Conceptual, Theoretical and Ethical Problems in

The Vertical Mosaic

by

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Abstract

The Vertical Mosaic is re-examined and an 'internal' critique of its multiple conceptual, theoretical and ethical problems is provided. Porter's value position in a 1961 essay is outlined and set up as a 'bench-mark' for evaluating the consistency of his 1965 value position. Value inconsistency is discovered in the form of a 'strategy of respectability,' consisting of five 'tactics.' This strategy is then drawn upon throughout the essay to explicate some of Porter's conceptual and theoretical errors.

These errors involve his treatment of class, power and democracy. It is argued that Porter's important distinction between "real middle class" and "middle majority" violates his original position on class, and is inadequate for his stated purpose. Furthermore, the theoretical foundations underlying the structure of class are unexplicated. His failure to distinguish between power and authority raises logical and utilitarian problems. Thus the theoretical foundations underlying the structure of power are inadequate. In both the case of class and power he 'transcends' his original definition in the process of doing his analysis.

The normative context of his study is found to be ambiguous, but appears to be the theory of democratic elitism. This constitutes a major value inconsistency because this theory rejects democracy as an end and treats it simply as a method. It is in opposition to thorough-going democracy, whose normative ends Porter supports. Its method, playing by the 'rules of the game', requires compromise and 'creates'
brokerage politics, which Porter dislikes. It fears and does not allow the broadening of social participation, which Porter calls for. Finally, it furnishes a context for Porter's findings which rob them of their import.

It is suggested that Porter should have treated democracy as a topic rather than as a resource. This would have allowed him to recognize the error in his rejection of liberal democracy, and would have allowed him to retain thoroughgoing democracy as a critical context with which to evaluate his findings. Furthermore, these findings would have been multiplied if he had simply used elitist democracy heuristically. Such findings and analyses, however, would have required that Porter not operate with a 'strategy of respectability.'

The essay concludes with two points, both rooted in the everyday world, and both suggested as programmatic, 'external,' answers to problems in Political Sociology.
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Introduction

The recent events in Quebec have revived interest in problems of class and power, even among social scientists. The Canadian touchstone for all such analysis is without question, The Vertical Mosaic by John Porter (1965). As one reviewer stated, "this is the sociological study of present-day Canada, and it will doubtless remain a basic reference work on Canadian social structure for some time to come" (Horowitz, I., 1966:862). That Horowitz has been correct on both counts is the raison d'être of this essay. If we are to build upon Porter's impressive beginning, it is imperative that we examine and explicate its weaknesses. While a small group of reviewers (Marshall, 1965; Longstaff, 1967; Resnick, 1968) have pointed up specific problems in The Vertical Mosaic, none of the book's reviewers have recognized its multiple conceptual, theoretical and ethical problems. It is upon these problems that this essay focuses.

Our approach consists of an 'internal' critique. That is to say, the attempt has been made to generate the critique within Porter's value system and in terms of the particular canons of science which he would recognize as applicable to his work. This leads us to posit a certain relationship between values and science based upon our own interpretation and modification of Weber's fact-value distinction (1949). We wish to clarify our approach at the outset in order to 1.) treat it as the taken for granted resource that it usually is taken to be in social science and 2.) 'bracket' the question of an 'external' critique based
upon a 'paradigm' of social science other than Porter's. The latter point, and possibility, is extremely interesting to us, but it appears to be more strategically sound to take the approach available and recognizable to most of our colleagues. The soundness of this strategy is suggested to us by the possibility that an internal critique will lead to, if not call for, 'external' answers. At the Here and Now of this writing, however, this is only a possibility. Furthermore, it is a possibility which takes us outside of the limits of our internal critique, and therefore will not be treated as a topic within this essay.

Science and Values

The relationship between science and values was examined most notably by Max Weber in his work on methodology in sociology (1949). He held that a scholar's choice of a specific problem always has relevance to value, i.e., the problem is always and essentially a part of the body of ethical and political concerns characteristic of the historical epoch in which the investigator lives. The crux of the matter, however, is that after a problem is chosen the researcher is subject to logical and empirical rules in analyzing the problem that are separate from his evaluative predispositions. In theory, any research can be critically evaluated without reference to the values of the researcher.

While we shall shortly modify Weber's fact-value distinction in the direction of tightening the relationship between values and science, we must concur that certain logical and empirical rules apply normatively within the finite province of meaning of scientific theoriz-
ing. As we shall see in chapters three, four, and five, when we apply the postulate of logical consistency to Porter's use of his concepts of class, power and democracy, we find gross inconsistencies and a dependency upon everyday and discipline — common meanings for the accomplishment of coherence. In the case of each of his key concepts, when we go beyond his 'facts' to examine the theoretical foundations and frameworks upon which his analyses rest and depend, we find theoretical poverty. Thus, from within the realm of science The Vertical Mosaic will be shown to have been a surprisingly unsound enterprise.

These findings in themselves would warrant a critique; but there is a problem which, in some sense, is above these conceptual and theoretical problems. This follows from the fact that scientific problems have value relevance. When the problems are class and power the relevance is especially clear. The writings of Porter indicate that he was highly aware of the importance and relevance of values to science. Thus it is exceedingly disappointing that the presentation and perspective of The Vertical Mosaic constitute an ethical problem of "value consistency."

The concept of "value consistency" is a modification and extension of Weber's fact-value distinction. In light of the equilibrium vs. conflict theory controversy over the past twenty years (Demerath and Peterson, 1967), it is quite clear that values and facts do not reside in separate rooms. When one enters upon facts, values are not left behind. The choice of perspectives, concepts and theory for the analyses of 'facts' has certain ideological features and consequences. It must be realized, as Tom Bottomore has pointed out, that "every socio-
logical concept and theory has an ideological force by reason of its influence upon the thoughts and actions of men in their everyday life" (1964:20). Values not only lead us to problems, they are important in our choice of analytical approaches to those problems. Such choices are ethical. We do not operate from purely theoretical perspectives; we operate from *ethico-theoretical* perspectives.

Without taking further our analysis of the embeddedness of facts within the realm of values, we can see that we are irremediably citizens as well as scientists. As such, we not only must operate under the postulate of logical consistency within the finite province of meaning of scientific theorizing; but in operating within that province, and living the dialectic between that province and the paramount reality of the everyday world, we are also governed by a postulate of "value consistency." This holds because of the categorically imperative nature of values and value systems. In member's parlance, to violate this norm is to be hypocritical to "sell out." While this norm is not a major concern to everyday members operating under common sense rationalities, for the scientist-member value consistency is of much more concern simply because consistency itself is such a dominant value in his science-centered life.

When we examine Porter's work in *The Vertical Mosaic* in terms of the embeddedness of science in values, we find that not only is his use of concepts inconsistent, but his choices of concepts, theory and perspectives are inconsistent with his values. He is not only guilty of logical inconsistency, he is guilty of value inconsistency. The two are not unrelated, although it is in the nature of such relationships
to be difficult to reconstruct.

When only an impersonal manuscript is available, one must depend upon a highly anonymous system of typifications (Natanson, 1970: 12) in order to get at how a piece of scholarship might have been done. Our reconstruction of how Porter's ethical duplicity affected his conceptual and theoretical efforts is only one of many possible interpretative reconstructions. For example, the 'strategy of respectability' discussed in Chapter Two is our construct to explain his muted radicalism. It is employed because of its usefulness in making sense of the character of the book. However, that he 'changed his mind' and was no longer a socialist when he wrote *The Vertical Mosaic*, is another plausible interpretation. For us, this interpretation is not strongly warranted because of the uneven polemical tone of the book, but it remains as an alternative interpretation which further information may support.

In that our reconstruction suggests a relationship between values and facts, the following essay is ordered so as to make this relationship available. Thus we shall first examine the ethical problems, then, turn to the conceptual and theoretical problems, and thirdly speculate as to what the consequences of value consistency would have been for Porter's conceptual and theoretical efforts. Our findings and possibilities will be summarized in the final chapter and the possibility of 'external' answers will again be raised.
Chapter One
Porter's Value Position in 1961

A major unrecognized problem in Porter's book is ethical duplicity, or value inconsistency. In order to recognize the value inconsistency of *The Vertical Mosaic* (hereafter referred to as *The VM*) it helps to establish a benchmark. (Porter's value position will be examined at length, for while there is value inconsistency within *The VM*, it is only when we go outside of the book and examine the other works of this author that we can discover whether *The VM* is consistent with other evidence of his value position.) Fortunately, we have Porter's contribution to the volume *Social Purpose for Canada* (Oliver, 1961: 27-56), entitled "Power and Freedom in Canadian Democracy," where his biases and ethical position are quite clear. In this chapter we shall document his value position.

Socialism and Democracy

"Power and Freedom in Canadian Democracy" appears to be written by a morally concerned 'left-wing social democrat,' which is appropriate for the book in which the essay appears. The author is a socialist concerned with the failures and shortcomings of the history of socialist parties and socialist theory. His answer, however, is not proletarian revolution and dictatorship. He opts to play by the rules of the game in order to get control of the political system. "Control of the political system," however, must be democratic and must lead to a thoroughgoing democratic society, which is the Good Society, par excellence.
Porter's contribution, which appears in the opening section entitled "Moral Issues," is thus as a socialist devoted to democracy. As befits the title of the edited volume in which this essay appears (Oliver, 1961), Porter seeks to clarify the 'social purpose for Canada.'

For our purposes of establishing his 1961 essay as a benchmark for comparison, we shall select and highlight certain relevant features of this essay. The relevancy of these features will become clear in the following chapters.

In 1961 Porter's concepts, vocabulary and perspective were socialist. Classes were referred to as real social groups existing in society. He focused on the working class and historical changes in the relations to the means of production. His discussion of the latter lead him to write of the "white collar 'salariat'" (1961:40) as he examined the "modern social structure based on industry" (1961:41).

The feature of the superstructure which bothered him the most was that creative behaviour, which would be the identifying characteristic of the citizenry of thorough-going Canadian democracy, is presently a class privilege.

Such behaviour continues to be a class privilege because those who engage in it are educated, or have inherited a way of life which is essential to its realization, or they occupy commanding positions in our institutional systems - economic, religious, educational, and so forth. Since our institutional elites are predominantly recruited from the higher segments of our class structure, our social and cultural values tend to be defined in class terms. (1961:34)

This "monopolization of a society's creative potential" (1961:34) is the newest and clearest reflection of the fact that "Capitalism has not lost its exploitative character" (1961:33).
Porter thus located the enemy in the economic system and left no question that the corporate elite are in a dominant position in Canadian society because of the structural dynamics of corporate capitalism. Their dominance affects all spheres of society. In a sentence, reminding one of C. Wright Mills' (1956) outrage at the "higher immorality" of elites, Porter emphatically stated that "The exploitive, predatory and restrictive character of capitalist institutions rests on a morality defined by those at the apex of our institutional hierarchies." Thus we have upper "class control of total social morality" (1961:38).

