THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PUBLIC POLICY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: A CASE STUDY OF HOUSING IN NIGERIA'S NEW CAPITAL CITY AT ABUJA

by

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A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES SCHOOL OF COMMUNITY AND REGIONAL PLANNING

We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard

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Date **JUNE 27, 1990**
ABSTRACT

This dissertation is concerned with the implementation process for housing in Nigeria's new capital at Abuja. It explores the inability of the Nigerian government to provide affordable housing for all income groups in the new capital as was originally planned. Based on nominal income, no resident in the city can afford to pay market rents for the housing provided, and less than 15 per cent of wage earners in the civil service (not to mention irregular wage earners in the informal sector) can afford the least expensive houses provided if they were unsubsidized.

The purpose of this study is both to elucidate factors contributing to policy performances and the imperfect correspondence between policy goals and outcomes in developing countries, and to raise basic policy issues pertaining to housing provision in the new capital. The main hypothesis tested is that of Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) who maintain that the outcome of public policy is ultimately determined by the disposition of implementing officials. While recognizing that the gap in the provision of housing in the new capital can be related to a host of factors including financial constraints in the face of apparently unlimited demand, the argument is developed that the disjunction is due primarily to the disposition of policy officials in Abuja, which has been to build a high-class, western-type administrative capital. Premised on this belief, the dissertation then argues that policy officials perceive medium- and high-cost housing to be more germane to the image of the new capital than low-cost dwellings affordable by the low-income population. Consequently, tastes and preferences in housing were in favor of the sophisticated western type of house design, material and layout, which meant that housing delivery strategies in the city were not based on the nature of the local demand and available resources.

To look for evidence in support of this hypothesis, the dissertation first determines the disposition of officials towards the Abuja project. The findings leave no doubt that Abuja was not to be just a western inspired alternative to the former capital of Lagos, but rather a
visionary sort rescue from the latter's intractable problems. It then relates this disposition to
the current housing situation in the city, through effects on the planning/implementation
process. The conclusion to emerge is that the disposition of policy officials greatly influences
implementation outcome regardless of planning intentions, and that the wider framework
proposed by Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) is an effective way of focusing research on
factors that impinge on policy performance. A related conclusion is that the essentially
western model of implementation proposed by Van Meter and Van Horn applies with equal, if
not more, validity to the developing world where past explanations for the problems of
implementation have tended to focus on such variables as: (1) financial resources; (2)
administrative and technical know-how; (3) imported theories and technologies; and (4)
indigenous regime or political characteristics. However, the unique politico-administrative
context of policy remains a crucial factor.

In light of the fact that the key to improved affordability is not sophistication, and that
the goal of providing low-cost housing in the new capital would ultimately require non-
western standards and styles of delivery, the chief pragmatic implication of the study is that a
dispositional change to encourage a more "Nigerian" city is a precondition for a successful
housing strategy in the new capital. This means discarding the current imported development
practices in the city and replacing them with a more functional orientation based on the
nature of the local demand for dwellings. A more "Nigerian" city is one in which the majority
of housing and related services are accessible by the average citizen, whether in the civil
service or not.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT.............................................................................................................................. ii
LIST OF TABLES....................................................................................................................... vii
LIST OF FIGURES................................................................................................................... viii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS............................................................................................................ ix
DEDICATION.......................................................................................................................... xi
ABBREVIATIONS....................................................................................................................... xii

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 PROBLEM......................................................................................................................... 1
1.2 PURPOSE......................................................................................................................... 2
1.3 HYPOTHESIS................................................................................................................... 2
1.4 OBJECTIVES.................................................................................................................... 5
1.5 META-HYPOTHESES AND ASSUMPTIONS................................................................ 6
1.6 SCOPE............................................................................................................................. 7
1.7 RATIONALE..................................................................................................................... 8
    1.7.1 Why Study Implementation in a Developing World Context?......................... 8
    1.7.2 Why the Selection of Abuja for a Case Analysis?............................................ 11
    1.7.3 Why Focus on Housing in Abuja?................................................................. 12
1.8 ORGANIZATION............................................................................................................. 13

CHAPTER 2: STUDYING IMPLEMENTATION: A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS

2.1 DEFINING PUBLIC POLICY............................................................................................ 14
2.2 DEFINING THE IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS................................................................. 16
2.3 PERSPECTIVES ON THE IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEM.............................................. 23
    2.3.1 Administrative Control Problem....................................................................... 23
    2.3.2 Inadequate Resources...................................................................................... 25
    2.3.3 Tense Inter-Governmental Relations............................................................... 27
    2.3.4 Problematic Nature of Policy Itself................................................................. 29
    2.3.5 Lack of Pressures from Target Groups............................................................ 32
    2.3.6 Disagreement over Goals................................................................................ 34
    2.3.7 Unfavorable Disposition of Implementors....................................................... 36
    2.3.8 The Complexity of Joint Action...................................................................... 37
    2.3.9 Ambiguous Goals and Communications....................................................... 38
    2.3.10 Faulty Theory of Action................................................................................ 41
    2.3.11 Faulty Study Design....................................................................................... 43
    2.3.12 A Non-Participatory Process....................................................................... 45
    2.3.13 Uncertainties................................................................................................. 46
2.4 COMPREHENSIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEM........... 47
    2.4.1 Rein & Rabinovitz (1978), Implementation: A Theoretical Perspective... 48
    2.4.2 Levitt (1980), Implementing Public Policy...................................................... 49
CHAPTER 3: MATERIALS AND METHOD

3.1 THE CASE OF ABUJA...

3.1.1 History of the New Capital Movement...
3.1.2 Rationale for Relocation...
3.1.3 Basic Concepts and Physical Form of the New Capital...
3.1.4 Administrative Arrangements for Abuja...
3.1.5 Setting of the New Site...
   3.1.5.1 Physical Characteristics...
   3.1.5.2 Economic Characteristics...
   3.1.5.3 Socio-Demographic Characteristics...

3.2. METHODS...
3.2.1 Research Design...
3.2.2 Evaluation Techniques...
3.2.3 Sources and Method of Data Collection...
3.2.4 Preliminary Activities in the Field and the Questionnaire...
3.2.5 Research Population and the Formal Interviews...
3.2.6 Issues Arising from the Field Setting...

CHAPTER 4: THE HOUSING CHALLENGE IN ABUJA

4.1 HOUSING GOALS AND ACHIEVEMENTS...
4.1.1 Background...
4.1.2 Housing Goals...
4.1.3 Housing Achievements...

4.2 CURRENT SETTLEMENT SITUATION...
4.2.1 Affordability...
4.2.2 Supply...
4.2.3 Exclusion...
4.2.4 Access to Land...
4.2.5 Squatting...
4.2.6 Segregated Development...
4.2.7 Location...
4.2.8 Crowding...
4.2.9 Services...
4.2.10 Design and Layout...
4.2.11 Quality...
4.2.12 Maintenance...
4.2.13 Livability...
4.2.14 Resettlement Housing...
LIST OF TABLES

3.1: Criteria for Selecting the Site of the Federal Capital Territory...........................................91
3.2: Population Profile of the FCT (1985-90)................................................................................102
4.1: Recent Population Projection for Major Urban Centers in Nigeria.................................114
4.3: Housing Program Options for Abuja......................................................................................119
4.4: Site and Floor Area for Principal Types of Dwelling Units in Abuja.....................................120
4.5: Number and Type of Housing Contracts Awarded by the FCDA and FHA (1988).........122
4.6: Status of Housing Starts by the FCDA in the Development Districts of the Four Local Government Areas of the FCT (Dec. 1988).................................................................124
4.7: Low-cost Housing Construction by the FHA Outside of the FCC (1983)..........................125
4.8: Application for Residential Plots by States (Dec. 1987).......................................................135
4.9: Housing Affordability by Civil Servants in Abuja.................................................................137
4.11: Treated Cost of Housing Constructed in Abuja (1982)......................................................138
4.14: Impact of Inflation on Cost of Housing Constructed by the FHA (1988-89)......................142
4.15: Cost of Standard Temporary Accommodation within the FCC in Naira (Feb. 1979). 143
4.16: Income Distribution for Civil Servants in Abuja by Salary Grade Levels (1988).............144
4.18: Untreated Cost of Housing Constructed in Abuja (1979-82).............................................145
4.19: Estimate of Housing Demand among the Civil Servants' Group in the FCT (1988)....148
4.20: The Manpower Strength of the Ministries already in Abuja and those to Move to City by 1989............................................................................................................................149
4.23: Location of FCDA's Housing Estates in the FCT and their Distances from the Boundary of the FCC (in miles).................................................................................................163
4.24: Typical Standard of Housing Allocation by the FCDA in Abuja.......................................165
4.25: Number and Type of Educational Institutions and Teacher-Student Ratio in the FCT by Local Govt Areas (June 1987).........................................................................................167
4.26: Basic Facts on Elements of Health Services in the FCT..................................................168
4.27: Motor Vehicle Registration in the Municipality of Abuja and the FCT (July 1986 - June 1987)...............................................................................................................................169
5.1: Summary of Nigerian Officials' Dispositions Toward Abuja (percent).............................182
5.2: Perceptions of Causes of Housing Problems in Abuja.......................................................192
6.1: Areas of Housing in Abuja Requiring Effort.........................................................................238
1: Building Construction and Infrastructure Costs .................................................................278
LIST OF FIGURES

2.1: Definition of Elements of Policy................................................................. 15
2.2: Rational-Mechanistic Model of Policy Process............................................. 17
2.3: Implementation as Action and Response...................................................... 22
2.4: Implementation as Continuation of Decision Making..................................... 22
2.5: Skeletal Flow Diagram of the Variables Involved in the Implementation Process... 50
2.6: The Policy Delivery System........................................................................... 53
2.7: A Model of Policy Implementation................................................................... 54
2.8: Causal Linkages Between Policy Directives and Performance.......................... 60
2.9: Causal Linkages Between Policy Resources and Performance........................... 61
2.10: Causal Linkages Between Characteristics of the Implementing Agencies and Performance.............................................................................................................. 63
2.11: An Elaboration of the Van Horn and Van Meter Model of Policy Implementation for Housing in Abuja............................................................ 68
3.1: Physical Design of Abuja.............................................................................. 81
3.2: Centralized Community Services in Abuja..................................................... 82
3.3: Federal Capital Development Authority Organizational Arrangement (1976-79)...... 85
3.5: Federal Capital Development Authority Organizational Arrangement (1984-85)....... 89
3.6: Location and Physical Access of Abuja.......................................................... 92
3.7: Alternative Sites Considered for Abuja within the FCT...................................... 93
3.8: Road Access to FCT vs Road Access to Lagos (1978)........................................ 96
3.9: A Typical Village in the FCT......................................................................... 97
3.10: Density and Settlement Pattern in the FCT (1978)........................................... 98
3.11: Pre- and Post-FCT Settlement Pattern (1977/85)............................................ 99
3.12: The Case Study Process for the Study............................................................ 105
4.1: Typical FCDA Low-Cost Housing in the FCT................................................ 126
4.2: FCDA Residential Development in Karu New Town........................................ 127
4.3: FCDA Blocks of Flat within the FCC.............................................................. 128
4.4: FCDA Semi-Detached Houses within the FCC............................................... 129
4.5: FCDA Detached Houses within the FCC......................................................... 130
4.6: Ministerial Quarters within the FCC............................................................... 131
4.7: Private Residential Building within the FCC.................................................... 132
4.8: Five-Star, Four-Star and Three-Star Hotels within the FCC............................ 133
4.9: Sites of Considerable Squatments in the Municipality of Abuja (1989)................ 155
4.10: A Typical Scene in Garki Village in Abuja...................................................... 156
4.11: Spontaneous Business Establishments within the FCC.................................... 157
4.12: The Excision of Suleja from the FCT.............................................................. 159
4.13: A Typology of Squatments in Terms of Development Levels and Security of Tenure 161
4.14: Development Sites of FCDA Housing Estates in the FCT............................... 164
4.15: Life in Neighborhood Centers in the Garki District of Abuja........................... 170
4.16: Temporary and Permanent Site of the Wuse Market in the Wuse District of the FCC 171
4.17: Local Government and Resettlement Areas in the FCT---------------------------- 178
4.18: Typical Resettlement Housing in Usuma Town in the FCT............................... 179
1: Housing Delivery System Model..................................................................... 279
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This study is the culmination of efforts from five distinct groups of people. The first group is the Ph.D. supervisory committee with the leading role played by Professor Brahm Wiesman. His devoted attention far beyond the call of duty is responsible for the dissertation being completed in a less stressful and time efficient manner. Other committee members to provide guidance are Professors Setty Pendakur and Alan Artibise. They are joined by former members of the committee including: Professors Robert Jackson, David Hulchanski, Peter Oberlander, Terry McGee and Mr. Maclin Hancock. Each man’s contribution is duly noted and valued.

The second group is the resource support agencies. Study in Canada was supported by a graduate scholarship from the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC). A substantial grant from the Canadian International Development Research Center (IDRC) paid for the one academic year spent in Nigeria and Tanzania. Other minor but helpful assistantships were received from: Donner Canadian Foundation Scholarship, Government of Canada Challenge 87, B.C. Government Post-Secondary Scholarship and U.B.C. Planning School teaching and research assistantships. The latter also provided office space and other numerous support services for the duration of the study.

The next group of people who deserve a mention is the Nigerian officials, particularly officials from: the Federal Capital Development Authority; the Ahmadu Bello University Department of Local Govt Studies; the University of Benin; the Federal Housing Authority; Ministry of National Planning; and the Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research.

A notable appreciation also goes the group of friends and colleagues who helped to keep the struggle sane. Contributions from past/present colleagues such as Dr. Dominique Levieil, Nancy Knight, Alain Cunningham, Mike Beazely and Mark Roseland were immense. The same applies to friends such as Caroline Oluoch-Olunya, Dr. Linus Igwemezie, Dyman Clarke, Dr. Okey Nwogu, Frances Lynn, Dr. Ibrahim Al-Hammad and Khalid Alskait.
The final group deserving recognition is my older brothers and sisters: Benson (Ph.D.), Grace (N.D.), Florence (M.B.A.), Caleb (P. Eng.), Emmanuel (B.Sc.) and Reuben (P. Eng.). Together with their spouses -- Micah Obiegbu (P. Eng., M.B.A.), Herbert Nweke (M.Sc.) and Chinwe Morah (M.A., C.A.) -- their professional backgrounds are a constant source of pride and inspiration.
To my eldest brother, Dr. Benson C. Morah. "Ezenwanne" -- brotherly King -- this goes to demonstrate that your exemplary lifestyle and commitment to academic excellence have not been without a consequence.
**ABBREVIATIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>AJ</td>
<td>Architects' Journal</td>
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<tr>
<td>FCC</td>
<td>Federal Capital City (i.e., Abuja)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCDA</td>
<td>Federal Capital Development Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCT</td>
<td>Federal Capital Territory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCTA</td>
<td>Federal Capital Territory Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FHA</td>
<td>Federal Housing Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMHE</td>
<td>Federal Ministry of Housing and Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMWH</td>
<td>Federal Ministry of Works and Housing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPA</td>
<td>International Planning Associates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFCT</td>
<td>Ministry of Federal Capital Territory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NISER</td>
<td>Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NITP</td>
<td>Nigerian Institute of Town Planners</td>
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<tr>
<td>TAP</td>
<td>Technical Assessment Panel for the Abuja master plan</td>
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

THIS IS A CASE STUDY OF AN IMPORTANT PLANNING EPISODE WITHIN THE DEVELOPING WORLD INVOLVING NIGERIA'S ATTEMPT TO BUILD A EUROPEAN CITY IN AFRICA, AN IDEAL WORLD-CLASS CITY FREE OF PITY AND FULL OF PRIDE FOR ALL NIGERIANS AND BLACK PEOPLES OF THE WORLD WHEREVER THEY MAY BE.

1.1 PROBLEM

This dissertation evaluates the implementation process for Nigeria's new capital at Abuja, focusing on housing provision. In particular, it evaluates the inability of the Nigerian government to provide affordable housing for all income groups in the new city, especially the low-income population.\(^1\) Despite statements by the government to confront the challenge of affordability in devising a housing program for the new capital, almost all the housing provided is out of reach for a majority of wage earners in the civil service, not to mention irregular wage earners in the informal sector.\(^2\) In seeking explanations for this shortfall between policy and outcome, the important research problems are:

(1) what are the housing goals and expectations for the new capital as formally stated and as perceived by current policy officials in the country?

(2) what has become of these goals and expectations in terms of the existing housing situation in the new capital?

(3) what are the difficulties encountered during the attempt to bring about the desired housing conditions?

(4) what possible solutions are envisioned by current policy officials for the settlement problems of the city?

\(^1\) An unratified 1985 White Paper on a New National Housing Policy for the Federal Republic of Nigeria defines the low-income group as "all wage earners and self-employed people whose annual income is below three thousand Naira (N3,000)." According to the document, about seventy per cent (70%) of Nigerians fall into this class.

\(^2\) See sections 4.1.2. and 4.2.1 on housing goals for the city and the problem of non-affordability.
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.2 PURPOSE

The purpose of this evaluation is three fold. The first is to obtain data on the actual process of policy implementation within a developing country’s setting, so as to shed more light on factors contributing to policy performance and the imperfect correspondence between policy goals and outcomes. The second is to raise basic policy issues pertaining to housing provision in the new capital, and to advance options for solving the settlement problems of the city. Finally, since the planning process for the new capital did not allow for much to be known about Nigerian officials’ feelings toward the project, it is hoped that the findings will help to fill this gap in knowledge. Hence, producing new knowledge about Abuja is one of the major contributions of the dissertation.

1.3 HYPOTHESIS

The main hypothesis to be tested is that of Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) who maintain that the outcome of policy implementation is ultimately determined by the disposition of implementing officials, as all of the imperatives of the process “must be filtered through the perceptions of the implementors.” The main thrust of the hypothesis is that, depending on the officials’ understanding of the policy, their acceptance of it and the intensity of this acceptance, successful implementation may be frustrated. What this suggests about the implementation of housing policy in Abuja is that the dispositions of the implementing officials were antithetical to the goal of providing low-cost housing. Said

3. Work on the master plan for the new capital was accomplished primarily in the U.S. by a team of American planners. (See section 5.2.1 on the planning process for the city.)
4. The Oxford dictionary of current English defines "disposition" as temperament or a person’s distinct nature or character. Webster’s defines it as the tendency of something to act in a certain manner under given circumstances. This dissertation accepts both of these definitions, but includes in the meaning all that is suggested by such terms as attitude, feeling, perception, inclination, natural tendency, etc.. Hence, within the context of the dissertation, the term is used loosely to denote the general feeling or attitude with which officials approach their work and, presumably, inform their behavior. It might be best to view the term as forming the "conceptual lenses" through which officials view their options and responsibilities.
differently, the attitudes of officials responsible for executing the housing program of the new capital contributed to the inability to provide inexpensive housing.

While recognizing that the gap in the provision of housing in Abuja can be related to a host of variables, including financial constraints in the face of apparently unlimited demand, it will be argued that the disjunction is due primarily to the disposition of the policy officials, which has been to build an "ideal western-type city." It will be maintained that *prima facie* this perception of the new capital, as a showcase, contradicts the goal of low-cost housing provision which would ostensibly be envisaged to resemble "squatments." Premised on this apparent contradiction, the dissertation will then argue that policy officials in Abuja perceive medium- and high-cost housing to be more germane to the image of the new capital, than low-cost dwellings affordable by the low-income population. Consequently, tastes and preferences in housing were in favor of the sophisticated western type of house design, material and layout. Furthermore, it will be argued that the housing policy of the new capital is exclusionary and discriminates against non-civil servants. Because Abuja is perceived by responsible policy officials as an exclusive administrative city, the housing strategy adopted for the new capital has had mainly the needs of the civil servants in mind; that is, it fails to explicitly articulate the housing needs of non-civil servants in the city.

An earlier study of Abuja blamed the housing quagmire of the city on "the problems and pitfalls of attempting to apply planning principles and building types derived from western culture and climate within an emerging Third World nation" (AJ 1985, p. 69). This dissertation takes this argument a step further to suggest that, aside from the reality of such crude applications, the Nigerian government, driven by the disposition to build a city comparable to those of the west, not only eagerly accepted building procedures designed for a totally different demand and circumstances, but appears to have modified the procedures to further reflect its disposition for a "showcase western-type" mega project. As a result, housing policy in the new capital was not based on the nature of the local demand and available resources, which meant that housing standard far surpassed both need and affordability.
To test, or look for evidence in support of, this hypothesis, the dissertation first determines the dispositions of officials toward Abuja in terms of what "attitudes" and "perceptions" the policy to build a new capital evokes in Nigerian society, especially amongst those who formulate and implement policy. It then relates the dispositions to housing outcomes in the city, through effects on the planning/implementation process. In all, the relationship between officials' dispositions toward the new capital and the cost of housing in the city will be accepted as a good measure of the extent to which the officials act on their dispositions.

Thus, to summarize, the objective of the dissertation is to show how officials' dispositions in Nigeria for building a city that resembles a western city affected subsequent decision making and, as a result, made it difficult to effectively implement affordable housing in the new capital as was originally planned. To the extent that the key to improved affordability is not sophistication, and that the goal of providing low-cost housing in the new capital would inevitably require non-western standards and styles of delivery, the suggestion is that 

\textit{attitudinal changes to encourage a more "Nigerian" city is a precondition for a successful housing strategy in the city.}^5

The argument is that 

\textit{the disposition of policy officials greatly influences implementation regardless of planning intentions}^6 and, subsequently, that a "disposition-free" model of policy implementation is unlikely to bear fruit in terms of rendering reliable predictions of outcomes. This potential contribution to knowledge is elaborated in the balance of the dissertation.

---

5. A more "Nigerian" city is one in which the majority of housing and related services are affordable by the average citizen. Abuja today is not a "Nigerian" city in the sense that non-civil servants have limited access to the city and the average citizen can neither afford the cheapest houses being constructed nor the cheapest temporary hotel accommodation. In fact, based on nominal income, no member of the federal civil service can afford to pay market rents for the quarters they presently occupy, and less than 15 per cent can afford the least expensive houses provided if they were unsubsidized.

6. An extension of this hypothesis by Mazmanian and Sabatier (1980) is that the public's assessment of policy performance is also related strongly to initial dispositions toward the policy.
1.4 OBJECTIVES

The objectives of the dissertation are divided into five segments. In the first segment, the theoretical objectives are explored:

(1) to explore what is meant by public policy and the implementation process;
(2) to review how past studies have attempted to explain the implementation problem;
(3) to present the Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) model for organizing thoughts concerning the implementation problem; and
(4) to examine empirically the importance of the principal variable of this model, the disposition of officials, for determining policy outcomes.

The second segment embodies the historical objectives:

(5) to introduce the case for analysis by reviewing the historical context of the new capital, its rationale, basic concepts and physical form, administrative arrangements and material setting; and
(6) to describe the methodology employed by the study including some field issues.

The third segment comprises the descriptive objectives concerning the housing program of the new capital:

(7) to determine the officials' goals and expectations for the new capital as they relate to housing provision; and
(8) to critically review the current settlement reality of the new capital in terms of housing achievements and problems.

The fourth segment encompasses the analytical objectives to explain the implementation process:

(9) to examine the planning process by which the housing goals and expectations for the new capital evolved;
(10) to scrutinize the validity of the plan put forth for achieving the desired goals and expectations;
(11) to document strategic choices made on how the housing goals and expectations were to be pursued;
(12) to analyze the consequences of these choices for subsequent implementation and politics;
to critically examine the present and past dispositions of policy officials toward various aspects of the new capital, particularly the housing provision aspects;

to analyze the impact of these dispositions on subsequent decisions regarding housing provision, including design, materials, standard of construction and delivery techniques; and

to examine the indigenous political context for administrative action, as well as wider issues that may have affected housing provision.

Finally, the last segment consists of the prescriptive objectives:

to examine what actual measures are presently being taken to respond to the housing problems of the new capital; and

to advance current professional opinions on how the settlement problems of the new capital might be solved.

1.5 META-HYPOTHESES AND ASSUMPTIONS

In addition to the examination of the main hypothesis involving the disposition of officials, the dissertation accepts two meta-hypotheses concerning: (1) the general workings of the public policy process; and (2) the generalizability of implementation frameworks across various settings. Beginning with the dynamics of the policy process, the dissertation rejects the assumptions behind the "mechanistic-rational" model and assumes instead that:

(1) policy making and policy implementation are not bounded, separate and sequential;

(2) there exists no distinct boundaries between policy makers and policy implementors because:

* there is no clear division of labor between policy makers, who are believed to set the goals, and policy implementors, who are believed to carry out these goals;

* policy makers are not capable of stating policies unambiguously, because they lack both the consensus and technical/specific knowledge to do so;

* policy implementors possess the technical capability but not necessarily the obedience and the commitment to carry out policies as handed down by the policy makers;
there is not clear boundary between the tasks of policy makers and implementors, and the process of implementation does not necessarily unfold in a chronological, sequential fashion in which policy making necessarily ends and then implementation begins; and

the decisions that are involved in implementation are both technical and political in nature, in that it is the aim but not the reality that policy implementors carry out policies in a "neutral," "objective," "rational" and "scientific" fashion (Adapted from Nakamura and Smallwood 1980, p. 10).

The main hypothesis involving officials' dispositions accepts two major assumptions. One is that the larger framework proposed by Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) provides a promising and testable way of organizing thoughts concerning the implementation problem. The other is that, in testing the hypothesis, further work relating disposition to behavior is not required beyond Van Meter and Van Horn's treatment of the matter. In other words, the discourse on the relationship between disposition and behavior is assumed to be on the order of a truism.

Lastly, in applying the Van Meter and Van Horn model in the circumstances of the developing world, the dissertation assumes that: "a context-free theory of implementation is unlikely to produce powerful explanations or accurate predictions" (Berman 1980). Consequently, it gives adequate attention to examining the political context of administrative action in Nigeria. More than any other macro factors, sub-optimal policy outcomes need to be examined against unique institutional characteristics of the country in which the policy is pursued.

1.6 SCOPE

The scope of this dissertation is restricted in three ways. First, the focus is exclusively on the implementation process for housing in the new capital: And even though housing consists of a combination of services including utilities, roads, social services, etc., it is not within the scope of this dissertation to consider at length the implementation processes for these services.
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Second, the dissertation focuses mainly on questions that seek to explain housing policy in practise, notably the disjunction between the housing goals for the new capital and the final outcome. This means that implementation gaps in other aspects of the new capital are beyond the scope of the dissertation, as are normative issues involving whether or not the new capital per se was a worthwhile idea.

Finally, in reviewing the literature, the dissertation focuses largely on works directly related to the field of policy implementation. Ever since emerging as a bona fide field of study in the 1970s, policy implementation has attracted mainly calls for a diversity of approaches. Williams (1976, p. 288) once posited that research on policy implementation "will be more valuable when approached by people with different disciplinary perspectives and frameworks that provide diverse interpretations. So let variety flower." While recognizing that this suggestion might be a good thing, particularly during these formative years of implementation theory, Nakamura and Smallwood (1980, p. 1) are correct in noting that the number of studies in the field "has reached a point at which it is useful to pull together the various findings in an effort to broaden our understanding of the policy implementation process." Judging from the literature, there already appears to be some unnecessary reproductions in the field, as well as evidence of some researchers talking past one another.

1.7 RATIONALE

1.7.1 Why Study Implementation in a Developing World Context?

That policies will not automatically be executed as designed has become axiomatic in developed countries and more so in the developing ones where most implementing bodies are either weak or still forming. Evaluations conducted by Green as far back as 1965 demonstrate that program implementation and administration are the critical problems in developing countries’ development plans. The following observation was made later:
Students of policy implementation and development administration in the Third World are centrally concerned with analyzing and explaining failure. Public policies do not get implemented at all, and those that do manage to get through the tortuous process of implementation often look very different from what their framers originally intended. The clear implication of existing studies is that policy implementation in the Third World bears little resemblance to the classical understanding of implementation as a process of rationally linking broad goals to specific programmatic decisions (Quick 1980, p. 40).

Several reasons reflecting the regime or politico-institutional characteristics of these countries are often given to account for this atrocious record of implementation. As previously noted, it is argued that administrative bodies in developing countries are still forming and yet to acquire the years of experience of their counterparts in the developed world.

Secondly, it is argued that interest aggregating structures (i.e., political parties and interest groups) for presenting collective demands to the political leadership, are either ineffective or non-existent. When such mechanisms are not abrogated by the various military dictatorships, the argument is that such structures have tended to be captive organizations primarily used by the elites to elicit mass followings.

Thirdly, it is argued that the politicians and administrators in these enclaves view public participation in policy formulation as being illegitimate or inefficient. As a result, they deliberately attempt to institute "technocratic" or "apolitical" approaches to policy-making, thus making the process that much more remote and inaccessible to most individuals.

Fourthly, it is argued that ethnic ties and factions, nepotism and the extended family network system, personal coalitions and patron-client linkages, which are often the basis of political activity in these countries, are well suited to individualized interventions at the execution stage. Consequently, flexibility in implementation is viewed as part of a deliberate polity-wide accommodation and conflict resolution technique for managing these realities, particularly the reality of ethnic rivalries. What often emerges from this argument is the suggestion that, for the general public in these countries, interventions at the implementing stage are natural and, perhaps, more strategic than involvement at the design stage.
Fifthly, it is argued that the implementation process in developing countries is bound to involve more intense competition than elsewhere, simply because their needs are far more pronounced and resources scarcer. For most developing countries suffering from the dead weight of population, almost no amount of resources will be enough to satisfy the demands.

Finally, rampant bureaucratic and political corruption are held to be a major source of weakness in implementation efforts. It is argued that, through bribery, well-to-do die-hard opponents of a specific policy who lose in the policy formulation stage, find the execution stage an especially easy way for them to neutralize undesirable policies.

So, whether the public is unwillingly excluded from the policy making stage or it chooses to exclude itself for strategic advantages during implementation, it is apparent that a large proportion of individual and collective demands in developing countries reach the political system at the implementation stage, rather than before policy is adopted. Echoing this theme of Scott (1969) and Smith (1973), Grindle (1980, p. 15) gives the following summary:

To a much greater extent than in the political systems of the United States and Western Europe, the process of implementing public policies is a focus of political participation and competition in the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.... Thus, while in the United States and Western Europe much political activity is focused on the input stage of the policy process, in the Third World a large portion of individual and collective demand making, the representation of interests, and the emergence and resolution of conflict occurs at the output stage.

The study of implementation in the developing world is, therefore, justified to the extent that the process is more politicized than elsewhere; and that, as a result, the pressures brought to bear on implementation tend to alter both the content and intended impact of policy. Furthermore, the nature of policies pursued by these countries cannot but make implementation harder for them. Unlike policies in the west, which tend to reflect only incremental changes, policies in developing countries tend to be ambitious and sweeping (e.g., building a new capital); a phenomenon which follows from the logic that they are late-comers in the march to modernity. Of course, related to this logic is the difficulty created by
adapting western theories and technologies which tend not to be suitable for implementation in the developing countries, where: (1) labor is almost super abundant; (2) capital is acutely scarce or erratic at best; and (3) the supply of skilled labor and management is always short or limited.

1.7.2 Why the Selection of Abuja for a Case Analysis?

The following answer might be given from a general perspective:

The founding of a new capital is always a notable event in world affairs, arresting in its audacity as an undertaking, revealing in attitudes about what government should be and, in fact, how life itself should be conducted implicit, if not stated, in the minds of the founders. The sheer vastness of such projects, at least in the 20th century, is awesome and overwhelming. One admires the strength, optimisms, and perhaps even the foolhardiness of those who undertake them. Abuja is such a project. It has not received the attention it deserves (Todd 1984, p. 115).

However, from the perspective of this study the reason is quite different. In addition to being ambitious and politically significant, the Abuja project has required a heavy expenditure of capital, materials and human resources to a degree that many Nigerians believe the project is responsible for crippling of the national economy and the collapse of the second republic (Onibokun 1984; Osagie 1984; Onimode 1984). As such, many questions have been raised about the project, especially in terms of what impacts and effects have thus far resulted from it. For example, is the goal of making the city a reality being achieved? How judiciously is the project being executed? In light of the fact that the new capital entailed an awesome sacrifice on the part of all Nigerians, is the city being developed with a view to making it accessible to all Nigerians alike? It is against these sort of queries that Abuja was found to be worthy of close ex-post scrutiny.

7. Total capital allocation to Abuja up to the climax of the construction period in 1983 was N1.35 billion (approximately $2.1 billion U.S.). This was the official quote "but given the scale of contract inflation and squandermania in Abuja, it would seem that these figures understate the full fiscal allocations, which have been variously alleged to vary between N2.5 to N5.0 billion [approximately $3.9 to $7.8 billion U.S.]" (Onimode 1984, p. 10).
On a different note, Abuja possibly represents the closest any developing world government has ever come to meeting those conditions thought to be necessary for it to successfully undertake urban development projects that rival those in the west in terms of magnitude and complexity. An argument seems fashionable that, if only the developing countries had both the resources and opportunity to plan and implement anew, without having to contend with existing urban problems, they would not experience the aggravated urban difficulties associated, for instance, with spontaneous settlements, congestion, pollution, urban decay, etc.. Abuja provides a rare opportunity to appraise this line of reasoning as, aided by "petro-dollars" and an imaginative plan prepared by a consortium of U.S. planners, the project began on virgin land presumably using state-of-the-art planning and implementation techniques.

It is not surprising that the construction of the new capital represents an opportunity to develop and test alternative planning styles, technologies and institutional arrangements for delivery. The project represents a critical arena for innovation with respect to planning and implementation (e.g., the use of foreign expertise under Nigerian control to produce a western-type city). It is also the case that the problem situation of the new capital is sufficiently complex and dynamic to include most, if not all, of the web of variables posited to be relevant in comprehending the implementation process.

1.7.3 Why Focus on Housing in Abuja?

It would be nearly impossible for any one study to cover the myriad of activities comprising the new capital. The housing program was chosen for evaluation because it is critical to the success of the new capital. Abuja is intended as an administrative city with a minimal economic base (Master plan 1979, p. 55). Housing in the new capital is a basic urban requirement, the largest land consumer, the major element in the overall cost of the new capital and, arguably, the most visible symbol of achievement. All of these suggest that the
success of the new capital, both in the eyes of its residents and outsiders, will tend to be judged on the basis of the quality of the residential environment.

1.8 ORGANIZATION

There are six chapters to the dissertation. Chapter 2 develops a theoretical framework for the dissertation, including a model of policy implementation that holds the disposition of policy officials to be the determinant of the process. Chapter 3 introduces the case for analysis as well as the study method. Chapter 4 explores the housing challenge in the new capital in terms of the goals, achievements and problems. Chapter 5 draws from both theory and field data to attempt to explain the gap in housing policy implementation. Chapter 6 addresses the relevance of the findings of the study for both the proposed model for implementation in Chapter 2 and the settlement problems of the new capital.
CHAPTER 2: STUDYING IMPLEMENTATION:
A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS

THIS CHAPTER PRESENTS AN ALTERNATE MEANS OF ORGANIZING THOUGHTS CONCERNING THE IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEM. IT BEGINS WITH AN EXPLORATION OF WHAT IS MEANT BY PUBLIC POLICY AND IMPLEMENTATION, AND THEN EXAMINES HOW PAST STUDIES HAVE TRIED TO EXPLAIN THE IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEM. EMERGING FROM THIS REVIEW IS A MODEL OF POLICY IMPLEMENTATION THAT HINGES ON THE DISPOSITION OF POLICY OFFICIALS AS A DETERMINANT OF THE PROCESS.

2.1 DEFINING PUBLIC POLICY

While there can be no denying that private actions by individuals and corporations affect many people collectively (Nadel 1975), the consensus among most scholars is that the "public" in public policy refers to actions taken by those who occupy official positions in government (Adie and Thomas 1982, p. 89). The core controversy over the meaning of public policy surrounds -- what is meant by "policy?" Does it mean: (1) a sector of activity; (2) a general statement of purpose or desired state of affairs; (3) a specific program for solving a problem; (4) a decision of government; (5) an output; (6) an outcome; (7) a theory, model or paradigm; or (8) a process (Hogwood and Gunn 1984, p. 3-64)?

When it is not the intention of government to ignore problems, policies are usually stated in sectoral terms (e.g., economic policy or energy policy), and generally involve a statement of goals for these sectors (e.g., full employment or self sufficiency). Realizing the desired conditions then depends on the development of action programs and projects which almost always imply a theory or causation. The implication is that, if certain action programs are implemented, the desired state of affairs will result. However, given that desired conditions are rarely what they seem, nor materialize as expected, policy also implies a description of what is actually delivered (output), as well as the objective reality (impact) of this output regardless of initial intentions. Finally, the fact that these activities occur in a
particular sequence or stages of a process implies yet another meaning, as does the fact that the process frequently culminates in a decision.

While accepting that policy probably implies each of these meanings and more, the following clear statements can nevertheless be made. First, policy is not a sector of activity even though it is often stated as such. Second, it is not a program as more than one program can be, and frequently is, developed to achieve the same desired condition. Third, it is not a decision as it often involves several decisions over time. And, lastly, it is not a theory but its tactical component programs necessarily imply causation. Policy is a general statement of intentions but, because intentions have unforeseeable consequences and the intention may be to change or perpetuate existing conditions, it also involves actions and inactions as well as the intended and unintended impacts.

Hence, by coalescing the meaning of "public" with that of "policy," a definition of the term that emerges is: what the government chooses to do or not do (output), why (intention) and how (process) it does what it does, and the difference what it does makes (impact). (See figure 2.1.) The boxed zone represents the traditional sphere of policy.

1. Note, however, that policy is a function of programs and is dependent upon their outcomes. For instance, the evaluation of policy almost necessarily involves investigation and analysis of concrete action programs designed to achieve policy aims. Sometimes, this allows for the two terms to be used interchangeably.
2. This includes both how the intentions are selected, converted into outputs and then delivered.
2.2 DEFINING THE IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS

The Oxford dictionary of current English defines implementation as the act of putting contract, decision, promise, etc. into effect. This is the definition adopted by Pressman and Wildavsky (1973, p. xiv) in their widely acclaimed path-breaking study of the U.S. Economic Development Agency's efforts to implement a job creation program in Oakland, California. The authors contend that "implementation may be viewed as a process of interaction between the setting of goals and actions geared to achieving them." In order to isolate this particular process of interaction, they distinguish between other policy processes relating to: (1) the creation of the initial conditions (i.e., legislation and funds) for implementation and (2) the creation of programs or the conversion of policy intentions into tactical components. These two processes, they argue, are outside the bounds of implementation and only form an input to it. The following logic is presented:

Implementation does not refer to the creating of the initial conditions. Legislation has to be passed and funds committed before implementation takes place to secure the predicted outcome.... To emphasize the actual existence of initial conditions we must distinguish a program from a policy.... A program exists when the initial conditions -- the 'if' stage of the policy hypothesis -- have been met. The word program signifies the conversion of a process hypothesis into governmental action. The initial premises of the hypothesis have been authorized. The degree to which the predicted consequences [the 'then' stage] take place we will call implementation.

This is the policy-centered, mechanistic-rational, top-down or policy makers' perspective on defining implementation. According to Barrett and Fudge (1981, p. 10-12), it assumes that policy (viewed as what policy makers are trying to achieve) is the starting point for implementation, followed by a series of logical steps leading from there to action. Policy is assumed to be made elsewhere and turned over, so to speak, to the implementing machinery which then puts it in place. This view implies that policy makers have a significant, if not complete, control over the actions of the officials responsible for implementation. That is, implementing officials are assumed to be perfectly subordinate to policy makers with no

3. Berman (1978, p. 177) similarly identifies a stage distinguishable from and prior to implementation which he refers to as "mobilization."
interests, priorities, visions or solutions of their own. If not, then the belief is that they do not have the discretionary powers to bring these personal dispositions to bear. Within the overall context of the policy process, this conception of implementation can be illustrated as shown in figure 2.2.

**Figure 2.2: Rational-Mechanistic Model of Policy Process**

![Diagram](image)

Source: Author.

Nakamura and Smallwood (1980, p. 9) describe the comprehensive steps involved in this approach to policy:

1. Faced with a given problem
2. Rational people first clarify their goals, values, or objectives, and then rank or otherwise organize them in their mind;
(3) they then list all important possible ways or policies for achieving their goals

(4) and investigate all the important consequences that would follow from each of the alternative policies,

(5) at which point they are in a position to compare consequences of each policy with goals

(6) and so choose the policy with consequences most closely matching their goals.

(7) An agent to carry out the policy is chosen by the policy maker according to technical criteria (i.e., the perceived ability of the agent to employ the appropriate means to accomplish the policy goals).

(8) The policy is communicated to the agent as a series of specific instructions.

(9) The agent implements (carries out) the specific instructions according to policy guidelines specified in the communication from the policy maker.

There are two pertinent questions about this model. The first is whether or not policy ends where Pressman and Wildavsky say it ends and, if not, where does policy end and implementation begin? Following from this, the second question is whether implementation mainly concerns matters of assembling, coordinating and managing resources for purposive ends? Without answers to these questions, a definition of implementation may not be possible.

Starting with the first question, some scholars support the concept that policy necessarily ends and implementation begins when broad policy intentions are translated into concrete plans and funds are committed. This support stems from either the usefulness of the definition as a heuristic, or from the logic presented by Pressman and Wildavsky (1973, p. xiv) that: “the world is full of policy proposals that are aborted. You can’t finish what you haven’t started. Lack of implementation should not refer to failure to get going but to inability to follow through.” Supporters of this argument include Grindle (1980, p. 7-8) who maintains that the general process of implementation can begin “only when general goals and objectives have been specified, when action programs have been designed, and when funds have been allocated for the pursuit of the goals.” Theoretically, continues Grindle, it is “at this point the policy formulation process is superseded by the policy implementation process, and
programs are activated." Other subscribers are Van Meter and Van Horn (1975, p. 448) who clearly warn that "the implementation phase does not commence until goals and objectives have been established (or identified) by prior policy decisions; it takes place only after legislation has been passed and funds committed."

On the side of those who do not support this definition is Bardach (1977, p. 36), who likens implementation to "an assembly process," "a large machine" that is to turn out desired ends. In defining implementation as the process of putting the machine together (i.e., assembling numerous and diverse program elements) and making it run, Bardach explicitly includes efforts to convert intentions into concrete terms in the implementation process. This view is shared by Williams (1976, p. 268) who writes that "implementation, the stage between a decision and operations, starts with the development of program guidelines or design specifications," and then moves to the continuance of efforts over time to raise the capability of the organization to achieve program objectives. Stating it differently, Edward (1980, p. 1) writes that:

Policy implementation is the stage of policy making between the establishment of policy -- such as the passage of a legislative act, the issuing of an executive order, the handing down of a judicial decision, or the promulgation of a regulatory rule -- and the consequences of the policy for the people whom it affects.

Thus, as seen by this group of scholars, implementation is the "missing link" (Hargrove 1975), involving nearly everything that follows between policy formation and final outcome. The group’s point of departure is their belief that it is broad policy intentions, not the technical means for achieving these intentions, that form the input to the implementation process. For them, the more interesting question is not "where does policy end and implementation begin" but, rather, whether or not such a distinction is possible in the first place.4

4. This thrust of the debate must be separated from the thrust which seeks to establish when implementation has occurred for evaluation purposes. Considering that there have been documented cases of programs that were considered ineffective by reputable evaluators when the programs were never implemented (Patton 1978), the problem presented by "implementation lag," or the time taken between policy adoption and actual program execution, is a major challenge for researchers of
Evidently, the fact that policy goals (which are by nature broad, vague, diffuse, ambiguous and contradictory) form the input to implementation, makes it not only possible but necessary for implementors to try and remake policy, so that broad intentions can be translated into technical and operational terms (Berman 1980). There is little need just yet to explore the reasons why politicians formulate unclear policy goals, or to argue that implementors are not passive agents on the receiving end of policy. Suffice to say that the phenomenon of "unclear policy directives" is an unavoidable phenomenon in the contemporary public policy scene, and that this fact serves as a catalyst for bureaucratic discretion at the lower levels of the hierarchy, including the attendant continuation of policy making beyond the legislative process.

