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UBC Theses and Dissertations

Unionization of professional engineers McArthur, Grant Douglas 1973

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UNIONIZATION OF PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERS GRANT DOUGLAS McARTHUR B. COmn. (1971) U.B.C. A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE WE ACCEPT THIS THESIS AS CONFORMING TO THE REQUIRED STANDARD UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA JUNE 29, 1973 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make i t freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by his representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Department of The University of British Columbia Vancouver 8 , Canada II ABSTRACT This thesis studies the p o s s i b i l i t i e s for greater development of unions for professional engineers i n Canada, The analysis of the paper serves the purpose of supporting or r e f l e c t i n g the i n i t i a l b e l i e f that more widespread p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n union a c t i v i t i e s i s l i k e l y for engineers. The method of investigation i s to analyze a l l relevant factors through use of published material, unpublished material, interviews and conference data. The general conclusion i s that greater involvement i n union a c t i v i t i e s are l i k e l y . Throughout the paper i t i s clear that factors which i n h i b i t union formation are becoming less prevalent i n Canada while the need for engineering unions i s growing, A new type of "professional' union" i s then discussed with o r i g i n a l contributions i n the areas of union functions, procedural d e t a i l s , union structure and the company side of unionization. Thesis Supervisor 0 0 0 I I I . TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter One Introduction p. 1. Chapter Two Professional Engineers i n the Canadian I n d u s t r i a l Relations System p. 12, Chapter Three Nature of Organization and Organizing p. 30. Chapter Four S p e c i f i c Forces Conducive to Formation of Engineering Unions p. 56. Chapter Five Legal Aspects p. 72. Chapter Six S o c i a l Aspects p. 92, Chapter Seven Forces I n h i b i t i n g Unionization p. 109, Chapter Eight Conclusions and Insights p. 121. Bibliography p. 151• IV. LIST OF TABLES I . OVERALL FORCES ACTING ON ENGINEERS p. 10 I I . AGE DISTRIBUTION OF ENGINEERS AND TEACHERS p.25 I I I . WORK FORCE GROWTH p.40 IV. WHITE COLLAR WORKERS p.41 V. GROWTH OF ENGINEERS p.42 V I . TELESCOPING OF WAGES p.69 V I I . SALARIES OF FEDERAL ENGINEERS P. 87 V I I I . ILLNESS BENEFITS OF FEDERAL ENGINEERS p. 87 IX. HIGHLIGHTS OF 1970 AGREEMENT p.88 X. MONETARY TERMS OF CURRENT AGREEMENT p. 89 X I . A COMPARISON OF LOCAL AND COSMOPOLITAN IDEALS P.99 v. LIST OF FIGURES I. A SCHEMATIC PRESENTATION OF THE CANADIAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS SYSTEM p. 2 II, THE STRAUSS MODEL OF WORK ROLES p. 13 I I I . A DIAGRAM SHOWING THE MOST LIKELY AREAS FOR UNIONIZED VS. NON-UNIONIZED WORKERS IN THE STRAUSS MODEL p. 15 IV. DISPERSION OF ENGINEER WORK ROLES p 017 V. GREATER STRESS ON WORKER ROLE p.18 VI. CANADIAN LABOUR CONGRESS GOALS p . 6 l VI. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would l i k e to of f e r my sincere thanks to Dr. G, Walter for his invaluable time and e f f o r t . The co-operation of the B. C. Association of Professional Engineers i s also much appreciated. CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION This paper i s a systems analys i s of the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of widespread un ion iza t ion of Canadian profes s iona l engineers. The thes is of the paper i s that Canadian profes s iona l engineers s h a l l organize to a wider extent i n the future for the purpose of c o l l e c t i v e bargaining. A thorough analys i s of the environmental f ac tor s , par t ies of i n t e r e s t , i n t e r a c t i o n processes and re su l t s produces the conclus ion that development of engineering unions i s probable i n Canada. The Craig-Dunlop model of the Canadian i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t ions system provides an exce l lent basis for de ta i l ed analys i s because the re l a t ionsh ip s of the factors studied are more e a s i l y understood through use of th i s model. Figure One i s the Craig-Dunlop model which also served as a basis for the task force study into Canadian i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s . - 2 -A-SCHEMATIC PRESENTATION OF THE CANADIAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS SYSTEM Environmental Part ies of v^ ; a In terac t ion . Factors Interest '£%ik. Processes P £ U * Results E c o l o g i c a l System Economic System P o l i t i c a l System S o c i a l & C u l t u r a l System C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Systems Legal System • '•Feedback 1 L Basic flow of inf luence * « Reverse flow of inf luence FIGURE ONE The chapters are arranged to enhance d i scuss ion i n a systems manner and by r e f e r r i n g back to the Dunlop Model i t i s poss ible to discover which elements are environmental f ac tors , part ies of i n t e r e s t , i n t e r a c t i o n processes, or r e s u l t s . Conclusions of the paper should provide a d d i t i o n a l information to the body of the paper because a f i n a l chapter must p red ic t the effects of the f ind ings . I f profess ional engineers do form unions on a wider scale then some aspects of these unions may wel l be d i f f e rent from b l u e - c o l l a r unions such as the form and procedures of profess ional c o l l e c t i v e bargaining u n i t s . A . J u s t i f i c a t i o n Rationale for studying un ion iza t ion of Canadian Enterprises Employee Organizations "Dependent-Contractor" Organizations Employer Organizations Legal Counsel & Consultants e-i lovernment The Publ ic Interest The Labour Market Personnel Adminis tra t ion C o l l e c t i v e Bargaining Labour Standards L e g i s l a t i o n York Stoppages and/or Terms and C o n d i t i o n s of Work -3-profes s iona l engineers i s based on growing numbers and increas ing influence of engineers and t h e i r profess ional col leagues. Walton (1961) j u s t i f i e s a study of t h i s nature with the fo l lowing l o g i c , "The s ize and growth of the engineering technica l segment of the work force gives the student of i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s s u f f i c i e n t reason for studying the experiences of c o l l e c t i v e bargaining among these employees. Even greater s ign i f i cance may be attached to a study of the engineering group when one considers i t as a part of the whi te -co l l a r area (profess ional and technica l workers, managers, o f f i c i a l s and propr ie tor s , c l e r i c a l and sales workers) s ince that area now exceeds i n number the b l u e - c o l l a r a rea . " Strauss (I963) further s tates , "Under a system of large-sca le commercial and i n d u s t r i a l organizations a l l those who occupy important pos i t ions w i l l gradual ly come wi th in profess ional associat ions or at l ea s t under t h e i r inf luence ."2 These arguments for research into un ion iza t ion of profess ional engineers are appropriate i n Canada at the present time. Increasing acceptance of c o l l e c t i v e bargain-ing by the engineering facet of the whi te -co l l a r sector may r e f l e c t upon trends for other profess ionals as we l l as changing at t i tudes on behalf of soc ie ty as a whole. Engineers and profess ional colleagues are unique however i n that they are increas ing i n numbers and influence more qu ick ly than other work groups, as evidence i n l a t e r chapters c l e a r l y i l l u s t r a t e s . Engineering unions const i tute the main focus of th i s paper but appl ica t ions to other profess ionals and soc ie ty i n general are noted i n the d i scuss ion . B. Goal One goal of th i s paper i s to indicate future p o s s i b i l -i t i e s for un ioniza t ion by studying various factors and t h e i r degrees of influence on profess ional engineers. Probable future outcomes for engineering unionism must be ca lcu la ted af ter exposure to opinions and facts from both sides of the argument. Conclusions of the paper a lso set a further goal which i s to present a de ta i l ed treatment of how an engineering union would funct ion and what issues i t would l i k e l y be concerned wi th 0 Methods of reaching th i s end include a review of the l i t e r a t u r e which i s addressed to c o l l e c t i v e bargaining i n many p e r i o d i c a l s , and books combined with unwritten sources, such as interviews and conferences, to formulate conclusions with the greatest amount of input pos s ib le . United States experience and l i t e r a t u r e i s valuable because some condi t ions , s imi l a r to those e x i s t i n g i n Canada today existed for engineers i n the U.S . many years ago, and the engineers of the two countries are of an apparently s i m i l a r nature. The plan of the paper i s intended to a id i n accomplishing a thorough treatment of the subject by organiz ing mater ia l i n a l o g i c a l manner for ana ly s i s . -5-C„ Plan of the Paper The layout of the paper i s planned to enhance d i scuss ion of the p r o b a b i l i t y of widespread un ion iza t ion of Canadian profess ional engineers. Topics include past developments, the current s i t u a t i o n , a t t i tudes of engineers, and f i n a l l y predic t ions and suggestions for the future . Relevant labour s tatutes , the nature of engineers, behavioural inf luences , as wel l as factors favouring and opposing organizat ion for c o l l e c t i v e bargaining are a l l discussed i n d e i a i l . Chapters have been arranged so that e a r l i e r segments of the study b u i l d a foundation for deeper analys i s i n l a t e r chapters. A b r i e f overview of the ent i re paper i s included as part of the in t roduct ion to i l l u s t r a t e a l l factors which oppose change, or enhance un ion iza t ion p o s s i b i l i t i e s . There i s no d i scuss ion of r e l a t i v e merits of arguments at th i s point because the s p e c i f i c aim of the sect ion i s to introduce a l l the relevant factors which are wi th in the realm of t h i s study. Chapter Two deals with engineers ' work ro les along with the nature of profess ional engineers. This b u i l d i n g chapter offers a good reference point to s tar t understanding values and needs of engineers as wel l as the complexity of the term "engineer . " George Strauss offers a model which i l l u s t r a t e s work ro les of engineers to help the reader understand engineers' duties i n organizat ions . Movements i n engineering work ro les may stress d i f f e rent components -6-of engineering s k i l l s and each a l t e r a t i o n of the work r o l e has d i f f e r e n t p o t e n t i a l e f f e c t s on union p o s s i b i l i t i e s , S t r a u s s ' model i s u s e f u l throughout the paper to i l l u s t r a t e how such f a c t o r s as bureaucracy or p r o f e s s i o n a l treatment a f f e c t o r g a n i z a t i o n of engineers. Needs, values and c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of p r o f e s s i o n a l engineers are a l s o introduced a t a very e a r l y stage to provide i n s i g h t i n t o engineers' behaviour. While these needs and values are d e a l t w i t h i n d e t a i l i n the s o c i a l chapter, they must be considered at an e a r l i e r time because they i n f l u e n c e engineers' a t t i t u d e s at a l l times. Teachers are a l s o discussed i n chapter two because they are the c l o s e s t comparison group to engineers i n terms of past experience and present s t a t u s , t h e r e f o r e they c o n s t i t u t e a v a l u a b l e reference group f o r l a t e r d i s c u s s i o n . Organizing and o r g a n i z a t i o n of engineers i s the subject of the next s e c t i o n . Reasons f o r union growth i n general, i n c l u d i n g economic, p o l i t i c a l , i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s , and s o c i o l o g i c a l f a c t o r s are presented. A f t e r a macro=view of union growth has been f u l l y e x plained, the focus moves to reasons f o r w h i t e - c o l l a r union growth. Bain c o n t r i b u t e s to issues such as trade union aspects, r e c o g n i t i o n by employers, p u b l i c p o l i c y and aspects of the work s i t u a t i o n to introduce d i s c u s s i o n on w h i t e - c o l l a r unionism. F o l l o w i n g reasons f o r union growth, a c t u a l growth f i g u r e s concerning the t o t a l labour f o r c e , w h i t e - c o l l a r workers, p r o f e s s i o n a l s , -7-and engineers are presented. These figures i l l u s t r a t e the great p o t e n t i a l white-collar area which i s available f o r organization i f the previously mentioned forces f o r union development are favourable. A c t i v i t i e s , goals and influence of professional associations are e s s e n t i a l factors i n the development of engineering unions. Past practices and a c t i v i t i e s of engineers* associations are presented i n conjunction with s p e c i f i c type of associations i n Canada. If widespread organization f o r c o l l e c t i v e bargaining were to occur, the r o l e of associations may a l t e r d r a s t i c a l l y and so might t h e i r importance. This i s e s p e c i a l l y true i f separate bodies are formed f o r the purpose of c o l l e c t i v e bargaining,, S p e c i f i c reasons f o r growth and v i a b i l i t y of engineers' unions merit a separate chapter. This chapter delves with great d e t a i l into the arguments which favour unionization of engineers. S a l a r i e s , the labour market, the trade union movement, attitudes toward unionism, and professional treatment are a few elements which have posit i v e implications for c o l l e c t i v e bargaining. Sources and impact of forces which encourage union formation are expanded upon i n t h i s section to analyze how great the effects s h a l l be on engineers' behaviour. Labour law has played a major role concerning unionization of professional engineers i n Canada. Labour statutes serve - 8 -as a vehicle to i l l u s t r a t e the dogmatic stands of most engineering associations i n the past to r e j e c t c o l l e c t i v e bargaining. U n t i l very recently there were very few provinces where engineers were allowed to bargain l e g a l l y but due to changes i t i s now possible f o r engineers i n Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Ontario, New Brunswick, and Quebec (as well as federal c i v i l servants) to form c e r t i f i e d bargaining units . Development and use of informal bargaining i s the only strategy available i n other provinces, therefore labour statutes e f f e c t i v e l y prevent a nation-wide movement towards unionization. Federal labour law of 1947-48 served as a model f o r p r o v i n c i a l labour acts and the h i s t o r y of this law i s traced i n the chapter. Of course, Labour Relations Boards are also important influences on any unionization attempt because of th e i r role i n i n t e r p r e t i n g the law and the use of past practice to help determine which units w i l l be l e g a l l y c e r t i f i e d . Thus the boards also w i l l be discussed i n Chapter Five, Chapter Six explores a wide range of s o c i a l issues concerning unionization. S p e c i f i c needs and values of engineers a i d i n determining targets which unions must s a t i s f y . The basic value system of engineers' i s c r i t i c a l to organization because unionization can only be successful i f these values and needs are given top p r i o r i t y . Conversion of predispositions into action i s relevant f o r union - 9 -organizers as w e l l as company r e c r u i t e r s . Environmental f a c t o r s and s p e c i f i c elements i n engineers* backgrounds may a f f e c t the a t t i t u d e s and f u t u r e behaviour of p r o f e s s i o n a l engineers toward c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g . Influence of group s i z e i s an appropriate issue f o r engineers because of the s h i f t i n t h e i r employment to l a r g e o r g a n i z a t i o n s . The i m p l i c a t i o n s of group s i z e are therefore a l s o presented i n t h i s s e c t i o n . Pressures which i n h i b i t union formation are i n c l u d e d i n Chapter Seven f o r a n a l y s i s i n d e t a i l . Factors i n h i b i t i n g , union formation i n c l u d e the t r a d i t i o n a l philosophy of engineers, the p r o f e s s i o n a l viewpoint, management l i n k s , f e a r of u n i f o r m i t y , and management p r a c t i c e . The a c t u a l degree to which i n h i b i t i n g f o r c e s reduce the p r o b a b i l i t y of union formation i s c e n t r a l to t h i s paper and the d i s c u s s i o n aims at e s t i m a t i n g t h i s f a c t o r i n Canada a t the present. The f i n a l chapter i n c l u d e s conclusions on u n i o n i z a t i o n p r o b a b i l i t i e s , o r g a n i z i n g s t r a t e g i e s , i s s u e s f o r union organizors, management aspects of u n i o n i z a t i o n , and f u t u r e prospects. Issues such as s a l a r i e s , s e n i o r i t y , f r i n g e b e n e f i t s , communication and autonomy are discussed i n d e t a i l . Much of the co n c l u s i o n i s devoted to greater s a t i s f a c t i o n f o r engineers with or without unions and i n some instances both employer and employee may achieve greater s a t i s f a c t i o n simultaneously. The outlook f o r the f u t u r e i s a r e s u l t of d e t a i l e d a n a l y s i s of the body of the paper as w e l l as -10-extrapola t ion by the author. D. A. General Overview At t h i s point i t i s valuable to give the reader a general f e e l for the area concerning profes s iona l engineers. The purpose of t h i s sect ion i s not to discuss p r o b a b i l i t y of un ion iza t ion but rather to i l l u s t r a t e the great number of forces which might u l t i m a t e l y af fect the behaviour of engineers. A general overview of the s i t u a t i o n helps erect a foundation on which the res t of the paper can be b u i l t . Deta i l ed analys i s i n fo l lowing chapters draws from topics presented here but f i r s t one can see just how various elements re l a te to un ion iza t ion . The table presented i n t h i s sect ion i s an i l l u s t r a t i o n of forces , NOT t h e i r magnitude nor future in f luence . In studying engineers i t i s eas iest to begin with the present s i t u a t i o n as fo l lows: OVERALL FORCES ACTING ON ENGINEERS Forces which are conductive to union formation Forces which i n h i b i t union formation 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 1. B . C . , Ontar io , and Quebec s i tua t ions . Growth of bureaucracy. Employer recogni t ion . F a c i l i t a t i n g l e g i s l a t i o n . Labour market. M o b i l i t y . 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 1. As soc ia t ion philosophy. Incompat ib i l i ty . Management p rac t i ce . Legal aspects. M i l i t a n c y . I d e n t i f i c a t i o n with management. Upward m o b i l i t y . T r a d i t i o n a l a t t i tudes . Trade-union image. 7. New soc ie ty a t t i tudes . 8. Canadian Labour Congress. 9. Paid employment. 10. Personal treatment. 7. 8. 9. 11. Profess ional treatment. 12. Federal c i v i l servants. TABLE ONE -11-Forces presented i n t h i s diagram were discovered through evidence and viewpoints of many sources which w i l l appear throughout the essay. This s t a r t i n g point i s useful for review and r e l a t i n g the s p e c i f i c subjects as they ar i se i n the body of the paper. The points are arranged i n roughly the same order as they are discussed i n the paper so that Table One may be used as a reference for review of which factors have been presented. The d i v i s i o n of factors i s meant s o l e l y for s i m p l i c i t y and i t i s noted that most of the elements i n Table One may be e i ther conducive or i n h i b i t o r y to union formation depending on the s p e c i f i c s i t u a t i o n , ( i e . personal treatment may be unacceptable i n some companies and exce l lent i n others . ) -12-CHAPTER TWO PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERS IN THE CANADIAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS SYSTEM Chapter two establishes a foundation for following sections by introducing important fundamental information i n regard to engineers. The Strauss Model i l l u s t r a t e s work roles of engineers and th i s diagram i s very useful i n explaining how d i f f e r e n t influences such as bureaucracy and t r a d i t i o n a l b e l i e f s of engineers a l t e r union p o s s i b i l -i t i e s . The effects of developments such as poor labour markets, unprofessional treatment, new attitudes i n society, and engineers codes of behaviour may a l l be i l l u s t r a t e d i n terms of the Strauss Model, so i t i s a valuable tool for analysis. Introduction of the Strauss Model also helps reveal the unique nature of engineers i n terms of the complexity of work roles and demands. Engineers* needs and values are additional basic elements which influence attitudes towards unionization and t h e i r propensity to unionize. Presentation of the nature of engineers i s c r i t i c a l to any analysis of engineers' future actions, therefore a general outline i s presented i n the systems chapter but further refinement appears i n the s o c i a l aspects section. At this early point i n the paper, facets of teachers' s i t u a t i o n are also introduced because teachers are the most comparable -13-reference group for engineers. A l l of the information i n t h i s chapter i s c r i t i c a l i n l a t e r sections because of i t s fundamental nature which af fects the amount of inf luence held by forces i n engineers ' environments. A. The Strauss Model George Strauss (1963) of fers a typology of work roles wi th in which the engineers ' unique work ro le i s e a s i l y and f r u i t f u l l y discussed. Through comparison of such dimensions as craftsmanship, c o n t r o l , t r a i n i n g , and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , Strauss derives a model which represents work ro le s of engineers. These ro le r e l a t ionsh ip s are i l l u s t r a t e d i n Figure Two below: THE STRAUSS MODEL OF WORK ROLES Executives s & Workers FIGURE TWO Strauss , George, "Profess ional ism and Occupational A s s o c i a t i o n s " , I n d u s t r i a l Rela t ions , Ins t i tu te of I n d u s t r i a l Re la t ions , U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a , Berkley, V o l . 2, No. 3, May I963, p. 11. -14-I t would be erroneous however, to consider an "engineer" to be a purework category i n i t s e l f . Engineers pa r t i c ipa te i n work ro le s which demand s k i l l s of workers and managers as we l l as profess ional c a p a b i l i t i e s . Each engineering p o s i t i o n requires a d i f f e rent mix of s k i l l s and the Strauss Model i l l u s t r a t e s the competing ro le demands which are placed on engineers. Examples of manager segments of the engineer 's work ro le include high personal r e s p o n s i b i l i t y P a desire to get ahead, cont ro l over subordinates and c o n f i d e n t i a l s tatus . (Strauss, I963). A l l of these t r a i t s are necessary to manage e f f e c t i v e l y i n any organizat ion. Worker facets of the engineer r o l e are evidenced by desires for greater secur i ty , taking orders from a boss, d i s t i n c t job dut ies , and the pursuance of overtime pay and increased f r inge benef i t s . (Strauss, I963). F i n a l l y , the profes s iona l or ro le f a c i t for engineers includes s e l f - d i r e c t i o n , high idea l s i n the sciences , i d e n t i f i c a t i o n with the group, and a desire for i n t e r a c t i o n with col leagues . D i f f e rent engineering jobs require d i f f e rent combinations of s k i l l s with the r e s u l t that engineers must a l t e r t h e i r work roles as projects change over time. I t i s imperative that engineers possess a f l e x i b l e outlook as we l l as a broad set of s k i l l s i f task requirements are to be f i l l e d e f f e c t i v e l y . Problems a r i se i f engineers have d i f f i c u l t y i n changing o r i e n t a t i o n such as s h i f t i n g from a s c i e n t i f i c ro le to a managerial r o l e . -15-A. 1. Unions and the Strauss Model Attempts of engineers to gain recogni t ion as f u l l profess ionals i n spi te of the worker and manager aspects of t h e i r ro le requirements i s an important issue i n t h i s paper. Evidence i s presented i n the law sec t ion , the s o c i a l s ec t ion , and i n the pressures against union formation sec t ion to support the outstanding importance of f u l l profes s iona l status to engineers. The Strauss Model can be roughly d iv ided to coincide with unionized and non-unionized workers i n the re s t of the work place. This s p l i t i n the diagram separates workers who are more l i k e l y to unionize from those who are not . This i s important for engineers because many engineers are i n jobs which are appropriate for un ioniza t ion and the diagram i s useful l a t e r to see sh i f t s toward or away from the union sec t ion . A DIAGRAM SHOWING THE MOST LIKELY AREAS FOR UNIONIZED VS. NON-UNIONIZED WORKERS IN THE STRAUSS MODEL MORE LIKELY TO LIKELY TO BE UNIONIZED S c i e n t i s t s and Profess ionals Workers FIGURE THREE -16-This i s not a d i v i s i o n which represents unionized versus non-unionized workers, rather i t indicates which work ro les are most l i k e l y to enhance the chances of c o l l e c t i v e bargaining. The diagram i n Figure Three presents the engineering enigma because engineering r o l e requirements are d i s t r i b u t e d throughout the whole space and many engineers no doubt face r o l e requirements i n the area which i s more l i k e l y to be organized for c o l l e c t i v e bargaining. This paper s h a l l study the engineers ' s i t u a t i o n to discover where engineers are concentrated on the diagram at present as w e l l as analyzing future s h i f t s i n concentrat ion. I f a large por t ion of engineers are moving towards the unionized sect ion then i t i s c r i t i c a l to discover behavioural impl ica t ions of such a s h i f t . This diagram i s of further value i n i l l u s t r a t i n g ef fects of forces which push and p u l l engineers in to and away from s i tua t ions which are appropriate for u n i o n i z a t i o n . B. Dilemna of Profess ionals Engineers have exerted continuous attempts to have the term "profess ional engineer" r e f l e c t a pure profes s iona l s tatus . F u l l documentation of these e f for t s are presented throughout the paper with p a r t i c u l a r emphasis i n the law, s o c i a l , and pressures against un ion iza t ion chapters. Herein ar i ses a dilemna. The term "profess ional engineer" includes self-employed engineers, paid engineers h i r e d i n a profes s iona l capaci ty , and paid engineers h i r e d i n a non-profess ional -17-capaci ty . (Goldenberg, 1968). Profess ional engineers f u l f i l l jobs which f a l l anywhere between b l u e - c o l l a r pos i t ions to managerial ro les and the non-profess ional work ro les are becoming more dominant i n Canada. Car r -Saunders and Wilson (1933) describe the breadth of engineering tasks: "There are innumerable small graduations i n s k i l l , knowledge and experience from the lowest l eve l s to the leaders of the profess ion."3 Strauss (1963) a lso s tates , " I t would be a great mistake to think of engineers as a homongeneous c l a s s . " ^ The term "profess ional engineer" may wrongly imply a great v a r i e t y of s k i l l s or job content i n l i g h t of th i s evidence. The re su l t of th i s s i t u a t i o n can be shown i n the Strauss Model i n the fo l lowing manner i n Figure Four: DISPERSION OF ENGINEERS WORK ROLES ENGINEER Exec. C l e r i c a l & Foremen Functional S t a f f Men S k i l l e d ' Craftsman Professional Worker FIGURE FOUR -18-Thus upon r e f l e c t i o n , the general desire for f u l l "pro fe s s iona l " status may wel l be inappropriate for large portions of the engineering labour force . A great number of engineers experience work s i tua t ions which most l i k e l y would be unionized i f any other worker held that job. Re ject ion of c o l l e c t i v e bargaining i s not an appropriate response i f unacceptable aspects at the work place could be improved by a union. I f a s h i f t i n concentrat ion pushes more engineering pos i t ions towards the unionizable sector of the diagram (as shown i n Figure F i v e ) , then many engineers and some p r o v i n c i a l governments may have to a l t e r t h e i r stances on un ion iza t ion . For examples GREATER STRESS ON WORKER ROLE FROM Worker Worker FIGURE FIVE There i s evidence to show that pressures are f o r c i n g engineers into work ro le s which enhance the p r o b a b i l i t y of un ion iza t ion on a wider scale i n Canada and th i s evidence -19-i s presented l a t e r i n the paper. A goal of th i s paper i s to analyze the strength and permanence of th i s s h i f t i n add i t ion to the forces which cause i t . P r o b a b i l i t y of engineering unioniza t ion i n Canada w i l l be based on the degree of concentrat ion of engineers i n ro le s which they perceive as unprofess ional and unacceptable, and cont inuing movements toward emphasis on worker ro les i n the organizat ion enhance t h i s p r o b a b i l i t y grea t ly . C. Nature of a Profess ional The term "profes s iona l " stands for a spec i f i c set of c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s and values . Strauss (1963) aids i n de f in ing profes s iona l with a simple yet comprehensive set of requ i re-ments : (1) Expert ise - s p e c i a l i z e d knowledge and s k i l l s . (2) Autonomy. (3) Committment to a c a l l i n g - i d e n t i f i c a t i o n with members of the profess ion not the company, cosmopolitan o r i en ta t ion rather than l o c a l (see s o c i a l chapter.) (4) A f e e l i n g of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to soc ie ty to maintain performance standards or work-including a code of e thics and a code of d i s c i p l i n e . 