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UBC Theses and Dissertations

Javanization of Indonesian politics 1972

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CI THE JAVANIZATION OF INDONESIAN POLITICS by DAVID LEONARD THORNTON B.Sc, V i r g i n i a Polytechnic I n s t i t u t e , 19&9 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS i n the Department of P o l i t i c a l Science We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA September, 1972 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of Bri t ish Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by his representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Department The University of Br i t ish Columbia Vancouver 8, Canada i ABSTRACT This thesis applies the a n a l y t i c a l concept of p o l i t i c a l culture to p o l i t i c s i n the Indonesian context. The term "Javanization" i s used to describe the process whereby ethnic Javanese and Javanized i n d i v i d u a l s gradually became the overwhelming and disproportionate majority of the governing e l i t e i n the post-independence era. I t i s further argued that the dominance i n terms of numbers has led to the Javanization of Indonesian conceptions of state and l i m i t s of p o l i t i c a l behavior. The f i r s t chapter surveys other theories of Indonesian p o l i t i c s and makes a proposal for a c u l t u r a l theory. The cu l t u r a l cleavages i n Indonesian society i n the horizontal plane are described and a description of the government of Mataram operating i n a t o t a l l y Javanese environment i s given. The changing roles of the primary bearers of Javanese p o l i t i c a l culture and the nature of the state are discussed. Chapter Two interprets post-independence p v > l i t i c a l h i s t o r y from the perspective of increasing Javanization and the gradual loss of national p o l i t i c a l influence by non-Javanese Islamic p o l i t i c a l elements. Data on the ethnic composition of the contemporary m i l i t a r y , governmental and p o l i t i c a l e l i t e are presented. i i Chapter Three i s a discussion of contemporary (1959 to I972) Indonesian government and p o l i t i c s using the same conceptual framework (structure, functions and style ) as i s used to discuss Mataram. Some s i m i l a r i t i e s and d i s - s i m i l a r i t i e s are pointed out„ The thesis concludes with a discussion of the future of Javanization. i i i TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER PAGE I POLITICAL CULTURE, GOVERNMENT AND JAVANISM ... 1 T h e o r i z i n g About Indonesian P o l i t i c s ; A C u l t u r a l P r o p o s i t i o n ................... 1 Government and P o l i t i c s i n a Javanese P o l i t i c a l C u l t u r e ; L a t e r Mataram (15th The Changing Roles of the P r i j a j i 3.1*1 CL S*t/3r"t 6 o e o e o o o o e o o o a o o v o n c o e o e o o o e o ^7 I I JAVANIZATION; HISTORY AND DATA ............... 44 H i s t o r y , P o l i t i c s and J a v a n i z a t i o n ........ 44 The Current P o l i t i c a l , M i l i t a r y and GovG3?in.m©n.tcil E l i t © <> o o o * o e o o o o o o o » « © « © » © c © 39 I I I JAVANISM AND CONTEMPORARY POLITICS . 70 The S t r u c t u r e of Indonesian Government .... 70 The Functions of Indonesian Government .... 86 The S t y l e of Indonesian Government .........109 IV THE FUTURE OF JAVANIZATION 140 "V BIBLIOGRAPHY o o o o o o o o ©_o o o e o o o o a o o o o o o o e o o o o o f t 13 3 VI GLOSSARY e o o o ^ o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o e e o o o o o o o « o o 1 63 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would l i k e to acknowledge the invaluable assistance of my thesis committee, consisting of Professors R,S. Milne, John Wood, and R.H. Jackson, whose e f f o r t s a c t u a l l y enabled the creation of a thesis from a series of poorly integrated discussions and data presentations. I am p a r t i c u l a r l y indebted to A l f i a n and Taufik Abdullah of Leknas, Juwono Sudarsono of the University of Indonesia and Ted Smith of the Ford Foundation i n Djakarta who spent much time reading and commenting on the i n i t i a l drafts of this paper. Thanks are also due to the many Indonesians i n Djakarta, Bandung, Solo, Jogjakarta, Surabaja, Den Pasar and Medan who gave so f r e e l y of t h e i r time to discuss the p o l i t i c s of t h e i r country with a mere foreign student. For assistance and guidance i n the long process of acquiring a degree of fluency In Bahasa Indonesia, I am grat e f u l to Anton Hilman, Mrs. N e l l i Soewarno, and Mrs. Etty M u l j a t i . Gratitude i s also due to my wife, Toeti, for her adamant impatience with my rate of progress i n her native language which resulted i n increased e f f o r t s on my own part to a t t a i n the standards of proficiency expected by her. I would l i k e to express my thanks to the University of B r i t i s h Columbia for f i n a n c i a l assistance and to Lembaga Pendidikan and Pembinaan Management i n Djakarta for the opportunity to supplement my meager income by teaching English. V F i n a l l y , I s h o u l d t h a n k I b u a n d B a p a k Manoe f o r t h e i r g r a c i o u s h o s p i t a l i t y d u r i n g my s t a y i n I n d o n e s i a a n d I b u a n d B a p a k " a n g k a t " L e v f o r t h e i r c o n s t a n t a t t e n t i o n , e n c o u r a g e m e n t a n d a d v i c e . D e s p i t e t h e f a c t t h a t s o much i s owed t o s o many f o r t h e s u c c e s s o f t h i s e n d e a v o r , I am s o l e l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e f i n a l p r o d u c t . D a v i d L . T h o r n t o n V a n c o u v e r , A u g u s t 1972 CHAPTER I POLITICAL CULTURE. GOVERNMENT AMD JAVANISM Theorizing About Indonesian Politics? A Cultural Proposition Indonesia i s a large culturally, ethnically and l i n g u i s t i c a l l y diverse nation in Southeast Asia. Following four years of fighting the Dutch, the country became inter- nationally recognized as an independent nation in 1950. Since that time Indonesia has suffered the many vicissitudes that seem so common in the newly independent nations of Africa and Asia. These include unsuccessful attempts at "Western style" democratic government, recurrent regional rebellions and revolts, "one-man" rule, and f i n a l l y , -military rule. P o l i t i c a l l y speaking, Indonesia has been a highly unstable nation with numerous changes of governments, 'constitutions, and other institutions. Besides the numerous attempts at general theorizing about the flow and instability of p o l i t i c s in the newly 1 independent nations , several authors have examined the Indonesian case in detail. Their theories can be broadly classifi e d Into three categories: the " s k i l l theory", the "ethnic theory" and the "class theory". In his tour de force on Indonesian P o l i t i c s of the 1950-58 period, Herbert Felth proposed that the. flow of p o l i t i c s should best be seen as the conflict between two 2 s k i l l groups? the administrators and the solidarity-makers. - 2 - P e i t h f e l t t h a t t h e a d m i n i s t r a t o r s w e r e v e r y p r a g m a t i c a l l y I n c l i n e d a n d W e s t e r n - o r i e n t e d w h i l e t h e s o l i d a r i t y - m a k e r s w e r e i n c l i n e d t o p l a c e p o l i t i c s a n d t h e " c o n t i n u a t i o n o f t h e r e v o l u t i o n " a b o v e a l l o t h e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . T h e " d e c l i n e o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d e m o c r a c y " was s e e n t o r e p r e s e n t t h e v i c t o r y o f t h e s o l i d a r i t y - m a k e r s o v e r t h e a d m i n i s t r a t o r s k i l l g r o u p . F e i t h i d e n t i f i e d t h e a d m i n i s t r a t o r s m a i n l y w i t h two p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s , t h e Mas . lumi ( a " m o d e r n i s t " M u s l i m p a r t y ) a n d t h e P S I ( a s m a l l i n t e l l e c t u a l - l e d s o c i a l i s t p a r t y ) . On t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e s o l i d a r i t y - m a k e r s w e r e s e e n a s b e s t r e p r e - s e n t e d i n t h e p e r s o n o f S u k a r n o a n d t h e PNI ( t h e n a t i o n a l i s t p a r t y ) . A t a b o u t t h e same t i m e t h a t F e i t h p u b l i s h e d h i s b o o k , L e s l i e P a l m i e r w r o t e a b o o k i n t e r p r e t i n g I n d o n e s i a n p o l i t i c s a s b a s i c a l l y a n e t h n i c c o n f l i c t b e t w e e n ' the l a r g e s t e t h n i c g r o u p , t h e J a v a n e s e , a n d t h e p e o p l e s o f t h e O u t e r I s l a n d s 3 o r n o n - J a v a n e s e . G i v e n t h e f a c t t h a t t h e O u t e r I s l a n d s h a d r e v o l t e d a g a i n s t t h e J a v a n e s e - l e d c e n t r a l g o v e r n m e n t d u r i n g t h e 1956-58 p e r i o d a n d t h a t t h e O u t e r I s l a n d a s s o c i a t e d Mas . lumi a n d P S I w e r e b a n n e d i n i t s w a k e , l e a v i n g o n l y t h e J a v a n e s e - d o m i n a t e d p a r t i e s a t t h e c e n t e r , t h e P a l m i e r t h e o r y seemed t o h a v e h i g h e x p l a n a t o r y v a l u e . Much l a t e r D a v i d L e v i n e a n d J a n P l u v i e r c h o s e t o I n t e r p r e t p o s t - i n d e p e n d e n c e p o l i t i c s i n I n d o n e s i a a s b a s i c a l l y a n e l i t e - m a s s c o n f l i c t . L e v i n e s a i d t h a t I n d o n e s i a h a s - 3 - essentially a "retrogressive" social system in which the various factions of the e l i t e fight among themselves for state power while at the same time attempting to keep the masses from exercising power in the p o l i t i c a l system. The decline of the parliamentary system in which the "people" (meaning the PKI for Levine) were on the verge of victory and the eventual destruction of the "people's party" by the military were seen as supporting this argument. After detailed f i e l d research, Rex Mortimer greatly reduced the applicability of the Levine theory by pointing out that despite numerous attempts to do so, the PKI had never been able to exploit the class divisions in Indonesian society in the way in which Marxist-Leninist theory said i t should."' The PjKI had simply abandoned such an approach as inapplicable to Indonesian society. Further, John Legge examined in detail the theories of Felth and Palmier and found that they were not completely convincing when actually applied to the specifics of any situation.^ He concluded that both theories explained part of the truth but were entirely too narrow to be the a l l encompassing theories that their authors presented them to be. After studying the above theories, my own conclusion Is that the ethnic theory expanded to a p o l i t i c a l culture theory i s the most promising way to conceptualize contemporary 7 Indonesian p o l i t i c s . Almond and Powell write " p o l i t i c a l - 4 - c u l t u r e i s the p a t t e r n of i n d i v i d u a l a t t i t u d e s and o r i e n t a t i o n s toward p o l i t i c s among the members of a p o l i t i c a l system . . . the kinds of o r i e n t a t i o n s which e x i s t i n a populat ion w i l l have a s i g n i f i c a n t inf luence on the ways i n which the p o l i t i c a l system works. The demands made upon the system, the responses to law and to appeals f o r support, and the conduct of i n d i v i d u a l s i n t h e i r p o l i t i c a l r o l e s , w i l l a l l be shaped and condit ioned by the common o r i e n t a t i o n p a t t e r n s . They c o n s t i t u t e the l a t e n t p o l i t i c a l tendencies f o r p o l i t i c a l behavior and as such they are of great importance i n e x p l a i n i n g and p r e d i c t i n g p o l i t i c a l 8 a c t i o n . " C l i f f o r d Geertz adds "one of the things everyone knows but no one can q u i t e think how to demonstrate i s that o a c o u n t r y ' s p o l i t i c s r e f l e c t the design of i t s c u l t u r e . " 7 Almond and Powell add that one n a t i o n - s t a t e may have many p o l i t i c a l s u b - c u l t u r e s and that the dominant p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e may not i n fact be the n a t i o n a l ( i n the sense of widely-spread and accepted) p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e a t a l l , nor even the p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e of the numerical majority of the c o u n t r y ' s i n h a b i t a n t s . This i s p a r t i c u l a r l y true i n most newly independent c o u n t r i e s , although some o l d e r nations a l s o have s i m i l a r d i f f i c u l t i e s , where i n Geertz»s words there i s a new state composed of an o l d society5 u s u a l l y many o l d s o c i e t i e s . The c u l t u r a l heterogeneity of Indonesia i s an - 5 - e s t a b l i s h e d f a c t and seems q u i t e i n v i t i n g f o r the a p p l i c a t i o n of the concept of p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e as an a n a l y t i c a l t o o l t o explore the flow of Indonesian p o l i t i c s . This paper examines the n o t i o n of p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e as a p p l i e d to the Indonesian case. The term " J a v a n i z a t i o n " i s presented t o e x p l a i n the process of p o l i t i c s from independence to the present ( 1 9 7 2 ) . " J a v a n i z a t i o n " means the process of gradual domination of the Indonesian p o l i t y by e t h n i c Javanese and t h e i r v a r i e t y of p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e , A model of t r a d i t i o n a l Javanese p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e i s presented and i t s b a s i c s i m i l a r i t i e s to contemporary Indonesian p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e are po i n t e d out. The process of " J a v a n i z a t i o n " i s argued h i s t o r i c a l l y and data on the composition of the contemporary Indonesian p o l i t i c a l and governmental e l i t e i s presented to support i t . F i n a l l y 9 some d i s c o n t i n u i t i e s or counter-processes are desc r i b e d and i n t e r p r e t e d from the standpoint of t h e i r e f f e c t on a "Javanized" government and p o l i t i c a l process. P o l i t i c a l Cultures i n Indonesia; I t i s almost impossible to s u c c e s s f u l l y g e n e r a l i z e about Indonesia's c u l t u r e because of the heterogeneity of the p o p u l a t i o n . I t has been estimated t h a t there are a t l e a s t 200 completely d i f f e r e n t languages spoken i n the vast a r c h i - l l pelago, and each of these language groups u s u a l l y has i t s own adat or t r a d i t i o n a l customs. A s i m p l i s t i c but f a i r l y accurate d e s c r i p t i o n of the country's p o p u l a t i o n would read - 6 - l i k e this* The major lin g u i s t i c and ethnic group is the Javanese who comprise about 50$ of the total population of 12 120 million and then come the Sundanese who l i v e on the western end of the island of Java who compose about 12$ of the population and then there are many other small groups no one of which totals more than 2 to 3$ of the population.^ At independence there was no all-Indonesian culture. There was one large sub-culture and a multitude of smaller ones. Given the legacies of colonial rule which l e f t the Javanese not only the most numerous cultural group in the new nation but also the best educated and most p o l i t i c a l l y mobilized, i t was almost inevitable that the new p o l i t i c a l culture of Indonesia would have strong traces of Javanese influence. Observing the f i r s t nine years of independence and commenting especially on the virtual c i v i l war in 1958 , Daniel S. Lev wrotes The process of assimilation - to use the term loosely - had already begun, a fact which may have lent more bitterness to the conflict. Except for the Sundanese of West Java ... most of the outer island groups were not only small i n numbers and mutually hostile but also culturally less self-assured than the Javanese. Their relationships with Java were and are ambivalent5 the Javanese are seen as effete and elusive, but also as halus (refined and cultured) and also p o l i t i c a l l y clever — a people to be dis- dained but also to be emulated. For their part, the Javanese never doubted their cultural superiority over other groupsj nor did they doubt their right 1 ^ to the principal voice in independent Indonesia. Despite the seeming multitude of small cultures in the Outer Islands, there was a factor that unified a great number - 7 - o f them, o t h e r t h a n s i m p l e o p p o s i t i o n t o J a v a , a n d t h a t was t h e i n f l u e n c e o f I s l a m . I n h i s work The D e c l i n e o f C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Democracy i n I n d o n e s i a , F e i t h d i s c u s s e d t he i d e a o f p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e b e f o r e t u r n i n g away f r om i t t o h i s s k i l l g roup t h e o r y . le s t a t e d t h a t h i s t o r y had c r e a t e d two m a j o r p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e s i n I n d o n e s i a ? J a v a n e s e a r i s t o c r a t i c a n d I s l a m i c e n t r e - p r e n e u r i a l p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e s . T h e r o o t s o f t h e s e , he w r o t e , c o u l d be a t t r i b u t e d t o t h e d i f f e r e n c e s o f h i s t o r i c a l e x p e r i e n c e o f t h e d i f f e r e n t c o m m u n i t i e s o f t h e a r c h i p e l a g o . The p o i n t s o f d i f f e r e n c e w e r e ; 1) d i f f e r e n c e s i n t r a d i t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l o r g a n i z a t i o n among the w e t - r i c e c u l t i v a t i o n a r e a s , t h e d r y - r i c e c u l t i v a t i o n a r e a s a n d t he c o a s t a l m a r i t i m e a r e a s s 2) t h e d i f f e r e n c e i n t he d e g r e e o f p e n e t r a t i o n o f I s l a m j and 3) t he d i f f e r e n c e s i n t h e i m p a c t o f D u t c h c o l o n i a l r u l e . The f i r s t o f t h e s e ( J a v a n e s e a r i s t o c r a t i c p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e ) , w h i c h i s t h e p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e o f t he g r e a t m a j o r i t y o f t he J a v a n e s e , was b o r n o f s t a t e o r g a n i z a t i o n i n t he w e t - r i c e a g r i c u l t u r e b a s e d i n l a n d e m p i r e s o f J a v a , o f s h a l l o w I s l a m i z a t i o n , and a l o n g p e r i o d o f i n t e n s i v e D u t c h i m p a c t , w h i c h p r o d u c e d enormous d e n s i t i e s o f p o p u l a t i o n , a h o l l o w - i n g ou t o f t h e s t r u c t u r e s o f s o c i a l i n t e g r a t i o n , and a n i n c a p a c i t a t i o n o f e n t r e p r e n e u r s h i p . The I s l a m i c e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e i s one whose a d h e r e n t s a r e f a r more d i s p e r s e d and s o c i a l l y d i s p a r a t e . . . h i s t o r i c a l l y t h i s p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e i s a p r o d u c t o f t h e m a r i t i m e c o m m e r c i a l t o w n s , o f t h o r o u g h I s l a m i z a t i o n , o f r e l a t i v e l y s l i g h t Du t ch i m p a c t , and o f t h e r e v i v a l o f e n t r e p r e n e u r s h i p i n t h e p r e s e n t c e n t u r y . 1? - 8 - Generalizing even further, Feith points out that not only was one of the p o l i t i c a l cultures contemptuous of economic pursuits and the other r e s p e c t f u l , but also one was associated with support for a secular and broadly t h e l s t i c or pan-theistic state and the other with support for a state based on Islam. In addition, Javanese a r i s t o - c r a t i c p o l i t i c a l culture involved a greater i n t e n s i t y of anti-Dutch sentiment than did the other p o l i t i c a l culture and at the same time, a l e s s intense h o s t i l i t y to the Chinese. Javanese a r i s t o c r a t i c p o l i t i c a l culture tended toward nativism, while Islamic entrepreneurial p o l i t i c a l culture was generally more ready to accept and incorporate influences stemming from the modern West. But, according to Feith, the Javanese a r i s t o c r a t i c p o l i t i c a l culture was far more sympa- 18 t h e t i c to s o c i a l i s t ideas. With the benefit of ten addit i o n a l years of perspective on Feith, i t can now be argued that the very factors that he believed created two major p o l i t i c a l cultures i n the country, i n f a c t , broke then down into other sub-cultures. The weakening of the structures of s o c i a l integration and over- population caused by the intense impact of Dutch c o l o n i a l r u l e , Japanese occupation, the four-year war f o r independence, the mass p o l i t i c s of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l and guided democracy, the penetration of contemporary world culture plus the coming of the "modernist" Islamic movement to the entire - 9 - country, shattered or a t the very l e a s t , g r e a t l y eroded the periphery of the Javanese a r i s t o c r a t i c and I s l a m i c e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e s which allowed the r i s e of other sub-cultures having some l i n k s to the o r i g i n a l and remnant ones D The Javanese a r i s t o c r a t i c p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e has e x i s t e d as the Great T r a d i t i o n of a g r a r i a n Java f o r many 19 c e n t u r i e s . The coming of Islam t o Java i n the 15th and 16th c e n t u r i e s only added another l a y e r of i n f l u e n c e t o the broadly Hindu-Javanese c u l t u r e , Islam, although accepted as the s i n g l e r e l i g i o n of Java, was thoroughly i n d i g e n i z e d and mixed w i t h more t r a d i t i o n a l v a r i a n t s of the "Javanese r e l i g i o n " . In many p a r t s of the Outer I s l a n d s and i n the non- Hinduized p o r t i o n s of Java, the i n i t i a l coming of Islam had a much gre a t e r e f f e c t . Despite the f a c t that some i n d i g e n i - z a t i o n and m o d i f i c a t i o n of Islam d i d occur i n these areas, I t was very minor compared w i t h t h a t i n the i n t e r i o r of east and c e n t r a l Java. In the Outer Islands In g e n e r a l , but i n A t j e h , Minangkabau, Makassar, West Java (Sunda) and the no r t h coast of c e n t r a l and east Java I n p a r t i c u l a r , Islam began to p l a y a major, i f not dominant, s o c i a l r o l e . In the l a t e 19th century, a new wave or cu r r e n t of Islam swept across the a r c h i p e l a g o . This wave, known as "modernist" or " p u r i s t " Islam or I s l a m i c reformism was much - 10 - less compatible with traditional forms of social and p o l i t i c a l organization. This "chauvinism" of "modernist" Islam set up abiding tensions even in Java that reflected the antagonism 20 of the traditional order and the Islamic reformist movement. Stated simply, the Outer Islands became more rigorously and s t r i c t l y Islamic while only a small portion of the ethnic Javanese came to accept the new "modernist" doctrine. With the birth of p o l i t i c a l parties, the differences between the "modernist" and the "traditionalist" varieties 21 of the Islamic or santri movement was institutionalized i n the form of the Masjumi, a "modernist" Muslim party, and the Mahdatul Ulama (NU), a "traditionalist" Muslim party. Given the above background, i t appears quite natural that the Masjuml had i t s greatest support in the Outer Islands and the NU in Java i t s e l f . Javanese aristocratic culture or the culture of the 22 Javanese pri . 1 a . 1 l and abangan was attacked not only by Islam of two varieties but also by Western p o l i t i c a l thought and de-traditionalization in general. The creation of p o l i t i c a l parties saw this p o l i t i c a l culture s p l i t in much the same manner as was Islam, a modernist-traditionalist division. Simplistically, the s p l i t can be said to have been institutionalized in a division between the PKI (the Indonesian Communist Party) and the PNI (the Indonesian Nationalist Party). The latter was i n i t i a l l y an organization that expected - 11 - t r a d i t i o n a l p a t r i m o n i a l s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s to give i t s t r e n g t h and the former hope t h a t economic and c l a s s d i v i s i o n s would giv e i t mass support. The PNI was an extremely complex o r g a n i z a t i o n , and conservative (read t r a d i t i o n a l ) and r a d i c a l (read extreme n a t i o n a l i s t ) f a c t i o n s e v e n t u a l l y appeared i n i t . " Since Soedjatmoko's i n i t i a l w r i t i n g on the s u b j e c t i n the e a r l y 1950's, i t has been recognized t h a t r a t h e r than being i n t e r e s t a r t i c u l a t o r s or aggregators Indonesian p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s represent a l l r a n or v a r i o u s flows of 24 thought w i t h i n the body p o l i t i c . Given the i n s t i t u t i o n a l l - 25 z a t l o n of these a l l ran as s o c i a l forces -* w i t h mutually a n t a g o n i s t i c and e x c l u s i v e i d e o l o g i e s or world views, i t can reasonably be argued t h a t the a l l r a n a r e , i n f a c t , p o l i t i c a l s u b-cultures i n themselves. In a l a t e r w r i t i n g , F e i t h gave the best graphic p r e s e n t a t i o n yet p u b l i s h e d of the d i v i s i o n of a l l r a n or sub- 26 c u l t u r e s and t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p to p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s . (See Figure I ) From the diagram i t can be seen t h a t F e i t h t h i n k s there are f i v e main p o l i t i c a l sub-cultures i n the country: communism, r a d i c a l n a t i o n a l i s m , Javanese t r a d i t i o n - a l i s m (here c a l l e d Javanese a r i s t o c r a t i c p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e ) , democratic s o c i a l i s m and Islam. For some unexplainable reason, he chose not to represent the r e a l s p l i t i n Islam between the "modernist" and " t r a d i t i o n a l i s t " or i n d i g e n l z e d - 12 - v a r i e t i e s or to r e l a t e the Indonesian army to the sub- 27 c u l t u r e s as he d i d the major p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s . My diagram (Figure I I ) i s an attempt to remedy the l a t t e r shortcoming. The two diagrams c l e a r l y show the d i v i s i o n s i n Indo- nesian s o c i e t y d e s c r i b e d i n the l a s t s e v e r a l pages. The c r u c i a l p o i n t , i n my o p i n i o n , i s t h a t a p o r t i o n of the PKI, the PNI, the NU and the army a l l f a l l w i t h i n the Javanese t r a d i t i o n a l i s t (or a r i s t o c r a t i c ) sphere. Each of these four o r g a n i z a t i o n s have common Javanese r o o t s . The army and the PNI are most c l o s e l y i n the center of Javanese a r i s t o c r a t i c c u l t u r e . As Lev noted about the three l a r g e Javanese based p a r t i e s (and I now add the army); "The NU k l j a j i ... the PNI p r i j a j i and the PKI peasant (and the army k e s a t r i a ) spoke the same language and shared the same stereotypes of the non-Javanese f o r whom the Masjumi spoke. S o c i a l communi- ca t i o n s between the three (now four) groups flowed w i t h more 2 8 or l e s s t r a d i t i o n a l ease „.." The above statement sets the stage f o r the a n a l y s i s of Indonesian p o l i t i c s from the p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e p e r s p e c t i v e . Broadly, the flow of p o l i t i c s can be seen as a two l e v e l s t r uggles one between the groups most i n f l u e n c e d by and l i n k e d to Javanese a r i s t o c r a t i c p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e versus the I s l a m i c e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e and secondly, among the v a r i a n t s or sub-cultures of the Javanese p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e . FlGURFS PO i. i T i c A L P A R T / E 5 A/JD P o L i n c ^ L AURAAJ POLIT ICAL A M D oaGAtf ' Z A T I O ^ L I N F L U E N C E S <?*J A B R J S O F F I C E coaps Trte N E U ; O R - D S S . - 13 - The o v e r a l l process can best be described as " J a v a n i z a t i o n " of p o l i t i c s . " J a v a n i z a t i o n " w i l l be used i n preference to the term " P r i j a j i - i z a t i o n " , d e s p i t e the f a c t that the l a t t e r term most c l o s e l y describes the process. " J a v a n i z a t i o n * w i l l be used t o describe the p r o g r e s s i v e increase i n i n f l u e n c e and power of e t h n i c Javanese and other Indonesians who have become very Javanese i n thought and a c t i o n i n the government and p o l i t i c s of Indonesia as a whole. Not only i s t h i s process seen as p u t t i n g more e t h n i c Javanese i n the government but e s p e c i a l l y Javanese of one c u l t u r a l v a r i a n t s the pri.1a.1l or Great T r a d i t i o n of Java. This concept should be kept c o n s t a n t l y i n mind as the remainder of t h i s paper i s read. A Note on the C u l t u r a l Influences on the M i l i t a r y ; I n Figure I I , I presented a r a t h e r c o n t r o v e r s i a l placement of the m i l i t a r y i n r e l a t i o n s h i p to the a l l r a n . The diagram only r e f e r s t o the present l e a d e r s h i p (as of 1972) and should not be seen as d e p i c t i n g a h i s t o r i c a l phenomenon. I t should f u r t h e r be noted that no communist or "modernist" I s l a m i c i n f l u e n c e s are shown. I t i s these two c u l t u r a l and i d e o l o g i c a l tendencies t h a t the Indonesian m i l i t a r y (ABRI) i s most h o s t i l e towards, and elements sympathetic to them have g r a d u a l l y been purged from the ranks — assuming t h a t they were ever present i n the f i r s t p l a c e . A l s o note the l i m i t e d i n f l u e n c e of democratic s o c i a l i s m - 1 4 - (Western p o l i t i c a l philosophy)and r a d i c a l n a t i o n a l i s m . The i n f l u e n c e of the former on p o l i t i c a l t h i n k i n g i n ABRI has seemingly decreased w i t h the i s o l a t i o n of the S i l i w a n g i D i v i s i o n of West Java since 1966. The l a t t e r i s more d i f f i - c u l t to d i s c u s s . At the moment i t s i n f l u e n c e seems t o be more l a t e n t than a c t i v e . The s e n s i t i v e n e s s of the Pre s i d e n t t o Indonesian businessmen's complaints about f o r e i g n competition and ABRI's recent s t r e s s on the i n h e r i t a n c e of the "1945 Generation" or the s p i r i t of r e v o l u t i o n a r y s t r u g g l e to the younger generation seem to be signs of i t s continued presence. While the i n f l u e n c e of Islam on the m i l i t a r y i n general i s s m a l l , most m i l i t a r y people i n c l u d i n g the Javanese acknowledge i t as t h e i r r e l i g i o n , a l b e i t w i t h c e r t a i n r e s e r v a t i o n s . The r e l a t i o n s h i p of "modern" or a t l e a s t western m i l i t a r y d o c t r i n e and Javanese t r a d i t i o n a l i s m would seem t o be the most c o n t r o v e r s i a l . The m i l i t a r y and i t s spokesmen are quick to proclaim t h e i r support f o r modernisasl and pembangunan (modernization and development) and deny the r o l e of t r a d i t i o n a l values and i n f l u e n c e s . This does not, however, correspond w i t h my own f e e l i n g about the matter. That the army has imported many modem o r g a n i z a t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s and put them to good use i s not denied. C e r t a i n l y some p o l i t i c a l d o c t r i n e expounded by ABRI i s a l s o of t h i s v a r i e t y . The ques t i o n remains as t o the depth of the acceptance of the - 15 - values to go along with the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s , and only a c t i o n s can give the proper answer to i t . The army w i t h i t s dual f u n c t i o n ideology c e r t a i n l y has created i t s own format f o r a c o n t i n u i n g p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l as w e l l as a m i l i t a r y r o l e which i s very d i s t i n c t l y d i f f e r e n t from the Western conceptions of the m i l i t a r y ' s proper r o l e . On the other hand, ABRI's a n a l y s i s of Indonesia's p o l i t i c a l problems and i t s p r e s c r i b e d remedies a t the Second Army Seminar i n Bandung durin g 1966 are decidedly Western i n approach. To t h i s date the implementation of s a i d remedies has had a d e c i d e d l y Javanese f l a v o r to i t , however. The correctness of my placement of ABRI's present l e a d e r s h i p on the diagram can be b e t t e r appreciated a f t e r the s i m i l a r i t i e s between the New Order and Mataram are pointed out. Government and P o l i t i c s i n a Javanese P o l i t i c a l C u l t u r e ; L a t e r Mataram (15th and 16th century) While the northern coast of Java or the p a s l s l r succumbed to Islam i n a very complete manner, t h i s was not true of the c u l t u r a l h e a r t l a n d of Java on the i n t e r i o r of the c e n t r a l and eastern p o r t i o n s of the i s l a n d . There Islam b a r e l y a f f e c t e d the t r a d i t i o n a l scheme of c u l t u r e and govern- ment. In the 15th and l 6 t h century Java e x i s t e d s i d e by s i d e w i t h the Dutch East I n d i a Company or VOC; yet l i t t l e a f f e c t e d by i t . At t h i s time the kingdom of Mataram c o n t r o l l e d the Javanese h e a r t l a n d . E x c e l l e n t s t u d i e s of t h i s p e r i o d of history have been made by Moertono and Schrieke while Anderson and Geertz have presented equally valuable 29 interpretations of "Javanism" as well. 7 Prom these studies, a model of "Javanism" and the Javanese state in relatively pure form can be obtained, while i t i s naturally impossible to ascertain the f u l l range of values, beliefs and attitudes that formed traditional Javanese p o l i t i c a l culture, i t i s possible to see the results of this p o l i t i c a l culture as reflected in the structure, functions and style of Mataram's 30 government. In turn this reflection can be compared with contemporary Indonesian p o l i t i c s to discover the broad similarities and dis-similarities. Structure % According to Steinberg, "the p o l i t i c a l structure of Java in Mataram times began — and theoretically speaking, 31 also ended — with the king." In theory, at least, there were and could not be any limits on the powers and rights of such a king for even with the acceptance of Islam, he was s t i l l somewhat of a sacral figure. The state i t s e l f was conceived of as consisting of four concentric circles of territory that faded Imperceptibly into each other with increasing distance from the center. The kraton or palace was the center which was surrounded by the negara agung or royal land. The latter was the very core of the kingdom, during Mataram times located in the area of - 17 - Solo and Jogjakarta. The next c i r c l e was the mantja negara or outer provinces which at the height of Mataram's power included a l l of Java except the very extreme eastern and western t i p s of the i s l a n d . F i n a l l y , there were the tanah sabrang or overseas states that acknowledged the suzerainty of the center. Naturally an elaborate administration was required to govern such a kingdom. By and large the realm was not governed by members of the royal family for they were kept at the court and hopefully, p o l i t i c a l l y neutral. In some of the outer provinces hereditary l o c a l lords were incor- porated into the administration; otherwise t h e i r areas were ruled through o f f i c i a l s , who no matter how independent they might be i n r e a l i t y , were i n theory only servants of the king. At the center i n the kraton and negara agung, there was an elaborate structure of administration that i n 3 2 composition was supposedly s a c r a l . Usually the r u l i n g council was composed of f i v e ministers; a patih or chief minister and four wedana or l e s s e r ministers. On occasion the king reserved the p o s i t i o n of patih for himself. "The functions of these o f f i c i a l s , i n contrast to the structure, were imprecise; areas of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and r e l a t i v e importance seem to have depended more on t h e i r personal r e l a t i o n s with the king or t h e i r strength i n court c i r c l e s - 18 - 33 than on the p a r t i c u l a r o f f i c e s they occupied." The s t r u c t u r e f o r m a l l y f i t the p a t t e r n that kept order i n the s m a l l e r world of the kingdom, but " p o l i t i c a l business was conducted 34 p r i m a r i l y i n terms of personal r e l a t i o n s , " Moertono notes that whatever the change i n the f u n c t i o n s of Mataram govern- ment during i t s 400 years of e x i s t e n c e , the i d e o l o g i c a l and s t r u c t u r a l bases of s t a t e l i f e seem not to have changed a t a l l . 