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UBC Theses and Dissertations

Javanization of Indonesian politics Thornton, David Leonard 1972-12-31

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CI  THE JAVANIZATION OF INDONESIAN POLITICS by DAVID LEONARD THORNTON V i r g i n i a Polytechnic Institute,  B.Sc,  19&9  A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS i n the Department o f P o l i t i c a l  Science  We accept t h i s t h e s i s as conforming r e q u i r e d standard  THE  t o the  UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA September, 1972  In presenting t h i s  thesis  an advanced degree at  further  fulfilment  the University of  the Library shall make it I  in p a r t i a l  freely  of  the  requirements  B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree  available  for  agree that permission for extensive copying of  of  this  representatives. thesis for  It  financial  that  reference and study. this  thesis  for s c h o l a r l y purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department by his  for  or  is understood that copying or p u b l i c a t i o n gain shall not  written permission.  Department The University of B r i t i s h Columbia Vancouver 8, Canada  be allowed without my  i  ABSTRACT T h i s t h e s i s a p p l i e s the a n a l y t i c a l concept o f political The  c u l t u r e to p o l i t i c s  i n the Indonesian  term " J a v a n i z a t i o n " i s used t o d e s c r i b e  whereby e t h n i c Javanese and Javanized  context.  the process  individuals  g r a d u a l l y became the overwhelming and d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e majority era.  o f the governing e l i t e  i n the post-independence  I t i s f u r t h e r argued t h a t the dominance i n terms  of numbers has l e d t o the J a v a n i z a t i o n o f Indonesian conceptions of s t a t e and l i m i t s of p o l i t i c a l The politics  f i r s t chapter surveys other and makes a p r o p o s a l  behavior.  t h e o r i e s of Indonesian  f o r a c u l t u r a l theory.  The  c u l t u r a l cleavages i n Indonesian s o c i e t y i n the h o r i z o n t a l plane a r e d e s c r i b e d Mataram o p e r a t i n g given.  and a d e s c r i p t i o n o f the government of  i n a t o t a l l y Javanese environment i s  The changing r o l e s of the primary bearers o f  Javanese p o l i t i c a l  c u l t u r e and the nature of the s t a t e a r e  discussed. Chapter Two i n t e r p r e t s post-independence p v > l i t i c a l h i s t o r y from the p e r s p e c t i v e and  the gradual  of i n c r e a s i n g  Javanization  l o s s of n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l  i n f l u e n c e by  non-Javanese I s l a m i c p o l i t i c a l  elements.  Data on the  e t h n i c composition of the contemporary m i l i t a r y , governmental and p o l i t i c a l  elite  are p r e s e n t e d .  ii (1959  Chapter Three i s a d i s c u s s i o n of contemporary to I972) Indonesian government and same conceptual  p o l i t i c s using  framework ( s t r u c t u r e , f u n c t i o n s  s t y l e ) as i s used to d i s c u s s Mataram. and  dis-similarities The  f u t u r e of  are p o i n t e d  and  Some s i m i l a r i t i e s  out„  t h e s i s concludes with a d i s c u s s i o n of Javanization.  the  the  iii TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER I  PAGE POLITICAL CULTURE, GOVERNMENT AND JAVANISM ...  1  T h e o r i z i n g About I n d o n e s i a n P o l i t i c s ; A C u l t u r a l P r o p o s i t i o n ...................  1  Government and P o l i t i c s i n a Javanese P o l i t i c a l C u l t u r e ; L a t e r Mataram (15th The Changing R o l e s o f the P r i j a j i 3.1*1 CL  II  S*t/3r"t 6  JAVANIZATION;  oeoeooooeoooaoovoncoeoeoooeo  HISTORY AND DATA  ^7  ............... 44  H i s t o r y , P o l i t i c s and J a v a n i z a t i o n ........ 44 The C u r r e n t P o l i t i c a l , M i l i t a r y and GovG3?in.m©n.tcil  III  E l i t ©  <> o o o * o e o o o o o o o » « © « © » © c ©  JAVANISM AND CONTEMPORARY POLITICS  39  . 70  The S t r u c t u r e o f I n d o n e s i a n Government .... 70 The F u n c t i o n s o f I n d o n e s i a n Government .... 86 The S t y l e o f I n d o n e s i a n Government .........109 IV  THE FUTURE OF JAVANIZATION  140  "V  BIBLIOGRAPHY  13 3  VI  GLOSSARY  oooooooo  ©_o o o e o o o o a o o o o o o o e o o o o o f t  eooo^oooooooooooooooooooeeooooo  oo « o o  1 63  ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would l i k e to acknowledge the i n v a l u a b l e a s s i s t a n c e of my  t h e s i s committee, c o n s i s t i n g of P r o f e s s o r s R,S.  John Wood, and R.H.  Jackson,  whose e f f o r t s a c t u a l l y  Milne, enabled  the c r e a t i o n of a t h e s i s from a s e r i e s of p o o r l y i n t e g r a t e d d i s c u s s i o n s and data p r e s e n t a t i o n s . I am p a r t i c u l a r l y indebted to A l f i a n and Abdullah  of Leknas, Juwono Sudarsono of the U n i v e r s i t y of  Indonesia and Ted Smith of the Ford Foundation who  Taufik  i n Djakarta  spent much time r e a d i n g and commenting on the  initial  d r a f t s of t h i s paper. Thanks are a l s o due  to the many Indonesians  D j a k a r t a , Bandung, Solo, J o g j a k a r t a , Surabaja, and Medan who politics  in  Den  Pasar  gave so f r e e l y of t h e i r time to d i s c u s s the  of t h e i r country with a mere f o r e i g n student.  For a s s i s t a n c e and guidance i n the l o n g process a c q u i r i n g a degree of f l u e n c y In Bahasa Indonesia,  I am  g r a t e f u l to Anton Hilman, Mrs.  Mrs.  Etty Muljati.  N e l l i Soewarno, and  G r a t i t u d e i s a l s o due  f o r her adamant impatience  with my  to my  wife,  Toeti,  r a t e of progress  i n her  n a t i v e language which r e s u l t e d i n i n c r e a s e d e f f o r t s on own by  p a r t to a t t a i n the standards  my  of p r o f i c i e n c y expected  her. I would l i k e  to express my  thanks to the U n i v e r s i t y  of B r i t i s h Columbia f o r f i n a n c i a l a s s i s t a n c e and Lembaga Pendidikan for  of  and Pembinaan Management i n D j a k a r t a  the o p p o r t u n i t y to supplement my  teaching E n g l i s h .  to  meager income by  V  Finally, their and  gracious  I  thank  hospitality  I b u and Bapak  attention,  should  "angkat"  encouragement  Despite for  the  success  for  the  final  Ibu  during Lev  and  and Bapak my s t a y  for  their  Manoe  in  for  Indonesia  constant  advice.  the  fact  that  so  much  of  this  endeavor,  I  is  owed t o  am s o l e l y  so  many  responsible  product. David  L.  Thornton  Vancouver,  August  1972  CHAPTER I POLITICAL CULTURE. GOVERNMENT AMD Theorizing About Indonesian P o l i t i c s ?  JAVANISM A Cultural Proposition  Indonesia i s a large c u l t u r a l l y , e t h n i c a l l y and l i n g u i s t i c a l l y diverse nation i n Southeast A s i a .  Following  four years of f i g h t i n g the Dutch, the country became i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y recognized as an independent nation i n  1950.  Since that time Indonesia has suffered the many v i c i s s i t u d e s that seem so common i n the newly independent nations of A f r i c a and A s i a .  These include unsuccessful attempts at  "Western s t y l e " democratic government, recurrent regional r e b e l l i o n s and r e v o l t s , "one-man" rule, and -military rule.  finally,  P o l i t i c a l l y speaking, Indonesia has been a  highly unstable nation with numerous changes of governments, ' c o n s t i t u t i o n s , and other i n s t i t u t i o n s . Besides the numerous attempts at general theorizing about the flow and i n s t a b i l i t y of p o l i t i c s i n the newly 1  independent nations , several authors have examined the Indonesian case i n d e t a i l .  Their theories can be broadly  c l a s s i f i e d Into three categories:  the " s k i l l theory", the  "ethnic theory" and the "class theory". In h i s tour de force on Indonesian P o l i t i c s of the  1950-58 period, Herbert Felth proposed that the. flow of p o l i t i c s should best be seen as the c o n f l i c t between two 2 s k i l l groups? the administrators and the solidarity-makers.  - 2 Peith  felt  Inclined were  that  and  to  the  Feith  other  democracy"  identified  (a  other  a l l  politics  solidarity-makers  parties, PSI  place  above  constitutional of  administrators  the  sented  the  Mas.lumi  small hand,  were  Western-oriented while  inclined  revolution"  the  in  the  At  about  and  was over  seen the  solidarity-makers  the  "continuation of  to  The  represent  mainly with  (a  Muslim party)  socialist  of  Sukarno  were  and  two  party). seen  the  as  PNI  of  victory  skill  administrators "modernist"  the  "decline the  administrator  solidarity-makers  person  the  pragmatically  considerations.  intellectual-led the  very  group.  political  and  the  On t h e best  (the  repre-  nationalist  party).  Leslie as  same  Palmier wrote  basically  group,  the  the  an  a  book  ethnic  Javanese,  time  that  Feith  published his  interpreting  conflict  Indonesian  between 'the  and  the  peoples  Given  the  fact  of  politics  largest  the  Outer  book,  ethnic  Islands  3 or  non-Javanese.  had  revolted against  the  Javanese-led  the  1956-58  p e r i o d and  associated  Mas.lumi  and PSI  during  only  the  Palmier  seemed  Much l a t e r Interpret an  to  David  conflict.  banned  high  at  Outer  politics said  Islands  government  Outer  Island  in  wake,  the  its  center,  explanatory  L e v i n e and Jan  Levine  the  central  the  parties  have  post-independence  elite-mass  that  were  Javanese-dominated theory  that  Pluvier  the  value. chose  i n Indonesia that  leaving  as  Indonesia  to basically has  -  3 -  e s s e n t i a l l y a "retrogressive" s o c i a l system i n which the various factions of the e l i t e f i g h t among themselves f o r state power while at the same time attempting to keep the masses from exercising power i n the p o l i t i c a l system. decline of the parliamentary  The  system i n which the "people"  (meaning the PKI for Levine) were on the verge of v i c t o r y and the eventual destruction of the "people's party" by the m i l i t a r y were seen as supporting this argument. After detailed f i e l d research, Rex Mortimer greatly reduced the a p p l i c a b i l i t y of the Levine theory by pointing out that despite numerous attempts to do so, the PKI had never been able to e x p l o i t the class d i v i s i o n s i n Indonesian society i n the way i n which Marxist-Leninist theory said i t should."'  The PjKI had simply abandoned such an approach as  inapplicable to Indonesian society. Further, John Legge examined i n d e t a i l the theories of Felth and Palmier and found that they were not completely convincing when a c t u a l l y applied to the s p e c i f i c s of any situation.^  He concluded that both theories explained part  of the truth but were e n t i r e l y too narrow to be the a l l encompassing theories that their authors presented them to be. A f t e r studying the above theories, my own conclusion Is that the ethnic theory expanded to a p o l i t i c a l culture theory i s the most promising way to conceptualize contemporary 7 Indonesian p o l i t i c s . Almond and Powell write " p o l i t i c a l  -  4  -  c u l t u r e i s the p a t t e r n of i n d i v i d u a l a t t i t u d e s  and  o r i e n t a t i o n s toward p o l i t i c s among the members o f a p o l i t i c a l system  ...  the k i n d s of o r i e n t a t i o n s which  i n a p o p u l a t i o n w i l l have a s i g n i f i c a n t  influence  ways i n which the p o l i t i c a l system works. upon the system,  the responses  exist  on the  The demands made  to law and to appeals  for  s u p p o r t , and the conduct of i n d i v i d u a l s i n t h e i r p o l i t i c a l r o l e s , w i l l a l l be shaped and c o n d i t i o n e d by the common orientation patterns. tendencies  They c o n s t i t u t e  the l a t e n t  political  f o r p o l i t i c a l b e h a v i o r and as such they a r e of  g r e a t importance i n e x p l a i n i n g and p r e d i c t i n g p o l i t i c a l 8  action."  Clifford  Geertz adds "one of the t h i n g s  everyone  knows but no one can q u i t e t h i n k how t o demonstrate i s a country's p o l i t i c s reflect  the d e s i g n o f i t s  Almond and Powell add t h a t  c u l t u r e may not i n f a c t  culture."  one n a t i o n - s t a t e  many p o l i t i c a l s u b - c u l t u r e s and t h a t  the dominant p o l i t i c a l  inhabitants.  of  p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e a t a l l , nor  even the p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e of the n u m e r i c a l m a j o r i t y country's  7  may have  be the n a t i o n a l ( i n the sense  w i d e l y - s p r e a d and accepted)  that o  of  the  T h i s i s p a r t i c u l a r l y t r u e i n most  newly independent c o u n t r i e s , a l t h o u g h some o l d e r n a t i o n s a l s o have s i m i l a r d i f f i c u l t i e s ,  where i n Geertz»s  t h e r e i s a new s t a t e composed of an o l d s o c i e t y 5 many o l d  words usually  societies.  The c u l t u r a l h e t e r o g e n e i t y  of Indonesia i s an  - 5 e s t a b l i s h e d f a c t and seems q u i t e i n v i t i n g f o r t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e concept o f p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e as an a n a l y t i c a l t o o l t o explore the flow of Indonesian p o l i t i c s .  T h i s paper examines  t h e n o t i o n o f p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e as a p p l i e d t o t h e I n d o n e s i a n case.  The term " J a v a n i z a t i o n " i s p r e s e n t e d t o e x p l a i n t h e  p r o c e s s o f p o l i t i c s from independence t o t h e p r e s e n t  (1972).  " J a v a n i z a t i o n " means t h e p r o c e s s o f g r a d u a l d o m i n a t i o n o f the I n d o n e s i a n p o l i t y by e t h n i c Javanese and t h e i r v a r i e t y of p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e ,  A model o f t r a d i t i o n a l  Javanese  p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e i s p r e s e n t e d and i t s b a s i c s i m i l a r i t i e s t o contemporary  Indonesian p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e a r e p o i n t e d out.  The p r o c e s s o f " J a v a n i z a t i o n " i s argued h i s t o r i c a l l y and d a t a on t h e c o m p o s i t i o n o f t h e contemporary p o l i t i c a l and governmental Finally  9  Indonesian  e l i t e i s presented t o support  it.  some d i s c o n t i n u i t i e s o r c o u n t e r - p r o c e s s e s a r e  d e s c r i b e d and i n t e r p r e t e d from t h e s t a n d p o i n t o f t h e i r e f f e c t on a " J a v a n i z e d " government and p o l i t i c a l p r o c e s s . P o l i t i c a l Cultures i n Indonesia; I t i s almost impossible t o s u c c e s s f u l l y g e n e r a l i z e a b o u t I n d o n e s i a ' s c u l t u r e because o f t h e h e t e r o g e n e i t y o f the p o p u l a t i o n .  I t has been e s t i m a t e d t h a t t h e r e a r e a t l e a s t  200 c o m p l e t e l y d i f f e r e n t languages ll pelago,  spoken i n t h e v a s t a r c h i -  and each o f t h e s e language groups u s u a l l y has i t s  own a d a t o r t r a d i t i o n a l customs.  A s i m p l i s t i c but f a i r l y  a c c u r a t e d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e c o u n t r y ' s p o p u l a t i o n would r e a d  - 6 l i k e this*  The major l i n g u i s t i c and ethnic group i s the comprise about 50$ of the t o t a l population of  Javanese who 12  120 m i l l i o n  and then come the Sundanese who  western end of the i s l a n d of Java who  l i v e on the  compose about 1 2 $ of  the population and then there are many other small groups no one of which totals more than 2 to 3$ of the p o p u l a t i o n . ^ At independence there was no all-Indonesian culture. There was ones.  one large sub-culture and a multitude of smaller  Given the legacies of c o l o n i a l r u l e which l e f t the  Javanese not only the most numerous c u l t u r a l group i n the new nation but also the best educated and most p o l i t i c a l l y mobilized, i t was almost i n e v i t a b l e that the new  political  culture of Indonesia would have strong traces of Javanese influence.  Observing the f i r s t nine years of independence  and commenting e s p e c i a l l y on the v i r t u a l c i v i l war i n  1958,  Daniel S. Lev wrotes The process of a s s i m i l a t i o n - to use the term loosely - had already begun, a fact which may have l e n t more bitterness to the c o n f l i c t . Except for the Sundanese of West Java ... most of the outer i s l a n d groups were not only small i n numbers and mutually h o s t i l e but a l s o c u l t u r a l l y less self-assured than the Javanese. Their r e l a t i o n s h i p s with Java were and are ambivalent5 the Javanese are seen as effete and elusive, but also as halus (refined and cultured) and also p o l i t i c a l l y clever — a people to be d i s dained but a l s o to be emulated. For t h e i r part, the Javanese never doubted t h e i r c u l t u r a l superiority over other groupsj nor did they doubt t h e i r r i g h t ^ to the p r i n c i p a l voice i n independent Indonesia. 1  Despite the seeming multitude of small cultures i n the Outer Islands, there was a factor that u n i f i e d a great number  -  of  them, o t h e r  7  -  t h a n s i m p l e o p p o s i t i o n t o J a v a , a n d t h a t was  the i n f l u e n c e of  Islam.  I n h i s w o r k The D e c l i n e o f C o n s t i t u t i o n a l D e m o c r a c y i n I n d o n e s i a , F e i t h d i s c u s s e d the i d e a of p o l i t i c a l b e f o r e t u r n i n g away f r o m i t  to h i s s k i l l group t h e o r y .  s t a t e d t h a t h i s t o r y h a d c r e a t e d two m a j o r p o l i t i c a l i n Indonesia?  Javanese a r i s t o c r a t i c and I s l a m i c  preneurial p o l i t i c a l wrote,  c u l t u r e s . T h e  roots  The p o i n t s political  communities of  of d i f f e r e n c e were;  the d r y - r i c e  cultivation  historical  the a r c h i p e l a g o . in  traditional  cultivation  areas and the c o a s t a l  areass  2) t h e d i f f e r e n c e  Islamj  a n d 3) t h e d i f f e r e n c e s i n t h e i m p a c t o f  colonial  cultures  entre-  of  1) d i f f e r e n c e s  o r g a n i z a t i o n among t h e w e t - r i c e  le  of t h e s e , he  c o u l d be a t t r i b u t e d t o t h e d i f f e r e n c e s  experience of the d i f f e r e n t  culture  areas,  maritime  i n the degree o f p e n e t r a t i o n  of  Dutch  rule.  The f i r s t o f t h e s e ( J a v a n e s e a r i s t o c r a t i c p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e ) , which i s the p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e of the g r e a t m a j o r i t y o f t h e J a v a n e s e , was b o r n o f s t a t e o r g a n i z a t i o n i n the w e t - r i c e a g r i c u l t u r e based i n l a n d empires of J a v a , of s h a l l o w I s l a m i z a t i o n , and a l o n g p e r i o d of i n t e n s i v e Dutch i m p a c t , which p r o d u c e d enormous d e n s i t i e s o f p o p u l a t i o n , a h o l l o w i n g out of the s t r u c t u r e s o f s o c i a l i n t e g r a t i o n , and an i n c a p a c i t a t i o n of e n t r e p r e n e u r s h i p . The I s l a m i c e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e i s one whose a d h e r e n t s a r e f a r more d i s p e r s e d a n d s o c i a l l y disparate . . . historically this p o l i t i c a l culture i s a product of the maritime commercial towns, of thorough I s l a m i z a t i o n , of r e l a t i v e l y s l i g h t Dutch impact, and of the r e v i v a l of e n t r e p r e n e u r s h i p i n t h e p r e s e n t c e n t u r y . 1?  - 8 G e n e r a l i z i n g even f u r t h e r , F e i t h p o i n t s out t h a t n o t o n l y was one o f the p o l i t i c a l  c u l t u r e s contemptuous o f  economic p u r s u i t s and the other r e s p e c t f u l , but a l s o one was a s s o c i a t e d w i t h support f o r a s e c u l a r and b r o a d l y t h e l s t i c or p a n - t h e i s t i c s t a t e and the other w i t h support f o r a s t a t e based on Islam. cratic political anti-Dutch  I n a d d i t i o n , Javanese a r i s t o -  culture involved a greater i n t e n s i t y of  sentiment than d i d the other p o l i t i c a l  and a t the same time, a l e s s i n t e n s e h o s t i l i t y Javanese a r i s t o c r a t i c p o l i t i c a l  culture  t o the Chinese.  c u l t u r e tended toward  n a t i v i s m , while I s l a m i c e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l p o l i t i c a l was g e n e r a l l y more ready t o a c c e p t and i n c o r p o r a t e  culture influences  stemming from the modern West.  But, a c c o r d i n g  t o F e i t h , the  Javanese a r i s t o c r a t i c p o l i t i c a l  c u l t u r e was f a r more sympa-  18 t h e t i c to s o c i a l i s t  ideas.  With the b e n e f i t o f t e n a d d i t i o n a l years o f p e r s p e c t i v e on F e i t h , i t can now be argued that the very b e l i e v e d created  two major p o l i t i c a l  i n f a c t , broke then down i n t o other  f a c t o r s t h a t he  c u l t u r e s i n the country, sub-cultures.  The  weakening of the s t r u c t u r e s of s o c i a l i n t e g r a t i o n and overpopulation  caused by the i n t e n s e  r u l e , Japanese occupation, the mass p o l i t i c s the p e n e t r a t i o n  impact o f Dutch c o l o n i a l  the f o u r - y e a r  war f o r independence,  o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l and guided democracy,  o f contemporary world c u l t u r e p l u s the  coming o f the "modernist" I s l a m i c movement t o the e n t i r e  - 9 c o u n t r y , s h a t t e r e d o r a t t h e v e r y l e a s t , g r e a t l y eroded the p e r i p h e r y o f t h e Javanese a r i s t o c r a t i c and I s l a m i c e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e s which a l l o w e d t h e r i s e o f o t h e r s u b - c u l t u r e s h a v i n g some l i n k s t o t h e o r i g i n a l and remnant o n e s  D  The Javanese a r i s t o c r a t i c p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e has e x i s t e d a s t h e G r e a t T r a d i t i o n o f a g r a r i a n J a v a f o r many 19 centuries. 16th  The coming o f I s l a m t o J a v a i n t h e 15th and  c e n t u r i e s o n l y added a n o t h e r l a y e r o f i n f l u e n c e t o t h e  b r o a d l y Hindu-Javanese c u l t u r e ,  Islam, although  accepted  a s t h e s i n g l e r e l i g i o n o f J a v a , was t h o r o u g h l y i n d i g e n i z e d and mixed w i t h more t r a d i t i o n a l v a r i a n t s o f t h e "Javanese religion". I n many p a r t s o f t h e Outer I s l a n d s and i n t h e nonH i n d u i z e d p o r t i o n s o f J a v a , t h e i n i t i a l coming o f I s l a m had a much g r e a t e r e f f e c t .  D e s p i t e t h e f a c t t h a t some i n d i g e n i -  z a t i o n and m o d i f i c a t i o n o f I s l a m d i d o c c u r i n t h e s e a r e a s , I t was v e r y minor compared w i t h t h a t i n t h e i n t e r i o r o f e a s t and c e n t r a l J a v a .  I n t h e Outer I s l a n d s I n g e n e r a l , b u t  i n A t j e h , Minangkabau, Makassar, West J a v a (Sunda) and t h e n o r t h c o a s t o f c e n t r a l and e a s t J a v a I n p a r t i c u l a r , I s l a m began t o p l a y a major, i f n o t dominant, s o c i a l I n t h e l a t e 19th  c e n t u r y , a new wave o r c u r r e n t o f  I s l a m swept a c r o s s t h e a r c h i p e l a g o . "modernist"  role.  T h i s wave, known a s  o r " p u r i s t " I s l a m o r I s l a m i c r e f o r m i s m was much  - 10 l e s s compatible with t r a d i t i o n a l forms of s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l organization.  This "chauvinism" of "modernist" Islam set up  abiding tensions even i n Java that r e f l e c t e d the antagonism 20 of the t r a d i t i o n a l order and the Islamic reformist movement. Stated simply,  the Outer Islands became more rigorously and  s t r i c t l y Islamic while only a small portion of the ethnic Javanese came to accept the new "modernist" doctrine. With the b i r t h of p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s , the differences between the "modernist" and the " t r a d i t i o n a l i s t " v a r i e t i e s 21 of the Islamic or santri  movement was i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d i n  the form of the Masjumi, a "modernist" Muslim party, and the Mahdatul Ulama (NU), a " t r a d i t i o n a l i s t " Muslim party. Given the above background, i t appears quite natural that the Masjuml had i t s greatest support i n the Outer Islands and the NU i n Java i t s e l f . Javanese a r i s t o c r a t i c culture or the culture of the 22 Javanese  pri.1a.1l  and abangan  was attacked not only by  Islam of two v a r i e t i e s but also by Western p o l i t i c a l thought and d e - t r a d i t i o n a l i z a t i o n i n general.  The creation of  p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s saw t h i s p o l i t i c a l culture s p l i t i n much the same manner as was Islam, a modernist-traditionalist division.  S i m p l i s t i c a l l y , the s p l i t can be said to have been  i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d i n a d i v i s i o n between the PKI (the Indonesian Communist Party) and the PNI (the Indonesian N a t i o n a l i s t Party). The l a t t e r was i n i t i a l l y an organization that expected  - 11 t r a d i t i o n a l patrimonial s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s to give i t strength and the former hope t h a t economic and c l a s s d i v i s i o n s would g i v e i t mass s u p p o r t .  The PNI was  an e x t r e m e l y  complex  o r g a n i z a t i o n , and c o n s e r v a t i v e ( r e a d t r a d i t i o n a l ) and  radical  ( r e a d extreme n a t i o n a l i s t ) f a c t i o n s e v e n t u a l l y appeared i n it." S i n c e Soedjatmoko's i n i t i a l w r i t i n g on the s u b j e c t i n t h e e a r l y 1950's, i t has been r e c o g n i z e d t h a t r a t h e r t h a n being i n t e r e s t a r t i c u l a t o r s or aggregators  Indonesian  p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s represent a l l r a n or various flows of 24 t h o u g h t w i t h i n the body p o l i t i c . G i v e n the i n s t i t u t i o n a l l 25 z a t l o n of t h e s e a l l r a n as s o c i a l f o r c e s -* w i t h  mutually  a n t a g o n i s t i c and e x c l u s i v e i d e o l o g i e s or w o r l d v i e w s , i t can r e a s o n a b l y be a r g u e d t h a t the a l l r a n a r e , i n f a c t ,  political  sub-cultures i n themselves. I n a l a t e r w r i t i n g , F e i t h gave the b e s t  graphic  p r e s e n t a t i o n y e t p u b l i s h e d of the d i v i s i o n o f a l l r a n o r 26 c u l t u r e s and t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p t o p o l i t i c a l (See F i g u r e I )  sub-  parties.  From the diagram i t can be seen t h a t F e i t h  t h i n k s t h e r e a r e f i v e main p o l i t i c a l s u b - c u l t u r e s i n the country:  communism, r a d i c a l n a t i o n a l i s m , Javanese t r a d i t i o n -  a l i s m (here c a l l e d Javanese a r i s t o c r a t i c p o l i t i c a l democratic  s o c i a l i s m and I s l a m .  culture),  For some u n e x p l a i n a b l e  r e a s o n , he chose not t o r e p r e s e n t the r e a l s p l i t i n I s l a m between the "modernist"  and  " t r a d i t i o n a l i s t " or indigenlzed  - 12 -  v a r i e t i e s o r t o r e l a t e t h e I n d o n e s i a n army t o t h e sub27  c u l t u r e s a s he d i d t h e major p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s .  My  diagram ( F i g u r e I I ) i s an a t t e m p t t o remedy t h e l a t t e r shortcoming. The two diagrams c l e a r l y show t h e d i v i s i o n s i n Indon e s i a n s o c i e t y d e s c r i b e d i n t h e l a s t s e v e r a l pages.  The  c r u c i a l p o i n t , i n my o p i n i o n , i s t h a t a p o r t i o n o f t h e P K I , t h e P N I , t h e NU and t h e army a l l f a l l w i t h i n t h e Javanese t r a d i t i o n a l i s t ( o r a r i s t o c r a t i c ) sphere.  Each o f t h e s e f o u r  o r g a n i z a t i o n s have common Javanese r o o t s .  The army and the  PNI a r e most c l o s e l y i n t h e c e n t e r o f Javanese a r i s t o c r a t i c culture.  As L e v n o t e d about t h e t h r e e l a r g e Javanese based  p a r t i e s (and I now add t h e army);  "The NU k l j a j i  ... t h e  PNI p r i j a j i and t h e PKI peasant (and t h e army k e s a t r i a ) spoke the same language and s h a r e d t h e same s t e r e o t y p e s the non-Javanese f o r whom t h e Masjumi spoke. c a t i o n s between t h e t h r e e  of  S o c i a l communi-  (now f o u r ) groups f l o w e d w i t h more 28  o r l e s s t r a d i t i o n a l ease  „.."  The above statement s e t s t h e s t a g e f o r the a n a l y s i s o f I n d o n e s i a n p o l i t i c s from the p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e Broadly, struggles  perspective.  the f l o w o f p o l i t i c s can be seen a s a two l e v e l one between t h e groups most i n f l u e n c e d by and  l i n k e d t o Javanese a r i s t o c r a t i c p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e v e r s u s t h e I s l a m i c e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e and s e c o n d l y , the v a r i a n t s o r sub-cultures  among  o f t h e Javanese p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e .  FlGURFS  PO i. i T i c A L  POLITICAL OFFICE  PART/E5  AMD  coaps  A/JD P o L i n c ^ L  oaGAtf'ZATIO^L  Trte  AURAAJ  INFLUENCES  N E U ; OR-DSS.  <?*J A B R J S  - 13 The o v e r a l l p r o c e s s can b e s t be d e s c r i b e d as of p o l i t i c s .  "Javanization"  " J a v a n i z a t i o n " w i l l be used i n p r e f e r e n c e t o  t h e term " P r i j a j i - i z a t i o n " , d e s p i t e the f a c t t h a t the l a t t e r term most c l o s e l y d e s c r i b e s the p r o c e s s .  "Javanization*  w i l l be used t o d e s c r i b e the p r o g r e s s i v e i n c r e a s e i n i n f l u e n c e and power o f e t h n i c Javanese and o t h e r I n d o n e s i a n s who  have become v e r y Javanese  i n thought and a c t i o n i n the  government and p o l i t i c s o f I n d o n e s i a as a whole.  Not o n l y  i s t h i s p r o c e s s seen as p u t t i n g more e t h n i c Javanese government b u t e s p e c i a l l y Javanese  o f one c u l t u r a l v a r i a n t s  t h e pri.1a.1l o r Great T r a d i t i o n o f J a v a .  T h i s concept s h o u l d  be k e p t c o n s t a n t l y i n mind as t h e remainder o f t h i s is  i n the  paper  read.  A Note on the C u l t u r a l I n f l u e n c e s on the M i l i t a r y ; In placement  Figure I I , I presented a r a t h e r c o n t r o v e r s i a l o f the m i l i t a r y i n r e l a t i o n s h i p t o the a l l r a n .  The diagram o n l y r e f e r s t o the p r e s e n t l e a d e r s h i p (as o f 1972) and s h o u l d not be seen as d e p i c t i n g a h i s t o r i c a l phenomenon. or  I t s h o u l d f u r t h e r be n o t e d t h a t no communist  " m o d e r n i s t " I s l a m i c i n f l u e n c e s a r e shown.  I t i s these  two c u l t u r a l and i d e o l o g i c a l t e n d e n c i e s t h a t the I n d o n e s i a n m i l i t a r y (ABRI) i s most h o s t i l e towards, and  elements  s y m p a t h e t i c t o them have g r a d u a l l y been purged from the r a n k s —  assuming t h a t they were ever p r e s e n t i n t h e f i r s t p l a c e .  A l s o note the l i m i t e d i n f l u e n c e o f d e m o c r a t i c s o c i a l i s m  -  14  -  (Western p o l i t i c a l p h i l o s o p h y ) a n d r a d i c a l n a t i o n a l i s m .  The  i n f l u e n c e o f t h e former on p o l i t i c a l t h i n k i n g i n ABRI has seemingly d e c r e a s e d w i t h t h e i s o l a t i o n o f t h e S i l i w a n g i D i v i s i o n o f West J a v a s i n c e 1966. cult to discuss.  The l a t t e r i s more d i f f i -  A t t h e moment i t s i n f l u e n c e seems t o be  more l a t e n t than a c t i v e .  The s e n s i t i v e n e s s o f t h e P r e s i d e n t  t o I n d o n e s i a n businessmen's c o m p l a i n t s about f o r e i g n competition  and ABRI's r e c e n t  s t r e s s on t h e i n h e r i t a n c e o f  t h e "1945 G e n e r a t i o n " o r t h e s p i r i t o f r e v o l u t i o n a r y t o t h e younger g e n e r a t i o n presence. general  struggle  seem t o be s i g n s o f i t s c o n t i n u e d  While t h e i n f l u e n c e o f I s l a m on t h e m i l i t a r y i n  i s s m a l l , most m i l i t a r y p e o p l e i n c l u d i n g t h e Javanese  acknowledge i t as t h e i r r e l i g i o n , a l b e i t w i t h c e r t a i n reservations. The  r e l a t i o n s h i p o f "modern" o r a t l e a s t w e s t e r n  m i l i t a r y d o c t r i n e and Javanese t r a d i t i o n a l i s m would seem t o be t h e most c o n t r o v e r s i a l .  The m i l i t a r y and i t s spokesmen  a r e q u i c k t o p r o c l a i m t h e i r s u p p o r t f o r m o d e r n i s a s l and pembangunan ( m o d e r n i z a t i o n and development) and deny t h e r o l e o f t r a d i t i o n a l v a l u e s and i n f l u e n c e s .  T h i s does n o t , however,  c o r r e s p o n d w i t h my own f e e l i n g about t h e m a t t e r .  That t h e  army has i m p o r t e d many modem o r g a n i z a t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s and put  them t o good use i s n o t d e n i e d .  C e r t a i n l y some p o l i t i c a l  d o c t r i n e expounded by ABRI i s a l s o o f t h i s v a r i e t y . question  The  remains as t o t h e depth o f t h e a c c e p t a n c e o f t h e  - 15 v a l u e s t o go a l o n g w i t h the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s , o n l y a c t i o n s can g i v e the p r o p e r answer t o i t .  The  and  army  w i t h i t s d u a l f u n c t i o n i d e o l o g y c e r t a i n l y has c r e a t e d i t s own  format f o r a c o n t i n u i n g p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l as w e l l as  a m i l i t a r y r o l e which i s v e r y d i s t i n c t l y d i f f e r e n t from the Western c o n c e p t i o n s  of the m i l i t a r y ' s p r o p e r r o l e .  o t h e r hand, ABRI's a n a l y s i s of I n d o n e s i a ' s  On  the  p o l i t i c a l problems  and i t s p r e s c r i b e d remedies a t the Second Army Seminar i n Bandung d u r i n g 1966  a r e d e c i d e d l y Western i n a p p r o a c h .  t h i s d a t e the i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  of s a i d remedies has had  d e c i d e d l y Javanese f l a v o r t o i t , however.  The  To a  correctness  o f my placement of ABRI's p r e s e n t l e a d e r s h i p on the diagram can be b e t t e r a p p r e c i a t e d a f t e r the s i m i l a r i t i e s between the New  Order and Mataram a r e p o i n t e d  out.  Government and P o l i t i c s i n a Javanese P o l i t i c a l C u l t u r e ; L a t e r Mataram (15th and 16th century) While the n o r t h e r n c o a s t of J a v a o r the  paslslr  succumbed t o I s l a m i n a v e r y complete manner, t h i s was  not  t r u e o f the c u l t u r a l h e a r t l a n d of J a v a on the i n t e r i o r  of  the c e n t r a l and e a s t e r n p o r t i o n s of the i s l a n d .  There I s l a m  b a r e l y a f f e c t e d the t r a d i t i o n a l scheme of c u l t u r e and ment.  I n the 15th  and l 6 t h c e n t u r y Java e x i s t e d s i d e by  s i d e w i t h the Dutch E a s t I n d i a Company or VOC; a f f e c t e d by i t .  govern-  yet  little  A t t h i s time the kingdom o f Mataram c o n t r o l l e d  t h e Javanese h e a r t l a n d .  E x c e l l e n t s t u d i e s of t h i s p e r i o d o f  h i s t o r y have been made by Moertono and Schrieke while Anderson and Geertz have presented equally valuable 29 interpretations of "Javanism" as w e l l .  7  Prom these studies,  a model of "Javanism" and the Javanese state i n r e l a t i v e l y pure form can be obtained,  while i t i s naturally impossible  to ascertain the f u l l range of values, b e l i e f s and attitudes that formed t r a d i t i o n a l Javanese p o l i t i c a l culture, i t i s possible to see the results of t h i s p o l i t i c a l culture as r e f l e c t e d i n the structure, functions and style of Mataram's 30 government.  In turn this r e f l e c t i o n can be compared with  contemporary Indonesian p o l i t i c s to discover the broad s i m i l a r i t i e s and d i s - s i m i l a r i t i e s . Structure % According to Steinberg, "the p o l i t i c a l structure of Java i n Mataram times began —  and t h e o r e t i c a l l y speaking, 31  a l s o ended —  with the king."  In theory, at l e a s t , there  were and could not be any l i m i t s on the powers and rights of such a king f o r even with the acceptance of Islam, he  was  s t i l l somewhat of a sacral figure. The state i t s e l f was conceived of as consisting of four concentric c i r c l e s of t e r r i t o r y that faded Imperceptibly into each other with increasing distance from the center. The kraton or palace was the center which was surrounded by the negara agung or royal land.  The l a t t e r was the very core  of the kingdom, during Mataram times located i n the area of  - 17 Solo and J o g j a k a r t a .  The next c i r c l e was  the mantja negara  or outer p r o v i n c e s which a t the h e i g h t of Mataram's power i n c l u d e d a l l of Java except the very extreme e a s t e r n  and  western t i p s of the i s l a n d .  tanah  F i n a l l y , there were the  sabrang or overseas s t a t e s t h a t acknowledged the of the  suzerainty  center. N a t u r a l l y an e l a b o r a t e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n was  govern such a kingdom.  By and  required to  l a r g e the realm was  not  governed by members of the r o y a l f a m i l y f o r they were kept a t the c o u r t and h o p e f u l l y , p o l i t i c a l l y n e u t r a l . of the o u t e r p r o v i n c e s porated  In some  h e r e d i t a r y l o c a l l o r d s were i n c o r -  i n t o the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ;  were r u l e d through o f f i c i a l s , who  otherwise t h e i r areas no matter how  they might be i n r e a l i t y , were i n theory  independent  only s e r v a n t s  of  the k i n g . A t the c e n t e r i n the k r a t o n and negara agung, there was  an e l a b o r a t e  s t r u c t u r e of a d m i n i s t r a t i o n t h a t i n 32  composition  was  c o u n c i l was  composed of f i v e m i n i s t e r s ;  m i n i s t e r and  supposedly s a c r a l .  U s u a l l y the  a p a t i h or c h i e f  f o u r wedana or l e s s e r m i n i s t e r s .  the k i n g r e s e r v e d  ruling  On  occasion  the p o s i t i o n of p a t i h f o r h i m s e l f .  "The  f u n c t i o n s of these o f f i c i a l s , i n c o n t r a s t to the s t r u c t u r e , were i m p r e c i s e ;  areas of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and  relative  importance seem to have depended more on t h e i r r e l a t i o n s with  personal  the k i n g or t h e i r s t r e n g t h i n court  circles  - 18  -  than on the p a r t i c u l a r o f f i c e s t h e y o c c u p i e d . "  33  The s t r u c t u r e  f o r m a l l y f i t the p a t t e r n t h a t k e p t o r d e r i n the s m a l l e r w o r l d o f the kingdom, but " p o l i t i c a l b u s i n e s s was conducted 34 p r i m a r i l y i n terms of p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s , "  Moertono n o t e s  t h a t whatever the change i n the f u n c t i o n s o f Mataram g o v e r n ment d u r i n g i t s 400 y e a r s o f e x i s t e n c e , the i d e o l o g i c a l  and  s t r u c t u r a l bases o f s t a t e l i f e seem not t o have changed a t all.35  While the s t r u c t u r e of the s t a t e was  elaborate, i n  r e a l i t y the degree of c o n t r o l by the c e n t e r was The degree o f e f f e c t i v e n e s s of the k i n g was  very  measured  what degree he c o u l d t i g h t e n up the l o o s e n e s s  low. by j u s t  of the s t r u c t u r e  or i n o t h e r words, accumulate power a t the c e n t e r .  Therefore,  as Anderson n o t e s , the Javanese seem t o have h e l d a v i e w of h i s t o r y t h a t e n v i s i o n e d f l u c t u a t i o n s of power a t the o o n t i n u a l w a x i n g and waning of power.  center;  Times o f t r a n q u i l i t y  c o r r e s p o n d e d t o s t r e n g t h and times o f d i s o r d e r t o weakness a t the c e n t e r . h e r e , i t was  I f t h e r e was any  c a u s a l r e l a t i o n s h i p seen  t h a t weakness causes or a l l o w s  disturbance,  r a t h e r than v i c e v e r s a . While r u l e i n the negara agung c o u l d be c o n t r o l l e d c l o s e l y , t h i s was  much l e s s t r u e i n the o u t e r p r o v i n c e s  the o v e r s e a s t e r r i t o r y .  A r u l e of f i n a n c i a l  self-sufficiency  o r autonomous f i n a n c i n g gave the o f f i c i a l s t h e r e f u l l undivided a u t h o r i t y over t h e i r r e g i o n .  and  and  " I t i s t h e r e f o r e not  - 19 surprising that, within t h i s region, he (the l o c a l o f f i c i a l ) wielded the powers of administration, judge and commander of the l o c a l contingent of troops ... the fact that regional o f f i c i a l s held undivided power made i t e s s e n t i a l that they 37 be chosen with great care."  Simply stated, despite i t s  outward appearances, the state was p r i m i t i v e l y  organized  and only held together by personal attachments and l o y a l t i e s , p a r t l y inevitable because of poor communications and far-flung nature of the kingdoms tegration was  the  so, the danger of d i s i n -  inherent i n the system, especially as  hereditary succession stimulated the establishment of gentry families i n the outer provinces and overseas  new  38  territories. Throughout the centuries the king's o f f i c i a l s , from the highest to the lowest, gradually became a s o c i a l class with an exclusive set of b e l i e f s and values.  They formed  the s o c i a l stratum between the king plus the small group of princes of royal blood and the great mass of private c i t i z e n s who,  i r r e s p e c t i v e of wealth or means of l i v i n g were c a l l e d  the wong t j i l i k or small people.  This administrative and  s o c i a l group was known as the p r i j a j i . Commoners could enter t h i s group but only by becoming a servant of the king, an 39 official. In such a p o l i t y , at l e a s t i n theory, there was  no  such phenomenon as p o l i t i c s for the king's s l i g h t e s t wish became law.  In a c t u a l i t y there were p o l i t i c s but of the court  -  or palace p o l i t i c s v a r i e t y .  20  -  There were m u l t i t u d e s  of  I n t r i g u e s , schemes and maneuverings f o r b e t t e r p o s i t i o n i n r e l a t i o n s h i p t o the r u l e r . p a r t i c i p a t i o n was,  The  n o t i o n o f mass p o l i t i c s  and  however, a l i e n t o the system.  Functions s I n the Javanese b e l i e f system o r w o r l d v i e w , harmony was the g r e a t e s t value„  Harmony as a g o a l meant t o  create  a "one-ness" w i t h one's s u r r o u n d i n g s and above a l l w i t h I t f o l l o w s t h a t the c o n c e p t i o n s t a t e was  God.  o f the p r o p e r f u n c t i o n o f  the  b r o a d e r and a t the same time n a r r o w e r t h a n the  modern one.  B r o a d e r because harmony extended t o the  soul  and n a r r o w e r because harmony meant, i n many c a s e s , the absence of government, i f p o s s i b l e .  "The  total  Javanese, there-  f o r e , would not c o n s i d e r the s t a t e t o have f u l f i l l e d i t s o b l i g a t i o n i f i t d i d not encourage i n n e r order  ( t e n t e r a m . peace and  e n f o r c i n g the f o r m a l o r d e r  psychological  t r a n q u i l i t y of h e a r t ) as w e l l as (tata)."  Continuing,  Moertono  says s F o l l o w i n g t h i s l i n e of r e a s o n i n g , one can u n d e r s t a n d why s t a t e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n the kingdoms o f o l d seem t o have n e g l e c t e d the p e o p l e ' s needs, seems t o have been detached from the t o i l s o f the common p e o p l e . I n a g r a r i a n c o u n t r i e s where man's l i f e depends so much more on the s t e a d y f l o w of s e a s o n a l change, where the c o n c e p t of harmony i s viewed more i n terms o f r e g u l a r i t y and f a m i l i a r i t y w i t h the p a t t e r n s of community l i f e , any i n t e r f e r e n c e i n the l i f e of s o c i e t y may d i s t u r b the b a l a n c e o f the universe. Thus the s t a t e w i l l as much as p o s s i b l e , r e f r a i n from i n t e r f e r e n c e . Such r e s t r a i n t i s f e a s i b l e t o o because of a g r a r i a n l i f e , r e l a t i v e l y ,  - 21 does not need much state stimulus to work ... I t follows that progress i n the modern sense of deliberate development and active stimulation could not have been considered a goal of the state. The r o l e of the king i s then more that of a protector than a developer ... with the a l l dominating p o s i t i o n of the king i n state l i f e , administration as a technical tool of kingship had to r e f l e c t the king's major concern, the preservation of harmony. This need ... determined the major and most important task, mainly, maintaining security. In practice this meant guarding against any possible disturbance from an outside foe as well as any i n t e r n a l crime or i r r e g u l a r i t y which might disturb the balance between the two cosmic . spheres (the kingdom and the universe). Anyone who disposed  did disturb the i n t e r n a l order had to be  of without delay, "just as one would dispose of a 41  caterpillar."  The e f f i c i e n c y of a regime was  measured by the existence of such disturbances.  also In fact,  there were frequent r e b e l l i o n s , and bands of robbers often roamed about plundering, but Moertono notes that once such groups became t e r r i t o r i a l , they governed exactly l i k e the 42 kingdom i t s e l f did. One can e a s i l y imagine that any change i n the kingdom became a threat to the regime, because change, any change, would disturb the balance and inner t r a n q u i l i t y of the state. The Javanese universe became ordered by hard and stern rules of action and i n t e r a c t i o n . servants was  The duty of the state and i t s  to contain change i n a l l forms.  became so obsessive  that h i s t o r y was  This passion  continually rewritten to  prove the lack of change and emphasize continuity.  The  ultimate enforcement of such reactionary " s t a b i l i t y " had  to  -  22  -  r e s t on something other than personal r e l a t i o n s h i p s , and i n the f i n a l analysis, i t was the a b i l i t y and willingness of the regime to use force that maintained order and prevented deviation. The f i n a l function of the state and i t s administration was taxation.  Taxation was a kind of tribute exacted i n  exchange f o r the king's protection. form of money, produce and labor. negara or outer provinces  This tribute was i n the E s p e c i a l l y i n the mant.ja  this taxation was farmed out to  the regent or p r o v i n c i a l governor, who had to be s e l f sufficient.  An order came from the top of the hierarchy as  to what was to be supplied and i n what quantity.  The l o c a l  l o r d or regent then adjusted h i s own administration to that requirement.  The state depended on this tribute to maintain  i t s e l f and the elaborate l i f e - s t y l e of the court, f o r i t had l i t t l e capacity to finance i t s e l f ,  In this sense then, the  center could be viewed as attempting to extract much but o f f e r i n g l i t t l e i n return;  e s p e c i a l l y i f the center was  weak, the room f o r deviation was great i n the submission of tribute. Style and Behaviors The s t y l e and behavior of the ruled and the r u l e r s i n Mataram was governed by a very i n t r i c a t e set of s o c i a l relationships and norms that ascribed a place to everything i n the universe.  The world view of the Javanese ascribed a  - 23 meaning to everything, every action, every event.  In f a c t ,  Moertono states that consequently Javanese are apt to search for meaning i n acts, words or situations, no matter  how ^3  r a t i o n a l l y incomprehensible  or unimportant they may seem.  The central focus of action, however, was  on the  creation and maintenance of harmony, both inside and outside of the human being.  This stress l e d to great emphasis on  ceremony and symbolism.  The approach to any problem had to  be i n harmony with the cosmos.  Therefore, the outer form  of functions and behavior became much more important the content of action i t s e l f .  than  This stress a l s o gave r i s e  to the unbelievably elaborate s t y l e of the age that was embodied i n the pri.1a.il. Pri.1a.1i-ism has been well described by C l i f f o r d 44 Geertz.  The etiquette of the pri.1a.1l was  so elaborate  and refined that he even c a l l e d i t a r e l i g i o n of s o r t s . In short, the i n d i v i d u a l was supposed to express his inner harmony and his outer harmony with the world In behavior.  own  surrounding  This style of behavior i s c a l l e d halus  and escapes f u l l d e f i n i t i o n i n English.  Loosely, i t means  "cultured" and "refined", but i t has far reaching i m p l i cations.  Expression of emotion i n d a i l y conduct i s forbidden.  Only smoothness of expression i s allowed?  hence, regardless  of one's true inner feelings, the countenance must remain unperturbed.  Opposition, anger, fear, jealousy, hate and the  - 24 l i k e are only expressed openly by kasar or crude beings; beings i n t h e i r natural state without any concentration of power or refinement i n the inner soul.  Consequently, i t i s  almost impossible for the prl.1a.jl to say "no", although c e r t a i n types of "yes" do mean "no".  As expressed i n the  structure and functions of the state, the form i s much more important than the content;  i n fact, the actual content i s  very often hard to distinguish from the symbolism of the form.  Geertz goes even further i n discussing the implications  of halus-ness by describing c a r e f u l l y a process c a l l e d etok-etok i n which pri.1a.1l avoid t e l l i n g the truth whenever 45 possible simply to preserve harmony(S) A  Pri.1a.jl must be sabar, l k l a s and terlma, terms of  v i r t u e which mean having patience, being sincere and devoted, and w i l l i n g to receive or accept a l l that comes one's way, 46 good or bad. These terms express a strongly s o c i a l i z e d i n c l i n a t i o n of submission to fate. There i s no room for a voluntary and mutual adjustment or a fine c o n c i l i a t i o n and conformation; rather the universe i s ordered by hard and stern r u l e s . Deviation from them would set o f f a chain reaction which might reach calamitous proportions. From here to a b e l i e f i n the working of fate i s but a very short distance. Harmony as a compelling need must therefore form the central concept i n man's e f f o r t s toward organization ... thus the state as a r e p l i c a of the cosmic order (harmony) must also have the propensities and capacities of that higher order, a power which as a part of the Great Order, no subject people dare r e s t r i c t or disturb. ^7  - 25 The despotic p o s s i b i l i t i e s of such attitudes are softened somewhat by the expression of paternalism f o r the subjects on the part of the r u l e r .  He must care for t h e i r  sufferings, so that, according to Moertono, the r u l e r assumes, i n f a c t , a role of protective s u p e r i o r i t y , the 48 ruled an attitude of acquiescent subservience. This gives r i s e to a sort of patron-client r e l a t i o n s h i p which i s often 49 c a l l e d Bapak-lsm or father-ism.  This type of patrimonial  r e l a t i o n s h i p was r e f l e c t e d i n the formal central hierarchy of the state as well as i n most forms of p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l organization.  In addition to the central hierarchy  or pyramid with the king at the top and a l l subjects below, the society i t s e l f was divided into many small or pyramids with similar  fiefdoms|*  ft  composition.  Ben Anderson has presented what he feels i s a Javanese or p r l j a j i philosophy of power.^° to be i n many ways completely  He believes i t  opposite from the s o c i a l  science conception of power today.  B r i e f l y , Anderson sees  the Javanese as believing power i s concrete, homogeneous, constant i n t o t a l quantity and as automatically legitimate i . e . there are no moral questions involved with power or i t s use.  On the other hand, he says Westerners view power as  abstract, heterogeneous i n i t s sources, unlimited i n quantity and morally ambiguous.  He further draws the implications of  these observations i n discussing p o l i t i c a l action and  - 26 "behavior In the Javanese context, several points of which have already been touched upon here. Another r e s u l t of the emphasis on harmony, as well as the idea of power, was  the importance of continuity.  Continuity i s an expression of non-change.  Dynasties  had  to be related even i f imaginary genealogies had to be created. Hence, the Dutch, with a l i t t l e twisting of history, became descendants of ancient Javanese kings.  Moertono stresses  that legitimacy was derived by these rewritings of history while Anderson counters that the simple flowing of power from a monarch to his opponent was enough confirmation of legitimacy given the Javanese view of history; h i s t o r i c a l rewriting was  therefore,  only a d d i t i o n a l support.  The central roles of harmony and continuity i n the Javanese mind, and thus i n the state, were also r e f l e c t e d i n a phenomenon known as syncretism. e s s e n t i a l l y taking a l l threats, new  Syncretism a l a Java  was  ideas and associated  forms of change and a s s i m i l a t i n g them to the major body of Javanese t r a d i t i o n and philosophy.  Hence, Islam and even  Dutch colonialism came to be expressed i n very Javanese ways.  The threat of new  into the mainstream.  ideas was defused by absorption  However, such domination of change  could only be maintained i n the long run by the continuation of Javanese power.  As long as colonial rule remained i n d i r e c t ,  the prlja.11 were In a p o s i t i o n to interpret new  ideas as they  wished, but i n the case of d i r e c t rule this could hardly be  - 27  -  the case. Soldiers were also servants  of the king.  The  knight  or kesatrla image of the humble s o l d i e r always l o y a l to h i s commander was  c l e a r l y expressed as a part of the  general  pri.ia.1l b e l i e f system. The means of s o c i a l i z a t i o n of the Great T r a d i t i o n of the p r l . 1 a . 1 i to the masses i s not well understood.  Ben  Anderson pointed out that the wa.lang k u l i t or shadow puppet show was prl.1a.1i  c e r t a i n l y a part of the process as i t depicts  the  norms i n ideal form and has been a great favorite 52  of a l l l e v e l s of Javanese society for centuries. In summary, t r a d i t i o n a l Javanese society and government were very strong and absorptive. extremely h i e r a r c h l a l i n structure. harmony was was  They were also The maintenance of  the major function of the government.  Change  seen as something to be tempered and controlled i f i t  could not be prevented altogether. The Changing Roles of the Pr 1.1 a.11 and the The  State  Pri.1a.1l;  The prl.ja.ll were the aristocracy of the Javanese abangan masses. administered  I t was  the pri.1a.1i who  the king's commands5  t i v e class of the kingdom. rested on three things? p o l i t i c a l myth that was  carried out  they were the  and  administra-  ''Java as a p o l i t i c a l e n t i t y  a common language and culture, a u n i v e r s a l l y accepted because i t  - 28 rested on and expressed  common r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f s , and 52  shared values of a Java-wide pri.1a.ll c l a s s . " ^  the  The prl.1a.1l.  then, as opposed to the peasant masses, were the foremost representatives of Javanese c i v i l i z a t i o n i n a l l of i t s manifestations, c u l t u r a l or p o l i t i c a l . With the advent of Dutch colonialism and the of Javanese royal power to that of the VOC  subjugation  or Dutch East India  Company i n the eighteenth century, the role of the prl.1a.1l i n i t i a l l y did not change substantially. As Steinberg puts i t : A l i e n though i t was, the VOC was enacting a r o l e i n Javanese h i s t o r y . Its e a r l i e r naval domination i n the archipelago was decaying; i t had gone ashore on Java and was now the successor to Mataram. The c i r c l e s of the realm were reversed, coastal Batavia (now Djakarta) was now the center, the Bupati now faced west and north, and Mataram princes were now outer vassals. But p o l i t i c a l l y the underlying structure of Java had changed hardly at a l l . S o c i a l l y , below a small conquering e l i t e of Dutchmen, pr 1.1a.11 s t i l l lorded i t over the wong t.Uliks a multitude of l o c a l economies s t i l l sent tribute through l o c a l channels to a greedy but d i s t a n t center. A Javanese writing of the 18th century, i n d i f f e r e n t to the company's outside connections but s e n s i t i v e to the Imperatives of Javanese h i s t o r y , could explain thiss 'Jang Kung' (Jan Coen, the Dutch GovernorGeneral who founded Batavlai), i t said, was the son of a wandering foreigner and a princess of West Java who was destined to bear kings. Through her, ^ therefore, descended a legitimate dynasty of Java. *^ Thus was  the strength of Javanese culture;  early  company representatives i n the Interior became Javanlzed. They took Javanese wives, spoke Javanese and wore Javanese clothes.  They became a part of the patrimonial system I t s e l f  and l i t t l e disturbed the role of the prl.1a.1l or the continuity  - 29  of  -  the c i v i l i z a t i o n . During the 18th century the VOC  treated the Inland  Javanese kingdoms as large and dangerous vassals that maintained a great deal of Independence.  This period saw  a great flowering of pri.1a.1l culture, and the p o s i t i o n of the prl.1a.ll v i s - a - v i s the peasant was greatly strengthened by the company.  "The Dutch ruled, but d a l l y government  remained i n the hands of the prl.1a.lig  production  was  increasingly commercial but i t continued to be organized i n the feudal forms of tribute or appanage."-' The turn of the century saw the collapse of the VOC and i t s replacement  by the Dutch government.  There was  an  immediate s h i f t i n p o l i c y and quite naturally, i t had an e f f e c t on the role of the prl.1a.1l. Governor-General  "Daendels (the f i r s t  appointed by the Dutch government) and h i s  successors came out from Europe determined than simply to control Java;  to govern rather  they challenged the whole  system of arrangement by which company servants and Javans had accommodated to each other for more than a century.""^ The size and independence of the Javanese kingdoms were reduced, and the Dutch attempted to transform the prl.1a.1l from petty vassals into ordinary c i v i l servants. The ease of dealing with t r a d i t i o n a l Javanese  insti-  tutions was again recognized by 1830 when the r i g h t of hereditary succession was returned to the regents;  the  - 30 Dutch discovered i t was much easier to rule through the personal authority of the pri.1a.ji than not.  Despite some  administrative s i m p l i f i c a t i o n , the pri.1a.1i were c l e a r l y onoe again i n day to day control of governing  Java.  The major s o c i a l and economic transformations 19th  of the  and early 20th centuries began to undermine the old  prl.1a.1i i n s t i t u t i o n s .  The Dutch p o l i c y of hereditary  succession coupled with large population growth, r e l a t i v e l y peaceful conditions and non-expansion of the native administration created a r i f t between the higher prl.1a.ll were regents or bupatis and the lower p r l j a j l who  who  i n more  normal times would have looked forward to gaining a foothold i n and ascending  the administrative hierarchy through force 56 or natural displacement. However, the advent of the 57  i n the l a s t decades of the 19th  E t h i c a l Policy  century,  helped feudal Java to gradually evolve, at l e a s t formally, i n t o a modern administrative state.  This meant a large  expansion of the number of government positions outside of the t r a d i t i o n a l hierarchy, and educational i n s t i t u t i o n s were set up i n the Indies to supply people with modern s k i l l s for these p o s i t i o n s .  The lower p r l j a j i , without a chance f o r  advancement i n the "frozen" t r a d i t i o n a l hierarchy, eagerly grasped the new  opportunities and became the doctors,  engineers and c i v i l Ethical rule.  lawyers,  servants of the Netherlands Indies under  Initially,  the status associated with  these  - 31 -  posts was not high, but Van Niel notes, "by the end of the ( 1 9 t h ) most of these persons were coming to be  century  viewed as prl.1a.ll of some standing by the common people of Indonesia,  even though they were often not descended from 58  the higher prl.1a.1i f a m i l i e s . " "Whereas i n 1900 the prl.1a.1l group had been mainly nobles and administrators, by 1 9 1 4 i t contained increasing numbers of c i v i l servants, government technicians and i n t e l l e c t u a l s who shared the e l i t i s t r o l e and who i n the eyes of the Indonesian common man of the v i l l a g e were 59  Included within the general designation of p r i j a j l . "  Most  p r l j a j l made outward adjustments to the West and Western style administration but continued l i v e s on t r a d i t i o n a l patterns. was,  to regulate t h e i r private  The c r u c i a l point, however,  "during the early 2 0 t h century the broadening leadership  pattern of Indonesian society was almost exclusively a development within the pri.1a.li group, and a sense of s o c i a l 60  distinctiveness remains a strong force among the e l i t e . " Thus, the r i s e of nationalism was also the expression of one group;  the prl.la.ll.  The pri.1a.1i have always had top status In Indonesian society.  The bureaucracy and white-collar positions that  came to be associated with the pri.1a.1i were and are the most respected i n the job hierarchy.  Non-prl.1a.1l, whether peasants  or even non-Javanese aspired to these positions and as a few  -  32  -  obtained them, became " p r i j a j l - i z e d "  i n the process.  t h i s day the above pattern remains s u r p r i s i n g l y  To  constant.  61  With the above i n mind, the Javanese e l i t e of today, 62  i n my opinion, should be considered modern day prl,1a.11. They include a l l government servants whether i t be m i l i t a r y , c i v i l servants, pamong-pradja (regional administrators corps), teachers or the major white-collar service professionals i n law and medicine .  A d d i t i o n a l l y , Geertz  has pointed out that Invariably p o l i t i c a l  party leaders i n  Java, including, s u r p r i s i n g l y , those of the PKI are of 63  p r l j a j l origin.  Thus the sons of Java carry on the great  p r i j a j l tradition, albeit i n different roles. The  States While the p r i j a j i were adapting to new  conception of the state was Initially,  r o l e s , the  changing to some extent a l s o .  Mataram and Batavia co-existed, but gradually  Batavia began to assume the role of the center.  As noted  e a r l i e r , the Javanese even made the Dutch into legitimate heirs to the kingship by rewriting h i s t o r y .  As the structure  of Mataram had not changed for 400 years, the advent of Dutch r u l e did not e a s i l y change the conception of the state and i t s functions.  For e s s e n t i a l l y , colonial rule was  same thing as indigenous rule when seen from the of the effect on the population. i s t i c state.  I t was  the  viewpoint  s t i l l a paternal-  There was no role f o r the population other than  - 33  -  to accept the decisions of the new  center and no way  to  p a r t i c i p a t e other than through t r a d i t i o n a l revolts against authority. old one;  There was  no conception  palace p o l i t i c s .  of p o l i t i c s except the  There was no conception  of  opposition except i n the t o t a l and i l l e g a l v a r i e t y , because i t was  seen as a threat to the e x i s t i n g order.  of communication remained the same; the top.  I f there was  The  channels  one way and always from  ever any formal l o c a l autonomy, i t  was always granted from the top by the grace of the GovernorGeneral,  the new king, and not obtained by any inherent r i g h t  of possession  of i t by the masses.  C l i v e Day noted that  " ... the most s t r i k i n g c h a r a c t e r i s t i c i s the immense concent r a t i o n of power i n the Governor-General, who  i n h i s sole  person represents  i s responsible  the royal authority and who  f o r the conduct of a f f a i r s .  Both i n the l e g i s l a t i o n and i n  administration, he i s without serious r i v a l and with checks i n the Indies;  few  the only serious l i m i t a t i o n on h i s  power i s that imposed by the government i n the Netherlands  64 (thousands of miles and several months away)." "During the c o l o n i a l period the fundamental objective of the government apparatus remained e s s e n t i a l l y the same; the maintenance of p o l i t i c a l , economic and s o c i a l control. Compliance was achieved  either by using coercion or by an  i m p l i c i t willingness to use i t on the part of the c o l o n i a l regime. " ^  -  3Hr -  19th  The advent of the E t h i c a l Policy i n the l a t e  century caused, at l e a s t on the surface, some rather d r a s t i c changes In the c o l o n i a l government. Netherlands  Supposedly, the  Indies government stopped being merely a control  apparatus and became interested i n advancing the welfare of the native population.  Heretofore, any roads or I r r i g a t i o n  works had been constructed f o r the maintenance of security and creating infrastructure f o r Dutch Investment.  The new  emphasis created a "modern" administrative state charged with supplying a l l sorts of s o c i a l services to the population. This emphasis allowed the creation of Dutch language schools and eventually, even medical, law and engineering colleges for the natives.  Native p o l i t i c a l organization was tolerated  as long as i t was not too open i n i t s c r i t i c i s m of the regime or Dutch colonialism. Thus, the E t h i c a l Policy gave r i s e to the Western-educated but prl,1a.11 e l i t e that was l a t e r to lead the independence movements. However, a f t e r the end of the F i r s t World War, the E t h i c a l P o l i c y came to an abrupt end.  P o l i t i c a l organization  was no longer so e a s i l y tolerated, although the expansion of education f o r Indonesians i n the Netherlands.  d i d continue both i n the Indies and  Even the Volksraad or People's Assembly,  conceived a t the height of the l i b e r a l E t h i c a l Policy, became a mere functionless organ with no power and serving only as a somewhat r e s t r i c t e d forum of c r i t i c i s m of the regime.  - 35 Paternalism remained the dominating p o l i c y i n terms of i n t e r - r e l a t i o n s between the rulers and the ruled. Several trends continued up to the Japanese invasion that made the l a t e r Dutch regime seem much l i k e the Javanese regimes of o l d . The emphasis on security and control and complete subjugation of the natives remained. the  Java remained  center of c o l o n i a l rule even though the "kraton" i t s e l f  moved to Batavia.  The Dutch c a l l e d a l l t e r r i t o r i e s outside  of Java "the Outer Islands", emphasizing the Java-centric nature of the regime.  While the t r a d i t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s of  Javanese rule were gradually eroded and replaced by the c o l o n i a l government, the replacement was also bureaucratic i n nature and e a s i l y adapted to old status, operational and p o l i t i c a l norms by the p r i . j a j i .  The role of the bureaucracy  i n society increased greatly, and i t s fused nature was gradually somewhat d i f f e r e n t i a t e d , but the major point was that Dutch Indies government and i t s personnel performed the same functions as Javanese government always had and e s s e n t i a l l y through the same sorts of structures, both i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y and s o c i a l l y . Ted Smith notes that "Indonesian public i n s t i t u t i o n s , during approximately 250 years of Dutch control absorbed many continental bureaucratic norms.  But the fact that the Dutch  r e l i e d primarily on i n d i r e c t rule meant that not as many of these norms were transferred as might be indicated by the long  - 36 duration of c o l o n i a l control.  Sultans and regents i n Java  and l o c a l princes i n the Outer Islands continued t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l style of rule, shaping i t only to meet whatever demands might be imposed upon them by t h e i r c o l o n i a l superiors.  Moreover, very few natives were brought into the  higher l e v e l s of Dutch East Indies b u r e a u c r a c y . ^ w  meant that despite the outward appearance  This  of Western-style  bureaucracy, Indonesians would possess no s o l i d core of high administrators at independence l i k e one found i n the ICS (Indian C i v i l Service) and MCS  (Malayan C i v i l Service) of  B r i t i s h India and Malaya. While the fundamental nature of government i n the Netherlands Indies did not change substantially, i t did allow and force other changes.  One of the most obvious was the  increasing numbers of poor peasants on Java.  The over-  population of Java was, i s and w i l l be one of the foremost influences on the future of the country.  The t r a d i t i o n a l  structure and i t s conservatism could not handle the large numbers of landless and v i r t u a l l y landless peasants.  For  these people i n t h e i r increasing m i l l i o n s had no reason to be thankful f o r peace and order f o r they have nothing to lose i n upheaval. Javanese p o l i t i c a l culture was and i s a non-participatory p o l i t i c a l culture.  I t and i t s government are at t h e i r  greatest strength when the majority of the population i s  - 37 parochial rather than even subjects.  67  There were no  structures, be they formal or informal, i n "Javanism" to handle mass p o l i t i c s and i n fact, a l l of the c u l t u r a l norms of the intensely e l i t e s t society argue against them.  The  c o l o n i a l government had l i t t l e to fear as long as the masses remained parochials and immobilized.  Without mobilization of  the masses, the prl.1a.1l e l i t e could never have gained independence from the Dutch on any terms but those of the Dutch.  The Dutch knew t h e i r own interests i n Indonesia well,  and anytime p o l i t i c a l organizations began to a t t r a c t mass followings, f o r whatever the reason, they were quickly suppressed;  t h e i r pri.ia.11 leaders sent i n t o e x i l e .  The  Japanese, however, had no compunctions against such organization, and t h e i r s t y l e of a g i t a t i v e colonialism created the exact tool that the prl.1a.1i needed to do b a t t l e with the Dutch. On the other hand, Dutch colonialism of the l a t e r period d i d allow one kind of organization to penetrate the masses. the  According to Benda, "by the end of the 19th century,  Dutch has ceased to play a Javanese game (colonial rule  became more and more d i r e c t i n Java);  i n spite of several  d i f f i c u l t i e s , they d i d not by and large i n t e r f e r e with the 68 growth of modern Muslim movements."  Without Dutch support  neither the t r a d i t i o n a l nor the modern Javanese e l i t e groups could stem the Islamic tide.  The "modernist" Muslim movement  thus escaped i n i t i a l l y the brunt of the syncretic tendencies of "Javanism" and made inroads i n the Javanese Java became divided against i t s e l f : and the Islamic p u r i s t s .  heartland.  between the syncrfejtksts  The long Javanese accommodation  with Islam came to an end. Such were the continuities and changes i n Javanese p o l i t i c a l culture and i n s t i t u t i o n s and t h e i r bearers u n t i l independence was declared.  The e l i t e remained p r l . 1 a . 1 i , the  government remained security and control (or harmony) oriented while t r a d i t i o n a l society continued to disintegrate and Islam grew i n strength.  The changes meant that there  could never be a neo-Mataram without the adoption of r a d i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t structures to handle the new forces set loose i n society.  But this did not mean that such an  attempt on the part of the prl.1a.1l e l i t e was impossible or would not be t r i e d .  J  - 39 NOTES on Chapter I 1  For i n s t a n c e Samuel H u n t i n g t o n , P o l i t i c a l Order I n Changing S o c i e t i e s , (New Havens Y a l e U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1968) and D a v i d A p t e r , The P o l i t i c s o f M o d e r n i z a t i o n ( C h i c a g o : U n i v e r s i t y o f Chicago P r e s s , 1965)„  2  H e r b e r t F e i t h , . The D e c l i n e o f C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Democracy i n Indonesia (Ithacas C o r n e l l U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1962). 3  L e s l i e P a l m i e r , I n d o n e s i a and t h e Dutch Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press7 19£07.  (London:  4  J a n P l u v i e r , C o n f r o n t a t i o n s ; A Study i n I n d o n e s i a n Politics ( K u a l a Lumpurs Oxford i n A s i a , 1965) and D a v i d L e v i n e , " H i s t o r y and S o c i a l S t r u c t u r e i n t h e Study o f Contemporary I n d o n e s i a , " I n d o n e s i a , 1969, No. 7. 5 Rex M o r t i m e r , " C l a s s , S o c i a l Cleavage and I n d o n e s i a n Communism", I n d o n e s i a , 1969, No. 8. ^ John D o Legge, I n d o n e s i a (Englewood C l i f f s s P r e n t i c e H a l l , 1 9 6 4 ) , p. 169. 7  T h i s was e s s e n t i a l l y Legge"s c o n c l u s i o n as w e l l , b u t he f a i l e d t o expand t h e i d e a . I b i d , p. 170. g G a b r i e l Almond and Bingham P o w e l l , Comparative P o l i t i c s : A Developmental Approach ( B o s t o n : L i t t l e , Brown, 1 9 6 5 ) 9 p . 5 0 . When t h e term p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e i s mentioned, i t u s u a l l y c o n j u r e s up thoughts o f s y s t e m a t i c a t t i t u d i n a l s u r v e y r e s e a r c h , such a s was used by G a b r i e l Almond and Sidney Verba i n t h e w e l l known s t u d y The C i v i c C u l t u r e ( P r i n c e t o n : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1962). Such work i s f a r beyond t h e scope o f t h i s s t u d y . P o l i t i c a l C u l t u r e here I s used t o r e f e r t o the h o r i z o n t a l c l e a v a g e s i n I n d o n e s i a n s o c i e t y between i t s major c u l t u r a l groups and t o a l e s s e r e x t e n t , t o r e f e r t o t h e v e r t i c a l c l e a v a g e between t h e e l i t e and mass p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e s . As such i t i s l i t t l e more than a broad term o r t o o l used t o p i c t u r e s o c i a l c l e a v a g e s i n t h e p o l i t i c a l d i m e n s i o n . S i n c e b a s i c s u r v e y d a t a was n o t a v a i l a b l e , t h i s paper f o l l o w s t h e t r a d i t i o n a l p a t t e r n o f u s i n g h i s t o r i c a l e v i d e n c e and t o a l e s s e r e x t e n t d a t a on t h e c o m p o s i t i o n o f t h e I n d o n e s i a n e l i t e t o make a number o f i n f e r e n c e s about t h e s t a t e o f t h e contemp o r a r y p o l i t i c a l p r o c e s s . T h i s paper i s perhaps a good s t a r t i n g p o i n t f o r an Almond-Verba type s t u d y b u t s h o u l d n o t be c o n s i d e r e d more than t h a t .  - 40 9 C l i f f o r d Geertz, "Afterword; The P o l i t i c s of Meaning", i n C l a i r e Holt (ed.), P o l i t i c s and Culture i n Indonesia (Ithaca; Cornell University Press, 1 9 7 2 ) , p. 319. 10 This term i s from C l i f f o r d Geertz (ed.) Old Societies and New States (New York; The Free Press, 19637". " 11 Hildred Geertz, "Indonesian Cultures and Communities", i n Ruth McVey (ed.) Indonesia (New Havens Human Relations Area F i l e s , 1 9 6 3 ) , p. 24. 12 According to the 1930 Census, ethnic Javanese composed 47$ of the population. There i s some reason to believe that t h i s figure has declined by several percent (2 or 3) since that date. Recent census are of no value i n c a l c u l a t i n g ethnic percentages as they only give regional population figures, and the population i s spread around considerably from the ethnic viewpoint. 13 The 1930 Census revealed that 3 . 4 $ of the population was Minangkabau, 2 . 6 $ was Bugis, 2% was Batak and 1 . 8 8 $ was Ballnese. 14 Daniel S. Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy (Ithaca; Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1967) p.3. lerbert Feith, op. c i t . , p.30. 16 Ibid., p.31. 17 Ibid., p.31. 18 Ibid., p.32. 19 C l i f f o r d Geertz uses the term Great Tradition to d i s t i n g u i s h a r i s t o c r a t i c or pri.ja.il t r a d i t i o n from that of the peasant ( L i t t l e TraditionT. See Geertz, The Religion of Java (Glencoe; The Free Press, i 9 6 0 ) , p.348. 20 For the best description of this movement see Deliar Noer, The Rise and Development of the Modernist Muslim Movement In Indonesia During the Dutch Colonial Period (1900-1942) , (unpublished Ph.D. d i s s e r t a t i o n , Cornell University, 1963). 