THE JAVANIZATION OF INDONESIAN POLITICS

by

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ABSTRACT

This thesis applies the analytical concept of political culture to politics in the Indonesian context. The term "Javanization" is used to describe the process whereby ethnic Javanese and Javanized individuals gradually became the overwhelming and disproportionate majority of the governing elite in the post-independence era. It is further argued that the dominance in terms of numbers has led to the Javanization of Indonesian conceptions of state and limits of political behavior.

The first chapter surveys other theories of Indonesian politics and makes a proposal for a cultural theory. The cultural cleavages in Indonesian society in the horizontal plane are described and a description of the government of Mataram operating in a totally Javanese environment is given. The changing roles of the primary bearers of Javanese political culture and the nature of the state are discussed.

Chapter Two interprets post-independence political history from the perspective of increasing Javanization and the gradual loss of national political influence by non-Javanese Islamic political elements. Data on the ethnic composition of the contemporary military, governmental and political elite are presented.
Chapter Three is a discussion of contemporary (1959 to 1972) Indonesian government and politics using the same conceptual framework (structure, functions and style) as is used to discuss Mataram. Some similarities and dis-similarities are pointed out.

The thesis concludes with a discussion of the future of Javanization.
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David L. Thornton

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CHAPTER I

POLITICAL CULTURE, GOVERNMENT AND JAVANISM

Theorizing About Indonesian Politics: A Cultural Proposition

Indonesia is a large culturally, ethnically and linguistically diverse nation in Southeast Asia. Following four years of fighting the Dutch, the country became internationally recognized as an independent nation in 1950. Since that time Indonesia has suffered the many vicissitudes that seem so common in the newly independent nations of Africa and Asia. These include unsuccessful attempts at "Western style" democratic government, recurrent regional rebellions and revolts, "one-man" rule, and finally, military rule. Politically speaking, Indonesia has been a highly unstable nation with numerous changes of governments, constitutions, and other institutions.

Besides the numerous attempts at general theorizing about the flow and instability of politics in the newly independent nations\(^1\), several authors have examined the Indonesian case in detail. Their theories can be broadly classified into three categories: the "skill theory", the "ethnic theory" and the "class theory".

In his tour de force on Indonesian Politics of the 1950-58 period, Herbert Feith proposed that the flow of politics should best be seen as the conflict between two skill groups: the administrators and the solidarity-makers.\(^2\)
Feith felt that the administrators were very pragmatically inclined and Western-oriented while the solidarity-makers were inclined to place politics and the "continuation of the revolution" above all other considerations. The "decline of constitutional democracy" was seen to represent the victory of the solidarity-makers over the administrator skill group. Feith identified the administrators mainly with two political parties, the Masjumi (a "modernist" Muslim party) and the PSI (a small intellectual-led socialist party). On the other hand, the solidarity-makers were seen as best represented in the person of Sukarno and the PNI (the nationalist party).

At about the same time that Feith published his book, Leslie Palmier wrote a book interpreting Indonesian politics as basically an ethnic conflict between the largest ethnic group, the Javanese, and the peoples of the Outer Islands or non-Javanese. Given the fact that the Outer Islands had revolted against the Javanese-led central government during the 1956-58 period and that the Outer Island associated Masjumi and PSI were banned in its wake, leaving only the Javanese-dominated parties at the center, the Palmier theory seemed to have high explanatory value.

Much later David Levine and Jan Pluvier chose to interpret post-independence politics in Indonesia as basically an elite-mass conflict. Levine said that Indonesia has
essentially a "retrogressive" social system in which the various factions of the elite fight among themselves for state power while at the same time attempting to keep the masses from exercising power in the political system. The decline of the parliamentary system in which the "people" (meaning the PKI for Levine) were on the verge of victory and the eventual destruction of the "people's party" by the military were seen as supporting this argument.

After detailed field research, Rex Mortimer greatly reduced the applicability of the Levine theory by pointing out that despite numerous attempts to do so, the PKI had never been able to exploit the class divisions in Indonesian society in the way in which Marxist-Leninist theory said it should. The PKI had simply abandoned such an approach as inapplicable to Indonesian society.

Further, John Legge examined in detail the theories of Felth and Palmier and found that they were not completely convincing when actually applied to the specifics of any situation. He concluded that both theories explained part of the truth but were entirely too narrow to be the all encompassing theories that their authors presented them to be.

After studying the above theories, my own conclusion is that the ethnic theory expanded to a political culture theory is the most promising way to conceptualize contemporary Indonesian politics. Almond and Powell write "political
culture is the pattern of individual attitudes and orientations toward politics among the members of a political system ... the kinds of orientations which exist in a population will have a significant influence on the ways in which the political system works. The demands made upon the system, the responses to law and to appeals for support, and the conduct of individuals in their political roles, will all be shaped and conditioned by the common orientation patterns. They constitute the latent political tendencies for political behavior and as such they are of great importance in explaining and predicting political action." Clifford Geertz adds "one of the things everyone knows but no one can quite think how to demonstrate is that a country's politics reflect the design of its culture." 

Almond and Powell add that one nation-state may have many political sub-cultures and that the dominant political culture may not in fact be the national (in the sense of widely-spread and accepted) political culture at all, nor even the political culture of the numerical majority of the country's inhabitants. This is particularly true in most newly independent countries, although some older nations also have similar difficulties, where in Geertz's words there is a new state composed of an old society; usually many old societies.

The cultural heterogeneity of Indonesia is an
established fact and seems quite inviting for the application of the concept of political culture as an analytical tool to explore the flow of Indonesian politics. This paper examines the notion of political culture as applied to the Indonesian case. The term "Javanization" is presented to explain the process of politics from independence to the present (1972). "Javanization" means the process of gradual domination of the Indonesian polity by ethnic Javanese and their variety of political culture. A model of traditional Javanese political culture is presented and its basic similarities to contemporary Indonesian political culture are pointed out. The process of "Javanization" is argued historically and data on the composition of the contemporary Indonesian political and governmental elite is presented to support it. Finally, some discontinuities or counter-processes are described and interpreted from the standpoint of their effect on a "Javanized" government and political process.

Political Cultures in Indonesia:

It is almost impossible to successfully generalize about Indonesia's culture because of the heterogeneity of the population. It has been estimated that there are at least 200 completely different languages spoken in the vast archipelago, and each of these language groups usually has its own adat or traditional customs. A simplistic but fairly accurate description of the country's population would read
like this: The major linguistic and ethnic group is the Javanese who comprise about 50% of the total population of 120 million and then come the Sundanese who live on the western end of the island of Java who compose about 12% of the population and then there are many other small groups no one of which totals more than 2 to 3% of the population.

At independence there was no all-Indonesian culture. There was one large sub-culture and a multitude of smaller ones. Given the legacies of colonial rule which left the Javanese not only the most numerous cultural group in the new nation but also the best educated and most politically mobilized, it was almost inevitable that the new political culture of Indonesia would have strong traces of Javanese influence. Observing the first nine years of independence and commenting especially on the virtual civil war in 1958, Daniel S. Lev wrote:

The process of assimilation - to use the term loosely - had already begun, a fact which may have lent more bitterness to the conflict. Except for the Sundanese of West Java ... most of the outer island groups were not only small in numbers and mutually hostile but also culturally less self-assured than the Javanese. Their relationships with Java were and are ambivalent; the Javanese are seen as effete and elusive, but also as halus (refined and cultured) and also politically clever -- a people to be disdained but also to be emulated. For their part, the Javanese never doubted their cultural superiority over other groups; nor did they doubt their right to the principal voice in independent Indonesia.

Despite the seeming multitude of small cultures in the Outer Islands, there was a factor that unified a great number
of them, other than simple opposition to Java, and that was the influence of Islam.

In his work The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, Feith discussed the idea of political culture before turning away from it to his skill group theory. He stated that history had created two major political cultures in Indonesia: Javanese aristocratic and Islamic entrepreneurial political cultures. The roots of these, he wrote, could be attributed to the differences of historical experience of the different communities of the archipelago. The points of difference were: 1) differences in traditional political organization among the wet-rice cultivation areas, the dry-rice cultivation areas and the coastal maritime areas; 2) the difference in the degree of penetration of Islam; and 3) the differences in the impact of Dutch colonial rule.

The first of these (Javanese aristocratic political culture), which is the political culture of the great majority of the Javanese, was born of state organization in the wet-rice agriculture based inland empires of Java, of shallow Islamization, and a long period of intensive Dutch impact, which produced enormous densities of population, a hollowing out of the structures of social integration, and an incapacitation of entrepreneurship. The Islamic entrepreneurial political culture is one whose adherents are far more dispersed and socially disparate ... historically this political culture is a product of the maritime commercial towns, of thorough Islamization, of relatively slight Dutch impact, and of the revival of entrepreneurship in the present century.
Generalizing even further, Feith points out that not only was one of the political cultures contemptuous of economic pursuits and the other respectful, but also one was associated with support for a secular and broadly theistic or pan-theistic state and the other with support for a state based on Islam. In addition, Javanese aristocratic political culture involved a greater intensity of anti-Dutch sentiment than did the other political culture and at the same time, a less intense hostility to the Chinese. Javanese aristocratic political culture tended toward nativism, while Islamic entrepreneurial political culture was generally more ready to accept and incorporate influences stemming from the modern West. But, according to Feith, the Javanese aristocratic political culture was far more sympathetic to socialist ideas. 18

With the benefit of ten additional years of perspective on Feith, it can now be argued that the very factors that he believed created two major political cultures in the country, in fact, broke them down into other sub-cultures. The weakening of the structures of social integration and overpopulation caused by the intense impact of Dutch colonial rule, Japanese occupation, the four-year war for independence, the mass politics of constitutional and guided democracy, the penetration of contemporary world culture plus the coming of the "modernist" Islamic movement to the entire
country, shattered or at the very least, greatly eroded the periphery of the Javanese aristocratic and Islamic entrepreneurial political cultures which allowed the rise of other sub-cultures having some links to the original and remnant ones.

The Javanese aristocratic political culture has existed as the Great Tradition of agrarian Java for many centuries. The coming of Islam to Java in the 15th and 16th centuries only added another layer of influence to the broadly Hindu-Javanese culture. Islam, although accepted as the single religion of Java, was thoroughly indigenized and mixed with more traditional variants of the "Javanese religion".

In many parts of the Outer Islands and in the non-Hinduized portions of Java, the initial coming of Islam had a much greater effect. Despite the fact that some indigenization and modification of Islam did occur in these areas, it was very minor compared with that in the interior of east and central Java. In the Outer Islands in general, but in Atjeh, Minangkabau, Makassar, West Java (Sunda) and the north coast of central and east Java in particular, Islam began to play a major, if not dominant, social role.

In the late 19th century, a new wave or current of Islam swept across the archipelago. This wave, known as "modernist" or "purist" Islam or Islamic reformism was much
less compatible with traditional forms of social and political organization. This "chauvinism" of "modernist" Islam set up abiding tensions even in Java that reflected the antagonism of the traditional order and the Islamic reformist movement. Stated simply, the Outer Islands became more rigorously and strictly Islamic while only a small portion of the ethnic Javanese came to accept the new "modernist" doctrine.

With the birth of political parties, the differences between the "modernist" and the "traditionalist" varieties of the Islamic or santri movement was institutionalized in the form of the Masjumi, a "modernist" Muslim party, and the Nahdatul Ulama (NU), a "traditionalist" Muslim party. Given the above background, it appears quite natural that the Masjumi had its greatest support in the Outer Islands and the NU in Java itself.

Javanese aristocratic culture or the culture of the Javanese prijai and abangan was attacked not only by Islam of two varieties but also by Western political thought and de-traditionalization in general. The creation of political parties saw this political culture split in much the same manner as was Islam, a modernist-traditionalist division. Simplistically, the split can be said to have been institutionalized in a division between the PKI (the Indonesian Communist Party) and the PNI (the Indonesian Nationalist Party). The latter was initially an organization that expected
traditional patrimonial social relations to give it strength and the former hope that economic and class divisions would give it mass support. The PNI was an extremely complex organization, and conservative (read traditional) and radical (read extreme nationalist) factions eventually appeared in it.23

Since Soedjatmoko's initial writing on the subject in the early 1950's, it has been recognized that rather than being interest articulators or aggregators Indonesian political parties represent aliran or various flows of thought within the body politic.24 Given the institutionalization of these aliran as social forces25 with mutually antagonistic and exclusive ideologies or world views, it can reasonably be argued that the aliran are, in fact, political sub-cultures in themselves.

In a later writing, Feith gave the best graphic presentation yet published of the division of aliran or sub-cultures and their relationship to political parties.26 (See Figure I) From the diagram it can be seen that Feith thinks there are five main political sub-cultures in the country: communism, radical nationalism, Javanese traditionalism (here called Javanese aristocratic political culture), democratic socialism and Islam. For some unexplainable reason, he chose not to represent the real split in Islam between the "modernist" and "traditionalist" or indigenized
varieties or to relate the Indonesian army to the subcultures as he did the major political parties.\textsuperscript{27} My diagram (Figure II) is an attempt to remedy the latter shortcoming.

The two diagrams clearly show the divisions in Indonesian society described in the last several pages. The crucial point, in my opinion, is that a portion of the PKI, the PNI, the NU and the army all fall within the Javanese traditionalist (or aristocratic) sphere. Each of these four organizations have common Javanese roots. The army and the PNI are most closely in the center of Javanese aristocratic culture. As Lev noted about the three large Javanese based parties (and I now add the army): "The NU \textit{ki.jaji} ... the PNI \textit{prijaji} and the PKI peasant (and the army \textit{kesatria}) spoke the same language and shared the same stereotypes of the non-Javanese for whom the Masjumi spoke. Social communications between the three (now four) groups flowed with more or less traditional ease ..."\textsuperscript{28}

The above statement sets the stage for the analysis of Indonesian politics from the political culture perspective. Broadly, the flow of politics can be seen as a two level struggle: one between the groups most influenced by and linked to Javanese aristocratic political culture versus the Islamic entrepreneurial political culture and secondly, among the variants or sub-cultures of the Javanese political culture.
FIGURES

I POLITICAL PARTIES AND POLITICAL ALIRAN
SOURCE: FEITH & CASTLES, OP. CIT., P. 14

II POLITICAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL INFLUENCES ON ABRI'S
OFFICER CORPS UNDER THE NEW ORDER
The overall process can best be described as "Javanization" of politics. "Javanization" will be used in preference to the term "Prijaji-ization", despite the fact that the latter term most closely describes the process. "Javanization" will be used to describe the progressive increase in influence and power of ethnic Javanese and other Indonesians who have become very Javanese in thought and action in the government and politics of Indonesia as a whole. Not only is this process seen as putting more ethnic Javanese in the government but especially Javanese of one cultural variant: the prijaji or Great Tradition of Java. This concept should be kept constantly in mind as the remainder of this paper is read.

A Note on the Cultural Influences on the Military:

In Figure II, I presented a rather controversial placement of the military in relationship to the aliran. The diagram only refers to the present leadership (as of 1972) and should not be seen as depicting a historical phenomenon. It should further be noted that no communist or "modernist" Islamic influences are shown. It is these two cultural and ideological tendencies that the Indonesian military (ABRI) is most hostile towards, and elements sympathetic to them have gradually been purged from the ranks -- assuming that they were ever present in the first place. Also note the limited influence of democratic socialism
(Western political philosophy) and radical nationalism. The influence of the former on political thinking in ABRI has seemingly decreased with the isolation of the Siliwangi Division of West Java since 1966. The latter is more difficult to discuss. At the moment its influence seems to be more latent than active. The sensitiveness of the President to Indonesian businessmen's complaints about foreign competition and ABRI's recent stress on the inheritance of the "1945 Generation" or the spirit of revolutionary struggle to the younger generation seem to be signs of its continued presence. While the influence of Islam on the military in general is small, most military people including the Javanese acknowledge it as their religion, albeit with certain reservations.

The relationship of "modern" or at least western military doctrine and Javanese traditionalism would seem to be the most controversial. The military and its spokesmen are quick to proclaim their support for modernisasi and pembangunan (modernization and development) and deny the role of traditional values and influences. This does not, however, correspond with my own feeling about the matter. That the army has imported many modern organizational principles and put them to good use is not denied. Certainly some political doctrine expounded by ABRI is also of this variety. The question remains as to the depth of the acceptance of the
values to go along with the organizational principles, and only actions can give the proper answer to it. The army with its dual function ideology certainly has created its own format for a continuing political and social as well as a military role which is very distinctly different from the Western conceptions of the military's proper role. On the other hand, ABRI's analysis of Indonesia's political problems and its prescribed remedies at the Second Army Seminar in Bandung during 1966 are decidedly Western in approach. To this date the implementation of said remedies has had a decidedly Javanese flavor to it, however. The correctness of my placement of ABRI's present leadership on the diagram can be better appreciated after the similarities between the New Order and Mataram are pointed out.

**Government and Politics in a Javanese Political Culture: Later Mataram (15th and 16th century)**

While the northern coast of Java or the pasisir succumbed to Islam in a very complete manner, this was not true of the cultural heartland of Java on the interior of the central and eastern portions of the island. There Islam barely affected the traditional scheme of culture and government. In the 15th and 16th century Java existed side by side with the Dutch East India Company or VOC; yet little affected by it. At this time the kingdom of Mataram controlled the Javanese heartland. Excellent studies of this period of
history have been made by Moertono and Schrieke while Anderson and Geertz have presented equally valuable interpretations of "Javanism" as well. From these studies, a model of "Javanism" and the Javanese state in relatively pure form can be obtained. While it is naturally impossible to ascertain the full range of values, beliefs and attitudes that formed traditional Javanese political culture, it is possible to see the results of this political culture as reflected in the structure, functions and style of Mataram's government. In turn this reflection can be compared with contemporary Indonesian politics to discover the broad similarities and dis-similarities.

Structure:

According to Steinberg, "the political structure of Java in Mataram times began -- and theoretically speaking, also ended -- with the king." In theory, at least, there were and could not be any limits on the powers and rights of such a king for even with the acceptance of Islam, he was still somewhat of a sacral figure.

The state itself was conceived of as consisting of four concentric circles of territory that faded imperceptibly into each other with increasing distance from the center. The kraton or palace was the center which was surrounded by the negara agung or royal land. The latter was the very core of the kingdom, during Mataram times located in the area of
Solo and Jogjakarta. The next circle was the *mantja negara* or outer provinces which at the height of Mataram's power included all of Java except the very extreme eastern and western tips of the island. Finally, there were the *tanah sabrang* or overseas states that acknowledged the suzerainty of the center.

Naturally an elaborate administration was required to govern such a kingdom. By and large the realm was not governed by members of the royal family for they were kept at the court and hopefully, politically neutral. In some of the outer provinces hereditary local lords were incorporated into the administration; otherwise their areas were ruled through officials, who no matter how independent they might be in reality, were in theory only servants of the king.

At the center in the *kraton* and *negara agung*, there was an elaborate structure of administration that in composition was supposedly sacral. Usually the ruling council was composed of five ministers: a *patih* or chief minister and four *wedana* or lesser ministers. On occasion the king reserved the position of *patih* for himself. The functions of these officials, in contrast to the structure, were imprecise; areas of responsibility and relative importance seem to have depended more on their personal relations with the king or their strength in court circles.
than on the particular offices they occupied." 33 The structure formally fit the pattern that kept order in the smaller world of the kingdom, but "political business was conducted primarily in terms of personal relations." 34 Moertono notes that whatever the change in the functions of Mataram government during its 400 years of existence, the ideological and structural bases of state life seem not to have changed at all. 35

While the structure of the state was elaborate, in reality the degree of control by the center was very low. The degree of effectiveness of the king was measured by just what degree he could tighten up the looseness of the structure or in other words, accumulate power at the center. Therefore, as Anderson notes, the Javanese seem to have held a view of history that envisioned fluctuations of power at the center; continual waxing and waning of power. 36 Times of tranquility corresponded to strength and times of disorder to weakness at the center. If there was any causal relationship seen here, it was that weakness causes or allows disturbance, rather than vice versa.

While rule in the negara agung could be controlled closely, this was much less true in the outer provinces and the overseas territory. A rule of financial self-sufficiency or autonomous financing gave the officials there full and undivided authority over their region. "It is therefore not
surprising that, within this region, he (the local official) wielded the powers of administration, judge and commander of the local contingent of troops ... the fact that regional officials held undivided power made it essential that they be chosen with great care.  

Simply stated, despite its outward appearances, the state was primitively organized and only held together by personal attachments and loyalties, partly inevitable because of poor communications and the far-flung nature of the kingdom; so, the danger of disintegration was inherent in the system, especially as hereditary succession stimulated the establishment of new gentry families in the outer provinces and overseas territories.  