5 A group of profess ionals must possess a l l of these c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s to be t r u l y c lassed i n the profes s iona l category. A l l four aspects of t h e ' d e f i n i t i o n should be remembered throughout the ana lys i s to conclude i f engineers are r e a l l y profes s iona l s , or what port ion of engineers r e a l l y demonstrate these t r a i t s . I t i s c r i t i c a l -20-to determine i f engineers are profess ionals faced by non-profes s iona l work ro les or i f very few of these workers have true claims to profes s iona l status. The nature of a profes s iona l i s i n d i c a t i v e of h i s desired r o l e i n the i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s system. This i s important because engineers s t r i v e for s p e c i f i c needs and values and also because the f i n a l goal of the movement to pro fes s iona l ize engineers i s to u l t i m a t e l y have a l l engineers exh ib i t these t r a i t s . Many engineers exh ib i t general c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s that are thought to be " t y p i c a l " of most profess ionals and these would i l l u s t r a t e members of the profes s iona l category i n the Strauss Model. C. (1) Needs and Values Prandy ( I965) and Strauss ( I 9 6 3 ) present c e r t a i n needs which character ize profess ional s . Engineers" needs include autonomy, completion, chal lenge, profes s iona l s k i l l , l ea rn ing , and profess ional recogn i t ion . (Strauss, I 9 6 3 ) . Needs exhibi ted by most profess ionals are higher order ones i n terms of the Maslow hierarchy because they lead to s e l f -a c t u a l i z a t i o n , therefore these needs d i f f e r from t y p i c a l b l u e - c o l l a r needs of s ecur i ty and interpersonal r e l a t ionsh ip s so that profess ionals can be segragated from b l u e - c o l l a r workers i n terms of needs. A major problem associated with a group such as engineers involves placement of workers who have profess ional needs into b l u e - c o l l a r jobs where changes to s e l f - a c t u a l i z e are non-existent . -21-Profess ionals also possess a unique system of values which dis t inguishes them from other workers. S p e c i f i c values such as freedom, dedicat ion to work, and ind iv idua l i sm are c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of profess ionals who place high importance on s c i e n t i f i c idea l s . Profess ion values genera l ly tend to separate engineers from b l u e - c o l l a r workers and management because of t h e i r i d e a l i s t i c nature. S p e c i f i c values of profess ionals are presented i n d e t a i l i n " Soc i a l Aspects" i n Chapter F i v e . D. An Overview of the Roles , Needs and Values of Profess ionals Profess ionals possess r o l e s , needs and values which are completely separate from management or worker t r a i t s i n these areas. Whi te-co l l a r segments of the work force f i l l a ro le between that of a manager and a worker and w h i t e - c o l l a r workers to add breadth to the work system. P r i o r to the emergence of w h i t e - c o l l a r workers the work force was po la r i zed with management at one extreme and workers at the opposite end. (Strauss, 1963)- Whereas work s i tua t ions formerly consis ted of those who gave orders and those who took them, profess ionals have f i l l e d a gap i n work r o l e s , values and needs. The influence of whi te -co l l a r workers i n the Canadian i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t ions system and numbers of white-c o l l a r workers have grown grea t ly over the past few decades. Goldenberg (I968) s ta tes , "White-co l l a r -22-workers i n Canada are the fas tes t growing work sector , as t h i s segment grew from 15-2% i n 1901 to 38.6% i n the I 9 6 I worker t o t a l . " 6 Profess ionals are a sub-group of white-c o l l a r workers who i n turn grew much more qu ick ly than the whi te -co l l a r average. With rap id growth of white-c o l l a r workers i t i s evident that such a t tent ion must be paid to needs and values which are important to white-c o l l a r employees on the job. Bureaucracy opposes v i r t u a l l y a l l values and needs mentioned yet i t i s becoming more dominant as a method of adminis t ra t ion as large organizations become more evident. (Bain, 1970). D. Teachers Teachers const i tute an occupation group which has some meaningful comparabi l i ty to engineers. They have s i m i l a r t r a i n i n g and job market s i tua t ions as we l l as many profes s iona l needs and values l i k e those of engineers. Experiences of teachers i n un ion iza t ion could prove to be important to engineers because of these s i m i l a r i t i e s . E . (1) Teacher S i m i l a r i t i e s Teachers exhib i t many s p e c i f i c s i m i l a r i t i e s to engineers as seen by Nault (I969). These s i m i l a r i t i e s inc lude : (1) Teachers formerly faced economic i n j u s t i c e with t r a d i t i o n a l l y lower l eve l s of pay than other professions (any many trades as w e l l . ) Unioniza t ion has changed th i s problem through c o l l e c t i v e ac t ion however and ra i sed the s a l a r i e s to an average of $7,124 i n 1970 from $1,965 i n - 2 3 -1950. Much of th i s ra i se i s due to a more m i l i t a r y stance at the c o l l e c t i v e bargaining t ab le , as Sect ion E ( I I ) i l l u s t r a t e s . Engineers are not r e a l l y as poorly paid as the teachers were but they do have sa lary problems i n c l u d i n g r e l a t i v e l y lower s a l a r i e s i n comparison to s e l f -employed engineers as we l l as peaking of s a l a r ie s at an ea r ly stage i n the work l i f e . (Goldenberg, 1968). (2) Teachers subscribe to bosses and they often experience rigid.community c o n t r o l over t h e i r personal l i v e s . (Nault , I969). This s i t u a t i o n contradicts needs of autonomy and challange which are s imi l a r values to engineers. "One can p a r a l l e l the percentage of engineers who now work for organizat ion (95%) to teachers who include 99% paid employees."7 (3) Nault states that teachers are upward mobile l i k e engineers, because teachers look to such areas as department heads and p r i n c i p a l s as we l l as appointed pos i t ions on school boards. Teachers also face fewer opportunit ies for advancement today much l i k e engineers i n large organizat ions . (4) Teachers are expected to j o in associat ions immediately upon entry into the job market as do most engineers. These associat ions are p r o v i n c i a l such as engineers associat ions and many a c t i v i t i e s are s i m i l a r except for c o l l e c t i v e bargaining. -24-(5) Moonlighting occurs i n both occupations with outside in teres t s such as papers pursued by both. Engineers consult to gain more money whereas teachers tutor pupi l s to supplement t h e i r income. (6) Teachers face increased bureaucrat izat ion and la rger work organizat ion which present s i m i l a r problems to those of engineers. (Nault, 1969). (7) Teachers face archaic personnel pract ices i n many schools . For example u n i l a t e r a l i s m , and concentra-t i o n of decision-making power are common pract ices i n teaching and these pract ices are becoming more prevalent i n engineering as bureaucrat izat ion increases , Nault a lso presents sovereignty, pa t ron iz ing and paternalism as teacher problems at the work place which make un ion iza t ion more a t t r a c t i v e . (8) There i s a fear of power erosion i n schools . Administrators expect a loss of power where c o l l e c t i v e bargaining exis t s and the threat of m i l i t a n c y occurs. This means less co-operation may occur between teachers and t h e i r bosses with the r e s u l t that teachers may i d e n t i f y les s with upper l eve l s of the profess ion. Anxiety over loss of power may be too great because c o l l e c t i v e bar-gaining has not a l t e red power bases for management and teachers to any huge degree. (9) Teaching i s going through the process of p ro fe s s iona l i z a t ion as i s engineering. Teachers are - 2 5 -making progress i n gaining profess ional recogni t ion i n spi te of the use of c o l l e c t i v e bargaining. (Nault, 1969). This i s an extremely important p a r a l l e l because of the impact of profes s iona l status on profess ional engineers* behaviour toward un ion iza t ion , (10) Teachers are also a very heterogeneous group i n knowledge, s k i l l s and job content. They teach d i f fe rent subjects at d i f ferent l eve l s and may have ended up as teachers as a r e su l t of many d i f f e rent paths through the u n i v e r s i t y curr iculum. S i m i l a r l y engineers const i tute a heterogeneous group and they may take various d i f f e rent courses to a t t a i n engineering s k i l l s . (11) "Age d i s t r i b u t i o n s of engineers and teachers also o show great s i m i l a r i t y which could effect u n i o n i z a t i o n . " AGE DISTRIBUTION OF ENGINEERS AND TEACHERS Tota l -24 2 5 - 2 9 3 0 - 3 ^ 3 5 - 4 ^ 4 5 - 5 4 5 5 - 6 4 65+ Engineers 100% 7~£2 17.28 34 . 28 14 .44 6771 1775 Teachers 100% 4 . 7 5 1 2 . 9 6 31.52 20 . 3 3 9 . 5 5 3 .42 TABLE TWO E . (II) Teacher M i l i t a n c y and Profess ional M i l i t a n c y In General Acceptance of c o l l e c t i v e bargaining by teachers r e f l e c t s some general trends i n Canadian i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s . S o c i a l protest has come to a new perspective and Canadian society now sees a new et iquette of s o c i a l protest according to Goldenberg ( I 968 ) and Nault (1969). C i v i l disobedience through exercise of group power i s now -26-accepted by society as appropriate action i n unjust situations, whereas previously t h i s general approval was not present. A new climate has evolved i n labour relations to support c o l l e c t i v e action and the federal government has played a leading role i n allowing a l l workers, even white-collar employers, to j o i n for the purpose of c o l l e c t i v e bargaining. Workers are gradually gaining an image of competency and valuable donators which was not present i n past times. Workers are also increasingly seen as people with rights i n the work organization rather than subordinates who take orders eight hours a day without questioning anything. Even the "most" professional workers have been influenced by this trend, so have teachers. Evidence f o r professional involvement includes a s t r i k e by doctors i n Saskatchewan i n 1963, a s t r i k e by policemen i n Quebec i n 1970, and a s t r i k e by postal workers i n Canada i n I968. Democratic trends of the l a s t decade also a f f e c t general acceptance of militancy by workers. Employees now demand the r i g h t to p a r t i c i p a t e i n decisions which influence them or else they take strong action. Workers' dignity and human treatment of employees are much i n focus i n the newspaper and everyday news as these are issues which lead to c o l l e c t i v e action. E. ( I l l ) Teachers Pattern Development of teacher unions has resulted from these -27-general inf luences as wel l as the spec i f i c s of t h e i r s i t u a t i o n . A pattern which l e d to teacher ac t ion took a form which i s s imi l a r to the steps that engineers have followed so far i n t h e i r development. At f i r s t , t e a c h e r s formed associat ions with s i m i l a r goals to present engineering a s soc ia t ions . Status of the profess ion and communication with colleagues were t y p i c a l a c t i v i t i e s of teacher groups and these associat ions also exhib i t s i m i l a r segmentation to engineers with federa l groups and p r o v i n c i a l boundaries. In 1930 a change i n goals came about i n teacher a s soc ia t ions . The economic p o s i t i o n of teachers and t h e i r p o s i t i o n i n the schools was given more emphasis as the associat ions took a more " u n i o n - l i k e " stance. Result of the s h i f t i n emphasis was bargaining over economic issues and attempts to obta in higher pay ra i ses than before. Since adoption of the new stance teachers have become more m i l i t a n t and c lo se r to trade-unions i n some respects . Result of the change can be seen today as Nault (1969) shows object ives of teacher associat ions today: (1) Improvement of teachers ' s a l a r i e s and working condi t ions . (2) Establishment of a code of e thics and a system of d i s c i p l i n e . (3) A c q u i s i t i o n of a more i n f l u e n t i a l p o s i t i o n i n the p r o v i n c i a l education power s t ructure . -28-Alber ta and New Brunswick are the only two provinces where teachers can l e g a l l y s t r i k e . Other teachers are forced to use pressure t a c t i c s such as mass res ignat ions , p u b l i c i t y , and study sessions instead of the t o t a l mi l i t ancy involved i n a s t r i k e . A good example of the use of p u b l i c i t y i s the campaign of the B r i t i s h Columbia Teachers Federat ion against the S o c i a l C r e d i t government i n August, 1°?2. Teachers across Canada w i l l continue to use c o l l e c t i v e bargaining as a pressure against management to upgrade t h e i r p o s i t i o n because implementation of b l u e - c o l l a r t a c t i c s to face management i s a r e f l e c t i o n on the s i t u a t i o n which i s f o r c i n g the teacher more and more into a b lue-c o l l a r work s i t u a t i o n . SUMMARY This chapter has shown the complex requirements and job s k i l l s which are part of the engineers * ro le i n organizat ions . Engineers f requent ly do not perform work normally associated with a pure pro fe s s iona l , ra ther they are required to perform worker and manager functions as w e l l . The Strauss Model i l l u s t r a t e s ro le s of engineers i n the system with r e l a t i o n to other workers and t h i s model can be used to show how pressures and influences a f fect engineers i n r e l a t i o n to un ion iza t ion . The dilemna of the engineer i s burgeoning. While s t r i v i n g for f u l l profess ional s tatus , engineers f i n d themselves being -29-pushed more and more into a b l u e - c o l l a r r o l e , Needs and values of engineers were touched on to point out dif ferences between engineers and other workers. Teachers are a good comparison group for engineers because they have many s i m i l a r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s and t h e i r past experiences have p a r a l l e l e d engineering experience, except for the notable area of c o l l e c t i v e bargaining. Teachers w i l l be used as a reference group throughout the paper to v e r i f y issues or show how engineering unionism could develop. Teachers are general ly thought to be at a s imi l a r profes s iona l status to engineers or s l i g h t l y ahead of engineers but they have accepted c o l l e c t i v e bargaining i n spi te of profess ional values which oppose i t . - 3 0 -CHAPTER THREE NATURE OF ORGANIZATION AND ORGANIZING A. Reasons for General Union Growth-Cer ta in factors help expla in movements i n numbers of unionized workers i n Canada. Blum (1968) breaks down the factors which influence union organizat ion in to four general areas, inc lud ing economic, s o c i o l o g i c a l , p o l i t i c a l , and i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t ions f ac tor s . Within each topic there are s p e c i f i c facets which ef fect union membership and these elements w i l l be discussed i n d e t a i l for a l l four areas. I t must be r e a l i z e d that movements i n union membership cannot be f u l l y explained by these factors but hopeful ly some i n d i c a t i o n of trends can be der ived . The value of beginning with general union growth i s that i t gives a macro perspective from which to commence before the focus centres on d e t a i l s of the engineering sector . (1) Economic Factors Blum (1968) offers economic factors such as the business cyc le to expla in union growth. The state of business i s a key area which dictates i f condit ions are appropriate for organizat ion. During boom times, consumers, employers, and employees are a l l r e l a t i v e l y s a t i s f i e d because demand and p r o f i t s are high while unemployment i s minimal. Companies can af ford s i g n i f i c a n t pay ra i se s and job s e c u r i t y i s not an issue for most workers, therefore - 3 1 -union formation i s not required to enhance monetary needs nor to protect job secur i ty . Poor business condit ions have opposite consequences s ince p r o f i t s and job s ecur i ty diminish as the business cycle f a l l s . Under s t r e s s f u l condit ions which are experienced i n poor business times a union i s more l i k e l y to form and grow as a means to combat the severe tension of r i s i n g unemployment (see the s o c i a l chapter.) Pr ices are frequently used to expla in union movements i n the same way as business cyc le s , however the r e l a t i o n s h i p between pr ices and union impetus i s not so c lear as effects of business condi t ions . A p r i ce change may or ig inate from many sources which means that re su l t s of new pr ices are uncer ta in . For example, a r i s e i n pr ices may b r i n g higher p r o f i t s , more employment, and increased wages but the same ra i se may also lead to lower p r o f i t s and a smaller share of the market. Pr ice movements may re su l t i n a v a r i e t y of responses from the market and uncerta inty of p r i c i n g s trategy i s f a i r l y h igh . For instance, lower pr ices may a t t r ac t a l arger market share, greater p r o f i t and increased job secur i ty , but a cut i n pr ice may also be an attempt to minimize losses . Pr ices often do not b r i n g the desired re su l t s because expectations based on pr ice movements are vague at best unless the f i rm enjoys a monopoly p o s i t i o n i n market. Other factors such as marketing s trategies combined with pr ice changes further .complicates - 3 2 -the area. (2 ) P o l i t i c a l Factors Blum presents p o l i t i c a l factors as another determinant of union growth. L e g i s l a t i o n i s able to encourage or discourage union s ize through manipulation of regula t ions . Rules i n v o l v i n g union formation can be a l tered to stimulate union membership but they may also be tightened to r e s t r i c t organizat ion. For example, to encourage union formation the government may e s t ab l i sh new laws to allow a l l workers, i n c l u d i n g profess ional s , to unionize , and c e r t i f i c a t i o n procedures can be s i m p l i f i e d . I f the law protects union r ight s by preventing employer interference with organiz ing , then unions are l i k e l y to develop and grow. Garbarino ( 1971 ) supports th i s claim through a study of un ion iza t ion of professors i n which he found that the law was the predominant factor i n un ion iz ing . Where the law fostered union formation i t was almost inev i tab le that professors would unionize . J u d i c i a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i n regard to union formation i s another p o l i t i c a l factor which af fects union p o s s i b i l i t i e s . I f the j u d i c i a r y allows ambiguities i n the law to work for unions then union growth i s more l i k e l y . A l s o , i f the j u d i c i a r y relaxes evidence requirements for appropriateness then more c e r t i f i e d uni t s should develop i n Canada. Through swift r e so lu t ion concerning decis ions regarding exclus ion of c e r t a i n employees from the u n i t , i t i s further poss ible to encourage un ion iza t ion . -33-Great importance of favourable public p o l i c y toward unionism i s evident i n Canada. Most union growth i n Canada has occurred where labour law i s sympathetic to union formation, or where resistance of employers i s minimal. (Goldenberg, 1968). There are examples of favourable p o l i c y and i t s a f f e c t s throughout the paper (eg. u n i v e r s i t y professors, Quebec engineers, federal c i v i l servants) and t h i s area may override others i n importance b a s i c a l l y because of the severe setbacks that unfavourable p o l i t i c a l p o l i c i e s have on unionization. (Blum, Estey, Kuhn, Wildman, and Troy, 1971X (3) The I n d u s t r i a l Relations System Blum argues that the i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s system includes many elements which e f f e c t union development to a s i g n i f i c a n t degree, A l i b e r a l stance toward unionism combined with existence of voluntary recognition of bargaining units insures c o l l e c t i v e bargaining f o r engineers i n spite of unfavourable law. The role of sympathetic management i s i l l u s t r a t e d by Quebec and United Kingdom experiences where management has played a strong role i n f o s t e r i n g union formation. Management t a c t i c s are available to discourage union membership through imple-mentation of such actions as f i r i n g union-organizers or waging a strong campaign against organization. E x i s t i n g trade unions influence p o t e n t i a l union members through t h e i r pattern of administration and - 3 4 -s t ructure . Desires of non-organized workers to j o i n unions are enhanced through demonstration of a f a i r adminis t ra t ion which protects in teres t s of a l l union members. In terna l operation of the u n i t should exh ib i t no favouri t i sm to any group of members and a good c o l l e c t i v e bargaining r e l a t i o n s h i p with the employer i s des irable for some po tent i a l un i t s ( e spec ia l ly pro fe s s iona l s ) . P o t e n t i a l union members may be further discouraged by uneth ica l behaviour or poor publ ic images of competing unions. Organizat ional techniques are far d i f fe rent for white-c o l l a r un i t s than for b l u e - c o l l a r workers because of the unique values of whi te -co l l a r workers and t h e i r d i f f e rent goals from b l u e - c o l l a r workers. A good example of the dif ference between these workers i s the whi te -co l l a r stance which opposes uni formity and conformity whereas most b l u e - c o l l a r unions seek equal benef i t s with the stress on s e n i o r i t y . Work environments within the i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s system, the technologica l and marketing s t ructures , as we l l as the s t ra teg ic p o s i t i o n of the f i rm i n the industry b r i n g d i f f e r i n g impl icat ions for union growth. I f a company faces d i sas ter as a r e s u l t of a s t r i k e or large wage increase , then a hard b a t t l e i s more l i k e l y to be fought against organizat ion. On the other hand a company with l i t t l e competition or excess demand could pay higher wages with no i l l e f fect s . Proximity of unionized - 3 5 -workers wi th in the work environment i s a lso re levant to un ion iza t ion . (Bain, 1970). I t i s more probable that employees w i l l organize when another group of nearby workers has unionized with considerable benef i t s . (Indik and Golds te in , 19^3 )• V i s i b l e returns and solut ions to common problems encourage non-unionized workers to think about bargaining c o l l e c t i v e l y , D. S o c i o l o g i c a l Factors Blum also studies s o c i o l o g i c a l factors of groups which concern t h e i r development into formal u n i t s . Informal groups emerge p r i o r to formal groups and the stimulus for fo rmal i z ing a p a r t i c u l a r group i s often some danger to s t a b i l i t y or s ecur i ty of the informal group. For example, i n the case of a union the impetus to formalize could be wage cu t t ing or unjust d i s c i p l i n e which endangers s ecur i ty of the informal group, The formative per iod i s determined by four long-term and two short-term trends: I. Long-term (a) Employees s t ra teg ic p o s i t i o n i n the technolog ica l or market s t ructure . (b) Workers b e l i e f "they w i l l remain workers. (c) E f f ec t of community i n s t i t u t i o n s . (d) P r e v a i l i n g community a t t i tudes . I I . Short-term (a) Developments i n the labour market. (b) Fundamental unrest i n workers. -36-Short-term trends can often be l inked v/ith long-terra developments. For example, fundamental unrest i n workers can be t i e d to community a t t i tudes or a loss of worker importance i n the technologica l s tructure as wel l as from increased autonomation which leads to erosion of i n d i v i d u a l importance i n the organizat ion. Developments i n the labour market are associated with employees* s t ra teg ic p o s i t i o n i n technolog ica l and market s tructures as we l l as community i n s t i t u t i o n s . Long-term factors r e s u l t from more basic elements such as s c i e n t i f i c achievements a f f ec t ing technology, government p o l i c y , and emergency of permanent a t t i tudes i n soc ie ty whereas short-term factors r e s u l t from more temporary inf luences . These trends can e a s i l y be appl ied to teachers to show: why they have unionized. Teachers experienced less cont ro l over t h e i r p o s i t i o n i n schools over time because they were less and less able to make autonomous decis ions regarding t h e i r work. (Nault, 1969). There was a lso a fundamental b e l i e f that schoolboards and bureaucracy intended to d ic ta te rules for conduct at the school as wel l as rules per ta in ing to behaviour during after-work hours. New at t i tudes toward c o l l e c t i v e bargaining have resu l ted from l i t t l e autonomy, decreasing p o s s i b i l i t y for v e r t i c a l m o b i l i t y , and an unimportant r o l e i n decision-making regarding teaching. This combination of short and long-term influences was strong enough to convince teachers -37-that c o l l e c t i v e bargaining was the only t a c t i c which would help them e f f e c t i v e l y , E . Overview of Factors At present the general pressures for union growth are favourable i n Canada. Unemployment i s r e l a t i v e l y high, worker s ecur i ty i s low, bureaucracy and large i n s t i t u t i o n s are increas ing , and community a t t i tudes are po s i t i ve toward c o l l e c t i v e bargaining, (Boyd, 1971. Ba in , 1970, Bairstow, I 9 6 8 ) . These tensions increase the p r o b a b i l i t y of organizat ion because workers seek more s ecur i ty and greater inf luence i n important decis ions e f f ec t ing themselves. The l e g a l aspects chapter i l l u s t r a t e s a growing ro le that publ ic p o l i c y can play and i s p lay ing for u n i o n i z a t i o n . (Goldenberg, 1968, Garbarino, 1971). Favourable laws protect organizat ion r ight s for p o t e n t i a l u n i t members while they