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Deputy ministers and politicization in the government of Canada : lessons learned from the 2006-2007… Wells, Shannon Leigh 2007

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D E P U T Y M I N I S T E R S A N D ' P O L I T I C I Z A T I O N I N T H E G O V E R N M E N T O F C A N A D A : L E S S O N S L E A R N E D F R O M T H E 2006-2007 C O N S E R V A T I V E T R A N S I T I O N by S H A N N O N L E I G H W E L L S B . A (Hons) Dalhous ie Unive r s i ty , 2005 A T H E S I S S U B M I T T E D I N P A R T I A L F U L F I L L M E N T O F T H E R E Q U I R E M E N T S F O R T H E D E G R E E O F M A S T E R O F A R T S i n T H E F A C U L T Y O F G R A D U A T E S T U D I E S (Po l i t i ca l Science) T H E U N I V E R S I T Y O F B R I T I S H C O L U M B I A Augus t 2007 © Shannon L e i g h W e l l s , 2007 Abstract T h i s thesis analyses the 2006-07 Conservat ive transit ion i n the Government o f Canada b y asking the f o l l o w i n g : is there evidence o f overt partisan po l i t i c i za t ion o f the deputy ministers dur ing this transit ion? Signif icant ly , there is no evidence o f overt po l i t i c iza t ion . Harper has not forced departure o f incumbent deputy ministers , nor has he appointed a significant number o f k n o w n partisan allies f rom outside the pub l i c service. Instead, Harper has retained the o v e r w h e l m i n g majori ty o f deputy ministers w h o served the previous L i b e r a l government. Howeve r , the 2006-07 transit ion also suggests considerable lateral career m o b i l i t y o f deputy ministers w i t h i n the highest levels o f government. The thesis argues that lateral m o b i l i t y is explained b y the "corporate" governance structure i n the government o f Canada , according to w h i c h deputy ministers are expected to identify wi th the government ' s broad p o l i c y goals and m o b i l i z e support for them. H i g h degrees o f lateral m o b i l i t y dur ing the Conservat ive transition provide evidence to suggest that a potential ly r i g i d bureaucratic system can be made responsive to the p o l i c y pr ior i t ies o f a new government wi thout c o m p r o m i s i n g the professional norms o f a non-partisan, career pub l ic service. i i Table of Contents Abstract i i Table o f Contents > i i i L i s t o f Tables . '. . . . i v Acknowledgement s '. v Introduction • • • 1 P o l i t i c a l Transi t ions i n the Government o f Canada 3 The R o l e o f Depu ty Min i s t e r s 6 The Conservat ive Trans i t ion : 2006-Present 8 Departures ; ....11 Appoin tments .....12 Transfers 15 Structuring and Coherence o f the Government Corpora t ion 19 Depu ty M i n i s t e r Career Patterns 19 M a n a g i n g the Depu ty M i n i s t e r C o m m u n i t y 21 C o n c l u s i o n ; . . . . . .26 B i b l i o g r a p h y 32 A p p e n d i x 34 i i i List of Tables Table 1 - M o b i l i t y o f D e p u t y Min i s t e r s dur ing Harper transit ion 10 Table 2 - Types o f Appo in tmen t s 12 Table 3 - Types o f Transfers 16 \ Acknowledgements The author is grateful to her supervisor, Professor A l l a n Tupper , for his guidance, insight and encouragement over the course o f this project and throughout her studies at the Un ive r s i t y o f B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a . She also thanks the S o c i a l Sciences and Humani t ies Research C o u n c i l for their generous funding through the C a n a d a Graduate Scholarships Program - Master 's Scholarships . F i n a l l y , the author w o u l d l i ke to acknowledge the residents and members o f G r e e n Co l l ege , U B C , whose ideas and friendship w i l l continue to be o f inspirat ion i n a l l her future pursuits. v I n t r o d u c t i o n The Canadian general election of January 2006 ended more than a decade of uninterrupted Liberal rule. This political shift saw the rise of a Conservative coalition large enough to rival the Liberal machine and to produce of a Conservative minority government. The Conservative Party of Canada was formed in December 2003 by the merger of the Progressive Conservative Party of Canada and Canadian Alliance, a party that was seen as "right wing" by Canadian standards. Stephen Harper, former leader of the Canadian Alliance and now Prime Minister of Canada, has taken great pains to distance his Conservative government from previous Liberal governments. The Conservative's first piece of legislation was the Federal Accountability Act, aimed to "change forever the way business is done in Ottawa."' Indeed, the Conservatives have given Canadians the impression that major changes are taking place under "Canada's New Government." The 2006 Conservative transition comes on the heels of 13 years of largely successful Liberal rule. A significant accomplishment of the Chretien/Martin Liberal governments was the elimination of a large budget deficit. In the 1997-1998 fiscal year Ottawa posted a $3.5-billion surplus, the first in nearly three decades. With consecutive budget surpluses, the Liberal government was able to establish a policy agenda that committed the Government of Canada to many new programs. The transition to a Conservative minority thus provides a useful case to observe how a new government behaves towards a permanent civil sendee that was loyal to a very different policy agenda. What changes have been made to deputy ministers, the most senior public servants who head the departments and agencies of the Government of Canada? Specifically, is there evidence of overt "politicization" in the 1 Office of the Prime Minister, "Prime Minister Harper outlines his Government's priorities and open federalism approach," speech given in Montreal, QC, 20 April 2006, available from http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=l 119. 1 selection of the deputy minister cadre? It is the purpose of this thesis to answer this major political science question. Conventionally understood, politicization is the result of partisanship in the selection of deputy ministers. In such cases, we would expect a new government to: • Force the departure of incumbent deputy ministers from the public service; • Assign incumbent deputy ministers to less important positions; and/or • Recruit known partisan supporters from outside the public service. A n extreme case of politicization may be termed a "purge" or "housecleaning'' of the deputy minister cadre, wherein most i f not all incumbent deputy ministers are dismissed and known partisan supporters are imported to fill these positions. Beyond housecleaning, new governments may employ more subtle strategies for securing authority over the public service, strategies which may involve a high degree of mobility in the senior ranks of the public service. The methodology employed builds on that by Jacques Bourgault and Stephane Dion in their,study of political transitions in the Government of Canada from 1867 to 1987. They argue that " i f there is politicization, then we will expect an appreciable increase in mobility following a change in government."2 Interestingly, Bourgault and Dion observe increasing levels of career mobility beginning in the early 1960s but conclude that "changes in political parties have had little effect on the tenure of deputy ministers in the Canadian federal government."3 Is this true of the transition to a Conservative government after 2006? Analvsis of the 2006-07 Conservative transition provides no evidence of overt "politicization". That is, the Conservatives under the leadership of Prime Minister Harper have made no effort to break-up the established deputy minister cadre, either by forcing the 2Jacques Bourgault and Stephan Dion, "Governments Come and Go, But What of Senior Civil Servants? Canadian Deputy Ministers and Transitions in Power (1867-1987)," Governance 2, no.2 (1989): 129. 3 Ibid., 145. . 2 departure of incumbents from the public service or by appointing a significant number of outsiders to the position of deputy minister. However, there is evidence of increased lateral career mobility between the deputy minister level and other senior positions in the government of Canada. What explains the noteworthy lateral movement of senior officials? It is argued that high degrees of lateral mobility observed during the current transition are explained by the growing "corporate" structure of governance at the federal level in Canada. Under this structure, deputy ministers are now expected to identify with the government's broad policy goals and mobilize support for them. Coordination of the government's policy agenda requires incumbent deputy ministers who know and understand the operations of the core executive agencies and who can interact functionally with them. In other words, deputy minister must be mobile within the centre of government. Corporate governance is seen as a new prism through which to understand executive government in Canada, one which distinguishes between political partisanship in the selection and retention of public servants and policy responsiveness. The 2006-07 Conservative transition is significant because it demonstrates that as a tool available to the Prime Minister, lateral mobility has generated sufficient responsiveness to a new change in government without overt pokticization. In short, high degrees of lateral mobility during the Conservative transition provide evidence to suggest that a potentially rigidly Weberian bureaucratic system can be made responsive to the policy priorities of a new government without compromising its professional character. P o l i t i c a l T r a n s i t i o n s i n the G o