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The implementation of public policy in developing countries : a case study of housing in Nigeria's new… Morah, Erasmus Uchenna 1990

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T H E I M P L E M E N T A T I O N OF PUBLIC POLICY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: A C A S E STUDY OF HOUSING IN NIGERIA'S N E W C A P I T A L CITY A T A B U J A by ERASMUS UCHENNA MORAH B.A., General Arts and Science, University of Alberta, 1984 Special Certificate, Political Science, University of Alberta, 1984 M.A., Public Policy and Public Administration, Concordia University, 1986 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY  in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES SCHOOL OF COMMUNITY A N D REGIONAL PLANNING  We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard  THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA May 1990 ® Erasmus Uchenna Morah, 1990  In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the degree at the  study. I further agree that permission for extensive  copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may or  by  his or  her  representatives.  be  granted by  It is understood  publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not  be  permission.  Department of t&MW*HlTV  g H&>loNAu  The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada  Date  DE-6  (2/88)  3tJ/v£  advanced  University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it  freely available for reference and department  requirements for an  Zl  ,  PLfirttiltiG-  the that  head of  my  copying  or  allowed without my  written  ABSTRACT  This dissertation  is concerned  with the  implementation  process for housing  in  Nigeria's new capital at Abuja. It explores the inability of the Nigerian government to provide affordable housing for all income groups in the new capital as was originally planned.  Based  on nominal income, no resident in the city can afford to pay market rents for the housing provided, and less than 15 per cent of wage earners in the civil service (not t o mention irregular wage earners in the informal sector) can afford the least expensive houses provided if they were unsubsidized. The  purpose  of  this study  is both  to  elucidate  factors  contributing  to  policy  performances and the imperfect correspondence between policy goals and outcomes in developing countries, and to raise basic policy issues pertaining t o housing provision in the new capital.  The main hypothesis tested is that of Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) who  maintain that the outcome of public policy is ultimately determined by the disposition of implementing officials. While recognizing that the gap in the provision of housing in the new capital can be related t o a host of factors including financial constraints in the face of apparently unlimited demand, the argument is developed that the disjunction is due primarily to the disposition of policy officials in Abuja, which has been t o build a high-class, westerntype administrative capital.  Premised on this belief, the dissertation then argues that policy  officials perceive medium- and high-cost housing to be more germane t o the image of the new capital than low-cost dwellings affordable by the low-income population.  Consequently,  tastes and preferences in housing were in favor of the sophisticated western type of house design, material and layout, which meant that housing delivery strategies in the city were not based on the nature of the local demand and available resources. To look for evidence in support of this hypothesis, the dissertation first determines the disposition of officials towards the Abuja project. The findings leave no doubt that Abuja was not to be just a western inspired alternative to the former capital of Lagos, but rather a  ii  visionary sort rescue from the latter's intractable problems. It then relates this disposition to the current housing situation in the city, through effects on the planning/implementation process. The conclusion to emerge is that the disposition of policy officials greatly influences implementation outcome regardless of planning intentions, and that the wider framework proposed by Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) is an effective way of focusing research on factors that impinge on policy performance. A related conclusion is that the essentially western model of implementation proposed by Van Meter and Van Horn applies with equal, if not more, validity to the developing world where past explanations for the problems of implementation have tended to focus on such variables as: (1) financial resources; (2) administrative and technical know-how; (3) imported theories and technologies; and (4) indigenous regime or political characteristics. However, the unique politico-administrative context of policy remains a crucial factor. In light of the fact that the key to improved affordability is not sophistication, and that the goal of providing low-cost housing in the new capital would ultimately require nonwestern standards and styles of delivery, the chief pragmatic implication of the study is that a dispositional change to encourage a more "Nigerian" city is a precondition for a successful housing strategy in the new capital. This means discarding the current imported development practices in the city and replacing them with a more functional orientation based on the nature of the local demand for dwellings. A more "Nigerian" city is one in which the majority of housing and related services are accessible by the average citizen, whether in the civil service or not.  iii  TABLE OF CONTENTS  ABSTRACT.  "  LIST OF TABLES  vii  LIST OF FIGURES  viii  ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS  ix  DEDICATION  xi  ABBREVIATIONS  xii  CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION  1.1 7.2 7.3 1.4 7.5 7.6 7.7  PROBLEM PURPOSE HYPOTHESIS OBJECTIVES META-HYPOTHESES AND ASSUMPTIONS SCOPE. RATIONALE 1.7.1 Why Study Implementation in a Developing World Context? 1.7.2 Why the Selection of Abuja for a Case Analysis? 7.7.3 Why Focus on Housing in Abuja? 1.8 ORGANIZATION  CHAPTER 2: STUDYING IMPLEMENTATION:  7 2 2 5 6 7 8 8 77 72 73  A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS  2.1 DEFINING PUBLIC POLICY. 14 2.2 DEFINING THE IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS 76 2.3 PERSPECTIVES ON THE IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEM 23 2.3.7 Administrative Control Problem 23 2.3.2 Inadequate Resources 25 2.3.3 Tense Inter-Governmental Relations 27 2.3.4 Problematic Nature of Policy Itself. 29 2.3.5 Lack of Pressures from Target Groups 32 2.3.6 Disagreement over Goals 34 2.3.7 Unfavorable Disposition of Implementors 36 2.3.8 The Complexity of Joint Action 37 2.3.9 Ambiguous Goals and Communications 38 2.3.10 Faulty Theory of Action 41 2.3.11 Faulty Study Design 43 2.3.12 A Non-Participatory Process 45 2.3.13 Uncertainties 46 2.4 COMPREHENSIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEM 47 2.4.1 Rein & Rabinovitz (1978), Implementation: A Theoretical Perspective... 48 2.4.2 Levitt (1980), Implementing Public Policy 49 iv  2.4.3 Mazmanian and Sabatier 1981, Effective Policy Implementation 49 2.4.4 Other Attempts at Conceptual Integration 51 2.4.5 Van Horn and Van Meter (1975), The Policy Implementation Process 5 2 Policy Standards and Objectives 55 Policy Resources...'. 55 Inter-organizational Communication and Enforcement Activities. 5 6 The Characteristics of the Implementing Agencies 56 Economic, Social and Political Conditions 57 The Disposition of Implementors 58 Hypothesized Linkages Between Components of the Model 59 2 . 5 SUMMARY OF THE THEORETICAL ARGUMENTS 64 CHAPTER 3: MATERIALS AND METHOD 3.1 THE CASE OF ABUJA 3 . 7 . 7 History of the New Capital Movement 3 . 7 . 2 Rationale for Relocation 3 . 7 . 3 Basic Concepts and Physical Form of the New Capital 3 . 7 . 4 Administrative Arrangements for Abuja 3.1.5 Setting of the New Site Physical Characteristics Economic Characteristics Socio-Demographic Characteristics 3 . 2 . METHODS 3 . 2 . 7 Research Design 3.2.2 Evaluation Techniques 3 . 2 . 3 Sources and Method of Data Collection 3.2.4 Preliminary Activities in the Field and the Questionnaire 3.2.5 Research Population and the Formal Interviews 3 . 2 . 6 Issues Arising from the Field Setting  69 69 72 77 83 90 .90 94 95 704 704 705 707 707 709 770  CHAPTER 4: THE HOUSING CHALLENGE IN ABUJA 4.1 HOUSING GOALS AND ACHIEVEMENTS 4 . 7 . 7 Background 4 . 7 . 2 Housing Goals 4 . 7 . 3 Housing Achievements 4.2 CURRENT SETTLEMENT SITUATION 4 . 2 . 7 Affordability 4.2.2 Supply 4.2.3 Exclusion 4.2.4 Access to Land 4.2.5 Squatting 4 . 2 . 6 Segregated Development 4.2.7 Location 4.2.8 Crowding 4 . 2 . 9 Services 4.2.10 Design and Layout 4 . 2 . 7 7 Quality 4.2.12 Maintenance 4 . 2 . 7 3 Liability 4 . 2 . 7 4 Resettlement Housing  v  773 773 776 722 736 736 • 746 749 750 752 762 762 765 766 772 773 773 774 774  CHAPTER 5: EXPLAINING THE POLICY IMPLEMENTATION DISPOSITIONS  GAP: OFFICIALS'  5.1 OFFICIALS' DISPOSITION 180 5.1.1 Overview of Dispositions Toward Abuja 767 5.7.2 Dispositions Toward Goals for Abuja 785 5.7.3 Dispositions Toward Housing in General 787 5.7.4 Dispositions Toward Housing in Abuja 789 5.7.5 Dispositions Toward Housing Problems in Abuja 797 5.7.6 Significant Discrepancies Between "Own" and "Popular" Responses.... 193 5.2 THE POLITICS OF THE NEW CAPITAL DECISION 795 5.2.7 The Aguda Panel on Relocation/Site Selection 796 5.2.2 Selecting Master Planners for the City 798 5.3 IMPACT OF OFFICIALS' DISPOSITION ON THE DYNAMICS OF THE MASTER PLANNING 202 5.4 IMPACT OF OFFICIALS' DISPOSITION ON THE HOUSING IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES 208 5.4.1 Building Construction Choices 209 5.4.2 Infrastructure Choices 276 5.5 IMPACT OF CONTEXT FOR ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 276 5.5.7 Nepotism and Ethnic Politics 277 5.5.2 Bureaucratic Corruption and Unprofessional Conduct 227 5.5.3 Political and Economic Instability 224 5.5.4 Imitation Culture 228 CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION: IN ABUJA  SOME FINAL THOUGHTS  ON HOUSING  IMPLEMENTATION  6.7 HOUSING OUTCOMES IN ABUJA AND THE DISPOSITION OF POLICY OFFICIALS 6.2 IMPROVING THE HOUSING SITUATION IN THE NEW CAPITAL 6.2.7 Housing Policy Incentives Mortgage Land and Certificate of Occupancy (C of O) Materials and Labor Standards Maintenance Squatter Management 6.2.2 Housing Policy Enforcement 6.3 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NEW CAPITAL REVISITED 6.4 CONTRIBUTION OF STUDY TO KNOWLEDGE AND THEORY.  REFERENCES  236 238 239 239 239 240 247 242 242 243 247 255  257  APPENDIX I: QUESTIONNAIRE  ON ABUJA AND NAMES OF INTERVIEWEES  APPENDIX II: CONTENT ANALYSIS OF THE ABUJA HOUSING APPENDIX III: HOUSING  233  TYPES IN TANZANIA'S  vi  PLAN  NEW CAPITAL AT DODOMA  267 275 287  LIST OF TABLES  3.7: 3.2: 3.3: 4.1: 4.2: 4.3: 4.4: 4.5: 4.6: 4.7: 4.8: 4.9: 4.70: 4.11: 4.72: 4.73: 4.74: 4.75: 4.16: 4.77: 4.78: 4.79: 4.20: 4.27: 4.22: 4.23: 4.24: 4.25: 4.26: 4.27: 4.28: 5.7: 5.2: 6.7: 7:  Criteria for Selecting the Site of the Federal Capital Territory 97 Population Profile of the FCT (1985-90) 702 Estimated Population of Government Workers and their Families in the FCC (1988).. 103 Recent Population Projection for Major Urban Centers in Nigeria 774 Housing Conditions in Select Urban Areas in Nigeria (1970-71) 776 Housing Program Options for Abuja 779 Site and Floor Area for Principal Types of Dwelling Units in Abuja 720 Number and Type of Housing Contracts Awarded by the FCDA and FHA (1988) 722 Status of Housing Starts by the FCDA in the Development Districts of the Four Local Government Areas of the FCT (Dec. 1988) 724 Low-cost Housing Construction by the FHA Outside of the FCC (1983) 725 Application for Residential Plots by States (Dec. 1987) 735 Housing Affordability by Civil Servants in Abuja 737 Housing Affordability by Non-Government Workers in Small Scale Industries in the Municipality of Abuja (1988) 737 Treated Cost of Housing Constructed in Abuja (1982) 738 Housing Rent Charged to Bank Officials (1986) vs Housing Rent Charged to Government Officials (1988) 740 Cost of Selected Building Materials in Nigeria (1978-89) 747 Impact of Inflation on Cost of Housing Constructed by the FHA (1988-89) 742 Cost of Standard Temporary Accommodation within the FCC in Naira (Feb. 1979).. 143 Income Distribution for Civil Servants in Abuja by Salary Grade Levels (1988) 744 Income Distribution for Workers in Small-Scale Industries in the Municipality of Abuja (1988) 744 Untreated Cost of Housing Constructed in Abuja (1979- 82) 745 Estimate of Housing Demand among the Civil Servants' Group in the FCT (1988).... 148 The Manpower Strength of the Ministries already in Abuja and those to Move to City by 1989 749 Estimate of Squatters in the Municipality of Abuja (1988) 753 Estimate of Squatters in the FCT (1988) 754 Location of FCDA's Housing Estates in the FCT and their Distances from the Boundary of the FCC (in miles) 7 63 Typical Standard of Housing Allocation by the FCDA in Abuja 765 Number and Type of Educational Institutions and Teacher-Student Ratio in the FCT by Local Govt Areas (June 1987) 767 Basic Facts on Elements of Health Services in the FCT. 768 Motor Vehicle Registration in the Municipality of Abuja and the FCT (July 7986 - June 1987) 769 Official Statistics on the Incidence of Criminal and Other Offences in the FCT (Oct. Dec. 1986 and Jan. - Mar. 1987) '. 775 Summary of Nigerian Officials' Dispositions Toward Abuja (percent) 782 Perceptions of Causes of Housing Problems in Abuja 792 Areas of Housing in Abuja Requiring Effort '.. 238 Building Construction and Infrastructure Costs 278  vii  LIST OF FIGURES  2.7: 2.2: 2.3: 2.4: 2.5: 2.6: 2.7: 2.8: 2.9: 2.70:  Definition of Elements of Policy 75 Rational-Mechanistic Model of Policy Process ...77 Implementation as Action and Response 22 Implementation as Continuation of Decision Making 22 Skeletal Flow Diagram of the Variables Involved in the Implementation Process 50 The Policy Delivery System 53 A Model of Policy Implementation 54 Causal Linkages Between Policy Directives and Performance 60 Causal Linkages Between Policy Resources and Performance 67 Causal Linkages Between Characteristics of the Implementing Agencies and Performance 63 2.77: An Elaboration of the Van Horn and Van Meter Model of Policy Implementation for Housing in Abuja '. 68 3.7: Physical Design of Abuja 87 3.2: Centralized Community Services in Abuja 82 3.3: Federal Capital Development Authority Organizational Arrangement (1976-79) 85 3.4: Federal Capital Development Authority Organizational Arrangement under Civilian Government (Oct. 1979 - Sept. 1983) 88 3.5: Federal Capital Development Authority Organizational Arrangement (1984-85) 89 3.6: Location and Physical Access of Abuja 92 3.7: Alternative Sites Considered for Abuja within the FCT. 93 3.8: Road Access to FCT vs Road Access to Lagos (1978) 96 3.9: A Typical Village in the FCT. .....97 3.10: Density and Settlement Pattern in the FCT (1978) 98 3.11: Pre- and Post-FCT Settlement Pattern (1977/85) 99 3.72: The Case Study Process for the Study.. 705 4.1: Typical FCDA Low-Cost Housing in the FCT. 726 4.2: FCDA Residential Development in Karu New Town 727 4.3: FCDA Blocks of Flat within the FCC. 728 4.4: FCDA Semi-Detached Houses within the FCC 729 4.5: FCDA Detached Houses within the FCC : 730 4.6: Ministerial Quarters within the FCC 737 4.7: Private Residential Building within the FCC 732 4.8: Five-Star, Four-Star and Three-Star Hotels within the FCC 733 4.9: Sites of Considerable Squatments in the Municipality of Abuja (1989) 755 4.10: A Typical Scene in Garki Village in Abuja 756 4.77: Spontaneous Business Establishments within the FCC. 757 4.72: The Excision of Suleja from the FCT. 759 4.73: A Typology of Squatments in Terms of Development Levels and Security of Tenure 767 4.74: Development Sites of FCDA Housing Estates in the FCT. 764 4.75: Life in Neighborhood Centers in the Garki District of Abuja 770 4.76: Temporary and Permanent Site of the Wuse Market in the Wuse District of the FCC 171 4.17: Local Government and Resettlement Areas in the FCT. 77S 4.18: Typical Resettlement Housing in Usuma Town in the FCT. 779 7: Housing Delivery System Model. 279  viii  ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS  This study is the culmination of efforts from five distinct groups of people.  The first  group is the Ph.D. supervisory committee with the leading role played by Professor Brahm Wiesman. His devoted attention far beyond the call of duty is responsible for the dissertation being completed in a less stressful and time efficient manner.  Other committee members to  provide guidance are Professors Setty Pendakur and Alan Artibise. They are joined by former members of the committee including: Professors Robert Jackson, David Hulchanski, Peter Oberlander, Terry McCee and Mr. Maclin Hancock. Each man's contribution is duly noted and valued. The second group is the resource support agencies.  Study in Canada was supported  by a graduate scholarship from the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC).  A  substantial grant from the Canadian International Development Research Center (IDRC) paid for the  one academic year spent in Nigeria and Tanzania.  Other  minor but  helpful  assistantships were received from: Donner Canadian Foundation Scholarship, Government of Canada Challenge 87, B.C. Government Post-Secondary Scholarship and U.B.C. School teaching and research assistantships.  Planning  The latter also provided office space and other  numerous support services for the duration of the study. The next group of people w h o deserve a mention is the Nigerian officials, particularly officials from: the Federal Capital Development Authority; the Ahmadu Bello  University  Department of Local Govt Studies; the University of Benin; the Federal Housing Authority; Ministry of National Planning; and the Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research. A notable appreciation also goes the group of friends and colleagues w h o helped t o keep the struggle sane.  Contributions from past/present colleagues such as Dr. Dominique  Levieil, Nancy Knight, Alain Cunningham, Mike Beazely and Mark Roseland were immense. The same applies to friends such as Caroline Oluoch-Olunya, Dr. Linus Igwemezie, Dyman Clarke, Dr. Okey Nwogu, Frances Lynn, Dr. Ibrahim Al-Hammad and Khalid Alskait.  ix  The final group deserving recognition is my older brothers and sisters: Benson (Ph.D.), Grace (N.D.), Florence (M.B.A.), Caleb (P. Eng.), Emmanuel (B.Sc.) and Reuben (P. Eng.). Together with their spouses - Micah Obiegbu (P. Eng., M.B.A.), Herbert Nweke (M.Sc.) and Chinwe Morah (M.A., C A . ) - their professional backgrounds are a constant source of pride and inspiration.  x  i  To my  eldest brother, Dr.  Benson  "Ezenwanne" — brotherly King demonstrate  that  your  C.  Morah.  — this goes to  exemplary  lifestyle and  commitment to academic excellence have not been without a consequence.  xi  ABBREVIATIONS  AJ  Architects' Journal  FCC  Federal Capital City (i.e., Abuja)  FCDA  Federal Capital Development Authority  FCT  Federal Capital Territory  FCTA  Federal Capital Territory Administration  FHA  Federal Housing Authority  FMHE  Federal Ministry of Housing and Environment  FMWH  Federal Ministry of Works and Housing  IPA  International Planning Associates  MFCT  Ministry of Federal Capital Territory  NISER  Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research  NITP  Nigerian Institute of Town Planners  TAP  Technical Assessment Panel for the Abuja master plan  xii  !  CHAPTER 1 : INTRODUCTION  THIS IS A CASE STUDY OF AN IMPORTANT PLANNING EPISODE WITHIN THE DEVELOPING WORLD INVOLVING NIGERIA'S ATTEMPT TO BUILD A EUROPEAN CITY IN AFRICA, AN IDEAL WORLD-CLASS CITY FREE OF PITY AND FULL OF PRIDE FOR ALL NIGERIANS AND BLACK PEOPLES OF THE WORLD WHEREVER THEY MAY BE.  1.1  PROBLEM  This dissertation evaluates the implementation process for Nigeria's new capital at Abuja, focusing on housing provision.  In particular, it evaluates the inability of the Nigerian  government t o provide affordable housing for all income groups in the new city, especially the low-income  population.  Despite statements  by the government  t o confront the  challenge of affordability in devising a housing program for the new capital, almost all the housing provided is out of reach for a majority of wage earners in the civil service, not t o mention irregular wage earners in the informal sector. ^  In seeking explanations for this  shortfall between policy and outcome, the important research problems are: (1)  what are the housing goals and expectations for the new capital as formally stated and as perceived by current policy officials in the country?  (2)  what has become of these goals and expectations in terms of the existing housing situation in the new capital?  (3)  what are the difficulties encountered during the attempt t o bring about the desired housing conditions?  (4)  what possible solutions are envisioned by current policy officials for the settlement problems of the city?  1. An unratified 1985 White Paper on a New National Housing Policy for the Federal Republic of Nigeria defines the low-income group as "all wage earners and self-employed people whose annual income is below three thousand Naira (N3,000)." According to the document, about seventy per cent. (70%) of Nigerians fall into this class. 2. See sections 4.1.2. and 4.2.1 on housing goals for the city and the problem of non-affordability.  1  CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION  1.2  PURPOSE The purpose of this evaluation is three fold.  The first is t o obtain data on the actual  process of policy implementation within a developing country's setting, so as t o shed more light on factors contributing t o policy performance between policy goals and outcomes.  and the imperfect  correspondence  The second is t o raise basic policy issues pertaining t o  housing provision in the new capital, and t o advance options for solving the settlement problems of the city.  Finally, since the planning process for the new capital did not allow for  much t o be known about Nigerian officials' feelings toward the project, ^ it is hoped that the findings will help t o fill this gap in knowledge.  Hence, producing new knowledge about  Abuja is one of the major contributions of the dissertation.  1.3  HYPOTHESIS The main hypothesis t o be tested is that of Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) w h o  maintain that  the outcome  of policy  implementation  is ultimately  determined  by the  disposition^ of implementing officials, as all of the imperatives of the process "must be filtered through the perceptions of the implementors."  The main thrust of the hypothesis is  that, depending on the officials' understanding of the policy, their acceptance of it and the intensity of this acceptance, successful implementation may be frustrated. What this suggests about the implementation  of housing policy  in Abuja is that  the dispositions  implementing officials were antithetical t o the goal of providing low-cost housing.  of the Said  3. Work on the master plan for the new capital was accomplished primarily in the U.S. by a team of American planners. (See section 5.2.1 on the planning process for the city.) 4. The Oxford dictionary of current English defines "disposition" as temperament or a person's distinct nature or character. Webster's defines it as the tendency of something to act in a certain manner under given circumstances. This dissertation accepts both of these definitions, but includes in the meaning all that is suggested by such terms as attitude, feeling, perception, inclination, natural tendency, etc.. Hence, within the context of the dissertation, the term is used loosely to denote the general feeling or attitude with which officials approach their work and, presumably, inform their behavior. It might be best to view the term as forming the "conceptual lenses" through which officials view their options and responsibilities.  2  CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION  differently, the attitudes of officials responsible for executing the housing program of the new capital contributed to the inability to provide inexpensive housing. While recognizing that the gap in the provision of housing in Abuja can be related t o a host of variables, including financial constraints in the face of apparently unlimited demand, it will be argued that the disjunction is due primarily to the disposition of the policy officials, which has been to build an "ideal western-type city."  It will be maintained that prima facie  this perception of the new capital, as a showcase, contradicts the goal of low-cost housing provision which would ostensibly be envisaged to resemble "squatments."  Premised on this  apparent contradiction, the dissertation will then argue that policy officials in Abuja perceive medium- and high-cost housing t o be more germane to the image of the new capital, than low-cost dwellings affordable by the low-income  population.  Consequently, tastes and  preferences in housing were in favor of the sophisticated western type of house design, material and layout.  Furthermore, it will be argued that the housing policy of the new capital  is exclusionary and discriminates against non-civil servants.  Because Abuja is perceived by  responsible policy officials as an exclusive administrative city, the housing strategy adopted for the new capital has had mainly the needs of the civil servants in mind; that is, it fails t o explicitly articulate the housing needs of non-civil servants in the city. An earlier study of Abuja blamed the housing quagmire of the city on "the problems and pitfalls of attempting to apply planning principles and building types derived from western culture and climate within an emerging Third World nation" (AJ 1985, p. 69). This dissertation takes this argument a step further to suggest that, aside from the reality of such crude applications, the Nigerian government, driven by the disposition to build a city comparable to those of the west, not only eagerly accepted building procedures designed for a totally different demand and circumstances, but appears t o have modified the procedures t o further reflect its disposition for a "showcase western-type" mega project. As a result, housing policy in the new capital was not based on the nature of the local demand and available resources, which meant that housing standard far surpassed both need and affordability.  3  CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION  To test, or look for evidence in support of, this hypothesis, the dissertation first determines the dispositions of officials toward Abuja in terms of what "attitudes" and "perceptions" the policy t o build a new capital evokes in Nigerian society, especially amongst those w h o formulate and implement policy,  lt then relates the dispositions t o housing  outcomes in the city, through effects on the planning/implementation process.  In all, the  relationship between officials' dispositions toward the new capital and the cost of housing in the city will be accepted as a g o o d measure of the extent t o which the officials act o n their dispositions. Thus, t o summarize, the objective of the dissertation is t o show h o w officials' dispositions in Nigeria for building a city that resembles a western city affected subsequent decision making and, as a result, made it difficult t o effectively implement affordable housing in the n e w capital as was originally planned.  To the extent that the key t o improved  affordability is not sophistication, and that the goal of providing low-cost housing in the new capital w o u l d inevitably require non-western standards and styles of delivery, the suggestion is  that attitudinal changes to encourage a more "Nigerian" city is a precondition for a successful housing strategy in the city.^ The argument is that the disposition of policy officials greatly influences implementation regardless of planning intentions^ and, subsequently, that a  "disposition-free" model of policy implementation is unlikely to bear fruit in terms of rendering reliable predictions of outcomes. This potential contribution t o knowledge is elaborated in the balance of the dissertation.  5. A more "Nigerian" city is one in which the majority of housing and related services are affordable by the average citizen. Abuja today is not a "Nigerian" city in the sense that non-civil servants have limited access to the city and the average citizen can neither afford the cheapest houses being constructed nor the cheapest temporary hotel accommodation. In fact, based on nominal income, no member of the federal civil service can afford to pay market rents for the quarters they presently occupy, and less than 15 per cent can afford the least expensive houses provided if they were unsubsidized. 6. An extension of this hypothesis by Mazmanian and Sabatier (1980) is that the public's assessment of policy performance is also related strongly to initial dispositions toward the policy.  4  CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION  1.4  OBJECTIVES  The objectives of the dissertation are divided into five segments.  In the first segment,  the theoretical objectives are explored: (1)  to explore what is meant by public policy and the implementation process;  (2)  t o review how past studies have attempted to explain the implementation problem;  (3)  to present the Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) model for organizing thoughts concerning the implementation problem; and  (4)  to examine empirically the importance of the principal variable of this model, the disposition of officials, for determining policy outcomes.  The second segment embodies the historical objectives: (5)  to introduce the case for analysis by reviewing the historical context of the new capital, its rationale, basic concepts and physical form, administrative arrangements and material setting; and  (6)  to describe the methodology employed by the study including some field issues.  The third segment comprises the descriptive objectives concerning the  housing  program of the new capital: (7)  to determine the officials' goals and expectations for the new capital as they relate to housing provision; and  (8)  to critically review the current settlement reality of the new capital in terms of housing achievements and problems.  The  fourth  segment  encompasses  the  analytical objectives to  explain  the  implementation process: (9)  to examine the planning process by which the housing goals and expectations for the new capital evolved;  (10)  to scrutinize the validity of the plan put forth for achieving the desired goals and expectations;  (11)  to document strategic choices expectations were to be pursued;  (12)  to analyze the consequences of these choices for subsequent implementation and politics;  5  made  on  how  the  housing  goals  and  CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION (13)  to critically examine the present and past dispositions of policy officials toward various aspects of the new capital, particularly the housing provision aspects;  (14)  t o analyze the impact of these dispositions o n subsequent decisions regarding housing provision, including design, materials, standard of construction and delivery techniques; and  (15)  to examine the indigenous political context for administrative action, as well as wider issues that may have affected housing provision.  Finally, the last segment consists of the prescriptive objectives: (16)  to examine what actual measures are presently being taken t o respond to the housing problems of the new capital; and  (17)  to advance current professional opinions on h o w the settlement problems of the new capital might be solved.  1.5 META-HYPOTHESES  AND  ASSUMPTIONS  In addition to the examination of the main hypothesis involving the disposition of officials, the dissertation accepts t w o meta-hypotheses concerning: (1) the general workings of the public policy process; and (2) the generalizability of implementation frameworks across various settings.  Beginning with the dynamics of the policy process, the dissertation rejects  the assumptions behind the "mechanistic-rational" model and assumes instead that: (1)  policy making and policy implementation are not bounded, separate and sequential;  (2)  there exists no distinct implementors because:  boundaries  between  policy  makers  and  policy  *  there is no clear division of labor between policy makers, w h o are believed to set the goals, and policy implementors, w h o are believed to carry out these goals;  *  policy makers are not capable of stating policies unambiguously, because they lack both the consensus and technical/specific knowledge t o do so;  *  policy implementors possess the technical capability but not necessarily the obedience and the commitment to carry out policies as handed d o w n by the policy makers;  6  CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION (3)  there is not clear boundary between the tasks of policy makers and implementors, and the process of implementation does not necessarily unfold in a chronological, sequential fashion in which policy making necessarily ends and then implementation begins; and  (4)  the decisions that are involved in implementation are both technical and political in nature, in that it is the aim but not the reality that policy implementors carry out policies in a "neutral," "objective," "rational" and "scientific" fashion (Adapted from Nakamura and Smallwood 1980, p. 10).  The main hypothesis involving officials' dispositions accepts t w o major assumptions. One is that the larger framework proposed by Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) provides a promising and testable way of organizing thoughts concerning the implementation problem. The other is that, in testing the hypothesis, further work relating disposition t o behavior is not required beyond Van Meter and Van Horn's treatment of the matter.  In other words, the  discourse on the relationship between disposition and behavior is assumed to be on the order of a truism. Lastly, in applying the Van Meter and Van Horn model in the circumstances of the developing world, the dissertation assumes that: "a context-free theory of implementation is unlikely  to  produce  powerful  explanations  or  accurate  predictions"  (Berman  1980).  Consequently, it gives adequate attention to examining the political context of administrative action in Nigeria.  More than any other macro factors, sub-optimal policy outcomes need to  be examined against unique institutional characteristics of the country in which the policy is pursued.  1.6 SCOPE The scope of this dissertation is restricted in three ways. First, the focus is exclusively on the implementation process for housing in the new capital:  And even though housing  consists of a combination of services including utilities, roads, social services, etc., it is not within the scope of this dissertation to consider at length the implementation processes for these services.  7  CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION  Second, the dissertation focuses mainly o n questions that seek t o explain housing policy in practise, notably the disjunction between the housing goals for the new capital and the final outcome.  This means that implementation gaps in other aspects of the new capital  are beyond the scope of the dissertation, as are normative issues involving whether or not the new capital per se was a worthwhile idea. Finally,  in reviewing the literature, the dissertation focuses largely on works directly  related t o the field of policy implementation.  Ever since emerging as a bona fide field of  study in the 1970s, policy implementation  has attracted mainly calls f o r a diversity of  approaches.  Williams (1976, p. 288) once posited that research o n policy implementation  "will be more valuable when approached by people with different disciplinary perspectives and frameworks that provide diverse interpretations. So let variety flower." While recognizing that this  suggestion  might  be a g o o d  thing, particularly  during  these  formative  years of  implementation theory, Nakamura and Smallwood (1980, p. 1) are correct in noting that the number of studies in the field "has reached a point at which it is useful t o pull together the various findings in an effort t o broaden our understanding of the policy implementation process."  Judging from the literature, there already appears t o be some  unnecessary  reproductions in the field, as well as evidence of some researchers talking past one another.  1.7  RATIONALE  1.7.1  Why Study  Implementation  in a Developing  World  Context?  That policies will not automatically be executed as designed has become axiomatic in developed countries and more so in the developing ones where most implementing bodies are either weak or still forming.  Evaluations conducted by Green as far back as 1965  demonstrate that program implementation and administration are the critical problems in developing countries' development plans. The following observation was made later:  8  CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION Students of policy implementation and development administration in the Third World are centrally concerned with analyzing and explaining failure. Public policies do not get implemented at all, and those that do manage to get through the tortuous process of implementation often look very different from what their framers originally intended. The clear implication of existing studies is that policy implementation in the Third World bears little resemblance t o the classical understanding of implementation as a process of rationally linking broad goals to specific programmatic decisions (Quick 1980, p. 40). Several reasons reflecting the regime or politico-institutional characteristics of these countries are often given to account for this atrocious record of implementation.  As  previously noted, it is argued that administrative bodies in developing countries are still forming and yet to acquire the years of experience of their counterparts in the developed world. Secondly, it is argued that interest aggregating structures (i.e., political parties and interest groups) for presenting collective demands to the political leadership, are either ineffective or non-existent. When such mechanisms are not abrogated by the various military dictatorships, the argument is that such structures have tended to be captive organizations primarily used by the elites to elicit mass followings. Thirdly, it is argued that the politicians and administrators in these enclaves view public participation in policy formulation as being illegitimate or inefficient.  As a result, they  deliberately attempt to institute "technocratic" or "apolitical" approaches to policy-making, thus making the process that much more remote and inaccessible t o most individuals. Fourthly, it is argued that ethnic ties and factions, nepotism and the extended family network system, personal coalitions and patron-client linkages, which are often the basis of political activity in these countries, are well suited t o individualized interventions at the execution stage.  Consequently, flexibility in implementation is viewed as part of a deliberate  polity-wide accommodation and conflict resolution technique for managing these realities, particularly the reality of ethnic rivalries.  What often emerges from this argument is the  suggestion that, for the general public in these countries, interventions at the implementing stage are natural and, perhaps, more strategic than involvement at the design stage.  9  CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION  Fifthly, it is argued that the implementation process in developing countries is bound t o involve more intense competition than elsewhere, simply because their needs are far more pronounced and resources scarcer.  For most developing countries suffering from the dead  weight of population, almost no amount of resources will be enough t o satisfy the demands. Finally, rampant bureaucratic and political corruption are held to be a major source of weakness in implementation efforts.  It is argued that, through bribery, well-to-do die-hard  opponents of a specific policy w h o lose in the policy formulation stage, find the execution stage an especially easy way for them t o neutralize undesirable policies. So, whether the public is unwillingly excluded from the policy making stage or it chooses t o exclude itself for strategic advantages during implementation, it is apparent that a large proportion of individual and collective demands in developing countries reach the political system at the implementation stage, rather than before policy is adopted.  Echoing  this theme of Scott (1969) and Smith (1973), Grindle (1980, p. 15) gives the following summary: To a much greater extent than in the political systems of the United States and Western Europe, the process of implementing public policies is a focus of political participation and competition in the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.... Thus, while in the United States and Western Europe much political activity is focused on the input stage of the policy process, in the Third World a large portion of individual and collective demand making, the representation of interests, and the emergence and resolution of conflict occurs at the output stage. The study of implementation in the developing world is, therefore, justified to the extent that the process is more politicized than elsewhere; and that, as a result, the pressures brought to bear on implementation tend to alter both the content and intended impact of policy.  Furthermore, the nature of policies pursued by these countries cannot but make  implementation harder for them.  Unlike policies in the west, which tend t o reflect only  incremental changes, policies in developing countries tend t o be ambitious and sweeping (e.g., building a new capital); a phenomenon which follows from the logic that they are latecomers in the march to modernity.  Of course, related to this logic is the difficulty created by  10  CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION  adapting western theories and technologies which tend not t o be suitable for implementation in the developing countries, where: (1) labor is almost super abundant; (2) capital is acutely scarce or erratic at best; and (3) the supply of skilled labor and management is always short or limited.  1.7.2 Why the Selection  of Abuja  for a Case  Analysis?  The following answer might be given from a general perspective: The founding of a new capital is always a notable event in world affairs, arresting in its audacity as an undertaking, revealing in attitudes about what government should be and, in fact, h o w life itself should be conducted implicit, if n o t stated, in the minds of the founders. The sheer vastness of such projects, at least in the 20th century, is awesome and overwhelming. One admires the strength, optimisms, and perhaps even the foolhardiness of those w h o undertake them. Abuja is such a project. It has not received the attention it deserves (Todd 1984, p. 115). However, from the perspective of this study the reason is quite different. In addition t o being ambitious and politically significant, the Abuja project has required a heavy expenditure of capital, materials and human resources t o a degree that many Nigerians believe the project is responsible for crippling of the national economy and the collapse of the second republic (Onibokun 1984; Osagie 1984; Onimode 1 9 8 4 ) /  As such, many questions have been raised  about the project, especially in terms of what impacts and effects have thus far resulted from it. For example, is the goal of making the city a reality being achieved? H o w judiciously is the project being executed?  In light of the fact that the new capital entailed an awesome sacrifice  on the part of all Nigerians, is the city being developed with a view t o making it accessible t o all Nigerians alike?  It is against these sort of queries that Abuja was found t o be worthy of  close ex-post scrutiny.  7. Total capital allocation to Ab'jja up to the climax of the construction period in 1983 was N1.35 billion (approximately $2.1 billion U.S.). This was the official quote "but given the scale of contract inflation and squandermania in Abuja, it would seem that these figures understate the full fiscal allocations, which have been variously alleged to vary between N2.5 to N5.0 billion [approximately $3.9 to $7.8 billion U.S.]" (Onimode 1984, p. 10).  11  CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION  On a different note, Abuja possibly represents the closest any developing world government has ever come to meeting those conditions thought to be necessary for it to successfully undertake urban development projects that rival those in the west in terms of magnitude and complexity.  An argument seems fashionable that, if only the developing  countries had both the resources and opportunity to plan and implement anew, without having to contend with existing urban problems, they would not experience the aggravated urban difficulties  associated,  pollution, urban decay, etc..  for instance,  with spontaneous  settlements,  congestion,  Abuja provides a rare opportunity to appraise this line of  reasoning as, aided by "petro-dollars" and an imaginative plan prepared by a consortium of U.S. planners, the project began on virgin land presumably using state-of-the-art planning and implementation techniques. It is not surprising that the construction of the new capital represents an opportunity to develop and test alternative planning styles, technologies and institutional arrangements for delivery. The project represents a critical arena for innovation with respect to planning and implementation (e.g., the use of foreign expertise under Nigerian control to produce a western-type city).  It is also the case that the problem situation of the new capital is  sufficiently complex and dynamic to include most, if not all, of the web of variables posited to be relevant in comprehending the implementation process.  1.7.3 Why Focus on Housing  in Abuja?  It would be nearly impossible for any one study to cover the myriad of activities comprising the new capital. The housing program was chosen for evaluation because it is critical to the success of the new capital. Abuja is intended as an administrative city with a minimal economic base (Master plan 1979, p. 55). Housing in the new capital is a basic urban requirement, the largest land consumer, the major element in the overall cost of the new capital and, arguably, the most visible symbol of achievement.  12  All of these suggest that the  CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION  success of the new capital, both in the eyes of its residents and outsiders, will tend to be judged on the basis of the quality of the residential environment.  1.8  ORGANIZATION There are six chapters to the dissertation. Chapter 2 develops a theoretical framework  for the dissertation, including a model of policy implementation that holds the disposition of policy officials to be the determinant of the process. analysis as well as the study method.  Chapter 3 introduces the case for  Chapter 4 explores the housing challenge in the new  capital in terms of the goals, achievements and problems. Chapter 5 draws from both theory and field data to attempt to explain the gap in housing policy implementation.  Chapter 6  addresses the relevance of the findings of the study for both the proposed model for implementation in Chapter 2 and the settlement problems of the new capital.  13  C H A P T E R 2: STUDYING I M P L E M E N T A T I O N : A F R A M E W O R K OF ANALYSIS  THIS CHAPTER PRESENTS AN ALTERNATE MEANS OF ORGANIZING THOUGHTS CONCERNING THE IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEM. IT BEGINS WITH AN EXPLORATION OF WHAT IS MEANT BY PUBLIC POLICY AND IMPLEMENTATION, AND THEN EXAMINES HOW PAST STUDIES HAVE TRIED TO EXPLAIN THE IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEM. EMERGING FROM THIS REVIEW IS A MODEL OF POLICY IMPLEMENTATION THAT HINGES ON THE DISPOSITION OF POLICY OFFICIALS AS A DETERMINANT OF THE PROCESS.  2.1 DEFINING PUBLIC POLICY While there can be no denying that private actions by individuals and corporations affect many people collectively (Nadel 1975), the consensus among most scholars is that the "public" in public policy refers to actions taken by those w h o occupy official positions in government (Adie and Thomas 1982, p. 89). The core controversy over the meaning of public policy surrounds - what is meant by "policy?"  Does it mean: (1) a sector of activity; (2) a  general statement of purpose or desired state of affairs; (3) a specific program for solving a problem; (4) a decision of government; (5) an output; (6) an outcome; (7) a theory, model or paradigm; or (8) a process ( H o g w o o d and Gunn 1984, p. 3-64)? When it is not the intention of government t o ignore problems, policies are usually stated in sectoral terms (e.g., economic policy or energy policy), and generally involve a statement of goals for these sectors (e.g., full employment or self sufficiency).  Realizing the  desired conditions then depends on the development of action programs and projects which almost always imply a theory or causation. The  implication is that, if certain action programs  are implemented, the desired state of affairs will result.  However, given that desired  conditions are rarely what they seem, nor materialize as expected, policy also implies a description of what is actually delivered (output), as well as the objective reality (impact) of this output regardless of initial intentions.  Finally, the fact that these activities occur in a  14  CHAPTER 2 : A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS  particular sequence or stages of a process implies yet another meaning, as does the fact that the process frequently culminates in a decision. While accepting that policy probably implies each of these meanings and more, the following clear statements can nevertheless be made.  