Throughout the centuries the king's officials, from the highest to the lowest, gradually became a social class with an exclusive set of beliefs and values. They formed the social stratum between the king plus the small group of princes of royal blood and the great mass of private citizens who, irrespective of wealth or means of living were called the wong tjilik or small people. This administrative and social group was known as the prijaji. Commoners could enter this group but only by becoming a servant of the king, an official.  

In such a polity, at least in theory, there was no such phenomenon as politics for the king's slightest wish became law. In actuality there were politics but of the court
or palace politics variety. There were multitudes of intrigues, schemes and maneuverings for better position in relationship to the ruler. The notion of mass politics and participation was, however, alien to the system.

Functions:

In the Javanese belief system or world view, harmony was the greatest value. Harmony as a goal meant to create a "one-ness" with one's surroundings and above all with God. It follows that the conception of the proper function of the state was broader and at the same time narrower than the modern one. Broader because harmony extended to the soul and narrower because harmony meant, in many cases, the total absence of government, if possible. "The Javanese, therefore, would not consider the state to have fulfilled its obligation if it did not encourage inner psychological order (tenteram, peace and tranquility of heart) as well as enforcing the formal order (tata)." Continuing, Moertono says:

Following this line of reasoning, one can understand why state administration in the kingdoms of old seem to have neglected the people's needs, seems to have been detached from the toils of the common people. In agrarian countries where man's life depends so much more on the steady flow of seasonal change, where the concept of harmony is viewed more in terms of regularity and familiarity with the patterns of community life, any interference in the life of society may disturb the balance of the universe. Thus the state will as much as possible, refrain from interference. Such restraint is feasible too because of agrarian life, relatively,
does not need much state stimulus to work ... It follows that progress in the modern sense of deliberate development and active stimulation could not have been considered a goal of the state. The role of the king is then more that of a protector than a developer ... with the all-dominating position of the king in state life, administration as a technical tool of kingship had to reflect the king's major concern, the preservation of harmony. This need determined the major and most important task, mainly, maintaining security. In practice this meant guarding against any possible disturbance from an outside foe as well as any internal crime or irregularity which might disturb the balance between the two cosmic spheres (the kingdom and the universe). Anyone who did disturb the internal order had to be disposed of without delay, "just as one would dispose of a caterpillar." The efficiency of a regime was also measured by the existence of such disturbances. In fact, there were frequent rebellions, and bands of robbers often roamed about plundering, but Moertono notes that once such groups became territorial, they governed exactly like the kingdom itself did.

One can easily imagine that any change in the kingdom became a threat to the regime, because change, any change, would disturb the balance and inner tranquility of the state. The Javanese universe became ordered by hard and stern rules of action and interaction. The duty of the state and its servants was to contain change in all forms. This passion became so obsessive that history was continually rewritten to prove the lack of change and emphasize continuity. The ultimate enforcement of such reactionary "stability" had to
rest on something other than personal relationships, and in the final analysis, it was the ability and willingness of the regime to use force that maintained order and prevented deviation.

The final function of the state and its administration was taxation. Taxation was a kind of tribute exacted in exchange for the king's protection. This tribute was in the form of money, produce and labor. Especially in the mantja negara or outer provinces this taxation was farmed out to the regent or provincial governor, who had to be self-sufficient. An order came from the top of the hierarchy as to what was to be supplied and in what quantity. The local lord or regent then adjusted his own administration to that requirement. The state depended on this tribute to maintain itself and the elaborate life-style of the court, for it had little capacity to finance itself. In this sense then, the center could be viewed as attempting to extract much but offering little in return; especially if the center was weak, the room for deviation was great in the submission of tribute.

Style and Behavior:

The style and behavior of the ruled and the rulers in Mataram was governed by a very intricate set of social relationships and norms that ascribed a place to everything in the universe. The world view of the Javanese ascribed a
meaning to everything, every action, every event. In fact, Moertono states that consequently Javanese are apt to search for meaning in acts, words or situations, no matter how rationally incomprehensible or unimportant they may seem.  

The central focus of action, however, was on the creation and maintenance of harmony, both inside and outside of the human being. This stress led to great emphasis on ceremony and symbolism. The approach to any problem had to be in harmony with the cosmos. Therefore, the outer form of functions and behavior became much more important than the content of action itself. This stress also gave rise to the unbelievably elaborate style of the age that was embodied in the prijaji.

Prijaji-ism has been well described by Clifford Geertz. The etiquette of the prijaji was so elaborate and refined that he even called it a religion of sorts. In short, the individual was supposed to express his own inner harmony and his outer harmony with the surrounding world in behavior. This style of behavior is called halus and escapes full definition in English. Loosely, it means "cultured" and "refined", but it has far reaching implications. Expression of emotion in daily conduct is forbidden. Only smoothness of expression is allowed; hence, regardless of one's true inner feelings, the countenance must remain unperturbed. Opposition, anger, fear, jealousy, hate and the
like are only expressed openly by kasar or crude beings; beings in their natural state without any concentration of power or refinement in the inner soul. Consequently, it is almost impossible for the prijaji to say "no", although certain types of "yes" do mean "no". As expressed in the structure and functions of the state, the form is much more important than the content; in fact, the actual content is very often hard to distinguish from the symbolism of the form. Geertz goes even further in discussing the implications of halus-ness by describing carefully a process called etok-etok in which prijaji avoid telling the truth whenever possible simply to preserve harmony(!).  

A prijaji must be sabar, iklas and terima, terms of virtue which mean having patience, being sincere and devoted, and willing to receive or accept all that comes one's way, good or bad. These terms express a strongly socialized inclination of submission to fate.

There is no room for a voluntary and mutual adjustment or a fine conciliation and conformation; rather the universe is ordered by hard and stern rules. Deviation from them would set off a chain reaction which might reach calamitous proportions. From here to a belief in the working of fate is but a very short distance. Harmony as a compelling need must therefore form the central concept in man's efforts toward organization ... thus the state as a replica of the cosmic order (harmony) must also have the propensities and capacities of that higher order, a power which as a part of the Great Order, no subject people dare restrict or disturb.
The despotic possibilities of such attitudes are softened somewhat by the expression of paternalism for the subjects on the part of the ruler. He must care for their sufferings, so that, according to Moertono, the ruler assumes, in fact, a role of protective superiority, the ruled an attitude of acquiescent subservience. This gives rise to a sort of patron-client relationship which is often called Bapak-ism or father-ism. This type of patrimonial relationship was reflected in the formal central hierarchy of the state as well as in most forms of political and social organization. In addition to the central hierarchy or pyramid with the king at the top and all subjects below, the society itself was divided into many small "fiefdoms" or pyramids with similar composition.

Ben Anderson has presented what he feels is a Javanese or prijaji philosophy of power. He believes it to be in many ways completely opposite from the social science conception of power today. Briefly, Anderson sees the Javanese as believing power is concrete, homogeneous, constant in total quantity and as automatically legitimate i.e. there are no moral questions involved with power or its use. On the other hand, he says Westerners view power as abstract, heterogeneous in its sources, unlimited in quantity and morally ambiguous. He further draws the implications of these observations in discussing political action and
behavior in the Javanese context, several points of which have already been touched upon here.

Another result of the emphasis on harmony, as well as the idea of power, was the importance of continuity. Continuity is an expression of non-change. Dynasties had to be related even if imaginary genealogies had to be created. Hence, the Dutch, with a little twisting of history, became descendants of ancient Javanese kings. Moertono stresses that legitimacy was derived by these rewritings of history while Anderson counters that the simple flowing of power from a monarch to his opponent was enough confirmation of legitimacy given the Javanese view of history; therefore, historical rewriting was only additional support.\textsuperscript{51}

The central roles of harmony and continuity in the Javanese mind, and thus in the state, were also reflected in a phenomenon known as syncretism. Syncretism \textit{à la Java} was essentially taking all threats, new ideas and associated forms of change and assimilating them to the major body of Javanese tradition and philosophy. Hence, Islam and even Dutch colonialism came to be expressed in very Javanese ways. The threat of new ideas was defused by absorption into the mainstream. However, such domination of change could only be maintained in the long run by the continuation of Javanese power. As long as colonial rule remained indirect, the \textit{priyai} were in a position to interpret new ideas as they wished, but in the case of direct rule this could hardly be
the case.

Soldiers were also servants of the king. The knight or kesatria image of the humble soldier always loyal to his commander was clearly expressed as a part of the general prijai belief system.

The means of socialization of the Great Tradition of the prijai to the masses is not well understood. Ben Anderson pointed out that the wajang kulit or shadow puppet show was certainly a part of the process as it depicts the prijai norms in ideal form and has been a great favorite of all levels of Javanese society for centuries.52

In summary, traditional Javanese society and government were very strong and absorptive. They were also extremely hierarchial in structure. The maintenance of harmony was the major function of the government. Change was seen as something to be tempered and controlled if it could not be prevented altogether.

The Changing Roles of the Prijai and the State

The Prijai:

The prijai were the aristocracy of the Javanese abangan masses. It was the prijai who carried out and administered the king's commands; they were the administrative class of the kingdom. "Java as a political entity rested on three things: a common language and culture, a political myth that was universally accepted because it
rested on and expressed common religious beliefs, and the shared values of a Java-wide prijaji class. The prijaji, then, as opposed to the peasant masses, were the foremost representatives of Javanese civilization in all of its manifestations, cultural or political.

With the advent of Dutch colonialism and the subjugation of Javanese royal power to that of the VOC or Dutch East India Company in the eighteenth century, the role of the prijaji initially did not change substantially. As Steinberg puts it:

Alien though it was, the VOC was enacting a role in Javanese history. Its earlier naval domination in the archipelago was decaying; it had gone ashore on Java and was now the successor to Mataram. The circles of the realm were reversed, coastal Batavia (now Djakarta) was now the center, the Bupati now faced west and north, and Mataram princes were now outer vassals. But politically the underlying structure of Java had changed hardly at all. Socially, below a small conquering elite of Dutchmen, prijaji still lorded it over the wong tiilik; a multitude of local economies still sent tribute through local channels to a greedy but distant center. A Javanese writing of the 18th century, indifferent to the company's outside connections but sensitive to the imperatives of Javanese history, could explain this: 'Jang Kung' (Jan Coen, the Dutch Governor-General who founded Batavia), it said, was the son of a wandering foreigner and a princess of West Java who was destined to bear kings. Through her, therefore, descended a legitimate dynasty of Java.

Thus was the strength of Javanese culture; early company representatives in the interior became Javanized. They took Javanese wives, spoke Javanese and wore Javanese clothes. They became a part of the patrimonial system itself and little disturbed the role of the prijaji or the continuity
of the civilization.

During the 18th century the VOC treated the inland Javanese kingdoms as large and dangerous vassals that maintained a great deal of independence. This period saw a great flowering of prijaji culture, and the position of the prijaji vis-à-vis the peasant was greatly strengthened by the company. "The Dutch ruled, but daily government remained in the hands of the prijaji; production was increasingly commercial but it continued to be organized in the feudal forms of tribute or appanage." 

The turn of the century saw the collapse of the VOC and its replacement by the Dutch government. There was an immediate shift in policy and quite naturally, it had an effect on the role of the prijaji. "Daendels (the first Governor-General appointed by the Dutch government) and his successors came out from Europe determined to govern rather than simply to control Java; they challenged the whole system of arrangement by which company servants and Javans had accommodated to each other for more than a century." The size and independence of the Javanese kingdoms were reduced, and the Dutch attempted to transform the prijaji from petty vassals into ordinary civil servants.

The ease of dealing with traditional Javanese institutions was again recognized by 1830 when the right of hereditary succession was returned to the regents; the
Dutch discovered it was much easier to rule through the personal authority of the prijaji than not. Despite some administrative simplification, the prijaji were clearly once again in day to day control of governing Java.

The major social and economic transformations of the 19th and early 20th centuries began to undermine the old prijaji institutions. The Dutch policy of hereditary succession coupled with large population growth, relatively peaceful conditions and non-expansion of the native administration created a rift between the higher prijaji who were regents or bupatis and the lower prijaji who in more normal times would have looked forward to gaining a foothold in and ascending the administrative hierarchy through force or natural displacement. However, the advent of the Ethical Policy in the last decades of the 19th century, helped feudal Java to gradually evolve, at least formally, into a modern administrative state. This meant a large expansion of the number of government positions outside of the traditional hierarchy, and educational institutions were set up in the Indies to supply people with modern skills for these positions. The lower prijaji, without a chance for advancement in the "frozen" traditional hierarchy, eagerly grasped the new opportunities and became the doctors, lawyers, engineers and civil servants of the Netherlands Indies under Ethical rule. Initially, the status associated with these
posts was not high, but Van Niel notes, "by the end of the century (19th) most of these persons were coming to be viewed as prijaji of some standing by the common people of Indonesia, even though they were often not descended from the higher prijaji families." 58

"Whereas in 1900 the prijaji group had been mainly nobles and administrators, by 1914 it contained increasing numbers of civil servants, government technicians and intellectuals who shared the elitist role and who in the eyes of the Indonesian common man of the village were included within the general designation of prijaji." 59 Most prijaji made outward adjustments to the West and Western style administration but continued to regulate their private lives on traditional patterns. The crucial point, however, was, "during the early 20th century the broadening leadership pattern of Indonesian society was almost exclusively a development within the prijaji group, and a sense of social distinctiveness remains a strong force among the elite." 60 Thus, the rise of nationalism was also the expression of one group: the prijaji.

The prijaji have always had top status in Indonesian society. The bureaucracy and white-collar positions that came to be associated with the prijaji were and are the most respected in the job hierarchy. Non-prijaji, whether peasants or even non-Javanese aspired to these positions and as a few
obtained them, became "prijahis" in the process. To this day the above pattern remains surprisingly constant.

With the above in mind, the Javanese elite of today, in my opinion, should be considered modern day prijahis. They include all government servants whether it be military, civil servants, pamong-pradja (regional administrators corps), teachers or the major white-collar service professionals in law and medicine. Additionally, Geertz has pointed out that invariably political party leaders in Java, including, surprisingly, those of the PKI are of prijahis origin. Thus the sons of Java carry on the great prijahis tradition, albeit in different roles.

The State:

While the prijahis were adapting to new roles, the conception of the state was changing to some extent also. Initially, Mataram and Batavia co-existed, but gradually Batavia began to assume the role of the center. As noted earlier, the Javanese even made the Dutch into legitimate heirs to the kingship by rewriting history. As the structure of Mataram had not changed for 400 years, the advent of Dutch rule did not easily change the conception of the state and its functions. For essentially, colonial rule was the same thing as indigenous rule when seen from the viewpoint of the effect on the population. It was still a paternalistic state. There was no role for the population other than
to accept the decisions of the new center and no way to participate other than through traditional revolts against authority. There was no conception of politics except the old one: palace politics. There was no conception of opposition except in the total and illegal variety, because it was seen as a threat to the existing order. The channels of communication remained the same: one way and always from the top. If there was ever any formal local autonomy, it was always granted from the top by the grace of the Governor-General, the new king, and not obtained by any inherent right of possession of it by the masses. Clive Day noted that "... the most striking characteristic is the immense concentration of power in the Governor-General, who in his sole person represents the royal authority and who is responsible for the conduct of affairs. Both in the legislation and in administration, he is without serious rival and with few checks in the Indies; the only serious limitation on his power is that imposed by the government in the Netherlands (thousands of miles and several months away)."^\textsuperscript{64}

"During the colonial period the fundamental objective of the government apparatus remained essentially the same; the maintenance of political, economic and social control. Compliance was achieved either by using coercion or by an implicit willingness to use it on the part of the colonial regime."^\textsuperscript{65}
The advent of the Ethical Policy in the late 19th century caused, at least on the surface, some rather drastic changes in the colonial government. Supposedly, the Netherlands Indies government stopped being merely a control apparatus and became interested in advancing the welfare of the native population. Heretofore, any roads or irrigation works had been constructed for the maintenance of security and creating infrastructure for Dutch investment. The new emphasis created a "modern" administrative state charged with supplying all sorts of social services to the population. This emphasis allowed the creation of Dutch language schools and eventually, even medical, law and engineering colleges for the natives. Native political organization was tolerated as long as it was not too open in its criticism of the regime or Dutch colonialism. Thus, the Ethical Policy gave rise to the Western-educated but prijaji elite that was later to lead the independence movements.

However, after the end of the First World War, the Ethical Policy came to an abrupt end. Political organization was no longer so easily tolerated, although the expansion of education for Indonesians did continue both in the Indies and in the Netherlands. Even the Volksraad or People's Assembly, conceived at the height of the liberal Ethical Policy, became a mere functionless organ with no power and serving only as a somewhat restricted forum of criticism of the regime.
Paternalism remained the dominating policy in terms of inter-relations between the rulers and the ruled.

Several trends continued up to the Japanese invasion that made the later Dutch regime seem much like the Javanese regimes of old. The emphasis on security and control and complete subjugation of the natives remained. Java remained the center of colonial rule even though the "kraton" itself moved to Batavia. The Dutch called all territories outside of Java "the Outer Islands", emphasizing the Java-centric nature of the regime. While the traditional institutions of Javanese rule were gradually eroded and replaced by the colonial government, the replacement was also bureaucratic in nature and easily adapted to old status, operational and political norms by the prijaji. The role of the bureaucracy in society increased greatly, and its fused nature was gradually somewhat differentiated, but the major point was that Dutch Indies government and its personnel performed the same functions as Javanese government always had and essentially through the same sorts of structures, both institutionally and socially.

Ted Smith notes that "Indonesian public institutions, during approximately 250 years of Dutch control absorbed many continental bureaucratic norms. But the fact that the Dutch relied primarily on indirect rule meant that not as many of these norms were transferred as might be indicated by the long
duration of colonial control. Sultans and regents in Java and local princes in the Outer Islands continued their traditional style of rule, shaping it only to meet whatever demands might be imposed upon them by their colonial superiors. Moreover, very few natives were brought into the higher levels of Dutch East Indies bureaucracy. This meant that despite the outward appearance of Western-style bureaucracy, Indonesians would possess no solid core of high administrators at independence like one found in the ICS (Indian Civil Service) and MCS (Malayan Civil Service) of British India and Malaya.

While the fundamental nature of government in the Netherlands Indies did not change substantially, it did allow and force other changes. One of the most obvious was the increasing numbers of poor peasants on Java. The overpopulation of Java was, is and will be one of the foremost influences on the future of the country. The traditional structure and its conservatism could not handle the large numbers of landless and virtually landless peasants. For these people in their increasing millions had no reason to be thankful for peace and order for they have nothing to lose in upheaval.

Javanese political culture was and is a non-participatory political culture. It and its government are at their greatest strength when the majority of the population is
parochial rather than even subjects. There were no structures, be they formal or informal, in "Javanism" to handle mass politics and in fact, all of the cultural norms of the intensely elitest society argue against them. The colonial government had little to fear as long as the masses remained parochials and unmobilized. Without mobilization of the masses, the pri.ija.11 elite could never have gained independence from the Dutch on any terms but those of the Dutch. The Dutch knew their own interests in Indonesia well, and anytime political organizations began to attract mass followings, for whatever the reason, they were quickly suppressed; their pri.ija.11 leaders sent into exile. The Japanese, however, had no compunctions against such organization, and their style of agitative colonialism created the exact tool that the pri.ija.11 needed to do battle with the Dutch.

On the other hand, Dutch colonialism of the later period did allow one kind of organization to penetrate the masses. According to Benda, "by the end of the 19th century, the Dutch has ceased to play a Javanese game (colonial rule became more and more direct in Java); in spite of several difficulties, they did not by and large interfere with the growth of modern Muslim movements." Without Dutch support neither the traditional nor the modern Javanese elite groups could stem the Islamic tide. The "modernist" Muslim movement
thus escaped initially the brunt of the syncretic tendencies of "Javanism" and made inroads in the Javanese heartland. Java became divided against itself: between the syncretists and the Islamic purists. The long Javanese accommodation with Islam came to an end.

Such were the continuities and changes in Javanese political culture and institutions and their bearers until independence was declared. The elite remained prija, the government remained security and control (or harmony) oriented while traditional society continued to disintegrate and Islam grew in strength. The changes meant that there could never be a neo-Mataram without the adoption of radically different structures to handle the new forces set loose in society. But this did not mean that such an attempt on the part of the prija elite was impossible or would not be tried.
NOTES on Chapter I


7 This was essentially Legge's conclusion as well, but he failed to expand the idea. Ibid. p. 170.

8 Gabriel Almond and Bingham Powell, Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little, Brown, 1965), p. 50. When the term political culture is mentioned, it usually conjures up thoughts of systematic attitudinal survey research, such as was used by Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba in the well known study The Civic Culture (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962). Such work is far beyond the scope of this study. Political Culture here is used to refer to the horizontal cleavages in Indonesian society between its major cultural groups and to a lesser extent, to refer to the vertical cleavage between the elite and mass political cultures. As such it is little more than a broad term or tool used to picture social cleavages in the political dimension. Since basic survey data was not available, this paper follows the traditional pattern of using historical evidence and to a lesser extent data on the composition of the Indonesian elite to make a number of inferences about the state of the contemporary political process. This paper is perhaps a good starting point for an Almond-Verba type study but should not be considered more than that.