v e r n m e n t o f C a n a d a Democratic transitions in power are valuable cases for studying the civil service. For one, they test the political neutrality of the permanent, administrative arm of the state. Upon taking power, a new government inherits a senior public service that only recendy served 3 another party. Tension and mistrust between elected government and permanent civil service can be high. Once in power, a new government, through various devices, might try to change the permanent civil service and to weaken its policy influence. During a transition, the concern is the civil service's support for the previous government's policies and its possible indifference to new initiatives. Political transitions at the federal level in Canada are interesting precisely because Liberal Party hegemony has meant that shifts in power are rare. The truism that the Liberal Party is the country's "natural governing party" has been accepted by most Canadian political scientists, as attested to by such tides as The Government Party : Organising and Financing /he Libera/Party of Canada, 1930-58 (R. Whitaker, University of Toronto Press, 1977) and The Big Red Machine : Plow the Liberal Party Dominates Canadian Politics (Stephen Clarkson, UBC Press, 2005). For a time, the Liberal party was also perceived as the only genuine "national" party in Canada. According to Carty, Cross and Young, "Despite the narrowness of the federalist victory in the [sic] 1995 referendum, or perhaps because of it, the Liberal Party had apparently re-emerged as the country's natural governing party, a position it had occupied for much of the century."4 Similar to the present transition, when Conservative leader John Diefenbaker ascended to power in 1957, more than two decades of uninterrupted Liberal rule came to an end. At the time, many observers perceived the possibility of partisan-inspired changes to the senior public service. However, J.E. Flodgetts anticipated a different crisis in the higher bureaucracy: "A generation of Liberal politicians and a generation of presumably neutral senior permanent officials have worked hand in hand to create what is now advertised as the 4 R.K Carty, William Cross and, Lisa Young, Rebuilding Canadian Party Politics (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2000), 13. 4 Liberal Programme."5 Rather than favouritism towards the Liberal party, Hodgetts perceived a bias on the part of the senior administration towards the Liberal's post-war policy agenda that had developed as a result of a close relationship between deputy ministers and political leadership. Noting the strength of the mandarins' loyalty to the Liberal program, he said: "Just as husbands and wives who live equally together for a generation are supposed ultimately to being to look alike, so too we may find a similar mental, if not physical, assimilation with respect to senior officials and their ministers."6 The challenge facing the Diefenbaker government, then, was a public service whose loyalty to a new policy agenda was uncertain. However, John Porter highlights the ideological similarity of the Liberals and Progressive Conservatives at the time and notes that, "there was no effort on the part of the Conservative ministry to break up the bureaucracy, either by forcing retirements pr by appointing outsiders known to be their political supporters."' The threat of partisan-inspired changes loomed heavily again in 1984, when Progressive Conservative leader Brian Mulroney declared that when he became Prime Minister, senior officials would receive "a pink slip and a pair of running shoes."8 However, Mulroney did not houseclean the senior civil service. Indeed, in Canada, new federal governments have seldom undertaken radical changes. As Dion and Bourgault observe, following each Conservative transition to power from 1935 to 1987, "changes in the upper public service were fewer than those promised [sic] during the electoral campaign."9 In 2006-07, Conservative leader Stephen Harper pledged to "clean-up Ottawa" in the wake of the Liberal "Sponsorship" scandal. When asked whether Canadians should be 5 J.E. Hodgetts, "Liberal and Bureaucrat," Queen's Quarterly, Summer (1955): 182. 6 J.E. Hodgetts, "The Civil Service and Policy Formation," Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science 23, no.4 (1957): 473. 7 John Porter, The Vertical Mosaic: an Analysis of Social Class and Power in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965), 453. 8 Quoted in Bourgault and Dion, 142. 9 Ibid., 140. 5 worried about a Conservative majority, Harper mentioned: "There were the courts and the Senate, as well as the public service, dominated by Liberal appointees" to keep liim in check.10 The Prime Minister-elect also noted during his victory speech in Calgary that "shuffling the deck was not enough."11 Do Prime Minister Harper's actions match his rhetoric? Did he change substantially the deputy minister cadre? The Role of Deputy Ministers Deputy ministers, the senior administrative officials in the bureaucratic hierarchy, wield considerable power and influence in the Government of Canada. They manage major departments and central agencies, advise misters daily, and contribute to policy development at the highest levels. As A.W. Johnson put it: "the role of the deputy minister is to make it possible for the minister and cabinet to provide the best government of which they are . . . ( capable — even better if either of them happens to be weak." Career changes to deputy ministers are significant because departmental statutes stipulate that deputy minister appointments should be made by the Governor in Council, which, by constitutional convention, means that the Prime Minister has the exclusive prerogative of recommendation. It follows that the appointment of a deputy minister is for an indefinite period at the pleasure of the Prime Minister. Section 24.1 of the Interpretation Act stipulates that the power to appoint includes the power to dismiss. As Bourgault notes, "A simple, unexplained decision by the Prime Minister is enough to relieve a deputy minister of his duties."13 1 0 L. Ian MacDonald, "How Harper forced a Conservative Spring," Policy Options March 2006, 30: " Conservative Party of Canada, "Canadians choose change and accountability," address by the Hon. Stephen Harper; P.C., M.P., Leader of the Conservative Party of Canada, Calgary: Jan. 23, 2006, available from, http://wvvw.conservative.ca/EN/1004/40299. 1 2 A.W. Johnson, "The Role of the Deputy Minister," Canadian Public Administration 4, no. 4 (1961): 363. 1 3 Jacques Bourgault, "The Deputy Minister's Role in the Government of Canada: His responsibility and his accountability," Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Sponsorship Program and Advertising Activities, Research Studies Volume 1 (Ottawa: PWGS, 2006), 256. 6 A s the l ink between the acJmMstrative arm o f a department and its poli t ical head, deputy ministers are the fulcrum o f executive bureaucratic relations. A c c o r d i n g to the doctrine o f ministerial responsibility, o n wh ich traditional Westminster government depends, the minister is the democratic l ink between the elected legislature and the permanent c iv i l service. The strength o f the convention depends on the ability o f the deputy minister to inform his or her minister o f the department's activities and to provide the minister wi th frank and impartial advice so that the minister may report to the legislature and be held accountable by its members. Whi l e this implies a necessary degree o f independence from the government o f the day, the senior c iv i l service must also be responsive to the government's pol icy agenda. The question o f whether Pr ime Minister Harper has "po l i t i c ized" the senior public service is timely. Analysis o f the 2006-07 Conservative transition may provide insight into whether, as some attest, the senior public service has become too politically responsive. 1 4 Clearer boundaries between politics and administration, some argue, are essential i f the public service is to be an effective, non-partisan and professional element o f democratic government. D r a w i n g a clear distinction between politics and administration, however, is very complex, especially in the roles o f deputy ministers w h o must balance poli t ical responsiveness and neutral competence; i n other words, demonstrate "loyalty that argues back." 1 5 1 4 See, among others, Donald J. Savoie, "The Canadian public service has a personality," Canadian Public Administration 49, no.2 (2006): 261-281, and Peter Aucoin, "The Staffing and Evaluation of Canadian Deputy Ministers in Comparative Westminster Perspective: A Proposal for Reform," in Commission of Inquiry into the Sponsorship Program and Advertising Activities, Research Studies Volume 1 (Ottawa: PWGSC, 2006), 297-331. 1 5 Hugh Heclo, "OMB and the Presidency - The Problem of Neutral Competence," The Public Interest 38 (1975): 80-82. The Conservative Transi t ion: 2006-Present T w o general points stand out about polit ical transitions: first, they test the resolve o f a professional public service; second, the Pr ime Minister is the most influential actor during such periods. D o n a l d J . Savoie has argued that "transition planning also strengths the hand o f court government, given that by definition it is designed to serve the prime minis ter . " 1 6 However , he conceptualizes poli t ical transitions as processes led by the Pr ivy C o u n c i l Office and that take place "dur ing the government's first few weeks i n off ice ." 