First, policy is n o t a sector of activity  even though it is often stated as such. Second, it is not a program as more than one program can be, and frequently is, developed t o achieve the same desired c o n d i t i o n .  1  Third, it is n o t a  decision as it often involves several decisions over time. And, lastly, it is not a theory but its tactical component programs necessarily imply causation.  Policy is a general statement of  intentions but, because intentions have unforeseeable consequences and the intention may be t o change or perpetuate existing conditions, it also involves actions and inactions as well as the intended and unintended impacts. Hence, by coalescing the meaning of "public" with that of "policy," a definition of the term that emerges is: what the government chooses to do or not do (output), why (intention)  and how (process)^- it does what it does, and the difference what it does makes (impact). (See figure 2 . 1 . ) The boxed zone represents the traditional sphere of policy.  FIGURE 2 . 1 .- D E F I N I T I O N OF ELEMENTS OF POLICY  PROCESS INTENTION  Source:  PROCESS  IMPACT  OUTPUT  Author.  1. Note, however, that policy is a function of programs and is dependent upon their outcomes. For instance, the evaluation of policy almost necessarily involves investigation and analysis of concrete action programs designed to achieve policy aims. Sometimes, this allows for the two terms to be used interchangeably. 2. This includes both how the intentions are selected, converted into outputs and then delivered.  15  CHAPTER 2: A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS  2.2 DEFINING THE IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS The Oxford dictionary of current English defines implementation as the act of putting contract, decision, promise, etc. into effect.  This is the definition adopted by Pressman and  Wildavsky (1973, p. xiv) in their widely acclaimed path-breaking study of the U.S. Economic Development Agency's efforts t o implement a j o b creation program in Oakland, California. The authors contend that "implementation may be viewed as a process of interaction between the setting of goals and actions geared t o achieving them."  In order t o isolate this particular  process of interaction, they distinguish between other policy processes relating t o : (1) the creation of the initial conditions (i.e., legislation and funds) for implementation and (2) the creation of programs or the conversion of policy intentions into tactical components.  These  t w o processes, they argue, are outside the bounds of implementation and only form an input to it.^ The following logic is presented: Implementation does not refer t o the creating of the initial conditions. Legislation has to be passed and funds committed before implementation takes place t o secure the predicted outcome.... To emphasize the actual existence of initial conditions w e must distinguish a program from a policy.... A program exists when the initial conditions - the ' i f stage of the policy hypothesis - have been met. The word program signifies the conversion of a process hypothesis into governmental action. The initial premises of the hypothesis have been authorized. The degree t o which the predicted consequences [the 'then' stage] take place we will call implementation. This  is the policy-centered,  perspective o n defining implementation.  mechanistic-rational,  top-down  or policy  makers'  According t o Barrett and Fudge (1981, p. 10-12), it  assumes that policy (viewed as what policy makers are trying t o achieve) is the starting point for implementation, followed by a series of logical steps leading from there t o action.  Policy  is assumed t o be made elsewhere and turned over, so t o speak, t o the implementing machinery which then puts it in place. This view implies that policy makers have a significant, if not complete, control over the actions of the officials responsible for implementation. That is, implementing officials are assumed t o be perfectly subordinate t o policy makers with no 3. Berman (1978, p. 177) similarly identifies a stage distinguishable implementation which he refers to as "mobilization."  16  from and prior to  CHAPTER 2: A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS  interests, priorities, visions or solutions of their o w n . If not, then the belief is that they do not have the discretionary powers t o bring these personal dispositions to bear. Within the overall context of the policy process, this conception of implementation can be illustrated as shown in figure 2.2.  FIGURE 2.2:  RATIONAL-MECHANISTIC M O D E L OF POLICY PROCESS  POLICY ENVIRONMENT  POLICY FORMATION  PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT  CONVERSION OF POLICY INTENTIONS TO HYPOTHESES AND ACTION PLANS  PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION  >  >  PROGRAM OUTCOME  COORDINATION AND MANAGEMENT OF PROGRAM ELEMENTS TO ACHIEVE ENDS  Source: Author.  Nakamura and Smallwood (1980, p. 9) describe the comprehensive steps involved in this approach to policy: (1)  Faced with a given problem  (2)  rational people first clarify their goals, values, or objectives, and then rank or otherwise organize them in their mind;  CHAPTER 2: A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS (3)  they then list all important possible ways or policies for achieving their goals  (4)  and investigate all the important consequences that would follow from each of the alternative policies,  (5)  at which point they are in a position to compare consequences of each policy with goals  (6)  and so choose the policy with consequences most closely matching their goals.  (7)  An agent to carry out the policy is chosen by the policy maker according to technical criteria (i.e., the perceived ability of the agent to employ the appropriate means to accomplish the policy goals).  (8)  The policy is communicated to the agent as a series of specific instructions.  (9)  The agent implements (carries out) the specific instructions according to policy guidelines specified in the communication from the policy maker.  There are two pertinent questions about this model. The first is whether or not policy ends where Pressman and Wildavsky say it ends and, if not, where does policy end and implementation begin? Following from this, the second question"is whether implementation mainly concerns matters of assembling, coordinating and managing resources for purposive ends? Without answers to these questions, a definition of implementation may not be possible. Starting with the first question, some scholars support the concept that policy necessarily ends and implementation begins when broad policy intentions are translated into concrete plans and funds are committed. This support stems from either the usefulness of the definition as a heuristic, or from the logic presented by Pressman and Wildavsky (1973, p. xiv) that: "the world is full of policy proposals that are aborted. You can't finish what you haven't started. Lack of implementation should not refer to failure to get going but to inability to follow through." Supporters of this argument include Grindle (1980, p. 7-8) who maintains that the general process of implementation can begin "only when general goals and objectives have been specified, when action programs have been designed, and when funds have been allocated for the pursuit of the goals." Theoretically, continues Grindle, it is "at this point the policy formulation process is superseded by the policy implementation process, and 18  CHAPTER 2: A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS  programs are activated."  Other subscribers are Van Meter and Van Horn (1975, p. 448) w h o  clearly warn that "the implementation phase does not commence until goals and objectives have been established (or identified) by prior policy decisions; it takes place only after legislation has been passed and funds committed." O n the side of those w h o do not support this definition is Bardach (1977, p. 36), w h o likens implementation t o "an assembly process," "a large machine" that is t o turn out desired ends.  In defining implementation as the process of putting the machine together (i.e.,  assembling numerous and diverse program elements) and making it run, Bardach explicitly includes efforts t o convert intentions into concrete terms in the implementation process. This view is shared by Williams (1976, p. 268) w h o writes that "implementation, the stage between a decision and operations, starts with the development of program guidelines or design specifications," and then moves t o the continuance of efforts over time t o raise the capability of the organization t o achieve program objectives.  Stating it differently, Edward (1980, p. 1)  writes that: Policy implementation is the stage of policy making between the establishment of policy - such as the passage of a legislative act, the issuing of an executive order, the handing d o w n of a judicial decision, or the promulgation of a regulatory rule - and the consequences of the policy for the people w h o m it affects. Thus, as seen by this group of scholars, implementation is the "missing link" (Hargrove 1975), involving nearly everything that follows between policy formation and final outcome. The group's point of departure is their belief that it is broad policy intentions, not the technical means for achieving these intentions, that form the input to the implementation process.  For them, the more interesting question is not "where does policy end and  implementation begin" but, rather, whether or not such a distinction is possible in the first place.  4  4. This thrust of the debate must be separated from the thrust which seeks to establish when implementation has occurred for evaluation purposes. Considering that there have been documented cases of programs that were considered ineffective by reputable evaluators when the programs were never implemented (Patton 1978), the problem presented by "implementation lag," or the time taken between policy adoption and actual program execution, is a major challenge for researchers of  19  CHAPTER 2: A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS  Evidently, the fact that policy goals (which are by nature broad, vague, diffuse, ambiguous and contradictory) form the input t o implementation, makes it not only possible but necessary for implementors to try and remake policy, so that broad intentions can be translated into technical and operational terms (Berman 1980). There is little need just yet t o explore  the reasons why politicians  formulate  unclear  policy  goals, or to argue  that  implementors are not passive agents on the receiving end of policy.  Suffice to say that the  phenomenon  phenomenon  of  "unclear  policy  directives"  is an unavoidable  in the  contemporary public policy scene, and that this fact serves as a catalyst for bureaucratic discretion at the lower levels of the hierarchy, including the attendant continuation of policy making beyond the legislative process. It  is not startling  then  that  Hill  (1981,  Implementation Distinction," should conclude  p. 222), in his article,  "The  Policy-  that "it is unrealistic t o expect the t w o  phenomena t o be clearly d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e . T h e clear indication, in practice, is that no one can say in uncertain terms where policy ends and implementation begins. What can be said is that: (1) policy is not made exclusively by legislators; and (2) junior-level officials, in carrying out directives handed d o w n to them by senior-level officials, do not carry out the directives exactly as specified.  Administrators make policy at all levels of the administrative hierarchy  including street-level bureaucrats, not just people at the t o p (Palumbo and Harder 1981, p. ix-x).  public programs. Suffice to say that, in a world of incremental changes in which programs tend to be put into operation gradually, any theory of policy that aims to tell us when implementation has occurred must go beyond the point when the policy becomes formally adopted, so as to allow for the bureaucratic process to reach a point where target populations have a chance to be affected by the program (Musheno 1981, p. 79). This not only entails allowing adequate time for the policy to be diffused to street-level bureaucrats and the public at large, but also for the "causal threshold" to be overcome. A causal threshold can operate to make the manifestation of an effect dependent on reaching at least a certain level of implementation, and it is usually when there is "widespread availability" of program elements to the target population that this effect can be considered overcome. 5. Again, this does not mean that attempts at separation between the two is wholly useless, because viewing implementation as a series of logical steps from intention to action also provides a useful heuristic device through which to identify issues and questions about "what is going on."  20  CHAPTER 2: A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS  Following from the above as well as evidence from this study, implementation is  defined as an ongoing process of decision making by a variety of actors beyond the initial passage of legislation.*  3  Because this definition encompasses the translation of policy goals  into procedures, the necessary process involves far more than assembling, coordinating and managing resources for purposive ends.  As noted by Crindle (1980, p. 3), "it involves  fundamental questions about conflict, decision making, and ' w h o gets what' in a society."  It  might be argued that arriving at a broad decision is the formal phase of establishing a policy but, when an action is taken t o implement the broad decision, a second phase of a policy is entered. Using Dror's terminology of "repolicymaking" t o emphasize this phase of policy, Bunker (1972, p. 72) describes what happens in it: The content is re-assessed, interpreted, and recast, sometimes with care t o preserve the core of the original intent, sometimes with thoughtful revision of the original assumptions and objectives, and sometimes as an unreflective response in terms of bureaucratic conventions or situational constraints which tend t o counter the framer's intent. Barrett and Fudge (1981, p. 4) suggest that this process is best perceived as a policy/action continuum in which an interactive and negotiation process takes place over time, between those seeking t o put policy into effect and those upon w h o m action depends.  Within the  particular context of the developing world, this policy/action continuum has been described as "the major arena in which individuals and groups are able t o pursue conflicting interests and compete for access t o scarce resources...; the principal nexus of the interaction between the government and the citizenry, between public officials and their constituents" (Crindle 1980, p. 19). Diagrammatically, the process can be represented as seen either in figure 2.3 or 2.4.  6. Note that this continuation of decision making is of a different type. It is more or less circumscribed by the existence of an already authorized policy direction, which not only affects the magnitude and orientations of digressions to be made, but also the strategy and tactics of decision making that is adopted. As Bardach (1977, p. 43) explains, this is the case because "all, or at least many, of the important participants act within a context of expectations that something will happen that bears at least a passing resemblance to whatever was mandated by the initial policy decision." That is why "conformance" or "compliance" can still be used to judge implementation success.  21  C H A P T E R 2: A F R A M E W O R K O F  FIGURE 2 . 3 : IMPLEMENTATION AS ACTION AND RESPONSE  TIME POLICY  > REFORMULATION  TIME ACTION  •> REACTION  Source: Barrett and Fudge 1981, p. 25.  FIGURE 2.4: IMPLEMENTATION AS CONTINUATION OF DECISION MAKING  POLICY ENVIRONMENT  POLICY FORMATION  < <  > >  POLICY IMPLEMENTATION  Source: Author.  22  POLICY OUTCOME  ANALYSIS  CHAPTER 2: A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS  The value of this perspective on implementation is that it provides a more realistic way to conceptualize the policy-implementation distinction that is neither t o p - d o w n nor bottomup but both. underlying  It also forces a more comprehensive approach t o research o n the subject. An  argument  of the dissertation  is that,  in order  t o fully  comprehend the  implementation problem, it is necessary t o examine both the up-stream (policy formulation or planning) as well as down-stream (implementation and outcome) activities of the policy process.  2.3 PERSPECTIVES ON THE IMPLEMENTATION  PROBLEM  7  The classifications t o follow are original and try t o unite related arguments in the field. In all, thirteen separate but not unrelated classifications are discussed.  2.3.1 Administrative  Control  Problem  The issue of control in the bureaucracy is perhaps the oldest and most prevalent explanation for the implementation problem.  Whether defined as "the problem of getting  work done and securing compliance with organizational rules" (Wilensky 1967, p. 3), or the process by which managers "ensure that rules are obeyed and orders followed" (Etzioni 1964, p. 68), almost all leading organizational theorists agree that the core implementation problem is essentially that of control and accountability in the bureaucracy (Wilson 1967; Downs 1967; Bardach 1977; Dunsire 1978). That is, lower-level bureaucrats not carrying o u t the instructions of higher-level officials. 7. The dissertation deliberately avoids using the term "implementation failure" because, except for cases of non-implementation, programs rarely fail to cause an impact as much as they encounter problems in optimally achieving expectations. McLaughlin (1976, p. 169) defines nonimplementation as when programs never get adopted, or they get adopted but break down due to lack of interest by the target population. "Implementation problem" is, therefore, suggested as a more becoming term for use in referring to programs with any proven track record, no matter how meritorious that record. On one level, the term refers to the myriad of generic factors that, act to constrain the achievement of program goals. On another, it refers to the objective reality of the program in terms of shortfalls in both the intended and unintended impacts of the program.  23  CHAPTER 2: A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS  According t o Downs (1967, p. 134), this seemingly recalcitrant behavior originates from the "leakage of authority" inside bureaucracy. The leakage occurs because implementing officials have different goals, "and each uses his discretion in translating orders from above into commands going downward." Consequently, "the purposes the superior had in mind will not be the precise ones his subordinate's orders convey to people further d o w n hierarchy."  That is why each communication should aim at minimizing "leeway" for the  organization that is charged with implementing it.  Obviously, the more that actors in the  process are allowed to act independently, the less the action will reflect the intentions.  the  original  Short of this, there has to be a system of explicit controls, sanctions and  incentives which may be invoked by t o p bureaucrats to achieve compliance with policy among subordinate officials, ln this regard, "the 'limits' of control would then depend on the amount of power (resources, legitimacy, authority, etc.) t o operate sanctions and incentives possessed by one agency vis-a-vis those it is seeking to control" (Barrett and Fudge 1981, p. 20).  Van  Meter and Van Horn (1975, p. 466) state the imperative in this way: Successful implementation often requires institutional mechanisms and procedures whereby higher authorities (superiors) may increase the likelihood that implementors (subordinates) will act in a manner consistent with a policy's standards and objectives... orders are not self-executing: they require the presence of an action-forcing mechanism. From this perspective, remedying the problem of implementation becomes a question of controlling discretion and maximizing routines in the bureaucracy (Elmore 1978, p. 199208).  This raises the principal objection that the interpretation identifies only one aspect of  the "bureaucracy problem" (Wilson 1967, p. 3-9), which makes it " t o o narrow a focus" (Bardach 1977, p. 46). After all, implementation processes, notes the latter: ... are driven at least as much if not more by inter-organizational transactions as by intra-organizational transactions. The array of relevant actors in the implementation process is large and diverse, including, in addition t o government bureaus, their clients, private contractors, professional associations, publicists, and so forth. All of these actors are quite capable of articulating their own special fears and anxieties.  24  CHAPTER 2: A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS  Thus, even though administrative control is generally accepted as the issue that is most relevant t o understanding the implementation problem, the above criticism denotes that such an understanding will be incomplete without taking into account those impacts and effects that result from the external environment.  2.3.2. Inadequate  Resources  Problems related to resources have tended t o be the mainstay of explanations for the policy implementation gap, especially in the developing world where resources are generally scarcer (Waterston 1965; Green 1965; Hirschman 1958; 1967).  This derives first from the  truism that a threshold of policy resources is necessary for there t o be any possibility of realizing policy objectives; and then from the logic that the level of resources above this threshold, up t o some saturation point, should be proportional to the probability of optimally achieving those objectives (Mazmanian and Sabatier 1981, p. 11). Defined as the cumulative effort necessary t o achieve policy aims, the concept of policy resources consists of several elements.  First among these is fiscal expenditures, or the  amount of funds allocated for both the policy's capital and operating costs.  This is usually  stated in monetary terms but it may also be in the form of capital assets, such as the amount of space, facilities and equipment devoted t o the policy.  Second is the personnel t o  operationalize the policy which, more than just the "sheer" manpower, includes the kinds of personnel and level of qualifications needed. and  managerial  manpower  has  long  It is c o m m o n knowledge that lack of technical  been  recognized  as  a  determinant  to  many  implementation efforts in the developing world. Third is the time available to get things done. Given that almost all policies in the public domain come with a political timetable, time is a particularly critical resource in implementation.  It restricts how deeply the problem can be  researched and planned for, as well as the level of success t o be attained by the policy.  25  The  CHAPTER 2: A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS  degree t o which a policy's performance is judged satisfactory would obviously depend on when, in the life of the policy, the evaluation is carried out. Political support t o see policy initiatives through is the fourth element.  This form of  support is termed political inasmuch as it differs from the type of support provided by the legal imperatives of policy (Rein and Rabinovitz 1978; Mazmanian and Sabatier 1981).  As a  rule, policy makers have to maintain a strong, if not united, support for a policy for it to have a reasonable chance of getting implemented.  This support may take the form of what  Bardach (1977) refers to as the "fixer," a legislator or person of authority w h o is personally interested in the policy, and w h o will guide it through the playing out of the various implementation games until the goals are realized.  In evaluation, Patton (1978) refers to this  notion of the "fixer" as the "personal factor" in policy. Finally, there is the element of information resource respecting both the problem to be addressed and the techniques by which to address the problem (i.e., relevant information on both theory and technology).  It was observed earlier that every policy implies a  substantive causal understanding of a problem and a procedural theory of action on how it should be solved.  Referring to the latter, Shanks (1983, p. 59) commented that, "while not  discussed in the policy literature, it w o u l d seem that the mechanism used to implement the policy might be an important component of the policy resources components." The  one  latent  problem  with  the  resource  approach  to  understanding  the  implementation gap is that no amount of resources applied to a bad idea, even when rightly applied, can cause it to produce the right results.  This is the concept of "substantive  irrationality," which refers t o the ethical problem in planning involving the use of the right means to achieve the wrong ends.  26  CHAPTER 2: A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS  2.3.3 Tense Inter-Governmental That  relations  between  Relations levels  of government  impact  on implementation  interpretation favored by political scientists w h o have studied the federalist  is an  system of  government in which powers are divided between t w o levels of government, each being independent of one another within its assigned jurisdiction.  As the problem is conceived,  conflict typically ensues whenever there is an attempt t o implement in one jurisdiction (e.g., local/provincial jurisdiction)  programs that are financed wholly or in part by the other  jurisdiction (e.g., the federal jurisdiction).  Yet, almost all contemporary public programs  involve a significant degree of collaboration between authorities in these jurisdictions. It is in respect of this difficult situation that the fate of implementation is postulated as likely t o be structurally determined along lines of the federalist constitutional structure. The study by Murphy (1971) concerning the 1965 Elementary and Secondary School Education Act (ESEA) in the U.S., is among the early observations of structural limits t o federally initiated programs.  In this work, Murphy (1971, p. 60) writes that t o blame the implementation  problems of Title 1 on "timidity, incompetence, or 'selling out' is to beg the question.... The primary cause... is political. The federal system - with its dispersion of power and control -not only permits but encourages the evasion and dilution of federal reform, making it nearly impossible for the federal administrator t o impose program priorities." Derthick (1972), in her study of the failure of the New Town in Town program, also draws a similar conclusion by blaming the failure of the program on the "disabilities" of a central government t o order changes in local priorities.  Because the division of authority  among governments in the federal system makes it ultra vires for the federal government t o order these governments t o do anything, the federal government can only get the local governments t o "carry out its purposes by offering incentives in the form of aid, which they may accept or not, and by attaching conditions t o the aid" (Derthick 1972, p. 84).® But even 8. In using the same framework, Ingram (1977, p. 499) notes a similar relationship between the federal and state governments. She points out that "it is difficult for the federal government to  27  CHAPTER 2: A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS  at that, observes Bardach (1977, p. 46), the problem still abounds, because the federal government neither commands an unlimited supply of incentives nor knows what sort of incentives the local institutions might respond to. Berman (1978. p. 157) later wraps the federalist argument in new jargon ~ 'The Study of Macro- and Micro Implementation."  Premised on the conviction that "implementation  problems stem mostly from the interaction of a policy within its institutional setting," Berman argues that the federal macro-implementation problem can be distinguished from the local micro-implementation problem in such a way that the former occurs in a "loosely coupled" setting, and involves a multitude of actors as well as decisions on who gets what, when, where and how. At this institutional setting, the chief concern is seen to be how to execute the policy, so as to cause local delivery agencies to behave in the desired ways. On the other hand, the micro-implementation problem is viewed as occurring in a less "loosely coupled" environment, and involving mainly attempts by local organizations to respond to federal directives through adaptation of those directives to fit local conditions and administrative practices. After examining interactions at both of these institutional levels, Berman (1978, p. 157, 179) concludes that "the effective power to determine a policy's outcome rests with local deliverers, not with federal administrators."  His reasons are that "the federal government  typically has limited leverage to influence the behavior of local implementors, who have the effective power in the system," and that "micro-implementation cannot be successful unless local delivery organizations undergo an adaptive process."  Incidentally, these reasons accord  closely with the assumptions of the "backward-mappers" of implementation who also identify the outcome of policy as resting with local institutions. These are the assumptions that "the closer one is to the source of the problem, the greater one's ability to influence it; and [that]  induce states to change substantially unless federal goals are shared;" and that "rather than buy compliance by offering a grant, the federal government achieves only the opportunity to bargain with states."  28  CHAPTER 2: A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS  the problem-solving ability of complex systems depends not on hierarchical control but on maximizing discretion at the point where the problem is most immediate" (Elmore 1982, p. 208). In terms of the drawbacks t o conceptualizing the implementation problem as a "center-periphery" conflict, it may be asked: what are we to make of the implementation gap when there is not such a dialectic, either as a result of a consensus on the policy or as a result of independent policy initiatives at the t w o levels?  2.3.4 Problematic  Nature  of Policy  Itself  In their search for an alternate explanation for the implementation problem,  Barrett  and Fudge (1981, p. 129) note that they keep "coming back again and again t o the question of policy [itself] as the key to the whole debate about implementation." nature of  policy as a single way of  generalizing the  This notion of the  multiple variables that  constrain  administrative action, was first suggested by Lowi (1964) when he observed that, depending on the kind of policy that is pursued, different types of pressures are brought to bear on the policy making process. Lowi's (1964, p. 688) argument was that: (1) The types of relationship to be found among people are determined by their expectations - by what they hope t o achieve or get from relating t o others. (2) In politics, expectations are determined by government outputs and policies. (3) Therefore, a political relationship is determined by the type of policy at stake, so that for every type of policy there is likely to be a distinctive type of political relationship. Thus, recognizing the fact that certain policies, simply by virtue of their nature, are candidates for implementation problems, some scholars have undertaken t o classify policies according to the following distinguishing characteristics which they believe are likely t o be consequential for implementation: (1)  what the policy content is in terms of its substantive subject matter;  (2)  what the policy seeks t o establish in terms of its goals and expectations;  (3)  the extent to which there is goal consensus on the policy;  29  CHAPTER 2: A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS  (4)  the amount of change or complexity involved in the policy;  (5)  whether the policy is of distributive, redistributive or regulatory nature; and  (6)  whether the policy concerns divisible or collective goods/services.  What the substance of policy is (e.g., public housing, transportation, education, agriculture, health, etc.) not only sets the stage in terms of the actors, agencies and interests to be involved in the implementation, but also influences the general dynamics of the process. Demonstrating this argument is the example by Temple and Temple (1980) in which the  authors  note  the following  intrinsic  attributes  of public  housing  that  may prove  consequential for implementation: (1)  the conspicuous fact that, despite housing per se being a basic need, its supply in the public domain is almost always short;  (2)  the fact that public housing is a divisible rather than a collective g o o d ;  (3)  the fact that public housing is usually priced at cost or lower compared t o the market value; and  (4)  the fact that public housing is extraordinarily visible, making success or failure less difficult t o discern.  As Temple and Temple view it, because of this substantive nature of public housing in which a basic scarce, tangible and conspicuous benefit is conferred on a small number of individuals at a cost lower than the market value, its impact on implementation is frequently such that individuals and groups with greater political power will seek t o acquire this benefit for themselves.  This makes shortfalls from such a policy likely due t o the intrinsic aspects of  centrally-provided housing than t o other causes. In similar ways t o the effects of substance, policy goals and expectations also help t o set the stage for what is put at stake, w h o is t o be indulged,^ in what arena and under what rules. This frequently determines the agenda for negotiations, as well as the attitudes, values and stances actors bring with them t o the process.  It might be said that the goals and  9. For example, Mazmanian and Sabatier (1981, p. 13) note that opportunities for participation in the process by actors external to the implementing agencies are often deliberately biased towards supporters of the policy.  30  CHAPTER 2: A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS  expectations of any policy largely establish the m o o d under which that policy's directives are further analyzed, objectified, put into effect and finally evaluated. In the case of the new capital,  for instance, it is not difficult to imagine that the mere expectation of building an  "ideal" city is apt, by itself, to impact on the housing standards/types considered, as is the expectation of building an administrative city, t h e latter would appear to suggest that mainly civil servants would inhabit the new city, and that the housing strategy should be developed with this class of residents in mind. The degree of conflict/consensus over goals and expectations is also held by many scholars to be another critical aspect of policy affecting implementation (Van Meter and Van Horn 1975; Berman 1980; Mazmanian and Sabatier 1981). This issue is specifically dealt with in section 2.3.6. Another hypothesis posited by Lindbiom (1959) suggests that the smaller the scope of behavioral change to be made, the less problematic successful implementation.  As Berman  (1980, p. 213) explains, this is because, in such a case, "implementation can be programmed along existing lines of authority and can consist of modifications to established standard operating procedures."  But "where policy involves major behavioral changes," resistance is  more likely as "existing routines have to be redesigned, replaced or sidestepped and new routines must be invented".  Mazmanian and Sabatier (1981) advance a similar argument by  pointing out that the "tractability" of the problem being addressed will probably impact on implementation. That is, in light of the truism that some problems are more manageable than others, depending on the level of uncertainty or the amount of knowledge that exists. In Lowi's typology, distributive policies are held t o generate low-level conflict for t w o reasons.  First, there are no clear winners and losers.  Second, the costs of benefits handed  out are absorbed by the system or distributed broadly across the larger population so that the cost to any one individual or group is negligible.  R e d i s t r i b u t e policies, on the other hand,  involve clear winners and losers but, because the dialectic is often between only t w o broad social groups (the "haves" and the "haves-not"), the conflict generated is held to  31  be  CHAPTER 2: A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS  moderate.  Regulatory policies, the last element of Lowi's typology, involves not only clear  winners and losers, but also the participation of numerous groups in the process which induces a high-level of conflict. Finally, using the basic framework provided by Lowi's three elements, Crindle (1980, p. 8) further observes that "a distinction can also be made between programs providing collective benefits, which encourage categorical demand making, and those providing benefits that  are  divisible, which  may  mobilize  more  particularistic  kinds  of  demands  at  the  implementation stage." So, as could be fathomed: Programs delivering collective goods such as the provision of light and water in urban slum neighborhoods may be readily implemented.... because the compliance of groups or localities affected will tend to be forthcoming with minimal amount of conflict or dissent. [Whereas] programs with divisible benefits such as housing, in contrast, may exacerbate conflict and competition among those seeking to benefit from them and may be more difficult to execute as intended. In assessing the difficulties  inherent  in viewing the implementation  problem as  stemming from the nature of policy itself, it is not hard to see that the classifications presented are broad and lacking in explicit criteria.  This reduces the prospects of using the  approach to predict and, possibly, preempt some of the problems of the policy process before they actually occur.  Furthermore, it is a major analytic problem to attempt t o define  the nature of policies in the public domain.  Such policies are usually politically charged and,  thus, defy neat categorizations and definitions.  Finally, it can be argued that any proposition  about a particular policy ultimately relates t o its nature, especially when this method of analysis is still in its infancy, and there are no widely accepted typologies (Quick 1980, p. 40).  2.3.5 Lack of Pressures  from  Target  Groups  In the work referred to earlier on Title 1 of ESEA, Murphy (1971) advances the view of implementation as a system of pressures and counter-pressures.  32  After finding that the  CHAPTER 2: A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS  problems of implementing federally initiated reform are related t o a number of causes including: (1) the fact that the reformers are not the implementors, (2) inadequate staff, (3) a law and tradition favoring local control, and (4) absence of pressure from the poor, Murphy suggests that the core problem is the absence of pressures from the poor and their allies in terms of being able to exert their demands on the system. This suggestion is not unlike the argument that gave rise to the era of advocacy planning in the U.S. around the same period of time. Building on the pluralist ideology, in which society's numerous and diverse groups compete t o shape public policy, advocacy planning, as envisioned by Davidoff (1965), argued that the reason the poor in the U.S. did not benefit from the reform programs of the Great Society is that they were largely unorganized and marginalized from the pressure system. Yet, in the system of pressure politics, public policy reflects primarily the interests of the well organized within the system. Thereafter, Davidoff envisioned transferring expert knowledge to the marginalized poor groups as a means of bringing them into the group pressure system. Thus, believing as does Davidoff that "the successful implementation  of  reform  depends heavily on the distribution of power," Murphy (1971, p. 39, 62) also proposed empowerment of the poor as the only real method of overcoming problems of the process. As he saw it, the balance of power is so tilted against the disadvantaged within the system that many more poor would have t o become organized on an individual basis, while banding together as communities on a nationwide basis to bring pressures to bear.  With specific  reference to the ESEA Title 1 program, Murphy wrote that: "the expansion of local counterpressures appears necessary and w o r t h the risk if we are serious about translating the spirit of Title 1 reform into educational practice." While it is unquestionable that the empirical evidence support the view that "pressure r-  politics" does describe some of the dynamics of the implementation process, Bardach (1977, p. 39) asks: What are we to make of the implementation gap when everyone is agreed on the principal objectives?  Presumably, in such a case, the dialectic of pressure and counter33  CHAPTER 2: A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS  pressure ceases t o exist and, therefore, could no longer shape relations and outcomes. is an interesting question but hardly a serious shortcoming for the interpretation.  This  It is a rarity  t o find a policy where there are c o m m o n views concerning both desired social ends as well as means toward them.  A more serious drawback to the interpretation is the conceptual  problem that results from the fact that "pressure" can become a catchall phrase which, by describing everything, describes nothing well.  2.3.6 Disagreement  over  Goals  Bunker (1972) is considered the originator of this interpretation.  In what Bardach  (1977) refers to as the earliest attempt he had found t o conceptualize the "implementation process" as a distinctive phenomenon of the policy process, Bunker suggests that a simple massing of "assent" is all that is required for successful implementation. As he had put it: For benefits consistent with the concept or design to be realized, those charged with carrying out the policy, and those to be affected by it, must yield some degree of assent. The requirement varies from passive but tolerant acquiescence on the part of some to scrupulous, informed and intense commitment for others who take responsibility for the guidance and execution of the plan (Bunker 1972, p. 72). Based on this, he envisages a solution scheme in which all relevant actors in the policy process are identified and located at some point in a three dimensional space defined by vectors of: (1) issue salience, or the centrality of the issue for a particular individual; (2) power resources, or the number/potency of political resources an actor has available; and (3) agreement, or position of an actor relative to that of an advocate of the policy.  It is these  dimensions which, when identified and weighted, would provide a summary estimate of the probability of policy implementation. "Disagreement over goals" as the core implementation problem is obviously an interpretation in g o o d currency, especially when it is considered that Lindblom's  (1959)  definition of a " g o o d " policy as the one on which political consensus can be found, held a great deal of sway in recent thinking.  Nevertheless, the interpretation contains several flaws,  34  CHAPTER 2: A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS  the least of which are the practicalities of the proposed solution.  As Bardach  sees it, the  chief problem with Bunker's view is its presumption that the same type of coalition politics characteristic of the policy-adoption stage, is also found at the policy-execution  stage.  Arguing that this is not the case, Bardach (1977, p. 42-3) suggests that implementation politics is distinguished from policy-adoption politics by the characteristic absence of coalitions and the  characteristic  presence  of  "defensive"  maneuvers and counter-maneuvers.  politics  involving  fragmented  and  isolated  He maintains that, in this special kind of politics, actors in  the process are generally concerned with what they might lose individually, as opposed to what might be gained collectively. While agreeing with Bardach that Bunker's interpretation entails some serious flaws, Shanks (1983, p. 48-9) disagrees that, because the politics of implementation necessarily takes a defensive form, it follows that coalitions cannot exist or  be forged.  In fact, Shanks argues  the opposite to be more likely, since individuals rarely perceive their self-interests in the abstract and are generally driven to action only upon the realization of actual impacts. Due to this uncertainty associated with individuals' expressing lucid opinions about things without the benefit of experience, it is more probable that, when  policy is being implemented, those  affected by it will feel the impact, as well as see the direction of what the actions produced, and be moved by this to mobilize accordingly.  Hinting at this likely scenario in his opening  paragraph, Bunker (1972, p. 71) writes: It is a worn, but important, truism that the real content known more accurately by observing uniformities in the charged with carrying out official dicta than by studying documents.... Until public behavior is affected, it is not public policy formation.  of policy can be behavior of those the formal policy proper t o talk of  O n balance, the real difficulty in accepting the notion of "disagreement over goals" as the central concept in explaining the implementation problem is that: as people, organizations and circumstances change, so do any previously made agreements.  Furthermore, if enough  time is allowed t o elapse, it is hard to imagine any set of agreements remaining firm.  35  This is  CHAPTER 2: A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS  the view taken by Pressman and Wildavsky (1984, p. 92) w h o find that not t o o far behind any agreements are several latent conflicts which only time can bring t o the fore.  2.3.7 Unfavorable  Disposition  of  Implementors  Another significant diagnosis of the implementation problem is the behavioral obstacle arising from the commitment or policy orientation of implementing officials. According to this diagnosis, unless a policy is introduced into a supportive environment, not just a neutral one, the responsible administrative agents are likely to derail the policy and undermine the process. This will be either because: (1) the officials are not aware that they are not in full compliance with the general intent, as well as the specific standards and objectives of the policy; or (2) their values and sense of self-interest or preferred courses of action are offended by the goals contained in the policy; or (3) the officials' negative dispositions cause them to defy program objectives by means of surreptitious diversion and evasion (i.e., through oversight and slack enforcement). As Sabatier and Mazmanian (1981, p. 13) explain: No matter how well a statute structures the formal decision process, the attainment of statutory objectives that seek to significantly modify target group behavior is unlikely unless officials in the implementing agencies are strongly committed to the achievement of those objectives. Any new program requires implementors w h o are not merely neutral but significantly persistent to develop new regulations and standard operating procedures, and to enforce them in the face of resistance from target groups and from public officials reluctant to make the mandated changes. In this view, "the major explanation" for the implementation problem is the failure on the part of implementing officials t o overcome their natural resistance t o change, and to develop enthusiasm and widespread acceptance for the policy's standards and objectives. Mazmanian and Sabatier (1981, p. 13) suggest t w o mechanisms available t o statutory framers t o reasonably assure that implementing officials have the requisite commitment to statutory objectives. supporters,  They suggest selecting or  assigning  top  responsibility  implementing for  officials from  implementation  to  a pool  agencies  of  policy  whose  policy  orientation is consistent with the statute and that will accord the new program high priority.  36  CHAPTER 2: A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS  2.3.8 The Complexity  of joint  Action  Whatever the underlying reasons, this is the story of t o o many cooks spoiling the broth.  Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) coined the phrase the "complexity of joint action" t o  illustrate implementation difficulties arising from the participation of t o o many actors in the process and the resultant blurring of lines of authority.  In the latter case where competing  government agencies at different levels have overlapping duties, no one may be willing or able t o exercise final authority and, consequently, no one does anything or they do as they wish.  In the former where a large number of disparate actors are involved in the process, the  consequences cannot but be: (1) proliferation of veto or decision/clearance points, (2) muddling of objectives due t o diverse perspectives, (3) heightened conflict and intergroup rivalry, (4) divided loyalty, (5) lack of coordination and (6) the diversion of energy in the playing out of a number of loosely interrelated games.  1  u  Arising "largely from the difficulty of coordinating the activities of several different units, each of which has its o w n goals and established routine," (Montjoy and O'Toole 1979, p. 473) the complexity of joint action always results in "disagreement" and "delay," an eventuality on which Pressman and Wildavsky (1984, p. 87) suggest we need not frown or be surprised.  In their view, if we come t o understand the complexity of joint administrative  action, we might wonder rather more why programs are attempted in the first place, or why they work at all, instead of expressing amazement at their shortfalls. The problem with this line of explanation is that not all policy implementation involve a multi-jurisdiction w e b of federal, state and local agencies, as well as a large number of nongovernmental organizations and private individuals.  