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Comparative study of the political and economic consolidation policies pursued by the Soviet Union in… Okoko, Cornelius Amaebi Biye 1973

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d A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONSOLIDATION POLICIES PURSUED BY THE SOVIET UNION IN KAZAKHSTAN (1917-33) AND COMMUNIST CHINA IN SINKIANG (1949-57) by CORNELIUS AMAEBI BIYE OKOKO AIMLT (Bacteriology) London,^ 1965 B.A. , (Hons.)5 U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1972 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS i n the Department of POLITICAL SCIENCE We accept t h i s thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA J u l y , 1973 In p r e s e n t i n g t h i s t h e s i s i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t o f the requirements f o r an advanced degree at the U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree t h a t the L i b r a r y s h a l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r r e f e r e n c e and study. I f u r t h e r agree t h a t p e r m i s s i o n f o r e x t e n s i v e c o p y i n g o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r s c h o l a r l y purposes may be g r a n t e d by the Head o f my Department or by h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . I t i s understood t h a t c o p y i n g or p u b l i c a t i o n of t h i s t h e s i s f o r f i n a n c i a l g a i n s h a l l not be a llowed w ithout my w r i t t e n p e r m i s s i o n . Department o f P o l i t i c a l Science The U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Columbia Vancouver 8, Canada Date 31 July, 1973 - i -ABSTRACT This study i s an attempt to compare s i m i l a r periods of development during the respective phases of consolidation of power by the Bolsheviks i n Kazakhstan and by the Chinese Communists i n Sinkiang. I t i s not intended to be an exhaustive study, given the momentous developments that transpired during the period under study - 1917-33 i n Kazakhstan and 1949-57 i n Sinkiang. This study w i l l therefore be l i m i t e d to those important p o l i t i c a l and economic developments which appear to t h i s writer to demonstrate more convincingly the s i m i l a r i t i e s and d i f f e r e n c e s these two periods of development - the p o l i t i c a l c o n s o l i d a t i o n phase and the economic consolidation phase - portrayed. What do the Soviet and Chinese economies of the period under study have i n common? What do the two regimes have i n common i n terms of t h e i r p o l i t i c a l p o l i c i e s ? Why compare them at a l l ? Perhaps the easiest answer to these questions i s that both economies, were lodged i n s i m i l a r d o c t r i n a l -p o l i t i c a l matrices. They were both i n t e g r a l aspects of Communist s o c i e t i e s and one-party systems that o f f i c i a l l y designated themselves, at l e a s t at the time, as Marxist-Leninist by i d e o l o g i c a l commitment, Communist by party l a b e l , and S o c i a l i s t by politico-economic order. But i t i s equally true, that a common i d e o l o g i c a l base alone does not of i t s e l f ensure that i t w i l l be applied p r e c i s e l y the same way regardless of time, place and circumstance. Thus when a Communist party takes power and consolidates i t s roots - i i -i n the n a t i o n a l s o i l , i t s perception of i t s needs and the nature of i t s commitments cannot avoid being coloured by the national i n t e r e s t s which i t has i n h e r i t e d and the pressures of the m i l i e u i n which i t i s compelled to function. In t h i s study, i t has also been demonstrated that, with C i v i l War behind them and once power was won, the p o l i t i c a l and economic p o l i c i e s pursued by both regimes also d i f f e r e d markedly i n many respects. < \ * - \ v \ -TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ABSTRACT i INTRODUCTION 1 SECTION I An H i s t o r i c a l Overview of Kazakhstan and Sinkiang P r i o r to the Seizure of Power by the Respective Communist Regimes. 1. Kazakhstan: The Period P r i o r to 1917 9 .Kazakhstan on the Eve of the October 1917 Revolution 14 2. Sinkiang 20 SECTION I I An Analysis of the P o l i t i c a l P o l i c i e s Adopted by Both Regimes During the P o l i t i c a l Consolidation Phase 1. Kazakhstan 30 2. Sinkiang 42 SECTION I I I An Analysis of the Economic P o l i c i e s of Both Regimes During the P o l i t i c a l Consolidation Phase 1. Kazakhstan 56 2. Sinkiang 62 _ \ V -Page SECTION rv An Analysis of the P o l i t i c a l and Economic Developments During the Period of Economic Consolidation 1. Kazakhstan 71 2. Sinkiang 79 CONCLUSION 88 FOOTNOTES 93 BIBLIOGRAPHY 111 APPENDICES 123 A Abbreviations B Population Table C Maps INTRODUCTION The purpose of t h i s study i s to compare s i m i l a r periods of development during the respective phases of p o l i t i c a l and economic c o n s o l i -dation aft.er the accession to power by the Bolsheviks i n Kazakhstan and by the Chinese Communists i n Sinkiang - both underdeveloped regions at the time. The r e l a t i o n s h i p between the "less-developed" and the more "developed" areas, between urban and r u r a l areas, centre and periphery etc., (both n a t i o n a l and i n t e r n a t i o n a l ) has generated considerable i n t e r e s t among scholars of i n t e g r a t i o n theory i n recent years. In a r e l a t e d sense therefore t h i s study w i l l attempt to look into the question of what Communism has to o f f e r to "under-developed" t e r r i t o r i e s . But given the l i m i t e d scope of t h i s study, and i n view of the f a c t that the c e n t r a l focus of t h i s study i s not on the theory of i n t e g r a t i o n per se, our d i s c u s s i o n of the concept w i l l therefore be l i m i t e d to the two dimensions of c o n s o l i d a t i o n - p o l i t i c a l and economic - as they r e l a t e to the o v e r a l l i n t e g r a t i v e process. In t h i s regard, I found the typology of Professor Weiner on i n t e g r a t i o n very u s e f u l f o r our purposes as i t encompasses the two dimensions under consideration. In h i s rather comprehensive examination of the various d e f i n i t i o n s or uses of i n t e g r a t i o n Professor Weiner delineated f i v e broad categories: n a t i o n a l i n t e g r a t i o n , t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r a t i o n , value i n t e g r a t i o n , elite-mass i n t e g r a t i o n , and i n t e g r a t i v e behaviour."'" Of these f i v e categories he suggests that " t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r a t i o n " which i s defined as "the process of bringing together c u l t u r a l l y and s o c i a l l y d i s c r e t e groups into a s i n g l e 2 t e r r i t o r i a l u n i t and the establishment of a n a t i o n a l i d e n t i t y " , remains - 2 -by f a r the most commonly used form of the term. While t h i s may be l a r g e l y true i n the context of most of the newly emergent nations of A s i a , A f r i c a and to some extent L a t i n America, i t can hardly hold true f o r the Soviet Union 3 or China. The reason i s that the t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y or sovereignty of these two countries v i s - a - v i s the two regions under study was never questioned by other powers, granted there were some i n t e r n a l rumblings w i t h i n the 4 sub-units. Thus both the leaders of the n a t i o n a l i s t movements of Kazakhstan and Sinkiang sent out feeble f e e l e r s f o r " n a t i o n a l autonomy" at the time of the accession to power of the two Communist regimes. More on t h i s l a t e r . The argument here i s that " t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r a t i o n " does not apply to the cases under study. What does apply however, at l e a s t f o r our purposes, i s Weiner's other four types: n a t i o n a l i n t e g r a t i o n , (the problem of e s t a b l i s h i n g n a t i o n a l c e n t r a l a u t h o r i t y over subordinate p o l i t i c a l u n i t s or regions which may or may not coincide with d i s t i n c t c u l t u r a l or s o c i a l units)"*; elite-mass i n t e g r a t i o n (the problem of l i n k i n g government with the governed); value i n t e g r a t i o n (the minimum value consensus necessary to maintain a s o c i a l order); and i n t e g r a t i v e behaviour (the capacity of people i n a s o c i e t y to organize f o r some common purpose).^ While accepting the basic substance of Weiner's d e f i n i t i o n s as an a n a l y t i c a l t o o l , I have found the compartmentalization of these four * In f a c t Lobanov-Rostovsky suggests that the Soviets f o r example, were d e l i b e r a t e l y stimulating the feebly developed n a t i o n a l i s t i c f e e l i n g s of /^Kazakhstan? and i n the r e s t of Central A s i a . " See Prince A. Lobanov-Rostovsky, Russia & Asia (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1933) p. 273. - 3 -categories unnecessary and cumbersome. It i s f u t i l e to t a l k s e r i o u s l y about n a t i o n a l i n t e g r a t i o n i f there i s an ever widening "elite-mass gap", i f there i s no "common purpose" among the leadership and the population at large, or i f there i s no minimum "value consensus". The absence of these c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s w i l l cast a negative shadow on the goal of n a t i o n a l i n t e g r a t i o n . Put i n another way, n a t i o n a l i n t e g r a t i o n w i l l be imperiled i f these aspects are found wanting i n any p o l i t i c a l community. The problem of n a t i o n a l i n t e g r a t i o n , writes Professor Binder, i s one of forging a s i n g l e s o c i a l type, out of a m u l t i p l i c i t y . I t r e q u i r e s , he continues, that "the gap between e l i t e s and n o n - e l i t e s be closed".^ The emphasis on n a t i o n a l i n t e g r a t i o n i s c r u c i a l because i t subsumes under i t s general r u b r i c the two aspects or dimensions of p o l i t i c a l and economic c o n s o l i d a t i o n which are the c e n t r a l themes of t h i s study. Both aspects are e s s e n t i a l to the process of n a t i o n a l i n t e g r a t i o n . Stresses which lead to a weakening of p o l i t i c a l and economic c o n s o l i d a t i o n must be reduced i f not eliminated by appropriate responses from the p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t i e s , otherwise the system's s u r v i v a l w i l l the threatened. Examples of such malintegrative s t r e s s i n modern h i s t o r y as a r e s u l t of the weakening of the two dimensions of p o l i t i c a l and economic c o n s o l i d a t i o n are those associated with the 'black power' movement i n the U.S.A., the attempted Bi a f r a n secession i n 1967, the Northern Ireland debacle, and the departure g of Singapore from the Malaysian f e d e r a t i o n i n 1965. Viewed i n t h i s sense then, the working d e f i n i t i o n of c o n s o l i d a t i o n of power f o r the purposes of t h i s study when elaborated upon becomes "a - 4 -process i n which the p o l i t i c a l and economic c o n s o l i d a t i o n of a system, (as part of an o v e r a l l i n t e g r a t i v e process) i s increased, and i s i n turn accompanied by an expansion of the scope and power of the system i n terms of sectors that are c o n t r o l l e d on a system rather than on a u n i t l e v e l " . Thus, the return of Moscovite power i n Kazakhstan following the d i s i n t e g r a -t i o n and the subsequent de f e c t i o n of leaders of the n a t i o n a l i s t movement i n November 1919, and the entrance of the People's L i b e r a t i o n Army (hereafter c i t e d as PLA) on September 26, 1949 into Sinkiang, can be viewed as dates on which the Russians and the Chinese r e s p e c t i v e l y s t a r t to assert f i r m c o n t r o l over these two regions. Both Moscow and Peking faced somewhat comparable economic and p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n s i n that, at these r e s p e c t i v e dates, neither of the two regions was economically or p o l i t i c a l l y integrated with the r e s t of the two countries. I t i s therefore of great s i g n i f i c a n c e and indeed i l l u m i n a t i n g that both Kazakhstan and Sinkiang were brought into the timetable of economic, p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l p o l i c i e s pursued by the two regimes (though i n varying i n t e n s i t i e s ) along with the r e s t of the Soviet Union and China proper - except of course Tibet i n the l a t t e r case. The f a c t that both regions were included i n these programmes coming j u s t i n the wake of t h e i r accession to power simply underscores the urgent d e s i r e on the part of the two Communist regimes to quickly consolidate t h e i r power and c o n t r o l (economically and p o l i t i c a l l y ) over the two regions - as part of t h e i r o v e r a l l i n t e g r a t i v e plan i n t h e i r respective countries. For both the Soviet Union and China the p o l i t i c a l agency charged to provide the preconditions necessary f o r the achievement of the two - 5 -dimensions of c o n s o l i d a t i o n was the Communist Party. To be sure, both p o l i t i c a l and economic co n s o l i d a t i o n are r e l a t e d processes but by no means i d e n t i c a l . Together they remain the two major dimensions of an o v e r a l l ongoing i n t e g r a t i v e process, the c e n t r a l core of t h i s study. . I have divided the actual c o n s o l i d a t i o n of power into two periods: the p o l i t i c a l c o n s o l i d a t i o n phase which l a s t e d from 1917 to 1928 i n Kazakhstan and from 1949-52 i n Sinkiang; and the economic c o n s o l i d a t i o n phase from 1928-33 i n Kazakhstan and from 1953-57 i n Sinkiang. The p o l i t i c a l c o n s o l i d a t i o n phase e s s e n t i a l l y i s characterized by the absorption and e l i m i n a t i o n of l o c a l l eft-wing regimes and "counter-revolutionaries'. This can be seen i n the Soviet absorption of the lef t - w i n g elements of 9 Kazakhstan's n a t i o n a l i s t movement - the Alash Orda - and the e l i m i n a t i o n of other "counter-revolutionaries" both w i t h i n and without the movement. Equally, the leaders of the Eastern Turkestan Republic i n Sinkiang met with a s i m i l a r f a t e , a l b e i t i n a much attenuated form. During the p o l i t i c a l c o n s o l i d a t i o n phase, the basic Communist p o l i t i c a l forms of c o n t r o l were introduced and f i r m l y established. These included among others the h i g h l y c e n t r a l i z e d Communist Party organization, and Soviet-type government i n s t i t u t i o n s . Secondly, i n the economic sphere t h i s period was characterized by the t r a n s f e r of the ownership of the basic means of production from the - 6 -former r u l i n g classes into the hands of the peasantry. During t h i s period, a g r i c u l t u r a l production was u n i v e r s a l l y dominated by the small farmer. On the other hand, the economic c o n s o l i d a t i o n phase 1928-33 i n Kazakhstan and 1953-57 i n Sinkiang witnessed the t r a n s f e r of the ownership and c o n t r o l of the basic means of production from the peasantry to the state. This period marked the c o n s t r u c t i o n of a new economic foundation f o r both regimes. A word on the choice of periods f o r the comparison i s i n order. I selected the two periods for comparison p r i m a r i l y because Communist China (hereafter r e f e r r e d to as China) patterned her i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n d r i v e and her p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s a f t e r the Russian experience, with the S t a l i n i s t model very much i n mind.'''^ Obviously, I am not unaware of the l i m i t a t i o n s of my choice of periods. The Soviet Union f o r example, was already on her way to i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n even before 1928. Mention must also be made about sources. . I have r e l i e d almost wholly on secondary sources i n c l u d i n g the t r a n s l a t i o n s of newspaper a r t i c l e s of the Survey of Mainland China Press, Survey of China Mainland Magazines, and the Current Background Ser i e s . I n c i d e n t a l l y , one of the great It must be noted however that i n the case of the Soviet Union there i s at l e a s t the t h e o r e t i c a l d i f f e r e n c e between the c o l l e c t i v e farm (Kolkhoz) and the state farm (Sovkhoz). More on t h i s l a t e r . S u f f i c e i t to say at t h i s point that the d i s t i n c t i o n , i t would seem, was l a r g e l y f i c t i o n a l and i n -consequential since the primary o b j e c t i v e of maintaining c e n t r a l c o n t r o l over the e n t i r e Soviet economic system extended even to the c o l l e c t i v e farms. ** These could however be regarded as primary sources. - 7 -disappointments of t h i s study was the l i m i t e d usefulness of the tr a n s l a t e d newspaper a r t i c l e s of these two p u b l i c a t i o n s . M a t e r i a l s from these i n regard to Sinkiang f o r the period under study proved to be l a r g e l y of a vague nature. These l i m i t a t i o n s notwithstanding, i t i s the considered view of t h i s w r i t e r that there are s u f f i c i e n t secondary sources to make a comparative study of the kind I have undertaken here very worthwhile. In scope the study i s l i m i t e d to a d e s c r i p t i o n and a n a l y s i s of c e r t a i n key p o l i c i e s and p r a c t i c e s i n the p o l i t i c a l and economic realms which the Soviet government and China pursued i n s p e c i f i c region - Kazakhstan and Sinkiang - during the formative years of these regimes. In t h i s respect i t i s a case study concerned with the working r e l a t i o n s h i p between the l i v i n g i n s t i t u t i o n s of the two regimes and the p o l i t i c a l , economic and s o c i a l goals towards which t h e i r r u l e r s aspired. S t r u c t u r a l l y , the study has been di v i d e d into four broad sections. Section I gives an h i s t o r i c a l overview of the two regimes p r i o r to 1917 and 1949 r e s p e c t i v e l y . Section II compares the p o l i t i c a l p o l i c i e s adopted by both regimes during the p o l i t i c a l c o n s o l i d a t i o n phase. Section I I I contrasts the broad economic p o l i c i e s of both regimes during the p o l i t i c a l c onsolida-t i o n phase and l a s t l y , Section IV discusses both the p o l i t i c a l and economic p o l i c i e s and developments during the economic c o n s o l i d a t i o n phase. - 3 -SECTION I An H i s t o r i c a l Overview of Kazakhstan and S i n k i a n g P r i o r to the S e i z u r e of Power by the Respective Communist Regimes Kazakhstan: The P e r i o d P r i o r to 1917 Although R u s s i a had made sporadic contacts w i t h what i s now known as Kazakhstan* f o r s e v e r a l c e n t u r i e s , and f a i r l y r e g u l a r l y from the seventeenth century on, the Russian p e n e t r a t i o n and the subsequent conquest and annexa-t i o n d i d not take p l a c e u n t i l the second q u a r t e r of the n i n e t e e n t h century."'"''" Ignorance of geography and of the economic p o t e n t i a l of the r e g i o n , coupled w i t h the remoteness of the r e g i o n from the heart of European R u s s i a , conspired i n keeping out R u s s i a ' s i n t e r e s t f o r a c o n s i d e r a b l e time from Kazakhstan. But by the second quarter of the n i n e t e e n t h century R u s s i a not only cast away i t s i n d i f f e r e n c e towards Kazakhstan, but became conscious of i t s obvious economic, m i l i t a r y and p o l i t i c a l p o t e n t i a l . Moreover, w i t h the heightened need to c o n t a i n the commercial and p o l i t i c a l expansion of Great B r i t a i n i n the I n d i a n sub-continent from s p i l l i n g over to C e n t r a l A s i a (then r e f e r r e d to as Turkestan), the r e g i o n (which was seen as a b u f f e r between * A f t e r the Russians a c t u a l l y came i n t o contact w i t h the Kazakhs, they always r e f e r r e d to them as " K i r g i z " or sometimes as " K a i s a k - K i r g i z " . According to Harcave, i n the C z a r i s t days, the Kazakhs were not even recognised as a separate n a t i o n a l i t y , and were simply c l a s s i f i e d as K i r g i z . Kazakhstan as a n a t i o n a l Republic dates from August, 1920 when the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e centres of the U r a l s k , T u r g a i , Akmolinsk and Semipalatinsk were u n i t e d to form the Kazakhstan ASSR w i t h i n the RSFSR. The Federated S o v i e t Republic of Kazakhstan now s t r e t c h e s from the Caspian and the lower reaches of the Volga i n the West to the A l t a i mountains i n the East and from the T r a n s - S i b e r i a n Railway i n the North to the mountains of T i e n Shan i n the South, and i s bounded i n the West and North by the RSFSR, on the East by China ( S i n k i a n g to be more s p e c i f i c ) and on the South by Uzbekistan and K i r g h i z i a . 10 -European Russia and the r e s t of Central Asia) became as important to Russia as securing the region's cotton f o r i t s t e x t i l e industry and opening the 12 Central Asian market for i t s manufactured a r t i c l e s . To be sure, Russian governors and generals had made intermittent forays to Kazakhstan where i n the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries p o l i t i c a l ft authority was divided among three weak e n t i t i e s : the Great Horde located i n the Southern and Eastern part; the Middle Horde, i n the North-Central; and 13 the L i t t l e Horde, i n the North-Western nearer the Caspain and the Ural River. In s p i t e of the separate and c e n t r i f u g a l tendencies amongst the Kazakhs, a r e c i p r o c a l harmony, however tenuous, emerged at one time or the other among the Three Hordes. Thus i n mid-eighteenth century a weak p o l i t i c a l union between the Middle and the L i t t l e Horde was forged. Moreover, external aggression on the part of the Kalmuks (the inhabitants of the powerful s t a t e of Dzungaria) i n 1643 and from 1681-1684 cemented the f e e l i n g s of a common bond and u n i t y among the Kazakhs of the region. This f e e l i n g of commonality was soon broken however under renewed attacks by the Kalmuks. The r e s u l t a n t weakening of Kazakh u n i t y following the devastating attacks by the Kalmuks made the h i t h e r t o f r a g i l e but " u n i f i e d " Hordes an easy prey to the Russians,•and by 1731 both the Middle and L i t t l e Hordes under the yoke of sustained Kalmuk invasions accepted Russian p r o t e c t i o n . The sequence of Russian penetration into Kazakhstan that followed was such that the Hordes "were absorbed i n t o the Russian empire according to 14 t h e i r proximity to European Russia". Accordingly the L i t t l e Horde was The term Horde, (ORDO) according to Krader, i s Mongol and Turkic by o r i g i n and i t means "court of a Prince or Khan". - 11 -absorbed f i r s t , followed by the Middle Horde and the Great Horde l a s t . By 1865, when Tashkent was captured, most of Kazakhstan had long since been brought under Russian administrative c o n t r o l . The formal incorporation of the Kazakh Steppe into the Russian empire was therefore accomplished by the nineteenth century. I t has to be pointed out that up to the time when Kazakhstan was incorporated into Russia only a small part of the t e r r i t o r y was s e t t l e d . The Kazakhs were p r i m a r i l y nomads. Following the nineteenth century annexa-t i o n by Russia, f o r t s and Russian m i l i t a r y and administrative centers at Omsk, Semipalatinsk, Akmolinsk, Verny (now Alma-Ata) and others began to spring up i n Kazakhstan. Alongside the towns new settlements founded by immigrants from c e n t r a l Russia appeared i n Kazakhstan. O r i g i n a l l y the C z a r i s t government f o r c i b l y s e t t l e d the f r i n g e s of Kazakhstan with S i b e r i a n Cossacks. In the nineteenth century a f o r t i f i e d chain along the Ur a l r i v e r to Omsk, then along to Ir t y s h r i v e r to Semipalatinsk and Semirechye was formed from Cossack v i l l a g e s , outposts and towns. At the end of the nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth century, following severe harvest f a i l u r e s and the attendant peasant d i s t u r -bances that followed i n European Russia, a wave of peasant s e t t l e r s poured into Tashkent during t h i s period had grown into a bas t i o n of a "revolutionary r a d i c a l i s m " which completely dominated the whole of Central A s i a i n c l u d i n g Kazakhstan. - 12 -Kazakhstan v i a the newly-built railways. The e f f e c t of such a migration around and into the Steppes of Kazakhstan was the reduction of the area of pasturage a v a i l a b l e to the nomads. And as the pressure on Kazakh pasture land increased, a scramble f o r pastures among the Kazakhs began. By t h i s time i t had become evident that p a c i f i c a t i o n of the Kazakh Steppes and the subsequent growth of population there were making i t d i f f i c u l t f o r the Kazakhs to preserve t h e i r ancient nomadic economic system."""^ According to Bacon, not only was the "economic independence of the nomads threatened by._the Russian incursions but now an even greater economic threat emerged i n the form of Russian trading posts and seasonal • 16 f a i r s along the borders of the nomadic t e r r i t o r y " . These trading posts l a t e r served as a medium through which Russian manufactured n o v e l t i e s were exchanged f o r animals and f u r s and thus generating new needs. The creeping Russian dominance of the Kazakhs sparked a s e r i e s of l o c a l r e b e l l i o n s , r e s i s t e n c e movements and wars of l i b e r a t i o n under the leader-ship of such notables as Batyr Srym Datov. These movements c h a r a c t e r i s t i -c a l l y centered among those Kazakhs c l o s e s t to Russia, and the f i r s t to be absorbed into the Russian Empire - the L i t t l e Horde - but soon engulfed most of the region. Although these uprisings were s h o r t - l i v e d , the r e s i s t e n c e to Russian penetration forced the Russians to move out of t h e i r areas of c o n t r o l along the r i v e r s . As i t turned out, however, the move was t a c t i c a l and the Russians switched to the b u i l d i n g of l i n e s of f o r t s that reached out to the Steppe at a much f a s t e r pace. This strategy of b u i l d i n g f o r t r e s s e s f a c i l i t a t e d - 13 -not only the extension of Russian m i l i t a r y might i n the area but brought about the b a l k i n i z a t i o n of the Kazakh Steppe into pacif.iable u n i t s , i s o l a t i n g centers of r e s i s t e n c e . By t h i s time any hopes of future Kazakh unity to stave o f f Russian occupation were more or l e s s summarily dashed. In sum, the Russian penetration i n t o Kazakhstan which began i n a rather piecemeal fashion by the eighteenth century climaxed i n the nineteenth century. By 1824 they had annexed the t e r r i t o r y of the L i t t l e Horde between the Caspian and the A r a l Seas. In the 1820's and 1830's they acquired the t e r r i t o r y of the Middle Horde. The Russian border had by now extended to the East by the A r a l Sea along the lower Syr-Darya i n 1853. By 1854 Russian r u l e was established i n the t e r r i t o r y of the Great Horde, the Semirechye, , H i V a l l e y , and as f a r South as Issyk K u l . In the same year Alma-Ata (now c a p i t a l of Kazakhstan) was taken and t h i s marked the complete annexation i n t o the Russian Empire the t e r r i t o r y of Central and Northern Kazakhstan. Having consolidated t h e i r p o s i t i o n i n Kazakhstan, the C z a r i s t government then i n s t i t u t e d a new administrative organization by 1867 which encompassed the whole t e r r i t o r y of the Kazakhs. *The administrative system that evolved divided the area into governor-generalship (guberniya), provinces ( o b l a s t s ) , counties (uezds) and d i s t r i c t s (volosts) and was p r i m a r i l y designed to provide a s a t i s f a c t o r y and e f f e c t i v e means of bringing the "Tribesmen" under Russian c o n t r o l . - 14 -Kazakhstan on the Eve of the October 1917 Revolution; Of p a r t i c u l a r s i g n i f i c a n c e we r e c a l l , was the movement of Russian peasants to the more f e r t i l e regions of the Northern and Eastern Steppes -a movement that continued unabated up to the outbreak of the F i r s t World War. By 1914 i t was estimated that nearly h a l f the t o t a l population of i these regions was Russian. According to the study conducted by Lorimer, the net migration to Kazakhstan between 1897 and 1914 was up to 60.4 per c e n t . ^ ' The problems of Kazakhstan with which the o l d Russian government had to contend with therefore remained l a r g e l y unresolved i n 1914. Such problems as land, economic development and communications, c u l t u r a l and the r e l a t e d aspects of r e l i g i o n and education as w e l l as the p o l i t i c a l a s p i r a t i o n s of c o n t r o l l i n g the newly devolved administrative machinery of the region loomed large. The system of land tenure, f o r example, presented many problem;! . The f i r s t concerned the lands that were o r i g i n a l l y granted i n c o n s i d e r a i v; -z~r g a r r i s o n duty to the Cossack regiments which had been s e t t l e d i n Kazakhs'rem and elsewhere i n Russian Central A s i a . Though they comprised only about 8 per cent of the t o t a l area, nevertheless, they were the choice lands :.tt. ar:.