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Semantic analysis of Because Powell, Mava Jo 1973

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cl A SEMANTIC ANALYSIS OF BECAUSE by MAVA JO POWELL B.A., U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Columbia, 1968 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS i n the Department of L i n g u i s t i c s We accept t h i s t h e s i s as conforming t o the re q u i r e d standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA June, 1973 In presenting t h i s thesis i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree that the Library s h a l l make i t f r e e l y available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of t h i s thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by h i s representatives. It i s understood that copying or publication of t h i s thesis for f i n a n c i a l gain s h a l l not be allowed without my written permission. Department of Linguistics  The University of B r i t i s h Columbia Vancouver 8, Canada i ABSTRACT Introduction This semantic analysis of because contains a general study of i t s potential as the focus of a sentence, and a specific study of i t s causative and non-causative meaning. In Chapter I, I discuss previous linguistic research on because and because-clauses. One conclusion that seems clear from the data is that because can be the central point of attention in a sentence. I investigate this prominence in Chapter II. I begin by re-defining the term "focus," synthesising c r i t e r i a from other definitions. The redefinition denotes phonological and syntactic rules which speakers apply to emphasize certain parts of a sentence. Then I demonstrate that these rules apply to because, thereby establishing that because can he focussed. In Chapter III, I turn to a more restricted problem. I i n -vestigate the semantic features of because which are common to reason-and causal-explanations. I propose that, in i t s underlying form, because has the feature CtcauseD. Sentences i n which because appears with the features C^causeH do not contain the l e x i c a l items "cause" or "reason." I also describe two conditioned variants of because. One, having the feature C+causeU, occurs with the noun or verb cause. The other, having the feature C-causeD, occurs with the noun reason. The results of this study confirm evidence accumulating from other linguistic investigations that grammatical words are semantically f u l l , and that they can be described by theoretical terminology appropriate to non-grammatical words. A number of recent publications have appeared i i on the semantic description of complementation structures, coordinating conjunctions, and determiners. There is comparatively l i t t l e recent publication on subordinating conjunctions. Even less information is available on lex i c a l items which have been classified both as subordi-nating conjunctions and as reason adverbials. Within this classification, the word because i s an especially important member. From the point of view of lin g u i s t i c s , i t i s s i g n i f i -cant as one of the few subordinatores which can occur as a one-word utterance. I investigate the implications of this status under the theoretical term "focus." Furthermore, although no one has claimed that "because is semantically empty, no one has agreed upon i t s precise meaning, nor has anyone studied the word i n depth. Because is also significant from the point of view of linguistic philosophy. The problem of defining reason- and causal-explanations has a long scholarly history. The results of this investigation demonstrate that "because i s a crucial word for this problem. I show that when because occurs i n a sentence either with the lexical items "reason" or "cause," "because assimilates in sense to these items. Thus, i n these environments, the sense of because i s conditioned. But when because occurs in sentences which do not contain those l e x i c a l items, because can be synonymously paraphrased either by "reason" or by "cause." Therefore, because is a word whose meaning is common both to reason- and causal-explanations. i i i TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter Page INTRODUCTION i I DISCUSSION OF SCHOLARSHIP ON THE WORD BECAUSE AND ON BECAUSE-CLAUSES 1 I I INVESTIGATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BECAUSE AND THE TERM 'FOCUS' 23 I I I A DESCRIPTION OF THE CAUSAL AND NON-CAUSAL FEATURES OF BECAUSE 51 LITERATURE CITED 72 CHAPTER I DISCUSSION OF SCHOLARSHIP ON THE WORD BECAUSE AND ON BECAUSE-CLAUSES In this chapter, I w i l l discuss previous linguistic scholarship on the word "because and on hec_ause-clauses. Since the purpose of an investigation inevitably affects the questions which arise, I w i l l distinguish between authors whose aim is studying modern English as a natural language, and those whose interest i s developing a theoretical language. The f i r s t investigators define because within English as a linguistic system; linguistic theoreticians, trying to formulate a theoretical language, use because as an empirical test of a particular theoretical model. This discussion centers around four questions. F i r s t , can because belong to two functional classes, that of adverb and of conjunction? Second, can some because-clauses occur as the subject of a sentence, while others modify predicates? Third, can one explain how because-clauses are different from other reason adverbials i n imperative sentences, in some declarative sentences, and i n sentences containing questions and negations? Fourth, can one determine whether because-clauses denote the notions cause or reason? Questions one, two, and three are essentially problems in syntax; question four i s a semantic issue. Discussions of question one, two, and four occur in the works of Otto Jespersen, whose grammars describe English as a natural 2 language."1" Jespersen formulates, question one as a problem i n f u n c t i o n a l c l a s s i f i c a t i o n . Although he describes two c l a s s i f i c a t i o n a l systems, the d e f i n i t i o n of because and because-clauses w i t h i n each system i s i n c o n -c l u s i v e . In h i s c a t e g o r i c a l system, the a n a l y t i c a l u n i t i s the word, and the s e l e c t i o n a l c r i t e r i o n f o r each c l a s s i s semantic. But the c l a s s i f i -c a t i o n a l c r i t e r i a f o r because are s y n t a c t i c . Moreover, i t i s not c l e a r i n t o which sub-class Jespersen places because. In A Modern E n g l i s h Grammar and E s s e n t i a l s o f E n g l i s h Grammar, because i s a member of a c l a s s named p a r t i c l e . This c l a s s contains the sub-classes adverb, p r e p o s i t i o n , c o o r d i n a t i n g and su b o r d i n a t i n g con-j u n c t i o n . In A Modern E n g l i s h Grammar, Jespersen c l a s s i f i e s because as a 2 member of the sub-class adverb s i n c e i t has a clause as i t s o b j e c t . On the other hand, i n E s s e n t i a l s o f E n g l i s h Grammar, he c l a s s i f i e s because as a s u b o r d i n a t i n g c o n j u n c t i o n s i n c e i t s f u n c t i o n i s t o connect a clause 3 w i t h a main sentence. Elsewhere, Jespersen s t a t e s t h a t adverbs can be c l a s s i f i e d as p r e p o s i t i o n s or as conjunctions according t o t h e i r s y n t a c t i c f u n c t i o n . When an adverb governs a noun, i t i s c l a s s i f i e d as a p r e p o s i t i o n . But when an adverb governs a c l a u s e , i t i s c l a s s i f i e d as a co n j u n c t i o n . Jespersen formulates the second q u e s t i o n , whether because-clauses Otto Jespersen, A Modern E n g l i s h Grammar on H i s t o r i c a l P r i n c i p l e s (Copenhagen: E i j n a r Munksgaard, 19^0) and E s s e n t i a l s o f E n g l i s h Grammar ( U n i v e r s i t y : Univ. of Alabama, 196k). 2 Jespersen, M. E. G., V, 15. Jespersen, E s s e n t i a l s , p. 69 . k Jespersen, M...E. G. , V, 2. 3 can be subjects of sentences as well as being clauses which modify predicates, as a problem in rank assignment. His second classificational system, the system of ranks, is logically distinct from the categorical classification of individual words. Consequently, a word's categorical and i t s rank assignment do not correspond one to one. The analytical unit for the ranking system is not only the word, but also is groups of words. Rank, then, is determined by words in combination. In this system, because-clauses are described as tertiaries and as primaries. In Essentials of English Grammar and in A Modern English Grammar, Jespersen classifies because-clauses as ter t i a r i e s . ^ Lengthy sets of i l l u s t r a t i v e examples support this classification. None of these sentences contain the words reason or cause, and none is predicate nominal in form. In a discussion of the nature of subordination, however, Jespersen states that because-clauses may also function as primaries: "What is really a clause tertiary with because i s made practically a clause primary (nearly = 'the fact that') as the subject or predicate of the sentence."^ A sentence supporting this statement i s , "The real reason why I am out of place here i s because I like men." The difference between this sentence, in which because ranks as a clause primary, and those sentences in which because ranks as clause tertiary, i s the predicate nominal structure (reason . . . is . . . because . . .) of the quoted example. For Jespersen, question four is a problem in assigning a class Jespersen, Essentials, p. 370; M. E. G., V, 3hh. Jespersen, M. E. G., V, 391. h name to because. The significance of a class name is that i t includes the semantic meanings of i t s particle members. There is a discrepancy between texts. In Essentials of English Grammar, "Cause" i s the name of the clausal tertiary class to which because belongs. But in A Modern English Grammar, the class name is "Cause, Reason and Motive." Referring to members of the latter class, Jespersen remarks that each particle member expresses "a relationship between two statements in which one statement is closely dependent on the other as showing i t s necessary cause •7 or the necessary motive for i t . " Moreover, Jespersen unequivocally accepts the view that because belongs to this semantic c l a s s i f i c a t i o n — he does- not even cite a supportive example. He merely l i s t s because, adds a colon, and leaves blank the place where an i l l u s t r a t i v e sentence should 8 occur. Though he cites sentences for a l l particle members other than because, he does not specify the particles that denote each of the notions cause, reason, or motive. And even though Jespersen subcategorizes the particles which belong to "Cause, Reason, Motive" into coordinators and subordinators according to semantic c r i t e r i a , because is ambiguously assigned. The difference between these subcategories i s one of the degree of semantic dependence between the tertiary clause and the main sentence. Jespersen remarks that when the causal tertiary occurs after the main statement, the statement of cause "tends to be less intimately connected 7 Jespersen, M. E. G., V, 387. Q Jespersen, M. E. G., V, 390. 5 „Q w i t h the main f a c t and thus t o he coordinated r a t h e r than subordinated. He c l a s s i f i e s t h e r e f o r e , so, and f o r as c o o r d i n a t o r s ; t h a t , as, s i n c e , f o r , and "because as subordinators. But i n the case o f f o r , the degree of semantic dependence must "be constant, s i n c e 'for can occur only a f t e r a main sentence. For, then, should "belong t o the sub-class subordinator. And because, which occurs e i t h e r before or a f t e r a main sentence, must be c r o s s - c l a s s i f i e d . Therefore, s u b c a t e g o r i z a t i o n based upon semantic c r i t e r i a does not e s t a b l i s h a meaning f o r because. There i s evidence, however, f o r a c a u s a l and non-causal i n t e r -p r e t a t i o n o f because. A sentence c o n t a i n i n g because appears i n an e x p l a n a t i o n o f cause and e f f e c t . Furthermore, e a r l i e r i n the t e x t , Jespersen s t a t e s t h a t cause i s not i n d i c a t e d i n the sentence, "I'm not saying t h a t I ever l i k e d O d e l l very much, because I don't. ""^ In another s e c t i o n , he says: "a p r e p o s i t i o n regimen i s at the base of because and t h a t i s 'by reason'.""'""'" The a l t e r n a t i v e s seeming most l i k e l y t o Jespersen, then, are c a u s a l and non-causal. In non-causal environments, the n o t i o n of reason may be expressed. To conclude, Jespersen's grammars describe because as adverb and conjunction. Some because-clauses f u n c t i o n as t e r t i a r i e s ; others as p r i m a r i e s . Those which are p r i m a r i e s can occur i n a p r e d i c a t e nominal form w i t h the noun reason. There i s evidence f o r a c a u s a l and non-causal Jespersen, M. E. G. , V, 3QL+. Jespersen, M. E. G., V, 391 . Jespersen, M. E. G., V, 393 . 6 i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f because, but no c r i t e r i a e x i s t f o r determining when each o f these p o s s i b l e a l t e r n a t i v e s apply. Although A l i c e Davison i s a l s o p r i m a r i l y concerned w i t h the d e s c r i p t i o n o f E n g l i s h as a n a t u r a l language, her study i s r e s t r i c t e d t o 12 causal adverbs. She describes s i n c e , as, because, i f , and so_as members of t h i s c l a s s . With the exception o f i f , each of these members i s i n c l u d e d i n Jespersen's c l a s s i f i c a t i o n . Although she does not provide a d e f i n i -t i o n f o r the c l a s s , she assumes th a t there i s some d e f i n i t i o n of cause which w i l l apply t o the members. Presumably, the d e f i n i t i o n must be se m a n t i c a l l y determined and very general. A l i c e Davison examines question t h r e e . Comparing the behaviour of because w i t h other c a u s a l a d v e r b i a l s , she observes t h a t because behaves i n a manner c o n s i s t e n t l y d i f f e r e n t from t h a t of other causal a d v e r b i a l s 13 i n sentences which have a p a r t i c u l a r l y d e fined i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e . She makes three observations. F i r s t , she mistakenly suggests t h a t although s i n c e , so, and as_ o f t e n s u b s t i t u t e f o r because, because-clauses are un-grammatical i f a main clause i s a q u e s t i o n , request or command. They are al s o ungrammatical i f the main clause contains an overt performative verb Ik or a d e c l a r a t i v e verb. She concludes t h a t the semantic r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of 12 A l i c e Davison, "Causal Adverbs and Performative Verbs," Papers  From the S i x t h Regional Meeting o f the Chicago L i n g u i s t i c S o c i e t y ( A p r i l , 19TO), pp. 190-201. 13 A. Davison, p. 191. ik A. Davison, p. 191. An i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e marker i s an ab s t r a c t verb w i t h a f i r s t person subject and a second person o b j e c t . A verb used p e r f o r m a t i v e l y i s one o c c u r r i n g i n a speech act which i s a l s o an act of doing. The speech act i s both the statement and performance of an a c t i o n . For f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n o f performative verbs, see footnote 29 below. 7 because must be marked so that i t cannot occur in a sentence which contains a verb used performatively."^ Her second observation is that, whereas because-clauses can be topicalized, negated and asserted, since- and 'if-clauses cannot. Since I w i l l discuss the relationship between because and the terms "topicalization," "negation," and "assertion" at some length i n Chapter II, I mention them only bri e f l y here to acknowledge and give coherence to her investigation. She also observes a difference in. "range of meaning" between because-clauses and other causal adverbial clauses. She does not define "range of meaning," but she may intend the term in two possible senses. The f i r s t may include the term "factive" as i t applies to because-clauses. She uses "factive" in the following way: An item is inserted into a frame of the type "counterfactual conditional." If an acceptable sentence results from the substitution, i t s complement is asserted to be true, and is called non-factive. If substitution i s unacceptable, the complement is presupposed, and is called factive. Because-clauses substitute unacceptably; therefore, according to this test, the because-clauses are presupposed; hence, factive. Her sentence (28a) w i l l i l l u s t r a t e this conclusion and my next point. One problem with her application of this test i s that the term 15 I qualify this conlusion in Chapter II, pp. l 6 Her exposition of this point i s d i f f i c u l t to follow. I w i l l quote i t here, i n case I have misunderstood her. "Morgan's test for presupposed truth is the combination of counterfactual subjunctive with the item in question, the result being both contradictory and ungrammatical i f the item requires i t s complement to be presupposed to be true." A. Davison, p. 193. 