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Berlin Dada and the notion of context Wall, Jeffrey David 1970

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BERLIN DAM AND THE NOTION OP CONTEXT  by JEFFREY DAVID WALL B. A., U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Columbia, 1968  A THESIS SUBMITTED IN FARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF Master of A r t s in' the Department of FINE ARTS  We accept t h i s t h e s i s as conforming to the required standard  THE UNIVERSITY OF. BRITISH COLUMBIA May, 1970  In  presenting  an  advanced  the I  Library  further  for  degree shall  agree  scholarly  by  his  of  this  written  this  thesis  in  at  University  the  make  tha  it  purposes  for  may  be  It  financial  for  of  Columbia,  British  by  gain  Columbia  for  the  understood  of  The U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h V a n c o u v e r 8, Canada  of  extensive  granted  is  fulfilment  available  permission.  Department  Date  freely  permission  representatives. thesis  partial  shall  Head  be  requirements  reference copying  that  not  the  of  agree  and  of my  I  this  or  allowed  without  that  study. thesis  Department  copying  for  or  publication my  i i  ABSTRACT  B E R L I N DADA AND T H E N O T I O N O F C O N T E X T  I.  A.  Dominant m a t e r i a l  B.  Society  C.  In  and  force  language  twentieth  = dominant  are  century  aspects  intellectual  of  society  the  society  over  a  single  force  in  society.  process.  fundamental  human p r o c e s s  of  labour  is  distorted. D.  Art  in  conflict  1.-Art E.  In  is  in  twentieth  other  with state  century  artist  is  a.-Artists' (e.g. The  the  attitude  with  toward  l a b o u r as  process.  language.  ideological  function  of  art  is  taken  over  by  deprived  is  myth  is  ability  meanings  to  development  to  rejection  step  beyond  absolute  of  of  society  rejection  toward  a  the  notion of  attitude  toward  Berlin  the  avant-garde,  Dada r e s i s t s  primitivism in  mys-  poetry.)  A p p l i e d meanings  bec-  means  historical  awareness;  history  as  the  meanings.  awareness  conflict  of  1917-1922.  Berlin  control definitions.  mystification  1. -Historical in  absolute  (reification).  process 2. - A r t  necessity.  critique  in  (example:  Resistance of  first  attitudes  tification, of  the  Dada e s t a b l i s h e s  ome a b s o l u t e  social  dialectic.  a.-Marxist Power  of  r e a c t i o n was  Rimbaud.)  critical  1.-Berlin  H.  the  immediate  Dada movement  viable  G.  tension  media.  1.-The  F.  of  is  with  contextual  social  awareness  definitions  and p r o c e s s  engages  in  awareness.  contextual  str-  uggle. 3. - M a n i f e s t o  is  a.-Critical that  the  manifesto  successful I.  Historical art.  tool  analysis to  awareness  is  extent  makes  of  art  meaningful  of  art  by  a.-New  method  New m e t h o d  of  Berlin  to it  of  and T z a r a ' s "art  does  art  is  manifestos  shows  condition". Manifesto not  operate  possible:  only  in  social  Duchamp a n d B e r l i n  A new m e t h o d  reification  that  negation  1. -Negation  anew.  struggle.  as  is  art.  negation  of  art  by  Dada).  2. -Negation ence  J.  contextual Huelsenbeck's  antithetical  the  (Duchamp a n d B e r l i n  of of  of  creation  totally  makes  terms.  Dada brought  is  historical/dialectical.  art  art  into  exist-  established. Objection  to  possible.  D a d a a n d Duchamp t a k e s  art-context  as  its  subject-  matter. K.  Old context ed  L.  Art's  activity  1.-For  Berlin  tions II. A.  becomes  i n w h i c h new  Account  is  of  the  the  i n new  completely  inherently  Dada,  made b y  ALIENATION  artifact  system  context;  redefines  a  total  break  is  establish-  activity.  revolutionary.  importance  bourgeois  of  art  lay  in  the  contextual  assump-  audience.  AND I D E O L O G Y Marx's  analysis  of  labour process;  concept  of  alienation,  cr-  iii  B. C. D. E. F. G. H. I. J. K. L. M. H.  i t i q u e of p o l i t i c a l economy,philosophy. Ideas are created from p r a c t i c e . A l l a c t i v i t y i s by d e f i n i t i o n s o c i a l i n the human world. D i a l e c t i c a l c r i t i c i s m e s t a b l i s h e s existence as a process. The nature of a r t i s d i a l e c t i c a l . The center of a r t i s process, revealed through theory which describes context. Account of the theory of i d e o l o g y . The o p p o s i t i o n of theory to i d e o l o g y . Marx: Ideology = F a l s e consciousness. Account of how ideology enters language; t r u t h and e r r o r part of s i n g l e process of knowledge. Language i s s o c i a l i n nature. Ideology mediates between a c t i o n and language. Ideology i s f u n c t i o n of c l a s s antagonism. Account of d i f f e r e n c e between myth and ideology. D i a l e c t i c a l c r i t i c i s m brings knowledge (true theory) out of f a l s e consciousness through contextual awareness. Knowledge destroys ideology. A r t i s a f u n c t i o n of knowledge.  I I I . ART  VS. CULTURE  A. Culture i s s o c i e t y ' s d e f i n i t i o n ; i t i s a f u n c t i o n of i d e o l o g y . B. Account of b o u r g e o i s - i d e a l i s t concept of c u l t u r e . C. Post-bourgeois world a l t e r i n g b o u r g e o i s - i d e a l i s t c u l t u r a l ideology, moving i t toward more p o s i t i v i s t i c viewpoint i n connection with t e c h n o l o g i c a l r a tionality. D. A r t i s a p a r t i c u l a r k i n d of labour: i t i s the image of a l l labour. E. B o u r g e o i s - i d e a l i s t concept of c u l t u r e remained d i a l e c t i c a l ; new ideology denying d i a l e c t i c i d e a completely. F. Marcuse's c r i t i c i s m of post-bourgeois c u l t u r a l ideology. G. Account of new n o t i o n of "empty category" of Duchamp and B e r l i n Dadaists. H. S o c i a l f u n c t i o n of a work of a r t e s s e n t i a l l y transforms i t s meaning. I . In face of a n t a g o n i s t i c s o c i a l r e a l i t y , a r t s t r u c t u r e s a l t e r n a t i v e events, generates an a l t e r n a t i v e language. J . T h i s language and event i s u n r e a l ; the f a c t that i t proclaims i t s e l f as • a n t a g o n i s t i c to the e x i s t i n g i s the b a s i s of i t s s i g n i f i c a n c e .  1  "The ideas of the ruling class are, i n every age, the ruling ideas: i . e . the class which i s the dominant material force i n society i s at the same time i t s dominant intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at i t s disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that i n consequence the ideas of those whollack the means of mental production are, i n general, subject to i t . The dominant ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas; hence of the relationships which make the one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas of i t s dominance. The individuals composing the ruling class possess among other things consciousness, and therefore think. Insofar, therefore, as they rule as a class and determined the extent and compass of an epoch, i t i s self-evident that they do this i n i t s whole range, hence among other things rule also as thinkers, as producers of ideas, and regulate the production and distribution of the ideas of their age: thus their ideas are the ruling ideas of the epoch. For instance, i n an age and i n a country where royal power, aristocracy and bourgeoisie are contending for mastery and where, therefore, mastery i s shared, the doctrine of the separation of powers proves to be the dominant idea and i s expressed as an 'eternal law*. The division of labour, which we already saw above as one of the chief forces of history up t i l l now, manifests i t s e l f also i n the ruling class as the division of mental and material labour, so that inside this class one part appears as the thinkers of the class ( i t s active, conceptive ideologists, who make the perfecting of the i l l u s i o n of the class about i t s e l f their chief source of livelihood), while the others' attitude to these ideas and i l l u s i o n s i s more passive and receptive, because they are i n reality the active members of this class and have less time to make up ideas and i l l u s i o n s about themselves. Within this class this cleavage can even develop into a certain opposition and host i l i t y between the two parts, which, however, i n the case of a practical c o l l i sion, i n which the class i t s e l f i s endangered, automatically comes to nothing, i n which case there also vanishes the semblance that the ruling ideas were not the ideas of the ruling class and had a power distinct from the power of this class. The existence of revolutionary ideas i n a particular period presupposes the existence of a revolutionary class..." — K a r l Marx, The German Ideology  2 "Every alienation of man from himself and from Nature appears i n the r e l a tion which he postulates between other men and himself and Nature. Thus r e l i g i ous alienation i s necessarily exemplified i n the r e l a t i o n between l a i t y and p r i e s t , or, since i t i s here a question of the s p i r i t u a l world, between the l a i t y and a mediator. In the r e a l world of practice, t h i s s e l f alienation can only be expressed i n the r e a l , p r a c t i c a l r e l a t i o n of man to his fellow men. The medium through which alienation occurs i s i t s e l f a p r a c t i c a l one. Through a l i e n ated labour, therefore, man not only produces his r e l a t i o n to the object, and to the process of production as to a l i e n and h o s t i l e men; he also produces the r e l a t i o n of other men to h i s production and his product, and the r e l a t i o n between himself and other men. Just as he creates h i s own production as a v i t i a t ion, a punishment, and his own product as a loss, as a product which does not belong to him, so he creates the domination of the non-producer over production and i t s product. As he alienates h i s own a c t i v i t y , so he bestows upon the s t r a nger an a c t i v i t y which i s not h i s own." K a r l Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844  I BERLIN DADA AND THE NOTION OF CONTEXT  3 Certainly there have been periods of history i n which art was generally integrated with the organization of society; the period of the twentieth century i s not one of these. One of the primary c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of art since the beginning of the F i r s t World War  particularly  has been i t s profound antagonism  to what has been defined as "culture". In such a h i s t o r i c a l s i t u a t i o n , art i s seen to have a c r i t i c a l function. Its relationship to the existent state of a f f a i r s i s negative, and i t i s i n v o l ved with a l l that which, i n society, i s denied or does not e x i s t . By taking on such a r o l e , the a c t i v i t y of art-making develops an acute concern with context. Every society maintains the r i g h t , or the power, to determine d e f i n i t i o n s i n regard to a l l a c t i v i t y , including of course a r t i s t i c a c t i v i t y . Art always has a context. However, i n t h i s century, a r t has become involved with the creation of a context i n the face of an already e x i s t i n g one, and therefore, with r e s i s t i n g an e x i s t i n g set of d e f i n i t i o n s . I t may seem audacious to claim that, i n the indu s t r i a l and l a t e i n d u s t r i a l s o c i e t i e s , art i s the expression of a l l that does not e x i s t , a l l that i s denied. This paper attempts to j u s t i f y such a claim. As Marx says, the dominant ideas of an age can be seen as the "dominant material relationships grasped as ideas". This paper attempts to discuss, i n theoretical terms, the bases of the dominant material relationships and to d e l ineate t h e i r divergence from the very material relationships exemplified by the art-process. Society's d e f i n i t i o n of art functions as the horizon of a r t . In Duchamp's terms, "...the a r t i s t may shout from a l l the rooftops that he Is a genius; he s,  w i l l have to wait f o r the verdict of the spectator i n order that h i s declarations take on a s o c i a l v a l u e . . . T h i s  d e f i n i t i o n i s the fundamental or univers-  a l grammar of p o s s i b i l i t i e s , judgements and categories. This i s an unescapable  4 f a c t , just as i t inescapable (therefore) that the a r t i s t can never consider hims e l f separate from society or from h i s t o r y . But this horizon i s a broken one, i t s rationale askew. We s h a l l discuss how i t has been created out of, and i n turn has created, a d i s t o r t i o n of a fundamental human process, that which Marx called "labour". This basic d i s t o r t i o n causes the a r t i s t to r e s i s t the horizon as oppressive. The horizon i s a horizon of codifications.and d e f i n i t i o n s . S o c i a l organization can be seen as, i n certain terms, the results of standardized patterns of i n t e r a c t i o n and perception, as "constant scanning patterns". Language i s obviousl y a central factor i n the establishment and maintenance of constant  scanning  patterns. In this sense, language i s a s t r u c t u r a l system, i n which the universe i s represented symbolically, and i t s relations depicted. I t i s an a p r i o r i that human society i s l i n g u i s t i c i n nature, that language and s o c i a l organization are i n fact one process. Marx maintains that the human being i s the only creature on earth who "creates the world"; i f t h i s i s true, we must remember that at the same time and i n the same action, he creates h i s language, and h i s language creates him. I f the d e f i n i t i o n of society which has been produced by the material basis of society i s a d i s t o r t i o n of the labour process, and i f a r t has recognized t h i s , then a r t must exist i n a state of^tension with language. Much nineteenth and twentieth century a r t , from Rimbaud to Duchamp, Burroughs and Warhol, can be seen, i n abstract terms, as an attack upon the language of i n d u s t r i a l c a p i t a l i s t society. I t i s an attack, not by being a propaganda device, but simply by being art. In the society with which Marx concerned himself of our society  the immediate ancestor  the function of art and the role of the a r t i s t had undergone a  deep and r a d i c a l transformation from the state i n which i t existed i n a pre-  5 technological-rational system. One need only mention Rubens or Bernini and t h e i r relationship to the s o c i a l processes of t h e i r time to make the point clear. The years since the beginning of World War I have witnessed the f i n a l stages of the removal of any r e a l s o c i a l necessity from a r t i s t i c a c t i v i t y . This removal has i t s beginnings i n the establishment of the bourgeois-industrial world i n the nineteenth century, but i t s sources are discernible i n the organization of I t a l y  2 during the "Renaissance".  In the nineteenth century the new conditions of mate-  r i a l production created by the bourgeois class established as a corollary, t h e i r media of communication, t h e i r methods of rendering themselves symbolic, of establishing i n consciousness the abstract representation of the principles of t h e i r right to power. Mechanical methods of communication and the d i s t r i b u t i o n of information and images were grasped by the conceptualizing ideologists of the society as a major part of the tool-complex of t h e i r i n t e l l e c t u a l dominance, just as the factory, the open market, and rent were understood as the basis of t h e i r material dominance. Mass publication, s t i l l and movie photography, radio and so on are i n the s t r i c t e s t sense major factors i n the c r i t i c a l state i n which f i n e art exists i n t h i s period. Consciousness of the s i t u a t i o n was apparent from the beginnings of the bourgeois-industrial world, but i t was not at a workable l e v e l ; i t was articulated purely i n terms of the negative, and the absolute despair of a r t i s t s and t h e i r attempt (as i n Lautreamont) to turn complet e l y away from the new society. Certainly by the f i f t h decade of the nineteenth century a r t i s t s were deeply aware of the a l t e r a t i o n i n the mode of t h e i r e x i s t ence. I t was apparent that art had no place i n the new world or i n i t s conceptu a l i z a t i o n s , save that accorded a "great t r a d i t i o n " and i t s value as c u l t u r a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n , as c u l t u r a l symbol. But the bulk of this ideological work was taken over by the mechanics of communication of a geometrically-progressing technology. The tone of European (and p a r t i c u l a r l y French) a r t of the l a t e r  6 nineteenth and early twentieth centuries i n r e l a t i o n to advancing bourgeois society, i s epitomized by Rimbaud: desperate negation and a deep, c e l l u l a r loathing: S i j'avais des antecedents a un point quelconque de l ' h i s t o i r e de France! Mais non, r i e n . I I m'est bien evident que j ' a i toujours ete race i n f e rieure. Je ne puis comprendre l a revolte. Ma race ne se souleva jamais que pour p i l l e r : t e l s l e s loups a l a bete q u ' i l s n'ont pas tuee. Je me rappelle l ' h i s t o i r e de l a France f i l l e ainee de 1'Eglise. J'aurais f a i t , maintenant, l e voyage-.de terre sainte; vues de Byzance, des remparts de Solyme; l e culte de Marie, l'attendrissement sur l e c r u c i f i e s"8eveillent en moi parmi m i l l e feeries profanes.—Je suis a s s i s , lepreux, sur l e s pots casses et l e s o r t i e s , au pied d'un mur ronge par l e soleil. Rimbaud's "career" was one of the fundamental guideposts f o r the Dadaists. They took him as a hero, understanding the implications of h i s vast and severe rejection of European culture. In t h e i r most l u c i d moments, they reveal the awareness of the c r u c i a l meaning of Rimbaud: the necessity of confronting the culture, of making a public denial of i t s . v a l i d i t y and, therefore, of i t s defign i t i o n s . In a certain sense, Harrar i s the ultimate, mythic rejection; but i t i s at the same time an imcomplete r e j e c t i o n , which i s content with the device of "absolute" denial, which makes no attempt at development of an alternative. I t i s important to understand that Rimbaud's reaction, l i k e that of such figures as Gerard de Nerval, Lautreamont and Baudelaire as w e l l , took place i n a more "primitive" context, one i n which the emerging r e a l i t y had not yet attained a degree of resolution and delineation which would make possible a structured progression out of the immediate act of negation. By 1916, the configuration of European culture had been more c l e a r l y defined; f o r many people, the 1914-1918 war was a summation. The war was an immediate catalyst f o r Dada a c t i v i t y , though i t i s obvious that i t was not, s t r i c t l y spea-  7 king, the cause.. The war was, f o r the Dadaists, the o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n of the factors i n European society vhich were most distressing. The Dada groups were faced with a s i t u a t i o n i n which the advancing' culture and i t s dying sources revealed, once and f o r a l l i n a s p e c i f i c c r i s i s / the corruption of i t s assumptions. Rimbaud had established the d e f i n i t i v e rejection per se; i t was l e f t to the Dada groups to make the f i r s t important extension of h i s position. To emulate him was meani ingless: s i t t i n g quietly i n neutral Zurich, they may as well have been i n Harrar. Richard Huelsenbeck, one of the o r i g i n a l members of the e a r l i e s t Zurich group, discusses the alternatives: " I f Tristan Tzara had barely suspected the meaning of t h i s famous existence we drag along between apes and bedbugs, he would have seen the fraud of a l l art and a l l a r t i s t i c movements and he would have become a Dadaist. Where have these gentlemen who are so eager to appear i n the history of l i t e r a t u r e l e f t t h e i r irony? Buried i n books, they have l o s t t h e i r independence, the ambition to be as famous as Rabelais or Flaubert has robbed them of the courage to laugh there i s so much marching, w r i t i n g , l i v i n g to be done. Rimbaud jumped i n the ocean and started to swim to St. Helena, Rimbaud was a h e l l of a guy, they s i t i n the cafes and rack t h e i r brains over the quickest way of gett i n g to be a h e l l of a guy. They have an academic concept i o n of l i f e a l l l i t t e r a t i are Germans; and f o r that reason they w i l l never.get close to l i f e . Rimbaud very well understood that l i t e r a t u r e and art are mighty, suspicious things and how well a man can l i v e as a pasha or a brothel-owner, as the creaking of the beds sings a song of mounting profits."4 To s i t i n the cafes i s e s s e n t i a l l y the "bourgeois" reaction: to admire the "work" and ignore the implications; that i s , to enforce the context which i s applied to a r t , to accept the s i t u a t i o n i n which an a r t i s t i s admired so long as h i s terms and t h e i r extensions are denied existence and effectiveness. Huelsenbeck understood immediately that one cannot profess to admire "Rimbaud" and then by accepting a context which the a r t i s t demands be obliterated, assume that this i s s u f f i c i e n t . "While Tzara was s t i l l w r i t i n g 'Dada ne s i g n i f i e r i e n '  in  8 Germany Dada l o s t i t s art-for-art s-sake character with i t s very f i r s t move. 1  Instead of continuing to produce a r t , Dada, i n direct contrast to .abstract a r t , -5 went out and found an adversary." What sets Dada apart from other " r a d i c a l " European a r t movements of the time i s i t s e x p l i c i t , self-conscious c r i t i c a l nature. Moving into the arena from the domain of a r t and l i t e r a t u r e , i t affirmed t h e i r necessity by denying i t s e l f the right to practice them, becoming a species of "didactic theatre", i n which the central themes are: context, d e f i n i t i o n , language, p o l i t i c s . I t i s necessary to make a d i s t i n c t i o n . In Prance, Dada was carried out i n the shadow of the immediate t r a d i t i o n of avant-garde poetry, and an immediate interest i n the workings of the unconscious considered largely f o r i t s own sake. The position of Andre Breton i n the French Dada movement, and h i s attitude t o ward that movement, are important considerations. His early interest i n psychiatry, h i s l a t e r acquaintance with Freud, h i s involvement with Jacques Vache have become common knowledge. From the beginning of Dada i n Paris i n 1919 Breton understood that i t was a p a r t i c u l a r manifestation, something which would necessa r i l y be transcended. His early involvement with the exploration of the unconscious combined with a deep and, i t might be argued, rather " t r a d i t i o n a l " commitment to the poetry of the French avant-garde mediated against the development of the kind of overt and direct p o l i t i c a l action which characterizes the Dada group i n B e r l i n , and to a lesser extent, i n Cologne. As w e l l , the p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n was different i n the two centers. Certainl y , post-war Paris was not quiet, but i t experienced nothing l i k e the immediate p o l i t i c a l c r i s i s which gripped B e r l i n , whose streets rang with the gunfire of the Spartakus Rebellion, and with word of the October Revolution i n Russia. The B e r l i n group became d i r e c t l y involved with revolution on the concrete l e v e l , while i n Paris the revolt was confined to l i t e r a r y c i r c l e s and bourgeois cultur-  9 a l ignorance, i n the manner of Zurich.** The Parisian Dada group had no connections with p o l i t i c a l organizations; the e a r l i e s t member of the French c i r c l e to take t h i s kind of action was Pierre N a v i l l e , who joined the French Communist 7 Party i n 1925» out of the Surrealist group. analysis and the Party were  In Germany however, the Marxist  constant companions of Dada. Of the o r i g i n a l B e r l -  i n conclave, Wieland Herzfelde, his brother Johann (who changed h i s name to Johnny Heartfield as an act of p o l i t i c a l provocation during World War l ) had been Party members previous to Huelsenbeck•s return to Germany to begin Dada there, and before even the beginnings of the Zurich group.  These two were i n  collaboration with the poets Franz Jung and Raoul Hausmann, and with the graphic a r t i s t , George Grosz. Johannes Baader, "der Oberdada", had been a contributor to Die F r i e Strasse during the war and entered the movement immediately upon g Huelsenbeck's a r r i v a l upon the scene i n January of 1917. Huelsenbeck was the unifying factor f o r Dada i n B e r l i n , f o r he brought the "idea" of Dada with him from Zurich, as Tzara took i t to Paris i n 1920. These people who had spent the war years i n Germany were p a r t i c u l a r l y receptive to the Dada message of r e v o l t . Huelsenbeck's Zurich residence lasted less than a year (February 26, 1916-January, 1917); he was ambivalent about the foundation of Dada: on the one hand he recognized the depth of the issues which i t had raised; on the other he was suspicious of the consciousness and therefore the motives of some of the participants i n the Cabaret Voltaire and the Galerie Dada. "The Galerie Dada capriciously exhibited cubist, expressioni s t and f u t u r i s t pictures; i t carried on i t s l i t t l e art business at l i t e r a r y teas, lectures and r e c i t a t i o n evenings, while the word Dada conquered the world. I t was something touching to behold. Day.after day the l i t t l e group sat i n i t s cafe reading aloud the c r i t i c a l comments that poured i n from every possible country, and which by t h e i r tone of indignation showed that Dada had struck someone to the heart. Stricken dumb with amazement, we basked i n our glory. T r i s t a n Tzara could think of no-  10  thing else to do but write manifesto a f t e r manifesto, speaking of ' l ' a r t nouveau, which i s neither cubism nor futurism", but Dada. But what was Dada? 'Dada', came the answer, 'ne s i g n i f i e rien.'With psychological astuteness, the Dadaists spoke of energy and w i l l and assured the world that they had amazing plans. But concerning the nature of these plans, no information whatever was forthcoming....As I think back on i t now, an a r t f o r art's sake mood lay over the Galerie Dada i t was a manicure salon of the fine a r t s , characterized by tea-drinking old ladies t r y i n g to revive t h e i r vanishing sexual powers with the help of 'something mad'....There might have been a way to make something of the s i t u a t i o n . The group did nothing, and garnered success..."10 Huelsenbeck maintains that the Zurich movement never r e a l l y understood i t s e l f , and therefore, never comprehended what Dada could mean. I t took the B e r l i n group to do so. One can appreciate h i s point: Zurich was a neutral t e r r i t o r y and a university town. Mo-one was i n d i r e c t physical danger and the manner of l i v i n g was not unbearable. The Cabaret Voltaire group was flushed with the achievements of avant-garde a r t : Picasso and Braque's analytic cubism, the "revolutionary" violence and contemporaneity of futurism and the work of Marinetti, the "cause" of abstract a r t (Arp), and even German Expressionism, through Huelsenbeck h i m s e l f . ^ The proposals of " a n t i - a r t " were u m b i l i c a l l y bound to the discoveries and methodologies of other a r t i s t s , and were directed generally against the uncomprehending bourgeois and bourgeois-student audience. I t i s not u n t i l the movement begins to operate i n Germany that the d i a l e c t i c a l and c r i t i c a l aspects become c l e a r l y articulated and Dada takes on a p o l i t i c a l r o l e . In t h i s sense Zurich Dada was a t o t a l l y a r t i s t i c r e v o l t , a proclamation of the new arts and a declaration of t h e i r "opposition" to bourgeois culture. Zuri c h Dada, under Tzara, did not f i n d anything to oppose i n the state of avantgarde a r t i t s e l f . His manifestoes 'of the time do not address themselves to t h i s question, which i s a central concern to Huelsenbeck i n En Avant Dada. and other writings of the period i and to the conduct of the B e r l i n movement as a whole.  11 The Zurich group might be seen, then, as a kind of "nascent" Dada, i n whi c h the major themes of the movement were indicated. Both B e r l i n and Paris developed out of the o r i g i n a l Zurich impulse, Paris as a continuation and r e f i n e ment, and B e r l i n as a rejection of i t .  12  "The Dadaists of the Cabaret Voltaire actually had no idea what they wanted the wisps of 'modern a r t ' that at some time or other had clung to the minds of these individuals were gathered together and called 'Dada'. Tristan Tzara was devoured by ambition to move i n international a r t i s t i c c i r c l e s as an equal or even a 'leader'....And what an extraordinary, neverto-be-repeated opportunity now arose to found an a r t i s t i c movement and play the part of a l i t e r a r y mime!...None of us suspected what Dada might become, f o r none of us understood enough about the times to free ourselves from t r a d i t i o n a l views and form a conception of a r t as a moral and s o c i a l phenomenon. Art just was there were a r t i s t s and bourgeois. You had to love one and hate the other. We see the rationale f o r Huelsenbeck•s departure from Zurich i n 1917. The Spartakus Movement, which would aid i n bringing Germany to revolution, was founded i n March, 1916. Huelsenbeck came to Zurich s p e c i f i c a l l y to avoid p a r t i c i p ating i n the war, about which he obviously had very strong feelings; developments i n Germany could not have escaped b i s attention. He could see the looming p o l i t i c a l c r i s i s and the attendant p o s s i b i l i t y of r e a l revolution i n the nation he seems to have deeply despised. He made the connection between the psychological and c u l t u r a l implications of Dada and concrete p o l i t i c a l conditions. "In January 1917 I returned to Germany, the face of which had meanwhile undergone a fantastic change. I f e l t as though I had l e f t a smug f a t i d y l l f o r a street f u l l of e l e c t r i c signs, shouting hawkers and auto horns. In Zurich the i n t e r national profiteers sat i n the restaurants with w e l l - f i l l e d wallets and rosy cheeks, ate with t h e i r knives and smacked t h e i r l i p s i n a merry hurrah f o r the countries that were bashing each other's s k u l l s i n . B e r l i n was a c i t y of t i g h t ened stomachers, of mounting, thundering hunger, where h i d den rage was transformed into a boundless money l u s t , and men's minds were concentrating more and more on questions of naked existence. Here we would have to proceed with e n t i r e l y  12 different methods, i f we wantedto say something to the people. Here we would have to discard our patent leather pumps and t i e our Byronic cravates to the doorpost....The people had an exalted and romantic attitude toward art and a l l c u l t u r a l values. A phenomenon f a m i l i a r i n German h i s t o r y was again manifested: Germany always becomes the land of poets and thinkers when i t begins to be washed up as the land of judges and butchers."^ The pattern of c u l t u r a l revolt which Huelsenbeck had learned to be so e f f ective from Zurich blended perfectly with the p o l i t i c a l l y - a l i g n e d attack on German culture already i n process i n the publications of Herzfelde, H e a r t f i e l d , 15 Jung and Hausmann.  One of t h e i r most s i g n i f i c a n t actions was the i s s u i n g and  reading of the C o l l e c t i v e Dada Manifesto ^in February, 1918, which attacks ex1  pressionism, cubism, futurism and abstract a r t , while endorsing "Bruitism", "simultaneity", and the "Static Poem" (which can be compared with Marinetti's "Parole i n l i b e r t a " ) . From the Zurich experience, Huelsenbeck understood the phenomenon of the manifesto. Speaking generally, the production of manifestoes can be seen as a r i s i n g out of the consciousness of the necessity to e s t a b l i s h previously nonapparent d e f i n i t i o n s i n the face of e x i s t i n g d e f i n i t i o n s . That i s , the manifesto i s a tool of contextual struggle. "There i s one l i t e r a r y form i n which we can compress much of what we think and f e e l : the manifesto. Tzara had enunciated this principle as early as 1916. From the day the Cabaret Voltaire opened i t s doors, we read and wrote manifestoes. We did not only read them, we spoke them as vociferously and d e f i a n t l y as we could. The manifesto as a l i t e r a r y medium answered our need f o r directness. We had no time to lose; we wanted to i n c i t e our opponents to resistance, and, i f necessary, to create new opponents f o r ourselves. We hated nothing so much as romantic s i l ence and search f o r a soul: we were convinced that the soul could only show i t s e l f i n our own a c t i o n s . " ^ I t i s important to grasp the nature of Huelsenbeck's statement and that of  13 the Collective Dada Manifesto 1918: they are intolerant• The function of the mani f e s t o i s d i a l e c t i c a l ; i t attempts to antagonize i n the realm of meaning and d e f i n i t i o n , and thereby to induce a rupture i n the e x i s t i n g continuum of concepts, language and behaviour. Intolerance i s a virtue of the manifesto and an absolute necessity i n any attack upon an e x i s t i n g and maintained i n t e l l e c t u a l structure. The" romantic silence" so despised by the Berliners can be connected to two t h ings: f i r s t l y , to the inward-seeking turning away from "objective" r e a l i t y exemplified by expressionist (and abstract) a r t , and secondly to a kind of " l i b eralism", an i l l u s o r y tolerance of divergent viewpoints i n a closed system i n which overriding d e f i n i t i o n s are part of the structure of the entire s i t u a t i o n ; diverging viewpoints are seen only i n the context of unstated assumptions and 18 seen therefore a s - — i n spite of any other characteristics  "deviant".  On t h i s basis the B e r l i n Dadaists attacked German Expressionism on the charge that i t was nothing better than an attempt to blot out the outside world, which proved so abusive and depressing, and to make an impotent and s o c i a l l y contemptible escape into the myth of "inner r e a l i t y " . "Now came the expressionists, l i k e those famous medical quacks who promise to ' f i x everything up', looking heavenward l i k e the gentle Muse; they pointed to 'the r i c h treasures of our l i t e r a t u r e ' , pulled the people gently by the sleeve and l e d them into the h a l f - l i g h t of the Gothic cathedrals, where the street noises die down to a distant murmur and, i n accordance with the old p r i n c i p l e that a l l cats are grey at night, men without exception are fine fellows. And so expressionism, which brought the Germans so many welcome truths, became a 'national achievement'. In art i t aimed at inwardness, abstraction, renunciation of a l l objectivity." 9 1  The invocation (and Huelsenbeck recognizes the deliberate nature of t h i s ) of so-called "universals", obscuring out of context the c r i t i c a l differences between things or men, i s obviously anathema to the d i a l e c t i c a l process, which  14 sees i t s e l f consciously as a divider of the continuum of r e a l i t y on the grounds that t h i s continuum i s not a s t a t i c " e n t i t y " , but a process, which i s constantly changing and developing. Therefore, the c r u c i a l relationships are between the parts of this process  the apparently s t a t i c conditions of the world  and the  movement of the whole, between the form of the whole grasped by the mind, and the events which both create the whole and participate i n i t . By accepting the d i v i s i o n between the "inner" and the "outer" worlds, between the realm of theory and that i f practice (which characterizes expressionism f o r the Dadaists), the external world i s accepted as i t i s . Huelsenbeck claims that such acceptance i s nothing better than cowardly resignation, an admission of weakness, lack of control, of alienation i n the sense that Marx applies the term to philosophy. The conception of the human condition as inherently p a i n f u l , f r u s t r a t i n g or" "absurd" ( c f . Schopenhauer) i s the ultimate r e i f i c a t i o n , and a t o t a l l y semantic 20 problem.  Expressionism i n a r t , f o r Huelsenbeck, occupies e s s e n t i a l l y the same  position as philosophy  s p e c i f i c a l l y German I d e a l i s t philosophy  held f o r  Marx i n the context of the material continuum of thought. Huelsenbeck, moreover, condemns the inward-seeking movement as less than an i n t e l l e c t u a l attitude toward the world, f o r i t does not attempt to "compre21 hend the world", but to escape from i t . Likewise, Marx assaults the i d e a l i s t philosophy which, " l i k e German Protestant theology before i t , transforms the aims of men into s p i r i t u a l values; i t thus renounces as hopeless the task of 22 anchoring them i n material r e a l i t y . "  Marx and Huelsenbeck establish p a r a l l e l  methods i n t h e i r various frames of reference; both attack the r e i f i c a t i o n of very material conditions of impotence and despair. Such r e i f i c a t i o n , masquerading as true i n t e l l e c t u a l a c t i v i t y or as authentic a r t , reveals i t s e l f as the negation of that which i t purports to uphold; therefore i t i s , i n addition to  15 i t s other f a u l t s , h y p o c r i t i c a l : "On the pretext of carrying out propaganda f o r the soul, they have, i n t h e i r struggle with naturalism, found t h e i r way back to the abstract, pathetic gestures which presuppose a comfortable l i f e free from content or s t r i f e . The stages are f i l l i n g up with kings, poets and Faustian characters of a l l sorts; the theory of a m e l i o r i s t i c philosophy, the psychologi c a l naivety of which i s highly s i g n i f i c a n t f o r a c r i t i c a l understanding of expressionism, runs ghostlike through the minds of men who never act....That sentimental resistance to the times, which are neither better nor worse, neither more reactionary nor more revolutionary than other times, that weak-kneed resistance, f l i r t i n g with prayers and incense when i t does not prefer to load i t s cardboard cannon with A t t i c iambics is the quality of a youth that never knew how to be young. Expressionism, discovered abroad, and i n Germany, true to s t y l e , transformed into an opulent i d y l l and the expectation of a good pension, has nothing i n common with the e f f o r t s of active men."23 This h y p o c r i t i c a l attitude, which forms an apology f o r a contradictory state of a f f a i r s , i s the attitude of the European bourgeois. The working class and the other poor, f o r example, could not turn away from the world, f o r to do so one must have resources. A poor man cannot follow the formulations of i d e a l i s t culture, because to l i v e the inward l i f e one must be assured of the surviva l of, not sorrmuch h i s "mind", but of, h i s very physical heart, which pumps blood through his brain. Likewise, i t i s not the active bourgeois himself who leads such a l i f e , but h i s symbolic c u l t u r a l counterpart. The philosophers and a r t i s t s who belong to the group which, i n Marx's terms, "make the perfecting of the i l l usions of the class about i t s e l f t h e i r chief source of l i v e l i h o o d " , carry out t h i s charade. The a r t i s t and philosopher play the role determined f o r them by the society i n which they e x i s t . In t h i s way the context f o r a r t and'thought i s established. However, we s h a l l see how, i n the same capacity as the a r t i s t i s created by the s o c i a l context, he i s c r i t i c a l of i t , or at least has the potenti a l to be so (see pp. 37-40). This p o t e n t i a l , when r e a l i z e d , led to B e r l i n Dada.  16 As a consequence of the awareness of the basis of the culture they were dealing with, the B e r l i n group moved into a d i a l e c t i c a l program which transcended the existent boundaries of a r t . In t h i s way they set up a c r i t i q u e of the avant-garde i t s e l f . In contrast to Paris Dada, the B e r l i n group operated from a position which included that of the a r t i s t i c avant-garde, but which understood i t as a s o c i a l product, l i k e everything else, and therefore f u l l y within the area of c r i t i c i s m . B e r l i n Dada included avant-garde art as part of i t s t a c t i c a l methodology, but they placed no f a i t h i n i t as an e f f e c t i v e opposition to s o c i ety and "culture". They understood that i t was i n a poor position to e f f e c t a meaningful c r i t i q u e as long as i t took i t s e l f f o r granted. In P a r i s , the Dadaists were involved i n what Huelsenbeck analyzed as a puerile and c i r c u l a r a c t i v i t y of attempting to c r i t i c i z e from a position within the confines of the d e f i n i t i o n under attack. This was seen as a f a i l u r e of consciousness and i s the basis of 24 Huelsenbeck's disdain f o r Tzara. The B e r l i n Dadaists, i n attacking the avant-garde i t s e l f , attacked the ent i r e notion of "high a r t " ; during t h e i r period of a c t i v i t y , with very few ex25 ceptions, the group produced mainly collage and photomontage as v i s u a l a r t , much of which was implemented as published material i n the several magazines 26 and b u l l e t i n s brought out between 1918 and 1922.  