A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC
CONSOLIDATION POLICIES PURSUED BY THE SOVIET UNION
IN KAZAKHSTAN (1917-33) AND COMMUNIST CHINA IN
SINKIANG (1949-57)

by

CORNELIUS AMAEBI BIYE OKOKO
AIMLT (Bacteriology) London, 1965
B.A., (Hons.), University of British Columbia, 1972

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Department of  

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The University of British Columbia  

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This study is an attempt to compare similar periods of development during the respective phases of consolidation of power by the Bolsheviks in Kazakhstan and by the Chinese Communists in Sinkiang. It is not intended to be an exhaustive study, given the momentous developments that transpired during the period under study - 1917-33 in Kazakhstan and 1949-57 in Sinkiang.

This study will therefore be limited to those important political and economic developments which appear to this writer to demonstrate more convincingly the similarities and differences these two periods of development - the political consolidation phase and the economic consolidation phase - portrayed.

What do the Soviet and Chinese economies of the period under study have in common? What do the two regimes have in common in terms of their political policies? Why compare them at all? Perhaps the easiest answer to these questions is that both economies, were lodged in similar doctrinal-political matrices. They were both integral aspects of Communist societies and one-party systems that officially designated themselves, at least at the time, as Marxist-Leninist by ideological commitment, Communist by party label, and Socialist by politico-economic order. But it is equally true, that a common ideological base alone does not of itself ensure that it will be applied precisely the same way regardless of time, place and circumstance.

Thus when a Communist party takes power and consolidates its roots
in the national soil, its perception of its needs and the nature of its commitments cannot avoid being coloured by the national interests which it has inherited and the pressures of the milieu in which it is compelled to function.

In this study, it has also been demonstrated that, with Civil War behind them and once power was won, the political and economic policies pursued by both regimes also differed markedly in many respects.
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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this study is to compare similar periods of development during the respective phases of political and economic consolidation after the accession to power by the Bolsheviks in Kazakhstan and by the Chinese Communists in Sinkiang - both underdeveloped regions at the time. The relationship between the "less-developed" and the more "developed" areas, between urban and rural areas, centre and periphery etc., (both national and international) has generated considerable interest among scholars of integration theory in recent years. In a related sense therefore this study will attempt to look into the question of what Communism has to offer to "under-developed" territories. But given the limited scope of this study, and in view of the fact that the central focus of this study is not on the theory of integration per se, our discussion of the concept will therefore be limited to the two dimensions of consolidation - political and economic - as they relate to the overall integrative process.

In this regard, I found the typology of Professor Weiner on integration very useful for our purposes as it encompasses the two dimensions under consideration. In his rather comprehensive examination of the various definitions or uses of integration Professor Weiner delineated five broad categories: national integration, territorial integration, value integration, elite-mass integration, and integrative behaviour. Of these five categories he suggests that "territorial integration" which is defined as "the process of bringing together culturally and socially discrete groups into a single territorial unit and the establishment of a national identity", remains
by far the most commonly used form of the term. While this may be largely true in the context of most of the newly emergent nations of Asia, Africa and to some extent Latin America, it can hardly hold true for the Soviet Union or China. The reason is that the territorial integrity or sovereignty of these two countries vis-a-vis the two regions under study was never questioned by other powers, granted there were some internal rumblings within the sub-units. Thus both the leaders of the nationalist movements of Kazakhstan and Sinkiang sent out feeble feelers for "national autonomy" at the time of the accession to power of the two Communist regimes. More on this later. The argument here is that "territorial integration" does not apply to the cases under study. What does apply however, at least for our purposes, is Weiner's other four types: national integration, (the problem of establishing national central authority over subordinate political units or regions which may or may not coincide with distinct cultural or social units); elite-mass integration (the problem of linking government with the governed); value integration (the minimum value consensus necessary to maintain a social order); and integrative behaviour (the capacity of people in a society to organize for some common purpose).

While accepting the basic substance of Weiner's definitions as an analytical tool, I have found the compartmentalization of these four

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*In fact Lobanov-Rostovsky suggests that the Soviets for example, were deliberately stimulating the feebly developed nationalistic feelings of Kazakhstan and in the rest of Central Asia." See Prince A. Lobanov-Rostovsky, *Russia & Asia* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1933) p. 273.
categories unnecessary and cumbersome. It is futile to talk seriously about national integration if there is an ever widening "elite-mass gap", if there is no "common purpose" among the leadership and the population at large, or if there is no minimum "value consensus". The absence of these characteristics will cast a negative shadow on the goal of national integration. Put in another way, national integration will be imperiled if these aspects are found wanting in any political community. The problem of national integration, writes Professor Binder, is one of forging a single social type, out of a multiplicity. It requires, he continues, that "the gap between elites and non-elites be closed".

The emphasis on national integration is crucial because it subsumes under its general rubric the two aspects or dimensions of political and economic consolidation which are the central themes of this study. Both aspects are essential to the process of national integration. Stresses which lead to a weakening of political and economic consolidation must be reduced if not eliminated by appropriate responses from the political authorities, otherwise the system's survival will be threatened. Examples of such malintegrative stress in modern history as a result of the weakening of the two dimensions of political and economic consolidation are those associated with the 'black power' movement in the U.S.A., the attempted Biafran secession in 1967, the Northern Ireland debacle, and the departure of Singapore from the Malaysian federation in 1965.

Viewed in this sense then, the working definition of consolidation of power for the purposes of this study when elaborated upon becomes "a
process in which the political and economic consolidation of a system, (as part of an overall integrative process) is increased, and is in turn accompanied by an expansion of the scope and power of the system in terms of sectors that are controlled on a system rather than on a unit level". Thus, the return of Moscovite power in Kazakhstan following the disintegration and the subsequent defection of leaders of the nationalist movement in November 1919, and the entrance of the People's Liberation Army (hereafter cited as PLA) on September 26, 1949 into Sinkiang, can be viewed as dates on which the Russians and the Chinese respectively start to assert firm control over these two regions. Both Moscow and Peking faced somewhat comparable economic and political situations in that, at these respective dates, neither of the two regions was economically or politically integrated with the rest of the two countries. It is therefore of great significance and indeed illuminating that both Kazakhstan and Sinkiang were brought into the timetable of economic, political and social policies pursued by the two regimes (though in varying intensities) along with the rest of the Soviet Union and China proper - except of course Tibet in the latter case. The fact that both regions were included in these programmes coming just in the wake of their accession to power simply underscores the urgent desire on the part of the two Communist regimes to quickly consolidate their power and control (economically and politically) over the two regions - as part of their overall integrative plan in their respective countries.

For both the Soviet Union and China the political agency charged to provide the preconditions necessary for the achievement of the two
dimensions of consolidation was the Communist Party. To be sure, both political and economic consolidation are related processes but by no means identical. Together they remain the two major dimensions of an overall ongoing integrative process, the central core of this study.

I have divided the actual consolidation of power into two periods: the political consolidation phase which lasted from 1917 to 1928 in Kazakhstan and from 1949-52 in Sinkiang; and the economic consolidation phase from 1928-33 in Kazakhstan and from 1953-57 in Sinkiang. The political consolidation phase essentially is characterized by the absorption and elimination of local left-wing regimes and "counter-revolutionaries". This can be seen in the Soviet absorption of the left-wing elements of Kazakhstan's nationalist movement - the Alash Orda⁹ - and the elimination of other "counter-revolutionaries" both within and without the movement. Equally, the leaders of the Eastern Turkestan Republic in Sinkiang met with a similar fate, albeit in a much attenuated form. During the political consolidation phase, the basic Communist political forms of control were introduced and firmly established. These included among others the highly centralized Communist Party organization, and Soviet-type government institutions.

Secondly, in the economic sphere this period was characterized by the transfer of the ownership of the basic means of production from the
former ruling classes into the hands of the peasantry. During this period, agricultural production was universally dominated by the small farmer. On the other hand, the economic consolidation phase 1928-33 in Kazakhstan and 1953-57 in Sinkiang witnessed the transfer of the ownership and control of the basic means of production from the peasantry to the state.* This period marked the construction of a new economic foundation for both regimes.

A word on the choice of periods for the comparison is in order. I selected the two periods for comparison primarily because Communist China (hereafter referred to as China) patterned her industrialization drive and her political institutions after the Russian experience, with the Stalinist model very much in mind. Obviously, I am not unaware of the limitations of my choice of periods. The Soviet Union for example, was already on her way to industrialization even before 1928.

Mention must also be made about sources. I have relied almost wholly on secondary sources including the translations of newspaper articles of the Survey of Mainland China Press, Survey of China Mainland Magazines, and the Current Background Series.** Incidentally, one of the great

* It must be noted however that in the case of the Soviet Union there is at least the theoretical difference between the collective farm (Kolkhoz) and the state farm (Sovkhoz). More on this later. Suffice it to say at this point that the distinction, it would seem, was largely fictional and inconsequential since the primary objective of maintaining central control over the entire Soviet economic system extended even to the collective farms.

** These could however be regarded as primary sources.
disappointments of this study was the limited usefulness of the translated newspaper articles of these two publications. Materials from these in regard to Sinkiang for the period under study proved to be largely of a vague nature. These limitations notwithstanding, it is the considered view of this writer that there are sufficient secondary sources to make a comparative study of the kind I have undertaken here very worthwhile.

In scope the study is limited to a description and analysis of certain key policies and practices in the political and economic realms which the Soviet government and China pursued in specific region - Kazakhstan and Sinkiang - during the formative years of these regimes. In this respect it is a case study concerned with the working relationship between the living institutions of the two regimes and the political, economic and social goals towards which their rulers aspired.

Structurally, the study has been divided into four broad sections. Section I gives an historical overview of the two regimes prior to 1917 and 1949 respectively. Section II compares the political policies adopted by both regimes during the political consolidation phase. Section III contrasts the broad economic policies of both regimes during the political consolidation phase and lastly, Section IV discusses both the political and economic policies and developments during the economic consolidation phase.
SECTION I

An Historical Overview of Kazakhstan and Sinkiang Prior
to the Seizure of Power by the Respective Communist Regimes

Kazakhstan: The Period Prior to 1917

Although Russia had made sporadic contacts with what is now known as Kazakhstan* for several centuries, and fairly regularly from the seventeenth century on, the Russian penetration and the subsequent conquest and annexation did not take place until the second quarter of the nineteenth century. Ignorance of geography and of the economic potential of the region, coupled with the remoteness of the region from the heart of European Russia, conspired in keeping out Russia’s interest for a considerable time from Kazakhstan.

But by the second quarter of the nineteenth century Russia not only cast away its indifference towards Kazakhstan, but became conscious of its obvious economic, military and political potential. Moreover, with the heightened need to contain the commercial and political expansion of Great Britain in the Indian sub-continent from spilling over to Central Asia (then referred to as Turkestan), the region (which was seen as a buffer between

* After the Russians actually came into contact with the Kazakhs, they always referred to them as "Kirgiz" or sometimes as "Kaisak-Kirgiz". According to Harcave, in the Czarist days, the Kazakhs were not even recognised as a separate nationality, and were simply classified as Kirgiz. Kazakhstan as a national Republic dates from August, 1920 when the administrative centres of the Uralsk, Turgai, Akmolinsk and Semipalatinsk were united to form the Kazakhstan ASSR within the RSFSR. The Federated Soviet Republic of Kazakhstan now stretches from the Caspian and the lower reaches of the Volga in the West to the Altai mountains in the East and from the Trans-Siberian Railway in the North to the mountains of Tien Shan in the South, and is bounded in the West and North by the RSFSR, on the East by China (Sinkiang to be more specific) and on the South by Uzbekistan and Kirghizia.
European Russia and the rest of Central Asia) became as important to Russia as securing the region's cotton for its textile industry and opening the Central Asian market for its manufactured articles.  

To be sure, Russian governors and generals had made intermittent forays to Kazakhstan where in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries political authority was divided among three weak entities: the Great Horde located in the Southern and Eastern part; the Middle Horde, in the North-Central; and the Little Horde, in the North-Western nearer the Caspian and the Ural River.  

In spite of the separate and centrifugal tendencies amongst the Kazakhs, a reciprocal harmony, however tenuous, emerged at one time or the other among the Three Hordes. Thus in mid-eighteenth century a weak political union between the Middle and the Little Horde was forged. Moreover, external aggression on the part of the Kalmuks (the inhabitants of the powerful state of Dzungaria) in 1643 and from 1681-1684 cemented the feelings of a common bond and unity among the Kazakhs of the region. This feeling of commonality was soon broken however under renewed attacks by the Kalmuks. The resultant weakening of Kazakh unity following the devastating attacks by the Kalmuks made the hitherto fragile but "unified" Hordes an easy prey to the Russians, and by 1731 both the Middle and Little Hordes under the yoke of sustained Kalmuk invasions accepted Russian protection.  

The sequence of Russian penetration into Kazakhstan that followed was such that the Hordes "were absorbed into the Russian empire according to their proximity to European Russia". Accordingly the Little Horde was

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*The term Horde, (ORDO) according to Krader, is Mongol and Turkic by origin and it means "court of a Prince or Khan".*
absorbed first, followed by the Middle Horde and the Great Horde last. By 1865, when Tashkent was captured, most of Kazakhstan had long since been brought under Russian administrative control. The formal incorporation of the Kazakh Steppe into the Russian empire was therefore accomplished by the nineteenth century.

It has to be pointed out that up to the time when Kazakhstan was incorporated into Russia only a small part of the territory was settled. The Kazakhs were primarily nomads. Following the nineteenth century annexation by Russia, forts and Russian military and administrative centers at Omsk, Semipalatinsk, Akmolinsk, Verny (now Alma-Ata) and others began to spring up in Kazakhstan. Alongside the towns new settlements founded by immigrants from central Russia appeared in Kazakhstan. Originally the Czarist government forcibly settled the fringes of Kazakhstan with Siberian Cossacks. In the nineteenth century a fortified chain along the Ural river to Omsk, then along to Irtysh river to Semipalatinsk and Semirechye was formed from Cossack villages, outposts and towns.

At the end of the nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth century, following severe harvest failures and the attendant peasant disturbances that followed in European Russia, a wave of peasant settlers poured into

* Tashkent during this period had grown into a bastion of a "revolutionary radicalism" which completely dominated the whole of Central Asia including Kazakhstan.
Kazakhstan via the newly-built railways. The effect of such a migration around and into the Steppes of Kazakhstan was the reduction of the area of pasturage available to the nomads. And as the pressure on Kazakh pasture land increased, a scramble for pastures among the Kazakhs began. By this time it had become evident that pacification of the Kazakh Steppes and the subsequent growth of population there were making it difficult for the Kazakhs to preserve their ancient nomadic economic system. According to Bacon, not only was the "economic independence of the nomads threatened by the Russian incursions but now an even greater economic threat emerged in the form of Russian trading posts and seasonal fairs along the borders of the nomadic territory". These trading posts later served as a medium through which Russian manufactured novelties were exchanged for animals and furs and thus generating new needs.

The creeping Russian dominance of the Kazakhs sparked a series of local rebellions, resistance movements and wars of liberation under the leadership of such notables as Batyr Srym Datov. These movements characteristically centered among those Kazakhs closest to Russia, and the first to be absorbed into the Russian Empire - the Little Horde - but soon engulfed most of the region.

Although these uprisings were short-lived, the resistance to Russian penetration forced the Russians to move out of their areas of control along the rivers. As it turned out, however, the move was tactical and the Russians switched to the building of lines of forts that reached out to the Steppe at a much faster pace. This strategy of building fortresses facilitated
not only the extension of Russian military might in the area but brought about the
balkinization of the Kazakh Steppe into pacifiable units, isolating centers of
resistence. By this time any hopes of future Kazakh unity to stave off
Russian occupation were more or less summarily dashed.

In sum, the Russian penetration into Kazakhstan which began in a
rather piecemeal fashion by the eighteenth century climaxed in the nineteenth
century. By 1824 they had annexed the territory of the Little Horde between
the Caspian and the Aral Seas. In the 1820's and 1830's they acquired the
territory of the Middle Horde. The Russian border had by now extended to
the East by the Aral Sea along the lower Syr-Darya in 1853. By 1854 Russian
rule was established in the territory of the Great Horde, the Semirechye,
Ili Valley, and as far South as Issyk Kul. In the same year Alma-Ata (now
capital of Kazakhstan) was taken and this marked the complete annexation into
the Russian Empire the territory of Central and Northern Kazakhstan.

