BERLIN DADA AND THE NOTION OF CONTEXT

by

JEFFREY DAVID WALL
B. A., University of British Columbia, 1968

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

Master of Arts

in the Department
of
FINE ARTS

We accept this thesis as conforming to the
required standard

THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA
May, 1970
In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by his representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission.

Department of FINE ARTS

The University of British Columbia
Vancouver 8, Canada

Date May 1, 1970
ABSTRACT

I. BERLIN DADA AND THE NOTION OF CONTEXT

A. Dominant material force = dominant intellectual force in society.
B. Society and language are aspects of a single process.
C. In twentieth century society the fundamental human process of labour is distorted.
D. Art in conflict with society over the attitude toward labour as process.
   1. - Art is in state of tension with language.
E. In twentieth century the ideological function of art is taken over by other media.
   1. - The artist is deprived of social necessity.
      a. - Artists' immediate reaction was absolute rejection of society (e.g. Rimbaud.)
F. The Dada movement is the first step beyond absolute rejection toward a viable critical dialectic.
   1. - Berlin Dada establishes critique of the notion of the avant-garde.
      a. - Marxist attitudes in Berlin 1917-1922. Berlin Dada resists mystification. (example: attitude toward primitivism in poetry.)
G. Power of myth is ability to control definitions. Applied meanings become absolute meanings (reification).
H. Resistance to mystification means historical awareness; history as the process of development of meanings.
   1. - Historical awareness is contextual awareness and process awareness.
   2. - Art in conflict with social definitions engages in contextual struggle.
   3. - Manifesto is the tool of contextual struggle.
      a. - Critical analysis of Huelsenbeck's and Tzara's manifestos shows that manifesto is antithetical to "art condition". Manifesto is successful to the extent that it does not operate as art.
I. Historical awareness makes negation of art possible: negation of art by art. (Duchamp and Berlin Dada).
   1. - Negation of art meaningful only in social terms.
   2. - Negation of art by Duchamp and Berlin Dada brought art into existence anew. A new method of creation is established.
      a. - New method is totally historical/dialectical. Objection to reification makes art possible.
J. New method of Berlin Dada and Duchamp takes art-context as its subject-matter.
K. Old context becomes artifact in new context; a total break is established in which new system completely redefines activity.
L. Art's activity is inherently revolutionary.
   1. - For Berlin Dada, the importance of art lay in the contextual assumptions made by the bourgeois audience.

II. ALIENATION AND IDEOLOGY

A. Account of Marx's analysis of labour process; concept of alienation, cr-
B. Ideas are created from practice.
C. All activity is by definition social in the human world.
D. Dialectical criticism establishes existence as a process.
E. The nature of art is dialectical. The center of art is process, revealed through theory which describes context.
F. Account of the theory of ideology. The opposition of theory to ideology.
G. Marx: Ideology = False consciousness.
H. Account of how ideology enters language; truth and error part of single process of knowledge.
I. Language is social in nature.
J. Ideology mediates between action and language.
K. Ideology is function of class antagonism. Account of difference between myth and ideology.
L. Dialectical criticism brings knowledge (true theory) out of false consciousness through contextual awareness.
M. Knowledge destroys ideology.
N. Art is a function of knowledge.

III. ART VS. CULTURE

A. Culture is society's definition; it is a function of ideology.
B. Account of bourgeois-idealist concept of culture.
C. Post-bourgeois world altering bourgeois-idealist cultural ideology, moving it toward more positivistic viewpoint in connection with technological rationality.
D. Art is a particular kind of labour: it is the image of all labour.
E. Bourgeois-idealist concept of culture remained dialectical; new ideology denying dialectic idea completely.
F. Marcuse's criticism of post-bourgeois cultural ideology.
G. Account of new notion of "empty category" of Duchamp and Berlin Dadaists.
H. Social function of a work of art essentially transforms its meaning.
I. In face of antagonistic social reality, art structures alternative events, generates an alternative language.
J. This language and event is unreal; the fact that it proclaims itself as antagonistic to the existing is the basis of its significance.
"The ideas of the ruling class are, in every age, the ruling ideas: i.e. the class which is the dominant material force in society is at the same time its dominant intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that in consequence the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are, in general, subject to it. The dominant ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas; hence of the relationships which make the one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its dominance. The individuals composing the ruling class possess among other things consciousness, and therefore think. Insofar, therefore, as they rule as a class and determined the extent and compass of an epoch, it is self-evident that they do this in its whole range, hence among other things rule also as thinkers, as producers of ideas, and regulate the production and distribution of the ideas of their age: thus their ideas are the ruling ideas of the epoch. For instance, in an age and in a country where royal power, aristocracy and bourgeoisie are contending for mastery and where, therefore, mastery is shared, the doctrine of the separation of powers proves to be the dominant idea and is expressed as an 'eternal law'.

The division of labour, which we already saw above as one of the chief forces of history up till now, manifests itself also in the ruling class as the division of mental and material labour, so that inside this class one part appears as the thinkers of the class (its active, conceptive ideologists, who make the perfecting of the illusion of the class about itself their chief source of livelihood), while the others' attitude to these ideas and illusions is more passive and receptive, because they are in reality the active members of this class and have less time to make up ideas and illusions about themselves. Within this class this cleavage can even develop into a certain opposition and hostility between the two parts, which, however, in the case of a practical collision, in which the class itself is endangered, automatically comes to nothing, in which case there also vanishes the semblance that the ruling ideas were not the ideas of the ruling class and had a power distinct from the power of this class. The existence of revolutionary ideas in a particular period presupposes the existence of a revolutionary class..."

--Karl Marx, The German Ideology
"Every alienation of man from himself and from Nature appears in the relation which he postulates between other men and himself and Nature. Thus religious alienation is necessarily exemplified in the relation between laity and priest, or, since it is here a question of the spiritual world, between the laity and a mediator. In the real world of practice, this self alienation can only be expressed in the real, practical relation of man to his fellow men. The medium through which alienation occurs is itself a practical one. Through alienated labour, therefore, man not only produces his relation to the object, and to the process of production as to alien and hostile men; he also produces the relation of other men to his production and his product, and the relation between himself and other men. Just as he creates his own production as a vitiation, a punishment, and his own product as a loss, as a product which does not belong to him, so he creates the domination of the non-producer over production and its product. As he alienates his own activity, so he bestows upon the stranger an activity which is not his own."

---Karl Marx, *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844*
I

BERLIN DADA
AND
THE NOTION OF CONTEXT
Certainly there have been periods of history in which art was generally integrated with the organization of society; the period of the twentieth century is not one of these. One of the primary characteristics of art—particularly since the beginning of the First World War—has been its profound antagonism to what has been defined as "culture".

In such a historical situation, art is seen to have a critical function. Its relationship to the existent state of affairs is negative, and it is involved with all that which, in society, is denied or does not exist. By taking on such a role, the activity of art-making develops an acute concern with context. Every society maintains the right, or the power, to determine definitions in regard to all activity, including of course artistic activity. Art always has a context. However, in this century, art has become involved with the creation of a context in the face of an already existing one, and therefore, with resisting an existing set of definitions. It may seem audacious to claim that, in the industrial and late industrial societies, art is the expression of all that does not exist, all that is denied. This paper attempts to justify such a claim.

As Marx says, the dominant ideas of an age can be seen as the "dominant material relationships grasped as ideas". This paper attempts to discuss, in theoretical terms, the bases of the dominant material relationships and to delineate their divergence from the very material relationships exemplified by the art-process.

Society's definition of art functions as the horizon of art. In Duchamp's terms, "...the artist may shout from all the rooftops that he is a genius; he will have to wait for the verdict of the spectator in order that his declarations take on a social value..."¹ This definition is the fundamental or universal grammar of possibilities, judgements and categories. This is an unescapable
fact, just as it inescapable (therefore) that the artist can never consider himself separate from society or from history. But this horizon is a broken one, its rationale askew. We shall discuss how it has been created out of, and in turn has created, a distortion of a fundamental human process, that which Marx called "labour". This basic distortion causes the artist to resist the horizon as oppressive.

The horizon is a horizon of codifications and definitions. Social organization can be seen as, in certain terms, the results of standardized patterns of interaction and perception, as "constant scanning patterns". Language is obviously a central factor in the establishment and maintenance of constant scanning patterns. In this sense, language is a structural system, in which the universe is represented symbolically, and its relations depicted. It is an a priori that human society is linguistic in nature, that language and social organization are in fact one process. Marx maintains that the human being is the only creature on earth who "creates the world"; if this is true, we must remember that at the same time and in the same action, he creates his language, and his language creates him.

If the definition of society which has been produced by the material basis of society is a distortion of the labour process, and if art has recognized this, then art must exist in a state of tension with language. Much nineteenth and twentieth century art, from Rimbaud to Duchamp, Burroughs and Warhol, can be seen, in abstract terms, as an attack upon the language of industrial capitalist society. It is an attack, not by being a propaganda device, but simply by being art.

In the society with which Marx concerned himself—the immediate ancestor of our society—the function of art and the role of the artist had undergone a deep and radical transformation from the state in which it existed in a pre-
technological-rational system. One need only mention Rubens or Bernini and their relationship to the social processes of their time to make the point clear. The years since the beginning of World War I have witnessed the final stages of the removal of any real social necessity from artistic activity. This removal has its beginnings in the establishment of the bourgeois-industrial world in the nineteenth century, but its sources are discernible in the organization of Italy during the "Renaissance". In the nineteenth century the new conditions of material production created by the bourgeois class established as a corollary their media of communication, their methods of rendering themselves symbolic, of establishing in consciousness the abstract representation of the principles of their right to power. Mechanical methods of communication and the distribution of information and images were grasped by the conceptualizing ideologists of the society as a major part of the tool-complex of their intellectual dominance, just as the factory, the open market, and rent were understood as the basis of their material dominance. Mass publication, still and movie photography, radio and so on are in the strictest sense major factors in the critical state in which fine art exists in this period. Consciousness of the situation was apparent from the beginnings of the bourgeois-industrial world, but it was not at a workable level; it was articulated purely in terms of the negative, and the absolute despair of artists and their attempt (as in Leutreamont) to turn completely away from the new society. Certainly by the fifth decade of the nineteenth century artists were deeply aware of the alteration in the mode of their existence. It was apparent that art had no place in the new world or in its conceptualizations, save that accorded a "great tradition" and its value as cultural justification, as cultural symbol. But the bulk of this ideological work was taken over by the mechanics of communication of a geometrically-progressing technology. The tone of European (and particularly French) art of the later
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in relation to advancing bourgeois social
ty is epitomized by Rimbaud: desperate negation and a deep, cellular loathing:

Si j'avais des antecedents a un point quelconque de l'histoire de France!
Mais non, rien.
Il m'est bien evident que j'ai toujours ete race inferieure. Je ne puis comprendre la revolte. Ma race ne se souleva jamais que pour piller: tels les loups a la bete qu'ils n'ont pas tuee.
Je me rappelle l'histoire de la France fille ainee de l'Eglise. J'aurais fait, maintenant, le voyage de terre sainte; vues de Byzance, des remparts de Solyme; le culte de Marie, l'attendrissement sur le crucifie s'erveillent en moi parmi mille feeries profanes.—Je suis assis, lepreux, sur les pots casses et les orties, au pied d'un mur ronge par le soleil.

Rimbaud's "career" was one of the fundamental guideposts for the Dadaists. They took him as a hero, understanding the implications of his vast and severe rejection of European culture. In their most lucid moments, they reveal the awareness of the crucial meaning of Rimbaud: the necessity of confronting the culture, of making a public denial of its validity and, therefore, of its definitions. In a certain sense, Harrar is the ultimate, mythic rejection; but it is at the same time an incomplete rejection, which is content with the device of "absolute" denial, which makes no attempt at development of an alternative. It is important to understand that Rimbaud's reaction, like that of such figures as Gerard de Nerval, Lautreamont and Baudelaire as well, took place in a more "primitive" context, one in which the emerging reality had not yet attained a degree of resolution and delineation which would make possible a structured progression out of the immediate act of negation.

By 1916, the configuration of European culture had been more clearly defined; for many people, the 1914-1918 war was a summation. The war was an immediate catalyst for Dada activity, though it is obvious that it was not, strictly spea-
king, the cause. The war was, for the Dadaists, the objectification of the factors in European society which were most distressing. The Dada groups were faced with a situation in which the advancing culture and its dying sources revealed, once and for all in a specific crisis; the corruption of its assumptions. Rimbaud had established the definitive rejection per se; it was left to the Dada groups to make the first important extension of his position. To emulate him was meaningless: sitting quietly in neutral Zurich, they may as well have been in Harrar. Richard Huelsenbeck, one of the original members of the earliest Zurich group, discusses the alternatives:

"If Tristan Tzara had barely suspected the meaning of this famous existence we drag along between apes and bedbugs, he would have seen the fraud of all art and all artistic movements and he would have become a Dadaist. Where have these gentlemen who are so eager to appear in the history of literature left their irony? Buried in books, they have lost their independence, the ambition to be as famous as Rabelais or Flaubert has robbed them of the courage to laugh—there is so much marching, writing, living to be done. Rimbaud jumped in the ocean and started to swim to St. Helena, Rimbaud was a hell of a guy, they sit in the cafes and rack their brains over the quickest way of getting to be a hell of a guy. They have an academic conception of life—all litterati are Germans; and for that reason they will never get close to life. Rimbaud very well understood that literature and art are mighty suspicious things—and how well a man can live as a pasha or a brothel-owner, as the creaking of the beds sings a song of mounting profits."4

To sit in the cafes is essentially the "bourgeois" reaction: to admire the "work" and ignore the implications; that is, to enforce the context which is applied to art, to accept the situation in which an artist is admired so long as his terms and their extensions are denied existence and effectiveness. Huelsenbeck understood immediately that one cannot profess to admire "Rimbaud" and then by accepting a context which the artist demands be obliterated, assume that this is sufficient. "While Tzara was still writing 'Dada ne signifie rien'—
Germany Dada lost its art-for-art's-sake character with its very first move. Instead of continuing to produce art, Dada, in direct contrast to abstract art, went out and found an adversary.5

What sets Dada apart from other "radical" European art movements of the time is its explicit, self-conscious critical nature. Moving into the arena from the domain of art and literature, it affirmed their necessity by denying itself the right to practice them, becoming a species of "didactic theatre", in which the central themes are: context, definition, language, politics.

It is necessary to make a distinction. In France, Dada was carried out in the shadow of the immediate tradition of avant-garde poetry, and an immediate interest in the workings of the unconscious considered largely for its own sake. The position of Andre Breton in the French Dada movement, and his attitude toward that movement, are important considerations. His early interest in psychiatry, his later acquaintance with Freud, his involvement with Jacques Vache have become common knowledge. From the beginning of Dada in Paris in 1919 Breton understood that it was a particular manifestation, something which would necessarily be transcended. His early involvement with the exploration of the unconscious combined with a deep and, it might be argued, rather "traditional" commitment to the poetry of the French avant-garde mediated against the development of the kind of overt and direct political action which characterizes the Dada group in Berlin, and to a lesser extent, in Cologne.

As well, the political situation was different in the two centers. Certainly, post-war Paris was not quiet, but it experienced nothing like the immediate political crisis which gripped Berlin, whose streets rang with the gunfire of the Spartakus Rebellion, and with word of the October Revolution in Russia. The Berlin group became directly involved with revolution on the concrete level, while in Paris the revolt was confined to literary circles and bourgeois cultur-
al ignorance, in the manner of Zurich. The Parisian Dada group had no connections with political organizations; the earliest member of the French circle to take this kind of action was Pierre Naville, who joined the French Communist Party in 1925, out of the Surrealist group. In Germany however, the Marxist analysis and the Party were constant companions of Dada. Of the original Berlin conclave, Wieland Herzfelde, his brother Johann (who changed his name to Johnny Heartfield as an act of political provocation during World War I) had been Party members previous to Huelsenbeck's return to Germany to begin Dada there, and before even the beginnings of the Zurich group. These two were in collaboration with the poets Franz Jung and Raoul Hausmann, and with the graphic artist, George Grosz. Johannes Baader, "der Oberdada", had been a contributor to Die Frie Strasse during the war and entered the movement immediately upon Huelsenbeck's arrival upon the scene in January of 1917.

Huelsenbeck was the unifying factor for Dada in Berlin, for he brought the "idea" of Dada with him from Zurich, as Tzara took it to Paris in 1920. These people who had spent the war years in Germany were particularly receptive to the Dada message of revolt. Huelsenbeck's Zurich residence lasted less than a year (February 26, 1916-January, 1917); he was ambivalent about the foundation of Dada: on the one hand he recognized the depth of the issues which it had raised; on the other he was suspicious of the consciousness and therefore the motives of some of the participants in the Cabaret Voltaire and the Galerie Dada.

"The Galerie Dada capriciously exhibited cubist, expressionist and futurist pictures; it carried on its little art business at literary teas, lectures and recitation evenings, while the word Dada conquered the world. It was something touching to behold. Day after day the little group sat in its cafe reading aloud the critical comments that poured in from every possible country, and which by their tone of indignation showed that Dada had struck someone to the heart. Stricken dumb with amazement, we basked in our glory. Tristan Tzara could think of no-
thing else to do but write manifesto after manifesto, speaking of 'l'art nouveau, which is neither cubism nor futurism', but Dada. But what was Dada? 'Dada', came the answer, 'ne signifie rien.' With psychological astuteness, the Dadaists spoke of energy and will and assured the world that they had amazing plans. But concerning the nature of these plans, no information whatever was forthcoming.... As I think back on it now, an art for art's sake mood lay over the Galerie Dada --- it was a manicure salon of the fine arts, characterized by tea-drinking old ladies trying to revive their vanishing sexual powers with the help of 'something mad'.... There might have been a way to make something of the situation. The group did nothing, and garnered success...."10

Huelsenbeck maintains that the Zurich movement never really understood itself, and therefore, never comprehended what Dada could mean. It took the Berlin group to do so. One can appreciate his point: Zurich was a neutral territory and a university town. No-one was in direct physical danger and the manner of living was not unbearable. The Cabaret Voltaire group was flushed with the achievements of avant-garde art: Picasso and Braque's analytic cubism, the "revolutionary" violence and contemporaneity of futurism and the work of Marinetti, the "cause" of abstract art (Arp), and even German Expressionism, through Huelsenbeck himself.11 The proposals of "anti-art" were umbilically bound to the discoveries and methodologies of other artists, and were directed generally against the uncomprehending bourgeois and bourgeois-student audience. It is not until the movement begins to operate in Germany that the dialectical and critical aspects become clearly articulated and Dada takes on a political role.

In this sense Zurich Dada was a totally artistic revolt, a proclamation of the new arts and a declaration of their "opposition" to bourgeois culture. Zurich Dada, under Tzara, did not find anything to oppose in the state of avant-garde art itself. His manifestoes of the time do not address themselves to this question, which is a central concern to Huelsenbeck in En Avant Dada, and other writings of the period, and to the conduct of the Berlin movement as a whole.
The Zurich group might be seen, then, as a kind of "nascent" Dada, in which the major themes of the movement were indicated. Both Berlin and Paris developed out of the original Zurich impulse, Paris as a continuation and refinement, and Berlin as a rejection of it.\(^{12}\)

"The Dadaists of the Cabaret Voltaire actually had no idea what they wanted—the wisps of 'modern art' that at some time or other had clung to the minds of these individuals were gathered together and called 'Dada'. Tristan Tzara was devoured by ambition to move in international artistic circles as an equal or even a 'leader'....And what an extraordinary, never-to-be-repeated opportunity now arose to found an artistic movement and play the part of a literary mime!...None of us suspected what Dada might become, for none of us understood enough about the times to free ourselves from traditional views and form a conception of art as a moral and social phenomenon. Art just was---there were artists and bourgeois. You had to love one and hate the other."\(^{13}\)

We see the rationale for Huelsenbeck's departure from Zurich in 1917. The Spartakus Movement, which would aid in bringing Germany to revolution, was founded in March, 1916. Huelsenbeck came to Zurich specifically to avoid participating in the war, about which he obviously had very strong feelings; developments in Germany could not have escaped his attention. He could see the looming political crisis and the attendant possibility of real revolution in the nation he seems to have deeply despised. He made the connection between the psychological and cultural implications of Dada and concrete political conditions.

"In January 1917 I returned to Germany, the face of which had meanwhile undergone a fantastic change. I felt as though I had left a smug fat idyll for a street full of electric signs, shouting hawkers and auto horns. In Zurich the international profiteers sat in the restaurants with well-filled wallets and rosy cheeks, ate with their knives and smacked their lips in a merry hurrah for the countries that were bashing each other's skulls in. Berlin was a city of tightened stomachers, of mounting, thundering hunger, where hidden rage was transformed into a boundless money lust, and men's minds were concentrating more and more on questions of naked existence. Here we would have to proceed with entirely
different methods, if we wanted to say something to the people. Here we would have to discard our patent leather pumps and tie our Byronic cravates to the doorpost....The people had an exalted and romantic attitude toward art and all cultural values. A phenomenon familiar in German history was again manifested: Germany always becomes the land of poets and thinkers when it begins to be washed up as the land of judges and butchers."

The pattern of cultural revolt which Huelsenbeck had learned to be so effective from Zurich blended perfectly with the politically-aligned attack on German culture already in process in the publications of Herzfelde, Heartfield, Jung and Hausmann. One of their most significant actions was the issuing and reading of the Collective Dada Manifesto in February, 1918, which attacks expressionism, cubism, futurism and abstract art, while endorsing "Bruitism", "simultaneity", and the "Static Poem" (which can be compared with Marinetti's "Parole in liberta").

From the Zurich experience, Huelsenbeck understood the phenomenon of the manifesto. Speaking generally, the production of manifestoes can be seen as arising out of the consciousness of the necessity to establish previously non-apparent definitions in the face of existing definitions. That is, the manifesto is a tool of contextual struggle.

"There is one literary form in which we can compress much of what we think and feel: the manifesto. Tzara had enunciated this principle as early as 1916. From the day the Cabaret Voltaire opened its doors, we read and wrote manifestoes. We did not only read them, we spoke them as vociferously and defiantly as we could. The manifesto as a literary medium answered our need for directness. We had no time to lose; we wanted to incite our opponents to resistance, and, if necessary, to create new opponents for ourselves. We hated nothing so much as romantic silence and search for a soul: we were convinced that the soul could only show itself in our own actions."
the Collective Dada Manifesto 1918: they are intolerant. The function of the manifesto is dialectical; it attempts to antagonize in the realm of meaning and definition, and thereby to induce a rupture in the existing continuum of concepts, language and behaviour. Intolerance is a virtue of the manifesto and an absolute necessity in any attack upon an existing and maintained intellectual structure. The" romantic silence" so despised by the Berliners can be connected to two things: firstly, to the inward-seeking turning away from "objective" reality exemplified by expressionist (and abstract) art, and secondly to a kind of "liberalism", an illusory tolerance of divergent viewpoints in a closed system in which overriding definitions are part of the structure of the entire situation; diverging viewpoints are seen only in the context of unstated assumptions and seen therefore as—in spite of any other characteristics—"deviant".¹⁸

On this basis the Berlin Dadaists attacked German Expressionism on the charge that it was nothing better than an attempt to blot out the outside world, which proved so abusive and depressing, and to make an impotent and socially contemptible escape into the myth of "inner reality".

"Now came the expressionists, like those famous medical quacks who promise to 'fix everything up', looking heavenward like the gentle Muse; they pointed to 'the rich treasures of our literature', pulled the people gently by the sleeve and led them into the half-light of the Gothic cathedrals, where the street noises die down to a distant murmur and, in accordance with the old principle that all cats are grey at night, men without exception are fine fellows. And so expressionism, which brought the Germans so many welcome truths, became a 'national achievement'. In art it aimed at inwardness, abstraction, renunciation of all objectivity."¹⁹

The invocation (and Huelsenbeck recognizes the deliberate nature of this) of so-called "universals", obscuring out of context the critical differences between things or men, is obviously anathema to the dialectical process, which
sees itself consciously as a divider of the continuum of reality on the grounds that this continuum is not a static "entity", but a process, which is constantly changing and developing. Therefore, the crucial relationships are between the parts of this process—the apparently static conditions of the world—and the movement of the whole, between the form of the whole grasped by the mind, and the events which both create the whole and participate in it. By accepting the division between the "inner" and the "outer" worlds, between the realm of theory and that if practice (which characterizes expressionism for the Dadaists), the external world is accepted as it is. Hulsebeck claims that such acceptance is nothing better than cowardly resignation, an admission of weakness, lack of control, of alienation in the sense that Marx applies the term to philosophy. The conception of the human condition as inherently painful, frustrating or "absurd" (cf. Schopenhauer) is the ultimate reification, and a totally semantic problem. Expressionism in art, for Hulsebeck, occupies essentially the same position as philosophy—specifically German Idealist philosophy—held for Marx in the context of the material continuum of thought.

