary,” is also central to the International Relations. What I mean by ‘popular international imaginary’ is the popular beliefs about the world outside of the state, the nature of that ‘outside’ — the international society, and the place of the state in that society. This is a slight modification of a term both Said and Shapiro use: “international imaginary.”

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76 McClintock, op cit.  
international imaginary is understood as the structural and symbolic framework that gives meaning to, and perpetuates the configuration of sovereign states and their international relations.\textsuperscript{80} Shapiro continues,

To analyze how things in the world take on meanings, it is necessary to analyze the structure of imaginative processes. The imaginative enactments that produce meanings are not simply acts of a pure, disembodied consciousness; they are historically developed practices which reside in the very style in which statements are made, of the grammatical, rhetorical, and narrative structures that compose even the discourses of the sciences.\textsuperscript{81}

I plan to use histories, travel writings, and IR theories, which use the discourse of civilization/barbarian to explain and justify imperialism, as reflections of the popular imaginary. This too marks a departure from traditional international relations which, for the most part, has concentrated on elite perceptions of the international realm. Given this focus on popular culture and popular international imaginary, I will concentrate on histories that are exemplary of their cultural milieu, supported by other literary and popular texts.

Culture and identity are central to this project, and from this perspective, to the study of international relations. However, this dissertation does not take the position that culture or identities are fixed, stable, or natural. Consequently, “On Barbarians” will examine how the civilized/barbarian dichotomy comes to represent an imperial dualism between Europe and its (post)colonial others in popular representations.


\textsuperscript{81} Shapiro, 1988, p.7.
Civilization

‘Civilization’ has stood for several different ideas in its history. Pasic argues mindful of the previous discussion about post-structuralist notions of identity construction that “exact meanings for terms such as civilization must be context-specific. As a category in understanding world politics, it is more important to see civilization as informal organization, a mythological cognitive construct like ‘race,’ ‘ethnicity,’ ‘nation,’ or ‘state’ that enables the perception of social unity upon which social organization is always grounded.”82 From its inception, civilization was defined as similar to culture and the opposite of ‘barbarism.’

In its first incarnations, ‘civilization’ stood for a process of ‘cultivation’ (linked to both manners and agriculture) and for European identity. The term first appears in English in 177283, in opposition to barbarity, and in French in 1767.84 The term was quickly mobilized in the imperial context— as both endorsement and critique of the process of European expansion.85 In the nineteenth century, ‘civilization’ was taken to represent a mission of homogenization and ‘improvement.’86 Thus, the rhetoric of ‘civilization’ was quickly appropriated by imperial ideology to mean the ‘civilizing mission.’ It also came to represent European states as a group.

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82 Pasic, op cit., p.99.
83 Young, op cit., pp.30-31.
85 Spengler, op cit., p.28.
86 I’d like to thank Dr. Edward Keene for first pointing this out to me.
For most of this part of its history, civilization was a political term that was used to elide the differences within European communities, in comparison to those savage and barbaric communities outside Europe. I will elaborate the differences between 'savage' and 'barbarians' in the next section. European civilization was defined, in part, as the technologically superior, universal standard portrayed by Enlightenment thinkers. The term 'civilization' was also defined against groups within Europe who were labelled 'barbaric' and 'savage.' The distinction between 'civilization' and 'savagery' and 'barbarism' was also mobilized to distinguish classes within European nations. Walker writes, "civilization’ in particular encompassed all kinds of notions which we now see as characterizing the development of a new kind of society... The most familiar of these are the conception of progress, the distinction between civilization and barbarism, secular rationalism, and individualism: the world enshrined in the Universal Histories of Enlightenment."88

In sum, 'civilization' has been a contested term used by both proponents and critics of the civilizing mission and the imperialism of which it was a vital part. However, 'civilization’ has always been a characteristic that ‘we’ have, in contradistinction to ‘them’ – the barbarians.89

Gerrit Gong adds to this understanding of the term that ‘civilization’ represented an expression of a single European identity, based on a notion of secular – rather than

87 See McClintock on Irish and Welsh racism and the parallels to the discourse of the lower classes in Britain. pp. 52-60.
religious—unity. He argues that, as a standard, ‘civilization’ reflected European culture’s dominance over other societies. Just as identity is involved in the policing of boundaries, European civilization was also figured as a ‘standard’ in international law. The European standard of civilization, of course, conflicted with other societies that had their own sense of ‘civilization’ and ‘barbarian.’ Said argues that, indeed, “all cultures tend to make representations of foreign cultures the better to master or in some way control them.” What is of particular interest, then, is how the European standard of civilization came to prevail over all others.

Gong explains how the standard of ‘civilization’ was mobilized to distinguish those states that could expect sovereignty and those that could expect domination. This juridical boundary between Western and non-Western states was patrolled earnestly. As Neumann and Welsh argue, the border between civilized Europe and the barbarous outside was integral to the European notion of self and other. The only non-European powers of account within nineteenth century international discourse were those which imitated Europe: the Ottoman Empire (1856), Egypt (between 1801 and 1882), Japan,

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90 Silvia Federici, “The God that Never Failed: The Origins and Crises of Western Civilization,” 


92 Ibid., p.8.


95 Neumann and Welsh, op cit., p.348.
The incorporation of these pseudo-western states into the international society of Europe was the exception that proved the rule of ‘civilizing,’ proving that it was possible for those that were not yet members to attain the status of ‘civilized.’ This distinction between civilized and barbarian spheres of international relations had serious implications for the conduct of imperial powers in the non-European world.

A resurgence of the term ‘civilization’ can be found in Europe during the First and Second World Wars. ‘Civilization’ was mobilized in wartime propaganda as a characteristic that separated ‘us’ from ‘them’—regardless of which side employed the rhetoric. There are some interesting uses of the rhetoric that will be examined in chapters four and five. A decline of the use of the term ‘civilization’ in popular and academic culture accompanied the process of decolonization and the loss of European self-confidence. Civilizations have received some attention by World Systems theorists, but this perspective is chiefly concerned with the expansion of global capital. Huntington’s now (in) famous “Clash of Civilizations” in 1993 represents the resurgence of the interest in ‘civilizations.’ While Huntington’s use of the civilizational concept has been recently examined, the imperialist echoes of this move have been largely unexamined.

In sum, though the meanings of ‘civilization’ have shifted according to the prevailing ideological needs of the dominant groups, it has always represented a standard

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98 Mazrui, op cit., p.35.
that determines the boundary of a particular, often European, community. However, the specific permutations of this rhetoric illuminate the structure of the changing European identity over the past two hundred years. Also, because so much of the civilized/barbarian rhetoric has been aimed at a popular audience, tracing the changing meanings of 'civilization' illustrates the potential of popular representations of international relations for critical IR theory.

**Barbarians**

Etymologically, the term 'barbarians' has its origins in the Greek description of foreigners whose speech was incomprehensible to them. «Barbarians» could not participate in Greek speech, which was the foundation of logic, philosophy, and politics — nor could they participate in the polis.  Aristotle describes barbarians as "slaves by nature," and this description has remained a vital part of the definition to the present day. ‘Barbarians’ are always described in relation to a standard of civilization, and are always defined in relation to a ‘lack’ of civilization. Barbarity is the mirror to civilization. As such, the ‘barbarian’ is gendered (as either masculine, androgynous, or feminine), sexualized (a lack of sexual restraint), capitalized (as ignorant of capitalism

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100 Mazrui, op cit., p.39.
101 Harbsmeier, op cit., p.7.
and the class system, but wily and dishonest once introduced), surveyed (inscrutable but controllable through counting, demography, and surveillance), indistinguishable (numerous and lacking individuality), and dangerous (both through open revolt and covert subversion of individuals). These standards may be implicit or explicit, but conditioned much imperial and metropolitan behaviour. As yet, no scholar has investigated the discourse of barbarians specifically.

In this section, I will trace some of the history of the term ‘barbarian,’ and distinguish it from the similar discourse of the ‘savage.’ During the Middle Ages, following ancient Greco-Roman symbolism, ‘barbarians’ were equated with the ‘other’ of Christendom. This dichotomy was reified during the Renaissance, most often using the stereotype of the ‘Turk’ in *exhortatio ad bellum contra barbaros.* In Neumann’s analysis of the evolution of the ‘Turk’ in the European imaginary, he notes a common feature of this rhetoric is that “a logic of culture exists and must take precedence over a logic of *raison d’état.*”

Renaissance thinkers drew distinctions between Scythian barbarians of Central Asia and the ‘monsters’ internal to the wilds of Europe (or outside Europe), but used both terms. It is important to remember that ‘barbarians’ and ‘monsters’ that the ‘others’ of Europe are not just external. Jews, Sinti and Roma [Gypsies], Eastern Europeans are each constituted as ‘other’ from mainstream European

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105 Neumann, 1999, p.47. The connection to Huntington – who attempts to connect a logic of culture with a logic of *raison d’état* – is particularly interesting.
identity, and, as such, are often the object of the ‘barbarian’ or ‘savage’ stereotypes.\textsuperscript{107} Neumann and Wolff both provide excellent historical studies of how Eastern Europeans, in particular, are constituted as marginal members of European society and how that marginal identity functions to shore the identity of Europe itself.\textsuperscript{108}

In part the separation of the ‘barbaric’ from the ‘savage’ coincided with the growing secularization of the European states system, and of European states themselves. The term ‘savages’ first came to be applied in the sixteenth century. The ‘other’ of Europe ceased to be defined primarily in religious terms during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.\textsuperscript{109} The terms ‘barbaric’ and ‘savage’ are used all but interchangeably from the 16\textsuperscript{th} century until the 18\textsuperscript{th} century. In the 18\textsuperscript{th} century, we see ‘savage’ and ‘barbarian’ come to represent different ‘others.’

Information and images about non-European societies proliferated in utopias, distopias, fiction, plays, and epistolary novels and became extremely popular throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.\textsuperscript{110} The exotic ‘East’ became a receptacle for European ideas – both about itself and its ‘others.’ In describing its ‘other,’ either as superior or inferior to Europe, representations of the ‘East’ were used to elaborate the identity of Europe. The distinction between ‘savages’ and ‘barbarians’ has two chief

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sources. The first is the growth of knowledge about other non-European civilizations and societies and the systematization of that knowledge. The second comes from a ‘four-stages’ model of societal development, based on subsistence relations, popularized by Scottish and French theorists in the 18th century.

Though tangential to this particular project, I will look at the evolution of the notion of the ‘savage.’ While ‘barbarian’ has been a staple – if not stable – stereotype since Herodotus, the stereotype of the ‘savage’ is of recent origin. ‘Savages,’ coming from the Roman word for woods [silva], was first used to represent [men] who lived in the German forests without any organized society. The ‘savage’ was conceived as either ‘noble’ or ‘ignoble’ – as either uncorrupted by ‘civilized’ manners and thus closer to the natural state or as entirely unrestrained by ‘civility’ and thus closer to an animal state. Whether ‘noble’ or ‘ignoble’ – peaceful or violent – the ‘savage’ lived without the benefit of society and European ‘civility.’ The ‘ignoble’ savage was viewed as justification for the civilizing mission. The Romantics used the position of the ‘noble’ savage to criticize European civilization. The ‘savage’ was represented both as an ancestor of the European and as an internal part of the psyche of a European.

Europe did not have a long-standing relationship to America, in the way that Asia had existed in its historical imaginary. As such, with the discovery of the New World, the ‘savages’ which the first explorers encountered were symbolically sui generis. This is not to imply that Europe did not have a source of images to project on the native

Americans. The description of ‘savages’ in the New World often coincided with ancient
descriptions of ‘monsters’ – mermaids, dog-headed men etc. Todorov’s Conquest of
America looks precisely at representations of native Americans to elaborate a general
theory of ‘otherness’ because it was an “extreme, and exemplary, encounter” with the
Other. However, we should note that American ‘savages’ was an ideal, that is to say
not over-determined, site on which to project the European view of itself. Accordingly,
those thinkers who regarded European ‘civilization’ well condemned the ‘savagery’ of
the Native Americans. Those thinkers, like Rousseau, Montaigne, and Montesquieu who
viewed the benefits of ‘civilization’ with more scepticism were more laudatory of society
with civilized decadence.

Montaigne’s “On cannibals” and “On the custom of wearing clothes,” published in
French in 1580 and in English in 1603, illustrate the critical potential of ‘savages.’ In
“On cannibals,” Montaigne argues that “we are justified in calling these [cannibals]
barbarians by reference to the laws of reason, but not in comparison with ourselves, who
surpass them in every kind of barbarity.” Exemplary of ‘positive’ Orientalism,
Montaigne says “I do not believe... that there is anything barbarous or savage about
them, except that we all call barbarous anything that is contrary to our own habits.”

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113 Fausett, op cit., p.193; Todorov, 1999, pp.16-17.
114 Todorov, 1999, p.5.
1603], pp.105-119.
116 Ibid., p.114.
117 Ibid., p.108.
Gong points out, this observation is lost on nineteenth century international lawyers.\textsuperscript{118} This relativist theme was recurrent in 16\textsuperscript{th} and 17\textsuperscript{th} century Europe.\textsuperscript{119}

Montaigne specifically equates ‘savages’ with ‘barbarians’ in “On cannibals.” However, we should note that even while Montaigne praises the natives of Brazil, he does by representing them as markedly ‘other’ – different from Europeans. He says, “there is a special savour and delicacy in some of the uncultivated fruits of those regions that is excellent even to our [corrupt] taste, and rivals our own.”\textsuperscript{120} Montaigne represents ‘cannibals’ as noble savages, who are free from the corruption of decadent society. It is also interesting to note that Montaigne distinguishes the savages of America to the Scythians, the barbarians described in Herodotus, Pliny, and Gibbon’s \textit{Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire}. Montaigne says that the cannibals do not eat the flesh of their enemies “for nourishment as the ancient Scythians did, but as a measure of extreme vengeance.”\textsuperscript{121} Consequently, we see the tension between the discourse of the noble savage and the Scythian barbarian, even at a time when the terms were used all but interchangeably. Further, Montaigne argues that the contemporary corporal punishments popular in France were \textit{more} barbarous than the cannibals’ were. ‘Savage’ and ‘barbaric’ customs provide a ground from which to criticize contemporary French customs at which Montaigne was taking aim.

\begin{footnotes}
\item \textsuperscript{118} Gong, op cit. p.8.
\item \textsuperscript{119} Las Casas [1528] cited in Todorov, op cit. p.190-191.
\item \textsuperscript{120} Montaigne, op-cit., p.109.
\item \textsuperscript{121} Ibid., p.113.
\end{footnotes}
Montesquieu's "Persian Letters," first published in 1721 [ten editions in the first year, the precursor to the "Spirit of the Laws"], is an interesting blend of self-critique and projection. By putting his critique of contemporary France in the letters of 'Persians,' Montesquieu the author insulates himself from dangerous political retribution. The "Persian Letters" is representative of the popularity of the 'East,' and of the Oriental stereotypes which were to dominate the European imagination for centuries to come. Montesquieu sketches the different 'essences' of Europe and the 'East:' science v. religion, reason v. mysticism, restraint v. erotic, masculine v. feminine, industrious v. indolent.

Montesquieu illustrates the ambivalent relationship of the barbarian to Europe. The barbarians hordes at once encircle and threaten Europe, at the same time the invaders have long-since been seen as a source of innovation, strength, and vigour. He exhorts the Tartar, who he claims "truly dominates the universe [...] in every period of history it has proved its power across the earth, and in every age it has been the scourge of nations." The Turk, the barbarian, lurks outside the borders of Europe — the barbarians define Europe's border, and act both as a threat to, and a catalyst for, European civilization. Descriptions of the 'barbarians' can be mobilized to simultaneously reify Europe's position as superior and criticize its values, mores, and institutions as inferior.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau describes the life of the savage in Émile: "Attached to no place, without prescribed task, obeying no one, with no other law than his will, [the


savage] is forced to reason in each action of his life. He does not make a movement, not a step, without having beforehand envisaged the consequences. Thus, the more his body is exercised, the more his mind is enlightened; his strength and his reason grow together and one is extended by the other.\textsuperscript{125} In fact, Rousseau’s work on education can be seen as a ‘antidote’ to the decadence of French civilization.\textsuperscript{126} Rousseau’s Discourse on the Origin of Language reiterates this point. He argues, “Eventually all men become similar, but the order of their progress is different.”\textsuperscript{127} In this essay, Rousseau also repeats the assumption that climate determines character, which becomes a staple of colonial rhetoric. Several dissertations could be written regarding the role of the ‘savage’ in the Enlightenment. In this section, it will suffice to indicate the wide range of scholarship on the topic.\textsuperscript{128}

In the mid-nineteenth century, a model of societal development was developed by French and Scottish philosophers.\textsuperscript{129} The development of a ‘four stages’ model of the progress of human societies marks a formal distinction between ‘savage’ and ‘barbarous’ societies. Societies were placed within a hierarchical taxonomy based on their method of subsistence. ‘Savage’ societies – which were the most primitive – consisted primarily of

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[Ibid.] p.66. [Ltr. 19]
\item Should there be any doubt about the sexualized/gendered notion of ‘civilization,’ one need only compare Émile’s education with Sophie’s.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
hunter-gatherers. ‘Barbarian’ societies – which were more developed than ‘savage’ peoples – consisted of shepherds. The third stage of society was the development of agriculture. The final stage of society – which in this case represents a description of European society – is the institution of a commercial, not to say capitalist, market. However, even though other ‘civilizations,’ such as Arabic, Turkic, Indian, Chinese, Japanese, could each be considered to be as evolved as Europe in this taxonomy, divisions between European and non-European civilizations remained important in popular discourse. In 1750, Montesquieu specifically distinguishes between ‘savage’ and ‘barbarians’ in the “Spirit of the Laws.” By 1777, Burke writes:

> now the Great Map of Mankind is unrolld at once; and there is not state or Gradation of barbarism and no mode of refinement which we have not at the same instant under our View. The very different Civility of Europe and China; The barbarism of Tartary, and of arabia. The Savage State of North America, and of New Zealand.

This excellent quotation illustrates several important points. First, by this time, it is well established that civilization, barbarism, and savagery represent different stages of societal evolution. Second, it admits China may have status as a civilization, portraying an attitude that was later imbued with European ethnocentrism. However, as Said argues, even when European authors praised the ‘East,’ they did so within the discursive structure of Orientalism, which implies a power/knowledge structure that does not allow for symbolic equality between East and West. Thus, the developmental model of evolution exists in the same discursive space as 16th and 17th century ideas about the

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130 Ibid., p.33.
‘Turk.’ The confluence of these two streams of discourse lead to an over-determination of the stereotype of the barbarian.

‘Barbarians’ are distinguished in a double move – not ‘us’ (i.e. European), and not ‘them’ (i.e. savages). The division of humanity corresponds to the central themes in European identity: theology (Christianity vs. monotheism/polytheism vs. animism); judicial structures (rule of law vs. presence vs. absence); governance (democracy vs. despotism vs. familial); civility (European manners vs. clothes vs. nakedness); sexuality (restrained vs. exotic vs. animalistic). For example, this table illustrates some dimensions upon which ‘barbarians’ are placed in-between ‘civilization’ and ‘savages.’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>‘Civilized’</th>
<th>‘barbarian’</th>
<th>‘savage’</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>poly/ monotheistic [abstract]</td>
<td>animism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rule of law</td>
<td>presence of laws</td>
<td>absence of rules</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>despotism</td>
<td>familial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European manners</td>
<td>clothes</td>
<td>nakedness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooked food</td>
<td>spicy food [raw]</td>
<td>humans as food</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adult</td>
<td>adolescent</td>
<td>childish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masculine</td>
<td>feminine</td>
<td>childlike</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restrained sexuality</td>
<td>exotic sexuality</td>
<td>animalistic sexuality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sovereignty</td>
<td>indirect rule</td>
<td>direct colonial domination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>high culture</td>
<td>low culture</td>
<td>nature</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In making this division, I mean only to delineate my own discussion. The ‘savage’ – both ‘noble’ and ‘ignoble’ – have an important place in the political imaginary of Europe. In particular, the notion of a state of nature – a philosophical and anthropological ‘first position’ – has played a central role in European thought regarding property and property relations. Vittoria [1527], Hugo Grotius [1625], John Locke [1690] have all used the ‘savages’ of North America as examples of their theories of
property.\textsuperscript{133} Recent work by Edward Keene has examined the importance of property relations to IR.\textsuperscript{134} However, as I have indicated above, the discourse of ‘barbarians’ is somewhat different.

In this project, I will concentrate on ‘imperial’ or ‘colonial’ barbarians. Within the European imperial context, ‘barbaric’ societies were viewed as lacking the conditions of European civilization.\textsuperscript{135} ‘Barbarians’ were both feared and patronized. The presence of ‘barbarians’ legitimized the rhetoric of the ‘civilizing mission.’ However, because the barbarians were never fully civilized, imperial rhetoric had to struggle to reconcile the promise and the realities of colonial rule. Because civilization was often taken to mean civility restraint, the lack of restraint made the ‘barbarian’ both alluring and frightening. Generally, ‘barbarians’ have referred in a negative way to individuals and societies whose actions and mores do not accord with Europe’s. Post-colonial criticism, led by Said, has indicated that even when the East is described positively in relation to the West, the Western source of this description reflects an inherent Orientalism.\textsuperscript{136} Lisa Lowe’s \textit{Critical Terrains} provides an insightful and important analysis of the multiple, national orientalisms.\textsuperscript{137}

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\footnote{Edward G. Keene, D.Phil London School of Economics. “International Theory and Practice in the Seventeenth Century: A New Interpretation of the Significance of the Peace of Westphalia” Presented at ISA 1997.}
\footnote{Gong, op cit., pp.14-15.}
\footnote{Said, 1978, pp57-5.}
\end{footnotes}
English School scholars provide the only major exploration within IR theory of the transition from a European to a global international society in which the civilized/barbarian discourse played a key role. Martin Wight, C.A.W. Manning, and Hedley Bull were each interested in inter-cultural relations, and mentioned barbarians specifically in their theories of world politics. Wight used ‘barbarians’ as an object of study in order to distinguish what he terms the three traditions of IR theory. Wight specifically described the centrality of ‘barbarians’ to all international societies: “All other states-systems, including the Western in its earlier chapters, have expanded or had to defend themselves against alien pressures. Hence the designation of those outside of the states-systems as ‘barbarians.’”\(^{138}\) The identification of a states-system as ‘civilized,’ for Wight, depends on the existence or construction of ‘barbarians.’ Wight, Bull, James Mayall, and Adam Watson recognize that ‘barbarians’ have a significant role to play in international theory. Within Anglo-Saxon realism Wight identifies positive and negative doctrines which justify imperialism, both of which are represented in popular culture: civilization has the absolute right to expand itself, and barbarians have no rights.\(^{139}\) The rationalist school of international theory usually sees barbarians as underdeveloped states, and thus sees imperialism as part of the ‘civilizing mission.’\(^{140}\) The revolutionist school of international theory views the barbarians as beyond redemption. Wight makes specific reference to Kant, and the limitations of perpetual peace.\(^{141}\) This illustrates a dynamic

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\(^{140}\) Wight, op cit., p.69.

\(^{141}\) Wight, op cit., p.42.
within international theory, and Western thought in general: dialectic between cosmopolitan and communitarian notions of community. Bull and Watson point to this tension in their introduction; “In the European tradition ideas of a universal law of nations or law of nature were contested by doctrines of a fundamental division of humanity between Greeks and barbarians, Christians and infidels, Europeans and non-Europeans.”¹⁴² Though the division of ‘us’ and ‘them’ remains “common to all forms of human interactions,” the status of the ‘other’ is variable.¹⁴³ Cosmopolitan thinkers view the world as united in its humanity: communitarians view the world as divided naturally into groups. Cosmopolitans, therefore, believe that all can be educated to cosmopolitanism. The communitarian, however, may believe that the outsiders are often irredeemable. Thus, the distinction between ‘savage’ and ‘barbarian’ became important as to the degree of assimilation/integration/marginalization the colonial subjects could expect from their European masters.

The rhetoric of the ‘civilizing mission’ shows the result of this tension. On the one hand, the civilizing mission is to enlighten and lift up other peoples to the freedom, knowledge, wealth, and security of Europeans. On the other hand, the barbarian was often represented as so beyond redemption that all efforts to improve his condition would be met with frustration, borne out by his inferior status and his resistance to European civilization. In both cases, acculturation was a major aspect of the transition. Whether acculturation made colonized subjects ‘better’ or merely ‘controllable’ does not affect the process of cultural imperialism which accompanied the military expansion. This

dissertation can be seen as adding to the English school’s discussion of the expansion of European international society. Examining the interaction between legal and popular discourse, we can study the field of culture from which the international actors and diplomatic practices arose.¹⁴⁴

The site of the ‘barbarian’ in popular culture reveals a number of intersections of cultural, political, and ideological discourses. Barbarians are most often the locus of anxiety. The lack of restraint which barbarians are represented as possessing in sexual, political, and military realms is assumed to endow them with more power than the restraint of the Europeans.¹⁴⁵ Whether or not the ‘other’ of identity structures may be viewed in benign terms, the ‘barbarian’ is never afford the same rights as ‘insiders.’¹⁴⁶ The barbarian always marks the foreign, dangerous, and threatening.

Because the term ‘barbarian’ is such a powerful image or trope, it is revealing to trace the changing groups which are described in popular and academic discourse as barbaric. In the nineteenth century, the term ‘barbarian’ was first applied to the ‘East.’¹⁴⁷ However, as the Industrial Revolution created an underclass of disenfranchised newly urbanized European peasants, the term was applied to them – reflecting the fears of the middle and upper classes. The European individual also saw the ‘barbarian’ within,

¹⁴³ Neumann and Welsh, op cit., p.328.
¹⁴⁴ Pasic, op cit., p.86.
¹⁴⁶ Kristeva describes how Persians became integral to Ancient Greek society while remaining outsiders. Kristeva, op cit., pp. 54-59.
¹⁴⁷ Lewis and Wigen describe admirably how the geographical location of the ‘East’ or the ‘Orient’ has shifted over time. Lewis and Wigen, op cit., pp.53-62.
represented by Freud's description of the Id. The rhetoric of the barbarian was mobilized during both world wars, by all sides. The term even came to be used by anti-colonial writers to criticise Western imperial governance. The resurgence of the trope of the barbarian in contemporary discourse, to describe Third World populations repeats this imperial mindset and indicates the direction from which the West perceives its chief threat. The civilized/barbarian discourse is a powerful rhetoric, and the use of this discourse in the post-Cold War era is particularly interesting. While it does highlight the continuity of the (post)colonial condition in contemporary politics, it is also being used as a tool of identity politics.

Conclusion

The aim of this chapter is not to settle the various academic or cultural debates surrounding the terms culture, identity, or the two chief strands of the civilized/barbarian rhetoric. Rather the aim is to situate the key terms in their historical and political context. While "On Barbarians" is influenced by post-structuralist understandings of culture and more recent writings on the construction of identity, that does not preclude an analysis of other, contending definitions of the terms.

In sum, I use a definition of identity which represents a post-structural position: identity is taken to be constructed, contested, and reified through practices of representation and performed in specific sociological, historical and political contexts. While primarily constituted by the self/other dualism, the relationship between the self and the other is not simply exclusion or inclusion but involves a continual negotiation of difference and identity. This negotiation takes place at the boundaries of identity and within the sphere of culture. Following this definition, I take culture to represent the field
of representations in which dominant and minority discourses constitute, reify, and contest identities. Using the concept of the 'popular international imaginary,' I emphasize the popular over the elite culture in an attempt to redress a general neglect of the popular in the field's analysis. The remainder of this thesis reflects my exploration of the civilized/barbarian rhetoric. The civilized/barbarian discourse was first developed and circulated in the nineteenth century. This period of imperial expansion also corresponds to a change in both international relations and the development of the 'modern' state. As such, it is an appropriate entry into this dissertation.
In the nineteenth century, "international" questions were understood as taking place either within the context of the European family of nations or between the civilized European states and 'barbaric' others. At times, the 'other' was portrayed as exotic, alluring, superior to the West, or even internal to the West. However, the category 'barbaric' has almost always been portrayed in negative ways, and always defined in relation to, and as the absence of, 'civilization.' Barbarians are always represented in terms of disorder, threat, and danger. The stereotype of the barbarian also freed Europeans from their own standard of 'civilization' in their dealings with them. Because of the latent anxiety about the unrestrained barbarian, Europeans were loosened from the restraints of civilization in dealing with barbarians, and imposing order upon them. By illustrating the unstable boundary of 'civilized' and 'barbaric' behaviour, we see the ambivalence within the discourse.

The identity of Europe became tightly bound up with imperial ideologies, and the trope of the barbarian marked an intersection of several of these discourses. In part, the barbarian was represented as an external threat to European civilization. As such, it had the effect of shoring European identity. The barbaric was also represented as an internal threat – the barbaric lower classes, minorities, or inner demons of Europe. Kiernan reports, "There is a story of the Austrian representative saying to the Hungarian, when the Hapsburg empire was transformed into the Dual monarchy in 1867, 'You look after your
barbarians, and we’ll look after ours’ — meaning Czechs, Serbs, and so on.”¹ The barbarian, whether in the darkest depths of Africa, the darkest depths of Central Europe, or the darkest depths of London, was coded in terms of race, class, and gender. National, European identities in this period cannot be seen either outside of their imperial context, or outside of their socio-political context. Using the lenses of culture and identity, the discourse of the barbarian complicates the domestic/international divide upon which the glossing of imperialism rests, and disrupts the order/anarchy description of these two realms. The lenses of culture and identity can help complicate the domestic/international dichotomy that also obscured imperialism as an exclusively domestic event in IR theory.²

Traditional narratives of the nineteenth century in IR characterize it as “ninety-nine years of general peace in Europe after the Vienna settlements.”³ There was a startling lack of Great Power war between the Congress of Vienna (1815) until the First World War. However, if violence committed in the periphery is taken into account, the century is not nearly as pacific as portrayed. Another frequently held theory about the nineteenth century in IR characterize it as “ninety-nine years of general peace in Europe after the Vienna settlements.”³ There was a startling lack of Great Power war between the Congress of Vienna (1815) until the First World War. However, if violence committed in the periphery is taken into account, the century is not nearly as pacific as portrayed. Another frequently held theory about the nineteenth century in IR characterize it as “ninety-nine years of general peace in Europe after the Vienna settlements.”³ There was a startling lack of Great Power war between the Congress of Vienna (1815) until the First World War. However, if violence committed in the periphery is taken into account, the century is not nearly as pacific as portrayed. Another frequently held theory about the nineteenth

² Lapid, op cit., pp.3.
century is that violence in the imperial periphery allowed European conflicts to take place outside of Europe.  

The beginning of the nineteenth century saw the inauguration of several social and ideological trends that fundamentally changed the fabric of European international society. The French revolution developed and spread the political ideals of liberty, equality, and fraternity. The industrial revolution gave rise to the globalization of capitalism, accompanied by a series of technological revolutions which made the world physically more accessible to Europeans.  

And, finally, European international society expanded its influence to encompass the globe. Traditional portrayals of this period in international relations theory focus on the peace within Europe between 1814-1914, and the ability of the Concert of Europe to prevent the outbreak of Great Power war.  

This peace is explained in classical terms, either as the triumph of balance of power dynamics or the growth of liberal interdependence. Hedley Bull and Adam Watson remind us that:

Nor should it be overlooked that the European states, as they evolved this non-hegemonic system in their relations with one another, at the same time established a number of empires which, while they were rival and competing, taken together amounted to a European hegemony over the rest of the world, which in the nineteenth century became an immense periphery looking to a European centre.

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A global history, which accounts for European expansion outside of Europe, reflects a much less pacific century. In the course of this expansion, Europe marked its boundaries in encounters with cultural and racial others: civilized inside, barbarians outside. This boundary both defined and fortified European identity. Gerrit Gong concurs, "the standard of 'civilization' helped define the internal identity and external boundaries of the nineteenth century's dominant international society." By looking at the barbarian as the marker of 'civilization' and Europe, I hope to introduce an additional, colonial, perspective of the nineteenth century to International Relations, and illustrate the utility of culture and identity as lenses for understanding international relations.

This chapter will explore four prominent sites of the 'civilized/barbarian' discourse. First, I will look at the connection between violence and imperial order, an important aspect of imperialism that is usually overlooked in IR representations of this era. Second, I will trace the portrayal of the stereotype of the barbarian. Because the barbarian is described as dangerous, Europe attempted to impose a "visual order" on their colonies. By 'visual order' I mean the mode of governance was structured along lines of site and according to a geometric systemization of power. Mitchell describes this order as "visible, and thinkable, only as a sense of geometric lines, the equal intervals,

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10 Gong, op cit., p.238.
the regulated movements of a system of order." I will look at the visual order in the practices of imperialism, and trace their path back to the imperial centre: specifically, the so-called exhibitionary order and surveillance. Third, in conjunction with this visual order is a common appeal to demography and population. Fourth, I will look at the linkage made between race, class, and gender in the imperial order. Not only are these three discourses interconnected in the nineteenth century, but also the connections explain the distinctions and comparisons made between internal and external barbarians. This section will focus on popular media — notably travelogues and the great exhibitions of the mid- to late-nineteenth century. Popular culture was especially important because, in the nineteenth century, "imperialism [became] a public phenomenon — which was not the case with expansion in the preceding centuries" — a move which was shored up by increasing literacy and state-sponsored education. These representations of the barbarian international realm shaped the imaginary of European publics, which in turn supported imperial violence. The discourse of civilization/barbarians persists in the popular international imagination, and its imperial roots are essential to the understanding of its later permutations.

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12 There is a rich literature on gender and sexuality in the colonial scene. In this project, I will be using the works of Stoler, McClintock, Doty, and Darby primarily. These scholars represent the cutting-edge of research which intersects International Relations but does not represent the entire field of study.  
Philosophical Context

At nineteenth century, philosophers, anthropologists, biologists, geologists, and other thinkers began to look at the non-European world as an object of study, not as fantasy or as a vehicle for self-criticism. International lawyers, or publicans, had investigated the question of territory, property, and sovereignty since the seventeenth century. Jean-Jacques Rousseau and John Locke both used colonial experiences of civilization and property to ground their theories of European society.

Other thinkers, from a Christian or cosmopolitan perspective, also attempted to undermine imperial rhetoric. A group of specifically anti-colonial or anti-imperial thinkers challenged the prevailing ideology. Karl Marx, J.A. Hobson, and V.I. Lenin attempted to undermine the imperial ideology on economic grounds. Economic justifications of expansion had long been central to the imperial ideology. However, in the latter-eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, there was a move from independent trading companies with royal charters to state-sponsored colonialism. Economic advantage was also coupled with the 'civilizing mission,' as Kiernan argues, "[In the nineteenth century] there was again a feeling that expansion ought to have some ideal purpose, a goal beyond sordid greed which came to be expressed in the phrase

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14 Harbsmeier, op cit., p.78.
 civilizing mission.’ Backward lands would be given civilization, in return for the products wanted by Europe.”19 While economic imperatives were certainly central to European expansion, I will focus in this project on the ideological/imaginary foundations of the project – the ‘master dichotomy’ of self/other, civilized/barbarian that supported imperialism.

Nineteenth century imperialist ideology was over-determined, meaning that it was situated at the intersection of a number of discourses: racial theories, social Darwinist theories of evolution, economic understandings of imperialism, religious ideas about salvation, and liberal theories of education. These ideas framed the ‘civilizing mission’ which was the central justification for imperialism. Ashis Nandy argues that, in fact; “colonialism minus a civilizational mission is no colonialism at all.”20 This ‘civilizing mission’ became the touchstone for much imperial activity, but how was this ‘civilizing mission’ framed?

G.W.F. Hegel’s lectures on world history and the geographical bases of history are essential to understanding nineteenth century European ideas about the larger world. Hegel argues “The History of the World travels from East to West, for Europe is absolutely the end of History, Asia the beginning.”21 A consequence of this geopolitical vision, which was adopted by populace and elite alike, is that Africa is absent from

History. Shiraz Dossa argues, “in this grand design of European Reason, [history-less] nations have neither rights nor duties, in fact Hegel characterizes them as ‘barbarian’ nations.” Hegel speaks specifically about Africa: “Africa proper, as far as History goes back, has remained — for all purposes of connection with the rest of the World — shut up; it is the Gold-land compressed within itself — the land of childhood, which lying beyond the day of self-conscious history, [it is] enveloped in the dark mantle of Night.”

These themes of light and darkness, progress and maturity, historical and history-less, resonated within imperialist ideology for the remainder of the century. Hegel’s portrayal of peoples and nations devoid of history legitimated the ‘civilizing mission’ of the European countries whose superiority was transformed into duty.

Hegel’s deterministic connection between History and geography shaped the study of IR in the nineteenth century. Dossa contends that Hegel’s representations endure in the contemporary IR imaginary: “the Third World was intellectually apprehended and appropriated as weak, chaotic, and primitive; it was assimilated into the European consciousness and practice as a cluster of inferior, exotic cultures right from the start.”

Edward Said provides a cultural perspective to the study of imperialism, from which this study draws:

We may thus consider imperialism as a process occurring as part of the metropolitan culture, which at times acknowledges, at other times obscures the sustained business of the empire itself. The important point is how the national

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22 Dossa, op cit. p.100
23 Hegel, op cit. p.91.
24 Ibid., p.95.
British, French and American cultures maintained hegemony over the peripheries. How within them was consent gained and continuously consolidated for the distant rule of native peoples and territories.\textsuperscript{25}

This perspective on imperialism, as a cultural and political process, shifts our focus away from elite or Marxist perceptions of the economic expansion of proto-multi-national-corporations or the power balancing among the Great Powers, and towards popular support of imperial ideologies. Roxanne Lynn Doty grounds her important exploration of imperial encounters on the observation that “the question of representation has historically been excluded from the academic study of international relations.”\textsuperscript{26} As argued above, identity is structured by representation. Doty studies culture as a field of representation. She examines how the imperial power imbalance came to be represented and reinforced in popular discourse.\textsuperscript{27} The “popular international imaginary” shaped national responses to international stimuli.\textsuperscript{28} The specific representation of the ‘other’ as barbaric has specific political effects in the nineteenth century which lay bare the knowledge-power dynamics of imperialism.

\textit{Egypt}

This section draws examples from English and French sources on Egypt, although other Anglo-French colonies will also be used.\textsuperscript{29} Lucie Duff Gordon wrote in 1863:

“This country is a palimpsest, in which the Bible is written over Herodotus, and the

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{25} Said, 1993, p.51.
\item \textsuperscript{26} Doty, 1996a, p.4.
\item \textsuperscript{27} Ibid., p.8.
\item \textsuperscript{28} Bloom, op cit., p.80.
\item \textsuperscript{29} Neumann’s recent work provides a brilliant exploration of the interaction between the Ottoman Empire – which also figured largely in Europe’s international imaginary. See Neumann, 1999, pp 39-63.
\end{itemize}
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Koran over that.” And Europe came to be written over that history. Egypt is also important because France and England, the two largest colonial powers of the period, both took considerable interest in Egypt, partially because of its geopolitical position but also because of its resources and economy.

Said argues:

Most historians [who] speak of empire speak of the ‘age of empire’ as formally beginning around 1878, with the ‘scramble for Africa.’ A close look at the cultural actuality reveals a much earlier, more deeply and stubbornly held view about overseas European hegemony; we can locate a coherent, fully mobilized system of ideas near the end of the eighteenth century, and there follows the set of integral developments such as the first great systematic conquests under Napoleon, the rise of nationalism and the European nation-state, and the advent of large-scale industrialization, and the consolidation of the power of the bourgeoisie.31

Napoleon’s invasion of 1798 is canonically accepted as the inaugural moment of Orientalism as an academic discipline, and the modern European fascination with the Orient.32 Alice Conklin states: “in Egypt ... the mission was defined – in Napoleon’s own words – as one of emancipation and ‘civilization.’ This idea was manifest in Napoleon’s decision to set off from France not only with troops, but with all the scientific and cultural apparatus for which the expedition is deservedly famous – an apparatus that the French had not deemed necessary for any European state they had conquered.”33 Said

argues, "the [French] occupation gave birth to the entire modern experience of the Orient as interpreted from within the universe of discourse founded by Napoleon in Egypt."\(^{34}\)

As several critics have pointed out, Said represents Orientalism as a monolithic academic discourse, which is uncontested and homogenous.\(^{35}\) However, English and French experiences, and English and French orientalisms, are not identical. The differences are the subject of an important work by Lisa Lowe, *Critical Terrains*.\(^{36}\) She points out that Orientalist discourse changed over time, and is better understood as a multiplicitous discourse which participated in any number of ideological and material struggles.\(^{37}\) For the purpose of this project, however, there remain enough discursive similarities between French and British stereotypes of the ‘barbarian’ to make this study viable.\(^{38}\)

The extent to which Egypt emerged into the European imagination is further shown by the attention that Hegel devotes to it. In the *Philosophy of History* lectures given in 1823, Hegel argued “The Empire of the solitary Nile is only present *beneath* the ground, in its speechless Dead ... in their majestic habitations; — for what remains above ground is nothing else but splendid tombs.”\(^{39}\) Africa is the continent without History. Asia the continent of History past. Europe is the end of History. Egypt is the fulcrum of the passage of History. Mindful of this notion, the Khedive Ismail announced with the


\(^{35}\) Said, 1993, p.98


\(^{37}\) Lowe, op cit. p.ix-xi.

\(^{38}\) Nuemann and Welsh, op cit. p.348.

\(^{39}\) Hegel, op cit. p.115.
opening of the Suez Canal, “Egypt is henceforth part of Europe, not Africa.”  However, as with all colonial mimicry, it never quite succeeded. V.G. Kiernan argues “Egypt was the theatre of a thorough-going experiment, the first in all the East, in Westernization by decree... There was much debate among foreigners, sharpened by rival interests, as to whether the new Egypt was a bona fide imitation of Europe, or a grotesque travesty of it.” Huntington will later refer to the tension of a Westernized elite and non-Western populace as a ‘torn’ country. This early westernization may also give insight into the post-independence dilemma of post-colonial states in the 1960s. Egypt’s vicinity to Europe made it accessible, while remaining strange, exotic, and Oriental. Napoleon’s invasion was well documented, and became a point of national pride. The British expedition effectively made Egypt an autonomous province of the Ottoman Empire. The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 made Egypt the pivot to India. The occupation in 1882 was coincident with British expansion in Africa. The Suez crisis of 1956 was a catalyst for the first peacekeeping mission of the United Nations. Even with the recent terrorist attacks, Egypt remains present in Europe’s imagination, outside and yet familiar; a “land of ruins” which presages the future. The concept of ‘barbarian’ grows to its maturity in Egypt. The European boundary in Egypt is written in racial, class-based, gendered, geographical, and cultural terms — embodied in the image of the barbarian. The chief characteristic of the barbarian stereotype is his propensity for irrational violence, which the Europeans both feared and respected.

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41 Kiernan, op.cit. p.118.
**Maxims and the Maxim Gun: Violence and the Imperial Order**

The violence inherent in the colonial project undermines some traditional IR narratives of a pacific nineteenth century. Violence was not only present in the conquest of colonial territories, but also manifest in those already-conquered territories. Political leaders have long been able to refer to palpable threats in the immediate international environment to justify violence in the domestic societies of Europe. However, a different representation of threat was needed to legitimate war with one’s own colonial subjects. There was a pressing need to explain the long, drawn-out resistance to the light of civilization, such as the British defeat in Sudan, the Boer War, the Indian Mutiny, or the Algerian Civil War and unrest in Indochina. The extent to which imperialism was viewed as continual warfare, either expansive or defensive, is evidenced by the fact that the British government had a single department for the Colonies and War from 1794 to 1854.

The barbarian stereotype was represented as not merely ignorant of civilization but also as antagonistic and destructive towards it. One of the chief benefits of ‘civilization’ and imperial rule was the supposed elimination of violence in everyday society — which lies at the root of the discourse of civilization — the principle of civility. Kiernan argues, “To be bringing order our of such chaos could be regarded as justification enough for British conquest, if any were asked for; Order was from first to last the grand imperial

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43 Ashley, op cit. pp 420-422.
watchword." In French colonies also, "French imperial ideology consistently identified civilization with one principle more than any other: mastery. Master not of other peoples – although ironically this would become one of civilization’s prerogatives in the age of democracy; rather, master of nature, including the human body, and master of what can be called ‘social behaviour.’" Civil peace, the hallmark of imperial rule was continually contested by the oppressed and thus necessitated constant policing. It is this unstable balance which I want to highlight here. Within the discourse of imperialism, there is a tension between the violence that was necessary to justify imperial rule and the omnipresent threat of violence implicit in imperial governance.

The image of the barbarian illustrates this tension clearly. Barbarians were, by nature, violent and irrational. Imperial rule, though violent itself, was rational and justified by the ‘civilizing mission.’ Massacres committed by ‘natives’ were portrayed as barbaric. Massacres committed by imperial rulers were portrayed as regrettable, but in the final account necessary. Novelists, amongst others in the nineteenth century, popularized the contrast between the violent ‘barbaric’ violence and ‘civilized’ violence. Conrad’s Heart of Darkness shows the limit of this distinction: Kurtz, the pride of Europe, ends his report with the infamous command to “Exterminate the brutes.” The discourse of civilization represents an attempt to stabilize this tension, through representations of the barbarian. If the ‘civilized’ administrator and the

45 Gong, op cit. p.14-5. The rule of law was a requirement of the standard of ‘civilization,’ and in its original French, civilization was used to describe the condition of civil law in contrast to lawlessness.
46 Kiernan, op cit. p.33.
47 Conklin, op cit. p.5-6.
barbarian were inherently different, then their violence could have different values.\textsuperscript{50} Indeed, that tension was present from the beginning. Kiernan argues that while British and French armies began under the sign of 'civilization,' the European also learned barbarism.\textsuperscript{51} "If conquest was doing something to civilize the outer world, it was also doing something to barbarize Europe... One sinister omen was a recrudescence in Europe of police torture, whose taproots in colonial warfare and repression can scarcely be missed."\textsuperscript{52} This ambivalence, uncertainty, and insecurity was characteristic of the colonial experience. Homi Bhabha's postcolonial theory has usefully explored this ambivalence to provide a more nuanced [if dense] understanding of the material and psychic conditions of colonialism.\textsuperscript{53}

The insecurity was expressed in terms of the stereotype of the barbarian: the threat of violence, indolence, and sexual/racial mingling. The barbarian was seen as a threat not only to order, but also to the regimes of capitalism and race. Stoler details the regimens of hygiene and manners that were put in place to prevent Englishmen and English women from 'going native' in India.\textsuperscript{54} In another study, she also details how racial (im)purity

\textsuperscript{50} During decolonization this ambiguity would be exploited to resist imperialism — citing that the violence necessary to the rule of the colonies was in itself barbaric. (Césaire, 1972 , p.59 )
\textsuperscript{51} Kiernan, op cit. p.216-7.
\textsuperscript{53} Homi K. Bhabha, "Of Mimicry and Man: The ambivalence of colonial discourse," \textit{The Location of Culture}. New York: Routledge, 1994, p.86.
became a barrier to Dutch citizenship, colonial government posts, and inheritance.\textsuperscript{55} The same point is made, although through the literary portrayal of the social restrictions of colonial life in Orwell's *Burmese Days*, E.M. Forster's *Passage to India*, and Graham Greene's *Heart of the Matter*. Barbarism was also seen as a threat to the European, either as the administrator-gone-native or as the barbaric lower classes who were portrayed in racial terms. However, through policing, regulation, and surveillance, the colonies were constructed as special, intermediate zones of controllable violence, where order could be imposed — however tenuously — by a more civilized culture. The traditional narrative of international theory and the realities of colonial rule seem to be at odds. At the very moment of a consolidation of a European identity, colonies were more violent than ‘anarchic’ European international space.

Even when the European rule in the colonies was ‘secure,’ the threat of violence was omnipresent.\textsuperscript{56} Ronald Hyam cites an anonymous writer in 1898, “there was no power in the hands of those that governed India or Africa ... to resist a general effort of the population to throw the white races out. In such a situation the only course was ‘to rule, as completely and with as little repentance, as if we were angels appointed to that task.’”\textsuperscript{57} This general fear of war, or the threat of war, necessitated constant preparedness.\textsuperscript{58} This anxiety was a result of the ‘barbarity’ of the colonial subjects, a point to which I will return later in the dissertation. Traditional IR explanations of


\textsuperscript{56} Kiernan, 1998, pill.

international anarchy map well onto descriptions of imperial rule. Citing Hobbes, Kenneth Waltz sets out that anarchy is not only the actual state of war between units, but "with each state deciding for itself whether or not to use force, war may break out at any time."\(^{59}\) International Relations traditionally distinguishes between the anarchy of the international and the peace of the domestic.\(^{60}\) I would suggest that in the context of nineteenth century Europe the divide between international anarchy and imperial 'peace' is even more problematic. Between the Great Powers, there was exceedingly little conflict between 1814-1914.\(^{61}\) As a consequence, the balance of power system embodied in the Concert of Europe is hailed with keeping the peace.\(^{62}\) This is not to deny that some European conflicts were violent or barbaric in themselves. It is only to argue that IR neglects to portray imperialism as a violent process or colonial governance as institutionalized violence. It also downplays the 'anarchical' condition of European rule in the colonies. While there was not continual violence in the colonies, there was certainly the continual threat of violence. Colonial rule was never absolute; imperial security was always uncertain. Imperial governments were always preparing for war against their native subjects, in addition to preparing for war against other European

\(^{58}\) Lloyd, op cit. p.178.


states. Of course, the threat of violence of the international realm and the threat of violence in the colonial realm are not identical, but certain parallels are compelling.

