A SEMANTIC ANALYSIS OF BECAUSE

by

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ABSTRACT

Introduction

This semantic analysis of because contains a general study of its potential as the focus of a sentence, and a specific study of its causative and non-causative meaning. In Chapter I, I discuss previous linguistic research on because and because-clauses. One conclusion that seems clear from the data is that because can be the central point of attention in a sentence. I investigate this prominence in Chapter II. I begin by redefining the term "focus," synthesising criteria from other definitions. The redefinition denotes phonological and syntactic rules which speakers apply to emphasize certain parts of a sentence. Then I demonstrate that these rules apply to because, thereby establishing that because can be focussed.

In Chapter III, I turn to a more restricted problem. I investigate the semantic features of because which are common to reason- and causal-explanations. I propose that, in its underlying form, because has the feature [+cause]. Sentences in which because appears with the features [+cause] do not contain the lexical items "cause" or "reason." I also describe two conditioned variants of because. One, having the feature [+cause], occurs with the noun or verb cause. The other, having the feature [-cause], occurs with the noun reason.

The results of this study confirm evidence accumulating from other linguistic investigations that grammatical words are semantically full, and that they can be described by theoretical terminology appropriate to non-grammatical words. A number of recent publications have appeared
on the semantic description of complementation structures, coordinating conjunctions, and determiners. There is comparatively little recent publication on subordinating conjunctions. Even less information is available on lexical items which have been classified both as subordinating conjunctions and as reason adverbials.

Within this classification, the word *because* is an especially important member. From the point of view of linguistics, it is significant as one of the few subordinatores which can occur as a one-word utterance. I investigate the implications of this status under the theoretical term "focus." Furthermore, although no one has claimed that *because* is semantically empty, no one has agreed upon its precise meaning, nor has anyone studied the word in depth.

*Because* is also significant from the point of view of linguistic philosophy. The problem of defining reason- and causal-explanations has a long scholarly history. The results of this investigation demonstrate that *because* is a crucial word for this problem. I show that when *because* occurs in a sentence either with the lexical items "reason" or "cause," *because* assimilates in sense to these items. Thus, in these environments, the sense of *because* is conditioned. But when *because* occurs in sentences which do not contain those lexical items, *because* can be synonymously paraphrased either by "reason" or by "cause." Therefore, *because* is a word whose meaning is common both to reason- and causal-explanations.
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In this chapter, I will discuss previous linguistic scholarship on the word *because* and on *because*-clauses. Since the purpose of an investigation inevitably affects the questions which arise, I will distinguish between authors whose aim is studying modern English as a natural language, and those whose interest is developing a theoretical language. The first investigators define *because* within English as a linguistic system; linguistic theoreticians, trying to formulate a theoretical language, use *because* as an empirical test of a particular theoretical model.

This discussion centers around four questions. First, can *because* belong to two functional classes, that of adverb and of conjunction? Second, can some *because*-clauses occur as the subject of a sentence, while others modify predicates? Third, can one explain how *because*-clauses are different from other reason adverbials in imperative sentences, in some declarative sentences, and in sentences containing questions and negations? Fourth, can one determine whether *because*-clauses denote the notions cause or reason? Questions one, two, and three are essentially problems in syntax; question four is a semantic issue.

Discussions of question one, two, and four occur in the works of Otto Jespersen, whose grammars describe English as a natural
Jespersen formulates question one as a problem in functional classification. Although he describes two classificational systems, the definition of because and because-clauses within each system is inconclusive. In his categorical system, the analytical unit is the word, and the selectional criterion for each class is semantic. But the classificational criteria for because are syntactic. Moreover, it is not clear into which sub-class Jespersen places because.

In *A Modern English Grammar* and *Essentials of English Grammar*, because is a member of a class named particle. This class contains the sub-classes adverb, preposition, coordinating and subordinating conjunction. In *A Modern English Grammar*, Jespersen classifies because as a member of the sub-class adverb since it has a clause as its object. On the other hand, in *Essentials of English Grammar*, he classifies because as a subordinating conjunction since its function is to connect a clause with a main sentence. Elsewhere, Jespersen states that adverbs can be classified as prepositions or as conjunctions according to their syntactic function. When an adverb governs a noun, it is classified as a preposition. But when an adverb governs a clause, it is classified as a conjunction.

Jespersen formulates the second question, whether because-clauses

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2 Jespersen, M. E. G., V, 15.

3 Jespersen, Essentials, p. 69.

4 Jespersen, M. E. G., V, 2.
can be subjects of sentences as well as being clauses which modify 
predicates, as a problem in rank assignment. His second classificational 
system, the system of ranks, is logically distinct from the categorical 
classification of individual words. Consequently, a word's categorical 
and its rank assignment do not correspond one to one. The analytical unit 
for the ranking system is not only the word, but also is groups of words. 
Rank, then, is determined by words in combination. In this system, 
because-clauses are described as tertiaries and as primaries. In 
Essentials of English Grammar and in A Modern English Grammar, Jespersen 
classifies because-clauses as tertiaries.\(^5\) Lengthy sets of illustrative 
examples support this classification. None of these sentences contain 
the words reason or cause, and none is predicate nominal in form.

In a discussion of the nature of subordination, however, Jespersen 
states that because-clauses may also function as primaries: "What is 
really a clause tertiary with because is made practically a clause primary 
(nearly = 'the fact that') as the subject or predicate of the sentence."\(^6\) 
A sentence supporting this statement is, "The real reason why I am out of 
place here is because I like men." The difference between this sentence, 
in which because ranks as a clause primary, and those sentences in which 
because ranks as clause tertiary, is the predicate nominal structure 
(reason . . . is . . . because . . .) of the quoted example.

For Jespersen, question four is a problem in assigning a class

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\(^5\) Jespersen, Essentials, p. 370; M. E. G., V, 344.

\(^6\) Jespersen, M. E. G., V, 391.
name to because. The significance of a class name is that it includes the semantic meanings of its particle members. There is a discrepancy between texts. In Essentials of English Grammar, "Cause" is the name of the clausal tertiary class to which because belongs. But in A Modern English Grammar, the class name is "Cause, Reason and Motive." Referring to members of the latter class, Jespersen remarks that each particle member expresses "a relationship between two statements in which one statement is closely dependent on the other as showing its necessary cause or the necessary motive for it."7 Moreover, Jespersen unequivocally accepts the view that because belongs to this semantic classification—he does not even cite a supportive example. He merely lists because, adds a colon, and leaves blank the place where an illustrative sentence should occur.8 Though he cites sentences for all particle members other than because, he does not specify the particles that denote each of the notions cause, reason, or motive. And even though Jespersen subcategorizes the particles which belong to "Cause, Reason, Motive" into coordinators and subordinators according to semantic criteria, because is ambiguously assigned.

The difference between these subcategories is one of the degree of semantic dependence between the tertiary clause and the main sentence. Jespersen remarks that when the causal tertiary occurs after the main statement, the statement of cause "tends to be less intimately connected

7 Jespersen, M. E. G., V, 387.
8 Jespersen, M. E. G., V, 390.
with the main fact and thus to be coordinated rather than subordinated.\textsuperscript{9}

He classifies therefore, so, and for as coordinators; that, as, since, for, and because as subordinators. But in the case of for, the degree of semantic dependence must be constant, since \textit{for} can occur only after a main sentence. \textit{For}, then, should belong to the sub-class subordinator. And \textit{because}, which occurs either before or after a main sentence, must be cross-classified. Therefore, subcategorization based upon semantic criteria does not establish a meaning for \textit{because}.

There is evidence, however, for a causal and non-causal interpretation of \textit{because}. A sentence containing \textit{because} appears in an explanation of cause and effect. Furthermore, earlier in the text, Jespersen states that cause is not indicated in the sentence, "I'm not saying that I ever liked Odell very much, because I don't."\textsuperscript{10} In another section, he says: "a preposition + regimen is at the base of \textit{because} and that is 'by reason'."\textsuperscript{11} The alternatives seeming most likely to Jespersen, then, are causal and non-causal. In non-causal environments, the notion of reason may be expressed.

To conclude, Jespersen's grammars describe \textit{because} as adverb and conjunction. Some \textit{because}-clauses function as tertiaries; others as primaries. Those which are primaries can occur in a predicate nominal form with the noun \textit{reason}. There is evidence for a causal and non-causal

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{9} Jespersen, M. E. G., V, 394.
\item \textsuperscript{10} Jespersen, M. E. G., V, 391.
\item \textsuperscript{11} Jespersen, M. E. G., V, 393.
\end{itemize}
interpretation of because, but no criteria exist for determining when each of these possible alternatives apply.

Although Alice Davison is also primarily concerned with the description of English as a natural language, her study is restricted to causal adverbs.\textsuperscript{12} She describes since, as, because, if, and so as members of this class. With the exception of if, each of these members is included in Jespersen's classification. Although she does not provide a definition for the class, she assumes that there is some definition of cause which will apply to the members. Presumably, the definition must be semantically determined and very general.

Alice Davison examines question three. Comparing the behaviour of because with other causal adverbials, she observes that because behaves in a manner consistently different from that of other causal adverbials in sentences which have a particularly defined illocutionary force.\textsuperscript{13} She makes three observations. First, she mistakenly suggests that although since, so, and as often substitute for because, because-clauses are ungrammatical if a main clause is a question, request or command. They are also ungrammatical if the main clause contains an overt performative verb or a declarative verb.\textsuperscript{14} She concludes that the semantic representation of

\textsuperscript{12} Alice Davison, "Causal Adverbs and Performative Verbs," Papers From the Sixth Regional Meeting of the Chicago Linguistic Society (April, 1970), pp. 190-201.

\textsuperscript{13} A. Davison, p. 191.

\textsuperscript{14} A. Davison, p. 191. An illocutionary force marker is an abstract verb with a first person subject and a second person object. A verb used performatively is one occurring in a speech act which is also an act of doing. The speech act is both the statement and performance of an action. For further discussion of performative verbs, see footnote 29 below.
because must be marked so that it cannot occur in a sentence which contains a verb used performatively.\textsuperscript{15}

Her second observation is that, whereas because-clauses can be topicalized, negated and asserted, since- and if-clauses cannot. Since I will discuss the relationship between because and the terms "topicalization," "negation," and "assertion" at some length in Chapter II, I mention them only briefly here to acknowledge and give coherence to her investigation. She also observes a difference in "range of meaning" between because-clauses and other causal adverbial clauses. She does not define "range of meaning," but she may intend the term in two possible senses. The first may include the term "factive" as it applies to because-clauses. She uses "factive" in the following way:

An item is inserted into a frame of the type "counterfactual conditional." If an acceptable sentence results from the substitution, its complement is asserted to be true, and is called non-factive. If substitution is unacceptable, the complement is presupposed, and is called factive. Because-clauses substitute unacceptably; therefore, according to this test, the because-clauses are presupposed; hence, factive.\textsuperscript{16} Her sentence (28a) will illustrate this conclusion and my next point.