1 7 This conception o f transitions underestimates the sustained influence that the Pr ime Minis ter has i n conteolling the machinery o f government through his authority to make discretionary appointments. A period o f poli t ical transition is more instructively defined as two years fol lowing the election o f a new government, w h i c h allows a government sufficient time to implement its changes. The current poli t ical transition began on January 26, 2006. A t the time o f writ ing, the Harper government has been i n office for less than two years; thus, al l changes to the deputy minister cadre to date are included. 1 8 This analysis focuses o n senior officials at the head o f departments and central agencies. The term 'deputy minister ' w i l l be used to describe all officials w h o head a federal government department or central agency. M o s t ho ld the tide 'titular deputy minister', but some are designated 'clerk' or 'secretary'. Us ing Bourgault and D i o n ' s methodology, mobility o f deputy ministers is measured by personnel changes that take the form o f departures, appointments or transfers. A departure signifies that a deputy minister has left the federal public service either because o f voluntary retirement, death, or dismissal. In the 1 6 Donald J. Savoie, "The Federal Government: Revisiting Court Government in Canada " in Luc Bernier Keith Brownsey, and Michael Howlett, eds. Executive Styles in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto ' Press, 2005), 33-34. 1 7 Ibid., 34. 1 8 The first change to the senior public service was announced by Prime Minister Harper on Feb. 06, 2006 At the time of writing, the last change to the senior public service was announced on June 29, 2007;' case o f appointments, this study expands o n the method o f Bourgault and D i o n , wh ich inadequately captures qualitative variations wi th in the category. Here we divide appointments into two groups. The first is a "parachute" appointment: the appointment o f someone from outside the public service to the posit ion o f deputy minister. T h e second is an internal promot ion: a senior public servant is promoted to the rank o f deputy minister. O u i final indicator o f mobil i ty, transfers, signifies that a deputy rninister has been reassigned within the public service. 1 9 Rates o f mobil i ty are the number o f career moves during a period o f transition (departures, appointments or transfers) expressed as a percentage o f the total number o f deputy ministers i n office at the beginning o f the transition, before any changes have been made. I f a Pr ime Minister "purged" the deputy ranks we w o u l d see a large number o f departures and a large number o f parachute appointments. That is, i n a case o f overt poli t icization, we w o u l d expect the Pr ime Minister to force the departure o f . incumbent deputy ministers and bring i n reliable allies f rom outside the publ ic sector. In 2006, the Harper Conservatives inherited 28 titular deputy ministers f rom outgoing Pr ime Minis ter Pau l Mar t in . This group is now marginally reduced to 27 deputy ministers (see Appendix) . That there has been no absolute increase i n the number o f deputy ministers tells us that, al l else equal, the current Pr ime Minis ter has not expanded the deputy group wi th trusted aides to r ival incumbent deputy ministers. Furthermore, as the findings i n Table 1 make clear, a purge o f the deputy minister group has not occurred. O n e fmding i n If one deputy minister is transferred twice in one year, it is counted as two transfers. Transfers to other senior positions outside the rank o f deputy minister but within the Prime Minis ter ' s discretionary power of appointment are included. 9 T A B L E 1 - M o b i l i t y o f D e p u t y M i n i s t e r s d u r i n g H a r p e r t r a n s i t i o n Type of career change Frequency Departures 6 (21%) Parachute Appointments 1 (3.6%) Internal Promot ions 11 (39.3%) Transfers 18 (64.3%) Unchanged 6 (21.4%) D e p u t y M i n i s t e r s i n office at b e g i n n i n g o f t r a n s i t i o n 28 (100%) Sources: Prime Minister's Office News Releases (www.pm.gc.ca) and, Library of Parliament particular emphasises this point: a total o f six deputy ministers have been spared from career changes o f any form during the 2006-07 transition. M o s t notably, the Secretary to the Treasury Board appointed by Paul Mar t in i n December 2004, Wayne Wouters, has been retained by Pr ime Minis ter Harper. Other Mar t in appointees that have been retained are the deputy rrrinisters o f Heal th , Justice, and Nat ional Defence; all o f w h o m were appointed i n 2004. Notably, two Chretien appointees have also been retained by Harper: the deputy ministers o f Canadian Heritage and Western E c o n o m i c Diversif icat ion; appointed i n 2002 and 1997, respectively. Representing almost a quarter o f the deputy minister cadre that served Harper's L ibera l predecessor, this sizeable proport ion o f unchanged deputy ministers indicates a substantial degree o f adrrunistrative continuity wi th in the deputy minister cadre. Further evidence that Harper has not poli t icized the deputy rrrinister groups is given by the fact that rather than force the departure o f a large number o f incumbents, only six deputy ministers have left the public service since the Harper government took office. In addition, instead o f hir ing a significant number o f Conservative supporters f rom outside the public service to become deputy ministers, there has been only one such "parachute" appointment. A l s o contradictory o f a housecleariing is the fact that almost one quarter o f incumbent deputy rriinisters have been sparred any form o f career change. A s Table 1 demonstrates, the vast majority o f deputy minister mobil i ty during the Conservative 10 transition is explained by transfers wi th in the senior ranks o f the publ ic service, and by internal promotions. In other words, there is no clear evidence o f overt partisan politicization. Departures Significantly, five o f the six departures during the current transition represent retirements from the public service. 2 0 These retirements came after 20, 34, 29, 30, and 16 years o f public service. 2 1 Wi thout further information to explain these retirements, no certain conclusions can be made about their rationale and motivation. It is nevertheless interesting to compare the rate o f departure during the current transition, 21.4 per cent, wi th the rates observed by Bourgault and D i o n . Q f the twelve polit ical transitions observed f rom 1867-1987, the average annual rate o f departures during periods o f transition was only 7 per cent. D u r i n g the Mulroney transition from September 1984-to September 1986 - w h i c h recorded the highest levels o f mobil i ty in Canadian history at all three indicators o f mobil i ty — the annual rate o f departures o f deputy ministers was 12.5 per cent. Whi le the rate o f departures under the current transition is quite high when compared wi th previous transitions, the average age o f these retirees (58 years) is i n line wi th trends observed by Bourgault i n 2005: "Since 1947, no deputy minister has remained i n office past the age o f 70 because o f the progression i n the challenges and the availability o f a more generous pension p l an . " 2 2 H e also observes that the level o f departures after the age o f 60 has been decreasing constandy since 1917; and since 1967, departures before the age o f 2 0 The sixth departure represents the death of Jack Stagg, Deputy Minister of Veterans Affairs, in August 2006. 2! The most recent retirement of Larry Murray, Deputy Minister of Fisheries and Oceans comes after only 16 in the federal public service. However, Mr. Murray, age 60 at the time of his retirement, held various senior positions with the Canadian Forces and Royal Canadian Navy before entering the senior public service in 1989. 2 2 Jacques Bougault, Profile of Deputy Ministers in the Government of Canada, Working Paper Series, (Ottawa: Canada School of Public Service, 2005), 14. 11 50 have become rare. O f those deputy ministers who left the public service between 1987 and 1997, 68 per cent were between the ages o f 50-59 and from 1997 to 2003, this figure rose to 80 per cent. 2 3 Thus , given their length o f tenure and age u p o n leaving office, the departures observed during the Harper transition are i n line wi th recent trends. M o r e importandy, there is no evidence to suggest that Harper has forced the departure o f significant number o f incumbent deputy ministers. Appointments A s previously mentioned, i f overt poli t icization has occurred, we w o u l d expect the Pr ime Minister to recruit a significant number o f obvious partisan supporters f rom outside the public service to the posi t ion o f deputy minister. In other words, we w o u l d expect to observe a high level o f "parachute" appointments. A s Table 2 indicates, however, Harper has made only one such appointment. T A B L E 2 - Types of Appointments Deputy minister appointed from (Le. last position held): Frequency Parachute Appointment Outside the Public Service Internal Promotions 1 (8.3%) Privy Council Office Crown Agency Within department Other department 2(16.7%) 2(16.7%) 2(16.7%) 5(41.7%) 1 Total 12 (100%) The lone external appointee is Richard Dice rn i , former Partner at Mercer De l t a Canada since December 2005, and as o f M a y 1, 2006, Deputy Minister o f Industry. However , M r . D i c e r n i brings notable public service experience to this position: f rom 1981-1991 he held two assistant deputy minister positions i n the federal government. H e also served as deputy "Ibid., 13. 