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Strategy, technology and the making of United States strategic doctrines, 1945-1972 Kupperman, Charles Martin 1973

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c.l STRATEGY, TECHNOLOGY AND THE MAKING OF UNITED STATES STRATEGIC DOCTRINES 19^5-1972 by CHARLES MARTIN KUPPERMAN B.A., Honors, Purdue U n i v e r s i t y , 1972 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS i n the Department of P o l i t i c a l Science We accept t h i s t h e s i s as conforming t o the r e q u i r e d standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA September, 1973 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make i t freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by his representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Charles M. Kupperman Department of P o l i t i c a l Science The University of British Columbia Vancouver 8, Canada Date October 3, 1973 i ABSTRACT The purpose of t h i s t h e s i s i s t o examine and analyze the nature of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the t e c h n o l o g i c a l developments i n nuc l e a r weapons systems and the e v o l u t i o n of the s t r a t e g i c d o c t r i n e of the United States 19^5-1972. Because of the dynamic nature of weapons development i n the status-conscious system, there i s a need t o evaluate the impact of weapons technology and momentum upon s t r a t e g i c d o c t r i n e . There i s a p l e t h o r a of l i t e r a t u r e which i s founded on the almost a p r i o r i assumption and a n a l y t i c a l leap t h a t technology i s the dominating f a c t o r i n the f o r m u l a t i o n of s t r a t e g i c d o c t r i n e . Although t h i s extremely d e t e r -m i n i s t i c , t e c h n o c r a t i c theory has great popular appeal, i t may serve only t o obscure other e q u a l l y important dimensions of defense p o l i c y and n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y s t r a t e g y . I t I s my b e l i e f that there are indeed other dimensions to s t r a t e g i c policy-making i n a d d i t i o n t o purely techno-l o g i c a l momentum. These a d d i t i o n a l components are the more s u b j e c t i v e and i n t u i t i v e aspects i n v o l v e d i n the machina-t i o n s of domestic and i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s of techno-l o g i c a l and s t r a t e g i c choice. The n e c e s s i t i e s of economics, the powerful b u r e a u c r a t i c pressures, and a s e n s i t i v i t y t o a p o t e n t i a l l y v o c a l domestic audience were a l l v i t a l f a c t o r s i n the making of s t r a t e g i c d o c t r i n e . An examination of i i these other v a r i a b l e s w i l l provide a more complete under-standing of the nature of the t e c h n o l o g i c a l - s t r a t e g i c r e l a t i o n s h i p i n the United S t a t e s . Exact calendar dates d e l i n e a t i n g e i t h e r t e c h n o l o g i c a l or s t r a t e g i c periods are somewhat a r t i f i c i a l ; they are an inescapable n e c e s s i t y which w i l l be used w i t h caution. S t r u c t u r a l l y , the t h e s i s w i l l be d i v i d e d i n t o f i v e p a r t s i f o u r chapters of t e x t and one s e c t i o n of assorted m a t e r i a l s . Chapter One contains a general d i s c u s s i o n of the com p l e x i t i e s and dynamics of defense planning i n the system of nuclear deterrence. Chapter Two i s devoted t o the v a r i o u s developments and d i r e c t i o n s of nuclear technology and s t r a t e g i c d o c t r i n e d u r i n g the per i o d 19^-5-1960. Chapter Three contains a s i m i l a r l y s t y l e d d i s c u s s i o n of the period 1960-1972. Chapter Four i s devoted t o drawing conclusions about the nature of the t e c h n o l o g i c a l - s t r a t e g i c r e l a t i o n s h i p i n the United States. There i s a l s o a " q u i c k - f i x " s e c t i o n f o l l o w i n g the t e x t which contains a gl o s s a r y and v a r i o u s appendices. These pages w i l l be most b e n e f i c i a l i f perused p r i o r t o reading the t e x t . The subject matter i s profound, h i g h l y complex, and u l t i m a t e l y , very s u b j e c t i v e . Because of these charac-t e r i s t i c s , a s t a t e of i n t e l l e c t u a l a l e r t n e s s and emotional calm i s the author*s a n a l y t i c a l and s t y l i s t i c o b j e c t i v e . TABLE OP CONTENTS I. CHAPTER ONE " The S t r a t e g i s t s Dilemma" 1-13 I I . CHAPTER TWO The Atom i s S p l i t " 14 -29 I I I . CHAPTER THREE " S t r a t e g i c Change" 30-4-5 IV. CHAPTER FOUR The Dilemma Remains" 4-6-52 V. FOOTNOTES 5 3 - 7 4 VI. BIBLIOGRAPHY 75-86 V I I . APPENDIX A 8 7 - 1 0 3 V I I I . APPENDIX B 104 IX. APPENDIX C 105 X. APPENDIX D 106 XI. APPENDIX E 107 X I I . APPENDIX P 108 X I I I . GLOSSARY 109-116 CHAPTER ONE "The S t r a t e g i s t ' s Dilemma" Those of us who do t h i s work are beset by a l l kinds of l i m i t a t i o n s i n c l u d i n g l i m i t a t i o n s i n t a l e n t and i n knowledge. Where the object i s to p r e d i c t the f u t u r e , f o r the sake of appro-p r i a t e a c t i o n , we simply cannot wait u n t i l a l l the r e l e v a n t f a c t s are i n . Besides, we can make progress only as we cut o f f and t r e a t i n i s o l a -t i o n a small p o r t i o n of the t o t a l universe of data and of problems that confront us, and every research p r o j e c t i s t o that extent, 'out of context.* In a d d i t i o n , we are d e a l i n g always w i t h l a r g e admixtures of pure chance. These are sometimes d i f f i c u l t t o take i n t o f u l l account without seeming t o s t u l t i f y our r e s u l t s , and that human beings are n a t u r a l l y l o a t h t o do. The same i s true of the l a r g e range of v a r i a b l e s which d e a l w i t h enemy i n t e n t i o n s and c a p a b i l i t i e s . F i n a l l y , we are immersed i n b i a s , our own and that of our c l i e n t s or readers. With our audience, i n s p i t e of our strong e f f o r t s t o be o b j e c t i v e , we cannot av o i d being i n f l u e n c e d by what we know i t l i k e s t o h e a r . l Deterrence as an element i n n a t i o n a l s t r a t e g y i s nothing new. To persuade an opponent t o d e s i s t from p a r t i c u l a r a c t i o n by t h r e a t e n i n g d e l e t e r i o u s r e t a l i a t i o n has always been a f u n c t i o n of i n t e r s t a t e p o l i t i c a l com-munication. However, the present p o s i t i o n of deterrence i n r e l a t i o n t o a l l - o u t war i s markedly d i f f e r e n t than the non-nuclear predecessor. P r i o r t o the nuclear age, s t r a t e g y was devoted t o d i s c o v e r i n g how the resources of a n a t i o n , both human and m a t e r i a l , could be developed and u t i l i z e d f o r maximizing 2 the t o t a l e f f e c t i v e n e s s of the n a t i o n both i n peace and i n war. I f d e t e r r e n c e d i d f a i l and war r e s u l t e d , n a t i o n s c o u l d " r o a d - t e s t " t h e i r s t r a t e g i c d o c t r i n e s without f e a r of a n n i h i l a t i o n . I f d e t e r r e n c e f a i l e d p r i o r t o 194-5, a "win-the war" s t r a t e g y c o u l d p o s s i b l y produce v i c t o r y i n the t r a d i t i o n a l context of the term. However, we can no l o n g e r enjoy the " l u x u r y " of a l l -out war which was a t l e a s t an a v a i l a b l e o p t i o n i n the non-nuclear p e r i o d . Because of the quantum l e a p i n both the d e s t r u c t i v e power and the speed of d e l i v e r y of n u c l e a r weapons, th e r e can be no breakdown i n the system of n u c l e a r d e t e r r e n c e . S t r a t e g y must now a n t i c i p a t e the t r i a l s of i<rar and by a n t i c i p a t i n g them, seek where p o s s i b l e t o i n c r e a s e one's advantage without unduly j e o p a r d i z i n g the maintenance of peace or the p u r s u i t of other v a l u e s . ^ The p s y c h o l o g i c a l a s p e c t s of p o l i t i c a l - m i l i t a r y communications are of paramount importance i n the system of n u c l e a r d e t e r r e n c e . The crux of the matter i s the c r e a t i o n of a " s t a t e of mind of d e t e r r e n c e . " In order t o c r e a t e t h i s " s t a t e of mind," s t r a t e g i c i n t e n t i o n s and techno-l o g i c a l c a p a b i l i t i e s must be c l e a r l y and unambiguously communicated t o o u r s e l v e s , our a l l i e s , and our enemies.^ T h i s i s r a r e l y an easy undertaking. The U n i t e d S t a t e s has responded t o the p s y c h o l o g i c a l n e c e s s i t i e s of d e t e r r e n c e w i t h a penchant f o r problem-s o l v i n g techniques. T h i s approach has produced the 3 o v e r q u a n t i f i c a t i o n of s t r a t e g i c i s s u e s , an academic numbers game, and the t h e o r e t i c a l " d e r i v a t i o n " of simple s o l u t i o n s t o complex s t r a t e g i c q u e s t i o n s . When these techniques experienced f a i l u r e , the remaining r e c o u r s e was the simple l e a p of f a i t h i n which c o n c l u s i o n s tended t o be accepted l o n g b e f o r e they were s u b s t a n t i a t e d . The offense-defense i n t e r a c t i o n Is a case i n p o i n t w i t h the former b e i n g seen as the simple s o l u t i o n . The e n t i r e process of n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y p o l i c y r e q u i r e s a h e a l t h y empathy f o r the o f t e n u n s o p h i s t i c a t e d emotions which shape the p u b l i c and p r i v a t e conduct of men and n a t i o n s of men. S t r a t e g y i s a v e r y " s o f t " a r e a of a n a l y s i s ; i n f a c t , i t i s messy. S t r a t e g i c matters do not l e n d themselves t o " s c i e n t i f i c " a n a l y s i s simply because they are so laden w i t h v a l u e judgments.^ But can a " s t a t e of mind" o f f e r any a l t e r n a t i v e ? Probably not. i Furthermore, and as Bernard Brodie has s t a t e d , " s u r e l y t h e r e i s something u n r e a l about a l l t h i s ; " - ' he i s s u r e l y more r i g h t than wrong. " T h i n k i n g about the u n t h i n k a b l e " i s always an i m a g i n a t i v e e x e r c i s e , and the p s y c h o l o g i c a l investment i n d e t e r r e n c e i s probably Immeasurable. In s h o r t , we have come t o expect the n u c l e a r system t o be c o n s t a n t l y c o i l e d ; but never do we expect i t to be sprung. Nor can we prove i f i t works! While n u c l e a r weapons may d e t e r only a narrow range of t h r e a t s , they are an ever-present v a r i a b l e i n the n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y c a l c u l u s . Power i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l system i s measured i n i t s grossest form, not by r e f i n e d analyses. S t r a t e g i c f o r c e s do have p o l i t i c a l u t i l i t y . The amount of i n f l u e n c e they w i e l d i s again dependent on the " s t a t e of mind," but g e n e r a l l y , we are concerned here w i t h the impact of l a r g e hardware systems of somewhat nebulous net t e c h n i c a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s on d e l i c a t e p s y c h o l o g i c a l matters of h i g h l y nebulous character. The general d i r e c t i o n of t h i s impact i s c l e a r , but i t i s not p o s s i b l e t o q u a n t i f y i t s magnitude i n terms t h a t admit d i r e c t comparison w i t h other r e l e v a n t f a c t o r s . " and as common sense reminds us about the " s t a t e of mind," Large f o r c e s look more impressive than s m a l l o n e s — f o r reasons which are by no means e n t i r e l y i r r a t i o n a l — . . . Human beings . . . g e n e r a l l y have i n common the f a c t that they make t h e i r most momentous d e c i s i o n s by what i s fundamentally i n t u i t i o n . ' Because of the u n s c i e n t i f i c and n o n - d e t e r m i n i s t i c nature of s t r a t e g i c persuasion, a numbers game i s played which seeks t o r a t i o n a l i z e , "how much i s enough?" Again, the answer l i e s u l t i m a t e l y i n the " s t a t e of mind." The e f f e c t i v e operation of deterrence over the long term r e q u i r e s that the other pa r t y be w i l l i n g t o l i v e w i t h our possession o of the c a p a b i l i t y upon which i t r e s t s . The present system of deterrence i s committed t o the s u r v i v a l of r e t a l i a t o r y f o r c e s of "adequate" s i z e a f t e r an enemy a t t a c k ? and t h i s means numbers and performance c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of weapons systems become important assumptions i n planning the n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y . But again, these assump-t i o n s are not s c i e n t i f i c . 5 The argument i s not about the t r u t h or f a l s i t y of some s c i e n t i f i c law, i t i s about the p l a u s i -b i l i t y of the assumptions on which c a l c u l a t i o n s are based . . . These are not questions of Science, they are matters of judgment based on experience.10 And experience t e l l s us t h a t because of a competitive n a t i o n - s t a t e i n t e r n a t i o n a l system, the f o r m u l a t i o n of n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y p o l i c y i s going t o be based on "con-s e r v a t i v e " estimates of enemy i n t e n t i o n s and c a p a b i l i t i e s . The prudent course i s t o plan f o r the "greater-than-expected t h r e a t ; " t h i s i s the medium t o upper range estimate of the q u a n t i t y and q u a l i t y of the enemy's f o r c e s and t h e i r s t r a t e g i c m o t i v a t i o n . 1 1 Because of the u n c e r t a i n t y i n planning n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y p o l i c y , i t i s prudent t o buy more insurance than t o buy too l i t t l e . Insurance i s a healthy inventory of weapons systems. No one r e a l l y knows "how much i s enough?" But the one-way p s y c h o l o g i c a l investment i n deterrence, that i s , the absolute b e l i e f t h a t deterrence must not f a i l , i s a very anxious road t o t r a v e l . On the one hand, great f a i t h i s placed upon the a d v e r s a r i e s being " r a t i o n a l " i n r e c o g n i z i n g r e c i p r o c a l i n t e n t i o n s and c a p a b i l i t i e s . Yet, on the other hand, s e c u r i t y p o l i c y must be planned w i t h the assumption t h a t a "gap" i n i n t e n t i o n s and r e l a t i v e strengths could develop and upset the c r e d i b i l i t y of a n a t i o n ' s s t r a t e g i c f o r c e s , 1 2 thereby u p s e t t i n g the system of deterrence. Therefore, the only recourse I s 6 conservative planning. As former Secretary of Defense Melvin R. L a i r d has t e s t i f i e d : Speakers Rayhurn and McCormack cautioned me, that i f I were to make any mistakes w h i l e I was on t h a t committee (Defense A p p r o p r i a t i o n s ) t h a t I e r r on the s i d e of the n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y of t h i s country. . I thought that was p r e t t y good advice . . . I have always t r i e d t o f o l l o w that advice and I t h i n k i t i s p r e t t y good advice i n t h i s whole area of n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y and defense planning. I do not l i k e t o gamble w i t h the n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y of t h i s country.13 L a i r d ' s testimony represents the a r c h e t y p a l n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y planning p e r s p e c t i v e . But t o hedge one's bets i n planning n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y r e q u i r e s the defense managers to grapple w i t h the concurrent development of technology and s t r a t e g y i n u n c e r t a i n f u t u r e environments. The problems of s e l e c t i n g s t r a t e g i e s and choosing weapons systems today are q u i t e u n l i k e anything t h a t e x i s t e d before World War I I . . . Before World War I I we d i d not plan on t e c h n o l o g i c a l change; we merely adjusted t o i t . Now we are planning on i t . We are debating whether i n v e n t i o n s can be s c heduled. 1^ A weapons system on which research and development i s s t a r t e d today w i l l have i t s u s e f u l l i f e i n the e n v i r o n -1 *> ment of two t o f o u r t e c h n o l o g i c a l r e v o l u t i o n s hence. ^ To p r o j e c t two or f o u r t e c h n o l o g i c a l r e v o l u t i o n s i n t o the f u t u r e i s a c l a s s i c example of operating i n a f o g . 1 ^ As A l b e r t Wohlstetter has s t a t e d , we are not very good at p r e d i c t i n g e i t h e r our own t e c h n o l o g i c a l advances or those of the adversary; the f u t u r e i s i n t r i n s i c a l l y uncertain. 1?' 7 One of the many u n c e r t a i n t i e s i s that there can be many a s l i p between the acceptance of an i d e a i n p r i n c i p l e and the implementation of i t through appro-p r i a t e l y s e l e c t e d plans and a c t i o n s . As Dr. John Poster, D i r e c t o r of Defense Research and Engineering has s t a t e d i A weapons system i s a complex i n t e g r a t i o n of hundreds of technologies. I t i s d e f i n e d by o b j e c t i v e s and by t h r e a t s , and there are many s u b s t i t u t i o n s t o the technologies and to the t h r e a t s d u r i n g the development and d u r i n g the operation of a weapons system.18 Weapons systems can be outraced by changes i n the techno-l o g i c a l and/or p o l i t i c a l environment long before they are ever deployed. However, some technologies w i l l s u r v i v e the ordeals and roadblocks i n development. Of p a r t i c u l a r concern to the defense planner are e x a c t l y which ones w i l l be deployed i n the s t r a t e g i c f o r c e . Because of the short i n t e l l i g e n c e lead-time a v a i l a b l e between the d i s c o v e r y of an adversary's t e c h n o l o g i c a l breakthrough i n i t s l a t e development stages and the deployment of the weapon system based on these t e c h n o l o g i c a l advances, there i s a p r e s s i n g need f o r a vigorous research and development program of our own. This program i s designed t o d i s c o v e r what we don't know 19 and what i s t e c h n o l o g i c a l l y p o s s i b l e so we w i l l be i n a ready p o s i t i o n t o e x p l o i t the technology before our a d v e r s a r i e s . A d d i t i o n a l l y , by pursuing a vigorous research and development program, i t i s p o s s i b l e t o e x t r a p o l a t e what 8 the adversary's t e c h n o l o g i c a l developments may be. When one of our own weapons systems reaches the l a t e r develop-ment stages, the conservative defense planner must assume that the enemy a l s o has the system i n a near comparable state-of-the-art.21 There are dangers, however, i n e x t r a p o l a t i n g the enemy's s t r a t e g i e s and technologies from our own. The tendency t o mirror-image the enemy, w h i l e i t may be ego-s a t i s f y i n g , . may a l s o be a pe r v e r s i o n of r e a l i t y . The enemy may have d i f f e r e n t s t r a t e g i c requirements and may have no need t o emulate our d o c t r i n e or technology. Another danger i s that we may not e x t r a p o l a t e a c c u r a t e l y enough the enemy's development i n a given f i e l d of t e c h -nology. Many o f f i c i a l United States estimates of Soviet 22 nuclear development come q j l c k l y t o mind. I d e a l l y , though,,technological s u r p r i s e s are few and d e c i s i o n s f o r weapons development are made which provide a l l reasonable hedges ag a i n s t p o s s i b l e new needs or changes i n t h r e a t s . As s e c u r i t y i s a r e l a t i v e " s t a t e of mind," What we have got t o do i s t o have the best s e c u r i t y we can on a c a l c u l a t e d b a s i s of our own I n t e l l i g e n c e and our e f f i c i e n c y and on our l o o k i n g forward a t any one time. 23 But even t a k i n g reasonable hedges a g a i n s t the f u t u r e t e c h n o l o g i c a l and s t r a t e g i c environments i n v o l v e s elements of choice. Although h i n d s i g h t i s u s u a l l y a more accurate a n a l y t i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e than f o r e s i g h t , defense 9 planning must attempt t o ask the " r i g h t " questions i n the present, about the u n c e r t a i n f u t u r e . Even when fo r m u l a t i n g these questions, planners do not possess i n t e l l e c t u a l c a r t e blanche. For as Comte has s a i d , "C'est I'ancien q u i nous empeche de connaitre l e nouveau," ( I t i s the o l d that prevents us from r e c o g n i z i n g the new). We are t o a l a r g e degree, molded by the past. As Bernard Brodie has s t a t e d : we should not deceive ourselves t h a t we have the a b i l i t y t o s t a r t from s c r a t c h w i t h completely f r e s h ideas, and guided merely by l o g i c , t o f a s h i o n a s t r a t e g y according t o the needs of the t i m e . 2 ^ Prevalent m i l i t a r y s t r a t e g y tends t o fa v o r i n v e n t i o n s t h a t f i t , and tends t o r e s i s t ideas that c l a s h w i t h i t and r e q u i r e r e v i s i o n ; the temptation i s t o evaluate new ideas i n terms of o l d p r a c t i c e s . 2 ^ This i s understandable given the k i n d of e v o l u t i o n a r y process by which new weapons 2.6 systems "grow" out of o l d ones, the n a t u r a l l i m i t s of technology, 2? and the m i l i t a r y ' s b u r e a u c r a t i c I n t e r e s t s i n v o l v e d . In an i d e a l t e c h n o l o g i c a l - s t r a t e g i c r e l a t i o n s h i p , Science i n v e n t s w h i l e defense planners innovate. Frequently, these r o l e s have not always been observed and the r e s u l t has been the p o l i t i c i z a t i o n of Science. S c i e n t i s t s have become most-favored p a r t i c i p a n t s i n the defense p o l i c y process. Because defense matters are 10 so u n c e r t a i n , " s c i e n t i f i c a u t h o r i t y " presents an i n v i t i n g r a t i o n a l e on which t o base d i f f i c u l t development d e c i s i o n s . In many weapons systems c o n t r o v e r s i e s , Science becomes a pawn i n the process.28 However, the (mis?) use of Science i n the p o l i c y process i s a l s o a f u n c t i o n of an eager s c i e n t i f i c community. Because of the need f o r m i l i t a r y and i n d u s t r i a l coordina-t i o n , s c i e n t i s t s are n a t u r a l weapons systems l o b b y i s t s , who tend t o have enthusiasm only f o r vogue, deployable systems which t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e i n d u s t r i e s a l s o favor. I f a weapons system, a f t e r a c o s t l y investment i n research and development, does not r e c e i v e a u t h o r i z a t i o n f o r deploy-ment, Science and i n d u s t r y move on t o other systems which promise a b e t t e r t r a c k record. 29 The defense planner's frequent cynicism then toward the " r e v o l u t i o n a r y " t e c h n o l o g i c a l s o l u t i o n t o complex s t r a t e g i c problems, i s not always p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y r e a c t i o n a r y . An o v e r r e l i a n c e on the t e c h n i c a l s o l u t i o n can obscure the p o l i t i c a l r e a l i t i e s of the s t r a t e g i c environment. S c i e n t i s t s enjoy the lux u r y of moving on t o new areas of research should o l d ones prove f r u i t l e s s ; defense planners may not always enjoy the l u x u r y of dead-end p o l i c y . The defense planner must attempt t o cope w i t h concurrent s t r a t e g i c and t e c h n o l o g i c a l developments and must at l e a s t appear to be i n c o n t r o l of them. This p o s i t i o n i s not easy t o 11 maintain. Any device which w i l l attempt t o b r i n g the two together looks promising t o the defense planner. In a d d i t i o n t o a p h i l o s o p h i c a l commitment to the past, defense planners tend t o r e l y on economic v a r i a b l e s when making d e c i s i o n s . Along w i t h the quantum leap i n d e s t r u c t i v e power, speed of d e l i v e r y , e t c . , weapons systems have experienced quantum leaps i n research and development, procurement, and operating c o s t s . Each successive genera-t i o n of a system seems t o get more complex and more c o s t l y . Strategy, not s u r p r i s i n g l y , wears a d o l l a r s i g n and i s co n c e p t u a l l y s i m i l a r t o economic theory.3® Indeed, the absence of a deep and constant concern f o r the economic aspects of defense planning would be g r o s s l y incompetent and i r r e s p o n s i b l e . In g eneral, there are two ways i n which the problem of b a l a n c i n g defense needs a g a i n s t f i s c a l r e s t r a i n t s can be approached.31 The f i r s t way i s the budget c e i l i n g , a pre-determlned f i s c a l l i m i t . The second way i s the defense requirements approach which a s c e r t a i n s e s s e n t i a l defense needs and seeks appropriate funding. Defense planning u t i l i z e s both of those approaches; e s p e c i a l l y , when two weapons systems can accomplish the same purpose.3 2 Economic c o n s i d e r a t i o n s tend t o have great impact on the p o l i c y process; however, even though there are these many "non-technological" v a r i a b l e s a f f e c t i n g weapons 1 2 choice, the commitment to the past and economic r e s t r a i n t s , there i s some truth i n the "mad momentum" deterministic interpretations of the technological-strategic i n t e r a c t i o n . Again, i t i s a question of degree. Although weapons programs and strategies are in c r e -mental i n nature-, a point i s reached when whole communities become linked to p a r t i c u l a r programs and concepts. When major engineering development i s reached, the st r a t e g i c rationale becomes stronger, and " i t i s the hardest thing i n the world to stop a weapons program,"33 Or as former Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara has stated, there Is a "mad momentum" to i t a l l . There i s a kind of mad momentum i n t r i n s i c to the development of a l l new nuclear weaponry. If a weapons system works . . . there i s strong pressure from many di r e c t i o n s to produce and deploy the weapon out of a l l proportion to the prudent l e v e l required.3 4 While "planned" and "unplanned" technological develop-ments provide "momentum" to the planning of defense policy, t h e i r impetus remains f o r the most part, psychologically determined. Technological developments are more than s c i e n t i f i c p r i n c i p l e s ; they are questions of attitude i n the "state of mind of deterrence,"3 5 The apparent impact of techno-l o g i c a l change on the in t e r n a t i o n a l system i s frequently deceptive, always unmeasurable, a n a \ a n too often a p o l i t i c a l . But because of the incremental nature of defense planning, "there seems to be a law governing defense p o l i c y 13 i n a l l c o u n t r i e s t h a t the more fundamental the question, the l e s s a t t e n t i o n i t i s l i k e l y t o r e c e i v e . " 3 7 Techno-l o g i c a l refinement does possess the p o t e n t i a l t o c a l l i n t o question c e r t a i n sacrosanct planning assumptions and i n many i n s t a n c e s , by-pass incrementalism and l a y open the b a s i c assumptions. I t i s u s u a l l y a t t h i s p o i n t that technology i s seen as being d e t e r m i n i s t i c . However, the danger i n a l l o w i n g technology too strong an i n f l u e n c e i n d e s i g n i n g n a t i o n a l s t r a t e g y may r e s u l t i n a l a c k of o v e r a l l balance of f o r c e s i n terms of t h e i r p o l i t i c a l context,3 8 D U t one need only r e c a l l Brodie's "The Strategist's Dilemma,"-^ which st a t e d defense p o l i c y wasn't easy. The f o l l o w i n g account of the t e c h n o l o g i c a l - s t r a t e g i c behavior of the United States 19^5-1972 w i l l analyze many of the s t r a t e g i s t ' s "dilemmas" and demonstrate that the i n t e r a c t i o n between technology and st r a t e g y , w h i l e not e n t i r e l y f a t a l i s t i c , i s c e r t a i n l y complex and possesses vague and ambivalent l i n k a g e s . 