A comprehensive catalogue of  the works of Hausmann, f o r example, does not e x i s t ; much of h i s work was  util-  ized i n publications. I t i s only f a i r l y recently that the oeuvre of John Heartf i e l d has received much attention: v i r t u a l l y a l l h i s work was u t i l i t a r i a n , as 27 .., propaganda. Several members we, as we have mentioned, poets and writers. This a c t i v i t y was not abandoned during the Dada episode, but i t was not given elevated status above the pressure of the moment to produce manifestoes, flysheets, pamphlets and b u l l e t i n s . Jung, Hehring, Einstein and Huelsenbeck continued to publish throughout the period.  17 Nevertheless, i t i s clear that i n attacking high a r t and the avant-garde, they were acting, so to speak, " i n the name of a r t " ; that i s , the understanding of society and the manner i n which i t applies meaning to a r t rendered i t impossi b l e f o r these people to affirm the unlimited a c t i v i t y of the avant-garde as i t was defined. They acted i n fact as a vanguard themselves, but, as we s h a l l see, t h i s position was confirmed, as a c t i v e l y c r i t i c a l only to the extent that i t was a c t i v e l y s e l f - c r i t i c a l . The avant-garde could function only i n a state of extreme tension "with i t s e l f " because of the overwhelming knowledge i t had of i t s e l f as a s o c i a l process. This i s the drive of Huelsenbeck's argument against Zurich and P a r i s , and i t was the central preoccupation of the B e r l i n movement (though the conceptual l e v e l of t h i s preoccupation varied from year to year and from person to person; f o r example, Grosz, Herzfelde, Jung and Heartfield were the most purely p o l i t i c a l i n t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s , Huelsenbeck very p o l i t i c a l but committed to p o l i t i c s through an a r t i s t i c consciousness, Hausmann a l i t t l e f u r ther i n the d i r e c t i o n of a r t i s t i c r e v o l t , Hannah Hoech further s t i l l , and Baader i n a sort of one-man class.) As Huelsenbeck says i n En Avant Dada, i t was necessary to form a conception of a r t as a moral and s o c i a l phenomenon; the B e r l i n Dada movement should be seen as the immediate outcome of such a necessity i n 1918. Their objection to high a r t was not so much formal as i d e o l o g i c a l ; high a r t , as i t existed i n Europe, had allowed i t s e l f to be introduced into the dominant culture, the bourgeois ideology. High a r t such as Picasso's had, by 1919» a place i n the bourgeois scheme, a role which precluded the p o s s i b i l i t y of i t s maintaining a position a c t i v e l y outside that scheme. The B e r l i n Dadaists found that the most "advanced a r t " of t h e i r time had not s u f f i c i e n t l y analyzed i t s position i n regard to the s o c i a l meaning which i t carried, and to the origins  18  of that meaning. In "taking a position outside the bourgeois scheme" i t should be remembered that Berlin Dada i n no way "escaped" the bourgeois world; and i n no way did i t attempt to do so. As mentioned previously with reference to Rimbaud and the notion of "absolute" rejection, the extreme attitude i s most tota l l y bound to i t s subject, but this binding i s dialectical, i n which the c r i t i c a l attitude attempts to indicate the negative aspect of the existent, to show what i s not i n the apparent continuum of "what i s " . Certainly, a s p i r i t of "revolt" colours a l l advanced art of the time; Huelsenbeck and the Berlin group c r i t i c i z e i t because i t has not extended the boundaries of this revolt to include rejection of the manner of operation of the cultural definitions which establish the art-context. The avant-garde of the cubists and the abstract artists were content to carry out the contextual action only to the limits of the already-organized definitions of art-process, and no further. That i s , the Berlin group f e l t that i f one i s involved with questioning the nature of a particular art-process, like painting, one i s implicitly accep28  ting the wider definition of art altogether.  To become involved i n a revolut-  ion of painting would mean not to become involved i n a more totally revolutionary action against the entire bourgeois context of art. Huelsenbeck's endorsement of Bruitism, Simultaneity and the "new medium"  collage-—stems from the  understanding that media themselves are definitions and tend to create contexts, and that such definitions and contexts can operate strongly as a "conservative" 1  element, although they seem to operate on such a broad level of acceptance and such a high level of abstraction that they appear unquestionable. In this sense art media can be seen as analogous to Roland Barthes' notion of language as horizon; " . . . a language i s a kind of natural ambience wholly pervading  19 the writer's expression, yet without endowing i t with form or content: i t i s , as i t were, an abstract c i r c l e of truths, outside of which alone the s o l i d residue of an individual logos begins to s e t t l e . I t enfolds the whole of l i t e r a r y creation much as the earth, sky and the l i n e where they meet .outline a f a m i l i a r habitat f o r mankind. I t i s not so much a stock of materi a l s as a horizon, which implies both a boundary and a perspect i v e ; i n short i t i s the comforting area of an ordered space."29 Therefore, a viable revolutionary move would not involve painting i n a new manner, i f one were concerned with the d e f i n i t i o n of painting as a r t . To paint i n a new manner simply reinforces the e x i s t i n g context, giving i t the appearance of i n f i n i t e f l e x i b i l i t y . Rather, a more wide-ranging action i s necessary. Huelsenbeck saw Picasso moving toward t h i s i n h i s work of 1906-19135 "The concept of r e a l i t y i s a highly variable value, and e n t i r e l y dependent upon the brain and the requirements of the brain that considers i t . When Picasso gave up perspect i v e , he f e l t that i t was a set of rules that had a r b i t r a r i l y thrown over "nature *: the parallels,which cross on the horizon are a deplorable deception behind them l i e s the i n f i n i t y of space that can never be measured. Consequently he r e s t r i c t e d h i s painting to the foreground, he abandoned depth, freed"himself from the morality of a p l a s t i c p h i l o sophy, recognized the conditionality of o p t i c a l laws, which governed h i s eye i n a p a r t i c u l a r country at a particular time; he sought a new, direct r e a l i t y he became, to use a vulgar term, nonr-objective. He wanted to paint no more men, women, donkeys and high-school students, since they partook of the whole system of deception, the theatre and the blague of existence and at the same time he f e l t that painting with o i l was a very d e f i n i t e symbol of a very d e f i n i t e c u l t ure and morality. He invented the new medium....He well understood the i d e a l , s l i c k , harmonious quality inherent i n perspective and i n o i l painting, and the falsehood of the , 'landscape' produced by the sentimentality of o i l painting."  0  Huelsenbeck's approval of Picasso i s mainly concerned with the a r t i s t ' s growing consciousness of the frame of reference of language i n which he works, and the a b i l i t y to grasp the frame of reference as nothing more than an h i s t o r i c a l s i t u a t i o n , open to scrutiny i n the broadest senses. Out of such examination action necessarily takes place; i t i s c l e a r l y a revolutionary praxis Huelsenbeck  20 i s demanding. Considering Picasso's development just before and soon a f t e r t h i s statement was made, one might f e e l that, i n the eyes of those holding the theor e t i c a l viewpoint of the B e r l i n group, i t would be seen as a f a i l u r e to carry 31 through the very r a d i c a l implications of h i s own work.  Cubism radicalized t e -  chnique, and the entire language of painting; of t h i s there i s no doubt. I t i n tentions, however, did not extend to those areas where the work of a r t becomes the "work of a r t " i n the abstract, to the (necessarily) theoretical areas where art's function as an e n t i t y i n society becomes the subject. There i s no necessi t y to " c r i t i c i z e " the cubists f o r t h i s apparent " f a i l u r e " ; however, i t i s v a l i d and desirable to indicate the difference between the extremity of t h e i r posi t i o n regarding art as a r t , and the extremity of the position of the B e r l i n group (to which only Duchamp had progressed by the same time.) In t h e i r attitude toward the avant-garde and t h e i r denial of i t s v a l i d i t y , B e r l i n had very much "come out against a r t " : "The appropriation by Dada of these three p r i n c i p l e s , bruitism, simultaneity and, i n painting, the new medium, i s of course the 'accident' leading to the psychological factors to which the r e a l Dadaist movement owed i t s e x i s t ence. As I have said, I f i n d i n the Dadaism of Tzara and his friends, who made abstract art the cornerstone of t h e i r new wisdom, no new idea deserving of very serious propaganda. They f a i l e d to advance along the abstract road, which u l t i m ately leads from the painted surface to the r e a l i t y of a post-office form. No sooner had they l e f t the old sentimenta l standpoint than they looked behind them, though s t i l l spurred on by ambition....In Germany Dadaism became p o l i t i c a l , i t drew the ultimate consequences from i t s position and renounced art entirely."32 The extremity of the position made i t necessary f o r them to negate the v i a b i l i t y of the continued existence of a r t i n the present context through the only l o g i c a l means available: art i t s e l f . The renunciation of art has value only i n i t s s o c i a l sense. The man who privately renounces art i s seen very simply as not  21  an a r t i s t . The consequential move i s the d i a l e c t i c a l "renunciation" of the conditions which exist through that art which i s necessarily i d e n t i f i a b l e with those conditions. Art, as a r t , had to register i t s resistance to the basis of the  33 organization of European society i n 1919. level, social conflicts  Because art functions on the s o c i a l  which are necessarily i n t e l l e c t u a l c o n f l i c t s  are i t s  a f f a i r . Art i s not seen as the force which can resolve these c o n f l i c t s , but as an area i n which consciousness articulates i t s e l f . As such, i t i s the "object-  34  /  i f i c a t i o n of consciousness", just as, i n Marx's terms (on a different but simi l a r l e v e l ) , "The object of labour i s the o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n of man's (species)  35 life."  Furthermore, i f , as Marx asserts, " I t i s not the consciousness of men  that determines t h e i r existence, but, on the contrary, t h e i r s o c i a l existence determines t h e i r consciousness."  then art (which i s nothing but the resolution  of the productions of particular a r t i s t s ) does not choose whether or not, i n Sartre's terms, to "engage"; i t i s by d e f i n i t i o n engaged  i n history. Renunc-  i a t i o n of a r t i s a d i a l e c t i c a l move on the part of the a r t i s t faced with a context beyond h i s control. I t i s a rejection of that context, a t a c t i c a l step i n the struggle to achieve conditions under which h i s art can be seen (which i s tantamount to the achievement of a new a r t ) . Obviously, t h i s i s a step i n the direction of joining the struggle f o r a new horizon altogether  a new society.  The a r t i s t whose consciousness reaches this state can no longer be s a t i s f i e d with "revolutions" within particular d i s c i p l i n e s or sub-strata, nor even with the p o s s i b i l i t y of a " c u l t u r a l revolution", f o r he realizes that rib c u l t u r a l revolution i s possible without the corresponding s o c i a l - p o l i t i c a l transformation. The B e r l i n group used the techniques of avant-garde art because they comprehended t h e i r potential i n the challenge to a l l d e f i n i t i o n s . However, the group  22 could not stop there because such techniques, f o r a l l t h e i r " l i n g u i s t i c " radicalism, were nevertheless categorizable as a r t . The challenge to the unquestionable horizon was subsumed i n the recognition and acceptance of new a r t , more art. In this l i g h t i t i s interesting to see how the B e r l i n a r t i s t s who made collage  s p e c i f i c a l l y Hausmann, Heartfield and Hannah Hoech, employed the medium.  Although t h e i r compositions derive to a great extent from the vocabularies of cubism and futurism, as well as from expressionist art i t s e l f and contemporary Russian work, there i s common to these Dadaists a s i g n i f i c a n t difference from the other schools. Unlike, f o r example, the collages of Picasso and Braque, the Dadaists do not attempt to "formalize" the elements. One of the most important reasons f o r this i s the use to which these works were put. Picasso's collages are conceived and organized as part of the program of cubist painting, as alternative solutions to i t s major problems, the modalities of depiction and the question of surface. These are formal problems wholly withi n the scope of the d e f i n i t i o n of painting. Picasso's most concrete f l a t works maintain adherence to the canon of high a r t . (See, f o r example, Nature morte. violon et f r u i t s . 1913,  Nature morte au Lacerba, 191 A,  or Nature morte a, l a  39\ chaise cannee. 1912. ) In the 1913 work concentration i s t y p i c a l l y focussed on the unity and resolution of the p i c t o r i a l organization; this impulse i s respons i b l e f o r the d i s t r i b t u i o n of newspaper cuttings across the picture, bringing the depiction together and asserting the surface i n e x p l i c i t contrast to the depth i l l u s i o n generated by the depiction of planes overlapping one another. The technique of combining standard drawing and painting passages with the c o l lage elements aids as well i n integrating these new components into the normative schema of the art object. Naturally, then, cubist collages took t h e i r places  23 on the g a l l e r y wall alongside the paintings. On the other hand, Dadaist works such as Heartfield's early Dada-Photomon40 tage of 1920,  or Hausmann's raucous synthetisches Cino der malerei pamphlet of  41 1918,  were not intended f o r the gallery w a l l , but had a more " u t i l i t a r i a n " pur-  pose. Their function was immediate and mechanical: the B e r l i n a r t i s t s were d e l ighted with the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of creating works which seemed l i k e a r t , but which had a contradictory relationship to a r t i s t i c canons. The Dada collages seemed l i k e a r t , but c o n t r a d i c t o r i l y , were found i n newspapers, handbills, and the covers of fly-by-night magazines, or else, they didn't seem l i k e art at a l l , i n t h e i r apparent artlessness, stylelessness and craftlessness, yet appeared i n what was acknowledged to be (some breed of) art movement. The Dadaists exploited both sides of the coin, impelled by the pressure of history and the desire "to say something to the people", to break the normative codifications of viewing context. The r e s u l t i s a s t y l e of impenetrable and inescapable concreteness, even i n the cases of works which were not published, such as Hausmann's ABCD of 42 1923. In contrast to the works by Picasso mentioned or, for a further example, / \43 Giacomo Balla's Dimonstrazione p a t r i o t i c a (1915), Hausmann v i r t u a l l y slams his material onto the sheet organization i s superb!)  not without care f o r the composition as a whole (the but without mediating the material, as the others  do. The banknotes, cut out l e t t e r s , gynaecological diagramssand o r i g i n a l photographs are not integrated to form an harmonious surface, nor are t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l natures subordinated to a generalized appearance of the work (as i n Balla's collage), but rather are permitted to assert themselves, and to form a conglomerate composition from t h i s assertion. Picasso's chaise cannee i s tame by comparison, with the stunning foreign element worked i n nicely through the extension of the painted areas, and thereby admitted into the pre-existing set of regulations by bending to conform to i t s outline. ABCD, Heartfield's Dada-Photomontage.  24 44 or even something as "formal" as Hausmann's GURK. 1918, which appeared i n his der Dada, consist entirely of these foreign elements colliding together without the soothing influence of the painting aesthetic. One of the most compelling aspects of photomontage was this ambivalence about i t s status as art, as mentioned above. Painting aesthetics, and the corresponding s t y l i s t i c questions were largely invalidated by the use of standardized, readymade material without any manual transformation. Also, by 1919, photographic media constituted the most universally available communication, direct l y tied to the material culture; i t was not connectedn with the art-context. 45 Unlike Hausmann, Hoech and Grosz, Heartfield  disguised the materiality  of his work quite soon after coming upon the photomontage medium. In the Dada period i t s e l f (1917-1923) his works share i n the prevailing mode of roughness, but later, when he turns his attention to specific anti-Fascist and anti-Nazi 46 propaganda, his work becomes technically complex and highly refined.  Most im-  portantly, Heartfield totally resisted the art-context. This was a very conscious choice; his work took the form of reproducible material: posters, newspaper features, handbills, etc. It seems to work only at the level of propaganda. Propaganda i t i s , and as propaganda i t exceeds art i n i t s comprehension of the power of image and of context. In the historical situation i n which he found himself, Heartfield realized that to use the techniques which he adopted and invented for what was to be  consciously  "art" was a regressive step. To do so  would mean that the crucial and necessary message (his content) which he was to convey would be obliterated by the acceptability of the context into'which i t 47  "The Dadaist considers i t necessary to come out against were placed.art, because he has seen through i t s fraud as a moral safety valve. Perhaps this militant attitude i s a last gesture of  25 inculcated honesty, perhaps i t merely amuses the Dadaist, perhaps i t means nothing at a l l . But i n any case, art ( i n cluding culture, s p i r i t , a t h l e t i c club), regarded from a serious point of view, i s a large-scale swindle....Culture can be designated solemnly and naively as the national spi r i t become form, but i t can also be characterized as a compensatory phenomenon, an obeisance to an i n v i s i b l e judge, as veronal f o r the conscience."4° In a very r e a l sense the B e r l i n group i s r e s i s t i n g mystification and the operation of myths. When the B r u i t i s t poem was developed, two p o s s i b i l i t i e s came into being regarding i t s use. F i r s t l y , the attitude held by the f u t u r i s t s , who r e a l l y invented the mode, was thatBruitism was the expression of the nature of the immediately contemporary world, the i n d u s t r i a l i z e d , mechanized, e l e c t r i f i e d speeded-up society, and as such, was bound to represent t h i s society i n i t s own language. The f u t u r i s t s , by remaining within the orbit of painting and sculpture, "formalized" t h i s language as i t was presented i n the terms of those a r t forms, and i n the context established by those forms. Huelsenbeck, i n the Collective Dada Manifesto, takes t h i s aspect of Bruitism into Dada: "The BRUITIST PGEM r e presents the streetcar as i t i s , the essence of the streetcar with the yawning  49 of Schulze the conductor and the screeching of the brakes."  No "distancing"  i s desired. Direct, unmanipulated aspects of s t r e e t - l i f e are pressed into a r t , or at least pressed forward i n the context of art f o r c r i t i c a l consideration. No attempt i s to be made to "aestheticize" these Bights or sounds, to make them beautiful. Just as the Dadaist collages rejected inclusion i n a high art aesthe t i c domain, the B r u i t i s t poem r e s i s t s inclusion i n the domain of a r t i s t i c l a n guage. There i s no Muse, no mystification about the source of the sounds. On the other hand, Bruitism, as i t developed i n France,' was i n f l e c t e d by the entire spectrum of French poetic concerns since Rimbaud. Picasso's Demoise l l e s d'Avignon (1906) i s representative of t h i s i n c l i n a t i o n : i n a single unforgettable image i t a l l i e s the contemporary aspects of cubism and the new medium  26 with the suggestion of a truth e x i s t i n g i n more primitive, non-European cultures. I t i s apparent that t h i s trend, which i n the 1920s began to f i l l European museums with the a r t i f a c t s of pre-technological c i v i l i z a t i o n s from A f r i c a , Asia and South and Central America, i s organically connected to Rimbaud's position. European l i t e r a t u r e of the post-World War-I period, deeply conscious of i t s own a l i e n a t i o n , made various attempts to escape a society which had apparently commi t t e d a h o r r i b l e suicide, yet which refused to die. These attempts followed the outlines set down by men such as Lautreamont or V i l l i e r s de 1'Isle-Adam, which consisted of a t o t a l escape into the imagination, or else those indicated by Rimbaud. "...the period since the War has furnished....many examples of writers who have gone the way of Rimbaud without usually, however, l i k e him, getting to the point of giving up l i t e r a t ure altogether. A l l our c u l t , which Wyndham Lewis has denounced, of more primitive places and peoples i s r e a l l y the manifestation of an impulse s i m i l a r to Rimbaud's D. H. Lawrence's mornings i n Mexico and h i s explorations of Santa Fe and Australi a ; Blaise Cendrars' negro anthology, the negro masks which bring such high prices i n P a r i s , Andre Gide's l i f e l o n g passion f o r A f r i c a which has f i n a l l y led him to navigate the Congo, Sherwood Anderson's exhilaration at the 'dark laughter' of the ,American South....all t h i s has followed i n the wake of Rimbaud."  Q  This point i s made i n the l i g h t of the fact that the Parisian Dadaists endorsed Picasso's primitivism and, through t h e i r connections with the Symbolist movement, participated i n the mystification of the process of Bruitism. At the beginning of the Zurich movement, devices such as Negro music and masks, bala-  51 l a i k a music, chant-poetry and r i t u a l dancing are used to make the*effect. Huelsenbeck reports that at Zurich, "In l i t e r a t u r e , primitive tendencies were pursued. They read medieval prose, and Tzara ground out Negro verses which he palmed o f f as accidentally-discovered remains of a Bantu or Winnetu culture,  52 again to the great amazement of the Swiss."  27 The objection i s not to chant-poetry, sound-poetry, Janco's p r i m i t i v i z i n g masks and the rest; however, the use of primitive devices which are to be speci f i c a l l y related to a romanticized notion of the virtue and v i t a l i t y of nonEuropean, pre-rational-technological cultures i s , I would argue, an association which removes the immediacy of the c r i t i c a l aspects of the attack upon European c u l t u r a l language which these new works and techniques represent. As such, i t stands f o r a position no more engaged than Rimbaud's, and so offers no v a l i d new d i a l e c t i c a l program. The process i s s i m i l a r to the turning of a manifesto into poetry or abstract speculation, as we s h a l l see Tzara does. I t i s basica l l y that of mystification, or, i n the more purely Marxian ( v i a Lukacs) term, of r e i f i c a t i o n , i n which immediate and h i s t o r i c a l conditions (product of r e l a t ionships between l i v i n g men) are represented as "universals" (product of r e l a t ionships between inanimate things) beyond the scope of the p a r t i c u l a r present and the i n d i v i d u a l . Primitivism i s an example of the operation of t h i s process: Rimbaud'3 absolute rejection of Europe gives Europe the semblance of an absolute. Europe becomes the absolute error, and the only solution i n this case i s to s t a r t again from the beginning, i n the manner of Rousseau. Rimbaud appeals to the myth of the noble savage, drinking h i s "liquor of molten metal", i n order to destroy the oppressive ideology created by the i n t e l l e c t u a l production of bourgeois-industrial society. But we are aware that, nevertheless, the myth invoked i s completely relevant to the h i s t o r i c a l connection because that poet, so deeply affected by h i s t o r y , made the connection. Rimbaud's attempt to annih i l a t e Europe took the form of forcing consciousness back i n time. The poet l i t e r a l l y could so no way out (he had witnessed first-hand and participated i n the f a i l e d S o c i a l i s t revolutions of 1848). To move through the present into the future seemed impossible: the present was beginning to be much too w e l l entren-  28 ehed. The attitude toward primitivism and Bruitism held by the B e r l i n and Paris groups i s an illuminating example of t h e i r general positions. By stringently maintaining a state of concentration upon the present, the B e r l i n Dadaists coul d a r r i v e at the f u l l c u l t u r a l value of a n t i - r a t i o n a l noise and simultaneous poetry. The character and source of this work had to be seen i n the context of the immediate environment: these savage-sounding chants and screams were not the product of a formalized, even pastorally-removed native agrarian c i v i l i z a t i o n , product of a past i d e a l , but the shrieks of modern Europeans, i n leather shoes and overcoats. This strictness of purpose and c l a r i t y of context works against the p o s s i b i l i t y of the impact of the work leaking away into a fascination with remote sources, and thereby creating a s i t u a t i o n i n which any rejection of the e x i s t i n g culture takes place i n the name of a culture which could not be immedately connected with i t . Concrete c o n f l i c t s are obscured i n the endorsement of highly abstract c o n f l i c t s . Myth does b a t t l e against myth. The analysis of the B e r l i n movement was from the beginning aimed at the destruction of the i n t e l l e c t u a l structure of Germany, and, by extension, a l l of bourgeois Europe. They were concerned i n a sense which i s quite s t r i c t l y Marxian, to move through the era of myth or ideology, into a very different kind of world. This intention made i t possible f o r them to relinquish the desire to continue to produce art above a l l else. The Marxian system of thought i s characterized as ultimately r a t i o n a l ; the existence of myth i s seen as a particular functioning of consciousness. I t i s bound to particular economic, productive conditions, and i s open to the c r i t i c al  destructive  effects of other functions.  " A l l s o c i a l l i f e i s e s s e n t i a l l y p r a c t i c a l . A l l the mysteries  29 which lead theory towards mysticism f i n d t h e i r r a t i o n a l solution i n human practice and i n the comprehension of this practice."53 The power of myth i s based on the power to control d e f i n i t i o n s : applied meanings, the results of determinate acts by particular human beings, are given the character of absolute meanings. They become the abstract horizon which i s never questioned, under which a l l d e f i n i t i o n s and concepts are established and maintained. Huelsenbeck s objection to the Zurich and Paris Dadaists includes 1  centrally the objection that one cannot combat mystification, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n i n d u s t r i a l i z e d class society, through the production of counter-myths. An i n t e g r a l part of the Marxian program i s the exposure of the process of m y s t i f i c a t i on as an incomplete and unfree state of thought, i n which language i s not used to communicate, but to obscure thought, i n which communication i s the communication of s t r i c t l y - c o n t r o l l e d ideas and meanings, (see pp. 69-72) To be c r i t i c a l i s to be aware of process; the man of c r i t i c a l , sceptical nature i s the one v/ho understands the procedure of producing meaning. "In an a r t i c l e on expressionsim Kornfield makes the d i s t i n c t i o n between the e t h i c a l man and the psychological man. The e t h i c a l man has the c h i l d - l i k e piety and f a i t h which per.mit him to kneel at some a l t a r and recognize some God, who has the power to lead men from t h e i r misery to some paradise. The psychological.man has journeyed vainly through the i n f i n i t e , has recognized the l i m i t s of h i s s p i r i t u a l p o s s i b i l i t i e s , he knows that every 'system' i s a seduction with a l l the consequences of seduction and every God an opportunity f o r f i n anciers . The Dadaist,as the psychological man, has brought back h i s gaze from the distance and considers i t important to have shoes that f i t and a suit without holes i n i t . The Dadadst i s an atheist by i n s t i n c t . He i s no longer a metaphysician i n the sense of finding a rule f o r the conduct of l i f e i n any theoretical p r i n c i p l e s , f o r him there i s no longer a 'thou shalt'....Consequently, the good is....no 'better' than the bad there i s only a imultaneity, i n values as i n everything else. This simultaneity applied to the economy of facts i s communism, a communism, to be sure, which has abandoned the  30 principle of 'making things better*, and above a l l sees i t s goal i n the destruction of everything that has gone bourgeois." This attitude, f o r a l l i t s ideological p e c u l i a r i t i e s , annihilates " b e l i e f " ; there can be no b e l i e f i n a r t , just as there can be none i n myth or r e l i g i o n , because, as we s h a l l see, the action indicated by the verb "to believe" i s i n validated by a new condition of thought. This new condition of thought brings art into existence i n the moment i t destroys the mystification of a r t , the moment art as m y s t i f i c a t i o n ends. A myth or an ideology does not cease to exist once i t i s revealed as an h i s t o r i c a l product. What occurs at this point i s a d i a l e c t i c a l event, i n which the alienated product of thought i s brought back into direct r e l a t i o n s i p with the process which created i t . The existence of the product i s never denied, but i t s independent status outside the range of humanly-created phenomena i s destroyed, and the product i s understood end examined i n i t s new status as resume of a mental procedure. In terms of a r t , the analogy i s very clear: Duchamp did not k i l l a r t , he gave b i r t h to i t  as a self-consc-  iously h i s t o r i c a l a c t i v i t y , "at the service of the mind." Duchamp understood the necessity f o r an explosion i n context; the alternative was to see art as a process d i e . The notion of the independent existence of "Art" bourgeois-idealism  the residue of  i s destroyed. Marx makes a s i m i l a r point i n discussion of  religion: "Since, however, f o r s o c i a l i s t man the whole of what i s called world h i s t o r y i s nothing but the creation of man by human labour, and the emergence of Nature f o r man, he therefore has the evident and i r r e f u t a b l e proof of h i s self-creat i o n , of h i s own origins. Once the essence of man and of Nature, man as a natural being and Nature as a human r e a l i t y , has become evident i n p r a c t i c a l l i f e , i n sense experience, the search f o r an a l i e n being, a being outside man and Hature (a search which i s the avowal of the u n r e a l i t y of man and Nature) becomes impossible i n practice. Atheism, as a denial of t h i s unreality, i s no longer meaningful, f o r atheism i s a  31  denial of God, and seeks to assert by this denial the existence of man. Socialism no longer requires such a roundabout method; i t begins from the theoretical and practical sense perception of man and Nature as real existences. It is a positive human self-consciousness, no longer a self-consciousness attained through the negation of religion, just as the real l i f e of man is positive and no longer attained through the negation of private property (communism)."55 In the same sense does art remain after i t s apparent "negation" in the work of Duchamp and the Berlin Dadaists. It is realized as a determinate mental product. Therefore, i t is controlled, by the mind and the context and never attains an independent existence, never generates idols. Art realizes itself as a phenomenon of consciousness in history, even at tis most abstract, even when i t is concerned only with mountains, deserts, glaciers and oceans. "Art", for Huelsenbeck or Duchamp, really does not exist. What does exist is a certain kind of art process. In a very similar way does society exist, not as an abstract "Society" which stands apart from the individuals who compose i t , but instead as the resolution of their interactions. "The fact i s , therefore, that determinate individuals, who are productively active in a definite way, enter into these determinate social and political relations. Empirical observation must, in each particular case, show empirically, and without any mystification or speculation, the connection of the social and political structure with production. The social structure and the State are continually evolving out of the life-process of determinate individuals, of individuals not as they appear in their own or other people's imagination, but as they really are: i.e. as they act, produce their material l i f e , and are occupied within determinate material limits, presuppositions and conditions, which are beyond their will."5° The rejection of the mythmaking activity (and that of counter-mythmaking) by the Berlin Dadaists is a measure of their sophistication in handling the notion of context. In 1935 Andre Breton was to characterize Surrealism as a "met-  32 57  hod of creating a c o l l e c t i v e myth";  i t i s t h i s approach which generates the  conceptual tensions of Surrealism, and which made i t impossible f o r a workable a l l i a n c e to be formed between that group and purely p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i s t s . P o l i t i c a l action, i n the Marxist sense, i s irrevocably aligned with the destruction of mystification, i n a world i n which the c o l l e c t i v e has been completely o b l i t erated. The existence of anti-mythical thought i s that of the c r i t i c a l nature of consciousness. The now-destroyed myth i s not ignored, but instead becomes an a r t i f a c t , and, at the same time, a symbol of the subversive nature of consciousness i n h i s t o r y . In the same way, the art which Duchamp and the B e r l i n Dadaists destroyed did not cease to e x i s t . In f a c t , i t s existence retains importance, but i n a transformed manner, i n that i t i s now placed i n a comparative context, one i n which the processes which produced i t can be c r i t i c a l l y revealed. Duchamp' s Fountain or Bottle Rack are anti-icons, shot through with the subversive knowledge of what goes into making an icon. This i s the source of the scepticism and the irony. I t might be argued that, s i m i l a r to the sense i n which there i s much i n Duchamp's work h o s t i l e to art as i t existed before him, there i s something i n Marx's thought deeply a n t i t h e t i c a l to poetry, to the so-called " a r t i s t i c impulse". I f there i s anything, i t i s the opposition to r e i f i c a t i o n . The destruction of r e i f i c a t i o n however, as we s h a l l see, makes poetry possible; the a r t i s t i c impulse becomes supremely s e l f - and historically-conscious. The myth, the poem, 58  the art work are seen as natural productions,  c l e a r l y i n the realm of the pra-  c t i c a l and the material. I t i s seen to have a history: the history of men. "The phantoms of the human brain are necessary sublimates of men's material life-processes, which can be empirically established and which are bound to material preconditions. Morality,  33 r e l i g i o n , metaphysics and other ideologies, and t h e i r corresponding forms of consciousness, no longer therefore r e t a i n t h e i r appearance of autonomous existence. They have no h i s t ory, no development; i t i s men, who, i n developing t h e i r materi a l production and t h e i r material intercourse, change, along with t h e i r r e a l existence, t h e i r thinking and the products of of t h e i r thinking. L i f e i s not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by l i f e . Those who adopt the f i r s t method begin with consciousness regarded as the l i v i n g i n d i v i d u a l ; those who adopt the second, which crresponds with r e a l l i f e , begin with the r e a l l i v i n g individuals themselves, and consider consciousness only as t h e i r consciousness. Likewise, art consciousness i s only the consciousness of the man making art, and t h i s i s seen as the content of a r t . Thus, the importance of Duchamp's Headymades, as context becomes content. The work of art has no existence except as a conscious h i s t o r i c a l act. I t does not necessarily partake i n the myth of the beautiful object nor of that of the message from the beyond. I t s r e l a t i o n ship with i n f i n i t y i s i r o n i c , i t s relationship to i t s own importance s k e p t i c a l . Like Duchamp, Huelsenbeck i s the consummate skeptic. "Skepticism" i s a term used to denote process-awareness,  which i s h i s t o r i -  c a l , c r i t i c a l awareness. This skepticism i s very sensitive to d e f i n i t i o n s , and to frames of reference  to systems. The B e r l i n Dadaists' c r i t i c a l focus on the  avant-garde i s a result of such thinking. With this i n mind, l e t us return to the discussion of the manifesto, with . the object of a r r i v i n g at a d e f i n i t i o n of i t i n relationship to the work of a r t , i . e . , to see i t s difference from a work of a r t . As stated above (p. 12),  the function of the manifesto i s to antagonize i n  the domain of d e f i n i t i o n s . I t s primary and authentic role i s contextual. This implies a s i t u a t i o n of struggle and c o n f l i c t , not development according to a pre-organized pattern of formal relationships  that i s , the manifesto emerges  as a polemical t o o l only i n a d i a l e c t i c a l s i t u a t i o n of c o n f l i c t . ^  34 Such a s i t u a t i o n i s synthetic: that i s , i t i s the product of p a r t i c u l a r h i s t o r i c a l acts  d e f i n i t i o n s . In this struggle, everything i s dynamic, and de-  pends f o r i t s intensity upon the determined opposition of fully-delineated components. In terms of the d i a l e c t i c , the more fully-developed the c o n f l i c t i n g components are, the more deep and acute the encounter w i l l be, and the more f u l l y resolved w i l l be the synthesis or resolution.