DÉPUTY MINISTERS AND POLITICIZATION IN THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA: LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE 2006-2007 CONSERVATIVE TRANSITION

by

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Abstract

This thesis analyses the 2006-07 Conservative transition in the Government of Canada by asking the following: is there evidence of overt partisan politicization of the deputy ministers during this transition? Significantly, there is no evidence of overt politicization. Harper has not forced departure of incumbent deputy ministers, nor has he appointed a significant number of known partisan allies from outside the public service. Instead, Harper has retained the overwhelming majority of deputy ministers who served the previous Liberal government. However, the 2006-07 transition also suggests considerable lateral career mobility of deputy ministers within the highest levels of government. The thesis argues that lateral mobility is explained by the “corporate” governance structure in the government of Canada, according to which deputy ministers are expected to identify with the government’s broad policy goals and mobilize support for them. High degrees of lateral mobility during the Conservative transition provide evidence to suggest that a potentially rigid bureaucratic system can be made responsive to the policy priorities of a new government without compromising the professional norms of a non-partisan, career public service.
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Introduction

The Canadian general election of January 2006 ended more than a decade of uninterrupted Liberal rule. This political shift saw the rise of a Conservative coalition large enough to rival the Liberal machine and to produce of a Conservative minority government. The Conservative Party of Canada was formed in December 2003 by the merger of the Progressive Conservative Party of Canada and Canadian Alliance, a party that was seen as “right wing” by Canadian standards. Stephen Harper, former leader of the Canadian Alliance and now Prime Minister of Canada, has taken great pains to distance his Conservative government from previous Liberal governments. The Conservative's first piece of legislation was the Federal Accountability Act, aimed to “change forever the way business is done in Ottawa.” Indeed, the Conservatives have given Canadians the impression that major changes are taking place under “Canada’s New Government.”

The 2006 Conservative transition comes on the heels of 13 years of largely successful Liberal rule. A significant accomplishment of the Chrétien/Martin Liberal governments was the elimination of a large budget deficit. In the 1997-1998 fiscal year Ottawa posted a $3.5-billion surplus, the first in nearly three decades. With consecutive budget surpluses, the Liberal government was able to establish a policy agenda that committed the Government of Canada to many new programs. The transition to a Conservative minority thus provides a useful case to observe how a new government behaves towards a permanent civil service that was loyal to a very different policy agenda. What changes have been made to deputy ministers, the most senior public servants who head the departments and agencies of the Government of Canada? Specifically, is there evidence of overt “ politicization” in the

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selection of the deputy minister cadre? It is the purpose of this thesis to answer this major political science question.

Conventionally understood, politicization is the result of partisanship in the selection of deputy ministers. In such cases, we would expect a new government to:

- Force the departure of incumbent deputy ministers from the public service;
- Assign incumbent deputy ministers to less important positions; and/or
- Recruit known partisan supporters from outside the public service.

An extreme case of politicization may be termed a "purge" or "housecleaning" of the deputy minister cadre, wherein most if not all incumbent deputy ministers are dismissed and known partisan supporters are imported to fill these positions. Beyond housecleaning, new governments may employ more subtle strategies for securing authority over the public service, strategies which may involve a high degree of mobility in the senior ranks of the public service. The methodology employed builds on that by Jacques Bourgault and Stéphane Dion in their study of political transitions in the Government of Canada from 1867 to 1987. They argue that "if there is politicization, then we will expect an appreciable increase in mobility following a change in government." Interestingly, Bourgault and Dion observe increasing levels of career mobility beginning in the early 1960s but conclude that "changes in political parties have had little effect on the tenure of deputy ministers in the Canadian federal government." Is this true of the transition to a Conservative government after 2006?

Analysis of the 2006-07 Conservative transition provides no evidence of overt "politicization". That is, the Conservatives under the leadership of Prime Minister Harper have made no effort to break-up the established deputy minister cadre, either by forcing the

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3 Ibid., 145.
departure of incumbents from the public service or by appointing a significant number of outsiders to the position of deputy minister. However, there is evidence of increased lateral career mobility between the deputy minister level and other senior positions in the government of Canada. What explains the noteworthy lateral movement of senior officials? It is argued that high degrees of lateral mobility observed during the current transition are explained by the growing "corporate" structure of governance at the federal level in Canada. Under this structure, deputy ministers are now expected to identify with the government’s broad policy goals and mobilize support for them. Coordination of the government’s policy agenda requires incumbent deputy ministers who know and understand the operations of the core executive agencies and who can interact functionally with them. In other words, deputy minister must be mobile within the centre of government.

Corporate governance is seen as a new prism through which to understand executive government in Canada, one which distinguishes between political partisanship in the selection and retention of public servants and policy responsiveness. The 2006-07 Conservative transition is significant because it demonstrates that as a tool available to the Prime Minister, lateral mobility has generated sufficient responsiveness to a new change in government without overt politicization. In short, high degrees of lateral mobility during the Conservative transition provide evidence to suggest that a potentially rigidly Weberian bureaucratic system can be made responsive to the policy priorities of a new government without compromising its professional character.

Political Transitions in the Government of Canada

Democratic transitions in power are valuable cases for studying the civil service. For one, they test the political neutrality of the permanent, administrative arm of the state. Upon taking power, a new government inherits a senior public service that only recently served
another party. Tension and mistrust between elected government and permanent civil service can be high. Once in power, a new government, through various devices, might try to change the permanent civil service and to weaken its policy influence. During a transition, the concern is the civil service’s support for the previous government’s policies and its possible indifference to new initiatives.

Political transitions at the federal level in Canada are interesting precisely because Liberal Party hegemony has meant that shifts in power are rare. The truism that the Liberal Party is the country’s “natural governing party” has been accepted by most Canadian political scientists, as attested to by such titles as *The Government Party: Organizing and Financing the Liberal Party of Canada, 1930-58* (R. Whitaker, University of Toronto Press, 1977) and *The Big Red Machine: How the Liberal Party Dominates Canadian Politics* (Stephen Clarkson, UBC Press, 2005). For a time, the Liberal party was also perceived as the only genuine “national” party in Canada. According to Carty, Cross and Young, “Despite the narrowness of the federalist victory in the [sic] 1995 referendum, or perhaps because of it, the Liberal Party had apparently re-emerged as the country’s natural governing party, a position it had occupied for much of the century.”

