Open Collections

UBC Theses and Dissertations

UBC Theses Logo

UBC Theses and Dissertations

Domestic unrest and interstate violence : four Middle Eastern states Bernstein, Irving 1973

Your browser doesn't seem to have a PDF viewer, please download the PDF to view this item.

Item Metadata

Download

Media
831-UBC_1973_A8 B47_5.pdf [ 7.54MB ]
Metadata
JSON: 831-1.0101421.json
JSON-LD: 831-1.0101421-ld.json
RDF/XML (Pretty): 831-1.0101421-rdf.xml
RDF/JSON: 831-1.0101421-rdf.json
Turtle: 831-1.0101421-turtle.txt
N-Triples: 831-1.0101421-rdf-ntriples.txt
Original Record: 831-1.0101421-source.json
Full Text
831-1.0101421-fulltext.txt
Citation
831-1.0101421.ris

Full Text

DOMESTIC UNREST AND INTERSTATE VIOLENCE: FOUR MIDDLE EASTERN STATES by " IRVING BERNSTEIN B.A., McGill University, 1966 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS i n the Department • of P o l i t i c a l Science We accept this, thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA October, 1973 In presenting t h i s thesis i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree that the Library s h a l l make i t f r e e l y available for reference and study. I further agree that permission fo r extensive copying of t h i s thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by h i s representatives. It i s understood that copying or publication of t h i s thesis for f i n a n c i a l gain s h a l l not be allowed without my written permission. Department of P o l i t i c a l Science The University of B r i t i s h Columbia Vancouver 8, Canada i ABSTRACT In recent years p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s have shown increasing interest i n the relationship between international and intranational p o l i t i c s . One of the problems most frequently dealt with i n t h i s area i s the relationship between foreign and domestic c o n f l i c t behaviour. Some of the notions involved are quite venerable and are commonly used i n explaining s p e c i f i c events o One suchi notion: i s scapegoating, the ddver*-sion of. popular attention, from domestic c o n f l i c t s to foreign: ones. Another sucha concept posits the strengthening of i n t e r n a l s o l i d a r i t y i n the face of external c o n f l i c t o However, attempts at s c i e n t i f i c , systema-t i c examinations of the issue have yielded evidence of only weak relationships at hesto Im t h i s paper the problem i s again approached, though from a di f f e r e n t angle than: ini most other studies. The types of behaviour examined are interstate violence and intrastate p o l i t i c a l unresto Measures f o r each of these variables are developedo Correlations between the measures are then computed f o r each of four Middle Eastern states: Egypt, I s r a e l , Jordan and Syria„ The calculations are made both with and without time lagSo The resu l t s show no s i g n i f i c a n t relationship between the v a r i a -bles f o r Israelo For Syria unrest predicts p o s i t i v e l y and with moderate strength to subsequent interstate violence, while interstate violence predicts moderately and negatively to subsequent unresto For Egypt and Jordan the variables predict strongly and p o s i t i v e l y to each other. I t i s suggested that these differences among the states may be due to d i f -f e r i n g degrees of freedom of access to p o l i t i c a l channels im thenu i i CONTENTS CHAPTER PAGE I. Introduction 1 I I . The Hypothesis 7. I I I . Review of the General Literature 12 IV. Review of the Literature on the Four States 22 V. Operationalization 28 VI. Findings and Interpretation 41 VII. Conclusions 77 Notes 84 Bibliography 95 Apriendices 102 i i i LIST OF TABLES TABLE PAGE I. Domestic Unrest and Interstate Violence of Is r a e l : Correlations Based on a Six-Month Temporal Unit . . . . . 42 I I . Domestic Unrest and Interstate Violence of I s r a e l : Correlations Based on a One-Year Temporal Unit . . . . . 42 I I I . Domestic Unrest and Interstate Violence of Syria: Correlations Based on a Six-Month Temporal Unit . . . . . 45 IV. Domestic Unrest and Interstate Violence of Syria: .Correlations Based on a One-Year Temporal Unit . . . . . 45 V. Domestic Unrest and Interstate Violence of the SAR: Correlations Based on a Six-Month Temporal Unit 46 VI. Domestic Unrest and Interstate Violence of the SAR: Correlations Based on a One-Year Temporal Unit . . . . . 46 VII. Domestic Unrest and Interstate Violence of Jordan: Correlations Based on a Six-Month Temporal Unit . . . . . 53 VIII. Domestic Unrest and Interstate Violence of Jordan: Correlations Based on a One-Year Temporal Unit . . . . . 53 IX. Domestic Unrest and Interstate Violence of Egypt: Correlations Based on a Six-rMonth Temporal Unit 59 X. Domestic Unrest and Interstate Violence of Egypt: Correlations Based on a One-Year Temporal Unit • • • • . 59 XI. Domestic Unrest and Interstate Violence of the UAR: Correlations Based on a Six-Month Temporal Unit . • • . . 60 XII. Domestic Unrest and Interstate Violence of the UAR: Correlations Based on a One-Year Temporal Unit. • • . • . 60 XIII. I s r a e l i Unrest i n Different Periods: Correlations Based on a Six-Month Temporal Unit . . . . . 68 XIV. I s r a e l i Unrest i n Different Periods: Correlations Based on a One-Year Temporal Unit . • • • . 68 XV. Syrian Unrest i n Different Periods: Correlations Based on a Six-Month Temporal Unit • . • . . 68 XVI. Syrian Unrest i n Different Periods: Correlations Based on a One-Year Temporal Unit . . . • . 68 TABLE PAGE XVIIo SAR Unrest i n Different Periods: Correlations Based on a Six-Month Temporal Unit • • • • 68 XVIII. SAR Unrest i n Different Periods: Correlations Based on a One-Year Temporal Unit • • • • 68 XIXo Jordan's Unrest i n Different Periods: Correlations Based on a Six-Month Temporal Unit . . . . 69 XX. Jordan's Unrest i n Different Periods: Correlations Based on a One-Year Temporal Unit • • • • 69 XXI. ' Egypt's Unrest i n Different Periods: Correlations Based on a Six-Month Temporal Unit • • • • 69 XXII. Egypt's Unrest i n Different Periods: Correlations Based on a One-Year Temporal Unit . . . . 69 XXIII. UAR Unrest i n Different Periods: Correlations Based on a Six-Month Temporal Unit • . . • 69 XXIV. UAR Unrest i n Different Periods: Correlations Based on a One-Year Temporal Unit • • • • 69 XXV. I s r a e l i .Interstate Violence i n Different Periods: Correlations Based on a Six-Month Temporal Unit . . . . 74 XXVI. I s r a e l i Interstate Violence i n Different Periods: Correlations Based on a One-Year Temporal Unit • • • • 74 XXVII. Syrian Interstate Violence i n Different Periods: Correlations Based on a Six-Month Temporal Unit . . . . 74 XXVIII. Syrian Interstate Violence i n Different Periods: Correlations Based on a One-Year Temporal Unit • • • • 74 XXLX. SAR Interstate Violence i n Different Periods: Correlations Based on a Six-Month Temporal Unit . . . . 74 XXX. SAR Interstate Violence i n Different Periods: Correlations Based on a One-Year Temporal Unit • • • • 74 XXXI. Jordan's Interstate Violence i n Different Periods: Correlations Based on a Six-Month Temporal Unit 0 . . . 75 XXXII. Jordan's Interstate Violence i n Different Periods: Correlations Based on a One-Year Temporal Unit . . . . 75. XXXIII. Egypt's Interstate Violence i n Different Periods: Correlations Based on a Six-Month Temporal Unit . . . . 75-TABLE PAGE XXXIV. Egypt's Interstate Violence i n Different Periods: Correlations Based on a One-Year Temporal Unit . • . . 75 XXXV. UAR Interstate Violence i n Different Periods: Correlations Based on a Six-Month Temporal Unit . . . . 75 XXXVI. UAR Interstate Violence i n Different Periods: Correlations Based on a One-Year Temporal Unit • . . • 75 Chapter I Introduction The "shrinking world" has become one of the most hackneyed of metaphorso The phrase i t s e l f seems to be of f a i r l y recent coinage 0 The basic idea involved — that the states and peoples of the earth are becoming increasingly s a l i e n t to each other i n a l l aspects of l i f e — can be traced quite f a r back i n time* The notion was, f o r example, i n t e l l e c -t u a l l y respectable i n the years before the F i r s t V/orld War„ Thus, Maclver wrote, i n 1912, that despite the existence of national states society i s one, and l i n k s the nearest to the most remote and makes the most remote indispensable to the nearest 0 \/ This interdependence of the peoples of the " c i v i l i z e d " states i s seen as 2 a r e s u l t of commerce, technology and the non-totalitarian nature of such p o l i t i c a l systemso Similar analyses can be found i n writings by e a r l i e r authors as well."^ Rosenau notes that interdependence i s the broadest and loosest of a group of concepts related to "across-systems" analysis.^ The others — penetration, linkage, intervention, emulation, integration and R adaptation^— are more precise and more recently developed f o c i of interest than the f i r s t one. Given the venerability of the theme of interdependence, one might expect more systematic analysis of t h i s and the related concepts than has occurred.^ Given the structure of Anglo-American p o l i t i c a l science, however, the lacuna becomes more comprehen-s i b l e . Rosenau points to the separation of comparative p o l i t i c s studies from international relations studies as a major source of this neglect. 7 Frankel notes that On the basis of r e l a t i v e security and i s o l a t i o n from foreign a f f a i r s , i t has become customary f o r B r i t i s h and American thinkers and statesmen to believe that the two domains are separatee... 8/ Actually, the rupture between the f i e l d s has not been as sharp or as clean as these statements would suggest. The interrelationship has often been acknowledged by p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s and conceptual allow-9 ance has been made f o r i t 0 Seldom, however, have researchers gone beyond these points to develop systematic analyses of the relationship,, Thus, while Easton includes the Extrasocietal Environment i n his frame-work,"*"^  he provides l i t t l e more than categories and subcategories (for the external environment). Nowhere i n Easton*s discussion are the phenomena embraced by his categories posited as interdependent. Nowhere are they conceived as self-sustaining processes which o.. lead to predictable forms of behavior. I l / In the f u l l e s t development of the structural-functional approach to comparative p o l i t i c s , Almond and Powell neglect the international 12 environment almost e n t i r e l y . As Riggs has pointed out, i t is-a t a c i t assumption of Almond's model ... that the p o l i t i c s of developing countries can be treated as r e l a t i v e l y autonomous closed p o l i t i c a l systems 0 13/ That t h i s should be the f i n a l form of the framework i s somewhat s u r p r i -sing, however,. For one year before the publication of Comparative P o l i -t i c s , an essay b r i e f l y summarizing the approach was printedo"*^- In that paper the international system was treated i n much the same way as i t was by Easton. Reference was made to system responsiveness to demands from 15 the international system,. The development of extractive c a p a b i l i t i e s v i s - a - v i s the domestic and international systems and the relationship 16 between these c a p a b i l i t i e s were also discussed. The ideas tend to be rather broad and vagueo Yet only very l i t t l e of this conceptual allow-ance finds i t s way into the Almond and Powell text. One gets the impression that the authors, while l o g i c a l l y compelled to acknowledge the relevance of the international system, are s t i l l acting on some assumption of the independence of the two domains 0 Therefore, they do not know how f a r to take the issue of i n t e r r e l a t i o n -ship. As f a r as these analysts are concerned, the boundaries between the f i e l d s seem to be more ragged than p r e c i s e 0 A small sample of introductory comparative p o l i t i c s texts shows that such raggedness i s not uncommon. Blondel ' and Curtis attempt to provide coherent approaches to comparative p o l i t i c s and are able to ignore the international system completely. In the surveys of the f i e l d provided i n selections of readings, however, the l i n e between the f i e l d s 19 becomes s l i g h t l y b l u r r e d 0 In the Eckstein and Apter text y and i n the 20 f i r s t e d i t i o n of the Macridis and Ward reader the relevance of the international system i s conceded only f o r the int e r n a l p o l i t i c s of non-Western-liberal-democratic states. Thus, the rol e of the '"Communist 21 camp" i n maintaining the domestic systems of i t s members i s discussed. The discussion, however, remains on the l e v e l of a special case and the p o s s i b i l i t y of the broader a p p l i c a b i l i t y of the concepts involved i s not ra i s e d . Discussions of newly-independent states e n t a i l frequent reference 22 to t h e i r c o l o n i a l paste Again, i n no case i s any attempt made to take 23 the discussion to a more general, systematic l e v e l . I t seems that the separation of comparative p o l i t i c s from the f i e l d of international relations has been neither sharp nor consistento While some authors have disregarded the international system, others have been driven by l o g i c or history to acknowledge i t s relevance. Yet t h i s very acknowledgement has often resulted i n a number of loose ends which were not, or could not be, t i e d up s a t i s f a c t o r i l y i n the context of a given framework. A b r i e f review of international relations studies reveals a s i m i l a r state of a f f a i r s . One might expect a greater tendency to consider intrastate p o l i t i c s relevant when the focus i s the national subsystem. Indeed, there are studies at t h i s l e v e l which tend to explain almost a l l aspects of foreign policy i n terms of the exigencies 24 of domestic p o l i t i c s . On the other hand, the major analytic approach at t h i s l e v e l , foreign policy decision-making, tends to relegate the i n t r a s t a t e system to a minor position at best. While Snyder, bruck and Sapin include the i n t r a s o c i e t a l setting i n their outline, i t remains l i t t l e more than an impressionistic backdropo Their commentary makes i t c l e a r that most of the aspects of t h i s setting are to be dealt with only i n the broadest sense. 5 The authors do not attempt an examination of the extent and nature of the relevance of these variables. In the Brecher, Steinberg and Stein development of the approach the domestic system i s subjected to a closer examination. However, only those aspects of i n t r a -state p o l i t i c a l behaviour consciously and purposefully aimed at the 26 f o r e i g n p o l i c y decision-making process are considered relevanto Morgenthau has focused on the power relations among states. He i s thus led to consider the "elements of power", a l l of which turn out to be aspects of the intranational system 0 The l i s t of elements, which runs from natural resources to the quality of government, i s s t r i k i n g l y ex-27 haustive. The power focus and the elimination of motives and ideology 28 as relevant variables l i m i t the depth to which analysis of these 5 elements might go,, however. F i n a l l y , we are l e f t with l i t t l e more than a l i s t of points whose interrelationship i s taken f o r granted,, The r e l a t i v e importance of the points and the manner i n which they are ,integrated into the thing c a l l e d power are not f u l l y discussed. While Morgenthau acknowledges the relevance of the domestic; p o l i t i c a l system, Singer has noted that while i t i s ... by no means inevitable .... we tend to move, i n a system oriented model, away from notions implying much national autonomy and independence of choice and toward a more deterministic orientation,, 29/ The more deterministic the approach, the less relevant are the int e r n a l processes of the s t a t e a Thus, LIska argues that domestic and international p o l i t i c s are separate domains on the grounds that: F i r s t , international p o l i t i c s of the system has i t s conventions, techniques and requirements which, embedded i n t r a d i t i o n and existing conditions, are r e l a t i v e l y independent of the int e r n a l p o l i t i c a l system of any one participant nation. The second and related reason f o r drawing a l i n e ... between domestic and foreign p o l i t i c s i s the persistence of national "self-preservation" and "survival" as the necessary and s u f f i c i e n t goals of foreign policy,, 3 0 / Thus, the boundaries of the f i e l d of international p o l i t i c s are subject to a great deal of v a r i a t i o n . While f o r one author the domestic system i s c r u c i a l , f o r another i t i s almost i r r e l e v a n t . In between these positions di f f e r e n t authors accept dif f e r e n t degrees of relevance of d i f f e r e n t aspects of the domestic system. To some extent, the position which denies the relevance of one system while the other i s being analyzed i s ju s t i f i a b l e o One might say that certain variables are being held constant while others are being tested. The point i s that i t i s not always clear that the researcher does indeed accept the separation of the f i e l d s as merely an analytic deviceo Because we cannot claim to know that the separation i s v a l i d i n any other sense, such lack of c l a r i t y may be dangerous. It can lead to a d i s t o r t i o n of r e a l i t y and to the loss of insights <, The approaches which -t r y to include some elements of the other system may be s i m i l a r l y dangerouso The l i s t i n g of points may be mistaken f o r analysis» The boundaries between what i s deemed relevant and what irrelevant are often i l l o g i c a l and seemingly arbitrary„ Therefore, one of the tasks of p o l i t i c a l science i s the delimitation, through empirical research, of the areas i n which national and international systems overlap 0 We may thus be better able to judge the extent to which the separation of the f i e l d s r e f l e c t s r e a l i t y and to construct more accurate and l o g i c a l models which take aspects of the other system into account when t h i s i s necessary,, This has been the course taken by certain p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s during the past few years 0 The purpose of this essay i s to provide further evidence about the a r t i f i c i a l i t y or r e a l i t y of the d i v i s i o n of the two f i e l d s . S p e c i f i c a l l y , t h i s paper deals with the relationship between two types of p o l i t i c a l behaviour— intrastate p o l i t i c a l unrest and interstate violenceo Chapter II The Hypothesis The basic hypothesis of this paper i s that the l e v e l of p o l i t i -c a l unrest within a state and the l e v e l of interstate violence involving that state covary 0 The association varies i n strength and d i r e c t i o n from state to state and with dif f e r e n t time lags. Each type of behaviour may predict p o s i t i v e l y or negatively to succeeding manifestations of the other type of behaviour. Since we are dealing with the potential overlap, as i t were, of national and international systems, i t i s best to conceive of states as very complex and often unstable c o a l i t i o n s , i n which the formal leadership may not always exercise effective control over the c o a l i t i o n members. 3 l / Intrastate p o l i t i c a l -unrest, or domestic unrest, i s overt beha-32 viour by actors within a state. Its purpose i s to express d i s s a t i s f a c -t i o n with, and to influence, the a l l o c a t i o n of values within the state or policy v i s - a - v i s other states. The i n i t i a t i n g actors may be defined i n terms of t h e i r ethnic, r e l i g i o u s , r a c i a l , i d e o l o g i c a l , class or other such associations. The targets of the action are s i m i l a r l y defined groups and/or the incumbents of positions of authority within the same state. The behaviour occurs outside the j u d i c i a l , l e g a l , administrative or formal p o l i t i c a l and.communications processes of the state.~'~> Domestic unrest has a number of implications. (A) It i s a threat to the security of tenure of the national e l i t e s . The threat may be d i r e c t , that i s , an attempt to remove the incumbents from o f f i c e . Unrest may also constitute an indirect threat 0 For example, opposition to s p e c i f i c p o l i c i e s of the e l i t e s can help to create a pool from which 8 34 r e c r u i t s to a more general e l e c t o r a l or subversive opposition may be drawn. Par more b a s i c a l l y , the circumvention of formal state processes i n such action implies a reject i o n of the legitimacy and authoritative-ness of the state i n s t i t u t i o n s and of those who hold o f f i c e i n them. (B) A c o n f l i c t s i t u a t i o n may be understood as one i n which there exist 35 mutually incompatible goals and purposes between and among groups. Given that we have defined the purpose of unrest behaviour i n terms of the incompatibility of goals, such action c l e a r l y implies the existence of a c o n f l i c t s i t u a t i o n and i s a type of c o n f l i c t behaviour. (C) There-fore, the l e v e l of domestic unrest indicates the degree to which the -in-state society lacks s o l i d a r i t y and integration. Integration i s here to be understood i n terms of the frequency of c o n f l i c t between groups, or — since unrest may e n t a i l violence — i n terms of the probability of 37 violence, given a c o n f l i c t situation. Interstate violence i s overt behaviour by actors from one state directed at targets which are under the authority of another stateo The i n i t i a t i n g actors may be private individuals or members of m i l i t a r y or paramilitary organizations. The aim of the action i s to seize t e r r i t o r y , to k i l l , injure or capture human inhabitants, to seize or destroy a i r -c r a f t or shipping, or to destroy other material objects of the other state. Thus, assuming that the population of the attacked state wants none of these things to happen, interstate violence too i s a type of c o n f l i c t behaviour. It i s differ e n t i a t e d from domestic unrest largely i n that i t involves action across international boundaries. However, the nature of c o n f l i c t In the area to be studied — the Middle East — leads to a s l i g h t blurring of the conceptual boundaries between the two variables. The problem l i e s i n t h i s : While the attacked state almost always holds the authorities of the state from which the attack emanated responsible f o r the action, these l a t t e r authorities often deny any involvement. I f the attacks are unauthorized, they are a form of domestic unrest. For there are certain state i n s t i t u t i o n s which are supposed to regulate the flow of violence to foreign countries: the government, the general s t a f f and so on 0 The circumvention of these i n s t i t u t i o n s implies, as does the circumvention of i n s t i t u t i o n s of the state i n domestic unrest, a re j e c t i o n of the legitimacy and authorita-tiveness of the structures and of their incumbents. Moreover, since the authorities generally claim that they are trying to suppress such unautho-r i z e d violence, there i s evidently a difference of policy, a c o n f l i c t , between e l i t e s and non-elites. The point may be drawn even further. It can be claimed that subversive elements may engage i n interstate violence primarily i n order to goad the external enemy into r e p r i s a l s . Such counterattacks may lead to the weakening of the authority and coercive power of the national e l i t e s and thus to a situation advantageous to the 39 subversives. In the f i n a l analysis, there i s no way to solve the problem of conceptual blur r i n g . I f the number of events of unauthorized violence i s large enough, interpretation of correlation c o e f f i c i e n t s i s d i f f i c u l t . I f such action i s consciously subversive, high correlation c o e f f i c i e n t s may well be a r t i f a c t u a l . To determine the probability of such d i f f i c u l t i e s a r i s i n g , the actual extent of unauthorized interstate violence must be discovered. 10 A f u l l discussion of the issue of e l i t e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i s too complex to be dealt with here« ' On the whole, the available evidence indicates that the various state authorities can keep unauthorized violence to a minimum when they want t o 0 ^ I f the l e v e l of such behaviour i s high, i t seems to be because there i s a lack of zeal among those tryi n g to suppress i t . In e f f e c t , non-interference amounts to t a c i t approval and encouragement. Thus, the difference between authorized and unauthorized interstate violence i s minimized, along with the elements of unrest i n the l a t t e r form of behaviour. There are, therefore, l i k e l y to be few t r u l y unauthorized attacks. In these circumstances problems of conceptual blurring and a r t i f a c t u a l correlation are not of major concern 0 According to our hypothesis, domestic unrest and interstate violence covary. The following paragraphs and the review of the pub-li s h e d l i t e r a t u r e i l l u s t r a t e the forms the association may take. The existence of these types of covariation can be tested s t a t i s t i c a l l y . The discussion below goes beyond mere covariance, however, and deals with causal processes l i n k i n g the variables. Such processes are only l o g i c a l ; they cannot be proven. S t i l l , considering them i s p a r t i c u l a r l y useful i n indicating possible intervening variables. By testing them, theory construction may proceed on a sturdier foundation. The following are the four possible relationships between the variables: l ) The higher the l e v e l of domestic p o l i t i c a l unrest, the higher the l e v e l of interstate v i o l e n c e The leadership of a state may seek to d i s t r a c t the populace 11 from engaging i n unrest behaviour by embarking on spectacular and v i o l e n t adventures against an external enemy. 