Hulsebeck, moreover, condemns the inward-seeking movement as less than an intellectual attitude toward the world, for it does not attempt to "comprehend the world"; but to escape from it. Likewise, Marx assaul ts the idealist philosophy which, "like German Protestant theology before it, transforms the aims of men into spiritual values; it thus renounces as hopeless the task of anchoring them in material reality." Marx and Hulsebeck establish parallel methods in their various frames of reference; both attack the reification of very material conditions of impotence and despair. Such reification, masquerading as true intellectual activity or as authentic art, reveals itself as the negation of that which it purports to uphold; therefore it is, in addition to
its other faults, hypocritical:

"On the pretext of carrying out propaganda for the soul, they have, in their struggle with naturalism, found their way back to the abstract, pathetic gestures which presuppose a comfortable life free from content or strife. The stages are filling up with kings, poets and Faustian characters of all sorts; the theory of a melioristic philosophy, the psychological naivety of which is highly significant for a critical understanding of expressionism, runs ghostlike through the minds of men who never act....That sentimental resistance to the times, which are neither better nor worse, neither more reactionary nor more revolutionary than other times, that weak-kneed resistance, flirting with prayers and incense when it does not prefer to load its cardboard cannon with Attic iambics—is the quality of a youth that never knew how to be young. Expressionism, discovered abroad, and in Germany, true to style, transformed into an opulent idyll and the expectation of a good pension, has nothing in common with the efforts of active men."23

This hypocritical attitude, which forms an apology for a contradictory state of affairs, is the attitude of the European bourgeois. The working class and the other poor, for example, could not turn away from the world, for to do so one must have resources. A poor man cannot follow the formulations of idealist culture, because to live the inward life one must be assured of the survival of, not so much his "mind", but of his very physical heart, which pumps blood through his brain. Likewise, it is not the active bourgeois himself who leads such a life, but his symbolic cultural counterpart. The philosophers and artists who belong to the group which, in Marx's terms, "make the perfecting of the illusions of the class about itself their chief source of livelihood", carry out this charade. The artist and philosopher play the role determined for them by the society in which they exist. In this way the context for art and thought is established. However, we shall see how, in the same capacity as the artist is created by the social context, he is critical of it, or at least has the potential to be so (see pp. 37-40). This potential, when realized, led to Berlin Dada.
As a consequence of the awareness of the basis of the culture they were dealing with, the Berlin group moved into a dialectical program which transcended the existent boundaries of art. In this way they set up a critique of the avant-garde itself. In contrast to Paris Dada, the Berlin group operated from a position which included that of the artistic avant-garde, but which understood it as a social product, like everything else, and therefore fully within the area of criticism. Berlin Dada included avant-garde art as part of its tactical methodology, but they placed no faith in it as an effective opposition to society and "culture". They understood that it was in a poor position to effect a meaningful critique as long as it took itself for granted. In Paris, the Dadaists were involved in what Huelsenbeck analyzed as a puerile and circular activity of attempting to criticize from a position within the confines of the definition under attack. This was seen as a failure of consciousness and is the basis of Huelsenbeck's disdain for Tzara.  

The Berlin Dadaists, in attacking the avant-garde itself, attacked the entire notion of "high art"; during their period of activity, with very few exceptions, the group produced mainly collage and photomontage as visual art, much of which was implemented as published material in the several magazines and bulletins brought out between 1918 and 1922. A comprehensive catalogue of the works of Hausmann, for example, does not exist; much of his work was utilized in publications. It is only fairly recently that the oeuvre of John Heartfield has received much attention: virtually all his work was utilitarian, as propaganda. Several members we, as we have mentioned, poets and writers. This activity was not abandoned during the Dada episode, but it was not given elevated status above the pressure of the moment to produce manifestoes, flysheets, pamphlets and bulletins. Jung, Mehring, Einstein and Huelsenbeck continued to publish throughout the period.
Nevertheless, it is clear that in attacking high art and the avant-garde, they were acting, so to speak, "in the name of art"; that is, the understanding of society and the manner in which it applies meaning to art rendered it impossible for these people to affirm the unlimited activity of the avant-garde as it was defined. They acted in fact as a vanguard themselves, but, as we shall see, this position was confirmed as actively critical only to the extent that it was actively self-critical. The avant-garde could function only in a state of extreme tension "with itself" because of the overwhelming knowledge it had of itself as a social process. This is the drive of Huelsenbeck's argument against Zurich and Paris, and it was the central preoccupation of the Berlin movement (though the conceptual level of this preoccupation varied from year to year and from person to person; for example, Grosz, Herzfelde, Jung and Heartfield were the most purely political in their activities, Huelsenbeck very political but committed to politics through an artistic consciousness, Hausmann a little further in the direction of artistic revolt, Hannah Hoech further still, and Baader in a sort of one-man class.) As Huelsenbeck says in *En Avant Dada*, it was necessary to form a conception of art as a moral and social phenomenon; the Berlin Dada movement should be seen as the immediate outcome of such a necessity in 1918.

Their objection to high art was not so much formal as ideological; high art, as it existed in Europe, had allowed itself to be introduced into the dominant culture, the bourgeois ideology. High art such as Picasso's had, by 1919, a place in the bourgeois scheme, a role which precluded the possibility of its maintaining a position actively outside that scheme. The Berlin Dadaists found that the most "advanced art" of their time had not sufficiently analyzed its position in regard to the social meaning which it carried, and to the origins
of that meaning. In "taking a position outside the bourgeois scheme" it should be remembered that Berlin Dada in no way "escaped" the bourgeois world; and in no way did it attempt to do so. As mentioned previously with reference to Rimbaud and the notion of "absolute" rejection, the extreme attitude is most totally bound to its subject, but this binding is dialectical, in which the critical attitude attempts to indicate the negative aspect of the existent, to show what is not in the apparent continuum of "what is".

Certainly, a spirit of "revolt" colours all advanced art of the time; Huelsenbeck and the Berlin group criticize it because it has not extended the boundaries of this revolt to include rejection of the manner of operation of the cultural definitions which establish the art-context. The avant-garde of the cubists and the abstract artists were content to carry out the contextual action only to the limits of the already-organized definitions of art-process, and no further. That is, the Berlin group felt that if one is involved with questioning the nature of a particular art-process, like painting, one is implicitly accepting the wider definition of art altogether. To become involved in a revolution of painting would mean not to become involved in a more totally revolutionary action against the entire bourgeois context of art. Huelsenbeck's endorsement of Bruitism, Simultaneity and the "new medium"——collage——stems from the understanding that media themselves are definitions and tend to create contexts, and that such definitions and contexts can operate strongly as a "conservative" element, although they seem to operate on such a broad level of acceptance and such a high level of abstraction that they appear unquestionable. In this sense art media can be seen as analogous to Roland Barthes' notion of language as horizon:

"...a language is a kind of natural ambience wholly pervading
the writer's expression, yet without endowing it with form or content: it is, as it were, an abstract circle of truths, outside of which alone the solid residue of an individual logos begins to settle. It enfolds the whole of literary creation much as the earth, sky and the line where they meet outline a familiar habitat for mankind. It is not so much a stock of materials as a horizon, which implies both a boundary and a perspective; in short it is the comforting area of an ordered space."29

Therefore, a viable revolutionary move would not involve painting in a new manner, if one were concerned with the definition of painting as art. To paint in a new manner simply reinforces the existing context, giving it the appearance of infinite flexibility. Rather, a more wide-ranging action is necessary. Huelsenbeck saw Picasso moving toward this in his work of 1906-1913:

"The concept of reality is a highly variable value, and entirely dependent upon the brain and the requirements of the brain that considers it. When Picasso gave up perspective, he felt that it was a set of rules that had arbitrarily thrown over "nature": the parallels which cross on the horizon are a deplorable deception—behind them lies the infinity of space that can never be measured. Consequently he restricted his painting to the foreground, he abandoned depth, freed himself from the morality of a plastic philosophy, recognized the conditionality of optical laws, which governed his eye in a particular country at a particular time; he sought a new, direct reality—he became, to use a vulgar term, non-objective. He wanted to paint no more men, women, donkeys and high-school students, since they partook of the whole system of deception, the theatre and the blague of existence—and at the same time he felt that painting with oil was a very definite symbol of a very definite culture and morality. He invented the new medium....He well understood the ideal, slick, harmonious quality inherent in perspective and in oil painting, and the falsehood of the 'landscape' produced by the sentimentality of oil painting."30

Huelsenbeck's approval of Picasso is mainly concerned with the artist's growing consciousness of the frame of reference of language in which he works, and the ability to grasp the frame of reference as nothing more than an historical situation, open to scrutiny in the broadest senses. Out of such examination action necessarily takes place; it is clearly a revolutionary praxis Huelsenbeck
is demanding. Considering Picasso's development just before and soon after this statement was made, one might feel that, in the eyes of those holding the theoretical viewpoint of the Berlin group, it would be seen as a failure to carry through the very radical implications of his own work. Cubism radicalized technique, and the entire language of painting; of this there is no doubt. It intentions, however, did not extend to those areas where the work of art becomes the "work of art" in the abstract, to the (necessarily) theoretical areas where art's function as an entity in society becomes the subject. There is no necessity to "criticize" the cubists for this apparent "failure"; however, it is valid and desirable to indicate the difference between the extremity of their position regarding art as art, and the extremity of the position of the Berlin group (to which only Duchamp had progressed by the same time.)

In their attitude toward the avant-garde and their denial of its validity, Berlin had very much "come out against art":

"The appropriation by Dada of these three principles, bruitism, simultaneity and, in painting, the new medium, is of course the 'accident' leading to the psychological factors to which the real Dadaist movement owed its existence. As I have said, I find in the Dadaism of Tzara and his friends, who made abstract art the cornerstone of their new wisdom, no new idea deserving of very serious propaganda. They failed to advance along the abstract road, which ultimately leads from the painted surface to the reality of a post-office form. No sooner had they left the old sentimental standpoint than they looked behind them, though still spurred on by ambition....In Germany Dadaism became political, it drew the ultimate consequences from its position and renounced art entirely."

The extremity of the position made it necessary for them to negate the viability of the continued existence of art in the present context through the only logical means available: art itself. The renunciation of art has value only in its social sense. The man who privately renounces art is seen very simply as not
an artist. The consequential move is the dialectical "renunciation" of the conditions which exist through that art which is necessarily identifiable with those conditions. Art, as art, had to register its resistance to the basis of the organization of European society in 1919. Because art functions on the social level, social conflicts—which are necessarily intellectual conflicts—are its affair. Art is not seen as the force which can resolve these conflicts, but as an area in which consciousness articulates itself. As such, it is the "objectification of consciousness"; just as, in Marx's terms (on a different but similar level), "The object of labour is the objectification of man's (species) life." Furthermore, if, as Marx asserts, "It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but, on the contrary, their social existence determines their consciousness," then art (which is nothing but the resolution of the productions of particular artists) does not choose whether or not, in Sartre's terms, to "engage"; it is by definition engaged—in history. Renunciation of art is a dialectical move on the part of the artist faced with a context beyond his control. It is a rejection of that context, a tactical step in the struggle to achieve conditions under which his art can be seen (which is tantamount to the achievement of a new art). Obviously, this is a step in the direction of joining the struggle for a new horizon altogether—a new society. The artist whose consciousness reaches this state can no longer be satisfied with "revolutions" within particular disciplines or sub-strata, nor even with the possibility of a "cultural revolution", for he realizes that no cultural revolution is possible without the corresponding social-political transformation.

The Berlin group used the techniques of avant-garde art because they comprehended their potential in the challenge to all definitions. However, the group
could not stop there because such techniques, for all their "linguistic" radicalism, were nevertheless categorizable as art. The challenge to the unquestionable horizon was subsumed in the recognition and acceptance of new art, more art.

In this light it is interesting to see how the Berlin artists who made collage—specifically Hausmann, Heartfield and Hannah Höch, employed the medium. Although their compositions derive to a great extent from the vocabularies of cubism and futurism, as well as from expressionist art itself and contemporary Russian work, there is common to these Dadaists a significant difference from the other schools. Unlike, for example, the collages of Picasso and Braque, the Dadaists do not attempt to "formalize" the elements. One of the most important reasons for this is the use to which these works were put.

Picasso's collages are conceived and organized as part of the program of cubist painting, as alternative solutions to its major problems, the modalities of depiction and the question of surface. These are formal problems wholly within the scope of the definition of painting. Picasso's most concrete flat works maintain adherence to the canon of high art. (See, for example, Nature morte, violon et fruits, 1913, Nature morte au Lacerba, 1914, or Nature morte a la chaise cannee, 1912.) In the 1913 work concentration is typically focussed on the unity and resolution of the pictorial organization; this impulse is responsible for the distribution of newspaper cuttings across the picture, bringing the depiction together and asserting the surface in explicit contrast to the depth illusion generated by the depiction of planes overlapping one another. The technique of combining standard drawing and painting passages with the collage elements aids as well in integrating these new components into the normative schema of the art object. Naturally, then, cubist collages took their places
on the gallery wall alongside the paintings.

On the other hand, Dadaist works such as Heartfield’s early Dada-Photomontage of 1920, or Hausmann’s raucous synthetisches Cino der malerei pamphlet of 1918, were not intended for the gallery wall, but had a more "utilitarian" purpose. Their function was immediate and mechanical: the Berlin artists were delighted with the possibilities of creating works which seemed like art, but which had a contradictory relationship to artistic canons. The Dada collages seemed like art, but contradictorily, were found in newspapers, handbills, and the covers of fly-by-night magazines, or else, they didn’t seem like art at all, in their apparent artlessness, stylelessness and craftlessness, yet appeared in what was acknowledged to be (some breed of) art movement. The Dadaists exploited both sides of the coin, impelled by the pressure of history and the desire "to say something to the people", to break the normative codifications of viewing context. The result is a style of impenetrable and inescapable concreteness, even in the cases of works which were not published, such as Hausmann’s ABCD of 1923. In contrast to the works by Picasso mentioned or, for a further example, Giacomo Balla’s Dimonstrazione patriotica (1915), Hausmann virtually slams his material onto the sheet—not without care for the composition as a whole (the organization is superb!)—but without mediating the material, as the others do. The banknotes, cut out letters, gynaecological diagrams and original photographs are not integrated to form an harmonious surface, nor are their individual natures subordinated to a generalized appearance of the work (as in Balla’s collage), but rather are permitted to assert themselves, and to form a conglomerate composition from this assertion. Picasso’s chaise cannee is tame by comparison, with the stunning foreign element worked in nicely through the extension of the painted areas, and thereby admitted into the pre-existing set of regulations by bending to conform to its outline. ABCD, Heartfield’s Dada-Photomontage,
or even something as "formal" as Hausmann's GURK, 1918,\(^{44}\) which appeared in his der Dada, consist entirely of these foreign elements colliding together without the soothing influence of the painting aesthetic.

One of the most compelling aspects of photomontage was this ambivalence about its status as art, as mentioned above. Painting aesthetics, and the corresponding stylistic questions were largely invalidated by the use of standardized, readymade material without any manual transformation. Also, by 1919, photographic media constituted the most universally available communication, directly tied to the material culture; it was not connected with the art-context.

Unlike Hausmann, Hoech and Grosz, Heartfield\(^{45}\) disguised the materiality of his work quite soon after coming upon the photomontage medium. In the Dada period itself (1917-1923) his works share in the prevailing mode of roughness, but later, when he turns his attention to specific anti-Fascist and anti-Nazi propaganda, his work becomes technically complex and highly refined.\(^{46}\) Most importantly, Heartfield totally resisted the art-context. This was a very conscious choice; his work took the form of reproducible material: posters, newspaper features, handbills, etc. It seems to work only at the level of propaganda. Propaganda it is, and as propaganda it exceeds art in its comprehension of the power of image and of context. In the historical situation in which he found himself, Heartfield realized that to use the techniques which he adopted and invented for what was to be—consciously—"art" was a regressive step. To do so would mean that the crucial and necessary message (his content) which he was to convey would be obliterated by the acceptability of the context into which it were placed.\(^{47}\)

"The Dadaist considers it necessary to come out against art, because he has seen through its fraud as a moral safety valve. Perhaps this militant attitude is a last gesture of
inculcated honesty, perhaps it merely amuses the Dadaist, perhaps it means nothing at all. But in any case, art (including culture, spirit, athletic club), regarded from a serious point of view, is a large-scale swindle....Culture can be designated solemnly and naively as the national spirit become form, but it can also be characterized as a compensatory phenomenon, an obeisance to an invisible judge, as veronal for the conscience."48

In a very real sense the Berlin group is resisting mystification and the operation of myths. When the Bruitist poem was developed, two possibilities came into being regarding its use. Firstly, the attitude held by the futurists, who really invented the mode, was that Bruitism was the expression of the nature of the immediately contemporary world, the industrialized, mechanized, electrified speeded-up society, and as such, was bound to represent this society in its own language. The futurists, by remaining within the orbit of painting and sculpture, "formalized" this language as it was presented in the terms of those art forms, and in the context established by those forms. Huelsenbeck, in the Collective Dada Manifesto, takes this aspect of Bruitism into Dada: "The BRUITIST POEM represents the streetcar as it is, the essence of the streetcar with the yawning of Schulze the conductor and the screeching of the brakes."49 No "distancing" is desired. Direct, unmanipulated aspects of street-life are pressed into art, or at least pressed forward in the context of art for critical consideration. No attempt is to be made to "aestheticize" these sights or sounds, to make them beautiful. Just as the Dadaist collages rejected inclusion in a high art aesthetic domain, the Bruitist poem resists inclusion in the domain of artistic language. There is no Muse, no mystification about the source of the sounds.

On the other hand, Bruitism, as it developed in France, was inflected by the entire spectrum of French poetic concerns since Rimbaud. Picasso's Demoiselles d'Avignon (1906) is representative of this inclination: in a single unforgettable image it allies the contemporary aspects of cubism and the new medium
with the suggestion of a truth existing in more primitive, non-European cultures. It is apparent that this trend, which in the 1920s began to fill European museums with the artifacts of pre-technological civilizations from Africa, Asia and South and Central America, is organically connected to Rimbaud's position. European literature of the post-World War I period, deeply conscious of its own alienation, made various attempts to escape a society which had apparently committed a horrible suicide, yet which refused to die. These attempts followed the outlines set down by men such as Lautremont or Villiers de l'Isle-Adam, which consisted of a total escape into the imagination, or else those indicated by Rimbaud.

"...the period since the War has furnished...many examples of writers who have gone the way of Rimbaud—without usually, however, like him, getting to the point of giving up literature altogether. All our cult, which Wyndham Lewis has denounced, of more primitive places and peoples is really the manifestation of an impulse similar to Rimbaud's—D. H. Lawrence's mornings in Mexico and his explorations of Santa Fe and Australia; Blaise Cendrars' negro anthology, the negro masks which bring such high prices in Paris, Andre Gide's lifelong passion for Africa which has finally led him to navigate the Congo, Sherwood Anderson's exhilaration at the 'dark laughter' of the American South....all this has followed in the wake of Rimbaud." 50

This point is made in the light of the fact that the Parisian Dadaists endorsed Picasso's primitivism and, through their connections with the Symbolist movement, participated in the mystification of the process of Bruitism. At the beginning of the Zurich movement, devices such as Negro music and masks, balalaika music, chant-poetry and ritual dancing are used to make the effect. 51

Huelsenbeck reports that at Zurich, "In literature, primitive tendencies were pursued. They read medieval prose, and Tzara ground out Negro verses which he palmed off as accidentally-discovered remains of a Bantu or Winnetu culture, again to the great amazement of the Swiss." 52
The objection is not to chant-poetry, sound-poetry, Janco's primitivizing masks and the rest; however, the use of primitive devices which are to be specifically related to a romanticized notion of the virtue and vitality of non-European, pre-rational-technological cultures is, I would argue, an association which removes the immediacy of the critical aspects of the attack upon European cultural language which these new works and techniques represent. As such, it stands for a position no more engaged than Rimbaud's, and so offers no valid new dialectical program. The process is similar to the turning of a manifesto into poetry or abstract speculation, as we shall see Tzara does. It is basically that of mystification, or, in the more purely Marxian (via Lukacs) term, of reification, in which immediate and historical conditions (product of relationships between living men) are represented as "universals" (product of relationships between inanimate things) beyond the scope of the particular present and the individual. Primitivism is an example of the operation of this process: Rimbaud's absolute rejection of Europe gives Europe the semblance of an absolute. Europe becomes the absolute error, and the only solution in this case is to start again from the beginning, in the manner of Rousseau. Rimbaud appeals to the myth of the noble savage, drinking his "liquor of molten metal", in order to destroy the oppressive ideology created by the intellectual production of bourgeois-industrial society. But we are aware that, nevertheless, the myth invoked is completely relevant to the historical connection because that poet, so deeply affected by history, made the connection. Rimbaud's attempt to annihilate Europe took the form of forcing consciousness back in time. The poet literally could so no way out (he had witnessed first-hand and participated in the failed Socialist revolutions of 1848). To move through the present into the future seemed impossible: the present was beginning to be much too well entren-
The attitude toward primitivism and Bruitism held by the Berlin and Paris groups is an illuminating example of their general positions. By stringently maintaining a state of concentration upon the present, the Berlin Dadaists could arrive at the full cultural value of anti-rational noise and simultaneous poetry. The character and source of this work had to be seen in the context of the immediate environment: these savage-sounding chants and screams were not the product of a formalized, even pastorally-removed native agrarian civilization, product of a past ideal, but the shrieks of modern Europeans, in leather shoes and overcoats. This strictness of purpose and clarity of context works against the possibility of the impact of the work leaking away into a fascination with remote sources, and thereby creating a situation in which any rejection of the existing culture takes place in the name of a culture which could not be immediately connected with it. Concrete conflicts are obscured in the endorsement of highly abstract conflicts. Myth does battle against myth.

The analysis of the Berlin movement was from the beginning aimed at the destruction of the intellectual structure of Germany, and, by extension, all of bourgeois Europe. They were concerned in a sense which is quite strictly Marxian, to move through the era of myth or ideology, into a very different kind of world. This intention made it possible for them to relinquish the desire to continue to produce art above all else.

The Marxian system of thought is characterized as ultimately rational; the existence of myth is seen as a particular functioning of consciousness. It is bound to particular economic, productive conditions, and is open to the critical—destructive—effects of other functions.

"All social life is essentially practical. All the mysteries
which lead theory towards mysticism find their rational solution in human practice and in the comprehension of this practice."

The power of myth is based on the power to control definitions: applied meanings, the results of determinate acts by particular human beings, are given the character of absolute meanings. They become the abstract horizon which is never questioned, under which all definitions and concepts are established and maintained. Huelsenbeck's objection to the Zurich and Paris Dadaists includes centrally the objection that one cannot combat mystification, particularly in industrialized class society, through the production of counter-myths. An integral part of the Marxian program is the exposure of the process of mystification as an incomplete and unfree state of thought, in which language is not used to communicate, but to obscure thought, in which communication is the communication of strictly-controlled ideas and meanings. (see pp. 69-72)

To be critical is to be aware of process; the man of critical, sceptical nature is the one who understands the procedure of producing meaning.

"In an article on expressionsim Kornfield makes the distinction between the ethical man and the psychological man. The ethical man has the child-like piety and faith which permit him to kneel at some altar and recognize some God, who has the power to lead men from their misery to some paradise. The psychological man has journeyed vainly through the infinite, has recognized the limits of his spiritual possibilities, he knows that every 'system' is a seduction with all the consequences of seduction and every God an opportunity for financiers.

The Dadaist, as the psychological man, has brought back his gaze from the distance and considers it important to have shoes that fit and a suit without holes in it. The Dadaist is an atheist by instinct. He is no longer a metaphysician in the sense of finding a rule for the conduct of life in any theoretical principles, for him there is no longer a 'thou shalt'....Consequently, the good is....no 'better' than the bad—there is only a simultaneity, in values as in everything else. This simultaneity applied to the economy of facts is communism, a communism, to be sure, which has abandoned the
This attitude, for all its ideological peculiarities, annihilates "belief";
there can be no belief in art, just as there can be none in myth or religion,
because, as we shall see, the action indicated by the verb "to believe" is in­
validated by a new condition of thought. This new condition of thought brings
art into existence in the moment it destroys the mystification of art, the mom­
ent art as mystification ends. A myth or an ideology does not cease to exist
once it is revealed as an historical product. What occurs at this point is a
dialectical event, in which the alienated product of thought is brought back
into direct relationship with the process which created it. The existence of the
product is never denied, but its independent status outside the range of human­
ly-created phenomena is destroyed, and the product is understood and examined
in its new status as resume of a mental procedure. In terms of art, the analogy
is very clear: Duchamp did not kill art, he gave birth to it—as a self-consc­
ciously historical activity, "at the service of the mind." Duchamp understood
the necessity for an explosion in context; the alternative was to see art as a
process die. The notion of the independent existence of "Art"—the residue of
bourgeois-idealism—is destroyed. Marx makes a similar point in discussion of
religion:

"Since, however, for socialist man the whole of what is
called world history is nothing but the creation of man by
human labour, and the emergence of Nature for man, he there­
fore has the evident and irrefutable proof of his self-crea­
tion, of his own origins. Once the essence of man and of
Nature, man as a natural being and Nature as a human reality,
has become evident in practical life, in sense experience, the
search for an alien being, a being outside man and Nature
(a search which is the avowal of the unreality of man and Nat­
ure) becomes impossible in practice. Atheism, as a denial of
this unreality, is no longer meaningful, for atheism is a
denial of God, and seeks to assert by this denial the
existence of man. Socialism no longer requires such a
roundabout method; it begins from the theoretical and
practical sense perception of man and Nature as real
existences. It is a positive human self-consciousness,
no longer a self-consciousness attained through the
negation of religion, just as the real life of man is
positive and no longer attained through the negation
of private property (communism)."

In the same sense does art remain after its apparent "negation" in the
work of Duchamp and the Berlin Dadaists. It is realized as a determinate mental
product. Therefore, it is controlled by the mind and the context and never att-
ains an independent existence, never generates idols. Art realizes itself as a
phenomenon of consciousness in history, even at its most abstract, even when it
is concerned only with mountains, deserts, glaciers and oceans. "Art", for Huel-
senbeck or Duchamp, really does not exist. What does exist is a certain kind of
art process. In a very similar way does society exist, not as an abstract "Soc-

ity" which stands apart from the individuals who compose it, but instead as the
resolution of their interactions.