^  The arena of t h i s c o n f l i c t -  1  — i n t h i s case, between e x i s t i n g a r t - d e f i n i t i o n s and emerging a r t - d e f i n i t i o n s — -brings the manifesto as a phenomenon of art, into existence. The effectiveness of the manifesto i s absolutely related to a particular context, a p a r t i c u l a r struggle. Beyond these concerns, i t has no interest. The manifesto, l i k e any factor within a struggle, i s less interested i n the f i e l d of c o n f l i c t as a f i e l d , than i t i s i n forging the necessary resolution of the s i t u a t i o n .  The b a t t l e -  ground i s engaged at a l l only to move past i t . The manifesto i s t o t a l l y a means, just as i n the t r i a d i c d i a l e c t i c a l reading, the thesis and antithesis can be seen as means to synthesis. As a means, the manifesto i s fundamentally different from a work of a r t . The work of a r t indeed carries a c r i t i c a l function, which necessitates that i t , too, antagonize i n the realm of meaning, but simultaneously i t also includes other functions at other l e v e l s , whose role appears more neutral because of the higher l e v e l of abstraction. The work of a r t as a work of art can reconcile opposites, which, on the immediate contextual l e v e l , cannot be reconciled; this occurs because the work takes the abovementioned " f i e l d of c o n f l i c t " as i t s subject-matter. Thus the work i s simultaneously transparent and opaque, i s looked a t , as a product, and looked through, as an indicator of method. As Robert Morris suggests, one does not look at a new formal-methodological a r t i s t i c dev-  62  eolment, but through i t , using i t to see the world.  Therefore, I would sugg-  35 est that there are possible  but not necessary, as Duchamp demonstrated  inter-  nal relations within the work of a r t which operate on a l e v e l at which immediately opposed factors are not s i g n i f i c a n t as opposites, but rather as simple aspects i n a meridian of p o s s i b i l i t i e s .  In works of a r t such as these, content  i s distinguishably d i f f e r e n t from context, i n that i t i s s t i l l possible to d i s tinguish the s p e c i f i c content of a work of a r t (for example, the concern with " i r r a t i o n a l " image-combinations i n Max Ernst's collages, or the relationship between object-shape and depicted image i n Frank S t e l l a ' s work) from the l e v e l at which the work, as a raw f a c t — — a s an abstraction  simply i s . This " i s " i s  no metaphysical i s , but rather refers to the minimum standards necessary f o r the recognition of the p a r t i c u l a r a r t work as an a r t work. That this l a t t e r concern i s a broader and more general one than that of s p e c i f i c content i s demonstrated by the fact the s p e c i f i c content can be obliterated by the mere fact of art-existence, by the i n t e n s i t y of relationship to context, to i t s e l f as a r t . "Art stands against history, withstands''ihistory which has been the history of oppression, f o r art subjects r e a l i t y to laws other than the established ones: to the laws of the Form which creates a different r e a l i t y negation of the established one even where a r t depicts the established r e a l i t y . But i n i t s struggle with history, a r t subjects i t s e l f to history: history enters the d e f i n i t i o n of a r t and enters into the d i s t i n c t i o n between a r t and pseudo-^art. Thus i t happens that what was once a r t becomes pseudo-art. Previous forms, s t y l e s , and q u a l i t i e s , previous modes of protest and refusal cannot be recaptured i n or against a d i f f e r e n t society. There are cases where an authentic oeuvre carries a regressive p o l i t i c a l message Dostoevski i s a case i n point. But then the message i s cancelled by the oeuvre i t s e l f , aufgehoben i n the a r t i s t i c form: i n the work as literature."°4 I t i s when, by a s p e c i f i c i n t e l l e c t u a l process, the work of a r t can become an abstraction of i t s e l f that the c o n t e x t u a l - c r i t i c a l question becomes meaningf u l . At t h i s point we deliberately put aside questions of "appreciation" and so on  36 on, and focus attention upon the work as a representative, i n a manner of speaking, of the category "work of a r t " , a construct of d e f i n i t i o n s , a result of  65 the "metaphoric"  nature of mental a c t i v i t y . At t h i s point, what art i s i s the  66 "art condition"; the a r t process i s seen as a limited system i n a p a r t i c u l a r context. "Works of art are analytic propositions. That i s , i f viewed within t h e i r context—as a r t — t h e y provide no information what-so-ever about any matter of f a c t . A work of a r t i s a tautology i n that i t i s the presentation of the art i s t ' s i n t e n t i o n , that i s , he i s saying that that p a r t i c u l a r work of a r t i s a r t , which means, i s a d e f i n i t i o n of a r t . Thus, that i t i s a r t i s true a p r i o r i (which i s what Judd means when he states that ' i f someone c a l l s i t a r t , i t ' s 67 art')."  We must r e a l i z e , however, that such a reading depends upon, as i s ad-  mitted by the invocation of an a p r i o r i , the existence of an h i s t o r i c a l l y established and agreed-upon context. The a r t work i n t h i s abstract state (exemplif i e d by the Bottle Rack or a work by Kosuth) exists as the result of nothing more than the recognition of the presence of context, which i t s e l f i s necessari l y seen as the resume of the metaphorical, analogical and material process of thought and meaning-application. Therefore, within the art-context (now a speci f i c a l l y , technically delimited zone of a c t i v i t y ) , the work of art needs do no  68 more than simply exist ( i t does not even have to be present  ), that i s , f u l f i l  a l l d e f i n i t i o n a l requirements, cause no l i n g u i s t i c contradictions. Duchamp proved Marx's statement that art i s necessarily a s o c i a l phenomenon. In an i n t e l l ectually organized society (and society i s by d e f i n i t i o n an i n t e l l e c t u a l organi z a t i o n ) , a l l that needs to exist i s a context, a d e f i n i t i o n , a ground of precedent and discourse. With t h i s , the p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r the d e f i n i t i o n are l i m i t l e s s , but only through the movement of context i t s e l f , which i s a s p e c i f i c procedure (see p p . 8 f - 8 Z ) .  37 However, i t i s imperative to recognize that the context i t s e l f i s a determinate h i s t o r i c a l product, an not an unquestionable a p r i o r i . Whenever l i m i t s are drawn around a s i t u a t i o n or an a c t i v i t y , the most important area becomes the edge, the interfeace where that which i s within the l i m i t interfaces with or confronts that which i s not. In opposition to the position held by Kosuth, I would argue that the existence of art i n this contextual state depends ultimately upon the c r i t i c a l recognition  at every moment  of the h i s t o r i c a l nature  of the context i t s e l f . In the d i a l e c t i c a l arena, nothing can e x i s t independentl y . That which i s A i s simply, by the fact of i t s being, something not only other than B, but opposed to B, antagonistic to B, c r i t i c a l of B. Each bounded defined being i s not only passively i t s e l f , but i t i s a c t i v e l y hot that which i t is not.^ Therefore, Duchamp, i n the creation of the f i r s t unassisted Readymades, attacked ostensibly an established context ( i n part, the "morphological"); but as w e l l , with t h i s move he set up a continuous c r i t i q u e of the notion of context i t s e l f . He established a new a r t i s t i c methodology, s i m i l a r to that of B e r l i n Dada, which related to the conscious art-context i n a new way: by treating i t as sub.iect-matter. In the same way i n which myth attains a"new i d e n t i t y when i t s mystifying, magical powers are understood and thereby destroyed,  context,  which i n the d e f i n i t i o n of Kosuth has s i m i l a r powers, i s transformed. Like the myth, and indeed as a subverted myth, i t takes on the character of a self-conscious process r e s u l t , as does the art-object or s i t u a t i o n created within i t . As Kosuth suggests, each art work, by presenting i t s e l f as the " d e f i n i t i o n " (or a d e f i n i t i o n ) has the potential to change the d e f i n i t i o n of a r t . However, such changes do not take place s o l e l y within the pre-established context; simultaneously with the following of p o s s i b i l i t i e s within the context and the redefining  38  of configurations within the d e f i n i t i o n , each such change-act i n fact reverberates upon the context i t s e l f as an entirety, as a notion, as a concept. "...the propositions of art are not f a c t u a l , but l i n g u i s t i c i n c h a r a c t e r — t h a t i s , they do no describe the behaviour of physical, or even mental objects; they express d e f i n i t i o n s of a r t , or the formal consequences of d e f i n i t i o n s of a r t . Accordingly, we can say that art operates on a l o g i c . For we s h a l l see that the characteristic mark of a purely l o g i c a l enquiry i s that i t i s concerned with the formal consequences of our d e f i n i t i o n s (of art) and not with questions of empirical fact."? 0  While t h i s suggestion i s acceptable as f a r as i t goes, I would suggest that i t does not go f a r enough. While the s p e c i f i c content of " l o g i c " as a process i s not under question, the process as & process. i n a certain sense as a "game" of thought, needs to be comprehended i n the l i g h t of man i n history. To i n s i s t upon t h i s i s not to relegate apparent universals to the status of conditioned r e f l e x ; f a r from i t . Rather, to i n s i s t such i s to point out the inescapable connection of thought with "empirical f a c t " . Again, t h i s does not deny the existence of thought-process which are not apparently concerned with p a r t i c u l a r issues of empirical f a c t . However, i t makes e x p l i c i t l y conscious that the process i n question a c t i v e l y separates i t s e l f from questions of an empirical nature, and that t h i s separation must be seen as conscious and deliberate and therefore part of the procedure i t s e l f . That i s , the d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n between analytic and  71 synthetic propositions i s i t s e l f a synthetic proposition.  Context i t s e l f i s  no a p r i o r i condition, but i s much a product of determinate h i s t o r i c a l acts as are the works and definitions which operate within i t . Like any language, however, context acts as the "unquestioned horizon" i n which particular acts seem naturally immersed. And we have understood (Marshall McLuhan) that i t i s the most immediate and pervasive environment which i s most d i f f i c u l t to objectivize and perceive c r i t i c a l l y .  39 To bring the discussion back immediately to the manifesto, we should note that, unlike the work of a r t , there i s nothing i n the manifesto which can be separated from the immediacy of direct contextual concerns. Where the a r t work can e x i s t i n a more highly abstracted state and therefore participate to a cert a i n extent i n a wider, more general context, the manifesto i s a l l d i a l e c t i c . a l l s p e c i f i c content. The manifesto not only does not participate i n the "art condition", i t i s a n t i t h e t i c a l to i t . I t i s correct to claim that the manifesto succeeds to the extent that i t does not e x i s t as a r t , to the extent to which i t repudiates the p o s s i b i l i t y of e x i s t i n g as a r t . As a r t , a r t present necessarily no thesis, no argument; instead i t remains " i t s e l f " , within the context, and any polemical aspect the work might have emanates from t h i s state. No matter how l o g i c a l and rationalized the work might be ( f o r example the "sculpture" of Judd), i t does not reach i t s l i m i t of a c t i v i t y i n the problem-solving practice. As Duchamp said, "There i s no solution because there i s no problem". I t i s i n this l i g h t that we understand the role-changing capacity of a r t works, t h e i r l i f e and death?, and t h e i r l i f e a f t e r death, as "history". The l i f e of the manifesto i s , c o n t r a r i l y , a l l c o n f l i c t , a l l problem, a l l solution. I t i s only when the authors of a manifesto realized this to i t s u t most that t h e i r product takes on f u l l value and i s most successful. I t i s against t h i s background that the manifestoes of Huelsenbeck and Tzara should be compared; a comparison of the manifestoes leads us a s surely to this t r a i n of t h ought as this t r a i n of thought leads to the consideration of t h e i r manifestoes. While the German Dadaists made i t t h e i r objective to r i p apart.what they saw as a repressive culture ("Instinctively he (the Dadaist) sees h i s mission 72 i n smashing the c u l t u r a l ideology of the Germans."  ), the Parisian group, ben-  eath the horizon of the notion of the avant-garde, understood t h e i r assault as  40 issuing from that avant-garde position. Tzara's a c t i v i t i e s i n Zurich as well as i n Paris are s u f f i c i e n t evidence of t h i s ; they are aimed at s o l i d i f y i n g the avant-garde out of which any c r i t i c i s m , carried out i n the name of art, would be achieved. The nature of t h e i r own position as such was not an object of c r i t i c ism,  i t was rather the standard of measurement. Consequently c r i t i c i s m of other  movements or branches was carried out withimhthe framework of an unquestioned c o n t e x t ^ i n a sense Tzara's notions of the relationship of advanced a r t to society create a mystification of the avant-garde i t s e l f . I n no manner do the Par i s i a n Dadaists or t h e i r Zurich predecessors renounce art; t h e i r motivation i s continually to affirm i t i n the most absolute sense. This attitude, and i t s F r ench poetic a f f i n i t i e s , i s revealed by Tzara i n h i s famous Dada Manifesto 1918; "Art i s a private a f f a i r , the a r t i s t produces i t f o r hims e l f ; an i n t e l l i g i b l e work i s the product of a j o u r n a l i s t , and because at t h i s moment i t strikes my fancy to combine t h i s monstrosity with o i l paints: a paper tube simulating the metal that i s automatically pressed and poured hatred cowardice v i l l a i n ^ . The a r t i s t the poet rejoice at the venom of the masses condensed into a section chief of t h i s industry, he i s happy to be insulted: i t i s a proof of h i s immutability. When a writer or a r t i s t i s praised by the newspapers, i t i s proof of the i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y of h i s work: wretched l i n i n g s of a coat f o r public use; tatters covering b r u t a l i t y , piss contributing to the warmth of an a n i mal brooding v i l e instincts."?4 Art exists f o r Tzara i n what we have seen Huelsenbeck characterize as a " t r a d i t i o n a l view", a view which had to be destroyed i n order to form a new con-  75 ception of "art as moral and s o c i a l phenomenon."  Note that Tzara i s not asser-  t i n g s p e c i f i c a l l y that art's language i s opposed to the s o c i a l r e a l i t y f o r concrete reasons, and that these reasons are beyond the control of a r t i s t s just as they are beyond the control of the bourgeois and the masses. To do so would be to recognize that the a r t i s t i s no super-human creature, aloof from the materi-  41 a l and i n t e l l e c t u a l d i f f i c u l t i e s of those s o c i a l groups, but instead that, i n being active i n an inherently s o c i a l enterprise, he i s as much a victim of c u l ture as they are. To accept this would mean ultimately to envisage a different s i t u a t i o n , and therefore a very different d e f i n i t i o n of a r t and the a r t i s t . Thus Tzare's manifestoes are documents of a no-revolt, one i n which no sol u t i o n i s offered, and no discussion i s generated beyond that of the absolute affirmation of the " a r t i s t " (which obviously means the a r t i s t as he exists) absolutely against the bourgeois and the working class. "I write a manifesto and I want nothing, yet I say certain things, and i n p r i n c i p l e I am against manifestoes, as I am also against principles (half-pints to measure the moral value of every phrase too too convenient; approximation was invented by the impressionists). I write this manifesto to show that people can perform contradictory actions together while taking one fresh gulp of a i r ; I am against reaction; f o r continuous cont r a d i c t i o n , f o r affirmation too, I am neither f o r nor against and I do not explain because I hate common sense."? 6  Huelsenbeck sees Tzara's position simply as the result of a lack of consciousness or development. In Tzara's w r i t i n g there i s no conscious move away from an authentic c r i t i c a l position; rather, the whole of h i s a c t i v i t y was organized without the t o t a l conceptual grasp of the s i t u a t i o n . Tzara's Zurich career operated, i t seems, on a c e l l u l a r , i n s t i n c t i v e l e v e l , i n which formulated c r i t i c a l and s e l f - c r i t i c a l concepts did not a r i s e . As Huelsenbeck says, " T r i s t an Tzara had been one of the f i r s t to grasp the suggestive power of the word Dada. From here on he worked indefatiguably as the prophet of a word, which on-  77 l y l a t e r was to be f i l l e d with-a concept."  In this context, Tzara's "DADA NE  SIGNIFIE RIEN" (1918) takes on a p a r t i c u l a r h i s t o r i c a l meaning f o r us. This d i f f i c u l t y i s apparent throughout the manifestoes written by Tzara.  42 While never e x p l i c i t l y a n t i - d i a l e c t i c a l , they never a t t a i n an authentic c r i t i c a l position because they never take up a true c r i t i c a l method. The Dada Manifesto 1918 or the Manifesto on feeble and b i t t e r love of 1920 are cases i n point: t h e i r focus i s d i f f u s e , they direct themselves to question whose range makes i t possible f o r them only to be mentioned i n passing: "A manifesto i s a communication addressed to the whole world, i n which there i s no other pretension than the discovery of a means of curing instantly p o l i t i c a l , astronomical, a r t i s t i c , parliamentary, agronomic, and l i t e r a r y syphlis. I t can be gentle, good natured, i t i s always r i g h t , i t i s strong vigorous and l o g i c a l . " ^ 7  In addition to t h i s , Tzara uses overtly "poetic" language, language whose compl e x i t y and i r r e g u l a r i t y , imagery and conceit, prevents the manifestoes from being c l e a r l y and d i r e c t l y comprehended. "I have given a pretty f a i t h f u l version of progress, law, morality and a l l other fine q u a l i t i e s that various highly i n t e l l i g e n t men have discussed i n so many books, only to conclude a f t e r a l l that everyone dances to his own personal boomboom, and that the writer i s e n t i t l e d to h i s boomboom: the s a t i s f a c t i o n of pathological c u r i o s i t y ; a private b e l l f o r inexplicable needs; pecuniary d i f f i c u l t i e s ; a stomach with repercussions i n l i f e ; the authority of the mystic wand formulated as the bouquet of a phantom orchestra made up of s i l e n t f i d d l e bows greased with p h i l t r e s made of chicken manure. "79 Tzara's manifestoes i n fact tend toward that which i s the very antithesis of the manifesto: poetry. I t i s f a i r to say that Tzara's intentions had been d i r e c t l y poetic from the beginning of the Zurich a f f a i r , as had been those of the rest of the Cabaret Voltaire g r o u p — B a l l , Janco, Huelsenbeck, Hennings, Arp. The f i r s t issue of Cabaret V o l t a i r e , the f i r s t Dada publication, included A p o l l i n a i r e , Picasso,  43 Modigliani, Kandinsky, Marinetti and Cendrars as w e l l as the Cabaret group themselves. Huelsenbeck's disillusionment with Zurich and the Cabaret Voltaire seems to stem from t h e i r overriding b e l i e f i n art and poetry: he sees this as a naivety, a lack of skepticism i n the sense used above. Huelsenbeck knew that to believe i n art t h i s way was to accept a r e i f i e d context. In an interview of  May,  1950, Tzara states: " I I s'agissait de f o u r n i r l a preuve que l a poesie e t a i t une force vivante sous tous les aspects, meme antipoetiques, 1' ecriture n'en etant qu'un vehicule occasionnel, nullement indispensable, et l'expression de cette spontaneite que faute d'un q u a l i f i c a t i f approprie, nous appelions d a d a i s t e s . " ^ In a s i t u a t i o n where art i s i n question i n i t s contextual sense, " b e l i e f " i s of l i t t l e importance, f o r b e l i e f i n s i s t s upon the unconditional character of i t s object. The "conservative" characteristics of t h i s argument are, I hope, evident. Something i s conceived as absolute, unconditionally necessary, etc., i n a p a r t i c u l a r frame of reference. I t i s , h i s t o r i c a l l y , not separable from that frame: to i n s i s t that i t exist unconditionally i s to do one of two things: either to i n s i s t i m p l i c i t l y that the context, irrespective of i t s nature, be retained without question, or else to be ignorant of the function of context i n the process of thought. E i t h e r way, what emerges i n practice i s at least the p o s s i b i l i t y of an excuse to r e a t i n , more or less consciously, the'existing s t a te of a f f a i r s . Tzara's b e l i e f i n poetry i s then, n a t u r a l l y enough, a b e l i e f i n a c e r t a i n poetry, which implies a p a r t i c u l a r contextual f i e l d . Tzara's thinking i n 1919 was strongly influenced, as mentionedjby French poetic ideas, from the sense of absolute revolt engendered by Rimbaud, to the notion of " d i f f i c u l t y "  and aestheticism, which i s part of the program of the  Symbolist movement and related a c t i v i t e s (cf. Mallarme). This influence shapes  44 his manifestoes down to the d e t a i l s . After the Dada Manifesto 1918, which was his second work (the more p o e t i c a l l y structured Manifesto of M. Antipyrene was 81 presented at Waag H a l l , Zurich, July 14, 1916  ), the writings take on a more  overtly "poetic" structure and syntax. XI Dada i s a dog—a compass—the abdominal c l a y — n e i t h e r new nor a Japanese nude—a gas meter of sentiments r o l l e d into p e l l e t s —Dada i s brutal and puts out no propaganda—Dada i s a quantity of l i f e undergoing a transparent transformation both e f f o r t l e s s and giratory XII ladies and gentlemen buy come i n and buy and do not read you w i l l see the man who holds i n h i s hands the keys of niagara the man who limps i n a blimp with the hemisphere i n a suitcase and his nose shut up i n a Japanese lantern and you w i l l see you w i l l see you w i l l see the stomach dance i n the massachusetts saloon the man who drives i n a n a i l and the t i r e goes f l a t the s i l k stockings of miss a t l a n t i s the trunk that navigates the globe 6 times to reach the addressee monsieur and h i s fiancee and h i s sister-in-law you w i l l f i n d the address of the carpenter the frog-watch the nerve shaped l i k e a paper-cutter you w i l l learn the address of the minor pin f o r the feminine sex and the address of the man who furnishes the king of greece with f i l t h y photographs and address of action francaise. XIII Dada i s a v i r g i n microbe Dada i s against the high cost of l i v i n g Dada a j o i n t stock company f o r the exploitation of ideas Dada has 391 different attitudes and colors depending on the sex of the chairman I t transforms i t s e l f affirms simultaneously says the opposite i t doesn't matter screams goes f i s h i n g . Dada i s the chameleon of rapid, interested change Dada i s against the future. Dada i s dead. Dada i s i d i o t i c . Hurrah f o r Dada. Dada i s not a l i t e r a r y schbol roar Tristan TZAEA  82  This outlook takes over completely by 1918; the three l a t e r manifestoes can  45 be seen to be completely i n t h i s category, which i s not c r i t i c a l and which though some may disagree  only approximates poetry:  "Hypertrophic painters hyperaestheticized and hypnotized by the hyacinths of the hypocritical-looking muezzins."83 The examination can be closed with the reproduction of one of Tzara's poems from the 1916 c o l l e c t i o n , Vingt-cinq Poemes, published at the time of the Caba84 ret V o l t a i r e . CINEMA. CALENDRIER DU COEUR ABSTRAIT MAISONS 2 avec tes doigts crispes s'allongeant et chancelants comme l e s yeux l a flamme appelle pour serre es-tu l a sous l a couverture les magasins crachent l e s employes midi l a rue l e s emporte les sonnettes des trams coupent l a phrase forte 3 vent desir cave sonore d'insomnie tempete temple l a chute des eaux at l a saute brusque des voyelles dans les regards qui fixent l e s points des abimes a venir a surpasser vecus a concevoir appellent l e s corps humains legers comme l e s allumettes dans tous les incendies de l'automne des vibrations et des arbres sueur de petrole 21 le f o o t - b a l l dans l e poumon casse l e s v i t r e s (insomnie) dans l e puits on f a i t b o u i l l i r les nains pour l e s v i n et l a f o l i e picabia arp ribemont-dessaignes bonjour I t i s not necessary to press the point; i n comparison to contemporaneous  46  works, such as Huelsenbeck's Collective Manifesto, or i n recent and well-known pieces l i k e Marinetti's h i s t o r i c F i r s t Futurist Manifesto of 1909,  and the con-  tinuing series of manifestoes from the pens of Marinetti and the group of Futuri s t painters (Severini, Russolo, Boccioni, B a l l a , Carra, etc.)t i t i s plain to see that the l i t e r a r y element i s dominant with Tzara. In being so, i t removes 85  his manifestoes from any corpus of c r i t i c a l a c t i v i t y . One may maintain i n the face of t h i s that Tzara's method is, c r i t i c a l , and acceptably so, i n that i t i s the kind of " d i a l e c t i c a l " or "didactic" theatre mentioned e a r l i e r when the works are read or performed, and possibly a s i m i l a r genre of poetry when published. No separation i s permitted between the a r t i s t i c and c r i t i c a l functions of the work. However, i t should be seen that t h i s object i o n has already been answered, i t being an argument, e s s e n t i a l l y , f o r a r t , whose c r i t i c a l function operates at at different l e v e l . D i a l e c t i c a l or didactic theatre i s , as with Brecht f o r example, an art form and nothing else. I t i s not c r i t i c i s m . The s p e c i f i c content might have, as i t has i n Brecht, a c r i t i c a l or s o c i a l message  even an exhortation and a threat as f o r example, i n the work of  Genet or i n "Living Theatre" concepts  but this function i s d i s t i n c t from the  c r i t i c a l function of art as art as discussed above (pp. 36-39). This c r i t i c a l a c t i v i t y i s carried out on a different l e v e l  that of "art i n the abstract" so 86  to speak  art (consciously and deliberately) i n context.  The primarily l i t e r a r y preoccupations of the Parisian Dada group precluded the establishment ism i n 1925  and 1926  u n t i l the organization of the conceptual basis f o r Surrealof a reasonable and effective position regarding the pr-  oblem of art-context. I t s ideological bases  i t s "undefined assumptions"  were those of the European avant-garde as i t developed s p e c i f i c a l l y i n French l i t e r a t u r e , whose rebellions, no matter how copious, must be seen as e s s e n t i a l l y  47 bourgeois. The break with bourgeois cultural dicta was not effected with any systematic, intellectual mediation u n t i l the fundamental engagement with Marxist thinking was created gon  principally by Naville, Breton, Eluard, Soupault and Ara-  around 1925. In this sense, the Parisian Dada movement can be characteri-  zed as a "bourgeois" phenomenon i n that, by resisting bourgeois society essenti a l l y from within one of i t s most prized definitions, they were doomed to social acceptance through the structure of already-created contexts which controlled the implications of their revolt. Their position created social antagonisms, to be sure, but these were produced within mangeable limits f o r the social organiation as a whole. The realization by the Berlin Dadaists of the bourgeois essence of avantgarde a c t i v i t y necessitated, as we have seen, the "cessation of art". But i t i s c r i t i c a l to understand that this cessation could not really take place; that i s , the Berlin Dadaists could not just do nothing. It was imperative to use art against art, to continue to make art, but only i n order to exacerbate the conflict, to focus on the contradictions involved. This i s particularly cogent to the extent that Marxist ideas were involved i n the position of Dada i n Berlin. The Marxist attitude toward art demands that i t be made i n total lucidity, i n f u l l possession of the awareness of putting oneself directly onto the horns of a d i lemma, a contradiction. Marx analyzed bourgeois society and found i t to be the product of contradiction. The art as well i s contradictory, even paradoxical, and the denial of art i s necessarily "contradictory" as well i n that i t had to be made by art, by the a r t i s t ' s activity i n the realm of established art-defini t i o n s . The "art" produced by the Berlin Dadaists was produced, then, i n a s i t uation of great d i a l e c t i c a l tension, truly at the breaking point. Art was seen as a social "product" and, insofar as i t was unconscious of this and the contra-  48 dictions produced by t h i s , i t was repudiated. "Dada i s German Bolshevism. The bourgeois must be deprived of the opportunity to 'buy up a r t f o r h i s j u s t i f i c a t i o n . A r t should altogether get a sound thrashing, and Dada stands f o r this 1  thrashing with a l l the vehemence of i t s limited nature." Unlike the Parisians, the Berliners held out no hope that a r t could be the "solution"; t h e i r understanding of i t s origins ruled t h i s out. A r t , f o r them, was not something to be believed i n ; i t was something to work with. The importance of art lay i n the contextual assumptions made by the bourgeois audience. The attack upon context was the attack upon art and, by obvious implication, upon the context-generating and maintaining c u l t u r a l ideology. Unlike the attack on culture made by Rimbaud, that of B e r l i n Dada was mediated and rationalized; they understood that t o t a l r e j e c t i o n i n such terms was out of the question. These a r t i s t s , l i k e the French, were t o t a l l y committed to a r t , but they had s u f f i c i e n t i n t e l l e c t u a l comprehension to observe the functioning of a r t i n i t s necessary frame of reference. Any r e j e c t i o n was seen as aocontextual, and therefore a d i a l e c t i c a l , a f f a i r , i n which development had to be achieved through d i r e c t confrontation with existent conditions. A t r u l y revolutionary rupture could only be achieve through t o t a l engagement with conditions as they existed. As Sartre has said, " I t i s always true of course, that to f i g h t something one must change oneself into i t ; i n other words one must become i t s 88 true opposite and not merely other than i t . " " I n s t i n c t i v e l y he (the Dadaist) sees h i s mission i n smashing the c u l t u r a l ideology of the Germans. I have no desire to j u s t i f y the Dadaist. He acts i n s t i n c t i v e l y , just as a man might say he was a t h i e f out of 'passion', or a stampc o l l e c t o r by preference. The 'ideal' has shifted: the abstract a r t i s t has become....a wicked m a t e r i a l i s t with the abstruse characteristics of considering the care of h i s stomach and stock jobbing more honorable than philosophy. 'But that's nothing new', those people w i l l shout who never tear themselves away from the 'old'. But i t i s some-  49 thing s t a r t l i n g l y new, since f o r the f i r s t time i n history the consequences have been drawn from the question: What i s German culture? (Answer: S h i t ) , and this culture i s attacked with a l l the instruments of s a t i r e , b l u f f , irony and f i n a l l y , violence. And i n a great common action."®-* "Dada l o s t i t s p o l i t i c a l and aesthetic v i r g i n i t y i n the post war period. By f a l l , 1920, the war had been over two years and i t was obvious that the tabula rasa,for which Swiss-German Dada was s t r i v i n g could not be-achieved. The Dada attitude began to s h i f t , imperceptibly at f i r s t , to the potential n i h i l i s m 90 for which i t i s now known."  This fact does not contradict the preceeding d i s -  cussion. As the p o s s i b i l i t y f o r revolution faded i n post-war Germany, the movement, t i e d to t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y f o r t h e i r polemical belie viability, found i t s own outlook more and more depreciated.Cultural attack, at the l e v e l of i n t e n s i t y and directness at which i t was carried out i n B e r l i n , i s a product of i n s t a b i l i t y i n society and the proximity of catastrophic l i b e r a t i v e change. As the image of catastrophe disappeared, new tactics began to become necssary. In France, these were to be S u r r e a l i s t t a c t i c s , which would enliven the Paris horizon soon a f t e r the "death" of Dada (Breton's F i r s t Manifesto of Surrealism i n 1924, the appearance of La Revolution Surrealiste on December 1 of the same year, the r i o t at the Closerie des L i l a s banquet i n honor of Saint-Pol-Roux  i n J u l y , 1925, f o r  91 \ example  ). In Germany, no Surrealism was apparent, and Dada simply ceased op-  erations.^  2  "Dada come-to p o l i t i c s through poetic r e v o l t , and p o l i t ics absorbed Dada. Dada died of i t s transposition into real i t y , f o r i t may be said that a f t e r 1920 Dada no longer exi s t e d . What was to take place i n France some years l a t e r when, after the death of Dada, surrealism subdued and u t i l i z e d i t s anarchic drive, occurred much sooner i n Germany, where Dada was only a f l a s h i n the pan, by the l i g h t of which a world was revealed. Dada's end was hastened by p o l i t i c a l events and the r e s u l t i n g transformation of i t s o r i g i n a l l y i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c sense of r e b e l l i o n and separation. An end worthy of Dada's  50 grandeur and i s o l a t i o n , a normal end, i n e v i t a b l y brought about by the metamorphosis of i t s idealism and by i t s active intervention i n society. I t was Dada and i t s disorder versus a l l the unworthy forces that lay i n wait to destroy i t : the embourgeoisment of i t s combativeness and the d i s t ortion of i t s l i b e r a t i n g energy; an aestheticism emerging from Dada through i t s annulment, of which abstract art i s the most disastrous example. Dada and i t s refusal to establi s h an aestheticism of any kind, because aestheticism i s always an absence of any attitude toward l i f e , and an end i n i t s e l f , were defenseless. Dada had never been a r t i s t i c , but i t had always been a state of mind, and i t had always been human: what happened i n Germany c l e a r l y proves t h i s . And the Communists, powerful i n Germany owing to t h e i r organization, showed that they understood t h i s fact by accept i n g representatives of Dada into t h e i r ranks which on t h e i r part was no mistake."93  II ALIENATION AND IDEOLOGY  51 The understending of the contextual nature of art, i t s status as a social process, i s but one part of the necessary analysis. We have established that to consider art except contextually i s meaningless; i t i s essential to indicate, in the same breath so to speak, the basis of the context of art itself. The f r ame of reference for art i s not an a priori construct; i t is historical (see note 71), the result of determinate actions and relationships. Society sely analogous with language  preci-  is the horizon under which a l l these relationsh-  ips take place and resolve themselves; yet, at the same time, society is completely a product of these relationships. The relations create society; that i s , the real actions of real men create the horizon in the same time as they live under i t . Marx understood society as this simultaneously concrete and reflexive phenomenon. In the same process in which men create society and language, these products in their turn, as completed constructs, reflect back on the original process, casting their image upon i t and modelling i t in that image. As a reflexive process, society i s understood as the objectification of the labour process of production, and therefore, in a certain sense, as an aspect of the "objectification of consciousness" mentioned earlier (see note 34). Art, like language, likewise i s an aspect of the objectification of consciousness, the articulation of consciousness. There is no question of identifying the articulation with that which i t is to articulate. However, the separation between articulation of consciousness and consciousness must be considered in terms of process. While i t is possible to suggest that art or language i s such an articulation, i t is not valid to postulate a schism between the two because in the necessarily social context of thought and action consciousness takes on meaning primarily as i t exists among individuals. Therefore, language ought not to be seen "additively" as something which simply makes consciousness accessib-  52 l e to other people. Rather, language should be seen d i a l e c t i c a l l y and r e f l e x i v e l y , as an i n t e g r a l part of consciousness i n that consciousness takes on s i g n i -  94 ficance only through i t s relationships with other subjects.  