8 ' "complement" i s undefined. Consider her sentence frame (28a) 17 Because he's here, I can/could see him. *he were here, *he had heen here, *had he heen here, We might a r r i v e at a d e f i n i t i o n of "complement" by process of e l i m i n a t i o n . The term "complement" must r e f e r t o the f i r s t c l a u s e , s i n c e she says t h a t second clauses need not he f a c t i v e . Therefore, "complement" must r e f e r e i t h e r t o a l l the items of the f i r s t c l a u s e , e x c l u d i n g because, or t o some of those items. I f we accept the f i r s t a l t e r n a t i v e , then "he's here" i s the complement and i s presupposed. We must r e j e c t t h i s a l t e r n a t i v e s i n c e i t is- p o s s i b l e t o negate the element "here." By her d e f i n i t i o n , a pre-s u p p o s i t i o n i s constant under negation."^ Considering the second a l t e r n a t i v e , "complement" must r e f e r e i t h e r to the pronoun "he," t o the v e r b — w h i c h i s the paradigm i t s e l f — o r , t o "here." We can e l i m i n a t e "here" on the grounds which I s t a t e d i n the preceding paragraph, and the verb, on the grounds t h a t i t i s the t e s t paradigm. The pronoun remains. I t i s n e i t h e r accurate nor u s e f u l t o say t h a t the subject pronoun o f a because-clause i s presupposed. In Chapter I I , I w i l l r e t u r n t o the r e l a t i o n s h i p between because and the term " f a c t i v e . " A second sense o f "range o f meaning" might i n c l u d e the n o t i o n of v o l i t i o n a l i t y . . A l i c e Davison s t a t e s t h a t " v o l i t i o n " seems t o be i n c l u d e d A. Davison, p. 194. A. Davison, pp. 193-194. 9 i n the meaning of because, but not i n the meaning of other causal adverbs. She states, with regard to vo l i t i o n a l i t y , that verbs have been sub-categorized on the basis of the presence or absence of volition. But she also states that causal adverbs are not restricted by the kinds of verbs they can modify. Thus, i t is impossible to determine just how the term "volitionality" can apply to because. In conclusion, while Alice Davison's research centers on question f i v e — a comparison in syntactic behaviour among members of the class.of causal adverbs—it also has implications for question one. If i t can be demonstrated that because i s sufficiently different from other members with which i t has been traditionally classified, then we must either re-classify i t , or re-evaluate the data. I have said that some linguists who include because-clauses in their investigations are primarily interested in theory construction. In his text, Irregularity i n Syntax, George Lakoff is concerned with ex-19 panding the "scope of metatheory on the basis of empirical evidence." Within this text because-clauses serve as empirical tests for three theoretical proposals. The f i r s t is a proposal for a form of lex i c a l entry. He states that i t would be theoretically economical i f words, George Lakoff, Irregularity in Syntax (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1 9 7 0 ) , p p . 3 - 4 . I n this book, Lakoff states that he had assumed when he wrote the text that Chomsky's le x i c a l base hypothesis was correct. This hypothesis i s that l e x i c a l insertion i s pre-transforma-tional. Working from this assumption toward a definition of the notion "exception to a transformational rule," Lakoff had to postulate hypothe-t i c a l l e x i c a l items. Since 1965 , he has revised his theoretical frame-work. Lexical, insertion remains an empirical problem i n theoretical linguistics. 10 s e m a n t i c a l l y r e l a t e d but s y n t a c t i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t , could be i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o a s i n g l e l e x i c a l entry. To describe the semantic synonomy o f these words-, he p o s t u l a t e s a c l a s s of t h e o r e t i c a l terms c a l l e d " h y p o t h e t i c a l l e x i c a l items." Regarding because, he proposes a h y p o t h e t i c a l verb form *=cLEAD TO or RESULT IIC^" as a p o s s i b l e deep s t r u c t u r a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of the f o l l o w i n g ambiguous sentence: " ( F - 3 9 ) I don't beat my w i f e because I l i k e her." He assumes the f o l l o w i n g . c l e f t sentence forms as deep s t r u c t u r a l sources from which two p o s s i b l e readings may d e r i v e : ( F - H 0 ) I t i s be cause I l i k e her t h a t I don't beat my w i f e . (F-i+l) I t i s not because I l i k e her th a t • I beat my w i f e . Phrase s t r u c t u r a l t r e e s (H) and ( i ) correspond t o ( F - H O ) and ( F - U l ) : (H) I t i s because I l i k e her t h a t I don't beat my w i f e . S I l i k e my w i f e +V +ADJ -<LEAD TO or RESULT I N > because i t I beat my w i f e 11 (i) It i s not because I lik e her that I beat my wife, I like my wife +ADJ <liEAD TO or RESULT IN>-because i t neg I beat my wife Notice that Lakoff does not associate because with the semantic notion of cause. In fact, he has another hypothetical l e x i c a l item 21 CAUSATIVE which represents the notion of direct and indirect causation. The semantic generalization <^LEAD TO or RESULT IN>follows from Lakoff's assumption that a transformation, FLIP, operates on the phrase structure trees (H) and (i) yielding the following derived sentences: "My l i k i n g 22 for my wife doesn't lead to my beating her." Although he does not specify the rules which apply to these nominalized forms, i t should be possible to derive from them the following phrase structures: 20 Lakoff, I. S., p. 169 and pp. 204-205. Notice that he negates the entire sentence in deep structure, i f , i n the surface structure form, not precedes because. I propose a different analysis on pp. Z9-3C 21 22 Lakoff, I. S. , p. hi. Lakoff, I. S., p. 205. FLIP interchanges subjects and objects, See p. 126. 12 (A) corresponds to (H) NP VP i t I li k e my wife (B) corresponds to (i) i t I like my wife Lakoff's third proposal for metatheory, represented i n the phrase structure labeled (A) and (B) on the preceding page, is the feature notation for because. Notice that because has the properties (+V) and (fADj). This is an example of his general hypothesis that adjectives and Lakoff, I. S., pp. 202-203. The negative element has been accidentally omitted from the tree in the text on p. 203. 13 verbs are members of a s i n g l e l e x i c a l category, and th a t adverbs d e r i v e 2k from a d j e c t i v a l c o n s t r u c t i o n s having p r e d i c a t e complements. We can see, t h e r e f o r e , t h a t i n f o r m u l a t i n g a t h e o r e t i c a l language, Lak o f f i n d i r e c t l y provides i n f o r m a t i o n f o r questions one, two, three and four. With regard t o i t s c l a s s i f i c a t i o n , because belongs t o a common verb-a d j e c t i v e category. The deep s t r u c t u r a l form from which L a k o f f proposes t o d e r i v e a sentence c o n t a i n i n g a because-clause i s one i n which the clause serves as the s u b j e c t . T r a n s l a t i n g t h i s d e r i v a t i o n i n t o Otto Jespersen's terminology, the "primary" form would be considered b a s i c , r a t h e r than the " t e r t i a r y " . For L a k o f f , because-clauses do not express the n o t i o n o f cause. And, l i k e A l i c e Davison, he r a i s e s the problem o f how negative and question operators apply t o sentences c o n t a i n i n g because-clauses. In "Contextual C o n s t r a i n t s on Reason A d v e r b i a l s , " Jack Davison maintains t h a t sentence grammars inadequately e x p l a i n c e r t a i n grammatical phenomena, and f a i l t o account f o r the a b i l i t y o f speakers t o use and 25 understand c e r t a i n l o c u t i o n s . J . Davison proposes, t h e r e f o r e , a For h i s arguments supporting t h i s h y p othesis, see I . S. , pp. 115-1^7 and pp. 157-159. The argument concerning the d e r i v a t i o n o f adverbs from a d j e c t i v e s i s based upon the s i n g l e case o f manner adverbs. He apparently extends the argument t o a l l a d v e r b i a l s t r u c t u r e s . For a more d e t a i l e d account o f the d e r i v a t i o n of s y n t a c t i c c a t e g o r i e s j see James D. McCawley, "Where Do Noun Phrases Come From," i n Readings i n Trans- f o r m a t i o n a l Grammar, ed. Roderick A. Jacobs and Peter S. Rosenbaum (Massachusetts: Ginn and Co., 1970), pp. 169-171; and a r e v i s e d v e r s i o n of the same paper i n Semantics: An I n t e r d i s c i p l i n a r y . R e a d e r i n Philosophy,  L i n g u i s t i c s and Psychology, ed. Danny A. Steinberg and Leon A. Jakobovits (London: Cambridge Univ. P r e s s , 1971) , pp."220-222. Jack Davison, "Contextual C o n s t r a i n t s on Reason A d v e r b i a l s , " L i n g u i s t i c s , (1973), To Appear. lU contextual approach to linguistic analysis, and uses reason-adverbials— specifically, examples of sentences containing because-clauses—to de-monstrate that the only way to represent some ambiguities in meaning is to include contextual constraints in grammars. Before he gives evidence for contextual analysis, J . Davison rejects previous proposals for the constituent structure of because-clauses. He contends that these clauses are not causal constructions; nor are they related to the causal adverbials which Alice Davison analyses. With regard to the proposal that because-clauses are causal i n meaning. J. Davison objects: " . . . we use because i n making explanations for which we need reasons, and although causes may be offered as reasons, not a l l 26 reasons are causes." In countering Alice Davison's proposals, he points out that because is unlike the set of adverbials containing since, i f , as, and others, in that they do not have head noun counterparts. The underlying semantic structure of because-clauses i s more like that of manner, place, and purpose adverbials, a l l of which have head noun counter-parts ^ J. Davison proposes a deep structural form for because-clauses which is like Lakoff's i n that the adverbial element i s represented as a 26 J. Davison, Linguistics, To Appear. 27 J. Davison, Linguistics, To Appear. A weak definition of the term "head noun counterpart" i s : a sentence which is a head noun counter-part of another sentence is one i n which a prepositional phrase can synonymously replace an adverb. In the following pair of sentences from J. Davison, a weak definition would hold: "28a) He cut the bread in a manner we told him to. (28b) He cut the bread as we told him to." Other subsitution pairs.are when: at the time, where: at the place, to: for the purpose, and because: the reason that. 15 higher sentence. J . Davison, however, does not derive the clause from a c l e f t - s e n t e n c e . In the u n d e r l y i n g forms ( 4 6 ) and ( 4 7 ) of the ambiguous sentence: " ( 4 3 ) He broke the handle because i t was the only way t o get i n , " REASON i s a head-noun,, and a p r e d i c a t e nominal s t r u c t u r e i s the highest -i 28 verb phrase. ( 4 6 ) John broke the handle S 3 — c o n j — S^ John intended I t ( b r e a k i n g t o destroy the handle) the evidence was the only• way t o get i n . ( 4 7 ) Reason John broke the handle John intended no one get i n I t (the handle) was the only way t o get i n . These t r e s s i n c l u d e c o n t e x t u a l i n f o r m a t i o n . J . Davison, L i n g u i s t i c s , To Appear. 16 Notice t h a t i n (h6) and (hj), J . Davison i n c l u d e s an u n d e r l y i n g Q-marker which i s attached t o S^. He s t a t e s t h a t j u s t as i t i s p o s s i b l e t o negate s p e c i f i c elements of a sentence c o n t a i n i n g an a d v e r b i a l , i t i s al s o p o s s i b l e t o question only the a d v e r b i a l phrase. And, as part of h i s argument f o r discourse a n a l y s i s , J . Davison s t a t e s t h a t the Q-marker allows f o r the p o s s i b i l i t y o f copying i n t o a grammar m a t e r i a l which a speaker r e t r i e v e s from a di s c o u r s e . Sometimes speakers t o p i c a l i z e one element of a question. One can ask, f o r example, "Why was i t THIEVES who broke i n t o the house?" and another can answer, "Because we have no vandals i n the area." The r e p l y could be represented i n deep s t r u c t u r e under the VP-node, and the question t o which the r e p l y responds could be t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l l y 29 i n s e r t e d i n t o the Q-marker p o s i t i o n . Other c o n t e x t u a l i n f o r m a t i o n which i s e s s e n t i a l f o r disambiguating sentences can a l s o be analyzed w i t h a deep s t r u c t u r a l form corresponding t o (h6) and ( 4 7 ) . In sentence (k), "Bobby s t a r t e d c r y i n g because he wanted i n , " J . Davison s t a t e s t h a t one must know whether the speaker b e l i e v e d t h a t c r y i n g would induce someone t o l e t him i n , or whether the speaker knew t h a t someone was purposely e x c l u d i n g him, and c r i e d as a r e s u l t of the ex-c l u s i o n . J . Davison concludes t h a t , s i n c e one must know a speaker's motive or i n t e n t i o n before one can understand what sentence (h) means, 30 motive and i n t e n t i o n must be i n c l u d e d i n grammatical d e s c r i p t i o n s . F i n a l l y , he s t a t e s t h a t i t i s a l s o e s s e n t i a l t o be able t o represent the d i f f e r e n c e i n i l l o c u t i o n a r y force between sentences which 29 See my.pp./e-'7 f o r an explanation of the Q-marker. 30 J . Davison, L i n g u i s t i c s , To Appear. IT are reports and those which are explanations. In r e p o r t i n g an event, he says, one u s u a l l y expresses the ideas o f ot h e r s ; b u t , i n g i v i n g an ex p l a n a t i o n , one u s u a l l y expresses one's own ideas . And, although he does not i n v e s t i g a t e the d i s t i n c t i o n i n depth, J . Davison e x p l a i n s t h a t 31 because-clauses seem to be intermediate between the two f o r c e s . Whereas the d e s c r i p t i o n o f because-clauses was a means o f arguing f o r c o n t e x t u a l grammatical a n a l y s i s , J . Davison's study a l s o provides evidence f o r question four. According t o h i s a n a l y s i s , because-clauses are explanations which express reasons. He does not i n v e s t i g a t e whether the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f ca u s a l explanations are excluded from, i n -cluded i n , or are overlapping w i t h explanations which are reasons. In "Some Observations Concerning Subordinate Clauses i n E n g l i s h , " W i l l i a m E. Rutherford defends and r e v i s e s Ross' performative sentence 32 a n a l y s i s . Information from subordinate clauses provides the l i n g u i s t i c evidence f o r these t h e o r e t i c a l m o d i f i c a t i o n s . Much o f the s t r e n g t h of h i s proposal comes from an a n a l y s i s o f sentences c o n t a i n i n g because-clauses. In 1972, M i c h a e l Kac pu b l i s h e d h i s r e a c t i o n s t o Rutherford's claims. Kac centers h i s counterarguments upon because-clauses and the performative a n a l y s i s . He o f f e r s an a l t e r n a t i v e e x p l a n a t i o n which he claims can Force a s c r i p t i o n which has i t s source i n speaker i n t e n t i o n s , as i n (k), seems t o me t o be d i f f e r e n t from f o r c e which derives from the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f types,of sentences i n t o r e p o rts and exp l a n a t i o n s . I. would agree t h a t both types seem t o be. somehow c o n t e x t u a l ; but the former seems " s i t u a t i o n a l , " whereas, the l a t t e r seems s t r i c t l y " l i n g u i s t i c . " J . Davison, L i n g u i s t i c s , To Appear. 32 W i l l i a m E. Ru t h e r f o r d , "Some Observations Concerning Sub-ordin a t e Clauses i n E n g l i s h , " Language k6 (1970), 97-115; John Robert Ross, "On D e c l a r a t i v e Sentences," Readings i n Transformational Grammar, ed. Roderick A. Jacobs and Peter S. Rosenbaum (Massachusetts: Gihn and Company), pp. 222-272. 