"The fact is, therefore, that determinate individuals,
who are productively active in a definite way, enter into
these determinate social and political relations. Empiric-
al observation must, in each particular case, show empir-
ically, and without any mystification or speculation, the
connection of the social and political structure with pro-
duction. The social structure and the State are continual-
ly evolving out of the life-process of determinate indivi-
duals, of individuals not as they appear in their own or
other people's imagination, but as they really are: i.e.
as they act, produce their material life, and are occupied
within determinate material limits, presuppositions and
conditions, which are beyond their will."56

The rejection of the mythmaking activity (and that of counter-mythmaking)
by the Berlin Dadaists is a measure of their sophistication in handling the no-
tion of context. In 1935 Andre Breton was to characterize Surrealism as a "met-
hod of creating a collective myth”; it is this approach which generates the conceptual tensions of Surrealism, and which made it impossible for a workable alliance to be formed between that group and purely political activists. Political action, in the Marxist sense, is irrevocably aligned with the destruction of mystification, in a world in which the collective has been completely obliterated.

The existence of anti-mythical thought is that of the critical nature of consciousness. The now-destroyed myth is not ignored, but instead becomes an artifact, and, at the same time, a symbol of the subversive nature of consciousness in history. In the same way, the art which Duchamp and the Berlin Dadaists destroyed did not cease to exist. In fact, its existence retains importance, but in a transformed manner, in that it is now placed in a comparative context, one in which the processes which produced it can be critically revealed. Duchamp's Fountain or Bottle Rack are anti-icons, shot through with the subversive knowledge of what goes into making an icon. This is the source of the scepticism and the irony.

It might be argued that, similar to the sense in which there is much in Duchamp's work hostile to art as it existed before him, there is something in Marx's thought deeply antithetical to poetry, to the so-called "artistic impulse". If there is anything, it is the opposition to reification. The destruction of reification however, as we shall see, makes poetry possible; the artistic impulse becomes supremely self- and historically-conscious. The myth, the poem, the art work are seen as natural productions, clearly in the realm of the practical and the material. It is seen to have a history: the history of men.

"The phantoms of the human brain are necessary sublimates of men's material life-processes, which can be empirically established and which are bound to material preconditions. Morality,
religion, metaphysics and other ideologies, and their corresponding forms of consciousness, no longer therefore retain their appearance of autonomous existence. They have no history, no development; it is men, who, in developing their material production and their material intercourse, change, along with their real existence, their thinking and the products of their thinking. Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life. Those who adopt the first method begin with consciousness regarded as the living individual; those who adopt the second, which corresponds with real life, begin with the real living individuals themselves, and consider consciousness only as their consciousness.59

Likewise, art consciousness is only the consciousness of the man making art, and this is seen as the content of art. Thus, the importance of Duchamp's Readymades, as context becomes content. The work of art has no existence except as a conscious historical act. It does not necessarily partake in the myth of the beautiful object nor of that of the message from the beyond. Its relationship with infinity is ironic, its relationship to its own importance skeptical. Like Duchamp, Huenisenbeck is the consummate skeptic.

"Skepticism" is a term used to denote process-awareness, which is historical, critical awareness. This skepticism is very sensitive to definitions, and to frames of reference—to systems. The Berlin Dadaists' critical focus on the avant-garde is a result of such thinking.

With this in mind, let us return to the discussion of the manifesto, with the object of arriving at a definition of it in relationship to the work of art, i.e., to see its difference from a work of art.

As stated above (p. 12), the function of the manifesto is to antagonize in the domain of definitions. Its primary and authentic role is contextual. This implies a situation of struggle and conflict, not development according to a pre-organized pattern of formal relationships—that is, the manifesto emerges as a polemical tool only in a dialectical situation of conflict.60
Such a situation is synthetic: that is, it is the product of particular historical acts—definitions. In this struggle, everything is dynamic, and depends for its intensity upon the determined opposition of fully-delineated components. In terms of the dialectic, the more fully-developed the conflicting components are, the more deep and acute the encounter will be, and the more fully resolved will be the synthesis or resolution. The arena of this conflict—in this case, between existing art-definitions and emerging art-definitions—brings the manifesto as a phenomenon of art, into existence. The effectiveness of the manifesto is absolutely related to a particular context, a particular struggle. Beyond these concerns, it has no interest. The manifesto, like any factor within a struggle, is less interested in the field of conflict as a field, than it is in forging the necessary resolution of the situation. The battleground is engaged at all only to move past it. The manifesto is totally a means, just as in the triadic dialectical reading, the thesis and antithesis can be seen as means to synthesis.

As a means, the manifesto is fundamentally different from a work of art. The work of art indeed carries a critical function, which necessitates that it, too, antagonize in the realm of meaning, but simultaneously it also includes other functions at other levels, whose role appears more neutral because of the higher level of abstraction. The work of art as a work of art can reconcile opposites, which, on the immediate contextual level, cannot be reconciled; this occurs because the work takes the abovementioned "field of conflict" as its subject-matter. Thus the work is simultaneously transparent and opaque, is looked at, as a product, and looked through, as an indicator of method. As Robert Morris suggests, one does not look at a new formal-methodological artistic development, but through it, using it to see the world. Therefore, I would sugg-
est that there are possible—but not necessary, as Duchamp demonstrated—internal relations within the work of art which operate on a level at which immediately opposed factors are not significant as opposites, but rather as simple aspects in a meridian of possibilities. In works of art such as these, content is distinguishably different from context, in that it is still possible to distinguish the specific content of a work of art (for example, the concern with "irrational" image-combinations in Max Ernst's collages, or the relationship between object-shape and depicted image in Frank Stella's work) from the level at which the work, as a raw fact—as an abstraction—simply is. This "is" is no metaphysical is, but rather refers to the minimum standards necessary for the recognition of the particular art work as an art work. That this latter concern is a broader and more general one than that of specific content is demonstrated by the fact the specific content can be obliterated by the mere fact of art-existence, by the intensity of relationship to context, to itself as art.

"Art stands against history, withstands history which has been the history of oppression, for art subjects reality to laws other than the established ones: to the laws of the Form which creates a different reality—negation of the established one even where art depicts the established reality. But in its struggle with history, art subjects itself to history: history enters the definition of art and enters into the distinction between art and pseudo-art. Thus it happens that what was once art becomes pseudo-art. Previous forms, styles, and qualities, previous modes of protest and refusal cannot be recaptured in or against a different society. There are cases where an authentic oeuvre carries a regressive political message—Dostoevski is a case in point. But then the message is cancelled by the oeuvre itself, aufgehoben in the artistic form: in the work as literature." 

It is when, by a specific intellectual process, the work of art can become an abstraction of itself that the contextual-critical question becomes meaningful. At this point we deliberately put aside questions of "appreciation" and so
on, and focus attention upon the work as a representative, in a manner of speaking, of the category "work of art", a construct of definitions, a result of the "metaphoric"\textsuperscript{65} nature of mental activity. At this point, what art is is the "art condition"\textsuperscript{66}; the art process is seen as a limited system in a particular context. "Works of art are analytic propositions. That is, if viewed within their context—as art—they provide no information what-so-ever about any matter of fact. A work of art is a tautology in that it is the presentation of the artist's intention, that is, he is saying that that particular work of art \textit{is} art, which means, is a \textit{definition} of art. Thus, that it is art is true \textit{a priori} (which is what Judd means when he states that 'if someone calls it art, it's art').\textsuperscript{67} We must realize, however, that such a reading depends upon, as is admitted by the invocation of an \textit{a priori}, the existence of an historically established and agreed-upon context. The art work in this abstract state (exemplified by the \textit{Bottle Rack} or a work by Kosuth) exists as the result of nothing more than the recognition of the presence of context, which itself is necessarily seen as the resume of the metaphorical, analogical and \textit{material} process of thought and meaning-application. Therefore, \textit{within} the art-context (now a specifically, technically delimited zone of activity), the work of art needs do no more than simply exist (it does not even have to be \textit{present}\textsuperscript{68}), that is, fulfill all definitional requirements, cause no linguistic contradictions. Duchamp proved Marx's statement that art is necessarily a social phenomenon. In an intellectually organized society (and society is by definition an intellectual organization), all that needs to exist is a context, a definition, a ground of precedent and discourse. With this, the possibilities for the definition are limitless, but only through the movement of context itself, which is a specific procedure (see pp.81-82).
However, it is imperative to recognize that the context itself is a determinate historical product, an not an unquestionable a priori. Whenever limits are drawn around a situation or an activity, the most important area becomes the edge, the interface where that which is within the limit interfaces with or confronts that which is not. In opposition to the position held by Kosuth, I would argue that the existence of art in this contextual state depends ultimately upon the critical recognition—at every moment—of the historical nature of the context itself. In the dialectical arena, nothing can exist independently. That which is A is simply, by the fact of its being, something not only other than B, but opposed to B, antagonistic to B, critical of B. Each bounded defined being is not only passively itself, but it is actively not that which it is not.

Therefore, Duchamp, in the creation of the first unassisted Readymades, attacked ostensibly an established context (in part, the "morphological"); but as well, with this move he set up a continuous critique of the notion of context itself. He established a new artistic methodology, similar to that of Berlinin Dada, which related to the conscious art-context in a new way: by treating it as subject-matter. In the same way in which myth attains a new identity when its mystifying, magical powers are understood and thereby destroyed, context, which in the definition of Kosuth has similar powers, is transformed. Like the myth, and indeed as a subverted myth, it takes on the character of a self-conscious process result, as does the art-object or situation created within it. As Kosuth suggests, each art work, by presenting itself as the "definition" (or a definition) has the potential to change the definition of art. However, such changes do not take place solely within the pre-established context; simultaneously with the following of possibilities within the context and the redefining
of configurations within the definition, each such change-act in fact reverberates upon the context itself as an entirety, as a notion, as a concept.

"...the propositions of art are not factual, but linguistic in character—that is, they do no describe the behaviour of physical, or even mental objects; they express definitions of art, or the formal consequences of definitions of art. Accordingly, we can say that art operates on a logic. For we shall see that the characteristic mark of a purely logical enquiry is that it is concerned with the formal consequences of our definitions (of art) and not with questions of empirical fact."  

While this suggestion is acceptable as far as it goes, I would suggest that it does not go far enough. While the specific content of "logic" as a process is not under question, the process as a process, in a certain sense as a "game" of thought, needs to be comprehended in the light of man in history. To insist upon this is not to relegate apparent universals to the status of conditioned reflex; far from it. Rather, to insist such is to point out the inescapable connection of thought with "empirical fact". Again, this does not deny the existence of thought-process which are not apparently concerned with particular issues of empirical fact. However, it makes explicitly conscious that the process in question actively separates itself from questions of an empirical nature, and that this separation must be seen as conscious and deliberate and therefore part of the procedure itself. That is, the differentiation between analytic and synthetic propositions is itself a synthetic proposition. Context itself is no a priori condition, but is much a product of determinate historical acts as are the works and definitions which operate within it. Like any language, however, context acts as the "unquestioned horizon" in which particular acts seem naturally immersed. And we have understood (Marshall McLuhan) that it is the most immediate and pervasive environment which is most difficult to objectivize and perceive critically.
To bring the discussion back immediately to the manifesto, we should note that, unlike the work of art, there is nothing in the manifesto which can be separated from the immediacy of direct contextual concerns. Where the art work can exist in a more highly abstracted state and therefore participate to a certain extent in a wider, more general context, the manifesto is all dialectic, all specific content. The manifesto not only does not participate in the "art condition", it is antithetical to it. It is correct to claim that the manifesto succeeds to the extent that it does not exist as art, to the extent to which it repudiates the possibility of existing as art. As art, art present necessarily no thesis, no argument; instead it remains "itself", within the context, and any polemical aspect the work might have emanates from this state. No matter how logical and rationalized the work might be (for example the "sculpture" of Judd), it does not reach its limit of activity in the problem-solving practice. As Duchamp said, "There is no solution because there is no problem". It is in this light that we understand the role-changing capacity of art works, their life and death, and their life after death, as "history".

The life of the manifesto is, contrarily, all conflict, all problem, all solution. It is only when the authors of a manifesto realized this to its utmost that their product takes on full value and is most successful. It is against this background that the manifestoes of Huelsenbeck and Tzara should be compared; a comparison of the manifestoes leads us as surely to this train of thought as this train of thought leads to the consideration of their manifestoes.

While the German Dadaists made it their objective to rip apart what they saw as a repressive culture ("Instinctively he (the Dadaist) sees his mission in smashing the cultural ideology of the Germans."72), the Parisian group, beneath the horizon of the notion of the avant-garde, understood their assault as
issuing from that avant-garde position. Tzara's activities in Zurich as well as in Paris are sufficient evidence of this; they are aimed at solidifying the avant-garde out of which any criticism, carried out in the name of art, would be achieved. The nature of their own position as such was not an object of criticism, it was rather the standard of measurement. Consequently criticism of other movements or branches was carried out within the framework of an unquestioned context; in a sense Tzara's notions of the relationship of advanced art to society create a mystification of the avant-garde itself. In no manner do the Parisian Dadaists or their Zurich predecessors renounce art; their motivation is continually to affirm it in the most absolute sense. This attitude, and its French poetic affinities, is revealed by Tzara in his famous Dada Manifesto 1918:

"Art is a private affair, the artist produces it for himself; an intelligible work is the product of a journalist, and because at this moment it strikes my fancy to combine this monstrosity with oil paints: a paper tube simulating the metal that is automatically pressed and poured hatred cowardice villainy. The artist the poet rejoice at the venom of the masses condensed into a section chief of this industry, he is happy to be insulted: it is a proof of his immutability. When a writer or artist is praised by the newspapers, it is proof of the intelligibility of his work: wretched linings of a coat for public use; tatters covering brutality, piss contributing to the warmth of an animal brooding vile instincts."  

Art exists for Tzara in what we have seen Huelsenbeck characterize as a "traditional view", a view which had to be destroyed in order to form a new conception of "art as moral and social phenomenon." Note that Tzara is not asserting specifically that art's language is opposed to the social reality for concrete reasons, and that these reasons are beyond the control of artists just as they are beyond the control of the bourgeois and the masses. To do so would be to recognize that the artist is no super-human creature, aloof from the materi-
al and intellectual difficulties of those social groups, but instead that, in being active in an inherently social enterprise, he is as much a victim of culture as they are. To accept this would mean ultimately to envisage a different situation, and therefore a very different definition of art and the artist.

Thus Tzara's manifestoes are documents of a no-revolt, one in which no solution is offered, and no discussion is generated beyond that of the absolute affirmation of the "artist" (which obviously means the artist as he exists) absolutely against the bourgeois and the working class.

"I write a manifesto and I want nothing, yet I say certain things, and in principle I am against manifestoes, as I am also against principles (half-pints to measure the moral value of every phrase too too convenient; approximation was invented by the impressionists). I write this manifesto to show that people can perform contradictory actions together while taking one fresh gulp of air; I am against reaction; for continuous contradiction, for affirmation too, I am neither for nor against and I do not explain because I hate common sense."76

Huelsenbeck sees Tzara's position simply as the result of a lack of consciousness or development. In Tzara's writing there is no conscious move away from an authentic critical position; rather, the whole of his activity was organized without the total conceptual grasp of the situation. Tzara's Zurich career operated, it seems, on a cellular, instinctive level, in which formulated critical and self-critical concepts did not arise. As Huelsenbeck says, "Tristan Tzara had been one of the first to grasp the suggestive power of the word Dada. From here on he worked indefatigably as the prophet of a word, which only later was to be filled with a concept."77 In this context, Tzara's "DADA NE SIGNIFIE RIEN" (1918) takes on a particular historical meaning for us.

This difficulty is apparent throughout the manifestoes written by Tzara.
While never explicitly anti-dialectical, they never attain an authentic critical position because they never take up a true critical method. The Dada Manifesto 1918 or the Manifesto on feeble and bitter love of 1920 are cases in point: their focus is diffuse, they direct themselves to question whose range makes it possible for them only to be mentioned in passing:

"A manifesto is a communication addressed to the whole world, in which there is no other pretension than the discovery of a means of curing instantly political, astronomical, artistic, parliamentary, agronomic, and literary syphilis. It can be gentle, good natured, it is always right, it is strong vigorous and logical."  

In addition to this, Tzara uses overtly "poetic" language, language whose complexity and irregularity, imagery and conceit, prevents the manifestoes from being clearly and directly comprehended.

"I have given a pretty faithful version of progress, law, morality and all other fine qualities that various highly intelligent men have discussed in so many books, only to conclude after all that everyone dances to his own personal boomboom, and that the writer is entitled to his boomboom: the satisfaction of pathological curiosity; a private bell for inexplicable needs; pecuniary difficulties; a stomach with repercussions in life; the authority of the mystic wand formulated as the bouquet of a phantom orchestra made up of silent fiddle bows greased with philtres made of chicken manure."  

Tzara's manifestoes in fact tend toward that which is the very antithesis of the manifesto: poetry.

It is fair to say that Tzara's intentions had been directly poetic from the beginning of the Zurich affair, as had been those of the rest of the Cabaret Voltaire group—Ball, Janco, Huelsenbeck, Hennings, Arp. The first issue of Cabaret Voltaire, the first Dada publication, included Apollinaire, Picasso,
Modigliani, Kandinsky, Marinetti and Cendrars as well as the Cabaret group themselves. Huelsenbeck's disillusionment with Zurich and the Cabaret Voltaire seems to stem from their overriding belief in art and poetry: he sees this as a naivety, a lack of skepticism in the sense used above. Huelsenbeck knew that to believe in art this way was to accept a reified context. In an interview of May, 1950, Tzara states:

"Il s'agissait de fournir la preuve que la poésie était une force vivante sous tous les aspects, même antipoétiques, l'écriture n'en étant qu'un véhicule occasionnel, nullement indispensable, et l'expression de cette spontanéité que faute d'un qualificatif approprié, nous appelions dadaistes."

In a situation where art is in question in its contextual sense, "belief" is of little importance, for belief insists upon the unconditional character of its object. The "conservative" characteristics of this argument are, I hope, evident. Something is conceived as absolute, unconditionally necessary, etc., in a particular frame of reference. It is, historically, not separable from that frame: to insist that it exist unconditionally is to do one of two things: either to insist implicitly that the context, irrespective of its nature, be retained without question, or else to be ignorant of the function of context in the process of thought. Either way, what emerges in practice is at least the possibility of an excuse to retain, more or less consciously, the existing state of affairs. Tzara's belief in poetry is then, naturally enough, a belief in a certain poetry, which implies a particular contextual field.

Tzara's thinking in 1918 was strongly influenced, as mentioned, by French poetic ideas, from the sense of absolute revolt engendered by Rimbaud, to the notion of "difficulty"---and aestheticism, which is part of the program of the Symbolist movement and related activities (cf. Mallarme). This influence shapes
his manifestoes down to the details. After the Dada Manifesto 1918, which was his second work (the more poetically structured Manifesto of M. Antipyrene was presented at Waag Hall, Zurich, July 14, 1916\(^1\)), the writings take on a more overtly "poetic" structure and syntax.

XI
Dada is a dog—a compass—the abdominal clay—neither new nor a Japanese nude—a gas meter of sentiments rolled into pellets—Dada is brutal and puts out no propaganda—Dada is a quantity of life undergoing a transparent transformation both effortless and giratory.

XII
ladies and gentlemen buy come in and buy and do not read you will see the man who holds in his hands the keys of niagara the man who limps in a blimp with the hemisphere in a suitcase and his nose shut up in a japanese lantern and you will see you will see the stomach dance in the massachusetts saloon the man who drives in a nail and the tire goes flat the silk stockings of miss atlantis the trunk that navigates the globe 6 times to reach the addressee monsieur and his fiancee and his sister-in-law you will find the address of the carpenter the frog-watch the nerve shaped like a paper-cutter you will learn the address of the minor pin for the feminine sex and the address of the man who furnishes the king of greece with filthy photographs and address of action francaise.

XIII
Dada is a virgin microbe
Dada is against the high cost of living
Dada
a joint stock company for the exploitation of ideas
Dada has 391 different attitudes and colors depending on the sex of the chairman
It transforms itself—affirms—simultaneously says the opposite—it doesn't matter—
screams—goes fishing.
Dada is the chameleon of rapid, interested change
Dada is against the future. Dada is dead.
Dada is idiotic. Hurrah for Dada. Dada is not a literary school roar.

Tristan TZARA\(^2\)

This outlook takes over completely by 1918; the three later manifestoes can
be seen to be completely in this category, which is not critical and which—
though some may disagree—only approximates poetry:

"Hypertrophic painters hyperaestheticized and hypnotized by the hyacinths
of the hypocritical-looking muezzins."83

The examination can be closed with the reproduction of one of Tzara's poems
from the 1916 collection, Vingt-cinq Poèmes, published at the time of the Caba-
ret Voltaire.84

CINEMA CALENDRIER DU COEUR ABSTRAIT MAISONS

2
avec tes doigts crispés s'allongeant et chancelants comme les yeux
la flamme appelle pour serre
es-tu la sous la couverture
les magasins crachent les employés midi
la rue les emporte
les sonnettes des trams coupent la phrase forte

3
vent désir cave sonore d'insomnie tempête temple
la chute des eaux
et la saute brusque des voyelles
dans les regards qui fixent les points des abîmes
a venir a surpasser vecus a concevoir
appellent les corps humains légers comme les allumettes
dans tous les incendies de l'automne des vibrations et des arbres
sueur de pétrole

21
le foot-ball dans le poumon
casse les vitres (insomnie)
dans le puits on fait bouillir les nains
pour les vin et la folie
picabia arp ribemont-dessaignes
bonjour

It is not necessary to press the point; in comparison to contemporaneous
works, such as Huelsenbeck’s Collective Manifesto, or in recent and well-known pieces like Marinetti’s historic First Futurist Manifesto of 1909, and the continuing series of manifestoes from the pens of Marinetti and the group of Futurist painters (Severini, Russolo, Boccioni, Balla, Carra, etc.), it is plain to see that the literary element is dominant with Tzara. In being so, it removes his manifestoes from any corpus of critical activity.85

One may maintain in the face of this that Tzara’s method is critical, and acceptably so, in that it is the kind of "dialectical" or "didactic" theatre mentioned earlier when the works are read or performed, and possibly a similar genre of poetry when published. No separation is permitted between the artistic and critical functions of the work. However, it should be seen that this objection has already been answered, it being an argument, essentially, for art, whose critical function operates at at different level. Dialectical or didactic theatre is, as with Brecht for example, an art form and nothing else. It is not criticism. The specific content might have, as it has in Brecht, a critical or social message—even an exhortation and a threat as for example, in the work of Genet or in "Living Theatre" concepts—but this function is distinct from the critical function of art as art as discussed above (pp. 36-39). This critical activity is carried out on a different level—that of "art in the abstract" so to speak—art (consciously and deliberately) in context.86

The primarily literary preoccupations of the Parisian Dada group precluded the establishment—until the organization of the conceptual basis for Surrealism in 1925 and 1926—of a reasonable and effective position regarding the problem of art-context. Its ideological bases—its "undefined assumptions"—were those of the European avant-garde as it developed specifically in French literature, whose rebellions, no matter how copious, must be seen as essentially
bourgeois. The break with bourgeois cultural dicta was not effected with any sys-
tematic, intellectual mediation until the fundamental engagement with Marxist
thinking was created—principally by Naville, Breton, Eluard, Soupault and Ara-
gon—around 1925. In this sense, the Parisian Dada movement can be characteri-
zied as a "bourgeois" phenomenon in that, by resisting bourgeois society essent-
ially from within one of its most prized definitions, they were doomed to social
acceptance through the structure of already-created contexts which controlled
the implications of their revolt. Their position created social antagonisms, to
be sure, but these were produced within manageable limits for the social organi-
ization as a whole.

The realization by the Berlin Dadaists of the bourgeois essence of avant-
garde activity necessitated, as we have seen, the "cessation of art". But it is
critical to understand that this cessation could not really take place; that is,
the Berlin Dadaists could not just do nothing. It was imperative to use art aga-
inst art, to continue to make art, but only in order to exacerbate the conflict,
to focus on the contradictions involved. This is particularly cogent to the ext-
tent that Marxist ideas were involved in the position of Dada in Berlin. The
Marxist attitude toward art demands that it be made in total lucidity, in full
possession of the awareness of putting oneself directly onto the horns of a di-
lemma, a contradiction. Marx analyzed bourgeois society and found it to be the
product of contradiction. The art as well is contradictory, even paradoxical,
and the denial of art is necessarily "contradictory" as well in that it had to
be made by art, by the artist's activity in the realm of established art-defini-
tions. The "art" produced by the Berlin Dadaists was produced, then, in a sit-
uation of great dialectical tension, truly at the breaking point. Art was seen
as a social "product" and, insofar as it was unconscious of this and the contra-
dictions produced by this, it was repudiated. "Dada is German Bolshevism. The bourgeois must be deprived of the opportunity to 'buy up art for his justification'. Art should altogether get a sound thrashing, and Dada stands for this thrashing with all the vehemence of its limited nature."87

Unlike the Parisians, the Berliners held out no hope that art could be the "solution"; their understanding of its origins ruled this out. Art, for them, was not something to be believed in; it was something to work with. The importance of art lay in the contextual assumptions made by the bourgeois audience. The attack upon context was the attack upon art and, by obvious implication, upon the context-generating and maintaining cultural ideology.