1> CHAPTER TWO "The Atom i s S p l i t " Despite the p o p u l a r l y "Gadzookst I t h i n k I've got i t ! " p e rception of s c i e n t i f i c discovery,^° E=mc2 was the product of intense i n q u i r y and not the c u l m i n a t i n g r e v e l a t i o n of a n o c t u r n a l dream. As e a r l y as 1 9 0 5 . E i n s t e i n d i d c l e a r l y s t a t e that mass and energy were eq u i v a l e n t , and h i s famous equation could w e l l be the most important formula of t h i s c e n t u r y . ^ 1 But E i n s t e i n ' s t h e o r e t i c a l knowledge was f a r ahead of the p r a c t i c a l s t a t e - o f - t h e a r t of n u c l e a r p h y s i c s , and the f i r s t n u c l e a r e x p l o s i o n d i d not occur u n t i l J u l y 16 , 19^5 at Alamogordo, New Mexico. Nuclear energy was developed through a long, arduous process of t r i a l and e r r o r l n which many answers had to be found to many u n c e r t a i n areas of p a r t i c l e p h y s i c s . ^ 2 Although nuclear weapons had been u t i l i z e d i n the P a c i f i c t h e a t r e of World War I I demonstrating a quantum leap l n d e s t r u c t i v e power over any p r e v i o u s l y known weapon,^3 t h e i r t e c h n o l o g i c a l and s t r a t e g i c impacts were immediately engulfed i n much u n c e r t a i n t y . Science s t i l l had a long process of nuclear t r i a l and e r r o r w i t h which t o contend. And d e s p i t e the nuclear explosions a t Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the atomic bomb was not m i l i t a r i l y i n s t r u m e n t a l 15 In the subsequent Japanese surrender. Also, the future r o l e of stra t e g i c bombing was ambiguous as the European stra t e g i c bombing campaign provided inconclusive evidence to prove unequivocally, the ef f e c t s of strategic bombing. Nevertheless, " i t was r i g h t at the time to stress the d r a s t i c nature of the change i n m i l i t a r y power, atomic weapons produced," The doctrine of st r a t e g i c bombing would eventually emerge as the dominant strategy of war^5 although not without patterns of technological uncertainty, intense i n t e r s e r v i c e r i v a l r y over missions and roles and writing the next war's scenario, and nuclear developments i n the Soviet Union. Technologically speaking, despite the destructive power of nuclear weapons, f i s s i o n bombs were s t i l l , c i r c a 1 9 5 0 , s u f f i c i e n t l y l i m i t e d In power and numbers to make i t appear necessary that a substantial stockpile would be required to win "command of the a i r , " the over-riding p r i o r i t y of a 46 doctrine of s t r a t e g i c bombing. Furthermore, these bombs would achieve t h e i r maximum r e s u l t s i f used against urban areas. With an American monopoly on atomic weapons, attempts to control them through i n t e r n a t i o n a l supervision were understandably doomed to f a i l ; the Soviet Union exploded i t s f i r s t nuclear device i n August, 1 9 4 9 . ^ U n t i l t h i s time, the s t r a t e g i c r e l a t i o n s h i p of the two superpowers was one of "primitive" or technologically d i s s i m i l a r deterrence; 16 the United S t a t e s ' atomic monopoly was o f f s e t by Soviet 48 conventional preponderance on the European continent. In any event, no one "knew" how many bombs i t would take to "knock-out" a country as l a r g e as e i t h e r the United States or Soviet Union and the war s c e n a r i o - w r i t i n g process was f i l l e d w i t h u n c e r t a i n t y . The n a t u r a l tendency i n a new t e c h n o l o g i c a l environment i s t o formulate a str a t e g y f o r war based on experience gleaned from the previous war.^9 The "next w a r — l a s t war" approach was chosen, but the choice of a "war of a t t r i t i o n " as o f f i c i a l p o l i c y r e s u l t e d i n i n t e n s e i n t e r s e r v i c e r i v a l r y i n the United States m i l i t a r y establishment.-5° Because of a very r a p i d and across-the-board, post-war d e - m o b i l i z a t i o n , the United States m i l i t a r y found i t s e l f r e e l i n g under the weight of the more t r a d i t i o n a l American r e v u l s i o n t o the use of f o r c e i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s . Faced w i t h n e o - i s o l a t i o n i s m , the m i l i t a r y became more p o l i t i c i z e d ; and d e s p i t e the increase of i n t e r n a t i o n a l commitments, raw c a p a b i l i t i e s continued t o be slashed. The m i l i t a r y s e r v i c e s scrambled f o r t h e i r budgetary l i v e s . In t h i s competitive process of winning missions and r o l e s , there was l i t t l e i n t e r s e r v i c e c o o r d i n a t i o n of s t r a t e g i c p lanning; i n f a c t , i t was discovered the s e r v i c e s weren't even planning f o r the same war.^l I n t e r s e r v i c e r i v a l r y would continue t o produce s i g n i f i c a n t impact on f u t u r e developments i n technology and s t r a t e g y . 17 The Korean War helped the m i l i t a r y r e g a i n some of i t s l o s t i n f l u e n c e i n the p o l i c y process; i t undermined the Truman A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s defensive s t r a t e g y of c o n t a i n -ment by exposing s e r i o u s d e f i c i e n c i e s i n non-nuclear f o r c e s . Korea provided domestic p o l i t i c a l impetus f o r a n a t i o n a l re-armament program and a f u l l - t i m e defense e s t a b l i s h m e n t . ^ 2 During the Korean quagmire, the United States acquired many f o r e i g n a i r bases f o r i t s new a l l - j e t medium bomber, the B-^7. This plane complemented the heavy long-range B-36 and provided the b a s i c technology f o r a second-generation j e t bomber, the B - 5 2 , which was America's f i r s t i n t e r -c o n t i n e n t a l j e t bomber, Bombers were the p r i n c i p a l s t r a t e g i c d e t e r r e n t ; and because of the r e j e c t i o n of "pre-v e n t i v e war," s t r a t e g i c warning and defense of the f o r c e s -i n - b e i n g became the keys to not only the v i a b i l i t y of the 5. manned bomber, but a l s o any f u t u r e mix of s t r a t e g i c f o r c e s . The A i r Force n a t u r a l l y r e c e i v e d the highest p r i o r i t y i n s t r a t e g i c d o c t r i n e and mission and expressed l i t t l e enthusiasm t o share nuclear weapons w i t h the other s e r v i c e s . Both s t r a t e g i c bombing as a d o c t r i n e of war and the f u t u r e r o l e of the b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e r e c e i v e d s u b s t a n t i a l t e c h n o l o g i c a l impetus from the detonation of a thermonuclear device i n 1952. Fusion produced a f u r t h e r quantum leap i n n u c l e a r power and proved beyond question t h a t a warhead could be designed f o r b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e d e l i v e r y . Indeed, without nuclear f u s i o n , a m i s s i l e ' s poor accuracy and a 18 l i m i t e d payload would have given any m i s s i l e system a very l i m i t e d s t r a t e g i c v a l u e . H o w e v e r , m i s s i l e t e c h -nology had I t s own course t o run and the manned bomber would remain the p r i n c i p a l d e t e r r e n t f o r many years t o come. The "New Look" i n s t r a t e g y taken by the Eisenhower A d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n 1953 was a r e j e c t i o n of the defensive o r i e n t a t i o n of containment and a r e j u v e n a t i o n of the a i r -power advocate's more o f f e n s i v e s p i r i t . C l e a r l y , the key d o c t r i n e t o emerge from the "New Look" was t h a t of 'massive r e t a l i a t i o n , ' which r e s t e d upon the Free World communities d e t e r r i n g aggression by being w i l l i n g and able t o "respond v i g o r o u s l y " t o i t "at places and w i t h means of i t s own 57 choosing," While containment apparently d i d l i t t l e t o deter Soviet probes i n t o the Western a l l i a n c e , 'massive r e t a l i a t i o n ' was expected t o cover the whole spectrum of p o l i t i c a l - m i l i t a r y contingencies. General C u r t i s Lemay s t a t e d i I do not understand why a f o r c e that w i l l d eter a b i g war w i l l not deter a small one i f we want i t t o and say i t w i l l ... I t h i n k we are going t o have to b u i l d f o r the worst case and then use I t f o r a l l . t h e others. 5 ° In 1 9 5 4 , b u i l d i n g f o r even the "worst case" of the d o c t r i n e of 'massive r e t a l i a t i o n ' was no easy matter, and c e r t a i n t e c h n o l o g i c a l r e a l i t i e s d i d not seem to i n f l u e n c e the more s u b t l e p o l i t i c a l aspects of 'massive r e t a l i a t i o n . • Despite the f a c t t h a t the United States would not " a i r drop" 19 a hydrogen bomb u n t i l 1956 and the u n c e r t a i n t i e s of hydrogen m i n i a t u r i z a t i o n ; and d e s p i t e the S o v i e t Union's p o s s e s s i o n of a comparable t e c h n o l o g i c a l knowledge of f u s i o n , the "New Look" would demonstrate t h a t t Mental c o n f l i c t s end e i t h e r i n a new and h i g h e r s y n t h e s i s ... or e l s e i n a r e v e r s i o n t o more p r i m i t i v e i d e a s which have been outgrown but to which we drop when j o l t e d out of our a t t a i n e d position.59 While more s o p h i s t i c a t e d s t r a t e g i c i n s i g h t s would emanate from the Eisenhower A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , the "New Look's" •massive r e t a l i a t i o n * was not one of them. I t must a l s o be s a i d t h a t the purposes of the "New Look's" s u b s t i t u t i o n of f i r e p o w e r f o r manpower were as much economic as they were s t r a t e g i c . As S e c r e t a r y of Defense Wilson e x p l a i n e d : We can't a f f o r d t o f i g h t l i m i t e d wars. We can only a f f o r d a b i g war and i f t h e r e i s one, t h a t i s the k i n d i t w i l l b e . 6 0 With t h i s f r u g a l p e r s p e c t i v e , a s t r o n g A i r Force was synonymous w i t h the " n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y . " The s t a t u s of the A i r Force i s e v i d e n t i n the defense budgeting formula of k6% A i r Force, Z%% Navy, and 23% Army; these f i g u r e s f l u c t u a t e d v e r y l i t t l e throughout the years of the Eisenhower A d m i n i s t r a t i o n . Deterrence, however, i s n e i t h e r assured or i m p o s s i b l e 6? but i s the product of " s u s t a i n e d i n t e l l i g e n t c h o i c e s . " D u r i n g the "New Look" p e r i o d , many d e c i s i o n s were made i n an e f f o r t t o b u i l d and m a i n t a i n a v i a b l e d e t e r r e n t . 20 Some of these d e c i s i o n s r e f l e c t e d i n t e l l i g e n t assumptions, others d i d not. The d e c i s i o n t o proceed w i t h a c o n t i n e n t a l a i r defense program was an example of the l a t t e r and r e f l e c t e d a c l e a r 63 example of t e c h n o l o g i c a l - s t r a t e g i c i n c o n g r u i t y . The power of thermonuclear weapons was so great that even a high r a t e of a t t r i t i o n a g a i n s t incoming hombers would prove more l i k e l y t o be an academic c a l c u l u s , yet many b i l l i o n s were invested i n a g r o s s l y misconceived and tech-n i c a l l y d e f i c i e n t a i r defense system. The d e c i s i o n t o proceed w i t h a bomber-rebasing, hardening, and a l e r t program was without o v e r s i m p l i f i c a t i o n , 6k an example of good common s t r a t e g i c sense. Indeed, even though there were many bombers i n the American i n -ventory, launching a nuclear s u r p r i s e a t t a c k on the e n t i r e American r e t a l i a t o r y f o r c e was perhaps, somewhat l e s s d i f f i c u l t t hat the Japanese a t t a c k on P e a r l Harbor. The American bombers were v u l n e r a b l e and needed d i s p e r s a l , hardening, and more warning t o ins u r e t h e i r s t r a t e g i c value. The Eisenhower A d m i n i s t r a t i o n was a l s o faced w i t h the always d i f f i c u l t f o r c e - l e v e l question: "How much i s enough?" The procurement d e c i s i o n s made durin g the "New Look" period proved t o be prudent although at the time emotions were running high and were not as calm as s t r a t e g i c planning should d i c t a t e them t o be. 21 The d i f f i c u l t i e s i n i n t e r p r e t i n g an adversary's i n t e n t i o n s a re u n c e r t a i n enough without the added complica-t i o n of a s t a t e of ignorance of h i s raw c a p a b i l i t i e s . D e s p i t e some ve r y r a p i d advances i n m i l i t a r y technology d u r i n g the "New Look," th e r e remained s e r i o u s d e f i c i e n c i e s i n i n t e l l i g e n c e g a t h e r i n g c a p a b i l i t i e s ; and because of t h i s l a c k of t e c h n o l o g i c a l competence, the Eisenhower A d m i n i s t r a -t i o n had t o cope w i t h one endemic phenomena of arms competi-t i o n s known as "gap p r e d i c t i o n . " ^ 5 The f i r s t of these dilemmas of "gap p r e d i c t i o n " i n v o l v e d e s t i m a t i n g S o v i e t heavy bomber pro d u c t i o n , and the ensuing i n t e n s e domestic p o l i t i c a l debate of the s o - c a l l e d 'bomber gap' p e r i o d had f a r - r e a c h i n g i m p l i c a t i o n s i n the f u t u r e e x e r c i s e s i n "gap p r e d i c t i o n . " The May, 195^ " f l y - b y s " of S o v i e t a i r c r a f t " g a v e the f i r s t hard evidence t h a t the S o v i e t s had a long-range bomber i n p r o d u c t i o n . Many airpower advocates b e l i e v e d t h a t Department of Defense p r o d u c t i o n and procurement schedules were not adequate t o meet the S o v i e t program. Intense C o n g r e s s i o n a l p r e s s u r e was brought a g a i n s t the Elsenhower A d m i n i s t r a t i o n d u r i n g 1955-1956. The A d m i n i s t r a t i o n remained calm i n the l i g h t of these events but i n c r e m e n t a l l y a u t h o r i z e d t h r e e p r o d u c t i o n a c c e l e r a t i o n s i n the B-52 b u i l d i n g program and an i n c r e a s e i n the number of bombers on ground a l e r t s t a t u s . ^ " 7 Although these measures 22 were t a k e n , the Ei s e n h o w e r A d m i n i s t r a t i o n emphasized the r a t h e r s o p h i s t i c a t e d s t r a t e g i c l o g i c t h a t t h e adequacy of a d e t e r r e n t i s more a f u n c t i o n of i t s p o s s e s s i n g " s u f f i c i e n c y " t h a n a g r o s s n u m e r i c a l advantage v i s a v i s t h e a d v e r s a r y . " S u f f i c i e n c y " was a y a r d s t i c k of s t r e n g t h r e l a t i v e t o t h a t of t h e a d v e r s a r y ' s and i n b a l a n c e w i t h r a t i o n a l n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y g o a l s . S t i l l , w i t h o u t c o n c l u s i v e e v i d e n c e of S o v i e t a c t i o n , t h e r e was l i t t l e c h o i c e but t o i n c r e a s e 68 the B-52 program. I n t he summer 1956, f l i g h t s of t h e U-2 s p y - p l a n e o v e r -f l e w t h e S o v i e t U n i o n ; and by e a r l y f a l l , i t was known t h a t t h e r e was i n d e e d no 'bomber gap' as was o r i g i n a l l y p e r c e i v e d . I n f a c t , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s was o u t p r o d u c i n g t h e S o v i e t Union i n heavy bombers; and t o t h i s day, t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s p o s s e s s e s a s u b s t a n t i a l l y l a r g e r heavy bomber f o r c e . The 'bomber gap' de m o n s t r a t e d : a f u t u r e A m erican s e n s i t i v i t y t o many of t h e q u a l i t a t i v e a s p e c t s of arms c o m p e t i t i o n s , t o t h e p r i n c i p l e of m a r g i n a l u t i l i t y ( t h e law of d i m i n i s h i n g r e t u r n s ) ; and a g r a d u a l a c c e p t a n c e of a s t a t e of m u t u a l d e t e r r e n c e . But w h i l e t h e s e more s o p h i s t i c a t e d i n s i g h t s were b e i n g v e r b a l i z e d , t h e manned bomber of t h e 1950's r e p r e s e n t e d a d e p l o y e d t e c h n o l o g y w h i c h was a l r e a d y b e i n g o u t r a c e d by a n o t h e r d e v e l o p i n g t e c h -69 n o l o g y , t h a t of t h e m i s s i l e . 7 23 Because of both the i n t r i n s i c a l l y simultaneous and the u n c e r t a i n development of technology and s t r a t e g y , no sooner had the s o - c a l l e d 'bomber gap* disappeared when another p o t e n t i a l dilemma appeared w i t h f u l l f o r c e , the m i s s i l e r e v o l u t i o n . The b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e threatened t o d r a s t i c a l l y upset the f u t u r e s t r a t e g i c environment because i t made the manned bomber h i g h l y v u l n e r a b l e t o a disarming f i r s t - s t r i k e . And because of the nature of f i r s t - g e n e r a t i o n b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e s , slow r e a c t i o n times due t o l i q u i d f u e l , and s o f t base con-f i g u r a t i o n s , whichever s i d e possessed the new system would l i k e l y f e e l as insecure as the si d e without. A side w i t h a h i g h l y v u l n e r a b l e f o r c e of manned bombers could not " r i d e out" a m i s s i l e a t t a c k ; and i n any i n t e r n a t i o n a l c r i s i s , both s i d e s could become in v o l v e d i n a se r i o u s pre-emptive s p i r a l . Furthermore, the l o g i c of the m i s s i l e had v i r t u a l l y destroyed the t r a d i t i o n a l b a s i s f o r the m i l i t a r y s e r v i c e s * o r g a n i z a t i o n around lan d , sea, and a i r r o l e s . From the beginning, m i s s i l e development i n the United States became a j u r i s d i c t i o n a l b a t t l e f i e l d among the m i l i t a r y s e r v i c e s f o r c o n t r o l of the m i s s i l e weapons systems. Each m i l i t a r y s e r v i c e possessed unique research and development and i n d u s t r i a l c o n t r a c t i n g procedures; the m i s s i l e e f f o r t i n 70 the United States was anything but coordinated. "The 24 R o c k e f e l l e r Report" would l a t e r note t h a t because of i n t e r -s e r v i c e r i v a l r y the r o l e of the S e c r e t a r y of Defense had become a n e g a t i v e one: The S e c r e t a r y of Defense i s so burdened w i t h the n e g a t i v e t a s k of t r y i n g t o a r b i t r a t e and c o n t r o l i n t e r s e r v i c e d i s p u t e s t h a t he cannot p l a y h i s f u l l p a r t i n the i n i t i a t i o n and development of h i g h m i l i t a r y p o l i c y . ' 1 Throughout the m i s s i l e ' s e a r l y beginnings, there were numerous E x e c u t i v e I n s p i r e d defense and " m i s s i l e committees" which gave a running, a n a l y t i c a l monologue of U n i t e d S t a t e s m i s s i l e and defense programs. The t h r e e most important of these were the second von Neumann, K i l l i a n , and G a i t h e r Committees. The second von Neumann Committee had p r o j e c t e d i n 1954 t h a t the U n i t e d S t a t e s could possess an ICBM c a p a b i l i t y w i t h i n f i v e t o s i x years i f the proper program a c c e l e r a t i o n s occurred. The von Neumann Committee a l s o emphasized t h a t the management of the ICBM program would be more important than s p e c i f i c t e c h n i c a l n e c e s s i t i e s . S c i e n t i f i c d i s c o v e r y and i n v e n t i o n needed b u s i n e s s l i k e o r g a n i z a t i o n and management. In l i g h t of the r e p o r t , the f i r s t - g e n e r a t i o n ATLAS ICBM was a s s i g n e d the h i g h e s t development p r i o r i t y i n May, 1954. The second s i g n i f i c a n t defense and " m i s s i l e committee" was the K i l l i a n Committee of 1955t which pr o v i d e d the v i t a l impetus f o r the d u a l IRBM development programs. In l i g h t of the K i l l i a n Committee's f o r e c a s t of S o v i e t m i s s i l e 25 c a p a b i l i t i e s , the IRBM m i s s i l e programs were awarded an equal development p r i o r i t y w i t h the ICBM program. In subsequent testimony l n the Hearings on "Airpower," Dr. K i l l i a n a l s o p l a c e d emphasis on the management a s p e c t s of d e v e l o p i n g a technology: We need t o strengthen the c o o r d i n a t i o n of s c i e n t i f i c a c t i v i t i e s a t policy-making l e v e l s and thus i n c r e a s e the p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t more s t r e n g t h and s k i l l i n c o o r d i n a t i o n and p l a n n i n g a t the top w i l l b r i n g about more e f f e c t i v e r e s e a r c h and development a l l down the l i n e . 7 3 The G a i t h e r Committee's r e p o r t was "leaked" i n 1957 , and the r e p o r t found t h a t SAC was h i g h l y v u l n e r a b l e t o a s u r p r i s e a t t a c k and t h a t the U n i t e d S t a t e s must develop 7k an i n v u l n e r a b l e s e c o n d - s t r i k e f o r c e as soon as p o s s i b l e . These t h r e e Committees had as much impact on the develop ment of the m i s s i l e as d i d any s p e c i f i c , t i m e l y t e c h n o l o g i c a l development. These Committees gave the p o l i t i c a l impetus f o r the t e c h n o l o g i c a l development of the m i s s i l e . D e s p i t e much e f f o r t , the Un i t e d S t a t e s " l o s t " the f i r s t round i n the m i s s i l e c o n t e s t w i t h the S o v i e t Union. The l a u n c h i n g of SPUTNIK i n the f a l l of 1957 produced i n the U n i t e d S t a t e s a sharp o u t c r y lamenting the l o s s of t e c h n o l o g i c a l s u p e r i o r i t y and charges of incompetency i n the n a t i o n a l e d u c a t i o n a l system and i n the p l a n n i n g of the n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y . Because the S o v i e t Union d i d not s e r i e s produce a heavy bomber, i t was thus b e l i e v e d t h a t they would do so 26 w i t h an ICBM. With these u n c e r t a i n matters a t hand, the Un i t e d S t a t e s remained committed t o the two simultaneous IRBM programs as a gap f i l l e r t o the S o v i e t ICBM and a s i g n i f i c a n t development step i n the more complex U n i t e d S t a t e s ICBM. Much l i k e the f i r s t g e n e r a t i o n B-4-7 j e t bomber, w i t h i t s range l i m i t a t i o n s , the IRBM's had t o be deployed overseas. Needless t o say, the IRBM's would l i k e -wise be v u l n e r a b l e t o a f i r s t s t r i k e i n these forward deploy-ments. I t was hoped t h a t an u l t i m a t e d e c i s i o n c o u l d be made 7 5 on choosing a s i n g l e IRBM: the d e c i s i o n was never made. While ambiguous i n t e l l i g e n c e d a t a began t o emerge p o s t u l a t i n g a r e d u c t i o n i n S o v i e t ICBM pr o d u c t i o n , the Eisenhower A d m i n i s t r a t i o n n e v e r t h e l e s s had t o admit t h a t the S o v i e t s would probably enjoy a nume r i c a l ICBM advantage i n the e a r l y I960's. 7 6 T h i s " m i s s i l e gap" c o n t r o v e r s y continued t o remain a s e n s i t i v e a r e a i n both U n i t e d S t a t e s s t r a t e g i c p l a n n i n g and domestic p o l i t i c a l debate. The l a c k of t i m e l y and r e l i a b l e i n t e l l i g e n c e caused by a l a c k of technology, l e f t unanswered the q u e s t i o n s concerning S o v i e t o p e r a t i o n a l ICBM's. Thus, i t was b e l i e v e d t h a t the Un i t e d S t a t e s was headed f o r another " t r a n s i t i o n a l p e r i o d " i n which the most d i s c o u r a g i n g aspect of the m i s s i l e gap i s t h a t we seem unable t o escape i t should the S o v i e t s produce the number of ICBM's which they a r e b e l i e v e d capable.'' 