It is not startling then that Hill (1981, p. 222), in his article, "The Policy-Implementation Distinction," should conclude that "it is unrealistic to expect the two phenomena to be clearly distinguishable." The clear indication, in practice, is that no one can say in uncertain terms where policy ends and implementation begins. What can be said is that: (1) policy is not made exclusively by legislators; and (2) junior-level officials, in carrying out directives handed down to them by senior-level officials, do not carry out the directives exactly as specified. Administrators make policy at all levels of the administrative hierarchy including street-level bureaucrats, not just people at the top (Palumbo and Harder 1981, p. ix-x).

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public programs. Suffice to say that, in a world of incremental changes in which programs tend to be put into operation gradually, any theory of policy that aims to tell us when implementation has occurred must go beyond the point when the policy becomes formally adopted, so as to allow for the bureaucratic process to reach a point where target populations have a chance to be affected by the program (Musheno 1981, p. 79). This not only entails allowing adequate time for the policy to be diffused to street-level bureaucrats and the public at large, but also for the "causal threshold" to be overcome. A causal threshold can operate to make the manifestation of an effect dependent on reaching at least a certain level of implementation, and it is usually when there is "widespread availability" of program elements to the target population that this effect can be considered overcome.

5. Again, this does not mean that attempts at separation between the two is wholly useless, because viewing implementation as a series of logical steps from intention to action also provides a useful heuristic device through which to identify issues and questions about "what is going on."
Following from the above as well as evidence from this study, implementation is defined as an ongoing process of decision making by a variety of actors beyond the initial passage of legislation. Because this definition encompasses the translation of policy goals into procedures, the necessary process involves far more than assembling, coordinating and managing resources for purposive ends. As noted by Grindle (1980, p. 3), "it involves fundamental questions about conflict, decision making, and 'who gets what' in a society." It might be argued that arriving at a broad decision is the formal phase of establishing a policy but, when an action is taken to implement the broad decision, a second phase of a policy is entered.

Using Dror's terminology of "repolicymaking" to emphasize this phase of policy, Bunker (1972, p. 72) describes what happens in it:

The content is re-assessed, interpreted, and recast, sometimes with care to preserve the core of the original intent, sometimes with thoughtful revision of the original assumptions and objectives, and sometimes as an unreflective response in terms of bureaucratic conventions or situational constraints which tend to counter the framer's intent.

Barrett and Fudge (1981, p. 4) suggest that this process is best perceived as a policy/action continuum in which an interactive and negotiation process takes place over time, between those seeking to put policy into effect and those upon whom action depends. Within the particular context of the developing world, this policy/action continuum has been described as "the major arena in which individuals and groups are able to pursue conflicting interests and compete for access to scarce resources...; the principal nexus of the interaction between the government and the citizenry, between public officials and their constituents" (Grindle 1980, p. 19). Diagrammatically, the process can be represented as seen either in figure 2.3 or 2.4.

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6. Note that this continuation of decision making is of a different type. It is more or less circumscribed by the existence of an already authorized policy direction, which not only affects the magnitude and orientations of digressions to be made, but also the strategy and tactics of decision making that is adopted. As Bardach (1977, p. 43) explains, this is the case because "all, or at least many, of the important participants act within a context of expectations that something will happen that bears at least a passing resemblance to whatever was mandated by the initial policy decision." That is why "conformance" or "compliance" can still be used to judge implementation success.
CHAPTER 2: A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS

FIGURE 2.3: IMPLEMENTATION AS ACTION AND RESPONSE

\[
\text{TIME} \\
\text{POLICY} \rightarrow \text{REFORMULATION}
\]


FIGURE 2.4: IMPLEMENTATION AS CONTINUATION OF DECISION MAKING

\[
\text{POLICY ENVIRONMENT} \\
\downarrow \\
\text{POLICY FORMATION} \quad \leftrightarrow \quad \text{POLICY IMPLEMENTATION} \quad \rightarrow \quad \text{POLICY OUTCOME}
\]

Source: Author.
CHAPTER 2: A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS

The value of this perspective on implementation is that it provides a more realistic way to conceptualize the policy-implementation distinction that is neither top-down nor bottom-up but both. It also forces a more comprehensive approach to research on the subject. An underlying argument of the dissertation is that, in order to fully comprehend the implementation problem, it is necessary to examine both the up-stream (policy formulation or planning) as well as down-stream (implementation and outcome) activities of the policy process.

2.3 PERSPECTIVES ON THE IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEM

The classifications to follow are original and try to unite related arguments in the field. In all, thirteen separate but not unrelated classifications are discussed.

2.3.1 Administrative Control Problem

The issue of control in the bureaucracy is perhaps the oldest and most prevalent explanation for the implementation problem. Whether defined as "the problem of getting work done and securing compliance with organizational rules" (Wilensky 1967, p. 3), or the process by which managers "ensure that rules are obeyed and orders followed" (Etzioni 1964, p. 68), almost all leading organizational theorists agree that the core implementation problem is essentially that of control and accountability in the bureaucracy (Wilson 1967; Downs 1967; Bardach 1977; Dunsire 1978). That is, lower-level bureaucrats not carrying out the instructions of higher-level officials.

7. The dissertation deliberately avoids using the term "implementation failure" because, except for cases of non-implementation, programs rarely fail to cause an impact as much as they encounter problems in optimally achieving expectations. McLaughlin (1976, p. 169) defines non-implementation as when programs never get adopted, or they get adopted but break down due to lack of interest by the target population. "Implementation problem" is, therefore, suggested as a more becoming term for use in referring to programs with any proven track record, no matter how meritorious that record. On one level, the term refers to the myriad of generic factors that act to constrain the achievement of program goals. On another, it refers to the objective reality of the program in terms of shortfalls in both the intended and unintended impacts of the program.
According to Downs (1967, p. 134), this seemingly recalcitrant behavior originates from the "leakage of authority" inside bureaucracy. The leakage occurs because implementing officials have different goals, "and each uses his discretion in translating orders from above into commands going downward." Consequently, "the purposes the superior had in mind will not be the precise ones his subordinate's orders convey to people further down the hierarchy." That is why each communication should aim at minimizing "leeway" for the organization that is charged with implementing it. Obviously, the more that actors in the process are allowed to act independently, the less the action will reflect the original intentions. Short of this, there has to be a system of explicit controls, sanctions and incentives which may be invoked by top bureaucrats to achieve compliance with policy among subordinate officials. In this regard, "the 'limits' of control would then depend on the amount of power (resources, legitimacy, authority, etc.) to operate sanctions and incentives possessed by one agency vis-a-vis those it is seeking to control" (Barrett and Fudge 1981, p. 20). Van Meter and Van Horn (1975, p. 466) state the imperative in this way:

Successful implementation often requires institutional mechanisms and procedures whereby higher authorities (superiors) may increase the likelihood that implementors (subordinates) will act in a manner consistent with a policy's standards and objectives... orders are not self-executing: they require the presence of an action-forcing mechanism.

From this perspective, remedying the problem of implementation becomes a question of controlling discretion and maximizing routines in the bureaucracy (Elmore 1978, p. 199-208). This raises the principal objection that the interpretation identifies only one aspect of the "bureaucracy problem" (Wilson 1967, p. 3-9), which makes it "too narrow a focus" (Bardach 1977, p. 46). After all, implementation processes, notes the latter:

... are driven at least as much if not more by inter-organizational transactions as by intra-organizational transactions. The array of relevant actors in the implementation process is large and diverse, including, in addition to government bureaus, their clients, private contractors, professional associations, publicists, and so forth. All of these actors are quite capable of articulating their own special fears and anxieties.
Thus, even though administrative control is generally accepted as the issue that is most relevant to understanding the implementation problem, the above criticism denotes that such an understanding will be incomplete without taking into account those impacts and effects that result from the external environment.

2.3.2. Inadequate Resources

Problems related to resources have tended to be the mainstay of explanations for the policy implementation gap, especially in the developing world where resources are generally scarcer (Waterston 1965; Green 1965; Hirschman 1958; 1967). This derives first from the truism that a threshold of policy resources is necessary for there to be any possibility of realizing policy objectives; and then from the logic that the level of resources above this threshold, up to some saturation point, should be proportional to the probability of optimally achieving those objectives (Mazmanian and Sabatier 1981, p. 11).

Defined as the cumulative effort necessary to achieve policy aims, the concept of policy resources consists of several elements. First among these is fiscal expenditures, or the amount of funds allocated for both the policy's capital and operating costs. This is usually stated in monetary terms but it may also be in the form of capital assets, such as the amount of space, facilities and equipment devoted to the policy. Second is the personnel to operationalize the policy which, more than just the "sheer" manpower, includes the kinds of personnel and level of qualifications needed. It is common knowledge that lack of technical and managerial manpower has long been recognized as a determinant to many implementation efforts in the developing world. Third is the time available to get things done. Given that almost all policies in the public domain come with a political timetable, time is a particularly critical resource in implementation. It restricts how deeply the problem can be researched and planned for, as well as the level of success to be attained by the policy. The
degree to which a policy's performance is judged satisfactory would obviously depend on when, in the life of the policy, the evaluation is carried out.

Political support to see policy initiatives through is the fourth element. This form of support is termed political inasmuch as it differs from the type of support provided by the legal imperatives of policy (Rein and Rabinovitz 1978; Mazmanian and Sabatier 1981). As a rule, policy makers have to maintain a strong, if not united, support for a policy for it to have a reasonable chance of getting implemented. This support may take the form of what Bardach (1977) refers to as the "fixer," a legislator or person of authority who is personally interested in the policy, and who will guide it through the playing out of the various implementation games until the goals are realized. In evaluation, Patton (1978) refers to this notion of the "fixer" as the "personal factor" in policy.

Finally, there is the element of information resource respecting both the problem to be addressed and the techniques by which to address the problem (i.e., relevant information on both theory and technology). It was observed earlier that every policy implies a substantive causal understanding of a problem and a procedural theory of action on how it should be solved. Referring to the latter, Shanks (1983, p. 59) commented that, "while not discussed in the policy literature, it would seem that the mechanism used to implement the policy might be an important component of the policy resources components."

The one latent problem with the resource approach to understanding the implementation gap is that no amount of resources applied to a bad idea, even when rightly applied, can cause it to produce the right results. This is the concept of "substantive irrationality," which refers to the ethical problem in planning involving the use of the right means to achieve the wrong ends.
2.3.3 Tense Inter-Governmental Relations

That relations between levels of government impact on implementation is an interpretation favored by political scientists who have studied the federalist system of government in which powers are divided between two levels of government, each being independent of one another within its assigned jurisdiction. As the problem is conceived, conflict typically ensues whenever there is an attempt to implement in one jurisdiction (e.g., local/provincial jurisdiction) programs that are financed wholly or in part by the other jurisdiction (e.g., the federal jurisdiction). Yet, almost all contemporary public programs involve a significant degree of collaboration between authorities in these jurisdictions.

It is in respect of this difficult situation that the fate of implementation is postulated as likely to be structurally determined along lines of the federalist constitutional structure. The study by Murphy (1971) concerning the 1965 Elementary and Secondary School Education Act (ESEA) in the U.S., is among the early observations of structural limits to federally initiated programs. In this work, Murphy (1971, p. 60) writes that to blame the implementation problems of Title 1 on "timidity, incompetence, or 'selling out' is to beg the question.... The primary cause... is political. The federal system -- with its dispersion of power and control -- not only permits but encourages the evasion and dilution of federal reform, making it nearly impossible for the federal administrator to impose program priorities."

Derthick (1972), in her study of the failure of the New Town in Town program, also draws a similar conclusion by blaming the failure of the program on the "disabilities" of a central government to order changes in local priorities. Because the division of authority among governments in the federal system makes it ultra vires for the federal government to order these governments to do anything, the federal government can only get the local governments to "carry out its purposes by offering incentives in the form of aid, which they may accept or not, and by attaching conditions to the aid" (Derthick 1972, p. 84). But even

8. In using the same framework, Ingram (1977, p. 499) notes a similar relationship between the federal and state governments. She points out that "it is difficult for the federal government to
at that, observes Bardach (1977, p. 46), the problem still abounds, because the federal government neither commands an unlimited supply of incentives nor knows what sort of incentives the local institutions might respond to.

Berman (1978, p. 157) later wraps the federalist argument in new jargon — "The Study of Macro- and Micro Implementation." Premised on the conviction that "implementation problems stem mostly from the interaction of a policy within its institutional setting," Berman argues that the federal macro-implementation problem can be distinguished from the local micro-implementation problem in such a way that the former occurs in a "loosely coupled" setting, and involves a multitude of actors as well as decisions on who gets what, when, where and how. At this institutional setting, the chief concern is seen to be how to execute the policy, so as to cause local delivery agencies to behave in the desired ways. On the other hand, the micro-implementation problem is viewed as occurring in a less "loosely coupled" environment, and involving mainly attempts by local organizations to respond to federal directives through adaptation of those directives to fit local conditions and administrative practices.

After examining interactions at both of these institutional levels, Berman (1978, p. 157, 179) concludes that "the effective power to determine a policy's outcome rests with local deliverers, not with federal administrators." His reasons are that "the federal government typically has limited leverage to influence the behavior of local implementors, who have the effective power in the system," and that "micro-implementation cannot be successful unless local delivery organizations undergo an adaptive process." Incidentally, these reasons accord closely with the assumptions of the "backward-mappers" of implementation who also identify the outcome of policy as resting with local institutions. These are the assumptions that "the closer one is to the source of the problem, the greater one's ability to influence it; and [that]
the problem-solving ability of complex systems depends not on hierarchical control but on maximizing discretion at the point where the problem is most immediate" (Elmore 1982, p. 208).

In terms of the drawbacks to conceptualizing the implementation problem as a "center-periphery" conflict, it may be asked: what are we to make of the implementation gap when there is not such a dialectic, either as a result of a consensus on the policy or as a result of independent policy initiatives at the two levels?

2.3.4 Problematic Nature of Policy Itself

In their search for an alternate explanation for the implementation problem, Barrett and Fudge (1981, p. 129) note that they keep "coming back again and again to the question of policy [itself] as the key to the whole debate about implementation." This notion of the nature of policy as a single way of generalizing the multiple variables that constrain administrative action, was first suggested by Lowi (1964) when he observed that, depending on the kind of policy that is pursued, different types of pressures are brought to bear on the policy making process. Lowi's (1964, p. 688) argument was that:

(1) The types of relationship to be found among people are determined by their expectations -- by what they hope to achieve or get from relating to others. (2) In politics, expectations are determined by government outputs and policies. (3) Therefore, a political relationship is determined by the type of policy at stake, so that for every type of policy there is likely to be a distinctive type of political relationship.

Thus, recognizing the fact that certain policies, simply by virtue of their nature, are candidates for implementation problems, some scholars have undertaken to classify policies according to the following distinguishing characteristics which they believe are likely to be consequential for implementation:

(1) what the policy content is in terms of its substantive subject matter;
(2) what the policy seeks to establish in terms of its goals and expectations;
(3) the extent to which there is goal consensus on the policy;
(4) the amount of change or complexity involved in the policy;
(5) whether the policy is of distributive, redistributive or regulatory nature; and
(6) whether the policy concerns divisible or collective goods/services.

What the substance of policy is (e.g., public housing, transportation, education, agriculture, health, etc.) not only sets the stage in terms of the actors, agencies and interests to be involved in the implementation, but also influences the general dynamics of the process. Demonstrating this argument is the example by Temple and Temple (1980) in which the authors note the following intrinsic attributes of public housing that may prove consequential for implementation:

(1) the conspicuous fact that, despite housing *per se* being a basic need, its supply in the public domain is almost always short;
(2) the fact that public housing is a divisible rather than a collective good;
(3) the fact that public housing is usually priced at cost or lower compared to the market value; and
(4) the fact that public housing is extraordinarily visible, making success or failure less difficult to discern.

As Temple and Temple view it, because of this substantive nature of public housing in which a basic scarce, tangible and conspicuous benefit is conferred on a small number of individuals at a cost lower than the market value, its impact on implementation is frequently such that individuals and groups with greater political power will seek to acquire this benefit for themselves. This makes shortfalls from such a policy likely due to the intrinsic aspects of centrally-provided housing than to other causes.

In similar ways to the effects of substance, policy goals and expectations also help to set the stage for what is put at stake, who is to be indulged,\(^9\) in what arena and under what rules. This frequently determines the agenda for negotiations, as well as the attitudes, values and stances actors bring with them to the process. It might be said that the goals and

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9. For example, Mazmanian and Sabatier (1981, p. 13) note that opportunities for participation in the process by actors external to the implementing agencies are often deliberately biased towards supporters of the policy.
expectations of any policy largely establish the mood under which that policy’s directives are further analyzed, objectified, put into effect and finally evaluated. In the case of the new capital, for instance, it is not difficult to imagine that the mere expectation of building an "ideal" city is apt, by itself, to impact on the housing standards/types considered, as is the expectation of building an administrative city. The latter would appear to suggest that mainly civil servants would inhabit the new city, and that the housing strategy should be developed with this class of residents in mind.

The degree of conflict/consensus over goals and expectations is also held by many scholars to be another critical aspect of policy affecting implementation (Van Meter and Van Horn 1975; Berman 1980; Mazmanian and Sabatier 1981). This issue is specifically dealt with in section 2.3.6.

Another hypothesis posited by Lindblom (1959) suggests that the smaller the scope of behavioral change to be made, the less problematic successful implementation. As Berman (1980, p. 213) explains, this is because, in such a case, “implementation can be programmed along existing lines of authority and can consist of modifications to established standard operating procedures.” But “where policy involves major behavioral changes,” resistance is more likely as “existing routines have to be redesigned, replaced or sidestepped and new routines must be invented”. Mazmanian and Sabatier (1981) advance a similar argument by pointing out that the “tractability” of the problem being addressed will probably impact on implementation. That is, in light of the truism that some problems are more manageable than others, depending on the level of uncertainty or the amount of knowledge that exists.

In Lowi’s typology, distributive policies are held to generate low-level conflict for two reasons. First, there are no clear winners and losers. Second, the costs of benefits handed out are absorbed by the system or distributed broadly across the larger population so that the cost to any one individual or group is negligible. Redistributive policies, on the other hand, involve clear winners and losers but, because the dialectic is often between only two broad social groups (the "haves" and the "haves-not"), the conflict generated is held to be
moderate. Regulatory policies, the last element of Lowi's typology, involves not only clear winners and losers, but also the participation of numerous groups in the process which induces a high-level of conflict.

Finally, using the basic framework provided by Lowi's three elements, Grindle (1980, p. 8) further observes that "a distinction can also be made between programs providing collective benefits, which encourage categorical demand making, and those providing benefits that are divisible, which may mobilize more particularistic kinds of demands at the implementation stage." So, as could be fathomed:

Programs delivering collective goods such as the provision of light and water in urban slum neighborhoods may be readily implemented... because the compliance of groups or localities affected will tend to be forthcoming with minimal amount of conflict or dissent. [Whereas] programs with divisible benefits such as housing, in contrast, may exacerbate conflict and competition among those seeking to benefit from them and may be more difficult to execute as intended.

In assessing the difficulties inherent in viewing the implementation problem as stemming from the nature of policy itself, it is not hard to see that the classifications presented are broad and lacking in explicit criteria. This reduces the prospects of using the approach to predict and, possibly, preempt some of the problems of the policy process before they actually occur. Furthermore, it is a major analytic problem to attempt to define the nature of policies in the public domain. Such policies are usually politically charged and, thus, defy neat categorizations and definitions. Finally, it can be argued that any proposition about a particular policy ultimately relates to its nature, especially when this method of analysis is still in its infancy, and there are no widely accepted typologies (Quick 1980, p. 40).

2.3.5 Lack of Pressures from Target Groups

In the work referred to earlier on Title 1 of ESEA, Murphy (1971) advances the view of implementation as a system of pressures and counter-pressures. After finding that the
problems of implementing federally initiated reform are related to a number of causes including: (1) the fact that the reformers are not the implementors, (2) inadequate staff, (3) a law and tradition favoring local control, and (4) absence of pressure from the poor, Murphy suggests that the core problem is the absence of pressures from the poor and their allies in terms of being able to exert their demands on the system. This suggestion is not unlike the argument that gave rise to the era of advocacy planning in the U.S. around the same period of time.

Building on the pluralist ideology, in which society's numerous and diverse groups compete to shape public policy, advocacy planning, as envisioned by Davidoff (1965), argued that the reason the poor in the U.S. did not benefit from the reform programs of the Great Society is that they were largely unorganized and marginalized from the pressure system. Yet, in the system of pressure politics, public policy reflects primarily the interests of the well organized within the system. Thereafter, Davidoff envisioned transferring expert knowledge to the marginalized poor groups as a means of bringing them into the group pressure system.

Thus, believing as does Davidoff that "the successful implementation of reform depends heavily on the distribution of power," Murphy (1971, p. 39, 62) also proposed empowerment of the poor as the only real method of overcoming problems of the process. As he saw it, the balance of power is so tilted against the disadvantaged within the system that many more poor would have to become organized on an individual basis, while banding together as communities on a nationwide basis to bring pressures to bear. With specific reference to the ESEA Title 1 program, Murphy wrote that: "the expansion of local counterpressures appears necessary and worth the risk if we are serious about translating the spirit of Title 1 reform into educational practice."

While it is unquestionable that the empirical evidence support the view that "pressure politics" does describe some of the dynamics of the implementation process, Bardach (1977, p. 39) asks: What are we to make of the implementation gap when everyone is agreed on the principal objectives? Presumably, in such a case, the dialectic of pressure and counter-
pressure ceases to exist and, therefore, could no longer shape relations and outcomes. This is an interesting question but hardly a serious shortcoming for the interpretation. It is a rarity to find a policy where there are common views concerning both desired social ends as well as means toward them. A more serious drawback to the interpretation is the conceptual problem that results from the fact that "pressure" can become a catchall phrase which, by describing everything, describes nothing well.

2.3.6 Disagreement over Goals

Bunker (1972) is considered the originator of this interpretation. In what Bardach (1977) refers to as the earliest attempt he had found to conceptualize the "implementation process" as a distinctive phenomenon of the policy process, Bunker suggests that a simple massing of "assent" is all that is required for successful implementation. As he had put it:

For benefits consistent with the concept or design to be realized, those charged with carrying out the policy, and those to be affected by it, must yield some degree of assent. The requirement varies from passive but tolerant acquiescence on the part of some to scrupulous, informed and intense commitment for others who take responsibility for the guidance and execution of the plan (Bunker 1972, p. 72).

Based on this, he envisages a solution scheme in which all relevant actors in the policy process are identified and located at some point in a three dimensional space defined by vectors of: (1) issue salience, or the centrality of the issue for a particular individual; (2) power resources, or the number/potency of political resources an actor has available; and (3) agreement, or position of an actor relative to that of an advocate of the policy. It is these dimensions which, when identified and weighted, would provide a summary estimate of the probability of policy implementation.

"Disagreement over goals" as the core implementation problem is obviously an interpretation in good currency, especially when it is considered that Lindblom's (1959) definition of a "good" policy as the one on which political consensus can be found, held a great deal of sway in recent thinking. Nevertheless, the interpretation contains several flaws,
the least of which are the practicalities of the proposed solution. As Bardach sees it, the chief problem with Bunker's view is its presumption that the same type of coalition politics characteristic of the policy-adoption stage, is also found at the policy-execution stage. Arguing that this is not the case, Bardach (1977, p. 42-3) suggests that implementation politics is distinguished from policy-adoption politics by the characteristic absence of coalitions and the characteristic presence of "defensive" politics involving fragmented and isolated maneuvers and counter-maneuvers. He maintains that, in this special kind of politics, actors in the process are generally concerned with what they might lose individually, as opposed to what might be gained collectively.

While agreeing with Bardach that Bunker's interpretation entails some serious flaws, Shanks (1983, p. 48-9) disagrees that, because the politics of implementation necessarily takes a defensive form, it follows that coalitions cannot exist or be forged. In fact, Shanks argues the opposite to be more likely, since individuals rarely perceive their self-interests in the abstract and are generally driven to action only upon the realization of actual impacts. Due to this uncertainty associated with individuals' expressing lucid opinions about things without the benefit of experience, it is more probable that, when policy is being implemented, those affected by it will feel the impact, as well as see the direction of what the actions produced, and be moved by this to mobilize accordingly. Hinting at this likely scenario in his opening paragraph, Bunker (1972, p. 71) writes:

It is a worn, but important, truism that the real content of policy can be known more accurately by observing uniformities in the behavior of those charged with carrying out official dicta than by studying the formal policy documents.... Until public behavior is affected, it is not proper to talk of public policy formation.

On balance, the real difficulty in accepting the notion of "disagreement over goals" as the central concept in explaining the implementation problem is that: as people, organizations and circumstances change, so do any previously made agreements. Furthermore, if enough time is allowed to elapse, it is hard to imagine any set of agreements remaining firm. This is
the view taken by Pressman and Wildavsky (1984, p. 92) who find that not too far behind any agreements are several latent conflicts which only time can bring to the fore.

2.3.7 Unfavorable Disposition of Implementors

Another significant diagnosis of the implementation problem is the behavioral obstacle arising from the commitment or policy orientation of implementing officials. According to this diagnosis, unless a policy is introduced into a supportive environment, not just a neutral one, the responsible administrative agents are likely to derail the policy and undermine the process. This will be either because: (1) the officials are not aware that they are not in full compliance with the general intent, as well as the specific standards and objectives of the policy; or (2) their values and sense of self-interest or preferred courses of action are offended by the goals contained in the policy; or (3) the officials' negative dispositions cause them to defy program objectives by means of surreptitious diversion and evasion (i.e., through oversight and slack enforcement). As Sabatier and Mazmanian (1981, p. 13) explain:

No matter how well a statute structures the formal decision process, the attainment of statutory objectives that seek to significantly modify target group behavior is unlikely unless officials in the implementing agencies are strongly committed to the achievement of those objectives. Any new program requires implementors who are not merely neutral but significantly persistent to develop new regulations and standard operating procedures, and to enforce them in the face of resistance from target groups and from public officials reluctant to make the mandated changes.

In this view, "the major explanation" for the implementation problem is the failure on the part of implementing officials to overcome their natural resistance to change, and to develop enthusiasm and widespread acceptance for the policy's standards and objectives. Mazmanian and Sabatier (1981, p. 13) suggest two mechanisms available to statutory framers to reasonably assure that implementing officials have the requisite commitment to statutory objectives. They suggest selecting top implementing officials from a pool of policy supporters, or assigning responsibility for implementation to agencies whose policy orientation is consistent with the statute and that will accord the new program high priority.
2.3.8 The Complexity of Joint Action

Whatever the underlying reasons, this is the story of too many cooks spoiling the broth. Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) coined the phrase the “complexity of joint action” to illustrate implementation difficulties arising from the participation of too many actors in the process and the resultant blurring of lines of authority. In the latter case where competing government agencies at different levels have overlapping duties, no one may be willing or able to exercise final authority and, consequently, no one does anything or they do as they wish. In the former where a large number of disparate actors are involved in the process, the consequences cannot but be: (1) proliferation of veto or decision/clearance points, (2) muddling of objectives due to diverse perspectives, (3) heightened conflict and intergroup rivalry, (4) divided loyalty, (5) lack of coordination and (6) the diversion of energy in the playing out of a number of loosely interrelated games. 

Arising “largely from the difficulty of coordinating the activities of several different units, each of which has its own goals and established routine,” (Montjoy and O'Toole 1979, p. 473) the complexity of joint action always results in “disagreement” and “delay,” an eventuality on which Pressman and Wildavsky (1984, p. 87) suggest we need not frown or be surprised. In their view, if we come to understand the complexity of joint administrative action, we might wonder rather more why programs are attempted in the first place, or why they work at all, instead of expressing amazement at their shortfalls.

The problem with this line of explanation is that not all policy implementation involve a multi-jurisdiction web of federal, state and local agencies, as well as a large number of non-governmental organizations and private individuals. Additionally, implementation problems

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10. This last point is Bardach's (1977) major contribution to the field. In using the metaphor of "games" to describe the process, Bardach conceives implementation as a series of loosely interconnected activities of a multitude of quasi-autonomous actors directed at safeguarding what they already have, while simultaneously using this as leverage to attempt to gain access to those program elements not yet under their control.
have been reported in programs involving only community or neighborhood participants (Gill and Thrasher 1985).

2.3.9 Ambiguous Goals and Communications

Ambiguity in policy goals, whether caused by design, misunderstanding, uncertainties or value conflict, is held by nearly all implementation researchers to be a significant part of the implementation problem. This is especially the belief of two groups of researchers: (1) those who see implementation as basically "putting policy into effect" (Pressman and Wildavsky 1973; Sabatier and Mazmanian 1979); and (2) those who are interested in policy evaluation (Weiss 1972; Rossi 1972; Ruthman 1984). The argument from both camps is that "statutory objectives that are precise and clearly ranked in importance serve as an indispensable aid in program evaluation, as unambiguous directives to implementing officials" (Sabatier and Mazmanian 1979). It is assumed that, without the guidance of lucid program goals, evaluators would flounder and not be able to ask the relevant and insightful questions about the program; whereas implementing officials would be left with inadequate guidance, not only unaware of what behaviors are expected of them, but most likely to fill in the gap using their own discretion which is almost always at odds with the original intentions. Commenting on a bureaucrat’s typical response to similar quandaries, Kaufman (1973, p. 3) writes: "Confronted by demands he cannot satisfy, he will fashion his own policies to handle the situation. His own policies often do not coincide with the policies of his leaders.” Hence, proponents of this theme of the implementation problem focus on ways a statute or other policy directive can constrain what occurs during execution.

In Sabatier and Mazmanian’s (1979, p. 487-92) list of conditions for effective policy implementation, number two is that "the statute (or other basic policy decision) contains unambiguous policy directives and structures the implementation process so as to maximize
the likelihood that target groups will perform as desired." The constituent parts of this condition are that:

(1) the policy objectives are precise and clearly ranked, both internally (within the specific statute) and in the overall program of the implementing agencies;

(2) the financial resources provided to the implementing agencies are sufficient to hire the staff and conduct the technical analyses involved in the development of regulations, the administration or permit/service delivery programs, and the monitoring of target group compliance;

(3) implementation is assigned to agencies supportive of statutory objectives that will give the new program high priority;

(4) the statute (or other basic policy decision) provides substantial hierarchical integration within and among implementing agencies by minimizing the number of veto/clearance points and by providing supporters of statutory objectives with inducements and sanctions sufficient to assure acquiescence among those with a potential veto;

(5) the decision rules of implementing agencies are supportive of statutory objectives; and

(6) the statute (or basic policy decision) provides ample opportunity for constituency (interest) groups and sovereigns supportive of statutory objectives to intervene in the implementation process through, for example, liberal rules of standing to agency and judicial proceedings and requirements for periodic evaluation of the performance of implementing agencies and target groups;

The unmistakable implication of this condition is that implementation would be smooth, if only policy directives input to implementing bureaus are unambiguous and non-contradictory in terms of stating exactly what is to be done and exactly who is to be responsible for doing what.

Those who do not subscribe to this view find it an over simplification of the implementation reality, in that it cannot be assured that unambiguous policy directives necessarily result in more faithful execution. As Shanks (1983, p. 55) points out, "one can envisage a situation where overzealous concentration on defined policy objectives during implementation could lead to less than optimal results such as in the case of a clear shift in values from the time of policy formation to implementation." Furthermore, continues Shanks, "no matter how clear the policy makers may think the objectives have been spelled out,
implementors still have to apply their own process to these objectives and, in some sense, the outcome of the process will reflect the characteristics of the implementation participants.” So, in essence, what the condition calls for “are precisely those which political processes are likely to undermine” (Barrett and Fudge 1981, p. 19). Not only are there many good reasons for expecting ambiguity in public policy directives but, in most situations, the phenomenon is wholly unavoidable.

In “Thinking about Programmed and Adaptive Implementation,” Berman (1980) advances the argument that unambiguous policy (identified with the former) is not necessarily best for implementation, because it does not enable initial plans to be adapted to unfolding (local) events, decisions and circumstances. Yet, “it is necessary for policies to be reinvented so that they better fit local needs” or “the needs and standard operating procedures of the agencies and individuals that carry them out” (Palumbo and Harder 1981, p. x-xi). Whether viewed as “mutual adaptation” (McLaughlin 1976; Browne and Wildavsky 1984) or “evolution” (Majone and Wildavsky 1979) or a “bargaining process” (Ingram 1977; Barrett and Fudge 1981), the unquestionable suggestion is that successful implementation requires flexibility in policies, so that they can be contextualized in implementation. McLaughlin (1976, p. 169) makes this observation:

Where implementation was successful, and where significant change in participants attitudes, skills, and behavior occurred, implementation was characterized by a process of mutual adaptation in which project goals and methods were modified to suit the needs and interests of the local staff and in which that staff changed to meet the requirements of the project.

That is basically why, for many like Berman (1978, p. 168), “whatever implementation difficulties it may cause, ambiguity seems both inevitable and desirable in the political process of passing a law.”


2.3.10 Faulty Theory of Action

Every policy implies a theory or causal relationship, observe Pressman and Wildavsky (1973, p. xiv). "The question is never whether a theory is there (it always is).... A promise underlies policy: if the actions we recommend are undertaken, good (intended) consequences rather than bad (unintended) ones actually occur" (Wildavsky 1979, p. 35). Policy is an "if-then" statement in the sense that "If X is done, then Y will result." (For a detailed description of elements comprising policy theory, see Hoppe et al. 1987.) Shanks (1983, p. 15) gives an example from water resources management to illustrate this point:

A policy might be adopted to attempt to reduce flood damages on a river floodplain. The policy could be further specified to include that it will be implemented by establishing a system of dykes along the river. This policy output embodies the hypothesis that, if the dykes are constructed to particular specifications, then a defined degree of flood protection will be afforded to the adjoining lands. Consideration of the policy output in this manner facilitates clear ex post evaluation. If, in June, lands, that were thought to be protected, are flooded, research into the shortfall can proceed by dissecting the hypothesis. Were the dykes constructed to the standard implied in the policy? Was some degree of protection provided, albeit lesser than anticipated? Is the hypothesized relationship between dykes and (flood) protection valid? Did the policy implicitly assume structural methods of flood control are the most effective means of reducing flood damages? These and other related questions flow from the policy when it is seen in the light of an "if-then" hypothesis.

Shanks' question is not at all unfamiliar to evaluation researchers who, upon finding that a program is ineffective, pose the crucial question: did the program's substantive theory fail or did its procedural theory fail? 11 This is because:

Most basic policy decisions are based upon an underlying causal theory that can be divided into two components -- the first relating achievement of the desired end-state(s) back to changes in target group behavior, the second specifying the means by which target group compliance can be obtained. Both

11. For example, in Pressman and Wildavsky's (1973, p. 147) analysis of EDA's Oakland project, they found that, in addition to implementation problems arising from the complexity of joint action, the program's "economic theory was faulty because it was aimed at the wrong target -- subsidizing the capital of business enterprises rather than their wage bill. Instead of taking the direct path of paying the employers a subsidy on wages after they had hired minority personnel, the EDA program expended its capital on the promise that they would later hire the right people."
the “technical” and the “compliance” components must be valid for the policy objective(s) to be obtained (Sabatier and Mazmanian 1979, p. 486).

Thus, continues Shanks (1983, p 44), in order to conclude either a failure of theory or program, “one must be sure that the program was actually implemented in accordance with the expectations of those hypothesizing the particular causal process.” Therefore, poor policy outcome can result from either valid theory poorly implemented or a faithfully implemented policy based on invalid theory (Rossi and Wright 1977).

It is in the above regard that implementation increasingly came to be viewed as “hypothesis testing,” in which the chief problem is often times a faulty theory of action. This is evidenced by the fact that Sabatier and Mazmanian’s (1979, p. 484) first condition for effective implementation is that: “The program is based on a sound theory relating changes in target group behavior to the achievement of the desired end-state (objectives).” To make certain that the centrality of this condition is not missed, or taken less seriously, Bardach (1977, p. 250) urges consideration of the following (humorous) hypothetical example:

If congress were to establish an agency charged with squaring the circle with compass and straight edge -- a task mathematicians have long ago shown impossible -- we could envision an agency coming into being, hiring a vast number of consultants, commissioning studies, and reporting that progress was being made, while at the same time urging in their appropriations request for the coming year that the Congress augment the agency’s budget so that it might undertake the development of a new and more promising sort of compass. After five years, much money would have been spent in vain, congressional sponsors would have dissociated themselves from the whole enterprise, and scholars would gravely cluck over the program’s problems of implementation.

Whether it is in terms of aiding the researcher to ask the relevant cause-and-effect relationships questions, or in ascertaining early in the analysis whether a program’s means for achieving goals are appropriate, there can be no dispute that conceiving implementation as hypothesis testing does provide an extremely useful method of focusing research on the process. The problem with the approach, however, is that, just as good implementation cannot overcome bad policy no matter how hard we try (Patton 1986, p. 108), good theory cannot overcome bad implementation.
2.3.11 Faulty Study Design

Almost all analyses of the implementation problem presume a top-down perspective insofar as they take "substantive policy" to be the common purpose or starting point from which implementation and everything else flows. Contemporary research, even when acknowledging the independence of action by actors in the process, still tends to operate on the assumption that there is a sense of common purpose about the process (Gill and Thrasher 1985, p. 40). Yet, when implementation is turned on its head and the behavior of "street-level bureaucrats," rather than those who formulate and convey policy, is taken as the starting point, the presumption of a common purpose becomes questionable, to say the least (Lipsky 1978; 1980). That is, the presumption that policy itself is the referent for all the actors in the process, and that everyone in the process is, by implication, genuinely intent on implementing the formally prescribed policy directives. The net result of rejecting this top-down approach to analysis is that policy deliverers or street-level bureaucrats become the primary actors in the process, with others in the arena mainly providing the context for their discretionary judgments (Lipsky 1978, p. 398). After all, in the unequivocal words of Berman (1978, p. 157), "the effective power to determine a policy's outcome rests with local deliverers, not with federal administrators."

Thus, in contrast to the usual manner of interpreting the problem, the bottom-up perspective views the implementation difficulty as deriving from a faulty study design which, by presuming a standard measure of effectiveness based on policy statements, produces a systematic bias towards identifying implementation "failures." As Lipsky (1978, p. 398) explains, besides it being common knowledge that formal policy goals intentionally reach for lofty and unrealizable aims:

Analysts who continue to pursue a policy-chain approach will continue to conclude that the system is ineffective in its own terms. Or they will continue to observe that the system is unresponsive to policy recipients and ultimately to itself, without having recognized that the articulated policy, in never
addressing issues of the environment in which policy implementors practice, never addressed the critical issues of implementation. A focus on the work structure, in contrast, is a focus on what people do, not on an abstraction called “policy” or its fate.

Gill and Thrasher (1985, p. 42) put the argument this way: “[because] the street-level bureaucrat has a propensity to define the implementation problem in ways which may conflict with those higher in the organization, there may be many different versions of policy and, therefore, many versions of what is implied by successful implementation.”

This fact that there are many different versions of policy has witnessed a daring move towards “goal-free” evaluation. For instance, Scriven (1971, p. 1-2) finds the consideration of goals in evaluation both unnecessary and contaminating. His argument is that “the less the external evaluator hears about goals of the project, the less tunnel vision will develop, the more attention will be paid to looking for actual effects (rather than checking on alleged effects).” Similarly, in reflecting on the validity of “forward-mapping” of implementation, which might be said to accept the original policy sin as the beginning point, Browne and Wildavsky (1984, p. 208-9) dismiss the importance of goal-fixed evaluation, arguing that, “because the program is most intimate with its environment at the point of service delivery, much of the evaluation should occur there.”

What this implies is that the degree to which the implementation problem is concluded to occur, not only depends a good deal on the point in time the evaluation is done, but also on the institutional level of policy where it is done. Browne and Wildavsky write:

The outcome of the resulting chain of implementation decisions cannot be predicted or measured according to indicators of formal, top-down hierarchies of control. The analytic onus is better placed on the decentralized, sometimes informal, and often unanticipated points of decision. Community politics, the behaviors of individuals outside the implementing domains, and the behaviors of individuals and groups within implementing organizations are recognized as determinants of policy outcome in backward mapping.

In a recent treatment of this topic, Desai (1988, p. 268) accepts that programs have goals but denies that these goals have any relevance for evaluation. He argues that the impacts of
program can be better understand by “finding out what is actually done instead of what was intended to be done.”

2.3.12 A Non-Participatory Process

That successful implementation is influenced by the degree to which target populations (implementors and recipients alike) have participated in the decision making or planning, is an interpretation of the process favored mainly by planners and organizational change theorists, based on the assumption that people are likely to obey laws if they believe in them and feel a part of them (Zeleny 1982). Despite that there is no established causal relationship between level of participation per se and the acceptance of change, support has been found for the following related arguments:

1. participation leads to higher staff morale, and high staff morale is necessary for successful implementation;
2. participation leads to greater commitment, and a high degree of commitment is required for effecting change;
3. participation leads to greater clarity about an innovation, and clarity is necessary for implementation;
4. beginning with the postulate of a basic resistance to change, the argument is that participation will reduce initial resistance and thereby facilitate successful implementation; and
5. subordinates will tend resist any innovation that they are expected to implement if it is initiated solely by their superiors (Gross et al. 1971, p. 24-5).

One inherent difficulty with this explanation is that the wider the range of participation, the less likely is consensus or decision making; and, as Gross et al. would argue, consensus is necessary for successful implementation. Obviously, "the more open the system is and the greater the number of actors with decision and veto power, the less likely are decisions to be made. An open and complex decision process that functions at many levels is always in danger of eroding consensus and distorting its initial priorities" (Rein and Rabinovitz 1978, p. 328).
2.3.13 Uncertainties

Policies of all nature invariably involve substantial uncertainties, and it is frequently in the implementation stage where these uncertainties must be resolved or, are at least, shown to exist. Defining uncertainties as the "unpredictabilities in factors which affect the success or direction of a course of action," Shanks (1983, p. 27) notes that one of its major effects on any public implementation process is "how values will have changed over time and thus perhaps shift the direction of the policy outcome from that which might have occurred in the absence of a value shift." Another major source of uncertainties, and by far the commonest source, is lack of knowledge or theory on the subject matter of policy. Much has been said on this already.

Finally, there is the source of uncertainty deriving from not knowing what the political and socioeconomic future might bring. Both the financial and political support for seeing through a particular policy are usually projected based on current conditions, which are by no means immutable to drastic changes.\(^1^2^\) The sort of changes that may, and often do, occur include: (1) a change in government and, hence, in policy commitment and orientation; (2) death or neutralization of a prominent political supporter of the policy; and (3) shock or recession in the economy, thereafter reducing resources available and, perhaps, inevitably forcing a change in priority.

It is in light of these sort of uncertainties that Sabatier and Mazmanian (1979, p. 485), in the last of their five conditions for effective implementation, insist that: "The relative priority of statutory objectives is not significantly undermined over time by the emergence of conflicting policies or by changes in relevant socioeconomic conditions that undermine the statute's 'technical' theory of political support."

\(^{12}\) There can be no better example of this than the case involving Abuja, Nigeria, petrodollars and the recent international oil glut.
2.4 COMPREHENSIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEM

Despite the explosion of research on the subject, there have been very few comprehensive frameworks developed for analyzing policy implementation. The Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) model is not only the first attempt, but the most comprehensive to date. However, before discussing this framework as the theoretical basis for the dissertation, it might be instructive to reflect on other attempts at conceptual integration. To the extent that much of what these other attempts address does not differ importantly from what has already been said, except by way of a different arrangement, the discussion to follow is brief and purely descriptive.