Having consolidated their position in Kazakhstan, the Czarist
government then instituted a new administrative organization* by 1867 which
encompassed the whole territory of the Kazakhs.

*The administrative system that evolved divided the area into governor-
generalship (guberniya), provinces (oblasts), counties (uezds) and
districts (volosts) and was primarily designed to provide a satisfactory
and effective means of bringing the "Tribesmen" under Russian control.
Kazakhstan on the Eve of the October 1917 Revolution:

Of particular significance we recall, was the movement of Russian peasants to the more fertile regions of the Northern and Eastern Steppes - a movement that continued unabated up to the outbreak of the First World War. By 1914 it was estimated that nearly half the total population of these regions was Russian. According to the study conducted by Lorimer, the net migration to Kazakhstan between 1897 and 1914 was up to 60.4 per cent.\textsuperscript{17}

The problems of Kazakhstan with which the old Russian government had to contend with therefore remained largely unresolved in 1914. Such problems as land, economic development and communications, cultural and the related aspects of religion and education as well as the political aspirations of controlling the newly devolved administrative machinery of the region loomed large.

The system of land tenure, for example, presented many problems. The first concerned the lands that were originally granted in consideration of garrison duty to the Cossack regiments which had been settled in Kazakhstan and elsewhere in Russian Central Asia. Though they comprised only about 8 per cent of the total area, nevertheless, they were the choice lands in dry steppe country situated along the banks of rivers - Irtysh and the Ural.

Secondly, Russian peasant settlement, which began from the second half of the nineteenth century in Kazakhstan, had grown to considerable proportions with the building of the two arterial railways (1886-9 and 1905) and following the period of the Stolypin land reforms (1905-9). The third problem concerned the break up of the indigenous population itself with the emergence...
of a new phenomenon - landless and cattleless peasants working as agricultural labourers and living in a dependent position in the homesteads of their masters.

By this time, influenced by the economic and cultural cooperation with the Russian people, the age-old restricted economy of Kazakh nomads began to disintegrate and some of them began to transfer to a settled way of life and agriculture. It has been estimated that by 1911, 17 per cent of land in the Steppes of Kazakhstan was cultivated by Russian migrants or their descendants while at the same time 30 per cent of the land was cultivated by indigenous population who reaped or cultivated mainly cotton.  

It must be noted however that the development of a sedentary life and settled farming among the hitherto nomadic Kazakhs was painful, slow and patchy. Thus by 1916 Professor Zhdanko claims, 40 per cent of the total Kazakh population was leading a nomadic or semi-nomadic way of life in Akmolinsk province, 78 per cent in Semipalatinsk province, 63 per cent Turgai province, 65 per cent in Uralsk province, 72 per cent in Semirechensk province and 61 per cent in Syr-Darya province.  

The most significant effects of Czarist "sedentarisation" policy was that increasingly there emerged a class of poor Kazakh peasants. Writes Professor Zhdanko on the point:

Many of the poor peasants of Kazakhstan... were reduced to such poverty that they had to leave their villages to find work, while those left behind tried to turn to a settled life based on agriculture.
Still the Czarist government in order to promote its own settlement plans, usurped the best land on the Steppes from the local population on the pretext that it "was surplus to their requirements". In addition the Kazakhs were made to pay very exhorbitant taxes, let alone the requisitioning of their horses.21

The rapidly deteriorating conditions of the Kazakh population alarmed Kazakh leaders, who by now became convinced that only the complete cessation of Russian "colonization" could save the nomads. Conferences were held and resolutions demanding the immediate cessation of settlement in nomadic lands were sent to the Russians. As expected the Russians refused to discuss the problem since "resettlement meant a substantial source of grain for Russia as well as an easement of the situation of the overcrowded Russian village".22

In circumstances such as these, tension between the nomads and the Russian settlers mounted. To make matters worse, the Russian government to fulfill the badly needed labour contingents during World War I decided to mobilize the Moslem population in Kazakhstan and Central Asia. News of the impending mobilization alarmed the Kazakhs and it apparently proved to be the catalyst that ignited the latent flames of rebellion. Thus while conceding that "mobilization was unavoidable" the Kazakh leaders argued that the "liability for military service should be accompanied by equality of all political and economic rights".23 Undaunted by the demands of the Kazakh leaders on June 25, 1916 the mobilization decree was signed by General Kuropatkin to the general dismay of the Moslem population. Discontent spread and it eventually led to a rebellion that engulfed not
only Kazakhstan but the entire Russian Central Asia in the second half of 1916. These uprisings were followed by "bloody suppressions and judiciary repressions" during which an estimated 300,000 or more Kazakhs fled to Kashgaria and Kulja in Chinese Central Asia - Sinkiang.²⁴ Significantly however, as a result of the "exceptionally restrained behaviour and understanding"* shown by the leaders of Kazakhstan during the period, an uneasy peace reigned in the region until it was broken by the guns of the 1917 revolution.

Once power was seized in Petrograd in 1917, it remained to be consolidated in the country, and this required years of unremitting effort. The Bolsheviks confronted formidable obstacles not only in Kazakhstan but in the rest of Central Asia. Thus after extricating themselves from the German War through the treaty of Brest-Litvosk (March 1918) the Bolsheviks were now faced with, among other problems, a rebellious anti-Bolshevik nationalist movement spearheaded by Kazakhstan's nationalist party - the Alash Orda - which was formed in December 1917. Thus despite the most strenuous efforts of the Bolshevik leadership at centralization of control

* During the uprisings, the Kazakh leaders urged "restrain yourselves, submit to Law". The same leaders again urged reconciliation after the uprising. They maintained that, "Kazakhs have been ruined in this senseless disorder. The cause of this terrible disaster lies in the Kazakhs' backwardness and their lack of culture". Perhaps the correctness of their diagnosis can be demonstrated by the continued support the leaders received from the Kazakh population throughout the revolution and the Civil War that followed. Thus in 1917 Baitursunov (by far the foremost Kazakh leader) received a convincing majority in the elections to the Constituent Assembly. See S. A. Zenkovsky, Pan-Turkism and Islam, in Russia, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), p. 137.
and direction in the course of events, the first years of Soviet power were uniquely a period when the spontaneous and anarchic forces of the revolution had their way. What was true of Moscow was equally true of the borderlands. Localism flourished and the effectiveness of Communist controls decreased in direct relation to the distance from the great urban centers.

After 1917, three elements struggled for supremacy in Kazakhstan - the White Russians, Red Russians and the Kazakh nationalists. The Kazakh nationalists' task was made more difficult since they had the Herculean task of explaining to the average Kazakh the events of the Civil War that followed the Revolution. Consequently, during the Civil War, "Kazakh territory was more an area of conflict between the Red and White Russians than of any national action by the Kazakhs themselves, who still lived according to the Weltanschauung of past centuries.... Despite conventions, resolutions, and programmes, the majority of Kazakhs remained apart from the events of 1917-20". 25

Clearly then, the October Revolution did not have any immediate repercussions on the life of the Kazakh people, who were cut off from the rest of Central Russia by the territory occupied by the counter-revolutionary Cossacks of the Urals and Orenburg. This, for a time, made it impossible for the Bolsheviks to infiltrate Kazakh territory. Taking advantage of the temporary lull, the nationalist party - Alash Orda - convened at Orenburg from the 5th to 13th of December 1917 under the protection of Dutov.*

*General Dutov (a Cossack) was the leader of the anti-Communist group in Orenburg after the October 1917 Revolution. He readily cooperated with Kazakh nationalists to thwart the efforts of the Russians from gaining control in Kazakhstan.
the third Pan-Kirgiz (Kazakh) Congress, in the course of which, on the 10th of December, the autonomy of Kazakhstan was proclaimed. It could be inferred from their action that the leaders of Alash Orda were anti-Communists, and their main if not their only concern was to prevent the penetration of the Steppe by the Bolsheviks. But to their dismay the Bolsheviks moved into Kazakhstan and from 1918 until early 1920 the Kazakh Steppe was plunged into the Civil War that had by now engulfed the whole country. In the words of Caroe, the Alash Orda by this time was "never much more than a committee which held Congresses and issued manifestos". Its government was less than nominal. Worse still, alarmed by the chaos that now reigned in Kazakhstan, the anti-Bolshevik government in Omsk announced on November 4, 1918 that it would no longer support Kazakh autonomy. And with the increased hostility of Admiral Kolchak (Commander of the White forces in the region) towards the Kazakhs, a pro-Soviet temper developed so rapidly that the Western Alash Orda government "was obliged to suppress a pro-Soviet uprising" on December 7, 1918. The pro-Soviet tide could not be checked. The dykes had broken and by mid 1919 several Alash Orda leaders including Baitursunov* had defected to the Reds. By November 10 after the final defeat of Admiral Kolchak's forces the Alash Orda government finally collapsed. Indeed as early as

*Baitursunov (1872-1928) was one of the foremost Kazakh nationalist leaders of his time. His position as the editor of the Kazakh newspaper - Kazakh - brought him to the limelight of the nationalist cause in Kazakhstan.
March 22, 1919, Jangeldin, the head of the Turgai Soviet administration had jubilantly sent a telegraph to Moscow:

Unification is now completed of all the labouring Kirghiz (Kazakh) people under the Red banner of the worker-peasant government.28

Now I turn to Sinkiang.29 In the modern Chinese State the current use of the expression - Sinkiang ("New Dominion" or "New Province", "New Frontier" or "New Borderland") perpetuates something of the traditional values. It is an area where China's ancient claims take on a contemporary form; an area where her prestige is at stake before an alien or hostile world. Though China's interest in Sinkiang is ancient, its hold and control over the region had been tenuous and intermittent for over two thousand years.30

The modern period started with the Ch'ien Lung conquest, which was completed in 1760 and the name Sinkiang (some writers have suggested) may indeed have been used from 1768 onwards.31 The area was incorporated into the Manchu Empire as a military governorship with its capital at Kuldja in Ili. The foundations for the integration of Sinkiang with the rest of China, I would argue, were therefore laid down during the Ch'ing Dynasty and in particular early in the nineteenth century.

The relationship between the Chinese and the Central Asian peoples throughout the modern era has been marked by a strong antipathy. This is still an important factor in the development of modern cultural, political and economic institutions in the region. We shall return to this later.

The evolution of the Sinkiang that we know today has much to do with three leading figures, Tso Tsung-t'ang, Sheng Shih-ts'ai and Wang En-mao, who was until recently the dominant figure in Sinkiang. Tso Tsung-t'ang a non-
military man by profession who turned out to be a great military strategist undertook the pacification of Sinkiang and the reassertion of Chinese authority during the Ch'ing Dynasty. The Moslem rebellion had spread from neighbouring Kansu into the northern parts of Sinkiang, in the mid 1850's and a Tungan regime had been set up in Ili. In the South, Chinese rule had virtually ceased to exist, and Yakub Beg, a Kokandian, ruled from Kashgar as autocrat of the whole area south of the Tien Shan. Tso, a Hunanese, frustrated by his failure to pass the Civil Service examination after several attempts, became increasingly competent as a military commander and strategist in action against the T'ai-p'ings, the Nien Fei and the Muslim rebellions of Shensi and Kansu. He set out in a north-westerly direction, and determined to reassert Chinese authority in Sinkiang and to oust the Russians from Ili an area they had occupied in 1871. Increasingly, his task was made more difficult in the face of Manchu Court vacillation as well as the opposition of the powerful group led by Li Hung-chang, the powerful Viceroy of Chihli, which advocated the abandonment of the Central Asian campaign in preference for a build up of China's maritime capabilities. For Li, Sinkiang was not a vital frontier of the Empire. Besides he argued it could easily revert to indigenous control so long as nominal obedience (through the tributary system) to China was maintained, at least until such time as China was once again strong enough to take it back.

Undaunted by the growing force of his opposition, Tso forcefully defended the view that maintaining control of the entire continental
frontier was essential for the defense of China as a whole. The Russian occupation of the Ili area was of course a vivid reminder to Tso of the dangers of non-assertion of China's "rightful" claims to the area. Tso summed up his defense by maintaining in a rather metaphorical tone:

"That the geographical situation in the northwest is like an apron from the shoulder to the fingertips. When the whole arm is safe, everything works out well. If Sinkiang is not secure, Mongolia will be in trouble; then not only will Shensi, Kansu and Shansi often be disturbed, but also the people in the national capital will not get one good night's sleep. Furthermore, the present situation is worsening, for the Russians are expanding daily.... Only in the central section do the Mongolian tribes act more or less as a buffer zone.... We have to make preparations to face the fact."

By April, 1875, Tso had won the blessing of the Court. He continued his campaign and by the end of 1878 it was successfully concluded. In 1881 the Russian-occupied territory was returned to China and Sinkiang emerged into the modern world in 1884 not as a "military colony" but as a province of China within a frontier with Russia that has remained more or less unchanged to the present day. Had Li Hung-chang had his way, the recovery of Sinkiang would have been delayed indefinitely and the creation of Sinkiang as a province of China may have never come to fruition. Tso did not live to see his dream come true, for he died half a year earlier. Consequently, with the establishment of the Sinkiang province on 16 November 1884, General Liu Chin-t'ang was appointed its first governor.

I do not consider it essential to go into the historical details
of the period. It is important, however, to make some mention of Manchu policy towards Northwestern China before discussing the period after 1911. Manchu policy toward Northwestern China and the Moslems, it would appear, was first to hold the 'national' frontier line west of Sinkiang and secondly, to keep a delicate balance of power between the various peoples so that the Manchus could rule them all. In short, it was a policy of divide and rule not unlike the policies of other colonial powers. To maintain the delicate balance therefore the Manchus instituted governmental establishments in Sinkiang after the area was subdued. Instead of transforming the land into a regular province, the Manchu government prior to 1884 set up the military governor of Ili, the military Lieutenant-Governor of Urumchi and numerous assistant military governors, commandants of forces, and agents. The common denominator was the fact that these were all occupied by "bannermen". Suffice it to say however that with the establishment of Sinkiang as a province all these positions were abolished\textsuperscript{35} and replaced by a new system of local government (see Section IV).

The Republican Era 1911-48:

The fall of the Ch'ing Dynasty in 1911 brought Yang Tseng-hsin\textsuperscript{36} to power in Sinkiang. Yang gradually closed the Sino-Soviet frontier following the October revolution of 1917, thus checking temporarily the Russian influence which had been gaining ground in Sinkiang for several decades as we shall see later.
But the position (i.e. the temporary check to Russian influence in the area) was soon to be reversed following the completion in 1930 of the Turkestan-Siberian railroad, running through Alma-Ata and the Semirech'ye region of Soviet Kazakhstan. The result was the heightened economic interdependence of the three districts, in Northern Sinkiang, (Ili, Tarbagatai, and Altai) and the Soviet Union. Soon in 1931, the Sinkiang administration accorded the Russians sweeping economic concessions in exchange for Soviet arms with which to counter the Moslem army advancing from Kansu. It is interesting to note that these concessions followed agreements that were made between the Soviet Union and a province of China, regardless of the wishes and interests of the Chinese central government.

Then in 1933-34, the Russians were able to intervene rather decisively in Sinkiang's affairs by giving direct military support to General Sheng Shih-t'sai in his attempt to seize power in the province and in his victory over the Moslem forces of Ma Ch'ung-ying. General Sheng himself was a native of Liaoning in Manchuria, a student of Waseda University in Japan and at the Japanese Imperial War College. In later years he asserted that he had become a Marxist at the age of 24 and gave this as his reason for not joining the Kuomintang. He did however, join the CPSU. Nevertheless, it seems possible that Sheng never was a Communist at heart, but that as a military governor of Sinkiang he became more and more the victim of circumstances quite beyond his control. He came to see the eventual Soviet domination of the affairs of his province as a fait accompli.
But in 1942, when the Soviet Union was hard pressed by the Germans, Sheng, perhaps in anticipation of a spectacular Nazi victory, turned against the Soviet Union and committed himself to the KMT government camp. As a result, between 1942-4 Soviet influence was gradually weakened under pressure from Sheng Shih-ts'ai. By the spring of 1943, the Soviet advisers and trade agencies had pulled out of Sinkiang; and the Soviet regiments stationed at Ili and Hami had withdrawn.