21 The term s a n t r i i s used f o r s t r i c t Muslims i n Indonesia while abangan i s used f o r those accepting Islam but retaining l a r g e l y t r a d i t i o n a l b e l i e f s as the main form of r e l i g i o n . The greater portion of Javanese peasants are regarded as abangan. The t r a d i t i o n a l Javanese upper classes who shared a s i m i l a r view of Islam as the abangan peasants are c a l l e d Pri.1a.il (the " j "  - 41 i s pronounced as a " y " ) . Robert Cruikshank, "Abangan, S a n t r i , and P r i j a j i " , Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 1972, V o l . I l l , No. 1 . 22 See footnote No. 21. 23  For a good d i s c u s s i o n of the PNI f a c t i o n s see J.E. Rocamora, "The P a r t a i Nasional Indonesia", Indonesia, 1970, No. 10. 24 Soedjatmoko, "The Role of P o l i t i c a l P a r t i e s i n Indonesia" i n P h i l l i p W. Thayer (ed.), Nationalism and Progress i n Free A s i a (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1 9 5 6 ) . 25 The term i s from Huntington, o p . c i t . , p. 256. 26 Herbert F e i t h and Lance C a s t l e s , Indonesian P o l i t i c a l Thinking 1945-65. (Ithaca: C o r n e l l U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1970) p.14. 27  For c r i t i c i s m on these points see A l f i a n , Masalah Mental, A l i r a n P o l i t k dan Radikalisme dalam Masjarakat Indonesia (Mental Problems, P o l i t i c a l A l i r a n and Radicalism i n Indonesian Society) (Djakarta: Leknas, 1 9 7 0 ) , p. 35° 28 Daniel S. Lev, o p . c i t . , p.77. ki.ja.1i i s the word f o r a respected Muslim leader and" K e s a t r i a i s the Javanese word f o r knight or s o l d i e r . 29 Soemarsaid Moertono, State and S t a t e c r a f t i n Old Java: A Study of the L a t e r Mataram P e r i o d (Ithaca: C o r n e l l Modern Indonesia P r o j e c t , 1 9 6 8 ) ; B.J.O. Schrieke, Indonesian S o c i o l o g i c a l Studies. Part I I , (The Hague: Van Hoeve, 1957)5 C l i f f o r d Geertz, The R e l i g i o n of Java . (Glencoe: The Free Press, i 9 6 0 ) ; and Ben Anderson, "The Idea of Power i n Javanese C u l t u r e " , i n C l a i r e H o l t (ed.), P o l i t i c s and Culture i n Indonesia (Ithaca: C o r n e l l U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1 9 7 2 ) . ~* Much of the content of these works i s conveniently summarized i n David J o e l Steinberg (ed.), In Search of Southeast A s i a (New York: Praeger, 1971). 30 The terms s t r u c t u r e , functions and s t y l e are only a n a l y t i c a l categories or t o o l s used to order the d i s c u s s i o n of Mataram and, l a t e r i n the paper, contemporary Indonesian p o l i t i c s . They are by no means mutually e x c l u s i v e c a t e g o r i e s , and the d i s c u s s i o n f r e e l y flows back and f o r t h between them. 32 31 ISteinberg, b i d . , p.83.o p . c i t . , p.81.  - 42 3 3  I b l d . , p.83.  ^ I b l d . . p.84. 35 ^Moertono, op.cit., p.5« 36 Anderson, op.cit., p. 20 37 Moertono, op.cit., p.92. I b l d . , p.109. I b l d . . p.93. 40 Ibid., p.4 and p.83. 41 Ibid., p.85. 42 Ibid., p.95. 43 Ibid.. p.20. 44 Geertz, op.cit., pp. 227-339 ^ I b i d . , p.246. 46 Ibid., p.241. 47 Moertono, op.cit., pp.3-4. 48 Ibid., p . 2 6 . 49 Geertz, op.cit., p.328. ^Anderson does so with the q u a l i f i c a t i o n that Javanese do not have the word or concept of "power" i n t h e i r vocabulary. Anderson, op.cit., p p . 5 - 8 . ^Moertono, op.cit., pp.53-5^s Anderson, op.cit. p.25 52 Steinberg, op.cit., p.85. 53 Ibid., p.86. 54 Ibid., p.148. 55 Ibid., p.150. *^This point i s made with some force i n Robert Van N i e l , The Emergence of the Modern Indonesian E l i t e (The Hague: Van Hoeve, I960), pp.27-9. '' 3 8  3 9  - 43 -^The E t h i c a l P o l i c y was i n a sense a r e a c t i o n t o t h e e a r l i e r open e x p l o i t a t i o n o f the I n d i e s and t h e d i s t u r b i n g r e p o r t s r e c e i v e d i n The Hague t h a t n a t i v e w e l f a r e was r a p i d l y d e c l i n i n g . E d u c a t i o n and modern h e a l t h s e r v i c e s were r a p i d l y expanded t o improve t h i s w e l f a r e . F o r f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n o f t h i s p o l i c y see S t e i n b e r g , o p . c i t . , p. 188. ^ Van N i e l , op.cit., 8  5 9  Ibid.,  p.29.  p.50.  °Ibid., p.50. 61 Ted S m i t h , The I n d o n e s i a n B u r e a u c r a c y ; S t a b i l i t y . Change and P r o d u c t i v i t y ( u n p u b l i s h e d Ph.D. d i s s e r t a t i o n , U n i v e r s i t y o f C a l i f o r n i a , B e r k e l e y , 1971)» PP. 2 2 4 - 2 5 . 62 , F u r t h e r d a t a / p r e s e n t e d on t h e s o c i a l o r i g i n s o f t h e contemporary e l i t e i n t h e s e c t i o n e n t i t l e d "The C u r r e n t P o l i t i c a l , M i l i t a r y and Governmental E l i t e * ' i n C h a p t e r I I . 63 G e e r t z , o p . c i t . , pp.371-73. 6  a r e  64  C l i v e Day, The Dutch i n Java, (Kuala Lumpur; Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1965), p.414. 65 Moertono, o p . c i t . . p.5. 66 S m i t h , o p . c i t . , p.202. 67 The terms p a r o c h i a l , s u b j e c t and p a r t i c i p a n t a r e used as d e f i n e d by Almond and l o w e l l , o p . c i t . , p.53. 68 H a r r y Benda, " D e c o l o n i z a t i o n i n I n d o n e s i a : The Problem o f C o n t i n u i t y and Change", American H i s t o r i c a l Review, 1965» V o l . LXX, No.4.  CHAPTER II  JAVANIZATION; HISTORY AND DATA History» P o l i t i c s and Javanization Having drawn a c u l t u r a l map  of Indonesia's diverse  population, presented a model of t r a d i t i o n a l Javanese a r i s t o c r a t i c p o l i t i c a l culture and government, and looked at the changing role of the bearers of that p o l i t i c a l culture, l e t us examine recent Indonesian p o l i t i c a l history to see i f the Javanization of Indonesia and Indonesian p o l i t i c s , i n any sense, can be p l a u s i b l y argued. The Pre-Independence Period: While the long and increasingly d i r e c t c o l o n i a l contact was hollowing out the i n s t i t u t i o n s of s o c i a l integration i n Java, Dutch colonialism was, with minor exceptions, l i t t l e concerned with the islands outside of Java.  Only  about the time of the E t h i c a l Policy d i d the Dutch turn t h e i r a t t e n t i o n to those areas.  Even by Japanese occu-  pation the Dutch Impact could only be considered heavy i n the East Coast Residency of Sumatra around Medan.* In the Outer Islands I t was Islam, rather than colonialism, that had the greatest impact on the t r a d i t i o n a l system. Partly because the d e - t r a d l t l o n a l i z a t i o n process had gone further i n Java than anywhere else i n the a r c h i pelago and p a r t l y because the only educational f a c i l i t i e s i n the Indies were located there, Java became the center of n a t i o n a l i s t a g i t a t i o n i n the Dutch East Indies. - 44 -  The  - 45 e a r l y 2 0 t h century saw  the r i s e i n Java o f Budl Utomo,  Sarekat Islam, the PKI and the e a r l y P a r t a i N a s i o n a l  2 Indonesia  as modern p o l i t i c a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s . O c c a s i o n a l l y ,  such o r g a n i z a t i o n s appeared  about to become mass p a r t i e s ,  o n l y to have the masses disappear with government oppos i t i o n and e x i l e o f the pri.la.ji p a r t y l e a d e r s . it  Today  seems t h a t any mass f o l l o w i n g of these y o u t h f u l  o r g a n i z a t i o n s can be e x p l a i n e d i n terms of Javanese m e s s i a n i c e x p e c t a t i o n s of a Eatu A d i l or J u s t P r i n c e of 3  Deliverance.  D e s p i t e the ominous forebodings r a i s e d by  the Communist u p r i s i n g s of 1926-27 and the tremendous economic d e c l i n e of the I n d i e s d u r i n g the Great  Depression,  there were no outward s i g n s of a d e c l i n e i n the Dutch p o s i t i o n a t the time of the Japanese i n v a s i o n s  the mass  of the p o p u l a t i o n remained p a s s i v e . During the Japanese occupation, the I n d i e s were d i v i d e d i n t o three separate r e g i o n s |  Sumatra was  ruled  a l o n g w i t h Malaya by a d i v i s i o n o f the Japanese army, Java from B a t a v i a a l s o by the army and E a s t e r n Indonesia from Makassar by the navy.  The governing  policies  d i f f e r e d w i d e l y , and only i n Java were the masses o r g a n i z e d , m o b i l i z e d and t o some extent t r a i n e d i n m i l i t a r y  matters.  Sukarno and other n a t i o n a l i s t l e a d e r s were brought  back  from e x i l e to l e a d mass o r g a n i z a t i o n s .  shortage  Due  to the  of Japanese a d m i n i s t r a t i v e p e r s o n n e l , l a r g e numbers of  - 46 prl.1a.3l bureaucrats attained high posts previously reserved f o r Dutch nationals.  The Japanese, however,  chose to play a "divide and r u l e " game between the n a t i o n a l i s t s and the emerging Islamic e l i t e ; 4  inevitably,  the gap between the two continued to widen. The War f o r National Independence;"* Although a hesitant Sukarno declared Indonesia Independent on August 17» 1945* i t was to take four years of f i g h t i n g before the Dutch were to recognize i t as a fact.  The i n i t i a l bursts of f i g h t i n g were spontaneous  and occurred throughout Java and to a l e s s e r extent Sumatra l a r g e l y out of the control of the prl.1a.1l e l i t e that had declared independence.  In some areas s o c i a l as well as  p o l i t i c a l revolution took place.  The masses of Indonesia  who f o r so long had been passive and subjugated rose to the c a l l of " r e v o l u s l " or revolution.  The most obvious  symbols of feudalism were destroyed as Sultans were dethroned and i n some cases k i l l e d . Gradually, the s i t u a t i o n was controlled by the conservative prl.1a.1i-led central government, and the elements favoring s o c i a l revolution were i s o l a t e d and then destroyed.  While the most obvious symbols of Dutch  colonialism were destroyed, by and large, the lower prl.1a.1l simply moved up a few steps to the top of the administrative hierarchy and continued a conservative negotiation-oriented  - 47 p o l i c y toward the A l l i e s and then the Dutch.  Despite Tan  Malaka's revolt and the communist-led Madiun A f f a i r plus some opposition from the army and PNI, conservatives w i l l i n g to make concessions  to the Dutch were able, a l b e i t  somewhat precariously, to maintain t h e i r grip on central power. During this period could be seen the f i r s t signs 7  of a s p l i t between the m i l i t a r y and c i v i l i a n e l i t e , ' although f o r our purposes i t could best be interpreted as a s p l i t between the bearers of Javanism and the bearers of the Islamic-entrepreneurial p o l i t i c a l culture. B a s i c a l l y , the Javanese dominated army and PNI were l i n e d up against the Mas.lumi and PSI over negotiation and g m i l i t a r y strategy. The f i n a l phase of Dutch opposition to the creation of an independent Indonesia 9 b e l l i g e r e n t Republic,  consisted of i s o l a t i n g the  whose strength was on the i n t e r i o r  of Central and East Java plus several i n t e r i o r areas of Sumatra, i n a large number of member states of a federal organization known as the BFO.  Many members of the  t r a d i t i o n a l Outer Island's e l i t e who were more a f r a i d of "Javanese imperialism" than the Dutch cooperated with the BFO. In December 1949 the United States of Indonesia formed.  was  The Dutch, i n the l a s t round of negotiations, had  - 48 i n s i s t e d on a f e d e r a l form of c o n s t i t u t i o n f o r the  new  n a t i o n as a c o n d i t i o n f o r t h e i r r e c o g n i t i o n of Independence. So,  the Republic  the new was  became j u s t one  f e d e r a l l y organized  of the 16 member s t a t e s  country.  While, i n f a c t ,  of  this  probably the best s t r u c t u r e f o r such a d i v e r s e a r c h i -  pelago and  to guarantee the containment o f "Javanese  imperialism",  i t was  a l s o a s t r u c t u r e designed t o p r o t e c t  the i n t e r e s t s of the Dutch. continued  So r e p u l s i v e was  the i d e a  of  Dutch i n f l u e n c e to the n a t i o n a l i s t s t h a t a l l  persons s u p p o r t i n g  the f e d e r a l i s t form were branded as  " f e u d a l , c o l o n i a l i s t s , compradores."  A l l n a t i o n a l i s t s , be  they Javanese or non-Javanese, were f o r c e d to outwardly support the i d e a of a u n i t a r y r e p u b l i c , r e g a r d l e s s i n n e r f e e l i n g s about the matter.  Within  of Indonesia i n August  their  s i x months the  f e d e r a l s t r u c t u r e c o l l a p s e d to be r e p l a c e d by Republic  of  the  unitary  1950.  In summary, the decade of Japanese occupation  and  " r e v o l u t i o n " ended w i t h the c r e a t i o n of a u n i t a r y n a t i o n a l s t a t e composed of the e n t i r e former Dutch E a s t I n d i e s West New  Guinea.  r e v o l u t i o n had  However, the brunt of occupation  been borne by Java,  The  except  and  Javanese and  the  heartland  o f Javanese c u l t u r e became f a r more m o b i l i z e d ,  organized  and  n a t i o n a l l y conscious than any  o f the p o p u l a t i o n .  The  o f the Outer I s l a n d s had  other  f e u d a l and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e been destroyed,  segment elites  d i s c r e d i t e d or  -  H-9  -  i s o l a t e d by the so-called s o c i a l revolutions i n North Sumatra and A t j e h the  1 0  and p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the BFO. 11  t r a d i t i o n a l e l i t e v i r t u a l l y incapacitated,  With the only  representatives of Outer Island culture remaining with influence were associated with " p u r i s t " or "modernist" Islam, an ancient enemy of Javanism;  this was to prove  fatal. Constitutional Democracy: The state of Indonesia existed i n name, but objectively, i n 1950, there was l i t t l e more.  There was  no all-Indonesia culture, society or p o l i t i c a l system. The only r e a l bonds of unity were the shared experiences of  the n a t i o n a l i s t e l i t e i n t h e i r opposition to c o l o n i a l  rule.  The e l i t e had a set of symbols:  a motto, a f l a g ,  an anthem and a "national" language which most found d i f f i culty expressing themselves i n . The mass of society was hardly i n any way attached to these symbols. L i t t l e thought, planning or action could be given to the at the  above problems, however, because of the chaos e x i s t i n g independence and the series of crises that engulfed Republic during the next decade.  independence, the separatist RMS  Almost immediately a f t e r  (Republic of South Moluccas)  r e b e l l i o n broke out and was quickly followed by Darul Islam (Islamic state) g u e r i l l a operations i n South Sulawesi, Atjeh 12 and West Java. Thus, Islam became associated with r e v o l t ,  - 50 r e b e l l i o n and  disunity;  -  the r e v o l t s had  to be crushed by  force. C r e d i t must be given to the n a t i o n a l i s t e l i t e t h e i r i n i t i a l e f f o r t s and to c r e a t e a new  idealism.  national p o l i t i c a l  for  They probably wished c u l t u r e that would  be  unique and  d i s t i n c t from a l l of the v a r i o u s n a t i o n a l sub-  cultures.  They c e r t a i n l y overestimated t h e i r own  o p e r a t i n g under the u n i t a r y and created  i n 1950*  parliamentary  parliamentary  unity  structure  In the l o n g run investments i n the  system's i n f r a s t r u c t u r e and  p o l i t i c a l game under them c o u l d have had  operation  of  the  powerful e f f e c t s  on the development of a t t i t u d e s f o r a t r u l y n a t i o n a l political  culture;  negatively.  Por  battlegrounds  i n a sense, they d i d but  these new  i n s t i t u t i o n s q u i c k l y became  f o r the s o c i e t y ' s d i f f e r i n g  cultures i n quite a l i t e r a l The  mostly  political  sense.  v a r i o u s a l i r a n or s o c i a l f o r c e s whose i d e o l o g i e s  were to a l a r g e extent mutually e x c l u s i v e became i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d i n the p a r t y  system.  The  f u n c t i o n i n g of  the  system seemed only to b r i n g out the extremes i n each aliran.  A l l o f the h o r r o r s  so w e l l d e s c r i b e d  i n Huntington's 13  model of the p r a e t o r i a n s o c i e t y came true i n I n d o n e s i a .  J  These s t r u g g l e s coupled w i t h a great d e a l of s e l f - i n t e r e s t and  r e a l economic grievances  t e n d e n c i e s with the  began to take on c e n t r i f u g a l  f l a r i n g up of r e g i o n a l m i l i t a r y coups  - 51 in  -  I956-57 and the advent o f c i v i l war i n 1958.  the problem s i m p l i s t i c a l l y , t h e r e were no  To s t a t e  underlying  n a t i o n a l u n i t y f a c t o r s t h a t c o u l d n e u t r a l i z e the  fissi-  parous t e n d e n c i e s a l l o w e d and even encouraged by  the  newly adopted system. The p a r l i a m e n t a r y p r o c e s s , b e f o r e the e l e c t i o n s of 1955» w i t n e s s e d  the d i v i s i o n o f the a l l r a n i n t o  broad c o a l i t i o n s .  two  The J a v a based p a r t i e s r e p e a t e d l y  a l l i e d t o d e f e a t or o b s t r u c t a c t i o n d e s i r e d by the Mas.luml and PSI whose l e a d e r s were e i t h e r v e r y o r "modernist*' Muslims. the PNI and  The  country's  Western-oriented two l a r g e s t p a r t i e s ,  the Mas.jumi, g r a d u a l l y began t o be  estranged 14  and c o u l d n o t c o o p e r a t e on even the s i m p l e s t of programs. The  1955  e l e c t i o n s r e - a f f i r m e d t h a t the PNI  Mas.luml were indeed the n a t i o n ' s l a r g e s t p a r t i e s ; they c o n t r o l l e d 114 of the 256 one and  together  seats.  o n l y p a r l i a m e n t a r y c a b i n e t formed a f t e r  e l e c t i o n s was The  parliamentary  and  The  the  a c o a l i t i o n between the Mas.jumi, PNI and  PKI r e f u s e d t o p l a y the r o l e o f opponent to the  c a b i n e t or I t s t o t a l p o l i c y .  NU.  full  Whenever the c o a l i t i o n  should  have been c o n s t r a i n e d because the Mas.jumi o b j e c t e d t o and NU p r o p o s a l s , i t was  not;  the PNI knew i t c o u l d  c o u n t on the PKI's support and v o t e s on the floor.  PNI  parliament  Because of t h i s problem and o t h e r s i m i l a r ones,  the Mas.jumi m i n i s t e r s r e s i g n e d from the c a b i n e t .  Shortly  a f t e r w a r d the m i n o r i t y c a b i n e t d e c l a r e d the n a t i o n under  - 52 m a r t i a l law and r e s i g n e d . C o i n c i d i n g w i t h these p a r l i a m e n t a r y developments, s e v e r a l Outer I s l a n d m i l i t a r y commanders r e v o l t e d and made coup d ' e t a t unable  i n t h e i r command r e g i o n s .  The  c a b i n e t proved  to c o n t r o l the m i l i t a r y or the s i t u a t i o n .  This  coupled with the r e s i g n a t i o n of the V i c e P r e s i d e n t , a Sumatran, and the f l i g h t of top members of the PSI  and  Mas.lumi to Sumatra, l e d to the d e c l a r a t i o n of m a r t i a l law. The r e g i o n a l d i s s i d e n t s then demanded g r e a t e r autonomy and  the r e s t o r a t i o n o f government under the l e a d e r s h i p of  former V i c e P r e s i d e n t H a t t a .  With the d e n i a l o f these  r e q u e s t s a r e b e l government was Sumatra, and c i v i l war Java was  s e t up i n Padang, West  ensued.  almost denuded of troops as the  I s l a n d s were invaded and occupied.  The  Outer  c i v i l war  was  e f f e c t i v e l y over i n three or f o u r months although the l a s t  ,  15  groups of r e b e l s d i d not s u r r e n d e r u n t i l 1961.  Party  p o l i t i c s were banned i n the army occupied a r e a s , and m a r t i a l law, regions.  the m i l i t a r y became the v i r t u a l r u l e r s i n the  Sukarno appointed a government t h a t was  r e s p o n s i b l e to the p a r l i a m e n t , and experiment  with  suddenly,  w i t h Western-style democracy was  not  Indonesia's over.  With the C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Assembly deadlocked  between  I s l a m i c elements and Javanese p l u s C h r i s t i a n s over the r e t u r n to  the 1945  C o n s t i t u t i o n and P r e s i d e n t i a l r u l e , Sukarno  - 53 simply d e c l a r e d c i v i l war  and  the r e t u r n h i m s e l f .  In the process of  the r e t u r n to the 19^5  e l i t e were d i s c r e d i t e d and  p o l i t i c a l and the Javanese.  p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y  o s t r a c i z e d from c e n t r a l  Suddenly, through a l o n g and the overwhelming m a j o r i t y  politics.  involved h i s t o r i c a l process,  of the  "legitimate" national  m i l i t a r y e l i t e were from one The  (UUD45),  Constitution  l a r g e numbers o f the Outer I s l a n d ' s  the  e t h n i c group,  UUD4-5, o r i g i n a l l y w r i t t e n by a committee  o f mostly Javanese, could then be more e a s i l y adopted. As Ben  Anderson put i t , the UUD45 was  comfortable f o r the Javanese  much more c u l t u r a l l y  elite. 17  The  c i v i l war  was  not a s e p a r a t i s t attempt.  members of the Indonesian p o l i t i c a l  e l i t e who  The  participated  i n i t never questioned the u n i t y of the Indonesian s t a t e . They were simply t r y i n g to r i g h t the balance between the Outer I s l a n d s and win  by  t h r e a t s and  J a v a , or, i n o t h e r words, attempting f o r c e what they had  b a t t l e a t the c e n t e r . day  Compromise was  f o r the m i l i t a r y and  i n 1958.  l o s t i n the not  With the m i l i t a r y defeat  of the r e v o l t s  and troops,  f r o n t o f the r e v o l t s c o l l a p s e d a l s o ,  simply r e i n f o r c e d the Javanese p o l i t i c a l v i c t o r y a t center. and  With the banning of the Masjumi and  the c o n t i n u a t i o n  confirmed.  of m a r t i a l law,  PSI  the  parties  o c c u p a t i o n of the Outer I s l a n d s by l o y a l Javanese the p o l i t i c a l  political  the order of  the Javanese p o l i t i c a l  to  and the  i n i960  the "takeover"  was  - 54 The basis of a new Indonesian culture and p o l i t i c a l system was to be Javanese and assuredly non-Islamic(purist). Those who disagreed were not allowed to p a r t i c i p a t e i n the system, i n the p o l i t i c a l game, a game that i n r e a l i t y was to be played mostly by Javanese and Javanized actors. I f there were a continued struggle for ultimate v i c t o r y , i t was  only to see which of the variants of Javanism was to  win. I t must be admitted  that the p o l i t i c a l events of  the 1950's were very complex.  Certainly, the struggle  was not consciously viewed by many of the p a r t i c i p a n t s as either a c u l t u r a l or ethnic b a t t l e .  However, the r e s u l t s  should be clear from the above arguments.  Perhaps there  was not another a l t e r n a t i v e , given the legacies of colonialism, within the confines of a single state, but one would never r e a l i z e i t from the length or the i n t e n s i t y of the struggle.  Daniel S. Lev has summed up the s i t u a t i o n  well i n these words s ... the Java-Outer Islands problem comprised a complicated combination of s o c i a l and c u l t u r a l , as well as p o l i t i c a l and economic h o s t i l i t i e s . These h o s t i l i t i e s might best be summed up as the test of Java's r e a l and inevitable domination of the archipelago. Javanese dominance rested on superior numbers, a more elaborate culture and the disunity of the other Indonesian ethnic groups. The Javanese e l i t e saw i n independence an opportunity, as i t were, to f u l f i l l the ambitions and promises of Javanese c i v i l i z a t i o n i n the new national state, while the smaller and more p a r t i c u l a r i s t i c societies of the rest of Indonesia recoiled before the v i s i o n of their eventual subordination or a s s i m i l a t i o n i n a Javanese dominated nation. "  - 55 Guided Democracy; M a r t i a l law and the r e t u r n t o the UUD45 l e g i t i m i z e d the  dominance o f Sukarno and the army over the p o l i t i c a l  system. the  Along w i t h the PKI whom Sukarno used t o o f f s e t  s t r e n g t h o f the m i l i t a r y , the major p o l i t i c a l  actors  (Sukarno and the army) were s t r o n g r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f Javanism.  While Sukarno was too much o f a p o l i t i c a l  m a n i p u l a t o r t o exclude Outer I s l a n d e r s from h i s government, t h e i r numbers d i d decrease, and those p r e s e n t appeared t o be l i t t l e  more than symbols  o r t o o l s f o r Sukarno's  mani-  19  pulations of p o l i t i c s .  I t must be admitted, however,  t h a t n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s became more and more focused upon Sukarno h i m s e l f . little  The Javanese dominated p a r t i e s p l a y e d  r o l e In d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g .  A p o l i t i c i a n ' s power  depended on h i s c l o s e n e s s t o the P r e s i d e n t r a t h e r than on what p a r t y , o r g a n i z a t i o n o r e t h n i c group he r e p r e s e n t e d . Under Guided Democracy, "the s u p r a - l o c a l p o l i t y , the of  national state,  (shrunk) more and more t o the l i m i t s  i t s t r a d i t i o n a l domain, the c a p i t a l  city-Djakarta-plus  a number o f semi-independent t r i b u t a r y c i t i e s and towns h e l d t o a minimal l o y a l t y by the t h r e a t o f c e n t r a l l y 20 applied force."  With the c o l l a p s e o f the n a t i o n a l  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n system and the economy i n g e n e r a l a f t e r 1958,  the r e g i o n s , e s p e c i a l l y those o u t s i d e o f J a v a ,  became i s o l a t e d from the n a t i o n a l p o l i t y .  The " v i c t o r y "  - 56 of the Javanese was bearable because of the lack of actual control by the Javanese-dominated center. The conclusion of the i n i t i a l phase of struggle f o r control of national power had ended with the Javanese i n a dominant p o s i t i o n but that did not mean an end to the p o l i t i c a l struggle i n Indonesia though there were no e l e c t i o n s .  or an end to mass p o l i t i c s , The national state was  just as f r a g i l e as at independence, and even i f the Outer Island problem had been settled, there was no guarantee that problems of a s i m i l a r nature might not a r i s e again. itself.  Besides, even "mother" Java?was divided among As Ted Smith put i t , Sukarno had to make concrete 21  investments i n s o l i d a r i t y , legitimacy and  stability.  After making such investments, and they were a continuous process, there was l i t t l e c a p i t a l of any kind l e f t for investment i n economically  productive schemes.  With the  continuing decline i n national welfare, the struggle for p o s i t i o n and scarce resources grew even more intense, but the Outer Islands and "modernist" Islam were i n no p o s i t i o n to a c t i v e l y p a r t i c i p a t e i n that struggle? a completely  Javanese  i t was  nearly  one.  "Most (Indonesian) parties s u f f e r i n varying degrees from the tension of being i d e o l o g i c a l l y on the 22  l e f t but s o c i a l l y on the r i g h t . "  This gap grew noticeably  wider during Guided Democracy and the President was  as  - 57 " g u i l t y " of i t as the p a r t i e s . were o f the p e r i o d r h e t o r i c and  While Indonesian p o l i t i c s  /._'. awash on a f l o o d of r e v o l u t i o n a r y s l o g a n e e r i n g , a c t u a l government p o l i c y  v e r y c o n s e r v a t i v e , even s t a t u s quo-oriented.  was  Beneath the  r h e t o r i c , the c o n f l i c t narrowed i n t o i n c r e a s i n g t e n s i o n s between the r a d i c a l s of the PKI and and  the c o n s e r v a t i v e s of Islam and  as the m i l i t a r y . two, and  i n c r e a s i n g l y , the  PNI  the r u r a l areas as w e l l  At the c e n t e r Sukarno c o u l d balance  but open c l a s h e s i n the c o u n t r y s i d e over l a n d  the  reform  s q u a t t e r ' s r i g h t s r e v e a l e d a s t r u g g l e much l e s s  controllable.  By l a t e 1964  and  l o n g e r appeared a b l e to balance  e a r l y I965 Sukarno no the opposing f o r c e s  and  i n c r e a s i n g l y tended to s i d e with the r a d i c a l f o r c e s , a t least verbally. At t h i s p o i n t the r a d i c a l s seem to have aimed a very s m a l l amount o f v i o l e n c e a t t h e i r foremost r i v a l s , the m i l i t a r y , hoping to thereby balance  conservative  s h i f t the c e n t r a l  of power d e c i d e d l y i n t h e i r d i r e c t i o n and  speed up  23 a r a d i c a l takeover a dramatic  s h i f t o f power but,  wrong d i r e c t i o n . Islam and  of the government.  time i n a decade or more,  s e c t i o n s of the Javanese e l i t e worked  civilian elite  The m i l i t a r y , the  (bureaucracy),  indeed  f o r the i n s t i g a t o r s , i n the  For the f i r s t  or at l e a s t , i n p a r a l l e l .  and  There was  together  conservative  the non-communist  the I s l a m i c masses combined i n an i n f o r m a l  intellectuals coalition  - 58 24  t h a t d e s t r o y e d the r a d i c a l s .  The PKI and e v e n t u a l l y ,  Sukarno were removed from the p o l i t i c a l The New  spectrum.  Orders With the o u t s i d e or o p p o s i t i o n p r e s s u r e s removed  t h a t had c r e a t e d the c o a l i t i o n i n the f i r s t p l a c e , the s o - c a l l e d New  Order c o a l i t i o n began to c o l l a p s e .  students, i n i t i a l l y ,  The  and then the "modernist" Muslims  were i s o l a t e d from power by the m i l i t a r y .  The  military  s l o w l y i s o l a t e d i t s own elements t h a t had sympathy w i t h or  supported these two groups.  The r u l i n g  coalition  became a group of Javanese g e n e r a l s a l l i e d w i t h c i v i l i a n t e c h n o c r a t s , a l s o l e d by Javanese.  The momentary glimpses  of p o l i t i c a l power f o r non-Javanese  were r e p l a c e d by  promises of a f a i r e r d i v i s i o n o f n a t i o n a l wealth. D e s p i t e the m o d e r n i z a t i o n and development the  m i l i t a r y - l e d New  larly  i d e o l o g y of  Order, Outer I s l a n d e r s and p a r t i c u -  "modernist" Muslims were not a l l o w e d p o l i t i c a l  i n f l u e n c e and i n some cases, not even room f o r p o l i t i c a l maneuver.  The New  Javanese-dominated In  Order d r i f t e d i n t o a  "centrist"  regime.  summary, i t can be h i s t o r i c a l l y argued t h a t  independence has witnessed a process of J a v a n i z a t i o n i n Indonesia.  Only b r i e f emergencies d u r i n g the r e v o l u t i o n  and a f t e r the I965 coup attempt, known as the G-30-S, have Outer I s l a n d e r s p l a y e d dominant  or equal r o l e s w i t h  - 59 the Javanese.  I t does seem p l a u s i b l e t h a t the game o f  Indonesian p o l i t i c s can o n l y be p l a y e d by those elements w i l l i n g t o subordinate themselves p r e v i o u s attempts  to Javanism.  All  to p a r t i c i p a t e i n p o l i t i c s i n o t h e r  than Javanese terms have l e d to f a i l u r e and  eventual  i s o l a t i o n and d e s t r u c t i o n . A s s i m i l a t i o n to Javanism i s a f a c t of l i f e t h a t a l l Indonesians The  must f a c e .  Current P o l i t i c a l , M i l i t a r y and Governmental E l i t e I f indeed any of the p r e v i o u s h i s t o r i c a l arguments  have any v a l i d i t y , one would expect t h a t Javanese and, r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the J a v a n e s e - a r i s t o c r a t i c  political  c u l t u r e would be v e r y numerous, even dominant, i n the key governmental and e l i t e p o s i t i o n s . seem to be the case.  T h i s , i n f a c t , does  The Javanese h o l d governmental  p o s i t i o n s to be of very h i g h s t a t u s v a l u e ; the e n t i r e bureaucracy  consequently,  has very l a r g e numbers of Javanese  25 in i t .  For the purposes  of n a t i o n a l u n i t y t h i s dominance  has never been w i d e l y p u b l i c i z e d and no exact f i g u r e s are a v a i l a b l e on the s u b j e c t .  Estimates made by some Indo-  n e s i a n sources have put the f i g u r e as h i g h as 90$ of the  26 total w h i l e a I 9 7 I review of the 207 top o f f i c e h o l d e r s i n the c e n t r a l bureaucracy by Ted Smith r e v e a l e d t h a t 71$ 27 o f them were e t h n i c Javanese. c o n c e r n i n g 154  T h i s author's  calculations  of the same p o s i t i o n s r e v e a l e d t h a t 64$  the t o t a l were Javanese.  However, by r e v i e w i n g the top  of  -  positions  28  60  -  i n the major M i n i s t r i e s o f I n t e r i o r , F o r e i g n  A f f a i r s , J u s t i c e , Information, Industry, Communications, P u b l i c Works and p e r c e n t a g e had  to 73$.  increased  Trade, A g r i c u l t u r e ,  H e a l t h showed t h a t Further,  i f only  e x t r e m e l y i m p o r t a n t c o n t r o l m i n i s t e r i e s of F i n a n c e , Communications and f i g u r e i s 84$.  Not  the  Interior,  Information are included  o n l y a r e the top o f f i c i a l s  Javanese but they a r e  the  the  ethnic  s t r o n g l y upper c l a s s ( o r p r i j a j l . )  i n s o c i a l background. A g l a n c e a t the r e c o n s t i t u t e d K a b i n e t Pembangunan o r Development C a b i n e t r e v e a l s t h a t o n l y 13 m i n i s t e r s a r e Javanese w h i l e Sumatrans and  2 are  o f the  3 a r e Sundanese, 4  from E a s t e r n I n d o n e s i a .  23  are  Thus 57$  of  the c a b i n e t a r e e t h n i c J a v a n e s e , but the i m p o r t a n t f a c t i s t h a t C h r i s t i a n s a r e o v e r - r e p r e s e n t e d i n the (3 out of 10)  and  the I s l a m i c p o l i t i c a l  u n d e r - r e p r e s e n t e d ( o n l y 2 and  remainder  culture i s vastly  perhaps 3 o f the M i n i s t e r s 29  c o u l d p o s s i b l y be c o n s i d e r e d s a n t r i M u s l i m s ) . The  major s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l f o r c e , a s i d e  from  the  c i v i l i a n bureaucracy, i n c e n t r a l Indonesian p o l i t i c s i s the m i l i t a r y which h i s t o r i c a l l y has  Javanese o r i g i n s  cultural influences.  The  national organization 30  i n the c o u n t r y , and  is.  army c l a i m s  Its original territorial  r e g i o n a l i n c o n t e n t and  and  t o be the most t r u l y i t probably  o r g a n i z a t i o n was  very  i t s a c t u a l w o r k i n g s were h i g h l y  r e f l e c t i v e of the c e n t e r - o u t e r p r o v i n c e s and  over-seas  - 61 t e r r i t o r i e s r e l a t i o n s h i p s d e s c r i b e d f o r L a t e r Mataram.  31  Each major r e g i o n had i t s own t r o o p s and command s t r u c t u r e ; i n the 1950's i t was v e r y d i f f i c u l t f o r t h e c e n t e r t o a p p o i n t n o n - n a t i v e s o f the r e g i o n s as t h e Panglima o r r e g i o n a l commander. organized.  The m i l i t a r y was de f a c t o f e d e r a l l y  The c o l l a p s e o f t h e r e g i o n a l r e v o l t s and t h e  Javanese o c c u p a t i o n was t h e b e g i n n i n g a s e t up, however.  o f t h e end o f such  T h i s type o f o r g a n i z a t i o n was seen a s  a l l o w i n g t h e army t o be i n f i l t r a t e d and used by p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s , e s p e c i a l l y the P K I , a s w e l l a s t h r e a t e n i n g the u n i t y of the s t a t e .  The m i l i t a r y t h e n has c o n s t a n t l y been  t r y i n g to strengthen  i t s own o r g a n i z a t i o n s i n c e independence  and  the p r o c e s s has gone r a p i d l y ahead s i n c e t h e d i s p o s a l  o f i t s two major "enemies", t h e PKI and P r e s i d e n t Sukarno, 32 d u r i n g the I965-67 p e r i o d .  This u n i f y i n g process  coupled  w i t h the r e v o l t s , t h e G-30-S, and subsequent i n t r a - m l l l t a r y c o n f l i c t s have succeeded i n r e d u c i n g  the " n a t i o n a l - n e s s "  o f t h e m i l i t a r y , a t l e a s t i n an e t h n i c sense.  With t h e  d e c l i n e of the S i l i w a n g i D i v i s i o n ' s i n f l u e n c e i n c e n t r a l 33 military circles, the m i l i t a r y has d r i f t e d more and more towards a Javanese p o l e . Polomka e s t i m a t e s t h a t f u l l y 75$ o f t h e o f f i c e r 34 J  corps i s Javanese. 62$  As o f October I965 Javanese h e l d  o f t h e c e n t r a l and r e g i o n a l command p o s t s ;  1967 the f i g u r e was 65$;  by A p r i l  as o f A p r i l I969 i t was 72$ and  - 62 i n October 1970  i t was  fully  80$.  3 5  H i n d l e y has noted that i t i s extremely r a r e f o r a member of the o f f i c e r corps t o come from e i t h e r the lower . c l a s s e s o r from the s a n t r i a l i r a n  (Islamic-entrepreneurial  16  political elite  culture).  In her study o f the contemporary  s t r u c t u r e and f a c t i o n a l i s m i n Indonesia, Ann  noted t h a t 7 o f the 20 l e a d e r s o f the e t h n i c  Gregory  Javanese  Diponegoro D i v i s i o n ( a l s o Suharto's former d i v i s i o n ) interviewed  were connected through k i n s h i p to one o f the  f o u r Javanese p a l a c e s and t h a t 29 o f the 39 l e a d e r s  inter-  viewed from the army's major d i v i s i o n s ( S i l i w a n g i , Diponegoro and B r a w l d j a j a ) were from gentry o r n o b i l i t y c l a s s e s w h i l e only 2 had merchant s o c i a l backgrounds  and  37 none had peasant backgrounds.  V i r t u a l l y the same  g e n e r a l i z a t i o n can be made about the m i l i t a r y as about the c i v i l i a n bureaucracys  the Javanese and C h r i s t i a n s  are o v e r - r e p r e s e n t e d w h i l e the s a n t r i a l i r a n i s v a s t l y under-represented, As p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s have become l e s s and l e s s important i n decision-making and the f u n c t i o n i n g o f government s i n c e the r e g i o n a l r e b e l l i o n s of the l a t e 1950's, there i s l i t t l e p o i n t i n g i v i n g d e t a i l e d e t h n i c d a t a on their central leadership structures. are appropriate, pointed  however.  The 1955  Some g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s elections clearly  out t h a t the c o n s t i t u e n c i e s o f the p a r t i e s were to  - 63 a l a r g e extent r e g i o n a l i z e d w i t h the NU, PKI,  each having  and  the  t h e i r g r e a t e s t s t r e n g t h i n Java w h i l e  Mas.luml s g r e a t e s t s t r e n g t h was 8  The NU  the PNI  i s a s a n t r i p a r t y and  the  i n the Outer I s l a n d s .  gained  some Outer I s l a n d  and  I s l a m i c "modernist" supporters  by d e f a u l t with the banning  o f the Mas.luml.  the NU remained dominated  Nevertheless,  by Javanese l e a d e r s .  