One problem with her application of this test is that the term

\textsuperscript{15} I qualify this conclusion in Chapter II, pp. 39-44.

\textsuperscript{16} Her exposition of this point is difficult to follow. I will quote it here, in case I have misunderstood her. "Morgan's test for presupposed truth is the combination of counterfactual subjunctive with the item in question, the result being both contradictory and ungrammatical if the item requires its complement to be presupposed to be true." A. Davison, p. 193.
"complement" is undefined. Consider her sentence frame (28a)

Because he's here, I can/could see him.  

* he were here,  
* he had been here,  
* had he been here,  

We might arrive at a definition of "complement" by process of elimination. The term "complement" must refer to the first clause, since she says that second clauses need not be factive. Therefore, "complement" must refer either to all the items of the first clause, excluding because, or to some of those items. If we accept the first alternative, then "he's here" is the complement and is presupposed. We must reject this alternative since it is possible to negate the element "here." By her definition, a presupposition is constant under negation.

Considering the second alternative, "complement" must refer either to the pronoun "he," to the verb—which is the paradigm itself—or, to "here." We can eliminate "here" on the grounds which I stated in the preceding paragraph, and the verb, on the grounds that it is the test paradigm. The pronoun remains. It is neither accurate nor useful to say that the subject pronoun of a because-clause is presupposed. In Chapter II, I will return to the relationship between because and the term "factive."

A second sense of "range of meaning" might include the notion of volitionality. Alice Davison states that "volition" seems to be included

17 A. Davison, p. 194.
in the meaning of because, but not in the meaning of other causal adverbs. She states, with regard to volitionality, that verbs have been sub-
categorized on the basis of the presence or absence of volition. But she 
also states that causal adverbs are not restricted by the kinds of verbs 
they can modify. Thus, it is impossible to determine just how the term 
"volitionality" can apply to because.

In conclusion, while Alice Davison's research centers on question 
five—a comparison in syntactic behaviour among members of the class of 
causal adverbs—it also has implications for question one. If it can be 
demonstrated that because is sufficiently different from other members 
with which it has been traditionally classified, then we must either re-
classify it, or re-evaluate the data.

I have said that some linguists who include because-clauses in 
their investigations are primarily interested in theory construction. In 
his text, Irregularity in Syntax, George Lakoff is concerned with ex-
panding the "scope of metatheory on the basis of empirical evidence."19 
Within this text because-clauses serve as empirical tests for three 
theoretical proposals. The first is a proposal for a form of lexical 
entry. He states that it would be theoretically economical if words,

19 George Lakoff, Irregularity in Syntax (New York: Holt, Rinehart 
and Winston, Inc., 1970), pp. 3-4. In this book, Lakoff states that he 
had assumed when he wrote the text that Chomsky's lexical base hypothesis 
was correct. This hypothesis is that lexical insertion is pre-transforma-
tional. Working from this assumption toward a definition of the notion 
"exception to a transformational rule," Lakoff had to postulate hypothe-
tical lexical items. Since 1965, he has revised his theoretical frame-
work. Lexical insertion remains an empirical problem in theoretical 
linguistics.
semantically related but syntactically different, could be incorporated into a single lexical entry. To describe the semantic synonymy of these words, he postulates a class of theoretical terms called "hypothetical lexical items."

Regarding *because*, he proposes a hypothetical verb form «LEAD TO or RESULT IN» as a possible deep structural representation of the following ambiguous sentence: "(F-39) I don't beat my wife because I like her." He assumes the following cleft sentence forms as deep structural sources from which two possible readings may derive:

(F-40) It is because I like her that I don't beat my wife.

(F-41) It is not because I like her that I beat my wife.

Phrase structural trees (H) and (I) correspond to (F-40) and (F-41):

(H) It is because I like her that I don't beat my wife.

\[
\begin{align*}
S & \quad \text{it} \quad \text{I like my wife} \\
\text{NP} & \quad \text{NP} \\
\text{VP} & \quad \text{V} \\
\text{S} & \quad \text{N} \\
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{S} & \quad \text{it} \\
\text{NP} & \quad \text{I beat my wife} \\
\text{VP} & \quad \text{because} \\
\text{NP} & \quad \text{Neg} \\
\end{align*}
\]
(I) It is not because I like her that I beat my wife.

Notice that Lakoff does not associate because with the semantic notion of cause. In fact, he has another hypothetical lexical item CAUSATIVE which represents the notion of direct and indirect causation. The semantic generalization $\langle$LEAD TO or RESULT IN$\rangle$ follows from Lakoff's assumption that a transformation, FLIP, operates on the phrase structure trees (H) and (I) yielding the following derived sentences: "My liking for my wife doesn't lead to my beating her."  

Although he does not specify the rules which apply to these nominalized forms, it should be possible to derive from them the following phrase structures:

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20 Lakoff, I. S., p. 169 and pp. 204-205. Notice that he negates the entire sentence in deep structure, if, in the surface structure form, not precedes because. I propose a different analysis on pp. 204-205.


22 Lakoff, I. S., p. 205. FLIP interchanges subjects and objects. See p. 126.
(A) corresponds to (H)

(B) corresponds to (I)

Lakoff's third proposal for metatheory, represented in the phrase structure labeled (A) and (B) on the preceding page, is the feature notation for *because*. Notice that *because* has the properties (*V*) and (*ADJ*). This is an example of his general hypothesis that adjectives and

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Lakoff, I. S., pp. 202-203. The negative element has been accidentally omitted from the tree in the text on p. 203.
verbs are members of a single lexical category, and that adverbs derive from adjectival constructions having predicate complements.\textsuperscript{24}

We can see, therefore, that in formulating a theoretical language, Lakoff indirectly provides information for questions one, two, three and four. With regard to its classification, because belongs to a common verb-adjective category. The deep structural form from which Lakoff proposes to derive a sentence containing a because-clause is one in which the clause serves as the subject. Translating this derivation into Otto Jespersen's terminology, the "primary" form would be considered basic, rather than the "tertiary". For Lakoff, because-clauses do not express the notion of cause. And, like Alice Davison, he raises the problem of how negative and question operators apply to sentences containing because-clauses.

In "Contextual Constraints on Reason Adverbials," Jack Davison maintains that sentence grammars inadequately explain certain grammatical phenomena, and fail to account for the ability of speakers to use and understand certain locutions.\textsuperscript{25} J. Davison proposes, therefore, a

\textsuperscript{24} For his arguments supporting this hypothesis, see I. S., pp. 115-147 and pp. 157-159. The argument concerning the derivation of adverbs from adjectives is based upon the single case of manner adverbs. He apparently extends the argument to all adverbial structures. For a more detailed account of the derivation of syntactic categories, see James D. McCawley, "Where Do Noun Phrases Come From," in Readings in Transformational Grammar, ed. Roderick A. Jacobs and Peter S. Rosenbaum (Massachusetts: Ginn and Co., 1970), pp. 169-171; and a revised version of the same paper in Semantics: An Interdisciplinary Reader in Philosophy, Linguistics and Psychology, ed. Danny A. Steinberg and Leon A. Jakobovits (London: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1971), pp. 220-222.

\textsuperscript{25} Jack Davison, "Contextual Constraints on Reason Adverbials," Linguistics, (1973), To Appear.
contextual approach to linguistic analysis, and uses reason-adverbials—specifically, examples of sentences containing because-clauses—to demonstrate that the only way to represent some ambiguities in meaning is to include contextual constraints in grammars.

Before he gives evidence for contextual analysis, J. Davison rejects previous proposals for the constituent structure of because-clauses. He contends that these clauses are not causal constructions; nor are they related to the causal adverbials which Alice Davison analyses. With regard to the proposal that because-clauses are causal in meaning, J. Davison objects: "... we use because in making explanations for which we need reasons, and although causes may be offered as reasons, not all reasons are causes." In countering Alice Davison's proposals, he points out that because is unlike the set of adverbials containing since, if, as, and others, in that they do not have head noun counterparts. The underlying semantic structure of because-clauses is more like that of manner, place, and purpose adverbials, all of which have head noun counterparts.27

J. Davison proposes a deep structural form for because-clauses which is like Lakoff's in that the adverbial element is represented as a

26 J. Davison, Linguistics, To Appear.

27 J. Davison, Linguistics, To Appear. A weak definition of the term "head noun counterpart" is: a sentence which is a head noun counterpart of another sentence is one in which a prepositional phrase can synonymously replace an adverb. In the following pair of sentences from J. Davison, a weak definition would hold: "(28a) He cut the bread in a manner we told him to. (28b) He cut the bread as we told him to." Other substitution pairs are when: at the time, where: at the place, to: for the purpose, and because: the reason that.
higher sentence. J. Davison, however, does not derive the clause from a cleft-sentence. In the underlying forms (46) and (47) of the ambiguous sentence: "(43) He broke the handle because it was the only way to get in," REASON is a head-noun, and a predicate nominal structure is the highest verb phrase. 28

(46)

(47)

28 These trees include contextual information. J. Davison, *Linguistics*, To Appear.
Notice that in (46) and (47), J. Davison includes an underlying Q-marker which is attached to $S_1$. He states that just as it is possible to negate specific elements of a sentence containing an adverbial, it is also possible to question only the adverbial phrase. And, as part of his argument for discourse analysis, J. Davison states that the Q-marker allows for the possibility of copying into a grammar material which a speaker retrieves from a discourse. Sometimes speakers topicalize one element of a question. One can ask, for example, "Why was it THIEVES who broke into the house?" and another can answer, "Because we have no vandals in the area." The reply could be represented in deep structure under the VP-node, and the question to which the reply responds could be transformationally inserted into the Q-marker position.  

Other contextual information which is essential for disambiguating sentences can also be analyzed with a deep structural form corresponding to (46) and (47). In sentence (4), "Bobby started crying because he wanted in," J. Davison states that one must know whether the speaker believed that crying would induce someone to let him in, or whether the speaker knew that someone was purposely excluding him, and cried as a result of the exclusion. J. Davison concludes that, since one must know a speaker's motive or intention before one can understand what sentence (4) means, motive and intention must be included in grammatical descriptions.  

