UBC Theses and Dissertations

UBC Theses Logo

UBC Theses and Dissertations

Conceptual, theoretical and ethical problems in the vertical mosaic Heap II, James Louis 1971

Your browser doesn't seem to have a PDF viewer, please download the PDF to view this item.

Notice for Google Chrome users:
If you are having trouble viewing or searching the PDF with Google Chrome, please download it here instead.

Item Metadata

Download

Media
831-UBC_1971_A8 H43.pdf [ 3.78MB ]
Metadata
JSON: 831-1.0101962.json
JSON-LD: 831-1.0101962-ld.json
RDF/XML (Pretty): 831-1.0101962-rdf.xml
RDF/JSON: 831-1.0101962-rdf.json
Turtle: 831-1.0101962-turtle.txt
N-Triples: 831-1.0101962-rdf-ntriples.txt
Original Record: 831-1.0101962-source.json
Full Text
831-1.0101962-fulltext.txt
Citation
831-1.0101962.ris

Full Text

Conceptual, Theoretical and Ethical Problems i n The Vertical Mosaic by James Louis Heap II B.A., University of California, Santa Barbara, 1968 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in the Department of Anthropology and Sociology We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA September, 1971 In p r e s e n t i n g t h i s t h e s i s i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t o f the r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r an advanced degree at the U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a , I a g r e e t h a t t h e L i b r a r y s h a l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r r e f e r e n c e and s t u d y . I f u r t h e r agree t h a t p e r m i s s i o n f o r e x t e n s i v e c o p y i n g o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r s c h o l a r l y p u r p o s e s may be g r a n t e d by the Head o f my Department o r by h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . I t i s u n d e r s t o o d t h a t c o p y i n g o r p u b l i c a t i o n o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r f i n a n c i a l g a i n s h a l l not be a l l o w e d w i t h o u t my w r i t t e n p e r m i s s i o n . Department of Anthropology and Sociology The U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h C o l umbia V a n c o u v e r 8, Canada Date September 28, 1971 Abstract The Vertical Mosaic is re-examined and an 'internal' critique of its multiple conceptual, theoretical and ethical problems is pro-vided. Porter's value position in a 1961 essay is outlined and set up as a 'bench-mark' for evaluating the consistency of his 1965 value position. Value inconsistency is discovered in the form of a 'strategy of respectability,' consisting of five 'tactics.' This strategy is then drawn upon throughout the essay to explicate some of Porter's con-ceptual and theoretical errors. These errors involve his treatment of class, power and demo-cracy. It is argued that Porter's important distinction between "real middle class" and "middle majority" violates his original position on class, and is inadequate for his stated purpose. Furthermore, the theore-tical foundations underlying the structure of class are unexplicated. His failure to distinguish between power and authority raises logical and utilitarian problems. Thus the theoretical foundations underlying the structure of power are inadequate. In both the case of class and power he 'transcends' his original definition in the process of doing his analysis. The normative context of his study is found to be ambiguous, but appears to be the theory of democratic elitism. This constitutes a major value inconsistency because this theory rejects democracy as an end and treats i t simply as a method. It is in opposition to thorough-going democracy, whose normative ends Porter supports. Its method, playing by the 'rules of the game', requires compromise and 'creates' brokerage p o l i t i c s , which Porter dislikes. It fears and does not allow the broadening of social participation, which Porter calls for. Final-ly , i t furnishes a context for Porter's findings which rob them of their import. It is suggested that Porter should have treated democracy as a topic rather than as a resource. This would have allowed him to re-cognize the error i n his rejection of l i b e r a l democracy, and would have allowed him to retain thoroughgoing democracy as a c r i t i c a l con-text with which to evaluate his findings. Furthermore, these findings would have been multiplied i f he had simply used e l i t i s t democracy heuristically. Such findings and analyses, however, would have required that Porter not operate with a 'strategy of respectability.' The essay concludes with two points, both rooted in the every-day world, and both suggested as programmatic, 'external,' answers to problems i n P o l i t i c a l Sociology. Acknowledgement iv Introduction 1 Chapter One: Porter's Value Position in 1961 6 Chapter Two: Porter's Value Position in 1965 13 Chapter Three: The 'Synthetic* Structure of Class 30 Chapter Four: The Legitimate Structure of Power 42 Chapter Five: The Ambiguous Context of E l i t i s t Democracy 52 Chapter Six: The Critical Context of Democracy 64 Chapter Seven: Summary and Conclusion 74 Literature Cited 79 The author wishes to thank Howard Boughey, Graham Johnson, Ronald Silvers and Dorothy Smith for their comments, criticisms and guidance. Introduction The recent events in Quebec have revived interest in problems of class and power, even among social scientists. The Canadian touch-stone for a l l such analysis is without question, The Vertical Mosaic by John Porter (1965). As one reviewer stated, "this is the socio-logical study of present-day Canada, and i t will doubtless remain a basic reference work on Canadian social structure for some time to come" (Horowitz, I., 1966:862). That Horowitz has been correct on both counts is the raison d'etre of this essay. If we are to build upon Porter's impressive beginning, i t Is imperative that we examine and ex-plicate Its weaknesses. While a small group of reviewers (Marshall, 1965; Longstaff, 1967; Resnick, 1968) have pointed up specific problems in The Vertical Mosaic, none of the book's reviewers have recognized its multiple conceptual, theoretical and ethical problems. It is upon these problems that this essay focuses; Our approach consists of an 'internal' critique. That is to say, the attempt has been made to generate the critique within Porter's value system and in terms of the particular canons of science which he_ would recognize as applicable to his work. This leads us to posit a certain relationship between values and science based upon our own inter-pretation and modification of Weber's fact-value distinction .(1949), We wish to clarify our approach at the outset in order to 1.) treat i t as the taken for granted resource that i t usually is taken to be in social science and 2.) 'bracket' the question of an 'external' critique based upon a 'paradigm' of social science other than Porter's. The latter point, and possibility, is extremely interesting to us, but i t appears to be more strategically sound to take the approach available and re-cognizable to most of our colleagues. The soundness of this strategy is suggested to us by the possibility that an internal critique will lead to, i f not call for, 'external' answers. At the Here and Now of this writing, however, this is only a possibility. Furthermore, i t is a possibility which takes us outside of the limits of our internal critique, and therefore will not be treated as a topic within this essay. Science and Values The relationship between science and values was examined most notably by Max Weber in his work on methodology in sociology (1949). He held that a scholar's choice of a specific problem always has rele-vance to value, i.e., the problem is always and essentially a part of the body of ethical and political concerns characteristic of the his-torical epoch in which the investigator lives. The crux of the matter, however, is that after a problem is chosen the researcher is subject to logical and empirical rules in analyzing the problem that are separate from his evaluative predispositions. In theory, any research can be critically evaluated without reference to the values of the researcher. While we shall shortly modify Weber's fact-value distinction in the direction of tightening the relationship between values and science, we must concur that certain logical and empirical rules apply normatively within the finite province of meaning of scientific theoriz-) ing. As we shall see in chapters three, four, and five, when we apply the postulate of logical consistency to Porter's use of his concepts of class, power and democracy, we find gross inconsistencies and a depen-dency upon everyday and discipline — common meanings for the accom-plishment of coherence. In the case of each of his key concepts, when we go beyond his 'facts' to examine the theoretical foundations and frameworks upon which his analyses rest and depend, we find theoretical poverty. Thus, from within the realm of science The Vertical Mosaic will be shown to have been a surprisingly unsound enterprise. These findings in themselves would warrant a critique; but there is a problem which, in some sense, is above these conceptual and theoretical problems. This follows from the fact that scientific pro-blems have value relevance. When the problems are class and power the relevance Is especially clear. The writings of Porter indicate that he was highly aware of the importance and relevance of values to science. Thus i t is exceedingly disappointing that the presentation and perspec-tive of The Vertical Mosaic constitute an ethical problem of "value consistency." The concept of "value consistency" is a modification and ex-tension of Weber's fact-value distinction. In light of the equilibrium vs. conflict theory controversy over the past twenty years (Demerath and Peterson, 1967), i t is quite clear that values and facts do not reside in separate rooms. When one enters upon facts, values are not left behind. The choice of perspectives, concepts and theory for the analyses of 'facts' has certain ideological features and consequences. It must be realized, as Tom Bottomore has pointed out, that "every socio-logical concept and theory has an ideological force by reason of its influence upon the thoughts and actions of men in their everyday l i f e " (1964:20). Values not only lead us to problems, they are important in our choice of analytical approaches to those problems. Such choices are ethical. We do not operate from purely theoretical perspectives; we operate from ethico-theoretical perspectives. Without taking further our analysis of the embeddedness of facts within the realm of values, we can see that we are irremediably citizens as well as scientists. As such, we not only must operate under the postulate of logical consistency within the finite province of meaning of scientific theorizing; but in operating within that pro-vince, and living the dialectic between that province and the paramount reality of the everyday world, we are also governed by a postulate of "value consistency." This holds because of the categorically impera-tive nature of values and value systems. In member's parlance, to vio-late this norm is to be hypocritical to "sell out." While this norm is not a major concern to everyday members operating under common sense rationalities, for the scientist-member value consistency is of much more concern simply because consistency itself is such a dominant value in his science-centered l i f e . When we examine Porter's work in The Vertical Mosaic in terms of the embeddedness of science in values, we find that not only is his use of concepts inconsistent, but his choices of concepts, theory and perspectives are inconsistent with his values. He is not only guilty of logical inconsistency, he is guilty of value inconsistency. The two are not unrelated, although i t is in the nature of such relationships When only an impersonal manuscript is available, one must depend upon a highly anonymous system of typifications (Natanson, 1970: 12) in order to get at how a piece of scholarship might have been done. Our reconstruction of how Porter's ethical duplicity affected his con-ceptual and theoretical efforts is only one of many possible interpreta-tive reconstructions. For example, the 'strategy of respectability' discussed in Chapter Two is our construct to explain his muted radical-ism. It is employed because of its usefulness in making sense of the character of the book. However, that he 'changed his mind' and was no longer a socialist when he wrote The Vertical Mosaic, is another plaus-ible interpretation. For us, this interpretation is not strongly war-ranted because of the uneven polemical tone of the book, but i t remains as an alternative interpretation which further information may support. In that our reconstruction suggests a relationship between values and facts, the following essay is ordered so as to make this re-lationship available. Thus we shall firs t examine the ethical problems, then, turn to the conceptual and theoretical problems, and thirdly speculate as to what the consequences of value consistency would have been for Porter's conceptual and theoretical efforts. Our findings and possibilities will be summarized in the final chapter and the possibi-l i t y of 'external' answers will again be raised. Chapter One Porter's Value Position in 1961 A major unrecognized problem in Porter's book is ethical dup-li c i t y , or value inconsistency. In order to recognize the value in-consistency of The Vertical Mosaic (hereafter referred to as The VM) i t helps to establish a bench-mark. (Porter's value position wi l l be examined at length, for while there is value inconsistency within The VM, i t is only when we go outside of the book and examine the other works of this author that we can discover whether The_VM is consistent with other evidence of his value position.) Fortunately, we have Por-ter's contribution to the volume Social Purpose for Canada (Oliver, 1961: 27-56), entitled "Power and Freedom in Canadian Democracy," where his biases and ethical position are quite clear/'" In this chapter we shall document his value position. Socialism and Democracy "Power and Freedom in Canadian Democracy" appears to be written by a morally concerned 'left-wing social democrat,' which is appropriate 2 for the book in which the essay appears. The author is a socialist con-cerned with the failures and shortcomings of the history of socialist parties and socialist theory. His answer, however, is not proletarian revolution and dictatorship. He opts to play by the rules of the game in order to get control of the political system. "Control of the poli-tical system," however, must be democratic and must lead to a thorough-going democratic society, which is the Good Society, par excellence. P o r t e r ' s c o n t r i b u t i o n , which appears i n the opening s e c t i o n e n t i t l e d "Moral I s s u e s , " i s thus as a s o c i a l i s t devoted to democracy. As b e -f i t s the t i t l e of the e d i t e d volume i n which t h i s essay appears ( O l i v e r , 1961), P o r t e r seeks to c l a r i f y the ' s o c i a l purpose f o r Canada. ' For our purposes of e s t a b l i s h i n g h i s 1961 essay as a bench-mark f o r comparison, we s h a l l s e l e c t and h i g h l i g h t c e r t a i n r e l e v a n t features of t h i s essay. The relevancy of these features w i l l become c l e a r i n the f o l l o w i n g chapters . In 1961 P o r t e r ' s concepts, vocabulary and p e r s p e c t i v e were s o c i a l i s t . Classes were r e f e r r e d to as r e a l s o c i a l g r o u p s . e x i s t i n g i n s o c i e t y . He focused on the working c lass and h i s t o r i c a l changes i n the r e l a t i o n s to the means of p r o d u c t i o n . His d i s c u s s i o n of the l a t t e r l e a d him to w r i t e of the "white c o l l a r ' s a l a r i a t ' " (.1961:40) as he examined the "modern s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e based on i n d u s t r y " (1961:41). The fea ture of the supers t ruc ture which bothered him the most was that c r e a t i v e behaviour , which would b e ' t h e i d e n t i f y i n g c h a r a c t e r i s -t i c of the c i t i z e n r y of thorough-going Canadian democracy, i s p r e s e n t l y a c l a s s p r i v i l e g e . Such behaviour continues to be a c lass p r i v i l e g e because those who engage i n i t are educated, or have i n h e r i t e d a way of l i f e which i s e s s e n t i a l to i t s r e a l i z a t i o n , or they occupy commanding p o s i t i o n s i n our i n s t i t u t i o n a l systems - economic, r e l i g i o u s , e d u c a t i o n a l , and so f o r t h . Since our i n s t i t u t i o n a l e l i t e s are predominantly r e c r u i t e d from the higher segments of our c lass s t r u c t u r e , our s o c i a l and c u l t u r a l values tend to be d e f i n e d i n c lass terms. 