10 This term is from Clifford Geertz (ed.) Old Societies and New States (New York: The Free Press, 1963).


12 According to the 1930 Census, ethnic Javanese composed 47% of the population. There is some reason to believe that this figure has declined by several percent (2 or 3) since that date. Recent census are of no value in calculating ethnic percentages as they only give regional population figures, and the population is spread around considerably from the ethnic viewpoint.

13 The 1930 Census revealed that 3.4% of the population was Minangkabau, 2.6% was Bugis, 2% was Batak and 1.88% was Balinese.


15 Herbert Feith, op. cit., p.30.

16 Ibid., p.31.

17 Ibid., p.31.

18 Ibid., p.32.


20 For the best description of this movement see Deliar Noer, The Rise and Development of the Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia During the Dutch Colonial Period (1900-1942) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1963).

21 The term santri is used for strict Muslims in Indonesia while abangan is used for those accepting Islam but retaining largely traditional beliefs as the main form of religion. The greater portion of Javanese peasants are regarded as abangan. The traditional Javanese upper classes who shared a similar view of Islam as the abangan peasants are called Prijaji (the "j"

22 See footnote No. 21.


25 The term is from Huntington, op.cit., p. 256.


27 For criticism on these points see Alfian, Masalah Mental, Aliran Politik dan Radikalisme dalam Masjarakat Indonesia (Mental Problems, Political Aliran and Radicalism in Indonesian Society) (Djakarta: Leknas, 1970), p.35.

28 Daniel S. Lev, op.cit., p.77. kijali is the word for a respected Muslim leader and Kesatria is the Javanese word for knight or soldier.


30 The terms structure, functions and style are only analytical categories or tools used to order the discussion of Mataram and, later in the paper, contemporary Indonesian politics. They are by no means mutually exclusive categories, and the discussion freely flows back and forth between them.

31 Steinberg, op.cit., p.81.

32 Ibid., p.83.
Anderson does so with the qualification that Javanese do not have the word or concept of "power" in their vocabulary. Anderson, op.cit., pp.5-8.

This point is made with some force in Robert Van Niel, The Emergence of the Modern Indonesian Elite (The Hague: Van Hoeve, 1960), pp.27-9.
The Ethical Policy was in a sense a reaction to the earlier open exploitation of the Indies and the disturbing reports received in The Hague that native welfare was rapidly declining. Education and modern health services were rapidly expanded to improve this welfare. For further discussion of this policy see Steinberg, op.cit., p. 188.

Van Niel, op.cit., p.29.

Ibid., p.50.

Ibid., p.50.


Further data presented on the social origins of the contemporary elite in the section entitled "The Current Political, Military and Governmental Elite" in Chapter II.


Moertono, op.cit., p.5.


The terms parochial, subject and participant are used as defined by Almond and Powell, op.cit., p.53.

CHAPTER II

JAVANIZATION: HISTORY AND DATA

History, Politics and Javanization

Having drawn a cultural map of Indonesia's diverse population, presented a model of traditional Javanese aristocratic political culture and government, and looked at the changing role of the bearers of that political culture, let us examine recent Indonesian political history to see if the Javanization of Indonesia and Indonesian politics, in any sense, can be plausibly argued.

The Pre-Independence Period:

While the long and increasingly direct colonial contact was hollowing out the institutions of social integration in Java, Dutch colonialism was, with minor exceptions, little concerned with the islands outside of Java. Only about the time of the Ethical Policy did the Dutch turn their attention to those areas. Even by Japanese occupation the Dutch impact could only be considered heavy in the East Coast Residency of Sumatra around Medan.¹ In the Outer Islands it was Islam, rather than colonialism, that had the greatest impact on the traditional system.

Partly because the de-traditionalization process had gone further in Java than anywhere else in the archipelago and partly because the only educational facilities in the Indies were located there, Java became the center of nationalist agitation in the Dutch East Indies. The
early 20th century saw the rise in Java of Budi Utomo, Sarekat Islam, the PKI and the early Partai Nasional Indonesia as modern political organizations. Occasionally, such organizations appeared about to become mass parties, only to have the masses disappear with government opposition and exile of the prijaji party leaders. Today it seems that any mass following of these youthful organizations can be explained in terms of Javanese messianic expectations of a Batu Adil or Just Prince of Deliverance. Despite the ominous forebodings raised by the Communist uprisings of 1926-27 and the tremendous economic decline of the Indies during the Great Depression, there were no outward signs of a decline in the Dutch position at the time of the Japanese invasion: the mass of the population remained passive.

During the Japanese occupation, the Indies were divided into three separate regions; Sumatra was ruled along with Malaya by a division of the Japanese army, Java from Batavia also by the army and Eastern Indonesia from Makassar by the navy. The governing policies differed widely, and only in Java were the masses organized, mobilized and to some extent trained in military matters. Sukarno and other nationalist leaders were brought back from exile to lead mass organizations. Due to the shortage of Japanese administrative personnel, large numbers of
The bureaucrats attained high posts previously reserved for Dutch nationals. The Japanese, however, chose to play a "divide and rule" game between the nationalists and the emerging Islamic elite; inevitably, the gap between the two continued to widen.  

The War for National Independence:

Although a hesitant Sukarno declared Indonesia independent on August 17, 1945, it was to take four years of fighting before the Dutch were to recognize it as a fact. The initial bursts of fighting were spontaneous and occurred throughout Java and to a lesser extent Sumatra largely out of the control of the prijaji elite that had declared independence. In some areas social as well as political revolution took place. The masses of Indonesia who for so long had been passive and subjugated rose to the call of "revolusi" or revolution. The most obvious symbols of feudalism were destroyed as Sultans were dethroned and in some cases killed.

Gradually, the situation was controlled by the conservative prijaji-led central government, and the elements favoring social revolution were isolated and then destroyed. While the most obvious symbols of Dutch colonialism were destroyed, by and large, the lower prijaji simply moved up a few steps to the top of the administrative hierarchy and continued a conservative negotiation-oriented
policy toward the Allies and then the Dutch. Despite Tan Malaka's revolt and the communist-led Madiun Affair plus some opposition from the army and PNI, conservatives willing to make concessions to the Dutch were able, albeit somewhat precariously, to maintain their grip on central power.

During this period could be seen the first signs of a split between the military and civilian elite, although for our purposes it could best be interpreted as a split between the bearers of Javanism and the bearers of the Islamic-entrepreneurial political culture. Basically, the Javanese dominated army and PNI were lined up against the Masjumi and PSI over negotiation and military strategy.

The final phase of Dutch opposition to the creation of an independent Indonesia consisted of isolating the belligerent Republic, whose strength was on the interior of Central and East Java plus several interior areas of Sumatra, in a large number of member states of a federal organization known as the BFO. Many members of the traditional Outer Island’s elite who were more afraid of “Javanese imperialism” than the Dutch cooperated with the BFO.

In December 1949 the United States of Indonesia was formed. The Dutch, in the last round of negotiations, had
insisted on a federal form of constitution for the new nation as a condition for their recognition of independence. So, the Republic became just one of the 16 member states of the new federally organized country. While, in fact, this was probably the best structure for such a diverse archipelago and to guarantee the containment of "Javanese imperialism", it was also a structure designed to protect the interests of the Dutch. So repulsive was the idea of continued Dutch influence to the nationalists that all persons supporting the federalist form were branded as "feudal, colonialists, compradores." All nationalists, be they Javanese or non-Javanese, were forced to outwardly support the idea of a unitary republic, regardless of their inner feelings about the matter. Within six months the federal structure collapsed to be replaced by the unitary Republic of Indonesia in August 1950.

In summary, the decade of Japanese occupation and "revolution" ended with the creation of a unitary national state composed of the entire former Dutch East Indies except West New Guinea. However, the brunt of occupation and revolution had been borne by Java. The Javanese and the heartland of Javanese culture became far more mobilized, organized and nationally conscious than any other segment of the population. The feudal and administrative elites of the Outer Islands had been destroyed, discredited or
isolated by the so-called social revolutions in North Sumatra and Atjeh and participation in the BFO. With the traditional elite virtually incapacitated, the only representatives of Outer Island culture remaining with influence were associated with "purist" or "modernist" Islam, an ancient enemy of Javanism; this was to prove fatal.

Constitutional Democracy:

The state of Indonesia existed in name, but objectively, in 1950, there was little more. There was no all-Indonesia culture, society or political system. The only real bonds of unity were the shared experiences of the nationalist elite in their opposition to colonial rule. The elite had a set of symbols: a motto, a flag, an anthem and a "national" language which most found difficulty expressing themselves in. The mass of society was hardly in any way attached to these symbols.

Little thought, planning or action could be given to the above problems, however, because of the chaos existing at independence and the series of crises that engulfed the Republic during the next decade. Almost immediately after independence, the separatist RMS (Republic of South Moluccas) rebellion broke out and was quickly followed by Darul Islam (Islamic state) guerilla operations in South Sulawesi, Atjeh and West Java. Thus, Islam became associated with revolt,
rebellion and disunity; the revolts had to be crushed by force.

Credit must be given to the nationalist elite for their initial efforts and idealism. They probably wished to create a new national political culture that would be unique and distinct from all of the various national subcultures. They certainly overestimated their own unity operating under the unitary and parliamentary structure created in 1950. In the long run investments in the parliamentary system's infrastructure and operation of the political game under them could have had powerful effects on the development of attitudes for a truly national political culture; in a sense, they did but mostly negatively. For these new institutions quickly became battlegrounds for the society's differing political cultures in quite a literal sense.

The various aliran or social forces whose ideologies were to a large extent mutually exclusive became institutionalized in the party system. The functioning of the system seemed only to bring out the extremes in each aliran. All of the horrors so well described in Huntington's model of the praetorian society came true in Indonesia. These struggles coupled with a great deal of self-interest and real economic grievances began to take on centrifugal tendencies with the flaring up of regional military coups
in 1956-57 and the advent of civil war in 1958. To state the problem simplistically, there were no underlying national unity factors that could neutralize the fissiparous tendencies allowed and even encouraged by the newly adopted system.

The parliamentary process, before the elections of 1955, witnessed the division of the aliran into two broad coalitions. The Java based parties repeatedly allied to defeat or obstruct action desired by the Masjumi and PSI whose leaders were either very Western-oriented or "modernist" Muslims. The country's two largest parties, the PNI and the Masjumi, gradually began to be estranged and could not cooperate on even the simplest of programs. 14

The 1955 elections re-affirmed that the PNI and Masjumi were indeed the nation's largest parties; together they controlled 114 of the 256 parliamentary seats. The one and only parliamentary cabinet formed after the elections was a coalition between the Masjumi, PNI and NU. The PKI refused to play the role of opponent to the full cabinet or its total policy. Whenever the coalition should have been constrained because the Masjumi objected to PNI and NU proposals, it was not: the PNI knew it could count on the PKI's support and votes on the parliament floor. Because of this problem and other similar ones, the Masjumi ministers resigned from the cabinet. Shortly afterward the minority cabinet declared the nation under
martial law and resigned.

Coinciding with these parliamentary developments, several Outer Island military commanders revolted and made coup d'etat in their command regions. The cabinet proved unable to control the military or the situation. This coupled with the resignation of the Vice President, a Sumatran, and the flight of top members of the PSI and Masjumi to Sumatra, led to the declaration of martial law. The regional dissidents then demanded greater autonomy and the restoration of government under the leadership of former Vice President Hatta. With the denial of these requests a rebel government was set up in Padang, West Sumatra, and civil war ensued.

Java was almost denuded of troops as the Outer Islands were invaded and occupied. The civil war was effectively over in three or four months although the last groups of rebels did not surrender until 1961. Party politics were banned in the army occupied areas, and with martial law, the military became the virtual rulers in the regions. Sukarno appointed a government that was not responsible to the parliament, and suddenly, Indonesia's experiment with Western-style democracy was over.

With the Constitutional Assembly deadlocked between Islamic elements and Javanese plus Christians over the return to the 1945 Constitution and Presidential rule, Sukarno
simply declared the return himself. In the process of the
civil war and the return to the 1945 Constitution (UUD45),
large numbers of the Outer Island's political and military
elite were discredited and ostracized from central politics.
Suddenly, through a long and involved historical process,
the overwhelming majority of the "legitimate" national
political and military elite were from one ethnic group,
the Javanese. The UUD45, originally written by a committee
of mostly Javanese, could then be more easily adopted.
As Ben Anderson put it, the UUD45 was much more culturally
comfortable for the Javanese elite.\textsuperscript{16}

The civil war was not a separatist attempt.\textsuperscript{17} The
members of the Indonesian political elite who participated
in it never questioned the unity of the Indonesian state.
They were simply trying to right the balance between the
Outer Islands and Java, or, in other words, attempting to
win by threats and force what they had lost in the political
battle at the center. Compromise was not the order of the
day for the military and the Javanese political parties
in 1958. With the military defeat of the revolts and
occupation of the Outer Islands by loyal Javanese troops,
the political front of the revolts collapsed also, and
simply reinforced the Javanese political victory at the
center. With the banning of the Masjumi and PSI in 1960
and the continuation of martial law, the "takeover" was
confirmed.
The basis of a new Indonesian culture and political system was to be Javanese and assuredly non-Islamic (purist). Those who disagreed were not allowed to participate in the system, in the political game, a game that in reality was to be played mostly by Javanese and Javanized actors. If there were a continued struggle for ultimate victory, it was only to see which of the variants of Javanism was to win.

It must be admitted that the political events of the 1950's were very complex. Certainly, the struggle was not consciously viewed by many of the participants as either a cultural or ethnic battle. However, the results should be clear from the above arguments. Perhaps there was not another alternative, given the legacies of colonialism, within the confines of a single state, but one would never realize it from the length or the intensity of the struggle. Daniel S. Lev has summed up the situation well in these words:

...the Java-Outer Islands problem comprised a complicated combination of social and cultural, as well as political and economic hostilities. These hostilities might best be summed up as the test of Java's real and inevitable domination of the archipelago. Javanese dominance rested on superior numbers, a more elaborate culture and the disunity of the other Indonesian ethnic groups. The Javanese elite saw in independence an opportunity, as it were, to fulfill the ambitions and promises of Javanese civilization in the new national state, while the smaller and more particularistic societies of the rest of Indonesia recoiled before the vision of their eventual subordination or assimilation in a Javanese dominated nation.
Guided Democracy:

Martial law and the return to the UUD45 legitimized the dominance of Sukarno and the army over the political system. Along with the PKI whom Sukarno used to offset the strength of the military, the major political actors (Sukarno and the army) were strong representatives of Javanism. While Sukarno was too much of a political manipulator to exclude Outer Islanders from his government, their numbers did decrease, and those present appeared to be little more than symbols or tools for Sukarno's manipulations of politics. It must be admitted, however, that national politics became more and more focused upon Sukarno himself. The Javanese dominated parties played little role in decision-making. A politician's power depended on his closeness to the President rather than on what party, organization or ethnic group he represented.

Under Guided Democracy, "the supra-local polity, the national state, (shrunk) more and more to the limits of its traditional domain, the capital city-Djakarta-plus a number of semi-independent tributary cities and towns held to a minimal loyalty by the threat of centrally applied force." With the collapse of the national transportation system and the economy in general after 1958, the regions, especially those outside of Java, became isolated from the national polity. The "victory"
of the Javanese was bearable because of the lack of actual control by the Javanese-dominated center.

The conclusion of the initial phase of struggle for control of national power had ended with the Javanese in a dominant position but that did not mean an end to the political struggle in Indonesia or an end to mass politics, though there were no elections. The national state was just as fragile as at independence, and even if the Outer Island problem had been settled, there was no guarantee that problems of a similar nature might not arise again. Besides, even "mother" Java was divided among itself. As Ted Smith put it, Sukarno had to make concrete investments in solidarity, legitimacy and stability. After making such investments, and they were a continuous process, there was little capital of any kind left for investment in economically productive schemes. With the continuing decline in national welfare, the struggle for position and scarce resources grew even more intense, but the Outer Islands and "modernist" Islam were in no position to actively participate in that struggle; it was nearly a completely Javanese one.

"Most (Indonesian) parties suffer in varying degrees from the tension of being ideologically on the left but socially on the right." This gap grew noticeably wider during Guided Democracy and the President was as
"guilty" of it as the parties. While Indonesian politics were of the period awash on a flood of revolutionary rhetoric and sloganeering, actual government policy was very conservative, even status quo-oriented. Beneath the rhetoric, the conflict narrowed into increasing tensions between the radicals of the PKI and increasingly, the PNI and the conservatives of Islam and the rural areas as well as the military. At the center Sukarno could balance the two, but open clashes in the countryside over land reform and squatter's rights revealed a struggle much less controllable. By late 1964 and early 1965 Sukarno no longer appeared able to balance the opposing forces and increasingly tended to side with the radical forces, at least verbally.

At this point the radicals seem to have aimed a very small amount of violence at their foremost conservative rivals, the military, hoping to thereby shift the central balance of power decidedly in their direction and speed up a radical takeover of the government. There was indeed a dramatic shift of power but, for the instigators, in the wrong direction. For the first time in a decade or more, Islam and sections of the Javanese elite worked together or at least, in parallel. The military, the conservative civilian elite (bureaucracy), the non-communist intellectuals and the Islamic masses combined in an informal coalition.
that destroyed the radicals.\textsuperscript{24} The PKI and eventually, Sukarno were removed from the political spectrum.

The New Order:

With the outside or opposition pressures removed that had created the coalition in the first place, the so-called New Order coalition began to collapse. The students, initially, and then the "modernist" Muslims were isolated from power by the military. The military slowly isolated its own elements that had sympathy with or supported these two groups. The ruling coalition became a group of Javanese generals allied with civilian technocrats, also led by Javanese. The momentary glimpses of political power for non-Javanese were replaced by promises of a fairer division of national wealth. Despite the modernization and development ideology of the military-led New Order, Outer Islanders and particularly "modernist" Muslims were not allowed political influence and in some cases, not even room for political maneuver. The New Order drifted into a "centrist" Javanese-dominated regime.

In summary, it can be historically argued that independence has witnessed a process of Javanization in Indonesia. Only brief emergencies during the revolution and after the 1965 coup attempt, known as the G-30-S, have Outer Islanders played dominant or equal roles with
the Javanese. It does seem plausible that the game of Indonesian politics can only be played by those elements willing to subordinate themselves to Javanism. All previous attempts to participate in politics in other than Javanese terms have led to failure and eventual isolation and destruction. Assimilation to Javanism is a fact of life that all Indonesians must face.

The Current Political, Military and Governmental Elite

If indeed any of the previous historical arguments have any validity, one would expect that Javanese and representatives of the Javanese-aristocratic political culture would be very numerous, even dominant, in the key governmental and elite positions. This, in fact, does seem to be the case. The Javanese hold governmental positions to be of very high status value; consequently, the entire bureaucracy has very large numbers of Javanese in it. For the purposes of national unity this dominance has never been widely publicized and no exact figures are available on the subject. Estimates made by some Indonesian sources have put the figure as high as 90% of the total while a 1971 review of the 207 top office holders in the central bureaucracy by Ted Smith revealed that 71% of them were ethnic Javanese. This author’s calculations concerning 154 of the same positions revealed that 64% of the total were Javanese. However, by reviewing the top
positions\textsuperscript{28} in the major Ministries of Interior, Foreign Affairs, Justice, Information, Industry, Trade, Agriculture, Communications, Public Works and Health showed that the percentage had increased to 73\%. Further, if only the extremely important control ministeries of Interior, Finance, Communications and Information are included the figure is 84\%. Not only are the top officials ethnic Javanese but they are strongly upper class (or \textit{priyjajl}) in social background.

A glance at the reconstituted Kabinet Pembangunan or Development Cabinet reveals that only 13 of the 23 ministers are Javanese while 3 are Sundanese, 4 are Sumatrans and 2 are from Eastern Indonesia. Thus 57\% of the cabinet are ethnic Javanese, but the important fact is that Christians are over-represented in the remainder (3 out of 10) and the Islamic political culture is vastly under-represented (only 2 and perhaps 3 of the Ministers could possibly be considered \textit{santri} Muslims).\textsuperscript{29}

The major socio-political force, aside from the civilian bureaucracy, in central Indonesian politics is the military which historically has Javanese origins and cultural influences. The army claims to be the most truly national organization in the country, and it probably is.\textsuperscript{30} Its original territorial organization was very regional in content and its actual workings were highly reflective of the center-outer provinces and over-seas
territories relationships described for Later Mataram. Each major region had its own troops and command structure; in the 1950's it was very difficult for the center to appoint non-natives of the regions as the Panglima or regional commander. The military was de facto federally organized. The collapse of the regional revolts and the Javanese occupation was the beginning of the end of such a set up, however. This type of organization was seen as allowing the army to be infiltrated and used by political parties, especially the PKI, as well as threatening the unity of the state. The military then has constantly been trying to strengthen its own organization since independence and the process has gone rapidly ahead since the disposal of its two major "enemies", the PKI and President Sukarno, during the 1965-67 period. This unifying process coupled with the revolts, the G-30-S, and subsequent intra-military conflicts have succeeded in reducing the "national-ness" of the military, at least in an ethnic sense. With the decline of the Siliwangi Division's influence in central military circles, the military has drifted more and more towards a Javanese pole.