12 rrunister in both the Rae and Harris administrations i n Ontar io from 1992-1996. Notably, from 1997-2005 he was Senior V i c e - President, Corporate and Envi ronmenta l Affairs, Executive Vice-President and Corporate Secretary, then acting President and C E O , Ontario Power Generat ion Inc. Biographical information does not indicate previous involvement wi th either the federal or provincial Conservative parties. In sum, the evidence suggests that this "parachute" appointment was indeed based o n M r . Dicerni ' s experience as a senior manager i n the private sector as wel l as his public service experience i n the Ontar io and federal governments. I f an appointee has not been "imported", then presumably, the appointment is a promot ion from wi th in the ranks o f the public service. Strikingly, all but one o f the appointments during the Conservative transition take the form o f an internal promot ion. A s Table 2 shows, 11 out o f 12, or 92 per cent o f appointments, have promoted a career public servant to the rank o f deputy rriinister. O f these internal promotions, there were two instances in w h i c h an official left a senior posit ion in the Pr ivy C o u n c i l Office to become a deputy rrunister; Yaprak Baltacioglu, Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet (Ope ra t i ons ) ,PCO was promoted to Depu ty Minis ter o f Agriculture and A g r i - F o o d , effective M a r c h 5, 2007 and Michae l Wernick , Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet (Plans and Consultations), P C O , became Deputy Minis ter o f Indian and Nor thern Development , effective M a y 23, 2006. Notably, M s . Baltacioglu and M r . Wernick were promoted to the rank o f deputy minister after federal public service careers o f 17 and 25 years, respectively. Table 2 shows that another 17 per cent o f appointments promoted C r o w n Agency Presidents to the rank o f deputy rrunister: Francois G u i m o n t , President Canadian F o o d Inspection Agency, was promoted to Deputy Minis ter o f Publ ic W o r k s and Government Services effective June 4, 2007; and Robert Wright , President o f E x p o r t Development Canada, became Deputy 13 Minister o f Finance effective June 12, 2006. A t the time o f appointment, M r . G u i m o n t had 25 years o f experience wi th in the federal public service, while M r . Wright ' s career as a federal public servant had reached an impressive 32 years. A l s o notable is W i l l i a m V . Baker's promot ion from Deputy Commiss ioner o f Revenue to Commiss ioner o f Revenue, after 20 years o f federal public service. Over half o f all internal promotions (6 o f 11) during the Conservative transition advance an associate deputy minister to the rank o f deputy minister. In only one case was this promot ion internal to the department i n which the official was associate deputy: Marie-Lucie M o r i n was promoted from Associate Deputy Minister Foreign Affairs to Deputy Minister o f International Trade fol lowing 25 years i n the federal public service. In the remaining five instances, an associate deputy was promoted to become deputy minister o f a different department. M o r e importantly, however, at the time o f their appointment to the posit ion o f deputy minister, these five associate deputies had spent an average o f 21 years as public servants wi th in the government o f Canada. 2 4 A s the lone external appointment makes clear, Pr ime Minis ter Harper has rejected the opt ion o f bringing i n large numbers o f new appointments. Rather, he has recruited liberally f rom wi t l i i n the established public service. A l l appointments but one have taken the form o f promotions wi th in the ranks o f the senior public service. Significantly, these 11 internal appointees have, o n average, 20 years o f experience as career public servants in the Government o f Canada. The pattern o f established careers observed i n Pr ime Minister 2 4 Suzanne Tining, former Deputy Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, now Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs - 31 years; Guy McKenzie, former Associate Deputy Minister of Transport, Infrastructure and Communities - 25 years; Louis Levesque, former Associate Deputy Minister of Finance and now Deputy Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs - 17 years; Helene Gosselin, former Associate Deputy Minister of Health, now Deputy Head of Service Canada - 25 years; Catherine (Cassie) Doyle, former Associate Deputy Minister of the Environment, now Deputy Minister of Natural Resources. - 4 years. (Notably, Ms. Doyle has previous public service experience with the City of Ottawa, from 1982-1992 and with the Government of British Columbia, from 1992-2001). 14 Harper's appointment of deputy ministers, and the fact that he has rejected the option of appointing a significant number of outsiders, suggests that he has favoured the option of retaining a neutral, career public service rather than resort to partisan politicization. Transfers Deputy minister "transfers" are an ambiguous category as they can have many different rationales. They may be unacknowledged demotions or promotions in disguise. Or, they may involve the reassignment of a deputy rriinister as a senior or special advisor in a central agency, wherein he or she is given a more influential role in policy making. Transfers can also include instances in which a deputy minister is given the responsibility of an additional portfolio. In any case, the assumption of a transfer is that a deputy minister is reassigned but remains part of the public service. Before the 1960s, deputy minister were seldom transferred. Since then, as Bourgault and Dion note, deputy ministers are frequently transferred, giving rise to a "veritable game of musical chairs."25 The current transition is no exception; almost two-thirds (64-per cent) of the mobility observed is transfers witiiin the senior public service. This is significandy higher than the annual rate of transfers observed by Bourgault and Dion during the Mulroney transition (50 per cent) which, at the time, produced the highest levels of deputy rriinister mobility since Confederation. Appointment to a Crown Agency or a diplomatic posting is a coveted assignment but often interpreted as a transfer wherein the deputy rriinister is "exiled" out of the deputy ministerial cadre. In such instances, a new leader creates a substantial degree of distance between untrustworthy deputy rninisters and the core of government.26 Notably, there has been only one transfer to a Crown Agency: Ian Bennett, former Deputy Minister of Finance, became Master of the Mint, effective June 12, 2006. A transfer to the Privy Council Office 2 5 Bourgault andDion., 136. 2 6 Ibid., 137. 15 or Treasury Board Secretariat, on the other hand, offers senior officials continued influence in government as strategic advisors wirJiin central authority structures. As Table 3 indicates,' over one third of the transfers during the 2006-07 transition have sent incumbent deputy ministers to senior positions in these central agencies (see Appendix I). Significantly, fully 50 per cent of the transfers were of the "ordinary" type; that is, a deputy minister has been reassigned but remains at the head of a department.27 In other words, in almost 90 per cent of transfers, a deputy rninister has remained within the highest levels of government. T A B L E 3 - Types of Transfers Deputy minister transferred to: Frequency Crown Agency Diplomatic Posting Treasury Board Privy Council Office Other deputy minister appointment 1 (5.5%) 1 (5.5%) 1 (5.5%) 6 (33.3%) 9(50%) Total 18(100%) The one transfer to a diplomatic posting deserves special mention. Alex Himelfarb, incumbent Clerk of the Privy Council and Secretary to the Cabinet, was reassigned as Canada's new Ambassador to Italy. As the most senior deputy rninister and Head of the Public Service, the Clerk recommends the appointment of deputy ministers to the Prime Minister and Cabinet and as such, is the principal link between the Prime Minister and the Public Service. It is the prerogative of the Prime Minister to choose a new Clerk of the Privy Council and Secretary to Cabinet. The current Prime Minister chose to transfer Kevin Lynch, Executive Director for the Canadian, Irish and Caribbean constituency at the 2 7 This includes three instances in which a current deputy minister was given additional portfolio responsibilities: Alan Nymark, Deputy Minister of Human Resources and Skills Development, becomes Deputy Minister of Human Resources and Social Development, effective February 7, 2006; Munir Sheikh, Deputy Minister Labour and Housing and Associate Deputy Minister of Human Resources and Skills Development, becomes Deputy Minister Labour and Associate Deputy Minister of Human Resources and Social Development, effective February 7, 2006; Louis Ranger, Deputy Minister of Transport takes on additional responsibilities of Deputy Head of Infrastructure and Communities; effective September 5, 2006. 