18 describe the same sentences as Rutherford's a n a l y s i s without Rutherford's conceptual inadequacies. I w i l l compare the two analyses. Rutherford begins by c i t i n g s y n t a c t i c evidence t h a t because-clauses d i f f e r : some of these clauses r e f e r t o a verb i n the surface main c l a u s e ; others do not. In the sentence, "(l8) Jenny.isn't here, because I don't see her," i t i s apparent t h a t the speaker i s g i v i n g a reason f o r 33 making the statement, r a t h e r than a reason f o r Jenny's absence. The problem f o r Rutherford i s i n r e p r e s e n t i n g the u n d e r l y i n g form of a clause which i s a d v e r b i a l , but which does not r e s t r i c t the surface main verb. He accepts a.modified form of Ross' d e c l a r a t i v e sentence a n a l y s i s . I f one hypothesized an u n d e r l y i n g main verb of "sayi n g " i n sentence (l8), then one might a l s o p o s t u l a t e the f o l l o w i n g phrase s t r u c t u r e : S Jenny i s n ' t here because I don't see her A r u l e c a l l e d performative d e l e t i o n would apply t o t h i s u n d e r l y i n g form, Rutherford, p. 100. and sentence (18) would result 19 •3k Kac's disagreement with Rutherford over ( l 8 ) does not center upon Rutherford's original problem concerning the scope of the becatise-clause. Kac takes issue with an inference about the theoretical form of the under-lying structure. He states that Rutherford and Ross assume that trans-35 formations preserve meaning. Kac replies to this assumption by saying that i f transformations, such as performative deletion, preserve meaning, the following two sentences should mean the same: "(6) I say to you that Jenny isn't here even though she i s , " and, "(7) Jenny isn't here even 36 though she i s . " He points out that they are different i n meaning: sentence (7) is only contradictory; but, sentence (6) can be read either as contradictory, or as an instance of a speaker's understanding that he is "admitting that he is saying something which is contrary to what he 37 knows to be true." Instead of representing Kac's sentence (6) with an underlying form 3k Rutherford does not give a phrase structure for this particular sentence. Since Kac selects (18) as the point of departure for his re-actions, I have constructed one on the basis of others in the text. 35 There are replies to Kac's contentions. I omit them because they involve issues in theoretical linguistics, rather than problems specific to because-clauses. Se Bruce Fraser and Stephen R. Anderson's evaluations of Ross' arguments for a performative hypothesis. Bruce Fraser, "An Examination of The Performative Analysis," Indiana University Club mimeograph (October, 1971); Stephen R. Anderson, "On the Linguistic Status of the Performative-Constative Distinction," Indiana University Club mimeograph (October, 1971). 36 Michael B. Kac, "Clauses of Saying and the Interpretation of because. Language, k8 (1972), 627. ' 3 7 Kac, p. 627. 20 c o n t a i n i n g a main verb of saying which has not undergone performative, d e l e t i o n — a s Rutherford probably would have done—Kac proposes two theo-r e t i c a l terms which can describe the d i f f e r e n c e between sentences (-6) and-(7) . The terms are " i n t r a d i s c u r s a r y " and " e x t r a d i s c u r s a r y . " I n t r a -d i s c u r s a r y c l a u s e s , as i n ( 6 ) , determine the t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s of the sentence which contains them i n surface s t r u c t u r e . E x t r a d i s c u r s a r y clauses as i n , "05) I t e l l you, Jenny i s n ' t here!" do not determine the t r u t h 38 c o n d i t i o n s of the sentence. Kac argues that i f t r u t h value i s part of the meaning o f a sentence, and i f there i s a r u l e "performative d e l e t i o n " which can d e l e t e p a r t o f a sentence which has t r u t h v a l u e , then t r a n s -formations cannot be meaning p r e s e r v i n g . Furthermore, Kac contends t h a t Ross uses the term "performative" i n a misleading way. Ross takes the term from the w r i t i n g s of J . L. 39 A u s t i n . According t o A u s t i n , performatives have no t r u t h v a l u e , but have other c o n d i t i o n s which determine appropriate usage. According t o Kac's terminology, only e x t r a d i s c u r s a r y clauses can be d e l e t e d s i n c e , by d e f i n i t i o n , they do not determine the t r u t h o f a sentence i n which they appear. Ross, then, i n a p p r o p r i a t e l y uses Au s t i n ' s term when he claims t h a t there can be a performative d e l e t i o n t r a n s f o r m a t i o n . Kac s t a t e s , " i t i s a l s o worth n o t i n g t h a t performative clauses must be i n t r a d i s c u r s o r y — s i n c e performative sentences have no t r u t h values at a l l , and. thus d i f f e r , from propositions-. " ^ E i t h e r there i s an e r r o r i n 3 8 Kac, p. 627. 3 9 J . L. A u s t i n , How To Do Things With Words (New York: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1962) ^° Kac. p. 628. 21 the t e x t , or Kac has contradicted himself. I f performative clauses have no t r u t h value, then, by his own d e f i n i t i o n , they must be extradiscursory. Kac's other main disagreement i s over a point which Rutherford d i d not i n v e s t i g a t e . In c h a s t i s i n g Rutherford and Ross, Kac says, " A l l we know for sure about such sentences . . . i s the reason adverbial cannot be i n t e r p r e t e d as g i v i n g a cause for what i s reported i n the f i r s t con-kl junct.'." But Rutherford d i d not make that claim. He only maintains that h i s r e v i s e d performative analysis can provide a uniform d e s c r i p t i o n of what might appear to be two d i s t i n c t forms of because. He does not describe how, or even whether they might d i f f e r i n semantic features. So Kac's proposal for a feature analysis of because i s a suggestion f o r i t s l e x i c a l representation. Kac claims that there are two senses of because which are r e l a t e d i n a systematic way. Both contain the sense of C*ConnectionH, but -only the i n t r a d i s c u r s a r y reading can have the 1+2 feature C+Connection, -/-Cause!]. He maintains, therefore, that, there i s a non-causal as w e l l as a causal i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of because. He suggests that further i n v e s t i g a t i o n should center upon these two feature s p e c i f i c a t i o n s . The disagreement between Rutherford and Kac i s e s s e n t i a l l y over theoretical, language. Nevertheless, the data s p e c i f i c to because r e l a t e to questions two and four. Rutherford i s i n t e r e s t e d i n the ways that because-clauses modify verbs, and Kac i s concerned with the causal and non-causal meanings .of the word. Kac , p. 631. Kac, p. 629 and p. 630. 22 Although linguists have disagreed over the specific grammatical category to which "because belongs, no one has suggested that i t is a non-grammatical word. But evidence from Jespersen that because may be of primary rank—thus placing i t in subject position—and the effects of applying negation and question transformations to because either require that i t s underlying form be c l e f t , or that i t be reformulated to derive from a head noun. The effect of a l l these data is intuitively to connect because with positions of prominence i n a sentence. In Chapter II, I w i l l investigate this prominence under the term "focus." CHAPTER I I INVESTIGATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BECAUSE AND THE TERM 'FOCUS' While reading d e s c r i p t i o n s o f "because-clauses, i t became apparent that the word because, i t s e l f , c ould be questioned, negated, and stressed." 1" P r e l i m i n a r y observations l e d me t o a t e n t a t i v e hypothesis t h a t because, considered apart from i t s c l a u s e , and subjected t o c e r t a i n s y n t a c t i c and p h o n o l o g i c a l rules-, could be a p r i n c i p l e message-bearing u n i t i n a sen-tence. The search f o r a d e f i n i t i o n of t h i s semantic prominence l e d me t o the term "focus." And, u n f o r t u n a t e l y , t o a current t h e o r e t i c a l dispute over, the meaning of the term. Semantic t h e o r e t i c i a n s disagree upon the u n i t which can be focussed, and upon the l e v e l o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n at which "focus"' may be defined. According t o Chomsky's standard t h e o r y , the focus of a sentence is- l o c a t e d i n the p r e d i c a t e o f the dominant p r o p o s i t i o n o f deep s t r u c t u r e . He says, regarding sentence 38: "(a) i s i t John who w r i t e s poetry? (b) i t i s n ' t JOHN who w r i t e s poetry" t h a t i t s u n d e r l y i n g deep s t r u c t u r e might be "something l i k e Cthe one who w r i t e s p o e t r y ! is-. John," and t h a t the p r e d i c a t e .of the dominant p r o p o s i t i o n of deep s t r u c t u r e , and the s t r e s s e d element i n the surface s t r u c t u r e , i s Sentences which.occur as evidence for. my arguments i n Chapter I I and I I I were not s p e c i a l l y constructed. I c o l l e c t e d , some of them from the news media, books, and d i c t i o n a r i e s . I e l i c i t e d others during conversations. 2h 2 the f o c a l u n i t . In a r e v i s e d d i s c u s s i o n of "focus," he st a t e s t h a t , " t h e •focus i s the phrase c o n t a i n i n g the i n t o n a t i o n center . . .." He f u r t h e r s t i p u l a t e s that the focus must "be composed of f u l l l e x i c a l items, and, e x p l i c a t i n g t h i s r e s t r i c t i o n , he maintains t h a t the s y l l a b l e c o n t a i n i n g the i n t o n a t i o n center cannot serve as focus when i t i s pa r t o f a l a r g e r l e x i c a l item. Thus, i n the sentence, "Did you c a l l him UP," the UP cannot serve as fo c u s , but only the sequence o f " c a l l him up." He concludes t h a t k t h i s r e s t r i c t i o n on the d e f i n i t i o n i s obvious. He a l s o p o i n t s out th a t i t i s e s p e c i a l l y when c o n t r a s t i v e and expressive s t r e s s occurs on a u n i t t h a t the d e f i n i t i o n o f "focus" becomes complex: " . . . phrases t h a t con-t a i n the i n t o n a t i o n center may be i n t e r p r e t e d as focus o f u t t e r a n c e , the con d i t i o n s perhaps being somewhat d i f f e r e n t and more r e s t r i c i t v e when the i n t o n a t i o n center i n v o l v e s expressive or c o n t r a s t i v e s t r e s s . . .." Wallace Chafe adds the n o t i o n "new" i n f o r m a t i o n t o a proposed d e f i n i t i o n o f "focus." He says, " I s h a l l take the p o s i t i o n t h a t new i s a s p e c i f i c a t i o n which may be added, not t o a whole verb or noun, but t o a p a r t i c u l a r semantic u n i t w i t h i n a verb o r noun." Items i d e n t i f i e d as "new" i n f o r m a t i o n are those which r e c e i v e strongest s t r e s s and highest Noam Chomsky, "Deep S t r u c t u r e , Surface S t r u c t u r e , and Semantic I n t e r p r e t a t i o n , " i n Semantics: An I n t e r d i s c i p l i n a r y Reader i n Philosophy,  L i n g u i s t i c s and Psychology, ed. Danny D. Steinberg and Leon A. Jakobovits (Cambridge: Univ. Press ,1971)., P- 199. 3 Chomsky, p. 200. ^ Chomsky, p. 206. I disagree t h a t the c o n d i t i o n i s obvious. I f , f o r i n s t a n c e , Chomsky had chosen the sentence, "Did you. b r i n g i t UP?.", i t i s not c l e a r t h a t the sequence " b r i n g i t up," i s focussed. 5 Chomsky, p. 205. 25 p i t c h i n the sentence.^ In sentences where a c o n t r a s t i v e u n i t i s a l s o "new" i n f o r m a t i o n , Chafe says t h a t the "new" semantic u n i t w i t h i n i t has heen s e l e c t e d by the speaker from various i m p l i e d a l t e r n a t i v e s . Although he does not elaborate on t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n , i t seems th a t i n t h i s e x p l a n a t i o n , the d i s t r i b u t i o n of the terms "new" and " c o n t r a s t i v e " overlap. L a t e r , i n a footnote, he amends t h i s by adding another term, "focus." Perhaps, then, c o n s t r a s t i v e sentences should not be thought t o c o n t a i n the s p e c i f i c a t i o n "new" at a l l , but r a t h e r some other s p e c i f i c a t i o n which might be l a b e l e d "focus". In t h a t case, "new" and "focus" would be i n complementary d i s t r i -b u t i o n , the former o c c u r r i n g only i n noncontras-t i v e sentences, the l a t t e r only i n c o n t r a s t i v e ones. For M. A. K. H a l l i d a y , the i n f o r m a t i o n focus of a sentence i s l o c a t e d i n the t o n i c s t r e s s p a t t e r n . One component i n t h i s contour i s presented as "new" i n f o r m a t i o n . "New" i n f o r m a t i o n , b r o a d l y d e f i n e d , i s g not d e r i v a b l e from preceding d i s c o u r s e . Though a l l of these d e f i n i t i o n s d i f f e r i n d e t a i l , d i s c u s s i o n s of "focus" i n Chomsky, Chafe, and H a l l i d a y i n c l u d e an i l l - d e f i n e d r e l a t i o n s h i p between s t r e s s p a t t e r n and the n o t i o n of new i n f o r m a t i o n . I t i s w i t h t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p t h a t George L a k o f f disagrees. He says, i n the sentence,. "The TALL g i r l l e f t , " t h a t primary s t r e s s on TALL does- not i n d i c a t e focus, i f the term "focus" i s a l s o t o i n c l u d e the con-^ Wallace L.. Chafe, Meaning and the S t r u c t u r e o f Language CChicago: Univ. of Chicago P r e s s , 1970), p. 212. 7 Chafe, p. 22U. o M. A. K. H a l l i d a y , "Notes on T r a n s i t i v i t y and Theme," J . L i n g u i s t i c s 3 (196?), 202-210. 26 cept o f new in f o r m a t i o n . He maintains, on the c o n t r a r y , t h a t what i s new info r m a t i o n ( o r , asserted.information) i s , t h a t the g i r l who was presupposed t o have l e f t i s c o r e f e r e n t i a l w i t h the g i r l who was pre-supposed to he t a l l . The semantic content of focus i s an a s s e r t i o n of c o r e f e r e n t i a l i t y . In t h i s very t y p i c a l example o f focus, the l e x i c a l -semantic content o f the surface s t r u c t u r e c o n s t i t u e n t h e a r i n g main s t r e s s has nothing whatever t o do wi t h the semantic content of the focus. Lakoff's main point i s t h a t "focus" cannot be defined i n terms o f surface s t r u c t u r e c o n s t i t u e n t s . For him, d e r i v e d s t r u c t u r e s are a l s o c r u c i a l . Lacking^an i n t e r p r e t e d d e f i n i t i o n o f "focus," a general one, conforming t o ord i n a r y usage, can describe the f u n c t i o n a l d i f f e r e n c e s between sentences. When l i n g u i s t i c theory includes a l a r g e r number of r u l e s , we may e v e n t u a l l y agree upon a d e f i n i t i o n . U n t i l then, I propose t h a t we use the term t o describe c e n t r a l points- o f a t t e n t i o n i n a message. I f , as speakers, we want t o c a l l a t t e n t i o n t o a p a r t i c u l a r u n i t i n a message, we may use a number o f d i f f e r e n t s y n t a c t i c or ph o n o l o g i c a l r u l e s f o r that, purpose. To name only a few, we may s t r e s s the u n i t , pre-pose i t , ask a s p e c i f i c question w i t h respect t o i t , deny i t , c l a i m t h a t i t i s t r u e , or assume t h a t i t i s t r u e . The e f f e c t o f any one of these rules-, or of s e v e r a l a p p l i e d c o n c u r r e n t l y , i s t o a l e r t a l i s t e n e r t o a s p e c i f i c u n i t w i t h i n a dis c o u r s e . Defined g e n e r a l l y , as a f u n c t i o n a l term, a focussed u n i t may be" an i n d i v i d u a l l e x i c a l item (.despite t h e o r e t i c a l equivocations o f Chomsky), George L a k o f f , "On Generative Semantics," i n Semantics, ed. Steinberg and Jakobovits (Cambridge: Univ. P r e s s , 1971) , P- 2 6 l . 27 or i t may be a conjunction of a s s e r t i o n s , as i n L a k o f f s sentence, "The TALL g i r l l e f t . " " ^ Discourse context determines the item which i s focussed. I f , f o r example, no mention had p r e v i o u s l y been made of any-one's l e a v i n g , or of any t a l l g i r l , then the preceding sentence would be regarded as- new i n f o r m a t i o n , and the speaker would be f o c u s s i n g TALL. I f , on the other hand, two conversants knew th a t one of two g i r l s l e f t , and one speaker s t a t e d t h a t i t was the TALL one who went, then Lakoff's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f c o - r e f e r e n t i a l i t y would be appropriate. The term "focus," t h e r e f o r e , i s f u n c t i o n a l l y dependent upon d i s c o u r s e . In the f o l l o w i n g i n v e s t i g a t i o n , I w i l l use the term "focus" t o apply t o any u n i t ( i ) i f i t can be negated as an i n d i v i d u a l element of a sentence; ( i i ) i f i t can bear primary s t r e s s ; ( i i i ) i f , when embedded i n a sentence c o n t a i n i n g a f a c t i v e or non-f a c t i v e verb, i t i s the s o l e object o f the p r e d i c a t e i n the m a t r i x sentence; ( i v ) i f i t occurs u n p r e d i c t a b l y i n a sentence which i s a r e p l y t o a question. I w i l l now demonstrate t h a t the word because can be focussed. I w i l l begin by demonstrating t h a t i t can be negated. In Chapter I , I b r i e f l y d e scribed Lakoff's proposal f o r the d e r i v a t i o n .of an ambiguous sentence c o n t a i n i n g a reason a d v e r b i a l and a negative element. The sentence, "C'F-39). I don't,.