Polomka estimates that fully 75% of the officer corps is Javanese. As of October 1965 Javanese held 62% of the central and regional command posts; by April 1967 the figure was 65%; as of April 1969 it was 72% and
in October 1970 it was fully 80%.³⁵

Hindley has noted that it is extremely rare for a member of the officer corps to come from either the lower classes or from the santri aliran (Islamic-entrepreneurial political culture).³⁶ In her study of the contemporary elite structure and factionalism in Indonesia, Ann Gregory noted that 7 of the 20 leaders of the ethnic Javanese Diponegoro Division (also Suharto's former division) interviewed were connected through kinship to one of the four Javanese palaces and that 29 of the 39 leaders interviewed from the army's major divisions (Siliwangi, Diponegoro and Brawijaya) were from gentry or nobility classes while only 2 had merchant social backgrounds and none had peasant backgrounds.³⁷ Virtually the same generalization can be made about the military as about the civilian bureaucracy: the Javanese and Christians are over-represented while the santri aliran is vastly under-represented.

As political parties have become less and less important in decision-making and the functioning of government since the regional rebellions of the late 1950's, there is little point in giving detailed ethnic data on their central leadership structures. Some generalizations are appropriate, however. The 1955 elections clearly pointed out that the constituencies of the parties were to
a large extent regionalized with the NU, the PNI and the PKI, each having their greatest strength in Java while the Masjumi's greatest strength was in the Outer Islands. The NU is a santri party and gained some Outer Island and Islamic "modernist" supporters by default with the banning of the Masjumi. Nevertheless, the NU remained dominated by Javanese leaders. Most "modernist" Muslims hoped that the creation of a new santri party in 1968 would give a place in the political constellation to the same aliran that the Masjumi had represented. Clearly this was the intention of a large part of the PMI or Parmusi leadership but the military was not willing to fully sanction such an occurrence. The initial chairman of the party was Javanese but a majority of the central leadership was non-Javanese. Had the party not been paralyzed by internal conflict and outside intervention, it probably would have provided "modernist" Muslims, especially Outer Islanders with a political outlet and done very well in the 1971 elections. The PNI still has a strong Javanese image and sections of the civilian bureaucracy still have inclinations towards it.

On the surface, at least, the successor to the political parties has been the army sponsored Functional Groups (Golongan Karya or Golkar) which holds an overwhelming majority of seats in the parliament and is somewhat
more representative of the actual power constellation in the country at present than are the political parties.

Of the central structure including the Dewan Pembina or Advisory Council and the Dewan Pimpinan or Leadership Council having 34 members, 25 or 74% are Javanese while five of the remainder are non-Javanese Christians. Golkar which is itself in and of the bureaucracy or state apparatus, both civilian and military, only reflects the data presented above on it. The Islamic-entrepreneurial political culture is under-represented.

In considering the above statistics and generalizations, it must be remembered that it is the central government or bureaucracy that is under consideration. As Smith points out government in the regions below Level II which includes the Kabupaten (Regency), Ketjamatan (District) and Kelurahan (Village) levels is largely in the hands of local inhabitants. There are 26 administrative regions or provinces in Indonesia, of which only 3 are ethnically Javanese. There are 17 military regions in the country and only 2 are ethnically Javanese. Yet 8 of the 26 Governors (head of the Province level administration) are Javanese and 12 of the 17 regional military commanders are ethnic Javanese. These positions are appointed by the Javanese dominated central government. Obviously, provincial government is
not a provincial affair, at least ethnically and perhaps culturally as well.

The above data points out a trend that has been noted before in post-independence Indonesia: there is a division of labor in the small non-agricultural sector of the country among ethnic groups (and political cultures?). The Javanese and the Christian minority have dominated the bureaucracy and military while the representatives of the Islamic-entrepreneurial political culture (especially Minangkabaus, Muslim Bataks and Bugis) along with the Chinese have been clustered in commerce. Javanese are seldom found in commerce with the exception of fields in which "governmental" connections are very important, such as brokerage and importing. The opposite seems to be true for representatives of the santri aliran; they are seldom found outside of the Ministry of Religion if they are in the government.
NOTES on Chapter II

1 The Minangkabau area on the West coast of Sumatra around Padang could be considered another area of intense impact but for rather different reasons than the Medan area. Padang was not a plantation area like Medan. The areas of Ambon in the Moluccas and Minahasa in Northeast Sulawesi were also strongly affected by Dutch colonialism for they were the fabled "Spice Islands" that had brought the Dutch to the Indies in the first place. By the turn of this century, however, these two areas were only "back-waters".

2 Budi Utomo or "Beautiful Endeavor" was a Javanese nationalist organization; Sarekat Islam initially was a santri-led organization but later H.O.S. Tjokrominoto, a prijaji, became its most famous leader; both the PKI and PNI were forerunners of the contemporaries of the same name.

3 Sukarno's popularity among the Javanese masses has been interpreted in this way in Bernard Dahm, Sukarno and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969), passim; and the popularity of the Sarekat Islam is interpreted in this light in Van Niel, op.cit., Chap. II.

4 The Dutch had followed a similar policy of separating the traditional and religious elite in the Outer Islands. See Noer, op.cit., passim.

5 Indonesians fondly call the 1945-50 period the revolution but it more closely fits with the definition of a war for national independence given in Samuel Huntington, op.cit., p.264.

6 On the Madiun Affair see George Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952), Chap. VIII. Ben Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972) discusses the 1945-46 period in detail and concludes that Tan Malaka was purposely made a scape-goat and his "plot" fabricated in order to crush the "true" revolutionaries.

7 Anderson, op.cit., Chap. VII.

9 The name used by the Sukarno-led Indonesian government.


11 Actually, one-half of the parliament of the unitary Republic was made up of former BFO parliamentarians. This caused no small amount of ill feeling on the part of radical nationalists who wanted to be rid of all Dutch influence. The "October 19, 1952 Affair" in which the army asked Sukarno to disband the parliament was allegedly caused by this. See Feith, op.cit., pp. 246-73.

12 For details on all of the revolts see Nugroho Notosuanto, *Sedjarah and Hankam* (History and the Hankam) (Djakarta: Lembaga Sedjarah Hankam, 1968), pp.82-92.

13 For a definition of a praetorian society see Huntington, op.cit., pp. 194-97.

14 For an excellent account concentrating on these pre-election coalitions see Herbert Feith, *The Wilopo Cabinet: A Turning Point in Indonesian History* (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1958).


18 Lev, op.cit., p.3.


20 Quoted in Liddle, op.cit., p.221.

21 Smith, op.cit., p.23.


24 On this coalition see Don Hindley, "The Alirans and the Fall of the Old Order", Indonesia, 1970, No.9.

25 It should be pointed out here that membership in the Javanese ethnic group coupled with social background is the only "proven" indicator of membership in the somewhat wider group which I have called "Javanized". The socialization of members of other ethnic groups is more difficult to provide hard data on. The Christian minority, in my opinion, is the most Javanized of any of the other segments of the society.


27 Ibid., p.39.

28 These positions are defined as being Minister, Secretary-General, Director-General and Inspector-General. The source used for the calculations was O.G. Roeder, Who's Who in Indonesia (Djakarta: Gunung Agung, 1972) pp. 521-30.

29 For a list of the new cabinet members and their backgrounds see Pedoman, September 10, 1971.

30 For further comments on this point see Harsja Bachtiar, "The Legitimacy of the Indonesian Military as a National Institution" in Kejakinan and Perdjuangan, (Djakarta: Gunung Mulia, 1972). Bachtiar does not consider the isolation of the Siliwangi Division from power in his analysis which is a tremendous drawback.

31 See the section of Chapter I entitled "Government and Politics in a Javanese Political Culture: Later Mataram" for this discussion.

32 For an excellent discussion of the "tightening up" process inside of the military see Ruth McVey, "The Post-Revolutionary Transformation of the Indonesian Army," Indonesia 1971-72, Nos. 11 and 13.
The Siliwangi whose regional area is West Java has long had the reputation of being the most "national" of all the army's divisions. Non-Sundanese have frequently been Panglima or Commander of Siliwangi while non-Javanese have never commanded the Diponegoro and Brawidjaja Divisions which are ethnic Javanese divisions. Siliwangi was closely associated with the so-called "radicals" of the New Order and highly influenced by ideas of democratic socialism. It had especially close links with former PSI members.


These figures were calculated from "Current Data on the Indonesian Military Elite" *Indonesia*, 1967, 1969 and 1970; Vols. 3, 7 and 10. The final figure was valid for after the major military re-organization of October 1969. The number of central positions dramatically increased at that time and may somewhat account for the large percentage increase of Javanese. It is worthy of note that only 3 Sundanese (about 5%) were in this final calculation while there were 26% of the 1967 figure and 20% of the 1965 figure.

Hindley, *op.cit.*, p. 27.


On this see Smith, *op.cit.*, p. 54.

Tempo, July 31, 1971.


These were calculated from *Sinar Harapan*, July 1, 1972.
CHAPTER III

JAVANISM AND CONTEMPORARY POLITICS

The Structure of Indonesian Government

In early 1959 the Indonesian Constitutional Assembly was hamstrung over the motion to return to the 1945 Constitution (UUD45) and abandon the parliamentary form of government used since the time of the proclamation of the unitary republic in 1950. Three votes on the return to the UUD45 failed by narrow margins to receive the necessary two-thirds majority. In July of that year Sukarno by Presidential Decree ordered the return to the UUD45, and the action was later unanimously approved by the parliament which had been elected in 1955.¹

The UUD45 acknowledges the sovereignty of the people and calls for a Super-Parliament (MPR) to choose the President and set the course of state policy.² The President would appoint a cabinet of his own choosing and hold office for a period of five years.³ The President would be responsible to no one except the MPR which was not required to meet more often than once in five years itself. One-half of the MPR membership was to be composed of the entire single house parliament (DPR). The remainder of the members were to be "delegations from the regions and groups".⁴ The UUD45 does not mention political
parties by name and the term golongan or group has been interpreted to mean political parties and other social groups who are not necessarily political in nature. The return to the UUD45 was outwardly seen and spoken of as a solution to the problem of instability in Indonesia. Inwardly the readoption of the UUD45 was a way of making formal and informal norms about government and power coincide. The strong executive was simply a reflection of the nature of social relationships in Javanese society. On the other hand, even the new constitution contained formal concepts of the sovereignty of the people and representation which had no counterpart in the organization of power relations in the society. This is perhaps why these provisions of the UUD45 have been most often ignored or handled in a manner inconsistent with the intent of the formal document without severe social or political repercussions.

The UUD45 has become an uncriticizable and almost sacred part of Indonesian government since its readoption (under both Guided Democracy and the New Order), but even to this present time political behavior does not closely correspond with the formal norms set forth by the document except for the position of the executive. If we reflect on our earlier description of government in Old Mataram, a similarity will be noted immediately. The
importance of the formal structure of the government was to reflect harmony with the cosmos while actual political behavior depended on other norms. This same gap between theory and practice seems to be still present. Perhaps the reasoning for the outward appearance has changed somewhat; today world cultural norms demand that every government, no matter whether its actual functioning be close or far from the statement in practice, declare the sovereignty of the people and the "democratic" nature of its rule. This is a kind of harmony with the cosmos also.

The Ruler:

The country has had two Presidents, both of whom were Javanese. Neither of the two were appointed to their posts by a popularly elected MPR. In fact, the MPR that gave Sukarno the title of President for life was entirely appointed by Sukarno himself. Suharto was appointed full President by an MPR that had been purged of all real opposition, the replacements subjected to investigation and approval by the government before they could take their seats and additional appointments made by Suharto. In fact, there was no election of a DPR or MPR under the UUD45 until some 13 years after its reintroduction.

Sukarno actually proclaimed himself to be the "people's tongue" which placed him above all others in the state; for in Sukarno's own words he was the sole
interpreter of the people’s wishes. The late President acted as if this were indeed the case and almost all decisions of state, no matter how large or how small, passed through his hands to be rubber-stamped by the Sukarno appointed DPR. The one direct affront to his wishes -- the DPR rejected his budget proposals in 1960 -- resulted in the disbanding and replacement of that body. Since General Suharto’s election as full president in 1968 there has been no open challenge by the DPR to any policy that he has put forward, nor is there likely to be any. On several occasions political parties have expressed their dismay at some of the government’s actions but stated quite simply what the President wants, the President gets. In reality there is no outside control over the President, whether it be formal or informal. Despite the constitutional prescription, authority and legitimacy seem to be derived from other sources.

Since the country seems to have no tested device for Presidential change, this raises the question as to how a ruler acquires legitimacy in Indonesia. Several answers seem possible in the case of Sukarno. Undoubtedly he could have won an openly contested race for the position if he had chosen to do so. He was the most outstanding figure of the nationalist movement and somehow managed to appear to be above all of the partisan political struggles
of "constitutional democracy". On the other hand, Bernard Dahm has attributed a part of his popularity and legitimacy to rather traditional sources like the "Ratu Adil" (Just Prince) legends of the Javanese and Sundanese. This theory seems somewhat confirmed by the fact that Sukarno was definitely more popular among Javanese than any other ethnic group and that his ideologizing was definitely more worshipped there than any other place in the archipelago. It is possible that Sukarno was seen as rescuing the realm from one of those periods of waning power and increasing disturbance; accumulating power at the center again. Power may simply have appeared to have flowed to Sukarno because of his great concentration. As Anderson notes, Guided Democracy was a very powerful state in the traditional sense of the word, but it is doubtful if Sukarno and the mass of Javanese ever realized that it was not in the modern sense.

Suharto is more difficult to picture in this perspective because of the Western-style cloak he has drawn around his regime. He too is probably more popular among Javanese than other groups. Also Suharto accumulated power at the center and saved the country after a period of chaotic drifting and waning of central power. For Javanese audiences, the relationship of Suharto's wife to the central Javanese royal house of Mankunegara has carefully been
emphasized. The New Order too is a powerful state in traditional terms and despite vigorous claims, has yet to prove it is in the modern sense. The simple fact that Suharto was able to defeat Sukarno without noticeable effort on his part seems to have been enough of a sign of legitimacy for him to maintain power initially.

The New Order regime has criticized Sukarno greatly for his "deviations" from the UUD45, but other than superficially seems in no great hurry to make its own actions conform to it to the letter either. While neither of the two UUD45 regimes has been totalitarian, if such is even possible in Indonesia, they have been highly authoritarian and heavily centralized in the decision-making sense. The executive seems to have absorbed the rule-making and rule adjudication functions in addition to its own rule-application functions. This concentration of power and the absence of checks upon it clearly resembles the nature of the theoretical power of Mataram's god-king, even if it is cloaked with modern day constitutional ornamentation.

The Ruler's Assistants:

There are almost no elected posts of consequence in the country outside of the Kepala Desa or Lurah (village headman) and the DPR members. The regional and kabupaten parliaments or DPRDI and DPRDII have only been elected once under the UUD45 (in July 1971) with the
remainder of the time being appointed and have very little power within the framework of the unitary state. All regional governors and military commanders are appointed from the center. Under Sukarno the military tried with some success to keep control of military appointments, but with a military man like Suharto as President both civilian and military posts in the regions are controlled by the President.

As prescribed by the constitution, the cabinet is appointed by the President. In the absence of open competitive politics during Guided Democracy, Sukarno used cabinet positions for rewards to his faithful followers and parties that would support his policies. This process got so far out of hand that in the last cabinet that Sukarno was in full control of appointments there were 100 ministers. It proved just as hard for Sukarno to manipulate the military at the center as in the regions and he had great difficulty in controlling internal appointments. The late President was able to replace General Nasution, an arch rival, with Achmad Yani, considered at the time to be more pliable, as Chief of Staff of the Army. Suharto too does not seem to mind using the cabinet as a reward base -- though even this apparently is decreasing -- but still has managed to keep it to a reasonable size.

Manipulation of military personnel does not present too
much of a problem to President Suharto. Initially this may have been the case but the Suharto faction is clearly in control now. His men sit in all of the important military positions and he has been able to appoint personal friends as the Chiefs of Staff of the Air Force and Navy as well as the Army.

In addition to the cabinet, the military and regional governors posts, President Suharto also directly appoints a series of Inspector Generals(12), Secretary Generals(27) and Director Generals(62) to ministries and their departments in order to strengthen his influence in the bureaucracy and obviously, increase control by having friends there on the inside.

One further point has been consistent between the two Presidents: that being the presence of a palace clique or golongan istana. In Sukarno's day such people as Adit, Charul Saleh and Subandrio assumed far greater roles in decision-making than their official positions warranted. Despite the advertised influence of the "technocrats" — who now sit at cabinet level positions — Suharto has had his special group of advisors and assistants from the beginning of his rise to power. These men who without exception are military have the official title of ASPRI or private assistant to the President for certain fields such as economics and special operations. Men like Ali Murtopo,
Sudjono Humardani and General Surjo have assumed some of the functions that the bureaucracy was intended to handle and in many cases their advice outweighs that of a minister.22

Despite New Order criticisms of the "cult of the personality", it is very clear that power and position in the new regime also heavily depend on personal relationships with the ruler. While Suharto has been very astute in his choices of highly qualified personnel for cabinet posts, such qualifications seem much less important in other areas, particularly personal advisors and assistants. Like Mataram, the ruler's control over his Outer Provinces depend to a large degree on personal relationships and, of course, in the last instance on force. Suharto has drawn freely from his old friendships of the Diponegoro and Mandala commands and this practice is unlikely to abate in the near future.23

The Masses:

Political organization in the modern sense of the word, whether it be among the elite or masses or sub-groups thereof, is a relatively new phenomenon in Indonesia. At best all such organizations' relationship to the government during the colonial era was ambiguous, if not outright illegal. During the revolution24 and the initial period of "constitutional democracy", the relationship of legally organized political parties to the government was clear.
The strength and closeness to power of a party depended on its number of representatives in the parliament which theoretically, at least, was determined by popular elections. Each of the major political parties had mass organizations or *ormas* affiliated with it in the form of Trade Unions, Peasant Unions, and Student Clubs. One parliamentary election (1955) and one election for regional assemblies were held under this system. The political organizations came to realize that the way to win under such a system was mass organization and mobilization for numbers would count more than personal relations in determining the party's closeness to power and rewards.\(^{25}\)

Under the UUD45 the relationship of political organization, specifically political parties, to the government lapsed into an ambiguous state again and has remained that way ever since. The President has never been a member of a political party and, indeed, formal politics outside of the palace itself have become increasingly irrelevant to the system. Numbers were not and are not as important as being close to the center of power. The leadership of political parties has stagnated except for forced or manipulated changes by the government,\(^{26}\) and younger political figures became involved in mass organizations.\(^{27}\) In outward appearance politics of Guided Democracy were a series of challenges by the PKI
and radicals and reactions by the threatened conservatives over issues like land reform and squatter's rights. Even this limited measure of public politics has been removed from the legitimate sphere of political activity for political organizations under the New Order. Politics in any form has become more and more of an internal government, and particularly army, affair-bureaucratic politics of a sort.

Since the beginning of the pressures for the return to the UUD45, the issue of the composition of the DPR and MPR has been under discussion. The political parties with their own interests in mind naturally felt that they had the right to control such bodies, but the UUD45 did not specifically mention the point. The army put forward the idea of functional groups as part of the golongan, golongan listed in the constitution as they would be legally recognized as a political force in doing so. Sukarno accepted this idea as it fit well with his concept of national harmony through representation of all groups, and he pushed for a DPR composed of one-half functional groups and one-half political parties. This proposal was not accepted by the parties, and eventually, Sukarno backed away from the issue, although he chose not to appoint any of his political rivals to the DPR or MPR. As had been hoped for, the military gained access to the cabinet, DPR and MPR through the return to the UUD45. The initial ABRI
contingent was 35 but this had been expanded to 75 by the time of the 1971 DPR elections.

Before the advent of the 1971 elections the military revived the idea of a Joint Secretariat of Functional Groups, called at that time Sekber Golkar, to combat the elections against the parties. Golkar is avowedly non-political with only an ideology of modernization and development. From the military’s point of view Golkar functioned perfectly in the elections by winning 63% of the votes and 236 of the 360 elected seats. The nearest political party received only 18% of the vote and 58 seats. After the elections Golkar held a working congress in which it made 21 formal decisions concerning the program it wanted to implement and they corresponded nearly 100% with ABRI wishes.