2) The higher the l e v e l of domestic unrest, the lower the l e v e l of interstate violence. The e l i t e s of a state involved i n interstate violence may face concurrent domestic unrest. The a l l o c a t i o n of attention and resources to the problems at home could lead to a corresponding decrease i n the attention and resources allocated to the interstate violence and, consequently, to a decrease i n the l e v e l of such a c t i v i t y . 3) The higher the l e v e l of interstate violence, the higher the l e v e l of domestic unrest. The involvement of a state i n interstate violence can lead to a diversion of attention and resources from pressing internal s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l problems. The resultant deterioration in.the domestic s i t u a -t i o n could lead sectors of the population to press f o r redress through unrest behaviour. 4) The higher the l e v e l of interstate violence, the lower the l e v e l of domestic unrest. In order to be able to devote more resources and attention to the interstate violence, e l i t e s may f o r c i b l y suppress those involved i n domestic unrest. 12 Chapter I I I Review of the- General Literature No published study deals with exactly the same types of behaviour i n exactly the same context as th i s study does. Some of the relevant research refers to different types of groups or to groups i n general. The types of behaviour examined are often subsets of domestic unrest and interstate violence 0 In other studies broader categories are used. In s t i l l other papers there i s only some overlap with the types of behaviour dealt with here. Some of the implications of each of the variables were outlined above. The exact types of behaviour involved are explained i n Appendices A and B„ Reference to these sections w i l l help relate the l i t e r a t u r e covered below to th i s study. The hypothesis and the subsidiary hypotheses used i n th i s paper were largely extrapolated from general propositions about groups and c o n f l i c t posited by Coser i n his reformulation of Simmel's work. The following are three propositions relevant to th i s study 8 C o n f l i c t with another group leads to the mobilization of the energies of group members and hence to increased cohesion of the group. Soc i a l systems lacking s o c i a l s o l i d a r i t y are l i k e l y to d i s i n -tegrate i n the face of outside c o n f l i c t , although some unity may be despotically enforced. 4 l / R i g i d l y organized struggle groups may actually search f o r enemies with the deliberate purpose or unwitting result of maintaining unity and inter n a l cohesion,,... The evocation of an outer enemy or the invention of such an enemy strengthens s o c i a l cohesion that i s threatened from within. 42/ Sumner proposed a relationship similar to the f i r s t of these three. The groups involved are p o l i t i e s , and the c o n f l i c t i s war. (A)ny group, i n order to be strong against an outside enemy, must be wel l - d i s c i p l i n e d , harmonious, and peaceful inside o.. because discord inside would cause defeat i n a battle with another group. 43/ 13 In t h i s formulation of a relationship between intergroup and intragroup c o n f l i c t behaviour i n t e r n a l peace i s not the end sought. Rather, in t e r n a l unity i s a means to the end of v i c t o r y . In other formulations the means and end are reversed. This i s seen i n the t h i r d of Coser's propositions c i t e d above. Intergroup c o n f l i c t becomes the means to intragroup peace. S i v i s pacem internam, para bellum externum summarizes th i s approach. Wright includes a similar delineation of the problem i n his study of war among states. He contends that as a society develops, i t s growth and decreasing homogeneity lead to increasing i n t e r n a l stress and tension. I f these tensions are not to rend the society asunder, h o s t i l i t i e s must be redirected to an external objecto This transference may be consciously manipulated by the e l i t e s or may be performed unconsciously; the state has been able to preserve i t s dominant position only by continuous preparation for-war and occasional resort to war. Haas and Whiting posit a similar process. In their analysis e l i t e s who f e e l t h e i r position threatened by the inte r n a l opposition may turn to 45 external c o n f l i c t behaviour, including war. One of the implications of these scapegoat theories i s that the external enemy may well be invented i n order to provide a target for the release of i n t r a s o c i e t a l tensions. On the other hand, Turner argues that a group w i l l not engage i n scapegoating "unless i t i s already mobilized  for intergroup c o n f l i c t . T h e process i s thus one i n which emphasis i s shifted from one c o n f l i c t to another, rather than one i n which another c o n f l i c t i s created. Another point that should be noted about scapegoat theories i s 14 that they involve two separate propositions when the behaviour i s seen as manipulative. The f i r s t proposition i s that unrest within the society w i l l lead to c o n f l i c t behaviour v i s - a - v i s other states. The second i s that this c o n f l i c t behaviour w i l l actually succeed i n s t i l l i n g i n t e r n a l c o n f l i c t s . A number of empirical studies have been carried out i n r e l a t i o n to the above propositions. Sherif and his colleagues tested a hypothesis similar to the f i r s t one quoted from Coser 1s study above i n terms of small groups of boys engaged i n game c o n f l i c t s . Data gathered by obser-vation of behaviour and relations among individual group members tended to support the hypothesis that The course of relations between two groups which are i n a state of competition and f r u s t r a t i o n v / i l l tend to produce an increase i n in-group s o l i d a r i t y 0 4 7 / Although this was indeed the general trend i n several instances defeat i n a contest with the r i v a l group brought temporarily increased internal f r i c t i o n i n i t s wake. (HoweverTJ heightened s o l i d a r i t y within the group was achieved through united cooperative action by the in-group  against the outgroup.... 48/ The r e l a t i o n of t h i s phenomenon to the second proposition quoted from Coser i s quite c l e a r . It i s interesting that the decrease i n s o l i d a r i t y i s so short-lived, and i s overcome i n the face of continued competition. It appears that the authors are dealing with two rather different matters. While i n Coser's proposition the lack of s o c i a l s o l i d a r i t y i s the c r u c i a l variable, i n S h e r i f 1 s experiment discouragement or some similar factor would seem to be operative 0 This study i s interesting i n that i t does demonstrate r e l a t i o n -ships between intergroup and intragroup behaviour. However, i t would be 15 wrong to extrapolate from these findings to the l e v e l of intrastate p o l i -t i c a l unrest and interstate violencej conditions of s o l i d a r i t y among individuals within groups are not necessarily conditions of s o l i d a r i t y among groups within states. Turner tested a scapegoat hypothesis i n the context of reaction to v i o l e n t "behaviour i n three university communities. He posited that blame for the incidents would be.transferred to non-members of the com-munities. Attitudes expressed by members i n l e t t e r s , newspaper a r t i c l e s 49 and e d i t o r i a l s , and "informal discussion" served as the data. ^ The findings indicate that while there was a tendency not to locate blame 50 within the communities, members of outgroups were not blamed either. Blainey studied scapegoating i n the context of the relationship between interstate war and intrastate c i v i l s t r i f e . The antecedents of a l l wars between Y/estern-type states outside L a t i n America from l 8 l 5 to 1939 were examined. I t was found that just over h a l f these wars were 51 preceded by c i v i l s t r i f e within one of the combattant countries. More detailed analysis leads Blainey to the following conclusion: Internal s t r i f e ... was most l i k e l y to lead to international war when i t muffled what had been previously a clear and accepted hierarchy of pov/er between two nations. C i v i l s t r i f e i n the stronger of two states may cause i t to appear weak-ened. The state which had hitherto appeared to be weaker, seizes the opportunity to gain i t s ends. On the other hand, c i v i l s t r i f e i n the weaker of two states merely serves as confirmation of i t s status. I t i s , 52 therefore, no more subject to attack than at other times.' Rosecrance analyzed nine international systems from the European ancien regime to the 1960's, looking f o r s t a b i l i z i n g and d e s t a b i l i z i n g 16 f a c t o r s . * ^ VThatever the weaknesses of the s t u d y , t h e conclusions are worthy of attention. Hosecrance finds that D e s t a b i l i z i n g (international) systems have been introduced con-current with mass s o c i e t a l tendencies; a greater international s t a b i l i t y has been introduced coincident with a greater internal s t a b i l i t y of r u l i n g e l i t e s . 55/ The commentary makes i t clear that scapegoating, as conscious manipula— 56 t i o n by the e l i t e s i s the mechanism involved. Another researcher has approached the problem of the r e l a t i o n -ship between i n t e r n a l disturbances and interstate war with a di f f e r e n t conceptualization of the issues involved. Sorokin contended that the two types of behaviour should be p o s i t i v e l y associated, since both are symptomatic of the breakdown of common value systems within a society. Force then becomes the ultimate arbiter i n a l l c o n f l i c t s . The break-57 down i t s e l f i s a r e s u l t of socio-cultural change i n the society. Sorokin tested the hypothesized association graphically, aggregating the data by centuries and by quarter-centuries 0 In the f i r s t case, no association was discerned. In the second a positive association was 58 e l i c i t e d which was "neither strong, consistent nor quite tangible."^ In a study focusing on domestic turmoil i n the United States i n r e l a t i o n to the Vietnam War, Tanter too analyzed the data graphically. His findings suggest that the .... i n i t i a l rate of change i n antiwar protests ... may be a function of the Vietnam escalation. The change i n demonstrations declines, moreover, with a decrease i n the esca-l a t i o n of the war.... A somewhat similar pattern seems to characterize urban r i o t s and c i v i l rights p a r t i c i p a t i o n . 59/ Rudolph Rummel has approached the problem of a relationship be-tween foreign and domestic c o n f l i c t behaviour d i f f e r e n t l y than any of the above analysts. His approach has been cross-sectional rather than l o n g i -17, t u d i n a l . Although not of i t s e l f s t r i c t l y relevant to th i s study, the purely cross-sectional analysis i s a good point at which to star t the examination of mixed, cross-sectional-cum-longitudinal, analyses. (The relevance of cross-sectional research to t h i s paper i s limite d by two factors. F i r s t , by omitting the time factor, temporal p r i o r i t y cannot he determined. With no notion of the- temporal r e l a -tionship between two variables, i t i s d i f f i c u l t to interpret an associ-ation between them i n processual and causal terms. Furthermore, the existence of a relationship across a l l states cannot be interpreted to mean that the relationship obtains for any pa r t i c u l a r state. Yet the causal processes operating i n certain states are what th i s study aims to find.) In one study Rummel tested a hypothesis which may be interpreted i n the following terms: A state with a high l e v e l of domestic i n s t a b i -l i t y i s l i k e l y to engage i n more/less foreign c o n f l i c t behaviour than 61 another state with a lower l e v e l of p o l i t i c a l i n s t a b i l i t y . ^ Rummel concludes that there i s " l i t t l e relationship" between the variables. Most of the mixed analyses have been based on factor analysis. The factor analyses performed since 1949 have tended to reveal separate 62 dimensions for foreign and domestic c o n f l i c t behaviour. The only ex-ceptions have occurred when certain controls were imposed on the data. C a t t e l l , Breul and Hartman extracted a dimension which included war, foreign clashes and r i o t s , ^ when they r e s t r i c t e d t h e i r study to "modern i n d u s t r i a l n a t i o n s . " ^ Rummel reports that Chadwick's factor analysis of annual data revealed dimensions common to types of foreign 65 and domestic c o n f l i c t behaviour. 18 As the factor analyses have been used as bases f o r further analysis, the c l a r i t y of the separation of foreign from domestic con-f l i c t behaviour has been obscured. Thus, i n a study i n which canonical equations were based on factor analyzed data, P h i l l i p s found that the type and amount of foreign c o n f l i c t behaviour sent by states during 1963 correlated highly with the type and amount received i n that year. For certain states, however, the canonical equations did not provide adequate predictions. Stepwise regression then revealed that modernized nations experiencing i n f l a t i o n and i n t e r n a l violence, possibly associated with the unlawful exchange of leadership, are l i k e l y to over respond m i l i t a r i l y to t h e i r environment. 66/ Hazlewood, using canonical correlation based on factor analyzed foreign and domestic c o n f l i c t behaviour data and other variables, found that Economic s t a b i l i t y , s o c i e t a l heterogeneity, and i n t e r n a l turmoil predict best to war. 67/ Other studies have introduced a longitudinal component into cross-sectional analyses by introducing time l a g s 0 Thus, Tanter, using multiple regression analysis, found a small relationship between domestic and foreign c o n f l i c t behavior, especially with a time lag. 68/ In a study r e s t r i c t e d to African states during the years 1963 to 1965* C o l l i n s based zero-order and multiple correlations on factor analyzed foreign and domestic c o n f l i c t data. Cross-sectional analysis revealed moderate to strong associations between types of interstate c o n f l i c t and types of domestic disorder. When inter n a l disorder i n one year was correlated with foreign c o n f l i c t i n the following year, certain associa-tions did remain quite strong. However, prediction to interstate v i o -19 69 lence became much weaker. x Wilkenfeld carried the- longitudinal aspect of the analysis somewhat further. Correlations were based on groups of similar nations and on the factor scores for each of them extracted on an annual 70 basis. The groups of nations were based on those derived i n Banks and Gregg's Q-factor analysis of the p o l i t i c a l variables of the Cross-Polity 71 Survey. Wilkenfeld's hypothesis was stated i n the following terms: Within certain groups of nations c l a s s i f i e d according to type of nation, there i s a tendency for internal (domestic) and external (foreign) c o n f l i c t behavior to co-occur, or for the occurrence" of one to be. followed by the occurrence of the other. 72/ The findings furnish evidence to support the hypothesis. A study by Wilkenfeld and Zinnes tends to confirm part of W i l -kenfeld' s research. A Markov analysis based on the factorization of domestic and foreign c o n f l i c t variables, revealed that the l e v e l of interstate c o n f l i c t i s a useful predictor to changes i n the l e v e l of internal c o n f l i c t behaviour. The predictive power varied according to the type and intensity of the interstate and intrastate c o n f l i c t 73 involved and according to the time lags and the type of state. What i s p a r t i c u l a r l y relevant about these mixed studies i s the generally increasing salience of the association between internal and external c o n f l i c t variables as increasing emphasis i s l a i d on the l o n g i -tudinal component. This would seem to indicate that the relationship posited i n our hypothesis i s more l i k e l y to f i n d supportive evidence than a relationship of the sort hypothesized by Rummel. The study by Wilkenfeld, Lussier and Tahtinen emphasizes the longitudinal aspect of the analysis most heavily. Factor analyses of foreign and domestic c o n f l i c t behaviour for each of six Middle Eastern 20 states served as the basis f o r stepwise regression analysis. The findings lead the authors to conclude that there i s an association be-tween the two types of behaviour f o r each state. The association 74 va r i e s i n type and strength from one country to the other. A number of points may be drawn from t h i s review of the l i t e r a -ture. The f i r s t point i s that relationships between interstate c o n f l i c t and violence and domestic unrest may indeed be found. Fxo?thermore, the relationships apparently vary from state to state and over time. Another point i s that these relationships tend to be rather weak, while the association between action of each type and other action of the same type tend to be stronger. Thus, Wilkenfeld concludes that The generally small size of the correlation c o e f f i c i e n t s ... indicate that we have not explained a great deal of the variance i n foreign c o n f l i c t behavior on the basis of domestic c o n f l i c t and vice versa. 75/ The greater and more general strength of association between behaviours of the same type i s indicated by the separate dimensions of. foreign and domestic c o n f l i c t extracted i n the factor analyses. Even with the i n -c l u s i o n of longitudinal elements, the r e l a t i v e strength of the r e l a t i o n -ships does not change. Thus, Tanter found more of the variance i n domes-t i c c o n f l i c t explained by preceding domestic than by foreign c o n f l i c t . S i m i l a r l y , foreign c o n f l i c t was predicted better by preceding behaviour of the same type. Wilkenfeld, Lussier and Tahtinen found that the most important predictors of each state's foreign c o n f l i c t behaviour are the c o n f l i c t behaviours directed toward i t by other states. 77/ 7R P h i l l i p s ' cross-sectional analysis indicates the same thing. C o l l i n s 1 findings show closer associations between and among foreign c o n f l i c t variables and between and among domestic c o n f l i c t variables than between 21 79 ' variables of both types. Indeed, the general implication of th i s group of studies i s that not much insight into the two types of c o n f l i c t behaviour i s l o s t when the f i e l d s of domestic and international p o l i t i c s are held separateo Any relationship between the two "genera" seems to be a secondary factor i n the processes leading to the occurrence of behaviour of each "genus". To some extent, t h i s i s i n l i n e with one of the points raised i n the review of the the o r e t i c a l l i t e r a t u r e . Turner, i t was noted, proposed that scape-goating w i l l not take place unless there i s already some c o n f l i c t brew-ing with the external enemy; the internal c o n f l i c t i s only a c a t a l y t i c agent i n the process leading to increased interstate c o n f l i c t behaviour. Therefore, i t seems to be i n order to test t h i s point: What i s the r e l a t i v e strength of association between each type of behaviour and the other kind, and between each and other behaviour of the same kind? One l a s t point can be derived from the published l i t e r a t u r e : ' an awareness of the complexity of the processes we are dealing with. In abstracting the two sorts of action from t h e i r environment, we may lose sight of t h i s . I t seems best to conceive of each variable as part of a concatenation of phenomena somehow related to each other. Only then can a study l i k e t h i s be useful — when i t i s seen as a preliminary step i n the elucidation of these complex processes. 22 . Chapter IV Review of the Literature on the Four States The states which were selected f o r this study are Egypt, I s r a e l , Jordan and Sy r i a . There are a number of reasons for this selection. The f i r s t i s my own interest i n these countries. The second i s the: occurrence of a rather large number of domestic unrest and interstate violence events i n them. I t i s the lack of a s u f f i c i e n t number of such incidents reported which led to the omission of other Middle Eastern states. The t h i r d reason f o r choosing these countries i s the a v a i l a b i l i t y of i n f o r -mation, the ease of c o l l a t i o n of data from readily accessible sources. The l a s t reason i s the recurrent emphasis i n the l i t e r a t u r e on the close connection between interstate and domestic p o l i t i c s i n the region. It i s to t h i s l i t e r a t u r e that we must now turn 0 An overview of this body of work w i l l be p a r t i c u l a r l y useful i n providing further background f o r the interpretation of the findings. I s r a e l The evidence regarding the relationship between the variables i n the case of I s r a e l i s inconclusive. Wilkenfeld's analysis of types of states may be applied to individual countries to the extent that the lon-g i t u d i n a l element determines the nature of the relationships found. Un-fortunately, the impact of t h i s element i s not c l e a r 0 In any case, W i l -80 kenfeld found that for the group of polyarchic states, which includes 8 l I s r a e l , domestic turmoil i s moderately associated with concurrent and 82 subsequent behaviour on the war, that i s , interstate violence, dimension. The types of behaviour involved i n these dimensions are similar to those 23 involved i n the variables used i n t h i s paper. Despite these findings, the study by Wilkenfeld and h i s colleagues reveals no such relationship f o r I s r a e l itself.®^ In a study based on survey data Peres found the tranquil r e l a -tions among I s r a e l i Jews of different origins largely attributable to t h e i r s o l i d a r i t y i n the face of the external Arab threat. This same c o n f l i c t , however, serves to increase the distance between Jews and Arabs 85 i n the state. Peres does not extrapolate to the l e v e l of c o n f l i c t behaviour between Jews and Arabs. The i n t u i t i v e l i t e r a t u r e tends to ignore the possibly contra-dictory effects of the violent c o n f l i c t with the Arab states. The h o s t i l i t i e s are seen to have "promoted national integration, construction 86 and c r e a t i v i t y , " and to have helped i n the development of "a modern, Qtj strong and homogeneous I s r a e l i nation, capable of survival." Another analyst notes that Alors que l a structure sociale israelienne offre une p o s s i b i l i t e r e e l l e de miner le regime de l ' i n t e r i e u r , les dirigeants nationalistes arabes ont reussi ce prodige de ressouder en per-manence l a f r a g i l e a l l i a n c e entre les masses sepharadites et les dirigeants i s r a e l i e n s . 88/ (D 1ailleurs,) l a classe dirigeante israelienne ... a su exploiter habilement (cette) menace exterieur permanente.... 89/ General Burns takes the scapegoating analysis somewhat further. He notes that the I s r a e l i leadership tends to blame the state's economic and other d i f f i c u l t i e s on the Arab boycott. In such circumstances, there seems to me to be a great tempta-tion to f i n d some excuse to go to war and thus to break out of the blockade and boycott. 90/ With specific reference to the period preceding the 1967 war, during which there was a great increase i n attacks upon and from I s r a e l , 24 Kimche and Bawly suggest a process similar to the one posited by Blainey: b a s i c a l l y , the Isr a e l of early 1967 presented an unhappy picture (of unemployment, bankruptcies, emigration, and weak govern-ment., o. ( l ) t was th i s picture of a weakened Isr a e l that the Arab leaders bore i n mind as they l a i d t h e i r plans.... 