Furthermore, i n  practice, the issue of language and art does not arise except i n a s o c i a l ambience . "...we f i n d that man....possesses 'consciousness*; but, even so, not inherent, not 'pure' consciousness. From the start the ' s p i r i t * i s a f f l i c t e d with the curse of being 'burdened* with matter, which here makes i t s appearance i n the form of agitated layers of a i r , sounds i n short, of language. Language i s as old as consciousness; language i s p r a c t i c a l consciousness, as i t exists f o r other men, and f o r t h i s reason i s r e a l l y beginning to exist f o r me personally as w e l l ; f o r language, l i k e consciousness, arises only from the need, the necessity of intercourse with other men. Where there exists a relationship, i t exists f o r me: the animal has no ' r e l a t ions' with anything, cannot have any. For the animal, i t s r e l a t i o n to others does not exist as a r e l a t i o n . Consciousness i s therefore, from the very beginning a s o c i a l product and remains so as long as men exist at all."95 The s o c i a l ambience and system of thought  the context  i n which a r t ex-  i s t s i n the modern era can be discussed i n terms of one word: a l i e n a t i o n . Obviously much has been said on the topic, and i t i s not my intention to add to a description of a r t i s t i c alienation  as such  here. Rather, the topic must be  seen, not as an isolated a r t i s t i c phenomenon, but as a direct function of a more general condition which animates and enervates society as a whole. The concept of alienation, while not o r i g i n a l with Marx, finds i t s concrete explication i n h i s c r i t i q u e of p o l i t i c a l economy. "...man's relationships with that which he produces by h i s unaided e f f o r t s are twofold. On the one hand he realizes himself i n them. There i s no a c t i v i t y which does not give form to some object, that does not have some issue or resu l t which i t s author enjoys d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y . On the other hand or, rather, at the same time man loses himself i n h i s works. He loses h i s way among the products of h i s own  53 e f f o r t , which turn against him and weigh him down....At one moment, he sets off a succession of events that c a r r ies him away: this i s h i s t o r y . At another moment, what he has created takes on a l i f e of i t s own that enslaves him: p o l i t i c s and the state. Now h i s own invention dazzles and fascinates him: t h i s i s the power of ideology. Now the thing he has produced with h i s own hands—more accurately, the abstract thing—tends to turn him into a thing himself, just another commodity, an object to be bought and sold."° Alienation exists i n twentieth century c a p i t a l i s t society not as a malfunctioning of the society, nor, r e a l l y , of the i n d i v i d u a l i n r e l a t i o n to that soc i e t y . Indeed, to attempt such an analysis on these terms leads nowhere, except to the useless notion of a "fundamental c o n f l i c t " . A very much more profitable f i e l d presents i t s e l f when one understands t h i s contradictory s i t u a t i o n to be a l o g i c a l and necessary outcome of the workings of a s o c i a l organization whose  97 essence i s alienated.  Such a s i t u a t i o n has an economic, material basis: mat-  e r i a l production, by the way i t organizes i t s e l f , creates s p e c i f i c r e l a t i o n ships between men. These relationships•change as the organization of production develops, becomes more complex and so on. "The sum t o t a l of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society  the r e a l foundation  on which r i s e l e g a l and p o l i t i c a l superstructures and to which correspond  defi-  nite forms of s o c i a l consciousness. The mode of production of material l i f e determines the general character of the s o c i a l , p o l i t i c a l and s p i r i t u a l processes of l i f e . I t i s not the consciousness of men that determines t h e i r existence, but, on the contrary, t h e i r s o c i a l existence which determines t h e i r consciousness."^ Alienation i s an active component and i t i s centered around, of course, the process of production, which depends upon the d i v i s i o n of labour and private property, which are seen as two aspects of the same process.  54 "With the d i v i s i o n of labour, i n which all....contradictions are i m p l i c i t and which i n i t s turn i s based on the natural d i v i s i o n of labour i n the family and the separation of s o c i ety into individual families opposed to one another, i s given simultaneously the d i s t r i b u t i o n , and indeed the unequal d i s t r i b u t i o n (both quantitative and q u a l i t a t i v e ) , of labour and i t s products, hence property: the nucleus, the f i r s t form of which l i e s i n the family, where wife and children are slaves of the husband. This latent slavery i n the fami l y , while s t i l l very crude, i s the f i r s t property, but even at this stage i t corresponds perfectly to the d e f i n i t ion of modern economist who c a l l i t the power of disposing of the labour power of others. Division of labour and p r i v ate property are, moreover, i d e n t i c a l expressions: i n the one the same thing i s affirmed with reference to a c t i v i t y as i s affirmed i n the other with reference to the product of the activity."99 In s o c i a l organization under these p r i n c i p l e s , working men are separated by an apparent s t r u c t u r a l necessity from involvement i n t h e i r work. When such a condition e x i s t s , labour, which i s the fundamental process of man, deeply connected with time-and self-consciousness, becomes, i n the eyes of those with the power to purchase i t , a commodity, a raw material i n a certain sense, l i k e coal, s t e e l or lumber; to those who are disposed to s e l l i t , i t becomes not l i f e i t s e l f , not involvement, but a means to l i f e , and, as such, an obstacle to achievement, (see below, p . 6 5 ) . Leaving aside (necessarily) an h i s t o r i c a l recapitul a t i o n of the development of t h i s state of a f f a i r s , l e t us examine what i t does to the worker. Nineteenth century p o l i t i c a l economy began from a situation i n which labour was already organized along the l i n e s indicated above, i n which land and the major means of production were already i n private hands. I t i s f r om this point that we also begin. The c r u c i a l  and obvious  point to remember i s that Marx's work, while  economically centered, i s a c r i t i q u e of p o l i t i c a l economy (cf. s u b t i t l e of Capi t a l ) . Marx points out that nineteenth century p o l i t i c a l economy i s by d e f i n i t -  55 ion " c a p i t a l i s t " i n i t s assumptions (see p. 1), that i t i s i t s e l f a product of these p a r t i c u l a r r e l a t i o n s . The problem with i t i n h i s eyes  and this p a r a l l e l s  Huelsenbeck's attitude toward the European a r t i s t i c avant-garde  was that i t  could not presume to be c r i t i c a l because i t could not move beyond the basic assumptions of the society which produced i t . " P o l i t i c a l economy begins with the fact of private property; i t does not explain i t . I t conceives the material process of private property as this occurs i n r e a l i t y , i n general and abstract formulas which then serve i t as laws. I t does not comprehend these laws; that i s , i t does not ,JQQ show how they arise out of the nature of private property." The basis of the difference (and the c o n f l i c t ) between the two major c l a s s es i n i n d u s t r i a l c a p i t a l i s t society i s c a p i t a l , and the processes which i t sets i n motion. Alienation might seem to be, then, only the province of the worker, f o r i t i s he who i s controlled by c a p i t a l , while the c a p i t a l i s t controls i t . Capital determines everything f o r the worker: i n the f i r s t instance i t determines whether or not he w i l l work at a l l , and a f t e r that, where, how long, how intensely, i n combination with whom, and so on. Nevertheless, we s h a l l see that, i n the f i n a l analysis the organization i s c i r c u l a r and monolithic: i t includes the owner of property and c a p i t a l as much as i t does the propertyless worker. The c r u c i a l difference i s one of immediacy and fundamentally. This difference i s s u f f i c i e n t , however, to understand that, while a l i e n a t i o n i s a condition pervading c a p i t a l i s t society, a f f e c t i n g a l l i t s members, i t does not appear to be a problem f o r those members of society whose interests are most d i r e c t l y and continually served by the t o t a l organization. Por these people the immediate e f f e c t s , and consequently the immediate awareness of the s i t u a t i o n i s v i t i a t e d by the processes i n society which are organized f o r t h e i r benefit. I t i s , therefore  i n our society as i t was i n the e a r l i e r c a p i t a l i s t nations d i r e c t l y under  56 Marx's gaze  the non-propertied  groups, the groups more f u l l y dependent upon  the organization of society f o r t h e i r basic material existence, who undergo a s i g n i f i c a n t a l i e n a t i o n . The a l i e n a t i o n of the r u l i n g class i s an abstract a l i e n ation, something to be discussed and studied almost as a scholarly d i s c i p l i n e ; therefore i t i s not, i n Marx's terms, an h i s t o r i c a l force. This force i s was p o t e n t i a l l y , i n Marx's day  or  the very concrete alienation of the working  class. These groups would f e e l the implications of t h e i r condition e a r l i e s t and most powerfully. "The performance of work appears i n the sphere of p o l i t i c a l economy as a v i t i a t i o n of the worker, o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n as a loss and as s e r v i t ude to the ob.iect. and appropriation as alienation."191 I t i s not the d i v i s i o n of labour as such which Marx i s c r i t i c i z i n g ; i t i s a p a r t i c u l a r organization of the d i v i s i o n of labour and the r e s u l t i n g conception of labour. "Further, the d i v i s i o n of labour implies the contradiction between the interest of the separate i n d i v i d u a l or the i n d i v idual family and the communal interest of a l l individuals who have intercourse with one another. And, indeed, t h i s communal interest does not exist merely i n the imagination, as the 'general good', but f i r s t of a l l i n r e a l i t y , as the mutual i n t e r dependence of the individuals among whom labour i s divided. And f i n a l l y , the d i v i s i o n of labour offers us the f i r s t example of how, as long as man remains i n natural society that i s , as long as a cleavage e x i s t s between the common and the parti c u l a r interest as long, therefore, as a c t i v i t y i s not v o l u n t a r i l y but naturally divided, man's own deed becomes an-alien power opposed to him, which enslaves him instead of being controlled by him. For as soon as labour i s d i s t r i b u t e d , each man has a p a r t i c u l a r , exclusive sphere of a c t i v i t y which i s forced upon him and from which he cannot escape. He i s a hunter, a fisherman, a shepherd or a c r i t i c a l c r i t i c , and must remain so i f he does not want to lose h i s means of l i v e l i h o o d ; while i n communist society, where nobody has one exclusive sphere of a c t i v i t y , but can become accomplished i n any branch he wishes, society regulates the general production and thus makes i t possible f o r me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt i n the morning, f i s h i n the afternoon, rear c a t t l e i n the evening, c r i t i c i z e a f t e r dinner, just as I have  57 a mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, shepherd or c r i t i c . " 1 0 2  Labour exists t o t a l l y i n terms of the external world, as a f i e l d of a c t i v i t y i n which man, the h i s t o r i c a l being, creates himself. I t i s i n t h i s sense that we understand Marx when he says that man creates the world, creates nature. But man carries out this process a l l the time, alienated or not. I t i s not a l i enation which stops him from carrying out the a c t i v i t y of creating nature. But alienation i s a distorted condition which creates, therefore a false world. When the product of labour i s separated from the process of i t s production, a def i n i t e antagonism exists between the product and the process  i . e . the worker  finds his product standing opposed to him as an object over which he has no cont r o l , yet, c o n t r a d i c t o r i l y , which he has created. I t i s apparent that t h i s s i t u ation w i l l extent from the immediate p a r t i c u l a r relationship between a s p e c i f i c worker and h i s s p e c i f i c product into more general realms. The relationship which entails between the p a r t i c u l a r worker and h i s particular product shapes the r e lationship between the general worker  man, and h i s general product  nature,  the world, his l i f e . "...just as nature affords the means of existence of labour, i n the sense that labour cannot l i v e without objects upon which i t can be exercised, so i t also provides the means of existence i n a narrower sense; namely, the means of physical existence f o r the worker himself. Thus the more the worker appropriates the external world of sensuous nature by h i s labour the more he deprives himself of means of existence, i n two respects: f i r s t , that the sensuous external world becomes progressively less an object belonging to h i s labour or a means of existence of h i s labour, and secondly, that i t becomes progressively less a means of existence i n the d i r ect sense, a means f o r the physical subsistence of the worker. In both respects, therefore, the worker becomes a slave of the object;....Thus the object enables him to e x i s t , f i r st as a worker and secondly, as a physical object. The c u l -  58 mination of this enslavement i s that he can only maintain himself as a physical ob.ject so far as he i s a worker, and that i t i s only as a physical ob.ject that he i s a worker." Through alienated labour, the relationship of man to a l l of nature i s a l t ered (see p. 2). Instead of creating a continuum, i n which labour and i t s product  l i f e and nature  are totally interrelated, the industrial world creates  a tense discontinuum, i n which the two are totally antagonistic. Furthermore, alienation i s not just the property and quality of the product,  i t does not become apparent only i n the post-labour state. For, i f at the  conclusion of a particular action of work, the worker i s faced with the objecti f i e d product of his labour, and i f this work i s totally out of his control, i t must follow that the entire process of creating this product was the process of destroying this control: "...alienation appears not merely i n the result but also i n the process of production, within productive activity i t s e l f . How could the worker stand i n an alien relationship to the product of his activity i f he did not alienate himself i n the process of production i t s e l f ? The product i s indeed only the • resume of a c t i v i t y , of production. Consequently, i f the product of labour i s alienation, production i t s e l f must be active alienation....(labour is)...not the satisfaction of a meed, but only a means for satisfying other needs. Its alien charac- , ter i s clearly shown by the fact that as soon as there i s no physical or other compulsion i t i s avoided l i k e the plague.... Finally, the external character of work for the worker i s shown by the fact that i t i s not his own work but work for someone else, that i n work he does not belong to himself but to another person." ^ 1  In the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, Marx extends his analysis to a further dimension of alienation: alienation of man from his "organic essence", from his "species l i f e " . This species-life "has i t s basis i n the fact that man (like animals) lives from inorganic nature, and since man i s more universal than an animal so the range of inorganic nature from which he  59 l i v e s i s more universal."  105  Por man, the entirety of the world outside h i s bo-  dy constitutes a basic part of h i s consciousness. "The u n i v e r s a l i t y of man appears i n practice i n the u n i v e r s a l i t y which makes the whole of nature into h i s inorganic body: (1) as a direct means of l i f e ; and equally (2) as the material object and instrument of h i s l i f e a c t i v i t y . Nature i s the inorganic body of man; 106 with which he must remain i n a continuous interchange i n order not to die." As we have seen, alienated labour removes man from nature, or nature from man, and man from himself. I t must, by a perfectly v a l i d movement, alienate him from i n d i v i d u a l other men and from a l l other men  the "species". " I t makes sp-  ecies l i f e into a means of i n d i v i d u a l l i f e , and secondly, i t turns the l a t t e r , as an abstraction, into the purpose of the former, also i n i t s abstract and a l i 107 enated form."  The l i f e - a c t i v i t y that i s labour, appears to be, as stated ab-  ove, now only a means to a l i f e - a c t i v i t y , and so "Life appears only as a means „ 1 . „ .,108 of l i f e . " If nature i s the inorganic body of man, man must make h i s existence i n terms of nature. No opposition i s seen here; there i s no necessity to suppose that, i n the "abstract", nature by d e f i n i t i o n stands opposite man and forces him to wage war against i t f o r s u r v i v a l , and therefore to l i v e on the carnage of nature. "iWhile Marx p a r t i a l l y retains the common nineteenth century view that nature exists b a s i c a l l y as the material of consciousness, he avoids the implication to treat i t as an instrumentality, devoid of any meaningful existence outside the p a r t i c u l a r aspirations of men. Man i s able to make workable abstractions about nature, to make d e f i n i t i o n s of i t . Once he achieves a d e f i n i t i o n of nature, he works i n i t s terms (see p. 51). I t should be apparent that t h i s i s l i a b l e to lead to various kinds of d i f f i c u l t y , most of which have been realized i n the twentieth century. These d i f f i c u l t i e s result from, i n general, the inad-  60 equacy of operational d e f i n i t i o n s of nature.  Marx understood the deep r e l a t -  ionship between man and nature; he knew that part of man's relationship with nature was passive, and very consciously so; i n a certain sense t h i s passivity corresponds to the the aesthetic impulse. "Animals produce only themselves, while man reproduces the whole of nature. The products of animal production belong d i r e c t l y to t h e i r physical bodies, while man i s free i n the face of h i s product. Animals construct only i n accordance with the standards and needs of the species to which they belong, while man knows how to produce i n accordance with the standards of every species and knows how to apply the appropriate standard to the object. Thus man also constructs i n accordance with the laws of b e a u t y . " 110  The object of labour i s the creation of the world. This statement should be considered i n the same terms as those stated by Rimbaud when asked mother  by h i s  i n what sense h i s poetry meant "what i t said": "exactly and i n every  sense". "The object of labour i s , therefore, the o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n of man's species l i f e ; f o r he no longer reproduces himself merely i n t e l l e c t u a l l y , as i n consciousness, but actively and i n a r e a l sense, and he sees h i s own r e f l e c t i o n i n a world which he has c o n s t r u c t e d . " ^ Therefore, alienated labour v i r t u a l l y deprives man of h i s species, or true community l i f e . We understand man now a l i e nated i n every sphere. Throughout Marx's argument, alienation i s nothing other than a human process: "The a l i e n being to whom labour and the product of labour belong, to whose service labour i s devoted, can only be man himself. I f the product of labour does not belong to the worker, but confronts him as an a l i e n power, t h i s can only be because i t belongs to a man other than the worker. I f t h i s a c t i v i t y i s a torment to him i t must be the source of enjoyment and pleasure to another. Not the gods, nor nature, but only man himself can be t h i s a l i e n power over men." 112  This statement throws a good deal of l i g h t on the positions of such cone-  61 epts as "God" and "Nature", which are seemingly timeless, i n the development of h i s t o r i c a l systems of thought or systems of ideology. In Marx's sense, systems of ideology are codifications of s p e c i f i c a c t i v i t i e s of s o c i a l organization, and, as Marcuse suggests, such systems produce controlled contexts i n which 113 "timeless" concepts of philosophy are used.  Society produces an i n t e l l e c t u a l  superstructure i n which these concepts w i l l be used; the manner i n which they are used defines the context of t h e i r use, and therefore defines them. We s h a l l see the implications of t h i s observation i n a l a t e r section (see below, p.no). The relationship of man to nature, and hence to other men, we have seen, i s the horizon under which i n t e l l e c t u a l a c t i v i t y develops. Marx argues that when a society bases i t s existence on an alienated productive process, i t w i l l produce,, on every l e v e l , an alienated world  including naturally, alienated i n t e l l e c t -  ual a c t i v i t y , which centers on the contextual location of these universal concepts. Moreover, as i n t e l l e c t u a l production increases, the process becomes refined and sophisticated: what might have been seen as an "arithmetic progression" of the dominance of certain abstract ideas becomes, with the advance of s e l f v a l i d a t i n g ideology, a "geometric progression", i n which the r e f l e x i v e nature of abstraction turns back onto the process of material production, re-forming i t i n i t s image with continually increasing speed and i n t e n s i t y . This procedure i s encased i n history while being the motive force of history. The production of universal concepts i s not an unnatural phenomenon; Marx i s not attempting any spurious debunking of abstraction as such. Rather, h i s intention i s to p l a ces such concepts s p e c i f i c content  i n terms of t h e i r position and function more than of t h e i r i n the context of a c t i v i t i e s which i n fact produced them,  and to which they owe t h e i r existence. "Such universals thus appear as conceptual instruments f o r  62  understanding the p a r t i c u l a r c o n d i t i o n s of things i n the l i g h t of t h e i r p o t e n t i a l i t i e s . They are h i s t o r i c a l and s u p r a - h i s t o r i c a l ; they conceptualize the s t u f f of which the experienced worl d consists....The p h i l o s o p h i c concepts are formed and developed i n the consciousness of a general c o n d i t i o n i n an h i s t o r i c a l continuum; they are elaborated from an i n d i v i d u a l p o s i t i o n withi n a s p e c i f i c s o c i e t y . The s t u f f of thought i s h i s t o r i c a l s t u f f no matter how a b s t r a c t , general, or pure i t may become i n p h i l o s o p h i c or s c i e n t i f i c theory. The a b s t r a c t - u n i v e r s a l and at the same time h i s t o r i c a l character of these 'eternal o b j e c t s ' of thought i s recognized...in Whitehead's Science and the Modern World: 'Eternal objects a r e . . . . i n t h e i r nature, a b s t r a c t . By " a b s t r a c t " I mean that what an e t e r n a l object is in itself that i s to say, i t s essence is comprehensible without reference to some one p a r t i c u l a r experience. To be a b s t r a c t i s to transcend the p a r t i c u l a r occasion of a c t u a l happening. But to transcend an a c t u a l occasion does not mean bei n g disconnected from i t . On the c o n t r a r y , I hold that each e t e r n a l object has i t s own proper conne c t i o n with each such occasion, which I term i t s mode of i n g r e s s i o n i n t o that occasion.' 'Thus the metaphysical s t a t u s of an e t e r n a l object i s that of a p o s s i b i l i t y f o r an a c t u a l i t y . Every a c t u a l occasion i s defined as to i t s character by how these p o s s i b i l i t i e s are a c t u a l i z e d f o r that occasion. '"IH  That Marx would concur e s s e n t i a l l y with such ideas i s made obvious by the following:  " I t should be noted....that everything which appears to the worker as an a c t i v i t y of a l i e n a t i o n . appears to the non-worker as a c o n d i t i o n of a l i e n a t i o n . Secondly, the r e a l , pract i c a l a t t i t u d e (as a s t a t e of mind) of the worker i n product i o n and to the product appears to the non-worker who confronts him as a t h e o r e t i c a l a t t i t u d e . 5 " D i v i s i o n of labour becomes t r u l y such only from the moment when a d i v i s i o n of m a t e r i a l and mental labour appears. From t h i s moment onwards consciousness can r e a l l y f l a t t e r i t s e l f that i t i s something other than consciousness of exi s t i n g p r a c t i c e , that i t i s r e a l l y c o n c e i v i n g something without c o n c e i v i n g something r e a l ; from now on consciousness i s i n a p o s i t i o n to emancipate i t s e l f from the world and to proceed to the formation of 'pure' theory, theology, philosophy,  63 ethics, etc. But even i f t h i s theory, theology, philosophy, ethics, etc., comes into contradiction with the e x i s t i n g r e l a t i o n s , t h i s can occur only as a result of the fact that e x i s t i n g s o c i a l relations have come into contradiction with the e x i s t i n g forces of production..." " 11  Such abstract thought attempts to renounce i t s material causes, and to r e place the acknowledgement of this with the idea that the material world i s f o r med from the concept, which exists p r i o r to any actual thing, and which informs the structure of the material world as i t s essence. This i s the basis of the tightly-structured ideology i n which processes exist as they are defined i n superstructural language, outside of whose system of maintained d e f i n i t i o n s one cannot venture. The alienated s o c i a l organization has removed the "natural" sources of men's wealth, and l e f t them with a false consciousness of wealth and poverty. "Private property has made us so stupid and p a r t i a l that an object i s not ours unless we have, when i t exists f o r us as c a p i t a l or when i t i s d i r e c t l y eaten, drunk, worn, inhabi t e d , etc., i n short, u t i l i z e d i n some way. But private property i t s e l f only conceives these various forms of possession as means of l i f e , and the l i f e f o r which they serve as means i s the l i f e of private property labour and the creation of c a p i t a l . Thus a l l the physical and i n t e l l e c t u a l senses have been replaced by the simple alienation of a l l these senses; the sense of having. The human being had to be reduced to t h i s absolute poverty i n order to be able t o give b i r t h to a l l his inner w e a l t h . " 117  The theoretical structure of alienation creates the dehumahization of the senses (and therefore of thought i t s e l f ) as a universal condition, whose truth i s proved i n that i t works i t s e l f out r e f l e x i v e l y i n society. Thus, alienated thinking recognizes i t s e l f , but, l i k e the c a p i t a l i s t p o l i t i c a l economy which i s one of i t s aspects, i t "takes f o r granted that which i t should explain"; that i s , i t posits as a universal a p r i o r i that s i t u a t i o n within which i t was creat-  64 ed, and which i t i s bound, as intellectual activity, to explain. The dehumanization of the sense i s a function of the ruin of the species l i f e of man;  the senses therefore, do not really exist i n this society; their  creation i s the project of society, which, i n effect i s destroyed or thwarted by organized alienation. In the alienated world, society, i n Marx's sense of the term, cannot exist; the universe shows i t s face as foreign and antagonistic, and the soundest advice comes from Beckett: "don't wait to be hunted to hide." In society, as Marx defines i t , every act i s social; i t i s the species l i f e of man to be social:  "...the social character i s the universal character of the whole movement; as society produces man as man, so i t i s produced by him. Activity and mind are social i n their content as well as i n their origin; they are social activity and social mind. The human significance of nature only exi s t s for social man, because only in. this case i s nature a bond with other men, the basis of his existence for others and of their existence for him. Only then i s nature the basis of his own human experience and a v i t a l element of human r e a l i t y . The natural existence of man has here become his human existence and nature i t s e l f has become human f o r him. Thus society i s the accomplished union of man with nature, the veritable resurrection of nature, the realized naturalism of man and the realized humanism of nature. Social activity and social mind by no means exist only in the form of activity or mind which i s directly communal. iV. Even-when I-carry out s c i e n t i f i c work, etc., an a c t i v i ty which I can seldom conduct i n direct association with other men, I perform a social, because human, act. It i s not only the material of my activity such as the language i t s e l f which the thinker uses which i s given to me as a social product. My own existence i s a social a c t i v i t y . For this reason, what I myself produce, I produce for society, and with the consciousness of acting as a social being. My universal consciousness i s only the theoretical form of that whose l i v i n g form i s the real community....although at the present day this universal consciousness i s an abstraction from real l i f e and i s opposed to i t as an enemy. That i s why the activity of my universal consciousness as such i s my theoretical existence as a social being. It i s above a l l necessary to avoid postulating 'society' once again as an abstraction confronting the individual. The individual is_ the social being."^^  65 The significance of the situation which Marx is describing is that i t does not exist. The l i f e which does exist is of a distinctly different kind. The intellectual activity of this l i f e  its universities, publishing houses, cultur-  al institutions, its art, necessarily is bound to and partakes of this alienation. If the consciousness of the chasm between the potential and the actual is the measure of the state of conflict in which a human individual exists in our world, we must begin to recognize as the Berlin Dadaists did, the inherent tension in art. It makes no sense to insist that the "essence" of art is not alienated, that artistic alienation is a surface phenomenon peculiar to the times. In the twentieth century art exists as a function of an alienated context-universe; i t is inherently alienated as no other previous art-system has been. For us to conceive an art which is not alienated, i t is necessary to conceive of a fundamentally different organization of society. "The fact that the growth of needs and of the means to satisfy them results in a lack of needs and of means is demonstrated in several ways by the economist....First, by reducing of the worker to the most miserable necessities required for the maintenance of his physical existence, and by reducing his physical activity to the most abstract mechanical movements, the economist asserts that man has nonneeds, for activity or enjoyment, beyond that; and yet he declares that this way of l i f e is a human way of l i f e . Secondly, by reckoning as the general standard of l i f e (general because i t is applicable to the mass of men) the most impoverished l i f e conceivable, he turns the worker into a being who has . neither senses nor needs, just as he turns his activity into a pure abstraction from a l l activity. Thus a l l workingclass luxury seems to him blameworthy, and everything which goes beyond the most abstract need (whether i t be a passive enjoyment or the manifestation of a personal activity) is regarded as a luxury. Political economy, the science of wealth, i s , therefore at the same time, the science of renunciation, of privation and of saving, which actually aucceeds in depriving man of fresh air and of physical activity. The science of a marvellous industry is at the same time the science of asceticism. Its true ideal is the ascetic but usurious miser and the ascetic but productive slave. Its  66 moral i d e a l i s the worker who takes a part of h i s wages to the savings bank. I t has even found a s e r v i l e art to embody t h i s favourite idea....Thus, despite i t s worldly and pleasure-seeking appearance, i t i s a t r u l y moral science, and the most mora l of a l l sciences. I t s p r i n c i p l e thesis i s the renunciation of l i f e and of human needs. The less you eat, drink, buy books, go to the theatre or to b a l l s , or to the public house, and the less you think, love, theorize, sing, paint, fence, etc., the more • you w i l l be able to save and the greater w i l l become your treasure which neither moth nor rust w i l l corrupt your c a p i t a l . The less you are, the less you express your l i f e , the more you have, the greater i s your alienated l i f e and the greater i s the saving of your alienated being. Everything which the economist takes from you i n the way of l i f e and humanity, he restores to you i n the form of money and wealth. And everything which you are unable to do, your money can do i t f o r you; i t can eat,drink, go to the b a l l and go to the theatre. I t can acquire a r t , learning, h i s t o r i c a l treasures, p o l i t i c a l power, and i t can t r a v e l . I t can appropriate a l l these things f o r you, can purchase everything; i t i s the true opulence. But although i t can do a l l t h i s , i t only desires to create i t s e l f , and to buy i t s e l f , f o r everything else i s subservient to i t . When one owns the master, one also owns the servant, and one has no need of the master's servants. Thus a l l passions and a c t i v i t i e s must be submerged i n avarice. The worker must have just what i s necessary f o r him to want to l i v e , and he must want to l i v e only i n order to have this.""? As mentioned above, c a p i t a l i s t society produces men;  the fact that moral  judgements render the society imperfect or worse does not change t h i s fundament a l f a c t . As Marx outlines, society's members are placed into positions of administered need and g r a t i f i c a t i o n ; as subjectsof analysis and manipulation they are t o t a l l y dependent. This dependence has i t s roots i n s p e c i f i c relationships between men. The knowledge of this implies c r i t i c i s m , and we have noted Marx's role as c r i t i c i n the f i e l d of p o l i t i c a l economy and philosophy. The  critical  role i s secular and r a t i o n a l , and does not allow the obscurity of abstraction. C r i t i c i s m as w e l l i s contextual i n nature. In the a c t i v i t y of c r i t i c i s m contexts are exploded and re-established on more general grounds. That i s , a p a r t i c u l a r system i s surpassed only by a system of greater functional generality, one which explains a l l that was explained by the o r i g i n a l system, and which explains the  67 o r i g i n a l system i t s e l f . In t h i s movement i s contained the "development" of ideas. D i a l e c t i c a l c r i t i c i s m , as introduced by Marx through the c r i t i q u e of Hegel, establishes the process of existence i n d i s t i n c t i o n from the "fact" of r e a l i t y , sees the world i n a state of constant development and change. This change i s not carried out at the l e v e l of abstraction, but at the l e v e l of practice, i n the a c t i v i t y of creating the material conditions of l i f e , and t h e i r corresponding i n t e l l e c t u a l conditions. Changes i n the conduct of a l l levels of l i f e occur f o r Marx not when revisions are made i n the configuration of a context  f o r example  when the management of a corporation enlarges the d e f i n i t i o n of t h e i r a c t i v i t y to include provision of care f o r i t s employees' children er subsidy.:for an a r t i s t to work with equipment i n t h e i r factories  but when the entire outline of  context i s redrawn. Art's p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n this process of r e a l i t y should be apparent, f o r i t i s much more readily accepted that art l i v e s by revolutionary development (which i s the breaking of the t o t a l i t y of context) than i t i s that society as a whole does so. Art's breath of l i f e i s constant change; "Only the present blows 120  fresh; a l l else i s faded and more faded."  Furthermore, change i s realized  only through practice, through the creation of new works of a r t . "Art" as a purpose or as an independent ( r e i f i e d ) entity i s obviously an i l l u s i o n . Theory i s reduced from the existence and function of actual works of art and, i n the reflexive manner outlined above, moves into the r e a l i t y of the process to inform further work. The theory of a particular a r t , obviously, never preceeded the appearance of concrete works of that a r t , but followed from the realm of fact created by the active a r t i s t s . However, once theory makes i t s appearance the role of the facts i s irrevocably changed: the truth of theory makes the world of fact also the world of appearance. The achieved work of a r t i s the a r t i f a c t  68 of an apparently imperceptible process. One i s conscious, with the appearance of the role of theory, of a l l that which, i n a work of a r t , cannot be seen or apprehended i n direct experience of the work. This imperceptible component i s process, and the work stands tied by d e f i n i t i o n to this imperceptible r e a l i t y . Theory and " a r t i f a c t " stand together; the question of primacy between them i s meaningless. The most d i f f i c u l t area of any work of art ata and so on  painting, novel, son-  i s i t s edge, the area where theory interfaces with f a c t i c i t y .  The value and truth of theory i s to illuminate this edge, to bring i t into focus, to show the r e a l i t y and consequences of the process with which the product stands i n d i a l e c t i c a l relationship. This outlook undermines any notions of " i n e v i t a b i l i t y " regarding the achieved state of f a c t . Theory reveals the truth that every work of a r t , despite i t s appearance of f i x i t y , as object, has i t s center i n process, or practice. The above i s not a theory of a r t , but i s more an approach to a theory of theory. The consideration of theory, i t w i l l be appreciated, brings us into contact with the problem of ideology. While the term "ideology" originated with the attempt to found a ^science of ideas", on generally empiricist terms i n the l a t e r eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries i n France, Marx and Engels i n the middle of the nineteenth 121  century transformed i t s meaning.  