Additionally, implementation problems  10. This last point is Bardach's (1977) major contribution to the field. In using the metaphor of "games" to describe the process, Bardach conceives implementation as a series of loosely interconnected activities of a multitude of quasi-autonomous actors directed at safeguarding what they already have, while simultaneously using this as leverage to attempt to gain access to those program elements not yet under their control.  37  CHAPTER 2: A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS  have been reported in programs involving only community or neighborhood participants (Gill and Thrasher 1985).  2.3.9 Ambiguous  Goals and  Communications  Ambiguity in policy goals, whether caused by design, misunderstanding, uncertainties or value conflict, is held by nearly all implementation researchers t o be a significant part of the implementation problem. This is especially the belief of t w o groups of researchers: (1) those w h o see implementation as basically  "putting policy into effect" (Pressman and Wildavsky  1973; Sabatier and Mazmanian 1979); and (2) those w h o are interested in policy evaluation (Weiss 1972; Rossi 1972; Ruthman 1984).  The argument from both camps is that "statutory  objectives that are precise and clearly ranked in importance serve as an indispensable aid in program evaluation, as unambiguous  directives t o  implementing  officials"  (Sabatier  and  Mazmanian 1979). It is assumed that, without the guidance of lucid program goals, evaluators would flounder and not be able to ask the relevant and insightful questions about the program; whereas implementing officials w o u l d be left with inadequate guidance, not only unaware of what behaviors are expected of them, but most likely t o fill in the gap using their own discretion which is almost always at odds with the original intentions. Commenting on a bureaucrat's typical response to similar quandaries, Kaufman (1973, p. 3) writes: "Confronted by demands he cannot satisfy, he will fashion his own policies to handle the situation. own policies often do not coincide with the policies of his leaders."  His  Hence, proponents of  this theme of the implementation problem focus on ways a statute or other policy directive can constrain what occurs during execution. In Sabatier and Mazmanian's (1979, p. 487-92) list of conditions for effective policy implementation, number t w o is that "the statute (or other basic policy decision) contains unambiguous policy directives and structures the implementation process so as to maximize  38  CHAPTER 2: A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS  the likelihood that target groups will perform as desired."  The constituent parts of this  condition are that: (1)  the policy objectives are precise and clearly ranked, both internally (within the specific statute) and in the overall program of the implementing agencies;  (2)  the financial resources provided to the implementing agencies are sufficient to hire the staff and conduct the technical analyses involved in the development of regulations, the administration or permit/service delivery programs, and the monitoring of target group compliance;  (3)  implementation is assigned to agencies supportive of statutory objectives that will give the new program high priority;  (4)  the statute (or other basic policy decision) provides substantial hierarchical integration within and among implementing agencies by minimizing the number of veto/clearance points and by providing supporters of statutory objectives with inducements and sanctions sufficient to assure acquiescence among those with a potential veto;  (5)  the decision rules of objectives; and  implementing agencies are supportive of  (6)  the statute (or basic constituency (interest) objectives to intervene liberal rules of standing for periodic evaluation target groups;  policy decision) provides ample opportunity for groups and sovereigns supportive of statutory in the implementation process through, for example, to agency and judicial proceedings and requirements of the performance of implementing agencies and  statutory  The unmistakable implication of this condition is that implementation would be smooth, if only policy directives input to implementing bureaus are unambiguous and non-contradictory in terms of stating exactly what is to be done and exactly w h o is to be responsible for doing what. Those w h o do not subscribe to this view find it an over simplification of implementation reality, in that it cannot be assured that unambiguous policy necessarily result in more faithful execution.  the  directives  As Shanks (1983, p. 55) points out, "one can  envisage a situation where overzealous concentration on defined policy objectives during implementation could lead to less than optimal results such as in the case of a clear shift in values from the time of policy formation to implementation."  Furthermore, continues Shanks,  " n o matter how clear the policy makers may think the objectives have been spelled out,  39  CHAPTER 2: A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS  implementors still have to apply their own process t o these objectives and, in some sense, the outcome of the process will reflect the characteristics of the implementation participants." So, in essence, what the condition calls for "are precisely those which political processes are likely to undermine" (Barrett and Fudge 1981, p. 19). Not only are there many g o o d reasons for expecting ambiguity in public policy directives but, in most situations, the phenomenon is wholly unavoidable. In  "Thinking about Programmed and  Adaptive Implementation,"  Berman  advances the argument that unambiguous policy (identified with the former) is not necessarily best for implementation, because it does not enable initial plans to be adapted to unfolding (local) events, decisions and circumstances. Yet, "it is necessary for policies t o be reinvented so that they better fit local needs" or "the needs and standard operating procedures of the agencies and individuals that carry them out" (Palumbo and Harder 1981, p. x-xi).  Whether  viewed as "mutual adaptation" (McLaughlin 1976; Browne and Wildavsky 1984) or "evolution" (Majone and Wildavsky 1979) or a "bargaining process" (Ingram 1977; Barrett and Fudge 1981), the unquestionable suggestion is that successful implementation requires flexibility in policies, so that they can be contextualized in implementation.  McLaughlin (1976, p. 169)  makes this observation: Where implementation was successful, and where significant change in participants attitudes, skills, and behavior occurred, implementation was characterized by a process of mutual adaptation in which project goals and methods were modified to suit the needs and interests of the local staff and in which that staff changed t o meet the requirements of the project. That is basically why, for many like Berman (1978, p.  168), "whatever  implementation  difficulties it may cause, ambiguity seems both inevitable and desirable in the political process of passing a law."  40  (1980)  CHAPTER 2: A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS  2.3.10  Faulty Theory  of  Action  Every policy implies a theory or causal relationship, observe Pressman and Wildavsky (1973, p. xiv). "The question is never whether a theory is there (it always is)....  A promise  underlies policy: if the actions we recommend are undertaken, g o o d (intended) consequences rather than bad (unintended) ones actually occur" (Wildavsky 1979, p. 35). Policy is an "ifthen" statement in the sense that - "If X is done, then Y will result."  (For a detailed  description of elements comprising policy theory, see Hoppe et al. 1987.)  Shanks (1983, p.  15) gives an example from water resources management t o illustrate this point: A policy might be adopted t o attempt t o reduce flood damages on a river floodplain. The policy could be further specified to include that it will be implemented by establishing a system of dykes along the river. This policy output embodies the hypothesis that, if the dykes are constructed t o particular specifications, then a defined degree of flood protection will be afforded t o the adjoining lands. Consideration of the policy output in this manner facilitates clear ex post evaluation. If, in June, lands, that were thought t o be protected, are flooded, research into the shortfall can proceed by dissecting the hypothesis. Were the dykes constructed t o the standard implied in the policy? Was some degree of protection provided, albeit lesser than anticipated? Is the hypothesized relationship between dykes and (flood) protection valid? Did the policy implicitly assume structural methods of flood control are the most effective means of reducing flood damages? These and other related questions flow from the policy when it is seen in the light of an "if-then" hypothesis. Shanks' question is not at all unfamiliar t o evaluation researchers w h o , upon finding that a program is ineffective, pose the crucial question: did the program's substantive theory fail or did its procedural theory f a i l ?  11  This is because:  Most basic policy decisions are based upon an underlying causal theory that can be divided into t w o components -- the first relating achievement of the desired end-state(s) back t o changes in target group behavior, the second specifying the means by which target group compliance can be obtained. Both  11. For example, in Pressman and Wildavsky's (1973, p. 147) analysis of EDA's Oakland project, they found that, in addition to implementation problems arising from the complexity of joint action, the program's "economic theory was faulty because it was aimed at the wrong target — subsidizing the capital of business enterprises rather than their wage bill. Instead of taking the direct path of paying the employers a subsidy on wages after they had hired minority personnel, the EDA program expended its capital on the promise that they would later hire the right people."  41  CHAPTER 2: A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS  the "technical" and the "compliance" components must be valid for the policy objective(s) to be obtained (Sabatier and Mazmanian 1979, p. 486). Thus, continues Shanks (1983, p 44), in order to conclude either a failure of theory or program, "one must be sure that the program was actually implemented in accordance with the expectations of those hypothesizing the particular causal process." Therefore, poor policy outcome can result from either valid theory poorly implemented or a faithfully implemented policy based on invalid theory (Rossi and Wright 1977). It is in the above regard that implementation increasingly came t o be viewed as "hypothesis testing," in which the chief problem is often times a faulty theory of action. This is evidenced by the fact that Sabatier and Mazmanian's (1979, p. 484) first condition for effective implementation is that: "The program is based on a sound theory relating changes in target group behavior to the achievement of the desired end-state (objectives)."  To make  certain that the centrality of this condition is not missed, or taken less seriously, Bardach (1977, p. 250) urges consideration of the following (humorous) hypothetical example: If congress were to establish an agency charged with squaring the circle with compass and straight edge - a task mathematicians have long ago shown impossible -- we could envision an agency coming into being, hiring a vast number of consultants, commissioning studies, and reporting that progress was being made, while at the same time urging in their appropriations request for the coming year that the Congress augment the agency's budget so that it might undertake the development of a new and more promising sort of compass. After five years, much money w o u l d have been spent in vain, congressional sponsors would have dissociated themselves from the whole enterprise, and scholars would gravely cluck over the program's problems of implementation. Whether it is in terms of aiding the researcher to ask the relevant cause-and-effect relationships questions, or in ascertaining early in the analysis whether a program's means for achieving goals are appropriate, there can be no dispute that conceiving implementation as hypothesis testing does provide an extremely useful method of focusing research on the process. The problem with the approach, however, is that, just as g o o d  implementation  cannot overcome bad policy no matter how hard we try (Patton 1986, p. 108), g o o d theory cannot overcome bad implementation.  42  CHAPTER 2: A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS  2.3.11 Faulty Study  Design  Almost all analyses of the implementation problem presume a t o p - d o w n perspective insofar as they take "substantive policy" to be the c o m m o n purpose or starting point from which  implementation  and everything else flows.  Contemporary  research, even  when  acknowledging the independence of action by actors in the process, still tends to operate on the assumption that there is a sense of common purpose about the process (Gill and Thrasher 1985, p. 40). Yet, when implementation is turned on its head and the behavior of "street-level bureaucrats," rather than those w h o formulate and convey policy, is taken as the starting point, the presumption of a c o m m o n purpose becomes questionable, t o say the least (Lipsky 1978; 1980). That is, the presumption that policy itself is the referent for all the actors in the process, and that everyone in the process is, by implication, genuinely intent on implementing the formally prescribed policy directives. . The net result of rejecting this t o p - d o w n approach to analysis is that policy deliverers or street-level bureaucrats become the primary actors in the process, with  others in the arena mainly providing the context  for their  discretionary  judgments (Lipsky 1978, p. 398). After all, in the unequivocal words of Berman (1978, p. 157), "the effective power to determine a policy's outcome rests with local deliverers, not with federal administrators." Thus, in contrast to the usual manner of interpreting the problem, the bottom-up perspective views the implementation difficulty as deriving from a faulty study design which, by presuming a standard measure of effectiveness based on policy statements, produces a systematic bias towards identifying implementation  "failures."  As Lipsky (1978, p. 398)  explains, besides it being common knowledge that formal policy goals intentionally reach for lofty and unrealizable aims: Analysts w h o continue to pursue a policy-chain approach will continue t o conclude that the system is ineffective in its o w n terms. Or they will continue t o observe that the system is unresponsive t o policy recipients and ultimately to itself, without having recognized that the articulated policy, in never  43  CHAPTER 2: A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS  addressing issues of the environment in which policy implementors practice, never addressed the critical issues of implementation. A focus on the work structure, in contrast, is a focus on what people do, not on an abstraction called "policy" or its fate. Gill and Thrasher (1985, p. 42) put the argument this way: "[because] the  street-level  bureaucrat has a propensity to define the implementation problem in ways which may conflict with those higher in the organization, there may be many different versions of policy and, therefore, many versions of what is implied by successful implementation." This fact that there are many different versions of policy has witnessed a daring move towards "goal-free" evaluation.  For instance, Scriven (1971, p. 1-2) finds the consideration of  goals in evaluation both unnecessary and contaminating.  His argument is that "the less the  external evaluator hears about goals of the project, the less tunnel vision will develop, the more attention will be paid t o looking for actual effects (rather than checking on alleged effects)."  Similarly, in reflecting on the validity of "forward-mapping" of implementation,  which might be said to accept the original policy sin as the beginning point, Browne and Wildavsky (1984, p. 208-9) dismiss the importance of goal-fixed evaluation, arguing that, "because the program is most intimate with its environment at the point of service delivery, much of the evaluation should occur there." What this implies is that the degree to which the  implementation  problem is  concluded t o occur, not only depends a g o o d deal on the point in time the evaluation is done, but also on the institutional level of policy where it is done.  Browne and Wildavsky  write: The outcome of the resulting chain of implementation decisions cannot be predicted or measured according to indicators of formal, t o p - d o w n hierarchies of control. The analytic onus is better placed on the decentralized, sometimes informal, and often unanticipated points of decision. Community politics, the behaviors of individuals outside the implementing domains, and the behaviors of individuals and groups within implementing organizations are recognized as determinants of policy outcome in backward mapping. In a recent treatment of this topic, Desai (1988, p. 268) accepts that programs have goals but denies that these goals have any relevance for evaluation.  44  He argues that the impacts of  CHAPTER 2: A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS  program can be better understand by "finding out what is actually done instead of what was intended to be done."  2.3.12 A Non-Participatory That  successful  Process  implementation  is  influenced  by  the  degree  to  which  target  populations (implementors and recipients alike) have participated in the decision making or planning, is an interpretation of the process favored mainly by planners and organizational change theorists, based on the assumption that people are likely to obey laws if they believe in them and feel a part of them (Zeleny 1982).  Despite that there is no established causal  relationship between level of participation per se and the acceptance of change, support has been found for the following related arguments: (1)  participation leads to higher staff morale, and high staff morale is necessary for successful implementation;  (2)  participation leads to greater commitment, and a high degree of commitment is required for effecting change;  (3)  participation leads to greater necessary for implementation;  (4)  beginning with the postulate of a basic resistance to change, the argument is that participation will reduce initial resistance and thereby facilitate successful implementation; and  (5)  subordinates will tend resist any innovation that they are expected t o implement if it is initiated solely by their superiors (Cross et al. 1971, p. 24-5).  One  inherent  difficulty  with  this  clarity about an innovation,  explanation  is that  the  wider  and clarity is  the  range  of  participation, the less likely is consensus or decision making; and, as Gross et al. would argue, consensus is necessary for successful implementation. Obviously, "the more open the system is and the greater the number of actors with decision and veto power, the less likely are decisions to be made. An open and complex decision process that functions at many levels is always in danger of eroding consensus and distorting its initial priorities" (Rein and Rabinovitz 1978, p. 328).  45  CHAPTER 2: A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS  2.3.13  Uncertainties Policies of all nature invariably involve substantial uncertainties, and it is frequently in  the implementation stage where these uncertainties must be resolved or, are at least, shown to exist. Defining uncertainties as the "unpredictabilities in factors which affect the success or direction of a course of action," Shanks (1983, p. 27) notes that one of its major effects on any public implementation process is " h o w values will have changed over time and thus perhaps shift the direction of the policy outcome from that which might have occurred in the absence of a value shift."  Another major source of uncertainties, and by far the commonest  source, is lack of knowledge or theory on the subject matter of policy.  Much has been said  on this already. Finally, there is the source of uncertainty deriving from not knowing what the political and socioeconomic future might bring.  Both the financial and political support for seeing  through a particular policy are usually projected based on current conditions, which are by no means immutable t o drastic changes. ^ 1  The sort of changes that may, and often do, occur  include: (1) a change in government and, hence, in policy commitment and orientation; (2) death or neutralization of a prominent political supporter of the policy; and (3) shock or recession in the economy, thereafter reducing resources available and, perhaps, inevitably forcing a change in priority. It is in light of these sort of uncertainties that Sabatier and Mazmanian (1979, p. 485), in the last of their five conditions for effective implementation, insist that: "The relative priority of statutory objectives is not significantly undermined over time by the emergence of conflicting policies or by changes in relevant socioeconomic conditions that undermine the statute's 'technical' theory of political support."  12. There can be no better example of this than the case involving Abuja, Nigeria, petrodollars and the recent international oil glut.  46  CHAPTER 2: A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS  2.4 COMPREHENSIVE Despite the  PERSPECTIVES  explosion of  ON THE IMPLEMENTATION  research on the subject,  there  PROBLEM  have been very  comprehensive frameworks developed for analyzing policy implementation.  few  The Van Meter  and Van Horn (1975) model is not only the first attempt, but the most comprehensive t o date. However, before discussing this framework as the theoretical basis for the dissertation, it might be instructive to reflect on other attempts at conceptual integration. To the extent that much of what these other attempts address does not differ importantly from what has already been said, except by way of a different arrangement, the discussion to follow is brief and purely descriptive.  2.4.1  Rein & Rabinovitz Rein  and  (1978), "Implementation:  Rabinovitz  (1978,  p.  308)  suggest  A Theoretical that  an  Perspectives"  understanding  of  the  implementation problem should be sought in terms of three imperatives: (1) the legal imperative to do what is right (i.e., respect among subordinates for legislative mandates); (2) the rational-bureaucratic imperative to do what is rationally defensible (i.e., application of the principles of "impersonality"); and (3) the consensual imperative t o do what is agreeable to contending parties w h o have a stake in the outcome. With respect to the first imperative, Rein and Rabinovitz (1978, p. 310) argue that legal imperatives will be most binding and lead to faithful implementation, when the following factors are positive: "(1) the strength and prestige of the legislation committee in which a bill originates; (2) the expertise of the committee's members, hence the presumption that the bill is technically sound; (3) the extent t o which areas of disagreement are squarely faced and clarified during legislative debate; and finally (4) the level of support for the law, among both lawmakers and the local communities where the legislation is implemented."  47  CHAPTER 2: A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS  But even when the above legal conditions have been satisfied, the authors warn that the law will be put into effect if, and only if, it does not offend the civil servants' sense of what is reasonable or just.  Though it is their suggestion that the  rational-bureaucratic  imperative would not be upset, insofar as the principles of the law remain  consistent,  workable and do not threaten the ways of the bureau. Finally, under the consensus imperative, Rein and Rabinovitz (1978, p. 313) note that both the legal and bureaucratic imperatives are ultimately subordinated to the preferences of the interest groups affected by the legislation. In their opinion, it is the consensuses of these groups that entirely govern implementation; a conclusion not unlike the one reached by Murphy (1971) w h o suggested that a simple massing of assent is all that is required for successful implementation.  2.4.2 Levitt The integration.  (1980), Implementing book  by  Levitt  (1980,  Public p.  153-9)  Policy contains  another  attempt  at  conceptual  Even though specifically developed for clarifying the problems of implementing  pollution control policies, Levitt states that the framework can be applied more widely to other policy studies.  The framework comprises three categories.  Under the technical  category are concerns relating to: (1) the nature of the problem, (2) the severity of the problem, (3) level of knowledge relative to the problem and (4) diligent application of technical knowledge to the problem. Under the administrative category are factors needed for introducing and carrying out the policy. These include: (5) the statutory expression of policy, or the administrative force of the policy, (6) instruments for policy, or the people, organizations and devices through which the policy is expressed, (7) the framework within which policy belongs, or areas/efforts related to the policy, (8) timetable for introducing the policy, (9) financial and resource costs, and (10) enforcement, or powers available to see through the policy.  48  CHAPTER 2: A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS  Last is the category of inter-organizational factors which include: (11) the interested organizations, (12) the roles of these organization, and (13) the relations between them. Appropriately, Levitt (1980, p. 159) suggests that this framework should be seen more as "an aid t o describing and identifying the important features of the policy process," rather than for diagnosing the problems of the process.  Otherwise, the framework can be criticized as  impossible to operationalize in comparative studies, as it involves t o o many variables, each of which is difficult t o define.  2.4.3 Mazmanian  and Sabatier  1981, Effective  Policy  Implementation  One other attempt at conceptual integration that has received a lot of attention has been that of Mazmanian and Sabatier (1981), which subsumes their earlier work (1979) on conditions of effective policy implementation.  Like Levitt (1980), their attempt also takes the  "recipe book" approach and lists all the factors they believe to have an affect on the achievement of policy goals.  These are listed under three broad categories: "(1) the  tractabiiity of the problem(s) being addressed by the statute; (2) the ability of the statute t o favorably structure the implementation process; and (3) the net effect of a variety of 'political' variables on the balance of support for statutory objectives."  The flow diagram of the entire  framework is represented in figure 2.5. The factors contained in the diagram are either self-explanatory or relate t o ground already covered.  New elements such as the "diversity of proscribed behavior" simply alerts  attention to the putative inference that "the more diverse the behavior being regulated, the more difficult it becomes to frame clear regulations and thus the less likely that statutory objectives will be attained" (Mazmanian and Sabatier 1981, p. 8). The non-statutory variable of "media attention t o the problem" is new and points t o how the mass media can influence the implementation process in two important ways.  First, by acting as an intervener between  proposed changes and perceptions of those changes by the general public.  49  Second, by  C H A P T E R 2: A F R A M E W O R K O F A N A L Y S I S  F I G U R E 2.5:  SKELETAL F L O W D I A G R A M O F T H E V A R I A B L E S I N V O L V E D I N T H E I M P L E M E N T A T I O N P R O C E S S  TRACTABILITY OF THE PROBLEM 1. 2. 3. 4.  AVAILABILITY OF VALID TECHNICAL THEORY OR TECHNOLOGY DIVERSITY OF TARGET-GROUP BEHAVIOR TARGET GROUP AS PERCENTAGE OF THE POPULATION EXTENT OF BEHAVIORAL CHANGE REQUIRED  NON-STATUTORY VARIABLES AFFECTING IMPLEMENTATION  ABILITY OF STATUE TO STRUCTURE IMPLEMENTATION 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.  CLEAR AND CONSISTENT OBJECTIVES INCORPORATION OF ADEQUATE CAUSAL THEORY FINANCIAL RESOURCES HIERARCHICAL INTEGRATION WITH AND AMONG IMPLEMENTING AGENCIES DECISION RULES OF IMPLEMENTING AGENCIES RECRUITMENT OF IMPLEMENTORS FORMAL ACCESS BY OUTSIDERS  1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.  STAGES (DEPENDENT VARIABLES) POLICY > OUTPUTS OF IMPLEMENTING AGENCIES  COMPLIANCE - --> WITH POLICY OUTPUTS BY TARGET GROUPS  SOCIOECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND TECHNOLOGY MEDIA ATTENTION TO THE PROBLEM PUBLIC SUPPORT ATTITUDES AND RESOURCES OF CONSTITUENCY SUPPORT FROM SOVEREIGNS COMMITMENT AND LEADERSHIP SKILLS OF IMPLEMENTING OFFICIALS  IN THE IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS  ACTUAL - - -> IMPACTS OF POLICY OUTPUTS  Source: Mazmanian and Sabatier 1981, p. 7.  50  PERCEIVED -•--> MAJOR IMPACTS OF REVISION POLICY IN STATUTE OUTPUTS  CHAPTER 2: A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS  influencing political support for policies through limited or undue coverage.  With perpetual  yearning for the new and dramatic, the mass media can usually manage t o focus attention on any given policy for only a short span of time. In sum, the framework's hypothesis is that effective implementation is likely when: (1) the policy objectives are precise and clearly ranked; (2) the policy incorporates a valid causal theory; (3) there are adequate resources; (4) the number of veto points in the implementation process is minimized and sanctions/inducements maximized; (5) the decision-rules of the implementing agencies are supportive of the objectives; (6) implementing officials have a favorable disposition towards the policy; (7) rules for outside involvement are liberalized to encourage wider participation; and (8) there are no new occurrences t o undermine the policy orientation and resource base (Mazmanian and Sabatier 1981, p. 14; Sabatier and Mazmanian 1979, p. 485).  2.4.4  Other  Attempts  at Conceptual  Integration  Other works that provide as good a classification or recipe as any includes Edwards' (1980)  Implementing  implementation:  (1)  Public effective  Policy,  which  claims  communication,  (2)  four  preconditions  adequate  resources,  for (3)  dispositions of implementors and (4) an appropriate bureaucratic structure. Larson's (1980) Why Government  Programs  Fail: Improving  Policy  effective supportive  Another is  Implementation,  which  maintains that there are five possible reasons for failure: (1) vague or unrealistic goals, (2) lack of  adequate  support,  (3) poor  implementation  procedures,  governmental action and (5) economic or environmental forces.  (4)  complexities  of  inter-  In "Implementing a Human  Services Program," Chase (1979) envisages obstacles arising from fifteen sources: the people to be served, the nature of the service, the likelihood of distortions or irregularities, the controllability of the program, money, personnel, space, supplies and technical equipment,  51  CHAPTER 2: A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS  and intersections with subsidiary agencies, other line agencies, elected politicians, higher levels of government, private sector providers, special interest groups, and the press. Collectively, these various efforts at conceptual integration provide a g o o d aid t o synthesizing thought about implementation and appreciating the complexity of the process. But  the  efforts  also  comprehensiveness.  clearly  demonstrate  the  potential  danger  of  any  attempt  at  Apart from frequently entailing prescriptions that cannot be met in the  real policy world, the frameworks generally result in producing a massive catalog or "recipe" of amorphous constraints that impinge upon effective implementation.  This places the  models beyond the reach of systematic empirical scrutiny. While the Van Meter and Van Horn model can also be criticized for t o o many variables, it will be seen that, by distinguishing between variables that have direct and indirect effect on performance, the authors were able to reduce the number of linkages between policy and outcome t o an empirically researchable sum.  2.4.5 Van Meter and Van Horn A Conceptual Framework"  (1975), 'The  Policy  Implementation  Process:  Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) base their framework on an adaptation similar t o Easton's (1965) systems theory of political life.  Both this adaptation and their model of the  implementation process are presented next in figures 2.6 and 2.7. As can be discerned, all six elements of this model (figure 2.7) have been covered previously.  Nevertheless,  both  these  elements  and  their  hypothesized  linkages  to  performance are covered by way of bringing together, in one framework, the several strands of theory advanced for explaining the problems of the process.  52  C H A P T E R 2: A F R A M E W O R K  O F ANALYSIS  FIGURE 2 . 6 : T H E POLICY DELIVERY SYSTEM  THE ENVIRONMENT OF THE SYSTEM  DEMANDS AND RESOURCES  CONVERSION PROCESS  POLICY  A  1 1  Source: Van Meter Van Horn (1975).  53  PERFORMANCE  FIGURE 2.7: A M O D E L O F POLICY IMPLEMENTATION  Source: Van Meter and Van Horn 1975, p. 463.  CHAPTER 2: A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS Policy Standards and Objectives Believing as d o Pressman and Wildavsky (1973, p. xiv) that "implementation cannot succeed or fail without a goal against which t o judge it," Van Meter and Van Horn view the identification  of  implementation.  performance  indicators  as a crucial  first  stage  in the analysis  of  By policy standards and objectives, they mean the elaboration of the overall  policy goals beyond the generalities of the legislative document, t o more concrete and operational objectives/targets.  The difference between the t w o is that numerical expressions  can usually be found t o substantiate the latter.  To actually determine what these standards  and objectives might be, the authors suggest using statements of policy makers as reflected in official documents such as program regulations and guidelines. ^ 1  Ultimately, they suggest  that the choice of performance measure should depend on the purpose of the evaluation. Policy Resources They define this as funds or other incentives contained in the policy t o facilitate obedient action.  While referring t o other sources for an elaboration on what they mean by  incentives and their utility, the authors note that funds allocated to programs are usually not adequate and, consequently, that the limited supply of incentives is a major contributor to the shortfall of programs.  13. Nakamura and Smallwood (1980, p. 74) give a more comprehensive list of ways to discern policy standards and objectives using cues from: (1) the "legal intent" of policy as written; (2) the "legislative history" of the policy; (3) the "understanding" of policy held by interest groups and other attentive elites; (4) the goals "developed" by participants during implementation; (5) the "translation" of a policy's goals from vague political language to more precise terms by evaluators; (6) the policy goals most consistent with "research requirements" of evaluators; and (7) "current policy makers" understanding of policy goals.  55  CHAPTER 2: A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS Inter-organizational Communication and Enforcement Activities In responding to the problem of inter-organizational communication, Van Meter and Van Horn (1975, p. 465-6), write that: Effective implementation requires that a program's standards and objectives be understood by those individuals responsible for their achievement.... If different sources of communication provide inconsistent interpretations of standards and objectives or if the same source provides conflicting interpretations over time, implementors will find it even more difficult to carry out the intentions of policy. Therefore, the prospects of effective implementation will be enhanced by the clarity with which standards and objectives are stated and by the accuracy and consistency with which they are communicated. As for enforcement activities, they point to several remedial measures that could be employed depending on the context.  Within the context of a single organization, they  envision t w o standard ways superiors can affect the actions of their subordinates: (1) through human resource powers stemming from recruitment, assignment, advancement and dismissal practices; and (2) through budgetary controls.  Within the context of  inter-organizational  relations where there are multi-jurisdiction interactions and no single line of command, they envision a different method of achieving influence involving: (1) provision of technical advice and assistance; (2) socialization, persuasion and cooptation; (3) joint participation in programs or  conditional  grants;  (4)  offering  valuable  services  as incentives;  and  ultimately  (5)  withholding funds, or the use of other explicit coercive power. The Characteristics of the Implementing Agencies Van Meter and Van Horn (1975, p. 471) list the following characteristics as likely to impinge on an agency's capacity to execute policy directives: (1)  the competence and size of an agency's staff;  (2)  the degree of hierarchical control of subunit decisions and processes within the implementing agencies;  (3)  an agency's executives);  political  resources  56  (e.g.,  support  among  legislators  and  CHAPTER 2: A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS  (4)  the vitality of an organization;  (5)  the degree of " o p e n " communication (i.e., networks of communication with free horizontal and vertical communication, and a relatively high degree of freedom in communications with persons outside the organization) within an organization; and  (6)  the agency's formal and informal linkages with the "policy making" and "policy enforcing" body. Economic, Social and Political Conditions By calling  for  the  incorporation  of  the  following  questions  about  the  policy  environment, Van Meter and Van Horn (1975, p. 471-2) move toward capturing the dynamic nature of implementation: (1)  Are the economic implementation?  resources  available  sufficient  to  (2)  To what extent (and how) will prevailing economic and social conditions be affected by the implementation of the policy in question [and vice-versa]?  (3)  What is the nature of public opinion; how salient are the policy issues?  (4)  Do elites favor or oppose implementation of the policy?  (5)  Is there partisan opposition or support for the policy?  (6)  To what extent are private interest opposition to the policy?  groups mobilized  support  successful  in support  of  or  The authors acknowledge that these questions have received little research attention, despite the plausibility that they may have a profound effect on the performance of implementing agencies.  Given the methodological problem involved, both in proving the effects of the  policy environment on implementation as well as in controlling for those effects, it is probably not by oversight that this area has been accorded limited analytical attention.  57  CHAPTER 2: A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS The Disposition of Implementors After discussing the six imperatives of the process, Van Meter and Van Horn (1975, p. 472-3) submit that: Each of the components of the model... must be filtered through the perceptions of the implementor.... Three elements of the implementors response may affect their ability and willingness t o carry o u t the policy: their cognition (comprehension, understanding) of the policy, the direction of their response toward it (acceptance, neutrality, rejection), and the intensity of that response. Regarding implementors' understanding of the goals and expectations of the policy, the authors point o u t that, under conditions of cognitive dissonance, officials may unknowingly impede implementation, first by screening out a clear message when it seems t o contradict deeply cherished beliefs and, second, by attempting t o redefine the message t o fit what is felt it ought t o have b e e n . ^ 1  Also, whether or not implementors accept/reject the policy's goals, or remain neutral towards them, is obviously going t o affect implementation. Van Meter and Van Horn suggest that officials may reject policy goals, or have their enthusiasm for them dashed, if the goals offend their personal value system, non-bureaucratic loyalties, sense of self-interest or the status quo. Finally, the intensity  of the implementors'  response  t o the policy  may affect  performance. Presumably, if implementors oppose the policy outright, it may lead t o its being ignored; if they are only lukewarm or neutral, it may lead t o a sloppy performance; and if they are enthusiastic, the chances of success are increased remarkably.  In the case of the second  scenario, Van Meter and Van Horn recommend being watchful for "surreptitious diversion and evasion." 14. The concept of "cognitive dissonance" by Festinger (1957) played an important role in the development of this hypothesis. Using the concept, Downs (1967, p. 180) similarly found that an official's "perception apparatus will partially screen out data adverse to his interests, and magnify those favoring his interests.... In formulating alternative actions, each official will tend to give undue precedence to alternatives most favorable to his interest."  58  CHAPTER 2: A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS Hypothesized Linkages Between Components of the Model The model specifies t w o sets of hypotheses: (1) the relationships between the independent variables and the ultimate dependent variable of performance, and (2) the relationships  among  the independent  variables. ^ 1  Beginning with  the standards and  objectives of the policy, the authors note they have only an indirect bearing o n performance, through their influences on inter-organizational communication and enforcement activities and, from there, t o the disposition of implementors. (See figure 2.8.) This includes influences from both the manner in which policy standards and objectives are communicated, and the extent t o which this communication promotes clarity as well as facilitates oversight and enforcement. Thus, policy standards and objectives have a significant influence on what the interorganizational enforcement rules turn out t o be, as well as h o w clearly and consistently these standards and objectives are transmitted t o the various implementing agencies.  The inter-  organizational communication and enforcement activities, in turn, then provide the terms of reference for relations between actors in the process, primarily between superiors and subordinates.  It is usually through these terms of reference that implementors develop a  good deal of their dispositions for the policy (e.g., their perceptions and interpretations of the policy intentions, arid their enthusiasm for compliance or otherwise). The causal linkages connecting policy resources t o outcome are shown in figure 2.9. The linkages show policy resources as having an indirect impact o n performance through three  components  of the model:  (1) the policy  environment,  (2) inter-organizational  communication and enforcement activities, and (3) the disposition of implementors.  15. It should be noted that Van Meter and Van Horn (1975, p. 462) suggest these linkages as explicitly representing "hypotheses which could be tested empirically, assuming that satisfactory indictors could be constructed and appropriate data collected."  59  C H A P T E R 2: A F R A M E W O R K O F A N A L Y S I S  F I G U R E 2 . 8 : C A U S A L L I N K A G E S B E T W E E N P O L I C Y DIRECTIVES A N D P E R F O R M A N C E  POLICY STANDARDS AND OBJECTIVES  v  ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES  INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL COMMUNICATION * MANNER OF COMMUNICATION AND PRESENTATION * CLARITY ABOUT WHAT IS TO BE DONE, BY WHOM, HOW AND WHEN  * * * *  MONITORING FUNCTIONS PUNISHMENT & INCENTIVE DEGREE OF DISCRETION JURISDICTIONAL LIMITS TO POWER  V  v  THE DISPOSITION OF IMPLEMENTORS * SEEING THE ADVANTAGES OF COMPLIANCE * SEEING THE DISADVANTAGES OF RESISTANCE  * PERCEPTIONS AND INTERPRETATIONS OF POLICY GOALS AND INTENTIONS  v  PERFORMANCE  Source: Adapted from the model by Van Horn and Van Horn (1975).  60  C H A P T E R 2: A F R A M E W O R K O F A N A L Y S I S  FIGURE 2 . 9 : C A U S A L L I N K A G E S B E T W E E N P O L I C Y R E S O U R C E S A N D P E R F O R M A N C E  POLICY RESOURCES  ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS  INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL COMMUNICATION  * MOBILIZATION IN SUPPORT OF POLICY * PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY * HEALTH OF ECONOMY  ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES  BOTH FACTORS, ESPECIALLY ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES, ARE A FUNCTION OF THE AMOUNT AND TYPE OF RESOURCES COMMITTED TO THEM BY THE POLICY DECISION  THE DISPOSITION OF IMPLEMENTORS ACCEPTANCE OF POLICY | GOALS ENCOURAGED BY WIDE PUBLIC SUPPORT | RESISTANCE ENCOURAGED BY NO PUBLIC SUPPORT I  COMPLIANCE ENCOURAGED BY THE PROSPECTS OF WORTHWHILE BENEFITS RESISTANCE ENCOURAGED BY LIMITED BENEFITS  PERFORMANCE  Source: Adapted from the model by Van Meter and Van Horn (1975).  61  CHAPTER 2: A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS  The hypothesis about the policy environment is that the availability of fiscal and other resources is likely t o stimulate participation, by either bringing otherwise inattentive actors into the process, or by causing those already in the process t o press for maximum involvement and benefits.  To the extent that broad based participation causes the complexity of joint  action, this component of the model is further hypothesized to have a direct bearing on performance.  Although questionable, Van Meter and Van Horn (1975, p. 476) venture so far  as t o assert that "environmental conditions may cause implementors to execute a policy without altering their personal preferences about that policy." The hypothesis about inter-organizational communications and enforcement activities is that both factors are a function of the amount of resources made available for them by the policy.  For example, technical assistance or audit services can only be offered if provided for  by the policy. Thirdly, the hypothesis about the disposition of implementors is that this can be influenced directly by both the type and quantity of resources perceived to be available. Van Meter and Van Horn (1975, p. 475-6) write: "when vast sums of money or other resources are perceived to be available, implementors  may view the program with added favor, and  compliance may be encouraged by the prospect of receiving a share of these resources. Conversely, support for a program will not be encouraged if implementors perceive that few benefits will be realized by active participation." Finally, on the linkages between characteristics of the implementing agencies and performance, Van characteristics  of  Meter  and Van  Horn  agencies that can affect  (1975, p.  477) note  the dispositions  the following  important  of their personnel,  facilitating or hindering effective implementation: (1) the nature of the  thereby  communications  network; (2) the degree of hierarchical control; and (3) the style leadership. They further note that "dispositions can also be influenced by the agency's formal and informal ties to the 'policy making' and 'policy enforcing' body." (See figure 2.10.)  62  CHAPTER 2: A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS  F I G U R E 2.10:  C A U S A L LINKAGES BETWEEN CHARACTERISTICS O F THE IMPLEMENTING A G E N C I E S A N D PERFORMANCE  CHARACTERISTICS OF THE IMPLEMENTING AGENCIES ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS  * FORM OF INTERNAL COMM. * DEGREE OF HIERARCHICAL VS INFORMAL CONTROL * STYLE OF LEADERSHIP  INTER-ORGANIZA. COMM. & ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES  THE DISPOSITION OF IMPLEMENTORS * BASIS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION & FOR CONCEPTUALIZING FORMAL AND INFORMAL RELATIONS  PERFORMANCE  Source: Adapted from the model by Van Meter and Van Horn (1975).  In summarizing the relevance of their model, Van Meter and Van Horn (1975, p. 47883) draw from the three general explanations of the implementation problem advanced by Kaufman (1973).  As the latter envisages it, the problem of implementation has three  dimensions -- (1) the communications dimension, (2) dispositional dimension -  the capability dimension and (3) the  in that order of increasing importance.  So, in mapping their  conditions for effective implementation, the authors propose the following:  63  CHAPTER 2: A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS  First, effective implementation requires that subordinates know what they are supposed t o do. Because problems may arise if subordinates fail to comprehend fully what is expected of them, policy standards and objectives must be transmitted to implementors clearly, accurately and consistently. Second, successful implementation requires that the implementing organization command the capacity to do what it is expected of it, as the ability to implement may be hindered by such factors as overworked and poorly trained staff, insufficient information and financial resources, or impossible time constraints. Finally, to achieve the objectives of policy, a favorable disposition is required on the part of the implementors, as implementation may fail because implementors refuse t o do what they are supposed to do. The willingness of implementors will be achieved if the policy directives do not: (1) offend implementors' personal values or extra-organizational loyalties; (2) violate implementors' sense of self-interest; or (3) alter features of the organization and its procedures that implementors desire to maintain.  