91/ In general, therefore, the i n t u i t i v e analyses lead us to expect some interrelationship between unrest and interstate violence, while the s t a t i s t i c a l studies provide contradictory evidence. Syria The. l i t e r a t u r e on Syria i s neither as extensive nor as intensive as that on I s r a e l . In the study by Wilkenfeld and his colleagues, a positive relationship between domestic violence i n one period and i n t e r -state verbal h o s t i l i t y i n succeeding periods i s found, but no association 92 i s discerned between the former and m i l i t a r y actions. It may well be that relationships are being obscured because of the manner i n which the data were collected. Although Syria was united with Egypt f o r most of the time from 1958 to the end of 1961, data were collated and regressions 93 calculated as i f the country had been independent f o r the entire period. Burrowes and Spector, however, who dealt only with the period since secession, also found only weak correlations between the two types of c o n f l i c t behaviour. What relationship did exist was largely negative. The strongest associations were between interstate violence indicators 94 and anti-subversive acts by the e l i t e s . Multiple regression did not reveal a strong t i e between domestic and foreign c o n f l i c t indicators. The 95 imposition of lags yielded only s l i g h t l y stronger associations. The i n t u i t i v e analyses tend to be more assertive about a r e l a -tionship between the two kinds of action. Usually, however,.the asser-tions refer not to general p o l i t i c a l processes i n Syria, but to s p e c i f i c 25 incidents. One of the points most often made i s that the Palestine War resulted i n great p o l i t i c a l upheavals. Strikes, r i o t s and coups d'etat f i n d t h e i r o r i g i n i n the great Arab disaster, blame f o r which was l a i d to the leadership The reverse process, domestic unrest leading to interstate v i o -lence, i s also discerned at various points i n Syrian history. In his analysis of the origins of the June War Laqueur perceives manipulative scapegoating on the part of the neo-Baathist e l i t e s . The security of tenure of t h e i r positions was doubtful: they had no mass support and had just fended o f f two coups. ( l ) t was clear from the beginning that this weakness would impel the regime to take a mili t a n t l i n e on the one issue that was universally popular — Palestine. 97/ The r e s u l t of t h i s insecurity was the increase i n border clashes with, and 98 / terrorism against, I s r a e l . Kimche and Bawly also see the neo-Baathist regime's i n s t a b i l i t y as an important element i n Syria's espousal of 99 v i o l e n t t a c t i c s against I s r a e l . In general, therefore, while the i n t u i t i v e analyses point to pos i t i v e associations between unrest and interstate violence, the s t a t i s t i c a l studies by Wilkenfeld and his colleagues and by Burrowes and Spector indicate no important relationship between the variables. J ordan Wilkenfeld, Lussier and Tahtinen found a positive association between domestic violence i n Jordan and m i l i t a r y actions undertaken by Jordan during the same period."*"^ Insofar as the mixed study by Wilken-f e l d may be interpreted longitudinally, internal war behaviour i n cen-26 t r i s t states,'*'^"*' l i k e Jordan, predicts to war behaviour with increa-sing strength as the lag lengthens. 1 0^ There i s no evidence that the reverse process applies. In his i n t u i t i v e analysis V a t i k i o t i s notes an association be-tween interstate violence and domestic unrest i n Jordan. . He maintains that I s r a e l i r e p r i s a l raids can lead to p o l i t i c a l disturbances. I f there i s great loss of c i v i l i a n l i f e and property i n such attacks, an angry populace may protest against rulers obviously incapable of pro-tec t i n g them. The e l i t e s ' ineptitude can also be interpreted as a lack of interest " i n restoring the f o r f e i t e d rights of " the Palestinians. I f there are many Jordanian m i l i t a r y casualties, "the loy a l t y of the o f f i c e r s 104 can waver," and conspiracies can r e s u l t . Other i n t u i t i v e analysts are not as forthright i n positing a relationship between interstate violence and domestic unrest. At most, such researchers point out that the e l i t e s must declare implacable h o s t i -105 l i t y to I s r a e l i n order to maintain t h e i r positions. Based on these few studies, one may expect that, i n the case of Jordan, our own findings w i l l reveal that domestic unrest predicts posi-t i v e l y to subsequent interstate violence, and that the reverse i s also true. . Egypt Wilkenfeld and his colleagues found a positive association be-tween domestic violence and m i l i t a r y actions of Egypt. The relationship 106 i s s l i g h t l y stronger than the one e l i c i t e d for Jordan. Wilkenfeld 1s findings about the prediction of war from the inte r n a l war behaviour of 107 ce trxst states apply to he United Arab Republic as well as to J rdan.27 Turning to the i n t u i t i v e l i t e r a t u r e we f i n d many authors pointing to situations i n which e l i t e insecurity led to involvement i n violent foreign adventures. Thus, the intervention i n Palestine was meant "to d i s t r a c t attention from internal d i f f i c u l t i e s . " Similar considerations are seen to have led the Y/afdist government to embark on 109 violent c o n f l i c t against the B r i t i s h i n the Canal Zone. y Dekmejian notes that the Free Of f i c e r s learned to use foreign policy — pa r t i c u -l a r l y i n the forms of c o n f l i c t with the West, I s r a e l and Arab "r e a c t i o -naries" — as a means of strengthening t h e i r domestic position."*'"*'^ The reverse process — international violence leading to domestic unrest — i s not consistently suggested by i n t u i t i v e analysts. Thus, as i n Syria, the Palestine War disaster was blamed on the e l i t e s and led to high levels of domestic u n r e s t . O n the other hand, the m i l i t a r y disaster of the Suez-Sinai War i s seen to have led to increased s o l i d a r i t y 112 i n the nation as i t closed ranks behind Nasser. The circumstances surrounding the wars were, of course, quite d i f f e r e n t . In general, researchers seem to agree that domestic unrest leads to interstate violence f o r Egypt. There i s no agreement on the reverse process, however. 28 Chapter V Operationalization A) General Design As noted above, t h i s paper i s concerned with certain causal relationships i n p o l i t i c a l processes. Causality implies the temporal p r i o r i t y of cause over e f f e c t . Process implies change and behaviour over time."*"*^ I t , therefore, seems l o g i c a l to use longitudinal methods of analysis. Cross-sectional studies are 'psycho- or soc i o - s t a t i c ' , providing a simultaneous and synoptic study of the situ a t i o n as i t i s at (a given point i n time). Longitudinal ... studies are 'socio-or psycho-dynamic* and are interested i n change. 114/ By using longitudinal methods, one may avoid the question that confronts the user of cross-sectional techniques(;) that of whether i t i s ever appropriate — and, i f so, when — to base inferences regarding change over time on the analysis of data collected on a single time point. 115/ In a longitudinal study one may observe that one type of behaviour consistently precedes another type. One may then i n f e r that both are elements of a single process and that the former causes the l a t t e r . A cross-sectional study, by omitting the temporal relationship, makes such interpretation more d i f f i c u l t . Causality cannot, i n any case, be proven since 0 what we r e f e r to as 'causes' are .... not simple, tangible l i n k s i n the chain of sense experience, but rather d e t a i l s i n an i n t r i c a t e pattern of concepts. 116/ But the aim of s o c i a l science i s to build concepts that f i t with observed r e a l i t y . The looser the f i t between observations and concepts, the more limited i s the value of those concepts. I t should be noted that pro-cessual concepts f i t cross-sectional observations rather poorly. 29 In t h i s essay the association between domestic unrest and in t e r s t a t e violence w i l l be tested i n the following manner: Indicators of the two variables w i l l be correlated with each other. Correlations f o r each state w i l l be computed both with and without time lags. Furthermore, measures of each type of behaviour w i l l be correlated with the measures of subsequent behaviour of the same type. B) The Variables l ) Intrastate P o l i t i c a l Unrest Domestic unrest was defined above as overt behaviour which emanates from and i s directed within a state's society and which expresses d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n with the a l l o c a t i o n of values i n the society or with some aspect of foreign p o l i c y . I t should be noted that our concern i s with overt behaviour and not with other manifestations of d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n such as withdrawal or non-participation. The basic reason f o r this l i m i t a t i o n i s o b s e r v a b i l i t y of behaviour, not only by the s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t but by the other members of the society. Without surveys of non-participants, p a r t i c i p a n t s and e l i t e s i n each state i t i s d i f f i c u l t , i f not impossible, to know whether non-participation stems from d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n , unaware-ness or from some other factors. Nor i s i t possible to assess the attitudes and surmises of the e l i t e s about this non-participation. Domestic unrest behaviour, as we have defined i t , i s both e a s i l y observa-ble and interpretable as c o n f l i c t and d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n behaviour. The typology of such behaviour used i n th i s essay i s loosely 117 based on the one used by Morrisson and Stevenson. The categories here are somewhat grosser, however, partly so that they may be more comparable with, the typologies used i n other studies. This grossness does not 30 r e a l l y a f f e c t our findings, since no calculations involve s p e c i f i c categories of behaviour. >(The reasons f o r t h i s non-involvement are out-l i n e d below.) Appendix A l i s t s the categories usedo One type of unrest behaviour not included i n t h i s essay i s Q " p l o t s . " The trouble with such actions i s that t h e i r revelation i s dependent e n t i r e l y upon the e l i t e s allegedly plotted against. The alleged plot may be only a pretext by which the govern-ment seeks to eliminate i t s p o l i t i c a l competitors. 118/ The "exposure" of a plot may thus be a response to other unrest or to legitimate opposition behaviour. Plots, along with purges and p o l i t i c a l arrests, would thus be only i n d i r e c t l y indicators of unrest behaviour. They might be better indicators of the e l i t e s ' assessment of the security of t h e i r p o sitions. While these types of action might well constitute a useful separate measure, the very incomplete data available preclude t h e i r use. Including one of these types — a measure of e l i t e response — i n the unrest categories, would add only to conceptual murkiness, f o r our aim here i s to discern whether interstate violence i s such a response to unrest. Two measures are used f o r intrastate p o l i t i c a l unrest. The f i r s t consists of the number of unrest events of a l l types occurring during a given time period. The second i s a measure of the magnitude of these events. During the remainder of the essay, the f i r s t w i l l be referred to as incidence of unrest; the second — as magnitude of  unrest. Magnitude of unrest i s a value based on a combination of measures of casualties, duration and t e r r i t o r i a l extent of each unrest incident. The combined measure was decided upon after pretesting i n d i -31 cated that i t generally provided stronger correlations than did any of the constituent measures. T e r r i t o r i a l extent provided the best corre-lat i o n s of the three; casualties — the weakest. Casualties are determined by the number of dead and injured r e s u l t i n g from each incident. Because the number of casualties i s being compared only within each country and not across states, the number of casualties per m i l l i o n was not determined. While i t might have been useful to take into account the growth of each state, the number of cen-suses during the seventeen years of the study was not great enough to make the exercise, worthwhile. The duration score f o r each event i s based on the number of days the incident lasted. A r i o t which occurs at some time between one mid-night and the next and l a s t s up to twenty-four hours receives a duration score of one. I f such an event continues during the next day, the score i s two, and so on and so f o r t h . For c e r t a i n types of behaviour, t e r r o r i s t attacks and coups, there i s no duration score. How long i s a bomb blast? Also, the essence of a coup d'etat i s i t s speed. A long coup i s evidence not of the magni-119 tude of insurgency but of the strength of the incumbents. y A duration score i s thus quite irrelevant to magnitude i n terms of these behaviours 0 T e r r i t o r i a l extent i s a measure substituted f o r the p a r t i c i p a -120 t i o n measure o r i g i n a l l y desired. Data on participants i s seldom ava i l a b l e . When a number i s reported, i t often varies so from source to source as to produce more f r u s t r a t i o n than information. T e r r i t o r i a l extent refers to the number of l o c a l i t i e s — v i l -lages, towns, refugee camps, and so on — i n which an unrest event occurs. 32 Because of the poor quality of population data, no d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n i s made according to the size* of the community. The highest score possible on t h i s measure i s ten. This number i s used to designate an incident taking place i n a l l parts of the country. The number of casualties involved i n an event i s often very large. Simply adding the duration and extent scores to the number of casualties would lead to the former being swamped i n many cases. To avoid such an e f f e c t , the standard score of each measure of each event was computed. The event score thus consists of the sum of the standard scores of the three measures. The magnitude of unrest score f o r a time period consists of the sum of the scores of a l l the events occurring during that period. I t i s obvious that both incidence of unrest and magnitude of unrest are d i s t o r t i v e measures. The former treats each event as i f i t were just as important as every other event of unrest. This i s hardly, l i k e l y to be an accurate r e f l e c t i o n of r e a l i t y . S t i l l , i t i s only a measure of incidence we are dealing with. The second measure i s based on the assumption that the three constituents form an accurate r e f l e c t i o n of the magnitude of an event. The measure assumes that there are no other elements involved i n the mag-nitude of an incident; .that property damage, f o r example, i s not a suitable measure. The point i s , of course, that the measures are based on consistently available data. Neither property damage nor the number of participants i s recorded with any consistency. Another point that must be considered i s that the magnitude mea-sure i s based on the assumption that there i s nothing immanent i n a type 33 of action which makes i t a greater threat to the security of tenure of the e l i t e s than any other type of behaviour. This i s hardly l i k e l y to he the case. A l o g i c a l place to begin the analysis might thus have been with the computation of the correlations using each type of unrest beha-viour separately. However, the number of incidents of each type i s neither great nor variable enough over time to make such analysis mean-i n g f u l . Factor analysis might have indicated which types of action could be combined on the same measure. Such a procedure was beyond our resources, ( i n t h i s connection i t i s noteworthy that published factor analyses of actions of the types dealt with here indicate a tendency to-ward unidimensionality i n such behaviour f o r the four states studied 121 here. Grouping a l l the types of unrest behaviour together i s thus less d i s t o r t i v e than one might have expected.) Scaling might have over-come the homogenization of the intensity of the diff e r e n t events, a homogenization inherent i n grouping a l l of them together. The F e i e r -abends and Nesvold have constructed several scales f o r c o n f l i c t behaviour ranging from simple consensual and construct-validity scales to more complicated ones, such as the Guttman scalogram. 122/ Acceptable and s c i e n t i f i c a l l y validated though such scales may be, they do tend to increase the arbitrary nature of one's measures. One must assign weights to positions on the scale and decide how such weights may be combined with other measures such as the three used here. Such d e c i -sions cannot help but be arbi t r a r y . The usefulness of one's measures i s thus placed i n doubt. A scaling procedure was, therefore, abandoned and the incidence and magnitude measures took the form outlined above. 34 2) Interstate Violence 1 Interstate violence was defined above as the seizure, injury or k i l l i n g of the inhabitants of a state, the seizure of i t s t e r r i t o r y and the seizure and/or destruction of i t s a i r c r a f t or shipping by personnel from another state. The types of action involved and th e i r d e f i n i t i o n s are l i s t e d i n Appendix B. Two measures of the l e v e l of interstate violence are used i n th i s essay: the incidence of violence and the magnitude of violenceo The incidence measure for a state i s simply the number of interstate violence events i n which the country i s involved — whether as aggressor or v i c t i m — during a given time period. I t was o r i g i n a l l y planned to use two incidence measures, the attacks sustained and the attacks i n i t i -ated by each country. A problem arose when the data were collated, how-ever. Roughly one-third of the interstate violence events were the sub-jects of claims and counterclaims by the states involved. Thus any decision as to the id e n t i t y of the i n i t i a t o r i n a s p e c i f i c case would be highly a r b i t r a r y . Double-counting such events as violence both sus-tained and i n i t i a t e d by a single state would l i k e l y have led to great distortions i n our s t a t i s t i c . The d i s t i n c t i o n was, therefore, omitted. The magnitude of violence measure for a state i s indicated by the number of casualties — dead and wounded — suffered by a l l parties i n the interstate violence events i n which a state i s involved during a given time period. One problem with t h i s measure i s that there are often two or more di f f e r e n t sets of casualty figures published about one event. When they were available, the numbers reported by United Nations M i l i -tary Observers wore used. In the absence of UN figures, those supplied 35, by each state for the casualties i t sustained were counted. I f only one state reported on casualties, including those of the other party, and there were no contrary reports, these were the data used. As with the incidence measure, i t was o r i g i n a l l y planned to use two measures for the magnitude of violence of each state; namely, casu-a l t i e s sustained and casualties i n f l i c t e d . The problem with the d i s t i n c -t i o n was i t s questionable usefulness. The levels of casualties sustained and i n f l i c t e d by a state tend to be highly correlated. The value of the rank-order correlation between these levels, using six-month temporal 12 3 units over the years 1950 to 1966, i s 4.88 for Jordan, for example. In these circumstances i t does not seem too l i k e l y that there would be any significant differences between correlations of each of these measures with the domestic unrest ones. The d i s t i n c t i o n would thus be of l i t t l e value for substantive - interpretation. Hence, this plan too was abandoned. Other indicators of the magnitude of interstate violence, such as the value of property destroyed, would have been desirable, since much of the interstate violence i n the Middle East i s not directed at people. Such data, however, are rarely available. In counting incidents of interstate violence, one important ex-ception was made. Attacks against embassies and similar e x t r a t e r r i t o r i a l emplacements were not cdunted, because i t i s too often impossible to d i s -entangle them from a context of domestic unrest. Violence directed at embassies often occurs as part of unrest events i n which the close r e l a -tionship between the national e l i t e s and the foreign state i s being pro-tested. On the other hand, attacks on occupying armies, when the occupa-ti o n i s protested by the e l i t e s , were counted as interstate violence. 36 When i t was impossible to i d e n t i f y both states involved i n an incident, i t was not countedo C) The States As noted above, the states dealt with here are Egypt, I s r a e l , Jordan and Syria. Syria and Egypt present a s l i g h t problem because they were u n i f i e d f o r a time. One study sought to circumvent the problem by 124 treating each as completely independent throughout. In t h i s paper two sets of calculations are made for each state. For Syria, one set i s based on data f o r the periods during which Syria was independent, 1950-1957 and 1962-1966. For simp l i c i t y , the country i s c a l l e d "Syria" when the f i r s t set i s referred to and the "Syrian Arab Republic" or the "SAR" when the second set i s dealt with. For Egypt, one set of calculations i s based on data f o r events emanating from, or occurring within, the t e r r i t o r y of Egypt i t s e l f o The second set includes data on events involving Syria during the period of union. The country i s called "Egypt" i n the former case and the "United Arab Republic" or the "UAR" i n the l a t t e r . Syrian data are included i n Egyptian calculations rather than vic e versa because Cairo, not Damascus, was the locus of power during the union: Egyptians, not Syrians, held the reins of power and determined 125 fo r what purposes t h i s power was to be used. D) Time The data for each of the states were collected f o r the seventeen years 1 9 5 0 to 1 9 6 6 . Two sets of correlations are computed for each country. One set i s based on a temporal unit of six calendar months: 1 January to 3 0 June and 1 July to 3 1 December. For the second set data are aggregated for each calendar year. The basic reason for using 37 two temporal units i s that we do not know what the temporal relationship between the two variables might be. Nor can we assume that the time element i s the same i n diffe r e n t states. For one country, one temporal unit may be more sensitive to increases and decreases i n an association. For another state, the second temporal unit may be the more sensitive one. Each temporal unit has Its own defect as f a r as co r r e l a t i o n a l analysis i s concerned. The year-long spans reduce the number of observa-tions greatly. On the other hand, the half-year spans increase the number of periods t i e d on the same rank f o r a given variable. Given the data and the states involved, these problems are unavoidable. Other temporal units are not used for a number of reasons. Longer ones would reduce the number of observations too greatly. Shorter ones would lead to an even greater proportion of t i e d ranks. Nor are time periods on the order of one month even p a r t i c u l a r l y l o g i c a l bases f o r analysis. In i n t u i t i v e studies of s p e c i f i c states reactions from 126 unrest to interstate violence and vice versa are seen as either immediate 127 or r e l a t i v e l y long term. Lags of one month and two months are hardly l i k e l y to reveal either association too well. Lags of from six to 24 months are hardly more l i k e l y to reveal the direction of immediate reactions than are the shorter ones. They may well be better at revealing the long term associations, however. Wilkenfeld, Lussier and Tahtinen argue for the use of the one month temporal unit on the basis of the i n s t a b i l i t y of e l i t e tenure i n 128 Middle Eastern states. This argument tends to lose i t s relevance when one looks more closely at the states involved. Indeed, the degree of 38 continuity i n p o l i t i c s i s quite remarkable. Despite coups and r e l a t i v e l y frequent cabinet changes, personnel and p o l i c i e s tend to remain stableo The central roles of Mapai, Hussein and Nasser f o r most of the period covered are unquestionable. Syria did have over forty cabinets from 1945 to 1967« Yet the membership r o l l s of succeeding cabinets tend to overlap 129 greatly. ' Even when great changes occurred, actual control often con-tinued i n the hands of dictators.or Revolutionary Command Councils. In general, temporal units of six months and one year are not i l l o g i c a l bases f o r seeking the hypothesized associations. E) The S t a t i s t i c The s t a t i s t i c used i n t h i s study i s the Spearman rank order cor-r e l a t i o n . Significance i s tested at the .05 l e v e l i n a two-tail t e s t . The non-normal and non-normalized d i s t r i b u t i o n of the data i n d i -cates that a non-parametric s t a t i s t i c i s in. order. Although i t has 131 "serious shortcomings," Spearman's rho i s easier to calculate and less incomparable — conceptually — to the s t a t i s t i c s used i n the published l i t e r a t u r e than, say, Somers' D would be. Kendall's tau, a two-way st a -t i s t i c l i k e rho, was rejected f o r the same reasons. I t might be noted that while there i s a difference i n the numeric value of rho and tau for a given set of observations, both " w i l l reject the n u l l hypothesis ... at 132 the same l e v e l of significance." The weaknesses of Spearman's rho. w i l l be noted and taken into account when the findings are considered. Si g n i f i c a n t values of rho are determined on the basis of tables of c r i t i c a l values presented by Hode"*"^ and by Snedecor and Cochran."