Their meaning was twofold: on the one hand,  i t i s a term which, instead of denoting a particular theory or f i e l d of study, as that of the French ideologues had, " i t came to denote a phenomenon the theory accounted f o r . This phenomenon now took on e n t i r e l y different dimensions. As interpreted by the French ideologists, ideology was limited to accounting f o r i n d i v i d u a l representations by a causal psychology. To Marx and Engels, the phenomenon under study became a c o l l e c t i o n of representations characteristic of a  69 given epoch and society. For example: The German Ideology."  122  On the other,  the term was used to designate a process of thinking which, f o r various reasons, i s incapable of comprehending the t o t a l i t y of i t s p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n or confri ext.  This "false consciousness" can be seen as, i n a certain sense, the narrow  d e f i n i t i o n of the term "ideology", and includes the seemingly mundane problem of conscious and deliberate d i s t o r t i o n of supposedly available facts by i n t e r est groups or classes against other groups or classes. In establishing the c r i t i c a l category of false consciousness, Marx set up a judgemental structure which ultimately depends upon a kind of "logic of h i s t ory", a b e l i e f that within history, but "behind" appearance, moves a structured process which can be known by, and which i s , true consciousness. This purpose, however, i s not necessarily a particular state or object; i t i s rather a p a r t i c u l a r process. The connections with Hegel are obvious: "The Marxian concept of ideology....fuses two different principles: Hegel's insight into the transitory nature of the successive manifestations of the s p i r i t , and Feuerbach's materialist inversion of Hegel, with i t s stress on the this-worldly character of natural existence. Separated from each other these concepts remained speculative; joined together they yielded an explosive mixture."123 At t h i s point a d i f f i c u l t y must be discussed, i f only summarily; i t s presence indicates a c r i t i c a l juncture of Marxist thought and, by?extension, a simi l a r lever i n the development of t h i s thesis, revealing, as i t does, several central undefined assumptions i n i t s structure. This problem i s discussed more f u l l y i n the essay by Lichtheim noted above, though i t was formulated independently by t h i s author. B a s i c a l l y , "Marx's conception of ideology as 'false consciousness' leads back to the problem of establ i s h i n g the true consciousness which w i l l enable men to understand t h e i r r o l e .  70 There i s only one truth about history, and only one c r i t e r i o n f o r judging the discrepancy between what men are and what they might become; this c r i t e r i o n i s supplied by philosophy, s p e c i f i c a l l y by i t s understanding of man as a r a t i o n a l being. Thus philosophy, as the norm of r e a l i t y , e n t a i l s an i m p l i c i t c r i t i q u e of this r e a l i t y . Yet Marx also held that thellphilbSpphy of every age i s the 'ideol o g i c a l r e f l e x ' of determinate s o c i a l conditions. How then could i t function as the source of normative judgements pointing beyond the e x i s t i n g state of airs?"  aff*j.i?  1 2 4  Unlike the French ideologues, who opted against assigning a r a t i o n a l content to h i s t o r y , Marx, while i n accordance with them denying t r a d i t i o n a l metaphysics, retained this view. This can be seen as the basis of h i s Hegelianism. Marx maintains, i n his concept of ideology, the d i s t i n c t i o n between "Reality" and "Appearance"; this d i s t i n c t i o n , as a process, i s a l i e n a t i o n . "Alienated s o c i a l a c t i v i t y i s to Marx what alienated mental a c t i v i t y i s to Hegel. For both, the d i s t i n c t i o n between Reali t y and Appearance i s involved i n the manner i n which r e a l processes are transformed into apparently f i x e d and stable characters. Reality i s process, appearance has the form of isolated objects. The task of c r i t i c a l thinking i s to grasp the relations which constitute these apparent o b j e c t s . " ^ 1  In terms of the Marxian d i a l e c t i c a contradiction e x i s t s , stemming from the fact that "there i s not  as Feuerbach had thought  a single universal hu-  man standpoint from which to judge the alienations imposed by history; there are only p a r t i c u l a r human standpoints, corresponding to forms of society which  126 arise from the interplay of material conditions..." The d i a l e c t i c i s worked out i n h i s t o r y , i n practice; the problems raised and the conditions created are "mirrored" i n the varying modes of thought. "These modes are 'ideological' i n that the participants f a i l to comprehend the s i t -  71 uation i n which they are involved."  However, i t , as Marx i n s i s t s , " I t i s not  the consciousness of men that determines t h e i r existence, but t h e i r s o c i a l existence which determines t h e i r consciousness." then the p a r a l l e l declaration, made as well by Marx, that men's consciousness can rupture the continuum of t h i s f a l se consciousness, seems contradictory and impossible, an unresolved mixture of " s o c i o l o g i c a l " r e l a t i v i t i e s and "philosophical" generalizations. Lichtheim explains: "The p r i n c i p l e that s o c i a l being determines consciousness must be understood as i t s e l f an h i s t o r i c a l one: i t refers to a state of a f f a i r s which has characterised history from the very beginning, but which i s due to disappear when a r a t i o n a l order has been created. For the attainment of such an order implies the conscious d i r e c t i o n of s o c i a l l i f e , hence the emancipation of consciousness from b l i n d , uncomprehended necessity. Consciousness i s ideological because i t i s powerless. When i t becomes the determining factor, i t sheds i t s blinkers along with i t s dependence on material circumstances. A r a t i o n a l order i s one i n which thinking determines being. Men w i l l be free when they are able to produce t h e i r own circumstances. H i s t o r i c a l materi a l i s m i s v a l i d only u n t i l i t has brought about i t s own d i a l e c t i c a l negation."128 In regard to t h i s , Marx's theories of history can be correctly interpreted as theories of a p a r t i c u l a r history: he called i t the period of "pre-history", to indicate that i s was the period of human a f f a i r s when reason had not yet manifested i t s e l f i n practice, i n which the "realm of necessity" continued to overwhelm the "realm of freedom". In e f f e c t , the history with which Marx was concerned was not yet "human" history at a l l , because the basis of the human was only a theoretical construct, disconnected from practice. Marx's history can be seen as the analysis of that which i s not yet i n existence, i n that what does exist i s seen i n the c r i t i c a l l i g h t of a notion of i t s l i m i t a t i o n s . Marx's " h i s t o r i c a l laws", as Lichtheim establishes, hold f o r the period of "pre-histo-  72 ry", when men are i n c o n f l i c t with the material world, when i t i s out of t h e i r control. Ideology, born out of an apparently chaotic s i t u a t i o n and chaotic prac t i c e , i s necessarily the system of thought of pre-history. "Marxian theory i s , then, incompatible with f a t a l i s t i c determinism. True, h i s t o r i c a l materialism involves the determinist principle that consciousness i s conditioned by s o c i a l e x i s t ence. ...however....the necessary dependence enunciated by t h i s p r i n c i p l e applies to the 'pre-historical' l i f e , namely, to the l i f e of class society. The relations of production that r e s t r i c t and d i s t o r t man's p o t e n t i a l i t i e s inevitably determine h i s consciousness, precisely because society i s not a free and conscious subject. As long as man i s incapable of dominating these relations and using them to g r a t i f y the needs and desires of the whole, they w i l l assume the form of an objective, independent e n t i t y . Consciousness, caught i n and overpowered by these relations, necessarily becomes ideological." 29 1  Ideology and alienation, l i k e private property and the c a p i t a l i s t d i v i s i o n of labour, are aspects of the same process. Just as alienation i s an incomplete condition of the process of s o c i a l production, ideology i s an incomplete condit i o n of the crresponding process of mental production. "False consciousness" i s thecorresponding thought-pattern and structure to a s p e c i f i c s o c i a l r e a l i t y . The judgemental aspects of the notion of "false consciousness" stem from a s p e c i f i c a l l y transcendent idea: "Marx preserved the o r i g i n a l motive of h i s thinking (together with the conception of history he had inherited from Hege l ) by refusing to recognize the dilemma inherent i n the principle that modes of thought are to be understood as 'expressions' of changing s o c i a l circumstances. He took i t f o r granted that, though consciousness i s conditioned by e x i s t ence, i t can also r i s e above existence and become a means of transcending the alienation which sets the h i s t o r i c a l process i n motion. The truth about man i s one and the same f o r a l l stages of history, even though every stage produces i t s own i l l u s i o n s . This truth i s likewise the c r i t e r i o n f o r the prac t i c a l a c t i v i t y which seeks to overcome man's alienation from h i s 'true' being. The concept of ideology illumines the h i s t o r i c a l circumstance that men are not i n possession of  73 the true consciousness which i f they had i t would enable them to understand the totality of their world and their p l ace i n i t . . . . T h e unity of mankind, and the universality of the truth, were as real to him as they were to Hegel..."^ 30 However, i t i s equally apparent that this notion, while transcendent, i s not s t r i c t l y metaphysical; that i s , i t does not contradict Marx's rejection of metaphysical notions of philosophy. Its frame of reference i s entirely within time, history and man himself, (see note 132) The quality of knowledge Marx attributes to man i s , again, definable contextually: that i s , the conviction that he possesses true consciousness (at least as a potential) i s based on the fact that particular men do i n fact achieve contextual revolution, do transcend the limitations of the context i n which their ideas were formed. It i s likewise an historical problem and a truth that such revolution has not taken place i n the total context, as i t has i n more limited areas such as linguistics, art or physics, for example. The fact that thought maintains a dynamic relationship with context, that by establishing context while being created by context, demonstrates the reflexive nature of thought, as discussed above (pp. 51-52). Just as men become aware of the limits of their language, they become conscious, i n the same procedure, of the nature of their own consciousness. The fact that men find language interesting i n i t s e l f , and not just for the representations and depictions, etc., that i t makes possible, i s evidence for this fact. This selfconsciousness exists not on the "spiritual" plane, as i t did with Hegel, but on earth, at the level of practice, of factual interaction i n daily l i f e ; i n short, in society. "Marx discovers that language i s not merely the vehicle of a pre-existent consciousness. It i s at once the natural and the social medium of consciousness, i t s mode of existence. It comes into being with the need for communication, with human intercourse i n the broadest sense. Consequently, being  74 inseparable from language, consciousness i s a s o c i a l creation."^ This does not deny the existence of non-verbal, "private" states of consciousness; i t simply indicates the realm of t h e i r s i g n i f i c a n c e, and the sources of 131  A  t h e i r structure.  Self-consciousness,  and the correspondent "overcoming of  a l i e n a t i o n , acts by d e f i n i t i o n i n society, human time, and history, and i s created out of these. Hence, something l i k e "essence" i s conceivable only i n terms of practice, and hence also the claim that, f o r Marx, transcendence i s a v a l i d 132 notion without metaphysical implications. Ideology as a process i s i d e n t i f i a b l e with a l i e n a t i o n i n that ideology i s alienated thought,•or thought formed within the alienated context which establishes i t s s t r u c t u r a l l i m i t s . Thought i t s e l f , as f a r as i t i s l i n g u i s t i c i n character, i s a s o c i a l product. The s o c i a l organization, which f o r the c a p i t a l i s t world i s " predicated upon the d i v i s i o n of labour, reaches i t s apex with the d i v i s i o n of material and i n t e l l e c t u a l labour (see note 116). At t h i s point thought loses i t s way i n the process of producing abstractions, becomes capable of detachment from process i t s e l f , and creates what seem to be "theories" (and i n cer t a i n aspects are), but which are components of ideology  abstract structures  of f a l s e consciousness. These structures are not r e a l l y independent, but are connected organically to the r e a l i t y of the context. The d i v i s i o n between l e v els of i d e o l o g i c a l a c t i v i t y i n society i s seen to be an a r t i f i c i a l one (see note 107, and p. 1) i n that, due to the irrevocable attachment, abstract ideaproduction becomes a function of class c o n f l i c t . Philosophy, Marx showed, was ideological thought i n that i t had not comprehended the source of i t s e l f  cf.  Theses on Feuerbach. Philosophy, as i t had existed p r i o r to Marx and Engels ( p a r t i c u l a r l y Germ-  75 an philosophy) had been bound up i n t h i s endless contradiction. A process, no matter what i t s nature, tends to become " r e a l " ; that i s , once set i n motion, an i l l u s i o n , f o r example, has the power to become an i n t e g r a l part of r e a l i t y . "Once ideology i s related to the r e a l conditions that gave r i s e to i t , i t ceases to be completely i l l u s o r y , e n t i r e l y f a l s e . For what i s ideology?.Either i t i s a theory that i s unconscious of i t s own pre-suppositions, i t s basis i n r e a l i t y , and true meaning, a theory unrelated to action, i . e . , without consequences or with consequences d i f f e r e n t from those expected or forseen. Or i t i s a theory that generalizes speci a l interests class interests by such means as abstraction, incomplete or distorted representations, appeals to fetishism. I f so, i t i s erroneous to maintain that every ideology i s pure i l l u s i o n . I t appears that ideology i s not, a f t e r a l l , to •rs be accounted f o r by a sort of ontological fate that compels consciousness to d i f f e r from being. Ideologies have a t r u l y h i s t o r i c a l and s o c i o l o g i c a l foundation i n the d i v i s i o n of labour on the one hand,?iri language on the other."133 Ideology r e f l e c t s back upon praxis and holds the power to influence subsequent a c t i v i t y . This i s a problem because i d e o l o g i c a l consciousness i s incomplete, and through i t s incompleteness becomes i n a sense powerless, and an implement of untruth, either deliberate or otherwise. Simply, the i d e o l o g i c a l consciousness comes out of a p a r t i a l r e a l i t y . To take up Marx's terminology, thought has the power to r e f l e c t r e a l i t y c l e a r l y , language has the capacity to render the structure of human relationships transparent. or comprehensible to a l l . As well i t has the capacity to obscure these relationships (more or less d e l i b e r ately) through the retention of abstractions produced i n a particular productive s o c i a l stage, which take on the appearance of immutable e n t i t i e s . Ideology thus becomes part of language as i t becomes part of the s o c i a l organization, part of praxis. We know that language i t s e l f i s a product of prax i s , that action determines what people say. Nevertheless, i t i s only when actions are moved to the l i n g u i s t i c realm that they become genuine s o c i a l property.  76 For example, an art work i s the product of practice, of the creative work of an i n d i v i d u a l . The creative work issues i n the work of a r t , whether i t i s "object" or not. As such, the creative process enters (or re-enters) the s o c i a l continuum, becomes e x p l i c i t s o c i a l property, generates language, influences people. Ideology can be seen as a d i a l e c t i c a l mediator between actions and language. This  me^  d i a t i o n , when ideological, i s a¥barrier or screen between language and the actions which brought i t into existence. Non-ideological thought  true "theory"—  i s likewise a mediator, but i t i s d i s t i n c t from ideology i n that i t i s conscious  134 of the nature of i t s own creation, so can never be a screen. This "barrier" aspect of ideology i s necessarily bound up with the antagoni s t i c structure of the society i n which i t develops. The b a r r i e r works " v i a pree x i s t i n g representations, selected by the dominant groups and acceptable to them. Old problems, old points of view, old vocabularies....stand i n the way of the  135 new elements i n society and new approaches to i t s problems."  The  connection  between ideology and bureaucracy (the tendency to become s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t wholes) i s apparent here. The two-leveled operation of ideology gives i t a double function: on the one hand, as Lefebvre points out, they are general, speculative and abstract, i n that they purport to formulate a comprehensive view of the world; on the other, they are representative of s p e c i f i c interests, and,.while attempting to explain the world, they reinforce and maintain the existence of a p a r t i c u l a r world, a p a r t i c u l a r context or "system of values". "...Ideological representations invariably serve as instruments i n the struggles between groups....and classes. But t h e i r intervention i n such struggles takes the form of masking the true i n t e r e s t s and aspirations of the groups involved, u n i v e r s a l i z i n g the p a r t i c u l a r and mistaking the part f o r the whole." 36 1  77 Thus i t can be seen  that the "class interest" aspect of ideology  invol-  ving more or less deliberate f a l s i f i c a t i o n s and distortions as t a c t i c a l maneuvers  and the broader "comprehensivist" tendencies cannot be considered separa-  t e l y , because the world concept, i n a class society, cannot develop under any ,other horizon but that sanctioned (and created) by the dominant c l a s s . This class weapon, as we have seen, contains as a necessary part of i t s s t ructure certain elements of truth, some " s c i e n t i f i c concepts", mixed up with amalgams of myth, r e l i g i o u s incantation, l i n g u i s t i c contradictions and deliberate d i s t o r t i o n s . Radical c r i t i c a l theory i s charged with the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of distinguishing between these various elements and delineating the process of t h e i r combination. In a post-revolutionary s i t u a t i o n i t aids i n a salvage operation, just as Marx and Engels "salvaged" the d i a l e c t i c a l process from the metaphysical German philosophical t r a d i t i o n . This "salvage" aspect indicates the truth of the statement that ideology cannot be seen as simply true or f a l s e ; i t i s clear that truth and falsehood, profundity and deception are linked together i n these systems of thought i n a unique manner. True and false consciousness are likewise interconnected i n t h i s contextual-dialectical way. True consciousness i s irrevocably bound to false consciousness; i t i s only through engagement with the l a t t e r that the former realizes i t s e l f . As Lefebvre says, "...emergent truth i s always mixed up with i l l u s i o n and error. The theory discards the view that error, i l l u s i o n , f a l s i t y stand o f f i n sharp and obvious d i s t i n c t i o n from knowledge, truth, certainty. There i s continual two-way d i a l e c t i c a l movement between the true and the false which transcends the h i s t o r i c a l s i t u a t i o n that gave r i s e to these representations. As Hegel had seen, error and i l l u s i o n are 'moments' of knowledge, out of which the truth emerges."137 Previously, we have used the term "myth" or "mystification" i n connection  78 with the i d e o l o g i c a l process (see pp. 25-35) as i t had manifested i t s e l f i n the actions of the Parisian Dadaists. Let us c l a r i f y the relationship between ideology and "myth". We have seen (pp. 74-75) how ideology enters language, and therefore, culture; becomes i n fact a part of the l i f e of a nation or society. An ideology's success depends upon the degree to which i t manages to o b l i t e r a t e antagonism. That i s , i t i s a substitute, a necessary replacement f o r outright physical force i n an antagonistic s i t u a t i o n . Ko society can survive i f a l l that holds i t together i s force and the threat of violence, unless t h i s force i s reshaped and becomes an organic part of the productive organization of the society. Those who rule must secure the consent of the ruled. This sounds suspicious l y l i k e democratic theory, and i s at the basis of "democratic ideology". " I t i s the role of ideologies to secure the assent of the oppressed and exploited. Ideologies present the l a t t e r to themselves i n such a way as to wrest from them, i n addition to material wealth, t h e i r ' s p i r i t u a l ' acceptance of t h i s s i t u a t i o n , even t h e i r support. Class ideologies create three images of the class that i s struggling f o r dominance: an image f o r i t s e l f ; an images of i t s e l f f o r other classes, which exalts i t ; an image of i t s e l f f o r other classes, which devalues them i n t h e i r own eyes, drags them down, t r i e s to defeat them....without at shot being f i r e d ? " We can see that the ideology attempts i n a single action to immortalize h i s t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s between groups, and to establish a sense of c o l l e c t i v e ident i t y which i s centered i n the outstanding q u a l i t i e s of a p a r t i c u l a r group within the c o l l e c t i v e . The f a l s i t y of the c o l l e c t i v e i s apparent; the notion of the c o l l e c t i v e has i t s o r i g i n i n mythic formulations of pre-technological societies i n which the ideology was intended to a r t i c u l a t e the status of the society as a whole. Myth, i n this sense, i s the thought-structure of s o c i e t i e s which have not undergone a delineation of classes and the attendant antagonisms. Lefebvre, i n  79 his  a n a l y s i s of the o r i g i n and development of i d e o l o g i c a l systems, points out  that although myth (as the i l l u s o r y representations of s o c i e t i e s l i v i n g under c o n d i t i o n s of production which preclude the p o s s i b i l i t y of formulation of conc-  139\ epts  ; i s a f a c t o r i n the h i s t o r i c a l development of ideology, i t i s not i d e n -  t i c a l to ideology. Although mythologies and s i m i l a r contructions (cosmogonies and theogonies) d i s p l a y s i m i l a r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of ideology, they cannot be c l assed as ideology because mythological s o c i e t i e s have not yet d i v i d e d i n t o c l asses i n t h e i r means of production, "...these l i k e works of a r t  c o n s t r u c t i o n s of the mind are more  more l i k e monuments than a b s t r a c t systems. They belong to  the same category as s t y l e s i n a r t h i s t o r y , compendia of moral wisdom, 'cultur-s 140 es'." Lefebvre suggests that i d e o l o g i e s r e s u l t when myth becomes an element i n systems of organized r e l i g i o n : "The the images and t a l e s are cut o f f from the s o i l that nourished  them, the beauty of which they represented  to the  eye  141 and mind."  T h e i r meaning i s transformed  as t h e i r use and f u n c t i o n i s t r a n s -  formed. They are c h a r a c t e r i z e d by p h i l o s o p h i c a l i n c l u s i v e n e s s and t o t a l i t y , t h i s manifests i t s e l f i n abstractness and the increment and  and  institutionalization  of the d i v i s i o n s between i n d i v i d u a l s , groups and c l a s s e s . "The great r e l i g i o n s were born concomitantly with the c o n s o l i d a t i o n of the power of the s t a t e , the 142 formation of nations, and the r i s e of c l a s s antagonisms."  Thus, ideology can  be r e l a t e d to "myth" only i n a p a r t i c u l a r sense. Within i d e o l o g i c a l systems, myths continue to operate. As components of the system, they advance the cause of " f a l s e consciousness",  and the d i v i s i o n of the genuine c o l l e c t i v e . The  ideo-  logy of the modern i n d u s t r i a l s t a t e stands as a prime example of how  ideology  r e a c t s against knowledge and reason and how  i t resorts  as " f a l s e consciousness"  to m y s t i f i c a t i o n as a means of f o r t i f y i n g i t s e l f against knowledge. C a p i t a l i s t production has created  i n a sense, beyond i t s own  control  (implying there-  80 for i t s own i r r a t i o n a l i t y ) a class c o n f l i c t which threatens i t s u n i t a r i a n secu r i t y , the security of the ideological c o l l e c t i v e , the self-image of the system as perfectible . The demonstrable i n a b i l i t y of ideology to contend with skepticism, demystification and knowledge forces i t to disguise i t s inner falseness with an absorption of c o n f l i c t i n g forces within i t s comprehensive perspective. This i s the basis of democratic l i b e r a l i s m and, as one of i t s s p e c i f i c products, the mystification of the avant-garde. E a r l i e r i n this essay we have seen that i t was the program of B e r l i n Dada to reveal the m y s t i f i c a t i o n of the avant-garde and Tzara's role i n extending that mystification to Dada i t s e l f . In t h i s way, an ideology attempts to secure i t s self-image as a perfectible system by securing the context  the conceptual l i m i t s  of the c o n f l i c t , allow-  ing f o r contention within a prescribed frame of reference. "Modernism", as a progressive scheme of incorporated c o n f l i c t , channels and d i s t o r t s the implications of the d i a l e c t i c a l nature of a r t . Ideological thought i s thought i n the realm of necessity. Thought i s incomplete insofar as i t i s determined by the contingent nature of the means of production (see pp. 71-72). This determined thought and action i s the necessary negation of freedom, which i s t i t a l l y self-conscious and cognisant of h i s t o r y as the procedure of thelcoming into being and fading away of representations and meanings. ,This Marx defines as knowledge, and this knowledge i s by d e f i n i t ion contextual, as I have t r i e d to show. Ideology, by denying contextual s e l f consciousness, denies knowledge. Ideology and reason, while mingled i n ideology, are completely antagonistic. Thus, ideologies propose and maintain themselves as perfectible systems, which might need adjustment i n d e t a i l , but never revision or negation i n princi p l e . "This gives r i s e to passionate and passionately interesting discussions  81 between conservatives and innovators, dogmatists and heretics, champions of the 143 past and champions of the future."  While s p e c i f i c contents of a particular  structure are open to change, the structure i t s e l f i s maintained as a constant, which does not participate, as such, i n change. In just this sense we discussed Kosuth's notion of context, which denies the d i a l e c t i c a l relationship between the whole and i t s parts, between "form" and "content". Context as a whole must be seen as simultaneously context as a part; that i s , i t must be seen as h i s t o r i c a l l y created and changeable by events originating wholly within i t s boundaries. These events w i l l t o t a l l y destroy the o r i g i n a l boundaries, making the f i r s t conext now a closed episode i n the history of the development of a larger context. Any art work which creates a contextual rupture, such as the Readymades, begins i t s development within the frame of reference which i t w i l l supercede and render obsolete. Thus the d e f i n i t i o n of a r t , f a r from being a coherent d e f i n i t i o n , i s not r e a l l y even a coherent context of d e f i n i t i o n s because d e f i n i t i o n s a r i s i n g from within the context or i t s d e f i n i t i o n s can cause the entire frame of reference to be reorganized. Therefore, i t i s perfectly sensible to speak of works of art which are "the negation of a r t " , as we speak of the Readymades. Just as Marx designated the i n d u s t r i a l proletariat of the nineteenth century as "a class whi144 ch i s the negation of a l l classes"  because a l l that was distorted i n s o c i a l  organization was the b i r t h r i g h t of t h i s particular group, we can speak of works of art which are the "dissolution of a l l a r t " . A l l that art defines i t s e l f to be creates an edge, a horizon. Because any such horizon i s the s p e c i f i c creation of determinate actions i n history and not an absolute category, every h o r i zon,awheniit appears i n h i s t o r y , implies i t s own dissolution. Under t h i s h o r i z -  82 on axe created works which are generated t o t a l l y i n connection with t h i s h o r i z on, but which quite suddenly extend beyond i t , thereby causing not just adjustments i n the organization of the context, but i t s entire reorganization around new d e f i n i t i o n s . In the same sense that the nineteenth century p r o l e t a r i a t could only r e a l i z e i t s e l f i n the t o t a l d i s s o l u t i o n of the e x i s t i n g order, these works of a r t , of which the Readymades are the f i n e s t example, can only come into e x i stence by taking as t h e i r s p e c i f i c content, or subject-matter, the whole of the pre-existing context which i n fact produced them. Thus with the Readymades, as with B e r l i n Dada,context becomes content. A new methodology i s consciously created. So we see the d i a l e c t i c a l process as being the art process, and art parti c i p a t e s , by d e f i n i t i o n , i n the "doctrine of revolution". The r e l a t i o n of system (methodology i n the product state) i s apparent: systems have a. v a l i d existence only when they are created with f u l l recognition of the h i s t o r i c a l nature  the necessary impermanence  of the horizon they estab-  l i s h and maintain. Art i s .a function of knowledge. "While the mist surrounding natural phenomena are being dispelled, the mystery (the opacity) of s o c i a l l i f e keeps thickening. While increasing human control over nature (technology, the d i v i s i o n of labour) makes i t possible to elaborate nonideological concepts of physical nature, the actions of the r u l i n g classes throw a v e i l of obscurity over s o c i a l l i f e . Praxis expands i n scope, grows more complex and harder to grasp, while consciousness and science play an increasingly e f f e c t i v e part i n i t . Thus i t has become possible f o r i l l u s o r y representations....to become an i n t e g r a l part of styles and cultures....They must now give way to knowledge. Revolutionary praxis and Marxism qua knowledge do away with the ideologies. According to Marx, Marxism has gone beyond ideology i t signals and hastens the end of ideology. Nor i s i t a philosophy, f o r i t goes beyond philosophy and translates i t into practice....It i s on the basis of conscious revolutionary praxis that thought and action are a r t i c u l a t e d d i a l e c t i c a l l y , and that knowledge 'reflects' praxis, i . e . , i s constituted , as r e f l e c t i o n on praxis. U n t i l then knowledge was charac-  83  terized precisely by i t s f a i l u r e to ' r e f l e c t ' r e a l i t y , ...could only....distort i t , confuse i t with i l l u s i o n s — i n short, knowledge was ideological.""145 I t was mentioned e a r l i e r that the "state of tension" or c o n f l i c t i n which an i n d i v i d u a l exists i n t h i s society might very well be the measure of the depth of h i s r e a l i z a t i o n of the abyss between what exists and what i s possible, but unrealized. In l i g h t of the concept of ideology, the statement can be reformulated i n different terms: the l e v e l of tension f o r an i n d i v i d u a l i s d i r e c t l y proportional to the degree to which the ideological nature and sources of h i s thought are revealed to him. In the case of the production of a r t , we see that art exists i n a continuous state of c o n f l i c t once the ideological nature of context and function of culture becomes t r u l y apparent f o r the a r t i s t . The assertion that a r t exists i n a state of c o n f l i c t with language (p. 4) indicates the f i e l d of art's interface with culture.  Ill  ART VS. CULTURE  84 "Art i s what we do; culture i s what i s done to us." Carl Andre 1  I t i s necessary to outline the notion of the ideological function of c u l t -  ure. I t i s not necessary to j u s t i f y the assertion that the notion of "Culture" i s i t s e l f a product of r e i f i c a t i o n . This i s apparent throughout the discussion. In the same way i n which concrete labour becomes abstract labour, and therefore a commodity, the concrete a c t i v i t y of making art i s abstracted and becomes a s i m i l a r commodity. "The products of labour become commodities, s o c i a l things whose q u a l i t i e s are at the same time perceptible and imperceptible by the senses....But....the existence of the things qua commodities and the value r e l a t i o n of the products of labour which stamps them as commodities have absolutely no r e l a t i o n with t h e i r physical propert i e s and the material relations a r i s i n g therefrom....A d e f i n i t e s o c i a l r e l a t i o n between men....assumes, i n t h e i r eyes, the fantastic form of a r e l a t i o n between things. In order therefore, to find an analogy, we must have recourse to the mist-enveloped regions of the r e l i g i o u s world. In t h i s world the productions of the human brain appear as independent beings endowed with l i f e and entering into relations both with one another and with the human race. So i t i s i n the world of commodities with the products of men's hands. This I . c a l l the Fetishism which attaches i t s e l f to the products of labour as soon as they are produced as commodities, and which i s therefore inseparable from the production of commodi t i e s . " 47 1  In the bourgeois and post-bourgeois world, "Culture" i s an abstraction and a f e t i s h i n this manner. "The pure abstractions to which men are reduced i n t h e i r s o c i a l relations extends as well to intercourse with ideas....Just as each individual's r e l a t i o n to the market i s immediate (without h i s personal q u a l i t i e s and needs being relevant except as commodities), so his relations to God, to 148 beauty, to goodness and- to truth are relations of immediacy."  Unlike the pre-  "democratic" world, bourgeois culture i s equally available to a l l ; but i t i s  85  available i n the same manner i n which bourgeois "freedom" i s available: i n the abstract. Marx's philosophical criticism was directed at i d e a l i s t conceptions of the world, and at the i d e a l i s t concept of culture, which was segregated from social processes and considered superior to them:  "Its decisive characteristic i s the assertion of a universa l l y obligatory, eternally better and more valuable world that must be unconditionally affirmed: a world essentially different from the factual world of the daily struggle for existence, yet realizable by every individual for himself 'from within', without any transformation of the state of fact. It i s only i n this culture that cultural a c t i v i t i e s and objects gain that value which elevates them above the everyday sphere. Their reception becomes an act of celebration and e x a l t a t i o n . " 4 9 1  However, the modalities of alienation and r e i f i c a t i o n have changed very essentially since the mid-nineteenth century, when Marx f i r s t formulated his ideas on culture and ideology, and have likewise changed since 1 9 3 7 , when Marcuse wrote "The Affirmative Character of Culture", which i s basically a critique of the functioning of idealistically-oriented culture i n a s t i l l classically-bourgeois world. I believe i t i s valuable to maintain that Marx's analysis of a l i e nation and r e i f i c a t i o n , of the commodity and i t s fetishes i s s t i l l basically sound, and that his insights into the contradictory, d i a l e c t i c a l nature of h i s tory and of c a p i t a l i s t society remain eminently workable, although, as George Lichtheim notes, they have unfortunately  (but not accidentally) become part of 150  an academic discipline i n the modern world.  The ideology of advanced indust-  r i a l society has grown out of the bourgeois ideology of the nineteenth but the change i n the organization of society through the sing technology  century,  geometrically-proges-  and the consciousness produced by technology  has created a  86 new s i t u a t i o n . Obviously, even to describe such a s i t u a t i o n i s out of the range of this paper. I t s most distinguished and controversial treatment i s Herbert Marcuse's One-Dimensional Man: Studies i n the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society (1964). This must be considered read i n the following discussion. Basica l l y , i t s thesis i s that contemporary c a p i t a l i s t society i s approaching the cond i t i o n wherein the concrete provision of a reasonable standard of l i v i n g at the attained l e v e l of needs i s within the status of normal capability of the means of production. The incredible technological progress seems to transcend the hor i z o n of a l l previous c r i t i c i s m ; i t portends to accomplish the "end of history" ( i n the Marxian sense) through the normal development and refinement of i t s productive power. The contradictory aspects of i t s organization are n u l l i f i e d under the weight of the assertion of i t s material accomplishments. In accordance with the preceeding discussion of ideology (and p. 1), the ideology of advanced technological c a p i t a l i s t society changes i t s nature. One of the central f a c tors i n t h i s change i s the concept of class: "At i t s origins i n the f i r s t half of the nineteenth century....the c r i t i q u e of i n d u s t r i a l society attained concreteness as a h i s t o r i c a l mediation between theoiy and practice, values and facts, needs and goals. This h i s t o r i c a l mediation occurred i n the consciousness and i n the p o l i t i c a l action of the two great classes which faced each other i n the society: the bourgeoisie and the prolet a r i a t . In the c a p i t a l i s t world they are s t i l l the basic classes. However, the c a p i t a l i s t development has altered the structure and function of these two classes i n such a way that they no longer appear to be agents of h i s t o r i c a l transformation. An overriding interest i n the preservation and improvement of the i n s t i t u t i o n a l status quo u n i tes the former antagonists i n the most advanced areas of contemporary society. And to the degree to which technica l progress assures the growth and cohesion of communist society, the very idea of q u a l i t a t i v e change recedes before the r e a l i s t i c notions of a non-explosive evolution. In the absence of demonstrable agents and agencies of s o c i a l change, the c r i t i q u e i s thus thrown back to a high l e v e l of abstraction. 