2.4.1 Rein & Rabinovitz (1978), "Implementation: A Theoretical Perspectives"

Rein and Rabinovitz (1978, p. 308) suggest that an understanding of the implementation problem should be sought in terms of three imperatives: (1) the legal imperative to do what is right (i.e., respect among subordinates for legislative mandates); (2) the rational-bureaucratic imperative to do what is rationally defensible (i.e., application of the principles of "impersonality"); and (3) the consensual imperative to do what is agreeable to contending parties who have a stake in the outcome.

With respect to the first imperative, Rein and Rabinovitz (1978, p. 310) argue that legal imperatives will be most binding and lead to faithful implementation, when the following factors are positive: "(1) the strength and prestige of the legislation committee in which a bill originates; (2) the expertise of the committee's members, hence the presumption that the bill is technically sound; (3) the extent to which areas of disagreement are squarely faced and clarified during legislative debate; and finally (4) the level of support for the law, among both lawmakers and the local communities where the legislation is implemented."
But even when the above legal conditions have been satisfied, the authors warn that the law will be put into effect if, and only if, it does not offend the civil servants' sense of what is reasonable or just. Though it is their suggestion that the rational-bureaucratic imperative would not be upset, insofar as the principles of the law remain consistent, workable and do not threaten the ways of the bureau.

Finally, under the consensus imperative, Rein and Rabinovitz (1978, p. 313) note that both the legal and bureaucratic imperatives are ultimately subordinated to the preferences of the interest groups affected by the legislation. In their opinion, it is the consensuses of these groups that entirely govern implementation; a conclusion not unlike the one reached by Murphy (1971) who suggested that a simple massing of assent is all that is required for successful implementation.

### 2.4.2 Levitt (1980), Implementing Public Policy

The book by Levitt (1980, p. 153-9) contains another attempt at conceptual integration. Even though specifically developed for clarifying the problems of implementing pollution control policies, Levitt states that the framework can be applied more widely to other policy studies. The framework comprises three categories. Under the technical category are concerns relating to: (1) the nature of the problem, (2) the severity of the problem, (3) level of knowledge relative to the problem and (4) diligent application of technical knowledge to the problem.

Under the administrative category are factors needed for introducing and carrying out the policy. These include: (5) the statutory expression of policy, or the administrative force of the policy, (6) instruments for policy, or the people, organizations and devices through which the policy is expressed, (7) the framework within which policy belongs, or areas/efforts related to the policy, (8) timetable for introducing the policy, (9) financial and resource costs, and (10) enforcement, or powers available to see through the policy.
Last is the category of inter-organizational factors which include: (11) the interested organizations, (12) the roles of these organization, and (13) the relations between them. Appropriately, Levitt (1980, p. 159) suggests that this framework should be seen more as "an aid to describing and identifying the important features of the policy process," rather than for diagnosing the problems of the process. Otherwise, the framework can be criticized as impossible to operationalize in comparative studies, as it involves too many variables, each of which is difficult to define.

2.4.3 Mazmanian and Sabatier 1981, Effective Policy Implementation

One other attempt at conceptual integration that has received a lot of attention has been that of Mazmanian and Sabatier (1981), which subsumes their earlier work (1979) on conditions of effective policy implementation. Like Levitt (1980), their attempt also takes the "recipe book" approach and lists all the factors they believe to have an affect on the achievement of policy goals. These are listed under three broad categories: "(1) the tractability of the problem(s) being addressed by the statute; (2) the ability of the statute to favorably structure the implementation process; and (3) the net effect of a variety of 'political' variables on the balance of support for statutory objectives." The flow diagram of the entire framework is represented in figure 2.5.

The factors contained in the diagram are either self-explanatory or relate to ground already covered. New elements such as the "diversity of proscribed behavior" simply alerts attention to the putative inference that "the more diverse the behavior being regulated, the more difficult it becomes to frame clear regulations and thus the less likely that statutory objectives will be attained" (Mazmanian and Sabatier 1981, p. 8). The non-statutory variable of "media attention to the problem" is new and points to how the mass media can influence the implementation process in two important ways. First, by acting as an intervener between proposed changes and perceptions of those changes by the general public. Second, by
CHAPTER 2: A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS

FIGURE 2.5: SKELETAL FLOW DIAGRAM OF THE VARIABLES INVOLVED IN THE IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS

TRACTABILITY OF THE PROBLEM
1. AVAILABILITY OF VALID TECHNICAL THEORY OR TECHNOLOGY
2. DIVERSITY OF TARGET-GROUP BEHAVIOR
3. TARGET GROUP AS PERCENTAGE OF THE POPULATION
4. EXTENT OF BEHAVIORAL CHANGE REQUIRED

ABILITY OF STATUTE TO STRUCTURE IMPLEMENTATION
1. CLEAR AND CONSISTENT OBJECTIVES
2. INCORPORATION OF ADEQUATE CAUSAL THEORY
3. FINANCIAL RESOURCES
4. HIERARCHICAL INTEGRATION WITH AND AMONG IMPLEMENTING AGENCIES
5. DECISION RULES OF IMPLEMENTING AGENCIES
6. RECRUITMENT OF IMPLEMENTORS
7. FORMAL ACCESS BY OUTSIDERS

NON-STATUTORY VARIABLES AFFECTING IMPLEMENTATION
1. SOCIOECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND TECHNOLOGY
2. MEDIA ATTENTION TO THE PROBLEM
3. PUBLIC SUPPORT
4. ATTITUDES AND RESOURCES OF CONSTITUENCY
5. SUPPORT FROM SOVEREIGNS
6. COMMITMENT AND LEADERSHIP SKILLS OF IMPLEMENTING OFFICIALS

STAGES (DEPENDENT VARIABLES) IN THE IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS
POLICY ---> COMPLIANCE ---> ACTUAL ---> PERCEIVED ---> MAJOR
OUTPUTS WITH POLICY IMPACTS IMPACTS OF REVISION
OF IMPLEMENTING OUTPUTS BY OF POLICY POLICY IN STATUTE
AGENCIES TARGET OUTPUTS OUTPUTS

influencing political support for policies through limited or undue coverage. With perpetual yeaming for the new and dramatic, the mass media can usually manage to focus attention on any given policy for only a short span of time.

In sum, the framework’s hypothesis is that effective implementation is likely when: (1) the policy objectives are precise and clearly ranked; (2) the policy incorporates a valid causal theory; (3) there are adequate resources; (4) the number of veto points in the implementation process is minimized and sanctions/inducements maximized; (5) the decision-rules of the implementing agencies are supportive of the objectives; (6) implementing officials have a favorable disposition towards the policy; (7) rules for outside involvement are liberalized to encourage wider participation; and (8) there are no new occurrences to undermine the policy orientation and resource base (Mazmanian and Sabatier 1981, p. 14; Sabatier and Mazmanian 1979, p. 485).

2.4.4 Other Attempts at Conceptual Integration

Other works that provide as good a classification or recipe as any includes Edwards’ (1980) *Implementing Public Policy*, which claims four preconditions for effective implementation: (1) effective communication, (2) adequate resources, (3) supportive dispositions of implementors and (4) an appropriate bureaucratic structure. Another is Larson’s (1980) *Why Government Programs Fail: Improving Policy Implementation*, which maintains that there are five possible reasons for failure: (1) vague or unrealistic goals, (2) lack of adequate support, (3) poor implementation procedures, (4) complexities of intergovernmental action and (5) economic or environmental forces. In “Implementing a Human Services Program,” Chase (1979) envisages obstacles arising from fifteen sources: the people to be served, the nature of the service, the likelihood of distortions or irregularities, the controllability of the program, money, personnel, space, supplies and technical equipment,
and intersections with subsidiary agencies, other line agencies, elected politicians, higher levels of government, private sector providers, special interest groups, and the press.

Collectively, these various efforts at conceptual integration provide a good aid to synthesizing thought about implementation and appreciating the complexity of the process. But the efforts also clearly demonstrate the potential danger of any attempt at comprehensiveness. Apart from frequently entailing prescriptions that cannot be met in the real policy world, the frameworks generally result in producing a massive catalog or "recipe" of amorphous constraints that impinge upon effective implementation. This places the models beyond the reach of systematic empirical scrutiny. While the Van Meter and Van Horn model can also be criticized for too many variables, it will be seen that, by distinguishing between variables that have direct and indirect effect on performance, the authors were able to reduce the number of linkages between policy and outcome to an empirically researchable sum.

2.4.5 Van Meter and Van Horn (1975), "The Policy Implementation Process: A Conceptual Framework"

Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) base their framework on an adaptation similar to Easton's (1965) systems theory of political life. Both this adaptation and their model of the implementation process are presented next in figures 2.6 and 2.7.

As can be discerned, all six elements of this model (figure 2.7) have been covered previously. Nevertheless, both these elements and their hypothesized linkages to performance are covered by way of bringing together, in one framework, the several strands of theory advanced for explaining the problems of the process.
Source: Van Meter Van Horn (1975).
FIGURE 2.7: A MODEL OF POLICY IMPLEMENTATION

Source: Van Meter and Van Horn 1975, p. 463.
2.4.5.1 Policy Standards and Objectives

Believing as do Pressman and Wildavsky (1973, p. xiv) that "implementation cannot succeed or fail without a goal against which to judge it," Van Meter and Van Horn view the identification of performance indicators as a crucial first stage in the analysis of implementation. By policy standards and objectives, they mean the elaboration of the overall policy goals beyond the generalities of the legislative document, to more concrete and operational objectives/targets. The difference between the two is that numerical expressions can usually be found to substantiate the latter. To actually determine what these standards and objectives might be, the authors suggest using statements of policy makers as reflected in official documents such as program regulations and guidelines. Ultimately, they suggest that the choice of performance measure should depend on the purpose of the evaluation.

2.4.5.2 Policy Resources

They define this as funds or other incentives contained in the policy to facilitate obedient action. While referring to other sources for an elaboration on what they mean by incentives and their utility, the authors note that funds allocated to programs are usually not adequate and, consequently, that the limited supply of incentives is a major contributor to the shortfall of programs.

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13. Nakamura and Smallwood (1980, p. 74) give a more comprehensive list of ways to discern policy standards and objectives using cues from: (1) the "legal intent" of policy as written; (2) the "legislative history" of the policy; (3) the "understanding" of policy held by interest groups and other attentive elites; (4) the goals "developed" by participants during implementation; (5) the "translation" of a policy's goals from vague political language to more precise terms by evaluators; (6) the policy goals most consistent with "research requirements" of evaluators; and (7) "current policy makers" understanding of policy goals.
2.4.5.3 Inter-organizational Communication and Enforcement Activities

In responding to the problem of inter-organizational communication, Van Meter and Van Horn (1975, p. 465-6), write that:

Effective implementation requires that a program’s standards and objectives be understood by those individuals responsible for their achievement.... If different sources of communication provide inconsistent interpretations of standards and objectives or if the same source provides conflicting interpretations over time, implementors will find it even more difficult to carry out the intentions of policy. Therefore, the prospects of effective implementation will be enhanced by the clarity with which standards and objectives are stated and by the accuracy and consistency with which they are communicated.

As for enforcement activities, they point to several remedial measures that could be employed depending on the context. Within the context of a single organization, they envision two standard ways superiors can affect the actions of their subordinates: (1) through human resource powers stemming from recruitment, assignment, advancement and dismissal practices; and (2) through budgetary controls. Within the context of inter-organizational relations where there are multi-jurisdiction interactions and no single line of command, they envision a different method of achieving influence involving: (1) provision of technical advice and assistance; (2) socialization, persuasion and cooptation; (3) joint participation in programs or conditional grants; (4) offering valuable services as incentives; and ultimately (5) withholding funds, or the use of other explicit coercive power.

2.4.5.4 The Characteristics of the Implementing Agencies

Van Meter and Van Horn (1975, p. 471) list the following characteristics as likely to impinge on an agency’s capacity to execute policy directives:

1. the competence and size of an agency’s staff;
2. the degree of hierarchical control of subunit decisions and processes within the implementing agencies;
3. an agency’s political resources (e.g., support among legislators and executives);
(4) the vitality of an organization;

(5) the degree of “open” communication (i.e., networks of communication with free horizontal and vertical communication, and a relatively high degree of freedom in communications with persons outside the organization) within an organization; and

(6) the agency’s formal and informal linkages with the “policy making” and “policy enforcing” body.

2.4.5.5 Economic, Social and Political Conditions

By calling for the incorporation of the following questions about the policy environment, Van Meter and Van Horn (1975, p. 471-2) move toward capturing the dynamic nature of implementation:

(1) Are the economic resources available sufficient to support successful implementation?

(2) To what extent (and how) will prevailing economic and social conditions be affected by the implementation of the policy in question [and vice-versa]?

(3) What is the nature of public opinion; how salient are the policy issues?

(4) Do elites favor or oppose implementation of the policy?

(5) Is there partisan opposition or support for the policy?

(6) To what extent are private interest groups mobilized in support of or opposition to the policy?

The authors acknowledge that these questions have received little research attention, despite the plausibility that they may have a profound effect on the performance of implementing agencies. Given the methodological problem involved, both in proving the effects of the policy environment on implementation as well as in controlling for those effects, it is probably not by oversight that this area has been accorded limited analytical attention.
2.4.5.6 The Disposition of Implementors

After discussing the six imperatives of the process, Van Meter and Van Horn (1975, p. 472-3) submit that:

Each of the components of the model... must be filtered through the perceptions of the implementor.... Three elements of the implementors response may affect their ability and willingness to carry out the policy: their cognition (comprehension, understanding) of the policy, the direction of their response toward it (acceptance, neutrality, rejection), and the intensity of that response.

Regarding implementors' understanding of the goals and expectations of the policy, the authors point out that, under conditions of cognitive dissonance, officials may unknowingly impede implementation, first by screening out a clear message when it seems to contradict deeply cherished beliefs and, second, by attempting to redefine the message to fit what is felt it ought to have been.¹⁴

Also, whether or not implementors accept/reject the policy's goals, or remain neutral towards them, is obviously going to affect implementation. Van Meter and Van Horn suggest that officials may reject policy goals, or have their enthusiasm for them dashed, if the goals offend their personal value system, non-bureaucratic loyalties, sense of self-interest or the status quo.

Finally, the intensity of the implementors' response to the policy may affect performance. Presumably, if implementors oppose the policy outright, it may lead to its being ignored; if they are only lukewarm or neutral, it may lead to a sloppy performance; and if they are enthusiastic, the chances of success are increased remarkably. In the case of the second scenario, Van Meter and Van Horn recommend being watchful for "surreptitious diversion and evasion."

¹⁴ The concept of "cognitive dissonance" by Festinger (1957) played an important role in the development of this hypothesis. Using the concept, Downs (1967, p. 180) similarly found that an official's "perception apparatus will partially screen out data adverse to his interests, and magnify those favoring his interests.... In formulating alternative actions, each official will tend to give undue precedence to alternatives most favorable to his interest."
2.4.5.7 Hypothesized Linkages Between Components of the Model

The model specifies two sets of hypotheses: (1) the relationships between the independent variables and the ultimate dependent variable of performance, and (2) the relationships among the independent variables. Beginning with the standards and objectives of the policy, the authors note they have only an indirect bearing on performance, through their influences on inter-organizational communication and enforcement activities and, from there, to the disposition of implementors. (See figure 2.8.) This includes influences from both the manner in which policy standards and objectives are communicated, and the extent to which this communication promotes clarity as well as facilitates oversight and enforcement.

Thus, policy standards and objectives have a significant influence on what the inter-organizational enforcement rules turn out to be, as well as how clearly and consistently these standards and objectives are transmitted to the various implementing agencies. The inter-organizational communication and enforcement activities, in turn, then provide the terms of reference for relations between actors in the process, primarily between superiors and subordinates. It is usually through these terms of reference that implementors develop a good deal of their dispositions for the policy (e.g., their perceptions and interpretations of the policy intentions, and their enthusiasm for compliance or otherwise).

The causal linkages connecting policy resources to outcome are shown in figure 2.9. The linkages show policy resources as having an indirect impact on performance through three components of the model: (1) the policy environment, (2) inter-organizational communication and enforcement activities, and (3) the disposition of implementors.

15. It should be noted that Van Meter and Van Horn (1975, p. 462) suggest these linkages as explicitly representing "hypotheses which could be tested empirically, assuming that satisfactory indictors could be constructed and appropriate data collected."
CHAPTER 2: A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS

FIGURE 2.8: CAUSAL LINKAGES BETWEEN POLICY DIRECTIVES AND PERFORMANCE

POLICY STANDARDS AND OBJECTIVES

INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL COMMUNICATION

* MANNER OF COMMUNICATION AND PRESENTATION
* CLARITY ABOUT WHAT IS TO BE DONE, BY WHOM, HOW AND WHEN

ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES

* MONITORING FUNCTIONS
* PUNISHMENT & INCENTIVE
* DEGREE OF DISCRETION
* JURISDICTIONAL LIMITS TO POWER

THE DISPOSITION OF IMPLEMENTORS

* PERCEPTIONS AND INTERPRETATIONS OF POLICY GOALS AND INTENTIONS

* SEEING THE ADVANTAGES OF COMPLIANCE
* SEEING THE DISADVANTAGES OF RESISTANCE

PERFORMANCE

Source: Adapted from the model by Van Horn and Van Horn (1975).
FIGURE 2.9: CAUSAL LINKAGES BETWEEN POLICY RESOURCES AND PERFORMANCE

Source: Adapted from the model by Van Meter and Van Horn (1975).
The hypothesis about the policy environment is that the availability of fiscal and other resources is likely to stimulate participation, by either bringing otherwise inattentive actors into the process, or by causing those already in the process to press for maximum involvement and benefits. To the extent that broad based participation causes the complexity of joint action, this component of the model is further hypothesized to have a direct bearing on performance. Although questionable, Van Meter and Van Horn (1975, p. 476) venture so far as to assert that "environmental conditions may cause implementors to execute a policy without altering their personal preferences about that policy."

The hypothesis about inter-organizational communications and enforcement activities is that both factors are a function of the amount of resources made available for them by the policy. For example, technical assistance or audit services can only be offered if provided for by the policy.

Thirdly, the hypothesis about the disposition of implementors is that this can be influenced directly by both the type and quantity of resources perceived to be available. Van Meter and Van Horn (1975, p. 475-6) write: "when vast sums of money or other resources are perceived to be available, implementors may view the program with added favor, and compliance may be encouraged by the prospect of receiving a share of these resources. Conversely, support for a program will not be encouraged if implementors perceive that few benefits will be realized by active participation."

Finally, on the linkages between characteristics of the implementing agencies and performance, Van Meter and Van Horn (1975, p. 477) note the following important characteristics of agencies that can affect the dispositions of their personnel, thereby facilitating or hindering effective implementation: (1) the nature of the communications network; (2) the degree of hierarchical control; and (3) the style leadership. They further note that "dispositions can also be influenced by the agency's formal and informal ties to the 'policy making' and 'policy enforcing' body." (See figure 2.10.)
In summarizing the relevance of their model, Van Meter and Van Horn (1975, p. 478-83) draw from the three general explanations of the implementation problem advanced by Kaufman (1973). As the latter envisages it, the problem of implementation has three dimensions -- (1) the communications dimension, (2) the capability dimension and (3) the dispositional dimension -- in that order of increasing importance. So, in mapping their conditions for effective implementation, the authors propose the following:
First, effective implementation requires that subordinates know what they are supposed to do. Because problems may arise if subordinates fail to comprehend fully what is expected of them, policy standards and objectives must be transmitted to implementors clearly, accurately and consistently.

Second, successful implementation requires that the implementing organization command the capacity to do what it is expected of it, as the ability to implement may be hindered by such factors as overworked and poorly trained staff, insufficient information and financial resources, or impossible time constraints.

Finally, to achieve the objectives of policy, a favorable disposition is required on the part of the implementors, as implementation may fail because implementors refuse to do what they are supposed to do. The willingness of implementors will be achieved if the policy directives do not: (1) offend implementors’ personal values or extra-organizational loyalties; (2) violate implementors’ sense of self-interest; or (3) alter features of the organization and its procedures that implementors desire to maintain.

2.5 SUMMARY OF THE THEORETICAL ARGUMENTS

The purpose of this chapter has been to both review past approaches to explaining the implementation process, and propose a testable alternative way of organizing research concerning the issue. In establishing the background to this end, the meaning of public policy was questioned and found basically to mean what the government does (actions or inactions) and the reasons why (intentions); how the government does what it does (process); and the difference its actions make (intended or unintended impact).

Similarly, perspectives on the meaning of implementation were reviewed, leading to the rejection of the mechanistic-rational understanding of implementation as a chronological, sequential process which begins only after broad policy intentions are transformed into tactical components. Rejected also is the implied understanding that the process involves mainly concerns about assembling, coordinating and managing resources for purposive ends. In proposing an alternative definition for the term, it was conceded that, due to the natural inexactitude of policy and the attendant proliferation of discretionary powers at the lower echelons of the bureaucracy, implementation cannot but be viewed as an ongoing process of decision making by a variety of actors beyond the initial passage of legislation. Though circumscribed by the existence of an already authorized policy direction, this continuation of
decision making is of a different type. It, nevertheless, encompasses the task of translating broad policy aims into routine procedures, which means that the necessary process involves far more than assembling, coordinating and managing resources for purposive end; it involves conflicts and choices about resource allocation. Within the context of the developing countries, this process was defined as the major arena in which policy making actually occurs.

The review of past studies of implementation suggests that they have tended to explain the problems of the process in anyone of thirteen ways or a combination thereof: (1) administrative control; (2) inadequate resources; (3) tense inter-governmental relations; (4) problematic nature of policy itself; (5) lack of pressures from target groups; (6) disagreement over goals; (7) unfavorable disposition of implementors; (8) the complexity of joint action; (9) ambiguous goals and communications; (10) faulty theory of action; (11) faulty study design; (12) a non participatory process; and (13) uncertainties.

Given the difficulty of examining, in detail, the implications of each constraint on implementation, the comprehensive model of the process proposed by Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) was selected for use in this research. This model, while containing elements of each of the thirteen components, posits only the following three as having a direct impact on performance: (1) the characteristics of the implementing agencies; (2) the policy environment consisting of social, economic and political conditions; and (3) the disposition of implementing officials. Among these three components, the model further advances the disposition of implementors as the single most inclusive and relevant variable for understanding the implementation problem. This is on the basis of the argument that, even when every other component of the process is favorable, a policy may still fail to achieve optimal results without a supportive disposition of the implementors, as each of these components must be filtered through their perceptions (Van Meter and Van Horn 1975, p. 472). In other words, implementation problems may still occur even when subordinates know exactly what they are supposed to do and have the necessary resources to do so. Hence, the
primary concern of the dissertation is to understand the outcome of housing efforts in Abuja in relation to the disposition of officials.\textsuperscript{16}

Van Horn and Van Meter (1975, p. 474) maintain that, in order for their hypothesis to be empirically tested, "the researcher must gather multiple indicators of various elements of the disposition of policy implementors." While this suggestion on method is accepted as an imperative, the dissertation refutes the presumption contained in it that the fate of implementation rests solely with the implementors. It should be evident that not all the crucial influences during implementation come from actors who are formally responsible to the implementing/administrative branch. As observed by Shanks (1983, p. 83), "some of the most influential individuals [e.g., attentive elites] may not formally be part of the process in question but, because of their actions, impact upon events and other individuals." So, to be even more comprehensive, any implementation analysis should find it necessary to examine the impacts of other relevant actors in the process.

In the case of Abuja, besides the decision makers and senior level officials in the bureaucracy, the academics are one such group of relevant actors who deserve nearly as much attention as the implementors. As a complex exercise requiring expertise of various kinds, the new capital project witnessed a great deal of interactions between bureaucrats and academics, in which the latter basically supplied the theoretical norms for activities within and about the new capital through consultancies, positions on panels that looked into questions

\textsuperscript{16} It is important to understand here that, without the existence of two academic dissertations that explicitly considered the Abuja question, it may not be possible to be concerned, in the main, with this one variable of the model, chief variable or not. The two volume Ph.D. dissertation by Agba (1986) examined the problems of implementing the new capital project from the theoretical underpinning of whether an agency's internal or external environment is what determines its performance. In other words, which of the two factors influence implementation more: "the internal dynamics of organizations, such as management ability, financial resources, standard operating procedures, etc.," or the exogenous dynamics such as "pressures from interest group politics, political instability, corruption, limited natural resources, etc." (Agba 1986, p. 46)? Therefore, Agba's study, of necessity, covers the effects on implementation of the other two important components of the Van Horn and Van Meter's model, namely: (1) the characteristics of the implementing agency and (2) the environmental conditions. Another senior undergraduate dissertation by Moore (1982) focused on the politics of the new capital in terms of events leading up to the decision, as well as those that occurred during the planning process and early construction period.
of the new capital, conferences held on the subject, public opinion formulation in the mass
media, etc.. The probable influence of this group in implementing the new capital takes on
more importance when it is considered that their dispositions toward the project may have
impacted not only on the decisions that were made, but also on the conceptual frameworks
of the implementors' themselves.

Figure 2.11 gives an elaboration of the model as it applies to housing implementation
in Abuja. Evidence from this figure confirms that, while the dissertation's primary concern
remains with the disposition of implementors, other components of the model, which directly
or indirectly influence performance, are considered. A scholar, after reviewing five books on
implementation, once noted that:

The implementation literature falls neatly into three categories. First, there are
definitions of implementation with valuable conceptualizations of the
implementation process and schemes for its analysis. Most of these.... rarely
offer any empirical evidence in the form of case analyses. Second, there are
many excellent case studies, which, however, recognize little debt to these
theoretical contributions.... [But] there are [only] a few works which combine
a conceptual framework focusing on implementation with its application in
one or more case studies (Alexander 1982, p. 133)

It is with this latter group of works that this dissertation resides.
Figure 2.11: An Elaboration of the Van Horn and Van Meter Model of Policy Implementation for Housing in Abuja

Source: Author. (Based on figure 2.7.)
CHAPTER 3: MATERIALS AND METHOD


3.1 THE CASE OF ABUJA

3.1.1 History of the New Capital Movement

Although founded and occupied by a British occupation force since 1861, Nigeria’s name and current boundaries were not forged until 1914 when the British, under Lord Lugard, amalgamated its two west African protectorates, the northern and the southern protectorates. It was in the wake of this amalgamation that the location of the country’s capital was first contemplated. Previously, the northern and southern protectorates were administered from Lagos and Kaduna, respectively. Soon to be the first governor of the newly created country, Lord Lugard contemplated the location of a capital for Nigeria and recommended to the British Government that Kaduna be selected.

Having assumed the choice of location to be restricted to either Kaduna or Lagos, Lugard rationalized his recommendation by pointing to the advantages of the former, while emphasizing the impropriety of the latter. As the prospective governor saw it, the benefits of Kaduna, as capital, included its mild climate and central location which was accessible by rail.

1. This is covered extensively by both Moore (1982) and Agba (1986). Their efforts will not be reproduced here.
2. Another logical consideration would have been Lokoja, a relatively small, central confluence town between the Niger and Benue rivers. Previous to the establishment of the two protectorates (1900 - 1914), this town had served as headquarters for the Royal Niger Company which oversaw British trading and administrative interests in that region of Africa.
from other major population centers of the country. Lagos, on the other hand, entailed disadvantages such as lack of land for growth, swampy terrain, hot and humid atmosphere during much of the year, established slums and unsanitary conditions, and the difficulty of isolating Europeans from indigenes (Abumere 1984, p. 14-15). In short, Lugard was appalled by Lagos and suggested that its selection over Kaduna would be "irrational," pure and simple. But, as history testifies, Lugard's exhortation was not heeded to by the colonial government as Lagos was chosen.

Notedly, however, this decision did not remove pressures for a different location than Lagos. Instead, the issue was submerged politically for almost four decades, resurfacing at nearly all the constitutional talks held between the late 1940s and 1950s. After the country's independence in 1960, the relocation debate might be said to have taken on a strictly Nigerian flavor. A United Nations' (1964) Report on Metropolitan Lagos explicitly considered the option of relocating the capital. Despite sounding out reasons that might justify such a move, the study found the option to be short on benefits and high on costs. It seemed that, up to 1967 when an independent government of Nigeria tinkered for the second time with state boundaries bringing the total number from 3 to 12, it remained unmoved from the commitment to Lagos as the capital.

However, the commitment to Lagos was later to change with the events of the late 1960s and early 1970s which radically changed the face of politics in the country. First, there was a bloody civil war (1967-70) along ethnic lines. Second, the population of the Greater Lagos more than quadrupled from 665,246 thousand in 1963 to an estimated 3.0 million in 1975 (Agba 1986, p. 135), thereby making more conspicuous and intolerable those inadequacies of the city that so appalled Lugard at the beginning of the century. And, finally, with the advent of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the consequent windfall (viz. "petro-dollars"), the country appeared to command for the first time the financial might to undertake a bold action in response to the issue.
In fact, in retrospect, it might be accurate to say that events since Lord Lugard’s advice was rejected in 1914, served to either delay a decision on relocation or to pave way for it. With the three aforementioned powerful forces at work, the Nigerian government, in August 1975, under the leadership of General Murtala Mohammed, established a panel to examine once and for all the issue of relocating the national capital. The panel, headed by Justice Akinola Aguda, had the following mandates:

(1) to examine the dual role of Lagos as a State, and Federal Capital and advise on the desirability, or otherwise, of the city retaining that role;

(2) if the committee found that Lagos was unsuitable for the dual role, it should recommend which of the two governments should move to a new capital; and

(3) if the committee found that the Federal Government should move out of Lagos, it should recommend suitable alternative locations, having regard to the need for easy accessibility to and from every part of the country (Report of the Committee 1976, p. iii).

Reflecting on these mandates, one could easily see how their stringed nature might bias the panel’s orientation, both in finding Lagos unsuitable as the capital and in recommending that the federal government, not the state government, should move to a new location. From the point of view that any body of individuals, once constituted, behaves like a living organism by gearing every effort towards survival, it was unlikely that the panel would have stopped short of exhausting all the potential mandates assigned to it. Conceptually, the panel had three lives to live -- the lives that would result from: (1) determining the desirability of Lagos; (2) deciding which of the federal and state governments should relocate; and (3) selecting a new site for the relocation. To live out these lives, the panel may have found it necessary to make these decisions so that they lead into one another.

In any event, less than four months from its inception, on December 10, 1975, the panel reported with findings that showed Lagos to be deficient as the national capital for several critical reasons:

(1) The city of Lagos is incapable of functioning as both a Federal Capital and a State Capital, due to the problem of inadequate land for development commensurate with its status as the Capital of Nigeria.
Lagos is identified predominantly with one ethnic group. A new capital in a more central location would provide equal access for Nigeria's great diversity of cultural groups.

A new capital is desirable that would be secure, ethnically neutral, centrally accessible, comfortable and healthful, and possess adequate land and natural resources to provide a promising base for urban development.

A new capital is needed as a symbol of Nigeria's aspirations for unity and greatness (Master plan 1979, p. 27).

These recommendations came as no surprise to most Nigerians. Even less surprising, was that without wasting any time, the Federal Military Government of General Murtala Mohammed, on February 5, 1976, promulgated Decree Number 6 -- The New Capital Territory Act -- which appropriated lands formerly belonging to Niger, Plateau and Kwara states for the new capital and created a new bureaucracy, the Federal Capital Authority (FCDA), to execute the decree.

3.1.2 Rationale for Relocation

The decision to transfer the country's capital was rationalized on eight grounds. First was the dual role of Lagos, both as a national and state capital. Since serving as the capital from 1914 till 1966, Lagos had largely been governed as an independent federal territory, not spatially or administratively tied to any region. However, things soon changed with the second creation of states in 1967, when an independent Lagos together with the "rural districts" of the Colony became Lagos State. This made the creation of a new state government immanent, and Lagos at this time commenced serving its historic role as capital for both the country and the state of Lagos; a role which has been synonymous with "the planning confusion in metropolitan Lagos" (Report of the Committee 1975, p. 32). Areas of this confusion included fisheries development, municipal affairs, housing, land tenure, etc. (Agba 1986, p. 140). It was observed in the literature review (Chapter 2), that it is usual in

3. In 1951, the MacPherson Constitution segmented Nigeria into Eastern, Western and Northern regions with respective regional headquarters at Enugu, Ibadan and Kaduna. Lagos, while remaining the country's capital, was added to the Western region and ceased to be an independent territory. In 1953, however, an amendment to the federal constitution reversed the position of Lagos, which reverted to an independent federal territory.
places where different levels of government have overlapping responsibilities, that either
nothing gets done or each level of government does as it wishes. The city of Lagos was such
a place.

Another dimension to the duality of Lagos concerns its role as both the administrative
and economic center of the country. On the administrative side, it is estimated that about 80
per cent of all federal civil servants reside in Lagos. This is approximately one million persons
including their families. Economically, Lagos is estimated to account for 38 per cent of all
industrial establishments in the country; 45 per cent of total industrial wages and salaries; 63
per cent of total industrial investment; and 58 per cent of total industrial output (Adeniyi 1984,
p. 3-4). These figures make Lagos undoubtedly the country's commercial and industrial hub.

A second ground for relocation has been referred to as the lack of elbow room in
Lagos. Apart from the land area of only 62 sq. miles, the disjointed nature of the city's terrain,
broken by lagoons and creeks, makes the site even more difficult for development.
Reclamation of land is made impossible by the enormous costs involved (as was demonstrated
by the cost of the National Theater building which was erected on a reclaimed site); and the
country's level of technology which precludes any serious consideration of vertical
development. So, with a population density of over 65,000 persons per square mile and an
annual population growth rate of about 10 per cent, it was felt that one of the critical
problems of Lagos is a lack of adequate land for expansion. For example, to adequately
accommodate the approximately one million persons that are said to be connected with the
federal civil service, it was estimated that 77.6 square miles of land are required in addition to
the currently existing federal structures (Report of the Committee 1975, p. 33). According to
this rationale, there is simply not enough land to plan effectively for Lagos.

A third rationale is the desire for a comfortable and healthy environment. Starting
with transportation, Lagos is considered an unlivable city because of its go-slow traffic
problem, which is no-go most of the time. Despite its low level of motor vehicle ownership,
which was less than 22 vehicles per 1,000 population in 1974 (Agba 1986, p. 137), the traffic
problems of the city confound those found in cities several times its size. Housing is another conspicuous urban problem that impinges on the city’s livability. Apart from an acute shortage estimated to be in the excess of 40,000 units (Agba 1986, p. 138), housing conditions in Lagos are deplorable with 73 per cent of households averaging nearly four persons per household occupying a single room; 28 per cent of the housing has no running water and 56 per cent is not equipped with flush toilets. (See table 4.2.)

Even though Lagos was provided with pipe-borne water in 1915 and was declared a first-class township in 1917 (Agba 1986, p. 132), water shortages and power failures are still not considered an anomaly by residents of the city. In terms of the sanitary condition of Lagos, the Report of the Committee on the Location of the Federal Capital (1976) had this to say: “Lagos remains one of the dirtiest capitals in the world, as most parts of the city suffer from perennial stench....” Finally, as far as security is concerned, the crime of armed robbery is punishable by firing squad. This has been the government’s response for many years but the problem has continued unabated, and Lagos is the one Nigerian city where burglary, armed robbery and other related crimes are rampant. It is Nigeria’s most unsafe city, forcing all of its residents to live in a constant state of carefulness. All of this suggests that the horrid conditions of urban life in Lagos and the prospect of a better life elsewhere were, without a doubt, a contributing factor in the movement to relocate.

A fourth rationale for deciding to move is the issue of national unity and ethnic neutrality. It is common knowledge that Nigeria is a multi-ethnic country with over 250 language and cultural groups, and that the country has been ruffled by ethnic rivalry from its inception. As such, there has always been a widespread feeling in the country that unity among such a great diversity of peoples is not served by the fact that Lagos, in 1963, was 72.20 per cent Yoruba, 15.46 per cent Ibo, 3.17 per cent Edo, and 2.05 per cent Hausa. The remarkable thing about this distribution is that the Yorubas are not even the largest of the country’s ethnic groups. Lagos, obviously, is a Yoruba land and with such a lop-sided ethnic mix, it was felt that the city, as capital, is inimical to the spirit of national unity as it could
never be a place where all Nigerians could lay claim to every available right, privilege and resource on an equal footing. This could only be achieved in a sort of no-man’s land where no one ethnic group predominated.

The fifth and sixth rationales for choosing to build a new capital are strategic in nature and concern issues of security and centrality. To the extent that conventional warfare is likely to be the dominant form in Africa for sometime to come, it was felt that a coastal capital would be harder to defend from an external incursion than an inland one. Furthermore, it was felt that a capital located in the spatial heartland of the country would bring the government closer to the governed, and assure that citizens from the extreme parts of the country are afforded roughly equal physical access in terms of distance. Lagos, as one of the old colonial capitals of Africa, was established along the coast chiefly to serve the commercial and functional purposes of the imperial power.

National pride is another reason cited for relocating the capital. As the most populous country in Africa with more than 100 million persons (Morah 1987), and the wealthiest in terms of natural resource endowments, Nigeria is regarded by both its nationals and outsiders as the “black giant” of Africa and, consequently, the world. It might be said that Nigerians regard their country as destined to be great, a leader of the black world and a force to be reckoned with in the international arena on matters political, economic and cultural. Normally, in ex-colonial countries, capital cities symbolize the culmination of this aspiration to become a member of the “Newer World” (Hamdan 1964, p. 239). Lagos, with all its aggravated urban problems, not only failed to provide this feeling of belongingness but, as remarked by the panel on the location of Abuja, the city’s “conditions are a disgrace to a country like Nigeria.”

Equally a disgrace was the fact that Lagos remained the most evident footprint of Imperial Britain in Nigeria; a situation which was neither admirable nor consistent with the concept of a new, independent country. Thus, for those with nationalist sentiments, building a new capital would signify having arrived in the new world, a coming of age into sovereign
statehood and a complete break from years of colonial rule. The new capital would represent a symbol of national pride.

An eighth rationale for relocation is the overall issue of efficiency in administration. Evidently, efficiency in government stands to be served if the new capital reduces the incredibly high idle capacity of both people and machines in Lagos resulting from the city's infamous go-slow traffic and intermittent power and water supply. Furthermore, to the extent that healthy living correlates positively with productivity, it is likely that an improved urban environment in a new location would translate into a net gain in administrative efficiency.

Finally, there are the regional development arguments for moving the capital. Even though advanced mainly after the issue of the new capital had been decided, the idea of using the decision to promote a more even and spatially balanced development in Nigeria became very strong. Virtually all academic commentaries on the new capital suggested that, given the eccentricity and primacy of the old colonial capital of Lagos, Abuja should serve as a device for attaining better regional balance and greater territorial integration (Nwafor 1980; Adeniyi 1984). It was also suggested that the new capital should be used to stimulate development in the hinterland of the region in which it is located; and to reduce population pressures on the country's major centers, especially Lagos, by redirecting flows of rural-urban migration. In fact, given the enormous costs involved in building a new capital, most academics and professionals in Nigerian felt that the rationale for relocation should not be accounted for mainly by such factors as "national pride" and the like. The new capital should symbolize a renewed optimism for development in general, an opportunity to experiment with a new approach to national development inspired by spatial theories of economic development.

Thus, it would seem that the rationale for the project rests on: (1) the dual role of Lagos, both as a national and state capital and as the administrative and economic center of the country; (2) the lack of "elbow room" or adequate land for development in Lagos; (3) the desire for a more comfortable and healthy environment than is provided by Lagos; (4) the
desire to enhance national unity by avoiding the lop-sided ethnic mix of Lagos; (5) the need to better secure the country’s capital from the possibility of an external incursion; (6) the desire to bring the government closer to the people through a more central location that affords citizens from the extreme parts of the country roughly equal physical access in terms of distance; (7) the desire to provide a symbol of national pride, of having arrived in the new world after years of subjugation under colonial rule; and (8) the notion of using the new capital to promote a more spatially balanced development by stimulating development in the hinterland of the new capital region. However, in reflecting on these justifications as well as the general history of relocation, three distinct impressions are formed as the more likely impetuses behind the decision to move the capital:

(1) Many Nigerians were dissatisfied with the appearance of the former capital of Lagos and the impression that it gave of the country to the outside world. (2) The northern Hausa-dominated decision making system in the country did not like the idea of having to conduct the nation’s affairs from a capital situated far away in the (hostile) south. (3) Notwithstanding these pressures, Abuja would have remained a dream, had it not been for the oil boom of the 1970s.

The validity of these justifications are clarified as the discussion in this chapter progresses.

3.1.3 Basic Concepts and Physical Form of the New Capital

Ranked in order of precedence by Todd (1984, p. 119-9),\(^4\) the broad official aims for the new capital were:

(1) to provide a physical symbol of national unity and of Nigeria as a symbol of pan-African unity;

(2) to provide a physical expression of the ideal of constitutional democratic government;

(3) to provide a cultural and symbolic center for West Africa;

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4. Todd was vice president of the IPA as well as the director of Wallace, McHarg and Todd Inc. which was one of the three planning firms that constituted the International Planning Associate (IPA). The latter was responsible for preparing the master plan for the new capital, and Todd was the director in charge of Site Evaluation, City Site Selection, Concept Planning, Urban Design, Master Planning and Community Services Planning (Master plan 1979, p. 285).
(4) to provide symbolic institutional and physical expression of the unique features of constitutional government forms as adapted to conditions and requirements particular to Nigeria and to traditional Nigerian governmental and cultural institutions;

(5) to provide a model of planning, urban design, organization of governmental functions, housing, and public services for emulation in new communities in Nigeria and West Africa;

(6) to provide in black Africa a metropolis including all the cosmopolitan elements and institutions characteristic of those cities generally acknowledged as world capitals; and

(7) to provide a high environmental standard for the inhabitants of the city that represents the best that can be afforded in Nigeria.

Nowhere in these goals was there a mention of building a city that resembles a western city, or in building an essentially administrative capital for that matter. If anything, the goals imply a multi-purpose city that would include an industrial and commercial base. It is true that the goals called for providing a high environmental standard for the city, but this was qualified by specifying that such a standard should, nonetheless, be the best that can be afforded in Nigeria.

The non-specific and rather ideological nature of these goals, however, allowed room for the FCDA officials to exercise their disposition.\(^5\) Consequently, the guidelines they developed for the preparation of the new capital's master plan do not accord closely with the broad aims expressed:

1. the master plan target is the year 2,000;

2. the new capital is to have a permanent population of 150,000 persons in residence upon inauguration in 1986;

3. the new capital will be permitted to grow to a maximum population of approximately 3 million, after which population growth will be accommodated in satellite towns;

4. the new capital will be an administrative city and will not be oriented to developing broad economic base characteristics of the other large cities of Nigeria, or what would be typical of a primate city; and

5. the new capital and Federal Capital Territory will have a limited quantity of light industrial, agricultural research and development, and housing activities to

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5. One of the responsibilities of the FCDA included the preparation of a master plan for the capital city. (See section 3.1.4.)
provide a city building industry, to foster social diversity, and to provide support service facilities related to unique capital city needs. Such non-administrative, institutional, or industrial activities that take place to build and serve the city will be compatible with the environment (Master plan 1979, p. 55).6

Beyond digressing from the spirit of building a cosmopolitan metropolis for all Nigerians, the guideline contains irreconcilable contradictions and raises all sorts of questions. For example, could a purely administrative city ever grow to 3.0 million,7 or serve as a "growth center," providing catalyst to development of the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), as suggested by one of the rationales for relocation? Given guidelines 4 and 5, it is unlikely that the new capital would have significant effects on its hinterland because, as basically a "non-propulsive" establishment, without strong "forward and backward linkages,"8 the city would tend to require less labor and raw materials from its surrounding areas. Almost all wage employees of the new city would be relocated from the former capital, with few positions available for unqualified rural migrants.