Finally, he states that it is also essential to be able to represent the difference in illocutionary force between sentences which

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29 See my pp. 16-17 for an explanation of the Q-marker.

30 J. Davison, Linguistics, To Appear.
are reports and those which are explanations. In reporting an event, he says, one usually expresses the ideas of others; but, in giving an explanation, one usually expresses one's own ideas. And, although he does not investigate the distinction in depth, J. Davison explains that because-clauses seem to be intermediate between the two forces. 31

Whereas the description of because-clauses was a means of arguing for contextual grammatical analysis, J. Davison's study also provides evidence for question four. According to his analysis, because-clauses are explanations which express reasons. He does not investigate whether the distribution of causal explanations are excluded from, included in, or are overlapping with explanations which are reasons.

In "Some Observations Concerning Subordinate Clauses in English," William E. Rutherford defends and revises Ross' performative sentence analysis. 32 Information from subordinate clauses provides the linguistic evidence for these theoretical modifications. Much of the strength of his proposal comes from an analysis of sentences containing because-clauses. In 1972, Michael Kac published his reactions to Rutherford's claims. Kac centers his counterarguments upon because-clauses and the performative analysis. He offers an alternative explanation which he claims can

31 Force ascription which has its source in speaker intentions, as in (4), seems to me to be different from force which derives from the classification of types of sentences into reports and explanations. I would agree that both types seem to be somehow contextual; but the former seems "situational," whereas, the latter seems strictly "linguistic." J. Davison, Linguistics, To Appear.

describe the same sentences as Rutherford's analysis without Rutherford's conceptual inadequacies. I will compare the two analyses.

Rutherford begins by citing syntactic evidence that because-clauses differ: some of these clauses refer to a verb in the surface main clause; others do not. In the sentence, "(18) Jenny isn't here, because I don't see her," it is apparent that the speaker is giving a reason for making the statement, rather than a reason for Jenny's absence. The problem for Rutherford is in representing the underlying form of a clause which is adverbial, but which does not restrict the surface main verb. He accepts a modified form of Ross' declarative sentence analysis. If one hypothesized an underlying main verb of "saying" in sentence (18), then one might also postulate the following phrase structure:

A rule called performative deletion would apply to this underlying form,

33 Rutherford, p. 100.
Kac's disagreement with Rutherford over (18) does not center upon Rutherford's original problem concerning the scope of the because-clause. Kac takes issue with an inference about the theoretical form of the underlying structure. He states that Rutherford and Ross assume that transformations preserve meaning. Kac replies to this assumption by saying that if transformations, such as performative deletion, preserve meaning, the following two sentences should mean the same: "(6) I say to you that Jenny isn't here even though she is," and, "(7) Jenny isn't here even though she is." He points out that they are different in meaning: sentence (7) is only contradictory; but, sentence (6) can be read either as contradictory, or as an instance of a speaker's understanding that he is "admitting that he is saying something which is contrary to what he knows to be true."

Instead of representing Kac's sentence (6) with an underlying form

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34 Rutherford does not give a phrase structure for this particular sentence. Since Kac selects (18) as the point of departure for his reactions, I have constructed one on the basis of others in the text.

35 There are replies to Kac's contentions. I omit them because they involve issues in theoretical linguistics, rather than problems specific to because-clauses. See Bruce Fraser and Stephen R. Anderson's evaluations of Ross' arguments for a performative hypothesis. Bruce Fraser, "An Examination of The Performative Analysis," Indiana University Club mimeograph (October, 1971); Stephen R. Anderson, "On the Linguistic Status of the Performative-Constative Distinction," Indiana University Club mimeograph (October, 1971).

36 Michael B. Kac, "Clauses of Saying and the Interpretation of because," _Language_, 48 (1972), 627.

37 Kac, p. 627.
containing a main verb of saying which has not undergone performative deletion—as Rutherford probably would have done—Kac proposes two theoretical terms which can describe the difference between sentences (6) and (7). The terms are "intradiscursory" and "extradiscursory." Intradiscursory clauses, as in (6), determine the truth conditions of the sentence which contains them in surface structure. Extradiscursory clauses as in, "(5) I tell you, Jenny isn't here!" do not determine the truth conditions of the sentence. Kac argues that if truth value is part of the meaning of a sentence, and if there is a rule "performative deletion" which can delete part of a sentence which has truth value, then transformations cannot be meaning preserving.

Furthermore, Kac contends that Ross uses the term "performative" in a misleading way. Ross takes the term from the writings of J. L. Austin. According to Austin, performatives have no truth value, but have other conditions which determine appropriate usage. According to Kac's terminology, only extradiscursory clauses can be deleted since, by definition, they do not determine the truth of a sentence in which they appear. Ross, then, inappropriately uses Austin's term when he claims that there can be a performative deletion transformation.

Kac states, "It is also worth noting that performative clauses must be intradiscursory—since performative sentences have no truth values at all, and thus differ from propositions." Either there is an error in

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38 Kac, p. 627.
40 Kac, p. 628.
the text, or Kac has contradicted himself. If performative clauses have no truth value, then, by his own definition, they must be extradiscursory.

Kac's other main disagreement is over a point which Rutherford did not investigate. In chastising Rutherford and Ross, Kac says, "All we know for sure about such sentences . . . is the reason adverbial cannot be interpreted as giving a cause for what is reported in the first conjunct." But Rutherford did not make that claim. He only maintains that his revised performative analysis can provide a uniform description of what might appear to be two distinct forms of because. He does not describe how, or even whether they might differ in semantic features.

So Kac's proposal for a feature analysis of because is a suggestion for its lexical representation. Kac claims that there are two senses of because which are related in a systematic way. Both contain the sense of [+Connection], but only the extradiscursary reading can have the feature [+Connection, +Cause]. He maintains, therefore, that there is a non-causal as well as a causal interpretation of because. He suggests that further investigation should center upon these two feature specifications.

The disagreement between Rutherford and Kac is essentially over theoretical language. Nevertheless, the data specific to because relate to questions two and four. Rutherford is interested in the ways that because-clauses modify verbs, and Kac is concerned with the causal and non-causal meanings of the word.

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41 Kac, p. 631.

42 Kac, p. 629 and p. 630.
Although linguists have disagreed over the specific grammatical category to which *because* belongs, no one has suggested that it is a non-grammatical word. But evidence from Jespersen that *because* may be of primary rank—thus placing it in subject position—and the effects of applying negation and question transformations to *because* either require that its underlying form be cleft, or that it be reformulated to derive from a head noun. The effect of all these data is intuitively to connect *because* with positions of prominence in a sentence. In Chapter II, I will investigate this prominence under the term "focus."
CHAPTER II

INVESTIGATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN

BECAUSE AND THE TERM 'FOCUS'

While reading descriptions of because-clauses, it became apparent that the word because, itself, could be questioned, negated, and stressed.\(^1\) Preliminary observations led me to a tentative hypothesis that because, considered apart from its clause, and subjected to certain syntactic and phonological rules, could be a principle message-bearing unit in a sentence. The search for a definition of this semantic prominence led me to the term "focus." And, unfortunately, to a current theoretical dispute over the meaning of the term. Semantic theoreticians disagree upon the unit which can be focussed, and upon the level of representation at which "focus" may be defined.

According to Chomsky's standard theory, the focus of a sentence is located in the predicate of the dominant proposition of deep structure. He says, regarding sentence 38:

"(a) is it John who writes poetry? 
(b) it isn't JOHN who writes poetry"

that its underlying deep structure might be "something like [the one who writes poetry] is John," and that the predicate of the dominant proposition of deep structure, and the stressed element in the surface structure, is

\(^1\) Sentences which occur as evidence for my arguments in Chapter II and III were not specially constructed. I collected some of them from the news media, books, and dictionaries. I elicited others during conversations.
the focal unit. In a revised discussion of "focus," he states that, "the focus is the phrase containing the intonation center ..." He further stipulates that the focus must be composed of full lexical items, and, explicating this restriction, he maintains that the syllable containing the intonation center cannot serve as focus when it is part of a larger lexical item. Thus, in the sentence, "Did you call him UP," the UP cannot serve as focus, but only the sequence of "call him up." He concludes that this restriction on the definition is obvious. He also points out that it is especially when contrastive and expressive stress occurs on a unit that the definition of "focus" becomes complex: "... phrases that contain the intonation center may be interpreted as focus of utterance, the conditions perhaps being somewhat different and more restrictive when the intonation center involves expressive or contrastive stress ...").

Wallace Chafe adds the notion "new" information to a proposed definition of "focus." He says, "I shall take the position that new is a specification which may be added, not to a whole verb or noun, but to a particular semantic unit within a verb or noun." Items identified as "new" information are those which receive strongest stress and highest

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3 Chomsky, p. 200.

4 Chomsky, p. 206. I disagree that the condition is obvious. If, for instance, Chomsky had chosen the sentence, "Did you bring it UP?", it is not clear that the sequence "bring it up," is focussed.

5 Chomsky, p. 205.
pitch in the sentence. In sentences where a contrastive unit is also "new" information, Chafe says that the "new" semantic unit within it has been selected by the speaker from various implied alternatives. Although he does not elaborate on this distinction, it seems that in this explanation, the distribution of the terms "new" and "contrastive" overlap. Later, in a footnote, he amends this by adding another term, "focus."

Perhaps, then, constrastive sentences should not be thought to contain the specification "new" at all, but rather some other specification which might be labeled "focus". In that case, "new" and "focus" would be in complementary distribution, the former occurring only in noncontrastive sentences, the latter only in contrastive ones.

For M. A. K. Halliday, the information focus of a sentence is located in the tonic stress pattern. One component in this contour is presented as "new" information. "New" information, broadly defined, is not derivable from preceding discourse. Though all of these definitions differ in detail, discussions of "focus" in Chomsky, Chafe, and Halliday include an ill-defined relationship between stress pattern and the notion of new information.

It is with this relationship that George Lakoff disagrees. He says, in the sentence, "The TALL girl left," that primary stress on TALL does not indicate focus, if the term "focus" is also to include the con-

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7 Chafe, p. 224.

cept of new information. He maintains, on the contrary, that what is new information (or, asserted information) is,

that the girl who was presupposed to have left is coreferential with the girl who was presupposed to be tall. The semantic content of focus is an assertion of coreferentiality. In this very typical example of focus, the lexical-semantic content of the surface structure constituent bearing main stress has nothing whatever to do with the semantic content of the focus.