One of Porter's solutions to these problems is the mainstay of the NDP position: "What we need in positions of power in a democratically planned society is a changed quality of leadership" (1961:50). This leadership must be imbued with a dedication to public service rather than private gain. Such leadership is not only needed in "government" bureaucracies. As a socialist, Porter recognized that government bureaucracies are not the only ones which should be planned and controlled democratically. "Politics" is not limited to the institutions of government: "despots" are found outside of the civil service. "Corporate 'despotism' can be much more far-reaching, as, for example, when it holds the future of a community in its hands by deciding to move its operations from one city to another" (1961:41). Porter's definition and discussion of power (1961:27-29) argued that hierarchy is an essential feature of any society, especially modern industrial society. The alternative is that all elites, in all spheres which impinge on our lives, must be elected democratically.
A new quality of leadership, democratically elected in all spheres, was not Porter's only, or even his most important, solution to the problem of the Good Life. The Good Life is the one also envisioned by classical, liberal democratic theorists such as J.S. Mill, a life marked by creativity and spontaneity as well as rationality and humanitarianism. The latter two characteristics of democratic man were treated by Mill and among others, Green, at the level of an ontology concerning the nature of man. Porter however treated these two characteristics as a goal to be attained within the Good Society: "It is possible to create a society in which the prevailing personality is marked by humanitarianism and rationality, and while such a goal may be far-distant, it is the goal we must keep in mind" (1961:51).

The fine mesh between Porter's socialism and the normative ends of classical democracy was such that the latter are called for under the former's name, and socialism was seen as dependent upon democracy for its implementation.

Socialist policy...must be directed towards releasing the spontaneous and creative forces within human society. Such a change can only be brought about through democratic planning and co-ordination (1961:38).

Democratic planning, within socialism, however, is not limited to the "political" sphere as in capitalist liberal democracies. Nor does it simply involve electing all major elites. Democracy must be thorough-going. Democratic planning requires participation by all those affected by the decisions to be made. The elite-mass structure will exist because hierarchy will still exist, but that hierarchy will be negotiable and thoroughly democratic.
Porter found it intolerable that "social goals are now established by a much smaller number than in the days of entrepreneurial capitalism....the vast majority in our mass democracies do not participate in any kind of creative behaviour" (1961:34). He was cognizant, however, of the obstacle which the "widespread apathy in our western industrial societies" (1961:54) sets up against the development of thorough-going democracy. Thus the development of techniques which will overcome apathy are a necessity for socialists, because "in a democratically planned society there must be a desire for participation in the establishment of social goals" (1961:54). Unfortunately, socialists have not found such techniques. Worse yet, "Socialists have never given enough attention to how social participation in the definition and achievement of goals can be brought about" (1961:39).

Porter saw the solution to the problem of participation as necessarily being in the direction of affecting its cause: the pervading sense of powerlessness and isolation. His answer was decentralization.

A massive homogeneous national culture can only intensify that sense of isolation and powerlessness of which we have spoken. Democratic social planning must preserve and foster group differences, because it is through identification with small rather than massive social aggregates that the individual can avoid the feeling of isolation. (1961:35)

In line with this position, he stated that "the French desire for cultural separation can be justified both psychologically and socially" (1961:35).

In the last few pages he returned to the problem of participation, this time in terms of the democratic control of industry, and
concludes that "since large productive units do not lend themselves well to worker participation, planning must result in decentralization" (1961:54) then, approvingly, he reminded us that "Decentralization furthermore helps to strengthen regional, cultural and sometimes ethnic differences" (1961:54).

Thus, to the question of the social purpose for Canada...

The answer surely lies in the desirability of social participation in defining and achieving goals, in the release of the potential for a creative life shared with others, governed not through competitiveness but through co-operation" (1961:35).

The realization of these ends requires a new quality of leadership, thorough-going democratic planning and decentralization, all of which are to accomplished within and through the political system.4
1. This work is chosen on the assumption that the most explicit statements of value position, especially when they express a controversial viewpoint, can be most safely taken as real/true/honest. Furthermore, his 1961 value position surfaces elsewhere in his work (1968) and in *The VM* itself. Other commentators have also remarked on his strong moral concerns (Horowitz, I., 1966; Horowitz, G., 1965; Wolf, C.P., 1970). Finally, if his 1961 position is not honest, then, without comparing that position to *The VM*, we can pronounce him intellectually dishonest and value inconsistent.

2. *Social Purpose for Canada* was to be for the NDP what *Social Planning for Canada* in 1935 was for the CCF: a statement of diagnoses and remedies for Canadian society which would be acted upon, at least in spirit, by the new political parties. The former book, however, is much less directly an NDP product than the latter was a CCF product. See Oliver (1961:v-vii).

3. On the two ontologies of man which pervade Western culture see C.B. Macpherson (1967).

4. Unfortunately, this vision is never linked to the realities of corporate capitalism in such a way that we can understand how we are to move from the latter to the former. The problem of how we are to be successful in destroying a class system by working within the very political system which has allowed that class system to be maintained, is never addressed. As we shall see, this problem haunts the conclusions to be drawn from *The Vertical Mosaic* — conclusions which Porter never drew.
Chapter Two
Porter's Value Position in 1965

When we turn to examine Porter's value position in The VM, we find a strange but not uncommon phenomenon. Gad Horowitz explains it in terms of Porter's frustration at the decay of socialist theory since the Second World War and the realization that the means to the socialist ends" - nationalization and central planning - have been tried and found wanting" (1965:14).

Porter the socialist therefore retreats a few steps to more solid ground and assumes the role of Porter the sociologist. Pointing out that our socialist and labour elites have 'muted' their radicalism in accepting the framework of corporate capitalism, he mutes his own radicalism. (1965:14)

Horowitz displays an ignorance of Porter's 1961 essay. Porter noted the decay of theory and the shortcomings of the means, but he saw ways out of these problems. Horowitz has nevertheless hit upon the peculiar flavor of The VM: 'muted' radicalism. In this chapter we shall try to bring to the fore the background strategy of respectability which mutes Porter's radicalism.

The Strategy of Respectability

In the "Foreword" of The VM John Meisel tells us that Porter's study is of extraordinary importance not only because it deals with and provides information on class and status; "but also because it departs from a longstanding tradition in Canadian academic circles concerning the degree to which a scholarly work can be simultaneously respectable
and polemical" (1965:x). Porter's muted radicalism can be understood as an attempt to be both left and right, "simultaneously respectable and polemical."

Porter footnotes Mills' The Power Elite in The VM and writes of meeting him in Toronto where they both read papers at a colloquium (1970:161). He was undoubtedly familiar with the controversy that Mills' book generated and very much aware that his book would receive a similar reception. The book was compared to Mills', but favorably. Irving Horowitz, in a glib, ill-informed review, tells the reader that Porter "discusses the Canadian political elite in Millsian terms, without falling prey to the assumptions of coordinated policy-making found in The Power Elite (1966:862)." Martin Robin, however, read the book a bit differently, and held that "Being a Canadian, Professor Porter is not given to the florid phraseology of the moral crusader, nor does he write with the massive indignation of his American equivalent, C. Wright Mills" (1966:154). That Horowitz finds a "Millsian" discussion and discovers Porter's "socialist consciousness" (1966:863), while Robin finds Porter to be an All-Canadian boy whose prose is "somewhat restrained" (1966:154), can be understood as a consequence of Porter's attempt to be both respectable and polemical.

Porter's background strategy of respectability is manifest in four minor and one major tactic. The four minor tactics are rhetoric, safe concepts, unanswered questions, and undrawn conclusions. These tactics give The VM a muted polemical tone while assuring its respectability. The major tactic is the assumption of a respectable theoretical perspective which leads the reader, and apparently the author, to over-
look the radical implications of the book's findings.

Tactic I

The minor tactic which accounts for the disparity between I. Horowitz' and Robin's readings of _The VM_ is rhetoric. Porter's rhetoric is that of a social democrat. This position and the rhetoric appropriate to it, surfaces in Porter's Preface and in three out of the seventeen chapters: Chapter One: "Class and Power;" Chapter Six: "Social Class and Educational Opportunity;" and Chapter Twelve: "The Canadian Political System." In the Preface he is quite explicit:

I attach great importance to equality of opportunity on both ethical and practical grounds...I believe strongly, too, in the creative role of politics, and in the importance of political institutions as the means through which the major goals of society can be achieved. (1965:xii)

While this is part of the social democrat's position, it is also a position acceptable to liberals (in the common American sense of the term). Thus what appears of his 1961 position is that part which is the most respectable (democratic control of industry, for example, is never mentioned). While his discussions in the sixth and twelfth chapters are more polemical than might be acceptable to liberals, the fact that polemics occur _en masse_ in only two chapters after the introduction, and that the rest of the book is 'dry sociology;' provides a situation where Horowitz can be taken with the few polemical chapters and thus discover "socialist consciousness," while Robin can attend to the book in general and comment that the prose is "somewhat restrained."
Tactic II

The second tactic, safe concepts, will be dealt with at length in the chapters dealing with class, power and democracy, but the argument that Porter's concepts are "safe" can be sketched here. First of all, Porter's rationale for choosing his concepts was safe and respectable. In his "Research Biography" he stated that "my task was analytical and descriptive, and it was therefore prudent to use those general structural categories, such as stratification and kinship, most widely employed in sociology and anthropology" (1970:157). The appropriateness of his concepts, in terms of both their adequacy for what he wanted to examine, and their normative consistency with his own value position, apparently was not at issue for him. Presumably, had Marxist categories been "most widely employed in sociology and anthropology," he would have used them.

Porter defines classes as self-conscious social groups. Even though Marx held class consciousness to be a necessary condition for the existence of class, this formulation is still "safe." With this formulation of class there exists the highest probability that the conclusion will be drawn that the democratic society being studied does not have 'classes,' which is good news to all 'protectors' of that society. Porter, however, has no data on class consciousness, so he takes the other extreme, safe, position, and defines class so narrowly that it loses all its politically-charged meaning. Thus when the work 'class' is used "we are talking about artificial statistical groups which do not have any life of their own or any coherence" (1965:11).
His definition of class is a considerable retreat from, and denial of, his 1961 position where he treated classes as real groups in the social structure and wrote of class privilege, class control and social and cultural values defined in class terms.

His concept of power is the same one he used in 1961, but when it is examined, as it will be in Chapter Four, it becomes clear that his concept is inadequate for his theoretical needs and is inconsistent with his values. For Porter, "Power is the right that some people have to direct the affairs of others" (1961:27). This rather curious definition identifies as 'power' what others would call legitimate authority. In this formulation all 'power' is legitimate. This formulation appears as contradictory to Porter's value position, for it rules out legitimacy as a problem in itself. Thus the question of values underlying and embodied by corporate capitalism cannot be addressed. The process of delegitimation, which is central to institutional change, and even to elite circulation, cannot even be dealt with. Furthermore, the fact that legitimacy is recognized as a problem by politicians and is sometimes central to elite disputes, means that certain analyses Porter attempts within this concept of power will be inadequate.

The safety of Porter's concept of democracy is a bit more difficult to address because Porter has concepts of democracy. He never explicitly states and operates with one concept and theory of democracy. Chapter Five will deal more extensively with the confusion on this point, but for now it can be said that he implicitly operates with, and within, the theory of democratic elitism as formulated and used by Schumpeter (1950), Lipset (1960), and Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee
(1954), among others. This theory of democracy explicitly drops the normative ends central to classical democratic theory: realization of full human potential via the Good Society created by all citizens via democratic methods. This theory is completely at odds with the thorough-going democracy called for by Porter in 1961. As with 'class' and 'power,' 'democracy' in The VM is 'respectable.'