Design wise, the basic concept is for the new capital to be a proud expression of both Nigerian urban traditions and the ideal of a constitutional democracy. Appropriately, a centrally-oriented city plan form was decided upon,9 focusing on the structures that will

6. It is interesting to note that the master plan avoids listing an explicit aspect of the guideline stating that "population shall be controlled to the extend that the new capital will not be permitted, as Lagos, to become target of migrating populations in search of employment. Squatter will be displaced" (Todd 1984, p. 119).
7. Perhaps more interesting is the question of what process was used in selecting this maximum size for the city, as no explanation was provided for this and the issue was not among those considered by the Aguda panel on relocation. Even though it was unclear to him "why the military would select an apparently arbitrary size instead of basing such a figure on projected employment figures, possible migration levels, or other analytical studies, Moore's (1982, p. 51) best guess is that the decision was made by the military politicians. A possible explanation is that the military, having minimal knowledge in the construction of new towns, did not find this issue worthy of wasting time on.
8. A "propulsive" entity is a type of dominant economic unit which, when it grows or innovates, induces growth in other economic units or sectors. As originally presented by Perroux, this unit is normally an industry with tangible productive capacities (Hansen 1972). Using the case of a cement industry to demonstrate forward and backward linkages, Hirschman (1958) writes: "the manufacturing of multi-wall bags for packaging process represents backward linkages, while the establishment of a cement block industry represents a satellite formation by forward linkages."
9. A study of 27 Nigerian cities by the International Planning Associates (IPA) "supposedly" found that they share a strong urban tradition in support of a contiguous urban mass with a single center, as opposed to non-contiguous clusters (Master plan 1979, p. 65-9). "Supposedly" because: "Initially social planning was not done by the IPA team. After the draft of the master plan had been
house the three distinct powers in a constitutional democracy -- the executive, the legislative and the judiciary. Both the architectural design of the structures and their location relative to dramatic topographic features of the site, are to give the city its orientation and monumental image. The city's form is to be confined to a "crescent shape" in harmony with the natural features of the site, while the special significance of the seat of the national government is to be achieved by an axial focus on Aso Hill, which towers over the surrounding plains by 1,300 ft. (See figure 3.1.)

In terms of the settlement plan, the basic concept is for Abuja to be a city of districts and neighborhoods, arranged in such a way that travel distance for services is minimized. Accommodating between 22,000 to 35,000 persons, a district is to be made up of smaller neighborhoods of between 4,000 to 7,000 persons. Each district is to be served by a district center and each neighborhood by a neighborhood center. (See figure 3.2). Even though the idea is to make each neighborhood self-sufficient with a market, a supermarket, a post office, a park, a clinic, shops and primary schools, the district centers are to provide residents with higher social amenities.

Regionally, "the new city and its surrounding territory are not isolated from one another. In fact, in many respects, they are closely interlocked functionally" (Master plan 1979, p. 225). One area of this functional interrelationship is the development of satellite towns, intended to serve as a catchment area for the excess population of the city at a 3.0 million capacity (Master plan 1979, p. 55). This, of course, begs the question why these satellite towns are now being developed simultaneous with the new city (i.e., with some negative consequences -- see section 4.2.7.), when the latter's population is still below 100,000.

completed, realizing their oversight, the IPA funded a study on neighborhood development. According to Lockwood [one of the IPA's resident managers] they were lucky to find that a 'traditional' Nigerian city, in terms of neighborhood development and spatial organization, conforms to a city that is planned according to western planning principles.... As a result of this 'lucky' coincidence the IPA felt it did not have to make significant changes in the plan" (Moore 1982, p. 96).
FIGURE 3.1: PHYSICAL DESIGN OF ABUJA

Source: Master plan 1979.
Source: Master plan 1979.
3.1.4 Administrative Arrangements for Abuja

Decree Number 6 of 1976, the New Capital Territory Act, which promulgated the relocation decision also established the administrative machinery for the new capital. It stated, in section 3, that:

There shall be established an authority to be known as the Federal Capital Development Authority which shall consist of a chairman and eight members to be appointed by the Supreme Military Council. The authority shall be a body corporate with perpetual succession and a common seal (Federal Republic of Nigeria 1976).

This body corporate was to be both the builder of the new city, as well as the government of the entire Federal Capital Territory (FCT). Section 4 of the decree lists the responsibilities of the Authority as including:

(1) the choice of site for the relocation of the capital city within the capital territory;

(2) the preparation of a master plan for the capital city and of land use with respect to town and country planning within the rest of the capital territory;

(3) the provision of municipal services within the capital territory;

(4) the establishment of infrastructure services in accordance with the master plan referred to above; and

(5) the coordination of the activities of all Ministries, Departments and Agencies of the government of the federation within the capital territory (Federal Republic of Nigeria 1976).

To properly discharge these functions, the same section 4 of the decree gave the Authority wide powers to do "anything" that would facilitate the carrying out of its activities, including the powers to:

(1) sue and be sued in the corporate name;

(2) hold and manage movable and immovable property;

(3) construct and maintain roads, railways, sidings, tramways, bridges, reservoirs, water courses, buildings, plants and machinery and such other works as may be necessary for, or conducive to, the discharge of its functions under this Decree (Act);

(4) purchase or otherwise acquire or take over any asset, business, property, privilege, contract, right, obligation and liability of any person or body
(whether corporate or unincorporate) which in the opinion of the Authority will facilitate the discharge of its functions under this Decree (Act); and

(5) train managerial and technical staff for the purpose of the discharge of functions conferred on it by or in pursuance of this Decree (Act) (Federal Republic of Nigeria 1976).

Even though the FCDA structurally consisted of one chairman and eight other members, as noted earlier, the daily management of the Authority was to be overseen by an executive secretary who, like the rest, would also be appointed by the Supreme Military Council. The organizational arrangement of the Authority between 1976 and 1979 is depicted in figure 3.3. It shows the corporation as aided by Special Advisers and Consultants and having five fully fledge departments: (1) Administration; (2) Financial/Economic Planning and Social Research; (3) Planning and Architecture; (4) Development and Engineering Service; and (5) Estate.

In terms of housing related duties, the Department of Development and Engineering Service was made responsible for transforming the physical plans of the new capital into reality. This included the responsibility for the construction and maintenance of houses and building complexes designed by the Planning and Architecture Department which, in turn, was made responsible for the following:

(1) to prepare strategic physical and environmental plans for the FCT in cooperation with other departments;

(2) to ensure the effective implementation of such plans for the FCT within the framework of the master plan;

(3) to prepare site development plans, landscaping plans, designs, specifications and standards for public and private buildings;

(4) to develop building standards and designs and keep current indices of building materials to promote construction efficiency and cost reduction;

(5) to keep all planning and development registries necessary for granting planning and building permissions, so as to avoid multiple allocations and/or uses and haphazard development; and

(6) to supervise all building construction to ensure compliance with planning development and design guidelines, and architectural controls (FCDA 1979, p. 23).
The Department of Estates, on the other hand, was made responsible for the administration of land and estates, and the maintenance of housing in the FCT, both public and private. This responsibility included:

1. surveying of plots and demarcating the land according to the site plan of the land;
2. allocating and assigning the land and ensuring that overlapping allocation of plots is avoided;

Source: Agba 1986, p. 312.
CHAPTER 3: MATERIALS AND METHOD

(3) estate surveying including the valuation of land properties for the purposes of property rating and compensation when necessary;

(4) allocation and management of public housing, house rent collections and sales;

(5) development and maintenance of all land use regulations, and collection of land revenues;

(7) surveying and mapping of lands before construction work begins on them;

(8) compensation and resettlement policies within the FCT;

(9) land/property acquisition and procurement for use by the FCDA; and

(10) land rehabilitation, and re-assignment and alienation (FCDA 1979, p. 30-1).

Without wasting much time on the subject, it is plain to see that the division of labor between the three aforementioned departments creates several sources of administrative confusion and conflict. For example, the Department of Development and Engineering’s function regarding "construction and maintenance of houses" conflicts with both the Department of Estate’s responsibility for the "allocation and management of public housing," as well as Planning and Architecture Department’s role of "supervising all building construction to ensure compliance." The responsibility for the "development and maintenance of all land use regulation" is another example. Categorically assigned to the Department of Estate, this function overlaps with Planning and Architecture Department whose responsibility encompassed both "preparing the physical plans for the FCT" and "ensuring compliance with planning development and design guidelines." A more detailed discussion of the FCDA’s organizational arrangement problems can be found in Agba (1986) and Geyus (1984).

In October 1979, with the ascent of a civilian administration, a new organizational arrangement was formed under the presidency of Alhaji Shehu Shagari. Shown in figure 3.4, the reorganization created two new bureaucracies and changed the status of the FCDA from an autonomous corporate body to a ministry. The reason for the reorganization would seem obvious with the advent of a democratic government in lieu of a military regime. The Authority had to be brought under the control of both the presidency and the legislature. However, given that the 1979 election was organised by the military, it has been suggested that President Shagari, a Northerner, feared that fighting a re-election campaign in 1983 from Lagos would prove extremely dangerous; that is, in light of the well
(MFCT) was created and made responsible for the territory's overall development policy, while the Federal Capital Territory Administration (FCTA) was charged with responsibility for the general administration of the territory (i.e., in ways analogous to a local government). The ministry was to serve as an umbrella for both the FCDA and FCTA. By freeing the FCDA to operate exclusively as the builder of the city, this structure appears more workable than the former. Nevertheless, the fact that the MFCT's "development function" was not clearly separated in the arrangement remained a source of confusion and conflict.

With the overthrow of the civilian administration in December 1983 and the return of the military under General Buhari, the FCTA was abolished and merged into the MFCT. (See figure 3.5.) The Buhari administration was short lived and when it collapsed in 1985, yet a new structure, albeit a cosmetic change, was adopted by the succeeding General Ibrahim Babangida which merged some departments and functions. For example, the Department of Public Works was created by merging the departments of Estate and Quartering, and Building and Services; and the Department of Administration became Personnel and Management. At the time of the field work, another structural reorganization was underway which can be expected to change yet again in 1990 when, and if, the army abdicates power to the civilians.

Known fact that the Southerner Yorubas who dominate Lagos, have never been amused over the transferring of the capital out of their homeland. From this perspective, therefore, the addition of the two new bureaucracies was primarily a ploy by the president to quicken the pace of the capital transfer to a more northern, hence safer location. This suggestion is corroborated by the fact that the Shagari administration actually updated the initial 1986 movement deadline to 1982, just a year before the date of the next election (Moore 1982, p. 103).
Figure 3.4: Federal Capital Development Authority Organizational Arrangement Under Civilian Government (Oct. 1979 - Sept. 1983)

CHAPTER 3: MATERIALS AND METHOD

Figure 3.5: Federal Capital Development Authority Organizational Arrangement (1984-5)

3.1.5 Setting of the New Site

Table 3.1 shows the basis used by the Aguda panel for selecting among the alternate sites for the new capital. It contains a thirteen point weighting system which, for ease of analysis, has been presented here to correspond with the subtitles shown. Before amplifying briefly on these criteria, it should be noted that the interesting thing about them remains whether or not they were devised after the fact, to justify an essentially political or arbitrary choice. Apparently, it appears that "the Abuja site has a history of its own" which does not deny this possibility (Moore 1982, p. 40-1). The fact that the ethnicity factor, which was considered to be so crucial in initiating the movement, was only assigned the weight of 3%, is a strong indication that the site selection process was carefully manipulated by the panel to suppress or avoid political issues and discussions. Yet, looking at the criteria creates the impression that the selection was done on the basis of physical and economic efficiency, as only 9 per cent of the weighting was given to socio-demographic consideration.

3.1.5.1 Physical Characteristics

The Federal Capital Territory (FCT) is located in the geographical heartland of Nigeria, bordered mostly by Niger and Plateau states. (See figure 3.6). It covers some 3,600 square miles, which is more than twice the size of Lagos state. Within this expanse, Abuja or the Federal Capital City (FCC) will occupy 96 square miles at a population of 1.6 million persons. When fully developed at 3 million, the city is expected to occupy approximately 180 square miles, nearly three times the size of the city of Lagos (See figure 3.7.) While these facts obviously satisfy the requirements for centrality, land availability and security, they suggest a very low density of development.
## Table 3.1: Criteria for Selecting the Site of the Federal Capital Territory

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criterion</th>
<th>Weight by (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Physical Characteristics</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Centrality</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Health and Climate</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Land Availability and Use</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Water Supply</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Security</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Power Resources</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Drainage</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Physical Planning Convenience</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Soil</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic Characteristics</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Multi-Access Possibilities</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Existence of Local Building Materials</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Socio-Demographic Characteristics</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Low Population Density</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Ethnic Accord</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Abumere 1984, p. 20.

Climate wise, the FCT experiences two major masses of air as do all parts of the country. Associated with the warm or dry season from November to March, is the tropical continental mass which develops in the north over the Sahara Desert and blows south. Engendering the wet or rainy season from April to October, is the countervailing maritime mass blowing from the Atlantic in the south. Hence, the FCT records its highest temperatures of between 30°C - 37°C during the dry season months, and lowest temperatures of as low as 7°C during the rainy season months.
CHAPTER 3: MATERIALS AND METHOD

FIGURE 3.6: LOCATION AND PHYSICAL ACCESS OF ABUJA

CHAPTER 3: MATERIALS AND METHOD

FIGURE 3.7: ALTERNATIVE SITES CONSIDERED FOR ABUJA WITHIN THE FCT

Source: Master plan 1979.
In terms of humidity, the FCT with a higher altitude than Lagos is less humid and, therefore, drier. It is generally the case in Nigeria that climate improves with altitude in the sense that heat and humidity diminish. This fact was crucial in deciding where to build the capital city within the territory. Apparently, the extreme southern part of the territory is marked by 10 per cent more humidity than the northern part. While the afternoon relative humidity during the wet seasons rises everywhere in the territory to above 50 per cent, it drops in the dry season to 20 per cent at more northern locations and to 30 per cent at extreme southern locations (Abumeri 1984, p. 39-42).

Disease vectors in the FCT are reported to include simulium carriers causing river blindness, tsetse fly causing sleeping sickness and female anopheles causing malaria. The latter two vectors are not unique to the territory, as they are found in all parts of the country at roughly the same incidence. As for simulium carriers, an ecological report on the FCT suggested that river blindness was a serious problem peculiar to the territory. This led to a simulium unit being established by the FCDA, both to conduct research on the problem and to treat the rivers and vegetations believed to incubate the carriers. Remarkably, a comparison of the incidence of river blindness throughout the country later revealed that the great attention given to the presence of the vector in the territory was grossly exaggerated and unjustified (Mabogunje and Abumeri 1981).

Finally, except for concerns expressed about the availability of water resources in the region (Master plan 1979, p. 27-54), the fact that the physiography of most of the FCT does not present any major geo-technical constraints to urban development, meant that the site selection goal of physical planning convenience was ultimately served.

3.1.5.2 Economic Characteristics

Two of the site selection criteria required for multi-access possibilities and the existence of local building materials presumably for use in building the city. While Abuja, in
the long run, may have more access than Lagos by virtue of its central location, there is no doubt that, "with existing highways, the FCT has noticeably poorer access" (Master plan 1979, p. 159). (See figure 3.8.) Regarding the availability of local building materials, the FCT has such pertinent resources as timber, gravel, sand, etc., but it was unlikely that much, if any, of these materials would be in the form that could be used for construction right away. That is, in light of the urgency surrounding the new capital construction, and the fact that this would make logistic issues of volume and security of supply a major problem with sourcing the city's building materials from within the region. As an obvious logic, it gives the impression that the criterion may have been incorporated in the site selection scheme simply to cater to the widespread sentiments among the professionals in the country that the new capital should be used as an instrument of regional development.

3.1.5.3 Socio-Demographic Characteristics

Initially, the Aguda panel on relocation had estimated approximately 50,000 inhabitants in the territory who would be affected by the project. After further speculating on the matter without hard facts, the government later rounded up this estimate to 125,000 in 1977 (FCDA 1987, p. 1). The dominant prior form of settlement in the FCT at this time was villages and hamlets.\(^1\) There were no fewer than 845 of these villages and hamlets scattered throughout the plains of the FCT. Many of these settlements were quite small then, varying from 2 - 4,000 inhabitants. In fact, about 85 per cent of the settlements at the time had population sizes of between 100 - 500 inhabitants. Only 5 villages had more than 2,000 inhabitants.

---

11. A village is larger than a hamlet but smaller than a town. Villages within the FCT are of the nucleated type, almost always made up of huts grouped very closely together to form compounds. The huts are never more than 4 meters in diameter and are composed of clay walls and thatched roof (Abumere 1984, p 55). Closely tied to the villages are the hamlets sometimes called tungas. A tuna is a daughter settlement usually located within a few hours walking distance from the parent village, upon which the tuna depends for its social life. A tuna has no market of its own and normally celebrates its traditional rites jointly with the parent village. So, as might be expected, there are several similarities between these two types of settlements such as a common architectural style. The round "Sudanese" design shown in figure 3.9 is prevalent and accounts for more than 80 per cent of the dwellings in the territory.
(Obiechina 1985, p. 34). So, one of the most striking characteristics of the territory is its sparse population, which satisfies the criterion of a "low population density."

**FIGURE 3.8: ROAD ACCESS TO FCT VS ROAD ACCESS TO LAGOS (1978)**

Source: Master plan 1979.
図3.9: FCTに典型的な村

Source: Abumere 1984.
Figure 3.10: Density and Settlement Pattern in the FCT (1978)

Source: Abumere 1984.
Figure 3.11: Pre- and Post-FCT Settlement Pattern (1977/85)

Source: Obiechina 1985, p. 31 & 34.
According to figure 3.10 on the settlement distribution of the territory in 1978, only Karu, Ruboichi and Abaji had population density of more than 30 persons per square kilometer. Most of the remaining areas had less than 20 persons per square kilometer. Based on the 1963 census, population density figures for selected provinces in the country range from 19 to 327 (Abumere 1984, p. 47).

Of course, since the onset of the new capital, there have been remarkable changes in the settlement pattern of the territory. These changes (see figure 3.11) were due mainly to the construction activities which drastically altered the economic opportunities in the region, but also to the government policy on resettlement.

The FCT Decree No. 6, 1976, which established the FCDA, initially envisaged that the FCDA would move to FCT, evacuate the inhabitants, compensate and resettle them outside of FCT and proceed to build the city. [But at a later date,] there was a change of policy whereby the Federal Military Government directed that only the inhabitants of the newly designated priority areas of the FCT (i.e., the FCC site proper) would be evacuated, compensated and resettled (FCDA 1979, p. 11).

More than call into question the site selection criterion of ethnic neutrality, this major shift in policy has meant that land tenure in the territory is going to be a crucial factor. Unlikely to be regarded as squatters on their own land, this raises the critical question of whether the indigenes of the FCT are to maintain their land tenure system. If so, there is nothing to prevent them from speculating in land or contesting the powers of the federal government to unilaterally administer land allocation and development in the territory?

According to a consultancy report prepared for the Nigerian government by the Institute of Administration at Ahmadu Bello University (1979, p. 78-86), the indigenous method of land

12. As Agba (1986, p. 211-2) explains, the reason for this change in policy was financial. It was mentioned earlier that the Aguda panel had initially estimated the indigenous population of the territory to be 50,000. But when a detailed study was later conducted to provide hard data for the compensation and resettlement purposes, this number rose dramatically. Consequently, estimated resettlement costs increased from N6.5 to N117 million. Later added to this excuse is the "planning implications of leaving a vast habitable land uninhabited" (FCDA 1988, p. 37).

13. Still, the problem that this presents is minuscule in comparison to Lagos. The ethnic composition of most of the villages and hamlets of the FCT are either entirely or about 85 per cent Quari. But the noteworthy point is that neither the Moslems (32.5%) nor the Christians (19.6%) dominates the area. The pagans or traditionalists (47.9%) make up half of the territory's indigenous population (Obiechina 1985, p. 39).
acquisition and transfer for much of population involves: (1) the simple clearing of virgin land, (2) inheritance or (3) borrowing or gift of land. The important point about this system of land tenure, according to the source, is that permission is usually not required from anyone to establish this right which is "permanent and which gives the land holder complete management right" to sell, give away, rent or loan the land.

The settlement difficulty presented by this change in policy should have been mitigated by the fact that some of the indigenous population of the territory were resettled in the neighboring states of their choice. But the information obtained during the field research is that many of those resettled outside the FCT, after taking their compensation money, have since returned to take up permanent residency in the territory. In any event, a 1981 census of the indigenous population revealed a total of 131,525 inhabitants (Mabogunje et al. 1981), whose status in the FCT hitherto has been considered ephemeral. Thus, with the change in policy making them permanent residents of the territory, it is not startling that some serious implications have been envisaged as a result:

The decision to allow the indigenous population to remain within the FCT will probably have the effect of slowing down the rate of migration to all FCT areas outside of the FCC. As early as 1984, all the applications for land in the FCT by Nigerians have been in respect of land within the FCC, none has gone for the rest of the FCT. It is possible to argue that this trend may change, but there is still the likely probability that the presence of an indigenous population may make the procurement of land by other Nigerians [i.e., non-FCT aborigines] in the rest of the FCT (outside the FCC) a little more difficult, a factor which itself may reduce the volume of migration into these areas (Abumere 1986, p. 291).

Noteworthy is that the current reality of squatting in the territory contradicts this prediction of the volume of migration into the region. The fact that squatting in the territory...
has tended to be heaviest in those indigenous settlements surrounding Abuja, suggests that these settlements instead encourage migration by acting as reception centers for the immigrants. (See section 4.2.6.) Tables 3.2 and 3.3 give a population profile of the FCT. The reader should, however, be warned that the reliability of the figures contained in the tables is suspect, as there has not been an actual head count to determine the population of the territory. The only census conducted in the area in 1981 focused exclusively on determining the population of the indigenous inhabitants for resettlement and compensation purposes.

### TABLE 3.2: POPULATION PROFILE OF THE FCT (1985-90)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>FCT (AS A WHOLE)</th>
<th>MUNICIPALITY* OF ABUJA</th>
<th>INDIGENE** FCT</th>
<th>INDIGENE/NON INDIGENE RATIO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>410,450</td>
<td>160,000</td>
<td>149,760</td>
<td>1 : 2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>492,300</td>
<td>198,500</td>
<td>154,706</td>
<td>1 : 3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>516,900</td>
<td>208,400</td>
<td>159,811</td>
<td>1 : 3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>535,020</td>
<td>218,820</td>
<td>165,085</td>
<td>1 : 3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>553,850</td>
<td>229,760</td>
<td>170,533</td>
<td>1 : 3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>573,450</td>
<td>241,250</td>
<td>176,161</td>
<td>1 : 3.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Includes the FCC and its immediate surrounding areas.

** 1981 (Mabogunje et al.) census figure of 131,525. Projected based on the assumptions of natural increase of 3.3 per cent (Morah 1987) and zero migration.

### Table 3.3: Estimated Population of Government Workers and Their Families in the FCC (1988) +

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Number of Government Houses in the FCC</td>
<td>6,108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Estimated Number of Persons Adequately Accommodated</td>
<td>36,648</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6,108 X 6 Persons per Household)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Estimated Subletting/Sharing by Those Adequately Accommodated*</td>
<td>7,390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Estimated Population of Privately Housed Individuals**</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Estimated Population of the FCC</td>
<td>44,118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2 + 3 + 4)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+ The balance population for the FCT is 58,014, making a total of 102,132. (See table 4.19 on housing demand for the territory.)

* The preliminary report on the 1988 FCDA housing census in the FCT does not give a breakdown of housing completions by type, but table 4.5 on total number of housing contracts awarded does. This table indicates a 22%, 35% and 43% formula for allocating 1, 2 and 3 or more bedroom house types in the FCC. Based on this, the ability of adequately housed individuals to sublet or accommodate "hangers-on" of extended families and friends is calculated as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>House Type</th>
<th>Number of Units</th>
<th>Added Capacity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3-6 BD (43%)</td>
<td>2,626 x 2</td>
<td>5,252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 BD (35%)</td>
<td>2,138 x 1</td>
<td>2,138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 BD (22%)</td>
<td>1,344 x 0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>6,108</strong></td>
<td><strong>7,390</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In other words, it is assumed that persons assigned to 3 or more bedroom units can manage to accommodate up to 8 people per unit, while persons assigned to 2 bedroom units can manage 7 people. Given that the 1 bedroom units were typically assigned to low-income civil servants who, in general, tend to have bigger households than higher income groups, the assumption is that this group of residents would not be able to take on boarders of any kind, beyond the average number of persons (6) assumed for each household by the IPA. Even though the FCDA (1988, p. 40) uses the average family size of 6 persons per household in computing its population estimates for the new capital, there are some sources that use a higher average household size of up to 8.

** Assuming 10 fully developed private plots with an average of 8 members per plot.

Source: Author
3.2. METHODS

3.2.1 Research Design

The study adopts the case study design as this is the prevailing mode of empirical inquiry on the subject of implementation (Bardach 1977; Palumbo and Harder 1981). It typically involves a post-adoption analysis of a decision/program with the aim of isolating salient occurrences which both describe what happened and suggest reasons why. The design is normally dismissed as being unscientific, first, because it lacks pre-adoption observations and a comparative group; second, because cases for analysis are not randomly selected; and, third, because there is no uniformity in the rules for selecting and interpreting information both between and within cases.

Nonetheless, it has been pointed out that case studies are frequently carried out in settings where many variables are measured at the pre-adoption stage; where contextual knowledge is already rich; and where intelligent presumptions can be made about what the outcome would be like without the program or treatment. These factors, it is argued, “can often serve the same role that pre-[adoption] measures and controls do” (Cook and Campbell 1979, p. 96). Thus, notwithstanding the problem of control and the fact that the design ultimately does not lend itself to generalizations, the common agreement among scholars is that case studies can be used effectively to provide both rich and concrete information on those elements that need to be taken into account in either developing or testing a model, paradigm or theory. Figure 3.12 shows the case study process followed by this researcher, except that there was first a preliminary data collection stage before the formal phase.

16. Both Cropper (1982) and Masser (1982) also conclude that the approach is particularly appropriate for the analysis of related processes of planning and decision making.
17. This problem is partially supplemented by the use of a survey design to both establish housing outcomes in the new capital, and determine the disposition of current policy officials towards the project. This is aside from the fact that the case study design does not come highly recommended for this sort of research issues in the first place (Yin 1984, p. 17).
3.2.2 Evaluation Techniques

Two techniques are employed -- (1) outcome evaluation to determine the extent to which Abuja has succeeded in reaching its physical housing goals; and (2) process evaluation to explain the housing outcomes. The two techniques complement each other in several ways. First, public policy is both a process of decision-making as well as the product and the outcome of that decision. Second, an outcome evaluation without a process evaluation may determine policy success or failure, but not the explanations behind that success or failure. And, third, a process evaluation can be used to mitigate some of the internal validity threats to
outcome evaluation resulting, for instance, from: (1) the use of vague policy goals as a yardstick for measuring policy effects; (2) the evaluation of policies that had become radically redefined during implementation; (3) improper designation of the intervention or when implementation has occurred; and (4) the lumping together of faulty implementation with program results.

To determine the outcome of the housing program in Abuja, it was necessary to do three things. The settlement goals for the new capital had to be established. It had to be ascertained whether or not the programs means for achieving goals are appropriate (i.e., whether the means and ends of the program are connected based on a valid theory of causation). Finally, valid quantifiable indicators or measures of effectiveness representing policy success had to be selected.

Pursuant to these requirements, cues from two sources are used in establishing the settlement goals of the new capital: (1) the "legal intent" of the policy as written in the legislation and the master plan; and (2) current policy makers' understanding of policy goals as reflected in their statements during field interviews. A content analysis of the Abuja master plan is carried out in order to ascertain the validity of the program's inherent theory. Finally, following from the settlement goals of the new capital, performance indices are selected that include: (1) affordability, (2) availability, (3) access, (4) squatting, (5) cultural propriety of development, etc..

In undertaking the preliminary process evaluation to explain why the shortfall in the housing program occurred, the research focus progresses from collecting and analyzing available data on the program to entering physically into the program's world. Rather than concentrating on the tangible products of the program, emphasis is placed on the process or dynamics whereby the products were produced such that, in meeting with key individuals associated with the program, more attention was paid to the qualitative and informal aspects of the implementation. For instance, much time was spent listening to the perceptions of people close to the program about the formal goals of the program, the informal goals, the
way the program is designed to operate, the way it actually operates, the way it ought to operate, and so forth.

3.2.3 Sources and Methods of Data Collection

The dissertation recognizes that no one source or method can exclusively serve its purposes, and that the kinds of data to be collected, as well as method of collection, will be governed by both the nature of the policy and what is obtainable in the field. The following sources and methods are used:

(1) **Self reports** -- officials were asked about themselves and their experiences.

(2) **Visual inspection** -- officials and program activities were observed on-site.

(3) **Program and operation records** -- all printed bureau material available on the policy were collected and evaluated. These include relevant legislative acts, program proposals and master plans, previous evaluation reports, reports by consultants, annual reports, budget submissions, operations reports, internal memoranda, propaganda booklets, press releases, etc.

(4) **Social indicators and official statistics** -- relevant quantitative indices of societal conditions and trends (e.g., population and income trends) were examined.

(5) **Documentary Research** -- relevant secondary studies (e.g., books, theses, conference papers, journal articles, newspaper editorials, etc.) on the topic were assembled and analyzed.

3.2.4 Preliminary Activities in the Field and the Questionnaire

The field work took place in Nigeria and Tanzania for eight months, between September 1988 and April 1989. The first stage of the preliminary activities involved gathering material from seven different research sites in Nigeria including Zaria, Abuja, Lagos, Ibadan, Ife, Benin and Nsukka. In keeping with the primary object of the preliminary field work to gather relevant secondary studies that are not available in libraries overseas, the research sites
in Nigeria were selected to include the country's six world-standard universities -- the Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria; the University of Lagos; the University of Ibadan; the Awolowo University, Ile Ife, (formerly the University of Ife); the University of Benin, Benin City; and the University of Nigeria, Nsukka.

While the greater part of the field work at this stage was done in these institutions and involved intensive literature search in their libraries, a substantial effort was also expended in developing an understanding of the politics surrounding the decision making and implementation process for the new capital. This was achieved primarily by interacting informally with academics, students, bureaucrats, politicians, and other groups and individuals concerned with matters related to the new capital. Generally, the respondents were asked about their feelings for the new capital, what problems they see with housing in the city and how these problems might be approached.

The second stage of the preliminary field work involved analyzing data collected from the various sites visited, comparing this to previously collected data and then developing a questionnaire for the formal level of the investigation. As such, the questionnaire was based on information collected from both the documentary research and the preliminary field interviews. There are two parts to the questionnaire. Part one comprises 36 closed ended propositions designed to elicit opinion and attitudinal responses on issues about the new capital for the purposes of: (1) determining officials' understanding of the policy, (2) their acceptance of it and (3) the intensity of this acceptance. As a result, response options to the propositions were closed to "strongly disagree," "disagree," "agree," or "strongly agree." For each proposition, respondents were asked to give two responses: (1) "own response" and (2) an estimation on what the "popular response" might be. By treating the propositions in terms of "agree" and "strongly agree," the instrument distinguishes between opinions and attitudes. The latter are typically held with more intensity.

18. The questions were designed with the aid of a "how to" handbook on measuring attitudes by Henerson et al. (1978).
There are several reasons behind the double answer format (i.e., "own" and "popular" response). First, to the extent that the object of the questionnaire was to uncover individual attitudes and dispositions, it was felt that officials may not want to expose their dispositions, preferring to see themselves in or with other people (i.e., popular response). Secondly, in the eventuality of this suspicion being borne out by the evidence (which it was not), it was felt that the format provides a basis for comparison and for checking for the internal validity of responses obtained. It acts to provide a lower and upper bound margin within which the likely response might be hypothesized. Nevertheless, it was intended that the deliberate random ordering of the propositions making up that part of the questionnaire would act as the main safeguard against the possibility of officials giving untrue responses. The logic is that the random ordering would discourage the interviewees from attempting to predict what sort of responses they feel may have been expected. Finally, for prescriptive reasons, the format provides an indication to what extent the officials feel they are in compliance with the public's wishes.

Part two of the questionnaire is open ended and comprises three direct self-explanatory questions on housing problems in the new capital, the causes of the problems and the envisioned solutions.

3.2.5 Research Population and the Formal Interviews

The formal research population was identified during the preliminary field work activities. Key informants were asked to recommended other key informants who are knowledgeable on the politics of the new capital and have (or have had) a direct senior level involvement with the project. This has generally meant current employees of the FCDA mandated to build the new capital,\(^1\) and university academics who research and consult on the project. But a few key employees were also recommended from the following pertinent

\(^{19}\) Within the FCDA, the emphasis was on officials from departments with definite housing related responsibilities: Planning and Survey; Architecture and Building; and Estate and Quartering.
agencies: Federal Housing Authority (FHA), Federal Ministry of Works and Housing (FMWH), Federal Ministry of National Planning under the Presidency, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Abuja Municipal Government under the Ministry of the Federal Capital Territory (MFCT), Nigerian Institute of Economic and Social Research (NISER) and Federal Ministry of Industries.

In all, a total of 45 officials (30 civil servants and 15 academics) were targeted to receive the formal questionnaires. It should be pointed out here that a select number of these targeted individuals also participated in the preliminary field interviews. 45 questionnaires were subsequently administered out of which 42 were recovered in a usable form. Among these are responses from: 11 decision makers (departmental deputy directors and directors); 20 implementors (senior level officials below the rank of deputy director); and 11 academics (members of faculty and/or research institutes). Names and official titles of these participants can be found in appendix 1, along with the formal questionnaire that was administered. The administration of the questionnaires was undertaken by the researcher. With the exception of a few that were administered as direct interviews, the majority of the questionnaires were left with the respondents for retrieval at a later date.

3.2.6 Issues Arising from the Field Setting

The biggest disappointment of the field work comes from failed attempts to reach any former members of the International Planning Associates (IPA), the American consortium that was responsible for preparing the master plan for Abuja. Though, admittedly, this disappointment did not come as a total surprise, as there have been accounts of similar outcomes from past attempts that were made only few years after the IPA completed its contract with the Nigerian government (Onibokun 1984, p. 16). This is one of the drawbacks that comes with engaging the services of international consultancies which tend to be organized on ad hoc basis and then disbanded once the contractual agreements are fulfilled. For planning, which tends to be an iterative affair, this drawback is a major concern.
In any event, references made to the IPA officials in this dissertation are drawn from the 1982 dissertation on Abuja by Moore who was able to interview members of this ephemeral organization. This is in addition to whatever information that was obtained about the interaction that occurred between the Nigerian government and the American planners from the present officials in Nigeria.

On an opposite note to the above, one of the favorable outcomes of the field work was the high response rate to the survey. Out of forty-five questionnaires administered, forty-two were recovered; all in a usable form. This high response rate can be attributed largely to the lengthy period in the field, which made it possible for the researcher to return to respondents as many times as necessary to recover the completed questionnaires. Secondly, there is the fact that the researcher had ample connections and contacts going into the field. Getting information from any civil servant in Nigeria comes a trifle easier if you could say that you were sent by so and so. Finally, there is something to be said about the willingness of the officials to cooperate, and to discuss issues relating to the new capital.

That officials cooperated enthusiastically came a bit as a surprise, as an earlier report by Agba (1986, p. 23) maintained that, because Abuja is a highly sensitive project, information is highly classified and difficult to get. Obviously, the fact that thirty-nine out of forty-two officials surveyed, willingly signed their full name, official title and work address on the back of the questionnaire suggests that respondents must not fear for themselves for having set down, in writing, strong critical opinions about a supposed "sensitive" project. But then it might be the case that Agba's observation has become less relevant over time, especially with the change in government from a democratic civilian rule to a military rule. It could be hypothesized that officials of the former are more likely to be sensitive to public opinion and not want to say anything that may make them "look bad," compared to officials in the latter circumstance who can afford to be less concerned with such things. It is also plausible that, with the worsened economic climate in the country, officials may have grown fed up and
more willing to reveal whatever they know in the hope of helping the country or, at least, in exonerating their involvement in the mismanagement of the national economy.

The other issue arising from the field work worthy of mention is that several respondents complained that the questions were "too tough" and "required a good deal of thinking." This is interesting given that a safety valve was included by allowing for a "no opinion" response. Whether or not these complaints detract from the study is open to debate. Given the near perfect response rate and the fact that the escape clause in the questionnaire was used infrequently, if any conclusion is warranted, it may be that the complaints were a complement to the study. The aim of a good research should be to ask thought provoking questions rather than readily answerable ones.
CHAPTER 4: THE HOUSING CHALLENGE IN ABUJA


4.1 HOUSING GOALS AND ACHIEVEMENTS

4.1.1 Background

The desired housing conditions expressed for Abuja have their basis in the reality of urban housing conditions in Nigeria as a whole. In 1952, Nigeria had a modest population of 30.4 million persons, but since this time the country has experienced what may be described as no less than a population explosion, swelling its rate of growth from 1.8 per cent to what authorities estimate to be 3.3 per annum at present. With an estimated 1987 population of 108.5 million, the country is by far the most populous in Africa with one out of every five Africans, or one out of every six black persons in the world, being Nigerian (Morah 1987, p. 161).

This enormous growth in population has resulted in urbanization at an equally rapid rate. Overall, Nigeria is characterized by high population density and moderate urbanization. The population growth rate for the urban areas between 1952 and 1963 ranged from 2.9 to 13 per cent for some leading urban centers, with a national average of about 6 per cent annually (Umo 1975, p. 65). Whereas in 1952 only 8 cities were estimated to have over 100,000 population, this number rose to 30 in 1982. Based on the most recent projections available, 16.5 per cent of the country's estimated 80 million persons reside in urban settlements with a population of over 100,000. See table 4.1.
### Table 4.1: Recent Population Projection for Major Urban Centers in Nigeria (in Rank Order)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cities</th>
<th>1963 Census</th>
<th>Most Recent Projections</th>
<th>Year of the Projections</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. LAGOS</td>
<td>1,113,000</td>
<td>4,500,000</td>
<td>&quot;82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. IBADAN</td>
<td>728,000</td>
<td>1,500,000</td>
<td>&quot;82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. KANO</td>
<td>295,000</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>&quot;82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. OGBOMOSHO</td>
<td>343,000</td>
<td>432,000</td>
<td>&quot;75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. ILORIN</td>
<td>208,000</td>
<td>400,000</td>
<td>&quot;80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. ABA</td>
<td>131,000</td>
<td>400,000</td>
<td>&quot;80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. PORT HARCOURT</td>
<td>179,000</td>
<td>377,000</td>
<td>&quot;83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. ABEOKUTA</td>
<td>187,000</td>
<td>363,000</td>
<td>&quot;83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. OSHOGBO</td>
<td>209,000</td>
<td>350,000</td>
<td>&quot;80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. JOS</td>
<td>90,000</td>
<td>285,000</td>
<td>&quot;82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. ENUGU</td>
<td>138,000</td>
<td>274,000</td>
<td>&quot;77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. ONITSHA</td>
<td>163,000</td>
<td>272,000</td>
<td>&quot;80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. ILESHA</td>
<td>165,000</td>
<td>224,000</td>
<td>&quot;75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. ZARIA</td>
<td>166,000</td>
<td>224,000</td>
<td>&quot;75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. IWO</td>
<td>166,000</td>
<td>214,000</td>
<td>&quot;75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. EDO-EKITI</td>
<td>158,000</td>
<td>213,000</td>
<td>&quot;75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. KADUNA</td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>202,000</td>
<td>&quot;75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. MAIDUGURI</td>
<td>140,000</td>
<td>189,000</td>
<td>&quot;75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. EDE</td>
<td>135,000</td>
<td>182,000</td>
<td>&quot;75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. OFFA</td>
<td>86,000</td>
<td>179,000</td>
<td>&quot;80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. ILE-IFE</td>
<td>130,000</td>
<td>176,000</td>
<td>&quot;75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. CALABAR</td>
<td>76,000</td>
<td>179,000</td>
<td>&quot;83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. ILA</td>
<td>26,000</td>
<td>155,000</td>
<td>&quot;75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. OYO</td>
<td>112,000</td>
<td>152,000</td>
<td>&quot;75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. IKERRE</td>
<td>107,000</td>
<td>145,000</td>
<td>&quot;75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26. MARKURDI</td>
<td>54,000</td>
<td>144,000</td>
<td>&quot;82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. BENIN CITY</td>
<td>101,000</td>
<td>136,000</td>
<td>&quot;75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28. ISEYIN</td>
<td>95,000</td>
<td>115,000</td>
<td>&quot;75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29. KATSINA</td>
<td>90,000</td>
<td>109,000</td>
<td>&quot;71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30. AWKA</td>
<td>49,000</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>&quot;80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total        | 5,790,000   | 13,191,000              | "78*                   |
| National Population | 55,700,000 | 80,000,000              | "80                   |
| Urban Pop. as (%) of National Pop. | 10.40 | 16.50 | "78 |

* This represents average year.

Source: Extracted from Peil M. and Sada P. 1984, p. 35.
CHAPTER 4: THE HOUSING CHALLENGE IN ABUJA

This agglomeration of people, egged on mostly by rural-urban migration and natural increase, has meant that the existing urban infrastructures has been unable to cope. A basic urban requirement such as housing, when available at all, has tended to be congested and strained to capacity by intensive usage. Table 4.2 on housing conditions in select urban areas in Nigeria provides a glaring proof of this. In Lagos, for example, 72.5 per cent of the city’s households of nearly four persons per household occupy a single room. This evidently suggests that not enough new houses are being produced commensurate with the rapid rates of rural-urban migration and natural increase. Affordability is another major housing problem, as the chasm between the supply and demand has escalated the cost of renting. As Onibokun (1985, p. 3) observes “just 15 years ago, 11.2 per cent of the income of an urban worker went into rent. Today, the same urban worker pays as much as 30 per cent of his monthly income on rent.”

Also evident from table 4.2 is the fact that housing shortage and affordability are not the only aspects of the urban housing problem in Nigeria. The quality of urban housing is desperately wanting. Massive urbanization has also meant a high rate of dilapidation, disrepair and generally poor conditions of environmental sanitation. For instance, the national average for urban housing with tap water and flush toilet is 45.6 and 16 per cent, respectively. This compares with 26.1 and 1.8 per cent for Kano, the third largest city in the country with an estimated 1980 population of 1 million. The master plan for Abuja (1979, p. 171) provides a summary of all these problem:

In many Nigerian cities today, the vast majority of population are tenants crowded into one- and two-story housing with densities as high as 2,000 dwelling units per hectare, and 50-70 per cent occupying one room and sharing inadequate or intermittent services. Furthermore, tenants are often paying high rents which may exceed 50 per cent of their incomes.


**Table 4.2: Housing Conditions in Select Urban Areas in Nigeria (1970-71)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Urban Area</th>
<th>Percent of Households Occupying One Room</th>
<th>Average Number of Persons Per Room</th>
<th>Percent of Houses with Tap Water</th>
<th>Percent of Houses with Flush Toilet</th>
<th>Percent of Houses with Electricity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LAGOS</td>
<td>72.5</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>71.7</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>93.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PORT HARcourt</td>
<td>51.5</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>75.0</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>81.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BENIN</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>59.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WARRI</td>
<td>59.9</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>62.4</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>89.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KADUNA</td>
<td>63.9</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>40.3</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>53.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KANO</td>
<td>69.1</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>69.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILORIN</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>28.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBADAN</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>56.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**National Average** 54.5 2.4 45.6 16.0 66.3

Source: Master plan 1979, p. 172.