l i m i t employer t a c t i c s against organizat ion. Community a t t i tudes , employer acceptance, and labour market condit ions are strong examples of forces for un ion iza t ion i n Canada which indicate that union growth i s poss ible and perhaps even l i k e l y i n Canada. F, Growth of White-Col lar Unions George Bain (I969) offers a more spec i f i c set of forces which ef fect growth of whi te -co l l a r unionism. Bain presents such factors as demographic c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , recogni t ion by employers, the economic p o s i t i o n of the company, publ ic p o l i c y , aspects of the work s i tua t ions , - 3 8 -and trade union images. Whi te -co l l a r union p o s s i b i l i t i e s are increased i f these influences s igna l that union organizat ion i s appropriate under unacceptable circumstances. Bain (1969) stresses aspects of trade unions such as publ ic image, recruitment p o l i c i e s and union structure which ef fect whi te -co l l a r outlooks on unionism. An unfavourable publ ic image may imply a tendency to use m i l i t a n c y i n bargaining or i t may r e f l e c t on unequal treatment to u n i t members, both of which oppose engineers* values . An image of co-operat ion with the employer and community for mutual benef i t a t t rac t s whi te -co l l a r employees to a great extent. Union structure i s another determinant of wh i t e -co l l a r un ion iza t ion because a f a i r , democratic union structure i s c r i t i c a l to whi te -co l l a r workers, whereas an undemocratic one i s r epu l s ive . Spec ia l recruitment techniques for profess ionals must be studied because hard s e l l b i t t e r campaigns against employers are not compatible with engineering values . Po ten t i a l unions must have an image, recruitment p o l i c y , and structure which are as compatible as poss ible with whi te -co l l a r values or involvement of th i s sector i s u n l i k e l y . Bain (1970) presents union recogni t ion by employers as an important influence involved i n whi te -co l l a r u n i o n i z a t i o n . Voluntary recogni t ion i s a s i g n i f i c a n t pos i t ive factor for union development as i s evidenced i n Quebec and Bain also c i t e s studies done i n B r i t a i n - 3 9 -(McCormick-mining, Blackburn-banking, and various studies on r e t a i l c lerks) to support the importance of voluntary recogni t ion . This type of bargaining r e l a t i o n s h i p i s of considerable in teres t i n Canada because whi te -co l l a r workers are res t ra ined from forming bargaining un i t s i n many provinces . Voluntary bargaining presents an opportunity to maintain co-operation and a s p i r i t of f r i endsh ip i n c o l l e c t i v e bargaining rather than f o r c i n g adversary r e l a t i o n s . Government p o l i c y i s another c r i t i c a l factor i n the opinion of Bain (1969). Government p o l i c y has tremendous ef fect on whi te -co l l a r unionism through n e u t r a l i z a t i o n or containment of ant i -union t a c t i c s on the part of employers as we l l as making whi te -co l l a r c e r t i f i c a t i o n ava i l ab le to more employees. Unioniza t ion i s most s i g n i f i c a n t i n Saskatchewan and Quebec where publ ic p o l i c y fosters organizat ion more than other areas i n Canada, (Goldenberg, I968). Bain offers some a l te rna t ives to increase the r o l e of publ ic p o l i c y i n whi te -co l l a r unionisms (1) Force the union to demonstrate a majori ty only amongst those vot ing , not those e l i g i b l e . (2) Relax the requirements for pre-signed members before a vote. (3) Speed up the recogni t ion process. (4) Give unions more access for exchange with employees to give the union an equal opportunity with the -40-employer. A l l of these suggestions increase the l i k e l i h o o d of union development by making the c e r t i f i c a t i o n procedure more easy and less time consuming. These new procedures would combat employer res i s tance and i f the i n i t i a l groups met with success then others may also fo l low. G. Engineers and White-Col lar Unioniza t ion i n Canada (1) Growth of the White-Col lar Work Force Whi te -co l l a r areas have grown tremendously during recent decades. (Kleingartner , 1968) Increases i n numbers commenced at the turn of the century but the greatest surge occurred af ter 1931. "In 1901 whi te -co l l a r workers comprised 15.2% of the Canadian labour force whereas t h i s f igure has r i s e n to 24.4% i n 1931 and 38.6% i n I 9 6 I . " 9 Whi te-co l l a r growth has been greater than most sectors except for service workers. The fo l lowing table i l l u s t r a t e s the dramatic r i s e i n whi te -co l l a r workers: WORK FORCE GROWTH* % INCREASE (Number of whi te -co l l a r workers ( ,000) ) Group 1931 1941 1951 1961 1971 1931- 1951- 1961-_** 1 9 6 l 1961 1971 A l l Workers 3,922 4,196 5,215 6,342 8,771 6~T77 2176' 3o7o White-co l l a r 958 1,059 1,691 2,447 4,108 155.4 44.7 63.0 Manual 1,323 1,402 1,964 2,313 2,?10 67.2 12,7 17.0 Service 363 440 446 683 1,090 88.0 53.2 70.0 Primary 1,2?5 1,285 1,050 830 790 434.9 - 2 0 . 9 7.0 TABLE THREE * Goldenberg, S h i r l e y , Task Force on Labour Rela t ions , Study No. 2, Profes s iona l Workers and C o l l e c t i v e Bargaining, Queen's P r i n t e r Ottawa, 1968, p. 16. - 4 1 -Estimates from Information Canada. The whi te -co l l a r sector increased by over 63% between I96I and 1971 which i s far higher than the average (38%) for the whole labour force . The profess ional segment of the whi te -co l l a r categories as the fo l lowing table shows: WHITE-COLLAR WORKERS * ( ,000) Class 1931 1941 1951 196I 1971 *# 1931 1951 - 6 1 - 6 1 1 9 6 1 -71 T o t a l 9 5 8 1 ,059 1 , 6 9 1 2 , 4 4 7 155 .4 4 4 . 7 Managerial 220 226 393 501 7 8 9 1 2 8 . 0 2 2 . 5 5 9 . 7 C l e r i c a l 261 3 0 4 563 819 1,217 2 1 4 , 2 4 5 . 4 F i n a n c i a l & Commercial 240 247 3 4 9 4 9 3 105 .5 4 1 , 2 Technical Profess ional 238 282 3 8 6 6 3 4 1 , 1 4 2 166 ,4 6 4 , 5 7 9 . 9 Sales 573 Service 996 Transportat ion Communication 431 TABLE FOUR * Goldenberg, p. 16. * * From S t a t i s t i c s Canada - The Profess ional and Technica l category i s the c loses t noncensus labour force category which i s comparable to the profess ional category. No e a r l i e r data i s ava i lab le for comparison to the 1971 f igure because e a r l i e r data did not include laboratory technicians and engineering a s s i s tants . In the profess ional area a rch i tec t s (69,0%), authors and journa l i s t s (80.5%), teachers and col lege professors , (65,0%), and nurses (75.0%) have led to upsurge to a point profess ionals const i tute over twenty-five percent of a l l whi t e -co l l a r workers, (Goldenberg, 1968) , L imited opportunity for v e r t i c a l m o b i l i t y i s evidenced by managerial -42-f igures which show the lowest growth rate of a l l categories and th i s lack of v e r t i c a l m o b i l i t y destroys di dent i f i c a t i o n with management and a i t e r s engineers 's expectations from t h e i r jobs. Bureaucratic methods of adminis trat ion are s trong, po s i t i ve influences for un ion iza t ion when combined and the trend towards paid employment and rap id growth of engineers ra i ses the p r o b a b i l i t y of organizat ion to a s i g n i f i c a n t degree. (2) Growth of Engineers Profess ional engineers have experienced less spectacular growth than many other profes s iona l categories but they s t i l l have exhibi ted large increases . The fo l lowing table categorizes engineers and t h e i r spec i f i c rates of increase : GROWTH OF ENGINEERS* % Change Engineers 1931 1941 1951 1961 1931-61 1951-61** Chemical NA NA 2572 2995 16.4 C i v i l NA NA 7743 11,877 53.4 E l e c t r i c a l 3937 4567 6349 8,758 122.5 37.9 Mechanical & I n d u s t r i a l 2859 4518 8328 12,091 322.9 45.2 TABLE FIVE * Goldenberg, p. 17. * * There i s no deta i led breakdown at a l l for 1971, even i n a rough form. While engineers have grown i n absolute numbers, they have simultaneously experienced greater involvement i n paid employment. Muir (1971) and Goldenberg (1968) found that engineering pos i t ions cons i s t of over 95% paid work and -43-less then 5% self-employment. This movement towards paid employment i s consistent with other profess ional groups such as economists, teachers, nurses, and accountants. (Goldenberg, 1968). The fo l lowing chapter c l e a r l y i l l u s t r a t e s the pos i t ive impl icat ions which growth of engineering numbers and concentrat ion i n paid employment have for un ion iza t ion . The increase of engineering numbers i s t i e d to the evolut ion of l a rge , bureaucratic organizations which are becoming more evident i n Canada. Bureaucracy and i t s treatment of workers i s a very strong force for union formation as l a t e r sections show but the purpose of t h i s segment i s b a s i c a l l y to provide evidence of th i s growth and the movement towards paid employment. (3) Degree of Unioniza t ion of Engineers Most employed profess ionals already engage i n some form of c o l l e c t i v e ac t ion despite res is tance to formal c o l l e c t i v e bargaining, Goldenberg (I968) s tates , "Although i t has long been an accepted pract ice for profess ionals to engage i n some form of c o l l e c t i v e economic ac t ion , such as fee s e t t i n g , there has been considerable res i s tance i n the publ ic mind, to the idea of c o l l e c t i v e bargaining as the term i s general ly u n d e r s t o o d . " l 0 This quote helps i l l u s t r a t e that bargaining a c t i v i t i e s of profess ionals may f a l l anywhere between informal consu l ta t ion to f u l l c o l l e c t i v e bargaining, depending on the group and i t s circumstances, Although engineers are l e g a l l y able to form bargaining uni t s i n Ontar io , New Brunswick, Quebec, Manitoba and Saskatchewan, the only s i g n i f i c a n t organizat ion has taken place i n Quebec (50%) and i n the federa l c i v i l s e rv ice . (Goldenberg, 1968), Profes s iona l engineers i n other provinces must r e l y on voluntary re l a t ionsh ips with employers to par t i c ipa te i n c o l l e c t i v e bargaining. Goldenberg (I968) presents Ontario as a prime example to support the f e a s i b i l i t y and v i a b i l i t y of voluntary re l a t ionsh ip s because one-tenth of that province ' s engineers are act ive i n th i s form of u n i t . One s p e c i f i c purpose of t h i s paper i s to study p o s s i b i l i t i e s for future u n i o n i z a t i o n , as we l l as a l t e rna t ive s which may evolve, and informal bargaining could be one strong p o s s i b i l i t y for future actions of engineers. Presently i n Canada there i s l i t t l e c o l l e c t i v e bargaining done by engineers and i n many instances the r e a l "bargaining agent" i s the profes s iona l a s soc ia t ion . (4) Profess ional Associat ions Profess ional associat ions influence a l l Canadian profes s iona l engineers to some degree and the ro le of the a s soc ia t ion i n a new bargaining u n i t i s a c r i t i c a l problem which must be dealt with. The functions of the a s soc ia t ion w i l l a l t e r d r a s t i c a l l y i f widespread un ion iza t ion of engineers develops and associat ions may play a far d i f f e rent ro le i n the future. -45-In one sense engineers are t o t a l l y organized because v i r t u a l l y every engineer i n Canada belongs to a profes s iona l a s soc ia t ion which i s e i ther p r o v i n c i a l i n scope ( B r i t i s h Columbia Profess ional Engineers Associat ion) or wider i n j u r i s d i c t i o n such as the Engineering Ins t i tu te of Canada. There i s an as soc ia t ion i n every province, and two of the more i n f l u e n t i a l bodies i n Canadian engineering are The As soc i a t ion of Profess ional Engineers of Ontario and The Federat ion of Profess ional Engineers i n Quebec. (Goldenberg, 1968). Associat ions do not pa r t i c ipa te i n c o l l e c t i v e bargaining but they often seek re l a t ions with companies on behalf of engineers. Engineers associat ions do not seek adversary s ty le s of bargaining, rather they engage i n communications which set a goal of he lp ing both engineers, and often the company. Existence of associat ions may lead to granting of time off for conferences or leaves of absence for engineers to re turn to u n i v e r s i t y to upgrade s k i l l s . Associat ions also s t r i v e to obtain other benef i t s such as research r i ght s and r i g h t s to publ i sh s c i e n t i f i c f ind ings , i n other words there are attempts to persuade employers to grant priveleges to engineers. ( H a l l , I972), Strauss (1963) presents some s p e c i f i c purpose that associat ions are meant to serve. These goals are completely d i f f e rent from the goals of b l u e - c o l l a r unions because they r e a l l y seek to s a t i s f y needs i n a profess ional sense -46-more than i n monetary terms. Purposes of profes s iona l associat ions do not include the pursuance of increased wages nor greater f r inge bene f i t s , rather they are i d e a l i s t i c i n nature. These purposes inc lude : (1) S o c i a l f r a t e r n i z a t i o n . (2) Occupational i d e n t i f i c a t i o n . (3) Ra i s ing the status of the profess ion. (4) S e l f - r e g u l a t i o n . I t i s apparent from these purposes that the t y p i c a l profes s iona l a s soc ia t ion i s a s p e c i a l , i d e a l type of group. There i s a " s p i r i t " i n th i s type of organizat ion which i s s t rongly t i e d to t r a d i t i o n and i d e a l i s t i c values . In the case of profess ional engineers th i s s p i r i t i s d i r e c t l y opposed to c o l l e c t i v e bargaining with the r e s u l t that Bairstow, Strauss , Goldenberg, and most other observers f e e l c o l l e c t i v e bargaining should be done by a completely d i f f e rent body i f i t i s done at a l l . Within the basic purposes of profes s iona l associat ions there can be many s p e c i f i c forms as the fo l lowing sec t ion i l l u s t r a t e s . (5) Forms of Associat ions Profess ional associat ions may serve many functions and Strauss (1963) a lso presents a v a r i e t y of categories i n th i s area. While a l l associat ions serve the four purposes which were previous ly mentioned they may have completely d i f f e rent o r i enta t ions . Strauss has categorized associat ions i n the fo l lowing way: (1) Learned soc ie ty . -47-(2) Technica l soc ie ty . (3) Personal-achievement or iented . (4) Sounding boards. (5) F u l l y c e r t i f i e d u n i t s . Engineering associat ions i n Canada cover the f u l l spectrum of categories but the vast majori ty f a l l into the f i r s t four areas. Advancement of knowledge i s a primary goal of the learned soc ie ty and v i r t u a l l y a l l engineering associat ions s tress th i s aim. Advancement of knowledge i s important to status of the profess ion because i t separates profess ionals from b l u e - c o l l a r workers. A l l profess ional associat ions are learned soc ie t i e s to some extent whereas b l u e - c o l l a r unions do not stress th i s aspect i n general . Technical soc ie ty and personal achievement functions also fos ter occupational i d e n t i f i c a t i o n while attempting to ra i se the status of the profess ion. The f i r s t three or ientat ions are common to v i r t u a l l y a l l profess ional associat ions because they are inherent i n the term " p r o f e s s i o n a l . " Profess ional needs and values are the very reason for existence of profess ional a s soc ia t ions , therefore the f i r s t three functions must serve these unique needs and values . T r a d i t i o n a l l y , the ro le of profes s iona l associat ions has served the f i r s t three areas as Jean-Real Cardin (1961) s tates , "The ro le of the profess ional a s soc ia t ion i s to endow the profess ion, as already described, of some representat ive -48-and administrat ive organizations capable of representing i t amongst other professions and toward the ent i re community. I t also has to manage the profess ion for the best in te re s t of i t s members and the publ ic i n general by the recruitment of members and contro l of t h e i r a c t i v i t y , " 1 ! On the other hand Muir (1971) be l ieves that th i s t r a d i t i o n a l stand of associat ions must change to serve the l a s t two functions i f engineers are to obtain maximum benef i t from these a l l i a n c e s . The f i n a l two types of organizations are unique i n o r i e n t a t i o n and less dominant i n Canada, Sounding board functions are gaining popular i ty with Canadian profes s iona l engineers as new problems of bureaucracy emerge. This approach u t i l i z e s non-bargaining groups of engineers, i n c l u d i n g those i n management, to attempt improvements i n communication between engineers and management. A primary aim of th i s approach i s to resolve problems before they severely hamper management-engineer r e l a t ionsh ip s and a f fect performance of engineers. The incidence of f u l l y c e r t i f i e d engineering uni t s involves only a small port ion of engineers because there are eleven act ive engineering uni t s i n Canada. (Carson, 1973). There are uni t s such as the Northern E l e c t r i c Employees As soc i a t ion , the General E l e c t r i c Engineers Group, Canadian National Telecommunications, Profes s iona l Engineers ' Group, and the Ontario C i v i l Service Profes s iona l -1+9-Engineers ' Group but these uni t s ef fect only a small port ion of Canadian engineers. A push for un ion iza t ion and changes i n re levant laws and publ ic p o l i c y could a l t e r the Canadian s i t u a t i o n so that bargaining un i t s become more common. (6) A , General A c t i v i t i e s Engineering associat ions have t r a d i t i o n a l l y concerned themselves with a c t i v i t i e s outside the realm of c o l l e c t i v e bargaining. This stance i s derived from profes s iona l values and a philosophy which condemns c o l l e c t i v e bargaining as appropriate behaviour. Types of associat ions and t h e i r purposes have been discussed i n general so a more deta i l ed analys i s of a s soc ia t ion a c t i v i t i e s can now be presented. Engineering associat ions normally conduct seminars and conferences e i ther i n conjunction with employers or outside the work place . These events serve two purposes, f i r s t they upgrade s k i l l s and maintain excellence i n engineering knowledge, and secondly, they re inforce profes s iona l values and fos ter i d e n t i f i c a t i o n with col leagues. Group cohesion i s maintained through contact with fe l low engineers who also stress profes s iona l values . In add i t ion to educational experiences at seminars and conferences, i t i s not unusual for associat ions to conduct t h e i r own research or to j o in with u n i v e r s i t i e s to upgrade engineering knowledge. ( H a l l , 1972) . Assoc iat ions sometimes research issues outside the engineering area such as the p o s s i b i l i t y of c o l l e c t i v e bargaining for profes s iona l engineers. - 5 0 -Unions could play an important ro le i n f a c i l i t a t i n g seminars, courses at u n i v e r s i t i e s , and conferences by a c t u a l l y bargaining for time off to attend such a c t i v i t i e s . Education could receive a number of hours per week to attend courses or seminars so that a company's engineering s t a f f would be f a m i l i a r with a l l new engineering techniques. Maintenance and progression of engineering knowledge i s an asset to organizations because d i r e c t costs c u t t i n g or development of new processes (products) . The education aspects of c o l l e c t i v e bargaining would t i e the a s soc ia t ion and union c l o s e l y together, at l ea s t on t h i s subject but th i s does not neces sa r i ly mean the a s soc ia t ion and union have to be one body. A c q u i s i t i o n of new members and regu la t ion of engineering a t t i tudes and behaviour are further a c t i v i t i e s of a s soc ia t ions . Profess ional associat ions s t r i v e for 100% membership of a l l engineers i n Canada and th i s has been a v i r t u a l success. Names of new engineers are ava i lab le from u n i v e r s i t i e s or companies, therefore recruitment i s f a i r l y simple because engineers ' whereabouts are e a s i l y obtained and also because engineers f u l l y expect to j o i n as soc ia t ions . Contro l of behaviour and a t t i tudes i s a more c r i t i c a l funct ion of profess ional a s soc ia t ions . This ro le of the normative reference group (see s o c i a l chapter) re inforces profes s iona l conduct and values which are d i f f e rent from b l u e - c o l l a r behaviour. (Kemper, 1968). There i s a code of -51-behaviour which i s maintained by group pressure and i n many associat ions res is tance to c o l l e c t i v e bargaining i s proper conduct. Engineers ' associat ions are act ive lobbyi s t s as w e l l . Influence of l e g i s l a t i o n has been c a r r i e d on e f f e c t i v e l y i n the past and exclus ion of profess ional engineers from c o l l e c t i v e bargaining i s a d i r e c t r e s u l t of past lobbying e f for t s (see l e g a l aspects, Carrothers , 1965). Through lobbying a c t i v i t i e s associat ions are able to use group power to influence Canadian law i n favour of engineers ' des i res . The primary goal of a l l lobbying i s to enhance status of the engineering profess ion while pursuing profes s iona l values. Communication and information exchange i s a further a c t i v i t y of the a s soc ia t ion . Communication re inforces occupational i d e n t i f i c a t i o n through contact with colleagues throughout the profess ion. Communication also allows s c i e n t i s t s to obtain recogni t ion for s c i e n t i f i c achieve-ments which enhances p o s s i b i l i t i e s of s e l f - a c t u a l i z a t i o n . Assoc ia t ions a c t u a l l y serve as warehouses for information exchange by gathering a l l incoming data and d i spers ing i t to the correct members. Planning for conferences and contact with fel low engineers i n other parts of the country would be very d i f f i c u l t without existence of a s soc ia t ions . Wideman (1971) offers a c t i v i t i e s which w i l l develop far greater importance i n the future than i n past times. -52-These areas include l e g a l advice to a s soc ia t ion members, employment counse l l ing , p u b l i c a t i o n of member f ind ings , and job placement. A l l of these a c t i v i t i e s r e f l e c t upon condit ions which are fo rc ing engineers to contemplate c o l l e c t i v e bargaining and a s soc ia t ion a c t i v i t i e s may be aimed at lowering d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n . B. C o n f l i c t Engineering associat ions attempt to minimize i n t e r n a l and external c o n f l i c t to maintain harmonious r e l a t i o n s with management and fe l low workers. Assoc ia t ions search for reso lut ions to problems rather than us ing economic weapons to int imidate employers. S t r ikes are an "unprofess ional" means of in f luenc ing management, therefore associat ions avoid work stoppage at a l l costs . In sp i te of d i sda in for s t r i k e s , future developments may see some involvement i n s t r i k e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n Quebec. I f such an ac t ion becomes necessary then some v i t a l answers w i l l be provided to questions such as, how long would engineers support a s t r i k e , how would the government react , or would the union receive 100% support? M i l i t a n c e has t r a d i t i o n a l l y been a source of power for b l u e - c o l l a r unions. B l u e - c o l l a r negotiaters view employers as adversaries i n c o l l e c t i v e bargaining and the s t r i k e i s the ult imate weapon to be used i n unsat i s fac tory bargaining. Negotiations based on m i l i t a n c y i n employer r e l a t i o n s i s not consistent with profess ional values - 5 3 -possessed by engineers, th i s implies that s t r ike threats may not be v iab le actions i n the case of an engineering uni and presents a b a r r i e r to union effectiveness because some sort of pressure must be ava i l ab le to engineers* negot iator i f gains are to be made. (Carrothers , 1965). There may be other weapons ava i lab le which are more compatible to engineering values but the r e a l bargaining power of other threats may not be very great. Teachers are a source of information i n the c o n f l i c t area. Teachers hold values s i m i l a r to those of engineers and they are s t r i v i n g for profes s iona l s tatus , as are engineers, yet they have exhibi ted m i l i t a n c y i n r e l a t i o n s with employers. There i s r e a l evidence i n the systems chapter that mi l i t ancy has re su l ted i n large gains for teachers yet t h e i r p ro fe s s iona l i z a t ion dr ive seems unhindered by th i s m i l i t a n c y . Changing needs of teachers were recognized by t h e i r associat ions and a more union-l i k e stance towards c o l l e c t i v e bargaining adopted to meet these problems, SUMMARY Forces for unioniza t ion of Canadian engineers occur at three separate l e v e l s , forces on the general labour force , pressures on w h i t e - c o l l a r workers and s p e c i f i c pressures which are unique to engineers. This chapter presents the f i r s t two areas and leaves the s p e c i f i c s for de ta i l ed analys i s i n another chapter. Blum presents -54-ecomonic, s o c i o l o g i c a l , i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s and p o l i t i c a l areas for the study of general union growth. Within each area there are more s p e c i f i c factors such as business c y c l e s , employer recogni t ion , and publ ic p o l i c y which encourage or i n h i b i t union growth. Through analys i s of various elements i n Canada, Blum bel ieves that trends i n union growth can be explained to a great degree. Bain offers whi te -co l l a r factors which are inf luenced by general forces but are more important for w h i t e - c o l l a r workers. Ba in ' s var iab les include trade union image, sociodemographic elements, economic p o s i t i o n , employer recogn i t ion , and publ ic p o l i c y . Some of the factors such as employer recogni t ion and publ ic p o l i c y can be f a c i l i t a t o r s to union formation whereas trade union aspects and the work s i t u a t i o n hold negative impl ica t ions for unionism which must be overcome. Growth i n numbers of profess ionals i n Canada has been phenomenal i n recent years . Whi te-co l l a r workers comprise over one-quarter of the labour force and t h i s sector i s s t i l l increas ing r a p i d l y . Profess ionals are the fas tes t growing segment of whi te -co l l a r workers although engineers are not 1 the leaders i n profes s iona l growth. Growth i n numbers of profess ionals i s phenomenal i n recent years , along with the trend to l arge , bureau-c r a t i c organizat ion i n Canada. Departmentalization and -55-segmentation are u t i l i z e d by large firms to obtain greater e f f i c i e n c y and pools of engineers are required . Increasing s ize re su l t s i n bureaucratic methods of adminis trat ion which may wel l be promotive to engineering unions. Profess ional associat ions i n Canada are one form of organiz ing which engineers have supported s o l i d l y . Assoc ia t ions re inforce profes s iona l values and goals while serv ing many purposes. Associat ions take the form of learned s o c i e t i e s , t echn ica l s o c i e t i e s , personal-achievement oriented groups, sounding boards or f u l l y c e r t i f i e d bargaining u n i t s . These groups a id i n s o c i a l f r a t e r n i z i n g , occupational i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , s e l f - r e g u l a t i o n , and r a i s i n g the status of the profess ion. A c t i v i t i e s have t r a d i t i o n a l l y been educational or dedicated to r a i s i n g profes s iona l status but some influence on the employer i s poss ib le . C o n f l i c t has been minimized by engineers and t h e i r associat ions because h o s t i l i t y v i o l a t e s profes s iona l conduct. S t r ikes are not acceptable to engineers yet teachers have s imi l a r values and goals to engineers and they have used mi l i t ancy to great advantage. - 5 6 -CHAPTER FOUR SPECIFIC FORCES CONDUCIVE TO THE FORMATION OF ENGINEERING UNIONS Forces encouraging