2.5 SUMMARY  OF THE THEORETICAL  ARGUMENTS  The purpose of this chapter has been to b o t h ' review past approaches to explaining the implementation process, and propose a testable alternative way of organizing research concerning the issue.  In establishing the background to this end, the meaning of public  policy was questioned and found basically to mean what the government does (actions or inactions) and the reasons why (intentions); how the government does what it does (process); and the difference its actions make (intended or unintended impact). Similarly, perspectives on the meaning of implementation were reviewed, leading to the rejection of the mechanistic-rational understanding of implementation as a chronological, sequential process which begins only after broad policy intentions are transformed into tactical components.  Rejected also is the implied understanding that the process involves mainly  concerns about assembling, coordinating and managing resources for purposive ends.  In  proposing an alternative definition for the term, it was conceded that, due t o the natural inexactitude of policy and the attendant proliferation of discretionary powers at the lower echelons of the bureaucracy, implementation cannot but be viewed as an ongoing process of decision making by a variety of actors beyond the initial passage of legislation.  Though  circumscribed by the existence of an already authorized policy direction, this continuation of  64  CHAPTER 2: A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS  decision making is of a different type.  It, nevertheless, encompasses the task of translating  broad policy aims into routine procedures, which means that the necessary process involves far more than assembling, coordinating and managing resources for purposive end; it involves conflicts and choices about resource allocation.  Within the context of the developing  countries, this process was defined as the major arena in which policy making actually occurs. The review of past studies of implementation suggests that they have tended t o explain the problems of the process in anyone of thirteen ways or a combination thereof: (1) administrative control; (2) inadequate resources; (3) tense inter-governmental relations; (4) problematic nature of policy itself; (5) lack of pressures from target groups; (6) disagreement over goals; (7) unfavorable disposition of implementors; (8) the complexity of joint action; (9) ambiguous goals and communications; (10) faulty theory of action; (11) faulty study design; (12) a non participatory process; and (13) uncertainties. Given the difficulty of examining, in detail, the implications of each constraint on implementation, the comprehensive model of the process proposed by Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) was selected for use in this research. This model, while containing elements of each of the thirteen components, posits only the following three as having a direct impact on performance: (1) the characteristics of the implementing agencies; (2) the policy environment consisting  of  social,  implementing officials. disposition  of  economic  and  political  conditions;  and  (3)  the  disposition  of  Among these three components, the model further advances the  implementors  as  the  single  understanding the implementation problem.  most  inclusive  and  relevant  variable  for  This is on the basis of the argument that, even  when every other component of the process is favorable, a policy may still fail to achieve optimal results without a supportive disposition of the implementors, as each of these components must be filtered through their perceptions (Van Meter and Van Horn 1975, p. 472). In other words, implementation problems may still occur even when subordinates know exactly what they are supposed to do and have the necessary resources to do so. Hence, the  65  CHAPTER 2: A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS  primary concern of the dissertation is t o understand the outcome of housing efforts in Abuja in relation t o the disposition of officials. ^ 1  Van Horn and Van Meter (1975, p. 474) maintain that, in order for their hypothesis t o be empirically tested, "the researcher must gather multiple indicators of various elements of the disposition of policy implementors." imperative,  the dissertation  refutes  While this suggestion on method is accepted as an  the presumption  implementation rests solely with the implementors.  contained  in it that  the fate of  It should be evident that not all the  crucial influences during implementation come from actors w h o are formally responsible t o the implementing/administrative branch. As observed by Shanks (1983, p. 83), "some of the most influential individuals [e.g., attentive elites] may not formally be part of the process in question but, because of their actions, impact upon events and other individuals."  So, t o be  even more comprehensive, any implementation analysis should find it necessary t o examine the impacts of other relevant actors in the process. In the case of Abuja, besides the decision makers and senior level officials in the bureaucracy, the academics are one such group of relevant actors w h o deserve nearly as much attention as the implementors.  As a complex exercise requiring expertise of various  kinds, the new capital project witnessed a great deal of interactions between bureaucrats and academics, in which the latter basically supplied the theoretical norms for activities within and about the new capital through consultancies, positions on panels that looked into questions 16. It is important to understand here that, without the existence of two academic dissertations that explicitly considered the Abuja question, it may not be possible to be concerned, in the main, with this one variable of the model, chief variable or not. The two volume Ph.D. dissertation by Agba (1986) examined the problems of implementing the new capital project from the theoretical underpinning of whether an agency's internal or external environment is what determines its performance. In other words, which of the two factors influence implementation more: "the internal dynamics of organizations, such as management ability, financial resources, standard operating procedures, etc.;" or the exogenous dynamics such as "pressures from interest group politics, political instability, corruption, limited natural resources, etc." (Agba 1986, p. 46)? Therefore, Agba's study, of necessity, covers the effects on implementation of the other two important components of the Van Horn and Van Meter's model, namely: (1) the characteristics of the implementing agency and (2) the environmental conditions. Another senior undergraduate dissertation by Moore (1982) focused on the politics of the new capital in terms of events leading up to the decision, as well as those that occurred during the planning process and early construction period.  66  CHAPTER 2: A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS  of the new capital, conferences held on the subject, public opinion formulation in the mass media, etc..  The probable influence of this group in implementing the new capital takes on  more importance when it is considered that their dispositions toward the project may have impacted not only on the decisions that were made, but also on the conceptual frameworks of the implementors' themselves. Figure 2.11 gives an elaboration of the model as it applies to housing implementation in Abuja.  Evidence from this figure confirms that, while the dissertation's primary concern  remains with the disposition of implementors, other components of the model, which directly or indirectly influence performance, are considered.  A scholar, after reviewing five books on  implementation, once noted that: The implementation literature falls neatly into three categories. First, there are definitions of implementation with valuable conceptualizations of the implementation process and schemes for its analysis. Most of these.... rarely offer any empirical evidence in the form of case analyses. Second, there are many excellent case studies, which, however, recognize little debt t o these theoretical contributions.... [But] there are [only] a few works which combine a conceptual framework focusing on implementation with its application in one or more case studies (Alexander 1982, p. 133) lt is with this latter group of works that this dissertation resides.  67  FIGURE 2.11:  A N ELABORATION OF THE V A N H O R N A N D V A N METER M O D E L OF I M P L E M E N T A T I O N F O R H O U S I N G IN A B U I A  MASTER PLANNING  CHOICE OF WESTERN PLANNERS AN A T T I T U D E OF I N D I F F E R ENCE TOWARDS COST INADEQUATE CONSIDERATION OF THE NATURE OF LOCAL DEMAND FOR HOUSING PREOCCUPATION WITH WESTERN URBAN FORMS AND A E S T H E T I C S  THE D I S P O S I T I O N S OF POLICY O F F I C I A L S ABUJA  »  POLICY  *  BUILD C I T Y SYMBOLIC OF NATIONAL PRIDE * PROVIDE B E S T HOUSING STANDARD A F F O R D A B L E IN NIGERIA  * * * * *  ECONOMIC,  BUILD AN IDEAL WESTERNTYPE CITY BUILD AN E X C L U S I V E ADMINISTRATIVE CITY AVOID INDICATIONS OF LAGOS MONEY/COST NOT AN O B J E C T HOUSING QUALITY MORE V I T A L THAN A F F O R D A B I L I T Y LOW-COST HOUSING U N F I T FOR THE NEW C A P I T A L ' S IMAGE  SOCIAL  AND P O L I T I C A L  NEPOTISM AND ETHNIC P O L I T I C S • E X P O R T PLANNING OVERSEAS •DESIGNED INEPTNESS OF FCDA •WRONG P E O P L E IN WRONG JOBS AND CONTRACTS •RESTRICTED ACCESS TO PLOTS  BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION  IMPLEMENTATION  P O L I . AND E C O N . INSTABILITY  STRATEGIES  COMPLETE HOUSING FOR C I V I L SERVANTS ONLY NO S E L F - H E L P / B A S I C HOUSING PREFABRICATED B L D G . SYSTEM WESTERN STANDARD OF HOUSE D E S I G N , MATERIAL (. LAYOUT LOW DENSITY OF DEVELOPMENT SEGREGATED DEVELOPMENT  CONDITIONS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  ACTION  IMITATION CULTURE  • B I A S FOR FOREIGN • L A C K OF O R G A N I •GENERAL PREFERCONSULTANTS AND ZATIONAL CONTROL ENCE FOR WESTERN AND CONTINUITY SOLUTIONS CONSUMPTION • R E J E C T I O N OF •SUPER F A S T - T R A C K PATTERNS SELF-HELP PLANNING AND • D I S R E S P E C T FOR • I N F L A T E D HOUSING IMPLEMENTATION NATIVE TYPE •ABANDONMENT OF CONTRACTS/COSTS HOUSING/MATERIAL l9% OF HOUSING • U S E OF AMATEUR •INFLAMMATION OF STARTS BY FCDA CONTRACTORS CORRUPTION  Source: Author. (Based on figure 2.7.)  PERFORMANCE  PROCESS  *  HIGH CLASS  *  CULTURALLY AND Q U A L I T A T I V E L Y UNSOUND HOUSING DEVELOPMENT  CITY  *  NON-AFFORDABLE HOUSING  *  EXCLUSION OF NONC I V I L SERVANTS  *  SHORTAGE OF P R I V A T E RENTAL ACCOMMODATION  *  DEVELOPMENT OF SQUATMENTS  *  RELEGATION OF LOWINCOME HOUSING TO C I T Y OUTSKIRTS  C H A P T E R 3: M A T E R I A L S A N D M E T H O D  IN FEBRUARY 1976 THE NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED THE DECISION TO MOVE ITS CAPITAL FROM THE COASTAL METROPOLIS OF LAGOS TO ABUJA, A VAST UNDERDEVELOPED REGION IN THE HEARTLAND OF THE COUNTRY. IN PRESENTING THIS DECISION AS THE CASE FOR ANALYSIS, THIS CHAPTER EXPLORES THE HISTORY LEADING UP TO THE DECISION, THE RATIONALE FOR THE RELOCATION, BASIC CONCEPTS AND THE PHYSICAL FORM OF THE NEW CAPITAL, THE ADMINISTRATIVE MACHINERY FOR TRANSFORMING THE DECISION INTO REALITY AND THE MATERIAL SETTING OF THE NEW SITE. THE CHAPTER ALSO DESCRIBES THE STUDY'S METHODOLOGY INCLUDING SOME FIELD RESEARCH ISSUES.  3.1 THE CASE OF ABUJA 3.1.1 History of the New Capital  Movement  1  Although founded and occupied by a British occupation force since 1861, Nigeria's name and current boundaries were not forged until 1914 when the British, under Lord Lugard, amalgamated its t w o west African protectorates, the northern and the southern protectorates. It was in the wake of this amalgamation that the location of the country's capital was first contemplated.  Previously, the northern and southern protectorates were administered from  Lagos and Kaduna, respectively.  Soon t o be the first governor of the newly created country,  Lord Lugard contemplated the location of a capital for Nigeria and recommended to the British Government that Kaduna be selected. Having assumed the choice of location t o be restricted t o either Kaduna or Lagos,^ Lugard rationalized his recommendation by pointing t o the advantages of the former, while emphasizing the impropriety of the latter. As the prospective governor saw it, the benefits of Kaduna, as capital, included its mild climate and central location which was accessible by rail 1. This is covered extensively by both Moore (1982) and Agba (1986). Their efforts will not be reproduced here. 2. Another logical consideration would have been Lokoja, a relatively small, central confluence town between the Niger and Benue rivers. Previous to the establishment of the two protectorates (1900 1914), this town had served as headquarters for the Royal Niger Company which oversaw British trading and administrative interests in that region of Africa.  69  CHAPTER 3: MATERIALS A N D METHOD  from other major population centers of the country.  Lagos, on the other hand, entailed  disadvantages such as lack of land for growth, swampy terrain, hot and humid atmosphere during much of the year, established slums and unsanitary conditions, and the difficulty of isolating Europeans from indigenes (Abumere 1984, p. 14-15).  In short, Lugard was appalled  by Lagos and suggested that its selection over Kaduna w o u l d be "irrational," pure and simple. But, as history testifies, Lugard's exhortation was not heeded to by the colonial government as Lagos was chosen. Notedly, however, this decision did not remove pressures for a different location than Lagos.  Instead, the issue was submerged politically for almost four decades, resurfacing at  nearly all the constitutional talks held between the late 1940s and 1950s. After the country's independence in 1960, the relocation debate might be said to have taken on a strictly Nigerian flavor.  A United Nations' (1964) Report on Metropolitan  the option of relocating the capital.  Lagos explicitly considered  Despite sounding out reasons that might justify such a  move, the study found the option to be short on benefits and high on costs. It seemed that, up to 1967 when an independent government of Nigeria tinkered for the second time with state boundaries bringing the total number from 3 to 12, it remained unmoved from the commitment t o Lagos as the capital. However, the commitment t o Lagos was later t o change with the events of the late 1960s and early 1970s which radically changed the face of politics in the country. was a bloody civil war (1967-70) along ethnic lines.  First, there  Second, the population of the Greater  Lagos more than quadrupled from 665,246 thousand in 1963 to an estimated 3.0 million in 1975  (Agba  1986,  p.  135), thereby  making  more  conspicuous  and  intolerable  inadequacies of the city that so appalled Lugard at the beginning of the century.  those  And, finally,  with the advent of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the consequent windfall (viz. "petro-dollars"), the country appeared to command for the first time the financial might t o undertake a bold action in response to the issue.  70  CHAPTER 3: MATERIALS A N D METHOD  In fact, in retrospect, it might be accurate to say that events since Lord Lugard's advice was rejected in 1914, served t o either delay a decision on relocation or t o pave way for it. With the three aforementioned powerful forces at work, the Nigerian government, in August 1975, under the leadership of General Murtala Mohammed, established a panel to examine once and for all the issue of relocating the national capital.  The panel, headed by Justice  Akinola Aguda, had the following mandates: (1)  to examine the dual role of Lagos as a State, and Federal Capital and advise on the desirability, or otherwise, of the city retaining that role;  (2)  if the committee found that Lagos was unsuitable for the dual role, it should recommend which of the t w o governments should move to a new capital; and  (3)  if the committee found that the Federal Government should move out of Lagos, it should recommend suitable alternative locations, having regard t o the need for easy accessibility to and from every part of the country (Report of the Committee 1976, p. iii).  Reflecting on these mandates, one could easily see how their stringed nature might bias the panel's orientation, both in finding Lagos unsuitable as the capital and in recommending that the federal government, not the state government, should move to a new location. From the point of view that any body of individuals, once constituted, behaves like a living organism by gearing every effort towards survival, it was unlikely that the panel would have stopped short of exhausting all the potential mandates assigned t o it.  Conceptually, the panel had three  lives t o live -- the lives that w o u l d result from: (1) determining the desirability of Lagos; (2) deciding which of the federal and state governments should relocate; and (3) selecting a new site for the relocation. To live out these lives, the panel may have found it necessary to make these decisions so that they lead into one another. In any event, less than four months from its inception, on December 10, 1975, the panel reported with findings that showed Lagos to be deficient as the national capital for several critical reasons: (1)  The city of Lagos is incapable of functioning as both a Federal Capital and a State Capital, due to the problem of inadequate land for development commensurate with its status as the Capital of Nigeria.  71  CHAPTER 3: MATERIALS A N D METHOD  (2)  Lagos is identified predominantly with one ethnic group. A new capital in a more central location would provide equal access for Nigeria's great diversity of cultural groups.  (3)  A new capital is desirable that would be secure, ethnically neutral, centrally accessible, comfortable and healthful, and possess adequate land and natural resources t o provide a promising base for urban development.  (4)  A new capital is needed as a symbol of Nigeria's aspirations for unity and greatness (Master plan 1979, p. 27).  These recommendations came as no surprise t o most Nigerians. Even less surprising, was that without wasting any time, the Federal Military Government of General Murtala Mohammed, o n February 5, 1976, promulgated Decree Number 6 — The New Capital Territory Act — which appropriated lands formerly belonging t o Niger, Plateau and Kwara states for the new capital and created a new bureaucracy, the Federal Capital Authority (FCDA), t o execute the decree.  3.1.2 Rationale  for  Relocation  The decision to transfer the country's capital was rationalized on eight grounds. was the dual role of Lagos, both as a national and state capital.  First  Since serving as the capital  from 1914 till 1966, Lagos had largely been governed as an independent federal territory, not spatially or administratively tied t o any region.-*  However, things soon changed with the  second creation of states in 1967, when an independent Lagos together with the "rural districts" of the Colony became Lagos State.  This made the creation of a new state  government immanent, and Lagos at this time commenced serving its historic role as capital for both the country and the state of Lagos;  a role which has been synonymous with "the  planning confusion in metropolitan Lagos" (Report of the Committee 1975, p. 32). Areas of this confusion included fisheries development, municipal affairs, housing, land tenure, etc. (Agba 1986, p. 140). It was observed in the literature review (Chapter 2), that it is usual in  3. In 1951, the MacPherson Constitution segmented Nigeria into Eastern, Western and Northern regions with respective regional headquarters at Enugu, Ibadan and Kaduna. Lagos, while remaining the country's capital, was added to the Western region and ceased to be an independent territory. In 1953, however, an amendment to the federal constitution reversed the position of Lagos, which reverted to an independent federal territory.  72  CHAPTER 3: MATERIALS AND METHOD  places where different levels of government have overlapping responsibilities, that either nothing gets done or each level of government does as it wishes. The city of Lagos was such a place. Another dimension t o the duality of Lagos concerns its role as both the administrative and economic center of the country. On the administrative side, it is estimated that about 80 per cent of all federal civil servants reside in Lagos. This is approximately one million persons including their families.  Economically, Lagos is estimated to account for 38 per cent of all  industrial establishments in the country; 45 per cent of total industrial wages and salaries; 63 per cent of total industrial investment; and 58 per cent of total industrial output (Adeniyi 1984, p. 3-4). These figures make Lagos undoubtedly the country's commercial and industrial hub. A second ground for relocation has been referred to as the lack of elbow room in Lagos. Apart from the land area of only 62 sq. miles, the disjointed nature of the city's terrain, broken  by  lagoons and  creeks, makes the site even more  difficult  for  development.  Reclamation of land is made impossible by the enormous costs involved (as was demonstrated by the cost of the National Theater building which was erected on a reclaimed site); and the country's  level  development.  of  technology  which  precludes  any  serious  consideration  of  vertical  So, with a population density of over 65,000 persons per square mile and an  annual population growth rate of about 10 per cent, it was felt that one of the critical problems of Lagos is a lack of adequate land for expansion.  For example, to adequately  accommodate the approximately one million persons that are said to be connected with the federal civil service, it was estimated that 77.6 square miles of land are required in addition to the currently existing federal structures (Report of the Committee 1975, p. 33). According to this rationale, there is simply not enough land t o plan effectively for Lagos. A third rationale is the desire for a comfortable and healthy environment. Starting with transportation, Lagos is considered an unlivable city because of its go-slow  traffic  problem, which is no-go most of the time. Despite its low level of motor vehicle ownership, which was less than 22 vehicles per 1,000 population in 1974 (Agba 1986, p. 137), the traffic  73  CHAPTER 3: MATERIALS AND METHOD  problems of the city confound those found in cities several times its size. Housing is another conspicuous urban problem that impinges on the city's livability.  Apart from an acute  shortage estimated to be in the excess of 40,000 units (Agba 1986, p. 138), housing conditions in Lagos are deplorable with 73 per cent of households averaging nearly four persons per household occupying a single room; 28 per cent of the housing has no running water and 56 per cent is not equipped with flush toilets. (See table 4.2.) Even though Lagos was provided with pipe-borne water in 1915 and was declared a first-class township in 1917 (Agba 1986, p. 132), water shortages and power failures are still not considered an anomaly by residents of the city. Lagos, the Report of the Committee  on the Location  In terms of the sanitary condition of  of the Federal Capital  (1976) had this  to say: "Lagos remains one of the dirtiest capitals in the world, as most parts of the city suffer from perennial stench...."  Finally, as far as security is concerned, the crime of armed robbery  is punishable by firing squad.  This has been the government's response for many years but  the problem has continued unabated, and Lagos is the one Nigerian city where burglary, armed robbery and other related crimes are rampant.  It is Nigeria's most unsafe city, forcing  all of its residents to live in a constant state of carefulness. All of this suggests that the horrid conditions of urban life in Lagos and the prospect of a better life elsewhere were, without a doubt, a contributing factor in the movement t o relocate. A fourth rationale for deciding to move is the issue of national unity and ethnic neutrality. It is common knowledge that Nigeria is a multi-ethnic country with over 250 language and cultural groups, and that the country has been riffed by ethnic rivalry from its inception.  As such, there has always been a widespread feeling in the country that unity  among such a great diversity of peoples is not served by the fact that Lagos, in 1963, was 72.20 per cent Yoruba, 15.46 per cent Ibo, 3.17 per cent Edo, and 2.05 per cent Hausa. The remarkable thing about this distribution is that the Yorubas are not even the largest of the country's ethnic groups.  Lagos, obviously, is a Yoruba land and with such a lop-sided ethnic  mix, it was felt that the city, as capital, is inimical to the spirit of national unity as it could  74  CHAPTER 3: MATERIALS A N D METHOD  never be a place where all Nigerians could lay claim t o every available right, privilege and resource on an equal footing. This could only be achieved in a sort of no-man's land where no one ethnic group predominated. The fifth and sixth rationales for choosing t o build a new capital are strategic in nature and concern issues of security and centrality. To the extent that conventional warfare is likely to be the dominant form in Africa for sometime t o come, it was felt that a coastal capital would be harder to defend from an external incursion than an inland one. Furthermore, it was felt that a capital located in the spatial heartland of the country would bring the government closer to the governed, and assure that citizens from the extreme parts of the country are afforded roughly equal physical access in terms of distance. Lagos, as one of the old colonial capitals of Africa, was established along the coast chiefly to serve the commercial and functional purposes of the imperial power. National pride is another reason cited for relocating the capital.  As the most  populous country in Africa with more than 100 million persons (Morah 1987), and the wealthiest in terms of natural resource endowments, Nigeria is regarded by both its nationals and outsiders as the "black giant" of Africa and, consequently, the world.  It might be said  that Nigerians regard their country as destined to be great, a leader of the black world and a force t o be reckoned with in the international arena on matters political, economic and cultural.  Normally, in ex-colonial countries, capital cities symbolize the culmination of this  aspiration to become a member of the "Newer W o r l d " (Hamdan 1964, p. 239).  Lagos, with  all its aggravated urban problems, not only failed to provide this feeling of belongingness but, as remarked by the panel on the location of Abuja, the city's "conditions are a disgrace t o a country like Nigeria." Equally a disgrace was the fact that Lagos remained the most evident footprint of Imperial Britain in Nigeria; a situation which was neither admirable nor consistent with the concept of a new, independent country. Thus, for those with nationalist sentiments, building a new capital would signify having arrived in the new world, a coming of age into sovereign  75  CHAPTER 3: MATERIALS A N D METHOD  statehood and a complete break from years of colonial rule. The new capital would represent a symbol of national pride. An eighth rationale for relocation is the overall issue of efficiency in administration. Evidently, efficiency in government stands to be served if the new capital reduces the incredibly high idle capacity of both people and machines in Lagos resulting from the city's infamous go-slow traffic and intermittent power and water supply.  Furthermore, t o the extent  that healthy living correlates positively with productivity, it is likely that an improved urban environment in a new location would translate into a net gain in administrative efficiency. Finally, there are the regional development arguments for moving the capital.  Even  though advanced mainly after the issue of the new capital had been decided, the idea of using the decision to promote a more even and spatially balanced development in Nigeria became very strong. Virtually all academic commentaries on the new capital suggested that, given the eccentricity and primacy of the old colonial capital of Lagos, Abuja should serve as a device for attaining better regional balance and greater territorial integration (Nwafor 1980; Adeniyi 1984).  It was also suggested that the new capital should be used t o stimulate  development in the hinterland of the region in which it is located; and to reduce population pressures on the country's major centers, especially Lagos, by redirecting flows of rural-urban migration.  In fact, given the enormous costs involved in building a new capital, most  academics and professionals in Nigerian felt that the rationale for relocation should not be accounted for mainly by such factors as "national pride" and the like. The new capital should symbolize a renewed optimism for development in general, an opportunity to experiment with a new  approach  to  national  development  inspired  by  spatial  theories  of  economic  development. Thus, it would seem that the rationale for the project rests on: (1) the dual role of Lagos, both as a national and state capital and as the administrative and economic center of the country; (2) the lack of "elbow r o o m " or adequate land for development in Lagos; (3) the desire for a more comfortable and healthy environment than is provided by Lagos; (4) the  76  CHAPTER 3: MATERIALS A N D METHOD  desire t o enhance national unity by avoiding the lop-sided ethnic mix of Lagos; (5) the need to better secure the country's capital from the possibility of an external incursion; (6) the desire to bring the government closer t o the people through a more central location that affords citizens from the extreme parts of the country roughly equal physical access in terms of distance; (7) the desire to provide a symbol of national pride, of having arrived in the new world after years of subjugation under colonial rule; and (8) the notion of using the new capital t o promote a more spatially balanced development by stimulating development in the hinterland of the new capital region.  However, in reflecting on these justifications as well as  the general history of relocation, three distinct impressions are formed as the more likely impetuses behind the decision to move the capital: (1) Many Nigerians were dissatisfied with the appearance of the former capital of Lagos and the impression that it gave of the country to the outside world. (2) The northern Hausa-dominated decision making system in the country did not like the idea of having to conduct the nation's affairs from a capital situated far away in the (hostile) south. (3) Notwithstanding these pressures, Abuja would have remained a dream, had it not been for the oil b o o m of the 1970s . The validity of these justifications are clarified as the discussion in this chapter progresses.  3.1.3 Basic Concepts  and Physical  Form of the New  Capital  Ranked in order of precedence by Todd (1984, p. 119-9), the broad official aims for 4  the new capital were: (1)  to provide a physical symbol of national unity and of Nigeria as a symbol of pan-African unity;  (2)  to provide a physical expression of the ideal of constitutional government;  (3)  t o provide a cultural and symbolic center for West Africa;  democratic  4. Todd was vice president of the IPA as well as the director of Wallace, McHarg and Todd Inc. which was one of the three planning firms that constituted the International Planning Associate (IPA). The latter was responsible for preparing the master plan for the new capital, and Todd was the director in charge of Site Evaluation, City Site Selection, Concept Planning, Urban Design, Master Planning and Community Services Planning (Master plan 1979, p. 285).  77  CHAPTER 3: MATERIALS A N D METHOD  (4)  t o provide symbolic institutional and physical expression of the unique features of constitutional government forms as adapted t o conditions and requirements particular t o Nigeria and t o traditional Nigerian governmental and cultural institutions;  (5)  t o provide a model of planning, urban design, organization of governmental functions, housing, and public services for emulation in new communities in Nigeria and West Africa;  (6)  t o provide in black Africa a metropolis including all the cosmopolitan elements and institutions characteristic of those cities generally acknowledged as world capitals; and  (7)  t o provide a high environmental standard for the inhabitants of the city that represents the best that can be afforded in Nigeria.  „  Nowhere in these goals was there a mention of building a city that resembles a western city, or in building an essentially administrative capital for that matter. If anything, the goals imply a multi-purpose city that would include an industrial and commercial base.  It is true that the  goals called for providing a high environmental standard for the city, but this was qualified by specifying that such a standard should, nonetheless, be the best that can be afforded in Nigeria. The non-specific and rather ideological nature of these goals, however, allowed room for the FCDA officials t o exercise their disposition.^  Consequently, the guidelines they  developed for the preparation of the new capital's master plan do not accord closely with the broad aims expressed: (1)  the master plan target is the year 2,000;  (2)  the new capital is t o have a permanent population of 150,000 persons in residence upon inauguration in 1986;  (3)  the new capital will be permitted t o grow t o a maximum population of approximately 3 million, after which population growth will be accommodated in satellite towns;  (4)  the new capital will be an administrative city and will not be oriented t o developing broad economic base characteristics of the other large cities of Nigeria, or what would be typical of a primate city; and  (5)  the new capital and Federal Capital Territory will have a limited quantity of light industrial, agricultural research and development, and housing activities t o  5. One of the responsibilities of the F C D A included the preparation of a master plan for the capital city. (See section 3.1.4.)  78  CHAPTER 3: MATERIALS AND METHOD  provide a city building industry, t o foster social diversity, and t o provide support service facilities related t o unique capital city needs. Such nonadministrative, institutional, or industrial activities that take place to build and serve the city will be compatible with the environment (Master plan 1979, p. 55). 6  Beyond digressing from the spirit of building a cosmopolitan metropolis for all Nigerians, the guideline contains irreconcilable contradictions and raises all sorts of questions. For example, could a purely administrative city ever grow t o 3.0 m i l l i o n / or serve as a "growth center," providing catalyst t o development of the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), as suggested by one of the rationales for relocation?  Given guidelines 4 and 5, it is unlikely that  the new capital would have significant effects o n its hinterland because, as basically a " n o n propulsive" establishment, without strong "forward and backward linkages,"** the city w o u l d tend t o require less labor and raw materials from its surrounding areas.  Almost all wage  employees of the new city would be relocated from the former capital, with few positions available for unqualified rural migrants. Design wise, the basic concept is for the new capital t o be a proud expression of both Nigerian urban traditions and the ideal of a constitutional democracy.  Appropriately, a  centrally-oriented city plan form was decided u p o n , ^ focusing o n the structures that will 6. It is interesting to note that the master plan avoids listing an explicit aspect of the guideline stating that "population shall be controlled to the extend that the new capital will not be permitted, as Lagos, to become target of migrating populations in search of employment. Squatter will be displaced" (Todd 1984, p. 119). 7. Perhaps more interesting is the question of what process was used in selecting this maximum size for the city, as no explanation was provided for this and the issue was not among those considered by the Aguda panel on relocation. Even though it was unclear to him "why the military would select an apparently arbitrary size instead of basing such a figure on projected employment figures, possible migration levels, or other analytical studies, Moore's (1982, p. 51) best guess is that the decision was made by the military politicians. A possible explanation is that the military, having minimal knowledge in the construction of new towns, did not find this issue worthy of wasting time on. 8. A "propulsive" entity is a type of dominant economic unit which, when it grows or innovates, induces growth in other economic units or sectors. As originally presented by Perroux, this unit is normally an industry with tangible productive capacities (Hansen 1972). Using the case of a cement industry to demonstrate forward and backward linkages, Hirschman (1958) writes: "the manufacturing of multi-wall bags for packaging process represents backward linkages, while the establishment of a cement block industry represents a satellite formation by forward linkages." 9. A study of 27 Nigerian cities by the International Planning Associates (IPA) "supposedly" found that they share a strong urban tradition in support of a contiguous urban mass with a single center, as opposed to non-contiguous clusters (Master plan 1979, p. 65-9). "Supposedly" because: "Initially social planning was not done by the IPA team. After the draft of the master plan had been  79  CHAPTER 3: MATERIALS AND METHOD  house the three distinct powers in a constitutional democracy -- the executive, the legislative and the judiciary. Both the architectural design of the structures and their location relative t o dramatic topographic features of the site, are t o give the city its orientation and monumental image.  The city's form is t o be confined t o a "crescent shape" in harmony with the natural  features of the site, while the special significance of the seat of the national government is t o be achieved by an axial focus on Aso Hill, which towers over the surrounding plains by 1,300 ft. (See figure 3.1.) In terms of the settlement plan, the basic concept is for Abuja t o be a city of districts and neighborhoods, arranged in such a way that travel distance for services is minimized. Accommodating between 22,000 t o 35,000 persons, a district is t o be made up of smaller neighborhoods of between 4,000 t o 7,000 persons.  Each district is t o be served by a district  center and each neighborhood by a neighborhood center. (See figure 3.2). Even though the idea is to make each neighborhood self-sufficient with a market, a supermarket, a post office, a park, a clinic, shops and primary schools, the district centers are t o provide residents with higher social amenities. Regionally, "the new city and its surrounding territory are not isolated from one another.  In fact, in many respects, they are closely interlocked functionally" (Master plan  1979, p. 225). One area of this functional interrelationship is the development of satellite towns, intended t o serve as a catchment area for the excess population of the city at a 3.0 million capacity (Master plan 1979, p. 55). This, of course, begs the question why these satellite towns are n o w being developed simultaneous with the new city (i.e., with some negative consequences -- see section 4.2.7.), when the latter's population is still below 100,000.  completed, realizing their oversight, the IPA funded a study on neighborhood development. According to Lockwood [one of the IPA's resident managers] they were lucky to find that a 'traditional' Nigerian city, in terms of neighborhood development and spatial organization, conforms to a city that is planned according to western planning principles.... As a result of this 'lucky' coincidence the IPA felt it did not have to make significant changes in the plan" (Moore 1982, p. 96).  80  C H A P T E R 3: M A T E R I A L S A N D M E T H O D  FIGURE 3 . 1 : P H Y S I C A L D E S I G N O F A B U J A  FIG.  FIG.  3.1.1  3.1.2  Source: Master plan 1979.  81  Source: Master plan 1979.  82  CHAPTER 3: MATERIALS A N D METHOD  3.1.4 Administrative  Arrangements  for  Abuja  Decree Number 6 of 1976, the New Capital Territory Act, which promulgated the relocation decision also established the administrative machinery for the new capital. It stated, in section 3, that: There shall be established an authority t o be known as the Federal Capital Development Authority which shall consist of a chairman and eight members to be appointed by the Supreme Military Council. The authority shall be a body corporate with perpetual succession and a c o m m o n seal (Federal Republic of Nigeria 1976). This body corporate was t o be both the builder of the new city, as well as the government of the entire Federal Capital Territory (FCT).  Section 4 of the decree lists the responsibilities of  the Authority as including: (1)  the choice of site for the relocation of the capital city within the capital territory;  (2)  the preparation of a master plan for the capital city and of land use with respect to town and country planning within tbe rest of the capital territory;  (3)  the provision of municipal services within the capital territory;  (4)  the establishment of infrastructure services in accordance with the master plan referred to above; and  (5)  the coordination of the activities of all Ministries, Departments and Agencies of the government of the federation within the capital territory (Federal Republic of Nigeria 1976).  To properly discharge these functions, the same section 4 of the decree gave the Authority wide powers to do "anything" that would facilitate the carrying out of its activities, including the powers to: (1)  sue and be sued in the corporate name;  (2)  hold and manage movable and immovable property;  (3)  construct and maintain roads, railways, sidings, tramways, bridges, reservoirs, water courses, buildings, plants and machinery and such other works as may be necessary for, or conducive to, the discharge of its functions under this Decree (Act);  (4)  purchase or otherwise acquire or take over any asset, business, property, privilege, contract, right, obligation and liability of any person or body  83  CHAPTER 3: MATERIALS A N D METHOD  (whether corporate or unincorporate) which in the opinion of the Authority will facilitate the discharge of its functions under this Decree (Act); and (5)  train managerial and technical staff for the purpose of the discharge of functions conferred on it by or in pursuance of this Decree (Act) (Federal Republic of Nigeria 1976).  Even though the FCDA structurally consisted of one chairman and eight  other  members, as noted earlier, the daily management of the Authority was to be overseen by an executive secretary  w h o , like the rest, would also be appointed by the Supreme Military  Council. The organizational arrangement of the Authority between 1976 and 1979 is depicted in figure 3.3.  It shows the corporation as aided by Special Advisers and Consultants and  having five fully fledge departments: (1) Administration; (2) Financial/Economic Planning and Social Research; (3) Planning and Architecture; (4) Development and Engineering Service; and (5) Estate. In terms of housing related duties, the Department of Development and Engineering Service was made responsible for transforming the physical plans of the new capital into reality.  This included the responsibility for the construction and maintenance of houses and  building complexes designed by the Planning and Architecture Department which, in turn, was made responsible for the following: (1)  to prepare strategic physical and cooperation with other departments;  (2)  to ensure the effective implementation of such plans for the FCT within the framework of the master plan;  (3)  to prepare site development plans, landscaping plans, designs, specifications and standards for public and private buildings;  (4)  to develop building standards and designs and keep current indices building materials to promote construction efficiency and cost reduction;  (5)  to keep all planning and development registries necessary for granting planning and building permissions, so as to avoid multiple allocations and/or uses and haphazard development; and  (6)  t o supervise all building construction t o ensure compliance with planning development and design guidelines, and architectural controls (FCDA 1979, p. 23).  84  environmental  plans  for  the  FCT  in  of  C H A P T E R 3: M A T E R I A L S A N D  METHOD  F I G U R E 3 . 3 : FEDERAL C A P I T A L D E V E L O P M E N T A U T H O R I T Y O R G A N I Z A T I O N A L A R R A N G E M E N T ( 1 9 7 6 - 7 9 )  SUPREME MILITARY COUNCIL  FEDERAL CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY CHAIRMAN & BOARD  EXECUTIVE SECRETARY  SPECIAL ADVISERS CONSULTANTS  DIRECTOR ADMINISTRATION  DIRECTOR FIN./ECON. PLAN. & SOC. RESEARCH  DIRECTOR PLANNING £> ARCHITECTURE  DIRECTOR DEVELOPMENT & ENGIN. SERVICE  DIRECTOR ESTATES  Source: Agba 1986, p. 312.  The Department  of Estates, on the other hand, was made responsible for the  administration of land and estates, and the maintenance of housing in the FCT, both public and private. This responsibility included: (1)  surveying of plots and demarcating the land according to the site plan of the land;  (2)  allocating and assigning the land and ensuring that over-lapping allocation of plots is avoided;  85  CHAPTER 3: MATERIALS A N D METHOD  (3)  estate surveying including the valuation of land properties for the purposes of property rating and compensation when necessary;  (4)  allocation and management of public housing, house rent collections and sales;  (5)  development and maintenance of all land use regulations, and collection of land revenues;  (7)  surveying and mapping of lands before construction work begins on them;  (8)  compensation and resettlement policies within the FCT;  (9)  land/property acquisition and procurement for use by the FCDA; and  (10)  land rehabilitation, and re-assignment and alienation (FCDA 1979, p. 30-1).  Without wasting much time on the subject, it is plain to see that the division of labor between the three aforementioned departments creates several sources of administrative confusion and conflict. function  regarding  For example, the Department of Development and Engineering's  "construction  and maintenance  of  houses"  conflicts  with  both  the  Department of Estate's responsibility for the "allocation and management of public housing," as well as Planning and Architecture Department's role of "supervising all building construction to ensure compliance."  The responsibility for the "development and maintenance of all land  use regulation" is another example.  Categorically assigned to the Department of Estate, this  function  and  overlaps  with  Planning  Architecture  Department  whose  responsibility  encompassed both "preparing the physical plans for the FCT" and "ensuring compliance with planning development and design guidelines."  A more detailed discussion of the FCDA's  organizational arrangement problems can be found in Agba (1986) and Ceyus (1984). In October 1979, with the ascent of a civilian administration, a new organizational arrangement was formed under the presidency of Alhaji Shehu Shagari.  Shown in figure 3.4,  the reorganization created t w o new bureaucracies and changed the status of the FCDA from an autonomous corporate body t o a ministry. ^ The Ministry for the Federal Capital Territory 1  10. The reason for the reorganization would seem obvious with the advent of a democratic government in lieu of a military regime. The Authority had to be brought under the control of both the presidency and the legislature. However, given that the 1979 election was organized by the military, it has been suggested that President Shagari, a Northerner, feared that fighting a reelection campaign in 1983 from Lagos would prove extremely dangerous; that is, in light of the well  86  CHAPTER 3: MATERIALS AND METHOD  (MFCT) was created and made responsible for the territory's overall development policy, while the Federal Capital Territory Administration (FCTA) was charged with responsibility for the general administration of the territory (i.e., in ways analogous t o a local government). The ministry was t o serve as an umbrella for both the FCDA and FCTA.  By freeing the FCDA t o  operate exclusively as the builder of the city, this structure appears more workable than the former.  Nevertheless, the fact that the MFCT's "development function" was n o t clearly  separated in the arrangement remained a source of confusion and conflict. With the overthrow of the civilian administration in December 1983 and the return of the military under General Buhari, the FCTA was abolished and merged into the MFCT.  (See  figure 3.5.) The Buhari administration was short lived and when it collapsed in 1985, yet a new structure, albeit a cosmetic change, was adopted by the succeeding General Ibrahim Babangida which merged some departments and functions.  For example, the Department of  Public Works was created by merging the departments of Estate and Quartering, and Building and Services; and the Department of Administration became Personnel and Management. At the time of the field work, another structural reorganization was underway which can be expected t o change yet again in 1990 when, and if, the army abdicates power t o the civilians.  known fact that the Southerner Yorubas who dominate Lagos, have never been amused over the transferring of the capital out of their homeland. From this perspective, therefore, the addition of the two new bureaucracies was primarily a ploy by the president to quicken the pace of the capital transfer to a more northern, hence safer location. This suggestion is corroborated by the fact that the Shagari administration actually updated the initial 1986 movement deadline to 1982, just a year before the date of the next election (Moore 1982, p. 103).  87  C H A P T E R 3: M A T E R I A L S A N D M E T H O D  FIGURE 3 . 4 : FEDERAL C A P I T A L D E V E L O P M E N T A U T H O R I T Y O R G A N I Z A T I O N A L A R R A N G E M E N T U N D E R C I V I L I A N G O V E R N M E N T ( O C T . 