-dry steppe country s i t u a t e d along the banks of r i v e r s - I r t y s h and the Ural:.; : Secondly, Russian peasant settlement, which began from the second h a l f crir . • the nineteenth century i n Kazakhstan, had grown to considerable proportions with the b u i l d i n g of the two a r t e r i a l railways (1886-9 and 1905) and following the period of the S t o l y p i n land reforms (1905-9). The t h i r d problem concerned the break up of the indigenous population i t s e l f with the emergence - 15 -of a new phenomenon - landless and c a t t l e l e s s peasants working as a g r i c u l t u r a l labourers and l i v i n g i n a dependent p o s i t i o n i n the homesteads of t h e i r masters. By t h i s time, influenced by the economic and c u l t u r a l cooperation with the Russian people, the age-old r e s t r i c t e d economy of Kazakh nomads began to d i s i n t e g r a t e and some of them began to t r a n s f e r to a s e t t l e d way of l i f e and a g r i c u l t u r e . I t has been estimated that by 1911, 17 per cent of land i n the Steppes of Kazakhstan was c u l t i v a t e d by Russian migrants or t h e i r descendants while at the same time 30 per cent of the land was c u l t i v a t e d by 18 indigenous population who reaped or c u l t i v a t e d mainly cotton. I t must be noted however that the development of a sedentary l i f e and s e t t l e d farming among the h i t h e r t o nomadic Kazakhs was p a i n f u l , slow and patchy. Thus by 1916 Professor Zhdanko claims, 40 per cent of the t o t a l Kazakh population was leading a nomadic or semi-nomadic way of l i f e i n Akmolinsk province, 78 per cent i n Semipalatinsk province, 63 per cent Turgai province, 65 per cent i n Uralsk province, 72 per cent i n Semirechensk 19 province and 61 per cent i n Syr-Darya province. The most s i g n i f i c a n t e f f e c t s of C z a r i s t " s e d e n t a r i s a t i o n " p o l i c y was that i n c r e a s i n g l y there emerged a c l a s s of poor Kazakh peasants. Writes Professor Zhdanko on the p o i n t : Many of the poor peasants of Kazakhstan... were reduced to such poverty that they had to leave t h e i r v i l l a g e s to f i n d work, while those l e f t behind t r i e d to turn to a s e t t l e d l i f e based on agriculture.20 - 16 -S t i l l the C z a r i s t government i n order to promote i t s own settlement plans, usurped the best land on the Steppes from the l o c a l population on the pretext that i t "was surplus to t h e i r requirements". In a d d i t i o n the Kazakhs were made to pay very exhorbitant taxes, l e t alone the r e q u i s i t i o n i n g of t h e i r h o r s e s . ^ The r a p i d l y d e t e r i o r a t i n g conditions of the Kazakh population alarmed Kazakh leaders, who by now became convinced that only the complete cessation of Russian " c o l o n i z a t i o n " could save the nomads. Conferences were held and re s o l u t i o n s demanding the immediate cessation of settlement i n nomadic lands were sent to the Russians. As expected the Russians refused to discuss the problem since "resettlement meant a s u b s t a n t i a l source of g r a i n f o r Russia 22 as w e l l as an easement of the s i t u a t i o n of the overcrowded Russian v i l l a g e " . In circumstances such as these, tension between the nomads and the Russian s e t t l e r s mounted. To make matters worse, the Russian government to f u l f i l l the badly needed labour contingents during World War I decided to mobilize the Moslem population i n Kazakhstan and Central A s i a . News of the impending m o b i l i z a t i o n alarmed the Kazakhs and i t apparently proved to be the c a t a l y s t that i g n i t e d the l a t e n t flames of r e b e l l i o n . Thus while conceding that " m o b i l i z a t i o n was unavoidable" the Kazakh leaders argued that the " l i a b i l i t y f o r m i l i t a r y s e r v i c e should be accompanied by e q u a l i t y 23 of a l l p o l i t i c a l and economic r i g h t s " . Undaunted by the demands of the Kazakh leaders on June 25, 1916 the m o b i l i z a t i o n decree was signed by General Kuropatkin to the general dismay of the Moslem population. Discontent spread and i t eventually led to a r e b e l l i o n that engulfed not - 17 -only Kazakhstan but the e n t i r e Russian Central A s i a i n the second h a l f of 1916. These u p r i s i n g s were followed by "bloody suppressions and j u d i c i a r y repressions" during which an estimated 300,000 or more Kazakhs f l e d to 24 Kashgaria and K u l j a i n Chinese Central A s i a - Sinkiang. S i g n i f i c a n t l y however, as a. r e s u l t of the " e x c e p t i o n a l l y r e s t r a i n e d behaviour and it understanding" shown by the leaders of Kazakhstan during the period, an uneasy peace reigned i n the region u n t i l i t was broken by the guns of the 1917 r e v o l u t i o n . Once power was seized i n Petrograd i n 1917, i t remained to be consolidated i n the country, and t h i s required years of unremitting e f f o r t . The Bolsheviks confronted formidable obstacles not only i n Kazakhstan but i n the r e s t of Central A s i a . Thus a f t e r e x t r i c a t i n g themselves from the German War through the t r e a t y of B r e s t - L i t v o s k (March 1918) the Bolsheviks were now faced with, among other problems, a r e b e l l i o u s anti-Bolshevik n a t i o n a l i s t movement spearheaded by Kazakhstan's n a t i o n a l i s t party -the Alash Orda - which was formed i n December 1917. Thus despite the most strenuous e f f o r t s of the Bolshevik leadership at c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of c o n t r o l During the u p r i s i n g s , the Kazakh leaders urged " r e s t r a i n yourselves, submit to Law". The same leaders again urged r e c o n c i l i a t i o n a f t e r the u p r i s i n g . They maintained that, "Kazakhs have been ruined i n t h i s senseless disorder. The cause of t h i s t e r r i b l e d i s a s t e r l i e s i n the Kazakhs' backwardness and t h e i r l a c k of c u l t u r e " . Perhaps the correctness of t h e i r diagnosis can be demonstrated by the continued support the leaders received from the Kazakh population throughout the r e v o l u t i o n and the C i v i l War that followed. Thus i n 1917 Baitursunov (by f a r the foremost Kazakh leader) received a convincing majority i n the e l e c t i o n s to the Constituent Assembly. See S. A. Zenkovsky, Pan-Turkism and Islam, i n  Russia, Cambridge: Harvard U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1960), p. 137. - 18 -and d i r e c t i o n i n the course of events, the f i r s t years of Soviet power were uniquely a period when the spontaneous and anarchic forces of the revo-l u t i o n had t h e i r way. What was true of Moscow was equally true of the borderlands. Localism f l o u r i s h e d and the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of Communist controls decreased i n d i r e c t r e l a t i o n to the distance from the great urban centers. A f t e r 1917, three elements struggled f o r supremacy i n Kazakhstan -the White Russians, Red Russians and the Kazakh n a t i o n a l i s t s . The Kazakh n a t i o n a l i s t s ' task was made more d i f f i c u l t since they had the Herculean task of explaining to the average Kazakh the events of the C i v i l War that followed the Revolution. Consequently, during the C i v i l War, "Kazakh t e r r i t o r y was more an area of c o n f l i c t between the Red and White Russians than of any n a t i o n a l a c t i o n by the Kazakhs themselves, who s t i l l l i v e d according to the Weltanschauung of past c e n t u r i e s . . . . Despite conventions 3 r e s o l u t i o n s , and programmes, the majority of Kazakhs remained apart from the events of 1917-20". 2 5 C l e a r l y then, the October Revolution did not have any immediate repercussions on the l i f e of the Kazakh people, who were cut o f f from the r e s t of Central Russia by the t e r r i t o r y occupied by the counter-revolutionary Cossacks of the Urals and Orenburg. T h i s , f o r a time, made i t impossible fo r the Bolsheviks to i n f l i t r a t e Kazakh t e r r i t o r y . Taking advantage of the temporary l u l l , the n a t i o n a l i s t party - Alash Orda - convened at Orenburg * from the 5th to 13th of December 1917 under the p r o t e c t i o n of Dutov, General Dutov (a Cossack) was the leader of the anti-Communist group i n Orenburg a f t e r the October 1917 Revolution. He r e a d i l y cooperated with Kazakh nationa-l i s t s to thwart the e f f o r t s of the Russians from gaining c o n t r o l i n Kazakhstan. - 19 -the t h i r d Pan-Kirgiz (Kazakh) Congress, i n the course of which, on the 10th of December, the autonomy of Kazakhstan was proclaimed. I t could be i n f e r r e d from t h e i r a c t i o n that the leaders of Alash Orda were anti-Communists, and t h e i r main i f not t h e i r only concern was to prevent the penetration of the Steppe by the Bolsheviks. But to t h e i r dismay the Bolsheviks moved in t o Kazakhstan and from 1918 u n t i l e a r l y 1920 the Kazakh Steppe was plunged into the C i v i l War that had by now engulfed the whole country. In the words of Caroe, the Alash Orda by t h i s time was "never much more than a committee which 26 held Congresses and issued manifestos". I t s government was l e s s than nominal. Worse s t i l l , alarmed by the chaos that now reigned i n Kazakhstan, the a n t i -Bolshevik government i n Omsk announced on November 4, 1918 that i t would no longer support Kazakh autonomy. And with the increased h o s t i l i t y of Admiral Kolchak (Commander of the White forces i n the region) towards the Kazakhs, a pro-Soviet temper developed so r a p i d l y that the Western Alash Orda 27 government "was obliged to suppress a pro-Soviet u p r i s i n g " on December 7, 1918. The pro-Soviet t i d e could not be checked. The dykes had broken and by mid 1919 several Alash Orda leaders i n c l u d i n g Baitursunov had defected to the Reds. By November 10 a f t e r the f i n a l defeat of Admiral Kolchak's forces the Alash Orda government f i n a l l y c o llapsed. Indeed as e a r l y as Baitursunov (1872-1928) was one of the foremost Kazakh n a t i o n a l i s t leaders of h i s time. His p o s i t i o n as the editor of the Kazakh newspaper - Kazakh -brought him to the l i m e l i g h t of the n a t i o n a l i s t cause i n Kazakhstan. - 20 -March 22, 1919, J a n g e l d i n , the head of the T u r g a i Soviet a d m i n i s t r a t i o n had j u b i l a n t l y sent a t e l e g r a p h to Moscow: U n i f i c a t i o n i s now completed of a l l the l a b o u r i n g K i r g h i z (Kazakh) people under the Red banner of the worker-peasant government.28 29 Now I t u r n to S i n k i a n g . In the modern Chinese S t a t e the c u r r e n t use of the e x p r e s s i o n - Sinkiang ("New Dominion" or "New P r o v i n c e " , "New F r o n t i e r " or "New Borderland") perpetuates something of the t r a d i t i o n a l v a l u e s . I t i s an area where China's ancient c l a i m s take on a contemporary form; an area where her p r e s t i g e i s at stake before an a l i e n or h o s t i l e w o r ld. Though China's i n t e r e s t i n S i n k i a n g i s a n c i e n t , i t s h o l d and c o n t r o l over the r e g i o n 30 had been tenuous and i n t e r m i t t e n t f o r over two thousand years. The modern p e r i o d s t a r t e d w i t h the Ch'ien Lung conquest, which was completed i n 1760 and the name Sink i a n g (some w r i t e r s have suggested) may 31 indeed have been used from 1768 onwards. The area was i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o the Manchu Empire as a m i l i t a r y governorship w i t h i t s c a p i t a l a t K u l d j a i n H i . The foundations f o r the i n t e g r a t i o n of Sinkiang w i t h the r e s t of China, I would argue, were t h e r e f o r e l a i d down during the Ch'ing Dynasty and i n p a r t i c u l a r e a r l y i n the nineteenth century. The r e l a t i o n s h i p between the Chinese and the C e n t r a l A s i a n peoples throughout the modern era has been marked by a strong a n t i p a t h y . This i s s t i l l an important f a c t o r i n the development of modern c u l t u r a l , p o l i t i c a l and economic i n s t i t u t i o n s i n ' t h e r e g i o n . We s h a l l r e t u r n to t h i s l a t e r . The e v o l u t i o n of the S i n k i a n g that we know today has much to do w i t h three l e a d i n g f i g u r e s , Tso Tsung-t"ang, Sheng S h i h - t s ' a i and Wang En-mao, who was u n t i l r e c e n t l y the dominant f i g u r e i n S i n k i a n g . Tso Tsung-t'ang a non-- 21 -m i l i t a r y man by profession who turned out to be a great m i l i t a r y s t r a t e g i s t undertook the p a c i f i c a t i o n of Sinkiang and the r e a s s e r t i o n of Chinese authority during the Ch'ing Dynasty. The Moslem r e b e l l i o n had spread from neighbouring Kansu in t o the northern parts of Sinkiang, i n the mid 1850's and a Tungan regime had been set up i n H i . In the South, Chinese 32 r u l e had v i r t u a l l y ceased to e x i s t , and Yakub Beg, a Kokandian, ruled from Kashgar as autocrat of the whole area south of the Tien Shan. Tso, a Hunanese, f r u s t r a t e d by h i s f a i l u r e to pass the C i v i l Service examination a f t e r several attempts, became i n c r e a s i n g l y competent as a m i l i t a r y commander and s t r a t e g i s t i n a c t i o n against the T'ai-p'ings, the Nien F e i and the Muslim r e b e l l i o n s of Shensi and Kansu. He set out i n a north-westerly d i r e c t i o n , and determined to reassert Chinese authority i n Sinkiang and to oust the Russians from H i an area they had occupied i n 33 1871. Increasingly, h i s task was made more d i f f i c u l t i n the face of Manchu Court v a c i l l a t i o n as w e l l as the opposition of the powerful group led by L i Hung-chang, the powerful Viceroy of C h i h l i , which advocated the abandonment of the Central Asian campaign i n preference f o r a b u i l d up of China's maritime c a p a b i l i t i e s . For L i , Sinkiang was not a v i t a l f r o n t i e r of the Empire. Besides he argued i t could e a s i l y revert to indigenous c o n t r o l so long as nominal obedience (through the t r i b u t a r y system) to China was maintained, at l e a s t u n t i l such time as China was once again strong enough to take i t back. Undaunted by the growing force of h i s opposition, Tso f o r c e f u l l y defended the view that maintaining c o n t r o l of the e n t i r e c o n t i n e n t a l - 22 -f r o n t i e r was e s s e n t i a l f o r the defense of China as a whole. The Russian occupation of the H i area was of course a v i v i d reminder to Tso of the dangers of non-assertion of China's " r i g h t f u l " claims to the area. Tso summed up h i s defense by maintaining i n a rather metaphorical tone: {ThatJ the geographical s i t u a t i o n i n the northwest i s l i k e an apron from the shoulder to the f i n g e r t i p s . When the whole arm i s safe, everything works out w e l l . If Sinkiang i s not secure, Mongolia w i l l be i n trouble; then notonly w i l l Shensi, Kansu and Shansi often be disturbed, but also the people i n the n a t i o n a l c a p i t a l w i l l not get one good night's sleep. Furthermore, the present s i t u a t i o n i s worsening, f o r the Russians are expanding d a i l y . . . . Only i n the c e n t r a l s e c t i o n do the Mongolian t r i b e s act more or l e s s as a buffer zone.... We have to make preparations to face the f a c t . 3 ^ By A p r i l , 1875, Tso had won the b l e s s i n g of the Court. He continued h i s campaign and by the end of 1878 i t was s u c c e s s f u l l y concluded. In 1881 the Russian-occupied t e r r i t o r y was returned to China and Sinkiang emerged into the modern world i n 1884 not as a " m i l i t a r y colony" but as a province of China within a f r o n t i e r with Russia that has remained more or l e s s unchanged to the present day. Had L i Hung-chang had h i s way, the recovery of Sinkiang would have been delayed i n d e f i n i t e l y and the c r e a t i o n . of Sinkiang as a province of China may have never come to f r u i t i o n . Tso did not l i v e to see h i s dream come true, for he died h a l f a year e a r l i e r . Consequently, with the establishment of the Sinkiang province on 16 November 1884, General L i u Chin-t'ang was appointed i t s f i r s t governor. I do not consider i t e s s e n t i a l to go into the h i s t o r i c a l d e t a i l s - 23 -of the period. I t i s important, however, to make some mention of Manchu p o l i c y towards Northwestern China before discussing the period a f t e r 1911. Manchu p o l i c y toward Northwestern China and the Moslems, i t would appear, was f i r s t to hold the 'national' f r o n t i e r l i n e west of Sinkiang and secondly, to keep a d e l i c a t e balance of power between the various peoples so that the Manchus could r u l e them a l l . In short, i t was a p o l i c y of di v i d e and r u l e not unl i k e the p o l i c i e s of other c o l o n i a l powers. To maintain the d e l i c a t e balance therefore the Manchus i n s t i t u t e d govern-mental establishments i n Sinkiang a f t e r the area was subdued. Instead of transforming the land into a regular province, the Manchu government p r i o r to 1884 set up the m i l i t a r y governor of H i , the m i l i t a r y Lieutenant-Governor of Urumchi and numerous a s s i s t a n t m i l i t a r y governors, commandants of forces, and agents. The common denominator was the fact that these were a l l occupied by "bannermen". S u f f i c e i t to say however that with the establishment of Sinkiang as a province a l l 35 these p o s i t i o n s were abolished and replaced by a new system of l o c a l government (see Section IV). The Republican Era 1911-48: 36 The f a l l of the Ch'ing Dynasty i n 1911 brought Yang Tseng-hsin to power i n Sinkiang. Yang gradually closed the Sino-Soviet f r o n t i e r following the October r e v o l u t i o n of 1917, thus checking temporarily the Russian influence which had been gaining ground i n Sinkiang f o r several decades as we s h a l l see l a t e r . - 24 -But the p o s i t i o n ( i . e . the temporary check to Russian influence i n the area) was soon to be reversed following the completion i n 1930 of the Turkestan-Siberian r a i l r o a d , running through Alma-Ata and the Semirech'ye region of Soviet Kazakhstan. The r e s u l t was the heightened economic interdependence of the three d i s t r i c t s , i n Northern Sinkiang, ( H i , Tarbagatai, and A l t a i ) and the Soviet Union. Soon i n 1931, the Sinkiang administration accorded the Russians sweeping economic concessions i n exchange for Soviet arms with which to counter the Moslem army advancing from Kansu. I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note that these concessions followed agreements that were made between the Soviet Union and a province of China, regardless of the wishes and i n t e r e s t s of the Chinese c e n t r a l government. Then i n 1933-34, the Russians were .able to intervene rather d e c i s i v e l y i n Sinkiang's a f f a i r s by g i v i n g d i r e c t m i l i t a r y support to General Sheng S h i h - t ' s a i i n h i s attempt to s e i z e power i n the province and 3'7 i n h i s v i c t o r y over the Moslem forces of Ma Ch'ung-ying. General Sheng himself was a native of Liaoning i n Manchuria, a student of Waseda U n i v e r s i t y i n Japan and at the Japanese Imperial War College. In l a t e r years he asserted that he had become a Marxist at the age of 24 and gave 38 t h i s as h i s reason f o r not j o i n i n g the Kuomintang. He d i d however, j o i n the CPSU. Nevertheless, i t seems po s s i b l e that Sheng never was a Communist at heart, but that as a m i l i t a r y governor of Sinkiang he became more and more the v i c t i m of circumstances quite beyond h i s c o n t r o l . He came to see the eventual Soviet domination of the a f f a i r s of h i s province as a f a i t accompli. - 25 -But i n 1942, when the Soviet Union was hard pressed by the Germans, Sheng, perhaps i n a n t i c i p a t i o n of a spectacular Nazi v i c t o r y , turned against the Soviet Union and committed himself to the KMT government camp. As a r e s u l t , between 1942-4 Soviet influence was gradually weakened under pressure from Sheng S h i h - t s ' a i . By the spring of 1943, the Soviet advisers and trade agencies had p u l l e d out of Sinkiang; and the Soviet regiments stationed at 39 H i and Hami had withdrawn. I r o n i c a l l y , with the p u l l o u t of the Soviets, the Chinese Central Government now f e l t strong enough to dispense with the help of Sheng, and i n August 1944 he was r e c a l l e d to Chungking and gradually faded away from the p o l i t i c a l l i m e l i g h t . Sheng's administrative era i n Sinkiang was not without any p o l i t i c a l changes. Sheng was an innovator whose ideas survived the troubles that c o n t i n u a l l y b e d e v i l l e d h i s r u l e . His p o l i c y of r a c i a l e q u a l i ty f o r a l l the Sinkiang peoples - Chinese and m i n o r i t i e s a l i k e - was a rather revolutionary p o l i c y at the time. The use of the time-honoured term Uighur was revived and the most numerous race i n the province invested with a sense of i d e n t i t y and d i g n i t y that i t had h i t h e r t o lacked. Sheng regenerated the s p i r i t of nationalism, and under the r u l e of Sheng Shih-t s ' a i , Moslem nationalism began to take newer forms and found more concrete expressions i n the 1930's. A f t e r Sheng, Sinkiang could no longer r e c o i l back to the "moribund" state of p o l i t i c a l , c u l t u r a l and economic backwardness i n which he found i t . Most importantly, i t had become manifest that a progressive Sinkiang could be contained w i t h i n the Chinese state only by a strong c e n t r a l authority - an authority able to confront a l l of the problems - 26 -attendant upon r u l i n g a m u l t i - r a c i a l region f a r from the hub of the centre and confident enough to enter f r e e l y into an understanding with the Soviet neighbour for the proper development of the area. Now, Sheng's switch of a l l e g i a n c e from Moscow to Chungking i n 1942, l e f t the Soviets with no p l i a n t p r o v i n c i a l government i n Sinkiang. No doubt, the absence of a bonafide Uighur n a t i o n a l movement i n Sinkiang deprived Soviet p o l i c y of a r e l i a b l e b a s i s and made i t depend almost e x c l u s i v e l y on the assistance of the pro-Soviet Chinese Governor Sheng S h i h - t s ' a i . This was p a r t l y of the Soviet Union's own making. For as i n numerous other t e r r i t o r i e s , so too i n Sinkiang, Soviet a n t i - r e l i g i o u s p o l i c y c o n f l i c t e d with the Soviet p o l i c y on n a t i o n a l i t i e s . S u f f i c e i t to say however that the c l o s i n g of Mosques and the persecution of Mullahs which was c a r r i e d out during the period of the de facto Soviet protectorate antagonised the Sinkiang Moslems whose good w i l l Russia might otherwise have won. With yet another setback (the d e f e c t i o n of an h i t h e r t o erstwhile supporter), the Soviet Union by l a t e 1942 turned to the only remaining p o t e n t i a l instrument f o r t h e i r t a c t i c a l designs of maintaining a dominant p o s i t i o n i n the province. This was to be found i n the apparent disenchant-ment of the m i n o r i t i e s which had been fanned by Chiang Kai-shek's plans f o r the development of Northwestern China. In 1942 Chiang had "pledged large sums of money to finance the t r a n s f e r of some 10,000 Han f a m i l i e s together with t h e i r f a m i l i e s , to b o l s t e r Sinkiang's administrative, educational, and 40 t e c h n i c a l a f f a i r s " . This i t was hoped would have strengthened the Chinese c e n t r a l government influence and c o n t r o l , a l b e i t at the expense of the - 27 -representatives of various minority groups who were being employed i n Sheng's regime. A f t e r the authority of the Chinese c e n t r a l government had been re-established i n the province 1943-44, i t was not the Uighurs but the 319,000 Kazakhs of Sinkiang who played the Russian game. In 1943 Moscow turned to the " t r i b e s " of Kazakhs,... and other groups, f u r n i s h i n g them with a few leaders, commanders and weapons, while remaining o f f i c i a l l y a l o o f , to protect i t s non-intervention i n Sinkiang a f f a i r s . ^ 1 But with the turn i n the t i d e of the war on the Western f r o n t running i n t h e i r favour, the Soviets i n 1944 s t i f f e n e d t h e i r a t t i t u d e towards China. The r e s u l t was that by the summer of 1944, the Kazakh areas adjacent to the Soviet Union were i n open r e v o l t . This was followed i n November of the same year by an u p r i s i n g i n the H i V a l l e y . The l o c a l Chinese o f f i c i a l s and the government troops were driven eastwards, and by the end of the year the rebels had set up an independent "Republic of Eastern Turkestan" embracing H i , A l t a i and Chuguchak, the three most northern of the Sinkiang's ten d i s t r i c t s . The establishment of the East Turkestan Republic was i n part a l o c a l response to the a s s e r t i o n of KMT r u l e i n Sinkiang and i n part a 42 manifestation of Russian great power p o l i t i c s i n Central A s i a . Both Uighur and Kazakh n a t i o n a l i s t s , who sought to prevent a return to t r a d i t i o n a l r u l e , came together i n the Republic. Under t h e i r nominal leader, Akhmedjan Kasimi, the n a t i o n a l i s t s sought to e s t a b l i s h a s p e c i a l autonomous status f o r the three d i s t r i c t s which would have not only made - 28 -i t p o s s i b l e f o r the Republic to maintain the d i s t i n c t i v e l y Turkic c u l t u r e of i t s people but also the pronounced Soviet o r i e n t a t i o n of i t s economy. But with S a i f u d i n succeeding to the formal leadership of the young Republic following Kasimi's sudden death i n a plane crash, the flames of nationalism i n the leadership soon faded. For.being a member of the CPSU S a i f u d i n bowed down to S t a l i n ' s pressures and became the t o o l of the l a t t e r i n the three d i s t r i c t s . Indeed the quasi-independent status which the Kazakhs, Uighurs and other non-Han peoples of the three d i s t r i c t s enjoyed under Russian p r o t e c t i o n was a t o o l f o r Moscow i n i t s negotiations w i t h the Chinese