0.961:34) T h i s "monopol izat ion of a s o c i e t y ' s c r e a t i v e p o t e n t i a l " (1961:34) i s the newest and c l e a r e s t r e f l e c t i o n of the f a c t that " C a p i t a l i s m has not l o s t i t s e x p l o i t a t i v e charac ter " (1961:33). Porter thus located the enemy in the economic system and left no question that the corporate elite are in a dominant position in Canadian society because of the structural dynamics of corporate capi-talism. Their dominance affects a l l spheres of society. In a sentence, reminding one of C. Wright Mills' (1956) outrage at the "higher immora-l i t y " of elites, Porter emphatically stated that "The exploitive, pre-datory and restrictive character of capitalist institutions rests on a morality defined by those at the apex of our institutional hierarchies." Thus we have upper "class control of total social morality" (1961:38). One of Porter's solutions to these problems is the mainstay of the NDP position: "What we need in positions of power in a democra-tically planned society is a changed quality of leadership" (1961:50). This leadership must be imbued with a dedication to public service rather than private gain. Such leadership is not only needed in "government" bureaucracies. As a socialist, Porter recognized that government bureau-cracies are not the only ones which should be planned and controlled demo-cratically. "Politics" is not limited to the institutions of govern-ment: "despots" are found outside of the c i v i l service. "Corporate 'despotism' can be much more far-reaching, as, for example, when i t holds the future of a community in its hands by deciding to move its operations from one city to another" 0.961:41). Porter's definition and discussion of power 01961:27-29) argued that hierarchy is an essen-ti a l feature of any society, especially modern industrial society. The alternative is that a l l elites, in a l l spheres which impinge on our lives, must be elected democratically. A new quality of leadership, democratically elected in a l l spheres, was not Porter's only, or even his most important, solution to the problem of the Good Life. The Good Life is the one also en-visioned by classical, liberal democratic theorists such as J.S. Mill, a l i f e marked by creativity and spontaneity as well as rationality and humanitarianism. The latter two characteristics of democratic man were treated by Mill and among others, Green, at the level of an onto-3 logy concerning the nature of man. Porter however treated these two characteristics as a goal to be attained within the Good Society: "It is possible to create a society in which the prevailing personality is marked by humanitarianism and rationality, and while such a goal may be far-distant, i t is the goal we must keep in mind" (1961:51), The fine mesh between Porter's socialism and the normative ends of classical democracy was such that the latter are called for under the former's name, and socialism was seen as dependent upon democracy for its implementation. Socialist policy...must be directed towards releasing the spontaneous and creative forces within human society. Such a change can only be brought about through democratic plan-ning and co-ordination (1961:38). Democratic planning, within socialism, however, is not limited to the "political" sphere as in capitalist liberal democracies. Nor does i t simply involve electing a l l major elites. Democracy must be thorough-going. Democratic planning requires participation by a l l those affec-ted by the decisions to be made. The elite-mass structure wi l l exist because hierarchy wi l l s t i l l exist, but that hierarchy will be nego-tiable and thoroughly democratic. Porter found i t intolerable that "social goals are now esta-blished by a much smaller number than in the days of entrepreneurial capitalism.... the vast majority in our mass democracies do not partici-pate in any kind of creative behaviour" (1961:34). He was cognizant, however, of the obstacle which the "widespread apathy in our western in-dustrial societies" (1961:54) sets up against the development of -thorough-going democracy. Thus the development of techniques which wil l overcome apathy are a necessity for socialists, because "In a demo-cratically planned society there must be a desire for participation in the establishment of social goals" (1961:54). Unfortunately, socialists have not found such techniques. Worse yet, "Socialists have never given enough attention to how social participation in the definition and achieve-ment of goals can be brought about" (1961:39). Porter saw the solution to the problem of participation as necessarily being in the direction of affecting its cause: the pervad-ing sense of powerlessness and isolation. His answer was decentraliza-tion. A massive homogeneous national culture can only intensify that sense of isolation and powerlessness of which we have spoken. Democratic social planning must preserve and foster group dif-ferences, because i t is through identification with small rather than massive social aggregates that the individual can avoid the feeling of isolation. 0-961:35) In line with this position, he stated that "the French desire for cul-tural separation can be justified both psychologically and socially" (1961:35). In the last few pages he returned to the problem of partici-pation, this time in terms of the democratic control of industry, and concludes that "since large productive units do not lend themselves well to worker participation, planning must result in decentralization" (1961: 54) then, approvingly, he reminded us that "Decentralization further-more helps to strengthen regional, cultural and sometimes ethnic differ-ences" (1961:54). Thus, to the question of the social purpose for Canada... The answer surely lies in the desirability of social participa-tion in defining and achieving goals, in the release of the po-tential for a creative l i f e shared with others, governed not through competitiveness but through co-operation" (1961:35). The realization of these ends requires a new quality of leadership, thorough-going democratic planning and decentralization, a l l of which are to accomplished within and through the political system.^ 1. This work is chosen on the assumption that the most explicit statements of value position, especially when they express a con-troversial viewpoint, can be most safely taken as real/true/honest. Furthermore, his 1961 value position surfaces elsewhere in his work (1968) and in The VM itself. Other commentators have also re-marked on his strong moral concerns (Horowitz, I., 1966; Horowitz, G., 1965; Wolf, C.P., 1970). Finally, i f his 1961 position is not honest, then, without comparing that position to The VM, we can pronounce him intellectually dishonest and value inconsistent. 2. Social Purpose for Canada was to be for the NDP what Social Planning  for Canada in 1935 was for the CCF: a statement of diagnoses and remedies for Canadian society which would be acted upon, at least in spirit, by the new political parties. The former book, however, is much less directly an NDP product than the latter was a CCF pro-duct. See Oliver (1961:v-vii). 3. On the two ontologies of man which pervade Western culture see CB. Macpherson Q.967). 4. Unfortunately, this vision is never linked to the realities of cor-porate capitalism in such a way that we can understand how we are to move from the latter to the former. The problem of how we are to be successful in destroying a class system by working within the very political system which has allowed that class system to be maintained, is never addressed. As we shall see, this problem haunts the conclusions to be drawn from The Vertical Mosaic - conclusions which Porter never drew. Chapter Two Porter's Value Position in. 1965 When we turn to examine Porter's value position in The VM, we find a strange but not uncommon phenomenon. Gad Horowitz explains i t in terms of Porter's frustration at the decay of socialist theory since the Second World War and the realization that the means to the socialist ends" - nationalization and central planning - have been tried and found wanting" (1965:14). Porter the socialist therefore retreats a few steps to more solid ground and assumes the role of Porter the sociologist. Pointing out that our socialist and labour elites have 'muted' their radicalism in accepting the framework of corporate capi-talism, he mutes his own radicalism. (1965:14) Horowitz displays an ignorance of Porter's 1961 essay. Porter noted the decay of theory and the shortcomings of the means, but he saw ways out of these problems. Horowitz has nevertheless hit upon the peculiar flavor of The VM: 'muted' radicalism. In this chapter we shall try to bring to the fore the background strategy of respectability which mutes Porter's radicalism. The Strategy of Respectability In the "Foreword" of The VM John Meisel tells us that Porter's study is of extraordinary importance not only because It deals with and provides information on class and status; "but also because i t departs from a longstanding tradition in Canadian academic circles concerning the degree to which a scholarly work can be simultaneously respectable and polemical" (1965:x). Porter's muted radicalism can be understood as an attempt to be both left and right, "simultaneously respectable and polemical." Porter footnotes Mills' The Power Elite in The VM and writes of meeting him in Toronto where they both read papers at a colloquim (1970:161). He was undoubtedly familiar with the controversy that Mills' book generated and very much aware that his book would receive a similar reception. The book was compared to Mills', but favorably. Irving Horo-witz, in a glib, ill-informed review, tells the reader that Porter "dis-cusses the Canadian political elite in Millsian terms, without falling prey to the assumptions of coordinated policy-making found in The Power  Elite (1966:862)." Martin Robin, however, read the book a bit differen-tly, and held that "Being a Canadian, Professor Porter is not given to the florid phraseology of the moral crusader, nor does he write with the massive indignation of his American equivalent, C. Wright Mills" (1966:154). That Horowitz finds a "Millsian" discussion and discovers Porter's "socialist consciousness" (1966:863), while Robin finds Porter to be an All-Canadian boy whose prose is "somewhat restrained" (1966: 154), can be understood as a consequence of Porter's attempt to be both respectable and polemical. Porter's background strategy of respectability is manifest in four minor and one major tactic. The four minor tactics are rhetbfic, safe concepts, unanswered questions, and undrawn conclusions. These tactics give The VM a muted polemical tone while assuring its respect-ability. The major tactic is the assumption of a respectable theoretical perspective which leads the reader, and apparently the author, to over-look the radical implications of the book's findings. Tactic I The minor tactic which accounts for the disparity between I. Horowitz1 and Robin's readings of The VM is rhetoric. Porter's rhetoric is that of a social democrat. This position and the rhetoric appro-priate to i t , surfaces in Porter's Preface and in three out of the seven-teen chapters: Chapter One: "Class and Power;" Chapter Six: "Social Class and Educational Opportunity;" and Chapter Twelve: "The Canadian Political System." In the Preface he is quite explicit: I attach great importance to equality of opportunity on both ethical and practical grounds...I believe strongly, too, in the creative role of politics, and in the importance of poli-tical institutions as the means through which the major goals of society can be achieved. C1965:xii) While this is part of the social democrat's position,"'" i t is also a position acceptable to liberals (in the common American sense of the term). Thus what appears of his 1961 position is that part which is the most respectable Cdemocratic control of industry, for example, is never mentioned). While his discussions in the sixth and twelfth chap-ters are more polemical than might be acceptable to liberals, the fact that polemics occur en masse in only two chapters after the introduction, and that the rest of the book is 'dry sociology;' provides a situation where Horowitz can be taken with the few polemical chapters and thus discover "socialist consciousness," while Robin can attend to the book in general and comment that the prose is "somewhat restrained." Tactic II The second tactic, safe concepts, will be dealt with at length in the chapters dealing with class, power and democracy, but the argu-ment that Porter's concepts are "safe" can be sketched here. First of a l l , Porter's rationale for choosing his concepts was safe and res-pectable. In his "Research Biography" he stated that "my task was analytical and descriptive, and i t was therefore prudent to use those general structural categories, such as stratification and kinship, most widely employed in sociology and anthropology" (1970:157). The appro-priateness of his concepts, in terms of both their adequacy for what he wanted to examine, and their normative consistency with his own value position, apparently was not at issue for him. Presumably, had Marxist categories been "most widely employed in sociology and anthropology," he would have used them. Porter defines classes as self-conscious social groups. Even though Marx held class consciousness to be a necessary condition for the existence of class, this formulation is s t i l l "safe." With this formulation of class there exists the highest probability that the conclusion will be drawn that the democratic society being studied does not have 'classes,1 which is good news to a l l 'protectors' of that society. Porter, however, has no data on class consciousness, so he takes the other extreme, safe, position, and defines class so narrowly that i t looses a l l its politically-charged meaning. Thus when the work 'class' is used "we are talking about a r t i f i c i a l statistical groups which do not have any lif e of their own or any coherence" (1965:11). His definition of class is a considerable retreat from, and denial of, his 1961 position where he treated classes as real groups in the social structure and wrote of class privilege, class control and social and cultural values defined in class terms. His concept of power is the same one he used in 1961, but when i t is examined, as i t will be in Chapter Four, i t becomes clear that his concept is inadequate for his theoretical needs and is inconsistent with his values. For Porter, "Power is the right that some people have to direct the affairs of others" (1961:27). This rather curious defini-tion identifies as 'power* what others would call legitimate authority. In this formulation a l l 'power' is legitimate. This formulation appears as contradictory to Porter's value position, for i t rules out legitimacy as a problem in i t 6 e l f . Thus the question of values underlying and embodied by corporate capitalism cannot be addressed. The process of delegitimation, which, is central to institutional change, and even to elite circulation, cannot even be dealt with. Furthermore, the fact that legitimacy is_ recognized as a problem by politicians and is sometimes central to elite disputes, means that certain analyses Porter attempts within this concept of power will be inadequate. The safety of Porter's concept of democracy is a bit more dif-ficult to address because Porter has concepts^ of democracy. He never explicitly states and operates with one concept and theory of democracy. Chapter Five wi l l deal more extensively with the confusion on this point, but for now i t can be said that he implicitly operates with, and within, the theory of democratic elitism as formulated and used by Schumpeter (1950), Lipset (.1960), and Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee (1954), among others. This theory of democracy explicitly drops the normative ends central to classical democratic theory: realization of f u l l human potential via the Good Society created by a l l citizens via democratic methods. This theory is completely at odds with the thorough-going democracy called for by Porter in 1961. As with 'class' and 'power,' 'democracy' in The VM is 'respectable.' Tactic III The third tactic consists of unanswered questions. Contro-versial questions are raised in a number of places in the book., but they are never explicitly answered, although data and discussions are provided which seemingly serve to answer the questions. The questions revolve around the nature of the power structure. In his discussion of Marxian theory in Chapter One he argues that "what we have instead of a class of capitalists is a smaller and probably more cohesive group -an elite within .the private sector of the economy" (1965:23). On the next page he declares that: If i t is true that the corporate elite is a relatively smaller and more coherent group than the nineteenth-century bourgoisie,-does its power extend beyond the economy? The answer can come only after empirical investigation. (.1965:24)3 The empirical investigation is provided, but the meaning/consequence of the implicit answer, for the configuration of power, is never addressed. Within Chapter Seven, Porter discusses Raymond Afon's extreme-type, continuum classification system. At one end we have the "soviet" model consisting of total organization and power in the hands of an integrated, monolithic power structure. In the "western" model, however, we have a plurality of competing elites who are only situationally dominant, tend toward an equilibrium of power, and are thus non-unified. Porter draws the section on "Degree of Co-ordination Among Elites" to a close by stating that: There are two questions which empirical investigation can help to answer. One is the extent to which any one society has moved towards either end of the continuum. The second is the relative power of the various elite groups in any one society at any particular period. (1965:215)4 How The VM answers these questions, and what the answers are, is con-fusing and uncertain. After discussing "Economic Elite and Social Structure" he con-cludes Chapter Nine with the following paragraph: In the general scheme of elite groups which forms the framework for this study i t was pointed out that elites compete for-„power with each other. Which of them was dominant, or whether they merged into a power elite, was a question for empirical investi-gation. We might be in a position to answer these questions after looking in the following chapters, at some of the other elites. 