16 International Monetary Fund (IMF) to the position of Clerk and Secretary to Cabinet. Lynch began his career at the Bank of Canada in 1976 and has held a number of senior positions in the departments of Finance and Industry, including Deputy Minister of Industry from 1995-2000 and Deputy Minister of Finance from 2000-2004. That Harper chose an experienced senior public servant rather than an outsider to become the most influential bureaucrat in the government of Canada confirms a Conservative comrnitment to a neutral public service. The same can also be said regarding the changes which took place to the more "powerful" departments of the Government of Canada. Although the departments of Finance, Foreign Affairs, and Environment all have new deputy rriinisters at the helm, each has significant experience witfiin the federal government: Robert Wright, former President of Export Development Canada was named Deputy Minister of Finance following the transfer of his predecessor to Master of the Mint; Leonard Edwards, former Deputy Minister of Agriculture and Agri Foods was transferred to the position of Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs following the retirement of Peter Harder; and Michael Horgan, former Deputy Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development was transferred to Deputy Minister of the Environment following the transfer of his predecessor to the Privy Council Office as a Special Advisor. In sum, we can extract four significant findings from the above analysis of the 2006-07 Conservative transition. The first is that, contrary to a case of overt pohticization, there has been no purge of the deputy minister group. That is, there have been no known forced departures of a significant number of deputy rriinisters. Secondly, rather than finding evidence of a large number, of "politicized" appointees from outside the public sector, we have observed only one external appointment, biographical evidence for which suggests that this external appointment was not motivated by partisanship. Contrary to what would be 17 expected of overt politicization, there have been a significant number of internal promotions. Senior career public servants have been promoted to the position of deputy minister at a rate of 40 per cent during the current transition. The tliird finding of significance is the high rate of transfers, almost 90 per cent of which have transferred incumbent deputies to other deputy minister positions or to advisor positions in central agencies. These types of transfers suggest a high degree of lateral career mobility within the highest levels of government. Furthermore, it also confirms that Harper has not "politicized" the deputy minister group by demoting incumbents. Finally, almost one quarter of incumbent deputy ministers were unaffected by career changes during the 2006-07 transition. At the outset of this transition, these deputies had, on average, 4.8 years of experience in their current position28 and 24.8 years in the federal public service.29 These six deputies, then, represent a sizeable degree of administrative continuity within the present deputy minister group, evidence to bolster the conclusion that partisan politicization has not played a factor in Prime Minister Harper's selection of deputy ministers. The evidence suggests that Harper has rejected partisan politicization of the public service in favour of retaining an experienced senior public service. What is unclear, however, is what the increased lateral career mobility represents. On this score, it is important to emphasize that transitions are not the motivating force behind increased mobility of deputy ministers. Indeed, while it would seem that political transitions since 1979 have accentuated the trend towards a more mobile senior civil service, the trend was initiated during the long period of Liberal dominance from 1963-1979; during a period of relative political 2 8 The average is slightly skewed by the Deputy Minister of Western Economic Diversification, Oryssia Lennie, who has held this position since November 1997. When this outlier is omitted from the calculation, the average is 2.4. 2 9 Oryssia Lennie is an outlier in this instance as well, having joined the federal public service only in 1997, following 26 years with the public service of Alberta, during which period she was Deputy Minister of Federal and Intergovernmental Affairs from 1990-1997; removed from the calculation the average number of years of federal experience of these unchanged deputies is 28. 18 continuity.30 To provide a possible explanation for the increased lateral mobility of the senior public service, we now turn to what is increasingly recognized as the "corporate" character of governance at the federal level in Canada. Structuring and Coherence of the Government Corporation Lateral mobility of deputy ministers is now a recognized feature of the public management structure at the federal level in Canada.31 The government "corporation" asserts that the deputy rrrinister's role is to serve the government as a whole, in its collective responsibility to parliament. The deputy minister is now part of a government-focused team. This characteristic is evident when one observes the changing career profile of deputy ministers, and the government's increasingly centralized approach to the management of the deputy ministers as a group. Deputy Minister Career Patterns Two significant aspects of the deputy minister career profile stand out: first, the term as a deputy and length of time heading a given department and; second, careers before reaching the rank of deputy minister. The length of deputy minister careers has been declining.32 In 1867, the deputy minister career lasted an average of 13.3 years; by 1997 this had been reduced to 6.76 years and in 2003 fell to 3.3 years.33 The proportion of those who receive only one assignment has decreased (it was the case of 91 per cent of those appointed before July 1, 1917 but fell to 48 per cent for those who became deputy rriinister after 1967) while the propensity to give multiple assignments has correspondingly increased.34 In other words, the career within the deputy minister group is short and generally consists of multiple 3 0 Bourgault and Dion, 143. ^ See Bourgault, "The Deputy Minister's Role in the Government of Canada:" This calculation ends even if the person remains employed by the federal government as a diplomat, special advisor or head of a Crown corporation. 3 Bourgault, Profile of Deputy Ministers in the Government of Canada, 13 3 4 Ibid., 12. 19 assignments as a departmental deputy minister, meaning less time spent in one departmental assignment. In his 1993 study of strategic management in the public service, Frank Swift found that experience in a central agency, most notably in the Privy Council Office, had become a "virtual prerequisite for deputy-level appointment."35 He concludes: "What emerges is a pattern of executive succession that, while still evolving, continues to give emphasis to central agency backgrounds and to policy skills, while giving short shrift to experience in managing programs and services to the public."36 Other observed trends in deputy minister careers include the following: • Deputy rriinisters come almost exclusively from the federal public service; • Three quarters of deputy ministers have held assistant or associate deputy rriinister departments or federal agencies; and • Nearly all have occupied a senior executive position in the Privy Council Office during ten years preceding their appointment.37 This latter trend has continued during the current political transition: two tiiirds of all appointees have had previous experience in the PCO. Of this group, the average number of appointments to the PCO is two and the average number of total years spent, in PCO is three. Bourgault confirms that the length of a senior appointment to the Privy Council Office averages between two and five years, demonstrating what he calls the deputy minister's "corporate training": "Since these agencies form the nerve centre and strategic centre of executive power, deputy ministers must know about and understand their operation so that they can deal with them. Furthermore, they play a key role in uTiplementing the government's agenda and management priorities."38 Deputy rriinisters Frank Swift, Strategic Management in the Public Service: The Changing Role of the Deputy Minister, (Ottawa: Canada Centre for Management Development, November 1993) 63 3 6 Ibid. 3 7 Bourgault, "The Deputy Minister's Role in the Government of Canada " 265 3 8 Ibid., 267. ' 20 identified as individuals who know and understand the operations of central agencies and who can interact functionally with them. As Bourgault explains, the strong trend towards experience in PCO "reflects that the 'rising stars', identified early in their career, become the government's corporate resources. These incumbents understand that they do not owe their J • • "59 career to an intradepartmental network, as might have been the case in the 1970s." On the whole, when these trends are combined with the short tenure in a department, we get a clear picture of the lateral mobility of the deputy minister, both interdepartmentally and between the department and centre of government. Managing the Deputy Minister Community The evolution of the machinery of government in Canada was fundamentally altered by Pierre Trudeau's expansion of a central apparatus for coordinating departmental actions. As Savoie notes, "he strengthened the centre of government by enlarging his own office, expanding the Privy Council Office and estabhshing new Cabinet cornmittees, effectively giving them the authority to make decisions."40 Following the initial establishment of coordinating central bodies, deputy ministers became increasingly involved in policy-making beyond their departments. As Campbell and Szablowski conclude in their 1979 study of central agencies: "no department in Ottawa today enjoys a monopoly of a policy domain, no matter what may be the terms of its statutory authority; and officials agree that the exercise of bureaucratic power takes place in interdepartmental and cabinet committees, largely because issues usually overlap and affect the interests of many departments."41 Similarly, the authors remarked that deputy ministers were taking on a greater role in the proliferating 3 9 Bourgault, Profile of Deputy Ministers in the Government of Canada, 12. 