Unlike the attack on culture made by Rimbaud, that of Berlin Dada was mediated and rationalized; they understood that total rejection in such terms was out of the question. These artists, like the French, were totally committed to art, but they had sufficient intellectual comprehension to observe the functioning of art in its necessary frame of reference. Any rejection was seen as contextual, and therefore a dialectical, affair, in which development had to be achieved through direct confrontation with existent conditions. A truly revolutionary rupture could only be achieve through total engagement with conditions as they existed. As Sartre has said, "It is always true of course, that to fight something one must change oneself into it; in other words one must become its true opposite and not merely other than it."88

"Instinctively he (the Dadaist) sees his mission in smashing the cultural ideology of the Germans. I have no desire to justify the Dadaist. He acts instinctively, just as a man might say he was a thief out of 'passion', or a stamp-collector by preference. The 'ideal' has shifted: the abstract artist has become...a wicked materialist with the abstruse characteristics of considering the care of his stomach and stock jobbing more honorable than philosophy. 'But that's nothing new', those people will shout who never tear themselves away from the 'old'. But it is some-
thing startlingly new, since for the first time in history the consequences have been drawn from the question: What is German culture? (Answer: Shit), and this culture is attacked with all the instruments of satire, bluff, irony and finally, violence. And in a great common action." 99

"Dada lost its political and aesthetic virginity in the post war period. By fall, 1920, the war had been over two years and it was obvious that the tabula rasa, for which Swiss-German Dada was striving could not be achieved. The Dada attitude began to shift, imperceptibly at first, to the potential nihilism for which it is now known." 90 This fact does not contradict the preceding discussion. As the possibility for revolution faded in post-war Germany, the movement, tied to this possibility for their polemical believability, found its own outlook more and more depreciated. Cultural attack, at the level of intensity and directness at which it was carried out in Berlin, is a product of instability in society and the proximity of catastrophic liberative change. As the image of catastrophe disappeared, new tactics began to become necessary. In France, these were to be Surrealist tactics, which would enliven the Paris horizon soon after the "death" of Dada (Breton's First Manifesto of Surrealism in 1924, the appearance of La Revolution Surrealiste on December 1 of the same year, the riot at the Closerie des Lilas banquet in honor of Saint-Pol-Roux in July, 1925, for example91). In Germany, no Surrealism was apparent, and Dada simply ceased operations. 92

"Dada come to politics through poetic revolt, and politics absorbed Dada. Dada died of its transposition into reality, for it may be said that after 1920 Dada no longer existed. What was to take place in France some years later when, after the death of Dada, surrealism subdued and utilized its anarchic drive, occurred much sooner in Germany, where Dada was only a flash in the pan, by the light of which a world was revealed. Dada's end was hastened by political events and the resulting transformation of its originally individualistic sense of rebellion and separation. An end worthy of Dada's
grandeur and isolation, a normal end, inevitably brought about by the metamorphosis of its idealism and by its active intervention in society. It was Dada and its disorder versus all the unworthy forces that lay in wait to destroy it: the embourgeoisement of its combativeness and the distortion of its liberating energy; an aestheticism emerging from Dada through its annulment, of which abstract art is the most disastrous example. Dada and its refusal to establish an aestheticism of any kind, because aestheticism is always an absence of any attitude toward life, and an end in itself, were defenseless. Dada had never been artistic, but it had always been a state of mind, and it had always been human: what happened in Germany clearly proves this. And the Communists, powerful in Germany owing to their organization, showed that they understood this fact by accepting representatives of Dada into their ranks—which on their part was no mistake."
II

ALIENATION AND IDEOLOGY
The understanding of the contextual nature of art, its status as a social process, is but one part of the necessary analysis. We have established that to consider art except contextually is meaningless; it is essential to indicate, in the same breath so to speak, the basis of the context of art itself. The frame of reference for art is not an a priori construct; it is historical (see note 71), the result of determinate actions and relationships. Society—precisely analogous with language—is the horizon under which all these relationships take place and resolve themselves; yet, at the same time, society is completely a product of these relationships. The relations create society; that is, the real actions of real men create the horizon in the same time as they live under it. Marx understood society as this simultaneously concrete and reflexive phenomenon. In the same process in which men create society and language, these products in their turn, as completed constructs, reflect back on the original process, casting their image upon it and modelling it in that image.

As a reflexive process, society is understood as the objectification of the labour process of production, and therefore, in a certain sense, as an aspect of the "objectification of consciousness" mentioned earlier (see note 34). Art, like language, likewise is an aspect of the objectification of consciousness, the articulation of consciousness. There is no question of identifying the articulation with that which it is to articulate. However, the separation between articulation of consciousness and consciousness must be considered in terms of process. While it is possible to suggest that art or language is such an articulation, it is not valid to postulate a schism between the two because in the necessarily social context of thought and action consciousness takes on meaning primarily as it exists among individuals. Therefore, language ought not to be seen "additively" as something which simply makes consciousness accessib-
le to other people. Rather, language should be seen dialectically and reflexively, as an integral part of consciousness in that consciousness takes on significance only through its relationships with other subjects. Furthermore, in practice, the issue of language and art does not arise except in a social ambience.

"...we find that man...possesses 'consciousness'; but, even so, not inherent, not 'pure' consciousness. From the start the 'spirit' is afflicted with the curse of being 'burdened' with matter, which here makes its appearance in the form of agitated layers of air, sounds—in short, of language. Language is as old as consciousness; language is practical consciousness, as it exists for other men, and for this reason is really beginning to exist for me personally as well; for language, like consciousness, arises only from the need, the necessity of intercourse with other men. Where there exists a relationship, it exists for me: the animal has no 'relations' with anything, cannot have any. For the animal, its relation to others does not exist as a relation. Consciousness is therefore, from the very beginning a social product and remains so as long as men exist at all."

The social ambience and system of thought—the context—in which art exists in the modern era can be discussed in terms of one word: alienation. Obviously much has been said on the topic, and it is not my intention to add to a description of artistic alienation—as such—here. Rather, the topic must be seen, not as an isolated artistic phenomenon, but as a direct function of a more general condition which animates and enervates society as a whole.

The concept of alienation, while not original with Marx, finds its concrete explication in his critique of political economy.

"...man's relationships with that which he produces by his unaided efforts are twofold. On the one hand he realizes himself in them. There is no activity which does not give form to some object, that does not have some issue or result which its author enjoys directly or indirectly. On the other hand—or, rather, at the same time—man loses himself in his works. He loses his way among the products of his own
effort, which turn against him and weigh him down. At one moment, he sets off a succession of events that carries him away: this is history. At another moment, what he has created takes on a life of its own that enslaves him: politics and the state. Now his own invention dazzles and fascinates him: this is the power of ideology. Now the thing he has produced with his own hands—more accurately, the abstract thing—tends to turn him into a thing himself, just another commodity, an object to be bought and sold.96

Alienation exists in twentieth century capitalist society not as a malfunctioning of the society, nor, really, of the individual in relation to that society. Indeed, to attempt such an analysis on these terms leads nowhere, except to the useless notion of a "fundamental conflict". A very much more profitable field presents itself when one understands this contradictory situation to be a logical and necessary outcome of the workings of a social organization whose essence is alienated.97 Such a situation has an economic, material basis: material production, by the way it organizes itself, creates specific relationships between men. These relationships change as the organization of production develops, becomes more complex and so on. "The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society—the real foundation on which rise legal and political superstructures and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life determines the general character of the social, political and spiritual processes of life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but, on the contrary, their social existence which determines their consciousness."98

Alienation is an active component and it is centered around, of course, the process of production, which depends upon the division of labour and private property, which are seen as two aspects of the same process.
"With the division of labour, in which all... contradictions are implicit and which in its turn is based on the natural division of labour in the family and the separation of society into individual families opposed to one another, is given simultaneously the distribution, and indeed the unequal distribution (both quantitative and qualitative), of labour and its products, hence property: the nucleus, the first form of which lies in the family, where wife and children are slaves of the husband. This latent slavery in the family, while still very crude, is the first property, but even at this stage it corresponds perfectly to the definition of modern economist who call it the power of disposing of the labour power of others. Division of labour and private property are, moreover, identical expressions: in the one the same thing is affirmed with reference to activity as in the other with reference to the product of the activity."

In social organization under these principles, working men are separated by an apparent structural necessity from involvement in their work. When such a condition exists, labour, which is the fundamental process of man, deeply connected with time–and self-consciousness, becomes, in the eyes of those with the power to purchase it, a commodity, a raw material in a certain sense, like coal, steel or lumber; to those who are disposed to sell it, it becomes not life itself, not involvement, but a means to life, and, as such, an obstacle to achievement. (see below, p.63). Leaving aside (necessarily) an historical recapitulation of the development of this state of affairs, let us examine what it does to the worker. Nineteenth century political economy began from a situation in which labour was already organized along the lines indicated above, in which land and the major means of production were already in private hands. It is from this point that we also begin.

The crucial—and obvious—point to remember is that Marx's work, while economically centered, is a critique of political economy (cf. subtitle of Capital). Marx points out that nineteenth century political economy is by definit-
ion "capitalist" in its assumptions (see p. 1), that it is itself a product of these particular relations. The problem with it in his eyes—and this parallels Huelsenbeck's attitude toward the European artistic avant-garde—was that it could not presume to be critical because it could not move beyond the basic assumptions of the society which produced it.

"Political economy begins with the fact of private property; it does not explain it. It conceives the material process of private property as this occurs in reality, in general and abstract formulas which then serve it as laws. It does not comprehend these laws; that is, it does not show how they arise out of the nature of private property." 100

The basis of the difference (and the conflict) between the two major classes in industrial capitalist society is capital, and the processes which it sets in motion. Alienation might seem to be, then, only the province of the worker, for it is he who is controlled by capital, while the capitalist controls it. Capital determines everything for the worker: in the first instance it determines whether or not he will work at all, and after that, where, how long, how intensely, in combination with whom, and so on. Nevertheless, we shall see that, in the final analysis the organization is circular and monolithic: it includes the owner of property and capital as much as it does the propertyless worker. The crucial difference is one of immediacy and fundamentality. This difference is sufficient, however, to understand that, while alienation is a condition pervading capitalist society, affecting all its members, it does not appear to be a problem for those members of society whose interests are most directly and continually served by the total organization. For these people the immediate effects, and consequently the immediate awareness of the situation is vitiated by the processes in society which are organized for their benefit. It is, therefore—in our society as it was in the earlier capitalist nations directly under
Marx's gaze—the non-propertied groups, the groups more fully dependent upon
the organization of society for their basic material existence, who undergo a
significant alienation. The alienation of the ruling class is an abstract alienation, something to be discussed and studied almost as a scholarly discipline; therefore it is not, in Marx's terms, an historical force. This force is—or was potentially, in Marx's day—the very concrete alienation of the working class. These groups would feel the implications of their condition earliest and most powerfully. "The performance of work appears in the sphere of political economy as a vitiation of the worker, objectification as a loss and as servitude to the object, and appropriation as alienation."101

It is not the division of labour as such which Marx is criticizing; it is
a particular organization of the division of labour and the resulting conception of labour.

"Further, the division of labour implies the contradiction between the interest of the separate individual or the individual family and the communal interest of all individuals who have intercourse with one another. And, indeed, this communal interest does not exist merely in the imagination, as the 'general good', but first of all in reality, as the mutual interdependence of the individuals among whom labour is divided. And finally, the division of labour offers us the first example of how, as long as man remains in natural society—that is, as long as a cleavage exists between the common and the particular interest—as long, therefore, as activity is not voluntarily but naturally divided, man's own deed becomes an alien power opposed to him, which enslaves him instead of being controlled by him. For as soon as labour is distributed, each man has a particular, exclusive sphere of activity which is forced upon him and from which he cannot escape. He is a hunter, a fisherman, a shepherd or a critical critic, and must remain so if he does not want to lose his means of livelihood; while in communist society, where nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity, but can become accomplished in any branch he wishes, society regulates the general production and thus makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticize after dinner, just as I have
Labour exists totally in terms of the external world, as a field of activity in which man, the historical being, creates himself. It is in this sense that we understand Marx when he says that man creates the world, creates nature.

But man carries out this process all the time, alienated or not. It is not alienation which stops him from carrying out the activity of creating nature. But alienation is a distorted condition which creates, therefore a false world. When the product of labour is separated from the process of its production, a definite antagonism exists between the product and the process—i.e. the worker finds his product standing opposed to him as an object over which he has no control, yet, contradictorily, which he has created. It is apparent that this situation will extend from the immediate particular relationship between a specific worker and his specific product into more general realms. The relationship which entails between the particular worker and his particular product shapes the relationship between the general worker—man, and his general product—nature, the world, his life.

"...just as nature affords the means of existence of labour, in the sense that labour cannot live without objects upon which it can be exercised, so it also provides the means of existence in a narrower sense; namely, the means of physical existence for the worker himself. Thus the more the worker appropriates the external world of sensuous nature by his labour the more he deprives himself of means of existence, in two respects: first, that the sensuous external world becomes progressively less an object belonging to his labour or a means of existence of his labour, and secondly, that it becomes progressively less a means of existence in the direct sense, a means for the physical subsistence of the worker.

In both respects, therefore, the worker becomes a slave of the object;...Thus the object enables him to exist, first as a worker and secondly, as a physical object. The cul-
mination of this enslavement is that he can only maintain himself as a physical object so far as he is a worker, and that it is only as a physical object that he is a worker."

Through alienated labour, the relationship of man to all of nature is altered (see p. 2). Instead of creating a continuum, in which labour and its product—life and nature—are totally interrelated, the industrial world creates a tense discontinuum, in which the two are totally antagonistic.

Furthermore, alienation is not just the property and quality of the product, it does not become apparent only in the post-labour state. For, if at the conclusion of a particular action of work, the worker is faced with the objectified product of his labour, and if this work is totally out of his control, it must follow that the entire process of creating this product was the process of destroying this control:

"...alienation appears not merely in the result but also in the process of production, within productive activity itself. How could the worker stand in an alien relationship to the product of his activity if he did not alienate himself in the process of production itself? The product is indeed only the resume of activity, of production. Consequently, if the product of labour is alienation, production itself must be active alienation...(labour is)...not the satisfaction of a meed, but only a means for satisfying other needs. Its alien character is clearly shown by the fact that as soon as there is no physical or other compulsion it is avoided like the plague.... Finally, the external character of work for the worker is shown by the fact that it is not his own work but work for someone else, that in work he does not belong to himself but to another person."  

In the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, Marx extends his analysis to a further dimension of alienation: alienation of man from his "organic essence", from his "species life". This species-life "has its basis in the fact that man (like animals) lives from inorganic nature, and since man is more universal than an animal so the range of inorganic nature from which he
lives is more universal." For man, the entirety of the world outside his body constitutes a basic part of his consciousness. "The universality of man appears in practice in the universality which makes the whole of nature into his inorganic body: (1) as a direct means of life; and equally (2) as the material object and instrument of his life activity. Nature is the inorganic body of man; with which he must remain in a continuous interchange in order not to die."  

As we have seen, alienated labour removes man from nature, or nature from man, and man from himself. It must, by a perfectly valid movement, alienate him from individual other men and from all other men—the "species". "It makes species life into a means of individual life, and secondly, it turns the latter, as an abstraction, into the purpose of the former, also in its abstract and alienated form." The life-activity that is labour, appears to be, as stated above, now only a means to a life-activity, and so "Life appears only as a means of life."  

If nature is the inorganic body of man, man must make his existence in terms of nature. No opposition is seen here; there is no necessity to suppose that, in the "abstract", nature by definition stands opposite man and forces him to wage war against it for survival, and therefore to live on the carnage of nature. "While Marx partially retains the common nineteenth century view that nature exists basically as the material of consciousness, he avoids the implication to treat it as an instrumentality, devoid of any meaningful existence outside the particular aspirations of men. Man is able to make workable abstractions about nature, to make definitions of it. Once he achieves a definition of nature, he works in its terms (see p. 51). It should be apparent that this is liable to lead to various kinds of difficulty, most of which have been realized in the twentieth century. These difficulties result from, in general, the inad-
equancy of operational definitions of nature. Marx understood the deep relationship between man and nature; he knew that part of man's relationship with nature was passive, and very consciously so; in a certain sense this passivity corresponds to the aesthetic impulse.

"Animals produce only themselves, while man reproduces the whole of nature. The products of animal production belong directly to their physical bodies, while man is free in the face of his product. Animals construct only in accordance with the standards and needs of the species to which they belong, while man knows how to produce in accordance with the standards of every species and knows how to apply the appropriate standard to the object. Thus man also constructs in accordance with the laws of beauty."  

The object of labour is the creation of the world. This statement should be considered in the same terms as those stated by Rimbaud when asked—by his mother—in what sense his poetry meant "what it said": "exactly and in every sense". "The object of labour is, therefore, the objectification of man's species life; for he no longer reproduces himself merely intellectually, as in consciousness, but actively and in a real sense, and he sees his own reflection in a world which he has constructed." Therefore, alienated labour virtually deprives man of his species, or true community life. We understand man now alienated in every sphere. Throughout Marx's argument, alienation is nothing other than a human process:

"The alien being to whom labour and the product of labour belong, to whose service labour is devoted, can only be man himself. If the product of labour does not belong to the worker, but confronts him as an alien power, this can only be because it belongs to a man other than the worker. If this activity is a torment to him it must be the source of enjoyment and pleasure to another. Not the gods, nor nature, but only man himself can be this alien power over men."  

This statement throws a good deal of light on the positions of such conc-
cepts as "God" and "Nature", which are seemingly timeless, in the development of historical systems of thought or systems of ideology. In Marx's sense, systems of ideology are codifications of specific activities of social organization, and, as Marcuse suggests, such systems produce controlled contexts in which "timeless" concepts of philosophy are used. Society produces an intellectual superstructure in which these concepts will be used; the manner in which they are used defines the context of their use, and therefore defines them. We shall see the implications of this observation in a later section (see below, p.110).

The relationship of man to nature, and hence to other men, we have seen, is the horizon under which intellectual activity develops. Marx argues that when a society bases its existence on an alienated productive process, it will produce, on every level, an alienated world—including naturally, alienated intellectual activity, which centers on the contextual location of these universal concepts. Moreover, as intellectual production increases, the process becomes refined and sophisticated: what might have been seen as an "arithmetic progression" of the dominance of certain abstract ideas becomes, with the advance of self-validating ideology, a "geometric progression", in which the reflexive nature of abstraction turns back onto the process of material production, re-forming it in its image with continually increasing speed and intensity. This procedure is encased in history while being the motive force of history. The production of universal concepts is not an unnatural phenomenon; Marx is not attempting any spurious debunking of abstraction as such. Rather, his intention is to places such concepts—in terms of their position and function more than of their specific content—in the context of activities which in fact produced them, and to which they owe their existence.

"Such universals thus appear as conceptual instruments for
understanding the particular conditions of things in the light of their potentialities. They are historical and supra-historical; they conceptualize the stuff of which the experienced world consists...The philosophic concepts are formed and developed in the consciousness of a general condition in an historical continuum; they are elaborated from an individual position within a specific society. The stuff of thought is historical stuff—no matter how abstract, general, or pure it may become in philosophic or scientific theory. The abstract-universal and at the same time historical character of these 'eternal objects' of thought is recognized...in Whitehead's *Science and the Modern World*:

'Eternal objects are...in their nature, abstract. By "abstract" I mean that what an eternal object is in itself—that is to say, its essence—is comprehensible without reference to some one particular experience. To be abstract is to transcend the particular occasion of actual happening. But to transcend an actual occasion does not mean being disconnected from it. On the contrary, I hold that each eternal object has its own proper connection with each such occasion, which I term its mode of  

ingression into that occasion.' Thus the metaphysical status of an eternal object is that of a possibility for an actuality. Every actual occasion is defined as to its character by how these possibilities are actualized for that occasion.'

That Marx would concur essentially with such ideas is made obvious by the following:

"It should be noted...that everything which appears to the worker as an activity of alienation, appears to the non-worker as a condition of alienation. Secondly, the real, practical attitude (as a state of mind) of the worker in production and to the product appears to the non-worker who confronts him as a theoretical attitude."

"Division of labour becomes truly such only from the moment when a division of material and mental labour appears. From this moment onwards consciousness can really flatter itself that it is something other than consciousness of existing practice, that it is really conceiving something without conceiving something real; from now on consciousness is in a position to emancipate itself from the world and to proceed to the formation of 'pure' theory, theology, philosophy,
ethics, etc. But even if this theory, theology, philosophy, ethics, etc., comes into contradiction with the existing relations, this can occur only as a result of the fact that existing social relations have come into contradiction with the existing forces of production..."\textsuperscript{116}

Such abstract thought attempts to renounce its material causes, and to replace the acknowledgement of this with the idea that the material world is formed from the concept, which exists prior to any actual thing, and which informs the structure of the material world as its \textit{essence}. This is the basis of the tightly-structured ideology in which processes exist as they are defined in superstructural language, outside of whose system of maintained definitions one cannot venture.

The alienated social organization has removed the "natural" sources of men's wealth, and left them with a false consciousness of wealth and poverty.

"Private property has made us so stupid and partial that an object is not \textit{ours} unless we have, when it exists for us as capital or when it is directly eaten, drunk, worn, inhabited, etc., in short, \textit{utilized} in some way. But private property itself only conceives these various forms of possession as \textit{means of life}, and the life for which they serve as means is the \textit{life} of \textit{private property}—labour and the creation of capital.
Thus \textit{all} the physical and intellectual senses have been replaced by the simple alienation of \textit{all} these senses; the sense of \textit{having}. The human being had to be reduced to this absolute poverty in order to be able to give birth to all his inner wealth."\textsuperscript{117}

The theoretical structure of alienation creates the dehumanization of the senses (and therefore of thought itself) as a universal condition, whose truth is proved in that it works itself out reflexively in society. Thus, alienated thinking recognizes itself, but, like the capitalist political economy which is one of its aspects, it "takes for granted that which it should explain"; that is, it posits as a universal a priori that situation within which it was creat-
ed, and which it is bound, as intellectual activity, to explain.

The dehumanization of the sense is a function of the ruin of the species life of man; the senses therefore, do not really exist in this society; their creation is the project of society, which, in effect is destroyed or thwarted by organized alienation.

In the alienated world, society, in Marx's sense of the term, cannot exist; the universe shows its face as foreign and antagonistic, and the soundest advice comes from Beckett: "don't wait to be hunted to hide." In society, as Marx defines it, every act is social; it is the species life of man to be social:

"...the social character is the universal character of the whole movement; as society produces man as man, so it is produced by him. Activity and mind are social in their content as well as in their origin; they are social activity and social mind. The human significance of nature only exists for social man, because only in this case is nature a bond with other men, the basis of his existence for others and of their existence for him. Only then is nature the basis of his own human experience and a vital element of human reality. The natural existence of man has here become his human existence and nature itself has become human for him. Thus society is the accomplished union of man with nature, the veritable resurrection of nature, the realized naturalism of man and the realized humanism of nature.

Social activity and social mind by no means exist only in the form of activity or mind which is directly communal. Even when I carry out scientific work, etc., an activity which I can seldom conduct in direct association with other men, I perform a social, because human, act. It is not only the material of my activity—such as the language itself which the thinker uses—which is given to me as a social product. My own existence is a social activity. For this reason, what I myself produce, I produce for society, and with the consciousness of acting as a social being.

My universal consciousness is only the theoretical form of that whose living form is the real community...although at the present day this universal consciousness is an abstraction from real life and is opposed to it as an enemy. That is why the activity of my universal consciousness as such is my theoretical existence as a social being.

It is above all necessary to avoid postulating 'society' once again as an abstraction confronting the individual. The individual is the social being."
The significance of the situation which Marx is describing is that it does not exist. The life which does exist is of a distinctly different kind. The intellectual activity of this life—its universities, publishing houses, cultural institutions, its art, necessarily is bound to and partakes of this alienation. If the consciousness of the chasm between the potential and the actual is the measure of the state of conflict in which a human individual exists in our world, we must begin to recognize as the Berlin Dadaists did, the inherent tension in art. It makes no sense to insist that the "essence" of art is not alienated, that artistic alienation is a surface phenomenon peculiar to the times. In the twentieth century art exists as a function of an alienated context-universe; it is inherently alienated as no other previous art-system has been. For us to conceive an art which is not alienated, it is necessary to conceive of a fundamentally different organization of society.

"The fact that the growth of needs and of the means to satisfy them results in a lack of needs and of means is demonstrated in several ways by the economist....First, by reducing of the worker to the most miserable necessities required for the maintenance of his physical existence, and by reducing his physical activity to the most abstract mechanical movements, the economist asserts that man has no needs, for activity or enjoyment, beyond that; and yet he declares that this way of life is a human way of life. Secondly, by reckoning as the general standard of life (general because it is applicable to the mass of men) the most impoverished life conceivable, he turns the worker into a being who has neither senses nor needs, just as he turns his activity into a pure abstraction from all activity. Thus all working-class luxury seems to him blameworthy, and everything which goes beyond the most abstract need (whether it be a passive enjoyment or the manifestation of a personal activity) is regarded as a luxury. Political economy, the science of wealth, is, therefore at the same time, the science of renunciation, of privation and of saving, which actually succeeds in depriving man of fresh air and of physical activity. The science of a marvellous industry is at the same time the science of asceticism. Its true ideal is the ascetic but usurious miser and the ascetic but productive slave. Its
moral ideal is the worker who takes a part of his wages to the savings bank. It has even found a servile art to embody this favourite idea. Thus, despite its worldly and pleasure-seeking appearance, it is a truly moral science, and the most moral of all sciences. Its principle thesis is the renunciation of life and of human needs. The less you eat, drink, buy books, go to the theatre or to balls, or to the public house, and the less you think, love, theorize, sing, paint, fence, etc., the more you will be able to save and the greater will become your treasure which neither moth nor rust will corrupt—your capital. The less you are, the less you express your life, the more you have, the greater is your alienated life and the greater is the saving of your alienated being. Everything which the economist takes from you in the way of life and humanity, he restores to you in the form of money and wealth. And everything which you are unable to do, your money can do it for you; it can eat, drink, go to the ball and go to the theatre. It can acquire art, learning, historical treasures, political power, and it can travel. It can appropriate all these things for you, can purchase everything; it is the true opulence. But although it can do all this, it only desires to create itself, and to buy itself, for everything else is subservient to it. When one owns the master, one also owns the servant, and one has no need of the master's servants. Thus all passions and activities must be submerged in avarice. The worker must have just what is necessary for him to want to live, and he must want to live only in order to have this."