**Tactic III**

The third tactic consists of unanswered questions. Controversial questions are raised in a number of places in the book, but they are never explicitly answered, although data and discussions are provided which seemingly serve to answer the questions. The questions revolve around the nature of the power structure. In his discussion of Marxian theory in Chapter One he argues that "what we have instead of a class of capitalists is a smaller and probably more cohesive group - an elite within the private sector of the economy" (1965:23). On the next page he declares that:

> If it is true that the corporate elite is a relatively smaller and more coherent group than the nineteenth-century bourgeoisie, does its power extend beyond the economy? The answer can come only after empirical investigation. (1965:24)

The empirical investigation is provided, but the meaning/consequence of the implicit answer, for the configuration of power, is never addressed.

Within Chapter Seven, Porter discusses Raymond Aron's extreme-type, continuum classification system. At one end we have the "soviet" model consisting of total organization and power in the hands of an integrated, monolithic power structure. In the "western" model, however, we have a plurality of competing elites who are only situationally dominant,
tend toward an equilibrium of power, and are thus non-unified. Porter draws the section on "Degree of Co-ordination Among Elites" to a close by stating that:

There are two questions which empirical investigation can help to answer. One is the extent to which any one society has moved towards either end of the continuum. The second is the relative power of the various elite groups in any one society at any particular period. (1965:215)

How The VM answers these questions, and what the answers are, is confusing and uncertain.

After discussing "Economic Elite and Social Structure" he concludes Chapter Nine with the following paragraph:

In the general scheme of elite groups which forms the framework for this study it was pointed out that elites compete for power with each other. Which of them was dominant, or whether they merged into a power elite, was a question for empirical investigation. We might be in a position to answer these questions after looking in the following chapters, at some of the other elites. (1965:308)

Up until the final chapter, empirical investigation seems to suggest strongly that the corporate elite are the most powerful. In Chapter Fifteen extensive data is presented to support the position that the large daily newspapers are "instruments of an established upper class" (1965:463), as are media in general. In terms of organized philanthropy:

...in no Canadian city would these large campaigns be successful without the support of the leading businessmen of the community. Not only do they supply funds, but they also recruit personnel, particularly their younger executives, to help in organization. (1965:302)

Of course, the corporate elite are also quite well represented on boards of institutions of higher learning. In general, "Success of cultural enterprise is linked to corporate decision-making. Thus in the creation
of a cultural social product, there is an extension of power far beyond the economic system" (1965:301).

More significantly for relations between elites, we find that the corporate elite have, and are involved in, powerful voluntary associations such as the Canadian Chamber of Commerce and the Canadian Manufacturers' Association. Regarding voluntary associations, Porter states that "leading positions within them constitute for the corporate elite an extension of power" (1965:299). The corporate elite's 'power' or influence is also evident and extended in the ideology of capitalist free enterprise which sanctifies the corporate elite, while serving to vilify any other elite which attempts to usurp corporate perogatives or trespass on corporate domain. Porter states that:

The fact that the corporate elite hold important positions beyond the corporate world means that they are in a position to make their ideology pervade the entire society until it becomes identified with the common good. (1965:305)

The thesis of corporate dominance is given further indirect support by Porter's presentation of the political elite's impotence. He rails against the conservative tone of brokerage politics, bemoans the lack of a Left-Right axis and condemns the opportunism of the two major parties (1965:366-416). The fact which is most damaging to the credibility of any counter-thesis of political elite dominance is that upper class citizens do not feel it necessary or advantageous to enter politics: the privileges enjoyed by the upper class are not threatened by the middle class holders of political power (1965:344-5).

The answers to the questions raised on pages 24, 215 and 308 seem clear. The build-up to the final chapter on elite relations points
quite distinctly to the corporate elite as predominant. The respectable theory of pluralism, which has it that power is equally shared and diffused throughout society, appears, subsequent to empirical investigation, to be a descriptively inaccurate ideology. Yet in the all-important final chapter we find that in almost every example of elite conflict and coalition, the political elite either wins or emerges unscathed. Only once do they lose but then it is to the public (1965:544). In three important cases (CNR, BCE, and A.V. Roe) they defeated the corporate elite. How it is that the compromising, impotent political elite are so 'powerful' is never dealt with.

In the end the question of which elite is dominant is not only left hanging, it is left confused. The structure of power appears as "free form," which allows one reviewer (Horowitz, I., 1966:863) to see the structure of power among elites as "horizontal," and another to report that "the economic elite is the predominant group within the ruling class" (Robin, 1966:154). Again, one can focus on one part, such as the final chapter and discover respectable findings, or focus on other parts and discover radical findings. Given the length of the text, 558 pages, and the general organization of all scholarly work, it is the final chapter which we would expect to carry the most weight in the decision as to whether a book is radical or 'respectable.' In the end, the important question, 'What is the structure of power in Canada?' is left unanswered. Confusion reigns, with the result being that respectable pluralism seems to prevail.
**Tactic IV**

The fourth tactic, undrawn conclusions, is related to the third, but of a different order. The tactic involves not drawing out the radical implications of particular findings. Loose ends are left lying, thus respectability is a lie. These 'loose ends' will be tied up in the following chapters, but at this point we can provide one surprisingly overlooked example. Porter attaches great importance to equality of opportunity, thus he is greatly upset that education is class determined and that Canada has relied upon educated immigrants to do the white collar technical jobs that Canadians should be educated to do.

The obvious, but unsettling, conclusion to be drawn is that inequality of educational opportunity in Canada is maintained by multinational corporations and an upper class who find it more expedient and inexpensive to import educated labour rather than shoulder any of the tax burden which educating Canadians would require. The consequence of not drawing this conclusion is to present a situation which appears to be the fault of no one, and whose solution appears to be the responsibility of everyone. "Equality of blame and responsibility" perpetuates the myth of equality of power and obscures the realities of class interests and Canada's satellite status viz. the U.S.

**Tactic V**

The major tactic employed is the utilization of two, complementary, respectable ethico-theoretical perspectives in the doing of
The VM: elitism and functionalism. Given Porter's treatment of classes as real social groups in his 1961 essay, and given his socialist democrat position, one would expect his analysis of Canada's power structure to be a class analysis. It is, in a very inconsistent and unsupported manner (see Chapter Three), but the main perspective he operates from is that of **elite analysis**.  

In terms of value consistency, it is most surprising that Porter did his analysis from an elitist perspective. In an interesting and revealing reconstruction of how The VM was done, Porter (1970) wrote of being intrigued with Aron's (1950) attempt to synthesize some of the ideas of Pareto and Marx: "I decided, by adding some Mosca and Weber to elaborate Aron's Pareto-Marx synthesis into a scheme for the study of power in Canada" (1970:159). Mosca and Pareto, as James Meisel has pointed out, are counter-revolutionary theorists, "both are fighting on two fronts: against democracy and (Marxist) socialism - which, to them, are one and the same thing" (1965:3). Their values, their ethico-theoretical perspective, contradict Porter's social democratic values. The contradictions are not averted by synthesizing Marx and Pareto, for Aron's position holds that minority rule, whether by a governing elite or a ruling class is **inevitable**, no matter what form of government is utilized. Within this view, the extension of democracy, i.e., increased social participation by the masses, is seen as a naïve and unattainable goal. Theorists of this ilk have made extensive use of the studies which show the masses to be highly authoritarian and lacking democratic values. Bottomore has shown that elite theory is compatible with only an adumbrated theory of democracy (1964:112-217). As
we shall see in Chapter Five, the theory of democratic elitism, which is part of the baggage of Porter's elite analysis, is irreconcilable with the central requirements of Porter's thorough-going democracy.

In doing so, Porter stated that he had adopted "a simple functionalist view that each of the subsystems contributed to the whole, that they were dynamically interrelated and that there should be a degree of integration between them" (1970:158). This view complements the elitist perspective because both operate in terms of separate but related/intergrated subsystems, e.g., the polity, the economy, religion. Porter does not carry through with the functionalist approach to the point of adopting a functionalist view of classes. His treatment of classes as simply "artificial statistical groups" (1965:11) has the effect of defining away class and thus making his attempt to use Aron's Marx-Pareto synthesis turn out to be lopsided in favor of Paretian elite analysis. Functionalism provides a way to link and explain social differentiation and political hierarchy, but Porter "decided to be eclectic" (1970:158) and chose to be a "simple" functionalist. Porter's is a liberal rather than conservative respectability.

The liberal respectability which 'simple' functionalism provides, however, conflicts at two points with Porter's 1961 value position. The "functionalist" framework which Porter adopts has him defining as "political" elites those holding certain high positions in the government. This is, of course, a standard, classical liberal way of cutting up the world. However, from a thorough-going democratic point of view, the classical liberal separation of state and society is anathema.
In "Power and Freedom in Canadian Democracy" Porter speaks of "corporate 'despotism'" and reveals how corporate "organizations impinge on our lives in myriads of ways" (1961:41). He pointed out that elites have a monopoly on creative behaviour (1961:34) and that it is only through the extension of social participation that this monopoly can be broken and the ends of democracy reached. Such a position necessarily treats "any persistent pattern of human relationships that involves, to a significant extent, power, rule, or authority" (Dahl, 1963:6) as political relationships. This concept of political is at the very core of thorough-going democratic theory. To operate with the narrow, "structural" definition of political, as having solely to do with government, is to obscure and avoid the crucial question of the accountability of all major elites to the masses in a thorough-going democracy.

The second point of conflict is the unit of reference of functionalism. Porter's "simple functionalist view that each of the sub-systems contributed to the whole" reveals a fundamental contradiction. What is functional or dysfunctional from the functionalist perspective is determined with reference "to the whole," to society, whereas the unit of reference for classical, and especially thorough-going democracy, is the individual. The "shift in emphasis from the needs and potentialities of the individual citizen to the requirements of the system" (Duncan and Lukes, 1967:175), which characterizes the elitist theory of democracy, means that not only is functionalism congenial to elitism but it is completely amenable to elitism's companion, elitist democracy.
Thus in choosing to operate from an elitist and functionalist theoretical perspective, Porter has assured himself of liberal respectability for The VM, but in so doing he has compromised his thoroughgoing democratic values. Had he developed a solidly based class analysis and took notice of conflict theory, especially Dahrendorf's postulate that "Every society rests on constraint of some of its members by others" (1964:103), he would have been value-consistent and have made some important discoveries, as will be shown.

Of course, the adoption of a value-consistent ethico-theoretical perspective is, in itself, no guarantee that these discoveries would have been revealed. As we have attempted to demonstrate, Porter seemed to be operating with a "strategy of respectability" in doing The VM. As we now turn to the conceptual and theoretical problems in The VM it will become clear that Porter has paid a price for his respectability: in the doing of his analysis he found it necessary to transcend his safe concepts and ends up within a theoretical context where his findings are not only unsurprising, but expected and applauded.
Footnotes

1. This would be a right wing social democrat's view. A left wing social democrat would argue for an equalizing (not an equality) of condition, rather than simply equality of opportunity. In his 1961 essay, Porter seemed nearer to the left wing view as he mentioned the "socialist principle of economic equality" (1961:30). However, his mention of this principle was in an historical discussion of socialism, thus his position in 1961 as a left, right, or middle "wing" social democrat, in terms of this issue, was not clear. His condemnation of capitalism certainly suggests a left of center position, though.

2. The introductory first chapter, because it is important to the tactic of unanswered questions, will be dealt with later on.

3. Logically, Porter cannot ask the question "...does its power extend beyond the economy?" because, for him, "Power means the recognized right to make effective decisions on behalf of a group of people" (1965:201). As will be clear in Chapter Four, "recognized rights" are legal, institutional rights. Thus, by definition, the corporate elite's 'power' is limited to its institutional realm, the economy.