Similar to the present transition, when Conservative leader John Diefenbaker ascended to power in 1957, more than two decades of uninterrupted Liberal rule came to an end. At the time, many observers perceived the possibility of partisan-inspired changes to the senior public service. However, J.E. Hodgetts anticipated a different crisis in the higher bureaucracy: “A generation of Liberal politicians and a generation of presumably neutral senior permanent officials have worked hand in hand to create what is now advertised as the

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Rather than favouritism towards the Liberal *party*, Hodgetts perceived a bias on the part of the senior administration towards the Liberal's post-war policy agenda that had developed as a result of a close relationship between deputy ministers and political leadership. Noting the strength of the mandarins' loyalty to the Liberal program, he said: “Just as husbands and wives who live equally together for a generation are supposed ultimately to being to look alike, so too we may find a similar mental, if not physical, assimilation with respect to senior officials and their ministers.” The challenge facing the Diefenbaker government, then, was a public service whose loyalty to a new policy agenda was uncertain. However, John Porter highlights the ideological similarity of the Liberals and Progressive Conservatives at the time and notes that, “there was no effort on the part of the Conservative ministry to break up the bureaucracy, either by forcing retirements or by appointing outsiders known to be their political supporters.”

The threat of partisan-inspired changes loomed heavily again in 1984, when Progressive Conservative leader Brian Mulroney declared that when he became Prime Minister, senior officials would receive “a pink slip and a pair of running shoes.” However, Mulroney did not houseclean the senior civil service. Indeed, in Canada, new federal governments have seldom undertaken radical changes. As Dion and Bourgault observe, following each Conservative transition to power from 1935 to 1987, “changes in the upper public service were fewer than those promised [sic] during the electoral campaign.”

In 2006-07, Conservative leader Stephen Harper pledged to “clean-up Ottawa” in the wake of the Liberal “Sponsorship” scandal. When asked whether Canadians should be

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8 Quoted in Bourgault and Dion, 142.
9 Ibid., 140.
worried about a Conservative majority, Harper mentioned: “There were the courts and the Senate, as well as the public service, dominated by Liberal appointees” to keep him in check.”10 The Prime Minister-elect also noted during his victory speech in Calgary that “shuffling the deck was not enough.”11 Do Prime Minister Harper’s actions match his rhetoric? Did he change substantially the deputy minister cadre?

The Role of Deputy Ministers

Deputy ministers, the senior administrative officials in the bureaucratic hierarchy, wield considerable power and influence in the Government of Canada. They manage major departments and central agencies, advise ministers daily, and contribute to policy development at the highest levels. As A.W. Johnson put it: “the role of the deputy minister is to make it possible for the minister and cabinet to provide the best government of which they are capable – even better if either of them happens to be weak.”12 Career changes to deputy ministers are significant because departmental statutes stipulate that deputy minister appointments should be made by the Governor in Council, which, by constitutional convention, means that the Prime Minister has the exclusive prerogative of recommendation. It follows that the appointment of a deputy minister is for an indefinite period at the pleasure of the Prime Minister. Section 24.1 of the Interpretation Act stipulates that the power to appoint includes the power to dismiss. As Bourgault notes, “A simple, unexplained decision by the Prime Minister is enough to relieve a deputy minister of his duties.”13

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As the link between the administrative arm of a department and its political head, deputy ministers are the fulcrum of executive bureaucratic relations. According to the doctrine of ministerial responsibility, on which traditional Westminster government depends, the minister is the democratic link between the elected legislature and the permanent civil service. The strength of the convention depends on the ability of the deputy minister to inform his or her minister of the department's activities and to provide the minister with frank and impartial advice so that the minister may report to the legislature and be held accountable by its members. While this implies a necessary degree of independence from the government of the day, the senior civil service must also be responsive to the government's policy agenda.

The question of whether Prime Minister Harper has " politicized" the senior public service is timely. Analysis of the 2006-07 Conservative transition may provide insight into whether, as some attest, the senior public service has become too politically responsive. Clearer boundaries between politics and administration, some argue, are essential if the public service is to be an effective, non-partisan and professional element of democratic government. Drawing a clear distinction between politics and administration, however, is very complex, especially in the roles of deputy ministers who must balance political responsiveness and neutral competence; in other words, demonstrate "loyalty that argues back."^15

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The Conservative Transition: 2006-Present

Two general points stand out about political transitions: first, they test the resolve of a professional public service; second, the Prime Minister is the most influential actor during such periods. Donald J. Savoie has argued that “transition planning also strengthens the hand of court government, given that by definition it is designed to serve the prime minister.”

However, he conceptualizes political transitions as processes led by the Privy Council Office and that take place “during the government’s first few weeks in office.” This conception of transitions underestimates the sustained influence that the Prime Minister has in controlling the machinery of government through his authority to make discretionary appointments. A period of political transition is more instructively defined as two years following the election of a new government, which allows a government sufficient time to implement its changes.

The current political transition began on January 26, 2006. At the time of writing, the Harper government has been in office for less than two years; thus, all changes to the deputy minister cadre to date are included.

This analysis focuses on senior officials at the head of departments and central agencies. The term ‘deputy minister’ will be used to describe all officials who head a federal government department or central agency. Most hold the title ‘titular deputy minister’, but some are designated ‘clerk’ or ‘secretary’. Using Bourgault and Dion’s methodology, mobility of deputy ministers is measured by personnel changes that take the form of departures, appointments or transfers. A departure signifies that a deputy minister has left the federal public service either because of voluntary retirement, death, or dismissal.

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17 Ibid., 34.
18 The first change to the senior public service was announced by Prime Minister Harper on Feb. 06, 2006. At the time of writing, the last change to the senior public service was announced on June 29, 2007.
case of appointments, this study expands on the method of Bourgault and Dion, which inadequately captures qualitative variations within the category. Here we divide appointments into two groups. The first is a "parachute" appointment: the appointment of someone from outside the public service to the position of deputy minister. The second is an internal promotion: a senior public servant is promoted to the rank of deputy minister. Our final indicator of mobility, transfers, signifies that a deputy minister has been reassigned within the public service. Rates of mobility are the number of career moves during a period of transition (departures, appointments or transfers) expressed as a percentage of the total number of deputy ministers in office at the beginning of the transition, before any changes have been made. If a Prime Minister "purged" the deputy ranks we would see a large number of departures and a large number of parachute appointments. That is, in a case of overt politicization, we would expect the Prime Minister to force the departure of incumbent deputy ministers and bring in reliable allies from outside the public sector.