2 7 Events and photo reconnaissance u l t i m a t e l y demonstrated t h a t there was indeed no " m i s s i l e gap," hut not before the Eisenhower A d m i n i s t r a t i o n took prudent a c t i o n by i n c r e a s i n g the number of B - 5 2 wings from eleven t o fourteen, by d i s p e r s i n g these a i r c r a f t , and by improving t h e i r r e a c t i o n t i m e . ^ Furthermore, program a c c e l e r a t i o n s were au t h o r i z e d f o r m i s s i l e d e t e c t i o n , s a t e l l i t e reconnaissance, the POLARIS submarine, and hardening f o r the f i r s t - g e n e r a t i o n l i q u i d -f u e l ICBM's. Of equal importance was the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s d e c i s i o n t o def e r f u l l - s c a l e deployment of an ICBM u n t i l the second-generation, s o l i d - f u e l MINUTEMAN was a v a i l a b l e ; t h i s f o r c e u n l i k e the f i r s t - g e n e r a t i o n ICBM's, could " r i d e 79 out" a s u r p r i s e a t t a c k , ' y However, as xrets the case i n the Congressional e l e c t i o n s of 1956, "gap t h i n k i n g " became a key element i n the Democratic P a r t y ' s i 9 6 0 e l e c t i o n p l a t f o r m ; and the period was l i t t e r e d w i t h many acrimonious charges and countercharges of who was Bo to blame f o r the unfavorable m i s s i l e balance. The Democrats won the White House, and almost immediately the " m i s s i l e gap" disappeared from t h e i r p o l i t i c a l consciences. Hanson Baldwin, the M i l i t a r y E d i t o r of the New York Times, o f f e r e d the f o l l o w i n g " m i s s i l e gap" post-mortem: Indeed the ' m i s s i l e g a p ' — i t s b i r t h , growth, and e a r l y d e a t h — h a d an Alice-in-Wonderland q u a l i t y about i t which could f l o u r i s h only In a democracy." 1 28 The Elsenhower pe r i o d i n American p o l i t i c s was drawing to a c l o s e . While i t had long been recognized t h a t the m i l i t a r y p o s i t i o n of the United States had d e c l i n e d v i s a 82 v i s that of the Soviet Union's, the Kennedy A d m i n i s t r a t i o n would i n h e r i t a r a t h e r dynamic t e c h n o l o g i c a l and i n d u s t r i a l base. This base would produce s i g n i f i c a n t q u a l i t a t i v e improvements i n the a l r e a d y expanding f i e l d s of computer technology, warhead improvement, m i s s i l e guidance, and extensions i n range f o r both m i s s i l e s and submarines.^ In the i n i t i a l years of the next decade, the United States would come to enjoy a s i g n i f i c a n t margin of s t r a t e g i c s u p e r i o r i t y , p r i m a r i l y by running a u n i l a t e r a l arms race; and then i n l a t e r years, look on as the Soviet Union embarked on a more than comparable, massive b u i l d i n g program. The decade of the 1960's would a l s o be subjected to a c o n t i n u a t i o n of i n t e r - s e r v i c e r i v a l r y and the e f f o r t s of the s e r v i c e s t o maintain t h e i r "glamor" systems. Congress as a whole would slo w l y and p a i n f u l l y become a more a c t i v e p a r t i c i p a n t i n the defense p o l i c y process, and l i k e w i s e would the American p u b l i c , by speaking out i n a very important debate about s t r a t e g i c defenses. F i n a l l y , the next decade would witness a reverent attempt by defense planners t o provide "hard," q u a n t i f i a b l e t e c h n o l o g i c a l answers t o " s o f t , " I n t u i t i v e , p o l i t i c a l -s t r a t e g i c problems. The S t r a t e g i c Arms L i m i t a t i o n Talks 29 (SALT), "beginning at the decade's end, would demonstrate that certain s t r a t e g i c myths do not e a s i l y succumb to new technological r e a l i t i e s . Strategy would continue to be a very inexact Science. 30 CHAPTER THREE " S t r a t e g i c Change" A d m i n i s t r a t i o n s come and go; i d e a l l y , n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y i s not as t r a n s i e n t . Because of the long l e a d -times i n v o l v e d i n weapons development, there i s a c e r t a i n c o n t i n u i t y i n defense planning. A newly innaugurated Adminis-t r a t i o n remains committed t o many d e c i s i o n s of previous A d m i n i s t r a t i o n s . Technology and s t r a t e g i c d o c t r i n e out-d i s t a n c e many a p o l i t i c a l career. The t e c h n o l o g i c a l and s t r a t e g i c options a v a i l a b l e t o the Kennedy A d m i n i s t r a t i o n were antedated t o the previous decade. The m i l i t a r y r e v o l u t i o n s i n m i s s i l e s , communica-t i o n s , and e l e c t r o n i c s were i n i t i a t e d long before the so-c a l l e d " s h i p of s t a t e " changed hands In 1 9 6 1 . Furthermore, the "need" f o r the United States t o move t o a secure second-s t r i k e f o r c e was w e l l - r e c o g n i z e d d u r i n g the per i o d of the manned bomber; and "mutual assured d e s t r u c t i o n " was seen to be the keeper of superpower s t r a t e g i c s t a b i l i t y as e a r l y as 1959 when The Washington Center of Foreign P o l i c y Research reported: I f and when both the US and USSR achieve r e l a t i v e l y i n v u l n e r a b l e s t r a t e g i c f o r c e s capable of d e v a s t a t i n g second-strike r e t a l i a -t i o n , the s t r a t e g i c equation w i l l become more s t a b l e , though only as long as these c a p a b i l i t i e s are preserved."^ 31 The t e s t of a s e c o n d - s t r i k e c a p a b i l i t y depends on whether "one can under n u c l e a r a t t a c k , preserve v e h i c l e s , d e c i s i o n c e n t e r s , and the f l o w of communications among them, whether one can and w i l l t r a n s m i t the order t o r e t a l i a t e , and whether one can p e n e t r a t e adversary d e f e n s e s . " ^ And the a d v e r s a r y must b e l i e v e t h a t a l l of the above can and w i l l be done. The Eisenhower A d m i n i s t r a t i o n had programmed the second-generation, s o l i d - f u e l MINUTEMAN ICBM and the f i r s t -g e n e r a t i o n , s o l i d - f u e l POLARIS IRBM t o provide the techno-l o g i c a l b a s i s f o r a s e c o n d - s t r i k e f o r c e . The low f i r e p o w e r MINUTEMAN was c e l e b r a t e d as the r e a l "economy" package i n m i s s i l e r y ; i t was s m a l l , mobile, q u i c k i n r e a c t i o n time, 86 and easy t o harden and handle, w h i l e the POLARIS co u l d be deployed i n the v a s t oceans. Both f o r c e s c o u l d be w i t h -h e l d f o r r e t a l i a t i o n , and these m i s s i l e systems gave a sense of s t a b i l i t y . ^ 7 And u n t i l s a t e l l i t e r econnaissance became more s o p h i s t i c a t e d , the e a r l y t a r g e t i n g d o c t r i n e of MINUTEMAN 88 and POLARIS would be p o p u l a t i o n o r i e n t e d . The Kennedy A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , then, a l r e a d y possessed two good m i s s i l e s i n the a r s e n a l . The A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s immediate and most d i f f i c u l t d e c i s i o n s would be made over numbers. D e s p i t e the severe domestic p o l i t i c a l p r e s s u r e s of the " m i s s i l e gap," the Eisenhower Department of Defense only a u t h o r i z e d a MINUTEMAN f o r c e of 150. The Kennedy A d m i n i s t r a t i o n could not be as r e s t r a i n e d . Faced w i t h a t e s t of p o l i t i c a l w i l l over B e r l i n i n the summer c r i s i s of 32 1 9 6 l, r e s t r a i n t was d i f f i c u l t . The worsening of the i n t e r -n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n d u r i n g t h i s period was accompanied by a Soviet announcement of a o n e - t h i r d increase i n m i l i t a r y spending. These Soviet moves l e d t o an extensive review of 89 the United S t a t e s ' f o r c e s t r u c t u r e . The review confirmed the need f o r a r a p i d build-up of b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e s t r e n g t h ; subsequently, the American s t r a t e g i c a r s e n a l grew from 63 ICBM's and 96 SLBM's i n 1 9 6 l , to k2k ICBM's and 224 SLBM's i n 1 9 6 3 . ^ ° In a d d i t i o n t o the build-up i n s t r a t e g i c f o r c e s , general purpose f o r c e s were s u b s t a n t i a l l y increased and the combined f o r c e posture became i n c u l c a t e d w i t h the d o c t r i n e , • f l e x i b l e response.' The d o c t r i n e of ' f l e x i b l e response* was an attempt to i n t e g r a t e and mutually r e i n f o r c e conventional and s t r a t e g i c c a p a b i l i t i e s w i t h f o r e i g n and defense p o l i c i e s . Each component would I d e a l l y , lend p o l i t i c a l c r e d i b i l i t y t o the other. * F l e x i b l e response' was a s t r a t e g y designed to balance f o r c e s t r u c t u r e w i t h t h r e a t ; i t was the f i n e -tuning of m i l i t a r y power t o r e f l e c t p o l i t i c a l w i l l i n a wide spectrum of contingencies. The emphasis was on balance. The answer does not l i e s o l e l y i n any mis-guided attempt to e l i m i n a t e conventional f o r c e s and r e l y s o l e l y upon r e t a l i a t i o n . Such a course would be completely s e l f - d e f e a t i n g . 9 1 I f we have shown ourselves able and ready to engage i n l a r g e - s c a l e , non-nuclear warfare i n response t o a communist provocation,, the S o v i e t s can h a r d l y misconstrue two t h i n g s : 33 f i r s t , t h a t we r e g ard t h i s p r o v o c a t i o n as a c h a l l e n g e t o our v i t a l I n t e r e s t s ; and second, t h a t we w i l l use n u c l e a r weapons t o p r e v a i l i f t h i s becomes necessary.°2 The McNamara Pentagon, i n 196l, thus began t o b u i l d balanced g e n e r a l purpose f o r c e s capable of s h o r t - n o t i c e g l o b a l i n t e r v e n t i o n . The added reach of American m i l i t a r y power was a n e c e s s i t y f o r an ocean-bound n a t i o n which d e s i r e d a l a r g e r and more f o r c e f u l r o l e i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s ; "might was more l i k e l y t o be r i g h t . " The ' f l e x i b l e response* a t the s t r a t e g i c l e v e l , enun-c i a t e d i n 1963 by S e c r e t a r y of Defense Robert S. McNamara befo r e the House Committee on Armed S e r v i c e s , promised an i n v u l n e r a b l e s e c o n d - s t r i k e c a p a b i l i t y w i t h o p t i o n s f o r both d a m a g e - l i m i t a t i o n and p o p u l a t i o n d e s t r u c t i o n . What we a r e p r o p o s i n g Is a c a p a b i l i t y t o s t r i k e back a f t e r a b s o r b i n g the f i r s t blow. T h i s means we have t o b u i l d and m a i n t a i n a s e c o n d - s t r i k e f o r c e . Such a f o r c e should have s u f f i c i e n t f l e x i b i l i t y t o permit a c h o ice of s t r a t e g i e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y an a b i l i t y t o (1) s t r i k e back d e c i s i v e l y a t the e n t i r e S o v i e t t a r g e t system s i m u l t a n e o u s l y , or (2) s t r i k e back f i r s t a t the S o v i e t bomber bases, m i s s i l e s i t e s , and other m i l i t a r y i n s t a l l a t i o n s ... and then i f necessary, s t r i k e back a t the S o v i e t urban and i n d u s t r i a l complex i n a c o n t r o l l e d and d e l i b e r a t e way.°3 As McNamara s t a t e d e a r l i e r , "our new p o l i c y g i v e s us the f l e x i b i l i t y t o choose among s e v e r a l o p e r a t i o n a l plans, " ^ T a r g e t s were t o be a l l o c a t e d t o weapons on the b a s i s of t h e i r urgency, importance, and p h y s i c a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . ' F l e x i b l e response* was, t o a v e r y 34 l a r g e extent, a f u n c t i o n of American s t r a t e g i c s u p e r i o r i t y . The c o n c i s e claims of American s t r a t e g i c s u p e r i o r i t y were made i n 1961 "by Deputy S e c r e t a r y of Defense Roswell G i l p a t r i c , and these claims were designed t o announce American predominance i n world p o l i t i c s and the t r u e nature of the s o - c a l l e d " m i s s i l e gap."95 By b u i l d i n g a s t r a t e g i c f o r c e s t r u c t u r e which gave numerous o p t i o n s , "we may seek to terminate war on more f a v o r a b l e terms by u s i n g our f o r c e s as a b a r g a i n i n g weapon-by t h r e a t e n i n g f u r t h e r attack."96 American n u c l e a r f o r c e s , then, c o u l d a l s o be used as an i n t r a - w a r d e t e r r e n t . . . . the S o v i e t l e a d e r s always say t h a t they would s t r i k e a t the e n t i r e complex of our m i l i t a r y power . . . meaning our c i t i e s . I f they were t o do so, we would, of course, have no a l t e r n a t i v e but t o r e t a l i a t e i n k i n d . . . I t would c e r t a i n l y be i n t h e i r i n t e r e s t as w e l l as ours t o t r y t o l i m i t the consequences of a n u c l e a r exchange. By b u i l d i n g i n t o our f o r c e s a f l e x i b l e c a p a b i l i t y , we a t l e a s t e l i m i n a t e the prospect t h a t we could s t r i k e back i n only one way, namely, a g a i n s t the e n t i r e S o v i e t t a r g e t i n g system i n c l u d i n g t h e i r c i t i e s . Such a prospect would g i v e the S o v i e t Union no i n c e n t i v e t o w i t h h o l d a t t a c k a g a i n s t our c i t i e s i n a f i r s t s t r i k e . . . C o n s i d e r i n g what i s a t stake, we b e l i e v e i t i s worth the a d d i t i o n a l e f f o r t on our p a r t to have t h i s option.97 While the d o c t r i n e of ' f l e x i b l e response* r e q u i r e d the p r o d u c t i o n of a hardened, d i s p e r s e d , and concealed American s t r a t e g i c a r s e n a l , ' f l e x i b l e response' as an American s t r a t e g i c d o c t r i n e was l a r g e l y an Inverse f u n c t i o n of a q u a n t i t a t i v e and q u a l i t a t i v e weapons r a t i o 35 v i s a v i s the Soviet Union. ' F l e x i b l e response* was s e n s i t i v e t o changes i n the Soviet a r s e n a l . A very l a r g e increase i n the number of f u l l y hardened Soviet ICBM*s and nuc l e a r powered b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e submarines would d e t r a c t from our a b i l i t y t o destroy completely the Sovi e t ' s s t r a t e g i c nuclear forces.9° One must remember tha t a s t r a t e g y of ' f l e x i b l e response—damage l i m i t a t i o n , t h a t i s , the d e s t r u c t i o n of the Soviet f o r c e s p r i o r t o theia? launch, must a l s o contend w i t h the a v a i l a b i l i t y of m i l i t a r y t a r g e t s . This i s commonly r e f e r r e d t o as "the empty-hole problem," and i s a constant dilemma f o r a n a t i o n which has renounced preventive and pre-emptive war.99 For a p e r i o d , though, i t appeared that the United States would maintain s t r a t e g i c s u p e r i o r i t y v i s a v i s the Sovi e t Union. S e n s i t i v e l y and r e s p o n s i v e l y , the McNamara Pentagon continued t o b u i l d a l a r g e ICBM f o r c e . The momen-tum behind the program was p o l i t i c a l , not t e c h n o l o g i c a l -s t r a t e g i c . A d e c i s i o n t o f r e e z e the ICBM f o r c e at 1 , 0 5 4 was made on November 5 , 1 9 6 4 ; 1 0 0 by t h i s time, the Soviets themselves possessed s u f f i c i e n t numbers of hardened second-generation ICBM's and b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e submarines t o 101 undermine a damage-limitation s t r a t e g y . Despite the numerical advantage and continuous q u a l i t a t i v e improvement 1 02 i n the American s t r a t e g i c a r s e n a l , damage-limitation w i t h an " o f f e n s i v e " emphasis was more an academic e x e r c i s e 36 than a s e r i o u s e f f o r t i n s t r a t e g i c p l a n n i n g ; L i k e p o p u l a r i t y i n p o l i t i c s , s t r a t e g i c s u p e r i o r i t y may he d i f f i c u l t t o d e f i n e , hut when i t s h i f t s , those concerned a r e l i k e l y t o he s e n s i t i v e t o the change ; 1 ° 3 the d o c t r i n e of 'assured d e s t r u c t i o n * was approaching. By 1967, 'assured d e s t r u c t i o n * was a sacred American s t r a t e g i c commitment, The cornerstone of our s t r a t e g i c p o l i c y continues t o he t o d e t e r d e l i b e r a t e n u c l e a r a t t a c k upon the U n i t e d S t a t e s , or i t s a l l i e s , by m a i n t a i n i n g a h i g h l y r e l i a b l e a b i l i t y t o i n f l i c t an unaccept-a b l e degree of damage upon any s i n g l e aggressor, or combination of a g g r e s s o r s a t any time d u r i n g the course of a s t r a t e g i c n u c l e a r exchange—even a f t e r a b s o r b i n g a s u r p r i s e f i r s t - s t r i k e ... T h i s can be d e f i n e d as our 'assured d e s t r u c t i o n ' c a p a b i l i t y ... Now i t i s v e r y Imperative t o under-stand t h a t 'assured d e s t r u c t i o n * i s the v e r y essence of the whole d e t e r r e n c e concept. 'Assured d e s t r u c t i o n ' meant the U n i t e d S t a t e s c o u l d " d e s t r o y the a g g r e s s o r t o the p o i n t t h a t h i s -society simply was no l o n g e r v i a b l e i n any meaningful t w e n t i e t h century sense. " 1 0 5 i n more p r e c i s e a n a l y t i c a l terms, •assured d e s t r u c t i o n ' of the S o v i e t Union r e q u i r e d the d e l i v e r y of f o u r hundred e q u i v a l e n t megatons on the USSR, enough t o promptly d e s t r o y o n e - t h i r d of the p o p u l a t i o n and one-half of the i n d u s t r y . The 'assured d e s t r u c t i o n ' c r i t e r i a was d e r i v e d i n the best a n a l y t i c a l f a s h i o n of the McNamara Pentagon's c o s t - e f f e c t i v e approach t o defense p l a n n i n g . Given the demographic c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the S o v i e t Union,! 0'' 7 the d e l i v e r y of fewer than f o u r hundred e q u i v a l e n t megatons 37 was c o n s i d e r e d t o be I n s u f f i c i e n t f o r d e t e r r e n c e w h i l e any number g r e a t e r than the f o u r hundred, would not produce s i g n i f i c a n t l y h i g h e r d e s t r u c t i o n r e t u r n s f o r the added investment i n s t r a t e g i c f o r c e s . T h e r e f o r e , the 108 number f o u r hundred was the i d e a l c o s t - e f f e c t i v e f i g u r e . A lthough the 'assured d e s t r u c t i o n ' c a l c u l a t i o n was the r e s u l t of the Department of Defense's O f f i c e of Systems A n a l y s i s * tendency t o b u i l d c l e a r - c u t , h i g h -109 confidence answers t o s t r a t e g i c problems, 7 the c a l c u l a t i o n was, n o netheless, an e x p l i c i t benchmark i n an a r e a of g r e a t u n c e r t a i n t y and i t d i d serve as a f r o n t - l i n e 110 defense a g a i n s t p r e s s u r e s f o r more s t r a t e g i c weapons. A c c o r d i n g the the l o g i c of 'assured d e s t r u c t i o n , ' the most meaningful and r e a l i s t i c measurement of n u c l e a r c a p a b i l i t y Is n e i t h e r gross megaton-nage nor the number of a v a i l a b l e l a unchers, but r a t h e r , the number of separate warheads ... Furthermore, we w i l l m a i n t ain a s u p e r i o r i t y by these same r e a l i s t i c c r i t e r i a — o v e r the USSR f o r as f a r ahead i n the f u t u r e as we can r e a l i s t i c a l l y p l a n . H I By the time the ICBM f o r c e reached i t s f i n a l d eploy-ment l e v e l i n 19&7, the development of the M u l t i p l e I n d i v i d u a l l y T a r g e t a b l e Reentry V e h i c l e (MIRV) was s u f -f i c i e n t l y advanced f o r i t t o f a l l n i c e l y i n t o 'assured d e s t r u c t i o n * d o c t r i n e . M I R V was a q u a l i t a t i v e s t r a t e g i c o f f e n s i v e warhead improvement which would a l l o w a s i n g l e m i s s i l e l auncher t o c a r r y a numher of i n d i v i d u a l l y t a r g e t a b l e warheads. MIRV would lower s u b s t a n t i a l l y the r a t i o of o f f e n s i v e weapons needed t o a t t a c k the defense. 38 A f o r c e of MIRVed m i s s i l e s would enhance 'assured d e s t r u c -t i o n . • However, other t h i n g s being equal, i n a d d i t i o n t o b e i n g a potent c o u n t e r - c i t y weapon, MIRV's co u l d be a s i g n i f i c a n t c o u n t e r f o r c e weapon, depending on accuracy and payload. Because of i t s ambiguity, MIRV's were seen as b e i n g both s t a b i l i z i n g and d e s t a b i l i z i n g t o the s t r a t e g i c balance. Concurrent w i t h the q u i e t development of MIRV, ther e came many advances i n B a l l i s t i c M i s s i l e Defense (BMD) technology. BMD would l i k e w i s e have f a r - r e a c h i n g and s c h i z o p h r e n i c i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r the d o c t r i n e of 'assured d e s t r u c t i o n ' and the superpower arms c o m p e t i t i o n . 1 1 ^ To say t h a t BMD was a p o l i t i c a l l y and s t r a t e g i c a l l y tempestuous s u b j e c t would, indeed, be an understatement. B a l l i s t i c M i s s i l e Defense had i t s t e c h n o l o g i c a l beginnings w i t h the development of the NIKE s e r i e s of a i r defense m i s s i l e s i n 19^4. The Army-Air Force b u r e a u c r a t i c b a t t l e was not l a t e i n f o l l o w i n g . 1 1 ^ Defense a g a i n s t the ICBM was y e t another step of an i n c r e m e n t a l technology " i n the never-ending quest f o r n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y . " With the p o t e n t i a l t h r e a t of the S o v i e t ICBM program i n the 1950's and the r e j e c t i o n of a p r e v e n t i v e war s o l u t i o n , the Un i t e d S t a t e s " c o u l d not a f f o r d t o put l e s s e f f o r t i n t o the defense than what was put i n t o the o f f e n s e . " D e s p i t e the many b i l l i o n s of d o l l a r s i n v e s t e d i n the c o n t i n e n t a l a i r defense, the c o n v e n t i o n a l s t r a t e g i c f a s h i o n t h a t "the best defense i s a s t r o n g o f f e n s e , " 39 would r e i g n u l t i m a t e ; and s e r i o u s b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e 117 defense would remain a s t r a t e g i c a s p e r s i o n . The b i a s toward the o f f e n s e was f u r t h e r r e i n f o r c e d because o f f e n s i v e technology continued t o advance ahead of d e f e n s i v e technology. U n t i l the NIKE-X System, BMD cou l d handle only the ve r y "simple t h r e a t s " an ICBM cou l d i m p o s e . 1 1 ^ With the development of the NIKE-X System w i t h i t s phased a r r a y radar, v a s t l y improved computers, and a s m a l l ! h i g h - a c c e l e r a t i o n i n t e r c e p t o r m i s s i l e , BMD became more t e c h n i c a l l y s o p h i s t i c a t e d and o f f e r e d a"counter t o the offense.**9 In 1967» S e c r e t a r y of Defense McNamara announced plans f o r a Un i t e d S t a t e s deployment of the SENTINEL ABM System. The... SENTINEL was a " t h i n " deployment designed f o r an a r e a defense of the U n i t e d S t a t e s a g a i n s t a t e c h -120 n o l o g i c a l l y p r i m i t i v e Chinese n u c l e a r a t t a c k . The announcement sparked ant i n t e n s e t e c h n i c a l and s t r a t e g i c debate on the m e r i t s of s t r a t e g i c defense. At the t e c h n i c a l end of the spectrum, opponents of SENTINEL argued t h a t the Chinese c o u l d e a s i l y exhaust the i n t e r c e p t o r s a t s p e c i f i c ABM s i t e s , thereby m a i n t a i n -i n g t h e i r s o - c a l l e d " n u c l e a r b l a c k m a i l . " In a d d i t i o n , the SENTINEL'S r a d a r s were v u l n e r a b l e and t h e r e f o r e , the s o f t e l e c t r o n i c s a l s o r e q u i r e d a defense. SENTINEL was f u r t h e r c r i t i c i z e d on t e c h n i c a l matters concerning the e f f e c t s of exoatmospheric r a d i a t i o n on the h i g h l y -s e n s i t i v e e l e c t r o n i c components caused by the d e t o n a t i o n 4-0 of nuclear warheads, the e f f e c t s t o urban areas caused by l o w - l e v e l SPRINT detonations, the " ^ i n t e s t a b i l i t y " of an ABM system, and the dangers of nuclear a c c i d e n t s . Proponents of SENTINEL responded by s t a t i n g that the system was designed a g a i n s t a very p r i m i t i v e Chinese economy and technology; and, t h e r e f o r e , i t could reduce 121 s i g n i f i c a n t l y c a s u a l t i e s should an a t t a c k occur. Radar v u l n e r a b i l i t i e s admittedly, d i d e x i s t , but were not t e c h n i c a l l y insurmountable, w h i l e the e f f e c t s of exo-atmospheric r a d i a t i o n , the " i o n i z a t i o n phenomena" would pose no s e r i o u s problems. Likewise, SPRINT i n t e r c e p t i o n s 1 22 would not produce d e l e t e r i o u s l o w - l e v e l atomic e f f e c t s . As f a r as the " t e s t a b i l i t y " of an ABM system, i t was as t e s t a b l e as any s t r a t e g i c o f f e n s i v e weapon system on which deterrence r e s t e d . 