0-965:308) Up until the final chapter, empirical investigation seems to suggest strongly that the corporate elite are the most powerful. In Chapter Fifteen extensive data is presented to support the position that the large daily newspapers are "instruments of an established upper class" 0965:463),-* as are media in general. In terms of organized phil-anthropy: ...in no Canadian city would these large campaigns be successful without the support of the leading businessmen of the community. Not only do they supply funds, but they also recruit personnel, particularly their younger executives, to help in organization. (1965:302) Of course, the corporate elite are also quite well represented on boards of institutions of higher learning. In general, "Success of cultural enterprise is linked to corporate decision-making. Thus in the creation of a cultural social product, there is an extension of power far be-yond the economic system" (1965:301). More significantly for relations between elites, we find that the corporate elite have, and are involved in, powerful voluntary associa-tions such as the Canadian Chamber of Commerce and the Canadian Manu-facturers' Association. Regarding voluntary associations, Porter states that "leading positions within them constitute for the corporate elite an extension of power" (1965:299). The corporate elite's 'power' or influence*' is also evident and extended in the ideology of capitalist free enterprise which sanctifies the corporate elite, while serving to v i l i f y any other elite which attempts to usurp corporate perogatives or trespass on corporate domain. Porter states that: The fact that the corporate elite hold important positions beyond the corporate world means that they are in a position to make their ideology pervade the entire society until i t becomes identified with the common good. (1965:305) The thesis of corporate dominance is given further indirect support by Porter's presentation of the political elite's impotence. He rails against the conservative tone of brokerage politics, bemoans the lack, of a Left-Right axis and condemns the opportunism of the two major parties (1965:366-416). The fact which is most damaging to the credibility of any counter-thesis of political elite dominance is that upper class citizens do not feel i t necessary or advantageous to enter politics: the privileges enjoyed by the upper class are not threatened by the middle class holders of political power OL965:344-5). The answers to the questions raised on pages 24, 215 and 308 seem clear. The build-up to the final chapter on elite relations points quite distinctly to the corporate e l i t e as predominant. The respectable theory of pluralism, which has i t that power i s equally shared and d i f -fused throughout society, appears, subsequent to empirical investiga-tion, to be a descriptively inaccurate ideology. Yet in the all-impor-tant f i n a l chapter we find that in almost every example of e l i t e con-f l i c t and coalition, the p o l i t i c a l e l i t e either wins or emerges unscathed. Only once do they lose but then i t is to the public (1965:544). In three important cases (CNR, BCE, and A.V. Roe) they defeated the corpor-ate e l i t e . How i t i s that the compromising, impotent p o l i t i c a l e l i t e are so 'powerful' i s never dealt with. In the end the question of which e l i t e Is dominant i s not only l e f t hanging, i t is l e f t confused. The structure of power appears as "free form," which allows one reviewer (Horowitz, I., 1966:863) to see the structure of power among eli t e s as "horizontal," and another to re-port that "the economic e l i t e is the predominant group within the r u l -ing class" (Robin, 1966:154). Again, one can focus on one part, such as the f i n a l chapter and discover respectable findings, or focus on other parts and discover radical findings.^ Given the length of the text, 558 pages, and the general organization of a l l scholarly work, i t is the f i n a l chapter which we would expect to the carry the most weight in the decision as to whether a book is radical or 'respectable.' In the end, the important question, 'What is the structure of power in Canada?' is l e f t unanswered. Confusion reigns, with the result be-ing that respectable pluralism seems to prevail. Tactic IV The fourth tactic, undrawn conclusions, is related to the third, but of a different order. The tactic involves not drawing out the radical implications of particular findings. Loose ends are l e f t lying, thus respectability is a l i e . These 'loose ends' w i l l be tied up in the following chapters, but at this point we can provide one sur-prisingly overlooked example. Porter attaches great importance to equa-l i t y of opportunity, thus he is greatly upset that education i s class determined and that Canada has relied upon educated immigrants to do the white collar technical jobs that Canadians should be educated to do. The obvious, but unsettling, conclusion to be drawn i s that inequality of educational opportunity i n Canada i s maintained by multi-national corporations and an upper class who find i t more expedient and inexpensive to import educated labour rather than shoulder any of the tax burden which educating Canadians would require. The consequence of not drawing this conclusion is to present a situation which appears to be the fault of no one, and whose solution appears to be the respon-s i b i l i t y of everyone. "Equality of blame and responsibility" perpetua-tes the myth of equality of power and obscures the r e a l i t i e s of class interests and Canada's s a t e l l i t e status viz. the U.S. Tactic V The major tactic employed is the u t i l i z a t i o n of two, comple-mentary, respectable ethico-theoretical perspectives in the doing of The VM: elitism and functionalism. Given Porter's treatment of classes as real social groups in his 1961 essay, and given his s o c i a l i s t demo-crat position, one would expect his analysis of Canada's power structure to be a class analysis. It i s , in a very inconsistent and unsupported manner (see Chapter Three), but the main perspective he operates from g is that of e l i t e analysis. In terms of value consistency, i t is most surprising that Porter did his analysis from an e l i t i s t perspective. In an interesting and revealing reconstruction of how The VM was done, Porter (1970) wrote of being intrigued with Aron's (1950) attempt to synthesize some of the ideas of Pareto and Marx: "I decided, by adding some Mosca and Weber to elaborate Aron's Pareto-Marx synthesis into a scheme for the study of power in Canada" (1970:159). Mosca and Pareto, as James Meisel has pointed out, are counter-revolutionary theorists, "both are fighting on two fronts: against democracy and (Marxist) socialism - which, to them, are one and the same thing" (1965:3). Their values, their ethico-q theoretical perspective, contradict Porter's social democratic values. The contradictions are not averted by synthesizing Marx and Pareto, for Aron's position holds that minority rule, whether by a governing e l i t e or a ruling class is inevitable, no matter what form of government is u t i l i z e d . Within this view, the extension of democracy, i.e., increased social participation by the masses, is seen as a naive and unattainable goal. Theorists of this I l k have made extensive use of the studies which show the masses to be highly authoritarian and lack-ing democratic values. Bottomore has shown that e l i t e theory i s compa-tible with only an adumbrated theory of democracy (1964:112-217). As we shall see in Chapter Five, the theory of democratic elitism, which is part of the baggage of Porter's elite analysis, is irreconcilable with the central requirements of Porter's thorough-going democracy. In doing The VM Porter stated that he had adopted "a simple functionalist view that each of the subsystems contributed to the whole, that they were dynamically interrelated and that there should be a degree of intergration between them" (1970:158). This view complements the e l i t i s t perspective because both operate In terms of separate but related/intergrated subsystems, e.g., the polity, the economy, religion. Porter does not carry through with the functionalist approach to the point of adopting a functionalist view of classes.^ His treatment of classes as simply " a r t i f i c i a l statistical groups" 0-965:11) has the effect of defining away class and thus making his attempt to use Aron's Marx-Pareto synthesis turn out to be lopsided in favor of Paretian elite analysis. Functionalism provides a way to link and explain social dif-ferentiation and political hierarchy, but Porter "decided to be eclectic" 0-970:158) and chose to be a "simple" functionalist. Porter's is a liberal rather than conservative respectability. The liberal respectability which 'simple' functionalism pro-vides, however, conflicts at two points with Porter's 1961 value posi-tion. The "functionalist" framework which Porter adopts has him defin-ing as "political" elites those holding certain high positions in the government. This i s , of course, a standard, classical liberal way of cutting up the world. However, from a thorough-going democratic point of view, the classical liberal separation of state and society is anathema. In "Power and Freedom in Canadian Democracy" Porter speaks of "corporate 'despotism'" and reveals how corporate "organizations impinge on our lives in myriads of ways" (1961:41). He pointed out that elites have a monopoly on creative behaviour (1961:34) and that i t Is only through the extension of social participation that this monopoly can be broken and the ends of democracy reached. Such a position necessarily treats "any persistent pattern of human relationships that involves, to a significant extent, power, rule, or authority" (Dahl, 1963:6) as political relationships. This concept of political is at the very core of thorough-going democratic theory. To operate with the narrow, "structural" definition of political, as having solely to do with govern- ment, is to obscure and avoid the crucial question of the accountability of a l l major elites to the masses in a thorough-going democracy. The second point of conflict is the unit of reference of func-tionalism. Porter's "simple functionalist view that each of the sub-systems contributed to the whole" reveals a fundamental contradiction. What is functional or dysfunctional from the functionalist perspective is determined with reference "to the whole," to society, whereas the unit of reference for classical, and especially thorough-going demo-cracy, is the individual. The "shift in emphasis from the needs and potentialities of the individual citizen to the requirements of the sys-tem" (Duncan and Lukes, 1967:175), which characterizes the e l i t i s t theory of democracy, means that not only is functionalism congenial to elitism but i t is completely amenable --to elitism's companion, e l i t i s t democracy. Thus i n choosing to operate from an e l i t i s t and f u n c t i o n a l i s t t h e o r e t i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e , Por ter has assured h i m s e l f of l i b e r a l r e s p e c -t a b i l i t y f o r The VM, but i n so doing he has compromised h i s thorough-going democratic v a l u e s . Had he developed a s o l i d l y based c lass ana-l y s i s and took n o t i c e of c o n f l i c t theory, e s p e c i a l l y Dahrendorf ' s p o s t u l a t e that "Every s o c i e t y res ts on c o n s t r a i n t of some of i t s mem-bers by o t h e r s " 01964:103), he would have been v a l u e - c o n s i s t e n t and have made some important d i s c o v e r i e s , as w i l l be shown. Of course, the adoption of a v a l u e - c o n s i s t e n t e t h i c o - t h e o r e -t i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e i s , i n i t s e l f , no quarantee that these d i s c o v e r i e s would have been r e v e a l e d . As we have attempted to demonstrate, P o r t e r seemed to be opera t ing w i t h a " s t ra tegy of r e s p e c t a b i l i t y " i n doing " The VM. As we now turn to the conceptual and t h e o r e t i c a l problems i n The VM I t w i l l become c l e a r that P o r t e r has p a i d a p r i c e f o r h i s r e s -p e c t a b i l i t y : i n the doing of h i s a n a l y s i s he found i t necessary to transcend h i s safe concepts and ends up w i t h i n a t h e o r e t i c a l context where h i s f i n d i n g s are not only u n s u r p r i s i n g , but expected and applauded. Footnotes 1. This would be a r i g h t wing s o c i a l democrat's view. A l e f t wing s o c i a l democrat would argue f o r an e q u a l i z i n g (not an equality) of condition, rather than simply e q u a l i t y of opportunity. In h i s 1961 essay, Porter seemed nearer to the l e f t wing view as he men-tioned the " s o c i a l i s t p r i n c i p l e of economic e q u a l i t y " (1961:30). However, h i s mention of this p r i n c i p l e was in an h i s t o r i c a l discus-s i o n of s o c i a l i s m , thus h i s p o s i t i o n i n 1961 as a l e f t , r i g h t , or middle "wing" s o c i a l democrat, i n terms of t h i s i s s u e , was not c l e a r . His condemnation of c a p i t a l i s m c e r t a i n l y suggests a l e f t of center p o s i t i o n , though. 2. The introductory f i r s t chapter, because I t i s important to the t a c t i c of unanswered questions, w i l l be dealt w i t h l a t e r on. 3. L o g i c a l l y , Porter cannot ask the question "...does i t s power extend beyond the economy?" because, f o r him, "Power means the recognized r i g h t to make e f f e c t i v e decisions on behalf of a group of people" 0-965:201). As w i l l be c l e a r i n Chapter Four, "recognized r i g h t s " are l e g a l , i n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s . Thus, by d e f i n i t i o n , the corpor-ate e l i t e ' s 'power' i s l i m i t e d to i t s i n s t i t u t i o n a l realm, the eco-nomy. 4. Given Porter's d e f i n i t i o n of power (see Chapter Four, below), the answer to the second question can only be In terms of the configura-t i o n of r i g h t s c o d i f i e d i n law, which i s ne i t h e r the answer nor question that the reader, or most s o c i a l t h e o r i s t s , are i n t e r e s t e d i n . 