1 9 7 9 - SEPT. 1 9 8 3 )  FEDERAL GOVERNMENT LEGISLATURE  SENATE  HOUSE OF REP. EXECtJTIVE (PRES][DENT)  MFCT (MINISTER)  FCI)A BO^  FCTA ADMINISTRATOR  EDUCATION  PERMANENT SECRETARY  SPECIAL  ADMIN. & FINANCE  WORK  HEALTH & SOC. WEL.  LAND SURVEY DEV. AREA NATURAL RES. COUNCIL  CONSULTANTS  ADMINISTRATION  FINANCE  DISTRICT DEV.  PLANNING & SURVEY  Source: Agba 1986, p. 314.  88  ENGIN. SERVICES  ESTATES  MEDICAL SERVICES  C H A P T E R 3: M A T E R I A L S A N D M E T H O D  FIGURE 3.5: FEDERAL C A P I T A L D E V E L O P M E N T A U T H O R I T Y O R G A N I Z A T I O N A L A R R A N G E M E N T (1984-5)  SUPREME MILITARY COUNCIL  MFCT (MINISTER) PERMANENT SECRETARY  BOARD OF DIRECTORS  MANAGING DIRECTOR AUDIT UNIT  DIRECTOR ADMINISTRA.  DIRECTOR FINANCE  LEGAL UNIT  DIRECTOR PLANNING & SURVEY  DIRECTOR ESTATE & QUARTERING  Source: Agba 1986, p. 318.  89  DIRECTOR CIVIL ENG. SERVICES  DIRECTOR MECHANICAL £. ELECTRIC.  DIRECTOR BUILDING SERVICES  CHAPTER 3: MATERIALS AND METHOD  3.1.5  Setting  of the New  Site  Table 3.1 shows the basis used by the Aguda panel for selecting among the alternate sites for the new capital.  It contains a thirteen point weighting system which, for ease of  analysis, has been presented here t o correspond with the subtitles shown.  Before amplifying  briefly on these criteria, it should be noted that the interesting thing about them remains whether or not they were devised after the fact, t o justify an essentially political or arbitrary choice.  Apparently, it appears that "the Abuja site has a history of its o w n " which does not  deny this possibility (Moore 1982, p. 40-1).  The fact that the ethnicity factor, which was  considered t o be so crucial in initiating the movement, was only assigned the weight of 3%, is a strong indication that the site selection process was carefully manipulated by the panel to suppress or avoid political issues and discussions.  Yet, looking at the criteria creates the  impression that the selection was done on the basis of physical and economic efficiency, as only 9 per cent of the weighting was given to socio-demographic consideration. Physical Characteristics The Federal Capital Territory (FCT) is located in the geographical heartland of Nigeria, bordered mostly by Niger and Plateau states.  (See figure 3.6).  miles, which is more than twice the size of Lagos state.  lt covers some 3,600 square  Within this expanse, Abuja or the  Federal Capital City (FCC) will occupy 96 square miles at a population of 1.6 million persons. When fully developed at 3 million, the city is expected to occupy approximately 180 square miles, nearly three times the size-of the city of Lagos (See figure 3.7.)  While these facts  obviously satisfy the requirements for centrality, land availability and security, they suggest a very low density of development.  90  C H A P T E R 3: M A T E R I A L S A N D M E T H O D  T A B L E 3.1: CRITERIA F O R S E L E C T I N G T H E SITE O F T H E FEDERAL C A P I T A L T E R R I T O R Y  CRITERION  W E I G H T B Y (%)  Physical Characteristics 1. Centrality 2. Health and Climate 3. Land Availability and Use 4. Water Supply 5. Security 6. Power Resources 7. Drainage 8. Physical Planning Convenience 9. Soil  22 12 10 10 6 5 5 4 4  Economic Characteristics 10. Multi-Access Possibilities 11. Existence of Local Building Materials  7 6  Socio-Demographic Characteristics 12. Low Population Density 13. Ethnic Accord  6 3  Total  100  Source: Abumere 1984, p. 20.  Climate wise, the FCT experiences t w o major masses of air as do all parts of the country.  Associated with the warm or dry season from November t o March, is the tropical  continental mass which develops in the north over the Sahara Desert and blows south. Engendering the wet or rainy season from April t o October, is the countervailing maritime mass blowing from the Atlantic in the south. Hence, the FCT records its highest temperatures of between 3 0 ° C - 37°C during the dry season months, and lowest temperatures of as low as 7 ° C during the rainy season months.  91  C H A P T E R 3: M A T E R I A L S A N D  FIGURE 3.6:  L O C A T I O N A N D PHYSICAL ACCESS OF ABUJA  92  METHOD  C H A P T E R 3: M A T E R I A L S A N D  FIGURE 3.7:  ALTERNATIVE SITES C O N S I D E R E D F O R A B U J A W I T H I N T H E F C T  Source: Master plan 1979.  93  METHOD  CHAPTER 3: MATERIALS A N D METHOD  In terms of humidity, the FCT with a higher altitude than Lagos is less humid and, therefore, drier.  It is generally the case in Nigeria that climate improves with altitude in the  sense that heat and humidity diminish. capital city within the territory.  This fact was crucial in deciding where to build the  Apparently, the extreme southern part of the territory is  marked by 10 per cent more humidity than the northern part.  While the afternoon relative  humidity during the wet seasons rises everywhere in the territory to above 50 per cent, it drops in the dry season to 20 per cent at more northern locations and to 30 per cent at extreme southern locations (Abumeri 1984, p. 39-42). Disease vectors in the FCT are reported t o include simulium carriers causing river blindness, tsetse fly causing sleeping sickness and female anopheles causing malaria.  The  latter t w o vectors are not unique to the territory, as they are found in all parts of the country at roughly the same incidence.  As for simulium carriers, an ecological report on the FCT  suggested that river blindness was a serious problem peculiar to the territory.  This led to a  simulium unit being established by the FCDA, both to conduct research on the problem and t o treat the rivers and vegetations believed to incubate the carriers. Remarkably, a comparison of the incidence of river blindness throughout the country later revealed that the great attention given to the presence of the vector in the territory was grossly exaggerated and unjustified (Mabogunje and Abumeri 1981). Finally, except for concerns expressed about the availability of water resources in the region (Master plan 1979, p. 27-54), the fact that the physiography of most of the FCT does not present any major geo-technical constraints t o urban development, meant that the site selection goal of physical planning convenience was ultimately served. Economic Characteristics Two of the site selection criteria required for multi-access possibilities and the existence of local building materials presumably for use in building the city.  94  While Abuja, in  CHAPTER 3: MATERIALS A N D METHOD  the long run, may have more access than Lagos by virtue of its central location, there is no doubt that, "with existing highways, the FCT has noticeably poorer access" (Master plan 1979, p. 159). (See figure 3.8.)  Regarding the availability of local building materials, the FCT has  such pertinent resources as timber, gravel, sand, etc., but it was unlikely that much, if any, of these materials would be in the form that could be used for construction right away. That is, in light of the urgency surrounding the new capital construction, and the fact that this would make logistic issues of volume and security of supply a major problem with sourcing the city's building materials from within the region. As an obvious logic, it gives the impression that the criterion may have been incorporated in the site selection scheme simply t o cater to the widespread sentiments among the professionals in the country that the new capital should be used as an instrument of regional development. Socio-Demographic Characteristics Initially, the Aguda panel on relocation had estimated approximately 50,000 inhabitants in the territory w h o would be affected by the project. After further speculating on the matter without hard facts, the government later rounded up this estimate to 125,000 in 1977 (FCDA 1987, p. 1). The dominant prior form of settlement in the FCT at this time was villages and hamlets.  There were no fewer than 845 of these villages and hamlets scattered throughout  the plains of the FCT. Many of these settlements were quite small then, varying from 2 4,000 inhabitants.  In fact, about 85 per cent of the settlements at the time had population  sizes of between 100 - 500 inhabitants.  Only 5 villages had more than 2,000 inhabitants  11. A village is larger than a hamlet but smaller than a town. Villages within the FCT are of the nucleated type, almost always made up of huts grouped very closely together to form compounds. The huts are never more than 4 meters in diameter and are composed of clay walls and thatched roof (Abumere 1984, p 55). Closely tied to the villages are the hamlets sometimes called tungas. A tunga is a daughter settlement usually located within a few hours walking distance from the parent village, upon which the tunga depends for its social life. A tunga has no market of its own and normally celebrates its traditional rites jointly with the parent village. So, as might be expected, there are several similarities between these two types of settlements such as a common architectural style. The round "Sudanese" design shown in figure 3.9 is prevalent and accounts for more than 80 per cent of the dwellings in the territory.  95  CHAPTER 3: MATERIALS A N D METHOD  (Obiechina 1985, p. 34).  So, one of the most striking characteristics of the territory is its  sparse population, which satisfies the criterion of a " l o w population density."  FIGURE 3.8: R O A D A C C E S S T O F C T vs R O A D A C C E S S T O L A G O S (1978)  To FCT Existing Roads  To Lagos Existing Roads  Access Circuity 1.3 - 1.4 j - " ]  Access Quality  Acceptable  1.5-1.6 1.7 - 1.8  Access Deficiency  1.9 +  Source: Master plan 1979 •Access Circuity = Road Distance Straight Line Distance  96  CHAPTER 3: MATERIALS AND METHOD  FIGURE 3 . 9 : A T Y P I C A L V I L L A G E I N T H E F C T  Source: Abumere 1 9 8 4 .  97  C H A P T E R 3: M A T E R I A L S A N D M E T H O D  F I G U R E 3 . 1 0 : D E N S I T Y A N D SETTLEMENT PATTERN I N T H E F C T ( 1 9 7 8 )  0  l  0  Source: Abumere 1 9 8 4 .  98  i  8 5  l  16  24 K m * .  K>  15 M i l * *  t  CHAPTER 3: MATERIALS A N D METHOD  99  CHAPTER 3: MATERIALS A N D METHOD  According t o figure 3.10 on the settlement distribution of the territory in 1978, only Karu, Rubochi and Abaji had population density of more than 30 persons per square kilometer. Most of the remaining areas had less than 20 persons per square kilometer.  Based  on the 1963 census, population density figures for selected provinces in the country range from 19 t o 327 (Abumere 1984, p. 47). Of course, since the onset of the new capital, there have been remarkable changes in the settlement pattern of the territory.  These changes (see figure 3.11) were due mainly t o  the construction activities which drastically altered the economic opportunities in the region, but also t o the government policy on resettlement. The FCT Decree No. 6, 1976, which established the FCDA, initially envisaged that the FCDA would move t o FCT, evacuate the inhabitants, compensate and resettle them outside of FCT and proceed to build the city. [But at a later date,] there was a change of policy whereby the Federal Military Government directed that only the inhabitants of the newly designated priority areas of the FCT (i.e., the FCC site proper) would be evacuated, compensated and resettled (FCDA 1979, p. 11). 2  More than call into question the site selection criterion of ethnic neutrality, -* this 1  major shift in policy has meant that land tenure in the territory is going t o be a crucial factor. Unlikely t o be regarded as squatters on their o w n land, this raises the critical question of whether the indigenes of the FCT are t o maintain their land tenure system.  If so, there is  nothing t o prevent them from speculating in land or contesting the powers of the federal government t o unilaterally administer land allocation and development  in the territory?  According t o a consultancy report prepared for the Nigerian government by the Institute of Administration at Ahmadu Bello University (1979, p. 78-86), the indigenous method of land 12. As Agba (1986, p. 211-2) explains, the reason for this change in policy was financial. It was mentioned earlier that the Aguda panel had initially estimated the indigenous population of the territory to be 50,000. But when a detailed study was later conducted to provide hard data for the compensation and resettlement purposes, this number rose dramatically. Consequently, estimated resettlement costs increased from N6.5 to N117 million. Later added to this excuse is the "planning implications of leaving avast habitable land uninhabited" (FCDA 1988, p. 37). 13. Still, the problem that this presents is minuscule in comparison to Lagos. The ethnic composition of most of the villages and hamlets of the F C T are either entirely or about 85 per cent Quari. But the noteworthy point is that neither the Moslems (32.5%) nor the Christians (19.6%) dominates the area. The pagans or traditionalists (47.9%) make up half of the territory's indigenous population (Gbiechina 1985, p. 39).  100  CHAPTER 3: MATERIALS AND METHOD  acquisition and transfer for much of population involves: (1) the simple clearing of virgin land, (2) inheritance or (3) borrowing or gift of l a n d .  1 4  The important point about this system of  land tenure, according t o the source, is that permission is usually not required from anyone t o establish  this  right  which  is "permanent  and which  gives the land  holder  complete  management right" t o sell, give away, rent or loan the land. The settlement difficulty presented  by this change in policy should have  been  mitigated by the fact that some of the indigenous population of the territory were resettled in the neighboring states of their c h o i c e . ^ 1  But the information obtained during the field  research is that many of those resettled outside the FCT, after taking their compensation money, have since returned t o take up permanent residency in the territory.  In any event, a  1981 census of the indigenous population revealed a total of 131,525 inhabitants (Mabogunje et al. 1981), whose status in the FCT hitherto has been considered ephemeral. Thus, with the change in policy making them permanent residents of the territory, it is not startling that some serious implications have been envisaged as a result: The decision to allow the indigenous population t o remain within the FCT will probably have the effect of slowing d o w n the rate of migration t o all FCT areas outside of the FCC. As early as 1984, all the applications for land in the FCT by Nigerians have been in respect of land within the FCC, none has gone for the rest of the FCT. It is possible t o argue that this trend may change, but there is still the likely probability that the presence of an indigenous population may make the procurement of land by other Nigerians [i.e., n o n FCT aborigines] in the rest of the FCT (outside the FCC) a little more difficult, a factor which itself may reduce the volume of migration into these areas (Abumere 1986, p. 291). Noteworthy is that the current reality of squatting in the territory contradicts this prediction of the volume of migration into the region. The fact that squatting in the territory 14. This means that "even strangers who borrow or are given land have de facto ownership rights over it. Their children certainly can inherit their land [without any] restrictions applied" (Institute of Administration 1979, p. 83). 15. Even though monies were paid out in compensation, it was never made clear what number of the inhabitants were actually resettled. Using the 1981 (Mabogunje et al.) census figure of 131,525 indigenous population and working backwards with a 3.3 per cent national rate of growth (Morah 1987, p. 161), it appears that up to 10,000 indigenes may have been relocated. This corresponds with the 20.6 per cent of all heads of households in the territory who, during the referendum on resettlement, expressed the preference to be resettled in the neighboring states (Abumere 1981, p. 477). The estimated indigenous population of the F C T in 1977 was 124,674 (FCDA 1987, p. 1).  101  CHAPTER 3: MATERIALS A N D METHOD  has tended t o be heaviest in those indigenous settlements surrounding Abuja, suggests that these settlements instead encourage migration by acting as reception centers for the inmigrants. (See section 4.2.6.)  Tables 3.2 and 3.3 give a population profile of the FCT. The  reader should, however, be warned that the reliability of the figures contained in the tables is suspect, as there has not been an actual head count t o determine the population of the territory.  The only census conducted in the area in 1981 focused exclusively o n determining  the population of the indigenous inhabitants for resettlement and compensation purposes.  TABLE 3.2: P O P U L A T I O N PROFILE O F T H E F C T (1985-90)  YEAR  FCT  MUNICIPALITY*  INDIGENE**  INDIGENE/NON  (AS A W H O L E )  OF ABUJA  FCT  INDIGENE RATIO  1985  410,450  160,000  149,760  1 : 2.7  1986  492,300  198,500  154,706  1 : 3.2  1987  516,900  208,400  159,811  1 : 3.2  1988  535,020  218,820  165,085  1 : 3.2  1989  553,850  229,760  170,533  1 : 3.3  1990  573,450  241,250  176,161  1 : 3.3  .  * Includes the FCC and its immediate surrounding areas. ** 1981 (Mabogunje et al.) census figure of 131,525. Projected based on the assumptions of natural increase of 3.3 per cent (Morah 1987) and zero migration.  Source: FCDA, 1987.  102  C H A P T E R 3: M A T E R I A L S A N D  METHOD  T A B L E 3 . 3 : ESTIMATED P O P U L A T I O N O F G O V E R N M E N T W O R K E R S A N D THEIR FAMILIES I N THE F C C (1988) +  1.  N U M B E R O F G O V E R N M E N T HOUSES IN THE F C C  6,108  2.  ESTIMATED N U M B E R O F P E R S O N S A D E Q U A T E L Y A C C O M M O D A T E D  36,648  ( 6 , 1 0 8 x 6 P E R S O N S PER H O U S E H O L D ) 3.  ESTIMATED S U B L E T T I N G / S H A R I N G BY T H O S E A D E Q U A T E L Y  7,390  ACCOMMODATED* 4.  ESTIMATED P O P U L A T I O N O F PRIVATELY H O U S E D I N D I V I D U A L S * *  5.  ESTIMATED P O P U L A T I O N O F T H E F C C  80  44,118  (2 + 3 + 4)  + The balance population for the F C T is 58,014, making a total of 102,132. housing demand for the territory.)  (See table 4.19 on  * The preliminary report on the 1988 FCDA housing census in the F C T does not give a breakdown of housing completions by type, but table 4.5 on total number of housing contracts awarded does. This table indicates a 22%, 35% and 43% formula for allocating 1 , 2 and 3 or more bedroom house types in the FCC. Based on this, the ability of adequately housed individuals to sublet or accommodate "hangers-on" of extended families and friends is calculated as follows: House Type 3-6 BD (43%) 2 BD (35%) 1 BD (22%) Total  Number of Units  Added Capacity  2,626 x 2 2,138 X 1 1,344 X 0  5,252 2,138 0  6,108  7,390  In other words, it is assumed that persons assigned to 3 or more bedroom units can manage to accommodate up to 8 people per unit, while persons assigned to 2 bedroom units can manage 7 people. Given that the 1 bedroom units were typically assigned to low-income civil servants who, in general, tend to have bigger households than higher income groups, the assumption is that this group of residents would not be able to take on boarders of any kind, beyond the average number of persons (6) assumed for each household by the IPA. Even though the FCDA (1988, p. 40) uses the average family size of 6 persons per household in computing its population estimates for the new capital, there are some sources that use a higher average household size of up to 8. ** Assuming 10 fully developed private plots with an average of 8 members per plot.  Source: Author  103  CHAPTER 3: MATERIALS A N D METHOD  3.2.  METHODS  3.2.1 Research  Design  The study adopts the case study design as this is the prevailing mode of empirical inquiry o n the subject of implementation (Bardach 1977; Palumbo and Harder 1 9 8 1 ) . ^ 1  It  typically involves a post-adoption analysis of a decision/program with the aim of isolating salient occurrences which both describe what happened and suggest reasons why. The design is normally dismissed as being unscientific, first, because its lacks  pre-adoption  observations and a comparative group; second, because cases for analysis are not randomly selected; and, third, because there is no uniformity in the rules for selecting and interpreting information both between and within cases. Nonetheless, it has been pointed out that case studies are frequently carried out in settings where many variables are measured at the pre-adoption stage; where contextual knowledge is already rich; and where intelligent presumptions can be made about what the outcome would be like without the program or treatment.  These factors, it is argued, "can  often serve the same role that pre-[adoption] measures and controls d o " (Cook and Campbell 1979, p. 96). Thus, notwithstanding the problem of control and the fact that the design ultimately does not lend itself t o generalizations, ^ the c o m m o n agreement among scholars is 1  that case studies can be used effectively t o provide both rich and concrete information o n those elements that need t o be taken into account in either developing or testing a model, paradigm or theory.  Figure 3.12 shows the case study process followed by this researcher,  except that there was first a preliminary data collection stage before the formal phase.  16. Both Cropper (1982) and Masser (1982) also conclude that the approach is particularly appropriate for the analysis of related processes of planning and decision making. 17. This problem is partially supplemented by the use of a survey design to both establish housing outcomes in the new capital, and determine the disposition of current policy officials towards the project. This is aside from the fact that the case study design does not come highly recommended for this sort of research issues in the first place (Yin 1984, p. 17).  104  C H A P T E R 3: M A T E R I A L S A N D M E T H O D  FIGURE 3.12:  T H E CASE STUDY PROCESS FOR THE STUDY  conceptual framework hypothesis formulation choice, of case studies refinement of conceptual framework  data collection  cases discarded because of lack of data and/or lack of appropriateness  summary narrative generalisation 'within' and 'between' cases higher level generalisation  Source: Masser 1982.  3.2.2 Evaluation  Techniques  Two techniques are employed - (1) outcome evaluation to determine the extent to which Abuja has succeeded in reaching its physical housing goals; and (2) process evaluation to explain the housing outcomes.  The t w o techniques complement each other in several  ways. First, public policy is both a process of decision-making as well as the product and the outcome of that decision.  Second, an outcome evaluation without a process evaluation may  determine policy success or failure, but not the explanations behind that success or failure. And, third, a process evaluation can be used t o mitigate some of the internal validity threats t o  105  CHAPTER 3: MATERIALS A N D METHOD  outcome evaluation resulting, for instance, from: (1) the use of vague policy goals as a yardstick for measuring policy effects; (2) the evaluation of policies that had become radically redefined during implementation; (3) improper designation of the intervention or when implementation has occurred; and (4) the lumping together of faulty implementation with program results. To determine the outcome of the housing program in Abuja, it was necessary t o do three things.  The settlement goals for the new capital had to be established.  It had t o be  ascertained whether or not the programs means for achieving goals are appropriate (i.e., whether the means and ends of the program are connected based on a valid theory of causation).  Finally, valid quantifiable indicators or measures of effectiveness  representing  policy success had t o be selected. Pursuant t o these requirements, cues from t w o sources are used in establishing the settlement goals of the new capital: (1) the "legal intent" of the policy as written in the legislation and the master plan; and (2) current policy makers' understanding of policy goals as reflected in their statements during field interviews.  A content analysis of the Abuja master  plan is carried out in order to ascertain the validity of the program's inherent theory.  Finally,  following from the settlement goals of the new capital, performance indices are selected that include: (1) affordability, (2) availability, (3) access, (4) squatting, (5) cultural propriety of development, etc.. In undertaking the preliminary process evaluation to explain why the shortfall in the housing program occurred, the research focus progresses from collecting and analyzing available data on the program to entering physically into the program's world.  Rather than  concentrating on the tangible products of the program, emphasis is placed on the process or dynamics whereby the products were produced such that, in meeting with key individuals associated with the program, more attention was paid to the qualitative and informal aspects of the implementation.  For instance, much time was spent listening to the perceptions of  people close to the program about the formal goals of the program, the informal goals, the  106  CHAPTER 3: MATERIALS A N D METHOD  way the program is designed to operate, the way it actually operates, the way it ought to operate, and so forth.  3.2.3 Sources  and Methods  of Data  Collection  The dissertation recognizes that no one source or method can exclusively serve its purposes, and that the kinds of data to be collected, as well as method of collection, will be governed by both the nature of the policy and what is obtainable in the field. The following sources and methods are used: (1)  Self reports experiences.  (2)  Visual inspection -- officials and program activities were observed onsite.  (3)  Program and operation records - all printed bureau material available on the policy were collected and evaluated. These include relevant legislative acts, program proposals and master plans, previous evaluation reports, reports by consultants, annual reports, budget submissions, operations reports, internal memoranda, propaganda booklets, press releases, etc..  (4)  Social indicators and official statistics - relevant quantitative indices of societal conditions and trends (e.g., population and income trends) were examined.  (5)  Documentary Research - relevant secondary studies (e.g., books, theses, conference papers, journal articles, newspaper editorials, etc.) on the topic were assembled and analyzed.  3.2.4 Preliminary  Activities  The field work took  officials  were  asked about  in the Field and the  themselves  and  their  Questionnaire  place in Nigeria and Tanzania for eight months,  between  September 1988 and April 1989. The first stage of the preliminary activities involved gathering material from seven different research sites in Nigeria including Zaria, Abuja, Lagos, Ibadan, Ife, Benin and Nsukka.  In keeping with the primary object of the preliminary field work t o  gather relevant secondary studies that are not available in libraries overseas, the research sites  107  CHAPTER 3: MATERIALS AND METHOD  in Nigeria were selected t o include the country's six world-standard universities - the Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria; the University of Lagos; the University of Ibadan; the A w o l o w o University, lie Ife, (formerly the University of Ife); the University of Benin, Benin City; and the University of Nigeria, Nsukka. While the greater part of the field work at this stage was done in these institutions and involved intensive literature search in their libraries, a substantial effort was also expended in developing an understanding of the politics surrounding the decision making and implementation process for the new capital. academics, students,  This was achieved primarily by interacting informally with  bureaucrats, politicians, and other groups and individuals concerned  with matters related t o the new capital.  Generally, the respondents were asked about their  feelings for the new capital, what problems they see with housing in the city and how these problems might be approached. The second stage of the preliminary field work involved analyzing data collected from the various sites visited, comparing this t o previously collected data and then developing a questionnaire for the formal level of the investigation.  As such, the questionnaire was based  on information collected from both the documentary research and the preliminary field interviews.  There are t w o parts t o the questionnaire.  Part one comprises 36 closed ended  propositions designed t o elicit opinion and attitudinal responses o n issues about the new capital for the purposes of: (1) determining officials' understanding of the policy, (2) their acceptance of it and (3) the intensity of this acceptance. ® 1  As a result, response options t o  the propositions were closed t o "strongly disagree," "disagree," "agree," or "strongly agree." For each proposition, respondents were asked t o give t w o responses: (1) " o w n response" and (2) an estimation o n what the "popular response" might be. By treating the propositions in terms of "agree" and "strongly agree," the instrument distinguishes between opinions and attitudes. The latter are typically held with more intensity.  18. The questions were designed with the aid of a "how to" handbook on measuring attitudes by Henerson et al. (1978).  108  CHAPTER 3: MATERIALS A N D METHOD  There are several reasons behind the double answer format (i.e., " o w n " and "popular" response).  First, t o the extent that the object of the questionnaire was t o uncover individual  attitudes and dispositions, it was felt that officials may not want t o expose their dispositions, preferring t o see themselves in or with other people (i.e., popular response). Secondly, in the eventuality of this suspicion being borne out by the evidence (which it was not), it was felt that the format provides a basis for comparison and for checking for the internal validity of responses obtained.  It acts t o provide a lower and upper bound margin within which the  likely response might be hypothesized.  Nevertheless, it was intended that the deliberate  random ordering of the propositions making up that part of the questionnaire would act as the main safeguard against the possibility of officials giving untrue responses. The logic is that the random ordering would discourage the interviewees from attempting t o predict what sort of responses they feel may have been expected.  Finally, for prescriptive reasons, the format  provides an indication t o what extent the officials feel they are in compliance with the public's wishes. Part t w o of the questionnaire  is open  ended and comprises  three direct  self-  explanatory questions on housing problems in the new capital, the causes of the problems and the envisioned solutions.  3.2.5 Research  Population  and the Formal  Interviews  The formal research population was identified during the preliminary field activities.  Key informants were asked t o recommended  work  other key informants w h o are  knowledgeable o n the politics of the new capital and have (or have had) a direct senior level involvement with the project.  This has generally meant current employees of the FCDA  mandated t o build the new capital, ^ 1  the project.  a  n  c  j  university academics w h o research and consult o n  But a few key employees were also recommended from the following pertinent  19. Within the FCDA, the emphasis was on officials from departments with definite housing related responsibilities: Planning and Survey; Architecture and Building; and Estate and Quartering.  109  CHAPTER 3: MATERIALS A N D METHOD  agencies: Federal Housing Authority (FHA), Federal Ministry of Works and Housing (FMWH), Federal Ministry of National Planning under the Presidency, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Abuja Municipal Government under the Ministry of the Federal Capital Territory (MFCT), Nigerian Institute of Economic and Social Research (NISER) and Federal Ministry of Industries. In all, a total of 45 officials (30 civil servants and 15 academics) were targeted t o receive the formal questionnaires. these  targeted  individuals  also  It should be pointed out here that a select number of participated  in  the  preliminary  field  interviews.  45  questionnaires were subsequently administered out of which 42 were recovered in a usable form.  Among these are responses from: 11 decision makers (departmental deputy directors  and directors); 20 implementors (senior level officials below the rank of deputy director); and 11 academics (members of faculty and/or research institutes).  Names and official titles of  these participants can be found in appendix 1, along with the formal questionnaire that was administered.  The administration of the questionnaires was undertaken by the researcher.  With the exception of a few that were administered as direct interviews, the majority of the questionnaires were left with the respondents for retrieval at a later date.  3.2.6 Issues Arising  from  the Field  Setting  The biggest disappointment of the field work comes from failed attempts t o reach any former members of the International Planning Associates (IPA), the American consortium that was responsible  for  preparing  the  master  plan for Abuja.  Though, admittedly,  this  disappointment did not come as a total surprise, as there have been accounts of similar outcomes from past attempts that were made only few years after the IPA completed its contract with the Nigerian government (Onibokun 1984, p. 16). This is one of the drawbacks that comes with engaging the services of international consultancies which tend to  be  organized on ad hoc basis and then disbanded once the contractual agreements are fulfilled. For planning, which tends t o be an iterative affair, this drawback is a major concern.  110  CHAPTER 3: MATERIALS A N D METHOD  In any event, references made t o the IPA officials in this dissertation are drawn from the 1982 dissertation on Abuja by Moore w h o was able t o interview members of this ephemeral organization. This is in addition t o whatever information that was obtained about the interaction that occurred between the Nigerian government and the American planners from the present officials in Nigeria. O n an opposite note to the above, one of the favorable outcomes of the field work was the high response rate to the survey. Out of forty-five questionnaires administered, fortytwo were recovered; all in a usable form. This high response rate can be attributed largely to the lengthy period in the field, which made it possible for the researcher t o return to respondents as many times as necessary t o recover the completed questionnaires.  Secondly,  there is the fact that the researcher had ample connections and contacts going into the field. Getting information from any civil servant in Nigeria comes a trifle easier if you could say that you were sent by so and so.  Finally, there is something to be said about the willingness of  the officials t o cooperate, and to discuss issues relating to the new capital. That officials cooperated enthusiastically came a bit as a surprise, as an earlier report by Agba (1986, p. 23) maintained that, because Abuja is a highly sensitive project, information is highly classified and difficult t o get.  Obviously, the fact that thirty-nine out of forty-two  officials surveyed, willingly signed their full name, official title and work address on the back of the questionnaire suggests that respondents must not fear for themselves for having set d o w n , in writing, strong critical opinions about a supposed "sensitive" project.  But then it  might be the case that Agba's observation has become less relevant over time, especially with the change in government from a democratic civilian rule to a military rule.  It could be  hypothesized that officials of the former are more likely to be sensitive to public opinion and not want to say anything that may make them "look bad," compared to officials in the latter circumstance w h o can afford to be less concerned with such things.  It is also plausible that,  with the worsened economic climate in the country, officials may have grown fed up and  111  CHAPTER 3: MATERIALS A N D METHOD  more willing to reveal whatever they know in the hope of helping the country or, at least, in exonerating their involvement in the mismanagement of the national economy. The other issue arising from the field work worthy of mention  is that  several  respondents complained that the questions were " t o o t o u g h " and "required a g o o d deal of thinking."  This is interesting given that a safety valve was included by allowing for a " n o  opinion" response. debate.  Whether or not these complaints detract from the study is open to  Given the near perfect response rate and the fact that the escape clause in the  questionnaire was used infrequently, if any conclusion is warranted, it may be that the complaints were a complement to the study.  The aim of a good research should be to ask  thought provoking questions rather than readily answerable ones.  112  C H A P T E R 4: T H E H O U S I N G C H A L L E N G E IN A B U J A THIS CHAPTER IDENTIFIES THE HOUSING GOALS OF THE NEW CAPITAL AND EXAMINES THE CURRENT HOUSING SITUATION IN THE FCT IN TERMS OF ACHIEVEMENTS AND PROBLEMS. FIRST, AS BACKGROUND, THE REALITIES OF URBAN HOUSING CONDITIONS IN NIGERIA ARE REVIEWED. SECOND, THE HOUSING CHALLENGE OF THE NEW CAPITAL IS DETERMINED IN RELATION TO STATEMENTS CONTAINED IN THE MASTER PLAN. AND, FINALLY, THE PRESENT SETTLEMENT REALITY OF THE CITY IS CONSIDERED, FOCUSING ON THE PROBLEMS OF AFFORDABILITY, AVAILABILITY, ACCESS, SQUATTERS AND RESETTLEMENT HOUSING.  4.1 HOUSING  4.1.1  GOALS AND  ACHIEVEMENTS  Background The desired housing conditions expressed for Abuja have their basis in the reality of  urban housing conditions in Nigeria as a whole.  In 1952, Nigeria had a modest population of  30.4 million persons, but since this time the country has experienced what may be described as no less than a population explosion, swelling its rate of growth from 1.8 per cent to what authorities estimate t o be 3.3 per annum at present.  With an estimated 1987 population of  108.5 million, the country is by far the most populous in Africa with one out of every five Africans, or one out of every six black persons in the world, being Nigerian (Morah 1987, p. 161). This enormous growth in population has resulted in urbanization at an equally rapid rate.  Overall, Nigeria is characterized by high population density and moderate urbanization.  The population growth rate for the urban areas between 1952 and 1963 ranged from 2.9 t o 13 per cent for some leading urban centers, with a national average of about 6 per cent annually (Umo 1975, p. 65).  Whereas in 1952 only 8 cities were estimated to have over 100,000  population, this number rose to 30 in 1982.  Based on the most recent projections available,  16.5 per cent of the country's estimated 80 million persons reside in urban settlements with a population of over 100,000. See table 4 . 1 .  113  CHAPTER 4 : THE HOUSING CHALLENGE IN ABUJA  TABLE 4 . 1 : RECENT P O P U L A T I O N PROJECTION F O R M A J O R U R B A N CENTERS IN NIGERIA (IN R A N K O R D E R )  CITIES  1963 CENSUS  M O S T RECENT PROJECTIONS  YEAR O F THE PROJECTIONS  1.  LAGOS  1,113,000  4,500,000  "82  2.  IBAD AN  728,000  1,500,000  "82  3.  KANO  295,000  1,000,000  "82  343,000  432,000  "75  208,000  400,000  "80  6. A B A  131,000  400,000  "80  7.  PORT HARCOURT  179,000  377,000  "83  8.  ABEOKUTA  187,000  363,000  "83  9.  OSHOGBO  209,000  350,000  "80  90,000  285,000  "82  4.  5.  OGBOMOSHO  lLORIN  10.  Jos  11.  ENUGU  138,000  274,000  "77  12.  ONITSHA  163,000  272,000  "80  13.  ILESHA  165,000  224,000  "75  166,000  224,000  "75  166,000  214,000  "75  158,000  213,000  "75  17. K A D U N A  150,000  202,000  "75  18.  140,000  189,000  "75  135,000  182,000  "75  14. ZARIA 15. 16.  Iwo EDO-EKITI MAIDUGURI  19. EDE 20.  OFFA  21.  ILE-IFE  86,000  179,000  "80  130,000  176,000  "75  22. CALABAR  76,000  179,000  "83  2 3 . ILA  26,000  155,000  "75  24. O Y O  112,000  152,000  "75  25.  107,000  145,000  "75  54,000  144,000  "82  101,000  136,000  "75  95,000  115,000  "75  29. KATSINA  90,000  109,000  "71  30. A W K A  49,000  100,000  "80  5,790,000  13,191,000  "78*  55,700,000  80,000,000  "80  10.40  16.50  "78  IKERRE  26. M A R K U R D I 27. BENIN CITY 28.  ISEYIN  TOTAL NATIONAL POPULATION U R B A N P O P . AS (%) O F N A T I O N A L P O P .  * This represents average year.  Source: Extracted from Peil M . and Sada P. 1 9 8 4 , p. 3 5 .  114  CHAPTER 4: THE HOUSING CHALLENGE IN ABUJA  This agglomeration of people, egged on mostly by rural-urban migration and natural increase, has meant that the existing urban infrastructures has been unable to cope.  A basic  urban requirement such as housing, when available at all, has tended to be congested and strained to capacity by intensive usage. Table 4.2 on housing conditions in select urban areas in Nigeria provides a glaring proof of this,  ln Lagos, for example, 72.5 per cent of the city's  households of nearly four persons per household occupy a single room.  This evidently  suggests that not enough new houses are being produced commensurate with the rapid rates of rural-urban migration and natural increase. Affordability is another major housing problem, as the chasm between the supply and demand has escalated the cost of renting.  As  Onibokun (1985, p. 3) observes "just 15 years ago, 11.2 per cent of the income of an urban worker went into rent.  Today, the same urban worker pays as much as 30 per cent of his  monthly income on rent." Also evident from table 4.2 is the fact that housing shortage and affordability are not the only aspects of the urban housing problem in Nigeria.  The quality of urban housing is  desperately wanting. Massive urbanization has also meant a high rate of dilapidation, disrepair and generally poor conditions of environmental sanitation.  For instance, the national average  for urban housing with tap water and flush toilet is 45.6 and 16 per cent, respectively.  This  compares with 26.1 and 1.8 per cent for Kano, the third largest city in the country with an estimated 1980 population of 1 million.  The master plan for Abuja (1979, p. 171) provides a  summary of all these problem: ln many Nigerian cities today, the vast majority of population are tenants crowded into one- and two-story housing with densities as high as 2,000 dwelling units per hectare, and 50-70 per cent occupying one room and sharing inadequate or intermittent services. Furthermore, tenants are often paying high rents which may exceed 50 per cent of their incomes.  115  C H A P T E R 4: T H E H O U S I N G C H A L L E N G E I N A B U J A  T A B L E 4 . 2 : H O U S I N G C O N D I T I O N S I N SELECT U R B A N A R E A S I N N I G E R I A (1970-71)  URBAN AREA  PERCENT O F  AVERAGE  PERCENT O F  PERCENT O F  PERCENT OF  HOUSEHOLDS  NUMBER OF  HOUSES WITH  H O U S E S WITH  HOUSES WITH  OCCUPYING  PERSONS  T A P WATER  F L U S H TOILET  ELECTRICITY  ONE R O O M  PER R O O M  LAGOS  72.5  3.8  71.7  43.5  93.2  PORTHARCOURT  51.5  2.4  75.0  18.6  81.4  BENIN  48.0  2.2  24.9  4.0  59.3  WARRI  59.9  2.6  62.4  10.9  89.7  KADUNA  63.9  2.1  40.3  14.1  53.3  KANO  69.1  2.4  26.1  1.8  69.1  ILORIN  23.9  1.6  30.7  10.3  28.4  IBADAN  47.3  2.1  33.4  25.2  56.1  2.4  45.6  16.0  66.3  NATIONAL AVERAGE 54.5  Source: Master plan 1 9 7 9 , p. 1 7 2 .  4.1.2 Housing  Goals  In light of the foregoing urban housing conditions in Nigeria, the housing challenge in Abuja was widely perceived t o be the striking of a balance among housing quantity, quality and, inevitably, affordability. The master plan ( 1 9 7 9 , p. 1 7 3 - 4 ) formally articulates this goal: A major challenge in developing an exemplary housing program for the New Capital City is to arrive at a satisfactory balance between residential quality and the ability of households to afford that quality.  116  CHAPTER 4: THE HOUSING CHALLENGE IN ABUJA  Many housing programs fail because they are not tailored t o a target population's income level and the household's ability t o pay. Housing programs have met with little success w h e n based on "needs" translated into arbitrary (and inaffordable) standards rather than on "affordability" and willingness t o pay. FCDA must develop a housing policy and program tailored t o the needs of the Capital's population. Based on the current post-Udoji civil servant salary structure and a recent survey, projections suggest that between 55 and 60 per cent of the anticipated households in the Capital City, in the year 2000, will have an income of N2,800 or less. Clearly, therefore, provision of adequate housing in the city at a cost affordable by all segments of the population, particularly the low income earners whose gross annual salary in 1985 did not exceed N3,000, can be considered an important goal for the new capital. Not only was this authenticated by a majority of current policy officials in Abuja, but it is closely 1  in keeping with the desires expressed in the unratified national housing policy published early in 1981: (1)  t o ensure that the provision of housing units are based on realistic standards which the prospective home owners can afford; and  (2)  t o give priority t o housing program designed t o benefit the low-income groups (FMHE 1981).  This explicit national attention towards solving the housing problems of low-income persons was later reaffirmed in the 1985 "Report of the Special Committee on National Housing Policy." In this report, it was stated that: The ultimate goal of our National Housing Policy  shall be to ensure that all Nigerians have access to decent housing accommodation at affordable cost. Hence, t o achieve this goal of affordability in Abuja, it was further accepted that a housing program for the city would have t o based on the nature of the traditional demand for dwellings.  In other words, such a program w o u l d have t o "free itself of many of the housing  preconceptions and standards imported from Europe and elsewhere" (Master plan 1979, p. 172); it would have t o expend considerable effort in developing dwellings more responsive t o  1. The majority of officials (57%) surveyed endorse the proposition that one of the major goals of government in Abuja is to provide affordable housing for people of all income levels, especially the low-income population. 74 per cent of them support that Abuja is truly intended for all Nigerians alike.  117  CHAPTER 4: THE HOUSING CHALLENGE IN ABUJA  the expressed cultural patterns of the population.  Consequently, the designers of the master  plan for the new capital, the International Planning Associates (IPA), first sought t o understand the income structure of the people (both civil servants and non-civil servants) w h o will eventually settle in the city. Four income groups were identified including: (1)  a high income group (N5,600 plus annually) comprising 2.2 per cent of the city's estimated total number of households;  (2)  a middle income group (N1,600 - N5,600) comprising 10 per cent of all households;  (3)  a low-income group households; and  (4)  a transient group (unstable incomes or less than N600) comprising the remaining households (Draft master plan 1978, p. 130).  (N1,200  - N770)  comprising  58 per cent  of all  almost all  Based on this calculation and the fact that the Nigerian government's position is that citizens should not have t o pay more than 20 per cent (between 10 and 15 per cent for lowincome earners) of their income o n rents (Master plan 1979, p. 176), the IPA proposed a housing program for the new city which rejected t w o extreme possibilities on the grounds of both costs and standards.  O n the one extreme was the provision of high standard, single  family detached housing for all income groups at a roughly estimated cost of N4,638.3 million (i.e., N3,125 million plus 48.5% subsidy) in both capital costs and subsidies.  2  O n the other  extreme was the provision of high density multi-family dwellings for the low-income groups, semi-detached  units for upper  and middle  income  groups,  and uniform  infrastructure  standards for both categories, at a total cost of about N1,502 million with no subsidies. See tables 4.3 and 4.4..  2. Subsidies mean both capital and interest subventions to reduce the total amount repaid (Master plan 1979, p. 176).  118  CHAPTER 4 : THE HOUSING CHALLENGE IN ABUJA  TABLE 4 . 3 : H O U S I N G P R O G R A M O P T I O N S FOR A B U J A  Option  Detached Serviced Semi-Det. Land  A . H I G H STANDARD  Flats  Multi Family  Total Cap. Cost (mil)*  Estimated % Subsidized  L,M,S  L,M  --  T  3,125  48  L,M,S  1  --  T  2,119  27  S  L,M  L,M,S  M,S,T  1,502  0  L,M,S  L,M  M,S  M,S,T  1,751  3  L,M,S  L,M  M,S  M,S,T  1,813  7  L,M,S  L,M  M,S  M,S,T  1,932  10  SINGLE F A M I L Y D E T . B. D E T A C H E D , REDUCED STANDARDS C. H I G H E R D E N S I T Y , No  SUBSIDY  D . R E D U C E D DENSITY AND  INFRASTRUCTURE,  Low  SUBSIDY  E. M I X E D , LOW DENSITY F. M I X E D , M O D E R A T E SUBSIDY.  Note: L = Large; M = Medium; S = Small; T = Transitional * Before subsidy.  Source: Master plan 1 9 7 9 , p. 1 8 0 .  119  CHAPTER 4: THE HOUSING CHALLENGE IN ABUJA  TABLE 4.4: SITE A N D FLOOR AREA FOR PRINCIPAL TYPES OF DWELLING UNITS I N ABUJA  H O U S I N G TYPE  1 . DETACHED/  SUB-TYPE  P L O T AREA PER  BUILT SPACE PER  HOUSEHOLD  HOUSEHOLD  LARGE  1,000M  SEMI-  MEDIUM  100-800M  DETACHED  SMALL  75-100M  LARGE  1,000M  MEDIUM  400M  LARGE SMALL  80M 60-80M 35-60M  2-3 FAMILY  120-150M *  4 FAMILY  180M *  40-75M 60-80M  -  240M *  60-80M  2. SERVICED LAND 3. FLATS  FAMILY 5. TRANSITIONAL  2  70-100M  30-60M  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  MEDIUM  4. MULTI-  120-160M  2  100M 2  2  85-1 O O M 45-70M  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  * Represents total plot area.  Source: Master plan 1979, p. 177.  A middle-ground  solution  (Program  F) between  the above  t w o extremes was  recommended by the IPA, based o n the argument that a mixed-housing program would satisfy improved standards required for the city and, at the same time, allow for affordable housing for the financially weaker sections of the population.  