govern-ment - f i r s t with the KMT and l a t e r with the CCP. The Soviet Union no doubt wished to perpetuate i t s s p e c i a l p o s i t i o n i n Sinkiang and i t s i n f l u e n c e i n the three d i s t r i c t s , which possess r i c h n a t u r a l resources, i n c l u d i n g uranium. By mid-1949, sensing or rather i n a n t i c i p a t i o n of an imminent v i c t o r y 43 of the Chinese Communists, the Soviet p o l i c y i n the three d i s t r i c t s s h i f t e d . One of the c a s u a l t i e s of the s h i f t was a s p l i t i n the Republic's leadership which led to an agreement with the CCP f o r the unopposed entry i n t o the three d i s t r i c t s of PLA units l a t e i n 1949. Arrangements f o r the entry of the PLA apparently were made between Peking and Ining (perhaps with Russian p a r t i c i p a t i o n ) and not i n Urumchi the p r o v i n c i a l c a p i t a l . On September 1949, Burhan, who headed the Sinkiang government, sent a c a b l e to Mao i n which he declared the provinces' surrender adding: "We w i l l request the p r o v i n c i a l 44 government members now i n H i to return to Urumchi f o r cooperation". The - 29 -way had now been opened f o r the 'peaceful' t r a n s f e r of power to the Communists. In comparing the r i s e to power of the Soviet Union i n Soviet Kazakhstan and of Communist China i n Sinkiang, one i s s t r u c k by the apparent d i f f e r e n c e i n the s t r a t e g i c p o s i t i o n s of the two regions. That i s , whereas there was no outside power that was a c t i v e l y involved i n the a f f a i r s of Kazakhstan other than the Soviet Union h e r s e l f , i n sharp contrast to t h i s , the Soviet Union conspicuously meddled i n Sinkiang's a f f a i r s both before and a f t e r 1949. This state of a f f a i r s may have been induced, as has been suggested e a r l i e r , by the f a c t that Sinkiang's natural economic, c u l t u r a l and trans-por t a t i o n l i n k s were with the Soviet Union. This a l s o explains the existence of considerable Soviet p o l i t i c a l and economic i n t e r e s t s i n the area to the v i r t u a l exclusion of any appreciable Chinese i n f l u e n c e . S i m i l a r l y , while both regions were plagued by r e b e l l i o u s m i n o r i t i e s at various time, the remoteness of Sinkiang from the hub of Chinese c i v i l i z a t i o n was g r e a t l y responsible f o r the r e l a t i v e success of leaders such as Yakub Beg, Yang Tseng-hsin, Chin Shu-jen, Sheng S h i h - t s ' a i and the leaders of the East Turkestan Republic i n thwarting the powers of the c e n t r a l government. I would hasten to add, however, that the continued p o l i t i c a l chaos of the twentieth century a r i s i n g not only from the d e b i l i t a t i n g e f f e c t s of Japanese i m p e r i a l i s t aggression but also from the decadence of the Republican era (1911-49) also contributed to the f a i l u r e of the Chinese c e n t r a l government to sustain a f i r m c o n t r o l over Sinkiang. SECTION II An Analysis of the P o l i t i c a l P o l i c i e s Adopted by Both Regimes During the P o l i t i c a l Consolidation Phase In terms of p o l i t i c a l developments, the p o l i t i c a l c o n s o l i d a t i o n phase as mentioned e a r l i e r was e s s e n t i a l l y characterized by the absorption and e l i m i n a t i o n of l o c a l l eft-wing regimes and counter-r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s as w e l l as the f i r m establishment of the b a s i c Communist p o l i t i c a l forms of c o n t r o l i n c l u d i n g among others, the h i g h l y c e n t r a l i z e d Communist Party organization. A f t e r the October Revolution we r e c a l l , the Soviet regime was faced with a considerably powerful Kazakh n a t i o n a l i s t movement, the, Alash Orda, which by December 1917 had gained o f f i c i a l r e c o g n i t i o n and was allowed to e s t a b l i s h i t s e l f as a party. And i n the same month at the Congress of the Kazakhs at Orenburg, the party proclaimed i t s own autonomous government f o r the former general government of the Steppe and attempted to assert i t s e l f between the Bolsheviks and the White forces - the other two contending forces f o r supremacy i n the area u n t i l 1919. In October 28, 1918 however, the a c t i v i t i e s of the Alash Orda party were prohibited by the Soviet government and by J u l y 10^1919 (following the f i n a l defeat of Admiral Kolchak's forces) the Soviets moved to set up a Revolutionary Committee (Kirrevkom) - 31 -to administer Kazakhstan. S i g n i f i c a n t l y , however, the Kirrevkom was not i n the hands of l o c a l n a t i o n a l i s t s but of o f f i c i a l s selected by Moscow from among trusted Communists, l a r g e l y non-Moslems, and f o r the good reason that i t could not serve as an instrument of native opposition. Thus i n the Kazakh-Kirghiz Steppe a l l the organs of p o l i t i c a l power were, from the 45 beginning of the Soviet occupation i n 1919, f i r m l y i n the hands of Moscow. Nevertheless, following the i n s t i t u t i o n of the Revolutionary Committee, a tenuous period of cooperation between some leaders of Alash Orda and the Soviet a u t h o r i t i e s developed. And on t h i s tenuous note several of the leaders i n c l u d i n g Baitursunov l a t e r defected to the Reds. But according to Hayit, " a f t e r c o n s o l i d a t i o n of power the supporters of the movement were t e r r o r i z e d and from 1930 to 1939 almost a l l the. supporters of the Alash 46 Orda movement were arrested". N a t u r a l l y , the aim of Soviet p o l i c y i n Kazakhstan as elsewhere i n Central A s i a was to destroy "any organized Kazakh n a t i o n a l movement, by wiping out a l l anti-Russian tendencies among the Kazakh Communists (mainly of non-47 Russian o r i g i n ) and non-party people". I t must be pointed out however, that both the Soviet Union's d r i v e to s i l e n c e Kazakh nationalism and the l a t e r d e f e c t i o n of leaders of Alash Orda to the Soviets i n 1919 did not s i g n i f y the 48 conclusive triumph of the Communist cause among the Kazakhs. Thus e a r l y attempts to introduce Communism among the Kazakhs met with l i t t l e success j u s t as there were very few supporters of Soviet power i n Kazakhstan. At t h i s point, i t i s reasonable to surmise that by f a r the most potent f a c t o r that motivated the leaders of Alash Orda to " v o l u n t a r i l y " - 32 -defect to the Soviets, was the Communist promise of self-determination and autonomy as enunciated i n t h e i r n a t i o n a l i t i e s p o l i c y . This coming i n the 49 wake of the withdrawal of support f o r Kazakh autonomy by Admiral Kolchak, proved to be an i r r e s i s t i b l e b a i t to the Kazakh leaders. In other words, the kernel of the answer to the question how d i d the Bolshevik Party e s t a b l i s h i t s e l f with r e l a t i v e ease i n Kazakhstan i n the face of Kazakh nationalism and autonomy (not to mention the Pan-Islam and Pan-Turkic movements i t had i n common with i n the r e s t of Central A s i a ) , l i e s i n the party's proclaimed p o l i c y on n a t i o n a l i s t s . The o f f i c i a l Bolshevik p o l i c y f o r Kazakhstan and Central A s i a was i n l i n e with the very l i b e r a l Bolshevik approach to the problem of Russia's n a t i o n a l i t i e s . Bolshevik p o l i c y was enunciated and widely p u b l i c i s e d as f a r back as i n 1913 at the summer meeting of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik f a c t i o n of the Russian S o c i a l Democratic Labour Party. A key r e s o l u t i o n of that meeting stated that; the r i g h t of a l l N a t i o n a l i t i e s forming part of Russia f r e e l y to secede and form indepen-dent states must be recognized. To deny them t h i s r i g h t or to f a i l to take measures guaranteeing them i t s p r a c t i c a l r e a l i z a t i o n i s equivalent to supporting a p o l i c y of seizure and annexation. Thus one week a f t e r the seizure of power, the Council of People's Commissars i n Petrograd confirmed and signed the Decree of N a t i o n a l i t i e s -of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia - the f i r s t l e g i s l a t i v e act of the Soviet government i n the sphere of n a t i o n a l i t y p o l i c y . I t guaranteed among other things: (1) the equality and sovereignty of the peoples of Russia; - 33 -(2) the r i g h t of the peoples of Russia to self-determination, i n c l u d i n g secession and the formation of an independent state; (3) the suppression of a l l p r i v i l e g e s (including n a t i o n a l r e l i g i o n s ) and l i m i t a t i o n s and (4) the f r e e development of n a t i o n a l m i n o r i t i e s and ethnic groups l i v i n g on the t e r r i t o r y of Russia. Indeed as e a r l y as i n 1914 Lenin had asked, "why should not we Russians, who oppress more nations than any other people, recognize the r i g h t of Poland, the Urkaine, Finland to secede?.... You have to be a madman to continue the p o l i c y of Tsar N i c h o l a s " . T h u s an important consequence of the Bolshevik's n a t i o n a l i t y p o l i c y was to paint the Czars as the oppressors and hence the enemies of freedom f o r the peoples of the m i n o r i t i e s . The Bolsheviks were the l i b e r a t o r s . But theory did not accord with p r a c t i c e . Thus when i n November the Ukranian Reds proclaimed the Ukranian Democratic Republic, l e s s than 20 days a f t e r the proclamation and l e s s than 50 days a f t e r the Decree on n a t i o n a l i t i e s , the Red Army marched against the major c i t i e s of the Ukraine and by 1920 the Ukraine Republic was j u s t one more a r t i f a c t i n the annals of h i s t o r y . C l e a r l y then, Lenin and the Party did not regard self-determination to the point of secession as a d e s i r a b l e goal. On the contrary, he viewed i t as detrimental to s o c i a l i s m , f o r i t would produce a multitude of states hindering the c r e a t i o n of a s o c i a l i s t s o c i e t y . He rather believed that the s t r i v i n g f o r n a t i o n a l independence could best be checked by announcing that no obstacles stood i n i t s way. I f , out of concern f o r the future of s o c i a l i s m , one denied the r i g h t to self-determination, one would s t i r resentment among the n a t i o n a l i t i e s and increase the d e s i r e f o r independence. - 34 -But by leaving the door to secession wide open one would blunt the d e s i r e for i t , since the n a t i o n a l i t i e s , recognizing the b e n e f i t s to be derived from a large s o c i a l i s t i c community would choose to remain w i t h i n the union rather than to withdraw into the " c o n s t r i c t i n g framework" of small statehood. In Lenin's view therefore the r i g h t to self-determination was to be promulgated i n order to nip the d e s i r e f o r i t i n the bud. "The r e c o g n i t i o n by the p r o l e t a r i a t of the r i g h t of nations to secede can /^lonej r bring about complete s o l i d a r i t y among the workers of the various nations and help to 52 bring the nations c l o s e r together on t r u l y democratic l i n e s " . Lenin's dilemma was equally that of S t a l i n who by now had become 53 the authority on Soviet n a t i o n a l i t i e s p o l i c y . But S t a l i n had already r e c o n c i l e d the c o n t r a d i c t i o n between the Communist general emancipatory programme and the p r a c t i c e of forced u n i t y following the d e c l a r a t i o n of the r i g h t of self-determination with the strong proviso (though f a r l e s s widely p u b l i c i z e d ) that: It would be impermissible to confuse the question of the r i g h t of nations f r e e l y to secede with the question of whether a nation must n e c e s s a r i l y secede at any given moment. This l a t t e r question must be s e t t l e d quite separately by the//Party of the P r o l e t a r i a t ^ i n each p a r t i c u l a r case, according to the circumstances. Thus we are at l i b e r t y to a g i t a t e f o r or against secession i n accordance with the i n t e r e s t s of the p r o l e t a r i a t , of the p r o l e t a r i a n r e v o l u t i o n . The " i n t e r e s t s of the p r o l e t a r i a t " not the mere r i g h t to secede thus became the d e c i s i v e f a c t o r for n a t i o n a l "self-determination"."^ Looking back on the Soviet's approach to the question of " s e l f -determination" one i s struck by the f a c t that "the n a t i o n a l p o l i c y of the - 35 -Soviet regime i s saturated with one general idea - namely, the subordination of the n a t i o n a l question to the i n t e r e s t s of the P r o l e t a r i a n Revolution". It becomes apparent that Soviet n a t i o n a l autonomy was defined w i t h i n narrow bounds and probably was designed p r i m a r i l y to placate minority f e e l i n g s and to act as a showpiece f o r impressing other Asian countries. Now, given the f a c t that only a Moscow-dominated party would be considered as the true spokesman f o r the p r o l e t a r i a t i t remained as the f i r s t step to e s t a b l i s h the c r e d e n t i a l s of the Bolshevik Party i n Kazakhstan as s o c i a l i s t f r i e n d s and not as n a t i o n a l i s t oppressors. To be sure, the October Revolution found Kazakhstan and Russian Central A s i a l a c k i n g even a nucleus of native c i v i l servants. The native i n t e l l i g e n t s i a which did e x i s t was microscopic, and educationally and p o l i t i c a l l y i t was a part of the "feudal" and " e x p l o i t i n g " c l a s s e s . ^ Nevertheless, despite the small nucleus of native i n t e l l i g e n t s i a and the small percentage of Kazakh Communists (1.05 per cent of the t o t a l ) , the establishment of a bona f i d e Communist Party i n Kazakhstan was f a c i l i t a t e d by the r e l a t i v e l y s i z e a b l e numbers (12,041 i n a l l ) of Communists of Russian 58 o r i g i n i n Kazakhstan. More importantly, through these l a t t e r elements the Communist Party of Kazakhstan came l a r g e l y under the d i r e c t c o n t r o l of the c e n t r a l party organs of the CPSU and l a t e r became dominated by w e l l -59 trai n e d and t r i e d l o y a l cadres. Writes Professor Kassof "The presence of s u b s t a n t i a l numbers of Russians i n Kazakhstan guaranteed at l e a s t a minimum p o l i t i c a l and ethnic b a l l a s t to counter s e p a r a t i s t sentiment. Their d i f f u s i o n served to a c c e l e r a t e the process of R u s s i a n i z a t i o n . . . . " ^ Apropos - 36 -of t h i s i s the s i g n i f i c a n t f a c t that the Kazakhstan administration did not s u f f e r any great purge i n the early 1920's as was the case i n the r e s t of Central Asia.*'""" This was p r i m a r i l y due to the f a c t that during the period of p o l i t i c a l c o n s o l i d a t i o n , the administration of Kazakhstan was almost wholly i n the hands of Russians as the f i g u r e s above would t e s t i f y . Observes Guest: " I t i s curious that the r e g i o n a l Soviets or other d i r e c t i n g party organs i n Kazakhstan as elsewhere i n Central A s i a are p r a c t i c a l l y always headed by Russian Communists or Communists imported from the neighbouring 62 region and of a d i f f e r e n t race". The importance of t h i s cannot be over-emphasized since the dominating f a c t o r which makes f o r the u n i t y of the component parts of the Soviet Union i s the strong party d i s c i p l i n e and the absolute l o y a l t y to the party i n t e r e s t s w i t h i n the Communist Party i t s e l f , and i t s absolute domination over the mass of population. This v i r t u a l monopolization of leadership i n Kazakhstan by Slavs can be a t t r i b u t e d to three f a c t o r s : f i r s t the r e l a t i v e "backwardness" of the Republic's nomadic population; second, the Republic's proximity to Russia proper, and t h i r d the f a c t that the urban centres that did e x i s t were l a r g e l y inhabited by Slavs. While on the question of Soviet c o n t r o l and monopolization of Kazakhstan's party and administrative machinery, i t must be pointed out that the combination of c e n t r a l i z e d c o n t r o l with n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l expression f o r the n a t i o n a l i t i e s came, as d i d a l l other p o l i t i c a l power r e l a t i o n s h i p s i n the Soviet Union under the designation of "democraticcHntralism" as enshrined i n the Party s t a t u t e s . And the most important p r i n c i p l e of "democratic centralism" states that "the decisions of higher bodies /when - 37 -once they have been taken a f t e r p r i o r c o n s u l t a t i o n s / are u n c o n d i t i o n a l l y binding upon lower ones". A t y p i c a l Party commentary upon these p r i n c i p l e s asserts that the very construction of the Party makes i t po s s i b l e to guide a l l Party work from one centre, and to r e a l i z e , i n p r a c t i c e leadership over members of the Party, as w e l l as the planned d i s t r i b u t i o n of Party forces. It f u r t h e r states that the Communist p a r t i e s belong to the A l l - U n i o n 64 Communist Party not as independent p a r t i e s . We have now seen that the implementation of the n a t i o n a l i t y p r i n c i p l e took the form of r e c o g n i t i o n of "freedom of n a t i o n a l development" i n the form of p o l i t i c a l expression, economic e q u a l i z a t i o n ( t h i s aspect w i l l be discussed more f u l l y i n the next section) and c u l t u r a l autonomy of the various Republics of the Union. But the freedom of n a t i o n a l development was not without any s t r i n g s . That i s , i t was not meant to be a one-way process. Accordingly, the three a t t r i b u t e s - p o l i t i c a l expression, economic e q u a l i z a t i o n and c u l t u r a l autonomy - were bound by t h e i r opposite numbers, based on the conception of the i n t e r e s t s of the P r o l e t a r i a n Revolution and of the Union as a whole i n the form of p o l i t i c a l c e n t r a l i z a t i o n , economic coordination and c e n t r a l i z e d planning and c u l t u r a l "concordance". Having discussed p o l i t i c a l c e n t r a l i z a t i o n l e t us now b r i e f l y look at the other form -c u l t u r a l concordance. In terms of c u l t u r a l concordance, coherence with c e n t r a l goals and with one another was to be secured f o r the various cultures of the n a t i o n a l i t i e s through uniformity of content expressed s u c c i n t l y i n the formula: - 38 -P r o l e t a r i a n i n content and n a t i o n a l i n form -such i s the u n i v e r s a l human cu l t u r e toward which Socialism i s marching. P r o l e t a r i a n c u l t u r e does not cancel n a t i o n a l c u l t u r e but lends i t content. National c u l t u r e , on the other hand, does not 5 5 cancel P r o l e t a r i a n c u l t u r e , but lends i t form. It was also pointed out that n a t i o n a l c u l t u r e , no l e s s than n a t i o n a l 66 statehood was placed "at the ser v i c e of s o c i a l i s t construction". Thus a s e r i e s of concrete measures were implemented i n Kazakhstan to bring about the propagation of a T P r o l e t a r i a n content' i n the Kazakh c u l t u r e i n the period of p o l i t i c a l c o n s o l i d a t i o n . These included i n the educational sphere, the cr e a t i o n of s p e c i a l schools of p o l i t i c a l l i t e r a c y (for i t need hardly be shown that ignorance and unenlightenment were the most dangerous enemies of the Soviet government) ; extension of the a c t i v i t i e s of the Un i v e r s i t y of Peoples of the East and i t s branches i n the l o c a l i t i e s and above a l l the in t r o d u c t i o n of the Russian language to Kazakh schools. C l o s e l y a l l i e d with these educational measures was the language p o l i c y . Here, the Arabic s c r i p t - the l i t e r a r y form among the Kazakhs -was replaced by a Soviet devised Roman orthography by 1924 following what Treadgold has described as the "alphabet r e v o l u t i o n " . By the end of the p o l i t i c a l c o n s o l i d a t i o n phase i n 1928 the L a t i n alphabet was widely i n use but i t too had to be 68. replaced i n the l a t e 1930's with C y r i l l i c alphabet. I t i s c l e a r that the Soviet government regarded l i n g u i s t i c regimentation as one of the v i t a l instruments i n the moulding of the new society during the p o l i t i c a l c o n s o l i d a t i o n phase. I t s - 39 -basic aim, a l l t o l d , was to prevent the formation of a s i n g l e Turkic l i t e r a r y language which might have aided i n the c r e a t i o n of a united T u r k i and Moslem n a t i o n a l movement, and of the Russian language being used by a l l sectors of the population. F i n a l l y , i n broad terms the a t t i t u d e of the Soviet government toward Islam as a r e l i g i o n was the same as t h e i r a t t i t u d e towards other r e l i g i o n s They strongly discouraged and r i d i c u l e d i t though they d i d not a c t i v e l y seek to suppress i t . But the Soviet government found i t d i f f i c u l t to conceal i t s h o s t i l i t y to Islam since i t regarded i t as more "dangerous and objectionable" than C h r i s t i a n i t y . 7 0 The main antipathy of the Soviet a u t h o r i t i e s to Islam writes Wheeler i s on m a t e r i a l i s t i c grounds. "They see i t l e s s as an i d e o l o g i c a l opponent of the Communist Creed than as an obstacle to the establishment of Russian c u l t u r a l , economic £and p o l i t i c a l / i n f l u e n c e Thus i n general the Russians' goal was to destroy Islam. Not only was t h i s proces f a c i l i t a t e d by the "alphabet r e v o l u t i o n " and reforms but a l s o by the 7?, r e l a t i v e weakness of the Moslem r e l i g i o n i n Kazakhstan. The i n i t i a l r e l a t i v e l y mild Soviet antagonism to Islam i n Kazakhstan gave way to sterner actions l a t e r . A f t e r 1928 Islam along with any remnants of Pan-Islamism, Pan-Turkism came under increased Communist attack. Clan leaders were eliminated, nomads were f o r c i b l y s e t t l e d , (more on t h i s l a t e r ) and an e f f o r t was made to uproot Islam and a l l i t s i n s t i t u t i o n s . On the whole the measures discussedabove were taken to ensure the c o n s o l i d a t i o n of power by the Soviet a u t h o r i t i e s . T h i s , i n the view of t h i s w r i t e r , the Soviet a u t h o r i t i e s did achieve by 1928, thanks to the - 40 -u n i f y i n g f o r c e of the Communist Party. A word of caution i s appropriate here, l e s t one gets the impression that p o l i t i c a l c o n s o l i d a t i o n was achieved through the use of force only. I t must be emphasized that f o r t a c t i c a l reasons, the Soviets were p e r i o d i c a l l y prepared to pursue a p o l i c y of coexistence with t h e i r p o l i t i c a l and i d e o l o g i c a l archenemies i n Kazakhstan and i n p a r t i c u l a r with the anti-Bolshevik elements w i t h i n Alash Orda. On the other hand, the n a t i o n a l i s t s i n the Alash Orda move-ments who cooperated with the Soviets, did not succeed i n achieving t h e i r o r i g i n a l aims, namely obtaining n a t i o n a l freedom by gradually transforming the Soviet apparatus. The r e a l power was i n the hands of the Russian Communists who were l o y a l to the Soviets. The e l i m i n a t i o n of the Alash Orda movement a f t e r 1930 which had been l e g i t i m i z e d as a representative of the people by the Congress of the Kazakhs, undermined at the same time a l l expressions of n a t i o n a l w i l l . Beyond t h i s the rmeasures were equally to ensure that the opportunities f o r n a t i o n a l c u l t u r a l a s s e r t i o n would not mitigate, but would contribute i n the long run toward the achievement of the ultimate goals and o b j e c t i v e s . I t was S t a l i n ' s c o n v i c t i o n that t h i s would be the case as he asserted i n the Sixteenth Party Congress i n 1930: It may seem strange that we, who are i n favour of the f u s i o n of n a t i o n a l c u l t u r e s i n the future into one common c u l t u r e (both i n form and content), with a s i n g l e common language, are at the same time i n favour of the blossoming of n a t i o n a l cultures at the present time, i n the period of the D i c t a t o r s h i p of the P r o l e t a r i a t . But there i s nothing strange i n t h i s . The n a t i o n a l cultures must be permitted to develop and expand and to reveal a l l t h e i r p o t e n t i a l q u a l i t i e s , i n order - 41 -to create the conditions necessary f o r the fusion into a s i n g l e , common culture with a si n g l e common language.73 To sum up then, having s u c c e s s f u l l y l a i d the foundations f o r p o l i t i c a l c o n s o l i d a t i o n through a l l the measures discussed above, the Soviet govern-ment then moved s w i f t l y to consolidate i t s power. With the m i l i t a r y s i t u a t i o n w e l l under c o n t r o l i n 1919 following the defeat of Admiral Kolchak, i n January of 1920 the f i r s t Kazakh Soviet Conference decided to unite a l l Kazakh administrative units into one Soviet Republic and i n February of the same year the Kazakh ASSR was established. In a n a t i o n a l f r o n t i e r s realignment of Kazakh and neighbouring Central Asian t e r r i t o r i e s i n 1924, some Kazakh populated areas were further included i n the Kazakh ASSR 74 with i t s c a p i t a l f i n a l l y moved to Alma-Ata (1929). With the formation of the Kazakh ASSR i n 1924, the v i r t u a l i n t e g r a t i o n of Kazakhstan to the Soviet Union became a f a c t of h i s t o r y . By 1928 a f t e r the l o c a l e l e c t i o n s i n Kazakhstan, "the Kazakhstan Party organization was able to report that i n the main the Aoul ( v i l l a g e - the lowest administrative u n i t ) has become Soviet-minded...."^ The period of p o l i t i c a l c o n s o l i d a t i o n was over and Kazakhstan entered with the r e s t of the Union to the next phase of consolida t i o n - the economic consoli d a t i o n phase i n 1928, beginning with the f i r s t f i v e year plan. I t w i l l be misleading to leave the impression that Soviet p o l i c i e s i n Kazakhstan during the p o l i t i c a l c o n s o l i d a t i o n phase were a l l negative. Indeed, however spurious Soviet n a t i o n a l i t y p o l i c y had been, the symbolic s a t i s f a c t i o n that the trapping of autonomous "statehood" bestowed upon - 42 -the Kazakhs cannot be underestimated. Beyond t h i s the Communists during the 1920's encouraged among others, the use of the native language elevating i t to the l e v e l of l i t e r a r y language - a s i t u a t i o n u n p a r a l l e l e d i n the past. Moreover, the f a c t that the Soviet n a t i o n a l i t i e s (Kazakhstan to be more s p e c i f i c ) must subordinate t h e i r p o l i t i c a l and nati o n a l a c t i v i t y , to higher s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l goals i s f a r from unique, as v i r t u a l l y a l l states made up of d i s t i n c t ethnic, r e g i o n a l or h i s t o r i c a l constituents c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y f ollow such a course. This important f a c t should not therefore be obfuscated simply because the norms imposed upon the Soviet n a t i o n a l i t i e s are Communist norms. The Soviet Union no l e s s than Canada, India, N i g e r i a , etc. frowns upon a l l manifestations of n a t i o n a l separation.. Sinkiang - P o l i t i c a l Consolidation In turning to the experience of the Chinese Communists during the p o l i t i c a l c o n s o l i d a t i o n phase, one f i n d s that, i n contrast to the Bolsheviks, who we r e c a l l had l i m i t e d contacts with the Moslems of Kazakhstan, having been v i r t u a l l y cut o f f from Moscow during the C i v i l War, the Chinese Communists had had considerable dealings with Moslems p r i o r to the seizure of power i n 1949 and i n p a r t i c u l a r during the Long 7d' March (October 1934-October 1935). Moreover, since the Chinese Communists were e s t a b l i s h i n g a base i n North Shensi, which was separated from the Soviet Union and Outer Mongolia (which was l a r g e l y a s a t e l l i t e of the Soviet Union at the time) by areas inhabited by Moslems, i t - 43 -became incumbent upon the Chinese Communists to maintain some l e v e l of cooperation with these Moslem communities. During the course of the Long March through Tsinghai, Ninghsia, and North Kansu, the Chinese Communists were able to sway young Moslems who were propagandizing against the "KMT running-dog" Ninghsia regime of Ma Hung-k'uei by promising to end Ma Hung-k'uei's c o n s c r i p t i o n , to cancel taxes and old debts and to protect Islamic c u l t u r e and to guarantee r e l i g i o u s freedom.