Most "modernist" Muslims hoped t h a t  the c r e a t i o n of a new  s a n t r i p a r t y i n I968 would g i v e a  p l a c e i n the p o l i t i c a l  c o n s t e l l a t i o n to the same a l l r a n  t h a t the Mas.jumi had r e p r e s e n t e d .  C l e a r l y t h i s was  i n t e n t i o n o f a l a r g e p a r t of the PMI but the m i l i t a r y was an occurrence.  The  the  or Parmusl l e a d e r s h i p  not w i l l i n g to f u l l y s a n c t i o n such i n i t i a l chairman of the p a r t y  was  Javanese but a m a j o r i t y o f the c e n t r a l l e a d e r s h i p was 38 Javanese.  Had  c o n f l i c t and  o u t s i d e i n t e r v e n t i o n , i t probably  provided  the p a r t y not been p a r a l y z e d by  non-  internal  would have  "modernist" Muslims, e s p e c i a l l y Outer I s l a n d e r s  with a p o l i t i c a l  o u t l e t and done very w e l l i n the  I97I  39 elections. The PNI s t i l l has a s t r o n g Javanese image and s e c t i o n s of the c i v i l i a n bureaucracy s t i l l have  40  i n c l i n a t i o n s towards i t . On the s u r f a c e , a t l e a s t , the s u c c e s s o r  to the  p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s has been the army sponsored F u n c t i o n a l Groups (Golongan Karya or Golkar) which holds an  over-  whelming m a j o r i t y of seats i n the p a r l i a m e n t and  i s somewhat  - 64 more r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f the a c t u a l power c o n s t e l l a t i o n i n the  c o u n t r y a t p r e s e n t than a r e the p o l i t i c a l  parties.  Of the c e n t r a l s t r u c t u r e i n c l u d i n g the Dewan Pembina o r A d v i s o r y C o u n c i l and the Dewan Pimplnan o r L e a d e r s h i p C o u n c i l h a v i n g 34 members, 25 o r 74$ a r e Javanese w h i l e 41 f i v e o f the remainder a r e non-Javanese  Christians.  G o l k a r w h i c h i s i t s e l f i n and o f the b u r e a u c r a c y o r s t a t e a p p a r a t u s , b o t h c i v i l i a n and m i l i t a r y , o n l y r e f l e c t s the d a t a p r e s e n t e d above on i t .  The  Islamic-entrepreneurial  p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e i s under-represented. I n c o n s i d e r i n g the above s t a t i s t i c s and  generali-  z a t i o n s , i t must be remembered t h a t i t i s the c e n t r a l government o r b u r e a u c r a c y t h a t i s under  consideration.  As Smith p o i n t s out government i n the r e g i o n s below I I w h i c h i n c l u d e s the Kabupaten  Level  (Regency), Ket,jamatan  ( D i s t r i c t ) and K e l u r a h a n ( V i l l a g e ) l e v e l s i s l a r g e l y i n 42 the  hands o f l o c a l i n h a b i t a n t s .  There a r e 26  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e regions or p r o v i n c e s i n Indonesia, of w h i c h o n l y 3 a r e e t h n i c a l l y Javanese.  There a r e  17  m i l i t a r y r e g i o n s i n the c o u n t r y and o n l y 2 a r e e t h n i c a l l y Javanese.  Y e t 8 o f the 26 Governors  (head o f the P r o v i n c e  l e v e l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ) a r e Javanese and 12 o f the  17 43  r e g i o n a l m i l i t a r y commanders a r e e t h n i c J a v a n e s e . ^ These p o s i t i o n s a r e a p p o i n t e d by the Javanese c e n t r a l government.  dominated  O b v i o u s l y , p r o v i n c i a l government i s  - 65 not a p r o v i n c i a l a f f a i r , a t l e a s t e t h n i c a l l y and perhaps c u l t u r a l l y as w e l l . The above data points out a trend that has been noted before i n post-independence  Indonesia;  there i s  a d i v i s i o n of labor i n the small non-agricultural sector of the country among ethnic groups (and p o l i t i c a l cultures?). The Javanese and the Christian minority have dominated the bureaucracy and m i l i t a r y while the representatives of the Islamic-entrepreneurial p o l i t i c a l culture (especially Minangkabaus, Muslim Bataks and Bugis) along with the Chinese have been clustered i n commerce.  Javanese are  seldom found i n commerce with the exception of f i e l d s i n which "governmental" connections are very important, such as brokerage and importing.  The opposite seems to be  true f o r representatives of the santri a l i r a n ; they are seldom found outside of the Ministry of Religion i f they are i n the government.  I  ~ 66 NOTES on Chapter I I 1  The Minangkabau area on the West c o a s t of Sumatra around Padang c o u l d be c o n s i d e r e d another a r e a of Intense impact but f o r r a t h e r d i f f e r e n t reasons than the Medan a r e a . Padang was not a p l a n t a t i o n a r e a l i k e Medan. The areas of Ambon i n the Moluccas and Minahasa i n Northeast Sulawesi were a l s o s t r o n g l y a f f e c t e d by Dutch c o l o n i a l i s m f o r they were the f a b l e d "Spice I s l a n d s " that had brought the Dutch to the I n d i e s i n the f i r s t p l a c e . By the t u r n of t h i s century, however, these two areas were only "back-waters".  2 Budi Utomo or " B e a u t i f u l Endeavor" was a Javanese n a t i o n a l i s t o r g a n i z a t i o n ; Sarekat Islam i n i t i a l l y was a s a n t r i - l e d o r g a n i z a t i o n but l a t e r H.O.S. Tjokrominoto, a prl.1a.11. became i t s most famous l e a d e r ; both the PKI and PNI were f o r e r u n n e r s of the contemporaries of the same name.  3  Sukarno's p o p u l a r i t y among the Javanese masses has been i n t e r p r e t e d i n t h i s way In Bernard Dahm, Sukarno and the S t r u g g l e f o r Indonesian Independence (Ithacaj Cornell U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1969)» passim; and the p o p u l a r i t y of the Sarekat Islam Is i n t e r p r e t e d i n t h i s l i g h t i n Van N i e l , o p . c i t . , Chap. I I .  4  The Dutch had f o l l o w e d a s i m i l a r p o l i c y of s e p a r a t i n g the t r a d i t i o n a l and r e l i g i o u s e l i t e i n the Outer I s l a n d s . See Noer, o p . c i t . , passim. ^ Indonesians f o n d l y c a l l the 1945-50 p e r i o d the r e v o l u t i o n but i t more c l o s e l y f i t s with the d e f i n i t i o n o f a war f o r n a t i o n a l independence g i v e n i n Samuel Huntington, o p . c i t . , p.264. ^ On the Madiu.n A f f a i r see George Kahin, N a t i o n a l i s m and R e v o l u t i o n i n Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, Chap. V I I I . Ben Anderson, Java i n a Time of R e v o l u t i o n ( I t h a c a : C o r n e l l U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1972) d i s c u s s e s the 194546 p e r i o d i n d e t a i l and concludes that Tan Malaka was p u r p o s e l y made a scape-goat and h i s " p l o t " f a b r i c a t e d i n o r d e r to crush the " t r u e " r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s .  7  Anderson,  o p . c i t . , Chap. V I I .  8 Kahin, o p . c i t . , Chaps. VI and X and A.H. Nasution, TNI: Tentara N a s i o n a l Indonesia D . l l l l d I (TNI: The Indonesian N a t i o n a l Army) ( D j a k a r t a : S e r u l i n g Masa, 1 9 6 8 ) , passim.  - 67 o  -  The name used by the S u k a r n o - l e d I n d o n e s i a n government.  10  See K a h i n , o p . c i t . , p.1795 and R. W i l l i a m L i d d l e , E t h n i c i t y , P a r t y and N a t i o n a l I n t e g r a t i o n (New Haven; Y a l e U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1970) p.54, on the " s o c i a l r e v o l u t i o n s " i n Sumatra. 11 A c t u a l l y , o n e - h a l f o f the p a r l i a m e n t o f the u n i t a r y R e p u b l i c was made up o f former BFO p a r l i a m e n t a r i a n s . T h i s caused no s m a l l amount of i l l f e e l i n g on the p a r t of r a d i c a l n a t i o n a l i s t s who wanted t o be r i d o f a l l Dutch i n f l u e n c e . The "October 19, 1952 A f f a i r " i n which the army a s k e d Sukarno t o d i s b a n d the p a r l i a m e n t was a l l e g e d l y caused by this. See F e i t h , o p . c i t . , pp. 2 4 6 - 7 3 . 12 For d e t a i l s on a l l o f the r e v o l t s see Nugroho Notosuanto, S e d j a r a h and Hankam ( H i s t o r y and the Hankam) ( D j a k a r t a ; Lembaga S e d j a r a h Hankam, 1 9 6 8 ) , p p , 8 2 - 9 2 . 13 ^ F o r a d e f i n i t i o n o f a p r a e t o r i a n s o c i e t y see H u n t i n g t o n , o p . c i t . , p p 194-97„ 14 F o r an e x c e l l e n t a c c o u n t c o n c e n t r a t i n g on these p r e e l e c t i o n c o a l i t i o n s see H e r b e r t F e i t h , The Wilopo C a b i n e t : A Turning P o i n t i n Indonesian H i s t o r y (Ithaca: Cornell Modern I n d o n e s i a " P r o j e c t , 1958)V 0  15  For f u l l d e t a i l s on the c i v i l war see D a n i e l Lev and H e r b e r t F e i t h , "The End o f the I n d o n e s i a n R e b e l l i o n s " P a c i f i c A f f a i r s , 1963, XXXVI, No,l„ 16 Ben Anderson, "The Idea o f Power i n Javanese C u l t u r e " i n C a l i r e H o l t ( e d . ) , P o l i t i c s and C u l t u r e i n I n d o n e s i a . ( I t h a c a : C o r n e l l U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 7 2 ) , p.37. 17 For t h i s v i e w see Mohammed Nawawi, R e g i o n a l i s m and Regional C o n f l i c t i n Indonesia ( u n p u b l i s h e d Ph.D. d i s s e r t a t i o n , Princeton" U n i v e r s i t y , 1968). 18 Lev, o p . c i t , , p.3. 19 ^The number o f non-Javanese i n the c a b i n e t s o f Guided Democracy d e c r e a s e d by 10$ over the C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Democracy P e r i o d . A k i o Yasunaka, " B a s i c Data on I n d o n e s i a n P o l i t i c a l L e a d e r s " I n d o n e s i a , 1970, No.10. 20 21 Quoted i n L i d d l e , o p . c i t . , p.221. S m i t h , o p _ . c i t o , p„23«  -  68 -  22  D a n i e l S o Lev, " P o l i t i c a l P a r t i e s i n I n d o n e s i a " J o u r n a l o f S o u t h e a s t A s i a n H i s t o r y , 1 9 6 7 , V o l . 8 , N o . l , p.60. 2 3  For a l u c i d d i s c u s s i o n on t h i s p o i n t see Guy P a u k e r , "The Gestapu A f f a i r o f 1 9 6 5 ; R e f l e c t i o n s on t h e P o l i t i c s o f I n s t a b i l i t y i n I n d o n e s i a " , Southeast A s i a . 1971» Vols,. 1-2, N o . l . PL  On t h i s c o a l i t i o n see Don H i n d l e y , "The A l i r a n s and the F a l l o f t h e O l d Order", I n d o n e s i a , 1 9 7 0 , No.9. ^ I t s h o u l d be p o i n t e d o u t here t h a t membership i n t h e Javanese e t h n i c group c o u p l e d w i t h s o c i a l background I s t h e o n l y "proven" i n d i c a t o r o f membership i n t h e somewhat w i d e r group which I have c a l l e d " J a v a n i z e d " . The s o c i a l i z a t i o n o f members o f o t h e r e t h n i c groups i s more d i f f i c u l t t o p r o v i d e h a r d d a t a on. The C h r i s t i a n m i n o r i t y , i n my o p i n i o n , i s t h e most J a v a n i z e d o f any o f t h e o t h e r segments o f t h e society. 26 Smith, o p . c i t . , p.26. 27 ' I b i d . . p.39. 28 These p o s i t i o n s a r e d e f i n e d a s b e i n g M i n i s t e r , S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l , D i r e c t o r - G e n e r a l and I n s p e c t o r - G e n e r a l . The source used f o r the c a l c u l a t i o n s was O.G. Roeder, Who's Who i n I n d o n e s i a ( D j a k a r t a : Gunung Agung, 1 9 7 2 )  pp.  521-30.  29  F o r a l i s t o f t h e new c a b i n e t members and t h e i r backgrounds see Pedoman, September 1 0 , 1 9 7 1 . 30  For f u r t h e r comments on t h i s p o i n t see H a r s j a B a c h t i a r , "The L e g i t i m a c y o f t h e I n d o n e s i a n M i l i t a r y a s a N a t i o n a l I n s t i t u t i o n " i n K e j a k i n a n and Perdjuangan, ( D j a k a r t a . Gunung M u l i a , 1 9 7 2 ) . B a c h t i a r does n o t c o n s i d e r t h e i s o l a t i o n o f t h e S i l i w a n g i D i v i s i o n from power i n h i s a n a l y s i s which i s a tremendous drawback. 31 See t h e s e c t i o n o f Chapter I e n t i t l e d "Government a n d P o l i t i c s i n a Javanese P o l i t i c a l C u l t u r e ; L a t e r Mataram" for this discussion. 32 For an e x c e l l e n t d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e " t i g h t e n i n g up" p r o c e s s i n s i d e o f t h e m i l i t a r y see Ruth McVey, "The P o s t R e v o l u t i o n a r y T r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f t h e I n d o n e s i a n Army," I n d o n e s i a 1 9 7 1 - 7 2 , Nos. 11 and 1 3 .  - 69  -  33  ^The S i l i w a n g i whose r e g i o n a l area i s West Java has l o n g had the r e p u t a t i o n of being the most "national'* of a l l the army's d i v i s i o n s . Non-Sundanese have f r e q u e n t l y been Panglima or Commander of S i l i w a n g i while non-Javanese have never commanded the Diponegoro and B r a w i d j a j a D i v i s i o n s which are e t h n i c Javanese d i v i s i o n s . S i l i w a n g i was c l o s e l y a s s o c i a t e d with the s o - c a l l e d " r a d i c a l s " of the New Order and h i g h l y i n f l u e n c e d by ideas of democratic s o c i a l i s m . I t had e s p e c i a l l y c l o s e l i n k s with former PSI members.  34 P e t e r Polomka, Indonesia Since Sukarno . ( V i c t o r i a , Australia; Penguin, 1971), p.79. 35 ^These f i g u r e s were c a l c u l a t e d from "Current Data on the Indonesian M i l i t a r y E l i t e " Indonesia, 1967, 1969 and 1970; V o l s . 3, 7 and 10. The f i n a l f i g u r e was v a l i d f o r a f t e r the major m i l i t a r y r e - o r g a n i z a t i o n of October 1969. The number of c e n t r a l p o s i t i o n s d r a m a t i c a l l y i n c r e a s e d a t t h a t time and may somewhat account f o r the l a r g e percentage i n c r e a s e of Javanese. I t i s worthy of note that only 3 Sundanese (about 5$) were i n t h i s f i n a l c a l c u l a t i o n while there were 26$ of the 1967 f i g u r e and 20$ of the 1965 f i g u r e .  36  Hlndley, o p . c i t . ,  p.27.  37 Journal P* 344.  Ann Gregory, " F a c t i o n a l i s m and of Comparative A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  the Indonesian Army", 1970, V o l . I I , No. 3 , J  38  K.E. Ward, The Foundation of the P a r t a i Musllmln Indonesia (Ithaca; C o r n e l l Modern Indonesia P r o j e c t , 1 9 7 0 ) , P.38.  39  For d e t a i l s see A l l a n Samson's a r t i c l e s , "Islam and Indonesian P o l i t i c s " A s i a n Survey, 1968, V o l . V I I I , No. 12; and "Army and Islam i n I n d o n e s i a " P a c i f i c A f f a i r s , 1 9 7 1 - 2 , V o l . XLIV, No.4„  40  On t h i s see Smith, o p . c i t . ,  p.54.  41 Tempo, J u l y 31,  1971«  42 43 Smith, o p . c i t . , p.138.  These were c a l c u l a t e d from S i n a r Harapan, J u l y 1,  1972.  CHAPTER III JAVANISM AND CONTEMPORARY POLITICS The Structure of Indonesian Government In early 1959 the Indonesian Constitutional Assembly was hamstrung over the motion to return to the 19^5  Constitution (UUD45) and abandon the parliamentary  form of government used since the time of the proclamation of the unitary republic i n 1950. Three votes on the return to the U U D 4 - 5 f a i l e d by narrow margins to receive the necessary  two-thirds majority.  In July of that year  Sukarno by P r e s i d e n t i a l Decree ordered the return to the UUD45) and the action was l a t e r unanimously approved by 1 the parliament which had been elected i n 1955» The UUD45 acknowledges the sovereignty of the people and c a l l s for a Super-Parliament (MPR) to choose 2 the President and set the course of state p o l i c y . The President would appoint a cabinet of h i s own choosing 3  and hold o f f i c e f o r a period of f i v e years.  The President  would be responsible to no one except the MPR which was not required to meet more often than once i n f i v e years itself.  One-half of the MPR membership was to be composed  of the entire single house parliament  (DPR).  The remainder  of the members were to be "delegations from the regions and groups".  The UUD45 does not mention p o l i t i c a l - 70 -  - 71 p a r t i e s by name and the term golongan o r group has been I n t e r p r e t e d to mean p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s and other s o c i a l groups who a r e not n e c e s s a r i l y p o l i t i c a l i n n a t u r e . The r e t u r n to the UUD4-5 was outwardly  seen and  spoken o f as a s o l u t i o n t o the problem o f i n s t a b i l i t y i n Indonesia. way  Inwardly  the r e a d o p t l o n o f the UUD45 was a  o f making formal and i n f o r m a l norms about government  and power c o i n c i d e .  The s t r o n g e x e c u t i v e was simply a  r e f l e c t i o n o f the nature of s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s i n Javanese society.  On the other hand, even the new c o n s t i t u t i o n  c o n t a i n e d formal concepts o f the s o v e r e i g n t y o f the people and r e p r e s e n t a t i o n which had no c o u n t e r p a r t i n the o r g a n i z a t i o n o f power r e l a t i o n s i n the s o c i e t y .  T h i s i s perhaps  why these p r o v i s i o n s o f the UUD4-5 have been most o f t e n i g n o r e d o r handled i n a manner i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the i n t e n t of the formal document without severe s o c i a l o r p o l i t i c a l repercussions.^ The UUD45 has become an u n c r i t i c i z a b l e and almost s a c r e d p a r t o f Indonesian government s i n c e i t s r e a d o p t l o n (under both Guided Democracy and the New Order), but even t o t h i s present time p o l i t i c a l behavior does n o t c l o s e l y correspond w i t h the formal norms s e t f o r t h by the document except f o r the p o s i t i o n o f the e x e c u t i v e .  I f we  r e f l e c t on our e a r l i e r d e s c r i p t i o n o f government i n O l d Mataram, a s i m i l a r i t y w i l l be noted immediately.  The  - 72 importance to  -  of the formal s t r u c t u r e of the government  r e f l e c t harmony w i t h the cosmos w h i l e a c t u a l  behavior depended on o t h e r norms„  political  T h i s same gap between  theory and p r a c t i c e seems to be s t i l l p r e s e n t . the r e a s o n i n g f o r the outward appearance has somewhat;  was  Perhaps  changed  today world cultura]. norms demand t h a t every  government, no matter whether i t s a c t u a l f u n c t i o n i n g be c l o s e or f a r from the statement s o v e r e i g n t y of the people and its  rule.  The  Rulers  i n p r a c t i c e , d e c l a r e the  the "democratic" nature  of  T h i s i s a k i n d of harmony w i t h the cosmos a l s o .  The country has had  two P r e s i d e n t s , both of whom  7 were Javanese.  N e i t h e r of the two were appointed to t h e i r  p o s t s by a p o p u l a r l y e l e c t e d MPR. gave Sukarno the t i t l e  o  In f a c t , t h e MPR  of P r e s i d e n t f o r l i f e was  that  entirely  o  a p p o i n t e d by Sukarno h i m s e l f . P r e s i d e n t by an MPR  y  Suharto was  appointed  full  t h a t had been purged of a l l r e a l  o p p o s i t i o n , the replacements  s u b j e c t e d to i n v e s t i g a t i o n  and a p p r o v a l by the government b e f o r e they c o u l d take 1  t h e i r seats and a d d i t i o n a l appointments made by In  f a c t , there was  no e l e c t i o n of a DPR  or MPR  Suharto. under the  UUD45 u n t i l some 13 years a f t e r i t s r e i n t r o d u c t i o n . Sukarno a c t u a l l y p r o c l a i m e d h i m s e l f to be "people's the s t a t e ;  the  tongue" which p l a c e d him above a l l others i n f o r i n Sukarno's own  words he was  the s o l e  0  - 73 i n t e r p r e t e r of the people's wishes.  The l a t e P r e s i d e n t  a c t e d as i f t h i s were indeed the case and almost a l l d e c i s i o n s of s t a t e , no matter how passed  l a r g e or how  small,  through h i s hands to be rubber-stamped by  Sukarno appointed DPR. wishes —  the DPR  The  the  one d i r e c t a f f r o n t to h i s  r e j e c t e d h i s budget p r o p o s a l s i n i 9 6 0  r e s u l t e d i n the d i s b a n d i n g and replacement S i n c e General Suharto's  —  of t h a t body.  e l e c t i o n as f u l l p r e s i d e n t i n I968  t h e r e has been no open c h a l l e n g e by the DPR  to any  t h a t he has put forward, nor i s there l i k e l y to be  policy any.  On s e v e r a l o c c a s i o n s p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s have expressed  their  dismay a t some of the government's a c t i o n s but s t a t e d q u i t e simply what the P r e s i d e n t wants, the P r e s i d e n t g e t s . I n r e a l i t y there i s no o u t s i d e c o n t r o l over the P r e s i d e n t ,  11 whether i t be formal or i n f o r m a l .  D e s p i t e the  constitu-  t i o n a l p r e s c r i p t i o n , a u t h o r i t y and l e g i t i m a c y seem to be d e r i v e d from other  sources.  Since the country seems to have no t e s t e d d e v i c e f o r P r e s i d e n t i a l change, t h i s r a i s e s the q u e s t i o n as to how  a r u l e r a c q u i r e s l e g i t i m a c y i n Indonesia.  answers seem p o s s i b l e i n the case of Sukarno. he c o u l d have won  Several Undoubtedly  an openly c o n t e s t e d race f o r the p o s i t i o n  i f he had chosen to do so.  He was  the most o u t s t a n d i n g  f i g u r e o f the n a t i o n a l i s t movement and  somehow managed  t o appear to be above a l l of the p a r t i s a n p o l i t i c a l s t r u g g l e s  - 74 of " c o n s t i t u t i o n a l democracy".  On the o t h e r hand,Bernard  Dahm has a t t r i b u t e d a p a r t of h i s p o p u l a r i t y and l e g i t i m a c y t o r a t h e r t r a d i t i o n a l sources l i k e the "Batu A d i l "  (Just  12  P r i n c e ) legends o f the Javanese and Sundanese.  This  theory seems somewhat confirmed by the f a c t t h a t  Sukarno  was d e f i n i t e l y more p o p u l a r among Javanese than any o t h e r e t h n i c group and t h a t h i s i d e o l o g i z i n g was  definitely  more worshipped there than any o t h e r p l a c e i n the a r c h i pelago.  I t i s p o s s i b l e that Sukarno was  seen as r e s c u i n g  the realm from one o f those p e r i o d s of waning power and increasing disturbance; again.  Power may  accumulating power a t the c e n t e r  simply have appeared t o have flowed to  Sukarno because of h i s great c o n c e n t r a t i o n .  As Anderson  n o t e s , Guided Democracy was a very powerful s t a t e i n the t r a d i t i o n a l sense o f the word, but i t i s d o u b t f u l i f Sukarno and the mass of Javanese ever r e a l i z e d t h a t i t 1 3  was not i n the modern sense, Suharto i s more d i f f i c u l t  to p i c t u r e i n t h i s  p e r s p e c t i v e because of the Western-style c l o a k he has drawn around h i s regime.  He too i s p r o b a b l y more p o p u l a r  among Javanese than o t h e r groups.  A l s o Suharto accumulated  power a t the c e n t e r and saved the country a f t e r a p e r i o d o f c h a o t i c d r i f t i n g and waning of c e n t r a l power  n  Por Javanese  audiences, the r e l a t i o n s h i p of Suharto's w i f e to the c e n t r a l Javanese r o y a l house o f Mankunegara has c a r e f u l l y  been  - 75 emphasized.  14  The New Order too i s a powerful s t a t e i n  t r a d i t i o n a l terms and d e s p i t e v i g o r o u s claims,has y e t to prove i t i s i n the modern sense.  The simple f a c t  that  Suharto was a b l e to d e f e a t Sukarno without n o t i c e a b l e e f f o r t on h i s p a r t seems to have been enough o f a s i g n o f  15 l e g i t i m a c y f o r him t o m a i n t a i n power  initially.  The New Order regime has c r i t i c i z e d Sukarno g r e a t l y for  h i s " d e v i a t i o n s " from the UUD45» but o t h e r than super-  ficially  seems i n no g r e a t h u r r y t o make i t s own a c t i o n s 16  conform to i t t o the l e t t e r e i t h e r . the  While n e i t h e r o f  two UUD45 regimes has been t o t a l i t a r i a n , i f such i s  even p o s s i b l e i n Indonesia, they have been h i g h l y a u t h o r i t a r i a n and h e a v i l y c e n t r a l i z e d i n the decision-making sense. The e x e c u t i v e seems to have absorbed the rule-making and r u l e a d j u d i c a t i o n f u n c t i o n s i n a d d i t i o n to i t s own r u l e 17  application functions. the of  absence  This c o n c e n t r a t i o n o f power and  o f checks upon i t c l e a r l y resembles  the nature  the t h e o r e t i c a l power o f Mataram's god-king, even i f i t  18 i s c l o a k e d with modern day c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  ornamentation.  The R u l e r ' s A s s i s t a n t s : There a r e almost no e l e c t e d p o s t s o f consequence i n the  country o u t s i d e o f the Kepala Desa o r Lurah  headman) and the DPR members.  7  (village  The r e g i o n a l and  kabupaten p a r l i a m e n t s o r DPRDI and DPRDII have only been e l e c t e d once under the UUD45 ( i n J u l y 1971)  w i t h the  -  76  -  remainder of the time b e i n g appointed and have very l i t t l e power w i t h i n the framework of the u n i t a r y s t a t e . A l l r e g i o n a l governors and m i l i t a r y commanders a r e appointed  from the c e n t e r .  t r i e d with some- success  Under Sukarno the m i l i t a r y  to keep c o n t r o l of m i l i t a r y  appointments, but with a m i l i t a r y man  l i k e Suharto as  P r e s i d e n t both c i v i l i a n and m i l i t a r y posts i n the  regions  are c o n t r o l l e d by the P r e s i d e n t . As p r e s c r i b e d by the c o n s t i t u t i o n , the c a b i n e t i s appointed  by the P r e s i d e n t .  In the absence of open  c o m p e t i t i v e p o l i t i c s d u r i n g Guided Democracy, Sukarno used c a b i n e t p o s i t i o n s f o r rewards to h i s  faithful  f o l l o w e r s and p a r t i e s t h a t would support h i s p o l i c i e s . T h i s process got so f a r out of hand t h a t i n the l a s t t h a t Sukarno was 100  ministers.  in full  cabinet  c o n t r o l of appointments there were  I t proved j u s t as hard f o r Sukarno to mani-  p u l a t e the m i l i t a r y a t the c e n t e r as i n the r e g i o n s and  he  had g r e a t d i f f i c u l t y i n c o n t r o l l i n g i n t e r n a l appointments. The l a t e P r e s i d e n t was  a b l e to r e p l a c e General Nasution,  an  a r c h r i v a l , with Achmad Y a n i , c o n s i d e r e d a t the time to be more p l i a b l e , as C h i e f of S t a f f of the Army.  20  Suharto  too does not seem to mind u s i n g the c a b i n e t as a reward 21  base —  though even t h i s a p p a r e n t l y i s d e c r e a s i n g  s t i l l has managed to keep i t to a reasonable  —  but  size.  M a n i p u l a t i o n o f m i l i t a r y personnel does not p r e s e n t  too  - 77  -  much of a problem to P r e s i d e n t Suharto. may  have been the case but the Suharto  i n c o n t r o l now.  His men  Initially  this  faction i s clearly  s i t i n a l l of the  important  m i l i t a r y p o s i t i o n s and he has been a b l e to a p p o i n t p e r s o n a l f r i e n d s as the C h i e f s of S t a f f of the A i r Force and Navy as w e l l as the Army. In a d d i t i o n to the c a b i n e t , the m i l i t a r y r e g i o n a l governors  and  p o s t s , P r e s i d e n t Suharto a l s o d i r e c t l y  a p p o i n t s a s e r i e s o f Inspector G e n e r a l s ( 1 2 ) , G e n e r a l s ( 2 7 ) and D i r e c t o r Generals(62)  Secretary  to m i n i s t r i e s  and  t h e i r departments i n order to strengthen h i s i n f l u e n c e i n the bureaucracy  and  f r i e n d s there on the One  obviously, i n c r e a s e c o n t r o l by inside.  f u r t h e r p o i n t has been c o n s i s t e n t between the  two P r e s i d e n t s ; t h a t being the presence o r  having  g o l ongan i s t a n a I n  Sukarno's day  Charul Saleh and Subandrio decision-making  of a palace  clique  such people as A d i t ,  assumed f a r g r e a t e r r o l e s i n  than t h e i r o f f i c i a l p o s i t i o n s warranted.  D e s p i t e the a d v e r t i z e d i n f l u e n c e of the "technocrats'" who  now  s i t a t cabinet l e v e l p o s i t i o n s —  Suharto has  — had  h i s s p e c i a l group of a d v i s o r s and a s s i s t a n t s from the b e g i n n i n g of h i s r i s e to power.  These men  e x c e p t i o n are m i l i t a r y have the o f f i c i a l  who  without  t i t l e , o f ASPRI or  p r i v a t e a s s i s t a n t to the P r e s i d e n t f o r c e r t a i n f i e l d s as economics and  special operations.  Men  such  l i k e A l l Murtopo,  -  78  -  Sudjono Humardani and General S u r j o have assumed some .of the  functions  t h a t the bureaucracy was intended to handle  and  i n many cases t h e i r a d v i c e outweighs t h a t o f a m i n i s t e r . D e s p i t e New Order c r i t i c i s m s of the " c u l t of the  personality",  i t i s very c l e a r t h a t power and p o s i t i o n i n  the new regime a l s o h e a v i l y depend on p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s w i t h the r u l e r .  While Suharto has been v e r y  i n h i s choices of highly q u a l i f i e d personnel f o r posts,  astute  cabinet  such q u a l i f i c a t i o n s seem mush l e s s important i n  other areas, p a r t i c u l a r l y personal advisors  and a s s i s t a n t s .  L i k e Mataram, the r u l e r ' s c o n t r o l over h i s Outer P r o v i n c e s depend to a l a r g e degree on p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s and, o f c o u r s e , i n the l a s t i n s t a n c e  on f o r c e .  f r e e l y from h i s o l d f r i e n d s h i p s  Suharto has drawn  o f the Diponegoro and  Mandala commands and t h i s p r a c t i c e i s u n l i k e l y to abate  23 i n the near The  future.  Massess Political  organization  i n the modern sense o f the  word, whether i t be among the e l i t e thereof,  i s a r e l a t i v e l y new phenomenon i n I n d o n e s i a .  b e s t a l l such o r g a n i z a t i o n s ' during  or masses or sub-groups At  r e l a t i o n s h i p t o the government  the c o l o n i a l e r a was ambiguous, i f n o t o u t r i g h t 2k  illegal.  D u r i n g the r e v o l u t i o n  and the i n i t i a l  period  o f " c o n s t i t u t i o n a l democracy", the r e l a t i o n s h i p o f l e g a l l y o r g a n i z e d p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s t o the government was c l e a r .  '  - 79 The  s t r e n g t h and  closeness  -  to power of a p a r t y depended  on i t s number of r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s i n the parliament t h e o r e t i c a l l y , a t l e a s t , was elections.  determined by  which  popular  Each of the major p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s had mass  o r g a n i z a t i o n s or ormas a f f i l i a t e d with i t i n the form o f Trade Unions, Peasant Unions, and parliamentary  e l e c t i o n (1955) and  Student Clubs. one  election for regional  assemblies were h e l d under t h i s system.  The  o r g a n i z a t i o n s came to r e a l i z e t h a t the way such a system was  One  political  to win  under  mass o r g a n i z a t i o n and m o b i l i z a t i o n f o r  numbers would count more than p e r s o n a l  relations in 25  determining  the p a r t y ' s c l o s e n e s s  to power and  Under the UUD45 the r e l a t i o n s h i p of organization, s p e c i f i c a l l y  rewards.  political  p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s , t o the  government l a p s e d i n t o an ambiguous s t a t e a g a i n and remained t h a t way  ever s i n c e .  The  P r e s i d e n t has  been a member of a p o l i t i c a l p a r t y and, politics  o u t s i d e of the palace  indeed,  has  never formal  i t s e l f have become  i n c r e a s i n g l y i r r e l e v a n t to the system.  Numbers were not  and are not as important as being c l o s e to the c e n t e r power.  The  l e a d e r s h i p of p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s has  of  stagnated  except f o r f o r c e d or manipulated changes by the govern26 ment,  and  younger p o l i t i c a l  f i g u r e s became i n v o l v e d i n  27 mass o r g a n i z a t i o n s .  In outward appearance p o l i t i c s  Guided Democracy were a s e r i e s of c h a l l e n g e s  by the  of PKI  - 80 and  r a d i c a l s and r e a c t i o n s by the threatened  over i s s u e s l i k e l a n d reform and s q u a t t e r ' s  conservatives rights.  Even  t h i s l i m i t e d measure o f p u b l i c p o l i t i c s has been removed from the l e g i t i m a t e sphere o f p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y  for  28  p o l i t i c a l organizations  under the New Order.  Politics  i n any form has become more and more o f an i n t e r n a l government, and p a r t i c u l a r l y army, a f f a i r - b u r e a u c r a t i c p o l i t i c s of a s o r t . Since  the b e g i n n i n g o f the pressures  f o r the  return  to the UUD45, the i s s u e o f the composition o f the DPR and MPR has been under d i s c u s s i o n .  The p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s with  t h e i r own i n t e r e s t s i n mind n a t u r a l l y f e l t t h a t they had the r i g h t t o c o n t r o l such bodies,  but the UUD45 d i d not  s p e c i f i c a l l y mention the p o i n t .  The army put  forward the  i d e a o f f u n c t i o n a l groups as p a r t o f the golongan, golongan l i s t e d i n the c o n s t i t u t i o n as they would be l e g a l l y recognized  as a p o l i t i c a l f o r c e i n doing so.  Sukarno  accepted t h i s i d e a as i t f i t w e l l w i t h h i s concept o f n a t i o n a l harmony through r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  o f a l l groups,  and he pushed f o r a DPR composed o f one-half groups and one-half  political parties.  functional  T h i s p r o p o s a l was  not accepted by the p a r t i e s , and e v e n t u a l l y , Sukarno backed 29  away from the i s s u e ,  although he chose not t o a p p o i n t any  o f h i s p o l i t i c a l r i v a l s t o the DPR o r MPR.  As had been  hoped f o r , the m i l i t a r y gained access t o the c a b i n e t , DPR and MPR through the r e t u r n to the UUD45.  The i n i t i a l ABRI  - 81 c o n t i n g e n t was 35 b u t t h i s had "been expanded t o 75 by t h e time o f t h e 1971 DPR e l e c t i o n s . Before  t h e advent o f t h e I 9 7 I e l e c t i o n s t h e m i l i t a r y  r e v i v e d t h e i d e a o f a J o i n t S e c r e t a r i a t o f F u n c t i o n a l Groups, c a l l e d a t t h a t time Sekber G o l k a r , t o combat t h e e l e c t i o n s 30 a g a i n s t the p a r t i e s ,  G o l k a r i s avowedly n o n - p o l i t i c a l  w i t h o n l y an i d e o l o g y o f m o d e r n i z a t i o n  and development.  From t h e m i l i t a r y ' s p o i n t o f view G o l k a r  functioned  p e r f e c t l y i n t h e e l e c t i o n s by w i n n i n g 63$ o f t h e v o t e s and 236  o f t h e 36O e l e c t e d s e a t s .  The n e a r e s t p o l i t i c a l 31  r e c e i v e d o n l y 18$ o f t h e v o t e and 58 s e a t s .  party  A f t e r the  e l e c t i o n s G o l k a r h e l d a w o r k i n g c o n g r e s s i n which i t made 21 f o r m a l d e c i s i o n s c o n c e r n i n g the program i t wanted t o implement and they c o r r e s p o n d e d n e a r l y 100$ w i t h ABRI 32 wishes. Despite  the f a c t t h a t G o l k a r c o n t r o l s the DPR and  l a t e r w i l l c o n t r o l t h e MPR, i t i s n o t a t a l l c l e a r t h a t i t 33  c o n t r o l s t h e government.  I n f a c t we have a l r e a d y  t h a t t h e r e a l c e n t e r o f power i n t h e p r e s e n t  seen  government,  b o t h f o r m a l l y and i n f o r m a l l y , does n o t l i e w i t h t h e p a r t i e s o r f u n c t i o n a l groups b u t e l s e w h e r e .  T h i s i s i n a sense why  the 1971 e l e c t i o n s were so f r u i t l e s s f o r p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s . For no m a t t e r how many s e a t s any i n d i v i d u a l p a r t y won, i t would n o t be any c l o s e r t o a c t u a l power t h a n b e f o r e t h e election.  - 82 At the present  time the government i s p r e p a r i n g a b i l l on  the s i m p l i f i c a t i o n o f p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s and t h e i r o r g a n i z a t i o n to present  t o the DPR.  This b i l l  i s expected to  f o r c e the f u s i o n o f the n a t i o n ' s 9 l e g a l p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s i n t o two and e l i m i n a t e a l l p a r t y o r g a n i z a t i o n below the kabupaten l e v e l .  This l a t e r concept i s known as the  " f l o a t i n g mass" and e n v i s i o n s no permanent o r g a n i z a t i o n a t the v i l l a g e l e v e l . philosophy  behind  political  According  t h i s measure, p o l i t i c a l  to the  conflict i s  to be removed from the v i l l a g e and only once i n every 5 years w i l l  the people be allowed  to p a r t i c i p a t e i n p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n through c a s t i n g b a l l o t s f o r the p a r t y o r Golkar o f their  choice. In p r a c t i c e demands and a l l o c a t i o n o f resources  a r e not made i n the DPR.  They a r e made through p e r s o n a l  r e l a t i o n s and c o n n e c t i o n s .  Rosihan Anwar d e s c r i b e d  Indonesian p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s , n o t as d e v i c e s  f o r aggregating  and a r t i c u l a t i n g group i n t e r e s t s , but as p l a t f o r m s f o r expressing  the i d e n t i t y o f the s e l f w i t h i n the s t r a t i f i 34  c a t i o n o f the p o l i t i c a l more than t h i s a l s o ? in  community.  I s Golkar  anything  The e l i m i n a t i o n o f p a r t y s t r u c t u r e s  the v i l l a g e s make i t d i f f i c u l t to see how, but perhaps  the f u n c t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s w i t h i n Golkar w i l l be a b l e t o p l a c e demands on the system. the e l i m i n a t i o n o f v i l l a g e p o l i t i c a l  eventually  A t any r a t e with  o r g a n i z a t i o n , the  - 83 e x i s t i n g p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s w i l l probably be  emasculated  i n the next e l e c t i o n w i t h Golkar d e r i v i n g the b e n e f i t . While many h i s t o r i c a l and p o l i t i c a l arguments can be put forward i n defense of o r a g a i n s t the  emerging  system, i t i s d i f f i c u l t not to n o t i c e t h a t the Western concept o f the r o l e and f u n c t i o n s o f p o l i t i c a l  parties  and o r g a n i z a t i o n s do not n e c e s s a r i l y a p p l y to the Indon e s i a n scene.  The proper sphere of l e g i t i m a t e  political  conduct compares f a v o r a b l y with that of Mataram. are  new  There  o r g a n i z a t i o n s , but the r e s u l t s seem the same.  The r u l e r through h i s bureaucracy governs and makes d e c i s i o n s which a r e t h e o r e t i c a l l y f o r the good of the 35  people.  