- beat my w i f e because I l i k e her," can be understood as- r e p r e s e n t i n g e i t h e r o f two paraphrases. See my d i s c u s s i o n on p. Z6-28 Let us assume t ha t a speaker o f the paraphrases (F-l+O) and ( F - i i l ) emphasizes the nega t i ve element i n b o t h : (F_-U0) I t i s because I l i k e her t ha t I DON'T beat my w i f e . ( F - l l l ) I t i s NOT because I l i k e her t h a t I beat my w i f e . 1 1 With these read ings i n mind, l e t us examine, i n each c a s e , the p r o p o s i t i o n s 12 the speaker concedes. In (F-l+O) the speaker admi ts : (a) I l i k e my wi f e . (b) I don ' t beat my w i f e . 13 (c) There i s a reason f o r my not b e a t i n g my w i f e . (d) The reason i s t ha t I l i k e my w i f e . In (F- l+ l ) , the speaker admi ts : (a) I may l i k e my w i f e . 1 * 1 (b) I beat my w i f e . (c) There i s a reason f o r b e a t i n g my w i f e . (d) The reason i s not t ha t I l i k e my w i f e . N o t i c e tha t i n bo th pa raph rases , the (c) and (d) p r o p o s i t i o n s admit t h a t t he re i s _ a reason . But i n L a k o f f ' s phrase s t r u c t u r e ( F - U l ) ( B ) , the negat ive element i s a t tached t o the topmost S . 1 ^ Such placement i m p l i e s 1 1 L a k o f f , I. S . , p. 169. -12 . Throughout t h i s c h a p t e r , there, are p r o p o s i t i o n s , con ta ined i n . the sentences which I do not l i s t . I have t r i e d t o i n c l u d e a l l o f those re levan t t o a d i s c u s s i o n o f because. 13 I use the word reason as a. paraphrase o f because on l y as an expediency i n t h i s chap te r . I w i l l be more p r e c i s e as t o i t s meaning i n Chapter I I I . . lh I use may i n the sense tha t the speaker does not commit h i m s e l f t o admiss ion o r d e n i a l . See the phrase s t r u c t u r e on my p. (2.-29 that the word because i s negated. For t h i s t o be the case, though, both (c) p r o p o s i t i o n s must read, "There i s . n o reason I n f a c t , as the (d) p r o p o s i t i o n s show, the speaker denies a s p e c i f i c reason. He does not deny t h a t there i s a reason. Even though hot precedes because i n the s u r -face s t r u c t u r e , be cause'.'is- outside the scope o f negation. I w i l l show that i t i s p o s s i b l e t o negate the word because so t h a t the (:c) propositions- w i l l deny th a t any exp l a n a t i o n whatsoever can e x i s t between (a) and (b) p r o p o s i t i o n s . There are three ways. F i r s t , because i s given r e i n f o r c e d s t r e s s and i s embedded i n a c l e f t sentence s t r u c t u r e . As an example, l e t us r e t a i n sentence (F-39) and s e l e c t paraphrase (F - 4 l ) as i t s intended meaning. Let us apply main s t r e s s t o because, and then give i t r e i n f o r c e d s t r e s s by pro l o n g i n g i t s a r t i c u l a t i o n . U t t e r the word. so t h a t i t s i n t o n a t i o n contour corresponds t o . bi kn:z (F - 4 l ) I t i s not BECAUSE I l i k e her t h a t I beat my w i f e . This sentence has the f o l l o w i n g p r o p o s i t i o n s : (a) I may l i k e my w i f e . (b) I beat my w i f e . (c) There i s no connection between whether I may l i k e her and my b e a t i n g her. In t h i s case, the speaker denies the conjunction between p r o p o s i t i o n s (a) and (b) by p r o p o s i t i o n C c ) . A second way of negating the'word because, i s by.phonological means o n l y . ^ Consider the f o l l o w i n g dialogue i n which negation o f because occurs-Kiparsky and Kiparsky describe the process o f ph o n o l o g i c a l pro-minence as a means of p r e s u p p o s i t i o n d e n i a l . I speak here o f th a t same process- as i m p l i c a t i o n d e n i a l . "Fact," i n Semantics, ed. Steinberg and Jakobovits (Cambridge: Univ. Press, 1971) p. 351. 30 without embedding i n a c l e f t form. Read the f o l l o w i n g sentence w i t h the r e i n f o r c e d p h o n o l o g i c a l contour t h a t I described above. ( l a ) Speaker 1: You do not love me because you are l e a v i n g . ' 17 ( l b ) Speaker 2: I'm. l e a v i n g not BECAUSE I don't love you. Let us examine the p r o p o s i t i o n s of sentence ( l a ) : (a) You are l e a v i n g . (b) There i s a reason f o r your l e a v i n g . (c) The reason i s t h a t you don't love me. Speaker 2 r e p l i e s ( l b ) w i t h the f o l l o w i n g p r o p o s i t i o n s : (a) I am l e a v i n g . (b) There i s no reason. (Or, There i s no connection between my going and my not l o v i n g you.) (c) I don't love you. Thus p r o p o s i t i o n (b) of sentence ( l b ) negates p r o p o s i t i o n (b) of ( l a ) . The t h i r d way of negating because i s seldom used i n o r d i n a r y d i s c o u r s e , but i t appears i n l o g i c . In order t o negate the e n t i r e sentence (F-39), one can say: " I t i s not the case t h a t I don't beat my w i f e because I l o v e her." In t h i s sentence, the negative governs the e n t i r e embedded sentence. Hence, i f one were t o use L a k o f f ' s a n a l y t i c a l framework, the negative of t h i s sentence must be attached t o the topmost S. We have.seen that because can be negated; thus, i t meets c r i t e r i o n ( i ) . I f because can be focussed, i t must a l s o bear primary s t r e s s . A A l l of these negations overload my r e c e p t i v e a b i l i t y . I i n c l u d e the sentence because I heard i t . I would never say i t — e v e n i f I wasn't l e a v i n g because I didn't love her. 31 f u n c t i o n o f primary s t r e s s i s emphasis of one element i n a sentence. Jones s t a t e s t h a t there are two kinds ,of p h o n o l o g i c a l emphasis. The f i r s t l8 i s emphasis f o r c o n t r a s t . I w i l l now show th a t because receives primary s t r e s s , a c h i e v i n g emphasis f o r c o n t r a s t . There i s a fundamental d i f f e r e n c e between the f u n c t i o n o f main 19 s t r e s s f o r c o n t r a s t on a form word and on because. When a speaker st r e s s e s a form word, he may be c o n t r a s t i n g : (a) the word s t r e s s e d and another word i n i t s semantic f i e l d , (b) the word s t r e s s e d and i t s antonym, and, (c) the word s t r e s s e d and i t s negation. Notice t h a t i n a l l o f these cases, the p o s s i b l e contrast i s between words. I w i l l i l l u s t r a t e each of these three p o s s i b i l i t i e s w i t h corresponding readings of an ambiguous sentence i n which the form word clean bears primary s t r e s s . Consider the f o l l o w i n g dialogue: (2a) Speaker 1: Mary cleaned the room. (2b) Speaker 2: No, Mary didn't CLEAN the room. On an (a) r e a d i n g , Speaker 2 might be i n d i c a t i n g t o Speaker 1 t h a t Mary only t i d i e d the room. The word cle a n belongs t o a set o f words d e s c r i b i n g d i f f e r e n t aspects of the general act o f c l e a n i n g . Each word i n the set ( o r , i n the semantic f i e l d , t o use other terminology) d i f f e r s from other set members i n the p r e c i s e aspect of c l e a n i n g each may des c r i b e . Thus, the f u n c t i o n o f primary s t r e s s i n (2b) might be t o s i g n a l t h a t Speaker 1 18 D a n i e l Jones, An O u t l i n e o f E n g l i s h Phonetics, 9th ed. (Cambridge: W. Heffe r and Sons L t d . , 196U), pp.- 278-279. 19 I use "form word" t o mean, roughly those words- which have been c l a s s i f i e d as nouns, verbs, a d j e c t i v e s , . and adverbs by t r a d i t i o n a l grammarians. I might a l s o extend the d e f i n i t i o n t o some p r e p o s i t i o n s , but the p o i n t here i s not p r e c i s e d e l i n e a t i o n of the members which belong t o a form c l a s s , but r a t h e r the e x c l u s i o n of because as one o f i t s members. 32 should have chosen more c a r e f u l l y among the f i e l d . Perhaps he should have s u b s t i t u t e d t i d i e d , s t r a i g h t e n e d , or dusted. On reading ( b ) , main s t r e s s on clean i n (2b) might be t o contrast clean w i t h d i r t y , i t s antonym. Whereas Speaker 1 thought t h a t Mary cleaned the room, Speaker 2 assures him t h a t Mary r e a l l y j u s t got i t d i r t i e r . And, on (c) rea d i n g , we might invent the f o l l o w i n g s i t u a t i o n . Imagine t h a t the only person who could have murdered X was the one who cleaned X's room. In (2a), Speaker 1 accuses Mary. Speaker 2 r e p l i e s w i t h (.2b) i n an attempt t o exonerate Mary. Not, i n combination w i t h the main s t r e s s on c l e a n , i s used t o s t a t e t h a t though Mary.might have been i n the room, she d i d not clean i t . I s a i d t h a t there i s a d i f f e r e n c e between the f u n c t i o n o f main s t r e s s on a form word such as c l e a n , and on a non-form word, because. Turning now t o because: there i s no antonym f o r because. Although there i s negation of because, i t does not occur w i t h primary s t r e s s . I t only occurs w i t h r e i n f o r c e d s t r e s s . I t i s p o s s i b l e , however, f o r because t o bear primary s t r e s s and i t i s p o s s i b l e t o say th a t the f u n c t i o n o f primary s t r e s s on because i s c o n t r a s t i v e . But the con t r a s t i s among p r o p o s i t i o n s and not, as i n the case o f form words, among words. These c o n t r a s t i n g p r o p o s i t i o n s are the set of p o s s i b l e conclusions of a sentence which a l s o contains p r o p o s i t i o n s s t a t i n g a major and minor •premise. In l o g i c , of course, only one conclusion i s p o s s i b l e , i f c o r r e c t formal procedures have been fo l l o w e d . Within o r d i n a r y d i s c o u r s e , however, i t i s common t h a t two speakers- w i l l accept the same major and minor premises, but w i l l reach a d i f f e r e n t c o n c l u s i o n . Both speakers accept the p o s s i b i l i t y o f a c o n c l u s i o n , but they d i f f e r as t o which c o n l u s i o n i s v a l i d . 33 In the f o l l o w i n g examples, the sentence of Speaker 1 contains a p r o p o s i t i o n which s t a t e s a c o n c l u s i o n . Speaker 2 r e p l i e s w i t h a sentence c o n t a i n i n g because which i s given primary s t r e s s . The f u n c t i o n o f the s t r e s s i s t o i n v a l i d a t e the s p e c i f i c p r o p o s i t i o n which i s a co n c l u s i o n drawn by Speaker 1. The word b e a r i n g main s t r e s s i s not used t o deny that a c o n c l u s i o n . i s p o s s i b l e , as i n the case o f r e i n f o r c e d s t r e s s . " (,3a) Speaker 1: I f you loved me you wouldn't leave . (3b) Speaker 2: I am l e a v i n g BECAUSE I love you. Here are the p r o p o s i t i o n s of (3a): (a) People do not leave the ones they l o v e . (b) You are l e a v i n g me. (c) Therefore, you don't love me. And, here are the p r o p o s i t i o n s o f (3b): (a) People do not leave the ones they l o v e . (b) I am l e a v i n g you. (c) Therefore, I love you. Sentence (3a) contains the same (a) and (b) p r o p o s i t i o n s as sentence (3b). The (c) p r o p o s i t i o n s , which s t a t e the corclusion, d i f f e r . The word i f , used i n sentence (3a) i s r h e t o r i c a l , r a t h e r than l i t e r a l , and because, w i t h primary s t r e s s , allows speakers t o r e t a i n the form, o f an argument w h i l e 20 s e l e c t i n g d i f f e r e n t c o n c l u s i v e p r o p o s i t i o n s . Although I describe t h i s procedure, by p r o p o s i t i o n a l a n a l y s i s , authors o f f i c t i o n have used, pseudo^logical.sentences f o r comic e f f e c t . • One, who valued, privacy- above, friendship., r e p l i e d ' t o a d i n n e r ' i n v i t a t i o n , s a y i n g , "Because you have asked me, t h e r e f o r e I cannot come." The humour l i e s i n c o n j o i n i n g two conc l u s i v e p r o p o s i t i o n s . 3k In another dialogue i n which because re c e i v e s primary s t r e s s , the same phenomenon occurs: {ka) Speaker 1: You can r e l a x now because she's gone. (1+b) Speaker 2: I'm tense BECAUSE she's gone. The p r o p o s i t i o n s f o r (Ua) are: (a) Her presence makes you tense. (b) She i s gone. (c) Therefore, you can r e l a x . The p r o p o s i t i o n s f o r (kb) are: (a) Her presence makes me tense. (b) She i s gone. (c) Therefore, I can not r e l a x . Once again, (a) and (b) p r o p o s i t i o n s are i d e n t i c a l , but .(c) p r o p o s i t i o n s d i f f e r . Therefore, main s t r e s s on because co n t r a s t s propo-s i t i o n s , and not words. Jones s t a t e s t h a t another k i n d o f emphasis, s i g n a l l e d by primary 21 s t r e s s , i s emphasis f o r i n t e n s i t y . While the d i s t i n c t i o n between emphasis f o r con t r a s t and emphasis f o r i n t e n s i t y i s a n a l y t i c a l l y v a l u a b l e , I do not t h i n k t h a t i n t e n s i t y ever occurs without i m p l i e d c o n t r a s t . Never-t h e l e s s , these terms are p r e c i s e enough f o r the purpose o f showing the d i f f e r e n c e between word i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n and p r o p o s i t i o n a l i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n . Jones says t h a t . i t i s appropriate t o apply i n t e n s i t y emphasis-only t o c e r t a i n words w^hich,express measurable q u a l i t i e s . He cites-examples o f adverbs which i n c l u d e very-, extremely, and r a t h e r , and 21 Jones, Ou t l i n e of E n g l i s h P h o n e t i c s , p. 298. 35 combines them w i t h t h e a d j e c t i v e s good, h o t , and l o n g . He adds t h a t t h e adverbs i n t e n s i f y t h e meaning.of t h e a d j e c t i v e s . N o t i c e t h a t i n h i s example, one word i s u s e d t o i n t e n s i f y t h e meaning o f a n o t h e r word. Of c o u r s e , e i t h e r word can r e c e i v e p r i m a r y s t r e s s , b u t f o r t h i s d i s c u s s i o n , I w i l l r e s t r i c t t h e a n a l y s i s - o f i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n t o where t h e a d j e c t i v e i s s t r e s s e d as- i n v e r y HOT. J u s t as i n p r i m a r y s t r e s s f o r c o n t r a s t , t h e f u n c t i o n o f p r i m a r y s t r e s s combined w i t h a d v e r b i a l m o d i f i c a t i o n o f f o r m words i s d i f f e r e n t f rom p r i m a r y s t r e s s - combined w i t h a d v e r b i a l m o d i f i c a t i o n o f b e c a u s e . L e t us c o n s i d e r t h e p o s s i b i l i t i e s w h i c h a r e a v a i l a b l e t o t h e s p e a k e r i n t h e c a s e o f h o t . The a d v e r b , v e r y , and p r i m a r y s t r e s s on h o t might be s i m i l a r t o p r i m a r y s t r e s s on c l e a n , as i n o u r e a r l i e r d i s c u s s i o n . That i s , i n -t e n s i f i c a t i o n a p p l i e s s p e c i f i c a l l y t o h o t r a t h e r t h a n t o a n o t h e r member i n i t s s e m a n t i c f i e l d , warm o r t e p i d . Or, perhaps t h e adverb and p r i m a r y s t r e s s m i g h t s e r v e t o i n t e n s i f y t h e meaning o f h o t as c o n t r a s t e d w i t h i t s antonym, c o l d . N e i t h e r o f t h e s e a l t e r n a t i v e s i s p o s s i b l e f o r b e c a u s e . There i s no c o r r e s p o n d e n c e b a s e d upon word a n a l y s i s w h i c h because can s a t i s f y . I t i s p o s s i b l e , however, f o r b e c a u s e t o r e c e i v e p r i m a r y s t r e s s and a d v e r b i a l 22 m o d i f i c a t i o n . That w h i c h i s b e i n g m o d i f i e d , i s a s e l e c t one among a s e t o f p o s s i b l e p r o p o s i t i o n s . I n t h e f o l l o w i n g examples, i t i s t h e s p e c i f i c S i d n e y Greenbaum, i n S t u d i e s i n E n g l i s h A d v e r b i a l Usage., d e s c r i b e s how; c e r t a i n adverbs can focus^ an.item-. None o f h i s s e n t e n c e s , however, c o n t a i n t h e c o - o c c u r r e n t phenomena o f a d v e r b i a l m o d i f i c a t i o n and main s t r e s s on one i t e m . S i d n e y Greenbaum, S t u d i e s i n E n g l i s h A d v e r b i a l Usage (.London: Longmans , Green and Co. , L t d . , 1969), p• 119. : 36 reason f o l l o w i n g the word because which i s being i n t e n s i f i e d . Because should be read w i t h the f o l l o w i n g i n t o n a t i o n contour: » b i kxiz (5) I am an a d d i c t o n ly BECAUSE I had a deprived childhood. Sentence (.5) contains the f o l l o w i n g p r o p o s i t i o n s : (a) I am an a d d i c t . (b) There i s a reason. (c) There i s a s p e c i f i c reason. (Or, there i s one reason only.) (d) The reason i s th a t I had a deprived childhood. Thus, the adverb only r e f e r s t o the s p e c i f i c reason which the speaker has chosen from among a l l p o s s i b l e reasons. S i m i l a r l y , i n a sentence i n which the because-clause i s embedded i n a c l e f t form, an adverb precedes because, and because bears primary s t r e s s , the scope of the adverb i s the s p e c i f i c reason which the speaker has s e l e c t e d from a number of p o s s i b l e reasons. (6) I t was p a r t i c u l a r l y BECAUSE I wanted t o eat th a t I s t o l e . The p r o p o s i t i o n s of (6) are: (a) I s t o l e . (b) There i s a reason why I s t o l e . (c) There i s one reason i n p a r t i c u l a r . (d) The reason i s t h a t I.wanted t o eat. Because a l s o carries- p rimary.stress when i t occurs as a one-word sentence. An a n a l y s i s of the f u n c t i o n .of primary s t r e s s i n these sentences i s d i f f i c u l t . The d i f f i c u l t y - , I admit,.. does-not l i e i n the obvious f a c t that there i s no.other element i n the sentence which can r e c e i v e main s t r e s s assignment. The f u n c t i o n ,of main s t r e s s as a s i g n a l o f d e l e t i o n 37 of an u n d e r l y i n g sentence t o tha t .of a one-word surface form i s a l s o c l e a r enough. The complexity l i e s i n e x p l a n a t i o n of the meaning o f the emotive 23 f o r c e which i s a l s o conveyed through the main s t r e s s . In the f o l l o w i n g four d i a l o g u e s , "because occurs as a one-word sentence h e a r i n g primary s t r e s s . A f t e r each dialogue I re c o n s t r u c t two p o s s i b l e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f because. These i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s w i l l be appro-ximations of the i n f o r m a t i o n Speaker 2 wants Speaker 1 t o i n f e r from the t e r s e r e p l y . Notice t h a t i n each case, Speaker 2 does not want the conversation t o continue. (7a) Mother, Speaker 1: Why d i d you l i e t o me about breaking t h a t vase? (7b) C h i l d , Speaker 2: Because! I n t e r p r e t a t i o n : (7b, l ) You already know that I l i e d because I was a f r a i d you would punish me. (7b, 2) I don't want t o t e l l you why I l i e d . (8a) Husband, Speaker 1: Why are you so i r r i t a b l e a l l the time? (8b) Wife, Speaker 2: Because!. I n t e r p r e t a t i o n : (8b, l ) You know very w e l l why I am i r r i t a b l e , you make me that way. (8b, 2) I don't, i n t e n d t o t e l l you because you should know without having t o ask. 23 ' By- "emotive f o r c e " I r e f e r .to.Buhler's- d i s t i n c t i o n .between phonology and phonostylisti.es.. See N.S. Trubetskoy, P r i n c i p l e s o f Phonology trans-. C h r i s t i a n e A. M. Baltaxe (Berkeley: Univ. o f C a l i f o r n i a P r ess, 1969/, pp. -lh-25. See als o F r a n t i s e k Danes,. "Sentence I n t o n a t i o n from a F u n c t i o n a l Point of View," Word l6 (i960), 35; 52-53. 