In 2006, the Harper Conservatives inherited 28 titular deputy ministers from outgoing Prime Minister Paul Martin. This group is now marginally reduced to 27 deputy ministers (see Appendix). That there has been no absolute increase in the number of deputy ministers tells us that, all else equal, the current Prime Minister has not expanded the deputy group with trusted aides to rival incumbent deputy ministers. Furthermore, as the findings in Table 1 make clear, a purge of the deputy minister group has not occurred. One finding in

\[19\] If one deputy minister is transferred twice in one year, it is counted as two transfers. Transfers to other senior positions outside the rank of deputy minister but within the Prime Minister's discretionary power of appointment are included.
TABLE 1 - Mobility of Deputy Ministers during Harper transition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of career change</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Departures</td>
<td>6 (21%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parachute Appointments</td>
<td>1 (3.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal Promotions</td>
<td>11 (39.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transfers</td>
<td>18 (64.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unchanged</td>
<td>6 (21.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Deputy Ministers in office at beginning of transition</strong></td>
<td><strong>28 (100%)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:** Prime Minister’s Office News Releases (www.pm.gc.ca) and, Library of Parliament

particular emphasises this point: a total of six deputy ministers have been spared from career changes of any form during the 2006-07 transition. Most notably, the Secretary to the Treasury Board appointed by Paul Martin in December 2004, Wayne Wouters, has been retained by Prime Minister Harper. Other Martin appointees that have been retained are the deputy ministers of Health, Justice, and National Defence; all of whom were appointed in 2004. Notably, two Chrétien appointees have also been retained by Harper: the deputy ministers of Canadian Heritage and Western Economic Diversification; appointed in 2002 and 1997, respectively. Representing almost a quarter of the deputy minister cadre that served Harper’s Liberal predecessor, this sizeable proportion of unchanged deputy ministers indicates a substantial degree of administrative continuity within the deputy minister cadre.

Further evidence that Harper has not politicized the deputy minister groups is given by the fact that rather than force the departure of a large number of incumbents, only six deputy ministers have left the public service since the Harper government took office. In addition, instead of hiring a significant number of Conservative supporters from outside the public service to become deputy ministers, there has been only one such “parachute” appointment. Also contradictory of a housecleaning is the fact that almost one quarter of incumbent deputy ministers have been spared any form of career change. As Table 1 demonstrates, the vast majority of deputy minister mobility during the Conservative
transition is explained by transfers within the senior ranks of the public service, and by internal promotions. In other words, there is no clear evidence of overt partisan politicization.

**Departures**

Significantly, five of the six departures during the current transition represent retirements from the public service.\(^{20}\) These retirements came after 20, 34, 29, 30, and 16 years of public service.\(^{21}\) Without further information to explain these retirements, no certain conclusions can be made about their rationale and motivation. It is nevertheless interesting to compare the rate of departure during the current transition, 21.4 per cent, with the rates observed by Bourgault and Dion. Of the twelve political transitions observed from 1867-1987, the average annual rate of departures during periods of transition was only 7 per cent. During the Mulroney transition from September 1984 to September 1986 – which recorded the highest levels of mobility in Canadian history at all three indicators of mobility – the annual rate of departures of deputy ministers was 12.5 per cent.

While the rate of departures under the current transition is quite high when compared with previous transitions, the average age of these retirees (58 years) is in line with trends observed by Bourgault in 2005: “Since 1947, no deputy minister has remained in office past the age of 70 because of the progression in the challenges and the availability of a more generous pension plan.”\(^{22}\) He also observes that the level of departures after the age of 60 has been decreasing constantly since 1917; and since 1967, departures before the age of

\(^{20}\) The sixth departure represents the death of Jack Stagg, Deputy Minister of Veterans Affairs, in August 2006.

\(^{21}\) The most recent retirement of Larry Murray, Deputy Minister of Fisheries and Oceans comes after only 16 in the federal public service. However, Mr. Murray, age 60 at the time of his retirement, held various senior positions with the Canadian Forces and Royal Canadian Navy before entering the senior public service in 1989.

50 have become rare. Of those deputy ministers who left the public service between 1987 and 1997, 68 per cent were between the ages of 50-59 and from 1997 to 2003, this figure rose to 80 per cent. Thus, given their length of tenure and age upon leaving office, the departures observed during the Harper transition are in line with recent trends. More importantly, there is no evidence to suggest that Harper has forced the departure of a significant number of incumbent deputy ministers.

**Appointments**

As previously mentioned, if overt politicization has occurred, we would expect the Prime Minister to recruit a significant number of obvious partisan supporters from outside the public service to the position of deputy minister. In other words, we would expect to observe a high level of “parachute” appointments. As Table 2 indicates, however, Harper has made only one such appointment.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deputy minister appointed from (i.e. last position held):</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Parachute Appointment</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outside the Public Service</td>
<td>1 (8.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Internal Promotions</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Privy Council Office</td>
<td>2 (16.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crown Agency</td>
<td>2 (16.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within department</td>
<td>2 (16.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other department</td>
<td>5 (41.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>12 (100%)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The lone external appointee is Richard Dicerni, former Partner at Mercer Delta Canada since December 2005, and as of May 1, 2006, Deputy Minister of Industry. However, Mr. Dicerni brings notable public service experience to this position: from 1981-1991 he held two assistant deputy minister positions in the federal government. He also served as deputy

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23 Ibid., 13.
minister in both the Rae and Harris administrations in Ontario from 1992-1996. Notably, from 1997-2005 he was Senior Vice-President, Corporate and Environmental Affairs, Executive Vice-President and Corporate Secretary, then acting President and CEO, Ontario Power Generation Inc. Biographical information does not indicate previous involvement with either the federal or provincial Conservative parties. In sum, the evidence suggests that this “parachute” appointment was indeed based on Mr. Dicerni’s experience as a senior manager in the private sector as well as his public service experience in the Ontario and federal governments.

If an appointee has not been “imported”, then presumably, the appointment is a promotion from within the ranks of the public service. Strikingly, all but one of the appointments during the Conservative transition take the form of an internal promotion. As Table 2 shows, 11 out of 12, or 92 per cent of appointments, have promoted a career public servant to the rank of deputy minister. Of these internal promotions, there were two instances in which an official left a senior position in the Privy Council Office to become a deputy minister. Yaprak Baltacioglu, Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet (Operations), PCO was promoted to Deputy Minister of Agriculture and Agri-Food, effective March 5, 2007 and Michael Wernick, Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet (Plans and Consultations), PCO, became Deputy Minister of Indian and Northern Development, effective May 23, 2006. Notably, Ms. Baltacioglu and Mr. Wernick were promoted to the rank of deputy minister after federal public service careers of 17 and 25 years, respectively. Table 2 shows that another 17 per cent of appointments promoted Crown Agency Presidents to the rank of deputy minister: François Guimont, President Canadian Food Inspection Agency, was promoted to Deputy Minister of Public Works and Government Services effective June 4, 2007; and Robert Wright, President of Export Development Canada, became Deputy
Minister of Finance effective June 12, 2006. At the time of appointment, Mr. Guimont had 25 years of experience within the federal public service, while Mr. Wright's career as a federal public servant had reached an impressive 32 years. Also notable is William V. Baker's promotion from Deputy Commissioner of Revenue to Commissioner of Revenue, after 20 years of federal public service.