5. The relation between class and power (elites) is highly problematic in The VM because of conceptual inconsistencies and theoretical weaknesses. (See Chapter Three, below.) Thus, the discussion of elite relations and relative power are never firmly grounded in a class analysis. Porter's atheoretical stance (1970:157) leads him away from discussing how control of major newspapers by an "establish-ed upper class" is to be understood as evidence for the dominance of the corporate elite. While his classes have "their origin in economic processes and economic differences" (1965:28), the cor-porate elite is seen as just another elite and not as .the elite central to, and responsible for, the class system. Porter, there-fore asks 'which elite is dominant?' rather than 'how does the upper class rule?' 6. Porter feels that i t would be more appropriate to consider honorific roles held by corporate elite to lead to increased influence rather than power (1965:299). Unfortunately, "influence" is never defined, although i t seems rather central to any complete discussion of elite relations. 7. However, in the case of the two reviewers cited, perception isn't selective. I. Horowitz found Millsian rhetoric but respectiable conclusions, whereas Robin found restrained prose presenting radical conclusions. 8. Thus, Gad Horowitz' statement that Porter the socialist "retreats a few steps to more solid ground and assumes the role of Porter the sociologist" (1965:14), displays an ignorance of the possible pers-pectives available from that "more solid ground." 9. Porter's desire for thorough-going democracy puts him closer to the Marxist socialists than to social democrats, and therefore makes his adoption of the e l i t e perspective a l l the more confounding. 10. He correctly views "functional inequality" as a conservative ideo-logy (1965:15). Chapter Three The 'Synthetic' Structure of Class In The Vertical Mosaic Porter places the constitutive accent on class consciousness as the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of 'real' classes. He defines classes as social groups within which "the members have a sense of identity with one another, share common values and traditions, and have an awareness of unity and common purpose" 0-965:10). Rather than taking the position that classes do exist in Canada, as he clearly did in his 1961 essay, Porter states that no nation-wide data is available on the all-important subjective dimension of class: class consciousness. Instead, he proposes to deal with, 'class' objectively. Thus when the word 'class' is used "we are talking about a r t i f i c i a l statistical groups which do not have any lif e of their own or any coherence" (1965:11). In organizing his class system he utilizes a simple gradation approach (cf. Ossowski: 1963:42). With this approach three or more classes are vertically ordered, not in terms of relations of dependence, but simply in terms of some objectively measurable characteristic. Porter uses income gradations to order his classes. Occasionally, how-ever, he makes use of Blishen's (1958) synthetic gradation scheme of occupational classes. In that occupations are attributes (cf. Gross: 1949) they cannot be ordered along a simple continuum, and therefore the order of occupations was established by synthesizing continuums of the occupation related variables, of income and education. Blishen took the average income and average number of years of schooling for each occupation, and computed standard scores for each variable. The synthesis took place when "these two standard scores were... combined and each occupation ranked according to this combined score" (Blishen, 1958: 522). For both the simple and synthetic gradation .schemes, the setting of class boundaries is arbitrary. One of the first problems we encounter has to do with a basic requirement of any stratification analysis (Gross, 1949: 41)). Al-though Porter speaks of the "structure of class" (1965: 29), "the class system" (1965: 28), and sometimes employs Blishen's seven occupa-tional classes;).he never settles on how many classes are in his sys-tem. He mentions "middle and upper classes" (1965: 291), the "classes below" these (1965: 283), the "lower class" (1965: 195), the "working class" (1965: 344) ( functional group!), and the "bottom class" (1965: 154), but never explicitly states whether there are 3, 4, or 5 classes. Of course, to have done so would have led to the stickly problem of drawing class boundaries. He only confronts this problem once, when he draws the line at $8,000 income per year (1965: 132) as the boundary between the middle class and the "classes below." It is at this point when a second, and much more important problem arises. When he draws this boundary i t becomes clear that his "class system" is not one of simple gradation but rather is a peculiar case of 'synthetic1 gradation. Rather than organizing his class system statistically in terms of modal points around which incomes are found to cluster, e.g., defining the middle class in terms of a "middle major-ity", he goes 'outside' his supposed 'simple gradation' scheme and em-ploys an external, unexplicated, subjective criteria to internally organize his class system. Unlike Blishen (1958), Porter never states his relevance criteria for the selection of class variables, nor how he has synthesized these variables. He does not define middle class statistically in terms of a "middle majority". Instead, he defines the "real middle class" (1965: 126) in terms of the variables of l i f e style and values: "the middle class style of l i f e does not rest on the ownership of gadgetry, but rather on the consumption of a different set of values." These values are health services, cultural enrichment and leisure. Thus, " i t is the ability to consume these things...which identifies the real middle class." In that It took an $8,000 per year income, or over, to live this l i f e during the late f i f t i e s , he drew the boundary between the middle and lower classes at this income level. Porter's objective, statistical class system is thus subjectively or-ganized in terms of what he takes classes to 'really' be. What classes 'really' are constitutes the major shift and inconsistency in Porter's discussion and analysis of class. By de-fining the "real middle class" in terms of a certain type of l i f e style and value consumption pattern, he has switched the constitutive accent from class consciousness to social isolation as the necessary and suf-ficient condition for the existence of "real" classes. Originally, social isolation had been a necessary, but not sufficient condition. Within Porter's definition of classes as social groups, the component that members "share common values and traditions" (1965: 10) refers to what Ossowski (.1963: 135-6) has called one of the four possible, fundamental characteristics of stratification systems: social isolation.^" While shared values and traditions can be seen as necessary for the development of "a sense of identity...and...aware-ness of unity and common purpose," the mere existence of shared values and traditions does not guarantee the existence of class consciousness. Therefore, social isolation is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the existence of real social groups, i.e., classes. By examining the concept of social isolation i t will become clear that in making the distinction between "real middle class" and "middle majority" Porter takes the contrary position that social isolation is a neces-sary and_sjifJfJL£ien_t condition for the existence of real classes. Social isolation is a generic concept having to do, in general, with social distance between members of different classes and, con-versely, with contact between members of the same class. It is most often treated as a consequence of economic factors, e.g., division of labor, income differences, relation to the means of production, etc. This behavioural criterion of class divisions takes many forms. The most explicit form is emphasized by a number of theorists CBaltzell, 1958i 59; Sweezy, 1959: 124; Kahl, 1957: 12; Schumpeter, 1953:77) who define class in terms of kinship and friendship networks. In this case a class is "the largest group of people whose members have i n t i -mate access to one another" (Davis, et. al., 1941: 59). Dahl's (1961: 229) definition of equal "social standing" emphasizes the "intimate access" aspect of social isolation, but goes further to suggest the aspect of shared l i f e style, i.e., members display a "willingness to dine together... to accept membership in the same clubs..." The l i f e style aspect of the social isolation characteristic Is directly re-fleeted in two of the indices used in assessing class standing in the Yankee City studies (Warner, 1963: 25-34): type of residence and resi-dential area. Finally, Veblen's (1934) emphasis upon "conspicuous con-sumption" reflects the aspect of l i f e style as well as the related dimensions of consumption patterns and values. Porter's assertion that the "real middle class" has a recogniz-able l i f e style and can be identified by its consumption of a certain set of values is thus a negation and contradiction of his original de-finition of class. He has shifted the constitutive accent from class consciousness to social isolation as the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of "real"classes. Problems of 'Synthesis', Adequacy and Consistency The 'latent', but most important function of distinguishing between the "real middle class" and the statistical "middle majority" was that i t allows Porter to more closely and concretely link class and power than could be done using "artifical statistical groups." Whenever he shows the relationship between class and power, he falls back on this distinction and locates the elites within "real" classes. This is especially the case with the political, intellectual and bureau-cratic elites, for they are mostly from the "real" middle class (1965: 395, 502, 445). His analysis of the class background of the economic elite Is especially revealing. In examining the backgrounds of 611 directors he found at least 19 7 persons who could with a variety of criteria be shown to have had a middle class social origin. The criteria used here included the father's occupation Cfor example, doctor, lawyer, clergyman, army officer, managerial) and where the father's occupation could not be established those with university edu-cation were included. (1965: 292) First of a l l , he has decided to treat the l i f e style and value consump-tion-related variable of education as a sufficient condition for mem-bership in a certain class. Second, and more important, when we exam-ine his examples of middle class occupations we discover that not only has he 'synthesized* his own class system, but he has taken Blishen's seven occupational classes and 'synthesized' them. These occupations f a l l within Blishen's top two occupational classes. They are only "middle class" in terms- of Porter's shifted definition of the "real middle class". They are not middle clas s in the sense of a statistical middle majority, for they compose the top eleven percent of the labor force C1965: 163). How Porter has synthesized the variables of l i f e style, value consumption, and the attribute o f occupation is completely unexplicated. Furthermore, his 'synthesis' is incomplete: i f doctors and lawyers are middle class occupations, and at the same time are listed in Blishen's top occupational class, what constitutes an upper class occupation? Finally, his declaration that classes constructed in terms of occupa-tions "are no more than statistical strata" (1965: 161) seems incon-sistent with his use of Blishen's occupational scale In linking class and power. The result of the distinction between the "real mid-dle class" and the statistical "middle majority" is that the structure of class and the links between class and power are entirely 'synthetic' The manifest purpose of making this distinction was to bring into question our "widespread social image of middle classness" (1965: 125). Having made this distinction, he then argues that 90 percent of the population are in the 'lower classes' because only 10 percent, or so, had incomes C$8,000+) which would allow them a middle class l i f e style (1965: 132). What he has done, however, is to violate what Schutz (1964: 19) has called the postulates of adequacy and consis-tency. In defining what the middle class "really" is , he does not con-sult any actors in the everyday world to see what they take the middle class to "really" be. Given his stated purpose, such a consultation or sampling, is necessary to determine i f his "typical construction would be reasonable and understandable for the actor himself as well as for his fellow-man" (Schutz, 1964: 19). This violation of the pos-tulate of adequacy leads to the situation where, i f members define middle classness differently, e.g., in terms of the ownership of gadgetry rather than the consumption of certain values, Porter's ana-lysis, discussion and conclusion are irrelevant to his purpose. If gadgetry ownership is the prime criteria in members' minds for mid-dle classness, which seems highly likely, then Porter's (1965: 131) finding that "such gadgetry gets distributed in some proportion in a l l income classes," e.g., "more than 80 percent had electric washers, telephones and television sets; and 75 percent had automobiles and vacuum cleaners" (1965: 130), can be taken as evidence to support the Canadian social image of middle classness. Besides violating the postulate of consistency (Schutz, 1964: 19) by shifting the meaning of class in making this distinction, he violates i t by shifting his use of the term class. In Chapter One (1965: 11) he had said that no data was available on the subjective side of class and therefore he would use the term class in the sense of " a r t i f i c i a l statistical groups." However, his actual use of the term in attempting to link class and power necessarily implies that i t is a "real" entity, "real" defined in terms of his shifted meaning of class. This shift in use is apparent in the statement: "The majority of Canadian political leaders have been drawn from the middle class" (1965: 395), riot from the middle majority. His use of class at a number of points reflects these shifts. He writes of "sociological and psychological elements" of "social class position" C1965: 183) which "help preserve the various social milieus of class" Q965: 193). A non-awareness of the different milieux of classes makes for a "class determined education system" (1965: 172) which affects mobility. Important to mobility is the university where members of the lower class (classes?) learn the "appropriate modes of behavior" (1965: 283) to enable them to succeed in the "mid-dle class occupational world" (1965: 284). When discussing elites, he discovers, that in effect, the large daily newspapers are "instru-ments of an established upper class" (1965: 463) (which suggests the existence of class consciousness and class interests, at least among the upper class). And in the process of examining the "class back-ground" (1965: 483) of elites he discovers the existence and interde-pendence of "class institutions" and "class continuity" (1965: 285). A l l of these ways of talking about class and class-related phenomena can only be understood i f we do not attempt to operate in terms of classes as a r t i f i c i a l statistical groups lacking coherence and unity. If one is operating with the notion of classes as socially isolated groups, then these ways of talking make sense. But since Porter says he won't deal with real social groups, because data are un-available on class consciousness, the only way his analysis of class is understandable is 1.) i f we accept the distinction between middle class and middle majority, and the accompanying, unexplicated shift of the constitutive accent from class consciousness to social isolation as the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of real classes, and 2.) i f , for the purpose of doing his analysis", we allow him to 'transcend' his original position and treat classes as 'real' rather than as a r t i f i c i a l statistical groups. Even i f we were to grant him these considerable liberties, his analysis would s t i l l be 'inade-quate' for his expressed purpose of dethroning the reigning middle class image of Canada. Since he does not know how members define 'middle class,' he has no way of knowing whether his analysis disproves their social image. In fact, i t may do the reverse i f members define middle class in terms of the ownership of gadgetry. In spite of his conceptual confusion and inconsistency, however, his analysis is "understandable" ori a common-sense level, because we are familiar with everyday and social scientific usages of the term 'class' and, on this level, neither Porter nor the readers are bound by the canons of science