Ironically, with the pullout of the Soviets, the Chinese Central Government now felt strong enough to dispense with the help of Sheng, and in August 1944 he was recalled to Chungking and gradually faded away from the political limelight. Sheng's administrative era in Sinkiang was not without any political changes. Sheng was an innovator whose ideas survived the troubles that continually bedevilled his rule. His policy of racial equality for all the Sinkiang peoples - Chinese and minorities alike - was a rather revolutionary policy at the time. The use of the time-honoured term Uighur was revived and the most numerous race in the province invested with a sense of identity and dignity that it had hitherto lacked. Sheng regenerated the spirit of nationalism, and under the rule of Sheng Shih-ts'ai, Moslem nationalism began to take newer forms and found more concrete expressions in the 1930's. After Sheng, Sinkiang could no longer recoil back to the "moribund" state of political, cultural and economic backwardness in which he found it. Most importantly, it had become manifest that a progressive Sinkiang could be contained within the Chinese state only by a strong central authority - an authority able to confront all of the problems
attendant upon ruling a multi-racial region far from the hub of the centre and confident enough to enter freely into an understanding with the Soviet neighbour for the proper development of the area.

Now, Sheng's switch of allegiance from Moscow to Chungking in 1942, left the Soviets with no pliant provincial government in Sinkiang. No doubt, the absence of a bonafide Uighur national movement in Sinkiang deprived Soviet policy of a reliable basis and made it depend almost exclusively on the assistance of the pro-Soviet Chinese Governor Sheng Shih-ts'ai. This was partly of the Soviet Union's own making. For as in numerous other territories, so too in Sinkiang, Soviet anti-religious policy conflicted with the Soviet policy on nationalities. Suffice it to say however that the closing of Mosques and the persecution of Mullahs which was carried out during the period of the de facto Soviet protectorate antagonised the Sinkiang Moslems whose good will Russia might otherwise have won.

With yet another setback (the defection of an hitherto erstwhile supporter), the Soviet Union by late 1942 turned to the only remaining potential instrument for their tactical designs of maintaining a dominant position in the province. This was to be found in the apparent disenchantment of the minorities which had been fanned by Chiang Kai-shek's plans for the development of Northwestern China. In 1942 Chiang had "pledged large sums of money to finance the transfer of some 10,000 Han families together with their families, to bolster Sinkiang's administrative, educational, and technical affairs". This it was hoped would have strengthened the Chinese central government influence and control, albeit at the expense of the
representatives of various minority groups who were being employed in Sheng's regime.

After the authority of the Chinese central government had been re-established in the province 1943-44, it was not the Uighurs but the 319,000 Kazakhs of Sinkiang who played the Russian game. In 1943 Moscow turned to the "tribes" of Kazakhs, ... and other groups, furnishing them with a few leaders, commanders and weapons, while remaining officially aloof, to protect its non-intervention in Sinkiang affairs.\(^{41}\)

But with the turn in the tide of the war on the Western front running in their favour, the Soviets in 1944 stiffened their attitude towards China. The result was that by the summer of 1944, the Kazakh areas adjacent to the Soviet Union were in open revolt. This was followed in November of the same year by an uprising in the Ili Valley. The local Chinese officials and the government troops were driven eastwards, and by the end of the year the rebels had set up an independent "Republic of Eastern Turkestan" embracing Ili, Altai and Chuguchak, the three most northern of the Sinkiang's ten districts.

The establishment of the East Turkestan Republic was in part a local response to the assertion of KMT rule in Sinkiang and in part a manifestation of Russian great power politics in Central Asia.\(^{42}\) Both Uighur and Kazakh nationalists, who sought to prevent a return to traditional rule, came together in the Republic. Under their nominal leader, Akhmedjan Kasimi, the nationalists sought to establish a special autonomous status for the three districts which would have not only made
it possible for the Republic to maintain the distinctively Turkic culture of its people but also the pronounced Soviet orientation of its economy. But with Saifudin succeeding to the formal leadership of the young Republic following Kasimi's sudden death in a plane crash, the flames of nationalism in the leadership soon faded. For, being a member of the CPSU Saifudin bowed down to Stalin's pressures and became the tool of the latter in the three districts.

Indeed the quasi-independent status which the Kazakhs, Uighurs and other non-Han peoples of the three districts enjoyed under Russian protection was a tool for Moscow in its negotiations with the Chinese government - first with the KMT and later with the CCP. The Soviet Union doubt wished to perpetuate its special position in Sinkiang and its influence in the three districts, which possess rich natural resources, including uranium.

By mid-1949, sensing or rather in anticipation of an imminent victory of the Chinese Communists, the Soviet policy in the three districts shifted. One of the casualties of the shift was a split in the Republic's leadership which led to an agreement with the CCP for the unopposed entry into the three districts of PLA units late in 1949. Arrangements for the entry of the PLA apparently were made between Peking and Iining (perhaps with Russian participation) and not in Urumchi the provincial capital. On September 1949, Burhan, who headed the Sinkiang government, sent a cable to Mao in which he declared the provinces' surrender adding: "We will request the provincial government members now in Ili to return to Urumchi for cooperation".
way had now been opened for the 'peaceful' transfer of power to the Communists.

In comparing the rise to power of the Soviet Union in Soviet Kazakhstan and of Communist China in Sinkiang, one is struck by the apparent difference in the strategic positions of the two regions. That is, whereas there was no outside power that was actively involved in the affairs of Kazakhstan other than the Soviet Union herself, in sharp contrast to this, the Soviet Union conspicuously meddled in Sinkiang's affairs both before and after 1949. This state of affairs may have been induced, as has been suggested earlier, by the fact that Sinkiang's natural economic, cultural and transportation links were with the Soviet Union. This also explains the existence of considerable Soviet political and economic interests in the area to the virtual exclusion of any appreciable Chinese influence.

Similarly, while both regions were plagued by rebellious minorities at various time, the remoteness of Sinkiang from the hub of Chinese civilization was greatly responsible for the relative success of leaders such as Yakub Beg, Yang Tseng-hsin, Chin Shu-jen, Sheng Shih-ts'ai and the leaders of the East Turkestan Republic in thwarting the powers of the central government. I would hasten to add, however, that the continued political chaos of the twentieth century arising not only from the debilitating effects of Japanese imperialist aggression but also from the decadence of the Republican era (1911-49) also contributed to the failure of the Chinese central government to sustain a firm control over Sinkiang.
SECTION II

An Analysis of the Political Policies Adopted by Both Regimes During the Political Consolidation Phase

In terms of political developments, the political consolidation phase as mentioned earlier was essentially characterized by the absorption and elimination of local left-wing regimes and counter-revolutionaries as well as the firm establishment of the basic Communist political forms of control including among others, the highly centralized Communist Party organization. After the October Revolution we recall, the Soviet regime was faced with a considerably powerful Kazakh nationalist movement, the Alash Orda, which by December 1917 had gained official recognition and was allowed to establish itself as a party. And in the same month at the Congress of the Kazakhs at Orenburg, the party proclaimed its own autonomous government for the former general government of the Steppe and attempted to assert itself between the Bolsheviks and the White forces - the other two contending forces for supremacy in the area until 1919. In October 28, 1918 however, the activities of the Alash Orda party were prohibited by the Soviet government and by July 10, 1919 (following the final defeat of Admiral Kolchak's forces) the Soviets moved to set up a Revolutionary Committee (Kirrevkom)
to administer Kazakhstan. Significantly, however, the Kirrevkom was not in the hands of local nationalists but of officials selected by Moscow from among trusted Communists, largely non-Moslems, and for the good reason that it could not serve as an instrument of native opposition. Thus in the Kazakh-Kirghiz Steppe all the organs of political power were, from the beginning of the Soviet occupation in 1919, firmly in the hands of Moscow. Nevertheless, following the institution of the Revolutionary Committee, a tenuous period of cooperation between some leaders of Alash Orda and the Soviet authorities developed. And on this tenuous note several of the leaders including Baitursunov later defected to the Reds. But according to Hayit, "after consolidation of power the supporters of the movement were terrorized and from 1930 to 1939 almost all the supporters of the Alash Orda movement were arrested".

Naturally, the aim of Soviet policy in Kazakhstan as elsewhere in Central Asia was to destroy "any organized Kazakh national movement, by wiping out all anti-Russian tendencies among the Kazakh Communists (mainly of non-Russian origin) and non-party people". It must be pointed out however, that both the Soviet Union's drive to silence Kazakh nationalism and the later defection of leaders of Alash Orda to the Soviets in 1919 did not signify the conclusive triumph of the Communist cause among the Kazakhs. Thus early attempts to introduce Communism among the Kazakhs met with little success just as there were very few supporters of Soviet power in Kazakhstan.

At this point, it is reasonable to surmise that by far the most potent factor that motivated the leaders of Alash Orda to "voluntarily"
defect to the Soviets, was the Communist promise of self-determination and autonomy as enunciated in their nationalities policy. This coming in the wake of the withdrawal of support for Kazakh autonomy by Admiral Kolchak, proved to be an irresistible bait to the Kazakh leaders. In other words, the kernel of the answer to the question how did the Bolshevik Party establish itself with relative ease in Kazakhstan in the face of Kazakh nationalism and autonomy (not to mention the Pan-Islam and Pan-Turkic movements it had in common with in the rest of Central Asia), lies in the party's proclaimed policy on nationalists.

The official Bolshevik policy for Kazakhstan and Central Asia was in line with the very liberal Bolshevik approach to the problem of Russia's nationalities. Bolshevik policy was enunciated and widely publicised as far back as in 1913 at the summer meeting of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik faction of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party. A key resolution of that meeting stated that:

the right of all Nationalities forming part of Russia freely to secede and form independent states must be recognized. To deny them this right or to fail to take measures guaranteeing them its practical realization is equivalent to supporting a policy of seizure and annexation.50

Thus one week after the seizure of power, the Council of People's Commissars in Petrograd confirmed and signed the Decree of Nationalities - of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia - the first legislative act of the Soviet government in the sphere of nationality policy. It guaranteed among other things: (1) the equality and sovereignty of the peoples of Russia;
(2) the right of the peoples of Russia to self-determination, including secession and the formation of an independent state; (3) the suppression of all privileges (including national religions) and limitations and (4) the free development of national minorities and ethnic groups living on the territory of Russia. Indeed as early as in 1914 Lenin had asked, "why should not we Russians, who oppress more nations than any other people, recognize the right of Poland, the Ukraine, Finland to secede?.... You have to be a madman to continue the policy of Tsar Nicholas". Thus an important consequence of the Bolshevik's nationality policy was to paint the Czars as the oppressors and hence the enemies of freedom for the peoples of the minorities. The Bolsheviks were the liberators.

But theory did not accord with practice. Thus when in November the Ukranian Reds proclaimed the Ukranian Democratic Republic, less than 20 days after the proclamation and less than 50 days after the Decree on nationalities, the Red Army marched against the major cities of the Ukraine and by 1920 the Ukraine Republic was just one more artifact in the annals of history.

Clearly then, Lenin and the Party did not regard self-determination to the point of secession as a desirable goal. On the contrary, he viewed it as detrimental to socialism, for it would produce a multitude of states hindering the creation of a socialist society. He rather believed that the striving for national independence could best be checked by announcing that no obstacles stood in its way. If, out of concern for the future of socialism, one denied the right to self-determination, one would stir resentment among the nationalities and increase the desire for independence.
But by leaving the door to secession wide open one would blunt the desire for it, since the nationalities, recognizing the benefits to be derived from a large socialistic community would choose to remain within the union rather than to withdraw into the "constricting framework" of small statehood. In Lenin's view therefore the right to self-determination was to be promulgated in order to nip the desire for it in the bud. "The recognition by the proletariat of the right of nations to secede can alone bring about complete solidarity among the workers of the various nations and help to bring the nations closer together on truly democratic lines".  

Lenin's dilemma was equally that of Stalin who by now had become the authority on Soviet nationalities policy. But Stalin had already reconciled the contradiction between the Communist general emancipatory programme and the practice of forced unity following the declaration of the right of self-determination with the strong proviso (though far less widely publicized) that: 

It would be impermissible to confuse the question of the right of nations freely to secede with the question of whether a nation must necessarily secede at any given moment. This latter question must be settled quite separately by the Party of the Proletariat in each particular case, according to the circumstances. Thus we are at liberty to agitate for or against secession in accordance with the interests of the proletariat, of the proletarian revolution.

The "interests of the proletariat" not the mere right to secede thus became the decisive factor for national "self-determination". Looking back on the Soviet's approach to the question of "self-determination" one is struck by the fact that "the national policy of the
Soviet regime is saturated with one general idea - namely, the subordination
of the national question to the interests of the Proletarian Revolution".\(^{56}\)
It becomes apparent that Soviet national autonomy was defined within narrow
bounds and probably was designed primarily to placate minority feelings and
to act as a showpiece for impressing other Asian countries.

Now, given the fact that only a Moscow-dominated party would be
considered as the true spokesman for the proletariat it remained as the first
step to establish the credentials of the Bolshevik Party in Kazakhstan as
socialist friends and not as nationalist oppressors. To be sure, the
October Revolution found Kazakhstan and Russian Central Asia lacking even
a nucleus of native civil servants. The native intelligentsia which did exist
was microscopic, and educationally and politically it was a part of the
"feudal" and "exploiting" classes.\(^{57}\)

Nevertheless, despite the small nucleus of native intelligentsia
and the small percentage of Kazakh Communists (1.05 per cent of the total),
the establishment of a bona fide Communist Party in Kazakhstan was facilitated
by the relatively sizeable numbers (12,041 in all) of Communists of Russian
origin in Kazakhstan.\(^{58}\) More importantly, through these latter elements
the Communist Party of Kazakhstan came largely under the direct control of
the central party organs of the CPSU and later became dominated by well-
trained and tried loyal cadres.\(^{59}\) Writes Professor Kassof "The presence of
substantial numbers of Russians in Kazakhstan guaranteed at least a minimum
political and ethnic ballast to counter separatist sentiment. Their
diffusion served to accelerate the process of Russianization..."\(^{60}\) Apropos
of this is the significant fact that the Kazakhstan administration did not suffer any great purge in the early 1920's as was the case in the rest of Central Asia. This was primarily due to the fact that during the period of political consolidation, the administration of Kazakhstan was almost wholly in the hands of Russians as the figures above would testify. Observes Guest: "It is curious that the regional Soviets or other directing party organs in Kazakhstan as elsewhere in Central Asia are practically always headed by Russian Communists or Communists imported from the neighbouring region and of a different race". The importance of this cannot be overemphasized since the dominating factor which makes for the unity of the component parts of the Soviet Union is the strong party discipline and the absolute loyalty to the party interests within the Communist Party itself, and its absolute domination over the mass of population. This virtual monopolization of leadership in Kazakhstan by Slavs can be attributed to three factors: first the relative "backwardness" of the Republic's nomadic population; second, the Republic's proximity to Russia proper, and third the fact that the urban centres that did exist were largely inhabited by Slavs.

While on the question of Soviet control and monopolization of Kazakhstan's party and administrative machinery, it must be pointed out that the combination of centralized control with national political expression for the nationalities came, as did all other political power relationships in the Soviet Union under the designation of "democratic centralism" as enshrined in the Party statutes. And the most important principle of "democratic centralism" states that "the decisions of higher bodies when
once they have been taken after prior consultations are unconditionally binding upon lower ones. A typical Party commentary upon these principles asserts that the very construction of the Party makes it possible to guide all Party work from one centre, and to realize, in practice leadership over members of the Party, as well as the planned distribution of Party forces. It further states that the Communist parties belong to the All-Union Communist Party not as independent parties.

We have now seen that the implementation of the nationality principle took the form of recognition of "freedom of national development" in the form of political expression, economic equalization (this aspect will be discussed more fully in the next section) and cultural autonomy of the various Republics of the Union. But the freedom of national development was not without any strings. That is, it was not meant to be a one-way process. Accordingly, the three attributes - political expression, economic equalization and cultural autonomy - were bound by their opposite numbers, based on the conception of the interests of the Proletarian Revolution and of the Union as a whole in the form of political centralization, economic coordination and centralized planning and cultural "concordance". Having discussed political centralization let us now briefly look at the other form - cultural concordance. In terms of cultural concordance, coherence with central goals and with one another was to be secured for the various cultures of the nationalities through uniformity of content expressed succinctly in the formula:
Proletarian in content and national in form - such is the universal human culture toward which Socialism is marching. Proletarian culture does not cancel national culture but lends it content. National culture, on the other hand, does not cancel Proletarian culture, but lends it form.