There are two relevant aspects to imperialist strategy in the nineteenth century: the acquisition of ‘new’ territory, and the control of occupied territory. The acquisition of ‘new’ territory was seen as an entirely European game, regulated by European rules and played out in non-Western space. Gong argues

the practice of bothering at all to create international legal agreements with “uncivilized” countries was justified as necessary to maintain law and order in the “civilized” international society ... when a ‘civilized’ power makes a legal agreement concerning “uncivilized” peoples, its title is an affair between the occupying European state and the rest of the “civilized” states of the world.63

The Berlin Conference of 1884-85 is emblematic of this structure, though the Brussels Conference of 1889-90 and the League of Nations Mandate system continued it.64 The European powers convened in Berlin to divide Africa in order to prevent conflict among them, which reversed nearly two centuries of viewing the space beyond Europe as entirely war-ridden.65 Watson mistakenly infers a “remarkable achievement” from a lack of European war to indicate of a lack of war generally in the nineteenth century.66 In fact, Watson ignores colonial violence in what we now recognize as wars of a ‘third kind.’67 The ‘remarkable achievement’ of the reduction of intra-European war

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63 Gong, 1984. p.58
64 Hedley Bull, “European States and African Political Communities,” The Expansion of International Society.
65 Lloyd, op cit. p.4
was predicated on the externalization of violence to the non-European world. With the inclusion of colonial wars, the record of the nineteenth century becomes far less peaceful.

The legal norms surrounding ‘civilized’ warfare did not apply in the barbarian, non-European world. The mobilization of the civilized/barbarian discourse makes the difference between European and colonial wars clear. Jürgen Osterhammel argues, "colonial wars were viewed as wars to spread ‘civilization’ to adversaries who were said to lack civilized rules of conduct...Methods of warfare that in Europe were morally and legally barred were considered legitimate in the face of an enemy who did not seem to subscribe to the same cultural code." 68 Kiernan concurs,

Europe was fond of parading its concept of “civilized warfare,” but in contests overseas it was “scientific warfare” that was being talked of more and more... As conquest quickened, a book on it would introduce Africa as a continent delivered from native barbarism by breech-loaders, Maxims, etc... and go on to hail any mass slaughter by the latest weapon as a “deadly blow dealt at barbarism; a triumph gained for humanity and civilization.” Civilization drove forward in a mortuary cart. 69

The notorious Maxim gun or dumdum bullet or the French Coloniale bomber, developed specifically for colonial use, were technologies considered too horrific to use on Europeans. 70 This, of course, was to prove a major aspect of the disillusionment brought about by the First World War. There are many examples of the ‘uncivilized’ behaviour of European troops in the colonies. Two notable incidents indicate the ‘barbarity’ of Europeans: the asphyxiation of over 500 men, women, children in the

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Dahra caves by Péllissier in 1845, and the massacre, and subsequent desecration, of the Sudanese Madhi and his forces, who had slaughtered Gordon of Khartoum

From both the colonized and colonizer points of view, the threat in the colonies was dispersed and continual: the colonized feared state and extra-governmental violence as the colonizers feared uprising and rebellion. Michael Mann explores the extent to which militarism was a part of the civil society in the European colonies. In the colonies, there was not a 'governmental' monopoly on the legitimate use of force. He argues, "most atrocities were committed in a series of irregular, decentralised waves organised in paramilitary forms by vigilante or volunteer units of the local [white] population itself, with states turning a blind eye or with its local agents complicit because they too belonged to 'White' civil society." War in the colonies substituted the 'civilizing mission' for raison d'état, which liberated Europeans from the restraints of the rules of 'civilized' warfare. And so, warfare in the non-European world became far more 'barbaric' than 'civilized' warfare within Europe.

The expansion of European society was not a uniform or uncontested process. The resistance of indigenous peoples to European domination continues to this day, and that uneven expansion determined the political culture of much of the globe. This violent history, though it may have been legalistically domestic to each of the European empires, resonates in the international imaginary of the Third World. The prosecution of colonial

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73 Gong, op cit. p.247; Shapiro, 1997, pp.1-16.
wars entailed innumerable slaughters, and speaks to the power of beliefs in international relations. The violence, however, did not end with the acquisition of territory.

The uncertain rule of the colonies made violence and the threat of violence an integral part of European imperial relations. However, the rule of colonies took place with a different tenor than European governance. The control of conquered territories was different, if only because the legitimacy that the European state had fostered domestically was uncertain in the colonies. In India, "The British [saw] themselves as a garrison in a country which could still explode into disorder and revert to the civil war of the eighteenth century if their central power was removed."74 In Algeria, the French rarely achieved complete control of the territory they claimed. In Egypt, passports and model villages were used to attempt to monitor and control the colonial population.75 Order was the goal of colonial rule, but constant policing was required because its application was so incomplete. The image of the barbarian helped resolve this paradox; the barbarian could only be partially tamed and educated, but racially he was still closer to savage than the European. The colonizer was, then, constantly on his guard from insurrection, and degradation. This siege mentality would persist until independence, and lead to methods of control, which were later exported back into the European metropolis.

This connection between order and violence is also seen in the connection of scientific and military operations in the empire. The projects of Orientalism as an

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74 Lloyd, op cit. p.178.
75 Mitchell, 1988, p.82.
academic discipline and imperialism as a political practice were intertwined; just as violence and order were intertwined. Some of the first descriptions of Egypt came from Napoleon's invasion and the Institute de Kaire that he founded. Marc Ferro argues, "Bonaparte's expedition to Egypt represents the change from one type of expansion to another. Bonaparte wanted to show that he was landing with an army which represented civilization." Denon published his Travels in Upper and Lower Egypt in 1803, which preceded the larger, twenty-three-volume work of the Institute by several years (1809-1823). The Descriptions de L'Egypte heralded a new era of 'authenticity' about the East, rather than fantasy. However, it should be noted that the illustrations of Egyptian monuments are all but devoid of 'real' Egyptians and resemble empty theatrical stages waiting for European players. The extent to which early writers were complicit in military and governmental structures is striking. In the preface, Vivant Denon writes how his position as observer was often forgotten in the heat of battle.

Being aware that the aim of my travels was to visit the monuments of Upper Egypt, [Napoleon] sent me with the division which was to achieve the conquest of that territory... In short, I made so truly a part of the battalion it formed, and within which I had in a manner taken up my abode, that I was frequently in the heat of action without recollecting myself, and without reflecting that war was foreign to my avocations.

In fact, war was not foreign to the Orientalist. The British, in their expedition to liberate Egypt from the French, were quick to publish their own account of Egypt. Thomas Walsh snidely remarks on the relative security of his own position as observer in relation to Denon.

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76 Ferro, p.66.
The work is accompanied by forty-one plates, including upwards of fifty subjects, most of them Drawing made by the Author with the utmost attention to correctness. Taken in perfect security, and with all the necessary deliberation; they are, at least, not the hasty sketches of a solitary traveler, who holds pencil with a trembling hand.79

This fear for personal safety resonated for the length of colonial occupation, as did the connection between Orientalism and colonial rule.

The threat of violence was also implicated in several other realms of European colonial life: sexual threat, indolence, racial mixing, and cultural contamination. The threat of disorder was also seen as the threat of cultural contamination, and consequently a threat to European identity. Insecurity and disorder were conditions of colonial rule.

The relationship of order to disorder in the colonies is not a straightforward presence/absence dichotomy, but is similar to the IR formulation of anarchy as the threat of war. Disorder is not solely the absence of order, just as peace is not solely the absence of violence. Disorder is the state of being threatened with disrupted order. As such, order is not a transitory condition, but a structure that regulates expectations and behavior. The imperial threat of violence and disorder was not the fear of specific instances, but that perpetual fear of uprising which stemmed from the colonizer’s tenuous physical position.80

Conklin argues that the ‘civilizing mission’ was instrumental in dealing with this problem:

80 Lowe, op cit. p.78.
Administrators – vastly outnumbered, and equipped with little more than their prejudices – relied upon the familiar categories of ‘civilization’ and its inevitable opposite, ‘barbarism,’ to justify and maintain their hegemony overseas. These categories served to structure how officials thought about themselves as rulers and the people whom they ruled, with complex and often contradictory consequences for French colonial policy – and French republican identity – in the twentieth century.81

Disorder, like the threat of violence, was a condition of imperial rule.

I have suggested in this section that the problem of violence in the imperial order complicates the domestic/international divide with its descriptions of order and anarchy, and that violence was implicit in Europe rule. In the next section, I will look at one of the primary ways in which French and English rulers in the empire attempted, never completely successfully, to maintain order through the application of surveillance and visual order to the barbarians, and eventually, to the civilized as well.

I spy, I spy, with my little eye: Visuality and the Imperial Order

Regimes of governance in the nineteenth century took a decidedly visual turn, but which I mean that seeing was believing, and the structure of space to enable seeing became a central motif of the nineteenth century. The application of visuality as a principle of colonial rule helps make clear the relationship between cultural practices and political power. The primary mechanism that England and France used to combat the uncertainty of colonial rule and the constant threat of violence was an economy of space structured around the principle of surveillance. This shift can be seen in through two themes: demography and surveillance.

81 Conklin, op cit. p.2.
The modern state was developed in conjunction with, and was partially a function of, mechanisms of surveillance. A surveillance regime has the goal of the policing action of the state internalizing in the mind of the citizen. Crime is conceptually linked to punishment, and thus state governance becomes centered on deterrence rather than punishment. Foucault charts this development:

When you have thus formed the chain of ideas in the heads of your citizens, you will then be able to pride yourselves on guiding them and being their masters. ... a true politician binds [his slaves] by the chain of their own ideas... on the soft fibers of the brain is founded the unshakable base of the soundest Empires.\(^2\)

Surveillance entails the ordering of social space along the lines of authoritative sight, as seats bolted to face the lecturer in a classroom. This policing through a visual ordering of bodies on a Cartesian plane is illustrated in Foucault's exemplary institution the panopticon. Jeremy Bentham designed the panopticon to be the perfection of surveillance. The institution, which can be used for prisons, schools, or factories, applies utilitarian principles of maximization of utility to lines of sight. The surveyed are arrayed in perfectly transparent cells, displayed before an obscured guard in an opaque tower. Bentham argues that the power of the panopticon is in the indeterminacy of the observer: since the observed never know when they are watched, they will assume that they are always watched. Thus, surveillance can be understood as an economy of power, the end result of which is self-policing. Foucault states "the perfection of power should tend to render its actual exercise unnecessary... hence the major effect of the Panopticon: to induce in the inmate a sense of consciousness and permanent visibility that assures the

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automatic functioning of power.\textsuperscript{83} The panoptic principle was generalized to society as a rule, creating what Foucault terms the disciplinary society.\textsuperscript{84} This metaphor has clear applications to the models of balance of power in international relations, wherein Great Power regulation becomes self-regulation in the context of international institutions and globalization. The concept of ‘discipline’ also supplements theories of deterrence which rely on intent and rationality.\textsuperscript{85} For the moment, I will concentrate on the application of this surveillance regime to the colonies, and to European, imperial metropolises.

The genealogy of the panopticon is particularly interesting, with respect to imperialism. Bentham’s brother first discovered a panoptic institution in the Ottoman Empire.\textsuperscript{86} It is ironic that the architectural configuration, which epitomized European power for Foucault, was found in the Sultan’s Palace of Justice.\textsuperscript{87} Further, panoptic institutions were most often constructed in the colonies. Colonial power used this economy of power through lines of sight and the ordering of space to make the natives police themselves. It was an extension of European modes of dealing with the poor, the insane, the perverse, and the criminal, to the colonial races.

The strangeness of the Orient was refracted through this prism of perspective and order. Part of what distinguished barbarous from civilized spheres was the visual disorder that presented itself to Europeans. This theme of visuality is reinforced by what

\textsuperscript{83} Ibid., p.201.
\textsuperscript{84} Ibid., p.212-15.
\textsuperscript{86} Mitchell, 1988, p.35.
Timothy Mitchell terms the "exhibitionary order:" the presentation of the world through pictures, artifacts, tours, and world exhibitions in ways that naturalize structures of surveillance. Foucault himself did not trace this principle to the colonies, but Mitchell has applied this framework to Egypt. The disorder of the colonies was seen as further justification for imperial rule, and Europeans imposed a Cartesian order on colonial space. One of the other legalistic markers of the standard of civilization, in addition to the rule of law, was "an organized bureaucracy with some efficiency in running state machinery..." Visual disorder, or chaos, was seen as a marker of barbarism.

Denon travelling with the French army, Walsh who chronicled the British campaign, Lane during the 1830s, Gustav Flaubert, and Richard Burton in the middle of the century, all describe approaching Cairo from the Nile in the same way, chaotic and unseeable, and consequently described as politically, culturally, and racially unstable. Elevated perspective, either racial or spatial, was the only remedy to chaos:

In our present position we saw numerous minarets surrounding Mount Katam, and proceeding from the gardens on the banks of the Nile, whilst Old Cairo, Bulac and Roda, appearing as part of the town gave it an appearance of verdure and freshness, and added to its magnificence. As we approached, however, the illusion vanished; every object returning as it were to its proper place, we only saw a heap of villages collected near an arid rock. The streets are unpaved, and most of them are narrow and irregular... By a stranger who merely passed through the street Cairo would be regarded as a very

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close and crowded city, but that this is not the case is evident to a person who
overlooks the town from the top of a lofty house or from the minaret of a
mosque.\(^92\)

The numerous villages on both banks... have at a distance a very pretty
appearance; and the minarets of the mosques, with which they all abound,
improve the prospect, from their light and airy structure. But, as you approach
nearer, the beauty gradually disappears; and when you arrive opposite them, they
offer nothing to the view but an assemblage of miserable half-ruined houses.\(^93\)

Each detail reaches out to grip you; it pinches you; and the more you concentrate
on it the less you grasp the whole. Then gradually all this becomes harmonious
and the pieces fall into place themselves, in accordance with the laws of
perspective.\(^94\)

In the face of such disorder, Europeans sought to impose the visual order of Europe
onto the chaotic colonies. At the same moment Haussman was constructing the
boulevards of Paris, the Egyptians were doing the same in Cairo. It was a natural
outgrowth of the visual nature of security that the British and French made the disorder of
the colonies observable and thus controllable. Mitchell writes,

the disorder of Cairo and other cities had suddenly become visible. The urban
space in which Egyptians moved had become a political matter, material to be
organised by the construction of great thoroughfares radiating out from the
geographical and political centre. At the same moment Egyptians themselves, as
they moved through this space, became similarly material, their minds and bodies
thought to need discipline and training. The space, the minds, and the bodies all
materialised at the same moment, in a common economy of order and
discipline.\(^95\)

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\(^92\) Edward William Lane, *An Account of the Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians

\(^93\) Walsh [7 Sept.1801] p.236.

\(^94\) Gustave Flaubert, *Flaubert in Egypt: A Sensibility on Tour._ Trans. and ed. Francis Steegmuller.

\(^95\) Mitchell, 1988, p.68.
The visual chaos of the East obscured the inhabitants. Colonial space itself undermined European rule. The attempt to render the colonies and their inhabitants visible was, of course, incomplete.

The corollary implication of this visual order was the obsession with obscured bodies, people who could not be seen. Or, as Foucault argues, "Visibility is a trap." The un-surveilled, the uncharted, the uncatalogued, were not under the control of the empire, and were thus a source of disorder. The notion of barbarians being invisible accompanied this anxiety. Portrayed as wild and uncivilized, colonies were not safe if the barbarian could not be seen. As such, "in the second quarter of the nineteenth century the people of Egypt were made inmates of their own villages." The use of passports both to certify racial heritage and to control movement illustrates the dangers of differences that could not be seen by Europeans. Ann Laura Stoler notes how a discourse of 'degeneracy' connected race and culture to citizenship (the signified of the passport). It is interesting to note that by the middle of the nineteenth century, the passport had faded from use in Europe, but was resurrected in the colonies as a means of controlling the native population. The passport as a marker of identity also made it unnecessary for the European administrator to differentiate between colonized individuals — which reaffirmed his own identity as a differentiated member of the white, ruling class.

96 Foucault, op cit., p.200.
97 Mitchell, 1988, p.34.
98 Stoler, 1995, p.32, 102-106
A common comparison between the colour of the natives’ skin and the earth invokes the danger of the unobserved or uncharted, and the hostility ascribed to nature itself.

Flaubert observes, “the color of the earth is exactly that of the Nubian women I saw in the slave market.” The use of the skin as racial marked is picked up by Fanon, Bhabha, and other post-colonial theorists. Cartographic expeditions were an attempt to fix unknown spaces, taming the earth as quinine tamed nature.

Said argues, “the geographical space of the Orient was penetrated, worked over, taken hold of. The cumulative effect of decades of... Western handling turned the Orient from alien into colonial space.” Anderson links map-making to this larger discourse of order:

European-style maps worked on the basis of a totalizing classification ... the entire planet’s curved surface had been subjected to a geometrical grid which squared off empty seas and unexplored regions in measured boxes. The task of “filling in” the boxes was to be accomplished by explorers, surveyors, and military forces. They were on the march to put space under the same surveillance which the census-makers were trying to impose on persons.

The imposition of geometric orders onto the towns, houses, and institutions in the colonies was an effort to make the entire population visible. “The legible order of the model village would overcome this kind of inaccessibility, this problem of a population and a way of life invisible to the observation of police. As Foucault has written, ‘in such ways the architecture of distribution and the art of policing can acquire a hold over

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100 Flaubert [7 February 1850] p.103.
101 Burton [Part I, Ch. 1] p.1. “In the autumn of 1852[...] I offered my services to the Royal Geographic Society of London, for the purpose of removing that opprobrium to modern adventure, the huge white blot which our maps still notes the Eastern and the Central regions of Arabia.”
102 Said, 1993, p.211.
N.B.: I will look at the sexual metaphors of ‘discover’ and ‘possession’ in the next section, in addition to the connection between racial, gendered, and class-based discourses.
individuals not simply by confining them but by opening up and inscribing what is hidden, unknown, and inaccessible.”

It was the condition of empire that this effort always be incomplete.

The discourse of surveillance/obscurity had an interesting side effect. By the middle of the century, Europeans had begun to perceive Lower Egypt as ‘civilized’ and thus inauthentic. The European in search of the ‘authentic’ experience took to disguising himself as ‘Oriental’ to get to the true Orient, hidden from the tourist eyes of the European. Ali Behdad calls this attitude ‘sentimental’ orientalism, which despairs at the proliferation of tourists in favour of the ‘true’ Orient. The European use of disguise has a tradition stemming from the first chroniclers of Egypt through to the present day: Burckhardt (1788), Lane (1834), Burton (1852), and even Kaplan (1994). Being unseen as Europeans to the natives allowed a freedom from civilized moral codes, which allowed European travelers to revel in their Orientalist fantasies. These fantasies were markedly sexual for Flaubert, and cartological for Burton: “[I sought a place] which no vacation tourist has yet described, measured, sketched, and photographed.” Flaubert elaborates the tension between his desire for authenticity and the desire for safety: “We look quite the pair of Orientals [however] considerations of our safety limit our sartorial splurges: in Egypt the European is accorded greater respect than the native, so we won’t

107 Burton [Part I, Ch.1] p.2.
dress up completely until we reach Syria.” It must be mentioned that this ability to disguise as the cultural and racial ‘other’ is a function of the power relationship of European occupation. While Europeans could pass as native, natives could never pass as European. Just as Egypt was not seen as a western nation but rather a grotesque travesty of Europe, Europeanized Egyptians were considered objects of mimicry. This was certainly true of Frantz Fanon’s personal experience, and is described by Homi Bhabha as “almost the same, but not quite.” Bhabha also explores the ambivalence of mockery and imitation as a practice of resistance to colonial rule. Post-colonial theorists argue this power dynamic and consequent prejudice is present in contemporary race relations. The way in which world exhibitions were used to represent the colonies and the colonized to the metropolitan population provides further evidence of the power of this discourse. The world exhibitions displayed the world for consumption by the metropolitan citizens, in terms of race, geography, and capitalism.

112 Bhabha, op cit.
113 It should be noted that the World Exhibitions took place chiefly within France, England, and America and not other European colonial powers. Yengoyan argues this is due to differences in worldview, best shown in the difference between French ‘civilization’ and German ‘kultur.’ “A culture model is bounded, limited, not expansive, and hardly universalistic in scope ... A civilization model is the basis of universalistic exhibitions.... The civilizing process which is the basis of western civilization in theory is not contained, bounded or limited.” For a deeper exploration of this division between German and Anglo-French notions of civilization, Patrick Thaddeus Jackson’s doctoral thesis: “Occidentalism: The Symbolic Technology of German Reconstruction.”
European Exhibitions

The extension of this visible, exhibitionary order is also apparent within metropolitan European culture. World Exhibitions were displays of industry, culture, and empire for the imperial population. The exhibitions were representations of the world on a grand scale, global in scope, nationalist in tone, and pedagogical in intent. They reflected the mutually-constituting ideologies of consumerism, nationalism, and imperialism. Pedagogically, the exhibitions were intended to educate the public in the products of the industrial revolution and imperial expansion, both of which had negative side-effects that needed to be obscured. Also, the exhibitions had a nation-building intent — to represent the nation to itself. The civilizing mission was central to the display of cultures in hierarchical fashion, Europeans representing the end of progress and other races representing earlier evolutionary epochs. McClintock argues that this exhibitionary order displays peoples as evidence of a Hegelian progression of history. "The axis of time was projected onto the axis of space and history became global. With social Darwinism, the taxonomic project, first applied to nature, was now applied to cultural history. Time became a geography of social power." And, the metropolitan masses flocked to see the spectacle. Eric Hobsbawm marks a convergence between the expansion of tourism within European countries for the poor and to the Orient for the rich:

The day trip for the masses ... was the child of the 1850s — to be more precise of the Great Exhibition of 1851... Thomas Cook himself, whose name was to become a by-word for organized tourism in the next twenty-five years, had begun his career arranging such outings and developed it into big business in 1851. The numerous International Expositions each brought its army of sightseers and the rebuilding of capital cities encouraged the provincials to sample their wonders.¹¹⁷

In this way, we see a parallel in the imperialist representation of colony to metropolis and the nationalist representation of rural to urban. The nationalist intent of these exhibitions connected to class-based and race-based discourses. These strategies of exhibition helped to describe the imperial project to its participants and its objects. Mitchell argues, “The new apparatus of representation, particularly the world exhibitions, have a central place to the representation of the non-Western world, and several studies have pointed out the importance of this construction of otherness to the manufacture of national identity and imperial purpose.”¹¹⁸ David Strang continues that, “imperial propaganda was directed at the colonial official and the metropolitan population, aiming to make the public resources of Western societies available for overseas adventure and administration.”¹¹⁹ As Marilyn Wan argues more specifically, “... the colonial exhibit at the 1889 Exposition Universalle was useful in representing France as a formidable imperial power to its international rivals, it was also instrumental in convincing a skeptical domestic public of the benefits of colonialism.”¹²⁰ Burton Benedict expands on this international competition in the realm of prestige: “Major

¹¹⁶ McClintock, op cit. p.37.
¹¹⁷ Hobsbawn, 1975. p.204.
powers [vied] with each other to present fairs ... Among the tokens of rivalry were colonies and their peoples. World’s fairs showed the power of the imperial nation and were meant to impress both foreigners and the home population. World Exhibitions were designed with two audiences in mind: first, other countries with whom the hosts vied for prestige; second, domestic populations in whom the organizers tried to instill a sense of national pride. This national pride was constructed, in part, through the description of its success in ‘civilizing’ barbarians — who were portrayed as opposite and inferior to national characteristics. There is an interest split in how ‘savages’ and ‘barbarians’ were differently represented at these exhibitions. Savages were displayed in their “natural habitat.” Their performance was merely living. However, ‘barbarians’ — like Egyptians, Japanese, Turks — were displayed in interactive modes. One could not only observe the ‘other,’ but also buy goods, ride donkeys, or pay for dancing girls.

Thus, if Britain and France were defined, in part, by sexual restraint, education, Christianity, and racial homogeneity, then the barbarians were displayed as either overly-erotic, uneducated, anti-Christian, and racially heterogeneous or as the product of a Western ‘civilization,’ in which they approximated – though never reached – European ideals.

McClintock argues that the exhibition is an extension of the panoptic principle of surveillance. In this formulation, the national public becomes the surveyor of the whole world. “Implicit in the [Great Exhibition of 1851] was the new experience of imperial progress consumed as a national spectacle. At the exhibition, white British workers

121 Burton Benedict, “Rituals of Representation: Ethnic Stereotypes and Colonized Peoples at
could feel included in the imperial nation, the voyeuristic spectacle of racial ‘superiority’ compensating them for their class subordination.”  

Wan also illustrates how one aspect of the discourse of visuality, “seeing as education,” was a prominent theme in the planning of the Exposition, and she details the way in which space was configured to represent the whole world to the masses. Allan Pred combines this pedagogical aspect with the exhibitions spatial characteristics,

As a public space designed to manufacture private desires; as a space suggesting an unlimited profusion of commodities; as a space where the commercial, the political, and the cultural were ideologically melted together; the space of such exhibitions was a precursor to the “society of the spectacle” [and] the ultimate spectacle of an ordered reality. 

The colonies, and colonial peoples, were displayed as national products, and as evidence of European superiority. The planned order of the exhibitions made a stark contrast to the contrived chaos of the colonial peoples inhabiting ‘indigenous’ buildings.

In an illuminating juxtaposition of visual order and Oriental chaos, the only disorderly part of the Exposition Universalle in Paris was the Cairo exhibit:

The Egyptian exhibit has been built by the French to represent a street in medieval Cairo, made of houses with overhanging upper stories and a mosque like that of Qaitbay. “It was intended,” one of the Egyptians wrote, “to resemble the old aspect of Cairo.” So carefully was this done, he noted, that “even the paint on the buildings was made dirty.” The exhibit had also been made carefully chaotic. In contrast to the geometric layout of the rest of the exhibition, the imitation street was arranged in the haphazard manner of the bazaar.

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122 McClintock, op cit. p. 59.
However, visitors could still pay for coffees in a cafe, pay for a ride on a Cairo donkey, buy a souvenir, or watch a belly-dancer.

Imperial products, shows, and natives on display were illustrative of three popular discourses. The display of goods inculcated the promise of the industrial revolution, in counterpoint to its detrimental societal effects. Global capitalism celebrated the production of consumer products as the return on investment overseas and the export potential of new markets. National pride in cultural traditions was embodied in displays of artwork, architecture, and empire.

The scope of rule and the character of the rulers were presented as triumphs of administration as manliness. The cult of the explorer, and the honor of public servants administering the empire, entwined notions of masculinity in the colonizer and femininity in the colonized. The display of actual barbarians, gave a face to the stereotype, and bolstered evidence of the success of the imperial civilizing mission. Walking through the exhibition, the upper, middle, and lower classes walked through the world, viewing each other, as well as the exhibit.

The universal expositions of the nineteenth century were intended as microcosms that would summarize the entire human experience ... In their carefully articulated order, they also signified the dominant relations of power. Ordered and characterization ranked, rationalized, and objectified different societies. The resulting hierarchies portrayed a world where races, sexes, and nations occupied fixed places...

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127 Wan, op cit. p. 60.
This world claimed to be an authentic representation of the outside, but was in fact implicated in the legitimization of imperialism through capitalist, nationalist, and imperialist ideologies. Just as popular culture identified external and internal barbarians [colonized peoples and the poor or the criminal], the exhibitions also reinforced European stereotypes.\footnote{See McClintock’s discussion of Irish racism, op cit. p.52-54.} Public commitment to the imperial project wavered, especially during the crises of the Indian Mutiny and the Algerian Civil War,\footnote{Hobsbawm, 1975, p.125.} so these representations were political to the extent that they conveyed an image of the international imaginary that supported the imperial project. The markedly pedagogical intent of world exhibitions illustrates the importance of culture and representation to the popular international imaginary. What I want to emphasize is that these domestic representations about the colonial world functioned to construct an image of what international relations constituted. Because domestic support was necessary to support the imperial, civilizing mission, these political representations act as early propaganda and illustrate the importance of popular culture on world politics.

Faced with continual threat of violence within the colonies, European administrators developed regimes of surveillance techniques. Geometric spatial orders were a sign of ‘civilization’ that made barbarian visible, and created the illusion of imperial security.\footnote{Anderson, op cit. p.184.} The colonized was a body to regulate, order, and control — though always imperfectly. This panoptic visual order was applied equally in the colonies and in the imperial center to observe and contain threatening populations, the criminal, the insane, children, the...
poor—the internal barbarians. This return of colonial governance mechanisms to the
imperial centre helps complicate the civilized/barbarian dichotomy. Both global and
domestic underclasses were feared, and similar mechanisms of control were used to
control both internal and external barbarians. This resonates with the most recent
writings on the civilized/barbarian dichotomy.

Demography: The Rising Tide of Numbers

Foucault best describes the connection between this visual turn and the rise of
demographics. He identifies a general shift in the pattern of European governance in the
late eighteenth-early nineteenth centuries from a regime which claimed to protect a
"people" to a regime which aimed to control a "population."

Demography—the study of populations—was a central part of the power/knowledge
structure of the modern state. Demography was used to describe domestic and
international populations. Thomas Malthus and Charles Darwin became popular at the
end of eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth century. The anxieties they
expressed became popular currency throughout the period of imperial expansion. This
discourse of racial anxiety connected Darwin's notion of 'survival of the fittest' with
Europe's own struggle against the other races.

\[132\] Michel Foucault, "Governmentality," *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality,* Graham
\[133\] Darwin's theory of evolution was, in fact, inspired by Malthus' *Essay Concerning Population.*
University Press, 1992, 177.
\[134\] Darwin's *Origin of the Species* was first published in 1859.
operates at this intersection, I will chart some of the ways in which this anxiety was manifest.

Malthus wrote *An Essay on the Principle of Population* in 1798, and it was published again in 1826. In it, he argues that while food production technology grows at an arithmetic rate, population grows at a geometric rate. However, there are several important social and political assumptions that make Malthus’ diagnoses less objective than it first appears. First, Malthus assumes that ‘the poor’ cannot improve their own condition, and the their position cannot be improved from outside. He argues, “the poor laws of England tend to depress the general condition of the poor in these two wars. Their first obvious tendency is to increase population without increasing the food for its support... Secondly, the quantity of provisions consumed in workhouses ... diminishes the shares that would otherwise belong to more industrious, and more worthy members...” Thus, the poor are not only responsible for their own condition, but are morally inferior, because their poverty is due to their lack of ‘industriousness.’ As Anderson argues with relation to the census, the representation of class changed over the course of the nineteenth century: “the census categories became more visibly and exclusively racial.”

Second, Malthus distinctly separates the degree of progress or civilization from its population ‘carrying capacity.’ This sets the stage for critics of imperialism to connect

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136 Ibid., p.33.
population growth in barbarian colonies to a decline of European civilization. He argues that the proportionate rates of growth between food production and technology are most efficient in the colonies. This sets the stage for the stereotype of the fecund barbarian in the face of a declining European population. Restraint characterized the difference between the barbarian and the European. The barbarian’s sexuality – and thus fertility – was unrestrained, while the European’s sexuality – and thus fertility were restrained.

These figures of population imbalance have remained constant throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, but are only invoked during times of crisis and self-doubt. While migration to the colonies may decrease the metropolitan population, releasing some of the inherent pressure of a growing lower class, the colonies represent a much more productive site of lower class population growth. Malthus argues that the basics of ‘civilization’ enable the fecundity of the colonies. Savage population growth is limited naturally by the trials of living without society. Barbarians are described as being ‘naturally’ more fertile, but that their uncivilized condition limits the gross population. However, with the benefits of civilization, population explodes in the colonies as fertility is translated into numbers with the restraining of ‘natural’ mortality.

The chief point for this thesis of Malthus’ work, and the science of demography which it spawned, is that the underclass – whether national or global – is more numerous, less industrious, less moral, and consequently a threat to the social order. This fear of the lower classes is translated by the turn of the nineteenth century into a fear of the

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138 Ibid., p. 39.
139 Ibid., pp. 18-20.
colonized as a kind of global lower class.\textsuperscript{140} Malthus represents the beginning of a souring of the ‘civilizing mission.’ The civilizing mission is perceived from this view as having the effect of making the barbarians more populous, more educated, healthier, and, in sum, more dangerous. Demography is used throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, which I will explore below. I want next to elaborate the connections between race, class, gender, and empire that mobilize these notions of threat and surveillance within and without Europe.

\textit{Race, Class, and Gender in the Imperial Order}

The rhetoric of civilized and barbarian was mobilized not only in imperial discourse, but it was also applied to the internal ‘others’ of European society. The lower classes, the criminal, the perverse, and women were all labeled barbaric, or described using exactly the same rhetoric. The relationship between internal and external barbarians complicates the essentialist inside/outside, self/other dualism, which I will elaborate below.

Lowe argues, “nineteenth-century orientalism provided a means of displacing, while obliquely figuring, both domestic instability \textit{and} colonialist conflicts; orientalism supported a coherent notion of the ‘nation’ — the ‘one’ — while subsuming and veiling a variety of social differences in the figuration of the Orient as Other.”\textsuperscript{141} In the face of

\textsuperscript{141} Lowe, op cit. p.78.
other races, Europeans were all similar – despite religious, class, or ethnic differences. National identity must be constructed, and the representation of the nation to itself was instrumental in making national characteristics paramount over other characteristics.

The sexual stereotype of the barbarian was coupled to the national identity figured in terms of race and class. McClintock makes this argument powerfully in *Imperial Leather*. Britain and France were figured as masculine nations, while the colonies were figured as feminine peoples. Women were also regarded as a "degenerate" race. However, women were also held up as the virginal, ignorant vulnerable, promise of civilization – as is ‘the Intended’ of Conrad’s *Heart of Darkness*. Kiernan notes how the popular headlines in the Boer War depicted women as the victims of barbarity. Darby argues that gender relations often stand in for colonial relations, and makes an excellent analysis of this dynamic. He argues,

Gender is a means of shaping and signifying relationships of power internationally as well as in the domestic sphere. It has thus played a major part in the construction and deconstruction of the relationship between ruler and ruled. Function is a key site of gender representations and it is important both discursively and for the complex and often contradictory ways in which gender as metaphor is deployed.

There is a rich literature on colonialism and gender, to which I can only refer here. McClintock, Stoler, and Spivak have canvassed the relationship between colonial discourse and gender/sexuality in particular. The stereotype of the barbarian is often cast

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142 Stoler explores how imperialism was represented as a bourgeois practice, but in fact required members from every class and the tension this endows. Stoler, 1995, Ch. IV.
143 Anderson, op cit. p.80; 113-14; Balibar, op cit.
144 McClintock, op cit., p.54-55.
in gendered/sexualized terms. However, as representations of gender within 'Western' culture are complex and unstable, so too are representations of the gendered barbarian. On the one hand, male barbarians are often characterized as hyper-masculine. This corresponds to the notion of the barbarian being creatively violent, sexually rapacious, and unmannered -- which, ironically, make him more powerful than the restrained European. On the other hand, female barbarians are characterized as hyper-feminine — most often as over-sexualized and undomestic. The gendering of the barbarian stereotype can be viewed as a mirror of gendering of the stereotype of the Europe. The barbarian is represented in relation to the European stereotype of itself. These stereotypes are not stable either within Europe or across the colonial scene. African males were often portrayed as masculine, whereas Asian and South Asian men were often portrayed in feminine terms. Amazonian women, ‘Oriental’ belly dancers, and bare-breasted women of the South Pacific were all staples of popular culture. These examples are provided to indicate how gender and sexuality are mobilized within the 'barbarian' stereotype and not to exhaust the subject. It must be noted that the description of the gendered/sexualized barbarian often reflects more upon the identity of the European than it does on the ‘others.’

The British and French were as superior in race as the aristocrats were in class. Benedict Anderson attributes empire with the “shoring up” of class structure: “if English lords were naturally superior to other Englishmen, no matter: these other Englishmen

were no less superior to the subjected natives." These intertwining discourses, which connected race, class, and gender, generated a series of dualities that were mapped on to imperial and metropolitan cultures alike. "The regulatory mechanisms of the colonial state were directed not only at the colonized, but as forcefully at the 'internal enemies' within the heterogeneous population that comprised the category of Europeans themselves." 

Imperial discourses did not merely mirror class and gender discourses of the nineteenth century, but were constitutive of them. Class relations were represented in terms of race relations: for example, the lower classes were portrayed on the scale of 'humanity' upon which barbarians and savages were placed. Thus, the upper classes were depicted as more 'evolved' than the lower classes. Race relations were understood in terms of class relations: in Egypt, the ethnic division of labour was translated for European audiences into classes (farmers, bourgeois, aristocracy, etc.). Sexual and gender characteristics were portrayed in racial terms: racial characteristics were portrayed in terms of sexuality and gender. These connections were not made explicitly by the framers of the discourse, as Foucault shows with respect to Victorian sexuality. Vincent also shows this connection with respect to race. To understand imperial relations, we need to understand how the discourse of civilization and barbarians was applied within Europe, as well as outside Europe.

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147 Anderson, op cit. p.150.
McClintock, in her pioneering work Imperial Leather, argues that the discourses of race, gender, and class were connected in the ideology of imperialism.¹⁵⁰ This also relates the Victorian chain of being to the racialist theories which also propped up the imperial ideology. R.J. Vincent argues “in the popular mind the notion of racial superiority was woven into the pattern of European empire ... and when the problem was not seen as one of ordering the lesser breeds, but of coping with the ‘rising tide of colour’ that threatened to engulf the white world demographically and economically, then it was necessary to construct a white redoubt to preserve higher civilization.”¹⁵¹ Thus, the ‘civilizing mission’ was coupled to racial threats. Stoler also argues that racial dynamics were central to popular nineteenth century culture and European identity:

race becomes the organizing grammar of an imperial order in which modernity, the civilizing mission and the ‘measure of man’ were framed. And with it, ‘culture’ was harnessed to do more specific political work; not only to mark difference, but to rationalize the hierarchies of privilege and profit, to consolidate the labor regimes of expanding capitalism, to provide the psychological scaffolding for the exploitative structures of colonial rule.¹⁵²

This externalization of class theory also had the internal effect of racializing the classes of the metropolitan populations. So, to parallel Stanley’s In Darkest Africa, there was published a year later In Darkest England (1890) by the founder of the Salvation army.¹⁵³ Kiernan argues, “in the European mind the affinity between race and class is equally palpable. In innumerable ways his attitude to his own ‘lower orders’ was identical with that of Europe to the ‘lesser breeds’ ... Much of the talk about the

¹⁵² Stoler, 1992, p.27.
barbarism or darkness of the outer world, which it was Europe's mission to route, was a transmuted fear of the masses at home.\footnote{154}{Kiernan, 1993, p.316.}

Two excerpts from travelogues illustrate the conflation between Egyptian races, and classes.

Lastly [of the races in Egypt] the Arab cultivator, the most civilized, the most corrupted, the most degraded, in consequence of the state of bondage in which he is held, and the most varied in person and character, as may be remarked in the heads of the sheiks, or chiefs of villages, in those of the fellahs or peasants, in those of the beggars, and finally, those of the artisans, who constitute the most abject class.\footnote{155}{Denon, [Vol. I, Ch. VI] p.210.}

Egypt is inhabited by several races of people, all differing greatly in their manners, customs, religions... Besides these four classes [Mamelukes, Bedoueen, Arabs, Fellahs], which constitute the chief population of the country, there are several others, as Turks, Greeks, Jews, etc. that are settled in the towns, and follow different employments.\footnote{156}{Walsh, [11 September 1801] p.257, 261.}

Because these two discourses were mutually-constituting, the fact that they evolved not only at the same time but using the same vocabulary, class relations could be used to explain racial relations and vice versa. Thus, race and class were conflated in the colonies, where colonial administrators tried to assign class positions to different races.

Bourgeois thinkers marshaled social Darwinism to justify class relations within Britain and France. They applied the theory of survival of the fittest to explain the social and economic disparity that the industrial revolution brought to the fore of the popular imagination. Because this social Darwinist view became especially prominent at the turn of the century, I will explore it in greater depth in the next chapter. Ascribing the
'underclass' the same characteristics, whether the domestic poor or the foreign barbarian, this rhetorical move relates foreign experiences to the domestic population in a language they can understand.

The imperial discourses of racial hierarchy and the capitalist understandings of free trade and the subsequent class relations were intertwined. Justifications of imperialism cannot be understood except with reference to internal tension within European societies.157 Also, the maintenance of colonial rule was informed by the class experience. The 'creation' of ethnic categories, which paralleled domestic classes, and the subsequent empowerment of collaborators made for a complex social system. In addition to the colonial civil service, the army was a main vehicle of acculturation in the colonies. Kiernan notes that the use of native troops "started as soon as white men began to find their way overseas. In the course of their classes in India the French and British pioneered the system of 'sepoy armies,' from then on an indispensable part of Europe's ability to go on conquering. Afro-asia was taught to conquer itself for foreign pay, most of it taken out of Afro-asian pockets."158

Thus, the stereotype of the barbarian was mobilized to marshal forces against internal and external classes or races. The characteristics of these barbarians were usually linked to ideas about capitalism, order, and sexuality. Barbarians, be it colonized peoples or the poor, were indolent, violent, licentious, and, above all, dangerous.

The writings of Flaubert, Lane, and Denon all point to the sexual fantasies which dominated popular notions of the Orient. In addition to these cultural stereotypes, the actual interaction between colonizers and colonized is central to imperial and post-colonial culture. Fanon, Said, McClintock, and others would all study the sexual dynamics in colonial rule.

Sex in any case formed an important area of contact between societies. Impressions of foreign lands owed much to men’s impressions of their women, and vice versa, and also of the way their men and women behaved to each other. The Egyptian belly-dancer was to be a primary image of the Orient, representing its lasciviousness, its accessibility, and its strangeness. "At the commencement of the dance [it] was voluptuous: it soon after became lascivious, and expressed, in the grossest and most indecent way, the giddy transports of passion." Lane authenticates his own writing through living in disguise in Cairo for five years. "The women of Egypt have the character of being the most licentious in their feelings of all females who lay any claim to

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be considered as members of a civilized nation.”

Lane clearly marks a tension between licentiousness and civilization, suggesting later that

the libidinous character of the generality of the women of Egypt, and the licentious conduct of a great number of them, may be attributed to many causes — partly to the climate, and partly to their want of instruction and of innocent pastimes and employments, but it is more to be attributed to the conduct of husbands themselves.

Geography and character are connected in a manner that echoes Hegel and Rousseau. Further, licentiousness is coupled with a lack of domesticity, which was understood as the racial purview of the colonizers.

Flaubert’s travel notes and letters home are extremely frank about the sexual nature of his Oriental tour. Bhedad argues that by the mid-eighteenth century the thrill of discovery had waned with the popularization of tourist package tours. As such, “what brings the tourist to the Orient is not the ‘lordly’ attempts of earlier orientalists to understand and ‘make sense’ of the internal dynamics of Oriental culture and to gain ‘new’ knowledge about them, but the desire to identify the already defined signs of exoticism as erotic.” The representations of the Orient had sufficiently been imbued to Europeans that, in Flaubert’s words, “anyone who is a little attentive redisCOVERs here much more than he discovers.” However, this does not stop Flaubert from rediscovering a great number of sexual delights. He writes “the oriental woman is a machine, and nothing more; she doesn’t differentiate between one man and another. As

163 Lane, op cit. p.297.
164 Lane, op cit. p.298.
165 Said, 1978, p.188. ‘Woven through all of Flaubert’s Oriental experiences, exciting or disappointing, is an almost uniform association between the Orient and sex.’
166 Behdad, op cit. p.49.
for physical pleasure, it must be very slight since they cut off that famous button, the very place of it, quite early on. And for me, this is what renders this woman so poetic, that she becomes absolutely one with nature."  

Lowe admonishes post-colonial critics that the stereotype of the Oriental woman is not unidimensional, or uncontestable. Stoler also argues that the sexual policing in the colonies prefigured the policing of perversion in Europe that Foucault explores in work on sexuality. The stereotype represents the frightening lack of restraint - to which the white (male) administrator was susceptible. The (inevitable) product of the unions between white administrators and ‘native’ women were treated as a challenge to the racial order.

The discourse of Oriental sexuality was not unambiguous, but certainly reflected the power difference between colonizer and colonized. Burton, known as “Dirty Dick,” is quite plain in his coupling of sexual and class relations in Europe and the Orient alike.

“How often is it our fate, in the West as in the East, to see in bright eyes and to hear from rosy lips an implied, if not an expressed, ‘Why don’t you buy me?’ or, worse still, ‘why can’t you buy me?’” The anxiety of sexual liberty or racial degradation is transmuted into a consumer’s anxiety of insufficient buying power, and the consolation of the security of property relations.

Whether the difference was figured as titillating, threatening, or incidental, the sexualized stereotypes of the colonized played a formative role in the representation of

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169 Lowe, op cit. p.76.  
the colonial world. McClintock argues that specifically sexual metaphors were used to reify colonial relations.

Women are the earth that is to be discovered, entered, named, inseminated, and, above all, owned... linked symbolically to the land, women are relegated to a realm beyond history and thus bear a particular vexed relation to narratives of historical change and political effect. Even more importantly, women are figured as property belonging to men and hence as lying, by definition, outside the male contests over land, money, and political power. 173

This connection between Hegelian notions of African geography and female characteristics is important to the deconstruction of the rhetoric of empire. The threat of racial degradation is central to Stoler’s application of Foucault into the colonial context. The constant allure of “going native” or “growing black” undermined the superiority of the colonizer. 174

Contemporary critics and postcolonial scholars comment upon this reliance on markers of race connected to the skin, the body, and the sexual organs extensively. Hyam argues, “Endless emphasis on the differences between ‘natives’ and themselves was one of the necessary props of empire. They could have only ruled subject peoples, especially when hopelessly outnumbered, by honestly believing themselves to be racially superior, and the subject race to be biologically different.” 175 This illustrates Foucault’s fascination with notions of ‘bio-power.’ 176 Burton continues this point:

Phrenology and physiognomy, be it observed, disappoint you often amongst civilised people, the proper action of whose brain upon the features is impeded by the external pressure of education, accident, example, habit, and necessity. But

172 Burton [Part I, Ch. IV] p.60.
173 McClintock, op cit. p.31.
174 Burton, [Part I, Ch. IV] p.58.
175 Hyam, op cit. p.103.
they are tolerably safe guides when groping your way through the mind of man in his so-called natural state, a being of impulse, in that chrysalis condition of mental development which is rather instinct than reason.\textsuperscript{177}

Stoler points out that this discourse of difference was mobilized not only between metropolis and colony, but also within classes and races in each community. She contrasts the myth of imperial unity to the actuality of class and racial division in the East Indies.

We are still left to explain the pervasive anxiety about white degeneration in the colonies, the insistent policing of those Europeans who fell from middle-class grace, the vast compendium of health manuals and housekeeping guides that threatened ill-health, ruin, and even death, if certain moral prescriptions and modes of conduct were not met.\textsuperscript{178}

Those ‘others’ of mixed race or low status were seen as dangerous because they undermined the supposed unity of the colonizers. The relations between colonial rulers, almost universally men, and indigenous women lays bare an important vector of imperial power. Multi-racial relations, and their progeny who often claimed colonizer status, complicated clear simple racial divisions. This effort reflects a change in public opinion regard sexual morals in the colonies. At first, the colonies were seen as realms exempt from sexual mores. Hyam argues:

The regulation of sexual relations with indigenous peoples was inherently a central feature of the colonial relationship, and it was fundamental to the construction of racial perceptions and misperceptions. As race relations became less relaxed in the later nineteenth century, so missionaries and memsahibs insisted on tighter controls. Sexual contacts thus became more depersonalized, and prostitution was preferred as politically safer.\textsuperscript{179}

\textsuperscript{177} Burton, [Part I, Ch. II] p.17.
\textsuperscript{178} Stoler, 1995, p.102.
\textsuperscript{179} Hyam, op cit. p.292.
This convergence of discourse is specifically interesting. The formerly racially-dangerous sexual consort becomes ‘safe’ once she is bought, and incorporated into European structures of consumerism and the sexual politics of domesticity. The uncertainty of racial relations is reconfigured in terms of ‘safe’ class relations, similar to Burton. This change in popular morality is seen to have had the effect of solidifying racial boundaries, which had been previously been more fluid. Lloyd argues, “It has been suggested that part of the reason why British attitudes to Indians became more hostile after the Mutiny was that British women came to India in larger numbers as the Suez route became less troublesome and were more concerned about keep a due and proper distance between Indians and themselves than man had ever been.”