un ion iza t ion of Canadian profes s iona l engineers have become more prevalent during recent years. I n d u s t r i a l r e l a t ions scholars and engineers have studied these forces and the r e s u l t of these inves t iga t ions are presented i n th i s chapter. Forces conducive to un ion iza t ion of engineers are unique to that group, therefore the topic i s much narrower i n scope than previous sections which presented pressures which act upon a l l workers ( inc lud ing engineers.) A l l of the forces discussed i n th i s sect ion increase the p o s s i b i l i t y of union formation but i t i s e s s en t i a l to discover which influences a c t u a l l y a f fect behaviour of engineers. These pressures are greatest i n B r i t i s h Columbia, Quebec, and Ontario but they are growing elsewhere i n Canada. (Muir, 1 9 7 D . A. Paid Employment A growing concentration of Canadian engineers f i n d themselves working for large companies i n paid employment. Muir (1971) and Goldenberg (1968) reveal that over 90% of Canada's profess ional engineers are engaged i n paid employment rather than being self-employed. This i s a p o t e n t i a l ca ta ly s t for unionism because of bureaucratic methods of leadership which are used to administer large -57-sub-groups wi th in organizat ions . The effects of large groups are documented i n the s o c i a l chapter to show s p e c i f i c connotations for profes s iona l engineers. The growth of Canadian industry has been l i n k e d to increas ing concentrat ion of large organizat ion to take advantage of s p e c i a l i z a t i o n and economies of sca le . I t i s becoming necessary to use large scale product ion, marketing, and transportat ion to remain competitive at home and abroad. Canadian engineers f i n d that employment i n large , bureaucratic organizat ion involves jobs which are r o u t i n i z e d and less demanding (and f u l f u l l i n g ) than past work r o l e s . (Muir, 1971)- Engineers have been removed from roles i n t o t a l projects so that many are v ic t ims of departmentalization and s p e c i a l i z a t i o n whereby i n d i v i d u a l contr ibut ions to the process cannot be seen. Bain (1970) i l l u s t r a t e s engineers ' problems of working i n a large company, "The development of s p e c i a l i z a t i o n wi th in the engineering profess ion has l ed to mass t r a i n i n g of engineers and the u t i l i z a t i o n of engineers on almost a production l i n e bas is by many large corporat ions . As a r e s u l t many engineers are d i s s a t i s f i e d with being one of a faceless mass of engineers with l i t t l e opportunity fo r incent ive . They are thus turning to c o l l e c t i v e bargaining as a means of a s ser t ing themselves and of having a say i n the determination of t h e i r s a l a r i e s and working condit ions ."12 -58-As engineers are moved towards b l u e - c o l l a r ro le s and status by s p e c i a l i z a t i o n , one appropriate means fo r pursuing engineers* desires i s through c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n . (Boyd, 1970). Opportunities for p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n manager and s c i e n t i s t roles are disappearing at the work p lace , and needSjother than worker needs, are not s a t i s f i e d through the job. Movement to a b l u e - c o l l a r p o s i t i o n i s not consis tent with needs nor goals of engineers but domination of l a rge , bureaucratic companies means that i n d i v i d u a l engineers are powerless to combat the s i t u a t i o n . (Blum et, al., 1971). Pursuance of greater output at lower cost i s the only goal-which concerns many companies therefore group ac t ion i s a most e f fec t ive method to a l t e r the s i t u a t i o n . B. The Labour Market The labour market also i s a pos i t ive force for un ion iza t ion i n Canada. A buyer 's market i n Canada has re su l ted from a supply of engineers which has far outdistanced demand during the past decade. (Boyd, 1971), This market condi t ion i s i n d i r e c t contrast to previous periods when engineers enjoyed a s e l l e r ' s advantage. Graduating engineers no longer have a wide choice of job offers they once d i d , and many graduates receive no job offers at a l l . (Goldenberg, I968, and Boyd, 1971). One very negative r e s u l t of the poor job market i s the i n a b i l i t y of engineers to seek jobs -59-which meet t h e i r personal and professional needs because competition f o r openings i s f i e r c e and job security for working engineers i s important, (Blum, 1971). M o b i l i t y has f a l l e n because of poor labour market conditions so that security precautions force engineers to remain at one job rather than q u i t t i n g work even i f the job circumstances are completely unacceptable, Intra-company p i r a t i n g was once a common practice but today th i s phenomena i s no longer an advantage f o r engineers because there are q u a l i f i e d , experienced engineers available i n job market. Voluntary mobility or carrying out a search for a new pos i t i o n while employed i s also more d i f f i c u l t f or engineers with the r e s u l t that threats to move to competitors no longer bring raises (or promotions) for engineers. Job mobility was previously a main strategy for v e r t i c a l mobility i n the hierarchy as well as an alternative to f i n d a more s a t i s f a c t o r y employer organization but a l l the advantages of a heavy demand are not existent any longer. (Boyd, Gross and McKay, 1971, Muir, 1971). With security becoming an issue, engineers are forced to accept lower levels of need s a t i s f a c t i o n whereby they experience v i o l a t i o n of some personal and professional values, A glut on the labour market makes i t imperative to f i n d and hold a job rather than search for a position that s a t i s f i e s higher order needs and Dvorak ( I 9 6 3 ) , -60-Walton (196l) } and Hansen (1963) a l l s tress the power of an unfavourable job market to increase engineering acceptance of unionism. Fears invo lv ing job security-b r i n g engineers c loser to a b l u e - c o l l a r stance and increase the l i k e l i h o o d of un ion iza t ion . (Bain, 1970). Personal power, which i s inherent i n a buoyant market, decreases, thus increas ing a t t ract iveness of power t a c t i c s such as those inherent i n u n i o n i z a t i o n , C. Trade Union Movement The trade union movement i s seen as a major pressure toward un ion iza t ion by Muir (1971), Nault (1969), and Goldenberg ( I 9 6 8 ) . The Canadian Labour Congree (CLC) i s s taging an overt attempt to organize whi te -co l l a r workers. In an e f for t to organize such workers as engineers, the CLC has hired a f u l l time co-ordinator of w h i t e - c o l l a r organizat ion, Mr, Arthur Kube, Muir (1971) offers the fee l ings of B i l l Dodge, Secretary-Treasurer of the CLC, "We w i l l assault the whi te -co l l a r area with a f u l l time co-ordinator of whi te -co l l a r areas with a f u l l time co-ordinator of whi te -co l l a r organizat ion for the purpose ofs (1) Develop an a f f i l i a t i o n between the CLC and profes s iona l associat ions , (2) Remove profess ional exclusions from labour re l a t ions acts , (3) Develop "cra f t - type" unions of profes s iona l o c c u p a t i o n s , ^ -61-The CLC pursues an i d e a l s i t u a t i o n where whi te -co l l a r workers w i l l unionize and a f f i l i a t e with the CLC. Removal of a l l profes s iona l exclusions i s a high goal to a t t a i n yet Sweden i s an exce l lent example that w h i t e - c o l l a r workers can be unionized nation-wide, (Kle ingartner , 1968), (The estimate from the Vancouver l i b r a r y i s that we l l over 80% of whi te -co l l a r workers are unionized . ) Idea l ly , the change i n the s i t u a t i o n according to the CLC can be seen v i a the Strauss model i n f igure s i x : CANADIAN LABOUR CONGRESS GOALS FROM the Present S i t u a t i o n More L i k e l y To be Unionized TO a s i t u a t i o n where almost every worker may j o i n a union. More L i k e l y to be Unionized FIGURE SIX D. At t i tudes Toward Unionism Muir (1971) and Goldenberg (1968) c i t e a changing a t t i tude on the part of profess ionals toward involvement i n c o l l e c t i v e bargaining. This trend i s true for soc ie ty as a whole, as we l l as whi te -co l l a r workers and there i s evidence to show t h i s i n the chapter concerning union growth. Profess ionals increa s ing ly accept c o l l e c t i v e -62-ac t ion as an appropriate method to involve whi te -co l l a r employees i n organizat ion decision-making s t ructures . Bain (i960) bel ieves th i s viewpoint i s leg i t imate and necessary for profess ionals because the leg i t imacy and j u s t i f i c a t i o n of trade unions res t s upon a b e l i e f i n the value of democratic decision-amking. Bain (1969) postulates that democracy i s a good th ing and the only way to maintain democratic circumstances i s for workers to form groups which have some voice i n dec i s ions , A softening a t t i tude towards the use of c o l l e c t i v e ac t ion i s a long-term trend with favourable impl ica t ions for union p o s s i b i l i t i e s . (See organizat ion chapter). New a t t i tude influences have produced a dramatic r e v o l -u t i o n i n engineering behaviour i n many provinces such as B .C . and Ontario (see law chapter) and these inf luences may also produce further ef fects elsewhere. Evidence of the changing at t i tude i s provided by Ontario and B r i t i s h Columbia experiences. Mr. Wil l iam H a l l , managing d i rec tor of the B. C. Assoc ia t ion of Profess ional Engineers, states that his As soc ia t ion i s a c t i v e l y seeking c o l l e c t i v e bargaining r i gh t s and the membership f u l l y supports th i s goal . I t must be noted that i n I966, seventy-five percent of the membership gave wr i t ten support for changes i n the Engineers Act to support c o l l e c t i v e barga ining . Ontario also exhib i t s a favourable a t t i tude toward c o l l e c t i v e bargaining. In - 6 3 -1 9 6 1 a vote of engineers crushed supporters of c o l l e c t i v e bargaining but by I966 the As soc i a t ion of Profes s iona l Engineers of Ontario made a key p o l i c y change to accept c o l l e c t i v e bargaining. (Globe and M a i l , June 28, 1969). The a s soc ia t ion a l tered i t s opposi t ion to engineering unions i n I966 because some members were experiencing deep f rus t ra t ions i n large , unusually impersonal, i n s t i t u t i o n s , u t i l i t i e s and super corporat ions . Engineers f e l t t h e i r value was nei ther recognized nor u t i l i z e d and s a l a r i e s were also unacceptable so c o l l e c t i v e bargaining was the only acceptable a l t e r n a t i v e , (Globe and M a i l , October 22, 1970). The Ontario As soc i a t ion did f e e l that bargaining should be c a r r i e d on i n an e t h i c a l and profess ional manner without use of the s t r i k e weapon. A major problem of un ion iza t ion centres on the use of s t r ikes and mi l i t ancy i n conjunction with c o l l e c t i v e bargaining. Carrothers (I965) states that a major b a r r i e r to union development i s not the i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y of unionism and professionalism but the discovery of a reasonable subst i tute for the s t r i k e . Cain and Seidman (1964) a l so concur on c o m p a t i b i l i t y of un ion iza t ion and profess ional ism but again the d i f f i c u l t y i s acqu i r ing group power without economic weapons such a?s the s t r i k e . E . Profess ional Treatment W. Lee Hansen (1963) presents problems of profes s iona l treatment faced by engineers, "The nature of discontent -64-and i t s growth among profess ional engineers becomes apparent even af ter a perusal of the growing body of l i t e r a t u r e on engineers, and c e r t a i n l y becomes quite c lear when the proceedings of various engineering soc ie t i e s are examined. B a s i c a l l y the engineer seems to f e e l that hi s treatment i s not that which should be accorded a profes s iona l worker , " !^ A lack of profess ional treatment for engineers i s a pos i t ive stimulus toward un ion iza t ion because i n d i v i d u a l bargaining i s not s u f f i c i e n t to improve condi t ions . Strauss (1963), Bairstow (1968), Muir (1971) and others have presented needs and values of engineers which require d i f fe rent treatment than b l u e - c o l l a r workers to achieve s a t i s f a c t i o n i n the organizat ion . S p e c i f i c complaints help i l l u s t r a t e de f i c i en t areas i n profes s iona l treatment. I d e n t i f i c a t i o n with management i s one area which i s unsat i s fac tory i n large , bureaucratic , organizat ion. (Bain, 1970). Engineers f e e l l i t t l e sympathy from management with the r e s u l t that lower status and a damaged self-image are experienced. I d e n t i f i c a t i o n with management i s a basic need for engineers to support t h e i r goals of upward m o b i l i t y and se l f -percept ions as " s p e c i a l workers." There i s a lso an inadequate amount of recogni t ion of engineers as profess ionals i n the assignment of work which i s below profess ional standards and r o u t i n i z e d i n many respects . Assignment of b l u e - c o l l a r tasks antagonizes engineers and increases the p o s s i b i l i t y of b l u e - c o l l a r t a c t i c s as a form of r e t a l i a t i o n . -65-Inappropriate means of s e t t l i n g i n d i v i d u a l problems also enhances union p o s s i b i l i t i e s . I t i s imperative that engineers perceive themselves as valuable i n d i v i d u a l s i n organizat ion but the methodical b l u e - c o l l a r treatment i n settlement of grievances i s unacceptable because everyday problem so lv ing and grievance settlement i n bureaucratic circumstances fol low rules and procedures which have always been used for b l u e - c o l l a r employees. A union could force management to deal with engineering problems more qu ick ly , perhaps through the c rea t ion of a new p o s i t i o n i n the hierarchy. Spec ia l a t tent ion to engineers grievances may make them f e e l that t h e i r contr ibut ion i s not t r i v i a l nor e a s i l y replaced l i k e a b l u e - c o l l a r worker. Communication also enters into the area of profess ional treatment. Management should allow engineers to communicate v e r t i c a l l y as wel l as h o r i z o n t a l l y to meet needs of exchange with colleagues and i d e n t i f i c a t i o n with management. I f channels of communication are blocked then engineers must f i n d other ways to communicate or d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n grows. Strauss (I963) shows that engineers are l i k e l y to ignore bureaucratic channels and go s t ra ight to the man they wish to speak with. A. probable r e s u l t of ignor ing proper channels i n a bureaucrat ic organizat ion i s a reprimand or punishment which brings even greater d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n to engineers. -66-Regressive management pract ices push engineers towards ro le conceptions which are s i m i l a r to members of the unionized sector . The f a u l t may not be due to management p o l i c y so much as the r i g i d rules of bureaucracy and perceptions of engineers are important because t h e i r own b e l i e f s a f fect behaviour. Bureaucracy pushes management further and further away from engineers as red tape and formal rules envelope the company, F . Personal Treatment Large, bureaucratic organizations seldom offer adequate recogni t ion or treatment for the i n d i v i d u a l . Separate treatment for each engineer (rather than group treatment) i s a c r i t i c a l element i n the needs of engineers, (Walton, I96I). Bureaucracy dictates that workers should be dealt with i n groups to fos ter e f f i c i e n c y but t h i s type of adminis trat ion leaves l i t t l e change for i n d i v i d u a l treatment. (Bain, I969), Broad c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of workers and a lack of job t i t l e s prevent engineers from measuring personal worth to the organizat ion. Engineers require reinforcement from management and reports on progress to re l i eve d i s s a t i f a c t i o n and f r u s t r a t i o n . Perhaps induct ion procedures or per iodic evaluations could minimize d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n , yet markers to measure personal progress are absent i n many organizat ions. Assignment to monotonous, b l u e - c o l l a r tasks can be offset p a r t i a l l y by project ro ta t ion and time off for conferences but personal treatment may s t i l l -67-be a source of d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n . Adoption of human re l a t ions type of leadership could also d i spe l problems of personal treatment. Although engineers do not want nor need a leader doting over t h e i r shoulder, they do require a leader who i s aware of engineers ' desires for praise and consul ta t ion . Bureaucracy tends to provide leaders who are present only during c r i se s whereas engineers seek praise and recogni t ion of i n d i v i d u a l merit . A jo int e f for t by management and union could seek the most e f fec t ive leadership s ty le to obtain greater output and s a t i s f a c t i o n . Kleingartner (1968) speaks of bureaucracy as a " re ign of ru le s " where favor i t i sm often affects d i s c i p l i n e and promotion far more than mer i t . A r e s u l t of the c o l l e c t i v e act ion could be procedural safeguards regarding d i smis sa l , meri t , promotion, e t c . , to deal with the re ign of ru l e s . Problems of personal treatment are summarized by Bain ( I969) : "They do not f e e l they are treated as ind iv idua l s so they don't react as ind iv idua l s and they are beginning to think i n terms of c o l l e c t i v e act ion."15 G. Sa lar ie s Sa lar ies are gaining influence as a pos i t ive impetus to c o l l e c t i v e bargaining. Engineers who are involved i n paid employment receive s i g n i f i c a n t l y les s remuneration than t h e i r self-employed counterparts . An unpublished -68-study by The Department of Manpower and Immigration I967 revealed that "engineers who are paid employees earn an average income of $12,148 compared to $17 ,299 average for self-employed engineers. Arguments on behalf of paid engineers are based on the fact that self-employed engineers and other profess ionals have made larger gains i n recent years. (Blum et. aL, 1971). This argument of r e l a t i v e depr ivat ion i s shown by Goldenberg (1968) to be a major source of discontent because engineering associat ions have ignored the s i t u a t i o n . Another facet of the sa lary problem i s comparison of s i m i l a r jobs i n d i f ferent organizat ion. There are s i g n i f i c a n t variances i n s a l a r i e s for engineers performing s i m i l a r tasks i n competing companies. Engineers are acutely aware of merit as a basis for rewards therefore unequal pay for s i m i l a r e f for t and output v io l a te s profess ional values and leads to d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n . (Strauss, I969). Existence of an unequal s i t u a t i o n i s t y p i c a l of a non-union area where there i s no extra-company comparisons required i n the sa lary area. Differences i n company s i tuat ions r e su l t i n inequ i t i e s between d i f f e rent companies which are unacceptable to engineers. "Peaking" i s another cause for complaint by paid engineers, J . L. C o r n e i l l e , president of the Corporat ion of Engineers Quebec s tates , "engineers seem to be the v ict ims of a plateau syndrome - they reach a c e r t a i n -69-sa lary and they never make any more. A l te rna t ive s such as wage guide l ines , adoption of by-laws by members t o ; implement a minimum wage scale or p r o v i n c i a l l e g i s l a t i o n for a province-wide scale for engineers are some a l ternat ives for study."-7 Engineers i n paid employment have expressed d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n v/ith sa lary progression i n other provinces as w e l l . Paid engineers often reach maximum sa lary by the age of f o r t y years i n spi te of the fact that much productive work l i f e s t i l l remains. Strauss (1964), Cain and Seidman (1964), and Goldenberg (1968) a l l stress the problem of te lescoping of s a l a r i e s for profess ional engineers. Obsolescence of s k i l l s may be one way to j u s t i f y te lescoping but p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n education to update s k i l l s i s a goal of engineering unions which tends to neutra l i ze th i s argument. Telescoping of wages i s supported by the fo l lowing Department of Manpower study: Telescoping of Wages* less than 9 years $ v e l " o ? § 4 8 n c o m e 10 - 19 12,695 20 - 29 12,885 over 30 years 14,999 TABLE SIX * Muir , J . Douglas, "Is a Trade Union Inevitable for Engineers?" , Canadian Personnel and I n d u s t r i a l  Relations Journal , V o l . 18, No. 1, January 19?1, P. 21. SUMMARY Spec i f i c forces for the growth of engineers' unions -70 appear to be increas ing i n s trength. The trade union movement, profess ional treatment, changing a t t i tudes toward unionism, an unfavourable labour market, personal treatment and sa lary problems provide j u s t i f i c a t i o n for a union movement. Profess ional and personal treatment are symptoms of d i f f i c u l t i e s which r e s u l t from bureaucracy because bureaucratic methods inherent ly require de-humanization and a lack of profess ional treatment i n sp i te of decreased s a t i s f a c t i o n i n the company. An improvement i n labour market condit ions would lessen the p r o b a b i l i t y of organizat ion because a l t e rna t ive s i n less bureaucratic organizat ion may be a v a i l a b l e . Sa lary problems are not l i k e l y to disappear unless some form of ac t ion i s taken by engineers, e i ther by the profes s iona l a s soc ia t ion or through a union. A softening a t t i tude towards unionism for w h i t e - c o l l a r workers i s growing throughout soc ie ty and i t w i l l f l o u r i s h as long as bureaucracy i s dominant form of adminis t ra t ion . A key to the influence of pos i t ive factors i s the permanence of these forces . I f severe v i o l a t i o n of engineers ' needs i s a long-run state then p r o b a b i l i t y of un ion iza t ion i s very high. The labour market appears to be leas t permanent of a l l factors because large , bureaucrat ic organizat ion are l i k e l y to employ even a greater percentage of engineers i n the future. Areas of treatment and at t i tudes toward unionism are l ea s t probable to disappear i n the short-term. The important -71-outlook here i s how profes s iona l engineers perceive t h e i r own s i t u a t i o n . I f they view pos i t ive forces as long-term influences then un ion iza t ion may be the only means of a s ser t ing an engineering outlook on management. Perhaps one quote can sum the area of pos i t ive forces very w e l l . Mr. V a l Scot t , general manager of the Soc ie ty of Ontario Hydro Profes s iona l Engineers and Associates s tates , "Engineers work i n large , u sua l ly impersonal, i n s t i t u t e s , u t i l i t i e s and super coporations. They are frequently t o l d that they are part of management, but th i s statement w i l l not stand up under close s c ru t iny . Just becasue they may supervise a number of subordinates does not mean that they occupy an e f fect ive management p o s i t i o n r e l a t i v e to t h e i r own condit ions of employment. Many of them f e e l that t h e i r value i s not s u f f i c i e n t l y recognized or u t i l i z e d , nor do they have an influence on working condit ions and standards at a l l commensurate with t h e i r profess ional and educational accomplishments. Sa la r ie s are also de te r io ra t ing i n r e l a t i o n to the rates of pay i n soc ie ty as a whole."1^ -72-CHAPTER FIVE LEGAL ASPECTS Legal aspects are c r i t i c a l determinants i n studying p r o b a b i l i t i e s for un ion iza t ion of Canadian profess ional engineers. The impact of labour law on the engineers* s i t u a t i o n i s of great consequence because labour statutes can s t i f l e union development or encourage i t through implementation of favourable publ ic p o l i c y . I t i s poss ible for laws to prevent un ion iza t ion even where unions are s trongly desired and needed by employees. Seventy percent of Canada's profess ional engineers are present ly able to form c e r t i f i e d uni t s at one of the fo l lowing three l e v e l s : f edera l , c i v i l service (prov inc ia l ) or p r i v a t e l y . (Carson, 1973). Not a l l provinces allow c i v i l engineers to bargain and many provinces don't allow any pr ivate engineers to bargain e i ther but a l l engineers under federa l j u r i s d i c t i o n have the r i g h t to c o l l e c t i v e bargaining. Exc lus ion of profess ional engineers from c o l l e c t i v e bargaining r ight s i s present ly a b a r r i e r to any major un ion iza t ion attempt i n Canada. I f labour regulat ions i n many Canadian provinces are not a l t e red to allow engineers to organize, then the r e a l issue for profes s iona l engineers becomes, "Is informal bargaining on a large scale poss ible or probable, and how would d i f f e rent circumstances a l t e r -73-that p r o b a b i l i t y ? " Profess ional engineers are allowed to bargain only i n the provinces of Quebec, New Brunswick, Saskatchewan, Ontar io , and Manitoba. Other provinces do not allow engineers to unionize for the purpose of c o l l e c t i v e bargaining because of t h e i r c o n f i d e n t i a l status i n most cases. There i s a p o s s i b i l i t y that other provinces s h a l l allow engineers to organize but th i s development i s dealt with more c l o s e l y i n the l a t t e r stages of the chapter. This chapter includes a h i s t o r y of labour r e l a t i o n s laws concerning profess ional engineers, the ro le of Labour Relat ions Boards, pressures which could a l t e r the law, and a de ta i l ed discuss ion of p r o v i n c i a l laws. A. H i s t o r y H i s t o r i c a l developments i n labour law r e f l e c t engineers ' sentiments toward unionism i n the past. Carrothers (1965) traces the development of labour l e g i s l a t i o n concerning engineers to show how present regulat ions evolved. The bas ic reasons for federa l and p r o v i n c i a l exclusions of engineers are revealed through h i s t o r i c a l basis although some of the p r o v i n c i a l laws and federa l exclusions have been a l te red r ecent ly . Approximately 1,100 engineers i n Canada were covered by c o l l e c t i v e agreements fo l lowing World War I I . Negotiations of these pacts took place under j u r i s d i c t i o n -74-of the Wartime Labour Relat ions Regulations of 1944, and t h e i r expiry date concurred with the end of the war. These wartime contracts provide the major experience for Canadian engineers i n the area of c o l l e c t i v e bargaining, however the s ign i f i cance of the agreements i s r e l a t i v e l y small because of spec i a l wartime circumstances. Adversary r e l a t i o n s which normally ex i s t between employer and employee during c o l l e c t i v e bargaining was not a major factor i n these agreements because the aim of the contracts was to avoid work interrupt ions at a l l cost . A Wartime Labour Relat ions Board was formed to protect the good of the country during wartime by preventing slowdowns or s t r i k e s , therefore the philosophy and terms contained i n these temporary contracts was meant s o l e l y to f a c i l i t a t e production for the war e f fo r t . The fo l lowing developments took place a f ter the war and i t i s the peace-time laws that are most pert inent to t h i s paper. Carrothers states that i n 1947 the House of Commons drafted a labour code whereby profess ional engineers were to be covered by c o l l e c t i v e bargaining prov i s ions . The b i l l was introduced into the House but i t f a i l e d to pass and subsequently i t was tabled for d i scuss ion and poss ible r e v i s i o n . In 1948 t h i s b i l l was reintroduced to Parliament with some minor r e v i s i o n s , one of the a l t e ra t ions being that engineers were to be excluded from c o l l e c t i v e -75-bargaining r i g h t s . This new b i l l was also delayed p r i o r to being passed on to a