Lakoff’s main point is that "focus" cannot be defined in terms of surface structure constituents. For him, derived structures are also crucial.

Lacking an interpreted definition of "focus," a general one, conforming to ordinary usage, can describe the functional differences between sentences. When linguistic theory includes a larger number of rules, we may eventually agree upon a definition. Until then, I propose that we use the term to describe central points of attention in a message. If, as speakers, we want to call attention to a particular unit in a message, we may use a number of different syntactic or phonological rules for that purpose. To name only a few, we may stress the unit, propose it, ask a specific question with respect to it, deny it, claim that it is true, or assume that it is true. The effect of any one of these rules, or of several applied concurrently, is to alert a listener to a specific unit within a discourse.

Defined generally, as a functional term, a focussed unit may be an individual lexical item (despite theoretical equivocations of Chomsky),

or it may be a conjunction of assertions, as in Lakoff's sentence, "The TALL girl left." Discourse context determines the item which is focussed. If, for example, no mention had previously been made of anyone's leaving, or of any tall girl, then the preceding sentence would be regarded as new information, and the speaker would be focussing TALL. If, on the other hand, two conversants knew that one of two girls left, and one speaker stated that it was the TALL one who went, then Lakoff's interpretation of co-referentiality would be appropriate. The term "focus," therefore, is functionally dependent upon discourse.

In the following investigation, I will use the term "focus" to apply to any unit

(i) if it can be negated as an individual element of a sentence;

(ii) if it can bear primary stress;

(iii) if, when embedded in a sentence containing a factive or non-factive verb, it is the sole object of the predicate in the matrix sentence;

(iv) if it occurs unpredictably in a sentence which is a reply to a question.

I will now demonstrate that the word because can be focussed. I will begin by demonstrating that it can be negated.

In Chapter I, I briefly described Lakoff's proposal for the derivation of an ambiguous sentence containing a reason adverbial and a negative element. The sentence, "(F-39) I don't beat my wife because I like her," can be understood as representing either of two paraphrases.

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10 See my discussion on p. 26.
Let us assume that a speaker of the paraphrases (F-i+O) and (F-i+ll) emphasizes the negative element in both:

(F-i+O) It is because I like her that I DON'T beat my wife.
(F-i+ll) It is NOT because I like her that I beat my wife.\(^{11}\)

With these readings in mind, let us examine, in each case, the propositions the speaker concedes.\(^{12}\) In (F-i+O) the speaker admits:

(a) I like my wife.
(b) I don't beat my wife.
(c) There is a reason for my not beating my wife.\(^{13}\)
(d) The reason is that I like my wife.

In (F-i+ll), the speaker admits:

(a) I may like my wife.\(^{14}\)
(b) I beat my wife.
(c) There is a reason for beating my wife.
(d) The reason is not that I like my wife.

Notice that in both paraphrases, the (c) and (d) propositions admit that there is a reason. But in Lakoff's phrase structure (F-i+ll) (B), the negative element is attached to the topmost S.\(^{15}\) Such placement implies

\(^{11}\) Lakoff, I. S., p. 169.

\(^{12}\) Throughout this chapter, there are propositions contained in the sentences which I do not list. I have tried to include all of those relevant to a discussion of because.

\(^{13}\) I use the word reason as a paraphrase of because only as an expediency in this chapter. I will be more precise as to its meaning in Chapter III.

\(^{14}\) I use may in the sense that the speaker does not commit himself to admission or denial.

\(^{15}\) See the phrase structure on my p. 12.
that the word *because* is negated. For this to be the case, though, both (c) propositions must read, "There is no reason . . . ." In fact, as the (d) propositions show, the speaker denies a *specific* reason. He does not deny that there is a reason. Even though *not* precedes *because* in the surface structure, *because* is outside the scope of negation.

I will show that it is possible to negate the word *because* so that the (c) propositions will deny that any explanation whatsoever can exist between (a) and (b) propositions. There are three ways. First, *because* is given reinforced stress and is embedded in a cleft sentence structure. As an example, let us retain sentence (F-39) and select paraphrase (F-41) as its intended meaning. Let us apply main stress to *because*, and then give it reinforced stress by prolonging its articulation. Utter the word so that its intonation contour corresponds to.

(F-41) It is not *BECAUSE* I like her that I beat my wife. This sentence has the following propositions:

(a) I may like my wife.
(b) I beat my wife.
(c) There is no connection between whether I may like her and my beating her.

In this case, the speaker denies the conjunction between propositions (a) and (b) by proposition (c).

A second way of negating the word *because*, is by phonological means only.\(^{16}\) Consider the following dialogue in which negation of *because* occurs

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without embedding in a cleft form. Read the following sentence with the reinforced phonological contour that I described above.

(la) Speaker 1: You do not love me because you are leaving.
(lb) Speaker 2: I'm leaving not BECAUSE I don't love you.\footnote{All of these negations overload my receptive ability. I include the sentence because I heard it. I would never say it—even if I wasn't leaving because I didn't love her.}

Let us examine the propositions of sentence (la):

(a) You are leaving.
(b) There is a reason for your leaving.
(c) The reason is that you don't love me.

Speaker 2 replies (lb) with the following propositions:

(a) I am leaving.
(b) There is no reason. (Or, There is no connection between my going and my not loving you.)
(c) I don't love you.

Thus proposition (b) of sentence (lb) negates proposition (b) of (la).

The third way of negating \textit{because} is seldom used in ordinary discourse, but it appears in logic. In order to negate the entire sentence (F-39), one can say: "It is not the case that I don't beat my wife because I love her." In this sentence, the negative governs the entire embedded sentence. Hence, if one were to use \Lakoff's analytical framework, the negative of this sentence must be attached to the topmost S.

We have seen that \textit{because} can be negated; thus, it meets criterion (i). If \textit{because} can be focussed, it must also bear primary stress. A
function of primary stress is emphasis of one element in a sentence. Jones states that there are two kinds of phonological emphasis. The first is emphasis for contrast. I will now show that because receives primary stress, achieving emphasis for contrast.

There is a fundamental difference between the function of main stress for contrast on a form word and on because. When a speaker stresses a form word, he may be contrasting: (a) the word stressed and another word in its semantic field, (b) the word stressed and its antonym, and, (c) the word stressed and its negation. Notice that in all of these cases, the possible contrast is between words. I will illustrate each of these three possibilities with corresponding readings of an ambiguous sentence in which the form word clean bears primary stress. Consider the following dialogue:

(2a) Speaker 1: Mary cleaned the room.
(2b) Speaker 2: No, Mary didn't CLEAN the room.

On an (a) reading, Speaker 2 might be indicating to Speaker 1 that Mary only tidied the room. The word clean belongs to a set of words describing different aspects of the general act of cleaning. Each word in the set (or, in the semantic field, to use other terminology) differs from other set members in the precise aspect of cleaning each may describe. Thus, the function of primary stress in (2b) might be to signal that Speaker 1

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19 I use "form word" to mean roughly those words which have been classified as nouns, verbs, adjectives, and adverbs by traditional grammarians. I might also extend the definition to some prepositions, but the point here is not precise delineation of the members which belong to a form class, but rather the exclusion of because as one of its members.
should have chosen more carefully among the field. Perhaps he should have substituted tidied, straightened, or dusted.

On reading (b), main stress on clean in (2b) might be to contrast clean with dirty, its antonym. Whereas Speaker 1 thought that Mary cleaned the room, Speaker 2 assures him that Mary really just got it dirtier. And, on (c) reading, we might invent the following situation. Imagine that the only person who could have murdered X was the one who cleaned X's room. In (2a), Speaker 1 accuses Mary. Speaker 2 replies with (2b) in an attempt to exonerate Mary. Not, in combination with the main stress on clean, is used to state that though Mary might have been in the room, she did not clean it.

I said that there is a difference between the function of main stress on a form word such as clean, and on a non-form word, because. Turning now to because: there is no antonym for because. Although there is negation of because, it does not occur with primary stress. It only occurs with reinforced stress. It is possible, however, for because to bear primary stress and it is possible to say that the function of primary stress on because is contrastive. But the contrast is among propositions and not, as in the case of form words, among words.

These contrasting propositions are the set of possible conclusions of a sentence which also contains propositions stating a major and minor premise. In logic, of course, only one conclusion is possible, if correct formal procedures have been followed. Within ordinary discourse, however, it is common that two speakers will accept the same major and minor premises, but will reach a different conclusion. Both speakers accept the possibility of a conclusion, but they differ as to which conclusion is valid.
In the following examples, the sentence of Speaker 1 contains a proposition which states a conclusion. Speaker 2 replies with a sentence containing because which is given primary stress. The function of the stress is to invalidate the specific proposition which is a conclusion drawn by Speaker 1. The word bearing main stress is not used to deny that a conclusion is possible, as in the case of reinforced stress.

(3a) Speaker 1: If you loved me you wouldn't leave.
(3b) Speaker 2: I am leaving BECAUSE I love you.

Here are the propositions of (3a):

(a) People do not leave the ones they love.
(b) You are leaving me.
(c) Therefore, you don't love me.

And, here are the propositions of (3b):

(a) People do not leave the ones they love.
(b) I am leaving you.
(c) Therefore, I love you.

Sentence (3a) contains the same (a) and (b) propositions as sentence (3b). The (c) propositions, which state the conclusion, differ. The word if, used in sentence (3a) is rhetorical, rather than literal, and because, with primary stress, allows speakers to retain the form of an argument while selecting different conclusive propositions.  

Although I describe this procedure by propositional analysis, authors of fiction have used pseudo-logical sentences for comic effect. One, who valued privacy above friendship, replied to a dinner invitation, saying, "Because you have asked me, therefore I cannot come." The humour lies in conjoining two conclusive propositions.
In another dialogue in which because receives primary stress, the same phenomenon occurs:

(4a) Speaker 1: You can relax now because she's gone.

(4b) Speaker 2: I'm tense BECAUSE she's gone.

The propositions for (4a) are:

(a) Her presence makes you tense.
(b) She is gone.
(c) Therefore, you can relax.

The propositions for (4b) are:

(a) Her presence makes me tense.
(b) She is gone.
(c) Therefore, I can not relax.

Once again, (a) and (b) propositions are identical, but (c) propositions differ. Therefore, main stress on because contrasts propositions, and not words.