CSchutz, 1964: 76-77). However, The Vertical Mosaic » is a social scientific work bound by the canons of science. Therefore i t is incumbent upon its author, i f he is to adequately describe the structure of class and to link class and power, to 1.) explicitly state the relevance criteria used to select the class variables of l i f e style and value consumption, 2.) enumerate the classes within his system, 3. ) describe the l i f e style and value consumption pattern of each class, 4. ) present, in some form, the data upon which these descriptions were based, along with a methodological note, 5.) state how variables were synthesized to determine class membership of elites and 6.) ex-plain how class boundaries were arrived at. The consequence of not meeting any of these requirements, or some such set (cf. Gross:1949), is that his analysis of class and his linkage of class and power are scientifically without foundation. * * * Had Porter recognized and resolved these problems he would have been in a position to not only provide an adequate and accurate description of the structure of class and of the link between class and power, but might have been led to recognize an Important, latent, finding in his work. Besides being able to tightly link ethnicity and class, and recognizing that "social control by the charter group" (1965: 71-2) would be more aptly labeled "class control," had Porter laid a founda-tion for his reconstituted concept of classes-as-socially-isolated-groups he might have discovered the class nature of the two social mechanisms which he says (1965: 526-8) serve to co-ordinate elites into a power structure: kinship and friendship. He found numerous kinship links within and between elites, as well as friendships "resulting from living together or having common experience of the same kind of social l i f e . " (1965: 527) In fact, his concept of elite presupposes a shared class background. This can be deduced from his statement that "Validity of the concept 'elite' rests on the probability that the individuals assigned to the group are socially homogeneous" (1965: 303). "Social homogeneity" is not a function of the relationship between frequency of interaction and positive feelings within the elite group. While It Is true that members of an elite undoubtedly become more socially homo-geneous, and probably group-consclous, validity of the concept 'elite' rests on the probability that the individuals 'assigned to the group are (already) socially homogeneous.' This formulation raises the ques-tion of how new members of the middle class can be socially homogeneous with members of upper class in the economic elite. It seems clear, however, that Porter already had the framework for establishing a solid rather than surreptitious link between class and power. Unless he did not recognize this 'latent' finding in his work, this 'pulled-punch' has to be treated as an example of the tactic of undrawn con-clusions within his overall 'strategy of respectability.' Footnotes Class consciousness is the characteristic Porter emphasizes in his definition of classes as social groups. His original formu-lation of an objective, statistical 'class' system composed of a r t i f i c i a l groups emphasizes the characteristic of vertial order, while excluding the other three characteristics. Porter also implicitly draws upon the fourth characteristic, distinctness of  interests, when he tells us that large daily newspapers are "instruments of an established upper class" (1965: 463). Unless that class has distinct interests, its instruments of propaganda have no raisort d'etre. Chapter Four The Legitimate Structure of Power The problems of logical consistency in Porter's analysis of class are mirrored in his analysis of power. As with class, we find Porter shifting his meaning and use of the concept of power. As with class, we find that he 'transcends' his original definition, but in this case his analysis cannot be logically done without such a shift. And, as with class, this shift can only be 'understood' by drawing upon 'what everyone knows,' by treating common-sense and discipline-common knowledge of what power "really" is as a resource. According to Porter (.1965: 201): "Power means the recognized right to make effective decisions on behalf of a group of people." The notion of effective decision making is probably drawn from Lasswell and Kaplan CL950: 74-102), since Porter footnotes them a number of times in his discussion of power. They define power relationally as a policy decision, involving severe sanctions, which is obeyed, i.e., the decision is effective. The idea of "recognized right" appears to be his own formulation and to have two distinct dimensions: internal and external. The internal dimension is the more obvious one: an A makes decisions as a recognized and legitimate representative of a group of people, B. For his analysis, this means that elites are representatives of their institutions. The external dimension appears as the more Important one: a l l A's recognize each other's weight, scope and domain of power (cf. Lasswell and Kaplan, 1950: 77) as legi-timate. As Porter (1965: 214) puts i t : In this respect the 'rights' about which we have spoken and which appear to limit the exercise of power (sic) are really the rights of institutional elites to organize and carry out their activities. If one elite threatens these rights i t will be challenged by other elites whose positions are threatened. As to how these rights are safeguarded and maintained, he tells us that they "come from the tradition of independence built up by elite groups within a system of juridical norms" (1965: 214) (emphasis added). In that Porter identifies power as legitimate, his concept differs radically from most theorists, who follow Weber (1968: 53) in distinguishing between power and authority. Porter (1965: 266-7) responds that the distinction is spurious because "any form of power can be rationalized as good" and legitimacy is relative. He argues that any type of regime, no matter how tyrannical, may appear as legi-timate to the ruled. Going from this point, he tells us that power must be obeyed to exist and that i t is within the province of power to obtain obedience. Then comes a pivotal point: "If power and obedience are thus correlative, and i f obedience requires the sense of legitimacy, can there be such a thing as Illegitimate power?" (1965: 266) (emphasis added). He answers in the negative and adds that, furthermore, by shifting perspectives and looking at a l l sides in disputes, a l l power can be seen as legitimate or illegitimate: i t depends upon whose side you want to take. He concludes that, "At most such a distinction applies only in periods of social transition... when the prevailing values are being called into question." (1965: 226). In Porter's view, Canada was not into such a period in the early sixties.^" Logical and Utilitarian Problems This argument and formulation can be criticized on logical and utilitarian grounds. In terms of his argument, i t is illogical to suppose that "obedience requires the sense of legitimacy" and yet hold that " i t is within the sphere of power to apply sanctions and thereby defeat resistance and retain obedience." (1965: 226) If there is resistance, and i t is necessary to secure obedience through the application of negative sanctions, then quite obviously obedience, in this case, is not forthcoming out of a sense of the legitimacy of the command or commander. Therefore, obedience does riot necessarily require the sense of legitimacy. Furthermore, i f i t is within the province of 'power' to apply sanctions, i t is also within the province of 'power' to secure obedience by threatening to apply sanctions. In both cases 'power' and obedience are correlative, but not necessarily linked by the "sense of legitimacy." Where obedience does require the "sense of legitimacy" is in authority 2 relations (Bachrach and Baratz, 1963: 638). Since Porter does not dis-tinguish between power and authority and defines a l l power as l e g i t i -mate (as authority), he is unable to analyze those situations where decisions are effective but not legitimate. As will be apparent, this is a fatal conceptual flaw. Given this flaw in his conceptualization of power, we are faced with important questions as to the usefulness of his concept for analyzing the structure of power in Canada. If he takes his definition seriously, a l l that he can actually describe is the formal structure of rights as reflected in the configuration of juridical norms which determine the weight, scope and domain of elites' power (cf. Lasswell and Kaplan, 1950: 77). Furthermore, i f these jurisdictional rights are "recognized," then there is no reason for elites to be in conflict. Where there is inter-elite conflict, then obviously jurisdictional rights are not "recognized," they are in dispute. If such is the case, then the nature of inter-elite relations is not one of "power" as defined by Porter. This logical problem begins to emerge at the end of the fir s t chapter (1965: 27r-8) when Porter tells us that inter-elite conflict can be seen "at those points where new possibilities appear for exploitation of social resources." Later on he calls these the "hinge points of change where new options are to be taken up." (1965: 44) However, the whole notion of hinge points and new options as the focus of elite con- f l i c t , implies that "recognized rights" don't exist or aren't clear. Otherwise, there would be no conflict. The fact that there is conflict between elites and that one side does 'take up new options,' cannot be accounted for or analyzed with a concept of power that a priori identifies a l l power as legitimate, as "recognized." Rights must be established, and i t is 'real power' which allows one side to take up an option and, through time, to establish that option as rightfully theirs. Thus, what is required is what has been discarded: a distinction between power, e.g., effective decision-making, and authority, e.g., the recognized right to make effective decisions. To be sure, even this distinction is crude, for i t does not distinguish power from force, or formal from substantive authority (cf. Bachrach and Baratz, 1963), but i t is basic and necessary for any analysis of the structure of power. Power Transcended When we turn to examine Porter's discussion and analysis of the structure of power we Immediately discover that, just as with class, he 'transcends' his constricted definition in the process of doing his analysis. As with class, he is 'understandable' because the wor3 "power" is so often used in everyday talk, the media, and in professional wri-tings. It is a resource which he draws upon and uses in familiar, but inconsistent ways. If we wish to pin down the discipline-common ori -gins of the concepts he utilizes, i t seems that we could point to at least Weber and Lasswell and Kaplan. Weber's (1968: 53) concept of power as Dahrendorf points out (1959: 166), is personal: power is an attribute of a person rather than of a role or position. This notion of power is especially evident when Porter (1965: 551) tells us that CD. Howe, the minister of defense production in 1955, "was probably the most powerful man in that adminis-tration." In terms of the formal organization of the cabinet, i.e., the structure of "recognized rights," we could have never arrived at this conclusion. However, what is being dealt with in this statement is an actor rather than his role. What is being drawn upon in this state-ment is "the possibility that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests." (Weber, 1968: 53). It is within the analysis of inter-elite conflict that we would expect Porter to put his concept of power to the greatest and clearest use. Instead, we discover that important examples of inter-elite con-f l i c t cannot be understood using his definitions of power. They can only be taken as legitimate examples of power relations i f we understand power, as do Lasswell and Kaplan (1950: 74), to be effective decision-making, without such decision-making being necessarily a "recognized right." When he presents the case of the nationalization of the Cana-dian Northern and Grant Trunk railways by the Conservatives early in this century (1965: 543), he mentions that "the cabinet minister responsible for the railway nationalization plan, was denounced as a socialist." It is surprising that Porter did not recognize that this dispute and the accusation of 'socialism' revolved around the question of the legitimate scope of government, i.e.,the "recognized right to make effective decis-ions" was apparently in question. The inadequacy of his concept of power is further reflected in the fact that "this period was an impor-tant one in shaping present day Canada." (1965: 544) This statement attests to the fact that the configuration of recognized rights is shaped by what other analysts would call "power". If "power means the recognized right...," then, for the sake of consistency and rigour, Porter should have generated another term besides 'power' which would have met his analytical needs. The British Columbia Electric dispute, which Porter called a "striking example of the conflict between political and economic elites" (1965: 548), also serves as a striking example of the inadequacy of his concept of power. He writes of the "long legal battle" which followed the expropriation of B.C.E. by Premier Bennett in 1961 and of the 1963 B.C. Supreme Court decision of Chief Justice Sherwood Lett to the effect that "the expropriation proceedings of 1961 were illegal and unconstitu-tional." (Porter, 1965: 549). Between 1961 and the 1963 court decision, the B.C. government had run B.C.E. under the name of "The British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority," and had reaped a profit of twenty million dollars. B.C. Power Corporation, the legal "father" of B.C.E., felt that i t should receive compensation for profit loss during the interim, plus an addi-tional cheque to cover the difference between what the Government paid for expropriation and the actual value of B.C.E. This last point was much more of a concern to B.C. Power Corporation than the fact of ex-propriation itself. On September 27, 1963 the two sides reached an out of court agreement at the prodding of Chief Justice Lett, who had decided the real worth of B.C.E. and, consequently, how much the Provincial Govern-ment had yet to pay. The payment did not include compensation for loss of earnings. After settlement, Attorney General Bonner stated that the Lett decision, which pronounced the expropriation illegal and unconstitu-tional, had been set aside and could not be formally entered as a judg-ment. The Chairman of B.C. Power Corporation said the judgment would s t i l l stand as a legal authority, as a precedent. The counsel for B.C. P.C. took the position that as a result of the judgment B.C. Hydro and Power Authority had no legal existence or authority (Ardies, 1963: 1-2). The striking conclusion to be drawn, which Porter ignored, is that an effective decision was made by a B.C. political elite in 1961 which went beyond the recognized institutional scope of that elite's power. Two years later, Bennett's 'decision' was declared to have bro-ken the all-important system of juridicial norms which safeguards the autonomy of institutions. Two months later, when the dispute was re-solved, the Provincial Government treated the solution as victory (Sher-man, 1966: 277). Their decision was s t i l l effective, even though i t was s t i l l "illegal and unconstitutional." This uncomfortable fact was simply downplayed and bypassed with rhetoric of a possible post facto constitu-tional amendment (Ardies, 1963: 2). Thus i t should be abundantly clear that Porter's original concept of power is inappropriate, inadequate and misleading as an ana-lytical tool for describing relations between elites. His concept ignores the possible variation in bases of obedience, thereby allowing him to identify a l l power as legitimate, as consisting of the "recognized right to make effective decisions." Logically, a l l that can be done with this formulation is to delimit the formal structure of power as reflected in a system of juridical norms. The actual structure of power revealed at the "hinge points of change," and during "border disputes," cannot be analyzed. When Porter does attempt to expose the actual structure of power, he necessarily transcends his definition of power and draws upon other discipline-common conceptualizations. The apparent coherence and rigour of his analysis, however, depends upon his and the readers' know-ledge of what power 'really' i s , rather than upon the consistent and logical use of his definition of i t . Thus while there is no founda-tion supporting Porter's structure of class, there is a foundation under his structure of power. The problem is that i t is both too narrow and faulty to offer any support. 