4. Given Porter's definition of power (see Chapter Four, below), the answer to the second question can only be in terms of the configuration of rights codified in law, which is neither the answer nor question that the reader, or most social theorists, are interested in.
5. The relation between class and power (elites) is highly problematic in The VM because of conceptual inconsistencies and theoretical weaknesses. (See Chapter Three, below.) Thus, the discussion of elite relations and relative power are never firmly grounded in a class analysis. Porter's atheoretical stance (1970:157) leads him away from discussing how control of major newspapers by an "established upper class" is to be understood as evidence for the dominance of the corporate elite. While his classes have "their origin in economic processes and economic differences" (1965:28), the corporate elite is seen as just another elite and not as the elite central to, and responsible for, the class system. Porter, therefore asks 'which elite is dominant?' rather than 'how does the upper class rule?'

6. Porter feels that it would be more appropriate to consider honorific roles held by corporate elite to lead to increased influence rather than power (1965:299). Unfortunately, "influence" is never defined, although it seems rather central to any complete discussion of elite relations.

7. However, in the case of the two reviewers cited, perception isn't selective. I. Horowitz found Millsian rhetoric but respectable conclusions, whereas Robin found restrained prose presenting radical conclusions.

8. Thus, Gad Horowitz' statement that Porter the socialist "retreats a few steps to more solid ground and assumes the role of Porter the sociologist" (1965:14), displays an ignorance of the possible perspectives available from that "more solid ground."
9. Porter's desire for thorough-going democracy puts him closer to the Marxist socialists than to social democrats, and therefore makes his adoption of the elite perspective all the more confounding.

Chapter Three
The 'Synthetic' Structure of Class

In The Vertical Mosaic Porter places the constitutive accent on class consciousness as the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of 'real' classes. He defines classes as social groups within which "the members have a sense of identity with one another, share common values and traditions, and have an awareness of unity and common purpose" (1965:10). Rather than taking the position that classes do exist in Canada, as he clearly did in his 1961 essay, Porter states that no nation-wide data is available on the all-important subjective dimension of class: class consciousness. Instead, he proposes to deal with 'class' objectively. Thus when the word 'class' is used "we are talking about artificial statistical groups which do not have any life of their own or any coherence" (1965:11).

In organizing his class system he utilizes a simple gradation approach (cf. Ossowski: 1963:42). With this approach three or more classes are vertically ordered, not in terms of relations of dependence, but simply in terms of some objectively measurable characteristic. Porter uses income gradations to order his classes. Occasionally, however, he makes use of Blishen's (1958) synthetic gradation scheme of occupational classes. In that occupations are attributes (cf. Gross: 1949) they cannot be ordered along a simple continuum, and therefore the order of occupations was established by synthesizing continuums of the occupation related variables, of income and education. Blishen took the average income and average number of years of schooling for
each occupation, and computed standard scores for each variable. The synthesis took place when "these two standard scores were...combined and each occupation ranked according to this combined score" (Blishen, 1958: 522). For both the simple and synthetic gradation schemes, the setting of class boundaries is arbitrary.

One of the first problems we encounter has to do with a basic requirement of any stratification analysis (Gross, 1949: 41)). Although Porter speaks of the "structure of class" (1965: 29), "the class system" (1965: 28), and sometimes employs Blishen's seven occupational classes; he never settles on how many classes are in his system. He mentions "middle and upper classes" (1965: 291), the "classes below" these (1965: 283), the "lower class" (1965: 195), the "working class" (1965: 344) (functional group!), and the "bottom class" (1965: 154), but never explicitly states whether there are 3, 4, or 5 classes. Of course, to have done so would have led to the stickly problem of drawing class boundaries. He only confronts this problem once, when he draws the line at $8,000 income per year (1965: 132) as the boundary between the middle class and the "classes below." It is at this point when a second, and much more important problem arises.

When he draws this boundary it becomes clear that his "class system" is not one of simple gradation but rather is a peculiar case of 'synthetic' gradation. Rather than organizing his class system statistically in terms of modal points around which incomes are found to cluster, e.g., defining the middle class in terms of a "middle majority", he goes 'outside' his supposed 'simple gradation' scheme and employs an external, unexplicated, subjective criteria to internally organize
his class system. Unlike Blishen (1958), Porter never states his relevance criteria for the selection of class variables, nor how he has synthesized these variables. He does not define middle class statistically in terms of a "middle majority". Instead, he defines the "real middle class" (1965: 126) in terms of the variables of life style and values: "the middle class style of life does not rest on the ownership of gadgetry, but rather on the consumption of a different set of values." These values are health services, cultural enrichment and leisure. Thus, "it is the ability to consume these things...which identifies the real middle class." In that it took an $8,000 per year income, or over, to live this life during the late fifties, he drew the boundary between the middle and lower classes at this income level.

Porter's objective, statistical class system is thus subjectively organized in terms of what he takes classes to 'really' be.

What classes 'really' are constitutes the major shift and inconsistency in Porter's discussion and analysis of class. By defining the "real middle class" in terms of a certain type of life style and value consumption pattern, he has switched the constitutive accent from class consciousness to social isolation as the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of "real" classes.

Originally, social isolation had been a necessary, but not sufficient condition. Within Porter's definition of classes as social groups, the component that members "share common values and traditions" (1965: 10) refers to what Ossowski (1963: 135-6) has called one of the four possible, fundamental characteristics of stratification systems: social isolation. While shared values and traditions can be seen as
necessary for the development of "a sense of identity...and...awareness of unity and common purpose," the mere existence of shared values and traditions does not guarantee the existence of class consciousness. Therefore, social isolation is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the existence of real social groups, i.e., classes. By examining the concept of social isolation it will become clear that in making the distinction between "real middle class" and "middle majority" Porter takes the contrary position that social isolation is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of real classes.

Social isolation is a generic concept having to do, in general, with social distance between members of different classes and, conversely, with contact between members of the same class. It is most often treated as a consequence of economic factors, e.g., division of labor, income differences, relation to the means of production, etc. This behavioural criterion of class divisions takes many forms. The most explicit form is emphasized by a number of theorists (Baltzell, 1958: 59; Sweezy, 1959: 124; Kahl, 1957: 12; Schumpeter, 1953:77) who define class in terms of kinship and friendship networks. In this case a class is "the largest group of people whose members have intimate access to one another" (Davis, et. al., 1941: 59). Dahl's (1961: 229) definition of equal "social standing" emphasizes the "intimate access" aspect of social isolation, but goes further to suggest the aspect of shared life style, i.e., members display a "willingness to dine together...to accept membership in the same clubs..." The life style aspect of the social isolation characteristic is directly re-
flected in two of the indices used in assessing class standing in the Yankee City studies (Warner, 1963: 25-34): type of residence and residential area. Finally, Veblen's (1934) emphasis upon "conspicuous consumption" reflects the aspect of life style as well as the related dimensions of consumption patterns and values.

Porter's assertion that the "real middle class" has a recognizable life style and can be identified by its consumption of a certain set of values is thus a negation and contradiction of his original definition of class. He has shifted the constitutive accent from class consciousness to social isolation as the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of "real" classes.

Problems of 'Synthesis', Adequacy and Consistency

The 'latent', but most important function of distinguishing between the "real middle class" and the statistical "middle majority" was that it allows Porter to more closely and concretely link class and power than could be done using "artifical statistical groups." Whenever he shows the relationship between class and power, he falls back on this distinction and locates the elites within "real" classes. This is especially the case with the political, intellectual and bureaucratic elites, for they are mostly from the "real" middle class (1965: 395, 502, 445).

His analysis of the class background of the economic elite is especially revealing. In examining the backgrounds of 611 directors he found at least
197 persons who could with a variety of criteria be shown to have had a middle class social origin. The criteria used here included the father's occupation (for example, doctor, lawyer, clergyman, army officer, managerial) and where the father's occupation could not be established those with university education were included. (1965: 292)

First of all, he has decided to treat the life style and value consumption-related variable of education as a sufficient condition for membership in a certain class. Second, and more important, when we examine his examples of middle class occupations we discover that not only has he 'synthesized' his own class system, but he has taken Blishen's seven occupational classes and 'synthesized' them. These occupations fall within Blishen's top two occupational classes. They are only "middle class" in terms of Porter's shifted definition of the "real middle class". They are not middle class in the sense of a statistical middle majority, for they compose the top eleven percent of the labor force (1965: 163).

How Porter has synthesized the variables of life style, value consumption, and the attribute of occupation is completely unexplained. Furthermore, his 'synthesis' is incomplete: if doctors and lawyers are middle class occupations, and at the same time are listed in Blishen's top occupational class, what constitutes an upper class occupation? Finally, his declaration that classes constructed in terms of occupations "are no more than statistical strata" (1965: 161) seems inconsistent with his use of Blishen's occupational scale in linking class and power. The result of the distinction between the "real middle class" and the statistical "middle majority" is that the structure of class and the links between class and power are entirely 'synthetic.'
The manifest purpose of making this distinction was to bring into question our "widespread social image of middle classness" (1965: 125). Having made this distinction, he then argues that 90 percent of the population are in the 'lower classes' because only 10 percent, or so, had incomes ($8,000+) which would allow them a middle class life style (1965: 132). What he has done, however, is to violate what Schutz (1964: 19) has called the postulates of adequacy and consistency. In defining what the middle class "really" is, he does not consult any actors in the everyday world to see what they take the middle class to "really" be. Given his stated purpose, such a consultation or sampling, is necessary to determine if his "typical construction would be reasonable and understandable for the actor himself as well as for his fellow-man" (Schutz, 1964: 19). This violation of the postulate of adequacy leads to the situation where, if members define middle classness differently, e.g., in terms of the ownership of gadgetry rather than the consumption of certain values, Porter's analysis, discussion and conclusion are irrelevant to his purpose. If gadgetry ownership is the prime criteria in members' minds for middle classness, which seems highly likely, then Porter's (1965: 131) finding that "such gadgetry gets distributed in some proportion in all income classes," e.g., "more than 80 percent had electric washers, telephones and television sets; and 75 percent had automobiles and vacuum cleaners" (1965: 130), can be taken as evidence to support the Canadian social image of middle classness.

Besides violating the postulate of consistency (Schutz, 1964: 19) by shifting the meaning of class in making this distinction, he
violates it by shifting his use of the term class. In Chapter One (1965: 11) he had said that no data was available on the subjective side of class and therefore he would use the term class in the sense of "artificial statistical groups." However, his actual use of the term in attempting to link class and power necessarily implies that it is a "real" entity, "real" defined in terms of his shifted meaning of class. This shift in use is apparent in the statement: "The majority of Canadian political leaders have been drawn from the middle class" (1965: 395), not from the middle majority.

His use of class at a number of points reflects these shifts. He writes of "sociological and psychological elements" of "social class position" (1965: 183) which "help preserve the various social milieus of class" (1965: 193). A non-awareness of the different milieus of classes makes for a "class determined education system" (1965: 172) which affects mobility. Important to mobility is the university where members of the lower class (classes?) learn the "appropriate modes of behavior" (1965: 283) to enable them to succeed in the "middle class occupational world" (1965: 284). When discussing elites, he discovers, that in effect, the large daily newspapers are "instruments of an established upper class" (1965: 463) (which suggests the existence of class consciousness and class interests, at least among the upper class). And in the process of examining the "class background" (1965: 483) of elites he discovers the existence and interdependence of "class institutions" and "class continuity" (1965: 285).