standing Committee on I n d u s t r i a l Relat ions for study i n greater d e t a i l . The Committee concurred with the dec i s ion that engineers should not be allowed to bargain c o l l e c t i v e l y , mainly as a r e s u l t of pressure exerted by engineers ' associat ions against c e r t i f i c a t i o n r i g h t s , Carrothers says the f i n a l dec i s ion to exclude engineers was reached because every p r o v i n c i a l i n s t i t u t e of engineers requested to be excluded from the bargaining area. When the Federal B i l l of 1947-48 was f i n a l l y passed into law, i t excluded profes s iona l engineers from c o l l e c t i v e bargaining. This dec i s ion grea t ly inf luenced p r o v i n c i a l ru l ings to exclude profess ional engineers because the federa l statute was designed as a model for s t ruc tur ing p r o v i n c i a l labour law. Considerable pressure on behalf of p r o v i n c i a l engineering associat ions succeeded i n in f luenc ing l e g i s l a t i o n , therefore i t i s reasonable to assume that equal e f forts would have been made at the p r o v i n c i a l l e v e l to have engineers removed from c o l l e c t i v e bargaining prov i s ions . In 1948 i t was recognized that a p o l i c y change may be required i n the future despite strong objections on behalf of a s soc ia t ions . There was speculat ion that the negative p o s i t i o n of engineers and t h e i r associat ions -76-may be unsound as a long-term strategy, so the law was enacted with the idea that future rev i s ions could occur. Engineers• a t t i tudes and actions may not have been appropriate for a l l engineers, even at that time. As the system chapter v i v i d l y i l l u s t r a t e s , engineers are a hetero-geneous group i n terms of work r o l e s , with the r e s u l t that t h e i r s trong, united stand opposing c o l l e c t i v e bargaining was questionable as a long-term strategy. Sure ly some engineers faced s i tua t ions where c o l l e c t i v e bargaining was required to combat bureaucracy and upgrade working condit ions even at that time. In l i g h t o f the evidence i t i s c lear that act ions of the engineers i n 1947 were a part of t h e i r desparate attempt to reach f u l l profess ional status rather than a r e f l e c t i o n on the needs of a l l engineers. A more f l e x i b l e stance would have been appropriate for the long run because a v a i l a b i l i t y of c o l l e c t i v e bargaining r i gh t s does not force engineers to become involved with bargaining, The only poss ible benef i ts from exclusion l i e i n the areas of upgrading profes s iona l status and image but these gains come at far too high a cost i f a s i g n i f i c a n t port ion of engineers require c o l l e c t i v e bargaining r i g h t s . B. Labour Relat ions Boards There are twenty-two labour re l a t ions boards i n Canada which possess much power to influence the s i t u a t i o n -77-regarding engineers and organizat ion. (Carson, 1973)» I f changes do occur to allow engineers to form bargaining u n i t s , then Labour Relat ions Boards must lead the way. The conservative nature of p r o v i n c i a l boards upholds exclusions because extreme changes are not made qu ick ly by these groups. Reasons for th i s conservative nature are based on a philosophy that unfounded, dras t i c modif icat ions are often harmful to i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s as wel l as the groups involved . ( O l i v e r , 1973). A major ro le of Labour Re la t ion Boards i s maintenance of peace and balance i n the system, thus i t i s easy to comprehend why much evidence i s required to support deci s ions . The conservative nature of boards i s evidenced by reluctance to c e r t i f y m u l t i - l o c a t i o n or multi-employer uni t s even where they have been operating in formal ly for a lengthy per iod or are c l e a r l y appropriate . The small amount of experience and short h i s t o r y of engineering unions i s one reason for reluctance to c e r t i f y engineers unions and create change. ( O l i v e r , 1973). I t appears that Labour Relat ions Boards would rather r e l y on voluntary bargaining re l a t ionsh ip s for engineers than a l t e r the law. Ontario experience i s pos i t ive evidence that these uni t s can form and funct ion succes s fu l ly but the r e a l question i s how many more bargaining uni t s would form i f the law were modified. Many groups of engineers may have met employer res istance to voluntary recogni t ion with -78-the r e s u l t that there i s no a l t e rna t ive but to accept the s i t u a t i o n . Problems of decer t i fy ing e x i s t i n g bargaining uni t s a lso lend support to employment of voluntary bargaining r e l a t i o n s h i p s . Under e x i s t i n g labour laws, a bare majority of 51% can maintain a bargaining u n i t , but operation of a union by t h i s method i s not acceptable to engineers. Much b i t t e r disagreement would r e s u l t i f a bare majori ty r e s i s t ed d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n or i f a major p o l i c y dec i s ion a f f ec t ing a l l un i t members was bare ly passed. One possible r e s u l t of feuding members could be a lack of communication or less cooperation on the job, both of which eventual ly b r i n g unsat i s fac tory performance. Unit boundaries present more d i f f i c u l t i e s because there i s a problem regarding d e f i n i t i o n of the term "engineer" ( i e . one who does engineers ' work or one who has a degree and does l e s ser work, e tc . ) and decis ions on management involvement. C. P r o v i n c i a l L e g i s l a t i o n 1. Quebec Quebec has been the leading province for un ion iza t ion of profess ional engineers i n Canada. Success or f a i l u r e of c o l l e c t i v e bargaining re l a t ionsh ips i n Quebec could a f fect labour statutes i n other parts of Canada by r e i n f o r c i n g present statutes or po int ing to future change. Ac tua l c o l l e c t i v e bargaining i n such areas as Quebec i s -79-the type of evidence which most influences labour re l a t ions boards i n other Canadian provinces to implement change. Goldenberg (I968) reveals that Quebec i s the only area where formal trade union a f f i l i a t i o n along with p o t e n t i a l use of s t r ike s have been enforces. There are s p e c i a l factors i n the Quebec context however, e s p e c i a l l y the "Quiet Revolut ion" which developed favourable a t t i tudes toward development of trade unionism. French-Canadians appear to be more prone to bargain c o l l e c t i v e l y and they are more w i l l i n g to s t r ike than t h e i r E n g l i s h counterparts . Scott (1973) also c i t e s nat ional ism and soc ia l i sm as two elements which make Quebec d i f f e rent from other provinces . In spi te of these dif ferences a t t i tudes i n the re s t of Canada has shown a tendency to fol low s i m i l a r paths' recent ly and the l i m i t a t i o n of French engineers may be outdated now. (Will iam H a l l , 1972). There are two laws concerning c o l l e c t i v e bargaining i n Quebec, the Syndicates Act contains no precise d e f i n i t i o n of the term "employee" thus i t allows a loophole for management engineers to j o i n the bargaining u n i t . (Canadian Labour Law Reporter, 1972). On the other hand the Labour Code does define the term "employee" and i t does prevent management engineers from j o i n i n g the bargaining u n i t . Another basic difference between the two acts i s that the Syndicates Act does not force c o l l e c t i v e bargaining and contracts cannot be made b inding unless -80-the employer agrees to negotiate under the A c t . (Goldenberg, 1968), The Labour Code i s a more t y p i c a l piece of labour l e g i s l a t i o n wherein i f the employer doesn't bargain he i s considered to be ac t ing i n bad f a i t h and i f he does bargain the r e s u l t i n g contract i s l e g a l l y b ind ing . In r e a l i t y the Labour Code removed c o l l e c t i v e bar-gaining from j u r i s d i c t i o n of the Syndicates Act yet th i s fact has not halted use of the 1924 s tatute . The Syndicates Act i s s t i l l u t i l i z e d to form uni t s of 15 or more members because of i t s ambiguities regarding management exclus ion and seven of the nine engineering uni t s ex i s t under the provis ions of th i s act . (Carson, 1973)- There has been no push to discontinue use of the Syndicates Act despite existence of the Labour Code so profess ional engineers i n management ranks belong to un i t s along with employee engineers. (Goldenberg, 1968). Another pos i t ive aspect of the Syndicates Act for engineers i s that u n i t members may res ign anytime with a penalty of three months dues. (Canadian Labour Law Reporter, 1972). Use of the Syndicates Act i n Quebec allows pro fe s s iona l , managerial, and worker or ienta t ions to unite i n a s ingle bargaining u n i t . D i f f e r i n g in tere s t s and work s i tua t ions wi th in one u n i t involves many po tent i a l sources of c o n f l i c t between members. Management-oriented engineers genera l ly pursue d i s s i m i l a r goals from engineers who perform more -81-tedious , r e p e t i t i v e work therefore appropriate aims for each group i n bargaining may be completely d i f f e r e n t . For instance, job secur i ty , personal freedom and improved communication may be absolute ly c r i t i c a l to engineers lower i n the hierarchy whereas these demands are meaningless to top l e v e l engineers. Union leadership and c o n t r o l i s another p o t e n t i a l source of dispute because c e r t a i n key leaders i n the union could allow personal or ienta t ions to ru le t h e i r act ions at the bargaining tab le . Quebec also allows p r o v i n c i a l c i v i l servants to organize for the purpose of c o l l e c t i v e bargaining. The C i v i l Service Act of I 9 6 5 extended provis ions of the Labour Code to c i v i l servants so that engineers may unionize i f they desire bargaining r i g h t s . (Goldenberg, 1968). Quebec l e g i s l a t i o n further provides f u l l s t r i k e powers to engineers which are ava i lab le only to Saskatchewan engineers and federa l engineers. Experience of engineers i n Quebec indicates that employers can fos ter c o l l e c t i v e bargaining and encourage u n i o n i z a t i o n . Goldenberg (1968) states that "engineers f i r s t formed bargaining uni t s i n the publ ic sector because th i s i s where the leas t employer res i s tance occurred . m 1 9 Garbarino (1971), Bain (1969),Blum (1971) and others have also stressed the argument that f a c i l i t a t i n g l e g i s -l a t i o n grea t ly aids i n the thrust for un ion iza t ion . In -82-Quebec where the law has been a help to organizers , the greatest degree of un ion iza t ion of engineers has taken place , 2. Saskatchewan Goldenberg (1 Q68) explains that the Trade Union Act (1944) allowed a l l profess ionals i n Saskatchewan to form c e r t i f i e d bargaining u n i t s . This Act excluded no one from c o l l e c t i v e bargaining, even "pure profess ional s " such as doctors , dent i s t s , and lawyers could take ac t ion under the Act . One main problem with th i s l i b e r a l l e g i s l a t i o n was that i t allowed l a rger groups to hold smaller groups ( i e . engineers) "capt ive" i n the bargaining u n i t . To resolve the s i t u a t i o n the Trade Union Act was amended i n 1966 to allow profess ionals to leave the bargaining u n i t v o l u n t a r i l y without need of d e c e r t i f i c a t i o n . In 1966 the statute provided four a l t e rna t ive s for profes s iona l s ; (a) J o in and be part of an i n d u s t r i a l employees* union. (b) The profess ional can v o l u n t a r i l y withdraw from an o f f i ce or employee's union. (c) Profess ionals can form a separate union with members of t h e i r s p e c i f i c profess ion comprising the u n i t . (d) Profess ionals do not have to organize at a l l , 2 0 This l e g i s l a t i o n i s i d e a l i n many ways because of the f l e x i b i l i t y i t o f fers . Voluntary separation from the union i s compatible with engineers ' values , e s p e c i a l l y i f they are forced into a un i t with non-profess ionals . I f engineers -83-f e e l that behaviour of the union v io l a te s personal value systems then withdrawal i s pos s ib le . One major problem with present Saskatchewan l e g i s l a t i o n i s tha havoc i t can cause i n the order ly adminis t ra t ion of the bargaining u n i t . S ize of the u n i t may change s i g n i f i c a n t l y wi th in a short time and employee tampering or promotion can induce l ay members to qu i t the u n i t as bargaining approaches. (3) Ontario Ontario law provides a s p e c i a l sec t ion for profes s iona l engineers which allows bargaining uni t s to cons i s t s o l e l y of engineers unless the Board i s s a t i s f i e d that a majori ty of the engineers want to be i n a l a rger u n i t . (Canadian Labour Law Reporter, 1972). In sp i te of the a v a i l a b i l i t y of bargaining r ight s Ontario has no c e r t i f i e d un i t s of engineers and i n fact voluntary bargaining i s present. Goldenberg (1968) estimates that ten percent of Ontar io ' s profes s iona l engineers p a r t i c i p a t e i n voluntary r e l a t i o n -ships with employers. S u r p r i s i n g l y these r e l a t i o n s did not help amend Ontario labour regulat ions u n t i l r ecent ly , and i r o n i c a l l y i t i s poss ible that successful informal bargaining aided i n maintenance of profes s iona l exclusions (see sec t ion B) . Ontario Hydro i s the outstanding example of voluntary bargaining as they have a r e l a t i o n s h i p which allows disputes to go to b inding a r b i t r a t i o n . (Scott , 1973). Continuing existence of voluntary bargaining uni t s i s -84-evidence to prove that changes i n the law are unnecessary because employees are already p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n c o l l e c t i v e bargaining. I t can also be argued that emergence of these uni t s reveals a need for new laws because ten percent i s a s i g n i f i c a n t l e v e l of involvement. Perhaps other employers are us ing the poor job market as a t o o l to r e s i s t voluntary bargaining by threatening to dismiss u n i t organizers . Engineers and other profess ionals have pe t i t ioned the Ontario government to allow c o l l e c t i v e bargaining r i gh t s for profess ionals with the r e s u l t that the law has recent ly been a l t e red . Engineers joined the b a t t l e to gain bargaining r ight s i n 1966 when the As soc i a t ion of Profes s iona l Engineers of Ontario changed i t s p o l i c y to support c o l l e c t i v e bargaining. This change i n a t t i tude from an opposing stance resu l ted from condit ions faced by Ontario engineers i n l a rge , bureaucratic organizat ion, (Globe and M a i l , A p r i l 18, 1967). D. B r i t i s h Columbia The B r i t i s h Columbia As soc ia t ion of Profess ional Engineers i s a c t i v e l y seeking bargaining r i g h t s . Mr. Wil l i am H a l l , Managing Di rec tor of the As soc i a t ion , says that the B .C . As soc ia t ion submitted a pr ivate b i l l request ing c o l l e c t i v e bargaining i n 1966. This presentat ion to the B .C . Leg i s la ture was backed by seventy-five percent -85-wri t ten support of the membership. B .C . engineers desired amendments i n the Engineers Act so an a n c i l l a r y body separate from the B .C . Profes s iona l As soc ia t ion could form for the purpose of c o l l e c t i v e bargaining. This goal of c e r t i f i e d u n i t status was not at ta ined at the time of in t roduc t ion and the b i l l has been i n a state of limbo since 1966. Mr. H a l l says the Assoc ia t ion t r i e d to iobta in c o l l e c t i v e bargaining r i gh t s and organize an a n c i l l a r y body for bargaining to beat trade unions to the punch!"21 Blum (1971) a lso s tressed fears of being dragged into b l u e - c o l l a r unions as an impetus to organize. L e g i s l a t i o n concerning only profes s iona l engineers i s s t i l l a c t i v e l y pursued i n l i e u of changes i n the B .C. Labour Relat ions Act and Mr. H a l l be l ieves the New Democratic government may be sympathetic towards engineers. V a l Scott (1973) a lso supports the view that the B .C . environment i s conducive to such a change because of the government and because of engineers' a t t i tudes . E . New Brunswick New Brunswick allows engineers to bargain, although no uni t s have been formed at t h i s time. The change from previous exclusions was a r e s u l t of f indings of a se lec t committee of the Legi s la ture of New Brunswick ( I 9 6 7 ) . Recommendations of the Committee included the removal of profes s iona l exclusions from the Labour Relat ions Act -86-and th i s has been done. The new law i s a t y p i c a l piece of l e g i s l a t i o n whereby engineers who are managers or c o n f i d e n t i a l employees may not by included i n the u n i t . Under th i s law profess ionals may be placed i n a u n i t with other workers i f the Board sees f i t but profess ionals are set apart by s k i l l s where the d i v i s i o n i s appropriate . Under the law i t i s poss ible fo r engineers (or any profess ional) to apply for removal from a l a rger u n i t . The regulat ions per ta in ing to p r o v i n c i a l c i v i l servants are also s i m i l a r to those i n the Act so that these workers may also form bargaining u n i t s . F. Federal Experience The Publ ic Service Sta f f Relat ions Act of 196? i s the guiding l e g i s l a t i o n for engineers who are under federa l j u r i s d i c t i o n s . This act allows a l l employees to bargain unless they are i n a managerial or c o n f i d e n t i a l capaci ty . Employees excluded are as fo l lows ! (1) Those i n pos i t ions which are c o n f i d e n t i a l to a M i n i s t e r , the Governor-General, a judge, the deputy head of a department, or a ch ie f executive o f f i c e r of a port ion of the publ ic s e rv ice . (2) Engineers involved i n executive duties and those responsible i n respect to developing and adminis-t e r i n g government programs. (3) Engineers who have personnel adminis trat ion duties or those who are involved i n bargaining for the employer. (4) Engineers who have dealings with grievances as part of t h e i r duty. - 6 7 -The l arges t s ingle bargaining un i t of Canadian profes s iona l engineers i s the Profess ional Ins t i tu te (engineers and land surveyors) which bargains with the Treasury Board of Canada, This u n i t was organized i n 1968 with a membership of one thousand, three hundred and seventy engineers. ( C o l l e c t i v e Bargaining Review, V o l . 11, 1969). The i n i t i a l agreement with the federa l government included a three year agreement on wages and working condit ions which was s e t t l e d at the bargaining tab le . Sa l a r ie s and s i ck benef i t s were key issues for engineers and they dealt mainly with these areas i n the f i r s t contract . Tables 7 and 8 present the most important terms of the agreement. SALARIES OF FEDERAL ENGINEERS* S t a r t i n g Base (en-2) Top (en-5) Ju ly 1, 1967 $ 8,312 $ 16,055 Ju ly 1, 1968 8,894 17,179 Ju ly 1, 1969 9,385 18,124 TABLE 7 * C o l l e c t i v e Bargaining Review No. 11, I969, Canada Dept. of Labour, ILLNESS BENEFITS OF FEDERAL ENGINEERS Years Days s ick leave allowed Under 2 30 8 - 1 1 165 over 20 300 TABLE 8 -88-i The next agreement was a two year pact which was s e t t l ed i n the a r b i t r a t i o n stage. One thousand, seven hundred and s i x t y engineers are members i n the u n i t which i s covered by the contract which i s a four hundred member increase since 1968. General terms of the agreement are reviewed i n Table 9. HIGHLIGHTS OF 1970 AGREEMENT * Date Base (en-2) Top (en-5) J u l y 6, 1970 $ 9»6o6 $ 19,211 {6% increase) Ju ly 5, 1971 _________________________ 10,086 20,175 (5fo increase) TABLE 9 * C o l l e c t i v e Bargaining Review, No. 3 , 1971. The issue of overtime work was also discussed, with the so lu t ion that time and a ha l f rates are paid for a l l hours worked i n excess of two hours af ter regular time (except for f i e l d workers.) A f i e l d survey allowance was ra i sed to $110 per month from the previous $100 as a further f r inge benef i t for engineers. The current contract between the Treasury Board and profes s iona l engineers indicates that federa l engineers are p r o f i t i n g from t h e i r involvement i n c o l l e c t i v e bargain-i n g . The federa l group made la rger gains and dealt with more issues i n the agreement which may r e f l e c t upon valuable experience gained during the f i r s t two contract s . The overtime issue was addressed i n greater d e t a i l with the r e s u l t that time and a ha l f rates are paid during the -89-f i r s t eight hours of overtime and double time i s paid a f ter that . Premium pay rates are also i n ef fect during paid hol idays and standby pay i s increased to a s ix d o l l a r minimum for any length of time. Table 10 shows the monetary gains i n the current contract . MONETARY TERMS OF CURRENT AGREEMENT * E f f e c t i v e Nov. 6, 1972 Ju ly 2, 1973 Average increase 7.7 % hi EG - 1 $ 6,064 Base $ 6,428 EG - 8 12,859 Base 13,631 EG - 11 18,089 Base 21,790 Retroact ive payment of $270 pa id to Nov. 5 , 1972 cover Ju ly 3 , 1972-TABLE 10 * C o l l e c t i v e Bargaining Review, No. 12, 1972, The contracts reached by federa l engineers are important because of t h e i r demonstration ef fect and influence on engineers i n other sectors . I f f edera l engineers meet with success i n the future then p o s s i b i l i t i e s for widespread organizat ion of engineers are enhanced. Federal engineers have made excel lent gains i n t h i s time and future impl ica t ions fo r government p o l i c y and greater organizat ion are favourable for union development. SUMMARY This sec t ion studies h i s t o r y of the law, ro le of labour re l a t ions boards, and s p e c i f i c p r o v i n c i a l s i tua t ions . Engineers have l e g a l bargaining r ight s only i n Quebec, Saskatchewan, Ontario , New Brunswick and Manitoba but -90-voluntary bargaining i s poss ible i n other provinces . Reasons for present p r o v i n c i a l exclusions can be traced to actions of engineering associat ions i n 19*1-7 when they success fu l ly inf luenced federa l labour law. Goals of enhancing profess ional recogni t ion and status have been major factors i n the campaign to prevent engineers from gaining c o l l e c t i v e bargaining r i g h t s . The conservative nature of labour re l a t ions boards (and opposi t ion from engineers associat ions) i s another s i g n i f i c a n t force opposing un ion iza t ion because these boards are very re luc tant to make changes which grea t ly a f fect the i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t ions system. Legal aspects may be a key i n f a c i l i t a t i n g un ion iza t ion of engineers a l so . Future developments may see the law play a pos i t ive ro le i n a id ing organizat ion i f changes allow engineers to form c e r t i f i e d u n i t s . Labour law grea t ly effects p r o b a b i l i t y and p o s s i b i l i t y of widespread un ion iza t ion of engineers and there i s evidence that l e g a l b a r r i e r s w i l l not be so great i n the future. V i r t u a l l y no c o l l e c t i v e bargaining i s existent i n B r i t i s h Columbia, A l b e r t a , Manitoba, Saskatchewan, New Brunswick, Newfoundland, Nova S c o t i a , and Prince Edward Is land, although laws do allow bargaining i n some of these areas. (Goldenberg, 1968). A l l f edera l engineers are allowed to bargain unless excluded for a s p e c i f i c reason and the federa l group i s important because of i t s s ize and value as a model group for other engineers. The key issues i n the l e g a l area include d e f i n i t i o n - 9 1 -and determination of bargaining uni t s for engineers, s ecur i ty c lauses , management exclus ion c lauses , ease of entry and e x i t , and procedural d e t a i l s . I f labour laws are a l t e red to r e f l e c t favourable publ ic p o l i c y toward union development then the l i k e l i h o o d of profes s iona l unions i s enhanced. For example, engineers could be allowed to form separate un i t s with d i f f e rent goals from t h e i r b l u e - c o l l a r counterparts and exclus ion boundaries can be placed r e l a t i v e l y high i n the organizat ion hierarchy. Voluntary p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the union i s des irable along with l e g a l assurance of f a i r vo t ing procedures ( i e . poss ible government i n v e s t i g a t i o n i f not f a i r . ) Secur i ty of union organizers and indeed the union i t s e l f must be assured and enforced r i g h t from the beginning. The procedural facets of organiz ing are very important and they s h a l l be dealt with at length i n the f i n a l chapter. -92-CHAPTER SIX SOCIAL ASPECTS S o c i a l aspects are relevant factors i n studying the l i k e l i h o o d of un ioniza t ion of Canadian profes s iona l engineers. Such issues as effects of group s i ze , reference group inf luences , and engineers t r a i t s are valuable aids i n analyzing behaviour of engineers toward u n i o n i z a t i o n . S o c i a l aspects which are reviewed i n th i s chapter re fer to soc io-l o g i c a l and psychologica l issues which a f fect the formation (or non-formation) of engineering unions. This approach d i f f e r s from a t y p i c a l labour r e l a t i o n s analys i s but the value of focussing on these var iab les i s evident for both union organizers and company o f f i c i a l s . S o c i a l issues are not ob ject ive , concrete var iab les such as labour s tatutes , labour market data, or growth f igures but they are v i t a l to a complete understanding of a l l inf luences which ef fect union p r o b a b i l i t y . A prime cont r ibut ion of th i s chapter l i e s i n i t s impl icat ions for organizat ion s t rateg ies and poss ible changes i n the engineers ' ro les i n the i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s system. A. Nature of Profess ional Engineers Engineers, as a group, espouse a p a r t i c u l a r set of values and t r a i t s which re inforce t h e i r p o s i t i o n as profes s iona l s . These c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s are inherent i n (or sought by most) engineers with strong support and leadership from the profes s iona l a s soc ia t ions . Unique - 9 3 -values and t r a i t s of engineers are fundamental components for understanding behaviour of ind iv idua l s and groups i n r e l a t i o n to any dec i s ion , i n c l u d i n g un ion iza t ion . Every i n d i v i d u a l engineer could not be expected to possess a l l the "des i rab le " a t t r ibutes but as a group these character-i s t i c s are apparent and more importantly, they are c r i t i c a l i n studying the p o s s i b i l i t i e s for organizat ion. Freedom to pursue an i n d i v i d u a l r o l e i n the organizat ion i s a fundamental part of each engineers ' value system. (Strauss, 1964). This desire for i n d i v i d u a l autonomy presents both ba r r i e r s and p o s s i b i l i t i e s for un ion iza t ion . B l u e - c o l l a r unions do not s tress personal freedom and i n d i v i d u a l i t y because these values are not re levant to most b l u e - c o l l a r categories i n which the same work i s done by each person i n his work grouping. For example, a l l workers c lassed as j an i tors have s i m i l a r work ro le s and job descr ipt ions which require l i t t l e f l e x i b i l i t y , therefore equal treatment i n pay and f r inge benef i t s i s appropriate . Engineers desire "equal treatment for a l l " i n a d i f f e rent sense. They want equal opportunity to fol low an i n d i v i d u a l r o l e i n the organizat ion while developing at one's own ra te . Goals of an engineering union include attainment of more personal freedom for each engineer to u t i l i z e his unique c a p a b i l i t i e s while developing at his own pace. Large, bureaucrat ic organizations tend to lessen personal freedom (see sec t ion on s ize) with the r e s u l t that engineering jobs - 9 4 -may be categorized or dealt out i n a way which v i o l a t e s engineering values . Rules p lay an increa s ing ly important ro le i n les sening personal freedom as bureaucracy develops and they el iminate ind iv idua l i sm i n organizat ions . Once the degree of personal freedom reaches c r i t i c a l l y low l e v e l s then un ion iza t ion becomes more probable as the group exerts pressure to maintain i n d i v i d u a l opportunity i n the organizat ion. Est imat ion and measurement of what l e v e l of personal freedom i s required to spur un ion iza t ion i s d i f f i c u l t , i f not impossible , but at some point engineers perceive themselves as becoming b l u e - c o l l a r employees with s t i f l i n g work r o l e s . (Blem et. al., 1971). Blum (1964) and Strauss (1963) show that communication with colleagues and management i s another des irable s i t u a t i o n for profess ional engineers. This t r a i t re inforces profess ional values while serving educational purposes as w e l l . As bureaucrat iza t ion takes ef fect i n large organizations there i s less opportunity to communicate with fe l low engineers with d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n r e s u l t i n g from th i s lack of exchange. Union p r i o r i t i e s include establishment of better communication with management as wel l as breaking down some blockages i n communications between engineers. Benefits of improved information exchange are received by management through bet ter work and by engineers through s a t i s f a c t i o n of personal and profess ional needs. D i v e r s i t y i n the work ro le i s also sought by engineers. -95-They are dedicated employees who w i l l work long hours to achieve s c i e n t i f i c ends i f the job i s i n t e r e s t i n g and cha l lenging . (Strauss, 1964). Tasks which motivate engineers are disappearing i n large , bureaucratic organizations with decreased i n i t i a t i v e on the part of engineers being a r e s u l t . Job enrichment or job ro ta t ion are two p o s s i b i l i t i e s to motivate engineers but the p r o b a b i l i t y of study i n the area i s minimal without pressure from a union. Emergence of assembly l i n e types of work ro les i n organizat ion push engineers toward unionism because the r e s u l t i s an engineering group who are r e a l l y g l o r i f i e d b l u e - c o l l a r employees. D i v e r s i t y i s a l i m i t e d quanti ty i n h ighly s p e c i a l i z e d organizations so other areas may be needed to compensate for th i s necessary e v i l ( i e . shorter work week, time off for conferences, e tc . ) Strauss (1963) a lso stresses opportunit ies for personal and profes s iona l growth as sources of s a t i s f a c t i o n for most engineers. This t r a i t i s also pert inent to un ion iza t ion because of the impersonal nature of bureaucratic organizat ions . Maintenance or increase of profes s iona l opportunit ies to grow must be fostered by a union to serve i t s membership e f f e c t i v e l y . As performance of engineers peaks at mid-career they often require pro ject ro t a t ion or greater freedom to use s e l f - r e l i a n c e i n order to remain product ive . I f a company does not recognize that age affects performance and motivat ion, then valuable experience i s wasted and work -96-q u a l i t y often f a l l s below i t s p o t e n t i a l . Perhaps a union could open new areas for personal and profess ional growth outside the organizat ion by arranging for conferences and pub l i ca t ion of f ind ings . Prest ige i n a company's engineering department may help draw other b r i l l i a n t workers to the organizat ion but th i s prest ige i s l i m i t e d under bureaucratic condi t ions . Status consistency i s a lso required by profes s iona l engineers. The extent to which jobs measure up to expectations of engineers has effects on motivat ion and s a t i s f a c t i o n i n the company. Goffman (1957) presents status consistency as the extent to which i n d i v i d u a l ranks are expected to go together and communicate consis tent status to the i n d i v i d u a l and others . Goffman (1957) further states that status consistency i s inver se ly re l a ted to preference for change i n power d i s t r i b u t i o n . In other words, people whose income and education are consis tent with t h e i r occupational rank experience high status consistency. Workers who are unable to r i s e i n the organizat ion but aspire to upward m o b i l i t y must seek changes to reduce status inconsis tency. Engineers face a s i t u a t i o n where they are unable to r i s e i n the organizat ion and an increas ing percentage of engineers are faced with b l u e - c o l l a r working condi t ions . Unprofessional treatment and other pos i t ive forces are becoming more and more dominant to a point where engineers may have to seek a - 9 7 -change, v i a p o l i t i c a l or union a c t i v i t y , to reduce status inconsis tency. Engineers demand a f a i r chance to a t t a i n a status which i s perceived as equitable i n the organizat ion and community. I f outputs are not met by appropriate i n t r i n s i c and e x t r i n s i c rewards then un ion iza t ion may be one way to enhance rewards. Input-output r a t i o s may be unacceptable i n bureaucratic organizat ion where engineers f i n d themselves coming c lo ser and c loser to a b l u e - c o l l a r r o l e , I n t r i n s i c returns e s p e c i a l l y may be less than profes s iona l expectations which means that un ion iza t ion may be the appropriate strategy to deal with the s i t u a t i o n . B. Loca l or Cosmopolitan A "profess ional r o l e " implies c e r t a i n b e l i e f s and needs for engineers but wi th in these basic s i m i l a r i t i e s engineers"' may possess d i f f e rent characters , The l o c a l or cosmopolitan question for engineers i s of p a r t i c u l a r importance to un ion iza t ion . I f a group of engineers tends to be more l o c a l i n nature th i s implies d i f f e rent a t t i tudes toward the job, company, and science which may a l l e f fect the formation of a union. The ' . ' local" engineer i s le s s committed to broad profes s iona l goals and more or iented towards immediate peer groups and the employer organizat ion, (Gouldner, 1957). Cosmopolitans on the other hand are less l o y a l to the employer and more committed to profes s iona l s k i l l s and -98-values . I t i s general ly accepted that most profess ionals tend to be cosmopolitans, and i n the case of engineers where the stress on gaining profes s iona l status i s so great, th i s must sure ly be the case. A union or company must recognize p a r t i c u l a r or ientat ions of i t s engineers as wel l as the spec i f i c values th i s outlook impl ie s . Gouldner (1957) presents three methods of determining i f an engineer i s l o c a l or cosmopolitan. Loya l ty to the organizat ion, committment to profes s iona l s k i l l s and values , and reference group or ienta t ions are var iab les which a id i n determining an engineers ' o r i en ta t ion . More l o y a l employees are l i k e l y to be l o c a l s , as are i n d i v i d u a l s who are les s committed to profes s iona l values . I t may be usefu l for the company and union organizer to determine group c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s by analyzing these three categories . Or ientat ion of a group of engineers i s also c r i t i c a l i n determining what type of union they would j o i n ( i f he would j o i n at a l l . ) Cosmopolitans would require a u n i t which stresses s c i e n t i f i c values rather than monetary items. Communication, research pub l i ca t ion and personal freedom are excel lent examples of p r i o r i t y for a cosmopolitan oriented union. A d i f f i c u l t y with organizing cosmopolitans i s that t h e i r tenacious dedicat ion to profes s iona l values brings severe disapproval to u n i o n i z a t i o n . Locals devote more a t tent ion to the company and project l e s ser dedicat ion to s c i e n t i f i c idea l s . Locals are often -99-more l o y a l to the employer and more upward mobile i n o r i e n t a t i o n than cosmopolitans. Locals are consequently l e s s devoted to values which condemn unions with more worry attached to r a i s i n g p r o f i t s than meeting s c i e n t i f i c ends. The fo l lowing table h igh l ight s dif ferences between the two philosophies very w e l l : A COMPARISON OF LOCAL AND COSMOPOLITAN IDEALS * Cosmopolitan 1. Fur ther ing knowledge. 2. Research as an end to i t s e l f . 3 . Reward - prest ige 4. The bench. 5. Research resu l t s belong to the s c i e n t i f i c community? should dessinated. 6. Publ i sh r e s u l t s . 7. Evaluated by peers through free discuss ion i n s c i e n t i f i c journals . Local 1. Making money. 2. Research - a means to an end. 3 . Reward - pay. 4. The desk. 5. Findings belong to the company and are guarded. 6. Trade secrets . 7. Evaluated by boss. 8. Senior colleagues who guides. 8. Boss d i r e c t s . 9. Status based on knowledge 9. Status based on p o s i t i o n . 10. Decis ions by groups. 10. Decis ions by higher-ups. 11. A l l f indings subject to 11. Bosses decis ions are c r i t i c i s m and are never f i n a l . f i n a l . 12. P e r f e c t i o n i s t - black and white answers. 13. Acceptance based on log i c and proof. 14. Strong taboos against commercial ization and popular iza t ion . TABLE 11 12, P r a c t i c a l - compromises. 13. Acceptance based on power. 14. Taboos against t h e o r e t i c a l th ink ing . -100-* Strauss , George, Glaswork for Course i n Business Adminis t ra t ion l_9p_, Winter, 1967, U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a , School of Business Admini s t ra t ion , p. 2. Locals are c l a s s i c a l l y the l i k e l y candidates for un ion iza t ion because t h e i r o r i en ta t ion focusses on the company rather than on the whole area of engineering. (Gouldner, 1957). Locals tend to be more bus ines s - l ike with more awareness of rewards i n terms of money and f r inge benef i t s and l o c a l s are also more secur i ty conscious and less confident of making i t on t h e i r own, i n contrast to cosmopolitans. The labour market does not work fo r l o c a l s i n the same way as i t does for cosmopolitans because cosmopolitans are more adaptable and have a more f l e x i b l e o r i e n t a t i o n which i s useful i n many organizat ion. Locals are not as l i k e l y to seek s a t i s f a c t i o n v i a educational leaves nor improved communication with colleagues as cosmopolitans because i n t r i n s i c rewards are not so meaningful as e x t r i n s i c re turns . Cosmopolitans would organize for completely d i f f e rent reasons than l o c a l s . Whereas l o c a l s would unionize because of threats to t h e i r job s ecur i ty , cosmopolitans are more l i k e l y to organize because of a v i o l a t i o n of profess ional values . Locals are le s s concerned with profes s iona l treatment, autonomy and prest ige but cosmopolitans suffer severe s tress i f these needs and values are c o n t i n u a l l y v i o l a t e d . I f s tress reaches c r i t i c a l l e v e l s then un ion iza t ion of engineers i s more probable for both l o c a l s and cosmopolitans -101-but the source of stress may be completely d i f f e r e n t . C. Predi spos i t ions Toward Unioniza t ion Another issue of concern i n studying un ion iza t ion i s p red i spos i t i on to s t r i k e and organize. Predi spos i t ions toward ac t ion and ult imate behaviour are not always consis tent but some t r a i t s of a worker may help pred ic t his acceptance of a union. Factors such as age, sex, o r i g i n , p o l i t i c a l a f f i l i a t i o n or r e l i g i o n may help pred ic t p o s s i b i l i t i e s of organizing a p a r t i c u l a r group of employees. Stephen Cole (I969) s tudied the conversion of p red i spos i t ion into ac t ion for teachers ' s t r i k e s . He found that nonteaching statutes such as age, r e l i g i o n , family o r i g i n , e t c . , could inf luence the p red i spos i t i on to s t r i k e . S p e c i f i c a l l y a person i s more l i k e l y to s t r i k e i f he obtains s o c i a l support from colleagues and there are no cross pressures i n the group. Results of th i s study are important to show general a p p l i c a b i l i t y of the area and also because teachers are a good comparison group for engineers. Using a sample of 900 teachers to study the factors Cole obtained the fo l lowing r e s u l t s : (1) Teachers under t h i r t y years of age are more l i k e l y to support a s t r ike than older teachers. (2) As age r i s e s support for s t r ikes f a l l s . (3) Working c lass o r i g i n teachers are more l i k e l y to s t r ike than teachers from other o r i g i n s . (4) Men are more l i k e l y to s t r ike than women. -102-(5) Behaviour during a s t r i k e i s v i s i b l y af fected by others ' vehaviour, i e . support of f r i e n d , col league, means conversion of p red i spos i t i on to ac t ion i s more l i k e l y , (6) Women i n schools with more men are more l i k e l y to s t r ike than women i n schools with few male teachers. (7) I f l o c a l leadership i s ine f f ec t ive i t i s l e s s probable that p red i spos i t ion to s t r ike w i l l be converted to ac t ion . C o l e ' s study reveals to unions that group c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s and t i e s can be useful gauges for showing predi spos i t ions to organize. Perhaps odds of a successful organizat ion campaign could be s i g n i f i c a n t l y increased by f i r s t studying group c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . I f these re su l t s are appl icable at a l l to engineers then the impl ica t ions for a union are great. The union would look for engineers who are l o c a l i n nature, young, from a working c lass o r i g i n , who work i n poorly run organizations and with fr iends already i n unions. The optimal s i t u a t i o n would be to f i n d a l l these t r a i t s exhibi ted by a group of engineers i n one organizat ion but t h i s i s u n l i k e l y . Indik and Goldste in (19&3) also studied backgrounds of engineers to see the effects and p r e d i c t a b i l i t y of such information. The basic question was whether factors i n a workers background were r e l i a b l e i n p r e d i c t i n g sympathy towards unionism or r e j e c t i o n of i t . For example,does les s education indicate greater union sympathy, or does lower -103-socio-economic o r i g i n , or b e l i e f s of one's parents, e t c . , r e f l e c t on union acceptance? This study discovered that union and non-union backgrounds have l i t t l e e f fect on engineers* behaviour. Rather i t i s the degree of s a t i s f a c t i o n which i s c r i t i c a l ( i e . i n t r i n s i c rewards such as interpersonal r e l a t i o n s , a t t i tude of the company, adequacy of f a c i l i t i e s , and e x t r i n s i c rewards.) Conclusions of the i n v e s t i g a t i o n include f i n d i n g that engineers are more l i k e l y to organize at one s i t e where a l l engineers have common problems and where other unions i n the same company have been e f fect ive i n deal ing with s i m i l a r problems. Perhaps some of the factors such as age and leadership and working c lass o r i g i n are most re levant for engineers, but th i s i s doubtful i n l i g h t of the l a s t study. I t appears that treatment of engineers and success of groups i n near proximity are very important however. D. Reference Group Theory Reference group theory provides further information on the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of u n i o n i z i n g engineers. (Kemper, 1968), Normative, comparison, and audience group theory may a l l play some r o l e i n res is tance or acceptance of engineers ' unions. Normative groups provide a guide to ac t ion by e x p l i c i t l y s e t t ing norms and by espousing p a r t i c u l a r values . The actor i s expected to comply with these values e i ther w i l l i n g l y or u n w i l l i n g l y although he may f i n d i t -104-necessary to act contrary to the rules on occasion. Kemper says t h i s type of group i s important for maintenance and cont ro l of group members as we l l as support of i t s a c t i v i t i e s and the stronger the committment to these values means the stronger the group i s as a whole. In Canada, engineering associat ions are b a s i c a l l y normative groups and t h e i r contro l and maintenance of values against c o l l e c t i v e bargaining has severely hindered un ion iza t ion of engineers. Rebel engineers i n favour of a union must be very f i rm i n b e l i e f or they w i l l not speak against the group and i t s values. This helps expla in why engineering associat ions have been so successful i n combating l e g i s l a t i o n which would allow engineers to unionize i n spite of a need for unions on the part of many engineers. Mr. Wil l iam H a l l of the B. C. Profess ional As soc i a t ion of Engineers fee l s the common stand i s changing however and soon acceptance of c o l l e c t i v e bargaining may be a value of a s soc ia t ions . Comparison groups are a lso pert inent to un ion iza t ion of engineers. These groups provide actors with a frame of reference to f a c i l i t a t e judgement. For example the comparison group can also be a l i g i t i m a t o r group to help r a t i o n a l i z e behaviour. The actor r a t i o n a l i z e s that others behave l i k e himself so t h i s l i n e of behaviour must be cor rec t . This example i s e a s i l y appl ied to engineers who point at fe l low profess ionals who are r e s i s t i n g unions although t h i s l og i c i s becoming less meaningful as time passes. This type of -105-group also f i t s into the Indik and Golds te in (1963) study-where unions i n the same company can have great influence on engineers i f they deal with s i m i l a r problems e f f e c t i v e l y . E. Group Size Group s ize i s re levant to un ion iza t ion because of the trend towards employment i n large organizations faced by many engineers. Larger pools of engineers and increas ing s ize of that department i s common i n large companies. Large groups b r i n g about a need to administer i n a bureaucrat ic way for e f f i c i e n c y to be achieved. Bain (1969) shows that the organizat ion tends to emphasize the o f f i ce rather than the i n d i v i d u a l as the organizat ion grows. People tend to be treated as members of groups and not as i n d i v i d u a l workers as s ize increases . Promotion i s more apt to be determined by formal rules rather than personal considerat ions and sentiments of managers therefore standardized working condit ions are i n e v i t a b l e . (Bain, 1970). As has been argued prev ious ly , these aspects of l a rger organizations and groups i n v a r i a b l y contrad ic t needs and values of engineers which are required to meet lower l e v e l needs l e t alone s e l f - a c t u a l i z a t i o n . Growth of organizations may thus be a great force towards un ion iza t ion of engineers as they combat force with force and s ize with s i z e . United States studies have shown a pos i t ive r e l a t i o n s h i p between greater s ize and un ion iza t ion . Studies done by the Bureau of Labor S t a t i s t i c s , S h e r i l l Cle land (1955), -106-Freder ic Myers (1956), and Steele and Maclntyre (1959) a l l support th i s view as wel l as studies i n Norway, Sweden, Japan and A u s t r i a . Development of teamwork becomes a d i f f i c u l t y for a growing organizat ion. Co l l abora t ion i s eas ier i f workers separate and read one anothers ' papers but t h i s may present problems of supervis ion and c o n t r o l . Also i t i s hard to put many b r i l l i a n t men onto one team as a department does so problems may ar i se here. One e f fec t ive so lu t ion may be to uni te l o c a l s and cosmopolitans i n one group to combine p r a c t i c a l and s c i e n t i f i c s k i l l s . Problems of teamwork i n the bureaucratic organizat ion or unions may develop to improve condit ions i n the work place. SUMMARY Spec i f i c needs of engineers include autonomy, completion, challenge, profes s iona l s k i l l , l ea rn ing and profes s iona l recogni t ion . (Strauss, 1963). Many of these needs are ignored or opposed by forces i n large organizations with d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n r e s u l t i n g . A union could study engineers i n the employer organizat ion to determine what needs have to be concentrated on i n an organizat ion campaign. Modern organizations are increa s ing ly reducing opportunit ies for freedom, l e a r n i n g , completion, and challenge because of any overwhelming drive for e f f i c i e n c y and large-sca le d i v i s i o n of work. Use of pro fes s iona l s k i l l s and recogni t ion of engineers i s a lso l a ck ing i n -107-large bureaucratic companies to a point where engineers are disappointed with t h e i r opportunit ies to contribute to the employer organizat ion as wel l as chances for i n t r i n s i c rewards. An engineers* union could focus on these problem areas and seek s a t i s f ac to ry changes at the bargaining table . Values and needs of engineers can be used to prevent un ion iza t ion by the employer. Blum (1964) presents many ways that a company can combat organizat ion e f f e c t i v e l y . Implementation of c e r t a i n s t rateg ies at c r i t i c a l points i n time can stave off group discontent and s t i f l e an organizat ion campaign. For example more personal freedom could be granted to engineers or an improvement of v e r t i c a l communication could be u t i l i z e d . Also arrangements for educational seminars or time off for conferences i n other c i t i e s are p o s s i b i l i t i e s to enhance engineers* s a t i s f a c t i o n with jobs. These s trategies and s trategies which a union may fol low w i l l be presented i n greater d e t a i l i n the f i n a l chapter. The l o c a l or cosmopolitan question i s also a key to future un ion iza t ion . Cosmopolitans are being forced into a l o c a l r o l e i n the organizat ion which increases d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n amongst engineers and makes un ion iza t ion more l i k e l y . A b i l i t y of organizat ion to make t h e i r engineers f e e l l i k e s c i e n t i s t s and not just tools of management w i l l be important i n th i s area. I t would -10,8-appear that organizat ion are f o r c i n g the values of l o c a l s on a l l engineers without regard for the consequences. I f the s i t u a t i o n comes too close to b l u e - c o l l a r condit ions or cosmopolitan values are severely v i o l a t e d then un ion iza t ion i s more probable. At t i tudes toward un ion iza t ion and factors such as age, sex, work o r i g i n or p o l i t i c a l a f f i l i a t i o n may also hinder or help un ion iza t ion . Backgrounds of new engineers enter ing the work place i n large numbers could g rea t ly inf luence the acceptance of engineers ' unions. As more engineers from working class backgrounds enter the work place there may be changes i n a t t i tudes towards c o l l e c t i v e bargaining although i t i s more l i k e l y that common problems for a l l engineers i n one company could be the stimulus for organizat ion. Growing s ize of organizations and use of pools of engineers have pos i t ive impl ica t ions for unions a l so . Adminis t ra t ion by bureaucracy to gain e f f i c i e n c y means that organizations meet engineers ' needs le s s and less and i n fact many needs and values are v i o l a t e d . The trend toward larger organizat ion i s evident i n Canada as i s the use of bureaucracy i n management. - 1 0 9 -CHAPTER SEVEN FORCES INHIBITING UNIONIZATION The forces i n h i b i t i n g un ion iza t ion of profes s iona l engineers are c r i t i c a l inputs for th i s systems analys i s because of the influence on engineers a t t i tudes and behaviour. Negative elements reduce the p r o b a b i l i t y of un ioniza t ion of profess ional engineers and help maintain the status quo. Many of these factors have already been dealt with b r i e f l y but further d i scuss ion of the r e l a t i v e merits of each argument from an engineering standpoint i s use fu l . Negative aspects of unionism have t r a d i t i o n a l l y dominated i n the case of Canadian profes s iona l engineers, but dra s t i c changes i n t h e i r work s i t u a t i o n negate many arguments which:oppose c o l l e c t i v e bargaining. Resistance toward unionism i s b a s i c a l l y ph i lo soph ica l and subjective i n nature whereas pos i t ive arguments tend to be more objective and concrete. Goldenberg (1968) states , "The opposit ion to c o l l e c t i v e bargaining for profess ionals has been argued mainly i n terms of s tatus , profess ional e th ic s , publ ic se rv ice , and the protec t ion of i n d i v i d u a l i s m . " 2 2 I t i s the strength and au thent i c i ty of these arguments that th i s chapter hopes to deal with . A . T r a d i t i o n a l Philosophy One major force combating un ion iza t ion i s the t r a d i t i o n a l engineering philosophy which condemns c o l l e c t i v e bargaining. -110-(Goldenberg, 1968), Some t y p i c a l engineering views are i l l u s t r a t e d through the fo l lowing quotes: "Now, whether i t i s bet ter to have Eng ineer s - in-Tra in ing i n a trade union i s another point of controversy. Our stand i s d e f i n i t e - they should not be i n any u n i o n . " 2 3 Seidman and Gain (1964) s ta te , "Profess ionals im i s an i n d i v i d u a l th ing . One must stand on h i s own merits and be given freedom for i n d i v i d u a l ac t ions . Profess ional ism i s not based on s tandardizat ion as i s unionism. Unionism emphasizes prest ige and profess ional standing. A true profes s iona l should not r e l y on a union to bargain for him. He i s lowering his s tatus . He should get paid what he i s worth, rather than some base pay for hours put i n . " 2 ^ These stands ignore s i tua t ions experienced present ly by engineers where s tandardizat ion , a lack of pres t ige , unprofess ional tasks, and rewards based on s e n i o r i t y are becoming facts of l i f e . (Bain, 1970). There i s a growing number of profess ional engineers i n Canada who discount the t r a d i t i o n a l stand on c o l l e c t i v e bargaining. (Muir, 19711 Ca in and Seidman, 1964). Evidence to support the claim that t r a d i t i o n a l sentiments are weakening i s we l l shown by Quebec unions and Ontario experience i n informal bargaining. The B .C . Profess ional Engineers As soc ia t ion i s also an exce l lent example of a body of engineers which not only accepts c o l l e c t i v e bargaining, but a lso sees i t as a necessary development -111-f o r engineers. (William H a l l , 1972). The term "professional" once meant condemnation of c o l l e c t i v e action hut recent developments i n society attitudes have altered t h i s s i t u a t i o n . Today, such Canadian professionals as doctors, policemen, and teachers have entered the realm of c o l l e c t i v e bargaining. In spite of changes i n the work environment, the t r a d i t i o n a l b e l i e f that unionism i s e v i l s t i l l e xists and i n some cases i t i s a strong force, A r a d i c a l change i n attitude on the part of many engineers would be required to weaken the outdated attitude that c o l l e c t i v e bargaining and professionalism are opposites. B. Professional Viewpoint Negative aspects from a professional viewpoint i s another argument which condemns c o l l e c t i v e bargaining. In Goldenberg's (1968) view this argument i s centred on issues such as c r e a t i v i t y and lower work standards. Op-ponents of unionism state that the professional viewpoint of engineers would be damaged or severely l i m i t e d i f unions existed. Discouragement of engineering thinking and c r e a t i v i t y i s supported with b l u e - c o l l a r examples where workers t o i l i n shallow, meaningless tasks. Another facet of t h i s argument i s possible group control over i n d i v i d u a l output through sanctions on over-producers (as well as slackers) to force uniformity onto the engineering group. A. d i v i s i o n of l o y a l t y between the -112-employer and employee groups i s a r e a l fear of supporters of th i s argument. This reasoning ignores s i tua t ions which ex i s t for engineers i n bureaucratic organizat ion. In r e a l i t y one of the greatest forces pushing engineers toward un ion iza t ion i s des truct ion of the profess ional viewpoint by l a rge , bureaucratic organizat ion. (Hansen, 1963). C r e a t i v i t y and freedom are s t i