This convergence of gendered, racial, and class discourses illustrates the pervasiveness of imperialism as a way of understanding European imperial culture. Wandering the exhibition grounds in Paris or London the public was educated towards, and made complicit in, the national, consumerist, and imperial project. Not only were the colonies, their products and peoples on view, but the nation was on view to itself. Anderson’s constructivist account of nationalism defends the notion that the production of a seeming homogenous nation from heterogeneous populations requires the representation of the people to themselves. At the exhibition, classes viewed each other. Races were viewed, and souvenirs were bought. Class and racial hierarchies were reaffirmed through spectacle. The chaos of the crowd contrasted the ordering of the architecture. The ordering of the races was coincident with the ordering of classes. The

\[180\] Lloyd, op cit. p.178.
barbarians, both internal and external, were on display. The hyper-sexualized Orientals were tamed by their participation in consumer capitalism, and by the architecture of spectacle. Masculine Europe was seen as the father of the family of man, paternalistic to the rest of the world through its civilizing mission. Race, class, and gender rhetoric was used to stabilize the image of a national identity, despite the class, sexual, and racial tension. The spectacle of the exhibition was an attempt to educate the metropolitan population of their similarity, in the face of lesser subject races, and their shared consumerism. The decline in the display of colonized peoples after the First World War is indicative of the wane of racism in Britain and France, the rising nationalism in the colonized peoples, and the undermining of the justification for the civilizing mission. However, for the majority of the nineteenth century, racial, class and gender politics were all tied to the imperial project.

Conclusion

In traditional IR theories, imperialism is portrayed as a uniform process of power accumulation, distinctly international in scope but domestic in nature. However, as this chapter has suggested, nineteenth century imperialism complicates this domestic/international divide. Further, certain prevailing cultural trends cannot be understood without reference to the colonial condition. Rather than isolating European and non-European politics as two separate realms of politics, I have suggested that the civilizing mission was central to European identity, and integral to non-European culture. Europe defined its identity in part by what it was not — and it was not barbarous. The

image of the barbarian implied continual threat and insecurity, descriptions that were also applied to dangerous domestic populations. Thus, the barbarian was implicated in the construction of the disciplinary society, the extension of surveillance to the general metropolitan and imperial populations. The continual state of war between colonizer and colonized resembles traditional definitions of anarchical relations. Imperialism also involved great amounts of violence, which are traditionally downplayed in studies of war in the nineteenth centuries. European identity was constituted in reference to lesser races and the concomitant civilizing mission. The boundary of European identity was policed at cultural and racial levels, often using visible markers and authoritative texts such as the passport and the census.

The discursive formation constituting the image of the barbarian attempted to resolve a number of tensions with the ideology of imperialism. Violence against the barbarian was justified in almost every instance. The rules of 'civilized' warfare did not apply to barbarians, nor did the rule of civilized governance. To get a full picture of international relations, we must not only investigate both sides of the domestic/international divide, but also look at liminal cases such as colonial rule which were both domestic and international. The reality of colonized peoples is, of course, far more varied. Indeed, Nandy and Césaire argue that Europe was far more negatively effected by colonialism than the colonies were.¹⁸² However, since the orientalist stereotype of the barbarian

¹⁸² Nandy, op cit. p.32. "They were overwhelmed by the experience of being colonial rulers. As a result, the long-term cultural damage colonialism did to the British society was greater." Césaire, op cit. p.13.
reached its peak in the nineteenth century, a brief mapping of the ideological terrain upon which he stands is useful.

The barbarian is irrational, uneducated, and violent. He is libidinous and indolent. She is libidinous and un-domestic. His subjugation must be violent because he cannot understand the benefits of civilization. Once conquered, he must be continually under surveillance because he is always planning sedition or revolt. The barbarian’s only chance of redemption is through a European education and acculturation. The barbarian proves his inferiority through his evident under-development, and any reluctance he may show to the imperial project. The barbarian proves the colonizers superiority at the same time. As Said argues about the stereotype of the Oriental, “The Oriental is irrational, depraved, child-like, different, thus the European is rational, mature, virtuous, ‘normal.’”

European identity was thus implicated deeply in the colonial project, and the image of the barbarian specifically. “Conscious of this [barbarian] world at his elbow, the Western felt his identity by contrast to it: it was his shadow, his antithesis, or himself in dreams.”

At the close of the nineteenth century, the discourse of civilization collapsed under its own weight. In bringing the light of civilization, Europe had darkened itself. The First World War, in addition to being fostered by the atmosphere of competition for imperial prestige, revealed that Europeans were just as barbaric as any other civilization. The use of colonial troops within the boundaries of Europe marked a change, which led in turn to

the growth of the nationalist movement. The Second World War saw the barbarizing of
Europe and the glorification of violence and barbarism, after which the rhetoric of
civilization took a profoundly pessimistic turn. Decolonization was the result of a
number of these forces. The discourse of civilization and barbarians brings all of these
discourse to the fore.
CH. IV: THE FIRST FORTY YEARS

A CIVILIZED OR BARBARIC EUROPE?

Like the travel-writers, novelists, and statesmen of the nineteenth century, philosophers and politicians of the new century found the categories of civilization and barbarian useful in their attempts to understand and describe imperial, international, and intra-European relations. The philosophers and intellectuals of the turn of the century — Arthur de Gobineau, Friedrich Nietzsche, Oswald Spengler, and Sigmund Freud in particular — redefined the terms civilization and barbarian as they reevaluated the ideological principles which had justified inter- and extra-European relations in the previous century’s period of rapid expansion. The work of these intellectuals became part of popular political culture, albeit in polarized and simplified terms.

This chapter will examine the more serious critical attempts to understand the world order at the turn of the century through the civilization/barbarian distinction. I will touch upon three illustrative intersections of the ‘civilized/barbarian’ discourse and the popular international imaginary: four important philosophers and thinkers of the period, the use of imperial troops and strategy, and indicate some interesting points in the development of IR. The chapter will also evaluate the extent to which the then newly formed discipline of International Relations affected and was effected by the circulation of the trope civilization/barbarian during this period. The change from Idealist to Realist paradigms within IR is also explored, looking specifically at the role of Adolf Hitler in this transformation. This chapter continues the genealogy of the civilization/barbarian
discourse into the twentieth century, reaffirms a methodological commitment to the study of culture and identity, and looks at the presence of imperialism in IR theory.

**Philosophers of Barbarism: de Gobineau, Nietzsche, Spengler, and Freud**

To understand fully the cultural mood at the turn of the century, we must first touch upon the intellectuals of this period. Of these, de Gobineau, Nietzsche, Freud, and Spengler are the most important to the general cultural mood of pessimism, from which the inversion of the civilized/barbarian trope develops. While these philosophers and intellectuals may not have been widely read in the original, “many of [Nietzsche’s, Freud’s, and Heidegger’s] ideas were conveyed in popular phrases and political clichés,” and their ideas became common currency in political discourse.1 These intellectuals investigated the valuations of ‘civilized’ and ‘barbarian’ critically — treating them as constructed, contentious, terms of judgment. I will also look briefly at the racialist theorists who began to circulate and gain public adherents, referring chiefly to de Gobineau and Chamberlain. None of these thinkers left the discourse of civilization/barbarian unaffected by their analysis, and their work had an impact on the popular imaginary of Europe.

**De Gobineau, Race, and Conflict**

Racial competition held a central place in the international imaginary of the period.2 If the international system is perceived as a realm of constant racial competition, the civilizing mission could be interpreted as giving aid to the enemy. These anxieties about

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the rising power of the colonized populations were especially prevalent in the pre-First
World War and interwar periods. The first Oxford professor of International Relations,
Alfred Zimmern described the defeat of the Russians by the Japanese “the most
important historical event in our lifetime; the victory of a non-white people over a white
people.” Politicians and theorists began to discuss the impeding “race war.” Whether
cloaked in scientific or imperial discourse, racial inequality was a core pillar of the
popular international imaginary of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Of
these, de Gobineau is the most popular and egregious. De Gobineau’s “Essay on the
Inequality of the Races” represents physical, anthropological differences as cultural
differences. He argues that racial ‘mixing’ is responsible for the general cultural
deterioration in Europe, and the world. While written in 1855, it’s first English
translation during the First World War made a significant impact on the popular
imagination. Another figure, Houston Stewart Chamberlain, connected fears of racial
decline with the fears of cultural decline. “Chamberlain played upon all the diverse
anxieties then afflicting Europe’s industrial powers – militarism, anticlericalism, ‘pan-
isms,’ the degeneration of political life, the rise of technological and managerial society –

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in an effort to create an integrated theory of race.” Racialist theories can be seen as an extension of the *kultur vs. zivilisation* debate prominent in Germany, but was pervasive throughout Europe during this time. Hugh Tinker described the Second World War as a war that was explicitly “racial” from the Nazi perspective, but not perceived as racial from the Western perspective.10

Frank Füredi provides an excellent survey of racial thinking as it pertains to International Relations. Race is often neglected as a concept in the study of IR, and his history is a welcome addition. Füredi argues that racial anxiety was fueled in large part by “perceptions that the white race was under pressure from more fertile others.”11 Michael Teitelbaum and Jay Winter have shown that while demographic trends have not changed significantly since Malthus’ time, the rhetoric of racial conflict based on population only emerges during times of political tension.12 The stereotype of the barbarian is often mobilized concurrently and complicity with this demographic rhetoric – in part because the barbarian has always been portrayed as fecund, over-sexual, racially threatening, and dangerous. However, at the turn of the century, rather than represent a significant change in the population of the ‘others,’ European anxiety reflected its own self-doubts.

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9 Ibid., p.348.
10 Tinker, op cit. p.43.
11 Füredi, op cit., p.68.
12 Teitelbaum and Winter, op cit., pp.129-133.
Nietzsche: The New Barbarian Comes

Nietzsche is one of the most complex and challenging figures of the nineteenth century. He “towers above the history of twentieth-century thought. He is the great prophet of ‘cultural pessimism.’” Nietzsche’s ideas became popular throughout the Western world in the twentieth century, and as Arthur Herman notes, “in the realm of the written word, terms such as ‘übermensch,’ ‘will to power,’ ‘master-slave morality,’ ‘transvaluation of all values,’ and ‘blond beast’ became standard parts of the vocabulary of intellectuals and political writers.” His popularity was such that, during the First World War, Thus Spoke Zarathustra was one of two books in a German soldier’s knapsack (the other being the Bible). Nietzsche’s popularity in Germany in turn caused him to be vilified as the “apostle of German ruthlessness and barbarism” in England and America. To elaborate his writings and what has been made of them, ignoring for the moment their obscure style, would require several separate books. Because Nietzsche’s writings set out a philosophy of culture in which he praised, rather than condemned, the barbarian, he is central to this project. Consequently, I will focus on two aspects of Nietzsche’s considerable corpus: his praise of the barbarian and his writings as a philosopher of culture and prophet of pessimism.

14 Ibid., p.224.
Nietzsche’s praise of barbarism is related to two of his central concepts: the death of God and the will to power. I will look at these in turn to explicate the pessimistic cultural mood that Nietzsche diagnosed and popularized. Nietzsche relates the parable of the madman in The Gay Science, and offers this infamous dialogue, “'Wither is God?' he cried, 'I will tell you. We have killed him — you and I. All of us are his murderers... God is dead.'”17 While Nietzsche indeed criticizes Christianity on a host of charges,18 he intends a deeper indictment of European thought. God represents an anchor in philosophical – or theological – certainty, which by definition must lay outside of the sphere of uncertain human affairs. Nietzsche believes this foundation has come undone, and has been shown to be an ephemeral psychological convenience. Nietzsche is perhaps the first European anti-foundationalist. His genealogy of moral valuations — and the attempted revaluation of all morals — traces the “all-too-human” origins of moral codes.19 “Nietzsche’s fear was that in a secular age men would replace God by their own man-made divinities... shorn of the certainty of religious belief, [man] would crave the certainty of political truth.”20 Morals, language, and reason itself are shown to be the inventions of fallible individuals. “Against positivism, which halts at phenomena — ‘These are only facts and nothing more’ I would say: No, facts are precisely what there are not, only interpretations. We cannot establish any fact ‘in itself’... It is our needs that

17 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science With a Prelude in Rhymes and an Appendix of Songs. Trans. Walter Kaufmann. New York: Random House, 1974 [1882], p.181 [125]. The brackets refer to original date of publication and section number respectively.


20 Coker, 1994b, p.43-44.
interpret the world...” 21 Against reason and causality, Nietzsche argues “Not ‘to know’ but to schematize — to impose upon chaos as much regularity and form as our practical needs require. In the formation of reason, logic, and the categories, it was need that was authoritative: the need, not ‘to know’ but to subsume, to schematize, for the purpose of intelligibility and calculation.” 22 Thus, all the ideals of the Enlightenment, such as reason, logic, and progress, are various aspects of the human need for order and thus not consistent either with an objective reality, or within themselves. They represent a system of belief that invents the foundation that it requires. This questioning of the very foundation of reason, language, and logic turns on its head the notion of progress and truth:

Progress — let us not be deceived! Time marches forward; we’d like to believe that everything that is in it also marches forward — that the development is one that moves forward. The most levelheaded are led astray by this illusion... “Mankind” does not advance... The overall aspect is that of a tremendous experimental laboratory in which a few successes are scored, scattered through the ages, while there are untold failures, and all order, logic, union, and obligingness is lacking. 23

“Truth”: this, according to my way of thinking, does not necessarily denote the antithesis of error, but in most fundamental cases only the posture of various errors in relation to one another. Perhaps one is older, more profound than another... What is truth. Inertia: that hypothesis which brings satisfaction, the smallest expenditure of spiritual force. 24

This condemnation of reason, progress, and truth — in short all the ideas of

Enlightenment culture — found a surprisingly receptive audience. The lack of objective foundation for reason, calculation, and history meant that individuals created meaning for

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22 Ibid., p.278 [515].

23 Ibid., p.55 [90].
themselves. The lack of foundations induced despair on the one hand, and on the other liberation. The individual is free to create his own truth. Modris Eksteins’ evaluation of fin de siècle Paris concludes, “the Nietzschean command ‘You ought to become who you are’ [became] the supreme moral law.”

Meaning did not come from Church or state (Nietzsche was a notorious enemy of nationalism), but from within — the will to power. Power created meaning. “You say that it is the good cause that hallows even war? I say unto you: it is that good war that hallows any cause. War and courage have accomplished more things than love of the neighbor.”

Nietzsche argues that the belief in the ideals which acted as the pillars of modern European civilization were corrupt. And, as such, Europe itself is corrupt and declining: “For some time now, our whole European culture has been moving us toward a catastrophe, with a tortured tension that is growing from decade to decade: restlessly, violently...” This decline can only be solved by the affirmation of the “noble virtues” through a “will to power.” Nietzsche contends that the values of weakness, piety, sickness, humility — the so-called “slave morality” — have been valued higher than the “noble” values of strength, will, responsibility. The ‘solution’ to decadence Nietzsche prescribes is the ‘will to power:’ it was the imposition of one’s strength, one’s will, onto

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24 Ibid, pp.290-91 [535-37].
26 Kaufmann, op cit., p.288.
28 Nietzsche, 1967, p.3 [Preface].
29 Ibid., p.465 [870]. “The root of all evil: that the slavish morality of meekness, chastity, selflessness, absolute obedience has triumphed — ruling natures were thus condemned.”
the world. For Nietzsche, the slave ethic centered on ‘restraint.’ The will to power is portrayed as the actualization of instinct, the unshackling of the individual from restraint. In short, the barbarian is represented as the solution to the decadence of European civilization at the end of the nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{30} Nietzsche exhorts his readers, “Where are the barbarians of the twentieth century? They will be the elements capable of the greatest severity towards themselves, and able to guarantee the most enduring will.”\textsuperscript{31} Coupled with the Nietzsche’s remarks elsewhere, we see that ‘barbarians’ are not simply not-decadent, not-civilized beings, but rather are individuals that have a vital energy that will regenerate European culture, through the disregard of moral prohibitions. The barbarian is Nietzsche’s \textit{übermenschen}, or overman.\textsuperscript{32} The \textit{übermenschen} is also the most evolved man, the supreme product of civilization [if not zivilization]. He overcomes morality and restraint to impose his will to power on the world, creating his own truth, and re-investing barbaric characteristics with moral value. Spengler elaborates this view of the regenerative power of barbarians to European culture.

\textsuperscript{31} Nietzsche, 1967, p.464 [868].
\textsuperscript{32} This interpretation runs at odds with Kaufmann’s assertion that “Nietzsche thinks of qualitative degrees of power as corresponding to various forms of behaviour and of culture; and the saint I considered the most powerful man. The barbarian, who is uncultured, is the least powerful” (Kaufmann, op cit. p.196). In testament to Nietzsche’s opaque style, Kaufmann provides a tortuous, gymnastic explanation of one aphorism from ‘The Dawn’ upon which he bases his wholesale repudiation of the barbarian. Kaufmann mistakenly makes a distinction between ‘barbarians’ and ‘new barbarians;’ Kaufmann concedes that the ‘new barbarians’ mentioned in Will to Power are seen not as a descent to bestiality, but an ascent beyond morals to naturalness. Kaufmann argues that the ‘new barbarians’ are not very barbarous (ibid., p. 362). Nietzsche does not distinguish between the man and his behaviour and so this explanation is strained. The simpler analysis, that Nietzsche does indeed value the barbarian as an individual of strength and will, not only accounts for Kaufmann’s misreading but also corresponds more precisely with Nietzsche’s praise of the barbarian both new and old.
Nietzsche indicts contemporary European culture as decadent, because it values the ‘slave’ ethics of weakness, sickness, and altruism above the ‘noble’ ethics of strength, health, and willfulness. Part of Nietzsche’s criticism of the ‘slave ethics’ concerns part of the self/other dynamic of which anti-Semitism is a particularly virulent variety. He argues, “Slave ethics... begins by saying no to an ‘outside,’ an ‘other,’ a non-self... Slave ethics requires for its inception a sphere different and hostile to its own. Physiological speaking it requires an outside stimulus in order to act at all; all its action is reaction.”

In short, Nietzsche is suggesting that the modern conception of identity – that identity requires difference – suffers from an internal weakness. The self depends upon the ‘other’ for recognition, which immediately complicates the difference. This critique prefigures much current critical thinking on identity.

The only solution Nietzsche foresaw was a revaluation of these characteristics and the rise of a new man. He describes the barbarian as one “who comes from the heights: a species of conquering and ruling natures,” who has the power and lack of restraint necessary to obey his natural instincts, and who gives vital energy back to European society. While Nietzsche’s work proposes a radical change in the terms by which European civilization was to value itself, he shares with his nineteenth century predecessors an interest in seeing Europe as the centre for the dissemination of these (new) values and of power. This perhaps accounts for his popularity and the extent to

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35 Nietzsche, 1967, p.478-9 [900].
which his cry of decadence and appeal to power were disseminated into European popular culture through literature, music, and philosophy.

Nietzsche was not anti-Semitic. Of course, Nietzsche’s own dense style lends itself to mis-interpretation. He cites Jewish theology as responsible for the inversion of values: “It was the Jew who, with frightening consistency, dared to invert the aristocratic value equations good/noble/powerful/beautiful/happy/favored-of-the-gods and maintain with furious hatred of the underprivileged and impotent that ‘only the poor, the powerless, are good; only the suffering, sick and ugly truly, blessed’... it was the Jews who started the slave revolt in morals...” However, distinct from Nietzsche’s criticism of the ‘slave ethic,’ he is vociferously anti-Semitic. He writes in a letter, “It is a matter of honor to me to be absolutely clean and unequivocal regarding anti-Semitism, namely opposed, as I am in my writings.”

Ironically, this explicit repudiation of anti-Semitism was directed at his sister – Elizabeth Forster-Nietzsche – who was an adamant anti-Semite and shameless promotor of her brother’s work. After his death, Forster-Nietzsche, Wagner, and Houston Stewart Chamberlain all quoted Nietzsche to support their beliefs. It should be noted that anti-Semitism was rife throughout Europe during this time. Nietzsche was also adopted as a

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36 Nietzsche, 1956, pp.167-68 [7].
37 Nietzsche quoted in Kaufmann, 1974, p.45.
38 Kaufmann in Nietzsche, 1967, pp.xvi-xix.
patron saint of Nazism. However, as Kaufmann argues, “Nietzsche could be quoted in support of Nazism only when passages were torn from their context.”

Nietzsche represents a powerful critique of the Enlightenment values, which had been predominant in European culture during the nineteenth century. As part of this critique, he inverts the value ascribed to the civilized/barbarian dichotomy. Nietzsche argues that the barbarian is the saviour of a decadent European civilization. This theme was to be popularized by Spengler, among others.

*Spengler: Decline of the West*

Spengler is of chief interest to this project because of his popularity within Germany in the interwar period. He also represents this anti-Enlightenment, Romantic theme of European thought. Spengler is one of the prime proponents of the value of *Kultur* over *zivilisation*. Seeing himself as the heir to Nietzsche’s prophecy, Spengler actually only came to the German public’s attention when Nietzsche’s sister awarded him the “Nietzsche Prize.” Eventually, however, Spengler’s influence stretched from Arnold Toynbee to Hitler. His historical epic, *The Decline of the West*, popularized two ideas that were to become central to interwar German, and European, culture. Spengler is a prophet of decline, and describes all cultures as organic forms. “Cultures, peoples, languages, truths, gods, landscapes bloom and age as the oaks and the pines, the blossoms, twigs and leaves — but there is no aging of ‘Mankind.’ Each Culture has its

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40 Kaufmann, op cit., pp.300-1.
41 Herman, op cit., p.244-5.
own possibility of self-expression which arise, ripen, decay, and never return.”

Spengler elaborates the distinction between Kultur and zivilization, which described ‘culture’ as the healthy, strong spirit of a people and ‘civilization’ as the decadent, baroque, decay of the spirit.

Spengler also popularized the pluralization of civilizations that could be studied comparatively. This is part of a larger discourse that is skeptical of ‘civilization’ and praises the strengths (lack of restraint) of the ‘barbarian.’ One finds this distinction in Nietzsche, but Nietzsche projects culture as the unrestrained actualization of the spirit of a people, and civilization as the restraint of instincts. He argues, “the great moments of culture were always, morally speaking, times of corruption [of the slave ethics]; and conversely, the periods when the taming of the human animal (‘civilization’) was desired and enforced were times of intolerance against the boldest and most spiritual natures.”

For both thinkers, civilization is decadent in itself. The restraint of a culture’s spirit marks its decline and inevitable collapse. It is interesting to note that Freud, who considered himself cosmopolitan, rejects the distinction between culture and civilization — seeing restraint of the barbaric as a necessary evil.

Spengler associated civilization with decline and a baroque emphasis on style over substance. Significantly, he also associated civilization with imperialism. “Civilizations

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43 Eksteins, op cit., pp.79-80.
44 Spengler, op cit. p.73.
45 Nietzsche, 1967, p.75 [121].
are the most external and artificial states of which a species of developed humanity is capable. They are a conclusion, a thing-become succeeding a thing-becoming, death following life, rigidity following expansion... History is not progress, as Hegel argued, but cyclical generation and decay.\(^{47}\) Imperialism, in this view, was taken to be the external direction of both individuals and resources but the 'spirit' of the nation. The national spirit was engaged in 'civilizing' others, rather than developing one's own national character further. Spengler identifies the nineteenth century specifically as the transition point from expansion to rigidity.\(^{48}\) He argues that the civilizing mission has the effect of looking outward rather than inward. The material expansion of European society depends upon the spiritual calcification of European culture. In sum, he says, "The energy of culture-man is directed inwards, that of civilization-man outwards"\(^{49}\) towards empire.\(^{49}\) The externalization of energy reflects the decline of European culture for Spengler.

This rejection of the civilizing mission challenged contemporary justifications of imperialism. In opposition to the altruism of late nineteenth century imperialist ideology, expansion was seen to be the imposition of a people's collective will to power — not just an expression of their moral superiority. Spengler undermines the 'civilizing mission' upon which imperialist ideology had rested in nineteenth century Europe. Imperialism was not seen as Progress; it was only territorial and economic expansion. This

\(^{48}\) Ibid., p.25.  
\(^{49}\) Ibid., p.28.
questioning of the civilizing mission was to have a profound effect on Germany after the First World War, and the loss of its colonies.\(^5^0\)

The second idea that Spengler helped legitimize, which was certainly circulating among the Front generation, was that of a “Fifth column” responsible for the German defeat in the First World War. German soldiers at the front felt as if they had been stabbed in the back by the General Staff’s surrender in 1918. “Spengler blamed Germany’s defeat on the presence of an *innere England*, the defection of a class that had been contaminated by liberal ideas, a group of which welcomed the defeat as a change to introduce Western parliamentarianism into German political life.”\(^5^1\)

Within Nietzsche and Spengler, the primitive, instinctual, will-to-power is set up in opposition to decadent civilization. The barbarian culture of expansion and domination is lauded as the remedy for the restraints of civilization. Both are influenced by the racist views of Joseph de Gobineau that had disseminated into popular culture by the turn of the century. In this view, “Europeans [used] racial or physiological differentiation to explain cultural differences.”\(^5^2\) However, it is worth noting that neither of these writers was anti-Semitic. Their work was, however, to be appropriated by Hitler and the Third Reich in the 1930s and 1940s to such ends that barbarism would never again have positive connotations. Thus, while ‘noble’ savages could be lauded until the

\(^{50}\) G. Kurt Johanssen and H.H. Kraft, *Germany’s Colonial Problem*. London: Thornton Butterworth Ltd, 1937, pp.24, 27-32. Although the authors argue that a ‘colonial guilt lie’ accompanies the ‘war guilt’ lie in the Versailles settlement, they do not justify Germany’s claim to colonies on the basis of the civilizing mission. Instead, they cite the economic, demographic, and territorial needs of Germany within Europe.


\(^{52}\) Herman, op cit. p.54.
present day for being more natural, spiritual, or environmentally conscious, barbarians come to have an uniformly negative connotation.\textsuperscript{53}

\textit{Freud: The Barbarian Within}

Freud is one of the most important thinkers of the twentieth century, and the impact of his work is felt in diverse academic fields. In addition to being the ‘father’ of psychoanalysis, Freud was a cultural critic—and it is in this capacity that he speaks to the civilization/barbarian discourse and the culture of Europe generally. As such, Freud felt himself to be the heir of the best of the European tradition. He also felt a certain intellectual kinship with Nietzsche. Freud acknowledges his debt to Nietzsche obliquely: “Nietzsche, whose guesses and intuitions often agree in the most astonishing way with the laborious findings of psychoanalysis, was for a long time avoided by me on that very account....”\textsuperscript{54} Nietzsche’s description of the processes of repression and sublimation in \textit{The Genealogy of Morals} bears an uncanny resemblance to Freud’s work.\textsuperscript{55} Freud, like Nietzsche and Spengler, was skeptical of the supposed progress of European civilization. He considered himself a cultured cosmopolitan, and was horrified at the rhetoric of nationalism stirred up by the First World War and even more horrified at the carnage that ensued.\textsuperscript{56}


\textsuperscript{55} Nietzsche, 1956, pp.189-230 [Second Essay].

Freud's psychoanalytic and anthropological work reflects an ambiguous attitude toward both civilization and barbarism — taking the view that both are inevitable forces in the history of humanity. Freud spoke directly to both aspects of the civilization/barbarian discourse. I will look at his treatment of both civilization and the barbarian within, concentrating on Civilization and Its Discontents and Thoughts for the Times on War and Death.

Freud made several attempts at anthropological writing, in which he deduced primeval group structures and contemporary moral prohibitions from psychoanalytic and therapeutic evidence. From his evidence of an "Oedipus complex," in which the developing (male) child wishes to occupy the (authorial and sexual) place of the father in the family, Freud speculates that early society was formed from a similar desire. The desire to take the place of the father led to patricide as the first fraternal, community-forming act. The violent act at the core of society is sublimated into guilt. However, the 'barbaric' impulse that fueled the initial patricide remains deep in the structure of society. Thus for Freud, "civilization has been attained through the renunciation of instinctual satisfaction, and it demands the same renunciation from each newcomer in turn. Throughout an individual's life there is a constant replacement of external by


internal compulsion." Civilization is a veneer of restraint over primordial instincts. For Freud, and many Europeans, the First World War showed how fragile that veneer was:

The war in which we had refused to believe broke out, and it brought — disillusionment... It tramples in blind fury all that come in its way, as though there were to be no future and no peace among men after this is over.\(^{50}\)

Freud views civilization as a precarious “struggle between Eros and Death,” in which civilized values demand the repression of instinct and in which those values are internalized as the voice of conscience.\(^{61}\)

Freud, like Spengler and Nietzsche, focused on European culture. Unlike Nietzsche, he felt that European civilization was still a productive project. He viewed himself as a citizen of the “wider fatherland” — of Europe — whose work was a part of a pantheon of European accomplishments. Freud’s own cosmopolitanism led him to condemn war and its concomitant nationalism and parochialism, as well as the states-system of which it was a fundamental institution. He argues that states have ignored the moral code that they require of individuals — and have thus loosed the restraints of civilization leading to a barbaric war. He argues against realist notion of self-interest as aggression: “It should not be objected that the state cannot refrain from wrong-doing, since that would place it at a disadvantage. It is no less disadvantageous, as a general rule, for the individual man to conform to the standards of morality and refrain from brutal and arbitrary conduct.”\(^{62}\)

Freud’s mix of idealism and pragmatism provide a thoughtful counterpoint to

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59 Freud, 1985b, p. 69.
60 Freud, 1985a, p.65.
61 Freud, 1985b, p.314.
62 Freud, 1985a, p.66.

The attempt to replace actual force by the force of ideas seems at present to be doomed to failure. We shall be making a false calculation if we disregard the fact that law was originally brute violence and that even to-day it cannot do without the support of violence. There is no use in trying to get rid of men’s aggressive inclinations. ... It is enough to try and divert them to such an extent that they need not find expression in war.

For Freud, civilization is a process of continual restraint and negotiation between instincts and rationality, not of decay or decline. Barbarism is not external to Europe, but internal to Europeans. The barbarian-other is not a type of human or a ‘race,’ but an indelible aspect of our unconscious. The barbarity of every civilized individual — which is unrestrained in wartime — levels the distinction between colonial-barbarian and European imperialist. The implicit universalism of psychoanalysis implies a uniformity of ‘barbarity’ within all individuals, which civilization restrains by degrees. Freud, like Nietzsche, argues that the civilized states may feel that ‘barbarous’ means of warfare are necessary in barbarous times. Freud firmly believes that cosmopolitanism and civilization work towards peace. But, he also admits that this involves the constant attempt to restrain barbarian instincts within the state and within the individual. While Freud sees psychoanalysis as a tool for the resolution of the tension between instincts and

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65 Nietzsche, 1967, p.487 [922]. "What means one has to employ with rude peoples, and that ‘barbarous’ means are not arbitrary and capricious, becomes palpable in practice as soon as one is placed, with all one’s European pampering, in the necessity of keeping control over barbarians, in the Congo or elsewhere."
the restraint of civilization, his discourse fits into the wider fear of (racial, sexual, and
civilizational) degradation, which was an anxiety endemic to the colonial scene.\textsuperscript{67} The
constant danger to society thus becomes “the return of the repressed” instincts, a term
which has recently found its way back into IR with the end of the Cold War. The
(re)emergence of ethnic conflict after the supposed peace of the Cold War has been
likened to Freud’s “return of the repressed.”\textsuperscript{68}

Freud also has some interesting insights into the process of identification and group
psychology. Since Matthew Arnold’s \textit{Culture and Anarchy} (1869), crowds had been
identified as a novel and frightening social phenomenon. Scholarly treatises on the study
of crowds began appearing in 1895 with Gustav LeBon’s \textit{Psychologie des foules}. Freud
investigates the crowd and mass psychology in 1922, by which time the crowd had
become a fixture in the imaginary of Europe. Indeed, Coker argues that the crowd
“dominated the imagination of 20th century Europe.”\textsuperscript{69} This has special relevance as a
diagnosis of the spirit of the First World War, which was epitomized by the mass rallies
of support when war was declared.\textsuperscript{70} Freud argues, “by the mere fact that he forms part
of an organized group, a man descends several rungs in the ladder of civilization.
Isolated he may be a cultivated individual; in a crowd, he is a barbarian — that is, a

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\textsuperscript{66} Freud, 1985c, p.362. \\
\textsuperscript{67} McClintock, op cit., pp.46-51. \\
\textsuperscript{68} Christopher Coker, “The New World (Dis)Order,” \textit{The International System After the Collapse of the}
\textit{East-West Order}. Armand Cleese, Richard Cooper, and Yoshikazu Sakamoto eds. London: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1994a, p.37. \\
\textsuperscript{69} Coker, 1994b, p.90. \\
\textsuperscript{70} Eksteins, op cit., p.56. 
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creature acting by instinct.” The crowd is represented as an individual psyche writ large (with the attendant fears, wishes, instincts, fetishes, neuroses) – the fear of the crows was the fear of one’s own instincts. The ‘barbaric’ crowd is an indication of how close to the psychic surface the barbaric instincts lie.

While this analysis of crowd psychology is reminiscent of Nietzsche’s condemnation of the “herd instinct,” Nietzsche believes that noble and slave mentalities which lead to powerful or weak instincts. Freud and Nietzsche disagree in this respect: whereas Nietzsche sees the natural instincts of the barbarian as ‘noble,’ Freud considers ‘instincts’ destructive to society. Psychoanalytic therapy is, in some aspects, the process of reconciling the necessary repression of society with one’s instinctual drives. The traumatic experience of war by the individual lays this process bare and psychoanalysis became a popular therapy to treat war neuroses during the First World War. Like Nietzsche, Freud is extremely critical of nationalism and of German nationalism in particular. However, Nietzsche views struggle as far more positive process for spiritual growth than does Freud.

What does not kill me makes me stronger

These prominent and popular thinkers spread the seeds and cultivated the attitude of cultural pessimism prevalent in Europe during the first forty years of the twentieth century. This widespread nihilistic disposition took two popular forms of interest to this

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72 Elshtain, 1989, p.54.
project: first, the belief that all civilizational values were transient and a matter of politics; and, second, the belief that barbarism was a vital part of the human will-to-power. Nietzsche and Freud insisted that not only was the world unknowable, but “we remain necessarily strangers to ourselves, we don’t understand our own substance.”

Barbarians were not ‘them,’ but ‘us.’ The barbaric was an integral – if repressed – component of every European’s psyche. This lead to either a fear of degradation or to repression and subsequent psychoanalysis. The killing-zone of the Western Front in the First World War seemed to legitimize this view. It was the site of the loss of a generation, and despite the manic frenzy of the twenties, this loss would haunt Europe until the discovery of even greater horrors. European culture was itself racialized for the first time, as it had racialized its subjects in the colonies. Imperial methods of rule and imperial methods of killing were transplanted to the metropolitan center. The drive to expand one’s culture was internalized within Europe. The rhetoric of the civilizing mission began to sound hollow.

**The First World War: Europe’s First Barbaric War**

The First World War marks a cultural break from the nineteenth to twentieth centuries. It was a war of mass mobilizations in which industrialized, mechanized, depersonalized death became familiar to civilian and soldier alike. Nationalist propaganda was utilized to an unparalleled extent, transforming the popular perception of conflict from a Newtonian ‘balance of power’ to an existential war of cultures and races.

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74 Nietzsche, 1956, p.149.
In fundamental ways, the First World War was, in part, a continuation of the nineteenth century. The imperialist, paternalist rhetoric of civilization and barbarism was mobilized to shore domestic identity and vilify the enemy on both sides of the conflict. The discourse of culture and race was used to mobilize popular opinion. Imperial competition was central to a nation’s self-image as a world power; and nationalism was a chief determining factor in world politics. By war’s end some of the foundations for the twentieth century were also laid down: the birth of modernism as a doubting of authority and the power of representation, the eroding belief in rationalism and reason and the growing belief in irrational forces and vitalism, the birth of total war and the subsequent mobilization of entire societies in war, the centrality of technology in war, the rise of democracy, the beginnings of colonial independence movements, and, finally, the beginning of the decline of Europe as the center of international society.

The discourse of ‘civilization/barbarian’ illustrates both the continuous and discontinuous aspects of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Daniel Pick argues:

It would be difficult to overestimate the centrality of the notion of “civilisation” in the language of the First World War. A broad distinction between “civilisation” and “barbarism” was used to distinguish the European imperial powers from their colonies; at other times to differentiate sections of the domestic population within a specific state; alternatively, “civilisation” was deployed to contrast the behaviour and genealogy of one European nation with another. The persistence of the discourse, and its power in the popular imagination, illustrates the endurance of imperialist world-views in IR. However, the First World War also saw

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75 Coker, 1994b, p.4-5.
76 Defining and debating modernism is a cottage industry in itself. In this project, I follow Eksteins, op cit.
the inversion of the civilization/barbarian discourse. For the first time, Europeans
described each other, and even themselves, as barbaric.78 By tracing the shift in the
rhetoric of civilization/barbarian, we see how popular culture shapes identity, and how
identity is politicized, especially in cases of war, to shore political support. The
simultaneous inversion of the imperialist civilized/barbarian trope also illuminates the
inherent ambivalence and instability within discourse, culture, and European identity. I
will first look at the First World War as a mass phenomenon, drawing on the
development of several tropes prevalent in the nineteenth century. I will then describe
precisely the way in which the First World War was figured as barbaric, in its use of
weapons, tactics, and colonial personnel.

First World War as a Mass Phenomenon

Two of the most enduring popular photos of the First World War are the massive
crowds that gathered to celebrate the outbreak of war (with a jubilant Hitler amongst the
sea of faces), and the exotic portrait of Lawrence of Arabia in native dress. The heroic
spy is the antithesis of the crowd, but both speak to the First World War as a mass
phenomenon. Other wars have, of course, been hotly debated or loomed large in the
public imagination — the American Civil, Russo-Japanese and Franco-Prussian wars
clearly shaped the public’s conception of war. However, the First World War was the
first war that required mass mobilization and subsequently mass support in a manner not
required of previous conflicts. In this section, I will look at crowds, propaganda, and war
itself to illustrate the shift from a nineteenth to a twentieth century culture.

One of the important modes of governance that evolves from the colonial context and finds its way back to the imperial metropolis is that of surveillance. The twin concern with seeing and the unseen leads to the geometric, panoptic layout of colonial barracks, schools, prisons, and even, in the case of Haussman’s boulevards, cities themselves. The opening of spaces, for both the circulation of people and commerce, has the effect of creating public spaces in which large numbers could gather. The first significant, pan-European, moment of this mass “euphoria, even ecstasy” is the outbreak of the First World War. Eksteins argues that “the crowds, in fact, seized the political initiative in Germany. Caution was thrown to the wind. The moment became supreme.” The young and aimless Hitler claims to have found his purpose in the crowd at Munich celebrating the outbreak of war. Freud is also caught up in this initial excitement for the Great War, “For the first time in 30 years, I find myself to be an Austrian,” he writes to a friend. But, there is a double meaning to these discoveries of national sentiment. Only in the face of an existential struggle with a powerful enemy could either feel included in the national community. Hitler feels German for the first time, instead of the provincial Austrian he was. Freud feels Austrian, despite the extent to which he had hitherto been excluded because of his Jewish heritage. The crowd gives a sense of identity and purpose to the nations at war, in large part, by defining an absolute enemy.

82 Coker, 1994b, p.66.
The crowd is, in essence, a microcosm of the state and a product of the popular international imaginary.

Pick powerfully argues that the propagandists play on national myths and construct a new, national readership of propaganda. The use of propaganda to create a national readership is a specific example of the wider pattern Benedict Anderson puts forward in *Imagined Communities*. In creating a common national geography of enmity and friendship, "internal differences were screened out of the representation [of the nation]; the lines of conflict were treated as purely external." Thus, the representation of a common enemy – or 'other' – has the effect of reifying the nation— the 'self.' Hitler's provincialism, Freud's Jewishness, class antagonisms, political divisions are all subsumed under the grander, more important, national enmity against the enemy — be they British, French, or German. Cate Haste argues, "the essence of propaganda is simplification. In wartime, the intricate patterns of politics are refined into simple and crude messages of right and wrong." While this characterization of propaganda is a good starting point, we must recognize that propaganda is not simply the statements of a government, but is "itself an active and often unsettled, a continuing and sometimes uneasy attempt to grasp and define national character." 

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84 Pick, op cit., p.147.
86 Pick, op cit., p.140.
Propaganda can be understood politicized popular culture and international identity made explicitly part of political discourse. Rather than viewing it as a product, Philip Taylor suggests that we view propaganda as "a process for the sowing, germination, and cultivation of ideas." As such, propaganda is understood as situated within a field of contested meanings and ambiguous identities. Propaganda makes an effort to portray political conflict in moralistic tones. The 'self' is virtuous; the 'other' – the enemy – is evil incarnate.

This is not to say that propagandistic discourse goes uncontested. Peace groups, in particular, often provide a dissenting view. However, the ways in which propaganda constructs a threat helps to delegitimize other discourses. In short, propaganda is a critical intersection of national identity and popular culture.

National identity in the context of the First World War was over-determined, by which I mean that national identity was not merely the result of the propaganda ministry's statements, but that a whole network of institutions and cultural fields reified the same message. Narratives of empire, capitalism, liberalism, and International Relations all circulated the same message. The masculine, imperialist, righteous British were united against Godless, Prussian militaristic, barbaric Huns, and Germany. The masculine, cultured, Germans were united against "Asiatic barbarism and Latin indifference." The use of the barbarian stereotype to portray both Germans to the

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88 Connolly, op cit, p.93.

89 It is true that there was a strong pacifist movement during the First World War, but even these pacifists used and reinforced the propagandist language and popular symbols: 'primitive,' 'savage,' 'barbarous,' 'civilized,' 'cultured'[Pick, op cit. p.151.]

90 Eksteins, op cit., p.196.
British, and the British to the Germans deserves specific attention because of its effect on
the attitudes and the actions of those engaged in waging the First and Second World
Wars.

In many ways, Europe was primed for the First World War. Dating from the end of
the Franco-Prussian War, there was a popular fascination for invasion stories in Britain,
France, and Germany. These popular novels, often serialized in magazines, described the
nation's imminent war with its traditional enemy. I.F. Clarke argues that the protagonists
of these invasion stories display “a shift in both attitudes and expectations which would
come to dominate all future-war fiction from 1871 onwards. Monarchs and their
dynasties vanish from these dramas. The whole nation — soldiers, sailors, volunteers,
and citizens — become the principal actors in the battle-to-come.”91 These stories played
a major role in shaping the pre-war imaginary in Britain, France, and Germany.
Specifically “William Le Queux’s The Invasion of 1910 fill[ed] the public mind with the
fear of invasion by a stereotyped enemy, ‘The Hun.’”92 Other stories shaped the
technological expectations for the next war, including fictional treatises on submarine
warfare, aerial warfare, and even the dangers of the Channel Tunnel. These stories filled
the popular imagination with prophecies of defeat and decline, and projected the cultural
decadence of Europe into the national and military spheres. The crowds of Europe
expected, even anticipated a war with which they had become familiar in contemporary
fiction.

91 I.F. Clarke, ‘Introduction: The Paper Warriors and their Fights of Fantasy’ The Tale of the Next Great
War, 1871-1914. Fictions of Future Warfare and the Battles Still-to-come, I.F. Clarke ed. Syracuse:
The crowd sees two chief threats to its identity: the external, knowable enemy, and the internal, seditious enemy. In some cases, the mobilization against this unseen enemy may take more extreme forms than those against the external enemy. In the nineteenth century, European civilization constructed its ‘other’ in the form of the domestic underclass and the global colonized. This pattern of ‘internal’ and ‘external ‘others’ was repeated during the First World War. The new ‘internal other’ was racialized and ascribed many of the characteristics used to portray colonial ‘barbarians.’ The ‘innere England’ or ‘Hun under the bed,’ became the prime internal other – which, often, had the effect of minimizing racial, class, and gender differences within the national community.

The antithesis of the united, national crowd is its unseen enemy. This image of the power of the ‘spy’ and his invisibility can be seen as a extension of the fetish for dressing in native costume in the nineteenth century. Hannah Arendt argues that the secret agent is central to colonial governance, dressing up to rule rather than just explore.93 However, what makes the place of the secret agent in the colonies secure is the fiction of the ability of the white to appear non-white, and the inability of the non-white to appear white. This visibility-function makes the white, intra-European spy so dangerous in comparison. The German spy does not have the visible marker of colour to distinguish him/herself from the ‘safe’ English citizen. As such, spy-paranoia was heightened by the earlier popular images of the Burton-esque imperial travelers. A manic attempt to locate ‘actual’ national markings ensued. “Letters poured in telling authors and editors [of newspapers]

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92 Bond, op cit., p.77.
of suspicious behaviour by German waiters, barbers, and tourists which presented an almost exact mirror image of Le Queux’s book.” 94 The suggested reprisals against German nationals in Britain were strikingly totalitarian. It is surprising that the methods used to alienate the Jewish population from Germany were first suggested by the British to be used against the Germans in England.

Horatio Bottomley [in May 1915] called for more colourful reprisals against Germans. All German property should be confiscated and all Germans locked up. Naturalized Germans should wear a distinctive badge and not be allowed out after dark. Their children should not be allowed to attend schools. 95

Without the external signifier of race, the internal, European ‘other’ is more seditious and thus demands other signs of racial otherness.

The use of the barbarian trope in propaganda illustrates exactly the awareness of external and internal ‘otherness.’ Barbarians, who had heretofore been confined to the non-European world or the lower classes, were suddenly “found” inside Europe’s bourgeois populace. The citizen of Britain, for example, became convinced that the citizen of Germany was visibly marked — if not by his/her skin colour, then by his/her unmaskable barbarous behaviour. The appeal to the civilized/barbarian rhetoric started almost immediately:

On the 8th of August 1914, The London Evening Standard, shouted “Civilization at Issue,” and the theme reverberated ever after. “Guerre contres les barbares,” was simultaneously declared in France, while in Germany, the defence and nurture of Kultur became the duty and privilege of all good Germans. 96

94 Bond, op cit., p.77.
95 Haste, op cit., p.127.
The barbarian stereotype is so strong that it immediately calls to mind danger.

Stereotypes are powerful because they simplify, and in doing so minimize ambiguity. They are most readily effective when they agree with previously held opinions.\footnote{Pick, op cit., p.140.} Bhabha elaborates, “the stereotype is [colonialism’s] major discursive strategy, is a form of knowledge and identification that vacillates between what is already ‘in place,’ already known, and something that must be anxiously repeated... as if the essential duplicity of the Asiatic or the bestial sexual licence of the African that needs no proof, can never really, in discourse be proved. It is this process of ambivalence, [which is] central to the stereotype.”\footnote{Bhabha, 1994a, p.66.}


In one sphere the colonialists, Britain in the lead, were far better equipped for the propaganda struggle which has been so essential a part of twentieth century warfare. They were well versed in the art of denigrating opponents, in order to justify their own less laudable acts and obviate fault-finding at home or abroad... in 1914-18, passion and prejudice long worked up against other races were diverted against a new target, with Germans in the roles of the “Huns.” Once again civilization confronted barbarism.\footnote{V. G. Kiernan, European Empires from Conquest to Collapse, 1815-1960. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s Press, 1998. pp.180-81.}

The stereotype of the barbarian called forth not only the passionate, irrational, Oversexed ‘coloured’ man from the tropics, but also the atrocities of Attila the Hun and the Asiatic hordes which decimated Europe. Both British and Germans used this rhetoric of the barbarian to identify their enemy. The British reported, and invented, atrocity stories — crimes against women, children, the rule of law, cultural and historic sites— all symbols which represented civilization itself. The British nurse Edith Cavell, who was captured and shot by the Germans in Belgium, was a spy. Her capture and execution,
however, were portrayed by the British press as an unprovoked assault on a defenseless woman, lending to the reification of the barbarian stereotype.\textsuperscript{100} Again, we see propagandists linking national identity to other discourses – such as gender and class. The Germans portrayed the Russians as the direct descendants of the Mongols bent on ravaging European culture, and portrayed the English as perpetrating “a kind of treacherous miscegenation, forging an alliance with black- and yellow-skinned people... blurring the lines of division between European and non-European, or between superior and inferior Europeans.”\textsuperscript{101} Both sides of the conflict saw themselves in an existential struggle for European culture, and each side saw itself as its protector of European culture. However, in naming other Europeans as barbaric, the imperialist ideology that was in part based on the palpable differences between civilized Europeans and barbaric non-Europeans began to unravel.