Over half of all internal promotions (6 of 11) during the Conservative transition advance an associate deputy minister to the rank of deputy minister. In only one case was this promotion internal to the department in which the official was associate deputy: Marie-Lucie Morin was promoted from Associate Deputy Minister Foreign Affairs to Deputy Minister of International Trade following 25 years in the federal public service. In the remaining five instances, an associate deputy was promoted to become deputy minister of a different department. More importantly, however, at the time of their appointment to the position of deputy minister, these five associate deputies had spent an average of 21 years as public servants within the government of Canada.

As the lone external appointment makes clear, Prime Minister Harper has rejected the option of bringing in large numbers of new appointments. Rather, he has recruited liberally from within the established public service. All appointments but one have taken the form of promotions within the ranks of the senior public service. Significantly, these 11 internal appointees have, on average, 20 years of experience as career public servants in the Government of Canada. The pattern of established careers observed in Prime Minister

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24 Suzanne Tining, former Deputy Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, now Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs – 31 years; Guy McKenzie, former Associate Deputy Minister of Transport, Infrastructure and Communities – 25 years; Louis Lévesque, former Associate Deputy Minister of Finance and now Deputy Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs – 17 years; Hélène Gosselin, former Associate Deputy Minister of Health, now Deputy Head of Service Canada – 25 years; Catherine (Cassie) Doyle, former Associate Deputy Minister of the Environment, now Deputy Minister of Natural Resources – 4 years. (Notably, Ms. Doyle has previous public service experience with the City of Ottawa, from 1982-1992 and with the Government of British Columbia, from 1992-2001).
Harper's appointment of deputy ministers, and the fact that he has rejected the option of appointing a significant number of outsiders, suggests that he has favoured the option of retaining a neutral, career public service rather than resort to partisan politicization.

Transfers

Deputy minister “transfers” are an ambiguous category as they can have many different rationales. They may be unacknowledged demotions or promotions in disguise. Or, they may involve the reassignment of a deputy minister as a senior or special advisor in a central agency, wherein he or she is given a more influential role in policy making. Transfers can also include instances in which a deputy minister is given the responsibility of an additional portfolio. In any case, the assumption of a transfer is that a deputy minister is reassigned but remains part of the public service. Before the 1960s, deputy ministers were seldom transferred. Since then, as Bourgault and Dion note, deputy ministers are frequently transferred, giving rise to a “veritable game of musical chairs.”

The current transition is no exception; almost two-thirds (64 per cent) of the mobility observed is transfers within the senior public service. This is significantly higher than the annual rate of transfers observed by Bourgault and Dion during the Mulroney transition (50 per cent) which, at the time, produced the highest levels of deputy minister mobility since Confederation.

Appointment to a Crown Agency or a diplomatic posting is a coveted assignment but often interpreted as a transfer wherein the deputy minister is “exiled” out of the deputy ministerial cadre. In such instances, a new leader creates a substantial degree of distance between untrustworthy deputy ministers and the core of government. Notably, there has been only one transfer to a Crown Agency: Ian Bennett, former Deputy Minister of Finance, became Master of the Mint, effective June 12, 2006. A transfer to the Privy Council Office

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25 Bourgault and Dion, 136.
26 Ibid., 137.
or Treasury Board Secretariat, on the other hand, offers senior officials continued influence in government as strategic advisors within central authority structures. As Table 3 indicates, over one third of the transfers during the 2006-07 transition have sent incumbent deputy ministers to senior positions in these central agencies (see Appendix I). Significantly, fully 50 per cent of the transfers were of the “ordinary” type; that is, a deputy minister has been reassigned but remains at the head of a department. In other words, in almost 90 per cent of transfers, a deputy minister has remained within the highest levels of government.

**TABLE 3 – Types of Transfers**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deputy minister transferred to:</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crown Agency</td>
<td>1 (5.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diplomatic Posting</td>
<td>1 (5.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treasury Board</td>
<td>1 (5.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Privy Council Office</td>
<td>6 (33.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other deputy minister appointment</td>
<td>9 (50%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>18 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The one transfer to a diplomatic posting deserves special mention. Alex Himelfarb, incumbent Clerk of the Privy Council and Secretary to the Cabinet, was reassigned as Canada’s new Ambassador to Italy. As the most senior deputy minister and Head of the Public Service, the Clerk recommends the appointment of deputy ministers to the Prime Minister and Cabinet and as such, is the principal link between the Prime Minister and the Public Service. It is the prerogative of the Prime Minister to choose a new Clerk of the Privy Council and Secretary to Cabinet. The current Prime Minister chose to transfer Kevin Lynch, Executive Director for the Canadian, Irish and Caribbean constituency at the

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27 This includes three instances in which a current deputy minister was given additional portfolio responsibilities: Alan Nymark, Deputy Minister of Human Resources and Skills Development, becomes Deputy Minister of Human Resources and Social Development, effective February 7, 2006; Munir Sheikh, Deputy Minister Labour and Housing and Associate Deputy Minister of Human Resources and Skills Development, becomes Deputy Minister Labour and Associate Deputy Minister of Human Resources and Social Development, effective February 7, 2006; Louis Ranger, Deputy Minister of Transport takes on additional responsibilities of Deputy Head of Infrastructure and Communities; effective September 5, 2006.
International Monetary Fund (IMF) to the position of Clerk and Secretary to Cabinet. Lynch began his career at the Bank of Canada in 1976 and has held a number of senior positions in the departments of Finance and Industry, including Deputy Minister of Industry from 1995-2000 and Deputy Minister of Finance from 2000-2004.