f l e d along with changes for s e l f -a c t u a l i z a t i o n . Loyal ty to the company i s decreased by bureaucracy simply because of the manner i n which workers are treated i n such an organizat ion. (Bain, 1969). Engineers are treated more l i k e cogs i n a machine than the valuable ind iv idua l s which they a t r ive to be. In fac t many engineers perform tasks which are no more creat ive nor more chal lenging than b l u e - c o l l a r jobs. C. Management Links A t r a d i t i o n a l t i e to management i s another force opposing unioniza t ion of engineers, (Strauss, 1963). In past times engineers have supported and i d e n t i f i e d with management, yet they have recognized management perogatives as necessary elements i n the work place . Engineers i d e n t i f y with management because they are upward mobile i n the organizat ion and many expect future promotion. (Blum et a l , I 97 I ) . There i s also a b e l i e f that management w i l l use merit as a measure of performance rather than simple rules such as s e n i o r i t y . Proponents -113-of t h i s view bel ieve that a union of engineers would lead to a loss of management r ight s i n areas of promotion, t rans fer , and work assignment which would not be a des irable development. There i s also a f e e l i n g that engineers would be less l i k e l y candidates for promotion a f ter organizat ion because management would be the adversary not the a l l y . Management l i n k arguments are often inappropriate for engineers employed i n l a rge , bureaucratic organizat ions . Rules and set procedures are followed to reach decis ions on promotion and transfer i n bureaucratic companies, therefore l i t t l e weight i s given to meri t . (Bain, 1970). Fewer and fewer higher l e v e l jobs are ava i lab le to engineers because competit ion i s greater and bureaucratic methods of management allow a few managers to administer many workers. I t i s also tenuous to argue that engineers and management are close a l l i e s under bureaucratic circumstances because of the methods used to administer engineers. C o n f i d e n t i a l status i s valuable i n meeting personal and profess ional needs of engineers but th i s p r i v i l e g e d status may be l o s t i f un ion iza t ion occurs. Loss of c o n f i d e n t i a l status implies that union members would not be allowed to work on many key projects because divulgence of secrets would be an overwhelming bargaining t o o l . I f p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n chal lenging projects was one r e s u l t of -114-an engineering union, then fewer opportunit ies for engineers to s e l f - a c t u a l i z e and meet other personal needs would be a severe disadvantage to un ion iz ing . On the other hand a loss of c o n f i d e n t i a l status may force companies to promote more engineers to work on secret projects and upward m o b i l i t y could f e a s i b l y increase . Also there i s t y p i c a l l y less and less opportunity to work on cha l leng ing , key projects i n large bureaucratic organizat ions . D. Fear of Uniformity Uniformity and conformity i n organizat ion ro les oppose engineers ' values yet they are d e f i n i t e l y associated with normal use of the word "un ion" . In spi te of the fact that many engineering jobs are moving p r e c i s e l y i n th i s d i r e c t i o n , profess ional engineers don't want to recognize the p o s s i b i l i t y that engineers would perform that type of work. Uniformity and conformity i n work ro les are "unprofess ional" therefore union formation i s i n h i b i t e d by the b e l i e f that emergence of a union could speed up the trend toward uniformity through groupings for pay and job c l a s s i f i c a t i o n . B l u e - c o l l a r unions are examples which support th i s argument which t i e s uni formity and conformity to union formation. Ind iv idua l freedom and dif ferences are c r i t i c a l items i n the engineers ' need hierarchy and trade unionism i s viewed as r e s t r i c t i n g i n these areas because of the uni formity which i s present i n t y p i c a l b l u e - c o l l a r unions. Uniformity i n pay rates -115-i s another h igh ly unacceptable t r a i t of b l u e - c o l l a r unions which i s not compatable with engineers* des i res , but these t r a i t s may be overcome (as teachers unions have shown.) E . Management Pract ice A growing a b i l i t y of management to appease engineers and prevent union development through u t i l i z a t i o n of ce r t a in pract ices opposes engineering unionism. Management can learn t a c t i c s through communication with other companies or from handling of other profess ionals i n the organizat ion. Bain (1970) and Walton (1961) have offered various methods of combating un ion iza t ion : (1) Bain (1970) and Walton ( I96I) suggest that sa lary adminis trat ion can be used to lessen p r o b a b i l i t y of organizat ion. Sa lar ie s may be ra i sed to higher l e v e l s than pay i n unionized firms or else a competitive l e v e l can be maintained. Timing of wage hikes i s important because increases i n pay at times of increas ing d i s s a t i s -f ac t ion may appease engineers. Also t iming of ra i ses may coincide with gains i n unionized companies or implementation of sa lary hikes may also be used to stay one jump ahead of unionized engineers. P r o f i t sharing i s another useful strategy because bonuses are paid near Christmas or at other c r i t i c a l times when d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n may be minimized. There i s an add i t iona l a l t e rna t ive i n the sa lary area and that i s to re inforce l o y a l t y by paying l o y a l -116-workers more money than t h e i r col leagues, (Bain, 1970) and a dec i s ion to use of merit to determine sa lary changes i s both motivat ing and s a t i s f y i n g for engineers i f the company has the means and i n c l i n a t i o n to do t h i s . (2) Another method of combating union formation and simultaneously increas ing organizat ion e f f i c i e n c y i s encouragement of v e r t i c a l and h o r i z o n t a l communication. (Strauss, 1963). E x i s t i n g channels may be unblocked or new channels for information flow can be opened because better communication between colleagues and management would present strong opposit ion for a union "organizer. A sense of l o y a l t y and personal value to the organizat ion i s ra i sed through better communication and i d e n t i f i c a t i o n with management i s a further force which v e r t i c a l communication re inforces to reduce p r o b a b i l i t y of union formation. Engineers also need contact with colleagues to s a t i s f y personal and profess ional needs while increas ing engineering effectiveness i n the organizat ion. * (3) Just and swift settlements of grievances i s a t h i r d useful a l ternat ive for management. (Kleingartner , I968) , A r r i v a l at a f a i r settlement i n deal ing with engineers* problems should be accomplished i n a short period to s a t i s fy engineers* desires and values while promoting organizat ion e f f i c i e n c y . By ignor ing d i f f i c u l t i e s and grievances presented by engineers, the company may reduce fee l ings of s e l f worth held by engineers and make them -117-f e e l l i k e b l u e - c o l l a r employees. (4) Recognition of i n d i v i d u a l di f ferences between engineers i s a fourth method to impede union formation. (Hansen, 1963). Unhappiness i n large , bureaucratic organizat ion i s a d i r e c t r e s u l t of the loss of a sense of i n d i v i d u a l i t y on the part of engineers. Values and needs i l l u s t r a t e d i n the s o c i a l chapter c l e a r l y demonstrate the importance of i n d i v i d u a l i t y to profess ional engineers. Bureaucratic organizations tend to place engineers i n assembly l i n e roles and the r e s u l t i n g loss of personal dif ferences i s discouraging and unacceptable. Perhaps companies can appoint engineers with administrat ive q u a l i t i e s to administer other engineers and show the members of the s ta f f that t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l cont r ibut ion i s recognized. (5) Fos ter ing of cont inual i d e n t i f i c a t i o n with management and provis ions for job secur i ty are further a l t e rna t ives which merit cons iderat ion . I t i s e s p e c i a l l y important to maintain engineers ' i d e n t i f i c a t i o n with management rather than a l lowing profess ional s c i e n t i s t s to f e e l l i k e ordinary workers with no spec i a l s tatus . Communication and spec i a l treatment above b l u e - c o l l a r standards are two ways to accomplish th i s goal . (6) S trategic use of promotion and transfer allow companies to influence key f igures i n the organizat ion of a. union and successful tacts can s t i f l e union a c t i v i t y - 1 1 8 -before i t s t a r t s . (Bain, 1970 ) , Companies may f i n d ways to f i r e engineers who are sympathetic to unionism or promote valuable contr ibutors to management ranks. Dismissa l of engineers i n a buyer ' s market i s a harsh form of d i s c i p l i n e because other companies are not l i k e l y to h i re a union sympathizer when there i s a wide choice of engineers i n the job market. This s trategy may be the most e f fec t ive and leas t c o s t l y of a l l but ru le by fear i s one way to force good workers to search for a new employer. F . Other Arguments Goldenberg (I968) presents the fact that arguments opposing engineering unions are psychologica l and t r a d i t i o n a l i n nature. These arguments may be summed into two general categories : ( 1 ) Unions are unneeded. (2) There w i l l be harmful effects from unions. The f i r s t argument i s b l i n d to changing condit ions i n engineer's work s i tuat ions and labour market for profess ional engineers. Unions are c l e a r l y appropriate for a considerable number of engineers because c o l l e c t i v e ac t ion i s v i r t u a l l y the only means of changing t h e i r s i t u a t i o n . The second view i s the more c r i t i c a l one. Rather than s t a t i n g that unions are not required , t h i s argument presents the notion that un ion iza t ion i n i t s b l u e - c o l l a r form could cause serious problems for engineers. Such d i f f i c u l t i e s could include a d i v i s i o n of l o y a l t y , lower -119-morale, re l i ance on s e n i o r i t y i n decision-making and increas ing uni formity . A union must address i t s e l f to answering th i s argument and les sening the inappropriate features of a t y p i c a l b l u e - c o l l a r u n i t . SUMMARY Factors opposing engineering un ion iza t ion are based on long establ i shed a t t i tudes which are t r a d i t i o n a l for the profess ion. Many negative arguments are outdated because they f a i l to recognize changing condit ions which are faced everyday by paid engineers. T r a d i t i o n a l philosophy, management l i n k s , profess ional viewpoint, e tc . have a l l been re inforced by the group as strong deterrents for unionism through past behaviour. T r a d i t i o n a l b e l i e f that c o l l e c t i v e bargaining i s not compatible with professionalism.. has been a prime reason for the present state of non-organization i n Canada. This stand i s disputed by most scholars and observers of the engineers ' s i t u a t i o n . (Bain, Goldenberg, Carrothers , e tc ) . A. good example of th i s stand comes from Russel (1954), " I t has genera l ly been accepted by the vast major i ty of membership that unionism and profess ional ism are not compatible. This viewpoint i s i n no way, s l i g h t i n g to trade unions. Trade unions are for the trades, but not for the profess ions . This i s the o f f i c i a l a t t i tude of The Counc i l of The A s s o c i a t i o n . " v These arguments give some i n d i c a t i o n of the b a r r i e r s -120-faced by union organizers . Some factors such as the t r a d i t i o n a l a t t i tude and profes s iona l viewpoint are changing (see law chapter) but others are s t i l l powerful inf luences i n Canada. -121-CHAPTER EIGHT CONCLUSIONS AND INSIGHTS The r e s u l t of th i s systems analys i s i s a confirmation of the thes i s that profess ional engineers i n Canada are l i k e l y to unionize on a greater scale i n the future . The influences i n the engineers• system indicate that the pressures toward union formation are becoming more and more dominant for a large por t ion of the engineering work force . The f indings of t h i s study are summarized wel l by the fee l ings of Seymour Fogelson ( I 9 6 9 ) , an/engineer with a masters degree, "I don't l i k e , of course to be put i n the same category as b l u e - c o l l a r workers, I think some as soc ia t ion has to be establ i shed to give engineers something l i k e a union, ' ' These sentiments, which t h e i r speakers concede c o n f l i c t with long-held p r i n c i p l e s of independence and professionalism on the part of engineers, are t y p i c a l of a growing vocalness from a b i t t e r segment of the so-ca l l ed s i l e n t m a j o r i t y . " The conclus ion of th i s paper i s that engineers w i l l organize on a wider scale but as Peter Carson (1973) says,they w i l l do i t r e l u c t a n t l y . Pos i t ive forces i n Canada are very great now and they continue to grow i n inf luence every day. T r a d i t i o n a l arguments which oppose unions are fast becoming inappropriate for a large port ion of profess ional engineers because profess ionals are not able to s a t i s f y t h e i r unique needs through the job. Goldenberg arid Strauss are key sources to -122-i l l u s t r a t e the erosion of i n d i v i d u a l i n i t i a t i v e and d ign i ty which i s taking place for engineers and Muir (1971) presents these reasons and other legi t imate forces which indicate engineers should form unions. Bain (I969) also supports un ion iza t ion of engineers through his b e l i e f that democracy i s less complete i f groups of profess ionals are not represented i n the f irm as wel l as outside i t . In fact there i s no inconsis tency between the status of profess ional engineers and use of c o l l e c t i v e ac t ion when one discovers the terms under which many profes s iona l engineers work. Blum (1971) a lso support th i s claim that unions are the most e f fec t ive means to r e -e s t ab l i sh se l f - respect and profess ional standing. There i s evidence throughout the paper to prove that s t i m u l i which enhance union p o s s i b i l i t i e s are reaching l e v e l s which force engineers to act out of f r u s t r a t i o n . In past years large , bureaucrat ic organizat ion were not as dominant as today, therefore t r a d i t i o n a l a t t i tudes were e a s i l y re inforced by profes s iona l a s soc ia t ions , but today an e n t i r e l y new s i t u a t i o n ex i s t s . Whereas po s i t i ve forces for organizat ion were not previous ly widespread enough to ef fect engineers' behaviour, they have increased to a point where many arguments against unionism are negated. P r i o r to widespread un ion iza t ion of engineers, some c r i t i c a l problems must be dealt with to make unionism more compatible with engineers ' values. I f a new type of union emerges without many b l u e - c o l l a r -123-" e v i l s " then l i k e l i h o o d of un ion iza t ion i s enhanced to a far greater extent. With the goal of increased compat-i b i l i t y i n mind th i s chapter offers a l ternat ives for engineering unions through analys i s of key issues . A. The Law As a prelude to widespread un ion iza t ion of engineers, laws i n many provinces must be a l tered to omit profes s iona l exclus ions . Present r e s t r i c t i o n s i n labour law do not f a c i l i t a t e a major movement towards c o l l e c t i v e bargaining i n Canada. Since the Federal l e g i s l a t i o n of 1947-48 was enacted with future rev i s ions i n mind there i s a strong p o s s i b i l i t y that engineers could lobby to have the laws amended, B r i t i s h Columbia i s a good example of an a s soc ia t ion which cur rent ly seeks changes to p a r a l l e l Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Ontario , New Brunswick and Quebec s i tuat ions where engineers are allowed to bargain c o l l e c t i v e l y . I t i s a de f in i te p o s s i b i l i t y that other p r o v i n c i a l associat ions w i l l fo l low more powerful groups to push for organizat ion r ight s i n t h e i r respect ive provinces. At t i tudes of soc ie ty and profess ionals continue to view c o l l e c t i v e bargaining as a legi t imate vehic le for worker p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the work place and hopeful ly the law w i l l soon r e f l e c t soc i e ty ' s a t t i tudes . Peter Carson (1973) be l ieves that the law should allow engineers to form t h e i r own bargaining u n i t s , - 1 2 4 -place management exclusions at a high point i n the organ-i z a t i o n hierarchy, provide for i n d i v i d u a l choice to j o i n or withdraw from the u n i t , and re l a t ions should be achieved without s t r i k e s . These goals are very compatible with the f indings of the res t of the paper i n regard to engineers ' values and needs. I t would be appropriate to require a very large majori ty vote to gain c e r t i f i c a t i o n i f the law did not provide for voluntary withdrawal, because engineers are extremely adverse to rule by bare majority. Separate uni t s for management engineers are not necessary i f the exclusion point i s placed s u f f i c i e n t l y high. For example, a l l engineers may be e l i g i b l e except those who d i r e c t other engineers and those who work i n personnel funct ions . The ro le of the labour r e l a t i o n s boards would be mainly procedural to ensure that engineers are given a f a i r opportunity to form t h e i r own u n i t with a democratic vote. The boards would also play a very important ro le i n decis ions per ta in ing to e l i g -i b i l i t y and maintenance of i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s . Fol lowing discuss ion i n t h i s chapter rests on the assumption that labour laws w i l l be a l t e red to allow a l l profess ional engineers to organize. Labour law i s the ult imate b a r r i e r to unionism i n that i t can be used e f f e c t i v e l y as a weapon by employers even i f a l l engineers seek bargaining p r i v i l e g e s . As pos i t ive forces render negative aspects inappropriate i n large butreaucracies -125-the only weapon ava i lab le to ha l t union formation i s through s t r i c t adherence to the law. The effect of favourable publ ic p o l i c y i s presented i n the paper as i t appl ies to engineers and other profess ional workers. Fol lowing sections help analyze what new p o l i c i e s may emerge and much of the d i scuss ion i s meant to discover new approaches to whi te -co l l a r bargaining or "pro fes s iona l " unions. B, Union Strategies and Goals Wideman (1971) states that a change i n a t t i tude towards c o l l e c t i v e bargaining has taken place i n soc ie ty , and he says, "Undesirable as i t may appear to many engineers, the fact i s today's democracy i s a system of pressure groups. In the past engineers were i n d i v i d u a l l y recognized and i n d i v i d u a l ac t ion was often s u f f i c i e n t to deal with an unsat i s factory s i t u a t i o n . This i s no longer the case. Unprofess ional though i t may seem, i t appears that the only remedy ava i l ab le today i s the formation of an organizat ion for the spec i f i c purpose of promoting the employed profess ional engineers* economic interes t s ."27 Organization should do far more than promote pure economic interes t s for profess ional engineers because v i o l a t i o n of other values aside from sa lary i ssues , i s the source of much of the impetus for un ion iza t ion . -126-A union could s a t i s fy engineers best by concentrat ing on i n t r i n s i c rewards as wel l as monetary items. The new "profess ional union" i s more l i k e l y to be an a n c i l l a r y body than the profess ional a s soc ia t ion i t s e l f . Profess ional unions w i l l require new leaders who are capable administrators and bargainers rather than men with pure profess ional o r ienta t ions . There i s a good p o s s i b i l i t y that the a s soc ia t ion and union would merge i n the long run because of unhealthy competition for l o y a l t y and the existence of many common goals (as we l l economies of space and manpower.) I t i s also poss ible that unions may s tar t out being a f f i l i a t e d with associat ions while not a c t u a l l y being a part of the profess ional a s soc ia t ion . This would be most probable where associat ions push heav i ly for union r ight s and where associat ions recognize that t h e i r future existence depends on support of the new union. (1) Individual ism Evidence has been presented throughout the paper to i l l u s t r a t e how bureaucracy has destroyed ind iv idua l i sm for engineers. Unionizat ion i s great ly aided through non-recognit ion of i n d i v i d u a l value to the organizat ion because engineers place a high value on personal worth and engineering unions would attempt to r e c t i f y t h i s s i t u a t i o n to some degree through bargaining. One method i s to seek reward based on merit which would force the organizat ion to recognize i n d i v i d u a l input , with the r e s u l t -127-that higher rewards would ind ica te greater value to the company. Rewards based on merit do not prevent de-partmental izat ion nor s p e c i a l i z a t i o n i n organizat ion of tasks, therefore i t i s poss ible that job ro les may s t i l l l i m i t ta lents and inputs of the engineers to some extent. There are many procedural d i f f i c u l t i e s i n f a c i l i t a t i n g i n d i v i d u a l rewards but the s i t u a t i o n i s not impossible. One p o s s i b i l i t y i s to u t i l i z e per iod ic reviews of the engineer 's performance. This may be accomplished through monthly meetings between superior and subordinate to mutually assess outcomes and goals. Another method may involve colleagues and peer appra i sa l . Peer appra i sa l seems to be compatible with both engineering values and ind iv idua l i sm, therefore i t may be an i d e a l so lu t ion to the problem of equitable returns . Individual ism i n the u n i t also means that engineers must be able to decide for themselves i f they want to j o i n and be part of an engineering a l l i a n c e . Perhaps a 70-80% vote i n favour of organiz ing should be a pre- requ i s i t e to prevent many unhappy i n d i v i d u a l s from being stuck i n a u n i t . Democratic pract ices such as e l e c t i o n of leaders and the use of peer evaluation i s a l so poss ible to protect i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s . An agency shop i s imperative to f a c i l i t a t e voluntary membership i n the profes s iona l union and to ensure union s ecur i ty -128-as w e l l . Another useful a l t e rna t ive to increase i n d i v i d u a l recogni t ion i s through d i f f e rent s ty les of leadership . Perhaps an engineers* union could bargain for leaders who provide sc ience-oriented leadership rather than normal bureaucratic s ty le s which are d i r e c t i v e i n nature. Contact with leaders who are knowledgeable and who merit t h e i r jobs increases t i e s to management, allows ind iv idua l s to measure progress through praise or punishment, and at the same time increases fee l ings of se l f -worth. The profes s iona l union would have l i t t l e cont ro l over leaders , aside from pressuring management to promote engineers on the basis of meri t . (2) Salary Determination Engineers seek d i f fe rent goals than b l u e - c o l l a r desires for general increases and categor izat ion of jobs. Engineers also pursue an equitable system of reward whereby returns are based on one's worth rather than some uniform rate of pay. I t i s far more important to gain f a i r rewards than hugh increments, i n other words engineers require an equity system of reward rather than an equa l i ty system such as b l u e - c o l l a r workers genera l ly have. In some cases the increment for paid engineers may be very large to obtain equity but t h i s may not be true i n a l l cases. I f i d e a l condit ions existed i n organizations engineers would have returns based on -129-e f fo r t , p r o d u c t i v i t y , and s k i l l input to complete the task and a l l i n d i v i d u a l wages would be revealed to prevent speculat ion and unhappiness due to rumours. Perhaps the goal of engineers i s best seen through use of Adams' theory on inequi ty . Adams' theory states that equity exis t s whens Outcomes for Others _ Outcomes to Person Inputs by Others Inputs by Person Implementation of safeguards to preserve equity i n the system and protect those who are u n f a i r l y rewarded i s also des i rab le . An appra i sa l system i s appropriate to protect jus t ice i n the system through p e r i o d i c a l l y review of rewards and meri t . Some organizations have already implemented a review system with success but engineers ' values would be more s a t i s f i e d i f the r i g h t to appeal was made ava i lab le to a l l engineers. The r i g h t of redress i s r e a l l y a chance to challenge the adminis t ra t ion on an issue to insure just treatment. Ind iv idua l engineers should be allowed to par t i c ipa te i n t h e i r own appra i sa l by d i scuss ing work goals and work accomplishment with the supervisor . I f an engineer s t i l l f ee l s jus t ice has not been served a f ter appra i sa l steps are concluded, then further steps to appeal decis ions should e x i s t . P r a c t i c a l problems of de r iv ing a formula for determing outputs and inputs would be the greatest b a r r i e r to an equity reward system because comparabi l i ty between jobs i s required i n the -130-formula. Engineers work on t o t a l l y d i f f e rent projects with various s k i l l requirements so f a i r comparisons of e f for t are very d i f f i c u l t . Perhaps a work procedure committee or an engineering c o u n c i l could be given s p e c i f i c duties i n the area to develop a f a i r formula and ensure just adminis trat ion of i t . Engineers would i n i t a l l y t r y to ra i se l eve l s of pay to prevent f a l l i n g behind the general work force while s t r i v i n g for rewards which are consis tent with t h e i r education, a b i l i t y , and serv ice . The problem of te lescoping must be corrected to motivate experienced engineers and recognize greater worth to the organizat ion. The profess ional union may bargain for greater benef i ts for mature engineers who offer valuable experience but th i s scheme must be based on meri t . Overtime payment could be a new issue because many engineers on sa lary receive no overtime pay although some engineers are allowed to take t ime-off to compensate. In the future engineers may be paid at premium rates for overtime or have a choice of time off instead of pay. Use of scheduled overtime i s a lso a p o s s i b i l i t y to d i s t r ibu te extra pay more f a i r l y throughout the engineering group. (3) Job Secur i ty Job secur i ty has become a relevant issue for Canadian profess ional engineers. Unionism could c l e a r l y strengthen th i s area through c o l l e c t i v e bargaining -131-through tradeoffs for le s ser benef i t s i n other areas or formulae for pay cuts are a l t e rna t ives to increase job secur i ty . I f a company requires les s engineers then the l a y -off system must be f a i r with just methods of re lease . An elected engineering counc i l and management could review s k i l l s and performance to mutually decide which engineers are leas t deserving of jobs. Profess ional l ay-o f f s are not based on pur s e n i o r i t y as i n the b lue-c o l l a r case because organizations s t r i v e to keep more valuable engineers. This method of l a y - o f f i s a great motivator i n the poor labour market which present ly exis t s i n Canada and i t also conforms with engineers ' values . There would be great incent ive for the i n d i v i d u a l to upgrade h i s s k i l l s i f l ay-o f f s were based on personal worth therefore organizations would have a b u i l t i n res i s tance to s k i l l obsolescence. Senior engineers could not s lack l i k e senior b l u e - c o l l a r workers and s k i l l upgrading would be forced upon older engineers to the