^ Furthermore, the Chinese Communists c a r r i e d out extensive i n s t r u c t i o n among t h e i r F i r s t and F i f t h Corps to b r i e f them on the 78 p o s i t i o n of the Chinese Communists on the d e l i c a t e Moslem question. Indeed by the end of 1936 Moslems along with other m i n o r i t i e s such as 79 the Mongols, Miao etc. were e n r o l l e d i n the Red Army at Yenan. No doubt, a l l t h i s was an attempt to soothe the h i s t o r i c a l animosity between the Chinese and the Moslem m i n o r i t i e s . In regard to the minority n a t i o n a l i t y question, the Chinese Communist n a t i o n a l i t y p o l i c y before 1949 o r i g i n a l l y d i f f e r e d i n no s i g n i -f i c a n t respect from that of the Soviet Union. I t too allowed for the same " f i c t i o n a l " r i g h t of secession. I t a l s o advocated that the c u l t u r e and way of l i f e of the n a t i o n a l i t y group should be, " n a t i o n a l i n form, - i• - • - - M 80 s o c i a l i s t i n content . Indeed as e a r l y as the f a l l of 1931, the f i r s t A l l - C h i n a Congress of Workers' and Peasants' Deputies i n Kiangsi approved the P r o v i s i o n a l C o n s t i t u t i o n of the "Chinese Worker-Peasant Democratic Republic" (Soviet Republic) which endorsed the e q u a l i t y of the various n a t i o n a l i t i e s - 44 -of China. A key s o l u t i o n of the Congress stated that: i n such regions as Mongolia, T i b e t , Sinkiang... the n a t i o n a l i t i e s have the r i g h t to determine by themselves whether they want to secede from the Chinese Soviet Republic and form t h e i r i n -dependent states, or j o i n the Union..., or to form autonomous regions wi t h i n the Chinese Soviet Republic.81 Similar sentiments were echoed on November 6, 1938 at the Si x t h Central Committee meeting of the CCP i n which Mao proclaimed that "the Mongols, the Hui, the Tibetan e t c . peoples w i l l enjoy powers equal to those of 82 the Chinese i n order to r e s i s t the Japanese together". But t h i s rather u t i l i t a r i a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the concept of self-determination was soon to come under close s c r u t i n y by Mao. Thus, although a Chinese Communist wartime c i v i l c o n s t i t u t i o n maintained the stand that a minority n a t i o n a l i t y had the r i g h t to secede, Mao Tse-tung, at the Seventh Congress of the Communist Party of China on J u l y 11, 1945, i n h i s report "On C o a l i t i o n Government", claimed that the Chinese Communists were at one with Sun Yat-sen's desir e to grant e q u a l i t y and the r i g h t of self-determination (but most importantly not to the extent of secession) to the minority n a t i o n a l i t i e s a f t e r the Han nation had been l i b e r a t e d . ^ A major change i n the m i n o r i t i e s n a t i o n a l i t i e s p o l i c y was seen See Page 50 of the Section on Documents i n H. G. Schwarz, Chinese  P o l i c i e s Towards M i n o r i t i e s : An Essay and Documents, (S e a t t l e : Western Washington State College, 1971). - 45 -i n the o f f i n g and by 1949, the Common Programme of the Chinese People's P o l i t i c a l Consultative Conference (hereafter r e f e r r e d to as CPPCC) designated China at l e a s t t h e o r e t i c a l l y as a "multinational s t a t e " compos' _ 84 of d i f f e r e n t but equal n a t i o n a l i t i e s . Conspicuously however, the r i g h to secede had been squeezed out of the CPPCC document. The new p o l i c y o • m i n o r i t i e s n a t i o n a l i t i e s was reaffirmed i n the new Chinese C o n s t i t u t i o n (based l a r g e l y on the Common Programme of the CPPCC) which stated i n A r t i c l e 3 that: the People's Republic of China i s a u n i f i e d , m u l t i n a t i o n a l s t a t e . . . ( A l l ) n a t i o n a l autonomous areas are i n a l i e n a b l e parts of the People's Republic of China.85 From t h i s point on, any expectations that the Chinese Communists would follow the Soviet example to the extent of r e s t r u c t u r i n g the Chinese state i n the form of a f e d e r a l union evaporated. The People's Republic of China i : a "unitary s t a t e " w i t h i n which p r o v i s i o n i s made f o r l o c a l autonomy f•, ; 86 "national m i n o r i t i e s " , but not as constituents of a federation. Having thus refused the minority n a t i o n a l i t i e s the r i g h t to .: rf.ede, the Chinese Communists on accession to power i n 1949 i n s t i t u t e d varic \ -forms of c o n t r o l i n t h e i r b i d to consolidate t h e i r power i n Sinkiang. Presumably l o c a l autonomy alone was not enough to placate the minorit •< n a t i o n a l i t i e s of the province. When the p r o v i n c i a l government of Sinkiang formally surrender to the Communists i n September of 1949, as discussed above, a c o a l i t i o n government was set up which included the East Turkestan leaders who during the Second World War had headed a government of the North border regions under the clandestine encouragement and support of the Soviet Union. - 46 -But a f t e r the death i n a plane crash of most of i t s prominent leaders (who were l e s s t r a c t a b l e to Chinese control) the leadership went to Sai f u d i n who apparently turned out to be more amenable to Chinese i n f l u e n c e . He joined the CCP i n 1950 and the former "Sinkiang League f o r the Defense of Peace and Democracy" formed i n 1948 (as a counterpart of the East Turkestan Republic) was renamed the "Sinkiang's People's Democratic League" and under the d i r e c t c o n t r o l of the Communists. The East Turkestan movement was d i s c r e d i t e d and purges of Uighur (the t i t u l a r majority i n Sinkiang) and Kazakhs followed i n 1951 to remove the unwholesome remnants of "narrow nationalism", "Pan-Islamism" and "feudalism". The backbone of Sinkiang resi s t a n c e was thus summarily broken and the leaders of the East Turkestan movement who had escaped the purges were then.absorbed into the new Communist organs of c o n t r o l . Now immediately a f t e r " L i b e r a t i o n " , the KMT system of r u l e was abolished and the Chinese Army set up "organs of m i l i t a r y c o n t r o l " i n which m i l i t a r y committees collaborated with the l o c a l People's governments i n a l l the d i s t r i c t s of Sinkiang except f o r the three Northern ones where organs of people's power had already been i n operation. The r o l e of the m i l i t a r y committees was, i n the words of L i u Shao-ch'i "to crush r e a c t i o n a r i e s by force and simultaneously protect and i n s p i r e the people and help them to set up conferences of People's representatives - organs of People's power of 87 a l l degrees...will gradually r e c e i v e f u l l power". , The r e a c t i o n a r i e s L i u had i n mind were of course remants of the KMT groups, Osman Bator's bands and presumably secret s o c i e t i e s . Thus out of 95 employees of the state i n s t i t u t i o n s of Kashgar 53 were " a f t e r painstaking i n v e s t i g a t i o n - 47 -unmasked as spies of various i n t e l l i g e n c e services".88 In concert with the f i r s t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l document of the PRC (accepted i n l a t e September 1949) which c a l l e d f o r the i n s t i t u t i o n of l o c a l autonomy and the cr e a t i o n of "United Democratic Government", the CCP set up i n December of 1949 a "United Democratic Government" i n Sinkiang with 31 members - 9 Uighurs, 3 Kazakhs, 2 Han Chinese, 2 Tungans and one 89 representative of each other n a t i o n a l i t y . The o l d KMT Paochia system, was replaced by a new Communist form of l o c a l administration. This took the form of e s t a b l i s h i n g l o c a l people's governments i n d i s t r i c t s , counties, areas, r u r a l areas, and v i l l a g e s . Of the 78 County (hsien) chairmen 45 were Uighurs, 13 Kazakhs, 11 Han Chinese, 4 Mongols, 3 K i r g h i z and 1 Tart a r . Of the 10 chairmen of d i s t r i c t governments, 4 were Uighurs, 3 Kazakhs, 2 Han and 1 Mongol.$6 In the second h a l f of 1950, the government f u r t h e r i n i t i a t e d a reorganization of the already e x i s t i n g organs of people's power i n the three northern d i s t r i c t s of Tarbagatay, A l t a i and H i i n which the governors were replaced by administrative c o n t r o l boards and the l o c a l Peoples governments were established i n counties, areas and v i l l a g e s much along the l i n e s i n the other d i s t r i c t s . Equally, the East Turkestan regime, whose armed forces i n September 1949 had been incorporated into the PLA, was also superseded by these new i n s t i t u t i o n s of c o n t r o l . Meantime, i n the r e s t of the province, [a. few months a f t e r the i n s t i t u t i o n of the new system of m i l i t a r y c o n t r o l ^ the exercise of power passed into the hands of the " l o c a l conferences of People's representatives - 48 -of a l l s t r a t a of the polulace and to the l o c a l People's governments elected by them". These conferences, were a t r a n s i t i o n stage of popular representation, e x i s t i n g while the economy of the country was being reconstructed. They existed at the v i l l a g e , r u r a l area, county, c i t y , and province l e v e l . Their most important functions were to debate and make proposals about the work of the People's governments and to p u b l i c i z e the decisions of the governments to the people. During the f i r s t period of t h e i r a c t i v i t y , t h e i r r e s o l u t i o n s were no more than recommendations. From the middle of 1951, however, they began to exercise the powers l a t e r possessed by the Assemblies of People's Representatives. A f t e r t h i s date the conferences selected the corresponding People's governments, c o n t r o l l e d t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s and confirmed t h e i r budgets, and t h e i r r e s o l u t i o n s had the for c e of commands. The s i g n i f i c a n c e of a l l these new administrative reforms i n Sinkiang l i e s i n the ubiquitous presence of the Communist party i n a l l the organs of c o n t r o l i n the p r o v i n c i a l administrative machinery. I t i s important therefore to note at t h i s point that though the governing bodies of the n a t i o n a l i t y autonomous areas, l i k e a l l other l o c a l governments, may organize l o c a l p u b l i c s e c u r i t y f o r c e s , manage l o c a l finance, and enact l o c a l r egulations they were subject to t i g h t e r c o n t r o l by the c e n t r a l government i n accordance with the general Communist p r i n c i p l e s of "democratic centralism" (discussion of which i s not necessary here as i t had already been f u l l y discussed e a r l i e r ) . Thus i t i s s t i p u l a t e d that the "enactment of t h e i r People's Congress must be approved by the Standing Committee of the National People's 92 Congress before they can take e f f e c t " . This aspect of Central Government - 49 -c o n t r o l becomes even more obvious when one r e a l i z e s that the c o n s u l t a t i v e Councils, which represented the Conferences between sessions, met only four times a year at the p r o v i n c i a l l e v e l and once a month at the c i t y l e v e l . I t appears that the conferences, i n s p i t e of t h e i r o f f i c i a l powers a c t u a l l y could not maintain e f f e c t i v e c o n t r o l of the l o c a l government u n i t s 93 or for that matter the p r o v i n c i a l government. In the words of Tang, what the Communists want i s that "the voice of authority s h a l l speak i n the language of the l o c a l minority groups but that the words s h a l l be the 94 words of the man at the top". Besides, the c o n s t i t u t i o n further demands that " a l l higher organs of state administration concerned...assist the various minority n a t i o n a l i t i e s i n t h e i r p o l i t i c a l economic and c u l t u r a l development".^ By these provisions the Central Government c l e a r l y was given a voice i n every aspect of l o c a l administration of the autonomous areas i n Sinkiang. Nevertheless, the development of l o c a l conferences of People's Representatives i n Sinkiang was completed by the end of 1952. But with the beginning of the f i r s t f i v e year plan i n 1953 the conferences were again replaced by Assemblies of People's Representatives elected by general suffrage. This was followed by 96 general e l e c t i o n s held i n 1953-4. The seemingly endless administrative reforms i n Sinkiang may have been due to the complexity of the m u l t i n a t i o n a l nature of the province and t h i s may have been one of the major f a c t o r s that delayed the granting of regional autonomy to Sinkiang t i l l September 1955 with the a b o l i t i o n of - 50 -Sinkiang Province. The establishment of autonomous areas no doubt, was an e s s e n t i a l device f o r the Communists not only i n t h e i r b i d to consolidate t h e i r power but also i n t h e i r attempt to f o s t e r a sense of i d e n t i f i c a t i o n with the new regime i n Peking on the part of the n a t i o n a l m i n o r i t i e s i n Sinkiang, and t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l leaders. Turning now to other p o l i c i e s i n i t i a t e d by the Communists during the p o l i t i c a l c o n s o l i d a t i o n phase we f i n d that s t i l l a n t i c i p a t i n g d i f f i c u l t i e s i n t h e i r r e l a t i o n s with the minority n a t i o n a l i t i e s i n Sinkiang the Communists introduced other measures on coming to power to ameliorate f u r t h e r the rather d e l i c a t e s i t u a t i o n . Such measures included the encouragement of migration (though not massive during t h i s period) of Han Chinese to the 98 region to hasten the process of c o n s o l i d a t i o n . In terms of education, schools were erected i n towns, v i l l a g e s i n c l u d i n g many remote areas to propagate the sense of n a t i o n a l consciousness. Another s i g n i f i c a n t and unique c r e a t i o n of the Communist regime f o r minority education, the I n s t i t u t e s f o r N a t i o n a l i t i e s , very much p o l i t i c a l l y o r i e nted, functioned with the primary purpose of t r a i n i n g p o l i t i c a l " a c t i v i s t s " among minority groups, In a d d i t i o n they were to produce proletarian-based i n t e l l e c t u a l s and to t r a i n t e c h n i c a l experts. P o l i t i c a l c o n s o l i d a t i o n w i t h i n Sinkiang was accompanied also by a s e r i e s of purges as already mentioned. By New Year's Day 1952, Burhan Shahidi had announced over Radio Urumchi that Sinkiang had been purged of *Burhan Shahidi headed the Sinkiang government j u s t p r i o r to the Communist v i c t o r y and was the one who sent the cable of surrender to Mao on September 26, 1949. - 51 -99' 120,000 "enemies of the people". Sinkiang also p a r t i c i p a t e d i n the nationwide " t h r e e - a n t i " and " f i v e - a n t i " campaigns which were d i r e c t e d against "counter-revolutionaries" of a l l types. C l e a r l y then, along with the granting of r e g i o n a l autonomy"^^to Sinkiang, the Chinese Communists coupled the transparent concession with a penetrating repression i n t h e i r attempt to consolidate t h e i r power i n S inkiang. On the question of r e c r u i t i n g minority cadres and f o r membership i n the CCP, the Chinese Communists found themselves i n a predicament s i m i l a r to that of the Soviet Union and the CPSU i n Kazakhstan. Thus i n s p i t e of • the Red pronouncement that l o c a l r u l e i n Sinkiang had to be c a r r i e d out by members of the l o c a l minority groups, the Communists were hard put to produce enough native cadres of Communists. In 1950, there were only 12,841 native cadres out of a population of 5 m i l l i o n i n Sinkiang. Native Communist Party membership grew even more slowly numbering only 27 by 1951 and 608 by 1 9 5 7 . 1 0 1 In reference to language p o l i c y , A r t i c l e 53 of the Common Programme 102 of the CPPCC guaranteed the development of minority languages and d i a l e c t s . Thus i n i t i a l Communist p o l i c i e s aimed at the f u l l development and use of non-Chinese languages perhaps more than anything e l s e to ensure maximum effec t i v e n e s s of o f f i c i a l propaganda and i n d o c t r i n a t i o n i n the minority areas. In Sinkiang, the Communist f i r s t attempt at systematic i n v e s t i g a t i o n of spoken languages and d i a l e c t s was c a r r i e d out i n 1950, though the adoption of the C y r i l l i c alphabet in Sinkiang came at a much l a t e r date i n 1956. - 52 -It i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note that by 1958 the C y r i l l i c alphabet was to be replaced by the L a t i n alphabet perhaps i n a n t i c i p a t i o n of the Sino-Soviet dxspute. L a s t l y , i n the r e l i g i o u s sphere, the Chinese Communists maintained a remarkable degree of tolerance towards Islam i n Sinkiang during the p o l i t i c a l c o n s o l i d a t i o n phase. Members of r e l i g i o u s orders were, f o r example, given equal r i g h t s with the peasants i n the possession of land. Furthermore, they encouraged the formation of the Chinese Islamic A s s o c i a t i o n , a l b e i t founded at a l a t e r date i n 1953. Hsiao suggests, however, that the apparent r e l a x a t i o n i n t h e i r treatment of Islam may have been simply due to the f a c t that i t had semi-autonomous p o l i t i c a l c o n t r o l of c e r t a i n geographical s t r a t e g i c areas i n Northwest China and was therefore more important p o l i t i c a l l y , as a s t r a t e g i c border area than r e l i g i o u s l y . Hence the Communists have i n general tended to deal with Islam as a minority n a t i o n a l i t y rather than as a r e l i g i o n - presenting themselves o c c a s i o n a l l y 104 as defenders of the Moslem m i n o r i t i e s against Han-Chinese oppression. In attempting to analyse the p o l i t i c a l p o l i c i e s of both the Soviet Union and Communist China during the p o l i t i c a l c o n s o l i d a t i o n phase two main f a c t o r s emerge. Not only were there r e l a t i v e l y minor s i m i l a r i t i e s i n t h e i r p o l i c i e s (which had been the common f i n d i n g among scholars) but that there were also major d i f f e r e n c e s i n t h e i r approaches to the p o l i t i c a l problems of c o n s o l i d a t i o n i n the two regions under study. An obvious case of s i m i l a r i t y i s the important r o l e of the s i n g l e party government as a u n i f y i n g f o r c e . But by and large the d i s s i m i l a r i t i e s were more s t r i k i n g . - 53 -Thus even though i t i s apparent both regimes interpreted the concept of self-determination as a weapon i n the struggle f or s o c i a l i s m , the Chinese Communists e x p l i c i t l y r e j e cted the notion of the r i g h t to secede as soon as they came to power. In a way i t could be argued that Chinese m i n o r i t i e s of Sinkiang possess even l e s s of a shadow of p o l i t i c a l autonomy than do t h e i r counterparts i n Soviet Kazakhstan. In keeping with i t s f e d e r a l character, the Soviet Union has granted the border r e p u b l i c s the t h e o r e t i c a l r i g h t to secede, a l b e i t with very important s t r i n g s attached. On the other hand, however, the Chinese C o n s t i t u t i o n which defines the PRC as " u n i f i e d , m u l t i n a t i o n a l s t a t e " extends no r i g h t of secession to i t s minority n a t i o n a l i -t i e s . Indeed Professor Wit t f o g e l has charged that i n f a i l i n g to extend the r i g h t of secession to n a t i o n a l minority u n i t s , the Chinese Communists have abandoned t h e i r e a r l i e r support for the L e n i n i s t p o s i t i o n which held that t h i s r i g h t should be guaranteed to a l l "oppressed n a t i o n s " . ! ^ But by f a r the most fundamental d i f f e r e n c e between the p o l i c i e s of the two regimes during t h i s period l i e s i n the r o l e of the Army, that i s , the extraordinary r o l e of the PLA i n Sinkiang as opposed to the secondary r o l e of the Soviet Red Army. To be sure, the fundamental d i f f e r e n c e i s l a r g e l y a r e f l e c t i o n of the respective developments of the Army-Party r e l a t i o n s h i p i n the Communist movements of the two regimes. In general the Bolsheviks seized power i n 1917 without an army. The army that was formed was comprised of many former C z a r i s t o f f i c e r s and as such was seen as an organization outside the o r i g i n a l Bolshevik Party which had captured the country. Indeed no one i n the top echelon of the Bolshevik Party was a - 54 -p r o f e s s i o n a l m i l i t a r y man. 106 In sharp contrast to the Bolshevik experience, the Chinese Communists came to power as hardened m i l i t a r y men by means of a g r u e l l i n g c i v i l war that l a s t e d 20 years. There was no c l e a r d i s t i n c t i o n between the PLA and the CCP. Chairman Mao i s s t i l l regarded as one of the foremost m i l i t a r y t h e o r i s t s of the time. In f u r t h e r contrast to the Bolshevik experience, p r i o r to the entrance of PLA u n i t s i n t o Sinkiang, there was no Chinese Communist organization i n the province. Thus i n the f i r s t months of Communist r u l e i n Sinkiang, a u t h o r i t y was vested i n the Commander of the Sinkiang m i l i t a r y d i s t r i c t , and the leadership of the Sinkiang sub-bureau of the CCPCC. To t h i s end, i t i s s i g n i f i c a n t that the organs of c o n t r o l (to ensure the c o n s o l i d a t i o n of power during the p o l i t i c a l c o n s o l i d a t i o n phase) was weighted h e a v i l y i n favour of m i l i t a r y c o n t r o l s i n Sinkiang while the Bolsheviks saw f i t to de-emphasize the r o l e of the Red Army i n the p o l i t i c a l developments of Kazakhstan. In c l o s i n g , mention must also be made of the use of purges to consolidate power during the p o l i t i c a l c o n s o l i d a t i o n phase. Here, the purges of Kazakhstan were f a r l e s s extensive than that of Sinkiang. The purges i n Kazakhstan took the form of the e l i m i n a t i o n of " r i g h t wing" accomplices of the Reds (1919-20); i n Sinkiang they involved the u n r e l i a b l e elements within the East Turkestan Republic Movement 1950-51. In a second wave, which Kazakhstan did not experience, Sinkiang joined the r e s t of the country during the "Three-Anti" and " F i v e - A n t i " campaigns dir e c t e d against l i n g e r i n g "counter r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s " , such as Pan-Turkic elements and - 55 -Uighur n a t i o n a l i s t s . The reason f o r the r e l a t i v e mildness i n the use of the purge as a weapon i n the co n s o l i d a t i o n of power i n Kazakhstan was due to the dominant r o l e that the Russian s e t t l e r s , upon whom the Soviet a u t h o r i t i e s r e l i e d so much, were playing there. And f i n a l l y the more ferocious attacks on the Islamic i n s t i t u t i o n s by the Soviet Reds i n contrast to the more res t r a i n e d assault by the Chinese Communists i n Sinkiang during the period of p o l i t i c a l c o n s o l i d a t i o n i s yet another pertinent i n d i c a t i o n of the d i s s i m i l a r i t i e s i n the p o l i t i c a l c o n s o l i d a t i o n p o l i c i e s of the two regimes. SECTION I I I An Analysis of the Economic P o l i c i e s of Both Regimes During the P o l i t i c a l Consolidation Phase The e s s e n t i a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c i n the economic realm during the p o l i t i c a l c o n s o l i d a t i o n phase we r e c a l l , was the t r a n s f e r of the ownership of the b a s i c means of production from the former r u l i n g c l a s s e s to the hands of the peasantry as w e l l as the u n i v e r s a l domination by the small farmer i n a g r i c u l t u r a l production. How was t h i s accomplished i n Kazakhstan? As stated previously, on the eve of the October Revolution a large part of Kazakhstan, was dominated by a "backward" p a s t o r a l economy of a nomadic or semi-nomadic type. Faced with the enormous task of developing the economy of Kazakhstan, o f f i c i a l Soviet p o l i c y advocated, as a f i r s t step, the immediate s e t t l i n g of the Kazakhs and the c r e a t i o n of an a g r i c u l t u r a l economy. Not only d i d the Soviet o f f i c i a l p o l i c y arouse the i r e of Kazakh's n a t i o n a l i s t groups but many others i n i t i a l l y , questioned the wisdom and indeed the economic f e a s i b i l i t y of a g r i c u l t u r e p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the a r i d regions of Central Kazakhstan. Thus a Russian s p e c i a l i s t warned i n 1926 that: the d e s t r u c t i o n of nomadism i n Kazakhstan would mean not only the perishing of Kazakh c a t t l e breeding and Kazakh economy as a whole, but would mean the transformation of the dry steppes into depopulated deserts. An a l t e r n a t i v e proposal that frequently accompanied such warnings was that of developing a herding economy with a pos s i b l e admixture of extensive - 57 -a g r i c u l t u r e so as to f u l l y e x p l o i t the economic p o t e n t i a l of most of the regions of Kazakhstan. But the demands for reorganization of the Kazakh economy were apparently underscored by the occurrence i n 1921 of a devastating famine caused by crop f a i l u r e and drought which a f f e c t e d one-half of the Kazakh population. Outmoded and antiquated methods of production were singled out to be the v i l l a i n , and the advocates of a b o l i t i o n of a l l forms of nomadism had t h e i r f i e l d day i n the Soviet courts with the claim that: We (the) workers of a n a t i o n a l minority must of course r e a l i z e that the basic reason for the misery and the dying out of the nomads i s the nomadic way of l i f e i t s e l f , and that the r e b i r t h of the Kazakh masses and t h e i r c u l t u r a l growth can begin only a f t e r s e t t l i n g . In a s e t t l e d economy and i n a European cu l t u r e l i e s the guarantee of progress and of the r e b i r t h of the nomads.108 Meanwhile the New Economic P o l i c y (NEP 1922-28) - a t a c t i c a l r e t r e a t f o r the Soviet leadership from the harsh and sometimes disastrous p o l i c i e s during the period of "War Communism" and the C i v i l War (1917-21) -proclaimed i n March 1921, (at the Tenth Congress of the Russian Communist Party) l a i d down furth e r guidelines f o r the economic development of Kazakhstan and Central Asia. I t must be pointed out however that during the NEP, before the f i r s t f i v e year plan, the Kazakhs experienced l i t t l e i n t e r f e r e n c e from the Soviet a u t h o r i t i e s compared to the rest of Central A s i a . 