Despite the fact that Golkar controls the DPR and later will control the MPR, it is not at all clear that it controls the government. In fact we have already seen that the real center of power in the present government, both formally and informally, does not lie with the parties or functional groups but elsewhere. This is in a sense why the 1971 elections were so fruitless for political parties. For no matter how many seats any individual party won, it would not be any closer to actual power than before the election.
At the present time the government is preparing a bill on the simplification of political parties and their organization to present to the DPR. This bill is expected to force the fusion of the nation's 9 legal political parties into two and eliminate all party organization below the kabupaten level. This later concept is known as the "floating mass" and envisions no permanent political organization at the village level. According to the philosophy behind this measure, political conflict is to be removed from the village and only once in every 5 years will the people be allowed to participate in political action through casting ballots for the party or Golkar of their choice.

In practice demands and allocation of resources are not made in the DPR. They are made through personal relations and connections. Rosihan Anwar described Indonesian political parties, not as devices for aggregating and articulating group interests, but as platforms for expressing the identity of the self within the stratification of the political community. Is Golkar anything more than this also? The elimination of party structures in the villages make it difficult to see how, but perhaps the functional organizations within Golkar will eventually be able to place demands on the system. At any rate with the elimination of village political organization, the
existing political parties will probably be emasculated in the next election with Golkar deriving the benefit.

While many historical and political arguments can be put forward in defense of or against the emerging system, it is difficult not to notice that the Western concept of the role and functions of political parties and organizations do not necessarily apply to the Indonesian scene. The proper sphere of legitimate political conduct compares favorably with that of Mataram. There are new organizations, but the results seem the same. The ruler through his bureaucracy governs and makes decisions which are theoretically for the good of the people.  

The Center-Periphery:

While Indonesia's geographic and ethnic heterogeneity seem to call for some type of federal arrangement for the national government, like Britain, Indonesia is officially a unitary state. In 1957 the last parliamentary cabinet passed a far reaching decentralization law which would have allowed meaningful governmental institutions in the regions with financial powers and substantial freedom from central interference in selecting regional governmental officials. With the advent of Guided Democracy, the emphasis shifted back in the other direction and most of the 1957 law was changed or forgotten.
The regionally elected *Kepala Daerah* (Regional Head) was reabsorbed into the central bureaucracy and appointed governors made the order of the day. Today the local DPRD's have no meaningful power in legislative or financial matters. The central government collects 98.6% of all tax revenues and the regional governments exist on allotments from the center whether they be in the form of direct subsidy or ADO returns. In July of 1966 the IV MPRS session passed a resolution calling for the government to increase regional autonomy within three years but up to this time the government has not acted. All meaningful decisions concerning provincial development allocations in addition to normal budget allocations are still made at the center. Ted Smith notes that even when a governor or *bupati* possesses the theoretical power to take independent initiative on development projects, he never has the financing or financing power to support the effort.

Despite the fact that the Outer Islands contribute about 80% of Indonesia's exports, and Indonesia's economy is an export economy, Java remains the center of the country. It has been estimated that around 60% of all of the money in circulation in the country is circulating in Djakarta alone. Outer Island transportation systems in general are equivalent to Java's 30 to 40 years ago.
The economic imbalances that contributed to the regional revolts of 15 years ago still exist. A government post outside of Java is considered sort of a demotion to the jungles by many civil servants. Any policy that called for the relative neglect of Java for development purposes in the Outer Islands would simply be impossible for any Javanese dominated government to consider seriously. Although government attitudes and policy under the New Order are considerably fairer to the regions than before, the situation is far from ideal. Suharto himself expressed a common Javanese opinion towards the other regions when as Panglima of the Diponegoro Division in 1957, he pointed out that any appeasement of the dissidents in Sumatra and Sulawesi as perverse partiality. He said that the 54 million people of Java would feel unjustly treated should the government relax its development efforts there in order to permit the obstreperous regions to catch up.

There seems to be an obvious negara agung-mantja negara comparison still existing in Indonesia. There is a continual struggle to maintain the central structure and power at the center. Any autonomy for the outer regions could encourage dissidence and lead to the waning of central power. The modern concept of the state does not quite seem to fit: it is hard for a Javanese to consider a Dayak
village off in the wilds of Kalimantan on equal terms with the thousands of Javanese villages he sees around him. \(^{40}\)

**The Functions of Indonesian Government**

The two regimes under the UUD45 have been very different in several ways. Sukarno was very skillful in the manipulation of political symbols and almost deified himself in the process as the symbol of the state; during this time his regime neglected in fact most of the policies that it espoused except confrontation e.g. sandang-pangan (food and clothes for the people). On the other hand, the New Order under the leadership of Suharto has expressed itself in more mundane ways with an emphasis on stability and economic development even though the same kinds of ideological symbols are still there but in a somewhat less prominent position. \(^{41}\) With such a drastic shift in emphasis, at first glance, it might seem very difficult to detect any underlying common roots, but as our previous analysis of political history points out, the former regime was much more influenced by mass politics than is the present one and this in itself is probably enough to account for a large portion of surface differences. The internal workings and the functions carried out by the two regimes may not, however, turn out to be all that different. If this is true, some comparisons with Mataram may also be appropriate.
Harmony through Control, Security and Stability:

The mass of ideology and symbolism used by Sukarno has been well discussed by Feith and Weatherbee, but some facets of the maze are worth pointing out here. From the beginning of his political career Sukarno never stopped expressing what he felt was the essential unity and harmony of Indonesian society. Bernard Dahm has shown the development of Sukarno’s NASAKOM policy was not new but followed consistently by him from the late 1920’s until his death. Sukarno analyzed Indonesian society as having three main currents — nationalism, religion(Islam) and communism — which were syncretically blended into compatible ideologies by Indonesians. He proclaimed himself to be all three at the same time. When his pre-war PNI fractured and split because of differences between these very ideologies, Sukarno also quit party life and never rejoined a party. His drive was syncretism and expressing unity. In October 1945 Sukarno could push for the creation of a single party system but Vice President Hatta was the one who had to decree that more parties could be created only a few days later. Sukarno evidently honestly believed that a multitude of parties divided the people. In 1956 he asked the people to “bury the parties” and later unveiled his Konsepsi that if accepted would solve the problems of a weak government. He proposed that all parties be represented
in a Gotong-Rojong (Mutual Help) cabinet and that all decisions be taken in the traditional Indonesian manner of musjawarah or consensus. Later after events had propelled the country towards a return to the UUD45, Sukarno still expressed his antagonism towards parties as such. He tried to create a National Front in which all groups were represented. He ever strived to create a DPR and MPR that reflected his conception of the unique harmony of the Indonesian people. He felt government could be run without opposition and taking votes. According to Indonesian tradition, Soekarno said, there were no losers and no tyranny of the 50% + 1 majority. Anyone or any party who could not agree with this expression of true "Indonesian-ness", then were no longer Indonesians but outside influenced. In this way the Masjumi and PSI committed suicide. They could not even superficially agree with the Konsepsi and Guided Democracy, so they were banished from the system. On the other hand, the military and the PKI were probably equally opposed to portions of Sukarno's plan for expressing and returning to the Indonesian identity, but by verbally agreeing to it were allowed to survive and at least covertly oppose the parts of the new system that they did not like. At least in some respects Donald Levine's statement about Amhara political culture in Ethiopia seems relevant to the elements of Javanese
culture that Sukarno was calling Indonesian culture, and to some extent what Suharto still expresses, when he said: "In authoritarian relationship -- and again all political interaction among the Amhara is contained within authoritarian relationships -- there are only three alternatives: complete deference, acquiescence and flattery; criticism by devious and covert means; or outright rebellion". 46

According to Anderson "The NASAKOM formula tended to be seen either as irresponsible and intellectually incoherent slogan or as a subtle device for weakening the anti-communist prejudices of powerful nationalist and religious groups. Such interpretations however, failed to place the NASAKOM-politique within the context of Javanese political thinking. In his orientation, Sukarno's formula could be interpreted not as a compromise or strategem, but as a powerful claim to possession of power by the ruler. For he alone was whole, sembada, absorbing all within himself, making the syncretic conquest". 47

For Sukarno and the New Order a powerful syncretic tool or symbol, in addition to the UUD45, was the Pantjasila. 48 This doctrine became the basis of the Indonesian state. Its adoption assures the Javanese as well as religious minority groups that their fundamental belief systems are protected from "religious and cultural" imperialism by Islam or any other monoistic and monopolistic
doctrine. Under Sukarno Pantjasila yielded the center-stage to NASAKOM and MANIPOL but under the New Order has once again risen to its central role again. Today Indonesia is proclaimed as struggling to achieve Pantjasila Democracy. It also tends to be a broadly syncretic doctrine that clearly pictures the Javanese world view more than it does any other part of Indonesian society. Its lack of concreteness and flexibility, however, is undoubtedly needed in a diverse country like Indonesia. Suharto himself has stated that he believes harmony is value in his culture (Javanese?) that is very real, both harmony between man and society and man and god. On another occasion the President said "we have to strive to cultivate harmony in the life of our society and feel calm in the developing of the noble cultural values that are in harmony with our people". So the Nasakom formula exploded with G-30-S but was promptly replaced by the Pantjasila Doctrine as first state symbol. The declarations of the basic "one-ness" of Indonesian society have not disappeared, only a new enemy has been added to the list.

The New Order government identifies three enemies of the people who are called golongan tertentu or fixed groups. They are the golongan ekstrim kiri (extreme left-communists), golongan ekstrim kanan (extreme right-proponents of an Islamic state) and golongan liberal (liberal-proponents of
a return to parliamentary democracy). These disturbers of harmony are seen as very small groups who are determined to impose their concept of society upon the majority. New Order supporters claim that their victory over the PKI shows clearly the people support Pantjasila. On the other hand it is interesting to note that government by either of the three enemies of the state would most likely mean an end to prijaji and Javanese elite rule. Harmony in its present day meaning also has status quo connotations attached to it.

Harmony as a value is of very little use unless a ruler can control and guarantee security in his society for its implementation or continuation. The chief problem is whether harmony is seen as an end in itself or a means to an end. Sukarno probably never saw the difference in the two concepts, but he was very much interested in control. All figures who would not submit to his ideological version of the state were quickly silenced. Hence the PSI and Masjumi were banned and most of their leaders imprisoned or exiled. The same fate was suffered by the Democratic League in 1960, the Body for the Promotion of Sukarnoism in 1964, and the Murba Party in 1965. Various newspapers were closed and their editors harrassed; even the PKI's publishing organs were restricted from time to time if they strayed too far
from the official line. The PNI, previously considered the party closest to the President, lost an independent political life apart from echoing the President's wishes. The NU also cooperated without hesitation. Even the PKI submitted to his control to the point that one American political scientist wrote about the "domestication of the PKI". As already mentioned the DPR and MPR proved no problem in manipulating and no elections were ever held. The decentralization law was reversed and Sukarno appointed the governors in addition to his already enormous appointive power at the center.

On the other hand, the President was constantly at odds with the military which should have been his most potent tool of control. The army had developed substantial political doctrine in addition to concrete political interests of its own. It was not willing to be the absolute tool of someone it did not completely trust. Sukarno was extremely upset over the lenient policy of the military towards the military participants in the regional revolts and the banning of the PKI in several regions in 1961 by the military martial law commanders. After the repeal of martial law in 1963, Sukarno was able to exert more leverage and was able to replace his long time enemy General Nasution.

Probably until the end of his regime he believed
that he could manipulate the PKI to his own advantage. He was clearly on the way to securing a stronghold in the military (as was the PKI) at the outbreak of the G-30-S. He was attempting to de-politicize the bureaucracy to insure its loyalty, and all open opposition (i.e. threats to harmony) had disappeared. 

As Pluvier noted in 1965, despite all of the radical rhetoric, the Sukarno regime was essentially a conservative one, although that might have changed had the G-30-S succeeded. The one big attempt by the PKI to strike at the status quo through land reform actions revealed a solid coalition of conservative forces that retaliated to the point of causing severe instability in the countryside. Sukarno asked the PKI to back down and it did. Despite verbal attacks on the bureaucratic capitalists, (read military managing nationalized firms) nothing was ever done about it. While the call of return to the tracks of the revolution and Indonesian socialism filled the air, domestically the Sukarno regime was less than radical. It simply was incapable of maintaining a coherent and sustained program of any kind in any direction. Harmony through control was the practice, but its effectiveness was so low that Sukarno could not prevent the G-30-S, if he even wanted to, or the military-led retaliation.
The New Order and Control:

Initially, the New Order government and most civilian intellectuals as well tended to see the weakness of Indonesia's political system as caused for the most part by the presence of ideologically oriented -- as opposed to program oriented -- political parties. In the army seminar in Bandung in 1966, the basic New Order program in the fields of economics and politics was mapped out. The cure for the ills of the political system was quite naturally seen to be best and most easily implemented through the framework of the UUD45 and Pantjasila Democracy. Basically, what was proposed from the diagnosis was as follows: 1) a program oriented nation-wide two party system, as only through that type of party system could the UUD45 Presidential system work properly; 2) an electoral system based on districts with the winner-take-all mechanism rather than proportional representation and 3) low central control over candidate selections in the districts. At that time it was thought that these proposals were widely accepted by even the military and that coupled with the MPRS decision that year to hold elections in 1968, they would be implemented as soon as possible. It turned out that the individuals who felt that way were small in number and eventually came to be known as the New Order "radicals"
which in the army part of the coalition was centered around
the Siliwangi Division. Although some attempts at imple­
mentation of a two party or Two-Group system was tried in
West Java, the core of the New Order coalition, Suharto
and the Javanese generals around him, evidently withdrew
their support from the proposals. The "radicals" gradually
slipped into the background as did the idea of political
reform. Electoral proposals were submitted to the DPR
by the government calling for a single member constituency
system but they were later withdrawn in the face of
political party opposition. The elections bill that
finally was passed by the DPR was a proportional system
still giving the central party headquarters complete control
over candidate choice. The voters would cast their ballot
for the party and not the man.

Given the fact that political parties were seen as
the major disturbers of harmony and the creators of social
division, it is not surprising that the policies and actions
of the New Order have been highly detrimental to their
strength and even existence. Initial efforts by the new
government to purge all parties of Old Order elements --
Sukarnoists and leftists -- was welcomed by most of the
elite. This led to the banning of the PKI and later of
Partindo as well as the expulsion of the radical wing of
the PNI from the party. The government initially allowed
the creation of a new Muslim party but so restricted its actions that it failed to develop and later a split was sanctioned by the government with the appointment of a cabinet member and close friend of Suharto's as general chairman of the party. The PNI was manipulated again in its latest congress with a long-time friend of Suharto's appointed chairman. Political parties have at best continued a tenuous existence. It was clear to all of them that Suharto would not permit any challenge to the newly found harmony and stability. All remaining political parties have sworn their allegiance to the New Order and Suharto personally, unanimously approving him as their choice for President in 1973, and several have even announced their willingness to disband and dissolve themselves if it is the wish of the President.

At this point it is worth considering why Suharto would allow elections, if he believes in complete harmony, because Indonesia's one experience with general elections had seen the creation of a tremendous amount of social tension. One cannot deny the President's honest intention to "build democracy" which for him means that free elections are regularly held. Additionally the 1966 MPRS had commanded him to hold elections in 1968, and disobeying that decision would have cost him crucial elite support as well as destroy one of the "legitimacy" symbols of his
rule. Finally, there must have been some pressure from the outside considering the large amounts of foreign aid the New Order needs to implement its program. Even with all of those "push" factors Suharto was very hesitant about the actual implementation of the elections. He took his case to the MPRS and won a three year delay but even then adamantly stated that elections would not be held until they would not disturb economic development and rehabilitation, the stability of the regime plus guarantee a victory for the New Order. With conditions set it is little wonder that some observers were doubtful that the elections would even be held in 1971 and that there would be no possibility of Suharto being discredited through them. 67

Suharto and Election Control:

If the elections were to eventually be held, Suharto was determined to control them. He probably concluded that no drastic changes in the political system could be made in the short run and that better control could be guaranteed through the proportional system and behind the scenes interference in party affairs. Still the New Order had no organizational structure of its own to compete in the election. A New Order political party was ruled out and the military backed Golongan Karya or Golkar was revived and to some extent reinvigorated to compete against the
Still unsure of Golkar's ability to attract votes, Suharto insisted that he personally be allowed to appoint 100 (out of a total of 460) members to the new DPR and one-third of the MPR plus 20% of the regional parliaments. Given the fractured nature of the political party system, this appointment power essentially meant that the President's fraction would be the largest in the DPR even if Golkar did not win any seats at all.

However, just the largest contingent was not enough; Suharto needed an absolute majority in the DPR to provide the necessary legal coating for any policy he wanted to implement. While Ali Murtopo and his Special Operations group were dividing the parties among themselves, Amir Machmud, Minister of Interior, became Chairman of the Elections Board to which the list of candidates from each party had to be submitted for approval; names could arbitrarily be removed if, according to the Board, their New Order credentials were lacking. According to Berita Yudha some 550 candidates were disqualified in this manner of the total of around 3,500. Machmud additionally brought as much pressure as possible to bear on the government apparatus to insure that it was loyal to Golkar. As even school teachers are government employees, this includes a large number of people and a very large percentage of the politically aware people in the country.
Finally, Golkar coopted almost all influential community leaders on to their lists, whether they intended for the individual to sit in the DPR later or not. The parties complained that their members were being forced to join Golkar. Golkar was also clearly the best financed of any of the contestants. The results, as mentioned earlier, were astonishing. Two of the 9 parties did not receive a seat and the largest party contingent was almost 20 members smaller than the appointed 75 member military fraction. The PNI, once the strongest non-communist party in the country and the forecasted winner by many observers, was virtually destroyed outside of Djakarta and Central Java as its bureaucratic constituency was taken away from it.

With such an absolute election victory, the stage was set for the destruction of the entire existing party system in a legal manner. In speaking about a new system, Amir Machmud stated "whether later we will have mass parties or cadre parties depends on continuing research but we have enough experience with the failure of mass parties". Perhaps this is part of the reasoning behind the "floating mass" system which will forbid all parties from organizing in the village -- control of the people will become the sole property of ABRI and the civil service. Additional blows were aimed at the parties,
existing or future ones, by forbidding labor unions to associate with political parties and the continued "de politicization" of the civil service through the creation of KORPRI (National Civil Servants Corps) to which all civil servants must belong. It will be affiliated with the "non-political" organization Golkar. So at the moment the two new political federations are little more than hollow shells and in their anonymous groups have lost all claims to separate identity and ideological pulling power. The central part of the political system is clearly under tight control. With the government's aid, Golkar already looks like an even bigger winner in 1976.

While political parties have proved very tame and malleable for Suharto at the center, their strength has always been at the village level. Who can keep the parties out of the village in practice? Obviously the civil service is one answer, but even with KORPRI, the loyalty of many civil servants in the regions is doubtful in the short run. The army is the second possible answer. Suharto has had a long struggle gaining absolute control over the military and creating a structure to maintain it, but he seems to have been extremely successful. Where Sukarno had to continually battle with the military to get it to obey, Suharto now has little trouble. His personal
friends and their friends in turn are scattered all through the civil bureaucracy in the regions, and also are strong in the military structure that parallels the civilian one all the way to the village level. The result is that Indonesia is more secure and has less internal disruption than at any time since independence.

When on March 11, 1966 Sukarno ceded full military power to Suharto, he was given emergency authority to deal with any security threat. KOPKAMTIB or the Command for the Restoration of Peace and Security was set up with extra-constitutional powers, and it still exists. The military has not hesitated to use its power. Thousands of political prisoners attest to this fact. ABRI has clearly performed its duties well as the destruction of the G-30-S and the uprising near Blitar in 1968 show. ABRI has also used its power to suspend PNI activities in several areas and to prevent groups which it does not trust from entering the villages. As the military has no intention of returning to the barracks, control is likely to continue to be a major function of the military until Suharto feels he can trust the civilian apparatus to do his bidding.

Thus, the politics of the New Order might be best described as the politics of manipulation and intrigue. Like the rulers of Mataram, Suharto seeks to have persons
who are personally loyal to him or his assistants in the key positions of the bureaucracy, military and regional government, even the political parties. Harmony, order and stability is maintained through the manipulation of these organizations and the "friends" within them.

Ultimately, however, loyalty and obedience are maintained by the threat of force or the willingness to use it rather than through any over-riding feeling of attachment to the system, the nation or the regime. Today, the unity and strength of ABRI are direct measures of the strength of the regime and its ability to maintain harmony.