**"^ The data upon which the correlations are based constitute the entire population of certain types of events which are recorded i n cer-39 t a i n publications. We are dealing with neither a random sample nor a randomized population. In such circumstances, the determination and meaningfulness of significance tests are subjects of controversy. " ^ The use of such tests here indicates our basic agreement with such arguments as those of Goldo"^ The importance of these tests must not 137 be overrated. They are but one "formal c r i t e r i o n " 1 to help us assess the importance of correlation values. As Gold points out, s t a t i s t i c a l significance i s not a s u f f i c i e n t condition f o r a t t r i b u t i n g substantive importance to the observed a s s o c i -ation.... In addition, the analyst must attend to the size of the association.... 138/ 139 and to the underlying v a r i a b i l i t y of the observations. I t i s i n t h i s context that the significance test i s used here. F) Data Sources Azar and his colleagues have pointed out the danger of r e l y i n g on a single data source f o r interstate events data."* -^ Wilkenfeld, Lussier and Tahtinen note that Multiple sources ... add to the volume, comprehensiveness and s e n s i t i v i t y of the data set, while countering systematic biases, random lapses, misinformation and ambiguity of individual sources. 141/ With these points i n mind, data were gathered from the following sources: The Hew York Times Index, Keesing's Contemporary Archives, The  Middle East Journal, and the Jewish Agency Digest of Press and Events which underwent two t i t l e and format changes to become the Israel Weekly  Digest and then the Is r a e l Digest (bi-weekly). In addition United  Nations Security Council O f f i c i a l Records and Documents were used as a source f o r interstate violence data. Each source i s , as might be expected, better for certain types of 4 0 events than f o r others. Keesing*s, f o r example, i s good for the more spectacular, that i s , more viole n t , unrest and interstate violence events and f o r most incidents involving a European power. The Digests emphasise a l l Arab attacks on I s r a e l . Since they are propaganda journals, this i s to he expected. However, they do also supply a great deal of information on I s r a e l i attacks on Arab states. The attacks are j u s t i f i e d , explained, or Arab claims are dismissed, but they are nonethe-less reported. One further point might be made about the data sources. Reports of interstate violence incidents are based on claims and ad-missions made by the states involved. Even reports by the UN Truce Supervision Organization are based on complaints by one of the parties and can be f u l l y investigated only with the cooperation of both parties. The reports which serve as data sources are not, therefore, s t r i c t l y speaking, reports of interstate violence, but rather reports of complaints and admissions of such behaviour. Only events i n d i v i d u a l l y reported were counted. Had aggregate data been available with any degree of consistency and i n manageable categories, they would have been included. However, when they were r e -ported, aggregations tended to cover odd and overlapping time periods of unequal length. In a l l , there are 323 separate events of domestic unrest i n the four countries over the seventeen years of the study, and 2493 separate interstate violence incidents. 41 Chapter VI Findings and Interpretation A) I s r a e l The values of the correlations between domestic unrest and interstate violence measures of Israel are recorded i n Tables I and I I . The most noteworthy aspect of these values i s t h e i r general and consis-tent weakness. In Table I the strongest correlation c o e f f i c i e n t i s equal to -.26.. Of the t h i r t y - s i x different correlations i n t h i s table, only twelve have an absolute value greater than .10. Table II reveals a si m i l a r picture f o r correlations based on a one-year temporal u n i t . Here the strongest corr e l a t i o n i s -.28. Nine of the twenty rho-values have an absolute value greater than . 1 0 , but only two greater than .20. In neither table i s there a rho-value s i g n i f i c a n t at the . 0 5 l e v e l . I t thus seems, clear that there i s a general independence between our measures of domestic unrest and interstate violence. There do not seem to be any grounds f o r a t t r i b u t i n g fluctuations over time i n one measure, to fluctuations i n the other. This lack of association i s i n l i n e with the findings of Wilken-f e l d and h i s colleagues, who were thus led to conclude that I s r a e l i foreign c o n f l i c t behavior may be formulated on the basis of the immediate si t u a t i o n .... 142 i n t h e i r relations with the Arab states. There seems to be no evidence of scapegoating or of a process l i k e that suggested by Blainey. Of course, there i s a p o s s i b i l i t y that the I s r a e l i e l i t e s respond to certain groups' unrest behaviour by scapegoating, but not to others 1. (The prob-lems i n discerning such selective responses are dealt with below.) Nor do the findings support the hypothesis that the l e v e l of 42 TABLE I Domestic Unrest and Interstate Violence of Isra e l : Correlations Based on a Six-Month Temporal Unit  Interstate Violence Unrest Precedes Precedes Unrest Interstate Violence Time Lag: 24 18 12 6 0 6 12 18 24 Mo. Ui-Vi - . 0 1 -.11 - . 0 7 - . 0 8 -.22 -.22 o i l .15 .06 Ui-Vm .10 .03 . 0 9 - . 0 7 - . 0 4 .11 .17 .14 .19 Um-Vi .00 -.10 -.04 - . 0 9 - . 1 9 - . 2 6 .06 . 0 8 -.15 Um-Vm .09 -.01 .01 -.10 -.06 . 0 8 .14 .09 .04 N: 30 31 32 33 34 33 32 31 30 TABLE II Domestic Unrest and Interstate Violence of Israel: Correlations Based on a One-Year Temporal Unit  Interstate Violence Unrest Precedes Precedes Unrest Interstate Violence Time Lag: 2 1 0 1 2 Years U i - V i -.08 - . 1 7 -.13 . 0 5 . 0 7 , Ui-Vm -.01 - . 0 6 - . 0 4 . 2 5 . 2 0 Um-Vi - . 2 8 - . 1 9 - . 2 0 - . 0 2 . 0 2 Um-Vm - . 0 6 - . 1 2 - . 0 6 . 0 8 .19 N: 15 16 17 16 15 N.B. Ui refers to incidence of unrest Urn refers to magnitude of unrest V i refers to incidence of violence Vm refers to magnitude of violence. Plus signs are not shown. 43 unrest i n I s r a e l i s affected by interstate violence. This does not necessarily mean that the c o n f l i c t has no impact on unrest behaviour i n I s r a e l . It may merely indicate that the impact i s d i f f e r e n t for d i f f e r -ent groups within the state. Such an analysis i s supported to some ex-tent by Peres* assertions and findings that while the peacefulness of r e -lations between Oriental and Western Jews may be attributed to the con-f l i c t with the Arab s t a t e s , s o may the exacerbation of relations be-tween I s r a e l i Arabs and J e w s 0 ^ ^ Looking at another source of unrest i n I s r a e l , the religious-secular c o n f l i c t , i t i s doubtful that the increased salience of the external threat would quel l agitation by r e l i g i o u s Jewish groups. The Heturei Karta sect, f o r example, does not recognize the state. It does not seem l i k e l y that members of the sect would cease agitation f o r s t r i c t adherence to. r e l i g i o u s law because the secular, i f not blasphemous, Zioni s t state i s being attacked. On the other hand, Jews who support p o l i t i c a l parties l i k e the Mafdal and Agudat Y i s r a e l seem to regard t h e i r agitation f o r r e l i g i o u s orthodoxy as necessary to 145 the strengthening of the state. J It would be interesting to test the d i f f e r e n t i a l and selective responses of e l i t e s and participants i n unrest to see i f there i s any s t a t i s t i c a l evidence to support the notion. Events of each type of behaviour are very small i n number, however. The v a r i a t i o n i n the i n -cidence and magnitude of each.type i s minimal. For example, r e l i g i o u s unrest provided the greatest number of cases when unrest behaviours were classed according to the source of c o n f l i c t (economic, ethnic, e t c . ) 0 There were only f i v e ranks f o r such unrest when one-year temporal units were used. Thus, correlations based on t h i s kind of action would not be 44 very meaningfulv In general, I s r a e l f i t s i n with the findings of Wilkenfeld and his colleagues that foreign and domestic c o n f l i c t are independent of each other. However, Wilkenfeld's findings f o r polyarchic states show a small to moderate association between the Turmoil and War measures. The great weakness of our rho-values indicates that Is r a e l i s not a t y p i c a l member of t h i s grouping. B) Syria-SAR Tables I I I and IV l i s t the values of the correlations f o r Syria, while Tables V and VI l i s t those.for the SAR. Comparison of the two sets of tables reveals that the correlation c o e f f i c i e n t s f o r the SAR are generally of higher value than those f o r Syr i a . Furthermore, the SAR set provides more s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t rho-values. Thus, while the right hand columns of Table III boast no value greater than f .30, the corresponding columns of Table V show values ranging up to f.49» For the one-year temporal unit correlations, the differences are more s t r i k i n g . No rho-value appears i n Table IV with an absolute value greater than .49* The absolute value of c o r r e l a -t i o n c o e f f i c i e n t s i n Table VI ranges as high as .79o Furthermore, while Table IV reveals no values s i g n i f i c a n t at the .05 l e v e l , Table VI shows f i v e such values. In general, therefore, the data f o r the SAR tend to show i n t e r -relationships between the variables more consistently and more c l e a r l y than do those for Syria. This difference i s c l e a r l y due to the inclusion of 1958-1961 data i n the Syrian set. From this we may conclude that p o l i -t i c a l processes were different i n t h i s period than during the periods of f 45. TABLE I I I Domestic Unrest and Interstate Violence of Syria: Correlations Based on a Six-Month Temporal Unit Interstate Violence Precedes Unrest Unrest Precedes Interstate Violence Time Lag: 24 18 12 6 0 6 12 18 24 Mo. Ui - V i -.26 -.31 -.05 .07 .00 .29 .29 .06 -.09 Ui-Vm -.39* -.33 -.25 -•.07 -.31 -.15 -.02 .11 .24 Um-Vi -o34 -.31 -.06 .07 .02 .29 .30 .04 -.09 Um-Vm -.42* -.40* -.25 --.07 -.20 -.02 .12 .25 N: 30 31 32 33 34 33 32 31 30 TABLE IV Domestic Unrest and Interstate Violence of Syria: a One-Year Temporal Unit Correlations Based on Interstate Violence Precedes Unrest Unrest Precedes Interstate Violence Time Lag: . 2 1 0 1 2 Years U i - V i -.39 -.09 . .17 o39 -.11 Ui-Vm " -.49 -.44 -.16 .13 .14 Um-Vi -.43 -.01 .14 .06 -.13 Um-Vm -.24 -.49 • f l6 .10 .14 N: 15 16 17 16 15 N.B. *p<o05 See also page 42 46 TABLE V Domestic Unrest and Interstate Violence of the SAR: Correlations Based on a Six-Month Temporal Unit  Interstate Violence Unrest Precedes Precedes Unrest Interstate Violence Time Lag: 24 18 12 6 0 6 12 18 24 Mo. Ui-Vi -.39 -.31 .14 .32 .11 .49* o37 .21 .14 Ui-Vm -.46 - . 4 5 * - . 0 5 .23 -.26 -.07 -.02 . 19 .22 Um-Vi -.38 -.27 »15 '.31 ol4 .48* .38 .22 . 15 Um-Vm - . 4 8 * -„44 -.02 .23 -.25 -.08 -.04 0 2 8 .23 N: 18 20 22 24 26 24 22 20 18 TABLE VI Domestic Unrest and Interstate Violence of the SAR: Correlations Based " on a One-Year Temporal Unit  Interstate Violence Unrest Precedes Precedes Unrest Interstate Violence Time Lag: 2 1 0 1 2 Years U i - V i -.64 .13 .38 .73* .20 Ui-Vm -.76* -.18 -o23 .23 -.02 Um-Vi -.68* .06 .34 - . 6 5 * . 2 5 Um-Vm -.79* -.29 -.01 .17 -.02 N: 9 11 13 11 ? N.B. *p < . 0 5 See also page 42. 47 independence. One obvious source of dif f e r e n t processes i s the presence of indigenous e l i t e s i n one period and t h e i r absence i n the other. The presence of indigenous Syrian e l i t e s thus seems to be a c r u c i a l variable i n the processes l i n k i n g domestic unrest and interstate violence. On the whole, the Syrian data tend to obscure relationships revealed by the SAR data. As the apparently better indicator of actual underlying processes, the SAR tables w i l l serve as the basis f o r substantive i n t e r -pretation. Tables V and VI show es s e n t i a l l y the same things. There i s no clear association between measures of the two variables when no time lag i s imposed. In the right-hand columns the shortest lags, six-months and one -year, y i e l d p o s i t i v e c o e f f i c i e n t s of moderate and high value, s i g n i -f i c a n t at the 0O5 l e v e l . With longer lags the correlations weaken greatly. The left-hand columns of both tables indicate f a i r l y weak asso-c i a t i o n between interstate violence and subsequent unrest, when only the shorter lags of one year and six and twelve months are used. The longer lags, however, reveal moderate and strong negative correlations. As one might expect, the correlations based on the one-year temporal unit tend to be of higher absolute value than those based on the six-month u n i t . This i s probably partly due to the elimination of cer-t a i n extreme values i n the former case 0 The one—year based data also o f f e r one more s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t correlation than the six-month based data do. One other difference i s that Table V indicates that the impact of domestic unrest on interstate violence i s already f e l t by the following six-^nonth period. The longer temporal unit of Table VI im-p l i e s a slower process. 48 In general, therefore, we may conclude that the impact of high l e v e l s of domestic unrest begins to make i t s e l f f e l t not immediately, hut a f t e r a six-month lag. The impact of interstate violence on domestic unrest involves a much longer process over at least eighteen months. Turning f i r s t to the unrest-to-interstate-violence process, we f i n d two factors pointing to the existence of manipulative scapegoating mechanisms. The f i r s t i s the time lag necessary before the relationship occurs. Were t h i s a case of subconscious transference of h o s t i l i t y , the unlagged correlations would most l i k e l y have been stronger. I f the automatic reaction of p o l i t i c a l l y conscious Syrians to high levels of unrest were somehow involved, one would expect an immediate increase i n interstate violence. Since t h i s would be favorable to the e l i t e s ' p o s i -t i o n , they would hardly interfere to stop i t . The passage of at least six months, however, implies a more organized, a better prepared campaign of acti o n against the external enemy. Simil a r l y , the time lag tends to rule out a process l i k e that suggested by Blainey. I f the purpose of attack-ing a f t e r high l e v e l s of domestic unrest i s to take advantage of the weakness of the s t r i f e - t o r n state, waiting, giving the Syrians time to gather t h e i r strength, i s i l l o g i c a l , to say the leasto The second factor which, leads one to suspect manipulative scapegoating i s the apparent c e n t r a l i t y of the e l i t e s , noted above, i n the process. I f the reaction to domestic unrest were largely unorganized and undirected, we would ex-pect l i t t l e difference between the correlations f o r Syria and those f o r the SAR. The fact that there i s a substantial difference points to an important ro l e f o r the e l i t e s . Manipulative scapegoating i s a mechanism aimed at consolidating 49 the positions of those i n power. I f interstate violence i s involved, i t i s l i k e l y to he at the end of a rather complex chain of behaviour. Unrest actions, p a r t i c u l a r l y the more disruptive ones, are l i k e l y to he followed by such a period of consolidation. The e l i t e s , whether new or old, w i l l probably spend time rooting out the opposition, purging the armed forces and the administration, arresting and possibly executing p o l i t i c a l opponents. At the same time they may a c t i v e l y expand t h e i r own security forces — the army and the p o l i c e . This would be done i n order to increase the e l i t e s * own coercive powers and to reward t h e i r suppor-4 . 146 t e r s . Another factor may also be involved i n the consolidation pro-cess. A common, i f not constant, theme of Syrian p o l i t i c s i s the i d e n t i -f i c a t i o n of one's p o l i t i c a l enemies with some international conspiracy which seeks to subvert Arab independence and unity. Thus, the suppression of the i n t e r n a l opposition and the expansion of the security forces may be j u s t i f i e d and legitimized i n terms of the external threat. The e l i t e s thus clothe themselves i n the f l a g , presenting themselves as acting, not f o r personal gain, but f o r the greater good of the Arab peo-ple. In order to make th i s point, a campaign of accusations and threats against the foreign enemy may be launched. Such behaviour also has the advantage of d i s c r e d i t i n g any further unrest as collaboration with the imperialists, Z i o n i s t s and/or. reactionaries. Thus, the consolidation process we are suggesting i s e s s e n t i a l -l y a three-pronged one. Suppression of opposition, expansion of security forces and non-violent anti-foreign c o n f l i c t behaviour may lead to actual interstate violence under the following circumstances. The external 50 enemy, noting the build-up of the security forces and the increase i n h o s t i l e behaviour, may fear an imminent attack and pre-empt i t . Con-versely, the SAR e l i t e s may decide that the external menace must be demonstrated more concretely i n order to prevent a c r e d i b i l i t y gap from developing,. The Damascene leadership may, therefore, order the troops on the f r o n t i e r to start f i r i n g . Clearly, the f i r s t of the three elements i n the proposed conso-l i d a t i o n process i s the least l o g i c a l l y connected to both unrest and i n -terstate violence. Testing t h i s triangular relationship i s important, however, i f the mechanism observed i s to be interpreted as manipulative scapegoating. I f the element of suppression i s absent, understanding the unrest-to-interstate-violence-process as scapegoating becomes more d i f f i -c u l t . The relevance of the t h i r d element, non-violent interstate con-f l i c t behaviour, to the process i s at least partly supported by the ' findings of Y/ilkenfeld, Lussier and Tahtinen. They found a small, p o s i -147 t i v e association between domestic violence and subsequent verbal 148 149 h o s t i l i t y and between verbal h o s t i l i t y and m i l i t a r y actions under-taken by Syria. Although the strength of the associations i s not great, the d i r e c t i o n and the temporal relationships are as we suggested'in the above scenario. In the left-hand columns of the tables there i s seen a negative association between interstate violence and domestic unrest when lags of eighteen and twenty-four months and of two years are imposed. This i n d i -cates that domestic unrest tends to decrease after periods of higher levels of interstate violence. In both tables the better predictor to 51 both, unrest measures i s the magnitude of violence. Again, the generally higher values, of the correlation c o e f f i -cients f o r the SAB than for Syria point to the involvement of the Syrian e l i t e s i n the process. This implication seems to be confirmed by the rather long time lags required before the consistent and moderate negative association appears. The evidence thus does not indicate an automatic r a l l y i n g to the national colours i n the face of the external c o n f l i c t . Time and the apparent involvement of the e l i t e s point to a moire complex and possibly manipulative process. The intervening variables would then be e s s e n t i a l l y the same as those outlined i n the discussion of the scapegoating process. The occur-rence of high levels of interstate violence, perhaps as a result of the SAR e l i t e s ' attempts to consolidate t h e i r own power, offers the leadership fresh opportunities f o r such consolidation. The security forces may be (further) expanded with the excuse that the state must be protected from the external enemy0 These same forces provide more effective coercive c a p a b i l i t i e s v i s - a - v i s internal dissidents. The long time lag f i t s i n with a programme of expansion and reorganization of the security forces, a programme which i s l i k e l y to take some time before i t s impact i s felto The interstate violence, moreover, provides an excuse for suppressing opposition elements. Such groups may be accused of consciously or sub-consciously subverting the national struggle. Emphasis and background f o r such actions may be provided by a stepped-up propaganda campaign against the external enemy. The end result would be increased s o l i d a r i t y achieved through active suppression. In general, therefore, we f i n d a moderate association between 52 interstate violence and intrastate p o l i t i c a l unrest. While the r e l a t i o n -ship i s not as strong as some observers have s u g g e s t e d , i t i s c e r t a i n -l y stronger than the findings of Burrowes and Spector1-''1' or of Wilkenfeld 152 and his colleagues y would suggest. I t i s tempting to interpret these findings as indicators of successful scapegoating: Higher levels of unrest lead to higher levels of interstate violence which lead to lower levels of domestic unrest 0 Further testing, involving the three i n t e r -vening variables suggested above, i s required before a clear picture of the interrelationship can emerge. The findings here indicate that there i s some tendency for the national and international p o l i t i c s of the Syrian Arab Republic to feed into and affect each other. C) Jordan The values of the correlations for Jordan are recorded i n Tables VII and VIII. Both show e s s e n t i a l l y the same relationships between the variables. The association between domestic unrest and interstate v i o -lence i s consistently positive and of moderate to rather great strength, both for unlagged and f o r lagged correlations. For unlagged data, the correlations l i s t e d i n Table VII are weak to moderate; R runs from 4.33 to +.42<, With the longer temporal.unit the association i s somewhat stronger, ranging from 4-.57 to 4 . 6 7 . In the right-hand columns of both tables, s i g n i f i c a n t associa-tions between domestic unrest and subsequent interstate violence are revealed. The best correlations are with a one-year lag and a six-month lag. As the time span between the two variables increases, the r e l a t i o n -ship weakens. In Table VIII only two of the eight correlations are s i g -n i f i c a n t at the .05 l e v e l . These involve the prediction of incidence of 53 TABLE VII Domestic Unrest and Interstate Violence of Jordan: Correlations Based on a Six-Month Temporal Unit Interstate Violence Precedes Unrest Unrest Precedes Interstate Violence Time Lag: 24 18 12 6 0 6 12 18 24 Mo. Ui- V i o40* .50** .58** .57** .42* .57** .43* o35 .27 Ui-Vm .40* .44.* .50** .61** .33 .61** .18 .16 .19 Um-Vi .41* .52** .55** .56** .41* .58** .45** o37* .28 Um-Vm .40* .55** .54** .57** .33 .54** .21 .17 .20 N: 30 11 32 33 34 33 32 31 30 TABLE VIII Domestic Unrest and Interstate Violence of Jordan: a One-Year Temporal Unit Correlations Based on Interstate Violence Precedes Unrest Unrest Precedes Interstate Violence Time Lag: 2 1 0 1 2 Years Ui-V i .48 .70** .64** .62* .42 Ui-Vm .51 .79** .57* .35 .27 Um-Vi o49 .68** .67** .62* .44 Um-Vm .48 .78** .57* .35 .26 N: 15 16 17 16 15 N.B. *p <.05 **p< .01 See also page 42. . 