1 0 9 The f i r s t settlement attempts followed the decree of 1921 which provided f o r the return to the Kazakhs of a l l land confiscated by the C z a r i s t government. According to Winner, i n 1921 over 8,000 Russian - 58 -peasants i n Kazakhstan were displaced and t h e i r land given to the Kazakhs. The purpose of t h i s reform was to e s t a b l i s h "complete" equality between the Russian immigrants and the native population where usage r i g h t s were concerned. The land reform i n Kazakhstan expressed i t s e l f i n the r e d i s t r i b u t i o n at f i r s t of the meadows and pastures. R e d i s t r i b u t i o n of land a v a i l a b l e i n each v i l l a g e was c a r r i e d out by the l o c a l Soviets, i n conjunction with representatives of the people and the l o c a l union of poor peasants (Koshchi). To e f f e c t t h i s i t became necessary to a b o l i s h the great c a t t l e farms, and the Soviet government implemented t h i s p o l i c y by r e q u i s i t i o n i n g c a t t l e from the well-to-do farms and d i s t r i b u t i n g them among the paupers. In regard to the arable lands, large farms were s p l i t up into small separate farms and a proportionate increase i n the number of the needy smallholders. According to Soviet sources, by 1927 more than 60 per cent of the land taken from well-to-do bays ( r i c h c a t t l e owners) was handed over to farm workers and poor peasants, nearly 30 per cent to the moderately prosperous peasants and about 8 per cent to the b e t t e r - o f f f a r m e r s 1 ^ The r e d i s t r i b u t i o n of the land and the attendant curtailment of the economic power, r i g h t s and p r i v i l e g e s of the wealthier " f e u d a l " c h i e f s and bays not only d r a s t i c a l l y modified the s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e of the nomad v i l l a g e s , but also undermined the t r a d i t i o n a l a u t h o r i t y and influence of the former clan c h i e f s and bays over the other members. Unquestionably t h i s psychological turning point was c r u c i a l i n paving the way f o r subsequent progress towards the long term ob j e c t i v e s of s o c i a l i s m . This we s h a l l see l a t e r . - 59 -At f i r s t sight t h i s aspect of land reform may have appeared highly successful and more i n l i n e with the procedures adopted by the Soviet a u t h o r i t i e s i n which: the confiscated land was turned over to t r i b a l or communal u n i t s for d i s p o s i t i o n by them rather than being presented outright to i n d i v i d u a l peasants. T r i b a l chieftans thus became the r e a l a r b i t e r s of the reform and i n some cases u t i l i z e d i t f o r t h e i r own personal-aggrandisement. Generally speaking, therefore, i n s p i t e of such inducements as " l i b e r a l loans, allotment of best lands, free b u i l d i n g m a t e r i a l s , exemption from l o c a l taxes and t e c h n i c a l a i d r e l a t i v e l y few Kazakhs were persuaded to s e t t l e v o l u n t a r i l y " . 1 : L^ P a r a l l e l to the land r e d i s t r i b u t i o n programme was a reform of the system of ownership of land and water supplied between 1925-29, which also a f f e c t e d the semi-nomadic population of Kazakhstan. Under t h i s measure land belonging to i n d i v i d u a l s who did no work themselves was wholly or p a r t i a l l y confiscated and shared out among the poor peasants and farm workers. Apart from these changes, the n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of wells and p r o v i s i o n of funds f o r the construction of watering places also d i d much to improve the l o t of the herdsmen. Furthermore, as a r e s u l t of these agrarian reforms, f a m i l i e s from d i f f e r e n t t r i b e s and clans, and even d i f f e r e n t n a t i o n a l i t i e s s e t t l e d i n neighbouring holdings, some of which were lands r e c e n t l y reclaimed or those previously i r r i g a t e d by former c l a n canals. Thus the whole system of c l a n settlement and the use of pastureland and water on a clan basis began to d i s i n t e g r a t e and with i t - 60 -the s o c i a l patterns and closed way of l i f e i n the v i l l a g e s . An important p o l i t i c a l reason f o r the suppression of nomadism (from the point of view of the Soviet a u t h o r i t i e s ) was the need to destroy weakened p a t r i a r c h a l system, which even i n i t s d e c l i n e and therefore attenuated form was unacceptable to the Soviet a u t h o r i t i e s as one s t r e s s i n g c l a n l o y a l t i e s while i n f a c t a l l l o y a l t y should be to the state. To t h i s end the destruction of the c l a s s of bays was undertaken during the agrarian reforms. This i n turn served as a prelude to the s t a b i l i z a t i o n of the nomads that was to follow l a t e r during the period of c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n which w i l l be discussed i n the next se c t i o n . For the purposes of suppressing c l a n s u r v i v a l s i t was e s s e n t i a l to change the economic conditions p r e v a i l i n g at the time - to t r a n s f e r the cattle-breeders from nomadic to s e t t l e d l i f e . Before summarizing the d i s c u s s i o n on land reforms during the period of p o l i t i c a l c o n s o l i d a t i o n , mention must be made of the s i n g l e most important p o l i t i c a l agency through which Moscow exercised i t s economic desires i n Kazakhstan and Central A s i a - the Central Asian Economic Council (CAEC) which was established i n March of 1923. This body was subordinate to the Russian Communist Party, of course, since under the c o n s t i t u t i o n of 1924 the general plan for the whole of the people's economy was assigned 114 as a function of the c e n t r a l government. F u n c t i o n a l l y the CAEC not only acted as a superior planning agency fo r Kazakhstan and Central Asia's a g r i c u l t u r e , i r r i g a t i o n , state trading and cooperatives, but assumed d i r e c t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r /Minifying/ the regions monetary systems, fo r e i g n trade, transport, and communications. - 61 -Indeed a f t e r the 1924 t e r r i t o r i a l d e l i m i t a t i o n i n Central A s i a , the Central Executive Committee of the CPSU gave the CAEC supreme economic power, i n concordance with Moscow's objectives and d i r e c t i v e s i n Kazakhstan. C l e a r l y then, Moscow's i n t e n t i o n was to maintain c e n t r a l i z e d c o n t r o l of Kazakhstan's economy on a l o c a l as w e l l as r e g i o n a l b a s i s . Henceforth, Kazakhstan's economy was to be integrated i n t o the o r b i t of the A l l - U n i o n economy. To summarize t h i s period then, i t i s f a i r to assert that the Soviet Union did prepare the grounds f o r her next assault on the economic front i n Kazakhstan. Thus, though the f i r s t steps taken i n the d i r e c t i o n of land reform during t h i s period of p o l i t i c a l c o n s o l i d a t i o n may be i n t e r p r e -ted as of no great s i g n i f i c a n c e (as some scholars have tended to argue) i n r e a l economic terms, they were nevertheless c r u c i a l i n many ways. F i r s t they aided the Soviet a u t h o r i t i e s i n t h e i r attempt to gain the l o y a l t y of the native peasants whose support and cooperation they deemed necessary. Moreover, for a l l p r a c t i c a l purposes, the Soviets eliminated r u r a l landlessness p a r t i c u l a r l y among the Kazakhs who had e a r l i e r been forced out of t h e i r holdings by Russian immigrants. In turn, the binding forces of the past - the t r a d i t i o n a l foundations of the v i l l a g e - were completely undermined by the e l i m i n a t i o n of the clan c h i e f s and bays who were also among the l a r g e r landowners. At the same time, however, by implementing the land r e d i s t r i b u t i o n p o l i c i e s and the other measures the Soviet Union had helped to create i n turn many small holders of small farms incapable of s e l f support. Consequently, these small holders unable to maintain t h e i r farms were forced to turn to - 62 -the government f o r aid?'"''*' In short, they could only survive and progress with the cooperation and the aid of the state. In sum then, the s i g n i f i c a n c e of the economic measures taken during the period of p o l i t i c a l c o n s o l i d a t i o n l i e s i n the f a c t that they enabled the c e n t r a l government to lay the foundations f o r t h e i r next step on the economic front having established a f i r m c e n t r a l government c o n t r o l over the economy of the region. They had paved the way f o r the r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of the economy on Soviet terms of the areas where nomadism and semi-nomadism had h i t h e r t o been the way of l i f e . In turning to the Chinese Communist economic reforms i n Sinkiang during the period of p o l i t i c a l c o n s o l i d a t i o n one f i n d s a s i m i l a r approach to that of Moscow i n Kazakhstan. That i s , the Communists di d not press hard immediately with d r a s t i c reforms. This i s not s u r p r i s i n g of course, given that the primary preoccupation at the time was to achieve p o l i t i c a l c o n s o l i d a t i o n . Any precipitous economic a c t i o n would simply have exacerbated f u r t h e r the already touchy r e l a t i o n s i n these two regions. Nevertheless the economic s i t u a t i o n e s p e c i a l l y (the g a l l o p i n g i n f l a t i o n ) i n China was grave and something had to be done. (I t was even worse i n Sinkiang.) Thus from 1950-52 the province had no f i n a n c i a l budget and f o r a l l intents and purposes was dependent on c e n t r a l government 117 appropriations. Given the complexity of the m u l t i n a t i o n a l nature of the province, plus the fa c t that most of the wealth i n terms of l i v e s t o c k , i r r i g a t i o n r i g h t s and land was under the v i r t u a l monopoly of the 'propertied c l a s s ' , - 63 -the Communists began t h e i r programme of reform i n 1950 with the i n t r o d u c t i o n f i r s t of a progressive tax system, an increase i n the amount of land leased to the peasants and of lowering rents, the p r o h i b i t i o n of the sale and p a r c e l l i n g out of land and the r e g u l a t i o n of the d i s t r i b u t i o n of wate?;.. A l \ t h i s was apparently i n response to the Communists'call by mid-1950 f o r van.a r e d i s t r i b u t i o n throughout the whole of China i n order to e s t a b l i s h th v Communist Party's monopoly of p o l i t i c a l and economic power and to ser\ ^ :.M a f i r s t step toward the 'gradual' n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of the r u r a l economy.. The immediate e f f e c t of the tax and land reform p o l i c i e s i n s t i t u t e d i n 1950 was the termination of the monopolization of the i r r Lgation systems by the landlords as w e l l as the annulment of rent arrears and debts. During 1952 and 1953 "landowners and r i c h peasants were deprived of a l l land except that which they worked themselves, of a l l working animal;:, implements, l i v i n g accommodation and g r a i n i n excess of t h e i r own neer1>;;".118 Indeed, the i n t e n t i o n of the Communists to n e u t r a l i z e the power of th-. landlords was c l e a r l y s p e l t out i n the Agrarian Reform Law of 1950 whi.:'.-. -l.va e f f e c t preserved the i n s t i t u t i o n s of p r i v a t e ownership of land (grant -JC there was no d e s i r e on the part of the Communists f o r permanent peasanc 119 ownership) while c o n f i s c a t i n g the landlords' holdings. In concentrating e f f o r t s to eliminate the landlord c l a s s , the Communists also accepted the "middle peasants" as a l l i e s , despite t h e i r awareness of the l a t t e r ' s strong "petty-bourgeois" tendencies. In the words of Mao Tse-tung: "In land reform i t i s e s s e n t i a l to unite middle - 64 -peasants who form about 20 per cent of the land p o p u l a t i o n . Otherwise the land reform w i l l end i n f a i l u r e " . ^^0 Thus the Chinese Communists not only g l a d l y allowed the middle peasants to r e t a i n more land than the poor peasants, they a l s o ordered t h a t the Peasant A s s o c i a t i o n s , which were the executive o r g a n i z a t i o n s of the land reform, should e n l i s t the middle peasants as members. In s h o r t , the general p o l i c y adopted by the CCP during the land reform was d i s c e r n i b l y based on four e s s e n t i a l p r i n c i p l e s -r e l y i n g on the poor peasants, u n i t i n g the middle peasants, n e u t r a l i z i n g the r i c h peasants, and e l i m i n a t i n g the l a n d l o r d c l a s s . The Communists' yearning f o r the e l i m i n a t i o n of the l a n d l o r d s no doubt sprang from the f a c t t h a t , l i k e elsewhere i n China, t h r e e to four per cent of the l a n d l o r d s i n Sinkiang had "usurped" over 50 per cent of the land and had leased 60-70 per cent of t h i s land to the peasants. Moreover, t r u e to the Communists' concept of c l a s s antagonisms, the Chinese Communist p o l i c y of waging a c l a s s s t r u g g l e amongst the r u r a l p o p u l a t i o n r e q u i r e d that the r u l i n g c l a s s i n r u r a l areas (the l a n d l o r d s i n t h i s case) be set up as a t a r g e t and destroyed by the poor and middle peasantry i n order to f a c i l i t a t e the c o n s o l i d a t i o n of the P a r t y ' s c o n t r o l over the peasantry. I t must be pointed out, however, that f o r reasons of p o l i t i c a l expediency the new A g r a r i a n Reform Law of 1950 s i g n i f i c a n t l y m o d i f i e d the e a r l i e r a g r a r i a n law adopted by the CCP i n September 1947. Thus, whereas the o l d law c a l l e d f o r the r e q u i s i t i o n of s u r p l u s r u r a l p r o p e r t i e s of r i c h peasants, the New A g r a r i a n Reform Law s t i p u l a t e d that land owned by r i c h peasants and worked by them or t h e i r h i r e d l a b o u r e r s - 65 -was not to be touched. Furthermore, those engaged i n non-agrarian occupations, such as f a c t o r y workers (though miniscule i n Sinkiang), and who owned and rented out small parcels of land, were not to be c l a s s i f i e d as landlords and were allowed to keep and to rent out such parcels of land. The dual purpose of these changes c l e a r l y , was to encourage the e a r l y r e s t o r a t i o n of a g r i c u l t u r a l production and to i s o l a t e the landlords as a c l a s s . This f l e x i b i l i t y of approach was also i n evidence i n Sinkiang. To be sure, there was a d e f i n i t e v a r i a t i o n from the norm of c l a s s antagonisms and warfare that p r e v a i l e d i n China proper. Thus i n contrast to the v i r t u a l l y u n i v e r s a l p o l i c y of c o n f i s c a t i n g l a n d l o r d property, the Chinese Communists i n Sinkiang meted out r e l a t i v e l y l e n i e n t treatment to those landlords who cooperated i n the reforms by allowing them to r e t a i n 122 t h e i r commercial and i n d u s t r i a l concerns undisturbed. Of course those landlords who r e s i s t e d and were opposed to the 123 reforms were m e r c i l e s s l y punished by the "peoples" courts. Meanwhile the Communists were making e f f o r t s to group the peasants into "labour mutual-aid teams" the st r u c t u r e of which was as f o l l o w s : Each i n d i v i d u a l peasant household s t i l l engaged i n i t s own production. The c o l l e c t i v e work of the teams was ef f e c t e d through the common use of man-power, animals and tools.124 The animals, land and t o o l s were s t i l l under private ownership. The Communists regarded these teams as a type of "embryonic s o c i a l i s m " . Their f u n c t i o n e s s e n t i a l l y was to accustom the peasants to c o l l e c t i v e management and pave the way f o r a g r i c u l t u r a l cooperation - c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n . - 66 -True to the now w e l l t r i e d p r i n c i p l e of experimentation before general implementation (perfected e s p e c i a l l y during the Yenan years) the Chinese Communists effected these reforms f i r s t i n selected areas of the province. As a r e s u l t , progress i n the implementation of the reforms was uneven geographically a l l across the province. To f u l l y mobilize the human resources of the region, the Chinese Communists attempted to get i n d i v i d u a l s from a l l walks of l i f e to p a r t i c i -pate i n the teams. Furthermore, since the Communists di d not i n i t i a l l y carry the stigma of being associated with a group which had r e s t r i c t e d the a c t i v i t i e s of the minority n a t i o n a l i t i e s as d i d the KMT i n Sinkiang, they proceeded immediately to advance a consistent p o l i c y of c a t e r i n g to the a s p i r a t i o n s of the various n a t i o n a l i t i e s w i t h i n the framework of Communist plans f o r development. This p o l i c y apparently created the i l l u s i o n that the c l a s s stuggle was an i n t e r n a l a f f a i r of each n a t i o n a l i t y and could therefore brook no i n t e r f e r e n c e by Han a u t h o r i t i e s . Thus the majority of p a r t i c i p a n t s i n the "teams" which were implementing the agrarian reform were of the same n a t i o n a l i t y as the landlord whose property they were expropriating. Lest one should be led to think that the implementation of the land reform measures was a l l p l a i n s a i l i n g , i t must be pointed out that while the immediate e f f e c t of the land reform was to produce p o l i t i c a l advantages f o r the new regime, i t created considerable s o c i a l acrimony among the various " c l a s s e s " of society. Indeed the Communist leaders themselves were not unaware of the consequence of t h e i r a c t i o n s . They - 67 -understood f o r instance, that the former p o l i t i c a l influence enjoyed by the landlords and r i c h peasants was based on t h e i r economic strength as w e l l as t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l s o c i a l standing and p r e s t i g e . In no uncertain terms, the r e d i s t r i b u t i o n of t h e i r land and the c o n f i s c a t i o n of t h e i r property ( e s p e c i a l l y f o r those who refused to cooperate with the a u t h o r i t i e s ) eliminated t h e i r economic power. The humiliating treatment and p h y s i c a l v i o l e n c e associated sometimes with the public accusation meeting, the anti-despot movements and public t r i a l s , a l l had the cumulative e f f e c t of destroying the landlords' s o c i a l standing. Understandably, excesses were made during the process of implementing the land reform measures. Indeed i t became apparent by the end of 1952 that " l e f t i s t " mistakes had been committed. But u n l i k e t h e i r Bolshevik counterparts i n Kazakhstan, the Chinese Communists c a l l e d f o r a r e t r e a t being cognizant of the existence of serious mistakes. They r e a d i l y admitted that, "pressure instead of persuasion had been too frequently used and that the Party a c t i v i s t s had t r i e d to go too f a r i n 125 imposing advanced s o c i a l i s t forms on a backward peasantry". And i n January of 1953 the Party reaffirmed the r i g h t to p r i v a t e property and relaxed i t s pressure, so much so that by the end of the year the number of "labour mutual-ai d brigades /Jteams7" had dropped by a h a l f . 126 But the r e s p i t e did not l a s t long, even i n the face of an apparent r e t r e a t . Thus i n December 1953 the Party proclaimed i n a decree the establishment of A g r i c u l t u r a l Producer Cooperatives which was then put into e f f e c t i n Sinkiang i n December 1954 and 1955. - 68 -Another highly s i g n i f i c a n t economic development during the period of p o l i t i c a l c o n s o l i d a t i o n which had no r e a l counterpart i n the Bolshevik economic reforms was the use of the PLA f o r carrying out important and v a r i e d production tasks. Following the c a l l i n December 5, 1949, on the PLA to a i d i n economic construction throughout the e n t i r e nation, the Sinkiang M i l i t a r y D i s t r i c t Production and Construction Corps was organized i n early 1950 and began immediately to respond to the s p i r i t of the c a l l . I t engaged from time to time " i n farming, b u i l d i n g water conservancy works, reclamation of wasteland, as well as i n d u s t r i a l construction".127; i n the a g r i c u l t u r a l sphere, the r o l e of the PLA production u n i t s included such diverse tasks as i n the production of cotton and wheat, and the r a i s i n g of l i v e s t o c k . Beginning with cotton experimental farms the cotton farming f i e l d s expanded by about 74 per cent 128 with the t o t a l output increasing about 217 per cent from 1949-54. S i m i l a r l y , i n the area of i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n the PLA r o l e was equally s i g n i f i c a n t . Thus, by 1955 the Sinkiang M i l i t a r y D i s t r i c t was operating 129 92 i n d u s t r i a l enterprises. A l l i n a l l , the land r e d i s t r i b u t i o n programme together with the a c t i v e p a r t i c i p a t i o n of the PLA i n that process during the period of p o l i t i c a l c o n s o l i d a t i o n produced important p o l i t i c a l advantages f o r the new regime. The programme e f f e c t i v e l y extended and consolidated Communist power at the v i l l a g e l e v e l In several ways. The t r a n s f e r of ownership of r u r a l properties to the poor peasants and farm labourers aimed not only at elevating t h e i r economic status, but also at i n f l u e n c i n g them to - 69 -replace the old system of s o c i a l values with an e n t i r e l y new pattern of l i v i n g . The land reform struggle had created large numbers of " a c t i v e elements" among the peasants. More importantly, having waged br u t a l struggle with the wealthy c l a s s , the poor peasants were forced to cooperate more r e a d i l y with the new regime. And with the i n s t i t u t i o n of the "Teams" the Communists were able to accustom the peasants to higher things to come - to c o l l e c t i v e management and thus pave the way f o r a g r i c u l t u r a l cooperation i n the form of c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n . In attempting to analyse the respective Soviet and Chinese agrarian p o l i c i e s during the period of p o l i t i c a l c o n s o l i d a t i o n , i t becomes apparent that both Kazakhstan ( p r i o r to the 1924 t e r r i t o r i a l d e l i m i t a t i o n ) and Sinkiang ( p r i o r to mid 1953) experienced p o l i c i e s which could be described as cautious and c o n c i l i a t o r y towards the peasant farmers. The Soviet p o l i c y of d i s t r i b u t i n g land through t r i b a l and communal leaders may at f i r s t sight appear to have been i n d i r e c t c o n f l i c t with the ultimate Soviet aim of destroying the t r a d i t i o n a l leaders of Kazakhstan since i t tended to strengthen the economic p o s i t i o n of the t r i b a l l e a d ers. Nevertheless on c l o s e examination, t h i s p o l i c y which was accompanied by the f a i l u r e of the Soviet a u t h o r i t i e s to a i d the newly created small farms with modern techniques i n r e a l i t y worked i n favour of the Soviet Union i n the p o l i t i c a l sphere by aggravating the p r i o r c l a s s antagonisms (though minimal) between the peasants and t h e i r feudal leaders. On the other hand, the Chinese did not have to face the problem - 70 -of r e d i s t r i b u t i n g lands that had been seized by Han Chinese immigrants as did the Soviets i n Kazakhstan. Thus p r i o r to 1952 the Chinese Communists simply i n s t i t u t e d a lowering of rents f o r the peasants and the system of progressive taxation. On the question of the monopoly of landlords over the r e g u l a t i o n of water d i s t r i b u t i o n , the Chinese Communists were j u s t as concerned as the Soviets and moved to end the monopoly almost immediately. In a noticeable d e v i a t i o n from the Soviet p r a c t i c e , the Chinese Communists practised a p o l i c y of leniency towards those landlords who cooperated with the regime. Furthermore, the Chinese by 1952 were able to i n i t i a t e the formation of "labour mutual-aid teams" - a halfway house between p r i v a t e ownership and c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n which again was absent from the Soviet experience. But f a r the most s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e i n the economic develop-ments of the two regions during t h i s period was the unparalled a g r i c u l t u r a l r o l e of the PLA u n i t s i n Sinkiang compared with the minimal r o l e played by the Red Army i n Kazakhstan. To summarize then, the primary aim of the two regimes i n terms of economic p o l i c i e s was to implement c e n t r a l l y d i r e c t e d plans to undermine fundamentally and gradually t r a d i t i o n a l s o c i a l p r a c t i c e s and i n s t i t u t i o n s and to destroy the s o l i d a r i t y and i n e r t i a of the native communities as a prelude toward the gradual public c o n t r o l of the r u r a l economy - to which we s h a l l now turn. SECTION IV An Analysis of the P o l i t i c a l and Economic Developments During the Period of Economic Consolidation The period of Economic Consolidation we r e c a l l was e s s e n t i a l l y characterized by the t r a n s f e r of the ownership and c o n t r o l of the basic means of production from the peasantry to the state. This period also marked the construction of a new economic foundation f o r both regions. The beginning of the period i n Kazakhstan as i n the r e s t of the Soviet Union coincided with the i n t r o d u c t i o n of the F i r s t Five Year Plan (which was passed i n 1928 but put into e f f e c t i n 1929) and ended with the conclusion of the c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n period i n 1933. Before beginning our d i s c u s s i o n of the economic developments of the period, a word about the p o l i t i c a l developments i s i n order. Without any question, Kazakhstan remained v i r t u a l l y unchanged from the p o l i t i c a l or-ganization of the p o l i t i c a l c o n s o l i d a t i o n period. The most s i g n i f i c a n t p o l i t i c a l event - the e l e v a t i o n of Kazakhstan to a constituent Republic of the Soviet Union occurred a f t e r the period on December 5, 1936, a f t e r the period under consideration. Besides, even the s e r i e s of purges of native p o l i t i c a l leaders that occurred elsewhere i n Central A s i a during t h i s period was barely v i s i b l e i n Kazakhstan. Along with these purges, a comprehensive assault on Islam followed which again was l a r g e l y r e s t r i c t e d to the strong centers of Islam i n Central See footnote on Page 6. - 72 -Asia given the r e l a t i v e weakness of Islam i n Kazakhstan. Thus even the "Hudjum" (the attack on the wearing of the v e i l by Moslem women) which formed the successful b a s i s of Soviet attack on Islam could not be extended to Kazakhstan since the p r a c t i c e was not observed by the nomadic Kazakhs. 1^ 0 Nevertheless, given the strong antagonism of the Soviet a u t h o r i t i e s to Islam f o r fear that i t could serve as the nucleus f o r p o l i t i c a l obstruc-tionism, the Soviets made sure that i t gained no further grounds i n Kazakhstan. On the whole, however, i n terms of p o l i t i c a l developments nothing of s i g n i f i c a n c e was i n i t i a t e d by the Soviets i n Kazakhstan during the economic c o n s o l i d a t i o n period. We must therefore turn now to the economic developments of the period i n Kazakhstan. Although the economic development of Kazakhstan may be said to have started i n 1928 with the beginning of the F i r s t F i v e Year Plan and the introduction of c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n , i t must be noted however, that c e r t a i n important measures such as the d i s t r i b u t i o n of land to the poor peasants had already been taken i n the preceding p e r i o d . Soviet economic p o l i c i e s f o r the region was determined by several c r u c i a l o bjectives. F i r s t was the urgent requirement to expand and increase cotton production i n Southern Kazakhstan as elsewhere i n Central A s i a given the f a c t that i n 1927-28 the USSR had "been forced to a l l o c a t e 1/6 of i t s t o t a l foreign expenditure to purchase of cotton from f o r e i g n s o u r c e s " . 