Despite the fact that Suharto has tightened up his control on Indonesia and has more and better facilities at his control for the penetration of the disparate society than any ruler in the archipelago's history, he, like the rulers of Mataram, is faced with the problem of theoretical and formal control but actual weakness. "Suharto must hesitate before he introduces measures which will add to the pressure which the government exerts on the great mass of the population, for he knows that most such measures are likely to be implemented in distorted fashion at the local level and to be used as warrants for more regulatory activity hampering the flow of trade." Thus the problem of formal over-centralization but actual "under-centralization" still exists for the New Order just
as it did in the realm of Mataram.

The actions of Sukarno and Suharto can be attributed to the wishes of a ruler to accumulate power and simply be able to control his environment. The power thus accumulated can be used to proclaim the ruler's privilege and protect the status quo or to affect basic changes in the society. The former was the concept of Mataram and of the Dutch colonial regime in Indonesia. In describing Indonesian social structure, Levine called it essentially a "retrogressive" social system; the acute emphasis on privilege, status and its protection was his focus. Internally, the Sukarno regime acted in that manner and the contraction of the political system under the New Order too has been used, in General Nasution's own words, to protect the status quo. On the other hand, the New Order has proclaimed as its major theme modernization and development change. What is the nature of this change?

The Problems of Change and Economic Development:

The late President Sukarno frankly admitted his dislike for the details of economics and obviously placed it low on his list of national priorities. Several times his regime began or almost began what looked like serious economic reform but in each instance could not maintain the initial direction and thrust. Sukarno's attempts at real and consistent change, other than destruction of
institutions, were at best half-hearted and usually served as more of a symbolic act than anything else.

The New Order has placed economic development at the top of its list of announced priorities. In a way development or pembangunan (literally building) has become one of the symbolic linch-pins of the New Order. However, we are not looking at the New Order in historical perspective. The new regime economically is only 5 or at most 6 years old and in the long run could very well drift into the same morass as other Javanized governments have. The economic changes under the New Order are by no means guaranteed or self-sustaining as of yet. The simple fact that for the first time in the nation's history modernization and development are widely discussed and most importantly, something is being done about it calls for some sort of examination of the roots of the shift. Simply why has the Southeast Asian nation that has been described as the least development minded suddenly become one of the most so, and finally for what purpose is this development being used?

It must be remembered that the members of the political and bureaucratic elite that have governed Indonesia since independence have now been pushed aside or are in a position clearly subordinate to that of the army. The military, despite some degree of prijaji and
kesatria influence and norms, is also the part of the society that has been most greatly influenced by Western organizational norms. If Robert M. Price’s reference group theory has any applicability, Indonesia is surely one case of it.\textsuperscript{87} Despite the much publicized Eastern Block aid to the Indonesian military -- which was largely concentrated on the navy and air force -- far greater numbers of Indonesians went to the United States to study military methods and organization. The army has always been ideologically as well as technologically more oriented toward the West than to the East.\textsuperscript{88} While maintaining its own doctrines of guerilla and territorial warfare, in addition to building its Dual Function theory,\textsuperscript{89} the Indonesian army, if it had any outside reference group to which it looked for professional and organizational norms at all, was adopting ideas from Western, and particularly United States’ military establishments.

With this background in mind, one member of the Indonesian military told this author that it was quite natural for the military once in control to espouse "development" as its major goal.\textsuperscript{90} The military saw many things in the West that they wished to have and felt that they were in a good position to push the society towards those material ends. Seeing modernization and development primarily as technical matters, they assumed
that they were the best qualified section of the society to implement them. The military probably also felt that a large part of the reason for the strength of the PKI in Indonesia was the low standard of living coupled with the declining economy. In order for the polity to survive without further radical influence and deviation, the military felt economic development to be a must. It would assist the New Order elite in achieving Pantjasila Democracy and stability. Coupled with depoliticization, economic development became the solution to Indonesia's political and social problems.

The New Order's leaders and Ali Murtopo in particular are fond of talking of the next 25 years as a period of accelerated development. This period is evidently envisioned as one of slow but constant change in the entire fabric of society. Development will control politics rather than vice versa. The process is one that cannot be made overnight but only with firm and stable leadership over the entire period. ABRI will constantly guard the Pantjasila state from ideological and political excesses, guaranteeing order and stability. The private sector with assistance and guidance from the government will be expected to start industrialization of the country. The Green Revolution will be realized and Indonesia will become self-sufficient in rice. Eventually, the masses will
be educated formally and informally in "modern ways" and enjoy a higher standard of living.

All of this is to be accomplished through a series of five year development plans that are constantly being readjusted to meet new problems and demands. Originally the first plan Repelita I was to stress rehabilitation of the transportation system and increasing agricultural production, while the second plan was to place emphasis on industrialization. Non-party technocrats and intellectuals were coopted into the regime to assist the military in achieving the goals.

To this point the results have simply been amazing, if only in comparison with previous efforts. The Repelita I is coming to a seemingly successful conclusion and the immeasurably destructive hyperinflation of the early and mid-1960's has been brought to a dramatic halt. Prices are stable and exports rising. The economy is expanding at about 7% per year. Statistically at least the New Order's program seems to be being implemented.

Despite the optimism expressed in some quarters for Indonesia's economic future there are signs of acute difficulties. Development as it has occurred so far seems to be happening despite the majority of the population rather than because of them. The great role played in all developments thus far by foreign aid and investment must
not be overlooked. The benefits of the New Order's stability and economic growth seem to be accruing to a very small portion of the population. With political demobilization, the masses are not participating in any process be it political or developmental. Thus far the New Order's development program has only reinforced the status and privilege of the rich and powerful as well as providing better means of control.93

The New Order government acknowledges this problem and says Pelita II will put emphasis on narrowing the income gap which in Indonesia's case is also a rural-urban gap.94 President Suharto himself has said that if the benefits of development are not felt by all a social revolution will inevitably come.95 Statements about good intentions for the future aside, however, even the New Order does not appear to be using their new tool of development to any different purpose than Mataram rulers used their existing tools of rulership. The purpose behind change is a very conservative one at best. As Huntington has put it the military's view of economic development is typically middle class and urban.96 It remains to be seen how that view will change under pressure of the impoverished rural masses.
The Style of Indonesian Government

We have previously discussed an alternative way to view the structure and functions of the contemporary Indonesian government. While our interpretation is debatable for Indonesian and foreigner alike, the style of Indonesian government is one thing that almost all observers agree on as being very Javanese. Style is a part of behavior but certainly not the total content of it. Style is the way in which things are done and the way in which problems are perceived and approached. Of course style has influence on goals and results also for the entire span of behavior is related.

Anderson and Geertz both note that single-mindedness of purpose is regarded by Javanese as the key to success. Absolute concentration on the object desired is needed before the goal can be achieved. This may help to account for the seemingly single track of Guided Democracy in relationship to the completion of the Indonesian Revolution. Once this goal was perceived as the ultimate aim of the nation, regardless of its true meaning or content, it would have been heresy to lose concentration by being side-tracked into economic stabilization and development. The New Order has taken up the same stance. Modernization and economic development to this point perceived as the ultimate aim or goal of the regime while actual content
is again rather hazily understood, and nothing must be allowed to stand in the way of its realization or it will fail. Concentration must not be lost. Should this observation have any degree of truth to it, it augurs well for the continuance of present orientation at least in name.97

On the other hand it is extremely bad taste for a Javanese to show emotion and inner desires. For instance, cultural norms in Javanese prija ji society are very strong against the open display of riches or power seeking motives. Thus the would-be ruler must seem to be inactive or passive; power must flow to him because of his superior concentration and inner qualities. This may also help to account for Sukarno's hesitancy to appear willing to take the reins of power and be a noticeably active ingredient in the downfall of the parliamentary system. He gave suggestions in public but from Feith and Lev's writing we know that behind the scenes he was never willing to support the existing system and did what he could to hasten its downfall. As a result power seemed to just flow to Sukarno and away from the old system. Westerners have tended to see Sukarno as a very active element in the decline of constitutional democracy, therefore to be condemned, but Indonesians (Javanese?) tend to view him as a saviour, as one whose approach to the situation was
strong and unyielding; whose inner strength allowed him to restore order and concentrate power at the center again.

One of the more interesting frameworks for viewing post-G-30-S politics has been presented by Peter Polomka who points out that Indonesian politics seem more like a wajang kulit or shadow play than anything else. By this he means that it is almost impossible to tell by public actions the real intents and purposes of the actors. This is essentially an expression of the non-emotion and non-desire norms we are talking about. It can clearly be noticed during the Suharto-Sukarno struggle of 1965-1967. Suharto was careful never to openly display a desire for power or actively do anything to achieve it. Suharto's struggle with Sukarno was very covert and often waged by proxy. The students in the cities and the "fanatic" Muslims in the villages had more to do with the destruction of the PKI and Sukarno's support than Suharto appeared to. Even the less Javanese elements (primarily Siliwangi and RPKAD) of the army were the ones to openly display their opposition to PKI and Sukarno. Thus Suharto just waited while his opponents were destroyed and disclosures made about Sukarno that weakened his public position, or so it all appeared from the outside. Power seemed to be flowing to Suharto quite without effort on his part; hence as a result of his inner power and concentration.
While it was not proper for Suharto to engage in a struggle with his technical superior, his assistants could do it without hesitation. Thus, the Special Operations or Opsus group, which had arisen from pre-G-30-S opposition to Sukarno and Subandrio by the military and was led by a Diponegoro and Mandala subordinate of Suharto's, Ali Murtopo, continued to operate while the aspirant remained untainted from the scars of "dirty" political battles and kept his "white Knight" image. The need for Special Operations has continued throughout the period of the New Order. The President does not usually get mixed up in political battles and publicly says little of them. But during both PNI party congresses since the G-30-S, Opsus pressure was felt and on both occasions leaders acceptable to Suharto were elected to the top party posts and those hostile either ostracized or isolated. The 1968 MPRS session was manipulated behind the scenes by Opsus. The 1971 PMI split was allegedly aided by Opsus and for sure the West Irian plebiscite and the recent general elections were targets of the Special Operations group. Similarly there have been charges of the same kind of interference at the January 1972 NU Congress where the most avid critic of the military was subsequently kicked off the leadership council and retired. Ali Murtopo is now the ASPRI for Special Operations and has acquired
quite a reputation as a "bulldozer" for the tactics he uses. Whatever the truth of the matter is, his power and influence have grown immensely with the successes of these operations and the President has largely been able to avoid expressing his emotion or showing any desire for power in the process.\textsuperscript{103}

It is further interesting to note here that although Suharto's Presidential term is completed in 1973 and almost everyone has spoken out in favor of his re-election, the President himself has never spoken publicly about the subject. In fact, the only time Suharto has even mentioned the Presidency while this author was in the country, he declared himself to be the humble servant of the people and that if anyone wanted to replace him, they should do so by constitutional means at the 1973 MPR session; yet in reality to attempt to do so, no matter what the motivation, would be tantamount to suicide for any individual or group.\textsuperscript{104} So for whatever the reason, Suharto has shown a remarkable non-interest in the pursuit of political power in public. This is perhaps why in 1969 Van der Kroef could remark, "....Suharto has increasingly acquired the reputation of being a good man thrust into a job seemingly beyond his capacities".\textsuperscript{105} The real politics of the New Order does not go on in public and Suharto does not express dynamism through his public
speaking or actions. Publicly he gives the impression of one subject or even victim to the flow of circumstances and events, which as a good Javanese he should, but behind the scenes it seems to be an entirely different matter: the President is in absolute control. 106

The President has decidedly shown emotion on only two or three occasions since his rise to power and always when he felt he was being pushed into a corner without other choice except to lose face or his realm. One such occasion was at the height of Muslim-Christian tensions in 1968. 107 With the santri Muslims seemingly ready to declare "Holy War" on the Christians who were seen as "stealing" converts, Suharto had little choice but to express his extreme displeasure at the thought of a resultant civil war. Harmony could not be disturbed in such an intolerant manner. Again in January 1972, following two months of protests concerning a tourism and cultural project proposed by his wife, Suharto lashed out in public at those trying to undermine the stability of the state. The President totally ignored all of the economic arguments that had been put forward against the project and interpreted the protests as personal attacks upon himself and his family. In this case the President must have felt his honor at stake and had to defend himself and his family. 108
The "wajang" sort of politics reflecting prioritizing social relations has a serious effect on the way that Indonesian political and military leaders view any action. Nothing can be taken for surface value; there always must be a hidden motive for action. Since the Javanese political leaders themselves do not play "honest" or direct politics, they have no reason to expect other political actors to do so either. The Djakarta elite spends hours of discussion trying to discover the true meaning and latar belakang (literally background) of any statement made or action taken. Since most actors do operate that way it is not an entirely fruitless task. Since speaking directly from the heart or frankly is not highly valued among Javanese but evidently, is with most "modernist" Muslims and many of the younger students, particularly the non-Javanese ones, a serious communication gap arises. This has to be a part of the reason 'modernist' Muslims have been pushed out of the political system and why the "Angkatan '66" or '66 Generation have not been able to find a comfortable place in the New Order constellation. This also partly accounts for the difficulty that foreigners have had in communicating with the Old Order as well as the New Order regime.

The above points out the futility of direct criticism of the regime. It will not be understood and frequently
other motives attached to its utterance, getting the critic in trouble or pointing him out as an automatic enemy of the regime, meaning that all his statements should be ignored. This has happened with the student protesters over and over again. They can make all of the "rational" arguments they want but they will be brushed aside in the search for ulterior motives. This happened in the KAK (Korps Anti-Korupsi), Mahasiswa Mengugat (Students Accuse), Kita Ingin Tahu (we want to know), Golput (Golongan Putih or White Group) and the Minatur Indonesia Indah protests as well. When Ali Murtopo says that such protests do not harmonize with the spirit of struggle of the New Order what he means is that such direct attacks on privilege are simply not in harmony with Javanese social etiquette.

This raises the question of the often stringent newspaper criticism and why it does exist while protest demonstrations are forbidden. One answer here is that direct personal attack on figures of the New Order leadership is not permitted. And by and large newspapers reach only urban and semi-urban areas, probably affecting only 2 or 3% of the population at most. Besides this there are several indications that journalistic criticism is not taken into account by New Order leaders. General Sumitro, the power behind KOPKAMTIB, said that he did not
even bother to read Indonesian newspapers because they were not of high enough quality. This does not mean that newspapers are not continually harassed and their credibility undermined by the regime. On the other hand, there does exist a long literal tradition in Java where criticism was allowed if done in an individual way. Perhaps this is why Harian Kami and Indonesia Raja as well as the pure oppositionist Abadi can exist with as much freedom as they do.

Unfortunately, the problem of opposition and criticism has certain ethnic overtones. Criticism can be accepted if it is done in a halus enough manner that it does not appear to be criticism at all. Naturally enough, this sort of persuasion is best done by someone with long experience in dealing with Javanese and who is very well acquainted with Javanese culture and language. Outer Islanders, particularly of the "modernist" Muslim group, seldom have such knowledge and experience or care to develop it. Even younger Javanese students with an urban background may have such problems. This has created a situation whereby the best and most effective critics are operating from inside the government rather than from outside and using indirect methods rather than direct confrontations to convey criticism. Despite all of the personal as well as government prestige wrapped up in the
BIMAS project for increasing rice production, a Javanese was able to approach the President and convince him that the program had to be stopped and admitted as a failure. Likewise, only a Javanese speaker appealing to all of the cultural and paternal prejudices could get the top military leaders to agree to the admission of the Minatur Indonesia Indah project problem into the parliament for open discussion -- discussion that would without a doubt criticize the government and various government officials (military and civilian) very directly and heavily. This kind of situation has very definite implications for national communications about political and economic issues. People with non-halus temperaments like Arief Budiman and Buyung Nasution, despite the brilliance of their ideas, find it very difficult to make themselves understood by the New Order regime.

Communication of alternatives and feedback is also hindered by the Javanese notion of the patrimonial state. Communication is not conceived of as a two-way process. The method of rule by the prijaji, albeit heavily reinforced by military norms, is by perintah or order; government by command. The most common Javanese social relationship type is the guru-murid, bapak-anak (father-son or teacher-pupil) type. The former knows best and is not to be questioned. This leads to a situation where policy
is formulated and executed without the expectation of opposition or criticism or of failure (if the approach is deemed correct). Hardly a day goes by without the expression of paternalism by one major government official in a public statement. The masses or massa bodoh (literally, stupid masses) have to be dididik or educated. The floating mass proposal, Amir Moertono's latest statement on governor elections in the provinces, or the important recent book by Brigadier General Sajidiman all show acute symptoms of paternalism. The Bimas program is one example, however, where the massa bodoh proved they were quite expert in their own field. Bimas means mass guidance and was used to increase rice production. Several major foreign companies were hired by the government to supply a package of fertilizer, high yielding rice seed along with the necessary insecticide on credit. According to the government policy decision the farmers were to have no choice whether or not they enrolled in the program and whether or not they wanted the entire package. The farmers were to repay the credit to the government from their increase in yields. What resulted was a massive failure. The government was not paid back and the state got very little of what it thought it was paying for, an increase in rice yield. The farmers simply resisted the decisions that were made for them
without knowledge of their particular conditions and situation. Until the system was made more flexible giving the farmers choice as to membership and the elements of the package they received, the program did not obtain worthwhile results. The Bimas failure evidently resulted from the initial feeling on the part of the program designers that they could think for the farmers.

The Minatur Indonesia Indah project was another example of a high level Indonesian figure, the wife of the President in this case, deciding to implement a project using government influence without the slightest suspicion that she could be challenged on it. The First Lady assumed that since she wanted the project that everyone else would automatically agree and contribute their money for its construction. Once she was challenged on the issue, she acted as if the criticizers did not have the right to obstruct her wishes.

The "Mini project" illustrates another problem that in the West is known as conflict of interest but that is seemingly unknown in Indonesia. There are no prohibitions of high level government employees participating in private enterprise outside of their regular government work. Hence Ali Sadikin and Ali Murtopo could serve as project officers to the "Mini project"
while officially it was a "private" project.\textsuperscript{124} This fusion of interests and other obvious misuses of power (in Western terms) such as corruption are all part of the traditional patrimonial attitude towards government on the part of the Javanese. When one gives a gift to a high government official or offers him an opportunity to buy stock on credit, "facilities" are expected in return.\textsuperscript{125}

We have already mentioned Sukarno's great stress on the correct approach or symbolic form of policies rather than on content and results. To some extent, the New Order has also been unable to escape this Javanese habit either. It has often been pointed out that Sukarno's eight year plan of 1962 was little more than a symbol and that it had been arranged and rearranged so that it contained the proper number of volumes, chapters and paragraphs to form 8-17-1945 or the date of Indonesian independence. Only this past year Golkar when shaping its central institutions arranged them so that the membership was 8-17-45; once again to correspond to the symbolic date. Perhaps this is also one reason that the "floating mass" is seen as so desirous. It is symbolic in forming a conflict-free environment but whether legislation will actually remove conflict from the village is another matter.
The same kind of form without content can be seen in the decree disbanding all "youth gangs" in Djakarta in the wake of the "Mini Project" protests. Symbolically all gang members came to police headquarters to declare that the gangs had been disbanded and dissolved. Notice, however, that within only a few weeks there were gangs forming again. After the KOPKAMTIB decree nothing was done to change the objective condition that had caused gangs to arise in the first place.

Finally, with the present emphasis on development every province and kabupaten now has a development operations room complete with charts, graphs, and diagrams showing the progress of all development occurring in the area. Polomka notes however that these rooms have very little correspondence with reality and that frequently the workers there do not even know what the diagrams stand for. The point is, however, that development means having an operations and planning room whether there is anything else or not.

In conclusion, it must be pointed out that the style of contemporary Indonesian government in many ways resembles that of Mataram. Rulers value concentration and non-expression of emotion and desire. The form and approach to any policy is extremely important and seems to take on sacral qualities. The government and rulers view themselves
as such and conduct their business in a manner that could best be described as "protective superiority". Like Mataram also, the government of contemporary Indonesia has the capacity to "fool itself" in terms of what is happening in the country and the world around it. Rewriting history could not make the Dutch into Javanese for Mataram and calling old policies by new names will not create a modern and developed Indonesia for the New Order.
NOTES on Chapter III

1 The decree, even with the Parliament's approval, was of dubious legality but clearly showed how shallow were the roots of the parliamentary system as well as who held the political initiative in the country. It is interesting to note that the army through General Nasution was the first to put forward the idea of the return to the UUD45.

2 The text of the Constitution of 1945 with full explanation and most of the documents surrounding the return to it are given in J.C.T. Simorangkir and B. Mang Reng Say, Tentang dan Sekitar Undang-Undang Dasar 1945 (About and Around the 1945 Constitution). (Djakarta: Djambatan, 1959). A very extensive discussion of the executive and his powers in relationship with other government organs is given in Ismail Suny, Pergeseran Kekuasan Exekutif (The Changing Powers of the Executive) (Djakarta: C.V. Calindra, 1965). The Constitution itself is extremely brief with only 37 articles and about 1700 words. Only the barest outlines of state structure are given and almost everything in terms of content is explicitly stated as being left to further regulations. In theory, the MPR is supposed to play a role somewhat similar to that originally intended for the Electoral Board in the United States with the added responsibility of determining the broad outlines of state policy. In theory also, the President is directly responsible to the MPR for his actions and can be removed at its command.