Both the capital costs and the subsidies  for this option was placed at N2,125.2 million, making it a reasonable compromise between quality and affordability.  In actual terms, the housing mix comprising this preferred option  was allocated as follows:  120  CHAPTER 4: THE HOUSING CHALLENGE IN ABUJA  * 95,000 single family detached housing units; * 11,200 serviced residential plots; * 5,500 flats;  '  .  •  * 117,700 low-income multi-family dwellings; * 19,000 transient housing units (Draft master plan 1978, p. 130). Subsequently, a housing target was set for the FCDA to provide 25,000 dwelling units needed t o  accommodate  the  150,000  persons  expected to  settle in the city by  the  completion of the first phase of development in 1986 (Ago 1984, p. 6). A target was also set for additional 2,000 units of low-cost housing to be build outside of the city by the Federal Housing Authority (FHA), to help accommodate the in-coming civil servants. Table 4.5 shows the number and type of housing contracts awarded by both of these agencies up to 1988. (See table 4.6 for actual starts and completions.)  Considering income distribution of civil  servants in the city and the fact that junior officials are typically assigned t o 1 and 2-bedroom units (see tables 4.16 and 4.24), this table outwardly indicates a bias favoring the better-of.  It  shows that 23.5 per cent of the total contracts awarded went to the upper level officials w h o are estimated to account for only 12.2 per cent of the federal civil service/and w h o are unlikely to be the first residents of the city. This is besides the fact that nearly 80 per cent of the low-cost housing contracts were destined for locations outside the FCC.  121  C H A P T E R 4: T H E H O U S I N G  T A B L E 4.5:  N U M B E R A N D TYPE O F H O U S I N G CONTRACTS  C H A L L E N G E IN A B U J A  AWARDED  BY T H E F C D A A N D T H E F H A (1988)  H O U S E TYPE  IN  FCC  IN  FCT  TOTAL  (%)  OF TOTAL  1  BD  2,017  7,924  9,941  47  2  BD  3,207  2,956  6,163  29  3  BD  2,283  625  2,908  14  4  BD  1,416  291  1,707  8  5  BD  121  41  162  0.8  6  BD  53  72  125  0.6  21,006  100  9,097  TOTAL  11,90  BD = BEDROOM  Source: FCDA 1988, p. 17; Ago 1984, p. 8-11.  4.1.3 Housing  Between  Achievements  November  14 and December  14 1988, the Statistics  Division  of  the  Department of Finance and Economic Development of FCDA was required to carry out a housing census of FCDA housing program in the FCT. The object of the census was to take stock of the total number of FCDA's housing starts in the territory as well as the status of those starts. According to a preliminary report of this exercise (FCDA 1989), a total of 19,535 housing units starts were recorded throughout the territory.  Of this number, 15,862 (81%)  were completed, while 3,673 (19%) were either uncompleted or abandoned. Within the FCC,  122  CHAPTER 4: THE HOUSING CHALLENGE IN ABUJA  7,328 (37.5% of total) units were started; 6,108 (83%) of these were completed; and 1,140 (17%) were uncompleted or abandoned.  A breakdown of the census result by current local  government boundaries is shown in table 4.6. Table 4.7 shows that 1,160 units (58%) of the 2,000 low-cost housing commissioned by the FHA have been completed; 778 units (36%) were under construction; and 112 units (6%) were yet t o be started. This was reported to have been the status of the project back in 1983.  An attempt to obtain more current statistics on the FHA housing uncovered some  puzzling and radically contradictory facts. According t o a source in the management cadre of the FHA, "the status of the agency's housing projects in the FCT is more like 200 units completed and 80 under construction as at May 1989."  This was not just for the low-cost  housing projects, but for all of the agency's total housing involvement in the territory, including its middle and high income housing.  Notably, however, a visual inspection of the  construction site failed t o substantiate this information either way, and the report prepared by Alhaji Sabo Ago (Director of Planning and Survey, FCDA, 1984) could not be substantiated. In any event, figures 4.1 through to 4.7 show, in an ascending order of quality, housing types found in the FCC as well as the FCT. accommodation that is available in the city.  123  the variety of  Figure 4.8 shows the typical temporary  C H A P T E R 4: T H E H O U S I N G C H A L L E N G E I N A B U J A  TABLE 4 . 6 : STATUS O F H O U S I N G STARTS BY THE F C D A I N THE DEVELOPMENT DISTRICTS O F A B U J A A N D THE F O U R LOCAL G O V E R N M E N T AREAS O F THE F C T ( D E C . 1 9 8 8 )  LOCAL G O V T  N O . OF U N I T S  N O . OF UNITS  N O . OF U N I T S  STARTED  COMPLETED  UNCOMPLETED  A . GARKI  4,284  4,048  236  B. W U S E  2,733  2,024  709  C . MAITAMA  108  14  94  D . ASOKORO  203  22  181  7,328  6,108  1,220  E. N Y A N Y A *  7,029  6,687  342  F. KARU  1,184  1,108  76  189  139  50  H . KARSHI  216  42  174  I. Q W A R I M P A  218  150  68  K. K U B W A LOST C O S T  913  198  715  L. K U B W A RESETTLE.  555  AREA 1. ABUJA M U N I C I P A L  F C C TOTAL  G.  BWARI/USHAFA  555  186  186  17,818  14,618  3,200  167  82  85  119  46  73  286  128  158  A . GWAGWALADA  764  693  71  B . GlRl  165  165  C . KWALl  209  110  99  1,138  968  170  208  106  102  85  42  43  293  148  145  19,535  15,862  3,673  M.  USUMA  TOTAL 2. ABAJI MUNICIPAL A . ABAJI B. YABA TOTAL 3 . G W A G W A L A D A MUNICIPAL  TOTAL 4 . KUJE M U N I C I P A L A . KUJE B. RUBOCHI TOTAL  FCT TOTAL  Single room row houses.  Source: F C D A 1 9 8 9 .  124  C H A P T E R 4: T H E H O U S I N G C H A L L E N G E I N A B U J A  T A B L E 4.7: L O W - C O S T H O U S I N G C O N S T R U C T I O N BY T H E F H A  O U T S I D E O F T H E F C C (1983)  LOCATION  No. O F U N I T S  No.  COMMISSIONED  COMPLETED  UNDER CONST.  N O T STARTED  1. G W A G W A L A D A  970  662  278  30  2. A B A J I  478  362  116  -  3. S H E D A  190  40  92  58  4. K U J E  150  56  78  16  5. R U B O C H I  56  ~  56  6. K W A L I  54  7. K A R S H I  54  WITHIN F C T  No. O F U N I T S  TOTAL  2,000  No.  O F UNITS  1,160  54 54  778  * Information contained does not reconcile with table 4.6 and cannot be substantiated.  Source: Ago 1984, p. 11.  125  O F UNITS  112  CHAPTER 4: THE HOUSING CHALLENGE IN ABUJA  FIGURE 4 . 1 : T Y P I C A L F C D A L O W - C O S T H O U S I N G W I T H I N T H E F C T  [SINGLE R O O M R O W D W E L L I N G S W I T H S H A R E D FACILITIES F O R JUNIOR CIVIL S E R V A N T S ETC. -  FIG.  E . G . , MESSENGERS, DRIVERS, C L E R K S ,  O U T S I D E T H E F C C IN N Y A N Y A A N D G W A G W A L A D A ]  4.1.2  Abumere 1984.  126  C H A P T E R 4: T H E H O U S I N G C H A L L E N G E I N A B U J A  FIGURE 4.2:  [2-4  F C D A RESIDENTIAL DEVELOPMENT I N KARU N E W T O W N  B E D R O O M HOUSES  DESIGNED  TO  PROVIDE A C C O M M O D A -  TIONS F O R SENIOR A N D I N T E R M E D I A T E S T A F F O F F C D A , AS W E L L AS O T H E R G O V E R N M E N T MINISTRIES.]  Source: Field Research 1988-89.  127  C H A P T E R 4: T H E H O U S I N G C H A L L E N G E  FIGURE 4.3:  [ONE,  TWO  AND  F C D A B L O C K S O F FLAT W I T H I N T H E F C C  THREE BEDROOM  APARTMENT  BLOCKS  FOR  I N T E R M E D I A T E CIVIL S E R V A N T S . !  F I G .  4.3  1  m  1 I H •  m  a  • -irinw • IT  II ! • ' •[• IIII  Source: Field Research 1988-89.  128  IN ABUJA  C H A P T E R 4: T H E H O U S I N G C H A L L E N G E I N A B U J A  FIGURE 4.4:  F C D A SEMI-DETACHED H O U S E S WITHIN THE F C C  [DUPLEXES F O R  SENIOR A N D  I N T E R M E D I A T E CIVIL  E A C H D U P L E X IS I N T E N D E D F O R T W O H O U S E H O L D S . ]  Source: Field Research 1988-89.  129  SERVANTS.  C H A P T E R 4: T H E H O U S I N G C H A L L E N G E I N A B U J A  FIGURE 4.5: F C D A D E T A C H E D H O U S E S W I T H I N T H E F C C  [4 B E D R O O M S P L I T - L E V E L H O U S E A N D 3 B E D R O O M B U N G A L O W S F O R SENIOR CIVIL S E R V A N T S . ]  Source: Field Research 1988-89.  130  C H A P T E R 4: T H E H O U S I N G C H A L L E N G E I N A B U J A  FIGURE 4.6:  MINISTERIAL QUARTERS W I T H I N THE F C C  Source: Field Research 1988-89.  131  C H A P T E R 4: T H E H O U S I N G C H A L L E N G E I N A B U J A  FIGURE 4.7:  PRIVATE RESIDENTIAL B U I L D I N G W I T H I N T H E F C C  C H A P T E R 4: T H E H O U S I N G C H A L L E N G E I N A B U J A  FIGURE 4.8:  FIVE-STAR, F O U R - S T A R A N D T H R E E - S T A R H O T E L S W I T H I N T H E F C C  Source: Field Research 1988-89.  133  CHAPTER 4: THE HOUSING CHALLENGE IN ABUJA  As for the master plan target of providing 11,200 serviced plots for private housing initiatives, table 4.8 provides a break d o w n of the number of applications for residential plots received and the number approved.  It shows that, as at December 1987, only  applications for plots had been approved.  2,747  It was, however, learned during the field work that  many of these plots remain unserviced with requisite infrastructure, which may explain in part the observation by the Nigerian Institute of Town Planners (NITP) (1984, p. 26): 2,500 plots have been allocated for residential development and 50 plots for commercial development. Only ten of the allocated residential are being developed by private developers. This indicates the low level participation of private developers in the development effort of the city. This is despite the observation that Abuja, at the time, was "becoming increasingly popular with industries" (Koko 1983, p. 128).  Based on visual inspection of development in Abuja,  this trend appears to have changed little to the present time. There may be up to 10 private houses completed and occupied with another 20 - 30 under construction^  As can be seen  from figure 4.7, these developments have tended to be in the form of a single family dwelling as opposed to a tenement or " r o o m i n g " house.  Some of the reasons behind this poor  showing on the part of private developers are explored in section 4.2.4.  134  C H A P T E R 4: T H E H O U S I N G  T A B L E 4.8:  C H A L L E N G E IN A B U J A  A P P L I C A T I O N F O R RESIDENTIAL P L O T S BY STATES ( D E C .  STATES  No.  OF  No.  OF A P P R O V E D  1987)  (%)  N O . OF A P P .  APPLICATIONS  APPLICATIONS  APPLICATIONS  11. B E N U E  331 439 36 359 930 992 367 281 511 617 533  163 119 12 220 240 197 134 158 135 144 175  49.3 27.1 33.3 61.3 25.8 19.9 36.5 56.2 26.4 23.3 32.8  S U B TOTAL  5,396  1,697  31.45  RIVERS  2,320 1,376 1,185 504 446 493 307 619 384  122 101 121 110 93 140 125 143 95  5.3 7.3 10.2 21.8 20.9 28.4 40.7 23.1 24.7  S U B TOTAL  7,634  1,050  13.75  13,030  2,747  21  N O R T H E R N STATES 1. B A U C H I 2.  BORNO  3. F C T 4.  GONGOLA  5.  KADUNA  6.  KANO  7.  NIGER  8. P L A T E A U 9. 10.  SOKOTO KWARA  S O U T H E R N STATES 12. A N A M B R A  13. I M O 14.  BENDEL  15.  C R O S S RIVER  16.  LAGOS  17.  OGUN  18.  ONDO  19. O Y O 20.  TOTAL  Source: FCDA 1988, p. 39.  135  CHAPTER 4: THE HOUSING CHALLENGE IN ABUJA  4.2 CURRENT  SETTLEMENT  SITUATION  In part II of the survey questionnaire on Abuja, the question is asked: what major problems d o you see with housing in Abuja?  The discussion t o follow draws mainly from  officials responses to this question, as well as evidence uncovered through  documentary  research and field observations.  Affordability  4.2.1  As might be expected, the biggest problem identified with housing in Abuja is that most of the houses are t o o expensive and, consequently, affordable t o only heavily subsidized civil servants and major private sector institutions such as banks.  Tables 4.9 t o 4.12 on  incomes and housing construction costs in Abuja demonstrate this fact. They show that even when housing costs are treated for graft (see table 4.11) and 20 per cent of gross current income is amortized over a quarter of a century at no interest, over 80 per cent of the civil servants cannot afford the type of houses that were being built up t o 1982.  For non-  government workers in small scale industries, this non-affordability rate is higher at over 95 per c e n t .  3  At a 1982 treated cost of N19,623 (or approximately $32,375 U.S.) for a one  bedroom house, only those civil servants (14.3%) at grade level 09 and above o n the government pay scale in 1989 can afford the cheapest housing being built in the FCC without subsidy.  4  It is interesting to note that houses costing up t o $652,800 U.S. (or N395,640)  were being built for legislators and advisers whose maximum housing affordability is less than $116,000 (or N70,000).  3. Since corruption in Nigeria is found to be more rife in the public rather than private sector (Oluwo 1983, p. 291), it would be inappropriate to use housing costs treated for graft in referring to this group. Official cost quotations are used instead. [The non-affordability rates of 80 and 95 per cent for both government and non-government workers were achieved through a further disaggregation of the groups' income distribution.] 4. Grade level 08, 09 and 10 are the entry levels for bureaucrats with Bachelor's, Master's and Ph.D. degrees, respectively.  136  C H A P T E R 4: T H E H O U S I N G  CHALLENGE IN ABUJA  TABLE 4 . 9 : H O U S I N G AFFORDABILITY BY CIVIL SERVANTS IN A B U J A (BASED O N CURRENT N O M I N A L I N C O M E )  SALARY G R A D E  09-12  13-17  01-06  07-08  72.5  13.2  10.4  1,500-  3,174-  5,112-  8,712-  2,418  3,924  8,034  13,812  300-  635-  LEVEL (%) O F C I V I L  3.9  SERVANTS ANNUAL INCOME (IN NAIRA)  20%  O F INCOME  1,022-  1,742-  484  785  1,607  2,762  TOTAL PAYMENTS  7,500-  15,875-  25,550-  43,550  O V E R 2 5 YEARS  12,100  19,625  40,175  69,060  FOR H O U S I N G *  * The goal stated by the government of Nigeria is that "no one should pay more than. 2 0 per cent of income in rents.... For low-income earners, rent should be fixed between 10 and 15 per cent of income" (Master plan 1979, p. 176).  Source: Table 4 . 1 6 .  j  TABLE 4 . 1 0 : H O U S I N G AFFORDABILITY BY N O N - G O V E R N M E N T W O R K E R S IN S M A L L S C A L E INDUSTRIES I N T H E M U N I C I P A L I T Y O F A B U J A ( 1 9 8 8 )  ANNUAL INCOME  1,200-  2,400-  3,600-  6,000-  2,400  3,600  6,000  ABOVE  66.6  26.7  5.7  1.0  240-  480-  720-  1,200-  480  720  1,200  ABOVE  TOTAL PAYMENTS  6,000-  12,000-  18,000-  30,000  O V E R 2 5 YEARS  12,000  18,000  30,000  ABOVE  (IN NAIRA) (%) O F L A B O U R POPULATION 20%  O F INCOME  FOR  HOUSING  Source: Table 4 . 1 7 .  137  C H A P T E R 4: T H EH O U S I N G C H A L L E N G E I N A B U J A  TABLE 4 . 1 1 : TREATED C O S T O F H O U S I N G C O N S T R U C T E D BY THE F C D A ( 1 9 8 2 )  H O U S E TYPE  OFFICIAL A V . C O S T +  ADJUSTED C O S T + +  U.S $*  1 BD  N26,164  N19,623  32,375  2  BD  N29,739  N22,304  36,800  3 BD  N48,742  N36,557  60,300  4  BD  N77,324  N55,993  92,375  5  BD  N527,521  N395,640  652,800  6  BD  N269,562  N202,181  333,600  BD = BEDROOM  * Figures reflect the equivalence of the adjusted cost in U.S. currency, using the 1984 official precurrency devaluation exchange rate of N1.00 = $1.65 U.S.. Currently N1.00 = $0.15 U.S.. + From table 4.18. ++ "Corruption is a major problem of national development in Nigeria. The practice is prevalent at every level; polity, administrative, as well as the upper and lower levels of the bureaucracy. Corrupt practices occur in nearly all ministries, departments, and agencies. The practice is more widespread with each passing day." This was the opening remark of an article by Aina (1982, p. 71), assistant chief management development officer, the Administrative Staff College of Nigeria. Several scholars share this view including Oluwo (1983; 1985) and Achebe (1983), an internationally acclaimed novelist who went as far as to entitle his treatment of the subject as The Trouble with Nigeria. Also, see section of this dissertation. All this, particularly the suggestion from the above and elsewhere (Carino 1985) that corruption in developing countries is a "shared" system, leads to the conclusion that any calculations to determine housing affordability in Abuja that relies solely on nominal incomes of civil servants is flawed. That is, just as any attempt to obtain information on corrupt earnings of civil servants is likely to be equally flawed. Three rudimentary problems confront any attempt to operationalize a unilateral treatment of civil servants' income data for earnings through corrupt practices. The first is that the majority of the civil servants may not be corrupt. The second is that earnings from corruption tend to be incredibly widespread, depending on official rank and role (i.e., a gate-keeper's role). The third is that data in the area is unavailable as transactions normally go unreported. In order to resolve this difficulty, the dissertation finds it necessary to stand the problem on its head, by asking the question: What if corruption was not a factor in producing the existing stock of housing in the new capital, what then might the affordability picture among the civil servants' group look like? An answer is developed based on a report by a western architect who worked in Abuja during the construction boom time. After chronicling widespread corruption involving the method of awarding housing contracts in the city, the architect's conclusion was that "nonconstruction percentage on-costs add at least 25 per cent, and possibly more, to cost of work in Nigeria" (AJ 1985, p. 78). The "adjusted" cost estimates are achieved using this rather conservative estimate to deflate the official quotation on housing cost in Abuja.  Source: Author.  138  CHAPTER 4: THE HOUSING CHALLENGE IN ABUJA  What the foregoing statistics imply is that no civil servant in Abuja today can afford the public housing they occupy without heavy government subsidies.  Table 4.12 provides an  approach to the amount of subsidy (between 83% and 94%) that may be required t o make the current stock of housing affordable t o the civil servant occupants.  It does this by  comparing the rent charged to bank officials up to 1986 with the rent currently charged to civil servants. This rate of subsidy compares to the 10 per cent rate initially envisioned by the IPA. (See table 4.3.)  Should the present standards of construction in Abuja be maintained in  the face of major currency devaluation (up t o 350%) and the concomitant spiral of inflation, it is not inconceivable that this rate of subsidy would eventually rise to nearly 100 per cent. That is, assuming no inflationary increase in civil servants salary as insisted upon by the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) forced upon the country by both the  International  Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. (For discussions of the SAP, see Bangura 1987). An indication of this prediction can be seen from table 4.13 which shows dramatic increases in construction costs and materials.  For instance, within the space of just a few  months, between 1988 and 1989, prices rose by as much as 4-fold for basic indigenously sourced building materials such as cement, sand, timber and labor. imported materials (e.g.,  Meanwhile, the rate for  rods, ceiling boards, galvanized iron roofing, lighting fixtures,  electrical cables, glass, pipe-work, etc.) requiring payment in hard currency, is shown to have risen by up to 567 per cent within the past year.  Consequently, the FHA experienced a 27.5  per cent increase in construction costs, between the latter part of 1988 and early 1989. (See table 4.14.)  139  CHAPTER 4: THE HOUSING CHALLENGE IN ABUJA  T A B L E 4.12: H O U S I N G R E N T C H A R G E D T O B A N K O F F I C I A L S (1986) vs H O U S I N G R E N T C H A R G E D T O G O V E R N M E N T O F F I C I A L S (1988)  H O U S E TYPE  A N N U A L RENT FOR  A N N U A L RENT FOR  (%) O F  B A N K OFFICIALS  G O V T OFFICIALS  SUBSIDY  (1986)+  (1988)  1 BD  N3,000  N168  94  2 BD  N3,500  N600  83  3 BD*  N4,500  N600  87  4 BD*  N5,500  N600  89  + It should be pointed out that these rates are not necessarily the market or economic rents. In fact, they are likely to be below the market rents. * Basis of estimate for 1 and 2 bedroom house units.  Source: Field Research 1988-89. (Privileged information, FCDA.)  140  CHAPTER 4 : THE HOUSING CHALLENGE IN ABUJA  T A B L E 4 . 1 3 : C O S T O F SELECTED B U I L D I N G M A T E R I A L S I N N I G E R I A ( 1 9 7 8 - 8 9 )  MATERIAL  1978  1982  1988*  1989*  % INCREASE 1988-89  i.  LOCAL  C E M E N T (1 B A G )  N3.00  N5.50  N12.00  N48.00  400  S A N D (1 TRIP)  N25.00  N30.00  N20.00  N55.00  275  TIMBER (6 x 2)  N5.50  N6.00  N12.00  N21.00  175  GENERAL LABOR +  N4.00  N5.00  N6.00  N18.00  300  SKILLED L A B O R +  N6.00  N9.00  N15.00  N25.00  167  IRON (5/8)  ~  -  N19.50  N105.00  539  CEILING BOARD  -  ~  N12.00  N68.00  567  CORRUGATED ZINC  -  -  N180.00  N480.00  267  2. IMPORT  ROOF (20 BUNDLE)  + On the basis of an 8 hour day. * Figures reflect pre- and post-currency devaluation values. [Up to 1984, N1.00 = $1.65 U.S.; whereas currently N1.00 = $0.15 U.S.]  Source: 1 9 7 8 - 8 2 figures extracted from Onibokun 1 9 8 5 , p. 6 7 . 1 9 8 8 - 8 9 figures obtained from Micah Obiegbu, Head, Department of Building Construction, Institute of Management and Technology, Enugu, Nigeria.  141  C H A P T E R 4: T H E H O U S I N G C H A L L E N G E I N A B U J A  TABLE 4 . 1 4 : IMPACT O F INFLATION O N C O S T O F H O U S I N G C O N S T R U C T E D BY THE F H A ( 1 9 8 8 - 8 9 )  TYPE  COST  RETAIL*  YEAR  2 BEDROOM  N40,000  N60,000  1989  2 BEDROOM  N29,000  N50,000  1988  * As a public corporation, the F H A is authorized to mark up prices for its housing. Noteworthy here is the fact that the cheapest low-cost housing currently being marketed by the corporation is around the N50,000 price range.  Source: Field Research 1 9 8 8 - 8 9 .  With respect t o alternatives t o finished housing, it appears that there has not been any effort on the part of government t o develop serviced plots that are affordable by the lowincome population.  Apart from the relatively high cost of the plots (high density =  N500;  medium density = N 7 5 0 ; and l o w density = N 1 , 0 0 0 ) , the high application fee of N 2 5 0 and the distribution of plots on a "first-come, first served" basis, made it impossible for the poor t o benefit from the scheme. Obviously, the poor lack both the information and political clout necessary t o effectively enter such an open competition. In terms of temporary accommodation, no cheap transient housing were provided as recommended by the IPA. Table 4 . 1 5 contains a list of some of the hotels currently operating in the capital, including their over night rates for a standard room.  Bearing in mind that 8 5 . 7  per cent of the salaried civil servants make a nominal salary of between N 5 . 7 7 and N 1 5 . 1 0 per day, the prohibitive nature of these rates cannot be mistaken. Yet, these rates are not all that is prohibitive about the accommodation, as a deposit of usually twice the r o o m rate is required.  142  C H A P T E R 4: T H E H O U S I N G C H A L L E N G E IN A B U J A  TABLE 4 . 1 5 : C O S T OF STANDARD TEMPORARY A C C O M M O D A T I O N W I T H I N THE F C C I N N A I R A (FEB. 1989)  HOTEL N A M E  R O O M RATE  R O O M CAPACITY  N/A  1,376  N/A  1,171  H I L T O N (5-STAR)  N210  998  A G U R A (4-STAR)  N140  274  SILVER-POT SUITE  N90  45  D U B U CATERING SERVICES  N65  15 +  FEDERAL GUEST H O U S E  N55  72  S U N N Y GUEST H O U S E  N55  24  HYATT (5-STAR) SHERATON  (5-STAR)*  TOTAL  3,975  Note that above rates are subject to 10% service charge plus 5% sales tax. * Completed but not yet operational. + A n estimated number of rooms.  Source: Field Research 1 9 8 8 - 8 9 .  143  C H A P T E R 4: T H E H O U S I N G C H A L L E N G E I N A B U J A  T A B L E 4.16: I N C O M E D I S T R I B U T I O N F O R C I V I L S E R V A N T S I N A B U J A BY S A L A R Y G R A D E LEVELS (1988)  SALARY G R A D E  (%) O F C I V I L  ANNUAL INCOME  SERVANTS  (IN NAIRA)  01 - 06  74.4  1,500 - 2,418  07 - 08  13.4  3,174 - 3,924  09 - 12  9.5  5,112 - 8,034  13 - 17  2.7  8,712 - 13,812  LEVELS  Source: Field Research 1988-89. Calculated based on the current salary structure of the federal civil service and the staff strength of the major ministries that already operate out of the new capital, as well as those mandated to move to the city by 1989. These include the ministries of M F C T / F C D A , Industry, Internal Affairs, Trade and Commerce, Finance (FCDA 1988, p. 40; FCDA 1987, p. 49; also see table 4.20). The ministry of Agriculture is disregarded in this calculation because of inconsistency in the data ascribed to it by the aforementioned FCDA source.  T A B L E 4 . 1 7 : I N C O M E D I S T R I B U T I O N F O R W O R K E R S I N S M A L L - S C A L E INDUSTRIES I N T H E M U N I C I P A L I T Y  O F A B U J A (1988)  ANNUAL INCOME (IN N A I R A )  (%) O F P O P U L A T I O N  N1,200 - B E L O W  9.5  N1,200 - 2,400  57.1  N2,400 - 3,600  26.7  N3,600 - 6,000  5.7  N6,000 - A B O V E  1.0  100.0  TOTAL  Source: Extracted from NISER 1989, p. 66. The figures are based on a population sample of 105 people and for industrial establishments employing not more than six persons.  144  C H A P T E R 4: T H E H O U S I N G  TABLE 4 . 1 8 : UNTREATED C O S T O F H O U S I N G C O N S T R U C T E D  CHALLENGE IN ABUJA  IN A B U J A ( 1 9 7 9 - 8 2 ) *  HOUSE  NUMBER  BUILDING  ESTIMATED C O S T * *  TYPE  O F UNITS  TYPE  (IN NAIRA)  1 BH  352  1 BF  990  N21,000 APARTMENT BLOCK  N28,000  N26,164  AVERAGE C O S T 2 BH  662  BUNGALOW  N38,174  2 BH  488  BUNGALOW  N15,665  2 BH  852  BUNGALOWS  N25,180  2 BF  1284  APARTMENT BLOCK  N31,000  2 BF  72  APARTMENT BLOCK  N79,019  N29,739  AVERAGE C O S T 3 BH  257  DUPLEX  N45,000  3 BH  229  BUNGALOW  N52,110  3 BF  740  APARTMENT BLOCK  N49,000  N48,742  AVERAGE C O S T 4 BF  216  APARTMENT BLOCK  N59,425  4 BH  95  DUPLEX  N65,000  4 BH  42  DUPLEX  N80,000  4 BH  145  BUNGALOW  N111,285  N77,324  AVERAGE C O S T  6  BH  36  4  BH  10  5  BH  4  BUNGALOW LEGISLATIVE  HOUSES  ADVISERS' HOUSES  N269,561 N426,418 N527,521  NOTE: BH = BEDROOM HOUSE; BF = BEDROOM FLAT. * This covers housing construction in the FCC plus the districts of Karu and Gwagwalada in the FCT. ** Likely to be undervalued as this excludes the cost of renovations which amounted to N12.0 million for 993 units.  Source: Field Research 1 9 8 8 - 8 9 . (Privileged information, FCDA.)  145  CHAPTER 4: THE HOUSING CHALLENGE IN ABUJA  4.2.2  Supply Housing supply for the civil servants in Abuja is short relative t o demand. This can be  seen from the fact that the 1986 building target of 25,000 dwelling units is yet t o be met. Tables 4.6 and 4.7 disclose that only a fraction of this target (17,022 including the FHA lowcost) had been completed and certified occupied by December 1988. This means that 102,132 persons can be effectively accommodated in government housing, assuming six persons per unit.^  When this number of accommodated persons is subtracted from the  population of civil servants and their families (116,838) and then divided by six person per housing unit, a rough estimate of housing demand is obtained that is in the excess of 2,400 units. (See table 4.19.) However, three factors suggest that all the members of this group are reasonably housed for the present time. First, ministries mandated t o move t o Abuja are usually assigned housing before actually being uprooted from Lagos. Second, n o t all those mandated t o move t o Abuja have done so (e.g., the Ministries of Education and Finance had not moved as at April 1989). Lastly, a portion of street-level professionals (e.g., grade school teachers and nurses/midwives) w h o qualify for housing assignment from FCDA are females and tend t o be wives of other civil servants w h o already have a housing allocation.  For example, 623 (or 29%) of grade school  teachers in the FCT in 1987 were w o m e n (FCDA 1987, p. 9, 14). Even though it is not known what portion of this group is single or married, it is n o t unreasonable t o suspect that many of them are wives of civil servants transferred from Lagos.  The same argument could be made  for nurses/midwives in the territory whose total population consists of 256 (or 69%) females (FCDA 1987, p. 20).  Hence, this possibility of having a civil servant's husband and wife team  5. It is probably an exaggeration to consider that many people adequately accommodated, as the 17,022 overall housing figure includes 6,687 units in single row house and 186 units in resettlement housing. These units are not self-contained and do not have living room or parlour spaces.  146  CHAPTER 4: THE HOUSING CHALLENGE IN ABUJA  housed in one unit of housing, should allow the FCDA additional latitude in dealing  with  excess demand.^ Thus, in the case of the civil servants' group in the FCT, it could be said that none of them ought t o be squatters. This means that the housing situation among them is, at worst, tight. Of course, the same cannot be said of the housing situation among the private or nongovernment groups where the shortage is terribly acute. (See section 4.2.5 on squatters.) In fact, one of the biggest housing quagmires in Abuja is this fact that "there has been virtually no noticeable development of any private plots for housing" (NITP 1984, p. 24). As mentioned earlier, only about 10 private plots in Abuja have been developed t o date, not t o mention the fact that those developed have tended t o be non-tenements or rooming houses. "The only key area where the private sector has participated is in hotel development" (NITP 1984, p. 24). But most of the participants in this area have tended t o be major players in the industry (e.g., Hilton, Sheraton, Hyatt and the Nigerian Government), so financial capital and access t o land were not a problem.  This suggests that the same level of involvement  could also have been achieved in residential development, had the government undertaken t o guarantee access t o serviced plots and mortgage facilities.  The latter w o u l d have been  effected either by arranging with the individual banks or by establishing financial institutions specifically t o offer credit for housing development in Abuja. Most officials interviewed during the field work cited both of these factors as a major barrier for workers w h o may want t o build their own homes, as well as for anyone else w h o may want t o build rental housing for profit.  W h y the government should hope for a great deal of private involvement in the  housing market of the new capital, without looking into these matters t o help bring about the desired response, is particularly enigmatic. This puzzle is partly explained in section 4.2.4.  6. Any slack that this leaves in the housing demand should be expected to be picked up by those private sector people (e.g., bank officials) who are assigned housing by the FCDA.  147  C H A P T E R 4: T H E H O U S I N G C H A L L E N G E I N A B U J A  TABLE 4 . 1 9 : ESTIMATE OF H O U S I N G D E M A N D A M O N G THE C I V I L SERVANTS' G R O U P I N THE F C T ( 1 9 8 8 )  1.  N U M B E R OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES  19,473  (BASED O N TABLE 4 . 2 0 ) 2.  POPULATION OF G O V ' T EMPLOYEES A N D THEIR FAMILIES  116,838  ( 1 9 , 4 7 3 X 6 PERSONS PER H O U S E H O L D ) 3.  N U M B E R OF GOVT HOUSES I N ABUJA  17,022  (INCLUDES H O U S I N G BY BOTH THE FCDA A N D FHA) 4.  N U M B E R OF PERSONS ADEQUATELY A C C O M M O D A T E D  102,132*  ( 1 7 , 0 2 2 X 6 PERSONS PER H O U S E H O L D ) 5.  N U M B E R O F PERSONS INADEQUATELY A C C O M M O D A T E D  14,706  (2 MINUS 4 )  6.  OVERALL H O U S I N G D E M A N D  2,451  (14,706 divided by 6)  * What is considered adequate here may be misleading, as the 17,022 total housing units include 6,687 in single room row houses and 186 in resettlement housing. These units are not self-contained and do not have living room or parlour space.  148  C H A P T E R 4: T H E H O U S I N G C H A L L E N G E I N A B U J A  T A B L E 4.20: T H E M A N P O W E R S T R E N G T H O F T H E M I N I S T R I E S A L R E A D Y I N A B U J A A N D T H O S E T O M O V E T O C I T Y B Y 1989  MINISTRY  TOTAL M A N P O W E R  MFCT/FDCA+  7,801  INDUSTRY  1,697  INTERNAL AFFAIRS  1,253  FINANCE  1,513  AGRICULTURE  2,160  TRADE & C O M M E R C E  1,721  OTHERS*  3,328  19,473  TOTAL  + This includes over 2,000 teachers and about 1,000 health officials working in various areas of the FCT. * That is assuming Education and the 1989. Included also Police Force and the  an average manpower strength of 1,539 for each of the two ministries (i.e., National Youth Service Corps Secretariat) mandated to moved to Abuja by is a guestimate of 250 manpower strength for members of both the Nigerian Army stationed in the territory.  Source: FCDA 1988, p. 40; FCDA 1987, p. 49).  4.2.3  Exclusion Closely related t o the problem of affordability is that of exclusion.  Even though the  master plan (1979, p. 60) estimated the ratio of non-government t o government workers in the city at 3:1 in 1986, t o rise t o 4:1 in 2,000, the FCDA has made no explicit provisions for non-civil servants.  The government expectation has been that private developers would get 149  CHAPTER 4: THE HOUSING CHALLENGE IN ABUJA  involved and somehow respond t o this group's housing needs. When this expectation failed to materialize, it is little wonder that all persons w h o d o not have formal ties with the civil service (both the well-to-do and the poor) are left t o fend for their own a c c o m m o d a t i o n /  It  should be noted that the FCDA made exceptions for the managers of major financial institutions and construction firms w h o were provided with housing by the agency, albeit at an exorbitant price that probably reflects close t o the market rent.  While it is conceivable that  some of the well-to-do members of the non-civil servants population may be able t o satisfy their housing needs by buying and developing plots, the important point is that a large portion are excluded from the housing market as a result of their l o w income.  Section 4.2.5  on squatters gives a sense of where this excluded portion of the people lives.  4.2.4 Access  to Land  The clear information to emerge from the field work  is that many  developers  interested in Abuja were kept from building, because they could not gain access t o plots. Except for areas occupied by the indigenous population, all land across the FCT is owned and administrated by the federal government.  According to table 4.8, out of 13,030 applications  for residential plots, only 2,747 (21.1%) had been approved by December 1987. number, many have not been serviced with the requisite infrastructure.  Of this  Of those that were  serviced, it was reported that the greater difficulty was in getting the certificate of occupancy (C of O ) , without which the plots could n o t be legally developed.  Finally, of those private  developers w h o were in the position t o develop their plots, a handful of them opted t o build private mansions rather than tenements (see figure 4.7); whereas the rest have not built anything despite government requirement that development take place within t w o years of  7. Officials at FCDA estimate that over 90 per cent of the total stock of residential structures in the territory are accounted for by the federal government efforts (i.e., excluding housing produced by the squatters and the indigenous population). Within the FCC, the estimate rises to nearly 100 per cent.  150  CHAPTER 4: THE HOUSING CHALLENGE IN ABUJA  allocation.  The only action the government has taken to enforce this requirement is t o  occasionally publish names of those w h o are in default. Several reasons are advanced t o explain the lack of interest of the private sector. First, it is suggested that would-be private developers still perceive a great deal of uncertainty in connection with the future of the new capital, in terms of its political status, ethnic balance and, ultimately, economic prospects. The feeling is that investors are not assured of a stable government or economic climate and that they, therefore, might simply be waiting for the government to become sufficiently involved in the development. Second, it is suggested that Abuja is seen t o be a "no-man's" land, which conflicts with the widespread social/traditional values of the populace which obligate individuals to build mainly in one's own village or place of origin. Insofar as the new capital is home for all Nigerians, it is no one's home in particular, except perhaps for the government itself which is unsurprisingly left to build the city alone. Third, it is suggested that the people w h o have expressed an interest in developing plots in the new capital are not the people wanted in the capital by the country's decision makers.  The predominance of northern influence in the politics of the country warrants the  suspicion that their hidden agenda for Abuja is to make it a northern, rather than a national capital.  Evidence for this can be found in table 4.8 which shows that 31.45 per cent of  applications for residential plots by residents of northern states were approved, compared to 13.75 per cent for the southern states which have more applicants and accounts for 58.59 per cent of the total applications submitted. This means that the ratio for successful applications is 1:1.6 in favor of northern states whose overall population ratio in the country is not up to 1:1. Finally, the argument could be made that the public rental subsidies are so great that private sector developers are unable to compete.  Nevertheless, and for what ever the  reasons, the situation with undeveloped plots in Abuja was such that plots were allocated  151  CHAPTER 4: THE HOUSING CHALLENGE IN ABUJA  mainly t o those individuals w h o could afford t o wait for a more propitious time t o develop, rather than t o those w h o seemed desperate t o develop right away.® Thus, in summarizing the situation, a principle town planning officer with the FCDA put it this way: "the question of w h o gets a plot in Abuja is a matter of politics, patronage and connections."  Though it should be noted that not a single plot has been allocated since the  past three or more years, following the disbanding of the Landuse Allocation Committee until further notice.  Whilst the reasons for this suspension may have t o do with tribal politics  mentioned earlier, it may simply be that the government had fallen terribly behind in surveying and servicing the plots.  4.2.5  Squatting The exclusionary nature and non-affordability of housing in the city has contributed t o  considerable squatting.  Despite the fact that statistics on the magnitude of this problem  could not be obtained, and that authorities in Abuja have so far been successful in dismantling all squatments erected within the capital city proper, the findings from the field research are that squatting is a major problem. Tables 4.21 and 4.22 represent an attempt to surmise the current number of squatters in both the Municipality of Abuja and the FCT as a whole, based on the hypothesis by Turner (1969, p. 511) that "autonomous urban settlement in the major cities of urbanizing nations is the product of the difference between the nature of popular demand for dwellings and those supplied by institutionalized society." The tables indicate that the housing needs of approximately 246,000 (or 46%) people in the FCT could n o t be accounted for; and that  106,000  of these  de  facto squatters  are located within the  8. Discussions with a reputable squatter businessman whose business establishments in the village of Garki have been bulldozed twice confirm this point. The man described the frustration that he and his colleagues have had to endure in attempting to legitimately gain access to Abuja, either through residential or commercial plot assignment. As the man explained, the only difference between himself and the fellow who has a shop in the neighborhood or district centers of Abuja, is that he does not have friends in high places nor as much money to bribe his way.  152  CHAPTER 4 : THE HOUSING CHALLENGE IN ABUJA  Municipality of Abuja, near the FCC proper.  These estimates, of course, have t o be  reconciled with the fact that there has not been an actual head count t o determine the number of people residing in the territory.  The 1 9 8 1 (Mabogunje et al.) census was  specifically directed at only determining the indigenous population of the territory.  The sites  of the squatments visited in the Municipality of Abuja can be found in figure 4 . 9 , while some evidence of the squatters themselves can be found in figures 4 . 1 0 and 4 . 1 1 .  T A B L E 4 . 2 1 : ESTIMATE O F S Q U A T T E R S I N T H E M U N I C I P A L I T Y O F A B U J A ( 1 9 8 8 )  1.  ESTIMATED P O P U L A T I O N O F T H E M U N I C I P A L I T Y O F A B U J A  218,820  ( F R O M TABLE 3 . 2 ) 2.  ESTIMATED P O P U L A T I O N O F INDIGENES ( 2 1 8 , 8 2 0 D I V I D E D BY 3 . 2 )  -68,381  ( F R O M I N D I G E N E / N O N - I N D I G E N E R A T I O I N TABLE 3 . 3 ) 3.  ESTIMATED P O P U L A T I O N O F P E R S O N S A D E Q U A T E L Y A C C O M M O D A T E D ( F R O M TABLE 3 . 3 )  -44,118*  4 . ESTIMATED P O P U L A T I O N O F SQUATTERS  106,321  * This includes accommodation provided by private sector housing.  Source: Author  9. Two things suggest that these figures may be reliable. The first are the field work experiences, particularly observations of the five squatments visited (see figure 4.9), as well as what was learned from officials at the FCDA concerning their efforts to control the problem. The second is the fact that "in 1962 [i.e., roughly a decade after construction commenced], the population of the uncontrolled settlements around Brasilia was at least 40 per cent of the total of the metropolitan area" (Abumere 1986, p. 295). Like Brazil, Nigeria is a populous and resource rich developing country; and, like Brasilia, Abuja is centrally located in a backward region of the country, and construction of the city commenced a decade ago. (See Farret 1978 and Epstein 1973 for discussion on Brasilia.)  153  C H A P T E R 4: T H E H O U S I N G C H A L L E N G E I N A B U J A  T A B L E 4 . 2 2 : ESTIMATE O F S Q U A T T E R S I N T H E F C T ( 1 9 8 8 )  1.  ESTIMATED P O P U L A T I O N O F T H E F C T  535,020  (SEE TABLE 3 . 2 ) 2.  ESTIMATED P O P U L A T I O N O F T H E I N D I G E N E S *  -165,085  (SEE TABLE 3 . 2 ) 3.  -102,132  ESTIMATED N U M B E R O F P E R S O N S A D E Q U A T E L Y A C C O M M O D A T E D ( F R O M TABLE 4 . 1 9 )  4.  ESTIMATED S U B L E T T I N G / S H A R I N G B Y CIVIL S E R V A N T S * *  -13,108  5.  ESTIMATED P O P U L A T I O N PRIVATELY A C C O M M O D A T E D *  -8,340  5.  ESTIMATED P O P U L A T I O N O F SQUATTERS  246,355  This population can be assumed to have always looked after its housing needs. Calculated based on the assumptions of table 3.3: House Type 3 OR M O R E BD  2 1  BD BD  Total  Number of Units  Added Capacity  4,086 x 2 4,936 X 1 8,000 X 0  8,172 4,936 0  17,022  13,108  + Officials at FCDA estimate that over 90 per cent of the total stock of residential structures in the territory are accounted for by the federal government efforts (i.e., excluding housing produced by the squatters and the indigenous population). Within the F C C , this estimate rises to nearly 100 per cent; a decreased rate of private sector participation in housing which is probably due to the relative absence of small scale industries in the city (NISER 1989). However, based on field observations, private housing in the territory is guestimated to account for no more than 7 per cent of (17,022) total government housing achievement. A higher average household size of 7 is assumed in the calculation.  Source: Author.  154  C H A P T E R 4: T H E H O U S I N C C H A L L E N G E I N A B U J A  F I G U R E 4.9:  SITES O F C O N S I D E R A B L E S Q U A T M E N T S I N T H E M U N I C I P A L I T Y O F A B U J A ( 1 9 8 9 )  CHAPTER 4: THE H O U S I N G CHALLENGE I N ABUJA  FIGURE 4 . 1 0 : A TYPICAL SCENE I N GARKI VILLAGE  156  C H A P T E R 4: T H E H O U S I N G C H A L L E N G E I N A B U J A  FIGURE 4 . 1 1 :  S P O N T A N E O U S BUSINESS ESTABLISHMENTS WITHIN THE FCC  [ESTABLISHMENTS A  NEARBY  SERVING T H E G A R K I DISTRICT  SCHOOL.  ESTABLISHMENTS  SERVING  S E C R E T A R I A T W H E R E T H E F C D A IS L O C A T E D . !  FlG^^I^I  Source: Field Research 1988-89.  157  HOSPITAL  AND  THE FEDERAL  CHAPTER 4: THE HOUSING CHALLENGE IN ABUJA  It may be asked why not a bigger population of squatters in light of the country's huge population and the heavy concentration of capital and public infrastructure in the territory. The answer is partly due t o government actions t o keep the squatters in check, but mostly t o the existence of Suieja, a satellite squatter colony approximately 30 miles from Abuja.  Estimated below the rank of an urban area in 1977 at 10,000, the settlement's  population increased dramatically t o nearly half a million in 1983 (Gandonu 1984, p. 9). Hence, except for a handful of construction workers w h o lived in the Nyanya labor camp, much labor for building the city was hauled in from this place on trailer trucks (Agba 1986, p. 180). The same applies t o the service workers. As the principal provider of support services, particularly informal services, needed t o sustain the new capital's population, the urban problems of Suieja have multiplied several fold. An extensive tour of various parts of the t o w n revealed its appalling urban conditions t o be either equal t o or worse than those found in the most horrid sections of Lagos. public infrastructure or service exists in the town.  No form of  Hindsight seems t o suggest that the site  selection panel may have envisioned this occurrence and carefully excised the settlement from the area of the FCT. Note the deliberate "V" shape along the northern borders of the FCT in figure 4.12. Returning to squatters in the FCT, the majority of them erected their shacks in the villages of G a r k i ^ and Maitama, immediately surrounding the capital city. 1  (See figure 4.9)  Only a few squatters were observed occupying uncompleted buildings belonging t o either the government or individuals within the city itself.  The shacks erected were generally sided as  well as roofed with aluminum sheets and scrap metal. Only in a few cases were the walls of the shacks made of tamped earth. Upon newly arriving in the FCT, the process that the squatters normally undergo is t o move directly t o the aforementioned villages and establish themselves among the indigenous  10. This village, which has by far the largest concentration of the squatters, is slated for relocation at Kwubwasoon. (See figure 4.10.)  158  CHAPTER 4: THE HOUSING CHALLENGE IN ABUJA  people w h o then act as hosts t o them. harder to detect by the authorities.  This supposedly makes them less conspicuous and Even though the squatters seem t o be of a mixed  population, coming from all parts of the country, there appears t o be more migrants from the eastern part of the country than from anywhere else.  This is supported by table 4.8 on  application for residential plots by states, as well as by the fact that people from eastern Nigeria have a long history of making sojourn t o foreign lands.  FIGURE 4.12:  T H E EXCISION O F SULEJA F R O M THE F C T  Source: Field Research 1988-89.  159  CHAPTER 4: THE HOUSING CHALLENGE IN ABUJA  In applying Turner's typology of stages of squatment development (figure 4.13), most of the squatments visited are still in their early stages, corresponding to the "provisional tenative squatter" stage. The level of physical development associated with this stage includes provisional construction of low standard and impermanent materials; while its degree of security of tenure is characterized by occupancy without any legal status or guarantee of continued tenure. There is also a characteristic absence of provision of public services of any kind, except perhaps for the frequent harassment of the squatters by government officials. The FCDA's policy towards the squatters group is to continue t o dislodge them by force, and to punish such actions by prosecution or fine. Specific information secured during the field research on the FCDA's treatment of the squatters, is that the agency, in conjunction with the Nigerian Police Force, periodically engage in a ferret-demolish exercise aimed at keeping the squatters from becoming entrenched.  Given the considerable amount  of  squatting that does occur in the villages of Garki and Maitama, most of the demolitions have tended t o take place in these locales.  The official justification normally given for the  demolitions is that such structures contradict the directives of the master plan which is a legal document.  Further, it is alleged by officials that such establishments provide a haven for law  offenders and abet criminal activities in general.  Normally when dispersed by force, the  squatters either attempt to integrate with the indigenes, or they fan out to the outlying satellite towns, making their reappearance almost inevitable.  According t o field information,  the government undertakes to dislodge these people about trice yearly.  160  C H A P T E R 4: T H E H O U S I N G C H A L L E N G E I N A B U J A  F I G U R E 4 . 1 3 : A T Y P O L O G Y O F S Q U A T M E N T S I N T E R M S O F D E V E L O P M E N T LEVELS A N D SECURITY O F T E N U R E  nomad  complete ae mi-squatter  complete legal  incomplete squatter  INCOMPLETE SEMI-SQUATTER  incomplete legal  incipient lenitive iq Hitter  INCIPIENT SQUATTER  INCIPIENT SEMI-SQUATTER  PROVISIONAL TENATIVE SQUATTER  PROVISIONAL SQUATTER  PROVISIONAL SEMI-SQUATTER  TRANSIENT TENATIVE SQUATTER  transient squatter  4  2 m z H S e ° >• c o t < m  ~ 8  11  sc  >  3 * 1 2.8 S 5 j! c §  ST a. v>  £  m jo  c > m 70  Source: Turner 1 9 6 9 .  161  ai  f  2 J,  s >j i J ££ a. - E. C S I' S. 5 3  - s i !  8 o -  r-  2 " ; j  ^5  CHAPTER 4: THE HOUSING CHALLENGE IN ABUJA  4.2.6 Segregated As  Development  explained  by one senior  FCDA  official  during  an interview,  " t h e initial  recommendation by the foreign planners was for the agency t o adopt a mixed housing scheme, but we found this scheme difficult t o reconcile with the reality of social stratification in Nigerian society. income groups.  