J  The C e n t e r - P e r i p h e r y ; While Indonesia's geographic and e t h n i c h e t e r o geneousness  seem to c a l l f o r some type of f e d e r a l a r r a n g e -  ment f o r the n a t i o n a l government, l i k e B r i t a i n , Indonesia In 1957  i s o f f i c i a l l y a unitary state.  the  last  p a r l i a m e n t a r y c a b i n e t passed a f a r r e a c h i n g d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n law which would have allowed meaningful  governmental  I n s t i t u t i o n s i n the r e g i o n s with f i n a n c i a l powers and s u b s t a n t i a l freedom from c e n t r a l i n t e r f e r e n c e i n s e l e c t i n g  36 r e g i o n a l governmental  officials.  With the advent o f  Guided Democracy, the emphasis s h i f t e d back i n the o t h e r d i r e c t i o n and most of the 1957  law was  changed or f o r g o t t e n .  - 84 The r e g i o n a l l y e l e c t e d Kepala Daerah (Regional Head) was reabsorbed i n t o the c e n t r a l bureaucracy and appointed governors made the order of the day.  Today the l o c a l  DPRD's have no meaningful power i n l e g i s l a t i v e or f i n a n c i a l matters.  The c e n t r a l government c o l l e c t s  9 8 . 6 $ of a l l tax revenues and the r e g i o n a l governments e x i s t on a l l o t m e n t s from the c e n t e r whether they be i n 37 the form of d i r e c t subsidy or ADO 1966  returns.  In J u l y o f  the IV MPRS s e s s i o n passed a r e s o l u t i o n c a l l i n g f o r  the government to Increase r e g i o n a l autonomy w i t h i n three years but up to t h i s time the government has not a c t e d . A l l meaningful d e c i s i o n s concerning p r o v i n c i a l development a l l o c a t i o n s i n a d d i t i o n to normal budget a l l o c a t i o n s are s t i l l made a t the c e n t e r .  Ted Smith notes t h a t even when  a governor or b u p a t i possesses the t h e o r e t i c a l power to take independent  i n i t i a t i v e on development p r o j e c t s ,  he  never has the f i n a n c i n g or f i n a n c i n g power to support the effort.  3 8  D e s p i t e the f a c t that the Outer I s l a n d s c o n t r i b u t e about 80$ of Indonesia's e x p o r t s , and Indonesia's economy i s an export economy, Java remains country.  the c e n t e r o f the  I t has been estimated t h a t around  60$ o f a l l of  the money i n c i r c u l a t i o n i n the country i s c i r c u l a t i n g i n Djakarta alone.  Outer I s l a n d t r a n s p o r t a t i o n systems i n  g e n e r a l are e q u i v a l e n t to Java's 30 to 40 years  ago.  The  85 -  economic imbalances t h a t c o n t r i b u t e d to-the r e g i o n a l  r e v o l t s o f 15 years ago s t i l l  exist.  o u t s i d e of Java i s considered  s o r t of a demotion t o the'  jungles by many c i v i l for in  servants.  the r e l a t i v e n e g l e c t of Java  A government post,  Any p o l i c y t h a t  called  f o r development purposes  the Outer I s l a n d s would simply be i m p o s s i b l e  f o r any  Javanese dominated government t o c o n s i d e r s e r i o u s l y . Although government a t t i t u d e s and p o l i c y under the New Order a r e c o n s i d e r a b l y f a i r e r t o the r e g i o n s than b e f o r e , the s i t u a t i o n i s f a r from i d e a l . expressed  Suharto h i m s e l f  a common Javanese o p i n i o n towards the o t h e r  r e g i o n s when as Panglima o f the Diponegoro D i v i s i o n i n 1957s he p o i n t e d out t h a t any appeasement o f the d i s s i d e n t s in  Sumatra and Sulawesi  as perverse  partiality.  He s a i d  t h a t the 5^ m i l l i o n people o f Java would f e e l u n j u s t l y t r e a t e d should the government r e l a x i t s development e f f o r t s there i n order to permit  the obstreperous  regions t o  39 c a t c h up. There seems to be an obvious negara agung-mantja negara comparison s t i l l  e x i s t i n g i n Indonesia.  a c o n t i n u a l s t r u g g l e to m a i n t a i n power a t the c e n t e r .  There i s  the c e n t r a l s t r u c t u r e and  Any autonomy f o r the outer  regions  c o u l d encourage d i s s i d e n c e and l e a d t o the waning o f c e n t r a l power.  The modern concept o f the s t a t e does n o t q u i t e  seem to f i t s  i t i s hard  f o r a Javanese t o c o n s i d e r a Dayak  - 86 v i l l a g e o f f i n the w i l d s of Kalimantan  on equal terms w i t h  the thousands o f Javanese v i l l a g e s he sees around The  Functions of Indonesian The two  him.  40  Government  regimes under the UUD45 have been very  d i f f e r e n t i n s e v e r a l ways,  Sukarno was  very s k i l l f u l i n  the m a n i p u l a t i o n of p o l i t i c a l symbols and almost  deified  h i m s e l f i n the process as the symbol of the s t a t e s  during  t h i s time h i s regime n e g l e c t e d i n f a c t most o f the p o l i c i e s t h a t i t espoused except c o n f r o n t a t i o n e.g. (food and c l o t h e s f o r the p e o p l e ) . New  sandang-pangan  On the other hand, the  Order under the l e a d e r s h i p of Suharto has  expressed  i t s e l f i n more mundane ways with an emphasis on and  stability  economic development even though the same kinds of  i d e o l o g i c a l symbols are s t i l l  there but i n a somewhat l e s s  41 prominent p o s i t i o n .  With such a d r a s t i c s h i f t i n emphasis,  a t f i r s t g l a n c e , i t might seem very d i f f i c u l t  to d e t e c t any  u n d e r l y i n g common r o o t s , but as our p r e v i o u s a n a l y s i s of p o l i t i c a l h i s t o r y p o i n t s out, the former regime was  much more  i n f l u e n c e d by mass p o l i t i c s than i s the p r e s e n t one  and  t h i s i n i t s e l f i s probably enough to account p o r t i o n of s u r f a c e d i f f e r e n c e s .  for a large  The i n t e r n a l workings and  the f u n c t i o n s c a r r i e d out by the two regimes may t u r n out to be a l l that d i f f e r e n t . comparisons w i t h Mataram may  not, however,  I f t h i s i s t r u e , some  a l s o be a p p r o p r i a t e .  - 87 Harmony through C o n t r o l , S e c u r i t y and S t a b i l i t y ; The  mass o f ideology and symbolism used by Sukarno  42 has  been w e l l d i s c u s s e d  by F e i t h and Weatherbee,  f a c e t s o f the maze a r e worth p o i n t i n g out here.  but some From the  b e g i n n i n g o f h i s p o l i t i c a l c a r e e r Sukarno never stopped expressing  what he f e l t was the e s s e n t i a l u n i t y and harmony  o f Indonesian s o c i e t y .  Bernard Dahm has shown the development  o f Sukarno's NASAKOM p o l i c y was n o t new but f o l l o w e d  consis-  t e n t l y by him from the l a t e 1 9 2 0 ' s u n t i l h i s d e a t h . ^ Sukarno a n a l y z e d Indonesian s o c i e t y as having three main currents —  nationalism,  r e l i g i o n ( I s l a m ) and communism  —  which were s y n c r e t i c a l l y blended i n t o compatible i d e o l o g i e s by Indonesians. the same time.  He proclaimed h i m s e l f  to be a l l three a t  When h i s pre-war PNI f r a c t u r e d and s p l i t  because o f d i f f e r e n c e s between these very  ideologies,  Sukarno a l s o q u i t p a r t y l i f e and never r e j o i n e d a p a r t y . His d r i v e was syncretism 1945  and expressing  unity.  I n October  Sukarno c o u l d push f o r the c r e a t i o n o f a s i n g l e p a r t y  system but V i c e P r e s i d e n t Hatta was the one who had t o decree t h a t more p a r t i e s c o u l d be created later.  Sukarno e v i d e n t l y h o n e s t l y  o f p a r t i e s d i v i d e d the people. to "bury the p a r t i e s "  only a few days  believed that a  multitude  In 1956 he asked the people  and l a t e r u n v e i l e d h i s Konsepsl  t h a t i f accepted would solve the problems o f a weak government.  He proposed t h a t a l l p a r t i e s be  represented  -  88  -  I n a Gotong-Rojong (Mutual Help) c a b i n e t and t h a t a l l d e c i s i o n s be taken i n the t r a d i t i o n a l Indonesian manner of musjawarah or consensus.  L a t e r a f t e r events had  p r o p e l l e d the country towards a r e t u r n to the UUD45, Sukarno s t i l l such.  expressed h i s antagonism  He t r i e d t o c r e a t e a N a t i o n a l Front i n which a l l  groups were r e p r e s e n t e d . and MPR  towards p a r t i e s as  He ever s t r i v e d to c r e a t e a  DPR  t h a t r e f l e c t e d h i s conception o f the unique harmony  o f the Indonesian people.  He  f e l t government c o u l d be run  without o p p o s i t i o n and t a k i n g v o t e s .  A c c o r d i n g to Indo-  n e s i a n t r a d i t i o n , Soekarno s a i d , there were no l o s e r s and no tyranny of the 5 0 $ + 1 m a j o r i t y . p a r t y who  Anyone or any  c o u l d not agree with t h i s e x p r e s s i o n of t r u e  *'Indonesian-ness", then were no l o n g e r Indonesians but outside influenced. committed s u i c i d e .  In t h i s way  the Masjumi and  PSI  They c o u l d not even s u p e r f i c i a l l y  agree  w i t h the Konsepsi and Guided Democracy, so they were banished from the system.  On the other hand, the m i l i t a r y and  the  PKI were probably e q u a l l y opposed to p o r t i o n s of Sukarno's p l a n f o r e x p r e s s i n g and r e t u r n i n g to the Indonesian i d e n t i t y , but by v e r b a l l y a g r e e i n g t o i t were a l l o w e d to s u r v i v e and a t l e a s t c o v e r t l y oppose the p a r t s of the system that they d i d not l i k e .  new  At l e a s t i n some r e s p e c t s  Donald L e v i n e ' s statement about Amhara p o l i t i c a l i n E t h i o p i a seems r e l e v a n t to the elements  culture  of Javanese  - 89  -  c u l t u r e that Sukarno was c a l l i n g Indonesian c u l t u r e , and to some extent what Suharto s t i l l expresses, when he s a i d : "In a u t h o r i t a r i a n r e l a t i o n s h i p — and again a l l p o l i t i c a l i n t e r a c t i o n among the Amhara i s contained w i t h i n a u t h o r i tarian relationships —  there are only three a l t e r n a t i v e s ;  complete deference, acquiescence and f l a t t e r y ;  criticism 46  by devious and covert means;  or o u t r i g h t r e b e l l i o n " .  According to Anderson "The NASAKOM formula to be seen e i t h e r as i r r e s p o n s i b l e and  tended  intellectually  incoherent slogan or as a s u b t l e device f o r weaking the anti-communist p r e j u d i c e s of powerful n a t i o n a l i s t and r e l i g i o u s groups.  Such i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s however, f a i l e d  to place the NASAKOM-politique w i t h i n the context of Javanese p o l i t i c a l t h i n k i n g .  In h i s o r i e n t a t i o n , Sukarno's  formula could be i n t e r p r e t e d not as a compromise or strategem, but as a powerful claim to possession of power by the r u l e r . For he alone was whole, sembada, absorbing a l l w i t h i n 47  himself, making the s y n c r e t i c conquest". For Sukarno and the New Order a powerful s y n c r e t i c t o o l or symbol, i n a d d i t i o n to the UUD45, was the 48  Pantjaslla.  This d o c t r i n e became the basis of the  Indonesian s t a t e .  I t s adoption assures the Javanese as  w e l l as r e l i g i o u s m i n o r i t y groups that t h e i r fundamental b e l i e f systems are protected from " r e l i g i o u s and  cultural"  i m p e r i a l i s m by Islam or any other monoistic and monopolistic  - 90 doctrine.  -  Under Sukarno P a n t j a s i l a y i e l d e d the c e n t e r -  stage to NASAKOM and MANIPOL but under the New once a g a i n r i s e n to i t s c e n t r a l r o l e a g a i n .  Order  Today  Indonesia i s proclaimed as s t r u g g l i n g to achieve Democracy.  has  Pantjasila  I t a l s o tends to be a b r o a d l y s y n c r e t i c  d o c t r i n e t h a t c l e a r l y p i c t u r e s the Javanese world view more than i t does any o t h e r p a r t of Indonesian I t s l a c k of concreteness and undoubtedly  society.  f l e x i b i l i t y , however, i s  needed i n a d i v e r s e country l i k e  Indonesia.  Suharto h i m s e l f has s t a t e d t h a t he b e l i e v e s harmony i s value i n h i s culture harmony between man  (Javanese?) and  t h a t i s very r e a l ,  s o c i e t y and man  another o c c a s i o n the P r e s i d e n t s a i d "we c u l t i v a t e harmony i n the l i f e  and god.  both On  have to s t r i v e to  of our s o c i e t y and f e e l  calm  In the d e v e l o p i n g of the noble c u l t u r a l v a l u e s t h a t are i n harmony w i t h our people",-^ w i t h G-30-S but was  0  promptly  So the Nasakom formula r e p l a c e d by the  D o c t r i n e as f i r s t s t a t e symbol. b a s i c "one-ness" of Indonesian o n l y a new  Pantjasila  The d e c l a r a t i o n s o f the s o c i e t y have not  enemy has been added to the  The New  exploded  disappeared,  list.  Order government i d e n t i f i e s three enemies o f  the people who.are c a l l e d golongan  t e r t e n t u or f i x e d  They are the golongan  (extreme l e f t - c o m m u n i s t s ) ,  golongan  ekstrim k i r j  groups.  e k s t r i m kanan (extreme r i g h t - p r o p o n e n t s of an  I s l a m i c s t a t e ) and golongan  liberal  (liberal-proponents of  - 91 a  return  to  parliamentary  of  harmony a r e  to  impose  seen  their  as  Order  supporters  PKI  shows  clearly  other  hand  either  of  mean a n in  its  it  is  the  end  attached  to  day  can  society  upon  that  enemies and  meaning  their  disturbers  who a r e the  majority.  victory  over  support  Pantjasila.  to  that  of  note the  state  the On  the  government would most  Javanese  elite  also  status  has  determined  rule.  by likely  Harmony  quo  connotations  it.  Harmony as ruler  of  people  pri.ja.ii  present  groups  interesting  three  to  small  claim  the  These  very  concept  New  51  democracy).  a  control  value  and  is  of  guarantee  very  little  security  use  in  unless  his  a  society  52 for  its  implementation  problem  is  whether  a  to  an  end.  difference  in  the  interested  in  control.  means  to  his  of  their  suffered  the in  Hence leaders by  the  Promotion  1965."^  editors were  of  is  Sukarno two  the  but  A l l figures  PSI  of  and  Democratic  the  time  in  the to  an  end  never he  in  saw  was  chief itself  state  very  were  much submit  quickly  banned  The  and fate  was  the  Body  for  53  i960, 54  I964,  and  the  Murba  closed  and  their  PKI°s  time  i f  publishing they  most  same  in  were  or  the  who w o u l d n o t  exiled.  League  newspapers even  The  Mas.jumi were or  Sukarnoism  from  as  probably  imprisoned  harrassed;"^  seen  concepts,  version  Various  restricted  continuation.  harmony  ideological  silenced.  or  strayed  Party  organs too  far  - 92 from the o f f i c i a l l i n e .  The  PNI,  p r e v i o u s l y considered  the p a r t y c l o s e s t to the P r e s i d e n t , l o s t an independent p o l i t i c a l l i f e a p a r t from echoing The NU a l s o cooperated  without  the P r e s i d e n t ' s wishes.  hesitation.  Even the  submitted  to h i s c o n t r o l to the p o i n t t h a t one  political  s c i e n t i s t wrote about the "domestication  PKI  American o f the  57 PKI".  As a l r e a d y mentioned the DPR  and MPR  proved  no  problem i n m a n i p u l a t i n g and no e l e c t i o n s were ever h e l d . The d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n law was  r e v e r s e d and Sukarno  appointed  the governors i n a d d i t i o n to h i s a l r e a d y enormous a p p o i n t i v e power a t the center,, On the other hand, the P r e s i d e n t was  constantly at  odds with the m i l i t a r y x^hich should have been h i s most potent  t o o l of c o n t r o l .  The army had developed s u b s t a n t i a l  p o l i t i c a l d o c t r i n e i n a d d i t i o n to concrete i n t e r e s t s of i t s own.  I t was  political  not w i l l i n g to be  a b s o l u t e t o o l of someone i t d i d not completely Sukarno was  extremely  upset  the trust.  over the l e n i e n t p o l i c y  of  the m i l i t a r y towards the m i l i t a r y p a r t i c i p a n t s i n the r e g i o n a l r e v o l t s and  the banning of the PKI  r e g i o n s i n I 9 6 I by the m i l i t a r y m a r t i a l law A f t e r the r e p e a l of m a r t i a l law i n 1963, to  e x e r t more l e v e r a g e and was  time enemy General Probably  i n several commanders.  Sukarno was  able  a b l e to r e p l a c e h i s l o n g  Nasution.  u n t i l the end  of h i s regime he b e l i e v e d  - 93 t h a t he c o u l d manipulate the PKI t o h i s own advantage. He was c l e a r l y on the way t o s e c u r i n g a s t r o n g h o l d i n the £•0  military  (as was the PKI) a t the outbreak o f the G-30-S.  He was attempting  t o d e - p o l i t i c i z e the bureaucracy t o  i n s u r e i t s l o y a l t y , and a l l open o p p o s i t i o n ( i . e . t h r e a t s to harmony) had disappeared, 59 As P l u v i e r noted i n 1965 s  d e s p i t e a l l o f the  r a d i c a l r h e t o r i c , the Sukarno regime was e s s e n t i a l l y a c o n s e r v a t i v e one, although G-30-S succeeded.  t h a t might have changed had the  The one b i g attempt by the PKI t o  s t r i k e a t the s t a t u s quo through l a n d reform revealed a s o l i d c o a l i t i o n of conservative r e t a l i a t e d t o the p o i n t o f causing severe the c o u n t r y s i d e , i t did.  actions  forces that instability in  Sukarno asked the PKI t o back down and  Despite v e r b a l a t t a c k s on the b u r e a u c r a t i c  capitalists,  (read m i l i t a r y managing n a t i o n a l i z e d f i r m s )  n o t h i n g was ever done about i t .  While the c a l l  of return  to the t r a c k s of the r e v o l u t i o n and Indonesian s o c i a l i s m filled  the a i r , d o m e s t i c a l l y the Sukarno regime was l e s s  than r a d i c a l . coherent  I t simply was i n c a p a b l e o f m a i n t a i n i n g a  and s u s t a i n e d program o f any k i n d i n any d i r e c t i o n .  Harmony through c o n t r o l was the p r a c t i c e , but i t s e f f e c t i v e ness was so low t h a t Sukarno could n o t prevent i f he even wanted t o , o r the m i l i t a r y - l e d  the G-30-S,  retaliation.  - 94 The  New Order and C o n t r o l °. Initially,  the New Order government and most  c i v i l i a n i n t e l l e c t u a l s as w e l l tended t o see the weakness o f Indonesia's p o l i t i c a l system as caused f o r the most p a r t by the presence of I d e o l o g i c a l l y o r i e n t e d — as opposed t o program o r i e n t e d —  political parties.  army seminar i n Bandung i n 1966, program i n the f i e l d s mapped out. was  I n the  the b a s i c New Order  o f economics and p o l i t i c s was  The cure f o r the i l l s  o f the p o l i t i c a l system  q u i t e n a t u r a l l y seen t o be b e s t and most e a s i l y  implemented through the P a n t j a s i l a Democracy.^  framework o f the UUD45 and Basically,what  the d i a g n o s i s was as f o l l o w s :  was proposed from  1) a program o r i e n t e d  nation-wide two p a r t y system, as only through t h a t type of p a r t y system c o u l d the UUD45 P r e s i d e n t i a l system work properly;  2) an e l e c t o r a l system based on d i s t r i c t s  the w i n n e r - t a k e - a l l  with  mechanism r a t h e r than p r o p o r t i o n a l  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n and 3) low c e n t r a l c o n t r o l over candidate s e l e c t i o n s i n the d i s t r i c t s . ^ thought t h a t these p r o p o s a l s  1  A t that time i t was  were widely accepted by  even the m i l i t a r y and that coupled with the MPRS d e c i s i o n that y e a r t o h o l d e l e c t i o n s i n 1968, implemented as soon as p o s s i b l e .  they would be  I t turned  out  that  the i n d i v i d u a l s who f e l t t h a t way were small i n number and  e v e n t u a l l y came t o be known as the New Order " r a d i c a l s "  - 95 which the  in  the  Siliwangi  mentation West and  of  Java, the  their  a  support  reform. the  core  the  they  or  the  the  some a t t e m p t s  New O r d e r  proposals. as  proposals for  later  a  was  around  imple-  tried  in  Suharto  evidently  withdrew  The  "radicals"  the  idea  of  political  submitted  to  t h e DPR  did  were  at  coalition,  around him,  calling  centered  Two-Group system  background  were  c o a l i t i o n was  Although  of  from  Electoral  but  the  generals  government  system  of  two p a r t y  the  into  part  Division.  Javanese  slipped  by  army  single  member  withdrawn i n  the  gradually  constituency  face  of  62 political finally  party  was  passed  s t i l l  giving  over  candidate  for  the  the  party Given  the  major  the  by  choice. and  the  i t  the  central  not fact  disturbers  division, of  opposition.  is  not  New O r d e r  The e l e c t i o n s  DPR was party  the  proportional  headquarters  The v o t e r s  that system  complete  would cast  their  control ballot  man.  that of  political  harmony and  surprising  have  a  bill  that  parties  were  seen  the  creators  of  the  policies  and  been h i g h l y d e t r i m e n t a l  to  as  social actions  their  AT  strength  and  government  to  Sukarnoists elite. Partindo the  PNI  even  This as from  existence„  purge  a l l  and l e f t i s t s  Initial  parties —  was  of  to  the  banning  well  as  the  expulsion  party.  Old Order  by  of  the of  of  radical initially  new —  the  PKI and l a t e r  the  The government  the  elements  welcomed by most  led  the  efforts  wing  of of  allowed  - 96 the c r e a t i o n of a new  Muslim p a r t y hut  a c t i o n s t h a t i t f a i l e d to develop and sanctioned  so r e s t r i c t e d i t s later a split  was  "by the government with the appointment o f a  c a b i n e t member and  c l o s e f r i e n d of Suharto's as  general  64 chairman o f the p a r t y .  The  PNI  was  manipulated  again  i n i t s l a t e s t congress w i t h a long-time f r i e n d of Suharto's appointed c h a i r m a n . ^  P o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s have a t  continued a tenuous e x i s t e n c e .  I t was  them t h a t Suharto would not permit any newly found harmony and  stability.  best  c l e a r to a l l of challenge  to  the  A l l remaining p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s have sworn t h e i r a l l e g i a n c e to the New  Order  and  Suharto p e r s o n a l l y , unanimously approving him as t h e i r choice  f o r President  i n 1973» and  s e v e r a l have even  announced t h e i r w i l l i n g n e s s to disband and themselves i f i t i s the wish of the  dissolve 66  President.  At t h i s p o i n t i t i s worth c o n s i d e r i n g why  Suharto  would a l l o w e l e c t i o n s , i f he b e l i e v e s i n complete harmony, because Indonesia's one had  experience w i t h general  seen the c r e a t i o n of a tremendous amount of  tension.  One  cannot deny the P r e s i d e n t ' s  elections social  honest i n t e n t i o n  t o " b u i l d democracy" which f o r him means t h a t f r e e e l e c t i o n s are r e g u l a r l y held. commanded him  A d d i t i o n a l l y the 1966  to h o l d e l e c t i o n s i n 1968,  t h a t d e c i s i o n would have c o s t him w e l l as d e s t r o y  one  MPRS had and  disobeying  c r u c i a l e l i t e support as  of the " l e g i t i m a c y " symbols of h i s  - 97 rule.  F i n a l l y , there must have been some pressure  the o u t s i d e  considering  the l a r g e amounts o f f o r e i g n a i d  the New Order needs to implement i t s program. all  from  o f those "push" f a c t o r s Suharto was very  Even w i t h hesitant  about the a c t u a l implementation o f the e l e c t i o n s .  He  took h i s case to the MPRS and won a three year d e l a y but even then adamantly s t a t e d t h a t e l e c t i o n s would n o t be h e l d u n t i l they would n o t d i s t u r b economic development and  r e h a b i l i t a t i o n , the s t a b i l i t y of the regime p l u s  guarantee a v i c t o r y f o r the New Order. set  With  conditions  i t i s l i t t l e wonder that some observers were d o u b t f u l  t h a t the e l e c t i o n s would even be h e l d i n 1971 and t h a t there would be no p o s s i b i l i t y o f Suharto being d i s c r e d i t e d through them. Suharto and E l e c t i o n Controls If  the e l e c t i o n s were to e v e n t u a l l y be h e l d , Suharto  was determined to c o n t r o l them.  He probably concluded that  no d r a s t i c changes i n the p o l i t i c a l in  system c o u l d be made  the short run and t h a t b e t t e r c o n t r o l could be guaranteed  through the p r o p o r t i o n a l system and behind the scenes interference i n party a f f a i r s . no  Still  the New Order had  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e o f i t s own to compete i n the  election.  A New Order p o l i t i c a l p a r t y was r u l e d out and  the m i l i t a r y backed Golongan Karya or Golkar was r e v i v e d and  t o some extent  r e i n v i g o r a t e d to compete a g a i n s t the  - 98 parties.  68  S t i l l unsure of Golkar's a b i l i t y to a t t r a c t  v o t e s , Suharto a p p o i n t 100 DPR  i n s i s t e d t h a t he p e r s o n a l l y be allowed to  (out of a t o t a l of 460)  and o n e - t h i r d of the MPR  parliaments.  members to the  new  p l u s 20$ of the r e g i o n a l  Given the f r a c t u r e d nature of the p o l i t i c a l  p a r t y system, t h i s appointment power e s s e n t i a l l y meant t h a t the P r e s i d e n t ' s f r a c t i o n would be the l a r g e s t i n the DPR  even i f Golkar d i d not win any  seats a t a l l .  However, j u s t the l a r g e s t c o n t i n g e n t was Suharto needed an a b s o l u t e m a j o r i t y i n the DPR  not enough; to p r o v i d e  the necessary l e g a l c o a t i n g f o r any p o l i c y he wanted to 69  implement.  7  While A l l Murtopo and h i s S p e c i a l  Operations  group were d i v i d i n g the p a r t i e s among themselves,  Amir  Machmud, M i n i s t e r of I n t e r i o r , became Chairman of the E l e c t i o n s Board  to which the l i s t  p a r t y had to be submitted arbitrarily New  o f candidates from each  f o r approval;  names c o u l d  be removed i f , a c c o r d i n g t o the Board, t h e i r  Order c r e d e n t i a l s were lacking„  A c c o r d i n g to B e r i t a  70 Yudha  some 550  candidates were d i s q u a l i f i e d i n t h i s  manner of the t o t a l of around 3»500.  Machmud a d d i t i o n a l l y  brought as much p r e s s u r e as p o s s i b l e to bear on the government apparatus Golkar.  to i n s u r e t h a t i t was  l o y a l to  As even s c h o o l teachers are government employees,  percentage t i c a l l y of aware people t h i s i n c l u dof e s athel a pr oglei number people and ai nv ethe r y lcountry. arge  7  - 99 F i n a l l y , Golkar  coopted almost a l l I n f l u e n t i a l  community l e a d e r s on to t h e i r l i s t s , whether they  intended 72  for  the i n d i v i d u a l to s i t i n the DPR  l a t e r or not.  p a r t i e s complained t h a t t h e i r members were b e i n g to  j o i n Golkar.  of any  Golkar was  The  forced  a l s o c l e a r l y the best  financed  of the c o n t e s t a n t s .  The  r e s u l t s , as mentioned  e a r l i e r , were a s t o n i s h i n g .  Two  of the 9 p a r t i e s d i d not  r e c e i v e a seat and  the l a r g e s t p a r t y contingent  almost 20 members s m a l l e r than the appointed military fraction.  The  PNI,  by many observers, was D j a k a r t a and  75 member  once the s t r o n g e s t  communist p a r t y i n the country and  was  non-  the f o r e c a s t e d winner  v i r t u a l l y destroyed  outside  C e n t r a l Java as i t s b u r e a u c r a t i c  of  constituency  73  was  taken away from i t . With such an a b s o l u t e  was  e l e c t i o n v i c t o r y , the  stage  s e t f o r the d e s t r u c t i o n of the e n t i r e e x i s t i n g  party  system i n a l e g a l manner.  In speaking  about a new  system,  Amir Machmud s t a t e d "whether l a t e r we w i l l have mass p a r t i e s or cadre p a r t i e s depends on c o n t i n u i n g but we have enough experience  research  with the f a i l u r e of mass  74 parties".  Perhaps t h i s i s p a r t of the r e a s o n i n g  the " f l o a t i n g mass" system which w i l l from o r g a n i z i n g i n the v i l l a g e — w i l l become the s o l e p r o p e r t y service.  behind  forbid a l l parties  c o n t r o l of the people  of ABRI and  the  civil  A d d i t i o n a l blows were aimed a t the p a r t i e s ,  -  100  -  e x i s t i n g or f u t u r e o n e s , by f o r b i d d i n g l a b o r u n i o n s associate with p o l i t i c a l "depoliticization"  p a r t i e s and the  of the c i v i l  c r e a t i o n o f KORPRI ( N a t i o n a l which a l l  civil  continued  s e r v i c e through  Civil  the  Servants Corps)  s e r v a n t s must b e l o n g .  to  It  will  to  be 75  affiliated  w i t h the " n o n - p o l i t i c a l " o r g a n i z a t i o n G o l k a r .  So a t t h e moment t h e two new p o l i t i c a l  federations  l i t t l e more t h a n h o l l o w s h e l l s a n d i n t h e i r groups have l o s t a l l  political  anonymous  claims to separate i d e n t i t y  i d e o l o g i c a l p u l l i n g power.'  are  The c e n t r a l p a r t  and  of  the  system i s c l e a r l y under t i g h t c o n t r o l .  With  the  government's a i d , G o l k a r a l r e a d y l o o k s l i k e an even b i g g e r 77  winner i n  I976.  While p o l i t i c a l and m a l l e a b l e  for  has always been a t parties civil  Suharto at  run.  in practice?  one a n s w e r , b u t  o f many c i v i l  i n the short  the c e n t e r ,  the v i l l a g e l e v e l ,  out of the v i l l a g e  service i s  loyalty  p a r t i e s have proved v e r y their  strength  who c a n k e e p  the  Obviously  the  even w i t h KORPRI,  the  s e r v a n t s i n the r e g i o n s i s  doubtful  The army i s t h e s e c o n d p o s s i b l e a n s w e r .  S u h a r t o has had a l o n g s t r u g g l e over the m i l i t a r y  tame  gaining absolute  and c r e a t i n g a s t r u c t u r e  control  to maintain  it,  7R  b u t h e seems t o h a v e b e e n e x t r e m e l y s u c c e s s f u l . Sukarno had to it  continually battle  t o o b e y , S u h a r t o now h a s l i t t l e  w i t h the m i l i t a r y trouble.  Where to  get  His personal  ]  - 101 f r i e n d s and  -  t h e i r f r i e n d s i n t u r n are s c a t t e r e d a l l through  the c i v i l bureaucracy i n the r e g i o n s , and a l s o are in  the m i l i t a r y s t r u c t u r e that p a r a l l e l s the  strong  civilian  79  one a l l the way  to the v i l l a g e level,,  t h a t Indonesia i s more secure and has d i s r u p t i o n than a t any  power to Suharto, he was  for  1966  less internal  Sukarno ceded f u l l m i l i t a r y  given emergency a u t h o r i t y  security threat,  the R e s t o r a t i o n  result is  time s i n c e independence.  When on March 11,  d e a l with any  The  to  KOPKAMTIB or the Command  of Peace and  S e c u r i t y was  s e t up w i t h  80 e x t r a - c o n s t i t u t i o n a l powers, and The  i t s t i l l exists.  m i l i t a r y has not h e s i t a t e d to use  i t s power.  of p o l i t i c a l p r i s o n e r s a t t e s t to t h i s f a c t .  Thousands  ABRI has  c l e a r l y performed i t s d u t i e s w e l l as the d e s t r u c t i o n the G-30-S and  of  the u p r i s i n g near B l i t a r i n I968 show.  ABRI has a l s o used i t s power to suspend PNI s e v e r a l areas and  activities in  to prevent groups which i t does not  t r u s t from e n t e r i n g the v i l l a g e s .  81 x  As the m i l i t a r y has  82 no i n t e n t i o n of r e t u r n i n g to the b a r r a c k s ,  control i s  l i k e l y to continue to be a major f u n c t i o n o f the m i l i t a r y u n t i l Suharto f e e l s he can t r u s t the c i v i l i a n apparatus to do h i s  bidding.  Thus, the p o l i t i c s o f the New  Order might be  d e s c r i b e d as the p o l i t i c s of m a n i p u l a t i o n and  best  intrigue,  L i k e the r u l e r s of Mataram, Suharto seeks to have persons  who a r e key  personally  positions  government, and  by  the  than  even  the  political parties.  strength the  is  however, of  control his  the  or  rulers  theoretical  the  fact  for  the  i n the  formal  "Suharto  must h e s i t a t e  will  to  the  add  the  g r e a t mass  such measures fashion at  are  the  the  before  but he  level  be  i t  to  unity  tightened  the  of  he,  society  like of  weakness. measures  government he  up facilities  problem  actual  knows  implemented be  and  disparate  introduces  and to  the  harmony.  the  for  rather  strength  history,  with  of  maintained  use  the  the  has  of  which the  to  are  more a n d b e t t e r  population,  likely  local  faced  control  pressure of  Suharto  penetration  is  of  maintain  and has  order  them.  to  Today,  archipelago's  Mataram,  and  to  regional  of attachment  measures  that  within  willingness feeling  the  manipulation  obedience  regime.  direct  on I n d o n e s i a  of  the  ability  the  ruler  and  in  Harmony,  the  "friends"  over-riding  and i t s  control  t h a n any  the  or  m i l i t a r y and  through  loyalty  force  nation  Despite  at  and  o f ABRI are  regime  his  maintained  through any the  assistants  bureaucracy,  threat  system,  him or h i s  the  organizations  Ultimately,  to  of  stability  these  loyal  -  102  in  used as  which  exerts  on  that  most  distorted warrants  for 8  more  regulatory  Thus  the  activity  problem of  hampering  formal  "under-centralization"  the  flow  of  over-centralization  still  exists  for  the  3  trade." but  actual  New O r d e r  just  - 103 as  i t d i d i n the realm o f Mataram. The a c t i o n s o f Sukarno and Suharto can be a t t r i b u t e d  to  the wishes o f a r u l e r to accumulate power and simply be  a b l e to c o n t r o l h i s environment.  The power thus accumulated  can  be used to p r o c l a i m the r u l e r ' s p r i v i l e g e and p r o t e c t  the  s t a t u s quo or to a f f e c t b a s i c changes i n the s o c i e t y .  The former was the concept o f Mataram and of the Dutch c o l o n i a l regime i n Indonesia.  In d e s c r i b i n g Indonesian  s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e , Levine c a l l e d i t e s s e n t i a l l y a " r e t r o g r e s s i v e " s o c i a l system?  the acute emphasis on  p r i v i l e g e , s t a t u s and i t s p r o t e c t i o n was h i s f o c u s . I n t e r n a l l y , the Sukarno regime a c t e d i n t h a t manner and the  c o n t r a c t i o n o f the p o l i t i c a l system under the New  Order too has been used, i n General Nasution's own wordsj  84 to p r o t e c t the s t a t u s quo.  On the other hand,the  New  Order has p r o c l a i m e d as i t s major theme m o d e r n i z a t i o n and development change.  What i s the nature of t h i s  The Problems of Change and Economic  change?  Development;  The l a t e P r e s i d e n t Sukarno f r a n k l y admitted h i s d i s l i k e f o r the d e t a i l s of economics and o b v i o u s l y p l a c e d i t low on h i s l i s t his  of national p r i o r i t i e s .  S e v e r a l times  regime began or almost began what l o o k e d l i k e  serious  economic reform but i n each i n s t a n c e could not m a i n t a i n the at  i n i t i a l d i r e c t i o n and t h r u s t . ^  Sukarno's attempts  r e a l and c o n s i s t e n t change, other than d e s t r u c t i o n o f  - 104 i n s t i t u t i o n s , were a t best h a l f - h e a r t e d served as more of a symbolic The  New  86  and usually-  a c t than a n y t h i n g e l s e .  Order has p l a c e d economic development a t  top o f i t s l i s t  of announced p r i o r i t i e s .  In a  the  way  development or pembangunan ( l i t e r a l l y b u i l d i n g ) has become one  of the symbolic  However, we  i i n c h - p i n s of the New  are not l o o k i n g a t the New  perspective.  The new  a t most 6 years  Order i n h i s t o r i c a l  regime economically  o l d and  i s only 5 or  i n the l o n g run c o u l d very w e l l  d r i f t i n t o the same morass as other J a v a n i z e d have.  The  Order.  economic changes under the New  governments  Order are  by  no means guaranteed or s e l f - s u s t a i n i n g as of y e t . simple  f a c t t h a t f o r the f i r s t  modernization  time i n the n a t i o n ' s h i s t o r y  and development are widely d i s c u s s e d  most i m p o r t a n t l y ,  has  and  something i s b e i n g done about i t c a l l s  f o r some s o r t of examination of the r o o t s o f the Simply why  The  shift.  the Southeast A s i a n n a t i o n t h a t has  been  d e s c r i b e d as the l e a s t development minded suddenly become one  o f the most so, and  f i n a l l y f o r what purpose i s t h i s  development b e i n g used? I t must be remembered t h a t the members of  the  p o l i t i c a l and b u r e a u c r a t i c e l i t e t h a t have governed Indonesia  s i n c e independence have now  been pushed a s i d e  o r are i n a p o s i t i o n c l e a r l y subordinate army.  to t h a t of  the  The m i l i t a r y , d e s p i t e some degree of pri.ja.ji  and  - 105 k e s a t r i a i n f l u e n c e and norms, i s a l s o the p a r t of the s o c i e t y t h a t has been most g r e a t l y i n f l u e n c e d by Western o r g a n i z a t i o n a l norms. group theory one  I f Robert M. P r i c e ' s  has any a p p l i c a b i l i t y , Indonesia i s s u r e l y  case o f i t .  Despite  the much p u b l i c i z e d E a s t e r n  Block a i d t o the Indonesian m i l i t a r y — concentrated  reference  which was l a r g e l y  on the navy and a i r f o r c e —  numbers o f Indonesians went to the United m i l i t a r y methods and o r g a n i z a t i o n .  far greater States  t o study  The army has always  been i d e o l o g i c a l l y as w e l l as t e c h n o l o g i c a l l y more o r i e n t e d toward the West than to the E a s t , i t s own d o c t r i n e s  88  While  maintaining  o f g u e r i l l a and t e r r i t o r i a l  warfare, 89  i n a d d i t i o n t o b u i l d i n g i t s Dual Function  theory,  Indonesian army, i f i t had any o u t s i d e r e f e r e n c e t o which i t looked  group  f o r p r o f e s s i o n a l and o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  norms a t a l l , was a d o p t i n g ideas p a r t i c u l a r l y United  the  from Western, and  States' m i l i t a r y  establishments.  With t h i s background i n mind, one member o f the Indonesian m i l i t a r y t o l d t h i s author t h a t i t was q u i t e n a t u r a l f o r the m i l i t a r y once i n c o n t r o l to espouse 90 "development" as i t s major g o a l .  The m i l i t a r y saw  many t h i n g s i n the West t h a t they wished t o have and f e l t t h a t they were i n a good p o s i t i o n t o push the s o c i e t y towards those m a t e r i a l ends.  