1 ^ Secondly, convinced as the Soviets were that an i n d u s t r i a l - 73 -p r o l e t a r i a t was the s i n g l e most important and r e l i a b l e source of r e c r u i t i n g or producing Communists, the a u t h o r i t i e s saw the need to provide at l e a s t some modicum of i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n f o r the region. T h i r d l y , Kazakhstan and the r e s t of Central Asia were to serve as shining examples for the Asian countries i n p a r t i c u l a r (many of which were equally "underdeveloped") of the g l o r i e s of Communism and what i t has to o f f e r to an "underdeveloped" t e r r i t o r y . And l a s t l y , the Soviets considered i t uneconomical that i n 1925-26 ha l f of the manufactured goods shipped into the region consisted of cotton t e x t i l e s , manufactured i n Russian i n d u s t r i a l centres from cotton supplied i n large part by Kazakhstan and Central A s i a . As i n the p o l i t i c a l c o n s o l i d a t i o n period, i n the area of economic co n s o l i d a t i o n the concept of "democratic centralism" was equally a p p l i c a b l e , It presupposed centralism i n such fundamental questions as i n the general d i r e c t i o n , i n maximum u n i f i c a t i o n of a l l economic a c t i v i t y by one ominibus state plan; i n d i r e c t i n g a g r i c u l t u r e and industry with the aim of the r a t i o n a l and economical u t i l i z a t i o n of a l l m a t e r i a l resources of the country. Thus, plans of the economic development of the n a t i o n a l t e r r i t o r i a l administrative e n t i t i e s are required to be an " i n t e g r a l part" of and f u l l y coordinated with the economic plan f o r the whole of the USSR. This was best summarized by the Commintern t h e s i s i n 1920 which posited that " s o c i a l i s m aims to t i e up a l l the regions, a l l the d i s t r i c t s , a l l the n a t i o n a l i t i e s by the unity of the economic plan", adding at the same time, "But economic centralism, f r e e from e x p l o i t a t i o n of c l a s s by c l a s s and nation by nation and therefore equally advantageous for a l l i s c o r r e l a t e d - without - 74 -132' detriment with genuine freedom of n a t i o n a l development". The F i r s t Five Year Plan which covers our economic c o n s o l i d a t i o n period gave these views an added impetus. With the i n i t i a t i o n of the plan i n 1928 e f f o r t s to induce the nomads to s e t t l e v o l u n t a r i l y on i n d i v i d u a l land holdings were replaced by a programme of f o r c e f u l collectivization!-.-^ The inherent d i f f i c u l t y i n c o n t r o l l i n g nomads meant an e a r l y d e s i r e by 134 the Soviet a u t h o r i t i e s to s e t t l e the nomads of Kazakhstan. Furthermore as f a r as Kazakhstan was concerned, i t was argued that an extensive nomadic economy was antagonistic to progress because " i n i t s very nature i t excludes the p o s s i b i l i t y of the growth of s o c i a l i s t elements and d i r e c t s i t s development along c a p i t a l i s t l i n e s ' 1 . 1 ^ In p a r t i c u l a r the p o s i t i o n of the bay which was seen as the embodiment of the old economic order i n c r e a s i n g l y came under f i r e . An important economic as w e l l as p o l i t i c a l reason for the suppression of nomadism was therefore to destroy the a u t h o r i t y vested i n the bays. For Goloshchekin (Chairman of the Kazakh Regional Committee of the Communist Party) c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n was the only s o l u t i o n for Kazakhstan. The following statement very much summarizes the p r e v a i l i n g ideology as i t evolved i n t h i s period: The backward, unproductive and archaic nomadic households must be replaced by a s e t t l e d economy. S e t t l i n g means c o l l e c t i -v i z a t i o n and the l i q u i d a t i o n of the bays which requires the d e s t r u c t i o n of the old t r i b a l and kinship r e l a t i o n s h i p s .13.6 I t must be pointed out here that since the economic c o n s o l i d a t i o n period witnessed very minor i n d u s t r i a l a c t i v i t y i n Kazakhstan during the - 75 -F i r s t Five Year Plan (the Turksib railway was the main i n d u s t r i a l 137 achievement), the discussion of t h i s period w i l l center p r i m a r i l y on the c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n programme. To r e i t e r a t e , then, the c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n programme discussed and passed i n 1928 was implemented i n 1929 i n Kazakhstan at the same time as i n other parts of the Soviet Union and seems i n i t i a l l y to have been c a r r i e d out with great speed and coercion r e f l e c t i n g the stringent a t t i t u d e s of t h i s period. Thus, S t a l i n i n h i s famous "dizzy with success" speech of March 2, 1930, spoke of threats by "overzealous" cadres i n Turkestan to the a g r i -c u l t u r a l population "to r e s o r t to m i l i t a r y f o r c e " and "to deprive peasants who do not as yet want to j o i n the c o l l e c t i v e farms of i r r i g a t i o n water and 138 manufactured goods". The process of c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n i n Kazakhstan was a complicated 139 one. Thus though i t s a g r i c u l t u r a l regions (inhabited by a small minority of the population) were considered models f o r Kolkhoz l i f e , i n the c e n t r a l areas where a g r i c u l t u r e and cattle-breeding were combined, the i n t r o d u c t i o n of Kolkhoz was beset with grave problems. Nevertheless, the C e n t r a l Committee of the Party on January 15, 1930 issued a decree c a l l i n g on 140 c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n according to which Kolkhozes were to be established i n the a g r i c u l t u r a l d i s t r i c t by the Spring of 1932. However completion of the plan was to be delayed t i l l the end of the F i r s t Five Year Plan i n 1933 i n the nomad and semi-nomad areas. The goal of the F i r s t Five Year Plan was to s e t t l e 544,000 nomadic 141 and semi-nomadic households (of the t o t a l of 566,000) by 1933. Subsequently i t i s claimed that there were 939 Kolkhozes by October 1928 142 and 2,096 by 1930. Furthermore the decree of 1930 s t i p u l a t e d that i n - 76 -the c a t t l e - b r e e d i n g areas the foundation of groups working together on t h e i r common land should be encouraged as a form of t r a n s i t i o n to Kolkhoz l i f e . The d r i v e f o r c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n apparently proved so " s u c c e s s f u l " that i n 1933 alone 242,000 nomad households had been s e t t l e d on l a n d , 143 though 182,000 of them already had some l a n d . I n a d d i t i o n i t has a l s o been asser t e d that during the F i r s t F i v e Year P l a n i n Kazakhstan there were e s t a b l i s h e d 202 Sovkhozes ( s t a t e farms), 4,800 Kolkhozes, 75 MTS 14A (Machine T r a c t o r S t a t i o n s ) and 65 MHS (Machine Har v e s t i n g S t a t i o n s ) . In a d d i t i o n some 700 bays had t h e i r goods i n c l u d i n g c a t t l e , farm implements, b u i l d i n g s , e t c . c o n f i s c a t e d and then were deported. According to Goloschekin, by 1930, 696 bay households were e x p r o p r i a t e d 145 and 144,474 head of c a t t l e belonging to the bays were c o n f i s c a t e d . An important p a r t of the c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n programme was the i n t r o d u c t i o n of the MTS a l r e a d y a l l u d e d t o . Each MTS served the surrounding c o l l e c t i v e farms w i t h t r a c t o r s and t e c h n i c a l a d v i c e . The u s u a l c o n t r a c t between the MTS and a Kolkhoz i s signed f o r a p e r i o d of 5 years... The MTS i s o b l i g e d to provide the c o l l e c t i v e w i t h a s p e c i f i e d number of t r a c t o r s , implements, and v a r i o u s s e r v i c e s . . . . The MTS i s a l s o o b l i g e d to make a l l the r e p a i r s of and provide a l l the necessary p a r t s f o r the c o l l e c t i v e ' s own machines. A l l expenses i n v o l v e d i n r e p a i r i n g i t s own machines and implements, i n producing the necessary f u e l and l u b r i c a n t s as w e l l as i n employing agronomists and t e c h n i c i a n s are to be f u l l y p a i d f o r by the MTSJ-46 Indeed i t i s reported that i n Kazakhstan acute r i v a l r y occurred between Sovkhoz and Klokhoz for the possession of the t r a c t o r s ; the Party Central - 77 -Committee had to i n t e r v e n e to moderate the enthusiasm of l o c a l p a r t y 147 a u t h o r i t i e s who wanted to reserve a l l t r a c t o r s f o r the Sovkhoz. For a l l i n t e n t s and purposes the MTS was yet another instrument of s t a t e s u p e r v i s i o n . They were the l y n c h p i n of a g r i c u l t u r a l development not only i n Kazakhstan but elsewhere i n the Soviet Union. They served as centers f o r a g r i c u l t u r a l and p o l i t i c a l education. Thus at l e a s t one q u a l i f i e d P a r t y o r g a n i z e r had t o serve i n every MTS and h i s work was c o n s t a n t l y being reviewed and encouraged, thus ensuring t h a t the "hand which b r i n g s t e c h n i c a l 14ft a s s i s t a n c e i s a l s o the hand which b r i n g s P a r t y p o l i t i c a l consciousness". I n s p i t e of a l l the seemingly r o s y p i c t u r e of c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n , i t became apparent t h a t by the end of the F i r s t F i v e Year P l a n , the c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n programme i n Kazakhstan had produced d i s a s t r o u s r e s u l t s , the most apparent of which was the s l a u g h t e r i n g of thousands of l i v e s t o c k herds by the peasants opposed to the c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n scheme on the grounds th a t i t was being imposed from above. The t o t a l number of c a t t l e i n 1930, f o r i n s t a n c e , was reported to have d e c l i n e d to only 25 per cent of the number i n 1925. I t has a l s o been estimated that between the summers of 1928 and 1934, the herds of sheep and goats d e c l i n e d from 18.1 m i l l i o n t o 5.7 m i l l i o n . Animals and horses from 5.1 m i l l i o n to 2.5 m i l l i o n . The damage was so extensive that " d e s p i t e a r a t h e r r a p i d r a t e of i n c r e a s e t h e r e a f t e r to 1937 l i v e s t o c k herds were s t i l l probably no more than 70 14 9 per cent of what they had been before c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n . Uraz Isayev (the Chairman of the Kazakh C o u n c i l of Peoples Commissars) a s s e r t e d i n 1935 t h a t the B o l s h e v i k s had worked f o r "immediate - 78 -s e t t l i n g under conditions of 100 percent c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n without 130 regard to the needs and i n t e r e s t s of the pasture-bound animal husbandry". Indeed when i t became apparent to the Soviet leaders that the peasants were putting up desperate r e s i s t a n c e , S t a l i n on March 2, 1930 pretending that h i s i n s t r u c t i o n s had been "misinterpreted" ( i . e . d e v i a t i o n from the Party l i n e ) claimed that " i t was stupid and reactionary to form c o l l e c t i v e s by force and blamed the excesses which had taken place on "giddiness from s u c c e s s " . T h e d e t a i l s of the consequences of c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n are beyond the scope of t h i s study. Besides no p r e c i s e information i s a v a i l a b l e on the e f f e c t produced by s t a b i l i z a t i o n and c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n on the population of Kazakhstan. S u f f i c e i t to say however that i n a d d i t i o n to the heavy d e c l i n e i n the numbers of l i v e s t o c k , i t i s on record that the t o t a l number of Kazakhs f e l l by nearly one 152 ' m i l l i o n between the Census of 1926 and 1939. A l l i n a l l , despite a l l the shortcomings, c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n during the F i r s t Five Year Plan remained the most f a r reaching measure not only i n Kazakhstan but throughout the Soviet Union. The o b j e c t i v e s were many. It brought the supply of a g r i c u l t u r a l products under state c o n t r o l thereby weakening the p o s i t i o n of the farmer. I t ushered i n l a r g e - s c a l e methods of a g r i c u l t u r e and above a l l " l i b e r a t e d " the t o i l i n g masses from the heavy yoke of the bays' influence and the unmasking of the "predatory" character of the l a t t e r which made i t p o s s i b l e to overcome c l a n s u r v i v a l s . - 79 -Fundamentally, the process of s e t t l i n g the nomadic and semi-nomadic households w i l l be f i n i s h e d i n 1933. By t h i s very f a c t we w i l l a l s o guarantee the complete l i q u i d a t i o n of the t r a d i t i o n a l k i n s h i p o r g a n i z a t i o n and ^ 5 3 semi-nomadic r e l a t i o n s i n Kazakh a u l ( v i l l a g e ) In summary then, i t i s evident from the foregoing d i s c u s s i o n t h a t the p e r i o d of economic c o n s o l i d a t i o n i n Kazakhstan was v e r y l i m i t e d i n scope compared w i t h the s i t u a t i o n i n European R u s s i a . I t concerned mostly the a g r i c u l t u r a l s e c t o r . I n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n i n the r e a l sense was more or l e s s a minute po i n t except f o r the T u r k s i b r a i l w a y . The motive f o r c e behind the F i r s t F i v e Year P l a n t h e r e f o r e was the s u b o r d i n a t i o n and e x p l o i t a t i o n of a g r i c u l t u r e by means of c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n i n order to amass the necessary c a p i t a l f o r the i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n of the So v i e t Union not n e c e s s a r i l y Kazakhstan. For Kazakhstan t h i s p e r i o d was marked by one f a c t : that i s a thorough d i s r u p t i o n of the s o c i a l and economic base which i n c l u d e d the e l i m i n a t i o n of the c l a n system and i t s l e a d e r s . In t h e i r p l a c e stood the c o l l e c t i v e and s t a t e farms which became the p o l i t i c a l instruments of B o l s h e v i k c o n t r o l . Turning now to the economic c o n s o l i d a t i o n p e r i o d i n Sin k i a n g (1953-57) one f i n d s that t h i s p e r i o d d i f f e r s q u i t e s i g n i f i c a n t l y i n one important respect from the corresponding phase of Kazakhstan's p o l i t i c a l development, that i s , i t was d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d and not l a t e r as was the case w i t h Kazakhstan, t h a t S i n k i a n g a t t a i n e d i t s mature p o l i t i c a l s t a t u s , moving from a province to an autonomous r e g i o n i n 1955. The i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c a l s t r u c t u r e of Sin k i a n g c a l l s f o r some n o t i c e at t h i s p o i n t . The year 1954 saw the a c c e l e r a t i o n of a process of s e t t i n g - 80 -up u n i t s of autonomous a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s at v a r i o u s l e v e l s of l o c a l government i n p a r t s of the country i n h a b i t e d by the m i n o r i t y peoples. When the c o n s t i t u t i o n of the PRC was adopted i n September 1954, i t defined the s t a t u s of the m i n o r i t i e s , who comprise some 6 per cent of the p o p u l a t i o n of China, and made p r o v i s i o n f o r l o c a l autonomy w i t h i n a u n i t a r y Chinese s t a t e from which anything approaching a f e d e r a l system was e x p l i c i t l y excluded. There i s t h e r e f o r e nothing p a r a l l e l 154 w i t h the Union R e p u b l i c s i n the Soviet Union. 15 5 In October 1955 when Sink i a n g ceased to be a province and became the Sinkiang - Uighur Autonomous Region i t s i n t e r n a l s t r u c t u r e had alr e a d y been set up over a wide area w i t h a v a r i e t y of autonomous cou n t i e s (hsien) and groups of c o u n t i e s (chou) f o r the d i f f e r e n t races 15fi of the r e g i o n . ° Autonomous a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s i n t r o d u c e members of the v a r i o u s races to o f f i c e i n l o c a l government and P a r t y organs and have the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t to the o f f i c i a l use of the predominant non-Chinese language. To t h i s end i n March 1957 a s p e c i a l P a r t y decree decl a r e d that "every Chinese cadre was bound to l e a r n w i t h i n 3-5 years 157 one of the m i n o r i t y languages of the r e g i o n i n which he worked". I t i s important to note t h a t t h i s type of " n a t i v i z a t i o n " does not n e c e s s a r i l y c a l l f o r the removal of Han or non-indigenous cadre from the Sinkiang a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and i s i n keeping w i t h Peking's c l a i m that i t s primary o b j e c t i v e i n t h i s f i e l d was to e s t a b l i s h the numerical predominance w i t h i n the Si n k i a n g a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of P a r t y -member cadres. That these i n d i v i d u a l s be n a t i o n a l i t y cadres t h e r e f o r e - 81 -becomes a secondary but not a primary consideration. This approach seems to be d i f f e r e n t from the Soviet c a l l f o r the "Kazakhization" of govern-mental, party and educational administrators. In short f o r Peking (at l e a s t t h e o r e t i c a l l y ) so long as the cadres were i d e o l o g i c a l l y orthodox i t did not matter i f they were a l l Han Party members. It could be argued that such a p o l i c y would mitigate against a massive i n f l u x of minority peoples into the administrative organs of the party and government of Sinkiang, and on the other hand mitigate against the r i s e of "great power chauvinism" on the part of the Chinese by demanding i d e o l o g i c a l orthodoxy of i t s cadres. The f a c t however i s that neither transpired. In the f i r s t place there were not enough trai n e d 158' cadres during t h i s period. So much for the p o l i t i c a l developments of t h i s period. In terms of economic developments i n Sinkiang during the economic co n s o l i d a t i o n period, there are three d i s c e r n i b l e areas of operation, v i z . : c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n of a g r i c u l t u r e , the establishment of p a s t o r a l cooperatives and the further expansion of industry. Concerning a g r i c u l t u r e t h i s period was characterized by the widespread existence of "labour mutual-aid terms" i n the s e t t l e d farming areas. But by December 1953 a decree to e s t a b l i s h " a g r i c u l t u r a l producer cooperatives" 15>9 throughout China was declared. The slow r a t e at which the decree was implemented can be seen from the f a c t that by the f i r s t h a l f of 1955, - 82 -5% of the peasants were grouped i n cooperatives compared w i t h 30% i n "teams" and a n e g l i g i b l e number i n cooperatives a t the end of 1953.-160 In a d d i t i o n by 1955 there were 72 s t a t e farms over h a l f of which were mechanized. There were a l s o a few MTS set up.161 Despite the ambitions of the programme Mao came out w i t h a strong a t t a c k on J u l y 31, 1955, against " r i g h t wing" d e v i a t i o n i s t s (we now know who they were) whom he claimed were slowing down the progress of c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n - a c o n v i c t i o n underscored by the f i g u r e above. A c a l l f o r the "completion of c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n w i t h i n the next few y e a r s " was made by Mao and t r u e to form, "by the Spring of 1956 p r a c t i c a l l y a l l the peasants i n Sinkiang belonged to a g r i c u l t u r a l producer c o o p e r a t i v e s of the lower type.... By October of 1957, 95.49% of the peasants belonged to c o o peratives of the " h i g h e r " type and the c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n d r i v e was considered t o have been f u l f i l l e d . " 1 6 2 I n t h i s c o nnection, the r o l e of the PLA again c a l l s f o r some b r i e f a t t e n t i o n . As p r e v i o u s l y s t a t e d , the PLA throughout the p e r i o d of economic c o n s o l i d a t i o n continued to perform v i t a l f u n c t i o n s . By December 1954 the p r o d u c t i o n u n i t s of the Army were u n i t e d i n a s p e c i a l " p r o d u c t i o n - c o n s t r u c t i o n Army" under the D i s t r i c t command. I t was assigned the t a s k of e s t a b l i s h i n g s t a t e farms i n the r u r a l s e c t o r . On the whole the main e f f o r t s of the " p r o d u c t i o n - c o n s t r u c t i o n army" was d i r e c t e d towards the establishment of h i g h a g r i c u l t u r a l l e v e l s , the s e t t i n g up of s t a t e farms, and the t r a n s i t i o n of s o c i a l i s t t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of a g r i c u l t u r e , 163 and the c r e a t i o n of favourable c o n d i t i o n s f o r i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n . - 83 -In the area of i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n , emphasis was placed upon developing an independent base for producing a g r i c u l t u r a l machinery. P r i o r to 1949 Sinkiang's i n d u s t r i a l base was v i r t u a l l y non-existent, c o n s i s t i n g of about a dozen enterprises. But between 1949 and 1957 the Chinese had 16J> claimed to have b u i l t 259 f a c t o r i e s and mines. In s p i t e of t h i s seemingly impressive i n d u s t r i a l growth i t must be cautioned that there i s great question as to the correctness of these f i g u r e s as c o n f l i c t i n g reports are always being issued on the same f i g u r e s . The c o n f l i c t i n g reports notwithstanding, there i s no doubt that Sinkiang during the economic consolid a t i o n period witnessed a f a r greater i n d u s t r i a l a c t i v i t y than occurred i n Kazakhstan. In terms of trade i n Sinkiang during t h i s period, there was a constant attempt to bring p r i v a t e trade under state supervision and c o n t r o l . Thus between 1954 and 1955, the share of p r i v a t e i n t e r e s t s i n the r e t a i l trade f e l l from 42.1% to 31.3%. By the end of 1956, 95.64% of the r e t a i l i fiiS trade had undergone " s o c i a l i s t transformation". On the topic of c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n mention must be made about the attempts to s e t t l e the nomads of Sinkiang. The importance of the nomads i s demonstrated by the f a c t that i n 1955, over 60% of China's wool production came from Sinkiang. L i t t l e wonder then that by 1954, 83 animal 16 6 husbandary farms were already established by the Communists i n Sinkiang. S i g n i f i c a n t l y however, i n contrast to the pace of agrarian c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n , the c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n of stock-breeding i n Sinkiang, probably because of the great strength of the t r i b a l and nomadic way of l i f e , was by f a r slower. - 84 -Thus even though the movement s t a r t e d i n 1955, by the end of 1956 about 16 7 20% belonged to mutual-aid groups. Indeed i t was not u n t i l a year a f t e r the economic c o n s o l i d a t i o n p e r i o d i n 1958 that the process of " s e m i — s o c i a l i s t 168 c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n " was decl a r e d completed. Peking i n i t s approach to the nomads deviated from the methods adopted i n the a g r i c u l t u r a l , areas. O f f i c i a l l y , t h e r e were no c l a s s antagonisms or open c l a s s c o n f l i c t . An a r t i c l e by S a i f u d i n i n the September 30, 1955 e d i t i o n s of People's D a i l y . f u r t h e r elaborated t h i s "moderate" approach. ...the m u l t i t u d e of herdsmen are a c t i v e l y l e d and organised to launch the d r i v e to i n c r e a s e the breeding and p r o t e c t i o n of l i v e s t o c k ; the c o n f l i c t between the h i r e d hands and the owners over wages has been mediated. 169 S a i f u d i n a t a subsequent date gives us a f u r t h e r i n s i g h t to the p o l i c y o r i e n t a t i o n at the time toward the nomad p o p u l a t i o n of Sinkiang when he s a i d : P r e p a r a t i o n f o r the o r g a n i z a t i o n of a new co o p e r a t i v e i n c l u d e s propaganda, d r a f t i n g a c o n s t i t u t i o n , r e g i s t e r i n g animals, f i x i n g shares, and f i n a l l y a f e s t i v i t y to c e l e b r a t e the opening of the new co- o p e r a t i v e . I t i s urged that the c l a n s t r u c t u r e of nomad s o c i e t y , t h e i r r e l i g i o u s p r e j u d i c e s and general backwardness should be taken i n t o account and that there should be no rus h i n g of those who were s t i l l u n w i l l i n g _ 170 Because of t h i s r e l a t i v e l y c a u t i o u s approach, by November 9, 1957 o n l y s l i g h t l y l e s s than one i n two (46%) of a l l the nomadic households i n Sin k i a n g were p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n the "lower" type of co-o p e r a t i v e s of which 1,078 had been formed. To sum up our d i s c u s s i o n of t h i s p e r i o d an e f f o r t w i l l be made to s i n g l e out i n b r i e f the d i f f e r e n c e s between the p o l i c i e s of Moscow and - 85 -Peking which emerge from the foregoing d i s c u s s i o n . In the area of p o l i t i c a l developments two s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e s can be discerned. F i r s t was the absence of any major p o l i t i c a l changes i n Kazakhstan whereas Sinkiang went through some major p o l i t i c a l changes the climax being the attainment of mature p o l i t i c a l structure i t s e l f - the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region. Secondly, was the d i f f e r e n c e between the Chinese and Soviet Union's conception of n a t i v i z a t i o n . For the Soviets n a t i v i z a t i o n implied and emphasized t r a i n i n g of minority n a t i o n a l s to assume n e a r l y a l l the duties of government and Party w i t h i n the respective p o l i t i c a l e n t i t i e s . Although the p r a c t i c a l i t y of t h i s goal can be questioned (and indeed one might add i t never was attained) i t can be seen at l e a s t t h e o r e t i c a l l y as being consistent with the formal f e d e r a t i v e s t r u c t u r e of the USSR. For the Chinese, on the contrary, n a t i v i z a t i o n implied the subordination of the p r i n c i p l e of complete ethnic n a t i v i z a t i o n of a p o l i t i c a l e n t i t y ' s governmental and Party organs to the t h e o r e t i c a l i f not p r a c t i c a l o b j e c t i v e of achieving an i d e o l o g i c a l l y orthodox r u l i n g group regardless of ethnic p u r i t y and t h i s tends once more to be consistent with the u n i t a r y s t r u c t u r e of the PRC: A t h i r d s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e i s the emergence of the Slav element as the largegtgroup i n Kazakhstan. Of the two, Kazakhstan remains the most e t h n i c a l l y d i l u t e d where the nat i v e population accounts f o r l e s s than 30 per cent of the t o t a l . The Russians and Ukrainians - 86 -account f o r more than h a l f . The same i s not true of Han Chinese i n Sinkiang. The importance l i e s i n the meaning i t holds for the future for Kazakhstan which i s beyond the scope of our present study. S u f f i c e i t to say however that the continued i n f l u x of Russians may lead to an o f f i c i a l downgrading of the Kazakh SSR on the grounds that i t s . population was now overwhelmingly Russian as was the case with Karelo-F i n n i s h SSR which had been downgraded to an ASSR. In the area of a g r i c u l t u r a l p o l i c i e s , one s t r i k i n g d i f f e r e n c e emerges. That i s the subtle way i n which the Chinese handled t h e i r c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n i n Sinkiang. This contrasts sharply with the harsh and impatient manner i n which the Soviet Union attended the transformation of Kazakhstan a g r i c u l t u r e . This becomes even more stark when one considers the rather b r u t a l way of . s e t t l i n g the nomad population of Kazakhstan, P a r a l l e l to t h i s was the speed and t e r r o r that marked the Soviet attempt to transform the peasant holdings d i r e c t l y into c o l l e c t i v e farms without going through an intermediate stage. The Chinese on the other hand, provided two intermediate stages (labour mutual-aid teams and a g r i c u l -t u r a l producer cooperatives i n the t r a n s i t i o n to c o l l e c t i v e s ) . The contrast between S t a l i n ' s March 2, 1930 c a l l f o r r e t r e a t and s a n i t y and Mao's J u l y 31, 1955 statement denouncing obstructionism on the part of c e r t a i n minority groups coupled with the c a l l to accelerate the pace of c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n c l e a r l y demonstrate the d i f f e r e n c e i n the tempo of the two regimes. F i n a l l y , whereas the Soviets d i d not embark on any s i g n i f i c a n t - 87 -i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n d r i v e i n Kazakhstan the Chinese did usher i n an era of considerable i n d u s t r i a l expansion i n Sinkiang. Nevertheless both regions witnessed the v i r t u a l e l i m i n a t i o n of p r i v a t e l y c o n t r o l l e d r e t a i l trade and i n both regions t h i s period marked the takeover by the State and Party of a l l economic enterprises of any s i g n i f i c a n c e . Commenting on the development i n Sinkiang, S a i f u d i n i n 1957 s a i d : The s o c i a l i s t transformation of a g r i c u l t u r e has now been completed; more than 95% of the peasants are now united i n a g r i c u l t u r e producer cooperatives of the higher type. The s o c i a l i s t transformation of the a r t i s a n industry has also been s u c c e s s f u l l y completed; most p r i v a t e l y owned i n d u s t r i a l and trade undertakings have been changed into s t a t e - p r i v a t e companies.171 CONCLUSION It i s not the i n t e n t i o n , and c e r t a i n l y no attempt has been made, to summarize the foregoing sections as t h i s would be tantamount to a r e p e t i t i o n of the s e c t i o n a l summaries already provided. The primary aim here i s therefore to provide g e n e r a l l y some of the more s a l i e n t f i n d i n g s of t h i s study - as itemized below: 1. Neither Kazakhstan nor Sinkiang o f f e r e d any ideology or movement which could i n i t i a t e a programme of p o l i t i c a l and economic reform comparable to those of the two Communist programmes f o r these two "underdeveloped" regions. Even Islam and i t s offshoot - Pan-Islamism proved to be too passive to challenge e f f e c t i v e l y the "superior" Communist ideology. 