It was also pointed out that national culture, no less than national statehood was placed "at the service of socialist construction". Thus a series of concrete measures were implemented in Kazakhstan to bring about the propagation of a 'Proletarian content' in the Kazakh culture in the period of political consolidation. These included in the educational sphere, the creation of special schools of political literacy (for it need hardly be shown that ignorance and unenlightenment were the most dangerous enemies of the Soviet government); extension of the activities of the University of Peoples of the East and its branches in the localities and above all the introduction of the Russian language to Kazakh schools. Closely allied with these educational measures was the language policy. Here, the Arabic script - the literary form among the Kazakhs - was replaced by a Soviet devised Roman orthography by 1924 following what Treadgold has described as the "alphabet revolution". By the end of the political consolidation phase in 1928 the Latin alphabet was widely in use but it too had to be replaced in the late 1930's with Cyrillic alphabet.

It is clear that the Soviet government regarded linguistic regimentation as one of the vital instruments in the moulding of the new society during the political consolidation phase. Its
basic aim, all told, was to prevent the formation of a single Turkic
literary language which might have aided in the creation of a united Turkic
and Moslem national movement, and of the Russian language being used by
all sectors of the population.

Finally, in broad terms the attitude of the Soviet government towards
Islam as a religion was the same as their attitude towards other religions.
They strongly discouraged and ridiculed it though they did not actively
seek to suppress it. But the Soviet government found it difficult to
conceal its hostility to Islam since it regarded it as more "dangerous
and objectionable" than Christianity.

The main antipathy of the Soviet authorities to Islam writes Wheeler
is on materialistic grounds. "They see it less as an ideological
opponent of the Communist Creed than as an obstacle to the establishment
of Russian cultural, economic and political influence". Thus in
general the Russians' goal was to destroy Islam. Not only was this process
facilitated by the "alphabet revolution" and reforms but also by the
relative weakness of the Moslem religion in Kazakhstan. The initial
relatively mild Soviet antagonism to Islam in Kazakhstan gave way to
sterner actions later. After 1928 Islam along with any remnants of Pan-
Islamism, Pan-Turkism came under increased Communist attack. Clan leaders
were eliminated, nomads were forcibly settled, (more on this later) and
an effort was made to uproot Islam and all its institutions.

On the whole the measures discussed above were taken to ensure the
consolidation of power by the Soviet authorities. This, in the view of
this writer, the Soviet authorities did achieve by 1928, thanks to the
unifying force of the Communist Party. A word of caution is appropriate here, lest one gets the impression that political consolidation was achieved through the use of force only. It must be emphasized that for tactical reasons, the Soviets were periodically prepared to pursue a policy of coexistence with their political and ideological archenemies in Kazakhstan and in particular with the anti-Bolshevik elements within Alash Orda. On the other hand, the nationalists in the Alash Orda movements who cooperated with the Soviets, did not succeed in achieving their original aims, namely obtaining national freedom by gradually transforming the Soviet apparatus. The real power was in the hands of the Russian Communists who were loyal to the Soviets. The elimination of the Alash Orda movement after 1930 which had been legitimized as a representative of the people by the Congress of the Kazakhs, undermined at the same time all expressions of national will.

Beyond this the measures were equally to ensure that the opportunities for national cultural assertion would not mitigate, but would contribute in the long run toward the achievement of the ultimate goals and objectives. It was Stalin's conviction that this would be the case as he asserted in the Sixteenth Party Congress in 1930:

It may seem strange that we, who are in favour of the fusion of national cultures in the future into one common culture (both in form and content), with a single common language, are at the same time in favour of the blossoming of national cultures at the present time, in the period of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat. But there is nothing strange in this. The national cultures must be permitted to develop and expand and to reveal all their potential qualities, in order
to create the conditions necessary for the fusion into a single, common culture with a single common language.\textsuperscript{73}

To sum up then, having successfully laid the foundations for political consolidation through all the measures discussed above, the Soviet government then moved swiftly to consolidate its power. With the military situation well under control in 1919 following the defeat of Admiral Kolchak, in January of 1920 the first Kazakh Soviet Conference decided to unite all Kazakh administrative units into one Soviet Republic and in February of the same year the Kazakh ASSR was established. In a national frontiers realignment of Kazakh and neighbouring Central Asian territories in 1924, some Kazakh populated areas were further included in the Kazakh ASSR with its capital finally moved to Alma-Ata (1929).\textsuperscript{74} With the formation of the Kazakh ASSR in 1924, the virtual integration of Kazakhstan to the Soviet Union became a fact of history. By 1928 after the local elections in Kazakhstan, "the Kazakhstan Party organization was able to report that in the main the Aoul (village - the lowest administrative unit) has become Soviet-minded...."\textsuperscript{75} The period of political consolidation was over and Kazakhstan entered with the rest of the Union to the next phase of consolidation - the economic consolidation phase in 1928, beginning with the first five year plan.

It will be misleading to leave the impression that Soviet policies in Kazakhstan during the political consolidation phase were all negative. Indeed, however spurious Soviet nationality policy had been, the symbolic satisfaction that the trapping of autonomous "statehood" bestowed upon
the Kazakhs cannot be underestimated. Beyond this the Communists during the 1920's encouraged among others, the use of the native language elevating it to the level of literary language - a situation unparalleled in the past. Moreover, the fact that the Soviet nationalities (Kazakhstan to be more specific) must subordinate their political and national activity, to higher social and political goals is far from unique, as virtually all states made up of distinct ethnic, regional or historical constituents characteristically follow such a course. This important fact should not therefore be obfuscated simply because the norms imposed upon the Soviet nationalities are Communist norms. The Soviet Union no less than Canada, India, Nigeria, etc. frowns upon all manifestations of national separation.

Sinkiang - Political Consolidation

In turning to the experience of the Chinese Communists during the political consolidation phase, one finds that, in contrast to the Bolsheviks, who we recall had limited contacts with the Moslems of Kazakhstan, having been virtually cut off from Moscow during the Civil War, the Chinese Communists had had considerable dealings with Moslems prior to the seizure of power in 1949 and in particular during the Long March (October 1934-October 1935). Moreover, since the Chinese Communists were establishing a base in North Shensi, which was separated from the Soviet Union and Outer Mongolia (which was largely a satellite of the Soviet Union at the time) by areas inhabited by Moslems, it
became incumbent upon the Chinese Communists to maintain some level of cooperation with these Moslem communities. During the course of the Long March through Tsinghai, Ninghsia, and North Kansu, the Chinese Communists were able to sway young Moslems who were propagandizing against the "KMT running-dog" Ninghsia regime of Ma Hung-k'uei by promising to end Ma Hung-k'uei's conscription, to cancel taxes and old debts and to protect Islamic culture and to guarantee religious freedom.77

Furthermore, the Chinese Communists carried out extensive instruction among their First and Fifth Corps to brief them on the position of the Chinese Communists on the delicate Moslem question.78 Indeed by the end of 1936 Moslems along with other minorities such as the Mongols, Miao etc. were enrolled in the Red Army at Yenan.79 No doubt, all this was an attempt to soothe the historical animosity between the Chinese and the Moslem minorities.

In regard to the minority nationality question, the Chinese Communist nationality policy before 1949 originally differed in no significant respect from that of the Soviet Union. It too allowed for the same "fictional" right of secession. It also advocated that the culture and way of life of the nationality group should be, "national in form, socialist in content".80

Indeed as early as the fall of 1931, the first All-China Congress of Workers' and Peasants' Deputies in Kiangsi approved the Provisional Constitution of the "Chinese Worker-Peasant Democratic Republic" (Soviet Republic) which endorsed the equality of the various nationalities
of China. A key solution of the Congress stated that:

in such regions as Mongolia, Tibet, Sinkiang... the nationalities have the right to determine by themselves whether they want to secede from the Chinese Soviet Republic and form their independent states, or join the Union..., or to form autonomous regions within the Chinese Soviet Republic.81

Similar sentiments were echoed on November 6, 1938 at the Sixth Central Committee meeting of the CCP in which Mao proclaimed that "the Mongols, the Hui, the Tibetan etc. peoples will enjoy powers equal to those of the Chinese in order to resist the Japanese together".82

But this rather utilitarian interpretation of the concept of self-determination was soon to come under close scrutiny by Mao. Thus, although a Chinese Communist wartime civil constitution* maintained the stand that a minority nationality had the right to secede, Mao Tse-tung, at the Seventh Congress of the Communist Party of China on July 11, 1945, in his report "On Coalition Government", claimed that the Chinese Communists were at one with Sun Yat-sen's desire to grant equality and the right of self-determination (but most importantly not to the extent of secession) to the minority nationalities after the Han nation had been liberated.83

A major change in the minorities nationalities policy was seen

in the offing and by 1949, the Common Programme of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (hereafter referred to as CPPCC) designated China at least theoretically as a "multinational state" composed of different but equal nationalities. Conspicuously however, the right to secede had been squeezed out of the CPPCC document. The new policy on minorities nationalities was reaffirmed in the new Chinese Constitution (based largely on the Common Programme of the CPPCC) which stated in Article 3 that:

the People's Republic of China is a unified, multinational state...(All) national autonomous areas are inalienable parts of the People's Republic of China.

From this point on, any expectations that the Chinese Communists would follow the Soviet example to the extent of restructuring the Chinese state in the form of a federal union evaporated. The People's Republic of China is a "unitary state" within which provision is made for local autonomy for "national minorities", but not as constituents of a federation.

Having thus refused the minority nationalities the right to secede, the Chinese Communists on accession to power in 1949 instituted various forms of control in their bid to consolidate their power in Sinkiang. Presumably local autonomy alone was not enough to placate the minority nationalities of the province.

When the provincial government of Sinkiang formally surrendered to the Communists in September of 1949, as discussed above, a coalition government was set up which included the East Turkestan leaders who during the Second World War had headed a government of the North border regions under the clandestine encouragement and support of the Soviet Union.
But after the death in a plane crash of most of its prominent leaders (who were less tractable to Chinese control) the leadership went to Saifudin who apparently turned out to be more amenable to Chinese influence. He joined the CCP in 1950 and the former "Sinkiang League for the Defense of Peace and Democracy" formed in 1948 (as a counterpart of the East Turkestan Republic) was renamed the "Sinkiang's People's Democratic League" and under the direct control of the Communists. The East Turkestan movement was discredited and purges of Uighurs (the titular majority in Sinkiang) and Kazakhs followed in 1951 to remove the unwholesome remnants of "narrow nationalism", "Pan-Islamism" and "feudalism". The backbone of Sinkiang resistance was thus summarily broken and the leaders of the East Turkestan movement who had escaped the purges were then absorbed into the new Communist organs of control.

Now immediately after "Liberation", the KMT system of rule was abolished and the Chinese Army set up "organs of military control" in which military committees collaborated with the local People's governments in all the districts of Sinkiang except for the three Northern ones where organs of people's power had already been in operation. The role of the military committees was, in the words of Liu Shao-ch'i "to crush reactionaries by force and simultaneously protect and inspire the people and help them to set up conferences of People's representatives - organs of People's power of all degrees...will gradually receive full power". The reactionaries Liu had in mind were of course remnants of the KMT groups, Osman Bator's bands and presumably secret societies. Thus out of 95 employees of the state institutions of Kashgar 53 were "after painstaking investigation
unmasked as spies of various intelligence services".88

In concert with the first constitutional document of the PRC (accepted in late September 1949) which called for the institution of local autonomy and the creation of "United Democratic Government", the CCP set up in December of 1949 a "United Democratic Government" in Sinkiang with 31 members - 9 Uighurs, 3 Kazakhs, 2 Han Chinese, 2 Tungans and one representative of each other nationality. The old KMT Paochia system, was replaced by a new Communist form of local administration. This took the form of establishing local people's governments in districts, counties, areas, rural areas, and villages. Of the 78 County (hsien) chairmen 45 were Uighurs, 13 Kazakhs, 11 Han Chinese, 4 Mongols, 3 Kirghiz and 1 Tartar. Of the 10 chairmen of district governments, 4 were Uighurs, 3 Kazakhs, 2 Han and 1 Mongol.89

In the second half of 1950, the government further initiated a reorganization of the already existing organs of people's power in the three northern districts of Tarbagatay, Altai and Ili in which the governors were replaced by administrative control boards and the local Peoples governments were established in counties, areas and villages much along the lines in the other districts. Equally, the East Turkestan regime, whose armed forces in September 1949 had been incorporated into the PLA, was also superseded by these new institutions of control.

Meantime, in the rest of the province, a few months after the institution of the new system of military control the exercise of power passed into the hands of the "local conferences of People's representatives
of all strata of the polulace and to the local People's governments elected by them."

These conferences, were a transition stage of popular representation, existing while the economy of the country was being reconstructed. They existed at the village, rural area, county, city, and province level. Their most important functions were to debate and make proposals about the work of the People's governments and to publicize the decisions of the governments to the people. During the first period of their activity, their resolutions were no more than recommendations. From the middle of 1951, however, they began to exercise the powers later possessed by the Assemblies of People's Representatives. After this date the conferences selected the corresponding People's governments, controlled their activities and confirmed their budgets, and their resolutions had the force of commands.  

The significance of all these new administrative reforms in Sinkiang lies in the ubiquitous presence of the Communist party in all the organs of control in the provincial administrative machinery. It is important therefore to note at this point that though the governing bodies of the nationality autonomous areas, like all other local governments, may organize local public security forces, manage local finance, and enact local regulations they were subject to tighter control by the central government in accordance with the general Communist principles of "democratic centralism" (discussion of which is not necessary here as it had already been fully discussed earlier). Thus it is stipulated that the "enactment of their People's Congress must be approved by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress before they can take effect". This aspect of Central Government
control becomes even more obvious when one realizes that the consultative Councils, which represented the Conferences between sessions, met only four times a year at the provincial level and once a month at the city level. It appears that the conferences, in spite of their official powers actually could not maintain effective control of the local government units or for that matter the provincial government. In the words of Tang, what the Communists want is that "the voice of authority shall speak in the language of the local minority groups but that the words shall be the words of the man at the top".

Besides, the constitution further demands that "all higher organs of state administration concerned...assist the various minority nationalities in their political economic and cultural development". By these provisions the Central Government clearly was given a voice in every aspect of local administration of the autonomous areas in Sinkiang. Nevertheless, the development of local conferences of People's Representatives in Sinkiang was completed by the end of 1952. But with the beginning of the first five year plan in 1953 the conferences were again replaced by Assemblies of People's Representatives elected by general suffrage. This was followed by general elections held in 1953-4.

The seemingly endless administrative reforms in Sinkiang may have been due to the complexity of the multinational nature of the province and this may have been one of the major factors that delayed the granting of regional autonomy to Sinkiang till September 1955 with the abolition of
Sinkiang Province. The establishment of autonomous areas no doubt, was an essential device for the Communists not only in their bid to consolidate their power but also in their attempt to foster a sense of identification with the new regime in Peking on the part of the national minorities in Sinkiang, and their traditional leaders.

Turning now to other policies initiated by the Communists during the political consolidation phase we find that still anticipating difficulties in their relations with the minority nationalities in Sinkiang the Communists introduced other measures on coming to power to ameliorate further the rather delicate situation. Such measures included the encouragement of migration (though not massive during this period) of Han Chinese to the region to hasten the process of consolidation. In terms of education, schools were erected in towns, villages including many remote areas to propagate the sense of national consciousness. Another significant and unique creation of the Communist regime for minority education, the Institutes for Nationalities, very much politically oriented, functioned with the primary purpose of training political "activists" among minority groups. In addition they were to produce proletarian-based intellectuals and to train technical experts.

Political consolidation within Sinkiang was accompanied also by a series of purges as already mentioned. By New Year's Day 1952, Burhan Shahidi* had announced over Radio Urumchi that Sinkiang had been purged of

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*Burhan Shahidi headed the Sinkiang government just prior to the Communist victory and was the one who sent the cable of surrender to Mao on September 26, 1949.
120,000 "enemies of the people". Sinkiang also participated in the nationwide "three-anti" and "five-anti" campaigns which were directed against "counter-revolutionaries" of all types.

Clearly then, along with the granting of regional autonomy to Sinkiang, the Chinese Communists coupled the transparent concession with a penetrating repression in their attempt to consolidate their power in Sinkiang.