3 The President is not responsible to the DPR but neither can he dismiss it or any of its members at any time he wishes. Suny, op.cit., p.206.

4 The UUD45 does not specify how the DPR should be chosen. Simorangkir and Say, op.cit., p.22.

5 It must be remembered that there were no political parties in existence in the country at the time of the writing of the UUD45.

6 This may also be true of the Vice President which is plainly called for in the UUD45 but there has not been one since its reintroduction in 1959.

7 Besides being Javanese both Suharto and Sukarno have essentially Central Javanese and upper class backgrounds. Sukarno's father was supposedly of aristocratic origin and the young Sukarno was the protege of the prijaji leader of Sarekat Islam, Tjokrominoto. Suharto is the son of a lesser
village official but was raised by a prijaji family in Solo. On Sukarno see Dahm, *op.cit., passim*; and on Suharto see O.G. Roeder, *The Smiling General* (Djakarta: Gunung Agung, 1969). The dominant position of the Javanese is tacitly recognized by most Indonesians. No one in the country that I have ever talked to felt that a non-Javanese could ever become President. The feeling about the Vice-Presidency was just the opposite: he should be non-Javanese. This may be one reason why, despite the logic of it, Nasution, a Sumatran Batak, did not become President in the wake of the G-30-S. Despite his loyalty to the army, Nasution has become somewhat of a critic of the operation of Javanese-led New Order and closely associated with the "out" faction of the army. See *Berita Buana* June 12, 1972 for some of his most recent comments. In an April 7, 1972 interview, Nasution revealed his opposition to the "floating mass" system.

Ali Murtopo, a Special Assistant to the President, has announced that the Sultan of Jogjakarta will be Golkar's nominee for Vice President at the upcoming 1973 MPR session. While Suharto was careful enough to give the Outer Islands representative equality with Java in the new DPR, it seems that the Vice President is not to be Sumatran. Is a tacit understanding about to be broken? For comments on Murtopo's announcement see *Pedoman* April 24, 1972.

This will no longer be true as of March 1973 when Suharto will be reelected without opposition. However, 33% of the MPR members will be direct Suharto appointees.

10 This is other than internal military considerations. The President seems to have overcome the major factional problems there though. On this see Ulf Sundhaussen, "The Military in Research on Indonesian Politics", *The Journal of Asian Studies*, 1972, Vol. XXXI, No.2.
12 See Dahm, *op.cit., passim*.
13 Anderson, *op.cit.*, p.64.

17 The New Order theorists speak of the "Tres Politika" (meaning division and separation of powers) and its application to Indonesia under the UUD'45, but it just does not seem to function that way. The executive, in reality, makes the laws, interprets them and attempts to enforce them. See Soediman Kartohadiprodjo, Beberapa Pikiran Sekitar Pantjasila (Some Thoughts on Pantjasila) (Bandung: Alumni, 1970), pp. 189-98.

18 Huntington makes the same point about tradition and the American presidential system. See Huntington, op. cit., pp. 93-139.

19 Village elections usually are of the musjawarah or consensus type, and it is not infrequent for the post to become considered hereditary. The selection of a village headman is subject to approval by the bupati or district head who as often as not has been a military man since 1965. This means that there are definitely outside pressures as to who will be selected. For the description of one such election see Totok Suharto, "Factionalisme Mendjelang Pemilihan Lurah didesad 'Sumber Air'", Tjakrawala, 1972, Vol. IV, No. 5. Also contrast the numbers of elected officials in Indonesia with those in India; See Myron Weiner in Lucian Pye and Sidney Verba, Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 208.

20 This turned out not to be such a victory for Sukarno after all. Yani proved to be hard to manipulate and staunchly anti-communist. He was eventually a victim of the G-30-S.

21 As examples of such "rewards", witness the presence of Idham Chalid of the NU in the cabinet and also of M. Dachlan until the latest reshuffle. At Suharto's insistence Chalid was appointed Speaker of the DPR, despite the fact that the NU has only 1/5 the number of seats of Golkar.
While in the field of economics Suharto has chosen to rely on civilian advisors or experts for planning and policy, this is much less true in the political field. Military advice especially from the ASPRI on such matters seems dominant. Even in the field of economics Sudjono Humardani has played a great role, and one interviewee expressed the belief that he was more important in dealing with Japan than Widjojo Nitisastro or Adam Malik. It is also interesting to note that there are four ASPRI, exactly the same number of assistants possessed by the patih of Mataram for symbolic reasons.

The simple fact that Suharto depends largely on personal friendship ties, which is the normal Javanese way of doing things, has meant that most of his trusted assistants and advisors are military men. The President, a professional military man, has had little real contact with the civilian world before attaining the position. His few civilian advisors have been Javanese. As one interviewee put it, Suharto is intellectually fascinated with civilians like Widjojo and Soedjatmoko - two of the most important civilian figures in the New Order. As of this writing 22 of 26 provincial governors were military men, and although Minister for Social Affairs Mintaredja has announced that the government intends to "civilianize" these posts along with lower level provincial positions, such is very unlikely to occur in the near future.

With the exception of the Hatta Cabinet (January 1948-December 1949), cabinets during the revolution were formed on a parliamentary majority basis. After the creation of the unitary Republic in August 1950 until the appointment of the Djuanda Cabinet in 1957, the same was also true.

See Daniel S. Lev, op.cit., passim; and Herbert Feith, The Indonesian Elections of 1955 (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1957) for excellent discussions of these two elections. Lev seems to feel that the non-communist elite's realization of the meaning of mass politics and their inability to compete with the PKI on such a basis - thus a traditional and self-interest reaction -- were the key factors in the party elite's weak reaction and opposition to a Guided Democracy system.

This occurred much to the relief of rural conservatives.
Sekber Golkar was originally formed by Presidential Decree No. 193/1964 as a part of Sukarno's National Front. It then consisted of 61 non-affiliated functional organizations and ABRI. As of present, there are 201 organizations affiliated with Golkar which in 1969 were grouped into 7 KINO's or Mother Organizational Groups according to the function of the organization itself. The symbol of Golkar is the banyan tree which is quite famous in Javanese folklore. For further details on Golkar see "The Sekber Golkar: A Bird's Eye View of its History", (Djakarta: Golkar Pusat, n.d.).


For these decisions see Sinar Harapan March 18, 1972.

Despite the President's statement that he expects Golkar to join in controlling the government, the actual prospects for it seem slight. For the President's statement see Berita Buana October 5, 1971. For arguments about the possibility of control by Golkar see Rosihan Anwar's article in Tempo July 10, 1971, p.9; and the Sinar Harapan editorial "Golkar Bukan Pemerintah" (Golkar is not the Government) on June 2, 1971. According to Golkar's leading civilian figure, Sumiskum, Golkar is basically three groups: ABRI, KORPRI and the Non-ABRI, Non-KORPRI of which the latter is by far the weakest. This makes Golkar appear to be the government and the military only.


Suharto has already announced that there will only be three choices in the next election: two parties and one Golkar. Pedoman October 28, 1971. His basis for such action is Decision No. XXII of the MPRS session of 1966. It has been pointed out that the decision said nothing about how the parties were to be simplified with the implication that the President is not on solid constitutional ground. For a thoughtful discussion of the "Floating Mass" system, see Alfian in Kompas April 27-8, 1972.

See Gerald Maryanov, Decentralization in Indonesia as a Political Problem (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1958) and John Legge, Central Authority and Regional Autonomy in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1961) for details of the 1957 law and the subsequent retreat from it. Due to the regional revolts most provisions of the new law never were fully implemented before their lapse.
Ted Smith and R.S. Smith, "The Political Economy of Regional and Urban Revenue Policy in Indonesia", Asian Survey, 1972, Vol. XI, No.8, p.296. ADO funds are the fixed proportion (now 10%) of all the tax earnings by the central government on the province's exports which are automatically returned to the provincial government. Where the money will be spent is already decided before it is returned to the local or regional government, however.


Daniel S. Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1967) p.29. The government says it is seriously concerned with the overcrowding of Java and hopes that people can be encouraged to migrate. Unfortunately, a net migration to Java rather than away from it is occurring, because almost all of the country's modern industry is located there - especially around Djakarta. If the government really expects to spread out the population, spontaneously or through transmigration, very high rates of infrastructure investment in the Outer Islands are needed, yet Java gets first priority, Minister of Public Works Sutami (a Javanese) mentioned recently that all roads start from Java. When asked why, he jokingly replied because when he was in grade school, geography started with Java(!). For an intelligent discussion of the problem see Sajidiman, op.cit., pp. 56-71. For Sutami's comment see Sinar Harapan June 26, 1972.

The new DPR has shown a good beginning in reviewing the regions' problems firsthand during the latest recess (March-April 1972), but unfortunately, they (the DPR members) are in little position to help with any problems they observed there. Such decisions and division of funds are made elsewhere.

Pembangunan or development is probably no less of a symbol than was Nasakom, but the former is definitely more appealing to Western ears and thus far to Western pocketbooks.


Dahm, op.cit., passim. For Indonesian comments on these points see Alfian in Sinar Harapan July 19-23, 1971.
See Sukarno's speeches attacking Liberal Democracy as translated in Feith and Castles, op.cit., Chap. 2.

Outer Islanders, as usual with anything Sukarno said, were rather skeptical about these "Indonesian" values. See Kahar Muzahar's writing in Feith and Castles, op.cit., pp. 330-5.

See Levine in Pye and Verba, op.cit., p.280.

Anderson, op.cit., p.15. Sembada means concentration of power because of meditation.

For the text of Sukarno's speech "The Birth of the Pantjasila" see Feith and Castles, op.cit., p.40.

Quoted in a book review in Tempo, April 8, 1972, p.52.

Kompas March 5, 1972. While harmony in its broad meaning is the objective of almost any government, some societies tolerate larger degrees of conflict as normal and legitimate than do others. As we noted earlier, a pervasive prijaji norm was the total avoidance of even any sign of conflict. This moral standard is still considered valid as this Suharto quote shows.

See Sajidiman, op.cit., pp. 78-9; and President Suharto's speech on the Minatur Indonesia Indah issue as summarized in Sinar Harapan January 6, 1972.

Harmony (in its extreme form) as a cultural norm is by no means restricted to the Javanese elite. African leaders have often expressed "African Socialism" in much the same terms and the roots of the Panchajati Raj system in India seem to reflect a similar line of thinking. See Myron Weiner's comments on the Indian elite's attitudes towards conflict in their own society in Pye and Verba, op.cit., pp. 235-6. As does Ben Anderson, I attribute this characteristic to the Hindu-Buddhist base of Javanese culture and therefore, would expect similar sorts of values to be present in Thailand, Burma and Cambodia. Further comparison on the subject definitely would be of value.


55 Ibid., p.324.

56 These included Mochtar Lubis's Indonesia Raja and Pedoman of the PSI, run by Soedjatmoko and Rosihan Anwar.


58 Ben Anderson and Ruth McVey wrote a controversial version of the G-30-S, A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965 Coup Attempt in Indonesia. (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1971), in which they attributed the entire affair to a group of young officers dissatisfied with the conservativeness and opposition to Sukarno by the Army's General Staff. While this version of the affair has been shown to be rather distorted, there remains a great deal of truth to the statement that there was a high degree of tension in the army at the time. It is certain that the PKI used this tension to their own advantage and Sukarno was probably the focus of loyalty used to lure the young officers into action, not communism.

59 Pluvier, op.cit., p. VIII.

60 Despite the fact that Pantjasila is the single most important ideological symbol in the country today, most Indonesians will say that they do not have any idea what Pantjasila Democracy is. A few will attempt to say what it is not, but that is usually the limit. For a very good attempt to explain the concept see A.H. Nasution, Pantjasila Democracy Today and Tomorrow. (Djakarta: Seruling Masa, 1971). Also see Hazairin, Demokrasi Pantjasila (Pantjasila Democracy) (Djakarta: Tintamas, 1970) and Ismaun, Tindjauan Pantjasila: Dasar Filsafat Negara Republik Indonesia (Observations of Pantjasila: The Basic Philosophy of the Republic of Indonesia) (Bandung: Carya Remadja, 1970).

61 For a complete discussion of the diagnosis and the cure see R. William Liddle, "Modernizing Indonesian Politics" (Stenciled, n.d.). Also see Sri Soemantri, Sistim Dua Partai (The Two Party System) (Bandung: Binatjipta, 1968).

62 Given the fact that Suharto has been able to secure the passage of any measure he feels vital by some means or another, the lack of "push" for the original bill showed how unimportant he felt the idea was. One of the more interesting features of the 1976 elections will be whether or not with its overwhelming majority, Golkar will pass a single member constituency bill. Among Golkar interviewees at this time, none had given it any thought—they said they were more concerned with the upcoming MPR session.
One might want to speculate as to why parties were not banned altogether if Suharto and his colleagues were so opposed to them. New Order supporters now answer that such a move would not have been "democratic"; however, this reasoning did not seem to apply to the PKI. This author is led to the conclusion that Suharto, initially, thought the parties to be much stronger than they later proved to be. Outside factors such as effects on loan and aid givers should not be under-estimated.

See Samson, op.cit., passim. It now appears that the permission for the creation of a new "modernist" Muslim party was a "pay-off" to this group for their support in the destruction of Sukarno and the PKI.


PMI (Parmusi), Katolik, Parkindo and PSII.


Golkar must not be seen as a party in any unified sense. It is a mere coalition of forces brought together by the military. Their common desire was and is development, plus they are willing to acknowledge the fact that ABRI is dominant in the society. Some civilians in the organization, particularly a group from Bandung known as the independents hope to play a role that is not 100% controlled by the military. At this date, this particular group is pessimistic of its chances to do so. Despite some hope for a big Golkar reorganization after the election, Ali Murtopo announced that Golkar would not become a party. Berita Buana October 12, 1971.

Previous to the formation of the new DPR, all decisions had to be taken in musjawarah style, meaning that resolutions had to be unanimous. As soon as Golkar obtained an absolute majority, the rules were changed to permit majority decisions. See Berita Buana December 23, 1971 on the changes. The President called it "Stopping the Dictatorship of the Minority" in Berita Buana October 12, 1971.
March 5, 1971. All PKI and most Masjumi leaders could not participate at all either. The latter definitely hurt the PMI.

All government employees had to vote at their places of work rather than at public polls. This made the total number of vote casters in any one poll station very small; even the public ones were seldom over 300. In several interviews with civil servants, I was told that direct pressure and threats were made towards them if the vote total did not turn out to be almost 100% for Golkar.

Donald Hindley, "Indonesia 1971: Pantjasila Democracy and the Second Parliamentary Elections", Asian Survey, 1972, Vol. XII, No. 1, p.61. Golkar manipulated their candidates and lists at will, even after the results of the election had been announced. A good example of how this manipulation was done was the case of Adam Malik, the Foreign Minister. Malik campaigned long and hard in his home provinces of North Sumatra and was number one of the North Sumatra Provincial Golkar List. After the election Malik was removed from the Golkar list and replaced with the excuse that his ministerial duties were too heavy to permit him time for the DPR.

Hindley gives a more complete list of the possible reasons for Golkar's victory. Hindley, op.cit., p.59.

Berita Buana October 6, 1971.

On the labor restriction see Kompas February 7, 1972. For a good summary of the position of organized labor under the New Order see Pedoman February 11, 1972. The right to strike is not recognized, although strikes do occasionally occur. On KORPRI see Sinar Harapan April 15, 1972 and the Kompas editorial of April 18, 1972. On depoliticization see the Kompas editorial of March 20, 1972.

Anticipating the government bill to be submitted to Parliament, the Islamic parties grouped together to form the Kelompok Persatuan Pembangunan or United Development Group while the PNI, Murba, IPKI and the two Christian parties formed the Kelompok Demokratis Pembangunan or Democratic Development Group. The latter has gone further than the former in creating a new political structure (probably because of the obstinance of the NU), but both remain essentially federations. Amir Machmud stated that fusion is a must and that federation can only be a transitory stage. Sinar Harapan April 1, 1972. As of this writing the bill has not been submitted to Parliament and this delay may represent some re-thinking of the problem inside the government.
A member of the Dewan Pimpinan Golkar or Leadership Council, Lim Bian Kie, told me, "Look at the size of our victory with only one and one-half years of preparation; just think what we can do with five years to work on it." (March 24, 1972). Ali Murtopo has recently added that Golkar will be satisfied with a 5% increase in their vote in 1976.


For this structure see Polomka, op.cit., pp. 96-7. The political parties, especially the PNI and NU, claim that this structure was used to control the outcome of the elections which to some extent was probably true.

It is interesting to note that for only 3 years of the 13 since the return to the UUD45 Indonesia has not been under what amounts to martial law.

This happened to WAY (World Assembly of Youth) which had development projects in the villages but that also contained "modernist" Muslim elements in the leadership that were not trusted by the military.

The military through its Dwi-Pungsi or Dual Function Doctrine has stressed time and time again that it has no intention of being a mere alat or tool of civilians. See Suharto's speech "ABRI is not a Fireman" summarized in Berita Buana March 6, 1972.

For a good discussion of the economic problems, especially inflation, see J.A.C. Mackie, Indonesian Inflation (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1967).

Such attempts are described as half-hearted because of the only passing attention they received from Sukarno. For certain there was a lack of resources for economic development but outside resources, Sukarno was told, were available should he decide to concentrate on rehabilitation. The basic problem, then, seems to have been one of priorities and will.


From an interview with Nugroho Notosusanto, the head of the military's history center, March 1972. One could, of course, argue with Nugroho as to whether armies with such experience are always forces for modernization.

Murtopo rather wildly predicted that Indonesia would catch up with Japan after the 25 year period.

In a recent University of Indonesia seminar on economic growth Professor Sarbini Sumawinata challenged several of the government's technocrats and their predictions concerning the rate of growth of the GNP in Indonesia during the next decade. In a debate which he seemed to win, Sarbini said that present growth could not be sustained because of the low investment rate. The high growth rates now, he said, were the result of rehabilitation or quick yields that were brought about by simple infrastructure improvement. See *Tempo* August 14, 1971 and *Melihat Kedepan Perspektif Ekonomi Indonesia* (A Future Perspective of the Indonesian Economy) (Djakarta: LP38, 1971).

The government is torn between the demands of the cities for low and stable rice prices and the countryside's demands for high but stable prices. A government supply bureau, Bulog, was set up to maintain price stability but the price decision definitely went in favor of the cities. Polomka notes that during 1970-1 Bulog acquired some 600,000 tons of rice at one-half the world market price and even then secured only from middlemen which meant the farmer did not even get the minimum price set by the government. Polomka, *op.cit.*, p.15. This continues while consumption of luxury goods in the major cities, especially Djakarta, runs wild. Another development from this system is that rice in Java, a rice deficit area, is cheaper than in several rice surplus areas in the Outer Islands.
This says nothing about the manner of goal selection which must be largely at the ruler's discretion. The paths to the goal are also defined by the ruler. Sukarno probably felt that his path for the completion of the "revolution" was a correct one. Hence, perhaps it should be said that "no deviation from the ruler's path to the goal can be allowed".

All of this is in very different perspective than it is usually presented. For very Western approaches to the Sukarno-Suharto struggle see Justus Van der Kroef, "Sukarno's Fall", Orbis, 1967, Vol. XI, No.2; and Donald Hindley, "The Alirans and the Fall of the Old Order", Indonesia, 1970, No.9.

The Sukarno-Suharto relationship can be viewed much like Karna's dilemma before the Bhrata Yudha as shown in the wajang kulit. Karna, of course, chose to follow his master rather than join the "right" and victorious side.

Portions of the military had opposed Sukarno's confrontation policy and the increasing influence of Subandrio's intelligence organization. Murtopo carried on secret negotiations with Malaysia about confrontation. See Ekpres September 6, 1971 for a cover story on Murtopo with much biographical data.

See Feith, op.cit., pp. 98-101 about this pressure.

See Sinar Harapan January 3-5, 1972 for a series of articles on the NU Congress. Subchan, a young energetic leader, was subsequently removed from the party hierarchy. NU members that I spoke with were positive that some sort of deal had been made with Murtopo.

Murtopo's power is largely non-institutionalized, and the military hierarchy has little control over his actions as he is responsible only to the President. Allegedly, this has given rise to some personal and institutional rivalries within ABRI. For some comments on this see Rosihan Anwar in Pedoman February 7, 1972.
This was said in anger on January 6, 1972 in reply to the "Mini" protests—see Sinar Harapan of the same date.