Jones states that another kind of emphasis, signalled by primary stress, is emphasis for intensity.\(^{21}\) While the distinction between emphasis for contrast and emphasis for intensity is analytically valuable, I do not think that intensity ever occurs without implied contrast. Nevertheless, these terms are precise enough for the purpose of showing the difference between word intensification and propositional intensification.

Jones says that it is appropriate to apply intensity emphasis only to certain words which express measurable qualities. He cites examples of adverbs which include very, extremely, and rather, and

\(^{21}\) Jones, Outline of English Phonetics, p. 298.
combines them with the adjectives good, hot, and long. He adds that the adverbs intensify the meaning of the adjectives. Notice that in his example, one word is used to intensify the meaning of another word. Of course, either word can receive primary stress, but for this discussion, I will restrict the analysis of intensification to where the adjective is stressed as in very HOT.

Just as in primary stress for contrast, the function of primary stress combined with adverbial modification of form words is different from primary stress combined with adverbial modification of because. Let us consider the possibilities which are available to the speaker in the case of hot. The adverb, very, and primary stress on hot might be similar to primary stress on clean, as in our earlier discussion. That is, intensification applies specifically to hot rather than to another member in its semantic field, warm or tepid. Or, perhaps the adverb and primary stress might serve to intensify the meaning of hot as contrasted with its antonym, cold.

Neither of these alternatives is possible for because. There is no correspondence based upon word analysis which because can satisfy. It is possible, however, for because to receive primary stress and adverbial modification. That which is being modified, is a select one among a set of possible propositions. In the following examples, it is the specific

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Sidney Greenbaum, in Studies in English Adverbial Usage, describes how certain adverbs can focus an item. None of his sentences, however, contain the co-occurrent phenomena of adverbial modification and main stress on one item. Sidney Greenbaum, Studies in English Adverbial Usage (London: Longmans, Green and Co., Ltd., 1969), p. 119.
reason following the word because which is being intensified. Because should be read with the following intonation contour: 

(5) I am an addict only BECAUSE I had a deprived childhood.

Sentence (5) contains the following propositions:

(a) I am an addict.
(b) There is a reason.
(c) There is a specific reason. (Or, there is one reason only.)
(d) The reason is that I had a deprived childhood.

Thus, the adverb only refers to the specific reason which the speaker has chosen from among all possible reasons.

Similarly, in a sentence in which the because-clause is embedded in a cleft form, an adverb precedes because, and because bears primary stress, the scope of the adverb is the specific reason which the speaker has selected from a number of possible reasons.

(6) It was particularly BECAUSE I wanted to eat that I stole.

The propositions of (6) are:

(a) I stole.
(b) There is a reason why I stole.
(c) There is one reason in particular.
(d) The reason is that I wanted to eat.

Because also carries primary stress when it occurs as a one-word sentence. An analysis of the function of primary stress in these sentences is difficult. The difficulty, I admit, does not lie in the obvious fact that there is no other element in the sentence which can receive main stress assignment. The function of main stress as a signal of deletion
of an underlying sentence to that of a one-word surface form is also clear enough. The complexity lies in explanation of the meaning of the emotive force which is also conveyed through the main stress.23

In the following four dialogues, because occurs as a one-word sentence bearing primary stress. After each dialogue I reconstruct two possible interpretations of because. These interpretations will be approximations of the information Speaker 2 wants Speaker 1 to infer from the terse reply. Notice that in each case, Speaker 2 does not want the conversation to continue.

(7a) Mother, Speaker 1: Why did you lie to me about breaking that vase?
(7b) Child, Speaker 2: Because!
Interpretation: (7b, 1) You already know that I lied because I was afraid you would punish me.
(7b, 2) I don't want to tell you why I lied.

(8a) Husband, Speaker 1: Why are you so irritable all the time?
(8b) Wife, Speaker 2: Because!
Interpretation: (8b, 1) You know very well why I am irritable, you make me that way.
(8b, 2) I don't intend to tell you because you should know without having to ask.

(9a) Wife, Speaker 1: Why are you late again?

(9b) Husband, Speaker 2: Because!

Interpretation: (9b, 1) You know perfectly well why. I was at the pub again.

(9b, 2) I don't intend to tell you, Hag.

(10a) Wife, Speaker 1: Why haven't you told me what the doctor said to you?

(10b) Husband, Speaker 2: Because!

Interpretation: (10b, 1) I haven't told you because he told me what you said he would say. And that makes me furious.

(10b, 2) I don't want you to know what he said.

One generalization about the semantic information conveyed by the emotive stress in dialogues (7) - (10) is that Speaker 2 uses Because! in an attempt to terminate the conversation. In each case, Speaker 1 asks a question beginning with "Why . . . ." In each case, Speaker 2 replies with "Because!" In reconstructing possible underlying full sentences for because, emotive stress on the abbreviated form seems to be a signal that Speaker 2 does not want to talk further on the subject. In interpretation 1, Speaker 2 refuses to answer because Speaker 1's question is really a pseudo-question. Speaker 2 knows that Speaker 1 already knows the answer. In interpretation 2, Speaker 2 may not want Speaker 1 to know the answer.

I have demonstrated that because can bear primary stress. I have also indirectly provided a partial explanation to one question which came
to Alice Davison's attention. In Chapter I, I said that several central questions appear in the literature on because. One of these asked how the behaviour of because-clauses was unlike that of other reason adverbials in imperative sentences. I turn now to that problem, and apply data on because and primary stress as an explanation for one of A. Davison's unacceptable sentences.

She observes that since and as can occur in a clause which precedes the main clause containing an overt imperative. But, in the following example, she notices that because will not substitute grammatically.

"(7) As
   {Since } you're an expert on antique paper clips,
   {Because} { come and see my collection.  
      {you must look at my collection.}"

She concludes from this and other examples, that because should be marked in the lexicon so that it does not occur with overt performative verbs. But notice that it is grammatical to say, (11) You must look at my collection because you're an expert on antique paper clips. It would seem that the ungrammatical reading occurs only when the because-clause is preposed.

One of the effects of preposing a clause is to give it prominence within a discourse. If we assume that the underlying form of a sentence containing because is one in which the main clause precedes the because-clause, then whenever a because-clause occurs at the beginning of a sentence, it occupies a place of special prominence. Moreover, when the

preposed clause begins with a word which can bear primary stress, the listener is alert to the possibility that this word, in particular, may be an essential message conveying unit.

I have already demonstrated that because can be stressed. Recall that in sentences containing an imperative as the main verb, the force of the command requires that the imperative verb receive main stress. An explanation of the unacceptability of because-clauses when they precede imperatives is rule conflict: in these sentences, the listener cannot anticipate the word which will receive primary stress assignment. The acceptability of since, and as, in the same position, can be explained by their inability to accept main stress.

A. Davison's sentence (7) becomes more acceptable when placed in a discourse. I have shown that one function of primary stress on because is to invalidate the conclusion of a preceding sentence in a dialogue. Consider the following:

(12a) Speaker 1: Thank goodness, I don't have to look at any more paper clip collections because I am already an acknowledged expert.

(12b) Speaker 2: Because you are an expert, you must look at my collection.

Now it is possible to read (12b) with primary stress on because and retain an overt imperative form for the verb. But the verb, in this case, does not bear primary stress. The main clause would probably be uttered with deliberate enunciation of each word, and with monotonous

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intonation rising slightly on the word my.

The propositions of (12a) are:

(a) A person who is an expert on a subject need not look at every single collection.
(b) I am an expert on the subject of antique paper clips.
(c) Therefore, I need not look at another collection.

The propositions of (12b) are:

(a) A person who is an expert on a subject need not look at every single collection.
(b) You are an expert on the subject of antique paper clips.
(c) Therefore, you must look at my collection.

Thus, as my earlier analysis predicts, the (c) proposition of (12b) denies the (c) proposition of (12a).

Other sentences which A. Davison finds unacceptable—those where because-clauses precede a main clause which is a question, a request, or an overt performative—become more acceptable when the because-clause is understood as referring to an underlying verb of saying. I refer the reader to William Rutherford's article for an account of these phenomena. 26

We have seen that because can be negated and can receive primary stress. I will now investigate whether because meets condition (iii).

There is a relationship between the terms "new" and "assert," and between

"old" and "presuppose." But this relationship has not been conclusively defined. So far, no one has claimed that presupposed information is new. But it may be possible to argue that old information is asserted. So, the correlation, new:assert :: old:presuppose, cannot be formulated until linguists agree upon definitions. The importance of these terms for a definition of "focus" is that assertions and assumptions are potential points of attention in discourse—arguments occur over truth claims.

One semantic test which opposes the terms "assert" and "presuppose" may show that because can be asserted as well as presupposed. I will embed because clauses into factive and non-factive predicates. I will use the following definitions in this procedure. A main sentence is either one which contains the word, "It is significant that," or, "It is likely that." The main sentence, "It is significant that" contains a predicate word, "significant," which has the semantic property of factivity. The main sentence, "It is likely that" contains a predicate word, "likely," which has the semantic property of non-factivity. The complement is an embedded sentence which contains three constituents. These three complement constituents are (rain) (because) (flood). If the

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28 I use the terms as defined in "Fact." An item which is presupposed by a speaker is factive. That which is asserted in a sentence is non-factive. While I accept the semantic distinction between these terms, I do not accept that the factivity status of a main predicate word determines the factivity status of the entire embedded complement. Kiparsky and Kiparsky, pp. 348-349.
word *because* can be focussed, then constituent (because) must be capable of being the scope of the non-factive predicate word, "likely," and, the non-factive predicate word, "significant."

I will show that the non-factive predicate word, "likely," and the factive predicate word, "significant," determine the factivity status of either an entire embedded complement, or, only part of an embedded complement. The scope of the predicate within the complement is always determined by main stress and may be determined by the combination of preposing and main stress. For the word *because* to satisfy condition (iii), it must be inside the scope of a factive and non-factive predicate word in some main stress readings.

Let us examine pairs of sentences which contain the constituent sentence, "It is significant that," and an embedded complement. The constituent sentence contains a factive predicate word. In sentences (13 a, a'; b, b'; c, c'; d, d'), the order of the complement constituents is (flood) (because) (rain). In sentences (14, 14') the order is (flood) (because) (rain). Sentences (13 a, b, c, d) and sentence (14) are questions which require a response containing a corresponding stress pattern.29

(13a) Is it SIGNIFICANT or not SIGNIFICANT that the river flooded because it rained?