On the question of recruiting minority cadres and for membership in the CCP, the Chinese Communists found themselves in a predicament similar to that of the Soviet Union and the CPSU in Kazakhstan. Thus in spite of the Red pronouncement that local rule in Sinkiang had to be carried out by members of the local minority groups, the Communists were hard put to produce enough native cadres of Communists. In 1950, there were only 12,841 native cadres out of a population of 5 million in Sinkiang. Native Communist Party membership grew even more slowly numbering only 27 by 1951 and 608 by 1957.

In reference to language policy, Article 53 of the Common Programme of the CPPCC guaranteed the development of minority languages and dialects. Thus initial Communist policies aimed at the full development and use of non-Chinese languages perhaps more than anything else to ensure maximum effectiveness of official propaganda and indoctrination in the minority areas. In Sinkiang, the Communist first attempt at systematic investigation of spoken languages and dialects was carried out in 1950, though the adoption of the cyrillic alphabet in Sinkiang came at a much later date in 1956.
It is interesting to note that by 1958 the Cyrillic alphabet was to be replaced by the Latin alphabet perhaps in anticipation of the Sino-Soviet dispute.

Lastly, in the religious sphere, the Chinese Communists maintained a remarkable degree of tolerance towards Islam in Sinkiang during the political consolidation phase. Members of religious orders were, for example, given equal rights with the peasants in the possession of land. Furthermore, they encouraged the formation of the Chinese Islamic Association, albeit founded at a later date in 1953. Hsiao suggests, however, that the apparent relaxation in their treatment of Islam may have been simply due to the fact that it had semi-autonomous political control of certain geographical strategic areas in Northwest China and was therefore more important politically, as a strategic border area than religiously. Hence the Communists have in general tended to deal with Islam as a minority nationality rather than as a religion - presenting themselves occasionally as defenders of the Moslem minorities against Han-Chinese oppression.

In attempting to analyse the political policies of both the Soviet Union and Communist China during the political consolidation phase two main factors emerge. Not only were there relatively minor similarities in their policies (which had been the common finding among scholars) but that there were also major differences in their approaches to the political problems of consolidation in the two regions under study. An obvious case of similarity is the important role of the single party government as a unifying force. But by and large the dissimilarities were more striking.
Thus even though it is apparent both regimes interpreted the concept of self-determination as a weapon in the struggle for socialism, the Chinese Communists explicitly rejected the notion of the right to secede as soon as they came to power. In a way it could be argued that Chinese minorities of Sinkiang possess even less of a shadow of political autonomy than do their counterparts in Soviet Kazakhstan. In keeping with its federal character, the Soviet Union has granted the border republics the theoretical right to secede, albeit with very important strings attached. On the other hand, however, the Chinese Constitution which defines the PRC as "unified, multinational state" extends no right of secession to its minority nationalities. Indeed Professor Wittfogel has charged that in failing to extend the right of secession to national minority units, the Chinese Communists have abandoned their earlier support for the Leninist position which held that this right should be guaranteed to all "oppressed nations".105

But by far the most fundamental difference between the policies of the two regimes during this period lies in the role of the Army, that is, the extraordinary role of the PLA in Sinkiang as opposed to the secondary role of the Soviet Red Army. To be sure, the fundamental difference is largely a reflection of the respective developments of the Army-Party relationship in the Communist movements of the two regimes. In general the Bolsheviks seized power in 1917 without an army. The army that was formed was comprised of many former Czarist officers and as such was seen as an organization outside the original Bolshevik Party which had captured the country. Indeed no one in the top echelon of the Bolshevik Party was a
In sharp contrast to the Bolshevik experience, the Chinese Communists came to power as hardened military men by means of a gruelling civil war that lasted 20 years. There was no clear distinction between the PLA and the CCP. Chairman Mao is still regarded as one of the foremost military theorists of the time. In further contrast to the Bolshevik experience, prior to the entrance of PLA units into Sinkiang, there was no Chinese Communist organization in the province. Thus in the first months of Communist rule in Sinkiang, authority was vested in the Commander of the Sinkiang military district, and the leadership of the Sinkiang sub-bureau of the CCP. To this end, it is significant that the organs of control (to ensure the consolidation of power during the political consolidation phase) was weighted heavily in favour of military controls in Sinkiang while the Bolsheviks saw fit to de-emphasize the role of the Red Army in the political developments of Kazakhstan.

In closing, mention must also be made of the use of purges to consolidate power during the political consolidation phase. Here, the purges of Kazakhstan were far less extensive than that of Sinkiang. The purges in Kazakhstan took the form of the elimination of "right wing" accomplices of the Reds (1919-20); in Sinkiang they involved the unreliable elements within the East Turkestan Republic Movement 1950-51. In a second wave, which Kazakhstan did not experience, Sinkiang joined the rest of the country during the "Three-Anti" and "Five-Anti" campaigns directed against lingering "counter revolutionaries", such as Pan-Turkic elements and
Uighur nationalists. The reason for the relative mildness in the use of the purge as a weapon in the consolidation of power in Kazakhstan was due to the dominant role that the Russian settlers, upon whom the Soviet authorities relied so much, were playing there. And finally the more ferocious attacks on the Islamic institutions by the Soviet Reds in contrast to the more restrained assault by the Chinese Communists in Sinkiang during the period of political consolidation is yet another pertinent indication of the dissimilarities in the political consolidation policies of the two regimes.
SECTION III

An Analysis of the Economic Policies of Both Regimes During the Political Consolidation Phase

The essential characteristic in the economic realm during the political consolidation phase we recall, was the transfer of the ownership of the basic means of production from the former ruling classes to the hands of the peasantry as well as the universal domination by the small farmer in agricultural production. How was this accomplished in Kazakhstan?

As stated previously, on the eve of the October Revolution a large part of Kazakhstan, was dominated by a "backward" pastoral economy of a nomadic or semi-nomadic type. Faced with the enormous task of developing the economy of Kazakhstan, official Soviet policy advocated, as a first step, the immediate settling of the Kazakhs and the creation of an agricultural economy. Not only did the Soviet official policy arouse the ire of Kazakh's nationalist groups but many others initially, questioned the wisdom and indeed the economic feasibility of agriculture particularly in the arid regions of Central Kazakhstan. Thus a Russian specialist warned in 1926 that:

the destruction of nomadism in Kazakhstan would mean not only the perishing of Kazakh cattle breeding and Kazakh economy as a whole, but would mean the transformation of the dry steppes into depopulated deserts.107

An alternative proposal that frequently accompanied such warnings was that of developing a herding economy with a possible admixture of extensive
agriculture so as to fully exploit the economic potential of most of the regions of Kazakhstan.

But the demands for reorganization of the Kazakh economy were apparently underscored by the occurrence in 1921 of a devastating famine caused by crop failure and drought which affected one-half of the Kazakh population. Outmoded and antiquated methods of production were singled out to be the villain, and the advocates of abolition of all forms of nomadism had their field day in the Soviet courts with the claim that:

We (the) workers of a national minority must of course realize that the basic reason for the misery and the dying out of the nomads is the nomadic way of life itself, and that the rebirth of the Kazakh masses and their cultural growth can begin only after settling. In a settled economy and in a European culture lies the guarantee of progress and of the rebirth of the nomads.108

Meanwhile the New Economic Policy (NEP 1922-28) - a tactical retreat for the Soviet leadership from the harsh and sometimes disastrous policies during the period of "War Communism" and the Civil War (1917-21) - proclaimed in March 1921, (at the Tenth Congress of the Russian Communist Party) laid down further guidelines for the economic development of Kazakhstan and Central Asia. It must be pointed out however that during the NEP, before the first five year plan, the Kazakhs experienced little interference from the Soviet authorities compared to the rest of Central Asia.109

The first settlement attempts followed the decree of 1921 which provided for the return to the Kazakhs of all land confiscated by the Czarist government. According to Winner, in 1921 over 8,000 Russian
peasants in Kazakhstan were displaced and their land given to the Kazakhs.

The purpose of this reform was to establish "complete" equality between the Russian immigrants and the native population where usage rights were concerned.

The land reform in Kazakhstan expressed itself in the redistribution at first of the meadows and pastures. Redistribution of land available in each village was carried out by the local Soviets, in conjunction with representatives of the people and the local union of poor peasants (Koshchi). To effect this it became necessary to abolish the great cattle farms, and the Soviet government implemented this policy by requisitioning cattle from the well-to-do farms and distributing them among the paupers. In regard to the arable lands, large farms were split up into small separate farms and a proportionate increase in the number of the needy smallholders. According to Soviet sources, by 1927 more than 60 per cent of the land taken from well-to-do bays (rich cattle owners) was handed over to farm workers and poor peasants, nearly 30 per cent to the moderately prosperous peasants and about 8 per cent to the better-off farmers.

The redistribution of the land and the attendant curtailment of the economic power, rights and privileges of the wealthier "feudal" chiefs and bays not only drastically modified the social structure of the nomad villages, but also undermined the traditional authority and influence of the former clan chiefs and bays over the other members. Unquestionably this psychological turning point was crucial in paving the way for subsequent progress towards the long term objectives of socialism. This we shall see later.
At first sight this aspect of land reform may have appeared highly successful and more in line with the procedures adopted by the Soviet authorities in which:

the confiscated land was turned over to tribal or communal units for disposition by them rather than being presented outright to individual peasants. Tribal chieftans thus became the real arbiters of the reform and in some cases utilized it for their own personal aggrandisement.¹¹²

Generally speaking, therefore, in spite of such inducements as "liberal loans, allotment of best lands, free building materials, exemption from local taxes and technical aid relatively few Kazakhs were persuaded to settle voluntarily".¹¹³

Parallel to the land redistribution programme was a reform of the system of ownership of land and water supplied between 1925-29, which also affected the semi-nomadic population of Kazakhstan. Under this measure land belonging to individuals who did no work themselves was wholly or partially confiscated and shared out among the poor peasants and farm workers.

Apart from these changes, the nationalization of wells and provision of funds for the construction of watering places also did much to improve the lot of the herdsmen. Furthermore, as a result of these agrarian reforms, families from different tribes and clans, and even different nationalities settled in neighbouring holdings, some of which were lands recently reclaimed or those previously irrigated by former clan canals. Thus the whole system of clan settlement and the use of pastureland and water on a clan basis began to disintegrate and with it
the social patterns and closed way of life in the villages.

An important political reason for the suppression of nomadism (from the point of view of the Soviet authorities) was the need to destroy weakened patriarchal system, which even in its decline and therefore attenuated form was unacceptable to the Soviet authorities as one stressing clan loyalties while in fact all loyalty should be to the state. To this end the destruction of the class of bays was undertaken during the agrarian reforms. This in turn served as a prelude to the stabilization of the nomads that was to follow later during the period of collectivization which will be discussed in the next section. For the purposes of suppressing clan survivals it was essential to change the economic conditions prevailing at the time - to transfer the cattle-breeders from nomadic to settled life.

Before summarizing the discussion on land reforms during the period of political consolidation, mention must be made of the single most important political agency through which Moscow exercised its economic desires in Kazakhstan and Central Asia - the Central Asian Economic Council (CAEC) which was established in March of 1923. This body was subordinate to the Russian Communist Party, of course, since under the constitution of 1924 the general plan for the whole of the people's economy was assigned as a function of the central government. Functionally the CAEC not only acted as a superior planning agency for Kazakhstan and Central Asia's agriculture, irrigation, state trading and cooperatives, but assumed direct responsibility for unifying the regions monetary systems, foreign trade, transport, and communications.
Indeed after the 1924 territorial delimitation in Central Asia, the Central Executive Committee of the CPSU gave the CAEC supreme economic power, in concordance with Moscow's objectives and directives in Kazakhstan. Clearly then, Moscow's intention was to maintain centralized control of Kazakhstan's economy on a local as well as regional basis. Henceforth, Kazakhstan's economy was to be integrated into the orbit of the All-Union economy.

To summarize this period then, it is fair to assert that the Soviet Union did prepare the grounds for her next assault on the economic front in Kazakhstan. Thus, though the first steps taken in the direction of land reform during this period of political consolidation may be interpreted as of no great significance (as some scholars have tended to argue) in real economic terms, they were nevertheless crucial in many ways. First they aided the Soviet authorities in their attempt to gain the loyalty of the native peasants whose support and cooperation they deemed necessary. Moreover, for all practical purposes, the Soviets eliminated rural landlessness particularly among the Kazakhs who had earlier been forced out of their holdings by Russian immigrants. In turn, the binding forces of the past - the traditional foundations of the village - were completely undermined by the elimination of the clan chiefs and bays who were also among the larger landowners.

At the same time, however, by implementing the land redistribution policies and the other measures the Soviet Union had helped to create in turn many small holders of small farms incapable of self support. Consequently, these small holders unable to maintain their farms were forced to turn to
the government for aid. In short, they could only survive and progress with the cooperation and the aid of the state.

In sum then, the significance of the economic measures taken during the period of political consolidation lies in the fact that they enabled the central government to lay the foundations for their next step on the economic front having established a firm central government control over the economy of the region. They had paved the way for the reconstruction of the economy on Soviet terms of the areas where nomadism and semi-nomadism had hitherto been the way of life.

In turning to the Chinese Communist economic reforms in Sinkiang during the period of political consolidation one finds a similar approach to that of Moscow in Kazakhstan. That is, the Communists did not press hard immediately with drastic reforms. This is not surprising of course, given that the primary preoccupation at the time was to achieve political consolidation. Any precipitous economic action would simply have exacerbated further the already touchy relations in these two regions.

Nevertheless the economic situation especially (the galloping inflation) in China was grave and something had to be done. (It was even worse in Sinkiang.) Thus from 1950-52 the province had no financial budget and for all intents and purposes was dependent on central government appropriations.

Given the complexity of the multinational nature of the province, plus the fact that most of the wealth in terms of livestock, irrigation rights and land was under the virtual monopoly of the 'propertied class',
the Communists began their programme of reform in 1950 with the introduction first of a progressive tax system, an increase in the amount of land leased to the peasants and of lowering rents, the prohibition of the sale and parcelling out of land and the regulation of the distribution of water. All this was apparently in response to the Communists' call by mid-1950 for land redistribution throughout the whole of China in order to establish the Communist Party's monopoly of political and economic power and to serve as a first step toward the 'gradual' nationalization of the rural economy.

The immediate effect of the tax and land reform policies instituted in 1950 was the termination of the monopolization of the irrigation systems by the landlords as well as the annulment of rent arrears and debts. During 1952 and 1953 "landowners and rich peasants were deprived of all land except that which they worked themselves, of all working animals, implements, living accommodation and grain in excess of their own needs". Indeed, the intention of the Communists to neutralize the power of the landlords was clearly spelt out in the Agrarian Reform Law of 1950 which in effect preserved the institutions of private ownership of land (grant there was no desire on the part of the Communists for permanent peasant ownership) while confiscating the landlords' holdings.

In concentrating efforts to eliminate the landlord class, the Communists also accepted the "middle peasants" as allies, despite their awareness of the latter's strong "petty-bourgeois" tendencies. In the words of Mao Tse-tung: "In land reform it is essential to unite middle
peasants who form about 20 per cent of the land population. Otherwise the land reform will end in failure. Thus the Chinese Communists not only gladly allowed the middle peasants to retain more land than the poor peasants, they also ordered that the Peasant Associations, which were the executive organizations of the land reform, should enlist the middle peasants as members. In short, the general policy adopted by the CCP during the land reform was discernibly based on four essential principles - relying on the poor peasants, uniting the middle peasants, neutralizing the rich peasants, and eliminating the landlord class.

The Communists' yearning for the elimination of the landlords no doubt sprang from the fact that, like elsewhere in China, three to four per cent of the landlords in Sinkiang had "usurped" over 50 per cent of the land and had leased 60-70 per cent of this land to the peasants. Moreover, true to the Communists' concept of class antagonisms, the Chinese Communist policy of waging a class struggle amongst the rural population required that the ruling class in rural areas (the landlords in this case) be set up as a target and destroyed by the poor and middle peasantry in order to facilitate the consolidation of the Party's control over the peasantry. It must be pointed out, however, that for reasons of political expediency the new Agrarian Reform Law of 1950 significantly modified the earlier agrarian law adopted by the CCP in September 1947. Thus, whereas the old law called for the requisition of surplus rural properties of rich peasants, the New Agrarian Reform Law stipulated that land owned by rich peasants and worked by them or their hired labourers
was not to be touched. Furthermore, those engaged in non-agrarian occupations, such as factory workers (though miniscule in Sinkiang), and who owned and rented out small parcels of land, were not to be classified as landlords and were allowed to keep and to rent out such parcels of land. The dual purpose of these changes clearly, was to encourage the early restoration of agricultural production and to isolate the landlords as a class.