3 5 While the s t r u c t u r e of the s t a t e was e l a b o r a t e , i n r e a l i t y the degree of c o n t r o l by the center was very low. The degree of e f f e c t i v e n e s s of the k i n g was measured by j u s t what degree he could t i g h t e n up the looseness of the s t r u c t u r e or i n other words, accumulate power a t the center. Therefore, as Anderson notes, the Javanese seem to have h e l d a view of h i s t o r y t h a t envisioned f l u c t u a t i o n s of power a t the center; o o n t i n u a l waxing and waning of power. Times of t r a n q u i l i t y corresponded to s t r e n g t h and times of d i s o r d e r to weakness a t the center. I f there was any causal r e l a t i o n s h i p seen here, i t was t h a t weakness causes or allows d i s t u r b a n c e , r a t h e r than v i c e versa. While r u l e i n the negara agung could be c o n t r o l l e d c l o s e l y , t h i s was much l e s s t r u e i n the outer provinces and the overseas t e r r i t o r y . A r u l e of f i n a n c i a l s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y or autonomous f i n a n c i n g gave the o f f i c i a l s there f u l l and undivided a u t h o r i t y over t h e i r r e g i o n . " I t i s t h e r e f o r e not - 19 - surprising that, within this region, he (the local o f f i c i a l ) wielded the powers of administration, judge and commander of the local contingent of troops ... the fact that regional o f f i c i a l s held undivided power made i t essential that they 37 be chosen with great care." Simply stated, despite i t s outward appearances, the state was primitively organized and only held together by personal attachments and loyalties, partly inevitable because of poor communications and the far-flung nature of the kingdoms so, the danger of disin- tegration was inherent in the system, especially as hereditary succession stimulated the establishment of new gentry families in the outer provinces and overseas 38 t e r r i t o r i e s . Throughout the centuries the king's o f f i c i a l s , from the highest to the lowest, gradually became a social class with an exclusive set of beliefs and values. They formed the social stratum between the king plus the small group of princes of royal blood and the great mass of private citizens who, irrespective of wealth or means of l i v i n g were called the wong t j i l i k or small people. This administrative and social group was known as the p r i j a j i . Commoners could enter this group but only by becoming a servant of the king, an 39 o f f i c i a l . In such a polity, at least in theory, there was no such phenomenon as p o l i t i c s for the king's slightest wish became law. In actuality there were poli t i c s but of the court - 20 - or palace p o l i t i c s v a r i e t y . There were multitudes of I n t r i g u e s , schemes and maneuverings f o r b e t t e r p o s i t i o n i n r e l a t i o n s h i p to the r u l e r . The n o t i o n of mass p o l i t i c s and p a r t i c i p a t i o n was, however, a l i e n to the system. Functions s In the Javanese b e l i e f system or world view, harmony was the g r e a t e s t value„ Harmony as a goal meant t o create a "one-ness" w i t h one's surroundings and above a l l w i t h God. I t f o l l o w s that the conception of the proper f u n c t i o n of the s t a t e was broader and a t the same time narrower than the modern one. Broader because harmony extended to the s o u l and narrower because harmony meant, i n many cases, the t o t a l absence of government, i f p o s s i b l e . "The Javanese, there- f o r e , would not consider the s t a t e to have f u l f i l l e d i t s o b l i g a t i o n i f i t d i d not encourage i n n e r p s y c h o l o g i c a l order (tenteram. peace and t r a n q u i l i t y of heart) as w e l l as e n f o r c i n g the formal order ( t a t a ) . " C o n tinuing, Moertono says s F o l l o w i n g t h i s l i n e of reasoning, one can understand why s t a t e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n the kingdoms of o l d seem to have neglected the people's needs, seems to have been detached from the t o i l s of the common people. In a g r a r i a n c o u n t r i e s where man's l i f e depends so much more on the steady flow of seasonal change, where the concept of harmony i s viewed more i n terms of r e g u l a r i t y and f a m i l i a r i t y w i t h the patterns of community l i f e , any i n t e r f e r e n c e i n the l i f e of s o c i e t y may d i s t u r b the balance of the u n i v e r s e . Thus the s t a t e w i l l as much as p o s s i b l e , r e f r a i n from i n t e r f e r e n c e . Such r e s t r a i n t i s f e a s i b l e too because of a g r a r i a n l i f e , r e l a t i v e l y , - 21 - does not need much state stimulus to work ... It follows that progress in the modern sense of deliberate development and active stimulation could not have been considered a goal of the state. The role of the king i s then more that of a protector than a developer ... with the a l l - dominating position of the king in state l i f e , administration as a technical tool of kingship had to reflect the king's major concern, the preservation of harmony. This need ... determined the major and most important task, mainly, maintaining security. In practice this meant guarding against any possible disturbance from an outside foe as well as any internal crime or irregularity which might disturb the balance between the two cosmic . spheres (the kingdom and the universe). Anyone who did disturb the internal order had to be disposed of without delay, "just as one would dispose of a 41 caterpillar." The efficiency of a regime was also measured by the existence of such disturbances. In fact, there were frequent rebellions, and bands of robbers often roamed about plundering, but Moertono notes that once such groups became t e r r i t o r i a l , they governed exactly like the 42 kingdom i t s e l f did. One can easily imagine that any change i n the kingdom became a threat to the regime, because change, any change, would disturb the balance and inner tranquility of the state. The Javanese universe became ordered by hard and stern rules of action and interaction. The duty of the state and i t s servants was to contain change in a l l forms. This passion became so obsessive that history was continually rewritten to prove the lack of change and emphasize continuity. The ultimate enforcement of such reactionary " s t a b i l i t y " had to - 2 2 - rest on something other than personal relationships, and i n the f i n a l analysis, i t was the a b i l i t y and willingness of the regime to use force that maintained order and prevented deviation. The f i n a l function of the state and i t s administration was taxation. Taxation was a kind of tribute exacted in exchange for the king's protection. This tribute was in the form of money, produce and labor. Especially in the mant.ja negara or outer provinces this taxation was farmed out to the regent or provincial governor, who had to be sel f - sufficient. An order came from the top of the hierarchy as to what was to be supplied and i n what quantity. The local lord or regent then adjusted his own administration to that requirement. The state depended on this tribute to maintain i t s e l f and the elaborate l i f e - s t y l e of the court, for i t had l i t t l e capacity to finance i t s e l f , In this sense then, the center could be viewed as attempting to extract much but offering l i t t l e i n return; especially i f the center was weak, the room for deviation was great in the submission of tribute. Style and Behaviors The style and behavior of the ruled and the rulers i n Mataram was governed by a very intricate set of social relationships and norms that ascribed a place to everything in the universe. The world view of the Javanese ascribed a - 23 - meaning to everything, every action, every event. In fact, Moertono states that consequently Javanese are apt to search for meaning in acts, words or situations, no matter how ^3 rationally incomprehensible or unimportant they may seem. The central focus of action, however, was on the creation and maintenance of harmony, both inside and outside of the human being. This stress led to great emphasis on ceremony and symbolism. The approach to any problem had to be in harmony with the cosmos. Therefore, the outer form of functions and behavior became much more important than the content of action i t s e l f . This stress also gave rise to the unbelievably elaborate style of the age that was embodied in the pri.1a.il. Pri.1a.1i-ism has been well described by Clifford 44 Geertz. The etiquette of the pri.1a.1l was so elaborate and refined that he even called i t a religion of sorts. In short, the individual was supposed to express his own inner harmony and his outer harmony with the surrounding world In behavior. This style of behavior i s called halus and escapes f u l l definition in English. Loosely, i t means "cultured" and "refined", but i t has far reaching impli- cations. Expression of emotion in daily conduct i s forbidden. Only smoothness of expression is allowed? hence, regardless of one's true inner feelings, the countenance must remain unperturbed. Opposition, anger, fear, jealousy, hate and the - 24 - li k e are only expressed openly by kasar or crude beings; beings in their natural state without any concentration of power or refinement in the inner soul. Consequently, i t i s almost impossible for the prl .1a.jl to say "no", although certain types of "yes" do mean "no". As expressed in the structure and functions of the state, the form i s much more important than the content; in fact, the actual content i s very often hard to distinguish from the symbolism of the form. Geertz goes even further in discussing the implications of halus-ness by describing carefully a process called etok-etok in which pri .1a.1l avoid t e l l i n g the truth whenever 45 possible simply to preserve harmony(S) A Pri .1a.jl must be sabar, lklas and terlma, terms of virtue which mean having patience, being sincere and devoted, and willing to receive or accept a l l that comes one's way, 46 good or bad. These terms express a strongly socialized inclination of submission to fate. There i s no room for a voluntary and mutual adjustment or a fine conciliation and conformation; rather the universe i s ordered by hard and stern rules. Deviation from them would set off a chain reaction which might reach calamitous proportions. From here to a belief in the working of fate i s but a very short distance. Harmony as a compelling need must therefore form the central concept in man's efforts toward organization ... thus the state as a replica of the cosmic order (harmony) must also have the propensities and capacities of that higher order, a power which as a part of the Great Order, no subject people dare res t r i c t or disturb. ^7 - 25 - The despotic possibilities of such attitudes are softened somewhat by the expression of paternalism for the subjects on the part of the ruler. He must care for their sufferings, so that, according to Moertono, the ruler assumes, i n fact, a role of protective superiority, the 48 ruled an attitude of acquiescent subservience. This gives rise to a sort of patron-client relationship which is often 49 called Bapak-lsm or father-ism. This type of patrimonial relationship was reflected in the formal central hierarchy of the state as well as in most forms of p o l i t i c a l and social organization. In addition to the central hierarchy or pyramid with the king at the top and a l l subjects below, the society i t s e l f was divided into many small ftfiefdoms|* or pyramids with similar composition. Ben Anderson has presented what he feels i s a Javanese or p r l j a j i philosophy of power.^° He believes i t to be i n many ways completely opposite from the social science conception of power today. Briefly, Anderson sees the Javanese as believing power is concrete, homogeneous, constant i n total quantity and as automatically legitimate i.e. there are no moral questions involved with power or i t s use. On the other hand, he says Westerners view power as abstract, heterogeneous in i t s sources, unlimited i n quantity and morally ambiguous. He further draws the implications of these observations in discussing p o l i t i c a l action and - 26 - "behavior In the Javanese context, several points of which have already been touched upon here. Another result of the emphasis on harmony, as well as the idea of power, was the importance of continuity. Continuity i s an expression of non-change. Dynasties had to be related even i f imaginary genealogies had to be created. Hence, the Dutch, with a l i t t l e twisting of history, became descendants of ancient Javanese kings. Moertono stresses that legitimacy was derived by these rewritings of history while Anderson counters that the simple flowing of power from a monarch to his opponent was enough confirmation of legitimacy given the Javanese view of history; therefore, historical rewriting was only additional support. The central roles of harmony and continuity in the Javanese mind, and thus in the state, were also reflected i n a phenomenon known as syncretism. Syncretism a l a Java was essentially taking a l l threats, new ideas and associated forms of change and assimilating them to the major body of Javanese tradition and philosophy. Hence, Islam and even Dutch colonialism came to be expressed i n very Javanese ways. The threat of new ideas was defused by absorption into the mainstream. However, such domination of change could only be maintained in the long run by the continuation of Javanese power. As long as colonial rule remained indirect, the prlja.11 were In a position to interpret new ideas as they wished, but in the case of direct rule this could hardly be - 27 - the case. Soldiers were also servants of the king. The knight or kesatrla image of the humble soldier always loyal to his commander was clearly expressed as a part of the general pri.ia .1l belief system. The means of socialization of the Great Tradition of the prl .1a .1i to the masses is not well understood. Ben Anderson pointed out that the wa.lang ku l i t or shadow puppet show was certainly a part of the process as i t depicts the prl .1a.1i norms in ideal form and has been a great favorite 52 of a l l levels of Javanese society for centuries. In summary, traditional Javanese society and govern- ment were very strong and absorptive. They were also extremely hierarchlal in structure. The maintenance of harmony was the major function of the government. Change was seen as something to be tempered and controlled i f i t could not be prevented altogether. The Changing Roles of the Pr 1.1 a.11 and the State The Pri . 1a .1 l ; The prl.ja.ll were the aristocracy of the Javanese abangan masses. It was the pri .1a.1i who carried out and administered the king's commands5 they were the administra- tive class of the kingdom. ''Java as a p o l i t i c a l entity rested on three things? a common language and culture, a p o l i t i c a l myth that was universally accepted because i t - 28 - rested on and expressed common religious beliefs, and the 52 shared values of a Java-wide pri.1a.ll class."^ The prl.1a.1l. then, as opposed to the peasant masses, were the foremost representatives of Javanese c i v i l i z a t i o n in a l l of i t s manifestations, cultural or p o l i t i c a l . With the advent of Dutch colonialism and the subjugation of Javanese royal power to that of the VOC or Dutch East India Company in the eighteenth century, the role of the prl.1a.1l i n i t i a l l y did not change substantially. As Steinberg puts i t : Alien though i t was, the VOC was enacting a role i n Javanese history. Its earlier naval domination in the archipelago was decaying; i t had gone ashore on Java and was now the successor to Mataram. The circles of the realm were reversed, coastal Batavia (now Djakarta) was now the center, the Bupati now faced west and north, and Mataram princes were now outer vassals. But p o l i t i c a l l y the underlying structure of Java had changed hardly at a l l . Socially, below a small conquering e l i t e of Dutchmen, pr 1.1a.11 s t i l l lorded i t over the wong t.Uliks a multitude of local economies s t i l l sent tribute through local channels to a greedy but distant center. A Javanese writing of the 18th century, indifferent to the company's outside connections but sensitive to the Imperatives of Javanese history, could explain thiss 'Jang Kung' (Jan Coen, the Dutch Governor- General who founded Batavlai), i t said, was the son of a wandering foreigner and a princess of West Java who was destined to bear kings. Through her, ^ therefore, descended a legitimate dynasty of Java. *^ Thus was the strength of Javanese culture; early company representatives in the Interior became Javanlzed. They took Javanese wives, spoke Javanese and wore Javanese clothes. They became a part of the patrimonial system Itself and l i t t l e disturbed the role of the prl.1a.1l or the continuity - 29 - of the c i v i l i z a t i o n . During the 18th century the VOC treated the Inland Javanese kingdoms as large and dangerous vassals that maintained a great deal of Independence. This period saw a great flowering of pri.1a.1l culture, and the position of the prl.1a.ll vis-a-vis the peasant was greatly strengthened by the company. "The Dutch ruled, but dally government remained in the hands of the prl.1a.lig production was increasingly commercial but i t continued to be organized i n the feudal forms of tribute or appanage."-' The turn of the century saw the collapse of the VOC and i t s replacement by the Dutch government. There was an immediate shift in policy and quite naturally, i t had an effect on the role of the prl.1a.1l. "Daendels (the f i r s t Governor-General appointed by the Dutch government) and his successors came out from Europe determined to govern rather than simply to control Java; they challenged the whole system of arrangement by which company servants and Javans had accommodated to each other for more than a century.""^ The size and independence of the Javanese kingdoms were reduced, and the Dutch attempted to transform the prl.1a.1l from petty vassals into ordinary c i v i l servants. The ease of dealing with traditional Javanese i n s t i - tutions was again recognized by 1830 when the right of hereditary succession was returned to the regents; the - 30 - Dutch discovered i t was much easier to rule through the personal authority of the pri.1a.ji than not. Despite some administrative simplification, the pri .1a.1i were clearly onoe again in day to day control of governing Java. The major social and economic transformations of the 19th and early 20th centuries began to undermine the old prl .1a.1i institutions. The Dutch policy of hereditary succession coupled with large population growth, relatively peaceful conditions and non-expansion of the native administration created a r i f t between the higher prl .1a.ll who were regents or bupatis and the lower p r l j a j l who i n more normal times would have looked forward to gaining a foothold in and ascending the administrative hierarchy through force 56 or natural displacement. However, the advent of the 57 Ethical Policy in the last decades of the 19th century, helped feudal Java to gradually evolve, at least formally, into a modern administrative state. This meant a large expansion of the number of government positions outside of the traditional hierarchy, and educational institutions were set up in the Indies to supply people with modern s k i l l s for these positions. The lower p r l j a j i , without a chance for advancement in the "frozen" traditional hierarchy, eagerly grasped the new opportunities and became the doctors, lawyers, engineers and c i v i l servants of the Netherlands Indies under Ethical rule. I n i t i a l l y , the status associated with these - 31 - posts was not high, but Van Niel notes, "by the end of the century (19th) most of these persons were coming to be viewed as prl.1a.ll of some standing by the common people of Indonesia, even though they were often not descended from 58 the higher prl.1a.1i families." "Whereas i n 1900 the prl.1a.1l group had been mainly nobles and administrators, by 1914 i t contained increasing numbers of c i v i l servants, government technicians and intellectuals who shared the e l i t i s t role and who in the eyes of the Indonesian common man of the village were 5 9 Included within the general designation of p r i j a j l . " Most prl j a j l made outward adjustments to the West and Western style administration but continued to regulate their private lives on traditional patterns. The crucial point, however, was, "during the early 2 0 t h century the broadening leadership pattern of Indonesian society was almost exclusively a development within the pri.1a.li group, and a sense of social 60 distinctiveness remains a strong force among the e l i t e . " Thus, the rise of nationalism was also the expression of one group; the prl.la.ll. The pri.1a.1i have always had top status In Indonesian society. The bureaucracy and white-collar positions that came to be associated with the pri.1a.1i were and are the most respected in the job hierarchy. Non-prl.1a.1l, whether peasants or even non-Javanese aspired to these positions and as a few - 32 - obtained them, became "p r i j a j l - i z e d " in the process. To 61 this day the above pattern remains surprisingly constant. With the above in mind, the Javanese el i t e of today, 62 in my opinion, should be considered modern day prl,1a.11. They include a l l government servants whether i t be military, c i v i l servants, pamong-pradja (regional administrators corps), teachers or the major white-collar service professionals in law and medicine . Additionally, Geertz has pointed out that Invariably p o l i t i c a l party leaders in Java, including, surprisingly, those of the PKI are of 63 p r l j a j l origin. Thus the sons of Java carry on the great p r i j a j l tradition, albeit in different roles. The States While the p r i j a j i were adapting to new roles, the conception of the state was changing to some extent also. I n i t i a l l y , Mataram and Batavia co-existed, but gradually Batavia began to assume the role of the center. As noted earlier, the Javanese even made the Dutch into legitimate heirs to the kingship by rewriting history. As the structure of Mataram had not changed for 400 years, the advent of Dutch rule did not easily change the conception of the state and i t s functions. For essentially, colonial rule was the same thing as indigenous rule when seen from the viewpoint of the effect on the population. It was s t i l l a paternal- i s t i c state. There was no role for the population other than - 33 - to accept the decisions of the new center and no way to participate other than through traditional revolts against authority. There was no conception of po l i t i c s except the old one; palace p o l i t i c s . There was no conception of opposition except in the total and i l l e g a l variety, because i t was seen as a threat to the existing order. The channels of communication remained the same; one way and always from the top. I f there was ever any formal local autonomy, i t was always granted from the top by the grace of the Governor- General, the new king, and not obtained by any inherent right of possession of i t by the masses. Clive Day noted that " ... the most striking characteristic i s the immense concen- tration of power in the Governor-General, who i n his sole person represents the royal authority and who i s responsible for the conduct of a f f a i r s . Both in the legislation and in administration, he i s without serious r i v a l and with few checks in the Indies; the only serious limitation on his power i s that imposed by the government i n the Netherlands 64 (thousands of miles and several months away)." "During the colonial period the fundamental objective of the government apparatus remained essentially the same; the maintenance of p o l i t i c a l , economic and social control. Compliance was achieved either by using coercion or by an implicit willingness to use i t on the part of the colonial regime. " ^ - 3Hr - The advent of the Ethical Policy i n the late 19th century caused, at least on the surface, some rather drastic changes In the colonial government. Supposedly, the Netherlands Indies government stopped being merely a control apparatus and became interested in advancing the welfare of the native population. Heretofore, any roads or Irrigation works had been constructed for the maintenance of security and creating infrastructure for Dutch Investment. The new emphasis created a "modern" administrative state charged with supplying a l l sorts of social services to the population. This emphasis allowed the creation of Dutch language schools and eventually, even medical, law and engineering colleges for the natives. Native p o l i t i c a l organization was tolerated as long as i t was not too open in i t s criticism of the regime or Dutch colonialism. Thus, the Ethical Policy gave rise to the Western-educated but prl,1a.11 e l i t e that was later to lead the independence movements. However, after the end of the First World War, the Ethical Policy came to an abrupt end. P o l i t i c a l organization was no longer so easily tolerated, although the expansion of education for Indonesians did continue both in the Indies and in the Netherlands. Even the Volksraad or People's Assembly, conceived at the height of the li b e r a l Ethical Policy, became a mere functionless organ with no power and serving only as a somewhat restricted forum of criticism of the regime. - 35 - Paternalism remained the dominating policy in terms of inter-relations between the rulers and the ruled. Several trends continued up to the Japanese invasion that made the later Dutch regime seem much like the Javanese regimes of old. The emphasis on security and control and complete subjugation of the natives remained. Java remained the center of colonial rule even though the "kraton" i t s e l f moved to Batavia. The Dutch called a l l territories outside of Java "the Outer Islands", emphasizing the Java-centric nature of the regime. While the traditional institutions of Javanese rule were gradually eroded and replaced by the colonial government, the replacement was also bureaucratic in nature and easily adapted to old status, operational and p o l i t i c a l norms by the pri.jaji. The role of the bureaucracy i n society increased greatly, and i t s fused nature was gradually somewhat differentiated, but the major point was that Dutch Indies government and i t s personnel performed the same functions as Javanese government always had and essentially through the same sorts of structures, both institutionally and socially. Ted Smith notes that "Indonesian public institutions, during approximately 250 years of Dutch control absorbed many continental bureaucratic norms. But the fact that the Dutch relied primarily on indirect rule meant that not as many of these norms were transferred as might be indicated by the long - 36 - duration of colonial control. Sultans and regents in Java and local princes in the Outer Islands continued their traditional style of rule, shaping i t only to meet whatever demands might be imposed upon them by their colonial superiors. Moreover, very few natives were brought into the higher levels of Dutch East Indies bureaucracy. w^ This meant that despite the outward appearance of Western-style bureaucracy, Indonesians would possess no solid core of high administrators at independence like one found i n the ICS (Indian C i v i l Service) and MCS (Malayan C i v i l Service) of British India and Malaya. While the fundamental nature of government in the Netherlands Indies did not change substantially, i t did allow and force other changes. One of the most obvious was the increasing numbers of poor peasants on Java. The over- population of Java was, i s and w i l l be one of the foremost influences on the future of the country. The traditional structure and i t s conservatism could not handle the large numbers of landless and virtu a l l y landless peasants. For these people in their increasing millions had no reason to be thankful for peace and order for they have nothing to lose in upheaval. Javanese p o l i t i c a l culture was and is a non-participa- tory p o l i t i c a l culture. It and i t s government are at their greatest strength when the majority of the population i s - 37 - 67 parochial rather than even subjects. There were no structures, be they formal or informal, in "Javanism" to handle mass poli t i c s and in fact, a l l of the cultural norms of the intensely e l i t e s t society argue against them. The colonial government had l i t t l e to fear as long as the masses remained parochials and immobilized. Without mobilization of the masses, the prl.1a.1l e l i t e could never have gained independence from the Dutch on any terms but those of the Dutch. The Dutch knew their own interests in Indonesia well, and anytime p o l i t i c a l organizations began to attract mass followings, for whatever the reason, they were quickly suppressed; their pri.ia.11 leaders sent into exile. The Japanese, however, had no compunctions against such organi- zation, and their style of agitative colonialism created the exact tool that the prl.1a.1i needed to do battle with the Dutch. On the other hand, Dutch colonialism of the later period did allow one kind of organization to penetrate the masses. According to Benda, "by the end of the 19th century, the Dutch has ceased to play a Javanese game (colonial rule became more and more direct in Java); in spite of several d i f f i c u l t i e s , they did not by and large interfere with the 68 growth of modern Muslim movements." Without Dutch support neither the traditional nor the modern Javanese e l i t e groups could stem the Islamic tide. The "modernist" Muslim movement thus escaped i n i t i a l l y the brunt of the syncretic tendencies of "Javanism" and made inroads in the Javanese heartland. Java became divided against i t s e l f : between the syncrfejtksts and the Islamic purists. The long Javanese accommodation with Islam came to an end. Such were the continuities and changes in Javanese p o l i t i c a l culture and institutions and their bearers until independence was declared. The el i t e remained prl . 1 a . 1 i , the government remained security and control (or harmony) oriented while traditional society continued to disintegrate and Islam grew in strength. The changes meant that there could never be a neo-Mataram without the adoption of radically different structures to handle the new forces set loose in society. But this did not mean that such an attempt on the part of the prl .1a.1l e l i t e was impossible or would not be tried. J - 39 - NOTES on Chapter I 1 For instance Samuel Huntington, P o l i t i c a l Order In Changing S o c i e t i e s , (New Havens Yale U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1968) and David Apter, The P o l i t i c s of Modernization (Chicago: U n i v e r s i t y of Chicago Press, 1965)„ 2 Herbert Feith,. The Decline of C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Democracy i n Indonesia (Ithacas C o r n e l l U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1962) . 3 L e s l i e Palmier, Indonesia and the Dutch (London: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press7 19£07. 4 Jan P l u v i e r , C onfrontations; A Study i n Indonesian P o l i t i c s (Kuala Lumpurs Oxford i n A s i a , 1965) and David Levine, " H i s t o r y and S o c i a l S t r u c t u r e i n the Study of Contemporary Indonesia," Indonesia, 1969, No. 7. 5 Rex Mortimer, " C l a s s , S o c i a l Cleavage and Indonesian Communism", Indonesia, 1969, No. 8 . ^ John Do Legge, Indonesia (Englewood C l i f f s s P r e n t i c e H a l l , 1964), p. 169. 7 This was e s s e n t i a l l y Legge"s c o n c l u s i o n as w e l l , but he f a i l e d to expand the i d e a . I b i d , p. 170. g G a b r i e l Almond and Bingham Powell, Comparative P o l i t i c s : A Developmental Approach (Boston: L i t t l e , Brown, 1 9 6 5)9 p . 