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29 Thus, I claim that it is possible to question an item which is a constituent in the complement of a factive predicate word. This need not counter a commonly stated property of presuppositions—that they are constant under questioning. One simply must distinguish the level of abstraction which is being subjected to questioning. It is theoretically possible to define a level sufficiently abstract such that anything which can be said can also be questioned.
(13a') It is SIGNIFICANT that the river flooded because it rained.

In this reading, the inquirer asks whether the entire event which is described as the complement is significant. The response that the entire event is, indeed, significant, confers factivity status on all constituents of the complement.

(13b) Is it significant that the CREEK flooded because it rained?

(13b') It is significant that the RIVER flooded because it rained.

In this reading, the inquirer asks whether it is significant that only the creek flooded, and the response is that it is significant that the river flooded. Thus, only constituent (flood) is factive.

(13c) Is it significant that the river OVERFLOWED because it rained?

(13c') It is significant that the river FLOODED because it rained.

In this reading the inquirer asks whether it is significant that the river only overflowed because it rained. The response is that it is significant that it flooded. Thus, constituent (rain) is factive.

(13d) Is it significant that the river flooded BECAUSE it rained?

(13d') It is significant that the river flooded BECAUSE it rained.

In this reading the inquirer isn't sure whether rain caused the river to flood. The answer is that it did. Thus constituent (because)
is factive.\textsuperscript{30}

(14) Is it significant that BECAUSE it rained the river flooded?

(14\textsuperscript{'} ) It is significant that BECAUSE it rained the river flooded.

In this pair, the order of the constituents is reversed, making it more likely that constituent (because) will receive main stress. It has the same reading as the pair (13a) and (13a\textsuperscript{'}). We can make the following generalizations from the preceding pairs of sentences. When the predicate word is stressed, the entire complement is within its range and is determined by the factivity status of the complement. When a word inside the complement is stressed, only its corresponding constituent is determined by the factivity status of the predicate word in the main sentence. In (13a, b, c, d) and (14) and their corresponding primed pairs, any one of the three constituents of the complement may be factive.

If the word because is to meet condition (iii), it is not sufficient that it be inside the scope of a factive predicate word. It must also be inside the scope of a non-factive predicate word. In the following pairs of sentences containing a main sentence in which a non-factive predicate word, "likely," and a complement occurs, I will show that it

\textsuperscript{30} The main stress on because signals the questioner's desire for confirmation of a particular conclusion implicit in the complement. See my pp. 31\textsuperscript{'} -38\textsuperscript{'} for an analysis of the function of main stress on because.
is possible for constituent (because), and, therefore, the word because to be within the scope of the non-factive predicate word.

(15a) Is it LIKELY or unlikely that the river flooded because it rained?

(15a') It is LIKELY that the river flooded because it rained.
The inquirer wonders whether the entire event which is described in the complement is likely. The response is that the entire event is, indeed, likely. Thus, the entire complement is non-factive.

(15b) Is it likely that the CREEK flooded because it rained?
(15b') It is likely that the RIVER flooded because it rained.
The inquirer asks whether it is significant that only the creek flooded. The response is that it is significant that it was the river which flooded. Thus, only constituent (river) is non-factive.

(15c) Is it likely that the river OVERFLOWED because it rained?

(15c') It is likely that the river FLOODED because it rained.
The inquirer asks whether it is significant that the river only overflowed because it rained. The response is that it is significant that it flooded. Thus, constituent (rain) is factive.

(15d) Is it likely that the river flooded BECAUSE it rained?
(15d') It is likely that the river flooded BECAUSE it rained.
In this reading the inquirer isn't sure whether additional rain will cause the river to flood. The answer is that it did flood. Thus, constituent (because) is non-factive.

(16) Is it likely that BECAUSE it rained the river flooded?
(16') It is likely that BECAUSE it rained the river flooded.
In this pair, the order of the complement constituents is reversed, thus, it is more likely that the constituent (because) will receive main stress. Its reading is the same as (15a) and (15a').

We can see from the preceding pairs of questions and answers that any word which can be stressed in the complement can also be questioned. This satisfies common sense. Whenever a speaker claims that an event is likely or significant, an appraising response may either accept or reject the entire event as being likely or significant, or accept or reject part of the event as being likely or significant. We can see, therefore, that the constituent (because) can be within the scope of a non-factive predicate word. Thus, the word because meets condition (iii).

Before we can decide whether because meets criterion (iv), I must define the term "predictable." Ordinarily, we use the word unpredictable to describe situations in which we have trouble in guessing or knowing what to expect. That same ordinary notion occurs in a more refined sense as a term in information theory. If it is possible to predict what a linguistic unit will be in a context, then that unit has a high degree of probability. The more probable a unit is, the lower is its message-bearing content.31

In information theory, the precise calculation of the amount of message a unit carries, depends upon the relationship between the terms "probability" and "functional load." As Lyons points out, the functional

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load of a particular contrast between expression elements is determined by a number of variables.  

He cautions:

Since it is impossible (in the present state of linguistic research at least) to identify all the semantically-relevant factors in the external situations in which particular utterances occur, it is also impossible to calculate the probability, and therefore the information-content, of any part of them.

But he also states that we can make general statements about probability, if we consider the structure of sentences in abstraction from the situations in which actual utterances occur.

Accordingly, I will define "probability" with reference to two sentences which comprise a dialogue. Jack Davison points out that because answers the questions why, what is the reason, and what is the cause. I will argue that because is a predictable reply to these questions on the grounds that because, why, reason, and cause can appear together in indicative sentences. I will also argue that although because is an acceptable reply to how, it is not a predictable response since how does not collocate with because, reason, why or cause in indicative sentences.

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32 Lyons, pp. 82-83.
33 Lyons, p. 97.
34 J.:o Davison, Language, To Appear.
35 Notice that I define the terms "predictable" and "unpredictable" as dichotomous for this analysis only. For an utterance to be meaningful in speech situations, some choice is essential. A completely predictable question would not be asked, since it would be meaningless. Therefore, the term "predictable," when used outside the context of this paper, should have a relative definition.
To the questions "Why are you going?", or, "For what reason are you going," an acceptable reply might be:

(17) I am going because I am tired.
(18) The reason why I am going is because I am tired.

In answer to the question, "What is the cause of the flood?", one might reply:

(19) The cause of the flood is that it thawed rapidly, and also because the dikes were weak.
(20) The cause of the flood is the same as why the river overflowed.

In (18), (19), and (20), it is possible to collocate because and why in answer to a question containing the interrogatives why, what reason, or what cause. I conclude that because is a predictable reply in these dialogues.

In contrast, I will show that although because is an acceptable reply to the question how, the two do not collocate in an indicative sentence. I will insert how into the positions of why and because in sentences (18), (19) and (20).

(21) * The reason how I am going is because I am tired.
(22) * The cause of the flood is that it thawed rapidly and also how the dikes were weak.
(23) * The cause of the flood is the same as how the river overflowed.

This reply was elicited from a relatively uneducated farmer. It is unacceptable for me and for some other speakers whose education is at university level. But when I asked five informants whose education is at highschool level, they replied that the sentence was acceptable for them.
How does not insert acceptably. Therefore, how does not collocate with because, reason, and cause. To demonstrate that because meets condition (iv), I will show that, although because does not collocate with how in indicative sentences, because occurs as an acceptable reply to a question beginning with how. I present the following dialogues as evidence.

(24) How did you remember the meaning of that word?
(24') I knew because I just looked it up in the dictionary the other day.
(25) How can you talk such nonsense?
(25') Oh, because I am only joking.
(26) How come you don't visit us anymore?
(26') I don't come because I live so far away now.

Austin points out that it is "odd" to answer the question how with because, but that it is also "dangerously definite" when an answer begins with because. I think the oddness and definiteness can be explained in terms of predictability. Since we do not group how and because in indicative sentences, we do not expect them to occur in question-answer dialogues in the way that we expect because to occur with why, reason and cause. Summarizing: because meets condition (iv) since it appears unpredictably in an answer to a question. Thus, I conclude that because can be focussed.


38 One could say that because is more unpredictable as a response to how than to why on the grounds that how has more lexical readings than why. If one excludes situational and contextual clues, then I would accept a correlation between lexical ambiguity and predictability.
CHAPTER III

A DESCRIPTION OF THE CAUSAL AND NON-CAUSAL
FEATURES OF BECAUSE

In this chapter, I will analyse the meaning of the word because as it relates to the lexical items "cause" and "reason." Earlier studies of because contain a number of alternative proposals for its semantic definition. If because is underlying, there may be two forms in the lexicon: one is causal; the other is non-causal. Alternatively, there may be only one which has the meaning of reason. If because is described as a derived form, then its underlying source may be a head noun REASON, or a verb or noun form with the meaning of cause.

These alternative linguistic analyses parallel a controversy existing in philosophical literature concerning the definitions of cause- and reason-explanations. The questions are similar. Are the definitions of reason- and causal-explanations inclusive? If they are, which is superordinate? Or, are they so dissimilar that we must define them disjointly? Or, are they contingent or overlapping in ways that we do not yet understand?¹

Whenever a solution to a problem is persistently unsatisfying, it can be useful to synthesise the alternatives from previous proposals. I will follow that procedure in this chapter. Consequently, I will argue that there is one underlying lexical item "because" which has both causal and non-causal features. Two authors have hinted at this approach. Kac advises those who intend to pursue a lexical analysis of because to concentrate on whether because has both non-causal and causal features. Joseph Margolis, writing from the point of view of linguistic philosophy, says:

It appears . . . that what we call actions form a logically mixed category, with respect to which explanations of different sorts overlap and intersect to some extent: the logic of justificatory reasons . . . appears to be substantially different from the logic of the reasons an agent has in acting as he does, and the logic of the latter appears to be significantly different from the logic of the causal explanation of his action. The promising key seems, therefore, to lie more with the points of contact and difference among these alternatives than with the prospects of subsuming one under the other.

The word because, then, is a promising candidate. It is controversial with regard to reasons and causes, and, if we attend to Kac's intuition that it may be causal and non-causal in meaning, we may discover that because is also the "point of contact" between the "logic of reasons" and the "logic of causes" which Margolis describes.

Evidence from naive native speakers does not encourage this speculation. Whenever I have asked naive informants to provide a definition of because, they have replied, "It means to cause something," or,

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"It's the cause of something." If we must accept speaker intuitions as unqualified data, we must conclude with a causal interpretation. But there are mitigating conditions which lead speakers to assume, unquestioningly, that because means, in some sense or other, to cause. First, the word contains "cause" in its form, and at one time in the history of English, because meant "by the cause of" or "by the cause that." Second, the word cause is contained in because, so one is tempted to explain because in terms of it, since the meaning of cause seems more transparent than the meaning of because.