**4.1.2 Housing Goals**

In light of the foregoing urban housing conditions in Nigeria, the housing challenge in Abuja was widely perceived to be the striking of a balance among housing quantity, quality and, inevitably, affordability. The master plan (1979, p. 173-4) formally articulates this goal:

A major challenge in developing an exemplary housing program for the New Capital City is to arrive at a satisfactory balance between residential quality and the ability of households to afford that quality.
Many housing programs fail because they are not tailored to a target population's income level and the household's ability to pay. Housing programs have met with little success when based on "needs" translated into arbitrary (and inaffordable) standards rather than on "affordability" and willingness to pay.

FCDA must develop a housing policy and program tailored to the needs of the Capital's population. Based on the current post-Udoji civil servant salary structure and a recent survey, projections suggest that between 55 and 60 per cent of the anticipated households in the Capital City, in the year 2000, will have an income of N2,800 or less.

Clearly, therefore, provision of adequate housing in the city at a cost affordable by all segments of the population, particularly the low income earners whose gross annual salary in 1985 did not exceed N3,000, can be considered an important goal for the new capital. Not only was this authenticated by a majority of current policy officials in Abuja,¹ but it is closely in keeping with the desires expressed in the unratified national housing policy published early in 1981:

1. to ensure that the provision of housing units are based on realistic standards which the prospective home owners can afford; and
2. to give priority to housing program designed to benefit the low-income groups (FMHE 1981).

This explicit national attention towards solving the housing problems of low-income persons was later reaffirmed in the 1985 "Report of the Special Committee on National Housing Policy." In this report, it was stated that: The ultimate goal of our National Housing Policy shall be to ensure that all Nigerians have access to decent housing accommodation at affordable cost.

Hence, to achieve this goal of affordability in Abuja, it was further accepted that a housing program for the city would have to based on the nature of the traditional demand for dwellings. In other words, such a program would have to "free itself of many of the housing preconceptions and standards imported from Europe and elsewhere" (Master plan 1979, p. 172); it would have to expend considerable effort in developing dwellings more responsive to

¹ The majority of officials (57%) surveyed endorse the proposition that one of the major goals of government in Abuja is to provide affordable housing for people of all income levels, especially the low-income population. 74 per cent of them support that Abuja is truly intended for all Nigerians alike.
the expressed cultural patterns of the population. Consequently, the designers of the master plan for the new capital, the International Planning Associates (IPA), first sought to understand the income structure of the people (both civil servants and non-civil servants) who will eventually settle in the city. Four income groups were identified including:

1. a high income group (N5,600 plus annually) comprising 2.2 per cent of the city's estimated total number of households;
2. a middle income group (N1,600 - N5,600) comprising 10 per cent of all households;
3. a low-income group (N1,200 - N770) comprising 58 per cent of all households; and
4. a transient group (unstable incomes or less than N600) comprising almost all the remaining households (Draft master plan 1978, p. 130).

Based on this calculation and the fact that the Nigerian government's position is that citizens should not have to pay more than 20 per cent (between 10 and 15 per cent for low-income earners) of their income on rents (Master plan 1979, p. 176), the IPA proposed a housing program for the new city which rejected two extreme possibilities on the grounds of both costs and standards. On the one extreme was the provision of high standard, single family detached housing for all income groups at a roughly estimated cost of N4,638.3 million (i.e., N3,125 million plus 48.5% subsidy) in both capital costs and subsidies. On the other extreme was the provision of high density multi-family dwellings for the low-income groups, semi-detached units for upper and middle income groups, and uniform infrastructure standards for both categories, at a total cost of about N1,502 million with no subsidies. See tables 4.3 and 4.4.

---

2. Subsidies mean both capital and interest subventions to reduce the total amount repaid (Master plan 1979, p. 176).
### Table 4.3: Housing Program Options for Abuja

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Detached Semi-Det.</th>
<th>Serviced Land</th>
<th>Flats</th>
<th>Multi Family</th>
<th>Total Cap. Cost (mil)*</th>
<th>Estimated % Subsidized</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B. Detached, Reduced Standards</td>
<td>L,M,S</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>2,119</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Higher Density, No Subsidy</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>L,M</td>
<td>L,M,S</td>
<td>M,S,T</td>
<td>1,502</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Reduced Density and Infrastructure, Low Subsidy</td>
<td>L,M,S</td>
<td>L,M</td>
<td>M,S</td>
<td>M,S,T</td>
<td>1,751</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Mixed, Low Density</td>
<td>L,M,S</td>
<td>L,M</td>
<td>M,S</td>
<td>M,S,T</td>
<td>1,813</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F. Mixed, Moderate Subsidy</td>
<td>L,M,S</td>
<td>L,M</td>
<td>M,S</td>
<td>M,S,T</td>
<td>1,932</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: L = Large; M = Medium; S = Small; T = Transitional

* Before subsidy.

CHAPTER 4: THE HOUSING CHALLENGE IN ABUJA

TABLE 4.4: SITE AND FLOOR AREA FOR PRINCIPAL TYPES OF DWELLING UNITS IN ABUJA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HOUSING TYPE</th>
<th>SUB-TYPE</th>
<th>PLOT AREA PER HOUSEHOLD</th>
<th>BUILT SPACE PER HOUSEHOLD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. DETACHED/ LARGE</td>
<td>1,000m²</td>
<td>120-160m²</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEMI- MEDIUM</td>
<td>100-800m²</td>
<td>70-100m²</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DETACHED SMALL</td>
<td>75-100m²</td>
<td>30-60m²</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. SERVICED LARGE</td>
<td>1,000m²</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAND MEDIUM</td>
<td>400m²</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. FLATS LARGE</td>
<td>80m²</td>
<td>100m²</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEDIUM</td>
<td>60-80m²</td>
<td>85-100m²</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMALL</td>
<td>35-60m²</td>
<td>45-70m²</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. MULTI- FAMILY 2-3 FAMILY</td>
<td>120-150m²</td>
<td>40-75m²</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 FAMILY</td>
<td>180m²</td>
<td>60-80m²</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. TRANSITIONAL</td>
<td>240m²</td>
<td>60-80m²</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Represents total plot area.

Source: Master plan 1979, p. 177.

A middle-ground solution (Program F) between the above two extremes was recommended by the IPA, based on the argument that a mixed-housing program would satisfy improved standards required for the city and, at the same time, allow for affordable housing for the financially weaker sections of the population. Both the capital costs and the subsidies for this option was placed at N2,125.2 million, making it a reasonable compromise between quality and affordability. In actual terms, the housing mix comprising this preferred option was allocated as follows:
* 95,000 single family detached housing units;
* 11,200 serviced residential plots;
* 5,500 flats;
* 117,700 low-income multi-family dwellings;
* 19,000 transient housing units (Draft master plan 1978, p. 130).

Subsequently, a housing target was set for the FCDA to provide 25,000 dwelling units needed to accommodate the 150,000 persons expected to settle in the city by the completion of the first phase of development in 1986 (Ago 1984, p. 6). A target was also set for additional 2,000 units of low-cost housing to be build outside of the city by the Federal Housing Authority (FHA), to help accommodate the in-coming civil servants. Table 4.5 shows the number and type of housing contracts awarded by both of these agencies up to 1988. (See table 4.6 for actual starts and completions.) Considering income distribution of civil servants in the city and the fact that junior officials are typically assigned to 1 and 2-bedroom units (see tables 4.16 and 4.24), this table outwardly indicates a bias favoring the better-of. It shows that 23.5 per cent of the total contracts awarded went to the upper level officials who are estimated to account for only 12.2 per cent of the federal civil service, and who are unlikely to be the first residents of the city. This is besides the fact that nearly 80 per cent of the low-cost housing contracts were destined for locations outside the FCC.
### Table 4.5: Number and Type of Housing Contracts Awarded by the FCDA and the FHA (1988)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>House Type</th>
<th>In FCC</th>
<th>In FCT</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>(%) of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 BD</td>
<td>2,017</td>
<td>7,924</td>
<td>9,941</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 BD</td>
<td>3,207</td>
<td>2,956</td>
<td>6,163</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 BD</td>
<td>2,283</td>
<td>625</td>
<td>2,908</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 BD</td>
<td>1,416</td>
<td>291</td>
<td>1,707</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 BD</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 BD</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL**  
9,097  
11,90  
21,006  
100

BD = BEDROOM


#### 4.1.3 Housing Achievements

Between November 14 and December 14, 1988, the Statistics Division of the Department of Finance and Economic Development of FCDA was required to carry out a housing census of FCDA housing program in the FCT. The object of the census was to take stock of the total number of FCDA’s housing starts in the territory as well as the status of those starts. According to a preliminary report of this exercise (FCDA 1989), a total of 19,535 housing units starts were recorded throughout the territory. Of this number, 15,862 (81%) were completed, while 3,673 (19%) were either uncompleted or abandoned. Within the FCC,
7,328 (37.5% of total) units were started; 6,108 (83%) of these were completed; and 1,140 (17%) were uncompleted or abandoned. A breakdown of the census result by current local government boundaries is shown in table 4.6.

Table 4.7 shows that 1,160 units (58%) of the 2,000 low-cost housing commissioned by the FHA have been completed; 778 units (36%) were under construction; and 112 units (6%) were yet to be started. This was reported to have been the status of the project back in 1983. An attempt to obtain more current statistics on the FHA housing uncovered some puzzling and radically contradictory facts. According to a source in the management cadre of the FHA, "the status of the agency's housing projects in the FCT is more like 200 units completed and 80 under construction as at May 1989." This was not just for the low-cost housing projects, but for all of the agency's total housing involvement in the territory, including its middle and high income housing. Notably, however, a visual inspection of the construction site failed to substantiate this information either way, and the report prepared by Alhaji Sabo Ago (Director of Planning and Survey, FCDA, 1984) could not be substantiated. In any event, figures 4.1 through to 4.7 show, in an ascending order of quality, the variety of housing types found in the FCC as well as the FCT. Figure 4.8 shows the typical temporary accommodation that is available in the city.
### Table 4.6: Status of Housing Starts by the FCDA in the Development Districts of Abuja and the Four Local Government Areas of the FCT (Dec. 1988)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local Govt Area</th>
<th>No. of Units Started</th>
<th>No. of Units Completed</th>
<th>No. of Units Uncompleted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Garki</td>
<td>4,284</td>
<td>4,048</td>
<td>236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Wuse</td>
<td>2,733</td>
<td>2,024</td>
<td>709</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Maitama</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Asokoro</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FCC Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>7,328</strong></td>
<td><strong>6,108</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,220</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Nyanya*</td>
<td>7,029</td>
<td>6,687</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F. Karu</td>
<td>1,184</td>
<td>1,108</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G. Bwari/Usahafa</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. Karshi</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. Qwarimpa</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K. Kubwa Lost Cost</td>
<td>913</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L. Kubwa Resettle.</td>
<td>555</td>
<td>555</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M. Usuma</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>17,818</strong></td>
<td><strong>14,618</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,200</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Abaji Municipal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Abaji</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Yaba</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>286</strong></td>
<td><strong>128</strong></td>
<td><strong>158</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Gwagwalada Municipal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Gwagwalada</td>
<td>764</td>
<td>693</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Giri</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Kwali</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,138</strong></td>
<td><strong>968</strong></td>
<td><strong>170</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Kuje Municipal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Kuje</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Rubochi</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>293</strong></td>
<td><strong>148</strong></td>
<td><strong>145</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FCT Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>19,535</strong></td>
<td><strong>15,862</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,673</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Single room row houses.

### Table 4.7: Low-cost Housing Construction by the FHA Outside of the FCC (1983)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOCATION WITHIN FCT</th>
<th>NO. OF UNITS COMMISSIONED</th>
<th>NO. OF UNITS COMPLETED</th>
<th>NO. OF UNITS UNDER CONST.</th>
<th>NO. OF UNITS NOT STARTED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. GWAGWALADA</td>
<td>970</td>
<td>662</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. ABAJI</td>
<td>478</td>
<td>362</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. SHERODA</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. KUJE</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. RUBOCHI</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. KWALI</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. KARSHI</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,160</strong></td>
<td><strong>778</strong></td>
<td><strong>112</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Information contained does not reconcile with table 4.6 and cannot be substantiated.

Source: Ago 1984, p. 11.
CHAPTER 4: THE HOUSING CHALLENGE IN ABUJA

FIGURE 4.1: TYPICAL FCDA LOW-COST HOUSING WITHIN THE FCT

[SINGLE ROOM ROW DWELLINGS WITH SHARED FACILITIES FOR JUNIOR CIVIL SERVANTS — E.G., MESSENGERS, DRIVERS, CLERKS, ETC. — OUTSIDE THE FCC IN NYANYA AND GWAGWALADA]

Source: Field Research 1988-89.

Abumere 1984.
CHAPTER 4: THE HOUSING CHALLENGE IN ABUJA

FIGURE 4.2: FCDA RESIDENTIAL DEVELOPMENT IN KARU NEW TOWN

[2-4 BEDROOM HOUSES DESIGNED TO PROVIDE ACCOMMODATIONS FOR SENIOR AND INTERMEDIATE STAFF OF FCDA, AS WELL AS OTHER GOVERNMENT MINISTRIES.]

Source: Field Research 1988-89.
CHAPTER 4: THE HOUSING CHALLENGE IN ABUJA

FIGURE 4.3: FCDA BLOCKS OF FLAT WITHIN THE FCC

[ONE, TWO AND THREE BEDROOM APARTMENT BLOCKS FOR INTERMEDIATE CIVIL SERVANTS.]

Source: Field Research 1988-89.
CHAPTER 4: THE HOUSING CHALLENGE IN ABUJA

FIGURE 4.4: FCDA SEMI-DETACHED HOUSES WITHIN THE FCC

[DUPLEXES FOR SENIOR AND INTERMEDIATE CIVIL SERVANTS. EACH DUPLEX IS INTENDED FOR TWO HOUSEHOLDS.]

Source: Field Research 1988-89.
CHAPTER 4: THE HOUSING CHALLENGE IN ABUJA

FIGURE 4.5: FCDA DETACHED HOUSES WITHIN THE FCC

[4 BEDROOM SPLIT-LEVEL HOUSE AND 3 BEDROOM BUNGALOWS FOR SENIOR CIVIL SERVANTS.]

Source: Field Research 1988-89.
CHAPTER 4: THE HOUSING CHALLENGE IN ABUJA

FIGURE 4.6: MINISTERIAL QUARTERS WITHIN THE FCC

Source: Field Research 1988-89.
CHAPTER 4: THE HOUSING CHALLENGE IN ABUJA

FIGURE 4.7: PRIVATE RESIDENTIAL BUILDING WITHIN THE FCC

Source: Field Research 1988-89.

CHAPTER 4: THE HOUSING CHALLENGE IN ABUJA

FIGURE 4.8: FIVE-STAR, FOUR-STAR AND THREE-STAR HOTELS WITHIN THE FCC

Source: Field Research 1988-89.
CHAPTER 4: THE HOUSING CHALLENGE IN ABUJA

As for the master plan target of providing 11,200 serviced plots for private housing initiatives, table 4.8 provides a break down of the number of applications for residential plots received and the number approved. It shows that, as at December 1987, only 2,747 applications for plots had been approved. It was, however, learned during the field work that many of these plots remain unserviced with requisite infrastructure, which may explain in part the observation by the Nigerian Institute of Town Planners (NITP) (1984, p. 26):

2,500 plots have been allocated for residential development and 50 plots for commercial development. Only ten of the allocated residential are being developed by private developers. This indicates the low level participation of private developers in the development effort of the city.

This is despite the observation that Abuja, at the time, was “becoming increasingly popular with industries” (Koko 1983, p. 128). Based on visual inspection of development in Abuja, this trend appears to have changed little to the present time. There may be up to 10 private houses completed and occupied with another 20 - 30 under construction. As can be seen from figure 4.7, these developments have tended to be in the form of a single family dwelling as opposed to a tenement or “rooming” house. Some of the reasons behind this poor showing on the part of private developers are explored in section 4.2.4.
## Table 4.8: Application for Residential Plots by States (Dec. 1987)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States</th>
<th>No. of Applications</th>
<th>No. of Approved Applications</th>
<th>(%) No. of Approved Applications</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Northern States</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Bauchi</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>49.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Borno</td>
<td>439</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>27.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. FCT</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Gongola</td>
<td>359</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>61.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Kaduna</td>
<td>930</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>25.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Kano</td>
<td>992</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>19.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Niger</td>
<td>367</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>36.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Plateau</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>56.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Sokoto</td>
<td>511</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>26.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Kwara</td>
<td>617</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>23.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Benue</td>
<td>533</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>32.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub Total</strong></td>
<td>5,396</td>
<td>1,697</td>
<td>31.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Southern States</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Anambra</td>
<td>2,320</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. IMO</td>
<td>1,376</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Bendel</td>
<td>1,185</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Cross River</td>
<td>504</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>21.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Lagos</td>
<td>446</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>20.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Ogun</td>
<td>493</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>28.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Ondo</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>40.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Oyo</td>
<td>619</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>23.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Rivers</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>24.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub Total</strong></td>
<td>7,634</td>
<td>1,050</td>
<td>13.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>13,030</td>
<td>2,747</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CHAPTER 4: THE HOUSING CHALLENGE IN ABUJA

4.2 CURRENT SETTLEMENT SITUATION

In part II of the survey questionnaire on Abuja, the question is asked: what major problems do you see with housing in Abuja? The discussion to follow draws mainly from officials responses to this question, as well as evidence uncovered through documentary research and field observations.

4.2.1 Affordability

As might be expected, the biggest problem identified with housing in Abuja is that most of the houses are too expensive and, consequently, affordable to only heavily subsidized civil servants and major private sector institutions such as banks. Tables 4.9 to 4.12 on incomes and housing construction costs in Abuja demonstrate this fact. They show that even when housing costs are treated for graft (see table 4.11) and 20 per cent of gross current income is amortized over a quarter of a century at no interest, over 80 per cent of the civil servants cannot afford the type of houses that were being built up to 1982. For non-government workers in small scale industries, this non-affordability rate is higher at over 95 per cent.\(^3\) At a 1982 treated cost of N19,623 (or approximately $32,375 U.S.) for a one bedroom house, only those civil servants (14.3%) at grade level 09 and above on the government pay scale in 1989 can afford the cheapest housing being built in the FCC without subsidy.\(^4\) It is interesting to note that houses costing up to $652,800 U.S. (or N395,640) were being built for legislators and advisers whose maximum housing affordability is less than $116,000 (or N70,000).

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3. Since corruption in Nigeria is found to be more rife in the public rather than private sector (Oluwo 1983, p. 291), it would be inappropriate to use housing costs treated for graft in referring to this group. Official cost quotations are used instead. [The non-affordability rates of 80 and 95 per cent for both government and non-government workers were achieved through a further disaggregation of the groups' income distribution.]
4. Grade level 08, 09 and 10 are the entry levels for bureaucrats with Bachelor's, Master's and Ph.D. degrees, respectively.
### CHAPTER 4: THE HOUSING CHALLENGE IN ABUJA

**Table 4.9: Housing Affordability by Civil Servants in Abuja**  
*(Based on current nominal income)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Salary Grade Level (%) of Civil Servants</th>
<th>01-06</th>
<th>07-08</th>
<th>09-12</th>
<th>13-17</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>72.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Annual Income (in Naira)</th>
<th>1,500-</th>
<th>3,174-</th>
<th>5,112-</th>
<th>8,712-</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2,418</td>
<td>3,924</td>
<td>8,034</td>
<td>13,812</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>20% of Income for Housing*</th>
<th>300-484</th>
<th>635-785</th>
<th>1,022-1,607</th>
<th>1,742-2,762</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20% of Income for Housing*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total Payments Over 25 Years | 7,500-12,100 | 15,875-19,625 | 25,550-40,175 | 43,550-69,060 |

*The goal stated by the government of Nigeria is that "no one should pay more than 20 per cent of income in rents.... For low-income earners, rent should be fixed between 10 and 15 per cent of income" (Master plan 1979, p. 176).

Source: Table 4.16.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Annual Income (in Naira)</th>
<th>1,200-2,400</th>
<th>2,400-3,600</th>
<th>3,600-6,000</th>
<th>6,000-ABove</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>66.6</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(%) of Labour Population</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20% of Income for Housing*</td>
<td>240-480</td>
<td>480-720</td>
<td>1,200-ABove</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total Payments Over 25 Years | 6,000-12,000 | 12,000-18,000 | 18,000-30,000 | 30,000-ABove |

Source: Table 4.17.
### Table 4.11: Treated Cost of Housing Constructed by the FCDA (1982)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>House Type</th>
<th>Official Av. Cost</th>
<th>Adjusted Cost</th>
<th>U.S $*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 BD</td>
<td>N26,164</td>
<td>N19,623</td>
<td>32,375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 BD</td>
<td>N29,739</td>
<td>N22,304</td>
<td>36,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 BD</td>
<td>N48,742</td>
<td>N36,557</td>
<td>60,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 BD</td>
<td>N77,324</td>
<td>N55,993</td>
<td>92,375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 BD</td>
<td>N527,521</td>
<td>N395,640</td>
<td>652,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 BD</td>
<td>N269,562</td>
<td>N202,181</td>
<td>333,600</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Figures reflect the equivalence of the adjusted cost in U.S. currency, using the 1984 official pre-currency devaluation exchange rate of N1.00 = $1.65 U.S.. Currently N1.00 = $0.15 U.S..

** From table 4.18.

++ "Corruption is a major problem of national development in Nigeria. The practice is prevalent at every level; polity, administrative, as well as the upper and lower levels of the bureaucracy. Corrupt practices occur in nearly all ministries, departments, and agencies. The practice is more widespread with each passing day." This was the opening remark of an article by Aina (1982, p. 71), assistant chief management development officer, the Administrative Staff College of Nigeria. Several scholars share this view including Oluwo (1983; 1985) and Achebe (1983), an internationally acclaimed novelist who went as far as to entitle his treatment of the subject as *The Trouble with Nigeria*. Also, see section 5.2.4.2 of this dissertation.

All this, particularly the suggestion from the above and elsewhere (Carino 1985) that corruption in developing countries is a "shared" system, leads to the conclusion that any calculations to determine housing affordability in Abuja that relies solely on nominal incomes of civil servants is flawed. That is, just as any attempt to obtain information on corrupt earnings of civil servants is likely to be equally flawed. Three rudimentary problems confront any attempt to operationalize a unilateral treatment of civil servants' income data for earnings through corrupt practices. The first is that the majority of the civil servants may not be corrupt. The second is that earnings from corruption tend to be incredibly widespread, depending on official rank and role (i.e., a gate-keeper’s role). The third is that data in the area is unavailable as transactions normally go unreported.

In order to resolve this difficulty, the dissertation finds it necessary to stand the problem on its head, by asking the question: What if corruption was not a factor in producing the existing stock of housing in the new capital, what then might the affordability picture among the civil servants' group look like? An answer is developed based on a report by a western architect who worked in Abuja during the construction boom time. After chronicling widespread corruption involving the method of awarding housing contracts in the city, the architect’s conclusion was that "non-construction percentage on-costs add at least 25 per cent, and possibly more, to cost of work in Nigeria" (AJ 1985, p. 78). The "adjusted" cost estimates are achieved using this rather conservative estimate to deflate the official quotation on housing cost in Abuja.

Source: Author.
What the foregoing statistics imply is that no civil servant in Abuja today can afford the public housing they occupy without heavy government subsidies. Table 4.12 provides an approach to the amount of subsidy (between 83% and 94%) that may be required to make the current stock of housing affordable to the civil servant occupants. It does this by comparing the rent charged to bank officials up to 1986 with the rent currently charged to civil servants. This rate of subsidy compares to the 10 per cent rate initially envisioned by the IPA. (See table 4.3.) Should the present standards of construction in Abuja be maintained in the face of major currency devaluation (up to 350%) and the concomitant spiral of inflation, it is not inconceivable that this rate of subsidy would eventually rise to nearly 100 per cent. That is, assuming no inflationary increase in civil servants salary as insisted upon by the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) forced upon the country by both the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. (For discussions of the SAP, see Bangura 1987).

An indication of this prediction can be seen from table 4.13 which shows dramatic increases in construction costs and materials. For instance, within the space of just a few months, between 1988 and 1989, prices rose by as much as 4-fold for basic indigenously sourced building materials such as cement, sand, timber and labor. Meanwhile, the rate for imported materials (e.g., rods, ceiling boards, galvanized iron roofing, lighting fixtures, electrical cables, glass, pipe-work, etc.) requiring payment in hard currency, is shown to have risen by up to 567 per cent within the past year. Consequently, the FHA experienced a 27.5 per cent increase in construction costs, between the latter part of 1988 and early 1989. (See table 4.14.)
### Table 4.12: Housing Rent Charged to Bank Officials (1986) vs Housing Rent Charged to Government Officials (1988)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>House Type</th>
<th>Annual Rent for Bank Officials (1986)</th>
<th>Annual Rent for Govt Officials (1988)</th>
<th>(% of Subsidy)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 BD</td>
<td>N3,000</td>
<td>N168</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 BD</td>
<td>N3,500</td>
<td>N600</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 BD*</td>
<td>N4,500</td>
<td>N600</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 BD*</td>
<td>N5,500</td>
<td>N600</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* It should be pointed out that these rates are not necessarily the market or economic rents. In fact, they are likely to be below the market rents.

* Basis of estimate for 1 and 2 bedroom house units.

Source: Field Research 1988-89. (Privileged information, FCDA.)
### Table 4.13: Cost of Selected Building Materials in Nigeria (1978-89)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>LOCAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cement (1 bag)</td>
<td>N3.00</td>
<td>N5.50</td>
<td>N12.00</td>
<td>N48.00</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sand (1 trip)</td>
<td>N25.00</td>
<td>N30.00</td>
<td>N20.00</td>
<td>N55.00</td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timber (6 x 2)</td>
<td>N5.50</td>
<td>N6.00</td>
<td>N12.00</td>
<td>N21.00</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Labor +</td>
<td>N4.00</td>
<td>N5.00</td>
<td>N6.00</td>
<td>N18.00</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled Labor +</td>
<td>N6.00</td>
<td>N9.00</td>
<td>N15.00</td>
<td>N25.00</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IMPORT</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iron (5/8)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>N19.50</td>
<td>N105.00</td>
<td>539</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ceiling Board</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>N12.00</td>
<td>N68.00</td>
<td>567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corrugated Zinc Roof (20 Bundle)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>N180.00</td>
<td>N480.00</td>
<td>267</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+ On the basis of an 8 hour day.

* Figures reflect pre- and post-currency devaluation values.

[Up to 1984, N1.00 = $1.65 U.S.; whereas currently N1.00 = $0.15 U.S.]

### TABLE 4.14: IMPACT OF INFLATION ON COST OF HOUSING CONSTRUCTED BY THE FHA (1988-89)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Cost</th>
<th>Retail*</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 Bedroom</td>
<td>N40,000</td>
<td>N60,000</td>
<td>1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Bedroom</td>
<td>N29,000</td>
<td>N50,000</td>
<td>1988</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* As a public corporation, the FHA is authorized to mark up prices for its housing. Noteworthy here is the fact that the cheapest low-cost housing currently being marketed by the corporation is around the N50,000 price range.

Source: Field Research 1988-89.

With respect to alternatives to finished housing, it appears that there has not been any effort on the part of government to develop serviced plots that are affordable by the low-income population. Apart from the relatively high cost of the plots (high density = N500; medium density = N750; and low density = N1,000), the high application fee of N250 and the distribution of plots on a "first-come, first served" basis, made it impossible for the poor to benefit from the scheme. Obviously, the poor lack both the information and political clout necessary to effectively enter such an open competition.

In terms of temporary accommodation, no cheap transient housing were provided as recommended by the IPA. Table 4.15 contains a list of some of the hotels currently operating in the capital, including their over night rates for a standard room. Bearing in mind that 85.7 per cent of the salaried civil servants make a nominal salary of between N5.77 and N15.10 per day, the prohibitive nature of these rates cannot be mistaken. Yet, these rates are not all that is prohibitive about the accommodation, as a deposit of usually twice the room rate is required.
TABLE 4.15: COST OF STANDARD TEMPORARY ACCOMMODATION WITHIN THE FCC IN NAIIRA (FEB. 1989)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HOTEL NAME</th>
<th>ROOM RATE</th>
<th>ROOM CAPACITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HYATT (5-STAR)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>1,376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHERATON (5-STAR)*</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>1,171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HILTON (5-STAR)</td>
<td>N210</td>
<td>998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGURA (4-STAR)</td>
<td>N140</td>
<td>274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SILVER-POT SUITE</td>
<td>N90</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DUBU CATERING SERVICES</td>
<td>N65</td>
<td>15+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEDERAL GUEST HOUSE</td>
<td>N55</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUNNY GUEST HOUSE</td>
<td>N55</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>3,975</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note that above rates are subject to 10% service charge plus 5% sales tax.

* Completed but not yet operational.

+ An estimated number of rooms.

Source: Field Research 1988-89.
CHAPTER 4: THE HOUSING CHALLENGE IN ABUJA

### Table 4.16: Income Distribution for Civil Servants in Abuja by Salary Grade Levels (1988)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Salary Grade Levels</th>
<th>(%) of Civil Servants</th>
<th>Annual Income (in Naira)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01 - 06</td>
<td>74.4</td>
<td>1,500 - 2,418</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07 - 08</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>3,174 - 3,924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09 - 12</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>5,112 - 8,034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 - 17</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>8,712 - 13,812</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field Research 1988-89. Calculated based on the current salary structure of the federal civil service and the staff strength of the major ministries that already operate out of the new capital, as well as those mandated to move to the city by 1989. These include the ministries of MFCT/FCDA, Industry, Internal Affairs, Trade and Commerce, Finance (FCDA 1988, p. 40; FCDA 1987, p. 49; also see table 4.20). The ministry of Agriculture is disregarded in this calculation because of inconsistency in the data ascribed to it by the aforementioned FCDA source.

### Table 4.17: Income Distribution for Workers in Small-Scale Industries in the Municipality of Abuja (1988)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Annual Income (in Naira)</th>
<th>(%) of Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N1,200 - Below</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N1,200 - 2,400</td>
<td>57.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N2,400 - 3,600</td>
<td>26.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N3,600 - 6,000</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N6,000 - Above</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Extracted from NISER 1989, p. 66. The figures are based on a population sample of 105 people and for industrial establishments employing not more than six persons.
## CHAPTER 4: THE HOUSING CHALLENGE IN ABUJA

### TABLE 4. 18: UNTREATED COST OF HOUSING CONSTRUCTED IN ABUJA (1979-82)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HOUSE TYPE</th>
<th>NUMBER OF UNITS</th>
<th>BUILDING TYPE</th>
<th>ESTIMATED COST** (IN NAIRA)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 BH</td>
<td>352</td>
<td></td>
<td>N21,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 BF</td>
<td>990</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>N28,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVERAGE COST</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>N26,164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 BH</td>
<td>662</td>
<td>BUNGALOW</td>
<td>N38,174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 BH</td>
<td>488</td>
<td>BUNGALOW</td>
<td>N15,665</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 BH</td>
<td>852</td>
<td>BUNGALOWS</td>
<td>N25,180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 BF</td>
<td>1284</td>
<td>APARTMENT BLOCK</td>
<td>N31,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 BF</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>APARTMENT BLOCK</td>
<td>N79,019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVERAGE COST</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>N29,739</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 BH</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>DUPLEX</td>
<td>N45,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 BH</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>BUNGALOW</td>
<td>N52,110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 BF</td>
<td>740</td>
<td>APARTMENT BLOCK</td>
<td>N49,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVERAGE COST</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>N48,742</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 BF</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>APARTMENT BLOCK</td>
<td>N59,425</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 BH</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>DUPLEX</td>
<td>N65,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 BH</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>DUPLEX</td>
<td>N80,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 BH</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>BUNGALOW</td>
<td>N111,285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVERAGE COST</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>N77,324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 BH</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>BUNGALOW</td>
<td>N289,561</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 BH</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>LEGISLATIVE HOUSES</td>
<td>N426,418</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 BH</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>ADVISERS' HOUSES</td>
<td>N527,521</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: BH = BEDROOM HOUSE; BF = BEDROOM FLAT.

* This covers housing construction in the FCC plus the districts of Karu and Gwagwalada in the FCT.

** Likely to be undervalued as this excludes the cost of renovations which amounted to N12.0 million for 993 units.

Source: Field Research 1988-89. (Privileged information, FCDA.)
4.2.2 Supply

Housing supply for the civil servants in Abuja is short relative to demand. This can be seen from the fact that the 1986 building target of 25,000 dwelling units is yet to be met. Tables 4.6 and 4.7 disclose that only a fraction of this target (17,022 including the FHA low-cost) had been completed and certified occupied by December 1988. This means that 102,132 persons can be effectively accommodated in government housing, assuming six persons per unit.\(^5\) When this number of accommodated persons is subtracted from the population of civil servants and their families (116,838) and then divided by six person per housing unit, a rough estimate of housing demand is obtained that is in the excess of 2,400 units. (See table 4.19.) However, three factors suggest that all the members of this group are reasonably housed for the present time.

First, ministries mandated to move to Abuja are usually assigned housing before actually being uprooted from Lagos. Second, not all those mandated to move to Abuja have done so (e.g., the Ministries of Education and Finance had not moved as at April 1989). Lastly, a portion of street-level professionals (e.g., grade school teachers and nurses/midwives) who qualify for housing assignment from FCDA are females and tend to be wives of other civil servants who already have a housing allocation. For example, 623 (or 29%) of grade school teachers in the FCT in 1987 were women (FCDA 1987, p. 9, 14). Even though it is not known what portion of this group is single or married, it is not unreasonable to suspect that many of them are wives of civil servants transferred from Lagos. The same argument could be made for nurses/midwives in the territory whose total population consists of 256 (or 69%) females (FCDA 1987, p. 20). Hence, this possibility of having a civil servant's husband and wife team...

---

\(^5\) It is probably an exaggeration to consider that many people adequately accommodated, as the 17,022 overall housing figure includes 6,687 units in single row house and 186 units in resettlement housing. These units are not self-contained and do not have living room or parlour spaces.
housed in one unit of housing, should allow the FCDA additional latitude in dealing with excess demand.6

Thus, in the case of the civil servants’ group in the FCT, it could be said that none of them ought to be squatters. This means that the housing situation among them is, at worst, tight. Of course, the same cannot be said of the housing situation among the private or non-government groups where the shortage is terribly acute. (See section 4.2.5 on squatters.) In fact, one of the biggest housing quagmires in Abuja is this fact that “there has been virtually no noticeable development of any private plots for housing” (NITP 1984, p. 24). As mentioned earlier, only about 10 private plots in Abuja have been developed to date, not to mention the fact that those developed have tended to be non-tenements or rooming houses.

“The only key area where the private sector has participated is in hotel development” (NITP 1984, p. 24). But most of the participants in this area have tended to be major players in the industry (e.g., Hilton, Sheraton, Hyatt and the Nigerian Government), so financial capital and access to land were not a problem. This suggests that the same level of involvement could also have been achieved in residential development, had the government undertaken to guarantee access to serviced plots and mortgage facilities. The latter would have been effected either by arranging with the individual banks or by establishing financial institutions specifically to offer credit for housing development in Abuja. Most officials interviewed during the field work cited both of these factors as a major barrier for workers who may want to build their own homes, as well as for anyone else who may want to build rental housing for profit. Why the government should hope for a great deal of private involvement in the housing market of the new capital, without looking into these matters to help bring about the desired response, is particularly enigmatic. This puzzle is partly explained in section 4.2.4.

6. Any slack that this leaves in the housing demand should be expected to be picked up by those private sector people (e.g., bank officials) who are assigned housing by the FCDA.

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td><strong>NUMBER OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES</strong>&lt;br&gt;(BASED ON TABLE 4.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19,473</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td><strong>POPULATION OF GOVT EMPLOYEES AND THEIR FAMILIES</strong>&lt;br&gt;(19,473 x 6 PERSONS PER HOUSEHOLD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>116,838</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td><strong>NUMBER OF GOVT HOUSES IN ABUJA</strong>&lt;br&gt;(INCLUDES HOUSING BY BOTH THE FCDA AND FHA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>17,022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td><strong>NUMBER OF PERSONS ADEQUATELY ACCOMMODATED</strong>&lt;br&gt;(17,022 x 6 PERSONS PER HOUSEHOLD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>102,132*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td><strong>NUMBER OF PERSONS INADEQUATELY ACCOMMODATED</strong>&lt;br&gt;(2 MINUS 4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14,706</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td><strong>OVERALL HOUSING DEMAND</strong>&lt;br&gt;(14,706 divided by 6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2,451</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* What is considered adequate here may be misleading, as the 17,022 total housing units include 6,687 in single room row houses and 186 in resettlement housing. These units are not self-contained and do not have living room or parlour space.
CHAPTER 4: THE HOUSING CHALLENGE IN ABUJA

### Table 4.20: The Manpower Strength of the Ministries Already in Abuja and Those to Move to City by 1989

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ministry</th>
<th>Total Manpower</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MFCT/FDCA+</td>
<td>7,801</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDUSTRY</td>
<td>1,697</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERNAL AFFAIRS</td>
<td>1,253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FINANCE</td>
<td>1,513</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGRICULTURE</td>
<td>2,160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRADE &amp; COMMERCE</td>
<td>1,721</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHERS*</td>
<td>3,328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>19,473</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+ This includes over 2,000 teachers and about 1,000 health officials working in various areas of the FCT.

* That is assuming an average manpower strength of 1,539 for each of the two ministries (i.e., Education and the National Youth Service Corps Secretariat) mandated to moved to Abuja by 1989. Included also is a guestimate of 250 manpower strength for members of both the Nigerian Police Force and the Army stationed in the territory.


4.2.3 Exclusion

Closely related to the problem of affordability is that of exclusion. Even though the master plan (1979, p. 60) estimated the ratio of non-government to government workers in the city at 3:1 in 1986, to rise to 4:1 in 2,000, the FCDA has made no explicit provisions for non-civil servants. The government expectation has been that private developers would get
involved and somehow respond to this group's housing needs. When this expectation failed to materialize, it is little wonder that all persons who do not have formal ties with the civil service (both the well-to-do and the poor) are left to fend for their own accommodation. It should be noted that the FCDA made exceptions for the managers of major financial institutions and construction firms who were provided with housing by the agency, albeit at an exorbitant price that probably reflects close to the market rent. While it is conceivable that some of the well-to-do members of the non-civil servants population may be able to satisfy their housing needs by buying and developing plots, the important point is that a large portion are excluded from the housing market as a result of their low income. Section 4.2.5 on squatters gives a sense of where this excluded portion of the people lives.

4.2.4 Access to Land

The clear information to emerge from the field work is that many developers interested in Abuja were kept from building, because they could not gain access to plots. Except for areas occupied by the indigenous population, all land across the FCT is owned and administrated by the federal government. According to table 4.8, out of 13,030 applications for residential plots, only 2,747 (21.1%) had been approved by December 1987. Of this number, many have not been serviced with the requisite infrastructure. Of those that were serviced, it was reported that the greater difficulty was in getting the certificate of occupancy (C of O), without which the plots could not be legally developed. Finally, of those private developers who were in the position to develop their plots, a handful of them opted to build private mansions rather than tenements (see figure 4.7); whereas the rest have not built anything despite government requirement that development take place within two years of

7. Officials at FCDA estimate that over 90 per cent of the total stock of residential structures in the territory are accounted for by the federal government efforts (i.e., excluding housing produced by the squatters and the indigenous population). Within the FCC, the estimate rises to nearly 100 per cent.
CHAPTER 4: THE HOUSING CHALLENGE IN ABUJA

allocation. The only action the government has taken to enforce this requirement is to occasionally publish names of those who are in default.

Several reasons are advanced to explain the lack of interest of the private sector. First, it is suggested that would-be private developers still perceive a great deal of uncertainty in connection with the future of the new capital, in terms of its political status, ethnic balance and, ultimately, economic prospects. The feeling is that investors are not assured of a stable government or economic climate and that they, therefore, might simply be waiting for the government to become sufficiently involved in the development.

Second, it is suggested that Abuja is seen to be a "no-man's" land, which conflicts with the widespread social/traditional values of the populace which obligate individuals to build mainly in one's own village or place of origin. Insofar as the new capital is home for all Nigerians, it is no one's home in particular, except perhaps for the government itself which is unsurprisingly left to build the city alone.

Third, it is suggested that the people who have expressed an interest in developing plots in the new capital are not the people wanted in the capital by the country's decision makers. The predominance of northern influence in the politics of the country warrants the suspicion that their hidden agenda for Abuja is to make it a northern, rather than a national capital. Evidence for this can be found in table 4.8 which shows that 31.45 per cent of applications for residential plots by residents of northern states were approved, compared to 13.75 per cent for the southern states which have more applicants and accounts for 58.59 per cent of the total applications submitted. This means that the ratio for successful applications is 1:1.6 in favor of northern states whose overall population ratio in the country is not up to 1:1.

Finally, the argument could be made that the public rental subsidies are so great that private sector developers are unable to compete. Nevertheless, and for what ever the reasons, the situation with undeveloped plots in Abuja was such that plots were allocated
mainly to those individuals who could afford to wait for a more propitious time to develop, rather than to those who seemed desperate to develop right away.\textsuperscript{8}

Thus, in summarizing the situation, a principle town planning officer with the FCDA put it this way: "the question of who gets a plot in Abuja is a matter of politics, patronage and connections." Though it should be noted that not a single plot has been allocated since the past three or more years, following the disbanding of the Landuse Allocation Committee until further notice. Whilst the reasons for this suspension may have to do with tribal politics mentioned earlier, it may simply be that the government had fallen terribly behind in surveying and servicing the plots.

\textbf{4.2.5 Squatting}

The exclusionary nature and non-affordability of housing in the city has contributed to considerable squatting. Despite the fact that statistics on the magnitude of this problem could not be obtained, and that authorities in Abuja have so far been successful in dismantling all squatments erected within the capital city proper, the findings from the field research are that squatting is a major problem. Tables 4.21 and 4.22 represent an attempt to surmise the current number of squatters in both the Municipality of Abuja and the FCT as a whole, based on the hypothesis by Turner (1969, p. 511) that "autonomous urban settlement in the major cities of urbanizing nations is the product of the difference between the nature of popular demand for dwellings and those supplied by institutionalized society." The tables indicate that the housing needs of approximately 246,000 (or 46%) people in the FCT could not be accounted for; and that 106,000 of these \textit{de facto} squatters are located within the

\textsuperscript{8} Discussions with a reputable squatter businessman whose business establishments in the village of Garki have been bulldozed twice confirm this point. The man described the frustration that he and his colleagues have had to endure in attempting to legitimately gain access to Abuja, either through residential or commercial plot assignment. As the man explained, the only difference between himself and the fellow who has a shop in the neighborhood or district centers of Abuja, is that he does not have friends in high places nor as much money to bribe his way.
Municipality of Abuja, near the FCC proper. These estimates, of course, have to be reconciled with the fact that there has not been an actual head count to determine the number of people residing in the territory. The 1981 (Mabogunje et al.) census was specifically directed at only determining the indigenous population of the territory. The sites of the squatments visited in the Municipality of Abuja can be found in figure 4.9, while some evidence of the squatters themselves can be found in figures 4.10 and 4.11.

**Table 4.21: Estimate of Squatters in the Municipality of Abuja (1988)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ESTIMATED POPULATION OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF ABUJA (FROM TABLE 3.2)</th>
<th>218,820</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>ESTIMATED POPULATION OF INDIGENES (218,820 DIVIDED BY 3.2) (FROM INDIGENE/NON-INDIGENE RATIO IN TABLE 3.3)</td>
<td>-68,381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>ESTIMATED POPULATION OF PERSONS ADEQUATELY ACCOMMODATED (FROM TABLE 3.3)</td>
<td>-44,118*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>ESTIMATED POPULATION OF SQUATTERS</td>
<td>106,321</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* This includes accommodation provided by private sector housing.