5' 1,1  87 The overwhelming concrete success of the s o c i a l organization, combined 152 with i t s t r a d i t i o n a l concept of "tolerance", manages to render i n e f f e c t i v e c r i t i c i s m of i t s operation i n p r i n c i p l e . This s i t u a t i o n renders obsolete f o r the most part the f o r c i b l e s i l e n c i n g of principled opposition. The pre-eminent posi t i o n of strength occupied by the r u l i n g class has, i n perfect hoarmony with Marx's formulation (p. 1), created a rationalized of a q u a l i t a t i v e pervasiveness unequalled i n history; the control of the means of i n t e l l e c t u a l production i s combined with extremely sophisticated media use to make possible a more t o t a l mobilization of consciousness than had ever before been accomplished.  This  t o t a l mobilization, i t i s maintained, i s the characteristic of t o t a l i t a r i a n i s m ; i n " l i b e r a l " theory a l ideology  which i s completely intertwined with the i d e a l i s t cultur-  there i s a concrete region of private l i f e exempted from dominat-  ion and control by the state. The abstract individual i n the c a p i t a l i s t labour process i s of interest to the controllers of the organization only insofar as the abstraction applies. The worker i s only dominated by the abstractions i n his capacity as worker; when he i s not at work he can (theoretically) exist i n a realm of freedom which i s r e s t r i c t e d , but which within the r e s t r i c t i o n s i s reasonably intact (cf. J . S. M i l l ) . The l i b e r a l i t y presumes two important things: f i r s t , that consciousness i s s u f f i c i e n t l y mobilized i n the productive process and s u f f i c i e n t l y impotent i n other s o c i a l areas, and secondly, that the current means of production have not outstripped the regions of discourse established by operative ideology. "Changes occur as soon as the preservation of the established form of the labour process can no longer gain i t s end with merely p a r t i a l mobilization (leaving the i n d i v i d u a l ' s private l i f e i n reserve), but rather requires 'total mobilization', through which the individual must be subjected i n a l l spheres of h i s existence to the d i s c i p l i n e of the authoritarian state.  88 Now the bourgeoisie comes into c o n f l i c t with i t s own culture. Total mobilization i n the era of monopoly capi t a l i s m i s incompatible with the progressive aspects of culture centered around the idea of personality. The s e l f - a b o l i t i o n of affirmative culture begins." •'•5 Marcuse suggests that advanced i n d u s t r i a l society, energized by the same contradictions Marx pointed out i n i t s nineteenth century ancestor  now raised  to a much higher pitch as the process moves toward i t s h i s t o r i c a l negation, monopoly capitalism  has undertaken t h i s t o t a l mobilization, and i s i n fact well  along the road i n i t s applications. The development of these ideas i n t h e i r rigorously p o l i t i c a l aspects I l e ave to the reader. We are attempting to formulate here something more s p e c i f i c , something which exists within the scope of the p o l i t i c a l horizon: the r e l a t i o n ship between the process of art as art to culture seen as an i d e o l o g i c a l function. The terms stated f o r t h i s examination were that art was to be seen as an expression of a l l that does not exist or i s denied i n culture. Art was to be seen as i n c o n f l i c t with language. Society i s e s s e n t i a l l y contradictory: we have examined the structure of the labour process and discovered there the basis of a l l contradictions. Language, functioning as the "ideological r e f l e x " performs an integrative duty f o r the defense of the established r e a l i t y . I f , as Marx i n s i s t s , lnaguage i s an Integral part of men's s o c i a l practice, i t can be seen as an aspect of the s o c i a l substructure, the material  foundation  of i n t e l l e c t u a l production. This, obviously, i s true only of language which v a l i d l y r e f l e c t s the relations of production. Ideological language, on the other hand, i s superstructural language i n that i t i s a b a r r i e r between r e a l action and r e a l language. A r t i s one of the truest superstructural c u l t u r a l phenomena; therefore, art and i d e o l o g i c a l language confront each other immediately i n ant-  89 agonistic society. Art i s a direct antagonist to ideological language i n i t s function as knowledge (see p. 82). Art  i s an aspect of labour, i n that labour i s defined as the " e x i s t e n t i a l  a c t i v i t y of man" by Marx. However, art i s a very p a r t i c u l a r kind of labour i n the c a p i t a l i s t world: i t i s the image of the p o s s i b i l i t y of a l l labour, the negation of labour as i t e x i s t s . However, we have established the t o t a l importance of context i n the consideration of a r t . The problem of art and ideological consciousness must be approached, therefore, through a further examination of the nautre of context, as i t has developed i n sophistication and complexity i n the advancement of contradictory society from the era of Marx and that of B e r l i n Dada to the present. In doing so, the nature of the B e r l i n movement as an h i s t o r i c a l event w i l l be more completely delineated. The l i n g u i s t i c context f o r art i s necessarily generated by i t s dependence  154 upon society as audience, as Duchamp pointed out.  Hence i t has the potentia-  l i t y of becoming ideological; when t h i s occurs, as i t has i n c a p i t a l i s t society, art must r e a l i z e i t s e l f as art i n fundamental opposition to the ideological context. In contemporary society the outlines of context are often more d i f f i c u l t to determine than i n the society of outright c r i s i s facing the B e r l i n Dadaists, for,  as Marcuse has established, the i d e a l i s t i c notion of culture has been fun-  damentally altered. This a l t e r a t i o n i s a twofold function, i n that much of the i d e a l i s t i c ideology has been retained i n the new context, and this combines with l a t e r developments. Where i d e a l i s t culture r i g i d l y separated the higher, abstracted culture from the concrete world of necessity, the newer technological s t ructure i s effecting an apparent closure of the gap. "Art" and " l i f e " , while i n a c t u a l i t y no closer together than ever before (and indeed i n many of the most important ways never further apart) are being subsumed under a single category,  90 which Marcuse terms the "material culture": "Today's novel feature i s the f l a t t e n i n g out of the antagonism between culture and s o c i a l r e a l i t y through the o b l i t e r a t i o n of the oppositional, a l i e n , and transcendent elements i n the higher culture by virtue of which i t constituted another dimension of r e a l i t y . The l i q u i d a t i o n of two-dimensional culture takes place not through the denial and rejection of the 'cultural values', but through t h e i r wholesale incorporation into the established order, through t h e i r reproduction and display on a massive scale." 55 1  In the bourgeois-idealist era, culture as a commodity was rendered impotent to affect material l i f e through i t s removal to an a h i s t o r i c a l realm. "Culture" i s analogous i n t h i s case with Marx's "Philosophy": "Philosophy explains nothing; i t i s i t s e l f explained by h i s t o r i c a l materialism. Philosophy, a contemplative a t t itude, accepts the e x i s t i n g . I t does not transform the world, but only interpretations of the world. The contemplative a t t i t u d e , one of the remoter consequences of the d i v i s i o n of labour, i s a mutilated, fragmentary a c t i v i t y . Now, the true i s the whole. Philosophy cannot lay claim to being the supreme, the t o t a l a c t i v i t y . The results achieved by this contemplative a c t i v i t y are inconsistent with empirically-observed f a c t s . There are no immobile absolutes, there i s no such thing as a s p i r i t u a l beyond. Every absolute i s a mask j u s t i f y i n g man's exploitation by man. Philosophical abstractions i n themselves have no value, no precise meaning. The true i s also the concrete. The propositions of philosophia perennis either are tautologies without content, or receive concrete meaning from some h i s t o r i c a l empirically v e r i f i a b l e content. To r i s e above the world by pure r e f l e c t i o n i s i n r e a l i t y to remain imprisoned i n pure reflections" 56 1  The bourgeois-idealist conception of culture i s irrevocably t i e d to that society's conception of freedom, because up to the present, culture has been i d e n t i f i a b l e with the exercise i n r e a l l i f e of freedom. That i s , "culture", as an abstract condition of l i v i n g , i s a condition available only to those who have made concrete the bourgeois abstract concept of freedom. The abstract equ-  91 a l i t y of men,  created by the reduction of concrete labour i n the interest of  formulating a conceptual basis f o r the commodity ( i . e . , the "free" h i r i n g out of one's labour power) establishes "freedom" as an abstraction. In c a p i t a l i s t 157 practice, the freedom i s realized as concrete unfreedom and inequality.  "Only  a small number of men dispose of the purchasing power required f o r the quantity of goods necessary i n order to secure happiness. Equality does not extend to the 158 conditions f o r attaining the means."  For the reigning nineteenth century bou-  rgeoisie, just as today f o r the apparent new "multi-class majority", the abstract d e f i n i t i o n of freedom has been formulated "within the relationships of the r u l i n g c l a s s " (see note 118); that i s , the d e f i n i t i o n of freedom was reduced to an abstraction from those previously-realized conditions which were the property of a c e r t a i n group. Marx stated that ideology could e x i s t only with the existence of the necessity f o r a certain class to represent the interests of i t s rule as "general". The abstract freedom of the bourgeois world i s an i d e o l o g i c a l construct. The positioning of art outside the predicament of concrete labour and freedom can be appreciated as a l o g i c a l and necessary development. But i n the newer context of the ideology of t o t a l mobilization we perceive i t s d i f f i c u l t i e s . The Marxian c r i t i q u e of i d e a l i s t philosophy represents the attempt to destroy the reign of abstraction insofar as abstraction sees i t s e l f as necessarily cut off from a c t i v i t y . The basis of Hegel's pre-eminent importance f o r Marx i s i n his comprehension of the abyss between abstraction and the r e a l i z a t i o n of abs t r a c t i o n . Hegel's insistence that there was nothing i n the universe beyond the powers of the i n d i v i d u a l mind asserted that man could know r e a l i t y ; the obvious implication, made by Marx, was that, i f he knew i t , he could create i t ; to do  92 this i t was l o g i c a l l y necessary to change the world as i t existed. The abyss between the abstract r e a l i z a t i o n and i t s concrete r e a l i z a t i o n Marx understood as h i s t o r i c a l . Marcuse correctly perceives that the value and significance of i d e a l i s t philosophy remains i n i t s constant attention to the realms which do not exist upon earth. "...bourgeois idealism i s not merely ideology, f o r i t expresses a correct objective content. I t contains not only the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of the established form of e x i s tence, but also the pain of i t s establishment: not only quiescence about what i t , but also remembrance of what could be. By making suffering and sorrow into great u n i versal forces, great bourgeois art has continually shattered i n the hearts of men the f a c i l e resignation of everyday l i f e . . . . i t has planted r e a l longing alongside poor consolation and false'consecration i n the s o i l of bourgeois l i f e . . . . T h i s exaggeration contains the higher truth that such a world cannot be changed piecemeal, but only through i t 3 destruction. C l a s s i c a l bourgeois art put i t s ideal forms at such a distance from everyday occurrence that those whose suffering and hope reside i n d a i l y l i f e could only rediscover themselves through a leap into a t o t a l l y other world. In t h i s way art nourished•the b e l i e f that a l l previous h i s t o r y had been only the dark and tragic prehistory of a coming existence. And philosophy took this idea seriously enough to be concerned about i t s r e a l i z a t i o n . Hegel's system i s the l a s t protest against the degradation of the idea: against playing o f f i c i o u s l y with the mind as though i t were an object that r e a l l y has nothing to do 1: with human h i s t o r y . At least idealism maintained that the materialism of bourgeois practice i s not the l a s t word and that mankind must be led beyond it." 59 1  In spite of the irreconcilable contradictions established by the i d e a l i s t philosophy as adapted by the bourgeois as ideology, i t retained i n i t s structure the consciousness of the difference between "essence" and "existence": s t r u c t u r a l l y i t simultaneously produced a nagging " e x i s t e n t i a l " discontent and removed the p o s s i b i l i t y of r e a l i z i n g the negation of that discontent. Nevertheless, idealism, especially with Hegel, i s inherently d i a l e c t i c a l . D i a l e c t i c a l thought,  93 as Marcuse maintains, i s negative thought, i n the sense that we have proposed i n connection with the nature of theory (pp. 67-68). That which " i s there" i s seen as "there" only i n connection with the process of i t s becoming, so that a l l significance of any particular f a c t , object or s i t u a t i o n emanates from the t o t a l i t y to which i t belongs. While i d e a l i s t culture continually denies or postpones concrete g r a t i f i c a t i o n , i t s d i a l e c t i c a l origins keep a l i v e the notion of an alternative. Art's role i n t h i s i s apparent: the i d e a l i s t conception of happiness contains i t s pot e n t i a l to motivate revolt. I d e a l i s t r e l i g i o n and philosophy were consistent i n t h e i r aversion to this notion. Happiness was therefore the province of a r t , whose subject remained "Ideal Beauty". Unlike theory, "the beauty of art i s compa t i b l e with the bad present, despite and within which i t can afford happiness."^ Unlike theory, a r t can be subjected to r e i f i c a t i o n ; i t has the potential to c r eate i t s own r e a l i t y , i t s own universe outside of history, i n which the spectator can become absorbed i n an act of "consolation" f o r the continuously wretched present. ("In a world without happiness....happiness cannot but be a consolation: the consolation of a beautiful moment i n an interminable chain of misf o r t u n e . " ^ ) Consequently, the project of bourgeois-idealist art i s the "immort a l i z a t i o n of the ephemeral". The f a m i l i a r i t y of these sentiments as expressed even i n casual discussion about art even i n the immediate present need.not be stressed. Consolation i s d i a l e c t i c a l i n nature. The enjoyment of "happiness"  (or any  of the other abstractions) i s permitted only i n s p i r i t u a l i z e d form, but " i d e a l i z a t i o n annuls happiness. For the i d e a l cannot be enjoyed, since a l l pleasure i s foreign to i t and would destroy the r i g o r and purity that must adhere to i t i n idealless r e a l i t y i f i t i s to be able to carry out i t s i n t e r n a l i z i n g , d i s c i -  94 plining function."  162  Therefore i d e a l i s m i n a s i n g l e a c t i o n creates d e s i r e , an  image of freedom, and, more deeply v e i l e d , the corresponding image of r e v o l t and s t i f l e s and p e r v e r t s these impulses. I t s a r t i s a p a i n f u l l y p e r f e c t image of f r u s t r a t i o n , and i t s i n e v i t a b l e companion, m y s t i f i c a t i o n . Here the medium of beauty remains a n e i l l u s i o n , an a b s t r a c t i o n . I t i s an i l l u s i o n of r e a l i t y , and as such has the p o t e n t i a l to p a r t i c i p a t e i n the d i a l e c t i c a l operation of a r t as a f u n c t i o n of knowledge ( i n that every i l l u s i o n can be s e l f - c o n s c i o u s ) . The bourg e o i s - i d e a l i s t context subverts t h i s p o t e n t i a l : the b e a u t i f u l world represented i n a r t can e x i s t only i n a s t r i c t l y d e l i m i t e d and c o n t r o l l e d frame of r e f e r e n c e . The p o s s i b i l i t y of making "a leap i n t o a t o t a l l y other world" i s suppressed,  as  f a r as concrete a c t i v i t y i s concerned, and the s i g n i f i c a n c e of t h i s a r t i s then completely c o n t r o l l e d . B o u r g e o i s - i d e a l i s t a r t r e t a i n s the n o t i o n of the potenti a l break with r e a l i t y , even though the r e a l i z a t i o n of t h i s break i s p r o h i b i t e d by the enforced context. German Expressionism and B e r l i n Dada's c r i t i c a l d e s t r u c t i o n of i t should be seen i n t h i s frame of r e f e r e n c e . In i t s p u b l i c , inflammatory c h a r a c t e r , Dada put i n t o p r a c t i c e the t r u t h of i t s theory t u r a l ideology of the Germans was  that the c u l -  the u l t i m a t e degradation of the a r t process.  With Duchamp, the B e r l i n Dadaists were the f i r s t to f i n d t h e i r t t e r i n the contemporary art-process as such; they understood  subject-ma-  the c r i t i c i s m i n -  herent i n a r t as a r t . The ephemerality of the a r t work produced  i n B e r l i n , with  the exceptionof Grosz, a c t s as a witness to the acute h i s t o r i c i t y of the movement. Like Duchamp*s Readymades, the a c t u a l work of the B e r l i n l a r l y the p e r i o d i c a l s i c a n t purposes  most p a r t i c u -  e x i s t only i n terms of h i s t o r y , and are f o r a l l s i g n i f -  outside the realm of a e s t h e t i c s proper, except as a k i n d of c r i -  t i q u e of the process of developing a e s t h e t i c canons. The B o t t l e Rack depends f o r i t s importance upon h i s t o r y , and nothing more; the a r t i f a c t s of B e r l i n i n t -  95 erest us i n aesthetic terms, but only peripherally, i n contrast to Ernst f o r example, "...they have come down to us as documents r e l a t i n g to one episode of action and struggle and nothing more. They are arms abandoned on the f i e l d of  163 b a t t l e . What i s important i s now hidden elsewhere..."  In the sudden awarene-  ss of h i s t o r y and process, the object fades from prominence, i n 1919  as i n l a t -  er periods. I t i s true to say that the significance of the Bottle Rack depends not at a l l i n i t s presence as an object; indeed, i t i s one of the most important objects i n the art of the twentieth century, though very few people have actuall y experienced i t as any more than a photographic reproduction, that i s , as i d ea. The revolution of Duchamp and B e r l i n Dada ogy of the negation of art by art  the discovery of the methodol-  was obviously the r e s u l t of a d i a l e c t i c a l  c r i s i s . Their a r t was the result of a t o t a l  not p a r t i a l  contextual challen-  ge; the t o t a l i t y of t h e i r challenge, and t h e i r success at making i t good, e f f e c t i v e l y destroyed the i d e a l i s t outlook, the false "innocence" of works of a r t . For the f i r s t time, art self-consciously threw i t s fate to the h i s t o r i c a l proc-? ess. The i l l u s i o n that art stood away from history, mastered h i s t o r y i n being cut off from i t , was shattered. This success stemmed from the a b i l i t y of Duchamp and the B e r l i n Dadaists to formulate accurately the terms of a confrontation. These people conceived that art as art denied the fragmentary truth of ideology. The art context of 1919  was i d e o l o g i c a l , but the a r t i s t ' s consciousness became contextual when the  material world overwhelmed the organized truth; i n this sense the war was a cat a l y s t f o r Dada. "Reality" and "Appearance" were thrown into sharp focus one against the other. In Marx's terms, action created a s u r f e i t of language; ideology, as a r e s t r i c t e d region of l i n g u i s t i c a l l y structured "truths" was revealed.  96  In t h i s extreme condition, the art of Duchamp and the B e r l i n group realized i t s e l f as knowledge; concurrently i t realized that knowledge was not something simply d i f f e r e n t from ideology and controlled categories. I t saw that knowledge was a c t i v e l y antagonistic to ideology. The new practice of art created a new theory. The l i m i t s of t h i s new theory are indicated i n the s i t u a t i o n of art i n advanced i n d u s t r i a l society. To specify these l i m i t s , i t i s necessary to see the ideology of t h i s society d i f f e r s from the that of 1919  how  Europe.  The i d e a l i s t i c origins of bourgeois culture insured that a d i a l e c t i c tension would persist i n c u l t u r a l ideology even when the conditions f o r i t s r e a l i z ation were eliminated. Although concrete alternatives to the established r e a l i ty were s t i f l e d , the abstract notion of an alternative remained i n the unmistakeable gap between the condition indicated by art and that of material society. As Marx showed, a society which i s based i n contradiction must develop through contradiction: contradiction i s at once i t s energy and the source of i t s eventu a l a n n i h i l a t i o n . Advanced c a p i t a l i s t society renders "the struggle f o r e x i s t ence and the exploitation of man and nature ever more s c i e n t i f i c and rational."^' The sophistication of the organization of t h i s society, i n accordance with i t s p r i n c i p l e s , produces a higher standard of l i v i n g and at the same time an intens i f i e d structure of e x p l o i t a t i o n , mobilization, and ideologization. Marcuse suggests that the manner i n which t h i s i s being accomplished i s very s i m i l a r to the p o s i t i v i s t philosophical procedure, i . e . , the quantification of man and ture. "The quantification of nature, which led to i t s e x p l i c ation i n terms of mathematical structures, separated r e a l i t y from a l l inherent ends and, consequently, separated the true from the good, science from ethics. No matter how s c i ence may now define the o b j e c t i v i t y of nature and the i n t e r -  na-  97 r e l a t i o n among i t s p a r t s , i t cannot s c i e n t i f i c a l l y conceive i t i n terms of ' f i n a l c a u s e s ' . 6 5 1,1  The mode of thinking underlying the technological r a t i o n a l i s m of s o p h i s t i cated i n d u s t r i a l capitalism i s correspondent i n many important ways to the n i n eteenth century p o s i t i v i s m of men l i k e Auguste Comte, who i n s i s t e d * t h a t h i s task was to organize " f a c t s " . The f a c t s were seen as the data of immediate experience ; the world i s considered as " g i v e n " . We s h a l l see that t h i s gesture i s the t o t a l a n t i t h e s i s of d i a l e c t i c a l thought, which i s by nature negative.  "It had been the fundamental conviction of idealism that t r u t h i s not given to man from some external source but originates i n the process of i n t e r a c t i o n between thought and r e a l i t y , theory and p r a c t i c e . The function of thought was not merely to c o l l e c t , comprehend and order f a c t s , h& but also to contribute a q u a l i t y that rendered such a c t i v i t y p o s s i b l e , a q u a l i t y that was thus a_ p r i o r i to the f a c t s . A decisive portion of the human world therefore consisted, the i d e a l i s t s h e l d , of elements that could not be v e r i f i e d by observation. P o s i t i v i s m repudiated t h i s d o c t r i n e , slowly replacing free spontaneity of thought with predominantly r e p e t i t i v e f u n c t i o n s . This was not mer e l y a matter of epistemology. The i d e a l i s t i c idea of r e a s o n , . . . h a s been i n t r i n s i c a l l y connected with the idea of freedom and had opposed any notion of a natural necessity r u l i n g over s o c i e t y . P o s i t i v e philosophy tended instead to equate the study of society with the study of nature, so that natural science, p a r t i c u l a r l y biology, became the archetype of s o c i a l t h e o r y . . . . T h i s p o s i t i o n d i r e c t l y con^~ t r a d i c t e d the view held by d i a l e c t i c a l s o c i a l theory, t h at society i s i r r a t i o n a l p r e c i s e l y i n that i t i s governed by natural l a w s . " ^ 1  Thus, the world becomes, i n Wittgenstein's words, " a l l that i s the case." It  i s inadvisable to become involved i n an e x p l i c a t i o n of p o s i t i v i s m per se he-  r e ; the implications of p o s i t i v i s t thought f o r d i a l e c t i c a l theory are amply b r 168 ought out by Professor Karcuse. t a t i o n of society forms part  The point i s that the p o s i t i v i s t i c and a c r u c i a l part  of the dominant  interpre-  interpret-  98  ation made by contemporary c a p i t a l i s t society of the basis of i t s own actions. Furthermore, Marcuse i n s i s t s that this positivism has become an "operationalist" r a t i o n a l i t y , one i n which "objects", "situations", "beings" are understood p r i 169  marily i n terms of what can be done with them. r l d tend to give up t h e i r "being-as-such" as-such  Phenomena of the external wo-  especially t h e i r d i a l e c t i c a l being-  f o r existence as instruments i n a structure of action which i s t o t a l -  l y liberated from questions regarding notions of substance and value. These questions are categorized as originating from a foreign context, whose questions are therefore considered meaningless i n that they transgress the l i m i t s of the established context. This i s , i n a sense, tautological, f o r , with the context under t o t a l acceptance, each statement made within i t i n effect v e r i f i e s i t s e l f . This kind of s e l f - v a l i d a t i n g , tautological method i s p a r t i c u l a r l y useful i n i d eological schemata, because i'tsiattitiide toward context i s i d e n t i c a l to that of the general process of ideology, "...proved i n i t s effectiveness;} this conception works as an a p r i o r i — i t predetermines experience, i t projects the d i r e c t 170  ion of the transformation of nature, i t organizes the whole."  In the operat-  i o n a l i s t context Marcuse describes, the external world tends to lose i n t e g r i t y as an independent realm, with which man and thought i n t e r a c t . In opposition to to i d e a l i s t i c idea that subject and object related to each other i n a state of 171  tension, "saturated with concreteness",  i n which "even the most monistic sys-  tem maintained the idea of a substance which unfolds i t s e l f i n subject and obj172  ect  the idea of an antagonistic r e a l i t y " , the " s c i e n t i f i c " theory of modern  technological development undermines the tension, participates i n e f f e c t , i n a dematerialization of nature. As the external world i s made more and more an object of abstracted manipulation i n the pressure of i n t e n s i f y i n g class-based contradictions i n the productive process, the more i r r a t i o n a l the state of fact becomes. Ideologically, technological society resolves t h i s problem, or attempts  99 to resolve i t by subsuming the problematic external world into the process of abstraction  "...as the extended matter becomes comprehensible i n mathematical  equations which, translated into technology, 'remake' this matter, the res ext173 ensa loses i t s character as an independent substance."  This i s s i m i l a r to the  inverted character of Hegel's d i a l e c t i c : "...thought which i s alienated and abs t r a c t . .. .ignores r e a l nature and man....Nature i s external to i t , loss of i t s e l f , and i s only conceived as something external, as abstract thought, but a l 174 ienated abstract thought."  The abstractions to which technological r a t i o n a l  thought reduces " r e a l i t y " must be seen as the outcome of h i s t o r i c a l conditions. Like that of Comte, t h i s kind of thought i s bound to "constantly establish and f o r t i f y the i n t e l l e c t u a l order which....is the indispensible basis of a l l v e r i 175 table order."  Comte's abstractions are reduced from the concrete s o c i a l and  material existence of a determinate group, and the understanding of the abstractions and action upon the understanding i s naturally entrusted to experts created by the class i t s e l f : "Social questions, because of t h e i r complicated natu176 re, must be handled 'by a small group of i n t e l l e c t u a l e l i t e ; ' " Unlike d i a l e c t i c a l thought, technological r a t i o n a l i s t thought assumes that men are free by ignoring the existence of alienation i n the labour process. The d i a l e c t i c procedure begins from the consciousness of alienation  on concrete,  s o c i a l grounds; concomitantly, i t perceives the unreality of the established soc i a l organization. Therefore, i t perceives the unreality of the world as a whole, because  p a r t i c u l a r l y when technology i s very sophisticated  the world i s the  r e f l e c t i o n of the men and history which has made i t . D i a l e c t i c a l thought understands the term "process of existence" and i t s d i s t i n c t i o n from " r e a l i t y " as an immutable meridian of f a c t , ( c f . Wittgenstein's Tractatus: "The t o t a l i t y of ex-  100  i s t i n g states of a f f a i r s also determines which states of a f f a i r s do not exist." 177  "The world i s determined by the f a c t s , and by t h e i r being a l l the facts.") Like Lenin's famous " d i a l e c t i c a l " water-glass, the facts have existence as the p a r t i c u l a r r e s u l t s of p a r t i c u l a r stages of a process. Any independent existence given them i s necessarily a r t i f i c i a l , the result of the contingencies of specif i c operations, l i k e controlled s c i e n t i f i c experiments, and so f o r t h . I t i s this unself-conscious independent condition of the facts which i s achieved by r a t i o n a l i s t technological thought. Thus the subject and object seem to be independent of one another, and the external world appears as immutably a l i e n and " d i f f e r ent". This, combined with the impulse to quantification generated by structura l i z e d control of the "object", produces the subject as a s p e c i f i c kind of obj e c t . And the d e f i n i t i o n of the world of objects i s carried out i n terms of what forces i t reacts to  "We are defining matter as a possible object of man's ma-  178  nipulation."  Wittgenstein (whom Marcuse castigates as a representative of  positive philosophy) has suggested that, although that which i s beyond language must be passed over i n silence, this does not imply i n any way that i t does not e x i s t ("There are indeed things which cannot be put into words. They make them179  selves manifest. They are what i s mystical."  ) In contradistinction to t h i s ,  the p o s i t i v i s t rationalism of the technological world i s committed to the creation of a .structurally-complete r e a l i t y , i n which  ideologically  that which  cannot be formulated i n the language of this r a t i o n a l r e a l i t y , cannot be of consequence . The principles of t h i s technocratic theory of advanced c a p i t a l i s t society are "pure" i n that, because of the abstractness which i s a result of t h e i r h i s t o r i c a l development, they do not necessarily espouse one implementation over  101 another. That i s , as Marcuse suggests, they do not seem to imply domination as such, do not "by nature" imply i t . "However, there i s no such thing as domination per se. As theory proceeds, i t abstracts from, or rejects, a factual t e l e o l o g i c a l context that i s the given, concrete universe of discourse and action. I t i s within t h i s universe i t s e l f that the s c i e n t i f i c project occurs or does not occur, that theory conceives or does not conceive the possible a l t e r natives, that i t s hypotheses subvert or extend the pre-established r e a l i t y . " 8 0 1  Therefore, i t i s i n t h e i r own pureness that they are impure. Technological theory refuses to admit i t s h i s t o r i c a l context. This context insure that i t s abstract formulations would be structured to contribute perfectly to the motive forces of the contradictory h i s t o r i c a l r e a l i t y ; naturally, this precluded the p o s s i b i l i t y that technological theory could be cognisant of that h i s t o r i c a l r e a l i t y which i t was created to serve. "Theoretical reason, remaining pure and neutral, entered into the service of p r a c t i c a l reason. The merger proved b e n e f i c i a l to both. Today, domination perpetuates and extends i t s e l f not only through technology as technology, but the l a t t e r provides the great legitimation of the expanding p o l i t i c a l power, which absorbs a l l spheres of c u l ture.... In t h i s universe, technology also provides the great r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of the unfreedom of man and demonstrates the 'technical' i m p o s s i b i l i t y of being autonomous, of determining one's own l i f e . For t h i s unfreedom appears neither as i r r a t i o n a l nor as p o l i t i c a l , but rather as submission to the technical apparatus which enlarges the comf o r t s of l i f e and increases the productivity of labour." 8 1  1  Science per se does not become ideology, i f by "science" i s meant s p e c i f i c propositions regarding subjects such as the structure of matter, energy and so on. However, i t i s Marx's claim that science has never existed per se, and that the abstractions of science take on significance as components i n an h i s t o r i c a l  102  project because this i s i n fact t h e i r context. Pure science, l i k e pure philosophy, theology, ethics, etc., becomes ideological because the claims to purity obliterate i t s contextual nature. The symbols of abstract science become analogous to the "barrier" of r e l i g i o u s thought, f o r example, i n that they assert t h e i r absolute character. The r e f l e x i v e character of ideology presents i t s e l f i n the image of s c i e n t i f i c prediction. Again, the ideology i t s e l f i s f u l l of tension, f o r i t i s obvious that the discoveries of science open new horizons and create a s u r f e i t of language which tends to oppose ideology. This, however, runs into cancellation when the entire spectrum of p o s s i b i l i t i e s and projects i s determined beforehand, i n connection with the needs of a s p e c i f i c s o c i a l organization. The context of s c i e n t i f i c work creates a horizon of assumptions i n which the v a l i d hypotheses of science philosophy  or,  take on significance, i n which they become common property i n the  l i v e s of people, "...science, by virtue of i t s own methods and concepts, has projected and promoted a universe i n which the domination of nature has remained linked to the domination of man....Nature, s c i e n t i f i c a l l y comprehended and mastered, reappears i n the technical apparatus of production and destruction which sustains and improves the l i f e of the individuals while subordinating them to t 182  the masters of the apparatus." Abstractions, as Marx pointed out, never exist independently of practice, of the concrete relationships which they schematize. Abstract science i s a development from such concrete r e l a t i o n s , and we have seen that the l o g i c of these relations has been the l o g i c of domination, and therefore an ideology. "What appeared extreneous, foreign to the theoretical project, shows forth as part of i t s very structure (methods and concepts): pure o b j e c t i v i t y reveals i t s e l f as  103 object f o r a subjectivity which provides the Telos, the ends." ext,  183  In t h i s cont-  "technology has become the great vehicle of r e i f i c a t i o n . . . . i n i t s most ma184  ture and effective form."  Unlikesearlier bourgeois structures, the world do-  es not appear the product of chance operations and blind necessity, but i t s l o gic i s presented c l e a r l y as that of technological p o s s i b i l i t y : what can be accomplished i s that which i s to be done. The f a c t s , divorced from the h i s t o r i c a l factors, reign unchallenged. The operationalist tone of the facts creates an "administered world", with i t s supply of experts, each of whom serve a context. The apparently objective empirical world of fact i s therefore ideological; the empiricism i s t o t a l and the realm of fact cannot, by i t s own d e f i n i t i o n , be t r anscended . This non-transcendent  realm i s a n t i - d i a l e c t i c . Just as Hegel subverted the  p o s s i b i l i t y f o r d i a l e c t i c a l thought to r e a l i z e i t s e l f i n i t s proper realm  the  world of p r a c t i c e — - b y placing both "poles" of the movement, so to speak, withi n that which i s only a single pole  "Spirit"  the a n t i - d i a l e c t i c a l world of  thought seems to separate subject and object, but r e a l l y destroys the dynamic logic of t h i s separation. I t s separation of subject and object renders the two components absolutely d i s t i n c t on the one hand, and on the other i t tends to subsume the "object"  the sensuous, external world  i n a series of pure abst-  ractions; i n other words, creates the object only as an extension of the function of the subject. Or (and at the same time) i t renders the subject as no more than a p a r t i c u l a r kind of object (as mentioned above, p. 100), a sophistication of the basic c a p i t a l i s t procedure of treating men as commodities. C o n f l i c t i s eliminated; organization and manipulation of structures takes i t s place. In philosophy, abstract structuralism makes i t s e l f known i n l i n g u i s t i c analysis. We have outlined the Marxian c r i t i q u e of this attitude toward l a n -  104 185 guage previously. Marx's concept and use of language i s c r i t i c a l ; just as philosophy i n comprehending the world i s a c r i t i q u e of the world, language, while a representation of practice, retains the capacity to abstract from, and c r i t i c i z e practice. D i a l e c t i c a l thought and language are thus "transcendent" i n that the r e l a t i o n established between subject and object i s dynamic: language renders practice an object f o r analysis and at the same time, as a product of practice, i t s e l f can become an object f o r analysis. This implies d i f f e r e n t language l e v e l s . The Marxian c r i t i q u e of l i n g u i s t i c analysis (which Marcuse carries out i n 186 part  ) i s based upon the fact that t h i s philosophical system proceeds to ana-  lyze "common language" as i t i s found to be i n existence. In this sense common language philosophy takes language to be " a l l that i s the case". D i a l e c t i c ana l y s i s understands language as a system produced by man i n the same gesture as producing the world, society. Therefore, i t can never be " a l l that i s the case", just as a t r a d i t i o n , an i n s t i t u t i o n , an association can never be so, and i n the sense that the o r b i t of the moon, f o r example, can be so. The significance of language i s that i t i s not the case; Marcuse maintains that, i n common l i n g u i s t i c use, the c r u c i a l sphere i s that which i s not stated, the "deep structure" of 18 s t r u c t u r a l assumptions which constitutes the generative nature of the language. The refusal or i n a b i l i t y to distinguish between ordinary and philosophical language i s attacked by Marcuse on the grounds that common language i s language 188 acting as an apparent object;  f o r reasons of e f f i c i e n c y i n the conduct of  d a i l y l i f e an entire range and dimension i s eliminated from consideration i n the p r a c t i c a l use of this language. Philosophical language, however, aims at bringing to the surface i n practice the entirety of i t s nature, "...exactness and c l a r i t y cannot be attained within the universe of ordinary discourse. The p h i l osophic concepts aim at a dimension of fact and meaning which elucidates the  105  phrases or words of ordinary discourse. Or, i f the subject of ordinary discourse i t s e l f becomes the object of philosophical analysis, the language of p h i l o s ophy becomes a meta-language ." 