All of these ways of talking about class and class-related phenomena can only be understood if we do not attempt to operate in
terms of classes as artificial statistical groups lacking coherence and unity. If one is operating with the notion of classes as socially isolated groups, then these ways of talking make sense. But since Porter says he won't deal with real social groups, because data are unavailable on class consciousness, the only way his analysis of class is understandable is (1.) if we accept the distinction between middle class and middle majority, and the accompanying, unexplicated shift of the constitutive accent from class consciousness to social isolation as the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of real classes, and (2.) if, for the purpose of doing his analysis, we allow him to 'transcend' his original position and treat classes as 'real' rather than as artificial statistical groups. Even if we were to grant him these considerable liberties, his analysis would still be 'inadequate' for his expressed purpose of dethroning the reigning middle class image of Canada. Since he does not know how members define 'middle class,' he has no way of knowing whether his analysis disproves their social image. In fact, it may do the reverse if members define middle class in terms of the ownership of gadgetry.

In spite of his conceptual confusion and inconsistency, however, his analysis is "understandable" on a common-sense level, because we are familiar with everyday and social scientific usages of the term 'class' and, on this level, neither Porter nor the readers are bound by the canons of science (Schutz, 1964: 76-77). However, The Vertical Mosaic is a social scientific work bound by the canons of science. Therefore it is incumbent upon its author, if he is to adequately describe the
structure of class and to link class and power, to 1.) explicitly state the relevance criteria used to select the class variables of life style and value consumption, 2.) enumerate the classes within his system, 3.) describe the life style and value consumption pattern of each class, 4.) present, in some form, the data upon which these descriptions were based, along with a methodological note, 5.) state how variables were synthesized to determine class membership of elites and 6.) explain how class boundaries were arrived at. The consequence of not meeting any of these requirements, or some such set (cf. Gross:1949), is that his analysis of class and his linkage of class and power are scientifically without foundation.

* * *

Had Porter recognized and resolved these problems he would have been in a position to not only provide an adequate and accurate description of the structure of class and of the link between class and power, but might have been led to recognize an important, latent, finding in his work.

Besides being able to tightly link ethnicity and class, and recognizing that "social control by the charter group" (1965: 71-2) would be more aptly labeled "class control," had Porter laid a foundation for his reconstituted concept of classes-as-socially-isolated-groups he might have discovered the class nature of the two social mechanisms which he says (1965: 526-8) serve to co-ordinate elites into a power structure: kinship and friendship. He found numerous kinship links within and between elites, as well as friendships "resulting
from living together or having common experience of the same kind of social life." (1965: 527)

In fact, his concept of elite presupposes a shared class background. This can be deduced from his statement that "Validity of the concept 'elite' rests on the probability that the individuals assigned to the group are socially homogeneous" (1965: 303). "Social homogeneity" is not a function of the relationship between frequency of interaction and positive feelings within the elite group. While it is true that members of an elite undoubtedly become more socially homogeneous, and probably group-conscious, validity of the concept 'elite' rests on the probability that the individuals 'assigned to the group are (already) socially homogeneous.' This formulation raises the question of how new members of the middle class can be socially homogeneous with members of upper class in the economic elite. It seems clear, however, that Porter already had the framework for establishing a solid rather than surreptitious link between class and power. Unless he did not recognize this 'latent' finding in his work, this 'pulled-punch' has to be treated as an example of the tactic of undrawn conclusions within his overall 'strategy of respectability.'
Footnotes

1. Class consciousness is the characteristic Porter emphasizes in his definition of classes as social groups. His original formulation of an objective, statistical 'class' system composed of artificial groups emphasizes the characteristic of vertical order, while excluding the other three characteristics. Porter also implicitly draws upon the fourth characteristic, distinctness of interests, when he tells us that large daily newspapers are "instruments of an established upper class" (1965: 463). Unless that class has distinct interests, its instruments of propaganda have no raison d'être.
Chapter Four
The Legitimate Structure of Power

The problems of logical consistency in Porter's analysis of class are mirrored in his analysis of power. As with class, we find Porter shifting his meaning and use of the concept of power. As with class, we find that he 'transcends' his original definition, but in this case his analysis cannot be logically done without such a shift. And, as with class, this shift can only be 'understood' by drawing upon 'what everyone knows,' by treating common-sense and discipline-common knowledge of what power "really" is as a resource.

According to Porter (1965: 201): "Power means the recognized right to make effective decisions on behalf of a group of people." The notion of effective decision making is probably drawn from Lasswell and Kaplan (1950: 74-102), since Porter footnotes them a number of times in his discussion of power. They define power relationally as a policy decision, involving severe sanctions, which is obeyed, i.e., the decision is effective. The idea of "recognized right" appears to be his own formulation and to have two distinct dimensions: internal and external. The internal dimension is the more obvious one: an A makes decisions as a recognized and legitimate representative of a group of people, B. For his analysis, this means that elites are representatives of their institutions. The external dimension appears as the more important one: all A's recognize each other's weight, scope and domain of power (cf. Lasswell and Kaplan, 1950: 77) as legitimate. As Porter (1965: 214) puts it:
In this respect the 'rights' about which we have spoken and which appear to limit the exercise of power (sic) are really the rights of institutional elites to organize and carry out their activities. If one elite threatens these rights it will be challenged by other elites whose positions are threatened.

As to how these rights are safeguarded and maintained, he tells us that they "come from the tradition of independence built up by elite groups within a system of juridical norms" (1965: 214) (emphasis added).

In that Porter identifies power as legitimate, his concept differs radically from most theorists, who follow Weber (1968: 53) in distinguishing between power and authority. Porter (1965: 266-7) responds that the distinction is spurious because "any form of power can be rationalized as good" and legitimacy is relative. He argues that any type of regime, no matter how tyrannical, may appear as legitimate to the ruled. Going from this point, he tells us that power must be obeyed to exist and that it is within the province of power to obtain obedience. Then comes a pivotal point: "If power and obedience are thus correlative, and if obedience requires the sense of legitimacy, can there be such a thing as illegitimate power?" (1965: 266) (emphasis added). He answers in the negative and adds that, furthermore, by shifting perspectives and looking at all sides in disputes, all power can be seen as legitimate or illegitimate; it depends upon whose side you want to take. He concludes that, "At most such a distinction applies only in periods of social transition... when the prevailing values are being called into question." (1965: 226). In Porter's view, Canada was not into such a period in the early sixties.
Logical and Utilitarian Problems

This argument and formulation can be criticized on logical and utilitarian grounds. In terms of his argument, it is illogical to suppose that "obedience requires the sense of legitimacy" and yet hold that "it is within the sphere of power to apply sanctions and thereby defeat resistance and retain obedience." (1965: 226) If there is resistance, and it is necessary to secure obedience through the application of negative sanctions, then quite obviously obedience, in this case, is not forthcoming out of a sense of the legitimacy of the command or commander. Therefore, obedience does not necessarily require the sense of legitimacy.

Furthermore, if it is within the province of 'power' to apply sanctions, it is also within the province of 'power' to secure obedience by threatening to apply sanctions. In both cases 'power' and obedience are correlative, but not necessarily linked by the "sense of legitimacy." Where obedience does require the "sense of legitimacy" is in authority relations (Bachrach and Baratz, 1963: 638). Since Porter does not distinguish between power and authority and defines all power as legitimate (as authority), he is unable to analyze those situations where decisions are effective but not legitimate. As will be apparent, this is a fatal conceptual flaw.

Given this flaw in his conceptualization of power, we are faced with important questions as to the usefulness of his concept for analyzing the structure of power in Canada. If he takes his definition seriously, all that he can actually describe is the formal structure
of rights as reflected in the configuration of juridical norms which determine the weight, scope and domain of elites' power (cf. Lasswell and Kaplan, 1950: 77). Furthermore, if these jurisdictional rights are "recognized," then there is no reason for elites to be in conflict. Where there is inter-elite conflict, then obviously jurisdictional rights are not "recognized," they are in dispute. If such is the case, then the nature of inter-elite relations is not one of "power" as defined by Porter.

This logical problem begins to emerge at the end of the first chapter (1965: 27-8) when Porter tells us that inter-elite conflict can be seen "at those points where new possibilities appear for exploitation of social resources." Later on he calls these the "hinge points of change where new options are to be taken up." (1965: 44) However, the whole notion of hinge points and new options as the focus of elite conflict, implies that "recognized rights" don't exist or aren't clear. Otherwise, there would be no conflict.

The fact that there is conflict between elites and that one side does 'take up new options,' cannot be accounted for or analyzed with a concept of power that a priori identifies all power as legitimate, as "recognized." Rights must be established, and it is 'real power' which allows one side to take up an option and, through time, to establish that option as rightfully theirs. Thus, what is required is what has been discarded: a distinction between power, e.g., effective decision-making, and authority, e.g., the recognized right to make effective decisions. To be sure, even this distinction is crude, for it does not
distinguish power from force, or formal from substantive authority (cf. Bachrach and Baratz, 1963), but it is basic and necessary for any analysis of the structure of power.

**Power Transcended**

When we turn to examine Porter's discussion and analysis of the structure of power we immediately discover that, just as with class, he 'transcends' his constricted definition in the process of doing his analysis. As with class, he is 'understandable' because the word "power" is so often used in everyday talk, the media, and in professional writings. It is a resource which he draws upon and uses in familiar, but inconsistent ways. If we wish to pin down the discipline-common origins of the concepts he utilizes, it seems that we could point to at least Weber and Lasswell and Kaplan.

Weber's (1968: 53) concept of power as Dahrendorf points out (1959: 166), is personal: power is an attribute of a person rather than of a role or position. This notion of power is especially evident when Porter (1965: 551) tells us that C.D. Howe, the minister of defense production in 1955, "was probably the most powerful man in that administration." In terms of the formal organization of the cabinet, i.e., the structure of "recognized rights," we could have never arrived at this conclusion. However, what is being dealt with in this statement is an actor rather than his role. What is being drawn upon in this statement is "the possibility that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless
of the basis on which this probability rests." (Weber, 1968: 53).

It is within the analysis of inter-elite conflict that we would expect Porter to put his concept of power to the greatest and clearest use. Instead, we discover that important examples of inter-elite conflict cannot be understood using his definitions of power. They can only be taken as legitimate examples of power relations if we understand power, as do Lasswell and Kaplan (1950: 74), to be effective decision-making, without such decision-making being necessarily a "recognized right."

When he presents the case of the nationalization of the Canadian Northern and Grant Trunk railways by the Conservatives early in this century (1965: 543), he mentions that "the cabinet minister responsible for the railway nationalization plan, was denounced as a socialist." It is surprising that Porter did not recognize that this dispute and the accusation of 'socialism' revolved around the question of the legitimate scope of government, i.e., the "recognized right to make effective decisions" was apparently in question. The inadequacy of his concept of power is further reflected in the fact that "this period was an important one in shaping present day Canada." (1965: 544) This statement attests to the fact that the configuration of recognized rights is shaped by what other analysts would call "power". If "power means the recognized right...," then, for the sake of consistency and rigour, Porter should have generated another term besides 'power' which would have met his analytical needs.

The British Columbia Electric dispute, which Porter called a "striking example of the conflict between political and economic elites"
(1965: 548), also serves as a striking example of the inadequacy of his concept of power. He writes of the "long legal battle" which followed the expropriation of B.C.E. by Premier Bennett in 1961 and of the 1963 B.C. Supreme Court decision of Chief Justice Sherwood Lett to the effect that "the expropriation proceedings of 1961 were illegal and unconstitu­tional." (Porter, 1965: 549).