1 2 3 And while nuclear a c c i d e n t s were p o s s i b l e , t h e i r p r o b a b i l i t y was no greater than a nuclear a c c i d e n t o c c u r r i n g a t numerous AEC power p l a n t s . While SENTINEL u l t i m a t e l y , was not deployed due t o the system's t e c h n i c a l i n a b i l i t y t o o f f e r a more d i v e r s i f i e d set of defensive options f o r i t s cost, the t e c h n o l o g i c a l haggling over the ABM was a c t u a l l y specious t o the r e a l i s s u e , t h a t of s t r a t e g i c defense. The t e c h n o l o g i c a l l i m i t a t i o n s of SENTINEL were used as a surrogate f o c a l p o i n t , f o r the c e n t r a l debate concerned c e r t a i n xenophobic s t r a t e g i c perceptions about nuclear deterrence. To many academicians, Congressional l e a d e r s , and c i t i z e n s , SENTINEL, w h i l e designed p r i m a r i l y a g a i n s t the 4-1 Chinese, deployment of the system would signal the f i r s t step In an inexorable offense/defense nuclear arms race 1 ?4 with the Soviet Union. The American p r o c l i v i t y f o r the "action-reaction" arms race interpretation was a r a l l y i n g argument f o r those against ABM deployment. This syndrome was de f e c t i v e l y reasoned as the p o s s i b i l i t y of an offense/defense arms race derived more from i l l -founded American perceptions of str a t e g i c requirements and the all-too-common "anticipatory reaction" psychosis, than from any unreasonable Soviet view about str a t e g i c defense. 1 25 While str a t e g i c defense was viewed as being quite provocative to the offense i n the dubious context of 126 •assured destruction,• strategic defense was also perceived to be p o l i t i c a l l y d e s t a b i l i z i n g by creating a f a l s e sense of strategic confidence. This f a l s e confidence i t was argued, would cause normally r a t i o n a l men to grow reckless and to engage i n high-risk i n t e r n a t i o n a l be-h a v i o r . 1 2 7 But to believe an ABM system would produce extreme p o l i t i c a l recklessness and games of nuclear brinksmanship, hardly seems l o g i c a l ... To believe that better defense would encourage aggressive behavior on our part contradicts not only American history but even human nature. From 1969 to the present, SAFEGUARD has been the program designation f o r the United States ABM system. S t i l l , the technology of str a t e g i c defense has been more 42 s o p h i s t ! c a t e d 1 2 ^ than most str a t e g i c thinking. Strategic defense, while o f f e r i n g a means to l i m i t damage, provide a hedge against an accidental launch, and defend the land-based ICBM d e t e r r e n t , 1 3 0 was p e r s i s t e n t l y viewed as "not a good thing." As Albert Wohlstetter has so eloquently written i n his a r t i c l e , "Good Guys, Bad Guys, and the ABM," I would not, myself, have thought a few years ago that one could organized: widespread popular indignation among Church groups and mothers on the basis of so extreme and far-fetched a dogma, one that suggests that i t i s a l l r i g h t to threaten to launch missiles at enemy c i v i l i a n s but p e c u l i a r l y heinous to prepare to knock a m i s s i l e down on i t s way to destroy m i l l i o n s of our c i v i l i a n s . 'Clergymen fo r Bombing C i v i l i a n s Only?' 'Mothers f o r the Offense?' I'd have thought i t would never f l y . I was quite wrong.131 Despite the technological promise of defense and the l o g i c behind defending people and MINUTEMAN, stra t e g i c doctrine continued to remain based on an anti-Maginot mentality.!3 2 With the signing of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks' (SALT) Agreements i n May of 1972, •mutual assured destruction* has become i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d s t r a t e g i c doctrine f o r both the United States and the Soviet U n i o n . 1 3 3 A b r i e f discussion of the dynamics of the SALT negotiations w i l l expose many American strategic, p o l i c y -making short-comings and demonstrate that technological momentum i s often a function of sanctimonious st r a t e g i c doctrine. Although the Nixon Administration has given verbal 43 homage t o the c r i t e r i a of ' s t r a t e g i c s u f f i c i e n c y ' and the need f o r more s t r a t e g i c f l e x i b i l i t y o t h e r t h a n t h e i n d i s -c r i m i n a t e s l a u g h t e r of c i v i l i a n h o s t a g e s , t h e American a p p r o a c h t o SALT r e f l e c t e d s u b s t a n t i a l a l l e g i a n c e t o 134 c e r t a i n time-honored s t r a t e g i c o f f e n s i v e s h i b b o l e t h s and a n a i v e a p p r e c i a t i o n of t h e i n t e r a c t i o n between m i l i t a r y f o r c e and p o l i t i c a l power. The ABM T r e a t y , e f f e c t i v e f o r an u n l i m i t e d - d u r a t i o n , r e s t r i c t s t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and S o v i e t U n i o n each t o a to k e n t w o - s i t e ABM depl o y m e n t . 1 3 5 i n a d d i t i o n , t h e r e a r e f u r t h e r r e s t r i c t i o n s on r a d a r c o n f i g u r a t i o n s and t h e number of m i s s i l e i n t e r c e p t o r s . These d e f e n s i v e l i m i t a t i o n s i n l i g h t of t h e I n t e r i m Agreement on o f f e n s i v e weapons, w i l l more t h a n i n s u r e t h a t " t h e m i s s i l e w i l l g e t t h r o u g h . h 1 3 6 S t r a t e g i c d e f e n s e i s f o r b i d d e n f r u i t . I n a d d i t i o n t o l e a v i n g c i v i l i a n p o p u l a t i o n s exposed, as the h o s t a g e s of " s t a b l e n u c l e a r d e t e r r e n c e , " t h e ABM T r e a t y r e s t r i c t s any s i g n i f i c a n t d e f e n s e of t h e l a n d - b a s e d ICBM d e t e r r e n t ; an i l l o g i c a l and i n c o n s i s t e n t d e t e r r e n c e p o l i c y . W i t h t h e e x p e c t e d g r e a t i n c r e a s e s i n m i s s i l e a c c u r a c y , d e f e n s e 137 of the d e t e r r e n t s h o u l d be a premium s t r a t e g i c o b j e c t i v e . y i W h i l e ABM r e s e a r c h and development w i l l c o n t i n u e , d e p l o y a b l e s t r a t e g i c d e f e n s e has l i t t l e p o l i t i c a l momentum. Fu r t h e r m o r e , t h e American p r o p e n s i t y t o approach s e r i o u s and s u b s t a n t i v e superpower p o l i t i c s a s b e i n g an e x e r c i s e i n c o n c i l a t i o n has once a g a i n been made e v i d e n t by t h e SALT.proceedings. The r e s u l t s of c o n c i l i a t i o n have 44 been t e m p o r a r i l y enshrined i n the s t r a t e g i c balance 138 negotiated a t SALT I . There was more than a l i b e r a l tendency on the part of the United States t o d i s m i s s the p o l i t i c a l u t i l i t y of crude numbers i n the superpower s t r a t e g i c balance, e x e m p l i f i e d by Chief Negotiator G. Smith's statement, "There i s no question t h a t t h i s agree-ment does not r e s u l t i n any i n e q u a l i t y f o r the United S t a t e s , " 1 3 9 By emphasizing the t e c h n i c a l i t i e s of the n e g o t i a t i o n s and by conducting a one-way seminar on American s t r a t e g i c d o c t r i n e , the United States neglected the raw p o l i t i c s and images of power i n v o l v e d i n SALT I. Numbers do matter i n matters of s t r a t e g y as w e l l as i n matters of i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s . The I n t e r i m Agreement gives the Soviet Union the q u a n t i t a t i v e advantage i n every area c o n t r o l l e d by the negotiated package. As an example of American s t r a t e g i c policy-making, SALT I r e f l e c t e d an extremely piecemeal methodology of l 4 l "high" p o l i t i c a l n e g o t i a t i o n and a sophomoric f a i l u r e to examine the substantive questions, "What doe we want our d e t e r r e n t t o do f o r us?" And "Are we w i l l i n g t o assume the c o s t s ? " The American n e g o t i a t i n g p o s i t i o n s h i f t e d time ag t e r time w i t h no c l e a r p o l i c y ever emerging. The constant and v o c a l o r c h e s t r a t i o n of the importance i n reaching an agreement a t the SALT I Summit, weakened any true hard b a r g a i n i n g p o s i t i o n . The psychology of "we agree to agree" was more than evident. In view of SALT l ' s p o t e n t i a l t e c h n o l o g i c a l a f t e r -math, there i s a need f o r a r e - t h i n k i n g of s t r a t e g i c p o l i c y . While defense of one's population w i l l l i k e l y remain a s t r a t e g i c nonsequitur, the p e r m i s s i b l e a c r o s s -the-board t e c h n o l o g i c a l refinement of nuclear a r s e n a l s w i l l continue. The American t r i a d of ICBM's, manned bombers-and ; m i s s i l e submarines remain the symbols of the nation's v i r i l i t y , 1 ^ and s i g n i f i c a n t d e c i s i o n s a f f e c t i n g t h e i r f u t u r e c o n f i g u r a t i o n s and importance w i l l be forthcoming. N a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y planning d i e s not wait f o r the i n k t o dry from l a s t year's "arms c o n t r o l " agreements. SALT I I ' b a r g a i n i n g p o s i t i o n s w i l l be constructed now. 46 CHAPTER POUR "The Dilemma Remains" At the r i s k of sounding t r i t e , the period 1945-1972 d i d not produce any unique s t r a t e g i c r e v e l a t i o n s per se; i t couldn't "because there haven't been any f o r countless years. What the per i o d d i d demonstrate was the s e l e c t i v e r e d i s c o v e r y and j u x t a p o s i t i o n of o l d ideas w i t h new technolo-g i e s . The nuclear age has h i g h l i g h t e d the ambivalent and multi- d i m e n s i o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p between technology and st r a t e g y . M i s s i l e s , computers, and nuclear energy have not replaced any strategems; they have only made them more p o t e n t i a l l y dangerous. The nuclear years have demonstrated most, i f not a l l , of the " s t r a t e g i s t ' s dilemmas" in v o l v e d i n the h i g h l y u n c e r t a i n matters of n a t i o n a l defense and p s y c h o l o g i c a l s e c u r i t y w i t h i n such a p o t e n t i a l l y d e s t r u c t i v e t e c h n o l o g i c a l environment. Can any semblance of order be brought to the t e c h n o l o g i c a l -s t r a t e g i c r e l a t i o n s h i p ? Perhaps, but the e x p o s i t i o n r e f l e c t s judgment, not f a c t . On the one hand, i t remains i n f i n i t e l y e a s i e r t o p r e d i c t what the t e c h n o l o g i c a l developments w i l l be. This i s so l a r g e l y because weapons systems tend t o grow-out of alre a d y deployed machines. This "follow-on" process of 4 7 procurement i s an i n t e g r a l part of the m i l i t a r y s e r v i c e s ' r e a f f i r m a t i o n of t h e i r r a i s o n d'etre. Furthermore, weapons technologies evolve around and develop along the "hard" laws of Science and are f i n i t e expressions of conventional wisdoms. On the other hand, t o p r e d i c t what impact these t e c h -n o l o g i c a l developments w i l l exert on the s t r a t e g i c e n v i r o n -ment i s nofciso f i n i t e . I t i s an e x e r c i s e i n " s o f t " a n a l y s i s and judgment which can be no b e t t e r than the most b a s i c assumptions. In some instances s t r a t e g i c d o c t r i n e has been profoundly a f f e c t e d by t e c h n o l o g i c a l r e v o l u t i o n ; yet i n others, d o c t r i n e has proven to be h i g h l y r e s i s t a n t to any change d e s p i t e the wide range of t e c h n o l o g i c a l pos-s i b i l i t i e s . S t r a t e g i c paradigms then are very often r e s i l i e n t b astions of thought seeking t o maintain an order i n the u n c e r t a i n minds of defense planners and s t r a t e g i s t s . Changes i n s t r a t e g i c d o c t r i n e are q u i t e s i m i l a r t o changes i n anything, slow and hard-won. Despite the o f t e n nebulous and amorphous impact of technology upon s t r a t e g i c d o c t r i n e , there has been a strong tendency to gorget that weapons are t o o l s of statesmen. The emphasis on the machines of s t r a t e g y should be t r a n s f e r r e d t o the machinations of s t r a t e g y . A l l too often there has been no i n t e l l e c t u a l examination of the primary assumptions of n a t i o n a l s t r a t e g y but r a t h e r frequent p s e u d o - s c i e n t i f i c e x e r c i s e s designed to e x t r a p o l a t e new 48 paradigms from o l d ones. The i n t r i n s i c s t r a t e g i c debates over "How much i s enough?" should have demonstrated t h a t wepons systems, although mechnaical, i n e v i t a b l y r e f l e c t questions of a t t i t u d e . A t t i t u d e s , u n f o r t u n a t e l y , are a l l too oft e n mechanical. Here, p l a i n common sense, good judgment, and p o l i t i c a l i n t u i t i o n are the p r e r e q u i s i t e s f o r any type of " a n a l y s i s . " Judgments, whether s c i e n t i f i c or i n t u i t i v e , are l i k e l y t o be no b e t t e r than the b a s i c assumptions. In the s e c u r i t y f i e l d we are t h i n k i n g i n terms not of c e r t a i n t y , which i f demanded can only be p a r a l y z i n g , but of high p r o b a b i l i t i e s , . warranting high-confidence p r e d i c t i o n s . 1 ^ 0 The questions about weapons systems and t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p t o s t r a t e g i c d o c t r i n e should be answered not i n terms of t e c h n i c a l c a p a b i l i t i e s , the horror s c e n a r i s t s don't need the help anyway, but i n terms of t h e i r p o l i t i c a l purpose. P o l i t i c s has oft e n been neglected when examining hardware systems. 1^ 7 But i n the f i n a l a n a l y s i s , the s t r a t e g i c hardware mix, the v i r i l e p i l l a r s of American defense p o l i c y and the products of technology, remain matters of p o l i t i c a l o p i n i o n , circumstance, and compromise. S t i l l there have been frequent belabored attempts to "prove" that s t r a t e g i c d o c t r i n e i s determined by the "hard" i n e v i t a b l e products of r a p i d t e c h n o l o g i c a l advance. Technology was j u s t one aspect among the many i n the e v o l u t i o n of s t r a t e g i c d o c t r i n e . •Massive r e t a l i a t i o n , * ' f l e x i b l e response,' and 49 •assured d e s t r u c t i o n * were the r e s u l t of an e v o l v i n g s e r i e s of " s o f t " complex s t r a t e g i c mythologies and the complex i n t e r a c t i o n s between nations and among va r i o u s domestic p a r t i c i p a n t s . U n f o r t u n a t e ly, these d o c t r i n e s r e f l e c t e d a b i a s toward the t o t a l s o l u t i o n t o m u l t i - v a r i a t e questions of s t r a t e g y and power. While not unduly d e n i g r a t i n g the d i s t i n c t pressures technologies can exert upon the s t r a t e g i c environment, the making of s t r a t e g y remains a f u n c t i o n of i n t e l l e c t u a l commitments t o the past, r e a c t i o n s t o p s y c h o l o g i c a l per-ceptions of t h r e a t s i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l system, and much emotional p o l i t i c a l i n f i g h t i n g . •Massive r e t a l i a t i o n . * and the r e v i t a l l z a t l o n of the o f f e n s i v e s p i r i t i n American i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s r e f l e c t e d the b e l i e f that the t h r e a t of the massive use of American f o r c e could r e s o l v e a l l v i t a l American i n t e r -n a t i o n a l commitments. The s u b s t i t u t i o n of nuclear f i r e -power f o r conventional manpower was a l s o h e a v i l y i n f l u e n c e d by the era's conventional f i s c a l wisdom that an annually high defense budget would r u i n the American economy. The r e l i a n c e on 'massive r e t a l i a t i o n * r e f l e c t e d the naive b e l i e f t h a t America could play the part of a world power wi t h l i t t l e human and economic cost. Unfortunately, "the games nat i o n s play" f r e q u e n t l y r e q u i r e the pl a y e r s t o ante-up. 'Massive r e t a l i a t i o n ' was the wrong game a t the wrong time; the d o c t r i n e was too steep to wager e i t h e r n a t i o n a l p r e s t i g e or n a t i o n a l s u r v i v a l . Technology, i f 50 anything, should have made t h i s very c l e a r . E q u a l l y important t o the s t r a t e g i c d o c t r i n e and hardware procurement of the 1950's and w e l l beyond, was the endemic phenomenon of "gap" p r e d i c t i o n . The Cold War mythologies and the prudent requirements of defense planning i n the u n c e r t a i n environment, exerted strong pressures f o r h e f t y a i r c r a f t and m i s s i l e procurement t o complement the b o i s t e r o u s clamor of 'massive r e t a l i a t i o n . * Only through long and hard p o l i t i c a l I n f i g h t i n g d i d the Eisenhower A d m i n i s t r a t i o n a v e r t the extreme o v e r - b u i l d i n g of America's s t r a t e g i c f o r c e s . While s u c c e s s f u l i n curbing procurement a p p e t i t e s , the Eisenhower A d m i n i s t r a t i o n could not manage to c o n t r o l s e r i o u s i n t e r s e r v i c e r i v a l r y . I n t e r s e r v i c e r i v a l r y and the b a t t l e s f o r b u r e a u c r a t i c muscle were other endemic v a r i a b l e s i n defense planning and i n many in s t a n c e s , the r e a l danger t o any arms s p i r a l came from the " a c t i o n -r e a c t i o n " among the s e r v i c e s themselves. Loose c o o r d i n a t i o n of t e c h n o l o g i c a l development allowed the I n d i v i d u a l s e r v i c e s much p o l i t i c a l b a r g a i n i n g power and would a l l o w them i n some Instances, the freedom t o produce and deploy weapons systems which had very l i t t l e to do w i t h the s t r a t e g i c d o c t r i n e . The u l t i m a t e r e s o l u t i o n of many j u r i s d i c t i o n a l and f o r c e l e v e l d i s p u t e s was accomplished by " s a t i s f i c i n g compromises" i n which a l l s e r v i c e s won concessions. The d o c t r i n e 'massive r e t a l i a t i o n ' demonstrated a 51 deep p h i l o s o p h i c a l commitment t o the s t r a t e g i c o f f e n s i v e and the d o c t r i n e ' f l e x i b l e response' was a quantum ex-pansion of that b i a s . By expanding both s t r a t e g i c and conventional c a p a b i l i t i e s , the Kennedy A d m i n i s t r a t i o n demonstrated a commitment to the t h r e a t and the use of f o r c e t o r e s o l v e p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n s . The procurement record of t h i s A d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n d i c a t e s not so much a juggernaut of t e c h n o l o g i c a l mad momentum as i t does l i t t l e r e s i s t a n c e t o s e r v i c e demands f o r weapons systems and a greater w i l l i n g n e s s t o compromise and s a t i s f i c e a t higher f o r c e l e v e l s . ' F l e x i b l e response' s i g n a l e d a s i g n i f i c a n t l y l a r g e r defense budget and the running of a u n i l a t e r a l arms race. "The worst case" i s not always the most prudent form of defense planning. • F l e x i b l e response' although s h o r t - l i v e d , produced the hardware f o r the epitome of the o f f e n s i v e b i a s , 'assured d e s t r u c t i o n . ' 'Assured d e s t r u c t i o n * was r e a l l y 'massive r e t a l i a t i o n * of another degree. The changing s t r a t e g i c balance v i s a v i s the Soviet Union and the f r u s t r a t i n g r e s u l t s produced by the use of American m i l i t a r y f o r c e , produced the complete swing t o the " a l l or nothing" psyche of American " s t a b l e deterrence." The e x p l i c i t c r i t e r i a of 'assured d e s t r u c t i o n * were der i v e d from p s e u d o - s c i e n t i f i c analyses based on the erroneous assumption of a mirror-image adversary. Had more b a s i c questions regarding the s u i c i d a l i m p l i c a t i o n s of 'assured d e s t r u c t i o n ' been r a i s e d , the d o c t r i n e may 52 have been d i f f e r e n t . The a n a l y t i c a l and t e c h n i c a l b i a s of •assured d e s t r u c t i o n * abscured the p o l i t i c a l meaning of s t r a t e g i c f o r c e s . The h a b i t f o r reasoning i n absolutes and the devotion t o the t e c h n i c a l i t i e s of s t r a t e g i c i s s u e s , r a t h e r than concern f o r the substantive matters of super-power p o l i t i c s , helped t o produce the " i t must not f a i l " system of n u c l e a r deterrence. The t e c h n o l o g i c a l e s t a b l i s h -ments were the t o o l s of d o c t r i n a l biases. The making of s t r a t e g y i s a k a l e i d o s c o p i c e x e r c i s e i n v o l v i n g many b i t s and pieces of technology, economics, pure chance, p s y c h o l o g i c a l p r e - d i s p o s i t I o n s , and time-hallowed d o c t r i n a l b e l i e f s . The plane upon which these fragments c i r c u l a t e i s p o l i t i c s , both domestic and i n t e r -n a t i o n a l . Deterrence i s a s t a t e of mind, A f o o l i s h consistency i s the hobgoblin of l i t t l e minds, adored by l i t t l e , statesmen and philosophers and d i v i n e s . 1 ^ 53 FOOTNOTES 1 United States Congress, Senate, Hearings Before the Sub-committee on National Security and International Operations of the Committee on Government Operations, "Planning— Programming—Budgeting," 90 t h Congress, First Session (Washington: GPO, 1967), Dr. Alain Enthoven, p. 157. 2 Bernard Brodie, "Strategy As A Science," World P o l i t i c s . July 1949, p. 477. See also i%lcolm Hoag, "Some Complexities in MLlitary Planning," Wor^ d, PpUUCP> ^ l y 1959. 3 United States Congress, Senate, Hearings Before the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services,"Status of U.S. Strategic Power," 90 t h Congress, 2 n d Session (Washington: GPO, 1968), Part I p. 13. See also Klaus Knorr and Oskar Mbrgenstern, "Science and Defense: Some C r i t i c a l Thoughts on Military Research and Development," Policy ^PfflPdum, 32,, The Center of International Studies, Princeton University, 1965, p. 45. Bernard Brodie, Strategy fa ^ha iftssUe A Se, p. 388. On page 21, Brodie states, "KLlitary strategy, while one of the most ancient of the human Sciences, i s at the same time, one of the least developed." 5 Ibid., p. 272. Brodie adds on page 351 that "Over the long term, a policy of deterrence threatens to founder on the fact that too few people are sufficiently rational or sufficiently wise, with respect to either diplomacy or strategy to make i t work." For a further critique of deterrence, see Philip Green's, Dea,flJ.y Lcfjjc. 6 Donald Brennan and J . J . Hoist, " B a l l i s t i c I&ssile Defense: Two Views," Adelphi Paper #43, London: ISS, November 1967, p. 17. 54 7 Brodie, Strategy In The Missile Age, p. 277. In other words, numbers do matter. Gross numbers, while not a sophisticated measure, are the denominations in which power is perceived. See also, Hearings, "Planning— IPrograinming—Budgeting," 1967, p. 131, "No set of c a l -culations alone can logically imply that we should follow a given strategy. No responsible Defense o f f i c i a l believes that i t i s possible to calculate the answers to major national security policy questions." According to Senator Henry Jackson, P . 118, " . . . there i s no substitute i n government for generalists with good judgment." One often wonders, "where have they gone?" 8 Brodie, Strategy In The Missile Age, p. 397. 9 Ibid^., p. 283. However, with a limited ABM deployment, the commitment to a surviving land-based retaliatory force may be more a psychological one than an actual hardware commitment. See footnote 137. 10 Op«E&tA9Bft fteaflflECh* January/February 1972, p. 241. 11 Statement By Secretary of Defense Clark M. Clifford, 1970 Pe^flse Budget ^ Please,,JPr.gg.ram Foy Fjgcal Years 1970-74. (Washington: GBQ. 1969). 12 Colin S. Gray, "'Gap' Prediction and America's Defense: Arms Race Behavior in the Eisenhower Years," Orbis. Spring 1972, p. 258. However, 'gap1 prediction and subsequent behavior "could set into motion the self-f u l f i l l i n g prophecy—the opponents reaction to the originally anticipated reaction." 13 United States Congress, Senate, Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, "Intelligence and the ABM," 91 s t Congress, 2 n d Session (Washington: GPO, 1969), p. 63. 14 A statement made by Dr. Alain Enthoven cited in William W. Kaufmann, The frfcNamara Strategy, pp. 241-242. However, according to Sir Solly Zuckerman, "What we a l l need to learn i s that the consequences of sc i e n t i f i c activity also cannot be commanded any more than • • • the layman can command a scientist to make a breakthrough in this or that problem." p. ix of Scientists and War. These are matters of degree. 55 15 A technological revolution would be a significant break-through in an area of research and development. The quantum jump in the "state-of-the-art would have great impact on the strategic environment. 16 Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War, p. 316. 17 United States Congress, Senate, Committee Print Submitted by the Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations of the Committee on Government Operations, "Defense Analysis: Two Examples," 91 s t Congress, I s * Session (Washington: GPO, 1969), p. 7. 18 United States Congress, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on I^ilitary Applications of Atomic Energy of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, "Scope, i%gnitude, and Implica-tions of the US ABM Program," 90 t h Congress, 1 s t Session (Washington: GPO, 1967), p. 142. The waiting for technology to develop was one variable in both the MMJTEMN and POLARIS programs; see United States Congress, Senate, Hearings Before the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, "Inquiry Into Satellite and M.ssile Programs," 8 5 t h Congress, l»t Session and 2 n d Session (Washington: GPO, 1957 and 1958), p. 1735. For a current perspective of the changing technological and p o l i t i c a l environments, see United States Congress, Senate, Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services, "Weapon Systems Acquisition Process," 92 n d Congress, 1 s t Session (Washington: GPO, 1971). 