\textit{Barbaric Warfare}

Another enduring image in the popular imaginary of Europe is the apocalyptic landscape of First World War battlefields and the faceless silhouettes of troops going ‘over the top’ into oblivion. First World War warfare was destructive on a scale previously unimagined. It should be recalled, however, that the Spanish flu epidemic of 1919 caused more death than the First World War.

In retrospect the worldwide conflict between 1914 and 1918 was widely regarded as a disaster for European civilization. Approximately 10 million men

\textsuperscript{100} Haste, op cit., pp.89-90.
\textsuperscript{101} Pick, op cit., p.157.
were killed and twice as many seriously wounded; there were 5 million widows, 9 million orphans, and 10 million refugees.\textsuperscript{102}

Three notable facets of the new, modern type of warfare were specifically considered barbaric: barbaric weapons, barbaric tactics, and barbaric troops.

It has been argued that the strategists of the First World War should have foreseen the prospects for a prolonged, costly war in the examples of the American Civil, Crimean, and Russo-Japanese wars.\textsuperscript{103} In the American Civil War, we see the precursors to modern warfare: the first use of railroads for mass mobilization, trench warfare, aerial balloons for surveillance, the destruction of civilian property as a military strategy, and shellshock.\textsuperscript{104} The Crimean War saw the first photographer, the use of colonial troops, and widespread peace movements in Britain. The Russo-Japanese war saw a majority of casualties occurring from artillery, rather than from sickness or face-to-face combat. The First World War saw the first use of general submarine warfare, toxic gas, the machine gun, and tactical air bombing. The codes of ‘civilized’ warfare were being undone by technology.

Submarine attacks and bombing raids did not discriminate between civilians and combatants, and thus complicated one of the primary customs of warfare. The submarine was incredibly effective when submerged, and when sinking other ships outright, but ineffective when acting as a small warship. International law attempted to restrict the indiscriminate killing of civilians and neutrals by proscribing rules of submarine warfare which neutralized all of the submarine’s advantages — giving fair warning, capturing the

\textsuperscript{102} Bond, op cit., p.100.
\textsuperscript{103} Coker, 1994b, p.6.
ship with a prize crew rather than sinking it, and so on. “Submarine commanders openly refused to act in accordance with this ‘absolute duty’ pleading military necessity... The only alternative was not to use submarines at all, or to use them ineffectively.”

Whereas in the nineteenth century, the use of technology was unambiguously positive in the advancement of civilization, new technologies at war were considered by all to be barbaric. Technology had outpaced moral/ideology.

Aerial bombing was first conducted in a colonial context, but was quickly adapted to the First World War:

In October 1911, during the Italian-Turkish War, they bombed Turkish troops and Arab tribesmen in Libya... A year later the French Air Force used terror bombing to put down an anticolonial rebellion in Morocco. Targets included villages, markets, flocks of sheep, and fields of grain... Only a few thousand tons of bombs were dropped on strategic targets in World War I, an amount soon matched in various colonial bombing campaigns by France and Britain. The French even developed a fighter-bomber for just such a role, Type Coloniale, while the British initiated in parts of the empire a system of air rule called “Control without Occupation.”

Although a conference was convened, the international agreement on use of airplanes in warfare was never signed. While both Allies and Axis powers denounced these tactics as ‘barbaric,’ neither could afford to forgo them.

The machine gun, which had pacified Africa and Asia, truly consumed a generation on the Western Front. Machine guns made killing an industrial process: “While the infantry remained under cover, the effect of much of this fire was wasted; but when they

104 Bond, op cit., p.178 (ft. 33).
rose to advance in attack, [a machine gun] might destroy a battalion of a thousand men in a few minutes.\textsuperscript{107} "Maxim, the inventor of the first machine-gun, believed that 'only a barbarian general would send his men to certain death against the concentrated power of his new gun.'\textsuperscript{108} Outdated military tactics fed poorly trained recruits into the maw of the Western Front in orderly lines.

The imperial origin of the machine gun and strategic bombing is not insignificant. "The only difference between the battle of the Somme (1916) and that of Omdurman (1898), the last of the great colonial battles, was that both sides in the European war had the same technology."\textsuperscript{109} It was not the use of these weapons in particular that was considered barbaric, but it was the use of these indiscriminate weapons against other whites.

Part of the objection to some weapon technology used in the First World War was the lack of discrimination between civilians and soldiers. Illustrative is Germany's "shelling of the peaceful coastal resorts of Scarborough and Hartlepool... killing 137 people and injuring 592, including a party of schoolchildren... and then, on December 24th—Christmas Eve — the first aeroplane raid took place over Dover."\textsuperscript{110} Also, "'strategic' [air] attacks far behind the lines such as German airships and Gotha bombers carried out against English cities from 1915 onwards, and the Royal Naval Air Service against the

\textsuperscript{108} Coker, 1994b, p.230.
\textsuperscript{109} Ibid., p.6.
\textsuperscript{110} Haste, op cit., pp.95-96.
Rhur and Rhineland cities” were clearly not military targets.111 The destruction of the library at Louvain, the ‘scratching’ of Nôtre Dame, and the destruction of the Cathedral at Rheims, were all described by France as “the destruction of buildings consecrated to Religion, Art, Science and Charity, [a] treacherous method of warfare.”112 Germany too had a shopping list of complaints against Britain and France, including: “the use of dumdum bullets, unlawful and inhumane methods of conducting war, a method of waging war contrary to all international law, the bombardment of towns and villages from aeroplanes.”113 Finally, most numbing to the soldiers at the Front was the strategic doctrine of ‘attrition.’

In the beginning of First World War, the military adhered to the “cult of the offensive,” which favoured movement and decisive victories — epitomized by the Schliffen Plan.114 However, the predominance of defensive weapons over offensive weapons in First World War led to a static war of attrition. Attrition, as a strategy, was intended to ‘bleed the enemy white,’ the pouring of troops into the battlefield until the opponent could no longer provide the work force to defend. Attrition was a battle of competing death; the winner being the country which could die more. “Battles had become an industrial operation in reverse, in which rates of destruction at the front matched the rates of production in the industries at home.”115 Not only were individuals expendable, but the living conditions in the trenches, where heat, food and safety were

112 Lasswell, op cit., p.85.
113 Ibid., p.86.
scarce, made “each man a savage.” This insensitive shoveling of men unto death was barbaric by any standard, and drained the meaning from the expectations of short, glorious war. Disillusion was the prevailing mood of the “Front Generation,” those veterans who had witnessed the carnage even if they could not express it. One group that suffered even greater disregard by the high command, on the side of the Allies, were the coloured troops employed in the First World War.

One of the most serious indictments by the Germans of the Allied war effort was “the employment of barbarous and warlike tribes in a European war.” The First World War was the “first time in history coloured troops were used in warfare on the continent of Europe,” and it shocked the European world. The colonial troops fought with valor and honour, and were considered so loyal as to be used to quell French mutinies in 1917. The use of colonial troops against other whites violated the racial hierarchy that is central to the ideology of imperialism. European’s right to rule on a strict hierarchy of ‘humanity’ — however, willingness to die patriotically undid this hierarchy. The propaganda of the First World War made sacrifice in the Great War the greatest patriotic

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116 Eksteins, op cit., p.147.
119 Lasswell, op cit., p.85.
120 Kiernan, 1995, p.84. Since Kiernan cites Wavell who argues that coloured troops from Napoleon’s Armée Chopte were used on the Italian peninsula — for which I could find no corroboration — I am left to argue that although it may not be the actual first time that coloured troops were used in battle in modern Europe, it was certainly the first time that their use was culturally significant.
duty of the British or French citizen. If colonial subjects could die just as well as Englishmen and Frenchmen, it was unclear what the essential difference was.\(^{122}\)

The use of colonial troops in a European conflict was not unforeseen. Hobson predicted the use of colonial troops in Imperialism in 1902.\(^{123}\) France’s fear of declining birthrates, and the dynamic growth of Germany, led Col. Mangin to propose La Force noire, made up of Africans, which could defend the homeland.\(^{124}\) Colonial troops suffered higher casualty rates in battle than did their European counterparts.\(^{125}\) On the one hand, using native troops was perfectly in keeping with the racialist conception of colonial subjects as bodies, for attrition if not surveillance. However, the valor attached to the wartime deaths of white Europeans – who in the colonies would be their rules – but whose death on the battlefield was no different, no less valorous, no less national, from theirs, complicated the imperial rhetoric. Colonial subjects were disposed of like bodies, but ironically in death were valorized like national citizens. This tension could not help but spill over into the political imaginary of the colonies when veterans returned.\(^{126}\)

There is an interesting convergence of rhetoric with the use of ‘barbaric’ troops against the ‘barbaric’ Germans. The Germans, while painting themselves as the defenders of civilization against the barbarians of the East, found themselves facing the ‘barbarians’ of the South — in the Senegalese, Indian, and West African units of the

\(^{122}\) Ibid., p.19.


\(^{124}\) Kiernan, 1995, p.85.

\(^{125}\) Ibid., p.86.
Anglo-French armies. The Germans “were told that Gurkha and Sikh troops crept across no man’s land at night, slipped into German trenches, slit German throats, and then drank the blood of their victims, and that Senegalese fighting with the French were cannibals.”

The Germans, for their part, dropped propaganda on South African compounds which read, “In this war I hate black people the most. I do not know what they want in this European war. Where I find them, I will smash them.”

Thus, Europeans perceived at least four dimensions of ‘otherness:’ internal/instinctual, national, European, and global.

Interestingly, the French camps in which both English and French colonial troops were housed used the same plans as model villages in the colonies. Whereas in the colonies, surveillance was designed to prevent insurrection, “the self-contained nature of the camps and the degree of internal security possible there also minimized that which the French authorities were most anxious to avoid — contact between the African troops and the French populace.”

The European colonizers clearly anticipated the disruption in the imperial discourse if contact were to occur. Given that the British strategy was attrition, and that Senegalese or Indians died just as well as their British or French rulers, the ‘essential’ difference in evolution was difficult to see. As Kiernan wryly comments,

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126 Page, op cit., p.18.
127 Eksteins, op cit., p.235.
“Britain wanted to think its native troops good enough to help win the war, but not good enough to be able to break away from the empire.”\textsuperscript{130}

So shocking was the war’s impact on European culture, and European identity, that the 1920s can be seen as a manic expression of relief at the war’s end. The discourse civilized/barbarian had been used extensively in propaganda by both sides in the conflict. As such, the stereotype was never more in the forefront of the European imaginary. However, the war’s barbarity — by Europe’s own standards — had left many Europeans with doubts. After describing fellow Europeans as barbarians, it was problematic to return to the simplistic imperialistic dichotomy of civilized colonizer and barbarian colonized. This was especially true when ‘civilized’ Europeans had behaved barbarically towards one another, and when ‘barbarians’ natives had acted with valor in war.

The self/other dichotomy, which proved so powerful, was mobilized against both internal, European ‘others’ and colonial ‘others.’ While these different groups were often described in the same way – relying on the discourse of civilization/barbarian – the national ‘self’ was strengthened by these threats. National identity was solidified in the face of threats within the nation, from other European nations, and from the colonized.

\textsuperscript{130} Kiernan, 1998, p. 186.
Interwar Years: The Great Disillusion

The primary intergovernmental institution of the interwar period was the League of Nations, the Covenant of which is steeped in the discourse of ‘civilization.’ Article 22, which deals with the Mandate System, refers specifically to the “sacred trust of civilization.” Those people who could not govern themselves were to be “tutored” by “advanced” nations, until such time as they could participate meaningfully in international society. The League of Nations retained some of nineteenth century Europe’s definition of itself as the civilized ruler of barbarian colonies, which were unable to rule themselves. Gong has traced this specific development in his seminal book, while Hedley Bull and Adam Watson have traced the general shift from a European to a global international society. Two distinct trends are visible. On the one hand, there was a popular panic over the “rising tide of colour,” which predicted the overthrow of European/Western culture by the barbarous savages. A rising anxiety about racial struggle began to emerge during the Interwar period. Furedi traces how this anxiety was played out in foreign policy elites. His analysis is wide-ranging, and I will only mention two interesting arguments here. Furedi argues that this anxiety was implicated in many other discourses: colonial sexuality was conflated with fears of miscegenation; colonial population was figured as demographic pressure; colonial economic conditions were equated with development. In fact, he argues that “between

132 The different categories of trust ['A,' 'B,' and 'C'] correspond to 'savage' and barbarian' hierarchy - redeemable or irredeemable in the eyes of Europe.
the two world wars demography remained a fundamental component of International Relations theory." He also notes that while official documents make no mention of Anglo-French racism, the movement towards independence in the colonies was portrayed in ‘racialist’ terms.

On the other hand, imperialism had begun to come under attack as a form of European self-aggrandizement, rather than as the pursuit of altruistic and concrete interests. Hobson’s critique of imperialism on economic grounds had been bolstered by Lenin’s polemic. As such, the new ‘civilizing mission’ was explicitly justified by its emphasis on more practical economic and governmental matters, as opposed to European nations previously stated goal of spiritual enlightenment. The divisions within European cultural identity, made more prominent through wartime propaganda, became politically significant in this context.

Outside of Western Europe, Wilson’s rhetoric of self-determination was equally hard-pressed to distinguish between nations deserving of statehood and colonies unfit for self-rule. Though independence movements were not widely successful, the idea of self-rule had entered into the political imaginary of Europe and its colonies. In sum, the

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135 Füredi, op cit., p.71
136 Ibid., p.131.
139 Haste, op cit., p.82.
140 Hedley Bull, “The Revolt Against the West,” The Expansion of International Society. p.221.
141 Anderson, op cit., p.113-30.
civilization/barbarian opposition was present in the international imaginary, but had lost some of its former rigidity. Europe was suspect as ‘civilization,’ although the League of Nations Mandate System was still explicitly based on the distinction.

The ambiguity, which had been introduced into the civilized/barbarian distinction, reflected a European community whose internal conflicts had unsettled its citizens’ sense of their own national and international claims to civilizational superiority. Within this uneasy inter-war period, IR emerged as a political and academic discipline struggling with the competing images of European civilization and barbarism that appeared in popular and political discourse. Two important intersections between the civilization/barbarian discourse and the discipline of International Relations are the study of propaganda, and the characterizations of Hitler.

The discipline of International Relations developed quickly in the period between the world wars, though its roots can be traced before the First World War. As a product of the initial post-war optimistic world-view, it quickly reflected the change in cultural mood and politics signified by the fall of the League of Nations system and the rise of Fascist power in Italy and Germany. It is interesting to note how briefly the ‘idealist’ turn of IR theory lasted, and the degree to which the early idealists felt themselves to be ‘realistic.’ It is also interesting that the ‘realist’ mood of interwar-IR integrated its idealist predecessor, rather than rejecting it outright. Alfred Zimmern, Arnold Toynbee, and E.H. Carr are prime examples of this fusion. Carr argues in Twenty Years’ Crisis for a balanced approach to IR theory. He warns “it is as fatal in politics to ignore power as it
is to ignore morality.”  

Though I would argue that Interwar realism is more nuanced that the traditional narrative allows, there is no doubt that idealism was denounced by these realist scholars. Again, to recall Carr: “From [the Manchurian crisis] onwards, a rapid succession of events forced upon all serious thinkers a reconsideration of [idealist] premises which were becoming more and more flagrantly divorced from reality.” The pessimistic turn of the 1930s can be represented by the shift in the primus inter pares of statesmen in the international imaginary: Wilsonian optimism is replaced by Hitler’s realpolitik. Whereas Wilson shaped the discourse of an international society in the optimistic post-War years, Hitler shaped the trope of the barbarian in the imaginary of the pre-Second World War IR community. In failing to respond adequately to Hitler, the discipline consequently adopted Hitler as their paradigm for the worst case scenario – a rational actor with irrational aims. Hitler’s foreign policy between 1933-1941 was the epitome of realist, power-maximization – however irrational his justifications or aims. Whereas the idealist view of international morality held that “an obligation to our fellow-men seems implicit in our conception of

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145 Carr, op cit., p.36.

146 This can be seen not only in the wartime experiences of Morgenthau, but in the pre-war writings of Carr, Toynbee, and Zimmern.
civilisation," Hitler’s power-politics successes quickly prompted a realist correction.\textsuperscript{147}

Hitler’s successes on both diplomatic and military stages shaped powerfully the imagination of the 1930-1945 generation of IR scholars. Although the realist mode of international theory has been traced through Rousseau, Hobbes, Machiavelli, and Thucydides, the post-Second World War discipline can be seen as guarding itself from Hitler’s example. After the failure of the Wilsonian League system, the discipline adopted a theoretical stance that could expect Hitler-like foreign policy in the future. After Hitler, international behaviour is assumed to be barbarian before it is assumed to be civilized.

\textit{Barbarian foreign policy: Theorizing Against Hitler}

The change from Idealist to Realist consensus in International Relations has much to do with the emergence of Hitler and the Nazi party onto the world stage.\textsuperscript{148} Hitler is one of the most challenging figures in modern history, especially because of his initial successes of his foreign policy and his popularity within Germany despite the violent and barbaric tenure of the Nazis. The scale of his crimes against humanity can barely be tallied, and the underlying banality of his personality has fundamentally altered our understanding of evil in this century.\textsuperscript{149} I would argue that Hitler’s success in the face of academic idealism led to the entrenchment of realism in the discipline of IR at this time.

\textsuperscript{147} Carr, op cit., p.154.


\textsuperscript{149} Coker, 1994b, p.77.
Of course, during the Cold War Stalin would also shape IR. Of course, during the Cold War Stalin would also shape IR. Hitler, a barbarian statesman, is adopted as primary role model in International Relations. Two trends in the IR community can be traced directly to Hitler’s appearance on the international scene. Before Hitler, the default assumption of the 1920s seemed to be that statesmen and nations would act honorably and according to Christian morals at least within the European family of nations. After the successes of Hitler’s aggression, individuals and nations were assumed to be “imperialist,” narrowly understood as seeking more power. After the revelation of German atrocities in Germany and the East, the Enlightenment and Wilsonian assumption that a nation would usually act rationally and morally was completely discredited. These two changes, the barbarism of international affairs and the potential barbarism of all nations, shaped the post-War IR imaginary. After tracing Hitler’s own theory of International Relations, I will look at the contention that post-1933 IR adopted Hitler as a dangerous statesman. When considering Hitler’s impact on International Relations, it is important to remember Bull’s point that, initially, the Second World War started as a war to prevent German hegemony over Europe. Without the evidence of the death-camps, the impetus to war on the Allied side was primarily the reassertion of a balance of power in Continental Europe.

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150 For comparison of Hitler and Stalin see Toland.

151 This applies chiefly to the realists of the contemporary generation (1930-1948), and was seen as a corrective to overly idealistic statesmen, such as Kellogg and Briand. Holsti increases not only the numbers of role models available to the theorist, but also presents the insight that statesmen assume multiple roles in varying contexts. K. J. Holsti, “National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy,” International Studies Quarterly 14,3. September 1970.

One might argue that American realism had started the ‘realist’ turn coincident to, but not because of the rise of Hitler.\textsuperscript{154} Frederick Schuman writes in the preface to his 1933 text \textit{International Politics}:

The analysis of international politics attempted in the following pages does not postulate the inevitability of sweetness and light or support the illusion that the law of the jungle in the international anarchy has, by some late magic, been superseded by the morality of the millennium. The approach is rather that of \textit{Realpolitik}, characterized by Machiavellian detachment and an earnest effort to delve beneath the phraseology to underlying realities.\textsuperscript{155}

America’s isolationist mood kept it insulated, in some regard, from the immediacy of Hitler’s actions. However, it is certainly true that post-war IR in the United States was shaped by Hitler in two specific respects. First, Hans J. Morgenthau’s personal experience as a refugee influenced his perception of international relations, statesmen, and morality. Second, Hitler was a taken as a model for Stalin’s behaviour.\textsuperscript{156} For this section, I will focus on the early English realists: Zimmern, Toynbee, and Carr.

Hitler himself is remarkably clear in expressing his theory of international politics: “I am concerned with power politics – that is to say, I make use of all means that seem to me to be of service, without the slightest concern for the proprieties or for codes of honour.”\textsuperscript{157} While this plain statement of realist principles has not been incorporated explicitly into IR as a discipline, I would argue it has been accepted as the assumed

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\textsuperscript{154} Olsen and Groom, op cit., p 81.


\textsuperscript{156} Morgenthau, op cit., p.6.

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viewpoint of post-war statesmen. There are two aspects of his thought, however, which have been totally discredited. First, it must be noted that Hitler’s world-view was dominated by a racialist ideology, which Arendt has argued is similar to the imperialist ideology of the nineteenth century. As he states in Mein Kampf, “all who are not of good race in this world are chaff.” The racialist aspects of Hitler’s view have been rejected by International Relations scholars, to the extent that race is rarely considered a legitimate object of study in the discipline. Second, Hitler’s theory of International Relations is based on a pseudo-Nietzschean, social-Darwinist idea that in the realm of world politics the strongest, hardest, and most brutal survive. This goes beyond notions of “self-defence,” and argues that aggression is the only way to guarantee security. In this sense, Arendt argues “the struggle for total domination of the total population of the earth, the elimination of every competing non-totalitarian reality, is inherent in the totalitarian regimes themselves; if they do not pursue global rule as their ultimate goal they are only too likely to lose whatever power they have already seized.” It can also be argued that Germany’s Nazi identity was stable only in “defence” against the enemies of the Volksgemeinschaft (national community). Following this, both of Hitler’s

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158 Arendt, op cit., p.470.
162 Arendt, op cit., p.392.
163 Arendt, op cit., p.344.
declarations of war cited self-defence as the primary cause of his aggression. However, separate from Hitler’s public declarations, his private speech reveals his obsession with aggression and attack.

On the eve of the invasion of the Low Countries, Hitler said to the German High Command, “Basically, I did not organize the Armed Forces in order not to strike. The decision to strike was always in me... Without attack the war cannot be ended victoriously.” Even earlier, Hitler stated in Mien Kampf: “Mankind has grown great in eternal struggle, and only in eternal peace does it perish.” Later in the same work, written in prison while Hitler was far from power, he summarizes his view of foreign policy. “The essential, fundamental and guiding principle, which we must always bear in mind judging this question, is that foreign policy is only a means to an end, and that the end is solely the promotion of our own nationality. In other words, the aim of German foreign policy of today must be the preparation for the reconquest of freedom for tomorrow.” In this statement we see the core of Hitler’s international theory: naked self-interest which subordinates all other consideration to the good of the nation. It must be said that this was not in conflict with the prevailing view of international politics. By the time of the Locarno Treaty, Germany had been reintegrated into the European family of nations, and it was widely accepted that Germany had been politically and

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166 Hitler, Mein Kampf. p.135.

167 Hitler, Mein Kampf. pp.609-10 [Italics in original].
psychologically prostrated in the Versailles settlement. As such, the predisposition of European states was to appease Hitler, atoning for the unjust terms of the Peace treaty. Hitler’s claim to *Lebensraum* ("living space"), on demographic terms was even treated as if it were valid in the popular press. But the policy of appeasement had ignored Hitler’s earlier repudiation of a diplomatic solution to Germany’s problems — and ignored the necessity of violence and brutality in the Nazi regime itself, which could not help but spill over borders. Hitler, as part of a larger ideology that praised violence, scorned attempts to make international relations peaceful. "We must clearly recognize the fact that the recovery of lost territories is not won through solemn appeals to the Lord or through pious hopes in a League of Nations, but only by a force of arms."171

In a revealing tirade, Hitler presents the view to which all post-War IR is a reaction.

It was the Peace of Westphalia which was the foundation of the permanent weakness of modern Germany. I have always said to my supporters: "It is not the Treaty of Versailles we must destroy, but the Treaty of Westphalia."172

Hitler wanted to undermine the very notions of order and balance which the Westphalia settlements and the institution of state sovereignty represent. He wanted an international system that was unipolar, instead of multipolar, based on the notion of racial conflict, and based on struggle rather than stability. The reaction of the International Relations community was to reassert the Westphalian system as its model,

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168 Toynbee, op cit., p. 111


171 Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, p. 627 [Bold in original].

and argue Machiavelli as its patron. The parallel which scholars drew between Napoleon and Hitler is revealing. Both are revolutionary and realist, in Wight’s sense of the terms, desiring to overthrow the international order. And both provoked a conservative reaction in the international imagination. Carr argues, “Hitler, like Napoleon, has performed the perhaps indispensable function of sweeping away the litter of the old idealist order. A new order must be built by other hands and by other methods.” With Machiavelli as his intellectual patron, and Napoleon as his historical example (along with Frederick the Great), IR scholars took these figures as paradigms, and structured their expectations around them.

During the Idealist turn of the discipline, the good of the nation was seen to be in ‘harmony’ with peace in the international system. This Idealism was based on nineteenth century philosophers such as Bentham and John Stuart Mill. The failure of idealist theories, international law, and international institutions to either prevent, deter, or limit Hitler’s foreign policy gave support to the realist camp. In short, Hitler was the most disruptive possible statesman, and International Relations after him took him to be their worst case scenario. He was intelligent, a skillful diplomat, aggressive, and

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173 Olsen and Groom, op cit., p.98.
175 Carr, 1942, p.10.
176 Carr, 1947, p.42.
imperialist. After Hitler, IR scholars assumed no statesman was necessarily moral or could be swayed by moral condemnation without the resort to force.

There is more than a general correlation between Hitler's philosophy of International Relations and the realist conception of world affairs. The early realists in Britain described Hitler as barbaric, and Nazism a threat to civilization. The coincidence in terminology resonates in popular culture and International Relations theory throughout the war, and after. Hitler himself saw the Third Reich as the celebration of barbarism. It was natural that his foreign policy reflect this: "The German is always restrained by moral scruples, which mean nothing to the British; to the latter such an attitude is merely a sign of weakness and stupidity. In the past we have readjusted the balance only by resorting in the most ruthless and barbarous manner." Many international theorists agreed.

Three prominent members of the inter-war and Second World War International Relations community were E.H. Carr, Arnold Toynbee, and Alfred Zimmern. This community of scholars represented the core of International Relations in Britain. Toynbee wrote the Survey of International Affairs under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, or Chatham House. They were familiar with each other's work, and committed to the ideals of Chatham House: "systematic analysis of

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179 Hitler, 1953, p.697 [6 September 1942].
international affairs and public education." The use of the same 'civilized/barbarian' rhetoric to describe Hitler and Nazism by all of these scholars is striking.

At first, these scholars reflected the view promulgated by Freud and Spengler, that barbarism was the necessary obverse of European civilization. Zimmern had stated in his inaugural lecture at Oxford that "Our choice is not between a civilized life in a [polis] of our own and admitting the barbarian within our walls. He dwells there already." Toynbee, Zimmern's student, describes barbarism as an integral component of European civilization. He writes,

The relation of the Nazi regime of 1933 in Germany to the rest of the World can be seen as a unity — and also, perhaps, seen in the clearest light — if it is regarded as one phase of the secular relation between the spirit of Western Christendom and the spirit of a European barbarism which Christianity had sometimes cowed and sometimes charmed, and had thereby partly tamed, but never wholly excised. As early as 1933, Toynbee identified Nazism as a threat to Western civilization, and Hitler as barbaric. In a fashion that would become familiar in his post-war epic, The Study of History (also published under the auspices of Chatham House, between 1934-1954), Toynbee traces the ascendancy of the Nazi party to the secular philosophy of Machiavelli. The realist invocation of Machiavelli is a rhetorical move. The totalitarian state becomes a moral end in and of itself. He summarizes Machiavelli,

if the worship of a parochial community constituted the whole duty of its subjects, then any community which was the object of such worship must be a
moral absolute — a moral universe in itself which could be subject to no transcendent moral law in its physical collisions with other representatives of its own species. This Machiavellian axiom that a deified parochial community must be non-moral — and therefore in Christian terms immoral — institution was irrefutable.\textsuperscript{185}

Machiavelli’s non-moral state becomes realized in the Nazi regime. Hitler is portrayed the modern incarnation of Machiavelli.\textsuperscript{186} International Relations reclaimed its realist heritage after his appearance. At the same time, early realists identified morality as an important component for statecraft, which allowed them to distinguish Hitler from themselves. This is the dilemma of European identity after Nazism and Hitler. There is no way \textit{a priori} to distinguish the Nazi strain of European culture and the democratic strain — both are equal heirs of the Enlightenment.\textsuperscript{187} This was to cause questioning of Europe’s identity as civilized, in the minds of Europeans and non-Europeans.\textsuperscript{188}

Toynbee argues that the Nazi regime is proven barbaric by the way it treats its minorities and dissenters.\textsuperscript{189} Toynbee had met Hitler in 1936, and came away from the meeting impressed.\textsuperscript{190} Like Carr, Toynbee initially supported the policy of appeasement — views which they later repudiated in the face of German barbarism.\textsuperscript{191} Upon reflection, however, Toynbee ascribes Hitler ‘barbaric’ characteristics in a number of texts. Zimmern makes the analogy between Hitler and Attila the Hun in the first Oxford

\textsuperscript{185} Ibid., p.116.
\textsuperscript{186} Again, this ignores Machiavelli’s strong moral component.
\textsuperscript{187} Carr, 1947, p.235.
\textsuperscript{189} Toynbee, 1934, p.121.
\textsuperscript{190} Herman, op cit., p.282.
\textsuperscript{191} Olsen and Groom, op cit., p.105.
Pamphlet on World Affairs, "The present rulers of Germany have been responsible for causing more human suffering than has ever been inflicted before by any body men in power. Attila's record is spotless compared with theirs." In A Study of History, Hitler is used as an example of the dangers of disarmament.

Hitler perceived that, in a world whose peoples were all now miserably war-weary and war-shy, world-domination might be the easy prize of any nation that could still be coaxed, duped, doped, or flogged by an audacious demagogue or despot into being one degree less unwarlike than its neighbours. The realism of Hitler's policy was coloured by the manic nihilism of his ideology, making Hitler the epitome of Realpolitik gone wrong. Hitler is portrayed as the worst possible, natural product of European political culture. Hitler personalizes the stereotype of the barbarian for international theorists, and IR reacts to him as such. This connection between Hitler's barbarism and colonial methods of rule will be elaborated in the following chapter. Toynbee and Carr each wrote a realist view of history, which pits Nazi barbarism against Western civilization.

Europe's Un-Civil War

European citizens had considered themselves 'civilized,' both in absolute and comparative terms in the nineteenth century. The pessimistic mood that overcame Europe in the first forty years of the twentieth century set the ideational basis to question this identity. Nietzsche, Freud, and Spengler reexamined this discourse of 'civilization' and 'barbarians,' with different conclusions. These intellectuals popularized ideas —

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such as will to power, decline of the West, return of the repressed — which were to become central terms in early twentieth century political discourse. The ideals of Nietzsche, Spengler, and Freud placed a different, less pejorative, emphasis on barbarism. They also described ‘civilization’ as far more precarious than was previously imagined. These ideas were to resonate with ambiguity within the identity of many Europeans as ‘civilized Europeans’ in the early twentieth century.

Hitler’s successes in the realm of international relations led to his adoption by the IR community as its worst case scenario – a lunatic against which they had to protect themselves. Hitler’s philosophy of struggle, violence, and brutality became the touchstone of post-War theorists. Just as Napoleon had caused a conservative reaction in European society, so too did Hitler elicit a defence of the Westphalian system, with its values of balance, statehood, and sovereignty.

This chapter has focused, almost exclusively, on the discourse of civilization and barbarians, and the relevance of culture and identity to International Relations. In the next chapter, I will look at the collapse of the imperial system. This trend was initiated by the sacrifice of native troops to defend their colonial masters, and in the rising awareness of Europe’s own political values. The moral foundation for decolonization can be found in the Nazi use of colonial tactics to perpetrate the “Final Solution.” Wight argues “the deepest reason why the West was shocked by Hitler was his introducing colonial methods of power politics, their own colonial methods, into international
relations. The following chapter will tackle the discrediting of the civilizing mission and the decline of imperialism in International Relations.

In the previous chapter, I argued that the discourse of 'civilized/barbarian' came undone during the First and Second World Wars. For the first time, Europeans described themselves as barbaric and doubted their own capacity for civilization. The prosecution of the Nazi invasion of Russia, and its attendant *Generalplan Ost*, provided the most shocking evidence of Europe’s ‘progress.’ Immediately after the Second World War, the discourse of ‘civilized/barbarian’ was again undermined. The anti-colonial movement prompted ‘colonized’ thinkers to decry Europe as barbaric and European civilization as bankrupt. Thinkers such as Aimé Césaire and Frantz Fanon portrayed how imperial governance was barbaric in itself, and debunked the rhetoric of the ‘civilizing mission.’ The ‘civilized/barbarian’ discourse was inverted, to serve the ideological needs of decolonization and to shore up anti- and post-colonial identity.

This chapter will trace the dissolution of the ‘civilized/barbarian’ discourse after the Second World War. In addition to the self-generated criticism of Europeans, anti-colonial thinkers attacked the very notion of European civilization on the basis of imperial rule. Faced with evidence of the barbarities of imperial rule in the case of Nazi Germany’s eastern campaign, Europe had little rebuttal. As the ‘civilized/barbarian’ discourse faded from popular culture, so too did imperialism fade from view as a specific historical event. Further, Europe ceased to define itself in terms of the civilizing mission and tried to forget imperialism. The Third World, or postcolonial world, was also obscured by this theoretical move. This chapter will examine the barbaric practices of
the Germans in the Second World War and indicate how “colonial” subjects viewed Europe after the Holocaust.

Barbaric by any measure: Nazism, the Generalplan Ost, and the Holocaust

The civilized/barbarian distinction, which Europeans made between themselves and their colonial subjects, and which had suffered in the First World War as a culturally self-authenticating device, completely collapsed after the Second World War. There are several aspects of this discursive shift which have serious implications for the development of the discipline of International Relations, and the international imaginary. The Second World War marks a transition from an imperially based barbarian – viewed from the European perspective – to an ideologically based barbarian – viewed from the American perspective. ¹ Nazi Germany provides a clear example of the evolution of the barbarian stereotype, and how it came to be applied to Europeans. Internally and externally, Nazi Germany’s rule was barbaric, by its own standards and by the standards of the international community. The most striking examples of this barbarity are related: Hitler’s attempt to socially engineer the German nation, and the attempt to colonize the East. Operation Barbarossa [the German code-name for the invasion of the Soviet Union] and the Generalplan Ost [the plan for the Occupied Eastern Territories, developed by Himmler and Hitler] were the extension of the European imperialist ideology to Europeans themselves. Operation Barbarossa and the Generalplan Ost can be characterized as imperialism without rhetoric of a ‘civilizing mission’ — those that were not already civilized would be destroyed.

¹ See Neumann, 1999, Ch.3.
Hitler also applied this rationale to his own population through the euthanasia programme, social and economic policies which promoted a *Volkgemeinshaft* (pure racial/national community), and the Holocaust. As Christopher Coker argues, the American ‘discovery’ of Hitler’s death camps constitutes “the worst possible confirmation of human perversity, the most eloquent challenge to man’s belief in progress and the power of human reason ... the first intimation of the apocalypse.” The Holocaust, and its attendant programmes, could not be thinkable without the imperialist modes of governance and imperialist theories of race. The bureaucratic mechanisms that enabled the Holocaust were also dependent on apparatuses of the ‘modern’ state which had developed, in part, to cope with the administration of the colonies. German sociologist Max Weber argues that these characteristics of the modern state were specifically Western. He also suggests that the development of ‘rationality’ makes Western civilization uniquely capable of imperial expansion. Modern education, public health institutions, statistics, demography, and ‘rational’ bureaucracies were valued as the epitome of European progress, but were also indispensable to the Holocaust.

The logical limit of the process of dehumanization of the ‘other’ is genocide. Within the imperialist ideology, non-European colonial subjects were viewed as possessing varying degrees of humanity. Non-European cultures were considered, for the most part, inferior to European civilization by the nations of Europe. The most extreme

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point of imperialist ideology – which remains true to the logic of the discourse – is the extermination of non-European cultures and peoples. This dehumanization of the ‘other’ is a recurrent pattern in Western society. American and Canadian governments practiced eugenic, race-based sterilization until the middle of the twentieth century. Bottomley suggested labeling dangerous immigrants during the First World War and excluding German immigrants from schools, professions, and public spaces. The British first used concentration camps during the Boer War. This is not to make a post hoc, ergo propter hoc argument – that because imperialism preceded Nazi genocide, imperialism is necessary to the Holocaust. I only wish to indicate that all of the precursors to the Nazi atrocities had been present in European culture prior to the Second World War.

The Holocaust depended on the discursive practice of “othering,” as did imperialism. In the colonial scene, colonial subjects were represented as inferior to Europeans and as less-than-human. In the Nazi case, Jews, Sinti and Roma, homosexuals, Poles, communists etc., were represented as inferior and less-than-human. Whereas European colonizers were restrained by the rhetoric of the ‘civilizing mission,’ there was no such restraint in the Nazi discourse. Many of the mechanisms, structures, and institutions that were used in the Holocaust, in fact, have their origins in the colonial context. However, the Nazi’s unique application of European institutions to these barbaric ends undermined European confidence in itself.

8 Connolly, 1991, pp.78-81
The question of how a modern, civilized state like Germany could descend into wholesale savagery is an essential part of the narrative of the civilized/barbarian discourse in European culture. This is not to say that the Japanese, Russian, or others did not also act barbarically in the Second World War, only that it was the stated ideal of Nazi Germany to become self-consciously barbaric.11 As Winston Churchill pointed out repeatedly in his public speeches, what makes the horror of the Holocaust all the more profound is that it was conducted as a “rational, scientific, bureaucratic” policy.12 The Holocaust — as much as Hiroshima — shaped the post-Second World War international imaginary, destroying forever, I would argue, the supposed moral supremacy of Europe and European ‘civilization.’ The Second World War saw the institutionalization of barbarism, both as an ideology and as a mode of governance. The internal and external dimensions of Nazi ideology are, of course, two sides of the same coin. In this section I will look at Hitler’s attempt to overcome internal ‘racial-hygienic’ enemies, the attempt to colonize the Eastern territories of the Reich, and the connection of the Final Solution to Operation Barbarossa.

**Barbarous Utopia: Nazi Ideology and the Volkgemeinshaft**

Just as European identity was constructed around the dichotomy of external and internal barbarians from the imperial world, German identity in the Second World War was also constructed around internal and external barbarians. However, the nihilist philosophy of Nazism negated any possibility of a civilizing mission. ‘Racially-unhygienic’ barbarians who were uncultured and uncivilized had been left behind by history. They would be destroyed or left to die off. The most disturbing aspect of the

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'euthanasia' programme and the 'Final Solution' was not that they were aberrant within European culture, but that they were merely the application of aspects of colonial strategies against other Europeans. Hitler and the Nazis imported the discourse of civilized/barbarian in order to shore a fragmented, post-First World War German identity and to justify their attempts to destroy the 'enemies' of the Reich.

Germany's rise in international stature is not separate from its domestic regeneration after the rise of the Nazi party. Germany had been formally re-integrated into international society with the Locarno treaties, as E.H. Carr states in 1937: "It would be difficult to exaggerate the contribution of the Locarno to the pacification of Europe. It struck, for the first time since the war, a fair and impartial balance between French and German needs ... by bringing Germany back into the family of Great Powers."13 Between the Locarno Treaty and the outbreak of the Second World War, Germany's claims to colonies, lost territories, economic security, were all treated as equal to the other powers of Europe.14 As such, Hedley Bull reminds us that the Western front of the Second World War was primarily fought to restore the balance of power within Europe, not to destroy fascism per se. "The revelation of 1945 of the full extent of Nazi atrocities [...] made the war seem in retrospect to have been more of a struggle for human rights than in fact it had been."15 Although, it must be remembered that a great deal of rhetoric portrayed the conflict in these manichean terms. Churchill was particularly vociferous in his denunciation of Hitler and the 'Huns.'16 However, Germany's meteoric rise from

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16 Churchill describes his motives for strategic bombing in the Second World War, despite heavy civilian casualties. "This is a military and not a civilian war. You and others may desire to kill women and children.
vanquished nation to Great Power was due primarily to the policies of the Nazi government. While the Nazis were notorious for their violent tendencies and xenophobic, incendiary rhetoric, they also instituted a large number of ‘progressive’ policies. The Nazi government instituted many modern, ‘social-welfare’ programmes, helped reduce unemployment, and rejuvenated German identity through a revisionist foreign policy. The only way to understand these contradictory impulses of modernization in social and economic policy and primitivism in politics is to examine the Nazi ideology. Michael Burleigh and Wolfgang Wippermann suggest Nazism constituted both “a simultaneous regression and progression into barbarism.” They suggest the progressive and regressive are not different impulses within the Nazi ideology but different aspects of the same “racial-hygienic” worldview. The ‘progressive’ measures were taken solely to create a Volkgemeinshaft, or pure racial/national community. The ‘regressive’ measures were taken against those enemies of the Volkgemeinshaft. The first campaign of the Nazi government was against these ‘racially-unhygienic,’ internal enemies. These individuals were thought to undermine the ‘health’ of the nation. In the first place, the unfit, handicapped, and terminally ill were targeted, along with Jews, Sinti, Roma, and homosexuals. However, these ‘obvious’ racial enemies came to include ‘asocial’ and ‘lazy’ individuals — in short, any and all enemies


18 Ibid., p. 10.

of the Nazi ideology. Coker draws the parallel between the Nazi ‘internal colonization’ – the attempt to purify the German race – and Anglo-French external colonization. He argues that the Nazis “set out with the same colonial zeal as the British and French… This time, however, they were more interested in ‘engineering the human soul.’” The Germans had moved from redeeming Africa to redeeming Europe by subjugating the Jews, the gypsies, the Slavs and any other subspecies of mankind considered to be ‘primitive,’ ‘ritualistic,’ ‘superstitious,’ or ‘alien.’ Coker implies that these stereotypes of ‘primitive,’ ‘superstitious,’ ‘aliens’ are exogenous to the process of exclusion. However, I would argue that the portrayal of these groups as ‘alien’ is central to the process of their exclusion.

In a bastardization of Nietzschean principles of cultural rejuvenation, Nazi ideology sought the stewardship of German culture through racial-hygienic means. Nietzsche seemed to prefigure this usage, he writes: “I know my destiny. Someday my name will be associated with the memory of something monstrous.” As argued above, while Nietzsche himself was not anti-Semitic, his Nazi followers used the scapegoat of the ‘Jew’ to shore up post-First World War Germany. Zygmunt Bauman argues, “Inside every nation, they were the ‘enemy inside.’” Nazis argued that the mythical Aryan could alone preserve true German Kultur: “In this world, human culture and civilization

21 The phrase “internal colonization” is used idiosyncratically by Hitler in Mein Kampf to refer to a system of land-usage (pp.133-6). Coker’s usage is more common – referring to a racially-based, hierarchical system of governance within a country, using imperial modes of governance usually reserved for non-European colonies.
are inseparably bound up with the existence of the Aryan. His dying off or his decline would again lower upon this earth the dark veils of a time without culture.”

Anti-Semitism was manifest in Nazi legislation almost immediately after achieving power: the Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service, which prohibited Jewish state employees, was followed by legislation against Jewish physicians, teachers, and students, all in April 1933. These laws were followed by further legislation against ‘alien races.’ The use of certain academic and bureaucratic institutions to ascertain physical characteristics of racial genealogy is evidence of the continuing complicity of academe in imperial projects, and shows the extent to which racial ideology was accepted as normal within European culture up to this point. These methods used to preserve German culture, and thus European civilization, on this racial basis were shockingly uncivilized. At the same time, they were shockingly modern. Hannah Arendt argues that these totalitarian modes of governance are an extension of imperial modes into the metropolitan population. Following the emphasis on ‘surveillance’ as a mode of imperial governance in Chapter Three, Burleigh and Wippermann argue specifically that “the employment of modern data-gathering and demoscopic techniques to encompass and control the whole population [facilitated] the ‘eradication’ of the ‘alien’ and ‘less valuable.’” The apotheosis of this “demoscopic” technique is the ‘Jewish Star,’ made compulsory on 1 September 1941. It “enabled ‘national comrades’ to tell at a glance who was a Jew, a matter difficult to establish with other criteria. The

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26 Burleigh and Wippermann, op cit., p.44.
28 Arendt, Origins of Totalitarianism. p.207.
29 Burleigh and Wippermann, op cit., p.52.
introduction of this visible stigma also marked the formal transition from defamation and economic ruination to the total exclusion of Jews from the 'national community.'" The ideational distinction between Germans and Jews was prior to the physical separation and subsequent extermination. This distinction, which became central to Nazi German identity, was made in popular culture, through methods that originated in the imperialist practices of the nineteenth centuries. As Bauman argues,

> The truth is that every “ingredient” of the Holocaust — all those many things that rendered it possible — were normal; ... in the sense of being in keeping with everything we know about our civilization, its guiding spirit, its priorities, its immanent vision of the world.

Modern bureaucracy was used extensively in the lead up to the Holocaust. Burleigh and Wippermann detail the way that racial policies were institutionalized. Marriage loans (which could be repaid by having children) were refused to individuals who were ‘racially suspect; “Hereditary Health Courts” could order “euthanasia” based on information from a network of bureaucratic offices and institutes which provided ‘genetic’ information; institutes and academic departments were established to parse the Nazi racial theories. They conclude, “the card indexes, charts, diagrams, maps, books, articles, and statistics [these academics] produced were partly responsible for the clinically comprehensive and devastatingly effective manner in which Nazi racist policies were carried out. Goldhagen, in particular, traces how Jews, the mentally ill, and Slavs were figured in a hierarchy similar to the imperialist model which accorded different status to savages and barbarians. State education, which had been used to

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30 Burleigh and Wippermann, op cit., p.95.
32 Bauman, op cit., p.8.
33 Burleigh and Wippermann, op cit., pp.46; 48; 51; Burleigh
34 Ibid., p.52.
foster nationalist sentiment, included instruction in racialist doctrine after 1933. The end-point of all of these bureaucratic measures was the Holocaust. The marginalization of Jews, Sinti, and Roma, and other ‘racial aliens’ started in 1933, and progressed throughout the tenure of the Nazi regime. There are many important scholarly works on the Holocaust, which track the exclusion of Jews from the beginnings of the Nazi party through the Final Solution. For the purposes of this project, I will limit myself to discussing the implication of the racial ideology of the Nazi party in popular culture. The measures by which ‘racial aliens’ and the ‘socially unvaluable’ were isolated, excluded, and finally exterminated, indicates that popular culture and identity are essential to understanding domestic and international politics.

The Nazi regime was dedicated to propaganda – to the forging of a Nazi consciousness through popular culture. George Mosse argues that the Third Reich controlled national popular and elite culture specifically in order to promulgate its ideology. The most coherent sections of Mein Kampf are those that deal with propaganda, and the most effective arm of the Nazi party was Goebbels’ Ministry for Propaganda. In order that German citizens [Jews, Sinti, Roma, and homosexuals, etc.] could be exterminated, a process of alienation was necessary. ‘True’ Germans had to be distinguished from ‘racial aliens.’ Following the logic of the ‘us/them’ dichomitization studied above, ‘racial aliens’ were excluded from the national community, and made the source of evil — which had the effect of strengthening the identity of the national

38 Mosse, op cit. p.133.
community, and making it the ‘true’ nation, and thus the source of good. 40 “The Jews were defined, and hence excluded, as the embodiments of general evils. Old legends and prejudices were revived and combined with the more up-to-date conspiracy theories like the falsified ‘Protocols of the Elders of Zion.’” 41 In addition to elaborating stereotypes of Jews and ‘Gypsies’ as unclean, parasitic, lecherous, disease-ridden and so on, there were actual political measures designed to accompany the ideational separation. The Reich Citizenship Law limited political rights to ‘German citizens,’ and made Jews ‘subjects’ of the German Reich. 42 By gradually excluding Jews and other ‘racial aliens’ from the Volksgemeinschaft, first professionally to make them “socially dead”, then economically, and finally spatially, they became perceived and treated as internal enemies to the German nation. 43 What is most disturbing about this trend of exclusion is that ‘modern’ – and imperial – modes of governance, such as surveillance, demography, anthropology, and public health organizations, were all implicated in the exclusion and subsequent extermination of the internal enemies of the German racial community. Operation Barbarossa and the subsequent Generalplan Ost make the connection to imperialism clearer.