J. L. Austin points out that we often use a simple action, like shoving a stone, as a model in terms of which we explain other events. He states that "causing" was probably a notion taken from the experience of performing simple actions. And, Austin extrapolates, since primitive man probably assumed that every event had a cause, either he or a spirit must have caused it. Later on in history, when events which are not actions have been included in our conceptual world, we still maintain that they are caused. We are bound by an original explanatory model. Austin says:

When, later, events which are not actions are realized to be such, we still say they must be 'caused', and the word snares us: we are struggling to ascribe to it a new, anthropomorphic meaning, yet constantly, in searching for its analysis, we unearth and incorporate the lineaments of the ancient model.

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3 J. L. Austin, Philosophical Papers, p. 150.
4 J. L. Austin, Philosophical Papers, p. 150.
Therefore, we should be aware that speaker intuitions may need modification.

Let us examine linguists' claims—counter-intuitive to those of naive informants—that because is non-causal in sense. Rutherford claims that in "Jenny isn't here, because I don't see her," the because-clause refers to the speaker's reason for making the statement. This sentence is unacceptable to me, and to many others I have consulted. So let us take one which is uniformly acceptable, and which he also claims is a 'reason': "He's not coming to class, because he just called from San Diego." Rutherford's analysis of this sentence is that the because-clause explains the speaker's reason for making the statement. This is not an indisputable interpretation: one could contend that the telephone call caused the speaker to make the statement.

While Rutherford's adversary, Kac, disagrees over theoretical terminology, Kac concurs that in sentences of the form $S_1$ because $S_2$, where because does not refer to a verb in $S_1$, because is non-causal in sense. Kac states that there is a difference in truth conditions between sentences which have an extradiscursary "I say to you" superordinate clause, and one which has an intradiscursary clause. He says that intradiscursary clauses cannot be deleted. He supports this contention with the following examples. In his sentence (9), if the say-clause is intradiscursory.

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6 Kac, "Clauses of Saying and the Interpretation of because," p. 631.
discurSary, then the truth of the sentence does not depend on the truth of the assertion that Julius Caesar is in this room: "I say to you that Julius Caesar is in this room." He states, "To the extent that truth conditions can be assigned at all to a sentence like (9), they would have to indicate that such a sentence is, if actually uttered, vacuously true." He contrasts sentence (9) with sentence (10), which he maintains is not vacuously true: "Julius Caesar is in this room." Pragmatic truth conditions do affect both sentences. Anyone listening to utterances corresponding to either (9) or (10), would be unconvinced unless he could see Julius Caesar or be otherwise convinced of his presence. Therefore, there is nothing vacuous about the conditions upon which I would judge the truth or falsity of (9) or (10). Furthermore, it seems as plausible to maintain that the presence of Julius Caesar could cause the speaker to make the remark, as it would be to maintain that the presence of Julius Caesar was the reason for the speaker's making the remark.

The relevance of the preceding discussion to because-clauses is that Kac hopes to indicate that there is a difference in truth conditions between the sentences "(2) I say to you that Jenny isn't here because I don't see her," and, "(3) Jenny isn't here, because I don't see her." If transformations are meaning-preserving, then the truth conditions of (2) and (3) must be the same. As I have indicated above, they are the same,

7 Kac, p. 628.
8 Kac, p. 628.
9 Kac, p. 626 and p. 628.
pragmatically, for me. The problem is not, it seems, in being understood, but is in efforts to incorporate data from language use into theoretical descriptions of sentences. And, for this thesis, the issue is whether it can be argued conclusively that a form, $S_1 \text{ because } S_2$, must be interpreted as either causal or non-causal.

Consider J. Davison's set of counterexamples to the causative hypothesis. He states that in sentences (6a) and (6b), the meaning of because cannot be causal: "(6a) The dog ran away because Mary disliked it. (6b) Mary caused the dog to run away because she disliked it." He says, regarding these two sentences, "We expect that Mary has performed some act or actions that have resulted in, but not caused, the dog's running away."

One could maintain that she did do something caused by her dislike, but that the description of this action is deleted in the sentence. Perhaps she beat the dog, because she disliked it; thus, dislike caused the beating which caused the dog to run away. Humourously viewed, it is a variation of The House That Jack Built. When considered seriously, it is a problem in the individuation of actions. If we substitute a noun with the feature [+human] for "dog" in sentence (6), we do not feel that a causal interpretation is odd: "Mary caused her daughter to run away because she disliked her." The difference in acceptability seems to be that a daughter could perceive the dislike in a way that a dog could not. Therefore, no action by the mother need occur for her dislike to cause the daughter to run away.

The most persuasive case for J. Davison's sentences to be understood non-causally occurs indirectly in F. Bowers' article, "On the Structure of Apparent Causative-Affectives in English." Bowers argues that "a cause does not find expression in a prepositional object." He maintains that simple affective constructions which contain mental state semantic forms, including those ending in -ed, such as averse to, intolerant of, afraid of, angry at, astonished at, concerned with, and delighted at, are not verbs in passive form. Rather, they are relative adjectives requiring a prepositional object which represents the semantic object of the feeling, and not the cause. If we also considered dislike of as a relative adjective, then we would have to say that in J. Davison's sentence (6a), the dog was the semantic object of Mary's dislike. This need not preclude our contending, however, that Mary was, from the point of view of the dog, the cause of its running away.

Bowers cites other examples of sentences containing because in construction with a simple affective verb. He claims that these sentences are not causal. He says that the sentence, "John was angry because Bill burst in without knocking," is non-causal, for it actually means, "John was angry at Bill's bursting in without knocking." And, Bowers maintains, causes are not expressed by prepositional objects.  

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12 F. Bowers, p. 17.

13 F. Bowers, p. 17.
But it could be argued that another object has been deleted. The sentence could be paraphrased, "John was angry at Bill because Bill burst in without knocking." Or, a less awkward sentence would be, "John was angry at Bill because he burst in without knocking." Whereas Bill may have been the object of John's anger, Bill did something to deserve it; namely, burst in without knocking. One could argue, then, that Bill's bursting in caused John to be angry at Bill.

A second non-causal example which Bowers cites is: "He was irritated because he was hungry." Bowers maintains that this sentence does not mean, "He was irritated at being hungry." I would agree, but counter once again that another object has been deleted; thus, "He was angry at something because he was hungry." Therefore, hunger caused him to be angry at something.

A reasonable conclusion to the question whether because, in sentences of the form, $S_1$ because $S_2$, need be either causal or non-causal, is that one can argue cogently for both interpretations only if neither $S_1$ nor $S_2$ contains the lexical items "cause" or "reason." I conclude that in this sentence form, because has the semantic feature [+cause]. However, one cannot maintain this conclusion unequivocally for because in sentences having a predicate nominal form. For instance, when because occurs in the predicate of sentences whose subject is represented by the noun reason, the meaning of because seems to be determined by the noun. Examine, once again, sentence (18) from Chapter II: "The reason why I am going is

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$^1$ F. Bowers, p. 18.
because I am tired." Or, J. Davison's sentence (34c), "The reason he left was because we told him to go." and, Otto Jespersen's sentence, "The real reason why I am out of place here is because I like men." In all of these sentences which contain a predicate nominal form, "reason . . . because," the word because does not seem to be causal in meaning. I propose that it functions as a pro-form to the noun, and assimilates in sense to it. In this environment because has the feature [-cause]. I present my evidence here.

Consider the following possible collocations of because and reason:

(a) The reason that . . . is because . . .
(b) The reason why . . . is because . . .
(c) The reason why . . . is that . . .
(d) The reason is because . . .
(e) The reason is because . . . and because . . .
(f) The reason is that . . .
(g) The reason why . . . is because . . . and that . . .
(h) The reason that . . . is . . .
(i) The reason why . . . was not that . . . but because . . .
(j) The reason . . . is why . . .

Three sequences are unacceptable:

(k) *The reason because . . .
(l) *The reason is why . . .
(m) *The reason is that . . . and why . . .

The first evidence which supports my proposal that *because* is a pro-form is that in all instances where *reason* occurs with *because*, one can either substitute *that* for *because* after the verb, or alternate *that* with *because* in a compound predicate. Moreover, there appears to be no loss of sense. One might object that the reason why *that* can substitute for *because*, is that *that* also has the feature [+reason]. This argument holds only for sentences where *reason* is followed by an embedded relative clause, and *because* or *that* occurs in the predicate.

For example in sentences (27)-(30), both *because* and *that* may occur in the same position, or, in sentences (27')-(30'), both may be deleted:

(27) The reason why I am going is *{that \(\text{because}^{\text{}}\)* I am tired.
(27') The reason why I am going is I am tired.
(28) The reason why we returned was *{that \(\text{because}^{\text{}}\)* we were broke.
(28') The reason why we returned was we were broke.
(29) The reason he left was *{that \(\text{because}^{\text{}}\)* we told him to go.
(29') The reason he left was we told him to go.
(30) The real reason why I am out of place here is *{that \(\text{because}^{\text{}}\)* I like men.
(30') The real reason why I am out of place here is I like men.

I conclude that in sentences (27)-(30), *because* and *that* are semantically redundant—neither represents features other than those already represented by the noun *reason*, since both *because* and *that* can be deleted.

Notice, to the contrary, that in sentences of the form $S_1 \text{ because } S_2$—where *because* occurs without the noun "reason"—*because* cannot be deleted, nor can *that* be substituted:
(31) I am going because I am tired.

(32) *I am going I am tired.

(33) *I am going that I am tired.

To retain sense, because must occur in sentence (31), since no other word appears in the sentence which represents the semantic content of because. That, unlike because, requires a referential noun in all environments.

Additional evidence supporting my claim that because is a pro-form of "reason" is that because cannot immediately follow reason. The explanation I offer for the unacceptability of the sequence "reason because" also explains the unacceptability of sequences such as, "The man he . . .," and "The girl she . . ." That is, we do not repeat in immediate succession, words which contain the same essential semantic information. In the sequence "man he," the features [+human, +male] are expressed initially by "man." Similarly, in "girl she," the features [+human, +female] are features of "girl." And, in "reason because," the noun "reason" represents [+reason]; hence, "reason because" is semantically redundant and unacceptable.

However, it should be noted that the sequence "reason that" is acceptable because that may assimilate in sense to any noun. Moreover, as sentence *(33) illustrates, that must have a noun to govern its sense.