5 4 violence from both unrest measures. The rho-values equal +.62. Of the sixteen correlation c o e f f i c i e n t s i n the right-hand columns of Table VII, on the other hand, f i v e are s i g n i f i c a n t at the o01 l e v e l , and two others at the »05 levelo Indeed, with a six-month lag, rho varies from fo54 to +.6l. In terms, therefore, of absolute value of the correlations and of s t a t i s t i c a l significance, the correlations i n the right-hand columns of Table VII provide a better basis f o r substantive interpretation than do those i n the right-hand columns of Table VIII. The former also provide a better picture of the temporal association between the variables. From the unlagged correlations of Table VIII one might guess that f a i r l y rapid reactions between unrest and interstate violence are very impor-tant. The r e l a t i v e weakness of the zero-month lag correlations i n Table VII indicates that these associations are r e l a t i v e l y unimportant com-pared to those involving sixr^nonth lags. The half-year data aggregations provide more subtle indications of the temporal association between unrest and subsequent interstate violence. The left-hand columns of the tables s i m i l a r l y indicate that the six-month temporal unit provides more sensitive indications of increases and decreases i n the strength of the relationship between interstate violence and domestic unrest than the one-year temporal u n i t . The former also y i e l d s a higher proportion of s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t c o e f f i c i e n t s than the l a t t e r . In terms of absolute value, however, the longer time span reveals much more impressive rho-values ranging to +.79• The one major d i f f i c u l t y with the shorter time spans i s that they tend to increase the number of periods t i e d oh a single ranlc YThen one computes Spearmen's rank order correlation, such t i e s may i n f l a t e the 55 c o e f f i c i e n t values. This point tends to weaken our f a i t h i n the s i x -month unit as the better basis f o r substantive interpretation. With t h i s reservation i n mind, we s h a l l base the following discussion on these data as the more sensitive indicators of the time element involved i n the processes l i n k i n g interstate violence and domestic unrest. As i n the case of the SAR, the time element seems to point to manipulative scapegoating as the process which leads from domestic unrest to interstate violence f o r Jordan. Table VII shows only weak to moderate correlations f o r unlagged data, while the six-month lags y i e l d rather strong values. This time lapse implies that i t i s not automatic, subcon-scious scapegoating or a process l i k e that suggested by Blainey that i s involved. Manipulative scapegoating seems to be the most l i k e l y explanation of the relationship,, As outlined above, the scapegoating-consolidation process i n -volved suppression of the opposition, expansion of the security forces and non-violent interstate behaviour. These three types of behaviour should be tested to see whether they are intervening variables i n the unrest-to-interstate-violence relationship f o r Jordan. Another variable might also be tested here: cooperation with Egypt. Brecher has noted that a basic change i n Jordan's domestic p o l i t i c s , which would place i t under Cairo's de facto control has long been considered a casus b e l l i by I s r a e l . 153/ The reasons behind such a stance were made clear i n a speech by Y i g a l A l l o n , then Minister of Labour of Is r a e l , i n February 1967• He stated that I s r a e l would go to war i f Jordan joins a m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e with another Arab state and 5.6 permits the concentration of foreign troops within her borders, especially West of the Jordan River. 154/ In the wake of domestic unrest, the Jordanian e l i t e s may embark on a p o l i c y of cooperation with Egypt. Much unrest i n Jordan centres on demands f o r more effective p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the struggle against Zionism and f o r Arab unity. Cooperative behaviour v i s - a - v i s Egypt, which was the popular centre of the Arab movement f o r most of the period studied, i s a l o g i c a l , positive response to such demands. The I s r a e l i s might regard such cooperation as the preliminary steps to Jordanian adherence to a f u l l - s c a l e m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e . Interstate violence on a scale short of war might then be directed against Jordan i n order to warn her leadership of the costs involved i n such an a l l i a n c e . Of the four suggested intervening variables, suppression, expan-sion of security forces, non-violent h o s t i l e international behaviour, and cooperative behaviour v i s - a - v i s Egypt, only the t h i r d has been tested s t a t i s t i c a l l y . Wilkenfeld, Lussier and Tahtinen found that verbal h o s t i -l i t y was p o s i t i v e l y associated with preceding domestic violence. However, 155 such h o s t i l i t y also varied d i r e c t l y as preceding m i l i t a r y action. J J The temporal relationship among the variables i s thus hardly that outlined i n the above scenario. The left-hand columns of Table VII reveal a f a i r l y strong and positive association between measures of interstate violence and measures of subsequent domestic unrest. The association i s consistent through s i x -twelve-, and eighteen-month l a g s 0 Only af t e r twenty-four months does the association weaken noticeably. Again, the r e l a t i v e weakness of. the unlagged correlations tends to indicate that swift reactions from interstate violence to domestic un-57. rest are not as l i k e l y as the longer-term processes. V a t i k i o t i s des-cribed a relationship that would f i t i n with such a time l a g . He noted that I s r a e l i raids may reveal the ineffectiveness of the e l i t e s as defenders of the people and lay them open to charges of d i s l o y a l t y to the Palestinian cause 0 Distrust of the e l i t e s among the masses and within the o f f i c e r s ' corps may thus increase. The r e s u l t could then be 156 conspiracies, p a r t i c u l a r l y among.members of the armed forces. ^ " Con-spiracies are l i k e l y to take some time before being executed, hence a f a i r l y long time l a g 0 Furthermore, even i f I s r a e l i attacks do not lead to p l o t s , the raids may dispose sectors of the population to take part i n unrest actions i f further events indicative of e l i t e d i s l o y a l t y occur. Such events may be a series of I s r a e l i r e p r i s a l s r e s u l t i n g i n heavy J o r -danian losses. Other such variables may be the suppression of int e r n a l dissidence and cooperative behaviour toward the Western, imperialist S*t Sri/6 S o One possible intervening variable i s es s e n t i a l l y the same as one suggested f o r the unrest-to-violence process: cooperation with Egypt. The following scenario i s posited: In order to head o f f an Egypto-Jor-danian a l l i a n c e , the I s r a e l i s increase the l e v e l of interstate violence against Jordan. The Jordanians understand the I s r a e l i warning and comply with-their neighbour's demand. Cooperative behaviour v i s - a - v i s Egypt decreases and, possibly, c o n f l i c t behaviour increases. The Jordanian opposition i s thus confirmed i n i t s b e l i e f s of e l i t e d i s l o y a l t y , and f u r -ther unrest ensueSo It might be noted that the continued strength of association as longer lags are imposed would seem to indicate that interstate violence 58 has a l a s t i n g disruptive effect on national s o l i d a r i t y i n Jordan. The tendency Sherif observed of a strong resurgence i n ingroup s o l i d a r i t y 157 a f t e r a period of disruption i s not seen i n the time periods covered. In general, therefore, we conclude that f o r Jordan there i s a very close relationship between intrastate p o l i t i c a l unrest and i n t e r -state violence. The association i s stronger than the one indicated by 158 Wilkenfeld and his colleagues. J When our correlations are compared 159 to those for Centrist states i n Wilkenfeld's studies, i t appears that Jordan i s a rather a t y p i c a l member of the group. No s i g n i f i c a n t a s s o c i -ation between interstate violence and subsequent domestic c o n f l i c t was found f o r t h i s category of states. For Jordan, t h i s association was found to be very strongo For Centrist states i n general, the association between domestic c o n f l i c t and subsequent international violence increased as longer lags were imposed. For Jordan, the association weakens. The interpenetration of national and international p o l i t i c s f o r Jordan i s thus different from what the other studies would have led one to suspect. D) Egypt-UAR Tables IX and X record the values of the correlations f o r Egypt, while Tables XI and XII l i s t those for the UAR. When the two sets of tables are compared, we see that the Egyptian c o e f f i c i e n t s are consis-tently stronger than those f o r the UAR. The reason for t h i s i s quite straightforward: the UAR calculations involve Syrian data fo r the period of union. A comparison of the Syrian correlation c o e f f i c i e n t s , especially those i n the left-hand columns, with the Egyptian rho-values reveals great differences between them i n both strength and di r e c t i o n . Combina-ti o n of elements of the two sets would, therefore, tend to obscure, 59 TABLE IX Domestic Unrest and Interstate Violence of Egypt: Correlations Based on a Six-Month Temporal Unit  Interstate Violence • Unrest Precedes Precedes Unrest Interstate Violence Time Lag: 24 18 12 6 0 6 12 18 24 Mo. Ui-Vi .37* o30 . 5 0 * * .56** .53** .48** .56** .67** 065** Ui-Vm . 4 2 * . 2 7 .56** .63** . 5 1 * * .48** . 5 2 * * .67** .60** Um-Vi .38* . 2 5 . 5 1 * * ;56** .56** .47** .55** .67** 065** Um-Vm .43* .27 .56** .69** .51** .46** .53** .68** .59** N: 10 31 32 33 34 33 32 31 10 TABLE X Domestic Unrest and Interstate Violence of Egypt: Correlations Based on a One-Year Temporal Unit  Interstate Violence Unrest Precedes Precedes Unrest Interstate Violence Time Lag: 2 1 0 1 2 Years U i - V i . 3 7 .56* . 7 3 * * . 6 2 * . 7 2 * * Ui-Vm . 5 0 .68** . 7 0 * * 069** . 7 2 * * Um-Vi . 3 7 .56* . 7 3 * * . 6 2 * . 7 2 * * Um-Vm .50 .68** .70** .69** .72** N: 15 16 17 16 15 N.B. * p< . 0 5 **p*~.01 See also page 4 2 . 60 TABLE XI Domestic Unrest and Interstate Violence of the UAR: Correlations Based on a Six-Month Temporal Unit  Interstate Violence- Unrest Precedes Precedes Unrest Interstate Violence Time Lag: 24 18 12 6 0 6 12 18 24 Mo. Ui-V i .27 .02 .33 .45** „4o* .32 .46** .49** .56** Ui-Vm .33 .10 .42* .53** .40* o34 .47** .54** .58** Um-Vi o26 .01 .18 ;46** .41* .31 .44* .50** .5.6** Um-Vm o34 .12 .42* .53** .41* .33 .45** .54** .57** N: 30 31 32 33 34 33 32 31 30 -TABLE XII Domestic Unrest and Interstate Violence of the UAR: Correlations Based on a One-Year Temnoral Unit Interstate Violence Unrest Precedes Precedes Unrest Interstate Violence Time Lag: 2 1 0 1 2 Years U i - V i .21 .43 .65** .42 .62* Ui-Vm .42 .58* .63** .30 .67* Um-Vi .22 .43 .64** .44 .61* Um-Vm .43 o59* .63* o59* .66* N: 15 16 17 16 15 M.B. *p<.05 **p <o01 See also page 42. 61 rather than to reveal, underlying relationships. Since the Egyptian data thus seem to provide a clearer picture of the association, i n the follow-ing discussion we s h a l l r e f e r only to them. Both Tables IX and X reveal e s s e n t i a l l y the same associations between the variables. Correlations are positive and very strong, whe-ther computed with or without time lags. In both tables, the unlagged correlations are stronger than the shortest lag ones i n the right-hand columns. As longer lags are imposed, the association grows stronger. Table IX does indicate that eventually the relationship does weaken some-what as the twenty-four-month lag i s used. The left-hand columns of the tables show that interstate v i o -lence i s associated with subsequent domestic unrest, when the shorter lags of s i x and twelve months and of one year are used. Both also i n d i -cate that longer lags lead to a weakening of the association. Table IX, however, indicates that there i s an upturn i n the strength of correlation when the longest, twenty-four-month lag i s imposed. In general, therefore, comparison of the two tables shows that aggregations of data and time lags based on a six-month temporal unit tend to be more sensitive indicators of increases and decreases i n the strength of association between the variables over time. In terms of the absolute value of the correlation c o e f f i c i e n t s , Table X displays somewhat more impressive rhos, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the centre and right-hand columns. (R ranges as high as +.68 on the right side of Table IX and up to f .72 i n the corresponding part of Table X.) In the left-hand columns the d i f f e -rences i n absolute value betv/een the tables tend to be s l i g h t , (v/ith a six-month lag rho varies from +.56 to +.69; with a one-year lag rho v a r i -62 es from +.56 to +.68.) In terms of s t a t i s t i c a l significance, Table IX provides more data to work with- Twenty-eight of the t h i r t y - s i x c o e f f i -cients i n Table IX are s i g n i f i c a n t at the .01 l e v e l ; four more are s i g -n i f i c a n t at the .05 l e v e l . In Table X twelve are s i g n i f i c a n t at the .01 l e v e l and four more at the .05 l e v e l , out of a t o t a l of twenty c o r r e l a -t i o n c o e f f i c i e n t s . Thus, the six-month based data seem to be a better foundation for substantive interpretation than do the year-based data. Again, however, the large number of t i e s on a single rank i n the measures may i n f l a t e the rho-values f o r the shorter temporal unit. With t h i s reservation i n mind, we s h a l l base the following discussion on Table IX as the more sensitive indicator of the interrelationships. The centre column of Table IX indicates a f a i r l y strong positive association between the measures when no lag i s used. (Rho ranges from +••51 "to +.56.) Assuming a causal relationship between the variables, t h i s i n t e r c o r r e l a t i o n suggests that reactions from domestic unrest to i n t e r -state violence and vice versa are l i k e l y to be very rapid. In the case of the former reaction, the short time lapse seems to indicate a non-manipulative form of scapegoating, a subconscious transference of h o s t i -l i t y to the external enemy. A closer analysis of the data, however, shows that t h i s i s not the most probable process. Much of the strength, or some of i t , i s due, on the one hand, to f a i r l y long periods of domes-t i c and international peace and, on the other hand, to the high levels of unrest and interstate violence during the early 1950s. The interstate violence involved government-sponsored g u e r r i l l a a c t i v i t i e s against the B r i t i s h i n the Canal Zone Unrest i n t h i s period articu l a t e d demands f o r a more vigorous pursuit of the struggle. Riots and demonstrations tended to occur shortly a f t e r incidents involving heavy Egyptian casualtieso The government seems to have responded p o s i t i v e l y to the popular demands and progressively to have stepped up the campaign. I t i s thus i n terms of unrest behaviour s p e c i f i c a l l y related to the foreign c o n f l i c t that the short-term interrelationship between the,variables should be un-derstood. As noted above, the right-hand columns of Table IX show that the association between unrest and subsequent interstate violence measures grows stronger as s i x - , twelve- and eighteen-month lags are imposed. Only a f t e r twenty-four months does the relationship begin to weaken s l i g h t l y . With the eighteen-month lag the rho-values vary from -t-,67 to 4-.68. Therefore, domestic unrest v/ould seem to be a major source of the interstate violence i n which Egypt i s involved over the long run. This i s not confirmed by Wilkenfeld and his colleagues who f i n d only a s l i g h t positive association between m i l i t a r y action and concurrent domestic violence.^® Our findings do, however, f i t i n with Wilkenfeld's about the relationship between i n t e r n a l war and subsequent interstate c o n f l i c t of c e n t r i s t states. The association f o r these was positive and tended to l 6 l grow stronger as the time-lag lengthened. The association revealed here may indicate the same sort of manipulative scapegoating hypothesized f o r Jordan and Syria. The three intervening variables suggested i n those cases might also be tested f o r Egypt. Suppression of opposition, expansion of security forces and i n -creased non-violent h o s t i l e behaviour directed against an external enemy may be part of a process intended to consolidate e l i t e control i n the wake of high levels of unrest. Wilkenfeld, Lussier and Tahtinen did test 64 the relevance of non-violent interstate c o n f l i c t behaviour. They found only a weak association between. Egyptian m i l i t a r y action and preceding verbal h o s t i l i t y . Verbal h o s t i l i t y , however, i s not seen to be related to preceding domestic c o n f l i c t behaviour. When we look at the left-hand columns we f i n d that with a s i x -month lag, measures of interstate violence correlate strongly with measures of subsequent unrest; rho ranges from t- .56 to f . 6 9 . This l a t t e r correlation obtains between the magnitude of violence and the magnitude of unrest. The strength of association decreases somewhat af t e r twelve months. With an eighteen-month lag the rho-values are small and none i s s i g n i f i c a n t at the . 0 5 l e v e l . With the twenty-four-month lag a moderate association i s revealed. These correlation c o e f f i c i e n t s seem to indicate a process l i k e the one V a t i k i o t i s posited f o r Jordan. They also f i t i n with a common version of the origins of the Free O f f i c e r s ' coup. Interstate violence has a festering e f f e c t . D i s s a t i s f a c t i o n a r i s i n g out of the regime's ineffectiveness i n terms of interstate violence, becomes a more generalized d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n with the membership and/or p o l i c i e s of the eliteso This d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n may lead to conspiracies and plotso It may also make unrest more l i k e l y when further unpopular moves are made by the leadership. Thus, contingency variables,"""^ l i k e further i n t e r -state violence incidents r e s u l t i n g i n heavy Egyptian losses,- suppression of opposition elements and cooperation with "imperialist" powers, should be tested to see i f they play any role i n the process. The resurgence i n strength of the association when the twenty-four-month lag i s used, may indicate l i t t l e more than the execution of 65 c e r t a i n long term conspiracies. In general, therefore, we f i n d that, f o r Egypt, there i s a strong relationship between domestic unrest and interstate violence, with each predicting p o s i t i v e l y to the l e v e l of the other i n subsequent time periods. The association between the two types of behaviour i s stronger than one would expect a f t e r reading the Wilkenfeld, Lussier and Tahtinen studyo ?/hen compared with Wilkenfeld"s findings f o r Centrist states, our findings f o r Egypt show that i t i s not a t y p i c a l member of that group. For Centrist states the relationship between unrest and subsequent i n t e r -state violence i s approximately the same as the one found for Egypt. However, prediction from interstate violence to subsequent unrest i s very 165 weak for Centrist states, but very strong for Egypt 0 E) Summary These findings f o r the four states indicate that relationships between domestic unrest and interstate violence may be discerned f o r ' some countries but not for others. Even among states f o r which r e l a -tionships are found, there are great variations i n t h e i r sign and strength, according to the state and the time lag involvedo These findings also indicate why.cross-sectional studies have not yielded much evidence of such relationships. Cross-sectional studies seek uniformi-t i e s among states. The result s of our correl a t i o n a l analysis indicate that there i s a lack of uniformity, that a single relationship between the variables i s simply non-existent 0 Even Wilkenfeld's analysis, which allows f o r some differences, does not, apparently, allow fo r enough of them. I s r a e l , Jordan and Egypt were included i n the groupings V/ilken-f e l d used. As noted above, they seem to be aty p i c a l members of th e i r 66 state-categorieso Perhaps a f i n e r typology of states, or f i n e r use of t h i s trichotomy, i s required. It should he noted that the three states do not load p a r t i c u l a r l y highly on t h e i r respective dimensions i n the Q-factor analysis. Israel's loading i s -.75, Egypt's i s +.62, and J o r -dan's i s +.58.1^^ A number of authors have pointed out that Middle Eastern e l i t e s have used the Arab-Israeli c o n f l i c t to strengthen national integration and t h e i r own positions. I t has been maintained, moreover, that the con-167 f l i c t has actually performed t h i s function. The findings do not confirm these contentions e n t i r e l y . In the case of I s r a e l , no s i g n i f i -cant relationship i s discerned between interstate violence and preceding domestic unrest. For the three Arab states, domestic unrest does indeed predict p o s i t i v e l y to subsequent interstate violence. Whether the pro-cess involved i s scapegoating, however, i s a subject f o r further r e -search. The second assertion, that integration actually has been aided by the c o n f l i c t i s also unconfirmed. Interstate violence has no apparent impact on the t o t a l l e v e l of domestic unrest i n I s r a e L In Egypt and Jordan, the tendency i s for unrest to increase following periods of high interstate violence. For the SAR there i s evidence that unrest does decrease a f t e r periods of high interstate violence. As noted above, however, t h i s may be more indicative of suppression of oppo-s i t i o n than of integration of the state society. The relationships found show greater strength than one might have expected a f t e r reading the Wilkenfeld, the Burrowes and. Spector, and the Wilkenfeld, Lussier and Tahtinen studies. Yet our findings do not r e a l l y indicate how important the relationships e l i c i t e d actually are to 67 an understanding of the processes which lead to domestic unrest and i n -terstate violence. To test the relationship between the variables they were abstracted from th e i r environment. This conceptual vacuum i n which we have manipulated the variables may cause us to overrate our findings. In other studies, i t was found that, whatever the association between i n -t e r n a l and external c o n f l i c t variables, there were stronger relationships between and among inter n a l c o n f l i c t variables and between and among"exter-nal c o n f l i c t variables. Such results have led to conclusions l i k e the following one: domestic c o n f l i c t behaviour appears to play only a minor rol e i n the explanation of foreign c o n f l i c t l e v e l s . 168/ In order to see whether our findings are s i m i l a r l y indicative of only minor explanatory roles, the following correlations w i l l be compu-ted. For each state, the rank order correlations w i l l be calculated be-tween interstate violence levels i n different periods and between domes-t i c unrest levels i n different periods. • Both six-month and one-year tem-poral units w i l l be used. I t should be noted that some associations can be predicted from the above findings. I f , f o r example, unrest at time " t " i s related to interstate violence both at time " t " and at time "t+l", we might expect some association between the external c o n f l i c t variables at these two points i n time. Tables XIII and XIV l i s t the values of the correlations between unrest l e v e l s i n different periods for I s r a e l . Neither table shows an even moderate association between the variables. The highest rho-value f o r the six-month based data i s +.30; f o r the year based data i t i s +.31. These correlations are s l i g h t l y stronger-than those i n the left-hand co-lumns of Tables I and I I . In general, though, neither unrest nor i n t e r -68 TABLE XIII I s r a e l i Unrest i n Different Pe--riods: Correlations Based on a Six-Month Temporal Unit Lag: 6 . 12 18 24 Mo. Ui-Ui .28 .01 -.01 .19 Ui-Um .21 -.01 -.05 .17 Um-Ui .30 .06 -.03 .14 Um-Um •17 .02 -.08 ol0 N: 33 32 31 30 TABLE.XV Syrian Unrest i n Different Pe-riods: Correlations Based on a Six-Month Temporal Unit  Lag: 6 12 18 24 Mo. Ui-Ui .40* .26 -.01 —.10 Ui-Um .40* .29 -.03 -.03 Um-Ui .45** .-22 .03 .12 Um-Um .38* .22 -.05 .02 N: 33 32 31 30 TABLE XVII SAR Unrest i n Different Periods: Correlations Based on a Six-Month Temporal Unit Lag: 6 12 18 24 Mo. Ui-Ui .25 .19 -.22 .02 Ui-Um .22 .17 -.27 .04 Um-Ui .25 .13 -o25 .12 Um-Um .21 .16 -.30 .04 N: 24 22 20 18 H.B. * p i . 0 5 **p< .01 Ui-Ui: Correlations between Ui Ui-Um: Correlations between Ui TABLE XIV I s r a e l i Unrest i n Different Pe-riods: Correlations Based on a One-Year Temporal Unit  Lag: 1 2 Yr. Ui-Ui -.06 .31 Ui-Um -.06 .31 Um-Ui -.01 .28 Um-Um .00 .28 N: 16 15 TABLE XVI Syrian Unrest i n Different Pe-riods: Correlations Based on a One-Year Temporal Unit Lag: 1 2 Yr. Ui-Ui .46 -.05 Ui-Um »59* -.06 Um-Ui .44 -.05 Um-Um .58* -.06 N: 16 15 TABLE XVIII SAR Unrest i n Different Periods: Correlations Based on a One-Year Temporal Unit Lag: 1 2 Yr. Ui-Ui o55 -.12 Ui-Um .47, -.14 Um-Ui .57 -.08 Um-Um .47 -.10 N: l i 9 i n one period and i n subsequent ones, and subsequent Um. See also page 42. 6* TABLE XIX Jordan's Unrest i n Different Pe-riods: Correlations Based on a Six-Month Temporal Unit  Lag: 6 12 18 24 Mo. Ui-Ui .24 .37* .28 .31 Ui-Um .25 .39* .26 .33 Um-Ui .23 .38* .28 .30 Um-Um .24 .04 .26 .32 N: 33 32 31 30 TABLE XXI Egypt's Unrest i n Different Pe-riods: Correlations Based on a Six-Month Temporal Unit  Lag: 6 12 18 24 Mo. Ui-Ui O60**.51** .51** o59** Ui-Um o60**.51** .51** .59** TJm-Ui .60**.50** .49** .61** Um-Um o59**.5Q** .50** »59** MS 33 32 31 30 TABLE XXIII UAR Unrest i n Different Periods: Correlations Based on a Six-Month Temporal Unit  Lag: 6 12 18 24 Mo. Ui-Ui .46**.36* .41* .51** Ui-Um .45**.34 .44* .52** Um-Ui .47**.34 .40* .51** Um-Um .53**.33 .43* .52** N: 33 32 31 30 N.B. *p<„05 * * p 5 . o i See also pages 42, 68. TABLE XX Jordan's Unrest i n Different Pe-.riods: Correlations Based on a One-Year Temporal Unit Lag: 1 2 Ui-Ui .34 .13 Ui-Um .31 .11 Um-Ui .35 .13 Um-Um .31 .30 N: 16 15 TABLE XXII Egypt's Unrest i n Different Pe-riods: Correlations Based on a One-Year Temporal Unit Lag: 1 2 " Ui-Ui .43 .56* Ui-Um .43 .56* Um-Ui .43 .56* Um-Um .43 .56 N: 16 15 TABLE XXIV UAR Unrest i n Different Periods: Correlations Based on a One-Year Temporal Unit  Lag: 1 2 Yr« Ui-Ui .24 .55* Ui-Um .25 .58* Um-Ui .28 .53* Um-Um .26 .57* N: 16 15 . 