38 (9a) Wife, Speaker 1: Why are you l a t e again? (9h) Husband, Speaker 2: Because! I n t e r p r e t a t i o n : (9b, l ) You know p e r f e c t l y w e l l why. I was at the pub again. (9b, 2) I don't i n t e n d t o t e l l you, Hag. (lOa) Wife, Speaker 1: Why haven't you t o l d me what the doctor s a i d t o you? (10b) Husband, Speaker 2: Because! I n t e r p r e t a t i o n : (10b, l ) I haven't t o l d you because he t o l d me what you s a i d he would say. And t h a t makes me f u r i o u s . (10b, 2) I don't want you t o know what he s a i d . One g e n e r a l i z a t i o n about the semantic i n f o r m a t i o n conveyed by the emotive s t r e s s i n dialogues (7) (10) i s t h a t Speaker 2 uses Because.' i n an attempt t o terminate the conversation. In each case, Speaker 1 asks a question beginning w i t h "Why . . .." In each case, Speaker 2 r e p l i e s w i t h "Because!" In r e c o n s t r u c t i n g p o s s i b l e u n d e r l y i n g f u l l sentences f o r because, emotive s t r e s s on the abbreviated form seems t o be a s i g n a l t h a t Speaker 2 does not want to t a l k f u r t h e r on the s u b j e c t . In i n t e r -p r e t a t i o n 1, Speaker 2 refuses t o answer because Speaker l ' s question i s r e a l l y a pseudo-question. Speaker 2 knows th a t Speaker 1 already knows the answer. In i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 2, Speaker 2 may not want Speaker 1 t o know the answer. I have demonstrated t h a t because can bear primary s t r e s s . I have a l s o i n d i r e c t l y provided a p a r t i a l e xplanation t o one question which came 39 to A l i c e Davison's a t t e n t i o n . In Chapter I , I s a i d t h a t s e v e r a l c e n t r a l questions appear i n the l i t e r a t u r e on because. One of these asked how the behaviour o f because-clau'ses was u n l i k e t h a t o f other reason ad-v e r b i a l s i n imperative sentences. I t u r n now t o th a t problem, and apply data on because and primary s t r e s s as an explanation f o r one of A. Davison's unacceptable sentences. She observes t h a t s i n c e and as_ can occur i n a clause which pre-cedes the main clause c o n t a i n i n g an overt imperative. But, i n the f o l l o w i n g example, she n o t i c e s t h a t because w i l l not s u b s t i t u t e grammatically. " ( 7 ) [AS J Since ) you're an expert on antique paper c l i p s , I Because ] ( come and see my c o l l e c t i o n . [ you must look at my c o l l e c t i o n . She concludes from t h i s and other examples, t h a t because should be marked i n the l e x i c o n so that i t does not occur w i t h overt performative verbs. But n o t i c e t h a t i t i s grammatical t o say, ( l l ) You must look at my c o l l e c t i o n because you're an expert on antique paper c l i p s . I t would seem t h a t the ungrammatical reading occurs only when the because-clause i s preposed. One of the e f f e c t s of preposing a clause i s t o give i t prominence w i t h i n a dis c o u r s e . I f we assume th a t the u n d e r l y i n g form o f a sentence c o n t a i n i n g because i s one .in which the main clause precedes the because-c l a u s e , then whenever a bec_ause_-clause occurs at the beginning of a sentence, i t occupies a place o f s p e c i a l prominence. Moreover, when the A. Davison, "Causal Adverbs and Performative Verbs," p. 191. preposed clause begins w i t h a word which can bear primary s t r e s s , the l i s t e n e r i s a l e r t t o the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t t h i s word, i n p a r t i c u l a r , may be an e s s e n t i a l message conveying u n i t . I have already demonstrated t h a t because can be s t r e s s e d . R e c a l l t h a t i n sentences c o n t a i n i n g an imperative as the main verb, the f o r c e of the command re q u i r e s t h a t the imperative verb r e c e i v e main s t r e s s . An explanation of the u n a c c e p t a b i l i t y of because-clauses when they precede imperatives i s r u l e c o n f l i c t : i n these sentences, the l i s t e n e r cannot a n t i c i p a t e the word which w i l l r e c e i v e primary s t r e s s assignment. The a c c e p t a b i l i t y of s i n c e , and as, i n the same p o s i t i o n , can be explained by t h e i r i n a b i l i t y , t o accept main s t r e s s . A. Davison's sentence (7) becomes more acceptable when placed i n 25 a d i s c o u r s e . I have shown th a t one f u n c t i o n of primary s t r e s s on because i s t o i n v a l i d a t e the conclusion of a preceding sentence i n a dialogue. Consider the f o l l o w i n g : (12a) Speaker 1: Thank goodness,' I don't have t o look at any more paper c l i p c o l l e c t i o n s because I am already an acknowledged expert. (12b) Speaker 2: Because you are an expert, you must look at my c o l l e c t i o n . Now i t i s p o s s i b l e t o read (l2b) w i t h primary s t r e s s on because and r e -t a i n an overt imperative form f o r the verb. But the verb, i n t h i s case, does not bear primary s t r e s s . The main clause would probably be u t t e r e d w i t h d e l i b e r a t e e n u n c i a t i o n of each word, and w i t h monotonous A. Davison, "Causal Adverbs and Performative Verbs," p. 191. i l l i n t o n a t i o n r i s i n g s l i g h t l y on the word my. The p r o p o s i t i o n s of (l2a) are: (a) A person who i s an expert on a subject need not look at every s i n g l e c o l l e c t i o n . (b) I am an expert on the subject of antique paper c l i p s . (c) Therefore, I need not look at another c o l l e c t i o n . The p r o p o s i t i o n s o f (12b) are: (a) A person who i s an expert on a subject need not look at every s i n g l e c o l l e c t i o n . (b) You are an expert on the subject o f antique paper c l i p s . (c) Therefore, you must look at my c o l l e c t i o n . Thus, as my e a r l i e r a n a l y s i s p r e d i c t s , the (c) p r o p o s i t i o n o f (l2b) denies the (c) p r o p o s i t i o n of (l2a). Other sentences which A. Davison f i n d s u n a c c e p t a b l e — those where because-clauses precede a main clause which i s a q u e s t i o n , a request, or an overt p e r f o r m a t i v e — become more acceptable when the because-clause i s understood as r e f e r r i n g t o an un d e r l y i n g verb o f saying. I r e f e r the reader t o W i l l i a m Rutherford's a r t i c l e f o r an account o f these 2 6 phenomena. We have seen that because can be negated and can r e c e i v e primary s t r e s s . I w i l l now i n v e s t i g a t e whether because meets c o n d i t i o n ( i i i ) . There i s a r e l a t i o n s h i p between the terms "new" and " a s s e r t , " and between ^ W. Rutherford, "Some Observations Concerning Subordinate Clauses i n E n g l i s h , " pp. 99-107. i i 42 " o l d " and "presuppose." But t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p has not be c o n c l u s i v e l y defined. So f a r , no one has claimed t h a t presupposed i n f o r m a t i o n i s new. But i t may be p o s s i b l e t o argue t h a t o l d i n f o r m a t i o n i s a s s e r t e d . So, the c o r r e l a t i o n , new:assert :: old:presuppose, cannot be formulated u n t i l 27 l i n g u i s t s agree upon d e f i n i t i o n s . The importance of these terms f o r a d e f i n i t i o n of "focus" i s that a s s e r t i o n s and assumptions are p o t e n t i a l p o i n t s o f a t t e n t i o n i n . discourse—arguments occur over t r u t h c l a i m s . One semantic t e s t which opposes the terms " a s s e r t " and "pre-suppose" may show t h a t because can be asse r t e d as w e l l as presupposed. 28 I w i l l embed because clauses i n t o f a c t i v e and n o n - f a c t i v e p r e d i c a t e s . .1 w i l l use the f o l l o w i n g d e f i n i t i o n s i n t h i s procedure. A main sentence i s e i t h e r one which contains the word, " i t i s s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t , " o r , " I t i s l i k e l y t h a t . " The main sentence, " I t i s s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t " contains a p r e d i c a t e word, " s i g n i f i c a n t , " which has the semantic property of f a c t i v i t y . The main sentence, " i t i s l i k e l y t h a t " contains a pre-d i c a t e word, " l i k e l y , " which has the semantic property o f n o n - f a c t i v i t y . The complement i s an embedded sentence which contains three c o n s t i t u e n t s . These three complement c o n s t i t u e n t s are ( r a i n ) (because) ( f l o o d ) . I f the For a d i s c u s s i o n of the d i f f e r e n t meanings of the term "pre-s u p p o s i t i o n , " see Ri c h a r d Garner, " ' P r e s u p p o s i t i o n ' i n Philosophy and Linguistios,," i n Studies i n L i n g u i s t i c Semantics, ed. Charles J . F i l l m o r e and D. Terence Langendoen (New York: H o l t , Rinehard and Winston, 1971), pp. 23-42. 28 I use the terms' as defined i n "Fact." An item which i s pre-supposed by a speaker i s f a c t i v e . That which'is a s s e r t e d i n a sentence i s n o n - f a c t i v e . While I accept the semantic d i s t i n c t i o n between these terms, I do not accept t h a t the f a c t i v i t y s t a t u s of a main p r e d i c a t e word determines the f a c t i v i t y s t a t us o f the e n t i r e embedded complement. Kiparsky and K i p a r s k y , pp. 348-34-9. h3 word because can be focussed, then c o n s t i t u e n t (because) must be capable of being the scope of the n o n - f a c t i v e p r e d i c a t e word, " l i k e l y , " and, the n o n - f a c t i v e p r e d i c a t e word, " s i g n i f i c a n t . " I w i l l show th a t the n o n - f a c t i v e p r e d i c a t e word, " l i k e l y , " and the f a c t i v e p r e d i c a t e word, " s i g n i f i c a n t , " determine the f a c t i v i t y s t a t us of e i t h e r an e n t i r e embedded complement, o r , only part of an embedded complement. The scope of the p r e d i c a t e w i t h i n the complement i s always determined by main st r e s s , and.may be determined by the combination of preposlng and main s t r e s s . For the word because t o s a t i s f y c o n d i t i o n ( i i i ) , i t must be i n s i d e the scope of a f a c t i v e and n o n - f a c t i v e p r e d i c a t e word i n some main s t r e s s readings. Let us. examine p a i r s of sentences which contain the c o n s t i t u e n t sentence, " i t i s s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t , " and an embedded complement. The c o n s t i t u e n t sentence contains a f a c t i v e p r e d i c a t e word. In sentences (13 ' ; b, b'; c, c'; d, d'), the order of the complement c o n s t i t u e n t s i s ( f l o o d ) (because) ( r a i n ) . In sentences (lk, lk1 ) the order i s ( f l o o d ) (because) ( r a i n ) . Sentences (13 a, b, c, d) and sentence (lk) are questions which r e q u i r e a response c o n t a i n i n g a corresponding s t r e s s 29 p a t t e r n . (13a) Is i t SIGNIFICANT or not SIGNIFICANT th a t the r i v e r f l ooded because i t rained? Thus, I c l a i m t h a t i t i s p o s s i b l e t o question an item which i s a c o n s t i t u e n t i n the complement of a f a c t i v e p r e d i c a t e word. This need not counter a commonly s t a t e d property of p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s — t h a t they are constant under que s t i o n i n g . One simply must d i s t i n g u i s h the l e v e l o f a b s t r a c t i o n which i s being subjected t o q u e s t i o n i n g . I t i s t h e o r e t i c a l l y p o s s i b l e t o define a l e v e l s u f f i c i e n t l y a b s t r a c t such t h a t anything which can be s a i d can a l s o be questioned. kk (13a') I t i s SIGNIFICANT th a t the r i v e r flooded because i t r a i n e d . In t h i s r eading, the i n q u i r e r asks whether the e n t i r e event which i s described as the complement i s s i g n i f i c a n t . The response t h a t the e n t i r e event i s , indeed, s i g n i f i c a n t , confers f a c t i v i t y s t a tus on a l l c o n s t i t u e n t s o f the complement. (l3b) Is i t s i g n i f i c a n t that the CREEK flooded because i t rained? (13b*) I t i s s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t the RIVER flooded because i t rai n e d . In t h i s r eading, the i n q u i r e r asks whether i t i s s i g n i f i c a n t t hat only the creek fl o o d e d , and the response i s th a t i t i s s i g n i f i c a n t t hat the r i v e r flooded. Thus, only c o n s t i t u e n t ( f l o o d ) i s f a c t i v e . (13c) Is i t s i g n i f i c a n t that the r i v e r OVERFLOWED because i t rained? ( l 3 c T ) I t i s s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t the r i v e r FLOODED because i t rai n e d . In t h i s reading the i n q u i r e r asks whether i t i s s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t the r i v e r only overflowed because i t r a i n e d . The response i s th a t i t i s s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t i t flooded. Thus, c o n s t i t u e n t ( r a i n ) i s f a c t i v e . (13d) Is i t s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t the r i v e r flooded BECAUSE i t rained? (13d') I t i s s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t the r i v e r f looded BECAUSE i t r a i n e d . In t h i s reading the i n q u i r e r i s n ' t sure whether r a i n caused the r i v e r t o f l o o d . The answer i s th a t i t d i d . Thus c o n s t i t u e n t (because) *5 . _ .. 