Seeing m o d e r n i z a t i o n and  development p r i m a r i l y as t e c h n i c a l matters, they assumed  - 106 that  they were the b e s t q u a l i f i e d s e c t i o n  of the  t o i m p l e m e n t them. The m i l i t a r y p r o b a b l y a l s o a large  part  of the reason  I n d o n e s i a was  the low standard of l i v i n g  d e c l i n i n g economy. without  felt  economic development  t h e New O r d e r e l i t e  and s t a b i l i t y . development and s o c i a l  of  that  the PKI i n  coupled with  and d e v i a t i o n ,  the  t o be a m u s t .  It  Coupled w i t h d e p o l i t i c i z a t i o n ,  became t h e s o l u t i o n t o I n d o n e s i a ' s  the  survive  i n achieving Pantjasila  would  Democracy  economic political  problems.  The New O r d e r ' s l e a d e r s are  felt  I n order f o r the p o l i t y t o  further radical influence  military assist  f o r the s t r e n g t h  society  and A l i Murtopo i n p a r t i c u l a r  fond of t a l k i n g of the next  25 y e a r s a s a p e r i o d  of  91 accelerated  development.  e n v i s i o n e d as fabric  This period i s  one o f s l o w b u t c o n s t a n t  of society.  Development The p r o c e s s  will  versa.  overnight  but o n l y w i t h f i r m and s t a b l e  jasila  state  guaranteeing  one t h a t  constantly  order and s t a b i l i t y . and guidance  to s t a r t  c a n n o t be  leadership guard the  rather  made over Pant-  The p r i v a t e  from the government  sector will  i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n of the c o u n t r y .  Green R e v o l u t i o n w i l l become  entire  from i d e o l o g i c a l and p o l i t i c a l e x c e s s e s ,  with assistance expected  ABRI w i l l  change i n the  control politics  than vice  the e n t i r e p e r i o d .  is  evidently  self-sufficient  be r e a l i z e d a n d I n d o n e s i a in rice.  be The  will  E v e n t u a l l y , t h e masses  will  - 107  -  be educated f o r m a l l y and i n f o r m a l l y i n "modern ways" and enjoy a h i g h e r standard of l i v i n g . A l l of t h i s i s t o be a c c o m p l i s h e d through a s e r i e s o f f i v e y e a r development p l a n s t h a t a r e c o n s t a n t l y b e i n g r e a d j u s t e d t o meet new  problems and demands.  the f i r s t p l a n R e p e l i t a I was  Originally  to s t r e s s r e h a b i l i t a t i o n  o f the t r a n s p o r t a t i o n system and i n c r e a s i n g a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t i o n , w h i l e the second p l a n was on i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n .  to p l a c e emphasis  Non-party t e c h n o c r a t s  and  i n t e l l e c t u a l s were c o o p t e d i n t o the regime t o a s s i s t  the  m i l i t a r y i n a c h i e v i n g the g o a l s . To t h i s p o i n t the r e s u l t s have s i m p l y been amazing, i f o n l y i n comparison w i t h p r e v i o u s e f f o r t s .  The R e p e l i t a  I i s coming t o a s e e m i n g l y s u c c e s s f u l c o n c l u s i o n and  the  immeasurably d e s t r u c t i v e h y p e r i n f l a t i o n of the e a r l y and mid-1960's has been brought t o a d r a m a t i c a r e s t a b l e and e x p o r t s r i s i n g . 92 a t about 7$ p e r y e a r .  The  halt.  Prices  economy i s expanding  S t a t i s t i c a l l y a t l e a s t the  New  Order's program seems t o be b e i n g implemented. D e s p i t e the optimism expressed Indonesia's  i n some q u a r t e r s f o r  economic f u t u r e t h e r e a r e s i g n s of  difficulties.  acute  Development as i t has o c c u r r e d so f a r seems  t o be happening d e s p i t e the m a j o r i t y o f the r a t h e r than because of them.  The  population  great r o l e played i n  a l l developments thus f a r by f o r e i g n a i d and i n v e s t m e n t must /  - 108 not  be overlooked.  stability  The b e n e f i t s of the New Order's  and economic growth seem t o be a c c r u i n g t o a  v e r y small p o r t i o n of the p o p u l a t i o n .  With p o l i t i c a l  d e m o b i l i z a t i o n , the masses a r e n o t p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n any p r o c e s s be i t p o l i t i c a l  o r developmental,  Thus f a r the  New Order's development program has only r e i n f o r c e d the s t a t u s and p r i v i l e g e of the r i c h and powerful as w e l l 93  as  p r o v i d i n g b e t t e r means o f c o n t r o l . The New Order government acknowledges t h i s problem  and says P e l i t a I I w i l l put emphasis on narrowing the income gap which i n Indonesia's case i s a l s o a r u r a l urban gap. the  P r e s i d e n t Suharto h i m s e l f has- s a i d t h a t i f  b e n e f i t s o f development a r e n o t f e l t by a l l a s o c i a l  95 revolution w i l l  i n e v i t a b l y come.  Statements about  good i n t e n t i o n s f o r the f u t u r e a s i d e , however, even the New Order does n o t appear to be u s i n g t h e i r new t o o l o f development to any d i f f e r e n t purpose than Mataram r u l e r s used t h e i r e x i s t i n g t o o l s o f r u l e r s h i p .  The purpose  behind change i s a very c o n s e r v a t i v e one a t b e s t .  As  Huntington has put i t the m i l i t a r y ' s view o f economic  96 development i s t y p i c a l l y middle c l a s s and urban. remains to be seen how t h a t view w i l l p r e s s u r e of the impoverished r u r a l  change under  masses.  It  - 109 The S t y l e of Indonesian Government We have p r e v i o u s l y d i s c u s s e d an a l t e r n a t i v e way  to  view the s t r u c t u r e and f u n c t i o n s of the contemporary Indonesian government. debatable  While  f o r Indonesian and  our i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s f o r e i g n e r a l i k e , the  style  of Indonesian government i s one t h i n g t h a t almost a l l observers agree on as being very Javanese.  Style i s a  p a r t o f b e h a v i o r but c e r t a i n l y not the t o t a l content of i t . S t y l e i s the way  i n which t h i n g s are done and the way  which problems are p e r c e i v e d and approached.  Of  in  course  s t y l e has' i n f l u e n c e on goals and r e s u l t s a l s o f o r the e n t i r e span of behavior i s r e l a t e d . Anderson and Geertz both note t h a t  single-mindedness  o f purpose i s regarded by Javanese as the key to s u c c e s s . A b s o l u t e c o n c e n t r a t i o n on the o b j e c t d e s i r e d i s needed b e f o r e the g o a l can be a c h i e v e d . f o r the seemingly  T h i s may  h e l p t o account  s i n g l e t r a c k o f Guided Democracy i n  r e l a t i o n s h i p to the completion of the Indonesian R e v o l u t i o n . Once t h i s g o a l was  p e r c e i v e d as the u l t i m a t e aim o f the  n a t i o n , r e g a r d l e s s of i t s t r u e meaning or content, i t would have been heresy to l o s e c o n c e n t r a t i o n by b e i n g s i d e - t r a c k e d i n t o economic s t a b i l i z a t i o n and development. The New  Order has taken up the same stance.  Modernization  are  and economic development to t h i s p o i n t /; p e r c e i v e d as the u l t i m a t e aim or g o a l of the regime w h i l e a c t u a l  content  -  110  -  I s a g a i n r a t h e r h a z i l y understood, a l l o w e d to stand i n the way fail.  and n o t h i n g must be  of i t s r e a l i z a t i o n or i t w i l l  C o n c e n t r a t i o n must not be l o s t .  Should  o b s e r v a t i o n have any degree of t r u t h to i t , w e l l f o r the continuance  this  i t augurs  of present o r i e n t a t i o n a t l e a s t  97  i n name. On the other hand i t i s extremely bad t a s t e f o r a Javanese to show emotion and i n n e r d e s i r e s .  For i n s t a n c e ,  c u l t u r a l norms i n Javanese prl.ja.11 s o c i e t y are very s t r o n g a g a i n s t the open d i s p l a y of r i c h e s or power seeking  motives.  Thus the would-be r u l e r must seem to be i n a c t i v e or p a s s i v e s power must flow to him because of h i s s u p e r i o r c o n c e n t r a t i o n and i n n e r q u a l i t i e s .  T h i s may  a l s o h e l p to account  for  Sukarno's h e s i t a n c y to appear w i l l i n g to take the r e i n s of power and be a n o t i c e a b l y a c t i v e i n g r e d i e n t i n the d o w n f a l l of the p a r l i a m e n t a r y system.  He gave  suggestions  i n p u b l i c but from F e i t h and Lev's w r i t i n g we know that behind the scenes he was  never w i l l i n g to support  the  e x i s t i n g system and d i d what he c o u l d to hasten i t s downfall.  As a r e s u l t power seemed to j u s t flow to  Sukarno and away from the o l d system. tended  Westerners have  to see Sukarno as a very a c t i v e element i n the  d e c l i n e of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l democracy, t h e r e f o r e to be condemned, but Indonesians as a s a v i o u r , as  (Javanese?)  tend to view him  one whose approach to the s i t u a t i o n  was  - Ills t r o n g and u n y i e l d i n g ;  whose i n n e r s t r e n g t h allowed him  to r e s t o r e order and concentrate  power a t the center  again.  One o f the more i n t e r e s t i n g frameworks f o r viewing post-G-30-S p o l i t i c s has been presented by Peter Polomka who p o i n t s out t h a t Indonesian p o l i t i c s seem more l i k e a wajang k u l i t or shadow p l a y than anything he means that i t i s almost impossible  else.  By t h i s  to t e l l by p u b l i c  a c t i o n s the r e a l i n t e n t s and purposes o f the a c t o r s . i s e s s e n t i a l l y an expression  This  o f the non-emotion and non-  d e s i r e norms we a r e t a l k i n g about.  I t can c l e a r l y be  n o t i c e d d u r i n g the Suharto-Sukarno s t r u g g l e o f I965-I967. Suharto was c a r e f u l never to openly d i s p l a y a d e s i r e f o r power o r a c t i v e l y do anything s t r u g g l e w i t h Sukarno was very proxy.  to achieve i t ,  Suharto's  covert and o f t e n waged by  The students i n the c i t i e s and the " f a n a t i c ' Muslims 5  i n the v i l l a g e s had more t o do with the d e s t r u c t i o n o f the PKI and Sukarno's support than Suharto appeared t o .  Even  the l e s s Javanese elements ( p r i m a r i l y S i l i w a n g i and RPKAD) o f the army were the ones to openly d i s p l a y t h e i r o p p o s i t i o n to PKI and Sukarno.  Thus Suharto j u s t waited w h i l e h i s  opponents were destroyed  and d i s c l o s u r e s made about  Sukarno t h a t weakened h i s p u b l i c p o s i t i o n appeared from the o u t s i d e .  s  or so i t a l l  Power seemed t o be f l o w i n g to  Suharto q u i t e without e f f o r t on h i s p a r t ;  hence as a  r e s u l t o f h i s i n n e r power and c o n c e n t r a t i o n .  98  - 112  -  While i t was not proper f o r Suharto to engage i n a s t r u g g l e with h i s t e c h n i c a l s u p e r i o r , h i s a s s i s t a n t s go c o u l d do i t without h e s i t a t i o n .  7  Thus,the  Special  Operations or Opsus group, which had a r i s e n from pre-G-30-S o p p o s i t i o n to Sukarno and Subandrio by the m i l i t a r y was  l e d by a Diponegoro  and  and Mandala subordinate of Suharto's,  All Murtopo,continued  to operate w h i l e the a s p i r a n t  remained u n t a i n t e d from the s c a r s of " d i r t y " b a t t l e s and kept h i s "white K n i g h t " image.  political The need f o r  S p e c i a l Operations has continued throughout the p e r i o d of the New  Order.  up i n p o l i t i c a l  The P r e s i d e n t does not u s u a l l y get mixed b a t t l e s and p u b l i c l y says l i t t l e  of them.  But d u r i n g both PNI p a r t y congresses s i n c e the G-30-S, Opsus p r e s s u r e was  f e l t and on both o c c a s i o n s l e a d e r s  a c c e p t a b l e to Suharto were e l e c t e d to the top p a r t y posts and those h o s t i l e e i t h e r o s t r a c i z e d or i s o l a t e d .  The  1968  101 MPRS s e s s i o n was manipulated behind the scenes by Opsus. The 1971  PMI  s p l i t was  a l l e g e d l y a i d e d by Opsus and f o r  sure the West I r i a n p l e b i s c i t e and the r e c e n t g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n s were t a r g e t s of the S p e c i a l Operations  group.  S i m i l a r l y there have been charges of the same k i n d of i n t e r f e r e n c e a t the January I972 NU Congress where the most a v i d c r i t i c of the m i l i t a r y was  subsequently k i c k e d  102 off  the l e a d e r s h i p c o u n c i l and r e t i r e d .  i s now  A l i Murtopo  the ASPRI f o r S p e c i a l Operations and has a c q u i r e d  - 113  -  q u i t e a r e p u t a t i o n as a "bulldozer'"' f o r the t a c t i c s uses.  Whatever the t r u t h of the matter i s  9  he  h i s power  and i n f l u e n c e have grown immensely w i t h the successes of these o p e r a t i o n s and the P r e s i d e n t has l a r g e l y been a b l e to a v o i d e x p r e s s i n g h i s emotion or showing any  desire  103  f o r power i n the p r o c e s s . I t i s f u r t h e r i n t e r e s t i n g to note here t h a t a l t h o u g h Suharto's P r e s i d e n t i a l term i s completed i n 1973  and almost  everyone has spoken out i n f a v o r o f h i s r e - e l e c t i o n , the P r e s i d e n t h i m s e l f has never spoken p u b l i c l y about the subject.  In f a c t , the only time Suharto has even  the Presj.dency w h i l e t h i s author was  mentioned  i n the country, he  d e c l a r e d h i m s e l f to be the humble s e r v a n t o f the people and t h a t i f anyone wanted t o r e p l a c e him, they s h o u l d do so by c o n s t i t u t i o n a l means a t the 1973  MPR  session;  yet  i n r e a l i t y to attempt to do so, no matter what the m o t i v a t i o n , would be tantamount  to s u i c i d e f o r any  individual  104 o r group.  So f o r whatever  the reason, Suharto has  shown a remarkable n o n - i n t e r e s t i n the p u r s u i t of p o l i t i c a l power i n p u b l i c .  T h i s i s perhaps why  i n I969  Van der K r o e f could remark, "....Suharto has i n c r e a s i n g l y . a c q u i r e d the r e p u t a t i o n of b e i n g a good man  thrust  into  105 a job seemingly beyond h i s c a p a c i t i e s " . politics  of the New  The  real  Order does not go on i n p u b l i c and  Suharto does not express dynami sm  through h i s p u b l i c  - 114 speaking  or a c t i o n s .  P u b l i c l y he gives the i m p r e s s i o n  one  s u b j e c t or even v i c t i m to the flow of  and  events, which as a good Javanese he should, but  of  circumstances behind  the scenes i t seems to be an e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t matter:  106 the P r e s i d e n t i s i n a b s o l u t e  control.  The P r e s i d e n t has d e c i d e d l y shown emotion on only two  or three occasions  s i n c e h i s r i s e to power and always  when he f e l t he was  being pushed i n t o a c o r n e r  o t h e r choice except  to l o s e face or h i s realm.  o c c a s i o n was  a t the h e i g h t of M u s l i m - C h r i s t i a n  without One  such  tensions  107 in  With the s a n t r i Muslims seemingly ready  I968.  d e c l a r e "Holy War"  on the C h r i s t i a n s who  " s t e a l i n g " c o n v e r t s , Suharto had l i t t l e express  to  were seen as c h o i c e but  to  h i s extreme d i s p l e a s u r e a t the thought of a  resultant c i v i l  war.  Harmony c o u l d not be d i s t u r b e d i n  such an i n t o l e r a n t manner.  Again  i n January  1972,  f o l l o w i n g two months of p r o t e s t s concerning a tourism  and  c u l t u r a l p r o j e c t proposed by h i s w i f e , Suharto l a s h e d  out  i n p u b l i c a t those t r y i n g to undermine the s t a b i l i t y the s t a t e .  The  P r e s i d e n t t o t a l l y ignored a l l of the  economic arguments t h a t had been put p r o j e c t and  of  forward a g a i n s t  the  i n t e r p r e t e d the p r o t e s t s as p e r s o n a l a t t a c k s  upon "himself and h i s f a m i l y .  In t h i s case the P r e s i d e n t  must have f e l t h i s honor a t stake and had and h i s f a m i l y .  108  to defend  himself  The  "wajang" s o r t o f p o l i t i c s r e f l e c t i n g pri,1a.1l  s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s has a s e r i o u s e f f e c t on the way t h a t Indonesian p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y l e a d e r s view any a c t i o n . Nothing can be taken f o r s u r f a c e v a l u e ; be a hidden motive  for action.  there always must  Since the Javanese  p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r s themselves do n o t p l a y "honest" or d i r e c t p o l i t i c s , they have no reason t o expect o t h e r p o l i t i c a l a c t o r s t o do so e i t h e r .  The D j a k a r t a e l i t e  spends hours o f d i s c u s s i o n t r y i n g t o d i s c o v e r the t r u e meaning and l a t a r belakang  ( l i t e r a l l y background) o f any  statement made or a c t i o n taken.  Since most a c t o r s do  operate t h a t way i t i s not an e n t i r e l y f r u i t l e s s t a s k . Since speaking d i r e c t l y from the h e a r t or f r a n k l y i s n o t h i g h l y valued among Javanese but e v i d e n t a l l y , i s w i t h most "modernist" Muslims and many o f the younger s t u d e n t s , p a r t i c u l a r l y the non-Javanese ones, a s e r i o u s communication gap a r i s e s .  This has t o be a p a r t o f the reason  Muslims have been pushed out o f the p o l i t i c a l  'modernist'  system and  why the "Angkatan '66*' or ' 6 6 Generation have n o t been a b l e t o f i n d a comfortable p l a c e i n the New Order 109 constellation.  T h i s a l s o p a r t l y accounts f o r the  d i f f i c u l t y t h a t f o r e i g n e r s have had i n communicating w i t h 110 the Old Order as w e l l as the New Order  regime.  The above p o i n t s out the f u t i l i t y o f the regime.  of d i r e c t  criticism  I t w i l l not be understood and f r e q u e n t l y  - 116 other motives attached critic  to i t s u t t e r a n c e ,  i n t r o u b l e or p o i n t i n g him  getting  the  out as an automatic  enemy o f the regime, meaning t h a t a l l h i s statements should  be i g n o r e d .  p r o t e s t e r s over and  T h i s has  happened w i t h the  over a g a i n .  They can make a l l o f  " r a t i o n a l " arguments they want but a s i d e i n the search i n the KAK  student  they w i l l be  f o r u l t e r i o r motives.  the  brushed  This happened  (Korps A n t i - K o r u p s i ) , Mahasiswa Mengugat  (Students A c c u s e ) , K i t a I n g i n Tahu (we  Tyrant  Golput (Golongan P u t i h or White Group) and Indonesia Indah p r o t e s t s as w e l l .  111  to know), the  Mlnatur  When A l i Murtopo  says t h a t such p r o t e s t s do not harmonize w i t h the  spirit  112 o f s t r u g g l e of the New  Order  what he means i s t h a t  such d i r e c t a t t a c k s on p r i v i l e g e are simply  not  i n harmony  w i t h Javanese s o c i a l e t i q u e t t e . T h i s r a i s e s the q u e s t i o n newspaper c r i t i c i s m and why demonstrations are d i r e c t personal  of the  often stringent  i t does e x i s t w h i l e p r o t e s t  forbidden.  One  answer here i s t h a t  a t t a c k on f i g u r e s of the New  s h i p i s not p e r m i t t e d . reach only urban and  J  And  by and  l a r g e newspapers  semi-urban areas,  only 2 or J% o f the p o p u l a t i o n  Order l e a d e r -  a t most.  probably a f f e c t i n g Besides  there are s e v e r a l i n d i c a t i o n s t h a t j o u r n a l i s t i c i s not  taken i n t o account by New  Order l e a d e r s .  this criticism General  Sumitro, the power behind KOPKAMTIB, s a i d t h a t he d i d not  -  117  -  even "bother to read Indonesian newspapers because they 114  were not of high enough q u a l i t y .  This does not mean  that newspapers are not continually harassed and t h e i r 115  c r e d i b i l i t y undermined by the regime.  J  On the other  hand, there does e x i s t a long l i t e r a l t r a d i t i o n i n Java where c r i t i c i s m was allowed i f done i n an i n d i v i d u a l  way.  Perhaps t h i s i s why Harlan Kami and Indonesia Ra.ja as well as the pure oppositionist Abadi can exist with as much 116  freedom as they do. Unfortunately, the problem of opposition and c r i t i c i s m has certain ethnic overtones.  C r i t i c i s m can  be accepted i f i t i s done i n a halus enough manner that i t does not appear to be c r i t i c i s m at a l l .  Naturally  enough, t h i s sort of persuasion i s best done by someone with long experience i n dealing with Javanese and who i s very well acquainted with Javanese culture and  language.  Outer Islanders, p a r t i c u l a r l y of the "modernist" Muslim group, seldom have such knowledge and experience or care to develop i t .  Even younger Javanese students with an  urban background may have such problems.  This has created  a s i t u a t i o n whereby the best and most e f f e c t i v e c r i t i c s are operating from inside the government rather than from outside and using i n d i r e c t methods rather than d i r e c t confrontations to convey c r i t i c i s m .  Despite a l l of the  personal as well as government prestige wrapped up i n the  - 118 BIMAS p r o j e c t f o r i n c r e a s i n g r i c e p r o d u c t i o n ,  117  a  Javanese was a b l e to approach the P r e s i d e n t and convince him  that the program had to be stopped and admitted as a  failure. all  L i k e w i s e , only a Javanese speaker a p p e a l i n g t o  o f the c u l t u r a l and p a t e r n a l p r e j u d i c e s c o u l d get the  top m i l i t a r y l e a d e r s t o agree to the admission Minatur for  o f the  Indonesia Indah p r o j e c t problem i n t o the p a r l i a m e n t  open d i s c u s s i o n —  doubt c r i t i c i z e officials  d i s c u s s i o n t h a t would without a  the government and v a r i o u s government  ( m i l i t a r y and c i v i l i a n ) very d i r e c t l y and  118 heavily.  This k i n d o f s i t u a t i o n has very  implications  f o r n a t i o n a l communications about  and economic i s s u e s .  definite political  People w i t h non-halus temperaments 119  l i k e A r i e f Budiman and Buyung Nasution,  d e s p i t e the  b r i l l i a n c e of t h e i r i d e a s , f i n d i t very d i f f i c u l t t o make themselves understood  by the New Order regime.  Communication of a l t e r n a t i v e s and feedback i s a l s o h i n d e r e d by the Javanese n o t i o n o f the p a t r i m o n i a l s t a t e . Communication i s not conceived o f as a two-way process.., The method o f r u l e by the p r i j a j i , a l b e i t h e a v i l y r e i n f o r c e d by m i l i t a r y norms, i s by p e r i n t a h o r orders government by command.  The most common Javanese s o c i a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p type i s the guru-murid, bapak-anak ( f a t h e r - s o n o r t e a c h e r - p u p i l ) type. to be questioned.  The former knows best and i s n o t  This l e a d s t o a s i t u a t i o n where p o l i c y  - 119  -  i s formulated and executed without the expectation of opposition or c r i t i c i s m or of f a i l u r e ( i f the approach i s deemed c o r r e c t ) .  Hardly a day goes by without the  expression of paternalism by one major government o f f i c i a l i n a public statement.  The masses or massa bodoh  ( l i t e r a l l y , stupid masses) have to be d l d i d i k or educated. The f l o a t i n g mass proposal, Amir Moertono's l a t e s t 120 statement on governor elections i n the provinces,  or  the important recent book by Brigadier General Sajidiman a l l show acute symptoms of paternalism.  The Bimas program  i s one example, however, where the massa bodohproved they were quite expert i n t h e i r own f i e l d .  Bimas means mass  guidance and was used to increase r i c e production. Several major foreign companies were hired by the government to supply a package of f e r t i l i z e r , high y i e l d i n g r i c e seed along with the necessary i n s e c t i c i d e on credit.. According to the government p o l i c y decision the farmers were to have no choice whether or not they enrolled i n the program and whether or not they wanted the entire package.  The farmers were to repay the c r e d i t to the  government from t h e i r increase i n y i e l d s . was a massive f a i l u r e .  What resulted  The government was not paid back  and the state got very l i t t l e of what i t thought i t was paying f o r , an increase i n r i c e y i e l d .  The farmers  simply r e s i s t e d the decisions that were made f o r them  - 120 without knowledge of t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r conditions and situation.  U n t i l the system was made more f l e x i b l e  giving the farmers choice as to membership and  the  elements of the package they received, the program did 121 not obtain worthwhile r e s u l t s .  The Bimas f a i l u r e  evidently resulted from the i n i t i a l f e e l i n g on the part of the program designers that they could think f o r the farmers. The Minatur Indonesia  Indah project was  another  example of a high l e v e l Indonesian figure, the wife of the President i n t h i s case, deciding to implement a project using government influence without the s l i g h t e s t suspicion that she could be challenged on i t .  The  First  Lady assumed that since she wanted the project that everyone else would automatically agree and contribute t h e i r money for i t s construction.  Once she was  challenged  on the issue, she acted as i f the c r i t i c i z e r s d i d not 122 have the r i g h t to obstruct her wishes. The "Mini project" i l l u s t r a t e s another problem that i n the West i s known as c o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t but that i s seemingly unknown i n Indonesia.  There are no  prohibitions of high l e v e l government employees p a r t i c i pating i n private enterprise outside of t h e i r regular 123 government work.  '  Hence A l l Sadikin and A l l Murtopo  could serve as project o f f i c e r s to the "Mini project"  - 121 while o f f i c i a l l y  i t was  -  a "private" project.  124  This  f u s i o n of i n t e r e s t s and other obvious misuses o f power ( i n Western terms) such as c o r r u p t i o n are a l l p a r t of the t r a d i t i o n a l p a t r i m o n i a l a t t i t u d e towards government on the p a r t o f the Javanese, a h i g h government o f f i c i a l to  When one g i v e s a g i f t  to  or o f f e r s him an o p p o r t u n i t y  buy stock on c r e d i t , " f a c i l i t i e s " are .expected i n  125 return. We have a l r e a d y mentioned Sukarno's great s t r e s s on the c o r r e c t approach  or symbolic form of p o l i c i e s  r a t h e r than on content and r e s u l t s . New  To some extent, the  Order has a l s o been unable t o escape t h i s  habit either.  Javanese  I t has o f t e n been p o i n t e d out that Sukarno's  e i g h t year p l a n o f 1962  was  l i t t l e more than a symbol and  t h a t i t had been arranged and rearranged so t h a t i t c o n t a i n e d the proper number of volumes, chapters and paragraphs  t o form 8-17-1945 or the date of Indonesian  independence.  Only t h i s p a s t year Golkar when shaping  i t s c e n t r a l i n s t i t u t i o n s arranged them so t h a t the membership was  8-17-45;  once a g a i n t o correspond t o the  symbolic d a t e .  Perhaps  t h i s i s a l s o one reason t h a t the  " f l o a t i n g mass" i s seen as so d e s i r o u s . i n forming a c o n f l i c t - f r e e environment  I t i s symbolic  but whether  l e g i s l a t i o n w i l l a c t u a l l y remove c o n f l i c t from the v i l l a g e i s another matter.  - 122 The same kind of form without content can be seen i n the decree disbanding a l l "youth gangs" i n Djakarta i n the wake of the "Mini Project" protests.  Symbolically  a l l gang members came to police headquarters  to declare  that the gangs had been disbanded and dissolved.  Notice,  however, that within only a few weeks there were gangs forming again.  A f t e r the KOPKAMTIB decree nothing  was  done to change the objective condition that had caused gangs to a r i s e i n the f i r s t place. F i n a l l y , with the present emphasis on development every province and kabupaten now has a development operations room complete with charts, graphs, and diagrams showing the progress of a l l development occurring i n the area.  Polomka notes however that these rooms have  very l i t t l e correspondence with r e a l i t y and that frequently the workers there do not even know what the diagrams stand 126 for.  The point i s , however, that development means  having an operations and planning room whether there i s anything else or not. In conclusion, i t must be pointed out that the style of contemporary Indonesian government i n many ways resembles that of Mataram.  Rulers value concentration and  expression of emotion and desire. to any p o l i c y i s extremely sacral q u a l i t i e s .  non-  The form and approach  important and seems to take on  The government and rulers view themselves  - 123 as such and conduct t h e i r b u s i n e s s i n a manner that c o u l d best be d e s c r i b e d as " p r o t e c t i v e superiority"',, L i k e Mataram a l s o , the government o f contemporary Indonesia has the c a p a c i t y t o " f o o l i t s e l f " i n terms of what i s happening i n the country and the w o r l d around it.  R e w r i t i n g h i s t o r y could not make the Dutch  into  Javanese f o r Mataram and c a l l i n g o l d p o l i c i e s by new names w i l l not c r e a t e a modern and developed Indonesia f o r the New Order,  -  124 -  NOTES on Chapter I I I * The d e c r e e , even w i t h the P a r l i a m e n t s a p p r o v a l , was o f dubious l e g a l i t y but c l e a r l y showed how s h a l l o w were the r o o t s o f the p a r l i a m e n t a r y system a s w e l l a s who h e l d the p o l i t i c a l i n i t i a t i v e i n the c o u n t r y . I t i s interesting to n o t e t h a t the army through G e n e r a l N a s u t i o n was the f i r s t t o put f o r w a r d the i d e a o f the r e t u r n t o the UUD45. 9  2  The t e x t o f the C o n s t i t u t i o n o f 1945 w i t h f u l l e x p l a n a t i o n and most o f the documents s u r r o u n d i n g the r e t u r n t o i t a r e g i v e n i n J.C.T. S i m o r a n g k i r and B. Mang Reng Say, Tentang dan S e k l t a r Undang-Undang Dasar 1945 (About and Around the 1945 C o n s t i t u t i o n ) . ( D j a k a r t a ! Djambatan, 1 9 5 9 ) . A v e r y e x t e n s i v e d i s c u s s i o n o f the e x e c u t i v e and h i s powers i n r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h o t h e r government organs i s g i v e n i n I s m a i l Suny, P e r g e s e r a n Kekuasan E x s e k u t i f (The Changing Powers o f the E x e c u t i v e ) . ( D j a k a r t a ; " C.V. C a l i n d r a , 1 9 6 5 ) . The C o n s t i t u t i o n i t s e l f i s e x t r e m e l y b r i e f w i t h o n l y 37 a r t i c l e s and about 1700 words. Only the b a r e s t o u t l i n e s o f s t a t e s t r u c t u r e a r e g i v e n and a l m o s t e v e r y t h i n g i n terms o f c o n t e n t i s e x p l i c i t l y stated as being l e f t t o f u r t h e r r e g u l a t i o n s . I n t h e o r y , the MPR i s supposed t o p l a y a r o l e somewhat s i m i l a r t o t h a t o r i g i n a l l y i n t e n d e d f o r the E l e c t o r a l Board I n the U n i t e d S t a t e s w i t h the added r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o f d e t e r m i n i n g the broad o u t l i n e s o f s t a t e p o l i c y . I n t h e o r y a l s o , the P r e s i d e n t i s d i r e c t l y r e s p o n s i b l e t o the MPR f o r h i s a c t i o n s and can be removed a t i t s command. 3 The P r e s i d e n t i s n o t r e s p o n s i b l e t o the DPR but n e i t h e r can he d i s m i s s i t o r any o f i t s members a t any time he w i s h e s . Suny, o p . c i t . , p.206, chosen.  The UUD45 does not s p e c i f y how the DPR s h o u l d be S i m o r a n g k i r and Say, o p . c i t . , p . 2 2 .  I t must be remembered t h a t t h e r e were no p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s i n e x i s t e n c e i n the c o u n t r y a t the time o f the w r i t i n g o f the UUD45. ^ T h i s may a l s o be t r u e o f the V i c e P r e s i d e n t w h i c h i s p l a i n l y c a l l e d f o r i n the UUD45 but t h e r e has n o t been one since i t s reintroduction i n 1959. 7  B e s i d e s b e i n g Javanese both S u h a r t o and Sukarno have e s s e n t i a l l y C e n t r a l Javanese and upper c l a s s backgrounds. Sukarno's f a t h e r was supposedly o f a r i s t o c r a t i c o r i g i n and t h e young Sukarno was the p r o t e g e o f the p r l j a j i l e a d e r o f Sarekat Islam, Tjokrominoto. S u h a r t o i s the son o f a l e s s e r  - 125 v i l l a g e o f f i c i a l but was raised by a prl.^aji family i n Solo. On Sukarno see Dahm, op.oit., passim; and on Suharto see O.G. Boeder, The Smiling General (Djakarta; Gunung Agung, 1969). The dominant p o s i t i o n of the Javanese i s t a c i t l y recognized by most Indonesians. No one i n the country that I have ever talked to f e l t that a non-Javanese could ever become President. The feeling about the Vice-Presidency was Just the opposites he should be non-Javanese. This may be one reason why, despite the l o g i c of i t , Nasution, a Sumatran Batak, did not become President i n the wake of the G-30-S. Despite h i s l o y a l t y to the army, Nasution has become somewhat of a c r i t i c of the operation of Javanese-led New Order and c l o s e l y associated with the "out* faction of the army. See Berlta Buana June 12, 1972 for some of his most recent comments. In an A p r i l 7, 1972 interview, Nasution revealed his opposition to the " f l o a t i n g mass" system. A l l Murtopo, a Special Assistant to the President, has announced that the Sultan of Jogjakarta w i l l be Golkar's nominee for Vice President a t the upcoming 1973 MPB session. While Suharto was c a r e f u l enough to give the Outer Islands representative equality with Java i n the new DPR, i t seems that the Vice President i s not to be Sumatran. Is a t a c i t understanding about to be broken? For comments on Murtopo"s announcement see Pedoman A p r i l 24, 1972. o  This w i l l no longer be true as of March 1973 when Suharto w i l l be reelected without opposition. However, 33$ of the MPR members w i l l be d i r e c t Suharto appointees. 9 Suny, op.oit.. pp.2l4r-5. 7  10 Herbert Feith, "Soeharto's Search for a P o l i t i c a l Format*', Indonesia. 1968, No. 6, p.98.  11  This i s other than i n t e r n a l m i l i t a r y considerations. The President seems to have overcome the major f a c t i o n a l problems there though. On this see U l f Sundhaussen, "The M i l i t a r y i n Research on Indonesian P o l i t i c s " , The Journal of Asian Studies. 1972, V o l . XXXI, No.2. •^See Dahm, op.oit.. passim. 13 Anderson, op.oit.. p.64. 14 Surlpto, Soehartos Suatu Sketsa Karler Dan P o l l t l k (Soehartos A Career and P o l i t i c a l Sketch), (Surabajas Grip, 1972),15pAnderson, .73. op.cit., p.25.  - 126 16  See S a j i d i m a n , L a n g k a h , L a n g k a h P e r d j u a n g a n K l t a (The S t e p s o f Our S t r u g g l e ) . . . ( D j a k a r t a ; P u s a t S e d j a r a h A B R I , 1 9 7 1 ) , PP» 75-8 5 a n d t h e G o l k a r Memorandum e n t i t l e d " T i n d j a u a n S i t u a s i N a s i o n a l " (An O b s e r v a t i o n o f t h e N a t i o n a l S i t u a t i o n ) , ( D j a k a r t a : S t e n c i l e d December 1970) a s w e l l a s A.H. Nasution, A B R I P e n e g a k D e m o k r a s i UUD45 ( A B R I : U p h o l d e r o f D e m o c r a c y o f t h e 1945 C o n s t i t u t i o n ) ( D j a k a r t a : S e r u l i n g M a s a , I 9 6 6 ) , p p . 5-26. The t h r e a t s a n d f o r c e , a l b e i t b e h i n d t h e s c e n e s , o f t h e New O r d e r t o g e t i t s way seem l i t t l e d i f f e r e n t , a l t h o u g h t h e y a r e c a l l e d " t e m p o r a r y necessities„" 9  17 The Ne?r O r d e r t h e o r i s t s s p e a k o f t h e " T r e s P o l i t i k a " (meaning d i v i s i o n and s e p a r a t i o n o f powers) and i t s a p p l i c a t i o n t o I n d o n e s i a u n d e r t h e UUD45, b u t i t j u s t d o e s n o t seem t o f u n c t i o n t h a t way. The e x e c u t i v e , i n r e a l i t y , makes t h e l a w s , i n t e r p r e t s them a n d a t t e m p t s t o e n f o r c e t h e m . S e e Soediman K a r t o h a d i p r o d j o , Beberapa P i k i r a n S e k i t a r P a n t j a s i l a (Some T h o u g h t s o n P a n t j a s i l a ) (Bandung: A l u m n i , 1970), pp. I 8 9 - 9 8 . 18 H u n t i n g t o n makes t h e same p o i n t a b o u t t r a d i t i o n a n d t h e American p r e s i d e n t i a l system. See H u n t i n g t o n , o p . c i t . , PPo  93-139o  19  V i l l a g e e l e c t i o n s u s u a l l y a r e o f the musjawarah o r consensus t y p e , and i t i s n o t i n f r e q u e n t f o r the p o s t t o become c o n s i d e r e d h e r e d i t a r y * T h e s e l e c t i o n o f a v i l l a g e headman i s s u b j e c t t o a p p r o v a l b y t h e b u p a t i o r d i s t r i c t h e a d who a s o f t e n a s n o t h a s b e e n a m i l i t a r y man s i n c e I 9 6 5 . This means t h a t t h e r e a r e d e f i n i t e l y o u t s i d e p r e s s u r e s a s t o who w i l l be s e l e c t e d . F o r t h e d e s c r i p t i o n o f one s u c h e l e c t i o n see Totok S u h a r t o , " F a c t i o n a l i s m e M e n d j e l a n g P e m i l i h a n Lurah d i d e s a 'Sumber A i r " , T . l a k r a w a l a , 1972, V o l . IV, N o , 5 „ Also c o n t r a s t t h e numbers o f e l e c t e d o f f i c i a l s i n I n d o n e s i a w i t h those i n India5 See M y r o n W e i n e r i n L u c i a n Pye a n d S i d n e y V e r b a , P o l i t i c a l C u l t u r e and P o l i t i c a l D e v e l o p m e n t . ( P r i n c e t o n s P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s7~ 1963)» p * 2 0 8 . 5  20  T h i s t u r n e d out n o t t o be s u c h a v i c t o r y f o r S u k a r n o after a l l . Y a n i p r o v e d t o be h a r d t o m a n i p u l a t e and s t a u n c h l y anti-communist„ He was e v e n t u a l l y a v i c t i m o f t h e G-30-S.  21  As e x a m p l e s o f s u c h " r e w a r d s " , w i t n e s s t h e p r e s e n c e o f Idham C h a l i d o f t h e NU i n t h e c a b i n e t a n d a l s o o f M. D a c h l a n u n t i l the l a t e s t r e s h u f f l e . A t Suharto's i n s i s t e n c e C h a l i d was a p p o i n t e d S p e a k e r o f t h e DPR, d e s p i t e t h e f a c t t h a t t h e NU has o n l y 1/5 t h e number o f s e a t s o f G o l k a r .  - 127  -  22  While i n the f i e l d of economics Suharto has chosen to r e l y on c i v i l i a n advisors or experts for planning and p o l i c y , this i s much l e s s true i n the p o l i t i c a l f i e l d . M i l i t a r y advice e s p e c i a l l y from the ASPRI on such matters seems dominant. Even i n the f i e l d of economics Sudjono Hunardani has played a great r o l e , and one interviewee expressed the b e l i e f that he was more important i n dealing with Japan than Widjojo N i t i s a s t r o or Adam Malik. I t i s also i n t e r e s t i n g to note that there are four ASPRI, exactly the same number of assistants possessed by the patih of Mataram for symbolic reasons. 