1. Given his avowed evolutionary perspective in writing The Vertical  Mosaic (Porter, 1970: 181), and his statement that a "macro-orientation requires a time dimension rather than the static or 'moment in time' orientation of equilibrium theory" (Porter, 1970: 152-3), i t is surprising that he formulates a 'static' con-cept of power chosen to analyze one 'moment In time.' 2. Bachrach and Baratz take Lasswell and Kaplan's formulation of autho-rity as "formal power" (1950: 133) to be inadequate because i t identifies a l l law as legitimte, without accounting for 'how mem-bers see i t . ' The "sense of legitimacy" 'resides' within the commanded's consciousness rather than in the law. Chapter Five The Ambiguous Context of E l i t i s t Democracy The "meaning" and significance of the class and power struc-tures in Canada can only be determined within a normative context. Such a context is provided by democratic theory. Unfortunately, there are a number of democratic theories. We have mentioned thorough-going democratic theory and the theory of democratic elitism. There are others.^" Which theory of democracy Porter is operating in terms of is ambiguous: thus, so are the meaning and significance of his findings. The theory he appears to operate with is the one which robs his findings of import. Had he treated democracy as a topic he would have been led to some important conclusions and could have provided The VM with a critical context. Early in Chapter One of The VM Porter mentions the importance of defining and clarifying terms "to avoid misunderstanding and con-fusion" (1965: 6). Unfortunately, he does not define and clarify what he means by "democracy." He trades on common sense notions of democracy when he discusses social images of equality and diffused power in the f i r s t chapter. When discussing the Canadian political 2 system in Chapter Twelve he makes Robert Lynd's distinction between "liberal democracy," which combines democracy in the "political" sphere with capitalism in the economic sphere, and "thorough-going democracy" which expresses and implements democratic values in a l l spheres. While he does mention in the final chapter that "Canada...has a long way to go to become in any sense a thorough-going democracy" (1965: 557), for a variety of reasons, i t appears that The VM is presented within an elite democratic context. The appearance of democratic elitism as the context has to be extrapolated from his statements and the ethico-theoretical perspec-tives he employed. If he were value-consistent with his 1961 posi-tion we would expect him to explicitly employ a thorough-going democra-tic framework. In spite of his mention of this framework, the logic and thrust of his argument against liberal democracy do the work of rejecting a thorough-going democratic framework and suggesting a demo-cratic e l i t i s t one. This is because both the liberal and thorough-going theories are essentially normative while the e l i t i s t brand of democracy is a descriptive, "empirical" theory. It is the latter type which Porter seeks. In the last chapter, Porter sketches the 19th century liberal theory of democracy. This theory assumed that man was rational and i f given equality of opportunity and the right to participate in decision-making he would build a society wherein he could realize his human potential and find happiness. Porter rejects this theory. To use the liberal theory as a basis for empirical research into the processes of power would be absurd in view of the frequency with which that theory has been empirically re-futed. (1965: 556) On the last page of the text of The VM he reiterates that: The nineteenth-century notion of a liberal citizen-participa-ting democracy is obviously not a satisfactory model by which to examine the processes of decision-making in either the eco-nomic or political context. (1965: 558) Of course, here he is referring to the important voting studies of the f i f t i e s , especially Vo ting by Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee (1954), which definitely undermined the liberal assumption that man is rational, competent and interested when i t comes to participating in politics. Even those, such as Graeme Duncan and Steven Lukes, who opposed the conclusions which the studies drew, had to agree that "the voters f a i l to satisfy most of the traditional requirements of democracy" (1967: 166). What Porter apparently did not recognize in his acceptance of the popular rejections of liberal democratic theory is that i f these 'empirical refutations' are valid for liberal democratic theory, they provide an even stronger refutation of thorough-going democracy. This is true because the only relevant differences between these types of democratic theory is in the domain and amount of citizen-participa-tion. Whereas liberal democracy calls for, at least, representative democracy within the "political" sphere, i.e., government, thorough-going democratic theory requires participatory democracy in a l l the major spheres of society, e.g., government, economy, education. Fur-thermore, both theories of democracy share the same assumptions regard-ing rational "democratic man" (the brother of rational economic man), as well as the same normative ends, "to provide the conditions for the f u l l and free development of the essential human capacities of a l l the members of the society" (Macpherson, 1965: 37).^ Thus the arguments and data put forward in the voting studies, which empirically destroy the underpinning assumptions of liberal democratic theory, undermine thorough-going democratic theory in the same manner. Both theories are non-empirical, descriptively inadequate and inaccurate. It is quite clear from Porter's statements, quoted above, that he requires that democratic theory provide a "satisfactory model" to guide empirical research. The one theory which can do that, and within which his study appears to be done, is the one suggested by the voting researchers. The conclusion that Berelson, et. a l . , reached is not that we should rededicate ourselves to the realization of democracy via education and realignment of the present system with democratic theory. Rather, they concluded that democratic theory was out of alignment with social realities and therefore needed to be re-formulated. In that the democratic system in the U.S. had survived and grown, they concluded that "where the classic theory is defective is in its concentration on the individual citizen" (1954: 312). This led them to examine the "requirements for the survival of the total democratic system" (1954: 322) and adopt an e l i t i s t theory of democracy. This new theory followed the lines set down by Joseph Schum-peter in Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. It had as central a couple of new twists on classical liberal democratic theory. Demo-cracy is now conceived of as simply "a political method, that is to say, a certain type of institutional arrangement for arriving at poli-tical. ..decisions and hence incapable of being an end in itself, irrespective of what decisions i t will produce under given historical conditions" (1950: 242). Thus, the ethical end of democracy, "to provide the conditions for the f u l l and free development of the essen-tia l human capacities of a l l the members of the society" (Macpherson, 1965: 37), is done away with. The second twist in this new theory is that the democratic method, i.e., "democracy," is defined as "that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive strug-gle for the people's vote" (1950: 269). Central to the democratic method are the "rules of the game" which operate to maintain the required institutional arrangement.^ From Seymour Martin Lipset's Political Man we can abstract two major rules of the game. The fir s t is the compromise rule: No group is to desire any one thing too much, so much that i t cannot abide defeat by the majority. The second is the cross-pressures rule: Interests must not line up in the same way for the same people (1960: 1-24). If proce-dures, institutions and values exist which assure compromise and cross-pressures, the system wil l experience enough conflict to be progressive but will be cohesive enough to have consensus. Not surprisingly, given the Cold War experience of these theorists, the major concern of demo-cratic elitists has been the stability of their "democratic" system. The result of this "empirically adequate" theory is that a situation is labelled as democratic where elites, playing by the rules of the game, compete with each other, within the "political" sphere, during elections. Thus democratic elitism is s t i l l "liberal:" state and society are separated, but government "by the people" is replaced by "government approved by the people" (Schumpeter, 1950: 246). That Porter is working within this theory has already been suggested in light of his e l i t i s t and functionalist ethico-theoretical perspectives. The latter perspective divides society into sectors, with a political sub-system, and defines the Good in terms of the whole, the total social system. The former perspective is a direct resource for democratic elite theorists, with its emphasis on the circulation of elites (Pareto). In fact, the only theory of demo-cracy which is compatible with (not to mention dependent upon) the existence of strong elites is Schumpeter-Lipset's. When he presents the theory of elites he is, whether he real-izes i t or not, supporting and presenting a central feature of em-pirical e l i t i s t democratic theory. Elites both compete and co-operate with one another: they compete to share in the making of decisions of major impor-tance for the society, and they co-operate because together they keep the society working as a going concern....It is elites who have the capacity to introduce change, but changes bring about shifts in the relations between elites. Because they a l l have power as their institutional right they can check each other's power, and, therefore, co-operation and accommodation, as well as conflict, characterize their rela-tions. (1965: 27) This quote can be treated as a restatement of the consensus-conflict motif within the literature of democratic elitism. It is also central to the equilibrium model within functionalist theory. Within this quote i t is also important to note that innovation, change, or "crea-tive behaviour" as Porter put i t in 1961, is expected to occur at the top. On the next page, while rejecting the notion of change com-ing from below, in the form of class conflict, he suggests that these classes "may, however, be the source of important dynamic elements to be mobilized by institutional leaders" (1965: 28). Thus he displays some of the attitudes which are essential characteristics of the demo-cratic e l i t i s t position. When Porter discusses the Canadian Political System he draws upon democratic e l i t i s t theory. In a differentiated pluralistic society there will not be general agreement on the means to be employed to reach these ~ general values (of progress and improvement). There will, how-ever, be some agreement on the ground rules. There are con-stitutional ground rules, but at the same time there is a body of political conventions which political parties observe, one of the most important being that the political party in power permits its rivals to exist. The two-party system is a func-tionally appropriate way of mediating the 'conservative' and 'progressive' social forces. (1965: 367) In "pluralistic" society the "ground rule" which Porter mentions is a derivation of Lipset's compromise rule. Porter's functionalist approach meshes nicely with democratic elitism, as we find conflict and consensus producing equilibrium via a two-party system of "con-servative" and "progressive" elites. Unfortunately, Canada does not have "conservative" and "progressive" social forces institutionalized in her two-party system. "The dialogue is between unity and discord rather than progressive and conservative forces" (1965: 369), with the "maintenance of national unity" as the major goal. Any "polarization to right and left in Canadian politics is regarded as disruptive. Consequently the main focus of Canadian politics has been to the right and the maintenance of the status quo" (1965: 369). Canada has "brokerage" rather than "creative" politics: too much consensus and not enough conflict. This is an important point, for Porter has shifted from treating democratic elitism as a "satisfactory model" to guide empirical research, to a treatment of democratic elitism wherein the latter is treated as providing a normative criteria for evaluating the Canadian poli-tical system. Thus, what Gad Horowitz (1965: 14) took to be the major point of Porter's work, is made within, and is entirely depen-dent upon a democratic e l i t i s t framework. A Value Contradiction As with Porter's assumption of the ethico-theoretical per-spectives of elite analysis and functionalism, his utilization of, and dependence upon, the theory of democratic elitism is a contrad-diction of his 1961 value position. In his 1961 essay he was a fer-vent supporter of socialist, thorough-going democracy, which conflicts with democratic elitism on at least six points: 1. Where Robert Lynd's favored theory sees democracy as both a method and an ethical end, democratic elitism sees i t only as a method. 2. Where thorough-going democracy defines the citizens' in-terest as both in the end result and in the production of that end result through participation; 'democratic elitism defines their interests one-dimensionally in terms of end results, e.g., 'more butter and guns.' In fact, the latter theory sees a certain level of apathy and non-participation as functional for the system. Non-voters and occasional voters provide flexibility and stability for the system (Berelson, et. al,, 1954: 316). 3. Where thorough-going theory aims at assuring equality of condition and power, e l i t i s t democracy is concerned only with equal opportunity to gain the prerequisites of power, i.e., elite status. 4. While the former theory defines as "political" any decision-making which significantly affects societal values, the latter theory operates within a liberal tradition and limits its definition of political to governmental decision-making and that which relates to i t . 5 . While the former theory relies upon broadening social par-ticipation to counter the authoritarian propensity of both the elites and the masses, the latter theory relies upon the elites to safeguard the democratic system against the authoritarian masses. 6. Thus democratic elitists view the elite-mass structure of modern society as being in the best interests of democracy, while thorough-going democrats wish to breakdown and de-centralize this structure as much as possible.** Put simply, Porter's use of democratic elitism as a resource  constitutes the major value inconsistency of The VM. His confused and confusing use of "democracy" suggests that this major inconsistency may be explained as a consequence of Porter only being familiar enough with the literature on democracy to draw upon the general features of the discipline-popular, respectable, theory of democratic elitism. This would help account for two of his errors: 1. He approvingly mentioned thorough-going democracy without apparently realizing that he must reject that theory on the same grounds that he accepts the refutation of liberal democracy: both are 'empirically unsound.' 