5 0 . When the term p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e i s mentioned, i t u s u a l l y conjures up thoughts of systematic a t t i t u d i n a l survey research, such as was used by G a b r i e l Almond and Sidney Verba i n the w e l l known study The C i v i c Culture ( P r i n c e t o n : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1962) . Such work i s f a r beyond the scope of t h i s study. P o l i t i c a l Culture here I s used to r e f e r to the h o r i z o n t a l cleavages i n Indonesian s o c i e t y between i t s major c u l t u r a l groups and to a l e s s e r extent, to r e f e r to the v e r t i c a l cleavage between the e l i t e and mass p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e s . As such i t i s l i t t l e more than a broad term or t o o l used to p i c t u r e s o c i a l cleavages i n the p o l i t i c a l dimension. Since b a s i c survey data was not a v a i l a b l e , t h i s paper f o l l o w s the t r a d i t i o n a l p a t t e r n of using h i s t o r i c a l evidence and to a l e s s e r extent data on the composition of the Indonesian e l i t e t o make a number of inferences about the s t a t e of the contem- porary p o l i t i c a l process. This paper i s perhaps a good s t a r t i n g p o i n t f o r an Almond-Verba type study but should not be considered more than t h a t . - 40 - 9 Clifford Geertz, "Afterword; The Politics of Meaning", in Claire Holt (ed.), Politics and Culture in Indonesia (Ithaca; Cornell University Press, 1972), p. 319. 10 This term is from Clifford Geertz (ed.) Old Societies and New States (New York; The Free Press, 19637". " 11 Hildred Geertz, "Indonesian Cultures and Communities", in Ruth McVey (ed.) Indonesia (New Havens Human Relations Area Files, 1963) , p. 24. 12 According to the 1930 Census, ethnic Javanese composed 47$ of the population. There i s some reason to believe that this figure has declined by several percent (2 or 3) since that date. Recent census are of no value in calculating ethnic percentages as they only give regional population figures, and the population is spread around considerably from the ethnic viewpoint. 13 The 1930 Census revealed that 3 .4$ of the population was Minangkabau, 2 . 6 $ was Bugis, 2% was Batak and 1 .88$ was Ballnese. 14 Daniel S. Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy (Ithaca; Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1967) p.3. lerbert Feith, op. c i t . , p.30. 16 Ibid., p.31. 17 Ibid., p.31. 18 Ibid., p.32. 19 Clifford Geertz uses the term Great Tradition to distinguish aristocratic or pri.ja.il tradition from that of the peasant (L i t t l e TraditionT. See Geertz, The Religion of Java (Glencoe; The Free Press, i 9 6 0 ) , p.348. 20 For the best description of this movement see Deliar Noer, The Rise and Development of the Modernist Muslim Movement In Indonesia During the Dutch Colonial Period (1900-1942) , (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1963). 21 The term santri is used for s t r i c t Muslims in Indonesia while abangan is used for those accepting Islam but retaining largely traditional beliefs as the main form of religion. The greater portion of Javanese peasants are regarded as abangan. The traditional Javanese upper classes who shared a similar view of Islam as the abangan peasants are called Pri.1a.il (the " j " - 41 - i s pronounced as a "y"). Robert Cruikshank, "Abangan, S a n t r i , and P r i j a j i " , Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 1972, V o l . I l l , No. 1 . 22 See footnote No. 21 . 23 For a good discussion of the PNI factions see J.E. Rocamora, "The Partai Nasional Indonesia", Indonesia, 1970, No. 10 . 24 Soedjatmoko, "The Role of P o l i t i c a l Parties i n Indonesia" i n P h i l l i p W. Thayer (ed.), Nationalism and Progress i n Free Asia (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1956) . 25 The term i s from Huntington, op.cit., p. 256. 26 Herbert Feith and Lance Castles, Indonesian P o l i t i c a l Thinking 1945-65. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970) p.14. 27 For c r i t i c i s m on these points see A l f i a n , Masalah Mental, A l i r a n P o l i t k dan Radikalisme dalam Masjarakat Indonesia (Mental Problems, P o l i t i c a l A l i r a n and Radicalism i n Indonesian Society) (Djakarta: Leknas, 1970) , p. 35° 28 Daniel S. Lev, op.cit., p.77. ki.ja.1i i s the word for a respected Muslim leader and" Kesatria i s the Javanese word for knight or s o l d i e r . 29 Soemarsaid Moertono, State and Statecraft i n Old Java: A Study of the Later Mataram Period (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1968); B.J.O. Schrieke, Indonesian Soc i o l o g i c a l Studies. Part I I , (The Hague: Van Hoeve, 1957)5 C l i f f o r d Geertz, The Religion of Java . (Glencoe: The Free Press, i 9 6 0 ) ; and Ben Anderson, "The Idea of Power i n Javanese Culture", i n Clair e Holt (ed.), P o l i t i c s and Culture i n Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972) . ~* Much of the content of these works i s conveniently summarized i n David Joel Steinberg (ed.), In Search of Southeast Asia (New York: Praeger, 1971). 30 The terms structure, functions and s t y l e are only a n a l y t i c a l categories or tools used to order the discussion of Mataram and, l a t e r i n the paper, contemporary Indonesian p o l i t i c s . They are by no means mutually exclusive categories, and the discussion f r e e l y flows back and forth between them. 31 Steinberg, op.cit., p.81. 2 I b i d . , p.83. - 42 - 3 3 I b l d . , p.83. ^ I b l d . . p.84. 35 ^Moertono, op.cit., p.5« 36 Anderson, op.cit., p. 20 37 Moertono, op.cit., p.92. 3 8 I b l d . , p.109. 3 9 I b l d . . p.93. 40 Ibid., p.4 and p.83. 41 Ibid., p.85. 42 Ibid., p.95. 43 Ibid.. p.20. 44 Geertz, op.cit., pp. 227-339 ^ I b i d . , p.246. 46 Ibid., p.241. 47 Moertono, op.cit., pp.3-4. 48 Ibid., p . 2 6 . 49 Geertz, op.cit., p.328. ^Anderson does so with the qualification that Javanese do not have the word or concept of "power" in their vocabulary. Anderson, op.cit., pp . 5 - 8 . ^Moertono, op.cit., pp.53-5^s Anderson, op.cit. p.25 52 Steinberg, op.cit., p.85. 53 Ibid., p.86. 54 Ibid., p.148. 55 Ibid., p.150. *^This point i s made with some force in Robert Van Niel, The Emergence of the Modern Indonesian E l i t e (The Hague: Van Hoeve, I960), pp.27-9. ' - 43 - -^The E t h i c a l P o l i c y was i n a sense a r e a c t i o n to the e a r l i e r open e x p l o i t a t i o n of the Indies and the d i s t u r b i n g r e p o r t s r e c e i v e d i n The Hague that n a t i v e welfare was r a p i d l y d e c l i n i n g . Education and modern h e a l t h s e r v i c e s were r a p i d l y expanded to improve t h i s w e l f a r e . For f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n of t h i s p o l i c y see St e i n b e r g , o p . c i t . , p. 188. ^ 8Van N i e l , o p . c i t . , p.29. 5 9 I b i d . , p.50. 6°Ibid., p.50. 61 Ted Smith, The Indonesian Bureaucracy; S t a b i l i t y . Change and P r o d u c t i v i t y (unpublished Ph.D. d i s s e r t a t i o n , U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a , Berkeley, 1971)» PP. 224 - 2 5 . 62 , a r e Further data / presented on the s o c i a l o r i g i n s of the contemporary e l i t e i n the s e c t i o n e n t i t l e d "The Current P o l i t i c a l , M i l i t a r y and Governmental E l i t e * ' i n Chapter II. 63 Geertz, o p . c i t . , pp.371-73. 64 C l i v e Day, The Dutch i n Java, (Kuala Lumpur; Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1965), p.414. 65 Moertono, o p . c i t . . p.5. 66 Smith, o p . c i t . , p.202. 67 The terms p a r o c h i a l , subject and p a r t i c i p a n t are used as d e f i n e d by Almond and l o w e l l , o p . c i t . , p.53. 68 Harry Benda, "D e c o l o n i z a t i o n i n Indonesia: The Problem of C o n t i n u i t y and Change", American H i s t o r i c a l Review, 1965» V o l . LXX, No.4. CHAPTER II JAVANIZATION; HISTORY AND DATA History» Politics and Javanization Having drawn a cultural map of Indonesia's diverse population, presented a model of traditional Javanese aristocratic p o l i t i c a l culture and government, and looked at the changing role of the bearers of that p o l i t i c a l culture, l e t us examine recent Indonesian p o l i t i c a l history to see i f the Javanization of Indonesia and Indonesian p o l i t i c s , i n any sense, can be plausibly argued. The Pre-Independence Period: While the long and increasingly direct colonial contact was hollowing out the institutions of social integration in Java, Dutch colonialism was, with minor exceptions, l i t t l e concerned with the islands outside of Java. Only about the time of the Ethical Policy did the Dutch turn their attention to those areas. Even by Japanese occu- pation the Dutch Impact could only be considered heavy in the East Coast Residency of Sumatra around Medan.* In the Outer Islands It was Islam, rather than colonialism, that had the greatest impact on the traditional system. Partly because the de-tradltlonalization process had gone further in Java than anywhere else in the archi- pelago and partly because the only educational f a c i l i t i e s in the Indies were located there, Java became the center of nationalist agitation in the Dutch East Indies. The - 44 - - 45 - early 20th century saw the r i s e i n Java of Budl Utomo, Sarekat Islam, the PKI and the early Partai Nasional 2 Indonesia as modern p o l i t i c a l organizations. Occasionally, such organizations appeared about to become mass par t i e s , only to have the masses disappear with government oppo- s i t i o n and e x i l e of the pri.la.ji party leaders. Today i t seems that any mass following of these youthful organizations can be explained i n terms of Javanese messianic expectations of a Eatu A d i l or Just Prince of 3 Deliverance. Despite the ominous forebodings raised by the Communist uprisings of 1926-27 and the tremendous economic decline of the Indies during the Great Depression, there were no outward signs of a decline i n the Dutch p o s i t i o n at the time of the Japanese invasions the mass of the population remained passive. During the Japanese occupation, the Indies were divided into three separate regions| Sumatra was ruled along with Malaya by a d i v i s i o n of the Japanese army, Java from Batavia also by the army and Eastern Indonesia from Makassar by the navy. The governing p o l i c i e s d i f f e r e d widely, and only i n Java were the masses organized, mobilized and to some extent trained i n m i l i t a r y matters. Sukarno and other n a t i o n a l i s t leaders were brought back from e x i l e to lead mass organizations. Due to the shortage of Japanese administrative personnel, large numbers of - 46 - prl.1a.3l bureaucrats attained high posts previously reserved for Dutch nationals. The Japanese, however, chose to play a "divide and rule" game between the nationalists and the emerging Islamic e l i t e ; inevitably, 4 the gap between the two continued to widen. The War for National Independence;"* Although a hesitant Sukarno declared Indonesia Independent on August 17» 1945* i t was to take four years of fighting before the Dutch were to recognize i t as a fact. The i n i t i a l bursts of fighting were spontaneous and occurred throughout Java and to a lesser extent Sumatra largely out of the control of the prl.1a.1l e l i t e that had declared independence. In some areas social as well as p o l i t i c a l revolution took place. The masses of Indonesia who for so long had been passive and subjugated rose to the c a l l of "revolusl" or revolution. The most obvious symbols of feudalism were destroyed as Sultans were dethroned and in some cases k i l l e d . Gradually, the situation was controlled by the conservative prl.1a.1i-led central government, and the elements favoring social revolution were isolated and then destroyed. While the most obvious symbols of Dutch colonialism were destroyed, by and large, the lower prl.1a.1l simply moved up a few steps to the top of the administrative hierarchy and continued a conservative negotiation-oriented - 47 - policy toward the All i e s and then the Dutch. Despite Tan Malaka's revolt and the communist-led Madiun Affair plus some opposition from the army and PNI, conservatives willing to make concessions to the Dutch were able, albeit somewhat precariously, to maintain their grip on central power. During this period could be seen the f i r s t signs 7 of a s p l i t between the military and c i v i l i a n e l i t e , ' although for our purposes i t could best be interpreted as a s p l i t between the bearers of Javanism and the bearers of the Islamic-entrepreneurial p o l i t i c a l culture. Basically, the Javanese dominated army and PNI were lined up against the Mas.lumi and PSI over negotiation and g military strategy. The f i n a l phase of Dutch opposition to the creation of an independent Indonesia consisted of isolating the 9 belligerent Republic, whose strength was on the interior of Central and East Java plus several interior areas of Sumatra, in a large number of member states of a federal organization known as the BFO. Many members of the traditional Outer Island's e l i t e who were more afraid of "Javanese imperialism" than the Dutch cooperated with the BFO. In December 1949 the United States of Indonesia was formed. The Dutch, in the last round of negotiations, had - 48 - i n s i s t e d on a federal form of constitution f o r the new nation as a condition for t h e i r recognition of Independence. So, the Republic became just one of the 16 member states of the new f e d e r a l l y organized country. While, i n f a c t , t h i s was probably the best structure for such a diverse a r c h i - pelago and to guarantee the containment of "Javanese imperialism", i t was also a structure designed to protect the i n t e r e s t s of the Dutch. So repulsive was the idea of continued Dutch influence to the n a t i o n a l i s t s that a l l persons supporting the f e d e r a l i s t form were branded as "feudal, c o l o n i a l i s t s , compradores." A l l n a t i o n a l i s t s , be they Javanese or non-Javanese, were forced to outwardly support the idea of a unitary republic, regardless of t h e i r inner feelings about the matter. Within s i x months the federal structure collapsed to be replaced by the unitary Republic of Indonesia i n August 1950. In summary, the decade of Japanese occupation and "revolution" ended with the creation of a unitary national state composed of the entire former Dutch East Indies except West New Guinea. However, the brunt of occupation and revolution had been borne by Java, The Javanese and the heartland of Javanese culture became fa r more mobilized, organized and n a t i o n a l l y conscious than any other segment of the population. The feudal and administrative e l i t e s of the Outer Islands had been destroyed, d i s c r e d i t e d or - H-9 - isolated by the so-called social revolutions in North Sumatra and A t j e h 1 0 and participation in the BFO. With 11 the traditional e l i t e virtually incapacitated, the only representatives of Outer Island culture remaining with influence were associated with "purist" or "modernist" Islam, an ancient enemy of Javanism; this was to prove fa t a l . Constitutional Democracy: The state of Indonesia existed i n name, but objectively, in 1950, there was l i t t l e more. There was no all-Indonesia culture, society or p o l i t i c a l system. The only real bonds of unity were the shared experiences of the nationalist e l i t e in their opposition to colonial rule. The e l i t e had a set of symbols: a motto, a flag, an anthem and a "national" language which most found d i f f i - culty expressing themselves i n . The mass of society was hardly in any way attached to these symbols. L i t t l e thought, planning or action could be given to the above problems, however, because of the chaos existing at independence and the series of crises that engulfed the Republic during the next decade. Almost immediately after independence, the separatist RMS (Republic of South Moluccas) rebellion broke out and was quickly followed by Darul Islam (Islamic state) guerilla operations in South Sulawesi, Atjeh 12 and West Java. Thus, Islam became associated with revolt, - 50 - r e b e l l i o n and disunity; the revolts had to be crushed by force. Credit must be given to the n a t i o n a l i s t e l i t e f o r t h e i r i n i t i a l e f f o r t s and idealism. They probably wished to create a new national p o l i t i c a l culture that would be unique and d i s t i n c t from a l l of the various national sub- cultures. They c e r t a i n l y overestimated t h e i r own unity operating under the unitary and parliamentary structure created i n 1950* In the long run investments i n the parliamentary system's infrastructure and operation of the p o l i t i c a l game under them could have had powerful effects on the development of attitudes for a t r u l y national p o l i t i c a l culture; i n a sense, they did but mostly negatively. Por these new i n s t i t u t i o n s quickly became battlegrounds f o r the society's d i f f e r i n g p o l i t i c a l cultures i n quite a l i t e r a l sense. The various a l i r a n or s o c i a l forces whose ideologies were to a large extent mutually exclusive became i n s t i t u - t i o n a l i z e d i n the party system. The functioning of the system seemed only to bring out the extremes i n each a l i r a n . A l l of the horrors so well described i n Huntington's 13 model of the praetorian society came true i n Indonesia. J These struggles coupled with a great deal of s e l f - i n t e r e s t and r e a l economic grievances began to take on c e n t r i f u g a l tendencies with the f l a r i n g up of regional m i l i t a r y coups - 51 - i n I956-57 and the advent of c i v i l war i n 1958. To s t a t e the problem s i m p l i s t i c a l l y , there were no u n d e r l y i n g n a t i o n a l u n i t y f a c t o r s that could n e u t r a l i z e the f i s s i - parous tendencies allowed and even encouraged by the newly adopted system. The parliamentary process, before the e l e c t i o n s of 1955» witnessed the d i v i s i o n of the a l l r a n i n t o two broad c o a l i t i o n s . The Java based p a r t i e s repeatedly a l l i e d to defeat or o b s t r u c t a c t i o n d e s i r e d by the Mas.luml and PSI whose leaders were e i t h e r very Western-oriented or "modernist*' Muslims. The country's two l a r g e s t p a r t i e s , the PNI and the Mas.jumi, g r a d u a l l y began to be estranged 14 and c o u l d not cooperate on even the si m p l e s t of programs. The 1955 e l e c t i o n s r e - a f f i r m e d t h a t the PNI and Mas.luml were indeed the n a t i o n ' s l a r g e s t p a r t i e s ; together they c o n t r o l l e d 114 of the 256 parliamentary seats. The one and only parliamentary cabinet formed a f t e r the e l e c t i o n s was a c o a l i t i o n between the Mas.jumi, PNI and NU. The PKI refused to p l a y the r o l e of opponent to the f u l l c a b inet or I t s t o t a l p o l i c y . Whenever the c o a l i t i o n should have been constrained because the Mas.jumi objected to PNI and NU proposals, i t was not; the PNI knew i t could count on the PKI's support and votes on the parliament f l o o r . Because of t h i s problem and other s i m i l a r ones, the Mas.jumi m i n i s t e r s resigned from the cabinet. S h o r t l y afterward the m i n o r i t y cabinet declared the n a t i o n under - 52 - martial law and resigned. Coinciding with these parliamentary developments, several Outer Island m i l i t a r y commanders revolted and made coup d'etat i n t h e i r command regions. The cabinet proved unable to control the m i l i t a r y or the s i t u a t i o n . This coupled with the resignation of the Vice President, a Sumatran, and the f l i g h t of top members of the PSI and Mas.lumi to Sumatra, led to the declaration of martial law. The regional dissidents then demanded greater autonomy and the restoration of government under the leadership of former Vice President Hatta. With the denial of these requests a rebel government was set up i n Padang, West Sumatra, and c i v i l war ensued. Java was almost denuded of troops as the Outer Islands were invaded and occupied. The c i v i l war was e f f e c t i v e l y over i n three or four months although the l a s t , 15 groups of rebels d i d not surrender u n t i l 1961. Party p o l i t i c s were banned i n the army occupied areas, and with martial law, the m i l i t a r y became the v i r t u a l r u l e r s i n the regions. Sukarno appointed a government that was not responsible to the parliament, and suddenly, Indonesia's experiment with Western-style democracy was over. With the Constitutional Assembly deadlocked between Islamic elements and Javanese plus Christians over the return to the 1945 Constitution and P r e s i d e n t i a l r u l e , Sukarno - 53 - simply declared the return himself. In the process of the c i v i l war and the return to the 19̂ 5 Constitution ( U U D 4 5 ) , large numbers of the Outer Island's p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y e l i t e were discre d i t e d and ostracized from central p o l i t i c s . Suddenly, through a long and involved h i s t o r i c a l process, the overwhelming majority of the "legitimate" national p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y e l i t e were from one ethnic group, the Javanese. The UUD4-5, o r i g i n a l l y written by a committee of mostly Javanese, could then be more e a s i l y adopted. As Ben Anderson put i t , the UUD45 was much more c u l t u r a l l y comfortable for the Javanese e l i t e . 1 7 The c i v i l war was not a separatist attempt. The members of the Indonesian p o l i t i c a l e l i t e who p a r t i c i p a t e d i n i t never questioned the unity of the Indonesian state. They were simply tr y i n g to r i g h t the balance between the Outer Islands and Java, or, i n other words, attempting to win by threats and force what they had l o s t i n the p o l i t i c a l b a t t l e at the center. Compromise was not the order of the day for the m i l i t a r y and the Javanese p o l i t i c a l parties i n 1958. With the m i l i t a r y defeat of the r e v o l t s and occupation of the Outer Islands by l o y a l Javanese troops, the p o l i t i c a l front of the r e v o l t s collapsed also, and simply reinforced the Javanese p o l i t i c a l v i c t o r y at the center. With the banning of the Masjumi and PSI i n i960 and the continuation of martial law, the "takeover" was confirmed. - 54 - The basis of a new Indonesian culture and p o l i t i c a l system was to be Javanese and assuredly non-Islamic(purist). Those who disagreed were not allowed to participate in the system, in the p o l i t i c a l game, a game that in reality was to be played mostly by Javanese and Javanized actors. If there were a continued struggle for ultimate victory, i t was only to see which of the variants of Javanism was to win. It must be admitted that the p o l i t i c a l events of the 1950's were very complex. Certainly, the struggle was not consciously viewed by many of the participants as either a cultural or ethnic battle. However, the results should be clear from the above arguments. Perhaps there was not another alternative, given the legacies of colo- nialism, within the confines of a single state, but one would never realize i t from the length or the intensity of the struggle. Daniel S. Lev has summed up the situation well in these words s ... the Java-Outer Islands problem comprised a complicated combination of social and cultural, as well as p o l i t i c a l and economic h o s t i l i t i e s . These h o s t i l i t i e s might best be summed up as the test of Java's real and inevitable domination of the archipelago. Javanese dominance rested on superior numbers, a more elaborate culture and the disunity of the other Indonesian ethnic groups. The Javanese e l i t e saw in independence an oppor- tunity, as i t were, to f u l f i l l the ambitions and promises of Javanese c i v i l i z a t i o n in the new national state, while the smaller and more parti- cularistic societies of the rest of Indonesia recoiled before the vision of their eventual subordination or assimilation in a Javanese dominated nation. " - 55 - Guided Democracy; Martial law and the return to the UUD45 leg i t i m i z e d the dominance of Sukarno and the army over the p o l i t i c a l system. Along with the PKI whom Sukarno used to off s e t the strength of the m i l i t a r y , the major p o l i t i c a l actors (Sukarno and the army) were strong representatives of Javanism. While Sukarno was too much of a p o l i t i c a l manipulator to exclude Outer Islanders from his government, t h e i r numbers did decrease, and those present appeared to be l i t t l e more than symbols or tools for Sukarno's mani- 19 pulations of p o l i t i c s . I t must be admitted, however, that national p o l i t i c s became more and more focused upon Sukarno himself. The Javanese dominated parties played l i t t l e r o le In decision-making. A p o l i t i c i a n ' s power depended on his closeness to the President rather than on what party, organization or ethnic group he represented. Under Guided Democracy, "the supra-local p o l i t y , the national state, (shrunk) more and more to the l i m i t s of i t s t r a d i t i o n a l domain, the c a p i t a l city-Djakarta-plus a number of semi-independent tributary c i t i e s and towns held to a minimal l o y a l t y by the threat of c e n t r a l l y 20 applied force." With the collapse of the national transportation system and the economy i n general a f t e r 1958, the regions, e s p e c i a l l y those outside of Java, became is o l a t e d from the national p o l i t y . The "v i c t o r y " - 56 - of the Javanese was bearable because of the lack of actual control by the Javanese-dominated center. The conclusion of the i n i t i a l phase of struggle for control of national power had ended with the Javanese in a dominant position but that did not mean an end to the p o l i t i c a l struggle i n Indonesia or an end to mass p o l i t i c s , though there were no elections. The national state was just as fragile as at independence, and even i f the Outer Island problem had been settled, there was no guar- antee that problems of a similar nature might not arise again. Besides, even "mother" Java?was divided among i t s e l f . As Ted Smith put i t , Sukarno had to make concrete 21 investments in solidarity, legitimacy and s t a b i l i t y . After making such investments, and they were a continuous process, there was l i t t l e capital of any kind l e f t for investment in economically productive schemes. With the continuing decline in national welfare, the struggle for position and scarce resources grew even more intense, but the Outer Islands and "modernist" Islam were in no position to actively participate i n that struggle? i t was nearly a completely Javanese one. "Most (Indonesian) parties suffer in varying degrees from the tension of being ideologically on the 22 l e f t but socially on the right." This gap grew noticeably wider during Guided Democracy and the President was as - 57 - " g u i l t y " of i t as the p a r t i e s . While Indonesian p o l i t i c s were of the period /._'. awash on a flood of revolutionary r h e t o r i c and sloganeering, actual government p o l i c y was very conservative, even status quo-oriented. Beneath the r h e t o r i c , the c o n f l i c t narrowed into increasing tensions between the r a d i c a l s of the PKI and increasingly, the PNI and the conservatives of Islam and the r u r a l areas as well as the m i l i t a r y . At the center Sukarno could balance the two, but open clashes i n the countryside over land reform and squatter's rights revealed a struggle much l e s s c o n t r o l l a b l e . By l a t e 1964 and early I965 Sukarno no longer appeared able to balance the opposing forces and increasingly tended to side with the r a d i c a l forces, at l e a s t verbally. At this point the r a d i c a l s seem to have aimed a very small amount of violence at t h e i r foremost conservative r i v a l s , the m i l i t a r y , hoping to thereby s h i f t the central balance of power decidedly i n t h e i r d i r e c t i o n and speed up 23 a r a d i c a l takeover of the government. There was indeed a dramatic s h i f t of power but, for the i n s t i g a t o r s , i n the wrong d i r e c t i o n . For the f i r s t time i n a decade or more, Islam and sections of the Javanese e l i t e worked together or at l e a s t , i n p a r a l l e l . The m i l i t a r y , the conservative c i v i l i a n e l i t e (bureaucracy), the non-communist i n t e l l e c t u a l s and the Islamic masses combined i n an informal c o a l i t i o n - 58 - 2 4 that destroyed the r a d i c a l s . The PKI and eventually, Sukarno were removed from the p o l i t i c a l spectrum. The New Orders With the outside or opposition pressures removed that had created the c o a l i t i o n i n the f i r s t place, the so-called New Order c o a l i t i o n began to collapse. The students, i n i t i a l l y , and then the "modernist" Muslims were i s o l a t e d from power by the m i l i t a r y . The m i l i t a r y slowly i s o l a t e d i t s own elements that had sympathy with or supported these two groups. The r u l i n g c o a l i t i o n became a group of Javanese generals a l l i e d with c i v i l i a n technocrats, also l e d by Javanese. The momentary glimpses of p o l i t i c a l power for non-Javanese were replaced by promises of a f a i r e r d i v i s i o n of national wealth. Despite the modernization and development ideology of the m i l i t a r y - l e d New Order, Outer Islanders and p a r t i c u - l a r l y "modernist" Muslims were not allowed p o l i t i c a l influence and i n some cases, not even room f o r p o l i t i c a l maneuver. The New Order d r i f t e d into a " c e n t r i s t " Javanese-dominated regime. In summary, i t can be h i s t o r i c a l l y argued that independence has witnessed a process of Javanization i n Indonesia. Only b r i e f emergencies during the revolution and a f t e r the I965 coup attempt, known as the G-30-S, have Outer Islanders played dominant or equal roles with - 59 - the Javanese. I t does seem plausible that the game of Indonesian p o l i t i c s can only be played by those elements w i l l i n g to subordinate themselves to Javanism. A l l previous attempts to p a r t i c i p a t e i n p o l i t i c s i n other than Javanese terms have le d to f a i l u r e and eventual i s o l a t i o n and destruction. Assimilation to Javanism i s a fact of l i f e that a l l Indonesians must face. The Current P o l i t i c a l , M i l i t a r y and Governmental E l i t e I f indeed any of the previous h i s t o r i c a l arguments have any v a l i d i t y , one would expect that Javanese and, representatives of the Javanese-aristocratic p o l i t i c a l culture would be very numerous, even dominant, i n the key governmental and e l i t e p ositions. This, i n fact, does seem to be the case. The Javanese hold governmental positions to be of very high status value; consequently, the entire bureaucracy has very large numbers of Javanese 25 i n i t . For the purposes of national unity this dominance has never been widely publicized and no exact figures are avail a b l e on the subject. Estimates made by some Indo- nesian sources have put the figure as high as 90$ of the 26 t o t a l while a I97I review of the 207 top o f f i c e holders i n the central bureaucracy by Ted Smith revealed that 71$ 27 of them were ethnic Javanese. This author's calculations concerning 154 of the same positions revealed that 64$ of the t o t a l were Javanese. However, by reviewing the top - 60 - 28 p o s i t i o n s i n the major M i n i s t r i e s of I n t e r i o r , Foreign A f f a i r s , J u s t i c e , Information, Industry, Trade, A g r i c u l t u r e , Communications, P u b l i c Works and Health showed that the percentage had increased t o 73$. Further, i f only the extremely important c o n t r o l m i n i s t e r i e s of I n t e r i o r , Finance, Communications and Information are i n c l u d e d the f i g u r e i s 84$. Not only are the top o f f i c i a l s e t h n i c Javanese but they are s t r o n g l y upper c l a s s (or p r i j a j l . ) i n s o c i a l background. A glance a t the r e c o n s t i t u t e d Kabinet Pembangunan or Development Cabinet r e v e a l s t h a t only 13 of the 23 m i n i s t e r s are Javanese while 3 are Sundanese, 4 are Sumatrans and 2 are from Eastern Indonesia. Thus 57$ of the cabinet are e t h n i c Javanese, but the important f a c t i s that C h r i s t i a n s are over-represented i n the remainder (3 out of 10) and the I s l a m i c p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e i s v a s t l y under-represented (only 2 and perhaps 3 of the M i n i s t e r s 29 could p o s s i b l y be considered s a n t r i Muslims). The major s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l f o r c e , aside from the c i v i l i a n bureaucracy, i n c e n t r a l Indonesian p o l i t i c s i s the m i l i t a r y which h i s t o r i c a l l y has Javanese o r i g i n s and c u l t u r a l i n f l u e n c e s . The army claims to be the most t r u l y n a t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n i n the country, and i t probably 30 i s . I t s o r i g i n a l t e r r i t o r i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n was very r e g i o n a l i n content and i t s a c t u a l workings were h i g h l y r e f l e c t i v e of the center-outer provinces and over-seas - 61 - 31 t e r r i t o r i e s r e l a t i o n s h i p s described f o r L a t e r Mataram. Each major re g i o n had i t s own troops and command s t r u c t u r e ; i n the 1950's i t was very d i f f i c u l t f o r the center to appoint non-natives of the regions as the Panglima or r e g i o n a l commander. The m i l i t a r y was de f a c t o f e d e r a l l y organized. The c o l l a p s e of the r e g i o n a l r e v o l t s and the Javanese occupation was the beginning of the end of such a set up, however. This type of o r g a n i z a t i o n was seen as a l l o w i n g the army to be i n f i l t r a t e d and used by p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s , e s p e c i a l l y the PKI, as w e l l as t h r e a t e n i n g the u n i t y of the s t a t e . The m i l i t a r y then has c o n s t a n t l y been t r y i n g to strengthen i t s own o r g a n i z a t i o n since independence and the process has gone r a p i d l y ahead si n c e the d i s p o s a l of i t s two major "enemies", the PKI and President Sukarno, 32 d u r i n g the I965-67 p e r i o d . This u n i f y i n g process coupled w i t h the r e v o l t s , the G-30-S, and subsequent i n t r a - m l l l t a r y c o n f l i c t s have succeeded i n reducing the " n a t i o n a l - n e s s " o f the m i l i t a r y , a t l e a s t i n an e t h n i c sense. With the d e c l i n e of the S i l i w a n g i D i v i s i o n ' s i n f l u e n c e i n c e n t r a l 33 m i l i t a r y c i r c l e s , J the m i l i t a r y has d r i f t e d more and more towards a Javanese pol e . Polomka estimates that f u l l y 75$ of the o f f i c e r 34 corps i s Javanese. As of October I965 Javanese h e l d 62$ of the c e n t r a l and r e g i o n a l command posts; by A p r i l 1967 the f i g u r e was 65$; as of A p r i l I969 i t was 72$ and - 62 - i n October 1970 i t was f u l l y 8 0 $ . 