Murtopo's ability to play what Indonesians call a "cowboy" role can probably be attributed to the lesser influence of prijaji culture in the area where he was born and raised—namely the pasisir. It is worth noting that while those around Suharto including the ASPRI and Madame Suharto have not been able to avoid the "corruptor" label, the President has been able to do so.


The "Mini Affair" was a very complex issue. For further details see my manuscript (in preparation), "Elite Conflict in Indonesia: The Minatur Indonesia Indah Project".

ABRI seems to be intent on "depoliticizing" Islam, partly because of its potential as an opposition force and partly because of the impossibility of communication between the two. Javanese, since independence, have consistently shown their inability to trust or communicate with "modernist" Muslims and vice versa. The biggest fear of all the elite is an Islam-non-Islam split which would polarize the polity into two almost equal parts. To help avoid this, ABRI believes the NU also must eventually abandon its political functions.

This happened to Ben Anderson and Ruth McVey with their monograph on the G-30-S. Anderson and McVey, op. cit., passim. Its interpretation of events was exactly opposite from the military's and the army could not believe that it was written with no ulterior motives. To this day, over 6 years since the paper was written, interviewees and newspapers still lash out at the two scholars as tools of communism and opponents of the regime.

A more recent example is the visit of Professor Zasloff of the University of Pittsburgh. He has no claim to be a scholar of Indonesian politics. He made a lecture on political development in Semarang and mentioned that Indonesia was still hunting for institutions to fit the mood and temperament of its people—which is obvious to anyone, if the changes of the party system are taken into consideration. Amir Machmud, Minister of Interior, immediately saw this as an attack on Pantjasila and the UUD45. Machmud invited Zasloff to stop interfering in Indonesia's internal affairs. See Tempo June 30, 1972.
All listed are student protest actions. The first three were protests against corruption and Golput with the lack of real choice in the 1971 elections.

Quoted in Ekspres September 6, 1971, p.16.

T.D. Hafas editor of Nusantara was sentenced to jail for one year for such criticism and the magazine Sendi had its license revoked for much the same reason. On the Hafas case see Tempo September 18, 1971 and on Sendi see Tempo February 26, 1972 and Sinar Harapan March 1, 1972.

Sumitro made this statement before the Foreign Correspondents Club in Djakarta on February 4, 1972.

Amir Machmud has recently accused the press of deliberately mis-quoting and distorting his speeches and statements - See Indonesia Raja editorial June 13, 1972 and Tempo June 23, 1972. Earlier in the year Sinar Harapan was handled roughly by KOPKANTIB for allegedly leaking an official background statement by BAKIN(Intelligence) Chief, Sutopo Juwono.

Harian Kami, edited by Nono Anwar Makarim, is associated with the remnant of the youth forces of the Generation of '66. Indonesia Raja is an independent edited by Mochtar Lubis. Abadi is the voice of the "modernist" Muslims and is constantly at "war" with the army supported newspapers Angkatan Bersendjata, Api Pantjasila and Berita Yudha as well as the Golkar organ, Suara Karya.

BIMAS (Bimbingan Masa) or Mass Guidance. There was also some heavy profit taking by high government people on "kickbacks" from the contract choices, if rumors and several confidential interviews are to be believed.

This is one of the indications that Golkar is definitely subordinate to the government even in its parliamentary activities. The parliamentary discussions were little more than a repetition of previous public debate. The special committee on the problem issued a carefully worded report that was hardly objectionable to anyone, at least of on the government side, and that did not really tackle the issue at hand -- it was avoided by saying that the project was out of the DPR's competence if it was a private project. It did point out very well, however, the problem of the younger generation in communicating with the government. See DPR Memorandum 1076/P.Ch.M.I.I./72.
Both Nasution and Budiman are non-Javanese and have a tendency to be too direct in their criticism. Neither are involved with the government, directly. Nasution does run the Djakarta City-sponsored Legal Aid Institute.

Moertono, the military liaison with Golkar announced that the regional DPRD's would be torn apart and factionalized, hence paralyzed, if they had to select the region's governor. Sinar Harapan June 6, 1972. He seemed to be saying that they were not sufficiently dididik to handle the process.

The "Floating Mass", as described in the previous sections, is essentially a mis-reading of the method of operation of the American and British party systems. No local branches of parties will be allowed below the Kabupaten level except at election time every five years. The acceptance of such a plan reveals the idealistic nature of the government's conception of village life. If only parties could be removed, goes the argument, conflict at that level would disappear.

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See Gary Hansen, "Episodes in Rural Modernization: Problems in the BIMAS Program", Indonesia, 1971, No. 11.

See my manuscript on the "Mini Affair".

There is such a prohibition for Ministers and Secretary Generals but not for their wives and families or for the military at all.

Sadikin explained his way out of the situation by saying that the Djakarta City Government had earlier given him authority to build a similar project. Murtopo offered no public explanation.

Stories of corruption in Indonesia are numerous. For one such incident that never became public see my manuscript on the "Mini Affair". For excellent studies of the problem see Ted Smith, "Corruption in Indonesia", Indonesia, 1971, No. 11; and Soedarso, Korupsi di Indonesia (Corruption in Indonesia) (Djakarta: Bharata, 1969).

Polomka, op. cit., pp. 24-6. Evidently, the idea was taken from the Malaysian Rural Development scheme. Statistics in Indonesia are highly suspect and with the pressure from above for progress and good results, it is probable that the control room figures are about as accurate as the "Vietnam Body-Count Totals".
CHAPTER IV

THE FUTURE OF JAVANIZATION

In the previous discussion, it was noted that there are many basic similarities between the ideas, structures and style of government in Mataram and in contemporary Indonesia. The following list summarizes the major similarities:

1) Structure: The formal and informal governmental structure in Mataram and contemporary Indonesia are extremely hierarchial in nature with very dominant rulers and centers. The formal structure of the government does not correspond to reality. The power and authority of the ruler's assistants depends primarily on their personal relationship to the ruler rather than on their formal position in the hierarchy. There are no functioning structures of mass participation in the political system.

2) Functions: The acknowledged primary function of the government is to maintain "harmony" throughout the realm. Thus, maintaining the status quo and stability are primary goals of the regime. Various sorts of controls, manipulations, and security measures are the main means to ensure the establishment and maintenance of "harmony". The government constantly struggles to prevent the emergence of autonomous power centers within the realm.
whether they be political or commercial. The chief motivation for any form of change or "development" is to strengthen the existing power distribution, not alter it.

3) Style: Both governments emphasize the correct approach or form of approach to any problem much more than the actual content of the policy. There is a high value placed on single-mindedness of purpose and non-expression of emotion or desire; hence, a style of *wa*jang or shadow politics is the result. There is little conception of moral implications of power which provides many opportunities for arbitrary use of state power and funds by the rulers. There is little cognizance of the value of opposition or criticism; it tends to be poorly tolerated or ignored. On the whole, the style of government could best be described as "protective superiority" or simply, paternalism.

There are many factors that could contribute to the similarities described above. Basically, the diversity of Indonesia has changed little since the time of Mataram. While some of the tools of rulership, control and penetration have changed since that time, the problems associated with ruling the territory have not. The tools of government may have improved but the forces of disintegration may be stronger than previously.

The fact that Indonesia today is largely controlled by the military may also contribute to some of the
similarities. Military norms which argue for stability and control must augment Javanese norms for such. Equally, the experiences of the constitutional democracy period, seemingly objectively showed Indonesians that Western style politics and government were ill suited either to the peculiarities of their nation or value system and increased a general desire for strong and authoritative government.

While one seeks to avoid the criticism of "cultural determinism", it is difficult to escape the conclusion that Javanese operating a government would operate it according to Javanese norms. Hence, it seems quite natural that the structure, functions and style of such a government would be rather Javanese. Further, the rules of participation and concept of the state would also be Javanese. The data given previously shows that, indeed, an overwhelming majority of all positions in the political, governmental and military elite are filled by Javanese or persons that are antagonistic toward the country's other major cultural group. Since the major characteristics of Guided Democracy and the New Order do correspond with the characteristics of Javanism, there is a strong indication that a process called Javanization has occurred within the political and governmental spheres.
On the Future of Javanization

The rulers of contemporary Indonesia have created a government that might be best described as a neo-Mataram. Javanese have imposed their conception of the state, their ideas of proper political behavior, their own definitions of the limits of political power and its uses on Indonesian society. This process has been done under the cloak of the search for Indonesia's true identity and national soul. It has been made immeasurably easier through the widespread adoption of a truly national language, Bahasa Indonesia, rather than the use of Javanese. Bahasa Indonesia has been greatly influenced by the Javanese language but the national lingua franca has had its own disintegrative effects upon Bahasa Djawa.

The same is true for much of what could be called traditional Javanese culture. The Javanese have been able to dominate but at the price of dilution of Javanism.

This dilution or softening of Javanism was necessary for the creation of a nation out of a disparate empire. Domination could never be clear and direct imposition of one cultural pattern upon the rest of the nation. If however, the domination were initiated and implemented ostensibly as a genuine national phenomenon, it might prove acceptable and eventually, become a workable scheme. Assimilation to the "new" Indonesian-
ness, though defined in a Javanese way, was conceivable where any assimilation to Javanism was ipso facto impossible.

Even the implementation of the "new" Indonesian politics as defined by Javanese was to cost casualties though far fewer than if Javanism had been imposed directly. Certain sectors and segments of society would become alienated, even revolt against the new definition of the polity, but the question of ultimate success rested on sheer politics, the politics of a minimal winning coalition, and lastly on force.

The victory of the Javanese hinterland group of the military led by Suharto was in a sense a regression or "throw back" to control of the polity to the traditionalist segment of the Javanese population. Since Javanese aristocratic political culture has long been in the process of decay and disintegration at the periphery, only the remnant or rump of the totality of Java is represented by this group. The actual functioning of the government and political system would be much smoother were it operating in the context of a traditional Javanese polity such as Mataram. So, while the government attempts to rule in a manner that closely resembles that of Mataram, the society that it governs is very different from that of Mataram.
Social change in Indonesia, particularly in Java, has gone on at a tremendous pace during the 20th century. The effects of the final years of Dutch Colonial Rule, the Great Depression, Japanese Occupation, the Revolution, the mass politics of Constitutional and Guided Democracy, vast overpopulation, rapid urbanization and widespread modern education have created a vortex of social mobilization\(^1\) that has changed the face of contemporary Indonesia. Odd as it may seem, today the most traditional portions of Indonesia are the Outer Islands. They are more easily controlled than is Java through cooptation of the regional governmental and traditional elite by the central government,\(^2\) The "concessions" of the governing elite to constitutionalism, parliaments, popular participation and ideas of popular sovereignty were made more to ethnically Javanese elements than they were to non-Javanese ones. As evidenced by the PKI and G-30-S, Javanese can also be the strongest enemies of Javanization, as defined here.

Djakarta, the most cosmopolitan and "Indonesian" of all the nation's cities, is the seat of the government. This capital city, located on the north coast of West Java, is far from the centers of traditional Javanese culture. Javanese are a minority of the capital's population. Djakarta in its own way is a force for the detraditionali-
zation of the government. There world culture and the 
diverseness of the Indonesian cultures meet to form a 
distinctive mix of style, form and behavior that assault 
Javanism directly and influence a very large portion of 
the rulers in everyday life.

It is in Djakarta and the associated university 
towns that Javanese have started asking themselves what 
Javanism is all about; what it is about Javanism that 
is holding their society back and keeping Indonesia from 
achieving the goals of modernity, stability and economic 
growth that the elite espouses. Indonesians have their 
own distinctive theories about prijaji-ism and neo-feudalism 
and their effects on the society’s functioning. 3

The large numbers of Javanese in the government 
and military is a fact of life that Indonesia will have 
to live with for a long time. Present trends do not 
reveal any desire on the part of Outer Islanders to join 
the central government in greater numbers. 4 While some 
Javanese are finding their way into commercial life and 
some Outer Islanders (besides Christians) into government 
service, the numbers are not large enough to have profound 
effects on the ethnic composition of civil servants as a 
group for several decades.

Likewise, the limitations and constraints on 
political action and behavior that have been set by Javanese
are unlikely to be openly challenged and changed in the near future. The younger generation of Javanese and Outer Island elite are most likely going to grow up accepting the outlines of the state and government as it now stands. The Javanese definitions of this generation may well become the Indonesian definitions of the next generation. Slow and constant change rather than a sudden shift in some of these fundamental definitions or limits is likely to occur. Erosion from the inside and change of the substance rather than the form is the most likely path for the future.

As Javanese and Javanized members of the elite change their own conceptions of politics, they are likely to change the definitions and limits of political action from the inside. Outside threats, whether it be from Islam, Communism or the West in the form of Democratic Socialism, have been successfully repelled by the core of Javanism but not without some change. Despite the limited horizons or worldvies: of the present ruling elite, they have been able to accept and use advice from other Javanese about innovations and changes that are desirable or necessary. Given the inclinations of Suharto and those around him, caution in any new undertaking is likely to continue to be a dominant quality. However, this is quite natural for anyone attempting to embark on "new" and untested paths of
governing. The major point is that innovations are occurring within the framework that has been very loosely but adamantly laid by Javanese themselves. Despite some contestations to the contrary, the New Order has not stagnated as yet. The idea of "dynamic stability" remains.

The greatest threats to the New Order and its form of Javanism are the possibilities of a polarization between Islamic and non-Islamic portions of the society, insufficient attention to Outer Island demands for a larger portion of the development budget and the increasing crisis of agricultural poverty on Java itself. In order to prevent or avoid chaos as a result of these problems, the government will simply be forced to modify its own limits of behavior and the distribution of power in the country. These modifications will probably be small and initially, hard to identify, but as in the past, Javanism will have to adjust itself to a changing reality.

Up to the present, only minimal work has been done by the New Order on creating institutions in the society that can carry on its mission for even the so-called period of 25 years of accelerated modernization. Of first priority was the military and then the bureaucracy. The reorganization and strengthening of the former seems almost complete while the organization of the latter is definitely fully underway. Golkar, relied upon without much thought and of temporary necessity, will have to get
an increasing amount of attention, reorganization and strengthening in the future, if indeed it is to be the New Order's political tool for restructuring the Indonesian polity. One prominent non-Javanese told me "slowly but surely, the institutionalists are winning." If this is the case and institutionalization is a proper path to attack and overcome the present ills of Indonesian society, present trends augur well for Indonesia's future.

Despite impressions to the contrary that may have been created earlier in this paper, the "evils" of contemporary Indonesian government do not arise from the fact that Javanese control it. The very strength of Javanese culture has been translated into an Indonesian strength in the modern world. To make a value judgment about Javanization is difficult but it may be that the country has benefited and will continue to benefit from the fact that Javanese rather than any other group control the country. The inevitable process, as described by Lev, could have been an extremely fortunate process. The country has continuity of culture and rulership to rely on and the dubious distinction of being ruled by a cultural group that is known for its lack of extremism and overall moderation in outlook, behavior and action.

The questions of the continuation of military rule, actual commitment to moderniasasi and the like have little
importance in comparison with the fate of Javanization. In fact, the answers to these questions may well depend on the degree of legitimacy that non-Javanese cultural groups accord to Javanization. For, ultimately, the continuation of the nation depends on this very question -- what is the fate of Javanization?
Notes on CHAPTER IV


2 I conclude this from the 1971 election results. The major tool of control of the outcome of the elections held by the government was its control of the bureaucracy of the entire country as well as the fact that Golkar was clearly the government "party". Despite the fact that Golkar is Javanese controlled, it did much better in many parts of the Outer Islands than in Java. Compare: Central Java - Golkar 54%; East Java - Golkar 50%; Djakarta - Golkar 42%; North Sumatra - Golkar 72%; Bali - Golkar 87%; Southeast Sulawesi - Golkar 92%; Riau - Golkar 77%; Djambi - 87%; and Kalimantan Selatan - Golkar 65%. These results were calculated from Sinar Harapan August 7, 1972.


4 While no exact figures were available on such trends, interviews with both Javanese and non-Javanese with some knowledge on the subject indicated that the younger officer's corps of ABRI and the younger ranks of the civil service in the capital do not contain large numbers of non-Javanese. All of Indonesia's best universities are located on Java and the army's military academy is located in Magelang, just outside of Jogjakarta. Javanese obviously have the easiest access to them given the archipelago's poor communication system.
This may seem to be somewhat of a contradiction given the rapid social change described in the previous paragraphs and it is. The elite has to accept these Javanese norms or be ostracized or destroyed by Javanese who still hold to them, namely the army. Like the PKI and ABRI under Sukarno, verbal acceptance does not mean that one does not strive to fight the limits of the system from within. The masses -- to use the term loosely -- especially on Java, have little reason to remain subdued or satisfied with a neo-Mataram type of political system. Given the traditional agrarian radicalism of Java and the continuance of the conditions that have encouraged it, the future is bleak unless there is change. Social explosions (the massacres) such as the ones that occurred after the G-30-S in 1965 are distinct possibilities in the future if the limits now placed on the polity are not relaxed. Survival, then, may dictate change. On these points see Sartono, "Peasant Radicalism in Java" in Claire Holt (ed.), Politics and Culture in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972).


Huntington, op.cit., passim, postulates that institutionalization is the only path to stability for a polity such as Indonesia.
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GLOSSARY OF IMPORTANT INDONESIAN TERMS AND ACRONYMS

abangan the Javanese masses that are Islamic in name only; their religious practices are a mixture of Islam, Hinduism and animism.

ABRI Angatan Bersendjata Republik Indonesia (Armed Forces of The Republic of Indonesia).

ASPRI Asisten Pribadi (Personal Assistant); refers to President Suharto's personal staff.

BIMAS Bimbingan Massa (Mass Guidance) - a government scheme for increasing rice production.

Brawijaja the Indonesian Army Division for the region of East Java.

bupati the administrative head of a kabupaten or district.

Diponegoro the Indonesian Army Division for the region of Central Java.

DPR Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat (Council of People's Representatives or Parliament).

DPRD Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat Daerah (Council of the People's Representatives of the Regions or Regional Parliament).

Gestapu or G-30-S Gerakan Tigapuluh September (30th of September Movement).

Golkar Golongan Karya (Functional Group); the government "party".

golongan tertentu fixed or determined groups; used especially in reference to enemies of the state.

gotong-rojong mutual or self-help; refers to doing things collectively rather than individually.
kabupaten  district; one administrative level below the Daerah Tingkat Satu or province; frequently referred to as Daerah Tingkat Dua (Second Level Region).

Kepala Daerah  literally Regional Head; today called governor.

Kepala Desa  Village Headman; in Java the term lurah is used.

kesatria  knight or soldier

kijaji  Islamic teacher

KINO  Kelompok Induk Organisasi (Mother Organization); refers to the seven different major divisions of functional groups within Golkar.

Konsepsi  Sukarno's idea for creating a stable government (1956).

massa bodoh  stupid or dumb masses

KOPKAMTIB  Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban (Command for Restoring Security and Public Order); an extra-constitutional military body set up in the wake of the G-30-S.

KORPRI  Korps Pegawai Negri (National Civil Servants Corps); one of the functional groups.

kraton  palace of the king or Sultan

lurah  village headman in Java; in the Outer Islands frequently called Kepala Desa.

MANIPOL  Political Manifesto; one of the key ideological symbols of the Sukarno regime.

MANDALA  the name given the command for the re-capturing of West Irian from the Dutch; Suharto was the head of this operation.

mantja negara  outer provinces
Masjumi  the "modernist" Muslim political party that was banned by Sukarno because of opposition to him.

MPR  Madjelis Permusjawarahan Rakjat (People's Deliberative Assembly or Super-Parliament).

musjawarah  consensus or unanimity

NASAKOM  Nasionalisme, Agama(Religion) dan Komunisme; another of the key symbols of the Sukarno regime.

negara agung  the king's land or the territory near the king's palace.

NU  Nahdatul Ulama; a "traditionalist" Muslim political party.

Panglima(Besar)  Regional Military Commander (Commander-in-Chief)

Parkindo  Partai Kristen Indonesia (Indonesian Christian Party)

prijaji  the aristocracy of the Javanese abangan masses.

PKI  Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party).

PMI or Parmusi  Partai Muslimin Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Party)

PNI  Partai Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian Nationalist Party).

PSI  Partai Sosialis Indonesia (Indonesian Socialist Party); banned in 1960 by Sukarno.

PSII  Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia; a small Muslim party.

OPSUS  Operasi Chusus (Special Operations); led by Ali Murtopo
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>santri</td>
<td>a strict observer of Islam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siliwangi</td>
<td>the Indonesian Army Division of the region of West Java</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tanah sabrang</td>
<td>overseas territory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UUD45</td>
<td>Undang-Undang Dasar 1945 (1945 Constitution).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wajang kulit</td>
<td>a shadow play made by using leather puppets; also frequently used to refer to the &quot;Indonesian&quot; style of politics.</td>
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</tbody>
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