External Colonization: A Barbaric Empire and the Un-Civilizing Mission

The imperialist ideology treated colonial subject with varying degrees of humanity. As Goldhagen elaborates, Jews, the mentally ill, and Slavs were accorded less and less

41 Burliegh and Wippermann, op cit., p.36.
42 There is an interesting parallel to the British treatment of colonial subjects with regard to British citizenship, and particularly the right of residence in England. Ibid., p.45.
‘humanity’ in comparison with Germans.\textsuperscript{44} The Slavs and Jews were irredeemable in racial terms, and subsequently were treated either as slaves for labour or ‘cancerous’ bodies for extermination. Hitler’s effort to colonize the Eastern occupied territories was a logical extension of imperialist ideology. In both Mein Kampf and Tabletalk, Hitler stresses his admiration for England and promises that Eastern Europe will be “Germany’s India.”\textsuperscript{45} However, Hitler rejects the civilizing mission. Those people without culture — Untermenschen, a term that only came into use after the launch of Operation Barbarossa\textsuperscript{46} — were to be destroyed or become slaves to German colonists. Omer Bartov argues that because the untermenschen were treated as subjects without humanity, these colonial conflicts “quickly developed much stronger genocidal tendencies” than those free of such ideas.\textsuperscript{47} The connection of the ideology of Untermenschen and imperialism is not accidental. Hitler’s Generalplan Ost was the first application of an imperialist ideology onto European peoples. The Asiatic-barbarians were racially and culturally designated others, considered outside of the Aryan, white, Europeans.\textsuperscript{48}

Hitler viewed the Western Front as a war between European powers that could be settled through traditional diplomatic, power-balancing means. The Eastern Front, however, was a Vernichtungskrieg (a war of annihilation), a war between Asiatic barbarian hordes and the culture-and Europe-defending Germans.\textsuperscript{49} The image of the

\textsuperscript{44} Ibid., p.471.
\textsuperscript{46} Brian Bond, War and Society in Europe 1870-1970, p.181.
\textsuperscript{48} Wolff and Neumann trace how Eastern Europeans were considered the ‘internal others’ to Europe.
\textsuperscript{49}Omer Bartov, “Savage War,” Confronting the Nazi Past. p.128
barbarian moves from England, who projects it onto the German Huns, and subsequently, the Germans project the stereotype onto the Slavs.

Hitler's search for a *Lebensraum* ("living space") for the German people, specifically in the East, was based on the British empire's legacy of imperialism. Hitler's claim to *Lebensraum* initially appeared demographically sound. Population data, growth rates, and agricultural statistics were all marshalled to make a case for more land for Germany. But, as R.R. Kuczynski showed in an Oxford Pamphlet on World Affairs [No.8], this was merely a rhetorical mask over Hitler's Eastern ambition. Both Arthur Salter and Kuczynski admit that Hitler's prima facie case for 'living space' is legitimate. Arthur Salter argues that, if by *Lebensraum* Germany means 'a place in the sun,' extra-European colonies, then it cannot be accommodated. Thus, Hitler and his followers began to look Eastward.

Hitler's plan for German colonies within the geographical boundaries of Europe is based on a consideration of the balance of power with Great Britain, and on the model of the British rule in India. Many scholars have studied Hitler's foreign policy. Notably, Eberhard Jäckel's outline of Hitler's foreign policy is compelling, tracing the choice Hitler perceived between a British alliance and continental hegemony, or a Soviet alliance and an attendant colonial policy. No scholar has yet plotted Hitler's fascination with British rule in India, and his plans for rule in the Eastern territories. This aspect of

52 Hitler, Mein Kampf, p.620.
53 "Hitler, at Charlevile [on June 5, 1940 — before the commencement of Operation Barbarossa], spoke to his generals of his admiration of Britain's rule in India." Martin Gilbert, The Second World War: Toronto: Stoddart, 1989, p.83.
Hitler’s foreign policy is illustrative of the power of imperialism in the international imaginary up until the Second World War, and also shows the persistence of the civilized/barbarian discourse. Although Hitler’s barbarians are Asiatic/Slavic or Jewish/Bolshevik, his programme for colonization uses the rhetoric of civilization and barbarian. It is telling that Hitler turned to Britain’s empire for his notions of imperial governance. In some aspects, Hitler wanted to imitate Britain. Because this has not been explored, it is worth quoting at length:

What India was for England, the territories of Russia will be for us. If only I could make the German people understand what this space means for our future. Let’s learn from the English, who, with two hundred and fifty thousand men in all, including fifty thousand soldiers, govern four hundred million Indians. This space in Russia must always be dominated by Germans. If the English were to be driven out of India, India would perish. Our role in Russia will be analogous to that of England in Russia... The Russian space is our India. Like the English, we shall rule this empire with a handful of men. To exploit the Ukraine properly — that new Indian Empire — I need only peace in the West. The frontier police will be enough to ensure us that the quiet conditions necessary for the exploitation of the conquered territories.

[The New German] will come to feel that nothing is impossible and, as the young Briton of today serves his apprenticeship in India, the young German will learn his lessons, looking round the most easterly territories of the Reich...

Let us hope that our Ministry for Eastern Territories will not... introduce [in the East] our laws against contraception. In this respect the British are our superiors. They, too, are the most frightful bureaucrats; but at least they have the sense not to exercise their bureaucracy in occupied territory to the advantage of the local inhabitant and the detriment of their own

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55 Hitler, Tabletalk, p.24 [8/9 August 1941]. (However, as pointed out by Broszat, this policy did not receive a great deal of encouragement from the prospective rural immigrants. Martin Broszat, “The Third Reich and the German People,” The Challenge of the Third Reich, p.87.)
56 Ibid., p.15 [27 July 1941].
57 Ibid., p.33 [17/18 September 1941].
58 Ibid., p.87 [27 October 1941].
59 Ibid., p. 493 [20 May 1942].
country. They have a genius for keeping others at a distance and in winning and preserving respect. Here, perhaps, we have the worst possible example of our methods — de-lousing infuriates the local inhabitants, as does our fanatical desire to civilise them. The net result is that they say to themselves: “These people aren’t really our superiors — it’s only the way they’re made.”

The *untermenschen* Slavs are not worth de-lousing or civilizing, according to this view. This last quotation traces explicitly the affinity Hitler felt for the British, and his repudiation of the civilizing mission. In fact, even in the instances in which Hitler criticizes British rule in India, his policy was still formulated with the British experience as a touchstone. Hitler wants to construct a German India in Eastern Europe without the civilizing mission.

...the local [Eastern] population must be given no facilities for higher education. A failure on our part in this respect would simply plant the seeds of future opposition to our rule. Schools, of course, they must have... but there is no need to teach them much more than, say, the meaning of the various road-signs.  
Anyone who “talks about cherishing the local inhabitant and civilizing him goes straight off to the concentration camp.”

It’s an imperative obligation for the white man, in the colonies, to keep the native at a distance.

Read together, all of Hitler’s prescriptions for the East is either taken from British examples or in direct contradiction to British attempt to ‘civilize’ their subjects. This ideational connection between British and German imperialism has been for the most part ignored. However, anti-colonial thinkers were adamant about the connection, pointing out repeatedly that imperialism and the Holocaust were different only in terms of degree. I will visit this response later in the chapter.

*Barbarossa and the Final Solution*

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60 Ibid., p.615 [5 August 1942].
61 Hitler, *Tabletalk*, p.588 [22 July 1942].
62 Waite, op cit., p.79.
63 Hitler, *Tabletalk*, p.258 [27 January 1942].
The connection between Operation Barbarossa and the ‘Final Solution’ is also important. Hitler clearly saw the Eastern Front as an existential struggle, a part of the struggle against Jews. Jewry and Bolshevism were, for Hitler, two aspects of the same ideology. The struggle for Lebensraum in the East was “inextricably intertwined with the extermination of Bolshevism and Jewry.”\footnote{Jürgen Förster, “The Relation between Operation Barbarossa as Ideological War of Extermination and the Final Solution,” The Final Solution: Origins and Implementation, David Cesarani ed. New York: Routledge, 1994, p.89.} It is also important that the “Final Solution to the Jewish Question in Europe” did not commence until the invasion of the Soviet Union. Bartov has commented extensively on the “barbarization of warfare” on the Eastern Front.\footnote{Omer Bartov, Hitler’s Army: Soldiers, Nazis, and War in the Third Reich, New York: Oxford University Press, 1992, p.16.} Bartov traces the cause of this barbarization to the material conditions of Barbarossa, the harsh military struggle against the Soviet army, and the ideological propaganda directed at the soldiers.\footnote{Bartov, The Eastern Front, p.106.} After looking at the propaganda which enabled the barbarization of the Ostheer (Eastern Army), I will briefly trace the connection between Barbarossa and the Final Solution.

The Wehrmacht was broken on the Eastern front, and the greatest military atrocities of the European war are to be found in the conduct of Operation Barbarossa. It was also the arena in which the trope of the barbarian was most prevalent. The propagandistic description of the Red Army as barbarous so saturated the Germany armies that it conducted its own war with unparalleled barbarity, and assisted the Einsatzgruppen (Action Groups) behind front lines. The barbarian image was so powerful that the Germans broke all rules of warfare, assisted in the prosecution of the Final Solution, and then destroyed Germany themselves in order to deprive the Red Army of the opportunity.
The representations of the enemy on the Eastern Front seemed to precede, and even supercede, the actual experience of the individual soldier. Rather than test the Nazi stereotypes of the Jew or the Asiatic-Bolshevik against his experience, the Nazi worldview was so powerful as seemingly to prevent self-reflection. The indoctrination of soldiers was so powerful; “it provided the soldiers with an image of the enemy which so profoundly distorted their perception that once confronted with reality they invariably experienced it as a confirmation of what they had come to expect.” The barbaric stereotype of the Bolshevik-Jew was reinforced by Hitler’s “Commissar Decree” of 3 March 1941. In it, Hitler exempted German soldiers from international law and from the standard of civilized warfare: “Any German soldier who breaks international law will be pardoned.” The Asiatic barbarians were considered ‘beyond the pale,’ beyond culture, and therefore beyond the protection of international law. A barbaric enemy justified barbaric warfare – just as in the colonial scene. (It was not until 18 October 1942 when the corresponding Commando Order on the Western Front was to be issued, on separate grounds.) The image of the barbarous Asiatic horde led the Wehrmacht to conduct a campaign of shocking brutality against the population as they advanced into the Soviet Union.

In addition to the death camps, the Einsatzgruppen, formed from SS troops, ranged behind the front lines. These ‘task-forces’ were directed by criminal orders, like the Commissar Decree, which ordered soldiers to commit massive reprisals for partisan activity, to plunder the population for supplies Germany could not transport, and to make

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67 Todorov makes the same observation of early explorers to the New World. Todorov, op cit., pp.34-44.
68 Bartov, Hitler’s Army, p.118.
69 Gilbert, op cit., p.160.
exploitative use of native labor. The reinstitution of slave labour by the German bureaucracy also echoes imperial practice. German work camps used Russian prisoners of war, with a shocking death rate.71 Himmler’s connection of slave labour to *Kultur* is germane to this point:

> What happens to a Russian or to a Czech, does not interest me in the slightest... Whether nations live in prosperity or starve to death interests me only in so far as we need them as slaves for our *Kultur*; otherwise, it is of no interest to me. Whether ten thousand Russian females fall down from exhaustion while digging an anti-tank ditch interests me only in so far as the anti-tank ditch for Germany is finished. 72

The *Einsatzgruppen* were responsible for mass shootings and gassings in the occupied territories. In addition to the national enemies, which they had exterminated in Germany – Jews, Sinti, Roma, and mental patients –, they also shot enemies of the Reich which endangered Nazi rule of the East – Polish intelligentsia and Soviet bureaucrats.73 The propagandistic image of the Slavic *Untermenschen* so permeated the Eastern Front, that even regular troops, not subject to the ideological training of the SS, were complicit in the massacres carried out by the *Einsatzgruppen.*74

A final testament to the strength of the barbarian discourse on the Eastern Front is found at the end of the war, both in the scorched earth policy followed by the *Wehrmacht* on its retreat to Berlin, and the final negotiations of surrender. The German Army was merciless in its destruction. Bartov argues that “the *Wehrmacht*’s barbarous policies [provided] a vivid and frightening model of what Germany itself could expect in defeat.”75 By now, the Allies had issued their joint demand of unconditional surrender. Caught between the Slavic barbarians and an uncompromising West, the army felt it had

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71 Bond, op cit., p.182.
73 Burleigh and Wippermann, op cit., p.67-68.
74 Goldhagen, op cit., p.152.
no choice but to fight until its annihilation. As one general said, "the demand for unconditional surrender gave us no hope from the West, while the men fighting on the Russian Front were well aware of the horrible fate which would befall eastern Germany if the Red hordes broke into our country."

The rhetoric of barbarism returned to ravage the German imagination.

Racist propaganda came back to terrorize its authors. As the Red Army gained back ground, the policies of retribution and massacres which the Wehrmacht had perpetrated against the Soviets now became crimes for which they would stand trial. In his last order of the day, on 16 April 1945, Hitler said,

"The hordes of our Judeo-Bolshevist foe have rallied for the last assault. They want to destroy Germany and exting ultimate our people. You, soldiers of the east, have seem with your own eyes what fate awaits German women and children: the aged, the men, the infants are murdered, the German women and girls are defiled and made into barrack whores. The rest are marched off to Siberia."

While Hitler may have intended to describe the barbaric practices of the Soviets, he undoubtedly also described the practices of the German troops on the Eastern Front — a double entendre not lost on the soldiers defending Germany from the oncoming army.

Hitler had persuaded the German people that he was forced to fight the Soviet Union in defence of European civilization from the Asiatic hordes. In his announcement of war, the Nazis told the German public that "because the Soviet Union is "about to attack German from the rear, in its struggle for life. The Führer has therefore ordered the German armed forces to oppose this threat with all the means at their disposal."

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75 Bartov, Hitler’s Army, p.126.
78 “Ribbentrop to Count Schulenburg, German Ambassador in Moscow, 21 June 1941,” The War, p.206.
national suicide was then undertaken. Hitler had often said that if Germany did not win the war for him, then he would destroy it: "If the war should be lost, then the nation, too, will be lost. That would be the nation’s unalterable fate... it is better ourselves to destroy things, for this nation will have proven itself weaker... Those who remain after the battles are over are in any case only inferior persons, since the best have fallen." With the advance of the Red Army, Hitler tried to fulfil that promise. "Goebbels declared, ‘Germany must be made more desolate than the Sahara.’ Nothing could be left which the Allied — and in particular the dreaded ‘Bolsheviks’ — could plunder." The Nazis set out to destroy not only any useful infrastructure, but also the records, documents, national treasures — so that nothing, not even the artifacts of the German nation, would remain.

[Hitler’s] scorched earth policy in November 1944 was far more ruthless than the Soviet Union’s own policy had been in 1941 — for Hitler was determined to destroy no less than the collective memory of the German nation. He gave orders for the destruction of every ration card and historical record, every birth certificate and bank account number, every church and museum, everything that made up the German identity in the imagination not only of the Germans but the world as well.

Hitler’s nihilistic Götterdämmerung was the natural end of his belief that he was the personification of Germany and his belief, which he promulgated to the German nation at large, that the barbarians of the East would destroy them given the chance. The degree to which Germans self-immolated is a testament to the power of Nazi propaganda and the image of the barbarian.

The use of slave labour, demoscopic surveillance techniques, and modern bureaucracy to prosecute the Holocaust and the Eastern Front violated all standards of international law and international custom. While the West was shocked, to anti-colonial

80 Gilbert, op cit., p. 528.
81 Coker, 1994b, p. 18.
writers, the method was familiar if the degree was severe. Europe lost its status of ‘civilized,’ in its own eyes. Post-war artistic movements, like abstract expressionism, testify to the malaise of European culture. While artists and thinkers within the West were ‘deconstructing representation,’ their counterparts in the colonized world were writing the scripts of decolonization.

*The Empire Strikes Back*

The discourse of ‘civilization’ and ‘barbarians’ decline in usage and became invoked less often after the Second World War. Georg Schwarzenberger claims the distinction has broken down by the rise of legal positivism in international law.\(^{82}\) However, there was also a decline in usage in popular culture, as well as with international jurists. There are two chief causes of the decline of this distinction in popular culture, which I will examine here. Europe began to see itself as barbaric with the prosecution of the Nazi Eastern Front and its attendant Holocaust, as detailed above. Coincident with this turn was a rise in anti- or post-colonial nationalisms. Ali Mazrui argues, “Because the term ‘civilized nations’ was used to justify European imperialism, it began to decline in public usage with the rise of nationalism in Asia and Africa. The new assertiveness of the colonized peoples and their sense of dignity gradually discouraged Europeans from talking about them as ‘barbarians’ and ‘heathens.’”\(^{83}\)

Aimé Césaire and Frantz Fanon argue that the Holocaust and Nazi rule in Germany removed any moral authority that Europeans might have. Europe’s ‘civilizing mission’ was in crisis if Europe itself was barbaric. Both writers agree that the methods

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used by the Nazis were *colonial* methods, perpetrated for the first time on Europeans instead of ‘natives.’ I will look at both of these arguments in turn.

Césaire criticizes European colonialism by way of Nazism, self-consciously using imperialist rhetoric for an anti-imperialist cause. He describes Nazism as

the supreme barbarism, the crowning barbarism that sums up all the daily barbarisms ... but before they were its victims, [Europeans] were its accomplices; they tolerated that Nazism before it was inflicted on them, they absolved it, shut their eyes to it, legitimized it, because, until then, it had been applied only to non-European peoples.\(^{84}\)

The techniques and methods of governance of the Nazi regime were those of colonization without a civilizing mission.\(^{85}\) Fanon argues “Nazism transformed the whole of Europe into a veritable colony.”\(^{86}\) In comparing imperialism to the Nazi regime, Césaire and Fanon attempt to discredit the civilizing mission on its own terms. Europe is described as barbaric, precisely because of the way it attempted its ‘civilizing mission.’ Echoing the experience of occupation that was fresh in the metropolitan French imagination, Fanon draws a powerful contrast. “A colonized people is not simply a dominated people. Under the German occupation the French remained men.”\(^{87}\) Under colonial rule, the colonial subjects were not considered or treated as men. There are only “relations of domination and submission... which turn the indigenous man into an instrument of production.”\(^{88}\) Fanon argues that in addition to political exclusion from the metropolitan power, and economic domination, the colonized suffer from cultural

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\(^{86}\) Ibid., p.250.
imperialism as well. "It is apparent to me that the effective disalienation of the black man entails an immediate recognition of the social and economic realities. If there is an inferiority complex, it is the outcome of a double process: primarily economic; subsequently, the internalization – or, better, the epidermalization – of this inferiority." 89

This is precisely the relationship which International Relations has forgotten: that coincident with an politico-economic oppression, imperialism institutionalized a social oppression. While dependency theorists, and later Third World Studies, focused on the politico-economic aspect of the imperial international structure, the social dimension of imperialism is almost completely neglected. I will elaborate this argument in the next section.

Rather than reinscribing the image of the native as victim, Fanon and Césaire attempt to paint the European colonizer as a victim. Building on the psychoanalytic method alluded to in the last chapter, both authors attempt to draw a precise picture of the relationship.

Colonization, I repeat, dehumanizes even the most civilized man; that colonial activity... which is based on contempt for the native and justified by that contempt, inevitably tends to change him who undertakes it; that the colonizers, who in order to ease his conscience gets into the habit of seeing the other man as an animal, ...tends objectively to transform himself into an animal. It is this result, this boomerang effect of colonization that I wanted to point out. 90

Imperialism reveals the inner barbarism of the European. Fanon also writes about this ‘boomerang effect’ in Wretched of the Earth. He uses psychoanalytic evidence,

88 Césaire, p.21.
90 Césaire, p.20.
through the retelling of case studies, to show that the colonizer who is accustomed to violence comes to practice it on everyone— not just the colonized, but even himself.\footnote{Fanon, 1963, p.267-269.}

A central theme of Césaire and Fanon’s writing is the place of the intellectual in the anti-colonial movement. Both saw culture and identity as important foundations for political independence, national statehood, and proof of sovereignty. Fanon argues that the education of the native intellectual in the European center prohibits any ‘native’ myth from usurping the colonial value system.\footnote{Fanon, 1963, p.219.} He describes elsewhere “a constellation of postulates, a series of propositions that slowly and subtly— with the help of books, newspapers, schools and their texts, advertisements, films, radio— work their way into one’s mind and shape one’s view of the world and of the group to which one belongs.”

Culture, as we have seen, can be a weapon of the colonizer to propagate the rhetoric of imperialism, and to normalize the colonial relationship to the colonized. However, culture also became a battleground for independence— culture in (post)colonial states was a political sphere. Fanon raises this issue of culture and force in \textit{Wretched of the Earth}. However, in \textit{A Dying Colonialism}, Fanon describes several specific sites of politico-cultural contention: the radio, the veil, and the doctor. Of these three fascinating examples, which parallel the anthropological study \textit{Facing Mount Kenya} by Jomo Kenyatta, I will briefly touch on the veil as a site of struggle.

Visibility has been one of the prime themes in European culture and imperial governance. At the beginning of this project, we recall Vivant Denon writing in his \textit{Descriptions de L’Egypte}: “I also deferred the pleasure of drawing the Egyptian women, until we should, by our influence over the manners over the eastern nations, remove the
visibility was still a powerful metaphor during the Algerian War for independence, in which Fanon was involved. At first, Fanon tells us, the French were committed to ‘liberating’ women from the veil as part of their civilizing mission. “Every new Algerian women unveiled announced to the occupier an Algerian society whose systems of defence were in the process of dislocation, open and breached. ... Unveiling this woman is revealing her beauty; it is baring her secret, breaking her resistance.” As the Algerian revolution began, the veil was re-appropriated by women who wanted independence. The veil was used to conceal disobedience; the haïk is used to conceal weapons. Women were used in the revolution to usurp the surveillance regime of the colonizer.

Césaire and Fanon are important to this project in two ways. First and foremost, they are key figures in an intellectual movement which helped discredit the rhetoric of the civilizing mission – by the comparison of Nazi and imperial rule, and by the description of the particulars of the colonizer/colonized relationship. Europe is represented as barbaric with evidence that is hard to refute. Second, both authors cite the importance of culture and identity to anti- and post-colonial struggle. International Relations’ concern with parsimony and power largely missed this important point.

Conclusion

The Second World War was represented as a caesura, a break, in the course of Western history. The Holocaust in particular was viewed as aberrance, rather than a

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93 Fanon, 1967, p.152.
96 Ibid., p.44.
natural part of Western culture. This chapter argues that, at least in part, the Holocaust was the extension of imperial rhetoric and modern bureaucratic institutions. The Holocaust, and the prosecution of the war on the eastern front by Germany, can be understood as imperialism without a civilizing mission. While Europe was slow to grasp this parallel, those anti-colonial intellectuals who had been subject to colonial regimes were certain of the similarity.

This chapter has concentrated on the popular dimension of the discourse of 'civilized/barbarian' during the Second World War and the years immediately afterwards. In the next chapter, I will look at the disciplinary response to decolonization. International Relations continues to be influenced by imperialist rhetoric and colonial ideas, even when struggling to come to terms with the new geopolitical facts of the Cold War and decolonization.
CH. VI: DECOLONIZING THE DISCIPLINE:

FORGETTING THE IMPERIAL PAST AND THE IMPERIAL PRESENT

While the previous chapter dealt with the popular discourse of 'civilized/barbarian,' this chapter will evaluate the use of the trope within the academic field of International Relations. The rhetoric of imperialism does not fade with the decline of the use of juridical status. I will argue that the discipline of International Relations, to the extent that it dealt with imperialism after the Second World War, can be seen as viewing imperialism and decolonization in terms of the civilized/barbarian trope. I will argue further that imperialist stereotypes are embedded in the discipline’s analysis of the nature and role of the Third World and post-colonial states. Important theorists from the period of decolonization, such as Georg Schwarzenberger, Frederick Schuman, and A.F.K. Organski retain some imperialist preconceptions about the colonial/post-colonial world. Alternately, the treatment of colonialism in extremely abstract terms also proves problematic. Post-war realists, such as Frederick Schuman, Hans J. Morgenthau, and Kenneth Waltz, remove imperialism from its historical context, characterizing it as the generic pursuit of power. I will also look at Cecil Crabb and Ali Mazrui, and briefly mention Dependencia theorists, who are more sympathetic to the specific situation of post-colonial states. Importantly, all of the theorists I will examine are concerned with decolonization and recognize its' importance to the terrain of International Relations, without developing sufficient tools to provide a nuanced analysis of the effects of colonization in IR. The Third World was largely ignored during the Cold War, except as an extraterritorial battlefield for the superpowers.
Schuman, Morgenthau, and Waltz

A certain sleight of hand is involved in treating the work of these three prominent realists together. Each realist comes from a distinct context and each realism differs from the other. However, all three realists perform the same theoretical move in their treatment of imperialism: all elide historically specific imperialisms into one universal practice of power accumulation. This has the effect, for both traditional and classical realists, of removing imperialism from the theoretical view of International Relations. Imperialism is defined, and becomes accepted as, the standard operating procedure of powerful states.

All three of these theorists have another factor in common. When discussing the concept of imperialism after 1919, each must account for the so-called ‘Communist’ view of imperialism, which was initiated by V.I. Lenin and became a rhetorical staple until the fall of the Soviet Union. Lenin’s polemic described imperialism as the ‘latest’ – not highest – stage of capitalism, the natural extension of market capitalism into the non-European world in search of markets and resources. However, later Communists used the term rhetorically to mean any expansion of the Western powers, or any policy to which the USSR objected. Anti-colonial writers were also actively critical of imperial. Whether or not the definition was precise or consistent, all three theorists had to define imperialism amongst these contending, and politically motivated, definitions.

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Following the more subtle theories of the interwar period that generally combined elements of idealism and realism, Schuman provides the most expansive definition of imperialism in the 1933 first edition of *International Politics*. Schuman’s definition accounts for the “political, economic and cultural ramifications [of] a phase of the competitive struggle for power between the sovereign units of the Western State System.” However, we also see in his explanation of imperialism the elision of cultural or ideological factors from considerations of power, which sets the stage for later realists to look at imperialism solely in terms of power accumulation. “Values and purposes,” in Schuman’s view, are inconsequential to the success or failure of specific imperial enterprises: imperialism is successful only to the extent that states are “technologically” capable. Schuman argues that civilizational contests are determined by technological advantage directly undermines the notion of Western superiority, which underpins the nineteenth century rhetoric of the ‘civilizing mission.’ This argument rewrites Western dominance as the result of ‘objective’ technological sophistication, rather than ‘subjective’ ideas. This rhetorical move also makes the success of European expansion seem accidental, suggesting that if any other civilization had achieved the technological sophistication of Europe then it would have expanded also. As we see in Chinese and Arab imperialism, however, non-Western imperialisms did not match the scale or success of Western expansion. Obscuring the ideational aspect of imperialism follows the realist

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4 Ibid., p.375.
5 Ibid., p.376.
6 Ibid., p.375.
bias towards the study of overt power politics, but neglects the more subtle power of ideas that proved so influential in the colonized world.

Following a more general trend in interwar society, Schuman's attitude toward imperialism is somewhat ambivalent. Although he recognizes the material benefits of imperialism, Schuman cautions "the path of empire is red with the blood of its victims." He specifically debunks the myth of the 'civilizing mission':

... the argument that colonies are acquired for the purpose of civilizing and converting the naked pagan savages and of conferring upon them the blessings of western culture is undeserving of serious consideration in any effort to evaluate imperialism in the international politics of the Western State System... The "white man's burden" rests heavily upon the shoulders of the black men and brown men and yellow men who have been subjugated. The benefits received by the victims have been entirely incidental and they have, moreover, been negligible in quantity, doubtful in quality, and bitterly resented because of their source and the methods employed in conferring them.

While he disdains the ideological justifications of imperialism, Schuman argues that imperialism is supported by several ideological discourses. The civilizing mission is predicated on notions of European superiority, racial hierarchies, and geographic determinism, among others. He also makes the valuable point, often forgotten, that western imperialism was an uneven, sporadic, chaotic process – not a monolithic program of expansion. In the final analysis, Schuman contends that "imperialism is intelligible as a factor in international politics only in terms of the imposition by military means of the power of the western nation-states upon the non-European parts of the world... the

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8 Schuman, op cit., p.399.
9 Ibid., p.426.
10 Ibid., p.422.
11 Ibid., p.427.
enhancement of power... is the alpha and omega of the quest for empire."12 Schuman represents the theoretical link between interwar idealist thinking on imperialism and interwar realist thinking on imperialism. Turning away from ideational factors, Schuman concludes that power is the central motive and machine of imperialism but his work attends to the historical specificity of the expansion of Europe.

Morgenthau's Politics Among Nations is central to the evolution of classical realism in the post-war International Relations theory. He defines imperialism simply as the “foreign policy [which] aims at acquiring more power than it actually has, through a reversal of existing power relations – whose foreign policy, in other words, seeks a favorable change in power status.”13 Unlike Schuman's, Morgenthau's definition obscures the historical and cultural specificity of imperialism. Morgenthau limits all possible foreign policy aims to three options: “to keep power, increase power, or to demonstrate power.”14 In his view, any country that seeks a reversal of the power relations in the world is an imperialist nation. Morgenthau hopes that this 'concrete' definition will clear up the current conceptual muddiness. However, in the process, Morgenthau dilutes the term beyond utility. Imperialism becomes the default action of any powerful state that is not pursuing a status-quo policy.15 By removing imperialism from its historical roots in European expansion, that expansion drops from the view of study. Realists generally seek parallels across historical periods. I would argue that obscuring this particular expansion hides imperialism from the view of International

12 Ibid., p.429.
14 Ibid., p.36.
Relations, and precludes analysis of the impact of imperialism as a specific political practice on the contemporary states system. The discipline in general adopts this theoretical move and imperialism remains out of sight until the introduction of dependency theory to the discipline in the 1970s.

Morgenthau follows the realist predisposition against investigating ideas and other such intangible forces. Like Schuman, he argues against the rhetoric of the 'civilizing mission.' "Colonial imperialism, in particular, has frequently been disguised by ideological slogans such as the 'blessings of Western civilization' which it was the mission of the conqueror to bring to the colored races of the earth." While he admits the power of 'cultural imperialism,' Morgenthau argues that "in modern times it is subsidiary to the other methods. It softens up the enemy, it prepares the ground for military conquest or economic penetration." This analysis downplays the fact that the three types of imperialism (military, economic, and cultural) were used in concert in the colonized world. Cultural imperialism normalized the military and economic domination of the colonized peoples by the European powers. By discounting the power of cultural imperialism, realists are unable to evaluate the influence of cultural politics on postcolonial societies. Ironically, Morgenthau himself seems to anticipate this criticism. In his chapter titled, 'the New Balance of Power,' Morgenthau argues that

the colonial revolution sprang from a moral challenge to the world as it was... It is carried forward under the banner of two moral principles:

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17 Morgenthau, op cit., p.85.
18 Ibid., p.57.
national self-determination and social justice. These are the ideas that for more than a century have in the West either guided policies, domestic or international, or have at least been appealed to as justifications for political action. ... It is these principles that Asia today hurls against the West condemning and revolting against Western political and economic policies in the name of the West's own moral standards. Even though Morgenthau admits that the trend towards decolonization was as much ideational as physical, he fails to analyze this cultural dynamic fully. Culture is a prime concern of politics in the post-colonial world. International Relations' lack of attention to the post-colonial world stems, in part, from this blind-spot to the function of culture.

The only openings for the power of culture in Morgenthau's framework are his sections on 'National Character' and propaganda. However, within these passages, Morgenthau rarely moves beyond stereotypes of the national 'character' of the great powers. This reluctance to take culture seriously was reiterated by Bernard Hennessy in Background, the precursor to International Studies Quarterly. K.J. Holsti's contribution of this analysis provides the final word of International Relations theory on the question of national character. His nuanced discussion of foreign policy roles firmly transfers discussion of national character into the domain of foreign policy analysis, and notes the methodological difficulty of studying identity formations. However, culture and identity are subsumed into the state as a generic unit of analysis. This tendency to perceive colonial and post-colonial states as a single category reduces the ability of International Relations theorists to observe some fundamental differences between the two. Post-

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19 Ibid., p.335.
colonial critics argue there is an ingrained orientalism within the discipline. This orientalism manifests itself in the tendency to regard post-colonial states as underdeveloped European states as Doty argues.\textsuperscript{22} This elision of all post-colonial states into a single category was fomented by the predominant politico-military conflict of the latter half of the twentieth century – the Cold War.\textsuperscript{23}

International Relations as a discipline is influenced by the political context in which it situated itself. International Relations sees itself as speaking to contemporary world politics – and this determined that the prime focus of American research in the post-war period was dominated by the Cold War.\textsuperscript{24} The Cold War had a large effect on the theorizing of world politics in the post-war era, especially in the American academy. Morgenthau responds to the rhetorical use of imperialism by the Russians to describe policies to which they were opposed. What’s more, he turns the charge against its authors. “The other outstanding example of cultural imperialism in our time, antedating and surviving the Nazi fifth column, is the Communist International.”\textsuperscript{25}

The Third World was described primarily as a site of the East-West conflict. Throughout the period of decolonization, postcolonial states were never treated autonomously within mainstream International Relations theory. They were seen as having moved from the control of European states to that of the United States or the USSR. The stance of non-alignment presented an attempt at independent foreign policy,

\textsuperscript{22} Doty, 1996a, p.162.
\textsuperscript{24} Olson and Groom, op cit., p.104.
about which many Cold War theorists were skeptical. While realist scholars praised the bipolar nature of the Cold War for bringing ‘peace’ to the latter half of the twentieth century, Acharya argues that, in fact, the Cold War exacerbated a large number of Third World conflicts.  

Waltz requires a brief mention in this section, because of the stature of neorealism in the discipline of International Relations. His criticism of the ‘second image’ of international politics also removes culture and imperialism from the scope of neorealist study. The ‘second image’ argues that the internal structure of states determines their external behavior.  

Waltz criticizes J.A. Hobson’s understanding of war in the international system as the product of capitalist states. His mention of imperialism in this work is tangential. Similarly, Waltz discounts the explanation that culture can act as a deterrent to war. Cultural similarity, it is argued, has not prevented war with any predictability, and may indeed have lent to the conditions that caused some. Criticizing Waltz has become a cottage industry in International Relations, and it is not for me to add to that debate. However, Waltz’s parsimonious theory, which obscures culture and imperialism from the view of International Relations, sets the stage for the discipline either to downplay imperialism, or to use imperialist ideas unselfconsciously to evaluate post-colonial societies.

These post-war theorists represent an important core of mainstream International Relations theory in the 1950’s and 1960’s. The use of imperialism to describe any grab

22 Ibid., p.57.
for power that upsets the international balance has the effect of removing European imperialism from special consideration. This elision of all imperialisms leads to a miscalculation of how post-colonial states will (inter)act in the post-independence system. These theorists also play down the importance of culture and identity. Figuring culture and identity as 'national character' tends to favour the use of stereotypes in characterizing a particular state's foreign policy. A more subtle analysis of culture and identity, as factors of power, becomes central to understanding post-colonial states and their behaviour on the world stage.

*The Hinterlands of Western Civilization: Decolonization and the Discipline*

This section will trace some of the discipline's responses to decolonization through an evaluation of four important textbooks. Schuman's *International Politics* (6th ed., 1958) and Schwarzenberger's *Power Politics* (3rd ed., 1964) will be treated in some depth, while less extensive analyses will be made of Holsti's *International Politics* and Organski's *World Politics*. It will also look at some other important voices in the discipline at this time, notably Crabb and Mazrui, who speak to these new states and International Relations. What is striking about these authors, despite later characterizations of them, is that they do attempt to take decolonization seriously. Whether or not they are successful in doing so depends on the degree to which these scholars can leave behind nineteenth century ideas of the colonized and colonial societies.

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39 Ibid., p.49-53.
30 Darby and Paolini, op cit., p.381.
Schuman and Schwarzenberger

Schuman and Schwarzenberger's textbooks were central in the field of International Relations during the period between the Second World War and the emergence of *Dependencia* Theory, and are taken here to be representatives of the mainstream response of the discipline. In both of these texts, I have looked specifically for new writing on the (post)colonial world, and sections on imperialism or decolonization. In presenting both the ways in which Schuman and Schwarzenberger are concerned with imperialism and decolonization, and the extent to which they rely on imperialist tropes and stereotypes, I hope to present a balanced analysis of the discipline's response.

It is revealing to revisit Schuman's *International Politics: The Western State System and the World Community* in its sixth edition, published in 1958, in the midst of decolonization. Schuman is sensitive to the importance of decolonization and the rise of the new post-colonial states in world politics. However, he remains indebted to the imperialist stereotypes elaborated in the first edition of his work in 1933. For example, Schuman argues that the Third World "may well prove more decisive for the shape of things to come in the World Community than any amount of violence or bargaining between Washington and Moscow." In granting post-colonial societies a sort of agency in world politics, Schuman also relies on colonial tropes of barbarism,

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describing the inhabitants of (post)colonial states as “dark and impoverish multitudes.”

Schuman continues:

Thanks to the impact of the West upon “backward peoples,” most of the human race in our time has been brought to the point of a vast and complex revolution against the status quo. This “revolution” may be depicted in sundry ways, none of them adequately descriptive of the groping efforts of the “lesser breeds without the law” to attain a better life.

Schuman’s use of Kipling to describe post-colonial societies reflects a larger trend in International Politics, and the discipline in general, to rely on colonial ideas of the colonized to describe their new condition. This is not to argue that, empirically, there were few “impoverished” Africans and Asians, and that their efforts at self-government were universally unsuccessful. However, I do want to emphasize that the language and ideas used to describe newly independent peoples were neither objective, nor entirely novel. Theorists such as Schuman and Schwarzenberger relied without reflection on their previous conceptions of the colonized to describe the conditions of new states. This is further evidenced by Schuman’s final description of African states as “The Terrorists.” He defines three possibilities for Africa in the face of the Cold War: first, acquiescence to one of the Great Powers; second, “terrorism and violent rebellion against white ‘colonialism;’” or third, “passive, watching, waiting, and hoping.” This tripartite description of the colonized response to Europe is directly descended from the orientalist stereotypes of the nineteenth century. ‘Barbarians’ may either be assimilated, violent, or passive. Schuman describes contemporary Africa in the same terms as Conrad uses to describe Africa in 1900 – barbaric.

32 Ibid., p.101.
To quote Schuman again, "the world’s disinherited are now resolved to recover their place in the sun."35 This reference to colonial rhetoric is not accidental: Schuman uses it again later to indicate that Western ideas, such as "self-determination" and "place in the sun," were adopted and appropriated by their colonial subjects to reject colonialism.36 To use the specific phrase which inaugurated a period of rapid expansion into Africa to describe the desire of post-colonial societies to assert their independence seems to misunderstand the explicit aim of post-colonial nationalist elites to do so in a specifically non-western way.37 The attempt to figure non-western states in terms of Western history is not only fallacious, but also intellectually imperialist.

The ways in which Schuman portrays post-colonial societies is also distinctly colonial. Schuman makes repeated references to "dark multitudes" and "teeming hordes," which were stock rhetorical phrases in demographic predictions of ‘white decline’ in the early twentieth century. Schuman follows a common orientalist trope in representing the societies themselves as backward, tribal, and underdeveloped.38 Schuman states, “of the 200,000,000 inhabitants of Africa, the larger part consists of native Negroes still living in preliterate tribal communities possessed of no well-defined elite.”39 Following the trope of tribalism and absence of ‘civilization,’ he states:

... we encounter something approaching a vacuum in most of the colonial lands. For here in the absence of industry, finance, and commerce, there is no equivalent of the “middle class”... The nearest approach to this

33 Ibid., p.101.
34 Ibid., p.641.
35 Ibid., p.103.
36 Ibid., p.315.
38 Schuman, 1958, pp.315-334.
39 Ibid., p.321.
stratum consists of native merchants and a small but unhappy “intelligentsia,” consisting chiefly of Western-educated sons of aristocrats, easily attracted to extreme nationalism.40

Again, this is not to say that newly independent states could provide the same standards of material well being, security, or legitimacy of governments to their citizens. I only point out that the same imperial stereotypes are used after independence, which has the effect of reifying imperial identities and eventually imperial politics. By reinscribing these colonial ideas, the cause of post-colonial underdevelopment is represented as the inherent nature of the colonized’s society, rather than a dynamic of imperial (mis)rule and politico-economic factors.

Nonalignment, as the most popular foreign policy of post-colonial states, is seen as intensified passivity, framed by violent domestic repression. Crabb makes the criticism that independence-minded, or non-alignment oriented, foreign policy is looked upon as aberrant or extreme by Western IR scholars. While Schuman attempts to come to terms with a palpable shift in power from the West to the non-West, his persistent use of colonial tropes, embedded in the discourse of civilized/barbarian, simultaneously undermines that agency by representing post-colonial societies in colonial terms.

Schwarzenberger also presents a view of the post-colonial world as the “hinterlands of Western civilisation” in his third edition of Power Politics: A Study of World Society.41 Despite this initial characterization of post-colonial societies, Schwarzenberger offers an analysis of the decolonizing world that raises some important questions. First, it must be noted that Schwarzenberger presages Gerrit Gong’s analysis

40 Ibid., p.317.
of the legal standard of 'civilization.' He observes that "in the post-1919 period, the Powers jettisoned even the standard of civilisation as a test of international personality. Whether a State was civilised or barbarian ceased to be relevant." However, as I have argued against Gong, this analysis concentrates solely on the legal, juridical standard of civilization, and does not take into account the popular persistence of the trope. Second, Schwarzenberger notes what will later be termed the "weakness" of post-colonial states.

All of these Afro-Asian states have three vital features in common: first, compared with the needs of their rapidly increasing populations, their economies are retrograde; secondly... the indigenous elites are too thin to allow for the rapid replacement made necessary by sheer exhaustion, internecine feuds and endemic corruption; thirdly, most of these States are saved from open bankruptcy only by continuous aid from outside.

The relatively objective terms in which Schwarzenberger frames the weakness of post-colonial states are interesting. Unlike Schuman, Schwarzenberger argues that this weakness is due, in some sense, to the anti-Western nationalism of post-colonial societies. Many theorists were impressed with the anti-Western, anti-white rhetoric of post-colonial nationalist movements. However, Schwarzenberger connects the racialist rhetoric of independence propaganda to the Nazi discourse examined in the last chapter. He says, "[Pan-Africa, -Asian, -American ideas] have an unmistakable racial, and anti-white, undertone. The racialist nationalism of the Third Reich has shown the nihilism inseparable from this form of relapse into barbarism." The connection between barbarism and anti-colonial nationalism is made explicit. Schwarzenberger also refers to

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42 Ibid., p.39.
43 Ibid., p.40. Italics in original.
44 Ibid., p.64.
45 Ibid., p.64.
this anti-colonialism/ Nazi barbarity later in the work, citing the Belgian Congo, the repression of Kurds in Iraq, the Tamils, as illustrations of racial struggles.47

Race and colour, which faded from view in the discipline after the horror of the Holocaust, also became important again during this period. In addition to linking post-colonial nationalism to racialism and anti-white sentiments, Schwarzenberger argues "the rebirth of the Afro-Asian States … has brought to the surface a basic fact hidden in the past by white world supremacy: the minority of the white race in world society."48 Schuman points out earlier that "two-thirds of mankind is ‘coloured,’ not ‘white.’"49 However, it is only with the rise of the political viability of anti-colonial movements such as negritude and Pan-Africanism that this racial divide assumes importance for International Relations. The concepts of race and colour are present in the ‘civilized/barbarian’ discourse, and inevitably in the discourse of decolonization and postcolonialism. Their presence in International Relations has not yet been fully explored, but shows some interesting avenues for research.50

Students of International Relations tend to view the post-colonial world chiefly as a ‘safe’ terrain for proxy conflicts between the Superpowers. Schwarzenberger makes the argument that from the weakness of the new states there is “constant danger of the Balkanisation of the areas in question and their transformation into fields of fierce

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46 Ibid., p.66.
47 Ibid., p.514.
48 Ibid., p.494. Italics mine.
competition and shadow-fighting, if nothing worse, between the world camps.\textsuperscript{51}

However, the emphasis on the post-colonial world as a passive site of the Cold War struggle does not prevent Schwarzenberger from mobilizing colonial tropes. “These teeming millions,” he argues, “are ideal recruits for a primitive and fanatical hate-propaganda of social revolution which is likely to shake to their foundations or tear apart the bamboo structures of the new states involved.”\textsuperscript{52} Postcolonial elites and their populations are viewed as irrational and easily swayed by more ‘powerful’ states. The stereotype of the individual colonial subject is applied to the newly post-colonial state.

Many other mainstream scholars also under- or mis-represented the post-colonial world in their analyses. The ‘Third World’ is repeatedly portrayed as the site of superpower proxy struggles during the 1950’s and 1960’s. Two brief examples of other popular texts will suffice to show that scholars continue to misjudge the specific properties of the post-colonial state. I will cite Holsti and Organski to show that even as the (post)colonial world was being investigated, colonial tropes are reified.

Holsti’s \textit{International Politics: A Framework for Analysis} was first published in 1967, and has since gone through seven editions. In his introduction, Holsti himself diagnoses a Cold War bias in the majority of contemporary theoretical writing in IR “to view almost all political problems in terms of [Soviet-American] rivalry.”\textsuperscript{53} His solution is the use of concepts which are objective, and can be observed in great, middle, and small powers. “Objectives, capabilities, threats, punishments, and rewards” are universal characteristics of states, and can thus mitigate any ideological predisposition in the

\textsuperscript{51} Schwarzenberger, 1964, p.496-98.
\textsuperscript{52} Ibid., p.514.
This move assumes that all states have these similar characteristics, or will act in predictable ways under the same conditions as western states, given the pattern of European behaviour throughout the history of the Westphalian system. It is unclear if this assumption is warranted, as Holsti himself later points out.\(^{55}\)

However, if Holsti is sensitive to the material differences in post-colonial states, he does not link these deficiencies to the process of imperialism.\(^{56}\) He also seems to gesture towards what is of great concern to later post-colonial theorists, the search for identity in post-colonial states. Figured in terms of status and prestige, Holsti also mentions the predisposition of newly independent states to favour a foreign policy of non-alignment.\(^{57}\)

Thus, the Third World is treated in *International Politics* as a subsystem of the Cold war, and post-colonial states as a variant of the traditional Western states system, albeit with unique characteristics.

Organski presents another popular text to the discipline: *World Politics*, which provides an excellent example of the same argument. Organski situates his textbook using nearly the exact phraseology of Holsti: "[what] those who approach world politics need most is a framework within which to organize their data."\(^{58}\)

First, Organski recognizes that colonialism is an important area of interest for International Relations. He then follows in the vein of Schwarzenberger and Schuman, using a definition of


\(^{54}\) Ibid., p.23.


\(^{56}\) Ibid., p.72.

\(^{57}\) Ibid., p.75.

colonialism that removes it from the specific European experience. By equating Greek, Roman, Indian, Chinese, Arabic, Turkic, and European colonialism, imperialism is seen to be a recurrent, generic historical pattern. This removes consideration of the specificity of European rule in the 19th and 20th centuries, which has, in some part, determined the terrain of contemporary world politics. What is particularly interesting about Organski’s analysis of European colonialism is his reliance on geographical determinism: the belief that climate determines character. He claims, “whether Europeans have settled in a particular colony or exploited it from a distance has been determined largely by climate, for Europeans on the whole have not adapted themselves to living permanently in the tropics.” This notion of temperate climates producing a superior European civilization and the intemperate tropics producing inferior barbarians stretches back through the history of Western thought, through the discourse of colonialism to Rousseau’s “Essay on the Origin of Languages.” The trope of climate as character was mobilized extensively throughout the history of European imperialism, and its resurgence in Organski illustrates his reliance on colonial stereotypes.

Second, Organski argues that the Cold War struggle over the Third World can be best understood in terms of colonialism. This claim clearly follows from his definition of colonialism as any relationship between strong and weak powers. Third World

59 Ibid., p.9.
60 Ibid., p.224.
62 Organski, op cit., p.231.
65 Organski, op cit., p.245.
countries are defined here, as in Schuman, as weak and malleable. First world powers are defined as rational and forceful. Organski’s description of superpower contest as ‘colonialist’ over the ‘dependencies’ of the world is too general and too dependent on subjective colonialist rhetoric to account for the subtleties of inter-state relations in the Cold War period he examines.