Source: Author

9. Two things suggest that these figures may be reliable. The first are the field work experiences, particularly observations of the five squatments visited (see figure 4.9), as well as what was learned from officials at the FCDA concerning their efforts to control the problem. The second is the fact that "in 1962 [i.e., roughly a decade after construction commenced], the population of the uncontrolled settlements around Brasilia was at least 40 per cent of the total of the metropolitan area" (Abumere 1986, p. 295). Like Brazil, Nigeria is a populous and resource rich developing country; and, like Brasilia, Abuja is centrally located in a backward region of the country, and construction of the city commenced a decade ago. (See Farret 1978 and Epstein 1973 for discussion on Brasilia.)
CHAPTER 4: THE HOUSING CHALLENGE IN ABUJA


| 1. ESTIMATED POPULATION OF THE FCT (SEE TABLE 3.2) | 535,020 |
| 2. ESTIMATED POPULATION OF THE INDIGENES* (SEE TABLE 3.2) | -165,085 |
| 3. ESTIMATED NUMBER OF PERSONS ADEQUATELY ACCOMMODATED (FROM TABLE 4.19) | -102,132 |
| 4. ESTIMATED SUBLETTING/SHARING BY CIVIL SERVANTS** | -13,108 |
| 5. ESTIMATED POPULATION PRIVATELY ACCOMMODATED* | -8,340 |

5. ESTIMATED POPULATION OF SQUATTERS 246,355

* This population can be assumed to have always looked after its housing needs.

** Calculated based on the assumptions of table 3.3:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>House Type</th>
<th>Number of Units</th>
<th>Added Capacity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3 OR MORE BD</td>
<td>4,086 x 2</td>
<td>8,172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 BD</td>
<td>4,536 x 1</td>
<td>4,936</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 BD</td>
<td>8,000 x 0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>17,022</td>
<td>13,108</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+ Officials at FCDA estimate that over 90 per cent of the total stock of residential structures in the territory are accounted for by the federal government efforts (i.e., excluding housing produced by the squatters and the indigenous population). Within the FCC, this estimate rises to nearly 100 per cent; a decreased rate of private sector participation in housing which is probably due to the relative absence of small scale industries in the city (NISER 1989). However, based on field observations, private housing in the territory is guestimated to account for no more than 7 per cent of (17,022) total government housing achievement. A higher average household size of 7 is assumed in the calculation.

Source: Author.
CHAPTER 4: THE HOUSING CHALLENGE IN ABUJA


1. Garki village
2. Maitama village
3. Karumo village
4. Idu village
5. Gwagwa village
6. Suleja town

Source: Field Research 1988-89.
CHAPTER 4: THE HOUSING CHALLENGE IN ABUJA

FIGURE 4.10: A TYPICAL SCENE IN GARKI VILLAGE

[THIS VILLAGE, LOCATED WITHIN A FIVE MINUTE DRIVE FROM THE GARKI DISTRICT DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOC, IS SCHEDULED TO BE RESETTLED AT KWUBWA]

Source: Field Research 1988-89.
FIGURE 4.11: SPONTANEOUS BUSINESS ESTABLISHMENTS WITHIN THE FCC

[ESTABLISHMENTS SERVING THE GARKI DISTRICT HOSPITAL AND A NEARBY SCHOOL. ESTABLISHMENTS SERVING THE FEDERAL SECRETARIAT WHERE THE FCDA IS LOCATED.]

Source: Field Research 1988-89.
It may be asked why not a bigger population of squatters in light of the country's huge population and the heavy concentration of capital and public infrastructure in the territory. The answer is partly due to government actions to keep the squatters in check, but mostly to the existence of Suleja, a satellite squatter colony approximately 30 miles from Abuja. Estimated below the rank of an urban area in 1977 at 10,000, the settlement's population increased dramatically to nearly half a million in 1983 (Gandonu 1984, p. 9). Hence, except for a handful of construction workers who lived in the Nyanya labor camp, much labor for building the city was hauled in from this place on trailer trucks (Agba 1986, p. 180). The same applies to the service workers.

As the principal provider of support services, particularly informal services, needed to sustain the new capital's population, the urban problems of Suleja have multiplied several fold. An extensive tour of various parts of the town revealed its appalling urban conditions to be either equal to or worse than those found in the most horrid sections of Lagos. No form of public infrastructure or service exists in the town. Hindsight seems to suggest that the site selection panel may have envisioned this occurrence and carefully excised the settlement from the area of the FCT. Note the deliberate "V" shape along the northern borders of the FCT in figure 4.12.

Returning to squatters in the FCT, the majority of them erected their shacks in the villages of Garki and Maitama, immediately surrounding the capital city. (See figure 4.9) Only a few squatters were observed occupying uncompleted buildings belonging to either the government or individuals within the city itself. The shacks erected were generally sided as well as roofed with aluminum sheets and scrap metal. Only in a few cases were the walls of the shacks made of tamped earth.

Upon newly arriving in the FCT, the process that the squatters normally undergo is to move directly to the aforementioned villages and establish themselves among the indigenous

10. This village, which has by far the largest concentration of the squatters, is slated for relocation at Kwubwa soon. (See figure 4.10.)
people who then act as hosts to them. This supposedly makes them less conspicuous and harder to detect by the authorities. Even though the squatters seem to be of a mixed population, coming from all parts of the country, there appears to be more migrants from the eastern part of the country than from anywhere else. This is supported by table 4.8 on application for residential plots by states, as well as by the fact that people from eastern Nigeria have a long history of making sojourn to foreign lands.

**Figure 4.12: The Excision of Suleja from the FCT**

Source: Field Research 1988-89.
In applying Turner's typology of stages of squatment development (figure 4.13), most of the squatments visited are still in their early stages, corresponding to the "provisional tenative squatter" stage. The level of physical development associated with this stage includes provisional construction of low standard and impermanent materials; while its degree of security of tenure is characterized by occupancy without any legal status or guarantee of continued tenure. There is also a characteristic absence of provision of public services of any kind, except perhaps for the frequent harassment of the squatters by government officials.

The FCDA's policy towards the squatters group is to continue to dislodge them by force, and to punish such actions by prosecution or fine. Specific information secured during the field research on the FCDA's treatment of the squatters, is that the agency, in conjunction with the Nigerian Police Force, periodically engage in a ferret-demolish exercise aimed at keeping the squatters from becoming entrenched. Given the considerable amount of squatting that does occur in the villages of Garki and Maitama, most of the demolitions have tended to take place in these locales. The official justification normally given for the demolitions is that such structures contradict the directives of the master plan which is a legal document. Further, it is alleged by officials that such establishments provide a haven for law offenders and abet criminal activities in general. Normally when dispersed by force, the squatters either attempt to integrate with the indigenes, or they fan out to the outlying satellite towns, making their reappearance almost inevitable. According to field information, the government undertakes to dislodge these people about trice yearly.
### Figure 4.13: A Typology of Squatments in Terms of Development Levels and Security of Tenure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITINERANT TRANSIENT</th>
<th>complete semi-squatter</th>
<th>complete legal</th>
<th>incomplete squatter</th>
<th>INCOMPLETE SEMI-SQUATTER</th>
<th>incomplete legal</th>
<th>incipient tentative squatter</th>
<th>INCIPENT SEMI-SQUATTER</th>
<th>PROVISIONAL TENATIVE SQUATTER</th>
<th>PROVISIONAL SQUATTER</th>
<th>PROVISIONAL SEMI-SQUATTER</th>
<th>nomad TRANSIENT TENATIVE SQUATTER</th>
<th>transient squatter</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

4.2.6 Segregated Development

As explained by one senior FCDA official during an interview, "the initial recommendation by the foreign planners was for the agency to adopt a mixed housing scheme, but we found this scheme difficult to reconcile with the reality of social stratification in Nigerian society. Eventually, we had to resort to segregating housing development by income groups. Somewhere in this process, houses intended for the low-income got zoned to their present location." The obvious problem presented by this scheme of development is that it entrenches inequality in the physical fabric of the city, which runs counter to both the spirit of the new capital and the notion of developing the city as "an exemplary housing program" for the nation (Master plan 1979, p. 173). Another possible adverse effect of this form of development is the inevitable "slumfication" of the low-income estates, as public policy neglect of these areas can be expected to follow.

4.2.7 Location

Another easily apparent settlement problem is the location of housing relative to the capital city. Of the 21,006 total units of housing contracts awarded up to 1988, 57 per cent (or 11,909 units) were intended for development outside Abuja. Regarding the junior officials, 80 per cent of the 9,941 1-bedroom units directed at them were meant to be built elsewhere in the FCT, almost all of this in Nyanya and Karu which are within a 10 mile distance from the capital city. This implies that the majority of the low-income officials may only be minimally inconvenienced by location, in terms of commuting costs and easy access to the government offices at the center.\(^{11}\) But there is another problem with the government developing over

---

11. Based on official rates, residents of Karu and Nyanya would pay between 12 and 16 per cent of their monthly salary to travel to and from the city, compared to rates that would be paid by individuals residing in far away places like Abaji (72% - 96%), Kuje (36% - 48%), Kwali (36% - 48%), Bwari (24% - 32%) and Gwagwalada (24% - 32%) (FCDA 1989*, p. 13). Obviously, what this means is that workers in these latter areas are unlikely to be assigned duties in the city without transportation being formally arranged.
CHAPTER 4: THE HOUSING CHALLENGE IN ABUJA

2,600 housing units at great distances from the city, between 19 and 82 miles. (See table 4.23 and figure 4.14). As Agba (1986, p. 279) observed, "while there was a shortage of housing at the FCC, many of the housing units developed in the FCT (e.g., at Gwagwalada) remain unoccupied, because of their great distances from the FCC, coupled with the problems of inadequate transportation." Some of the civil servants interviewed during the field work confirmed that it is not unusual for residents of many of these places to spend up to four hours daily travelling to and from the city. This casts strong doubts over these developments' utility in supplementing housing demands in the city as was originally intended.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DEVELOPMENT AREAS</th>
<th>NO. OF UNITS COMPLETED</th>
<th>NO. OF UNITS UNCOMPLETED</th>
<th>DISTANCES FROM ABUJA IN MILES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. KARSHI</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. BWARI</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. GWAGWALADA</td>
<td>858</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. KWALI</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. KUJE</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. YABA</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. ABAJI</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. RUBOCHI</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1,468*</td>
<td>696</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* This total excludes the 1,160 low-cost housing units constructed by the FHA in these areas.

Source: Agba 1986, p. 280; Table 4.6.
CHAPTER 4: THE HOUSING CHALLENGE IN ABUJA

FIGURE 4.14: DEVELOPMENT SITES OF FCDA HOUSING ESTATES IN THE FCT

Source: Author.
4.2.8 Crowding

Crowding within dwellings is a problem in most of the low-income areas. The reason is simple enough. The allocation procedure is based exclusively on salary grade levels such that the higher a civil servant is on this scale the more the entitlement for additional rooms. (See table 4.24.) This method obviously does not take into account household size, which meant that one bedroom units are generally assigned to low-income staff who typically have larger families of between 6-8 persons.

This problem is most noticeable in the Nyanya labor camp which officials fear is developing into a slum area. The settlement was established at the beginning of construction to serve as a temporary home for the labor needed to build the city. It comprises the single room row house type as opposed to the executive-type one bedroom apartment units which are self-contained. Built at a cost of N20,000, each row house contains four distinct rooms with shared facilities. (See figure 4.1.) Although unlikely, what this suggests is that up to 24 persons may actually live in one such building, assuming an average of six persons per household. In all, 6,687 units of such housing were built in Nyanya, which suggests a population of approximately 40,000 for a very small area.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 4.24: TYPICAL STANDARD OF HOUSING ALLOCATION IN ABUJA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>SALARY GRADE LEVELS</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01 - 04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05 - 07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08 - 09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 - 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 - 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPECIAL SCALES</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field Research 1988-89.
4.2.9 Services

As far as physical infrastructure is concerned (e.g., roads, water, electricity, sewerage/drainage systems, telecommunication, etc.), not all residential areas have water and electricity. Most residential areas outside of the municipality of Abuja are without pipe borne water, and they usually have no electricity or are served intermittently by generators. At the time of the field work, the whole of Karu town was without water and their residents had to either collect water in buckets from far off streams or pay for tanker service. This is notwithstanding the fact that the town is within the municipality of Abuja (i.e., within 10 miles of the FCC). At present, private telephone service in the FCT is still a luxury, as only a few households in Abuja and Gwagwalada enjoy the facility. In all, the number of working telephones in these two places is reported to be 2,025 (FCDA 1988, p. 14). Presumably this number includes the few coin box telephones observed in the Garki district of the capital.

In the area of social services, table 4.25 contains basic facts about the state of education infrastructure in the four municipalities of the FCT. It shows the territory doing reasonably well as of June 1987, with nearly 79,000 pupils in 205 primary schools, 25 secondary schools and 1 college, and an average teacher-student ratio of between 35 and 37 for primary and secondary schools, respectively.\(^\text{12}\)

\(^\text{12}\) According to Obiechina (1985, p. 45), only seven primary school existed in the FCT before the creation of the new capital. Consequently, illiteracy rate among the indigenous population was estimated at 83 per cent in 1980. Still staggering, this rate has gone down to 75 per cent in 1985 as a result of the new schools established (Obiechina 1985, Appendix 3).
Table 4.25: Number and Type of Educational Institutions and Teacher-Student Ratio in the FCT by Local Govt Areas (June 1987)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOCAL GOVT AREAS</th>
<th>PRIMARY SCHOOLS</th>
<th>TEACHER-PUPIL RATIO</th>
<th>SECONDARY SCHOOLS</th>
<th>TEACHER-PUPIL RATIO</th>
<th>COLLEGES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABAJI</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABuja</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GWAGWALADA</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KUJE</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>205</strong></td>
<td><strong>36</strong></td>
<td><strong>25</strong></td>
<td><strong>37</strong></td>
<td><strong>1</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ENROLLMENT**

|                | **59,985** | **18,499** | **453** |

Source: Extracted from FCDA 1987.

Table 4.26 on health related facts suggest that this service could be much improved. Assuming that the indigenous population is little interested in western health practices, what the table suggests is that, as of June 1987, there were only 83 beds and 29 certified physicians for the whole of the territory’s 344,403 non-indigenous population. According to a report by the FCDA (1988, p. 31), this situation, however, stands to be greatly improved when the 300 bed specialist hospital in Gwagwalada opens soon. This report states that the construction of the hospital is complete, and that most of the equipment ordered for it has already arrived.
Table 4.26: Basic Facts on Elements of Health Services in the FCT (June 1987)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Health Elements</th>
<th>Total Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Hospital/Clinic/Health Center</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Dispensary</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Hospital Beds</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Surgeon</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Pediatrician</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Gynaecologist/Obstetrician</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Ear, Nose &amp; Throat (ENT)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. General Practitioner (GP)</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Optometrist</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Dentist</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Pharmacist</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Nurses and Midwives</td>
<td>268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Vaccinators</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Senior Admin./Planning Staff</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Extracted from FCDA 1987.

Table 4.27 presents motor vehicle statistics for both the Municipality of Abuja and FCT, between July 1986 and June 1987. It suggests that transportation in the territory may be a problem, especially outside the FCC. Experience in Abuja support this, although it appeared that the roads leading to the various local government areas were not the problem as much as the shortage of vehicles. The table indicates that motor cycles are by far the most popular mode of transport in the territory. Within the city itself, the government operates a few small buses, but the main mode of transport for the majority is taxis and privately owned Kombi buses. Because many of those transferred to the city from Lagos still maintain out of FCT license plates, the number of private cars registered is lower than the number operating in the city. Many of the civil servants have their own cars. In terms of airline movement in and out of the FCT, the Abuja airport had an average of 35 commercial flights per month between July
CHAPTER 4: THE HOUSING CHALLENGE IN ABUJA

1986 and June 1987. Together with the private flights, a total of 29,271 people embarked and disembarked from the airport in this period (FCDA 1987, p. 43).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VEHICLE Type</th>
<th>MUNICIPALITY. OF ABUJA</th>
<th>FCT</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PRIVATE CARS</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>535</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAXI CARS</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>397</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUSES/VANS</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>429</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LORRIES/TRUCKS</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOTOR CYCLES</td>
<td>1,857</td>
<td>1,097</td>
<td>2,954</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Extracted from FCDA 1987, p. 39.

For economic services, the FCT as a whole, especially the FCC, is adequately served by financial institutions. In all, 13 banks have so far opened branches in the region with many more reported to follow. Limited petty goods and services requirements of the residents of the city are normally met through the district neighborhood centers. (See figure 4.15.) Otherwise, an extensive variety of goods can only be found at the main market which convenes at various locations across the FCT on a rotating basis. Within Abuja, the Wuse market convenes of Mondays and the Garki market on Fridays. The former's temporary site stretches approximately three blocks long and one block deep, and offers a range of goods that include perishables (food stuff), textiles and plastic materials. (See figure 4.16.)
CHAPTER 4: THE HOUSING CHALLENGE IN ABUJA

FIGURE 4.15: LIFE IN NEIGHBORHOOD CENTERS IN THE GARKI DISTRICT OF THE FCC

Source: Field Research 1988-89.
CHAPTER 4: THE HOUSING CHALLENGE IN ABUJA

FIGURE 4.16: TEMPORARY AND PERMANENT SITE OF THE WUSE MARKET IN THE WUSE DISTRICT OF THE FCC

Source: Field Research 1988-89.
On the other hand, the Garki market, which is mixed-in with the Garki village, is a bigger market and offers more variety of goods and services. Manufactured goods, technical (e.g., mechanics) and non technical services can be found here. Finally, there is the Suleja market outside the FCT, which convenes daily and offers the most variety of goods and especially services.

4.2.10 Design and Layout

The housing design and residential area layout for Abuja was handled by the Milton Keynes consulting group of London, whose services were later terminated but not before much of its plans were well underway. A western architect who worked in Abuja provides the following account which articulates the widespread feeling in Nigeria that the taste and culture of the indigenes were not taken into consideration in designing and constructing the houses:

A British new town authority provided plans and house types for use in Abuja.... And here in the middle of the African landscape are built British new town row housing and four storey tenement blocks. Seemingly no attempt has been made to suit the housing to African needs and the Nigerian climate. It looks as if a job lot has been taken out of the plan chest and sold to the FCDA (AJ 1985, p. 73).

As such, dwellings especially in the high density area of Garki do not have private outside spaces essential for life in Africa. There is no outside space for low income families to supplement their income through their usual practices of keeping live stock and growing a small amount of crops. Yet, "the planners allocated a total land of 32 per cent to recreation and open space whereas the Nigerian standard is 4 per cent" (Onibokun et al. 1984, p. 349). No provision is made for places to hang clothes to dry despite the fact that washing clothes is a frequent occurrence for families in hot, humid climates. There is not adequate recreational facilities where children can play outdoors, away from the roads, but within sight of their house. Despite being very much part and parcel of the Nigerian way of life, there is no place in the house plans of the city to house servants, drivers, security guards and the hangers-on of extended families (AJ 1985, p. 73-4).
4.2.11 Quality

The quality of houses in Abuja, especially those built by Nigerian contractors, is astonishingly poor. Acknowledging this deficiency, a one time director of Planning and Survey, FCDA, wrote that "the major problem facing the building of Abuja so far as housing was concerned is the poor construction recorded in quite a large number of houses so far done" (Ago 1984, p. 10). The same architect who articulated the unsuitability of housing designs in Abuja, had this to say about the quality of houses constructed:

The quality of all but a very few of the buildings is abysmal. Pride in workmanship and materials does not exist. Quality control is unknown. Buildings have been accepted by the FCDA that have out-of-plumb walls visibly bulging and hanging over their footings, staircase risers varying by 100 mm, timber-work straight from the forest, twisted, rough and nail-fixed. Tilling is cracked, out-of-square, uneven and stained. Finished houses appear to be the work of inept and demented jerry-builders. In too many contracts the aspirations, the expenditure and the effort have resulted in buildings that would best be bulldozed away (AJ 1985, p. 74).

It is interesting to note that it was confirmed during the field work that some blocks of flats were indeed bulldozed as a result of debased construction quality. But, because only the worst ones were torn down, not too many flats were affected. To understand this housing outcome, section 5.2.4.2 of the dissertation dealing with corruption and unprofessional conduct provides some valuable insights. It basically points to the facts that: (1) housing contract awards were not based on merit or price; (2) generally unproven contractors in building construction were hired; (3) building materials specified in the contracts were never used; and (4) thorough supervision during construction was lacking.

4.2.12 Maintenance

Except for houses built and sold in the open market by the FHA, the rest of the houses built by the FCDA are owned and administered by the government strictly for rental purposes. The houses are normally rented to government employees who must relinquish
use of the quarters as soon as they cease to be employees of the government. As such, maintenance of the city's housing stock lies with the government, specifically with the FCDA's department of Public Works (Estate Division). However, because maintenance in the city is already a problem in light of the poor quality construction and finish, many residents of the city showed great concern for this issue. Housing fixtures either never worked properly or they have since developed problems and stopped working. The commonest problems reported involve electrical wiring and fixtures, and the plumbing system (e.g., leaky faucets and toilet). Some structural flaws were also reported (e.g., cracks in walls).

Thus, with this looming problem and the fiscal crisis of the state, the residents fear that the government may not be able to cope, and that they might ultimately be called upon to make the repairs themselves with their meagre disposable income. These worries seem justified insofar as suggestions have been made by some officials that, in the future, each government department should be responsible for the upkeep of housing assigned to its workers. Presumably the department would then work out a cost recovery arrangement with its employees.

4.2.13 Livability

In spite of problems listed above, Abuja today is very much a livable and viable city, compared generally to urban conditions described earlier for Nigeria. It outwardly appears not to have any aggravated urban problems. The structures are relatively new, the roads are well paved and decorated with light fixtures, development of squatments have been kept in check, pollution is almost non-existent, and human and traffic congestion is nothing to compare to that of Lagos. In short, in terms of the quality of the urban environment, Abuja today is a haven for Nigerians who long for the amenities of a modern society, but without its headaches and pressures. For a territory of over half a million persons, the official information on crime contained in table 4.28 (however inaccurate), simply reinforces the assertion that
Abuja today is a livable city. The urban standards far surpass that of any other Nigerian city. However, this is also the chief problem of Abuja as residents cannot afford these standards.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criminal Offences</th>
<th>Total Reported 1986</th>
<th>Total Reported 1987</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Murder/Manslaughter</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Armed Robbery</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Drugs</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Suicide</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Assault</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Rape</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Burglary/Stealing etc.</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Fraud</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Arson</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Other</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**4.2.14 Resettlement Housing**

As stated earlier in Chapter 3, the resettlement program in Abuja was part of the government's plan to make the new capital ethnically neutral. Initially, the plan called for the territory's entire indigenous population to be resettled, but this decision was later revised restricting the resettlement program to the FCC or actual site of the new capital. Nevertheless, the indigenes were still given the options of either staying in their present settlement (which must not be within the site of FCC proper), moving to another location of their choice within the FCT or being resettled outside of the FCT to a state of their choosing. In the last instance, the government would pay compensation to those affected; and, in the
second instance, the FCDA would be responsible for resettling the population. In articulating the goals of this resettlement, it was stressed that the population should be rehoused at a minimum cost; that “replacement” -- not development -- should be the overriding variable; and that the new settlement should reflect the traditional pattern of the old, so as to minimize chances of rejection by the indigenes (Okafor 1988).

According to the report by Okafor (1988), between 1980 and 1986, two resettlement areas were established: (1) the Usuma Town resettlement comprising 186 family units (completed); and (2) the Kubwa resettlement comprising 555 units (under construction) designed to accommodate 20,000 persons when completed. (See figures 4.17 and 4.18.) This report maintains that, as at May 1987, about 1,500 inhabitants (roughly 201 family units) had been rehoused. It then went on to identify the following problems with the resettlement efforts:

(1) Bricks were used for the walls of the houses, while corrugated iron sheets, instead of thatch, were used for the roof. This modification has its attendant problem because thermal conductivity in iron-roofed houses is drastically different from the houses built with thatch roof. Since the houses are not adequately ventilated, they are unbearably hot during the season of maximum isolation.

(2) The housing units are congested, with houses standing only about 10 meters apart. This pattern of housing has seriously eroded the privacy which the people highly regard.

(3) Population density within the small area of the housing units has been very much increased, thereby affecting land claims and landuse in the resettled area. Households are restricted to minute holdings which are usually insufficient for cultivation and grazing.

(4) A serious omission in the housing arrangement was the lack of recognition of the differential status of households in the allocation of houses. In spite of the fact that all the households are not of similar size, houses were allocated irrespective of family size and social status.

(5) Perhaps the most serious omission in the resettlement housing units is that there was no provision for granaries and animal shelters; in their former abodes inhabitants provided themselves with well-protected granaries for grain storage.... Consequently, the incidence of famine resulting from prolonged shortage of stored grains has been reported in the two settlement units (Okafor 1988, p. 173-4).
Another drawback in the resettlement housing uncovered during the field research, is the fact that the resettled population at Kubwa with no history of modern sanitary facilities were provided with water system toilets instead of pit latrines. As might be expected, the facilities were disregarded by the natives who found use for them as storage spaces.

In summary, this chapter presents facts about the existing housing situation in the new capital and argues that the housing conditions desired for the new capital have their basis in the reality of urban housing conditions in Nigeria as a whole. It subsequently identifies the housing challenge in the new city as the striking of a balance among housing quantity, quality and, inevitably, affordability. On the basis of this logic, as well as statements contained in the master plan and data from the field survey, the conclusion is reached that the provision of adequate housing in the new capital at a cost affordable by all segments of the population, particularly the low-income, was an important goal for the new capital project. Using this standard to judge the outcome, the following gaps in the housing program of the new capital are identified:

* Housing was only provided for the civil servants, leaving all other segments of the population to fend on their own for accommodation.

* Of the 1986 housing target of 25,000 units, only a portion (17,022 or 68%) had been met by December 1988.

* Of the current stock of housing, none of it is affordable by the civil servants without a government subsidy of between 83 - 94 per cent of annual costs. Without any subsidy, only about 20 per cent of the civil servants can afford the cheapest type of housing provided.

* Despite the intention to prevent squatments from developing in the new capital, there are approximately 100,000 squatters within the municipality of Abuja and 240,000 within the FCT. These figures respectively represent 48 and 46 per cent of the estimated total population of these areas.

* A host of other settlement problems abounds in the city including: (1) shortage of rental housing, (2) limited access to land, (3) segregated development, (4) awkward location for low-cost housing developments, (5) culturally improper housing designs and layouts, (6) debased quality of construction, (7) lagging maintenance and (8) absent or intermittent urban services to most areas outside of the FCC.

The subsequent chapter aims at explaining these shortfalls from expectations.
CHAPTER 4: THE HOUSING CHALLENGE IN ABUJA

FIGURE 4.17: LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND RESETTLEMENT AREAS IN THE FCT

CHAPTER 4: THE HOUSING CHALLENGE IN ABUJA

Figure 4.18: Typical resettlement housing in Usuma Town in the FCT

CHAPTER 5: EXPLAINING THE POLICY IMPLEMENTATION GAP: OFFICIALS’ DISPOSITIONS

As shown by evidence in the last chapter, despite the government’s intentions to confront the challenge of affordability in devising a housing program for the new capital, almost all the housing provided is beyond the means of most residents. To understand this occurrence, this chapter undertakes a thorough examination of policy officials dispositions toward the issue, as well as features of the plan and the process by which it was formulated and altered in practice.

5.1 OFFICIALS’ DISPOSITION.

Even though current dispositions of policy officials in Abuja could not have been responsible for the existing housing situation in the city, the assumption supported by the discussions in this chapter, is that Nigerian dispositions toward this important national issue have, in the main, not changed. This may be puzzling as the more logical expectation would have been for the country’s sudden poverty to have engendered a violent swing in the national mood, encouraged by the need to apportion blame for the dramatic turn in fortune. Based on field experience, this was not the case except that people in the country now have a somewhat more realistic picture of the extent of the country’s resources and economic power.

Presented below (table 5.1) are the results of the survey of 42 Nigerian policy officials regarding their dispositions toward a variety of issues respecting the Abuja project. (See appendix 1 for survey questionnaire, as well as names and official titles of individuals surveyed.) The analysis is qualitative and involves a number of basic steps. First, the random propositions constituting the questionnaire are sorted into several substantive issues. Second, the propositions are then treated in the aggregate on the basis of “agree” and “disagree” responses. Third, weighting is assigned to the responses to discern the more strongly held perceptions (i.e., where “strongly agree” = 3; “agree” = 1; “strongly disagree” = -3;
“disagree” = -1; and “no opinion” is disregarded). This means that the higher the mean ranking for any proposition (whether plus or minus), the more strongly held is the perception on that proposition. Fourth, the responses are disaggregated to isolate the views of the three policy official groups surveyed, namely: (1) the decision makers, (2) the implementors and (3) the academics. Though the disaggregated separate responses are discussed only when there are significant differences between the three groups. Finally, significant differences between “own” and “popular” responses are identified and discussed.

5.1.1 Overview of Dispositions Toward Abuja

Despite the controversies that surround the reasonableness of the new capital including its appropriate role in the country, the survey establishes quite clearly that Nigerian officials basically support the building of Abuja. It also establishes clearly that, despite the persistent suspicion regarding the underlying motive for the project, the officials believe that Abuja is truly intended for all Nigerians alike. Overall support for both propositions among officials surveyed is 78 and 74 per cent, respectively.

On the rationale for the new capital, an earlier discussion has suggested that there were several reasons behind the move. However, the survey supports that, when all is said and done, most officials (74%) concur that the underlying reason for the new capital is more political than either economic, cultural or social. This is to say they believe that the decision to build a new capital has more to do with reasons of ethnic politics, national pride and creating an avenue to spend a newly acquired wealth, than to issues of security, efficiency, regional development, impropriety of Lagos, etc..
TABLE 5.1: SUMMARY OF NIGERIAN OFFICIALS DISPOSITIONS TOWARD ABUJA (PERCENT)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DECISION MAKERS</th>
<th>IMPLEMENTORS</th>
<th>ACADEMICS</th>
<th>OVERALL RESPONSES</th>
<th>MEAN RATING &amp; SAMPLE SIZE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AGR DIS</td>
<td>AGR DIS</td>
<td>AGR DIS</td>
<td>AGR DIS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**5.1.1 Overview Dispositions Toward Abuja**

1. Nigerians basically support the building of Abuja.  
   - **AGR DIS**
   - **AGR DIS**
   - **AGR DIS**
   - **AGR DIS**

2. Abuja is truly intended for all Nigerians alike.  
   - **AGR DIS**
   - **AGR DIS**
   - **AGR DIS**
   - **AGR DIS**

3. The underlying reason for Abuja is more political than either economic, cultural or social.  
   - **AGR DIS**
   - **AGR DIS**
   - **AGR DIS**
   - **AGR DIS**

4. Nigeria at the beginning of the Abuja project was a wealthy nation.  
   - **AGR DIS**
   - **AGR DIS**
   - **AGR DIS**
   - **AGR DIS**

5. The work of planning and constructing the new capital was not within Nigeria's indigenous technical capability.  
   - **AGR DIS**
   - **AGR DIS**
   - **AGR DIS**
   - **AGR DIS**

   - **AGR DIS**
   - **AGR DIS**
   - **AGR DIS**
   - **AGR DIS**

7. It is not necessary for Abuja to be planned and built by Nigerians for it to be a Nigerian city.  
   - **AGR DIS**
   - **AGR DIS**
   - **AGR DIS**
   - **AGR DIS**

**5.1.2 Dispositions Toward Goals for Abuja**

8. Abuja should be a proud reflection of Nigeria's wealth and power.  
   - **AGR DIS**
   - **AGR DIS**
   - **AGR DIS**
   - **AGR DIS**

9. Nigeria, as an advanced country, should have a capital comparable to those of other advanced countries.  
   - **AGR DIS**
   - **AGR DIS**
   - **AGR DIS**
   - **AGR DIS**

10. Abuja must not suffer any of the defects of Lagos.  
    - **AGR DIS**
    - **AGR DIS**
    - **AGR DIS**
    - **AGR DIS**

11. Any manifestations of poverty in Abuja should be eradicated at all cost.  
    - **AGR DIS**
    - **AGR DIS**
    - **AGR DIS**
    - **AGR DIS**

12. Abuja should be mainly an administrative center.  
    - **AGR DIS**
    - **AGR DIS**
    - **AGR DIS**
    - **AGR DIS**
### CHAPTER 5: EXPLAINING THE POLICY IMPLEMENTATION GAP

#### TABLE 5.1 CONTINUED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decision Makers</th>
<th>Implementors</th>
<th>Academics</th>
<th>Overall Responses</th>
<th>Mean Rating &amp; Sample Size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AGR</td>
<td>DIS</td>
<td>AGR</td>
<td>DIS</td>
<td>AGR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Every Nigerian should have a right to housing.</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. People should be free to build to the best of their ability regardless of resulting housing quality.</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Countries concerned with their progress toward modernity must enforce high standards of building and construction.</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>71</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. It is easy for low-cost housing estates to turn into slums.</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>86</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Low-cost housing is often poorly designed and unsightly.</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>87</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. In the long run, it costs more to build cheaply because low-cost housing require a good deal of maintenance and become obsolete in a short time.</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>62</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. The problem with self-help housing is that the poor do not have the necessary resources to build and improve their own shelter.</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. “Low-cost housing,” “basic housing,” “self-help housing,” “sites and services schemes,” “appropriate technology” and other concepts of the sort are all part of a ploy by the west to make developing countries comfortable with backward conditions.</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. There is lack of manpower skilled in the use of local building materials.</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>33</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Local traditional building materials are not as durable, and of the same quality, as imported materials.</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>62</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 5.1.3 Dispositions Toward Housing in General

13. Every Nigerian should have a right to housing.

14. People should be free to build to the best of their ability regardless of resulting housing quality.

15. Countries concerned with their progress toward modernity must enforce high standards of building and construction.

16. It is easy for low-cost housing estates to turn into slums.

17. Low-cost housing is often poorly designed and unsightly.

18. In the long run, it costs more to build cheaply because low-cost housing require a good deal of maintenance and become obsolete in a short time.

19. The problem with self-help housing is that the poor do not have the necessary resources to build and improve their own shelter.

20. "Low-cost housing," "basic housing," "self-help housing," "sites and services schemes," "appropriate technology" and other concepts of the sort are all part of a ploy by the west to make developing countries comfortable with backward conditions.

21. There is lack of manpower skilled in the use of local building materials.

22. Local traditional building materials are not as durable, and of the same quality, as imported materials.

### 5.1.4 Dispositions Toward Housing in Abuja

23. One of the major goals of government in Abuja is to provide affordable housing for people of all income levels, especially the low income population.

24. The government has the obligation to provide complete housing for all its workers in Abuja.
CHAPTER 5: EXPLAINING THE POLICY IMPLEMENTATION GAP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 5.1 CONTINUED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DECISION MAKERS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. The government has the obligation to participate in providing housing for all levels of people in Abuja.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26. It is necessary for Abuja to have native type houses and neighborhood layouts for it to be a Nigerian city.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. High-density development in Abuja would contradict the City's image as Nigeria's visible symbol of modernity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28. There is enough space at Abuja for a comfortable low density of development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29. Higher standards for housing must be enforced in Abuja in order to avoid duplicating the crowded conditions of Lagos.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30. Housing in Abuja is the most visible symbol of achievement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31. For Abuja housing quality is more important than affordability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32. It is possible to avoid squatters in Abuja.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.1.5 Dispositions Toward Housing Problems in Abuja

| 33. Money is not a major factor in explaining the housing problems of Abuja. | 09 | 91 | 20 | 80 | 20 | 80 | 18 | 82 | -1.64 | OWN (41) |
| 34. There was never any serious plan to provide housing in Abuja for low income people who are not in the civil service. | 50 | 50 | 53 | 47 | 82 | 18 | 59 | 41 | 0.35 | OWN (40) |
| 35. Attitudinal changes to encourage a more "Nigerian" city is a must for a successful housing strategy in Abuja. | 67 | 33 | 61 | 39 | 40 | 60 | 57 | 43 | 0.13 | OWN (37) |
| 36. Housing policy in Abuja was adopted by a military government concerned with impressive design and construction, not with ensuring propriety and affordability. | 33 | 67 | 44 | 56 | 67 | 33 | 49 | 51 | 0.16 | OWN (31) |
|                  | 40 | 60 | 87 | 13 | 62 | 38 | 66 | 34 | 0.81 | POPULAR (21) |

Among the various underlying assumptions of the new capital is the concurrence by 80 per cent of the officials with the proposition that Nigeria at the beginning of the Abuja project was a wealthy country. Ranking number seven (i.e., a mean rank of 1.50) in the more strongly held dispositions toward Abuja, the assumption implies a clear belief on the part of the officials that the country commanded the financial resources to see the Abuja project through as originally intended. By uniformly disagreeing (65% and 86%) with the propositions that the work of planning and constructing the new capital was not within Nigeria’s indigenous technical capability and that expert in Nigeria means expatriates, the officials appear to also believe that the country equally commanded the technical and administrative capabilities to execute the project. Support for the latter proposition is shown to be strong with a mean ranking of -1.50.

This foregoing inference, however, is contradicted by the fact that the decision makers (80%) and the implementors (72%) support the proposition that it is not necessary for Abuja to be planned and built by Nigerians for it to be a Nigerian city. The contradiction is: why not have Nigerians plan and build the city when it is believed that local expertise and capability for the job exists? The logic of this position is probably what led 70 per cent of the academics to disagree with the proposition (i.e., besides the fact that they stood to have gained personally from having all the work on Abuja accomplished internally). What may be reasoned from the contradiction is that the officials probably assume that, with the country’s affluence, it could afford to buy whatever technologies it may need through international consultancy and expatriate management.

5.1.2 Dispositions Toward Goals for Abuja

The survey finds consensus for the symbolic role of the city, with 71 per cent of the officials in support of the proposition that Abuja should be a proud reflection of Nigeria’s wealth and power. Another 57 per cent agree that Nigeria, as an advanced country, should
have a capital comparable to those of other advanced countries, all of which may seem ironic for a country that only recently had stark poverty visited upon it by the collapse of the international oil economy.

With respect to function, the majority of the officials (58%) endorse the proposition that Abuja should be mainly an administrative center, which raises the question of how then could the city be truly intended for all Nigerians alike, as was supported by 74 per cent of the officials. Perhaps the officials’ reasoning in favor of an administrative center is that this may be necessary to ensure that the lofty ideals of the new capital are achieved. Seemingly, with Abuja serving strictly as a government city, the chaos of Lagos resulting from its being both the administrative, commercial and industrial center of the country would be avoided. Another explanation is that the officials may have reasoned that Abuja, simply by virtue of being ethnically balanced, would be for all Nigerians alike; or that the city is simply a symbol for all Nigerians rather than an abode.

While the implementors (45%) and the academics (50%) are divided on the place of poverty in the new city, the decision makers (73%) agree that any manifestations of poverty in the city should be eradicated at all cost. Whether or not the response to the next proposition means that poverty should not be tolerated in the new capital, the survey finds overwhelming (92%) support that Abuja must not suffer any of the defects of Lagos. However, it is hard to imagine anyone arguing cogently that squalor is not one of the fundamental defects of Lagos. Ranking number two (1.95) in the more intensely held dispositions toward Abuja, there is no doubt that the proposition was one of the chief principles guiding the thinking about the new capital as well as deciding on its options.

Thus, in terms of visions of how things should be in the new capital, the survey finds little disagreement that Abuja is to be a political show-piece, an ideal world-class city free of pity and full of pride for all Nigerians. The city is not to be just an alternative to the former capital of Lagos, but rather a visionary sort of rescue from the intractable problems of that city.
5.1.3 Dispositions Toward Housing in General.

The proposition that attracted the most intense response (2.20) in the survey is that every Nigerian should have a right to housing. Overall, 93 per cent of the officials support the proposition, but 86 per cent also disagree strongly (-1.70) that people should be free to build to best of their ability regardless of resulting housing quality. This obviously means that, while the officials are overwhelmingly in favor of the right to housing, they equally favor controlling development and ensuring a minimum standard of building. In fact, the majority (80%) of the officials strongly (1.50) support the proposition that countries concerned with their progress toward modernity must enforce high standards of building and construction. While recognizing that the quality of residential accommodation is an important yardstick for measuring the degree of sophistication of any community, simple logic suggests that any developing country which insists on a minimum (not to even mention high) standard of building and construction, is likely to experience a shortage of housing as many would-be builders would be prevented from building.

Regarding dispositions toward low-cost housing, a significant majority (70%) of the officials clearly (1.00) agree that it is easy for low-cost housing estates to turn into slums; a belief which would obviously make this option unattractive for the new capital. Reinforcing this perception is the support among the decision makers (70%), academics (56%) and implementors (35%) that low-cost housing is often poorly designated and unsightly. The implication is that low-cost housing resembles squatments and, therefore, would probably be contrary to the intended show-case image of the new capital.

Lastly on this note, although both the implementors (45%) and the academics (45%) are weak in their support for the proposition, the decision makers’ overwhelming (90%) support that, in the long run, it costs more to build cheaply, because low-cost housing require a good deal of maintenance and become obsolete in a short time. By this the
decision makers imply that this approach is only deceivingly cheap and, thus, should not be unsuspectingly embraced to the exclusion of other seemingly more costlier approaches.

Related to the above are the dispositions expressed toward the concept of self-help, which is one of the dominant strategies in low-cost housing. An overwhelming (95%) majority of the officials strongly (1.93) concur with the proposition that the problem with self-help housing is that the poor do not have the necessary resources to build and improve their own shelter. So, in other words, any housing scheme that bases its efforts on this sort of concept likely invites failure. Apparently, little matters to the officials that authorities on affordable housing have demonstrated time and again that the resourcefulness of the low-income people to meet their own housing needs is terribly underrated (Perlman 1987?).

In any event, the foregoing dispositions give a clear impression that officials in Nigeria have a very low regard for low-cost housing. Because they view the option as problematic at best, the suggestion is that not only would they be unlikely to push strongly for its alternative, but they would also tend not to be innovative in dealing with the issue. It is interesting to note that 41 per cent of the officials surveyed support the proposition that low-cost housing, basic housing, self-help housing, sites and services, appropriate technology and other concepts of the sort, are all part of a ploy by the west to make developing countries comfortable with backward conditions.

Lastly, on the issue of indigenous building skills and materials, the officials are almost evenly split in their support (51% and 49%) for the propositions that: there is lack of manpower skilled in the use of local building materials; and that local traditional building materials are not as durable, and of the same quality, as imported materials. Nevertheless, it is instructive to note that 60 per cent of the implementors support the former proposition, while 64 per cent of both the decision makers and the academics support the latter (i.e., local building materials being inferior to imported materials). This alludes to a clear mood in the country that anyone who builds with local traditional materials, or who does not erect a modern house, is out of step with national aspirations. The idea of ‘making it’ (i.e.,
establishing ones worth) in the eyes of Nigerian society, is apparently connected with erecting a ‘modern house,’ which is generally one of cement blocks with corrugated aluminum sheet roofing. It differs from native type houses which are generally constructed using such materials as tamped earth, burnt bricks, bamboo sticks, lime substitute for cement and clay tiles or thatch for roofing.