4 0 Donald J. Savoie, Governing from the Centre: The Concentration of Political Power in Canada, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), 85. 4 1 Colin Campbell and George J. Szablowski, The Superbureaucrats: Structure and Behaviour in Central Agencies, (Toronto: MacMillan of Canada, 1979), 152. 21 cabinet committee system. Ministers who simply didn't have the time to attend cabinet committee meetings began to delegate their attendance to senior officials. Career civil servants thus became "Central agents [with] developed 'ministerial' abilities — that is, they can perform on behalf of ministers with ease and effectiveness."42 In 2007, corporate governance structures differ from earlier periods in that they now incorporate deputy ministers into horizontal management practices. The machinery of government now has deputy ministers working within a corporate framework wherein overall government priorities shape department roles. Horizontal management promotes mutual information, coordination of initiatives and integration of departmental programs. The tools of horizontal management are threefold: first, files on policy or program development or management of direct concern to die department facilitated by thematic focus groups; second, corporate files where the deputy ministers give collective opinions as senior advisers to the government.; and finally, self-management of the community of deputy ministers.43 Bourgault notes that horizontal management of all types now takes close to 40 per cent of the working time of deputy rriinisters.44 Every Friday (or the day following Cabinet meetings), deputy ministers assemble for a meeting which includes a summary of Cabinet's deliberations, a presentation of the Clerk's vision, and a discussion of "certain political aims."45 There are also a number of other formal and ad hoc committees (the later with mandates within the PCO) that bring together deputy ministers. Additionally, the Committee of Senior Officials (COSO) is mandated within PCO to identify potential candidates for the positions of associate deputy minister and deputy rriinister. 4 2 Ibid., 156. 4 3 Bourgault, "The Deputy Minister's Role in the Government of Canada," 273 4 4 Ibid., 277. 4 5 Ibid., 273. 22 . The Performance Management Program (PMP) administered by the Senior Personnel and Special Projects Secretariat of the Privy Council Office is another horizontal management tool that forcefully conveys corporate expectations to deputy ministers. The program was adopted as a compensation plan for senior officials in February 1998, in response to the recommendations contained in the First Report of the Advisory Committee on Senior Lepei Retention and Compensation.46 Following private sector models, performance pay has two elements: at-risk pay which must be re-earned each year, and a bonus for performance that surpasses expectations. With the successful achievement of on-going commitments, deputy ministers normally progress at 5 per cent per year through the salary range to reach the job rate maximum in approximately three years.47 PMP represents an agreement between the Clerk of the Privy Council and each of the deputy ministers to ensure that the individual objectives of the latter are aligned with the government's policy agenda. These are common commitments of deputy ministers not the priorities of a department. PMP sets corporate standards for results-based assessments of the deputy minister group in three categories. First, are the key and ongoing commitments of deputy ministers, as described in the Corporate Priorities issued annually by the Clerk of the Privy Council to reflect the government's policy priorities. The second category of performance expectations are the horizontal elements of a deputy's core organizational and management accountabilities. Finally, the agreement sets out expectations for personal learning objectives (demonstration of the leadership competencies required to successfully carry out the responsibilities of the position). 4 6 The Performance Management Program applies to deputy ministers as well as associate deputy ministers, and individuals paid in the GX salary range (Governor in Council appointees). Jean-Guy Fleury, Performance Management Program in the Canadian Federal Public Service PUMA/HRM 12 (2002), 9.' As a recent report from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development notes, performance-related pay systems assume that pay can be administered in a way which capitalises on its expected incentive value for potential recipients.48 As an incentive system, performance pay is an alternative to the traditional approach of rigorously controlled promotions. The report also notes that one of the key reasons why performance pay is now used in civil services is that it facilitates wider organizational changes.49 That is, performance management provides a stimulus to change workplace culture. At the federal level in Canada, insofar as corporate priorities are reflected in the pay structure, the Performance Management Program is first and foremost a management tool to integrate departmental deputy ministers into the new corporate governance framework. Deputy ministers now have a clear financial incentive to manage the government's broad policy agenda. Corporate expectations are conveyed to deputy ministers primarily by the Clerk and in this respect, the Clerk's supremacy over the deputy minister group is fundamental to the government corporation. In his May 2006 address to assembled senior officials, the new Clerk of the Privy Council and Secretary to Cabinet, Kevin Lynch, made clear his commitment to sttengmening the government corporation by reinforcing mobility between central agencies and line departments. Among his proposals for public service renewal, Lynch announced that PCO secretariats would be streamlined.50 Special advisors previously in PCO secretariats have been reassigned to departments with clear mandates in those areas, OECD, "Executive Summary," Performance Related Pay for Government Employees, (OECD: Paris, 2005), 1, available from http://vvvvw.0ecd.0rg/data0ecd/l 6/11/35117916.pdf 4 9 Ibid, 4.' ' " 5 0 Privy Council Office, "Making Public Service Renewal Real" Remarks by the Clerk of the Privy Council and Secretary to the Cabinet at the 2006 APEX Symposium. May 30, 2006,.Ottawa, available from www.pco.gc.ca 24 confirming that expertise in a central coordinating body, rather than experience within a department, has become essential for nomination to a senior departmental post. Increasingly, associate deputy ministers are being integrated into the government's corporate framework as a part of the bureaucratic elite. Associate deputy ministers are distinguished from assistant deputy ministers by the fact that they, like deputy ministers, are Governor-in-Council appointments. Reflecting a desire to encourage teamwork and collective action at the deputy minister and associate deputy minister level, PCO has revamped the deputy ministerial committees with the aim of "an integrated and coordinated approach to both the management agenda and the policy agenda."5' Under the reforms announced by Lynch,associate deputies will now act as vice-chairs on all deputy1 ministerial committees. Interestingly, Bourgault and Dion noted in their 1988 study that more associate deputy ministers than before receive discretionary appointments. Preliminary analysis suggests that this phenomenon is also pronounced during the Harper transition. The government corporation requires a centralized, coherent approach to the management of deputy ministers. Corporate governance is a new prism through which to understand executive bureaucratic relations in Canada, one which deviates from traditional vertical models of governance towards a more horizontal approach. But what of its significance for the 2006-07 Conservative transition? Rather than provide an exhaustive account of the origins and development of corporate governance, the foregoing is meant to provide a flavour of its key elements in the context of our present analysis of the 2006-07 transition and its high level of lateral mobility of deputy ministers. Indeed, this essay is not the first to deal with the issue of the increasingly corporate structure of governance at the federal level in Canada. It is, however, the first to treat the issue of corporate governance in 5 1 PCO, "Making Public Service Renewal Real." 25 the context of political transitions. Corporate governance has been shown to be a self-regulating structure which keeps the senior public service responsive and in line with the policy priorities of the government of the day. To this extent, corporate governance facilitates the process of transition by providing mcoming governments with a responsive team of senior civil servants that is able to identify policy goals and mobilize support for them; that is, they understand how to navigate within the corporate structure. Within this structure, deputy ministers are relied upon neither for their experience within a given department nor their technical expertise in a given policy domain, but rather for their experience at the centre of government, overall knowledge of government and responsiveness to government priorities. For this reason, transferring deputy ministers within the highest levels of government becomes a tool that new Prime Ministers can use to