That Harper chose an experienced senior public servant rather than an outsider to become the most influential bureaucrat in the government of Canada confirms a Conservative commitment to a neutral public service. The same can also be said regarding the changes which took place to the more “powerful” departments of the Government of Canada. Although the departments of Finance, Foreign Affairs, and Environment all have new deputy ministers at the helm, each has significant experience within the federal government: Robert Wright, former President of Export Development Canada was named Deputy Minister of Finance following the transfer of his predecessor to Master of the Mint; Leonard Edwards, former Deputy Minister of Agriculture and Agri Foods was transferred to the position of Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs following the retirement of Peter Harder; and Michael Horgan, former Deputy Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development was transferred to Deputy Minister of the Environment following the transfer of his predecessor to the Privy Council Office as a Special Advisor.

In sum, we can extract four significant findings from the above analysis of the 2006-07 Conservative transition. The first is that, contrary to a case of overt politicization, there has been no purge of the deputy minister group. That is, there have been no known forced departures of a significant number of deputy ministers. Secondly, rather than finding evidence of a large number of “ politicized” appointees from outside the public sector, we have observed only one external appointment, biographical evidence for which suggests that this external appointment was not motivated by partisanship. Contrary to what would be
expected of overt politicization, there have been a significant number of internal promotions. Senior career public servants have been promoted to the position of deputy minister at a rate of 40 per cent during the current transition. The third finding of significance is the high rate of transfers, almost 90 per cent of which have transferred incumbent deputies to other deputy minister positions or to advisor positions in central agencies. These types of transfers suggest a high degree of lateral career mobility within the highest levels of government. Furthermore, it also confirms that Harper has not “politicized” the deputy minister group by demoting incumbents. Finally, almost one quarter of incumbent deputy ministers were unaffected by career changes during the 2006-07 transition. At the outset of this transition, these deputies had, on average, 4.8 years of experience in their current position and 24.8 years in the federal public service. These six deputies, then, represent a sizeable degree of administrative continuity within the present deputy minister group, evidence to bolster the conclusion that partisan politicization has not played a factor in Prime Minister Harper’s selection of deputy ministers.

The evidence suggests that Harper has rejected partisan politicization of the public service in favour of retaining an experienced senior public service. What is unclear, however, is what the increased lateral career mobility represents. On this score, it is important to emphasize that transitions are not the motivating force behind increased mobility of deputy ministers. Indeed, while it would seem that political transitions since 1979 have accentuated the trend towards a more mobile senior civil service, the trend was initiated during the long period of Liberal dominance from 1963-1979; during a period of relative political

28 The average is slightly skewed by the Deputy Minister of Western Economic Diversification, Oryssia Lennie, who has held this position since November 1997. When this outlier is omitted from the calculation, the average is 2.4.

29 Oryssia Lennie is an outlier in this instance as well, having joined the federal public service only in 1997, following 26 years with the public service of Alberta, during which period she was Deputy Minister of Federal and Intergovernmental Affairs from 1990-1997; removed from the calculation the average number of years of federal experience of these unchanged deputies is 28.
continuity. To provide a possible explanation for the increased lateral mobility of the senior public service, we now turn to what is increasingly recognized as the “corporate” character of governance at the federal level in Canada.

**Structuring and Coherence of the Government Corporation**

Lateral mobility of deputy ministers is now a recognized feature of the public management structure at the federal level in Canada. The government “corporation” asserts that the deputy minister’s role is to serve the government as a whole, in its collective responsibility to parliament. The deputy minister is now part of a government-focused team. This characteristic is evident when one observes the changing career profile of deputy ministers, and the government’s increasingly centralized approach to the management of the deputy ministers as a group.

**Deputy Minister Career Patterns**

Two significant aspects of the deputy minister career profile stand out: first, the term as a deputy and length of time heading a given department and; second, careers before reaching the rank of deputy minister. The length of deputy minister careers has been declining. In 1867, the deputy minister career lasted an average of 13.3 years; by 1997 this had been reduced to 6.76 years and in 2003 fell to 3.3 years. The proportion of those who receive only one assignment has decreased (it was the case of 91 per cent of those appointed before July 1, 1917 but fell to 48 per cent for those who became deputy minister after 1967) while the propensity to give multiple assignments has correspondingly increased. In other words, the career within the deputy minister group is short and generally consists of multiple

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30 Bourgault and Dion, 143.
31 See Bourgault, “The Deputy Minister’s Role in the Government of Canada.”
32 This calculation ends even if the person remains employed by the federal government as a diplomat, special advisor or head of a Crown corporation.
34 Ibid., 12.
assignments as a departmental deputy minister, meaning less time spent in one departmental assignment. In his 1993 study of strategic management in the public service, Frank Swift found that experience in a central agency, most notably in the Privy Council Office, had become a "virtual prerequisite for deputy-level appointment." He concludes: "What emerges is a pattern of executive succession that, while still evolving, continues to give emphasis to central agency backgrounds and to policy skills, while giving short shrift to experience in managing programs and services to the public."

Other observed trends in deputy minister careers include the following:

- Deputy ministers come almost exclusively from the federal public service;
- Three quarters of deputy ministers have held assistant or associate deputy minister departments or federal agencies; and
- Nearly all have occupied a senior executive position in the Privy Council Office during ten years preceding their appointment.

This latter trend has continued during the current political transition: two thirds of all appointees have had previous experience in the PCO. Of this group, the average number of appointments to the PCO is two and the average number of total years spent in PCO is three. Bourgault confirms that the length of a senior appointment to the Privy Council Office averages between two and five years, demonstrating what he calls the deputy minister’s "corporate training": "Since these agencies form the nerve centre and strategic centre of executive power, deputy ministers must know about and understand their operation so that they can deal with them. Furthermore, they play a key role in implementing the government’s agenda and management priorities."

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36 Ibid.
37 Bourgault, "The Deputy Minister’s Role in the Government of Canada," 265.
38 Ibid., 267.
identified as individuals who know and understand the operations of central agencies and who can interact functionally with them. As Bourgault explains, the strong trend towards experience in PCO "reflects that the 'rising stars', identified early in their career, become the government's corporate resources. These incumbents understand that they do not owe their career to an intradepartmental network, as might have been the case in the 1970s." On the whole, when these trends are combined with the short tenure in a department, we get a clear picture of the lateral mobility of the deputy minister, both interdepartmentally and between the department and centre of government.