Between 1961 and the 1963 court decision, the B.C. government had run B.C.E. under the name of "The British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority," and had reaped a profit of twenty million dollars. B.C. Power Corporation, the legal "father" of B.C.E., felt that it should receive compensation for profit loss during the interim, plus an additional cheque to cover the difference between what the Government paid for expropriation and the actual value of B.C.E. This last point was much more of a concern to B.C. Power Corporation than the fact of expropriation itself.

On September 27, 1963 the two sides reached an out of court agreement at the prodding of Chief Justice Lett, who had decided the real worth of B.C.E. and, consequently, how much the Provincial Govern­ment had yet to pay. The payment did not include compensation for loss of earnings. After settlement, Attorney General Bonner stated that the Lett decision, which pronounced the expropriation illegal and unconstitu­tional, had been set aside and could not be formally entered as a judg­ment. The Chairman of B.C. Power Corporation said the judgment would still stand as a legal authority, as a precedent. The counsel for B.C. P.C. took the position that as a result of the judgment B.C. Hydro and Power Authority had no legal existence or authority (Ardies, 1963: 1-2).
The striking conclusion to be drawn, which Porter ignored, is that an effective decision was made by a B.C. political elite in 1961 which went beyond the recognized institutional scope of that elite's power. Two years later, Bennett's 'decision' was declared to have broken the all-important system of juridical norms which safeguards the autonomy of institutions. Two months later, when the dispute was resolved, the Provincial Government treated the solution as victory (Sherman, 1966: 277). Their decision was still effective, even though it was still "illegal and unconstitutional." This uncomfortable fact was simply downplayed and bypassed with rhetoric of a possible post facto constitutional amendment (Ardies, 1963: 2).

Thus it should be abundantly clear that Porter's original concept of power is inappropriate, inadequate and misleading as an analytical tool for describing relations between elites. His concept ignores the possible variation in bases of obedience, thereby allowing him to identify all power as legitimate, as consisting of the "recognized right to make effective decisions." Logically, all that can be done with this formulation is to delimit the formal structure of power as reflected in a system of juridical norms. The actual structure of power revealed at the "hinge points of change," and during "border disputes," cannot be analyzed.

When Porter does attempt to expose the actual structure of power, he necessarily transcends his definition of power and draws upon other discipline-common conceptualizations. The apparent coherence and rigour of his analysis, however, depends upon his and the readers' know-
ledge of what power 'really' is, rather than upon the consistent and logical use of his definition of it. Thus while there is no foundation supporting Porter's structure of class, there is a foundation under his structure of power. The problem is that it is both too narrow and faulty to offer any support.
1. Given his avowed evolutionary perspective in writing *The Vertical Mosaic* (Porter, 1970: 181), and his statement that a "macro-orientation requires a time dimension rather than the static or 'moment in time' orientation of equilibrium theory" (Porter, 1970: 152-3), it is surprising that he formulates a 'static' concept of power chosen to analyze one 'moment in time.'

2. Bachrach and Baratz take Lasswell and Kaplan's formulation of authority as "formal power" (1950: 133) to be inadequate because it identifies all law as legitimate, without accounting for 'how members see it.' The "sense of legitimacy" 'resides' within the commanded's consciousness rather than in the law.
Chapter Five
The Ambiguous Context of Elitist Democracy

The "meaning" and significance of the class and power structures in Canada can only be determined within a normative context. Such a context is provided by democratic theory. Unfortunately, there are a number of democratic theories. We have mentioned thorough-going democratic theory and the theory of democratic elitism. There are others. Which theory of democracy Porter is operating in terms of is ambiguous: thus, so are the meaning and significance of his findings. The theory he appears to operate with is the one which robs his findings of import. Had he treated democracy as a topic he would have been led to some important conclusions and could have provided The VM with a critical context.

Early in Chapter One of The VM Porter mentions the importance of defining and clarifying terms "to avoid misunderstanding and confusion" (1965: 6). Unfortunately, he does not define and clarify what he means by "democracy." He trades on common sense notions of democracy when he discusses social images of equality and diffused power in the first chapter. When discussing the Canadian political system in Chapter Twelve he makes Robert Lynd's distinction between "liberal democracy," which combines democracy in the "political" sphere with capitalism in the economic sphere, and "thorough-going democracy" which expresses and implements democratic values in all spheres. While he does mention in the final chapter that "Canada...has a long way to
go to become in any sense a thorough-going democracy" (1965: 557), for a variety of reasons, it appears that The VM is presented within an elite democratic context.

The appearance of democratic elitism as the context has to be extrapolated from his statements and the ethico-theoretical perspectives he employed. If he were value-consistent with his 1961 position we would expect him to explicitly employ a thorough-going democratic framework. In spite of his mention of this framework, the logic and thrust of his argument against liberal democracy do the work of rejecting a thorough-going democratic framework and suggesting a democratic elitist one. This is because both the liberal and thorough-going theories are essentially normative while the elitist brand of democracy is a descriptive, "empirical" theory. It is the latter type which Porter seeks.

In the last chapter, Porter sketches the 19th century liberal theory of democracy. This theory assumed that man was rational and if given equality of opportunity and the right to participate in decision-making he would build a society wherein he could realize his human potential and find happiness. Porter rejects this theory.

To use the liberal theory as a basis for empirical research into the processes of power would be absurd in view of the frequency with which that theory has been empirically refuted. (1965: 556)

On the last page of the text of The VM he reiterates that:

The nineteenth-century notion of a liberal citizen-participating democracy is obviously not a satisfactory model by which to examine the processes of decision-making in either the economic or political context. (1965: 558)

Of course, here he is referring to the important voting studies
of the fifties, especially *Voting* by Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee (1954), which definitely undermined the liberal assumption that man is rational, competent and interested when it comes to participating in politics. Even those, such as Graeme Duncan and Steven Lukes, who opposed the conclusions which the studies drew, had to agree that "the voters fail to satisfy most of the traditional requirements of democracy" (1967: 166).

What Porter apparently did not recognize in his acceptance of the popular rejections of liberal democratic theory is that if these 'empirical refutations' are valid for liberal democratic theory, they provide an even stronger refutation of thorough-going democracy. This is true because the only relevant differences between these types of democratic theory is in the domain and amount of citizen-participation. Whereas liberal democracy calls for, at least, representative democracy within the "political" sphere, *i.e.*, government, thorough-going democratic theory requires participatory democracy in all the major spheres of society, *e.g.*, government, economy, education. Furthermore, both theories of democracy share the same assumptions regarding rational "democratic man" (the brother of rational economic man), as well as the same normative ends, "to provide the conditions for the full and free development of the essential human capacities of all the members of the society" (Macpherson, 1965: 37). Thus the arguments and data put forward in the voting studies, which empirically destroy the underpinning assumptions of liberal democratic theory, undermine thorough-going democratic theory in the same manner. Both
theories are non-empirical, descriptively inadequate and inaccurate. It is quite clear from Porter's statements, quoted above, that he requires that democratic theory provide a "satisfactory model" to guide empirical research. The one theory which can do that, and within which his study appears to be done, is the one suggested by the voting researchers. The conclusion that Berelson, et. al., reached is not that we should rededicate ourselves to the realization of democracy via education and realignment of the present system with democratic theory. Rather, they concluded that democratic theory was out of alignment with social realities and therefore needed to be reformulated. In that the democratic system in the U.S. had survived and grown, they concluded that "where the classic theory is defective is in its concentration on the individual citizen" (1954: 312). This led them to examine the "requirements for the survival of the total democratic system" (1954: 322) and adopt an elitist theory of democracy.

This new theory followed the lines set down by Joseph Schumpeter in Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. It had as central a couple of new twists on classical liberal democratic theory. Democracy is now conceived of as simply "a political method, that is to say, a certain type of institutional arrangement for arriving at political...decisions and hence incapable of being an end in itself, irrespective of what decisions it will produce under given historical conditions" (1950: 242). Thus, the ethical end of democracy, "to provide the conditions for the full and free development of the essential human capacities of all the members of the society" (Macpherson,
1965: 37), is done away with. The second twist in this new theory is that the democratic method, i.e., "democracy," is defined as "that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote" (1950: 269).

Central to the democratic method are the "rules of the game" which operate to maintain the required institutional arrangement. From Seymour Martin Lipset's Political Man we can abstract two major rules of the game. The first is the compromise rule: No group is to desire any one thing too much, so much that it cannot abide defeat by the majority. The second is the cross-pressures rule: Interests must not line up in the same way for the same people (1960: 1-24). If procedures, institutions and values exist which assure compromise and cross-pressures, the system will experience enough conflict to be progressive but will be cohesive enough to have consensus. Not surprisingly, given the Cold War experience of these theorists, the major concern of democratic elitists has been the stability of their "democratic" system.

The result of this "empirically adequate" theory is that a situation is labelled as democratic where elites, playing by the rules of the game, compete with each other, within the "political" sphere, during elections. Thus democratic elitism is still "liberal:" state and society are separated, but government "by the people" is replaced by "government approved by the people" (Schumpeter, 1950: 246).

That Porter is working within this theory has already been suggested in light of his elitist and functionalist ethico-theoretical
perspectives. The latter perspective divides society into sectors, with a political sub-system, and defines the Good in terms of the whole, the total social system. The former perspective is a direct resource for democratic elite theorists, with its emphasis on the circulation of elites (Pareto). In fact, the only theory of democracy which is compatible with (not to mention dependent upon) the existence of strong elites is Schumpeter-Lipset's.

When he presents the theory of elites he is, whether he realizes it or not, supporting and presenting a central feature of empirical elitist democratic theory.

Elites both compete and co-operate with one another: they compete to share in the making of decisions of major importance for the society, and they co-operate because together they keep the society working as a going concern... It is elites who have the capacity to introduce change, but changes bring about shifts in the relations between elites. Because they all have power as their institutional right they can check each other's power, and, therefore, co-operation and accommodation, as well as conflict, characterize their relations. (1965: 27)

This quote can be treated as a restatement of the consensus-conflict motif within the literature of democratic elitism. It is also central to the equilibrium model within functionalist theory. Within this quote it is also important to note that innovation, change, or "creative behaviour" as Porter put it in 1961, is expected to occur at the top. On the next page, while rejecting the notion of change coming from below, in the form of class conflict, he suggests that these classes "may, however, be the source of important dynamic elements to be mobilized by institutional leaders" (1965: 28). Thus he displays some of the attitudes which are essential characteristics of the demo-
When Porter discusses the Canadian Political System he draws upon democratic elitist theory.

In a differentiated pluralistic society there will not be general agreement on the means to be employed to reach these general values (of progress and improvement). There will, however, be some agreement on the ground rules. There are constitutional ground rules, but at the same time there is a body of political conventions which political parties observe, one of the most important being that the political party in power permits its rivals to exist. The two-party system is a functionally appropriate way of mediating the 'conservative' and 'progressive' social forces. (1965: 367)

In "pluralistic" society the "ground rule" which Porter mentions is a derivation of Lipset's compromise rule. Porter's functionalist approach meshes nicely with democratic elitism, as we find conflict and consensus producing equilibrium via a two-party system of "conservative" and "progressive" elites.