ensure the successful implementation of their government's policy agenda Conclusion Political transitions iUuminate a basic dilemma in democratic governance: the permanent bureaucracy must be responsive to its current political masters, yet it must maintain the necessary professionalism to be able to fulfill its duties efficiendy and effectively. The established critique against an independent and therefore, politically neutral, civil service is that its permanent character can lead to a rigid bureaucratic power that, in the extreme, can block democratic leadership. In cases where newly elected governments have a philosophy that is markedly different from their predecessors, a housecleaning of the higher bureaucracy is more likely. Such a loss of continuity of the adrrunistrative machinery is characteristic of the American system of executive branch leadership which, as Pfiffmer notes, "was designed to maximize responsiveness to the electorate by ensuring that many top positions 26 throughout the government are filled by supporters of the President".52 This essay has determined whether there is evidence of such overt poHticization during the 2006-07 transition in the Government of Canada. The transition of the Stephen Harper Conservatives yields four major conclusions; all of which indicate that the Prime Minister has avoided overt partisan politicization of the deputy rriinister cadre. First, no evidence is found of a purge of incumbent deputy ministers; Harper has not forced their departure in large numbers, nor has he appointed a significant number of obvious partisans from outside the public service. In fact, he has made only one external appointment. Quite the opposite of overt politicization, the second conclusion is that an overwhelming number of experienced senior public servants have been promoted to the rank of deputy minister. Third, a sizeable number of deputy rriinisters who were appointed by Liberal Prime Ministers Chretien and Martin have not been changed by Harper, indicating a substantial element of adrninistrative continuity and a measure of bureaucratic independence. These findings provide strong evidence to suggest that Harper has favoured retaining a permanent, non-partisan senior public service rather than resort to overt poHticization. However, although there is significant continuity of the deputy rriinister cadre, there is also noticeable change. The final conclusion regarding the 2006-07 transition is the considerable lateral career mobility of deputy ministers. The implication cannot be overstated: lateral mobility has generated sufficient responsiveness to a new political agenda without partisan politicization. Indeed, that Harper has not housecleaned the ranks of deputy ministers demonstrates both the professional character of the senior public service and the Prime Minister's confidence in its ability to be responsive to his policy agenda. In short, the defining feature of the 2006-2007 transition is its administrative and political efficiency. 5 2 James P. Pfiffner, "Political Appointees and Career Executives: the Democracy-Bureaucracy Nexus in the Third Century," Public Administration Review 47, no. 1(1987): 62. 27 Lateral career mobility of deputy ministers within the highest levels of government is fundamental to corporate governance and to the 2006-07 transition. Indeed, it is the feature which has been shown to distinguish the Harper transition from all others observed by Bourgault arid Dion. Lateral mobility guards against policy bias in that it ensures public servants shed their previous policy commitments by providing them with an assignment in a different department or central agency. Under the corporate governance model, the executive capacity of deputy ministers provides the political leadership with alternatives in the implementation of its. policy agenda. As a device for ensuring political responsiveness, lateral mobility has only recently come of age. Today, Prime Ministers have a new option because deputy ministers' skills are, unlike earlier periods, easily transferable. Deputy ministers are aware that they support overall government priorities and are accustomed to frequent changes. In sum, as a mechanism of corporate governance, lateral mobility is a tool to make a potentially rigidly Weberian, unsteerable bureaucratic system responsive to the political priorities of a new government without compromising its non-partisan, professional character. Those concerned with the increased responsiveness of deputy ministers to central priorities have made their case known: such responsiveness discourages a deputy's connections within the department. That is, a deputy minister is encouraged to "manage up" rather than "manage down."53 Indeed, under the corporate governance model, the deputy minister has a greater sense of loyalty to the corporate priorities of the government than to a specific department. The relationship between a deputy and his or her minister has been weakened if not eroded by the deputy's commitments to the government corporation. Donald J. Savoie, "The Rise of Court Government in Canada," Canadian Journal of Political Science 32 no.4 (1999), 660. ' 28 Close personal relationships seldom exist between deputies and ministers; the attachment is now between the deputy and the centre of government. Absent any evidence of overt politicization, to the extent that the current transition demonstrates the intensification of a corporate model of governance according to which responsive competence is ensured by centralized decision-making, it can be argued that the ' consequences of the centralization of power in Canadian politics are not as dysfunctional for public adrninistration as some observers have contended. In Governingfrom the Centre, Savoie argues that "it is ironic perhaps that as the hand of the centre has been strengthened, its ability to manage horizontal issues has been weakened."54 To the contrary, this essay provides evidence to suggest that deputy ministers in fact facilitate horizontal management in the Government of Canada. Ultimately, corporate governance ensures that the policy agenda of the government of the day is articulated to deputy ministers and that this group provides the appropriate level of support for its implementation. Proposals to increase the "independence" of the public service are misguided, in that they presume the increased responsiveness of the deputy rninister group represents profound politicization. As a major political science question, politicization needs to be reconsidered in light of the findings of the 2006-07 Conservative transition. These fmdings imply a distinction between overt partisanship in the selection of deputy ministers and increased policy responsiveness as a result of corporate governance. Partisan politicization is responsiveness to short term political ends (i.e. re-election, keeping ministers out of trouble) while corporate governance is responsiveness to complex policy programs that require high degrees of coherence and lateral coordination. Distinguishing between partisanship and policy responsiveness is necessary because it highHghts the potential benefits of a more politically 5 4 Savoie, Governingfrom the Centre, 15. 29 responsive role for senior public servants. Despite Prime Minister Harper's prerogative, he has not made partisanship a factor in the selection of deputy ministers. Rather, he has appointed politically neutral, experienced federal public servants to contribute to policy development at the highest levels in the Government of Canada. In short, the policy responsiveness of deputy rrLinisters has not undermined their non-partisan, professional character. A more accurate understanding of poHticization must begin with reconsidering our approach to the study of deputy ministers and how we categorize them within the larger structures of executive bureaucratic relations in Canada. As the 2006-07 transition confirms, deputy ministers are a unique bureaucratic eHte in the Government of Canada. Indeed, deputy ministers are the bureaucratic eHte par excellence. Some scholars continue to refer to deputy ministers as part of the pubUc service writ large, leading them to conclude that the legitimacy of the pubHc service as a professional institution has been undermined by the increasing influence deputy ministers wield in the poHcy process. As Savoie has argued, "Individual pubHc servants have become highly valued at the expense of the pubHc service as an institution."55 However, this ignores the unique role and function of deputy minister within the corporate governance structure; one that is not expected of civil servants who fall under the independent staffing authority of the PubHc Service Commission of Canada. As the current transition has shown, deputy rriinisters make their way to this position foUowing a lengthy career in the PubHc Sendee of Canada but effectively leave this institution when they have been identified by poHtical leadership to possess competencies that are necessary for the implementation of the government's poHcy agenda. So long as coordination and coherence are valued aspects of contemporary governance, the responsibiHties of deputy 5 5 Savoie, "The Rise of Court Government in Canada," 662. 30 ministers in the policy process will continue to challenge traditional boundaries of politics and administration. In short, when it comes to deputy ministers, rather than construct rigid boundaries around politics and administration, we ought to think in terms of a continuum where policy and administration are different aspects of the same process. 