19 Hearings, "Inquiry Into Satellite and f i s s i l e Programs," 1957 and 1958, p. 389. See also, United States Congress, Senate, Report of the Subcommittee on the Air Force of the Committee on Armed Services, "Airpower," 84 t n Congress, (Washington: GPO, 1957), pp. 40-41. 20 Hearings, "Scope, i%gnitude, and Implications of the US ABM Program," 1967, Dr. John Foster, p. 142. See also, Hearings, "Status of US Strategic Power," 1968, Part I, p. 49. 21 James Kurth, "A Widening Gyre: The Logic of American Weapons Procurement," Public Policy. Summer 1971, p. 396. 56 22 Among them were the A-bomb, the H-bomb, and bomber develop-ment. The recent Soviet build-up of strategic forces prior to SALT I was not recognized to be a drive for numerical superiority u n t i l the Soviets actually stockpiled the large quantities. Even then, Soviet intentions remained ambiguous. Throughout the nuclear age, there has been a distinct tendency to "mirror-image" the Soviet Union, i . e. to expect the Soviets to emulate our strategic behavior. 23 United States Congress, Senate, Hearings Before the Sub-committee on the Air Force of the Committee on Armed Services, "Study of Airpower," 84 t h Congress, 2 n d Session (Washington: GPO, 1956), p. 1527. 24 Brodie, Strategy In The M s s i l e Age, p. 20. 25 Knorr and H>rgenstern, "Science and Defense: . . . ," p. 24. See also, Benjamin S. Lambeth, "Deterrence i n the WOLRV Era," World P o l i t i c s . January 1972, p. 240. 26 United States Congress, House, Eleventh Report by the Committee on Government Operations,'"Organization and Hanagement of Hissile Programs," 86^ Congress, 1 s t Session (Washington: GPO, 1959), p. 149. See also, Knorr and Margenstern, loc. c i t . pp. 12-13. 27 United States Congress, House, Hearings Before the Sub-committee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, "Strategy and Science: Toward A National Security Policy for the 1970«s" 91 s t Congress, 1 s t Session (Washington: GPO, 1969), p. 41. 28 Committee on Government Operations Print, "Defense Analysis: Two Examples," 1969, p. 9. 29 Hearings, "Strategy and Science," 1969, p. 148. 30 Brodie, Strategy In The M s s i l e Age, p. 361. 57 31 Report, "Study of Airpower," 1957, p. 9. 32 Brodie, Strategy In The M i s s i l e Age, p. 359. As for the budget c e i l i n g , Brodie writes, "We do not have and probably never w i l l have enough money to buy a l l of the things we could e f f e c t i v e l y use for our defense." "Strategy i n peacetime i s expressed l a r g e l y i n choices among weapons systems." p. 361, However, pro-curement of systems i s not always purely a function of s t r a t e g i c requirements. For a good discussion of the budgetary process, see Aaron Wildavsky, The P o l i t i c s p% the Budgetary Process,. 33 Eleventh Report, "Organization and Management of M i s s i l e Programs," 1959, p. 150. Robert S. $%Ifamara, "United States Nuclear Strategy," i n V i t a l Speeches of the Dav. September 18, 1967, p. 743. See also, Kurth, "A Widening Gyre: The Logic of American Weapons Procurement," p. 396. Some l i t e r a t u r e regarding t h i s subject reads l i k e a r e l i g i o u s allegory: "Whenever a new discovery i s made i n Science, the d e v i l i s quick to capture i t , while angels s t a r t a lengthy discussion on how to use the d i s -covery i n the most e f f i c i e n t way." See V. Emelyanov, "On the Question of the Development of M i l i t a r y Technology," i n The Impact of New Technologies on the Arms Race. T. B. Feld, et a l . ed., p. 335. 35 "ABM: Yes or Not" The Center for the Study of Democratic I n s t i t u t i o n s , A Center Occasional Paper. Donald Brennan, p. 22. 36 "Developments i n M i l i t a r y Technology and Their Impact on United States Strategy and Foreign P o l i c y , " Report of Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research of The Johns Hopkins University, (Washington: GPO, 1959), p. 61. 37 Colin S. Gray, "Air Defense: A Sceptical View," Queens Quarterly. Spring 1972, p. 3. 58 38 United States Congress, Senate, Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, "Strategic and Foreign Policy Implica-tions of ABM Systems," 91 s t Congress, 1 s t Session (Washington: GPO, 1969), p. 150. See also Knorr and Margenstern, "Science and Defense: . . . " p. 37; and Colin S. Gray, "The Arms Race i s About P o l i t i c s , " Foreign Policy. Winter 1972-73, p. 120. 39 See page one of the text. Chapter Two 40 Indeed, sci e n t i f i c breakthroughs are often viewed as being the product of some absent-minded scientist stumbling onto new laws of nature. While this image makes wonderful reading, sc i e n t i f i c discovery i s most often the result of hard constant explorations. In both cases, though, the t r i a l s and errors are present. 41 Henry De Wolf Smyth, Atomic Energy For Military Purposes:. "The O f f i c i a l Report on the Development of the Atomic Bomb." p. 2. Hereafter cited as The Smyth Report. In actual figures, one kilogram of matter (2.2 lbs.) i f converted entirely into energy, would yield 25 b i l l i o n kilowatt hours. 42 Ibid.. pp. 16, 25, 31-33, 44-47, 98, and 247. Among them were the separation of isotopes from uranium and plutonium and controlling the c r i t i c a l size of a large atomic pile while conducting a sustained chain reaction. These bridges were built and crossed in the 1930's and 1940's, yet, even the Alamogordo Test was f i l l e d with great uncertainty. The bomb was not created by "the devilish inspiration of some warped genius but by thousands of normal men and women working for the safety of their country," p. 223. See also, Bernard Brodie, "The Atomic Bomb and American Security," Ivfemo 18, Yale Institute of International Studies, p. 2. Brodie's paper, circa 1945, expressed concern about possible acts of nuclear sabotage and terrorism, a relevant concern today. 43 For a discussion of the physical effects of nuclear weapons see, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory's, The Effects of  fliuclear Weapons, prepared for and in cooperation with the United States Department of Defense and United States Atomic Energy Commission (Washington: GPO, 1950), and The Effects of Nuclear Weapons. United States Department of Defense (Washington: GPO, 1962). 59 44 United States Government, Department of War, The United  States Strategic Bombing Survey:. "The Effects of Strategic Bombing on Japanese i^brale," (Washington: GBO, 1947), p. 4. See also, Brodie, Strategy In The M i s s i l e Age, pp. 107, 123, and 130. 45 ibj,d.., p. 152. 46 Ibid., pp. 82 and 152. Brodie, "The Atomic Bomb and American Security," p. 15. The Eff e c t s of Atomic Weapons 1950, p. 17, and George Quester, Nuclear Diplomacy: F i r s t Twentv-five Years, p. 7. 47 United States Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, "The Hydrogen Bomb and International Control: Technical and Background Information," 8 1 s t Congress, 2 n d Session (Washington: GIPO, 1950), pp. 15-18. The American nuclear monopoly was a rather ephemeral condition of the post-war world. The Soviet detonation on July 29, 1949 was a "technological surprise" i n only the gross underestimation of Soviet c a p a b i l i t i e s . The Smyfrh Report provided much nuclear knowledge. See Brodie, "The Atomic Bomb and American Security," pp. 20-21. 48 See Quester, p. 7. 49 United States Congress, Senate, Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, "Developments i n M i l i t a r y Technology and Impact on United States Strategy and Foreign P o l i c y , " 8 7 t n Congress, 1 s t Session (Washington: GPO, 1961), Arnold Wolfers, p. 315. 50 Samuel P. Huntington, "Interservice Competition and the P o l i t i c a l Roles of the Armed Services," The American P o l i t i c a l  Science Review, March 1961, p. 44. Interservice r i v a l r y at t h i s time tended to weaken the m i l i t a r y as a whole but strengthened the i n d i v i d u a l services. See also Edgar M. Bottome, The M i s s i l e Gap: A Study of the Formulation of  M i l i t a r y and P o l i t i c a l Policy, p. 18. 51 Quester, p. 102. Despite the enormous increases i n nuclear power, there were c o n f l i c t i n g estimates over the length of any future war. The newly innaugurated Eisenhower Administra-t i o n would plan on the "average" of the short A i r Force 60 estimate and the long Army one. The f i n a l figure was three years. See also, Report, "Study of Airpower," pp. 2-5, and the Report of Panel II of the Special Studies Project, The Rockefeller Report. 1958. 52 Warner R. S c h i l l i n g , Paul Y. Hammond, and Glenn H. Snyder, Strategy. P o l i t i c s , and Defense Budgets: e s p e c i a l l y the chapter "NSC-68: Prologue to Rearmament." It i s frequently assumed that Korea pushed NSC-68 from i t s status as an Executive paper to a f u l l defense program. This was not e n t i r e l y the case. When the Korean War began, NSC-68 remained unprogrammed and unapproved; p. 345. 53 Kahn, p. 419. See Peter M. Bowers, Boeing A i r c r a f t Since 1916, p. 62. See also, Hearings, "Strategy and Science: . . " 1969, p. 266. 54 Brodie, Strategy In The fta.ssile Age, pp. 84, 185, 393, and 403. The outcome of any future could be decided by l ) who s t r i k e s f i r s t ? 2) with what degree of surprise? 3) against what preparations. See also, Hearings, "Study of Airpower," 1956, pp. 125, 441, 1278, and 1481. The element of surprise was not l o s t on Soviet s t r a t e g i s t s , although, S t a l i n ' s " p r i n c i p l e s of war" had yet to be discounted. 55 The decision to move ahead on fusion was made i n 1950. Fusion was surrounded by much technological uncertainty because of the d i f f i c u l t y i n c o n t r o l l i n g the r e a c t i o n . See "The Hydrogen Bomb and International Control: . . . ," 1950, pp. 1 and 23. For an analysis of the q u a l i t a t i v e differences between megaton and k i l o t o n weapons, see The Effects of Nuclear Weapons. 1962. pp. 87-91. 56 Bottome, The H l s s i l e Gap: . . . , p. 17. See also, Hearings, "Inquiry Into S a t e l l i t e and M s s i l e Programs," 1957 and 1958, Dr. Edward T e l l e r , p. 6. And Eleventh Report, "Organization and Management of F i s s i l e Programs," 1959, p. 69. 57 John Foster Dulles, "Foreign P o l i c i e s and National Security," i n V i t a l Speeches of the Dav. February 1, 1954. Gradually, Dulles' comments were retracted} but i f one examines the course a c t u a l l y pursued by national defense p o l i c y and m i l i t a r y programming over the period that followed, i t was the o r i g i n a l speech which stood. It was, however, d i f f i c u l t to determine exactly how much US " i n i t i a t i v e " 'massive r e t a l i a t i o n ' meant. The ambiguity was i n t e n t i o n a l . 61 58 Remarks made by General Curtis Le Kay, c i t e d by Kaufmann, p. 13. 59 From Lambeth, p. 241. As early as 1945, Brodie wrote that "massive r e t a l i a t i o n " combines the maximum of indiscriminate destruction with the minimum of d i r e c t c o n t r o l . The question reased was one of p o l i t i c a l c r e d i b i l i t y ; see "The Atomic Bomb and American Security," p. 8. Brodie l a t e r wrote, that because of the Soviet possession of fusion, the time for a doctrine of "massive r e t a l i a t i o n " should c e r t a i n l y have been ending i n 1954, not just beginning. A l l future American strategic doctrine would be based on some form of "massive r e t a l i a t i o n , " Strategy In the M i s s i l e Age, pp. 249-251. 60 Cited by David Rees, "Towards the McNamara Doctrine," i n The Military-Technical Revolution. John Erickson ed., p. 86. Page 100 of The Washington Center's Foreign Policy Research Report f 1959 l o c . c i t . , presents a good discussion of the economic motivations behind the "New Look." 61 Hearings, "Study of Airpower," 1956, p. 1668. For a d i s -cussion of the p o l i t i c s and economics of both i n t e r s e r v i c e r i v a l r y and the nuclear-non-nuclear force levels debate, see Maxwell D. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet: Eleventh Report, "Organization and Management of M i s s i l e Programs," 1959, pp. 151-154; Hearings, "Inquiry Into S a t e l l i t e and M i s s i l e Programs," 1958, p. 1007; Bottome, The M i s s i l e Gap: . . . p. 32; and The Rockefeller Report. The Soviet Union would also undergo a si m i l a r period where nuclear firepower was substituted for manpower. In both cases, general purpose forces would ultimately be seen as having great st r a t e g i c u t i l i t y by increasing the c r e d i b i l i t y of the deterrent. 62 Albert Wohlstetter, "The Delicate Balance of Terror," Foreign A f f a i r s . January 1959, p. 211. For an excellent analysis of a i r defense see, C o l i n S. Gray's, "Air Defense: A Sceptical View," and "Canada and NORAD: A Study i n Strategy," Behind the Headlines. June 1972. For the scenario of a Soviet bomber attack, see Hearings, "Strategy and Science," 1969, p. 4, and for the basics of the system, see Eleventh Report, "Organization and Manage-ment of M i s s i l e Programs," 1959. Interestingly, the A i r Force showed l i t t l e enthusiasm for defensive measures because of thefiinds i t would diver t from B-52 procurement, Quester, p. 23. While the A i r Defense system of the 1950*s may have been i l l o g i c a l l y defined, i t s development gave technological insights into future a n t i - b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e defenses; i t also created another i n d u s t r i a l lobby. 62 64 Albert Wohlstetter et. a l . , Protecting US Power to Strike  Back i n the 1950's and 1960's. RAND-290. p. 33. SAC forces were " s o f t " and concentrated at a few bases with i n s u f f i c i e n t warning available, and active defense f a c i l i t i e s were very poor. 65 Colin S. Gray, "'Gap' Prediction and America's Defense: . . . " 66 Hearings, "Study of Airpower," 1956, pp. 184-1770. The perception of the Soviet bomber program was a mirror-image of that of the United States, i . e. the building of a large long-range A i r Force u n t i l the deployment of m i s s i l e forces. 67 Ibid., p. 1587. Along with production rate increases came a hefty increase i n the s i z e of the B-52 wing, from 30-45. And there would be eleven heavy bomber wings instead of seven. The twenty per month production rate was never attained; the rate was f i n a l at f i f t e e n . See Hearings, "Inquiry Into S a t e l l i t e and M i s s i l e Programs," 1958, p. 271. 68 Again, i t i s a question of degree. The Eisenhower Administra-t i o n , although responding to the pressures of "gap" prediction, could have procured more planes than "sensible precaution" dictated. See Gray, "'Gap1, Prediction and America's Defense: . . • ," p. 265. 69 While the manned bomber i s more vulnerable, i t possesses c e r t a i n advantages over m i s s i l e s ; i t can be launched on waining and r e c a l l e d ; i t has a very large payload; and i t can hunt for targets. Manned bombers w i l l not l i k e l y be completely replaced by m i s s i l e s ; they also have a strong A i r Force and i n d u s t r i a l lobby. 70 Eleventh Report, "Organization and Management of M i s s i l e Programs," 1959, pp. 35-52. The basic clash i n the m i s s i l e f i e l d was between the Army and the A i r Force. With the formation of NASA i n 1958, came yet another area of j u r i s d i c t i o n a l debate involving the Department of Defense and the Space Agency, p. 144. Hearings, "Inquiry Into S a t e l l i t e and M i s s i l e Programs," 1958, p. 1007. 63 72 Eleventh Report, "Organization and Management of M i s s i l e Programs," 1959, p. 71. 73 Hearings, "Study of Airpower," 1956, p. 40. The accounting procedures had been altered by the Administration and an increase i n research and development funds was shown when act u a l l y R & D decreased. 74 Morton Halperin, "The Gaither Committee and the P o l i c y Process," World P o l i t i c s . A p r i l 1961, p. 367. 75 An ad hoc committee was formed to decide on a single land-based IRBM but the group could not state with assurance which was the better system, THOR or JUPITER. Ultimately, both were deployed. See Eleventh Report, "Organization and Management of M i s s i l e Programs," 1959, pp. 33 and 115. However, by the end of 1956, the Army and Navy were separated from t h e i r j o i n t IRBM program, and the Havy went on to develop POLARIS, p. 29. "Back-up" systems frequently become the p r i o r i t y program's chief r i v a l . 76 The following was asked of Secretary of Defense McElroy i n January 1959: "Do you assume that Russia i s now ahead of us i n m i s s i l e s ? " The Secretary responded, "Wo, we do not assume that as of now." See United States Congress, Senate, Joint Hearings Before the Preparedness Investigating Sub-committee of the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, "Missile and Space A c t i v i t i e s , " 8 6 t h Congress, I s * Session (Washington: GPO, 1959), p. 49. The Administration defined the so-called "missile gap" i n terms of "state-of-the a r t " technologies, i n which the DoD claimed the United States was ahead; see United States Congress, Senate, Hearings Before the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services i n Conjunction with the Committee on Aero-n a u t i c a l and Space Sciences, " M i s s i l e s , Space, and Other Major Defense Matters," 8 6 t n Congress, 2 n a Session (Washington: GPO, 1960), p. 218. However, the Senate Armed Services Committee was not to be placated. 77 Report of The Washington Center of Foreign Po l i c y Research, 1959, p. 57. The Report goes on to say that even i f the United States wanted to overbuild i t s m i s s i l e deterrent, i t could not. "The choice as i t affected the early years of the m i s s i l e gap was no longer an option for the United States." p. 58. Events would prove t h i s an erroneous assumption. 64 78 Bottome, The Mi s s i l e Gap: . . . ,p. 118. 79 Hearings, "Missiles, Space, and Other Major Defense Matters," 1960, p. 502. M i s s i l e technology was advancing so rap i d l y that to have gone ahead with f u l l - s c a l e deployment of ATLAS and TITAN would have been a cos t l y mistake; see, Hearings, "Inquiry Into S a t e l l i t e and M i s s i l e Programs," 1958, p. 2319. The fi r s t - g e n e r a t i o n ICBM's were l i q u i d - f u e l making them a f i r s t - s t r i k e weapon. S o l i d - f u e l was, however, having d i f f i c u l t i e s ; pp. 1735 and 2368-2383. 80 Bottome, The M i s s i l e Gap: . . . pp. 59-60. The Repub-lican s blamed the "missile gap" on the Truman Administration for f a i l i n g to provide s u f f i c i e n t attention and money to the programs. However, money did not seem to be the r e a l issue i n m i s s i l e development; from 1950-1959, twenty-five b i l l i o n was spent; see Eleventh Report, "Organization and Management of M i s s i l e Programs," 1959, p. 63. 81 Bottome, The M i s s i l e Gap: . . . . p. 168. 82 Report of The Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, 1959, p. 3. 83 Chapter Three 84 Ibid., p. 8. Albert Wohlstetter wrote i n his a r t i c l e , "The Delicate Balance of Terror," that the p i l l a r s of nuclear deterrence were cast i n the 1950's; p. 216. 85 Committee on Government Operations P r i n t , "Defense Analysis: Two Examples," 1969, p. 6. 86 Eleventh Report, "Organization and Management of M i s s i l e Programs," 1959, pp. 68 and 146. The MLNUTEMAN development plan was also the most daring example of concurrency manage-ment. The complete development and production of the system were done simultaneously and i n three years. See Eugene M. Emme, ed., The History of Rocket Technology, p. 157. Current procurement p o l i c y i s " f l y before you buy," exactly opposite of MLNUTEMAN*s pattern. 65 87 MINUTEMAN was to be placed i n s i l o s hardened to 300 p s i . while the command and control centers were to be hardened to l,000psi. See Earnest G. Schwiebert, A History of the USAF B a l l i s t i c M i s s i l e s , p. 60. The enemy's attack-timing problem with a " t r i a d " U.S. force to be destroyed was seen to be very great. 88 The United States "did not have the least idea where Soviet m i s s i l e s i t e s were located." See Hearings, " M i s s i l e s , Space, and Other Major Defense Matters," 1960, p. 287. And when s a t e l l i t e s began to provide more r e l i a b l e targeting data, because of POLARIS' guidance system and limited payload, the SAC bombers and the MINUTEMAN ICBM's were the counterforce weapons• 89 Department of Defense Annual Report for F i s c a l Year 1961. (Washington:GPO, 1962), p. 3. 90 The M i l i t a r y Balance I97l,~1972» P- 56. 91 This was a statement made by President Eisenhower c i t e d by Halperin, "The Gaither Committee and the Po l i c y Process," p. 371. The f i r s t o f f i c i a l break with the " A l l or Nothing" philosophy was signaled by General L. Norstad's speech of 11/12/57. In i t he stated a need for an option "more useful than the simple choice between a l l or nothing. If we have means to meet less-than-ultimate threats with a decisive but less-than-ultimate response, the very possession of t h i s a b i l i t y would discourage the threat, and would thereby provide us with e s s e n t i a l p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y manouever-a b i l i t y , " see Brodie, Strategy In T^e, M i s s i l e A^g, p. 337. However, throughout the Eisenhower years there was a constant debate over how much conventional c a p a b i l i t y was needed. See Hearings, "Inquiry Into S a t e l l i t e and M i s s i l e Programs," 1958, General Taylor, pp. 476 and 529; and Hearings, "Study of Airpower," 1956, General Gavin, pp. 740, 810, and 841. 92 Robert S. MaNamara c i t e d by Kaufmann, p. 75. For the ethos of the use of force i n the Kennedy Administration see, David Halberstam's, The Best and the Brightest. In 1961, American forces were s t i l l preparing for d i f f e r e n t wars; the A i r Force for a short nuclear war and the Army for a long war, see Hearings, "Planning-Programming-Budgeting," 1967, Dr. A. Enthoven, p. 97. 93 Robert S. McNamara c i t e d by Kaufmann, p. 92. 66 94 ifeM., P. 75. 95 Roswell Gilpatric, "Present Defense Policies and Programs," in Vital Speeches of the Dav. December 1, 1961. 96 Kaufmann, p. 75. 97 Ibi,d.. p. 92. The reader is reminded to consider these phnases: "to try to limit the consequences of a nuclear exchange" and "Considering what i s at stake..." in the context of the ABM debate. 98 P« 94. 99 "We are a country that has indicated repeatedly that we w i l l not undertake a pre-emptive strike. Therefore, we have a very real problem because we do not know how many of the holes are going to be f i l l e d and how many of the holes are going to be empty." See Hearings, "Status of US Strategic Power," 1968, p. 357. However, a renunciation of pre-emptive war i s not a fact. 100 United States Congress, Senat, Report by the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, "Status of US Strategic Power," 90 t n Congress, 2 n d Session (Washington: GPO, 1968), p. 12. See also, Kurth, "A Widening Gyre:...", p. 382 and Robert S. MeNamara, "US Nuclear Strategy," p. 743. KeNamara stated that the f i n a l force levels of MLNUTEMAN and POLARIS were the results of "hedging" against a possible Soviet Build-up, another mirror-image perception. Much uncertainty of the Soviet threat should have been eliminated with SAMOS. As i s often the case, force levels are compromise figures; such was the case with MINUTEMAN, the Air Force had requested 3,000* 101 The ^LWary Bfllance 1971-1972, P. 56. Improvements in Soviet forces began to erode 'damage-limitation.' See Hearings, Strategic and Foreign Policy Implications of ABM Systems," 1969, p. 25. The capabilities of the SSBN would make the sea-based deterrent a v i t a l element in 'assured destruction.' However, as General Wheeler has stated, "there w i l l always be some elements of 'flexible response,'" see Hearings, "Status of US Strategic Power," 1968, Part I, p. 3. 67 102 The United States introduced the A-2 and A-3 models of POLARIS, the MINUTEMAN I I , and the HOUND-DOG equipped B-52G and H. Damage-limitation as a serious strategy for a country which renounced preventive and pre-emptive war would be much more viable with an emphasis on s t r a t e g i c defense. The ABM debate was s t i l l years ahead. 103 Hearings, "Scope, Magnitude, and Implications of the US ABM Program," 1967, p. 72. Superiority would be redefined to mean technological or q u a l i t a t i v e s u p e r i o r i t y , see Hearings, "Status of US Strategic Power," 1968, Part I, General wheeler, p. 17 and Dr. J . Foster, p. 59. 104 Robert S. ^fcNamara, "US Nuclear Strategy." 'Assured destruc-t i o n ' was the very essence of United States doctrine, not necessarily the Soviet Union's. 105 Ibid,., p. 738. 106 Ibid.. p. 739. 107 See Appendix B, "Cumulative Percentage D i s t r i b u t i o n of Population and I n d u s t r i a l Capacity of the US and USSR: 1970." Soviet population and industry was not as densely confined as those of the US. Therefore, there were fewer Soviet prime targets for the US to attack. 108 See Appendix C, "Assured Destruction Calculations." Four hundred equivalent megatons would k i l l 74 m i l l i o n Russians and destroy 76% of a l l Soviet industry. These figures r e f l e c t immediate damage only and were thought to be suf-f i c i e n t l y high enough to provide a state of deterrence. 109 For a c r i t i q u e of the US problem-solving approach to st r a t e g i c policy-making, see Ralph E. Strauch, "Winners and Losers: A Conceptual Barrier i n Our Strategic Thinking," RAND P-4769. June, 1972. For comments and c r i t i c i s m s on the O f f i c e for Systems Analysis, see United States Congress, Senate, Memorandum Prepared at the Request of the Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations of the Com-mittee on Government Operations, "Uses and Abuses of Analysis," 9 0 t h Congress, 2 n d Session (Washington: GPO, 1968). Aaron Wildavsky, "Rescuing Policy Analysis From PPBS," Public  Administration Review. March/April, 1969. And for a journey-man's guide to systems analysis see, E.S. Quade and W.I. Boucher, Systems Analysis and Policy Planning. 