As mentioned above, capitalist society produces men; the fact that moral judgements render the society imperfect or worse does not change this fundamental fact. As Marx outlines, society's members are placed into positions of administered need and gratification; as subjects of analysis and manipulation they are totally dependent. This dependence has its roots in specific relationships between men. The knowledge of this implies criticism, and we have noted Marx's role as critic in the field of political economy and philosophy. The critical role is secular and rational, and does not allow the obscurity of abstraction. Criticism as well is contextual in nature. In the activity of criticism contexts are exploded and re-established on more general grounds. That is, a particular system is surpassed only by a system of greater functional generality, one which explains all that was explained by the original system, and which explains the
original system itself. In this movement is contained the "development" of ideas. Dialectical criticism, as introduced by Marx through the critique of Hegel, establishes the process of existence in distinction from the "fact" of reality, sees the world in a state of constant development and change. This change is not carried out at the level of abstraction, but at the level of practice, in the activity of creating the material conditions of life, and their corresponding intellectual conditions. Changes in the conduct of all levels of life occur for Marx not when revisions are made in the configuration of a context—for example when the management of a corporation enlarges the definition of their activity to include provision of care for its employees' children or subsidy for an artist to work with equipment in their factories—but when the entire outline of context is redrawn.

Art's participation in this process of reality should be apparent, for it is much more readily accepted that art lives by revolutionary development (which is the breaking of the totality of context) than it is that society as a whole does so. Art's breath of life is constant change; "Only the present blows fresh; all else is faded and more faded." Furthermore, change is realized only through practice, through the creation of new works of art. "Art" as a purpose or as an independent (reified) entity is obviously an illusion. Theory is reduced from the existence and function of actual works of art and, in the reflexive manner outlined above, moves into the reality of the process to inform further work. The theory of a particular art, obviously, never preceded the appearance of concrete works of that art, but followed from the realm of fact created by the active artists. However, once theory makes its appearance the role of the facts is irrevocably changed: the truth of theory makes the world of fact also the world of appearance. The achieved work of art is the artifact
of an apparently imperceptible process. One is conscious, with the appearance of the role of theory, of all that which, in a work of art, cannot be seen or apprehended in direct experience of the work. This imperceptible component is process, and the work stands tied by definition to this imperceptible reality. Theory and "artifact" stand together; the question of primacy between them is meaningless. The most difficult area of any work of art—painting, novel, sonata and so on—is its edge, the area where theory interfaces with facticity. The value and truth of theory is to illuminate this edge, to bring it into focus, to show the reality and consequences of the process with which the product stands in dialectical relationship. This outlook undermines any notions of "inevitability" regarding the achieved state of fact. Theory reveals the truth that every work of art, despite its appearance of fixity, as object, has its center in process, or practice.

The above is not a theory of art, but is more an approach to a theory of theory. The consideration of theory, it will be appreciated, brings us into contact with the problem of ideology.

While the term "ideology" originated with the attempt to found a "science of ideas", on generally empiricist terms in the later eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries in France, Marx and Engels in the middle of the nineteenth century transformed its meaning. Their meaning was twofold: on the one hand, it is a term which, instead of denoting a particular theory or field of study, as that of the French ideologues had, "it came to denote a phenomenon the theory accounted for. This phenomenon now took on entirely different dimensions. As interpreted by the French ideologists, ideology was limited to accounting for individual representations by a causal psychology. To Marx and Engels, the phenomenon under study became a collection of representations characteristic of a
given epoch and society. For example: *The German Ideology.* On the other, the term was used to designate a process of thinking which, for various reasons, is incapable of comprehending the totality of its particular situation or context. This "false consciousness" can be seen as, in a certain sense, the narrow definition of the term "ideology", and includes the seemingly mundane problem of conscious and deliberate distortion of supposedly available facts by interest groups or classes against other groups or classes.

In establishing the critical category of false consciousness, Marx set up a judgemental structure which ultimately depends upon a kind of "logic of history", a belief that within history, but "behind" appearance, moves a structured process which can be known by, and which is, true consciousness. This purpose, however, is not necessarily a particular state or object; it is rather a particular process. The connections with Hegel are obvious:

"The Marxian concept of ideology...fuses two different principles: Hegel's insight into the transitory nature of the successive manifestations of the spirit, and Feuerbach's materialist inversion of Hegel, with its stress on the this-worldly character of natural existence. Separated from each other these concepts remained speculative; joined together they yielded an explosive mixture."123

At this point a difficulty must be discussed, if only summarily; its presence indicates a critical juncture of Marxist thought and, by extension, a similar lever in the development of this thesis, revealing, as it does, several central undefined assumptions in its structure.

This problem is discussed more fully in the essay by Lichtheim noted above, though it was formulated independently by this author. Basically, "Marx's conception of ideology as 'false consciousness' leads back to the problem of establishing the true consciousness which will enable men to understand their role."
There is only one truth about history, and only one criterion for judging the discrepancy between what men are and what they might become; this criterion is supplied by philosophy, specifically by its understanding of man as a rational being. Thus philosophy, as the norm of reality, entails an implicit critique of this reality. Yet Marx also held that the philosophy of every age is the 'ideological reflex' of determinate social conditions. How then could it function as the source of normative judgements pointing beyond the existing state of affairs?"124

Unlike the French ideologues, who opted against assigning a rational content to history, Marx, while in accordance with them denying traditional metaphysics, retained this view. This can be seen as the basis of his Hegelianism. Marx maintains, in his concept of ideology, the distinction between "Reality" and "Appearance"; this distinction, as a process, is alienation.

"Alienated social activity is to Marx what alienated mental activity is to Hegel. For both, the distinction between Reality and Appearance is involved in the manner in which real processes are transformed into apparently fixed and stable characters. Reality is process, appearance has the form of isolated objects. The task of critical thinking is to grasp the relations which constitute these apparent objects."125

In terms of the Marxian dialectic a contradiction exists, stemming from the fact that "there is not---as Feuerbach had thought---a single universal human standpoint from which to judge the alienations imposed by history; there are only particular human standpoints, corresponding to forms of society which arise from the interplay of material conditions..."126

The dialectic is worked out in history, in practice; the problems raised and the conditions created are "mirrored" in the varying modes of thought. "These modes are 'ideological' in that the participants fail to comprehend the sit-
uation in which they are involved. However, it, as Marx insists, "It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence which determines their consciousness." then the parallel declaration, made as well by Marx, that men's consciousness can rupture the continuum of this false consciousness, seems contradictory and impossible, an unresolved mixture of "sociological" relativities and "philosophical" generalizations.

Lichtheim explains:

"The principle that social being determines consciousness must be understood as itself an historical one: it refers to a state of affairs which has characterized history from the very beginning, but which is due to disappear when a rational order has been created. For the attainment of such an order implies the conscious direction of social life, hence the emancipation of consciousness from blind, uncomprehended necessity. Consciousness is ideological because it is powerless. When it becomes the determining factor, it sheds its blinkers along with its dependence on material circumstances. A rational order is one in which thinking determines being. Men will be free when they are able to produce their own circumstances. Historical materialism is valid only until it has brought about its own dialectical negation."128

In regard to this, Marx's theories of history can be correctly interpreted as theories of a particular history: he called it the period of "pre-history", to indicate that is was the period of human affairs when reason had not yet manifested itself in practice, in which the "realm of necessity" continued to overwhelm the "realm of freedom". In effect, the history with which Marx was concerned was not yet "human" history at all, because the basis of the human was only a theoretical construct, disconnected from practice. Marx's history can be seen as the analysis of that which is not yet in existence, in that what does exist is seen in the critical light of a notion of its limitations. Marx's "historical laws", as Lichtheim establishes, hold for the period of "pre-histo-
ry", when men are in conflict with the material world, when it is out of their control. Ideology, born out of an apparently chaotic situation and chaotic practice, is necessarily the system of thought of pre-history.

"Marxian theory is, then, incompatible with fatalistic determinism. True, historical materialism involves the determinist principle that consciousness is conditioned by social existence...however...the necessary dependence enunciated by this principle applies to the 'pre-historical' life, namely, to the life of class society. The relations of production that restrict and distort man's potentialities inevitably determine his consciousness, precisely because society is not a free and conscious subject. As long as man is incapable of dominating these relations and using them to gratify the needs and desires of the whole, they will assume the form of an objective, independent entity. Consciousness, caught in and overpowered by these relations, necessarily becomes ideological."129

Ideology and alienation, like private property and the capitalist division of labour, are aspects of the same process. Just as alienation is an incomplete condition of the process of social production, ideology is an incomplete condition of the corresponding process of mental production. "False consciousness" is the corresponding thought-pattern and structure to a specific social reality.

The judgemental aspects of the notion of "false consciousness" stem from a specifically transcendent idea:

"Marx preserved the original motive of his thinking (together with the conception of history he had inherited from Hegel) by refusing to recognize the dilemma inherent in the principle that modes of thought are to be understood as 'expressions' of changing social circumstances. He took it for granted that, though consciousness is conditioned by existence, it can also rise above existence and become a means of transcending the alienation which sets the historical process in motion. The truth about man is one and the same for all stages of history, even though every stage produces its own illusions. This truth is likewise the criterion for the practical activity which seeks to overcome man's alienation from his 'true' being. The concept of ideology illumines the historical circumstance that men are not in possession of
the true consciousness which—if they had it—would enable them to understand the totality of their world and their place in it....The unity of mankind, and the universality of the truth, were as real to him as they were to Hegel...”

However, it is equally apparent that this notion, while transcendent, is not strictly metaphysical; that is, it does not contradict Marx's rejection of metaphysical notions of philosophy. Its frame of reference is entirely within time, history and man himself. (see note 132) The quality of knowledge Marx attributes to man is, again, definable contextually: that is, the conviction that he possesses true consciousness (at least as a potential) is based on the fact that particular men do in fact achieve contextual revolution, do transcend the limitations of the context in which their ideas were formed. It is likewise an historical problem and a truth that such revolution has not taken place in the total context, as it has in more limited areas such as linguistics, art or physics, for example. The fact that thought maintains a dynamic relationship with context, that by establishing context while being created by context, demonstrates the reflexive nature of thought, as discussed above (pp. 51-52). Just as men become aware of the limits of their language, they become conscious, in the same procedure, of the nature of their own consciousness. The fact that men find language interesting in itself, and not just for the representations and depictions, etc., that it makes possible, is evidence for this fact. This self-consciousness exists not on the "spiritual" plane, as it did with Hegel, but on earth, at the level of practice, of factual interaction in daily life; in short, in society.

"Marx discovers that language is not merely the vehicle of a pre-existent consciousness. It is at once the natural and the social medium of consciousness, its mode of existence. It comes into being with the need for communication, with human intercourse in the broadest sense. Consequently, being
inseparable from language, consciousness is a social crea-
tion."¹³¹

This does not deny the existence of non-verbal, "private" states of consci-
ousness; it simply indicates the realm of their significance, and the sources of
their structure.¹³¹ Self-consciousness, and the correspondent "overcoming of
alienation, acts by definition in society, human time, and history, and is cre-
ated out of these. Hence, something like "essence" is conceivable only in terms
of practice, and hence also the claim that, for Marx, transcendence is a valid
notion without metaphysical implications.¹³²

Ideology as a process is identifiable with alienation in that ideology is
alienated thought, or thought formed within the alienated context which estab-
lishes its structural limits. Thought itself, as far as it is linguistic in ch-
acter, is a social product. The social organization, which for the capitalist
world is predicated upon the division of labour, reaches its apex with the div-
ision of material and intellectual labour (see note 116). At this point thought
loses its way in the process of producing abstractions, becomes capable of det-
achment from process itself, and creates what seem to be "theories" (and in ce-
rtain aspects are), but which are components of ideology—abstract structures
of false consciousness. These structures are not really independent, but are
connected organically to the reality of the context. The division between lev-
els of ideological activity in society is seen to be an artificial one (see
note 107, and p. 1) in that, due to the irrevocable attachment, abstract idea-
production becomes a function of class conflict. Philosophy, Marx showed, was
ideological thought in that it had not comprehended the source of itself—cf.
Theses on Feuerbach.

Philosophy, as it had existed prior to Marx and Engels (particularly Germ-
an philosophy) had been bound up in this endless contradiction. A process, no matter what its nature, tends to become "real"; that is, once set in motion, an illusion, for example, has the power to become an integral part of reality.

"Once ideology is related to the real conditions that gave rise to it, it ceases to be completely illusory, entirely false. For what is ideology? Either it is a theory that is unconscious of its own pre-suppositions, its basis in reality, and true meaning, a theory unrelated to action, i.e., without consequences or with consequences different from those expected or forseen. Or it is a theory that generalizes special interests—class interests—by such means as abstraction, incomplete or distorted representations, appeals to fetishism.

If so, it is erroneous to maintain that every ideology is pure illusion. It appears that ideology is not, after all, to be accounted for by a sort of ontological fate that compels consciousness to differ from being. Ideologies have a truly historical and sociological foundation in the division of labour on the one hand, in language on the other."\(^{133}\)

Ideology reflects back upon praxis and holds the power to influence subsequent activity. This is a problem because ideological consciousness is incomplete, and through its incompleteness becomes in a sense powerless, and an implement of untruth, either deliberate or otherwise. Simply, the ideological consciousness comes out of a partial reality. To take up Marx's terminology, thought has the power to reflect reality clearly, language has the capacity to render the structure of human relationships transparent, or comprehensible to all. As well it has the capacity to obscure these relationships (more or less deliberately) through the retention of abstractions produced in a particular productive social stage, which take on the appearance of immutable entities.

Ideology thus becomes part of language as it becomes part of the social organization, part of praxis. We know that language itself is a product of praxis, that action determines what people say. Nevertheless, it is only when actions are moved to the linguistic realm that they become genuine social property.
For example, an art work is the product of practice, of the creative work of an individual. The creative work issues in the work of art, whether it is "object" or not. As such, the creative process enters (or re-enters) the social continuum, becomes explicit social property, generates language, influences people. Ideology can be seen as a dialectical mediator between actions and language. This mediation, when ideological, is a barrier or screen between language and the actions which brought it into existence. Non-ideological thought—true "theory"—is likewise a mediator, but it is distinct from ideology in that it is conscious of the nature of its own creation, so can never be a screen.¹³⁴

This "barrier" aspect of ideology is necessarily bound up with the antagonistic structure of the society in which it develops. The barrier works via pre-existing representations, selected by the dominant groups and acceptable to them. Old problems, old points of view, old vocabularies... stand in the way of the new elements in society and new approaches to its problems."¹³⁵ The connection between ideology and bureaucracy (the tendency to become self-sufficient wholes) is apparent here.

The two-leveled operation of ideology gives it a double function: on the one hand, as Lefebvre points out, they are general, speculative and abstract, in that they purport to formulate a comprehensive view of the world; on the other, they are representative of specific interests, and, while attempting to explain the world, they reinforce and maintain the existence of a particular world, a particular context or "system of values".

"...Ideological representations invariably serve as instruments in the struggles between groups... and classes. But their intervention in such struggles takes the form of masking the true interests and aspirations of the groups involved, universalizing the particular and mistaking the part for the whole."¹³⁶
Thus it can be seen that the "class interest" aspect of ideology—invovling more or less deliberate falsifications and distortions as tactical maneuvers—and the broader "comprehensivist" tendencies cannot be considered separately, because the world concept, in a class society, cannot develop under any other horizon but that sanctioned (and created) by the dominant class.

This class weapon, as we have seen, contains as a necessary part of its structure certain elements of truth, some "scientific concepts", mixed up with amalgams of myth, religious incantation, linguistic contradictions and deliberate distortions. Radical critical theory is charged with the responsibility of distinguishing between these various elements and delineating the process of their combination. In a post-revolutionary situation it aids in a salvage operation, just as Marx and Engels "salvaged" the dialectical process from the metaphysical German philosophical tradition. This "salvage" aspect indicates the truth of the statement that ideology cannot be seen as simply true or false; it is clear that truth and falsehood, profundity and deception are linked together in these systems of thought in a unique manner. True and false consciousness are likewise interconnected in this contextual-dialectical way. True consciousness is irrevocably bound to false consciousness; it is only through engagement with the latter that the former realizes itself. As Lefebvre says,

"...emergent truth is always mixed up with illusion and error. The theory discards the view that error, illusion, falsity stand off in sharp and obvious distinction from knowledge, truth, certainty. There is continual two-way dialectical movement between the true and the false which transcends the historical situation that gave rise to these representations. As Hegel had seen, error and illusion are 'moments' of knowledge, out of which the truth emerges."

Previously, we have used the term "myth" or "mystification" in connection
with the ideological process (see pp. 25-35) as it had manifested itself in the actions of the Parisian Dadaists. Let us clarify the relationship between ideology and "myth". We have seen (pp. 74-75) how ideology enters language, and therefore, culture; becomes in fact a part of the life of a nation or society. An ideology's success depends upon the degree to which it manages to obliterate antagonism. That is, it is a substitute, a necessary replacement for outright physical force in an antagonistic situation. No society can survive if all that holds it together is force and the threat of violence, unless this force is re-shaped and becomes an organic part of the productive organization of the society. Those who rule must secure the consent of the ruled. This sounds suspiciously like democratic theory, and is at the basis of "democratic ideology".

"It is the role of ideologies to secure the assent of the oppressed and exploited. Ideologies present the latter to themselves in such a way as to wrest from them, in addition to material wealth, their 'spiritual' acceptance of this situation, even their support. Class ideologies create three images of the class that is struggling for dominance: an image for itself; an images of itself for other classes, which exalts it; an image of itself for other classes, which devalues them in their own eyes, drags them down, tries to defeat them....without at shot being fired:"

We can see that the ideology attempts in a single action to immortalize historical difficulties between groups, and to establish a sense of collective identity which is centered in the outstanding qualities of a particular group within the collective. The falsity of the collective is apparent; the notion of the collective has its origin in mythic formulations of pre-technological societies in which the ideology was intended to articulate the status of the society as a whole. Myth, in this sense, is the thought-structure of societies which have not undergone a delineation of classes and the attendant antagonisms. Lefebvre, in
his analysis of the origin and development of ideological systems, points out
that although myth (as the illusory representations of societies living under
conditions of production which preclude the possibility of formulation of con-
cepts\textsuperscript{139}) is a factor in the historical development of ideology, it is not iden-
tical to ideology. Although mythologies and similar contructions (cosmogonies
and theogonies) display similar characteristics of ideology, they cannot be cl-
assed as ideology because mythological societies have not yet divided into cl-
asses in their means of production. "...these constructions of the mind are more
like works of art—more like monuments than abstract systems. They belong to
the same category as styles in art history, compendia of moral wisdom, 'cultur-
es'."\textsuperscript{140} Lefebvre suggests that ideologies result when myth becomes an element
in systems of organized \textbf{religion}: "The the images and tales are cut off from
the soil that nourished them, the beauty of which they represented to the eye
and mind."\textsuperscript{141} Their meaning is transformed as their use and function is trans-
formed. They are characterized by philosophical inclusiveness and totality, and
this manifests itself in abstractness and the increment and institutionalization
of the divisions between individuals, groups and classes. "The great religions
were born concomitantly with the consolidation of the power of the state, the
formation of nations, and the rise of class antagonisms."\textsuperscript{142} Thus, ideology can
be related to "myth" only in a particular sense. Within ideological systems,
myths continue to operate. As components of the system, they advance the cause
of "false consciousness", and the division of the genuine collective. The ide-
ology of the modern industrial state stands as a prime example of how ideology
reacts against knowledge and reason and how as "false consciousness" it resorts
to mystification as a means of fortifying itself against knowledge. Capitalist
production has created—in a sense, beyond its own control—(implying there—
for its own irrationality) a class conflict which threatens its unitarian sec-
urity, the security of the ideological collective, the self-image of the system
as perfectible. The demonstrable inability of ideology to contend with skepti-
icism, demystification and knowledge forces it to disguise its inner falseness
with an absorption of conflicting forces within its comprehensive perspective.
This is the basis of democratic liberalism and, as one of its specific products,
the mystification of the avant-garde. Earlier in this essay we have seen that it
was the program of Berlin Dada to reveal the mystification of the avant-garde
and Tzara's role in extending that mystification to Dada itself.

In this way, an ideology attempts to secure its self-image as a perfectible
system by securing the context—the conceptual limits—of the conflict, allow-
ing for contention within a prescribed frame of reference. "Modernism", as a
progressive scheme of incorporated conflict, channels and distorts the implica-
tions of the dialectical nature of art.

Ideological thought is thought in the realm of necessity. Thought is incom-
plete insofar as it is determined by the contingent nature of the means of pro-
duction (see pp. 71-72). This determined thought and action is the necessary
negation of freedom, which is titally self-conscious and cognisant of history
as the procedure of the coming into being and fading away of representations
and meanings. This Marx defines as knowledge, and this knowledge is by definit-
ion contextual, as I have tried to show. Ideology, by denying contextual self-
consciousness, denies knowledge. Ideology and reason, while mingled in ideology,
are completely antagonistic.

Thus, ideologies propose and maintain themselves as perfectible systems,
which might need adjustment in detail, but never revision or negation in prin-
ciple. "This gives rise to passionate and passionately interesting discussions
between conservatives and innovators, dogmatists and heretics, champions of the past and champions of the future." While specific contents of a particular structure are open to change, the structure itself is maintained as a constant, which does not participate, as such, in change. In just this sense we discussed Kosuth's notion of context, which denies the dialectical relationship between the whole and its parts, between "form" and "content". Context as a whole must be seen as simultaneously context as a part; that is, it must be seen as historically created and changeable by events originating wholly within its boundaries. These events will totally destroy the original boundaries, making the first context now a closed episode in the history of the development of a larger context. Any art work which creates a contextual rupture, such as the Readymades, begins its development within the frame of reference which it will supersede and render obsolete.

Thus the definition of art, far from being a coherent definition, is not really even a coherent context of definitions because definitions arising from within the context or its definitions can cause the entire frame of reference to be reorganized. Therefore, it is perfectly sensible to speak of works of art which are "the negation of art", as we speak of the Readymades. Just as Marx designated the industrial proletariat of the nineteenth century as "a class which is the negation of all classes" because all that was distorted in social organization was the birthright of this particular group, we can speak of works of art which are the "dissolution of all art". All that art defines itself to be creates an edge, a horizon. Because any such horizon is the specific creation of determinate actions in history and not an absolute category, every horizon, when it appears in history, implies its own dissolution. Under this horiz-
on are created works which are generated totally in connection with this horizon, but which quite suddenly extend beyond it, thereby causing not just adjustments in the organization of the context, but its entire reorganization around new definitions. In the same sense that the nineteenth century proletariat could only realize itself in the total dissolution of the existing order, these works of art, of which the Readymades are the finest example, can only come into existence by taking as their specific content, or subject-matter, the whole of the pre-existing context which in fact produced them. Thus with the Readymades, as with Berlin Dada, context becomes content. A new methodology is consciously created. So we see the dialectical process as being the art process, and art participates, by definition, in the "doctrine of revolution".

The relation of system (methodology in the product state) is apparent: systems have a valid existence only when they are created with full recognition of the historical nature—the necessary impermanence—of the horizon they establish and maintain. Art is a function of knowledge.

"While the mist surrounding natural phenomena are being dispelled, the mystery (the opacity) of social life keeps thickening. While increasing human control over nature (technology, the division of labour) makes it possible to elaborate nonideological concepts of physical nature, the actions of the ruling classes throw a veil of obscurity over social life. Praxis expands in scope, grows more complex and harder to grasp, while consciousness and science play an increasingly effective part in it. Thus it has become possible for illusory representations....to become an integral part of styles and cultures....They must now give way to knowledge. Revolutionary praxis and Marxism qua knowledge do away with the ideologies. According to Marx, Marxism has gone beyond ideology—it signals and hastens the end of ideology. Nor is it a philosophy, for it goes beyond philosophy and translates it into practice....It is on the basis of conscious revolutionary praxis that thought and action are articulated dialectically, and that knowledge 'reflects' praxis, i.e., is constituted as reflection on praxis. Until then knowledge was charac-
terized precisely by its failure to 'reflect' reality, ...could only...distort it, confuse it with illusions--
in short, knowledge was ideological."145

It was mentioned earlier that the "state of tension" or conflict in which an individual exists in this society might very well be the measure of the depth of his realization of the abyss between what exists and what is possible, but unrealized. In light of the concept of ideology, the statement can be reformulated in different terms: the level of tension for an individual is directly proportional to the degree to which the ideological nature and sources of his thought are revealed to him. In the case of the production of art, we see that art exists in a continuous state of conflict once the ideological nature of context and function of culture becomes truly apparent for the artist. The assertion that art exists in a state of conflict with language (p. 4) indicates the field of art's interface with culture.
III

ART VS. CULTURE
"Art is what we do; culture is what is done to us."
——Carl Andre

It is necessary to outline the notion of the ideological function of culture. It is not necessary to justify the assertion that the notion of "Culture" is itself a product of reification. This is apparent throughout the discussion. In the same way in which concrete labour becomes abstract labour, and therefore a commodity, the concrete activity of making art is abstracted and becomes a similar commodity.  