Unfortunately, Canada does not have "conservative" and "progressive" social forces institutionalized in her two-party system. "The dialogue is between unity and discord rather than progressive and conservative forces" (1965: 369), with the "maintenance of national unity" as the major goal. Any "polarization to right and left in Canadian politics is regarded as disruptive. Consequently the main focus of Canadian politics has been to the right and the maintenance of the status quo" (1965: 369). Canada has "brokerage" rather than "creative" politics: too much consensus and not enough conflict. This is an important point, for Porter has shifted from treating democratic elitism as a "satisfactory model" to guide empirical research, to a
treatment of democratic elitism wherein the latter is treated as providing a normative criteria for evaluating the Canadian political system. Thus, what Gad Horowitz (1965: 14) took to be the major point of Porter's work, is made within, and is entirely dependent upon a democratic elitist framework.

A Value Contradiction

As with Porter's assumption of the ethico-theoretical perspectives of elite analysis and functionalism, his utilization of, and dependence upon, the theory of democratic elitism is a contradiction of his 1961 value position. In his 1961 essay he was a fervent supporter of socialist, thorough-going democracy, which conflicts with democratic elitism on at least six points:

1. Where Robert Lynd's favored theory sees democracy as both a method and an ethical end, democratic elitism sees it only as a method.

2. Where thorough-going democracy defines the citizens' interest as both in the end result and in the production of that end result through participation; 'democratic elitism defines their interests one-dimensionally in terms of end results, e.g., 'more butter and guns.' In fact, the latter theory sees a certain level of apathy and non-participation as functional for the system. Non-voters and occasional voters provide flexibility and stability for the system (Berelson, et al., 1954: 316).
3. Where thorough-going theory aims at assuring equality of condition and power, elitist democracy is concerned only with equal opportunity to gain the prerequisites of power, i.e., elite status.

4. While the former theory defines as "political" any decision-making which significantly affects societal values, the latter theory operates within a liberal tradition and limits its definition of political to governmental decision-making and that which relates to it.

5. While the former theory relies upon broadening social participation to counter the authoritarian propensity of both the elites and the masses, the latter theory relies upon the elites to safeguard the democratic system against the authoritarian masses.

6. Thus democratic elitists view the elite-mass structure of modern society as being in the best interests of democracy, while thorough-going democrats wish to breakdown and decentralize this structure as much as possible.⁶

Put simply, Porter's use of democratic elitism as a resource constitutes the major value inconsistency of The VM. His confused and confusing use of "democracy" suggests that this major inconsistency may be explained as a consequence of Porter only being familiar enough with the literature on democracy to draw upon the general features of the discipline-popular, respectable, theory of democratic elitism. This would help account for two of his errors:
1. He approvingly mentioned thorough-going democracy without apparently realizing that he must reject that theory on the same grounds that he accepts the refutation of liberal democracy: both are 'empirically unsound.'

2. At the same time, however, he drew upon democratic elitism as the "satisfactory model" to guide his empirical research; but then turned around and treated that theory normatively when he discovered 'too much' consensus and 'not enough' conflict, in Canadian politics.

There is a third "error" which follows upon the previous two. When Porter turns around and uses democratic elitism as more than an empirical theory, i.e., as a normative theory, he allows and instructs us to treat all of The VM in terms of the normative criteria provided by democratic elitism. Thus, while it is unquestionably the case that "Canada...has a long way to go to become in any sense a thorough-going democracy" (1965: 557), the latter theory is empirically unsound and therefore is not to be used. The road to becoming a full-blown elitist democracy is to be taken instead, and, not surprisingly, it is a shorter road. All that is needed is a bit more money spent on elite education, and a circulation of elites, perhaps bringing the NDP into office. This liberal, elitist answer is soothing, as it was to the ColdWar warriors of the early sixties in the U.S. But the respectability of The VM is only gained at the sake of down-playing, if not doing away with, the ethical ends democracy should pursue.

Even if we were to lower the requirements of scholarship and
allow his unfamiliarity with the literature on democracy, we would still expect him to recognize the major conflicts between the general features of liberal democratic elitism and socialist thorough-going democracy. However, even in 1961, his stock of knowledge as a socialist may have provided him with the central tenets of thoroughgoing democracy, without him being familiar with the literature on democracy, per se. This is not to say that the label of "value inconsistent" is inappropriately applied in Porter's case. Rather, Porter should be labelled value inconsistent, as well as "theoretically innocent," to use C.P. Wolf's charitable description of Porter (1970: xix). Were we to be less charitable, we might say that the lack of any foundation for his analysis of class; the narrow, faulty foundation for his analysis of power; and his loose employment of a democratic elitist content suggest theoretical ignorance.
Footnotes


2. Porter's "Power and Freedom in Canadian Democracy" appears, at key points, to be a Canadian version of Lynd's 1957 essay, "Power as a Problem and Resource in American Society."

3. What Porter means by "citizen-participating democracy" (1965: 558) is apparently Jeffersonian, participatory democracy. However, nineteenth-century liberal democratic theory variously called for participatory or representative (J.S. Mill) democracy. The latter has become the twentieth-century form of liberal democracy.

4. Macpherson here refers to the shared goal of liberal democracy, "Communist" democracy and the classic, pre-liberal democracy of Rousseau now popular in the "underdeveloped" countries. It is the latter form of democracy, of Macpherson's three, which may be called "thorough-going."

5. The rejection of democracy-as-an-end has created a curious normative vacuum for elite theorists, which has been filled by the "rules of the game." As we've witnessed in the U.S. during the past decade, the rules of the game are elevated above democratic ideals by elites. This has been especially so when it is the masses who, in complete and foolish ignorance of the new theory of democracy, call for the realization of those outdated ideals.

6. These six points owe much to Peter Bachrach's comparison of democratic elitism and what he calls "modern self-developmenta...
cracy" (1967). The major difference between the latter theory and thorough-going democracy is on point three in the text. Where thorough-going democracy calls for equality of condition, Bachrach only calls for equality of opportunity. On this point Porter may actually be closer to Bachrach than to Lynd.
Chapter Six
The Critical Context of Democracy

Had Porter treated democracy seriously, and familiarised himself with the literature, he would have discovered that the liberal and the thorough-going theories of democracy cannot be empirically refuted. In the process he would have come to realize the difference between "normative" and "descriptive" theories. This would have allowed him to use a descriptive theory heuristically to uncover the relationships between class, democracy, power and ideology, while retaining his normative theory as a yardstick to measure the State of Canada. All this, however, would have required Porter to operate with a strategy of integrity rather than respectability.

What the authors of the voting studies ignored, and what Porter apparently wasn't aware of, is that while it is possible to "empirically refute" the liberal theory of democracy as descriptively inadequate, no amount of empirical data can refute it, or thorough-going democracy, on grounds of normative "inadequacy," i.e., facts cannot refute values. On this issue, Duncan and Lukes have pointed out that the pre-liberal and liberal theories of Rousseau and J.S. Mill "are a critique of reality in terms of a vision of human nature and possibilities, and for this reason cannot simply be refuted on the grounds that people do not satisfy the required standards and that soi-distant 'democracies' nonetheless survive" (1967: 171).

That leading social scientists would turn their backs on liberal democratic theory when the facts showed the U.S. to be less
the ideal democracy than it was portrayed to be, has to be understood in terms of the historical conditions since World War II. The Cold War had the U.S. locked in mortal combat with the "Red Menace." To be critical of the American political system was to play into the hands of the International Communist Conspiracy. Besides, it was quite clear to almost everyone in the U.S. that they were better off under what-was-called-democracy than they would have been under Communism. Thus a questionable continuum-yardstick was set up by Raymond Aron in 1950 (and referred to approvingly in The VM). "Soviet" and "western" societies were formulated as ideal types residing at opposite ends of the continuum. In this way citizens and social scientists in the western societies could compare their society to Russian society, instead of comparing their society to the ideal of liberal democracy. The result was self-satisfied celebration rather than self-critical honesty. "Empirically adequate,\(^1\) descriptive, elitist democratic theory developed as an historical product of this period. It described that which existed, labelled it "democracy," and that was 'empirically adequate' for essentially practical purposes.

Had Porter recognized the false refutation of liberal democratic theory and the empirical adequacy of democratic elitism he could have safely retained thorough-going democracy as a yardstick and used democratic elitism heuristically. The use of the latter would have required uncharacteristic diligence on Porter's part so as to not fall into the liberal apologist trap of treating democratic elitism normatively. Assuming that that could have been accomplished,
let us now turn to the discoveries and undrawn conclusions hidden within the respectable pages of *The VM*.

The first discovery has to do with brokerage politics. If Porter had treated democracy as a topic he would have been able to improve his explanation of brokerage politics by examining the relationship of the two "rules of the game" stated in the previous chapter. Brokerage politics can be best explained in terms of the working of the government itself. If both political parties "are closely linked with corporate enterprise" (1965: 368), then there are inadequate cross-pressure, which is a violation of rule two. As a consequence of rule one working where number two is violated, you have little conflict, with agreement or compromise as the general state of affairs. One final result of the working out of rule one when rule two is violated is a situation in which people care less and less about the issues that are involved, i.e., apathy. Apathy and brokerage politics are to be expected as a result of the working out of the rules of the game in Canadian society. Furthermore, when both parties are rooted in corporate enterprise, and when corporate capitalism requires national unity for the sake of efficiency, brokerage politics on the right are to be expected. Which is to say, the operation of the political system cannot be fully understood in a western society unless it is examined within the larger, economic context, of corporate capitalism.

Had Porter treated democratic elitism heuristically within a corporate capitalist context he would have discovered that "democracy,"
as it presently operates in Canada, serves upper class interests. This requires pulling together some of Porter's findings and drawing some provisional conclusions which suggest lines for future research.

Mobility into the upper class is quite low (1965: 293) and looks to get worse because of the "increasing bureaucratization of the economic system through the development of the national corporation" (1965: 283). This is the case as a result of the small labour pool of middle and upper class college graduates provided by the class-determined education system in Canada. Porter pointed out that this "leads to an increasingly closed system of stratification" (1965: 283). However, there is a considerable amount of mobility into the middle class (1965: 51), which would seem to ensure the growth of the corporate labour pool. In the past, however, the most upwardly mobile middle class members have emigrated to the U.S. and elsewhere, while their positions have been taken by immigrants from other countries. The upshot of this situation is that the top of the class structure remains rigid and experiences high class continuity between generations, while the classes below are in a state of flux and therefore experience much less class continuity.

This situation needs to be set in a context of corporate capitalist society, where property rights and the legal fiction of the corporation-as-citizen account for the wealth which defines the upper as the upper class. Given this situation and its historical context, in whose favor do the rules of the game operate? The obvious answer is the upper class. Because of their high class continuity, and
rootedness in the corporate system, they experience fewer cross pres-
sures than any other class. Their class interests are more clearly
visible to themselves as a result of their continuity, which suggests,
as Porter constantly does, that they compose not only a socially iso-
lated group, but they are group, i.e., class, conscious. All of
Porter's findings point to almost a classical case of the existence
of what Marx called a class-for-itself (1964: 187), which has the
tactical advantage of any organized minority (Mosca) over any class-
in-itself.

The fact that the upper class faces fewer cross-pressures is
apparent at the point where the violation of the rule of compromise
would occur. The one point, paradoxically, where the upper class will
violate the first rule is on any occasion where the rules of the game
themselves are called into question. At that point the legitimacy of
the authority of the governing class is in question and it is naive
to expect them, or their representative elite, to compromise their
power.