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16 One can immediately repeat the same word for purposes of intensification, as in the sequences "very, very hot" or "red, red rose." One may not say "very hot, hot" or "red rose, rose." Nor can a verb pro-form immediately follow its antecedent: "John ran down the hill and Mary did, too" is acceptable. But "John ran down the hill did and Mary, too" is unacceptable.
But since *because* assimilates only to "reason" or (as I shall argue below), to "cause," *because* may not occur in a position immediately following either of these lexical items without unacceptable semantic redundancy. Furthermore, since *because* assimilates only to these lexical items, *because* can occur in sentences without either "reason" or "cause."

Final evidence that *because* is a pro-form for "reason" is that *because*-clauses cannot precede the noun "reason" in discourse-initial sentences. This prohibition is compatible with Susumu Kuno's condition on backward pronominalization. He states that backward pronominalization is possible only when the right of two noun phrases is old information.\(^\text{17}\)

If *because* is anaphoric in the following sentences, then we may predict their unacceptability:

\[
(34) \quad \text{Because I was hungry is the reason that I got up.}
\]

\[
(35) \quad \text{Because he was hurt is the reason John stayed out of the game.}
\]

\[
(36) \quad \text{Because it rained forty days is the reason the river flooded.}
\]

A reversed order of the clauses produces acceptable sentences:

\[
(34') \quad \text{The reason that I got up is because I was hungry.}
\]

\[
(35') \quad \text{The reason John stayed out of the game is because he was hurt.}
\]

\[
(36') \quad \text{The reason that the river flooded is because it rained forty days.}
\]

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And, as further confirmation, consider the following unacceptable sentences where because is preposed and embedded in a cleft form:

(37) *It was because I was ill was the reason that I stayed home.

(38) *It was because it rained forty days is the reason the river flooded.

It is impossible to provide acceptable sentences for *(37) and *(38) by reversing the order of the clauses. Preposing must be a condition on clefting in sentences in which reason and because co-occur. This condition does not apply to sentences of the S₁ because S₂ form.¹⁸

I conclude that because is a pro-form for reason in the previously described environments.¹⁹ I base this conclusion on the following summarized data. In any sentence of predicate nominal form where reason and because co-occur, that can substitute for because, and because may not immediately follow reason. In any sentence where a relative clause immediately follows reason, and because occurs in the predicate, because can be deleted. Finally, because-clauses adhere to backward pronominalization rules: because-clauses cannot precede main clauses which contain reason, if the sentence is discourse-initial.

Now I will show that when because occurs in sentences of predicate nominal form where the subject is represented by the noun cause, because

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¹⁸ Thus, in reply to the question, "What reason is given for the flood?" one may reply acceptable either with, "It's because it rained that the river flooded," or, with, "It's that the river flooded because it rained."

¹⁹ See pp.59.
functions as a pro-form to the noun. In this environment, because has the feature [·cause]. Notice that the following collocations of cause and because are possible:

(a) The cause of . . . is because . . .
(b) The cause of . . . is that . . .
(c) The cause of . . . is that . . . and because . . .
(d) The cause of . . . is because . . . and that . . .
(e) The cause . . . is not that . . . but because . . .
(f) The cause . . . is not because . . . but that . . .

Two sequences are unacceptable:

(g) *The cause because
(h) *The cause of . . . because

My explanation of the unacceptable sequence of "reason because" also applies here to unacceptable collocation *'(g). That is, in sentences which contain cause and because, rules of English do not allow immediate sequences of words containing redundant semantic information. In the foregoing forms, (a) - (f), there is also a phonic explanation why the farther apart because is from cause, the more natural the sentence sounds. Notice that sequences (c) and (e) sound more acceptable than sequences (d) and (f). The explanation seems to be that speakers avoid phonic redundancy unless assonance is desired for special stylistic purposes.

Just as that can substitute for because in reason . . . because constructions, that can substitute for because in cause . . . because constructions:

(39) The cause of the fire was because I was careless.
(39') The cause of the fire was that I was careless.

(40) The cause of the flood was because it thawed rapidly, and because the dikes were weak.

(40') The cause of the flood was that it thawed rapidly, and that the dikes were weak.

(41) The cause of my being late is not because I slept in, but because my car failed to start.

(41') The cause of my being late is not that I slept in, but that my car failed to start.

And, parallel to reason . . . because constructions, because can be deleted in cause . . . because constructions without loss of sense.

(39'') The cause of the fire was I was careless.

(40'') The cause of the flood was it thawed rapidly and the dikes were weak.

(41'') The cause of my being late is not my sleeping in but my car failing to start.

I conclude that substitution of that for because in sentences (39)-(41'') would be impossible if because were not a pro-form for cause. In addition, in sentences (39'')-(41''), because can be deleted since its feature [*cause] is also a property of the noun cause.

As Because . . . reason sequences are unacceptable, so Because . . . cause sequences are unacceptable. In the following sentences which are discourse initial, the prohibition on preposing because is predictable from Kuno's constraint on backwards pronominalization:

(42) *Because I was careless was the cause of the fire.
(43) *Because it thawed rapidly and because the dikes were weak was the cause of the flood.

(44) *Not because I slept in but because my car failed to start is the cause of my being late.

Similarly, celft forms are unacceptable:

(42') *It was because I was careless was the cause of the fire.

(43') *It was because it thawed rapidly and because the dikes were weak was the cause of the flood.

(44') *It was not because I slept in but because my car failed to start is the cause of my being late.

I conclude that in sentences where the noun cause collocates with because, because is a pro-form of cause. In these sentences, the feature [-cause] is suspended, and the feature [+cause] assimilates to the noun.

Because also occurs in sentences with the verb cause. And, although none of the evidence which establishes my case for a causal interpretation of because in nominal cause . . . because sentences holds for verbal cause . . . because sentences, I will, nevertheless, demonstrate that because also assimilates in sense to verbal cause. I will begin with negative evidence. First, a because-clause can either precede or follow a verb:

(45) Because I was careless, I caused the fire.

(45') I caused the fire because I was careless.

(46) Because he was being hounded by debt collectors, his desire for the money caused him to yield to their demands.
(46') His desire for the money caused him to yield to their demands because he was being hounded by debt collectors.

(47) Because I hate living in the rain, the nice weather is one of the things which caused me to come here.

(47') The nice weather is one of the things which caused me to come here, because I hate living in the rain.

We cannot conclude, then, as we did with nominal cause . . . because collocations, that verbal cause . . . because constructions are anaphoric in the sense of a pro-form.

Second, it is impossible to delete because from the foregoing sentences and retain sense:

(45") I was careless, I caused the fire.

(45"') I started the fire I was careless.

(46") He was being hounded by debt collectors, his desire for the money caused him to yield to their demands.

(46"') His desire for the money caused him to yield to their demands he was being hounded by debt collectors.

(47") I hate living in the rain, the nice weather is one of the things which caused me to come here.

(47"') The nice weather is one of the things which caused me to come here I hate living in the rain.

Finally, it is also impossible to substitute that for because in sentences (45)-(47). Despite these negative conclusions, I contend that
because assimilates in sense to the verb cause on the grounds that it is possible to delete because when the because-clause is interpreted as a restrictive appositive.

There is traditional precedent for this position. Jespersen states that particles—he classifies because as a particle—are often placed in apposition to a primary. The appositive may either precede or follow the primary. In these sentences, he says, any form of be denotes "cause or reason." I amend this definition to state that in cases where be is in apposition to a sentence which includes verbal cause, the appositive is causal in meaning. I present the following sentences as evidence for this amendment.

Consider the following set of sentences in which because is included in the (a) examples, but is replaced by a participial form of be in the (b) examples.

(48a) Because I was careless, I caused the fire.
(48b) Being careless, I caused the fire.
(49a) Because he was being hounded by debt collectors, his desire for the money caused him to yield to their demands.
(49b) Being hounded by debt collectors, his desire for the money caused him to yield to their demands.
(50a) Because I hate living in the rain, the nice weather is one of the things which caused me to come here.

20 O. Jespersen, Essentials, p. 94.
(50b) Hating (as I do) to live in the rain, the nice weather is one of the things which caused me to come here.

I maintain that it would be impossible to delete because in these sentences and retain sense if because added semantic information to the sentence. One might counter that these sentences are particularly easy to paraphrase with adjectival appositive constructions, since the subject noun in both clauses is identical in reference.

In sentences (51a)-(52b), the subject nouns of the two clauses are not co-referential, yet an appositive analysis with have as participle holds:

(51a) The match caused the fire in the compartment because the oxygen hadn't been turned off.
(51b) The match caused the fire in the compartment, the oxygen not having been turned off.
(52a) The crowd caused another disturbance because the Beatles played so loud.
(52b) The crowd caused another disturbance, the Beatles having played so loud.

Therefore, because can be deleted in sentences which contain verbal cause.

In conclusion, I propose the following lexical analysis of because. In the sentence form, $S_1$ because $S_2$, where neither $S_1$ nor $S_2$ contains the lexical items "reason" or "cause," because has the feature [\_cause]. Because has two conditioned variants. When because occurs in a sentence of predicate nominal form whose subject is represented by the
noun "reason," the feature [+cause] is suspended, and because has the
feature [-cause]. When because occurs in a sentence of predicate nominal
form whose subject is represented by the noun "cause," the feature [-cause]
is suspended, and because has the feature [+cause]. In these predicate
nominal sentence forms, because is a pro-form of the nouns "reason" and
"cause." When because occurs in a sentence with verbal cause, the feature
[-cause] is suspended, and [+cause] assimilates to the verb. Therefore,
returning to Margolis' suggestions and Kac's intuition, because is both
a point of contact and a difference between the logic of reasons and
the logic of causes.
SUMMARY

In Chapter I, I describe previous linguistic research on because and because-clauses. Data from these investigations associates because with positions of prominence in a sentence. In Chapter II, I investigate this prominence by applying criteria of the term "focus" to because. The definition of "focus," synthesised from previous definitions, includes linguistic rules of stress, negation, question, and embedding. In Chapter III, I propose that because may have semantic features common to reason- and causal-explanations. I claim that S₁ because S₂ is the underlying form of because, and that in this form, because has the semantic property [·cause]. I describe two conditioned variants of because occurring in sentences either with the noun reason or with the noun or verb cause. In the former environment, the feature [·cause] is suspended and because assimilates in sense to reason. Similarly, in the latter environment, the feature [-cause] is suspended and because assimilates in sense to the noun or verb cause.
Literature Cited