23  The simple fact that Suharto depends l a r g e l y on personal friendship t i e s , which i s the normal Javanese way of doing things, has meant that most of his trusted assistants and advisors are m i l i t a r y men. The President, a professional m i l i t a r y man, has had l i t t l e r e a l contact with the c i v i l i a n world before a t t a i n i n g the p o s i t i o n . His few c i v i l i a n advisors have been Javanese. As one interviewee put i t , Suharto i s i n t e l l e c t u a l l y fascinated with c i v i l i a n s l i k e Widjojo and Soedjatmoko - two of the most important c i v i l i a n figures i n the New Order. As of this writing 22 of 26 p r o v i n c i a l governors were m i l i t a r y men, and although Minister for S o c i a l A f f a i r s Mintaredja has announced that the government intends to " c i v i l i a n i z e " these posts along with lower l e v e l p r o v i n c i a l positions, such i s very u n l i k e l y to occur i n the near future. 24 With the exception of the Hatta Cabinet (January 1948December 1949), cabinets during the revolution were formed on a parliamentary majority basis. A f t e r the creation of the unitary Republic i n August 1950 u n t i l the appointment of the Djuanda Cabinet i n 1 9 5 7 9 the same was also true. 25 -'See Daniel S. Lev, op.cit., passim; and Herbert F e i t h , The Indonesian Elections of 1955 (Ithacas Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1957) f o r excellent discussions of these two e l e c t i o n s . Lev seems to f e e l that the non-conmruhlst e l i t e ' s r e a l i z a t i o n of the meaning of mass p o l i t i c s and t h e i r i n a b i l i t y to compete with the PKI on such a basis - thus a t r a d i t i o n a l and s e l f - i n t e r e s t reaction — were the key factors i n the party e l i t e ' s weak reaction and opposition to a Guided Democracy system. ^^Daniel S. Lev, op.cit., p.63. 27 Daniel S. Lev, "Parties, Functional Groups and E l e c t i o n s " Asia, Autumn 1 9 7 0 , p. 116. 28 This occurred much to the r e l i e f of r u r a l conservatives.  - 128 29  Simorankir and Say,  op.oit., pp.200-03.  30  Sekber Golkar was o r i g i n a l l y formed by P r e s i d e n t i a l Decree No. 193/1964 as a part of Sukarno's National Front. I t then consisted of 61 n o n - a f f i l i a t e d functional organizations and ABRI. As of present, there are 201 organizations a f f i l i a t e d with Golkar which in-19-69 were grouped into 7 KINO's or Mother Organizational Groups according to the function of the organization i t s e l f . The symbol of Golkar i s the banyan tree which i s quite famous i n Javanese f o l k l o r e . For further d e t a i l s on Golkar see "The Sekber Golkars A Bird's Eye View of i t s History", (Djakarta? Golkar Pusat, n.d.). 31  For f u l l e l e c t i o n r e s u l t s see Don Hindley, "Indonesia 1971s P a n t j a s l l a Democracy and the Second Parliamentary E l e c t i o n s " , Asian Survey. 1 9 7 2 , V o l . XII, No. 1 , pp.59-62. 32  For these decisions see Sinar Harapan March 18,  1972.  33  Despite the President's statement that he expects Golkar to j o i n i n c o n t r o l l i n g the government, the actual prospects for i t seem s l i g h t . For the President's statement see Berita Buana October 5s 1 9 7 1 . For arguments about the p o s s i b i l i t y of control by Golkar see Rosihan Anwar's a r t i c l e i n Tempo July 1 0 , 1 9 7 1 , P-95 and the Slnar Harapan e d i t o r i a l "Golkar Bukan Pemerintah" (Golkar i s not the Government) on June 2 , 1 9 7 1 . According to Golkar's leading c i v i l i a n figure, Sumiskum, Golkar i s b a s i c a l l y three groups? ABRI, K0RPRI and the Non-ABRI, Non-KORPRI of which the l a t t e r i s by f a r the weakest. This makes Golkar appear to be the government and the m i l i t a r y only. 34  Rosihan Anwar, "Dead End i n Indonesian P o l i t i c s " , P a c i f i c Community (Tokyo), 1 9 7 0 , V o l . I I , No.2, p.396. 35  Suharto has already announced that there w i l l only be three choices i n the next elections two parties and one Golkar. Pedoman October 28, 1 9 7 1 . His basis for such action i s Decision No. XXII of the MPRS session of 1 9 6 6 . It has been pointed out that the decision said nothing about how the parties were to be s i m p l i f i e d with the implication that the President i s not on s o l i d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l ground. For a thoughtful discussion of the "Floating Mass" system, see A l f i a n i n Kompas A p r i l 27-8, 1972. 36 See Gerald Maryanov, Decentralization i n Indonesia as a P o l i t i c a l Problem (Ithacas Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1958) and John Legge, Central Authority and Regional Autonomy In Indonesia . (Ithacas Cornell University Press, 1961) for d e t a i l s of the 1957 law and the subsequent retreat from i t . Due to the regional r e v o l t s most provisions of the new law never were f u l l y implemented before t h e i r lapse.  - 129 •^Ted Smith and R.S. Smith, "The P o l i t i c a l Economy of Regional and Urban Revenue Policy i n Indonesia", Asian Survey» 1 9 7 2 , Vol. XI, No.8, p.296. ADO funds are the fixed proportion (now 10$) of a l l the tax earnings by the central government on the province's exports which are automatically returned to the p r o v i n c i a l government. Where the money w i l l be spent i s already decided before i t i s returned to the l o c a l or regional government, however. 38  Ted Smith, The Indonesian Bureaucracy. S t a b i l i t y . Change and Productivity . (unpublished Ph.D. d i s s e r t a t i o n , University of C a l i f o r n i a , Berkeley, 1971), p.143, 39  Daniel S. Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy (Ithaca; Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, I 9 6 7 ) p.29. The government says i t i s seriously concerned with the overcrowding of Java and hopes that people can be encouraged to migrate. Unfortunately, a net migration to Java rather than away from i t i s occurring, because almost a l l of the country's modern industry i s located there - e s p e c i a l l y around Djakarta. I f the government r e a l l y expects to spread out the population, spontaneously or through transmigration, very high rates of infrastructure investment i n the Outer Islands are needed, yet Java gets f i r s t p r i o r i t y , Minister of Public Works Sutami (a Javanese) mentioned recently that a l l roads s t a r t from Java. When asked why, he jokingly r e p l i e d because when he was i n grade school, geography started with Java(J). For an i n t e l l i g e n t discussion of the problem see Sajidiman, op.cit.. pp. 5 6 - 7 I . For Sutami's comment see Slnar Harapan June 2 6 , 1 9 7 2 . 40 The new DPR has shown a good beginning i n reviewing the regions' problems firsthand during the l a t e s t recess (March-April 1 9 7 2 ) , but unfortunately, they (the DPR members) are i n l i t t l e p o s i t i o n to help with any problems they observed there. Such decisions and d i v i s i o n of funds are made elsewhere. 41 Pembangunan or development i s probably no less of a symbol than was Nasakom, but the former i s d e f i n i t e l y more appealing to Western ears and thus f a r to Western pocketbooks. 42 Herbert Feith, "Indonesia's P o l i t i c a l Symbols and t h e i r Wielders", World P o l i t i c s . 1 9 6 3 , V o l . XVI, No.l5 and Donald Weatherbee, Ideology i n Indonesia: Sukarno's Indonesian Revolution (New Havens Yale University Press, 1 9 6 6 ) . 43 Dahm, op.cit., passim. For Indonesian comments on these points see A l f i a n i n Sinar Harapan July 1 9 - 2 3 , 1 9 7 1 .  - 130 44  See Sukarno's speeches a t t a c k i n g L i b e r a l Democracy as t r a n s l a t e d i n F e i t h and C a s t l e s , o p . c i t . , Chap.2,  45 ^Outer I s l a n d e r s , as u s u a l w i t h a n y t h i n g Sukarno s a i d , were r a t h e r s k e p t i c a l about these "Indonesian" v a l u e s . See Kahar Muzahar's w r i t i n g i n F e i t h and C a s t l e s , o p . c i t . ,  PP. 3 3 0 - 5 . 46  See Levine i n Pye and Verba, o p . c i t . , p.280,  47 Anderson, o p . c i t . , p.15, of power because of m e d i t a t i o n ,  Sembada means c o n c e n t r a t i o n  48  For the t e x t of Sukarno's speech "The B i r t h of the P a n t j a s i l a " see F e i t h and C a s t l e s , o p . c i t . , p.40,  49  Quoted i n a book review i n Tempo, A p r i l 8, 1972, p.52. ^°Kompas March 5» 1972. While harmony i n i t s broad meaning i s the o b j e c t i v e of almost any government, some s o c i e t i e s t o l e r a t e l a r g e r degrees of c o n f l i c t as normal and l e g i t i m a t e than do o t h e r s . As we noted e a r l i e r , a p e r v a s i v e p r i j a j i norm was the t o t a l avoidance of even any s i g n o f conflict. This moral standard i s s t i l l c o n s i d e r e d v a l i d as t h i s Suharto quote shows.  51  See Sajidiman, o p . c i t , , pp. 7 8 - 9 , and P r e s i d e n t Suharto's speech on the Minatur Indonesia Indah i s s u e as summarized i n S i n a r Harapan January 6, 1972.  52  ,  v  Harmony ( i n i t s extreme form) as a c u l t u r a l norm i s by no means r e s t r i c t e d to the Javanese e l i t e . African l e a d e r s have o f t e n expressed " A f r i c a n S o c i a l i s m " i n much the same terms and the r o o t s of the P a n c h a j a t i Raj system i n I n d i a seem to r e f l e c t a s i m i l a r l i n e o f t h i n k i n g . See Myron Weiner's comments on the I n d i a n e l i t e ' s a t t i t u d e s towards c o n f l i c t i n t h e i r own s o c i e t y i n Pye and Verba, o p . c i t . , pp. 2 3 5 - 6 . As does Ben Anderson, I a t t r i b u t e t h i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c to the Hindu-Buddhist base o f Javanese c u l t u r e and t h e r e f o r e , would expect s i m i l a r s o r t s o f v a l u e s to be p r e s e n t i n T h a i l a n d , Burma and Cambodia. F u r t h e r comparison on the s u b j e c t d e f i n i t e l y would be of v a l u e .  53  -^See J.A.C. Mackie, "Indonesian P o l i t i c s Under Guided Democracy", A u s t r a l i a n Outlook, I 9 6 I , V o l , XV, No.3, pp.269-76.  54  See J u s t u s Van der K r o e f , "Indonesian Communism's 'Revolutionary Gymnastics'", A s i a n Survey, I 9 6 5 , Vol.V, No.5, p..321:  - 131  5  5  r  b  i  d  .  ,  -  p.324.  -^These I n c l u d e d Mochtar L u b i s ' s I n d o n e s i a R a j a and Pedoman o f the P S I , r u n by Soedjatmoko and R o s i h a n Anwar. -"Donald H l n d l e y , " P r e s i d e n t Soekarno and the Communists; The P o l i t i c s o f D o m e s t i c a t i o n " , A m e r i c a n P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e Review, 1962, V o l . L V I , No.4~i Ben Anderson and Ruth McVey wrote a c o n t r o v e r s i a l v e r s i o n of the G-30-S, A P r e l i m i n a r y A n a l y s i s o f the October 1, 1965 Coup Attempt i n I n d o n e s i a . ( I t h a c a : C o r n e l l Modern I n d o n e s i a P r o j e c t , I 9 7 I ) , i n w h i c h they a t t r i b u t e d the e n t i r e a f f a i r t o a group o f young o f f i c e r s d i s s a t i s f i e d w i t h the c o n s e r v a t i v e n e s s and o p p o s i t i o n t o Sukarno by the Army's G e n e r a l S t a f f . While t h i s v e r s i o n o f the a f f a i r has been shown t o be r a t h e r d i s t o r t e d , t h e r e remains a g r e a t d e a l o f t r u t h t o the statement t h a t t h e r e was a h i g h degree o f t e n s i o n i n the army a t the t i m e . I t i s c e r t a i n t h a t the PKI used t h i s t e n s i o n t o t h e i r own advantage and Sukarno was p r o b a b l y the focus o f l o y a l t y used t o l u r e the young o f f i c e r s i n t o a c t i o n , not communism. 59 - " P l u v i e r , o p . c i t . , p. V I I I , 60 D e s p i t e the f a c t t h a t P a n t j a s i l a i s the s i n g l e most i m p o r t a n t i d e o l o g i c a l symbol i n the c o u n t r y today, most I n d o n e s i a n s w i l l say t h a t they do n o t have any i d e a what P a n t j a s i l a Democracy i s . A few w i l l attempt t o say what i t i s n o t , but t h a t i s u s u a l l y the l i m i t . For a v e r y good a t t e m p t to e x p l a i n the concept see A.H. N a s u t i o n , P a n t j a s i l a Democracy Today and Tomorrow- ( D j a k a r t a : S e r u l i n g Masa, I 9 7 I ) . A l s o see H a z a l r l n , Demokrasi P a n t j a s i l a ( P a n t j a s i l a Democracy) ( D j a k a r t a ; T i n t a m a s f 1970) and Ismaun, T i n d j a u a n P a n t j a s i l a : Dasar F i l s a f a t Negara R e p u b l i k I n d o n e s i a ( O b s e r v a t i o n s o f P a n t j a s i l a : The B a s i c P h i l o s o p h y o f the R e p u b l i c o f Indon e s i a ) (Bandung: Carya Remadja, 1 9 7 0 ) , 6l For a complete d i s c u s s i o n o f the d i a g n o s i s and the cure see R. W i l l i a m L i d d l e , " M o d e r n i z i n g I n d o n e s i a n P o l i t i c s " ( S t e n c i l e d , n . d . ) . A l s o see S r i S o e m a n t r i , S i s t i m Dua P a r t a i (The Two P a r t y System) (Bandung: B i n a t j i p t a , I 9 6 8 ) . * 62 Given the f a c t t h a t Suharto has been a b l e t o s e c u r e the passage o f any measure he f e e l s v i t a l by some means o r a n o t h e r , the l a c k o f "push" f o r the o r i g i n a l b i l l showed how unimportant he f e l t the i d e a was. One o f the more i n t e r e s t i n g f e a t u r e s o f the 1976 e l e c t i o n s w i l l be whether or not w i t h i t s overwhelming m a j o r i t y , G o l k a r w i l l pass a s i n g l e member c o n s t i t u e n c y b i l l . Among G o l k a r i n t e r v i e w e e s a t t h i s t i m e , none had g i v e n i t any t h o u g h t — t h e y s a i d they were more concerned w i t h the upcoming, MPR s e s s i o n .  - 132  -  AT  One might want to s p e c u l a t e as to why p a r t i e s were not banned a l t o g e t h e r i f Suharto and h i s c o l l e a g u e s were so opposed to them. New Order supporters now answer t h a t such a move would not have been "democratic", however, t h i s r e a s o n i n g d i d not seem t o apply to the PKI. T h i s author i s l e d to the c o n c l u s i o n that Suharto, i n i t i a l l y , thought the p a r t i e s to be much s t r o n g e r than they l a t e r proved to be. Outside f a c t o r s such as e f f e c t s on l o a n and a i d g i v e r s should not be under-estimated.  64 See Samson, o p , c i t . , passim. I t now appears t h a t the p e r m i s s i o n f o r the c r e a t i o n of a new "modernist" Muslim p a r t y was a " p a y - o f f " to t h i s group f o r t h e i r support i n the d e s t r u c t i o n of Sukarno and the PKI. ^ S e e Don H i n d l e y , "Indonesia 1970s The Workings of P a n t j a s i l a Democracy", A s i a n Survey, 1971, V o l . XI, No.2, p . H 7 j f o r some d i s c u s s i o n of the a f f a i r . For Indonesian coverage of the Congress and charges o f government i n t e r v e n t i o n see H a r i a n Kami d u r i n g A p r i l , 1970. AA  PMKParmusi). K a t o l i k , Parkindo and  PSII.  On the p o s s i b l e meaning of the e l e c t i o n s , as viewed beforehand, see J , A o C , Mackie, " C i v i l - M i l i t a r y R e l a t i o n s and the 1971 E l e c t i o n s i n Indonesia", A u s t r a l i a n Outlook, 1970, V o l . 24, No.3. On the dilemmas of c o e r c i o n f o r Suharto see Herbert F e i t h , "Suharto's Search f o r a P o l i t i c a l Format", Indonesia, I 9 6 8 , No.6, pp. 104-5.  68 Golkar must not be seen as a p a r t y i n any u n i f i e d sense. I t i s a mere c o a l i t i o n of f o r c e s brought together by the m i l i t a r y . T h e i r common d e s i r e was and i s development, p l u s they are w i l l i n g to acknowledge the f a c t that ABRI i s dominant i n the s o c i e t y . Some c i v i l i a n s i n the o r g a n i z a t i o n , p a r t i c u l a r l y a group from Bandung known as the independents hope to p l a y a r o l e that i s not 100$ c o n t r o l l e d by the m i l i t a r y . At t h i s date, t h i s p a r t i c u l a r group i s p e s s i m i s t i c of i t s chances to do so. Despite some hope f o r a b i g Golkar r e o r g a n i z a t i o n a f t e r the e l e c t i o n , A l i Murtopo announced t h a t Golkar would not become a p a r t y , B e r l t a Buana October 12, 1971.  69^  Previous to the formation of the new DPR, a l l d e c i s i o n s had t o be taken i n mus.jawarah s t y l e , meaning t h a t r e s o l u t i o n s had to be unanimous. As soon as Golkar obtained an a b s o l u t e m a j o r i t y , the r u l e s were changed to permit m a j o r i t y d e c i s i o n s . See B e r i t a Buana December 2 3 , 1971 on the changes. The P r e s i d e n t c a l l e d i t "Stopping the D i c t a t o r s h i p of the M i n o r i t y " i n B e r i t a Buana October 12, 1971.  - 133  -  70 ' March 5, 1971. A l l PKI and most Mas.jumi l e a d e r s c o u l d n o t p a r t i c i p a t e a t a l l e i t h e r . The l a t t e r d e f i n i t e l y h u r t the PMI. 71 A l l government employees had t o v o t e a t t h e i r p l a c e s o f work r a t h e r than a t p u b l i c p o l l s . T h i s made the t o t a l number o f v o t e c a s t e r s i n any one p o l l s t a t i o n v e r y s m a l l s even t h e p u b l i c ones were seldom over 300. In several I n t e r v i e w s w i t h c i v i l s e r v a n t s , I was t o l d t h a t d i r e c t p r e s s u r e and t h r e a t s were made towards them i f t h e v o t e t o t a l d i d n o t t u r n out t o be a l m o s t 100$ f o r G o l k a r . 72 Donald H i n d l e y , " I n d o n e s i a 1971s Pantjasila Democracy and the Second P a r l i a m e n t a r y E l e c t i o n s " , A s i a n Survey, 1972, V o l . X I I , No. 1, p.61. G o l k a r m a n i p u l a t e d t h e i r c a n d i d a t e s and l i s t s a t w i l l , even a f t e r the r e s u l t s o f the e l e c t i o n had been announced. A good example o f how t h i s m a n i p u l a t i o n was done was the case o f Adam M a l i k , the F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r . M a l i k campaigned l o n g and h a r d i n h i s home p r o v i n c e s o f N o r t h Sumatra and was number one o f the N o r t h Sumatra P r o v i n c i a l G o l k a r L i s t . A f t e r the e l e c t i o n M a l i k was removed from the G o l k a r l i s t and r e p l a c e d w i t h t h e excuse t h a t h i s m i n i s t e r i a l d u t i e s were t o o heavy t o p e r m i t him time f o r the DPR, 73 H i n d l e y g i v e s a more complete l i s t o f t h e p o s s i b l e r e a s o n s f o r G o l k a r ' s v i c t o r y . H i n d l e y , o p . c i t . , p.59« 74 B e r i t a Buana October 6, 1971. 75 On the l a b o r r e s t r i c t i o n see Kompas February 7, 1972. For a good summary o f the p o s i t i o n o f o r g a n i z e d l a b o r under the New Order see Pedoman February l l " , 197.2. The r i g h t to s t r i k e i s n o t r e c o g n i z e d , a l t h o u g h s t r i k e s do o c c a s i o n a l l y occur. On K0RPRI see S i n a r Harapan A p r i l 1 5 , 1 9 7 2 and the Kompas e d i t o r i a l o f A p r i l 18, 1972, On d e p o l i t i c i z a t i o n see the Kompas e d i t o r i a l of March 2 0 , I 9 7 2 . 76 A n t i c i p a t i n g the government b i l l t o be s u b m i t t e d t o P a r l i a m e n t , the I s l a m i c p a r t i e s grouped t o g e t h e r t o form t h e Kelompok P e r s a t u a n Pembangunan o r U n i t e d Development Group w h i l e t h e PNI, Murba, IPKI and the two C h r i s t i a n p a r t i e s formed t h e Kelompok Demokratis Pembangunan o r D e m o c r a t i c Development Group. The l a t t e r has gone f u r t h e r than the f o r m e r i n c r e a t i n g a new p o l i t i c a l s t r u c t u r e ( p r o b a b l y because o f the o b s t i n a n c e o f the NU), but b o t h r e m a i n e s s e n t i a l l y f e d e r a t i o n s . Amir Machmud s t a t e d t h a t f u s i o n i s a must and t h a t f e d e r a t i o n can o n l y be a t r a n s i t o r y s t a g e . Sinar Harapan A p r i l 1, 1972. As o f t h i s w r i t i n g the b i l l has n o t been s u b m i t t e d t o P a r l i a m e n t and t h i s d e l a y may r e p r e s e n t . some r e - t h i n k i n g o f - t h e problem i n s i d e the government.  - 134  -  77 'A member of the Dewan Pimplnan G o l k a r o r L e a d e r s h i p C o u n c i l , Lim B i a n K i e , t o l d me, "Look a t the s i z e of our v i c t o r y w i t h o n l y one and o n e - h a l f y e a r s of p r e p a r a t i o n ; j u s t t h i n k what we can do w i t h f i v e y e a r s t o work on i t . " (March 24, 1 9 7 2 ) . A l i Murtopo has r e c e n t l y added t h a t G o l k a r w i l l be s a t i s f i e d w i t h a 5$ i n c r e a s e i n t h e i r v o t e in 1976. op  For some o f S u h a r t o ' s d e a l i n g w i t h the i n t e r n a l m i l i t a r y s i t u a t i o n see Donald H i n d l e y , " A l i r a n s . and the F a l l of the Old O r d e r " , I n d o n e s i a , 1970, No. 9 , p.50; and Donald H i n d l e y , " I n d o n e s i a I97O; The Workings of P a n t j a s i l a Democracy" A s i a n Survey 1971, V o l . X I , No. 2 , p . 1 1 2 . 79  For t h i s s t r u c t u r e see Polomka, o p . c i t . , p p . 9 6 - 7 . The p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s , e s p e c i a l l y the PNI and NU, c l a i m t h a t t h i s s t r u c t u r e was used t o c o n t r o l the outcome of the e l e c t i o n s w h i c h t o some e x t e n t was p r o b a b l y t r u e . 80 I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o n o t e t h a t f o r o n l y 3 y e a r s of the 13 s i n c e the r e t u r n t o the UUD45 I n d o n e s i a has not been under what amounts t o m a r t i a l law. 81 T h i s happened t o WAY (World Assembly of Youth) which had development p r o j e c t s i n the v i l l a g e s but t h a t a l s o c o n t a i n e d " m o d e r n i s t " M u s l i m elements i n the l e a d e r s h i p t h a t were not t r u s t e d by the m i l i t a r y , 82 The m i l i t a r y through i t s Dwi-Pungsi o r . D u a l F u n c t i o n D o c t r i n e has s t r e s s e d time and t i m e . a g a i n t h a t i t has no i n t e n t i o n o f b e i n g a mere a l a t or t o o l o f c i v i l i a n s . See S u h a r t o ' s speech "ABRI i s not a Fireman" summarized i n B e r l t a Buana March 6, 1972. 83  F e i t h , o p . c i t . , p.105. 84 A.H, N a s u t i o n , " P o l i t i c a l R e s t r u c t u r i n g A f t e r 'G-30-S'", P a c i f i c Community, 1971, V o l . I l l , N p . l , p . 3 2 3 . For a good d i s c u s s i o n o f the economic p r o b l e m s , e s p e c i a l l y i n f l a t i o n , see J.A.C. M a c k i e , I n d o n e s i a n I n f l a t i o n (Ithacas C o r n e l l Modern I n d o n e s i a P r o j e c t , I 9 6 7 ) . 86  Such a t t e m p t s are. d e s c r i b e d as h a l f - h e a r t e d because, of the only, p a s s i n g a t t e n t i o n they r e c e i v e d from Sukarno. For c e r t a i n t h e r e was a l a c k of r e s o u r c e s f o r economic development but o u t s i d e r e s o u r c e s , Sukarno was t o l d , were a v a i l a b l e s h o u l d he d e c i d e t o c o n c e n t r a t e on r e h a b i l i t a t i o n . The b a s i c p r o b l e m t h e n , seems t o have been one of p r i o r i t i e s and w i l l .  s  - 135  -  87 'Robert M. P r i c e , "A T h e o r e t i c a l Approach to M i l i t a r y Rule i n New S t a t e s : Reference Group Theory and the Ghanaian Case", World P o l i t i c s , I 9 7 I , V o l , XXIII, No,3 9 pp,398-430.  88  Ruth McVey notes t h a t between 1958 and I965 °ver 4 , 0 0 0 Indonesian o f f i c e r s were t r a i n e d i n the U n i t e d S t a t e s . Ruth McVey, "The P o s t - R e v o l u t i o n a r y Transformation of the Indonesian Army", Indonesia, 1972, No. 13* p . 1 6 9 . A l s o see Guy Pauker,'"General Nasution's M i s s i o n to Moscow", A s i a n Survey, I 9 6 I , V o l . 1 , N o . l .  89  For a good d i s c u s s i o n of Army p h i l o s o p h y see Michael Ehrmann, The Indonesian Army Under Guided Democracy (unpublished M.AT t h e s i s , C o r n e l l U n i v e r s i t y , I967J", Chap.II. 90  From an i n t e r v i e w with Nugroho Notosusanto, the head of the m i l i t a r y ' s h i s t o r y c e n t e r , March 1972. One c o u l d , of course, argue with Nugroho as to whether armies with such experience are always f o r c e s f o r modernization,  91 Murtopo r a t h e r w i l d l y p r e d i c t e d t h a t Indonesia would c a t c h up with Japan a f t e r the 25 year p e r i o d ,  9.2  In a r e c e n t U n i v e r s i t y o f Indonesia seminar on economic growth P r o f e s s o r S a r b i n i Sumawinata c h a l l e n g e d s e v e r a l of the government's technocrats and t h e i r p r e d i c t i o n s concerning the r a t e of growth o f the GNP i n Indonesia d u r i n g the next decade. In a debate which he seemed to win, S a r b i n i s a i d that present growth could not be s u s t a i n e d because of the low investment r a t e , The h i g h growth r a t e s now, he s a i d , were the r e s u l t of r e h a b i l i t a t i o n or quick y i e l d s t h a t were brought about by simple i n f r a s t r u c t u r e improvement. See Tempo August 14, 1971 and M e l i h a t Kedepan P e r s p e k t i f Ekonomi Indonesia (A Future P e r s p e c t i v e of the Indonesian Economy!"™ ( D j a k a r t a ; LP38, 1 9 7 1 ) ,  93  The government i s t o r n between the demands of the c i t i e s f o r low and s t a b l e r i c e p r i c e s and the c o u n t r y s i d e ' s demands f o r high but s t a b l e p r i c e s . A government supply bureau, Bulog, was s e t up to m a i n t a i n p r i c e s t a b i l i t y but the p r i c e d e c i s i o n d e f i n i t e l y went i n f a v o r of the c i t i e s . Polomka notes t h a t d u r i n g I970-I Bulog a c q u i r e d some 600,000 tons of r i c e a t one-half the world market p r i c e and even then secured only from middlemen which meant the farmer d i d not even get the minimum p r i c e s e t by the government, Polomka, o p . c i t . , p.l5o T h i s continues while consumption of l u x u r y goods i n the major c i t i e s , e s p e c i a l l y D j a k a r t a , runs w i l d . Another development from t h i s system i s t h a t r i c e i n Java, a r i c e d e f i c i t a r e a , i s cheaper than i n s e v e r a l r i c e s u r p l u s areas i n the Outer I s l a n d s .  - 136 94  Ben HIgglns, "Survey o f Recent Developments" B u l l e t i n o f Indonesian Economic S t u d i e s , 1972, V o l , V I I I , No.l, p.25. 95  KpmEas A p r i l 11,  1972.  96 Huntington, op.cit„, p.222„  97 This says nothing about the manner o f goal s e l e c t i o n which must be l a r g e l y a t the r u l e r ' s d i s c r e t i o n . The paths to the goal are a l s o d e f i n e d by the r u l e r . Sukarno probably f e l t t h a t h i s path f o r the completion of the " r e v o l u t i o n " was a c o r r e c t one. Hence, perhaps i t should be s a i d t h a t "no d e v i a t i o n from the r u l e r ' s path to the goal can be allowed".  98  A l l of t h i s i s i n very d i f f e r e n t p e r s p e c t i v e than i t i s u s u a l l y presented. For very Western approaches to the Sukarno-Suharto s t r u g g l e see Justus Van der Kroef, "Sukarno's F a l l " , O r b i s , 1967 V o l . XI, No.2; and Donald H i n d l e y , "The A l i r a n s and the F a l l of the Old Order", Indonesia, 1970, No.9. 9  99  The Sukarno-Suharto r e l a t i o n s h i p can be viewed much l i k e Kama's dilemma before the Bhrata Yudha as shown i n the wa.jang k u l i t , Kama, of course, chose to f o l l o w h i s master r a t h e r than j o i n the " r i g h t " and v i c t o r i o u s s i d e .  100  P o r t i o n s of the m i l i t a r y had opposed Sukarno's c o n f r o n t a t i o n p o l i c y and the i n c r e a s i n g i n f l u e n c e of S u b a n d r i o s i n t e l l i g e n c e o r g a n i z a t i o n . Murtopo c a r r i e d on s e c r e t n e g o t i a t i o n s with M a l a y s i a about c o n f r o n t a t i o n . See Ekpres September 6, 1971 f o r a cover s t o r y on Murtopo with much b i o g r a p h i c a l data. c  101  See  F e i t h , o j D ^ c i t . , pp.  98-IOI about t h i s  pressure.  102  S i n a r Harapan January 3-5, 1972 f o r a s e r i e s o f a r t i c l e s on the NU Congress. Subchan, a young e n e r g e t i c l e a d e r , was subsequently removed from the p a r t y h i e r a r c h y . NU members t h a t I spoke with were p o s i t i v e that some s o r t of d e a l had been made with Murtopo, S e e  103  Murtopo's power i s l a r g e l y n o n - i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d , and the m i l i t a r y h i e r a r c h y has l i t t l e c o n t r o l over h i s a c t i o n s as he i s r e s p o n s i b l e only to the P r e s i d e n t . Allegedly, this has given r i s e to some p e r s o n a l and i n s t i t u t i o n a l r i v a l r i e s w i t h i n ABRI. For some comments on t h i s see Rosihan Anwar i n Pedoman February 7, I 9 7 2 .  - 137  -  104  T h i s was s a i d i n anger on J a n u a r y 6, 1972 i n r e p l y t o the " M i n i " p r o t e s t s - see Sinai- Harapan o f the same d a t e . 105 J u s t u s Van d e r K r o e f , ''New P o l i t i c a l P a t t e r n s i n I n d o n e s i a " , World Today, 1969, V o l . 2 5 , No.5, p.219. 10 &  Murtopo's a b i l i t y to p l a y what I n d o n e s i a n s c a l l a "cowboy" r o l e can p r o b a b l y be a t t r i b u t e d t o the l e s s e r i n f l u e n c e of pri.1a.ji c u l t u r e i n the a r e a where he was born and r a i s e d — the p a s i s i r . I t i s worth n o t i n g t h a t w h i l e those around S u h a r t o i n c l u d i n g the ASPRI and Madame S u h a r t o have not been a b l e to a v o i d the " c o r r u p t o r " l a b e l , the P r e s i d e n t has been a b l e t o do so. 107 See Van d e r K r o e f , o p . c i t . , p,222 and Polomka, o p . c i t . , pp.179-96 f o r a d i s c u s s i o n o f the M u s l i m - C h r i s t i a n c o n f l i c t . 108  The " M i n i A f f a i r " was a v e r y complex i s s u e . For f u r t h e r d e t a i l s see my m a n u s c r i p t ( i n p r e p a r a t i o n ) , " E l i t e C o n f l i c t i n I n d o n e s i a ? The M i n a t u r I n d o n e s i a Indah P r o j e c t " . 109  ABRI seems t o be i n t e n t on " d e p o l i t i c i z i n g " .Islam, p a r t l y because o f i t s p o t e n t i a l as an o p p o s i t i o n f o r c e and p a r t l y because of the i m p o s s i b i l i t y of communication between the two, J a v a n e s e , s i n c e independence, have c o n s i s t e n t l y shown t h e i r i n a b i l i t y t o t r u s t or communicate w i t h " m o d e r n i s t " Muslims and v i c e v e r s a . The b i g g e s t f e a r of a l l the e l i t e i s an I s l a m - n o n - I s l a m s p l i t which would p o l a r i z e the p o l i t y i n t o two a l m o s t e q u a l p a r t s . To h e l p a v o i d t h i s , ABRI b e l i e v e s the NU a l s o must e v e n t u a l l y abandon i t s p o l i t i c a l functions, 110  T h i s happened t o Ben Anderson and Ruth McVey w i t h t h e i r monograph on the G-30-S, Anderson and McVey, o p . c i t . , passim.. I t s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of events was e x a c t l y o p p o s i t e from the m i l i t a r y ' s and the army c o u l d not b e l i e v e t h a t i t was w r i t t e n w i t h no u l t e r i o r motives,. To t h i s day, o v e r 6 y e a r s s i n c e the paper was w r i t t e n , i n t e r v i e w e e s and newspapers s t i l l l a s h out a t the two s c h o l a r s as t o o l s of communism and opponents o f the regime. A more r e c e n t example i s the v i s i t o f P r o f e s s o r Z a s l o f f o f the U n i v e r s i t y of P i t t s b u r g h . He has no c l a i m t o be a s c h o l a r of Indonesian p o l i t i c s . He made a l e c t u r e on p o l i t i c a l development i n Semarang and mentioned t h a t I n d o n e s i a was s t i l l h u n t i n g f o r i n s t i t u t i o n s t o f i t the mood and temperament of i t s p e o p l e — w h i c h i s obvious t o anyone, i f the changes of the p a r t y system a r e t a k e n i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n . Amir Machmud, M i n i s t e r of I n t e r i o r , i m m e d i a t e l y saw t h i s as an a t t a c k on P a n t j a s i l a and the UUD45, Machmud i n v i t e d Z a s l o f f t o s t o p i n t e r f e r i n g i n Indonesia's i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s . See Tempo June 30, 1972.  - 138  -  111  A l l l i s t e d a r e s t u d e n t p r o t e s t a c t i o n s . The f i r s t t h r e e were p r o t e s t s a g a i n s t c o r r u p t i o n and G o l p u t w i t h the l a c k o f r e a l c h o i c e i n the 1971 elections„ 112  Quoted i n E k s p r e s September 6, 1971?  p.16.  113  T.D. Hafas e d i t o r of N u s a n t a r a was s e n t e n c e d t o j a i l f o r one y e a r f o r such c r i t i c i s m and the magazine S e n d i had i t s l i c e n s e r e v o k e d f o r much the same r e a s o n . On the Hafas case see Tempo September 18, 1971 and on S e n d i see Tempo F e b r u a r y 26, 1972 and S l n a r Harapan March 1, 1972. 114 S u m i t r o made t h i s statement b e f o r e the F o r e i g n Correspondents Club i n D j a k a r t a on F e b r u a r y 4, 1972. 115 Amir Machmud has r e c e n t l y a c c u s e d the p r e s s of d e l i b e r a t e l y m i s - q u o t i n g and d i s t o r t i n g h i s speeches and s t a t e m e n t s - See I n d o n e s i a R a j a e d i t o r i a l June 1 3 , 1972 and Tempo June 2 3 , 1 9 7 2 . E a r l i e r i n the y e a r S i n a r Harapan was h a n d l e d r o u g h l y by KOPKAMTIB f o r a l l e g e d l y l e a k i n g an o f f i c i a l background statement by B A K I N ( I n t e l l i g e n c e ) C h i e f , Sutopo Juwono. 116 H a r l a n Kami, e d i t e d by Nono Anwar Makarim, i s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the remnant o f the y o u t h f o r c e s o f the G e n e r a t i o n o f '66. I n d o n e s i a R a j a i s an independent e d i t e d by Mochtar L u b i s . A b a d i i s the v o i c e o f the " m o d e r n i s t " Muslims and i s c o n s t a n t l y a t "war" w i t h the army s u p p o r t e d newspapers Angkatan B e r s e n d j a t a , A p i P a n t j a s i l a and B e r i t a Yudha as w e l l as the G o l k a r organ"^ Suara K a r y a . 119  'BIMAS (Bimbingan Masa) o r Mass Guidance. There was a l s o some heavy p r o f i t t a k i n g by h i g h government p e o p l e on " k i c k b a c k s " from the c o n t r a c t c h o i c e s , i f rumors and s e v e r a l c o n f i d e n t i a l i n t e r v i e w s a r e t o be b e l i e v e d . 118 T h i s i s one of the i n d i c a t i o n s t h a t G o l k a r i s d e f i n i t e l y s u b o r d i n a t e t o the government even i n i t s p a r l i a m e n t a r y a c t i v i t i e s . .The p a r l i a m e n t a r y d i s c u s s i o n s were l i t t l e more t h a n a r e p e t i t i o n o f p r e v i o u s p u b l i c debate. The s p e c i a l committee on the problem i s s u e d a c a r e f u l l y worded r e p o r t t h a t was h a r d l y o b j e c t i o n a b l e t o anyone, a t l e a s t o f on the government s i d e , and t h a t d i d n o t r e a l l y t a c k l e the i s s u e a t hand — i t was a v o i d e d by s a y i n g t h a t the p r o j e c t was out o f the DPR's competence i f i t was a p r i v a t e p r o j e c t . I t d i d p o i n t out v e r y w e l l , however, the problem o f the younger g e n e r a t i o n i n communicating w i t h the government. See DPR Memorandum 1076/P.Ch.M.I.I./72,  - 139  -  119 'Both N a s u t i o n and Budiman a r e non-Javanese and have a tendency to be too d i r e c t i n t h e i r c r i t i c i s m . Neither a r e i n v o l v e d w i t h the government, d i r e c t l y , N a s u t i o n does r u n the D j a k a r t a C i t y - s p o n s o r e d L e g a l A i d I n s t i t u t e . 120 Moertono, the m i l i t a r y l i a i s o n w i t h G o l k a r announced t h a t the r e g i o n a l DPRD's would be t o r n a p a r t and f a c t i o n a l i z e d , hence p a r a l y z e d , i f they had t o s e l e c t the r e g i o n ' s g o v e r n o r . S i n a r Harapan June 6, 1972. He seemed t o be s a y i n g t h a t they were not s u f f i c i e n t l y d i d i d i k t o handle the p r o c e s s . The " F l o a t i n g Mass", as d e s c r i b e d i n the p r e v i o u s s e c t i o n s , i s e s s e n t i a l l y a m i s - r e a d i n g o f the method o f o p e r a t i o n o f the American and B r i t i s h p a r t y systems. No l o c a l branches of p a r t i e s w i l l be a l l o w e d below the Kabupaten l e v e l except a t e l e c t i o n time every f i v e y e a r s . The a c c e p t a n c e of such a p l a n r e v e a l s the i d e a l i s t i c n a t u r e o f the government's c o n c e p t i o n o f v i l l a g e l i f e . I f only p a r t i e s c o u l d be removed, goes the argument, c o n f l i c t a t t h a t l e v e l would d i s a p p e a r , 121 See Gary Hansen, " E p i s o d e s i n R u r a l M o d e r n i z a t i o n s Problems i n the BIMAS Program" I n d o n e s i a , 1971, No. 11. 122 See my m a n u s c r i p t on the " M i n i A f f a i r " , 123 There i s such a p r o h i b i t i o n f o r M i n i s t e r s and S e c r e t a r y G e n e r a l s but not f o r t h e i r wives and f a m i l i e s or f o r the m i l i t a r y at a l l , 124 S a d i k i n e x p l a i n e d h i s way out of the s i t u a t i o n by s a y i n g t h a t the D j a k a r t a C i t y Government had e a r l i e r g i v e n him a u t h o r i t y t o b u i l d a s i m i l a r p r o j e c t , Murtopo o f f e r e d no p u b l i c e x p l a n a t i o n , 9  125  •^Stories of c o r r u p t i o n i n I n d o n e s i a a r e numerous. For one such i n c i d e n t t h a t never became p u b l i c see my m a n u s c r i p t on the " M i n i A f f a i r " . For e x c e l l e n t s t u d i e s o f the problem see Ted S m i t h , " C o r r u p t i o n i n I n d o n e s i a " , I n d o n e s i a , 1971, No. l l ? and Soedarso, K o r u p s i d i I n d o n e s i a ( C o r r u p t i o n i n Indonesia) ( D j a k a r t a s ~ B h a r a t a , 1969)~ 12 6 Polomka, o p . c i t . , pp. 2 4 - 6 . E v i d e n t l y , the i d e a was taken from the M a l a y s i a n R u r a l Development scheme. S t a t i s t i c s i n I n d o n e s i a a r e h i g h l y s u s p e c t and w i t h the p r e s s u r e from above f o r p r o g r e s s and good r e s u l t s , i t i s p r o b a b l e t h a t the c o n t r o l room f i g u r e s a r e about as a c c u r a t e as the "Vietnam Body-Count T o t a l s " .  CHAPTER IV THE  FUTURE OF JAVANIZATION  In the p r e v i o u s d i s c u s s i o n , i t was  noted t h a t there  a r e many b a s i c s i m i l a r i t i e s between the i d e a s , s t r u c t u r e s and  s t y l e of government i n Mataram and i n contemporary  Indonesia.  The  following l i s t  summarizes the major  similaritiess 1) S t r u c t u r e ;  The  formal and i n f o r m a l governmental  s t r u c t u r e i n Mataram and contemporary Indonesia a r e extremely h i e r a r c h i a l i n nature w i t h very dominant r u l e r s and c e n t e r s .  