2. At the same time, however, he drew upon democratic elitism as the "satisfactory model" to guide his empirical research; but then turned around and treated that theory normatively when he discovered 'too much' consensus and 'not enough' conflict, in Canadian politics. There is a third "error" which follows upon the previous two. When Porter turns around and uses democratic elitism as more than an empirical theory, i.e., as a normative theory, he allows and instructs us to treat a l l of The VM in terms of the normative criteria provided by democratic elitism. Thus, while i t is unquestionably the case that "Canada...has a long way to go to become in any sense a thorough-going democracy" (1965: 557), the latter theory is empirically unsound and therefore is not to be used. The road to becoming a full-blown e l i t i s t democracy is to be taken instead, and, not surprisingly, i t is a shorter road. A l l that is needed is a bit more money spent on elite education, and a circulation of elites, perhaps bringing the NDP into office. This liberal, e l i t i s t answer is soothing, as i t was to the ColdWar warriors of the early sixties in the U.S. But the respect-ability of The VM is only gained at the sake of down-playing, i f not doing away with, the ethical ends democracy should pursue. Even i f we were to lower the requirements of scholarship and allow his unfamiliarity with the literature on democracy, we would s t i l l expect him to recognize the major conflicts between the general features of liberal democratic elitism and socialist thorough-going democracy. However, even in 1961, his stock of knowledge as a social-ist may have provided him with the central tenets of thoroughgoing democracy, without him being familiar with the literature on democracy, per se. This is not to say that the label of "value inconsistent" is inappropriately applied in Porter's case. Rather, Porter should be labelled value inconsistent, as well as "theoretically innocent," to use CP. Wolf's charitable description of Porter (1970: xix) . Were we to be less charitable, we might say that the lack of any foundation for his analysis of class; the narrow, faulty foundation for his ana-lysis of power; and his loose employment of a democratic e l i t i s t con-tent suggest theoretical ignor-ance. Footnotes 1. See CB. Macpherson (1965). 2. Porter's "Power and Freedom in Canadian Democracy" appears, at key points, to be a Canadian version of Lynd's 1957 essay, "Power as a Problem and Resource in American Society." 3. What Porter means by "citizen-participating democracy" (1965: 558) is apparently Jeffersonian, participatory democracy. However, nineteenth-century liberal democratic theory variously called for participatory or representative (J.S. Mill) democracy. The latter has become the twentieth-century form of liberal democracy. 4. Macpherson here refers to the shared goal of liberal democracy, "Communist" democracy and the classic, pre-liberal democracy of Rousseau now popular in the "underdeveloped" countries. It is the latter form of democracy, of Macpherson's three, which may be called "thorough-going." 5. The rejection of democracy-as-an-end has created a curious normative vacuum for elite theorists, which has been f i l l e d by the "rules of the game." As we've witnessed in the U.S. during the past decade, the rules of the game are elevated above democratic ideals by elites. This has been especially so when i t is the masses who, in complete and foolish ignorance of the new theory of democracy, call for the realization of those outdated ideals. 6. These six points owe much to Peter Bachrach's comparison of demo-cratic elitism and what he calls "modern self-developmental demo-cracy" (1967). The major d i f f e r e n c e between the l a t t e r theory and thorough-going democracy i s on point three i n the text. Where thorough-going democracy c a l l s f o r e quality of condition, Bachrach only c a l l s f o r e q u a l i t y of opportunity. On t h i s point Porter may a c t u a l l y be c l o s e r to Bachrach than to Lynd, Chapter Six The Critical Context of Democracy Had Porter treated democracy seriously, and familiarised him-self with the literature, he would have discovered that the liberal and the thorough-going theories of democracy cannot be empirically re-futed. In the process he would have come to realize the difference between "normative" and "descriptive" theories. This would have a l -lowed him to use a descriptive theory heuristically to uncover the relationships between class, democracy, power and ideology, while retaining his normative theory as a yardstick, to measure the State of Canada. A l l this, however, would have required Porter to operate with a strategy of integrity rather than respectability. What the authors of the voting studies ignored, and what Porter apparently wasn't aware of, is that while i t is possible to "empirically refute" the liberal theory of democracy as descriptively inadequate, no amount of empirical data can refute i t , or thorough-going democracy, on grounds of normative "inadequacy," i.e., facts cannot refute values. On this issue, Duncan and Lukes have pointed out that the pre-liberal and liberal theories of Rousseau and J.S. Mill "are a critique of reality in terms of a vision of human nature and possibilities, and for this reascn cannot simply be refuted on the grounds that people do not satisfy the required standards and that soi- distant 'democracies' nonetheless survive" (1967: 171). That leading social scientists would turn their backs on liberal democratic theory when the facts showed the U.S. to be less 64 the ideal democracy than i t was portrayed to be, has to be under-stood in terms of the historical conditions since World War II. The Cold War had the U.S. locked in mortal combat with the "Red Menance." To be critical of the American political system was to play into the hands of the International Communist Conspiracy. Besides, i t was quite clear to almost everyone in the U.S. that they were better off under what-was-rcalled-democracy than they would have been under Communism. Thus a questionable continuum-yardstick was set up by Raymond Aron in 1950 (and referred to approvingly in The VM). "Soviet" and "west-ern" societies were formulated as ideal types residing at opposite ends of the continuum. In this way citizens and social scientists in the western societies could compare their society to Russian society, instead of comparing their society to the ideal of liberal democracy. The result was self-satisfied celebration rather than self-critical honesty. "Empirically adequate,descriptive, e l i t i s t democratic theory developed as an historical product of this period. It descri-bed that which existed, labelled i t "democracy," and that was 'em-pirically adequate' for essentially practical purposes. Had Porter recognized the false refutation of liberal demo-cratic theory and the empirical adequacy of democratic elitism he could have safely retained thorough-going democracy as a yardstick and used democratic elitism heuristically. The use of the latter would have required uncharacteristic diligence on Porter's part so as to not f a l l into the liberal apologist trap of treating democratic elitism normatively. Assuming that that could have been accommplished, let us now turn to the discoveries and undrawn conclusions hidden wtihin the respectable pages of The VM. The first discovery has to do with brokerage politics. If Porter had treated democracy as a topic he would have been able to improve his explanation of brokerage politics by examining the rela-tionship of the two "rules of the game" stated in the previous chap-ter. Brokerage politics can be best explained in terms of the working of the government itself. If both political parties "are closely linked with corporate enterprise" (1965: 368), then there are inadequ-ate cross-pressure, which is a violation of rule two. As a consequence of rule one working where number two is violated, you have l i t t l e con-f l i c t , with agreement or compromise as the general state of affairs. One final result of the working out of rule one when rule two is vio-lated is a situation in which people care less and less about the issues that are involved, i.e., apathy. Apathy and brokerage poli-tics are to be expected as a result of the working out of the rules of the game in Canadian society. Furthermore, when both parties are rooted in corporate enterprise, and when corporate capitalism requires national unity for the sake of efficiency, brokerage politics on the  right are to be expected. Which is to say, the operation of the poli-tical system cannot be fully understood in a western society unless i t is examined within the larger, economic context, of corporate capi-talism. Had Porter treated democratic elitism heuristically within a corporate capitalist context he would have discovered that "democracy," as i t presently operates In Canada, serves upper class interests. This requires pulling together some of Porter's findings and drawing some provisional conclusions which suggest lines for future research. Mobility into the upper class is quite low (1965: 293) and looks to get worse because of the "increasing bureaucratization of the economic system through the development of the national corporation" (1965: 283). This is the case as a result of the small labour pool of middle and upper class college graduates provided by the class-determined education system in Canada. Porter pointed out that this "leads to an increasingly closed system of stratification" (1965: 283). However, there is a considerable amount of mobility into the middle class (1965: 51), which would seem to ensure the growth of the cor-porate labour pool. In the past, however, the most upwardly mobile middle class members have emigrated to the U.S. and elsewhere, while their positions have been taken by immigrants from other countries. The upshot of this situation is that the top of the class structure remains rigid and experiences high class continuity between genera-tions, while the classes below are in a state of flux and therefore experience much less class continuity. This situation needs to be set in a context of corporate capitalist society, where property rights and the legal fiction of the corporation-as-citizen account for the wealth which defines the upper as the upper class. Given this situation and its historical context, in whose favor do the rules of the game operate? The obvious answer is the upper class. Because of their high class continuity, and rootedness in the corporate system, they experience fewer cross pres-sures than any other class. Their class interests are more clearly visible to themselves as a result of their continuity, which suggests, as Porter constantly does, that they compose not only a socially iso-lated group, but they are group, i.e., class, conscious. A l l of Porter's findings point to almost a classical case of the existence of what Marx called a class-for-itself (1964: 187), which has the tactical advantage of any organized minority (Mosca) over any class-in-itself. The fact that the upper class faces fewer cross-pressures is apparent at the point where the violation of the rule of compromise would occur. The one point, paradoxically, where the upper class w i l l violate the first rule is on any occasion where the rules of the game themselves are called into question. At that point the legitimacy of 2 the authority of the governing class is in question and i t is naive to expect them, or their representative elite, to compromise their 3 power. A serious treatment of how the rules of the game are reflected in the institutional arrangement of democracy, integrated with a serious class analysis, along the lines set out above, would have had another pay off. If democracy-as-it-operates-now serves governing class 4 interests, and i f the descriptive content of Canada's three "social images" of middle classness and equality of opportunity and power are false (as the latter two certainly are), then liberal democracy is an ideology in Marx' sense (Lichtheim, 1967). This holds whether by " l i b -eral democracy" is meant classical liberal democracy or e l i t i s t liberal democracy, for Canada does not even meet the minimum requirements of democracy embodied in the latter theory. It does not have equality of opportunity and i t does not have the amount of mobility required for the individual "circulation of elites.""' It is the existence of liberal democracy as an ideology which legitimates and obscures the class-power structure. It keeps the "mosaic" vertical. The ideological function of liberal democratic theory re-veals the problematic nature of legitimacy. In order to handle this problem, Porter would have had to distinguish between power and author-ity. In that he gave two chapters on a discussion of the ideological elite, and declared that the popularity of Canada's "social.image" was due to the workings and WeltanschanUung of media people, i t is surpris-ing that he didn't recognize the separate but related nature of power/ authority and legitimacy. If he had paid attention to his problem and given a more thoughtful examination of the liberal democratic "social images" with which he begins his book, he might have realized the triadic nature of any social philosophy (Mills, 1963: 188). He draws upon liberal demo-cratic theory, and would have discovered its ideological nature had he used democratic e l i t i s t theory consciously and heuristically. An-other dimension should have been obvious to him: liberal democratic social philosophy provides a set of ideals. Members' belief that 'Canada is middle class,' 'We have equal opportunity' and 'We a l l share power' (1965: 3, 4, 6,) are not only descriptive statements, they have a normative content. If Canadians believe these statements are true, they are proud of i t . To any Canadian liberal democrat, 'Canada should be middle class,' 'We should have equal opportunity,' and 'we should share power.' Thus when Porter demonstrates the descriptive, or 'theoretical,' inadequacy of these social images, he also exposes the gap between the ideal and the actual. As has been discovered in studies of social change, the one universal motor cause of change is "lack of close  correspondence between the 'ideal' and the 'actual'" (Moore, 1963: 18). If Porter is correct in asserting that lack of educational faci-l i t i e s is the 'cause' of "mobility deprivation" (1965: 49), and i f we were correct in Chapter Two in concluding that i t is in the governing class' interest to depend upon immigrant technicians rather than shoulder an extra tax burden to expand Canadian educational facilities, then we may draw another provisional conclusion. By not recognizing the normative dimension of Canada's "social images," Porter misses the opportunity of pointing to potential class conflict and the de-legitimation of elites. To conclude this speculative excursion; had Porter used demo-cratic elitism heuristically, he would have recognized that democratic elitism is an ideology for elite consumption. It is an obstacle to the fulfillment of the ends which he believes a society should pursue. The answer surely lies in the desirability of social participa-tion in defining and achieving goals, in the release of the potential for a creative l i f e shared with others, governed not through competitiveness but through co-operation. (Porter, 1961: 35) Thorough-going democratic planning and decentralization w i l l never be instituted to achieve these ends as long as the belief persists, and i s propagated by well known social scientists, that what we have i s democracy, and that a l l that i s needed is expanded e l i t e education and circulation. The corrallory i s that any major change would auto-matically include loss of democracy. * * * Had Porter only used democratic elitism to guide his empirical research, while maintaining and clarifying his own value position vis-a-vis thorough-going democracy, he would have provided The Vertical  Mosaic with the one context within which his findings have the most significance and impact. What significance and impact the book does have i s muted because the context of his findings appears to be demo-cratic elitism. As a result, the book depends for impact upon what-everyone-knows about 'how things are supposed to be' in a democracy. However, since The VM i s a social s c i e n t i f i c work, and "democracy" i s anything but a simple, common-sense concept, democracy should have been treated as a topic rather than as a resource. In the end, his strategy of respectability cannot spare him from an unfavorable comparison with C. Wright M i l l s . Robert Lynd's criticism of Mills and The Power E l i t e i s even more strikingly appro-priate for John Porter and The Vertical Mosaic. Mi l l s ' failure to deal with the meanings for democracy of the impressive power trends he analyzes i s the colossal loose end of The Power E l i t e . (1968: 107) Footnotes 1. The "empirical" nature of democratic elitism was its major selling point among "apolitical," "value-free" social scientists who sought the respectability given the "hard" (read "real") scien-tists. 2. Porter's findings, when extricated from his inconsistencies and set upon firm foundations, point to the existence of what G. William Domhoff has called a "governing class." "A 'governing class' is a social upper class which owns a disproportionate amount of a country's wealth, receives a disproportionate amount of a country's yearly income, and contributes a disproportionate number of its members to the controlling institutions and key decision-making groups of the country" (1967: 5). 