3 5 Hindley has noted that i t i s extremely rare f o r a member of the o f f i c e r corps to come from either the lower . classes or from the s a n t r i a l i r a n (Islamic-entrepreneurial 16 p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e ) . In her study of the contemporary e l i t e structure and factionalism i n Indonesia, Ann Gregory noted that 7 of the 20 leaders of the ethnic Javanese Diponegoro D i v i s i o n (also Suharto's former d i v i s i o n ) interviewed were connected through kinship to one of the four Javanese palaces and that 29 of the 39 leaders i n t e r - viewed from the army's major d i v i s i o n s (Siliwangi, Diponegoro and Brawldjaja) were from gentry or n o b i l i t y classes while only 2 had merchant s o c i a l backgrounds and 37 none had peasant backgrounds. V i r t u a l l y the same generalization can be made about the m i l i t a r y as about the c i v i l i a n bureaucracys the Javanese and Christians are over-represented while the s a n t r i a l i r a n i s vastly under-represented, As p o l i t i c a l p arties have become l e s s and l e s s important i n decision-making and the functioning of government since the regional r e b e l l i o n s of the l a t e 1950's, there i s l i t t l e point i n giving d e t a i l e d ethnic data on t h e i r central leadership structures. Some generalizations are appropriate, however. The 1955 elections c l e a r l y pointed out that the constituencies of the parties were to - 63 - a large extent regionalized with the NU, the PNI and the PKI, each having t h e i r greatest strength i n Java while the Mas.luml8s greatest strength was i n the Outer Islands. The NU i s a s a n t r i party and gained some Outer Island and Islamic "modernist" supporters by default with the banning of the Mas.luml. Nevertheless, the NU remained dominated by Javanese leaders. Most "modernist" Muslims hoped that the creation of a new s a n t r i party i n I968 would give a place i n the p o l i t i c a l c o n s t e l l a t i o n to the same a l l r a n that the Mas.jumi had represented. Clearly t h i s was the int e n t i o n of a large part of the PMI or Parmusl leadership but the m i l i t a r y was not w i l l i n g to f u l l y sanction such an occurrence. The i n i t i a l chairman of the party was Javanese but a majority of the central leadership was non- 38 Javanese. Had the party not been paralyzed by i n t e r n a l c o n f l i c t and outside intervention, i t probably would have provided "modernist" Muslims, e s p e c i a l l y Outer Islanders with a p o l i t i c a l outlet and done very well i n the I97I 39 e l e c t i o n s . The PNI s t i l l has a strong Javanese image and sections of the c i v i l i a n bureaucracy s t i l l have 40 i n c l i n a t i o n s towards i t . On the surface, at l e a s t , the successor to the p o l i t i c a l parties has been the army sponsored Functional Groups (Golongan Karya or Golkar) which holds an over- whelming majority of seats i n the parliament and i s somewhat - 64 - more r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the a c t u a l power c o n s t e l l a t i o n i n the country a t present than are the p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s . Of the c e n t r a l s t r u c t u r e i n c l u d i n g the Dewan Pembina or Advisory Council and the Dewan Pimplnan or Leadership Council having 34 members, 25 or 74$ are Javanese w h i l e 41 f i v e of the remainder are non-Javanese C h r i s t i a n s . Golkar which i s i t s e l f i n and of the bureaucracy or s t a t e apparatus, both c i v i l i a n and m i l i t a r y , only r e f l e c t s the data presented above on i t . The I s l a m i c - e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e i s under-represented. In c o n s i d e r i n g the above s t a t i s t i c s and g e n e r a l i - z a t i o n s , i t must be remembered th a t i t i s the c e n t r a l government or bureaucracy that i s under c o n s i d e r a t i o n . As Smith p o i n t s out government i n the regions below L e v e l I I which i n c l u d e s the Kabupaten (Regency), Ket,jamatan ( D i s t r i c t ) and Kelurahan ( V i l l a g e ) l e v e l s i s l a r g e l y i n 42 the hands of l o c a l i n h a b i t a n t s . There are 26 a d m i n i s t r a t i v e regions or provinces i n Indonesia, of which only 3 are e t h n i c a l l y Javanese. There are 17 m i l i t a r y regions i n the country and only 2 are e t h n i c a l l y Javanese. Yet 8 of the 26 Governors (head of the Province l e v e l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ) are Javanese and 12 of the 17 43 r e g i o n a l m i l i t a r y commanders are e t h n i c Javanese. ^ These p o s i t i o n s are appointed by the Javanese dominated c e n t r a l government. Obviously, p r o v i n c i a l government i s - 65 - not a provincial a f f a i r , at least ethnically and perhaps culturally as well. The above data points out a trend that has been noted before in post-independence Indonesia; there is a division of labor in the small non-agricultural sector of the country among ethnic groups (and p o l i t i c a l cultures?). The Javanese and the Christian minority have dominated the bureaucracy and military while the representatives of the Islamic-entrepreneurial p o l i t i c a l culture (especially Minangkabaus, Muslim Bataks and Bugis) along with the Chinese have been clustered in commerce. Javanese are seldom found in commerce with the exception of fields in which "governmental" connections are very important, such as brokerage and importing. The opposite seems to be true for representatives of the santri aliran; they are seldom found outside of the Ministry of Religion i f they are in the government. I ~ 66 - NOTES on Chapter II 1 The Minangkabau area on the West coast of Sumatra around Padang could be considered another area of Intense impact but f o r rather d i f f e r e n t reasons than the Medan area. Padang was not a plantation area l i k e Medan. The areas of Ambon i n the Moluccas and Minahasa i n Northeast Sulawesi were also strongly affected by Dutch colonialism for they were the fabled "Spice Islands" that had brought the Dutch to the Indies i n the f i r s t place. By the turn of t h i s century, however, these two areas were only "back-waters". 2 Budi Utomo or "Beautiful Endeavor" was a Javanese n a t i o n a l i s t organization; Sarekat Islam i n i t i a l l y was a s a n t r i - l e d organization but l a t e r H.O.S. Tjokrominoto, a prl.1a.11. became i t s most famous leader; both the PKI and PNI were forerunners of the contemporaries of the same name. 3 Sukarno's popularity among the Javanese masses has been interpreted i n t h i s way In Bernard Dahm, Sukarno and the Struggle f o r Indonesian Independence (Ithacaj Cornell University Press, 1969)» passim; and the popularity of the Sarekat Islam Is interpreted i n t h i s l i g h t i n Van N i e l , op.cit., Chap. I I . 4 The Dutch had followed a si m i l a r p o l i c y of separating the t r a d i t i o n a l and r e l i g i o u s e l i t e i n the Outer Islands. See Noer, op.cit., passim. ^ Indonesians fondly c a l l the 1945-50 period the revolution but i t more closely f i t s with the d e f i n i t i o n of a war for national independence given i n Samuel Huntington, op.cit., p.264. ^ On the Madiu.n A f f a i r see George Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution i n Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, Chap. VIII. Ben Anderson, Java i n a Time of Revolution (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972) discusses the 1945- 46 period i n d e t a i l and concludes that Tan Malaka was purposely made a scape-goat and his " p l o t " fabricated i n order to crush the "true" revolutionaries. 7 Anderson, op.cit., Chap. VII. 8 Kahin, op.cit., Chaps. VI and X and A.H. Nasution, TNI: Tentara Nasional Indonesia D . l l l l d I (TNI: The Indonesian National Army) (Djakarta: Seruling Masa, 1968) , passim. - 67 - o The name used by the Sukarno-led Indonesian government. 10 See Kahin, o p . c i t . , p.1795 and R. W i l l i a m L i d d l e , E t h n i c i t y , Party and N a t i o n a l I n t e g r a t i o n (New Haven; Yale U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1970) p.54, on the " s o c i a l r e v o l u t i o n s " i n Sumatra. 11 A c t u a l l y , one-half of the parliament of the u n i t a r y Republic was made up of former BFO p a r l i a m e n t a r i a n s . This caused no small amount of i l l f e e l i n g on the p a r t of r a d i c a l n a t i o n a l i s t s who wanted to be r i d of a l l Dutch i n f l u e n c e . The "October 19, 1952 A f f a i r " i n which the army asked Sukarno t o disband the parliament was a l l e g e d l y caused by t h i s . See F e i t h , o p . c i t . , pp. 246 -73 . 12 For d e t a i l s on a l l of the r e v o l t s see Nugroho Notosuanto, Sedjarah and Hankam ( H i s t o r y and the Hankam) (Dj a k a r t a ; Lembaga Sedjarah Hankam, 1968) , pp,82-92. 13 ^For a d e f i n i t i o n of a p r a e t o r i a n s o c i e t y see Huntington, o p . c i t . , pp 0 194-97„ 14 For an e x c e l l e n t account concentrating on these pre- e l e c t i o n c o a l i t i o n s see Herbert F e i t h , The Wilopo Cabinet: A Turning P o i n t i n Indonesian H i s t o r y ( I t h a c a : C o r n e l l Modern Indonesia" P r o j e c t , 1958)V 15 For f u l l d e t a i l s on the c i v i l war see D a n i e l Lev and Herbert F e i t h , "The End of the Indonesian R e b e l l i o n s " P a c i f i c A f f a i r s , 1963, XXXVI, No,l„ 16 Ben Anderson, "The Idea of Power i n Javanese C u l t u r e " i n C a l i r e H o l t (ed.), P o l i t i c s and Culture i n Indonesia. ( I t h a c a : C o r n e l l U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1972), p.37. 17 For t h i s view see Mohammed Nawawi, Regionalism and Regional C o n f l i c t i n Indonesia (unpublished Ph.D. d i s s e r t a t i o n , Princeton" U n i v e r s i t y , 1968) . 18 Lev, o p . c i t , , p.3. 19 ^The number of non-Javanese i n the cabinets of Guided Democracy decreased by 10$ over the C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Democracy P e r i o d . Akio Yasunaka, "Basic Data on Indonesian P o l i t i c a l Leaders" Indonesia, 1970, No.10. 20 Quoted i n L i d d l e , o p . c i t . , p.221. 21 Smith, op_.cito, p„23« - 68 - 22 Daniel S o Lev, " P o l i t i c a l P a r t i e s i n Indonesia" J o u r n a l of Southeast A s i a n H i s t o r y , 1967, V o l . 8 , N o . l , p.60. 2 3 For a l u c i d d i s c u s s i o n on t h i s p o i n t see Guy Pauker, "The Gestapu A f f a i r of 1965; R e f l e c t i o n s on the P o l i t i c s of I n s t a b i l i t y i n Indonesia", Southeast A s i a . 1971» Vols,. 1-2, N o . l . PL On t h i s c o a l i t i o n see Don Hindley, "The A l i r a n s and the F a l l of the Old Order", Indonesia, 1970, No.9. ^ I t should be pointed out here that membership i n the Javanese e t h n i c group coupled w i t h s o c i a l background I s the only "proven" i n d i c a t o r of membership i n the somewhat wider group which I have c a l l e d "Javanized". The s o c i a l i z a t i o n of members of other e t h n i c groups i s more d i f f i c u l t to provide hard data on. The C h r i s t i a n m i n o r i t y , i n my o p i n i o n , i s the most Javanized of any of the other segments of the s o c i e t y . 26 Smith, o p . c i t . , p.26. 27 ' I b i d . . p.39. 28 These p o s i t i o n s are defined as being M i n i s t e r , Secretary-General, D i r e c t o r - G e n e r a l and Inspector-General. The source used f o r the c a l c u l a t i o n s was O.G. Roeder, Who's Who i n Indonesia (Djakarta: Gunung Agung, 1972) pp. 521-30. 29 For a l i s t of the new cabinet members and t h e i r backgrounds see Pedoman, September 1 0 , 1971. 30 For f u r t h e r comments on t h i s p o i n t see Harsja B a c h t i a r , "The Legitimacy of the Indonesian M i l i t a r y as a N a t i o n a l I n s t i t u t i o n " i n Kejakinan and Perdjuangan, (Djakarta. Gunung M u l i a , 1 9 7 2 ) . B a c h t i a r does not consider the i s o l a t i o n of the S i l i w a n g i D i v i s i o n from power i n h i s a n a l y s i s which i s a tremendous drawback. 31 See the s e c t i o n of Chapter I e n t i t l e d "Government and P o l i t i c s i n a Javanese P o l i t i c a l C u l t u r e ; L a t e r Mataram" f o r t h i s d i s c u s s i o n . 32 For an e x c e l l e n t d i s c u s s i o n of the " t i g h t e n i n g up" process i n s i d e of the m i l i t a r y see Ruth McVey, "The Post- Revolutionary Transformation of the Indonesian Army," Indonesia 1971-72, Nos. 11 and 1 3 . - 69 - 3 3 ^The Siliwangi whose regional area i s West Java has long had the reputation of being the most "national'* of a l l the army's d i v i s i o n s . Non-Sundanese have frequently been Panglima or Commander of Siliwangi while non-Javanese have never commanded the Diponegoro and Brawidjaja Divisions which are ethnic Javanese d i v i s i o n s . Siliwangi was c l o s e l y associated with the so-called " r a d i c a l s " of the New Order and highly influenced by ideas of democratic socialism. I t had especially close l i n k s with former PSI members. 34 Peter Polomka, Indonesia Since Sukarno . ( V i c t o r i a , A u s t r a l i a ; Penguin, 1971), p.79. 35 ^These figures were calculated from "Current Data on the Indonesian M i l i t a r y E l i t e " Indonesia, 1967, 1969 and 1970; Vols. 3 , 7 and 10 . The f i n a l figure was v a l i d for a f t e r the major m i l i t a r y re-organization of October 1969. The number of central positions dramatically increased at that time and may somewhat account for the large percentage increase of Javanese. I t i s worthy of note that only 3 Sundanese (about 5$) were i n this f i n a l c a l c u l a t i o n while there were 26$ of the 1967 figure and 20$ of the 1965 figure. 36 Hlndley, op.cit., p.27. 37 Ann Gregory, "Factionalism and the Indonesian Army", Journal of Comparative Administration 1970, V o l . I I , No. 3 , P* 344. J 38 K.E. Ward, The Foundation of the Partai Musllmln Indonesia (Ithaca; Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1970) , P.38. 39 For d e t a i l s see A l l a n Samson's a r t i c l e s , "Islam and Indonesian P o l i t i c s " Asian Survey, 1968, V o l . VIII, No. 12; and "Army and Islam i n Indonesia" P a c i f i c A f f a i r s , 1971-2, V o l . XLIV, No.4„ 40 On t h i s see Smith, op.ci t . , p.54. 41 Tempo, July 31, 1971« 42 Smith, op.cit., p.138. 43 These were calculated from Sinar Harapan, July 1, 1972. CHAPTER III JAVANISM AND CONTEMPORARY POLITICS The Structure of Indonesian Government In early 1959 the Indonesian Constitutional Assembly was hamstrung over the motion to return to the 19^5 Constitution (UUD45) and abandon the parliamentary form of government used since the time of the proclamation of the unitary republic in 1950. Three votes on the return to the UUD4-5 failed by narrow margins to receive the necessary two-thirds majority. In July of that year Sukarno by Presidential Decree ordered the return to the UUD45) and the action was later unanimously approved by 1 the parliament which had been elected in 1955» The UUD45 acknowledges the sovereignty of the people and calls for a Super-Parliament (MPR) to choose 2 the President and set the course of state policy. The President would appoint a cabinet of his own choosing 3 and hold office for a period of five years. The President would be responsible to no one except the MPR which was not required to meet more often than once in five years i t s e l f . One-half of the MPR membership was to be composed of the entire single house parliament (DPR). The remainder of the members were to be "delegations from the regions and groups". The UUD45 does not mention p o l i t i c a l - 70 - - 71 - parties by name and the term golongan or group has been Interpreted to mean p o l i t i c a l parties and other s o c i a l groups who are not necessarily p o l i t i c a l i n nature. The return to the UUD4-5 was outwardly seen and spoken of as a solution to the problem of i n s t a b i l i t y i n Indonesia. Inwardly the readoptlon of the UUD45 was a way of making formal and informal norms about government and power coincide. The strong executive was simply a r e f l e c t i o n of the nature of s o c i a l relationships i n Javanese society. On the other hand, even the new constitu t i o n contained formal concepts of the sovereignty of the people and representation which had no counterpart i n the organi- zation of power r e l a t i o n s i n the society. This i s perhaps why these provisions of the UUD4-5 have been most often ignored or handled i n a manner inconsistent with the intent of the formal document without severe s o c i a l or p o l i t i c a l repercussions.^ The UUD45 has become an u n c r i t i c i z a b l e and almost sacred part of Indonesian government since i t s readoptlon (under both Guided Democracy and the New Order), but even to t h i s present time p o l i t i c a l behavior does not clo s e l y correspond with the formal norms set forth by the document except for the pos i t i o n of the executive. I f we r e f l e c t on our e a r l i e r description of government i n Old Mataram, a s i m i l a r i t y w i l l be noted immediately. The - 72 - importance of the formal structure of the government was to r e f l e c t harmony with the cosmos while actual p o l i t i c a l behavior depended on other norms„ This same gap between theory and practice seems to be s t i l l present. Perhaps the reasoning for the outward appearance has changed somewhat; today world cultura]. norms demand that every government, no matter whether i t s actual functioning be close or far from the statement i n practice, declare the sovereignty of the people and the "democratic" nature of i t s r u l e . This i s a kind of harmony with the cosmos also. The Rulers The country has had two Presidents, both of whom 7 were Javanese. Neither of the two were appointed to t h e i r o posts by a popularly elected MPR. In fact,the MPR that gave Sukarno the t i t l e of President for l i f e was e n t i r e l y o appointed by Sukarno himself. y Suharto was appointed f u l l President by an MPR that had been purged of a l l r e a l opposition, the replacements subjected to i n v e s t i g a t i o n and approval by the government before they could take 1 0 t h e i r seats and additional appointments made by Suharto. In f a c t, there was no e l e c t i o n of a DPR or MPR under the UUD45 u n t i l some 13 years a f t e r i t s reintroduction. Sukarno a c t u a l l y proclaimed himself to be the "people's tongue" which placed him above a l l others i n the state; for i n Sukarno's own words he was the sole - 73 - interpreter of the people's wishes. The l a t e President acted as i f t h i s were indeed the case and almost a l l decisions of state, no matter how large or how small, passed through h i s hands to be rubber-stamped by the Sukarno appointed DPR. The one d i r e c t a f f r o n t to h i s wishes — the DPR rejected h i s budget proposals i n i960 — resulted i n the disbanding and replacement of that body. Since General Suharto's e l e c t i o n as f u l l president i n I968 there has been no open challenge by the DPR to any p o l i c y that he has put forward, nor i s there l i k e l y to be any. On several occasions p o l i t i c a l parties have expressed t h e i r dismay at some of the government's actions but stated quite simply what the President wants, the President gets. In r e a l i t y there i s no outside control over the President, 11 whether i t be formal or informal. Despite the constitu- t i o n a l p r e s c r i p t i o n , authority and legitimacy seem to be derived from other sources. Since the country seems to have no tested device fo r P r e s i d e n t i a l change, this raises the question as to how a r u l e r acquires legitimacy i n Indonesia. Several answers seem possible i n the case of Sukarno. Undoubtedly he could have won an openly contested race for the p o s i t i o n i f he had chosen to do so. He was the most outstanding figure of the n a t i o n a l i s t movement and somehow managed to appear to be above a l l of the partisan p o l i t i c a l struggles - 74 - of " c o n s t i t u t i o n a l democracy". On the other hand,Bernard Dahm has attributed a part of h i s popularity and legitimacy to rather t r a d i t i o n a l sources l i k e the "Batu A d i l " (Just 12 Prince) legends of the Javanese and Sundanese. This theory seems somewhat confirmed by the fact that Sukarno was d e f i n i t e l y more popular among Javanese than any other ethnic group and that his ideologizing was d e f i n i t e l y more worshipped there than any other place i n the a r c h i - pelago. I t i s possible that Sukarno was seen as rescuing the realm from one of those periods of waning power and increasing disturbance; accumulating power at the center again. Power may simply have appeared to have flowed to Sukarno because of h i s great concentration. As Anderson notes, Guided Democracy was a very powerful state i n the t r a d i t i o n a l sense of the word, but i t i s doubtful i f Sukarno and the mass of Javanese ever r e a l i z e d that i t 1 3 was not i n the modern sense, Suharto i s more d i f f i c u l t to picture i n this perspective because of the Western-style cloak he has drawn around his regime. He too i s probably more popular among Javanese than other groups. Also Suharto accumulated power at the center and saved the country a f t e r a period of chaotic d r i f t i n g and waning of central powern Por Javanese audiences, the r e l a t i o n s h i p of Suharto's wife to the central Javanese royal house of Mankunegara has c a r e f u l l y been - 75 - 14 emphasized. The New Order too i s a powerful state i n t r a d i t i o n a l terms and despite vigorous claims,has yet to prove i t i s i n the modern sense. The simple fact that Suharto was able to defeat Sukarno without noticeable e f f o r t on his part seems to have been enough of a sign of 15 legitimacy for him to maintain power i n i t i a l l y . The New Order regime has c r i t i c i z e d Sukarno greatly for h i s "deviations" from the UUD45» but other than super- f i c i a l l y seems i n no great hurry to make i t s own actions 16 conform to i t to the l e t t e r either. While neither of the two UUD45 regimes has been t o t a l i t a r i a n , i f such i s even possible i n Indonesia, they have been highly authori- t a r i a n and heavily centralized i n the decision-making sense. The executive seems to have absorbed the rule-making and rule adjudication functions i n addition to i t s own r u l e - 1 7 a p p l i c a t i o n functions. This concentration of power and the absence of checks upon i t c l e a r l y resembles the nature of the theoreti c a l power of Mataram's god-king, even i f i t 18 i s cloaked with modern day con s t i t u t i o n a l ornamentation. The Ruler's Assistants: There are almost no elected posts of consequence i n the country outside of the Kepala Desa or Lurah ( v i l l a g e headman) and the DPR members. 7 The regional and kabupaten parliaments or DPRDI and DPRDII have only been elected once under the UUD45 ( i n July 1971) with the - 76 - remainder of the time being appointed and have very l i t t l e power within the framework of the unitary state. A l l regional governors and m i l i t a r y commanders are appointed from the center. Under Sukarno the m i l i t a r y t r i e d with some- success to keep control of m i l i t a r y appointments, but with a m i l i t a r y man l i k e Suharto as President both c i v i l i a n and m i l i t a r y posts i n the regions are controlled by the President. As prescribed by the constitution, the cabinet i s appointed by the President. In the absence of open competitive p o l i t i c s during Guided Democracy, Sukarno used cabinet positions for rewards to his f a i t h f u l followers and parties that would support his p o l i c i e s . This process got so far out of hand that i n the l a s t cabinet that Sukarno was i n f u l l control of appointments there were 100 ministers. I t proved just as hard for Sukarno to mani- pulate the m i l i t a r y at the center as i n the regions and he had great d i f f i c u l t y i n c o n t r o l l i n g i n t e r n a l appointments. The l a t e President was able to replace General Nasution, an arch r i v a l , with Achmad Yani, considered at the time to 20 be more p l i a b l e , as Chief of S t a f f of the Army. Suharto too does not seem to mind using the cabinet as a reward 21 base — though even th i s apparently i s decreasing — but s t i l l has managed to keep i t to a reasonable s i z e . Manipulation of m i l i t a r y personnel does not present too - 77 - much of a problem to President Suharto. I n i t i a l l y t h i s may have been the case but the Suharto faction i s c l e a r l y i n control now. His men s i t i n a l l of the important m i l i t a r y positions and he has been able to appoint personal friends as the Chiefs of S t a f f of the A i r Force and Navy as well as the Army. In addition to the cabinet, the m i l i t a r y and regional governors posts, President Suharto also d i r e c t l y appoints a series of Inspector Generals(12), Secretary Generals(27) and Director Generals(62) to ministries and t h e i r departments i n order to strengthen his influence i n the bureaucracy and obviously, increase control by having friends there on the i n s i d e . One further point has been consistent between the two Presidents; that being the presence of a palace clique o r g o l ongan i s t a n a I n Sukarno's day such people as Adit, Charul Saleh and Subandrio assumed far greater roles i n decision-making than t h e i r o f f i c i a l positions warranted. Despite the advertized influence of the "technocrats'" — who now s i t at cabinet l e v e l positions — Suharto has had hi s special group of advisors and assistants from the beginning of h i s r i s e to power. These men who without exception are m i l i t a r y have the o f f i c i a l t i t l e , o f ASPRI or private assistant to the President for c e r t a i n f i e l d s such as economics and special operations. Men l i k e A l l Murtopo, - 78 - Sudjono Humardani and General Surjo have assumed some .of the functions that the bureaucracy was intended to handle and i n many cases t h e i r advice outweighs that of a minister. Despite New Order c r i t i c i s m s of the " c u l t of the personality", i t i s very clear that power and p o s i t i o n i n the new regime also heavily depend on personal r e l a t i o n - ships with the r u l e r . While Suharto has been very astute i n his choices of highly q u a l i f i e d personnel for cabinet posts, such q u a l i f i c a t i o n s seem mush les s important i n other areas, p a r t i c u l a r l y personal advisors and as s i s t a n t s . Like Mataram, the rul e r ' s control over his Outer Provinces depend to a large degree on personal relationships and, of course, i n the l a s t instance on force. Suharto has drawn f r e e l y from his old friendships of the Diponegoro and Mandala commands and th i s practice i s un l i k e l y to abate 23 i n the near future. The Massess P o l i t i c a l organization i n the modern sense of the word, whether i t be among the e l i t e or masses or sub-groups thereof, i s a r e l a t i v e l y new phenomenon i n Indonesia. At best a l l such organizations' r e l a t i o n s h i p to the government during the c o l o n i a l era was ambiguous, i f not outright ' 2k i l l e g a l . During the revolution and the i n i t i a l period of "constitutional democracy", the relat i o n s h i p of l e g a l l y organized p o l i t i c a l parties to the government was cle a r . - 79 - The strength and closeness to power of a party depended on i t s number of representatives i n the parliament which t h e o r e t i c a l l y , at l e a s t , was determined by popular ele c t i o n s . Each of the major p o l i t i c a l parties had mass organizations or ormas a f f i l i a t e d with i t i n the form of Trade Unions, Peasant Unions, and Student Clubs. One parliamentary e l e c t i o n (1955) and one e l e c t i o n for regional assemblies were held under t h i s system. The p o l i t i c a l organizations came to r e a l i z e that the way to win under such a system was mass organization and mobilization f o r numbers would count more than personal relations i n 25 determining the party's closeness to power and rewards. Under the UUD45 the re l a t i o n s h i p of p o l i t i c a l organization, s p e c i f i c a l l y p o l i t i c a l p a rties,to the government lapsed into an ambiguous state again and has remained that way ever since. The President has never been a member of a p o l i t i c a l party and, indeed, formal p o l i t i c s outside of the palace i t s e l f have become increasingly i r r e l e v a n t to the system. Numbers were not and are not as important as being close to the center of power. The leadership of p o l i t i c a l parties has stagnated except for forced or manipulated changes by the govern- 26 ment, and younger p o l i t i c a l figures became involved i n 27 mass organizations. In outward appearance p o l i t i c s of Guided Democracy were a series of challenges by the PKI - 80 - and r a d i c a l s and reactions by the threatened conservatives over issues l i k e land reform and squatter's r i g h t s . Even th i s l i m i t e d measure of public p o l i t i c s has been removed from the legitimate sphere of p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y for 28 p o l i t i c a l organizations under the New Order. P o l i t i c s i n any form has become more and more of an i n t e r n a l govern- ment, and p a r t i c u l a r l y army, affair-bureaucratic p o l i t i c s of a sort. Since the beginning of the pressures for the return to the UUD45, the issue of the composition of the DPR and MPR has been under discussion. The p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s with t h e i r own interests i n mind na t u r a l l y f e l t that they had the r i g h t to control such bodies, but the UUD45 d i d not s p e c i f i c a l l y mention the point. The army put forward the idea of functional groups as part of the golongan, golongan l i s t e d i n the constitution as they would be l e g a l l y recognized as a p o l i t i c a l force i n doing so. Sukarno accepted t h i s idea as i t f i t well with h i s concept of national harmony through representation of a l l groups, and he pushed for a DPR composed of one-half functional groups and one-half p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s . This proposal was not accepted by the part i e s , and eventually, Sukarno backed 29 away from the issue, although he chose not to appoint any of his p o l i t i c a l r i v a l s to the DPR or MPR. As had been hoped for, the m i l i t a r y gained access to the cabinet, DPR and MPR through the return to the UUD45. The i n i t i a l ABRI - 81 - contingent was 35 but t h i s had "been expanded to 75 by the time of the 1971 DPR e l e c t i o n s . Before the advent of the I97I e l e c t i o n s the m i l i t a r y r e v i v e d the ide a of a J o i n t S e c r e t a r i a t of F u n c t i o n a l Groups, c a l l e d a t that time Sekber Golkar, to combat the e l e c t i o n s 30 a g a i n s t the p a r t i e s , Golkar i s avowedly n o n - p o l i t i c a l w i t h only an ideology of modernization and development. From the m i l i t a r y ' s p o i n t of view Golkar functioned p e r f e c t l y i n the e l e c t i o n s by winning 63$ of the votes and 236 of the 36O e l e c t e d seats. The nearest p o l i t i c a l p a r t y 31 r e c e i v e d only 18$ of the vote and 58 seats. A f t e r the e l e c t i o n s Golkar h e l d a working congress i n which i t made 21 formal d e c i s i o n s concerning the program i t wanted to implement and they corresponded n e a r l y 100$ w i t h ABRI 32 wishes. Despite the f a c t that Golkar c o n t r o l s the DPR and l a t e r w i l l c o n t r o l the MPR, i t i s not a t a l l c l e a r that i t 33 c o n t r o l s the government. I n f a c t we have already seen that the r e a l center of power i n the present government, both f o r m a l l y and i n f o r m a l l y , does not l i e w i t h the p a r t i e s or f u n c t i o n a l groups but elsewhere. This i s i n a sense why the 1971 e l e c t i o n s were so f r u i t l e s s f o r p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s . For no matter how many seats any i n d i v i d u a l p a r t y won, i t would not be any c l o s e r to a c t u a l power than before the e l e c t i o n . - 82 - At the present time the government i s preparing a b i l l on the s i m p l i f i c a t i o n of p o l i t i c a l parties and t h e i r organi- zation to present to the DPR. This b i l l i s expected to force the fusion of the nation's 9 l e g a l p o l i t i c a l p arties into two and eliminate a l l party organization below the kabupaten l e v e l . This l a t e r concept i s known as the " f l o a t i n g mass" and envisions no permanent p o l i t i c a l organization at the v i l l a g e l e v e l . According to the philosophy behind this measure, p o l i t i c a l c o n f l i c t i s to be removed from the v i l l a g e and only once i n every 5 years w i l l the people be allowed to pa r t i c i p a t e i n p o l i t i c a l a c t ion through casting b a l l o t s f o r the party or Golkar of th e i r choice. In practice demands and a l l o c a t i o n of resources are not made i n the DPR. They are made through personal re l a t i o n s and connections. Rosihan Anwar described Indonesian p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s , not as devices for aggregating and a r t i c u l a t i n g group i n t e r e s t s , but as platforms for expressing the i d e n t i t y of the s e l f within the s t r a t i f i - 34 cation of the p o l i t i c a l community. Is Golkar anything more than th i s also? The elimination of party structures i n the v i l l a g e s make i t d i f f i c u l t to see how, but perhaps the functional organizations within Golkar w i l l eventually be able to place demands on the system. At any rate with the elimination of v i l l a g e p o l i t i c a l organization, the - 83 - e x i s t i n g p o l i t i c a l parties w i l l probably be emasculated i n the next e l e c t i o n with Golkar deriving the benefit. While many h i s t o r i c a l and p o l i t i c a l arguments can be put forward i n defense of or against the emerging system, i t i s d i f f i c u l t not to notice that the Western concept of the role and functions of p o l i t i c a l p arties and organizations do not necessarily apply to the Indo- nesian scene. The proper sphere of legitimate p o l i t i c a l conduct compares favorably with that of Mataram. There are new organizations, but the re s u l t s seem the same. The r u l e r through his bureaucracy governs and makes decisions which are t h e o r e t i c a l l y for the good of the 35 people. J The Center-Periphery; While Indonesia's geographic and ethnic hetero- geneousness seem to c a l l for some type of federal arrange- ment for the national government, l i k e B r i t a i n , Indonesia i s o f f i c i a l l y a unitary state. In 1957 the l a s t parliamentary cabinet passed a far reaching decentralization law which would have allowed meaningful governmental In s t i t u t i o n s i n the regions with f i n a n c i a l powers and substantial freedom from central interference i n se l e c t i n g 36 regional governmental o f f i c i a l s . With the advent of Guided Democracy, the emphasis sh i f t e d back i n the other d i r e c t i o n and most of the 1957 law was changed or forgotten. - 84 - The regionally elected Kepala Daerah (Regional Head) was reabsorbed into the central bureaucracy and appointed governors made the order of the day. Today the l o c a l DPRD's have no meaningful power i n l e g i s l a t i v e or f i n a n c i a l matters. The central government c o l l e c t s 98.6$ of a l l tax revenues and the regional governments e x i s t on allotments from the center whether they be i n 37 the form of d i r e c t subsidy or ADO returns. In July of 1966 the IV MPRS session passed a resolution c a l l i n g for the government to Increase regional autonomy within three years but up to t h i s time the government has not acted. A l l meaningful decisions concerning p r o v i n c i a l development a l l o c a t i o n s i n addition to normal budget a l l o c a t i o n s are s t i l l made at the center. Ted Smith notes that even when a governor or bupati possesses the th e o r e t i c a l power to take independent i n i t i a t i v e on development projects, he never has the financing or financing power to support the e f f o r t . 