A serious treatment of how the rules of the game are reflected
in the institutional arrangement of democracy, integrated with a serious
class analysis, along the lines set out above, would have had another
pay off. If democracy-as-it-operates-now serves governing class
interests, and if the descriptive content of Canada's three "social
images" of middle classness and equality of opportunity and power are
false (as the latter two certainly are), then liberal democracy is an
ideology in Marx' sense (Lichtheim, 1967). This holds whether by "lib-
eral democracy" is meant classical liberal democracy or elitist liberal
democracy, for Canada does not even meet the **minimum requirements** of
democracy embodied in the latter theory. It does not have equality of
opportunity and it does not have the amount of mobility required for
the individual "circulation of elites." It is the existence of
liberal democracy as an ideology which legitimates and obscures the
class-power structure. It keeps the "mosaic" vertical.

The ideological function of liberal democratic theory re­
veals the problematic nature of legitimacy. In order to handle this
problem, Porter would have had to distinguish between power and author­
ity. In that he gave two chapters on a discussion of the ideological
elite, and declared that the popularity of Canada's "social image" was
due to the workings and Weltanschauung of media people, it is surpris­
ing that he didn't recognize the separate but related nature of power/
authority and legitimacy.

If he had paid attention to his problem and given a more
thoughtful examination of the liberal democratic "social images" with
which he begins his book, he might have realized the triadic nature of
any social philosophy (Mills, 1963: 188). He draws upon liberal demo­
cratic theory, and would have discovered its ideological nature had
he used democratic elitist theory consciously and heuristically. An­
other dimension should have been obvious to him: liberal democratic
social philosophy provides a set of **ideals**. Members' belief that
'Canada is middle class,' 'We have equal opportunity' and 'We all
share power' (1965: 3, 4, 6,) are not only descriptive statements,
they have a normative content. If Canadians believe these statements
are true, they are proud of it. To any Canadian liberal democrat, 'Canada should be middle class,' 'We should have equal opportunity,' and 'we should share power.'

Thus when Porter demonstrates the descriptive, or 'theoretical,' inadequacy of these social images, he also exposes the gap between the ideal and the actual. As has been discovered in studies of social change, the one universal motor cause of change is the 'lack of close correspondence between the 'ideal' and the 'actual'" (Moore, 1963: 18). If Porter is correct in asserting that lack of educational facilities is the 'cause' of "mobility deprivation" (1965: 49), and if we were correct in Chapter Two in concluding that it is in the governing class' interest to depend upon immigrant technicians rather than shoulder an extra tax burden to expand Canadian educational facilities, then we may draw another provisional conclusion. By not recognizing the normative dimension of Canada's "social images," Porter misses the opportunity of pointing to potential class conflict and the de-legitimation of elites.6

To conclude this speculative excursion; had Porter used democratic elitism heuristically, he would have recognized that democratic elitism is an ideology for elite consumption. It is an obstacle to the fulfillment of the ends which he believes a society should pursue.

The answer surely lies in the desirability of social participation in defining and achieving goals, in the release of the potential for a creative life shared with others, governed not through competitiveness but through co-operation. (Porter, 1961: 35)
Thorough-going democratic planning and decentralization will never be instituted to achieve these ends as long as the belief persists, and is propagated by well known social scientists, that what we have is democracy, and that all that is needed is expanded elite education and circulation. The corollary is that any major change would automatically include loss of democracy.

* * * * *

Had Porter only used democratic elitism to guide his empirical research, while maintaining and clarifying his own value position vis-à-vis thorough-going democracy, he would have provided *The Vertical Mosaic* with the one context within which his findings have the most significance and impact. What significance and impact the book does have is muted because the context of his findings appears to be democratic elitism. As a result, the book depends for impact upon what-everyone-knows about 'how things are supposed to be' in a democracy. However, since *The VM* is a social scientific work, and "democracy" is anything but a simple, common-sense concept, democracy should have been treated as a topic rather than as a resource.

In the end, his strategy of respectability cannot spare him from an unfavorable comparison with C. Wright Mills. Robert Lynd's criticism of Mills and *The Power Elite* is even more strikingly appropriate for John Porter and *The Vertical Mosaic*.

Mills' failure to deal with the meanings for democracy of the impressive power trends he analyzes is the colossal loose end of *The Power Elite*. (1968: 107)
Footnotes

1. The "empirical" nature of democratic elitism was its major selling point among "apolitical," "value-free" social scientists who sought the respectability given the "hard" (read "real") scientists.

2. Porter's findings, when extricated from his inconsistencies and set upon firm foundations, point to the existence of what G. William Domhoff has called a "governing class." "A 'governing class' is a social upper class which owns a disproportionate amount of a country's wealth, receives a disproportionate amount of a country's yearly income, and contributes a disproportionate number of its members to the controlling institutions and key decision-making groups of the country" (1967: 5).

3. The recent FLQ crisis is an example of a case where the rules of the game were challenged on the basis of the legitimacy of the (English) governing class' domination of Quebec. The government of upper class member P.E. Trudeau refused to compromise until after Laporte was dead and the Englishman Cross was left. That "compromise" was considered a victory by and for the government.

4. If this were not the case, we would certainly expect members of the governing class to be actively participating as members of the "political" elite. As was pointed out in our discussion of "unanswered questions," members of the governing class see no threat from the middle class dominated political system, and therefore do not actively participate.
5. As Bottomore has pointed out (1964: 48), Pareto uses this concept at different times 1.) to refer to a process in which *individuals* circulate between the elite and the non-elite, or 2.) to refer to a process whereby *one elite* is replaced by another. My use of the concept refers to its former denotation.

6. Both of which are important from the evolutionary perspective which he espouses (1970: 181). As was mentioned in Chapter Two, Porter would have done wisely to have drawn upon conflict theory: "Every society rests on constraint of some of its members by others" (Dahrendorf, 1964: 103).
Chapter Seven
Summary and Conclusion

Irving Louis Horowitz' declaration that The Vertical Mosaic "is the sociological study of present-day Canada" (1966: 862) is as sad as it is true. This essay has attempted to counter the initial euphoric reception of The VM by looking past its impressive array of data. In so doing, we have discovered conceptual confusion, theoretical poverty and ethical duplicity.

In light of Porter's 1961 value position the 'strategy of respectability' he appears to have employed in doing The VM constitutes ethical duplicity. In attempting to be "simultaneously polemical and respectable" Porter muted his radicalism. He did make occasional use of polemical rhetoric. However, the fact that 1.) he formulated his concepts in so narrow a fashion, 2.) he did not explicitly answer the questions he raised, and 3.) he held off from drawing any controversial, even if warranted, conclusions, assured his work of a warm reception in liberal circles. Aside from his presentation, the major value inconsistencies were his adoption of an elitist-functionalist ethico-theoretical perspective, and the implicit use of democratic elitism as the theoretical context for his study. Porter's 'strategy of respectability' thus stands as an almost complete compromise of the socialist, thorough-going democratic value position he held in 1961.

When we turn to the multiple conceptual and theoretical pro-
blems in *The VM*, we find that, to a degree, they are a consequence of his 'strategy of respectability.' If Porter had not attempted to be so narrow and respectable in his definition of class, his distinction between "real middle class" and "middle majority" would not have been needed. If he had not tried to be respectable, he could have treated class as a topic and provided a theoretical foundation for his analysis of the structure of class in Canada. Had he not been blinded by respectability, he might have recognized that a theoretically strong link between class and power was already available to him, in the form of his data on elite kinship and friendship networks.

If Porter had treated democracy as a topic, he would have been able to retain thorough-going democracy as a context, while using, rather than being used by, elitist democracy. Thus he would not have committed the logical inconsistencies of drawing unknowingly on contradictory theories of democracy. As the previous chapter suggested, the consistent, heuristic, use of one particular theory of democracy could have supplied Porter with a whole host of potentially fruitful hypotheses.

The 'strategy of respectability,' however, cannot account for the conceptual and theoretical problems surrounding Porter's use of power. He did treat power as a topic, but given that his analysis of the British Columbia Electric dispute 'transcends' his definition of power, it is clear that his treatment was inadequate. Had he been more attuned to the relationship between values and science he might have recognized that, all along, his definition of power had been
inappropriate for his analytical needs.

Towards a Politics of Experience

In conclusion, our analysis suggests two points. Both of these points are rooted in the everyday world and both can be treated programatically as 'external' answers to Porter's problems. Their intriguing feature, when taken together is that they appear programmatically paradoxical. From our perspective, the resolution of this paradox constitutes the major problem and hope for Political Sociology.

The first point is that Porter would have produced a much finer and incisive piece of scholarship if he had rigourously worked from the ethico-theoretical perspective he held in his 1961 essay. The benefits of a neo-Marxist approach have been suggested in the approach our criticisms have taken here. Programmatically speaking, Canadian Sociology, especially Porter's brand, has to get beyond vulgar, ideological caricatures of Marxism and come to grips with the fact that Marxist analyses 'make more sense of the world' than do any other approaches currently enjoying popularity among Political Sociologists in Canada.

The second point is equally programmatic. Porter's theoretical innocence and his dependency upon the everyday and discipline-common meanings of his concepts are not problems unique to him. The problem of conceptual confusion is a general one haunting all social scientists. This has to do with the fact that acts of scientific theorizing are essentially solitary, but the communication of scientific findings requires a return to the intersubjective reality of the
everyday world. This "paradox of communication" (Schutz, 1962: 257) is especially problematic for social scientists because we operate with second degree constructs (Schutz, 1962: 6) expressed in terms derived from everyday usage (Berger, 1963: 25). This problem is further compounded by the existence of multiple and incompatible definitions of the same 'objects' within social science. Because we are members as well as scientists this paradox sometimes is not recognized as problematic, and therefore isn't provisionally resolved with the rigour and consistency demanded by science.

As we have seen, in Porter's case, this paradox is both problematic and unrecognized. However, in his case, as in the case of all conventional, 'positivist' social scientists the problem is even further compounded. These sociologists find themselves dependent upon common-sense constructs, while at the same time attempting to rise above, and disassociate themselves from, common-sense.

The criticisms in this essay have been offered entirely within Porter's 'paradigm.' The nature of his problems with communication, however, suggest that value consistency and positivist rigour aren't the final answers. What is needed in Political Sociology is the shift to a 'paradigm' which recognizes the social scientist's rootedness in the everyday world, and rigourously treats the experience of that world as the beginning and ending points for all investigation. Such a 'paradigm' in social science would rest upon a phenomenological foundation, such as the one proposed by Alfred Schutz (1967).

Thus we are faced with the paradoxical situation of calling
for both Marxism and Phenomenology as guiding lights for Political Sociologists. We are calling for an improbable synthesis: the reconciliation of materialist and, so-called, 'idealist' world views. Obviously we cannot resolve this paradox here. Possibly it cannot be resolved. However, there are gratifying signs in the literature (Schroyer, 1970; Litchman, 1970; Klare, 1971; Zaner, 1971), that Marxists and Phenomenologists are beginning to recognize that they each have something to offer the other.

As a consequence of this exchange, we may be in the position of having the tools and framework to do an accurate and 'adequate' analysis of class and power in Canada. If so, it is imperative that those tools be rigourously employed in an intellectually honest fashion. The framework must be made explicit and the whole enterprise must be examined and evaluated by a critical audience. The imperative for this arduous task does not emanate simply from some abstract ideal of science. Rather, it emanates from our experience of a 'concrete', but constituted, social world going mad.
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