31 Bibliography Aucoin, Peter. "The Staffing and Evaluation of Canadian Deputy Ministers in Comparative Westrninster Perspective: A Proposal for Reform," in Commission of Inquiry into the Sponsorship Program and Advertising Activities. Research Studies Volume 1. Ottawa: PWGSC, 2006. 297-331. Bougault, Jacques. Profile of Deputy Ministers in the Government of Canada. Working Paper Series. Ottawa: Canada School of Public Service, 2005. Bourgault, Jacques"The Deputy Minister's Role in the Government of Canada: His responsibility and his accountability." Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Sponsorship Program and Advertising Activities. Research Studies Volume 1. Ottawa: PWGS, 2006. 253-293. Bourgault, Jacques and Stephan Dion. "Governments Come and Go, But What of Senior Civil Servants? Canadian Deputy Ministers and Transitions in Power (1867-1987)" Governance. 2, no.2 (1989): 124-151. - Campbell, Cohn and George J. Szablowski. The Superbureaucrats: Structure and Behaviour in „ CentralAgencies. Toronto: MacMillan of Canada, 1979. Carty, R.K., William Cross and, Lisa Young. Rebuilding Canadian Party Politics. Vancouver: UBC Press, 2000. Conservative Party of Canada. "Canadians choose change and accountability." Address by the Hon. Stephen Harper, P.C., M.P., Leader of the Conservative Party of Canada. Calgary, Jan. 23, 2006. Available from, http: / /www.consel-vative.ca/EN /1004/40299. Fleury, Jean-Guy. Performance Management Program in the Canadian Federal Public Service. P U M A / H R M 12(2003). Heclo, Hugh. "OMB and the Presidency - The Problem of Neutral Competence." The Public Interest^ (1975): 80-98. Hodgetts, J.E, "Liberal and Bureaucrat." Queen's Quarterly. Summer (1955): 176-83. Hodgetts, J.E. "The Civil Service and Policy Formation" Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science 23, no.4 (1957): 467-479. Johnson, A.W. "The Role of the Deputy Minister." Canadian Public Administration 4, no. 4 (1961): 363-367. 32 MacDonald, L. Ian.. "How Harper forced a Conservative Spring." Policy Options, March 2006, Office of the Prime Minister. "Prime Minister Harper outlines his Government's priorities and open federalism approach." Speech given in Montreal, QC, 20 April 2006. Available from, http: //www.pm.gc.ca/eng/-rnedia.asp?id— 1119. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, "Executive Summary," Performance Related Pay for Government Employees. OECD: Paris, 2005. Available from, http: / / www.oecd.org/dataoecd/16 /11735117916.pdf. Pfiffner, James P. "Political Appointees and Career Executives: the Democracy-Bureaucracy Nexus in the Third Century." Public Administration Review 47, no. 1 (1987): 57-65. Porter, John. The Vertical Mosaic: an Analysis of Social Class and Power in Canada. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965. Privy Council Office. "Making PubHc Service Renewal Real." Remarks by the Clerk of the Privy Council and Secretary to the Cabinet at the 2006 A P E X Symposium. May 30, 2006, Ottawa. Available from, www.pco.gc.ca Savoie, Donald J. "The Canadian pubHc service has a personaHty," Canadian Public Administration, 49:2 (FaU 2006), 261-281. Savoie, Donald J. "The Federal Government: Revisiting Court Government in Canada." In, Luc Bernier, Keith Brownsey, and Michael Howlett, Eds. Executive Styles in Canada. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005. 17-46 Savoie, Donald J. Governingfrom the Centre: The Concentration of Political Power in Canada. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999. Savoie, Donald J. "The Rise of Court Government in Canada," Canadian journal of Political Science.32, no.4 (1999): 635-64. Swift, Frank. Strategic Management in the Public Service: The Changing Role of the Deputy Minister. Ottawa: Canada Centre for Management Development, November 1993. Online Sources http://www.pco.gc.ca http://www.pm.gc.ca http://www.parl.gc.ca 33 APPENDIX Deputy Ministers in Office (by department or central agency) as of 26 January, 2006 and career changes to these positions (departures, transfers, appointments) as of July 30, 2007 1. Agriculture and Agrifood Transfer. Leonard Edwards to Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs (Effective March 5, 2007) Appointment: Yaprak Baltacioglu, Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet (Operations), PCO (Effective March 5, 2007) 2. Canadian Heritage No Change: Judith A. LaRocque (appointed Deputy Minister April 2002) 3. Citizenship and Immigration Transfer: Janice Charette to D M Human Resources and Social Development (Effective July 1, 2006) 4. Economic Development Agency of Canada for the Regions of Quebec Transfer: Michelle d'Auray to Deputy Minister of Fisheries and Oceans (Effective August 6, 2007) Appointment: Guy McKenzie, Associate Deputy Minister Transport, mfrastructure and Communities (Effective August 6, 2006) 5. Environment Transfer: Samy Watson to Special Advisor to the POC (Effective May 23, 2006) 6. Finance Transfer: Ian Bennett to Master of Mint (Effective June 12, 2006) Appointment: Robert Wright, President, Export Development Canada (Effective June 12, 2006) 7. Fisheries and Oceans Departure: Larry Murray, Retirement (Effective August 6, 2007) 8. Foreign Affairs Departure: Peter Harder, Retirement (Effective March 5, 2007). 9. Health No Change: Morris Rosenberg (appointed Deputy Minister in December 2004). 10. Human Resources and Skills Development (becomes Human Resources and Social Development on February 7, 2007) Transfer: Alan Nymark, Deputy Minister of Human Resources and Skills Development, becomes Deputy Minister of Human Resources and Social Development (Effective February 7, 2006) Departure: Alan Nymark, Retirement (Effective July 1, 2006) 11. Indian Affairs and Northern Development 34 Transfer. Michael Horgan to Deputy Minister of the Environment (Effective May 23, 2006) Appointment: Michael Wemick, Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet (Plans and Consultations), PCO (Effective May 23, 2006) 12. Industry Transfer: Suzanne Hurtubise, to Deputy Minister of Public Safety (Effective May 1, 2006) Appointment: Richard Dicerni, Partner at Mercer Delta Canada (Effective May 1, 2006) 13. Intergovernmental Affairs Departure: Marie Fortier, Retirement (Effective May 1, 2006) Appointment: Louis Levesque, Associate Deputy Minister of Finance (Effective May 1, 2006) 14. International Trade Transfer: Robert Fonberg, to Senior Associate Secretary of the Treasury Board (Effective April 13,2006) Appointment: Marie-Lucie Morin, Associate Deputy Minister Foreign Affairs (Effective April 13, 2006) 15. Justice No Change: John H. Simms (appointed Deputy Minister December 2004).. 16. Labour Transfer: Munir Sheikh, Deputy Minister Labour and Housing and Associate Deputy Minister of Human Resources and Skills Development, becomes Deputy Minister Labour and Associate Deputy Minister of Human Resources and Social Development (Effective February 7, 2006) 17. National Defence No Change: Ward Elcock (appointed Deputy Minister August 2004) 18. Canadian Revenue Agency Departure: Michael Dorais, Commissioner of Revenue Retirement (Effective April 2, 2007) Appointment: William V. Baker, Deputy Commissioner of Revenue (Effective April 2, 2007) 19. Natural Resources Transfer: Richard Fadden, to Deputy Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (Effective July 1, 2006) Appointment: Catherine (Cassie) Doyle, Associate Deputy Minister of the Environment (Effective July 10, 2006) 20. Privy Council Office Transfer: Alex Himelfarb, Clerk of the Privy Council and Secretary to the Cabinet becomes Ambassador of Canada to the Italian Republic with concurrent accreditation to the Republic of Albania and the Republic of San Marino, and as High Commissioner for Canada to the Republic of Malta. (Announced March 6, 2007) Transfer. Kevin Lynch, Executive Director for the Canadian, Irish and Caribbean constituency at the International Monetary Fund to Clerk of the Privy Council and Secretary to the Cabinet. (Effective March 6, 2006) 21. Public Works and Government Services Transfer: David Marshall to Senior Advisor to the Privy Council Office. (Effective June 4, 2007) 35 Appointment: Francois Guimont, President, Canadian Food Inspection Agency. (Effective June 4, 2007) 22. Public Safety Transfer: Margaret Bloodworm to Associate Secretary to the Cabinet. (Effective May 1, 2006) 23. Social Development Transfer: Nicole Jauvin to Associate Cle of the Pricy Council for Senior Personnel. (Effective February 7, 2006) 24. Service Canada Transfer: Maryantonett Flumian to Senior Advisor to the Privy Council Office. (Effective September 5, 2006) Appointment: Helene Gosselin, Associate Deputy Minister of Health. (Effective September 5, 2007) *(Note title changed from Deputy Minister to Deputy Head, effective February 7, 2006. Deputy Head reports to Minister for Human Resources and Social Development) 25. Transport (Became known as Department of Transport, mfrastructure and Communities, •effective February 7, 2006) Transfer: Louis Ranger, Deputy Minister of Transport takes on additional responsibilities of Deputy Head of Infrastructure and Communities. (Effective September 5, 2006). 26. Treasury Board Secretariat No Change: Wayne Wouters (appointed Deputy Minister December 2004) 27. Veterans Affairs Departure: Jack Stagg (Death, August 2006) Appointment: Suzanne Tining, Associate Deputy Minister, Indian and Northern Affairs Canada and Executive Director and Deputy Head, Indian Residential Schools Resolution Canada (Effective January 22, 2007) 28. Western Economic Diversification No Change: Oryssia Lennie (appointed November 1997) 36 

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