Managing the Deputy Minister Community

The evolution of the machinery of government in Canada was fundamentally altered by Pierre Trudeau's expansion of a central apparatus for coordinating departmental actions. As Savoie notes, "he strengthened the centre of government by enlarging his own office, expanding the Privy Council Office and establishing new Cabinet committees, effectively giving them the authority to make decisions." Following the initial establishment of coordinating central bodies, deputy ministers became increasingly involved in policy-making beyond their departments. As Campbell and Szablowski conclude in their 1979 study of central agencies: "no department in Ottawa today enjoys a monopoly of a policy domain, no matter what may be the terms of its statutory authority; and officials agree that the exercise of bureaucratic power takes place in interdepartmental and cabinet committees, largely because issues usually overlap and affect the interests of many departments." Similarly, the authors remarked that deputy ministers were taking on a greater role in the proliferating

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39 Bourgault, Profile of Deputy Ministers in the Government of Canada, 12.
40 Donald J. Savoie, Governing from the Centre: The Concentration of Political Power in Canada, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), 85.
cabinet committee system. Ministers who simply didn’t have the time to attend cabinet committee meetings began to delegate their attendance to senior officials. Career civil servants thus became “Central agents [with] developed ‘ministerial’ abilities – that is, they can perform on behalf of ministers with ease and effectiveness.”

In 2007, corporate governance structures differ from earlier periods in that they now incorporate deputy ministers into horizontal management practices. The machinery of government now has deputy ministers working within a corporate framework wherein overall government priorities shape department roles.

Horizontal management promotes mutual information, coordination of initiatives and integration of departmental programs. The tools of horizontal management are threefold: first, files on policy or program development or management of direct concern to the department facilitated by thematic focus groups; second, corporate files where the deputy ministers give collective opinions as senior advisers to the government; and finally, self-management of the community of deputy ministers.

Bourgault notes that horizontal management of all types now takes close to 40 per cent of the working time of deputy ministers.

Every Friday (or the day following Cabinet meetings), deputy ministers assemble for a meeting which includes a summary of Cabinet’s deliberations, a presentation of the Clerk’s vision, and a discussion of “certain political aims.” There are also a number of other formal and ad hoc committees (the later with mandates within the PCO) that bring together deputy ministers. Additionally, the Committee of Senior Officials (COSO) is mandated within PCO to identify potential candidates for the positions of associate deputy minister and deputy minister.

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42 Ibid., 156.
43 Bourgault, “The Deputy Minister’s Role in the Government of Canada,” 273
44 Ibid., 277.
The Performance Management Program (PMP) administered by the Senior Personnel and Special Projects Secretariat of the Privy Council Office is another horizontal management tool that forcefully conveys corporate expectations to deputy ministers. The program was adopted as a compensation plan for senior officials in February 1998, in response to the recommendations contained in the First Report of the Advisory Committee on Senior Level Retention and Compensation. Following private sector models, performance pay has two elements: at-risk pay which must be re-earned each year, and a bonus for performance that surpasses expectations. With the successful achievement of on-going commitments, deputy ministers normally progress at 5 per cent per year through the salary range to reach the job rate maximum in approximately three years. PMP represents an agreement between the Clerk of the Privy Council and each of the deputy ministers to ensure that the individual objectives of the latter are aligned with the government’s policy agenda. These are common commitments of deputy ministers not the priorities of a department. PMP sets corporate standards for results-based assessments of the deputy minister group in three categories. First, are the key and ongoing commitments of deputy ministers, as described in the Corporate Priorities issued annually by the Clerk of the Privy Council to reflect the government’s policy priorities. The second category of performance expectations are the horizontal elements of a deputy’s core organizational and management accountabilities. Finally, the agreement sets out expectations for personal learning objectives (demonstration of the leadership competencies required to successfully carry out the responsibilities of the position).

46 The Performance Management Program applies to deputy ministers as well as associate deputy ministers, and individuals paid in the GX salary range (Governor in Council appointees).
As a recent report from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development notes, performance-related pay systems assume that pay can be administered in a way which capitalises on its expected incentive value for potential recipients. As an incentive system, performance pay is an alternative to the traditional approach of rigorously controlled promotions. The report also notes that one of the key reasons why performance pay is now used in civil services is that it facilitates wider organizational changes. That is, performance management provides a stimulus to change workplace culture. At the federal level in Canada, insofar as corporate priorities are reflected in the pay structure, the Performance Management Program is first and foremost a management tool to integrate departmental deputy ministers into the new corporate governance framework. Deputy ministers now have a clear financial incentive to manage the government’s broad policy agenda.

Corporate expectations are conveyed to deputy ministers primarily by the Clerk and in this respect, the Clerk’s supremacy over the deputy minister group is fundamental to the government corporation. In his May 2006 address to assembled senior officials, the new Clerk of the Privy Council and Secretary to Cabinet, Kevin Lynch, made clear his commitment to strengthening the government corporation by reinforcing mobility between central agencies and line departments. Among his proposals for public service renewal, Lynch announced that PCO secretariats would be streamlined. Special advisors previously in PCO secretariats have been reassigned to departments with clear mandates in those areas,

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49 Ibid., 4.
confirming that expertise in a central coordinating body, rather than experience within a
department, has become essential for nomination to a senior departmental post.

Increasingly, associate deputy ministers are being integrated into the government’s
corporate framework as a part of the bureaucratic elite. Associate deputy ministers are
distinguished from assistant deputy ministers by the fact that they, like deputy ministers, are
Governor-in-Council appointments. Reflecting a desire to encourage teamwork and
collective action at the deputy minister and associate deputy minister level, PCO has
revamped the deputy ministerial committees with the aim of “an integrated and coordinated
approach to both the management agenda and the policy agenda.”51 Under the reforms
announced by Lynch, associate deputies will now act as vice-chairs on all deputy ministerial
committees. Interestingly, Bourgault and Dion noted in their 1988 study that more associate
deputy ministers than before receive discretionary appointments. Preliminary analysis
suggests that this phenomenon is also pronounced during the Harper transition.

The government corporation requires a centralized, coherent approach to the
management of deputy ministers. Corporate governance is a new prism through which to
understand executive bureaucratic relations in Canada, one which deviates from traditional
vertical models of governance towards a more horizontal approach. But what of its
significance for the 2006-07 Conservative transition? Rather than provide an exhaustive
account of the origins and development of corporate governance, the foregoing is meant to
provide a flavour of its key elements in the context of our present analysis of the 2006-07
transition and its high level of lateral mobility of deputy ministers. Indeed, this essay is not
the first to deal with the issue of the increasingly corporate structure of governance at the
federal level in Canada. It is, however, the first to treat the issue of corporate governance in

51 PCO, “Making Public Service Renewal Real.”
the context of political transitions. Corporate governance has been shown to be a self-regulating structure which keeps the senior public service responsive and in line with the policy priorities of the government of the day. To this extent, corporate governance facilitates the process of transition by providing incoming governments with a responsive team of senior civil servants that is able to identify policy goals and mobilize support for them; that is, they understand how to navigate within the corporate structure. Within this structure, deputy ministers are relied upon neither for their experience within a given department nor their technical expertise in a given policy domain, but rather for their experience at the centre of government, overall knowledge of government and responsiveness to government priorities. For this reason, transferring deputy ministers within the highest levels of government becomes a tool that new Prime Ministers can use to ensure the successful implementation of their government's policy agenda.