1  1  189  As Wittgenstein suggests, "A thing cannot 190  be at the same time a measure and the thing measured."  Marcuse, as a Marxist,  objects that l i n g u i s t i c analysis, l i k e a l l alienated philosophy, removes i t s e l f and i t s subject from the universal medium of the formation of concepts and words. "The philosopher, himself an abstract form of alienated man, sets himself 191  up as the measure of the alienated world."  P o s i t i v e language philosophy, with  an a n t i - d i a l e c t i c a l methodology and approach, binds i t s e l f to the explication, the admittedly precise and detailed description of something which, to the d i a l e c t i c thinker, i n a sense does not e x i s t . One i s reminded from a l i n e from Genet 's Our Lady of the Flowers: "I l i v e d i n the midst of an i n f i n i t y of holes i n the form of men."  D i a l e c t i c a l analysis brings forward the history of everyday  language and everyday constructs "as a hidden dimension of meaning  the rule of  192  society over i t s language."  Language i s constantly stressed as a s o c i a l phen-  omenon, i n which every d e t a i l i s generated by determinate factors, even the i n determinate d e t a i l s . In p o s i t i v i s t analysis the context exists as a l o g i c a l a p r i o r i under which a l l content i s judged. "But this r a d i c a l acceptance of the empirical violates the empirical, f o r i n i t speaks the mutilated, 'abstract' individual who experiences (and expresses) only that which i s given to him (given i n a l i t e r a l sense), who has only the facts and not the factors, whose behaviour i s one-dimensional and manipulated. By virtue of the f a c t ual repression, the experienced world i s the result of r e s t r i c t e d experience, and the p o s i t i v i s t cleaning of the mind brings the mind i n l i n e with r e s t r i c t e d experience." ^ 1  The c l o s i n g of context i s apparent, and the closed context i s important f o r what i t excludes. Marcuse indicates examples of regions of thought relegat-  106  194  ed to the status of " f i c t i o n " or "myth", and asserts that, i n accordance with the theory of ideology, there i s no reason why r a t i o n a l thought or true consciousness cannot at times be pressured into the category of myth. This can occur when i t s antithesis reaches a l e v e l of i d e o l o g i c a l productivity wherein grand contexts are t i g h t l y controlled (administration of u n i v e r s i t i e s , publishing houses, i n s t i t u t i o n a l associations, teaching, etc.). D i a l e c t i c a l , negative thought 7  i s i t s e l f negated by positive thought when positive thought holds the r e i f y i n g power. Obviously, the l e v e l of f o r c i b l e suppression s h i f t s ; i t i s apparent to a l l that every d i a l e c t i c a l , negative, revolutionary i d e a f l s f r e e l y available i n certain sectors of advanced c a p i t a l i s t society. This a v a i l a b i l i t y denies the assertion that i n t e l l e c t u a l suppression i s practiced. But the denial i s i t s e l f annihilated when the truth of the Marxian idea that theory and practice must not be separated i s understood. In the controlled contextual scene of ideologica l culture, ideas separated from practice i n fact serve the ideology by destroying i t i i i the abstract. The world i t s e l f i s not changed, but descriptions of i t are changed. The Marxian concept of language renders l i n g u i s t i c analysis as i t exists transparent as a function of ideology, simultaneously  produced by f a l s e consci-  ousness and continuing and i n t e n s i f y i n g i t . Common language takes on sense only when i t i s comprehended i n the clear l i g h t of the factors which bring i t about. True consciousness  and therefore true language study  makes the established  195  language "speak what i t conceals or excludes." The h i s t o r i c a l condition of advanced i n d u s t r i a l society challenges  true  consciousness. In the controlled context of ideology, thinking implies recognit i o n of the contradictions. Contemporary society, as mentioned e a r l i e r , cannot be seen d i a l e c t i c a l l y u n t i l the contradictory nature of i t s energy i s recogniz-  107  ed; at the same time t h i s contradictory nature makes i t s e l f known through d i a l e c t i c a l consciousness. D i a l e c t i c a l thought, because of Marx's work, i s inherently historical. Likewise, the d i a l e c t i c of a r t , because of B e r l i n Dada and Duchamp, i s h i s t o r i c a l . The task facing Duchamp and the B e r l i n Dadaists was to take the e n t i rety of the art context as t h e i r subject-matter. They were producing the  new  system, which supervenes the old. Their a c t i v i t i e s l a i d the foundation f o r a t o t a l l y new d e f i n i t i o n of a r t . This d e f i n i t i o n , as we have seen (pp. 81-82) i s not a s p e c i f i c a l l y delimited zone of a c t i v i t y ; rather i t i s a negative d e f i n i t 196 ion, or, i n Peckham's terms, an empty category,  one which i s f i l l e d with the  content which becomes necessary i n r e l a t i o n to current praxis and the abstractions which can be made out of i t (which necessarily generate both c r i t i c a l and anticipatory functions). However, the empty category i s not necessarily i n f i n i t e ; the notion of the empty category might, on the other hand, generate a limi t l e s s method, as Jack Burnham points out i n a discussion of Robert Morris' work: " E a r l i e r I mentioned that Morris has....transcended.... Duchampian strategies rather than revert to Duchampian forms. Quite obviously no one can choose another u r i n a l . Such an act carries not one i o t a of recognition ( i . e . , re-evaluation of the art s i t u a t i o n ) . But there are other choices that can be made. One i s the act of 'bracketing' a l l art sub-sets so that art i s demonstrably seen to be a closed and exhausted category. When i t i s demonstrated that the art structure merely demands that a r t i s t s i n vent a new sub-set or sub-sub-set ( i . e . , environmental systems, fabricated objects, p i l e s of materials, paintings, sculptures, f i l e cards, motion pictures, or any other e n t i t y ) then once and f o r a l l the art category i s closed. Perception of art's structure, as Levi-Strauss implies, dissipates art's s o c i e t a l function. Once the l i m i t s of the category are understood, or bracketed, c@ then a l l further a c t i v i t y i s r e s i d u a l , merely e x i s t i n g  108 for collectors and museum directors. Only by redefining art away from i t s present focussing, tautological condi t i o n can the art category be made open again." 57 1  This i s c r u c i a l . Duchamp's discoveries showed that whenever a new system i s created, the old remains as a r t i f a c t , a depleted energy-source. Wo new  syst-  em can claim i n f i n i t u d e because i t l i v e s by the d i a l e c t i c a l p r i n c i p l e . That i s , every empty category w i l l by d e f i n i t i o n have to become closed: t h i s i s the s i g nificance of these categories i n h i s t o r y . The empty category or new context c r eated by Duchamp and the B e r l i n Dadaists i s i n i t s own turn closed as l a t e r art i s t s ' practice includes a t o t a l d e f i n i t i o n of t h e i r f i e l d of action. This context, as we have seen, was the bourgeois-idealist culture and i t s ideology. The new post-bourgeois culture has established a new ideology, which l i k e wise includes a completed d e f i n i t i o n of the old. That i s , advanced i n d u s t r i a l society  or, more precisely, the ideologists who conceptualize i t s i l l u s i o n s —  -understands d i a l e c t i c a l thought very w e l l . The newer p o s i t i v i s t i c a l thinking i s a s p e c i f i c repudiation  technologic-  of the d i a l e c t i c a l q u a l i t i e s residual i n  bourgeois-idealist culture, q u a l i t i e s which kept i n view the p o s s i b l i t y of an alternative existence. The new context includes a t o t a l d e f i n i t i o n of the old: advanced i n d u s t r i a l society makes i t s e l f an "empty category" i n a sense, with the moves ideology makes to prolong the l i f e of i t s energy source  r e i f i e d con-  t r a d i c t i o n . The destruction of d i a l e c t i c thought i s a necessary condition of the operation of t h i s society: denial not only of the alternatives, but also of the consciousness which conceives the alternatives  even i n the abstract.  Art replenishes i t s e l f only through t o t a l revolution. As Burnham says above, an open category can be created not by extension or reform of treatment of a spe c i f i c context, but only by the establishment of a completely new context. There  109  i s no other method available. The entire range of categories i n contemporary society i s created and stimulated by alienation; alienation i s the force which makes society run, which runs the process of production. A r t , as long as i t entertains any notions about making i t s e l f consequential i n the world, continually redirects i t s e l f i n accordance with the formulations of alienation. Ideology attains f l e x i b i l i t y through i t s method. Art does not manage to stand against soci e t y today even i n i t s most r a d i c a l gestures. The reception of Duchamp's Fountain  or of Hausmann and Huelsenbeck s Central European tour of 1920 i s not repe1  ated i n connection with the "revolutionary" art of today. The context has s h i f ted;  i t i s confronted with new ideological problems. The Fountain c o l l i d e d with  an ideology already beginning to f a i l (1917): i t can be seen as evidence of the s u r f e i t of practice i n the world at the time. The bourgeois-idealist ideology had been revealed as other than the world: the Fountain or the Bottle Rack indicate the depth of the ingression of praxis into verbal l i f e  the degree of  penetration of knowledge into ideology. Like the B e r l i n Dada movement must be considered as a work of art  which  the Readymade brings the non-existent c r -  ashing into the safely-delimited world of "the f a c t s " . In the l i g h t of t h i s explosion, "a world i s revealed", the old category i s revealed as irrevocably c l osed. Marcuse maintains that the nature of art as art makes i t possible f o r art to r e t a i n i t s negating quality i n the face of apparently t o t a l contextual contv.  r o i . This i s because, just to make art at a l l the a r t i s t must consciously  more or less  recognize h i s consciousness f o r what i t i s : contextual and h i s t o -  r i c a l . Every a r t i s t struggles with the influence of other a r t i s t s . A r t i s t i c a l ienation i s mediated, conscious alienation, alienation at a higher, more abstracted, self-conscious l e v e l .  110  In the i d e a l i s t culture of the bourgeois world, a r t remained a coherent vehicle of alienation, "sustaining and protecting the contradiction....They (the arts) were a r a t i o n a l , cognitive force, revealing a dimension of man and nature 198  which was repressed and repelled i n r e a l i t y . "  The primary characteristic of  bourgeois-idealist culture i s i t s difference from everyday l i f e . The museum, concert-hall and theatre were special occasions. "Now this essential gap between the arts and the order of the day, kept open i n the a r t i s t i c alienation, i s progressively closed by advancing technological society. And with i t s closing, the Great Refusal i s i n turn refused; the 'other dimension' i s absorbed into the prevailing state of a f f a i r s . The works of a l i e n a t i o n are themselves incorporated into t h i s society and c i r c u l a t e as part and parcel of the equipment which adorns and psychoanalyzes the prevailing state of a f f a i r s . Thus they become commercials they s e l l , comfort, or excite." 99 1  The reserved realm of i d e a l i s t culture removed art from material l i f e , but at the same time i t insured that the negative aspect of the remoteness would »• survive. " . . . t h i s remoteness has been removed and with i t the transgression and the indictment....The a r t i s t i c a l i e n ation has become as functional as the architecture of the new theatres and concert h a l l s where i t i s performed.... the c u l t u r a l center i s becoming a f i t t i n g part of the shopping center, or the municipal center, or government center....It i s good that everyone can now have the fine arts at h i s f i n g e r t i p s , by just turning a knob on his set, or by just stepping into his drugstore. In this d i ffusion, however, they become cogs i n a culture-machine which remakes t h e i r content."200 Marcuse articulates a c r u c i a l truth; upon i t hinges the understanding of art's content i n the twentieth century. In an ideological context, the s o c i a l function of the art work e s s e n t i a l l y t r a n s f o r m s — o r  d e t e r m i n e s — i t s meaning.  111  The  r e v o l u t i o n a r y move of Duchamp and  the B e r l i n Dadaists  e s t a b l i s h e d the awar-  eness of the t r u t h of t h i s as the center of t h e i r methodology. Art becomes s i g n i f i c a n t only when i t enters language and becomes an i n f l u e n c e . Therefore  i t is  true that the nature of the a r t ' s entry i n t o language determines the i n f l u e n c e i t has  i t s "content". In a frame of reference which i s genuinely  dimensional",  i n Marcuse's terms  a d i s t o r t i o n of the intended  open  "two-  content w i l l  not n e c e s s a r i l y take place, because there i s no o v e r r i d i n g system which must be served above a l l other c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . However, i n the i d e o l o g i c a l context  cru-  c i a l aspects of content are o b l i t e r a t e d i n the process of the work's entry i n t o language, or c u l t u r e . In the manner i n which a r t works f u n c t i o n i n s o c i e t y r e s t s t h e i r meaning, content and  s i g n i f i c a n c e . The work, as content, then, i s t o t -  a l l y empty i n the one-dimensional ideology: i t awaits r e i f i e d s o c i e t y ' s v e r d i c t on i t s e l f . This i s the l i m i t of Duchamp's notion about the p a r t i c i p a t i o n of the spectator put forward i n "The  Creative  Act".  T h i s s u b s t i t u t i o n of the "empty work" f o r the empty category i s characteri s t i c of the o p e r a t i o n a l i s t s t r u c t u r e Marcuse d i s c u s s e s . The  "empty work" i s an  i c o n f o r every ideology. As such, i t can be seen as a component i n the process of the dominance of "closed c a t e g o r i e s " , the maintenance of c o d i f i e d frames of reference. The  methodology of B e r l i n Dada and Duchamp i s e n t i r e l y v a l i d . As Burnham  says, Duchampian s t r a t e g i e s motivate the most advanced a r t of our time. The i t i c a l d i f f e r e n c e l i e s i n the "angle"  taken by the method. The  s t r a t e g y determ-  ined that a r t n e c e s s a r i l y a s s e r t i t s c o n t r a d i c t o r y character. The character of a r t i n 1916-1919 determined that i t rupture  cr-  contradictory  the i d e a l i s t i c  distance  and e s t a b l i s h i t s e l f as a f u n c t i o n of m a t e r i a l c u l t u r e . As Duchamp s t a t e d at the time, "The  best works of a r t America has  produced are her plumbing and her b r i d -  112 ges.";  the  removal  of  art  from  the  movement  of  concrete  culture  was  to  be  dest^  royed. But  we  see  integration  of  that art  culture  into  and  le,  Rauschenberg,  fact  that  ievement  the of  integrated The bles the  mode the  pant mpt  the  destroy  consumer  i n  a  out  programs  the  subject  of  from  objectified  the  by  a  difficult  sense,  material  culture,  subversion  which  aspects  that  must  awaits  "technology"  has  and  for  reasons.  ely  obliterated  In  good  the  society  of  in  of  art,  do  i t .  so  old  The is  impetus  was  it  culture, is  full the  in  the  To  be  destroyed,  while  i f  it art  is  awareness  move  of  absorbed,  i n  this, and  the  in  of  To  the  the  c l -  passive  art  "into  tends  into  alienation,  art's  life  is  its  to  antagonism of  art  the  and and  gadgetry,  was  absolut-  servile.  advanced  of  bourgeois-  further  content  atte-  status  of  technocratic its  out  the  the  much-praised alliance for  art".  resem-  art  museum c u l t u r e  to  ach-  been  edge.  moving  protected,  advertisement  completely  the  has about  "get  necessity  the  (an  object  thin  the  spectator/partici-  achieve  However,  "art  examp-  of  Dada)  to  on a  which  light  art  balances  arena.  a n d new,  i n  the  an absolute  because,  F o r example,  art  but  (for  art-object  becomes  The  Duchamp's  him  the  the  The  Therefore, only  in  better.  redefined.  produced nothing but  and i t  seen  to  Duchamp a n d B e r l i n  museum m u s t  operation  remoteness.  it  related  more  the  the  street"  idealist  be  considerably.  ideology.  the  cultural  the  living  must  of  society,  culture,  similar institutions  the  of  present,  museum a n d  stifle  in  life  the  is  function  self-consciousness  participative  alienation  culture  carrying  changed;  everyday  true  a  consciousness  has  of  now  ground  Historical self-consciousness  critical  creation  becomes to  is  of  shifted  become  extreme  historical  landscape  the  of  alienation  have  Warhol and M o r r i s )  considerably.  of  has  artists  creation  the  museums"  arify:  of  life  "success", Johns,  that  and i d e o l o g y  negativity,  its  113  a b i l i t y to ingress into the domain of the factual with the awareness of that which does not e x i s t . I t s prime c h a r a c t e r i s t i c i s i t s difference from what l i f e has become. Marcuse points out the "alienation-effect", or "estrangement-effect"  form-  ulated by Brecht f o r the theatre as an example of the ingressive, unreal nature of a r t : "The ^estrangement-effect i s not superimposed on l i t e r a t ure. I t i s rather l i t e r a t u r e ' s own answer to the threat of t o t a l behaviourism the attempt to rescue the r a t i o n a l i t y of the negative. In t h i s attempt the great 'conservative' of l i t e r a t u r e joins forces with the r a d i c a l a c t i v i s t . Paul Valery i n s i s t s on the inescapable commitment of the poetic language to the negation. The verses of t h i s language 'ne parlent jamais que des choses absentes.' They speak of that which, though absent, haunts the established universe of discourse and behaviour as i t s most tabooes p o s s i b i l i t y neither heaven nor h e l l , neither good nor e v e i l but simply 'le bonheur'....Creating and moving i n a medium which presents the absent, the poetic language i s a language of cognition but a cognition which subverts the positive. In i t s cognitive function, poetry performs the great task of thought: 'le t r a v a i l que f a i t vivre en nous ce qui n'existe pas'. Naming the 'things that are absent' i s the breaking of the s p e l l of the things that are; moreover i t i s the ingression of a different order of things into the established one 'le commencement d'un monde'."201 1  Because, however, the established r e a l i t y has mobilized language and organized expression to an unprecedented degree, " t r u l y avant-garde works of l i t erature communicate the break with communication. With Rimbaud, and then with dada and surrealism, l i t e r a t u r e rejects the very structure of discourse which, throughout the history of culture, has linked a r t i s t i c and ordinary language."' The communication of the break with communication i s analogous to the negation of art by art discussed e a r l i e r . In t h i s negation, "The t r a d i t i o n a l s t u f f of art (images, harmonies, colors) reappears only as 'quotes', residues of  114 past meaning i n a context of refusal."  203  The closed categories reappear i n new  art only as a r t i f a c t s , their potential to carry meaning i n the new context i s exhausted, subsumed by the h i s t o r i c a l self-consciousness of the process of art (the process of d i a l e c t i c a l signification, "pointing with the finger..."). Unl i k e the art which preceeded i t , that of Duchamp and the Berlin Dadaists, i n Morris' words, uses "structure....to build events. In this sense i t draws clos204 er to science as a mode."  Earlier art tended to search for structure i n ex-  i s t i n g events; but as the universe of existing events becomes progressively c l osed to the a r t i s t i c impulse, that impulse moves to complete the negation on i t s own terms: to establish i t s own "apparent fact,!' with a model of i t s own version of the history of facts. Huelsenbeck and Hausmann, i n their "Grand Tour" of Dada (Berlin, Leipzig, Prague, Karlsbad, etc.) created the most extreme "environmenta l " work of art u n t i l the May,  1968 Paris uprisings.  The negation of art by art i s the work of the art of total alienation. As such i t necessarily becomes a critique of the conditions of i t s own existence. The "Duchampian strategy" created the fundamental methodology for art, a totally new context and stance. As methodology i t remains intact, and i s l i k e l y to be so for some time to come. Por, i n contrast to Kosuth, Duchamp did not set up an impulse "for an art context only", and which therefore leads inevitably to the self-sufficient contentlessness of the tautology. Rather, his method indicated the outlines of a totally "revolutionary" generative scheme, a "grammar" of renewal. Kosuth's notion of context i s intensional and analytic; the Berlin-Duchamp notion can be characterized as extensional and synthetic, i n that i t moves out from a multitude of actual occurrences and events, rather than systematica l l y eliminating events and occurrences from a p r i o r i s t i c contextual schema. The  115  t o t a l l y d i a l e c t i c a l , h i s t o r i c a l nature of the extensional, synthetic method means that no abstract categories remain beyond the movement of actual practice. The "empty category" i s f i l l e d according to the needs of praxis, which begins from alienation. The major s h i f t i n a r t i s t i c strategy concerns the changing modalities of ideology i n the post-bourgeois world. In a world which i s increasingly r e i f i e d and increasingly developing through i t s contradictions, the preoccupation advanced art i s to generate alternatively-structured events, and therefore, to generate an alternative language. The s p e c i f i c content of s o c i a l existence which determined the consciousness of Duchamp, Huelsenbeck, Hausmann, the Herzfeldes and the rest i s no longer an issue. The society out of which they emerged i s a closed category. Their achievement, i n Marxian terms, "transcends" the soc i a l existence which produces the a r t , giving proof of the doctrine of the d i a l e c t i c a l reflexiveness of consciousness. The d e f i n i t i o n they created applies to an a c t i v i t y , not to a set of r e s u l t s . The results interest us as documents of history; formerly " l i v i n g " works of art remain as a r t i f a c t s . As Burnham maintains, i t i s not a question of choosing a new u r i n a l ; the introduction of process as content establishes a new method of creation.. The Readymades and the p o l i t i c a l action of B e r l i n f o r the f i r s t time established contextual praxis as art's subject-matter, r e a l i z i n g the s o c i a l nature of art-meanings. VJithin t h i s r e a l i z a t i o n i s contained the essentials of a c r i t i c a l vocabulary, which i s s t i l l i n the process of being a r t i c u l a t e d . Art contains i t s c r i t i c a l vocabulary, i n contradistinction to Duchamp, who  left  the development of this more s p e c i f i c a l l y to "posterity", which i n Marxian preh i s t o r y , means contingency. The attempt at the removal of remoteness and-negativity from art i n the i d -  116  eological world is, therefore, to be resisted, and this resistance comes "naturally" in the dialectical art-strategy; since its own subject-matter i s i t s relationship to history, reification is revealed as an illusory condition, as conditioned consciousness. False consciousness mutilates the imagination, creates a mutilated imagination in which reification is internalized. Thus, even "instinctual" needs, so long understood as the property of the abstract "private sector" of individual l i f e , become functions of ideology. This reification i s the effective negation of the imagination. Art as knowledge performs the "negation of the negation". The apparently contradictory statements of the negative consciousness are refuted by the "radical empiricist" or positivistic ideology of advanced capitalist society, but their meaning persists in the consciousness of history. This historical consciousness becomes "real" only in the necessary connection of theory and practice, as Marx outlined. This alliance itself can be seen as the negation of contemporary ideology. The possibilities for this connection in the contemporary world are subject for other and further discussion. In art, this a l l iance does exist, but only as an image, a presentation of "in fact" unreal events. "Culture", as the condition of knowledge in capitalist society, reveals itself as the antagonist of art. The language of this culture  ae seemingly  unbreakable, impenetrable continuum, is the field of conflict (cf. William S. Burroughs). Events generate language, and, as stated above, the task of art since Duchamp and Berlin Dada is to generate events which proclaim their antagonism to the structure of events which produced the conditions for their creation. The events built by art are unreal, and necessarily so. Therein lies their negating value, the domain of their consequence.  117 NOTES 1. -Marcel Duchamp, "The Creative Act", paper read at a Session on the Creative Act, Convention of the American Federation of the Arts, Houstion, Texas, Apr i l , 1957; published i n Robert Lebel, Marcel Duchamp, Trianon Press, Paris, Grove Press, New York, 1959, 77-78. 2. -see Arnold Hauser, The Social History of Art, New York, 1964.  Vintage Editions (Random House),  3. -Arthur Rimbaud, "Mauvais Sang", from Une Saison en Enfer, 1873, i n Oliver Bernard, ed. and trans, from the French, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1962, 302303. 4. -Richard Huelsenbeck, En Avant Dada: Eine Geschichte des Dadaismus, P. Steegeman, Hanover, 1920; translated as En Avant Dada: A History of Dadaism i n Robert Motherwell, ed., The Dada Painters and Poets: An Anthology, Documents of Modern Art no. 8, George Wittenborn Inc., New York, 1951 > (hereafter referred to as DPP), 29. 5. -Huelsenbeck, DPP, 41. 6. -For relevant information regarding the distributions of Parisian group, see Herbert S. Gershman, The Surrealist The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1969, 140. ributions of publications by the B e r l i n group, see Hans and Anti-Art, Thames and Hudson, London, 1965, 110-112.  publications by the Revolution i n France, Regarding the d i s t Richter, Dada: Art %  7. -See Maurice Nadeau, H i s t o i r e du Surrealisme. Editions du S e u i l , P a r i s , 1942, vol. 1, ch. 7, which refers to Naville's essay,"La revolution et l e s i n t e l l ectuels: mieux et moins bein", 1927, a l a t e r publication of a previous paper, "Que peuvent f a i r e l e s surrealistes?" of 1926, published i n La Revolution Surrealiste. no. 9-10, October, 1927. For a f u l l e r description of the dialogbe tween N a v i l l e and Breton at t h i s time, see Gershman, 86-91 and notes. 8. -see Richter, 102, 110-114, regarding the periodicals Neue Jugend. edited by the Herzfeldes, and Die Friet Strasse, edited by Hausmann and Jung. 9. -regarding Baader, see Richter, 123-127, DPP, 45-47, 148-152 10. -Huelsenbeck, DPP, 32-33. 11. -Connections: " B a l l and I had been extremely active i n helping to spread expressionism i n Germany; B a l l was an intimate friend of Kandinsky, i n c o l l aboration with whome he had attempted to found an expressionist theatre i n Munich. Arp i n Paris had been i n close contact with Picasso and Braque and was thoroughly convinced of the necessity of combatting n a t u r a l i s t conception i n any form. Tristan Tzara....brought with him from Rumania an unlimited l i t erary facility....Through Tzara we were also i n r e l a t i o n with the f u t u r i s t movement and carried on a correspondence with Marinetti.", Huelsenbeck, DPP, 24. The poetic concepts of simultaneity and bruitismwere b a s i c a l l y taken f r om futurism. 12. -For example, Huelsenbeck can point to the manner i n which Dada accepted i t s demise. In Germany, Dada was over by 1922, finished by i t s members without unnecessary lament, while i n Paris Tzara kept Dada together as a movement  118 through mid-1923, with the Coeur a barbe soiree on July 6, and published h i s "Conference sur Dada" i n Schwitters' MERZ i n January, 1924. The i n f i g h t i n g of the Paris movement (Bretpn-Tzara, Picabia-Breton, Picabia-Tzara, etc.) i s ;>~ well-documented, and a study of Breton's a c t i v i t y makes i t apparent that the r e a l thrust of Paris Dada had been spent by the time of the "Proces Barres" of May 31, 1921; a f t e r t h i s event the theoretical c o n f l i c t between Breton and Tzara rendered following Dada episodes e r r a t i c and quarrelsome. This i s not to suggest that the B e r l i n movement did not experience s i m i l a r d i f f i c u l t i e s . From the beginning i t was beset by f i e r c e competition between Huelsenbeck and Hausmann f o r influence, and certainly Huelsenbeck seems to have had l i t t l e use f o r Baader ("...a Swabian p i e t i s t who at the brink of old age discovered Dadaism and journeyed through the countryside as a Dadaist prophet to the delight of a l l f o o l s . " , En Avant Dada. DPP, 26-27.). However, no member of the B e r l i n group attempted to keep i t i n existence f o r i t s own sake, under* standing that to do so would be e s s e n t i a l l y an anti-Dada gesture, " . . . i n 1922, when the power of the f a i t h began to wane and all-too-human c o n f l i c t s began to appear, these same people....began to lose t h e i r sense of common l o y a l t y . Baader turned against one RH, who, i n h i s turn, deserted and slandered the other RH, or else t r i e d to outdo him i n power and status. No longer moved by the enthusiasm that sprang from t h e i r shared experience, the i n d i v i d u a l personalities were worth what they and t h e i r anti-art were worth, and no more....By the beginning of 1923, a l l of the 'storm' had been stressed out of Sturm und Drang.", Richter, 134. 13. -Huelsenbeck, DPP, 26-27. 14. -Huelsenbeck, DPP, 3915. -Dada publications i n B e r l i n after 1917 included: Die Blutige Ernst, edited by Carl Einstein; Jedermann Sein Signer Fussball ("Every Man His Own Footb a l l " ) , c o l l e c t i v e l y edited and distributed, (see note 6); der Dada. edited by Raoul Hausmann; Club Dada, edited by Huelsenbeck, Jung and Hausmann f o r one issue only. Also published were: Dada-Almanach. edited by Huelsenbeck; Dada Seigt, a c o l l e c t i o n published by Malik-Verlag i n 1920, and several other single issue ventures, often closely-pursued by police and censors; such as The P i l l . The Cudgel. Rose-Colored Spectacles. Adversary. Bankruptcy and Germany Must Perish. For detailed information on numbers, contributors, etc., see Herbert S. Gershman, A Bibliography of the Surrealist Revolution i n F r ance, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1969. 16. -Motherwell (DPP) mistakenly dates t h i s work as 1920 (242-246); Richter reproduces a l l four pages of the o r i g i n a l publication(105), showing the correct date, 1918. 17. -Richter, 103, quoting Huelsenbeck's speech at the "Saal der neuen Sezession" B e r l i n , Bebruary, 1918. 18. -That i s , a system of thought which permits dissent, but which, i n the very act of permitting, labels that which i s permitted as deviant. Herbert Marcuse has analyzed t h i s s i t u a t i o n i n h i s essay "Repressive Tolerance" i n Critique of Pure Tolerance (with Robert Paul Wolff and Barrington Moore, J r . ) , Beacon Press, Boston, 1965, and this essay i s evident i n the following discussion. 19.-Huelsenbeck, DPP, 40.  119 20. -see Alfred Korzybski, Science and Sanity: An Introduction to Non-Aristotelian Systems and General Semantics. International Non-Aritotelian Library Publishing Company, Lakeville, Conn., 1933. 21. -Karl Marx, Theses on Feuerbach, XI, Addenda to, Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The German Ideology, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1964> 647. (The German Ideology hereafter referred to as GI.) 22. -George Lichtheim, Marxism: A Historical and C r i t i c a l Study, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1961, 3. 23. -Huelsenbeck, DPP, 40-41. 24. - I t i s also the basis of Andre Breton's dissatisfaction with Dada (and Tzara's leadership of i t ) by early 1921. The weakness of Dada's program i n Paris i s apparent to Breton before the Proces Barres, as i t i s a motivating factor i n his attitude toward the episode. 25. -see the catalogue for the only latge Berlin exhibition, the F i r s t International Dada Fair held at the Burchard Gallery, Berlin, 1920. The exhibition included a l l members of the Berlin corps, and also Ernst ("dadamax ernst cologne"), Baargeld, Schwitters, Picabia, Otto Dix, Paul Citroen, and other, lesser-known names. Publications were prominently included, and much of the p i c t o r i a l work was illustrations for these, such as Heartfield's works for Huelsenbeck's second edition of Phantastiche Gebete, brought out by MalikVerlag. Many works were collaborative (Ernst-Baargeld, Grosz-Heartfield). 26. -George Grosz published four volumes of his s a t i r i c a l drawings between 1917 and 1923, a l l brought out by Malik-Verlag: 1. -Kleine Grosz Mappe, 1917. 2. -Das Geschichte der herrschenden Klasse: 57 politische zeichnungen. (Kleine Revolutionaire Bibliotek, 4), 1921. "This was originally based on 60 drawings i n 1919» based on published work from 'Die P l e i l e ' , 'Der Blutige 'feErriSt', and similar sources." (DPP, bibliography no. 273.) 3. -Ecce Homo. 84 plates, 1923. , 27. -On Heartfield, see DPP, 290-293; Wieland Herzfelde, John Heartfield; Leben und Werke, dargestellt von seinem Bruder, Dresden, 1962; Aaron Scharf, "John Heartfield, Berlin Dada, and the Weapon of Photomontage", Studio International, v o l . 176, no. 904, October, 1968, 134-140; Frank Whitford, ed., "John Heartfield: Manifestos and related statements", Studio International, v o l . 78, no. 915, October, 1969, 102-104. 28. -Joseph Kosuth, i n Arthur R. Rose, "Four Interviews: Barry, Huebler, Kosuth, Weiner", Arts Magazine, February, 1969, 23. 29. -Roland Barthes, Writing Degree Zero, H i l l and Wang, New York, 1953 (1968 ed.), 9. 30. -Huelsenbeck, DPP,  36.  31. -The so-called "conservative" aspect of Picasso's thoughts throughout the painting revolution he achieved are made clear i n his Statement to Marius de Zayas of 1923: "Cubism has kept i t s e l f within the limits and limitations of painting, never pretending to go beyond i t . Drawing, design and color are understood and practiced i n cubism i n the s p i r i t and manner i n which they are understood and practiced i n a l l other schools. Our subjects might be d i fferent, as we have introduced into painting objects and forms which were formerly ignored': We have kept our eyes open to our surroundings, and also our brains.", from "Picasso Speaks", The Arts, New York, May, 1923, 315-326,  120  r e p r i n t e d i n A l f r e d H . Barr, Picasso, Museum of Modern A r t , New  York, 1 9 4 6 ,  271.  3 2 . -Huelsenbeck, DPP,  37.  3 3 . - T h i s p o s i t i o n i s very c l o s e to that which Jean-Paul S a r t r e advocates i n h i s What Is L i t e r a t u r e ? , P h i l o s o p h i c a l L i b r a r y , New York, 1 9 4 9 . Huelsenbeck has a l i g n e d h i s v e r s i o n of Dada with Sarte's e x i s t e n t i a l i s t thought of the 1 9 4 0 s and 1 9 5 0 s : see h i s a r t i c l e , "Dada and E x i s t e n t i a l i s m " , i n Verkauf, ed., Dada: Monograph of a Movement, New York, 1 9 6 1 . Both w r i t e r s propose "engagement" as a necessary s t a t e f o r l i t e r a t u r e and a r t . 3 4 . -Ian Wallace, i n conversation,  Vancouver, 1 9 6 9 .  3 5 . - K a r l Marx, The Economic and P h i l o s o p h i c a l Manuscripts of 1 8 4 4 . trans, and ed. by T. B. Bottomore i n K a r l Marx: E a r l y Writings. McGraw-Hill Book Co., Toronto, New York, London, 1 9 6 4 , 1 2 8 . (Hereafter, the Economic and Philosoph i c a l Manuscripts of 1 8 4 4 w i l l be r e f e r r e d to as EPM.) 3 6 . - K a r l Marx, " C o n t r i b u t i o n to the C r i t i q u e of P o l i t i c a l Economy", i n Lewis S. Feuer, ed., Marx and Engels: Basic Writings on P o l i t i c s and Philosophy, Doubleday Anchor Books, Garden C i t y , N. Y., 1 9 5 9 , 4 3 . 3 7 . -Herta Wescher, Die C o l l a g e : Geschichte eines k u n s t l e r i s c h e n V e r l a g M. Dumont Schauberg, C o l o g n e , 1 9 6 8 , 23.  Ausdrucksmittels,  3 8 . -Wescher, p l a t e 1 6 . 3 9 . -Wescher, p l a t e 1 0 . 4 0 . -Richter, plate 6 3 . 4 1 . -Richter, plate 4 9 . 4 2 . -Wescher, 1 3 7 . 4 3 . -Wescher, 7 1 . 4 4 . -Richter, plate 6 5 . 4 5 . -Scharf,  p. 1 3 7 , Don't Worry—He's A Vegetarian. 1 9 3 9 -  4 6 . -Scharf,  f o r example, Don't Worry—He's A Vegetarian, 1 9 3 9 .  