3 8 Despite the fact that the Outer Islands contribute about 80$ of Indonesia's exports, and Indonesia's economy i s an export economy, Java remains the center of the country. I t has been estimated that around 60$ of a l l of the money i n c i r c u l a t i o n i n the country i s c i r c u l a t i n g i n Djakarta alone. Outer Island transportation systems i n general are equivalent to Java's 30 to 40 years ago. - 85 - The economic imbalances that contributed to-the regional rev o l t s of 15 years ago s t i l l e x i s t . A government post, outside of Java i s considered sort of a demotion to the' jungles by many c i v i l servants. Any p o l i c y that c a l l e d for the r e l a t i v e neglect of Java for development purposes i n the Outer Islands would simply be impossible f o r any Javanese dominated government to consider seriously. Although government attitudes and p o l i c y under the New Order are considerably f a i r e r to the regions than before, the s i t u a t i o n i s far from i d e a l . Suharto himself expressed a common Javanese opinion towards the other regions when as Panglima of the Diponegoro D i v i s i o n i n 1957s he pointed out that any appeasement of the dissidents i n Sumatra and Sulawesi as perverse p a r t i a l i t y . He said that the 5^ m i l l i o n people of Java would f e e l unjustly treated should the government relax i t s development e f f o r t s there i n order to permit the obstreperous regions to 39 catch up. There seems to be an obvious negara agung-mantja negara comparison s t i l l e x i s t i n g i n Indonesia. There i s a continual struggle to maintain the central structure and power at the center. Any autonomy for the outer regions could encourage dissidence and lead to the waning of central power. The modern concept of the state does not quite seem to f i t s i t i s hard for a Javanese to consider a Dayak - 86 - v i l l a g e off i n the wilds of Kalimantan on equal terms with 40 the thousands of Javanese v i l l a g e s he sees around him. The Functions of Indonesian Government The two regimes under the UUD45 have been very d i f f e r e n t i n several ways, Sukarno was very s k i l l f u l i n the manipulation of p o l i t i c a l symbols and almost d e i f i e d himself i n the process as the symbol of the states during t h i s time his regime neglected i n fact most of the p o l i c i e s that i t espoused except confrontation e.g. sandang-pangan (food and clothes for the people). On the other hand, the New Order under the leadership of Suharto has expressed i t s e l f i n more mundane ways with an emphasis on s t a b i l i t y and economic development even though the same kinds of i d e o l o g i c a l symbols are s t i l l there but i n a somewhat l e s s 41 prominent po s i t i o n . With such a d r a s t i c s h i f t i n emphasis, at f i r s t glance, i t might seem very d i f f i c u l t to detect any underlying common roots, but as our previous analysis of p o l i t i c a l h istory points out, the former regime was much more influenced by mass p o l i t i c s than i s the present one and t h i s i n i t s e l f i s probably enough to account for a large portion of surface differences. The i n t e r n a l workings and the functions carried out by the two regimes may not, however, turn out to be a l l that d i f f e r e n t . I f t h i s i s true, some comparisons with Mataram may also be appropriate. - 87 - Harmony through Control, Security and S t a b i l i t y ; The mass of ideology and symbolism used by Sukarno 42 has been well discussed by Feith and Weatherbee, but some facets of the maze are worth pointing out here. From the beginning of his p o l i t i c a l career Sukarno never stopped expressing what he f e l t was the essential unity and harmony of Indonesian society. Bernard Dahm has shown the development of Sukarno's NASAKOM p o l i c y was not new but followed consis- t e n t l y by him from the l a t e 1920's u n t i l his d e a t h . ^ Sukarno analyzed Indonesian society as having three main currents — nationalism, religion(Islam) and communism — which were s y n c r e t i c a l l y blended into compatible ideologies by Indonesians. He proclaimed himself to be a l l three at the same time. When his pre-war PNI fractured and s p l i t because of differences between these very ideologies, Sukarno also quit party l i f e and never rejoined a party. His drive was syncretism and expressing unity. In October 1945 Sukarno could push for the creation of a single party system but Vice President Hatta was the one who had to decree that more parties could be created only a few days l a t e r . Sukarno evidently honestly believed that a multitude of parties divided the people. In 1956 he asked the people to "bury the p a r t i e s " and l a t e r unveiled his Konsepsl that i f accepted would solve the problems of a weak government. He proposed that a l l parties be represented - 88 - In a Gotong-Rojong (Mutual Help) cabinet and that a l l decisions be taken i n the t r a d i t i o n a l Indonesian manner of musjawarah or consensus. Later a f t e r events had propelled the country towards a return to the UUD45, Sukarno s t i l l expressed his antagonism towards parties as such. He t r i e d to create a National Front i n which a l l groups were represented. He ever str i v e d to create a DPR and MPR that r e f l e c t e d his conception of the unique harmony of the Indonesian people. He f e l t government could be run without opposition and taking votes. According to Indo- nesian t r a d i t i o n , Soekarno said, there were no losers and no tyranny of the 50$ + 1 majority. Anyone or any party who could not agree with this expression of true *'Indonesian-ness", then were no longer Indonesians but outside influenced. In this way the Masjumi and PSI committed suicide. They could not even s u p e r f i c i a l l y agree with the Konsepsi and Guided Democracy, so they were banished from the system. On the other hand, the m i l i t a r y and the PKI were probably equally opposed to portions of Sukarno's plan for expressing and returning to the Indonesian i d e n t i t y , but by verbally agreeing to i t were allowed to survive and at l e a s t covertly oppose the parts of the new system that they did not l i k e . At l e a s t i n some respects Donald Levine's statement about Amhara p o l i t i c a l culture i n Ethiopia seems relevant to the elements of Javanese - 89 - culture that Sukarno was c a l l i n g Indonesian culture, and to some extent what Suharto s t i l l expresses, when he said: "In authoritarian r e l a t i o n s h i p — and again a l l p o l i t i c a l i n t e r a c t i o n among the Amhara i s contained within authori- t a r i a n relationships — there are only three a l t e r n a t i v e s ; complete deference, acquiescence and f l a t t e r y ; c r i t i c i s m 46 by devious and covert means; or outright r e b e l l i o n " . According to Anderson "The NASAKOM formula tended to be seen either as irresponsible and i n t e l l e c t u a l l y incoherent slogan or as a subtle device for weaking the anti-communist prejudices of powerful n a t i o n a l i s t and r e l i g i o u s groups. Such interpretations however, f a i l e d to place the NASAKOM-politique within the context of Javanese p o l i t i c a l thinking. In his orientation, Sukarno's formula could be interpreted not as a compromise or strategem, but as a powerful claim to possession of power by the r u l e r . For he alone was whole, sembada, absorbing a l l within 47 himself, making the syncretic conquest". For Sukarno and the New Order a powerful syncretic tool or symbol, i n addition to the UUD45, was the 48 P a n t j a s l l a . This doctrine became the basis of the Indonesian state. I t s adoption assures the Javanese as w e l l as r e l i g i o u s minority groups that t h e i r fundamental b e l i e f systems are protected from " r e l i g i o u s and c u l t u r a l " imperialism by Islam or any other monoistic and monopolistic - 90 - doctrine. Under Sukarno Pantjasila yielded the center- stage to NASAKOM and MANIPOL but under the New Order has once again r i s e n to i t s central role again. Today Indonesia i s proclaimed as struggling to achieve P a n t j a s i l a Democracy. I t also tends to be a broadly syncretic doctrine that c l e a r l y pictures the Javanese world view more than i t does any other part of Indonesian society. Its lack of concreteness and f l e x i b i l i t y , however, i s undoubtedly needed i n a diverse country l i k e Indonesia. Suharto himself has stated that he believes harmony i s value i n his culture (Javanese?) that i s very r e a l , both harmony between man and society and man and god. On another occasion the President said "we have to s t r i v e to c u l t i v a t e harmony i n the l i f e of our society and f e e l calm In the developing of the noble c u l t u r a l values that are i n harmony with our people",-^ 0 So the Nasakom formula exploded with G-30-S but was promptly replaced by the P a n t j a s i l a Doctrine as f i r s t state symbol. The declarations of the basic "one-ness" of Indonesian society have not disappeared, only a new enemy has been added to the l i s t . The New Order government i d e n t i f i e s three enemies of the people who.are c a l l e d golongan tertentu or fixed groups. They are the golongan ekstrim k i r j (extreme left-communists), golongan ekstrim kanan (extreme right-proponents of an Islamic state) and golongan l i b e r a l (liberal-proponents of - 91 - 51 a r e t u r n t o p a r l i a m e n t a r y d e m o c r a c y ) . T h e s e d i s t u r b e r s o f h a r m o n y a r e s e e n a s v e r y s m a l l g r o u p s who a r e d e t e r m i n e d t o i m p o s e t h e i r c o n c e p t o f s o c i e t y u p o n t h e m a j o r i t y . New O r d e r s u p p o r t e r s c l a i m t h a t t h e i r v i c t o r y o v e r t h e PKI shows c l e a r l y t h e p e o p l e s u p p o r t P a n t j a s i l a . On t h e o t h e r h a n d i t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o n o t e t h a t g o v e r n m e n t b y e i t h e r o f t h e t h r e e e n e m i e s o f t h e s t a t e w o u l d m o s t l i k e l y mean a n e n d t o p r i . j a . i i a n d J a v a n e s e e l i t e r u l e . Harmony i n i t s p r e s e n t d a y m e a n i n g a l s o h a s s t a t u s quo c o n n o t a t i o n s a t t a c h e d t o i t . Harmony a s a v a l u e i s o f v e r y l i t t l e u s e u n l e s s a r u l e r c a n c o n t r o l a n d g u a r a n t e e s e c u r i t y i n h i s s o c i e t y 52 f o r i t s i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o r c o n t i n u a t i o n . The c h i e f p r o b l e m i s w h e t h e r h a r m o n y i s s e e n a s a n e n d i n i t s e l f o r a means t o a n e n d . S u k a r n o p r o b a b l y n e v e r saw t h e d i f f e r e n c e i n t h e two c o n c e p t s , b u t h e was v e r y much i n t e r e s t e d i n c o n t r o l . A l l f i g u r e s who w o u l d n o t s u b m i t t o h i s i d e o l o g i c a l v e r s i o n o f t h e s t a t e w e r e q u i c k l y s i l e n c e d . H e n c e t h e P S I a n d Mas . jumi w e r e b a n n e d a n d m o s t o f t h e i r l e a d e r s i m p r i s o n e d o r e x i l e d . T h e same f a t e was 53 s u f f e r e d by t h e D e m o c r a t i c L e a g u e i n i 9 6 0 , t h e B o d y f o r 54 t h e P r o m o t i o n o f S u k a r n o i s m i n I964, a n d t h e M u r b a P a r t y i n 1965."^ V a r i o u s n e w s p a p e r s w e r e c l o s e d a n d t h e i r e d i t o r s h a r r a s s e d ; " ^ e v e n t h e P K I ° s p u b l i s h i n g o r g a n s w e r e r e s t r i c t e d f r o m t i m e t o t i m e i f t h e y s t r a y e d t o o f a r - 92 - from the o f f i c i a l l i n e . The PNI, previously considered the party closest to the President, l o s t an independent p o l i t i c a l l i f e apart from echoing the President's wishes. The NU also cooperated without h e s i t a t i o n . Even the PKI submitted to his control to the point that one American p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t wrote about the "domestication of the 57 PKI". As already mentioned the DPR and MPR proved no problem i n manipulating and no elections were ever held. The decentralization law was reversed and Sukarno appointed the governors i n addition to h i s already enormous appointive power at the center,, On the other hand, the President was constantly at odds with the m i l i t a r y x^hich should have been his most potent tool of control. The army had developed substantial p o l i t i c a l doctrine i n addition to concrete p o l i t i c a l i n t e r e s t s of i t s own. I t was not w i l l i n g to be the absolute tool of someone i t did not completely t r u s t . Sukarno was extremely upset over the lenient p o l i c y of the m i l i t a r y towards the m i l i t a r y participants i n the regional revolts and the banning of the PKI i n several regions i n I96I by the m i l i t a r y martial law commanders. Af t e r the repeal of martial law i n 1963, Sukarno was able to exert more leverage and was able to replace his long time enemy General Nasution. Probably u n t i l the end of h i s regime he believed - 93 - that he could manipulate the PKI to his own advantage. He was c l e a r l y on the way to securing a stronghold i n the £•0 m i l i t a r y (as was the PKI) at the outbreak of the G-30-S. He was attempting to d e - p o l i t i c i z e the bureaucracy to insure i t s l o y a l t y , and a l l open opposition ( i . e . threats to harmony) had disappeared, 59 As Pluvier noted i n 1965 s despite a l l of the r a d i c a l r h e t o r i c , the Sukarno regime was e s s e n t i a l l y a conservative one, although that might have changed had the G-30-S succeeded. The one big attempt by the PKI to s t r i k e at the status quo through land reform actions revealed a s o l i d c o a l i t i o n of conservative forces that r e t a l i a t e d to the point of causing severe i n s t a b i l i t y i n the countryside, Sukarno asked the PKI to back down and i t d i d . Despite verbal attacks on the bureaucratic c a p i t a l i s t s , (read m i l i t a r y managing nationalized firms) nothing was ever done about i t . While the c a l l of return to the tracks of the revolution and Indonesian socialism f i l l e d the a i r , domestically the Sukarno regime was l e s s than r a d i c a l . I t simply was incapable of maintaining a coherent and sustained program of any kind i n any d i r e c t i o n . Harmony through control was the practice, but i t s e f f e c t i v e - ness was so low that Sukarno could not prevent the G-30-S, i f he even wanted to, or the m i l i t a r y - l e d r e t a l i a t i o n . - 94 - The New Order and Control °. I n i t i a l l y , the New Order government and most c i v i l i a n i n t e l l e c t u a l s as well tended to see the weakness of Indonesia's p o l i t i c a l system as caused for the most part by the presence of Ideologically oriented — as opposed to program oriented — p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s . In the army seminar i n Bandung i n 1966, the basic New Order program i n the f i e l d s of economics and p o l i t i c s was mapped out. The cure for the i l l s of the p o l i t i c a l system was quite naturally seen to be best and most e a s i l y implemented through the framework of the UUD45 and Pant j a s i l a Democracy.^ Basically,what was proposed from the diagnosis was as follows: 1) a program oriented nation-wide two party system, as only through that type of party system could the UUD45 Pres i d e n t i a l system work properly; 2) an e l e c t o r a l system based on d i s t r i c t s with the winner-take-all mechanism rather than proportional representation and 3) low central control over candidate selections i n the d i s t r i c t s . ^ 1 At that time i t was thought that these proposals were widely accepted by even the m i l i t a r y and that coupled with the MPRS decision that year to hold elections i n 1968, they would be implemented as soon as possible. I t turned out that the individuals who f e l t that way were small i n number and eventually came to be known as the New Order " r a d i c a l s " - 95 - w h i c h i n t h e a r m y p a r t o f t h e c o a l i t i o n was c e n t e r e d a r o u n d t h e S i l i w a n g i D i v i s i o n . A l t h o u g h some a t t e m p t s a t i m p l e - m e n t a t i o n o f a two p a r t y o r T w o - G r o u p s y s t e m was t r i e d i n West J a v a , t h e c o r e o f t h e New O r d e r c o a l i t i o n , S u h a r t o a n d t h e J a v a n e s e g e n e r a l s a r o u n d h i m , e v i d e n t l y w i t h d r e w t h e i r s u p p o r t f r o m t h e p r o p o s a l s . The " r a d i c a l s " g r a d u a l l y s l i p p e d i n t o t h e b a c k g r o u n d a s d i d t h e i d e a o f p o l i t i c a l r e f o r m . E l e c t o r a l p r o p o s a l s w e r e s u b m i t t e d t o t h e DPR b y t h e g o v e r n m e n t c a l l i n g f o r a s i n g l e member c o n s t i t u e n c y s y s t e m b u t t h e y w e r e l a t e r w i t h d r a w n i n t h e f a c e o f 62 p o l i t i c a l p a r t y o p p o s i t i o n . T h e e l e c t i o n s b i l l t h a t f i n a l l y was p a s s e d by t h e DPR was a p r o p o r t i o n a l s y s t e m s t i l l g i v i n g t h e c e n t r a l p a r t y h e a d q u a r t e r s c o m p l e t e c o n t r o l o v e r c a n d i d a t e c h o i c e . The v o t e r s w o u l d c a s t t h e i r b a l l o t f o r t h e p a r t y a n d n o t t h e m a n . G i v e n t h e f a c t t h a t p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s w e r e s e e n a s t h e m a j o r d i s t u r b e r s o f h a r m o n y a n d t h e c r e a t o r s o f s o c i a l d i v i s i o n , i t i s n o t s u r p r i s i n g t h a t t h e p o l i c i e s a n d a c t i o n s o f t h e New O r d e r h a v e b e e n h i g h l y d e t r i m e n t a l t o t h e i r A T s t r e n g t h a n d e v e n e x i s t e n c e „ I n i t i a l e f f o r t s by t h e new g o v e r n m e n t t o p u r g e a l l p a r t i e s o f O l d O r d e r e l e m e n t s — S u k a r n o i s t s a n d l e f t i s t s — was w e l c o m e d b y m o s t o f t h e e l i t e . T h i s l e d t o t h e b a n n i n g o f t h e P K I a n d l a t e r o f P a r t i n d o a s w e l l a s t h e e x p u l s i o n o f t h e r a d i c a l w i n g o f t h e P N I f r o m t h e p a r t y . The g o v e r n m e n t i n i t i a l l y a l l o w e d - 96 - the creation of a new Muslim party hut so r e s t r i c t e d i t s actions that i t f a i l e d to develop and l a t e r a s p l i t was sanctioned "by the government with the appointment of a cabinet member and close friend of Suharto's as general 64 chairman of the party. The PNI was manipulated again i n i t s l a t e s t congress with a long-time fr i e n d of Suharto's appointed chairman.^ P o l i t i c a l parties have at best continued a tenuous existence. I t was c l e a r to a l l of them that Suharto would not permit any challenge to the newly found harmony and s t a b i l i t y . A l l remaining p o l i t i c a l p a rties have sworn t h e i r allegiance to the New Order and Suharto personally, unanimously approving him as t h e i r choice for President i n 1973» and several have even announced t h e i r willingness to disband and dissolve 66 themselves i f i t i s the wish of the President. At t h i s point i t i s worth considering why Suharto would allow elections, i f he believes i n complete harmony, because Indonesia's one experience with general elections had seen the creation of a tremendous amount of s o c i a l tension. One cannot deny the President's honest intention to "build democracy" which for him means that free elections are regularly held. A d d i t i o n a l l y the 1966 MPRS had commanded him to hold elections i n 1968, and disobeying that decision would have cost him c r u c i a l e l i t e support as well as destroy one of the "legitimacy" symbols of his - 97 - r u l e . F i n a l l y , there must have been some pressure from the outside considering the large amounts of foreign a i d the New Order needs to implement i t s program. Even with a l l of those "push" factors Suharto was very hesitant about the actual implementation of the elections. He took his case to the MPRS and won a three year delay but even then adamantly stated that elections would not be held u n t i l they would not disturb economic development and r e h a b i l i t a t i o n , the s t a b i l i t y of the regime plus guarantee a vi c t o r y for the New Order. With conditions set i t i s l i t t l e wonder that some observers were doubtful that the elections would even be held i n 1971 and that there would be no p o s s i b i l i t y of Suharto being discredited through them. Suharto and E l e c t i o n Controls I f the elections were to eventually be held, Suharto was determined to control them. He probably concluded that no d r a s t i c changes i n the p o l i t i c a l system could be made i n the short run and that better control could be guaranteed through the proportional system and behind the scenes interference i n party a f f a i r s . S t i l l the New Order had no organizational structure of i t s own to compete i n the ele c t i o n . A New Order p o l i t i c a l party was ruled out and the m i l i t a r y backed Golongan Karya or Golkar was revived and to some extent reinvigorated to compete against the - 98 - 68 p a r t i e s . S t i l l unsure of Golkar's a b i l i t y to a t t r a c t votes, Suharto i n s i s t e d that he personally be allowed to appoint 100 (out of a t o t a l of 460) members to the new DPR and one-third of the MPR plus 20$ of the regional parliaments. Given the fractured nature of the p o l i t i c a l party system, t h i s appointment power e s s e n t i a l l y meant that the President's f r a c t i o n would be the l a r g e s t i n the DPR even i f Golkar did not win any seats at a l l . However, just the largest contingent was not enough; Suharto needed an absolute majority i n the DPR to provide the necessary l e g a l coating for any p o l i c y he wanted to 6 9 implement. 7 While A l l Murtopo and his Special Operations group were di v i d i n g the parties among themselves, Amir Machmud, Minister of I n t e r i o r , became Chairman of the Elections Board to which the l i s t of candidates from each party had to be submitted for approval; names could a r b i t r a r i l y be removed i f , according to the Board, t h e i r New Order credentials were lacking„ According to B e r i t a 70 Yudha some 550 candidates were d i s q u a l i f i e d i n t h i s manner of the t o t a l of around 3»500. Machmud a d d i t i o n a l l y brought as much pressure as possible to bear on the government apparatus to insure that i t was l o y a l to Golkar. As even school teachers are government employees, t h i s includes a large number of people and a very large 7 percentage of the p o l i t i c a l l y aware p ople i n the country. - 99 - F i n a l l y , Golkar coopted almost a l l I n f l u e n t i a l community leaders on to t h e i r l i s t s , whether they intended 72 for the i n d i v i d u a l to s i t i n the DPR l a t e r or not. The par t i e s complained that t h e i r members were being forced to j o i n Golkar. Golkar was also c l e a r l y the best financed of any of the contestants. The r e s u l t s , as mentioned e a r l i e r , were astonishing. Two of the 9 parties d i d not receive a seat and the largest party contingent was almost 20 members smaller than the appointed 75 member m i l i t a r y f r a c t i o n . The PNI, once the strongest non- communist party i n the country and the forecasted winner by many observers, was v i r t u a l l y destroyed outside of Djakarta and Central Java as i t s bureaucratic constituency 7 3 was taken away from i t . With such an absolute e l e c t i o n v i c t o r y , the stage was set f o r the destruction of the entire ex i s t i n g party system i n a l e g a l manner. In speaking about a new system, Amir Machmud stated "whether l a t e r we w i l l have mass parties or cadre parties depends on continuing research but we have enough experience with the f a i l u r e of mass 74 p a r t i e s " . Perhaps this i s part of the reasoning behind the " f l o a t i n g mass" system which w i l l forbid a l l parties from organizing i n the v i l l a g e — control of the people w i l l become the sole property of ABRI and the c i v i l service. Additional blows were aimed at the p a r t i e s , - 100 - e x i s t i n g o r f u t u r e o n e s , by f o r b i d d i n g l a b o r u n i o n s t o a s s o c i a t e w i t h p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s and t he c o n t i n u e d " d e p o l i t i c i z a t i o n " o f t he c i v i l s e r v i c e t h r o u g h t he c r e a t i o n o f KORPRI ( N a t i o n a l C i v i l S e r v a n t s C o r p s ) t o w h i c h a l l c i v i l s e r v a n t s must b e l o n g . I t w i l l be 75 a f f i l i a t e d w i t h t he " n o n - p o l i t i c a l " o r g a n i z a t i o n G o l k a r . So a t t h e moment t he two new p o l i t i c a l f e d e r a t i o n s a r e l i t t l e more t h a n h o l l o w s h e l l s and i n t h e i r anonymous g r o u p s have l o s t a l l c l a i m s t o s e p a r a t e i d e n t i t y and i d e o l o g i c a l p u l l i n g p o w e r . ' The c e n t r a l p a r t o f t he p o l i t i c a l s y s t e m i s c l e a r l y u n d e r t i g h t c o n t r o l . W i t h t h e g o v e r n m e n t ' s a i d , G o l k a r a l r e a d y l o o k s l i k e an even b i g g e r 7 7 w i n n e r i n I976. W h i l e p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s have p r o v e d v e r y tame and m a l l e a b l e f o r S u h a r t o a t t h e c e n t e r , t h e i r s t r e n g t h has a l w a y s been a t t he v i l l a g e l e v e l , who can k e e p t h e p a r t i e s ou t o f t h e v i l l a g e i n p r a c t i c e ? O b v i o u s l y t h e c i v i l s e r v i c e i s one a n s w e r , bu t even w i t h K O R P R I , t he l o y a l t y o f many c i v i l s e r v a n t s i n the r e g i o n s i s d o u b t f u l i n t he s h o r t r u n . The army i s t h e s e c o n d p o s s i b l e a n s w e r . S u h a r t o has had a l o n g s t r u g g l e g a i n i n g a b s o l u t e c o n t r o l o v e r t he m i l i t a r y and c r e a t i n g a s t r u c t u r e t o m a i n t a i n i t , 7R b u t he seems t o have been e x t r e m e l y s u c c e s s f u l . Where Suka rno had t o c o n t i n u a l l y b a t t l e w i t h t he m i l i t a r y t o g e t i t t o obey , S u h a r t o now has l i t t l e t r o u b l e . H i s p e r s o n a l ] - 101 - friends and t h e i r friends i n turn are scattered a l l through the c i v i l bureaucracy i n the regions, and also are strong i n the m i l i t a r y structure that p a r a l l e l s the c i v i l i a n 79 one a l l the way to the v i l l a g e level,, The r e s u l t i s that Indonesia i s more secure and has less i n t e r n a l disruption than at any time since independence. When on March 11, 1966 Sukarno ceded f u l l m i l i t a r y power to Suharto, he was given emergency authority to deal with any security threat, KOPKAMTIB or the Command for the Restoration of Peace and Security was set up with 80 extra-constitutional powers, and i t s t i l l e x i s t s . The m i l i t a r y has not hesitated to use i t s power. Thousands of p o l i t i c a l prisoners a t t e s t to t h i s f a c t . ABRI has c l e a r l y performed i t s duties well as the destruction of the G-30-S and the uprising near B l i t a r i n I968 show. ABRI has also used i t s power to suspend PNI a c t i v i t i e s i n several areas and to prevent groups which i t does not 81 t r u s t from entering the v i l l a g e s . x As the m i l i t a r y has 82 no intention of returning to the barracks, control i s l i k e l y to continue to be a major function of the m i l i t a r y u n t i l Suharto feels he can t r u s t the c i v i l i a n apparatus to do his bidding. Thus, the p o l i t i c s of the New Order might be best described as the p o l i t i c s of manipulation and intrigue, Like the r u l e r s of Mataram, Suharto seeks to have persons - 102 - who a r e p e r s o n a l l y l o y a l t o h i m o r h i s a s s i s t a n t s i n t h e k e y p o s i t i o n s o f t h e b u r e a u c r a c y , m i l i t a r y a n d r e g i o n a l g o v e r n m e n t , e v e n t h e p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s . H a r m o n y , o r d e r a n d s t a b i l i t y i s m a i n t a i n e d t h r o u g h t h e m a n i p u l a t i o n o f t h e s e o r g a n i z a t i o n s a n d t h e " f r i e n d s " w i t h i n t h e m . U l t i m a t e l y , h o w e v e r , l o y a l t y a n d o b e d i e n c e a r e m a i n t a i n e d b y t h e t h r e a t o f f o r c e o r t h e w i l l i n g n e s s t o u s e i t r a t h e r t h a n t h r o u g h a n y o v e r - r i d i n g f e e l i n g o f a t t a c h m e n t t o t h e s y s t e m , t h e n a t i o n o r t h e r e g i m e . T o d a y , t h e u n i t y a n d s t r e n g t h o f A B R I a r e d i r e c t m e a s u r e s o f t h e s t r e n g t h o f t h e r e g i m e a n d i t s a b i l i t y t o m a i n t a i n h a r m o n y . D e s p i t e t h e f a c t t h a t S u h a r t o h a s t i g h t e n e d u p h i s c o n t r o l o n I n d o n e s i a a n d h a s m o r e a n d b e t t e r f a c i l i t i e s a t h i s c o n t r o l f o r t h e p e n e t r a t i o n o f t h e d i s p a r a t e s o c i e t y t h a n a n y r u l e r i n t h e a r c h i p e l a g o ' s h i s t o r y , h e , l i k e t h e r u l e r s o f M a t a r a m , i s f a c e d w i t h t h e p r o b l e m o f t h e o r e t i c a l a n d f o r m a l c o n t r o l b u t a c t u a l w e a k n e s s . " S u h a r t o m u s t h e s i t a t e b e f o r e h e i n t r o d u c e s m e a s u r e s w h i c h w i l l a d d t o t h e p r e s s u r e w h i c h t h e g o v e r n m e n t e x e r t s o n t h e g r e a t m a s s o f t h e p o p u l a t i o n , f o r h e k n o w s t h a t m o s t s u c h m e a s u r e s a r e l i k e l y t o b e i m p l e m e n t e d i n d i s t o r t e d f a s h i o n a t t h e l o c a l l e v e l a n d t o b e u s e d a s w a r r a n t s f o r 8 3 m o r e r e g u l a t o r y a c t i v i t y h a m p e r i n g t h e f l o w o f t r a d e . " T h u s t h e p r o b l e m o f f o r m a l o v e r - c e n t r a l i z a t i o n b u t a c t u a l " u n d e r - c e n t r a l i z a t i o n " s t i l l e x i s t s f o r t h e New O r d e r j u s t - 103 - as i t did i n the realm of Mataram. The actions of Sukarno and Suharto can be a t t r i b u t e d to the wishes of a r u l e r to accumulate power and simply be able to control his environment. The power thus accumulated can be used to proclaim the ru l e r ' s p r i v i l e g e and protect the status quo or to a f f e c t basic changes i n the society. The former was the concept of Mataram and of the Dutch c o l o n i a l regime i n Indonesia. In describing Indonesian s o c i a l structure, Levine c a l l e d i t e s s e n t i a l l y a "retrogressive" s o c i a l system? the acute emphasis on p r i v i l e g e , status and i t s protection was his focus. Internally, the Sukarno regime acted i n that manner and the contraction of the p o l i t i c a l system under the New Order too has been used, i n General Nasution's own wordsj 84 to protect the status quo. On the other hand,the New Order has proclaimed as i t s major theme modernization and development change. What i s the nature of this change? The Problems of Change and Economic Development; The l a t e President Sukarno frankly admitted his d i s l i k e for the d e t a i l s of economics and obviously placed i t low on his l i s t of national p r i o r i t i e s . Several times his regime began or almost began what looked l i k e serious economic reform but i n each instance could not maintain the i n i t i a l d i r e c t i o n and t h r u s t . ^ Sukarno's attempts at r e a l and consistent change, other than destruction of - 104 - 86 i n s t i t u t i o n s , were at best half-hearted and usually- served as more of a symbolic act than