68 110 As General wheeler stated, "the cornerstone of US strategy i s Assured Destruction, although i t has been given greater weight than the Joint Chiefs of Staff would have advocated." See Hearings, "Status of US Strategic Power," 1968, Part I, p. 5. I l l Robert S. McNamara, "US Nuclear Strategy," p. 739. With future MIRV technology, a m i s s i l e ' s throweight would be the most relevant c r i t e r i a i n determining the number of separate warheads• 112 MIRV was something on the nature of an invention. It was invented i n the US probably i n 1962 or 1963. Only the trade journals gave i t coverage and u n t i l 1967, the idea was only well-known i n c l a s s i f i e d c i r c l e s . Around 1968 i t began to be a prominent topic of discussion i n the US. See United States Congress, House, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on National Security P o l i c y and S c i e n t i f i c Developments of the Committee on Foreign A f f a i r s , "Diplomatic and Strategic Impact of Multiple Warhead M i s s i l e s , " 91 Congress, 1 Session (Washington: GPO, 1969), Donald Brennan, p. 128. 113 Hearings, "Status of US Strategic Power," 1968, Part I, pp. 33 and 121. The blast e f f e c t s of nuclear weapons do not increase i n d i r e c t proportion to t h e i r y i e l d . For a counter-force weapon, doubling the accuracy i s comparable to increasing the y i e l d by a factor of 10. MIRV's also can demolish urban areas more e f f e c t i v e l y than a large y i e l d single warhead. 114 There were many "mad momentum" interpretations given to MIRV development and BMD technology, see Hearings, "Diplomatic and Strategic Impact of Multiple Warhead M i s s i l e s , " 1969, p.2. With a freeze on numbers of launchers, MIRV was a s a t i s f i c e r to the JCS, while BMD was an expansion of a i r defense. Incidentally, the Army needed BMD to stay i n the m i s s i l e game. 115 Hearings, "Inquiry Into S a t e l l i t e and M i s s i l e Programs," 1958, pp. 380-381. The c o n f l i c t over a i r defense missions and r o l e s was eventually s e t t l e d by an a r b i t r a r y 200 mile l i m i t : m i s s i l e s with greater range would be the A i r Force's, m i s s i l e s with less range would be the Army's. However, "area" defense and "point" defense did not lend themselves to easy d i s t i n c t i o n . J u r i s d i c t i o n over a i r defense remained ambiguous, see Eleventh Report, "Organization and Management of M i s s i l e Programs," 1959, p.126. 116 Hearings, "Study of Airpower," 1956, p. 257. Also, Brodie, Strategy In The M i s s i l e Age, p. 176. 69 117 Brodie, "The Atomic Bomb and American Security," pp. 9-11. As early as 1945, Brodie recognized the dangers i n the dogma, "the best defense i s the best offense." Brodie wrote, "Whatever may be the s p e c i f i c changes indicated, i t i s clea r that our m i l i t a r y authorities w i l l have to b e s t i r themselves to a wholly unprecedented degree i n re v i s i n g m i l i t a r y concepts in h e r i t e d from the past." 118 The NIKE-ZEUS was the f i r s t ABM system. Because of i t s mechanically steered radar and limited range, i t could be e a s i l y overcome by decoys and jamming. It would have also been obsolete by the time i t was deployed. However, against the simple ICBM threat, i . e . , one attacking m i s s i l e per radar and interceptor, the NIKE-ZEUS had a track record of 10 k i l l s i n 14 attempts (71%). It was impressive for a "bul l e t h i t t i n g a b u l l e t . " See " B a l l i s t i c M i s s i l e Defense: Two Views," p. 2. 119 NIKE-X had phased array radars which were e l e c t r o n i c a l l y slewed and had a multi-variate tracking c a p a b i l i t y . Computers aided i n guidance and data processing. SPRINT was the high-acceleration m i s s i l e which would be launched a f t e r the atmosphere had f i l t e r e d out decoys. NIKE-ZEUS remained the long-range m i s s i l e , see Hearings, "Strategic and Foreign Policy Implications of ABM Systems," 1969, p. 25. With exoatmospheric r a d i a t i o n , i t was no longer necessary for a "bull e t to h i t a b u l l e t . " NIKE-X i f deployed, would also have been outrun by technology. McNamara r e s i s t e d strong pressures for i t s deployment. 120 Hearings, "Scope, Magnitude, and Implications of the US ABM Program," 1967, p. 135. SENTINEL was based on PAR, MAR, MSR, and TACMAR radars; SPARTAN long-range m i s s i l e s and SPRINTS for shorter ranges. The 15-20 s i t e deployment cost was estimated at 5 b i l l i o n and I n i t i a l Operating Capability (IOC) would have been i n the early 1970's. 121 See Appendix D, "SENTINEL'S Effectiveness Against A Chinese Attack;" Hearings, "Scope, Magnitude, and Implications of the US ABM Program," 1967, p. 135. The d i f f i c u l t i e s i n penetrating defenses i s as technologically challenging as defense i t s e l f , see " B a l l i s t i c M i s s i l e Defense: Two Views," Donald Brennan, p. 7. 122 This was somewhat questionable. For d e t a i l s of the atmospheric e f f e c t s of nuclear explosions see, The Effects of Nuclear  Weapons 1962. pp. 506-514. 70 123 For remarks concerning the "testability" of an ABM system, see "ABM: Yes Or No?," Donald Brennan, p. 19. 124 SENTINEL was technically limited in terms of a Soviet f i r s t -strike. But i t was recognized that the system had great "growth" potential; i t s deployment would also have given "in-f i e l d " experience in operating a strategic defense. O f f i c i a l DoD statements indicated that SENTINEL was'not the f i r s t step in an anti-Soviet system, see Hearings,"Status of US Strategic Power," 1968, Part I, pp. 52 and 346-371. One must note that MIRV had been advancing on i t s own despite the Soviet slow-down in their GALOSH ABM. In terms of image, and status, an ABM system was a symbol of superpower status; see Hearings, "Scope, Magnitude, and Implications of the US ABM Program," 1967, p. 73. 125 Adding a new weapon system w i l l neither necessarily nor automatically represent an# escalation in the arms competition, see Hearings, "Strategy and Science:...," 1969, pp. 115 and 148. 126 As J.J. Hoist has written, " i t i s necessary for decision-makers to abandon any dogmatic pre-suppositions about i n -exorable arms race response and fixed levels of 'assured destruction,'" " B a l l i s t i c Missile Defense: Two Views," p. 36. 127 This argument was as incredible as the a l l too common belief that the Chinese were ir r a t i o n a l j see Robert S. MeNamara, "US Nuclear Strategy," p. 742. The implication was that •assured destruction' may not deter the Chinese. For a more accurate appraisal of Chinese behavior see, Arthur Huck, The Security of Chj,flft. 128 Hearings, "Strategic and Foreign Policy Implications of ABM Systems," 1969, Dr. E• Teller, p. 503. 129 United States Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, "Supplementary Hearings on Defense Procurement Authorization Relating to SALT Agreement," 92 n d Congress, 2 n d Session (Washington: GPO, 1972). SAFEGUARD s t i l l had radar limitations, but a "hard-point" system was under development, see United States Congress, Senate, Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, "ABM , MIRV, SALT, and the Nuclear Arms Race," 91 s t Congress, 2 n d Session (Washington: GPO, 1970), p. 61. 71 130 See Statement by Secretary of Defense Melvin R. La i r d , F i s c a l Year 1,971 Defense Program and Budget. {Washington: GPO, 1970), pp. 46-47. For a further discussion of strategic defenses, see Hearings, "Strategy and Science:•••% 1969, Herman Kahn, pp. 111-115. 131 United States Congress, Senate, Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services, "Authorization f o r M i l i t a r y Procurement, Research and Development, F i s c a l Year 1971, and Selected Reserve Strengths," 9 1 s t Congress, 2 n d Session (Washington: GPO, 1970), p. 2237. For d e t a i l s of the public's sentiment to the ABM see, Unitdd States Congress, House, Br i e f i n g Before the Committee on Appropriations, "SENTINEL An t i -B a l l i s t i c M i s s i l e System," 9 1 s t Congress, 1 s t Session (Washington: GPO, 1969), pp. 2-8. As Dr. J . Wiesner has stated: "offensive systems are less abstrusive. People are not conscious of them. They can be put i n q u i e t l y . But an ABM i s d i f f e r e n t ; i t does not do a l o t of good to defend one-half of our population, so an ABM has to be a massive thing. It i s put i n people's backyards so to speak. It also shows up as an enormous budget item," Hearings, "Strategy and Science:...", 1969, p. 19. 132 Typical of the s t r a t e g i c wisdom of the peridd was the following exchange: Sen. Fulbright: "Are you f a m i l i a r with the Maginot Line?" DR. Panofsky: "1 have heard about i t , yes, s i r . " Sen. Fulbright: "Well, i t was a defense, wasn't i t ? " Dr. Panofsky: "Yes." Sen. Fulbright: "Was i t more co s t l y to b u i l d than i t was for the Germans to penetrate i t ? " Dr. Panofsky: "I frankly don't know the answer to that question." Sen. Fulbright: "I was under the impression i t was very c o s t l y and u t t e r l y i n e f f e c t i v e . " See Hearings, "The Strategic and Foreign P o l i c y Implications of ABM Systems," 1969, p. 373. 133 H. S c o v i l l e , Y. Kulish, P. G a l l o i s , and D. Brennan, "Strategic Forum: The SALT Agreements," Survival. September/October, 1972. Interpretations vary as to why the USSR has signed away "defense of the homeland." The complete text of the SALT Agreements i s provided i n Appendix A. 134 Former Ulss't Secretary of Defense Packard was quoted as saying, " s u f f i c i e n c y i s a nice word to use i n a speech, but i t doesn't mean a God-damned thing." The US did not work through many of the i n t e l l e c t u a l questions surrounding SALT. 72 As Donald Brennan has t e s t i f i e d , "The proposed ABM Treaty does the wrong thing well and the Interim Agreement does the r i g h t things badly," see United States Congress, Senate, Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, "Strategic Arms Limitation Agreements," 9 2 n d Congress, 2 n d Session (Washington: GPO, 1972), p. 186. For a discussion of the dominant American arms race mythologies see, Colin S. Gray, "The Arms Race Is About P o l i t i c s , " Foreign P o l i c y . Winter, 1972-73. 135 One of the two permitted US ABM s i t e s i s the National Command Authority (NCA) ABM and w i l l probably not be deployed; see United States Congress, Senate, Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services, " F i s c a l Year 1973 Authorization for the M i l i t a r y Procurement, Research and Development, Construction Authorization for the SAFEGUARD ABM, and Active Duty and Selected Reserve Strengths," 9 2 n d Congress, 2 n d Session (Washington: GjPO, 1972), pp. 4286-4288. 136 By assuring that "the m i s s i l e w i l l get throught? there i s no hedge against accident, unauthorized f i r i n g , Nth country complications, or a range of superpower options. Furthermore, " i t i s immoral not to attempt defense," see Hearings, Senate, 1972 "Strategic Arms Limitation Agreements," Sen. J . Buckley, p. 257. 137 The v u l n e r a b i l i t y of a hardened ICBM was recognized long before a substantial force was buried, see Hearings, "Inquiry Into S a l t e l l i t e and M i s s i l e Programs," 1958, General Gavin, p. 503. A CEP of 30 meters i s possible, see D.C. Hoag, " B a l l i s t i c M i s s i l e Guidance," i n The Impact of New Technologies on the Arms Race, by B.T. Feld e t . a l . p. 81. SALT I has not braked the q u a l i t i a t i v e arms competition. 138 "To our minds, international negotiations are so completely a means for ending c o n f l i c t that we are b l i n d to the fact that they may be... equally adapted to continuing i t * " see United States Congress, Senate, Selected Writings Compiled by the Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations of the Committee on Government Operations, "The Soviet Approach to Negotiation." 9 1 s t Congress, 1 s t Session (Washington: GPO, 1969), p. 28. 139 Hearings, Senate, "Strategic Arms Limitation Agreements," 1972, p. 33; Hearings, House,"Military Implications of SALT," 1972, G. Smith, p. 15099; and United States Congress, Senate, Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services, " M i l i t a r y Implications of the Treaty on the Limitation of A n t i - B a l l i s t i c 73 M i s s i l e Systems and the I n t e r i m Agreement on L i m i t a t i o n of S t r a t e g i c O f f e n s i v e Arms," 92n<a Congress, 2 n d Session (Washington: GPO, 1972). 140 I,b\d., p. 188. There has been no "ro a d - t e s t " of the deterrent system w i t h a s t r a t e g i c a l l y muscular Soviet Union. Numbers do matter as Donald Hrennan s t a t e s , "most p o l i t i c a l leaders and m i l i t a r y leaders are not academic s t r a t e g i s t s ; these leaders not only count weapons, they tend to t h i n k i n terms of who w i l l come out ahead...," see Hearings, Senate, S t r a t e g i c Arms L i m i t a t i o n Agreements," 1972, p. 188. For a d i s c u s s i o n of the gains and l o s s e s f o r both side s at SALT I , see W i l l i a m R. Ki n t n e r and Robert L. P f a l t z g r a f f , "Assessing the Moscow SALT Agreements," O r b i s . Summer, 1972. 141 In f a c t , much of the 'hard 1 n e g o t i a t i n g i n SALT I was done i n Washington, see United States Congress, Senate, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Na t i o n a l S e c u r i t y and I n t e r n a t i o n a l Operations of the Committee on Government Operations, " I n t e r n a t i o n a l N e g o t i a t i o n : Some Oper a t i o n a l P r i n c i p l e s of Soviet Foreign P o l i c y , " 92 n d Congress, 2 n d Session (Washington: GPO, 1972), p. 207. 142 C o l i n S. Gray, "The Arms Race Is About P o l i t i c s , " p. 129. 143 Enlargement may be the more accurate term. UndBr the terms of SALT I , a m i s s i l e s ' s volume may be increased by 327o, see Hearings, Senate, " M i l i t a r y I m p l i c a t i o n s of SALT," 1972, p. 312 and Hearings, House, M i l i t a r y I m p l i c a t i o n s of SALT," 1972, pp. 15106, 15111, 15119, 15137, 15140, and 15145. 144 M a r t i n L. Pearl,"SALT and I t s I l l u s i o n s , " B u l l e t i n of j:he Atomic S c i e n t i s t s . December, 1971, p. 8. As Jeremy J . Stone has w r i t t e n , "We are now accustomed to maintaining three separate s t r a t e g i c f o r c e s . . . R a t i o n a l i z a t i o n s can be o f f e r e d f o r t h i s but at bottom, i t i s s e r v i c e r i v a l r y and bureau-c r a t i c i n e r t i a t h a t s u s t a i n three d i s t i n c t systems," see h i s "When and How to Use SALT," Foreign A f f a i r s . January, 1970, p. 267. 145 Many of these d e c i s i o n s r e f l e c t r e v e r s a l s of e a r l i e r t e c h n o l o g i c a l - s t r a t e g i c c h o i c e s : among them are curre n t development programs f o r a "heavy" ICBM and a submarine-launched c r u i s e m i s s i l e (SLCM). Many d e c i s i o n s n a t u r a l l y i n v o l v e " f o l l o w - o n " programs; f o r a d e s c r i p t i o n of these see, Hearings, "FY 1973 A u t h o r i z a t i o n . . . , " 1972, B - l bomber-pp. 2331-2363; TRIDENT submarine and m i s s i l e system-74 pp. 2633-2683 and 3139-3217; ARBRES warhead- pp. 2089-2120; ABM technology- pp. 3033-3096. For the new additions to bomber defenses see, Colin S. Gray, Canadian Defense P r i o r i t i e s : A Question of Relevance, pp. 77-84. Chapter Four 146 Bernard Brodie, "The Impact of Technological Change on the International System: Reflections on Prediction," Journal. of International Affairs v o l . 25, No. 2, 1971, P . 217. 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T R E A T Y BETWEEN T H E U N I T E D S T A T E S O F A M E R I C A AND T H E U N I O N O F S O V I E T S O C I A L I S T R E P U B L I C S ON T H E L I M I T A T I O N O F A N T I * B A L L I S T I C M I S S I L E S Y S T E M S T h e U n i t e d S t a t e s o f A m e r i c a a n d t h e U n i o n o f S o v i e t S o c i a l i s t R e p u b l i c s , h e r e i n a f t e r r e f e r r e d t o a s t h e P a r t i e s , P r o c e e d i n g f r o m t h e p r e m i s e t h a t n u c l e a r w a r w o u l d h a v e d e v a s t a t i n g c o n s e q u e n c e s f o r a l l m a n k i n d , C o n s i d e r i n g t h a t e f f e c t i v e m e a s u r e s t o l i m i t a n t i * b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e s y s t e m s w o u l d b e a s u b s t a n t i a l f a c t o r i n c u r b i n g t h e r a c e i n s t r a t e g i c o f f e n s i v e a r m s a n d w o u l d l e a d t o a d e c r e a s e i n t h e r i s k o f o u t b r e a k o f w a r i n v o l v i n g n u c l e a r w e a p o n s , P r o c e e d i n g f r o m t h e p r e m i s e t h a t t h e l i m i t a t i o n o f a n t i - b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e s y s t e m s , a s w e l l a s c e r t a i n a g r e e d m e a s u r e s w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e l i m i t a t i o n o f s t r a t e g i c o f f e n s i v e a r m s , w o u l d c o n t r i b u t e t o t h e c r e a t i o n o f m o r e f a v o r a b l e c o n d i t i o n s f o r f u r t h e r n e g o t i a t i o n s o n l i m i t i n g s t r a t e g i c a r m s , M i n d f u l o f t h e i r o b l i g a t i o n s u n d e r A r t i c l e V I o f t h e T r e a t y o n t h e N o n - P r o l i f e r a t i o n o f N u c l e a r W e a p o n s , D e c l a r i n g t h e i r i n t e n t i o n t o a c h i e v e a t t h e e a r l i e s t p o s s i b l e d a t e t h e c e s s a t i o n o f t h e n u c l e a r a r m s r a c e a n d t o t a k e e f f e c t i v e m e a s u r e s t o w a r d r e d u c t i o n s i n s t r a t e g i c a r m s , n u c l e a r d i s a r m a m e n t , a n d g e n e r a l a n d c o m p l e t e d i s a r m a m e n t , D e s i r i n g t o c o n t r i b u t e t o t h e r e l a x a t i o n o f i n t e r * n a t i o n a l t e n s i o n a n d t h e s t r e n g t h e n i n g o f t r u s t b e t w e e n S t a t e s , H a v e a g r e e d a s f o l l o w s : A R T I C L E I 1. E a c h P a r t y u n d e r t a k e s t o l i m i t a n t i - b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e ( A B M ) s y s t e m s a n d t o a d o p t o t h e r m e a s u r e s i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f t h i s T r e a t y * 2; E a c h P a r t y u n d e r t a k e s n o t t o d e p l o y A B M s y s t e m s f o r a d e f e n s e o f t h e t e r r i t o r y o f i t s c o u n t r y a n d n o t t o p r o v i d e a b a s e f o r s u c h a d e f e n s e , a n d n o t t o d e p l o y A B M s y s t e m s f o r d e f e n s e o f a n i n d i v i d u a l r e g i o n e x c e p t a s p r o v i d e d f o r i n A r t i c l e I I I o f t h i s T r e a t y . A R T I C L E I I l ; F o r t h e p u r p o s e s o f t h i s T r e a t y a n A B M s y s t e m i s a s y s t e m t o c o u n t e r s t r a t e g i c b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e s o r t h e i r e l e m e n t s i n f l i g h t t r a j e c t o r y , c u r r e n t l y c o n s i s t i n g o f : 88 ( a ) A B M i n t e r c e p t o r m i s s i l e s , w h i c h a r e i n t e r c e p t o r m i s s i l e s c o n s t r u c t e d a n d d e p l o y e d f o r a n A B M r o l e , o r o f a t y p e t e s t e d i n a n A B M m o d e ; ( b ) A B M l a u n c h e r s , w h i c h a r e l a u n c h e r s c o n s t r u c t e d a n d d e p l o y e d f o r l a u n c h i n g A B M i n t e r c e p t o r m i s s i l e s ; a n d ( c ) A B M r a d a r s , w h i c h a r e r a d a r s c o n s t r u c t e d a n d d e p l o y e d f o r a n A B M r o l e , o r o f a t y p e t e s t e d i n a n ABM m o d e . 2 . T h e A B M s y s t e m c o m p o n e n t s l i s t e d i n p a r a g r a p h 1 o f t h i s A r t i c l e i n c l u d e t h o s e w h i c h a r e : ( a ) o p e r a t i o n a l ; ( b ) u n d e r c o n s t r u c t i o n ; ( c ) u n d e r g o i n g t e s t i n g ; ( d ) u n d e r g o i n g o v e r h a u l , r e p a i r o r c o n v e r s i o n ; o r ( e ) m o t h b a l l e d . A R T I C L E I I I E a c h P a r t y u n d e r t a k e s n o t t o d e p l o y A B M s y s t e m s o r t h e i r c o m p o n e n t s e x c e p t t h a t : ( a ) w i t h i n o n e A B M s y s t e m d e p l o y m e n t a r e a h a v i n g a r a d i u s o f o n e h u n d r e d a n d f i f t y k i l o m e t e r s a n d c e n t e r e d o n t h e P a r t y * s n a t i o n a l c a p i t a l , a P a r t y m a y d e p l o y : (1) n o m o r e t h a n o n e h u n d r e d A B M l a u n c h e r s a n d n o m o r e t h a n o n e h u n d r e d A B M i n t e r c e p t o r m i s s i l e s a t l a u n c h s i t e s , a n d (2) A B M r a d a r s w i t h i n n o m o r e t h a n s i x A B M r a d a r c o m p l e x e s , t h e a r e a o f e a c h c o m p l e x b e i n g c i r c u l a r a n d h a v i n g a d i a m e t e r o f n o m o r e t h a n t h r e e k i l o m e t e r s ; a n d ( b ) w i t h i n o n e A B M s y s t e m d e p l o y m e n t a r e a h a v i n g a r a d i u s o f o n e h u n d r e d a n d f i f t y k i l o m e t e r s a n d c o n t a i n i n g I C B M s i l o l a u n c h e r s , a P a r t y m a y d e p l o y : ( l ) n o m o r e t h a n o n e h u n d r e d A B M l a u n c h e r s a n d n o m o r e t h a n o n e h u n d r e d A B M i n t e r c e p t o r m i s s i l e s a t l a u n c h s i t e s , (2) t w o l a r g e p h a s e d - a r r a y A B M r a d a r s c o m p a r a b l e i n p o t e n t i a l t o c o r r e -s p o n d i n g A B M r a d a r s o p e r a t i o n a l o r u n d e r c o n s t r u c t i o n o n t h e d a t e o f s i g n a t u r e o f t h e T r e a t y i n a n A B M s y s t e m d e p l o y m e n t a r e a c o n t a i n i n g I C B M s i l o l a u n c h e r s , a n d (3) n o m o r e t h a n e i g h t e e n A B M r a d a r s e a c h h a v i n g a p o t e n t i a l l e s s t h a n t h e p o t e n t i a l o f t h e s m a l l e r o f t h e a b o v e - m e n t i o n e d t w o l a r g e p h a s e d - a r r a y A B M r a d a r s * A R T I C L E I V r i T h e l i m i t a t i o n s p r o v i d e d f o r i n A r t i c l e I I I s h a l l n o t a p p l y t o A B M s y s t e m s o r t h e i r c o m p o n e n t s u s e d f o r d e v e l o p -m e n t o r t e s t i n g , a n d l o c a t e d w i t h i n c u r r e n t o r a d d i t i o n a l l y a g r e e d t e s t r a n g e s . E a c h P a r t y m a y h a v e n o m o r e t h a n a t o t a l o f f i f t e e n A B M l a u n c h e r s a t t e s t r a n g e s . ARTICLE V 1. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, a i r -based, space-based, or mobile land-based. 2. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM launchers for launching more than one ABM interceptor missile at a time from each launcher, nor to modify deployed launchers to provide them with such a capability, nor to develop, test, or deploy automatic or semi-automatic or other similar systems for rapid reload of ABM launchers. ARTICLE VI To enhance assurance of the effectiveness of the limitations on ABM systems and their components provided by this Treaty each Party undertakes: (a) not to give missiles, launchers, or radars, other than ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars, capabilities to counter strategic b a l l i s t i c missiles or their elements in fli g h t trajectory, and not to test them in an ABM mode; and (b) not to deploy i n the future radars for early warning of strategic b a l l i s t i c missile attack except at locations along the-periphery of i t s national territory and oriented outward. ARTICLE VII Subject to the provisions of this Treaty, moderniza-tion and replacement of ABM systems or their components may be'carried out• ARTICLE VIII ABM systems or their components i n excess of the numbers or outside the areas specified in this Treaty, as well as ABM systems or their components prohibited by this Treaty, shall be destroyed or dismantled under agreed procedures within the shortest possible agreed period of time. ARTICLE IX To assure the v i a b i l i t y and effectiveness of this Treaty, each Party undertakes not to transfer to other States, and not to deploy outside i t s national territory, ABM systems or their components limited by this Treaty. ARTICLE X Each Party undertakes not. to assume any international obligations which would conflict with this Treaty* ARTICLE XI The Parties undertake to continue active negotia-tions for limitations on strategic offensive arms* ARTICLE XII 1* For the purpose of providing assurance of com-pliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at i t s disposal i n a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law* 2* Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article* 3* Each Party undertakes not to use deliberate con-cealment measures which impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty* This obligation shall not require changes in current construction, assembly, conversion, or overhaul practices* ARTICLE XIII 1* To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties shall establish promptly a Standing Consultative Commission, within the framework of which they w i l l : (a) consider questions concerning compliance with the obligations assumed and related situations which may be considered ambiguous; (b) provide on a voluntary basis such informa-tion as either Party considers necessary to assure confidence in compliance with the obligations assumed: (c) consider questions involving unintended interference with national technical means of verification; (d) consider possible changes i n the strategic situation which have a bearing on the provisions of this Treaty; (e) agree upon procedures and dates for destruction or dismantling of ABM systems or their components i n cases provided for my the provisions of this Treaty; (f) consider, as appropriate, possible pro-posals for further increasing the v i a b i l i t y of this T r e a t y , i n c l u d i n g p r o p o s a l s f o r a m e n d m e n t s i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f t h i s T r e a t y ; ( g ) c o n s i d e r , a s a p p r o p r i a t e , p r o p o s a l s f o r f u r t h e r m e a s u r e s a i m e d a t l i m i t i n g s t r a t e g i c a r m s . 