benef i t of the company. Walton ( I 9 6 I ) suggests three further a l t e rna t ives for l ay-o f f s which may be considered by a union. These choices include l ay-of f s by a r a t i n g system, man-to-man comparison ( s imi la r to previous suggestion), and s e n i o r i t y on an inter-company bas i s . The f i r s t two p o s s i b i l i t i e s are congruent with engineers' values more than the t h i r d one because merit i s the basis for r a t i n g the engineers. -132-There are p r a c t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s i n construct ing r a t i n g systems and evaluat ing i n d i v i d u a l s but these b a r r i e r s are far from insurmountable. Another method of increas ing job secur i ty i s to arrange for a l l engineers to take a s l i g h t cut i n pay rather than have a fel low engineer re leased. This a l -ternat ive would help companies by r e t a i n i n g valuable workers while simultaneously preventing the condi t ion of labour market oversupply. Each engineer probably would receive a very s l i g h t drop i n pay of far less than f ive percent but the benefi ts i n group cohesion are great. Blum (1970) supports t h i s notion of work sharing as one method of avoiding unemployment and increas ing worker s o l i d a r i t y at a r e l a t i v e l y low cost . Clauses per ta in ing to automation are also goals for bargaining i n some cases. There could be obl igat ions for the company to make new jobs for those displaced by automation or some spec i a l monetary benef i t s may be given to those who are l a i d of f . (Blum, 1970). Profess ional unions and associat ions would not oppose technolog ica l advances but they would demand assistance to those who lose jobs and programs to f a c i l i t a t e re-employment. (Blum, 1970). The union spec i f i c duties and committments to engineers ' s ecur i ty through the use of employment -133-counse l l ing and job placement a c t i v i t i e s . (Blum, 1970), I t i s poss ible for l o c a l uni t s to communicate on a na t iona l scale to ensure that engineers are aware of jobs r i g h t across Canada. The profes s iona l union could also go further than th i s by bargaining for clauses which require the employer to help the engineers re locate through contact with other employers. (4) Development of Engineers Education could be one of the most important bargaining areas to increase engineers ' s a t i s f a c t i o n . Issues concerning education may be used to lessen d i s -s a t i s f a c t i o n on the job while increas ing i n t r i n s i c rewards. An engineering union could demand "X" hours per week for education purposes to prevent obsolescence of s k i l l s while a l lowing contact with fe l low profess ional s . Perhaps an arrangement i s poss ib le whereby a nearby u n i v e r s i t y becomes involved i n arranging weekly seminars and i n s t r u c t i o n . Another a l t e rna t ive i s use of a s soc ia t ion personnel to help update knowledge through gathering and d i spers ing of new techniques or theories i n engineering. Educat ional leaves of absence for one year or longer provide an add i t iona l bargaining issue of concern for a l l engineers. Leaves of absence would assure the i n d i v i d u a l engineer that hi s place i n the organizat ion would be saved while he gained extensive educational benef i t s . Attendance at - 1 3 4 -engineering conferences and night classes might be fully-financed by companies or at l ea s t part of the cost shared. Increased education programs ensure that engineers with experience can stay abreast with s c i e n t i f i c developments and apply them to the organizat ion (while overcoming the problem of s k i l l absolescence.) Cost-saving processes and more e f f i c i e n t production methods are probable dividends for the company i f cont inuing education of engineers i s f a c i l i t a t e d . The upgrading of s k i l l s a lso "cosmopolitanizes" workers to make them more usefu l for other companies i n case of unemployment. Continuing edcuation also lessens needs i n other areas because i t meets such needs as contact with col leagues , increased perception of personal worth, and profess ional s tatus . (5) Fr inge Benefits Fringe benefi ts such as pension plans and vacations are other issues to be dealt wi th . Wideman (1971) offers many areas which unions must study as p o t e n t i a l bargaining i ssues . These benefi ts include l i f e insurance, pension funds, d i s a b i l i t y income, sickness income, h o s p i t a l coverage, household insurance, profes s iona l l i a b i l i t y insurance, and unemployment benef i t s . There i s a lack of fr inge beneftis i n many organizations because engineers are s a l a r i ed workers who are not as secure as b l u e - c o l l a r employees but engineers are paid f a i r l y high rates compared to most b l u e - c o l l a r workers, -135-therefore engineers have not pushed for a d d i t i o n a l gains. Fringe benef i t s are of greater concern to b l u e - c o l l a r workers because e x t r i n s i c rewards such as guards against i n j u r i e s and phys ica l belongings are c r i t i c a l to these workers. Pension schemes with voluntary involvement are necessary for engineers. Poor job markets r e su l t i n less m o b i l i t y for engineers therefore much of an engineer 's career i s l i k e l y to be spent with one organizat ion. Longer job spans mean that a pension fund can be developed and administered whereas constant turnover of personnel creates great problems. Various options for engineer payment can be modelled a f ter b l u e - c o l l a r formulae so that engineers can put up to "X" percent of t h e i r income into the pension fund. Cooperation with other unions i n the organizat ion can give benef i t s to gain a l a rge , stable pension fund with high returns . I t i s a lso des irable that the pension fund be portable so the engineer can take i t to h i s next job. Vacat ion time could be increased for engineers or t iming of vacations could be negotiated. For example, engineers may be allowed to take holidays a f ter projects are completed, or, i f the pro ject takes more than one year, then vacat ion time can be accumulated. A f t e r -hours use of lab f a c i l i t i e s i s another f r inge benef i t which meets profess ional needs. I f the engineer i s not -136-being challenged on the job then experiments of h i s own could help to reduce d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n . Rights to publ i sh r e su l t s of experiments i s another a t t r ac t ive s i t u a t i o n for engineers. (6) Communication The r o l e of communication has been stressed throughout the paper. Improvement of v e r t i c a l and hor i zonta l communication i s a primary concern for an engineering union. Union power may force more v e r t i c a l exchange to take place because management would be more aware of engineers and t h e i r values . Union negotiat ions could also f a c i l i t a t e hor i zonta l communication through less adherence to formal channels of communication. Perhaps engineers could be p h y c i s a l l y close to one another so consul ta t ion i s easier and group cohesion i s increased because adminis-t r a t i o n by bureaucracy tends to s t i f l e communication for the cause of e f f i c i e n c y , but bureaucratic rules may lead to lower production due to d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n on the part of engineers. Management must communicate with union representat ives on c r i t i c a l issues and perhaps t h i s i s the greatest value of u n i o n i z i n g . Regular meetings with management by union representat ives seems to be one appropriate way to impress engineers ' views on higher l e v e l s of the hierarchy. Through per iodic appraisa ls of engineers ' work the union could force management to communicate with engineers. -137-Channels of communication may be unblocked and new ones may be opened for greater e f f i c i e n c y i n the organizat ion, Poss ib ly an engineers could go d i r e c t l y to the person he needs to consult with unless the problem i s a major one. Rise of s t r i c t h i e ra rcha l rules and existence of red tape often r e s u l t i n great d i f f i c u l t i e s i n s o l v i n g minor problems. (7) C o n f l i c t Resolution Resolut ion of c o n f l i c t i s one area where engineering unions are very l i k e l y to diverge from t h e i r b l u e - c o l l a r counterparts . The m i l i t a n t c o n f l i c t s ty le of b l u e - c o l l a r unions i s or iented to s t r ikes and severe economic threats which are e n t i r e l y unacceptable to engineers. V a l Scott (1973) points out there has never been a s t r ike by engineers i n Canada and John O l i v e r (1973) questions the effect iveness of such a s t r i k e anyway because engineering projects are long-term ef fort s which are e a s i l y delayed for lengthy periods . Slowdowns, mass res ignat ions , and workshops are a l t e rna t ive s trategies to apply pressure on the employer but these t a c t i c s also v i o l a t e engineers ' behavioural standards. There are further a l te rnat ives ava i l ab le to engineers however and these are most l i k e l y to be used. Bain (1969) suggests that compulsory, b inding a r b i t r a t i o n may be agreed upon to resolve disputes . A t h i r d party may be agreed upon to hand down a b inding award so that s t r ikes are avoided. Perhaps mediation -138-and c o n c i l i a t i o n stages are poss ible to s e t t l e disputes as we l l because most p r o v i n c i a l labour re l a t ions acts provide c o n c i l i a t i o n machinery. Shrum (1970) suggests a more lengthy set of steps for engineers to resolve disputes . F i r s t of a l l the employer and the union would t r y to work things out by themselves as i n any c o l l e c t i v e bargaining s i t u a t i o n and perhaps they may even agree on mediation and a r b i t r a t i o n on t h e i r own. I f the f i r s t step brought no agreement then a f a c t - f i n d i n g body could be appointed by a commission to get the two part ies together. I f th i s second stage also f a i l e d then the c o n f l i c t may be re ferred to the l e g i s l a t u r e with or without recommendations from the commission. A l l of these steps would have time l i m i t s but Shrum would not hurry the procedure so the par t ie s could cool o f f . This procedure appears to be acceptable to both engineers and companies so some form of t h i s dispute method could we l l appear i n the future . V a l Scott (1973) offers another method of dispute settlement for engineers c a l l e d the " F i n a l Offer S e l e c t i o n . " (Columbian, A p r i l 4, 1973, p .21). "The basic p r i n c i p l e i s that i f two sides i n a dispute are unable to resolve t h e i r d i f ferences , a mutually acceptable ' s e l e c t o r ' or s e l e c t i o n o f f i c e r would have the power to choose between the f i n a l offers presented by both s i d e s . T h i s type of mechanism would c a l l for bargaining to s t a r t s ix months - 1 3 9 -before the expiry date of the contract and as each item i s s e t t l ed i t i s removed from the agenda. P r i o r to two months before the expiry date the se lector i s introduced to hear pos i t ions on the outstanding items remaining on the agenda. Fol lowing an attempt at mediation by the se lec tor the remaining items are then put to the f i n a l of fer whereby the se lector accepts one of fer or the other and does not have to j u s t i f y h i s dec i s ion . This method el iminates s t r ikes and lockouts which are i n v i o l a t i o n with engineers ' values and wishes. The "One-or-the-Other" c r i t e r i o n i s also supported i n Donald Brown's Task Force study into in te r se t a r b i t r a t i o n . This model seeks to overcome the cent ra l f a u l t with t r i p a r t i t e a r b i t r a t i o n by s t imula t ing the part ies to adopt r e a l i s t i c pos i t ions . Brown states , "The aim i s to stimulate a c o n f l i c t - c h o i c e s i t u a t i o n as would be created by a threat to s t r ike and thereby make the main dec i s ion processes p r e - a r b i t r a l nego t i a t ions ." 2 9 of course there i s no r i g h t to s t r i k e or lockout under th i s model and e i ther party i s free to invoke a r b i t r a t i o n . The model i s designed to force concession and compromise because each party must examine i t s expected opportunity cost of a r b i t r a t i o n . The main objections to the model are that in t ra -organ iza t iona l c o n f l i c t s f ac ing negotiators may lead to implementing a r b i t r a t i o n i n order to avoid taking r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of making d i f f i c u l t decis ions or -140-else both sides may adopt u n r e a l i s t i c stands. (Brown, 1968). The f i r s t problem may be overcome by making sure that r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i s placed s o l e l y i n the hands of the negot ia tors , so they cannot sh i rk r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . The second problem i s avoided by i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y prov id ing for appeal to another t h i r d party . (8) Spec ia l Profess ional Issues There are many spec ia l profes s iona l issues which s h a l l be negotiated by engineering unions. Ind iv idua l merit i s an issue of i n t e r e s t . This element has already been reviewed i n the sa lary sec t ion but ind iv idua l i sm i s important i n other areas as w e l l . Mer i t i s a lso important i n l ay-o f f s , promotions, and leadership of engineers i n general . Improvement of working condit ions for profess ional engineers combined with greater status of the profess ion are l i k e l y topics of d i scuss ion with management. I t would be reasonable for company and union to cooperate for mutual benef i t i n work q u a l i t y and image. I t i s imperative that profess ional performance and standards be kept at high l eve l s rather than f a l l i n g into a s a t i s f i c i n g s i t u a t i o n . S ty les of leadership may be questioned by a union. Strauss (1963) d i rec t s the question as to which s ty l e of leadership i s appropriate for engineer, l a i s s e z - f a i r e , dominating, or supportive. Bureaucracy provides leaders -141-who are not human re l a t ions or iented at a l l , rather they are dominating i n nature. Engineers require supervis ion which i s based on s c i e n t i f i c knowledge combined with frequent i n t e r a c t i o n to a id the engineer i n measuring i n d i v i d u a l worth and status i n the organizat ion. An i d e a l leader for an engineering group i s one who guides rather than d i rec t s as we l l as one who i s capable of both praise and punishment. A study done by Frank Andrews and George F a r r i s provides in s i gh t into the leadership of engineers. They found that s c i e n t i s t s did not want leaders who were s k i l l e d i n human r e l a t i o n s or adminis trat ion rather these employees desire leaders who are c r i t i c a l l y eva luat ive , who can influence work goals , who are ava i lab le and competent i n current procedures, and who know the t echnica l de ta i l s of the subordinates work. A good leader can a l t e r the climate i n the group and insp i re high achievement while guarding h i s subordinates from exter ior forces . E f f e c t i v e leaders also keep t h e i r hand i n by conducting research themselves or taking part i n current s c i e n t i f i c work. I t i s a lso important that the leader be given only a few groups to supervise so he may be s u f f i c i e n t l y close to the work. I f supervisors are unable to r e s t r i c t themselves to a few groups then Andrews and F a r r i s state that sub-ordinates should be granted more freedom to ef fect dec i s ions . The s u r p r i s i n g r e su l t i s that a good engineering leader -142-may be a poor administrator and cool towards his subO ordinates , yet he may be very e f f ec t ive . These re su l t s imply that the engineering union must push for promotion which i s based s o l e l y on competence, not s e n i o r i t y , for the s a t i s f a c t i o n of engineers and the good of the company. C. S ty le of Organization Organizing strategy of an engineering union would not fo l low a h a r d - s e l l , b i t t e r campaign s t y l e . An e f fec t ive means of s t imulat ing un ion iza t ion i s to convince engineers they are f a l l i n g into b l u e - c o l l a r ro les i n which a union i s absolutely necessary to maintain engineers ' status and need-sa t i s fac t ion . Comparison groups such as doctors and teachers are ava i l ab le to i l l u s t r a t e that profess ional ism i s not destroyed not l i m i t e d by un ion iza t ion . In fact as Peter Carson (1973) of the B. C. As soc i a t ion of Profess ional Engineers says, the challenge i s to s e l l a d i f f e rent s ty le of c o l l e c t i v e bargaining. Evidence throughout the paper has offered the opinion that c o l l e c t i v e bargaining and profess ional ism are NOT incompatible. Many sources i n c l u d i n g Goldenberg (1968) and Carrothers (1965) r e j ec t the i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y argument as i r r e l e v a n t . An excerpt from the Globe and M a i l i n 1967 reveals the general a t t i tude toward th i s s i t u a t i o n , "Although some members of the professions (engineers included) are not much pleased by the prospect of being trade u n i o n i s t s , the move i s overdue. For too long now -143-the word profes s iona l , once honored, has been confused with the word mercenary. When knighthood i s for sa le , sure ly bargaining i s permissable. " 3 0 I t i s very d i f f i c u l t to determine i f profess ional unions should be an extension of the a s soc ia t ion or a separate e n t i t y a l together . The f indings of th i s paper suggest that the union should be separate from the engineering as soc ia t ion for the i n i t i a l per iod at l e a s t . (Goldenberg, 1968). The phys ica l requirements of a new union are s u f f i c i e n t that new of f ices and storage spaces must be located even i f the as soc ia t ion wishes to take part i n c o l l e c t i v e bargaining. Separation of the two e n t i t i e s would cause less d i s rupt ion i n the a s soc ia t ion and i t would allow the more enthusiast ic engineers to lead the new union' with the help of outside consultants . A dichotomy of engineers i s not r e a l l y desirable i n the long run, however, and i t may be sui table to combine the union and as soc ia t ion into a new sort of organizat ion where the two philosophies can co-exi s t . There could be p a r t i c i p a t i v e and non- ' p a r t i c i p a t i v e members i n the " c o l l e c t i v e bargaining d i v i s i o n " and f u l l act ive membership i n the "a s soc ia t ion" f a c i t . Combination of the two uni t s would prevent r a i d i n g and offer economies of scale through use of dues and s e c r e t a r i a l pools etc . I t seems that unions and associat ions would both be more v iab le i n the long term i f a compremise could be struck. -144-Implementation of a campaign based on log ic and hard facts would a id the cause of u n i o n i z a t i o n . Engineers would be more receptive to a l o g i c a l d i sp lay of evidence which proves inequi t ie s and i n j u s t i c e s inherent i n work s i tuat ions than they would be to an emotional appeal. Structure of the new union must insure f a i r treatment for a l l members, with no favor i t i sm allowed for . A l l members should have the r i g h t to be heard and bare majori ty rule i s not acceptable on major i ssues . Perhaps the union cons t i tu t ion could require eighty or n inety percent agreement on a l l decis ions to decide p o l i c i e s for the u n i t . Individual ism and equity are c r i t i c a l features i n union s t ructure . D. Company Side Prevention of union formation has previous ly been reviewed i n the paper and th i s i s r e a l l y the company side of un ion iza t ion . An i d e a l s i t u a t i o n for companies occurs when they can prevent union formation at minimal cost . Problems of bureaucracy are of primary importance i f unioniza t ion of engineers i s to be blocked because problems concerning profess ional treatment, communication, personal treatment and poor s ty les of leadership are sources of d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n for engineers. Companies must discover a way to impress on engineers that they are i n d i v i d u a l s i n the organizat ion and not just an employee number. Engineers have to perceive themselves as valuable members wi th in -145-organizat ion who contribute a s i g n i f i c a n t input to the process. Employers could also use education to s t i f l e organizat ion of profess ional engineers. Education on the job, educational leaves of absence, and paid time off for attendance at seminars and conferences are good p o l i c i e s for meeting profes s iona l needs. Not only do these p o l i c i e s s a t i s fy needs of engineers i n a profess ional sense but they also update s k i l l s and prevent obsolescence of s k i l l s . Knowledge i n a l l s c i e n t i f i c areas i s advancing very qu ick ly and, as a r e s u l t , graduates of twenty years ago require exposure to new ideas so they can contribute a f a i r share to the organizat ion. Organizations could also improve communication at l i t t l e cost . Engineers need to exchange information and receive encouragement from higher l eve l s of the hierarchy to i d e n t i f y with management. Better communication with managers and fe l low s c i e n t i s t s ensures that engineers f e e l they are valuable to the organizat ion because each engineer sees himself r e c e i v i n g d i f f e rent treatment from b l u e - c o l l a r workers. Ea s i e r communication also helps e f f i c i e n c y because i t prevents dup l i ca t ion of work and aids i n problem-solving. Employers can a c t u a l l y go outside the organizat ion to prevent organizat ion. Support of engineers ' associat ions and t h e i r ideals i s an e f fec t ive way to ha l t un ion iza t ion . -146-Funds could be given to the a s soc ia t ion for pamphlets and seminars which oppose c o l l e c t i v e bargaining. Organ-iza t ions could also combat changes i n labour laws. Lobbying i s one way to prevent new labour regulat ions and th i s t a c t i c also can be done i n conjunction with as soc ia t ions . Recruitment of new engineers could a lso hinder organizat ion i n that companies could seek out cosmopolitans or workers with outlooks who would be less l i a b l e to support c o l l e c t i v e bargaining under any circumstances. Companies may study factors i n engineers ' backgrounds to f i n d which elements indicate anti-unionism s p e c i f i c a l l y for the purpose of l o c a t i n g sympathetic engineers. Secur i ty could also be ra i sed by companies at l i t t l e cost . Organizations could.enforce pay cuts rather than l a y i n g off engineers i n periods where losses are incurred . Along v/ith th i s secur i ty companies could ensure v e r t i c a l m o b i l i t y for engineers with increased amounts of work on c o n f i d e n t i a l pro jects . I f the company cannot prevent un ion iza t ion then i t must adapt to new circumstances. Adaptation to a new u n i t requires ce r t a in changes to deal with the unions. For example, bargaining s trategies and goals must be discussed, day to day administrat ion of the contract i s imperative and the company must locate personnel to carry out these functions. Grievance procedures are l i a b l e to become more - U n -c o s t l y and more formal i f a union forms because s p e c i f i c rules and steps for dispute settlement w i l l emerge. Perhaps a p o s i t i o n i n the hierarchy w i l l be created to deal with engineers' grievances and ensure f a i r governing of the contract . I t i s also probable that companies may form ah a l l i a n c e to deal with engineers because there are economies to be derived and also group power may be greater. Eventual ly i t i s poss ible that groups of employers may bargain with many uni t s to give a l l engineers s i m i l a r contracts . PROSPECTS The future hold some dramatic changes for profes s iona l engineers i n Canada. I t i s h i g h l y probable that union formation w i l l occur on a l a rger scale with B r i t i s h Columbia and Ontario leading the way. I f a l ternat ions to the law are effected i n B r i t i s h Columbia and elsewhere then a good port ion of Canda's engineers are l i k e l y to j o i n profess ional unions. A n c i l l a r y bodies for c o l l e c t i v e bargaining should be structures which are separate from profess ional associat ions i n the f i r s t stages of devel-opment, then the two may unite l a t e r . Unions are l i k e l y to be a long-term phenomenom because the trend towards l arge , bureaucratic organizations w i l l not diminish i n Canada, i n fact i t could wel l increase . Pos i t ive forces>vwill continue to grow and negative at t i tudes are disappearing as time passes. The future for un ioniza t ion -148-of profess ional engineers w i l l be very br ight i f the f i r s t few unions adhere to engineering values i n bargaining and i n s t ructure . These unions w i l l have a d i f f e rent or ienta t ion than b l u e - c o l l a r un i t s and hopeful ly e f fec t ive leaders w i l l emerge who recognize engineers 1 needs and values as w e l l as having ta lents to hold together the u n i t and bargain as w e l l . -149-FOOTNOTES 1. Walton, Richard E . , The Impact of the Profess ional Engineering  Union, D i v i s i o n of Research, Graduate School of Business Admini s t ra t ion , Harvard U n i v e r s i t y , Boston, Massachusetts, 1961, p. 4. 2. Strauss , George, "Professionalism and Occupational As soc i a t ions " , Indus t r i a l Rela t ions , Ins t i tu te of I n d u s t r i a l Re la t ions , U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a , Berkeley,Volume 2, No. 3, May 1963. p. 7. 3. Carr-Saunders, A, M . , and Wilson, P. A , , The Profess ions , Clarendon Press, Oxford England, 1933» p. 155. 4. Walton, Engineering Union, p. 22. 5. Strauss , Occupational Assoc ia t ions , Volume 2, no. 3» p. 7. 6. Goldenberg, S h i r l e y B . , Profess ional Workers and C o l l e c t i v e  Bargaining, Task Force on Labour Rela t ions , Study No. 2, lueen ' s P r i n t e r , Ottawa, December, 1968, p. 16. 7. I b i d . , p. 262. 8. I b i d . , p. 264. 9. I b i d . , p. 14. 10. I b i d . , p. 1. 11. Card in , Jean-Real, "The Profess ional Occupation: A Confused Not ion" , Relat ions I n d u s t r i e l l e s , Volume 16, no. 4, October 1961, p. Wo~. 12. Ba in , George Sayers, The Growth of White-Cpi lar Unionism, Clarendon Press , Oxford, 1970, p. 23. 13. Muir , J . Douglas, "Is a Trade Union Inevitable for Profess ional Engineers?" , Canadian Personnel and I n d u s t r i a l Relat ions  Journal , V o l . 18, No. 1, January 1971, p. 20. 14. Hansen, W. Lee, "Profess ional Engineers : Salary Structure Problems", Indus t r i a l Rela t ions , Ins t i tu te of I n d u s t r i a l Relat ions , U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a , Berkeley, Volume 2, No. 3, May 1963, p. 33. -150-15. Bain, George Sayers, "The Growth of White-Col lar Unionism and Publ ic P o l i c y i n Canada", Relat ions I n d u s t r i e l l e s , Volume 24, No. 2, A p r i l 1969, p. 263. 16. Muir , Is a Trade Union Inevitable for Profes s iona l  Engineers, Volume 18, No. 1, p. 21. 17. Toronto Globe and M a i l , June 7, 1967t p. B2. 18. Toronto Globe and M a i l , October 22, 1970, p. B4. 19. Goldenberg, C o l l e c t i v e Bargaining, p. 136. 20. Muir , Inevi table , p. 22. 21. H a l l , Wi l l i am, Managing D i rec to r of the Assoc ia t ion of B. C. Engineers, Personal Interview, November 9, 1972. 22. Goldenberg, C o l l e c t i v e Bargaining, p. 20. 23. Russel , D. W., "Beyond The Thin Edge", The B .C .  Profess ional Engineer, October 1954, p. 9. 24. Ca in , Glen G . , and Seidman, J o e l , "Unionized Engineers and Chemists: A Case Study of a Profess ional Union" , Journal of Business, U n i v e r s i t y of Chicago, Volume 37, No. 3, Ju ly 1964, p. 252. 25. Russel , op. c i t . , p. 8. 26. New York Times, October 4, I 9 6 9 , p. 11. 27. Wideman, R. M . , "The Second Report to the Member Services Committee on Welfare and C o l l e c t i v e Bargaining for Engineers" , Engineering Journal , November 1971, p. 8. 28. 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