Eventually, we had t o resort t o segregating housing development by  Somewhere in this process, houses intended for the low-income got zoned  t o their present location." The obvious problem presented by this scheme of development is that it entrenches inequality in the physical fabric of the city, which runs counter to both the spirit of the new capital and the notion of developing the city as "an exemplary housing program" for the nation (Master plan 1979, p. 173). Another possible adverse effect of this form of development is the inevitable "slumfication" of the low-income estates, as public policy neglect of these areas can be expected t o follow.  4.2.7  Location  Another easily apparent settlement problem is the location of housing relative t o the capital city.  Of the 21,006 total units of housing contracts awarded up t o 1988, 57 per cent  (or 11,909 units) were intended for development outside Abuja. Regarding the junior officials, 80 per cent of the 9,941 1-bedroom units directed at them were meant t o be built elsewhere in the FCT, almost all of this in Nyanya and Karu which are within a 10 mile distance from the capital city.  This implies that the majority of the low-income officials may only be minimally  inconvenienced by location, in terms of commuting costs and easy access t o the government  1" 1 offices at the center.  But there is another problem with the government developing over  11. Based on official rates, residents of Karu and Nyanya would pay between 12 and 16 per cent of their monthly salary to travel to and from the city, compared to rates that would be paid by individuals residing in far away places like Abaji (72% - 96%), Kuje (36% - 48%), Kwali (36% 48%), Bwari (24% - 32%) and Gwagwalada (24% - 32%) (FCDA 1989*, p. 13). Obviously, what this means is that workers in these latter areas are unlikely to be assigned duties in the city without transportation being formally arranged.  162  C H A P T E R 4: T H E H O U S I N G  C H A L L E N G E IN ABUJA  2,600 housing units at great distances from the city, between 19 and 82 miles. (See table 4.23 and figure 4.14). As Agba (1986, p. 279) observed, "while there was a shortage of housing at the FCC, many of the housing units developed in the FCT (e.g., at Gwagwalada) remain unoccupied, because of their great distances from the FCC, coupled with the problems of inadequate transportation."  Some of the civil servants interviewed during the field work  confirmed that it is not unusual for residents of many of these places to spend up to four hours daily travelling to and from the city. This casts strong doubts over these developments' utility in supplementing housing demands in the city as was originally intended.  T A B L E 4.23:  L O C A T I O N O F F C D A ' S H O U S I N G ESTATES I N T H E F C T A N D THEIR D I S T A N C E S F R O M T H E B O U N D A R Y O F T H E F C C ( I N MILES)  DEVELOPMENT  N O . OF UNITS  No.  O F UNITS  DISTANCES F R O M  COMPLETED  UNCOMPLETED  A B U J A I N MILES  1. K A R S H I  42  174  19  2.  139  50  27  3. G W A G W A L A D A  858  71  32  4. K W A L I  110  99  42  5. K U J E  106  102  45  6. Y A B A  46  73  70  7. A B A J I  82  85  73  8.  85  42  82  1,468*  696  AREAS  BWARI  RUBOCHI  TOTAL  * This total excludes the 1,160 low-cost housing units constructed by the FHA in these areas.  Source: Agba 1986, p. 280; Table 4.6.  163  CHAPTER 4: T H E H O U S I N G CHALLENGE I N ABUJA  FIGURE 4 . 1 4 : D E V E L O P M E N T SITES O F F C D A H O U S I N G ESTATES I N T H E F C T  .A  7  Bwari  /  A  /  I Gwagwalada  Yaba  / Abuja Municipal LGA V  t  .  9  - Xaru^ y  —•*  New  Town)  / Karsh.  Kwali  Kuje  •I  I  Ii  Aba,i  I  \ -» '  i  Nyanya  r/  Rubochi  Phase-one area developed  Source: Author.  164  CHAPTER 4: THE HOUSING CHALLENGE IN ABUJA  4.2.8  Crowding Crowding within dwellings is a problem in most of the low-income areas. The reason  is simple enough.  The allocation procedure is based exclusively on salary grade levels such  that the higher a civil servant is on this scale the more the entitlement for additional rooms. (See table 4.24.)  This method obviously does not take into account household size, which  meant that one bedroom units are generally assigned to low-income staff who typically have larger families of between 6-8 persons. This problem is most noticeable in the Nyanya labor camp which officials fear is developing into a slum area. The settlement was established at the beginning of construction to serve as a temporary home for the labor needed to build the city.  It comprises the single  room row house type as opposed to the executive-type one bedroom apartment units which are self-contained.  Built at a cost of N20,000, each row house contains four distinct rooms  with shared facilities.  (See figure 4.1.) Although unlikely, what this suggests is that up t o 24  persons may actually live in one such building, assuming an average of six persons per household.  In all, 6,687 units of such housing were built in Nyanya, which suggests a  population of approximately 40,000 for a very small area.  T A B L E 4.24:  TYPICAL STANDARD OF H O U S I N G A L L O C A T I O N IN A B U J A  SALARY G R A D E LEVELS  H O U S I N G TYPE  01 - 04 05 - 07 08-09 10-14 15 - 17  1 B D UNITS (SHARED FAC.) 1 B D UNITS (EXEC. TYPE) 2 B D UNITS 3 B D S E M I / D E T A C H E D UNITS 4 B D D E T A C H E D UNITS  SPECIAL SCALES  5 & 6 B D D E T A C H E D UNITS  Source: Field Research 1988-89.  165  CHAPTER 4: THE HOUSING CHALLENGE IN ABUJA  4.2.9  Services As  far as physical  infrastructure  is concerned  (e.g.,  roads,  water,  electricity,  sewerage/drainage systems, telecommunication, etc.), n o t all residential areas have water and electricity.  Most residential areas outside of the municipality of Abuja are without pipe borne  water, and they usually have no electricity or are served intermittently by generators.  At the  time of the field work, the whole of Karu town was without water and their residents had t o either collect water in buckets from far off streams or pay for tanker service.  This is  notwithstanding the fact that the town is within the municipality of Abuja (i.e., within 10 miles of the FCC).  At present, private telephone service in the FCT is still a luxury, as only a f e w  households in Abuja and Gwagwalada enjoy the facility.  In all, the number of working  telephones in these t w o places is reported to be 2,025 (FCDA 1988, p. 14). Presumably this number includes the few coin box telephones observed in the Carki district of the capital. In the area of social services, table 4.25 contains basic facts about the state of education infrastructure in the four municipalities of the FCT. It shows the territory doing reasonably well as of June 1987, with nearly 79,000 pupils in 205 primary schools, 25 secondary schools and 1 college, and an average teacher-student ratio of between 35 and 37 for primary and secondary schools, respectively. ^ 1  12. According to Obiechina (1985, p. 45), only seven primary school existed in the F C T before the creation of the new capital. Consequently, illiteracy rate among the indigenous population was estimated at 83 per cent in 1980. Still staggering, this rate has gone down to 75 per cent in 1985 as a result of the new schools established (Obiechina 1985, Appendix 3).  166  C H A P T E R 4: T H E H O U S I N G  TABLE 4 . 2 5 :  C H A L L E N G E IN A B U J A  N U M B E R A N D TYPE O F E D U C A T I O N A L INSTITUTIONS A N D T E A C H E R - S T U D E N T IN T H E F C T B Y L O C A L G O V T A R E A S (J UNE  RATIO  1987)  PRIMARY  TEACHER-  SECONDARY  TEACHER-  AREAS  SCHOOLS  PUPIL RATIO  SCHOOLS  PUPIL RATIO  ABAJI  24  30  3  31  -  ABUJA  69  39  11  40  -  GWAGWALADA  64  37  7  47  1  KUJE  48  37  4  30  -  205  36  25  37  i  LOCAL GOVT  TOTAL ENROLLMENT  59,985  18,499  COLLEGES  453  Source: Extracted from FCDA 1 9 8 7 .  Table 4 . 2 6 on health related facts suggest that this service could be much improved. Assuming that the indigenous population is little interested in western health practices, what the table suggests is that, as of June 1 9 8 7 , there were only 8 3 beds and 2 9 certified physicians for the whole of the territory's 3 4 4 , 4 0 3 non-indigenous population. According t o a report by the FCDA ( 1 9 8 8 , p. 3 1 ) , this situation, however, stands to be greatly improved when the 3 0 0 bed specialist hospital in Gwagwalada opens soon. This report states that the construction of the hospital is complete, and that most of the equipment ordered for it has already arrived.  167  CHAPTER 4 : THE HOUSING CHALLENGE IN ABUJA  T A B L E 4 . 2 6 : B A S I C FACTS O N ELEMENTS O F H E A L T H S E R V I C E S I N THE F C T (JUNE  H E A L T H ELEMENTS  1987)  TOTAL N U M B E R  1.  HOSPITAL/CLINIC/HEALTH CENTER  2.  DISPENSARY  14 37  3.  HOSPITAL BEDS  83  4.  SURGEON  1  5.  PEDIATRICIAN  1  6.  GYNAECOLOGIST/OBSTETRICIAN  3  7.  EAR, N O S E & T H R O A T ( E N T )  1  8.  GENERAL PRACTITIONER ( G P )  19  9.  OPTOMETRIST  1  10.  DENTIST  1  11. PHARMACIST  11  12. NURSES A N D MIDWIVES  268  13. VACCINATORS  5  1 4 . S E N I O R A D M I N . / P L A N N I N G STAFF  12  Source: Extracted from FCDA 1 9 8 7 .  Table 4 . 2 7 presents motor vehicle statistics for both the Municipality of Abuja and FCT, between July 1 9 8 6 and June 1 9 8 7 . It suggests that transportation in the territory may be a problem, especially outside the FCC. Experience in Abuja support this, although it appeared that the roads leading to the various local government areas were not the problem as much as the shortage of vehicles.  The table indicates that motor cycles are by far the most popular  mode of transport in the territory. Within the city itself, the government operates a few small buses, but the main mode of transport for the majority is taxis and privately owned Kombi buses.  Because many of those transferred t o the city from Lagos still maintain out of FCT  license plates, the number of private cars registered is lower than the number operating in the city. Many of the civil servants have their o w n cars! In terms of airline movement in and out of the FCT, the Abuja airport had an average of 3 5 commercial flights per month between July  168  CHAPTER 4 : THE HOUSING CHALLENGE IN ABUJA  1 9 8 6 and June 1 9 8 7 . Together with the private flights, a total of 2 9 , 2 7 1 people embarked and disembarked from the airport in this period (FCDA 1 9 8 7 , p. 4 3 ) .  TABLE 4 . 2 7 : M O T O R V E H I C L E REGISTRATION IN T H E M U N I C I P A L I T Y O F A B U J A A N D T H E F C T (JULY 1 9 8 6 - J U N E  1987)  V E H I C L E Type  MUNICIPALITY, OF ABUJA  FCT  PRIVATE C A R S  361  174  535  TAXI C A R S  278  119  397  BUSESA/ANS  299  130  429  LORRIES/TRUCKS  38  14  52  M O T O R CYCLES  1,857  1,097  TOTAL  2,954  Source: Extracted from FCDA 1 9 8 7 , p. 3 9 .  For economic services, the FCT as a whole, especially the FCC, is adequately served by financial institutions. In all, 1 3 banks have so far opened branches in the region with many more reported to follow.  Limited petty goods and services requirements of the residents of  the city are normally met through the district neighborhood centers.  (See figure 4 . 1 5 . )  Otherwise, an extensive variety of goods can only be found at the main market which convenes at various locations across the FCT on a rotating basis. market convenes of Mondays and the Garki market on Fridays.  Within Abuja, the Wuse  The former's temporary site  stretches approximately three blocks long and one block deep, and offers a range of goods that include perishables (food stuff), textiles and plastic materials. (See figure 4 . 1 6 . )  169  CHAPTER 4: T H E H O U S I N G C H A L L E N G E I N ABUJA  FIGURE 4 . 1 5 : LIFE IN N E I G H B O R H O O D CENTERS IN T H E G A R K I DISTRICT O F T H E F C C  Source: Field Research 1 9 8 8 - 8 9 .  170  C H A P T E R 4: T H E H O U S I N G C H A L L E N G E I N A B U J A  F I G U R E 4 . 1 6 : T E M P O R A R Y A N D P E R M A N E N T SITE O F T H E W U S E M A R K E T IN T H E W U S E DISTRICT O F T H E F C C  Source: Field Research 1988-89.  171  CHAPTER 4: THE HOUSING CHALLENGE IN ABUJA  On the other hand, the Garki market, which is mixed-in with the Garki village, is a bigger market and offers more variety of goods and services.  Manufactured goods, technical  (e.g., mechanics) and non technical services can be found here.  Finally, there is the Suieja  market outside the FCT, which convenes daily and offers the most variety of goods and especially services.  4.2.10 Design  and  Layout  The housing design and residential area layout for Abuja was handled by the Milton Keynes consulting group of London, whose services were later terminated but not before much of its plans were well underway. A western architect w h o worked in Abuja provides the following account which articulates the widespread feeling in Nigeria that the taste and culture of the indigenes were not taken into consideration in designing and constructing the houses: A British new town authority provided plans and house types for use in Abuja.... And here in the middle of the African landscape are built British new t o w n row housing and four storey tenement blocks. Seemingly no attempt has been made to suit the housing to African needs and the Nigerian climate. It looks as if a job lot has been taken out of the plan chest and sold to the FCDA (AJ 1985, p. 73). As such, dwellings especially in the high density area of Garki d o not have private outside spaces essential for life in Africa. There is no outside space for low income families t o supplement their income through their usual practices of keeping live stock and growing a small amount of crops. Yet, "the planners allocated a total land of 32 per cent t o recreation and open space whereas the Nigerian standard is 4 per cent" (Onibokun et al. 1984, p. 349). No provision is made for places to hang clothes to dry despite the fact that washing clothes is a frequent occurrence for families in hot, humid climates. There is not adequate recreational facilities where children can play outdoors, away from the roads, but within sight of their house.  Despite being very much part and parcel of the Nigerian way of life, there is no place  in the house plans of the city to house servants, drivers, security guards and the hangers-on of extended families (AJ 1985, p. 73-4).  172  CHAPTER 4: THE HOUSING CHALLENGE IN ABUJA  4.2.11  Quality The quality of houses in Abuja, especially those built by Nigerian contractors, is  astonishingly poor.  Acknowledging this deficiency, a one time director of Planning and  Survey, FCDA, wrote that "the major problem facing the building of Abuja so far as housing was concerned is the poor construction recorded in quite a large number of houses so far done" (Ago 1984, p. 10).  The same architect w h o articulated the unsuitability of housing  designs in Abuja, had this to say about the quality of houses constructed: The quality of all but a very few of the buildings is abysmal. Pride in workmanship and materials does not exist. Quality control is unknown. Buildings have been accepted by the FCDA that have out-of-plumb walls visibly bulging and hanging over their footings, staircase risers varying by 100 m m , timber-work straight from the forest, twisted, rough and nail-fixed. Tilling is cracked, out-of-square, uneven and stained. Finished houses appear to be the work of inept and demented jerry-builders, in t o o many contracts the aspirations, the expenditure and the effort have resulted in buildings that w o u l d best be bulldozed away (AJ 1985, p. 74). It is interesting to note that it was confirmed during the field work that some blocks of flats were indeed bulldozed as a result of debased construction quality. the worst ones were torn d o w n , not t o o many flats were affected. housing  outcome,  section  of  the  dissertation  unprofessional conduct provides some valuable insights.  dealing  But, because only To understand this  with  corruption  It basically points t o the facts that:  (1) housing contract awards were not based on merit or price; (2) generally contractors  and  in building construction were hired; (3) building  unproven  materials specified in the  contracts were never used; and (4) thorough supervision during construction was lacking.  4.2.12  Maintenance  Except for houses built and sold in the open market by the FHA, the rest of the houses built by the FCDA are owned and administered by the government strictly for rental purposes.  The houses are normally rented to government employees w h o must relinquish  173  CHAPTER 4: THE HOUSING CHALLENGE IN ABU)A  use of the quarters as soon as they cease to be employees of the government.  As such,  maintenance of the city's housing stock lies with the government, specifically with the FCDA's department of Public Works (Estate Division).  However, because maintenance in the city is  already a problem in light of the poor quality construction and finish, many residents of the city showed great concern for this issue.  Housing fixtures either never worked properly or  they have since developed problems and stopped working.  The commonest  problems  reported involve electrical wiring and fixtures, and the plumbing system (e.g., leaky faucets and toilet). Some structural flaws were also reported (e.g., cracks in walls). Thus, with this looming problem and the fiscal crisis of the state, the residents fear that the government may not be able t o cope, and that they might ultimately be called upon to make the repairs themselves with their meagre disposable income.  These worries seem  justified insofar as suggestions have been made by some officials that, in the future, each government department should be responsible for the upkeep of housing assigned to its workers.  Presumably the department would then work out a cost recovery arrangement with  its employees.  4.2.13  Livability  In spite of problems listed above, Abuja today is very much a livable and viable city, compared generally t o urban conditions described earlier for Nigeria. not to have any aggravated urban problems.  It outwardly appears  The structures are relatively new, the roads are  well paved and decorated with light fixtures, development of squatments have been kept in check, pollution is almost non-existent, and human and traffic congestion is nothing t o compare t o that of Lagos.  In short, in terms of the quality of the urban environment, Abuja  today is a haven for Nigerians w h o long for the amenities of a modern society, but without its headaches and pressures. For a territory of over half a million persons, the official information on crime contained in table 4.28 (however inaccurate), simply reinforces the assertion that  174  CHAPTER 4 : THE HOUSING CHALLENGE IN ABUJA  Abuja today is a livable city. The urban standards far surpass that of any other Nigerian city. However, this is also the chief problem of Abuja as residents cannot afford these standards.  T A B L E 4 . 2 8 : O F F I C I A L STATISTICS O N T H E I N C I D E N C E O F C R I M I N A L A N D O T H E R O F F E N C E S I N T H E F C T ( O C T . - D E C . 1 9 8 6 A N D JAN. - M A R . 1987)  Criminal Offences  1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.  Total Reported  Total Reported  1986  1987  Murder/Manslaughter Armed Robbery Drugs Suicide Assault Rape Burglary/Stealing etc. Fraud Arson Other  0  0  0  0  7  5  0  0  37  38  1  1  146  109  13  14  4  11  78  56  Source: FCDA 1 9 8 7 .  4.2.14 Resettlement  Housing  As stated earlier in Chapter 3, the resettlement program in Abuja was part of the government's plan to make the new capital ethnically neutral.  Initially, the plan called for the  territory's entire indigenous population to be resettled, but this decision was later revised restricting  the  resettlement  program  to  the  FCC  or  actual  site  of  the  new  capital.  Nevertheless, the indigenes were still given the options of either staying in their present settlement (which must not be within the site of FCC proper), moving t o another location of their choice within the FCT or being resettled outside of the FCT to a state of their choosing. In the last instance, the government would pay compensation to those affected; and, in the  175  CHAPTER 4: THE HOUSING CHALLENGE IN ABUJA  second instance, the FCDA would be responsible for resettling the population.  In articulating  the goals of this resettlement, it was stressed that the population should be rehoused at a minimum cost; that "replacement" - not development « should be the overriding variable; and that the new settlement should reflect the traditional pattern of the old, so as to minimize chances of rejection by the indigenes (Okafor 1988). According to the report by Okafor (1988), between 1980 and 1986, t w o resettlement areas were  established: (1) the  Usuma Town resettlement comprising  186 family units  (completed); and (2) the Kubwa resettlement comprising 555 units (under designed t o accommodate 20,000 persons when completed.  construction)  (See figures 4.17 and 4.18.)  This report maintains that, as at May 1987, about 1,500 inhabitants (roughly 201 family units) had been rehoused. It then went on to identify the following problems with the resettlement efforts: (1)  Bricks were used for the walls of the houses, while corrugated iron sheets, instead of thatch, were used for the roof. This modification has its attendant problem because thermal conductivity in iron-roofed houses is drastically different from the houses built with thatch roof. Since the houses are not adequately ventilated, they are unbearably hot during the season of maximum isolation.  (2)  The housing units are congested, with houses standing only about 10 meters apart. This pattern of housing has seriously eroded the privacy which the people highly regard.  (3)  Population density within the small area of the housing units has been very much increased, thereby affecting land claims and landuse in the resettled area. Households are restricted to minute holdings which are usually insufficient for cultivation and grazing.  (4)  A serious omission in the housing arrangement was the lack of recognition of the differential status of households in the allocation of houses. In spite of the fact that all the households are not of similar size, houses were allocated irrespective of family size and social status.  (5)  Perhaps the most serious omission in the resettlement housing units is that there was no provision for granaries and animal shelters; in their former abodes inhabitants provided themselves with well-protected granaries for grain storage.... Consequently, the incidence of famine resulting from prolonged shortage of stored grains has been reported in the t w o settlement units (Okafor 1988, p. 173-4).  176  CHAPTER 4: THE HOUSING CHALLENGE IN ABUJA  (6)  Another drawback in the resettlement housing uncovered during the field research, is the fact that the resettled population at Kubwa with no history of modern sanitary facilities were provided with water system toilets instead of pit latrines. As might be expected, the facilities were disregarded by the natives w h o found use for them as storage spaces.  In summary, this chapter presents facts about the existing housing situation in the new capital and argues that the housing conditions desired for the new capital have their basis in the reality of urban housing conditions in Nigeria as a whole.  It subsequently identifies the  housing challenge in the new city as the striking of a balance among housing quantity, quality and, inevitably, affordability.  O n the basis of this logic, as well as statements contained in the  master plan and data from the field survey, the conclusion is reached that the provision of adequate housing in the new capital at a cost affordable by all segments of the population, particularly the low-income, was an important goal for the new capital project.  Using this  standard to judge the outcome, the following gaps in the housing program of the new capital are identified: *  Housing was only provided for the civil servants, leaving all other segments of the population to fend on their own for accommodation.  *  Of the 1986 housing target of 25,000 units, only a portion (17,022 or 68%) had been met by December 1988.  *  Of the current stock of housing, none of it is affordable by the civil servants without a government subsidy of between 83 - 94 per cent of annual costs. Without any subsidy, only about 20 per cent of the civil servants can afford the cheapest type of housing provided.  *  Despite the intention to prevent squatments from developing in the new capital, there are approximately 100,000 squatters within the municipality of Abuja and 240,000 within the FCT. These figures respectively represent 48 and 46 per cent of the estimated total population of these areas.  *  A host of other settlement problems abounds in the city including: (1) shortage of rental housing, (2) limited access t o land, (3) segregated development, (4) awkward location for low-cost housing developments, (5) culturally improper housing designs and layouts, (6) debased quality of construction, (7) lagging maintenance and (8) absent or intermittent urban services t o most areas outside of the FCC.  The subsequent chapter aims at explaining these shortfalls from expectations.  177  C H A P T E R 4: T H E H O U S I N G  FIGURE 4.17:  C H A L L E N G E IN A B U J A  L O C A L G O V E R N M E N T A N D RESETTLEMENT A R E A S I N T H E F C T  —  /  A  /  \  \  / |  7* \  !  r'  /  '  v  Bwari LGA  /  Kubwa  /  ' v h I P A I Gwagwalada / i ( Local Government Area / \ (LGA) / T  a  D  a  L  U  / Abuja Municipal LGA  > /  ~  /  /  Town  '  J V  I  V  '  »  (  I I /  ^ ' l  lAbaji LGA*  /  -\J  I  /  KujeLGA  V  Rufcochi LGA \  V  — - / Karshi LGA v N /  \ Kwali LGA  s  \  /  \  1  j  /  Usuma  f """y'  \  I  *  /  ^-v.  ! j  /  N  /  I ' I  \  A  I  /  /  \  •  /  / \  «*•'  L.L.-1.-  [ j  Source: Okafor 1 9 8 8 .  178  /  '  'j Phase-one area developed | Resettlement area  C H A P T E R 4: T H E H O U S I N G C H A L L E N G E I N A B U J A  F I G U R E 4.18:  Source: F C D A  T Y P I C A L RESETTLEMENT H O U S I N G I N U S U M A T O W N IN T H E F C T  1988.  179  CHAPTER 5: EXPLAINING THE POLICY IMPLEMENTATION GAP: OFFICIALS' DISPOSITIONS AS  SHOWN  BY  EVIDENCE  INTENTIONS  TO  CONFRONT  IN  THE  THE  LAST  CHAPTER,  CHALLENGE  OF  DESPITE  THE  AFFORDABILITY  GOVERNMENT'S IN  DEVISING  A  H O U S I N G PROGRAM FOR THE NEW CAPITAL, ALMOST ALL THE H O U S I N G PROVIDED IS BEYOND THE MEANS OF M O S T RESIDENTS. CHAPTER  UNDERTAKES  DISPOSITIONS TOWARD  A  T O UNDERSTAND THIS O C C U R R E N C E , THIS  THOROUGH  THE ISSUE,  EXAMINATION  OF  POLICY  OFFICIALS  AS WELL AS FEATURES O F THE PLAN A N D  THE  PROCESS BY WHICH IT WAS FORMULATED AND ALTERED IN PRACTICE.  5.1  OFFICIALS'DISPOSITION. Even though current dispositions of policy officials in Abuja could not have been  responsible for the existing housing situation in the city, the assumption supported by the discussions in this chapter, is that Nigerian dispositions toward this important national issue have, in the main, not changed. This may be puzzling as the more logical expectation w o u l d have been for the country's sudden poverty t o have engendered a violent swing in the national m o o d , encouraged by the need t o apportion blame for the dramatic turn in fortune. Based on field experience, this was not the case except that people in the country now have a somewhat more realistic picture of the extent of the country's resources and economic power. Presented below (table 5.1) are the results of the survey of 42 Nigerian policy officials regarding their dispositions toward a variety of issues respecting the Abuja project. appendix  1 for survey questionnaire, as well as names and official titles of  (See  individuals  surveyed.) The analysis is qualitative and involves a number of basic steps. First, the random propositions constituting the questionnaire are sorted into several substantive issues. Second, the propositions are then treated in the aggregate on the basis of "agree" and "disagree" responses.  Third, weighting is assigned to the responses t o discern the more strongly held  perceptions (i.e., where "strongly agree" =  180  3; "agree"  =  1; "strongly disagree"  =  -3;  CHAPTER 5: EXPLAINING THE POLICY IMPLEMENTATION GAP  "disagree" = - 1 ; and "no opinion" is disregarded).  This means that the higher the mean  ranking for any proposition (whether plus or minus), the more strongly held is the perception on that proposition. Fourth, the responses are disaggregated to isolate the views of the three policy official groups surveyed, namely: (1) the decision makers, (2) the implementors and (3) the academics. Though the disaggregated separate responses are discussed only when there are significant differences between the three groups.  Finally, significant differences between  " o w n " and "popular" responses are identified and discussed.  5.1.1 Overview  of Dispositions  Toward  Abuja  Despite the controversies that surround the reasonableness  of the new  capital  including its appropriate role in the country, the survey establishes quite clearly that Nigerian officials basically support the building of Abuja. It also establishes clearly that, despite the persistent suspicion regarding the underlying motive for the project, the officials believe that Abuja is truly intended for all Nigerians alike. Overall support for both propositions among officials surveyed is 78 and 74 per cent, respectively. O n the rationale for the new capital, an earlier discussion has suggested that there were several reasons behind the move.  However, the survey supports that, when all is said  and done, most officials (74%) concur that the underlying reason for the new capital is more political than either economic, cultural or social. This is t o say they believe that the decision to build a new capital has more to do with reasons of ethnic politics, national pride and creating an avenue to spend a newly acquired wealth, than to issues of security, efficiency, regional development, impropriety of Lagos, etc..  181  C H A P T E R 5: E X P L A I N I N G T H E P O L I C Y I M P L E M E N T A T I O N G A P  T A B L E 5.1: S U M M A R Y O F N I G E R I A N O F F I C I A L S D I S P O S I T I O N S T O W A R D A B U J A ( P E R C E N T )  DECISION MAKERS DIS ACR S. / . / Overview Dispositions Abuja 1.  2.  4.  5.  ACADE-  OVERALL  MEAN  TORS ACR DIS  MICS DIS ACR  RESPONSES ACR DIS  RATING  RESPONSE TYPE & SAMPLE SIZE  Toward  Nigerians basically s u p p o r t t h e b u i l d i n g of Abuja. A b u j a is truly i n t e n d e d for all Nigerians alike.  3.  IMPLE-  The u n d e r l y i n g reason for A b u j a is m o r e political than e i t h e r e c o n o m i c , cultural o r social.  56  46  78  22  0.57  OWN  70  30  52  48  -0.11  POPULAR ( 3 4 )  56 33  44  74  26  0.89  OWN  67  52  48  0.39  POPULAR ( 3 3 )  82  18  74  26  1.05  OWN  91  09  87  13  1.22  POPULAR ( 3 5 )  20  80  20  100  0  1.50 2.03  OWN  00  40 40  60 60  35  65 69  -0.68 -0.42  OWN  31  86 47  -1.50  OWN  -0.19  POPULAR (33)  80 14  20  88  86  53  12 47  100  00  68  32  75  25  50  50  100 100  00 00  55  45  75  25  80 100  (36)  (39)  (42)  73  27  86  14  100  00  100  00  44 14  56  33 54  67  86  22 57  06 37  94  24  73  14  43  63  67  33  53  80 14  72 44  28 56  30  38  0.30  OWN  33  70 67  62  86  32  68  -0.76  POPULAR (25)  73 87  27  67  33  73  27  71  29  0.85  OWN  13  80  20  80  20  82  18  1.06  POPULAR ( 3 3 )  Nigeria, as an a d v a n c e d c o u n t r y ,  50  50  S9  41  60  40  57  43  0.30  OWN  s h o u l d have a capital c o m p a r a b l e  62  38  75  25  70  30  70  30  0.47  POPULAR ( 3 0 )  89 94  11  100  00  1.95  OWN  100  00  92 97  8  06  3  1.76  POPULAR ( 3 4 )  55  50  50  54  46  0.18  OWN  46  75  25  59  41  0.11  POPULAR ( 2 7 )  Nigeria at the b e g i n n i n g of t h e A b u j a p r o j e c t was a w e a l t h y nation. The w o r k of p l a n n i n g and c o n s t r u c t i n g the n e w capital was n o t  46  (40)  POPULAR ( 3 3 )  (37)  POPULAR ( 2 8 )  w i t h i n Nigeria's i n d i g e n o u s technical capability. 6.  7.  Expert in Nigeria means e x p a triates. It is n o t necessary for A b u j a t o be p l a n n e d a n d built by Nigerians  78  20  (40)  (37)  for it t o be a N i g e r i a n city.  5.1.2 Dispositions for Abuja 8.  Toward  Coals  Abuja s h o u l d be a p r o u d r e f l e c t i o n of Nigeria's w e a l t h a n d p o w e r .  9.  (40)  (37)  t o those o f o t h e r a d v a n c e d countries. 10.  90  10  100  00  A n y manifestations o f p o v e r t y in  73  27  A b u j a s h o u l d b e eradicated at all  50  50  45 54  64  36  61  39  45  55  58  42  0.45  OWN  . 37  63  65  35  50  50  55  45  0.28  POPULAR ( 3 3 )  A b u j a must n o t suffer any o f t h e defects o f Lagos.  11.  (40)  (39)  cost. 12.  A b u j a s h o u l d be mainly an a d m i n i strative center.  182  (40)  CHAPTER 5: EXPLAINING THE POLICY IMPLEMENTATION GAP  TABLE 5.1 CONTINUED  5.1.3 Dispositions in G e n e r a / 13.  14.  15.  Toward  DECISION  IMPIE-  ACADE-  OVTRAU  MEAN  MAKERS ACR DIS  TORS ACR DIS  MICS ACR DIS  RESPONSES A C R DIS  RATING  RESPONSE TYPE A SAMPLE SIZE  Housing  Every Nigerian s h o u l d have a right t o h o u s i n g .  90  10 11  85 86  15 14  100  00  93  7  2.20  100  00  92  8  1.80  OWN (40) POPULAR (35)  18 71  82  19 56  81 44  00  100  14  86  -1.70  OWN  60  40  61  39  0.39  POPULAR (33)  Countries concerned with their  73  27  progress t o w a r d m o d e r n i t y m u s t  89  11  73  27  80  OWN  14  100  00  89  11  93  20 7  1.50  86  1.51  POPULAR (31)  82 87  18 13  58  42 42  80 86  20 14  70 73  30 27  1.00 1.07  OWN  58  70 62  30  35  65  56  OWN  50  56  53 47  0.00  50  44 44  47  38  0.18  POPULAR (29)  10  45 42  55 58  45 64  55 36  56 52  44  0.22  OWN  48  -0.03  POPULAR (29)  00 00  90  10 00  95 97  5 3  1.93  OWN  100  1.91  POPULAR (31)  People s h o u l d be free t o b u i l d t o the best o f their ability regardless of resulting h o u s i n g quality.  89  29  e n f o r c e h i g h standards of b u i l d -  (42)  (40)  i n g and c o n s t r u c t i o n . 16.  It is easy for l o w - c o s t h o u s i n g estates t o t u r n i n t o slums.  17.  L o w - c o s t h o u s i n g is o f t e n p o o r l y d e s i g n a t e d and unsightly.  18.  19.  20.  In the l o n g r u n , it costs m o r e t o b u i l d cheaply because l o w - c o s t h o u s i n g r e q u i r e a g o o d deal of maintenance and b e c o m e o b s o l e t e in a short t i m e .  53  (40)  POPULAR (27) (38)  90 50  50  The p r o b l e m w i t h self-help h o u s i n g is that t h e p o o r d o n o t have the necessary resources t o b u i l d a n d i m p r o v e their o w n shelter.  90 100  10 00  100  " L o w - c o s t h o u s i n g , " "basic h o u s -  40  60  44  i n g , " " s e l f - h e l p h o u s i n g , " "sites  56  37  63  41  OWN  50  50  50  60  40  56  59 44  -0.23  50  0.05  POPULAR ( 2 1 )  40  45 27  55  51  49  73  29  71  -0.02 -0.71  OWN  73  36 27  49  51  0.13  OWN  64  36  0.53  POPULAR (31)  and services s c h e m e s , " " a p p r o -  100  (41)  (39)  (34)  priate t e c h n o l o g y " a n d o t h e r c o n c e p t s o f t h e sort are all part o f a p l o y by t h e west t o m a k e developing countries comfortable with backward conditions. 21.  There is lack o f m a n p o w e r skilled  45  55  in the use o f local b u i l d i n g  33  67  60 27  Local traditional b u i l d i n g mater-  64  ials are n o t as d u r a b l e , and o f  36  29  71  64  62  38  58  42  73  materials. 22.  t h e same quality, as i m p o r t e d  (37)  POPULAR (28)  (39)  materials.  5. 1.4 Dispositions  in 23.  Towird  Housing  Abujt (37)  O n e of the major goals of g o v e r n -  73  27  56  44  40  60  57  43  0.51  OWN  m e n t in A b u j a is t o p r o v i d e  78  22  86  14  70  30  82  18  0.88  POPULAR (32)  20 67  80  74  26  50  50  31  60  60  40  0.10 0.44  OWN  69  36 40  64  33  affordable h o u s i n g for p e o p l e o f all i n c o m e levels, especially t h e low income population. 24.  The g o v e r n m e n t has t h e o b l i g a t i o n to provide complete housing for all its w o r k e r s in Abuja.  183  (40)  POPULAR (32)  CHAPTER 5: EXPLAINING THE POLICY IMPLEMENTATION GAP  TABLE 5.1 CONTINUED DECISION  IMPU-  ACADE-  MAKERS DIS ACR  TORS DIS ACR  MICS ACR  DIS  OVERALL RESPONSES ACR DIS  MEAN RATING  RESPONSE TYPE & SAMPLE SIZE  45 100  55 00  47 71  S3 29  27 50  73 so  41 72  59 28  0.07 1.06  OWN (41) POPULAR (32)  It is necessary for Abuja to have native type houses and n e i g h b o r h o o d layouts for it t o be a Nigerian city.  27 87  73 13  26 40  74 60  18 30  82 70  24 55  76 45  -0.85 0.03  OWN (41) POPULAR (31)  27.  H i g h - d e n s i t y d e v e l o p m e n t in A b u j a w o u l d contradict the City's i m a g e as Nigeria's visible s y m b o l of modernity.  54 75  46 25  50 56  50 44  45 50  55 50  50 58  50 42  -0.25 0.05  OWN (40) POPULAR (21)  28.  There is e n o u g h space at A b u j a for a c o m f o r t a b l e l o w density o f development.  100 100  00 00  85 100  15 00  82 90  18 10  88 93  12 7  1.38 1.58  OWN (42) POPULAR (31)  29.  H i g h e r standards for housing must b e e n f o r c e d in Abuja in order t o a v o i d d u p l i c a t i n g the c r o w d e d c o n d i t i o n s of Lagos.  90 89  10 11  89 50  11 50  82 80  18 20  88 71  12 29  1.90 1.13  OWN (40) POPULAR (31)  30.  H o u s i n g in Abuja is the most visible s y m b o l of achievement.  64 75  36 25  61 69  39 31  45 64  55 36  59 68  41 32  0.28 0.46  OWN (39) POPULAR (35)  31.  For Abuja h o u s i n g quality is m o r e i m p o r t a n t than affordability.  44 40  56 60  65 61  35 39  56 33  44 67  58 48  42 52  0.17 -0.11  OWN (36) POPULAR (27)  32.  It is possible t o avoid squatters in A b u j a .  64 43  36 57  55 33  45 67  45 40  55 60  55 39  45 61  -0.14 -0.50  OWN (42) POPULAR (32)  09 13  91 87  20 31  80 69  20 33  80 67  18 28  82 72  •1.64 -1.19  OWN  There was never any serious plan t o p r o v i d e h o u s i n g in Abuja f o r l o w i n c o m e p e o p l e w h o are n o t in t h e civil service.  50 83  50 17  53 77  47 23  82 91  18 09  59 86  41 14  0.35 1.24  OWN  A t t i t u d i n a l changes t o e n c o u r a g e a m o r e " N i g e r i a n ' city is a m u s t f o r a successful h o u s i n g strategy in Abuja.  67 67  33 33  61 64  39 36  40 40  60 60  57 55  43 45  0.13 0.26  OWN  Housing  33 40  67 60  44 87  56 13  67 62  33 38  49 66  51 34  0.16 0.81  OWN  25.  The g o v e r n m e n t has the o b l i g a t i o n t o participate in providing h o u s ing for all levels of p e o p l e in Abuja.  26.  5.7.5 Dispositions Toward Problems in Abuja  33.  Housing  M o n e y is n o t a major factor in e x p l a i n i n g the h o u s i n g p r o b l e m s  *  (41)  POPULAR (33)  o f Abuja.  34.  35.  36.  p o l i c y in A b u j a was  a d o p t e d by a military g o v e r n m e n t c o n c e r n e d w i t h impressive d e s i g n a n d c o n s t r u c t i o n , n o t w i t h ensuri n g p r o p r i e t y a n d affordability.  Source: Survey Questionnaire on Abuja, Part I, 1989.  184  (40)  POPULAR (30)  (37)  POPULAR (27)  (31)  POPULAR (21)  CHAPTER 5: EXPLAINING THE POLICY IMPLEMENTATION GAP  Among the various underlying assumptions of the new capital is the concurrence by 80 per cent of the officials with the proposition that Nigeria at the beginning of the Abuja project was a wealthy country. Ranking number seven (i.e., a mean rank of 1.50) in the more strongly held dispositions toward Abuja, the assumption implies a clear belief o n the part of the officials that the country commanded the financial resources to see the Abuja project through as originally intended. By uniformly disagreeing (65% and 86%) with the propositions that the  work of planning and  constructing the new  capital was not  within Nigeria's  indigenous technical capability and that expert in Nigeria means expatriates, the officials appear to also believe that the country equally commanded the technical and administrative capabilities to execute the project.  Support for the latter proposition is shown to be strong  with a mean ranking of -1.50. This foregoing inference, however, is contradicted by the fact that the decision makers (80%) and the implementors (72%) support the proposition that it is not necessary for Abuja to be planned and built by Nigerians for it to be a Nigerian city. The contradiction is: why not have Nigerians plan and build the city when it is believed that local expertise and capability for the j o b exists? The logic of this position is probably what led 70 per cent of the academics to disagree with the proposition (i.e., besides the fact that they stood to have gained personally from  having all the work on Abuja accomplished internally). What may be  reasoned from the contradiction is that the officials probably assume that, with the country's affluence, it could afford to buy whatever technologies it may need through international consultancy and expatriate management.  5.7.2  Dispositions  Toward  Goals for  Abuja  The survey finds consensus for the symbolic role of the city, with 71 per cent of the officials in support of the proposition that Abuja should be a proud reflection of Nigeria's wealth and power. Another 57 per cent agree that Nigeria, as an advanced country, should  185  CHAPTER 5: EXPLAINING THE POLICY IMPLEMENTATION GAP  have a capital comparable to those of other advanced countries, all of which may seem ironic for a country that only recently had stark poverty visited upon it by the collapse of the international oil economy. With respect to function, the majority of the officials (58%) endorse the proposition that Abuja should be mainly an administrative center, which raises the question of how then could the city be truly intended for all Nigerians alike, as was supported by 74 per cent of the officials. Perhaps the officials' reasoning in favor of an administrative center is that this may be necessary t o ensure that the lofty ideals of the new capital are achieved.  Seemingly, with  Abuja serving strictly as a government city, the chaos of Lagos resulting from its being both the administrative, commercial and industrial center of the country w o u l d  be avoided.  Another explanation is that the officials may have reasoned that Abuja, simply by virtue of being ethnically balanced, would be for all Nigerians alike; or that the city is simply a symbol for all Nigerians rather than an abode. While the implementors (45%) and the academics (50%) are divided on the place of poverty in the new city, the decision makers (73%) agree that any manifestations of poverty in the city should be eradicated at all cost. Whether or not the response t o the next proposition means that poverty should not be tolerated in the new capital, the survey finds overwhelming (92%) support that Abuja must not suffer any of the defects of Lagos. However, it is hard t o imagine anyone arguing cogently that squalor is not one of the fundamental defects of Lagos.  Ranking number t w o (1.95) in the more intensely held  dispositions toward Abuja, there is n o doubt that the proposition was one of the chief principles guiding the thinking about the new capital as well as deciding on its options. Thus, in terms of visions of h o w things should be in the new capital, the survey finds little disagreement that Abuja is t o be a political show-piece, an ideal world-class city free of pity and full of pride for all Nigerians.  The city is not t o be just an alternative t o the former  capital of Lagos, but rather a visionary sort of rescue from the intractable problems of that city.  186  CHAPTER 5: EXPLAINING THE POLICY IMPLEMENTATION GAP  5.1.3 Dispositions  Toward  Housing  in  General.  The proposition that attracted the most intense response (2.20) in the survey is that every Nigerian should have a right to housing. Overall, 93 per cent of the officials support the proposition,  but 86 per cent also disagree strongly (-1.70) that people should be free to  build to best of their ability regardless of resulting housing quality. This obviously means that, while the officials are overwhelmingly in favor of the right to housing, they equally favor controlling development and ensuring a minimum standard of building.  In fact, the majority  (80%) of the officials strongly (1.50) support the proposition that countries concerned with their progress toward modernity must enforce high standards of building and construction. While recognizing that the quality of residential accommodation is an important yardstick for measuring the degree of sophistication of any community, simple logic suggests that any developing country which insists o n a minimum (not t o even mention high) standard of building and construction, is likely t o experience a shortage of housing as many would-be builders w o u l d be prevented from building. Regarding dispositions toward low-cost h o u s i n g / a significant majority (70%) of the officials clearly (1.00) agree that it is easy for low-cost housing estates to turn into slums; a belief which w o u l d obviously make this option unattractive for the new capital.  Reinforcing  this perception is the support among the decision makers (70%), academics (56%) and implementors (35%) that low-cost housing is often poorly designated and unsightly.  The  implication is that low-cost housing resembles squatments and, therefore, would probably be contrary to the intended show-case image of the new capital. Lastly o n this note, although both the implementors (45%) and the academics (45%) are weak in their support for the proposition, the decision makers' overwhelming (90%) support that, in the long run, it costs more to build cheaply, because low-cost housing require a good deal of maintenance and become obsolete in a short time. By this the  187  CHAPTER 5: EXPLAINING THE POLICY IMPLEMENTATION CAP  decision makers imply that this approach is only deceivingly cheap and, thus, should not be unsuspectingly embraced to the exclusion of other seemingly more costlier approaches. Related to the above are the dispositions expressed toward the concept of self-help, which is one of the dominant strategies in low-cost housing.  An overwhelming (95%)  majority of the officials strongly (1.93) concur with the proposition that the problem with selfhelp housing is that the poor do not have the necessary resources to build and improve their own shelter. So, in other words, any housing scheme that bases its efforts on this sort of concept likely invites failure.  Apparently, little matters to the officials that authorities on  affordable housing have demonstrated time and again that the resourcefulness of the lowincome people to meet their own housing needs is terribly underrated (Perlman 1987?). In any event, the foregoing dispositions give a clear impression that officials in Nigeria have a very low regard for low-cost housing. Because they view the option as problematic at best, the suggestion is that not only would they be unlikely t o push strongly for its alternative, but they would also tend not to be innovative in dealing with the issue.  It is interesting to  note that 41 per cent of the officials surveyed support the proposition that low-cost housing, basic housing, self-help housing, sites and  services, appropriate technology and other  concepts of the sort, are all part of a ploy by  the  west to make developing countries  comfortable with backward conditions. Lastly, on the issue of indigenous building skills and materials, the officials are almost evenly split in their support ( 5 1 % and 49%) for the propositions that: there is lack of manpower skilled in the use of local building materials; and that local traditional building materials are not as durable, and of the same quality, as imported materials.  Nevertheless, it  is instructive to note that 60 per cent of the implementors support the former proposition, while 64 per cent of both the decision makers and the academics support the latter (i.e., local building materials being inferior to imported materials).  This alludes to a clear m o o d in the  country that anyone w h o builds with local traditional materials, or w h o does not erect a modern house, is out of step with national aspirations.  188  The idea of 'making it' (i.e.,  CHAPTER 5: EXPLAINING THE POLICY IMPLEMENTATION GAP  establishing ones worth) in the eyes of Nigerian society, is apparently connected with erecting a 'modern house,' which is generally one of cement blocks with corrugated aluminum sheet roofing.  It differs from native type houses which are generally constructed using such  materials as tamped earth, burnt bricks, bamboo sticks, lime substitute for cement and clay tiles or thatch for roofing.  5.1.4 Dispositions  Toward  Housing  in  Abuja  The survey corroborates the statement in the master plan that a major challenge in developing the housing program for the new capital is the challenge of affordability. that a majority (57%) of the officials -  It shows  decision makers (73%), implementors (56%) and  academics (40%) - endorse the proposition that one of the major goals of government in Abuja is to provide affordable housing for people of all income levels, especially the lowincome population. This notwithstanding, the survey also shows that the officials are evenly (50%) divided in their support for the proposition that the government has the obligation to provide complete housing for all its workers in Abuja, while they are in disagreement (59%) that the government has the obligation to participate in providing housing for all levels of people in Abuja. Clearly, these responses are conflicting and suggest that Nigerian officials are divided on the question of whether housing should be considered a social welfare g o o d or a market commodity.  Regarding housing goals in the new capital, the responses suggest that, at best,  affordable housing was probably only a goal to be achieved for people employed by the government.  Aside from the fact that  public housing in Nigeria has almost always meant  housing for civil servants, 74 per cent of the implementors support the proposition that the government should provide complete housing for them.  