The  formal s t r u c t u r e of the government does  not correspond to r e a l i t y .  The power and a u t h o r i t y of  the r u l e r ' s a s s i s t a n t s depends p r i m a r i l y on t h e i r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p to the r u l e r r a t h e r than on t h e i r formal p o s i t i o n i n the h i e r a r c h y .  There are no f u n c t i o n i n g  s t r u c t u r e s of mass p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the p o l i t i c a l 2)  Functions %  system.  The acknowledged primary f u n c t i o n o f the  government i s to m a i n t a i n "harmony" throughout  the  Thus, m a i n t a i n i n g the s t a t u s quo and s t a b i l i t y are g o a l s of the regime.  realm. primary  V a r i o u s s o r t s of c o n t r o l s , manipu-  l a t i o n s , and s e c u r i t y measures are the main means t o ensure  the establishment and maintenance of "harmony".  The government c o n s t a n t l y s t r u g g l e s to prevent  the  emergence of autonomous power c e n t e r s w i t h i n the realm  -  140  -  - 141 whether they be p o l i t i c a l or commercial.  The c h i e f  m o t i v a t i o n f o r any form of change or "development"  i s to  strengthen the e x i s t i n g power d i s t r i b u t i o n , n o t a l t e r 3) S t y l e % or  Both governments  emphasize  it.  the c o r r e c t approach  form o f approach to any problem much more than the  a c t u a l content of the p o l i c y .  There i s a h i g h value p l a c e d  on single-mindedness of purpose and non-expression of emotion o r d e s i r e ;  hence, a s t y l e o f wa.jang or shadow  p o l i t i c s i s the r e s u l t ,  There i s l i t t l e  conception of  moral i m p l i c a t i o n s of power which p r o v i d e s many o p p o r t u n i t i e s for  a r b i t r a r y use of s t a t e power and funds by the r u l e r s .  There i s l i t t l e criticism;  cognizance of the value of o p p o s i t i o n o r  i t tends to be p o o r l y t o l e r a t e d o r i g n o r e d .  On the whole, the s t y l e o f government c o u l d b e s t be d e s c r i b e d as " p r o t e c t i v e s u p e r i o r i t y " o r simply, p a t e r n a l i s m . There a r e many f a c t o r s that could c o n t r i b u t e t o the s i m i l a r i t i e s d e s c r i b e d above. Indonesia has changed l i t t l e  B a s i c a l l y , the d i v e r s i t y of s i n c e the time of Mataram.  While some of the t o o l s of r u l e r s h i p , c o n t r o l and penet r a t i o n have changed s i n c e that time, the problems a s s o c i a t e d w i t h r u l i n g the t e r r i t o r y have not. of  The t o o l s  government may have improved but the f o r c e s of  d i s i n t e g r a t i o n may be s t r o n g e r than p r e v i o u s l y . The f a c t t h a t Indonesia today i s l a r g e l y  controlled  by the m i l i t a r y may a l s o c o n t r i b u t e t o some o f the  - 142 similarities. and  M i l i t a r y norms which argue f o r s t a b i l i t y  c o n t r o l must augment Javanese norms f o r such.  the experiences  Equally,  of the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l democracy p e r i o d ,  seemingly o b j e c t i v e l y showed Indonesians t h a t Western s t y l e p o l i t i c s and  government were i l l  s u i t e d e i t h e r to  the p e c u l i a r i t i e s o f t h e i r n a t i o n or value  system  and  i n c r e a s e d a g e n e r a l d e s i r e f o r strong and a u t h o r i t a t i v e government. While one  seeks to a v o i d the c r i t i c i s m of  determinism", i t i s d i f f i c u l t  to escape the  "cultural  conclusion  t h a t Javanese o p e r a t i n g a government would operate i t according  to Javanese norms.  Hence, i t seems q u i t e n a t u r a l  t h a t the s t r u c t u r e , f u n c t i o n s and would be r a t h e r Javanese. p a t i o n and The  s t y l e of such a government  Further,  the r u l e s of p a r t i c i -  concept of the s t a t e would a l s o be  data given p r e v i o u s l y shows t h a t , indeed,  whelming m a j o r i t y  of a l l p o s i t i o n s i n the  Javanese. an  over-  political,  governmental and m i l i t a r y e l i t e are f i l l e d by Javanese or persons t h a t are a n t a g o n i s t i c toward the country's major c u l t u r a l group. Guided Democracy and  other  Since the major c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the New  Order do correspond w i t h  the  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of Javanism, there i s a s t r o n g i n d i c a t i o n that a process  c a l l e d J a v a n i z a t i o n has  the p o l i t i c a l and  governmental spheres.  occurred  within  - 143 On the Fut lire of J a v a n i z a t i o n The  r u l e r s of contemporary Indonesia  have c r e a t e d  a government that might be b e s t d e s c r i b e d as a neo-Mataram. Javanese have imposed t h e i r conception i d e a s of proper p o l i t i c a l behavior,  t h e i r own d e f i n i t i o n s  of the l i m i t s of p o l i t i c a l power and Indonesian s o c i e t y *  T h i s process  the cloak of the search and n a t i o n a l s o u l .  of the s t a t e , t h e i r  has  i t s uses on been done under  f o r Indonesia's true  identity  I t has been made immeasurably e a s i e r  through the widespread adoption  of a t r u l y n a t i o n a l  language, Bahasa Indonesia,  r a t h e r than the use  Javanese.  has  Bahasa Indonesia  by the Javanese language but has had The  i t s own  of  been g r e a t l y i n f l u e n c e d  the n a t i o n a l l i n g u a f r a n c a  d i s i n t e g r a t i v e e f f e c t s upon Bahasa Djawa.  same i s true f o r much of what could be  t r a d i t i o n a l Javanese c u l t u r e .  The  called  Javanese have been  a b l e to dominate but a t the p r i c e o f d i l u t i o n of Javanism. T h i s d i l u t i o n or s o f t e n i n g of Javanism  was  n e c e s s a r y f o r the c r e a t i o n of a n a t i o n out of a d i s p a r a t e empire.  Domination c o u l d never be c l e a r and  i m p o s i t i o n o f one nation.  direct  c u l t u r a l p a t t e r n upon the r e s t o f  I f however, the domination were i n i t i a t e d  the and  implemented o s t e n s i b l y as a genuine n a t i o n a l phenomenon, i t might prove a c c e p t a b l e workable scheme.  and  e v e n t u a l l y , become a  A s s i m i l a t i o n to the "new"  Indonesian-  - 144 -ness, though d e f i n e d i n a Javanese way, where any a s s i m i l a t i o n to Javanism was  was  ipso  conceivable facto  impossible. Even the implementation of the "new" p o l i t i c s as d e f i n e d by Javanese was  to c o s t  Indonesian casualties  though f a r fewer than i f Javanism had been imposed  directly.  C e r t a i n s e c t o r s and segments of s o c i e t y would become a l i e n a t e d , even r e v o l t a g a i n s t the new d e f i n i t i o n of the p o l i t y , but the q u e s t i o n o f u l t i m a t e success r e s t e d sheer p o l i t i c s ,  on  the p o l i t i c s of a minimal winning c o a l i t i o n ,  and l a s t l y on f o r c e . The v i c t o r y of the Javanese h i n t e r l a n d group o f the m i l i t a r y l e d by Suharto was  i n a sense a r e g r e s s i o n  o r "throw back*' to c o n t r o l o f the p o l i t y to the t r a d i t i o n a l i s t segment of the Javanese p o p u l a t i o n .  Since  Javanese a r i s t o c r a t i c p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e has l o n g been i n the process of decay and d i s i n t e g r a t i o n a t the p e r i p h e r y , only the remnant'or rump of the t o t a l i t y o f Java i s r e p r e s e n t e d by t h i s group. government and p o l i t i c a l  The a c t u a l f u n c t i o n i n g of the  system would be much  smoother  were i t o p e r a t i n g i n the c o n t e x t o f a t r a d i t i o n a l Javanese p o l i t y such as Mataram.  So, w h i l e the government attempts  to r u l e i n a manner that c l o s e l y resembles that o f Mataram, the s o c i e t y that i t governs i s very d i f f e r e n t from t h a t of Mataram.  - 14-5 S o c i a l change i n Indonesia, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n Java, has gone on a t a tremendous pace d u r i n g the 2 0 t h  century.  The e f f e c t s of the f i n a l years of Dutch C o l o n i a l  Rule,  the Great Depression, Japanese Occupation, the R e v o l u t i o n , the mass p o l i t i c s of C o n s t i t u t i o n a l and Guided Democracy, v a s t o v e r p o p u l a t i o n , r a p i d u r b a n i z a t i o n and  widespread  modern e d u c a t i o n have c r e a t e d a v o r t e x of s o c i a l 1 mobilization Indonesia.  t h a t has changed the face of contemporary Odd as i t may  seem, today the most t r a d i t i o n a l  p o r t i o n s of Indonesia are the Outer I s l a n d s .  They are  more e a s i l y c o n t r o l l e d than i s Java through c o o p t a t i o n of the r e g i o n a l governmental 2  and t r a d i t i o n a l e l i t e by the  c e n t r a l government,  " c o n c e s s i o n s " of the governing  The  e l i t e to c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m , p a r l i a m e n t s , p o p u l a r p a r t i c i p a t i o n and i d e a s of popular s o v e r e i g n t y were made more t o e t h n i c a l l y Javanese ones.  elements  than they were to non-Javanese  As evidenced by the PKI and G - 3 0 - S , Javanese  can  a l s o be the s t r o n g e s t enemies of J a v a n i z a t i o n , as d e f i n e d here. D j a k a r t a , the most cosmopolitan and o f a l l the n a t i o n ' s c i t i e s ,  "Indonesian"  i s the seat of the government.  T h i s c a p i t a l c i t y , l o c a t e d on the n o r t h coast of West Java, i s f a r from the c e n t e r s o f t r a d i t i o n a l Javanese Javanese  culture.  are a m i n o r i t y of the c a p i t a l ' s p o p u l a t i o n .  D j a k a r t a i n i t s own way  i s a f o r c e f o r the d e t r a d i t i o n a l i -  - 146 z a t i o n o f the government. dlverseness  There world c u l t u r e and the  o f the Indonesian c u l t u r e s meet t o form a  d i s t i n c t i v e mix o f s t y l e , form and behavior t h a t a s s a u l t Javanism d i r e c t l y and i n f l u e n c e a very l a r g e p o r t i o n o f the r u l e r s i n everyday It  life.  i s i n Djakarta  and the a s s o c i a t e d u n i v e r s i t y  towns that Javanese have s t a r t e d a s k i n g Javanism i s a l l about;  themselves what  what i t i s about Javanism that  i s h o l d i n g t h e i r s o c i e t y back and keeping Indonesia from achieving  the goals  o f modernity, s t a b i l i t y and economic  growth t h a t the e l i t e espouses.  Indonesians have t h e i r  own d i s t i n c t i v e t h e o r i e s about p r i j a j i - i s m and n e o - f e u d a l i s m  3 and  t h e i r e f f e c t s on the s o c i e t y ' s f u n c t i o n i n g . The  and  l a r g e numbers of Javanese i n the government  m i l i t a r y i s a f a c t of l i f e  to l i v e with f o r a l o n g time.  that Indonesia w i l l have Present trends  do not  r e v e a l any d e s i r e on the p a r t of Outer I s l a n d e r s  to j o i n  4 the c e n t r a l government i n g r e a t e r numbers.  While some  Javanese a r e f i n d i n g t h e i r way i n t o commercial l i f e and some Outer I s l a n d e r s  (besides  C h r i s t i a n s ) i n t o government  s e r v i c e , the numbers a r e n o t l a r g e enough to have profound e f f e c t s on the e t h n i c composition of c i v i l  servants  as a  group f o r s e v e r a l decades. Likewise,  the l i m i t a t i o n s and c o n s t r a i n t s on  p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n and b e h a v i o r t h a t have been s e t by Javanese  - 147 a r e u n l i k e l y to be openly c h a l l e n g e d and changed i n the near f u t u r e .  The younger g e n e r a t i o n of Javanese and  Outer  I s l a n d e l i t e are most l i k e l y going to grow up a c c e p t i n g the o u t l i n e s of the s t a t e and government as i t now The Javanese d e f i n i t i o n s of t h i s g e n e r a t i o n may  stands.  well  become the Indonesian d e f i n i t i o n s of the next g e n e r a t i o n . ^ Slow and constant change r a t h e r than a sudden s h i f t of  i n some  these fundamental d e f i n i t i o n s or l i m i t s i s l i k e l y  occur.  E r o s i o n from the i n s i d e and change of the  to  substance  r a t h e r than the form i s the most l i k e l y path f o r the future. As Javanese and J a v a n i z e d members of the e l i t e change t h e i r own  conceptions of p o l i t i c s ,  they are l i k e l y  to change  the d e f i n i t i o n s and l i m i t s of p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n from inside. or  Outside t h r e a t s , whether i t be from Islam, Communism  the West i n the form of Democratic  S o c i a l i s m , have been  s u c c e s s f u l l y r e p e l l e d by the core of Javanism without  the  some change.  but not  Despite the l i m i t e d h o r i z o n s or  worldvie:r of the present r u l i n g e l i t e , they have been a b l e to accept and use a d v i c e from other Javanese about innov a t i o n s and changes t h a t are d e s i r a b l e or n e c e s s a r y . the i n c l i n a t i o n s of Suharto and those around him, i n any new  undertaking i s l i k e l y  dominant q u a l i t y .  Given  caution  to continue to be a  However, t h i s i s q u i t e n a t u r a l f o r  anyone attempting t o embark on "new"  and untested paths  of  - 148 governing.  The  major p o i n t i s t h a t i n n o v a t i o n s  are  o c c u r r i n g w i t h i n the framework t h a t has been very l o o s e l y but adamantly l a i d by Javanese themselves. contestations  to the contrary.,  stagnated as y e t . The  The  the New  Despite  Order has  some  not  i d e a o f "dynamic s t a b i l i t y " remains.  g r e a t e s t t h r e a t s to the Nexf Order and  i t s form  of Javanism are the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of a p o l a r i z a t i o n between I s l a m i c and non-Islamic p o r t i o n s of the s o c i e t y , i n s u f f i c i e n t a t t e n t i o n to Outer I s l a n d demands f o r a l a r g e r p o r t i o n o f the development budget and  the i n c r e a s i n g c r i s i s of a g r i -  c u l t u r a l poverty on Java i t s e l f .  In order to prevent or.,  "avoid chaos as a r e s u l t of these problems, the government will  simply  be  f o r c e d to modify i t s own  l i m i t s of b e h a v i o r  and' the d i s t r i b u t i o n of power i n the country. m o d i f i c a t i o n s w i l l probably be small and  These  initially,  hard  to i d e n t i f y , but as i n the p a s t , Javanism w i l l have to adjust i t s e l f Up by  the New  to a changing r e a l i t y .  to the present,  only minimal work has  Order on c r e a t i n g i n s t i t u t i o n s i n the  t h a t can c a r r y on i t s m i s s i o n  the m i l i t a r y and  r e o r g a n i z a t i o n and  society  f o r even the s o - c a l l e d  p e r i o d of 25 years of a c c e l e r a t e d modernization, p r i o r i t y was  been done  Of  then the bureaucracy.  strengthening  first The  of the former seems  almost complete while the o r g a n i z a t i o n of the l a t t e r i s definitely  f u l l y underway.  much thought and  Golkar, r e l i e d upon without  of temporary n e c e s s i t y , w i l l have to  get  - 149 an i n c r e a s i n g amount of a t t e n t i o n , r e o r g a n i z a t i o n strengthening New  i n the  f u t u r e , i f indeed i t i s to be  Order's p o l i t i c a l t o o l f o r r e s t r u c t u r i n g the  nesian p o l i t y . "slowly but  One  and the  Indo-  prominent non-Javanese t o l d  me  s u r e l y , the i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s t s are winning."^  I f t h i s i s the case and path to a t t a c k and  i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n i s a proper  overcome the present  ills  of Indonesian  7 s o c i e t y , present Despite been c r e a t e d  trends augur w e l l f o r Indonesia's  impressions to the c o n t r a r y  e a r l i e r i n t h i s paper, the  future.  t h a t may  "evils"  have  of  contemporary Indonesian government do not a r i s e from f a c t that Javanese c o n t r o l i t . Javanese c u l t u r e has  The  b e n e f i t e d and  will  i t may  The  be t h a t  on and  the  i n e v i t a b l e process,  other group c o n t r o l as d e s c r i b e d  c o u l d have been an extremely f o r t u n a t e p r o c e s s . country has  judgment  continue to b e n e f i t from  f a c t that Javanese r a t h e r than any  the c o u n t r y .  of  Indonesian  To make a value  about J a v a n i z a t i o n i s d i f f i c u l t but  the  strength  been t r a n s l a t e d i n t o an  s t r e n g t h i n the modern world.  country has  very  the  c o n t i n u i t y of c u l t u r e and  by  Lev,  The  r u l e r s h i p to r e l y  the dubious d i s t i n c t i o n of being r u l e d by a  cultural  group that i s known f o r i t s l a c k of extremism and o v e r a l l moderation i n outlook, The  questions  b e h a v i o r and  action.  of the c o n t i n u a t i o n  a c t u a l commitment to moderniasasi and  of m i l i t a r y r u l e ,  the l i k e have  little  - 150  -  importance i n comparison with the f a t e of J a v a n i z a t i o n . In f a c t , the answers to these questions  may  w e l l depend  on the degree of l e g i t i m a c y t h a t non-Javanese groups a c c o r d  to J a v a n i z a t i o n .  cultural  For, u l t i m a t e l y , the  c o n t i n u a t i o n of the n a t i o n depends on t h i s very —  what i s the f a t e of  Javanization?  question  - 151  -  Notes on CHAPTER IV S o c i a l m o b i l i z a t i o n as d e f i n e d i n K a r l Deutstch, " S o c i a l M o b i l i z a t i o n and P o l i t i c a l Development", American P o l i t i c a l Science Review, 1961, Vol.LV, N o . 3 . 2 I conclude t h i s from the 1971 e l e c t i o n r e s u l t s . The major t o o l o f c o n t r o l of the outcome of the e l e c t i o n s h e l d by the government was i t s c o n t r o l of the bureaucracy o f the e n t i r e country as w e l l as the f a c t t h a t Golkar was c l e a r l y the government " p a r t y " . Despite the f a c t t h a t Golkar i s Javanese c o n t r o l l e d , i t d i d much b e t t e r i n many p a r t s of the Outer I s l a n d s than i n Java. Compare: C e n t r a l Java - Golkar 54$% E a s t Java - Golkar 50$; D j a k a r t a - Golkar 42$; North Sumatra - Golkar 72$; B a l i - Golkar 8 7 $ ; Southeast Sulawesi ~ Golkar 92%% Riau - Golkar 7 7 $ ; Djambi - 8 7 $ ; and Kalimantan S e l a t a n Golkar 65$. These r e s u l t s were c a l c u l a t e d from S i n a r Harapan August 7, I 9 7 2 .  3  See Selo Soemardjan, "Asian A t t i t u d e s and A s i a n Development" Horizons, 1 9 7 2 , V o l . XXXI, No.2, pp.14-17; Soedjatmoko, Economic Development as a C u l t u r a l Problem ( I t h a c a : C o r n e l l Modern Indonesia P r o j e c t , I957)'; ~ K o e n t j a r a n i n g r a t , "Masalah Sikap-Mental Yang Cocok Untuk Membangun" (The Problem of Mental A t t i t u d e s that Harmonize w i t h Development) i n K e j a k i n a n dan Perdjuangan ( C o n v i c t i o n and S t r u g g l e ) . ( D j a k a r t a : Gunung M u l i a , 1 9 7 2 ) ; "Beberapa T j a t a t a n Tentang P r i j a j i " (Some Notes About P r i j a j i ) S i n a r Harapan January 4 , 1 9 7 2 , A l s o see the Panglima o f B r a w i d j a j a ' s statement on p r e v e n t i n g p r i j a j i and c o o l i e a t t i t u d e s , S i n a r Harapan June 3s 1972', F o r an o f f i c i a l view see M i n i s t e r of E d u c a t i o n Mastmri's a r t i c l e i n S i n a r Harapan June 2 8 - 2 9 , I 9 7 2 which s t a t e s t h a t the p r e s e n t e d u c a t i o n a l system breeds p r i j a j i - i s m . See Soedjatmoko s most r e c e n t statement on neo-feudalism i n S i n a r Harapan J u l y 3 9 1 9 7 2 , 5  4  While no exact f i g u r e s were a v a i l a b l e on such t r e n d s , i n t e r v i e w s w i t h both Javanese and non-Javanese w i t h some knowledge on the s u b j e c t i n d i c a t e d t h a t the younger o f f i c e r ' s corps of ABRI and the younger ranks of the c i v i l s e r v i c e i n the c a p i t a l do not c o n t a i n l a r g e numbers o f non-Javanese. A l l of Indonesia's best u n i v e r s i t i e s a r e l o c a t e d on Java and the army's m i l i t a r y academy i s l o c a t e d i n Magelang, j u s t o u t s i d e o f J o g j a k a r t a . Javanese o b v i o u s l y have the e a s i e s t a c c e s s to them g i v e n the a r c h i p e l a g o ' s poor communication system.  - 152  -  ^ T h i s may seem to be somewhat of a c o n t r a d i c t i o n g i v e n the r a p i d s o c i a l change d e s c r i b e d i n the p r e v i o u s paragraphs and i t i s . The e l i t e has to accept these Javanese norms or be o s t r a c i z e d or destroyed by Javanese who s t i l l h o l d to them, namely the army. L i k e the PKI and ABRI under Sukarno, v e r b a l acceptance does not mean t h a t one does not s t r i v e to f i g h t the l i m i t s of the system from w i t h i n . The masses — to use the term l o o s e l y — e s p e c i a l l y on Java, have l i t t l e reason to remain subdued or s a t i s f i e d with a neo-Mataram type of p o l i t i c a l system. Given the t r a d i t i o n a l a g r a r i a n r a d i c a l i s m of Java and the continuance of the c o n d i t i o n s t h a t have encouraged i t , the f u t u r e i s bleak u n l e s s there i s change. S o c i a l e x p l o s i o n s (the massacres) such as the ones that occurred a f t e r the G-30-S i n 1965 distinct possibilities i n the f u t u r e i f the l i m i t s now p l a c e d on the p o l i t y are not r e l a x e d . S u r v i v a l , then, may d i c t a t e change. On these p o i n t s see Sartono, "Peasant R a d i c a l i s m i n Java" i n C l a i r e H o l t (ed.), P o l i t i c s and C u l t u r e ; i n Indonesia (Ithacas C o r n e l l U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 7 2 ) . a  r  e  ^Nono Anwar Makarim, e d i t o r of H a r i a n Kami, i n an i n t e r v i e w , J u l y 24, 1972. ^, 7 Huntington, o p . c i t . , passim, p o s t u l a t e s t h a t i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n i s the only path to s t a b i l i t y f o r a p o l i t y such as Indonesia.  - 153 BOOKS Alfian;  M i l i t e r Dan P o l i t i k ? Pengalaman Beberapa Negara (The M i l i t a r y and P o l i t i c s ? The E x p e r i e n c e s o f S e v e r a l C o u n t r i e s ) D j a k a r t a ? L i p p i 1970«  Alflan;  Segl P o l i t i k P a r i Perentianan Masjarakat ( P o l i t i c a l A s p e c t s o f S o c i a l P l a n n i n g ) D j a k a r t a ? Leknas 1 9 7 2 .  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X L V , N o . 2 , (Summer 19727 ~ Cruikshank, Roberts "Abangan, S a n t r i and P r i j a j i " , J o u r n a l o f S o u t h e a s t A s i a n S t u d i e s V o l . I l l , N o . l ( M a r c h 1972) " C u r r e n t D a t a o n t h e I n d o n e s i a n Army E l i t e " I n d o n e s i a N o . 7 , ( A p r i l I969) " C u r r e n t D a t a on t h e I n d o n e s i a n Army E l i t e " I n d o n e s i a N o . 1 0 ( O c t o b e r 1970) "Data on the C u r r e n t M i l i t a r y E l i t e " I n d o n e s i a  N o . 3 ( A p r i l I967)  - 158  -  Dencon, David B.s "Indonesia; T r a n s i t i o n to S t a b i l i t y " , Current H i s t o r y , V o l , 6 1 , No,364 (December 1971) F e i t h , H e r b e r t : " P r e s i d e n t Sukarno, the Army and the Communists: The T r i a n g l e Changes Shape", A s i a n Survey, V o l , I V , No,8 (August 1964) F e i t h , Herberts "Soeharto's Search f o r a P o l i t i c a l Format", Indonesia No,6, (October I968) F e i t h , Herberts "The Dynamics of Guided Democracy" i n Ruth McVey (ed.) Indonesia, New Havens HRAF, I967 F e i t h , Herberts "Indonesia's P o l i t i c a l Symbols and t h e i r Wielders", World P o l i t i c s XVI, N o . l (October 1963) Geertz, H i l d r e d s "Indonesian C u l t u r e s and Communities", i n Ruth McVey (ed.) Indonesia, New Haven; HRAF,1963 Geertz, C l i f f o r d s "Afterword; The P o l i t i c s of Meaning" i n C l a i r e H o l t (ed.) P o l i t i c s and C u l t u r e i n Indonesia. I t h a c a ; C o r n e l l U n i v e r s i t y Press I972 Gregory, Annes " F a c t i o n a l i s m and the Indonesian Army", J o u r n a l of Comparative A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , I I No.3 (November 1970) Hanna, W i l l a r d A.: "The M a g i c a l - M y s t i c a l Syndrome i n the Indonesian M e n t a l i t y " , American U n i v e r s i t i e s F i e l d S t a f f Reportss Southeast A s i a S e r i e s , Vol.XV, Nos. 5-9. H a r n e t t , P.J.: "The Indonesian Army 1 9 4 5 - 6 5 " , Review of Indonesian and Malayan A f f a i r s , V o l . 1 , No.l (January-March 1 9 6 7 7 " ~~ Hansen, Garys "Episodes i n R u r a l Modernizations Problems i n the Bimas Program", Indonesia No.11 (April 1971) H i g g i n s , Ben: "Survey of Recent Developments", B u l l e t i n of Indonesian Economic S t u d i e s , V o l . V I I I , No.l (March 1972) H i n d l e y , Donalds " P r e s i d e n t Soekarno and the Communists: The P o l i t i c s of Domestication", American P o l i t i c a l Science Review V o l . L V I , No.4 (December I 9 6 2 ) H i n d l e y , Donalds " A l i r a n s and the F a l l of the Old Indonesia No.9 ( A p r i l I 9 7 O )  Order",  - 159  -  H i n d l e y , Donalds "Indonesia 1970s The Workings of P a n t j a s i l a Democracy", A s i a n Survey V o l . X I , No.2, (February 1971) H i n d l e y , Donald; "Indonesia 1971; P a n t j a s i l a Democracy and the Second P a r l i a m e n t a r y E l e c t i o n s " , A s i a n Survey XII No.l (January 1972) Lev, D a n i e l S.; " P a r t i e s , F u n c t i o n a l Groups and E l e c t i o n s " , A s i a : A J o u r n a l of the A s i a S o c i e t y (Autumn 1970) Lev, D a n i e l S.s "The P o l i t i c a l Role of the Army i n Indonesia", P a c i f i c A f f a i r s XXXVI No.4 (Winter 1963-4) Lev, D a n i e l S,s " P o l i t i c a l P a r t i e s i n Indonesia", J o u r n a l of Southeast A s i a n H i s t o r y , V o l . 8 , No.l (March I967) Lev, D a n i e l and F e i t h , Herbert; "The End of the Indonesian R e b e l l i o n " , P a c i f i c A f f a i r s XXXVI No.l ( S p r i n g I963) L e v i n e , David; " H i s t o r y and S o c i a l S t r u c t u r e i n the Study of Contemporary Indonesia", Indonesia No.7 ( A p r i l I969) L i d d l e , R. W i l l i a m : "Modernizing n.d.(I970?) Stenciled.  I n d o n e s i a n P o l i t i c s " n.p.,  M c l n t y r e , Anguss " D i v i s i o n s and Power i n the Indonesian N a t i o n a l P a r t y " , Indonesia No.11 (April 1972) Mackie, J.A.C.s. "Indonesian P o l i t i c s under Guided Democracy", A u s t r a l i a n Outlook, V o l . 1 5 , No.3 (December 19OT) Mackie, J.A.C.5 " C i v i l - M i l i t a r y R e l a t i o n s and the I 9 7 I E l e c t i o n s i n Indonesia", A u s t r a l i a n Outlook, Vol.24, No.3 (December I970I McVey, Ruth T.; "The P o s t - R e v o l u t i o n a r y Transformation of the Indonesian Army" (Two P a r t s ) Indonesia, V o l s . 11 and 13 ( A p r i l 1971 and I972I Mortimer, Rexs " C l a s s , S o c i a l Cleavage and Communism", Indonesia, No.8 (October  Indonesian I969)  Nasution, A.H.5 " P o l i t i c a l R e s t r u c t u r i n g A f t e r 'G-30-S'" P a c i f i c Community (Tokyo) V o l . 3 , No.l (January 1971) Paget, Rogers "The M i l i t a r y i n Indonesia; The Burden of Power", P a c i f i c A f f a i r s , Vol.XL, No.3 ( F a l l and Winter I 9 6 7 - 6 8 )  - 160  -  Pauker, Guy s "The Gestapu A f f a i r of 1965s Reflections on the P o l i t i c s of I n s t a b i l i t y i n Indonesia", Southeast A s i a s An I n t e r n a t i o n a l Q u a r t e r l y , V o l .'I, Nos. 1-2 (Winter-Spring 1971) Pauker, Guys "Indonesia i n 1964s Toward a 'People's Democracy'?" A s i a n Survey Vol.V, No.2 (February  I965)  P r i c e , Robert M.s "A T h e o r e t i c a l Approach to M i l i t a r y Rule i n New S t a t e s s Reference Group Theory and the Ghanaian Case", World P o l i t i c s V o l . X X I I I , No,3, (April I 9 7 D Rocamora, J.E.s "The P a r t a i N a s i o n a l Indonesia", Indonesia No.10 (October 1970) Sajidiman: "Membangun Manusia Indonesia Untuk Mentjapai Masjarakat P a n t j a s i l a " (Developing Indonesians to Achieve a P a n t j a s i l a S o c i e t y ) Djakartas A p r i l 1972 (Stenciled). Samson, A l l a n s "Islam and Indonesian P o l i t i c s " , A s i a n Survey V o l . V I I I , No.12 (December 1968) Samson, A l l a n ; "Army and Islam i n Indonesia", P a c i f i c A f f a i r s , Vol.XLIV, No.4 (winter I 9 7 I - 7 2 ) Smith,  R.S. and Theodore M.: "The P o l i t i c a l Economy o f Regional and Urban Revenue P o l i c y i n Indonesia", A s i a n Survey, V o l . X I , No.8 (August 1971)  Sudarsono, Juwono " M e n i l a i Kembali Makna Perkembangan P o l i t i k " ( R e - e v a l u a t i n g the Purpose of P o l i t i c a l Development), Ekonomi Tahun IX, N o . l . Soedjatmoko; "Indonesia; Problems and O p p o r t u n i t i e s " , A u s t r a l i a n Outlook, V o l . 2 1 , No.3 (December I 9 6 7 ) Soedjatmoko; "The Role of P o l i t i c a l P a r t i e s i n I n d o n e s i a " i n P h i l l i p W. Thayer (ed.) N a t i o n a l i s m and Progress i n Free A s i a , Baltimores John Hopkins P r e s s , 1956 Soehartos "Beberapa Pokok P i k i r a n Mengenai Pewarisan N i l a i - N i l a i '45 Kepada Generasi Muda I n d o n e s i a " (Some Main Thoughts concerning the i n h e r i t i n g of the 19^5 Values by the Young Generation of I n d o n e s i a ) , S t e n c i l e d March 1 3 , 1972. Sundhaussen, U l f s "The M i l i t a r y i n Research on Indonesian P o l i t i c s " , The J o u r n a l of A s i a n S t u d i e s , Vol.XXXI, No.2 (February 1972)  - l6lVan der Kroef, J u s t u s ; "New P o l i t i c a l Patterns i n Indon e s i a " , World Today, V o l . 2 5 , No.5 (May 1969) Van der Kroef, J u s t u s ; "Sukarno's F a l l " , O r b i s , V o l . X I , No.2 (Summer 1967) Van der Kroef, J u s t u s : "Indonesian Communism's ' R e v o l u t i o n a r y Gymnastics'", A s i a n Survey, Vol.V, No.5 (May 1965) Wilner, Ann Ruth: "The N e o t r a d i t i o n a l Accommodation to P o l i t i c a l Independences The Case of Indonesia" i n L u c i a n Pye (ed.) Cases i n Comparative P o l i t i c s s A s i a Bostons L i t t l e , Brown 1970. Yasunaka, Akios Leaders",  "Basic Data on Indonesian Indonesia No.10 (October  NEWSPAPERS AND  Political 1970)  MAGAZINES  BERITA BUANA (A D j a k a r t a - p u b l i s h e d d a i l y newspaper with tenuous m i l i t a r y c o n n e c t i o n s ) ; June 1 2 , 1972; October 5 , 1971? October 1 2 , I97I5 December 2 3 , I 9 7 I 5 October 6, 19715 March 6, 1 9 7 2 . BERITA YUDHA (A D j a k a r t a - p u b l i s h e d d a i l y newspaper backed by the m i l i t a r y ) ; March 5 , 1971. EKPRES (A D j a k a r t a - p u b l i s h e d weekly news magazine); September 6, I 9 7 I . INDONESIA RAYA (A D j a k a r t a - p u b l i s h e d d a i l y newspaper; independent); June 1 3 , 1972. KOMPAS (A D j a k a r t a - p u b l i s h e d d a i l y newspaper a s s o c i a t e d with PARTAI KATOLIK); A p r i l 27-28, 1 9 7 2 ; March 2 0 , 1972; A p r i l 18, 1 9 7 2 ; February 7, 1 9 7 2 ; A p r i l 1 1 , 1 9 7 2 ; March 16, I 9 7 2 . PEPOMAN (A D j a k a r t a - p u b l i s h e d d a i l y newspaper a s s o c i a t e d with the former P S I - S o c i a l i s t p a r t y ) ; A p r i l 24, 1972; October 28, 19711 February 1 1 , 1 9 7 2 ; February 7, I 9 7 2 . SINAR HARAPAN (A D j a k a r t a - p u b l i s h e d d a i l y newspaper a s s o c i a t e d with PARKINDO, the C h r i s t i a n P a r t y ) ; March 18, 1972; June 2 , 1 9 7 2 ; June 2 6 , 1 9 7 2 ; J u l y 1 9 - 2 3 , 1 9 7 2 ; January 6, 1 9 7 2 ; A p r i l 1 5 , 1972; A p r i l 1, 1972; January 3-5, 1972; March 1, 1972; June 6, 1972; June 3 , 1 9 7 2 ; June 2 8 - 2 9 , 1972; January 4 , 1972.  - 162 -  TEMPO (A D j a k a r t a - p u b l i s h e d weekly news magazine); July 10, 19715 A p r i l 8, 1 9 7 2 ; August 14, 1 9 7 1 ; June 3 0 , 1 9 7 2 ; September 18, 1971? February 2 6 , 1 9 7 2 ; June 2 3 , 1 9 7 2 . UNPUBLISHED THESES AND DOCUMENTS Ehrmann, M i c h a e l s The I n d o n e s i a n Army under Guided Democracy, M.A, T h e s i s , C o r n e l l U n i v e r s i t y I967, Nawawi, Mohammeds R e g i o n a l i s m and R e g i o n a l C o n f l i c t s i n Indonesia, Doctoral d i s s e r t a t i o n , Princeton University, I968. Noer, D e l i a r s The R i s e and Development o f t h e M o d e r n i s t Muslim Movement i n I n d o n e s i a D u r i n g t h e Dutch C o l o n i a l P e r i o d (1900-1942), Ph.D. D i s s e r t a t i o n , C o r n e l l U n i v e r s i t y 1963. S m i t h , Teds The I n d o n e s i a n Bureaucracys S t a b i l i t y , Change and P r o d u c t i v i t y , D i s s e r t a t i o n , U n i v e r s i t y o f C a l i f o r n i a , Berkeley 1971. "Memorandum Dewan P e r w a k i l a n R a k j a t R e p u b l i k I n d o n e s i a Mengenai Masalah M i n a t u r I n d o n e s i a ' I n d o n e s i a Indah' Dan H a r i d e p a n G e n e r a s i Muda" (Memorandum o f t h e I n d o n e s i a n , P a r l i a m e n t c o n c e r n i n g t h e Problems o f t h e B e a u t i f u l I n d o n e s i a I n M i n i a t u r e and t h e F u t u r e o f t h e Younger G e n e r a t i o n ) , No. l 0 7 6 / P . C h . M . I . I . / 7 2 . "Pembaharuan S t r u k t u r P o l i t i k " S t r u c t u r e ) G o l k a r Pusat  (Renewing t h e P o l i t i c a l (no d a t e )  "Perkembangan Baru D i I n d o n e s i a " (New Developments i n I n d o n e s i a ) Bahan G o l k a r Pusat N 0 . O I 5 (24-2-71) " P e r n j a t a a n P o l i t i k Golongan K a r y a " (The P o l i t i c a l Statement of Golongan K a r y a ) , G o l k a r Pusat (no d a t e ) "The  Sekber G o l k a r s G o l k a r Pusat  A b i r d ' s - e y e view o f i t s h i s t o r y " , (no d a t e ) .  S u r a t Keputusan No, KEP-101/VII/Golongan K a r y a / 1 9 7 1 (Containing the p o s t - e l e c t i o n s t r u c t u r e o f Golkar) S u r a t Keputusan No. K E P - 4 0 l / l X / G o l o n g a n K a r y a / 7 1 ( c o n t a i n i n g the temporary b a s i c r e g u l a t i o n s o f p o s t - e l e c t i o n G o l k a r , the program and l i s t s o f t h e p e r s o n n e l o f t h e G o l k a r Co-ordinating Bodies) " T i n d j a u a n S i t u a s i N a s i o n a l " (An O b s e r v a t i o n o f t h e N a t i o n a l S i t u a t i o n ) G o l k a r Pusat (Medio, December 1970)  - 163  -  GLOSSARY OP IMPORTANT INDONESIAN TERMS AND  ACRONYMS  abangan  the Javanese masses t h a t are I s l a m i c In name only; their religious practices are a mixture of Islam, Hinduism and animism.  ABRI  Angatan B e r s e n d j a t a Republik Indonesia (Armed Forces of The Republic of Indonesia).  ASPRI  A s i s t e n P r i b a d i (Personal A s s i s t a n t ) ; r e f e r s to P r e s i d e n t Suharto's p e r s o n a l staff.  BIMAS  Bimbingan Massa (Mass Guidance) - a government scheme f o r i n c r e a s i n g r i c e production.  Brawidjaja  the Indonesian Army D i v i s i o n f o r the r e g i o n of E a s t Java.  bupati  the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e head o f a kabupaten or d i s t r i c t .  Diponegoro  the Indonesian Army D i v i s i o n f o r the r e g i o n of C e n t r a l Java.  DPR  Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat ( C o u n c i l of People's R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s or P a l i a m e n t ) .  DPRD  Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat Daerah ( C o u n c i l of the People's R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the Regions or Regional P a r l i a m e n t ) .  Gestapu or G-30-S  Gerakan Tigapuluh September ( 3 0 t h o f September Movement).  Golkar  Golongan Karya ( F u n c t i o n a l Group); government " p a r t y " .  golongan  tertentu  gotong-rojong  the  f i x e d or determined groups; used e s p e c i a l l y i n r e f e r e n c e to enemies of the s t a t e . mutual or s e l f - h e l p ; r e f e r s to doing t h i n g s c o l l e c t i v e l y r a t h e r than individually.  - 164 district; one a d m i n i s t r a t i v e l e v e l "below the Daerah Tingkat Satu or p r o v i n c e ; f r e q u e n t l y r e f e r r e d t o as Daerah Tingkat Dua (Second L e v e l Region)„ l i t e r a l l y Regional governor„ V i l l a g e Headman; l u r a h i s used. knight  Head; today  called  i n Java the term  or s o l d i e r  Islamic  teacher  Kelompok Induk Organasasi (Mother Organization); r e f e r s to the seven d i f f e r e n t major d i v i s i o n s of f u n c t i o n a l groups w i t h i n Golkar, Sukarno's i d e a f o r c r e a t i n g a s t a b l e government (1956). s t u p i d or dumb masses Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan K e t e r t i b a n (Command f o r R e s t o r i n g S e c u r i t y and P u b l i c Order); an e x t r a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l m i l i t a r y body s e t up i n the wake of the G-30-S. Korps Pegawai Negri ( N a t i o n a l Servants Corps); one of the f u n c t i o n a l groups. palace  Civil  o f the k i n g or S u l t a n  v i l l a g e headman i n Java; i n the Outer I s l a n d s f r e q u e n t l y c a l l e d Kepala Desa. P o l i t i c a l Manifesto; one of the key i d e o l o g i c a l symbols of the Sukarno regime. the name g i v e n the command f o r the r e c a p t u r i n g of West I r a i n from the Dutch; Suharto was the head of t h i s o p e r a t i o n . outer  provinces  - 165 Masjumi  the ''modernist" Muslim p o l i t i c a l p a r t y that was banned by Sukarno because of o p p o s i t i o n to him„  MPR  M a d j e l i s Permusjawarahan Rakjat (People's D e l i b e r a t i v e Assembly or Super-Parliament).  musjawarah  consensus or unanimity  NASAKOM  Nasionalisme, Agama(Religion) dan Komunisme; another of the key symbols of the Sukarno regime.  negara  agung  the k i n g ' s l a n d or the t e r r i t o r y near the k i n g ' s p a l a c e .  NU  Nahdatul Ulama; a " t r a d i t i o n a l i s t " Muslim p o l i t i c a l p a r t y .  Panglima(Besar)  Regional' M i l i t a r y Commander (Commander-in-Chief)  Parkindo  P a r t a i K r i s t e n Indonesia C h r i s t i a n Party)  prijaji  the a r i s t o c r a c y o f the Javanese abangan masses.  PKI  P a r t a i Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist P a r t y ) .  PMI o r Parmusi  P a r t a i Muslimin I n d o n e s i a (Indonesian Muslim Party)  PNI  P a r t a i N a s i o n a l Indonesia (Indonesian N a t i o n a l i s t P a r t y ) .  PSI  P a r t a i S o s i a l i s Indonesia (Indonesian S o c i a l i s t Party);banned i n i960 by Sukarno.  PSII  P a r t a i Sarekat Islam Indonesia; a small Muslim p a r t y .  OPSUS  Operas! Chusus ( S p e c i a l O p e r a t i o n s ) ; l e d by A l i Murtopo  (Indonesian  0  - 166 santri  a s t r i c t observer of Islam  Siliwangi  the Indonesian Army D i v i s i o n o f the r e g i o n o f West Java  tanah  overseas  sabrang  territory  UUD45  Undang-Undang Dasar 1945 (1945 C o n s t i t u t i o n ) .  wajang k u l i t  a shadow p l a y made by u s i n g l e a t h e r puppets 1 a l s o f r e q u e n t l y used to r e f e r to the "Indonesian" s t y l e of politics.  

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