"The products of labour become commodities, social things whose qualities are at the same time perceptible and imperceptible by the senses....But....the existence of the things qua commodities and the value relation of the products of labour which stamps them as commodities have absolutely no relation with their physical properties and the material relations arising therefrom....A definite social relation between men....assumes, in their eyes, the fantastic form of a relation between things. In order therefore, to find an analogy, we must have recourse to the mist-enveloped regions of the religious world. In this world the productions of the human brain appear as independent beings endowed with life and entering into relations both with one another and with the human race. So it is in the world of commodities with the products of men's hands. This I call the Fetishism which attaches itself to the products of labour as soon as they are produced as commodities, and which is therefore inseparable from the production of commodities."  

In the bourgeois and post-bourgeois world, "Culture" is an abstraction and a fetish in this manner. "The pure abstractions to which men are reduced in their social relations extends as well to intercourse with ideas....Just as each individual's relation to the market is immediate (without his personal qualities and needs being relevant except as commodities), so his relations to God, to beauty, to goodness and to truth are relations of immediacy." Unlike the pre-"democratic" world, bourgeois culture is equally available to all; but it is
available in the same manner in which bourgeois "freedom" is available: in the abstract.

Marx's philosophical criticism was directed at idealist conceptions of the world, and at the idealist concept of culture, which was segregated from social processes and considered superior to them:

"Its decisive characteristic is the assertion of a universally obligatory, eternally better and more valuable world that must be unconditionally affirmed: a world essentially different from the factual world of the daily struggle for existence, yet realizable by every individual for himself 'from within', without any transformation of the state of fact. It is only in this culture that cultural activities and objects gain that value which elevates them above the everyday sphere. Their reception becomes an act of celebration and exaltation."149

However, the modalities of alienation and reification have changed very essentially since the mid-nineteenth century, when Marx first formulated his ideas on culture and ideology, and have likewise changed since 1937, when Marcuse wrote "The Affirmative Character of Culture", which is basically a critique of the functioning of idealistically-oriented culture in a still classically-bourgeois world. I believe it is valuable to maintain that Marx's analysis of alienation and reification, of the commodity and its fetishes is still basically sound, and that his insights into the contradictory, dialectical nature of history and of capitalist society remain eminently workable, although, as George Lichtheim notes, they have unfortunately (but not accidentally) become part of an academic discipline in the modern world.150 The ideology of advanced industrial society has grown out of the bourgeois ideology of the nineteenth century, but the change in the organization of society through the geometrically-progressing technology—and the consciousness produced by technology—has created a
new situation. Obviously, even to describe such a situation is out of the range of this paper. Its most distinguished and controversial treatment is Herbert Marcuse's *One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society* (1964). This must be considered read in the following discussion. Basically, its thesis is that contemporary capitalist society is approaching the condition wherein the concrete provision of a reasonable standard of living at the attained level of needs is within the status of normal capability of the means of production. The incredible technological progress seems to transcend the horizon of all previous criticism; it portends to accomplish the "end of history" (in the Marxian sense) through the normal development and refinement of its productive power. The contradictory aspects of its organization are nullified under the weight of the assertion of its material accomplishments. In accordance with the preceding discussion of ideology (and p. 1), the ideology of advanced technological capitalist society changes its nature. One of the central factors in this change is the concept of class:

"At its origins in the first half of the nineteenth century....the critique of industrial society attained concreteness as a historical mediation between theory and practice, values and facts, needs and goals. This historical mediation occurred in the consciousness and in the political action of the two great classes which faced each other in the society: the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. In the capitalist world they are still the basic classes. However, the capitalist development has altered the structure and function of these two classes in such a way that they no longer appear to be agents of historical transformation. An overriding interest in the preservation and improvement of the institutional status quo unites the former antagonists in the most advanced areas of contemporary society. And to the degree to which technical progress assures the growth and cohesion of communist society, the very idea of qualitative change recedes before the realistic notions of a non-explosive evolution. In the absence of demonstrable agents and agencies of social change, the critique is thus thrown back to a high level of abstraction."

151
The overwhelming concrete success of the social organization, combined with its traditional concept of "tolerance", manages to render ineffective criticism of its operation in principle. This situation renders obsolete for the most part the forcible silencing of principled opposition. The pre-eminent position of strength occupied by the ruling class has, in perfect harmony with Marx's formulation (p. 1), created a rationalized of a qualitative pervasive-ness unequalled in history; the control of the means of intellectual production is combined with extremely sophisticated media use to make possible a more total mobilization of consciousness than had ever before been accomplished. This total mobilization, it is maintained, is the characteristic of totalitarianism: in "liberal" theory—which is completely intertwined with the idealist cultural ideology—there is a concrete region of private life exempted from domination and control by the state. The abstract individual in the capitalist labour process is of interest to the controllers of the organization only insofar as the abstraction applies. The worker is only dominated by the abstractions in his capacity as worker; when he is not at work he can (theoretically) exist in a realm of freedom which is restricted, but which within the restrictions is reasonably intact (cf. J. S. Mill). The liberality presumes two important things: first, that consciousness is sufficiently mobilized in the productive process and sufficiently impotent in other social areas, and secondly, that the current means of production have not outstripped the regions of discourse established by operative ideology.

"Changes occur as soon as the preservation of the established form of the labour process can no longer gain its end with merely partial mobilization (leaving the individual's private life in reserve), but rather requires 'total mobilization', through which the individual must be subjected in all spheres of his existence to the discipline of the authoritarian state."
Now the bourgeoisie comes into conflict with its own culture. Total mobilization in the era of monopoly capitalism is incompatible with the progressive aspects of culture centered around the idea of personality. The self-abolition of affirmative culture begins."

Marcuse suggests that advanced industrial society, energized by the same contradictions Marx pointed out in its nineteenth century ancestor—now raised to a much higher pitch as the process moves toward its historical negation, monopoly capitalism—has undertaken this total mobilization, and is in fact well along the road in its applications.

The development of these ideas in their rigorously political aspects I leave to the reader. We are attempting to formulate here something more specific, something which exists within the scope of the political horizon: the relationship between the process of art as art to culture seen as an ideological function. The terms stated for this examination were that art was to be seen as an expression of all that does not exist or is denied in culture. Art was to be seen as in conflict with language.

Society is essentially contradictory: we have examined the structure of the labour process and discovered there the basis of all contradictions. Language, functioning as the "ideological reflex" performs an integrative duty for the defense of the established reality.

If, as Marx insists, language is an integral part of men's social practice, it can be seen as an aspect of the social substructure, the material foundation of intellectual production. This, obviously, is true only of language which validly reflects the relations of production. Ideological language, on the other hand, is superstructural language in that it is a barrier between real action and real language. Art is one of the truest superstructural cultural phenomena; therefore, art and ideological language confront each other immediately in ant-
agonistic society. Art is a direct antagonist to ideological language in its function as knowledge (see p. 82).

Art is an aspect of labour, in that labour is defined as the "existential activity of man" by Marx. However, art is a very particular kind of labour in the capitalist world: it is the image of the possibility of all labour, the negation of labour as it exists. However, we have established the total importance of context in the consideration of art. The problem of art and ideological consciousness must be approached, therefore, through a further examination of the nature of context, as it has developed in sophistication and complexity in the advancement of contradictory society from the era of Marx and that of Berlin Dada to the present. In doing so, the nature of the Berlin movement as an historical event will be more completely delineated.

The linguistic context for art is necessarily generated by its dependence upon society as audience, as Duchamp pointed out. Hence it has the potentiality of becoming ideological; when this occurs, as it has in capitalist society, art must realize itself as art in fundamental opposition to the ideological context. In contemporary society the outlines of context are often more difficult to determine than in the society of outright crisis facing the Berlin Dadaists, for, as Marcuse has established, the idealistic notion of culture has been fundamentally altered. This alteration is a twofold function, in that much of the idealistic ideology has been retained in the new context, and this combines with later developments. Where idealist culture rigidly separated the higher, abstracted culture from the concrete world of necessity, the newer technological structure is effecting an apparent closure of the gap. "Art" and "life", while in actuality no closer together than ever before (and indeed in many of the most important ways never further apart) are being subsumed under a single category,
which Marcuse terms the "material culture":

"Today's novel feature is the flattening out of the antagonism between culture and social reality through the obliteration of the oppositional, alien, and transcendent elements in the higher culture by virtue of which it constituted another dimension of reality. The liquidation of two-dimensional culture takes place not through the denial and rejection of the 'cultural values', but through their wholesale incorporation into the established order, through their reproduction and display on a massive scale."\textsuperscript{155}

In the bourgeois-idealist era, culture as a commodity was rendered impotent to affect material life through its removal to an ahistorical realm. "Culture" is analogous in this case with Marx's "Philosophy":

"Philosophy explains nothing; it is itself explained by historical materialism. Philosophy, a contemplative attitude, accepts the existing. It does not transform the world, but only interpretations of the world. The contemplative attitude, one of the remoter consequences of the division of labour, is a mutilated, fragmentary activity. Now, the true is the whole. Philosophy cannot lay claim to being the supreme, the total activity. The results achieved by this contemplative activity are inconsistent with empirically-observed facts. There are no immobile absolutes, there is no such thing as a spiritual beyond. Every absolute is a mask justifying man's exploitation by man. Philosophical abstractions in themselves have no value, no precise meaning. The true is also the concrete. The propositions of philosophia perennis either are tautologies without content, or receive concrete meaning from some historical empirically verifiable content. To rise above the world by pure reflection is in reality to remain imprisoned in pure reflection."\textsuperscript{156}

The bourgeois-idealist conception of culture is irrevocably tied to that society's conception of freedom, because up to the present, culture has been identifiable with the exercise in real life of freedom. That is, "culture", as an abstract condition of living, is a condition available only to those who have made concrete the bourgeois abstract concept of freedom. The abstract equ-
ality of men, created by the reduction of concrete labour in the interest of formulating a conceptual basis for the commodity (i.e., the "free" hiring out of one's labour power) establishes "freedom" as an abstraction. In capitalist practice, the freedom is realized as concrete unfreedom and inequality.\(^\text{157}\) Only a small number of men dispose of the purchasing power required for the quantity of goods necessary in order to secure happiness. Equality does not extend to the conditions for attaining the means.\(^\text{158}\) For the reigning nineteenth century bourgeoisie, just as today for the apparent new "multi-class majority", the abstract definition of freedom has been formulated "within the relationships of the ruling class" (see note 118); that is, the definition of freedom was reduced to an abstraction from those previously-realized conditions which were the property of a certain group.

Marx stated that ideology could exist only with the existence of the necessity for a certain class to represent the interests of its rule as "general". The abstract freedom of the bourgeois world is an ideological construct. The positioning of art outside the predicament of concrete labour and freedom can be appreciated as a logical and necessary development. But in the newer context of the ideology of total mobilization we perceive its difficulties.

The Marxian critique of idealist philosophy represents the attempt to destroy the reign of abstraction insofar as abstraction sees itself as necessarily cut off from activity. The basis of Hegel's pre-eminent importance for Marx is in his comprehension of the abyss between abstraction and the realization of abstraction. Hegel's insistence that there was nothing in the universe beyond the powers of the individual mind asserted that man could know reality; the obvious implication, made by Marx, was that, if he knew it, he could create it; to do
this it was logically necessary to change the world as it existed. The abyss between the abstract realization and its concrete realization Marx understood as historical. Marcuse correctly perceives that the value and significance of idealist philosophy remains in its constant attention to the realms which do not exist upon earth.

"...bourgeois idealism is not merely ideology, for it expresses a correct objective content. It contains not only the justification of the established form of existence, but also the pain of its establishment: not only quiescence about what it, but also remembrance of what could be. By making suffering and sorrow into great universal forces, great bourgeois art has continually shattered in the hearts of men the facile resignation of everyday life....it has planted real longing alongside poor consolation and false consecration in the soil of bourgeois life....This exaggeration contains the higher truth that such a world cannot be changed piecemeal, but only through its destruction. Classical bourgeois art put its ideal forms at such a distance from everyday occurrence that those whose suffering and hope reside in daily life could only rediscover themselves through a leap into a totally other world. In this way art nourished the belief that all previous history had been only the dark and tragic prehistory of a coming existence. And philosophy took this idea seriously enough to be concerned about its realization. Hegel's system is the last protest against the degradation of the idea: against playing officiously with the mind as though it were an object that really has nothing to do with human history. At least idealism maintained that the materialism of bourgeois practice is not the last word and that mankind must be led beyond it."

In spite of the irreconcilable contradictions established by the idealist philosophy as adapted by the bourgeois as ideology, it retained in its structure the consciousness of the difference between "essence" and "existence": structurally it simultaneously produced a nagging "existential" discontent and removed the possibility of realizing the negation of that discontent. Nevertheless, idealism, especially with Hegel, is inherently dialectical. Dialectical thought,
as Marcuse maintains, is negative thought, in the sense that we have proposed in connection with the nature of theory (pp. 67-68). That which "is there" is seen as "there" only in connection with the process of its becoming, so that all significance of any particular fact, object or situation emanates from the totality to which it belongs.

While idealist culture continually denies or postpones concrete gratification, its dialectical origins keep alive the notion of an alternative. Art's role in this is apparent: the idealist conception of happiness contains its potential to motivate revolt. Idealist religion and philosophy were consistent in their aversion to this notion. Happiness was therefore the province of art, whose subject remained "Ideal Beauty". Unlike theory, "the beauty of art is compatible with the bad present, despite and within which it can afford happiness." Unlike theory, art can be subjected to reification; it has the potential to create its own reality, its own universe outside of history, in which the spectator can become absorbed in an act of "consolation" for the continuously wretched present. ("In a world without happiness....happiness cannot but be a consolation: the consolation of a beautiful moment in an interminable chain of misfortune." Consequently, the project of bourgeois-idealistic art is the "immortalization of the ephemeral". The familiarity of these sentiments as expressed even in casual discussion about art even in the immediate present need not be stressed.

Consolation is dialectical in nature. The enjoyment of "happiness" (or any of the other abstractions) is permitted only in spiritualized form, but "idealization annuls happiness. For the ideal cannot be enjoyed, since all pleasure is foreign to it and would destroy the rigor and purity that must adhere to it in idealless reality if it is to be able to carry out its internalizing, disci-
Therefore idealism in a single action creates desire, an image of freedom, and, more deeply veiled, the corresponding image of revolt---and stifles and perverts these impulses. Its art is a painfully perfect image of frustration, and its inevitable companion, mystification. Here the medium of beauty remains an illusion, an abstraction. It is an illusion of reality, and as such has the potential to participate in the dialectical operation of art as a function of knowledge (in that every illusion can be self-conscious). The bourgeois-idealist context subverts this potential: the beautiful world represented in art can exist only in a strictly delimited and controlled frame of reference. The possibility of making "a leap into a totally other world" is suppressed, as far as concrete activity is concerned, and the significance of this art is then completely controlled. Bourgeois-idealist art retains the notion of the potential break with reality, even though the realization of this break is prohibited by the enforced context. German Expressionism and Berlin Dada's critical destruction of it should be seen in this frame of reference. In its public, inflammatory character, Dada put into practice the truth of its theory—that the cultural ideology of the Germans was the ultimate degradation of the art process.

With Duchamp, the Berlin Dadaists were the first to find their subject-matter in the contemporary art-process as such; they understood the criticism inherent in art as art. The ephemerality of the art work produced in Berlin, with the exception of Grosz, acts as a witness to the acute historicity of the movement. Like Duchamp's Readymades, the actual work of the Berlin---most particularly the periodicals---exist only in terms of history, and are for all significant purposes outside the realm of aesthetics proper, except as a kind of critique of the process of developing aesthetic canons. The Bottle Rack depends for its importance upon history, and nothing more; the artifacts of Berlin int-
erest us in aesthetic terms, but only peripherally, in contrast to Ernst for example. "...they have come down to us as documents relating to one episode of action and struggle and nothing more. They are arms abandoned on the field of battle. What is important is now hidden elsewhere..." In the sudden awareness of history and process, the object fades from prominence, in 1919 as in later periods. It is true to say that the significance of the Bottle Rack depends not at all in its presence as an object; indeed, it is one of the most important objects in the art of the twentieth century, though very few people have actually experienced it as any more than a photographic reproduction, that is, as idea.

The revolution of Duchamp and Berlin Dada—the discovery of the methodology of the negation of art by art—was obviously the result of a dialectical crisis. Their art was the result of a total—not partial—contextual challenge; the totality of their challenge, and their success at making it good, effectively destroyed the idealist outlook, the false "innocence" of works of art. For the first time, art self-consciously threw its fate to the historical process. The illusion that art stood away from history, mastered history in being cut off from it, was shattered.

This success stemmed from the ability of Duchamp and the Berlin Dadaists to formulate accurately the terms of a confrontation. These people conceived that art as art denied the fragmentary truth of ideology. The art context of 1919 was ideological, but the artist's consciousness became contextual when the material world overwhelmed the organized truth; in this sense the war was a catalyst for Dada. "Reality" and "Appearance" were thrown into sharp focus one against the other. In Marx's terms, action created a surfeit of language; ideology, as a restricted region of linguistically structured "truths" was revealed.
In this extreme condition, the art of Duchamp and the Berlin group realized itself as knowledge; concurrently it realized that knowledge was not something simply different from ideology and controlled categories. It saw that knowledge was actively antagonistic to ideology. The new practice of art created a new theory. The limits of this new theory are indicated in the situation of art in advanced industrial society. To specify these limits, it is necessary to see how the ideology of this society differs from the that of 1919 Europe.

The idealistic origins of bourgeois culture insured that a dialectic tension would persist in cultural ideology even when the conditions for its realization were eliminated. Although concrete alternatives to the established reality were stifled, the abstract notion of an alternative remained in the unmistakable gap between the condition indicated by art and that of material society. As Marx showed, a society which is based in contradiction must develop through contradiction: contradiction is at once its energy and the source of its eventual annihilation. Advanced capitalist society renders "the struggle for existence and the exploitation of man and nature ever more scientific and rational."\textsuperscript{164} The sophistication of the organization of this society, in accordance with its principles, produces a higher standard of living and at the same time an intensified structure of exploitation, mobilization, and ideologization. Marcuse suggests that the manner in which this is being accomplished is very similar to the positivist philosophical procedure, i.e., the quantification of man and nature.

"The quantification of nature, which led to its explication in terms of mathematical structures, separated reality from all inherent ends and, consequently, separated the true from the good, science from ethics. No matter how science may now define the objectivity of nature and the inter-
relation among its parts, it cannot scientifically conceive it in terms of 'final causes'."165

The mode of thinking underlying the technological rationalism of sophisticated industrial capitalism is correspondent in many important ways to the nineteenth century positivism of men like Auguste Comte, who insisted that his task was to organize "facts". The facts were seen as the data of immediate experience: the world is considered as "given". We shall see that this gesture is the total antithesis of dialectical thought, which is by nature negative.

"It had been the fundamental conviction of idealism that truth is not given to man from some external source but originates in the process of interaction between thought and reality, theory and practice. The function of thought was not merely to collect, comprehend and order facts, but also to contribute a quality that rendered such activity possible, a quality that was thus a priori to the facts. A decisive portion of the human world therefore consisted, the idealists held, of elements that could not be verified by observation. Positivism repudiated this doctrine, slowly replacing free spontaneity of thought with predominantly repetitive functions. This was not merely a matter of epistemology. The idealistic idea of reason,...has been intrinsically connected with the idea of freedom and had opposed any notion of a natural necessity ruling over society. Positive philosophy tended instead to equate the study of society with the study of nature, so that natural science, particularly biology, became the archetype of social theory....This position directly contradicted the view held by dialectical social theory, that society is irrational precisely in that it is governed by natural laws."166

Thus, the world becomes, in Wittgenstein's words, "all that is the case."167 It is inadvisable to become involved in an explication of positivism per se here; the implications of positivist thought for dialectical theory are amply brought out by Professor Marcuse.168 The point is that the positivistic interpretation of society forms part—and a crucial part—of the dominant interpret-
ation made by contemporary capitalist society of the basis of its own actions. Furthermore, Marcuse insists that this positivism has become an "operationalist" rationality, one in which "objects", "situations", "beings" are understood primarily in terms of what can be done with them. Phenomena of the external world tend to give up their "being-as-such"—especially their dialectical being-as-such—for existence as instruments in a structure of action which is totally liberated from questions regarding notions of substance and value. These questions are categorized as originating from a foreign context, whose questions are therefore considered meaningless in that they transgress the limits of the established context. This is, in a sense, tautological, for, with the context under total acceptance, each statement made within it in effect verifies itself. This kind of self-validating, tautological method is particularly useful in ideological schemata, because its attitude toward context is identical to that of the general process of ideology. "...proved in its effectiveness, this conception works as an a priori—it predetermines experience, it projects the direction of the transformation of nature, it organizes the whole." In the operationalist context Marcuse describes, the external world tends to lose integrity as an independent realm, with which man and thought interact. In opposition to the idealistic idea that subject and object related to each other in a state of tension, "saturated with concreteness", in which "even the most monistic system maintained the idea of a substance which unfolds itself in subject and object—the idea of an antagonistic reality", the "scientific" theory of modern technological development undermines the tension, participates in effect, in a dematerialization of nature. As the external world is made more and more an object of abstracted manipulation in the pressure of intensifying class-based contradictions in the productive process, the more irrational the state of fact becomes. Ideologically, technological society resolves this problem, or attempts
to resolve it by subsuming the problematic external world into the process of abstraction—"...as the extended matter becomes comprehensible in mathematical equations which, translated into technology, 'remake' this matter, the res extensa loses its character as an independent substance." This is similar to the inverted character of Hegel's dialectic: "...thought which is alienated and abstract....ignores real nature and man....Nature is external to it, loss of itself, and is only conceived as something external, as abstract thought, but alienated abstract thought." The abstractions to which technological rational thought reduces "reality" must be seen as the outcome of historical conditions. Like that of Comte, this kind of thought is bound to "constantly establish and fortify the intellectual order which....is the indispensible basis of all veritable order." Comte's abstractions are reduced from the concrete social and material existence of a determinate group, and the understanding of the abstractions and action upon the understanding is naturally entrusted to experts created by the class itself: "Social questions, because of their complicated nature, must be handled 'by a small group of intellectual elite;''" Unlike dialectical thought, technological rationalist thought assumes that men are free by ignoring the existence of alienation in the labour process. The dialectic procedure begins from the consciousness of alienation—on concrete, social grounds; concomitantly, it perceives the unreality of the established social organization. Therefore, it perceives the unreality of the world as a whole, because—particularly when technology is very sophisticated—the world is the reflection of the men and history which has made it. Dialectical thought understands the term "process of existence" and its distinction from "reality" as an immutable meridian of fact. (cf. Wittgenstein's Tractatus: "The totality of ex-
isting states of affairs also determines which states of affairs do not exist."
"The world is determined by the facts, and by their being all the facts."\textsuperscript{177}
Like Lenin's famous "dialectical" water-glass, the facts have existence as the particular results of particular stages of a process. Any independent existence given them is necessarily artificial, the result of the contingencies of specific operations, like controlled scientific experiments, and so forth. It is this unself-conscious independent condition of the facts which is achieved by rationalist technological thought. Thus the subject and object seem to be independent of one another, and the external world appears as immutably alien and "different". This, combined with the impulse to quantification generated by structuralized control of the "object", produces the subject as a specific kind of object. And the definition of the world of objects is carried out in terms of what forces it reacts to—"We are defining matter as a possible object of man's manipulation."\textsuperscript{178}
Wittgenstein (whom Marcuse castigates as a representative of positive philosophy) has suggested that, although that which is beyond language must be passed over in silence, this does not imply in any way that it does not exist ("There are indeed things which cannot be put into words. They make themselves manifest. They are what is mystical."\textsuperscript{179}) In contradistinction to this, the positivist rationalism of the technological world is committed to the creation of a structurally-complete reality, in which—ideologically—that which cannot be formulated in the language of this rational reality, cannot be of consequence.

The principles of this technocratic theory of advanced capitalist society are "pure" in that, because of the abstractness which is a result of their historical development, they do not necessarily espouse one implementation over
another. That is, as Marcuse suggests, they do not seem to imply domination as such, do not "by nature" imply it.

"However, there is no such thing as domination per se. As theory proceeds, it abstracts from, or rejects, a factual teleological context—that is the given, concrete universe of discourse and action. It is within this universe itself that the scientific project occurs or does not occur, that theory conceives or does not conceive the possible alternatives, that its hypotheses subvert or extend the pre-established reality."

Therefore, it is in their own pureness that they are impure. Technological theory refuses to admit its historical context. This context insure that its abstract formulations would be structured to contribute perfectly to the motive forces of the contradictory historical reality; naturally, this precluded the possibility that technological theory could be cognisant of that historical reality which it was created to serve.

"Theoretical reason, remaining pure and neutral, entered into the service of practical reason. The merger proved beneficial to both. Today, domination perpetuates and extends itself not only through technology as technology, but the latter provides the great legitimation of the expanding political power, which absorbs all spheres of culture....In this universe, technology also provides the great rationalization of the unfreedom of man and demonstrates the 'technical' impossibility of being autonomous, of determining one's own life. For this unfreedom appears neither as irrational nor as political, but rather as submission to the technical apparatus which enlarges the comforts of life and increases the productivity of labour."

Science per se does not become ideology, if by "science" is meant specific propositions regarding subjects such as the structure of matter, energy and so on. However, it is Marx's claim that science has never existed per se, and that the abstractions of science take on significance as components in an historical
project because this is in fact their context. Pure science, like pure philosophy, theology, ethics, etc., becomes ideological because the claims to purity obliterate its contextual nature. The symbols of abstract science become analogous to the "barrier" of religious thought, for example, in that they assert their absolute character. The reflexive character of ideology presents itself in the image of scientific prediction.