5.1.4 Dispositions Toward Housing in Abuja

The survey corroborates the statement in the master plan that a major challenge in developing the housing program for the new capital is the challenge of affordability. It shows that a majority (57%) of the officials -- decision makers (73%), implementors (56%) and academics (40%) -- endorse the proposition that one of the major goals of government in Abuja is to provide affordable housing for people of all income levels, especially the low-income population. This notwithstanding, the survey also shows that the officials are evenly (50%) divided in their support for the proposition that the government has the obligation to provide complete housing for all its workers in Abuja, while they are in disagreement (59%) that the government has the obligation to participate in providing housing for all levels of people in Abuja.

Clearly, these responses are conflicting and suggest that Nigerian officials are divided on the question of whether housing should be considered a social welfare good or a market commodity. Regarding housing goals in the new capital, the responses suggest that, at best, affordable housing was probably only a goal to be achieved for people employed by the government. Aside from the fact that public housing in Nigeria has almost always meant housing for civil servants, 74 per cent of the implementors support the proposition that the government should provide complete housing for them. Hence, one certainty about the conflicting responses is that they do not recognize that a plan existed for Abuja that explicitly
articulates the housing needs of non-civil servants in the city, or that affordability was a particular concern of that plan.

As for what affordable housing actually means to the officials, the survey gives reason to believe that it does not mean cheap native type houses, as 76 per cent of the officials disagree that *it is necessary for Abuja to have native type houses and neighborhood layout for it to be a Nigerian city*. Moreover, affordability has always been a non-issue in Nigerian public sector housing, as houses provided never closely related to the earning capacity of the households that occupy them.

While the officials are evenly (50%) divided in their support that *high-density development in Abuja would contradict the city’s image as Nigeria’s visible symbol of modernity*, they overwhelmingly (88%) and strongly (1.38) support the proposition that *there is enough space at Abuja for a comfortable low density of development*. Believing (59%) that *housing in Abuja is the most visible symbol of achievement*, an overwhelming majority (88%) of the officials strongly support (1.90) that *higher standards for housing must be enforced in Abuja in order to avoid duplicating the crowded conditions of Lagos*. They (58%) accept the proposition that, *for Abuja, housing quality is more important than affordability*. As an overriding concern, this is a particularly crucial finding, helping to make sense of the fact that the current stock of housing in Abuja is far out of reach of a majority of the residents.

Finally, despite the enormous squatter pressures in the territory, the survey indicates that the decision makers (65%), implementors (55%) and academics (45%) believe that *it is possible to avoid squatters in Abuja*. This is important because, if the history of other new capitals in the developing world is to portend outcomes, then this belief is erroneous and would leave its believers unprepared to deal intelligently with the problem of squatters in the city as it arises. Previous to deciding on the new capital, a committee of Nigerian wise men toured several foreign capitals with the aim of noting the pitfalls of these cities, so that they might be avoided in the Nigerian experience. Among the peculiar features of these capitals to be clearly identified by the committee was the proliferation of squatments. This makes it
CHAPTER 5: EXPLAINING THE POLICY IMPLEMENTATION GAP

doubly surprising that the belief evident in the survey is maintained (i.e., even after the Abuja experience has proven not to be an exception to the rule).

5.1.5 Dispositions Toward Housing Problems in Abuja

By overwhelmingly (82%) and strongly (-1.64) disagreeing with the proposition that money is not a major factor in explaining the housing problems of Abuja, the officials appear to identify finance as one of the chief causes of the settlement problems of the new capital. This is in spite of their preponderant and firm support for the proposition that Nigeria, at the start of the new capital, commanded sufficient wealth to execute the project according to plan.

Next to finance, the officials (59%) -- academics (82%), implementors (53%) and decision makers (50%) -- support that the city's settlement problems stem from the fact that there was never any serious plan to provide housing in Abuja for low-income people who are not in the civil service. Following this, they (57%) support unfavorable dispositions to such housing to be another major contributor. This is implied in their endorsement -- decision makers (67%), implementors (61%) and academics (40%) -- of the proposition that attitudinal changes to encourage a more "Nigerian" city is a precondition for a successful housing strategy in Abuja.

Finally, 67 per cent of the academics support that the settlement problems of the city resulted, because housing policy in Abuja was adopted by a military government concerned with impressive design and construction, not with ensuring propriety and affordability. Both the decision makers (33%) and the implementors (44%) disagree with this proposition but, given the unusually high (24%) "no opinion" response rate on the question for the two groups, it is possible that their responses may have been influenced by the fact that they were serving under a military administration at the time of the survey. Consequently, the officials estimate 66 per cent overall popular support for the proposition.
In part II of the survey questionnaire, officials were asked, in an open-ended question, to associate causes with the major problems they perceive with housing in the city. Table 5.2 below presents a summary of the responses. Consistent with the foregoing findings, it shows that the officials basically locate the cause of the new capital's settlement problems with finance or matters related to it (i.e., high cost of building materials). Next to these, they blame inadequate planning/policy, administrative incompetence, dishonest and undue politics, lack of private interest and political instability in that order.

**Table 5.2: Perception of Causes of Housing Problems in Abuja (By Number of Mentions by Officials)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Causes</th>
<th>Decision Makers</th>
<th>Implementors</th>
<th>Academics</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. General Economic Problem</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Lack of Good Planning/Policy</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Cost of Building Materials</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Administrative Incompetence</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Dishonesty and Undue Politics</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Lack of Private Interest</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Political Instability</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>15</strong></td>
<td><strong>28</strong></td>
<td><strong>9</strong></td>
<td><strong>52</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.1.6 Significant Discrepancies Between "Own" and "Popular" Responses

Two types of discrepancies are possible: (1) mutually reinforcing discrepancies (e.g., where 59% of “own” response agree and 86% of “popular” response also agree); and (2) mutually opposing discrepancies (e.g., where 41% of “own” response agree but 72% of “popular” response disagree). Of interest is the latter type which is significant (15% or more difference on either side based on the natural distribution of responses) for ten out of the thirty-six closed-ended propositions constituting the first part of the survey questionnaire. What this limited number of discrepancies suggests is that officials in Abuja, by and large, did not act under cognitive dissonance in terms of what they did and what they thought the popular response would rather have had them do. If anything, the officials’ estimation on what the popular response might be on certain key propositions (e.g., propositions 3, 4, 5, 9, 10, 15, 16, 18, 21, 22, 28, 30, & 31) suggests that the latter is even more deluded about the extent of the country’s wealth and, therefore, would have had the officials build a more rosy capital than they have done.

The clear indication from the estimated popular responses is that the aforementioned would be far less inclined to produce or tolerate low-cost housing in the new capital, as this was perceived to be shabby housing which is unfit for the image of the new city. Of the thirteen propositions cited above that test for upward bias in the goals and expectations for Abuja, more support was consistently estimated for the popular response in all thirteen cases, which is a significant and crucial finding. It meant that there was no “pull” whatsoever in the country in favor of producing low-cost housing or a modest capital with standards that would be consistent with the citizens’ economic lot.

Most of the discrepancies between "own" and "popular" responses on the thirteen propositions are of the mutually reinforcing type, except for two which are of the opposing type. While the officials (49%) are divided on the proposition that local traditional building materials are not as durable, and of the same quality, as imported material, they estimate a majority (64%) popular support for the proposition. They also estimate 56 per cent popular
(vs 41% own) support for the proposition that low-cost housing and the like are all part of a ploy by the west to make developing countries comfortable with backward conditions.

Other important discrepancies in the results include the fact that officials estimate only a 32 per cent popular (vs 62% own) support for the proposition that it is not necessary for Abuja to be planned and built by Nigerians for it to be a Nigerian city. This is interesting because the officials also estimate a majority popular (53% vs 14% own) support for the proposition that expert in Nigeria means expatriates. That is, why should the popular response want the new capital planned locally when it believes expertise in the country to mean expatriates? Nevertheless, by not seeing the necessity for some local inputs to the new capital's planning process, the officials seem to confirm an old but still prevalent political and administrative attitude in developing countries that public participation in policy formulation is illegitimate or inefficient (Riggs 1964, p. 271). Otherwise, the question that the finding begs is: how can the new capital be a reflection of Nigeria, if it is not necessary for the city to be planned or built by Nigerians? Probably suspecting the popular response of untempered nationalist sentiments, the officials went on to estimate popular (55% vs 24% own) support for the proposition that it is necessary for Abuja to have native type houses and neighborhood layouts for it to be a Nigerian city.

As evident from their attitudes toward housing goals in Abuja, officials in Nigeria are, at best, divided over the role of government in housing provision in the country. But, as might be expected, they estimate clear popular (72% vs 41% own) support for the proposition that the government has the obligation to participate in providing housing for all levels of people in Abuja. Despite being overwhelmingly in support of controlling development in the new capital, the officials estimate popular (61% vs 14% own) support for the proposition that people should be free to build to the best of their ability regardless of resulting housing quality. This amounts to a paradox in that the popular response is estimated to favor government involvement but without loosing the ability to build freely. If the level of support for the two propositions is to be an augury, the important aspect of the paradox is that the
popular response would not want any government involvement, if it means that people would be prevented from building to the best of their ability. It may be said that they want the government to assist them to build what they can.

Finally, the officials estimate popular (39% vs 55% own) support for the proposition that it is possible to avoid squatters in Abuja; (29% vs 51%) that there is lack of manpower skilled in the use of local building materials; and (66% vs 49%) that housing policy in Abuja was adopted by a military government concerned with impressive design and construction, not with ensuring propriety and affordability.

Before undertaking to illustrate how all these dispositional factors relating to tastes and preferences in Abuja militated against low-cost housing goals in the city, a review of the preliminary phase of the new capital planning/implementation process is in order. This is a necessary step to both provide background information for the discussion, and to further explore the dissertation's underlying argument that, in order to fully comprehend the implementation problem, it is imperative to examine both the up-stream and down-stream activities of the policy process.

5.2 THE POLITICS OF THE NEW CAPITAL DECISION

With an excerpt from his August 5, 1975 inaugural speech, the late General Murtala Mohammed promulgated the new capital decision and formally began the preliminary phase of the planning/implementation process for the city. Said the General in the speech:

As to the question of a Federal Capital, you are no doubt aware of the many problems that have arisen from the city of Lagos serving as the dual capital of both the Federal Government and the Lagos State Government. Some of these problems have proved intractable, an there have been persistent suggestions that, as Lagos seems unable to accommodate both Governments, either the Lagos State Government or the Federal Government should move its capital elsewhere. The issue has to be examined closely.... It is believed

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1. The discussion to follow on this subject relies on some field observations, but mainly on the work done by Moore (1982). Since Moore's field work was done during the planning phase and early construction period of the project, he was able to interact with both the expatriate planners and the relevant Nigerian policy officials.
that the body of knowledgeable men to be set up, assisted by the contributions from the public at large, will be able to make useful recommendations to the Federal Government (NITP 1984, p. 1-2).

5.2.1 The Aguda Panel on Relocation/Site Selection

On August 9, 1975, following the inaugural meeting of the Supreme Military Council, the Aguda panel was constituted to look into whether or not a new capital was necessary for the country, and what the best location for it might be. Subsequent activities by this panel pursuant to these two mandates marked the first phase of the new capital planning process that was "supposedly" open to the public. Even before the panel was initiated to delve into the issue, "many discerning Nigerians, including the military administration, were convinced that no solution, other than a new Federal Capital, would suffice" (Abumere 1984, p. 18). Both Agba (1986) and Moore (1982) provide convincing arguments about the predetermined nature of the panel's decisions, both in recommending a new capital and in selecting its current central location at Abuja. This is evidenced by the fact that the panel was only given till December 31, 1975 to report on such a momentous decision, as well as the fact that the panel actually submitted its report on December 10, 1975, scarcely four months after coming into existence.

Nonetheless, to justify its existence and legitimize the decisions made, the eight member panel (consisting of no experienced persons in urban planning)\(^2\) undertook to invite briefs from across the country. But as suggested in the literature review (Chapter 2) that opportunities for participation in policy process by actors external to the implementing agencies tend to be deliberately biased towards supporters of the policy (Mazmanian and Sabatier 1981, p. 13), the panel made certain that "memoranda were requested only from those groups that would not present a serious challenge to the committee's previously made conclusions" (Moore 1982, p. 43). For example, the Nigerian Institute of Town Planners

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2. According to Agba (1986, p. 194), the membership consisted of "a business man, a judge, a professor of gynecology, an army chaplain, a legal practitioner, a secondary school teacher and a geographer."
(NITP) was not invited to submit a brief, but did do so anyway. To further limit participation, the panel made its request for briefs through only a single source (the Nigerian newspapers) and called for written representations in fifteen copies no later than September 30, 1975. Other methods of getting the message across to the masses were not explored, and the majority of society who could not write were ignored. Those who could write obviously had little time to do so, let alone write something reasonable.

In addition to inviting briefs, the panel also undertook a hasty tour of the country's state capitals, mainly to consult the state governments and interview some entities of the state's wider public. But outside of talking to some influential individuals and organizations in Nigerian politics, "the committee did not consult with other segments of the society, such as the association of market women, petty traders, labor organizations, etc." (Agba 1986, p. 182). Neither did it consult with the individual members of the public, as is evident from the following comment contained in the panel's final report:

It was our intention to take evidence from the general public or even to meet with them. However, the time at our disposal was very short and we believed that we could arrive at a good decision on each of our terms of reference by making extensive use of memoranda that we called for in addition to other means of information and education available to us (Report of the Committee 1975, p. 23).

Lastly, the panel also spent one month touring several foreign capitals including Canberra, Brasilia, Delhi, Karachi, Islamabad, Dodoma, Gaborone, Lusaka, Nairobi, etc.. The object was to enable panelists to observe the realities of these cities so that, should Nigeria elect to build a new capital, it could learn from their successes and avoid their mistakes. That was the aim but, in reality, the panel was noted to have been particularly "enthralled by the large theaters, night clubs, and luxury hotels of these places," rather than by their functional role in spatial development (Moore 1982, p. 36).

3. This question is made suspect by the fact that the foreign tour was the first measure undertaken by the panel (Moore 1982, p. 35). Ideally, if the panel did not treat the decision to relocate as fait accompli, then the tour should not come first. Or, at least, part of its aim should have been to thresh out the political ramifications of building a new capital with the founding fathers and planners of the foreign capitals visited.
It should be mentioned as well that the FCDA and the NISER held a workshop, attended mainly by Nigerian professionals, to discuss site selection and the planning process for the city. But this conference was not held until late September 1976 after the site selection had been completed, which meant that the exercise may have allowed for the expression of professional opposition, but certainly not for its serious consideration in the decision making. In Moore's (1982, p. 44) words, "the truth is that the FCDA had no interest in hearing the voice of the Nigerian academics and planners."

As a conclusion to this phase of the new capital planning process, the panel's final report noted that altogether 286 memoranda were received from across the country, with a significant majority of these being in full support of a new capital. It also noted that all but two (Western and Rivers states) out of the twelve states comprising the country supported the move. On the selection of an optimal location for the capital, it noted that the states had their preferences and listed them, but fell short of actually dealing with the disadvantages of their preferred sites.

5.2.2 Selecting Master Planners for the City

The choice of master planners for the city marked the beginning of the second phase of the new capital planning process. As it was perceived, the choice was essentially between Nigerian planners and expatriate planners. Both the military leadership and responsible civilian officials in government concurred on the choice of expatriates, but disagreed on whether or not an international competition should be held to choose planners for the city. Apparently, as explained by Moore (1982, p. 49), there were indications that "top military officials preferred to award the contract to an expatriate firm that would consider awarding additional favors to them in return." The dispute eventually ended with Mr. I. Ebong insisting on an international competition to select planners that would oversee the drafting of a comprehensive landuse plan for the city. Mr. Ebong was the first executive secretary of the
FCDA, but was later asked to step down by his military appointees for his role in insisting on a competition. He was replaced by Mr. M. Adeogun, a man who was typified as famous for generally awarding contracts to "friends" (Moore 1982, p. 55).

Close to one hundred different groups of expatriate firms submitted proposals for the Abuja master plan contract. This number was quickly narrowed to fifteen including planning teams from Britain, West Germany, U.S., Japan, Canada and Greece. An American consortium formed specifically for the competition was eventually selected. The International Planning Associates (IPA) comprised three American planning firms: (1) Wallace, McHarg, Roberts and Todd (architects and city and regional planning); (2) Planning Research Corporation (transportation planners and utilities engineers); and (3) Archisystems International (architects and planners).

In an official letter to the Nigerian government accepting the job, the IPA was quoted by Moore (1982, p. 57) as having said that the "IPA understands the magnitude and complexity of the assignments; is familiar with Nigeria's urbanization patterns; and has first hand knowledge of Nigeria." Yet, upon a closer examination of the IPA's records, Moore found this statement to be misleading and untrue. Based on the firm's own publications of past work experience, the consortium was shown not to have had a single project in Nigeria or Africa for that matter. Two members of the consortium had some experience in Nigeria but "neither of these individuals was directly involved in the development of the master plan" (Moore 1982, p. 57). Given that the IPA's work history was contained in the firm's proposal, it becomes questionable on what grounds the Nigerian government made its decision. Cost was never indicated by the leadership to be a factor worthy of concern, so the firm could not have been selected for this reason.

It may be asked -- what was the feeling in the country about the choice of foreign planners over Nigerian planners? What reasons did the military leadership have for opting to engage the services of an international consultancy? Needless to say, Nigerian professionals were and still are unhappy with the decision, as their contributions were shunted aside when
they had the opportunity to count the most. In a paper delivered at the 1976 NISER/FCDA workshop, the then president of the Nigerian Institute of Town Planners (NITP) makes the point that the Institute had issued a press release early in that year offering “its services to the government of this country in all aspects leading to the preparation and implementation of schemes for this capital city” (Quoted in Moore 1982, p. 44). But this offer was not even heard in the right quarters, let alone responded to. A paper read at another conference that was organized four years later takes a more stern tone:

The citizens of this country should have the rare opportunity to plan, design and build their national capital. Nothing can be more satisfying. Nothing can be more historical. Anything short of this will tarnish the image and prestige of the nation.... In the various stages of implementing the proposals, we might require the services of foreign consultants... [but] Nigerian consultants should be the principal consultants with whom the consultants from abroad would work. Nigerian consultants should not become appendages in their own country.... The sad event of the national anthem should not be repeated. We could, as we are now trying to, allow Nigerians to re-write the national anthem (Tokun 1984, p. 25).

The point was widely lamented that “Nigeria lost the unique opportunity of allowing indigenous planners to face the challenge of planning their country’s new capital” (Onibokun 1984, p. 17-8). But at this time the professionals could only hope that the already manifest follies of the capital “teach [the Nigerian decision makers] the consequences of employing wrong hands” (Gandonu 1984, p. 346). It is understandable that the Nigerian professionals should feel indignation. As revealed by the survey results, the majority of the decision makers, implementors and academics surveyed support that there was the local know-how to plan and execute the new capital. The critical question then is why did the leadership opt for an overseas solution when there was a local alternative?

In an attempt to make sense of this question, there is first the observation by Moore (1982, p 47) that the military leadership responsible for making the decision did not have any experience in large scale urban planning. As he had put it, “you had a government run basically by a bunch of generals that knew nothing about cities and economics.” The leadership had two main concerns: (1) getting action soonest and (2) building a beautiful and
CHAPTER 5: EXPLAINING THE POLICY IMPLEMENTATION GAP

functional city. To maximize these two concerns, it felt that the entire project should be turned over to the foreign planners who could complete the plan in record time. This feeling was communicated openly to the FCDA whose official mandate included the preparation of a master plan for the city. It should be noted here that, even though the survey results indicate that over 80 per cent of the officials surveyed disagree with the proposition that experts in the country meant expatriates, Moore (1982, p. 47), in his own experience, found that "experts, in the opinion of the Nigerian military, were expatriates." Note that the officials estimate a 53 per cent popular (vs 20% own) support for the proposition. This suggests that the implied meaning of the proposition may have insulted the officials, thereby causing them to respond in the way they did.

Apart from all this, it should be kept in mind what type of city the military was interested in building. The indication from every source is that the military wanted to build a European city in Africa, an ideal world-class city free of pity and squatters. Thus, in the sense that the new capital was to mimic images of western cities, it would be contrary to reason that non-western planners would be ideal for the job.

Nonetheless, to justify its use of "apolitical" approaches to the planning of the new capital, the FCDA, under Mr. Ebong, argued that the cumbersome and arduous of task of planning a new city was not within the indigenous technical capability. The agency, of course, did not disclose feelings to the contrary among the indigenous professional community, and their strong desire that "Abuja should be a Nigerian city planned by Nigerians." After all, this was not the bygone days when developing countries depended on the advanced countries to plan their world, which is probably why only 30 per cent of the academics (and 32% of the popular response) support the proposition that it is not necessary for Abuja to be planned and built by Nigerian for it to be a Nigerian city. This contrasts with the strong support among the decision makers (80%) and the implementors (72%).

4. This point was made in a telephone interview with Moore (1982, p. 48).
Another crucial aspect not brought out by the FCDA's rationalization is that the use of indigenous professionals would have opened each step of the planning process to intense internal political wrangling. The issues surrounding the proper role of the new capital then and now remain exceeding contentious throughout the country. In the literature review (Chapter 2), it was noted that the result of involving too many people in any planning process, is almost always "disagreement" and "delay." The military leadership wanted neither of these two outcomes and, accordingly, sought to deliberately insulate the new capital planning process from internal dynamics by exporting it overseas. If accepted as a conscious strategy on the part of the leadership, there is no doubt that the ploy worked to expedite the planning phase and achieve the master plan in less than two years as was originally intended. The military's urgency and desire for fast results stemmed from the fact that it had promised in 1976 to relinquish power to a civilian administration in 1979. Consequently, it wanted the new capital project to have progressed sufficiently by this time, so that it would become a "no-going back" policy for the subsequent administration. Once again, the Generals were masters on this intention.

The specific impacts of officials' dispositions on both the master plan process and implementation strategies for housing in the new capital are discussed in the next section. This is done with a view to showing a continuation between past and recent dispositions toward the new capital, and how these converged to influence what options were pursued in making the new capital housing plans a reality.

5.3 IMPACT OF OFFICIALS' DISPOSITIONS ON THE DYNAMICS OF THE MASTER PLANNING

According to an article by Todd (1984, p. 120-1), a member of the IPA project management board in charge of project direction, the actual planning process for Abuja was divided into the following six consecutive stages:
(1) **Programming**: the determination of the demographic, population and economic characteristics;

(2) **Site Evaluation and Site Selection**: the study of the geography of the federal capital territory and the various natural and man-made elements to determine the most suitable site for the new city and, finally, the testing of various urban forms on the selected site to determine its capacity for accepting urban form;

(3) **The Plan for the Region**: the determination of the future landuse of the federal capital territory and the relation of the territory to the surrounding states;

(4) **The Master Plan Concept**: the determination of the conceptual framework of the new city;

(5) **The Master Plan**: the detailing and development of the conceptual plan including the plan both for the central area and the 12 residential towns or "sectors" of the city; and

(6) **The Design and Development Manual**: the determination of development standards for all the various components of the city.

Todd readily admits that "work on these elements was accomplished primarily in the United States," in Washington, D.C. and Philadelphia. He also readily admits that "this was somewhat at odds with the concept that the FCDA had that all of the work would be accomplished in Nigeria." This fact remained "a source of discontent in the FCDA" throughout the master planning phase, as the agency was never appeased with the alternative arrangements that were made. Commenting on the seriousness of this disharmony, Todd cautions: "let this experience be a word of warning to those who would practice their profession in the distant land." The repercussion of this warning was later to be felt when the FCDA had control of implementation of the master plan.

5. It was resolved that there would be an IPA resident manager in Nigeria who would maintain daily contact with the agency and liaise between the two. Also, represented in the FCDA organizational chart were two other independent liaison groups: (1) a three-member International Review Panel (IRP) and a twenty-seven member Technical Assessment Panel (TAP). The former composed of foreign experts in new capital planning and the latter Nigerian professionals of pertinent backgrounds. Together the two panels were to serve as consultants and advisers to the IPA-FCDA planning team; but, as Moore (1982, p. 76) reports: "Since the master plan was developed on a strict time schedule, the two consultant groups were never integrated into the plan formulation. It was not until after the master plan had been completed that these two panels were asked to submit evaluations of the project. [Information from an IPA director is that] the TAP and IRP were used only to verify that the Nigerians had 'purchased a valid plan for a new capital.' The panels were never meant to serve as consultants."
In an attempt to defend the IPA’s decision to conduct the planning in the U.S., Todd (1984, p. 121) later argued that it was either this mode of working or “bankruptcy;” that it was simply impractical to move the entire planning office staff to Nigeria, given the limited budget and very short planning schedule of eighteen months. Why Todd assumed that it would be necessary to move the “entire” staff, rather than the essential staff, is astounding. But more astounding is the statement by Todd that the FCDA “thought” that all work on the capital would be accomplished in Nigeria rather than in the U.S.. Ordinarily, one would expect the FCDA to have been clear on this before it considered and signed a contract with the IPA for the job. Likewise, the IPA would have had to focus on the matter before it could prepare its proposal and establish its professional fees, as the latter would vary significantly depending on whether the firm is to plan from home or in Nigeria.

As for the financial argument for not moving the IPA staff to Nigeria, this conflicts flagrantly with the overall mood that characterized the entire planning phase of the new capital. At no time was cost considered a serious issue by members of the new capital’s decision making body. This fact becomes clearer as the analysis progresses, but the point to be made here is that the arrangement to plan Abuja from across the Atlantic Ocean worked to the interests of both the Nigerian decision makers and the IPA.

Thus, given this situation that the Atlantic Ocean separated the planners from the project, it is probably an understatement to suggest that the IPA never developed an understanding of the nature of the local demand for housing. Yet, the firm was responsible for producing a complete guideline for the city’s settlement plan. The question is thus raised -- from whom did the expatriate planners get their cues on the nature of the local demand for housing? It should be recalled that not only was there a bad rapport between the planners

6. In 1979, the Milton Keynes Development Corporation of London was retained to produce detailed housing designs and residential layouts for the city. The firm's services were, however, later terminated for reasons unknown to this researcher. Though this was not until after much of the firm's plans were underway. Other firms involved in the detail planning of the settlement included Egbor and Arenco Associates, Dar-AlHandasah Consultants, S.F. Consultants, International Companies Associates and Doxiades Associates (Nig.) Ltd.
CHAPTER 5: EXPLAINING THE POLICY IMPLEMENTATION GAP

(the IPA) and the implementing agency (the FCDA), but the latter was intentionally made superfluous and served primarily to legitimize the impression of a Nigerian involvement. It is, nevertheless, acceptable to maintain that the process for the new capital involved three major participants: (1) the Nigerian military leaders, (2) the IPA and (3) the FCDA in that descending order of importance. Agba (1986, p. 215) summarizes the dynamics of the interactions between these three actors: "the FCDA served mainly as a medium through which the IPA interacted with the military government...; the military government dictated the 'tempo' of planning, while the IPA developed mainly technical solutions to match their demands."

This fact that the planning process for the city was entirely top-down in the most classical sense, implies that the foreign planners could not but obtain their impression of local housing needs from the views expressed by the army chiefs. It becomes important, therefore, to reflect further on the dispositions of the army chiefs toward the new capital in order to determine the dispositions held by the expatriate planners (or what was put to them) toward housing provision.

As alluded to earlier, the goal of the military was to build a new, monumental capital which would not only be a visible symbol of the government's achievement on behalf of the populace, but also a home and source of pride for the government. The following comments, culled from the speech by a past Minister of the FCT, late Major General M.J. Vatsa, confirms some of these sentiments:

The objective is Abuja, a city all Nigerians will ever remain proud of.... I implore [all] professionals who have acquired experience in the planning of new Capital Cities to... help us build Abuja as one of the best planned Capital Cities in the world.... It is the government's intentions to make [Abuja] a befitting Capital that will be a pride of the black man wherever he may be (Speeches by Late General Murtala Ramat Mohammed and succeeding Ministers of FCT, Abuja 1988, p. 12-3).

7. This suggestion was confirmed by the agency's first executive secretary, Mr. Ebong. Additional supportive evidence includes the amount of discontent expressed over the matter by present officials of the FCDA; and the fact that few planning tasks were ever assigned the agency, and that the few ever assigned were often redone by the western planners.
“Let us have a Capital City Free of pity,” said the late Major General in another public address (FCDA 1985, p. 1).

Undoubtedly, the issue of housing was central to the achievements of these aspirations, because progress in the sector would most readily suggest success or failure of the new capital, both in the eyes of its residents and outside observers. As shown by evidence from the survey, housing is perceived to both represent a symbol of achievement and progress toward modernity, and the most visible symbol of policy accomplishments in the city. The latter is the traditional argument that a city is only as good as “the quality of the residential environment... [because] ‘housing’ is more than merely the dwelling unit. It is a complex product made up of a combination of services... (with respect to work and community services)” (Master plan 1979, p. 171).

The above realization, in conjunction with the assumption that Nigeria was a wealthy country, are probably what led the army chiefs to believe that costs should not be a concern in adopting construction standards for the city; a belief which is shared by the majority (58%) of current policy officials surveyed. The assumption about the country’s affluence was made explicit by the military’s hand-picked panel on relocation. According to the final report of this panel:

The argument that colossal sums of money would be involved in building up a new capital is attractive but unconvincing.... First, we must say that we are not economists, but we can see no justification for pessimism displayed in the above [argument].... Even if the cost is high, we can afford it today (Report of the Committee 1975, p. 55).

Admittedly, such an assumption was warranted at the time, given the windfall that the country experienced through “petrodollars.” After the Arab oil embargo in 1973, Nigeria joined the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and succeeded in raising the average price of the country’s crude from $3.05 in 1971 to $14.69 (U.S.), an increase of 482 per cent. Having one of the finest grades of crude (bony light), and as one of the three largest suppliers of crude to the U.S. at the time, the country’s annual production soared from 395.8 million barrels in 1970 to 823.3 in 1974. Subsequently, oil revenue rose dramatically
from N633.2 million (26.3% of total revenue) in 1970 to N4.5 billion (82.1% of total revenue) in 1974 (Onimode 1987, p. 53). [Up to 1984, N1.00 = $1.65 approximately.]

Of course, at the time of writing the report about the country’s new found wealth, the panel could not foresee the near collapse of the OPEC and the consequent sharp drop in oil revenues. Were the panelists, along with the rest of the country’s decision makers, to have known “that the oil boom would not last, the tempo and the style of development of Abuja might have been different” (Onibokun 1984, p. 6). That is, particularly in view of the fact that the high oil revenue figures of 1974, which formed the financial basis for the venture, remained the highest ever in terms of percentage of total government revenue.

Getting back to the views expressed by the committee, it was only to be expected that decision makers showed an attitude of indifference towards cost related issues during the formulation of construction plans for the new capital:

An American planner recounted an incident when IPA delivered a presentation outlining the estimated costs of the project to a number of top military officials at Dodan Barracks [the military headquarters] in Lagos. The military men were generally oblivious to the figures, using the presentation as an opportunity to catch some rest. Cost to the majority of the military leaders, was not a factor worthy of their concern.

The economic boom brought on by the rise in oil revenues had given the leaders personal prosperity and with this a mistaken perception that Nigeria was a wealthy country. The leaders’ failure to accept and make decisions based on the realities of Nigerian development played an important role in determining the plans for the new capital at Abuja (Moore 1982, p. 59).

As there were numerous instances of this sort, it follows that they had considerable impact on the expatriate planners, by creating a working relationship and atmosphere in which they would become less concerned with issues related to costs and affordability.

The ensuing section examines closely the impact of the dispositions of civilian policy officials on the housing options pursued in the new capital. It shows that the officials’ dispositions converge with those of the army chiefs in support of selecting the most modern technology available for use in the new capital.
5.4 IMPACT OF OFFICIALS' DISPOSITIONS ON THE HOUSING IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES

More than planning intentions, strategic choices on how program objectives are actually pursued greatly affect the result. In Chapter 1, this fact was noted to be especially so in the developing countries where the definite tendency is for policy demands to reach the system after legislation is passed, rather than before as is generally the case with countries of the west. As the argument was developed, this occurrence is what ultimately causes the marginalized individuals and groups to resort to bringing their political pressures to bear at the means-selection stage and, by so doing, alter both the content and the intended impact of policy. This is aside from the fact that die-hard opponents of the policy who lost out in the planning phase would seek, and find, means to continue their opposition in this stage (Bardach 1977, p. 38).

That the whole of the Nigerian public, including its professional class, was marginalized from the planning process for the new capital, leaves no doubt as to the validity of the above assertion. Even though specifically created to build the new capital, the FCDA was equally marginalized from the planning of the city in a manner reminiscent of the classical, but erroneous dichotomies between policy and administration, or between planning and implementation. The agency was effectively relegated to a secondary role as a mere channel through which the army chiefs communicated their wishes to the foreign technical experts. Though it was learned during the field research that this role was later improved to include assembling the various pieces of planning works done by the foreign consultants.8

Given the above situation, it follows that all the marginalized actors in Nigeria, particularly the FCDA, resorted to focusing their demand-making efforts on the choice of strategies to be adopted in the plan execution stage. But, since the FCDA has a virtual monopoly in deciding the financial aspects of these strategies, it is logical to assert that the disposition of officials responsible to this agency is one of the single most inclusive

8. Sources in the management cadre of the FCDA confirmed that almost no serious or original planning work was ever done internally.
explanations for the failure to provide affordable shelter in the new capital as was intended by the master plan guideline.

Furthermore, as Abuja was widely perceived to be an administrative city, the bureaucrats who were to occupy it held the biggest stake, not only in the quality of housing produced, but also in the image of exclusivity for the city. It is, therefore, not startling that the survey results suggest that the dispositions the bureaucrats brought to the process closely relate to those of the army chiefs in support of a strong bias in favor of building a "high class" city. By virtue of their likely places of academic training and their generally elitist position in society, it is perhaps even less of a coincidence that the dispositions expressed by the other relevant indigenous actors in the process (i.e., the academics),\(^9\) should also favor building a high class, western-type city.

The remainder of this section discusses what some of these attitudes were and how they were manifested in the choices made in relation to the two primary components affecting housing costs in the city, namely: (1) construction and management, and (2) infrastructure. The dissertation's argument that dispositions toward Abuja have, in the main, not changed, should be borne in mind.

### 5.4.1 Building Construction Choices

*Materials.* Even though the master plan guideline was cognizant of the fact that many construction materials needed to build the capital must be imported, it urged a restraint on the gross amount to be imported. It proposed supplementing these wherever possible with less costlier local materials. In reality, however, this exhortation was not heeded, as there was little by way of local substitution. Despite recommendations to the contrary on the basis of cost, the trend favoring prefabricated method of building continued unabated.

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9. It is realized here that a powerful argument could be made, on the basis of information contained in this dissertation, that the academics were, in fact, not relevant actors in the process, but mere "bystanders." To this, the response is that they in fact had a role in bolstering the ideals of the new capital and in maintaining an upward pressure on development standards adopted in the city.
There were several reasons for this. The first was that the government never followed up the master plan’s broad guidelines with clear directives on what constitutes local content, much less legislative directives requiring contractors to abide by such definitions.

The second was that the ability to buy materials from within the country became especially difficult. There was such spectacular demand for building materials that the local market was unable to cope. Consequently, prices skyrocketed and certain imported items (e.g., ironmongery and electrical carcassing) even moved into the black market (Aj 1985, p. 75).

Finally, compounding these problems was the general reluctance on the part of Nigerian society to accept local materials as a genuine alternative to imports. As suggested by the survey, a significant portion of the officials -- decision makers (64%), academics (64%) and implementors (29%) or overall popular response (64%) -- support the proposition that the quality of local materials is not at par with imported materials. Even for the implementors who hold a dissenting opinion on the issue, it seems highly unlikely that any of them would actually support having their houses built using local materials and fixtures. Hence, while there is no doubt that public policy in developing countries is convinced of the efficacy of import substitution with local materials, the problem of social acceptability has remained.

Labor. It was mentioned that to help bring the cost of housing within the range of affordability, the IPA had recommended "a combination of self-help techniques and reliance on local building materials," which: (1) can reduce total costs by almost 50 per cent; (2) provide opportunities for self expression by way of indigenous building styles; and (3) stimulate the mobilization of latent indigenous resources. The FCDA was unconvinced of this recommendation, particularly the part concerning "self-help" techniques. The agency argued that "low-income workers would not have the energy, after a hard day's work, to make contributions to their housing" (Moore 1982, p. 72).
During a subsequent debate that ensued between the agency and the IPA over the issue, Mr. Stephen Lockwood, the IPA's resident project manager, was quoted by Moore (1982, p. 75) as telling the FCDA officials that they have a naive knowledge of the problems involved in building low-cost shelter; that the new city "cannot look like a European city in Africa, not with 70 per cent of the households earning less than N3,000 per year." In the end, however, the FCDA remained unyielding and elected to pursue the low-income housing goals without self-help techniques; a decision which apparently meant that self-help would not be pursued for all the other income brackets. The plan was that the government would provide complete housing for all its workers, while it would be left up to the private sector to respond to the housing needs of the non-civil servants.

Given the truism that individuals are more efficient suppliers of their own shelter, and that shelter built by government is consistently and outrageously more costly than similar quality shelter built privately, this decision to exclude self-help measures in the housing program for the city automatically meant more expensive houses for the civil servants. It is only logical that the costs resulting from contractors' huge overheads and profits, lax concerns for both material and construction costs, the setting of unrealistic standards and the failure to mobilize all available local financial resources, would combine to push up the cost of housing. For the non-civil servants, the no self-help decision simply meant that they were on their own in fending for shelter in the city. Contrary to the survey results, the fact that this decision was not followed up by any concrete arrangements to stimulate private sector response is sufficient proof that there never was the intention to provide housing for this group.

Why did the FCDA reject the self-help option? A possible answer is suggested by the fact that 95 per cent of current policy officials in Abuja concur with the proposition that

10. That is, apart from the agency's claim that low-income people would not have the energy to contribute to providing their own shelter. After all, there is nothing in this reasoning that precludes the middle and upper income people from benefiting from the scheme, especially those aspects of it that call for omitting portions of housing which were superfluous and which can be upgraded later by residents.
the problem with self-help housing is that the poor do not have the necessary resources to build and improve their own shelter. When the question was specifically put to Mr. P. Iyortyer, current deputy director of architecture and building, FCDA, during an interview, his response was that "the idea appears to insult and offend some of the decision makers. Personally, I did not like the idea when it was first introduced to me and was rather upset by it. But, of course, I now know that this is the way to go." Continues Mr. Iyortyer, you must bear in mind that "the philosophy of housing development in Nigeria as a whole is the 'design and construct' philosophy [in the sense that] housing delivery is narrowly viewed to be direct/complete construction of housing units." According to the survey results, Mr. Iyortyer is apparently not alone in his initial feelings toward the concept of self-help housing. While estimating a majority (56%) popular support for the proposition, 41 per cent of the officials surveyed support that self-help housing and the sort are all part of a ploy by the west to make developing countries comfortable with backward conditions.

Standards. To reduce housing costs, the IPA had also recommended keeping construction standards realistic and adopting a more compact form of development. By comparing the average plot size in Abuja with standards adopted elsewhere in other populous developing countries, Agba (1986, p. 380) was able to show that the plots designed for Abuja residents have far higher standards. Average plot sizes in Abuja range from 428 to 604 square meters in comparison to 300 square meters in Egypt, 200 in Brazil and in Argentina, and 75 in India. Obviously, this low density of development not only meant that the low-income people were faced with having to buy more land than they might need or could afford, but that they also had to pay more for infrastructure services as there would be fewer households per a given area of land to share such costs.

Despite the above comparative analysis and the reason for a more compact development, sentiments for even higher standards of building and bigger plot sizes persisted. To demonstrate how pronounced this high-mindedness was, Mr. Iyortyer gave the example of the Wuse district of the new capital which was specifically designed as a low density
settlement mainly for senior government officials. According to lyortyer, "the standards of home built in this place even surpassed the already high standards stipulated by the government itself. Yet, there was wide spread criticism by residents of this place that they required more spacious quarters with more rooms, yard space, built-in garages, green space, etc."  

During the 1984 workshop on the planning of new capital cities held in Abuja, similar sentiments in favor of higher standards were widely expressed. Said Onibokun (1984, p. 11-2) to his conferees:

When we go on a tour of the Abuja city this afternoon you will notice the high density, compact and unappealing apartment structures that characterize the accelerated development district. Is this type of development called for in modern day Nigeria, especially when we have the experience of Brasilia, Ottawa, Canberra, Washington, D.C., Islamabad, Dakar and Nairobi to fall upon.

In what was more of a stern warning against future developments in the city, Gandonu (1984, p. 42), a staunch proponent of the new capital and former member of the Aguda panel on relocation, writes:

Higher standards of housing construction and space must be enforced beyond the poor performance so far at the accelerated districts, which appears to duplicate the crowded conditions from which Lagos evacuees expected to be freed. There is enough space at the new capital for a more pleasant environment and Abuja must set the standard for the improved development of other Nigerian cities.

In an interview, Mr. E. Okoro, an assistant chief architecture with the FCDA, made this point that "one of the biggest contradictions of Abuja was that decision makers were driven to avoid any manifestation of Lagos, even if the said manifestation was culturally and inherently Nigerian." Mr. Okoro also noted that a majority of "the high level officials in Abuja were seriously affected by the concept of building an ideal capital city, and that many of them had made their decisions with this belief in mind." These testimonies find strong support in the results of the survey. For example, there was overwhelming (92%, 88% and 88% respectively) support for the propositions that there is enough space at Abuja for a comfortable low density of development; that Abuja must not suffer any of the defects of
Lagos; and that higher standards for housing must be enforced in Abuja in order to avoid duplicating the crowded conditions of Lagos. When asked what sort of pressures did the architecture and building department receive from top officials regarding standards, Mr. Iyortyler responded that "the pressures were never to reduce standards." "That was the problem. Officials in Abuja dream too high."

Location. While location was not identified by the IPA as one of the potential contributors to the total cost of residential development, it is obvious that service costs borne by households stand to be reduced by locating housing estates close to centers of employment and activities. This is especially the case for the poor whose business relations require them to bear the responsibility for being in frequent contact with their patrons rather than vice-versa. Hence, they prefer ease of access more than any other of the services provided by housing when selecting a place to live (Linn 1983). So, why then were the low-income housing developments in Abuja not located within the FCC proper? An analysis of the location of the government's housing estates in Chapter 4, showed that virtually all the housing for the junior civil servants were developed outside the FCC, sometimes in far away places as between 19 - 82 miles from the city. It is true that low-income developments are not always close to city centers, but this is usually because of the high cost of land near the city center. Land in Abuja and across the FCT is, however, owned by the government at no cost to the FCDA. The truth of the matter is that policy officials in Abuja found such housing to be contrary to the intended image of the new capital. As explained by one principle town planning officer with the FCDA:

The planning and survey department had gone along with the idea of building low-income housing on the fringe of the city, mainly because the idea was suggested as a temporary measure. However, as it has now become obvious that this is no stop-gap measure, but rather the policy orientation of the administration, the department is refusing to go along. We are now arguing that these low income workers need to be housed within or nearer the capital city along with mainstream population (paraphrased from field interview).
Transient Housing. In recognition of the fact that not all migrants to Abuja would be civil servants moving from Lagos on a permanent basis, the IPA had recommended that a total of 19,000 transient housing units be provided to accommodate these people. Expectedly, nothing ever became of this goal in light of the fact that the IPA also recommended self-help as a way of making the scheme possible. Besides, to the extent that the master plan (1979, p. 179) described these migrants as "likely to have marginal and unstable incomes less than the lowest civil servant incomes," it was highly improbable that the policy officials would consider them capable of producing the type of shelter that would uphold the show-case image intended for the new capital. According to the survey results, policy officials in Nigeria not only believe that the poor do not have the necessary resources to build and improve their own shelter, but that "low-cost housing is often times unsightly" and can "easily turn into slums." To buttress their belief, some of the officials interviewed cited the Nyanya labor camp which they maintain is rapidly turning into a slum. But this notwithstanding, remarks one senior government official in Abuja:

Abuja is not for the low-income and they should not be allowed access to the city. It must be remembered that the city is exclusively intended for the conduct of the affairs of the state. So, not only do the poor not have any business in the city but, if allowed in, they are sure to 'spoil' it just like they spoiled Lagos. That is why Abuja was designed with the aim in mind to discourage the extended family system and the slum-like environment that comes with this. The fact that houses in Abuja, unlike in other places like Lagos, have no boys' quarters is proof.