3. The recent FLQ crisis is an example of a case where the rules of the game were challenged on the basis of the legitimacy of the (English) governing class' domination of Quebec. The government of upper class member P.E. Trudeau refused to compromise until after Laporte was dead and the Englishman Cross was left. That "com-promise" was considered a victory by and for the government. 4. If this were not the case, we would certainly expect members of the governing class to be actively participating as members of the 'political" elite. As was pointed out in our discussion of "un-answered questions," members of the governing class see no threat from the middle class dominated political system, and therefore do not actively participate. 5. As Bottomore has pointed out (1964: 48), Pareto uses this concept at different times 1.) to refer to a process in which individuals circulate between the elite and the non-elite, or 2.) to refer to a process whereby one elite is replaced by another. My use of the concept refers to its former denotation. 6. Both of which are important from the evolutionary perspective which he espouses (1970: 181). As was mentioned in Chapter Two, Porter would have done wisely to have drawn upon conflict theory: "Every society rests on constraint of some of its members by others" (Dahrendorf, 1964: 103). Chapter Seven Summary and Conclusion Irving Louis Horowitz' declaration that The Vertical Mosaic "is the sociological study of present-day Canada" (1966: 862) is as sad as i t is true. This essay has attempted to counter the i n i t i a l euphoric reception of The VM by looking past its impressive array of data. In so doing, we have discovered conceptual confusion, theore-tical poverty and ethical duplicity. In light of Porter's 1961 value position the 'strategy of respectability' he appears to have employed in doing The VM consti-tutes ethical duplicity. In attempting to be "simultaneously polemi-cal and respectable" Porter muted his radicalism. He did make occa-sional use of polemical rhetoric. However, the fact that 1.) he formulated his concepts in so narrow a fashion, 2.) he did not ex-pli c i t l y answer the questions he raised, and 3.) he held off from drawing any controversial, even i f warranted, conclusions, assured his work of a warm reception in liberal circles. Aside from his presenta-tion, the major value inconsistencies were his adoption of an elitist-functionalist ethico-theoretical perspective, and the implicit use of democratic elitism as the theoretical context for his study. Porter's 'strategy of respectability' thus stands as an almost com-plete compromise of the socialist, thorough-going democratic value position he held in 1961. When we turn to the multiple conceptual and theoretical pro-74 blems in The VM, we find that, to a degree, they are a consequence of his 'strategy of respectability.' If Porter had not attempted to be so narrow and respectable in his definition of class, his distinction between "real middle class" and "middle majority" would not have been needed. If he had not tried to be respectable, he could have treat-ed class as a topic and provided a theoretical foundation for his ana-lysis of the structure of class in Canada. Had he not been blinded by respectability, he might have recognized that a theoretically strong link between class and power was already available to him, in the form of his data on elite kinship and friendship networks. If Porter had treated democracy as a topic, he would have been able to retain thorough-going democracy as a context, while using, rather than being used by, e l i t i s t democracy. Thus he would not have committed the logical inconsistencies of drawing unknowingly on contra-dictory theories of democracy. As the previous chapter suggested, the consistent, heuristic, use of one particular theory of democracy could have supplied Porter with a whole host of potentially fruitful hypo-theses. The 'strategy of respectability,' however, cannot account for the conceptual and theoretical problems surrounding Porter's use of power. He did treat power as a topic, but given that his analysis of the British Columbia Electric dispute 'transcends' his definition of power, i t is clear that his treatment was inadequate. Had he been more attuned to the relationship between values and science he might have recognized that, a l l along, his definition of power had been inappropriate for his analytical needs. Towards a Politics of Experience In conclusion, our analysis suggests two points. Both of these points are rooted in the everyday world and both can be treated programatically as 'external' answers to Porter's problems. Their intriguing feature, when taken together is that they appear programatic-ally paradoxical. From our perspective, the resolution of this paradox constitutes the major problem and hope for Political Sociology. The f i r s t point is that Porter would have produced a much finer and incisive piece of scholarship i f he had rigourously worked from the ethico-theoretical perspective he held in his 1961 essay. The benefits of a neo-Marxist approach have been suggested in the approach our criticismshave taken here. Programmatically speaking, Canadian Sociology, especially Porter's brand, has to get beyond vulgar, ideo-logical caricatures of Marxism and come to grips with the fact that Marxist analyses 'make more sense of the world' then do any other ap-proaches currently enjoying popularity among Political Sociologists in Canada. The second point is equally programmatic. Porter's theore-tical innocence and his dependency upon the everyday and discipline-common meanings of his concepts are not problems unique to him. The problem of conceptual confusion is a general one haunting a i l social scientists. This has to do with the fact that acts of scientific theorizing are essentially solitary, but the communication of scienti-fi c findings requires a return to the intersubjective reality of the everyday world. This "paradox of communication" (Schutz, 1962: 257) is especially problematic for social scientists because we operate with second degree constructs (Schutz, 1962: 6) expressed in terms derived from everyday usage (Berger, 1963: 25). This problem is further compounded by the existence of multiple and incompatible de-finitions of the same 'objects' within social science. Because we are members as well as scientists this paradox sometimes is not re-cognized as problematic, and therefore isn't provisionally resolved with the rigour and consistency demanded by science. As we have seen, in Porter's case, this paradox is both pro-blematic and unrecognized. However, in his case, as in the case of a l l conventional, 'positivist' social scientists the problem is even further compounded,. These sociologists find themselves dependent upon common-sense constructs, while at the same time attempting to rise above, and disassociate themselves from, common-sense. The criticisms in this essay have been offered entirely within Porter's 'paradigm.' The nature of his problems with communication, however, suggest that value consistency and positivist rigour aren't the final answers. What is needed in Political Sociology is the shift to a 'paradigm' which recognizes the social scientist's rootedness in the everyday world, and rigourously treats the experience of that world as the beginning and ending points for a l l investigation. Such a 'paradigm' in social science would rest upon a phenomenological founda-tion, such as the one proposed by Alfred Schutz (1967). Thus we are faced with the paradoxical situation of calling for both Marxism and Phenomenology as guiding lights for Political Sociologists. We are calling for an improbable synthesis: the re-conciliation of materialist and, so-called, 'idealist' world views. Obviously we cannot resolve this paradox here. Possibly i t cannot be resolved. However, there are gratifying signs in the literature (Schroyer, 1970; Litchman, 1970; Klare, 1971; Zaner, 1971), that Marxists and Phenomenologists are beginning to recognize that they each have something to offer the other. As a consequence of this exchange, we may be in the position of having the tools and framework to do an accurate and 'adequate' analysis of class and power in Canada. If so, i t is imperative that those tools be rigourously employed in an intellectually honest fashion. The framework must be made explicit and the whole enterprise must be examined and evaluated by a critical audience. The impera-tive for this arduous task does not emanate simply from some abstract ideal of science. Rather, i t emanates from our experience of a 'concrete', but constituted, social world going mad. Literature Cited Ardies, Tom 1963 "$197 Million Rays Off BCE" The Sunday Sun (September 28): 1-2 Bachrach, Peter 1967 The Theory of Democratic Elitism. Toronto: Little, Brown, and Company. Bachrach, Peter and M. Baratz 1963 "Decisions and Nondecisions: An Analytical Framework." American Political Science Review LVII, No. 3 (September): 632-642. Baltzell, E.D. 1958 The Philadelphia Gentleman. Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press. Berelson, B; P. Lazarsfeld and R. McPhee 1954 Voting. Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press Berger, Peter 1963 Invitation to Sociology. Graden City, New York: Doubleday. Blishen, B.R. 1958 "The Construction and Use of an Occupational Class Scale." Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, XXIV, No. 4 (November): 519-31. Bottomore, T.B. 1964 Elites and Society. London: Penguin Books Dahl, Robert 1963 Modern Political Analysis. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, Inc. 1961 Who Governs? New Haven: Yale University Press Dahrendorf, Ralf 1959 Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society. Stan-ford, California: Stanford University Press 1964 "Toward a Theory of Social Conflict." Pp. 98 in A. Etzioni and E. Etzioni (eds), Social Change. New York: Basic Books, Inc. Davis, A.; B.B. Gardner and M.R. Gardner 1941 Deep South: Social Anthropological Study of Caste and Class. Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press. Demerath, N.J. and R.A. Peterson 1967 System, Change and Conflict. New York: The Free Press. Domhoff, G.W. 1967 Who Rules America? Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc. Duncan, G. and S. Lukes 1967 "The New Democracy." Pp. 160-184 in C. McCoy and J. Playford (eds), Apolitical Politics. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company. Gross, Llewellyn 1949 "The Use of the Concept of Class in Social Research." American Journal of Sociology, LIV, No. 5 (March): 409-21. Horowitz, Gad 1965 "Creative Politics." Canadian Dimension, Vol. I l l , No. 1 (November-December): 14-15, 28. Kahl, Joseph 1957 The American Class Structure. New York: Rhinehart and Co* Klare, Karl 1971 "The Critique of Everyday Life, Marxism, and the New Left." Berkeley Journal of Sociology, Vol. XVI Lasswell, H. and A. Kaplan 1950 Power and Society. New Haven: Yale University Press. Lichtheim, George 1967 The Concept of Ideology and Other Essays. New York: Random House Lichtman, Richard 1970 "Symbolic Interactionism and Social Reality: Some Marxist Queries." Berkeley Journal of Sociology, Vol. XV Lipset, S.M. 1960 Political Man. Garden City, New York: Doubleday Longstaff, Steven 1967 "John Porter's Vertical Mosaic: A Critique with some Reflections on the Canadian Scene." Berkeley Journal of Sociology, Vol. XII Lynd, Robert 1957 "Power in American Society as Resource and Problem." Pp. 1-45 in A. Kornhauser (ed), Problems of Power in Ameri-can Democracy. Detroit: Wayne State University Press. 1968 "Power in the United States." Pp. 103-115 in G.W. Domhoff and H.B. Ballard (eds) C. Wright Mills and the Power Elite. Boston: Beacon Press. Macpherson, CB. 1967 "Democratic Theory: Ontology and Technology." Ch. 9 in D. Spitz (ed), Political Theory and Social Change. New York: Atherton Press 1965 The Real World of Democracy. Toronto: CBC Publications Marshall, T.H. 1965 "Class and Power in Canada." Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology. Vol. 2, No. 4 (November): 215-21. Marx, Karl 1964 Selected Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Book Co. Meise1, James 1965 "Pareto and Mosca." Pp. 1-45 in J. Meisel (ed) Pareto and Mosca. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc. Meisel, John 1965 "Foreword" Pp. ix-x in Porter, The Vertical Mosaic. Toronto: University of Toronto Press Mills, C.W. 1963 "Liberal Values in the Modern World." Pp. 187-95 in I.L. Horowitz (ed), Power, Politics and People: The Collected Essays of C. Wright Mills. New York: Balantine Books. 1956 The Power Elite. New York: Oxford University Press. Moore, W.E. 1963 Social Change. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc. Natanson, Maurice 1970 "Phenomenology and Typification: A Study in the Philosophy of Alfred Schutz." Social Research. Vol. 37, No. 1 (Spring): 1-22. Oliver, M. 1961 "Preface." Pp. v-vii in M. Oliver (ed) Social Purpose for Canada. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Ossowski, Stanislaw 1963 Class Structure in the Social Consciousness. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Porter, John 1968 "The Future of Upward Mobility," American Sociological Review, 33 (February): 5-19. 1961 "Power and Freedom in Canadian Democracy." Pp. 27-56 in M. Oliver (ed) Social Purpose for Canada. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1970 "Research Biography of a Macrosociological Study: The Vertical Mosaic." Pp. 147-181 in J. Coleman, A. Etzioni, and J. Porter (eds) Macrosociology: Research and Theory. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc. 1965 The Vertical Mosaic. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Resnick, Philip 1968 "The Dynamics of Power in Canada." Our Generation, Vol. 5, No. 4 (November) Robin, Martin 1966 "The Vertial Mosaic." American Political Science Re-view, LX, No. 1 (March): 153-4. Schroyer, Trent 1970 "Toward a Critical Theory for Advanced Industrial Society." Pp. 209-234 in H.P. Dreitzel (ed) Recent Sociology No. 2. Toronto: Collier-Macmillan, Ltd. Schumpeter, Joseph 1950 Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. New York: Harper and Row. 1953 "The Problem of Classes." Pp. 75-81 in R. Bendix and S.M. Lipset (ed) Class, Status and Power. Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press. Schutz, Alfred 1962 The Collected Papers I: The Problem of Social Reality. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. 1964 The Collected Papers II: Studies in Social Theory. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 1967 The Phenomenology of the Social World. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press Sherman, Paddy 1966 Bennett. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited Sweezy, Paul 1953 The Present as History. New York: Monthly Review Press Veblen, Thorstein 1934 Theory of the Leisure Class. New York: Modern Library Warner, Lloyd 1963 Yankee City. New Haven: Yale University Press Weber, Max 1968 Economy and Society. New York: Bedminster Press 1949 The Methodology of the Social Sciences. Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press Wolf, CP. 1970 "Foreword." Pp. xi-xx in J. Coleman, A. Etzioni, J. Porter (eds), Macrosciology: Research and Theory. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc. Zaner, Richard 1971 "Solitude and Sociality: The Critical Foundations of Social Science." Presented at the 1971 meeting of the American Sociological Association, Session 81. 

Cite

Citation Scheme:

        

Citations by CSL (citeproc-js)

Usage Statistics

Share

Embed

Customize your widget with the following options, then copy and paste the code below into the HTML of your page to embed this item in your website.
                        
                            <div id="ubcOpenCollectionsWidgetDisplay">
                            <script id="ubcOpenCollectionsWidget"
                            src="{[{embed.src}]}"
                            data-item="{[{embed.item}]}"
                            data-collection="{[{embed.collection}]}"
                            data-metadata="{[{embed.showMetadata}]}"
                            data-width="{[{embed.width}]}"
                            data-media="{[{embed.selectedMedia}]}"
                            async >
                            </script>
                            </div>
                        
                    
IIIF logo Our image viewer uses the IIIF 2.0 standard. To load this item in other compatible viewers, use this url:
https://iiif.library.ubc.ca/presentation/dsp.831.1-0101962/manifest

Comment

Related Items