Again, the ideology itself is full of tension, for it is obvious that the discoveries of science open new horizons and create a surfeit of language which tends to oppose ideology. This, however, runs into cancellation when the entire spectrum of possibilities and projects is determined beforehand, in connection with the needs of a specific social organization. The context of scientific work creates a horizon of assumptions in which the valid hypotheses of science—or, philosophy—take on significance, in which they become common property in the lives of people. "...science, by virtue of its own methods and concepts, has projected and promoted a universe in which the domination of nature has remained linked to the domination of man....Nature, scientifically comprehended and mastered, reappears in the technical apparatus of production and destruction which sustains and improves the life of the individuals while subordinating them to the masters of the apparatus."  

Abstractions, as Marx pointed out, never exist independently of practice, of the concrete relationships which they schematize. Abstract science is a development from such concrete relations, and we have seen that the logic of these relations has been the logic of domination, and therefore an ideology. "What appeared extraneous, foreign to the theoretical project, shows forth as part of its very structure (methods and concepts): pure objectivity reveals itself as
object for a subjectivity which provides the Telos, the ends."\textsuperscript{183} In this context, "technology has become the great vehicle of reification.... in its most mature and effective form."\textsuperscript{184} Unlike earlier bourgeois structures, the world does not appear the product of chance operations and blind necessity, but its logic is presented clearly as that of technological possibility: what can be accomplished is that which is to be done. The facts, divorced from the historical factors, reign unchallenged. The operationalist tone of the facts creates an "administered world", with its supply of experts, each of whom serve a context. The apparently objective empirical world of fact is therefore ideological; the empiricism is total and the realm of fact cannot, by its own definition, be transcended.

This non-transcendent realm is anti-dialectic. Just as Hegel subverted the possibility for dialectical thought to realize itself in its proper realm—the world of practice—by placing both "poles" of the movement, so to speak, within that which is only a single pole—"Spirit"—the anti-dialectical world of thought seems to separate subject and object, but really destroys the dynamic logic of this separation. Its separation of subject and object renders the two components absolutely distinct on the one hand, and on the other it tends to subsume the "object"—the sensuous, external world—in a series of pure abstractions; in other words, creates the object only as an extension of the function of the subject. Or (and at the same time) it renders the subject as no more than a particular kind of object (as mentioned above, p. 100), a sophistication of the basic capitalist procedure of treating men as commodities.

Conflict is eliminated; organization and manipulation of structures takes its place. In philosophy, abstract structuralism makes itself known in linguistic analysis. We have outlined the Marxian critique of this attitude toward lan-
Marx's concept and use of language is critical; just as philosophy in comprehending the world is a critique of the world, language, while a representation of practice, retains the capacity to abstract from, and criticize practice. Dialectical thought and language are thus "transcendent" in that the relation established between subject and object is dynamic: language renders practice an object for analysis and at the same time, as a product of practice, itself can become an object for analysis. This implies different language levels.

The Marxian critique of linguistic analysis (which Marcuse carries out in part) is based upon the fact that this philosophical system proceeds to analyze "common language" as it is found to be in existence. In this sense common language philosophy takes language to be "all that is the case". Dialectic analysis understands language as a system produced by man in the same gesture as producing the world, society. Therefore, it can never be "all that is the case", just as a tradition, an institution, an association can never be so, and in the sense that the orbit of the moon, for example, can be so. The significance of language is that it is not the case; Marcuse maintains that, in common linguistic use, the crucial sphere is that which is not stated, the "deep structure" of structural assumptions which constitutes the generative nature of the language.

The refusal or inability to distinguish between ordinary and philosophical language is attacked by Marcuse on the grounds that common language is language acting as an apparent object: for reasons of efficiency in the conduct of daily life an entire range and dimension is eliminated from consideration in the practical use of this language. Philosophical language, however, aims at bringing to the surface in practice the entirety of its nature. "...exactness and clarity cannot be attained within the universe of ordinary discourse. The philosopthic concepts aim at a dimension of fact and meaning which elucidates the
phrases or words of ordinary discourse. Or, if the subject of ordinary discourse itself becomes the object of philosophical analysis, the language of philosophy becomes a 'meta-language'. As Wittgenstein suggests, "A thing cannot be at the same time a measure and the thing measured." Marcuse, as a Marxist, objects that linguistic analysis, like all alienated philosophy, removes itself and its subject from the universal medium of the formation of concepts and words. "The philosopher, himself an abstract form of alienated man, sets himself up as the measure of the alienated world." Positive language philosophy, with an anti-dialectical methodology and approach, binds itself to the explication, the admittedly precise and detailed description of something which, to the dialectic thinker, in a sense does not exist. One is reminded from a line from Genet's *Our Lady of the Flowers*: "I lived in the midst of an infinity of holes in the form of men." Dialectical analysis brings forward the *history* of everyday language and everyday constructs "as a hidden dimension of meaning—the rule of society over its language." Language is constantly stressed as a social phenomenon, in which every detail is generated by determinate factors, even the indeterminate details. In positivist analysis the context exists as a logical *a priori* under which all content is judged.

"But this radical acceptance of the empirical violates the empirical, for in it speaks the mutilated, 'abstract' individual who experiences (and expresses) only that which is given to him (given in a literal sense), who has only the facts and not the factors, whose behaviour is one-dimensional and manipulated. By virtue of the factual repression, the experienced world is the result of restricted experience, and the positivist cleaning of the mind brings the mind in line with restricted experience."

The closing of context is apparent, and the closed context is important for what it excludes. Marcuse indicates examples of regions of thought relegat-
ed to the status of "fiction" or "myth," and asserts that, in accordance with the theory of ideology, there is no reason why rational thought or true consciousness cannot at times be pressured into the category of myth. This can occur when its antithesis reaches a level of ideological productivity wherein grand contexts are tightly controlled (administration of universities, publishing houses, institutional associations, teaching, etc.). Dialectical, negative thought is itself negated by positive thought when positive thought holds the reifying power. Obviously, the level of forcible suppression shifts; it is apparent to all that every dialectical, negative, revolutionary ideas is freely available in certain sectors of advanced capitalist society. This availability denies the assertion that intellectual suppression is practiced. But the denial is itself annihilated when the truth of the Marxian idea that theory and practice must not be separated is understood. In the controlled contextual scene of ideological culture, ideas separated from practice in fact serve the ideology by destroying it in the abstract. The world itself is not changed, but descriptions of it are changed.

The Marxian concept of language renders linguistic analysis as it exists transparent as a function of ideology, simultaneously produced by false consciousness and continuing and intensifying it. Common language takes on sense only when it is comprehended in the clear light of the factors which bring it about. True consciousness—and therefore true language study—makes the established language "speak what it conceals or excludes." The historical condition of advanced industrial society challenges true consciousness. In the controlled context of ideology, thinking implies recognition of the contradictions. Contemporary society, as mentioned earlier, cannot be seen dialectically until the contradictory nature of its energy is recogniz-
ed; at the same time this contradictory nature makes itself known through dialectical consciousness. Dialectical thought, because of Marx's work, is inherently historical.

Likewise, the dialectic of art, because of Berlin Dada and Duchamp, is historical. The task facing Duchamp and the Berlin Dadaists was to take the entirety of the art context as their subject-matter. They were producing the new system, which supervenes the old. Their activities laid the foundation for a totally new definition of art. This definition, as we have seen (pp. 81-82) is not a specifically delimited zone of activity; rather it is a negative definition, or, in Peckham's terms, an empty category, one which is filled with the content which becomes necessary in relation to current praxis and the abstractions which can be made out of it (which necessarily generate both critical and anticipatory functions). However, the empty category is not necessarily infinite; the notion of the empty category might, on the other hand, generate a limitless method, as Jack Burnham points out in a discussion of Robert Morris' work:

"Earlier I mentioned that Morris has...transcended.... Duchampian strategies rather than revert to Duchampian forms. Quite obviously no one can choose another urinal. Such an act carries not one iota of recognition (i.e., re-evaluation of the art situation). But there are other choices that can be made. One is the act of 'bracketing' all art sub-sets so that art is demonstrably seen to be a closed and exhausted category. When it is demonstrated that the art structure merely demands that artists invent a new sub-set or sub-sub-set (i.e., environmental systems, fabricated objects, piles of materials, paintings, sculptures, file cards, motion pictures, or any other entity) then once and for all the art category is closed. Perception of art's structure, as Levi-Strauss implies, dissipates art's societal function. Once the limits of the category are understood, or bracketed, then all further activity is residual, merely existing
for collectors and museum directors. Only by redefining art away from its present focussing, tautological condition can the art category be made open again."

This is crucial. Duchamp's discoveries showed that whenever a new system is created, the old remains as artifact, a depleted energy-source. No new system can claim infinitude because it lives by the dialectical principle. That is, every empty category will by definition have to become closed: this is the significance of these categories in history. The empty category or new context created by Duchamp and the Berlin Dadaists is in its own turn closed as later artists' practice includes a total definition of their field of action. This context, as we have seen, was the bourgeois-idealistic culture and its ideology.

The new post-bourgeois culture has established a new ideology, which likewise includes a completed definition of the old. That is, advanced industrial society—or, more precisely, the ideologists who conceptualize its illusions—understands dialectical thought very well. The newer positivistic technological thinking is a specific repudiation of the dialectical qualities residual in bourgeois-idealistic culture, qualities which kept in view the possibility of an alternative existence. The new context includes a total definition of the old: advanced industrial society makes itself an "empty category" in a sense, with the moves ideology makes to prolong the life of its energy source—refied contradiction. The destruction of dialectic thought is a necessary condition of the operation of this society: denial not only of the alternatives, but also of the consciousness which conceives the alternatives—even in the abstract.

Art replenishes itself only through total revolution. As Burnham says above, an open category can be created not by extension or reform of treatment of a specific context, but only by the establishment of a completely new context. There
is no other method available. The entire range of categories in contemporary society is created and stimulated by alienation; alienation is the force which makes society run, which runs the process of production. Art, as long as it entertains any notions about making itself consequential in the world, continually redirects itself in accordance with the formulations of alienation. Ideology attains flexibility through its method. Art does not manage to stand against society today even in its most radical gestures. The reception of Duchamp's Fountain or of Hausmann and Huelsenbeck's Central European tour of 1920 is not repeated in connection with the "revolutionary" art of today. The context has shifted; it is confronted with new ideological problems. The Fountain collided with an ideology already beginning to fail (1917): it can be seen as evidence of the surfeit of practice in the world at the time. The bourgeois-idealistic ideology had been revealed as other than the world: the Fountain or the Bottle Rack indicate the depth of the ingression of praxis into verbal life—-the degree of penetration of knowledge into ideology. Like the Berlin Dada movement—-which must be considered as a work of art—-the Readymade brings the non-existent crashing into the safely-delimited world of "the facts". In the light of this explosion, "a world is revealed", the old category is revealed as irrevocably closed.

Marcuse maintains that the nature of art as art makes it possible for art to retain its negating quality in the face of apparently total contextual control. This is because, just to make art at all the artist must—-more or less consciously—-recognize his consciousness for what it is: contextual and historical. Every artist struggles with the influence of other artists. Artistic alienation is mediated, conscious alienation, alienation at a higher, more abstracted, self-conscious level.
In the idealist culture of the bourgeois world, art remained a coherent vehicle of alienation, "sustaining and protecting the contradiction....They (the arts) were a rational, cognitive force, revealing a dimension of man and nature which was repressed and repelled in reality." The primary characteristic of bourgeois-idealist culture is its difference from everyday life. The museum, concert-hall and theatre were special occasions.

"Now this essential gap between the arts and the order of the day, kept open in the artistic alienation, is progressively closed by advancing technological society. And with its closing, the Great Refusal is in turn refused; the 'other dimension' is absorbed into the prevailing state of affairs. The works of alienation are themselves incorporated into this society and circulate as part and parcel of the equipment which adorns and psychoanalyzes the prevailing state of affairs. Thus they become commercials—they sell, comfort, or excite.""199

The reserved realm of idealist culture removed art from material life, but at the same time it insured that the negative aspect of the remoteness would survive.

"...this remoteness has been removed—and with it the transgression and the indictment....The artistic alienation has become as functional as the architecture of the new theatres and concert halls where it is performed....the cultural center is becoming a fitting part of the shopping center, or the municipal center, or government center....It is good that everyone can now have the fine arts at his fingertips, by just turning a knob on his set, or by just stepping into his drugstore. In this diffusion, however, they become cogs in a culture-machine which remakes their content."200

Marcuse articulates a crucial truth; upon it hinges the understanding of art's content in the twentieth century. In an ideological context, the social function of the art work essentially transforms—or determines—its meaning.
The revolutionary move of Duchamp and the Berlin Dadaists established the awareness of the truth of this as the center of their methodology. Art becomes significant only when it enters language and becomes an influence. Therefore it is true that the nature of the art's entry into language determines the influence it has---its "content". In a frame of reference which is genuinely open---"two-dimensional", in Marcuse's terms---a distortion of the intended content will not necessarily take place, because there is no overriding system which must be served above all other considerations. However, in the ideological context crucial aspects of content are obliterated in the process of the work's entry into language, or culture. In the manner in which art works function in society rests their meaning, content and significance. The work, as content, then, is totally empty in the one-dimensional ideology: it awaits reified society's verdict on itself. This is the limit of Duchamp's notion about the participation of the spectator put forward in "The Creative Act".

This substitution of the "empty work" for the empty category is characteristic of the operationalist structure Marcuse discusses. The "empty work" is an icon for every ideology. As such, it can be seen as a component in the process of the dominance of "closed categories", the maintenance of codified frames of reference.

The methodology of Berlin Dada and Duchamp is entirely valid. As Burnham says, Duchampian strategies motivate the most advanced art of our time. The critical difference lies in the "angle" taken by the method. The strategy determined that art necessarily assert its contradictory character. The contradictory character of art in 1916-1919 determined that it rupture the idealistic distance and establish itself as a function of material culture. As Duchamp stated at the time, "The best works of art America has produced are her plumbing and her brid-
ges."; the removal of art from the movement of concrete culture was to be destroyed.

But we see that culture and ideology have shifted ground considerably. The integration of art into life has become now a function of ideology. Duchamp's "success", and that of artists carrying out programs related to him (for example, Johns, Rauschenberg, Warhol and Morris) must be seen in the light of the fact that the creation of extreme self-consciousness in the art-object (an achievement of the historical consciousness of Duchamp and Berlin Dada) has been integrated considerably. Historical self-consciousness becomes "art about art". The mode of alienation has changed; in society, the more the art object resembles the landscape of everyday life the better. The impetus to "get art out of the museums" is critical in the present, but it balances on a thin edge. To clarify: the creation of a participative culture, in which the spectator/participant becomes the true subject of culture, is an absolute necessity in the attempt to destroy alienation from the cultural arena. To achieve this, the passive consumer culture objectified by the museum must be destroyed, and the status of the museum and similar institutions redefined. However, the moving of art "into the street" is a difficult operation because, while the museum culture tends to stifle the living aspects of art, old and new, it protected, in the bourgeois-idealist sense, that remoteness. Therefore, if art is to move further into the material culture, it must do so only in full awareness of the antagonism and subversion which awaits it. For example, the much-praised alliance of art and "technology" has produced nothing but advertisement for technocratic gadgetry, and for good reasons. The art was completely absorbed, its content was absolutely obliterated and it is servile.

In the society of advanced alienation, art's life is its negativity, its
ability to ingress into the domain of the factual with the awareness of that which does not exist. Its prime characteristic is its difference from what life has become.

Marcuse points out the "alienation-effect", or "estrangement-effect" formulated by Brecht for the theatre as an example of the ingressive, unreal nature of art:

"The 'estrangement-effect' is not superimposed on literature. It is rather literature's own answer to the threat of total behaviourism—the attempt to rescue the rationality of the negative. In this attempt the great 'conservative' of literature joins forces with the radical activist. Paul Valery insists on the inescapable commitment of the poetic language to the negation. The verses of this language 'ne parlent jamais que des choses absentes.' They speak of that which, though absent, haunts the established universe of discourse and behaviour as its most taboos possibility—neither heaven nor hell, neither good nor evil but simply 'le bonheur'....Creating and moving in a medium which presents the absent, the poetic language is a language of cognition—but a cognition which subverts the positive. In its cognitive function, poetry performs the great task of thought: 'le travail que fait vivre en nous ce qui n'existe pas'.

Naming the 'things that are absent' is the breaking of the spell of the things that are; moreover it is the ingress of a different order of things into the established one—'le commencement d'un monde'."

Because, however, the established reality has mobilized language and organized expression to an unprecedented degree, "truly avant-garde works of literature communicate the break with communication. With Rimbaud, and then with dada and surrealism, literature rejects the very structure of discourse which, throughout the history of culture, has linked artistic and ordinary language."

The communication of the break with communication is analogous to the negation of art by art discussed earlier. In this negation, "The traditional stuff of art (images, harmonies, colors) reappears only as 'quotes', residues of
past meaning in a context of refusal. The closed categories reappear in new art only as artifacts, their potential to carry meaning in the new context is exhausted, subsumed by the historical self-consciousness of the process of art (the process of dialectical signification, "pointing with the finger..."). Unlike the art which preceeded it, that of Duchamp and the Berlin Dadaists, in Morris' words, uses "structure...to build events. In this sense it draws closer to science as a mode." Earlier art tended to search for structure in existing events; but as the universe of existing events becomes progressively closed to the artistic impulse, that impulse moves to complete the negation on its own terms: to establish its own "apparent fact" with a model of its own version of the history of facts. Huelsenbeck and Hausmann, in their "Grand Tour" of Dada (Berlin, Leipzig, Prague, Karlsbad, etc.) created the most extreme "environmental" work of art until the May, 1968 Paris uprisings.

The negation of art by art is the work of the art of total alienation. As such it necessarily becomes a critique of the conditions of its own existence. The "Duchampian strategy" created the fundamental methodology for art, a totally new context and stance. As methodology it remains intact, and is likely to be so for some time to come. For, in contrast to Kosuth, Duchamp did not set up an impulse "for an art context only", and which therefore leads inevitably to the self-sufficient contentlessness of the tautology. Rather, his method indicated the outlines of a totally "revolutionary" generative scheme, a "grammar" of renewal. Kosuth's notion of context is intensional and analytic; the Berlin-Duchamp notion can be characterized as extensional and synthetic, in that it moves out from a multitude of actual occurrences and events, rather than systematically eliminating events and occurrences from a prioristic contextual schema. The
totally dialectical, historical nature of the extensional, synthetic method means that no abstract categories remain beyond the movement of actual practice. The "empty category" is filled according to the needs of praxis, which begins from alienation.

The major shift in artistic strategy concerns the changing modalities of ideology in the post-bourgeois world. In a world which is increasingly reified and increasingly developing through its contradictions, the preoccupation advanced art is to generate alternatively-structured events, and therefore, to generate an alternative language. The specific content of social existence which determined the consciousness of Duchamp, Huelsenbeck, Hausmann, the Herzfeldes and the rest is no longer an issue. The society out of which they emerged is a closed category. Their achievement, in Marxian terms, "transcends" the social existence which produces the art, giving proof of the doctrine of the dialectical reflexiveness of consciousness.

The definition they created applies to an activity, not to a set of results. The results interest us as documents of history; formerly "living" works of art remain as artifacts. As Burnham maintains, it is not a question of choosing a new urinal; the introduction of process as content establishes a new method of creation. The Readymades and the political action of Berlin for the first time established contextual praxis as art's subject-matter, realizing the social nature of art-meanings. Within this realization is contained the essentials of a critical vocabulary, which is still in the process of being articulated. Art contains its critical vocabulary, in contradistinction to Duchamp, who left the development of this more specifically to "posterity", which in Marxian pre-history, means contingency.

The attempt at the removal of remoteness and negativity from art in the id-
The eological world is, therefore, to be resisted, and this resistance comes "naturally" in the dialectical art-strategy; since its own subject-matter is its relationship to history, reification is revealed as an illusory condition, as conditioned consciousness.

False consciousness mutilates the imagination, creates a mutilated imagination in which reification is internalized. Thus, even "instinctual" needs, so long understood as the property of the abstract "private sector" of individual life, become functions of ideology. This reification is the effective negation of the imagination. Art as knowledge performs the "negation of the negation". The apparently contradictory statements of the negative consciousness are refuted by the "radical empiricist" or positivistic ideology of advanced capitalist society, but their meaning persists in the consciousness of history. This historical consciousness becomes "real" only in the necessary connection of theory and practice, as Marx outlined. This alliance itself can be seen as the negation of contemporary ideology. The possibilities for this connection in the contemporary world are subject for other and further discussion. In art, this alliance does exist, but only as an image, a presentation of "in fact" unreal events.

"Culture", as the condition of knowledge in capitalist society, reveals itself as the antagonist of art. The language of this culture—a seemingly unbreakable, impenetrable continuum, is the field of conflict (cf. William S. Burroughs). Events generate language, and, as stated above, the task of art since Duchamp and Berlin Dada is to generate events which proclaim their antagonism to the structure of events which produced the conditions for their creation. The events built by art are unreal, and necessarily so. Therein lies their negating value, the domain of their consequence.
NOTES


5. -Huelsenbeck, DPP, 41.


7. -See Maurice Nadeau, Histoire du Surrealisme, Editions du Seuil, Paris, 1942, vol. 1, ch. 7, which refers to Naville's essay,"La revolution et les intellectuels: mieux et moins bein", 1927, a later publication of a previous paper, "Que peuvent faire les surrealistes?" of 1926, published in La Revolution Surrealiste, no. 9-10, October, 1927. For a fuller description of the dialog between Naville and Breton at this time, see Gershman, 86-91 and notes.

8. -see Richter, 102, 110-114, regarding the periodicals Neue Jugend, edited by the Herzfeldes, and Die Friese Strasse, edited by Hausmann and Jung.

9. -regarding Baader, see Richter, 123-127, DPP, 45-47, 148-152

10. -Huelsenbeck, DPP, 32-33.

11. -Connections: "Ball and I had been extremely active in helping to spread expressionism in Germany; Ball was an intimate friend of Kandinsky, in collaboration with whom he had attempted to found an expressionist theatre in Munich. Arp in Paris had been in close contact with Picasso and Braque and was thoroughly convinced of the necessity of combatting naturalist conception in any form. Tristan Tzara....brought with him from Rumania an unlimited literary facility....Through Tzara we were also in relation with the futurist movement and carried on a correspondence with Marinetti." , Huelsenbeck, DPP, 24. The poetic concepts of simultaneity and bruitism were basically taken from futurism.

12. -For example, Huelsenbeck can point to the manner in which Dada accepted its demise. In Germany, Dada was over by 1922, finished by its members without unnecessary lament, while in Paris Tzara kept Dada together as a movement
through mid-1923, with the Coeur a barbe soiree on July 6, and published his "Conference sur Dada" in Schwitters' MERZ in January, 1924. The infighting of the Paris movement (Breton-Tzara, Picabia-Breton, Picabia-Tzara, etc.) is well-documented, and a study of Breton's activity makes it apparent that the real thrust of Paris Dada had been spent by the time of the "Proces Barr" of May 31, 1921; after this event the theoretical conflict between Breton and Tzara rendered following Dada episodes erratic and quarrelsome. This is not to suggest that the Berlin movement did not experience similar difficulties. From the beginning it was beset by fierce competition between Huelsenbeck and Hausmann for influence, and certainly Huelsenbeck seems to have had little use for Baader ("...a Swabian pietist who at the brink of old age discovered Dadaism and journeyed through the countryside as a Dadaist prophet to the delight of all fools."), En Avant Dada, DPP, 26-27.). However, no member of the Berlin group attempted to keep it in existence for its own sake, understanding that to do so would be essentially an anti-Dada gesture. "...in 1922, when the power of the faith began to wane and all-too-human conflicts began to appear, these same people...began to lose their sense of common loyalty. Baader turned against one R, who, in his turn, deserted and slandered the other R, or else tried to outdo him in power and status. No longer moved by the enthusiasm that sprang from their shared experience, the individual personalities were worth what they and their anti-art were worth, and no more....By the beginning of 1923, all of the 'storm' had been stressed out of Sturm und Drang.", Richter, 134.

13.-Huelsenbeck, DPP, 26-27.
14.-Huelsenbeck, DPP, 39.
15.-Dada publications in Berlin after 1917 included: Die Blutige Ernst, edited by Carl Einstein; Jedermann Sein Eigner Fussball ("Every Man His Own Football"), collectively edited and distributed, (see note 6); der Dada, edited by Raoul Hausmann; Club Dada, edited by Huelsenbeck, Jung and Hausmann for one issue only. Also published were: Dada-Almanach, edited by Huelsenbeck; Dada Seigt, a collection published by Malik-Verlag in 1920, and several other single issue ventures, often closely-pursued by police and censors; such as The Pill, The Cudgel, Rose-Colored Spectacles, Adversary, Bankruptcy and Germany Must Perish. For detailed information on numbers, contributors, etc., see Herbert S. Gershman, A Bibliography of the Surrealist Revolution in France, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1969.

16.-Motherwell (DPP) mistakenly dates this work as 1920 (242-246); Richter reproduces all four pages of the original publication(105), showing the correct date, 1918.

17.-Richter, 103, quoting Huelsenbeck's speech at the "Saal der neuen Sezession" Berlin, February, 1918.

18.-That is, a system of thought which permits dissent, but which, in the very act of permitting, labels that which is permitted as deviant. Herbert Marcuse has analyzed this situation in his essay "Repressive Tolerance" in Critique of Pure Tolerance (with Robert Paul Wolff and Barrington Moore, Jr.), Beacon Press, Boston, 1965, and this essay is evident in the following discussion.

19.-Huelsenbeck, DPP, 40.