Hence, one certainty about the  conflicting responses is that they d o not recognize that a plan existed for Abuja that explicitly  189  CHAPTER 5: EXPLAINING THE POLICY IMPLEMENTATION GAP  articulates the housing needs of non-civil servants in the city, or that affordability was a particular concern of that plan. As for what affordable housing actually means to the officials, the survey gives reason to believe that it does not mean cheap native type houses, as 76 per cent of the officials disagree that it is necessary for Abuja to have native type houses and neighborhood layout for it to be a Nigerian city. Moreover, affordability has always been a non-issue in Nigerian public sector housing, as houses provided never closely related to the earning capacity of the households that occupy them. While  the officials are evenly (50%) divided  development in Abuja would contradict the  in their support  that high-density  city's image as Nigeria's visible symbol of  modernity, they overwhelmingly (88%) and strongly (1.38) support the proposition that there is enough space at Abuja for a comfortable low density of development. Believing (59%) that housing in Abuja is the most visible symbol of achievement, an overwhelming majority (88%) of the officials strongly support (1.90) that higher standards for housing must be enforced in Abuja in order to avoid duplicating the crowded conditions of Lagos. They (58%) accept the proposition that, for Abuja, housing quality is more important than affordability. As an overriding concern, this is a particularly crucial finding, helping to make sense of the fact that the current stock of housing in Abuja is far out of reach of a majority of the residents. Finally, despite the enormous squatter pressures in the territory, the survey indicates that the decision makers (65%), implementors (55%) and academics (45%) believe that it is possible to avoid squatters in Abuja. This is important because, if the history of other new capitals in the developing world is to portend outcomes, then this belief is erroneous and w o u l d leave its believers unprepared to deal intelligently with the problem of squatters in the city as it arises.  Previous to deciding on the new capital, a committee of Nigerian wise men  toured several foreign capitals with the aim of noting the pitfalls of these cities, so that they might be avoided in the Nigerian experience. Among the peculiar features of these capitals to be clearly identified by the committee was the proliferation of squatments.  190  This makes it  CHAPTER 5: EXPLAINING THE POLICY IMPLEMENTATION GAP  doubly surprising that the belief evident in the survey is maintained (i.e., even after the Abuja experience has proven not t o be an exception to the rule).  5.7.5  Dispositions  Toward Housing Problems in Abuja  By overwhelmingly (82%) and strongly (-1.64) disagreeing with the proposition that money is not a major factor in explaining the housing problems of Abuja, the officials appear to identify finance as one of the chief causes of the settlement problems of the new capital. This is in spite of their preponderant and firm support for the proposition that Nigeria, at the start of the new capital, commanded sufficient wealth t o execute the project according to plan. Next to finance, the officials (59%) -- academics (82%), implementors (53%) and decision makers (50%) - support that the city's settlement problems stem from the fact that there was never any serious plan to provide housing in Abuja for low-income people who  are  not in the civil service. Following this, they (57%) support unfavorable dispositions to such housing to be another major contributor.  This is implied in their endorsement -- decision  makers (67%), implementors (61%) and academics (40%) - of the proposition that attitudinal changes to encourage a more "Nigerian" city is a precondition for a successful housing strategy in Abuja. Finally, 67 per cent of the academics support that the settlement problems of the city resulted, because housing policy in Abuja was adopted by a military government concerned with impressive design and construction, not with ensuring propriety and affordability. Both the decision makers (33%) and the implementors (44%) disagree with this proposition but, given the unusually high (24%) " n o opinion" response rate on the question for the t w o groups, it is possible that their responses may have been influenced by the fact that they were serving under a military administration at the time of the survey. estimate 66 per cent overall popular support for the proposition.  191  Consequently, the officials  C H A P T E R 5: E X P L A I N I N G T H E P O L I C Y I M P L E M E N T A T I O N G A P  In part II of the survey questionnaire, officials were asked, in an open-ended question, to associate causes with the major problems they perceive with housing in the city. Table 5 . 2 below presents a summary of the responses. Consistent with the foregoing findings, it shows that the officials basically locate the cause of the new capital's settlement problems with finance or matters related to it (i.e., high cost of building materials).  Next t o these, they  blame inadequate planning/policy, administrative incompetence, dishonest and undue politics, lack of private interest and political instability in that order.  TABLE 5.2: PERCEPTION O F C A U S E S O F H O U S I N G P R O B L E M S IN A B U J A (BY N U M B E R O F M E N T I O N S BY OFFICIALS)  CAUSES  DECISION  IMPLE-  ACADE-  MAKERS  MENTORS  MICS  1. G E N E R A L E C O N O M I C P R O B L E M  3  8  1  12  2. LACK OF G O O D PLANNING/POLICY  2  6  4  12  3 . C O S T O F B U I L D I N G MATERIALS  6  3  0  9  4. ADMINISTRATIVE INCOMPETENCE  1  4  2  7  5 . D I S H O N E S T Y A N D U N D U E POLITICS  0  5  2  7  6. L A C K O F PRIVATE INTEREST  2  1  0  3  7. P O L I T I C A L INSTABILITY  1  1  0  2  15  28  9  52  TOTAL  Source: Survey Questionnaire on Abuja, Part II, 1 9 8 9 .  192  TOTAL  CHAPTER 5: EXPLAINING THE POLICY IMPLEMENTATION GAP  5.1.6 Significant  Discrepancies  Between  "Own"  and "Popular"  Responses  Two types of discrepancies are possible: (1) mutually reinforcing discrepancies (e.g., where 59% of " o w n " response agree and 86% of "popular" response also agree); and (2) mutually opposing discrepancies (e.g., where 4 1 % of " o w n " response agree but 72% of "popular" response disagree).  Of interest is the latter type which is significant (15% or more  difference on either side based on the natural distribution of responses) for ten out of the thirty-six closed-ended propositions constituting the first part of the survey questionnaire. What this limited number of discrepancies suggests is that officials in Abuja, by and large, did not act under cognitive dissonance in terms of what they did and what they thought the popular response would rather have had them do.  If anything, the officials' estimation on  what the popular response might be on certain key propositions (e.g., propositions 3, 4, 5, 9, 10, 15, 16, 18, 2 1 , 22, 28, 30, & 31) suggests that the latter is even more deluded about the extent of the country's wealth and, therefore, would have had the officials build a more rosy capital than they have done. The clear indication from the estimated popular responses is that the aforementioned w o u l d be far less inclined to produce or tolerate low-cost housing in the new capital, as this was perceived to be shabby housing which is unfit for the image of the new city.  Of the  thirteen propositions cited above that test for upward bias in the goals and expectations for Abuja, more support was consistently estimated for the popular response in all thirteen cases, which is a significant and crucial finding. It meant that there was no "pull" whatsoever in the country in favor of producing low-cost housing or a modest capital with standards that would be consistent with the citizens' economic lot. Most of the discrepancies between " o w n " and "popular" responses on the thirteen propositions are of the mutually reinforcing type, except for two which are of the opposing type.  While the officials (49%) are divided on the proposition that local traditional building  materials are not as durable, and of the same quality, as imported material, they estimate a majority (64%) popular support for the proposition.  193  They also estimate 56 per cent popular  CHAPTER 5: EXPLAINING THE POLICY IMPLEMENTATION GAP  (vs 41 % own) support for the proposition that low-cost housing and the like are all part of a ploy by the west to make developing countries comfortable with backward conditions. Other important discrepancies in the results include the fact that officials estimate only a 32 per cent popular (vs 62% own) support for the proposition that it is not necessary for Abuja to be planned and built by Nigerians for it to be a Nigerian city. This is interesting because the officials also estimate a majority popular (53% vs 14% own) support for the proposition that expert in Nigeria means expatriates. That is, why should the popular response want the new capital planned locally when it believes expertise in the country to mean expatriates?  Nevertheless, by not seeing the necessity for some local inputs to the new  capital's planning process, the officials seem to confirm an old but still prevalent political and administrative attitude in developing countries that public participation in policy formulation is illegitimate or inefficient (Riggs 1964, p. 271).  Otherwise, the question that the finding begs  is: how can the new capital be a reflection of Nigeria, if it is not necessary for the city t o be planned or built by Nigerians?  Probably suspecting the popular response of untempered  nationalist sentiments, the officials went on to estimate popular (55% vs 24% own) support for the proposition that it is necessary for Abuja to have native type houses and neighborhood layouts for it to be a Nigerian city. As evident from their attitudes toward housing goals in Abuja, officials in Nigeria are, at best, divided over the role of government in housing provision in the country.  But, as  might be expected, they estimate clear popular (72% vs 4 1 % own) support for the proposition that the government has the obligation to participate in providing housing for all levels of people in Abuja. Despite being overwhelmingly in support of controlling development in the new capital, the officials estimate popular ( 6 1 % vs 14% own) support for the proposition that people should be free to build to the best of their ability regardless of resulting housing quality. This amounts to a paradox in that the popular response is estimated t o favor government involvement but without loosing the ability to build freely. If the level of support for the two propositions is to be an augury, the important aspect of the paradox is that the  194  CHAPTER 5: EXPLAINING THE POLICY IMPLEMENTATION GAP  popular response would not want any government involvement, if it means that people would be prevented from building t o the best of their ability.  It may be said that they want the  government t o assist them t o build what they can. Finally, the officials estimate popular (39% vs 55% own) support for the proposition  that it is possible to avoid squatters in Abuja; (29% vs 51%) that there is lack of manpower skilled in the use of local building materials; and (66% vs 49%) that housing policy in Abuja was adopted by a military government concerned with impressive design and construction, not with ensuring propriety and affordability. Before undertaking t o illustrate h o w all these dispositional factors relating t o tastes and preferences in Abuja militated against low-cost housing goals in the city, a review of the preliminary phase of the new capital planning/implementation process is in order.  This is a  necessary step t o both provide background information for the discussion, and to further explore the dissertation's  underlying argument  that, in order t o fully comprehend the  implementation problem, it is imperative t o examine both the up-stream and down-stream activities of the policy process.  5.2 THE POLITICS  OF THE NEW CAPITAL  DECISION  1  With an excerpt from his August 5, 1975 inaugural speech, the late General Murtala Mohammed promulgated the new capital decision and formally began the preliminary phase of the planning/implementation process for the city. Said the General in the speech: As t o the question of a Federal Capital, you are no doubt aware of the many problems that have arisen from the city of Lagos serving as the dual capital of both the Federal Government and the Lagos State Government. Some of these problems have proved intractable, an there have been persistent suggestions that, as Lagos seems unable t o accommodate both Governments, either the Lagos State Government or the Federal Government should move its capital elsewhere. The issue has t o be examined closely It is believed 1. The discussion to follow on this subject relies on some field observations, but mainly on the work done by Moore (1982). Since Moore's field work was done during the planning phase and early construction period of the project, he was able to interact with both the expatriate planners and the relevant Nigerian policy officials.  195  CHAPTER 5: EXPLAINING THE POLICY IMPLEMENTATION GAP  that the body of knowledgeable men t o be set up, assisted by the contributions from the public at large, will be able t o make useful recommendations t o the Federal Government (NITP 1984, p. 1-2).  5.2.7 The Aguda  Pane! on Relocation/Site  Selection  On August 9, 1975, following the inaugural meeting of the Supreme Military Council, the Aguda panel was constituted to look into whether or not a new capital was necessary for the country, and what the best location for it might be. Subsequent activities by this panel pursuant t o these t w o mandates marked the first phase of the new capital planning process that was "supposedly" open t o the public.  Even before the panel was initiated t o delve into  the issue, "many discerning Nigerians, including the military administration, were convinced that no solution, other than a new Federal Capital, w o u l d suffice" (Abumere 1984, p. 18). Both Agba (1986) and Moore (1982) provide convincing arguments about the predetermined nature of the panel's decisions, both in recommending a new capital and in selecting its current central location at Abuja. This is evidenced by the fact that the panel was only given till December 3 1 , 1975 t o report on such a momentous decision, as well as the fact that the panel actually submitted its report on December 10, 1975, scarcely four months after coming into existence. Nonetheless, t o justify its existence and legitimize the decisions made, the eight member panel (consisting of no experienced persons in urban planning) undertook t o invite 2  briefs from across the country.  But as suggested in the literature review (Chapter 2) that  opportunities for participation in policy process by actors external t o the implementing agencies tend t o be deliberately biased towards supporters of the policy (Mazmanian and Sabatier 1981, p. 13), the panel made certain that "memoranda were requested only from those groups that would not present a serious challenge t o the committee's previously made conclusions" (Moore 1982, p. 43).  For example, the Nigerian Institute of Town Planners  2. According to Agba (1986, p. 194), the membership consisted of "a business man, a judge, a professor of gynecology, an army chaplain, a legal practitioner, a secondary school teacher and a geographer.".  196  CHAPTER 5: EXPLAINING THE POLICY IMPLEMENTATION GAP  (NITP) was not invited to submit a brief, but did d o so anyway. To further limit participation, the panel made its request for briefs through only a single source (the Nigerian newspapers) and called for written representations in fifteen copies no later than September 30, 1975. Other methods of getting the message across t o the masses were not explored, and the majority of society w h o could not write were ignored. Those w h o could write obviously had little time t o d o so, let alone write something reasonable. ln addition to inviting briefs, the panel also undertook a hasty tour of the country's state capitals, mainly t o consult the state governments and interview some entities of the state's wider public. But outside of talking t o some influential individuals and organizations in Nigerian politics, "the committee did not consult with other segments of the society, such as the association of market w o m e n , petty traders, labor organizations, etc." (Agba 1986, p. 182). Neither did it consult with the individual members of the public, as is evident from the following comment contained in the panel's final report: It was our intention t o take evidence from the general public or even t o meet with them. However, the time at our disposal was very short and we believed that w e could arrive at a g o o d decision on each of our terms of reference by making extensive use of memoranda that we called for in addition t o other means of information and education available t o us (Report of the Committee 1975, p. 23). Lastly, the panel also spent one month touring several foreign capitals including Canberra, Brasilia, Delhi, Karachi, Islamabad, Dodoma, Gaborone, Lusaka, Nairobi, etc.. The object was t o enable panelists t o observe the realities of these cities so that, should Nigeria elect t o build a new capital,  3  it could learn from their successes and avoid their mistakes.  That was the aim but, in reality, the panel was noted t o have been particularly "enthralled by the large theaters, night clubs, and luxury hotels of these places," rather than by their functional role in spatial development (Moore 1982, p. 36).  3. This question is made suspect by the fact that the foreign tour was the first measure undertaken by the panel (Moore 1982, p. 35). Ideally, if the panel did not treat the decision to relocate as faite accompli, then the tour should not come first. Or, at least, part of its aim should have been to thresh out the political ramifications of building a new capital with the founding fathers and planners of the foreign capitals visited.  197  CHAPTER 5: EXPLAINING THE POLICY IMPLEMENTATION GAP  It should be mentioned as well that the FCDA and the NISER held a workshop, attended mainly by Nigerian professionals, t o discuss site selection and the planning process for the city.  But this conference was not held until late September 1976 after the site  selection had been completed, which meant that the exercise may have allowed for the expression of professional opposition, but certainly not for its serious consideration in the decision making. In Moore's (1982, p. 44) words, "the truth is that the FCDA had no interest in hearing the voice of the Nigerian academics and planners." As a conclusion to this phase of the new capital planning process, the panel's final report noted that altogether 286 memoranda were received from across the country, with a significant majority of these being in full support of a new capital.  It also noted that all but  t w o (Western and Rivers states) out of the twelve states comprising the country supported the move.  O n the selection of an optimal location for the capital, it noted that the states had  their preferences and listed them, but fell short of actually dealing with the disadvantages of their preferred sites.  5.2.2  Selecting  Master  Planners  for the  City  The choice of master planners for the city marked the beginning of the second phase of the new capital planning process. As it was perceived, the choice was essentially between Nigerian planners and expatriate planners. Both the military leadership and responsible civilian officials in government concurred on the choice of expatriates, but disagreed on whether or not an international competition should be held to choose planners for the city.  Apparently,  as explained by Moore (1982, p. 49), there were indications that " t o p military officials preferred to award the contract to an expatriate firm that would consider awarding additional favors t o them in return." international  competition  The dispute eventually ended with Mr. I. Ebong insisting on an to  select  planners  comprehensive landuse plan for the city.  that  would  oversee  the  drafting  of  a  Mr. Ebong was the first executive secretary of the  198  CHAPTER 5: EXPLAINING THE POLICY IMPLEMENTATION CAP  FCDA, but was later asked to step d o w n by his military appointees for his role in insisting on a competition.  He was replaced by Mr. M. Adeogun, a man w h o was typified as famous for  generally awarding contracts to "friends" (Moore 1982, p. 55). Close to one hundred different groups of expatriate firms submitted proposals for the Abuja master plan contract.  This number was quickly narrowed t o fifteen including planning  teams from Britain, West Germany, U.S., Japan, Canada and Greece. An American consortium formed specifically for the competition was eventually selected.  The International Planning  Associates (IPA) comprised three American planning firms: (1) Wallace, McHarg, Roberts and Todd  (architects  and  city  and  regional  planning);  (2)  Planning  Research  Corporation  (transportation planners and utilities engineers); and (3) Archisystems International (architects and planners). In an official letter to the Nigerian government accepting the job, the IPA was quoted by Moore  (1982, p. 57) as having said that the "IPA understands the magnitude  and  complexity of the assignments; is familiar with Nigeria's urbanization patterns; and has first hand knowledge of Nigeria."  Yet, upon a closer examination of the IPA's records, Moore  found this statement to be misleading and untrue.  Based on the firm's own publications of  past work experience, the consortium was shown not t o have had a single project in Nigeria or Africa for that matter.  Two members of the consortium had some experience in Nigeria  but "neither of these individuals was directly involved in the development of the master plan" (Moore 1982, p. 57). Given that the IPA's work history was contained in the firm's proposal, it becomes questionable on what grounds the Nigerian government made its decision.  Cost  was never indicated by the leadership t o be a factor worthy of concern, so the firm could not have been selected for this reason. It may be asked - what was the feeling in the country about the choice of foreign planners over Nigerian planners? What reasons did the military leadership have for opting to engage the services of an international consultancy?  Needless to say, Nigerian professionals  were and still are unhappy with the decision, as their contributions were shunted aside when  199  CHAPTER 5: EXPLAINING THE POLICY IMPLEMENTATION GAP  they had the opportunity to count the most.  In a paper delivered at the 1976 NISER/FCDA  workshop, the then president of the Nigerian Institute of Town Planners (NITP) makes the point that the Institute had issued a press release early in that year offering "its services t o the government of this country in all aspects leading t o the preparation and implementation of schemes for this capital city" (Quoted in Moore 1982, p. 44).  But this offer was not even  heard in the right quarters, let alone responded to. A paper read at another conference that was organized four years later takes a more stern tone: The citizens of this country should have the rare opportunity to plan, design and build their national capital. Nothing can be more satisfying. Nothing can be more historical. Anything short of this will tarnish the image and prestige of the nation.... In the various stages of implementing the proposals, we might require the services of foreign consultants... [but] Nigerian consultants should be the principal consultants with w h o m the consultants from abroad would work. Nigerian consultants should not become appendages in their own country.... The sad event of the national anthem should not be repeated. We could, as we are now trying to, allow Nigerians to re-write the national anthem (Tokun 1984, p. 25). The point was widely lamented that "Nigeria lost the unique opportunity of allowing indigenous planners t o face the challenge of planning their country's new capital" (Onibokun 1984, p. 17-8).  But at this time the professionals could only hope that the already manifest  follies of the capital "teach [the Nigerian decision makers] the consequences of employing wrong hands" (Gandonu 1984, p. 346). should feel indignation.  It is understandable that the Nigerian professionals  As revealed by the survey results, the majority of the decision  makers, implementors and academics surveyed support that there was the local know-how t o plan and execute the new capital. The critical question then is why did the leadership opt for an overseas solution when there was a local alternative? In an attempt to make sense of this question, there is first the observation by Moore (1982, p 47) that the military leadership responsible for making the decision did not have any experience in large scale urban planning.  As he had put it, "you had a government run  basically by a bunch of generals that knew nothing about cities and economics."  The  leadership had t w o main concerns: (1) getting action soonest and (2) building a beautiful and  200  CHAPTER 5: EXPLAINING THE POLICY IMPLEMENTATION GAP  functional city.  To maximize these t w o concerns, it felt that the entire project should be  turned over t o the foreign planners w h o could complete the plan in record time. This feeling was communicated openly to the FCDA whose official mandate included the preparation of a master plan for the city. It should be noted here that, even though the survey results indicate that over 80 per cent of the officials surveyed disagree with the proposition that experts in the country meant expatriates, Moore (1982, p. 47), in his o w n experience, found that "experts, in the opinion of the Nigerian military, were expatriates."  Note that the officials estimate a 53  per cent popular (vs 20% own) support for the proposition.  This suggests that the implied  meaning of the proposition may have insulted the officials, thereby causing them t o respond in the way they did. Apart from all this, it should be kept in mind what type of city the military was interested in building. The indication from every source is that the military wanted t o build a European city in Africa, an ideal world-class city free of pity and squatters. Thus, in the sense that the new capital was t o mimic images of western cities, it would be contrary t o reason that non-western planners would be ideal for the job. Nonetheless, t o justify its use of "apolitical" approaches t o the planning of the new capital, the FCDA, under Mr. Ebong, argued that the cumbersome and arduous of task of planning a new city was not within the indigenous technical capability.^ course, did not disclose feelings  t o the contrary  among  The agency, of  the indigenous  professional  community, and their strong desire that "Abuja should be a Nigerian city planned by Nigerians."  After all, this was not the bygone days when developing countries depended on  the advanced countries t o plan their world, which is probably why only 30 per cent of the academics (and 32% of the popular response) support the proposition that it is not necessary for Abuja to be planned and built by Nigerian for it to be a Nigerian city. This contrasts with the strong support among the decision makers (80%) and the implementors (72%).  4. This point was made in a telephone interview with Moore (1982, p. 48).  201  CHAPTER 5: EXPLAINING THE POLICY IMPLEMENTATION GAP  Another crucial aspect not brought out by the FCDA's rationalization is that the use of indigenous professionals would have opened each step of the planning process t o intense internal political wrangling.  The issues surrounding the proper role of the new capital then  and now remain exceeding contentious throughout the country.  In the literature review  (Chapter 2), it was noted that the result of involving t o o many people in any planning process, is almost always "disagreement" and "delay."  The military leadership wanted neither of these  t w o outcomes and, accordingly, sought to deliberately insulate the new capital planning process from internal dynamics by exporting it overseas.  If accepted as a conscious strategy  on the part of.the leadership, there is no doubt that the ploy worked to expedite the planning phase and achieve the master plan in less than t w o years as was originally intended.  The  military's urgency and desire for fast results stemmed from the fact that it had promised in 1976 to relinquish power to a civilian administration in 1979.  Consequently, it wanted the  new capital project to have progressed sufficiently by this time, so that it would become a "no-going back" policy for the subsequent administration.  Once again, the Generals were  masters on this intention. The specific impacts of officials' dispositions  on both the master plan process and  implementation strategies for housing in the new capital are discussed in the next section. This is done with a view to showing a continuation between past and recent dispositions toward the new capital, and how these converged t o influence what options were pursued in making the new capital housing plans a reality.  5.3 IMPACT OF OFFICIALS' MASTER PLANNING  .  DISPOSITIONS  ON  THE DYNAMICS  OF  THE  According to an article by Todd (1984, p. 120-1), a member of the IPA project management board in charge of project direction, the actual planning process for Abuja was divided into the following six consecutive stages:  202  CHAPTER 5: EXPLAINING THE POLICY IMPLEMENTATION GAP  (1)  Programing: the determination of the demographic, population and economic characteristics;  (2)  Site Evaluation and Site Selection: the study of the geography of the federal capital territory and the various natural and man-made elements t o determine the most suitable site for the new city and, finally, the testing of various urban forms o n the selected site t o determine its capacity for accepting urban form;  (3)  The Plan for the Region: the determination of the future landuse of the federal capital territory and the relation of the territory t o the surrounding states;  (4)  The Master Plan Concept: the determination of the conceptual framework of the new city;  (5)  The Master Plan: the detailing and development of the conceptual plan including the plan both for the central area and the 12 residential towns or "sectors" of the city; and  (6)  The Design and Development Manual: the determination of development standards for all the various components of the city.  Todd readily admits that "work o n these elements was accomplished primarily in the United States," in Washington, D.C. and Philadelphia. He also readily admits that "this was somewhat at odds with the concept that the FCDA had that all of the work would be accomplished in Nigeria."  This fact remained "a source of discontent in the FCDA" throughout the master  planning phase, as the agency was never appeased with the alternative arrangements that were made.^  Commenting on the seriousness of this disharmony, Todd cautions: "let this  experience be a w o r d of warning t o those w h o would practice their profession in the distant land."  The repercussion of this warning was later t o be felt when the FCDA had control of  implementation of the master plan.  5. It was resolved that there would be an IPA resident manager in Nigeria who would maintain daily contact with the agency and liaise between the two. Also, represented in the FCDA organizational chart were two other independent liaison groups: (1) a three-member International Review Panel (IRP) and a twenty-seven member Technical Assessment Panel (TAP). The former composed of foreign experts in new capital planning and the latter Nigerian professionals of pertinent backgrounds. Together the two panels were to serve as consultants and advisers to the IPA-FCDA planning team; but, as Moore (1982, p. 76) reports: "Since the master plan was developed on a strict time schedule, the two consultant groups were never integrated into the plan formulation. It was not until after the master plan had been completed that these two panels were asked to submit evaluations of the project. [Information from an IPA director is that] the T A P and IRP were used only to verify that the Nigerians had 'purchased a valid plan for a new capital.' The panels were never meant to serve as consultants."  203  CHAPTER 5: EXPLAINING THE POLICY IMPLEMENTATION GAP  In an attempt to defend the IPA's decision to conduct the planning in the U.S., Todd (1984, p. 121) later argued that it was either this mode of working or "bankruptcy;" that it was simply impractical to move the entire planning office staff to Nigeria, given the limited budget and very short planning schedule of eighteen months.  Why Todd assumed that it w o u l d be  necessary to move the "entire" staff, rather than the essential staff, is astounding.  But more  astounding is the statement by Todd that the FCDA "thought" that all work on the capital w o u l d be accomplished in Nigeria rather than in the U.S..  Ordinarily, one w o u l d expect the  FCDA t o have been clear on this before it considered and signed a contract with the IPA for the job.  Likewise, the IPA w o u l d have had to focus on the matter before it could prepare its  proposal and establish its professional fees, as the latter would vary significantly depending on whether the firm is to plan from home or in Nigeria. As for the financial argument for not moving the IPA staff to Nigeria, this conflicts flagrantly with the overall m o o d that characterized the entire planning phase of the new capital.  At no time was cost considered a serious issue by members  decision making body.  of the new capital's  This fact becomes clearer as the analysis progresses, but the point to  be made here is that the arrangement to plan Abuja from across the Atlantic Ocean worked to the interests of both the Nigerian decision makers and the IPA. Thus, given this situation that the Atlantic Ocean separated the planners from the project, it is probably an understatement  to suggest that the IPA never developed an  understanding of the nature of the local demand for housing.  Yet, the firm was responsible  for producing a complete guideline for the city's settlement plan.** The question is thus raised - from w h o m did the expatriate planners get their cues on the nature of the local demand for housing?  It should be recalled that not only was there a bad rapport between the planners  6. In 1979, the Milton Keynes Development Corporation of London was retained to produce detailed housing designs and residential layouts for the city. The firm's services were, however, later terminated for reasons unknown to this researcher. Though this was not until after much of the firm's plans were underway. Other firms involved in the detail planning of the settlement included Egbor and Arenco Associates, Dar-AlHandasah Consultants, S.F. Consultants, International Companies Associates and Doxiades Associates (Nig.) Ltd..  204  CHAPTER 5: EXPLAINING THE POLICY IMPLEMENTATION GAP  (the IPA) and the implementing agency (the FCDA), but the latter was intentionally made superfluous and served primarily to legitimize the impression of a Nigerian i n v o l v e m e n t /  It is,  nevertheless, acceptable t o maintain that the process for the new capital involved three major participants: (1) the Nigerian military leaders, (2) the IPA and (3) the FCDA in that descending order of importance.  Agba (1986, p. 215) summarizes the dynamics of the interactions  between these three actors: "the FCDA served mainly as a medium through which the IPA interacted with the military government...;  the military government dictated the ' t e m p o ' of  planning, while the IPA developed mainly technical solutions to match their demands." This fact that the planning process for the city was entirely t o p - d o w n in the most classical sense, implies that the foreign planners could not but obtain their impression of local housing needs from the views expressed by the army chiefs. It becomes important, therefore, t o reflect further on the dispositions of the army chiefs toward the new capital in order t o determine the dispositions held by the expatriate planners (or what was put to them) toward housing provision. As alluded to earlier, the goal of the military was to build a new, monumental capital which would not only be a visible symbol of the government's achievement on behalf of the populace, but also a home and source of pride for the government.  The  following  comments, culled from the speech by a past Minister of the FCT, late Major General M.J. Vatsa, confirms some of these sentiments: The objective is Abuja, a city all Nigerians will ever remain proud of.... I implore [all] professionals w h o have acquired experience in the planning of new Capital Cities to... help us build Abuja as one of the best planned Capital Cities in the world.... It is the government's intentions to make [Abuja] a befitting Capital that will be a pride of the black man wherever he may be (Speeches by Late General Murtala Ramat Mohammed and succeeding Ministers of FCT, Abuja 1988, p. 12-3).  7. This suggestion was confirmed by the agency's first executive secretary, Mr. Ebong. Additional supportive evidence includes the amount of discontent expressed over the matter by present officials of the FCDA; and the fact that few planning tasks were ever assigned the agency, and that the few ever assigned were often redone by the western planners.  205  CHAPTER 5: EXPLAINING THE POLICY IMPLEMENTATION GAP  "Let us have a Capital City Free of pity," said the late Major General in another public address (FCDA 1985, p. 1). Undoubtedly,  the  issue of  housing was central to  the achievements  of  these  aspirations, because progress in the sector would most readily suggest success or failure of the new capital, both in the eyes of its residents and outside observers.  As shown by  evidence from the survey, housing is perceived to both represent a symbol of achievement and progress toward modernity, and the most visible symbol of policy accomplishments in the city.  The latter is the traditional argument that a city is only as g o o d as "the quality of the  residential environment... [because] 'housing' is more than merely the dwelling unit. complex product  It is a  made up of a combination of services... (with respect to work  and  community services)" (Master plan 1979, p. 171). The above realization, in conjunction with the assumption that Nigeria was a wealthy country, are probably what led the army chiefs to believe that costs should not be a concern in adopting construction standards for the city; a belief which is shared by the majority (58%) of current policy officials surveyed. The assumption about the country's affluence was made explicit by the military's hand-picked panel on relocation. According to the final report of this panel: The argument that colossal sums of money w o u l d be involved in building up a new capital is attractive but unconvincing.... First, we must say that we are not economists, but we can see no justification for pessimism displayed in the above [argument].... Even if the cost is high, we can afford it today (Report of the Committee 1975, p. 55). Admittedly, such an assumption was warranted at the time, given the windfall that the country experienced through "petrodollars."  After the Arab oil embargo in 1973, Nigeria  joined the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and succeeded in raising the average price of the country's crude from $3.05 in 1971 to $14.69 (U.S.), an increase of 482 per cent.  Having one of the finest grades of crude (bony light), and as one of the three  largest suppliers of crude to the U.S. at the time, the country's annual production soared from 395.8 million barrels in 1970 t o 823.3 in 1974.  206  Subsequently, oil revenue rose dramatically  CHAPTER 5: EXPLAINING THE POLICY IMPLEMENTATION GAP  from N633.2 million (26.3% of total revenue) in 1970 to N4.5 billion (82.1% of total revenue) in 1974 (Onimode 1987, p. 53). [Up t o 1984, N1.00 = $1.65 approximately.] Of course, at the time of writing the report about the country's new found wealth, the panel could not foresee the near collapse of the OPEC and the consequent sharp drop in oil revenues.  Were the panelists, along with the rest of the country's decision makers, t o have  known "that the oil b o o m would not last, the tempo and the style of development of Abuja might have been different" (Onibokun 1984, p. 6). That is, particularly in view of the fact that the high oil revenue figures of 1974, which formed the financial basis for the venture, remained the highest ever in terms of percentage of total government revenue. Getting back to the views expressed by the committee, it was only t o be expected that decision makers showed an attitude of indifference towards cost related issues during the formulation of construction plans for the new capital: An American planner recounted an incident when IPA delivered a presentation outlining the estimated costs of the project to a number of top military officials at Dodan Barracks [the military headquarters] in Lagos. The military men were generally oblivious to the figures, using the presentation as an opportunity to catch some rest. Cost t o the majority of the military leaders, was not a factor worthy of their concern. The economic b o o m brought on by the rise in oil revenues had given the leaders personal prosperity and with this a mistaken perception that Nigeria was a wealthy country. The leaders' failure t o accept and make decisions based on the realities of Nigerian development played an important role in determining the plans for the new capital at Abuja (Moore 1982, p. 59). As there were numerous instances of this sort, it follows that they had considerable impact on the expatriate planners, by creating a working relationship and atmosphere in which they would become less concerned with issues related to costs and affordability. The ensuing section examines closely the impact of the dispositions of civilian policy officials on the housing options pursued in the new capital.  It shows that the officials'  dispositions converge with those of the army chiefs in support of selecting the most m o d e m technology available for use in the new capital.  207  CHAPTER 5: EXPLAINING THE POLICY IMPLEMENTATION GAP  5.4 IMPACT MENTATION  OF OFFICIALS' STRATEGIES  DISPOSITIONS  ON THE HOUSING  IMPLE-  More than planning intentions, strategic choices o n h o w program objectives are actually pursued greatly affect the result. In Chapter 1, this fact was noted t o be especially so in the developing countries where the definite tendency is for policy demands t o reach the system after legislation is passed, rather than before as is generally the case with countries of the west.  As the argument was developed, this occurrence is what ultimately causes the  marginalized individuals and groups t o resort t o bringing their political pressures t o bear at the means-selection stage and, by so doing, alter both the content and the intended impact of policy.  This is aside from the fact that die-hard opponents of the policy w h o lost out in the  planning phase would seek, and find, means t o continue their opposition in this stage (Bardach 1977, p. 38). That  the whole  of the Nigerian  public,  including  its professional  class, was  marginalized from the planning process for the new capital, leaves no doubt as t o the validity of the above assertion.  Even though specifically created t o build the new capital, the FCDA  was equally marginalized from the planning of the city in a manner reminiscent of the classical, but erroneous dichotomies between policy and administration, or between planning and implementation.  The agency was effectively relegated t o a secondary role as a mere channel  through which the army chiefs communicated their wishes t o the foreign technical experts. Though it was learned during the field research that this role was later improved t o include assembling the various pieces of planning works done by the foreign consultants.^ Given the above situation, it follows that all the marginalized actors in Nigeria, particularly the FCDA, resorted t o focusing their demand-making efforts o n the choice of strategies t o be adopted in the plan execution stage.  But, since the FCDA has a virtual  monopoly in deciding the financial aspects of these strategies, it is logical t o assert that the disposition of officials responsible t o this agency is one of the single most  inclusive  8. Sources in the management cadre of the FCDA confirmed that almost no serious or original planning work was ever done internally.  208  CHAPTER 5: EXPLAINING THE POLICY IMPLEMENTATION GAP  explanations for the failure t o provide affordable shelter in the new capital as was intended by the master plan guideline. Furthermore,  as Abuja was widely  perceived  t o be an administrative  city, the  bureaucrats w h o were t o occupy it held the biggest stake, not only in the quality of housing produced, but also in the image of exclusivity for the city.  It is, therefore, not startling that  the survey results suggest that the dispositions the bureaucrats brought t o the process closely ( relate t o those of the army chiefs in support of a strong bias in favor of building a "high class" city.  By virtue of their likely places of academic training and their generally elitist position in  society, it is perhaps even less of a coincidence that the dispositions expressed by the other relevant indigenous actors in the process (i.e., the academics), ^ should also favor building a high class, western-type city. The remainder of this section discusses what some of these attitudes were and h o w they were manifested in the choices made in relation t o the t w o primary  components  affecting housing costs in the city, namely: (1) construction and management, and (2) infrastructure.  The dissertation's argument that dispositions toward Abuja have, in the main,  not changed, should be borne in mind.  5.4.7 Building  Construction  Materials.  Choices  Even though the master plan guideline was cognizant of the fact that many  construction materials needed t o build the capital must be imported, it urged a restraint on the gross amount t o be imported.  It proposed supplementing these wherever possible with  less costlier local materials. In reality, however, this exhortation was not heeded, as there was little by way of local substitution.  Despite recommendations t o the contrary on the basis of  cost, the trend favoring prefabricated method of building continued unabated. 9. It is realized here that a powerful argument could be made, on the basis of information contained in this dissertation, that the academics were, in fact, not relevant actors in the process, but mere "bystanders." To this, the response is that they in fact had a role in bolstering the ideals of the new capital and in maintaining an upward pressure on development standards adopted in the city.  209  CHAPTER 5: EXPLAINING THE POLICY IMPLEMENTATION GAP  There were several reasons for this. The first was that the government never followed up the master plan's broad guidelines with clear directives on what constitutes local content, much less legislative directives requiring contractors to abide by such definitions. The second was that the ability to buy materials from within the country became especially difficult.  There was such spectacular demand for building materials that the local  market was unable to cope.  Consequently, prices sky rocketed and certain imported items  (e.g., ironmongery and electrical carcassing) even moved into the black market (AJ 1985, p. 75). Finally, compounding these problems was the general reluctance on the part of Nigerian society t o accept local materials as a genuine alternative to imports. As suggested by the survey, a significant portion of the officials -- decision makers (64%), academics (64%) and implementors (29%) or overall popular response (64%) -- support the proposition that the quality of local materials is not at par with imported materials. Even for the implementors w h o hold a dissenting opinion on the issue, it seems highly unlikely that any of them w o u l d actually support having their houses built using local materials and fixtures.  Hence, while  there is no doubt that public policy in developing countries is convinced of the efficacy of import substitution with local materials, the problem of social acceptability has remained. Labor. It was mentioned that to help bring the cost of housing within the range of affordability, the IPA had recommended "a combination of self-help techniques and reliance on local building materials," which: (1) can reduce total costs by almost 50 per cent; (2) provide opportunities for self expression by way of indigenous building styles; and (3) stimulate the mobilization of latent indigenous resources. The FCDA was unconvinced of this recommendation, particularly the part concerning "self-help" techniques.  The agency argued  that "low-income workers would not have the energy, after a hard day's work, to make contributions t o their housing" (Moore 1982, p. 72).  210  CHAPTER 5: EXPLAINING THE POLICY IMPLEMENTATION GAP  During a subsequent debate that ensued between the agency and the IPA over the issue, Mr. Stephen Lockwood, the IPA's resident project manager, was quoted by Moore (1982, p. 75) as telling the FCDA officials that they have a naive knowledge of the problems involved in building low-cost shelter; that the new city "cannot look like a European city in Africa, not with 70 per cent of the households earning less than N3,000 per year." In the end, however, the FCDA remained unyielding and elected t o pursue the low-income housing goals without self-help techniques; a decision which apparently meant that self-help would not be pursued for all the other income brackets. The plan was that the government would provide complete housing for all its workers, while it would be left up t o the private sector t o respond to the housing needs of the non-civil servants. Given the truism that individuals are more efficient suppliers of their o w n shelter, and that shelter built by government is consistently and outrageously more costly than similar quality shelter built privately, this decision t o exclude self-help measures in the housing program for the