30 i s f a c t i v e . {lk) Is i t s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t BECAUSE i t r a i n e d the r i v e r flooded? ( l V ) I t i s s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t BECAUSE i t r a i n e d the r i v e r flooded. In t h i s p a i r , the order of the c o n s t i t u e n t s i s reversed, making i t more l i k e l y t h a t c o n s t i t u e n t (because) w i l l r e c e i v e main s t r e s s . I t has.the same reading as the p a i r ( l 3 a ) and ( l 3 a ' ) . We can make the f o l l o w i n g g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s from the preceding p a i r s of sentences. When the p r e d i c a t e word i s s t r e s s e d , the e n t i r e complement i s w i t h i n i t s range and i s determined by the f a e t i v i t y s t a t u s of the complement. When a word i n s i d e the complement i s s t r e s s e d , only i t s corresponding c o n s t i t u e n t i s determined by the f a c t i v i t y s t a t us o f the p r e d i c a t e word i n the main sentence. In (13*, a, b, c, d) and (lk) and t h e i r corresponding primed p a i r s , any one of the three c o n s t i t u e n t s of the complement may be f a c t i v e . I f the word because i s t o meet c o n d i t i o n ( i i i ) , i t i s not suf-f i c i e n t t h a t i t be i n s i d e the scope of a f a c t i v e p r e d i c a t e word. I t must al s o be i n s i d e the scope of a n o n - f a c t i v e p r e d i c a t e word. In the f o l l o w i n g p a i r s o f sentences c o n t a i n i n g a main sentence i n which a no n - f a c t i v e p r e d i c a t e word, " l i k e l y , " and a complement occurs, I w i l l show t h a t i t The main s t r e s s on because s i g n a l s the questioner's d e s i r e f o r co n f i r m a t i o n of a p a r t i c u l a r c o n c l u s i o n i m p l i c i t i n the complement. See my pp. 3/ -3^ f o r an a n a l y s i s of the f u n c t i o n of main s t r e s s on because. h6 i s p o s s i b l e f o r c o n s t i t u e n t ( b e c a u s e ) , and, t h e r e f o r e , t h e word b e c a u s e t o be w i t h i n t h e scope o f t h e n o n - f a c t i v e p r e d i c a t e word. (l5a) I s i t LIKELY o r u n l i k e l y t h a t t h e r i v e r f l o o d e d because i t r a i n e d ? (l5a') I t i s LIKELY, t h a t t h e r i v e r f l o o d e d b e c a u s e i t r a i n e d . The i n q u i r e r wonders w h e ther t h e e n t i r e e v e n t w h i c h i s d e s c r i b e d i n t h e complement i s l i k e l y . The r e s p o n s e i s t h a t t h e e n t i r e e v e n t i s , i n d e e d , l i k e l y . Thus, t h e e n t i r e complement i s n o n - f a c t i v e . (15b) I s i t l i k e l y t h a t t h e CREEK f l o o d e d b e c a u s e i t r a i n e d ? (15b') I t i s l i k e l y t h a t t h e RIVER f l o o d e d b e c a u s e i t r a i n e d . The i n q u i r e r a sks w h e t h e r i t i s s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t o n l y t h e c r e e k f l o o d e d . The r e s p o n s e i s t h a t i t i s s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t i t was t h e r i v e r w h i c h f l o o d e d . Thus, o n l y c o n s t i t u e n t ( r i v e r ) i s n o n - f a c t i v e . (15c) I s i t l i k e l y t h a t t h e r i v e r OVERFLOWED because i t r a i n e d ? (l5c 1) I t i s l i k e l y t h a t t h e r i v e r FLOODED because i t r a i n e d . The i n q u i r e r a s k s w h e t h e r i t i s s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t t h e r i v e r o n l y o v e r f l o w e d b e c a u s e i t r a i n e d . The r e s p o n s e i s t h a t i t i s s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t i t f l o o d e d . Thus, c o n s t i t u e n t ( r a i n ) i s f a c t i v e . (I5d) I s i t l i k e l y t h a t t h e r i v e r f l o o d e d BECAUSE i t r a i n e d ? (I5d') I t i s l i k e l y t h a t t h e r i v e r f l o o d e d BECAUSE i t r a i n e d . I n t h i s r e a d i n g t h e i n q u i r e r i s n ' t s u r e w h e t h e r a d d i t i o n a l r a i n w i l l cause t h e r i v e r t o f l o o d . The answer i s t h a t i t d i d f l o o d . Thus, c o n s t i t u e n t ( because) i s n o n - f a c t i v e . (l6) I s i t l i k e l y t h a t BECAUSE i t r a i n e d t h e r i v e r f l o o d e d ? (16') I t i s l i k e l y t h a t BECAUSE i t r a i n e d t h e r i v e r f l o o d e d . hi I n t h i s p a i r , t h e o r d e r o f t h e complement c o n s t i t u e n t s i s r e v e r s e d , t h u s , i t i s more l i k e l y t h a t t h e c o n s t i t u e n t (because) w i l l r e c e i v e main s t r e s s . I t s r e a d i n g i s t h e same as ( l 5 a ) and ( 1 5 a 1 ) . We c a n see f r o m t h e p r e c e d i n g p a i r s o f q u e s t i o n s and answers t h a t any word w h i c h can be s t r e s s e d i n t h e complement can a l s o be q u e s t i o n e d . T h i s s a t i s f i e s common s e n s e . Whenever a s p e a k e r c l a i m s t h a t an e v e n t i s l i k e l y o r s i g n i f i c a n t , an a p p r a i s i n g r e s p o n s e may e i t h e r a c c e p t o r r e j e c t t h e e n t i r e e v e n t as b e i n g l i k e l y o r s i g n i f i c a n t , o r a c c e p t o r r e j e c t p a r t o f t h e e v e n t as b e i n g l i k e l y o r s i g n i f i c a n t . We can s e e , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t t h e c o n s t i t u e n t (because) can be w i t h i n t h e scope o f a n o n - f a c t i v e p r e d i c a t e word. Thus, t h e word b e c a u s e meets c o n d i t i o n ( i i i ) . B e f o r e we can d e c i d e w h e t h e r b e c a u s e meets c r i t e r i o n ( i v ) , I must d e f i n e t t h e t e r m " p r e d i c t a b l e . " O r d i n a r i l y , we use t h e w o r d un- p r e d i c t a b l e t o d e s c r i b e s i t u a t i o n s i n w h i c h we have t r o u b l e i n g u e s s i n g o r knowing what t o e x p e c t . That same o r d i n a r y n o t i o n o c c u r s i n a more r e f i n e d sense as a t e r m i n i n f o r m a t i o n t h e o r y . I f i t i s p o s s i b l e t o p r e d i c t what a l i n g u i s t i c u n i t w i l l be i n a c o n t e x t , t h e n t h a t u n i t has a h i g h degree o f p r o b a b i l i t y . The more p r o b a b l e a u n i t i s , t h e l o w e r i s 31 i t s m e s s a g e - b e a r i n g c o n t e n t . I n i n f o r m a t i o n t h e o r y , t h e p r e c i s e c a l c u l a t i o n o f t h e amount o f message a u n i t c a r r i e s , depends upon t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e terms " p r o b a b i l i t y " and " f u n c t i o n a l l o a d . " As Lyons p o i n t s o u t , t h e f u n c t i o n a l F o r an i n t r o d u c t o r y a c c o u n t o f i n f o r m a t i o n t h e o r y and i t s p l a c e w i t h i n t h e o r e t i c a l l i n g u i s t i c s , see John L y o n s , An I n t r o d u c t i o n  t o T h e o r e t i c a l L i n g u i s t i c s (London: Cambridge U n i v . P r e s s , 1968), pp. 81-91. 48 l o a d o f a p a r t i c u l a r c o n t r a s t "between e x p r e s s i o n elements i s d e t e r m i n e d 32 "by a number o f v a r i a b l e s . He c a u t i o n s : S i n c e i t i s i m p o s s i b l e ( i n t h e p r e s e n t s t a t e o f l i n g u i s t i c r e s e a r c h a t l e a s t ) t o i d e n t i f y a l l t h e s e m a n t i c a l l y - r e l e v a n t f a c t o r s i n t h e e x t e r n a l s i t u a t i o n s i n w h i c h p a r t i c u l a r u t t e r a n c e s o c c u r , i t i s a l s o i m p o s s i b l e t o c a l c u l a t e t h e p r o b a b i l i t y , and t h e r e f o r e t h e i n f o r m a t i o n - c o n t e n t , o f any p a r t o f them. But he a l s o s t a t e s t h a t we can make g e n e r a l s t a t e m e n t s about p r o b a b i l i t y , i f we c o n s i d e r t h e s t r u c t u r e o f s e n t e n c e s i n a b s t r a c t i o n f r o m t h e s i t u a t i o n s i n w h i c h a c t u a l u t t e r a n c e s o c c u r . A c c o r d i n g l y , I w i l l d e f i n e " p r o b a b i l i t y " w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o two s e n t e n c e s w h i c h c o m p r i s e a d i a l o g u e . J a c k D a v i s o n p o i n t s o u t t h a t because 34 answers t h e q u e s t i o n s why, what i s t h e r e a s o n , and what i s t h e c a u s e . I w i l l argue t h a t because i s a p r e d i c t a b l e r e p l y t o t h e s e q u e s t i o n s on t h e grounds t h a t b e c a u s e , why, r e a s o n , and cause can appear t o g e t h e r i n i n -d i c a t i v e s e n t e n c e s . I w i l l a l s o argue t h a t a l t h o u g h b e c a u s e i s an a c c e p t a b l e r e p l y t o how, i t i s n o t a p r e d i c t a b l e r e s p o n s e s i n c e how does 35 n o t c o l l o c a t e w i t h b e c a u s e , r e a s o n , why o r cause i n i n d i c a t i v e s e n t e n c e s . 3 2 L y o n s , pp. 82 -83 . 3 3 L y o n s , p. 97-34 J?:oDayison, Language, To Appear. 35 N o t i c e t h a t I d e f i n e t h e terms " p r e d i c t a b l e " and " u n p r e d i c t a b l e " as dichotomous f o r t h i s a n a l y s i s o n l y . F o r an u t t e r a n c e t o be m e a n i n g f u l i n s p e e c h s i t u a t i o n s , some c h o i c e i s e s s e n t i a l . A c o m p l e t e l y p r e d i c t a b l e q u e s t i o n w o u l d not be a s k e d , s i n c e i t w o u l d be m e a n i n g l e s s . T h e r e f o r e , t h e t e r m " p r e d i c t a b l e , " when u s e d o u t s i d e t h e c o n t e x t o f t h i s p a p e r , s h o u l d have a r e l a t i v e d e f i n i t i o n . kg To the questions "Why are you going?", o r , "For what reason are you going," an acceptable r e p l y might be: (17) I am going because I am t i r e d . (18) The reason why I am going i s because I am t i r e d . In answer t o the q u e s t i o n , "What i s the cause of the f l o o d ? " , one might r e p l y : (19) The cause of the f l o o d i s t h a t i t thawed r a p i d l y , and a l s o because the dikes were weak. (20) The cause of the f l o o d i s the same as why the r i v e r 36 overflowed. In (18), (19), and (20), i t i s p o s s i b l e t o c o l l o c a t e because and why i n answer toa-aquestion c o n t a i n i n g the i n t e r r o g a t i v e s why, what reason, or what cause. I conclude that because i s a p r e d i c t a b l e r e p l y i n these dialogues. In c o n t r a s t , I w i l l show t h a t although because i s an acceptable r e p l y t o the question how, the two do not c o l l o c a t e i n an i n d i c a t i v e sentence. I w i l l i n s e r t how i n t o the p o s i t i o n s o f why and because i n sentences (l8), (19) and (20). (21) KThe reason how I am going i s because I am t i r e d . (22) *The cause of the f l o o d i s t h a t i t thawed r a p i d l y and a l s o how the dikes were weak. (23) *The cause of the f l o o d i s the same as how the r i v e r overflowed. This r e p l y was e l i c i t e d from a r e l a t i v e l y uneducated farmer. I t i s unacceptable f o r me and f o r some other speakers whose education i s at u n i v e r s i t y l e v e l . But when I asked f i v e informants whose education i s at highschool l e v e l , they r e p l i e d t h a t the sentence was acceptable f o r them. 50 How does not i n s e r t acceptably. Therefore, how does not c o l l o c a t e w i t h because, reason, and cause. To demonstrate t h a t because meets c o n d i t i o n ( i v ) , I w i l l show t h a t , although because does not c o l l o c a t e w i t h how i n i n d i c a t i v e sentences, because occurs as an acceptable r e p l y to a question beginning w i t h how. I present the f o l l o w i n g dialogues as evidence. {2k) How d i d you remember the meaning of t h a t word? (2k1) I knew because I j u s t looked i t up i n the d i c t i o n a r y the other day. (25) How can you t a l k such nonsense? (25') Oh, because I am only j o k i n g . (26) How come you don't v i s i t us anymore? (26') I don't come because I l i v e so f a r away now. A u s t i n p o i n t s out t h a t i t i s "odd" t o answer the question how w i t h because, but t h a t i t i s a l s o "dangerously d e f i n i t e " when an answer 37 begins w i t h because. I t h i n k the oddness and d e f i n i t e n e s s can be expl a i n e d i n terms of p r e d i c t a b i l i t y . Since we do not group how and because i n i n d i c a t i v e sentences, we do not expect them t o occur i n question-answer dialogues i n the way t h a t we expect because t o occur w i t h why, reason and cause. Summarizing: because meets c o n d i t i o n ( i v ) s i n c e 38 i t appears u n p r e d i c t a b l y i n an answer t o a question. Thus, I conclude th a t because can be focussed. 37 J . L. A u s t i n , P h i l o s o p h i c a l Papers (Oxford: Clarendon P r e s s , 1961), pp. 1+9-53. 38 One could say t h a t because i s more un p r e d i c t a b l e as a response t o how than t o why on the grounds t h a t how has more l e x i c a l readings than why. I f one excludes s i t u a t i o n a l and co n t e x t u a l dues , then I would accept a c o r r e l a t i o n between l e x i c a l ambiguity and p r e d i c t a b i l i t y . CHAPTER I I I A DESCRIPTION OF THE CAUSAL AND NON-CAUSAL FEATURES OF BECAUSE In t h i s chapter, I w i l l analyse the meaning o f the word because as i t r e l a t e s t o the l e x i c a l items "cause" and "reason." E a r l i e r s t u d i e s of because c o n t a i n a number of a l t e r n a t i v e proposals f o r i t s semantic d e f i n i t i o n . I f because i s u n d e r l y i n g , there may be two forms i n the l e x i c o n : one i s c a u s a l ; the other i s non-causal. A l t e r n a t i v e l y , there may be only one which has the meaning of reason. I f because i s described as a der i v e d form, then i t s u n d e r l y i n g source may be a head noun REASON, or a verb or noun form w i t h the meaning of cause. These a l t e r n a t i v e l i n g u i s t i c analyses p a r a l l e l a controversy e x i s t i n g i n p h i l o s o p h i c a l l i t e r a t u r e concerning the d e f i n i t i o n s o f cause-and reason-explanations. The questions are s i m i l a r . Are the d e f i n i t i o n s of reason- and causal-explanations i n c l u s i v e ? I f they a r e , which i s superordinate? Or, are they so d i s s i m i l a r t h a t we must define them d i s -j o i n t l y ? Or, are they contingent or overlapping i n ways that we do not yet understand? 1 The most rec e n t l y - c o m p i l e d b i b l i o g r a p h y o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l i n -v e s t i g a t i o n s on t h i s question i s Robert McGowan and Myron Gochnauer, "A B i b l i o g r a p h y of the Philosophy of A c t i o n , " i n Agent, A c t i o n , and Reason, ed. Robert B i n k l e y , R i c h a r d Bronaugh, and Ausonio Marras (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto P r e s s , 1971), pp. 167-199. An a r t i c l e which contains an explanation of the nature o f the controversy over reasons and causes i n philosophy i s Ruth M a c k l i n , "Explanation and A c t i o n : Recent Issues and Cont r o v e r s i e s , " Synthase 20 (1969), 388-U15. 52 Whenever a s o l u t i o n t o a problem i s p e r s i s t e n t l y u n s a t i s f y i n g , i t can be u s e f u l t o synthesise the a l t e r n a t i v e s from previous proposals. I w i l l f o l l o w that procedure i n t h i s chapter. Consequently, I w i l l argue th a t there i s one und e r l y i n g l e x i c a l item "because" which has both cau s a l and non-causal f e a t u r e s . Two authors have h i n t e d at t h i s approach. Kac advises those who i n t e n d t o pursue a l e x i c a l a n a l y s i s o f because t o concentrate on whether because has both non-causal and caus a l f e a t u r e s . Joseph M a r g o l i s , w r i t i n g from the poi n t of view o f l i n g u i s t i c philosophy, says: I t appears . . . th a t what we c a l l a c t i o n s form a l o g i c a l l y mixed category, w i t h respect t o which explanations o f d i f f e r e n t s o r t s overlap and i n t e r -sect t o some extent: the l o g i c o f j u s t i f i c a t o r y reasons . . . appears t o be s u b s t a n t i a l l y d i f -f erent from the l o g i c of the reasons an agent has i n a c t i n g as he does, and the l o g i c o f the l a t t e r appears t o be s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t from the l o g i c of the c a u s a l explanation o f h i s a c t i o n . The promising key seems, t h e r e f o r e , t o l i e more w i t h the p o i n t s o f contact and d i f f e r e n c e among these a l t e r n a t i v e s than w i t h the prospects o f subsuming one under the other. The word because, then, i s a promising candidate. I t i s c o n t r o v e r s i a l w i t h regard t o reasons and causes, and, i f we attend t o Kac's i n t u i t i o n t hat i t may be caus a l and non-causal i n meaning, we may d i s c o v e r t h a t because i s a l s o the "point of conta c t " between the " l o g i c ^ o f reasons" and the " l o g i c " o f causes" which Margolis d e s c r i b e s . Evidence from naive n a t i v e speakers does not encourage t h i s s p e c u l a t i o n . Whenever I have asked naive informants t o provide a d e f i -n i t i o n o f bec_ause_, they have r e p l i e d , " I t means t o cause something," o r , Joseph. M a r g o l i s , "Explanation by Reasons and by Causes," The  Jo u r n a l o f Philosophy, 67 (1970), p. 195. 