anything else. The New Order has placed economic development at the top of i t s l i s t of announced p r i o r i t i e s . In a way development or pembangunan ( l i t e r a l l y building) has become one of the symbolic iinch-pins of the New Order. However, we are not looking at the New Order i n h i s t o r i c a l perspective. The new regime economically i s only 5 or at most 6 years old and i n the long run could very well d r i f t into the same morass as other Javanized governments have. The economic changes under the New Order are by no means guaranteed or s e l f - s u s t a i n i n g as of yet. The simple fact that for the f i r s t time i n the nation's h i s t o r y modernization and development are widely discussed and most importantly, something i s being done about i t c a l l s for some sort of examination of the roots of the s h i f t . Simply why has the Southeast Asian nation that has been described as the l e a s t development minded suddenly become one of the most so, and f i n a l l y for what purpose i s t h i s development being used? It must be remembered that the members of the p o l i t i c a l and bureaucratic e l i t e that have governed Indonesia since independence have now been pushed aside or are i n a p o s i t i o n c l e a r l y subordinate to that of the army. The m i l i t a r y , despite some degree of pri.ja.ji and - 105 - k e s a t r i a influence and norms, i s also the part of the society that has been most greatly influenced by Western organizational norms. I f Robert M. Price's reference group theory has any a p p l i c a b i l i t y , Indonesia i s surely one case of i t . Despite the much public i z e d Eastern Block a i d to the Indonesian m i l i t a r y — which was l a r g e l y concentrated on the navy and a i r force — far greater numbers of Indonesians went to the United States to study m i l i t a r y methods and organization. The army has always been i d e o l o g i c a l l y as well as technologically more oriented 88 toward the West than to the East, While maintaining i t s own doctrines of g u e r i l l a and t e r r i t o r i a l warfare, 8 9 i n addition to building i t s Dual Function theory, the Indonesian army, i f i t had any outside reference group to which i t looked for professional and organizational norms at a l l , was adopting ideas from Western, and p a r t i c u l a r l y United States' m i l i t a r y establishments. With this background i n mind, one member of the Indonesian m i l i t a r y t o l d this author that i t was quite natural f o r the m i l i t a r y once i n control to espouse 90 "development" as i t s major goal. The m i l i t a r y saw many things i n the West that they wished to have and f e l t that they were i n a good p o s i t i o n to push the society towards those material ends. Seeing modernization and development primarily as technical matters, they assumed - 106 - t h a t t h e y were t h e b e s t q u a l i f i e d s e c t i o n o f t h e s o c i e t y t o i m p l e m e n t them. The m i l i t a r y p r o b a b l y a l s o f e l t t h a t a l a r g e p a r t o f t h e r e a s o n f o r t h e s t r e n g t h o f t h e P K I i n I n d o n e s i a was t h e l o w s t a n d a r d o f l i v i n g c o u p l e d w i t h t h e d e c l i n i n g economy. I n o r d e r f o r t h e p o l i t y t o s u r v i v e w i t h o u t f u r t h e r r a d i c a l i n f l u e n c e a n d d e v i a t i o n , t h e m i l i t a r y f e l t economic d e v e l o p m e n t t o be a m u s t . I t w o u l d a s s i s t t h e New O r d e r e l i t e i n a c h i e v i n g P a n t j a s i l a Democracy a n d s t a b i l i t y . C o u p l e d w i t h d e p o l i t i c i z a t i o n , economic d e v e l o p m e n t became t h e s o l u t i o n t o I n d o n e s i a ' s p o l i t i c a l a n d s o c i a l p r o b l e m s . The New O r d e r ' s l e a d e r s a n d A l i M u r t o p o i n p a r t i c u l a r a r e f o n d o f t a l k i n g o f t h e n e x t 25 y e a r s as a p e r i o d o f 91 a c c e l e r a t e d d e v e l o p m e n t . T h i s p e r i o d i s e v i d e n t l y e n v i s i o n e d as one o f s l o w b u t c o n s t a n t change i n t h e e n t i r e f a b r i c o f s o c i e t y . D e v e l o p m e n t w i l l c o n t r o l p o l i t i c s r a t h e r t h a n v i c e v e r s a . The p r o c e s s i s one t h a t c a n n o t be made o v e r n i g h t b u t o n l y w i t h f i r m a n d s t a b l e l e a d e r s h i p o v e r t h e e n t i r e p e r i o d . ABRI w i l l c o n s t a n t l y g u a r d t h e P a n t - j a s i l a s t a t e f r o m i d e o l o g i c a l a n d p o l i t i c a l e x c e s s e s , g u a r a n t e e i n g o r d e r a n d s t a b i l i t y . The p r i v a t e s e c t o r w i t h a s s i s t a n c e and g u i d a n c e f r o m t h e government w i l l be e x p e c t e d t o s t a r t i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n o f t h e c o u n t r y . The G r e e n R e v o l u t i o n w i l l be r e a l i z e d a n d I n d o n e s i a w i l l become s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t i n r i c e . E v e n t u a l l y , t h e masses w i l l - 107 - be educated f o r m a l l y and i n f o r m a l l y i n "modern ways" and enjoy a higher standard of l i v i n g . A l l of t h i s i s to be accomplished through a s e r i e s of f i v e year development plans that are c o n s t a n t l y being r e a d j u s t e d to meet new problems and demands. O r i g i n a l l y the f i r s t p l a n R e p e l i t a I was to s t r e s s r e h a b i l i t a t i o n of the t r a n s p o r t a t i o n system and i n c r e a s i n g a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t i o n , while the second p l a n was to place emphasis on i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n . Non-party technocrats and i n t e l l e c t u a l s were coopted i n t o the regime to a s s i s t the m i l i t a r y i n a c h i e v i n g the goals. To t h i s p o i n t the r e s u l t s have simply been amazing, i f only i n comparison w i t h previous e f f o r t s . The R e p e l i t a I i s coming to a seemingly s u c c e s s f u l c o n c l u s i o n and the immeasurably d e s t r u c t i v e h y p e r i n f l a t i o n of the e a r l y and mid-1960's has been brought to a dramatic h a l t . P r i c e s are s t a b l e and exports r i s i n g . The economy i s expanding 92 a t about 7$ per year. S t a t i s t i c a l l y a t l e a s t the New Order's program seems to be being implemented. Despite the optimism expressed i n some quarters f o r Indonesia's economic future there are signs of acute d i f f i c u l t i e s . Development as i t has occurred so f a r seems to be happening despite the m a j o r i t y of the p o p u l a t i o n r a t h e r than because of them. The great r o l e played i n a l l developments thus f a r by f o r e i g n a i d and investment must / - 108 - not be overlooked. The benefits of the New Order's s t a b i l i t y and economic growth seem to be accruing to a very small portion of the population. With p o l i t i c a l demobilization, the masses are not p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n any process be i t p o l i t i c a l or developmental, Thus far the New Order's development program has only reinforced the status and p r i v i l e g e of the r i c h and powerful as well 9 3 as providing better means of control. The New Order government acknowledges t h i s problem and says P e l i t a II w i l l put emphasis on narrowing the income gap which i n Indonesia's case i s also a r u r a l - urban gap. President Suharto himself has- said that i f the benefits of development are not f e l t by a l l a s o c i a l 95 revolution w i l l i n e v i t a b l y come. Statements about good intentions for the future aside, however, even the New Order does not appear to be using t h e i r new tool of development to any d i f f e r e n t purpose than Mataram rulers used th e i r e x i s t i n g tools of ru l e r s h i p . The purpose behind change i s a very conservative one at best. As Huntington has put i t the m i l i t a r y ' s view of economic 96 development i s t y p i c a l l y middle class and urban. I t remains to be seen how that view w i l l change under pressure of the impoverished r u r a l masses. - 109 - The Style of Indonesian Government We have previously discussed an a l t e r n a t i v e way to view the structure and functions of the contemporary Indonesian government. While our int e r p r e t a t i o n i s debatable for Indonesian and foreigner a l i k e , the s t y l e of Indonesian government i s one thing that almost a l l observers agree on as being very Javanese. Style i s a part of behavior but c e r t a i n l y not the t o t a l content of i t . Style i s the way i n which things are done and the way i n which problems are perceived and approached. Of course s t y l e has' influence on goals and re s u l t s also f o r the entire span of behavior i s related. Anderson and Geertz both note that single-mindedness of purpose i s regarded by Javanese as the key to success. Absolute concentration on the object desired i s needed before the goal can be achieved. This may help to account for the seemingly single track of Guided Democracy i n r e l a t i o n s h i p to the completion of the Indonesian Revolution. Once t h i s goal was perceived as the ultimate aim of the nation, regardless of i t s true meaning or content, i t would have been heresy to lose concentration by being side-tracked into economic s t a b i l i z a t i o n and development. The New Order has taken up the same stance. Modernization are and economic development to t h i s point /; perceived as the ultimate aim or goal of the regime while actual content - 110 - Is again rather h a z i l y understood, and nothing must be allowed to stand i n the way of i t s r e a l i z a t i o n or i t w i l l f a i l . Concentration must not be l o s t . Should t h i s observation have any degree of truth to i t , i t augurs well for the continuance of present orientation at l e a s t 97 i n name. On the other hand i t i s extremely bad taste for a Javanese to show emotion and inner desires. For instance, c u l t u r a l norms i n Javanese prl.ja.11 society are very strong against the open display of riches or power seeking motives. Thus the would-be r u l e r must seem to be inactive or passives power must flow to him because of his superior concentration and inner q u a l i t i e s . This may also help to account for Sukarno's hesitancy to appear w i l l i n g to take the reins of power and be a noticeably active ingredient i n the downfall of the parliamentary system. He gave suggestions i n public but from Feith and Lev's writing we know that behind the scenes he was never w i l l i n g to support the exi s t i n g system and did what he could to hasten i t s downfall. As a r e s u l t power seemed to just flow to Sukarno and away from the old system. Westerners have tended to see Sukarno as a very active element i n the decline of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l democracy, therefore to be condemned, but Indonesians (Javanese?) tend to view him as a saviour , as one whose approach to the s i t u a t i o n was - I l l - strong and unyielding; whose inner strength allowed him to restore order and concentrate power at the center again. One of the more i n t e r e s t i n g frameworks for viewing post-G-30-S p o l i t i c s has been presented by Peter Polomka who points out that Indonesian p o l i t i c s seem more l i k e a wajang k u l i t or shadow play than anything else. By t h i s he means that i t i s almost impossible to t e l l by public actions the real intents and purposes of the actors. This i s e s s e n t i a l l y an expression of the non-emotion and non- desire norms we are tal k i n g about. It can c l e a r l y be noticed during the Suharto-Sukarno struggle of I965-I967. Suharto was careful never to openly display a desire for power or a c t i v e l y do anything to achieve i t , Suharto's struggle with Sukarno was very covert and often waged by proxy. The students i n the c i t i e s and the "fanatic' 5 Muslims i n the v i l l a g e s had more to do with the destruction of the PKI and Sukarno's support than Suharto appeared to. Even the l e s s Javanese elements (primarily Siliwangi and RPKAD) of the army were the ones to openly display t h e i r opposition to PKI and Sukarno. Thus Suharto just waited while his opponents were destroyed and disclosures made about Sukarno that weakened his public p o s i t i o n s or so i t a l l appeared from the outside. Power seemed to be flowing to Suharto quite without e f f o r t on his part; hence as a 98 r e s u l t of his inner power and concentration. - 112 - While i t was not proper for Suharto to engage i n a struggle with his technical superior, his assistants go could do i t without h e s i t a t i o n . 7 Thus,the Special Operations or Opsus group, which had arisen from pre-G-30-S opposition to Sukarno and Subandrio by the m i l i t a r y and was l e d by a Diponegoro and Mandala subordinate of Suharto's, A l l M u r t o p o , c o n t i n u e d to operate while the aspirant remained untainted from the scars of " d i r t y " p o l i t i c a l b a ttles and kept his "white Knight" image. The need for Special Operations has continued throughout the period of the New Order. The President does not usually get mixed up i n p o l i t i c a l battles and p u b l i c l y says l i t t l e of them. But during both PNI party congresses since the G-30-S, Opsus pressure was f e l t and on both occasions leaders acceptable to Suharto were elected to the top party posts and those h o s t i l e e i t h e r ostracized or i s o l a t e d . The 1968 101 MPRS session was manipulated behind the scenes by Opsus. The 1971 PMI s p l i t was allegedly aided by Opsus and for sure the West I r i a n p l e b i s c i t e and the recent general elections were targets of the Special Operations group. S i m i l a r l y there have been charges of the same kind of interference at the January I972 NU Congress where the most avid c r i t i c of the m i l i t a r y was subsequently kicked 102 o f f the leadership council and r e t i r e d . A l i Murtopo i s now the ASPRI for Special Operations and has acquired - 113 - quite a reputation as a "bulldozer'"' for the t a c t i c s he uses. Whatever the truth of the matter i s 9 his power and influence have grown immensely with the successes of these operations and the President has l a r g e l y been able to avoid expressing his emotion or showing any desire 103 f o r power i n the process. It i s further i n t e r e s t i n g to note here that although Suharto's Pre s i d e n t i a l term i s completed i n 1973 and almost everyone has spoken out i n favor of his r e - e l e c t i o n , the President himself has never spoken p u b l i c l y about the subject. In fact, the only time Suharto has even mentioned the Presj.dency while this author was i n the country, he declared himself to be the humble servant of the people and that i f anyone wanted to replace him, they should do so by co n s t i t u t i o n a l means at the 1973 MPR session; yet i n r e a l i t y to attempt to do so, no matter what the moti- vation, would be tantamount to suicide for any i n d i v i d u a l 104 or group. So for whatever the reason, Suharto has shown a remarkable non-interest i n the pursuit of p o l i t i c a l power i n public. This i s perhaps why i n I969 Van der Kroef could remark, "....Suharto has increasingly . acquired the reputation of being a good man thrust into 105 a job seemingly beyond his cap a c i t i e s " . The r e a l p o l i t i c s of the New Order does not go on i n public and Suharto does not express dynami sm through his public - 114 - speaking or actions. P u b l i c l y he gives the impression of one subject or even vi c t i m to the flow of circumstances and events, which as a good Javanese he should, but behind the scenes i t seems to be an e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t matter: 106 the President i s i n absolute control. The President has decidedly shown emotion on only two or three occasions since his r i s e to power and always when he f e l t he was being pushed into a corner without other choice except to lose face or his realm. One such occasion was at the height of Muslim-Christian tensions 107 i n I 9 6 8 . With the s a n t r i Muslims seemingly ready to declare "Holy War" on the Christians who were seen as " s t e a l i n g " converts, Suharto had l i t t l e choice but to express his extreme displeasure at the thought of a resultant c i v i l war. Harmony could not be disturbed i n such an intolerant manner. Again i n January 1972, following two months of protests concerning a tourism and c u l t u r a l project proposed by his wife, Suharto lashed out i n public at those tr y i n g to undermine the s t a b i l i t y of the state. The President t o t a l l y ignored a l l of the economic arguments that had been put forward against the project and interpreted the protests as personal attacks upon "himself and his family. In this case the President must have f e l t his honor at stake and had to defend himself 108 and h i s family. The "wajang" sort of p o l i t i c s r e f l e c t i n g pri,1a.1l s o c i a l r e lations has a serious e f f e c t on the way that Indonesian p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y leaders view any action. Nothing can be taken for surface value; there always must be a hidden motive for action. Since the Javanese p o l i t i c a l leaders themselves do not play "honest" or d i r e c t p o l i t i c s , they have no reason to expect other p o l i t i c a l actors to do so either. The Djakarta e l i t e spends hours of discussion tr y i n g to discover the true meaning and l a t a r belakang ( l i t e r a l l y background) of any statement made or action taken. Since most actors do operate that way i t i s not an e n t i r e l y f r u i t l e s s task. Since speaking d i r e c t l y from the heart or frankly i s not highly valued among Javanese but evidentally, i s with most "modernist" Muslims and many of the younger students, p a r t i c u l a r l y the non-Javanese ones, a serious communication gap a r i s e s . This has to be a part of the reason 'modernist' Muslims have been pushed out of the p o l i t i c a l system and why the "Angkatan '66*' or '66 Generation have not been able to fin d a comfortable place i n the New Order 109 c o n s t e l l a t i o n . This also partly accounts for the d i f f i c u l t y that foreigners have had i n communicating with 110 the Old Order as well as the New Order regime. The above points out the f u t i l i t y of d i r e c t c r i t i c i s m of the regime. It w i l l not be understood and frequently - 116 - other motives attached to i t s utterance, getting the c r i t i c i n trouble or pointing him out as an automatic enemy of the regime, meaning that a l l his statements should be ignored. This has happened with the student protesters over and over again. They can make a l l of the " r a t i o n a l " arguments they want but they w i l l be brushed aside i n the search f o r u l t e r i o r motives. This happened i n the KAK (Korps Anti-Korupsi), Mahasiswa Mengugat (Students Accuse), Kita Ingin Tahu (we Tyrant to know), Golput (Golongan Putih or White Group) and the Mlnatur 111 Indonesia Indah protests as well. When A l i Murtopo says that such protests do not harmonize with the s p i r i t 112 of struggle of the New Order what he means i s that such d i r e c t attacks on p r i v i l e g e are simply not i n harmony with Javanese s o c i a l etiquette. This raises the question of the often stringent newspaper c r i t i c i s m and why i t does exist while protest demonstrations are forbidden. One answer here i s that d i r e c t personal attack on figures of the New Order leader- ship i s not permitted. J And by and large newspapers reach only urban and semi-urban areas, probably a f f e c t i n g only 2 or J% of the population at most. Besides t h i s there are several indications that j o u r n a l i s t i c c r i t i c i s m i s not taken into account by New Order leaders. General Sumitro, the power behind KOPKAMTIB, said that he did not - 1 1 7 - even "bother to read Indonesian newspapers because they 1 1 4 were not of high enough quality. This does not mean that newspapers are not continually harassed and their 1 1 5 credibility undermined by the regime. J On the other hand, there does exist a long l i t e r a l tradition i n Java where criticism was allowed i f done in an individual way. Perhaps this i s why Harlan Kami and Indonesia Ra.ja as well as the pure oppositionist Abadi can exist with as much 1 1 6 freedom as they do. Unfortunately, the problem of opposition and criticism has certain ethnic overtones. Criticism can be accepted i f i t i s done in a halus enough manner that i t does not appear to be criticism at a l l . Naturally enough, this sort of persuasion i s best done by someone with long experience in dealing with Javanese and who i s very well acquainted with Javanese culture and language. Outer Islanders, particularly of the "modernist" Muslim group, seldom have such knowledge and experience or care to develop i t . Even younger Javanese students with an urban background may have such problems. This has created a situation whereby the best and most effective c r i t i c s are operating from inside the government rather than from outside and using indirect methods rather than direct confrontations to convey criticism. Despite a l l of the personal as well as government prestige wrapped up in the - 118 - 117 BIMAS project for increasing r i c e production, a Javanese was able to approach the President and convince him that the program had to be stopped and admitted as a f a i l u r e . Likewise, only a Javanese speaker appealing to a l l of the c u l t u r a l and paternal prejudices could get the top m i l i t a r y leaders to agree to the admission of the Minatur Indonesia Indah project problem into the parliament for open discussion — discussion that would without a doubt c r i t i c i z e the government and various government o f f i c i a l s ( m i l i t a r y and c i v i l i a n ) very d i r e c t l y and 118 heavily. This kind of s i t u a t i o n has very d e f i n i t e implications for national communications about p o l i t i c a l and economic issues. People with non-halus temperaments 119 l i k e A r i e f Budiman and Buyung Nasution, despite the b r i l l i a n c e of t h e i r ideas, f i n d i t very d i f f i c u l t to make themselves understood by the New Order regime. Communication of alter n a t i v e s and feedback i s also hindered by the Javanese notion of the patrimonial state. Communication i s not conceived of as a two-way process.., The method of rule by the p r i j a j i , a l b e i t heavily reinforced by m i l i t a r y norms, i s by perintah or orders government by command. The most common Javanese s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p type i s the guru-murid, bapak-anak (father-son or teacher-pupil) type. The former knows best and i s not to be questioned. This leads to a s i t u a t i o n where p o l i c y - 119 - i s formulated and executed without the expectation of opposition or criticism or of failure ( i f the approach is deemed correct). Hardly a day goes by without the expression of paternalism by one major government o f f i c i a l i n a public statement. The masses or massa bodoh ( l i t e r a l l y , stupid masses) have to be dldidik or educated. The floating mass proposal, Amir Moertono's latest 120 statement on governor elections i n the provinces, or the important recent book by Brigadier General Sajidiman a l l show acute symptoms of paternalism. The Bimas program is one example, however, where the massa bodohproved they were quite expert in their own f i e l d . Bimas means mass guidance and was used to increase rice production. Several major foreign companies were hired by the govern- ment to supply a package of f e r t i l i z e r , high yielding rice seed along with the necessary insecticide on credit.. According to the government policy decision the farmers were to have no choice whether or not they enrolled i n the program and whether or not they wanted the entire package. The farmers were to repay the credit to the government from their increase in yields. What resulted was a massive failure. The government was not paid back and the state got very l i t t l e of what i t thought i t was paying for, an increase i n rice yield. The farmers simply resisted the decisions that were made for them - 120 - without knowledge of their particular conditions and situation. Until the system was made more flexible giving the farmers choice as to membership and the elements of the package they received, the program did 121 not obtain worthwhile results. The Bimas failure evidently resulted from the i n i t i a l feeling on the part of the program designers that they could think for the farmers. The Minatur Indonesia Indah project was another example of a high level Indonesian figure, the wife of the President in this case, deciding to implement a project using government influence without the slightest suspicion that she could be challenged on i t . The First Lady assumed that since she wanted the project that everyone else would automatically agree and contribute their money for i t s construction. Once she was challenged on the issue, she acted as i f the c r i t i c i z e r s did not 122 have the right to obstruct her wishes. The "Mini project" illustrates another problem that in the West is known as conflict of interest but that is seemingly unknown in Indonesia. There are no prohibitions of high level government employees p a r t i c i - pating in private enterprise outside of their regular 123 government work. ' Hence A l l Sadikin and A l l Murtopo could serve as project officers to the "Mini project" - 121 - 124 while o f f i c i a l l y i t was a "private" project. This fusion of interests and other obvious misuses of power ( i n Western terms) such as corruption are a l l part of the t r a d i t i o n a l patrimonial attitude towards government on the part of the Javanese, When one gives a g i f t to a high government o f f i c i a l or offers him an opportunity to buy stock on c r e d i t , " f a c i l i t i e s " are .expected i n 125 return. We have already mentioned Sukarno's great stress on the correct approach or symbolic form of p o l i c i e s rather than on content and r e s u l t s . To some extent, the New Order has also been unable to escape t h i s Javanese habit either. I t has often been pointed out that Sukarno's eight year plan of 1962 was l i t t l e more than a symbol and that i t had been arranged and rearranged so that i t contained the proper number of volumes, chapters and paragraphs to form 8-17-1945 or the date of Indonesian independence. Only t h i s past year Golkar when shaping i t s central i n s t i t u t i o n s arranged them so that the membership was 8-17-45; once again to correspond to the symbolic date. Perhaps t h i s i s also one reason that the " f l o a t i n g mass" i s seen as so desirous. I t i s symbolic i n forming a c o n f l i c t - f r e e environment but whether l e g i s l a t i o n w i l l a c t u a l l y remove c o n f l i c t from the v i l l a g e i s another matter. - 122 - The same kind of form without content can be seen in the decree disbanding a l l "youth gangs" in Djakarta i n the wake of the "Mini Project" protests. Symbolically a l l gang members came to police headquarters to declare that the gangs had been disbanded and dissolved. Notice, however, that within only a few weeks there were gangs forming again. After the KOPKAMTIB decree nothing was done to change the objective condition that had caused gangs to arise in the f i r s t place. Finally, with the present emphasis on development every province and kabupaten now has a development operations room complete with charts, graphs, and diagrams showing the progress of a l l development occurring in the area. Polomka notes however that these rooms have very l i t t l e correspondence with reality and that frequently the workers there do not even know what the diagrams stand 126 for. The point i s , however, that development means having an operations and planning room whether there i s anything else or not. In conclusion, i t must be pointed out that the style of contemporary Indonesian government in many ways resembles that of Mataram. Rulers value concentration and non- expression of emotion and desire. The form and approach to any policy is extremely important and seems to take on sacral qualities. The government and rulers view themselves - 123 - as such and conduct t h e i r business i n a manner that could best be described as "protective superiority"',, Like Mataram also, the government of contemporary Indonesia has the capacity to " f o o l i t s e l f " i n terms of what i s happening i n the country and the world around i t . Rewriting history could not make the Dutch into Javanese for Mataram and c a l l i n g old p o l i c i e s by new names w i l l not create a modern and developed Indonesia for the New Order, - 124 - NOTES on Chapter I I I * The decree, even w i t h the P a r l i a m e n t 9 s approval, was of dubious l e g a l i t y but c l e a r l y showed how shallow were the r o o t s of the parliamentary system as w e l l as who hel d the p o l i t i c a l i n i t i a t i v e i n the country. I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note that the army through General Nasution was the f i r s t to put forward the idea of the r e t u r n to the UUD45. 2 The t e x t of the C o n s t i t u t i o n of 1945 w i t h f u l l e x p l a n a t i o n and most of the documents surrounding the r e t u r n to i t are given i n J.C.T. Simorangkir and B. Mang Reng Say, Tentang dan S e k l t a r Undang-Undang Dasar 1945 (About and Around the 1945 C o n s t i t u t i o n ) . (Djakarta! Djambatan, 1 9 5 9 ) . A very extensive d i s c u s s i o n of the executive and h i s powers i n r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h other government organs i s given i n I s m a i l Suny, Pergeseran Kekuasan E x s e k u t i f (The Changing Powers of the Executive) . (Djakarta;" C.V. C a l i n d r a , 1 9 6 5 ) . The C o n s t i t u t i o n i t s e l f i s extremely b r i e f w i t h only 37 a r t i c l e s and about 1700 words. Only the barest o u t l i n e s of s t a t e s t r u c t u r e are given and almost everything i n terms of content i s e x p l i c i t l y s t a t e d as being l e f t to f u r t h e r r e g u l a t i o n s . In theory, the MPR i s supposed to pla y a r o l e somewhat s i m i l a r to that o r i g i n a l l y intended f o r the E l e c t o r a l Board In the United States w i t h the added r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of determining the broad o u t l i n e s of s t a t e p o l i c y . I n theory a l s o , the P r e s i d e n t i s d i r e c t l y r e s p o n s i b l e to the MPR f o r h i s a c t i o n s and can be removed at i t s command. 3 The President i s not r e s p o n s i b l e to the DPR but n e i t h e r can he dismiss i t or any of i t s members a t any time he wishes. Suny, o p . c i t . , p.206, The UUD45 does not s p e c i f y how the DPR should be chosen. Simorangkir and Say, o p . c i t . , p.22. I t must be remembered that there were no p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s i n existence i n the country a t the time of the w r i t i n g of the UUD45. ^ This may a l s o be true of the V i c e President which i s p l a i n l y c a l l e d f o r i n the UUD45 but there has not been one sin c e i t s r e i n t r o d u c t i o n i n 1959. 7 Besides being Javanese both Suharto and Sukarno have e s s e n t i a l l y C e n t r a l Javanese and upper c l a s s backgrounds. Sukarno's f a t h e r was supposedly of a r i s t o c r a t i c o r i g i n and the young Sukarno was the protege of the p r l j a j i l e a d e r of Sarekat Islam, Tjokrominoto. Suharto i s the son of a l e s s e r - 125 - village o f f i c i a l but was raised by a prl.^aji family in Solo. On Sukarno see Dahm, op.oit., passim; and on Suharto see O.G. Boeder, The Smiling General (Djakarta; Gunung Agung, 1969). The dominant position of the Javanese i s ta c i t l y recognized by most Indonesians. No one in the country that I have ever talked to f e l t that a non-Javanese could ever become President. The feeling about the Vice-Presidency was Just the opposites he should be non-Javanese. This may be one reason why, despite the logic of i t , Nasution, a Sumatran Batak, did not become President in the wake of the G-30-S. Despite his loyalty to the army, Nasution has become somewhat of a c r i t i c of the operation of Javanese-led New Order and closely associated with the "out* faction of the army. See Berlta Buana June 12, 1972 for some of his most recent comments. In an April 7, 1972 interview, Nasution revealed his opposition to the "floating mass" system. A l l Murtopo, a Special Assistant to the President, has announced that the Sultan of Jogjakarta w i l l be Golkar's nominee for Vice President at the upcoming 1973 MPB session. While Suharto was careful enough to give the Outer Islands representative equality with Java in the new DPR, i t seems that the Vice President i s not to be Sumatran. Is a tacit understanding about to be broken? For comments on Murtopo"s announcement see Pedoman April 24, 1972. o This w i l l no longer be true as of March 1973 when Suharto w i l l be reelected without opposition. However, 33$ of the MPR members w i l l be direct Suharto appointees. 9 7 Suny, op.oit.. pp.2l4r-5. 10 Herbert Feith, "Soeharto's Search for a P o l i t i c a l Format*', Indonesia. 1968, No. 6, p.98. 11 This i s other than internal military considerations. The President seems to have overcome the major factional problems there though. On this see Ulf Sundhaussen, "The Military in Research on Indonesian P o l i t i c s " , The Journal of Asian Studies. 1972, Vol. XXXI, No.2. •^See Dahm, op.oit.. passim. 13 Anderson, op.oit.. p.64. 14 Surlpto, Soehartos Suatu Sketsa Karler Dan Polltlk (Soehartos A Career and P o l i t i c a l Sketch), (Surabajas Grip, 1972), p .73. 