Organski remains indebted to imperialist discourses, treating post-colonial countries as new colonies of a different sort, economic as opposed to political. Newly independent states are described as “the spoils” of the Cold War. Organski does not protect himself from the charge of ideological bias, portraying Russia as a far more cruel imperialist power than the Western European states. “If anything,” he argues, “Soviet control over the political life of the satellites was even more complete than that exercised by the colonial rulers of the past… In addition to maintaining order and to exploiting their possessions economically, [the Russians] also wished to communize them, to turn each satellite into a miniature edition of the Soviet Union.”

Even if we overlook his mischaracterization of European colonialism, Organski clearly allies himself with the Western camp. Imperialism, despite Schuman and Morgenthau’s efforts, becomes again a term of opprobrium to level against the Cold War enemy.

To conclude, Organski’s focus on colonialism seems admirable at first glance. In addition to describing the ‘civilizing mission’ as a vital piece of imperialist policy, Organski describes how European colonialism sows the seeds of its own destruction.

66 Ibid., p.254.
67 Ibid., p.479.
68 Ibid., p.264.
69 Ibid., pp.229-230;236-37.
The parallel between historical and modern colonialism seems also to hold promise. However, his reliance on the realist, universalized definition of imperialism dilutes any analytical power this comparison might have, as does his ideological use of the term. Organski describes the entire post-colonial realm of International Relations as a subset (the spoils) of the Cold War, and fails to accord the underdeveloped countries any agency or particularity whatsoever.

This mixture of attention and neglect of (post)colonial states seems representative of the discipline as a whole in the 1950's and 1960's—using traditional tools to analyze the politics of post-colonial states. This leads to two results: the diminution of the particularity of the post-colonial state, and the use of traditional models, images, and stereotypes to characterize these states. While the discourse of civilized/barbarian, which had been prominent in previous writing, all but disappears during the period of decolonization, these examples show that the enduring stereotypes, which constitute the discourse, were still very much in circulation. While Schuman, Schwarzenberger, and Organski do not mention barbarians specifically in relation to post-colonial societies, the stereotypes of the barbarian still resonate in their characterization of the Third World.

*Crabb and Mazrui*

To supplement this analysis of four mainstream textbooks, I will also look at two contemporaneous texts that are more sympathetic to the post-colonial situation. This section will touch upon Crabb's *The Elephants and the Grass* and Mazrui's *Towards a Pax Africana*. Crabb offers a critique of Western theorizing of the policy of nonalignment. Mazrui details the foreign policy implications of post-colonial nationalisms and pan-Africanism.
Crabb’s work on non-alignment speaks directly to the ingrained orientalism of International Relations theorists, and makes a nuanced analysis of the tendency to portray the post-colonial world as merely the passive site of Cold War competition. Because the Cold War dominated the imagination of American theorists, the Third World was portrayed as the ‘spoils’ of the Cold War, or as a strategic problem to be solved. The Third World’s predisposition towards non-alignment thus became the chief way in which post-colonial societies were theorized. Non-alignment refers to a number of different foreign policy stances, chiefly from post-colonial societies. The policy of non-alignment can be characterized as a foreign policy in which states “on their own initiative and without the guarantee of other states, refuse to commit themselves militarily to the goals and objectives of other states” -- most often the superpowers in the Cold War context.

Crabb argues that Western analysts saw the policy of non-alignment as deceptive. They argued that non-alignment was a default alliance with the Communist bloc. He argues, “observers in the West [postulated] their own conception of what nonalignment ideally ought to entail and to categorize deviations from this norms with labels like ... ‘surreptitious alignment with the Soviet bloc.’” The orientalist tendency of this practice shows itself in two ways. First, it displays the belief that the West has a monopoly on the ‘pure’ ideal of nonalignment, which African leaders had already described as

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74 Ibid., p.21.
Second, this orientalism is evident in the description of nonalignment as an aberration of foreign policy, “signifying the existence of a policy vacuum or immobilism on the part of the adherents.” The theorists Crabb criticizes use colonial rhetoric to describe post-colonial foreign policy formulation as tainted by “emotionalism, ingrained prejudice toward the West, or diplomatic myopia – which prevent[ed] the neutralist governments from engaging in the kind of sober, careful consideration of [rational] policy alternatives…” This contrast between Western rationalism and non-Western emotionalism is a long-standing trope in imperialist rhetoric, although newly applied to the formulation of foreign policy.

Crabb admits that nonalignment in post-colonial states was often accompanied by anti-Western sentiments. However, he argues that this simplistic conceptual framework of pro-Western or anti-Western fails to take the full gamut of colonial history into account. In addition to particular material similarities between post-colonial states, Crabb agrees with Organski that, in the fight for independence, these states used anti-Western and anti-colonial sentiments for political mobilization. However, Crabb argues such anti-Western feelings do not end with the moment of independence. He writes:

the paramount reality, to which American policy seemed strangely oblivious, was the fact that anti-colonialism is to the neutralist world what anti-Communism is to the United States. Somehow, Americans have never quite understood that the one principle uniting Ghana, Ethiopia, Egypt, Afghanistan, India, Cambodia, and Indonesia is (as an African

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75 Touré, op cit., p.141.
76 Crabb, op cit., p.40.
77 Ibid. p.40.
78 Ibid., p.34.
79 Organski, op cit., p.230.
expressed it) that "we are still at war with colonialism" and that "the face of the enemy is Western."\textsuperscript{80}

The policy of nonalignment was oriented away from the West not as a rejection of one contestant in the Cold War, but as a rejection of the former or neo-imperialist nations. It is also true that the Soviet Union did a better job at disguising its own imperialism.\textsuperscript{81} Crabb states, "from West Africa to East Africa, nonalignment is viewed as springing from, and being an integral part of, the ongoing struggle against colonialism... the policy of nonalignment is held to be both a visible symbol of a nation's dedication to anti-colonialism and a method of inhibiting new colonialist tendencies."\textsuperscript{82}

This lack of consideration for the historically-specific context of post-colonial states is the outcome of the general tendency in the discipline to apply colonial stereotypes to post-colonial states.

As Holsti remarks, the policies of nonalignment can be connected to the "ideological and philosophical emancipation, [promoting the] quest for ideological and spiritual 'identity' that is the hallmark of contemporary African, Arab, and Asian nationalism."\textsuperscript{83} Identity and culture are two key themes in anti-colonial writers, such as Césaire and Fanon. In limiting their analysis of culture and identity to the notion of 'national character,' mainstream International Relations theorists were reduced to either reinscribing national stereotypes or becoming dependent on country specialists for a more empirical view. This view takes culture and identity to be attributes of a state, rather than political processes or areas of contention. Culture and identity have the potential to

\textsuperscript{80} Crabb, op cit., p.119.
\textsuperscript{82} Ibid., p.42
\textsuperscript{83} Holsti, 1967, p.50.
mobilize national support for international action, but the field of culture and identity can hardly be characterized as stable. Specifically, post-colonial societies were faced with a situation wherein their national boundaries did not represent established identity groups.\(^{84}\) Culture and identity were crucial to the ongoing survival of the post-colonial state as a viable political unit, and the policy of nonalignment acted as the international face of independence. Mazrui makes the connection between post-colonial domestic politics and non-alignment as a common foreign policy stance, as I will elaborate below.

Mazrui makes several important arguments in *Towards a Pax Africana* which are relevant to this chapter. First, he argues that African, or more generally post-colonial, states are unique in world politics. He argues that in addition to sovereign states, African politics recognizes racial and continental identifications across national borders to be central to International Relations.\(^{85}\) Second, to complement this unique African identity, Mazrui argues that nonalignment and Pan-Africanism are really two sides of the same coin: the desire for independence.\(^{86}\) Third, he argues that race and racial identity are important factors in African post-colonial politics, both domestic and international.\(^{87}\) While I will not take this third point up extensively, it remains an issue of which International Relations has failed to take sufficient account.\(^{88}\)

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\(^{84}\) Holsti, 1996, p.68.
\(^{85}\) Mazrui, op cit., p.125.
\(^{86}\) Ibid., p.165.
\(^{87}\) Ibid., p.14.
Post-colonial states are assumed in much contemporary International Relations writing to be under-evolved European states. While their material conditions differ, theorists such as Huntington, Holsti, and Organski represent their juridical status as a single analytical category. Mazrui argues that the post-colonial state is unique in several important respects. Primarily, he argues that African nationalism developed in the colonial setting, and thus was chiefly negative nationalism. African nationalism developed largely in opposition to imperial rule and European conceptions of the self and other. Above, I have argued that discourse and culture have material, political effects within the identity of Europe. Mazrui argues here that African identity was determined, in large part, by the European characterization of Africans in colonial discourse. European characterization of the ‘other,’ as African – rather than Nigerian, or Ibo, or Masai etc – led to characterization of the African ‘self’ as African, rather than as a tribal or religious identity. Because of this chiefly, negatively-defined identity, a deep-seated anti-colonialism and a sense of cross-national racial identity condition African politics. In sum, he argues, African nationalist thought seems to regard traditional international law as having been naïve when it reduced all tensions to interstate relations. In African estimations, three levels of identity are relevant in diplomatic behaviour – a racial identity, a continental identity and the identities of sovereign states.

90 Mazrui, op cit., p. 3.
91 Ibid., p. 52.
92 Ibid., p. 48.
93 Ibid., p. 125.
Other post-colonial writers have endorsed this idea that racial and cultural identity are particularly salient issues in post-colonial societies.\textsuperscript{94} The notions of identity and cultural self-determination become central to post-colonial theory – but have for the most part been played down in International Relations.\textsuperscript{95} It can be argued that post-colonial states have unique histories of imperial occupation, which have important impacts on how these states relate to the international environment.

Mazrui makes the argument that nonalignment is an essential part of the anti-colonial inheritance of African states. Nonalignment is the foreign face of Pan-Africanism. "The ultimate inspiration behind Pan-Africanism is the desire to see Africa become more powerful in the world, the ultimate ambition of nonalignment is to reconcile Africa's weakness today with a certain degree of diplomatic freedom."\textsuperscript{96} This anti-Western bent, and its foreign policy manifestation – nonalignment – is not directed at the Cold War, but rather is seen by its authors as part of their anti-colonial heritage.

American theorists, in particular, failed to accept this aspect of nonalignment, viewing it only in terms of the Cold War.\textsuperscript{97} Mazrui continues to theorize on the "African condition," which I will touch upon in the next chapter.

Crabb and Mazrui represent a separate voice in the discipline of International Relations theory. This perspective assessed the condition of post-colonial states from a fresh perspective. Both theorists were critical of the mainstream, and offered a more nuanced analysis of post-colonial politics. Culture and identity play an important role in

\textsuperscript{95} Darby and Paolini, op cit., p.375.
\textsuperscript{96} Mazrui, op cit., p.165.
their writings, as they do in the post-colonial state itself. Mazrui in particular describes
the post-colonial state as conditioned by the colonial experience, an insight which
mainstream International Relations failed to capitalize upon. Mazrui and Crabb also link
the domestic identity crisis of post-colonial states to the external foreign policy of
nonalignment. Figuring culture and identity in terms of national character attempts to
draw behavioural patterns over history. However, this analysis fails when dealing with
new states, self-consciously trying to break colonial patterns of subordination. Mazrui
and Crabb introduce new tools into the arsenal of International Relations which help
understand the post-colonial situation more fully than their realist predecessors do.

Another significant branch of mainstream theory, which drew the discipline’s
attention to the Third World, was Dependencia theory. Though I will not engage with
Dependency theory in great depth, it remains an important school of thought. Based on
Marxist critiques of imperialism, Dependencia theorists, largely from South America,
argued that the discipline’s traditional concerns of war and the balance of power were not
central to Third World politics. The economic privation – which they viewed as
imbedded in post-colonial international society – was far more pressing than distant
conflicts between the Western great powers. Economic well being was more important
to Dependency theorists than military security. By fore grounding the economic
dimensions of international relations, scholars such as Fernando Cardoso and Enzo

98 Holsti, 1985, p.74-75.
99 Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, Dependency and Development in Latin America. Trans.
Faletto, Samir Amin, Johan Galtung, and Andre Gunder Frank, prompted a re-examination of the Eurocentric focus of IR theory.

In the current topography of IR, Dependency theory is “all but dead.” However, as suggested by Wallerstein and James, there remain some interesting intersections between racial, class, and gendered discourse when viewed in relation to the nation-state. Nevertheless, Dependency theory is peripheral to contemporary mainstream IR theory. Dependency theory and World-Systems theory did reify, however, the core/periphery model in International Relations and placed imperialism back in the scope of the discipline. I will look at how mainstream and critical theorists examined imperialism in the next chapter.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has developed two important ideas. First, it has shown that the discipline of International Relations, from the end of the Second World War to the rise of Dependencia theory in the early 1970s, continued to perceive Africa and the Third World in imperialist ways. While all of these important texts attempted to take imperialism seriously, their efforts were circumscribed by a reliance on the same generalizations, images, and preconceptions about the Third World that were shown to be present in the nineteenth century. Although the terms “civilized” and “barbarian” do not make frequent appearances in these texts, the stereotypes that underpinned this discourse are certainly prominent. The mainstream scholars quoted above viewed the Third World as

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100 Paul James, “Postdependency?” *At the Edge of International Relations: Postcolonialism, Gender and Dependency.* Philip Darby ed. New York: Pinter, 1997, p.61.
constituted of malleable, backward nations, or as a passive site on which to play out the Cold War. However, there were dissenting voices in the discipline that explored a more sympathetic view.

Second, it has suggested that post-colonial states possess some unique characteristics, which may require an analytic apparatus separate from that which is used to analyze the Western states system. Scholars more sympathetic to the nuances of the post-colonial condition indicate the importance of culture and identity to post-colonial states. Postulating different, non-Western patterns of state development, these theorists are able to examine the behaviour and structure of post-colonial states with a view to their unique characteristics. This has great utility in understanding the particular ways that they interact with the wider system – in this case, nonalignment.

In the next chapter, I will continue this gloss of the discipline of International Relations. The English School and several critical theorists brought culture and identity explicitly back into the mainstream of the discipline. This chapter will set the stage for the explicit return of the civilized/barbarian discourse.
To continue to track the evolution of the civilized/barbarian discourse, I will indicate two efforts to bring the post-colonial world into the mainstream of International Relations theory: the English School, and critical theory. This chapter will examine scholars within the English School and critical theory who address precisely the civilized/barbarian dichotomy or culture and identity. In short, the early- to mid-1980s sees the increased usage of the civilized/barbarian discourse and the (re)introduction of culture, and identity into the discipline. Within IR, scholars have started to view contemporary international society as being influenced by imperial and post-colonial relations, and are giving culture a more prominent role in the study of world politics. In popular culture, the civilized/barbarian discourse is at once asserted and complicated by post-colonial thinkers who affirm that while dualistic structures are central to identity, such identities are fluid and constructed. This chapter charts some of the critical and historical perspectives with which this project engages.

The English School’s long-standing historical predisposition investigated the evolution of international society and, specifically, to the introduction of the post-colonial world into mainstream international society. Hedley Bull and Adam Watson’s Expansion of International Society is seminal to this thesis, containing several important chapters on race, imperialism, and the changing normative regimes of post-colonial international society. Gerrit Gong’s The Standard of ‘Civilisation’ in International Society examines

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1 I use critical theory as an umbrella term to encompass post-colonial, post-structural, and post-modern criticisms. I do not use the term to refer to Critical Theory, which is a branch of Continental Philosophy represented by Habermas.
the standard of ‘civilization’ in international law during the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries. Gong evaluates the standard of ‘civilization’ as both a legal concept of some
importance and as an identity device. Robert Jackson’s “Quasi-States, Dual Regimes,
and Neoclassical Theory: International Jurisprudence and the Third World” is also
pivotal to the post-Cold War international imaginary. Nearly all mainstream accounts of
the Third World adopt his bifurcation between real and quasi-states. While other scholars
in the English School tradition wrote on the expansion of international society during this
time, these leading scholars refer specifically to the civilized/barbarian discourse.

At the same time, another group of scholars took the discipline of International
Relations to task, questioning some of its core epistemological premises. Engaging with
contemporary debates in social and political theory, R.B.J. Walker and Ali Mazrui – to
take two prominent examples – used the concepts of culture and identity to critique the
focus of mainstream IR theory. These concepts not only remedy an overly parsimonious
realism, but also bring to light a number of political and social critiques that circulate in
social science in general.

**English School: The Legacy of Imperial Thinking**

Unlike the American preoccupation with the Cold War, English and British
scholars seem more sensitive to the role of post-colonial states in world politics. Perhaps
due to its previous imperial status or the (post-)colonial origins of many of its members
the so-called English School\(^2\) also theorized decolonization to a degree not found in

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\(^2\) Jackson, in particular, has pointed out that the English School is comprised of non-Englishmen
[Bull (Australian), Manning (South African), Jackson (Canadian)]. However, for the purposes of this
chapter, I will abide by the convention of the discipline in so naming them. There is also a theoretical
dilemma in ‘nationalizing’ IR scholars – who usually assume a non-national position. In fact, it is only
American circles, Arnold Toynbee was one of the first theorists in International Relations to note the importance of the Third World. \(^3\) *International Affairs* was the only mainstream journal to devote an entire issue to decolonization, and was long concerned with the break-up of the British Empire. \(^4\) C.A.W. Manning and Martin Wight had both spoken in the 1960s of the importance of barbarians to the classification of international theory. \(^5\) In this section, I will look at the efforts of the English School in the 1980’s to understand the post-colonial world. I will concentrate on Bull and Watson’s seminal work, *The Expansion of International Society*, Gong’s *The Standard of Civilization in International Society*, and Jackson’s *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World*. These works represent three leading attempts to come to historical, juridical, and legalistic understandings of the evolution of the contemporary world system and especially its incorporation of post-colonial states.

*Bull and Watson: Expanding Horizons*

Bull comments on the necessity of a common culture to international society in his early work *The Anarchical Society*. \(^6\) However, the study of culture does not come into

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full view until his collaboration with Watson on *The Expansion of International Society*. This important volume represents the first major work to address European expansion in the English School tradition. In this section, I will look at a number of essays in *Expansion* to illustrate how decolonization is taken seriously by the English School and the extent to which post-colonial states are considered as influenced, but not determined, by European colonial experience. This work represents a great advance in theoretical writings about the post-colonial world. However, it should be noted that culture and identity play a limited role in these authors’ considerations of post-colonial international society.

Bull and Watson recognize in their introduction that contemporary international society is determined in large part by European imperialism and the subsequent decolonization. Relations between the European states as *empires* also determined to some extent the terrain of the international society – especially when one thinks of the Berlin Conference of 1885. Previously, European powers had agreed that conflict *ex mare* – outside the physical boundaries of Europe – would not determine conflict within the bounds of Europe. This resembles the Islamic distinction between *Dar el Islam* and *Dar el harb* (the Realm of God and the Realm of War). To this end, Bull and Watson treat neither the European states system nor its colonial subset in predetermined ways. Rather, European international relations are clearly influenced by European imperialism.

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7 Hereafter *Expansion*.
Bull and Watson pursue this idea independent of imperialist stereotypes. Further, they argue that "there has been a considerable shift in political, economic, and even in military power away from the [former-imperial powers] and towards the [post-colonial states], who are now clearly subjects and not merely objects in the international political process." This represents one of the first, unequivocal statements of non-Western agency in the mainstream of the discipline.

Following the historicist tendency of the English School, Bull and Watson also assert the historical continuity of the European states system and the universal international society that followed it. They argue that the contemporary universal international society carries with it some distinctly European notions: "when the Europeans embarked upon their historic expansion they did so with a set of assumptions about relations with non-European and non-Christian peoples inherited from medieval Latin Christendom and ultimately from the Ancient World." While the authors do not specifically trace the evolution of the civilized/barbarian dichotomy, as I hope to have done here, Bull and Watson do indicate the centrality of such dualistic identity structures.

In "European States and African Political Communities," Bull traces the conquest of African communities which, he argues, were not states or even proto-states at the time of conquest – a claim which Mazrui disputes. Bull makes three important arguments in this essay. First, he argues that European agreement on imperial expansion, typified in

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10 Ibid., p.6.
12 Bull and Watson, op cit., p.5.
13 Mazrui, 1984, p.186.
the Berlin conference, implied a consensus on imperial ideology.\textsuperscript{14} Second, he argues that the rhetoric of trusteeship, and the contrast to expropriation of Australian land, which was considered \textit{terra nullius}, indicates that existent African communities were considered to predate European rule.\textsuperscript{15} This lies in direct contrast to some of the imperial rhetoric of the time, which asserted that the Europeans gave governance and peace to Africans who had previously lived a chaotic, tribal life. Third, he notes that the encounter between European and African societies should not be characterized either as surrender or as assimilation – that these encounters were a combination of both and difficult to generalize.\textsuperscript{16} Bull presages an argument that figures largely with post-colonial thinkers. In an attempt to complicate the European narrative of colonial domination, some scholars argue that the imperial encounter is chiefly characterized by ambiguity – political, social, and sexual.\textsuperscript{17}

The second of Bull’s essay in this work is “The Emergence of a Universal International Society,” in which he traces the introduction of non-European actors into international society. In an argument that parallels Gong’s \textit{Standard of Civilization},\textsuperscript{18} Bull suggests that the reluctance to admit non-European actors into international society stemmed from conflicting trends in European thought. Cosmopolitan thought argued that all humanity had natural rights, whereas the predominant imperial rhetoric argued for rights accorded by status and consequently prescribed the ‘civilizing mission.’

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{14} Hedley Bull, “European States and African Political Communities,” \textit{Evolution of International Society}. p.109.
\item \textsuperscript{15} Ibid., p.111.
\item \textsuperscript{16} Ibid., p.113.
\item \textsuperscript{17} Homi Bhabha, \textit{The location of culture}. New York: Routledge, 1994, p.86.
\end{itemize}
debate set "the unity of all mankind as moral beings up against those who, like Aristotle, divided men into Greeks and barbarians and held the latter to be slaves by nature..."19

The relative merits of these traditions of international ethics are beyond the scope of this thesis – however, it is interesting that Bull regards the civilized/barbarian distinction as important in the analysis of imperialism and the post-imperial international society.

Bull also makes a powerful argument in the conclusion on this point. He argues that "the need for Asian and African countries to meet the ‘standard of civilization’ demanded by the Europeans... came to be recognized in these countries themselves, as domestic reforms were undertaken in many of these countries, often at the urging of the Europeans, to close the gap."

The ‘standard of civilization’ is not merely a legalistic device to determine the membership of international society, in this view, but has material consequences for colonial and post-colonial states. The consequence for colonial states was a rhetorical pressure to meet their own standard of ‘civilization’ in their domestic politics. For the objects of the ‘standard of civilization,’ their cultures came to internalize that standard, and attempted to approximate European governance within their own countries – even after the juridical structure of imperialism had vanished. Ashis Nandy demonstrates this point clearly in his work.21 Bull believes that imperialist ideas, and the European culture that served as the vehicle of those ideas, have material effects, which outlast juridical imperialism.

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18 Bull was, in fact, Gong’s supervisor at Oxford when he wrote Standard of Civilization.

19 Hedley Bull, “The Emergence of a Universal International Society,” Expansion of International Society, p.120.

“The Revolt Against the West” is Bull’s final contribution to the volume, in which he addresses several gaps in the analysis of the decolonization in International Relations. Bull refutes Georg Schwarzenberger’s claim that technology determines empire, shifting the emphasis from material factors to ideational factors. Bull continues to investigate the ideational cause of Western rule, and the demise of Western predominance. He describes five themes, which, he argues, characterize the revolt against the West.

Important to this study are his third and fifth phases:

...there has been a struggle for racial equality, or more accurately the struggle of non-white states and people against white supremacism. The old Western-dominated international order was associated with the privileged position of the white race...

...there has been the struggle for what is called cultural liberation: the struggle of non-Western peoples to throw off the intellectual or cultural ascendancy of the Western world so as to assert their own identity in matters of the spirit.

Bull raises two important concepts, which are absent from previous mainstream analysis of decolonization. First, he argues that race played an integral part in the self-consciousness of anti-colonial rhetoric and the political culture of newly-independent states. Second, he argues that an anti-colonial identity was a central aim of decolonization. While Bull does not expand on either of these points, these ‘themes’ of decolonization open up theoretical space for the analysis of culture, identity, and race. Note that these themes are derived from a study of the popular ideas surrounding decolonization, and not strictly juridical or diplomatic intercourse. In fact, Bull argues

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23 Ibid., p.221-22. Italics mine.
that the "psychological or spiritual awakening" of colonial peoples was the first step to the demise of the Western-dominated international order.\(^{24}\)

Finally, Bull makes an interesting observation that stands in contrast to the bulk of commentary on Third World underdevelopment. While the material benefits and political independence promised by decolonization are slow to manifest themselves in the post-colonial world, Bull observes that "the revolt against Western dominance has had some measure of success."\(^{25}\) In comparison to the conditions at the turn of the century, post-colonial states are in a better position – figured in terms of cultural, social, political, and economic independence. Crediting post-colonial states with some measure of empirical success is certainly a minority position in the field.

In sum, Bull opens theoretical space in the mainstream of the discipline for the study of culture and imperialism. He also hints at the potential for study of post-colonial, or quasi-states, which "still share some of the characteristics that led European statesmen in the last century to conclude that they could not be brought into international society."\(^{26}\) His work in this book displays an ability to stand apart from the preconceptions of the discipline and theorize novel circumstances without relying on inappropriate concepts or stereotypes. In addition to Bull's contributions to *The Expansion of International Society*, I will mention briefly some of the insights from Vincent and Bozeman.

\(^{24}\) Ibid., p.224.

\(^{25}\) Ibid., p.228.

\(^{26}\) Bull and Watson, "Conclusion," p.430.
R.J. Vincent is one of the only contemporary mainstream theorists to discuss racial discourse in International Relations theory. He traces the history of race as a concept in writing about international and imperial affairs. He argues, "in the popular mind the notion of racial superiority was woven into the pattern of European empire, and affected relations both between European settlers and non-European 'natives' and between the imperial states and their non-European dependencies." Vincent notes that racial difference can no longer be based on any scientific evidence. However, this fact should not prevent the theorist from analyzing the political significance which is accorded to "certain obvious, if superficial, differences between peoples..." He is also clear that Europe is responsible for "racializing the world," through the promulgation of racialist, imperial ideology. Vincent notes a certain irony in that Europe has come to suffer from this racial discourse, which it initially endorsed. He also confirms that it was the Nazi experience in Europe which led to the decline of the Western endorsement of racialist theory, as I have argued above. However, for the duration of the imperial project, "the function of racialist doctrine was to legitimate European dominance, and to buttress the idea of cultural superiority..." In any event, by reference to both cultural and racial


31 This is not to say that other societies were not racist, or imposed their racism on other societies. However, Europe was almost uniquely successful in promulgating their ideology. Ibid., p.241.
superiority... Europeans sustained the will to govern; non-Europeans remained deferential."\textsuperscript{33} Vincent's connection of racial and cultural superiority, and the connection of the discourse of civilized/barbarian, proves fertile ground for later post-colonial theorists.\textsuperscript{34}

However, Vincent's important critique of racial discourse in International Relations makes an error common to many reductionist theories. He claims, "it is still true to say that the affluent and the hungry worlds stand on either side of an [accidental] colour line."\textsuperscript{35} In the first place, this arguments mischaracterizes Western states as racially homogeneous, and further suggests that there is a clear poverty line entirely visible in international relations – neither of which can be said to be accurate. Western states are neither ethnically nor racially homogenous, and describing a set of 'rich' and 'poor' nations obscures the domestic class divides in both rich and poor states. This is only to say that representing the 'rich,' racially homogenous North and 'poor,' racially plural South over-simplifies some important racial and class dynamics. In the second place, Vincent argues that the colour line is accidental to the extent that the powerful, Western, white nations do not persist in their racist ideas. Consequently, any divide in world politics between rich, white nations and poor, non-white nations is accidental – as opposed to intentional.\textsuperscript{36} Vincent cites the economic success of East Asian countries as

\textsuperscript{32} Ibid., p.252.
\textsuperscript{33} Ibid., p.251.
\textsuperscript{34} Manzo, op cit., p.3. See also Young who discusses the tension between notions of 'culture' and 'civilization': Robert Young, \textit{Colonial Desire: Hybridity Theory, Culture and Race}. London: Routledge, 1995, pp.30-45.
\textsuperscript{35} Ibid., p.253.
\textsuperscript{36} Ibid., p.254.
evidence that the West has ceased to be racist in its international relations. As I will argue to the contrary in the next chapter, the resurgence of the discourse of barbarism in recent scholarship represents a return to racialist stereotypes, if not to overt racial discourse. Further, Vincent's claim presupposes a *tabula rasa*, an historical break between the colonial and post-colonial international societies. However, as argued vociferously by non-Western scholars, such imperial relations continue despite the end of juridical imperialism. Vincent's (re)introduction of race into the awareness of mainstream International Relations theory has great promise. However, it is circumscribed in this specific attempt. His other major contribution on this subject shares similar weaknesses.\(^37\) The discourse of race in International Relations forms an important companion to the civilized/barbarian discourse that is the focus of this study. While Vincent's analysis is markedly traditional, the theoretical space he has opened has interesting potential.

Adda Bozeman's earlier work displays an uncommon emphasis on culture and international history. While she is primarily concerned with civilizational contact and conflict in *Politics and Culture in International History*, she lays some interesting foundations for her present contribution.\(^38\) Her belief in the importance of culture is evident:

> International history richly documents the thesis that political systems are transient expedients on the surface of civilization, and that the destiny of each linguistically and morally unified community depends ultimately upon the survival of certain primary structuring ideas around which


successive generation have coalesced and which thus symbolize the society's continuity. This *cultural substratum of norm-setting beliefs and linguistic guidelines for thought* spawns, supports, or rejects a given society's political system, just as it also determines the general cast of its religions, art styles, social structures, and *dispositions to the outside world*.  

Within Bozeman's framework, culture is the structure of beliefs for a given society, which entails a conception of the self and the other. Culture thus entails an identity structure: identity structures determine culture. Though she works from a decidedly mainstream perspective, the notion that culture and identity are mutually-constitutive is central to critical approaches to International Relations theory.  

Bozeman, however, remains indebted to Toynbee's definition of civilization as a society that arises from a literate, culturally-homogenous group. This definition removes many African and Asian societies sustained by oral cultures from theoretical view. Africa is described in Toynbee as primitive, or non-civilized — a description which Bozeman also adopts. Despite this blind spot, Bozeman is sensitive to other, non-Western imperialisms. Following Toynbee, she argues that the notion of cultural superiority was not peculiar to the West. Though wary of generalizing about imperialisms across time and space, Bozeman argues that Western imperialism relied

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44 Toynbee, op cit., p.101.
more on rhetorical and ideological justifications than did Oriental imperialism. This reliance on the discourse of 'civilization' made Western imperialism more susceptible to criticism, and paradoxically more stable in encompassing dissenting viewpoints. Dissent could be incorporated into the structure of Western rationality, and thus politically diffused. Criticism reified the superiority of Western values, over the non-inclusive values of non-Western imperial states.

Toynbee had argued that the transmission of ideas between civilizations never occurs without distortion. However, within Bozeman, this distortion is entirely attributed to (post)colonial states. Stemming from her view that African societies were pre-literate, and consequently uncivilized, Bozeman argues that the persistence of tribal barriers prevents the perfect imitation of the West. Her diagnosis of the post-colonial condition deserves quoting at length:

Westernized elites [of post-colonial states] were not able to Westernize the basic beliefs and values of their nations ... unity and order could not be maintained in the new Asian and African states through reliance on imported Occidental institutions and standards of behaviour... nationalism was being identified increasingly with commitments to traditional culture. Frustration soon led to doubt and disenchantment about the worth of European precepts and models. Unrelieved by self-criticism, or other analytical reflections, these sentiments grew into suspicion and resentment until the West as a whole was being imagined in many lands as a false prophet or a mischievous sorcerer who had led his apprentices astray deliberately.

45 Bozeman, 1984, p.393-94.
46 Nandy, op cit., pp.ix;3.
48 Bozeman, 1984, p.397.
49 Ibid., p.397.
Despite Bozeman's openness in other venues, her description of the post-colonial situation seems to rely to a great deal on colonial stereotypes. Rather than explain underdevelopment as the result of the dynamic relationship between imperial and post-colonial societies, the failure of the post-colonial state is ascribed exclusively to the colonized themselves. Because of their tribal, pre-literate origins, she describes Asians and Africans as thinking in terms of magic, or animism. She argues that their failure to educate themselves or embrace fully the dialectical reasoning of the West has led to the failure of post-colonial societies. She suggests, likewise, in Conflict in Africa, that non-literate cultures and the belief in magic are intrinsically connected, and magic has a determining effect on conflict. Given the extent to which Western rules of warfare were founded upon Christian theology, this position seems remarkably ethnocentric. This reliance on orientalist tropes of the magical, superstitious non-Western native undermines her overall account of culture in international affairs. While Bozeman's study of culture and Africa provides an interesting starting point, it does not liberate itself from colonial stereotypes.

*Gong: The Legal Standard of 'Civilization'*

Working within the tradition of the English School, Gong wrote The Standard of 'Civilization' in International Society. His thesis traces the history of the legal standard of 'civilization,' from its inception in the 'Capitulations' sent between the Ottoman Empire and Europe to its demise in the process of decolonization. The standard of

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50 Ibid., p.403.
‘civilization' has two faces: the legalistic requirements laid down in European international law and diplomacy, and “the concept which ... determined the identity and delimited the boundaries of ‘civilized' international society.” Gong’s work investigates only the diplomatic and legalistic aspects of the civilized/barbarian discourse.

Gong elaborates Bull’s argument on the standard of ‘civilization.' He argues,

a standard of civilization is an expression of the assumptions, tacit and explicit, used to distinguish those that belong to a particular society from those who do not... By definition, those who fulfil the requirements of a particular society’s standard of civilization are brought inside its circle of “civilized” members, while those who do not so conform are left outside as “not civilized” or possibly “uncivilized.”

The standard of ‘civilization' was used to define the membership of international society during the formative period of its expansion. Like the authors above, Gong argues that the expansion of European international society has had a definitive effect on the practices and membership of contemporary, universal international society. He concludes, “because the realm of cultural sovereignty may become the next major arena in the struggle for spheres of influence, historical interpretations of the European confrontation with the non-European world will become increasingly important.” This project has been carried forward by a number of traditional and critical scholars.

Like Edward Said, Gong reminds us that there were conflicting standards of ‘civilization’ – each civilization presents its unique, ethnocentric standard. The European standard of ‘civilization’ was not accepted by those states that already had a standard of

52 Ibid., p.23.
54 Ibid., p.247.
their own.\textsuperscript{55} He warns that "to speak of the standard of 'civilization' is often to forget that China, Japan, the Ottoman Empire, and other non-European countries had to compromise or surrender their own historic standards of 'civilization'... earlier in history, many such standards existed."\textsuperscript{56} This caveat stands as a powerful reminder of the orientalist tendency to generalize European experience, and ignore the historical specificity of European imperialism.

Gong focuses almost exclusively on the first aspect of the 'civilization' discourse: the legalistic standards of admission into international society. By concentrating on this juridical aspect, and neglecting the popular realm of discourse in which these concepts circulated, Gong's analysis is sometimes circumscribed. Those juridical and legalistic paradoxes which he indicates as problematic are resolved within the larger discourse of 'civilized' Europe and 'barbarian' others. Gong notices some slippage between the legalistic discourse and the actual diplomatic practice of recognition. He argues that "the subjective nature of the recognition process and the political element within the standard of 'civilization' put the European powers in the always powerful and sometime awkward position of having to be judge in their own cases."\textsuperscript{57} However, when the legalistic discourse of recognition is placed in the context of the popular discourse of civilized/barbarian, racial hierarchy, and civilizing missions, this 'awkwardness' can be seen merely as the continuing attempts of the imperial powers to solidify their own identity, \textit{vis a vis} their colonial wards. Gong argues elsewhere that Japan's admission

\textsuperscript{55} Ibid., p.8.
\textsuperscript{56} Ibid., p.23.
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid., p.61.
into international society as ‘civilized,’ proved that it was possible for a non-European state to enter ‘civilized’ international society. But, what Gong fails to note is that the only grounds upon which Japan was admitted to the European international society was its miming of European values.

Furthermore, Gong notes that when dealing with peoples which did not approach the European standard, European recognition was even more strained. When indigenous societies did not meet any of the requirements of the standard of ‘civilization,’ they were considered incapable of fully entering into a treaty with the European power. Thus, while treaties between European powers diffused imperial competitive tensions amongst the international society of European states, these treaties simultaneously refused to recognize any standing of the object territory or people. Gong argues that the most common legal manifestation of the civilizing mission resulted in treaties with non-European peoples in which they were denied any “legal personality.” Thus, the standard of civilization was almost entirely a device which was internal to European international society – although it may have been applied to non-European societies. The treaties to which non-Europeans were a signatory did not grant them any international legal rights. This awkwardness lies entirely within the legalistic terms of the standard of ‘civilization.’ The popular discourse, of which international law can be seen to be a part, expressed no such awkwardness. Gong seems to acknowledge this dynamic, “The general trends suggest that the legal concept of the standard of ‘civilization’ rose above,

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58 Ibid., p.29-30.
59 Ibid., p.58.
60 Ibid., p.76.
though it remained firmly routed in, the popular concerns and assumptions of the 19th century European society regarding race, colour, and religion. However, the popular discourse is left largely unexamined. The European standard of civilization stood as a community boundary marker – within was civilized Europe, without was barbaric others. The policing of that community’s identity was a natural process, however contingent and arbitrary in its application. What made the discourse of European expansion so persuasive was the way in which it masked the arbitrary nature of its application to both its subjects and objects.

Gong goes on to argue that the standard of ‘civilization,’ when viewed as an identity practice, was useless in isolation: “what the civilized world had in common became apparent only when juxtaposed with the ‘barbarous’ and ‘savage’ worlds.” Identity involves a representation of the self and a representation of the ‘other’ – be it environmental, social, political, racial, or cultural. As Gong concludes, “the standard of ‘civilization’ thereby helped define the internal identity and external boundaries of the nineteenth century’s dominant international society.” The standard of ‘civilization’ in international society specifically policed which peoples could become part of the

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61 Ibid., p.53.
62 Ibid., p.4. Gong himself argues that the notion of ‘civilization’ reflects a shift in European self-identification from Christendom to ‘civilization’ – which reflects a shift in the primary axis along which difference is figured, from religious to cultural.
63 Harbsmeier, op cit., p.86.
64 Gong, op cit., p.36. It should be noted that barbarians are distinguished from savages on their degree of ‘civilization.’ Barbarians have their own religion, whereas savages are described as having no religion (Mazrui, 1984, p.39).
65 Ibid., p.238.
international community. Actors within European international society defined the standard in the action of inclusion or exclusion of non-European peoples. The standard of ‘civilization,’ however, is not distinct from the actors who judge it. Because the primary institution of the Westphalian system is state sovereignty, the standard of ‘civilization’ was also used to determine whether or not a state was sovereign.

The civilized/barbarian discourse became central to the establishment of international society as such, not just to the constitution of the specific European international society. More than a legalistic term, the standard of ‘civilization’ was an identity-practice. The superior military and technological capabilities of the European imperial states came to mean that the communication between civilizations was more one-sided than in almost any other expansion in history. However, it was the discourse of imperialist ideology, of ‘civilization’ and its necessary opposite ‘barbarism’ was an essential part that explained and justified Europe’s “overlordship of non-European countries in other than military terms.”

The identity of Europe, either a community in general or specifically as ‘civilized,’ was not and is not static. As above, Gong argues that the Second World War and the Nazi holocaust undermined Europe’s own view of its self as ‘civilized.’ Decolonization brought the final decline of the standard of ‘civilization’ within international law.

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66 Ibid., p.100.
67 Ibid., p.3.
68 Ibid., p.32.
69 Ibid., p.42.
70 Ibid., p.87.
71 Ibid., p.90.
Because of Gong's legalistic focus, he takes the standard of 'civilization' to end with the demise of the formal legal standard. This project seeks to expand the focus to popular discourse, as well as legalistic discourse, and consequently uncover the persistence of tacit standards of civilization in international theory. I would argue that the stereotypes and discourse of civilization and barbarians, of which the legalist standard was an integral international reflection, persists beyond decolonization. Jackson extends this analysis beyond the end of the formal standard to look the underlying norms of the standard of 'civilization' in the negative sovereignty regime.

*Jackson: Quasi-States as Barbaric*

Robert Jackson, who is often associated with the English School, makes a nuanced empirical analysis of the normative and juridical sovereignty regime of contemporary international society. He contends that decolonization represented a sea-change in the "rules of the sovereignty game." The doctrine of positive sovereignty was replaced by a doctrine of negative sovereignty. Jackson's argument is complex, and it is difficult to engage with it briefly. It must suffice to summarize Jackson's argument, and indicate some of the parallels to the civilized/barbarian discourse.

Jackson argues that the ideational orientation in international norms towards self-determination and anti-colonialism had the effect of a revolutionary regime change. The positive sovereignty regime, which had limited membership in European international society to states displaying the empirical attributes of statehood, changed dramatically

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after the Second World War. It should be noted that Jackson attributes decolonization almost entirely to normative change within European international society, rather than from anti-colonial movements themselves. Naeem Inayatullah argues that Jackson removes his analysis from the social, historical, and economic context of imperialism. He argues that Jackson neglects the ideational aspect of post-colonial states, and the anti-colonial identification so central to many societies. Roxanne Lynn Doty also criticizes Jackson for his “bloodless” representation of European imperialism. His geographical focus is limited to Africa.

International society after the Second World War admitted all former colonial states, forgoing the standard of civilization to apply a different legal standard. Drawing a parallel to Isaiah Berlin's distinction between positive and negative freedom, Jackson argues that decolonization represents the institutionalization of a ‘negative sovereignty’ regime. Positive sovereignty is defined as the accordance of status with empirical capabilities to provide the good life to a state’s citizens; negative sovereignty is defined as the automatic granting of sovereignty to (post-colonial) states, regardless of their capacity. Jackson draws a related distinction between real and quasi-states. Real states have the capability to provide a good life for their citizens. Quasi-states, which are


78 Ibid., p.21.
the beneficiaries of this new negative sovereignty regime, exist because of the permissive international society and the indiscriminate application of the principles of self-determination and 'racial sovereignty.' Jackson also notes an anti-racist taboo that has arisen in conjunction with the norms of anti-colonialism. This taboo proscribes criticism of non-white regimes by white theorists in the name of orientalism. Despite this taboo, He argues that quasi-states lack the empirical qualities of statehood, and most often are a danger to their own citizens. Quasi-states may be civilized in their international relations, but are often barbaric in their domestic relations. While the empirical qualities of statehood and the standard of 'civilization' may be different standards, they are both practices that aim to define the limits and membership of community. Both standards also act to reify (post)colonial divisions. Though the proving ground shifts from European standards to 'empirical' standards, both act to police the boundary of international society. Doty examines, in depth, the impact of this rhetoric of Jackson's argument, and connects it specifically to a series of dichotomies in which the non-West is portrayed variously as barbaric, peripheral, or 'unreal.'

Jackson suggests the importance of the concept of 'civilization' to the study of International Relations. He uses the definition of civilization provided by R.G. Collingwood: "Civilization is not civilization but barbarity unless it insists that you shall

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81 Jackson, 1987, p.528.
82 Doty, 1996a, pp.151-53.
83 Jackson, 1990, p.141.
treat every member of your community as civilly as possible." The rule of law and the expansion of civilization are also hallmarks of Collingwood’s definition. This leads Jackson to make the following argument: quasi-states are civilized in their international capacity and barbaric in their domestic (in)capacity. However, the adoption of Collingwood’s definition also restricts the amount of discourse that Jackson evaluates. Jackson claims only to investigate the juridical discourse of sovereignty, and does not examine the popular discourse of Third World sovereignty. However, we must note that though his analysis of international law and diplomatic interaction is admirable, Collingwood’s definition circumscribes the discourses, and stereotypes, which make up the constellation of senses in which the ideas of ‘civilized’ and ‘barbarian’ are used. Putting this popular discourse of civilized/barbarian aside momentarily, the civilized/barbarian distinction is still implicit within the parameters of Jackson’s argument.

Jackson holds that international law, and the ‘sovereignty game’ in particular, has the effect of ‘civilizing’ relations between states. The doctrine of positive sovereignty requires that each individual sovereign state to have the capacity to provide a ‘civil’ life for its citizens, among other criteria. The regime of negative sovereignty, on the other hand, does not require any such capacity on the part of post-colonial states. While not argued in these terms, the real state/quasi state distinction has the effect of reifying the

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84 Ibid., p.142.
87 Jackson, 1990, p.35.
civilized/barbarian dichotomy. Positive sovereignty requires 'civility' and 'civilization' both within and without states. The negative sovereignty regime does not require 'civility.' Many of the states, which exist at the courtesy of the negative sovereignty regime, are not required by international society to display domestic civility. Some scholars have portrayed African post-colonial states as not being able to provide a 'civil' state. This reflects the influence of the standard of 'civilization' — though it may be based on empirical, rather than cultural, criteria. However, one cannot ignore the similarities between Jackson's description of quasi-states and the nineteenth century descriptions of barbaric states. This is only to say that Jackson's empirical evidence of a distinction between 'real' and 'quasi' states has the effect of reinscribing the 'civilized/barbarian' discourse in IR theory. Though the two discourses may be based on entirely different foundations, they have a similar effect.

Finally, there appears in Jackson's description of quasi-states the implication that the root cause of contemporary underdevelopment is the lack of pre-existing political structures. He argues, "traditional continental Africa is far better characterized by anthropology or sociology... than by political theory, jurisprudence, diplomatic history or international law. It was a world of societies more than states." Elsewhere, he describes Africa as "a more personal- or primordial-favouring political arrangement than a public-regarding realm." Two of the virtuous aspects of Western imperialism he describes were the pacification of tribal wars, and the adoption of its role as a 'referee'
between contending ethnic groups. Jackson’s description of pre-European African societies implies that post-colonial African societies suffer from underdevelopment because of the ‘backwardness’ of African peoples. Setting aside the factual disputes between Mazrui and Jackson on the empirical status of ‘states’ in pre-colonial Africa, this characterization appears to reinscribe the stereotypes of the civilized/barbarian dichotomy—not in a juridical sense, but in the wider sense of a hierarchy of development. Thus, states are classified as real and quasi: sovereignty is described as either positive or negative. The West prospers in the real, positive realm; African states suffer the weaknesses of its underdevelopment. I will return to this dichotomy in the next chapter.

Walker emphasizes this weakness in his review of Jackson’s book. Walker agrees that the analysis is informed by the assumption that sovereignty in the Third World can be understood as a kind of counterpoint to a more firmly established norm. Many of the historical sensitivities of the analysis seem to me to call this assumption, and the pervasive dichotomies that flow from it, into question. The simple distinction between formal status and empirical condition especially obscures more than it reveals in this context.

However, it can be argued that Walker operates from a different philosophical perspective, which is more critical of traditional approaches. Since Walker publishes a volume on culture at a similar time, it is important to note the similarities and differences

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91 Ibid., p. 527.
92 Jackson, 1990, p. 72.
93 Ibid., p. 131.
94 Doty, 1996a, p. 152. Jackson refers primarily to African states, and not to the ‘developing’ states of South East or South Asia.
between the English School and Walker's more critical theory in their treatment of the expansion of international society and the study of culture and identity.

**Culture, International Relations, and Critical Theory**

A final school of IR theory came to prominence during the mid- to late-1980s. Scholars such as R.B.J. Walker, Richard Ashley, James Der Derian, and Jim George have brought critiques of modernity from continental political and social thought into IR theory. An important basis of this critique was the deconstruction of binary dichotomies by Jaque Derrida among others. Another important strand of this thought was the reintroduction of culture and identity into IR theory. Walker's contributions to the discipline of International Relations have been characterized as deconstruction. His contributions to the study of culture and identity represent a more critical approach than the traditional scholars cited in this chapter. This section will indicate some of Walker's contributions to the analysis of the civilized/barbarian dichotomy. Mazrui, on the other hand, has remained a dissident voice in mainstream IR theory since the 1960's. His recent work contributes to more critical approaches, as I will explore below. I will also look at Said and Nandy – two non-Western thinkers whose work on imperialism, culture, and identity have been pivotal to post-colonial studies. Their deconstruction of dualistic identity structures within the colonial context shape much current thinking on identity. Both Said and Nandy use the civilized/barbarian dichotomy as a specific case of the general self/other dualism that they criticize. These scholars illustrate the potential of

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studying culture and identity in IR theory using the civilized/barbarian discourse as a specific example.