**Conclusion**

Political transitions illuminate a basic dilemma in democratic governance: the permanent bureaucracy must be responsive to its current political masters, yet it must maintain the necessary professionalism to be able to fulfill its duties efficiently and effectively. The established critique against an independent and therefore, politically neutral, civil service is that its permanent character can lead to a rigid bureaucratic power that, in the extreme, can block democratic leadership. In cases where newly elected governments have a philosophy that is markedly different from their predecessors, a housecleaning of the higher bureaucracy is more likely. Such a loss of continuity of the administrative machinery is characteristic of the American system of executive branch leadership which, as Pfiffner notes, "was designed to maximize responsiveness to the electorate by ensuring that many top positions
throughout the government are filled by supporters of the President". This essay has determined whether there is evidence of such overt politicization during the 2006-07 transition in the Government of Canada.

The transition of the Stephen Harper Conservatives yields four major conclusions; all of which indicate that the Prime Minister has avoided overt partisan politicization of the deputy minister cadre. First, no evidence is found of a purge of incumbent deputy ministers; Harper has not forced their departure in large numbers, nor has he appointed a significant number of obvious partisans from outside the public service. In fact, he has made only one external appointment. Quite the opposite of overt politicization, the second conclusion is that an overwhelming number of experienced senior public servants have been promoted to the rank of deputy minister. Third, a sizeable number of deputy ministers who were appointed by Liberal Prime Ministers Chrétien and Martin have not been changed by Harper, indicating a substantial element of administrative continuity and a measure of bureaucratic independence. These findings provide strong evidence to suggest that Harper has favoured retaining a permanent, non-partisan senior public service rather than resort to overt politicization. However, although there is significant continuity of the deputy minister cadre, there is also noticeable change. The final conclusion regarding the 2006-07 transition is the considerable lateral career mobility of deputy ministers. The implication cannot be overstated: lateral mobility has generated sufficient responsiveness to a new political agenda without partisan politicization. Indeed, that Harper has not housecleaned the ranks of deputy ministers demonstrates both the professional character of the senior public service and the Prime Minister’s confidence in its ability to be responsive to his policy agenda. In short, the defining feature of the 2006-2007 transition is its administrative and political efficiency.

Lateral career mobility of deputy ministers within the highest levels of government is fundamental to corporate governance and to the 2006-07 transition. Indeed, it is the feature which has been shown to distinguish the Harper transition from all others observed by Bourgault and Dion. Lateral mobility guards against policy bias in that it ensures public servants shed their previous policy commitments by providing them with an assignment in a different department or central agency. Under the corporate governance model, the executive capacity of deputy ministers provides the political leadership with alternatives in the implementation of its policy agenda. As a device for ensuring political responsiveness, lateral mobility has only recently come of age. Today, Prime Ministers have a new option because deputy ministers’ skills are, unlike earlier periods, easily transferable. Deputy ministers are aware that they support overall government priorities and are accustomed to frequent changes. In sum, as a mechanism of corporate governance, lateral mobility is a tool to make a potentially rigidly Weberian, unsteerable bureaucratic system responsive to the political priorities of a new government without compromising its non-partisan, professional character.

Those concerned with the increased responsiveness of deputy ministers to central priorities have made their case known: such responsiveness discourages a deputy’s connections within the department. That is, a deputy minister is encouraged to “manage up” rather than “manage down.”53 Indeed, under the corporate governance model, the deputy minister has a greater sense of loyalty to the corporate priorities of the government than to a specific department. The relationship between a deputy and his or her minister has been weakened if not eroded by the deputy’s commitments to the government corporation.

Close personal relationships seldom exist between deputies and ministers; the attachment is now between the deputy and the centre of government.

Absent any evidence of overt politicization, to the extent that the current transition demonstrates the intensification of a corporate model of governance according to which responsive competence is ensured by centralized decision-making, it can be argued that the consequences of the centralization of power in Canadian politics are not as dysfunctional for public administration as some observers have contended. In *Governing from the Centre*, Savoie argues that “it is ironic perhaps that as the hand of the centre has been strengthened, its ability to manage horizontal issues has been weakened.”

To the contrary, this essay provides evidence to suggest that deputy ministers in fact facilitate horizontal management in the Government of Canada. Ultimately, corporate governance ensures that the policy agenda of the government of the day is articulated to deputy ministers and that this group provides the appropriate level of support for its implementation. Proposals to increase the “independence” of the public service are misguided, in that they presume the increased responsiveness of the deputy minister group represents profound politicization.

As a major political science question, politicization needs to be reconsidered in light of the findings of the 2006-07 Conservative transition. These findings imply a distinction between overt partisanship in the selection of deputy ministers and increased policy responsiveness as a result of corporate governance. Partisan politicization is responsiveness to short term political ends (i.e. re-election, keeping ministers out of trouble) while corporate governance is responsiveness to complex policy programs that require high degrees of coherence and lateral coordination. Distinguishing between partisanship and policy responsiveness is necessary because it highlights the potential benefits of a more politically

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54 Savoie, *Governing from the Centre*, 15.
responsive role for senior public servants. Despite Prime Minister Harper's prerogative, he has not made partisanship a factor in the selection of deputy ministers. Rather, he has appointed politically neutral, experienced federal public servants to contribute to policy development at the highest levels in the Government of Canada. In short, the policy responsiveness of deputy ministers has not undermined their non-partisan, professional character.