15 Anderson, op.cit., p.25. - 126 - 16 See S a j i d i m a n , Langkah, Langkah Perdjuangan K l t a (The S t e p s o f Our Struggle)... ( D j a k a r t a ; P u s a t S e d j a r a h ABRI, 1971), PP» 75-8 5 and the G o l k a r Memorandum e n t i t l e d " T i n d j a u a n S i t u a s i N a s i o n a l " (An O b s e r v a t i o n o f the N a t i o n a l S i t u a t i o n ) , ( D j a k a r t a : S t e n c i l e d 9 December 1970) as w e l l as A.H. N a s u t i o n , ABRI Penegak Demokrasi UUD45 (ABRI: Upholder o f Democracy o f the 1945 C o n s t i t u t i o n ) ( D j a k a r t a : S e r u l i n g Masa, I 9 6 6 ) , pp. 5-26. The t h r e a t s and f o r c e , a l b e i t b e h i n d the s c e n e s , o f the New Order t o ge t i t s way seem l i t t l e d i f f e r e n t , a l t h o u g h t h e y a r e c a l l e d "temporary necessities„" 17 The Ne?r Order t h e o r i s t s speak o f the "Tres P o l i t i k a " (meaning d i v i s i o n and s e p a r a t i o n o f powers) and i t s a p p l i - c a t i o n t o I n d o n e s i a under the UUD45, b u t i t j u s t does n o t seem t o f u n c t i o n t h a t way. The e x e c u t i v e , i n r e a l i t y , makes the l a w s , i n t e r p r e t s them and a t t e m p t s t o e n f o r c e them. See Soediman K a r t o h a d i p r o d j o , Beberapa P i k i r a n S e k i t a r P a n t j a s i l a (Some Thoughts on P a n t j a s i l a ) (Bandung: A l u m n i , 1970), pp. I 8 9 - 9 8 . 18 H u n t i n g t o n makes the same p o i n t about t r a d i t i o n and the A m e r ican p r e s i d e n t i a l system. See H u n t i n g t o n , o p . c i t . , P P o 93-139o 19 V i l l a g e e l e c t i o n s u s u a l l y a r e o f the musjawarah o r consensus t y p e , and i t i s n o t i n f r e q u e n t f o r the p o s t t o become c o n s i d e r e d h e r e d i t a r y * The s e l e c t i o n o f a v i l l a g e headman i s s u b j e c t t o a p p r o v a l by the b u p a t i o r d i s t r i c t head who as o f t e n as no t has been a m i l i t a r y man s i n c e I 9 6 5 . T h i s means t h a t t h e r e a r e d e f i n i t e l y o u t s i d e p r e s s u r e s as t o who w i l l be s e l e c t e d . For the d e s c r i p t i o n o f one such e l e c t i o n see Totok S u h a r t o , " F a c t i o n a l i s m e M e n d j e l a n g P e m i l i h a n L u r a h d i d e s a 'Sumber A i r 5 " , T.lakrawala, 1972, V o l . IV, N o , 5 „ A l s o c o n t r a s t the numbers o f e l e c t e d o f f i c i a l s i n I n d o n e s i a w i t h t h o s e i n I n d i a 5 See Myron Weiner i n L u c i a n Pye and S i d n e y V e r b a , P o l i t i c a l C u l t u r e and P o l i t i c a l Development . ( P r i n c e t o n s P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s7~ 1963)» p*208. 20 T h i s t u r n e d out n o t t o be such a v i c t o r y f o r Sukarno a f t e r a l l . Y a n i p r o v e d t o be h a r d t o m a n i p u l a t e and s t a u n c h l y anti-communist„ He was e v e n t u a l l y a v i c t i m o f the G-30-S. 21 As examples o f such "rewards", w i t n e s s the p r e s e n c e o f Idham C h a l i d o f the NU i n the c a b i n e t and a l s o o f M. Da c h l a n u n t i l the l a t e s t r e s h u f f l e . A t Su h a r t o ' s i n s i s t e n c e C h a l i d was a p p o i n t e d Speaker o f the DPR, d e s p i t e t h e f a c t t h a t the NU has o n l y 1/5 the number o f s e a t s o f G o l k a r . - 127 - 22 While in the f i e l d of economics Suharto has chosen to rely on c i v i l i a n advisors or experts for planning and policy, this is much less true in the p o l i t i c a l f i e l d . Military advice especially from the ASPRI on such matters seems dominant. Even in the f i e l d of economics Sudjono Hunardani has played a great role, and one interviewee expressed the belief that he was more important in dealing with Japan than Widjojo Nitisastro or Adam Malik. It is also interesting to note that there are four ASPRI, exactly the same number of assistants possessed by the patih of Mataram for symbolic reasons. 23 The simple fact that Suharto depends largely on personal friendship ties, which is the normal Javanese way of doing things, has meant that most of his trusted assistants and advisors are military men. The President, a professional military man, has had l i t t l e real contact with the c i v i l i a n world before attaining the position. His few c i v i l i a n advisors have been Javanese. As one interviewee put i t , Suharto i s intellectually fascinated with ci v i l i a n s l i k e Widjojo and Soedjatmoko - two of the most important c i v i l i a n figures i n the New Order. As of this writing 22 of 26 provincial governors were military men, and although Minister for Social Affairs Mintaredja has announced that the government intends to " c i v i l i a n i z e " these posts along with lower level provincial positions, such is very unlikely to occur in the near future. 24 With the exception of the Hatta Cabinet (January 1948- December 1949), cabinets during the revolution were formed on a parliamentary majority basis. After the creation of the unitary Republic i n August 1950 u n t i l the appointment of the Djuanda Cabinet in 19579 the same was also true. 25 -'See Daniel S. Lev, op.cit., passim; and Herbert Feith, The Indonesian Elections of 1955 (Ithacas Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1957) for excellent discussions of these two elections. Lev seems to feel that the non-conmruhlst elite's realization of the meaning of mass po l i t i c s and their i n a b i l i t y to compete with the PKI on such a basis - thus a traditional and self-interest reaction — were the key factors in the party elite's weak reaction and opposition to a Guided Democracy system. ^^Daniel S. Lev, op.cit., p.63. 27 Daniel S. Lev, "Parties, Functional Groups and Elections" Asia, Autumn 1970, p. 116. 28 This occurred much to the r e l i e f of rural conservatives. - 128 - 29 Simorankir and Say, op.oit., pp.200-03. 30 Sekber Golkar was originally formed by Presidential Decree No. 193/1964 as a part of Sukarno's National Front. It then consisted of 61 non-affiliated functional organizations and ABRI. As of present, there are 201 organizations a f f i l i a t e d with Golkar which in-19-69 were grouped into 7 KINO's or Mother Organizational Groups according to the function of the organization i t s e l f . The symbol of Golkar i s the banyan tree which is quite famous in Javanese folklore. For further details on Golkar see "The Sekber Golkars A Bird's Eye View of i t s History", (Djakarta? Golkar Pusat, n.d.). 31 For f u l l election results see Don Hindley, "Indonesia 1971s Pantjaslla Democracy and the Second Parliamentary Elections", Asian Survey. 1972, Vol. XII, No. 1, pp.59-62. 32 For these decisions see Sinar Harapan March 18, 1972. 33 Despite the President's statement that he expects Golkar to join in controlling the government, the actual prospects for i t seem slight. For the President's statement see Berita Buana October 5s 1971. For arguments about the possibility of control by Golkar see Rosihan Anwar's a r t i c l e in Tempo July 10, 1971, P-95 and the Slnar Harapan editorial "Golkar Bukan Pemerintah" (Golkar is not the Government) on June 2, 1971. According to Golkar's leading c i v i l i a n figure, Sumiskum, Golkar is basically three groups? ABRI, K0RPRI and the Non-ABRI, Non-KORPRI of which the lat t e r i s by far the weakest. This makes Golkar appear to be the government and the military only. 34 Rosihan Anwar, "Dead End in Indonesian P o l i t i c s " , Pacific Community (Tokyo), 1970, Vol. II, No.2, p.396. 35 Suharto has already announced that there w i l l only be three choices in the next elections two parties and one Golkar. Pedoman October 28, 1971. His basis for such action i s Decision No. XXII of the MPRS session of 1966. It has been pointed out that the decision said nothing about how the parties were to be simplified with the implication that the President i s not on solid constitutional ground. For a thoughtful discussion of the "Floating Mass" system, see Alfian in Kompas April 27-8, 1972. 36 See Gerald Maryanov, Decentralization in Indonesia as a P o l i t i c a l Problem (Ithacas Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1958) and John Legge, Central Authority and Regional Autonomy In Indonesia . (Ithacas Cornell University Press, 1961) for details of the 1957 law and the subsequent retreat from i t . Due to the regional revolts most provisions of the new law never were ful l y implemented before their lapse. - 129 - •^Ted Smith and R.S. Smith, "The P o l i t i c a l Economy of Regional and Urban Revenue Policy in Indonesia", Asian Survey» 1 9 7 2 , Vol. XI, No.8, p.296. ADO funds are the fixed proportion (now 10$) of a l l the tax earnings by the central government on the province's exports which are automatically returned to the provincial government. Where the money w i l l be spent is already decided before i t is returned to the local or regional government, however. 38 Ted Smith, The Indonesian Bureaucracy. Stability. Change and Productivity . (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1971), p.143, 39 Daniel S. Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy (Ithaca; Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, I 9 6 7 ) p.29. The government says i t is seriously concerned with the overcrowding of Java and hopes that people can be encouraged to migrate. Unfortunately, a net migration to Java rather than away from i t i s occurring, because almost a l l of the country's modern industry is located there - especially around Djakarta. If the government really expects to spread out the population, spontaneously or through transmigration, very high rates of infrastructure investment in the Outer Islands are needed, yet Java gets f i r s t priority, Minister of Public Works Sutami (a Javanese) mentioned recently that a l l roads start from Java. When asked why, he jokingly replied because when he was in grade school, geography started with Java(J). For an intelligent discussion of the problem see Sajidiman, op.cit.. pp. 5 6 - 7 I . For Sutami's comment see Slnar Harapan June 2 6 , 1972. 40 The new DPR has shown a good beginning in reviewing the regions' problems firsthand during the latest recess (March-April 1 9 7 2 ) , but unfortunately, they (the DPR members) are in l i t t l e position to help with any problems they observed there. Such decisions and division of funds are made elsewhere. 41 Pembangunan or development is probably no less of a symbol than was Nasakom, but the former is definitely more appealing to Western ears and thus far to Western pocketbooks. 42 Herbert Feith, "Indonesia's P o l i t i c a l Symbols and their Wielders", World P o l i t i c s . 1 9 6 3 , Vol. XVI, No.l5 and Donald Weatherbee, Ideology in Indonesia: Sukarno's Indonesian Revolution (New Havens Yale University Press, 1 9 6 6 ) . 43 Dahm, op.cit., passim. For Indonesian comments on these points see Alfian in Sinar Harapan July 1 9 - 2 3 , 1 9 7 1 . - 130 - 44 See Sukarno's speeches attacking L i b e r a l Democracy as translated i n Feith and Castles, op.cit., Chap.2, 45 ^Outer Islanders, as usual with anything Sukarno said, were rather skeptical about these "Indonesian" values. See Kahar Muzahar's writing i n Feith and Castles, op.cit., PP. 330-5. 46 See Levine i n Pye and Verba, op.cit., p.280, 47 Anderson, op.cit., p.15, Sembada means concentration of power because of meditation, 48 For the text of Sukarno's speech "The Bi r t h of the P a n t j a s i l a " see Feith and Castles, op.cit., p.40, 49 Quoted i n a book review i n Tempo, A p r i l 8, 1972, p.52. ^°Kompas March 5» 1972. While harmony i n i t s broad meaning i s the objective of almost any government, some so c i e t i e s tolerate l a r g e r degrees of c o n f l i c t as normal and legitimate than do others. As we noted e a r l i e r , a pervasive p r i j a j i norm was the t o t a l avoidance of even any sign of c o n f l i c t . This moral standard i s s t i l l considered v a l i d as this Suharto quote shows. 51 See Sajidiman, op.cit,, pp. 7 8 - 9 , and President Suharto's speech on the Minatur Indonesia Indah issue as summarized i n Sinar Harapan January 6, 1972. 52 , v Harmony ( i n i t s extreme form) as a c u l t u r a l norm i s by no means r e s t r i c t e d to the Javanese e l i t e . A f r i c a n leaders have often expressed "African Socialism" i n much the same terms and the roots of the Panchajati Raj system i n India seem to r e f l e c t a s i m i l a r l i n e of thinking. See Myron Weiner's comments on the Indian e l i t e ' s attitudes towards c o n f l i c t i n t h e i r own society i n Pye and Verba, op.cit., pp. 235-6. As does Ben Anderson, I a t t r i b u t e this c h a r a c t e r i s t i c to the Hindu-Buddhist base of Javanese culture and therefore, would expect s i m i l a r sorts of values to be present i n Thailand, Burma and Cambodia. Further comparison on the subject d e f i n i t e l y would be of value. 53 -^See J.A.C. Mackie, "Indonesian P o l i t i c s Under Guided Democracy", Australian Outlook, I 9 6 I , Vol, XV, No.3, pp.269-76. 54 See Justus Van der Kroef, "Indonesian Communism's 'Revolutionary Gymnastics'", Asian Survey, I 9 6 5 , Vol.V, No.5, p. .321 : - 131 - 5 5 r b i d . , p.324. -^These Included Mochtar Lubis's Indonesia Raja and Pedoman of the PSI, run by Soedjatmoko and Rosihan Anwar. -"Donald Hlndley, "President Soekarno and the Communists; The P o l i t i c s of Domestication", American P o l i t i c a l Science Review, 1962, V o l . LVI, No.4~i Ben Anderson and Ruth McVey wrote a c o n t r o v e r s i a l v e r s i o n of the G-30-S, A P r e l i m i n a r y A n a l y s i s of the October 1, 1965 Coup Attempt i n Indonesia. ( I t h a c a : C o r n e l l Modern Indonesia P r o j e c t , I 9 7 I), i n which they a t t r i b u t e d the e n t i r e a f f a i r to a group of young o f f i c e r s d i s s a t i s f i e d w i t h the conservativeness and o p p o s i t i o n to Sukarno by the Army's General S t a f f . While t h i s v e r s i o n of the a f f a i r has been shown to be r a t h e r d i s t o r t e d , there remains a great d e a l of t r u t h to the statement that there was a h i g h degree of t e n s i o n i n the army a t the time. I t i s c e r t a i n that the PKI used t h i s t e n s i o n to t h e i r own advantage and Sukarno was probably the focus of l o y a l t y used to l u r e the young o f f i c e r s i n t o a c t i o n , not communism. 59 - " P l u v i e r , o p . c i t . , p. V I I I , 60 Despite the f a c t that P a n t j a s i l a i s the s i n g l e most important i d e o l o g i c a l symbol i n the country today, most Indonesians w i l l say that they do not have any idea what P a n t j a s i l a Democracy i s . A few w i l l attempt to say what i t i s not, but that i s u s u a l l y the l i m i t . For a very good attempt to e x p l a i n the concept see A.H. Nasution, P a n t j a s i l a Democracy Today and Tomorrow- (Djakarta: S e r u l i n g Masa, I 9 7 I). A l s o see H a z a l r l n , Demokrasi P a n t j a s i l a ( P a n t j a s i l a Democracy) (Djaka r t a ; Tintamasf 1970) and Ismaun, Tindjauan P a n t j a s i l a : Dasar F i l s a f a t Negara Republik Indonesia (Observations of P a n t j a s i l a : The Basic Philosophy of the Republic of Indo- nesia) (Bandung: Carya Remadja, 1970), 6 l For a complete d i s c u s s i o n of the d i a g n o s i s and the cure see R. W i l l i a m L i d d l e , "Modernizing Indonesian P o l i t i c s " ( S t e n c i l e d , n.d.). A l s o see S r i Soemantri, S i s t i m Dua P a r t a i (The Two Party System) (Bandung: B i n a t j i p t a , I 9 6 8 ) . * 62 Given the f a c t that Suharto has been able to secure the passage of any measure he f e e l s v i t a l by some means or another, the l a c k of "push" f o r the o r i g i n a l b i l l showed how unimportant he f e l t the idea was. One of the more i n t e r e s t i n g features of the 1976 e l e c t i o n s w i l l be whether or not w i t h i t s overwhelming m a j o r i t y , Golkar w i l l pass a s i n g l e member constituency b i l l . Among Golkar interviewees a t t h i s time, none had given i t any t h o u g h t — t h e y s a i d they were more concerned w i t h the upcoming, MPR s e s s i o n . - 132 - A T One might want to speculate as to why parties were not banned altogether i f Suharto and his colleagues were so opposed to them. New Order supporters now answer that such a move would not have been "democratic", however, th i s reasoning did not seem to apply to the PKI. This author i s l e d to the conclusion that Suharto, i n i t i a l l y , thought the parties to be much stronger than they l a t e r proved to be. Outside factors such as effects on loan and aid givers should not be under-estimated. 64 See Samson, op,cit., passim. I t now appears that the permission for the creation of a new "modernist" Muslim party was a "pay-off" to this group for t h e i r support i n the destruction of Sukarno and the PKI. ^See Don Hindley, "Indonesia 1970s The Workings of Pan t j a s i l a Democracy", Asian Survey, 1971, Vol. XI, No.2, p . H 7 j for some discussion of the a f f a i r . For Indonesian coverage of the Congress and charges of government i n t e r - vention see Harian Kami during A p r i l , 1970. AA PMKParmusi). Katolik, Parkindo and PSII. On the possible meaning of the elections, as viewed beforehand, see J , A o C , Mackie, " C i v i l - M i l i t a r y Relations and the 1971 Elections i n Indonesia", Australian Outlook, 1970, V o l . 24, No.3. On the dilemmas of coercion for Suharto see Herbert Feith, "Suharto's Search for a P o l i t i c a l Format", Indonesia, I 9 6 8 , No.6, pp. 104-5. 68 Golkar must not be seen as a party i n any u n i f i e d sense. I t i s a mere c o a l i t i o n of forces brought together by the m i l i t a r y . Their common desire was and i s development, plus they are w i l l i n g to acknowledge the fact that ABRI i s dominant i n the society. Some c i v i l i a n s i n the organization, p a r t i c u l a r l y a group from Bandung known as the independents hope to play a role that i s not 100$ controlled by the m i l i t a r y . At t h i s date, this p a r t i c u l a r group i s pessimistic of i t s chances to do so. Despite some hope for a big Golkar reorganization a f t e r the e l e c t i o n , A l i Murtopo announced that Golkar would not become a party, Berlta Buana October 12, 1971. 69^ Previous to the formation of the new DPR, a l l decisions had to be taken i n mus.jawarah s t y l e , meaning that resolutions had to be unanimous. As soon as Golkar obtained an absolute majority, the rules were changed to permit majority decisions. See Berita Buana December 23 , 1971 on the changes. The President c a l l e d i t "Stopping the Dictatorship of the Minority" i n Berita Buana October 12, 1971. - 133 - 70 ' March 5 , 1971. A l l PKI and most Mas.jumi leaders could not p a r t i c i p a t e a t a l l e i t h e r . The l a t t e r d e f i n i t e l y h u r t the PMI. 71 A l l government employees had to vote a t t h e i r places of work r a t h e r than a t p u b l i c p o l l s . This made the t o t a l number of vote c a s t e r s i n any one p o l l s t a t i o n very smalls even the p u b l i c ones were seldom over 300. In s e v e r a l Interviews w i t h c i v i l servants, I was t o l d t h a t d i r e c t pressure and t h r e a t s were made towards them i f the vote t o t a l d i d not t u r n out to be almost 100$ f o r Golkar. 74 B e r i t a Buana October 6, 1971. 72 Donald Hindley, "Indonesia 1971s P a n t j a s i l a Democracy and the Second Parliamentary E l e c t i o n s " , A s i a n Survey, 1972, V o l . X I I , No. 1, p.61. Golkar manipulated t h e i r candidates and l i s t s a t w i l l , even a f t e r the r e s u l t s of the e l e c t i o n had been announced. A good example of how t h i s manipulation was done was the case of Adam M a l i k , the Foreign M i n i s t e r . M a l i k campaigned lo n g and hard i n h i s home provinces of North Sumatra and was number one of the North Sumatra P r o v i n c i a l Golkar L i s t . A f t e r the e l e c t i o n M a l i k was removed from the Golkar l i s t and replaced w i t h the excuse that h i s m i n i s t e r i a l d u t i e s were too heavy to permit him time f o r the DPR, 73 Hindley gives a more complete l i s t of the p o s s i b l e reasons f o r Golkar's v i c t o r y . Hindley, o p . c i t . , p.59« 75 On the l a b o r r e s t r i c t i o n see Kompas February 7, 1972. For a good summary of the p o s i t i o n of organized l a b o r under the New Order see Pedoman February ll", 197.2. The r i g h t to s t r i k e i s not recognized, although s t r i k e s do o c c a s i o n a l l y occur. On K0RPRI see Sinar Harapan A p r i l 1 5 , 1 9 7 2 and the Kompas e d i t o r i a l of A p r i l 18, 1972, On d e p o l i t i c i z a t i o n see the Kompas e d i t o r i a l of March 20 , I972. 76 A n t i c i p a t i n g the government b i l l to be submitted to Parliament, the Islamic p a r t i e s grouped together to form the Kelompok Persatuan Pembangunan or United Development Group w h i l e the PNI, Murba, IPKI and the two C h r i s t i a n p a r t i e s formed the Kelompok Demokratis Pembangunan or Democratic Development Group. The l a t t e r has gone f u r t h e r than the former i n c r e a t i n g a new p o l i t i c a l s t r u c t u r e (probably because of the obstinance of the NU), but both remain essen- t i a l l y f e d e r a t i o n s . Amir Machmud s t a t e d that f u s i o n i s a must and t h a t f e d e r a t i o n can only be a t r a n s i t o r y stage. S i n a r Harapan A p r i l 1, 1972. As of t h i s w r i t i n g the b i l l has not been submitted to Parliament and t h i s delay may represent . some r e - t h i n k i n g of-the problem i n s i d e the government. - 134 - 77 'A member of the Dewan Pimplnan Golkar or Leadership C o u n c i l , Lim Bian K i e , t o l d me, "Look a t the s i z e of our v i c t o r y with only one and one-half years of p r e p a r a t i o n ; j u s t t h i n k what we can do w i t h f i v e years to work on i t . " (March 24, 1 9 7 2 ) . A l i Murtopo has r e c e n t l y added that Golkar w i l l be s a t i s f i e d w i t h a 5$ increase i n t h e i r vote i n 1976. op For some of Suharto's d e a l i n g w i t h the i n t e r n a l m i l i t a r y s i t u a t i o n see Donald Hindley, " A l i r a n s . and the F a l l of the Old Order", Indonesia, 1970, No. 9, p.50; and Donald Hindl e y , "Indonesia I97O; The Workings of P a n t j a s i l a Democracy" Asian Survey 1971, V o l . X I , No. 2, p.112. 79 For t h i s s t r u c t u r e see Polomka, o p . c i t . , pp.96-7. The p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s , e s p e c i a l l y the PNI and NU, c l a i m t h a t t h i s s t r u c t u r e was used to c o n t r o l the outcome of the e l e c t i o n s which to some extent was probably t r u e . 80 I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note that f o r only 3 years of the 13 since the r e t u r n to the UUD45 Indonesia has not been under what amounts to m a r t i a l law. 81 This happened to WAY (World Assembly of Youth) which had development p r o j e c t s i n the v i l l a g e s but that a l s o contained "modernist" Muslim elements i n the l e a d e r s h i p t h a t were not t r u s t e d by the m i l i t a r y , 82 The m i l i t a r y through i t s Dwi-Pungsi or.Dual Function Doctrine has s t r e s s e d time and time.again t h a t i t has no i n t e n t i o n of being a mere a l a t or t o o l of c i v i l i a n s . See Suharto's speech "ABRI i s not a Fireman" summarized i n B e r l t a Buana March 6 , 1972 . 83 F e i t h , o p . c i t . , p.105. 84 A.H, Nasution, " P o l i t i c a l R e s t r u c t u r i n g A f t e r 'G-30-S'", P a c i f i c Community, 1971, V o l . I l l , Np.l, p.323. For a good d i s c u s s i o n of the economic problems, e s p e c i a l l y i n f l a t i o n , see J.A.C. Mackie, Indonesian I n f l a t i o n (Ithacas C o r n e l l Modern Indonesia P r o j e c t , I 9 6 7 ) . 86 Such attempts are. described as h a l f - h e a r t e d because, of the only, passing a t t e n t i o n they r e c e i v e d from Sukarno. For c e r t a i n there was a l a c k of resources f o r economic development but outside resources, Sukarno was t o l d , were a v a i l a b l e should he decide to concentrate on r e h a b i l i t a t i o n . The b a s i c problem s then, seems to have been one of p r i o r i t i e s and w i l l . - 135 - 87 'Robert M. Price, "A Theoretical Approach to Military- Rule i n New States: Reference Group Theory and the Ghanaian Case", World P o l i t i c s , I97I, V o l , XXIII, No,3 9  pp,398-430. 88 Ruth McVey notes that between 1958 and I965 °ver 4,000 Indonesian o f f i c e r s were trained i n the United States. Ruth McVey, "The Post-Revolutionary Transformation of the Indonesian Army", Indonesia, 1972, No. 13* p . 1 6 9 . Also see Guy Pauker,'"General Nasution's Mission to Moscow", Asian Survey, I 9 6 I , V o l . 1 , No.l. 89 For a good discussion of Army philosophy see Michael Ehrmann, The Indonesian Army Under Guided Democracy (unpublished M.AT thesis, Cornell University, I967J", Chap.II. 9 0 From an interview with Nugroho Notosusanto, the head of the m i l i t a r y ' s history center, March 1972. One could, of course, argue with Nugroho as to whether armies with such experience are always forces for modernization, 91 Murtopo rather wild l y predicted that Indonesia would catch up with Japan a f t e r the 25 year period, 9.2 In a recent University of Indonesia seminar on economic growth Professor Sarbini Sumawinata challenged several of the government's technocrats and t h e i r predictions concerning the rate of growth of the GNP i n Indonesia during the next decade. In a debate which he seemed to win, Sarbini said that present growth could not be sustained because of the low investment rate, The high growth rates now, he said, were the r e s u l t of r e h a b i l i t a t i o n or quick yi e l d s that were brought about by simple infrastructure improvement. See Tempo August 14, 1971 and Melihat Kedepan Perspektif Ekonomi Indonesia (A Future Perspective of the Indonesian Economy!"™ (Djakarta; LP38, 1971), 93 The government i s torn between the demands of the c i t i e s for low and stable r i c e prices and the countryside's demands for high but stable prices. A government supply bureau, Bulog, was set up to maintain price s t a b i l i t y but the price decision d e f i n i t e l y went i n favor of the c i t i e s . Polomka notes that during I970-I Bulog acquired some 600,000 tons of r i c e at one-half the world market price and even then secured only from middlemen which meant the farmer did not even get the minimum price set by the government, Polomka, op.cit., p . l 5 o This continues while consumption of luxury goods i n the major c i t i e s , e s p e c i a l l y Djakarta, runs wild. Another develop- ment from this system i s that r i c e i n Java, a r i c e d e f i c i t area, i s cheaper than i n several r i c e surplus areas i n the Outer Islands. - 136 - 94 Ben HIgglns, "Survey of Recent Developments" B u l l e t i n of Indonesian Economic Studies, 1972, Vol, VIII, No.l, p.25. 9 5 KpmEas A p r i l 11, 1972. 96 Huntington, op.cit„, p .222„ 97 This says nothing about the manner of goal s e l e c t i o n which must be l a r g e l y at the r u l e r ' s d i s c r e t i o n . The paths to the goal are also defined by the r u l e r . Sukarno probably f e l t that his path for the completion of the "revolution" was a correct one. Hence, perhaps i t should be said that "no deviation from the ruler's path to the goal can be allowed". 98 A l l of this i s i n very d i f f e r e n t perspective than i t i s usually presented. For very Western approaches to the Sukarno-Suharto struggle see Justus Van der Kroef, "Sukarno's F a l l " , Orbis, 1967 9 Vol. XI, No .2; and Donald Hindley, "The Alirans and the F a l l of the Old Order", Indonesia, 1970, No.9. 99 The Sukarno-Suharto r e l a t i o n s h i p can be viewed much l i k e Kama's dilemma before the Bhrata Yudha as shown i n the wa.jang k u l i t , Kama, of course, chose to follow his master rather than j o i n the " r i g h t " and v i c t o r i o u s side. 100 Portions of the m i l i t a r y had opposed Sukarno's confrontation p o l i c y and the increasing influence of Subandrio cs i n t e l l i g e n c e organization. Murtopo car r i e d on secret negotiations with Malaysia about confrontation. See Ekpres September 6, 1971 for a cover story on Murtopo with much biographical data. 101 See Feith, ojD^cit., pp. 98-IOI about this pressure. 102 S e e Sinar Harapan January 3-5, 1972 for a series of a r t i c l e s on the NU Congress. Subchan, a young energetic leader, was subsequently removed from the party hierarchy. NU members that I spoke with were posit i v e that some sort of deal had been made with Murtopo, 103 Murtopo's power i s l a r g e l y n o n - i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d , and the m i l i t a r y hierarchy has l i t t l e control over his actions as he i s responsible only to the President. Allegedly, this has given r i s e to some personal and i n s t i t u t i o n a l r i v a l r i e s within ABRI. For some comments on this see Rosihan Anwar i n Pedoman February 7, I972 . - 137 - 104 This was s a i d i n anger on January 6, 1972 i n r e p l y t o the " M i n i " p r o t e s t s - see Sinai- Harapan of the same date. 105 Justus Van der Kroef, ''New P o l i t i c a l Patterns i n Indonesia", World Today, 1969, V o l . 2 5 , No.5, p.219. 10 & Murtopo's a b i l i t y to p l a y what Indonesians c a l l a "cowboy" r o l e can probably be a t t r i b u t e d to the l e s s e r i n f l u e n c e of pri.1a.ji c u l t u r e i n the area where he was born and r a i s e d — the p a s i s i r . I t i s worth no t i n g t h a t w h i l e those around Suharto i n c l u d i n g the ASPRI and Madame Suharto have not been able to a v o i d the " c o r r u p t o r " l a b e l , the P r e s i d e n t has been able t o do so. 107 See Van der Kroef, o p . c i t . , p,222 and Polomka, o p . c i t . , pp.179-96 f o r a d i s c u s s i o n of the M u s l i m - C h r i s t i a n c o n f l i c t . 108 The "Mini A f f a i r " was a very complex i s s u e . For f u r t h e r d e t a i l s see my manuscript ( i n p r e p a r a t i o n ) , " E l i t e C o n f l i c t i n Indonesia? The Minatur Indonesia Indah P r o j e c t " . 109 ABRI seems to be i n t e n t on " d e p o l i t i c i z i n g " .Islam, p a r t l y because of i t s p o t e n t i a l as an o p p o s i t i o n force and p a r t l y because of the i m p o s s i b i l i t y of communication between the two, Javanese, since independence, have c o n s i s t e n t l y shown t h e i r i n a b i l i t y to t r u s t or communicate w i t h "modernist" Muslims and v i c e versa. The biggest f e a r of a l l the e l i t e i s an Islam-non-Islam s p l i t which would p o l a r i z e the p o l i t y i n t o two almost equal p a r t s . To help a v o i d t h i s , ABRI b e l i e v e s the NU a l s o must e v e n t u a l l y abandon i t s p o l i t i c a l f u n c t i o n s , 110 This happened to Ben Anderson and Ruth McVey w i t h t h e i r monograph on the G-30-S, Anderson and McVey, o p . c i t . , passim.. I t s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of events was e x a c t l y opposite from the m i l i t a r y ' s and the army could not b e l i e v e that i t was w r i t t e n w i t h no u l t e r i o r motives,. To t h i s day, over 6 years since the paper was w r i t t e n , interviewees and newspapers s t i l l l a s h out a t the two s c h o l a r s as t o o l s of communism and opponents of the regime. A more recent example i s the v i s i t of P r o f e s s o r Z a s l o f f of the U n i v e r s i t y of P i t t s b u r g h . He has no c l a i m to be a s c h o l a r of Indonesian p o l i t i c s . He made a l e c t u r e on p o l i t i c a l development i n Semarang and mentioned that Indonesia was s t i l l hunting f o r i n s t i t u t i o n s to f i t the mood and temperament of i t s people — which i s obvious to anyone, i f the changes of the p a r t y system are taken i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n . Amir Machmud, M i n i s t e r of I n t e r i o r , immediately saw t h i s as an a t t a c k on P a n t j a s i l a and the UUD45, Machmud i n v i t e d Z a s l o f f to stop i n t e r f e r i n g i n Indonesia's i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s . See Tempo June 30, 1972. - 138 - 111 A l l l i s t e d are student p r o t e s t a c t i o n s . The f i r s t three were p r o t e s t s a g a i n s t c o r r u p t i o n and Golput w i t h the l a c k of r e a l choice i n the 1971 elections„ 112 Quoted i n Ekspres September 6, 1971? p.16. 113 T.D. Hafas e d i t o r of Nusantara was sentenced to j a i l f o r one year f o r such c r i t i c i s m and the magazine Sendi had i t s l i c e n s e revoked f o r much the same reason. On the Hafas case see Tempo September 18, 1971 and on Sendi see Tempo February 26, 1972 and S l n a r Harapan March 1, 1972. 114 Sumitro made t h i s statement before the Foreign Correspondents Club i n Djakarta on February 4, 1972. 115 Amir Machmud has r e c e n t l y accused the press of d e l i b e r a t e l y mis-quoting and d i s t o r t i n g h i s speeches and statements - See Indonesia Raja e d i t o r i a l June 13, 1972 and Tempo June 2 3 , 1972. E a r l i e r i n the year S i n a r Harapan was handled roughly by KOPKAMTIB f o r a l l e g e d l y l e a k i n g an o f f i c i a l background statement by BAKIN(Intelligence) Chief, Sutopo Juwono. 116 Harlan Kami, e d i t e d by Nono Anwar Makarim, i s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the remnant of the youth f o r c e s of the Generation of '66. Indonesia Raja i s an independent e d i t e d by Mochtar L u b i s . Abadi i s the voice of the "modernist" Muslims and i s c o n s t a n t l y a t "war" w i t h the army supported newspapers Angkatan Bersendjata, A p i P a n t j a s i l a and B e r i t a Yudha as w e l l as the Golkar organ"^ Suara Karya. 119 'BIMAS (Bimbingan Masa) or Mass Guidance. There was a l s o some heavy p r o f i t t a k i n g by high government people on "kickbacks" from the c o n t r a c t choices, i f rumors and s e v e r a l c o n f i d e n t i a l i n t e r v i e w s are to be b e l i e v e d . 118 This i s one of the i n d i c a t i o n s t h a t Golkar i s d e f i n i t e l y subordinate to the government even i n i t s parliamentary a c t i v i t i e s . .The parliamentary d i s c u s s i o n s were l i t t l e more than a r e p e t i t i o n of previous p u b l i c debate. The s p e c i a l committee on the problem issued a c a r e f u l l y worded r e p o r t th a t was h a r d l y o b j e c t i o n a b l e to anyone, a t l e a s t of on the government s i d e , and that d i d not r e a l l y t a c k l e the i s s u e a t hand — i t was avoided by saying t h a t the p r o j e c t was out of the DPR's competence i f i t was a p r i v a t e p r o j e c t . I t d i d p o i n t out very w e l l , however, the problem of the younger generation i n communicating w i t h the government. See DPR Memorandum 1076/P.Ch.M.I.I./72, - 139 - 119 'Both Nasution and Budiman are non-Javanese and have a tendency to be too d i r e c t i n t h e i r c r i t i c i s m . Neither are i n v o l v e d w i t h the government, d i r e c t l y , Nasution does run the Djakarta City-sponsored Legal A i d I n s t i t u t e . 