2 * T h e P a r t i e s t h r o u g h c o n s u l t a t i o n s h a l l e s t a b l i s h , a n d m a y a m e n d a s a p p r o p r i a t e , R e g u l a t i o n s f o r t h e S t a n d i n g C o n s u l t a t i v e C o m m i s s i o n g i v e r n i n g p r o c e d u r e s , c o m p o s i t i o n a n d o t h e r r e l e v a n t m a t t e r s * A R T I C L E X I V 1* E a c h P a r t y m a y p r o p o s e a m e n d m e n t s t o t h i s T r e a t y * A g r e e d a m e n d m e n t s s h a l l e n t e r i n t o f o r c e i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e p r o c e d u r e s g o v e r n i n g t h e e n t r y i n t o f o r c e o f t h i s T r e a t y * 2 * F i v e y e a r s a f t e r e n t r y i n t o f o r c e o f t h i s T r e a t y , a n d a t f i v e y e a r i n t e r v a l s t h e r e a f t e r , t h e P a r t i e s s h a l l t o g e t h e r c o n d u c t a r e v i e w o f t h i s T r e a t y * A R T I C L E X V 1 . T h i s T r e a t y s h a l l b e o f u n l i m i t e d d u r a t i o n * 2* E a c h P a r t y s h a l l , i n e x e r c i s i n g i t s n a t i o n a l s o v e r e i g n t y , h a v e t h e r i g h t t o w i t h d r a w f r o m t h i s T r e a t y i f i t d e c i d e s t h a t e x t r a o r d i n a r y e v e n t s r e l a t e d t o t h e s u b j e c t m a t t e r o f t h i s T r e a t y h a v e j e o p a r d i z e d i t s s u p r e m e i n t e r e s t s * I t s h a l l g i v e n o t i c e o f i t s d e c i s i o n t o t h e o t h e r P a r t y s i x m o n t h s p r i o r t o w i t h d r a w a l f r o m t h e T r e a t y * S u c h n o t i c e s h a l l i n c l u d e a s t a t e m e n t o f t h e e x t r a o r d i n a r y e v e n t s t h e n o t i f y i n g P a r t y r e g a r d s a s h a v i n g j e o p a r d i z e d i t s s u p r e m e i n t e r e s t s * A R T I C L E X V I 1* T h i s T r e a t y s h a l l b e s u b j e c t t o r a t i f i c a t i o n i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o c e d u r e s o f e a c h P a r t y T h e T r e a t y s h a l l e n t e r i n t o f o r c e o n t h e d a y o f t h e e x c h a n g o f i n s t r u m e n t s o f r a t i f i c a t i o n * 2 * T h i s T r e a t y s h a l l b e r e g i s t e r e d p u r s u a n t t o A r t i c l e 1 0 2 o f t h e C h a r t e r o f t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s * D o n e a t M o s c o w o n May 2 6 , 1 9 7 2 , i n t w o c o p i e s , e a c h i n t h e E n g l i s h a n d R u s s i a n l a n g u a g e s , b o t h t e x t s b e i n g e q u a l l y a u t h e n t i c * F o r t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s o f A m e r i c a : R I C H A R D N I X O N P r e s i d e n t o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s o f A m e r i c a * F o r t h e U n i o n o f S o v i e t S o c i a l i s t R e p u b l i c s : L * I * B r e z h n e v G e n e r a l S e c r e t a r y o f t h e C e n t r a l C o m m i t t e e o f t h e C P S U 92 INTERIM AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON CERTAIN MEASURES WITH RESPECT TO THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties, Convinced that the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-B a l l i s t i c Missile Systems and this Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms w i l l contribute to the creation of more favorable conditions for active negotiations on limiting strategic arms as well as to the relaxation of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States, Taking ! into account the relationship between strategic offensive and defensive arms, Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Have agreed as follows: ARTICLE I The Parties undertake not to start construction of additional fixed land-based intercontinental b a l l i s t i c missile (ICBM) launchers after July 1, 1972. ! ARTICLE II The Parties undertake not to convert land-based launchers for light ICBMs, or for ICBMs of older types deployed prior to 1964, into land-based launchers for heavy ICBMs of types deployed after that time* ARTICLE III The Parties undertake to limit submarine-launched b a l l i s t i c missile (SLBM) launchers and modern b a l l i s t i c missile submarines to the numbers operational and under construction on the date of signature of this Interim Agreement, and i n addition to launchers and submarines constructed under procedures established by the Parties as replacements for an equal number of ICBM launchers of older types deployed prior to 1964 or for launchers on older submarines• ARTICLE IV Subject to the provisions of this Interim Agreement, modernization and replacement of strategic offensive b a l l i s t i c missiles and launchers covered by this Interim Agreement may be undertaken* 93 ARTICLE V 1. For the purpose of providing assurance of com-pliance with the provisions of this Interim Agreement, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at i t s disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of International law* 2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article* 3* Each Party undertakes not to use deliberate con-cealment measures which impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of this Interim Agreement* This obligation shall not require changes in current construction, assembly, conversion, or overhaul practices* ARTICLE VI To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Interim Agreement, the Parties shall use the Standing Consultative Commission established under Article XIII of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-B a l l i s t i c Missile Systems in accordance with the provisions of that A r t i c l e . ARTICLE VII The Parties undertake to continue active negotiations for limitations on strategic offensive arms* The obliga-tions provided for in this Interim Agreement shall not prejudice the scope or terms of the limitations on strategic offensive arms which may be worked out in the course of further negotiations. ARTICLE VIII 1. This Interim Agreement shall enter into force upon exchange of written notices of acceptance by each Party, which exchange shall take place simultaneously with the exchange of instruments of r a t i f i c a t i o n of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems* 2* This Interim Agreement shall remain i n force for a period of five years unless replaced earlier by an agree-ment on more complete measures limiting strategic offensive arms. It i s the objective of the Parties to conduct active follow-on negotiations with the aim of concluding such an agreement as soon as possible. 3. Each Party shall, i n exercising i t s national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Interim Agreement of i t decides that extraordinary events related 94 to the subject matter of this Interim Agreement have jeopardized i t s supreme interests* It shall give notice of i t s decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from this Interim Agreement* Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized i t s supreme interests• Done at Moscow on May 26, 1972, i n two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic* For the United States of America: RICHARD NIXON, President of the United States of America* For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: L. I* BREZHNEV, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 95 P R O T O C O L T O T H E I N T E R I M AGREEMENT BETWEEN T H E U N I T E D S T A T E S O F A M E R I C A AND T H E U N I O N O F S O V I E T S O C I A L I S T R E P U B L I C S ON C E R T A I N M E A S U R E S W I T H R E S P E C T T O T H E L I M I T A T I O N O F S T R A T E G I C O F F E N S I V E ARMS •i< ' , T h e U n i t e d S t a t e s o f A m e r i c a a n d t h e U n i o n o f S o v i e t S o c i a l i s t R e p u b l i c s , h e r e i n a f t e r r e f e r r e d t o a s t h e P a r t i e s , H a v i n g a g r e e d o n c e r t a i n l i m i t a t i o n s r e l a t i n g t o s u b m a r i n e - l a u n c h e d b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e l a u n c h e r s a n d m o d e r n b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e s u b m a r i n e s , a n d t o r e p l a c e m e n t p r o c e d u r e s , i n t h e I n t e r i m A g r e e m e n t , H a v e a g r e e d a s f o l l o w s : T h e P a r t i e s u n d e r s t a n d t h a t , u n d e r A r t i c l e I I I o f t h e I n t e r i m A g r e e m e n t , f o r t h e p e r i o d d u r i n g w h i c h t h a t A g r e e m e n t r e m a i n s i n f o r c e : T h e U S m a y h a v e n o m o r e t h a n 7 1 0 b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e l a u n c h e r s o n s u b m a r i n e s ( S L B M s ) a n d n o m o r e t h a n 4 4 m o d e r n b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e s u b m a r i n e s . T h e S o v i e t U n i o n m a y h a v e n o m o r e t h a n 9 5 0 b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e l a u n c h e r s o n s u b m a r i n e s a n d n o m o r e t h a n 6 2 m o d e r n b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e s u b m a r i n e s . A d d i t i o n a l b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e l a u n c h e r s o n s u b m a r i n e s u p t o t h e a b o v e - m e n t i o n e d l e v e l s , i n t h e U S — o v e r 6 5 6 b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e l a u n c h e r s o n n u c l e a r - p o w e r e d s u b m a r i n e s , a n d i n t h e U S S R — o v e r 7 4 0 b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e l a u n c h e r s o n n u c l e a r - p o w e r e d s u b m a r i n e s , o p e r a t i o n a l a n d u n d e r c o n -s t r u c t i o n , m a y b e c o m e o p e r a t i o n a l a s r e p l a c e m e n t s f o r e q u a l n u m b e r s o f b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e l a u n c h e r s o n o l d e r s u b m a r i n e s . T h e d e p l o y m e n t o f m o d e r n S L BMs o n a n y s u b m a r i n e , r e g a r d l e s s o f t y p e , w i l l b e c o u n t e d a g a i n s t t h e t o t a l l e v e l o f S L B M s p e r m i t t e d f o r t h e U S a n d t h e U S S R . T h i s P r o t o c o l s h a l l b e c o n s i d e r e d a n i n t e g r a l p a r t o f t h e I n t e r i m A g r e e m e n t . D o n e a t M o s c o w t h i s 2 6 t h d a y o f May, 1 9 7 2 . F o r t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s o f A m e r i c a : R I C H A R D N I X O N , P r e s i d e n t o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s o f A m e r i c a * F o r t h e U n i o n o f S o v i e t S o c i a l i s t R e p u b l i c s : L . I . B R E Z H N E V , G e n e r a l S e c r e t a r y o f t h e C e n t r a l C o m m i t t e e o f t h e C P S U . ( E n c l o s u r e 3 ) 96 1. AGREED INTERPRETATIONS. (a) Initialed Statements* The texts of the statements set out below were agreed upon and i n i t i a l e d by the Heads of the.Delegations on May 26, 1972. ABM TREATY (A) The Parties understand that, in addition to the ABM radar8 which may be deployed i n accordance with subparagraph (a) of Article III of the Treaty, those non-phased-array ABM radars operational on the date of signature of the Treaty within the ABM system deployment area for defense of the national capital may be retained (B) The Parties understand that the potential (the product of mean emitted power i n watts and antenna area i n square meters) of the smaller of the two large phased-array ABM radars, referred to i n subparagraph (b) of Article III of the Treaty i s considered for purposes of the Treaty to be three million. (C) The Parties understand that the center of the ABM system deployment area centered on the national capital and the center of the ABM system deployment area containing ICBM s i l o launchers for each Party shall be separated by no less than thirteen hundred kilometers. (D) The Parties agree not to deploy phased-array radars having a potential (the product of mean emitted power i n watt8 and antenna area i n square meters) exceeding three million, except as provided for i n Articles III, IV, and VI of the Treaty, or except for the purposes of tracking objects i n outer space or for use as national technical means of ver i f i c a t i o n . (E) In order to insure fulfillment of the obligation not to deploy ABM systems and their components except as provided i n Article III of the Treaty, the Parties agree that i n the event ABM systems based on other physical 97 principles and Including components capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars are created i n the future, specific limitations on such systems and their components would be subject to discussion in accordance with Article XIII and agreement in accordance with Article XIV of the Treaty, (F) The Parties understand that Article V of the Treaty includes obligations not to develop, test or deploy ABM interceptor missiles for the delivery by each ABM inter-ceptor missile or more than one independently guided warhead. (Q) The Parties understand that Article IX of the Treaty includes the obligation of the US and the USSR not to provide to other States technical descriptions or blueprints specially worked out for the construction of ABM systems and their components limited by the Treaty. INTERIM AGREEMENT (H) The Parties understand that land-based ICBM launchers referred to i n the Interim Agreement are understood to be launchers for strategic b a l l i s t i c missiles capable of ranges i n excess of the shortest distance between the northeastern border of the continental US and the north-western border of the continental USSR. (I) The Parties understand that fixed land-based ICBM launchers under active construction as of the date of signature of the Interim Agreement may be completed. (J) The Parties understand that in the process of moderniza-tion and replacement the dimensions of land-based ICBM s i l o launchers w i l l not be significantly increased. (K) The Parties understand that dismantling or destruction of ICBM launchers of older types deployed prior to 1964 and b a l l i s t i c missile launchers on older submarines being replaced by new SLBM launchers on modern submarines w i l l be initiated at the time of the beginning of sea t r i a l s of a replacement submarine, and w i l l be completed in the 98 s h o r t e s t p o s s i b l e a g r e e d p e r i o d o f t i m e . S u c h d i s m a n t l i n g o r d e s t r u c t i o n , a n d t i m e l y n o t i f i c a t i o n t h e r e o f , w i l l b e a c c o m p l i s h e d u n d e r p r o c e d u r e s t o b e a g r e e d i n t h e S t a n d i n g C o n s u l t a t i v e C o m m i s s i o n . ( L ) T h e P a r t i e s u n d e r s t a n d t h a t d u r i n g t h e p e r i o d o f t h e I n t e r i m A g r e e m e n t t h e r e s h a l l b e n o s i g n i f i c a n t i n c r e a s e i n t h e n u m b e r o f I C B M o r S L B M t e s t a n d t r a i n i n g l a u n c h e r s , o r i n t h e n u m b e r o f s u c h l a u n c h e r s f o r m o d e r n l a n d - b a s e d h e a v y I C B M s . T h e P a r t i e s f u r t h e r u n d e r s t a n d t h a t c o n -s t r u c t i o n o r c o n v e r s i o n o f I C B M l a u n c h e r s a t t e s t r a n g e s s h a l l b e u n d e r t a k e n o n l y f o r p u r p o s e s o f t e s t i n g a n d t r a i n i n g • ( b ) Common U n d e r s t a n d i n g s . Common u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e P a r t i e s o n t h e f o l l o w i n g m a t t e r s w a s r e a c h e d d u r i n g t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s : A . I n c r e a s e i n I C B M S i l o D i m e n s i o n s . — A m b a s s a d o r S m i t h m a d e t h e f o l l o w i n g s t a t e m e n t o n May 2 6 , 1 9 7 2 : " T h e P a r t i e s a g r e e t h a t t h e t e r m ' s i g n i f i c a n t l y i n c r e a s e d * m e a n s t h a t a n i n c r e a s e - w i l l n o t b e g r e a t e r t h a n 1 0 - 1 5 p e r c e n t o f t h e p r e s e n t d i m e n s i o n s o f l a n d - b a s e d I C B M s i l o l a u n c h e r s " . M i n i s t e r S e m e n o v r e p l i e d t h a t t h i s s t a t e m e n t c o r r e s p o n d e d t o t h e S o v i e t u n d e r s t a n d i n g . B. L o c a t i o n o f I C B M D e f e n s e s . — T h e U . S . D e l e g a t i o n m a d e t h e f o l l o w i n g s t a t e m e n t o n May 2 6 , 1 9 7 2 : " A r t i c l e I I I o f t h e A B M T r e a t y p r o v i d e s f o r e a c h s i d e o n e A B M s y s t e m d e p l o y m e n t a r e a c e n t e r e d o n i t s n a t i o n a l c a p i t a l a n d o n e A B M s y s t e m d e p l o y m e n t a r e a c o n t a i n i n g I C B M s i l o l a u n c h e r s . T h e t w o s i d e s h a v e r e g i s t e r e d a g r e e m e n t o n t h e f o l l o w i n g s t a t e m e n t : ' T h e P a r t i e s u n d e r s t a n d t h a t t h e c e n t e r o f t h e A B M s y s t e m d e p l o y m e n t a r e a c e n t e r e d o n t h e n a t i o n a l c a p i t a l a n d t h e c e n t e r o f t h e A B M s y s t e m d e p l o y m e n t a r e a c o n t a i n i n g I C B M s i l o l a u n c h e r s f o r e a c h P a r t y s h a l l b e s e p a r a t e d b y n o l e s s t h a n t h i r t e e n h u n d r e d k i l o m e t e r s . 1 I n t h i s c o n n e c t i o n , t h e U . S . s i d e n o t e s t h a t i t s A B M s y s t e m d e p l o y m e n t a r e a f o r d e f e n s e o f I C B M s i l o l a u n c h e r s , l o c a t e d w e s t o f t h e M i s s i s s i p p i R i v e r , w i l l b e c e n t e r e d i n t h e G r a n d F o r k s I C B M s i l o l a u n c h e r d e p l o y m e n t a r e a . " ( S e e I n i t i a l e d S t a t e m e n t " C " . ) C . A B M T e s t R a n g e s . — T h e U . S . D e l e g a t i o n m a d e t h e f o l l o w i n g s t a t e m e n t o n A p r i l 2 6 , 1 9 7 2 : " A r t i c l e I V o f t h e A B M T r e a t y p r o v i d e s t h a t ' t h e l i m i t a t i o n s p r o v i d e d f o r i n A r t i c l e I I I s h a l l n o t a p p l y t o A B M s y s t e m s o r t h e i r c o m p o n e n t s u s e d f o r d e v e l o p m e n t o r t e s t i n g , a n d l o c a t e d w i t h i n c u r r e n t o r a d d i t i o n a l l y a g r e e d t e s t r a n g e s . 1 We b e l i e v e i t w o u l d b e u s e f u l t o a s s u r e t h a t t h e r e i s n o m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g a s t o c u r r e n t A B M t e s t r a n g e s . I t i s o u r 99 u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t A B M t e s t r a n g e s e n c o m p a s s t h e a r e a w i t h i n w h i c h A B M c o m p o n e n t s a r e l o c a t e d f o r t e s t p u r p o s e s * T h e c u r r e n t U . S . A B M t e s t r a n g e s a r e a t W h i t e S a n d s , New M e x i c o , a n d a t K w a j a l e i n A t o l l , a n d t h e c u r r e n t S o v i e t A B M t e s t r a n g e i s n e a r S a r y S h a g a n i n K a z a k h s t a n * We c o n s i d e r t h a t n o n - p h a s e d a r r a y r a d a r s o f t y p e s u s e d f o r r a n g e s a f e t y o r i n s t r u m e n t a t i o n p u r p o s e s m ay b e l o c a t e d o u t s i d e o f A B M t e s t r a n g e s * W e . i n t e r p r e t t h e r e f e r e n c e i n A r t i c l e I V t o ' a d d i t i o n a l l y a g r e e d t e s t r a n g e s ' t o m e a n t h a t A B M c o m p o n e n t s w i l l n o t b e l o c a t e d a t a n y o t h e r t e s t r a n g e s w i t h o u t p r i o r a g r e e m e n t b e t w e e n o u r G o v e r n -m e n t s t h a t t h e r e w i l l b e s u c h a d d i t i o n a l A B M t e s t r a n g e s . " O n May 5, 1 9 7 2 , t h e S o v i e t D e l e g a t i o n s t a t e d t h a t t h e r e w a s a common u n d e r s t a n d i n g o n w h a t A B M t e s t r a n g e s w e r e , t h a t t h e u s e o f t h e t y p e s o f n o n - A B M r a d a r s f o r r a n g e s a f e t y o r i n s t r u m e n t a t i o n w a s n o t l i m i t e d u n d e r t h e T r e a t y , t h a t t h e r e f e r e n c e i n A r t i c l e I V t o " a d d i t i o n a l l y a g r e e d " t e s t r a n g e s w a s s u f f i c i e n t l y c l e a r , a n d t h a t n a t i o n a l m e a n s p e r m i t t e d i d e n t i f y i n g c u r r e n t t e s t r a n g e s * D. M o b i l e A B M S y s t e m s . — O n J a n u a r y 2 8 , 1 9 7 2 , t h e U . S . D e l e g a t i o n m a d e t h e f o l l o w i n g s t a t e m e n t : " A r t i c l e V ( l ) o f t h e J o i n t D r a f t T e x t o f t h e A B M T r e a t y i n c l u d e s a n u n d e r -t a k i n g n o t t o d e v e l o p , t e s t , o r d e p l o y m o b i l e l a n d - b a s e d A B M s y s t e m s a n d t h e i r c o m p o n e n t s . O n May 5 , 1 9 7 1 , t h e U . S . s i d e i n d i c a t e d t h a t , i n i t s v i e w , a p r o h i b i t i o n o n d e p l o y m e n t o f m o b i l e A B M s y s t e m s a n d c o m p o n e n t s w o u l d r u l e o u t t h e d e p l o y m e n t o f A B M l a u n c h e r s a n d r a d a r s w h i c h w e r e n o t p e r m a n e n t f i x e d t y p e s . A t t h a t t i m e , we a s k e d f o r t h e S o v i e t v i e w o f t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . D o e s t h e S o v i e t s i d e a g r e e w i t h t h e U . S . s i d e ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n p u t f o r w a r d o n May 5 , 1 9 7 1 ? " O n A p r i l 1 3 , 1 9 7 2 , t h e S o v i e t D e l e g a t i o n s a i d t h e r e i s a g e n e r a l common u n d e r s t a n d i n g o n t h i s m a t t e r . £ • S t a n d i n g C o n s u l t a t i v e C o m m i s s i o n . — A m b a s s a d o r S m i t h m a d e t h e f o l l o w i n g s t a t e m e n t o n May 2 3 , 1972.: " T h e U n i t e d S t a t e s p r o p o s e s t h a t t h e s i d e s a g r e e t h a t , w i t h r e g a r d t o i n i t i a l i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f t h e A B M T r e a t y ' s A r t i c l e X I I I o n t h e S t a n d i n g C o n s u l t a t i v e C o m m i s s i o n ( S C C ) a n d o f t h e c o n s u l t a t i o n A r t i c l e s t o t h e I n t e r i m A g r e e m e n t o n o f f e n s i v e a r m s a n d t h e A c c i d e n t s A g r e e m e n t , * a g r e e m e n t e s t a b l i s h i n g t h e S C C w i l l b e w o r k e d o u t e a r l y i n t h e f o l l o w - o n S A L T n e g o t i a t i o n s ; u n t i l t h a t i s c o m p l e t e d , t h e f o l l o w i n g a r r a n g e -m e n t s w i l l p r e v a i l : w h e n S A L T i s i n s e s s i o n , a n y c o n s u l t a -t i o n d e s i r e d b y e i t h e r s i d e u n d e r t h e s e A r t i c l e s c a n b e c a r r i e d o u t b y t h e t w o S A L T D e l e g a t i o n s ; w h e n S A L T i s n o t i n s e s s i o n , a d h o c a r r a n g e m e n t s f o r a n y d e s i r e d c o n s u l t a -t i o n s u n d e r t h e s e A r t i c l e s m a y b e m a d e t h r o u g h d i p l o m a t i c c h a n n e l s . " * S e e A r t i c l e 7 o f A g r e e m e n t t o R e d u c e t h e R i s k o f O u t b r e a k o f N u c l e a r War B e t w e e n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s o f A m e r i c a a n d t h e U n i o n o f S o v i e t S o c i a l i s t R e p u b l i c s , s i g n e d S e p t e m b e r 3 0 , 1 9 7 1 . 100 Minister Semenov replied that, on an ad referendum basis, he could agree that the U.S. statement correpsonded to the Soviet understanding. F. Standstill.—On May 6, 1972, Minister Semenov made the following statement: "In an effort to accommodate the wishes of the U.S. side, the Soviet Delegation i s prepared to proceed on the basis that the two sides w i l l i n fact observe the obligations of both the Interim Agreement and the ABM Treaty beginning from the date of signature of these two documents.11 In reply, the U.S. Delegation made the following state-ment on May 20, 1972: "The U.S. agrees in principle w i t h the Soviet statement made on May 6 concerning observance of o b l i g a t i o n s beginning from date of signature but we would l i k e to make c l e a r our understanding that t h i s means t h a t , pending r a t i f i c a t i o n and acceptance, n e i t h e r s i d e would take any a c t i o n p r o h i b i t e d by the agreements a f t e r they had entered i n t o f o r c e . This understanding would continue t o apply i n the absence of n o t i f i c a t i o n by e i t h e r s i g n a t o r y of i t s i n t e n t i o n not t o proceed w i t h r a t i f i c a t i o n or approval." The Soviet Delegation i n d i c a t e d agreement w i t h the U.S. statement. 