A more accurate understanding of politicization must begin with reconsidering our approach to the study of deputy ministers and how we categorize them within the larger structures of executive bureaucratic relations in Canada. As the 2006-07 transition confirms, deputy ministers are a unique bureaucratic elite in the Government of Canada. Indeed, deputy ministers are the bureaucratic elite par excellence. Some scholars continue to refer to deputy ministers as part of the public service writ large, leading them to conclude that the legitimacy of the public service as a professional institution has been undermined by the increasing influence deputy ministers wield in the policy process. As Savoie has argued, "Individual public servants have become highly valued at the expense of the public service as an institution." However, this ignores the unique role and function of deputy minister within the corporate governance structure; one that is not expected of civil servants who fall under the independent staffing authority of the Public Service Commission of Canada. As the current transition has shown, deputy ministers make their way to this position following a lengthy career in the Public Service of Canada but effectively leave this institution when they have been identified by political leadership to possess competencies that are necessary for the implementation of the government's policy agenda. So long as coordination and coherence are valued aspects of contemporary governance, the responsibilities of deputy

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ministers in the policy process will continue to challenge traditional boundaries of politics and administration. In short, when it comes to deputy ministers, rather than construct rigid boundaries around politics and administration, we ought to think in terms of a continuum where policy and administration are different aspects of the same process.
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APPENDIX

Deputy Ministers in Office (by department or central agency)
as of 26 January, 2006 and career changes to these positions (departures, transfers, appointments) as of July 30, 2007

1. Agriculture and Agrifood
   *Transfer*: Leonard Edwards to Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs (Effective March 5, 2007)
   *Appointment*: Yaprak Baltacioglu, Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet (Operations), PCO (Effective March 5, 2007)

2. Canadian Heritage
   *No Change*: Judith A. LaRocque (appointed Deputy Minister April 2002)

3. Citizenship and Immigration
   *Transfer*: Janice Charette to DM Human Resources and Social Development (Effective July 1, 2006)

4. Economic Development Agency of Canada for the Regions of Quebec
   *Transfer*: Michelle d’Auray to Deputy Minister of Fisheries and Oceans (Effective August 6, 2007)
   *Appointment*: Guy McKenzie, Associate Deputy Minister Transport, Infrastructure and Communities (Effective August 6, 2006)

5. Environment
   *Transfer*: Samy Watson to Special Advisor to the POC (Effective May 23, 2006)

6. Finance
   *Transfer*: Ian Bennett to Master of Mint (Effective June 12, 2006)
   *Appointment*: Robert Wright, President, Export Development Canada (Effective June 12, 2006)

7. Fisheries and Oceans
   *Departure*: Larry Murray, Retirement (Effective August 6, 2007)

8. Foreign Affairs
   *Departure*: Peter Harder, Retirement (Effective March 5, 2007).

9. Health
   *No Change*: Morris Rosenberg (appointed Deputy Minister in December 2004).

10. Human Resources and Skills Development (becomes Human Resources and Social Development on February 7, 2007)
    *Transfer*: Alan Nymark, Deputy Minister of Human Resources and Skills Development, becomes Deputy Minister of Human Resources and Social Development (Effective February 7, 2007)
    *Departure*: Alan Nymark, Retirement (Effective July 1, 2006)

11. Indian Affairs and Northern Development
Transfer: Michael Horgan to Deputy Minister of the Environment (Effective May 23, 2006)
Appointment: Michael Wemick, Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet (Plans and Consultations), PCO (Effective May 23, 2006)

12. Industry
Transfer: Suzanne Hurtubise, to Deputy Minister of Public Safety (Effective May 1, 2006)
Appointment: Richard Dicerni, Partner at Mercer Delta Canada (Effective May 1, 2006)

13. Intergovernmental Affairs
Departure: Marie Fortier, Retirement (Effective May 1, 2006)
Appointment: Louis Lévesque, Associate Deputy Minister of Finance (Effective May 1, 2006)

14. International Trade
Transfer: Robert Fonberg, to Senior Associate Secretary of the Treasury Board (Effective April 13, 2006)
Appointment: Marie-Lucie Morin, Associate Deputy Minister Foreign Affairs (Effective April 13, 2006)

15. Justice
No Change: John H. Simms (appointed Deputy Minister December 2004).

16. Labour
Transfer: Munir Sheikh, Deputy Minister Labour and Housing and Associate Deputy Minister of Human Resources and Skills Development, becomes Deputy Minister Labour and Associate Deputy Minister of Human Resources and Social Development (Effective February 7, 2006)

17. National Defence
No Change: Ward Elcock (appointed Deputy Minister August 2004)

18. Canadian Revenue Agency
Departure: Michael Dorais, Commissioner of Revenue Retirement (Effective April 2, 2007)
Appointment: William V. Baker, Deputy Commissioner of Revenue (Effective April 2, 2007)

19. Natural Resources
Transfer: Richard Fadden, to Deputy Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (Effective July 1, 2006)
Appointment: Catherine (Cassie) Doyle, Associate Deputy Minister of the Environment (Effective July 10, 2006)

20. Privy Council Office
Transfer: Alex Himelfarb, Clerk of the Privy Council and Secretary to the Cabinet becomes Ambassador of Canada to the Italian Republic with concurrent accreditation to the Republic of Albania and the Republic of San Marino, and as High Commissioner for Canada to the Republic of Malta. (Announced March 6, 2007)
Transfer: Kevin Lynch, Executive Director for the Canadian, Irish and Caribbean constituency at the International Monetary Fund to Clerk of the Privy Council and Secretary to the Cabinet. (Effective March 6, 2006)

21. Public Works and Government Services
Transfer: David Marshall to Senior Advisor to the Privy Council Office. (Effective June 4, 2007)
**Appointment:** François Guimont, President, Canadian Food Inspection Agency. (Effective June 4, 2007)

22. Public Safety
*Transfer:* Margaret Bloodworth to Associate Secretary to the Cabinet. (Effective May 1, 2006)

23. Social Development
*Transfer:* Nicole Jauvin to Associate Cle of the Pricy Council for Senior Personnel. (Effective February 7, 2006)

24. Service Canada
*Transfer:* Maryantonett Flumian to Senior Advisor to the Privy Council Office. (Effective September 5, 2006)
*Appointment:* Hélène Gosselin, Associate Deputy Minister of Health. (Effective September 5, 2007)
*(Note title changed from Deputy Minister to Deputy Head, effective February 7, 2006. Deputy Head reports to Minister for Human Resources and Social Development)*

25. Transport (Became known as Department of Transport, Infrastructure and Communities, effective February 7, 2006)
*Transfer:* Louis Ranger, Deputy Minister of Transport takes on additional responsibilities of Deputy Head of Infrastructure and Communities. (Effective September 5, 2006).

26. Treasury Board Secretariat
*No Change:* Wayne Wouters (appointed Deputy Minister December 2004)

27. Veterans Affairs
*Departure:* Jack Stagg (Death, August 2006)
*Appointment:* Suzanne Tining, Associate Deputy Minister, Indian and Northern Affairs Canada and Executive Director and Deputy Head, Indian Residential Schools Resolution Canada (Effective January 22, 2007)

28. Western Economic Diversification
*No Change:* Oryssia Lennie (appointed November 1997)