2. The study revealed i n i t s most naked form the p o l i t i c a l and economic inf l u e n c e of the Soviet Union i n the i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s of Sinkiang before and during the period (1949-57) under study. This contrasts very sharply with the non-involvement by Communist China i n the a f f a i r s of Kazakhstan. 3. while both Moscow and Peking applied the p r i n c i p l e of self-determination to l u r e and then overthrow the n a t i o n a l i s t regimes and to eliminate h i t h e r t o f o r e "progressive" elements who had become detrimental to the t o t a l incorporation of these t e r r i t o r i e s to the "motherland", both l a t e r t r a n s l a t e d t h i s concept i n t o a c t i o n l a r g e l y i n accordance with the character of t h e i r r e s pective state i n s t i t u t i o n s . - 89 -Thus i n keeping with i t s f e d e r a l character, the Soviet Union has granted the border r e p u b l i c s the t h e o r e t i c a l r i g h t to secede. On the other hand, the Chinese c o n s t i t u t i o n , which defines the PRC as a " u n i f i e d , m u l t i n a t i o n a l s t a t e " extends no r i g h t of secession to i t s n a t i o n a l m i n o r i t i e s . One must add however, that the e f f o r t s of the Communists to "modernize" these previously underdeveloped regions must be viewed w i t h i n the framework of the r e s t r i c t i n g as w e l l as l i b e r a t i n g elements of the programme. The famous catchword, " n a t i o n a l i n form, s o c i a l i s t i n content" a c t u a l l y permits l i t t l e i n the very way of autonomy and nothing i n the way of n a t i o n a l self-determination. 4. The study reveals s t r i k i n g l y the overwhelming r o l e and dominance of the Russian population among the scant " p r o l e t a r i a t " that did e x i s t i n Kazakhstan, i n the party organizations to the v i r t u a l exclusion ( e i t h e r i n t e n t i o n a l or unintentional) of the Kazakh population. This contrasts sharply with the Chinese Communists p r a c t i c e i n Sinkiang. The Chinese held out the hand of p o s s i b l e c o l l a b o r a t i o n with a l l the c l a s s e s i n Sinkiang i n c l u d i n g landlords and r i c h peasants i n keeping with i t s p o l i c y of United Front (Burhan Shahidi was of a middle c l a s s o r i g i n ) . 5. The Soviet Union's t h e o r e t i c a l conception of " n a t i v i z a t i o n " implied and emphasized the t r a i n i n g of minority n a t i o n a l s to assume nearly a l l the duties of government and Party w i t h i n the r e s p e c t i v e p o l i t i c a l e n t i t i e s consistent (at l e a s t t h e o r e t i c a l l y ) with the formal f e d e r a t i v e structure of the USSR. But for the Communist Chinese, " n a t i v i z a t i o n " , implied the subordination of the p r i n c i p l e of complete ethnic n a t i v i z a t i o n - 90 -of a p o l i t i c a l e n t i t y ' s government and party organs to the t h e o r e t i c a l i f not p r a c t i c a l objective of achieving an i d e o l o g i c a l l y orthodox r u l i n g group regardless of ethnic p u r i t y again i t seems quite consistent with the u n i t a r y structure of the PRC. 6. In the area of c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n the Chinese Communists were more t a c t f u l and r e s t r a i n e d i n Sinkiang (as epitomized by t h e i r two-stage p o l i c y i n the implementation of the c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n programme) than the Soviets were i n Kazakhstan. 7. During the economic c o n s o l i d a t i o n period, i n d u s t r i a l a c t i v i t y was v i r t u a l l y non-existent i n Kazakhstan whereas i n Sinkiang the Chinese Communists l a i d down strong foundations for Sinkiang's i n d u s t r i a l take-off. 8. F i n a l l y , the study demonstrated quite c l e a r l y that the PLA played a much more prominent and c r u c i a l r o l e i n Sinkiang than the Red Army ever d i d i n Kazakhstan i n the a g r i c u l t u r a l , p o l i t i c a l , economic and i n d u s t r i a l development of these two regions during the period under study. One more word about the p e r i o d i z a t i o n scheme adopted f o r t h i s study. I would emphasize that i t i s not meant to be i n f l e x i b l e . That there are i n c o n g r u i t i e s should not be s u r p r i s i n g . An obvious example i s the d i s p a r i t y i n the lengths of the periods chosen. Furthermore the f a c t that China depended on Soviet a i d during the two periods covered i n t h i s study underscores the inherent d i f f i c u l t i e s which must be acknowledged i n a study of t h i s type. Nevertheless, regardless of these i n c o n g r u i t i e s , and i f not anything e l s e , t h i s study has demonstrated that an i n c i s i v e comparative study i s p o s s i b l e . - 91 -A f t e r a l l i t i s one of the r u l e s of the comparative method that e n t i t i e s to be compared should be of the same general order of magnitude and should possess c e r t a i n main c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s i n common f o r comparison to be meaningful. At the same time however, i t i s generally accepted that i t i s not always easy to follow t h i s r u l e to the l e t t e r i n comparing s o c i e t i e s , f o r each i s i n some s i g n i f i c a n t sense a s p e c i a l case. The two countries studied here are no exceptions to the general r u l e . They too have f u l f i l l e d the c r i t e r i a s u f f i c i e n t to make comparison not only f e a s i b l e but c r e d i b l e . In sum, t h i s study reveals that i n s p i t e of the Chinese dependence on the Soviet Union f o r economic guidance and assistance during the two periods studied, (which has no counterpart i n the experience of the Soviet Union) the former did not follow to the l e t t e r the developmental s t r a t e g i e s of the l a t t e r . I t could be argued that with p o l i t i c a l hindsight the Chinese Communists were i n a better p o s i t i o n to le a r n from the past "mistakes" of the Russians hence they were able to carry out t h e i r c o n s o l i -dation of p o l i t i c a l and economic c o n t r o l (as part of t h e i r o v e r a l l i n t e g r a t i v e Plan) ' over Sinkiang with l e s s d e s t r u c t i o n , more r e s t r a i n t , and subtlety than Moscow ever d i d i n Kazakhstan. More than t h i s however, the f a c t that the two areas under study d i d not develop i n the same d i r e c t i o n economically and p o l i t i c a l l y can perhaps be best explained as a r e f l e c t i o n of the d i f f e r e n t h i s t o r i c a l , p o l i t i c a l , s t r a t e g i c and economic s i t u a t i o n s which the Russians and the Chinese faced i n t h e i r r e s pective regions during the period studied. Nevertheless, i t has been amply demonstrated throughout t h i s study that while the objectives of p o l i t i c a l - 92 -and economic c o n s o l i d a t i o n of the two regimes i n respect to the two "underdeveloped" regions studied may have been s i m i l a r , the p o l i c i e s designed to achieve these objectives were markedly d i f f e r e n t i n many respects. FOOTNOTES 1. Myron Weiner, " P o l i t i c a l Integration and P o l i t i c a l Development", i n P o l i t i c a l Modernization, ed. by Claude E. Welch, J r . (BelmontrDuxbury Press Co., 1967) p. 180 2. I b i d . , p. 182 3. Olaf Caroe, Soviet Empire: The Turks of Central A s i a & S t a l i n i s m . (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967) p. 143 4. Indeed, i t has been a major mark of p o l i t i c a l t h e o r i s t s to hold that the "ultimate mark of a community's p o l i t i c a l i n t e g r a t i o n i s i t s attainment of a status of "sovereignty" - sovereignty here being defined as a " f u l l y organized s o c i e t y " i n which " a l l members of the community are subject to a supreme p o l i t i c a l a uthority; and second that the community as a p o l i t i c a l e n t i t y i s independent of c o n t r o l by any one e l s e . " P h i l i p E. Jacob & Henry Teune, "The I n t e g r a t i v e Process: Guidelines for Analysis of the Bases of P o l i t i c a l Community" i n the Integration of P o l i t i c a l Communities, ed. by P h i l i p E. Jacob & James Toscano (P h i l a d e l p h i a : J . B. L i p p i n c o t t Co., 1964) p. 38 5. Myron Weiner, " P o l i t i c a l Integration and P o l i t i c a l Development", pp. 181-182 6. Here I do not consider the concept of n a t i o n a l i n t e g r a t i o n as t a u t o l o g i c a l as suggested by Claude Ake since "nation always implies i n t e g r a t i o n " . C l e a r l y , the a r b i t r a r i l y created nations of A f r i c a can hardly be r e f e r r e d to as "integrated nations". See Claude Ake, A Theory of P o l i t i c a l Integration, (Homewood, I l l i n o i s : The Dorsey Press, 1967) p. 13 7. Leonard Binder, "National Integration and P o l i t i c a l Development" American P o l i t i c a l Science Review,(hereafter c i t e d as APSR) Vol. LVIII, No. 3, (September, 1964) p. 627 - 94 -8. The degree of i n t e g r a t i o n of a community, no doubt, i s r e l a t e d to s e v e r a l other f a c t o r s besides the two dimensions under study. Such f a c t o r s i n c l u d e f o r example, the dominance of the p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e of the community or system over the s u b c u l t u r e w i t h i n i t , the e f f i c a c y of p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s and processes of the community i n -meeting e x p e c t a t i o n s , the ease and frequency of p o l i t i c a l communica-t i o n among members of the community, e t c . M a l i n t e g r a t i o n tends to occur f o r example when the range of shared p o l i t i c a l v a l u e s i s d i m i n i s h e d , c o e r c i o n becomes necessary to o b t a i n compliance w i t h the law, and demands are made by s e c t i o n s of the community f o r s e c e s s i o n . 9. Olaf Caroe, Soviet Empire: The Turks of C e n t r a l A s i a & S t a l i n i s m , p. 143. 10. Roderick Macfarquhar, "Communist China's Twenty Years: A P e r i o d i z a t i o n " , The China Q u a r t e r l y , No. 39 (July-September, 1969) p. 58 11. Thomas G. Winner, The O r a l A r t and L i t e r a t u r e of the Kazakhs of  Russian C e n t r a l A s i a , (Durham, N.C.: Duke U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1958) I n t r o d u c t i o n & p. 5 12. See L o u i s E. F r e c h t l i n g , "Anglo-Russian R i v a l r y i n East Turkestan 1863-1881", J o u r n a l of Royal C e n t r a l A s i a n S o c e i t y , V o l . 26 ( J u l y , 1939) pp. 482-3 13. Geoffrey Wheeler, The Modern H i s t o r y of Soviet C e n t r a l A s i a , (New York: F r e d e r i c k A. Praeger, 1964), p. 12. U n t i l the s i x t e e n t h century the Kazakh Khanate remained a l o o s e c o l l e c t i o n of federated t r i b e s w i t h s e v e r a l p e t t y s u l t a n s governing more or l e s s g e o g r a p h i c a l l y separated s t r e t c h e s of Kazakhstan. 14. C i t e d by L. Krader, Peoples of C e n t r a l A s i a , (Bloomington: Indiana U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1963), p. 93 15. E. E. Bacon, C e n t r a l A s i a Under Russian R u l e , ( I t h a c a , New York: C o r n e l l U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1966), p. 93 16. I b i d . , p. 92 - 95 -17. F. Lorimer, The Population of the Soviet Union, (Geneva: League of Nations, 1946), p. 36 18. I b i d . , p. 23 19. T. Zhdanko, "Sedentarisation of the Nomads of Central A s i a " , International Labour Review, V o l . 93 No. 6 (June 1966), p. 611 20. I b i d . , p. 610. 21. E. E. Bacon, Central A s i a Under Russian Rule, p. 97 22. S. A. Zenkovsky, Pan-Turkism and Islam i n Russia, (Cambridge: Harvard U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1960), p. 69 23. I b i d . , p. 131. 24. L. Krader, Peoples of Central A s i a , p. 108 25. S. A. Zenkovsky, Pan-Turkism and Islam i n Russia, pp. 209-210 26. Olaf Caroe, Soviet Empire: The Turks of Central A s i a and Sta l i n i s m , p.104 27. S. A. Zenkovsky, Pan-Turkism and Islam i n Russia, p. 217 28. I b i d . , p. 218 29. Sinkiang, situated i n the Northwestern part of China borders on India, Afghanistan, the Mongolian Peoples Republic and the USSR. The region i s s p l i t i nto two great basins: the Tarim Basin, which occupied more than h a l f the t o t a l area of Sinkiang, i n the South and the Dzungarian Basin i n the North; and by the Tien Shan Mountains c u t t i n g across the c e n t r a l part of Sinkiang. - 96 -30. Owen L a t t i m o r e , P i v o t of A s i a : Sinkiang and the Inner A s i a n  F r o n t i e r s of China and R u s s i a , (Boston: L i t t l e Brown & Co., 1950), p. 5 31. Immanuel C. Hsu, The R i s e of Modern China, (London: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1970), p. 1 32. The B r i t i s h had given a strong backing to Yakub's adventures convinced as the B r i t i s h government was at the time that t h e i r i n t e r e s t s would best be served by d e a l i n g w i t h a weak Moslem s t a t e i n Sinkiang than to have some powerful Western s t a t e e s t a b l i s h e d here. See I. C. Y. Hsu, The H i C r i s i s : A Study of Sino-Russian Diplomacy  1878-1881, (Oxford: Clarendon P r e s s , 1965), p. 4 33. I b i d , p. 1 34. Chu Wen-djang, "The P o l i c y of the Manchu Government i n the Suppression of the Moslem R e b e l l i o n " , (Unpublished Ph.D. d i s s e r t a t i o n , U n i v e r s i t y of Washington, 1955), p. 279. 35. I . C. Y. Hsu, The I i i C r i s i s , p. 195. 36. Very l i t t l e i s known about Yang's career other than that he was a d i c t a t o r i a l and a u t o c r a t i c r u l e r whose p o l i c i e s have been c r e d i t e d w i t h keeping Sinkiang w i t h i n China f o l l o w i n g the t u r b u l e n t years that f o l l o w e d the f a l l of the Manchu Dynasty i n 1911. See M a r t i n R. Morins, Gateway to A s i a (New York: The John Day Co., 1944), p. 60. 37. The heights to which Soviet p o l i t i c a l and economic p e n e t r a t i o n of Sinkiang a t the time i s demonstrated by the f a c t that even the p r o v i n c i a l p o l i c e were excluded from the mining c o r p o r a t i o n ' s p r o p e r t i e s some of which were j o i n t Soviet-Chinese e n t e r p r i s e s . In a d d i t i o n " a l l exports of produce were to be duty f r e e , compen-sated f o r by a 2 per cent ad valorem charge". See A l l en S. Whiting & General Sheng S h i h - t s ' a i , S i n k i a n g : Pawn or P i v o t , (East Lansing: Michigan State U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1958), p. 67. 38. I b i d . - 97 -39. N. L. D. McLean, "Sinkiang Today", In t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s , C J u l y , 1948), p. 382. 40. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the U.S. Diplomatic  Papers, 1942: China (Washington D.C., 1956), p. 260 41. David J . D a l l i n , Soviet Russia & The Far East (New Haven: Yale U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1948), p. 362. 42. Owen Lattimore, Pivot of A s i a , p. 86. See also Lattimore, "The Uprising i n Northwest Sinkiang, 1944-49", Central Asian Review, (hereafter c i t e d as CAR) V o l . I I , (1963), 181-185 43. See "The Peaceful L i b e r a t i o n of Sinkiang", t r a n s l a t e d i n Current  Background, No. 365 (October 25, 1955), pp. 44-46 44. I t has been suggested that had the Kuomintang emerged v i c t o r i o u s , the three d i s t r i c t s might w e l l have been incorporated o u t r i g h t by the Soviet Union not u n l i k e the f a t e of the nearby Turkic area of Tanu Tuva i n 1944 a l l with KMT connivance i n order to undermine the CCP. See Henry J . Liberman's a r t i c l e "Nanking i s Seeking a Deal with the Soviet Union", The New York Times, Feb. 1, 1949. 45. Richard Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union, (Cambridge: Harvard U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1964), p. 73. 46. B. Hayit, Soviet Russian Colonialism and Imperialism i n Turkestan (Cologne, 1966), p. 51. 47. Walter Kolarz, Russia and Her Colonies, (London: George P h i l i p & Son Ltd., 1952), p. 263 48. S. A. Zenkovsky, Pan-Turkism and Islam i n Russia, p. 218. Zenkovsky suggests that a stubborn i n t r a - p a r t y (CPSU) b a t t l e up to the turn of 1920 s t i l l raged on i n Kazakhstan between die-hard Communists and some former supporters of the Alash Orda who had now joined the Communist Party or defected to the side of the Soviet Union. The struggle featured quite prominently i n the main administrative organ of the Kazakh region - the Kirrevkom. - 98 -49. Ibid. , pp. 216-217. 50. Resolution on the National Question, adopted by the Seventh (April) Ail-Russian Conference of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party 1917. See J. Stalin, Marxism and the National and Colonial  Question: A Collection of Articles and Speeches, (New York; International Publishers, 1934), p. 269. 51. M. Tachmurat, "Turkestan Between Two Fires", Problems of the Peoples of the USSR, Vol. 20, (Winter 1963), p. 26. 52. J. Stalin, Marxism and the National and Colonial Question, p. 269. 53. Indeed, already in January 1918, Stalin had written, that " i t i s nececessary to limit the principle of free self-determination of nations by granting i t to the toilers and refusing i t to the Bourgeoisie". Ibid. 54. Ibid. 55. R. Conquest, The Soviet Deportation of Nationalities, (London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1960) p. 110 56. M. Chokayev, "Land Reform in Kazakhstan", Journal of the Royal  Central Asia Society (hereafter cited as JRCAS) XVIII, (Jan. 1931), p. 415 57 G. wheeler, "Race Relations in Soviet Muslim Area", JRCAS XLVII (April, 1960), p. 97 See also Thomas G. Winner, The Oral Art and Literature of the  Kazakhs of Russian Central Asia, (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1958), p. 131 58. Figures from the Communist International between the F i f t h and the Sixth World Congress, 1924-28. (London 1928), pp. 507-508. Indeed a later day Soviet historian i s said to have written, "A healthy, active core of Communists did not exist among the Kazakhs then", Zenkovsky, Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia, p. 219 - 99 -59. C y r i l E. Black, "Soviet Society: A Comparative View", i n Prospects f o r Soviet Society, ed. by A l l a n Kassof (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), p. 20 60. C y r i l E. Black, "Soviet Society: A Comparative View", p. 149 61. Alexander G. Park, Bolshevism i n Turkestan 1917-1927, (New York: Columbia U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1957), p. 129 62. Haden Guest, The New Russia, (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1949), p. 63 63. Frederick C. Barghoorn, Soviet Russian Nationalism, (New York, Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1956), p. 86 64. Ibid. , p. 87 65. J . S t a l i n , Marxism and the National and C o l o n i a l Question, p. 210. 66. I b i d . , pp 257-259. 67. I b i d . , p. 85 68. Donald W. Treadgold, Twentieth Century Russia, (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co. 1959), p. 302. The in t r o d u c t i o n of the C y r i l l i c alphabet was i n response to the language reforms of Ataturk i n 1928 which a l s o saw the i n s t i t u t i o n of a Roman alphabet i n Turkey. The Soviet move was thus to thwart any c u l t u r a l contact between the Soviet Moslems and Turkic peoples with t h e i r brethren outside the USSR. See also C.W. Host l e r , Turkism and the Soviets. (London: George A l l e n & Unwin Ltd. 1957),p. 63. 69. G. Wheeler, R a c i a l Problems i n Soviet Muslim A s i a , (London: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1960) p. 34. 70. Ibid. 71. Ibid. , p. 35. - 100 -72. Professor Kolarz asserts that the weakness of the Moslem r e l i g i o n i n Kazakhstan was l a r g e l y due to the f a c t that i t never had as deep roots among the previously nomadic Kazakhs (whose ancient r e l i g i o n was Shamanism not Islam) as among the s e t t l e d population of Central A s i a e s p e c i a l l y that of Uzbekistan. Hence he argues that the notion that Islam was an " a l i e n " r e l i g i o n f o r c i b l y imposed on them ( i . e . the Kazakhs), f i r s t by Arab invaders, l a t e r by Tartar Clergy and f i n a l l y by the C z a r i s t administrators was p a r t i c u l a r l y tempting to them. The Communist took the l i n e that t h e i r ancient r e l i g i o n , Shamanism was " l e s s harmful" than the f o r e i g n Moslem r e l i g i o n which superseded i t . See Walter Kolarz, Russia and Her Colonies, p. 406 73. S t a l i n , Marxism and the National and C o l o n i a l Question, p. 261 74. In December 1936, with the promulgation of the new Soviet C o n s t i t u t i o n , the Kazakh ASSR was elevated to a Union Republic of Soviet S o c i a l i s t Republics. It must be pointed out that the delay i n cr e a t i n g the Kazakh ASSR a f t e r i t s promulgation i n 1920 was owing to severe famine which struck the area i n 1921 ( i n which an estimated m i l l i o n l i v e s were l o s t ) . A s p i l l o v e r e f f e c t of the famine was that i t helped to paralyse any e f f e c t i v e native r e s i s t a n c e to the Communists. See Treadgold, Twentieth Century Russia, p. 194. 75. M. Holdsworth, "Soviet Central A s i a " , Soviet Studies, V o l . 3, 1951/2, p. 263 76. Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China. (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1961), p. 282 77. I b i d . , p. 348 7a I b i d . , p. 353 79. I b i d . , pp. 254-56 80. Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works (New York: I n t e r n a t i o n a l P u b l i s h e r s , 1954), Vol. I l l , pp. 151-55 - 101 -81. Owen Lattimore, Pivot of A s i a : Sinkiang and the Inner Asian F r o n t i e r s  of China and Russia, p. 115 82. China News Analysis No. 431, (Hong Kong, August 3, 1962), p. 1 It i s worthy to note that the Chinese Communist p o l i c i e s on m i n o r i t i e s n a t i o n a l i t i e s contrasts sharply to that of the KMT. The KMT p o l i c y on m i n o r i t i e s n a t i o n a l i t i e s i n essence implied the a s s i m i l a t i o n of these m i n o r i t i e s - a kind of melting-pot. Thus, of the f i v e c o n s t i t u t i o n s formulated during the various "Republican" governments of China between 1912 and 1949 only the l a s t dated December of 1946 can be said to contain more than the most perfunctory p l a t i t u d e s about China's m i n o r i t i e s . Those c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n s relevant to m i n o r i t i e s during the Republican period from 1912-1949 i n general simply read: " c i t i z e n s of the Chinese Republic are a l l equal and there s h a l l be no r a c i a l , c l a s s , or r e l i g i o u s d i s t i n c t i o n s " . * The question of creating c u l t u r a l autonomous regions f o r the minority areas or indeed the r i g h t to self-determination - even i n theory - was therefore not s e r i o u s l y contemplated upon by the KMT. * For t h i s and other relevant c o n s t i t u t i o n a l Documents see, H. G. Schwarz, Chinese P o l i c i e s Towards M i n o r i t i e s , pp. 46-198. 83. Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works, (New York: I n t e r n a t i o n a l Publishers, 1956), Vol. IV, p. 301 84. "The Common Programme", China Digest (October 5, 1949), Supplement. See also George Moseley, The Party and the National Question i n China, (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1966), pp. 168-170 85. C o n s t i t u t i o n of the People's Republic of China, (Perking: Foreign Languages Press, 1954) , p. 10 86. G. F. Hudson, "The N a t i o n a l i t i e s of China", St. Anthony's Papers No. 7 (1957), p. 53 87. "Sinkiang 1928-1959", CAR, VII, No. 4, (1960), p. 447. 88. I b i d . - 102 -89.. I b i d . There are fourt e e n n a t i o n a l i t i e s i n Sin k i a n g -Chinese, Uighur, Mongol, Sibo, Solon, Uzbek, Kazakh, Moslem (Tungan), K i r g h i z , White Russians, T a r a n c h i , Manchu, T a r t a r , and T a d j i c . See A l l e n S. Whiting and General Shen S h i h - t s ' a i , S i n k i a n g : Pawn  or P i v o t , p. 156 90. i b i d . , p. 448 91. I b i d . 92. Hsiao H s i a , China (New Haven: HRAF P r e s s , 1960), p. 230 93. " S i n k i a n g , 1928-59", p. 449 94* Peter S. H. Tang, Communist China Today (New York: F r e d e r i c k A. Praeger, 1957), p. 202 95. i b i d . 