2. UNILATERAL STATEMENTS (a) The f o l l o w i n g noteworthy u n i l a t e r a l statements were made during the n e g o t i a t i o n s by the United States Delegation:--A. Withdrawal from the ABM Treaty On May 9, 1972, Ambassador Smith made the f o l l o w i n g statement: "The U.S. Delegation has s t r e s s e d the importance the U.S. Government attaches to achieving agreement on more complete l i m i t a t i o n s on s t r a t e g i c o f f e n s i v e arms, f o l l o w i n g agreement on an ABM Treaty and on an Inte r i m Agreement on c e r t a i n measures w i t h respect t o the l i m i t a -t i o n of s t r a t e g i c o f f e n s i v e arms. The U.S. Delegation b e l i e v e s t h a t an o b j e c t i v e of the follow-on n e g o t i a t i o n s should be t o c o n s t r a i n and reduce on a long-term bas i s t h r e a t s t o the s u r v i v a b i l i t y of our r e s p e c t i v e s t r a t e g i c r e t a l i a t o r y f o r c e s . The USSR Delegation has a l s o i n d i c a t e d t h a t the o b j e c t i v e s of SALT would remain u n f u l f i l l e d w i t h -out the achievement of an agreement p r o v i d i n g f o r more complete l i m i t a t i o n s on s t r a t e g i c o f f e n s i v e arms. Both s i d e s recognize t h a t the i n i t i a l agreements would be steps toward the achievement of more complete l i m i t a t i o n s on s t r a t e g i c arms. I f an agreement p r o v i d i n g f o r more complete s t r a t e g i c o f f e n s i v e arms l i m i t a t i o n s were not achieved w i t h i n f i v e y e a r s , U.S. supreme i n t e r e s t s c o u l d be jeopard-i z e d . Should t h a t occur, i t would c o n s t i t u t e a ba s i s f o r 101 withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. The U.S. does not wish to see such a s i t u a t i o n occur, nor do we believe that the USSR does. It i s because we wish to prevent such a s i t u a -t i o n that we enphasize the importance the U.S. Govern-ment attaches to achievement of more complete l i m i t a t i o n s on s t r a t e g i c offensive arms. The U.S. Executive w i l l inform the Congress, i n connection with Congressional con-sid e r a t i o n of the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement, of t h i s statement of the U.S. p o s i t i o n . " B. Land-Mobile ICBM Launchers The U.S. Delegation made the following statement on May 20, 1972: "In connection with the important subject of land-mobile ICBM launchers, i n the in t e r e s t of concluding the Interim Agreement the U.S. Delegation now withdraws i t s proposal that A r t i c l e I or an agreed statement e x p l i c i t l y p r o h i b i t the deployment of mobile land-based ICBM launchers. I have been instructed to inform you that, while agreeing to defer the question of l i m i t a t i o n of operational land-mobile ICBM launchers to the subsequent negotiations on more complete l i m i t a t i o n s on st r a t e g i c offensive arms, the U.S. would consider the deployment of operational land-mobile ICBM launchers during the period of the Interim Agreement as inconsistent with the objectives of that Agreement•" C. Covered F a c i l i t i e s The U.S. Delegation made the following statement on May 20, 1972: "I wish to emphasize the importance that the United States attaches to the provisions of A r t i c l e V, including i n p a r t i c u l a r t h e i r a p p l i c a t i o n to f i t t i n g out or berthing submarines." D. "Heavy" ICBMs The U.S. Delegation made the following statement on May 26, 1972: "The U.S. Delegation regrets that the Soviet Delegation has not been w i l l i n g to agree on a common d e f i n i -t i o n of a heavy m i s s i l e . Under these circumstances, the U.S. Delegation believes i t necessary to state the following: The United States would consider any ICBM having a volume s i g n i f i c a n t l y greater than that of the largest l i g h t ICBM now operational on either side to be a heavy ICBM. The U.S. proceeds on the premise that the Soviet side w i l l give due account to t h i s consideration." £. Tested i n ABM Mode On A p r i l 7, 1972, the U.S. Delegation made the following statement: " A r t i c l e II of the Joint Draft Text used the term 'tested i n an ABM mode,1 i n defining ABM components, and A r t i c l e VI includes c e r t a i n obligations concerning such t e s t i n g . We believe that the side should have a common understanding of t h i s phrase. F i r s t , we would note that 102 the testing provisions of the ABM Treaty are intended to apply to testing which occurs after the date of signature of the Treaty, and not to any. testing which may have occurred in the past. Next, we would amplify the remarks we have made on this subject during the previous Helsinki phase by setting forth the objectives which govern the U.S. view on the subject, namely, while prohibiting testing of non-ABM components for ABM purposes: not to prevent testing of ABM components, and not to prevent testing of non-ABM components for non-ABM purposes. To c l a r i f y our interpretation of 'tested in an ABM mode,' we note that we would consider a launcher, missile or radar to be 'tested in an ABM mode* i f , for example, any of the following events occur: (1) a launcher is used to launch an ABM interceptor missile, (2) an interceptor missile is f l i g h t tested against a target vehicle which has a fl i g h t trajectory with charac-t e r i s t i c s of a strategic b a l l i s t i c missile f l i g h t trajectory, or i s fl i g h t tested in conjunction with the test of an ABM interceptor missile or an ABM radar at the same test range, or i s f l i g h t tested to an altitude inconsistent with interception of targets against which air defenses are deployed, (3) a radar makes measurements on a cooperative target vehicle of the kind referred to in item (2) above during the reentry portion of i t s trajectory or makes measurements in conjunction with the test of an ABM inter-ceptor missile or an ABM radar at the same test range. Radars used for purposes such as range safety or instru-mentation would be exempt from application of these c r i t e r i a . " F. No-Transfer Article of ABM Treaty On April 18, 1972, the U.S. Delegation made the following statement: "In regard to this Article (IX), I have a brief and I believe self-explanatory statement to make. The U.S. side wishes to make clear that the provisions of this Article do not set a precedent for whatever provision may be considered for a Treaty on Limiting Strategic Offensive Arms. The question of transfer of strategic offensive arms is a far more complex issue, which may require a different solution." G. No Increase in Defense of Early Warning Radars On July 28, 1970, the U.S. Delegation made the following statement: "Since Hen House radars (Soviet b a l l i s t i c missile early warning radars) can detect and track b a l l i s t i c missile warheads at great distances, they have a significant ABM potential. Accordingly, the U.S. would regard any increase i n the defenses of such radars by surface-to-air missiles as inconsistent with an agreement." 103 (b) The following noteworthy unilateral statement was made by the Delegation of the U.S.S.R. and i s shown here with the U.S. reply: On May 17, 1972, Minister Semenov made the following unilateral ''Statement of the Soviet Side:" "Taking into account that modern b a l l i s t i c missile submarines are presently in the possession of not only the U.S., but also of i t s NATO a l l i e s , the Soviet Union agrees that for the period of effectiveness of the Interim 'Freeze* Agreement the U.S. and i t s NATO a l l i e s have up to 50 such submarines with a total of up to 800 b a l l i s t i c missile launchers thereon (including 41 U.S. submarines with 656 b a l l i s t i c missile launchers)* However, i f during the period of effectiveness of the Agreement U.S. a l l i e s i n NATO should increase the number of their modern submarines to exceed the numbers of submarines they would have opera-tional or under construction on the date of signature of the Agreement, the Soviet Union w i l l have the right to a corresponding increase i n the number of i t s sub-marines* In the opinion of the Soviet side, the solution of the question of modern b a l l i s t i c missile submarines provided for in the Interim Agreement only partially com-pensates for the strategic imbalance in the deployment of the nuclear-powered missile submarines of the USSR and the U.S. Therefore, the Soviet side believes that this whole question, and above a l l the questions of liquidating the American missile submarine bases outside the U.S., w i l l be appropriately resolved in the course of follow-on negotiations*" On May 24, Ambassador Smith made the following reply to Minister Semenov: "The United States side has studied the 'statement made by the Soviet side' of May 17 concerning compensation for submarine basing and SLBM submarines belonging to third countries. The United States does not accept the validit y of the considerations in that statement*" On May 26 Minister Semenov repeated the unilateral statement made on May 24. Ambassador Smith also repeated the U.S. rejection on May 26. 104 APPENDIX B "CUMULATIVE PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION AND INDUSTRIAL CAPACITY IN 1970" (# of c i t i e s i n order of population rank) US USSR China # C i t i e s Poo. Ind. POP* Ind. POP* Ind 10 25.1 33.1 8.3 25.0 3.7 30-35 50 42.0 55.0 20.0 40.0 6.8 50-60 100 48.0 65.0 25.0 50.0 8.6 65-75 200 55.0 75.0 34.0 62.0 9.0 80-90 400 60.0 82.0 40.0 72.0 10.0 85-90 1,000 63.0 86.0 47.0 82.0 11.0 (figures are percentages) Source: Statement by Secretary of Defense Mslvin R. Laird, FY 1971, Defense Program and Defense Budget, p. 44. 105 APPENDIX G "US ASSURED DESTRUCTION CALCULATIONS'* Soviet Population and Industry Destroyed (Assumed 1972 t o t a l population 247 m i l l i o n . Urban population 116 m i l l i o n ) 1 MT Equivalents, Delivered Warheads Total Populations Industrial Capacity Destroyed % 100 200 400 800 1200 1600 37 52 74 96 109 116 15 21 30 39 44 47 59 72 76 77 77 77 Note: F a t a l i t i e s are the immediate f a t a l i t i e s i n an exchange. Source: Statement of Secretary of Defense Robert S. MeNamara on The FY 1969-73 Defense Program and 1969 Defense  Budget. p. 57. 106 APPENDIX D 11 SENTINEL1 S EFFECTIVENESS AGAINST CHINESE ATTACK" US F a t a l i t i e s From a Chinese F i r s t Strike 1975-80 # Chinese ICBM1 s US F a t a l i t i e s ( m illions) without sentinel with sentinel QJ Fewer than 1 m i l l i o n deaths with some p r o b a b i l i t y of no deaths X 2.5X 7.5X 7 11 23 Source: Statement by Secretary of Defense Clark M. C l i f f o r d The 1970 Defense Budget and Defense Program for FY 1970-74. p. 54 APPENDIX E "EXPENDITURES FOR STRATEGIC FORCES" (i n m i l l i o n s ) FY62 FY63 FY64 FY65 FY66 FY67 11,252 10,403 9,257 7,075 6,685 6,893 FY68 FY69 FY70 FY71 FY72 FY73 7,884 9,618 9,596 7,737 7,639 8,846 Note: Expenditures are i n terms of FY value* Source: Compiled from annual posture statements of the Secretary of Defense FY68-FY73. 108 APPENDIX F ULMS "WEAPON SYSTEM PROGRAMS TO WATCH" (cost--millions) FY69 FY70 FY71 FY72 FY73 (Actual) (Actual) (Actual) (Planned) (Proposed) 5 10 44 140 942 B - l 25 77 75 370 445 ARBRES 105 109 100 104 104 HARDSITE 25 60 80 ABM TECHNOLOGY 137 175 104 96 102 SATELLITE SURVEILLANCE 105 86 80 Source: Compiled from annual posture statements of the Secretary of Defense. FY68-FY73. 109 GLQSSARy Accelerometer: an instrument which i s so designed that i t responds to the accelerations of the earth relative to the suspended mass of the instrument rather than measuring either the velocity or the displacement of the earth; used in the i n e r t i a l guidance systems of missiles Active Defense: defense involving interception of attacking enemy aircraft or missiles by using either aircraft or missiles AMSA (Advanced Manned Strategic Aircraft): now the B-l bomber program, the follow-on to the B-52 (The craft would be a large bomber with a capability for pene-trating adversary defenses at low altitudes and supersonic speeds* It would carry sophisticated penaids* Operational capability could be achieved by 1980 at a cost of forty-five million per aircraft*) ARBRES (Advanced B a l l i s t i c Reentry System): research and development of reentry vehicles, new heat-shielding techniques, hardening of warheads, penetration aids, and guidance Area Type Defense: defense system permitting the defense of any number of targets within f a i r l y large areas (The f e a s i b i l i t y of such defense i s dependent on use of aircraft or missiles that are effective over long ranges•) Assured Destruction Capability: a b i l i t y to i n f l i c t some specific level of damage on an adversary with a very high degree of confidence (This i s generally equated with the a b i l i t y to destroy adversary population and industry and was the o f f i c i a l United States doctrine in the McNamara Pentagon.) ASW (Anti-Submarine Warfare): a l l operations aimed at locating, tracking, identifying, and potentially destroying enemy submarines ATLAS: United States f i r s t generation ICBM; large liquid fuel missile of high vulnerability 110 Attack Timing Problem: the problem of simultaneous destruction of the adversary*s strategic forces, in a timed, coordinated manner AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System): system involving the use of large aircraft carrying radars, computers, and communications f a c i l i t i e s to control the engagement between intercepting aircraft and adversary bombers (The system i s less vulnerable to attack by missiles•) B-52: the principal United States intercontinental strategic bomber; designed for high altitude penetra-tion but long since modified for low level attack at subsonic speed B-70: one proposed follow-on bomber to the B-52; designed to f l y at KACH 3 and penetrate at high altitudes (The program was cancelled when i t was discovered that high level penetration of the enemy's defenses would be much more d i f f i c u l t than low level attack*) Backscatter Radar: radar which detects changes in the characteristics of the ionosphere (These changes in the ionosphere affect the intensity of the radio-frequency waves emitted by the radar transmitter and "scatter" them back to the radar receiver*) BMD ( B a l l i s t i c Missile Defense): any system intended to defend against attack by b a l l i s t i c missiles BMEWS (B a l l i s t i c Missile Early Warning System): an electronic system for providing detection and early warning of attack by ICBMs Catalytic War: war resulting from the act of a smaller power provoking war between two great powers so that they w i l l destroy each other CEP (Circular Error Probable): a commonly used measure of the inaccuracy of weapon systems (In repeated firi n g s , f i f t y percent of the weapons would miss their targets by less than the CEP or median miss distance and f i f t y percent would miss by more than the CEP« A frequent misinterpretation assumes that a l l weapons miss their targets by a distance equal to the CEP, which i s like assuming that a l l student score at the f i f t i e t h percentile on an exam* A nautical mile, 6,080;feet, i s the standard dimension for measuring the CEP.) Counterforce Capability: a b i l i t y to destroy the adversary's strategic offensive forces I l l Damage Lim i t i n g : use of strategic forces to reduce the capacity of the country being attacked to i n f l i c t damage on the attacker Decoy: device intended to confuse enemy defenses Decoy Discrimination: a b i l i t y of the defender to d i s -tinguish between decoys and r e a l warheads or bombers Deterrence: prevention from action because of the fear of consequences; a state of mind brought about by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction ECM (Electronic Counter Measures): equipment to enhance the penetration and s u r v i v a l of the United States 1 s t r a t e g i c bomber force as i t approaches i t s targets; devices which jam radars, black i t out, etc. Endoatmospheric Interception: interception at a l t i t u d e s of up to for t y miles Exchange Ratio: the number of attacking m i s s i l e s necessary to destroy one target FB-111: bomber version of the F - l l l a i r c r a f t ; replacement bomber for the B-58 (It was anticipated that the FB-111 would enter SAC i n FY69 and that 250 a i r c r a f t would be procured. The program has been severely cutback.) F i r s t Strike C a p a b i l i t y : synonymous with a counterforce c a p a b i l i t y ; the a b i l i t y to destroy the enemy's str a t e g i c offensive forces by attacking f i r s t FOBS (Fractional O r b i t a l Bombardment System): systems involving the delivery of nuclear weapons from low a l t i t u d e o r b i t a l t r a j e c t o r i e s ; (Unlike ICBMs, FOBS requires the use of reverse thrust to bring the warhead down on target. Because the apogee of the traj e c t o r y i s lower than that of an ICBM, detection using long range radars i s more d i f f i c u l t . However, the payload that can be delivered with a given propulsion system i s smaller than with that of an ICBM; and the accuracy i s generally poorer because of the flattened t r a j e c t o r y . ) Galosh: Moscow ABM system Greater-Than-Expected Threat: the medium to upper range of Soviet forces (The nature of the exercise i n 112 Hardening: protection of military f a c i l i t i e s by making them resistant to blast effects of a nuclear weapon Highest Expected Threat: the upper range of National Intelligence Estimates (NIE) for each element of the Soviet Unions strategic forces HOUND DOG: stand-off missile carried by the United States 1 strategic bomber force designed to be launched prior to the bombing run in order to "soften" the defensive environment enhancing penetration ICBM: Intercontinental B a l l i s t i c Missile; a range of at least 5,000 nautical miles IRBM: Intermediate Range B a l l i s t i c Missile; a range of roughly 2,000-4,000 nautical miles JUPITER: United States Army IRBM program during the 1950's; a f i r s t generation, liquid fueled missile developed for quick deployment in overseas bases Kiloton (KT): 1,000 tons of TNT Megaton (MT): 1,000,000 tons of TNT MINUTEMAN: a three-stage, solid-propellent, second-generation ICBM equipped with a nuclear warhead and designed for highly automated, remote operation (Currently, MINUTEMAN III i s being phased onto the force. It i s designed to carry MIRVs.) MIRV (Maltiple Individually Targetable Reentry Vehicle: system now being deployed in which a warhead cluster is carried by a "bus" (A single guidance and propul-sion system w i l l control the orientation and velocity of the bus from which the RVs w i l l be released sequentially. After each release, there w i l l be a further adjustment in the velocity and direction of the bus. Thus, each reentry vehicle can be directed to a separate target. MIRVs can penetrate defenses with sufficient accuracy. It i s well-suited to being a counterforce weapon.) MRBM (Medium Range B a l l i s t i c Missile): this signifies a range of about 1,500 nautical miles. MRV (Multiple Reentry Vehicle): the f i r s t technological step to MIRV; a cluster of warheads which i s independently targetable only in the sense that i t can be released sequentially or in a shotgun pattern with no post-boost guidance 113 Nth Country Problem: the possibility of diffusion of nuclear weapons to an indeterminate or "N" number of countries through the development of independent capabilities or the acquisition of nuclear weapons from the existing nuclear powers NIKE-X: plan for large-scale, a n t i - b a l l i s t i c missile deployment for the protection of the United States against a massive Soviet attack (The system had very high potential costs and questionable techno-logical concepts. It was not deployed.) Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: treaty approved by the United States in 1968 by which each non-nuclear signatory would undertake not to acquire nuclear weapons and not to assist non-nuclear powers in acquiring nuclear weapons Open Skies Proposal: proposal by President Eisenhower at the Geneva Summit Conference (1955) for the reciprocal aerial inspection of the United States and the Soviet Union and for the exchange of blueprints of the military establishments of the two countries as safe-guards against surprise attack Overkill: the idea that the nuclear forces of the United States i s much larger than required for i n f l i c t i n g unacceptable damage on the homeland of the Soviet Union (This concept f a i l s to consider factors of r e l i a b i l i t y , including, aborted missiles during entire f l i g h t , defensive measures, etc.) Over-The-Horizon Radar: radar which detects objects at a low level around the curvature of the earth; a significant advance over the line-of-sight radar which had serious "blind-spots" Parity: the quality or state of being equal in strategic forces Passive Defense: defense by protective shelter, hardening, dispersal, airborne alert, etc. Penetration Aids (Penaids): devices f a c i l i t a t i n g the entry of aircraft or missiles through enemy active defenses, including decoys which simulate warheads and the use of chaff (See ECM, SCAD, SRAM, HOUND DOG) Phased Array Radar: radars in which the beam is steered electronically, therefore involving no moving parts 114 (These radars have an advantage over the older, mechanically steered radars in that they can handle many tracks simultaneously and can move from one track to another.) POLARIS: United States nuclear powered, missile launching submarine carrying sixteen missiles (The term i s also used to refer to the missiles of which there have been three versions. The f i r s t two, POLARIS A-l and A-2 each carried single warheads with a yield of about 1MT. POLARIS A-3 carries three smaller warheads which are not individually targetable.) POSEIDON: successor to the polaris missile capable of carrying many warheads or MRVs Pre-Emptive War: f i r s t strike designed to knock out the adversary's offensive forces in anticipation of a possible strike by him Preventive War: a premeditated attack by one country against another, which i s unprovoked i n the sense that i t does not wait upon a specific aggression or other overt action by the target state, and i n which the chief and most immediate objective i s the destruction of the latter's strategic forces Real-Time Re-Targeting: the a b i l i t y to provide information for the instant substitution of ICBMs for those which have aborted their missions SABWIS (Sea-based Anti-Ballistic Missile System): system designed to u t i l i z e many of the SAFEGUARD components aboard United States Navy vessels SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks): negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union from November, 1969 to May, 1972, aimed at limiting their strategic arms (See Appendix) SAFEGUARD: United States ABM system which was the follow-on to SENTINEL; designed to protect MLNUTEMAN from a Soviet f i r s t strike and to provide residual protection to the United States population; limited to two sites under the recent ABM Treaty of SALT I Salvage-Fusing: a device placed in the warheads of ICBMs which would detonate the payload when approached by an a n t i - b a l l i s t i c missile SCAD (Subsonic Cruise Armed Decoy): penetration aid being developed (SCAD w i l l use radar cross-section augmentors 115 and jamming devices to more effectively simulate the bomber's electronic signature characteristics and to help dilute enemy defenses*) Second Strike: a blow delivered after receiving an enemy nuclear attack; most commonly defined as a retaliatory attack aimed at area targets (i.e., enemy population centers) with forces that may have been depleted by an enemy's f i r s t strike Second-Strike Capability: the a b i l i t y to survive an attack and launch a retaliatory blow large enough to i n f l i c t intolerable damage on the opponent S e l f - F u l f i l l i n g Prophecy: (1) the assertion implied in a nation's attitude of trust or distrust toward another nation, which generates, i f believed, a like attitude on the part of the other, thereby reinforcing the f i r s t nation's attitude and making the implied assertion self-validating; (2) a psychological effect by which one side's defensive action may be observed by the other, which misinterpreting i t as aggressive, may, therefore, make some defensive move; this, i f misread in turn by the other side, confirms the original suspicions* (Reactions and signals may thus be set into motion u n t i l a point of no return i s reached.) SENTINEL: proposed United States light ABM system to defend population against a Chinese attack, accidental launches, and the f i r s t step i n the deployment of a thick ABM vis a vis the Soviet Union SLBM: Submarine Launched B a l l i s t i c Missile SLCM: Submarine Launched Cruise Missile (The United States has a Research and Development Program on this type of missile which i s air-breathing and designed to penetrate at low altitude Soft F a c i l i t i e s : missile sites, command and control centers, or other f a c i l i t i e s that have not been provided with protective shielding against the effects of nuclear explosions SRAM (Short Range Attack Missile): a smaller, more accurate, low altitude missile used in the like mission of HOUND DOG SSBN: nuclear powered b a l l i s t i c missile f i r i n g submarine SSN: nuclear powered attack submarine 116 Strategic: to be considered strategic, the concept of attacking the enemy*s homeland must be f i r s t and foremost Tactical: not capable of striking the enemy's homeland (The distinction between strategic and t a c t i c a l i s rather a question of emphasis and semantic differentia-tion. Both are i n the eyes of the beholder.) Tallinn Defense: defensive system deployed by the Soviet Union (The prevailing view in the United States intelligence community i s that the Tallinn system i s a bomber air defense system with no significant ABM capability. However, some believe that with an upgrading of the radars, an ABM system may be possible.) Terminal Defenses: defenses designed to intercept a missile during the f i n a l part of i t s trajectory (Such defenses make use of the differential decelerating effect of the atmosphere to f a c i l i t a t e discrimination between warheads and less dense penetration aids. Because such defenses involve interception late i n the trajectory, they are relatively inflexible. Thus, the missiles deployed to defend one point cannot defend other points some distance away.) THOR: United States Air Force's IRBM missile project; comparable to the Army's JUPITER TITAN: United States back-up ICBM to ATLAS (Presently, there are fifty-four TITAN II's in the United States force which can carry the largest payload.) Triad: the concept that the United States should maintain three independent types of strategic weapons systems: ICBMs, manned bombers, and SLBMs ULMS: has been renamed TRIDENT, and may refer to either a new SSBN or a new missile, the follow-on to POSEIDON (The ULMS program is designed to make use of greater areas of the oceans and employ longer range missiles.) Yield-To-Weight Ratio: the explosive power of a nuclear weapon relative to i t s weight or destructive power per pound of the warhead 

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