120 Moertono, the m i l i t a r y l i a i s o n with Golkar announced tha t the r e g i o n a l DPRD's would be t o r n apart and f a c t i o n a l i z e d , hence paraly z e d , i f they had to s e l e c t the region's governor. S i n a r Harapan June 6, 1972. He seemed to be saying t h a t they were not s u f f i c i e n t l y d i d i d i k to handle the process. The " F l o a t i n g Mass", as described i n the previous s e c t i o n s , i s e s s e n t i a l l y a mis-reading of the method of operation of the American and B r i t i s h party systems. No l o c a l branches of p a r t i e s w i l l be allowed below the Kabupaten l e v e l except a t e l e c t i o n time every f i v e years. The acceptance of such a p l a n r e v e a l s the i d e a l i s t i c nature of the government's conception of v i l l a g e l i f e . I f only p a r t i e s could be removed, goes the argument, c o n f l i c t a t t h a t l e v e l would disappear, 121 See Gary Hansen, "Episodes i n Rural Modernizations Problems i n the BIMAS Program" 9 Indonesia, 1971, No. 11. 122 See my manuscript on the "Mini A f f a i r " , 123 There i s such a p r o h i b i t i o n f o r M i n i s t e r s and Secretary Generals but not f o r t h e i r wives and f a m i l i e s or f o r the m i l i t a r y a t a l l , 124 S a d i k i n explained h i s way out of the s i t u a t i o n by saying that the Djakarta C i t y Government had e a r l i e r given him a u t h o r i t y to b u i l d a s i m i l a r p r o j e c t , Murtopo o f f e r e d no p u b l i c e x p l a n a t i o n , 1 2 5 •^Stories of c o r r u p t i o n i n Indonesia are numerous. For one such i n c i d e n t that never became p u b l i c see my manuscript on the "Mini A f f a i r " . For e x c e l l e n t s t u d i e s of the problem see Ted Smith, "Corruption i n Indonesia", Indonesia, 1971, No. l l ? and Soedarso, Korupsi d i Indonesia (Corruption i n Indonesia) (Djakartas~Bharata, 1969)~ 12 6 Polomka, o p . c i t . , pp. 24 - 6 . E v i d e n t l y , the i d e a was taken from the Malaysian Rural Development scheme. S t a t i s t i c s i n Indonesia are h i g h l y suspect and w i t h the pressure from above f o r progress and good r e s u l t s , i t i s probable that the c o n t r o l room f i g u r e s are about as accurate as the "Vietnam Body-Count T o t a l s " . CHAPTER IV THE FUTURE OF JAVANIZATION In the previous discussion, i t was noted that there are many basic s i m i l a r i t i e s between the ideas, structures and s t y l e of government i n Mataram and i n contemporary Indonesia. The following l i s t summarizes the major s i m i l a r i t i e s s 1) Structure; The formal and informal governmental structure i n Mataram and contemporary Indonesia are extremely h i e r a r c h i a l i n nature with very dominant rulers and centers. The formal structure of the government does not correspond to r e a l i t y . The power and authority of the r u l e r ' s assistants depends primarily on t h e i r personal rela t i o n s h i p to the r u l e r rather than on t h e i r formal po s i t i o n i n the hierarchy. There are no functioning structures of mass p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the p o l i t i c a l system. 2) Functions % The acknowledged primary function of the government i s to maintain "harmony" throughout the realm. Thus, maintaining the status quo and s t a b i l i t y are primary goals of the regime. Various sorts of controls, manipu- l a t i o n s , and security measures are the main means to ensure the establishment and maintenance of "harmony". The government constantly struggles to prevent the emergence of autonomous power centers within the realm - 1 4 0 - - 141 - whether they be p o l i t i c a l or commercial. The chief motivation for any form of change or "development" i s to strengthen the ex i s t i n g power d i s t r i b u t i o n , not a l t e r i t . 3) Style % Both governments emphasize the correct approach or form of approach to any problem much more than the actual content of the po l i c y . There i s a high value placed on single-mindedness of purpose and non-expression of emotion or desire; hence, a sty l e of wa.jang or shadow p o l i t i c s i s the r e s u l t , There i s l i t t l e conception of moral implications of power which provides many opportunities for a r b i t r a r y use of state power and funds by the r u l e r s . There i s l i t t l e cognizance of the value of opposition or c r i t i c i s m ; i t tends to be poorly tolerated or ignored. On the whole, the sty l e of government could best be described as "protective s u p e r i o r i t y " or simply, paternalism. There are many factors that could contribute to the s i m i l a r i t i e s described above. B a s i c a l l y , the d i v e r s i t y of Indonesia has changed l i t t l e since the time of Mataram. While some of the tools of rulership, control and pene- t r a t i o n have changed since that time, the problems associated with r u l i n g the t e r r i t o r y have not. The tools of government may have improved but the forces of disi n t e g r a t i o n may be stronger than previously. The fact that Indonesia today i s l a r g e l y controlled by the m i l i t a r y may also contribute to some of the - 142 - s i m i l a r i t i e s . M i l i t a r y norms which argue for s t a b i l i t y and control must augment Javanese norms for such. Equally, the experiences of the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l democracy period, seemingly objectively showed Indonesians that Western s t y l e p o l i t i c s and government were i l l suited either to the p e c u l i a r i t i e s of t h e i r nation or value system and increased a general desire for strong and authoritative government. While one seeks to avoid the c r i t i c i s m of " c u l t u r a l determinism", i t i s d i f f i c u l t to escape the conclusion that Javanese operating a government would operate i t according to Javanese norms. Hence, i t seems quite natural that the structure, functions and style of such a government would be rather Javanese. Further, the rules of p a r t i c i - pation and concept of the state would also be Javanese. The data given previously shows that, indeed, an over- whelming majority of a l l positions i n the p o l i t i c a l , governmental and m i l i t a r y e l i t e are f i l l e d by Javanese or persons that are antagonistic toward the country's other major c u l t u r a l group. Since the major c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of Guided Democracy and the New Order do correspond with the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of Javanism, there i s a strong i n d i c a t i o n that a process c a l l e d Javanization has occurred within the p o l i t i c a l and governmental spheres. - 143 - On the Fut lire of Javanization The rulers of contemporary Indonesia have created a government that might be best described as a neo-Mataram. Javanese have imposed t h e i r conception of the state, t h e i r ideas of proper p o l i t i c a l behavior, t h e i r own d e f i n i t i o n s of the l i m i t s of p o l i t i c a l power and i t s uses on Indonesian society* This process has been done under the cloak of the search for Indonesia's true i d e n t i t y and national soul. I t has been made immeasurably easier through the widespread adoption of a t r u l y national language, Bahasa Indonesia, rather than the use of Javanese. Bahasa Indonesia has been greatly influenced by the Javanese language but the national lingua franca has had i t s own d i s i n t e g r a t i v e effects upon Bahasa Djawa. The same i s true for much of what could be c a l l e d t r a d i t i o n a l Javanese culture. The Javanese have been able to dominate but at the price of d i l u t i o n of Javanism. This d i l u t i o n or softening of Javanism was necessary for the creation of a nation out of a disparate empire. Domination could never be c l e a r and d i r e c t imposition of one c u l t u r a l pattern upon the r e s t of the nation. I f however, the domination were i n i t i a t e d and implemented ostensibly as a genuine national phenomenon, i t might prove acceptable and eventually, become a workable scheme. Assimilation to the "new" Indonesian- - 144 - -ness, though defined i n a Javanese way, was conceivable where any assim i l a t i o n to Javanism was ipso facto impossible. Even the implementation of the "new" Indonesian p o l i t i c s as defined by Javanese was to cost casualties though far fewer than i f Javanism had been imposed d i r e c t l y . Certain sectors and segments of society would become alienated, even re v o l t against the new d e f i n i t i o n of the p o l i t y , but the question of ultimate success rested on sheer p o l i t i c s , the p o l i t i c s of a minimal winning c o a l i t i o n , and l a s t l y on force. The v i c t o r y of the Javanese hinterland group of the m i l i t a r y l e d by Suharto was i n a sense a regression or "throw back*' to control of the p o l i t y to the t r a d i t i o n a l i s t segment of the Javanese population. Since Javanese a r i s t o c r a t i c p o l i t i c a l culture has long been i n the process of decay and d i s i n t e g r a t i o n at the periphery, only the remnant'or rump of the t o t a l i t y of Java i s represented by t h i s group. The actual functioning of the government and p o l i t i c a l system would be much smoother were i t operating i n the context of a t r a d i t i o n a l Javanese p o l i t y such as Mataram. So, while the government attempts to rule i n a manner that cl o s e l y resembles that of Mataram, the society that i t governs i s very d i f f e r e n t from that of Mataram. - 14-5 - Social change i n Indonesia, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n Java, has gone on at a tremendous pace during the 2 0 t h century. The effects of the f i n a l years of Dutch Colonial Rule, the Great Depression, Japanese Occupation, the Revolution, the mass p o l i t i c s of Constitutional and Guided Democracy, vast overpopulation, rapid urbanization and widespread modern education have created a vortex of s o c i a l 1 mobilization that has changed the face of contemporary Indonesia. Odd as i t may seem, today the most t r a d i t i o n a l portions of Indonesia are the Outer Islands. They are more e a s i l y controlled than i s Java through cooptation of the regional governmental and t r a d i t i o n a l e l i t e by the 2 central government, The "concessions" of the governing e l i t e to constitutionalism, parliaments, popular p a r t i c i - pation and ideas of popular sovereignty were made more to e t h n i c a l l y Javanese elements than they were to non-Javanese ones. As evidenced by the PKI and G-30-S, Javanese can also be the strongest enemies of Javanization, as defined here. Djakarta, the most cosmopolitan and "Indonesian" of a l l the nation's c i t i e s , i s the seat of the government. This c a p i t a l c i t y , located on the north coast of West Java, i s f a r from the centers of t r a d i t i o n a l Javanese culture. Javanese are a minority of the c a p i t a l ' s population. Djakarta i n i t s own way i s a force for the d e t r a d i t i o n a l i - - 146 - zation of the government. There world culture and the dlverseness of the Indonesian cultures meet to form a d i s t i n c t i v e mix of s t y l e , form and behavior that assault Javanism d i r e c t l y and influence a very large portion of the r u l e r s i n everyday l i f e . I t i s i n Djakarta and the associated u n i v e r s i t y towns that Javanese have started asking themselves what Javanism i s a l l about; what i t i s about Javanism that i s holding t h e i r society back and keeping Indonesia from achieving the goals of modernity, s t a b i l i t y and economic growth that the e l i t e espouses. Indonesians have t h e i r own d i s t i n c t i v e theories about p r i j a j i - i s m and neo-feudalism 3 and t h e i r e f f e c ts on the society's functioning. The large numbers of Javanese i n the government and m i l i t a r y i s a fact of l i f e that Indonesia w i l l have to l i v e with for a long time. Present trends do not reveal any desire on the part of Outer Islanders to j o i n 4 the central government i n greater numbers. While some Javanese are finding t h e i r way into commercial l i f e and some Outer Islanders (besides Christians) into government service, the numbers are not large enough to have profound e f f e c t s on the ethnic composition of c i v i l servants as a group for several decades. Likewise, the l i m i t a t i o n s and constraints on p o l i t i c a l action and behavior that have been set by Javanese - 147 - are unlike l y to be openly challenged and changed i n the near future. The younger generation of Javanese and Outer Island e l i t e are most l i k e l y going to grow up accepting the outlines of the state and government as i t now stands. The Javanese d e f i n i t i o n s of t h i s generation may well become the Indonesian d e f i n i t i o n s of the next generation.^ Slow and constant change rather than a sudden s h i f t i n some of these fundamental d e f i n i t i o n s or l i m i t s i s l i k e l y to occur. Erosion from the inside and change of the substance rather than the form i s the most l i k e l y path for the future. As Javanese and Javanized members of the e l i t e change t h e i r own conceptions of p o l i t i c s , they are l i k e l y to change the d e f i n i t i o n s and l i m i t s of p o l i t i c a l action from the i n s i d e . Outside threats, whether i t be from Islam, Communism or the West i n the form of Democratic Socialism, have been successfully repelled by the core of Javanism but not without some change. Despite the l i m i t e d horizons or worldvie:r of the present r u l i n g e l i t e , they have been able to accept and use advice from other Javanese about inno- vations and changes that are desirable or necessary. Given the i n c l i n a t i o n s of Suharto and those around him, caution i n any new undertaking i s l i k e l y to continue to be a dominant qu a l i t y . However, this i s quite natural for anyone attempting to embark on "new" and untested paths of - 148 - governing. The major point i s that innovations are occurring within the framework that has been very loosely but adamantly l a i d by Javanese themselves. Despite some contestations to the contrary., the New Order has not stagnated as yet. The idea of "dynamic s t a b i l i t y " remains. The greatest threats to the Nexf Order and i t s form of Javanism are the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of a p o l a r i z a t i o n between Islamic and non-Islamic portions of the society, i n s u f f i c i e n t attention to Outer Island demands for a larger portion of the development budget and the increasing c r i s i s of a g r i - c u l t u r a l poverty on Java i t s e l f . In order to prevent or., "avoid chaos as a r e s u l t of these problems, the government w i l l simply be forced to modify i t s own l i m i t s of behavior and' the d i s t r i b u t i o n of power i n the country. These modifications w i l l probably be small and i n i t i a l l y , hard to i d e n t i f y , but as i n the past, Javanism w i l l have to adjust i t s e l f to a changing r e a l i t y . Up to the present, only minimal work has been done by the New Order on creating i n s t i t u t i o n s i n the society that can carry on i t s mission for even the so-called period of 25 years of accelerated modernization, Of f i r s t p r i o r i t y was the m i l i t a r y and then the bureaucracy. The reorganization and strengthening of the former seems almost complete while the organization of the l a t t e r i s d e f i n i t e l y f u l l y underway. Golkar, r e l i e d upon without much thought and of temporary necessity, w i l l have to get - 149 - an increasing amount of attention, reorganization and strengthening i n the future, i f indeed i t i s to be the New Order's p o l i t i c a l tool for restructuring the Indo- nesian p o l i t y . One prominent non-Javanese t o l d me "slowly but surely, the i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s t s are winning."^ I f this i s the case and i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n i s a proper path to attack and overcome the present i l l s of Indonesian 7 society, present trends augur well for Indonesia's future. Despite impressions to the contrary that may have been created e a r l i e r i n t h i s paper, the " e v i l s " of contemporary Indonesian government do not a r i s e from the f a c t that Javanese control i t . The very strength of Javanese culture has been translated into an Indonesian strength i n the modern world. To make a value judgment about Javanization i s d i f f i c u l t but i t may be that the country has benefited and w i l l continue to benefit from the fact that Javanese rather than any other group control the country. The inevitable process, as described by Lev, could have been an extremely fortunate process. The country has continuity of culture and rulership to r e l y on and the dubious d i s t i n c t i o n of being ruled by a c u l t u r a l group that i s known for i t s lack of extremism and o v e r a l l moderation i n outlook, behavior and action. The questions of the continuation of m i l i t a r y r u l e , actual commitment to moderniasasi and the l i k e have l i t t l e - 150 - importance i n comparison with the fate of Javanization. In fact, the answers to these questions may well depend on the degree of legitimacy that non-Javanese c u l t u r a l groups accord to Javanization. For, ultimately, the continuation of the nation depends on this very question — what i s the fate of Javanization? - 151 - Notes on CHAPTER IV Social mobilization as defined i n Kar l Deutstch, "Social Mobilization and P o l i t i c a l Development", American P o l i t i c a l Science Review, 1961, Vol.LV, No .3 . 2 I conclude th i s from the 1971 e l e c t i o n r e s u l t s . The major tool of control of the outcome of the elections held by the government was i t s control of the bureaucracy of the entire country as well as the fact that Golkar was c l e a r l y the government "party". Despite the fact that Golkar i s Javanese controlled, i t did much better i n many parts of the Outer Islands than i n Java. Compare: Central Java - Golkar 54$% East Java - Golkar 50$; Djakarta - Golkar 42$; North Sumatra - Golkar 72$; B a l i - Golkar 8 7 $ ; Southeast Sulawesi ~ Golkar 92%% Riau - Golkar 7 7 $ ; Djambi - 8 7 $ ; and Kalimantan Selatan - Golkar 65$. These re s u l t s were calculated from Sinar Harapan August 7, I 9 7 2 . 3 See Selo Soemardjan, "Asian Attitudes and Asian Development" Horizons, 1 9 7 2 , Vol. XXXI, No.2, pp.14-17; Soedjatmoko, Economic Development as a Cultural Problem (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, I957)'; ~ Koentjaraningrat, "Masalah Sikap-Mental Yang Cocok Untuk Membangun" (The Problem of Mental Attitudes that Harmonize with Development) i n Kejakinan dan Perdjuangan (Conviction and Struggle) . (Djakarta: Gunung Mulia, 1 9 7 2 ) ; "Beberapa Tjatatan Tentang P r i j a j i " (Some Notes About P r i j a j i ) Sinar Harapan January 4 , 1972, Also see the Panglima of Brawidjaja's statement on preventing p r i j a j i and coolie attitudes, Sinar Harapan June 3s 1972', For an o f f i c i a l view see Minister of Education Mastmri's a r t i c l e i n Sinar Harapan June 28 - 2 9 , I972 which states that the present educational system breeds p r i j a j i - i s m . See Soedjatmoko 5s most recent statement on neo-feudalism i n Sinar Harapan July 3 9 1972, 4 While no exact figures were avail a b l e on such trends, interviews with both Javanese and non-Javanese with some knowledge on the subject indicated that the younger o f f i c e r ' s corps of ABRI and the younger ranks of the c i v i l service i n the c a p i t a l do not contain large numbers of non-Javanese. A l l of Indonesia's best u n i v e r s i t i e s are located on Java and the army's m i l i t a r y academy i s located i n Magelang, just outside of Jogjakarta. Javanese obviously have the easiest access to them given the archipelago's poor communication system. - 152 - ^This may seem to be somewhat of a contradiction given the rapid s o c i a l change described i n the previous paragraphs and i t i s . The e l i t e has to accept these Javanese norms or be ostracized or destroyed by Javanese who s t i l l hold to them, namely the army. Like the PKI and ABRI under Sukarno, verbal acceptance does not mean that one does not s t r i v e to f i g h t the l i m i t s of the system from within. The masses — to use the term loosely — es p e c i a l l y on Java, have l i t t l e reason to remain subdued or s a t i s f i e d with a neo-Mataram type of p o l i t i c a l system. Given the t r a d i t i o n a l agrarian radicalism of Java and the continuance of the conditions that have encouraged i t , the future i s bleak unless there i s change. Social explosions (the massacres) such as the ones that occurred a f t e r the G-30-S i n 1965 a r e d i s t i n c t possibilities i n the future i f the l i m i t s now placed on the p o l i t y are not relaxed. Survival, then, may dictate change. 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Indonesia, New Havens HRAF, I967 Feith, Herberts "Indonesia's P o l i t i c a l Symbols and t h e i r Wielders", World P o l i t i c s XVI, No.l (October 1963) Geertz, Hildreds "Indonesian Cultures and Communities", i n Ruth McVey (ed.) Indonesia, New Haven; HRAF,1963 Geertz, C l i f f o r d s "Afterword; The P o l i t i c s of Meaning" i n C l a i r e Holt (ed.) P o l i t i c s and Culture i n Indonesia. Ithaca; Cornell University Press I972 Gregory, Annes "Factionalism and the Indonesian Army", Journal of Comparative Administration, II No.3 (November 1970) Hanna, Willard A.: "The Magical-Mystical Syndrome i n the Indonesian Mentality", American Uni v e r s i t i e s F i e l d S t a f f Reportss Southeast Asia Series, Vol.XV, Nos. 5-9. Harnett, P.J.: "The Indonesian Army 1945-65", Review of Indonesian and Malayan A f f a i r s , V o l . 1 , No.l (January-March 19677" ~~ Hansen, Garys "Episodes i n Rural Modernizations Problems i n the Bimas Program", Indonesia No.11 ( A p r i l 1971) Higgins, Ben: "Survey of Recent Developments", B u l l e t i n of Indonesian Economic Studies, Vol.VIII, No.l (March 1972) Hindley, Donalds "President Soekarno and the Communists: The P o l i t i c s of Domestication", American P o l i t i c a l Science Review Vol.LVI, No.4 (December I 9 6 2 ) Hindley, Donalds "Alirans and the F a l l of the Old Order", Indonesia No.9 (April I 9 7 O ) - 159 - Hindley, Donalds "Indonesia 1970s The Workings of Pa n t j a s i l a Democracy", Asian Survey Vol.XI, No.2, (February 1971) Hindley, Donald; "Indonesia 1971; Pantjasila Democracy and the Second Parliamentary Elections",Asian Survey XII No.l (January 1972) Lev, Daniel S.; "Parties, Functional Groups and El e c t i o n s " , Asia: A Journal of the Asia Society (Autumn 1970) Lev, Daniel S.s "The P o l i t i c a l Role of the Army i n Indonesia", P a c i f i c A f f a i r s XXXVI No.4 (Winter 1963-4) Lev, Daniel S,s " P o l i t i c a l Parties i n Indonesia", Journal of Southeast Asian History, V o l . 8 , No.l (March I967) Lev, Daniel and Feith, Herbert; "The End of the Indonesian Rebellion", P a c i f i c A f f a i r s XXXVI No.l (Spring I963) Levine, David; "History and Social Structure i n the Study of Contemporary Indonesia", Indonesia No.7 ( A p r i l I969) Liddle, R. William: "Modernizing IndonesianPolitics" n.p., n.d. ( I970?) Stenciled. Mclntyre, Anguss "Divisions and Power i n the Indonesian National Party", Indonesia No.11 ( A p r i l 1972) Mackie, J.A.C.s. "Indonesian P o l i t i c s under Guided Democracy", Australian Outlook, Vol . 1 5 , No.3 (December 19OT) Mackie, J.A.C.5 " C i v i l - M i l i t a r y Relations and the I97I Elections i n Indonesia", Australian Outlook, Vol.24, No.3 (December I970I McVey, Ruth T.; "The Post-Revolutionary Transformation of the Indonesian Army" (Two Parts) Indonesia, Vols. 11 and 13 ( A p r i l 1971 and I972I Mortimer, Rexs "Class, Social Cleavage and Indonesian Communism", Indonesia, No.8 (October I969) Nasution, A.H.5 " P o l i t i c a l Restructuring After 'G-30-S'" P a c i f i c Community (Tokyo) V o l . 3 , No.l (January 1971) Paget, Rogers "The M i l i t a r y i n Indonesia; The Burden of Power", P a c i f i c A f f a i r s , Vol.XL, No.3 ( F a l l and Winter I967-68) - 160 - Pauker, Guy s "The Gestapu A f f a i r of 1965s Reflections on the P o l i t i c s of I n s t a b i l i t y i n Indonesia", Southeast Asias An International Quarterly, Vol .'I, Nos. 1-2 (Winter-Spring 1971) Pauker, Guys "Indonesia i n 1964s Toward a 'People's Democracy'?" Asian Survey Vol.V, No.2 (February I965) Price, Robert M.s "A Theoretical Approach to M i l i t a r y Rule i n New Statess Reference Group Theory and the Ghanaian Case", World P o l i t i c s Vol.XXIII, No,3, ( A p r i l I 9 7 D Rocamora, J.E.s "The Partai Nasional Indonesia", Indonesia No.10 (October 1970) Sajidiman: "Membangun Manusia Indonesia Untuk Mentjapai Masjarakat P a n t j a s i l a " (Developing Indonesians to Achieve a P a n t j a s i l a Society) Djakartas A p r i l 1972 (Stenciled). Samson, Allans "Islam and Indonesian P o l i t i c s " , Asian Survey Vol.VIII, No.12 (December 1968) Samson, A l l a n ; "Army and Islam i n Indonesia", P a c i f i c A f f a i r s , Vol.XLIV, No.4 (winter I97I-72) Smith, R.S. and Theodore M.: "The P o l i t i c a l Economy of Regional and Urban Revenue Policy i n Indonesia", Asian Survey, Vol.XI, No.8 (August 1971) Sudarsono, Juwono "Menilai Kembali Makna Perkembangan P o l i t i k " (Re-evaluating the Purpose of P o l i t i c a l Development), Ekonomi Tahun IX, No.l. Soedjatmoko; "Indonesia; Problems and Opportunities", Australian Outlook, V o l . 2 1 , No.3 (December I967) Soedjatmoko; "The Role of P o l i t i c a l Parties i n Indonesia" i n P h i l l i p W. Thayer (ed.) Nationalism and Progress i n Free Asia, Baltimores John Hopkins Press, 1956 Soehartos "Beberapa Pokok Pik i r a n Mengenai Pewarisan N i l a i - N i l a i '45 Kepada Generasi Muda Indonesia" (Some Main Thoughts concerning the i n h e r i t i n g of the 19^5 Values by the Young Generation of Indonesia), Stenciled March 13, 1972. Sundhaussen, Ulfs "The M i l i t a r y i n Research on Indonesian P o l i t i c s " , The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol.XXXI, No.2 (February 1972) - l 6 l - Van der Kroef, Justus; "New P o l i t i c a l Patterns i n Indo- nesia", World Today, Vol . 2 5 , No.5 (May 1969) Van der Kroef, Justus; "Sukarno's F a l l " , Orbis, Vol.XI, No.2 (Summer 1967) Van der Kroef, Justus: "Indonesian Communism's 'Revolutionary Gymnastics'", Asian Survey, Vol.V, No.5 (May 1965) Wilner, Ann Ruth: "The Neotraditional Accommodation to P o l i t i c a l Independences The Case of Indonesia" i n Lucian Pye (ed.) Cases i n Comparative P o l i t i c s s Asia Bostons L i t t l e , Brown 1970. Yasunaka, Akios "Basic Data on Indonesian P o l i t i c a l Leaders", Indonesia No.10 (October 1970) NEWSPAPERS AND MAGAZINES BERITA BUANA (A Djakarta-published d a i l y newspaper with tenuous m i l i t a r y connections); June 1 2 , 1 9 7 2 ; October 5, 1971? October 1 2 , I97I5 December 2 3 , I 9 7 I 5 October 6, 19715 March 6, 1 9 7 2 . BERITA YUDHA (A Djakarta-published d a i l y newspaper backed by the m i l i t a r y ) ; March 5, 1971 . EKPRES (A Djakarta-published weekly news magazine); September 6, I 9 7 I . INDONESIA RAYA (A Djakarta-published d a i l y newspaper; independent); June 13, 1 9 7 2 . KOMPAS (A Djakarta-published d a i l y newspaper associated with PARTAI KATOLIK); A p r i l 27-28, 1972; March 2 0 , 1972; A p r i l 18, 1972; February 7, 1 9 7 2 ; A p r i l 11 , 1972; March 16, I 9 7 2 . PEPOMAN (A Djakarta-published d a i l y newspaper associated with the former PSI-Socialist party); A p r i l 24, 1972; October 28, 19711 February 1 1 , 1 9 7 2 ; February 7, I 9 7 2 . SINAR HARAPAN (A Djakarta-published d a i l y newspaper associated with PARKINDO, the Christian Party); March 18, 1972; June 2 , 1 9 7 2 ; June 26, 1972; July 1 9-23, 1972; January 6, 1972; A p r i l 15, 1 9 7 2 ; A p r i l 1 , 1972; January 3-5, 1972; March 1 , 1 9 7 2 ; June 6, 1972; June 3, 1972; June 28 - 2 9 , 1 9 7 2 ; January 4 , 1 9 7 2 . - 162 - TEMPO (A Djakarta-published weekly news magazine); J u l y 10, 19715 A p r i l 8, 1972; August 14, 1971; June 30, 1972; September 18, 1971? February 26, 1972; June 2 3 , 1972. UNPUBLISHED THESES AND DOCUMENTS Ehrmann, Michaels The Indonesian Army under Guided Democracy, M.A, Thesis, C o r n e l l U n i v e r s i t y I967, Nawawi, Mohammeds Regionalism and Regional C o n f l i c t s i n Indonesia, Doctoral d i s s e r t a t i o n , P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y , I 9 6 8 . Noer, D e l i a r s The Rise and Development of the Modernist Muslim Movement i n Indonesia During the Dutch C o l o n i a l P e r i o d (1900-1942), Ph.D. D i s s e r t a t i o n , C o r n e l l U n i v e r s i t y 1963. Smith, Teds The Indonesian Bureaucracys S t a b i l i t y , Change and P r o d u c t i v i t y , D i s s e r t a t i o n , U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a , Berkeley 1971. "Memorandum Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat Republik Indonesia Mengenai Masalah Minatur Indonesia 'Indonesia Indah' Dan Haridepan Generasi Muda" (Memorandum of the Indonesian , Parliament concerning the Problems of the B e a u t i f u l Indonesia I n M i n i a t u r e and the Future of the Younger Generation), No. l076/P.Ch.M.I.I./72. "Pembaharuan S t r u k t u r P o l i t i k " (Renewing the P o l i t i c a l S t r u c t u r e ) Golkar Pusat (no date) "Perkembangan Baru Di Indonesia" (New Developments i n Indonesia) Bahan Golkar Pusat N 0 . O I 5 (24-2-71) "Pernjataan P o l i t i k Golongan Karya" (The P o l i t i c a l Statement of Golongan Karya),Golkar Pusat (no date) "The Sekber Golkars A bird's-eye view of i t s h i s t o r y " , Golkar Pusat (no d a t e ) . Surat Keputusan No, KEP-101/VII/Golongan Karya/1971 (Containing the p o s t - e l e c t i o n s t r u c t u r e of Golkar) Surat Keputusan No. KEP-40l/lX/Golongan Karya/71 ( c o n t a i n i n g the temporary basic r e g u l a t i o n s of p o s t - e l e c t i o n Golkar, the program and l i s t s of the personnel of the Golkar Co-ordinating Bodies) "Tindjauan S i t u a s i N a s i o n a l " (An Observation of the N a t i o n a l S i t u a t i o n ) Golkar Pusat (Medio, December 1970) - 163 - GLOSSARY OP IMPORTANT INDONESIAN TERMS AND ACRONYMS abangan ABRI ASPRI BIMAS Brawidjaja bupati Diponegoro DPR DPRD Gestapu or G-30-S Golkar golongan tertentu gotong-rojong the Javanese masses that are Islamic In name only; th e i r r e l i g i o u s practices are a mixture of Islam, Hinduism and animism. Angatan Bersendjata Republik Indonesia (Armed Forces of The Republic of Indonesia). Asisten Pribadi (Personal A s s i s t a n t ) ; refers to President Suharto's personal s t a f f . Bimbingan Massa (Mass Guidance) - a government scheme for increasing r i c e production. the Indonesian Army D i v i s i o n for the region of East Java. the administrative head of a kabupaten or d i s t r i c t . the Indonesian Army D i v i s i o n for the region of Central Java. Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat (Council of People's Representatives or Paliament). Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat Daerah (Council of the People's Representatives of the Regions or Regional Parliament). Gerakan Tigapuluh September ( 3 0 t h of September Movement). Golongan Karya (Functional Group); the government "party". fixed or determined groups; used especially i n reference to enemies of the state. mutual or s e l f - h e l p ; refers to doing things c o l l e c t i v e l y rather than i n d i v i d u a l l y . - 164 - d i s t r i c t ; one administrative l e v e l "below the Daerah Tingkat Satu or province; frequently referred to as Daerah Tingkat Dua (Second Level Region)„ l i t e r a l l y Regional Head; today c a l l e d governor„ V i l l a g e Headman; i n Java the term lurah i s used. knight or so l d i e r Islamic teacher Kelompok Induk Organasasi (Mother Organization); refers to the seven d i f f e r e n t major d i v i s i o n s of functional groups within Golkar, Sukarno's idea for creating a stable government (1956). stupid or dumb masses Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban (Command for Restoring Security and Public Order); an extra- co n s t i t u t i o n a l m i l i t a r y body set up in the wake of the G-30-S. Korps Pegawai Negri (National C i v i l Servants Corps); one of the functional groups. palace of the king or Sultan v i l l a g e headman i n Java; i n the Outer Islands frequently c a l l e d Kepala Desa. P o l i t i c a l Manifesto; one of the key ide o l o g i c a l symbols of the Sukarno regime. the name given the command for the re- capturing of West I r a i n from the Dutch; Suharto was the head of t h i s operation. outer provinces - 165 - Masjumi MPR musjawarah NASAKOM negara agung NU Panglima(Besar) Parkindo p r i j a j i PKI PMI or Parmusi PNI PSI PSII OPSUS the ''modernist" Muslim p o l i t i c a l party that was banned by Sukarno because of opposition to him„ Madjelis Permusjawarahan Rakjat (People's Deliberative Assembly or Super-Parliament). consensus or unanimity Nasionalisme, Agama(Religion) dan Komunisme; another of the key symbols of the Sukarno regime. the king's land or the t e r r i t o r y near the king's palace. Nahdatul Ulama; a " t r a d i t i o n a l i s t " Muslim p o l i t i c a l party. Regional' M i l i t a r y Commander (Commander-in-Chief) Partai Kristen Indonesia (Indonesian Ch r i s t i a n Party) the aristocracy of the Javanese abangan masses. Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party). Partai Muslimin Indonesia 0 (Indonesian Muslim Party) Partai Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian Na t i o n a l i s t Party). Partai S o s i a l i s Indonesia (Indonesian S o c i a l i s t Party);banned i n i960 by Sukarno. Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia; a small Muslim party. Operas! Chusus (Special Operations); led by A l i Murtopo - 166 - santri Siliwangi tanah sabrang UUD45 wajang k u l i t a s t r i c t observer of Islam the Indonesian Army Di v i s i o n of the region of West Java overseas t e r r i t o r y Undang-Undang Dasar 1945 (1945 Constitution). a shadow play made by using leather puppets 1 also frequently used to re f e r to the "Indonesian" s t y l e of p o l i t i c s .

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