70 state violence i s a good predictor of subsequent levels of unrest i n I s r a e l . Tables XV and XVI l i s t the correlations between unrest levels i n diff e r e n t periods f o r Syria. The rho-values indicate that there i s a moderate association between unrest i n one period and i n the immediately following period. With a six-month lag, the association ranges from +o38 to +.45* With a one-year lag i t ranges from +.44 to 4-.59« Longer lags y i e l d only weaker correlations. Table III shows that for Syria i n t e r -state violence predicts moderately and negatively to subsequent unrest when the longer lags are used. Table IV shows a similar relationship, though none of the rho-values here i s s i g n i f i c a n t . Thus, for short-term prediction, domestic unrest i s the better predictor to similar behaviour. For long-term prediction, interstate violence i s better. Neither association seems to be s i g n i f i c a n t l y stronger than the other. Tables XVII and XVIII show that f o r the SAR, the unrest-to-unrest relationship i s similar to that for Syria. The association i s generally weaker for the SAR, however, and none of the correlation c o e f f i c i e n t s i s s i g n i f i c a n t . Tables V and VI, on the other hand, showed moderate to strong negative associations between interstate violence and subsequent unrest. For the SAR, interstate violence i s c l e a r l y a better predictor of intrastate p o l i t i c a l ' u n r e s t than other unrest i s . Tables XIX and XX show only rather weak associations between unrest i n one period and i n subsequent periods for Jordan. The highest rho-value i n Table XX i s +.35° Only Table XIX shows values s i g n i f i c a n t at the o05 l e v e l . These are found when a twelve-month lag i s imposed and they vary from +.37 to 4.39« Tables VII and VIII, on the other hand, 71 show very close, positive associations between interstate violence and lev e l s of subsequent unrest. The correlations range up to +.61 i n the left-hand columns of Table VII and up to +.79 i n the left-hand columns of Table VIII. For Jordan, then, unrest i s predicted better by preceding interstate violence than by other unrest. Tables XXI and XXII indicate that f o r Egypt there i s a strong and consistent positive association between unrest i n different periods. In Table XXI the co e f f i c i e n t s reach a maximum value of +.61; i n Table XXII the highest value i s +.56. Tables XXIII and XXIV, which refer to the UAR, show the same general relationship between the variables. The corr e l a t i o n c o e f f i c i e n t s are generally weaker than those for Egypt. When we compare these findings with those i n the left-hand columns of Tables IX to XII, an interesting picture emerges. For the six-month based data, the shorter lags y i e l d correlations which are at least as strong as, and are sometimes stronger than, the corresponding correlations between the unrest measures. With a one-year temporal unit, one-year lags y i e l d much stronger correlations between unrest and preceding interstate v i o -lence than between unrest and preceding unrest. With longer lags, how-ever, interstate violence i s only a poor predictor, while unrest i s a strong one, to ensuing unrest behaviour. On the whole,' therefore, interstate violence need not necessari-l y be a minor predictor of domestic unrest. Indeed, f o r the SAR and Jor-dan, i t i s a better predictor than domestic unrest i n e a r l i e r periods. For I s r a e l , both variables are apparently minor predictors of unrest. For Syria and for Egypt-UAR, each variable i s a better predictor within a dif f e r e n t time-frame. In these circumstances, we can hardly reject the 72 , p o s s i b i l i t y that, f o r these Arab states P interstate violence i s a c r u c i a l factor i n the genesis of domestic unrest. The values of the correlations between measures of interstate violence i n d i f f e r e n t periods are l i s t e d i n Tables XXV to XXXVII» Tables XXV and XXVI refer to I s r a e l 0 They show a very strong association between the variables which grows progressively weaker as longer lags are imposed. The rho-values reach a maximum of -t-<,76 i n Table XXV and +.77 i n Table XXVI. The correlation c o e f f i c i e n t s i n the right-hand columns of Tables I and II are so much weaker than these that i t i s obvious that interstate violence i s predicted better by similar preceding behaviour than by domestic unrest. Tables XXVII and XXVIII show that, f o r Syria, there i s a mode-rate positive association between interstate violence i n different p e r i -ods. Only the former table y i e l d s correlation c o e f f i c i e n t s s i g n i f i c a n t at the 0 O 5 l e v e l . The association i s found for both long and short lags. The highest rho-value i n this table i s 4 o 5 2 . The correlations l i s t e d i n the right-hand columns of Tables III and IV show only weak associations between interstate violence and preceding domestic unrest. Thus, i f Syria i s treated as an independent entity through a l l the years examined, i n -terstate violence i s a better predictor to similar behaviour than domes-t i c unrest. Tables XXIX and XXX show that the matter i s somewhat more com-plicated i n the case of the SAR. The tables reveal moderate positive associations between the variables, with only the six-month based data y i e l d i n g s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t correlation c o e f f i c i e n t s . The mode-rate association i s found both with long and with short l a g s 0 The r i g h t -73 hand columns of Table V indicate that the prediction of levels of i n t e r -state violence from preceding domestic unrest i s not as good as prediction from preceding interstate violence. The difference i s not great, however, when six-month lags are usedo With t h i s lag rho ranges to +.49 i n Table V and - f o 5 2 i n Table XXIX 0 On the other hand, Table VI shows that the i n -cidence of violence may be well predicted from both unrest measures when a one-year l a g i s imposed; R equals + - . 6 5 and +.73 • The highest value i n Table XXX i s only tr-.47« Thus, depending on the time lag and the temporal unit used, domestic unrest may be a better predictor to subsequent levels of interstate violence of the SAR than other interstate violence. Tables XXXI and XXXII show that f o r Jordan there i s a remarkably strong association between interstate violence i n one period and i n anothero The highest value recorded i n Table XXXI i s + . 8 6 ; i n Table XXXII i t i s 4*0780 As the time lags lengthen, the association decreases i n strengths The right-hand columns of Tables VII and VIII show a f a i r l y strong positive association between domestic unrest and interstate v i o -lence. The maximum rho-value i n the former table i s f . 6 l ; i n the l a t t e r i t i s + 0 6 2 . These c o e f f i c i e n t s seem very small when compared with the values i n Tables XXXI and XXXII. Clearly, then, r e l a t i v e to interstate violence, domestic unrest i s only a minor predictor of subsequent i n t e r -state violence involving- Jordan. In Tables XXXIII to XXXVII we can see that for Egypt and the UAR, there i s a very strong association between levels of interstate violence i n d i f f e r e n t periods. The association grows progressively weaker as lon-ger lags are imposed. The right-hand columns of Tables IX and X show that the association between unrest and subsequent interstate violence 74 TABLE XXV I s r a e l i Interstate Violence i n Diffe r e n t Periods: Correlations TABLE XXVI I s r a e l i Interstate Violence i n Different Periods: Correlations Lag: 6 1 2 1 8 2 4 Mo. Lag: 1 2 Yr. Vi-Vi o 7 0 * * o 5 9 * * . 4 2 * . 2 8 V i - V i .70** o 2 5 Vi-Vm .56** .56** o 4 3 * .29 Vi-Vm . 6 0 * . 2 7 Vm-Vi „ 6 7 * * o 6 l * * . 4 1 * o 3 8 * Vm-Vi . 6 2 * . 4 1 Vm-Vm „ 7 6 * * 0 7 2 * * . 5 4 * * . 4 1 * Vm-Vm .77** . 4 5 N: 3 3 32 3 1 1 0 N : 16 1 5 TABLE XXVII Syrian Interstate Violence i n Different Periods: Correlations TABLE XXVIII Syrian Interstate Violence i n Different Periods: Correlations Lag: 6 1 2 1 8 2 4 Mo. Lag: 1 2 Yr.. V i - V i o 4 8 * * . 2 6 . 2 6 . 2 3 V i - V i . 1 9 . 1 9 Vi-Vm .36* . 1 8 . 4 1 * .52** Vi-Vm . 2 0 o 3 9 Vm-Vi - . 0 2 .25 .25 . 0 8 Vm-Vi . 0 0 o l O Vm-Vm .16* . 2 1 . 1 5 . 2 2 Vm-Vm . 1 4 .11 N : 3 3 32 3 1 1 0 N : 1 6 1 5 TABLE XXIX SAR Interstate Violence i n D i f f e r -ent Periods: Correlations Based on a Six-Month Temporal Unit TABLE XXX SAR Interstate Violence' i n D i f f e r -ent Periods: Correlations Based Lag: 6 1 2 1 8 2 4 Mo. Lag: 1 2 Yr. V i - V i .52* .30 .45* . 4 2 V i - V i o 4 7 .13 Vi-Vm . 4 2 * . 1 1 . 4 4 .56* Vi-Vm ol9 .18 Vm-Vi . 0 8 . 2 4 . 2 8 . 2 7 • Vm-Vi . 0 3 . 3 3 Vm-Vm . 3 2 . 1 4 - . 1 7 . 1 7 Vm-Vm . 0 5 - . 0 1 H : 2 4 2 2 2 0 1 8 N : 2 1 9 N . B . *p^ . 0 5 **p< .01 Vi-Vm: Correlations between V i Vm-Vi: Correlations between Vm See also page 4 2 . and subsequent Vm. and subsequent V i Q 75 TABLE XXXI TABLE XXXII Jordan's Interstate Violence i n Different Periods: Correlations Based on a Six-Month Temporal Unit Jordan's Interstate Violence i n Different Periods: Correlations Based on a One-Year Temporal Unit Lag: 6 12 18 24 Mo. Lag: 1 2 Yr. V i - V i .86**.75** .62** .51** V i - V i .78** .49 Vi-Vm .69**.56** .41* o25 Vi-Vm .59* .32 Vm-Vi .79**-77,** .70** .64** Vm-Vi .78** .70** Vm-Vm o72**.67** .53** .38* Vm-Vm .67** .53* Ni 33 32 31 30 N: 16 15 TABLE XXXIII TABLE XXXIV Egypt's Interstate Violence i n Different Periods: Correlations Based on a Six-Month Temporal Unit Egypt's Interstate Violence i n Different Periods: Correlations Eased on a One-Year Temporal Unit Lag: 6 12 18 24 Mo. Lag: 1 2 Yr. Vi - V i .75**.60** .58** .49** V i - V i .71** .59* Vi-Vm .69**.51** .50** .41* Vi-Vm 069** .46 Vm-Vi .71**o56** o58** .53** Vm-Vi .78** 0 6 9 * * Vm-Vm .66**.48** .56** .45* Vm-Vm .73** o55* N: 33 32 31 30 N: 16 15 TABLE XXXV TABLE XXXVI UAR Interstate Violence i n Differ-ent Periods: Correlations Based UAR Interstate Violence i n Differ-ent Periods: Correlations Based Lag: 6 12 18 24 Mo. Lag: 1 2 Yr. Vi - V i o72**.53** .42* .44* V i - V i .67** .57* Vi-Vm .65**.44* o39* .41* Vi-Vm .62* .40 Vm-Vi .37* »57** .53** .48** Vm-Vi .75** .74** Vm-Vm .60**.48** .48** .45* Vm-Vm .78** .60* N: 33 32 31 30 N: 16 15 N.B. *p<»05 **p<.01 See also pages 74, 42. 7& grows progressively stronger fo r Egypt. Thus, with a six-month lag, interstate violence i s predicted better by similar behaviour than by unresto With a twelve-month lag the difference i n the predictive power of the two variables i s very slighto Y/ith eighteen- and twenty-four-month lags, on the other hand, unrest i s c l e a r l y the better predictor. S i m i l a r l y , a comparison of the right-hand columns of Table X with Table XXXIV, both based on a one-year temporal unit, indicates that unrest i s the better long term predictor. A comparison of Tables XI and XII with Tables XXXVI and XXXVII tends to reveal the same sort of relationships f o r the UAR. In general, therefore, the findings do not confirm that domestic unrest i s necessarily a poorer predictor of interstate violence than other violence i s . For I s r a e l , Jordan and Syria, unrest i s the weaker predictor. For the SAR, however, with different data aggregations and time lags, interstate violence i s the weaker predictor. For Egypt and the UAR, while interstate violence y i e l d s stronger correlations with short lags, unrest y i e l d s stronger ones with long lags. I t seems, therefore, that the relevance of the association be-tween interstate violence and domestic unrest to an understanding of each of these types of behaviour cannot be dismissed out of hando For some states the relationship may be as unimportant as i t seems to be f o r Israelo For others i t may be as c r u c i a l as i t appears to be i n the case • of Jordanian domestic unrest. The relationship between the two types of c o n f l i c t behaviour i s c l e a r l y worthy of further empirical examination. 77 Chapter VII Conclusions A) Policy Implications. Imdiscussing, the p o l i c y implications of our findings, we assume that the correlations are accurate r e f l e c t i o n s of actual p o l i t i c a l pro-cesses o Insofar as such an assumption i s questionable, the following arguments may be treated as tentative. The f i r s t point to note i s that the violence between Isr a e l and the Arabs has no apparent effect on t o t a l levels of unrest i n I s r a e l . 169 The "cowardly Jews" neither panic i n the face of great Arab violence, nor give f u l l vent to t h e i r internal dissensions when violence decreases markedly. We have found no evidence to support the contention that the foreign c o n f l i c t i s the only thing binding the I s r a e l i s together, the only thing which keeps the state from s p l i t t i n g " l i k e the Jewish kingdom 170 af t e r the death of Solomon,," In terms, therefore, of t h e i r goal of 171 l i q u i d a t i n g "the traces of Z i o n i s t aggression," the Arabs are at an impasse. Given I s r a e l i m i l i t a r y superiority, the Arabs cannot score a m i l i t a r y v i c t o r y . An escalation of Arab violence w i l l not cause Isr a e l to crumble from within. (Perhaps Israel's demonstrated a b i l i t y to deal e f f e c t i v e l y with such violence i s the c r u c i a l factor i n insulating domestic c o n f l i c t s from the external one. I f m i l i t a r y superiority should s h i f t to the Arabs, t h i s situation might v/ell change.) F i n a l l y , the abandonment of violence as a policy of interstate c o n f l i c t seems unlikely 172 to hasten the process of Israel's internal decay either. If violence holds no clear advantage for the Arabs i n terms of the international situation, i t may be disadvantageous to the Arab e l i t e s 78 domestically. Our findings indicate that interstate violence i s a d i s -ruptive force i n the inte r n a l p o l i t i c s of Jordan and Egypt. Assuming that the e l i t e s of these two states are interested i n domestic peace, the abandonment of violence as an instrument of foreign policy could.well be i n t h e i r interest. This does not necessarily mean capitulation to I s r a e l . I t simply means that other weapons, l i k e petroleum, are safer bets. Conversely, continuation by Israel of i t s violent policy v i s - a -v i s Jordan and Egypt appears to be inimical to the I s r a e l i e l i t e s ' o f t -expressed aim of a l a s t i n g peace. In both these countries interstate violence breeds unrest and unrest breeds further interstate violence. Furthermore, increased unrest i n Jordan and Egypt may lead to the down-f a l l of Hussein and Sadat, who seem to, or try to seem to, be the most moderate interlocutors possible'from the I s r a e l i viewpoint. Khadhafi's 173 apparent great popularity i n Egypt indicates the di r e c t i o n which p o l i t i c s might take there i n the wake of high levels of unrest. The I s r a e l i s ' distaste f o r a Jordan very closely t i e d to other Arab states, 174 a l i k e l y consequence of unrest there, has been declared quite often. In these terms, continued violence betv/een Israel and these two Arab states i s disadvantageous to the Zionists as well as to the Cairene and Ammani policy-makers. Syria presents a different problem. However useless interstate violence may be i n terms of the international situation, i t does seem to have a s t a b i l i z i n g effect i n t e r n a l l y . Thus, abandoning violence as an instrument of foreign policy could well be disadvantageous to the Syrian leadership. Therefore, the probability that any I s r a e l i concessions would contribute to l a s t i n g peace seems quite slim. Lower levels of i n -79 terstate violence tend to lead to increased unrest i n independent Syria. Unrest tends to lead to increased violence. I t would thus be d i f f i c u l t f o r the I s r a e l i s to think i n terms other than short term defence as f a r as the Syrian front i s concerned. Unless further research indicates that the relationship between unrest and interstate violence for Syria has changed, an independent Syria w i l l be an obstacle to t r a n q u i l i t y i n the Middle East. In conclusion i t should be noted that Israel's foreign violence interactions are largely undetermined by considerations about internal unrest. The Arab states must recognize that Israel has the apparent a b i l i t y to interact f r e e l y on the basis of changing (interna-tional) circumstances. 175/ This t a c t i c a l freedom and f l e x i b i l i t y gives Israel a decided advantage over her adversaries who may have to take extraneous — that i s , internal p o l i t i c a l — factors into consideration. Just as the Arabs should be aware t h e i r violent i n i t i a t i v e s can bring a swift response, the. I s r a e l i s should be aware that their enemies are not playing solely to a foreign audience. They should be more restrained i n responding to Arab violence, p a r t i c u l a r l y when they suffer only limited damage and injury. Escalation of the violence against Jordan.and Egypt can hurt a l l three parties. In the f i n a l analysis, i t can only be urged that Jerusalem, Amman and Cairo show greater r e s t r a i n t i n the i r use of force against each other. Such re s t r a i n t i s i n the interest of a l l three parties. As for Syria, perhaps a reconstructed union with Egypt might serve the cause of internal and international s t a b i l i t y 0 80 B) Research Implications In general our findings suggest that behaviour within the con-text of national p o l i t i c s may lead to other behaviour i n the context of international p o l i t i c s , and vice versa. In Rosenau*s terminology, there i s evidence of reactive linkages between domestic unrest and interstate violence for certain countries. At this point, i t might he noted that the net effect of Rosenau*s linkage approach has been to draw attention to generally neglected phenomena. Seldom, i t seems, has use been made of 177 the more s p e c i f i c , substantive aspects of his framework. Rosenau himself has admitted that to some extent the linkage framework has merely provided a new rhetoric with which to analyze old problems and, to the extent that t h i s has become i t s predominant use, i t can hardly be coun-ted on as a route to future theoretical breakthroughs. 178/ He attributes part of the framework's f a i l u r e to the fact that i t "was 179 simply a typology that was t o t a l l y lacking i n theory." This may be so, but the framework has another characteristic which makes i t a poor basis for theoretical analysis. As Wilkenfeld notes, Implicit in. the linkage concept i s the notion that (national and international p o l i t i c s ) are i n fact two d i s t i n c t areas of concern. Implied also i s that they overlap under certain c i r -cumstances, at least i n the sense that events i n one sphere influence and are in-turn influenced by events i n the other. 180/ There i s , therefore, a suggestion that interactions of intranational and o international p o l i t i c a l behaviour are somehow "abnormal". This i s an unfortunate connotation, since i t i s clea r l y Rosenau*s intention to encourage research into comparisons and generalizations. I f i t were not, why bother with a 144 c e l l matrix? This i s a point which seems often to be forgotten i n linkage studies, and i s i s to this point that we now turn. 81 In the discussion of the findings suggestions were made for further research into the processes l i n k i n g unrest and interstate violent c o n f l i c t i n each of the four stateso Comparative analysis of these pro-cesses must await such investigation. But comparative analysis also leads to a question at another l e v e l : Given that the interrelationship i s d i f f e r e n t f o r different states, to what i s t h i s v a r i a t i o n due? Wil-kenfeld has suggested that a factor extracted i n Gregg and Banks' factor analysis of Cross-Polity Survey variables may prove useful i n explaining -l 8 l these differences. Examination of the variables loading highly on t h i s factor shows that they involve dichotomies which r e f e r generally to r e s t r i c t i v e as opposed to permissive i n s t i -tutions and interaction. Or, to use Truman's concept (the fac-tor) r e f l e c t s the degree of access to p o l i t i c a l channels. 182/ The access factor may thus be conceived as a scale. States ranked on i t may be placed on a continuum. At one pole one would have the i d e a l type of state i n which the emphasis i n policy-making i s on the e l i t e s ' r e s-ponse, to demands from a l l sectors of the society. At the other end of the scale i s the i d e a l type of p o l i t i c a l system i n which, not only do e l i t e s not respond to demands from the society, but they also seek to mobilize i t , to have i t f u l f i l some demands they themselves formulated on the basis of some ideology. While Wilkenfeld does not go into the theoretical grounds for suggesting "access" as a c r u c i a l element, i t seems that the following construction may be put upon i t . I f unrest occurs, i t seems l o g i c a l to expect that e l i t e s i n an access-permissive system w i l l be more l i k e l y to. respond to the issues involved than e l i t e s i n an access-restrictive system. After a l l , the former system i s geared to respond to demands 82 while the l a t t e r i s not. In the l a t t e r type of state demands from the masses may well he regarded as disruptive — i f not subversive —- of the plans of the decision-makers. Thus, suppressive and/or diversionary behaviour by the e l i t e s i s a l i k e l y response to unrest» In an access-permissive system, i f the government does not respond p o s i t i v e l y to the issues, i n s t i t u t i o n a l opposition groups may take up the aim of the unrest behaviour as t h e i r own. In either case, the issue i s , as i t were, "co-opted" into the i n s t i t u t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l process. Suppression and diversion are thus less necessary precisely because the unrest can be defused i n t h i s manner. Unrest i s , therefore, less of a threat to the long term s t a b i l i t y of a permissive system. Similarly, because of the existence of numerous channels f o r the a r t i c u l a t i o n of demands, grievan-ces a r i s i n g out of interstate violence are less l i k e l y to f i n d expression i n unrest behaviour. On the other hand, i n an access-restrictive system two courses are possible. The e l i t e s may use the excuse of the external danger as j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r the suppression of opposition which may have caused them to resort to violence and scapegoating i n the f i r s t place. Or, new grievances may arise out of the interstate violence. The lack of any other channels of communication to the e l i t e s may force a r t i c u l a t i o n of 1 ft V these demands through unrest behaviour. Thus, the closer a state i s to one end of the access continuum or to the other, the more l i k e l y the interrelationship between the v a r i a -bles i s to be either weak or strong. There i s some empirical evidence that the access factor i s indeed a useful explanatory device. Gregg and Banks point out that a state rank-83 ing high on the scale would tend to be a polyarchic one, while t o t a l i -t a r i a n systems, which have the highest loadings on the c e n t r i s t state 184 cluster, would rank low» I f the theoretical construction outlined above i s correct, v/e would expect a closer relationship between foreign and domestic c o n f l i c t behaviour for the l a t t e r type than f o r the former. Wilkenfeld's findings are i n l i n e with t h i s prediction; the association 185 i s stronger fo r c e n t r i s t states than for polyarchic ones. J I f I s r a e l , Jordan and Egypt are located on the access scale, I s r a e l f a l l s closer to * the permissive pole, while the other two states f a l l closer to the r e s t r i c -t i v e pole, with Egypt s l i g h t l y closer.to the extremity 0 Our findings showed no relationship between unrest and interstate violence f o r I s r a e l but strong associations f o r the two Arab states, p a r t i c u l a r l y f o r Egypt 0 Thus, these findings too f i t i n with the states* positions on the access continuum. On the whole, therefore, the factor seems to be a promising research tool." 1"^ In t h i s paper we sought evidence of relationships between the l e v e l of unrest within a state and the l e v e l of interstate violence i n which i t i s involvedo Our findings indicate that such associations may be very strong. The correlations do not constitute proof, however, f o r proof i s unattainable. • In the f i n a l analysis a l l that we can claim i s that t h i s that t h i s paper shows that further research into the r e l a -tionship between national and international p o l i t i c s i s needed and i s l i k e l y to be f r u i t f u l 0 84 NOTES 1. Robert Mac Tver, "War and C i v i l i z a t i o n , " P o l i t i c s and Society, ed., David Spitz (New York: Atherton Press, 1969) P» 435° 2. Ibido 3. See Edward H a l l e t t Carr, The Twenty Years' C r i s i s , 1919-1939 (London: Macmillan and Company, 1958) pp 0 41-62. 4o James N. Rosenau, "Theorizing Across Systems: Linkage P o l i -t i c s Revisited," C o n f l i c t Behavior and Linkage P o l i t i c s , ed., Jonathan Wilkenfeld (New York: "'David McKay Company, 1973) p. 32. 5. Ibid, p 0 30. 6. Ibid. The a r t i c l e reviews some of the research done on the basis of these concepts. 