24. It is also the basis of André Breton's dissatisfaction with Dada (and Tzara's leadership of it) by early 1921. The weakness of Dada's program in Paris is apparent to Breton before the *Procès Barres*, as it is a motivating factor in his attitude toward the episode.

25. See the catalogue for the only large Berlin exhibition, the *First International Dada Fair* held at the Burchard Gallery, Berlin, 1920. The exhibition included all members of the Berlin corps, and also Ernst ("dadamax ernst cologne"), Baargeld, Schwitters, Picabia, Otto Dix, Paul Citroen, and other, lesser-known names. Publications were prominently included, and much of the pictorial work was illustrations for these, such as Heartfield's works for Huelsenbeck's second edition of *Phantastische Gebete*, brought out by Malik-Verlag. Many works were collaborative (Ernst-Baargeld, Grosz-Heartfield).

26. George Grosz published four volumes of his satirical drawings between 1917 and 1923, all brought out by Malik-Verlag:
   2. *Das Geschichte der herrschenden Klasse: 57 politische zeichnungen*, (Kleine Revolutionaire Bibliotek, 4), 1921. "This was originally based on 60 drawings in 1919, based on published work from 'Die Pleile', 'Der Blutige Ernst', and similar sources." (DPP, bibliography no. 273.)


30. Huelsenbeck, DPP, 36.

31. The so-called "conservative" aspect of Picasso's thoughts throughout the painting revolution he achieved are made clear in his *Statement to Marius de Zayas* of 1923: "Cubism has kept itself within the limits and limitations of painting, never pretending to go beyond it. Drawing, design and color are understood and practiced in cubism in the spirit and manner in which they are understood and practiced in all other schools. Our subjects might be different, as we have introduced into painting objects and forms which were formerly ignored: We have kept our eyes open to our surroundings, and also our brains.", from "Picasso Speaks", *The Arts*, New York, May, 1923, 315-326,

32.-Huelsenbeck, DPP, 37.

33.-This position is very close to that which Jean-Paul Sartre advocates in his *What Is Literature?*, Philosophical Library, New York, 1949. Huelsenbeck has aligned his version of Dada with Sarte's existentialist thought of the 1940s and 1950s: see his article, "Dada and Existentialism", in Verkauf, ed., *Dada: Monograph of a Movement*, New York, 1961. Both writers propose "engagement" as a necessary state for literature and art.


38.-Wescher, plate 16.

39.-Wescher, plate 10.

40.-Richter, plate 63.

41.-Richter, plate 49.

42.-Wescher, 137.

43.-Wescher, 71.

44.-Richter, plate 65.


46.-Scharf, for example, *Don't Worry—He's A Vegetarian*, 1939.

47.-Here it might be argued that art's task is not to carry a political message and so, in this sense, Heartfield never even had the potentiality of being an artist. I would object that, given the situation, Heartfield would work in the knowledge that such messages were necessary to increase the possibility of revolution. His work was an effort to clear a context by clearing away a society. As well, one might object that this outlook places the time in which one could make art in some abstract future state. This is incorrect. Art is always of the present, but its presentness depends upon its contextual control. The very immediate conditions made it necessary for the Dadaists in Berlin to forego the process of making art first and foremost as an entity in itself in favour of bringing to conscious consideration the conflicts in context.

48.-Huelsenbeck, DPP, 43.
49. Huelsenbeck, *Collective Dada Manifesto*, 1918, DPP, 244.


52. Huelsenbeck, DPP, 33. Note that Huelsenbeck participated, and that, while in Zurich, published two collections of poems: *Phantastische Gebete*, Collection Dada, Zurich, 1917, with 7 woodcuts by Arp (DPP bibliography no. 305); and *Schalaben, Schalomai, Schalamezomai*, Collection Dada, Zurich, 1916 (DPP bibliography no. 307). Both collections contain work using the principles of bruitism, simultaneity, and "static" or concrete poetry (see: *End of the World*, from *Phantastische Gebete*, DPP, 226).

Huelsenbeck does not use a conscious primitivism in these early works; the imagery of *End of the World* is entirely brought from the world of the street, the cafe, etc. In other of his poems he uses "meaningless" sounds, commingles words and noises and mixes languages.


54. Huelsenbeck, DPP, 42.

55. Marx, EPM, 166-167.

56. Marx, GI, 36-37.


58. On the use of the term "natural", see, for example Picasso's comments in the *Statement to Marius de Zayas* (see note 31).


60. This itself says a great deal about the nature of art in an age which produces manifestoes. Not only does struggle exist between different art groups, as between the Dadaists in Paris and Berlin for example, but also on the broader level, when artists find it necessary to confront the domain of definit of art explicitly. This is what Marinetti does in the *First Futurist Manifesto* of 1909.

61. This dialectical relationship can be exemplified by the "triadic" (thesis-antithesis-synthesis) reading so often applied to it. As well, the situation can be comprehended as the relationship between a whole and its parts, between a "field" as discussed in this paper, and its components. That is, the dialectical process depends upon the relationship between "form", which can be seen as the "whole", and "content" as "parts". In a particular situation, this can assume the triadic form (which is not central to Hegel, but which was employed, for example, by Fichte); see Gustav E. Mueller, "The Hegel Legend of 'Thesis-Antithesis-Synthesis'", in *Journal of the History of Ideas*, June, 1958, 411-414, noted in Lichtheim, 7, note 2.

63. See, for example, the writing of John Cage: Where there's a history of organization (art), introduce disorder. Where there's a history of disorganization (world society), introduce order. These directives are no more opposed to one another than mountain's opposed to spring weather. "How can you believe this when you believe that? How can I not?", from "Diary: How to Improve the World (You Will Only Make Matters Worse), 1965, in A Year From Monday, Wesleyan University Press, Middletown, Conn., 1969, 19-20.

64. -Marcuse, "Repressive Tolerance", 89. It is important to note that Marcuse does not invoke a form-content dichotomy to explain the fact that he work of art can transcend problems in its content. The distinction is rather in levels of abstraction.


67. -Kosuth, 136.


69. -It is necessary to indicate that it is an essential part of the nature of dialectical struggle that each opposing component comprehends that its identity is in no way independent from that of its opponent. The poles of a contradiction do not exist separately from one another, and dialectical "resolution", or synthesis is not a victory of one pole over the other, but rather the fission of the combined energy of the two creating a totally new situation.

70. -Kosuth, 136.

71. -This distinction, when made without explicit recognition that it is a synthetic proposition, creates a dualistic reading which produces tensions which are unresolvable. This is because of the non-dialectical nature of Kosuth's construction; leftover contradictions are "problems" in the system. With Kosuth this problem manifests itself in the attempt to reject the material aspect of art: "All my work exists when it is conceived because the execution in irrelevant to art....the art is for an art context only..." (Statement from PROSPECT 69 exhibition catalogue, quoted in Jack Burnham, "Alice's Head: Reflections on Conceptual Art", Artforum, February, 1970, 43.) Burnham notices the "irony of Kosuth's that he is forced to produce it physically..." (43) suggesting that the "true medium" for conceptual art is "telepathy". He also says that "The reification is invariably mistaken for art. As pure conceptual investigation Kosuth implies that his subject-matter is substantially irrelevant, but that its assumptions provide meaning or context as art. By the act of giving definitions (tautologies) for terms other than 'art', Kosuth creates art and therefore functionally defines it."(43).

It is not irrelevant to the thesis as a whole to point out that Burnham has misused the term "reification" here, at least by implication. The implication is that, in the relationship between the "mental" and the "material" worlds, the basic existence of the material is a "reification"—and there-
fore, an alienation. This is completely incorrect. If a thought-system is taken as an a priori, its deliberate, historical nature is ignored. Kosuth's art-system is totally within history in its existence as art. Kosuth takes a context as an a priori. Context always exists; art is art "for an art context only". Context is not grasped as a function of history in Kosuth's work. Therefore, it is what is "reified", and in a sense we can turn Burnham's words around a little: "The art is invariably mistaken for reification". Reification takes place when abstract relations are placed in control of the concrete relations which produced them; the concrete relations thus "serve" the abstract relations. Kosuth's art serves a context; a tautology is irrevocably tied to a particular linguistic structure, without which it cannot exist. I would suggest that this problem is basic to Kosuth's work and Burnham's understanding of it. Therefore, Kosuth's patronizing denigration of Walter de Maria (see note 23 to "Art After Philosophy, Part I", 137) should be seen critically: "...his (de Maria's) intentions are very poetic: he really wants his work to change men's lives." The condition of alienated thought is that of fragmented, partial thought; the ultimate in fragmentation must be the rigid separation of "influencing other artists" from "changing men's lives".

72. -Huelsenbeck, DPP, 44.
73. -see Tzara's comments on the "cubist and futurist academies" in his Dada Manifesto 1918, DPP, 77.
74. -Tzara, DPP, 80. It is interesting to note the connections expressed herebetween Tzara's theoretical conceptions and the notion of "difficulty" in avant-garde French literature through the Symbolist movement.
75. -see note 13.
76. -Tzara, DPP, 76.
77. -Huelsenbeck, DPP, 26.
78. -Tzara, DPP, 79.
79. -Tristan Tzara, Manifesto on feeble and bitter love (read originally at the Povolotzky Gallery, Paris, December 12, 1920), DPP, 86.
81. -Again, the connection to Tzara's literary concerns is obvious: among his earliest productions in Zurich--written before the 25 Poemes--are the two theatrical works, Le Premiere Aventure Celeste de M. Antipyrene, and Le Deuxieme Aventure... See Lacote and Haldas, 115-119.
82. -Tzara, Manifesto on feeble and bitter love, DPP, 95.
83. -Tzara, Proclamation without pretension, read originally at the eighth Dada performance in Zurich, Kafleuten Hall, April 8, 1919, DPP, 82.
84. -Tristan Tzara, Vingt-Cinq Poemes, Collection Dada, Imprimierie J. Heuberger, Zurich, 1916. Note the total absence of punctuation marks in the manner established by Apollinaire in Alcools. This is also apparent in the Antipyrene works. DPP notes a deluxe edition of the Premiere Aventure... See Lacote and Haldas, bibliography no. 414. It is also relevant to note that the manifestoes
were published in book form, with a portrait of the artist by Picabia, in 1924 by Editions Jean Budry, Paris.

85. As a comparison, see Apollinaire's *The Futurist Antitradition*, published and set in type by Marinetti in 1913, which, along with *Alcools* and Marinetti's manifestoes, was a strong poetic influence in Paris after that date. It is important to note that by 1913 Marinetti had established the theoretical-critical basis for *Parole in liberta*, which began the "typographic revolution" (Second Manifesto of Futurism, May 11, 1913; see E. Carrieri, *Futurism*, Edizioni del Milione, Milan, 1966, 82-84), and about this time his ideas about type-setting and page composition underwent a radical change. The layout of Apollinaire's manifesto is an example. However, it is important to note that, unlike Apollinaire (the content of whose manifesto was relatively unimportant), Marinetti continued to present a cogent critical program in the manifesto format. Apollinaire's *The Futurist Antitradition* might be seen as similar to Tzara's in the position it takes regarding the nature of its own role vis a vis the critical context. As well, it might be seen as a more or less direct influence on Tzara.

86. A developed understanding of this question must be attributed to André Breton, who, in the first years of the 1920s, wrote in a "Dada Manifesto", "DA-DA attacks you with your own idea, if we reduce you to maintaining that it is more advantageous to believe than not to believe what is taught by all the religions of beauty, love, truth and justice, it is because you are afraid to put yourself at the mercy of Dada by accepting an encounter with us on the terrain that we have chosen, which is doubt." (Three Dada Manifestos, DPP, 204). And later, presumably in 1923: "My friends Phillippe Soupault and Paul Eluard will not contradict me if I say that we have never regarded 'Dada' as anything but a rough image of a state of mind that it by no means helped to create....In an article of that period, which was not published and is known to few persons, I deplored the stereotyped character our gestures were assuming, and wrote as follows: 'After all there is more at stake than our carefree existence and the good humour of the moment. For my part, I never aspire to amuse myself. It seems to me that the section of a series of utterly futile "dada" acts is in danger of gravely compromising an attempt at liberation to which I remain strongly attached. Ideas which may be counted among the best are at the mercy of their too hasty vulgarization.'"("After Dada", 1923(?), DPP, 205.)

In this frame of reference it is important to notice that Breton has at all times understood the nature of the division of poetry from critical activity. His work is clearly separable into classes of "poetry/literature" and "criticism". The First Manifesto of Surrealism of 1924 is a case in point. It is a "critical essay" (with occasional lapses), in which Breton, like Marinetti, attempts to delineate a method and a construct in conscious distinction from the work of art itself. See, for example, the section in the First Manifesto, "Secrets of the Magical Surrealist Art" (Richard Seaver and Helen R. Lane trans., 29-30: "After you have settled yourself in a place as favourable as possible to the concentration of your mind upon itself, have writing materials brought to you..."). Breton outlines, poetically to be sure, the methodological structure of Surrealist literature. Yet, the essay never becomes that which it is talking about, though there are areas where clarity slips. Nevertheless, the work is conscious of itself as criticism and equal-
ly conscious of itself as not art. It is in this context that the original Surrealist automatic texts of Breton and Soupault are presented (cf. "Poisson Soluble" of 1924 and "Champs Magnetiques" of 1920).

Similarly, Tzara, in Manifesto on feeble and bitter love, 1920, gives the recipe for a Dadaist poem (DPP, 92.).

87.-Huelsenbeck, DPP, 44.


89.-Huelsenbeck, DPP, 44.


91.-Regarding the Closerie des Lilas episode, see Gershman, The Surrealist Revolution in France, 89-90.

92.-Richter, 130-131.


94.-The discretion between "exists" and "takes on meaning", again, can only be defined in practice; i.e., consciousness which does not participate in any intersubjective activity naturally cannot be suggested not to exist. Rather, the question concerns more immediately the significance of this consciousness for anyone other than the subject. Regarding the question of a "private language" in Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 258-270, see A. J. Ayer, "Can There Be A Private Language?", in The Concept of a Person and Other Essays, MacMillan Co., Toronto, 1963.

95.-Marx, GI, 41-42.


97.-Marcuse, Reason and Revolution (hereafter referred to as R.R), 311-312: "...the...conclusions of Marx's analysis of the laws of capitalism...(reveal)...a social order that progresses through the development of the contradictions inherent in it. Still, it progresses and these contradictions are the very means through which occur a tremendous growth in the productivity of labour, an all-embracing use and mastery of natural resources, and a loosening of hitherto unknown capacities and needs among men. Capitalist society is a union of contradictions. It gets freedom through exploitation, wealth through impoverishment, advance in production through restriction of consumption. The very structure of capitalism is a dialectical one: every form and institution of the economic process begets its determinate negation and the crisis is the extreme form in which the contradictions are expressed."

98.-Marx, "Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy", Feuer, 43.

99.-Marx, GI, 44.
100. Marx, EPM, 129-121.
101. EPM, 122.
102. Marx, GI, 44-45.
103. EPM, 123.
104. EPM, 124-125.
105. EPM, 126.
106. EPM, 126-127.
107. EPM, 127.
108. EPM, 127.
109. See, for example, the writings of Alfred Korzybski (note 20), and R. Buckminster Fuller.
110. EPM, 128.
111. EPM, 128.
112. EPM, 130. Note that this is essentially Marx's attitude toward religion, which he sees as the ultimate alienation and, therefore, the ultimate subject of criticism: "According to Marx the foundation of all criticism is the criticism of religion. Why? Because religion sanctions the separation of man from himself, the cleavage between the sacred and the profane, between the supernatural and nature. 'The critique of religion is the prerequisite of all criticism....The foundation of this critique is the following: man makes religion, religion does not make man.' (opening lines from the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, 1843-1844)" Lefebvre, 10.
115. Marx, EPM, 134.
116. Marx, GI, 43. Note the parallel with Renaissance artists' attempts to establish themselves as "liberal" artists in direct antagonism to the definition of their activity under previous means of production.
117. Marx, EPM, 159-160.
118. EPM, 157-158
119. EPM, 170-172.
122. Lefebvre, 60.
123.-Lichtheim, *Concept of Ideology*, 18.

124.-Lichtheim, 18.

125.-Lichtheim, 19. On the subject of reification: "Man's reflections on the forms of social life and consequently, also his scientific analysis of these forms, take a course directly opposite to that of their actual historical development. He begins, post festum, with the results of the process of development ready to hand before him. The characters that stamp products as commodities and whose establishment is a necessary preliminary to the circulation of commodities have already taken on the stability of natural, self-understood forms of social life, before man sets out to decipher—not their historical character, for in his eyes they are immutable—but their meaning."  

(\*Capital\*, vol. I, 87.)

The narrower view of ideology is completely bound up with the wider aspect: the ideologizing class is within the framework of the ideology; the world-view is the view of their world. Thus, the "vulgar" class-interest aspects of the procedure are necessary steps in the comprehensive, philosophical structure.

"Once the ruling ideas have been separated from the ruling individuals and, above all, from the relationships which result from a given stage of the mode of production, and in this way has been reached that history is always under the sway of ideas, it is very easy to abstract from these various ideas 'the idea', the notion, etc., as the dominant force in history, and thus to understand all these separate ideas and concepts as 'forms of self-determination' on the part of the concept developing in history. It follows then naturally, too, that all the relationships of men can be derived from the concept of man, man as conceived, the essence of man, Man. This has been done by the speculative philosophers. Hegel himself confesses at the end of the *Geschichtsphilosophie* that he 'has considered the progress of the concept only' and has represented in history the 'true theodicy' (p. 446). Now one can go back again to the producers of the 'concept', to the theorists, ideologists and philosophers, and one comes then to the conclusion that the philosophers, the thinkers as such, have at all times been dominant in history: a conclusion, as we see, already expressed by Hegel. The whole trend of proving the hegemony of the spirit in history....is thus confined to the following three efforts:

No. 1. One must separate the ideas of those ruling for empirical reasons, under empirical conditions and as empirical individuals, from these actual rulers, and thus recognize the rule of ideas or illusions in history.

No. 2. One must bring an order into this rule of ideas, prove a mystical relationship (connection) among the successive ruling ideas, which is managed by understanding them as 'acts of self-determination on the part of the concept'. (This is possible because of the empirical basis these ideas are really connected with one another and because, conceived as mere ideas, they become self-distinctions, distinctions made by thought.)

No. 13. To remove the mystical appearance of this 'self-det-
ermining concept' it is changed into a person—'Self-Consciousness'—or, to appear thoroughly materialistic, into a series of persons, who represent the 'concept' in history, into the 'thinkers', the 'philosophers', the ideologists, who again are understood as the manufacturers of history, as the...rulers. Thus the whole body of materialistic elements has been removed from history and now free rein can be given to the speculative steed." (Marx, GI, 63-64.)

126.-Lichtheim, 20.
127.-Lichtheim, 20.
128.-Lichtheim, 21.
129.-Marcuse, RR, 119.
130.-Lichtheim, Concept of Ideology, 21-22.
131.-Lefebvre, 66-67. (See also, p. 52, note 94.)
131A.-cf. the work of Lucien Goldmann, for example.
132.-Marx develops this idea in The German Ideology, in connection with the critique of Feuerbach's concept of essence:

"As an example of Feuerbach's acceptance and at the same time misunderstanding of existent reality...we recall the passage in the Philosophie der Zukunft, where he develops the view that the existence of a thing or a man is at the same time its or his essence, that the conditions of existence, the mode of life and activity of an animal or human individual are those in which its or his 'essence' feels itself satisfied. Here every exception is expressly conceived as an unhappy chance, as an abnormality which cannot be altered. Thus if millions of proletarians feel by no means contented with their living conditions, if their 'existence' does not in any way correspond to their 'essence', then, according to the passage quoted, this is an unavoidable misfortune, which must be borne quietly. The millions of proletarians and communists, however, think differently and will prove this in time, when they bring their 'existence' into harmony with their 'essence' in a practical way, by means of a revolution." (54-55.)

This criticism is twofold, or, at least, its subject manifests itself in two ways. Either, as above, "essence" is identified with existence so that the notion that existence is in any way false is not permitted to develop, or else the realms of essence and existence are rigidly separated. In this action, which will be discussed more fully further on, the realm of essence is removed from history and established in a timeless realm where it is supposedly free from the corruption of contingency, etc. This area is continually designated as the "spiritual", or the "abstract" and so on, as in Thomistic philosophy.

The result of the separation of the two notions is identical to the bind of them together: in either case the existent reality is rendered immune to negation and transformation, on the one hand because "reality" is a priori identical to "essence", and on the other because the "reality" was rendered
impotent to manifest itself in the world.

While essence is, in a certain sense, an abstraction, its only significance is in its being made real; essence appears only in practice. In Marx's terms, until the achievement of a rational world, essence and existence are dialectically separated. Essence, because knowable (Hegel), can be realized—in fact, only becomes "real" in its "realization". Until this time, it is conspicuous for its absence.

133.-Lefebvre, 65-66.

134.-It will be appreciated that ideology involves itself to a great extent with mimetic actions—actions which, through ignorance of their own contextual nature, do not apprehend the relationship they have with process, and so cannot approach process consciously, i.e., creatively. An interesting support to the views of Marx on the transcendent qualities of consciousness and language can be extracted from Noam Chomsky's notion of "The creative aspect of language use". (See Noam Chomsky, Language and Mind, Harcourt, Brace and World, New York, 1968.) He asserts that normal (and this word must be used carefully) use of language is innovative, in the sense that much of what we say in the course of everyday language use is entirely "new", not repetition, but definite extension of meanings and patterns heard in the past: "The fact surely is, however, that the number of sentences in one's native language that one will understand without feelings of difficulty or strangeness is astronomical; and that the number of patterns underlying our normal use of language and corresponding to meaningful and easily comprehensible sentences in our language is of orders of magnitude greater than the number of seconds in a lifetime. It is in this sense that the normal use of language is innovative." (10).

Moreover, this quantitative enormity of possibility of language use is not the extent to which linguistic creativity extends: language is "infinite", that is, self-generating, in variety and is free from complete stimulus-control (learning by analogy, etc.). As Marx suggests, language becomes an object of thought and language; they become aware of the abstraction that it is and that using it entails. Language limitations are felt most intensely as the realm of the "unsayable" begins to ingress upon that which has been expressed in the past. That is, the limits of language are known at particular times. The "transcendent" aspects of language use stem from its capacity to generate itself in practice, and to become an object of consideration. (See also Chomsky, Cartesian Linguistics, Harper and Row, New York, 1966.)

135.-Lefebvre, 69.

136.-Lefebvre, 70-71.

137.-Lefebvre, 85.

138.-Lefebvre, 76.

139.-Lefebvre, 77-78.

140.-Lefebvre, 78.

141.-Lefebvre, 79.

142.-Lefebvre, 79.
143. -Lefebvre, 8.
144. -Marx, *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, Bottomore, 58.
145. -Lefebvre, 86-87.
148. -Marcuse, "The Affirmative Character of Culture", in *Negations*, 93. (Hereafter referred to as ACC)
149. -Marcuse, ACC, 95.
152. -See note 16.
153. -Marcuse, ACC, 124.
154. -Marcel Duchamp, "The Creative Act", in *Lebel*, 77-78.
156. -Lefebvre, 131-132.
157. -Marcuse, ACC, 97; *RR*, 295-302; *ID Man*, 133-143.
158. -Marcuse, ACC, 97. See also "Bourgeois society....keep it pure.", 115-116.
159. -Marcuse, ACC, 98-99.
160. -ACC, 118.
161. -ACC, 118.
162. -ACC, 119.
164. -Marcuse, *ID Man*, 146.
165. -*ID Man*, 146. The argument derives from chapters 5, 6, and 7 particularly.
166. -Marcuse, *RR*, 343-344.
170. -*ID Man*, 152.
171. -*ID Man*, 152.
172. -*ID Man*, 152.
173. -*ID Man*, 152.


177. Wittgenstein, *Tractatus*, 2.05, 1.11.


181. *1D Man*, 158.

182. *1D Man*, 166.


185. See p. 1, 52.


187. See Chomsky, *Language and Mind*, 15, and Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, 199: "To understand a sentence is to understand a language. To understand a language is to be master of a technique."

188. *1D Man*, 174 ff.

189. *1D Man*, 179.


194. *1D Man*, 188.


199. *1D Man*, 64.

200. *1D Man*, 65. (Underlining mine.)

201. *1D Man*, 67-68.


203. *1D Man*, 69.

204. Burnham, 75.
The bibliography includes only sources directly cited in the text, and a very few other immediately related texts (cf. bib. 4, 13, 15, 37.). This method, admittedly inadequate, has been chosen as the least inadequate possibility. The reading for this paper covers several different areas and many volumes, not all of which are immediately relevant. For example, a large number of works of fiction, poetry etc. would necessarily have to be included in a more total bibliography.

This is not a reference bibliography; very full bibliographies on the Dada and Surrealist movements can be found in Huelsenbeck, bib. 15, Gershman, bib. 13, and Sanouillet, bib. 37, as well as, of course, in Motherwell, bib. 31.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. BOOKS


28. __________, The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, in Bottomore (note 27.).

29. __________, The German Ideology (with Frederick Engels), including the Theses on Feuerbach, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1964.


complete from the French by Ralph Manheim in bib. 31.)

40.——Vingt-cinq Poèmes, Collection Dada, Imprimerie J. Heuberger, Zurich, 1916.


47.——Hegel, G. W. F., Aesthetik, trans. from the German by F. P. B. Osmaston as the Philosophy of Fine Art, G. B. Bell and Son, London, 4 vol., 1920.

2. ARTICLES


50.——Hugnet, Georges, "The Dada Spirit in Painting", Cahiers d'Art, vol. 7, no. 1-2, 6-7, 8-10, 1932; vol. 9, no. 1-4, 1934. (trans. from the French by Ralph Manheim in bib. 31.)