This flexibility of approach was also in evidence in Sinkiang. To be sure, there was a definite variation from the norm of class antagonisms and warfare that prevailed in China proper. Thus in contrast to the virtually universal policy of confiscating landlord property, the Chinese Communists in Sinkiang meted out relatively lenient treatment to those landlords who cooperated in the reforms by allowing them to retain their commercial and industrial concerns undisturbed.

Of course those landlords who resisted and were opposed to the reforms were mercilessly punished by the "peoples" courts.

Meanwhile the Communists were making efforts to group the peasants into "labour mutual-aid teams" the structure of which was as follows:

Each individual peasant household still engaged in its own production. The collective work of the teams was effected through the common use of man-power, animals and tools.

The animals, land and tools were still under private ownership. The Communists regarded these teams as a type of "embryonic socialism". Their function essentially was to accustom the peasants to collective management and pave the way for agricultural cooperation - collectivization.
True to the now well-tried principle of experimentation before general implementation (perfected especially during the Yenan years), the Chinese Communists effected these reforms first in selected areas of the province. As a result, progress in the implementation of the reforms was uneven geographically all across the province.

To fully mobilize the human resources of the region, the Chinese Communists attempted to get individuals from all walks of life to participate in the teams. Furthermore, since the Communists did not initially carry the stigma of being associated with a group which had restricted the activities of the minority nationalities as did the KMT in Sinkiang, they proceeded immediately to advance a consistent policy of catering to the aspirations of the various nationalities within the framework of Communist plans for development. This policy apparently created the illusion that the class struggle was an internal affair of each nationality and could therefore brook no interference by Han authorities. Thus the majority of participants in the "teams" which were implementing the agrarian reform were of the same nationality as the landlord whose property they were expropriating.

Lest one should be led to think that the implementation of the land reform measures was all plain sailing, it must be pointed out that while the immediate effect of the land reform was to produce political advantages for the new regime, it created considerable social acrimony among the various "classes" of society. Indeed the Communist leaders themselves were not unaware of the consequence of their actions. They
understood for instance, that the former political influence enjoyed by the landlords and rich peasants was based on their economic strength as well as their traditional social standing and prestige. In no uncertain terms, the redistribution of their land and the confiscation of their property (especially for those who refused to cooperate with the authorities) eliminated their economic power. The humiliating treatment and physical violence associated sometimes with the public accusation meeting, the anti-despot movements and public trials, all had the cumulative effect of destroying the landlords' social standing.

Understandably, excesses were made during the process of implementing the land reform measures. Indeed it became apparent by the end of 1952 that "leftist" mistakes had been committed. But unlike their Bolshevik counterparts in Kazakhstan, the Chinese Communists called for a retreat being cognizant of the existence of serious mistakes. They readily admitted that, "pressure instead of persuasion had been too frequently used and that the Party activists had tried to go too far in imposing advanced socialist forms on a backward peasantry".125 And in January of 1953 the Party

reaffirmed the right to private property and relaxed its pressure, so much so that by the end of the year the number of "labour mutual-aid brigades /teams/" had dropped by a half.126

But the respite did not last long, even in the face of an apparent retreat. Thus in December 1953 the Party proclaimed in a decree the establishment of Agricultural Producer Cooperatives which was then put into effect in Sinkiang in December 1954 and 1955.
Another highly significant economic development during the period of political consolidation which had no real counterpart in the Bolshevik economic reforms was the use of the PLA for carrying out important and varied production tasks. Following the call in December 5, 1949, on the PLA to aid in economic construction throughout the entire nation, the Sinkiang Military District Production and Construction Corps was organized in early 1950 and began immediately to respond to the spirit of the call. It engaged from time to time "in farming, building water conservancy works, reclamation of wasteland, as well as industrial construction". In the agricultural sphere, the role of the PLA production units included such diverse tasks as in the production of cotton and wheat, and the raising of livestock. Beginning with cotton experimental farms the cotton farming fields expanded by about 74 per cent with the total output increasing about 217 per cent from 1949-54. Similarly, in the area of industrialization the PLA role was equally significant. Thus, by 1955 the Sinkiang Military District was operating 92 industrial enterprises.

All in all, the land redistribution programme together with the active participation of the PLA in that process during the period of political consolidation produced important political advantages for the new regime. The programme effectively extended and consolidated Communist power at the village level in several ways. The transfer of ownership of rural properties to the poor peasants and farm labourers aimed not only at elevating their economic status, but also at influencing them to
replace the old system of social values with an entirely new pattern of living. The land reform struggle had created large numbers of "active elements" among the peasants. More importantly, having waged brutal struggle with the wealthy class, the poor peasants were forced to cooperate more readily with the new regime. And with the institution of the "Teams" the Communists were able to accustom the peasants to higher things to come - to collective management and thus pave the way for agricultural cooperation in the form of collectivization.

In attempting to analyse the respective Soviet and Chinese agrarian policies during the period of political consolidation, it becomes apparent that both Kazakhstan (prior to the 1924 territorial delimitation) and Sinkiang (prior to mid 1953) experienced policies which could be described as cautious and conciliatory towards the peasant farmers. The Soviet policy of distributing land through tribal and communal leaders may at first sight appear to have been in direct conflict with the ultimate Soviet aim of destroying the traditional leaders of Kazakhstan since it tended to strengthen the economic position of the tribal leaders. Nevertheless on close examination, this policy which was accompanied by the failure of the Soviet authorities to aid the newly created small farms with modern techniques in reality worked in favour of the Soviet Union in the political sphere by aggravating the prior class antagonisms (though minimal) between the peasants and their feudal leaders.

On the other hand, the Chinese did not have to face the problem
of redistributing lands that had been seized by Han Chinese immigrants as did the Soviets in Kazakhstan. Thus prior to 1952 the Chinese Communists simply instituted a lowering of rents for the peasants and the system of progressive taxation. On the question of the monopoly of landlords over the regulation of water distribution, the Chinese Communists were just as concerned as the Soviets and moved to end the monopoly almost immediately.

In a noticeable deviation from the Soviet practice, the Chinese Communists practised a policy of leniency towards those landlords who cooperated with the regime. Furthermore, the Chinese by 1952 were able to initiate the formation of "labour mutual-aid teams" - a halfway house between private ownership and collectivization which again was absent from the Soviet experience.

But far the most significant difference in the economic developments of the two regions during this period was the unparalleled agricultural role of the PLA units in Sinkiang compared with the minimal role played by the Red Army in Kazakhstan.

To summarize then, the primary aim of the two regimes in terms of economic policies was to implement centrally directed plans to undermine fundamentally and gradually traditional social practices and institutions and to destroy the solidarity and inertia of the native communities as a prelude toward the gradual public control of the rural economy - to which we shall now turn.
SECTION IV

An Analysis of the Political and Economic Developments During the Period of Economic Consolidation

The period of Economic Consolidation we recall was essentially characterized by the transfer of the ownership* and control of the basic means of production from the peasantry to the state. This period also marked the construction of a new economic foundation for both regions.

The beginning of the period in Kazakhstan as in the rest of the Soviet Union coincided with the introduction of the First Five Year Plan (which was passed in 1928 but put into effect in 1929) and ended with the conclusion of the collectivization period in 1933.

Before beginning our discussion of the economic developments of the period, a word about the political developments is in order. Without any question, Kazakhstan remained virtually unchanged from the political organization of the political consolidation period. The most significant political event - the elevation of Kazakhstan to a constituent Republic of the Soviet Union occurred after the period on December 5, 1936, after the period under consideration. Besides, even the series of purges of native political leaders that occurred elsewhere in Central Asia during this period was barely visible in Kazakhstan.

Along with these purges, a comprehensive assault on Islam followed which again was largely restricted to the strong centers of Islam in Central

* See footnote on Page 6.
Asia given the relative weakness of Islam in Kazakhstan. Thus even the "Hudjum" (the attack on the wearing of the veil by Moslem women) which formed the successful basis of Soviet attack on Islam could not be extended to Kazakhstan since the practice was not observed by the nomadic Kazakhs.\textsuperscript{130}

Nevertheless, given the strong antagonism of the Soviet authorities to Islam for fear that it could serve as the nucleus for political obstructionism, the Soviets made sure that it gained no further grounds in Kazakhstan.

On the whole, however, in terms of political developments nothing of significance was initiated by the Soviets in Kazakhstan during the economic consolidation period.

We must therefore turn now to the economic developments of the period in Kazakhstan. Although the economic development of Kazakhstan may be said to have started in 1928 with the beginning of the First Five Year Plan and the introduction of collectivization, it must be noted however, that certain important measures such as the distribution of land to the poor peasants had already been taken in the preceding period.

Soviet economic policies for the region was determined by several crucial objectives. First was the urgent requirement to expand and increase cotton production in Southern Kazakhstan as elsewhere in Central Asia given the fact that in 1927-28 the USSR had "been forced to allocate 1/6 of its total foreign expenditure to purchase of cotton from foreign sources".\textsuperscript{131} Secondly, convinced as the Soviets were that an industrial
proletariat was the single most important and reliable source of recruiting or producing Communists, the authorities saw the need to provide at least some modicum of industrialization for the region. Thirdly, Kazakhstan and the rest of Central Asia were to serve as shining examples for the Asian countries in particular (many of which were equally "underdeveloped") of the glories of Communism and what it has to offer to an "underdeveloped" territory. And lastly, the Soviets considered it uneconomical that in 1925-26 half of the manufactured goods shipped into the region consisted of cotton textiles, manufactured in Russian industrial centres from cotton supplied in large part by Kazakhstan and Central Asia.

As in the political consolidation period, in the area of economic consolidation the concept of "democratic centralism" was equally applicable. It presupposed centralism in such fundamental questions as in the general direction, in maximum unification of all economic activity by one ominibus state plan; in directing agriculture and industry with the aim of the rational and economical utilization of all material resources of the country. Thus, plans of the economic development of the national territorial administrative entities are required to be an "integral part" of and fully coordinated with the economic plan for the whole of the USSR. This was best summarized by the Comintern thesis in 1920 which posited that "socialism aims to tie up all the regions, all the districts, all the nationalities by the unity of the economic plan", adding at the same time, "But economic centralism, free from exploitation of class by class and nation by nation and therefore equally advantageous for all is correlated - without
detriment with genuine freedom of national development".  

The First Five Year Plan which covers our economic consolidation period gave these views an added impetus. With the initiation of the plan in 1928 efforts to induce the nomads to settle voluntarily on individual land holdings were replaced by a programme of forceful collectivization. The inherent difficulty in controlling nomads meant an early desire by the Soviet authorities to settle the nomads of Kazakhstan.

Furthermore as far as Kazakhstan was concerned, it was argued that an extensive nomadic economy was antagonistic to progress because "in its very nature it excludes the possibility of the growth of socialist elements and directs its development along capitalist lines." In particular the position of the bay which was seen as the embodiment of the old economic order increasingly came under fire. An important economic as well as political reason for the suppression of nomadism was therefore to destroy the authority vested in the bays. For Goloshchekin (Chairman of the Kazakh Regional Committee of the Communist Party) collectivization was the only solution for Kazakhstan. The following statement very much summarizes the prevailing ideology as it evolved in this period:

The backward, unproductive and archaic nomadic households must be replaced by a settled economy. Settling means collectivization and the liquidation of the bays which requires the destruction of the old tribal and kinship relationships.

It must be pointed out here that since the economic consolidation period witnessed very minor industrial activity in Kazakhstan during the
First Five Year Plan (the Turksib railway was the main industrial achievement), the discussion of this period will center primarily on the collectivization programme.

To reiterate, then, the collectivization programme discussed and passed in 1928 was implemented in 1929 in Kazakhstan at the same time as in other parts of the Soviet Union and seems initially to have been carried out with great speed and coercion reflecting the stringent attitudes of this period. Thus, Stalin in his famous "dizzy with success" speech of March 2, 1930, spoke of threats by "overzealous" cadres in Turkestan to the agricultural population "to resort to military force" and "to deprive peasants who do not as yet want to join the collective farms of irrigation water and manufactured goods".

The process of collectivization in Kazakhstan was a complicated one. Thus though its agricultural regions (inhabited by a small minority of the population) were considered models for Kolkhoz life, in the central areas where agriculture and cattle-breeding were combined, the introduction of Kolkhoz was beset with grave problems. Nevertheless, the Central Committee of the Party on January 15, 1930 issued a decree calling on collectivization according to which Kolkhozes were to be established in the agricultural district by the Spring of 1932. However completion of the plan was to be delayed till the end of the First Five Year Plan in 1933 in the nomad and semi-nomad areas.

The goal of the First Five Year Plan was to settle 544,000 nomadic and semi-nomadic households (of the total of 566,000) by 1933. Subsequently it is claimed that there were 939 Kolkhozes by October 1928 and 2,096 by 1930. Furthermore the decree of 1930 stipulated that in
the cattle-breeding areas the foundation of groups working together on their common land should be encouraged as a form of transition to Kolkhoz life. The drive for collectivization apparently proved so "successful" that in 1933 alone 242,000 nomad households had been settled on land, though 182,000 of them already had some land. In addition it has also been asserted that during the First Five Year Plan in Kazakhstan there were established 202 Sovkhozes (state farms), 4,800 Kolkhozes, 75 MTS (Machine Tractor Stations) and 65 MHS (Machine Harvesting Stations).

In addition some 700 bays had their goods including cattle, farm implements, buildings, etc. confiscated and then were deported. According to Goloschekin, by 1930, 696 bay households were expropriated and 144,474 head of cattle belonging to the bays were confiscated.

An important part of the collectivization programme was the introduction of the MTS already alluded to. Each MTS served the surrounding collective farms with tractors and technical advice.

The usual contract between the MTS and a Kolkhoz is signed for a period of 5 years...
The MTS is obliged to provide the collective with a specified number of tractors, implements and various services.... The MTS is also obliged to make all the repairs of and provide all the necessary parts for the collective's own machines. All expenses involved in repairing its own machines and implements, in producing the necessary fuel and lubricants as well as in employing agronomists and technicians are to be fully paid for by the MTS.  

Indeed it is reported that in Kazakhstan acute rivalry occurred between Sovkhoz and Klokhoz for the possession of the tractors; the Party Central
Committee had to intervene to moderate the enthusiasm of local party authorities who wanted to reserve all tractors for the Sovkhoz. For all intents and purposes the MTS was yet another instrument of state supervision. They were the lynch pin of agricultural development not only in Kazakhstan but elsewhere in the Soviet Union. They served as centers for agricultural and political education. Thus at least one qualified Party organizer had to serve in every MTS and his work was constantly being reviewed and encouraged, thus ensuring that the "hand which brings technical assistance is also the hand which brings Party political consciousness". 

In spite of all the seemingly rosy picture of collectivization, it became apparent that by the end of the First Five Year Plan, the collectivization programme in Kazakhstan had produced disastrous results, the most apparent of which was the slaughtering of thousands of livestock herds by the peasants opposed to the collectivization scheme on the grounds that it was being imposed from above. The total number of cattle in 1930, for instance, was reported to have declined to only 25 per cent of the number in 1925. It has also been estimated that between the summers of 1928 and 1934, the herds of sheep and goats declined from 18.1 million to 5.7 million. Animals and horses from 5.1 million to 2.5 million. The damage was so extensive that "despite a rather rapid rate of increase thereafter to 1937 livestock herds were still probably no more than 70 per cent of what they had been before collectivization."

Uraz Isayev (the Chairman of the Kazakh Council of Peoples Commissars) asserted in 1935 that the Bolsheviks had worked for "immediate
settling under conditions of 100 percent collectivization without regard to the needs and interests of the pasture-bound animal husbandry".

Indeed when it became apparent to the Soviet leaders that the peasants were putting up desperate resistance, Stalin on March 2, 1930 pretending that his instructions had been "misinterpreted" (i.e. deviation from the Party line) claimed that "it was stupid and reactionary to form collectives by force and blamed the excesses which had taken place on "giddiness from success". The details of the consequences of collectivization are beyond the scope of this study. Besides no precise information is available on the effect produced by stabilization and collectivization on the population of Kazakhstan. Suffice it to say however that in addition to the heavy decline in the numbers of livestock, it is on record that the total number of Kazakhs fell by nearly one million between the Census of 1926 and 1939.