Walker

First, it must be noted that Walker is one of the first scholars in IR to note the “clash of civilizations and a decline of current hegemony of Western cultural forms.” While the phrase “clash of civilizations” has become common currency after Huntington’s article of the same name, this is one of the first mentions within the discipline of International Relations. However, Walker removes the certainty from the definition of ‘culture.’ Citing the term’s etymology, he argues that the concept of culture is itself “historically and sociologically specific, bringing with [it] meanings and implications that may require careful handling... culture, like civilization, becomes something we have distinguishing us from the barbarians outside.” Thus Walker urges that concepts like culture and ideology be looked at in their specific historical context, and with awareness that they are themselves sites of political contestation. As Walker argues, “the possession of ‘civilization’ justifies the conquest of ‘barbarism.’”

The second important point that Walker makes is that the West, as a politico-cultural unit, faces an internal and external critique. Not only are other civilizations modernizing without westernizing (to predict Huntington), but the Western doctrine of

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97 Walker, 1984, p.3.
98 Ibid., p.4.
100 Walker, op cit., p.6.
universality itself is under attack from its own philosophers.\textsuperscript{101} Walker argues that “concepts of autonomy, nationalism, and pluralism have come to challenge the assumed universality of progress towards the ‘civilization’ of the West.”\textsuperscript{102} This diagnosis of the contemporary condition of the West, as unstable both on its own terms and in conversation with other civilizations, becomes central to Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations” argument. Walker also uses this challenge to the Western assumption of universality to criticize a similar assumption by scholars in International Relations.\textsuperscript{103} Not only are Western scholars generally unaware of their Western bias, he argues, but there persists a general “lack of concern about those aspects of human action which are usually subsumed under the term ‘culture’ – values, aspirations, creativity, language, and ideology.”\textsuperscript{104} Walker goes on to parse the specific ideological struggle from which the concept of ‘culture’ emerged, framed within a larger argument surrounding universalism and pluralism in international theory.\textsuperscript{105} Finally, he argues that “the theme which I regard as being central to all these issues is the imperative to dichomotize, whether in its epistemological subject-object, or its imperially useful we/they form.”\textsuperscript{106} Mazrui below also explores this dualism.

In sum, Walker adds to the discourse of civilization/barbarian by describing the West as under attack from within and without. He also insists on the importance of

\textsuperscript{101} Ibid., p.7.  
\textsuperscript{103} Ibid., p.184.  
\textsuperscript{104} Ibid., p.197.  
\textsuperscript{105} Ibid., p.209.  
\textsuperscript{106} Ibid., p.212.
culture to International Relations, including an important reminder that culture is a historically-specific, contested concept that has material effects.

Mazrui

Scholars such as Said, Mazrui, and Nandy speak to the specific issues of culture and identity in post-colonial states. While Said and Nandy have not been taken up by mainstream International Relations, their contributions to the field of post-colonial studies shape the way in which critical theorists view culture, identity and the postcolonial state. It must be noted, however, that scholars like Mazrui, Said, and Nandy do not lie at the core of the discipline.\(^{107}\)

Mazrui is an African scholar who enjoys a position of some prominence in International Relations.\(^{108}\) He makes two arguments important to this thesis: first, that dualism is a central characteristic of political identity; and, second, that in addition to economic dependency, post-colonial states suffer from a kind of cultural dependency. First, Mazrui identifies the dualistic structure of identity. He argues,

> The “us/them” confrontation is the most persistent theme in world order perceptions. This dichotomy can take a variety of forms -- the native versus the foreigner, the friend versus the foe, the familiar versus the strange, the Orient versus the Occident, the East versus the West, the North versus the South, and so on. This dichotomous framework of world order perceptions amounts to an iron law of dualism, a persistent conceptualization of the world in terms of “us” and “them.”\(^{109}\)

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\(^{108}\) As I suggested above, there is some danger in ‘nationalizing’ IR scholars. Mazrui has identified himself as an African scholar.

This “iron law of dualism” marks the connection between the generic ‘us/them’ dichotomy to the more specific ‘civilized/barbarian’ dichotomy, which has been the subject of this study. Mazrui also argues that dualism in International Relations has fundamental political and material effects, an argument which is familiar to many critical theorists.\textsuperscript{110} Specifically, those inside the state or national community are often valued more than those outside the state or national community. This issue has particular salience in the post-colonial state wherein the state and national boundaries are rarely coterminous. Furthermore, Mazrui’s contention that this structure is “almost universal” connects the specific politics of exclusion which were found in the rhetoric of the civilizing mission to other discourses which have the same effect.\textsuperscript{111} By describing peoples, states, or nations as outside the boundaries of international society, non-Western societies were given a lower status, and accorded less political rights. Mazrui argues that this persistent division between Western and non-Western societies is evidenced by “the [direct] transition from religious dualism to civilizational dualism to developmental dualism.”\textsuperscript{112} In this way, the contemporary discourse of North/South divisions, or the West vs. the rest, can be seen as a continuation of the civilized/barbarian dichotomy.

All political communities use dualistic structures of ‘self’ and ‘other’ to determine the boundaries of belonging. Since culture is the field in which identity is constructed, Mazrui argues the importance of studying culture – not merely in post-colonial contexts,

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\textsuperscript{111} Mazrui, op cit., p.24. \\
\textsuperscript{112} Ibid., p.39. 
\end{flushright}
but in understanding many dimensions of world politics. Mazrui argues that culture has an identity function, "determining who are the 'we' in a given situation and who are the 'they.'" Mazrui also claims that the evolution of the discourse of nation-state has evolved in parallel with the discourse of race. Combining this discourse on race and international society, he contends that the chief dualism around which European identity and European international society is constructed is 'civilized/barbarian.' "In the ultimate analysis, the great divide was between the civilized and the uncivilized, defined both in terms of a pecking order of cultures and pecking order of pigmentation." Mazrui uses this theoretical foundation to criticize contemporary international theories on Africa, and to evaluate the post-colonial condition.

Mazrui insists that a primary characteristic of post-independence African states has been the tension between imperial borders and tribal or ethnic communities. Mazrui adds kinship relationships – or as he terms them, ethnicity – to the study of IR theory. He argues that Africa suffers from a kind of 'cultural dependency.' The nation-state is the only unit of political organization granted the right of sovereignty in post-Westphalian international society. Furthermore, the discourse of the state and self-determination is predicated on the discourse of nationalism. As he argues, "the modern nation-state was therefore a merger of two-trends – the trend toward sovereign political

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113 Ibid., p.25.
115 Mazrui, op cit., p.32.
116 Ibid., p.32.
118 Ibid., p.298. See also Wallerstein, 1991.
centralization (statehood) and the trend toward cultural homogeneity (nationhood)." \(^{119}\)

In the European context, this convergence has been understood, for the most part, as unproblematic – although Michel Foucault’s critiques of social institutions such as the prison and the asylum cast doubt on this claim. At the very least, European nation-states had a number of years in which their national and state boundaries could coalesce. \(^{120}\) However, without wanting to reify the ‘natural’ evolution of European states and the ‘forced’ evolution of newly-independent colonies, the structure and boundaries of non-European states were often determined by colonial boundaries and Western conceptions of the state.

Much contemporary scholarship on the subject of nationalism has attempted to come to terms with the difference between European and post-colonial nationalisms. \(^{121}\) Much of the IR theory since decolonization has judged the political development or ‘modernization’ of post-colonial states according to the European ‘norm.’ Because Africa has maintained its imperial boundaries, and because those boundaries are not the same as the cultural boundaries of ethnic communities, this presents a unique impossibility of creating a culturally-homogenous, post-colonial nation-state. \(^{122}\) African states are caught between the conflicting appeals of ethnic communities and an ever-elusive civic nationalism. \(^{123}\) Within civic nationalist ideology, cultural affiliations are

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\(^{119}\) Ibid., p.373.  
\(^{123}\) Holsti, 1996, p.68.
made subservient to the national, political affiliation – which faces serious resistance from long-standing tribal and ethnic communities.\textsuperscript{124} If Africa intended to be independent it had to acquire the rights of sovereign statehood – which in the European example appears dependent on the development of civic nationalism. In this way, Africa is culturally dependent on European ideas about what a nation-state looks like.\textsuperscript{125} Whether the struggle to develop civic national culture in post-colonial states is successful, and to date the record is not optimistic, culture remains a field of political contestation in which national and sub-national identities compete for allegiance.\textsuperscript{126} Culture becomes the site of ethnic, racial, and national stereotypes which are central to the politicization of identity in post-colonial states.

\textit{Said and Nandy}

It is important to mention briefly two theorists whose relevance to International Relations is recognized chiefly in critical theory. Said’s \textit{Orientalism} and Nandy’s \textit{The Intimate Enemy: Loss and Recovery of Self under Colonialism} are recognized as seminal texts in other disciplines, but have only recently come to the attention of IR scholars. Both texts have been acknowledged as having an important impact on critical thinking about culture and identity in the post-colonial context, if not generally accepted in the field.

\textsuperscript{124} Mazrui, 1984, p.186.

\textsuperscript{125} Ali A. Mazrui and Michael Tidy, \textit{Nationalism and New States in Africa from about 1935 to the present}. London:Heinemann, 1984, p.298.

\textsuperscript{126} Tamarkin, op cit., p.364.
Said inaugurates a movement of general critique of Western scholars’ attitude towards the ‘Orient,’ or the East. He describes the stereotype of the Oriental in terms similar to the stereotype of the barbarian: “irrational, depraved (fallen), child-like, different, thus the European is rational, mature, virtuous, ‘normal.’ What gave the Oriental’s world its intelligibility and identity was not the result of its own efforts but rather a whole complex series of knowledgeable manipulations by which the Orient was identified by the West.” In addition to the detailing the specific errors of fact within this stereotype, Said criticizes the discipline of knowledge that studies the Orient and substantiates the Oriental stereotype in the name of objective knowledge. While he has been criticized for replacing the Western view of Orientals with his own essentialized view of the West, Said provides some important theoretical perspectives which broaden our understanding of culture. Pal Ahluwalia and Michael Sullivan admit, “Said’s work is not considered to be part of any acceptable [IR] canon.” However, many critical theorists have argued specifically that his Orientalism has a great deal of insight to offer to students of International Relations.

Said is relevant to this project specifically for two reasons: first, he argues that culture is a political sphere that has material and power-related consequences; second, he

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129 Ibid., p.57.


shows how the civilized/barbarian dichotomy is central to the discourse of orientalism as an academic subject. Following many post-colonial theorists, Said contends that in colonial and post-colonial societies alike culture is an essential component of politics. Following Foucault, he analyzes culture as an important mechanism by which the exercise of power is normalized.\[133\] In a later work, Said contends that “to ignore or otherwise discount the overlapping experience of Westerners and Orientals, the interdependence of cultural terrains in which colonizer and colonized co-existed and battled each other through projections as well as rival geographies, narratives, and histories, is to miss what is essential about the world of the last century.”\[134\] He elaborates this connection further: “Neither culture nor imperialism is inert, and so the connections between them as historical experiences are dynamic and complex.”\[135\] Thus culture is central to understanding how political power is maintained, justified, and normalized.\[136\]

Like Mazrui, Said argues that “self-definition is one of the activities practiced by all cultures.”\[137\] But, Said reminds us that culture is not a stable field. Said makes the valuable argument that culture is always a site of conflict. For example, in addition the ‘civilized/barbarian’ discourse which has been the focus of this project, there is a strain of European culture that projects positive characteristics on the stereotype of the ‘noble savage.’ Culture thus becomes a ‘contested’ site of power, where rival stereotypes compete for usage and reification. Whenever two cultures interact, both present a view

\[133\] Ibid., p.3.
\[135\] Ibid., p.14.
\[136\] It must be noted that Said refers primarily to ‘high’ culture – not popular culture. Ibid., p.xii.
\[137\] Ibid., p.37.
of themselves and the other. As Michael Harbsmeier has argued, the West was successful in its imperial expansion precisely because that other accepted Western projections/representations of images of the other.\textsuperscript{138} This representation of culture as a dialogue, rather than a hegemonic discourse, opens a wide theoretical space, which provides a more nuanced analysis of the interactions between colonizer and colonized. Particularly, this notion of culture as a ‘contested space’ counteracts the tendency of orientalist scholarship to rely on the predominant stereotypes of the Orient (and the West).\textsuperscript{139}

Second, Said discusses the specific relevance of the civilized/barbarian dichotomy. The civilized/barbarian dichotomy is a specific instance of the more general ‘us/them’ or ‘self/other’ dichotomy, which Said argues is an integral part of any group identity. In one sense, this distinction is spatial:

\begin{quote}
this universal practice of designating in one’s mind a familiar space which is ‘ours’ and an unfamiliar space beyond ‘ours’ which is ‘theirs’ is a way of making geographical distinctions which can be entirely arbitrary. I use the word arbitrary here because imaginative geography of the ‘our land – barbarian land’ variety does not require that the barbarians acknowledge the distinction. It is enough for ‘us’ to set up these boundaries in our minds; ‘they’ become ‘they’ accordingly, and both their territory and their mentality are designated as different from ours.\textsuperscript{140}
\end{quote}

As noted, this distinction between us/them, civilized/ barbarian is constructed and arbitrary. Since the barbarians are not required to acknowledge their status, the civilized/barbarian dichotomy can be seen as being entirely self-referential. Calling

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{139} Doty, 1996a, p.23.
\end{quote}
others barbarians makes one’s self civilized. This criticism of Orientalism contends that the Orient is internal to the West’s imagination – it is a projection of opposite characteristics.\textsuperscript{141} Said quotes Walter Benjamin: “There is no document of civilization which is not at the same time a document of barbarism.”\textsuperscript{142} In investigating the evolution of the image and stereotype of the ‘barbarian,’ we describe by default the evolution of the identity of ‘civilization.’

Said has been criticized on several grounds. In Orientalism, Said presents a critique of the academic discipline of orientalism, and the generalizations that it makes about the Orient. However, in doing so, Said makes generalizations about the West, representing the West as homogenous.\textsuperscript{143} Fox argues that Said’s argument does not apply outside of his chief example of Egypt. He argues “Said’s Orientalism does not travel as far as Orientalism itself did.”\textsuperscript{144} Said has also been taken for task for presenting the ‘self/other,’ ‘West/Orient’ relationship as static.\textsuperscript{145} It is also undoubtedly true that Said’s focus on culture and cultural texts, such as books, novels, and operas, do not reflect the traditional concerns of International Relations. However, despite these criticisms, Said remains an important figure in post-colonial theory. Phillip Darby in particular has

\textsuperscript{140} Said, 1978, p.54.
\textsuperscript{141} Ibid., p.57.
\textsuperscript{142} Said, op cit., 1993. p.309.
\textsuperscript{143} Walker, 1984, p.14.
\textsuperscript{145} Homi Bhabha, “The other question: The ambivalence of colonial discourse,” The location of culture, p.74.
recently shown the promise of Said’s theory and method. Furthermore, rather than simply arguing that post-colonial theory has much to offer, we should note that International Relations has much to offer the overly-textual methods prominent in post-colonial theorists. The concern of IR scholars for material bases and the historical contexts of domination are an important addendum to post-colonial theory.

Nandy is another non-Western scholar whose work has recently come to the attention of critical theorists, if not mainstream scholars, in International Relations. Nandy writes on the identity and culture of post-colonial India. Building on the concepts and complications which Said and Mazrui have presented, Nandy views culture as a contested site in which stereotypes and ideas struggle for supremacy. Nandy goes further in complicating the narrative of colonialism, shifting his analytical focus from the mechanisms of British rule to the specifics of Indian obedience. Rather than concentrating on the first term of the identity dichotomy – be it ‘us,’ ‘self,’ or ‘civilization’ – Nandy investigates the relationship between the ‘us’ and ‘them.’ He argues that the colonizer/colonized relationship cannot be characterized as a simplistic hierarchy, but should be represented as an “unbreakable dyadic relationship.” He continues, “The Raj saw the Indians as crypto-barbarians who needed to further civilize themselves. It saw British rule as an agent of progress and as a mission. Many Indians in

turn saw their salvation in becoming more like the British, in friendship or in enmity.\textsuperscript{149}

Nandy characterizes the colonial relationship as dialectic and progressive, not monological and static. Post-colonial theorists also tap the notion of ambiguity, incorporation, and appropriation.\textsuperscript{150} Identity structures, even those as ‘universal’ as us-them, self-other, civilized-barbarian, are fluid, evolving processes which change and adapt to new political circumstances, social pressures, and economic needs. Further, we should note that acknowledging this fluidity does not make analysis impossible – identity and culture have real, material effects, even if they are “contextual, invented, imagined, or shifting.”\textsuperscript{151} In fact, this conception of identity and culture as fluid and contested adds a much-needed dimension of movement and agency to our notion of dualistic identity structures and culture.

In stressing the imperial relationship, Nandy also evaluates the net effect of colonialism on both British and Indian societies. He concludes that “the long-term cultural damage colonialism did to the British society was far greater” than the damage it did to Indian society, which provides an interesting counterpoint to many postcolonial critics.\textsuperscript{152} The civilized/barbarian discourse of the civilizing mission had the effect of producing a “false sense of cultural homogeneity in Britain.”\textsuperscript{153} The history of British race relations after decolonization confirms Nandy’s critique.\textsuperscript{154} Nandy corroborates

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{149} Nandy, op cit., p. 7.
\item \textsuperscript{151} Tamarkin, op cit., p.363.
\item \textsuperscript{152} Nandy, op cit., p.32.
\item \textsuperscript{153} Ibid., p.32.
\end{itemize}
Said’s argument that Western identity was constructed in contrast to the non-Western man. He argues, “the colonial experience made the mainstream Western consciousness definitionally non-Oriental and redefined the West’s self-image as the antithesis or negation of the East.”

In short, Nandy argues that the imperial rhetoric of the civilizing mission helped define the West as civilized and the non-West as barbaric – a characterization which both West and non-West accepted, however uneasily and contingently.

These non-Western voices speak indirectly to the discipline of International Relations, either in their repudiation of its traditional concerns (viewing imperialism as a kind of continual war), their inclusion of culture as an important arena of politics (viewing culture as a field of representation in which identities vie for allegiance), or in their insistence on the centrality of imperialism on contemporary culture/theory (viewing much international politics as based on post-colonial relations). While none of these theorists, save Walker, can properly be said to be part of an accepted canon of International Relations theory, each speaks directly to the civilized/barbarian dichotomy, to the importance of culture and identity in International Relations, and to the centrality of imperialism to post-colonial international theory. While these ideas germinated, mainstream International Relations began to discover imperialism anew.

**Conclusion**

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155 Nandy, op cit., p. 72.
We see a remarkable convergence of theoretical thinking in the early- to mid-1980s. Mazrui and Jackson discuss dualism as central to the European identity. Bull, Watson, Gong, and Jackson discuss the juridical standard of civilization and its implications for IR. Mazrui, Said, Nandy, and Walker discuss the centrality of culture to the study of politics in general and of international relations by implication. Within the work of scholars we see the seeds of much critical thinking on culture, identity, and imperialism in international theory to come.

Within the discourse of civilized/barbarian, Mazrui argues that it is representative of an ‘almost universal’ dualist structure of political organization. This dualism is also theorized by Said, Nandy, Bull, Jackson, Gong, and Walker. Further, the civilized/barbarian dichotomy is traced from its religious roots as Christian vs. heathen peoples through to its contemporary incarnation as the developed and underdeveloped worlds. Nandy and Said provide interesting counterpoint to Mazrui’s simplistic dualistic structure, arguing that culture and identity are processes rather than strict hierarchies. This idea allows us to view the dichotomy as a relationship which is contested, a site of political struggle which may change over time. European notions of the barbarian have changed, in racial, cultural, and spatial terms.\textsuperscript{156} And, European notions of its self as ‘civilized’ have changed over time.\textsuperscript{157} Furthermore, Europeans have been challenged in their self-definition by non-Westerners – especially anti-colonial and post-colonial writers such as Fanon, Césaire, and Memmi. And non-Western scholars have challenged the predominant Western definition of themselves – Said, Nandy, and Mazrui are notable

\textsuperscript{156} Lewis and Wigen, op cit., p.53-55 & Map 4: Migrations of the “East” and the “Orient” p.56.

\textsuperscript{157} See Christopher Coker, \textit{Twilight of the West}. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998.
in this effort. In sum, culture can be understood as the contested field in which identity politics are played out. This has important ramifications for the study of nationalism, post-colonial states, and international relations generally. The dichotomy of civilized/barbarian persists in international theory in both implicit and explicit ways.

Within International Relations, we can see several developments. Culture is reintroduced as an important focus of study. Culture has material effects, and has been described as implied in the mechanisms of power – not separate from it. Cultural narratives support, justify, and normalize the apparatuses of power, even when culture simultaneously becomes a field of contention. International Relations adds to the post-colonial theorizing on culture to the extent that it emphasizes material conflict above representation.

Within the discipline, imperialism and post-colonial international society are looked at in their own terms, rather than as a subset of the Cold War or as the modern offspring of imperial stereotypes. As such, imperial or post-colonial relationships are seen as having multiple dimensions – not only strategic, but also economic and cultural aspects. The politicized culture of post-colonial states is also elaborated as the tension between imperial boundaries and pre-colonial ethnicities. Thus, the post-colonial state is figured as having unique, though not generalizable, characteristics – including a particularly politicized view of (national) culture and identity.

Much of the rhetoric circulated in the ‘clash of civilizations’ debate and in writings about culture and identity has its roots in imperialist discourse. After the end of the Cold

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War, we see a similar thematic convergence in International Relations' scholarship. Huntington, Barber, Goldgeier and McFaul, and Singer and Wildavsky, each diagnose a coming 'clash of civilizations.' Culture is figured as the new realm of political, international conflict. The discipline appears to 'discover' the tension between ethnic identities and post-colonial boundaries, and the intractable conflicts they engender. Within the discipline of International Relations, culture and identity are theorized anew, and given pride of place in critical theory. All of these concepts come into play in the next chapter.
The end of the Cold War wrought important changes in the popular and academic international imaginary. In the popular press, several trends emerged to diagnose the brave new world order. Francis Fukuyama proclaimed the victory of liberalism and market-capitalism, which he figured in Hegelian terms as the 'end of history.' The global interpenetration of western capital, with its accompanying media, communications, and technological revolutions, inspired predictions of politico-cultural homogenization. This prompted both greetings and warnings of a 'global culture.' Yet, the 'New World Order' proclaimed by George Bush, which seemed to herald an era of benevolent unipolarism, faced a series of notable failures. Somalia, Rwanda, and the former Yugoslavia alerted elite and popular perceptions alike to 'ethnic' conflicts which, many – inaccurately – argued, had been 'suppressed' by the global geopolitics of the Cold War. These trends were reflected in academic analyses. Though critical perspectives began to proliferate in the discipline in the late 1980's, the end of the Cold War caught most IR scholars by surprise. What followed was a proliferation of

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paradigms offered to fit the brave new world. John Mearsheimer and Kenneth Waltz insisted on the continuing relevance of realism. Some argued for economic unification and the rise of the ‘region-state.’ Charles and Clifford Kupchan advocated a return to the Concert of Europe model. James Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, and Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky developed the two world’s paradigm, in which the developed West was peaceful and the developing non-West was a zone of conflict. Critical theorists forecast the end of totalizing theories, and prompted accounts of international relations from non-traditional points of view.

The most widely accepted model has been the ‘two-worlds’ thesis. The trend towards dualism has manifested itself again in post-Cold War international theory. Whether expressed as ‘core/periphery,’ ‘zones of peace and zones of conflict,’ ‘the West vs. the rest,’ this model has come to be accepted by many traditional scholars in international relations. Some have noted that the ‘us/them’ dichotomy, which now

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pervades IR theory, rests on imperial distinctions between the civilized West and its acolytes and the uncivilized, barbaric, post-colonial periphery. In representing world politics as divided into realms of security and realms of insecurity, scholars must be self-conscious of the tenor of their diagnoses. The repetition of imperial stereotypes and the reintroduction of the ‘civilized/barbarian’ dichotomy have worrying implications for the post-Cold War International Relations imaginary.

In tracing the reappearance of the civilized/barbarian rhetoric in International Relations theory, I will look first at Samuel Huntington’s seminal article, “The Clash of Civilizations?” I will then chart the constellation of ‘two-world’ paradigms indicating some its major and minor stars; including Goldgeier and McFaul, Singer and Waldivsky, and Paul Kennedy. I will also look at the popularization of these ideas in the works of Robert Kaplan and Benjamin Barber. In addition to indicating some empirical concerns, I will concentrate on the rhetoric of civilized/barbarian in these works. The reintroduction of the civilized/barbarian dichotomy is important because of its historical legacy, and the implications it has for theorizing about world politics in the post-Cold War world. In these works, identity is represented as a binary us/them distinction, and culture as an ideational realm of soft power and zero-sum competition, provides an analysis which reproduces imperial stereotypes.

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Huntington: Barbarians at the Gates

One of the major interventions in the post-Cold War search for a new paradigm is Huntington’s 1993 “Clash of Civilizations?” article in Foreign Affairs.12 Testament to its impact is the cottage industry that has arisen around this argument, and the new-found interest in culture and identity in mainstream IR. Huntington suggests, in this article and elsewhere, that culture will become the dominant axis of conflict in the next century, and civilizations the primary cultural groupings.13 In addition to empirical concerns regarding his specific case studies and his generalizations, there is a great deal of concern with the political impact of this article.14 O’Hagan’s excellent chapter on Huntington elaborates a connection between his previous work and his current work. In particular, Huntington was the architect of the ‘strategic hamlet’ strategy during the Vietnam War.15 Shapiro in particular argues that the argument is “historically and ethically impoverished.”16 After dealing with some of the empirical concerns of Huntington’s critics, I will look at these troubling political implications of his argument. His analysis of identity and culture is circumscribed by his reliance on cultural stereotypes in a manner similar to explorations of national character by IR’s early scholars. On the other hand, while we may be hesitant

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13 Huntington, 1993a, p.22.


to accept wholly Huntington’s argument, his work does indeed open space for important inquiry into the role of culture and identity in post-Cold War world politics.

Huntington argues that a civilization is an allegiance “at the greatest level, less than that of humanity in general” to which an individual feels loyalty. Civilizations are distinguished by culture and can be understood as the field of beliefs which comprise one’s identity with regards to the relations between God and man, the individual and the group, the citizen and the state, parents and children, husband and wife, as well as differing views of the relative importance of rights and responsibilities, liberty and authority, equality and hierarchy.”¹⁷ Because these cultural beliefs are central to an individual’s identity – which Huntington views as static and unitary – they cannot be compromised. As a result, Huntington argues, the cultural, economic, and political intervention of ‘Western civilization’ into non-western civilizations has produced a xenophobic backlash within those non-western cultures. This is the crux of Huntington’s predictions: non-Western civilizations are “modernizing without westernizing.”¹⁸ Which represents a relative decline in Western power and eventually a threat to Western identity, culture, and power.

Had not Iain Johnston first used the term ‘cultural realism’ to describe national differences in strategic culture, we might use such a term to describe Huntington’s characterization of the world. Instead, we are left with ‘civilizational realism.’

¹⁷ Huntington, 1993a, p.25.
¹⁸ Ibid, p.49.
Following Keohane’s description of neorealism,¹⁹ we might describe the precepts of Huntington’s civilizational realism as follows:

1) civilizations are the key cultural groupings in world politics, led by core states supported by the kin-country syndrome;
2) states seek power, cultures seek conversion, and civilizations seek universalization;
3) all civilizations, and states within civilizations, make political decisions according to their own cultural standards, but only the Western culture is rational.

Huntington’s “civilizational realism” is based on the assumption that the only possible outcome of the interaction of cultures is conflict.²⁰ Jacinta O’Hagan had diagnosed this weakness in Huntington’s analysis from his first article.²¹ According to Huntington, civilizational difference produces cultural conflict in all areas of political and economic interaction. Trade between groups is dependent on their degree of cultural unity: “economic integration depends on cultural commonality.”²² International organizations are likewise dependent on this sense of cultural commonality: “By and large, single civilization organizations do more things and are more successful than multicivilizational organizations...”²³ Because a civilization’s culture contains values which determine the relationship between individual and group, society and government, market and state, and

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²³ Ibid, p.131.
so on, Huntington predicts that organizations which do not share similar values will be mired in philosophical discussions from mutually-exclusive philosophical positions.

At its root in Huntington’s argument, the conflict-prone nature of cultural interaction has two causes. The first is the classical realist assumption about the natural state of human society as conflictual.24 Second, cultural interaction is conflictual because culture, and the identification with a specific culture or civilization, cannot be compromised.25 Culture not only sharpens conflict,26 it is described as the new realm of zero-sum competition. Huntington states plainly, “cultural questions like these involve a yes or no, zero-sum choice.”27 Huntington’s description of cultural clash seems to disregard a large part of the historical record of exchange between civilizations, exchange that may be productive as well as conflictual.28 His recent contributions to Foreign Affairs seem to corroborate this perspective. In addition to any historical concerns, O’Hagan also points to the ‘civilizational realism’ of his article. She concludes, “there is some doubt as to whether Huntington is genuinely interested in inter-civilizational relations in their full complexity, or simply interested in ‘looking for enemies,’ trying to locate and justify the next threat.”29

24 Ibid, p.130.
27 Ibid, p.130.
Some of Huntington's critics have focused on his delineation of the seven civilizations which makes up the realm of global conflict. Following Arnold Toynbee, Huntington divides the world's cultures into eight distinct civilizations: Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American, and "perhaps" African. Toynbee had discounted Latin American civilization as an off-shoot of Western civilization, and not included African civilization because it lacked a coherent literary tradition or single, unifying religion. Sub-saharan Africa, in particular, was labelled savage in the Study of History. One criticism of Toynbee, which Huntington inherits, focuses on the portrayal of civilizations as discrete, bordered entities. Toynbee and Huntington assume that the borders between civilizations are clear, and mutually recognized. Martin Wigen and Kären Lewis also indicate that civilizational identity is often blurred in these border zones — and even if borders were distinguishable — the history of civilizational interaction is a factor for which Huntington can not account. In fact, Huntington resurrects the analytical concept of 'national character' in the form of civilizational characteristics. This shares the same problems which the early IR scholars

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31 Huntington, 1993a, p.25.


encountered with this concept, namely that ‘national character’ is merely a scholastic way to say stereotype.\textsuperscript{36}

Huntington’s division has been criticized in its general sense, and in its specific cases. Huntington’s critics have pointed out that civilizations are neither unitary nor cohesive. The case against the West as a unified civilization is also pressing.\textsuperscript{37} A number of scholars have posed the question, ‘Wither the West?’ — doubting if the North Atlantic alliance can survive the end of the Cold War.\textsuperscript{38} Huntington side-steps this debate in his book by arguing that core states – America, China, India, Russia, and the like – act as the political focus of a particular civilization.\textsuperscript{39} In this move, he resurrects the realist concern with great powers. The case against the unity of an Islamic civilization is the strongest.\textsuperscript{40} Scholars suggest that the Arabic, Turkic, and Malay strains of Islamic civilization do not perceive themselves as being a community, and as such, are unlikely to come to each other’s aid.\textsuperscript{41} Fouad Ajami argues, “the world of Islam divides and subdivides,”\textsuperscript{42} and that states determine world politics more than ephemeral cultural groupings. Huntington’s description of the Gulf War, and Sadaam Hussien’s attendant

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\textsuperscript{37} Ajami, op cit., p.3; O’Hagan, 1995, pp 30-34.
\textsuperscript{39} Huntington, 1996, p. 157.
\textsuperscript{40} Ajami, op cit., p.8.
\textsuperscript{41} Mahbubani, op cit, pp.12-13.
\textsuperscript{42} Ajami, op cit., p.9.
kin-country rally, has been taken to task on several fronts. The most obvious example is that Hussein had no qualms about annexing another Arab country to Iraq. Huntington points to Muslim terrorists in Bosnia and Arab support of the Persian Gulf War to claim that political contests will be decided on the basis of cultural affiliation. However, several scholars have argued that Huntington has misunderstood the realist political manoeuvring of states as cultural affiliation.

This “kin-country syndrome” is refined in Huntington’s recent book in which he develops a theory of interstate relations within individual civilizations. Huntington classifies states in five categories within civilizations: “member states, core states, lone countries, cleft countries, and torn countries.” Core states, such as the US, China, India, Russia and Japan, act as the great power of their civilization, providing political direction and cultural leadership. Civilizations without core states are leaderless and thus dangerous. Member states can be understood as middle powers, culturally and politically aligned with the core states. Lone countries is Huntington’s term for so-called ‘rogue states’ figured in terms of cultural, rather than political, isolation. A ‘cleft country’ is a sovereign state whose populace is divided between two civilizations. He cites examples such as India, Sri Lanka, Malaysia and Singapore, China, Philippines, and

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45 Ajami, op cit., pp.7-9.


Indonesia. "Torn countries" suffer a kind of cultural schizophrenia; the populace adheres to one civilization, and the state's elite wishes to change that allegiance to another civilization. Attaturk's transformation of Turkey and Peter the Great's attempted westernization of Russia are considered paradigmatic of this pattern. Problematically, Huntington's division does not encompass post-colonial countries which have experienced imperial rule and whose culture is filtered through the imperial lens.

Through this portrayal of great and middle powers, natural alliances, and rogue states, inter-civilizational relations adopt a resemblance to European multipolar systems. Huntington argues specifically: "the result is a highly complex pattern of international relations, comparably in many ways to those which existed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in Europe..." This refined typology of states reincorporates structuralist logic to civilizational realism.

While Huntington had dismissed the 'two worlds thesis' as overly reductionist, the effect of his later predictions, and his emphasis on conflict, is to reinscribe this pattern. Emphasizing the dualistic tendency of political representations, Huntington affirms "People are always tempted to divide people into us and them, the in-group and the other, our civilization and those barbarians." Huntington acknowledges Said's criticism of this dualistic, essentialist tendency and argues that neither the West nor the non-West can

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51 Ibid, p. 32.
be said to be unitary. As he makes it. He argues,

The polarization of ‘East’ and ‘West’ culturally is in part another consequence of the universal and unfortunate practice of calling European civilization Western civilization. Instead of ‘East and West,’ it is more appropriate to speak of “the West and the rest” which at least implies the existence of many non-Wests. The world is too complex to be usefully envisioned for most purposes as simply divided economically between North and South or culturally between East and West.

In one rhetorical move, Huntington acknowledges criticisms of the dualistic tendency in International Relations and reinscribes that dualism as the simplest, best way to describe the world. He states that there are multiple non-Wests, multiple Others, but he also asserts that the West is unitary. The West is united, if only against the non-Wests. As he states, “...in the clash of civilizations, Europe and America will hang together or hang separately...” This implies a disunited West. Given that earlier in his book he had stated, “we know who we are only when we know who we are not and often only when we know whom we are against,” he cannot be unaware of the impact of his division of the “West and the rest” on the identity politics of international relations and International Relations. Specifically, offering a ‘metageography’ of world politics, Huntington aims to unify Western civilization around the leadership of America and to unify the West against the threat of all others.

In reifying the West and the rest paradigm, Huntington in effect reinscribes the ‘two worlds’ dichotomy. Even if the Other is multiple, it is still defined in terms of a

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52 Ibid, p.33.
53 Ibid, p.33.
binary structure. Huntington applies the civilized/barbarian discourse to this structure of distinction. He mobilizes the barbarian stereotypes in his description of the 'other' civilizations – irrational, fundamentalist, and violent – which have been circulated since the nineteenth century. He also portrays the West as the only truly 'civilized' – i.e. 'developed' – civilization.

Huntington's prime example of the threat to the Western civilizational order is Islam, for which he has received a great deal of criticism. He argues that the historical record and quantitative analysis from a variety of "disinterested sources" validate his conclusion. Huntington characterizes an 'Islamic Resurgence' taking place in Islamic societies, in which Islam is regaining a prominent place in the culture of, chiefly Arabic, states. This Resurgence has particular salience because of its anti-Western bias. Huntington does not link anti-Westernism to anti-colonialism, and thus misses a central foundation of post-colonial political culture. Huntington describes the belief system as weak in itself. He predicts,

The [Islamic] Resurgence will have shown that "Islam is the solution" to the problems of morality, identity, meaning, and faith, but not to the problems of social injustice, political repression, economic backwardness, and military weakness. These failures could generate widespread disillusionment with political Islam, a reaction against it, and a search for alternative "solutions" to these problems. Conceivably even more

56 Huntington, 1993a, p.35.
57 Huntington, 1996, p.258.
58 Huntington capitalizes "Islamic Resurgence" to highlight what he sees as the historical parallels to the "Protestant Reformation" (1996, p.109).
59 Ibid, p.213.
60 Ibid., p.213.
intensely anti-Western nationalisms could emerge, blaming the West for the failures of Islam.⁶¹

Whether or not Huntington is correct in his prediction, he does not explore specifically what characteristics make Islam not the solution. To avoid Said's criticism that his argument is "ideologically-closed," Huntington must justify his pessimistic characterization of Islamic society.⁶² Rather than enter into this particular religious or historical debate, following from O'Hagan's analysis, I will focus on his comparison of Islam and Marxism. Huntington gives 'objective' criteria for the comparison: "in its political manifestations, the Islamic Resurgence bears some resemblance to Marxism, with scriptural texts, a vision of the perfect society, commitment to fundamental change, rejection of the powers that be and the nation states, and doctrinal diversity ranging from moderate reformist to violent revolutionary."⁶³ Huntington specifically endorses the comparison of Western/Muslim tension to the Cold War.⁶⁴ In doing so, he seeks, and finds, an enemy which is powerful, threatening, and anti-Western. However, this parallel is strained in a number of ways.

Islam is represented as threatening the West from a number of directions, on a variety of fronts. One of the vectors of anti-Western threat is demographic. Another is terrorism. A final vector of threat is the 'hollow centre' of Islamic civilization. Huntington's diagnosis of the weakness of Islamic civilization is not the same as Ajami's criticism levelled at Huntington's categorization of Islam as a single civilization.

⁶¹ Ibid, p.121.
⁶³ Huntington, 1996, p.111.
⁶⁴ Ibid, p.212.
Huntington asserts that Islamic states share a common civilizational culture. The weakness of Islamic civilization as a whole does not derive from internal differences, as his critics assert, but rather from the lack of leadership which would be provided by a core state. Huntington argues, "the absence of an Islamic core state is a major contributor to the pervasive internal and external conflicts which characterize Islam. Consciousness without cohesion is a source of weakness to Islam and a source of threat to other civilizations."65

One of the major trends that Huntington predicts, following his diagnosis of the bloody innards and borders of Islam, is an Islamic/Confucian, anti-Western alliance.66 He argues that although these two civilizations would be as prone to conflict as any other two civilizations would, the declining relative power of the West, and their mutual opposition to West, create a sympathetic relationship. He argues that,

[quote]

a common enemy creates a common interest. Islamic and Sinic societies which see the West as their antagonist thus have reason to cooperate with each other against the West ... By the early 1990s a "Confucian-Islamic connection" was in place between China and North Korea, on the one hand, and in varying degrees Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Algeria, on the other, to confront the West [on issues of human rights, economics, military capabilities].67

Some scholars have again questioned the salience of this cooperation and the importance of an Islamic-Confucian connection.68 However, in uniting these civilizations against the West, Huntington elides the multiple "Others" into a single enemy. Thus, while criticizing dualism, on the one hand, Huntington's nuanced 'multiple' Others on

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65 Ibid, p.177.
66 Huntington, 1993a, p.46.
67 Huntington, 1996, p.185.
the other hand, are figured as one, single enemy. The ‘rest’ unite in opposition to the ‘West.’

Huntington’s argument is wide-ranging, and in some senses a moving target. Further, he has insulated himself from empirical criticisms with his caveat that:

this book is not intended to be a work of social science. ... the test of its meaningfulness and usefulness is not whether it accounts for everything that is happening in global politics. Obviously it does not. The test is whether it provides a more meaningful and useful lens through which to view international developments than any alternative paradigm. 

With this caveat, Huntington defuses any criticism about specific instances that challenge his theory and that confine any challenge to a theory of similar scope and range.

Demography: Preparing for the Nineteenth and/or the Twenty-first Century

The notion of ‘demography as destiny’ has emerged several times in this century and again into popular and academic culture in the late 1990s. Demography has a long association with the rhetoric of imperialism, race and class, and civilized/barbarian distinctions. The science of demography is the study of populations – a science that Foucault links to the development of the modern state.

The stereotype of the barbarians who are more fertile and populous than ‘civilized’ individuals is one of the underlying assumptions of demographic arguments. This is not to say that these demographic figures are inaccurate, only that demographic arguments are mobilized in the periods

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70 Huntington, 1993b, 194.
when the West feels under threat – even though the demographic data have remained largely the same since the turn of the twentieth century. Since the nineteenth century, an essential part of the barbarian stereotype had been overpopulation.

We must look also at the prescriptions, be they scientific, racist, or paternalistic, to which demography leads us. The use of demography in IR has been traced in several works. Frank Furedi’s analysis of the changing perceptions of race in Western society pinpoints a fascination with demography in the interwar period. Descriptions of the ‘rising tide of colour’ were popular currency. In the 1960s, this demographic interest arose again, especially in America, with the invention of an accessible birth-control pill coupled with the movement towards decolonization – the so-called population explosion. Whenever societies feel under threat from migration, immigration, and multiculturalism, it seems demography is used to justify these fears. Just as mechanisms of surveillance were mobilized to control colonial populations, demography has represented a new mechanism of surveillance of the non-West, and the West. By tracking the populations of both Western and non-Western populations, Western demographers can ‘know’ exactly the comparative size and make-up of the two groups. When these data are analyzed within a context of zero-sum gains, as Malthus,

73 Furedi, op cit., pp.68-75.
Huntington, and Kennedy advocate, then demography becomes a crucial predictor of stability and threat.

Both Huntington and Kennedy use demography to indicate the external threats to the Western, developed world (particularly the United States) in the post-Cold War era. Traditional realists have long considered demographic strength as a factor of military power. Huntington argues that the present demographic predominance of the West [which is questionable in itself] is in jeopardy because of numbers, but also because of education: "Quantitatively Westerns thus constitute a steadily decreasing minority of the world's population. Qualitatively, the balance between the West and other populations is also changing. Non-Western peoples are becoming healthier, more urban, more literate, and better educated." Not only are the numbers of non-Westerners increasing, but their 'quality' is also improving. This represents the inverse of the civilizing mission, a fear of the educated non-Westerner who will colonize the West. Coker uses the Freudian term "return of the repressed" to describe this anxiety in the post-Cold War world. However, this anxiety can be seen at all stages of the imperial project. In addition to this numerical or qualitative disadvantage, Huntington also points to the age differentials between Western and non-Western civilizations. The West and its allies, Japan and Russia, have populations which are steadily ageing on average. Other non-Western civilizations with a larger proportion of children will benefit from "future workers and

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76 Huntington, 1996, pp. 84-85.
77 Coker, 1994a, p. 29.
The imperial representation of non-Western individuals as numerous, fertile, and violent becomes relegitimized through the lens of demography.

Following his prediction that the Islamic civilization will be the West’s prime challenger, Huntington uses demographic evidence to bolster his characterization of Islamic threat. Population growth in Muslim countries, and particularly the expansion of the fifteen- to twenty-four-year-old age cohort, provides recruits for fundamentalism, terrorism, insurgency, and migration. “Economic growth strengthens Asian governments; demographic growth threatens Muslim governments and non-Muslim societies.” He continues to chart the impact of this demographic trend. Huntington argues that “young people are the protagonists of protest, instability, reform, and revolution.” While emigration to settler colonies [America, Canada, Australia] helped diffuse the youth cohort of the early nineteenth century, there is no such outlet for the growing Muslim populations of today. In his conclusion he augurs a reversal of this trend. Because the West “no longer has economic or demographic dynamism... [and as] Asian and Muslim societies begin more and more to assert the universal relevance of their cultures, Westerns will come to appreciate more the connection between universalism and imperialism.” Demography becomes one more symptom of Western decline – in both comparative and absolute terms. And, in the expression of these demographic threats the anxiety of racial and cultural imperialism comes to be centred at the imperial core rather than in the post-colonial periphery. The “return of the repressed”

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79 Huntington, 1996, p.86.
80 Ibid, p.103.
81 Ibid, p.117.
Huntington foresees is violent, life-threatening, and imminent. Huntington’s use of demography is not idiosyncratic.

Paul Kennedy, in *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, posits a cyclical pattern of growth and decline which resembles Spengler and Toynbee’s pattern of civilizational growth and decline. In his recent work, Kennedy draws a parallel between the turn of the eighteenth century and our contemporary millennial angst. He is prompted by the writings of Thomas Malthus, whose famous “Essay on Population” argued that food production technology could only increase at an arithmetic rate while population increased at a geometric rate. From this dual concern with demography and technology, Kennedy diagnoses the post-Cold War situation and attempts to draw out some parallels between the dawn of the nineteenth and twenty-first centuries.

Kennedy also uses demographic evidence to shape his prediction of the future world order. Not only does a re-reading of Malthus prompt Kennedy’s analysis, but he traces Malthusian concerns about the growth of technology and population in contemporary politics. The crux of Kennedy’s argument is not the population crisis in general, but, like Malthus, it is the growth of the underclass. Kennedy’s key argument is that “between now and 2025, around 95 percent of global population growth will take place in” developing countries. Kennedy is also careful to indicate that the danger is not

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82 Ibid, p.310.
spatially-removed from the West or North. While it may “appear that the main problem is there,” Kennedy is quick to point out the dangers for the West in the form of environmental degradation, health risks, and economic collapse. The ‘return of the repressed’ happens for Kennedy through depletion and degradation of the global commons, but is no less dangerous or threatening for its amorphous nature. Finally, Kennedy makes Huntington’s point that children will become soldiers. The technology of warfare has advanced beyond attrition, and sheer numbers no longer translate into military might. However, as Kennedy and Huntington agree, many well-known historical revolutions were prompted or supported by upsurges in the proportion of youth in society. The presence of large, young cohorts in developing countries is linked directly to violence. Kennedy, however, does not link this violence to Islamic culture as Huntington does. Of all the demographic data presented, this connection between youth and violence seems to me to be the most compelling. And, given the historical precedents, it is perhaps not surprising that scholars firmly established in the status quo should express the anxiety of the ancien régime.

The developing countries have higher birth rates and lower aged populations than do the developed countries. What is interesting about this analysis is that Kennedy lays the blame at the feet of “Western health practices, especially immunization and

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87 Ibid, p.32.
88 Ibid. p.35.
89 Scholars from as diverse backgrounds as psychoanalysis, sociology, psychology, women’s and men’s studies, ethnic conflict and nationalism, strategic studies, and international relations have commented on the propensity of men between the ages of 15-35 towards violence. There has been no compelling conclusion, but it seems to me an area of great importance for social theory.
90 Kennedy, 1993, p.36.
In addition to reifying the success of the Western civilizing mission, this reaffirms a stereotype about the non-West that it is disease-ridden. If one does not want to go that far, the assumption that the success of Western medicine is not an absolute good is reminiscent of rhetoric of social Darwinism, wherein nature and natural selection keep populations at sustainable levels. In sum, Kennedy argues that

the greatest test for human society as it confronts the twenty-first century is how to find effective global solutions in order to free the poorer three-quarters of humankind from the growing Malthusian trap of malnutrition, starvation, resource depletion, unrest, enforced migration, and armed conflict – developments that will also endanger the richer nations, if not directly.²

This rhetoric echoes the ‘civilizing mission’ rhetoric in which Christian, European nations would ‘free’ the colonized natives from their barbarity.

The resurgence of demographic discourse indicates a parallel with Malthus’ own time. However, rather than cite the similarity in empirical conditions, I would point to the similarity in political conditions. The rise of the industrial revolution had brought a large underclass to urban centres. The rise of globalism has brought the global underclass to the West. The fear of the underclass – either industrial or global – has prompted insecurity in the privileged sectors of the West, which is translated as a fear of increased fertility amongst the underclass and declining birth rates amongst the upper-class. Malthus is relevant – not only because of his predictions, but also because of the fears it reveals.

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91 Ibid, p.25.
This criticism does not impugn the validity of demography or the utility of using demography in international relations. However, the demographic trends have not changed substantially since the turn of the century! One of the core aspects of the barbarian stereotype, which links this demographic analysis specifically to imperial rhetoric in the nineteenth century, is the representation of the barbarian as over-sexual—and consequently, producing a higher number of children. Freud argued that libidinal restraint was a characteristic of civilization, and, subsequently, the civilizing mission gained a sexual character. Anne McClintock makes this point in *Imperial Leather*, and connects the fear of over-sexed colonized natives to the fear of over-sexed lower classes. The domestic underclass in European metropolitan centres was often described in the same terms as those used to describe the natives. It is no surprise, then, that when Malthus is translated into late-twentieth century discourse, the underclass which concerned him is represented as the global underclass. It is only during periods in which the West feels insecure that demographic data become a central component of arguments concerned with international relations. Kennedy describes this insecurity as a set of "deep-rooted cultural and racial anxieties ... the fear of population decline." Quite aside from the statistical validity of these predictions, we should note that demographic concerns are only raised when the West faces a challenge in the realm of world politics.