53 " i t ' s the cause of something." I f we must accept speaker i n t u i t i o n s as u n q u a l i f i e d data, we must conclude w i t h a c a u s a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . But there are m i t i g a t i n g c o n d i t i o n s which l e a d speakers t o assume, unques-t i o n i n g l y , t h a t because means, i n some sense or o t h e r , t o cause. F i r s t , the word contains "cause" i n i t s form, and at one time i n the h i s t o r y o f E n g l i s h , because meant "by the cause o f " or "by the cause t h a t , " Second, the word cause i s contained i n because, so one i s tempted t o e x p l a i n because i n terms of i t , s i n c e the meaning of cause seems more transparent than the meaning of because. J . L. A u s t i n p o i n t s out t h a t we o f t e n use a simple a c t i o n , l i k e 3 shoving a stone, as a model i n terms of which we e x p l a i n other events. He s t a t e s t h a t "causing" was probably a n o t i o n taken from the experience of performing simple a c t i o n s . And, A u s t i n e x t r a p o l a t e s , s i n c e p r i m i t i v e man probably assumed th a t every event had a cause, e i t h e r he or a s p i r i t must have caused i t . L a t e r on i n h i s t o r y , when events which are not a c t i o n s have been i n c l u d e d i n our conceptual w o r l d , we s t i l l maintain t h a t they are caused. We are bound by an o r i g i n a l explanatory model. A u s t i n says : When, l a t e r , events which are not actions are r e a l i z e d t o be such, we s t i l l say they must be 'caused', and the word snares us: we are s t r u g g l i n g toi ascribe t o i t a new, anthropomor-ph i c meaning, yet c o n s t a n t l y , i n searching f o r i t s a n a l y s i s , we unearth and i n c o r p o r a t e the lineaments of the ancient model. J . L. A u s t i n , P h i l o s o p h i c a l Papers, p. 150. J . L. A u s t i n , P h i l o s o p h i c a l Papers, p. 150. 5H Therefore, we should be aware t h a t speaker i n t u i t i o n s may need m o d i f i -c a t i o n . Let us examine l i n g u i s t s 1 c l a i m s — c o u n t e r - i n t u i t i v e t o those of naive i n f o r m a n t s ' — t h a t because i s non-causal i n sense. Rutherford claims t h a t i n "Jenny i s n ' t here, because I don't see her," the because-clause r e f e r s to the speaker's reason f o r making the statement. This sentence i s unacceptable t o me, and t o many others I have consulted. So l e t us take one which i s uniform l y acceptable, and which he a l s o claims i s a "reason": "He's not coming t o c l a s s , because he j u s t c a l l e d from San Diego."^ Rutherford's a n a l y s i s o f t h i s sentence i s that the because-clause e x p l a i n s the speaker's reason f o r making the statement. This i s not an i n d i s p u t a b l e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n : one could contend t h a t the telephone c a l l caused the speaker t o make the statement. While Rutherford's, adversary, Kac, disagrees over t h e o r e t i c a l terminology, Kac concurs t h a t i n sentences of the form S^ because S^, where because does not r e f e r t o a verb i n , because i s non-causal i n sense.^ Kac sta t e s t h a t there i s a d i f f e r e n c e i n t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s between sentences which have an e x t r a d i s c u r s a r y " I say t o you" superordinate c l a u s e , and one which has an i n t r a d i s c u r s a r y c l a u s e . He says t h a t i n t r a -d i s c u r s a r y clauses cannot be deleted. He supports t h i s contention w i t h the f o l l o w i n g examples. In h i s sentence ( 9 ) , i f the say-clause i s i n t r a -^ Rutherford, "Some Observations Concerning Subordinate Clauses i n E n g l i s h , " p. 97 and p. 10U. ^ Kac, "Clauses o f Saying and the I n t e r p r e t a t i o n 6f because," p. 631 . 55 d i s c u r s a r y , then the t r u t h of the sentence does not depend on the t r u t h of the a s s e r t i o n t h a t J u l i u s Caesar i s i n t h i s room: " I say t o you t h a t J u l i u s Caesar i s i n t h i s room." He s t a t e s , "To the extent t h a t t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s can be assigned at a l l t o a sentence l i k e (9), they would have 7 t o i n d i c a t e t h a t such a sentence i s , i f a c t u a l l y u t t e r e d , vacuously t r u e . " He c o n t r a s t s sentence (9) w i t h sentence (10), which he maintains g i s mt fvacuously t r u e : " J u l i u s Caesar i s i n t h i s room." Pragmatic t r u t h c o n ditions do a f f e c t both sentences. Anyone l i s t e n i n g t o utterances corresponding t o e i t h e r (9) or (10), would be unconvinced unless he could see J u l i u s Caesar or be otherwise convinced of h i s presence. Therefore, there i s nothing vacuous about the c o n d i t i o n s upon which I would judge the t r u t h or f a l s i t y o f (.9) or (10). Furthermore, i t seems as p l a u s i b l e to maintain t h a t the presence of J u l i u s Caesar could cause the speaker t o make the remark, as i t would be t o maintain t h a t the presence of J u l i u s Caesar was the reason f o r the speaker's making the remark. The relevance of the preceding d i s c u s s i o n t o because-clauses i s th a t Kac hopes t o i n d i c a t e t h a t there i s a d i f f e r e n c e i n t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s between the sentences "(2) I say t o you t h a t Jenny i s n ' t here because I don't see her," and, "(3) Jenny i s n ' t here, because I don't see her." I f transformations are meaning-preserving, then the t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s of (2) and (3) must be the same. As I have i n d i c a t e d above, they are the same, Kac, p. 628. Kac, p. 628. Kac, p. 626 and p. 628. 56 p r a g m a t i c a l l y , f o r me. The problem i s not, i t seems, i n being understood, but i s i n e f f o r t s t o i n c o r p o r a t e data from language use i n t o t h e o r e t i c a l d e s c r i p t i o n s o f sentences. And, f o r t h i s t h e s i s , the i s s u e i s whether i t can be argued c o n c l u s i v e l y t h a t a form, because , must be i n t e r -preted as e i t h e r causal or non-causal. Consider J . Davison's set of counterexamples t o the causative hypothesis. He s t a t e s t h a t i n sentences (6a) and ,(6b), the meaning of because cannot be c a u s a l : "(6a) The dog ran away because Mary d i s l i k e d i t . (6b) Mary caused the dog t o run away because she d i s l i k e d i t . " He says, regarding these two sentences, "We expect t h a t Mary has performed some act or actions t h a t have r e s u l t e d i n , but not caused, the dog's running away.""'"^  One could maintain t h a t she d i d do something caused by her d i s -l i k e , but that the d e s c r i p t i o n of t h i s a c t i o n i s d e l e t e d i n the sentence. Perhaps she beat the dog, because she d i s l i k e d i t ; t h u s , d i s l i k e caused the b e a t i n g which caused the dog t o run away. Humourously viewed, i t i s a v a r i a t i o n of The House That Jack B u i l t . When considered s e r i o u s l y , i t i s a problem i n the i n d i v i d u a t i o n o f a c t i o n s . I f we, s u b s t i t u t e a noun w i t h the f e a t u r e C+humanH f o r "dog" i n sentence (6), we do not f e e l t h a t a causal i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s odd: "Mary caused her daughter t o run away because she d i s l i k e d her." The d i f f e r e n c e i n a c c e p t a b i l i t y seems t o be that a daughter could perceive the d i s l i k e i n a way tha t a dog cou l d not. Therefore, no a c t i o n by the mother need occur f o r her d i s l i k e t o cause the daughter t o run away. J . Davison, "Contextual C o n s t r a i n t s on Reason A d v e r b i a l s , " t o appear. 57 The most persuasive case f o r J . Davison's sentences t o he under-stood non-causally occurs i n d i r e c t l y i n F. Bowers' a r t i c l e , "On the Str u c t u r e o f Apparent C a u s a t i v e - A f f e c t i v e s i n E n g l i s h . "~L1 Bowers argues 12 t h a t "a.cause does not f i n d expression i n a p r e p o s i t i o n a l o b j e c t . " He maintains t h a t simple a f f e c t i v e c o n s t r u c t i o n s which cont a i n mental s t a t e semantic forms., i n c l u d i n g those ending i n -ed, such as averse t o , i n t o l e r a n t  o f , a f r a i d o f , angry a t , astonished a t , concerned w i t h , and d e l i g h t e d a t , are not verbs i n passive form. Rather, they are r e l a t i v e a d j e c t i v e s r e -q u i r i n g a p r e p o s i t i o n a l object which represents the semantic object o f the f e e l i n g , and not the cause. I f we a l s o considered d i s l i k e o f as a r e l a t i v e a d j e c t i v e , then we would have t o say t h a t i n J . Davison's sentence ( 6 a ) , the dog was the semantic object of Mary's d i s l i k e . This need not preclude our contending, however, t h a t Mary was, from the po i n t of view of the dog, the cause of i t s running away. Bowers c i t e s other examples of sentences c o n t a i n i n g because i n c o n s t r u c t i o n w i t h a simple a f f e c t i v e verb. He claims t h a t these sentences are not c a u s a l . He says t h a t the sentence, "John was angry because B i l l b u r s t i n without knocking," i s non-causal, f o r i t a c t u a l l y means, "John was angry at B i l l ' s b u r s t i n g i n without knocking." And, 13 Bowers maintains, causes are not expressed by p r e p o s i t i o n a l o b j e c t s . F. Bowers, "On the S t r u c t u r e o f Apparent C a u s a t i v e - A f f e c t i v e s i n E n g l i s h , " Progress Report, mimeo. (Vancouver: Univ. of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1971), pp. 1-28. 12 F. Bowers, p. 17. F. Bowers, p. 17• 58 But i t could be argued that another object has been deleted. The sentence could be paraphrased, "John was angry at B i l l because B i l l burst i n without knocking." Or, a les s awkward sentence would be, "John was angry at B i l l because he burst i n without knocking." Whereas B i l l may have been the object of John's anger, B i l l did something to deserve i t ; namely, burst i n without knocking. One could argue, then, that B i l l ' s b u r s t i n g i n caused John to be angry at B i l l . A second non-causal example which Bowers c i t e s i s : "He was i r r i t a t e d because he was hungry." Bowers maintains that t h i s sentence does not mean, "He was i r r i t a t e d at being hungry.""^ I would agree, but counter once again that another object has been deleted; thus, "He was angry at something because he was hungry." Therefore, hunger caused him to be angry at something. A reasonable conclusion to the question whether because, i n sentences of the form, because S^, need be e i t h e r causal or non-causal, i s that one can argue cogently f o r both i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s only i f neither nor contains the l e x i c a l items "cause" or "reason." I conclude that i n t h i s sentence" form, because has the semantic feature C+cause3. However, one cannot maintain t h i s conclusion unequivocally f o r because i n sentences having a predicate nominal form. For instance, when because occurs i n the predicate of sentences whose subject i s represented by the noun reason, the meaning of because seems to be determined by the noun. Examine, once again, sentence (l8) from Chapter I I : "The reason why I am going i s F. Bowers, p. 18. 59 because I am t i r e d . " Or, J . Davison's sentence (34c), "The reason he l e f t vas because we t o l d him to go." and, Otto Jespersen's sentence, "The r e a l reason why I am out of p l a c e here i s because I l i k e men.""'"'' In a l l of these sentences which c o n t a i n a p r e d i c a t e nominal form, "reason . . . because," the word because does not seem t o be cau s a l i n meaning. I propose t h a t i t f u n c t i o n s as a pro-form t o the noun, and a s s i m i l a t e s i n sense t o i t . In t h i s environment because has the fe a t u r e C-causeH. I present my evidence here. Consider the f o l l o w i n g p o s s i b l e c o l l o c a t i o n s o f because and reason: (a) The reason t h a t . . . i s because . . . (b) The reason why . . . i s because . . . (c) The reason why . . . i s t h a t . . . (d) The reason i s because . . . (e) The reason i s because . . . and because . . . ( f ) The reason i s t h a t . . . (g) The reason why . . . i s because . . . and t h a t . . (h) The reason t h a t . . . is- . . . ( i ) The reason why . . . was not that . . . but because ( J ) The reason . . . i s why . . . Three sequences are unacceptable: (k) *The reason because . . . (1) *The reason i s why . . . (m) *The reason i s t h a t . . . and why . . . J . Davison, to appear; Otto Jespersen, Modern E n g l i s h Grammar, V, 391. 6o The f i r s t evidence which supports my proposal t h a t because i s a pro-form i s t h a t i n a l l instances where reason occurs w i t h because, one can e i t h e r s u b s t i t u t e t h a t f o r because a f t e r the verb, or a l t e r n a t e t h a t w i t h because i n a compound p r e d i c a t e . Moreover, there appears t o be no l o s s of sense. One might object t h a t the reason why t h a t can s u b s t i t u t e f o r because, i s t h a t t h a t a l s o has the feature C+reasonH. This argument holds only f o r sentences where reason i s followed by an embedded r e l a t i v e c l a u s e , and because or t h a t occurs i n the p r e d i c a t e . For example i n sentences (27)-(30), both because and t h a t may occur i n the same p o s i t i o n , o r , i n sentences (27')-(30T), both may be deleted: (27) The reason why I am going i s ] ^ * 1 8 ^ I am t i r e d . ID ecause _) (27') The reason why I am going i s I am t i r e d . t h a t because we were broke. (28) The reason why we returned was (28') The reason why we returned was we were broke. C t h a t 7 (29) The reason he l e f t was \. > we t o l d him t o go, ^because J (29') The reason he l e f t was we t o l d him t o go. (30) The r e a l reason why I am out of place here i s f I DSC St US 6 J ( t h a t ;ason wny 1 am out or p±ace nere ~~ I l i k e men. (30') The r e a l reason why I am out of p l a c e here i s I l i k e men. I conclude t h a t i n sentences (27)-(30), because and t h a t are s e m a n t i c a l l y r e d u n d a n t — n e i t h e r represents features other than those already r e -presented by the noun reason, s i n c e both because and t h a t can be del e t e d . N o t i c e , t o the c o n t r a r y , t h a t i n sentences of the form because —where because occurs without the noun "reason"—-because cannot be de l e t e d , nor can t h a t be s u b s t i t u t e d : 61 (31) I am going because I am t i r e d . (32) * I , :.am going I am t i r e d . (33) * I an going t h a t I am t i r e d . To r e t a i n sense, because must occur i n sentence ( 3 l ) , s i n c e no other word appears i n the sentence which represents the semantic content o f because. That, u n l i k e because, r e q u i r e s a r e f e r e n t i a l noun i n a l l en-vironments . A d d i t i o n a l evidence supporting my c l a i m that because i s a pro-form of "reason" i s t h a t because cannot immediately f o l l o w reason. The explanation I o f f e r f o r the u n a c c e p t a b i l i t y of the sequence " reason because" a l s o e x p l a i n s the u n a c c e p t a b i l i t y of sequences such as, " KThe man he . . .," and "*The g i r l she . . .." • That i s , we do not repeat i n immediate suc c e s s i o n , words which c o n t a i n the same e s s e n t i a l semantic l 6 3£ i n f o r m a t i o n . In the sequence " man he," the features C+human, -finale3 are expressed i n i t i a l l y by "man." S i m i l a r l y , i n " K g i r l she," the features C+human, +femaleD are features of " g i r l . " And, i n "^reason because," the noun "reason" represents C+reason3 ; hence, "^reason because" i s s e m a n t i c a l l y redundant and unacceptable. However, i t should be noted t h a t the sequence "reason t h a t " i s acceptable because t h a t may a s s i m i l a t e i n sense t o any noun. Moreover, as sentence (33) i l l u s t r a t e s , t h a t must have a noun t o govern i t s sense. One can immediately repeat the same word f o r purposes of i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n , as i n the sequences "very, very hot" or "red, red rose." One may not say "very- hot, hot" or "red rose, rose." Nor can a.verb pro-form immediately f o l l o w i t s antecedent: "John ran down the h i l l and Mary d i d , t o o " i s acceptable. But " John ran down the h i l l d i d and Mary, t o o " i s unacceptable. 62 But since because assimilates only to "reason" or (as I s h a l l argue below), to "cause," because may not occur i n a position immediately following either of these l e x i c a l items without unacceptable semantic redundancy. Furthermore, since because assimilates only to these l e x i c a l items, because can occur i n sentences without either "reason" or "cause." F i n a l evidence that because i s a pro-form for "reason" i s that because-clauses cannot precede the noun "reason" i n d i s c o u r s e - i n i t i a l sentences. This prohibition i s compatible with Susumu Kuno's condition on backward pronominalization. He states that backward pronominalization 17 i s possible only when the right of two noun phrases i s old information. I f because i s anaphoric i n the following sentences, then we may predict t h e i r unacceptability: (3*0 ^Because I was hungry i s the reason that I got up. (.35) Because he was hurt i s the reason John stayed out of the game. (36) because i t rained forty days i s the reason the r i v e r flooded. A reversed order of the clauses produces acceptable sentences: (3V) The reason that I got up i s because I was hungry. (35') The reason John stayed out of the game i s because he was hurt. C36') The reason that the r i v e r flooded i s because i t rained f o r t y days. Susumu Kuno, "Functional Sentence Perspective," L i n g u i s t i c  Inquiry, 3 ( 1 9 7 2 ) , ' 302. 