All in all, despite all the shortcomings, collectivization during the First Five Year Plan remained the most far reaching measure not only in Kazakhstan but throughout the Soviet Union. The objectives were many. It brought the supply of agricultural products under state control thereby weakening the position of the farmer. It ushered in large-scale methods of agriculture and above all "liberated" the toiling masses from the heavy yoke of the bays' influence and the unmasking of the "predatory" character of the latter which made it possible to overcome clan survivals.
Fundamentally, the process of settling the nomadic and semi-nomadic households will be finished in 1933. By this very fact we will also guarantee the complete liquidation of the traditional kinship organization and semi-nomadic relations in Kazakh aul (village) ¹⁵³

In summary then, it is evident from the foregoing discussion that the period of economic consolidation in Kazakhstan was very limited in scope compared with the situation in European Russia. It concerned mostly the agricultural sector. Industrialization in the real sense was more or less a minute point except for the Turksib railway. The motive force behind the First Five Year Plan therefore was the subordination and exploitation of agriculture by means of collectivization in order to amass the necessary capital for the industrialization of the Soviet Union not necessarily Kazakhstan. For Kazakhstan this period was marked by one fact: that is a thorough disruption of the social and economic base which included the elimination of the clan system and its leaders. In their place stood the collective and state farms which became the political instruments of Bolshevik control.

Turning now to the economic consolidation period in Sinkiang (1953-57) one finds that this period differs quite significantly in one important respect from the corresponding phase of Kazakhstan's political development, that is, it was during this period and not later as was the case with Kazakhstan, that Sinkiang attained its mature political status, moving from a province to an autonomous region in 1955.

The internal political structure of Sinkiang calls for some notice at this point. The year 1954 saw the acceleration of a process of setting
up units of autonomous administrations at various levels of local government in parts of the country inhabited by the minority peoples. When the constitution of the PRC was adopted in September 1954, it defined the status of the minorities, who comprise some 6 per cent of the population of China, and made provision for local autonomy within a unitary Chinese state from which anything approaching a federal system was explicitly excluded. There is therefore nothing parallel with the Union Republics in the Soviet Union.

In October 1955, when Sinkiang ceased to be a province and became the Sinkiang - Uighur Autonomous Region its internal structure had already been set up over a wide area with a variety of autonomous counties (hsien) and groups of counties (chou) for the different races of the region. Autonomous administrations introduce members of the various races to office in local government and Party organs and have the constitutional right to the official use of the predominant non-Chinese language. To this end in March 1957 a special Party decree declared that "every Chinese cadre was bound to learn within 3-5 years one of the minority languages of the region in which he worked".

It is important to note that this type of "nativization" does not necessarily call for the removal of Han or non-indigenous cadre from the Sinkiang administration and is in keeping with Peking's claim that its primary objective in this field was to establish the numerical predominance within the Sinkiang administration of Party-member cadres. That these individuals be nationality cadres therefore
becomes a secondary but not a primary consideration. This approach seems to be different from the Soviet call for the "Kazakhization" of governmental, party and educational administrators. In short for Peking (at least theoretically) so long as the cadres were ideologically orthodox it did not matter if they were all Han Party members.

It could be argued that such a policy would mitigate against a massive influx of minority peoples into the administrative organs of the party and government of Sinkiang, and on the other hand mitigate against the rise of "great power chauvinism" on the part of the Chinese by demanding ideological orthodoxy of its cadres. The fact however is that neither transpired. In the first place there were not enough trained cadres during this period. So much for the political developments of this period.

In terms of economic developments in Sinkiang during the economic consolidation period, there are three discernible areas of operation, viz.: collectivization of agriculture, the establishment of pastoral cooperatives and the further expansion of industry. Concerning agriculture this period was characterized by the widespread existence of "labour mutual-aid terms" in the settled farming areas. But by December 1953 a decree to establish "agricultural producer cooperatives" throughout China was declared.

The slow rate at which the decree was implemented can be seen from the fact that by the first half of 1955,
5% of the peasants were grouped in cooperatives compared with 30% in "teams" and a negligible number in cooperatives at the end of 1953. In addition by 1955 there were 72 state farms over half of which were mechanized. There were also a few MTS set up. Despite the ambitions of the programme Mao came out with a strong attack on July 31, 1955, against "right wing" deviationists (we now know who they were) whom he claimed were slowing down the progress of collectivization — a conviction underscored by the figure above. A call for the "completion of collectivization within the next few years" was made by Mao and true to form, "by the Spring of 1956 practically all the peasants in Sinkiang belonged to agricultural producer cooperatives of the lower type.... By October of 1957, 95.49% of the peasants belonged to cooperatives of the "higher" type and the collectivization drive was considered to have been fulfilled." In this connection, the role of the PLA again calls for some brief attention. As previously stated, the PLA throughout the period of economic consolidation continued to perform vital functions. By December 1954 the production units of the Army were united in a special "production-construction Army" under the District command. It was assigned the task of establishing state farms in the rural sector. On the whole the main efforts of the "production-construction army" was directed towards the establishment of high agricultural levels, the setting up of state farms, and the transition of socialist transformation of agriculture, and the creation of favourable conditions for industrialization.
In the area of industrialization, emphasis was placed upon developing an independent base for producing agricultural machinery. Prior to 1949 Sinkiang's industrial base was virtually non-existent, consisting of about a dozen enterprises. But between 1949 and 1957 the Chinese had claimed to have built 259 factories and mines. In spite of this seemingly impressive industrial growth it must be cautioned that there is great question as to the correctness of these figures as conflicting reports are always being issued on the same figures. The conflicting reports notwithstanding, there is no doubt that Sinkiang during the economic consolidation period witnessed a far greater industrial activity than occurred in Kazakhstan.

In terms of trade in Sinkiang during this period, there was a constant attempt to bring private trade under state supervision and control. Thus between 1954 and 1955, the share of private interests in the retail trade fell from 42.1% to 31.3%. By the end of 1956, 95.64% of the retail trade had undergone "socialist transformation".

On the topic of collectivization mention must be made about the attempts to settle the nomads of Sinkiang. The importance of the nomads is demonstrated by the fact that in 1955, over 60% of China's wool production came from Sinkiang. Little wonder then that by 1954, 83 animal husbandary farms were already established by the Communists in Sinkiang. Significantly however, in contrast to the pace of agrarian collectivization, the collectivization of stock-breeding in Sinkiang, probably because of the great strength of the tribal and nomadic way of life, was by far slower.
Thus even though the movement started in 1955, by the end of 1956 about 20% belonged to mutual-aid groups.\textsuperscript{167} Indeed it was not until a year after the economic consolidation period in 1958 that the process of "semi-socialist collectivization" was declared completed.\textsuperscript{168} Peking in its approach to the nomads deviated from the methods adopted in the agricultural areas. Officially, there were no class antagonisms or open class conflict. An article by Saifudin in the September 30, 1955 editions of \textit{People's Daily} further elaborated this "moderate" approach.

\begin{quote}
...the multitude of herdsmen are actively led and organised to launch the drive to increase the breeding and protection of livestock; the conflict between the hired hands and the owners over wages has been mediated.\textsuperscript{169}
\end{quote}

Saifudin at a subsequent date gives us a further insight to the policy orientation at the time toward the nomad population of Sinkiang when he said:

\begin{quote}
Preparation for the organization of a new cooperative includes propaganda, drafting a constitution, registering animals, fixing shares, and finally a festivity to celebrate the opening of the new co-operative. It is urged that the clan structure of nomad society, their religious prejudices and general backwardness should be taken into account and that there should be no rushing of those who were still unwilling.\textsuperscript{170}
\end{quote}

Because of this relatively cautious approach, by November 9, 1957 only slightly less than one in two (46%) of all the nomadic households in Sinkiang were participating in the "lower" type of co-operatives of which 1,078 had been formed.

To sum up our discussion of this period an effort will be made to single out in brief the differences between the policies of Moscow and
Peking which emerge from the foregoing discussion. In the area of political developments two significant differences can be discerned. First was the absence of any major political changes in Kazakhstan whereas Sinkiang went through some major political changes, the climax being the attainment of mature political structure itself - the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region.

Secondly, was the difference between the Chinese and Soviet Union's conception of nativization. For the Soviets, nativization implied and emphasized training of minority nationals to assume nearly all the duties of government and Party within the respective political entities. Although the practicality of this goal can be questioned (and indeed one might add it never was attained) it can be seen at least theoretically as being consistent with the formal federative structure of the USSR. For the Chinese, on the contrary, nativization implied the subordination of the principle of complete ethnic nativization of a political entity's governmental and Party organs to the theoretical if not practical objective of achieving an ideologically orthodox ruling group regardless of ethnic purity and this tends once more to be consistent with the unitary structure of the PRC.

A third significant difference is the emergence of the Slav element as the largest group in Kazakhstan. Of the two, Kazakhstan remains the most ethnically diluted where the native population accounts for less than 30 per cent of the total. The Russians and Ukrainians
account for more than half. The same is not true of Han Chinese in Sinkiang. The importance lies in the meaning it holds for the future for Kazakhstan which is beyond the scope of our present study. Suffice it to say however that the continued influx of Russians may lead to an official downgrading of the Kazakh SSR on the grounds that its population was now overwhelmingly Russian as was the case with Karelo-Finnish SSR which had been downgraded to an ASSR.

In the area of agricultural policies, one striking difference emerges. That is the subtle way in which the Chinese handled their collectivization in Sinkiang. This contrasts sharply with the harsh and impatient manner in which the Soviet Union attended the transformation of Kazakhstan agriculture. This becomes even more stark when one considers the rather brutal way of settling the nomad population of Kazakhstan. Parallel to this was the speed and terror that marked the Soviet attempt to transform the peasant holdings directly into collective farms without going through an intermediate stage. The Chinese on the other hand, provided two intermediate stages (labour mutual-aid teams and agricultural producer cooperatives in the transition to collectives).

The contrast between Stalin's March 2, 1930 call for retreat and sanity and Mao's July 31, 1955 statement denouncing obstructionism on the part of certain minority groups coupled with the call to accelerate the pace of collectivization clearly demonstrate the difference in the tempo of the two regimes.

Finally, whereas the Soviets did not embark on any significant
industrialization drive in Kazakhstan the Chinese did usher in an era of considerable industrial expansion in Sinkiang. Nevertheless both regions witnessed the virtual elimination of privately controlled retail trade and in both regions this period marked the takeover by the State and Party of all economic enterprises of any significance. Commenting on the development in Sinkiang, Saifudin in 1957 said:

The socialist transformation of agriculture has now been completed; more than 95% of the peasants are now united in agriculture producer cooperatives of the higher type. The socialist transformation of the artisan industry has also been successfully completed; most privately owned industrial and trade undertakings have been changed into state-private companies.171
CONCLUSION

It is not the intention, and certainly no attempt has been made, to summarize the foregoing sections as this would be tantamount to a repetition of the sectional summaries already provided. The primary aim here is therefore to provide generally some of the more salient findings of this study— as itemized below:

1. Neither Kazakhstan nor Sinkiang offered any ideology or movement which could initiate a programme of political and economic reform comparable to those of the two Communist programmes for these two "underdeveloped" regions. Even Islam and its offshoot— Pan-Islamism proved to be too passive to challenge effectively the "superior" Communist ideology.

2. The study revealed in its most naked form the political and economic influence of the Soviet Union in the internal affairs of Sinkiang before and during the period (1949-57) under study. This contrasts very sharply with the non-involvement by Communist China in the affairs of Kazakhstan.

3. While both Moscow and Peking applied the principle of self-determination to lure and then overthrow the nationalist regimes and to eliminate hitherto-pre "progressive" elements who had become detrimental to the total incorporation of these territories to the "motherland", both later translated this concept into action largely in accordance with the character of their respective state institutions.
Thus in keeping with its federal character, the Soviet Union has granted the border republics the theoretical right to secede. On the other hand, the Chinese constitution, which defines the PRC as a "unified, multinational state" extends no right of secession to its national minorities.

One must add however, that the efforts of the Communists to "modernize" these previously underdeveloped regions must be viewed within the framework of the restricting as well as liberating elements of the programme. The famous catchword, "national in form, socialist in content" actually permits little in the very way of autonomy and nothing in the way of national self-determination.

4. The study reveals strikingly the overwhelming role and dominance of the Russian population among the scant "proletariat" that did exist in Kazakhstan, in the party organizations to the virtual exclusion (either intentional or unintentional) of the Kazakh population. This contrasts sharply with the Chinese Communists practice in Sinkiang. The Chinese held out the hand of possible collaboration with all the classes in Sinkiang including landlords and rich peasants in keeping with its policy of United Front (Burhan Shahidi was of a middle class origin).

5. The Soviet Union's theoretical conception of "nativization" implied and emphasized the training of minority nationals to assume nearly all the duties of government and Party within the respective political entities consistent (at least theoretically) with the formal federative structure of the USSR. But for the Communist Chinese, "nativization", implied the subordination of the principle of complete ethnic nativization
of a political entity's government and party organs to the theoretical if not practical objective of achieving an ideologically orthodox ruling group regardless of ethnic purity again it seems quite consistent with the unitary structure of the PRC.

6. In the area of collectivization the Chinese Communists were more tactful and restrained in Sinkiang (as epitomized by their two-stage policy in the implementation of the collectivization programme) than the Soviets were in Kazakhstan.

7. During the economic consolidation period, industrial activity was virtually non-existent in Kazakhstan whereas in Sinkiang the Chinese Communists laid down strong foundations for Sinkiang's industrial take-off.

8. Finally, the study demonstrated quite clearly that the PLA played a much more prominent and crucial role in Sinkiang than the Red Army ever did in Kazakhstan in the agricultural, political, economic and industrial development of these two regions during the period under study.

One more word about the periodization scheme adopted for this study. I would emphasize that it is not meant to be inflexible. That there are incongruities should not be surprising. An obvious example is the disparity in the lengths of the periods chosen. Furthermore the fact that China depended on Soviet aid during the two periods covered in this study underscores the inherent difficulties which must be acknowledged in a study of this type. Nevertheless, regardless of these incongruities, and if not anything else, this study has demonstrated that an incisive comparative study is possible.
After all it is one of the rules of the comparative method that entities to be compared should be of the same general order of magnitude and should possess certain main characteristics in common for comparison to be meaningful. At the same time however, it is generally accepted that it is not always easy to follow this rule to the letter in comparing societies, for each is in some significant sense a special case. The two countries studied here are no exceptions to the general rule. They too have fulfilled the criteria sufficient to make comparison not only feasible but credible.

In sum, this study reveals that in spite of the Chinese dependence on the Soviet Union for economic guidance and assistance during the two periods studied, (which has no counterpart in the experience of the Soviet Union) the former did not follow to the letter the developmental strategies of the latter. It could be argued that with political hindsight the Chinese Communists were in a better position to learn from the past "mistakes" of the Russians hence they were able to carry out their consolidation of political and economic control (as part of their overall integrative Plan) over Sinkiang with less destruction, more restraint, and subtlety than Moscow ever did in Kazakhstan. More than this however, the fact that the two areas under study did not develop in the same direction economically and politically can perhaps be best explained as a reflection of the different historical, political, strategic and economic situations which the Russians and the Chinese faced in their respective regions during the period studied. Nevertheless, it has been amply demonstrated throughout this study that while the objectives of political
and economic consolidation of the two regimes in respect to the two "underdeveloped" regions studied may have been similar, the policies designed to achieve these objectives were markedly different in many respects.

2. Ibid., p. 182


4. Indeed, it has been a major mark of political theorists to hold that the "ultimate mark of a community's political integration is its attainment of a status of "sovereignty" - sovereignty here being defined as a "fully organized society" in which "all members of the community are subject to a supreme political authority; and second that the community as a political entity is independent of control by any one else." Philip E. Jacob & Henry Teune, "The Integrative Process: Guidelines for Analysis of the Bases of Political Community" in the Integration of Political Communities, ed. by Philip E. Jacob & James Toscano (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1964) p. 38


6. Here I do not consider the concept of national integration as tautological as suggested by Claude Ake since "nation always implies integration". Clearly, the arbitrarily created nations of Africa can hardly be referred to as "integrated nations". See Claude Ake, A Theory of Political Integration, (Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1967) p. 13

8. The degree of integration of a community, no doubt, is related to several other factors besides the two dimensions under study. Such factors include for example, the dominance of the political culture of the community or system over the subculture within it, the efficacy of political institutions and processes of the community in meeting expectations, the ease and frequency of political communication among members of the community, etc. Malintegration tends to occur for example when the range of shared political values is diminished, coercion becomes necessary to obtain compliance with the law, and demands are made by sections of the community for secession.