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95 McClintock, 1995, pp.22;77.
The Real Clash: America's clash of cultures

There is a dual audience for the 'clash of civilizations' argument. Plainly, Huntington's argument is directed at official American foreign policy circles. His most recent article makes this intention clear: "In acting as if this were a unipolar world, the United States is also becoming increasingly alone ... with one or few partners, opposing most of the rest of the world's states and peoples." His suggestion of a "uni-multi-polar" system presents a more nuanced understanding of America's position with a multi-civilizational globe. However, there is another, popular, audience that Huntington addresses. His argument is also an exhortation to the strengthening of American identity. Stephen Chan argues that, "the Foreign Affairs article was essentially a [nationalist] polemic and it cannot be disguised by expansion ... It is a work of partisanship, not of scholarship." Said concurs. However, rather than dismiss the argument as a nationalist polemic, it is more useful to evaluate Huntington's exhortation, and the threats he characterizes. Huntington details several threats to American national identity, which come from a variety of directions: multiculturalism, demography, and post-modernism.

Following his characterization of culture both as an indicator and as a factor of soft power, Huntington argues that America's cultural condition reflects America's declining

99 Ibid, p.36.
101 Said, 1994, pp.22-23,
power in the realm of world politics. Though not mentioned until the final chapter of his book, multiculturalism becomes Huntington’s prime target within the American domestic establishment. ‘Multiculturalism’ has been termed ‘identity politics’ in other contexts and represents the inclination to focus on ethnic, racial, and cultural identities over national identities. The criticism of the rise of multiculturalism and identity politics within American popular and academic culture is long-standing – most recently inaugurated in the post-Cold War era by Alan Bloom’s *Closing of the American Mind*. Huntington also argues against its influence, which he characterizes as follows:

> In the late twentieth century both [political and cultural] components of American identity have come under concentrated and sustained onslaught from a small but influential numbers of intellectuals and publicists. In the name of multiculturalism they have attacked the identification of the United States with Western civilization, denied the existence of a common American culture, and promoted racial, ethnic, or other subnational cultural identities and groupings. Multiculturalism is both symptom and cause of the decline of a coherent and unitary American national identity. Identity politics are central to Huntington’s conception of foreign policy because he argues that national identity structures national interest. As he argues in another *Foreign Affairs* article, “Without a sure sense of national identity, Americans have become unable to define their national interests…”

Identity thus determines the direction of the kin-country syndrome in his civilizational realism. Culture is necessarily prior to cultural affinity. And cultural affinity is prior to international cooperation. He states more vociferously in *The Clash of Civilizations* and

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103 Huntington, 1996, p.305.

the Remaking of the World Order, “A multicivilizational United States will not be the United States; it will be the United Nations.” He represents Hispanics as outside the domestic order, though physically located within American territory, because of what he sees as a lack of cultural assimilation. Indeed, Huntington links the future of the West in general to the cultural strength of its core state: the United States. “The futures of the West depend on Americans reaffirming their commitment to Western civilization. Domestically this means rejecting the divisive siren calls of multiculturalism.”

Internal identity divisions – such as occurred during the Vietnam War – is interpreted as weakness in the international realm and thus undermines international prestige. Coker suggests a remedy in a paper which followed Huntington’s at a 1994 conference: “In a word, the West needs a new threat to define itself against, if only because it has difficulty understanding what it stands for.” Following this prescription, Huntington portrays Muslim civilization as the external threat to Western civilization and multiculturalism comes to be represented as the internal threat. He describes both of these ‘Others’ with a view to shoring of American identity by presenting it with immediate and dangerous threats.

James Kurth’s article “The Real Clash” responds to Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations?” by arguing that the real clash is “between Western civilization and a different grand alliance, one composed of the multicultural, and the feminist movements.

107 Coker, 1994a, p.35.
It is, in short, a clash between Western and post-Western civilizations.\textsuperscript{108} Following Kennedy’s description of non-military threats in military terms\textsuperscript{109} and Huntington’s description of identity politics as the realm of zero-sum, if soft, power,\textsuperscript{110} Kurth describes American culture as an imperial battlefield:

> African American, Latino Americans and Asian Americans ... form a sort of series of beachheads or even colonies of these [African, Latin American, Confucian, and Islamic] civilizations on the North American continent, and are now contesting the hegemony there of Western civilization.\textsuperscript{111}

This rhetoric of the empire striking back parallels the anxiety of Coker, Kennedy, and Huntington.\textsuperscript{112} The anxiety about the ‘return of the repressed’ is a common theme in much popular analyses of post-Cold War politics.\textsuperscript{113}

The second, domestic threat to American and Western identity according to Huntington and Kurth is more empirical. It “comes from immigrants from other civilizations who reject assimilation and continue to adhere to and propagate the values, customs, and cultures of their home societies.”\textsuperscript{114} This relates to the demographic threat. Huntington argues that these culturally threatening domestic groups are also those that pose a demographic threat to Western homogeneity: Muslims in Europe and Hispanics in America. Because culture and identity politics are represented as zero-sum contests based on relative demographic power, not only is conflict endemic between states and

\begin{footnotes}
\item[110] Huntington, 1996, p.91.
\item[111] Kurth, op cit., p.12.
\item[112] Huntington, 1996, p.310.
\item[113] Manzo, op cit. p.39.
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civilizations but also within states. Because, in Kurth and Huntington’s view, America is the core state of the predominant civilization, the threats posed by multiculturalism supported by demographic growth are pressing and dangerous.

Kurth and Huntington represent multiculturalism, feminism, and post-modernism as a threat to the hegemonic, masculine, white, European identity upon which they argue America is based. That identity is, in turn, equated with the values of liberalism and capitalism. Their argument suggests that the assertion of a female and/or multicultural identity involve the rejection of liberal and capitalist values.\(^\text{115}\)

Kurth suggests an immediate remedy. He points to the turn of the twentieth-century, when America faced a large influx of immigrants. In response to the reality of a large number of multi-cultural citizens, the American elite “undertook a massive and systematic program of Americanization, imposing on the new immigrants and on their children the English language, Anglo-American history, and American civics.”\(^\text{116}\) Kurth admits that this process of homogenization was so “relentless and even ruthless [that] many individuals were oppressed and victimized by it, and many rich and meaningful cultural islands were swept away.”\(^\text{117}\) However, this price was legitimized retroactively by American success in the Second World War. American identity — in the sense of sameness and unity — produced American strength. Huntington extends this view to

\(^{114}\) Huntington, 1996, p.304.  
\(^{115}\) Kurth, op cit., p.14.  
\(^{116}\) Kurth, op cit., p.13.  
\(^{117}\) Ibid, p.13.
argue that American identity produces American interests which produces American policy. Diversity amongst identity groups leads to fragmented policy.

Coker argues that "the West needs a new threat to define itself against, if only because it has difficulty understanding what is stands for." Huntington would argue that America stands for the American Creed of political culture and Western civilization generally. However, Huntington also believes in the power of the enemy to consolidate national identity. But this view of identification, that the self requires the rejection of the Other, shapes both Huntington's analysis of cultural politics and his condemnation of multiculturalism. I wish to make two points: first, that Huntington argues that Americans, other than Huntington himself, are looking for an other to shore up their cultural identity and national interests; and second, Huntington, unselfconsciously perhaps, makes an 'other' out of multiculturalism to shore up domestic American identity.

Huntington understands identity to represent homogeneity and the primacy of national identity over racial or ethnic allegiances, gender, or sexual preferences. He argues that because multiculturalism has failed to maintain American identity, then "identity and unity will depend on a continuing consensus on political ideology." In other words, shared political ideology will take the place of shared cultural values. The end of the Cold War is responsible, in part, for the lack of identification – because of the

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118 Coker, 1994a, p.35.
119 Hall, 1996, p.4.
120 Huntington, 1997, p.34.
loss of the Soviet Union as a common enemy of the United States. The attention paid to ethnic conflicts in the post-Cold War era does not provide Americans with an immediate danger. Huntington points to the Oklahoma City bombing as an indication of America’s post-Cold War malaise. The initial reaction to the bombing was anti-Muslim—it was first reported that ‘dark-skinned, bearded men’ were seen driving away from the scene. Americans, Huntington argues, had expected an external, Muslim enemy. The actual culprit, Timothy McVeigh, and a right-wing militia group, left America bewildered. The common condemnation of McVeigh only united Americans against “one of their own.”

Huntington’s anti-Islamic and anti-multicultural agenda stems from his understanding of identity formation. “We know who we are only when we know who we are not and often only when we know who we are against.” Huntington argues, “define their identity by what they are not.” Indeed, he continues in “Erosion of American National Interests,” that the need of an ‘Other’ is both justified by psychology in general and American history specifically. The implication he draws from this understanding of identity is interesting. Because American culture is under threat from outside and inside its borders, American culture is declining. Cultural decline leads to the diffusion of a homogenous identity, which renders national interests opaque,

121 Ibid, p.31.
and muddles foreign policy goals. American cultural decline produces and is produced by a decline in the coherence of American identity. Diffusion of American identity is a symptom of a decline in power, but also contributes to that decline. Huntington’s response is thus to describe two ‘Others’ – an internal and external other – to bolster and reconstitute American unity, identity, and culture for his popular audience. Thus, while decrying multiculturalism and identity politics – Huntington’s articles can be seen as a nationalistic intervention in contemporary identity politics. His ‘clash of civilizations’ connects international relations to domestic identity, culture, and power – but not unproblematically.

**Popular Accounts of the ‘Two Worlds’ Model**

Huntington’s ‘clash of civilizations’ argument has enjoyed a great deal of critical engagement within the discipline of international relations. Because it reflects the two most prominent trends in the post-Cold War world – international conflicts and cultural or identity politics – many sympathetic readings have extended his argument into the realm of popular culture. In this section I will look at Barber’s “Jihad vs. McWorld” and Kaplan’s “The Coming Anarchy” and the later books based on these articles. Barber and Kaplan represent the popular incarnation of Huntington and Kurth. Their use of similar rhetoric – with similar intentions – has particular salience for the popularization of the civilization/barbarian discourse in the late 1990s and the inclusion of culture and identity in popular analyses of international relations.

**Barber and Huntington**

Barber was among the first political scientists in the post-Cold War era to argue that the trends towards globalization and fragmentation were not only related, but
mutually-constituted. He uses the terms “McWorld” and “Jihad” to represent the social spheres of globalization and fragmentation. These spheres are neither mutually-exclusive, nor physical spaces. Rather, McWorld and Jihad are both states of social life in which either unification or fragmentation takes precedence. Similar to this spatial disjuncture, Barber diagnoses a general shift from national time – understood as simultaneity in Anderson’s sense – to an obsession with the global, multinational and ahistoric field of popular culture and capital. Completing the Hegelian notion of history as understood by Fukuyama, Barber argues that, in fact, globalized Western culture has moved beyond national culture and beyond historical development. In an argument that Huntington later adopts, Barber contends that the process of globalization and homogenization is inherently alienating. The backlash to the imposition of homogenous images and products within the global market induces individuals to identify with smaller and smaller groups.

Barber’s political agenda is democratic, and he evaluates each of these tendencies – towards unification and fragmentation – from its potential for democracy. I would like to focus on two parts of his argument which have special relevance for this project. First, Barber identifies “the information-technology imperative” to describe how the globalization of popular media and the communications revolution have fostered the unification of global culture and the globalization of capital. Second, Barber analyzes Islamic culture and its prospects for democracy. Although it differs from “Clash of

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127 Barber, 1995, Ch. 10.
Civilizations” in several important respects – not the least of which is its identity-politics – “Jihad vs. McWorld” can be seen as the popular analogue to Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations” argument. By tracing the ways in which the argument slips and shifts when moved into the popular realm, we can trace the dynamics of identity politics in international relations and the popular international imaginary.

Barber traces four ‘imperatives’ which he believes drive globalization: the market imperative; the resource imperative; the information-technology imperative; and, the ecological imperative. The imperative of market capitalism towards freedom of information, movement, and purchase has been well documented.129 An international division of labour and the near-universal extension of capital in all spaces of the globe – even virtual spaces – have discredited almost entirely the notion of autarky. While a scientific consensus has not yet formed on ecological sustainability, it is generally recognized in popular and elite culture that the environment and environmental resources are global factors which cannot be ignored.130 The information-technology imperative has also been theorized in international relations.131 However, as Barber notes, in political science this analysis has focused primarily on the ‘hardware’ of globalization: the technology that facilitates world-wide communication. Cultural studies, post-colonial studies, and human geography have been more oriented towards the ‘software’ of

globalization. Popular media images, television programmes, and films not only sell products to the globe, they also disseminate the cultural mores of the West. The spread of American ideals has been a focus of many non-Western and Western nationalist scholars. Even Huntington warns of the danger of being perceived as culturally imperialist. While he may overstate the case, Barber's (re)introduction of popular culture to international relations is important. "McWorld," Barber's shorthand for the sphere of globalization, "permits private corporations whose only interest is their revenue stream to define by default the public goods of the individuals and communities they serve." Because the investigation of popular culture in international relations is a relatively new phenomenon, I will look more closely at this particular argument. International Relations has started to recognize the import of the popular international imaginary.

Barber's evidence of the influence of popular culture on politics in a post-Cold War era is compelling. Proponents of nationalism have long-argued that cultural autarky is central to political autonomy. Barber's core assumption is that "more and more people around the world watch films that are less and less varied. Nowhere is American monoculture more evident and more feared than in its movies and videos." The global

133 Barber, 1995, p.98.
135 Barber, 1995. p.98.
136 Quebec's demand for political sovereignty is based in part on its need to defend its francophone culture. Barber, 1995, p.178.
137 Ibid, p.89.
dominance – not to say hegemony – of American cinema and television products has important political ramifications. Barber claims that American cultural ideals are hegemonic, because even in indigenous, non-Western countries, filmmaking is “rooted in the glamour of the seductive lifestyle trinity: sex, violence, and money...mainly devoted to low-budget imitations or blockbuster replicas of Hollywood fare.”\textsuperscript{138} One might argue for the uniqueness of Indian or Hong Kong cinema, but the draw of American films internationally makes his larger point that American images, stereotypes, and narratives are internationally predominant.\textsuperscript{139} For example, even within the Western community, “America now controls well over 80 percent of the European market, while Europe has less than 2 percent of the American market.”\textsuperscript{140} Barber reproduces these results across the globe in an appendix.\textsuperscript{141} Barber argues that if this is true for movies, it is doubly true for television, which reaches even more households across the globe. “the Americanization of global television is proceeding even faster than the globalization of American films.”\textsuperscript{142} As evidenced by the most popular shows in the world, Baywatch, and Hercules/Zena Warrior Princess, it is not high culture that circulates globally but the lowest common denominator of Western culture. The dominance of American media represents, for Barber, evidence of an “imagineered” international imaginary which increasingly homogenous and Western. Public, civic-oriented behaviour is being eclipsed by private, consumer-oriented media, which Barber deplores as damaging to democracy. It is also

\textsuperscript{138} Ibid, p.90.

\textsuperscript{139} For up-to-date box office gross earnings, with percentage foreign and domestic, see Gitesh Pandya, www.boxofficeguru.com/intl.html, March 20, 1999.

\textsuperscript{140} Barber, 1995, p.92.

\textsuperscript{141} Ibid, pp.307-309.
damaging to nationalism and national identities. When participating in this American-dominated McWorld, Barber describes the position as “nowhere” and “everywhere.”

“Universal images assault the eyes and global dissonances assault the ears in a heart-pounding tumult that tells you everything except which country you are in. Where are you? You are in McWorld.”

The social sphere of McWorld is best described as a ‘theme park,’ not in the literal sense, but in the figurative sense of any social space that is consumer-oriented, fantastic, and strangely homogenous. Thus, just as Mitchell argues for an ‘exhibitionary order’ in colonial Egypt and Britain, Barber argues for a ‘Disneyfied Order’ across the globe. In describing this ‘Disneyfied order,’ Barber points to shopping malls, theme restaurants, and media-business partnerships that promulgate products as ideas across cultures. Euro- and Japan-Disney are but the most obvious examples of this trend. Shopping malls in particular are a spatial inversion of the ‘exhibitionary order’ rather than the world being represented within the exhibition, the mall is represented as the world. Barber’s recollection of the theme park echoes the previous analysis of nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century world exhibitions. The world exhibitions displayed national, imperial, and industrial successes to metropolitan crowds. World exhibitions were not hegemonic, unproblematic sites of ideological display, however. The ‘exhibitionary

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144 Ibid, p.128.
147 Barber, 1995, p.129.
order' was faced with class, national, and racial tensions. These tensions were resolved through the participation of the audience in the spectacle of the exhibition. But, as Barber argues, such participation is lacking in today’s theme parks. In McWorld, “all you can do is buy a ticket to watch: watch without consequences, watch without engagement, watch without responsibility.” In the contemporary world, the theme park of post-modernity is decentralized, enjoyed not as a community spectacle but as individual consumers. At most, culture is experienced not as a national identity, but as ‘it’s a small world’ or as the provider of different booths at the food court. McWorld’s theme parks display private, commercial successes and the universality of consumers – in short, an anti-national message. This leads Huntington and Barber to theorize the small worlds that purposefully isolate themselves from this (post)modernity.

Barber argues that viewing American stories may not convert other cultures. However, he asserts, the globalization of American media “inculcates secularism, passivity, consumerism, vicariousness, impulse buying, and an accelerated pace of life ... Stories told to a tribe around the campfire, whatever their content, knit people together and reflect a common heritage.” Other scholars have criticized the idea of a universal, or global culture. Huntington has argued that, in fact, the promulgation of American

149 Barber, 1995, p.136.
150 Barber, 1992, p.60.
151 Barber, 1995, p.97.
pop culture cannot be seen as imperialist. He argues that consumerism and market
capitalism is not at the heart of the American creed.  

Given Huntington’s attempt to describe Islam as America’s ‘Other,’ I would also
like to highlight Barber’s popular characterization of Islam. Fostered by religious ‘anti-
modernism,’ Barber describes the Islamic scepticism of Western values and material or
cultural products. Again, using the language of battlefields, Barber argues that
fundamentalism “has been a literal war on the values, culture, and institutions that make
up liberal society.” Like Huntington, Barber elides the West with modernism and
argues, “Islam regards Western secular culture and its attending values as corrupting to
and morally incompatible to with its own.” However, Barber makes several valuable
and important points about Islamic fundamentalism. First, Islamic fundamentalism has
its roots, at least in the modern age, in colonialism – or rather anti-colonialism. Barber
recalls the rhetoric of Hassan Al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, who
promulgated anti-Western fundamentalism in the 1920s. Second, Barber spends very
little time on Islam as such, and moves quickly in his argument to fundamentalism within
America. By citing American and Western parallels to the fundamentalist movement –
specifically the contemporary Christian Right and the historical Puritan movement –
Barber opens the theoretical space to sympathize with the ‘Other.’ By describing
American ‘martyrs’ – like Timothy McVeigh – as part of an American jihad, Barber

represents the ‘other’ as internal as well as external. Jihad is not just ‘out there.’ In being ‘in here,’ Jihad is part of a non-national, non-spatial pattern of alienation, and becomes understandable as a reaction to the process of globalization for ‘us’ as well as ‘them.’ In contrast, Huntington portrays Islamic fundamentalists in stereotypically ‘barbaric’ terms, which prevents sympathy. The ‘Other’ is undesirable, wholly-unlike ‘us,’ and so is definitively beyond redemption. Barber, on the other hand, represents Islamic fundamentalism as part of an understandable, historically- and contextually-situated social and religious tradition, which has analogues in Western and American culture. Barber’s argument approaches a more nuanced understanding of identity and undoes the ‘othering’ rhetoric of Huntington. In part, Barber’s depiction of American and Islamic Jihads can be seen as a remedy for Huntington’s essentialist description.

Kaplan and Kennedy

Just as Barber can be seen as a popularization of Huntington, Robert Kaplan states specifically that his book can be understood as “a brief romp through a swath of the globe, in which I try to give personal meaning to the kinds of issues raised in Paul Kennedy’s Preparing for the Twenty-first Century.” Kaplan is a travel-writer who envisions a new, authentic, and realistic travelogue which “confront[s] the real world, slums and all, rather than escape into an airbrushed version of a more rustic past ... which folds international studies into a travelogue.” This folding of international

158 Ibid, p.212.
studies has some interesting potential, which other IR scholars have plumbed. However, rather than invent new cultural narratives or seek ‘authentic’ observations about the post-Cold war world, Kaplan resurrects a great number of imperial tropes. Kaplan rewrites in the American international imaginary many of the orientalist tropes popular in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, notably; climate as character, darkness vs. light, development vs. underdevelopment, history as progress, and westernization. He paints the periphery as violent, unstable, and anarchic in specific contrast to American national space which – apart from the inner cities – is peaceful, stable, and ordered. Even in this exception, Kaplan’s description of the domestic and global underclass in the same terms recalls the Victorian descriptions of the East End of London as a “wilderness wherein they, who live like wild beasts upon their fellow creatures find prey a cover.”

Kaplan’s “Journey to the Frontiers of Anarchy” may be criticized on similar empirical and theoretical grounds to Huntington and Kennedy. One might object that Kaplan does not intend to write International Relations (and, in fact, disavows political science in general). In fact, it could be argued that because Kaplan reads historians exclusively, he is a prisoner to their stereotypes. However, I would argue that, apart from these criticisms, Kaplan’s work could be analyzed as an artefact of popular culture. In his reinscription of nineteenth-century stereotypes of the barbarian, these stereotypes are reintroduced into the American popular imaginary, and gain political import to the

161 K.J. Holsti, “Along the Road of International Theory in the Next Millennium: Four Travelogues,” Unpublished manuscript.
163 Quoted in McClintock, 1995, p.120.
164 Robert D. Kaplan, Personal communication, September 25th 1998, Vancouver, BC.
extent that they are used in public discourse. However, like Barber, Kaplan also provides a more nuanced understanding of identification and the rise of ‘politicized Islam.’ Given the extent to which Kaplan is widely read, I would argue he is crucial to understanding Africa’s representation in the American international imaginary. Indeed, he counts American President Clinton among his readers. To avoid repetition, I will concentrate on Kaplan’s descriptions of West Africa and Egypt.

Like the imperialist writings of the late-nineteenth-century, Kaplan argues that the threat from Africa is natural and elemental. He writes: “the threat is more elemental: nature unchecked... To understand the events of the next fifty years, then, one must understand environmental scarcity, cultural and racial clash, geographic destiny, and the transformation of war.” Kaplan connects the demographic growth identified by Kennedy and mobilized by Huntington to the resource and ecological perspectives cited by Barber. Kaplan also uses the figure of Malthus to warn Western audiences of West African population growth. Like Malthus, Kaplan cites statistics that locate the population explosion in the underclass, in the underdeveloped world. Kaplan also adds an important dimension to popular demographic discourse. He argues,

Demographic pressures never reveal themselves as such...The crush of humanity invites scarcity, whether in food, water, housing, or jobs.

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165 See Press Conference by President Clinton and President Mandela, Garden of Tuynhius Cape Town, South Africa, Office of the Press Secretary, March 27, 1998.
166 Kaplan, 1996, p.54.
167 Ibid, p 117.
Scarcity fuels discontent, wearing the mask in this [Egyptian] case of politicized Islam.\textsuperscript{170}

As with Kennedy, demographic increases are linked with the ‘carrying capacity’ of the region’s natural resources. Kaplan describes the African earth as “seething with fecundity and too much of it…”\textsuperscript{171} He describes the physical results of this fecundity, children, as being as “numerous as ants.”\textsuperscript{172} The stereotypes of the tropical earth as being too fertile and children as being insects are more familiar to the nineteenth-century than the twentieth.

Kaplan also resurrects the imperialist discourse that treats geography as destiny.\textsuperscript{173} This is not to argue that environmental scarcity and regional geopolitics have an unimportant role in international relations.\textsuperscript{174} Indeed, Kaplan cites Thomas Homer-Dixon and popularizes his thesis that environmental factors – and the constellation of issues related to resource scarcity and population growth – will become the “core foreign-policy challenge” in the post-Cold War world.\textsuperscript{175} However, Kaplan implies that climate determines character. In general, he writes, “Africa is nature writ large.”\textsuperscript{176} “Now the threat is more elemental: nature unchecked.”\textsuperscript{177} These kind of description reinscribe the dichotomy between European man who is the master of the environment and African

\textsuperscript{170} Kaplan, 1996, p.117-8.
\textsuperscript{171} Ibid, p.3.
\textsuperscript{172} Kaplan, 1994, p.55.
\textsuperscript{173} Huntington, 1999, p.49.
\textsuperscript{175} Kaplan, 1994, p.58. VP Al Gore read Kaplan’s article and was shortly after invited to speak with the Vice President about these issues.
\textsuperscript{176} Kaplan, 1996, p.5.
man who is a slave to his environment. As he states in an argument that echoes Rousseau and Montesquieu, "it is almost certainly not accidental that Africa is both the poorest and hottest region of the world."¹⁷⁸ He describes his train in Egypt as a "time machine," using the Hegelian metaphor in which distance from Europe indicates movement backward in history.¹⁷⁹ Local individuals are described as having the same colour as the soil – as well as its fecundity. The elision of population and nature is reminiscent of nineteenth century divisions between civilized and barbarian – both in terms of sexual and population restraint and in terms of society's relation to nature. Because this division has rarely been utilized to emancipate – except in the paternalistic variation of the civilizing mission – we must be wary of reinscribing these stereotypes in popular or academic culture.

Despite his refusal to acknowledge a specific connection between his own travel-writing and Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations" rhetoric, Kaplan does mention Huntington specifically. Kaplan recounts the core argument of "Clash of Civilizations" and highlights Fouad Ajami's criticism. However, if Kaplan disagrees with Huntington's description of Islam, he also uses Huntington's notion of culture and civilizational conflict in his analysis of troubled areas.¹⁸⁰ Specifically, Kaplan describes Islamic culture as providing a moral foundation for Turkish and Egyptian society – despite environmental, social, and political conditions similar to those in West Africa. Against

¹⁷⁷ Kaplan, 1994, p.54.
¹⁷⁹ Ibid, p.102.
Huntington’s description of Turkey as a ‘torn country,’ Kaplan describes Islamic organizations holding together the social fabric of newly-urbanized peasants, and providing a social and moral super-structure that minimizes their alienation. His analysis is incisive, and worth quoting at length:

Whereas rural poverty is age-old and almost a “normal” part of the social fabric, urban poverty is socially destabilizing... Islamic extremism is the psychological defense mechanism of many urbanized peasants threatened with the loss of traditions in pseudo-modern cities where their values [and communal identities] are under attack. ...Islam’s very militancy makes it attractive to the downtrodden. It is the one religion that is prepared to fight. A political era driven by environmental stress, increased cultural sensitivity, unregulated urbanization, and refugee migrations is an era divinely created for the spread and intensification of Islam, already the world’s fastest growing religion.

Rather than a country in which elite and popular civilizations clash, as Huntington has portrayed Turkey, Kaplan argues that Islam – and religion in general – has provided an answer to the displacement of urban migration and the alienation of changing social structures. However, while refuting Huntington’s specific diagnosis of Turkey, Kaplan’s description of the move towards cultural renaissance is the same as Barber and Huntington’s. In the alienation of the post-colonial, globalized culture, there is a general trend to smaller, more coherent identity groupings. Kaplan’s description of Islamic is more sympathetic, but there remains a consensus on the centrality of identity politics in contemporary world politics. In representing Islam as a rational alternative to alienation, Kaplan makes the rise in Islamic fundamentalism appear understandable and rational.

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Like Barber, Kaplan also cites the Muslim Brotherhood and Hassan el-Banna as a "useful barometer" of political conditions in Egypt. While the Muslim Brotherhood has had a violent history – a fact that Barber neglects – the organization has changed in character since 1970. In tactics similar to many counter-governmental organizations in developing countries, the Muslim Brotherhood has turned from violence to welfare to convert its followers. The Muslim Brotherhood "is a benevolent neighborhood force, operating clinics, welfare organizations, schools, and hospitals that arose to fill a void created ... in general by modernism." Kaplan thus describes an Islamic, religious organization that is acting rationally, and even compassionately. This is the benign face of modernization without westernization, which Huntington occludes. By resisting the stereotype of Islamic fundamentalist as violent, irrational, and barbaric, Kaplan presents a sympathetic view of the Islamic other. By not "othering" the 'Other,' Kaplan allows a more nuanced analysis and opens the possibility for dialogue in the place of civilizational conflict.

Kaplan’s ‘folding’ of travelogue and international studies also provides for more personal encounters with the ‘Other.’ Because stereotypes can never be perfectly applied to individuals, Kaplan’s selective one-on-one encounters have a paradoxical effect. On the one hand, Kaplan reinscribes nineteenth century stereotypes on those individuals whom he does not meet. However, when Kaplan does meet individuals face-to-face, he is prompted to engage with them, and come to understand them. These

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185 Ibid, p.108.
conversations restrict the 'othering' of the 'Other.' The stereotype that appears clear from a distance, becomes unreliable in personal interaction. Kaplan’s depictions of the 'frontiers of anarchy' have shaped the contemporary international imaginary of the non-West. While we must be wary of his reinscription of nineteenth-century stereotypes, the form of his travelogue *cum* international studies has great potential for contact with cultural others without conflict.

**Conclusion: The Real Clash of Identity Politics**

The contrast between popular and academic representations of identity politics is telling. On the one hand, Huntington’s effort to describe external and internal ‘others’ to shore domestic identity and thus domestic power relies on demographic and imperialist rhetoric from the nineteenth century. Dossa argues that this trend in US policy circles, "is an attempt to mentally construct, and in practice reconstruct, the Third World as the place of evil it was imagined to be in the heyday of imperialism in the nineteenth century." Barber and Kaplan, on the other hand, manage to portray the ‘other’ in far more sympathetic and subtle ways. I do not want to argue that either argument is more faithful to the reality of Islamic fundamentalism or demographic shift. What I want to emphasize is the political intent of each message. While Huntington’s description of the clash of civilizations allows only for conflict between cultures, Kaplan and Barber each open up spaces for dialogue and cooperation. Huntington argues that cultural similarity will structure the success of all international organizations, trade agreements, and the

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In focusing on the local and individual, Kaplan and Barber cite the specific strengths and weakness of cultural solutions to common problems – criticizing ‘us’ and ‘them’ in a similar fashion. Huntington portrays the Islamic-Confucian alliance and multiculturalism as America’s chief enemies – and urges a process of Americanization domestically and wariness internationally. Declaring multiculturalists and feminists enemies of America is not the same as describing the Christian Right as a fundamentalist movement. The former places multiculturalists outside of the community, whereas the latter identifies common processes of alienation and provokes comparisons with other fundamentalist movements outside the Western community. Kaplan and Barber offer a framework for inter-cultural encounters which is based on dialogue rather than conflict, citing lessons to be learned and taught by Western civilization and America in particular.

I would make one final criticism of the ‘two-worlds’ model of post-Cold War international relations. The two-world’s model is a direct heir of the realist tradition of parsimony. Many IR scholars, and critical theorists in particular, have taken realism to task for the deification of parsimony. This debate relates to oft-heard debates in IR with regards to theory-building. However, this particular dualistic simplification fails to reflect the many diverse political conditions present in the ‘non-West.’ Rhetorically, the ‘two-worlds’ model acts as a form of identity politics: while creating a unified ‘enemy,’ the dualist model also attempts to render ‘our’ world unproblematic. In addition to the

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diverse and serious problems faced by many ‘Third World’ nations – whether or not we see these problems as the inheritance of imperialism – IR needs to consider seriously the problems facing ‘The West.’ Acharya argues that, in the field of security studies, the ‘periphery’ has become the ‘core’ object of study.\(^{190}\) While this is plainly a positive move, we must be wary of the theories which portray the Third World as derivative, homogenous, or outside of its historical context. I would argue that while IR should direct more of its attention to the periphery, we should be wary of recreating imperialist stereotypes when we do so.

A great deal of critical international theory is oriented towards evaluating how theories come to be endowed with meanings. Campbell argues that the very vociferousness of the debate over ‘identity politics’ and the Third Debate in IR theory reveals the politics at stake.\(^{191}\) Whether it is critical geopolitics or critical security studies or critical theory, a number of influential scholars are currently evaluating how international relations are theorized as International Relations. This chapter illustrates the way in which a political agenda may be framed as IR theory.


THE RETURN OF CULTURE, IDENTITY, CIVILIZATION, AND BARBARIANS TO IR.

By way of conclusion, this chapter will trace thematically the core concerns of this project. It will examine the changing meanings ascribed to the ‘civilized/barbarian’ discourse in IR theory and trace the importance of several key concepts – imperialism, culture, and race to IR theory. It will also look at the importance of popular culture and the popular international imaginary to contemporary IR theory and examine how a genealogy of the ‘civilized/barbarian’ dichotomy problematizes essentialist understandings of identity politics and the self/other relationship. It will also trace the changing representations of warfare, as an example of the civilized/barbarian discourse. Finally, it will suggest some further avenues for research that this dissertation has left open.

A number of IR scholars have suggested the importance of post-structural and post-colonial theories to the discipline. The most powerful of these efforts are marked by a concentration on the genealogy of one particular discourse: David Campbell on American foreign policy; James Der Derian on diplomacy and terrorism; Roxanne Lynn Doty on the ‘North/South’ model of post-Cold War politics; Katherine Manzo on nationalism and racism; Iver Neumann on the ‘East.’ In adding to this conversation, “On Barbarians” investigates one trope in International Relations and the popular international imaginary. In order to show the importance of the ‘civilized/barbarian’ rhetoric to world politics, it has also been necessary to indicate the value of analyses of culture and identity, and specifically of popular culture.
In recent International Relations theory, there has been a great deal of concern for self-reflection, at both a personal and disciplinary level. Tracing the impact of one set of ideas – the ‘civilized/barbarian’ discourse – across time illuminates, on the one hand, how the discipline has changed its epistemological focus, and, on the other hand, how it remains concerned with the same central questions. IR theory is concerned with questions of war, power, and security. For the majority of the twentieth century, IR was concerned chiefly with the international system as an objective social realm. War was operationalized. Power was quantified in terms of economic, military, and diplomatic strength. Security was theorized as a zero-sum game. The Third Debate has shifted the focus of the discipline towards the textual and discursive aspects of power and security. While early IR theorists sought to define ‘civilization,’ this dissertation illustrates the ‘civilized/barbarian’ discourse has shifted and changed to meet the contemporary political imagination. The rhetoric of the preservation of ‘civilization’ against the threat of the ‘barbarian’ remains a staple in political discourse. By understanding its origin in the ‘civilizing mission,’ we might better understand uses to which this rhetoric could be applied today.

The concept of ‘civilization’ – both as a marker of progress and as a marker of belonging – was central to nineteenth and early twentieth century IR theory. The community of ‘civilized’ nations was constituted, reified, and policed through the legalistic standard of ‘civilization,’ as well as a matrix of imperialist, racial, class, and gendered discourses. ‘Civilization’ and ‘barbarism’ defined the members of international society, and, in part, regulated the status they were accorded. Early idealist thinkers took the defence of universal ‘civilization’ against warfare to be one of the prime tasks of IR
theory. Realist thinkers adopted the more pluralistic sense of ‘civilizations’ as social groupings. English School scholars have also taken ‘barbarians’ in particular to be an essential part of IR theory – but this dimension of their work has not been adopted by mainstream IR. However, apart from World-Systems theory, which has come to examine ‘civilizations’ as potential units of analysis, the notions of ‘civilization’ and ‘barbarians’ largely faded from the discipline’s view until the end of the Cold War. A number of thinkers – both popular and academic – reasserted the ‘civilized/barbarian’ dichotomy in the post-Cold War world. Whether figured as ‘core/periphery,’ ‘liberal zones of peace/realist zones of conflict,’ or ‘West/ the Rest,’ the description of contemporary world politics in these terms has the effect of the ‘civilized/barbarian’ division. Scholars such as Samuel Huntington and Paul Kennedy and popular writers such as Benjamin Barber and Robert Kaplan use imperialist stereotypes and concepts to describe the contemporary international society. As I have shown, the representation of groups as ‘barbaric’ has specific, negative, material and political effects. We must be wary before invoking this rhetoric again.

Imperialism was a central concern of early IR theorists – and was perhaps the source of the discipline as such. However, as realists moved towards parsimonious theories of international relations, imperialism was removed from its specific historical context. European imperialism was no longer considered a specific case of expansion and exploitation. Instead, imperialism was defined as any policy by a state wishing to change the current power configuration. This theoretical move had the effect of retroactively legitimizing European imperialism as a natural result of an anarchic system.
It also has the result of removing from view the impact of European imperialism on the contemporary post-colonial international society.

The Marxist critique of mainstream theory in the late 1970s brought imperialism and neocolonialism to the fore as economic processes of domination. While this critique was certainly peripheral to the mainstream, Dependencia and World-Systems theories directed disciplinary attention the impact of imperialism on the post-colonial world. English School scholars such as Hedley Bull, Adam Watson, Gerrit Gong, and Robert Jackson took this interest further. These scholars, among others, traced the historical evolution of the European international society into a universal international society, taking specific note of the impact of European imperialism in this process. Though they do not engage the concepts of culture and identity, as such, their analysis opens space to view imperialism in both its ideational and material aspects. Scholars from the post-colonial world — such as Ali Mazrui, Edward Said, and Ashis Nandy — also began to write towards IR theory, if not engaging directly with it. Though more important to post-colonial theory than International Relations theory, these scholars wrote specifically about the impact of imperialism on post-colonial politics. Recently, critical scholars have attempted to use the insights of post-colonial theory to understand international relations as, at least in part, the legacy of imperial structures of power. This dissertation continues this project, suggesting some of the danger in resurrecting models that enhance this power structure.

The study of culture in IR theory has also taken several forms. Mindful of the political stakes attached to the definition of culture and identity, these concepts are nonetheless central to the study of world politics. Early IR theory studied ‘culture’ and
'identity' under the guise of 'national culture.' Realists and Idealists alike used national stereotypes to characterize foreign countries – and indeed their own country. As noted by scholars of the time, the representation of a country's national character was often implicated in the foreign policy of the state. Though 'power over opinion' would remain an important analytic tool, the dominance of the Cold War in the Anglo-American academy largely shifted the focus from national culture to 'ideology.' The power of ideas and beliefs was subsumed within the context of superpower contest. However, in the mid-1980s, a resurgence of critical interest in the concepts of culture and identity can be observed.

In part, the resurgence of the debate in philosophical circles between the universal values of the Enlightenment and the relativist values of the Romantic movement prompted a re-examination of this debate within IR theory. It must be noted that also at this time, a debate within Western societies concerning multiculturalism and 'identity politics' raged. The clear connection between identity groups, cultural fields, and power was shown in any number of academic circles. With increasing attention being paid to globalization, scholars began to take note of the interpenetration of cultural forms made possible by telecommunications and transportation revolutions. A debate emerged, which was similar to ones that took place during at the turn of the century: are we moving towards a global culture? Also, students of international organizations began to examine the regimes and institutions shaped by ideational consensus. Thus, studies of globalization, international regimes, and studies of contemporary philosophical debates provided three angles from which IR examined the relevance of culture.
This study of 'culture' takes two primary forms in contemporary international relations. First, culture is studied as the norms, values, and ideas which institutions or nations share in common. Traditionally subsumed under foreign policy analysis or country-specific studies, recent scholars have taken to examine the ideational context of national and international institutions. The study of strategic culture, for example, is a fast-growing sub-field of study. Scholarship in this area has concentrated, for the most part, on elite or policy-forming cultures. Second, culture is studied as a field of representations in which identities and social meanings are constructed, contested, and reified. Familiar post-colonial theory, cultural studies, human and cultural geography, and women's studies, this definition of culture is implicit in a great deal of work done by critical theorists. Students of critical security studies and critical geopolitics represent the leading edge of this sub-field. Critical scholarship has focussed a great deal of fresh attention on popular culture, which this dissertation reflects.

The concept of 'race' was central to nineteenth and early-twentieth century imperialist ideology. Initially figured as a hierarchy that legitimized European rule, the anxiety of racial mixing or racial demographics came to 'colour' the imperial effort. Racial politics were important to early IR scholars. The Holocaust discredited racial politics, although traces can still be found during decolonization. American anxiety about its own racial tension was projected onto its competition with the Soviets for control of the non-aligned countries. Explicit racial politics has been peripheral to IR theory since the 1970s, with very few notable exceptions. While recent scholarly attention has been drawn to race in the context of post-colonial theory, International Relations has been slow to study this important, if problematic, concept. The
combination of the 'civilized/barbarian' discourse and stereotypes of racial 'others' gives cause for concern. Although not a central component of this project, I hope to have indicated the importance of this concept to IR theory and the popular international imaginary. The use of 'race' in IR theory certainly deserves a more sustained interrogation.

One aspect of racial discourse, which is particularly salient to post-Cold War popular culture, is demographic rhetoric. While demographic data have not changed significantly since the turn of the nineteenth century, demographic rhetoric often appears when groups feel threatened. This has been shown during the late nineteenth century, the interwar years, the era of decolonization, and the post-Cold War era. Because demographic threats are sometimes linked to racism, we must be wary of the reintroduction of this rhetoric in IR theory.

'Identity' is a leading theme in contemporary politics and scholarship. A large number of scholars from a variety of disciplines and perspectives are engaging with the concept of 'identity.' While traditional studies had concentrated on a simple, dualistic relationship between the 'self' and the 'other,' contemporary critical theorists have problematized this relationship in any number of ways. The 'self/other' dichotomy has faced theoretical and empirical critiques. The most recent scholarship views 'identity' as an ongoing process of definition which is always contested, always incomplete, and always multiplicitous. While critics of this view argue that such an ephemeral definition makes analysis difficult, critical scholars have argued that it is the very difficulty of this complex concept, which makes it useful.
Attempting to complicate ‘identity’ by placing it in a historical, socio-political, cultural perspective seeks to redress the imbalance of generalizations of empirical social science. Against the essentializing tendencies of Said, several scholars have indicated how one may avoid reifying the ‘self/other’ dichotomy. Darby illustrates how fiction can disrupt the self/other dualism. Kaplan and Barber demonstrate how personal encounters disrupt stereotypes. Todorov depicts the ‘self/other’ relationship from a number of perspectives. Der Derian and Campbell show how the ‘self/other’ relationship shifts and changes over time. This dissertation has sought to undermine the ‘iron law of dualism’ by examining how one particular dualism – ‘civilized/barbarian’ – has changed meaning, location, and politics over time.

Following post-colonial theory, this dissertation aims to show the importance of imperialism, race, and identity to contemporary politics. As Phillip Darby suggests, there can be a productive interface between IR theory and post-colonial theory. While post-colonial theory concentrates primarily on literary texts and the power of representation, IR emphasizes the material forces of domination. One such intersection that seems to me to be especially valuable is in representations of war. A number of scholars have worked in this direction. Michael Shapiro has indicated the importance of popular culture to contemporary American cartography. Campbell has also traced the history of the shifting American ‘enemies.’ Other scholars, such as Der Derian, Jean Beth Elshtain, Simon Dalby, Ken Booth, and Bradley Klein, have also looked at the meaning ascribed to the war/politics confrontation.

By tracing the ways that the ‘barbarian’ stereotype was mobilized in a number of wars, the stakes involved in the politics of representation become clear. Imperial
ideology used the 'civilizing mission' rhetoric to justify warfare against 'barbarians.' In
many cases, technology or strategy that was considered immoral when used against
'civilized' Europeans, was considered necessary against the 'barbarian.' During the First
World War, all sides of the conflict circulated the same message: 'we' are fighting for the
protection of 'civilization' against the 'barbarians.' However, as the war dragged on,
Europe began to suspect that it was barbaric itself. The interwar period saw a frantic
reassertion of the 'civilizing mission,' embodied in the Covenant of the League of
Nations and the Mandate System. The machinations of Hitler, and the Second World
War in general, disrupted the distinction between 'civilized' and 'barbarian.' In part, the
barbarity of Nazi rule, especially in the East, was derived from its application of
imperialist ideology without a civilizing mission. The West represented itself as again
fighting for the preservation of civilization. The barbarity of Nazi rule was familiar to
colonial subjects, which Aimé Césaire and Frantz Fanon point out with great clarity and
force. Anti-colonialism and decolonization marked the retreat of the 'civilized/barbarian'
dichotomy in representations of warfare for some time.

However, we find some of the same images, tropes, and descriptions marshalled in
contemporary representations of 'ethnic,' 'tribal,' or 'intractable' conflicts. In post-Cold
War scholarship, the 'discovery' of ethnic wars or wars of a 'third kind' resembles
nineteenth-century descriptions of imperial warfare. However, as Kaplan portrays West
Africa, in contemporary popular culture, both sides are barbaric. 'Ethnic' conflicts are
portrayed as being 'irrational' and not 'understandable' from a Western point of view.
'Ethnic' conflicts are represented as 'natural' features of the post-colonial periphery,
often as a result of colonial borders. Although some scholars working from the vantage of
international ethics urge a reconsideration of intervention as a viable international institution, the majority of mainstream theorists argue like Huntington that these wars are fundamentally 'irresolvable' and consequently counsel non-intervention. Whether one favours intervention or non-intervention, the genealogy of imperialist ideology and the paternalistic rhetoric of the civilizing mission is especially germane to this public debate.

**Implications**

"On Barbarians" contributes to several contemporary conversations in IR theory. From one vantage, this dissertation shows the utility of the concepts of 'culture' and 'identity' for understanding international relations. It has utilized definitions from postcolonial and critical theory to move beyond simplistic, dualist definitions of identity as 'self/other' and attempted to show how identity is better understood as a process. It has used a nuanced definition of culture as a field of representation in which identities and meanings vie for allegiance. Combined these two theoretical perspectives help IR theorists move beyond a simple 'primordialist/constructivist' or 'agency/structure' debate. Situating identity within its historical, political, economic, and social discursive context removes any need for any independent ontological foundations.

From another vantage, "On Barbarians" engages critically with Huntington's 'clash of civilization' rhetoric. It has shown that, when situated in its discursive and historical context, the 'civilized/barbarian' dichotomy is familiar to both popular and academic culture. Despite the degree to which Huntington attempts to present his terms and argument as unproblematic, this genealogy of his discourse has shown the extent to which 'civilization' and 'barbarians' have been used in political, ideological, and unstable ways for imperialist ends since the nineteenth century. Using critical analysis, it
has also shown that Huntington's arguments act as a polemic against 'identity politics' and multiculturalism within the West and America. Huntington describes internal enemies who are as much to blame as the 'Islamic-Confucian' connection for American decline. IR scholars must take care to engage both faces of Huntington's argument.

From another aspect, "On Barbarians" shows that popular culture is a valuable source of international relations. This dissertation has focused on one theme in popular culture – the 'barbarians' – from its usage in the nineteen through the twentieth centuries. It has shown the importance of popular culture as a reflection of international politics. However, it has also shown the importance of popular culture and national identity on the realm of international relations. Analysis of the popular international imaginary can provide a deeper, more nuanced understanding of international relations by focusing not only on the elites who 'do' international politics, but also on the populace who endorse or reject these policies. One contemporary example of the importance of the popular international imaginary is the 'two worlds' model. Circulated by academics and popular press alike, the 'two worlds' model is fast becoming the accepted model of post-Cold War international relations. We must be wary that descriptions of a peaceful, Western, core and a violent, non-Western periphery do not come to mean a division between the spheres of civilization and spheres of barbarism. As is indicated by the contemporary description of 'ethnic' or 'tribal' conflict, we are in danger of theoretically dividing the world into the realm of the understandable 'West' and the premodern, incomprehensible 'non-West.' While there may be characteristics of post-colonial states about which we wish to generalize, we must be wary of relying on imperialist stereotypes or colonial rhetoric that has the effect of reifying power relations.
From another vantage, "On Barbarians" has sought to continue the research started by Doty, Manzo, and Darby on the interaction possible between post-colonial and IR theories. Post-colonial and critical theories of identity and culture have been shown to be particularly illuminating. Further, the post-colonial tendency to focus on texts supplements IR theory, which traditionally concerns itself with material dominance rather than ideational dominance. By not emphasizing the ideational or representational aspects of power, IR cannot understand many relations of dominance or sites of resistance.

This genealogy of the 'civilized/barbarian' discourse illustrates how the power of discourse in politics. IR theory itself can act as a powerful form of identity politics. Often moored to a 'nation,' it defines the world in which all national 'selves' act. If it is not moored to a 'nation,' IR theory has the potential to represent all nations as 'others,' which may preclude the potential for cross-national, inter-civilizational dialogue. As suggested by critical theorists, we must examine how the 'self/other' dyad comes to be constructed, resisted, and reified – and how we can complicate those representations and disrupt that power.
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