4 7 . -Here i t might be arguedthat a r t ' s task i s not to c a r r y a p o l i t i c a l message and so, i n t h i s sense, H e a r t f i e l d never even had the p o t e n t i a l i t y of being an a r t i s t . I would object that, given the s i t u a t i o n , H e a r t f i e l d would work i n the knowledge that such messages were necessary to increase the p o s s i b i l i t y of r e v o l u t i o n . His work was an e f f o r t to c l e a r a context by c l e a r i n g away a s o c i e t y . As w e l l , one might object that t h i s outlook places the time i n which one could make a r t i n some a b s t r a c t future s t a t e . T h i s i s i n c o r r e c t . Art i s always of the present, but i t s presentness depends upon i t s contextual c o n t r o l . The very immediate c o n d i t i o n s made i t necessary f o r the Dadaists i n B e r l i n to forego the process of making a r t f i r s t and foremost as an e n t i t y i n i t s e l f i n favour of b r i n g i n g to conscious c o n s i d e r a t i o n the c o n f l i c t s i n context. 4 8 . -Huelsenbeck, DPP,  43.  121 49. -Huelsenbeck, Collective Dada Manifesto, 1918, DPP, 244. 50. -Edmund Wilson, Axel's Castle: A Study i n the Imaginative Literature of 18701930, Charles Scribner's & Sons, New York and London, 1931, 287-288. 51. -see Tzara's Zurich Chronicle 1915-1919. DPP, 235-242. 52. -Huelsenbeck, DPP, 33. Note that Huelsenbeck participated, and that, while i n Zurich, published two collections of poems: Phantastiche Gebete, Collection Dada, Zurich, 1917, with 7 woodcuts by Arp (DPP bibliography no. 305); and Schalaben, Schalomai, Schalamezomai, Collection Dada, Zurich, 1916 (DPP bibliography no. 307). Both collections contain work using the principles of bruitism, simultaneity, and " s t a t i c " or concrete poetry (see: End of the Wor l d , from Phantastiche Gebete, DPP, 226). Huelsenbeck does not use a conscious primitivism i n these early works; the imagery of End of the World i s e n t i r e l y brought from the world of the street, the cafe, etc. In other of h i s poems he uses "meaningless" sounds, commingles words and noises and mixes languages. 53. -Marx. Theses on Feuerbach, VIII, G l , 647. 54. -Huelsenbeck, DPP, 42. 55. -Marx, EPM, 166-167. 56. -Marx, G l , 36-37. 57. -Andre Breton, " P o l i t i c a l Position of Today's Art", i n Manifestos of Surrealism, trans, from the French by Richard Seaver and Helen R. Lane, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1969, 146. 58. -on the use of the term "natural", see, f o r example Picasso's comments i n the Statement to Marius de Zayas (see note 31)• 59. -Marx, G l , 37-38. 60. -This i t s e l f says a great deal about the nature of art i n an age which produces manifestoes. Not only does struggle exist between different a r t groups, as between the Dadaists i n Paris and B e r l i n f o r example, but also on the broader l e v e l , when a r t i s t s find i t necessary to confront the domain of d e f i n i t of a r t e x p l i c i t l y . This i s what Marinetti does i n the F i r s t Futurist Manifesto of 1909. 61. -This d i a l e c t i c a l relationship can be exemplified by the " t r i a d i c " (thesisantithesis-synthesis) reading so often applied to i t . As well, the s i t u a t i on can be comprehended as the relationship between a whole and i t s parts, between a " f i e l d " as discussed i n t h i s paper, and i t s components. That i s , the d i a l e c t i c a l process depends upon the relationship between "form", which can be seen as the "whole", and "content" as "parts". In a particular s i t u a t i o n , this can assume the t r i a d i c form (which i s not central to Hegel, but which was employed, f o r example, by Fichte); see Gustav E. Mueller, "The Hegel Legend of 'Thesis-Antithesis-Synthesis'", i n Journal of the History of Ideas, June, 1958, 411—414, noted i n Lichtheim, 7, note 2. 62.-Robert Morris, "Notes on Sculpture, Part IV: Beyond Objects", Artforum. Apr i l , 1969, 5 1 .  122 63. -See, for example, the writing of John Cage: Where there's a history of organization (art), introduce disorder. Where there's a history of disorganization (world society), introduce order. These directives are no more opposed to one another than mountain's oppoesed to spring weather. 'How can you believe this when you believe that?' How can I not?", from "Diary: How to Improve the World (You Will Only Make Matters Worse), 1965, in A Year From Monday, Wesleyan University Press, Middletown, Conn., 1969, 19-20. 64. -Marcuse, "Repressive Tolerance", 89. It is important to note that Marcuse does not invoke a form-content dichotomy to explain the fact that he work of art can transcend problems in its content. The distinction is rather in levels of abstraction. 65. -see C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards, The Meaning of Meaning, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1949. 66. -Joseph Kosuth, "Art After Philosophy, Part I", Studio International, vol. 78, no. 915, October, 1969, 13567. -Kosuth, 136. 68. -see Terry Atkinson, David Bainbridge, Michael Baldwin, Harold Hurrell, ed., Art-Language, vol. 1, no. 1, May, 1969. 69. -It is necessary to indicate that i t is an essential part of the nature of dialectical struggle that each opposing component comprehends that its identity is in no way independent from that of its opponent. The poles of a contradiction do not exist separately from one another, and dialectical "resolution", or synthesis is not a victory of one pole over the other, but rather the fission of the combined energy of the two creating a totally new situation. 70. -Kosuth, 136. 71. -This distinction, when made without explicit recognition that i t is a synthetic proposition, creates a dualistic reading which produces tensions which are unresolvable. This is because of the non-dialectical nature of Kosuth 's construction; leftover contradictions are "problems" in the system. With Kosuth this problem manifests itself in the attempt to reject the material aspect of art: "All my work exists when i t is conceived because the execution in irrelevant to art....the art is for an art context only;.." (Statement f r om PROSPECT 69 exhibition catalogue, quoted in Jack Burnham, "Alice's Head: Reflections on Conceptual Art", Artforum, February, 1970, 43.)Burnham notices the "irony of Kosuth's that he is forced to produce i t physically..." (43) suggesting that the "true medium" for conceptual art is "telepathy". He also says that "The reification is invariably mistaken for art. As pure conceptual investigation Kosuth implies that his subject-matter is substantially i r relevant, but that its assumptions provide meaning or context as art. By the act of giving definitions (tautologies) for terms other than 'art', Kosuth creates art and therefore functionally defines it."(43). It is not irrelevant to the thesis as a whole to point out that Burnham has misused the term "reification" here, at least by implication. The implication is that, in the relationship between the "mental" and the "material" worlds, the basic existence of the material is a "reification" and there-  123 f o r e , an a l i e n a t i o n . T h i s i s completely i n c o r r e c t . I f a thought-system i s t a ken as an a p r i o r i , i t s d e l i b e r a t e , h i s t o r i c a l nature i s ignored. Kosuth's art-system i s t o t a l l y w i t h i n h i s t o r y i n i t s existence as a r t . Kosuth takes a context as an ay p r i o r i . Context always e x i s t s ; a r t i s a r t " f o r an a r t context o n l y " . Context i s not grasped as a f u n c t i o n of h i s t o r y i n Kosuth's work. Therefore, it_ i s what i s " r e i f i e d " , and i n a sense we can turn Burnham's words around a l i t t l e : " T h e a r t i s i n v a r i a b l y mistaken f o r r e i f i c a t i o n " . R e i f i c a t i o n takes place when a b s t r a c t r e l a t i o n s are placed i n c o n t r o l of the concrete r e l a t i o n s which produced them; the concrete r e l a t i o n s thus "serve" the a b s t r a c t r e l a t i o n s . Kosuth's a r t serves a context; a tautology i s i r r e v o c a b l y t i e d to a p a r t i c u l a r l i n g u i s t i c s t r u c t u r e , without which i t cannot e x i s t . I would suggest that t h i s problem i s b a s i c to Kosuth's work and Burnham's understanding of i t . Therefore, Kosuth's p a t r o n i z i n g d e n i g r a t i o n of Walter de Maria (see note 23 to "Art A f t e r Philosophy, Part I", 137) should be seen c r i t i c a l l y : " . . . h i s (de Maria's) i n t e n t i o n s are very p o e t i c : he r e a l l y wants h i s work to change men's l i v e s . " The c o n d i t i o n of a l i e n a t e d thought i s that of fragmented, p a r t i a l thought; the ultimate i n fragmentation must be the r i g i d separation of " i n f l u e n c i n g other a r t i s t s " from "changing men's l i v e s " . 72. -Huelsenbeck, DPP,  44.  73. -see Tzara's comments on the " c u b i s t and f u t u r i s t academies" i n h i s Dada Man i f e s t o 1918. DPP, 77. 74. -Tzara, DPP, 80. I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note the connections expressed herebetween Tzara's t h e o r e t i c a l conceptions and the n o t i o n of " d i f f i c u l t y " i n avant-garde French l i t e r a t u r e through the Symbolist movement. 75. -see note 13. 76. -Tzara, DPP,  76.  77. -Huelsenbeck, DPP, 78. -Tzara, DPP,  26.  79-  79. - T r i s t a n Tzara, Manifesto on f e e b l e and b i t t e r love (read o r i g i n a l l y at the Povolotzky G a l l e r y , P a r i s , December 12, 1920), DPP, 86. 80. -George Ribemont-Dessaignes, radio i n t e r v i e w with T r i s t a n Tzara, Chaine Nati o n a l e , May, 1950. Quoted i n Rene Lacote and Georges Haldas, T r i s t a n Tzara (Poetes d'aujourd 'hui 32), E d i t i o n s P i e r r e Seghers, P a r i s , 1952, 19. 81. -Again, the connection touTzara's l i t e r a r y concerns i s obvious: among h i s e a r l i e s t productions i n Z u r i c h w r i t t e n before the 25_ P o e m e s — a r e the two t h e a t r i c a l works, La Premiere Aventure Celeste de M. Antipyrene, and Le Deuxieme Aventure... See Lacote and Haldas, 115-119. 82. -Tzara, Manifesto on f e e b l e and b i t t e r love. DPP,  95.  83. -Tzara, Proclamation without p r e t e n s i o n , read o r i g i n a l l y at the e i g h t h Dada performance i n Z u r i c h , K a f l e u t e n H a l l , A p r i l 8, 1919, DPP, 82. 84. - T r i s t a n Tzara, Vingt-Cinq Poemes. C o l l e c t i o n Dada, Imprimierie J . Heuberger, Z u r i c h , 1916. Note the t o t a l absence of punctuation marks i n the manner e s t a b l i s h e d by A p o l l i n a i r e i n A l c o o l s . This i s a l s o apparent i n the Antipyrene works. DPP notes a deluxe e d i t i o n of the PremiereaAvgnturewith woodcuts by Janco, b i b l i o g r a p h y no. 414. I t i s a l s o relevant to note that the manifestoes  124 were published i n book form, with a p o r t r a i t of the a r t i s t by Picabia, i n 1924 by Editions Jean Budry, Paris. 85. -As a comparison, see A p o l l i n a i r e s The Futurist A n t i t r a d i t i o n , published and set i n type by Marinetti i n 1913, which, along with Alcools and Marinetti's manifestoes, was a strong poetic influence i n Paris after that date. I t i s important to note that by 1913 Marinetti had established the theoretical-cri t i c a l basis f o r Parole i n l i b e r t a . which began the "typographic revolution" (Second Manifesto of Futurism, May 11, 1913; see E. C a r r i e r i , Futurism, Edizi o n i d e l Milione, Milan, 1966, 82-84), and about t h i s time h i s ideas about type-setting and page composition underwent a r a d i c a l change. The layout of Apollinaire's manifesto i s an example. However, i t i s important to note that, unlike A p o l l i n a i r e (the content of whose manifesto was r e l a t i v e l y unimportant), Marinetti continued to present a cogent c r i t i c a l program i n the manifesto format. Apollinaire's The Futurist A n t i t r a d i t i o n might be seen as simil a r to Tzara's i n the position i t takes regarding the nature of i t s own role vis a v i s the c r i t i c a l context. As w e l l , i t might be seen as a more or less direct influence on Tzara. 1  86. -A developed understanding of this question must be attributed to Andre Breton, who, i n the f i r s t years of the 1920s, wrote i n a "Dada Manifesto", "DADA attacks you with your own idea. I f we reduce you to maintaining that i t i s more advantageous to believe than not to believe what i s taught by a l l the r e l i g i o n s of beauty, love, truth and j u s t i c e , i t i s because you are a f r a i d to put yourself at the mercy of Dada by accepting an encounter with us on the t e r r a i n that we have chosen, which i s doubt."(Three Dada Manifestos, DPP, 204). And l a t e r , presumably i n 1923: "My friends P h i l l i p p e Soupault and Paul Eluard w i l l not contradict me i f I say that we have never regarded 'Dada' as anything but a rough image of a state of mind that i t by no means helped to c r eate.... In an a r t i c l e of that period, which was not published and i s known to few persons, I deplored the stereotyped character our gestures were assuming, and wrote as follows: 'After a l l there i s more at stake than our carefree existence and the good humour of the moment. For my part, I never aspire to amuse myself. I t seems to me that the saction of a series of u t t e r l y f u t i l e "dada" acts i s i n danger of gravely compromising an attempt at l i b e r ation to which I remain strongly attached. Ideas which may be counted among the best are at the mercy of t h e i r too hasty vulgarization.'"("After Dada", 1923(?), DPP, 205.) In this frame of reference i t i s important to notice that Breton has at a l l times understood the nature of the d i v i s i o n of poetry from c r i t i c a l acti v i t y . His work i s c l e a r l y separable into classes of "poetry/literature" and " c r i t i c i s m " . The F i r s t Manifesto of Surrealism of 1924 i s a case i n point. I t i s a " c r i t i c a l essay" (with occasional lapses), i n which Breton, l i k e Mari n e t t i , attempts to delineate a method and a construct i n conscious d i s t i n c t i o n from the work of art i t s e l f . See, f o r example, the section i n the F i r s t Manifesto, "Secrets of the Magical Surrealist Art" (Richard Seaver and Helen R. Lane trans., 29-30: "After you have settled yourself i n a place as favourable as possible to the concentration of your mind upon i t s e l f , have writing materials brought to you..."). Breton outlines, poetically to be sure, the methodological structure of Surrealist l i t e r a t u r e . Yet, the essay never becomes that which i t i s t a l k i n g about, though there are areas where c l a r i t y s l i p s . Nevertheless, the work i s conscious of i t s e l f as c r i t i c i s m and equal-  125  l y conscious of i t s e l f as not a r t . I t i s i n this context that the o r i g i n a l Surrealist automatic texts of Breton and Soupault are presented ( c f . "Poisson Soluble" of 1924 and "Champs Magnetiques" of 1920). S i m i l a r l y , Tzara, i n Manifesto on feeble and b i t t e r love. 1920, gives the recipe f o r a Dadaist poem (DPP, 92.). 87. -Huelsenbeck, DPP, 44. 88. -Jean-Paul Sartre, "Interview", The New York Review of Books, March 26, 1970, 29. 89. -Huelsenbeck, DPP, 44. 90. -Lucy R. Lippard, "Dada Into Surrealism: Notes on Max Ernst as a Proto-Surre a l i s t " , Artforum, September, 1966, 10. 91. -Regarding the Closerie des L i l a s episode, see Gershman, The Surrealist Revolution i n France, 89-90. 92. -Richter, 130-131. 93. -Georges Hugnet, "The Dada S p i r i t i n Painting", published o r i g i n a l l y i n Cahi e r s d'Art, v o l . 7, no. 1-2, no. 6-7, no. 8-10, 1932; v o l . 9, no. 1-4, 1934. Trans, from the French by Ralph Manheim f o r DPP, 152. 94. -The discretion between "exists" and "takes on meaning",again, can only be defined i n practice; i . e . , consciousness which does not participate i n any intersubjective a c t i v i t y naturally cannot be suggested not to e x i s t . Rather, the question concerns more immediately the significance of this consciousness f o r anyone other than the subject. Regarding the question of a "private language" i n Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations. 258-270, see A. J . Ayer, "Can There Be A Private Language?", i n The Concept of a Person and Other E&3 says. MacMillan Co., Toronto, 1963. 95. -Marx, GI, 41-42. 96. -Henri Lefebvre, The Sociology of Marx, Vintage Books, New York, 1969, 8-9. See also Marcuse, Reason and Revolution, Beacon Press, Boston, 1941 (1961 ed.), 273 f f . 97. -Marcuse, Reason and Revolution (hereafter referred to as R R)» 311-312: "...the....conclusions of Marx's analysis of the laws of capitalism....(reve a l ) . . . ^ s o c i a l order that progresses through the development of the contradictions inherent i n i t . S t i l l , i t progresses and these contradictions are the very means through which occur a tremendous growth i n the productivity of labour, an all-embracing use and mastery of natural resources, and a loosing of hitherto unknown capacities and needs among men. C a p i t a l i s t society i s a union of contradictions. I t gets freedom through exploitation, wealth through impoverishment, advance i n production through r e s t r i c t i o n of consumption. The very structure of capitalism i s a d i a l e c t i c a l one: every form and i n s t i t u t i o n of the economic process begets i t s determinate negation and the c r i s i s i s the extreme form i n which the contradictions are expressed." 98. -Marx, "Contribution to the Critique of P o l i t i c a l Economy", Feuer, 43. 99. -Marx, GI, 44.  1.26 100. -Marx, EPM, 129-121. 101. -EPM, 122. 102. -Marx, G l , 44-45. 103. -EPM, 123. 104. -EPM, 124-125. 105. -EPM, 126. 106. -EPM, 126-127. 107. -EPM, 127. 108. -EPM, 127. 109. -See, f o r example, the writings of Alfred Korzybski (note 20), and R. Buckminster F u l l e r . 110. -EPM, 128. 111. -EPM, 128. 112. -EPM, 130. Note that t h i s i s e s s e n t i a l l y Marx's attitude toward r e l i g i o n , which he sees as the ultimate alienation and, therefore, the ultimate subject of c r i t i c i s m : "According to Marx the foundation of a l l c r i t i c i s m i s the c r i t i c i s m of r e l i g i o n . Why? Because r e l i g i o n sanctions the separation of man from himself, the cleavage between the sacred and the profane, between the supernatural and nature. "The c r i t i q u e of r e l i g i o n i s the prerequisite of a l l criticism....The foundation of t h i s c r i t i q u e i s the following: man makes r e l i g i o n , r e l i g i o n does not make man.' (opening l i n e s from the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right. 1843-1844)", Lefebvre, 10. 113«-cf. Marcuse, "Concept of Essence", i n Negations. Beacon Press, Boston, 196 . 114. -Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man: Studies i n the Ideology of Advanced I n d u s t r i a l Society. Beacon Press, Boston, 1964, 215. (Hereafter referred to as YD Man.) 115. -Marx, EPM, 134. 116. -Marx, G l , 43. Note the p a r a l l e l with Renaissance a r t i s t s * attempts to estab l i s h themselves as " l i b e r a l " a r t i s t s i n d i r e c t antagonism to the d e f i n i t i o n of t h e i r a c t i v i t y under previous means of production. 117. -Marx, EPM, 159-160. 118. -EPM, 157-158 119. -EPM, 170-172. 120. -G. W. F. Hegel, Aesthetik. trans, from the German by F. P. B. Osmaston as Philosophy of Fine Art. G. B. B e l l and Sons, London, 1920, v o l . I I , 396. 121. -For a discussion of the French origins of the study of "ideology", see George Lichtheim,"The Concept of Ideology", i n The Concept of Ideology and Other Essays, Random House, New York, 1967, 3-46. 122. -Lefebvre, 60.  127  123. -Lichtheim, Concept of Ideology. 18. 124. -Lichtheim, 18. 125. -Lichtheim, 19. On the subject of r e i f i c a t i o n : "Man's reflections on the forms of social l i f e and consequently, also his s c i e n t i f i c analysis of these forms, take a course directly opposite to that of their actual h i s t o r i c a l development. He begins, post festum. with the results of the process of development ready to hand before him. The characters that stamp products as commodities and whose establishment i s a necessary preliminary to the c i r c u l a tion of commodities have already taken on the s t a b i l i t y of natural, self-understood forms of social l i f e , before man sets out to decipher not their h i s t o r i c a l character, for i n his eyes they are immutable but their meaning." (Capital, v o l . I, 87.) The narrower view of ideology i s completely bound up with the wider aspect: the ideologizing class i s within the framework of the ideology; the wo• rld-view i s the view of their world. Thus, the "vulgar" class-interest aspects of the procedure are necessary steps i n the comprehensive, philosophical structure. "Once the ruling ideas have been separated from the ruling individuals and, above a l l , from the relationships which result from a g i ven stage of the mode of production, and i n this way has been reached that history i s always under the sway of ideas, i t i s very easy to abstract from these various ideas 'the idea', the notion, etc., as the dominant force i n history, and thus to understand a l l these separate ideas and concepts as 'forms of self-determination' on the part of the concept developing i n history. It follows then naturally, too, that a l l the relationships of men can be derived from the concept of man, man as conceived, the essence of man, Man. This has been done by the speculative philosophers. Hegel himself confesses at the end of the Geschichtphilosophie that he 'has considered the progress of the concept only' and has represented i n history the true theodicy' (p. 446). Now one can go back again to the producersiof the 'concept', to the theorists, ideologists and philosophers, and one comes then to the conclusion that the philosophers, the thinkers as such, have at a l l times been dominant i n history: a conclusion, as we see, already expressed by Hegel. The whole t r of proving the hegemony of the s p i r i t i n history....is thus confined to the following three efforts: No. 1. One must separate the ideas of those rulingfor empirica l reasons, under empirical conditions and as empirical individuals, from these actual rulers, and thus recognize the rule of ideas or i l l u s i o n s i n history. No. 2. One must bring an order into this rule of ideas, prove a mystical relationship (connection) among the successive ruling Ideas, which i s managed by understanding them as 'acts of s e l f determination 'on the part of the concept'. (This i s possible because by virtue of their empirical basis these ideas are really connected with one another and because, conceived as mere ideas, they become self-distinctions, distinctions made by thought.) No.13- To remove the mystical appearance of this 'self-det1  128  ermining concept' i t i s changed i n t o a person—'Self-Consciousness'—or, to appear thoroughly m a t e r i a l i s t i c , i n t o a series of persons, who represent the 'concept' i n h i s t o r y , i n t o the ' t h i n k e r s ' , the ' p h i l o s o p h e r s ' , the i d e o l o g i s t s , who again are understood as the manufacturers of h i s t o r y , as t h e . . . . r u l e r s . Thus the whole body of m a t e r i a l i s t i c elements has been removed from h i s t o r y and now free r e i n can be given to the speculative s t e e d . " (Marx, GI, 63-64.) 126. -Lichtheim, 20. 127. -Lichtheim, 20. 128. -Lichtheim, 21. 129. -Marcuse, RR, 119. 130. -Lichtheim, Concept of Ideology, 21-22. 131. -Lefebvre, 66-67.(See a l s o , p. 52, note 94.) 131 A-.-cf. the work of Lucien Goldmann, f o r example. . :  132. -Marx develops t h i s ideas i n The German Ideology, i n connection with the c r i t i q u e of Feuerbach's concept of essence: "As an example of Feuerbach's acceptance and at the same time misunderstanding of existent r e a l i t y . . . . w e r e c a l l the passage i n the Philosophie der Zukunft, where he develops the view that the existence of a thing o r , a man i s at the same time i t s or h i s essence, that the conditions of existence, the mode of l i f e and a c t i v i t y of an animal or human i n d i v i d u a l are those i n which i t s or h i s 'essence' f e e l s i t s e l f s a t i s f i e d . Here every exception i s expressly conceived as an unhappy chance, as an abnormality which cannot be a l t e r e d . Thus i f m i l l i o n s of proletarians f e e l by no means contented with t h e i r l i v i n g cond i t i o n s , i f t h e i r ' e x i s t e n c e ' does not i n any way correspond to t h e i r 'essence', then, according to the passage quoted, t h i s i s an unavoidable misfortune, which must be borne q u i e t l y . The m i l l i o n s of proletarians and communists, however, think d i f f e r e n t l y and w i l l prove t h i s i n time, when they bring t h e i r 'existence' i n t o harmony with t h e i r 'essence' i n a p r a c t i c a l way, by means of a r e v o l u t i o n . " (54-55.) This c r i t i c i s m i s twofold, o r , at l e a s t , i t s subject manifests i t s e l f i n two ways. E i t h e r , as above, "essence" i s i d e n t i f i e d with existence so that the notion that existence i s i n any way f a l s e i s not permitted to develop, or e l se the realms of essence and existence are r i g i d l y separated. In t h i s a c t i o n , which w i l l be discussed more f u l l y further on, the realm of essence i s removed from h i s t o r y and established i n a timeless realm where i t i s supposedly free from the corruption of contingency, e t c . This area i s c o n t i n u a l l y d e s i g nated as the " s p i r i t u a l " , or the "abstract" and so on, as i n Thomistic p h i l osophy. The r e s u l t of the separation of the two notions i s i d e n t i c a l to the bindof them together: i n e i t h e r case the existent r e a l i t y i s rendered immune to negation and transformation, on the one hand because " r e a l i t y " i s a p r i o r i i d e n t i c a l to "essence", and on the other because the " r e a l i t y " was rendered  129  impotent to manifest i t s e l f i n the world. While essence i s , i n a certain sense, an abstraction, i t s only significance i s i n i t s being made r e a l ; essence appears only i n practice. In Marx's terms, u n t i l the achievement of a r a t i o n a l world, essence and existence are d i a l e c t i c a l l y separated. Essence, because knowable (Hegel), can be realized i n f a c t , only becomes " r e a l " i n i t s " r e a l i z a t i o n " . Unt i l t h i s time, i t i s conspicuous f o r i t s absence. 133. -Lefebvre, 65-66. 134. - I t w i l l be appreciated that ideology involves i t s e l f to a great extent with mimetic actions actions which, through ignorance of t h e i r own contextual nature, do not apprehend the relationship they have with process, and so cannot approach process consciously, i . e . , creatively . An interesting support to the views of Marx on the transcendent q u a l i t i e s of consciousness and language can be extracted from Noam Chomsky's notion of "The creative aspect of l a nguage use". (See Noam Chomsky, Language and Mind, Harcourt, Brace and World, New York, 1968.) He asserts that normal (and t h i s word must be used carefully) use of language i s innovative, i n the sense that much of what we say i n the course of everyday language use i s e n t i r e l y "new", not r e p e t i t i o n , but d e f i n i t e extension of meanings and patterns heard i n the past: "The fact sur e l y i s , however, that the number of sentences i n one's native language that one w i l l understand without feelings of d i f f i c u l t y or strangeness i s astronomical; and that the number of patterns underlying our normal use of language and corresponding to meaningful and e a s i l y comprehensible sentences i n our language i s of orders of magnitude greater than the number of seconds i n a l i f e t i m e . I t i s i n t h i s sense that the normal use of language i s innovative." ( 1 0 ) . Moreover, t h i s quantitative enormity of p o s s i b i l i t y of language use i s not the extent to which l i n g u i s t i c c r e a t i v i t y extends: language i s " i n f i n i t e " , that i s , self-generating, i n variety and i s free from complete stimulus-cont r o l .( learning by analogy, e t c . ) . As Marx suggests, language becomes an object of thought and language; they become aware of the abstraction that i t i s and that using i t e n t a i l s . Language l i m i t a t i o n s are f e l t most intensely as the realm of the "unsayable" begins to ingress upon that which has been expressed i n the past. That i s , the l i m i t s of language are known at p a r t i c u l a r times. The "transcendent" aspects of language use stem from i t s capacity to generate i t s e l f i n practice, and to become an object of consideration. (See also Chomsky, Cartesian L i n g u i s t i c s . Harper and Row, New York, 1966.) 135. -Lefebvre, 69. 136. -Lefebvre, 70-71. 137. -Lefebvre, 85. 138. -Lefebvre, 76. 139. -Lefebvre, 77-78. 140. -Lefebvre, 78. 141. -Lefebvre, 79. 142.-Lefebvre, 79.  130  143. - l e f e b v r e , 8. 144. -Marx, C r i t i q u e of Hegel's Philosophy o f Right, Bottomore, 58. 145. -Lefebvre, 86-87. 146. -Marcuse, RR, 295-312; Lichtheim, Marxism. 176-200. 147. -Marx, C a p i t a l , I, 83. 148. -Marcuse, "The A f f i r m a t i v e Character of C u l t u r e " , i n Negations, . t e r r e f e r r e d to as ACC)  93.  (Hereaf-  J  149. -Marcuse, ACC, 95. 150. -Lichtheim, Marxism, 401-406. 151. -Marcuse, ID Man, I n t r o d u c t i o n , x i i i . 152. -See note 16. 153. -Marcuse, ACC, 124. 154. -Marcel Duchamp, "The C r e a t i v e Act", i n Lebel,. 77-78. 155. -Marcuse, YD Man, 59• 156. -Lefebvre,  131-132.  157. -Marcuse, ACC, 97; RR, 295-302; VD Man, 133-143. 158. -Marcuse, ACC, 97. See a l s o "Bourgeois  society....keep i t pure.", 115-116.  159. -Marcuse, ACC, 98-99. 160. -ACC, 118. 161. -ACC, 118. 162. -ACC, 119. 163. -Hugnet, "Dada S p i r i t i n P a i n t i n g " , DPP, 147. 164. -Marcuse, YD Man, 146. 165. -1D Man. 146. The argument d e r i v e s from chapters 5,6, and 7 p a r t i c u l a r l y . 166. -Marcuse, RR, 343-344. 167. -Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans, from the German by D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1967 (ed.), 1. 168. -Marcuse, RR, 340-359. 169. - c f . Marcuse, 1D Man,  chapter,6.  170. -1D Man, 152. 171 .-II) Man, 152. 172.-1D Man. 152. 175.-1D Man. 152. 174.-Marx, C r i t i q u e of Hegel's D i a l e c t i c and General Fhilosophy, Bottomore, 200.  131  175. -Auguste Comte, Cours de philosophie p o s i t i v e , ed. E. L i t t r e i s , 1877, IV, 138. 176. -Marcuse, RR,  (6 v o l . ) , Par-  349.  177. -Wittgenstein, Tractatus, 2.05,  1.11.  178. -C. F. von Weizsacker, The H i s t o r y of Mature. 142, noted i n Marcuse, 1D  Man,  155. 179. -Wittgenstein, T r a c t a t u s , 6.522. 180. -Marcuse, 1D Man,  158.  181. -1D Man,  158.  •182.-1D Man.  166.  183. -JLD Man,  168.  184. -1D Man,  168-169-  185. -See  p. 1, 52.  186. -ID Man,  chapter 7.  187. -See Chomsky, Language and Mind, 15, and Wittgenstein, P h i l o s o p h i c a l Investi g a t i o n s . 199: "To understand a sentence i s to understand a language. To understand a language i s to be master of a technique." 188. - H  Man,  189. -1D Man,  174 f f . 179-  190. -Ludwig Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Foundation of Mathematics, ed. by G. H. von Wright, R. Rhees and G. E. M. Anscombe, B. B l a c k w e l l , Oxford, 1956, I, 40, notes. 191. -Marx, C r i t i q u e of Hegel's D i a l e c t i c , Bottomore, 192. -ID Man,  200.  181 .  193. -ID Man, 182. See pp. 65-66. 194. -ID Man,  188.  195. -ID Man,  195-  196. -Morse Peckham, Man's Rage For Chaos, Shocken Books, New York,  1969.  197. -Jack Burnham, "Robert Morris Retrospective i n D e t r o i t " , Artforum, March, 1970, 75. (Underlining mine.) 198. -1D Man,  61.  199. -ID Man,  64.  200. -1D Man,  65. ( U n d e r l i n i n g mine.)  201. - I D Man,  67-68.  202. -1D Man,  68.  203. -JD Man,  69.  204. -Burnham, 75.  '  132 A MOTE ON THE BIBLIOGRAPHY The bibliography includes only sources directly cited in the text, and a very few other immediately related texts (cf. bib. 4, 13, 15, 37.). This method, admittedly inadequate, has been chosen as the least inadequate possibility. The reading for this paper covers several different areas and many volumes, not a l l of which are immediately relevant. For example, a large number of works of fiction, poetry etc. would necessari l y have to be included in a more total bibliography. This is not a reference bibliography; very f u l l bibliographies on the Dada and Surrealist movements can be found in Huelsenbeck, bib. 15, Gershman, bib. 13» and Sanouillet, bib. 37, as well as, of course, in Motherwell, bib. 31.  133 BIBLIOGRAPHY  1 . BOOKS 1 . -Apollinaire, Guillaume, Alcools: Poems 1 8 9 8 - 1 9 1 5 ,  trans, from the French by William Meredith, Doubleday Inc., Garden City, N. Y., 1 9 6 5 .  2 . -Barr, Alfred H. J r . , Picasso, Museum of Modern Art, New York, 1 9 4 6 . 5.-Barthes, Roland, Writing Degree Zero, trans, from the French by Annette Layers and Colin Smith, H i l l and Wang, New York, 1 9 6 8 . 4.-Breton, Andre, Entretiens, 1 9 1 5 - 1 9 5 2 , avec Andre Parinaud (et. a l . ) , Gallimard, Paris, 1 9 5 2 . 5. 6. -  , Manifestes du Surrealisme; polsson soluble, Editions Kra, Paris, 1929.  , Manifestes du Surrealisme, J . J . Pauvert, Paris, 1 9 6 2 .  7. , Manifestoes of Surrealism, trans, from the French by Richard Seaver and Helens R. Lane, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1 9 6 9 . 8 . -Cage, John, A Year From Monday, Wesleyan University Press, Middletown, Conn., 1969.  9 . -Chomsky, Noam, Cartesian Linguistics; A Chapter i n the History of Rationali s t Thought, Harper and Row, New York, 1 9 6 6 . 10. -  , Language and Mind, Harcourt, Brace and World, New York, 1 9 6 8 .  I^-Comte, Auguste, Cours de philosophie positive, Editions E. L i t t r e j Paris, 1 8 7 7 , 6 vols. 12.-Gershman, Herbert S., The Surrealist Revolution i n France, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1 9 6 9 15., A Bibliography of the Surrealist Revolution i n France, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1 9 6 9 1 4 . -Huelsenbeck, Richard, En Avant Dada: Eine Geschichte des Dadaismus, P. Steegeman, Hanover, 1 9 2 0 . (See also bib. .) 15. , Dada: eine literarische Dokumentation, Reinbek bei Hamburg, Rowohlt Paperback, 1 9 6 4 . 1 6 . -Korzybski, Alfred, Science and Sanity: An Introduction to Non-Aristotelian Systems and General Semantics. International Non-Aristotelian Library, 1 9 5 5 . 1 7 . -Lacote, Rene, and Haldas Georges, Tristan Tzara (Poetes d'aujourdihui 3 2 ) , Editions Pierre Seghers, Paris, 1 9 5 2 . 1 8 . -Lebel, Robert, Marcel Duchamp, Trianon Press, Paris and New York, 1 9 5 9 . 1 9 . -Lefebvre, Henri, The Sociology of Marx, Vintage Books, New York, (1969 ed.). 2 0 . -Lichtheim, George, The Concept of Ideology and Other Essays. Random House, New York, 1 9 6 7 .  134  21. , Marxism: A H i s t o r i c a l and Critical.Study, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1961. 22. -Marcuse, Herbert, Critique of Pure Tolerance, (with Robert Paul Wolff and Barrington Moore, J r . ) , Beacon Press, Boston, 1965. 23-on, 1968.  , Negations: Essays i n C r i t i c a l Theory, Beacon Press, Bost-  24. , One-Dimensional Man: Studies i n the Ideology of Advanced I n d u s t r i a l Society, Beacon Press, Boston, 1964. 25. , Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the; Rise of Social Theory, (1941), Beacon Press, Boston edition, 1961. 26. -Marx, K a r l , C a p i t a l : A Critique of P o l i t i c a l Economy, trans, from the t h i r d German edition by Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling and edited by Frederick Engels, C. H. Kerr, Chicago, 1906-1909. 27. , "Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right", i n T. B. Bottomore, ed., K a r l Marx: Early Writings, McGraw-Hill Book Co., New York, Toronto, London, 1964. 28. , The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, i n Bottomore (note 27.). 29. , The German Ideology (with Frederick Engels), including the Theses on Feuerbach. Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1964. 30. , "Contribution to the Critique of P o l i t i c a l Economy", i n Lewis S. Feuer, Marx and Engels: Basic Writings on P o l i t i c s and Philosophy, Doubleday Anchor Books, Garden City, N. Y., 1959. 31. -Motherwell, Robert, ed., The Dada Painters and Poets: An Anthology, George Wittenborn Inc., Documents of Modern Art 8, New York, 1951. (includes E n g l i sh translation of bib. 14, bib. 50 (Hugnet), bib. 39(Tzara), etc.) 32. -Nadeau, Maurice, Histoire du Surrealisme. Editions du S e u i l , Paris, 2 vols., 1942. 33. -0gden, C. K., and Richards, I . A., The Meaning of Meaning: a study of the influence of language upon thought and of the science of symbolism, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 194934. -Peckham, Morse, Man's Rage f o r Chaos: Biology,Behaviour and the Arts, Shocken Books, New York, 1968. 35. -Richter, Hans, Dada: Art and Anti-Art, Thames and Hudson, London, 1965. 36. -Rimbaud, Arthur, Selected Verse, trans, by Oliver Bernard, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1962. 37. -Sanouillet, Michel, Dada a P a r i s , J J J . Pauvert, P a r i s , 1965. 38. -Sartre, Jean-Paul, What Is Literature?, trans, from the French by Bernard Frechtman, Philosophical Library, New York, 1949. 39. -Tzara, Tristan, Lampisteries precedes des Sept Manifestes Dada, J . J . Pauvert, Paris, 1962. (Originally published by Jean Budry, Paris, 1924. Trans<  135  complete from the French by Ralph Manheim i n bib. 3 1 . ) 40.  , Vingt-cinq Poemes. Zurich, 1 9 1 6 .  Sollection  Dada, Imprimerie J . Heuberger,  4 1 . -Verkauf, W i l l y , with Bollinger, Hans and Janco, Marcel, eds., Dada: Monograph of a Movement. Hastings House, New York, 1 9 6 1 . 4 2 . -Wescher, Herta, Die Collage: Geschichte eines kunstlerischen Ausdrucksmitte l s , Verlag DuMont Schauberg, Cologne, 1 9 6 8 . 4 3 . -Wilson, Edmund, Axel's Castle: A Study i n the Imaginative Literature of 1 8 7 0 - 1 9 3 0 , Charles Scribner's and Sons, New York and London, 1 9 3 1 . (includes Tristan Tzara'S "Memoirs of Dadaism" as Appendix I.) 4 4 . -Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Philosophical Investigations, trans, by G. E. M. Anscombe, B a s i l Blackwell, Oxford, 1 9 5 8 . 45. , Remarks on the Foundation of Mathematics, ed. by G. H. von Wright, R. Rhees, and G. E. M. Anscombe, B a s i l Blackwell, Oxford, 1 9 5 6 . 46. , Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans, from the German by D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1967.  4 7 . -Hegel, G. W. F., Aesthetik, transi from the German by F.' P. B. Osmaston as the Philosophy of Fine A r t , G. B. B e l l and Son, London, 4 v o l . , 1 9 2 0 . 2 . ARTICLES 4 8 . -Burnham, Jack, "Alice's Head: Reflections on Conceptual A r t " , Artforum. February, 1 9 7 0 , 3 7 - 4 3 . 49. 1970,  , "Robert Morris Retrospective i n Detroit", Artforam, March, 71-75.  5 0 . -Hugnet, Georges, "The Dada S p i r i t i n Painting", Cahiers d'Art. v o l . 7 , no. 1 - 2 , 6 - 7 , 8 - 1 0 , 1 9 3 2 ; v o l . 9 , no. 1 - 4 , 1 9 3 4 . (trans, from the French by Ralph Manheim i n bib. 3 1 • ) 5 1 . -Kosuth, Joseph, "Art After Philosophy, Part I " , Studio International, v o l . 1 7 8 , no. 9 1 5 , October, 1 9 6 9 , 1 3 4 - 1 3 7 . 5 2 . -Lippard, Lucy R., "Dada Into Surrealism: Notes on Max Ernst as a Proto-Surr e a l i s t " , Artforum. September, 1 9 6 6 , 1 0 - 1 5 . 5 3 . -Morris, Robert, "Notes on Sculpture, Part IV: Beyond Objects", Artforum, April, 1969, 5 0 - 5 5 . 5 4 . -Mueller, Gustav E., "The Hegel Legend of 'Thesis-Antithesis-Synthesis'", Journal of the History of Ideas, v o l . XIX, no. 3 , June, 1 9 5 8 , 4 1 1 - 4 1 4 . 5 5 . -Rose, Arthur R., "Four Interviews: Barry, Huebler, Kosuth, Weiner", Arts Magazine, February, 1 9 6 9 , 5 7 - 5 9 .  136  56.-Sartre, Jean-Paul, "Interview", The New York Review of Books, March 21, 1970, 24-29.  

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