96. "Sinkiang 1928-59", pp. 449-50 97. S a i f u d i n on h i s part advanced the reason f o r the de l a y on the grounds that the East Turkestan r e v o l t had been c a r r i e d out as a "bourgeois democratic r e v o l u t i o n " - th a t i t was not under the c o n t r o l of the Chinese Communists - w i t h the r e s u l t t h a t u n r e l i a b l e " f e u d a l i s t i c " and "bourgeois" elements had i n f i l t r a t e d the government a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and had t o be weeded out. Hence he claimed the major e f f o r t to set up autonomous n a t i o n a l u n i t s was delayed t i l l l a t e 1953. S a i f u d i n was V i c e Chairman of the Sinkiang's People's Government u n t i l h i s appointment as Chairman of the autonomous r e g i o n i n 1955. Wang En-mao hel d the p o s i t i o n of the F i r s t S e c r e t a r y of the Sink i a n g Sub-Bureau of the CCP C e n t r a l Committee. Though no accurate f i g u r e s f o r Han Chinese immigrants are a v a i l a b l e during the pe r i o d (1949-52), Freeberne has estimated, a f t e r examining s e v e r a l sources, t h a t the number of Han Chinese i n Si n k i a n g stood a t only 300,000 i n 1953. See Mi c h a e l Freeberne, "Demographic and Economic Changes i n the Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region", P o p u l a t i o n S t u d i e s , V o l . XX, No. 1 ( J u l y 1966), p. 105 - 103 -99. Hans de Weerd, "Burhan Shahidi", CAR VIII, No. 1 (1958), p. 95 100. On the question of the formation of autonomous regions, the Chinese Communists devised four categories: (1) Those areas inhabited by one minority only (2) those areas inhabited by one dominant minority group, but i n c l u d i n g other smaller groups (3) those areas inhabited by two or more minority groups of approximately the same s i z e and (4) those areas inhabited by Han-Chinese, but i n c l u d i n g some m i n o r i t i e s . 101. "Enlarged Conference of CCP Sinkiang Commission", Current Background, No.512 (July 10 1958), p. 2 102. "The Common Programme" China Digest (October 5, 1949), Supplement. See also H. G. Schwarz, "Language P o l i c i e s f o r Ethnic M i n o r i t i e s " , China Quarterly, No. 12 (October-December 1962), p. 170 103. New China News Agency - E n g l i s h Urumchi August 27 1956. Nevertheless, by 1958 f i r s t i n d i c a t i o n s of p o l i c y change i n minority languages appeared which s i g n i f i c a n t l y r e f l e c t e d a d e l i b e r a t e de-emphasis of "courting the m i n o r i t i e s " on the part of the Peking regime. Perhaps the outbreak of what was dubbed " l o c a l nationalism" at the turn of 1958 may have prompted the Communists to have second thoughts on t h e i r longstanding p o l i c y of s p e c i a l p r i v i l e g e s f o r the non-Chinese people. The most s i g n i f i c a n t change being the c a l l to the minority n a t i o n a l i t i e s to l e a r n the Chinese language. 104. Hsiao Hsia, China, p. 130 105 K a r l W i t t f o g e l , "The Influence of Leninism-Stalinism on China", Annals of the American Academy of P o l i t i c a l and S o c i a l Science, V o l . 277 (Sept. 1951), p. 33 106. Leon Trotsky, S t a l i n : An Appraisal of the Man and His Influence, (New York: Grosset and Dunlop, 1941), p. 269 107. I. Winner, "Some Problems of Nomadism and S o c i a l Organization Among the Recently S e t t l e d Kazakhs", CAR, V o l . II (1936), p. 251 108. Ibid. , p. 252. - 104 -109. f a n M. Matley, " A g r i c u l t u r a l Development" i n Central A s i a : A Century  of Russian Rule, ed. by E. Allworth (New York: Columbia U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1967), p. 300 HO. !• Winner, "Some Problems of Nomadism and S o c i a l Organization Among the Recently Settled Kazakhs," p. 252 H I . T. Zhdanko, "The Nomads of Central A s i a " , p. 612 112. A- G- Park, Bolshevism i n Turkestan, 1918-27, p. 325 113. !• Winner, "Some Problems of Nomadism and S o c i a l Organization Among the Recently Settled Kazakhs", p. 252 114. M « Holdsworth, "Soviet Central A s i a 1917-40", p. 265 115. A. G. Park, Bolshevism i n Turkestan, 1918-27, p. 267 116. I b i d . , p. 346 117. Jen Min J i h Pao,(The People's D a i l y ) , (September 24, 1957) 118. "Sinkiang: The C o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n of A g r i c u l t u r e " , CAR V o l . VIII No. 3 (1960), p. 332 119. Cheng, Chu-yuan,Communist China's Economy 1949-62, (Seton H a l l , New Jersey: Seton H a l l U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1963), p. 13 120. Mao Tse-tung, "Speech at the Conference of Cadres f o r Shansi and Suiyan", Selected Works, V o l . IV, pp. 1 & 12 121. Hsiao Hsia, China, p. 338 122. Hsueh Mu-chiao, The S o c i a l i s t Transformation of the National Economy of China, (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1960) - 105 -123. The S i g n i f i c a n c e of the Communists emphasis on "Class Struggle" i n course of the land reform measures was pointedly summarized i n L i u Shao-ch'i's report to the Eighth CCP Congress i n 1956. It stated: In carrying out land reform, our Party d i d not take the simple and easy way of merely r e l y i n g on administrative decrees and bestowing land on the peasants....We accomplished the task of land reform through the struggle of the peasants themselves....Thus land reform succeeded not only i n e l i m i n a t i n g the landlords as a c l a s s and weakening the r i c h peasants i n the economic realm, but, a l s o , p o l i t i c a l l y , i n overthrowing the land-l o r d c l a s s and i s o l a t i n g the r i c h peasants. See L i u Shao-ch'i P o l i t i c a l Report of the Central Committee of the  CCP to the Eighth National Congress (Peking: Foreign Languages Press 1956), p. 9 124. Hsueh Mu-chiao, The S o c i a l i s t Transformation of the National  Economy of China, pp. 112-3. 125. "The Muslim Republics of the USSR", JRCAS XLVII (July-October 1960) pp. 201-202 126. I b i d . 127. Current Background, October 25, 1955, 2-3. Furthermore, by means of a January 20, 1950 decree 110,000 out of the 193,000 troops stationed i n Sinkiang were to engage i n productive work. See China News An a l y s i s , No. 103:6. The primary task of the corps was to insure food supplies. To t h i s end, top p r i o r i t y was given to the r e p a i r and construction of i r r i g a t i o n works given the fac t that most of the c u l t i v a t e d areas i n Sinkiang depended on a r t i f i c i a l i r r i g a t i o n . I t i s important to note here that the PLA farms were organized e i t h e r on a cooperative or state farm b a s i s as we s h a l l see l a t e r t h e i r development served as a basis f o r the establishment of state farms. 128. Jen Min J i h Pao (The People's Da i l y ) (October 1, 1955) 129. I b i d . - 106 -130. W. K o l a r z , Russia and Her C o l o n i e s , p. 416. 131. P« B. Henze, "the Economic Development of So v i e t C e n t r a l A s i a on the Eve of World War 2", J o u r n a l of the Royal A s i a n S o c i e t y (October 1949), p. 35 132. C i t e d by Towster, P o l i t i c a l Power i n USSR 1917-47, (New York: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1948) p. 209 133. According t o Matley as e a r l y as 1927 the f i r s t s i g n s of c o l l e c t i -v i z a t i o n were i n evidence i n Kazakhstan when "the c a t t l e and possessions of a few hundred Kazakh bays were c o n f i s c a t e d , the c a t t l e being d i s t r i b u t e d among the poorer peasants, who were then formed i n t o n u c l e i , f o r c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n " . See I . M. M a t t l e y , " A g r i c u l t u r a l Developments", p. 302 134. Under S t a l i n those p a r t s of the c u l t u r e which stood i n the way of maximum economic development or which threatened S o v i e t c o n s o l i d a t i o n of both p o l i t i c a l and economic power were to be h a r s h l y d e a l t w i t h . 135. "New Settlements i n C e n t r a l A s i a and Kazakhstan", CAR, V o l . I I (1963), p. 253 136. I b i d . 137: Apparently i t was i n the Second F i v e Year P l a n that i n d u s t r i a l development gathered momentum i n Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan's non-ferrous m e t a l s , copper works, l e a d , e t c . were opened up on a l a r g e s c a l e during t h i s p e r i o d . The major aim of the T u r k s i b r a i l w a y (the hallmark of i n d u s t r i a l a c t i v i t y d u r i ng the F i r s t F i v e Year Plan) was to b r i n g g r a i n from S i b e r i a and North Kazakhstan to the c o t t o n areas of the South. See M. Holdsworth, " S o v i e t C e n t r a l A s i a 1917-40", p. 269 and see a l s o P. B. Henze, "Economic Developments of Soviet C e n t r a l A s i a " , p. 35 138 Maurice Dobs, So v i e t Economic Development Since 1914, (London: Macmillan & Co., 1948), pp. 250-251 - 107 -13a. I t has been suggested that i n i t s i n i t i a l stages, c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n as a form of struggle against c l a n s u r v i v a l s proved s i n g u l a r l y unsuccessful since many Kolkhozes constituted themselves i n the c l a n b a s i s . This s i t u a t i o n was "overcome" only by further purges of the " e v i l " characters. See the " S t a b i l i z a t i o n of the Nomads", CAR, V o l . VII (1959), p. 225 140. Kolkhozes were the c o l l e c t i v e farms as opposed to Sovkhozes which were the state farms. State farms (Sovkhozes) were l a r g e l y used fo r experimental work i n areas not previously c u l t i v a t e d , and were organized on l i n e s s i m i l a r to that of manufacturing industry. C o l l e c t i v e farms (Kolkhozes) were more prevalent given the wide-spread peasant opposition to t h e i r i n t r o d u c t i o n . Here the land was pooled and the peasant l o s t the r i g h t to regard any part of i t as h i s own, while the great extension of the area to be managed as a s i n g l e u n i t was intended to make po s s i b l e economics i n planning, crop r o t a t i o n and the use of b u i l d i n g s and equipment. I n c i d e n t a l l y , the peasants were allowed to r e t a i n p r i v a t e p l o t s as a concession. 141. In general the number of households i n a Kolkhoz ranged from 10-12 households, but there were a l s o l a r g e Kolkhozes each embracing a number of c l a n s . Even i n the l a t t e r cases each kept to i t s e l f and worked together, i t s members c o n s t i t u t i n g a "brigade". 142. " S t a b i l i z a t i o n of the Nomads" CAR V o l . V I I (1959), p. 224 143. I b i d . 144. "New Settlements i n C e n t r a l A s i a and Kazakhstan" CAR V o l . I I (1963), p. 254 145. I b i d . , p. 255 146. I b i d . 147. E. H. Carr and R. W. Davies, Foundations of a Planned Economy  1926-29, (New York, Macmillan 1971), V o l . I, p. 207. 148. M. Holdsworth, "Sov i e t C e n t r a l A s i a i n 1917-40", p. 267 Kazakhstan i n 1935 had 206 MTS f o r a sown area of 5,124,000 hectares - 108 -149. W. Wilhelm, " S o v i e t C e n t r a l A s i a : Development of a Backward Area", F o r e i g n P o l i c y Reports, V o l . 25, No. 18, (February 1950), p. 220 150. "New Settlements i n C e n t r a l A s i a and Kazakhstan" CAR V o l . XI (1963), p. 256 151. Leonard Schapiro, The Communist P a r t y of the Soviet Union, (New York: Random House 1959), p. 384 152. "The Muslim Republics of the USSR", JRCAS V o l . XLVI (1959), p. 15 153. "New Settlements i n C e n t r a l A s i a and Kazakhstan", CAR V o l . X I (1963), p. 254 154. For more on t h i s see The C o n s t i t u t i o n of the People's Republic of China, p. 9 155. The reasons f o r the delay i n e s t a b l i s h i n g the Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region have been d e a l t w i t h e a r l i e r and do not need any f u r t h e r e l a b o r a t i o n here. We may add however t h a t i n a d d i t i o n , Peking claimed t h a t i t was necessary to a l t e r the a n t a g o n i s t i c r e l a t i o n s between the v a r i o u s n a t i o n a l i t i e s as w e l l as l o o k i n g a t ways t o ease the ago o l d d i s t r u s t between the n a t i o n a l i t i e s and the Han Chinese i n the r e g i o n . Furthermore, the need to e l i m i n a t e "narrow n a t i o n a l i s m " and o p p o s i t i o n elements from the "dying remnants" of the East Turkestan groups (the Sinkiang league f o r the defense of Peace and Democracy) was considered v i t a l by the CCP. See U.S. Consul General, Hong Kong, Survey of China Mainland P r e s s , No. 961, (Hong Kong, Sept. 30 1954), pp. 6-7, & Tang, Communist China Today, pp. 210-11. 156. The most Important autonomous area i n Sin k i a n g i s the H i Kazakh autonomous Chou. I t i s comprised of three p a r t s - H i , Tarb a g a t a i and A l t a i . I n c i d e n t a l l y , the H i p a r t i s p r a c t i c a l l y i d e n t i c a l w i t h the t e r r i t o r y occupied by Russia i n the l a s t century and i t was the base f o r the r e v o l t a g a i n s t Chinese a u t h o r i t y i n Urumchi from 1944-49, e f f e c t i v e l y c a r r y i n g T a r b a g a t a i and A l t a i w i t h i t . And s i g n i f i c a n t l y , i t was mainly from H i that the exodus i n t o the adjacent S o v i e t t e r r i t o r y (Kazakhstan) r e s u l t i n g from " d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n " w i t h c o n d i t i o n s of l i f e i n S i n k i a n g took p l a c e i n 1962. - 109 -"Sinkiang 1928-59", pp. 445-46. I t must be pointed out that c o n s i d e r a b l e e f f o r t s were made to t r a i n m i n o r i t y cadres from 1949-55; i t has been estimated t h a t the CCP t r a i n e d 36,000 m i n o r i t y cadres i n Sinkiang and by 1957 the m i n o r i t y cadres i n Sinkiang had grown from 12,841 i n 1950 to 63,995. I t a l s o r evealed that i n the same year 35.13 per cent of the t o t a l number of cadres of the h s i e n l e v e l and above were cadres from the n a t i o n a l m i n o r i t i e s of S i n k i a n g . See J . P. Lo " F i v e Years of the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region", China Q u a r t e r l y , October-December No. 8 (1961), p. 92. While not d e l v i n g i n t o the d e t a i l s of the a g r i c u l t u r a l c o o p e r a t i v e s , i t must be noted t h a t there was a "lower" as w e l l as a " h i g h e r " type of a g r i c u l t u r a l producer c o o p e r a t i v e s . The d i f f e r e n c e being t h a t : i n the "lower" or " s e m i - s o c i a l i s t " type the peasants s t i l l owned la n d i n d i v i d u a l l y but pooled t h e i r f i n a n c e s and equipment, w h i l e i n the "higher" type l a n d , c a t t l e and implements were owned c o l l e c t i v e l y . . . Peasants r e c e i v e d i n t e r e s t s on the lan d h o l d i n g s as w e l l as a share of the crop f o r work done. F i n a l l y , i n the s o c i a l i s t c o o p e r a t i v e , or c o l l e c t i v e farm, the land and bigger farm implements became common property and work done was the s o l e source of income. See "Two R e v o l u t i o n s f o r the Farm", China i n T r a n s i t i o n , (Peking 1957), p. 75. " S i n k i a n g : The C o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n of A g r i c u l t u r e " , CAR V I I I No. 3, p. 333 J . P. Lo, " F i v e Years of the SUAR", p. 92. "The Muslim R e p u b l i c s of the USSR", JRCAS X L V I I , p. 202. Jen Min J i h Pao, (The People's Daily)(September 27, 1955) New China News Agency, A p r i l 5, 1960 c i t e d by M i c h a e l Freeberne, "Changes i n the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region", p. 113. During the F i r s t F i v e Year P l a n , f i v e main i n d u s t r i a l zones emerged centered i n order of importance upon Kashgar, K u l d j a , ( H i D i s t r i c t ) , Urumchi, Hami, and Sharasume ( A l t a i D i s t r i c t ) . - 110 -165. "Sinkiang 1928-59", p. 451 166. Ib i d . 167. "The Muslim Republics of the USSR", JRCAS XLVIII, p. 202 168. I t must be pointed out here that t h i s p o l i c y of leniency towards the stock-breeders did not apply to China proper. There, by the end of 1956, 96.3% of the stock-breeding householders and joined cooperative movements and of these 87.8% were taking part i n cooperatives of the "higher" type. See Ching Chi Yen Chiu, Economic Research Monthly, No. 10 (Peking 1959), p. 3. Cited i n Cheng Chu-yuan, Communist China's Economy 1949-62, p. 34 169. Jen Min J i h Pao (The People's Daily) (September 30, 1955) 170. "Borderlands: Current Developments i n Sinkiang" CAR V, No. 2 (1957) 171. "Sinkiang: Some Current Developments", CAR V o l . 6, 1958. - I l l -SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY Ake, Claude, A Theory of P o l i t i c a l Integration. (Homewood, I l l i n o i s : The Dorsey Press, 1967) Allworth, E. ed., Central A s i a : A Century of Russian Rale. (New York: Columbia U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1967) Bacon, E., Central Asians Under Russian Rule. (New York: C o r n e l l U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1966) Barghoorn, F. C., Soviet Russian Nationalism. (New York: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1956) Barnett, A. 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(Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1960) Hu, Chang-tu, ed., China, I t s People, I t s Society, I t s Culture. (New Haven: HRAF Press, 1960) Jacob, E. P. & James Toscano, ed., The Integration of P o l i t i c a l Communities. (Ph i l a d e l p h i a : J . B. L i p p i n c o t t Co., 1964) Kassof, A l l e n , "Prospects f o r Soviet Society" i n Soviet N a t i o n a l i t y Problems. ed., E. Allworth, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968) K h a l f i n , N.A., Russia's P o l i c y i n Central A s i a 1857-1863. (London: Central Asian Research Centre, 1964) Kolarz, Walter, R e l i g i o n i n the Soviet Union. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1961) , Russia and Her Colonies. (London: George P h i l i p & Son Ltd., 1952) - 114 -Krader, L., Peoples of Central Asia. (Bloomington: Indiana U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1963) Kunitz, Joshua, Dawn Over Samarkand. (New York: I n t e r n a t i o n a l Publishers, 1935) Lattimore, Owen, Inner Asian F r o n t i e r s of China. 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(New York: Grove Press, 1961) , The Other Side of the River: Red China Today. (New York: Random House, 1962) - 116 -S t a l i n , J . V., Problems of Leninism. (New York: I n t e r n a t i o n a l Publishers, 1934) j_ Marxism and the National & C o l o n i a l Question (New York: In t e r n a t i o n a l Publishers, 1934) Schwarz, H. G., Chinese P o l i c i e s Towards M i n o r i t i e s : An Essay and Documents. (Bellingham: Western Washington State College, 1971) Tang, P. S. H., Communist China Today: Domestic and Foreign P o l i c i e s . (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1958) T i l l e t t , L., The Great Friendship: Soviet H i s t o r i a n s on the Non-Russian  N a t i o n a l i t i e s . (Chapel H i l l : U n i v e r s i t y of North Carolina Press, 1969) Towster, P o l i t i c a l Power i n USSR 1917-47. (New York: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1948) Treadgold, D. W., Twentieth Century Russia. (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1959) ed. Soviet and Chinese Communism. 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S. & General Sheng S h i h - t s ' a i , Sinkiang: Pawn or Pivo t . (East Lansing, Michigan: Michigan State U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1958) Wilber, C. K., The Soviet Model and Underdeveloped Countries. (Chapel H i l l , U n i v e r s i t y of North C a r o l i n a Press, 1969) Winner, Thomas, The Oral Art & L i t e r a t u r e of the Kazakhs of Russian Central A s i a . (Durham, N.C.: Duke U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1958) Wood, J . R., "The P o l i t i c a l Integration of B r i t i s h P r i n c e l y Gujarat", (Unpublished Ph.D. d i s s e r t a t i o n , Columbia U n i v e r s i t y , 1972) Zenkovsky, S., Pan-Turkism and Islam i n Russia. (Cambridge: Harvard U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1960) _ 118 _ PERIODICAL ARTICLES Binder, Leonard, "National Integration and P o l i t i c a l Development", American P o l i t i c a l Science Review V o l . LVIII, No.3 (Sept., 1964), 622-631. "The Borderlands of Soviet Central A s i a : Sinkiang", Central Asian Review (Hereafter c i t e d as CAR) V o l . I I (1957) 144-162. Chang L i , " S t r a t e g i c Development i n Sinkiang", Foreign A f f a i r s , V o l . 32 No. 3 ( A p r i l 1954), 491-503, China News Analysis No. 431 (August 3, 1962)' Chokayev, M., "Turkestan and the Soviet Union" Journal of Royal Central  Asian Society, XVIII (January, 1931) (Hereafter c i t e d as JRCAS), 403-420. "The Common Programme", China Digest (October, 1949) "Enlarged Conference of CCP Sinkiang Commission", Current Background No.512 (July 10, 1958) Current Background, No. 365 (October 25, 1955) de Weerd Hans, "Burhan Shahidi", CAR VIII No. 1 (1958), 93-96. Dreyer, June, "China M i n o r i t y N a t i o n a l i t i e s T r a d i t i o n a l and Party E l i t e s " , P a c i f i c A f f a i r s V o l . XLIII No. 4 (Winter 1970-71), 506-530. F a r i s , N.A., "Islam and Communism", Islamic Review (June 1956), 28-31. F i e l d , A. R., "St r a t e g i c Development i n Sinkiang", Foreign A f f a i r s , V o l . 39 No. 2 (January 1961), 312-318. - 119 -F r e c h t l i n g , L. E., "Anglo-Russian R i v a l r y i n East Turkestan 1863-1881", JRCAS V o l . XXVI (July 1939) , 471-489. Freeberne, M., "Demographic & Economic Changes i n the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region", (Hereafter c i t e d as SUAR), Population  Studies V o l . XX, No. 1 (July 1966), 103-124 Henze, P. B., "The Economic Development of Soviet Central A s i a on the Eve of World War I I " , JRCAS XXXV (October 1949) 29-44. Henze, P., Alphabet Changes i n Soviet Central A s i a and Communist China", JRCAS XLIV (July-October 1958), 124-135. Holdsworth, M., "Soviet Central A s i a 1917-40", Soviet Studies V o l . 3 (1951/52), 260-277 Hudson, G. F., "The N a t i o n a l i t i e s of China", St. Anthony's Papers, No. 7, (1957), 51-61 Holubnychy, L., "Chinese Treatment of the N a t i o n a l i t y Problem i n Sinkiang", The East Turkic Review II No. 4 (December 1960), 81-116. Jones, P. H. M., " S e n s i t i v e Sinkiang", Far Eastern Economic Review (Hereafter c i t e d as F.E.E.R.) Vol. LV, No. 6 (February 9, 1967), 189-191. , "Sinkiang Gets to Work", F.E.E.R. V o l . XXXV, No. 12 (March 2, 1962), 654-56. Kashih, A., "The Muslims i n China and Their Struggle with Communism", The East Turkic Review II No. 3 (Sept. 1960), 102-11. Lo, J. P., "Five Years of the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region", China Quarterly No. 8 (October-December, 1961), 92-105. - 120 -Macfarquhar, "Communist China's Twenty Years: A P e r i o d i z a t i o n " , China Quarterly No. 39 (July-Sept. 1969), 55-63. McLean, N.L.D., "Sinkiang Today", International A f f a i r s (July 1948), 380-85. Moseley, G. "Fresh Approach to National Minority Question", China Quarterly No. 24 (Oct.-Dec. 1965), 15-27. "The Muslim Republics of the USSR", JRCAS,XLVII (Jaunary 1960), 11-21. , JRCAS,XLVII ( A p r i l 1960) 106-116 , JRCAS, XLVII (July - Oct. 1960), 193-205. , JRCAS, XLVI, (July - Oct. 1959), 202-212. New China News Agency - Engli s h Urumchi (August 27, 1956). "New Settlements i n Central A s i a & Kazakhstan", CAR V o l . XI (1963), 238-240. , E d i t o r i a l Commentary, "The Peaceful L i b e r a t i o n of Sinkiang", trans, i n Current Background, No. 365 (Oct. 25, 1955). People's China, (Peking, A p r i l 16, 1950) "The Revolutions f o r the Farm", China i n T r a n s i t i o n (Peking 1957), 73-78. Schwarz, H. G., "Language P o l i c i e s f o r Ethnic M i n o r i t i e s " , China Quarterly No. 12 (Oct. - D e c . 1962), 170-182. "Sinkiang: Some Current Developments" CAR V o l . VI No. 3 (1958), 76-79. "Sinkiang: the C o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n of A g r i c u l t u r e " , CAR V o l . VIII No. 3 (1960), 332-33. "Sinkiang" 1928-59", CAR VIII No. 4 (1960), 441-57. - 121 -"SUAR", Current Background No. 365 (Oct. 25, 1955). Smlrnov, N. A., "An Outline of the Hist o r y of Islamic Studies i n the USSR", CAR I I I No. 1 (1955), 77. "Soviet O r i e n t a l Studies: A New P e r i o d i c a l " CAR I I I No. 4 (1955) 344-46. " S t a b i l i z a t i o n of the Nomads", CAR VII, No. 3 (1959), 222-27, Survey of the Mainland China Press, No. 297 (Hereafter c i t e d as SMCP) Hong Kong (March 18, 1952), 34-35. SMCP No. 394 Hong Kong (August 14, 1952), 12-16. SMCP No. 961 Hong Kong (Sept. 30, 1954), 6-7. Tachmurat, "Turkestan Between Two F i r e s " , Problems of the Peoples of the USSR, V o l . 20 (Winter 1963), 21-7. T r e t i a k , Daniel, "Peking's P o l i c y Towards Sinkiang: Trouble on the 'New F r o n t i e r ' , Current Scene, V o l . 2, Issue 24 (November 15, 1963). Wheeler, G., "Race Relations i n Soviet Muslim A s i a " JRCAS XLVII ( A p r i l 1960), 93-106. Wheeler, G., "Sinkiang and the Soviet Union", China Quarterly, No. 16 (Nov. - D e c , 1963), 56-61. Whiting, A. S., " N a t i o n a l i t y Tensions i n Sinkiang" Far Eastern Survey XXV No. 1 (Jan. 1956), 8-13. Whiting, A. S. "Sinkiang & Sino-Soviet R e l a t i o n s " , China Quarterly, No. 3 (July-Sept. 1960), 32-41. - 122 -Winner, I., "Some Problems of Nomadism and S o c i a l Organization Among the Recently S e t t l e d Kazakhs", CAR Vol. XI (1963), 246-260. Wi t t f o g e l , K a r l , "The Influence of Leninism-Stalinism on China", Annals of the American Academy of P o l i t i c a l and S o c i a l Science, Vol. 227 (September 1951), 33-52. Zdanko, T., "Sedentarization of the Nomads of Central A s i a i n c l u d i n g Kazakhstan, Under the Soviet Regime", International Labour Review, Vol. 93, No. 6 (June 1966), 601-620. NEWSPAPERS C h r i s t i a n Science Monitor (August 28, 1963) Jen Min J i h Pao, (The People's Daily) (September 24, 1957) Jen Min J i h Pao, (The People's D a i l y ) (October 1, 1955) New York Times, (February 1, 1949) Pravda, ( A p r i l 14, 1921) - 123 -APPENDIX A ABBREVIATIONS ASSR Autonomous Soviet S o c i a l i s t Republic CAEC Central Asian Economic Council CAR Central Asian Review CCP Chinese Communist Party CPSU Communist Party of the Soviet Union JRCAS Journal of Royal Central Asian Society KMT Kuomintang NCNA New China News Agency PLA People's L i b e r a t i o n Army PRC People's Republic of China RSFSR Russian Soviet Federated S o c i a l i s t Republic SMCP Survey of China Mainland Press SSR Soviet S o c i a l i s t Republic SUAR Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region USSR Union of Soviet S o c i a l i s t Republic _ 124 _ APPENDIX B KAZAKHSTAN'S POPULATION Kazakhs Russians Ukrainians 1926 Census 57% 20% 13% 1939 Census 2,335,500 2,619,900 (includes Ukrainians) Source: "The Muslim Republics of the USSR", JRCAS, XLVII ( A p r i l , 1960), 106-116 SINKIANG'S POPULATION 1953 Census Uighurs 3,600,000 Kazakhs 500,000 . Ki r g h i z 75,000 Mongols 30,000 Russians 20,000 Sibos 19,000 Tadzhiks 14,000 Uzbeks 13,000 Tarta r s 6,000 Hui D i f f i c u l t to a s c e r t a i n Manchu N e g l i g i b l e Solons N e g l i g i b l e Han 250,000 Taranchi N e g l i g i b l e Source: Cited i n "The Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region", Current Background, No. 365 (October 25, 1955) 125 'vs.-. :' * ' ,-- SciiiipahiliiisIC^-^ \ -/, S 1 .,sK " A?. T U R G A I O 4» <S> }V,J. Jt,ti-e $.(!.(•}!:'.<>', / i / ^ . f - j U . ••••• /nr.cu/E \ : *\f* A R I A YLs¥^If..jt > (- B R IT I S H -' I N D I A 0 100 200 GOO Kazakh Steppes and Central Asia before T i ' the Revolution of 1917 MAP 1 Source: S. Zenkovsky, Pan-Turk-ism and Islam i n Russia, (Cambridge: Harvard Un i v e r s i t y Press, I960), p 126 MAP. 2 Source: A. G. Park, Bolshevism i n Turkestan 1918-27, New York: Columbia U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1957.), p. 127 3 SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA a r Park B n 1 ^ * " H g ™ i n Turkestan^ 1918-27 Source: A. G. Park, ^ ^ i f ^ p ^ ^ ^ Press, 1957. 128 MAP 4 Source: Michael Freeberne, "Demographic and Economic Changes i n the SUAR" Population Studies, Vol. XX No. 1, Ju l y 1966, p. 104 129 SINKIANG-ADMINISTRATIVE UNITS Ho-pu-k'0-sai-erh (Kobuk-Saur ) Mongol A . >t P O - E R H - T A - L A I B O R O - T A L A ) M O N G O L A . C C h'a-pu-ch'a-erh (C h a pchal) Si bo A . H . Pa-li-k'un ( B a r - K b l ) K a z a k h A . H . 4 0 0 A C . AUTONOMOUS C H O U A.H. AUTONOMOUS HS1EN 2 0 0 K M S . 4 0 O Source: MAP 5 Michael Freeberne, "Demographic and Economic Changes i n the SAUR" Population Studies. V o l . XXX No. 1, July 1966, p. 110 

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