7. James N. Rosenau, "Introduction: P o l i t i c a l Science i n a Shrinking World," Linkage P o l i t i c s , ed., James N. Rosenau (New York: The Free Press, 19"6"9')' "pp. 4-5. 8o Joseph Frankel, International Relations (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964) p. 54o 9. Rosenau, "Introduction," op 0 c i t a , p D 4 . 10. David Easton, A Framework for P o l i t i c a l Analysis (Englewood C l i f f s , N.J.: Prentice-Hall, I965T PP° 73-74. 11. James N. Rosenau, "The External Environment as a Variable i n Foreign Policy Analysis," The Analysis of International P o l i t i c s , eds., James N. Rosenau, Vincent Davis, Maurice East (New Y o r k : T h e Free Press, 1972) p. 153. 12. Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, J r . , Comparative  P o l i t i c s : A Developmental Approach (Boston: L i t t l e , Brown and Company, 196677"^ 13. Fred W. Riggs, "The Theory of Developing P o l i t i e s , " World  P o l i t i c s , XVI, 1 (October, 1963) 171. 14. Gabriel A. Almond, "A Developmental Approach to P o l i t i c a l Systems," The Shaping of Foreign Policy, eds 0, H.K. Jacobson and William ZimmexTnan (New York: Atherton Pross, 1969) pp. '99-138. 15. Ibid, pp. 107-108. I60 Ibid, p. 122o 85; 17. Jean Blondel, An Introduction to Comparative Government (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1969) 0 18. Michael Curtis, Comparative Government and P o l i t i c s : An  Introductory Essay i n P o l i t i c a l Science (New York: Harper and Row, 1 9 6 5 ) . 19. Harry Eckstein and David E. Apter, eds., Comparative P o l i - t i c s : A Reader (New York: The Free Press, 1963)0 20o Roy C. Macridis and Bernard E. Brown, eds., Comparative  P o l i t i c s : Notes and Readings (Homewood, 1 1 1 . : The Dorsey Press, 1 9 6 l ) . 2 1 . Zbigniew Brzezinsky, "The Organization of. the Communist Camp," Eckstein and Apter, op 0 c i t . , pp. 511-528. 2 2 . See f o r example, Michael Brecher, " P o l i t i c a l I n s t a b i l i t y i n the New States of Asia," Ibid, pp. 617-635. 2 3 . In one essay the author does deal with the issue on a more than anecdotal l e v e l , although only as a secondary theme. See Karl Jaspers, "The End of Colonialism," i b i d , pp. 604-616. 24o See f o r example, Miles Copeland, The Game of Nations (lLondon: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969)0 25. Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck and Burton Sapin, "Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International Relations," Foreign  P o l i c y Decision Making, eds., Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck and Burton Sapin (New York: The Free Press, 1962) pp. 56-I85. ' 2 6 . M. Brecher,.. B. Steinberg and J o Stein, "A Framework f o r Research on Foreign Policy Behavior," Journal of Co n f l i c t Resolution, XIII, 1 (March, 1972) 75-101. See also, Michael Brecher, The Foreign  P o l i c y System of I s r a e l : Setting, Images Process (London: Oxford University Press, 1 9 7 2 ) . 2 7 . Hans J . Morgenthau. J r 0 , P o l i t i c s Among Nations (3rd ed.; New York: A l f r e d A. Knopf, i 9 6 0 ) pp. IOI - I 6 3 . 2 8 . Ibid, pp 0 6 - 8 . 29. J . David Singer, "The Level-of-Analysis Problem i n Interna-t i o n a l Relations," International P o l i t i c s and Foreign Policy, ed., James N. Rosenau (Rev. ed.; New York: The Free Press, 1 9 ° 9 ) pp. 22-23. 30o George Liska, International Equilibrium (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957) PP. 2 0 0 - 2 0 1 o 3 1 . J . David Singer, "The Global System and'its Subsystems: A Developmental View," Linkage P o l i t i c s , op Q c i t 0 , p .24o 86 32. Reference i s to the overt or stated purpose of the action. This i s not to deny the p o s s i b i l i t y of myriad other purposes which are unstated. 33. Compare Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970) p. 4 . Gurr's d e f i n i t i o n of p o l i t i c a l violence i s somewhat narrower than the concept of p o l i t i c a l unrest used here. 34• That i s , not r e s t r i c t e d to a single issue. 35* See Robert C. North, Howard E. Koch and Dina A. Zinnes, "The Integrative Functions of C o n f l i c t , " Journal of C o n f l i c t Resolution, IV, 3. (September, i960) 356. 36. By d e f i n i t i o n ; "community of interests, objectives or standards." Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English  Language (Springfield, Mass.: G. L. Merriam Company, 1966) p. 2169. 37. North et a l . , op. c i t . , p. 358. 38 . This assumption has been questioned. 39* For an argument along these l i n e s , see S i r John Bagot Glubb, A Soldier With the Arabs (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1957) pp. 305-06. 4 0 . See "particularly E a r l Berger, The Covenant and the Sword (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965) PP. 85-103. 41 • Lev/is A. Coser, The Functions of Social C o n f l i c t (Glencoe, 111.: The Free Press, 1956) p. 95. 4 2 . Ibid, p. 110. 4 3 . William Graham Sumner, "War," War: Studies from Psychology,  Sociology, Anthropology, eds., Leon Bramson and George W. Goethals (Rev. ed.; New York: Basic Books, I968) p. 210. 4 4 . Quincy Wright, A Study of War (Abridged ed.; Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1964) pp. 169, 239-241. 45• Ernst B. Haas and Al l e n S. Whiting, Dynamics of Internation- a l Relations (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1956) pp. 62-63. 4 6 . Ralph A. Turner, "Integrative B e l i e f s i n Group Crises," Journal of C o n f l i c t Resolution, XVI, 1 (March, 1972) 37. I t a l i c s i n o r i g i n a l . 47• Muzafer Sherif et a l . , Intergroup C o n f l i c t and Cooperation:  The Robbers' Cave Experiment (Norman, Oklahoma: The University of Oklahoma, 1961) p. 123. ~~ 87 48. Ibid, pp. 123-124. Underlined i n o r i g i n a l . 49. Turner, op. c i t . , p. 29. 50. Ibid, p. 35,. 51. Geoffrey Blainey, "The Scapegoat Theory of International War," H i s t o r i c a l Studies. XV, 5.7 (October, 1971) 73-74. 52. Ibid, p. 83. 53. Richard N. Rosecrance, Action and Reaction i n World P o l i - t i c s (Boston: L i t t l e , Brown and Company, 1 9 6 3 ) . 54. For a c r i t i q u e , see Dina A. Zinnes, "The Requisites f o r International S t a b i l i t y : A Review," Journal of C o n f l i c t Resolution. VIII, 3 (September, 1964) 301-305. 55. Rosecrance, op. c i t . , p. 285. 56. Ibid, pp. 281-285. 57. P i t i r i m A. Sorokin, Fluctuation of Social Relationships, Y/ar  and Revolution V o l . I l l , Social, and Cultural Dynamics (New York: Ameri-can Book Company, 1937) PP. 3 7 5 - 3 7 6 . 58. Ibid, pp. 488-489. I t a l i c s i n o r i g i n a l . 59. Raymond Tanter, "International War and Domestic Turmoil: Some Contemporary Evidence," The History of Violence i n America, eds., Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert Gurr (-New York: Praeger, Publishers, 1970) p. 566. 60. Rudolph J . Rummel, "The Relationship Between National Attributes and Foreign C o n f l i c t Behavior," Quantitative International  P o l i t i c s , ed., J . David Singer (New York: The Free Press, 1968) pp. 187 , 208. 61. Ibid, p. 208. 62. The studies concerned are: Raymond B. C a t t e l l , "The Dimen-sions of Culture Patterns and Factorization of National Characters," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, XLIV (1949) 4 4 3 - 4 6 9 ; Raymond B. C a t t e l l , H. Breul and H. Parker Hartman, "An Attempt at a More Refined D e f i n i t i o n of the Cultural Dimensions of Syntality i n Modern Nations," American Sociological Review, XVII, 4 (August, 1952) 408-421; Rudolph J . Rummel, "Dimensions of C o n f l i c t Behavior Within and Between Nations," General Systems, VIII (1963) 1 -50; Raymond Tanter, "Dimensions of Con-f l i c t Behavior Within and Between Nations, 1 9 5 8 - 1 9 6 0 , " Journal of Con- f l i c t Resolution, X, 1 (March, 1966) 4 8 - 6 4 ; For a review of these and other factor analytic studies, see Rudolph J . Rummel, "Dimensions of 88 Foreign and Domestic C o n f l i c t Behavior: A Review of Empirical Findings," Theory and Research on the Causes of War, eds., Dean G. P r u i t t and Richard C. Snyder (Englewood C l i f f s , N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969) pp. 219-228. 63. C a t t e l l , Breul and Hartman, op. c i t . , p. 415* 64. Ibid, p. 410. 65. Rummel, "Dimensions: A Review," op. c i t . , pp. 224-225. 66. Warren R. P h i l l i p s , "The C o n f l i c t Environment of Nations," C o n f l i c t Behavior and Linkage P o l i t i c s , op. c i t . , p. 143. 67. Leo A. Hazlewood, "Externalizing Systemic Stresses: Inter-national C o n f l i c t as Adaptive Behavior," C o n f l i c t Behavior and Linkage  P o l i t i c s , op. c i t . , p. 169. 68. Tanter, "Dimensions, 1953-1960," op. c i t . , p. 58. 69. John N. C o l l i n s , "Foreign C o n f l i c t Behavior and Domestic Disorder i n A f r i c a , " C o n f l i c t Behavior and Linkage P o l i t i c s , op. c i t . , pp. 25I-293. See especially Table 7> p. 280. 70. Jonathan Wilkenfeld, "Some Further Findings Regarding the Domestic and Foreign C o n f l i c t Behavior of Nations," Journal of Peace  Research, VI (1969) 147. 71. Jonathan Wilkenfeld, "Domestic and Foreign C o n f l i c t Beha-v i o r of Nations," Journal of Peace Research, V (1968) 57. 72. Ibid. 73. Jonathan Wilkenfeld and Dina A. Zinnes, "A Linkage Model of Domestic C o n f l i c t Behavior," Con f l i c t Behavior and Linkage P o l i t i c s , op. c i t . , pp. 325-356. 74. Jonathan Wilkenfeld, V i r g i n i a Lee Lussier and Dale T a h t i -nen, "Co n f l i c t Interactions i n the Middle East, 1949-1967," Journal of Con f l i c t Resolution, XVI, 2 (June, 1972) 135-154. 75-* Wilkenfeld, "Some Further Findings," op. c i t . , p. 155.. 76. Tanter, "Dimensions, 1958-1960," op. c i t . , pp. 55-56. 77. Wilkenfeld, Lussier and Tahtinen, op. c i t . , pp. 150-151. 78. P h i l l i p s , op. c i t . , p. 147. 79. C o l l i n s , op. c i t . , Table 3, p. 274. 80. Polyarchic states tend to be "economically developed Wes-89 tern nations" with liberal-democratic forms of government. See Jonathan Wilkenfeld, "Domestic and Foreign C o n f l i c t , " C o n f l i c t Behavior and Link- age P o l i t i c s , op. c i t . , Table 4 , p. 1 1 5 , p. 120. 81. Ibid, Table 4 , p. 115. 82. Ibid, Table 8, p. 121. 83. Wilkenfeld, Lussier and Tahtinen, op. c i t . , pp. 1 4 3 - 1 4 6 . 84. Yochanan Peres, "Ethnic Relations i n I s r a e l , " People and P o l i t i c s i n the Middle East, ed., Michael Curtis (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1971) pp. 3 3 - 3 8 . 85. Ibid, pp. 5 3 - 6 0 . 86. Yehoshaphat Harkabi, "Ending the Arab-Israeli C o n f l i c t , " People and P o l i t i c s i n the Middle East, op. c i t . , p. 2 7 4 . 87. Arieh Loya, quoted i n Kennett Love, Suez; The Twice- Fought War (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969) pp. 5.2-53. 8 8 . Nathan Weinstock, Le siortisme contre Is r a e l (Paris: Francois Maspero, I969) p. 3 4 1 . 89. Ibid, p. 366 . 9 0 . Lt-Gen. E.L.M. Burns, Between Arab and I s r a e l i (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin, 1962) p. 290. 9 1 . David Kimche and Dan Bawly, The Sandstorm (New York: Stein and Day, 1968) p. 7 0 . 92. Wilkenfeld, Lussier and Tahtinen, op. c i t . , p. 1 4 2 . 9 3 . Ibid, p. 1 3 7 . 9 4 . Robert Burrowes and Bertram Spector, "The Strength and D i -re c t i o n of Relationships Between Domestic and External C o n f l i c t and Cooperation: Syria, I96I-I967," C o n f l i c t Behavior and Linkage P o l i t i c s , op. c i t . , Table 5> P« 308. 9 5 . Ibid, pp. 312 -314. 96. See, for example, Edouard 'Saab, La Syrie ou l a revolution  dans l a rancoeur ( J u l l i a r d , 1968) pp. 40 - 4 1 ; A. L. Tibawi, A Modern  History of Syria (London: Macmillan and Company, 1969) pp. 382-383 ; Patrick Seale, The Struggle for Syria (London: Oxford University Press, 1965) PP. 3 3 - 3 4 , 41-45. 9 7 . Walter Laqueur, The Road to.War (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books Ltd., 1969) p. 5 8 . 9° 98. Ibid, pp. 5 8 - 6 O . 99. Kimche and Bawly,. op. c i t . , pp. 2 1 - 2 4 . 1 0 0 . Wilkenfeld, Lussier and Tahtinen, op. c i t . , p. 1 4 8 . 101. The Centrist group consists of nations that "exhibit both d i c t a t o r i a l and highly centralized patterns of leadership." Wilkenfeld, "Domestic and Foreign C o n f l i c t , " op. c i t . , p. 119. 1 0 2 . Ibid, Table 4 , p. 115. 103. Ibid, Table 7, p. 120. 1 0 4 . P . J o V a t i k i o t i s , P o l i t i c s and the M i l i t a r y i n Jordan (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publisher, 1967) p. 1 3 4 . 105. See, f o r example, George L. Harris, Jordan: i t s People,  i t s Society, i t s Culture (New Haven: HRAF Press, 1958) p. 113; Aq.il Hyder Hasan Abidi, Jordan: A P o l i t i c a l Study (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1965) p. 170. 1 0 6 . Wilkenfeld, Lussier and Tahtinen, op. c i t . , pp. 146-147. 107. Wilkenfeld, "Domestic and Foreign C o n f l i c t , " op. c i t . , Table 4 , p. 115. 1 0 8 . Muhamad Husein Baikal, quoted i n P.J. V a t i k i o t i s , The Egyp- t i a n Army i n P o l i t i c s (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1961) p. 33; see also, Mahmoud Husein, La lutte de classes en Egypte (2e ed.; Paris: Francois Maspero, 1971) p. 76 . 109. See Tom L i t t l e , Modern Egypt (New York: Praeger, 1967) p. 107; V a t i k i o t i s , The Egyptian Army, op. c i t . , p. 65; Husein, op. c i t . , PP. 76-77. 110. R. Hrair Dekmejian, Egypt Under Nasser (Albany: State Uni-v e r s i t y of New York Press, 1971) PP. 39-44. • 111. V a t i k i o t i s , The Egyptian Army, op. c i t . , pp. 32, 59; L i t t l e , op. c i t . , p. 103; Husein, l o c . c i t . 112. Tom L i t t l e i n Anthony Moncrieff, ed., Suez Ten Years After (London: BBC, 1967) p. 4 6 . 1 1 3 . A process i s a series of interlinked events which commences under certain defined conditions... and which concludes under certain defined conditions.... Alan R. Beals, Culture i n Process (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1967) P. 6. I t a l i c i z e d i n o r i g i n a l . 1 1 4 . W.D. Wall and H.L. Williams, Longitudinal Studies and the 91 Social Sciences (London: Heineman Educational Books, 1970) p. 7. 115. Robert Burrowes, "Multiple Time-Series Analysis of Nation-Level Data," Comparative P o l i t i c a l Studies, I I , 4 (January, 1970) 468. 116. Norwood Russell Hanson, Patterns of Discovery (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1958) p. 54. 117. Donald G. Morrison and Hugh Michael Stevenson, " P o l i t i c a l I n s t a b i l i t y i n Independent Black A f r i c a : More Dimensions of C o n f l i c t Behavior Y/ithin Nations," Journal of C o n f l i c t Resolution, XV, 3 (Septem-ber, 1971) 350-353, Table 1. 118. Ibid, p. 351. 119. E l i e z e r Beeri, Army Officers i n Arab P o l i t i c s and Society (Jerusalem: I s r a e l U n i v e r s i t i e s Press, 19°9) P. 255. 120. For a short discussion of measures of c i v i l s t r i f e see Raymond Tanter and Manus Midlarsky, "A Theory of Revolution," Journal of C o n f l i c t Resolution, XI, 3 (September, I967) 266. 121. See Burrowes and Spector, op. c i t . , p. 304; Wilkenfeld, Lussier and Tahtinen, Table 3, p. 142. 122. Ivo K. Feierabend with Rosalind L. Feierabend and Betty A. Nesvold, "The Comparative Study of Revolution and Violence," Comparative  P o l i t i c s , V, 3 ( A p r i l , 1973).394-396. 123. P . 0 1 . 124. Y/ilkenfeld, Lussier and Tahtinen, op. c i t . , p. 136. 125. Malcolm Kerr, The Arab Cold War, 1958-1967 (2nd ed.; London: Oxford University Press, 1967) pp. 14-34. 126. See, f o r example, V a t i k i o t i s , P o l i t i c s and the M i l i t a r y i n  Jordan, op. c i t . , p. 134. 127. See, for example, Laqueur, op. c i t . , pp. 58-6O. 128. Burrowes and Spector, op. c i t . , p. 297; Wilkenfeld, Lussier and Tahtinen, op. c i t . , p. 139* 129. See l i s t s i n Seale, op. c i t . , throughout the book. 130. Martin Seymour, "The Dynamics of Power i n Syria since the Break with Egypt," Middle East Journal, VI, 1 (January, 1970) 37. 131. Johan Galtung, Theory and Methods of Social Research (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1967) pp. 218-220. 92 132. Sidney Siegel, Nonparametric S t a t i s t i c s for the Beha- v i o r a l Sciences (Hew York: McGraw-Hill, 1956) p. 219. 133. Elmer B. Mode, Elements of S t a t i s t i c s (3rd ed.; Englewood C l i f f s , N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1961) p. 311, Table 0. 134. George W# Snedecor and William G. Cochran, S t a t i s t i c a l  Methods (6th ed.; Ames, Iowa: The Iowa State University Press, I967) p. 195, Table 7.11.12, and p. 557, Table A l l . Reasons for use of the l a t t e r given, i b i d , p. 194. 135. See Denton E. Morrison and Ramon A. Henkel, eds., The  Significance Test Controversy (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1970). 136. David Gold, " S t a t i s t i c a l Tests and Substantive Signifi** . cance," The Significance Test Controversy, op. c i t . , pp. 172-181. 137* James A. Davis, "Some P i t f a l l s of Data Analysis Without a Formal C r i t e r i o n , " The Significance Test Controversy, op. c i t . , p. 91 . 138. Gold, op. c i t . , p. 181. 139. Ibid, p. 179. 140. Edward E. Azar et a l . , "The Problem of Source Coverage i n International Events," International Studies Quarterly, XVI, 3 (1972) 386-387. 141. Wilkenfeld, Lussier and Tahtinen, op. c i t . , p. 138. 142. Ibid, p. 151. 143. Peres, op. c i t . , pp. 33-38. 144. Ibid, pp. 53-60. 145. See, f o r example, the 1959 election plank of the Agudah quoted i n Brecher, The Foreign-Policy System of I s r a e l , op. c i t . , p. 180; also Menahem Porush's regular column i n the Jewish Press (New York). 146. For a discussion of related themes, see Louis M. T e r r e l l , "Societal Stress, P o l i t i c a l I n s t a b i l i t y and Levels of M i l i t a r y E f f o r t , " Journal of C o n f l i c t Resolution, XV, 3 (September, 1971) p. 3 0 . 147. Domestic violence involves coups, p o l i t i c a l arrests, press c o n f l i c t , p o l i t i c a l and economic suppression and administrative and execu-t i v e changes. Wilkenfeld, Lussier and Tahtinen, op. c i t . , p* 142, Table 3. 148. Verbal h o s t i l i t y involves nagative sanctions, accusations and shows of h o s t i l i t y . Ibid, p. 144, Table 5» 93 , 149. M i l i t a r y actions involve antiforeign demonstrations, protests, m i l i t a r y actions and border skirmishes. Ibid. 150. See above, pp. 25-26. 151. Burrowes and Spector, op. c i t . , p. 315* 152. Wilkenfeld, Lussier and Tahtinen, op. c i t . , p. 149* 153. Brecher, The Foreign Policy System of I s r a e l , op. c i t . , P. 51. 154. Y i g a l Allon, "Sof Ma'aseh b'Mahshavah Thilah," Milhamah  v'Uitzahon, ed., Kaphtali Arbel (M. Mizrahi, 1967) p. 11. 155• Wilkenfeld, Lussier and Tahtinen, op. c i t . , pp. 146-147. 156. V a t i k i o t i s , P o l i t i c s and the M i l i t a r y i n Jordan, op. c i t . , p. 134. 157. Sherif et a l . , op. c i t . , pp. 123-124. 158. Wilkenfeld, Lussier and Tahtinen, op. c i t . , p. 148. 159. Wilkenfeld, "Domestic and Foreign C o n f l i c t , " op. c i t . , p. 120, Table 7. 160. Wilkenfeld, Lussier and Tahtinen, op. c i t . , p. 146. 161. Wilkenfeld, "Domestic and Foreign C o n f l i c t , " l o c . c i t . 162. V a t i k i o t i s , P o l i t i c s and the M i l i t a r y i n Jordan, l o c . c i t . 163. See note 111. 164. Paul Lazarsfeld, "Interpretation of S t a t i s t i c a l Relations as a research Operation," The Language of Social Research, eds., Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Morris Rosenberg (Glencoe, 1 1 1 . : T h e Free Press, 1955) p. 122. 165. Wilkenfeld, Lussier and Tahtinen, l o c . c i t . 166. Wilkenfeld, "Domestic and Foreign C o n f l i c t , " op. c i t . , p. 115, Table A . 167. For an overview of such arguments see Benjamin Beit-Hal- . lahmi, "Some Psychosocial and Cultural Factors i n the Arab-Israeli C o n f l i c t : A Review of the Literature," Journal of C o n f l i c t Resolution, XVI, 2 (June, 1972) 274-275. 168. Y/ilkenfeld, Lussier and Tahtinen, op. c i t . , p. 150. 169. Y. Harkabi, Arab Attitudes to Is r a e l , trans., Misha Louvish (Jerusalem: I s r a e l Universities Press, 1972) p. 3 2 5 . 170. Muhammad *Abd al-Qadir, c i t e d i b i d , p. 3 2 3 . 171. Ibid, pp. 1 2 - 1 3 . 172. Note that the reference i s to the abandonment of violence, not of non-violent h o s t i l e behaviour. 1 7 3 . See Le nouvel observateur, No. 455 (30 July, 1973) p. 1 9 . 174. See notes 153 and 1 5 4 . 175. Y/ilkenfeld, Lussier and Tahtinen, op. c i t . , p. 1 5 1 . 1 7 6 . James N. Rosenau, "Toward the Study of National-Interna-t i o n a l Linkages," Linkage P o l i t i c s , op. c i t . , p. 4 6 . 177 . Thus i n C o n f l i c t Behavior and Linkage P o l i t i c s some of the authors mention the concept of linkages, some do not. 1 7 8 . Rosenau, "Theorizing Across Systems," op. c i t . , p. 5 2 . 1 7 9 . Ibid, p. 4 5 . 1 8 0 . Jonathan Y/ilkenfeld, "Introduction," C o n f l i c t Behavior'' and  Linkage P o l i t i c s , op. c i t . , p. 1. 1 8 1 . V/ilkenfeld, "Domestic and Foreign C o n f l i c t , " op. c i t . , p. 1 2 2 . 1 8 2 . Cf. Gurr, op. c i t . , pp. 7 3 - 7 9 . 183. P h i l l i p M. Gregg and Arthur S. Banks, "Dimensions of P o l i -t i c a l Systems: Factor Analysis of A Cross-Polity Survey," American P o l i - t i c a l Science Review, LIX, 3 (September, 1965) 6 0 7 . I t a l i c s i n o r i g i n a l . For variables loading highly on the factor see p. 608, Table I I . 184. Ibid, Table XIII, p. 6 1 3 . 1 8 5 . V/ilkenfeld, "Domestic and Foreign C o n f l i c t , " op. c i t . , pp. 1 1 9 - 1 2 1 . 1 8 6 . Syria was omitted because of a lack of data. 95, Bibliography Primary Sources The Isr a e l Digest (Jerusalem) 1 9 5 8 - 1 9 6 7 . The Israel Weekly Digest (Jerusalem) 1957-1958. The Jewish Agency Digest of Press and Events (Jerusalem) 1 9 5 0 - 1 9 5 7 . Keesing's Contemporary Archives, I95O-I967. The Middle East Journal "Chronology," I95O-I967. The New York Times Index, 195O-I967. United Nations Security Council O f f i c i a l Records and Documents, I95O-I967. Secondary Sources: Books Abidi, Aq.il Ryder Hasan. Jordan: A P o l i t i c a l Study. Bombay: Asia Pub-l i s h i n g House, 1965. Almond, Gabriel A. and G. Bingham Powell, J r . Comparative P o l i t i c s : A Developmental Approach. Boston: L i t t l e , Brown and Company, 1966. Assima, Georges. La c r i s e de Suez, 1956. Lausanne: L'age de l'hornme, S.A., 1 9 7 0 . Banks, Arthur S. and Robert B. Textor. A Cross-Polity Survey. Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1 9 6 3 . Beals, Alan R. Culture i n Process. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Win-ston, 1969. Beeri, E l i e z e r . Army O f f i c e r s i n Arab P o l i t i c s and Society. Jerusalem: Israel U n i v e r s i t i e s Press, 1969. Berger, Elmer. The Covenant and the Sword.- London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965. Berque, Jacques. Egypt: Imperialism and Revolution, trans, j- Jean Stew-a r t . London: Faber and Faber, 1971. Blondel, Jean. An Introduction to Comparative Government. New York: Praeger, Publishers, 1969. Bramson, Leon and George W. Goethals, eds. War: Studies from Psychology,  Sociology, Anthropology. Rev. ed.; New York: Basic Books, 1968. Brecher, Michael. The Foreign Policy System of Is r a e l : . Settings, Images, 96 Burns, E.L.M.,•Lt-Gen. Between Arab and I s r a e l i . Toronto: Clarke, Irwin, 1962. Carr, Edward H a l l e t t . The Twenty Years' Crisis,. 1919-1939. London: Macmillan and Company, 1958. Copeland, Miles. The Game of Nations. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1969. Coser, Lev/is A. The Functions of Social C o n f l i c t . Glencoe, 111.: The Free Press, 1956. Curtis, Michael. Comparative Government and P o l i t i c s : An Introductory  Essay i n P o l i t i c a l Science. New York: Harper and Row, 1965. Dekmejian, R. Hra i r . Egypt Under Nasser. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1971. Easton, David. A Framework for P o l i t i c a l Analysis. Englewood C l i f f s , N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965. Eckstein, Harry and David E. Apter, eds. Comparative P o l i t i c s : A  Reader. New York: The Free Press, 1963. F a r r e l l , R. Barry, ed. Approaches to Comparative and International P o l i t i c s . Evanston, 111.: Northwestern University Press, 1966. Frankel, Joseph. International Relations. New York: Oxford University Press, 1964. Galtung, Johan. Theory and Methods of Social Research. Oslo: Univer-s i t e t s f o r l a g e t , 1967. Glubb, S i r John Bagot. A Soldier With the Arabs. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1957. Graham, Hugh Davis and Ted Robert Gurr, eds. The History of Violence i n  America. New York: Praeger, Publishers, 1970. Gurr, Ted Robert. Why Men Rebel. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970. • Haas, Ernst B. and A l l e n S. Whiting. Dynamics of International Relations. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1956. Hanson, Norwood Russell. Patterns of Discovery. Cambridge: At the University Press, 1958. Harkabi, Y. Arab Attitudes to I s r a e l , trans., Misha Louvish. Jerusalem: Israel U niversities Press, 1972. 97 Harris, George L. Jordan: i t s People, i t s Society, i t s Culture. New Haven: HEAP Press, 1958. Husein, Mahmoud. La l u t t e de classes en Egypte. 2d ed.; Paris: Francois Maspero, 1971. Kerr, Malcolm. The Arab Cold War, 1958-1967. 2d ed.; London: Oxford University Press, 1968. Kimche, David and Dan Bawly. The Sandstorm. New York: Stein and Day, 1968. Koury, Enver M. The Patterns of Mass Movements i n Arab Revolutionary  States. Mouton: The Hague, 1970. Laqueur, Walter. The Road to War. Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books Ltd., I969. Liska, George. International Equilibrium. Cambridge: Harvard Universi-ty Press, 1957. L i t t l e , Tom. Modern Egypt. New York: Praeger, 1967. Love, Kennett. Suez: The Twice-Fought War. New York: McGraw-Hill, I969. Macridis, Roy C. and Bernard E. Brown, eds. Comparative P o l i t i c s : Notes  and Readings. Homewood, 111.: The Dorsey. Press, 1961. Mansfield, Peter. The B r i t i s h i n Egypt. London: Weidenfeld and Nichol-son, 1971. Mode, Elmer B. Elements of S t a t i s t i c s . 3rd ed.; Englewood C l i f f s , N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1961. Moncrieff, Anthony, ed. Suez Ten Years Af t e r . London: BBC, 1967. Morgenthau, Hans J . , J r . P o l i t i c s Among Nations. 3rd ed., New York: A l f r e d A. Knopf, i 9 6 0 , Morrison, Denton E. and Ramon A. Henkel, eds. The Significance Test  Controversy. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1970. Nieburg, H.L. P o l i t i c a l Violence: The Behavioral Process. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1969. Rosecrance, Richard N. Action and Reaction i n World P o l i t i c s . Boston: L i t t l e , Brown and Company, 1963. Rosenau, James N., ed. Linkage P o l i t i c s . New York: The Free Press, 1969. Saab, Edouard. La Syrie ou l a revolution dans l a rancoeur. J u l l i a r d , 1968. 9a Seale, Patrick. The Struggle f o r Syria. London: Oxford University Press, 1965. Sherif, Muzafer, O.J. Harvey, B. Jack White, William R. Hood, and Carolyn W. Sherif. Intergroup Co n f l i c t and Cooperation: The Robbers  Cave Experiment. Norman, Oklahoma: The University of Oklahoma, 196X Siegel, Sidney. Nonparametric S t a t i s t i c s f o r the Behavioral Sciences. New York: McGraw-Hall, 1969. Snedecor, George W. and William G. Cochran. S t a t i s t i c a l Methods. 6 t h ed.; Ames, Iowa:. The Iowa State University Press, 1967. Sorokin, P i t i r i m . Social and Cultural Dynamics v o l . I l l Fluctuation of  Social Relationships, War and Revolution. New York: American Book Company, 1937• Tibawi, A. L. A Modern History of Syria. London: Macmillan and Compa-ny, 19W. V a t i k i o t i s , P.J. The Egyptian Army i n P o l i t i c s . Bloomington, Indiana; Indiana University Press, 1961. V a t i k i o t i s , P.J. P o l i t i c s and the M i l i t a r y i n Jordan. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publisher, 1967. Wall, W.D. and H.L. Williams. Longitudinal Studies i n the Social Scien- ces. London: Heineman Educational Books, 1970. Waltz, Kenneth N.' Man,'the State and War. New York: Columbia Universi-ty Press, 1959. Weinstock, Nathan. Le sionisme contre I s r a e l . Paris: Francois Maspero, 1969. Wilkenfeld, Jonathan, ed. C o n f l i c t Behavior and Linkage P o l i t i c s . New York: David McKay Company, 1973. Wright, Quincy. A Study of War. Abridged ed.; Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1964. Secondary Sources: A r t i c l e s A l l o n , Y i g a l . "Sof Maaseh baMahshavah Thilah," Milhamah v'Nitzahon, ed., Naphtali Arbel, M. Mizrahi, 1967, pp. 7-21. Almond, Gabriel A. "A Developmental Approach to P o l i t i c a l Systems," The Shaping of Foreign Policy, eds., H.K. Jacobson and William Zimmerman, New York: Atherton Press, 1969, pp. 99-138. 99 Azar, Edward E., Stanley H. Cohen, Thomas 0. Jukam and J.M. McCormick. "The Problem of Source Coverage i n International Events." International Studies Quarterly, XVI, 3 (September, 1972) 373-3§oT ; : Blainey, Geoffrey. "The Scapegoat Theory of International War." Histo- r i c a l Studies, XV, 57 (October, 1971) 72-87. Burrowes, Robert. "Multiple Time-Series Analysis of Nation-Level Data." Comparative P o l i t i c a l Studies, I I , 4 (January, 1970) 465-48O. C a t t e l l , Raymond B. "The Dimensions.of Culture Patterns and F a c t o r i z a -t i o n of National Characters." Journal of Abnormal and Social  Psychology, XLIV (1949) 443-469. C a t t e l l , Raymond B., H. Breul and H. Parker Hartman. "An Attempt at a More Refined D e f i n i t i o n of the Cultural Dimensions of Syntality i n Modern Nations." American Sociological Review, XVII,4' (August, 1952) 408-421. Feierabend, Ivo K. with Rosalind L. Feierabend and Betty A. Nesvold. "The Comparative Study of Revolution and Violence." Comparative  P o l i t i c s , V, 3 ( A p r i l , 1973) 393-424. Feierabend, Ivo K. and Rosalind L. Feierabend. "Aggressive Behaviors With-i n P o l i t i e s , 1948-1962: A Cross-National Study." Journal of  C o n f l i c t Resolution, X 3 (September, 1966) 249-271. Gregg, P h i l l i p M. and Arthur S. Banks. "Dimensions of P o l i t i c a l Systems: Factor Analysis of A Cross-Polity Survey." American P o l i t i c a l  Science Review, LLX, 3 (September, 1965) 602-614. Harkabi, Yehoshaphat. "Ending the Arab-Israeli C o n f l i c t . " People and P o l i t i c s i n the Middle East, ed., Michael C u r t i s . New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1971, PP. 258-277. Khouri, Fred J . " F r i c t i o n and C o n f l i c t on the I s r a e l i - S y r i a n Front." Middle East Journal, XVII (1963) 14-34. Lazarsfeld, Paul F. ^."Interpretation of S t a t i s t i c a l Relations as a Re-search Operation." The Language of Social Research, eds., Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Morris Rosenberg, Glencoe, 111.: The Free Press, 1955, PP. 115-125. Liska, George. "Continuity and Change i n International Systems." World  P o l i t i c s , XVI, 1 (October, 1963) 118-136. Maclver, Robert. "War and C i v i l i z a t i o n . " P o l i t i c s and Society, ed., 100 David S p i t z . New York: Atherton Press, 1969, pp. 427-440. Morrison, Donald G. and Hugh Michael Stevenson. " P o l i t i c a l I n s t a b i l i t y i n Independent Black A f r i c a : More Dimensions of C o n f l i c t Beha-v i o r Within Nations." Journal.of C o n f l i c t Resolution, XV, 3 (September, 1971) 347-368. Moul, B i l l . "The Level of Analysis Problem: Spatial and Temporal Aggre-: gation i n International Relations." Paper presented at the 44th Annual Meeting of the Canadian P o l i t i c a l Science Association, Montreal, June, 1972. North, Robert C , Howard E. Koch and Dina A. Zinnes. "The Integrative Functions of C o n f l i c t . " Journal of C o n f l i c t Resolution, IV, 3 (September, i960) 355-374. Peres, Yochanan. "Modernization and Nationalism i n the Identity of the Israel Arab." Middle East Journal, XXIV, 4 (1970) 479-492. Peres, Yochanan. "Ethnic Relations i n I s r a e l . " People and P o l i t i c s i n  the Middle East, ed., Michael C u r t i s . New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1971, PP« 31-68. Perlmutter, • Amos. "The I n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n of C i v i l - M i l i t a r y Relations i n I s r a e l : The Ben-Gurion Legacy and i t s Challengers." Middle  East Journal, XXII, 4 (1968) 415-432. Riggs, Fred W. "The Theory of Developing P o l i t i e s . " World P o l i t i c s , XVI, 1 (October, 1963) 147-171. Rondot, Pierre. "Le r a i d de Samou et l e c o n f l i t arabo-israelien." Revue  de defense nationale, 23e annee (janvier, 1967) 68-78. Rosenau, James N. "The External Environment as a Variable i n Foreign Po-l i c y Analysis." The Analysis of International P o l i t i c s , eds., James N. Rosenau, Vincent Davis and Maurice East, New York: The Press, 1972, pp. 145-165. Rummel, Rudoloh J . "Dimensions of C o n f l i c t Behavior Within and Between Nations," General Systems, VIII (.1963) 1-50. Hummel, Rudolph J . "Dimensions of Foreign and Domestic C o n f l i c t Beha-vi o r : A Review of Empirical Findings." Theory and Research on  the Causes of War, eds., Dean G. P r u i t t and Richard C. Snyder. Englewood C l i f f s , II.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., I969, pp. 219-228. Rummel, Rudolph J . "The Relationship Between National Attributes and Foreign C o n f l i c t Behavior." Quantitative International P o l i t i c s , ed., J . David Singer. New York: The Free Press, 1968, pp. 187-214. Seymour, Martin. "The Dynamics of Power i n Syria since the Break with 101 Egypt." Middle East Journal, VI, 1 (January, 1970) 35-47. Singer, J . David. "The Level-of-Analysis Problem i n International P o l i -t i c s . " International P o l i t i c s and Foreign Policy, ed., James N. Rosenau, Rev. ed.; New York: The Free Press, 1969, pp. 20-29. Snyder, Richard C , H.W. Bruck and Burton Sapin. "Decision Making as an Approach to the Study of International Relations." Foreign  Policy Decision Making, eds., Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck and Burton Sapin. New York: The Free Press, 1962, pp. 14-185. Tanter, Raymond. "Dimensions of Co n f l i c t Behavior Within and Between Nations, 1958-1960." Journal of C o n f l i c t Resolution, X, 1 (March, 1966) 41-64. Tanter, Raymond and Manus Midlarsky. "A Theory of Revolution." Journal of C o n f l i c t Resolution,XI, 3 (September, 1967) 264-280. T e r r e l l , Louis M. "Societal Stress, P o l i t i c a l I n s t a b i l i t y and Levels of M i l i t a r y E f f o r t . " Journal of Co n f l i c t Resolution, XV, 3 (Septem-ber, 1971) 329-346. Turner, Ralph A. "Integrative Be l i e f s i n Group Crises." Journal of Con- f l i c t Resolution, XVI, 1 (March, 1972) 25-40. Wilkenfeld, Jonathan. "Domestic and Foreign C o n f l i c t Behavior of Nations." Journal of Peace Research, V (1968) 56- 69. Wilkenfeld, Jonathan. "Some Further Findings Regarding the Domestic and Foreign C o n f l i c t Behavior of Nations." Journal of Peace  Research, VI (1969) 147-155. Wilkenfeld, Jonathan, V i r g i n i a Lee Lussier and Dale Tahtinen. " C o n f l i c t Interactions i n the Middle East, 1949-1967." Journal of Con- f l i c t Resolution, XVI, 2 (June, 1972) 135-154. Zinnes, Dina. "The Requisites f o r International S t a b i l i t y : A Review." Journal of C o n f l i c t Resolution, VIII, 3 (September, 1964) 301-305. 102 Appendix A Domestic Unrest Behaviour i 1. Strikes are organized disruptions of the economy by groups v/ho refuse to work at th e i r regular employment i n order to protest governmental p o l i c i e s or authority. Strikes concerned sol e l y with the conditions of employment i n a s p e c i f i c firm are not coun-ted unless a l l strikes are i l l e g a l i n the state. 2. Demonstrations are non-violent gatherings, usually planned and orga-nized, to protest against governmental p o l i c i e s , personnel, or authority, or against competing non-governmental i n t r a s o c i e t a l groups. 3 . Riots are events involving (usually unplanned) short-lived but violent a c t i v i t y (including f i g h t i n g ) , i n which the generalized aims of the insurgents or the objects of th e i r aggression are not coherently specified or are very limited i n nature. They may or may not be directed against governmental policy or authority or against i n t r a s o c i e t a l groups., or have such protest as th e i r excuse. When demonstrations are counteracted' by violence on the part of others (notably police) they (are considered to be) r i o t s . 4. T e r r o r i s t attacks are events involving r e l a t i v e l y highly organized and planned a c t i v i -ty on the part of small ... groups i n which the (aim of the) a c t i v i t y i s to damage, injure or eliminate government (or com-peting i n t r a s o c i e t a l group) property or personnel. These a c t i -v i t i e s include bomb plants, sabotage..., assassination (attemp-ted or successful) and isolated g u e r r i l l a a c t i v i t i e s . 5. Coups d'etat are attempted or successful displacements of the e x i s t -ing p o l i t i c a l leadership personnel by the action of a r e l a t i v e l y small, e l i t e group without any overt mass p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the event. 103 6« Mutiny involves the re f u s a l of national security forces, or a por-t i o n thereof, to obey the orders of the p o l i t i c a l authorities or superior o f f i c e r s . The aims of the action are usually limited to r e -v i s i o n of the conditions of service. 7. Rebellion i s a viol e n t event i n which some major, self-conscious segment of the population organizes i t s e l f and physically assaults the government, t h e i r i n s t a l l a t i o n s or forces, i n order to gain r e v i s i o n of s p e c i f i c p o l i c i e s related to t h e i r group or, more generally "increased autonomy from the national p o l i t i c a l authority." 8. Revolt i s an event i n which coordinated attacks against government pro-perty and personnel are carried out by groups who are more rea d i l y i d e n t i f i a b l e by membership i n a mass p o l i t i c a l movement, and whose aim i s to overthrow the existing government. 9 . C i v i l war i s an a l l out war between two or more major segments of the popu-l a t i o n . Each segment has i t s own government.... One of the groups may claim independence from the other, or both may claim sovereignty over the whole state. "The entire nation becomes i n -volved." Note: A l l quotations are from Morrison and Stevenson, op. c i t . , pp. 3 5 0 -3 5 3 , Table 1. 104 Appendix B Interstate Violence Behaviour 1. M i l i t a r y action involves (a) the penetration into another state's t e r r i t o r y , airspace, t e r r i t o r i a l waters or into demilitarized border zones, of a state's m i l i t a r y personnel, m i l i t a r y a i r c r a f t and naval vessels; (b) naval or a i r clashes on or over the high seas; (c) f i r i n g or s h e l l i n g across borders and armistice demarcation l i n e s . 2. C i v i l i a n penetration r e s u l t i n g i n violence. This involves the penetration of non-military personnel, a i r c r a f t and shipping into the t e r r i t o r y , airspace or t e r r i t o r i a l waters of a state, during which . armed force i s used i n an encounter with the inhabitants of the penetrated state. 3. Wars are m i l i t a r y actions on a very large scale, usually involving most of the armed forces personnel of the combattants. Appendix C Data Upon Which Calculations Are Based Domestic Unrest i n I s r a e l Yr.Mo .Day Event Casualties Duration T e r r i t o r i a l 5.0.01.22 Demo. 0 12 1 5 0 . 0 1 Demo. 0 1 1 5 0 . 0 1 . 2 9 Riot 5 1 1 5 0 . 0 2 . 1 4 Riot 21 1 1 5 0 . 0 2 . 1 9 Riot 0 1 1 5 0 . 0 2 . 2 2 Riot 0 1 1 5 0 . 0 3 . 2 6 Demo. 0 1 1 5 0 . 0 3 . 2 8 Demo. 0 1 1 5 0 . 0 5 . 0 1 Riot 0 1 1 50.07.23 Demo. 0 1 1 5 0 . 0 8 . 0 1 Strike 0 14 10 5 1 . 0 1 . 2 3 Riot 0 1 1 5 1 . 0 2 . 0 2 Demo. 4 1 3 5 1 . 0 5 . 0 1 Riot 0 1 1 5 1 . 0 7 . 2 9 Riot 10 1 1 5 1 . 0 8 . 2 8 . Demo. 0 1 1 5 1 . 1 1 . 1 2 Demo. 0 1 2 51.11 .23 Demo. 0 1 1 51.12.14 Riot 42 1 1 5 1 . 1 2 . 1 7 Demo. 0 1 1 5 1 . 1 2 . 2 5 Demo. 0 1 1 5 2 . 0 1 . 0 7 Riot 350 1 1 5 2 . 0 1 . 0 8 Demo. 0 l 1 5 2 . 0 3 . 2 1 Demo. 0 1 1 5 2 . 0 3 . 2 2 Demo. 0 1 1 5 2 . 0 3 . 2 5 Demo. 0 1 1 5 2 . 0 3 . 2 5 Demo. 0 4 1 5 2 . 0 4 . 1 5 Riot 11 1 1 5 2 . 0 4 . 2 5 Demo. 0 1 1 5 2 . 0 5 . 0 1 Riot 0 1 1 5 2 . 0 6 . 0 2 Strike 0 3 10 5 2 . 0 6 . 0 4 Demo. 0 1 1 5 2 . 0 6 . 2 3 Terror. 0' 0 1 5 2 , 0 6 . 2 9 Strike 0 1 10 5 2 . 0 8 Riot 0 2 1 5 2 . 0 9 . 0 1 Demo. 0 1 1 5 2 . 1 0 . 0 5 Terror. 0 0 1 52.IO.27- Demo. 0 1 5 5 2 . 1 2 . 0 3 Terror. - 0 0 2 53.01.13 Demo. 0 1 1 5 3 . 0 1 . 3 0 Terror. 0 0 1 Yr.Mo.Day Event Casualties Duration T e r r i t o r i a l 53.02.09 Terror. 3 0 1 53.02.12 Riot 0 1 1 53.05.15 Demo. 0 1 2 53.05.15 Riot 0 1 1 53.05.27 Terror. 0 0 1 53.07.14 Demo. 0 1 1 53.07.22 Demo. 0 1 1 53.09.07 Terror. 0 0 1 54.06.18 Riot 0 1 1 55.02.07 Riot 0 1 1 55.07 Terror. 2 0 1 55.07.17 Terror. 0 0 3 56.01.27 Riot 0 1 1 56.04.29 Riot 28 1 1 56.05.06 Demo. 0 1 1 56.06 Riot 0 1 1 56.09.01 Riot 8 1 1 56.09.09 Demo. 0 1 1 56.11.18 Riot 75 1 1 57.03.03 Terror. 1 0 1 57.04.02 Demo. 0 1 1 57.10.29 Riot 0 1 1 57.10.29 Terror. 5 0 1 58.04.09 Demo. 0 1 1 58.05.Ol Riot 80 1 1 58.05.03 Riot 0 1 1 58.08.04 Riot 0 1 1 58.08.25 Strike 0 1 10 58.08.25 Riot 0 1 1 59.03.18 Demo. 0 1 1 59.03.23 Riot 0 1 2 59.07.08 Riot 0 1 1 59.07.09 Riot 0 1 1 59.07.31 Riot 0 1 1 61.02.04 Riot 0 1 1 61.02.14 Demo. 0 1 1 61.07.12 Riot 0 1 1 6 l . 0 7 . l 6 Riot 2 1 1 61.09.21 Demo. 0 2 2 61.09.23 Riot 2 1 1 62.02.14 Demo. 0 1 1 62.03.04 Demo. 0 1 1 1 0 7 Yr.Mo.Day Event Casualties Duration T e r r i t o r i a l Extent 63.02.20 Demo. 0 1 1 6 3 . 0 5 . 2 5 Demo. 0 1 2 63.06.01 Riot 0 1 1 6 3 . 0 7 . 1 5 Riot 0 1 ' 1 6 3 . 0 7 . 2 2 Riot 2 1 1 6 3 . 0 7 . 2 7 Riot 0 1 1 63.09.10 Riot 0 1 2 63.09.14 Riot 0 1 1 63.10.03 Riot 0 1 1 63.10.13 Demo. 0 1 1 63.10.26 Riot 3 1 1 6 3 . 0 9 . 0 5 Demo. 0 1 1 64.08.17 Strike 0 2 10 64.11.14 Riot 0 1 1 64.12.17 Demo. 0 1 1 65 .O5.O6 Riot 0 1 1 6 5 . O 8 . O 8 Demo. 0 1 1 65.08.13 Demo. 0 1 1 6 5 . O 8 . i 7 Demo. 0 2 1 6 5 . O 8 . l 8 Demo. 0 1 1 6 5 . O 8 . i 9 Riot 0 1 1 65.08.22 Riot 0 1 1 6 5.lO . l 6 Riot 0 1 1 65.IO Riot 0 1 1 65.11.27 Demo. 0 1 1 Domestic Unrest i n Syria Yr.Mo.Day Event Casualties Duration T e r r i t o r i a l Extent 50.01.14 Riot 40 1 1 50.03.14 Strike 0 1 1 5 0 . 0 5 . 2 9 Terror. 0 0 1 50.06.21 Riot 13 1 1 5 0 . 0 6 . 2 7 Terror. 0 0 1 5 0 . 0 7 Terror. 1 0 1 50.10.13 Terror. 2 0 1 50.12 .22 Riot 31 1 1 50.12.12 Demo. 0 1 1 51.07.20 Riot 0 1 1 51.08 .05 Demo. 0 1 1 51.10 .06 Demo. 0 1 1 51.11.07 Demo. 0 1 1 51.11 Demo. 0 1 1 51.11 .29 Coup, 0 0 1 52.01.26 Riot 27 1 1 52.02 .15 Riot 0 1 2 52.02 Strike 0 3 3 Yr.Mo.Day Event Casualties Duration T e r r i t o r i a l Extent 5 2 . 0 3 . 2 9 Terror. 1 0 1 5 2 . 1 2 . 0 3 Terror. 0 0 1 5 3 . 0 7 . 1 0 Terror. 0 0 1 5 4 . 0 1 . 2 8 Riot 0 1 4 5 4 . 0 1 . 2 7 Revolt 0 9 2 5 4 . 0 1 . 2 9 Strike 0 1 10 5 4 . 0 2 . 2 5 Coup 0 0 10 5 4 . 0 2 . 2 6 Riot 108 2 1 5 4 . 0 4 . 0 1 Riot 1 2 1 5 4 . 0 6 . 1 1 Riot 0 1 1 5 4 . 0 7 Demo. 0 1 1 5 4 . 0 7 . 1 5 Strike 0 1 10 5 4 . 0 7 . 1 8 Demo. 0 1 1 5 4 . 0 8 Riot 1 1 1 5 4 . 0 8 . 1 3 Riot 0 1 1 5 4 . 0 9 . 1 5 Riot 25 1 1 5 4 . 0 9 . 2 7 Riot 29 1 1 5 4 . 1 0 . 0 1 Riot 18 1 1 5 5 . 0 1 . 1 3 Riot 0 1 1 55.01.16 Riot 0 1 1 5 5 . 0 2 . 2 7 Riot 10 1 1 55.03.06 Riot 34 1 1 5 5 . 0 3 . 2 7 Demo. 0 1 1 5 5 . 0 4 Riot 4 1 2 5 5 . 0 4 . 1 7 Riot 7 1 1 5 5 . 0 4 . 2 2 Terror. 1 0 1 5 5 . 0 4 . 2 2 Riot 0 1 1 5 5 . 0 4 . 2 5 Demo. 0 1 1 5 5 . 0 4 . 2 7 Strike 0 1 10 5 5 . 0 7 . 0 9 Demo. 0 1 1 5 5 . 0 8 . 2 5 Terror. 1 0 1 5 6 . 0 2 . 0 8 Riot 22 1 1 5 6 . 0 2 . 1 2 Riot 5 1 1 5 6 . 0 4 . 0 8 Riot 38 1 1 5 6 . 0 6 . 0 1 Demo. 0 1 1 5 6 . 1 0 Riot 0 1 1 5 6 . 1 0 Strike 0 1 1 5 7 . 0 2 . 0 3 Terror. 0 0 1 5 7 . 0 2 . 0 8 Riot 0 1 1 57.05.O6 Riot 8 1 2 5 7 . 0 9 . Terror. 0 0 2 5 9 . 0 1 . 0 2 Riot 0 3 1 5 9 . 0 1 . 0 3 Riot 0 1 1 6 l . 0 9 . 2 8 Coup 0 0 1 Yr.Mo.Day Event Casualties Duration T e r r i t o r i a l 61.10.01 Demo. 0 1 1 62.03.28 Coup 0 0 1 62.03.'31-.. ' Riot' 5 1 3 62.03.31 Demo. 0 3 4 62.04.01 Revolt 0 3 2 62.04.02 Riot 0 1 1 62.07.07 Riot 31 1 1 62.07.07 Strike 0 6 2 62.07.09 Riot 0 1 1 62.07.13 Terror. 0 0 1 62.07.13 Terror. 0 0 3 62.07.16 Terror. 0 0 3 62.07.23 Terror. 2 0 3 62.08.13 Riot 5 1 1 62.09.08 Terror. 25 0 1 62.10.02 Demo. 0 1 1 62.11.20 Riot 4 1 1 62.11.21 Demo. 0 1 1 63.01.09 Demo. 0 1 1 63.01.12 Riot 11 2 1 63.01.13 Riot 13 1 1 63.01.14 Riot 0 1 1 63.01.27 Riot 25 1 1 63.02.02 Riot 7 1 1 63.03.08 Coup 0 0 1 63.03.10 Riot 4 1 1 63.03.13 Demo. 0 1 2 63.03.31 Riot 0 2 4 63.04.15 Terror. 1 0 1 63.05.08 Riot 50 1 2 63.05.09 Riot 0 1 1 63.05.09 Riot 0 1 1 63.07.18 Coup 170 0 1 63.07.24 Terror. 0 0 1 64.02.08 Riot 0 1 1 64.02.22 Riot 0 1 1 64.04.15 Revolt 70 2 1 64.04.20 Demo. 0 1 1 64.04.20 Riot 1 1 1 64.03.08 Revolt 0 1 1 65.01.23 Riot 2 1 1 65.01.24 Strike 0 3 1 65.Ol.27 Riot 0 1 1 65.03.24 Revolt 34 1 1 65.12.30 Coup 0 0 1 66.02.23 Coup 146 0 1 110 Yr.Mo.Day Event Casualties Duration T e r r i t o r i a l Extent 6 6 . 0 9 . 0 8 Coup 0 0 1 Domestic Unrest i n Jordan Yr.Mo.Day Event Casualties Duration T e r r i t o r i a l Extent 5 0 . 0 4 . 0 4 Riot 3 1 1 5 0 . 0 6 . 0 2 Riot 0 1 1 5 0 . 1 1 . 2 9 Demo. 0 1 1 5 1 . 0 7 . 2 0 Terror. 2 0 1 51.11 .16 Demo. 0 1 1 52 .11 . 16 Riot 0 2 4 53 . 0 8 . 2 4 Demo. 0 1 1 53.10.17 Demo. 0 7 4 53.10.23 Riot 0 1 1 54.06.13 Demo. 0 1 1 54.10.17 Riot 143 2 4 54.10.17 Strike 0 7 10 5 4 . 1 0 . 2 1 Strike 0 1 1 55 .11 .04 Riot 1 1 1 55.11.04 Demo. 0 1 4 55.12.16 Riot 68 4 6 5 5 . 1 2 . 2 0 Strike 0 1 1 55 . 12 .20 Strike 0 3 1 55 . 12.22 Demo. 0 1 1 5 6 . 0 1 . 0 7 Riot 50 1 7 56 .01 .07 Strike 0 1 7 5 6 . 0 1 . 1 2 Riot 0 1 1 56 .04.22 Riot 33 1 4 56 .12.17 Strike 0 1 10 5 7 o 0 4 . l l Demo. 0 1 1 57.04.13 Coup 13 1 1 57.04.14 Riot 0 1 1 57.04.14 Demo. 0 1 1 5 7 . 0 4 . 1 6 Demo. 0 1 1 57 .04.16 Riot 0 1 1 57 .04.22 Demo. 0 2 4 5 7 . 0 4 . 2 4 Riot 0 1 1 57 . 0 4 . 2 4 Strike 0 1 10 57 . 0 9 . 0 9 Terror. 0 0 1 57.09 Terror. 0 0 1 5 8 . 0 8 . 0 2 Terror. 0 0 2 6 O . 0 8 . 2 9 Terror. 60 0 2 I l l Yr.Mo.Day Event Casualties Duration Ti 63.01.12 Strike 0 1 1 63.04.16 Riot 1 2 3 63.04.20 Riot 12 4 3 66.05.02 Terror. 1 0 1 66.11.15 Riot 0 1 1 66.11.19 Riot 0 1 1 66.11.20 Riot 0 1 1 66.11.21 Riot 0 1 1 66.11.23 Riot 0 1 1 66.11.24 Riot 0 1 1 66.11.25 Strike 0 1 5 66.11.25 Riot 42 1 6 66.11.29 Strike 0 1 1 66.11.29 Demo. 0 1 4 66.11.29 Riot 2 1 1 66.12.05 Riot 0 1 2 66.11.18 Demo-. 0 1 6 66.12.30 Terror. 0 0 4 Domestic Unrest i n Egypt e r r i t o r i a l Extent Yr.Mo.Day • Event Casualties Duration T e r r i t o r i a l 50.01.11 Riot 4 1 1 50.11.16 Riot 0 2 1 50.11.27 Riot 10 1 2 50.11.29 Riot 50 1 1 50.11.30 Demo. 0 1 1 51.01.13 Demo. 0 1 1 51.02.18 Demo. 0 1 1 51.07.30 Demo. 0 1 1 51.08.05 Strike 0 1 1 51.08.27 Riot 0 1 1 51.10.11 Riot 0 1 1 51.10.12 Riot 0 1 1 51.10.18 Demo. 0 1 2 51.10.23 Riot 5 1 1 51.10.23 Riot 40 1 1 51.11.12 Demo. 0 1 1 51.12.04 Riot 28 1 2 51.12.05 Riot 36 1 2 51.12.05 Terror. 1 0 1 51.12.26 Riot 0 1 1 51.12.26 Demo. 0 1 1 51.12.27 Riot 30 1 1 51.12.27 Demo. 0 1 1 51.12.27 Riot 26 1 1 51.12.27 Demo. 0 1 1 51.12.30 Demo. 0 1 3 51.12.31 Demo. 0 1 5 112 Yr.Mo.Day Event Casualties Duration T e r r i t o r i a l 52.01.06 Demo. 0 1 1 5 2 . 0 1 . 0 4 Riot 4 2 2 5 2 . 0 1 . 1 5 Riot 0 1 1 5 2 . 0 1 . 2 0 Riot 2 1 1 5 2 . 0 1 . 2 6 Riot 113 1 1 5 2 . 0 7 . 2 4 Coup 0 1 1 5 2 . 0 8 . 1 1 Strike 0 2 1 5 2 . 0 8 . 1 3 Riot 204 1 1 5 2 . 0 8 . 1 3 Riot 6 1 1 5 2 . 0 9 Terror. 0 0 1 52.11.16 Riot 0 1 1 5 4 . 0 1 . 1 2 Riot 0 1 1 5 4 . 0 2 . 0 7 Coup 0 1 1 5 4 . 0 2 . 2 8 Demo. 0 1 1 5 4 . 0 2 . 2 8 Riot 13 1 1 5 4 . 0 3 . 1 4 Demo. 0 1 1 5 4 . 0 3 . 1 7 Demo. 0 1 1 5 4 . 0 3 . 1 3 Demo. 0 7 1 5 4 . 0 3 . 2 1 Terror. 0 1 5 5 4 . 0 3 . 2 5 Demo. 0 1 1 5 4 . 0 3 . 2 7 Strike 0 3 1 5 4 . 0 3 . 2 5 Demo. 0 4 1 5 4 . 0 3 . 2 9 Riot 2 1 1 5 4 . 0 3 . 3 0 Demo. 0 3 1 5 4 . 0 4 . 0 3 Riot 0 1 1 5 4 . 0 4 . 0 3 Demo. 0 1 1 5 4 . 0 4 . 0 5 Demo. 0 1 1 5 4 . 0 4 . 0 7 Riot 0 1 1 5 4 . 0 4 . 0 7 Demo. 0 1 1 54.08 .27 Riot 30 1 1 5 4 . 0 9 . 1 0 Riot 5 1 1 5 4 . 1 0 . 2 6 Terror. 0 0 1 5 4 . 1 0 . 2 7 Riot 0 1 1 54.11 .15 Riot 0 1 1 5 5 . 0 3 . 0 2 Demo. 0 1 1 5 5 . 0 3 . 0 3 Riot 7 1 1 5 6 . 0 4 . 0 7 Demo. 0 1 1 5 6 . 0 5 Strike 0 1 1 5 6 . 0 5 Strike 0 1 1 5 7 . 0 2 . 2 6 Mutiny 7 1 1 5 7 . 0 5 . 2 6 Riot 17 1 1 5 7 . 0 7 . 0 3 Riot 16 1 1 5 7 . 0 7 . 1 4 Riot 17 1 1 65.O8.29 Riot 0 1 1 113 Interstate Violence Figures: Six-Month Temporal Unit Isr a e l Jordan Syria Egypt Period V i Vm V i Vm V i Vm V i Vm 1950a 21 22 12 14 5 0 4 •8 1950b 35 71 20 32 4 2 • 8 25 1951a 54 80 25, 55 25 23 4 2 1951b 17 22 10 18 2 4 105 368 1952a 24 56 15 51 4 1 50 224 1952b 18 22 12 20 2 0 4 2 1953a 72 125 60 115 i 0 15 14 1953b 73 202 54 113 6 0 23 102 1954a 143 212 87 168 11 19 64 45 1954b 143 108 70 66 9 3 58 38 1955a 319 265 73 47 47 3 98 215 1955b 333 416 39 21 48 110 142 283 1956a 318 344 68 42 23 12 221 278 1956b 133 3593 81 319 12 8 60 7380 1957a 143 139 52 40 37 53 53 68 1957b 81 54 32 21 46 33 12 13 1953a . 64 49 23 24 48 27 6 5 1958b 37 19 15 4 26 10 7 6 1959a 46 32 9 14 28 29 19 15. 1959b 27 ~ 12 8 4 16 10 9 5 1960a 27 24 2 0 25 24 0 0 1960b 13 6 3 2 13 4 0 0 196la 24 11 2 6 24 7 0 0 1961b 10 5 6 5 10 10 0 0 1962a 33 16 7 8 27 8 0 0 1962b 35 9 1 5 33 4 1 Y 1963a 76 10 3 3 73 1 3 6-Y 1963b 41 23 8 11 30 6 5 9-Y 1964a 35 18 11 10 22 3 3 5-Y 1964b 91 79 9 11 77 58 5 7-Y 1965a 45 54 18 34 20 13 9 10-Y 1965b 39 51 32 40 3 10 1 Y 1966a 41 86 18 72 18 " 12 1 Y 1966b 47 146 17 97 28 48 4 1-Y "Y" refers to the number of casualties suffered and i n f l i c t e d by Egyptian troops i n the Yemen. It i s impossible to f i n d finy figures for t h i s war. There i s one Jerusalem Post report, however, which c i t e s figures presen-ted to a closed session of the National Assembly i n 1965. Total Egyptian casualties up to that time were given as 1607. (Jerusalem Post, March 1965) 

Cite

Citation Scheme:

        

Citations by CSL (citeproc-js)

Usage Statistics

Share

Embed

Customize your widget with the following options, then copy and paste the code below into the HTML of your page to embed this item in your website.
                        
                            <div id="ubcOpenCollectionsWidgetDisplay">
                            <script id="ubcOpenCollectionsWidget"
                            src="{[{embed.src}]}"
                            data-item="{[{embed.item}]}"
                            data-collection="{[{embed.collection}]}"
                            data-metadata="{[{embed.showMetadata}]}"
                            data-width="{[{embed.width}]}"
                            async >
                            </script>
                            </div>
                        
                    
IIIF logo Our image viewer uses the IIIF 2.0 standard. To load this item in other compatible viewers, use this url:
http://iiif.library.ubc.ca/presentation/dsp.831.1-0101421/manifest

Comment

Related Items