63 And, as f u r t h e r c o n f i r m a t i o n , consider the f o l l o w i n g unacceptable sentences where because i s preposed and embedded i n a c l e f t form: (37) S I t was because I was i l l was the reason t h a t I stayed home. (38) K I t was because i t r a i n e d f o r t y days i s the reason the r i v e r flooded. I t i s impossible t o provide acceptable sentences f o r (37) and (38) by r e v e r s i n g the order of the cl a u s e s . Preposing must be a c o n d i t i o n on c l e f t i n g i n sentences i n which reason and because co-occur. l8 This c o n d i t i o n does not apply t o sentences o f the because form. I conclude t h a t because i s a pro-form f o r reason i n the p r e v i o u s l y 19 described environments. I base t h i s c o n c l u s i o n on the f o l l o w i n g summarized data. In any sentence of p r e d i c a t e nominal form where reason and because co-occur, t h a t can s u b s t i t u t e f o r because, and because may not immediately f o l l o w reason. In any sentence where a r e l a t i v e clause immediately f o l l o w s reason, and because occurs i n the p r e d i c a t e , because can be dele t e d . F i n a l l y , because-clauses adhere t o backward p r o n o m i n a l i -z a t i o n r u l e s : because-clauses cannot precede main clauses which cont a i n reason", i f the sentence i s d i s c o u r s e - i n i t i a l . Now I w i l l show t h a t when because occurs i n sentences o f p r e d i c a t e nominal form where the subject i s represented by the noun cause, because l8 Thus, i n r e p l y t o the qu e s t i o n , "What reason i s given f o r the flood?", one may r e p l y acceptable e i t h e r with., " i t ' s because i t r a i n e d t h a t the r i v e r f l o o d e d , " o r , w i t h , " i t ' s t h a t the r i v e r flooded because i t r a i n e d . " 1 9 See pp5"<?. 6k functions- as a pro-form to the noun. In t h i s environment, because has the feature C+causeH. Notice t h a t the f o l l o w i n g c o l l o c a t i o n s o f cause and because are p o s s i b l e : (a) The cause o f . . . is- because . • • (b) The cause o f . . . is- t hat . . . (c) The cause of . . . i s t h a t . . , .- and because (d> The cause of . . . i s because . . . and t h a t (e) The cause . . . i s not t h a t . . . but because ( f ) The cause . . . i s not because . . . . but th a t Lences are unacceptable: (g) *The cause because (h) *The cause o f . . . because My ex p l a n a t i o n of the unacceptable sequence o f " reason because" a l s o a p p l i e s here t o unacceptable c o l l o c a t i o n K ( g ) . That i s , i n sentences which c o n t a i n cause and because, r u l e s of E n g l i s h do not al l o w immediate sequences o f words c o n t a i n i n g redundant semantic i n f o r m a t i o n . In the foregoing forms, (a) - ( f ) , there i s a l s o a phonic explanation why the f a r t h e r apart because i s from cause, the more n a t u r a l the sentence sounds. Notice t h a t sequences (c) and (e) sound more acceptable than sequences (d) and ( f ) . The explanation seems to be t h a t speakers avoid phonic redundancy unless assonance i s d e s i r e d f o r s p e c i a l s t y l i s t i c purposes. Jus t as t h a t can s u b s t i t u t e f o r because i n reason . . . because c o n s t r u c t i o n s , t h a t can s u b s t i t u t e f o r because i n cause . . . because c o n s t r u c t i o n s : (.39) The cause o f the f i r e was because I was c a r e l e s s . 65 (39') The cause of the f i r e was tha t I was c a r e l e s s . (1+0) The cause o f the f l o o d was because i t thawed r a p i d l y , and because the dikes were weak. (1+0') The cause of the f l o o d was tha t i t thawed r a p i d l y , and that the dikes were weak. (4l) The cause of my being l a t e i s not because I s l e p t i n , but because my car f a i l e d t o s t a r t . .(1+1') The cause o f my being l a t e i s not t h a t I s l e p t in,, but t h a t my car f a i l e d t o s t a r t . And, p a r a l l e l to reason . . . because c o n s t r u c t i o n s , because can be del e t e d i n cause . . . because c o n s t r u c t i o n s without l o s s of sense. (39") The cause of the f i r e was I was c a r e l e s s . (1+0") The cause of the f l o o d was i t thawed r a p i d l y and the dikes were weak. (Ul") The cause of my being l a t e i s not my s l e e p i n g i n but my car f a i l i n g t o s t a r t . I conclude that s u b s t i t u t i o n of t h a t f o r because i n sentences (39)-(4l") would be impossible i f because were not a pro-form f o r cause. In a d d i t i o n , i n sentences (39")-(4l"), because can be deleted s i n c e i t s feature C+causeH i s a l s o a property o f the noun cause. As Because . . . reason sequences are unacceptable, so Because . .  cause sequences are unacceptable. I n the f o l l o w i n g sentences which are discourse i n i t i a l , the p r o h i b i t i o n on preposing because i s p r e d i c t a b l e from Kuno's c o n s t r a i n t on backwards p r o n o m i n a l i z a t i o n : (1+2) ^Because I was- c a r e l e s s was the cause of the f i r e . 66 (fc3) 'Because i t thawed r a p i d l y and because the dikes were weak was the cause of the f l o o d . (MO ^Not because I s l e p t i n but because my car f a i l e d t o s t a r t i s the cause of my being l a t e . S i m i l a r l y , c e l f t forms are unacceptable: (1+2') I t was because I was c a r e l e s s was the cause of the f i r e . (1+3') * I t was because i t thawed r a p i d l y and because the dikes were weak was the cause of the f l o o d . (1+1+') * I t was not because I s l e p t i n but because my car f a i l e d t o s t a r t i s the cause of my b e i n g l a t e . I conclude t h a t i n sentences where the noun cause c o l l o c a t e s w i t h because, because i s a pro-form of cause. In these sentences, the feature C-causeH i s suspended, and the feature C+causeH a s s i m i l a t e s t o the noun. Because a l s o occurs i n sentences w i t h the verb cause. And, although none of the evidence which e s t a b l i s h e s my case f o r a cau s a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f because i n nominal cause . . . because sentences holds f o r v e r b a l cause . . . because sentences, I w i l l , n e v e r t h e l e s s , demon-s t r a t e t h a t because a l s o a s s i m i l a t e s i n sense t o v e r b a l cause. I w i l l begin w i t h negative evidence. F i r s t , a because-clause can e i t h e r precede or f o l l o w a verb: (1+5) Because I was c a r e l e s s , I caused the f i r e . (1+5') I caused the f i r e because I was c a r e l e s s . (1+6) Because he was being hounded by debt c o l l e c t o r s , h i s d e s i r e f o r the money caused him t o y i e l d t o t h e i r demands. 67 ( 4 6 ' ) His de s i r e f o r the money caused him t o y i e l d t o t h e i r demands because he was being hounded by debt c o l l e c t o r s . ( 4 7 ) Because I hate l i v i n g i n the r a i n , the ni c e weather i s one of the things which caused me t o come here. ( 4 7 ' ) The ni c e weather i s one of the things which caused me t o come here, because I hate l i v i n g i n the r a i n . We cannot conclude, then, as we d i d w i t h nominal cause . . . because c o l l o c a t i o n s , t h a t v e r b a l cause . . . because c o n s t r u c t i o n s are anaphoric i n the sense o f a pro-form. Second, i t i s impossible t o delete because from the foregoing sentences and r e t a i n sense: ( 4 - 5 " ) K I was c a r e l e s s , I caused the f i r e . ( 4 - 5 " ' ) K I s t a r t e d the f i r e I was c a r e l e s s . ( 4 6 " ) *He was being hounded by debt c o l l e c t o r s , h i s d e s i r e f o r the money caused him t o y i e l d t o t h e i r demands. ( 4 6 " ' ) *His d e s i r e f o r the money caused him t o y i e l d t o t h e i r demands he was being hounded by debt c o l l e c t o r s . ( 4 7 " ) K I hate l i v i n g i n the r a i n , the ni c e weather i s one of the things which, caused me t o come here. ( 4 7 " * ) *The n i c e weather i s one of the things which caused me t o come here I hate l i v i n g i n the r a i n . F i n a l l y , i t i s a l s o impossible t o s u b s t i t u t e t h a t f o r because i n sentences ( 4 5 ) - ( 4 7 ) . Despite these negative c o n c l u s i o n s , I contend t h a t 68 because a s s i m i l a t e s i n sense t o the verb cause on the grounds t h a t i t i s p o s s i b l e t o de l e t e because when the because-clause i s i n t e r p r e t e d as a r e s t r i c t i v e a p p o s i t i v e . There i s t r a d i t i o n a l precedent f o r t h i s p o s i t i o n . Jespersen st a t e s that p a r t i c l e s — h e c l a s s i f i e s because as a p a r t i c l e — a r e o f t e n placed i n a p p o s i t i o n t o a primary. The a p p o s i t i v e may e i t h e r precede or f o l l o w the primary. In these sentences, he says, any form of be_ denotes 20 "cause or reason." I amend t h i s d e f i n i t i o n t o s t a t e t h a t i n cases where be_ i s i n a p p o s i t i o n t o a sentence which i n c l u d e s v e r b a l cause, the a p p o s i t i v e i s caus a l i n meaning. I present the f o l l o w i n g sentences as evidence f o r t h i s amendation. Consider the f o l l o w i n g set of sentences i n which because i s i n c l u d e d i n the (a) examples, but i s repla c e d by a p a r t i c i p i a l form of be_ i n the (b) examples. (48a) Because I was c a r e l e s s , I caused the f i r e . (48b) Being c a r e l e s s , I caused the f i r e . (49a) Because he was being hounded by debt c o l l e c t o r s , h i s d e s i r e f o r the money caused him t o y i e l d t o t h e i r demands. (49b) Being hounded by debt c o l l e c t o r s , h i s d e s i r e f o r the money caused him t o y i e l d t o t h e i r demands. (,50a) Because I hate l i v i n g i n the r a i n , the n i c e weather i s one of the things which caused me t o come here. 0. Jespersen, E s s e n t i a l s , p. 94. 69 (50b) Hating (as I do) t o l i v e i n the r a i n , the nice weather i s one of the things which caused me t o come here. I maintain t h a t i t would be impossible t o delete because i n these sentences and r e t a i n sense i f because added semantic i n f o r m a t i o n t o the sentence. One might counter t h a t these sentences are p a r t i c u l a r l y easy t o paraphrase w i t h a d j e c t i v a l a p p o s i t i v e c o n s t r u c t i o n s , s i n c e the subject noun i n both clauses i s i d e n t i c a l i n refe r e n c e . In sentences (51a)-(52b), the subject nouns of the two clauses are not c o - r e f e r e n t i a l , yet an a p p o s i t i v e a n a l y s i s w i t h have as p a r t i c i p l e h olds: (51a) The match caused the f i r e i n the compartment because the oxygen hadn't been turned o f f . (51b) The match caused the f i r e i n the compartment, the oxygen not having been turned o f f . (52a) The crowd caused another disturbance because the Beatles played so loud. (52b) The crowd caused another d i s t u r b a n c e , the Beatles having played so l o u d . Therefore, because can be de l e t e d i n sentences which cont a i n v e r b a l cause. In c o n c l u s i o n , I propose the f o l l o w i n g l e x i c a l a n a l y s i s of because. In the sentence form, because S^, where n e i t h e r nor contains the l e x i c a l items "reason" or "cause," because has the feat u r e C+causeH. Because has two co n d i t i o n e d v a r i a n t s . When because occurs i n a sentence o f p r e d i c a t e nominal form whose subject i s represented by the 70 noun "reason," the feature Ctcausel i s suspended, and because has the feature C-causeH. When because occurs i n a sentence o f p r e d i c a t e nominal form whose subject i s represented by the noun "cause," the feature C-causeH i s suspended, and because has the feature C+causeH. In these p r e d i c a t e nominal sentence forms, because i s a pro-form of the nouns "reason" and "cause." When because occurs i n a sentence w i t h v e r b a l cause, the feature C-causeD i s suspended, and C+causeH a s s i m i l a t e s t o the verb. Therefore, r e t u r n i n g t o Margoli s '"'suggestions and Kac's i n t u i t i o n , because i s both a p o i n t of contact and a d i f f e r e n c e between the l o g i c of reasons and the l o g i c of causes. 71 SUMMARY In Chapter I , I describe previous l i n g u i s t i c research on because and because-clauses. Data from these i n v e s t i g a t i o n s a s s o c i a t e s because w i t h p o s i t i o n s o f prominence i n a sentence. In Chapter I I , I i n v e s t i g a t e t h i s prominence by applying c r i t e r i a of the term "focus" to because. The d e f i n i t i o n of "focus"" synthesised from previous d e f i n i t i o n s , i n c l u d e s l i n g u i s t i c r u l e s of s t r e s s , negation, q u e s t i o n , and embedding. In Chapter I I I , I propose t h a t because may have semantic features common t o reason- and ca u s a l - e x p l a n a t i o n s . I c l a i m t h a t S^ because S^ i s the u n d e r l y i n g form of because, and that i n t h i s form, because has the semantic property C±causeH. I describe two c o n d i t i o n e d v a r i a n t s o f because o c c u r r i n g i n sentences e i t h e r w i t h the noun reason or w i t h the noun or verb cause. In the former environment, the feature OcauseH i s suspended and because a s s i m i l a t e s i n sense t o reason. S i m i l a r l y , i n the l a t t e r environment, the feature C-causel i s suspended and because a s s i m i l a t e s i n sense to the noun or verb cause. 72 L i t e r a t u r e C i t e d Anderson, Stephen R. "On the L i n g u i s t i c Status of the Performative-Constative D i s t i n c t i o n . " Indiana Univ. Club Mimeograph, October, 1971, pp. 1-28. A u s t i n , J . L. P h i l o s o p h i c a l Papers. Oxford: Clarendon P r e s s , 196l. How t o Do Things With Words. New York: Oxford Univ. P r e s s , 1962. Bowers, F. "On the St r u c t u r e of Apparent C a u s a t i v e - A f f e c t i v e s i n E n g l i s h . " Progress Report Mimeograph, Vancouver: Univ. of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1971. Chafe, Wallace L.. Meaning and the St r u c t u r e of Language. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press1970. Chomsky, Noam. "Deep S t r u c t u r e , Surface S t r u c t u r e , and Semantic I n t e r p r e t a t i o n . " Semantics: An I n t e r d i s c i p l i n a r y Reader  i n Philosophy, L i n g u i s t i c s and Psychology.. Ed. Danny D. Steinberg and Leon A. Ja k o b o v i t s . Cambridge: Univ. P r e s s , 1971, pp. 183-216. Danes,. F r a n t i s e k . "Sentence I n t o n a t i o n from a F u n c t i o n a l P o i n t of View." Word, 16 (i960), 34-54. Davison, A l i c e . "Causal Adverbs and Performative Verbs.". Papers  from the S i x t h Regional Meeting o f the Chicago L i n g u i s t i c  S o c i e t y , A p r i l , 19J0, pp. 190-201. Davison, Jack. "Contextual C o n s t r a i n t s on Reason A d v e r b i a l s . " L i n g u i s t i c s , (1973). To Appear. F r a s e r , Bruce. "An Examination o f the Performative A n a l y s i s . " Indiana Univ. Club Mimeograph, October, 1971, pp. 1-30. Garner, Richard. " ' P r e s u p p o s i t i o n ' i n Philosophy and L i n g u i s t i c s . " Studies i n L i n g u i s t i c .Semantics. Ed. Charles J . F i l l m o r e and D. Terence Langendoen. New York: H o l t , Rinehart and Winston, 1971, pp. 23-42. Greenbaun, Sidney. Studies i n E n g l i s h A d v e r b i a l Usage. London: Longmans, Green and Co., L t d , 1969. H a l l i d a y , M. A. K. "Notes on T r a n s i t i v i t y and Theme." J . L i n g u i s t i c s 3 (1967), 177-244. 73 Jespersen, Otto. A Modern E n g l i s h Grammar On H i s t o r i c a l P r i n c i p l e s , V o l . V. Copenhagen: Ejnar Munksgaard, 1940. . E s s e n t i a l s o f E n g l i s h Grammar. U n i v e r s i t y : Univ. of Alabama, 1964. Jones, D a n i e l . An Qu t l i n e o f E n g l i s h P h o n e t i c s , 9th ed., Cambridge: W. Heff e r & Sons, L t d . , 1964. Kac, M i c h a e l . "Clauses of Saying and the I n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Because." Language, 48 (1972), 626-632. K i p a r s k y , Paul and C a r o l K i p a r s k y . "Fact." 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Massachusetts: Ginn and Co., pp. 222-272. R u t h e r f o r d , W i l l i a m E. "Some Observations Concerning Subordinate Clauses i n E n g l i s h . " Language U6 (1970), 91-115. Trubetskoy, N. S. P r i n c i p l e s o f Phonology. Trans. C h r i s t i a n e A. M. Baltaxe. Berkeley: Univ. o f C a l i f o r n i a P r e s s , 1969. 

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