16. Ibid., p. 92


24. L. Krader, *Peoples of Central Asia*, p. 108


27. S. A. Zenkovsky, *Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia*, p. 217


29. Sinkiang, situated in the Northwestern part of China borders on India, Afghanistan, the Mongolian Peoples Republic and the USSR. The region is split into two great basins: the Tarim Basin, which occupied more than half the total area of Sinkiang, in the South and the Dzungarian Basin in the North; and by the Tien Shan Mountains cutting across the central part of Sinkiang.


32. The British had given a strong backing to Yakub's adventures convinced as the British government was at the time that their interests would best be served by dealing with a weak Moslem state in Sinkiang than to have some powerful Western state established here. See I. C. Y. Hsu, *The Ili Crisis: A Study of Sino-Russian Diplomacy 1878–1881*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), p. 4


36. Very little is known about Yang's career other than that he was a dictatorial and autocratic ruler whose policies have been credited with keeping Sinkiang within China following the turbulent years that followed the fall of the Manchu Dynasty in 1911. See Martin R. Morins, *Gateway to Asia* (New York: The John Day Co., 1944), p. 60.

37. The heights to which Soviet political and economic penetration of Sinkiang at the time is demonstrated by the fact that even the provincial police were excluded from the mining corporation's properties some of which were joint Soviet-Chinese enterprises. In addition "all exports of produce were to be duty free, compensated for by a 2 per cent ad valorem charge". See Allen S. Whiting & General Sheng Shih-ts'ai, *Sinkiang: Pawn or Pivot*, (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1958), p. 67.


43. See "The Peaceful Liberation of Sinkiang", translated in **Current Background**, No. 365 (October 25, 1955), pp. 44-46

44. It has been suggested that had the Kuomintang emerged victorious, the three districts might well have been incorporated outright by the Soviet Union not unlike the fate of the nearby Turkic area of Tanu Tuva in 1944 all with KMT connivance in order to undermine the CCP. See Henry J. Liberman's article "Nanking is Seeking a Deal with the Soviet Union", **The New York Times**, Feb. 1, 1949.


48. S. A. Zenkovsky, *Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia*, p. 218. Zenkovsky suggests that a stubborn intra-party (CPSU) battle up to the turn of 1920 still raged on in Kazakhstan between die-hard Communists and some former supporters of the Alash Orda who had now joined the Communist Party or defected to the side of the Soviet Union. The struggle featured quite prominently in the main administrative organ of the Kazakh region - the Kirrevkom.
49. Ibid., pp. 216-217.


52. J. Stalin, Marxism and the National and Colonial Question, p. 269.

53. Indeed, already in January 1918, Stalin had written, that "it is necessary to limit the principle of free self-determination of nations by granting it to the toilers and refusing it to the Bourgeoisie". Ibid.

54. Ibid.


58. Figures from the Communist International between the Fifth and the Sixth World Congress, 1924–28. (London 1928), pp. 507-508. Indeed a later day Soviet historian is said to have written, "A healthy, active core of Communists did not exist among the Kazakhs then", Zenkovsky, Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia, p. 219


64. Ibid., p. 87


66. Ibid., pp 257-259.

67. Ibid., p. 85

68. Donald W. Treadgold, Twentieth Century Russia, (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co. 1959), p. 302. The introduction of the cyrillic alphabet was in response to the language reforms of Ataturk in 1928 which also saw the institution of a Roman alphabet in Turkey. The Soviet move was thus to thwart any cultural contact between the Soviet Moslems and Turkic peoples with their brethren outside the USSR. See also C.W. Hostler, Turkism and the Soviets. (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1957), p. 63.


70. Ibid.

71. Ibid., p. 35.
Professor Kolarz asserts that the weakness of the Moslem religion in Kazakhstan was largely due to the fact that it never had as deep roots among the previously nomadic Kazakhs (whose ancient religion was Shamanism not Islam) as among the settled population of Central Asia especially that of Uzbekistan. Hence he argues that the notion that Islam was an "alien" religion forcibly imposed on them (i.e. the Kazakhs), first by Arab invaders, later by Tartar Clergy and finally by the Czarist administrators was particularly tempting to them. The Communist took the line that their ancient religion, Shamanism was "less harmful" than the foreign Moslem religion which superseded it. See Walter Kolarz, Russia and Her Colonies, p. 406.

In December 1936, with the promulgation of the new Soviet Constitution, the Kazakh ASSR was elevated to a Union Republic of Soviet Socialist Republics. It must be pointed out that the delay in creating the Kazakh ASSR after its promulgation in 1920 was owing to severe famine which struck the area in 1921 (in which an estimated million lives were lost). A spillover effect of the famine was that it helped to paralyse any effective native resistance to the Communists. See Treadgold, Twentieth Century Russia, p. 194.


Ibid., p. 348

Ibid., p. 353

Ibid., pp. 254-56

81. Owen Lattimore, *Pivot of Asia: Sinkiang and the Inner Asian Frontiers of China and Russia*, p. 115

82. *China News Analysis* No. 431, (Hong Kong, August 3, 1962), p. 1

It is worthy to note that the Chinese Communist policies on minorities nationalities contrasts sharply to that of the KMT. The KMT policy on minorities nationalities in essence implied the assimilation of these minorities—a kind of melting-pot. Thus, of the five constitutions formulated during the various "Republican" governments of China between 1912 and 1949 only the last dated December of 1946 can be said to contain more than the most perfunctory platitudes about China's minorities. Those constitutional provisions relevant to minorities during the Republican period from 1912-1949 in general simply read: "citizens of the Chinese Republic are all equal and there shall be no racial, class, or religious distinctions".* The question of creating cultural autonomous regions for the minority areas or indeed the right to self-determination—even in theory—was therefore not seriously contemplated upon by the KMT.


88. Ibid.

90. Ibid., p. 448

91. Ibid.


95. Ibid.


97. Saifudin on his part advanced the reason for the delay on the grounds that the East Turkestan revolt had been carried out as a "bourgeois democratic revolution"—that it was not under the control of the Chinese Communists—with the result that unreliable "feudalistic" and "bourgeois" elements had infiltrated the government administration and had to be weeded out. Hence he claimed the major effort to set up autonomous national units was delayed till late 1953. Saifudin was Vice Chairman of the Sinkiang's People's Government until his appointment as Chairman of the autonomous region in 1955. Wang En-mao held the position of the First Secretary of the Sinkiang Sub-Bureau of the CCP Central Committee.

98. Though no accurate figures for Han Chinese immigrants are available during the period (1949-52), Freeberne has estimated, after examining several sources, that the number of Han Chinese in Sinkiang stood at only 300,000 in 1953. See Michael Freeberne, "Demographic and Economic Changes in the Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region", *Population Studies*, Vol. XX, No. 1 (July 1966), p. 105
100. On the question of the formation of autonomous regions, the Chinese Communists devised four categories:
   (1) Those areas inhabited by one minority only (2) those areas inhabited by one dominant minority group, but including other smaller groups (3) those areas inhabited by two or more minority groups of approximately the same size and (4) those areas inhabited by Han-Chinese, but including some minorities.

103. Nevertheless, by 1958 first indications of policy change in minority languages appeared which significantly reflected a deliberate de-emphasis of "courting the minorities" on the part of the Peking regime. Perhaps the outbreak of what was dubbed "local nationalism" at the turn of 1958 may have prompted the Communists to have second thoughts on their longstanding policy of special privileges for the non-Chinese people. The most significant change being the call to the minority nationalities to learn the Chinese language.

104. Hsiao Hsia, China, p. 130


108. Ibid., p. 252.

110. I. Winner, "Some Problems of Nomadism and Social Organization Among the Recently Settled Kazakhs," p. 252

111. T. Zhdanko, "The Nomads of Central Asia", p. 612

112. A. G. Park, Bolshevism in Turkestan, 1918-27, p. 325

113. I. Winner, "Some Problems of Nomadism and Social Organization Among the Recently Settled Kazakhs", p. 252


115. A. G. Park, Bolshevism in Turkestan, 1918-27, p. 267

116. Ibid., p. 346

117. Jen Min Jih Pao, (The People's Daily), (September 24, 1957)


121. Hsiao Hsia, China, p. 338

123. The Significance of the Communists' emphasis on "Class Struggle" in course of the land reform measures was pointedly summarized in Liu Shao-ch'i's report to the Eighth CCP Congress in 1956. It stated:

In carrying out land reform, our Party did not take the simple and easy way of merely relying on administrative decrees and bestowing land on the peasants....We accomplished the task of land reform through the struggle of the peasants themselves....Thus land reform succeeded not only in eliminating the landlords as a class and weakening the rich peasants in the economic realm, but, also, politically, in overthrowing the landlord class and isolating the rich peasants.


126. Ibid.

127. Current Background, October 25, 1955, 2-3. Furthermore, by means of a January 20, 1950 decree 110,000 out of the 193,000 troops stationed in Sinkiang were to engage in productive work. See China News Analysis, No. 103:6. The primary task of the corps was to insure food supplies. To this end, top priority was given to the repair and construction of irrigation works given the fact that most of the cultivated areas in Sinkiang depended on artificial irrigation. It is important to note here that the PLA farms were organized either on a cooperative or state farm basis as we shall see later their development served as a basis for the establishment of state farms.

128. Jen Min Jih Pao (The People's Daily) (October 1, 1955)

129. Ibid.


133. According to Matley as early as 1927 the first signs of collectivization were in evidence in Kazakhstan when "the cattle and possessions of a few hundred Kazakh bays were confiscated, the cattle being distributed among the poorer peasants, who were then formed into nuclei for collectivization". See I. M. Mattley, "Agricultural Developments", p. 302

134. Under Stalin those parts of the culture which stood in the way of maximum economic development or which threatened Soviet consolidation of both political and economic power were to be harshly dealt with.


137. Apparently it was in the Second Five Year Plan that industrial development gathered momentum in Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan's non-ferrous metals, copper works, lead, etc. were opened up on a large scale during this period. The major aim of the Turksib railway (the hallmark of industrial activity during the First Five Year Plan) was to bring grain from Siberia and North Kazakhstan to the cotton areas of the South. See M. Holdsworth, "Soviet Central Asia 1917-40", p. 269 and see also P. B. Henze, "Economic Developments of Soviet Central Asia", p. 35

139. It has been suggested that in its initial stages, collectivization as a form of struggle against clan survivals proved singularly unsuccessful since many Kolkhozes constituted themselves in the clan basis. This situation was "overcome" only by further purges of the "evil" characters. See the "Stabilization of the Nomads", CAR, Vol. VII (1959), p. 225

140. Kolkhozes were the collective farms as opposed to Sovkhozes which were the state farms. State farms (Sovkhozes) were largely used for experimental work in areas not previously cultivated, and were organized on lines similar to that of manufacturing industry. Collective farms (Kolkhozes) were more prevalent given the widespread peasant opposition to their introduction. Here the land was pooled and the peasant lost the right to regard any part of it as his own, while the great extension of the area to be managed as a single unit was intended to make possible economics in planning, crop rotation and the use of buildings and equipment. Incidentally, the peasants were allowed to retain private plots as a concession.

141. In general the number of households in a Kolkhoz ranged from 10-12 households, but there were also large Kolkhozes each embracing a number of clans. Even in the latter cases each kept to itself and worked together, its members constituting a "brigade".


143. Ibid.


145. Ibid., p. 255

146. Ibid.


Kazakhstan in 1935 had 206 MTS for a sown area of 5,124,000 hectares


154. For more on this see The Constitution of the People's Republic of China, p. 9

155. The reasons for the delay in establishing the Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region have been dealt with earlier and do not need any further elaboration here. We may add however that in addition, Peking claimed that it was necessary to alter the antagonistic relations between the various nationalities as well as looking at ways to ease the ago old distrust between the nationalities and the Han Chinese in the region. Furthermore, the need to eliminate "narrow nationalism" and opposition elements from the "dying remnants" of the East Turkestan groups (the Sinkiang league for the defense of Peace and Democracy) was considered vital by the CCP. See U.S. Consul General, Hong Kong, Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 961, (Hong Kong, Sept. 30 1954), pp. 6-7, & Tang, Communist China Today, pp. 210-11.

156. The most important autonomous area in Sinkiang is the Ili Kazakh autonomous Chou. It is comprised of three parts - Ili, Tarbagatai and Altai. Incidentally, the Ili part is practically identical with the territory occupied by Russia in the last century and it was the base for the revolt against Chinese authority in Urumchi from 1944-49, effectively carrying Tarbagatai and Altai with it. And significantly, it was mainly from Ili that the exodus into the adjacent Soviet territory (Kazakhstan) resulting from "dissatisfaction" with conditions of life in Sinkiang took place in 1962.
It must be pointed out that considerable efforts were made to train minority cadres from 1949-55; it has been estimated that the CCP trained 36,000 minority cadres in Sinkiang and by 1957 the minority cadres in Sinkiang had grown from 12,841 in 1950 to 63,995. It also revealed that in the same year 35.13 per cent of the total number of cadres of the hsien level and above were cadres from the national minorities of Sinkiang. See J. P. Lo "Five Years of the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region", China Quarterly, October-December No. 8 (1961), p. 92.

While not delving into the details of the agricultural cooperatives, it must be noted that there was a "lower" as well as a "higher" type of agricultural producer cooperatives. The difference being that:

in the "lower" or "semi-socialist" type the peasants still owned land individually but pooled their finances and equipment, while in the "higher" type land, cattle and implements were owned collectively...

Peasants received interests on the landholdings as well as a share of the crop for work done. Finally, in the socialist cooperative, or collective farm, the land and bigger farm implements became common property and work done was the sole source of income.

See "Two Revolutions for the Farm", China in Transition, (Peking 1957), p. 75.

"Sinkiang: The Collectivization of Agriculture", CAR VIII No. 3, p. 333

J. P. Lo, "Five Years of the SUAR", p. 92.


Jen Min Jih Pao, (The People's Daily)(September 27, 1955)


166. Ibid.


168. It must be pointed out here that this policy of leniency towards the stock-breeders did not apply to China proper. There, by the end of 1956, 96.3% of the stock-breeding householders and joined cooperative movements and of these 87.8% were taking part in cooperatives of the "higher" type. See Ching Chi Yen Chiu, Economic Research Monthly, No. 10 (Peking 1959), p. 3. Cited in Cheng Chu-yuan, Communist China's Economy 1949-62, p. 34


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### APPENDIX A

#### ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ASSR</td>
<td>Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAEC</td>
<td>Central Asian Economic Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central Asian Review</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCP</td>
<td>Chinese Communist Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPSU</td>
<td>Communist Party of the Soviet Union</td>
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<td>JRCAS</td>
<td>Journal of Royal Central Asian Society</td>
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<td>KMT</td>
<td>Kuomintang</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCNA</td>
<td>New China News Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>PLA</td>
<td>People's Liberation Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>People's Republic of China</td>
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<tr>
<td>RSFSR</td>
<td>Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>SMCP</td>
<td>Survey of China Mainland Press</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSR</td>
<td>Soviet Socialist Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>SUAR</td>
<td>Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region</td>
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<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republic</td>
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APPENDIX B

KAZAKHSTAN'S POPULATION

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<tr>
<th>1926 Census</th>
<th>1939 Census</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhs</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2,335,500
2,619,900 (includes Ukrainians)

Source: "The Muslim Republics of the USSR", JRCAS, XLVII (April, 1960), 106-116

SINKIANG'S POPULATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1953 Census</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Uighurs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kirghiz</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mongols</td>
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<td>Russians</td>
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<td>Hui</td>
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<tr>
<td>Solons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Han</td>
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<tr>
<td>Taranchi</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Cited in "The Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region", Current Background, No. 365 (October 25, 1955)
Kazakh Steppes and Central Asia before the Revolution of 1917

MAP 1

MAP 2

Source: A. G. Park, Bolshevism in Turkestan 1918-27,
MAP 3 SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA

Source: A. G. Park, Bolshevism in Turkestan: 1918-27
MAP 5