Rich non-civil servants may be allowed access to the city, but this must only be after all the roads and necessary public infrastructures are in place. Otherwise, you will get these individuals exerting their property rights to the detriment of the public planners who may be needing their lands for some public good (paraphrased from field interview).

This attitude that the non-civil servant poor should not be tolerated in the new capital is supported by the fact that the majority of current policy officials in the country endorse the propositions that: (1) Abuja should be mainly an administrative center; (2) Abuja must not suffer any of the defects of Lagos; and (3) any manifestations of poverty in Abuja should be eradicated at all costs.
5.4.2 Infrastructure Choices

Considering that infrastructure costs typically account for between 20 and 45 per cent of total residential development costs, the IPA recommended reducing costs by building infrastructure to lower initial standards. Again, the FCDA did not follow this guideline. To quote Moore (1982, p. 60) in detail:

The grandiose images of the FCDA and of the military leaders led them to conclude that the appropriate technology for the city of Abuja was the most advanced and the most modern available. Two examples of how this input affected the city are in the formulation of plans for waste-water treatment, and transportation development....

The waste-water system selected by IPA for the capital city is anaerobic pond-aerated system. This system, which is suited to the climatological setting of the FCT, is capable of meeting treatment requirements with a minimal commitment to mechanical equipment....

The cost of the selected system is far less than that of a more standard, mechanically operated sewerage system. Estimates of the relative costs of the secondary type systems indicate that they are five- to fifteen-fold greater than an anaerobic pond... [i.e., excluding] the size and skill levels of the operating and maintenance staff, and the need for repair facilities and replacement parts....

In direct contradiction to the policy guidelines of the IPA, the FCDA selected the standard secondary treatment system. The FCDA acted with the belief that Nigeria as an advanced country should have the most advanced system of waste-water treatment comparable to other western capitals....

The attitude of FCDA had a similar effect on transportation planning.... The major considerations were bus or rail systems. Based on cost-benefit analyses and the technological development of the Nigerians, IPA suggested a bus system.... Unfortunately, the Nigerians were not to be stopped by cost-benefit analyses. After the IPA ended its contract with the Nigerians, a French corporation was hired to plan an underground rail system for the city.

For the record, Abuja is currently served by means of a bus surface transportation system.

5.5 IMPACT OF CONTEXT FOR ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION

To postulate that "implementation is not conducted in a vacuum" is not novel. Yet, it is to postulate something that is all too frequently overlooked by researchers in the field who remain eager to drive square pegs into round holes, simply because the theory has it that way. For field application, theories, paradigms or models (as forms of generalizations derived from specifics) have to be reconciled once again with the specifics. Not to do this would be
equivalent to disregarding completely what actually occurs in the life of the policy, which would inevitably lead to the an inability to explain, for instance, why a particular policy may be successfully implemented in one setting but not in another.

Nevertheless, recognizing that a square peg (with sufficient force) can be made to fit a round hole thereby transforming the issue to "how well does it fit," this dissertation does not reject the universality of theories of the implementation problem. In fact, it accepts the possibility, but stipulates that any useful conceptualization of the policy implementation process must either begin with a model of politics of the country in which the policy is pursued, or risk "irrelevance" or inevitably regressing to it. What this means is that the story of housing in the new capital can be further illuminated and made more comprehensible by taking into account system variables or unique institutional characteristics of Nigeria.

For this purpose, it is suggested that any model of politics or "policy terrain" for Nigeria would have to include the following key systems variables: (1) nepotism and ethnic politics; (2) corruption and unprofessional conduct; (3) political and economic instability; and (4) imitation culture. These variables are briefly discussed in the remainder of this section, along with their impact on the implementation process for housing in the new capital. It is suggested that these variables be viewed as constituting the "soul" of Nigeria, from which further insights can be gained into all the other aspects of the society.

5.5.1 Nepotism and Ethnic Politics

In addition to being the most relevant source of instability in the country, ethnic nationalism holds the most threatening implications for policy efforts in Nigeria. Based on dialect, Nigeria is said to have over 250 ethnic groups with the Hausas in the north, the Yorubas in the west and the Ibos in the east comprising the major groups, "supposedly" in that order. The Northerners are mostly Moslems and the Southerners, which encompasses

11. No body actually knows which of the three groups has the larger population, as the country has not had an official census since 1963. Conceivably, this confusion stands to be clarified by 1991
both the Yorubas and the Ibos, are mostly Christians. The animosity between members of these three groups is so deeply rooted that they make it a point to disagree with one another regardless the issue. Each fears that support for any given policy by members of one group speaks sufficiently to the policy’s hidden benefits for that group, much to the detriment of the others. In addition to the divisive element of religion, which compounds ethnic rivalry, there is the widespread practice of nepotism pertaining to the traditional responsibility that many officials feel towards extended family members and tribal loyalties. It was quickly learnt during the field research that obtaining information from the Nigerian bureaucracy comes easier if it could be said that one was sent by such and such a person. In the local parlance, this is known as the “man-know-man” system. Without it nothing works, but with it everything works amazingly well. Thus, in response to the polarization of people in Nigeria along ethnic and regional lines, the *modus operandi* for regimes in the country has traditionally been to “distribute power among the three largest ethnic groups in such a way that none would feel excluded from power and totally oppose the federal power structure as it was constituted” (Dean 1972, p. 53). Consequently:

For purposes of planned development, there was not so much a government as collection of regions at the center.... This struggle for regional economic advantage -- known in Nigerian parlance as ‘sharing national cake’ -- provides when the government plans to embark on a nation-wide head count to determine the country’s population. But the fact is that the politics of population in Nigeria can neither be separated from the politics of tribe and religion, nor from the politics of power and revenue sharing among the states. These forces act to constrain the hopes of ever achieving any meaningful census for the country that would not be fraught with massive cheats, or be abrogated by those in power for failing to produce the expected results. In any event, professional speculation in the country has it that the Ibos are currently the largest, followed by the Yorubas and then the Hausas. According to this speculation, the Imo state in the former east-central region of the country is the most highly populated state. 12. The following macro-examples illustrate the magnitude of this problem: (1) the 1966 ethnic riots in the northern Hausa land in which tens of thousands of Ibos were massacred; (2) the 1967-70 Biafra-Nigeria civil war fought between the Ibos and the rest of the country over the issue of secession; (3) the 1976 decision to relocate the national capital from Lagos to Abuja on the grounds that the former had come to be identified with one particular ethnic group, namely the Yorubas; (4) two 1980s ethnic/religious riots in northern Nigeria which claimed thousands of lives; and (5) the unusually high popularity of General-come-president Ibrahim Babangida for subscribing to a different form of representational democracy -- being among the Hausa group, he married an Ibo.
key to understanding the planning strategy and plan implementation.... Politicians have risen to positions of national power on the basis of their success in providing... [benefits for people of] their localities (paraphrased -- Aboyade 1968, p. 52).

It follows from this that the ultimate impact of regionalism on policy implementation in the country is the importance attached to equity among ethnic groups over consideration of efficiency.

Several events adversely affecting implementation in Abuja can be related to this practice. For example, there is still no satisfactory answer on why Nigerian decision makers saw fit to turn over the planning of the new capital to foreigners, when it was believed that local expertise and capability for the job existed. Using the country’s system variable of ethnic politics to attempt to further decipher the reasonableness of this decision, it is no secret that, ever since the defeat of Biafra, Northerners have been the most influential of the three major ethnic groups in terms of political power. They reside in the commanding heights of the military and, during the recent period of civilian administration, controlled its decision making. On the other hand, it is also no secret that the Ibos and Yorubas historically have been far better educated than Northerners and are vastly over-represented in the professional and business classes.

In light of these facts, it is not contrary to reason that a northern dominated military regime did not want to entrust the planning of the new capital to an indigenous class of professionals dominated by non-Northerners. Given that this southern domination extends to the business class, the same reasoning can be said to apply to the recruitment of both contractors for the city and top officials of the FCDA. Names of contract winners in Abuja and top executive officers of the FCDA have tended to be prefaced by the title of "Alhaji," which suggests a Moslem and most probably Northern or Hausa background. Because it is the official practise of the Nigerian government to recruit equitably in order to reflect the so-called "national character,”13 the impact of this dynamic has generally been wrong people in

13. The official practise is supposedly to recruit equitably to reflect the ethnic composition of the country. Yet, both the administrator and six out of seven executive members of the short lived
wrong jobs. Reacting to this point, Gandonu (1984, p. 343-4) writes: “there is no evidence of consistent application of a policy of right worker for the job. There are too many square pegs in round holes in the FCDA.... [For example, there are] such scandals as placing licensed surveyors under the supervision of town planners and placing regional planners in charge of reputable architects.... On occasions one gets the uncomfortable feeling of ethnic and religious flavors sneaking into the system.” “How far,” asks Gandonu rhetorically, “should the administrative division [of the FCDA] interfere with purely professional decisions?”

On the business front, a writer once referred to the chaotic construction environment of Abuja as “the legacy of the Alhaji contractor policy imposed by one of the Abuja ministers” (AJ 1985, p. 75) many of whom have been either Moslems or Northerners. Word has it in Abuja that the inefficiency of the Alhaji contractors was only matched by their greed for quick profit and ignorance of building construction and management.

Another aspect of construction in Abuja that appears to have suffered as a result of ethnic politics is the distribution of undeveloped residential plots. As mentioned earlier, there is suggestive evidence that the people who have expressed an interest in developing private plots in Abuja may not be those wanted by the Nigerian decision makers. This can be discerned from table 4.16 on applications for residential plots by states. According to this table, northern states (31.45%) enjoyed a considerably higher average approval rate for plots than their southern counterparts (13.75%), despite the former’s expressed limited interest relative to the latter. Southern states account for 58.59 per cent of all the applications received. This skewed plot allocation is most noticeable with the predominantly Ibo speaking states of Anambra and Imo whose average approval rate is a contemptible 6.0 per cent despite their making 28.37 per cent of the applications. Yet, the government shows amazement that there has been little private participation in housing development in the city.

Federal Capital Territory Administration (FCTA) were appointed from the Hausa group (Adeniyi 1984, p. 20).
5.5.2 Bureaucratic Corruption and Unprofessional Conduct

The problem of ethics in government is easily the most striking aspect of Nigeria's politics and, most probably, the Trouble with Nigeria (Achebe 1983) as an emergent force in Africa. The problem basically concerns bribery, which is the giving of unmerited material/positional inducements to public officials to cause them to produce decisions/actions that favor the giver. It refers to the unwritten but well understood "you chop I chop" rule of fair play in the game of "sharing the national cake." Its chief impact on planned development in the country has tended to be defining of problems or goals so that proposed solutions would lead to the distribution of certain types of contracts to certain interests, both within and outside the country. For instance, the FCDA's categorical refusal to accept self-help has been linked to the fact that the technique could not provide for large, lucrative contracts. A bias favoring foreign solutions has also been alleged to the effect that "foreign contractors and experts who would compensate officials with foreign exchange gratuities were favored against indigenous professional" (Gandonu 1984, p. 336).

Foreign firms normally influence planning ends in Nigeria by paying the usual 10 per cent commission -- or "kick-back" as it is locally known -- to indigenous decision makers and administrators. Recall that top military officials in Nigeria had wanted to award the master plan contract to an expatriate firm that would in turn consider awarding them kick-backs. When an outright bribery of this sort is not sufficiently sophisticated for the purpose, the method used by foreign firms is to enlist the assistance of their "compradors" who, insofar as they act as a cadre of indigenous professional intermediaries between foreign firms and the state, can easily be manipulated to serve the interest of the foreign firms (Turner 1977). So, as can be imagined, there were one too many foreign firms in Abuja with Nigerian fronts (e.g., Doxiades Associates Nigerian Limited).

Likewise, foreign governments also influence local planning goals, except that they generally opt for a more benign legal strategy which is equally effective in securing their
wishes. Dean (1972, p. 18) writes the following about the 1962-68 Nigerian national development plan:

Foreign governments influenced planning decisions. The plan was designed to be of a size that could be financed only with considerable foreign aid and discussions with several government were carried on during the formulation of the plan. Economic missions from the U.S.A., a country from which much aid was expected, visited Nigeria... and made known its views on specific projects. The world Bank, which later organized a consultative group to aid the plan, also made known its own views on some matters.

Another way that corruption impacts on planned development in Nigeria is through actual implementation or administrative decisions made. To get local officials to comply, profiteers and opponents of the policy would simply resort to bribing these officials directly, as was demonstrated in the 1974 indigenization decree which sought to transfer ownership and management of the country’s productive forces into local hands (Bierstekker 1977; Turner 1977).

In all, add-on costs of corruption to the housing program in Abuja occurred through several steps. First, housing contracts were awarded inefficiently in that "the placing of a contract [was] more a political decision than one of merit or price." Second, the predominance of the "you chop I chop" rule of fair play, which obligates that there ought to be something in the transaction for the awarding official, suggests that the contracts were generally over-valued. Third, some "contracts were awarded and then cancelled" but, at times, after the usual 10 per cent, sometimes as high as 20 per cent mobilization costs had been paid. Fourth, among those contractors whose work was not cancelled, "some started and ran away; others never appeared." Fifth, for those contractors who did not run away, many subdivided their contracts "into a myriad of small works, each contract for a few houses, and awarded [them] to a mass of middlemen" many of whom were unproven in the construction business. Finally, for those whose "jerry-builders" were able to literally nail something to the ground to prove they merited any payments, "twenty-seven separate approvals were required on each certificate," and "each time a file passed across a desk it attracted a toll." And, finally, because "dash makes the system work," "neither senior nor
junior staff [of the FCDA had] any wish to modify a system that can be so lucrative.” Consequently, it is estimated that, altogether, “non-construction percentage on-costs add at least 25 per cent, and possibly more, to the cost of work in Nigeria” (AJ 1985).

The foregoing were the remarks of a western architect who had worked in Abuja during the boom time and contractors’ rush. The architect summarized the Abuja project as “the product of graft and greed... an uncontrollable of orgy of maladministration” (AJ 1985).

To quote a Nigerian perspective:

January to December 1981 is best described as the boom time for Abuja and contractors for the project. The acts of recklessness were not in money spent to implement the project but on the unchecked corruption and malpractices which made instant millionaires and billionaires of mediocre politicians, officials and contractors. The result was a mad rush to secure contracts at all costs, fail to complete or even attempt to execute the contract and make away with the proceeds. There were cases of mobilization fees of N5 million and above collected by Nigerians but who as party stalwarts felt free to regard such money as their share of the national cake!

Along with the boom in Abuja business came serious indiscipline in the rank and file, with officials or board members striving to outdo one another in the “you chop I chop” game. Allegations ranged from cases of quantity surveyors making N100,000 a year or even becoming instant millionaires by merely trading contract figures between rival contractors, to filing clerks building houses overnight from tips received from contractors and consultants who were left in doubt as to the fate of their “missing files” if they neglected to pay such tips. There were also cases of field architects and engineers finding it easy to prey on contractors to the tune of N1,000 a time for merely showing work sites to such contractors (Gandonu 1984, p. 335-6).

Stories of unethical financial dealings in Abuja are endless. “Missing millions” is an article which appeared in the November 1981 issue of Africa Economic Digest, focusing on allegations that up to N2,000 million ($3,000 million U.S.) of funds allocated for Abuja went astray. In trying to comprehend the magnitude of this corrupt spending in Abuja, Onimode (1984) ventures so far as to suggest that it contributed in no small measure to the country’s current economic state, as well as the fall of the second civilian republic. Corruption in Abuja, it must be remembered, was not corruption as usual. The project was by far the single largest financial enterprise ever to be undertaken by the government of Nigeria, and it was publicly proclaimed by decision makers that cost should not be made an object.
5.5.3 Political and Economic Instability

Political instability. Since independence in 1960, Nigeria has had two failed republics, lasting altogether not more than a decade. Aside from these two democratic episodes, the country's government and politics have been dominated by the military, encompassing in all seven successful coups d'état, four of them within the last decade.

In terms of how these relate to the new capital, General Yakubu Gowon, who had been in power since 1966, was ousted in 1975 in a bloodless coup by General Murtala Mohammed who, within a year of his administration, adopted the new capital policy. A year later, in 1976, he was eliminated in a botched up coup attempt which saw General Olusegun Obasanjo emerge as the new leader.

The new leader kept on the path of the old and, as had been promised by Murtala when he came to power, Obasanjo relinquished authority in 1979 to a civilian constituted administration led by Alhaji Shehu Shagari. Roughly four years from this time, in January 1984, the military returned under the leadership of General Muhammadu Buhari to reclaim power from the civilians.

Scarcely two years later, in 1986, Buhari's regime was usurped by General-come-president Ibrahim Babangida who, as at the time of writing, is still the leader of the country. Though mechanisms are currently being put in place to effect yet another transfer of power to a democratic regime by 1992. Short of the impossibility of making coups unconstitutional, the new Nigerian constitution which was recently debated and signed, only permits a two party system of competition in the hope of promoting stability. But it remains to be seen how well a fundamentally three-nation country can function harmoniously under a two-party system.

In any event, the point to be made here about the policy environment in Nigeria is that it is marked by extreme turbulence and uncertainty. Among the obvious implications is the discontinuity in policy which, in one respect, was of less consequence to Abuja. Besides
the fact that none of the leaders opposed the idea of the new capital, the 1976-79 Obasanjo regime made certain that the project became a "no-going back" policy for the next administration through massive infusions of capital into the project.

Where the rapid changes in government did have a serious adverse impact was in maintaining organizational chain of command and accountability. According to Agba (1986, p. 331), in the eight year period between 1976-84, the FCDA had five different permanent secretaries (i.e., not more than an average of one-and-a-half years under each permanent secretary). As suggested by the earlier discussion of the several organizational arrangements that the FCDA operated under (Chapter 3), these changes were not restricted to the permanent secretaries, but also included leadership of the MFCT as well as the FCDA Board of Directors. These interruptions in organizational leadership, without a doubt, greatly weakened the agency's supervisory role, because often enough planning projects which went out to the foreign consultants under one permanent secretary had to be settled under another.

Another consequence of the political instability is that people in Nigeria rarely know where they stand, owing to shifts in priorities brought on by changes in government. This uncertainty has meant a culture of impatience or the pushing for maximum/tomorrow's benefits today for the "common man." Because tomorrow is entirely unknown, the constant pressure on planning in the country is to provide benefits here and now. Remarked Eleazu, "Nigerians [are] very impatient people, they tend not to give a leader much time to develop a policy" (Round Table Cards 1987, p. 156). When asked in a recent interview -- what is the trouble with Nigeria -- President Babangida confirmed that "the country is a hurry.... What will take one week, the Nigerian would want it in 24 hours" (Newswatch 1990, p. 21). Another witness for Eleazu's assertion are the several coups that have plagued the country and the public support for most of them. These coups tend to be rationalized on the grounds of ineffective planning and mismanagement of the national resources (Oluwo 1985, p. 7), which implies that the Generals upon being catapulted to power may feel a certain obligation to suspend whatever plan/planning that had gone on before and plan/implement anew.
For the "uncommon man" such as the army chiefs, the civilian politicians and senior bureaucrats, the fact that no condition is permanent has slightly different implications. On one level, it means that, if the record of the last decade portends the future, any incumbent administration has less than three years in office to effect whatever new ideas it may have. On another level, it means having to quickly build up a retirement trust fund because, as Gboyega (1986, p. 19) explains, "most government officials are uncertain about their political future, so they try to make as much money as possible before the fateful day." Abuja is an ideal example of both, the quick planning/implementation syndrome and the quick wealth syndrome.

It is no secret that Abuja was planned as an instant city, to be built in a day if not over night. The city was planned in record time and made viable scarcely four years after construction began. While this super fast-track strategy of implementation helped to curtail increased construction costs that would have inevitably resulted from inflation, the approach has also been blamed for the planning shortcomings of the city, including the debased quality of construction. Evidently, with such a strategy for such a massive project, it was only natural that quality control and other checks and balances would be overwhelmed and fail to function. Whether this was by design or not, the allegation is that the terribly lax financial management situation in Abuja "made instant millionaires and billionaires of mediocre politicians, officials and contractors" (Gandonu 1984, p. 335).

Economic instability. From a planning point of view, the one structural characteristic noteworthy about the Nigerian economy is its polarized nature first in cash crops (i.e., groundnuts, cocoa and palm products) and then in fossil fuel. "Oil has financed Nigeria's huge development plans.... More than 90 per cent of foreign exchange and over 80 per cent of government revenue are derived from the sale of oil" (Quoted in Osemeke 1987, p. 33). Insofar as this implies an acute trade dependence with the outside world, it leaves the country, together with its various development undertakings, highly susceptible to extraneous influences. That many development projects in Nigeria today are cut back, stifled or
suspended indefinitely as a result of the international oil glut, clearly demonstrates this assertion and the implication that project planning in the country has to take into account this inherently unstable structure of the economy. Economic stability achievable only through a well diversified economy, is obviously required for project implementation to prosper, as this is often what affords managers of the economy the necessary room to maneuver under tough economic conditions.

In terms of relationships between all these and housing outcomes in Abuja, much has been said about how the new capital was not only planned under conditions of perceived affluence, but with the deliberate disregard for dollars and sense. Suffice to add that the international oil market collapsed and prices plummeted from approximately $40 per barrel to $15. Suddenly the new capital which was originally designed without economic constraints, began to be viewed as a very expensive proposition. As noted by one of the FCDA’s assistant chief town planning officers, “the present economic has contributed in no small way to the slow pace of housing development.”

This new perspective on Abuja is further evidenced in table 5.2 and by the fact that the majority (82%) of officials surveyed strangely found themselves strongly (-1.64) disagreeing with the proposition that money was not a major factor in explaining the housing problems of the new capital. That is, in a marked contrast to their overwhelming support for the proposition that Nigeria at the beginning of the Abuja project was a wealthy country and that funds to oversee the project as planned would not be a problem. Further adding to this contrast was the initial categorical submission by the Aguda panel on relocation that “even if the cost of building the new capital is high, the country can afford it today.”

Nevertheless, with the troubled international oil economy, the government’s difficulties in obtaining foreign exchange to pay for materials and equipment grew. The FCDA eventually unable to pay contractors abandoned many of the housing projects it had underway. In all, 3,673 housing units in the FCT, representing 19 per cent of total housing starts by the FCDA to date, were affected. Another noteworthy impact of the economic
instability is the spiral inflation that now threatens to bear heavily on future housing developments in the city. (See tables 4.13 and 4.14 on current inflationary pressures in the country.) It should be recalled that the situation with the international oil economy also succeeded in forcing a substantial devaluation (up to 350%) in the country's currency within the past three years. Both of these two related developments suggest, once again, the hypothesis that the tempo and style of development in Abuja might have been different, had the Nigerian policy officials taken into account the mono-cultural structure of the economy along with its concomitant instability. (See Agba 1986 for a more systematic treatment of financial constraints on the implementation of Abuja.)

5.5.4 Imitation Culture

The dependence on petrodollar financing, the movement away from productive activities (i.e., agriculture) to services activities and the dramatic rise in the availability of consumer goods (i.e., imports), are also undoubtedly among the most prominent features of the Nigerian economy and society. Since it makes sense to think that the first feature begot the latter two, the consistent view, and one which is accepted here, has been along the lines that:

The oil boom encouraged the policy makers to embark on a number of prestigious projects and to think big and act big in matters relating to pattern and style of spending and commitments. The new riches ushered in a new pattern of lifestyle and high tastes among Nigerians.

These were manifest in increased number of consumer goods and development projects in Lagos and other big cities in Nigeria. Besides, the boom changed the expectations of most Nigerians -- agriculture was relatively abandoned, and people from rural areas flocked to the cities in search of white-collar jobs and cheap money from contracts, trading and other secondary and tertiary jobs which were more readily available in the cities than in rural areas (Onibokun 1984, p. 8)

However, to fully appreciate both the findings of the survey and the Nigerian perception of Abuja, it is suggested that these profound changes in Nigerian life styles and pattern of consumption, are only partly attributable to the availability of petrodollars. The
phenomenon of western consumption patterns without the western means of accumulation and human/material base, is not peculiar to Nigeria. Neither is it peculiar to only those developing countries who are oil exporters. In an in-depth study of consumption in Latin America, Filgueira (1981, p. 71) interprets this trend as forming a much more general process of economic development and social modernization which can only be understood within the context of global tendencies. In his analysis, it is the global propensities that act to further "the creation of forms of social organization in which the relative absence of other accepted manners of personal realization and social participation give 'modern' consumption a central role in both personal life and in the principles of social integration."

Filgueira (1981, p. 77), argues that the new habits of modern consumption in developing countries are determined by the expanding indigenous middle class and their leading role, which is modelled after patterns of behavior similar to those of the middle classes in the developed west. This process of value transfer, Filgueira describes as the 'demonstration effect' which, in its simplest form, is based on the theory that:

When individuals have knowledge of material or non-material goods or styles of life which are superior or perceived to be so, regardless of whether these are objects which satisfy old needs or create new ones, the probability increases that they will feel dissatisfied with their own levels. In proportion as their knowledge of these goods are expanded, and consequently also their knowledge of the symbols and values associated with their use, new needs arise and the demand for the consumptions of such goods increases.

Thus, the noteworthy thing about the process is that it operates in a top-down fashion with informalized social leadership stemming from the upper levels where more sophisticated forms of consumption behavior occur, and then disseminating downwards to strata below. Consequently, information, including its effective dissemination, play a fundamental role in determining the success of the process.

Leaving aside a host of issues, the main consequences as well as characteristics of western/modern consumption patterns in developing countries are shown to include:

1. spectacular growth of the consumption of modern goods, especially durable goods and material objects, 'sophisticated' consumer goods for the home, recreation and personal care, and food, beverages and

229
tobacco, all of them corresponding to levels and styles of consumption typical of the most highly developed countries;

(2) a drastic change in the origin of the products consumed, which now come mainly from abroad; thus, importation becomes the mechanism *par excellence* permitting the change in consumption patterns;

(3) growing diffusion of modern lifestyles and certain types of goods to the middle, lower middle and lower strata, especially in the case of those articles and items of lower unit cost;

(4) growing inequality in the allocation of expenditure for the consumption of basic goods such as food, footwear, clothing and housing, thus leading to the deteriorating of the family 'shopping basket' and insufficient coverage of basic needs in the lowest strata; and

(5) all this, of course, takes place within a regressive process of distribution of income and growing concentration of wealth (Filgueira 1981, p. 106).

Having said that consumerism, as depicted by the above characteristics, is not unique to Nigeria, it should also be said that not all the other developing countries have had the opportunity to experience this process to the same depth and with the same rapidity as the oil producing countries of the developing world (Petras and Morley 1983). Whether one looks at the survey results from Abuja, or at the country's figure on importation or income distribution (i.e., in tandem with the tremendous aggregate economic growth of the past two decades), there can be no denying that Nigeria presents a perfect fit with the characteristics listed above.

But that such terms as consumer society and superfluous consumption are fully applicable to Nigerian society is a major contradiction, because Nigeria hardly has a mature industrial economy, nor the proven western genius for accumulation. Neither have the basic needs of the majority of its population been met, leaving aside the fact that it is not at all uncommon to find several pieces of sophisticated electronic and electrical goods in many households that are obviously deficient in meeting basic needs (Filgueira 1981, p. 107).

Despite the windfall from oil and significant aggregate growth in the economy, it is estimated that the highest 5 per cent of the Nigerian population earns 38 per cent of the national income, while the lowest 40 per cent of the population earns only 14 per cent (Meier 1977, p.
an observation which warrants consumerism in the country to be qualified as “consumerism without moral censure.”

In any event, given that imitation culture is a great mechanism for diffusing both national and individual aspirations and expectations, its ultimate impact in Nigeria has been a clear preference for western consumption patterns which, in turn, affected decisions in Abuja by promoting a policy atmosphere that was antithetical to solving the low-income housing problems in the city. Much has already been said about how Abuja was promoted as a “European city in Africa,” and how this fostered an attitude among Nigerian officials favoring high standards of development, especially among the army chiefs who, while being indifferent to the issues of costs, pressed for impressive designs and construction. Rather than repeat these themes, a speech quoted in Temple and Temple (1980, p. 235) is offered that appears to capture the consumption bias/reality of housing in Abuja. The speech contains public statements made by the late president Jomo Mzee Kenyatta of Kenya in 1972 at the inauguration of a new housing development project outside of Nairobi. The newspaper report entitled -- *No More Shabby Houses for Our People* -- stated that:

President Kenyatta warned at the weekend he will sack any of his Ministers who continue to treat Kenyan as the colonialists did by building them “native-type” houses not suitable for human habitation.

He said all those charged with the responsibility of building houses for Wananchi [the common people], especially in towns, must ensure that the houses built are suitable for a family to live in.

Mzee Kenyatta recalled that in the olden days Africans were provided with poor quality houses known as “native houses” not fit for human beings to occupy. The houses were not adequate to accommodate families and lacked such amenities as water, sanitation or light.

“I will sack any of my Ministers who continues to treat the Wananchi of independent Kenya in this manner,” said the President, [because] the time has gone when people of Kenya should be treated in such a manner.

Note that demonstration effect has been related to the issue of corruption in developing countries, explaining, in part, why the phenomenon may be so prevalent there. As noted by Hope (1985, p. 3), "Third World nations have been regressing rather than progressing in terms of economic development. This, in turn, has lead to a bipolar type of income distribution creating the 'haves' and the 'haves-not.' Civil servants striving for high social status and to be counted among the 'haves' must resort to the instrument of 'demonstration effect' — a demonstration effect that entails conspicuous consumption of luxury goods that they cannot afford from their low salaries... [this] forces individuals not only to tolerate corruption, but also to initiate it where none exists, and to take advantage of it where it is present."
Temple and Temple state that the speech had a tremendous effect on city council officials who, when asked months later why they did not build cheaper shelter, still recalled it.

Although no statements of this type were found about housing in Abuja, it does not mean that such propositions were never expressed. Or that the same effects could not have been caused in several other ways, e.g., by belief in the propositions contained in the survey questionnaire. Suffice to say that the general atmosphere regarding taste in Abuja, created by officials' public pronouncements about the project in the media and professional gatherings, could only have encouraged responsible officials to treat proposals for low-cost housing in the new capital with limited enthusiasm and low regard. Listed below are some of these pronouncements which maintain that the new capital must be:

1. A capital city free of pity. A befitting capital that will be a pride of the black man wherever he may be (Culled from Speeches by the first Minister of the FCT).

2. A symbol of Nigeria's aspirations for unity and greatness (Master plan 1979, p. 27).

3. An ideal city by providing essential services to all its dwellers (NISER 1976, p. 27).

4. Every Nigeria's mecca, inspiration, and pride... a cultural, scientific and political show-piece (Okoro 1975, p. 5).

5. The best that can be offered in Nigeria... a metropolis including all of the cosmopolitan elements and institutions characteristic of those cities generally acknowledged as world cities (Todd 1984, p. 119).

6. One of the vital provisions toward political, socioeconomic, and infrastructure restructuring of Nigeria in preparation for aspirant role as a decolonized and viable nation state in contemporary world politics (Gandonu 1983, p. 2)

While all this can be rightly regarded as "utopian" thinking, the problem is that uses for utopia are found precisely in the fact that it forms the basis for transforming the existing situation.
6.1 HOUSING OUTCOMES IN ABUJA AND THE DISPOSITION OF POLICY OFFICIALS

It is important to begin by introducing findings from the content analysis of the housing plan for the new capital prepared by the foreign planners. (See appendix II.) This is necessary in order to set the stage for hypothesizing a procedural implementation problem rather than a substantive theory problem. The master plan prepared by the IPA did not present specific designs and formulas for housing in the city, but it did set the major challenges and included suggestions on how these challenges might be overcome. When these means-ends relations are critically evaluated, the conclusion to emerge is that the housing guidelines evolved for the new capital were, by and large, consistent with the requisite theoretical maxims for producing adequate low-cost shelter in the city. This means that the question can then be legitimately raised: what possible connection can be made between the actual housing provision in Abuja and the implementation theories discussed in Chapter 2? More specifically, what empirical relevance is there for this study of the principle variable of the Van Horn and Van Meter (1975) model, the disposition of officials, for organizing thoughts concerning the implementation problem?

An answer is formulated by first summarizing the basic dispositions of policy officials toward Abuja, and then pointing out ways in which these dispositions militated against wider access and affordable housing goals for the city. In terms of visions of how things should be
in Abuja, the discussions in section 5.1 on officials’ dispositions leave no doubt that the new capital was intended as a political show-piece, an ideal world-class city free of pity and squatters. The city was not meant to be just an alternative to the former capital of Lagos, but rather a visionary sort of rescue from the latter’s intractable problems. For example, a majority of the officials interviewed support the propositions that: (1) Abuja should be a proud reflection of Nigeria’s wealth and power; (2) Nigeria, as an advanced country, should have a capital comparable to those of other advanced countries; (3) Abuja should be mainly an administrative center; (4) Abuja must not suffer any of the defects of Lagos; and (5) any manifestations of poverty in Abuja should be eradicated at all cost.

The discussion of officials’ dispositions further confirmed that they perceived low-cost housing to be contrary to the intended showcase image for the new capital. This was partially substantiated by their belief in the following propositions: (1) it is easy for low-cost housing estates to turn into slums; (2) the problem with self-help housing is that the poor do not have the necessary resources to build and improve their own shelter; (3) high density development in Abuja would contradict the city’s image as Nigeria’s visible symbol of modernity; (4) for Abuja, housing quality is more important than affordability; and (5) in the long run, it costs more to build cheaply because low-cost housing require a good deal of maintenance and become obsolete in a short time.

Finally, the discussion also confirmed that the officials preferred a western type of house design, material and layout for the new capital. For instance, the majority of them supported the propositions that: (1) it is not necessary for Abuja to be planned and built by Nigerians for it to be a Nigerian city; (2) it is not necessary for Abuja to have native type houses and neighborhood layouts for it to be a Nigerian city; and (3) local traditional building materials are not as durable, and of the same quality, as imported materials.

These dispositional factors relating to tastes and preferences for Abuja were subsequently explored for effects on housing provision in city. The findings suggest significant impacts at both the planning and implementation stages. The planning process for
the new capital was deliberately exported overseas in order to insulate it from consultation
with any indigenous groups, except for the military leadership which was predisposed to
building a high class western-type city regardless of the cost. This decision to turn over the
entire project to foreign planners (despite the acknowledgment that there was local capability
for the job), was based on the military's desire for a "European city" and the connected
thinking that it would be contrary to reason to employ non-western planners. The military
also wanted the new capital to proceed at a very rapid pace, which could only be assured by
moving the process out of Nigeria where it would not be subject to many local pressures and
possible delays. Consequently, the foreign planners acted without being cognizant of
Nigerian conditions.

Following from this (i.e., after the Nigerian policy officials gained control of the master
plan implementation), the officials either rejected or modified the policy guidelines of the
foreign planners to reflect their dispositions for a "showcase western type" mega project:

Planning. The IPA recommended reducing costs by increasing the number of
houses which shared infrastructure services. In direct contradiction to this, the
FCDA adopted a low density of development, believing that there is enough
space at Abuja for a comfortable low density of development.

Infrastructure. The IPA recommended substantial initial cost reductions by
adopting appropriate or cost-effective technology in providing infrastructure
services such as sewerage and transportation. Contrary to this, the FCDA
selected the most advanced technology, believing that Nigeria is an advanced
country and should, therefore, have a Capital with technologies comparable to
those of other advanced countries.

Materials. To achieve a cost reduction of up to 30 per cent, the IPA
recommended the use of locally produced materials. Again, this recommenda-
tion was ignored as the reliance on imported materials continued unabated,
largely due to the general reluctance on the part of the officials to accept local
building materials as a genuine alternative to imports.

Housing Types. To cater to a wide variety of people in the new capital, the IPA
recommended several housing strategies: (1) sites and services; (2) basic housing
or omitting portions of houses which are superfluous and which can be upgraded
later by residents; and (3) rooming houses as opposed to executive type
apartments. Acting on the belief that the low-income population does not have
the "necessary resources" nor the "energy" to improve their shelter, the FCDA
rejected the self-improvement strategy in favor of the "lock and key" method of
providing complete housing. The agency also rejected the recommendation for
rooming houses in favor of executive type apartment blocks.
Construction Technology. In light of the fact that sophisticated construction technology is unlikely to reduce costs, the IPA recommended discouraging the use of such building techniques as prefabricated building systems. Again, this suggestion was not adhered to as prefabrication was favored until it soured.

Transient Housing. Recognizing that not all migrants to Abuja would be civil servants moving to the city on a permanent basis, the IPA recommended 19,000 transient housing units. This suggestion was rejected and not a single unit of transient housing was provided.

Thus, it is the conclusion of this study from these facts that the disposition of officials responsible for formulating and implementing the housing program of the new capital, contributed in no small measure to the inability to provide affordable housing for all income groups in the city as was originally intended. The suggestion from this conclusion is that officials in Abuja would have produced a high-class city regardless of any planning intentions to the contrary.

6.2 IMPROVING THE HOUSING SITUATION IN THE NEW CAPITAL: PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS

Thinking beyond the direct implications of the foregoing conclusion for practice, the question that is addressed here is: how can the knowledge gained from researching both the politics and administrative complexities of the new capital construction be utilized to respond to the current housing problems of the city? However, because this question also transcends responses to the survey proposition regarding what possible solutions officials in Nigeria envision for the settlement problems of the new capital, what follows should be regarded as the researcher's own pragmatic policy proposals based on "what housing practices have not worked" in the city.

Results from the field survey clearly demonstrate that Nigerian officials support the policy that every Nigerian should have a right to housing. To start with, this desire should be recognized and appropriate policies developed to achieve it. Housing for all can only be achieved if houses provided are affordable, or if people are not prevented from building what they can afford. Imported standards, dispositions and practices, which militate against the
CHAPTER 6: SOME FINAL THOUGHTS ON HOUSING IMPLEMENTATION IN ABUJA

goal of affordable housing, must be discarded and replaced with a more realistic orientation based on the nature of local demands, resources and practices. From this stance, the following suggestions are proposed to alleviate the housing problems of the new capital to achieve the goal of affordable housing for all (i.e., both civil servants and non-civil servants):

1. The government's housing role in the capital should essentially be enabling and catalytic. 2. The government should concentrate mainly on policy formulation and enforcement, and improving access to land through the preparation and allocation of plots. 3. For at least the next ten years, the government should cease the direct construction of complete housing for incoming civil servants.

The latter suggestion, though seemingly extreme, attacks the lopsided development of the new capital and the imperative for introducing policies to stimulate private sector involvement in the housing market. Invoking a moratorium on direct construction by government would not only free resources and focus attention on the acute shortage of private rental housing in the capital, but also create the necessary pressures/tensions to stimulate a response to the shortage. This means slowing down the pace of transfer of government offices from Lagos, but the feeling among some of the officials is that a deferral seems both inevitable and desirable. Abuja was planned and executed in haste, out of fear of not being effectuated at all. Now that the capital has become a reality, time should be taken to make it a beneficial capital for all by bringing local deliberations and impressions to bear on future developments. Also, adopting a long term perspective on movement to the new

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1. The government in late 1988 slated 500 new housing units to be built by the FCDA to help settle recent transferees to the city. This decision should be rescinded in favor of completing the 1,140 abandoned units in the city. However, once completed, 500 of these units should be used to resettle the civil servants the government had in mind. The remainder of the units should be used as "short term" accommodation/hostel (2 years max.) for private sector developers, while they build or make arrangements to build homes in the city. After the ten year moratorium, the policy on supplying civil servants housing should be reviewed. Depending on the outcome of this review, the housing units being used to temporarily accommodate private developers should either be turned over to the government, assigned to low-income non-civil servants or disposed off in the open market. The good aspect of public housing in Abuja is that it breaks with the tradition of only providing housing for high ranking civil servants. Provided an equitable rate of subsidy can be decided upon, there is merit in the government sharing in the responsibility associated with housing its workers.
CHAPTER 6: SOME FINAL THOUGHTS ON HOUSING IMPLEMENTATION IN ABUJA

capital would allow time for the financial picture of the country to improve, at which point the merits of a complete transfer to Abuja could be re-examined.

6.2.1 Housing Policy

For the next ten years, it should be the housing goal of government in Abuja to ensure that all Nigerians interested in living or doing business in the city have access to serviced plots and mortgage facilities at affordable costs. To achieve this aim, table 6.1 shows housing initiatives favored by current policy officials in Nigeria.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AREAS</th>
<th>DECISION MAKERS</th>
<th>IMPLEMENTORS</th>
<th>ACADEMICS</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. INCENTIVES</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. MORTGAGE</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. LAND &amp; C OF O</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. MATERIALS/LABOR</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. STANDARDS</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. MAINTENANCE</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>21</strong></td>
<td><strong>28</strong></td>
<td><strong>15</strong></td>
<td><strong>64</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C of O = Certificate of occupancy or legal title over the property.

Source: Field Survey Questionnaire on Abuja, 1989. Responses to the open-ended question in part II dealing with: what possible solutions do officials envision for the settlement problems of the new capital?
6.2.1.1 Incentives

In addition to providing temporary housing in the new capital for potential private sector builders, the government should do the following:

* Guarantee loans to housing co-operatives and low-income non-civil servants.
* Introduce core or basic housing as a way of encouraging participation by the low-income stratum.
* Enforce the plot allocation clause which stipulates that development should take place within two years.

6.2.1.2 Mortgage

Improved access to housing mortgage facilities is key to the success of home ownership. It is, therefore, proposed that the government should pursue a two-tier strategy in this regard:

* Establish a mortgage institution (or command the existing Federal Mortgage Bank) specifically to give housing loans for residential developments in Abuja.

* Arrange with private banks to liberalize conditions for loan qualification, e.g., (1) liberalization of income assessment to allow, for instance, the inclusion of future/potential income accrued from renting part of the house; (2) liberalization of age requirements to include post-secondary school leavers; (3) liberalization of guarantor’s requirement; (4) liberalization of repayment schemes to start with minimum payments (progressive annuity loans) and increase as owners’ income increases; etc..

6.2.1.3 Land and Certificate of Occupancy (C of O)

The basis for all development is access to land. In Abuja, this truism has two dimensions: plots allocated by the FCDA cannot be legally developed without the acquisition of C of O. The latter, which specifically involves obtaining a legal title to land, is a wholly independent process from that required to secure a plot allocation from the FCDA in the first instance. The housing effect of this added process has generally been that the few individuals
who have been allocated plots are kept from building, as any such development would be technically illegal and lacking in tenure without a C of O. That is why it is critical to improve land supply in the capital and streamline the approval process for C of O.

Section 6.2.1.5 outlines changes in construction standards to achieve the latter aim. Part of the requirement for obtaining a C of O is the submission of a house design that satisfies development specifications stipulated by the FCDA. As for increasing land supply, the proposed down-scaled role of government in housing in the new capital should make it possible for resources to be shifted to reflect the prime importance of surveying, registering, mapping, servicing and allocating plots. For example, more qualified surveyors should be hired, as their lack was suggested to have been one of the main reasons for the limited number of serviced plots available in the city.

6.2.1.4 Materials and Labor

Availability of building supplies and skilled labour are important factors affecting the rate of housing production. To maximize housing production in the new capital at an affordable cost, the government should pursue the following range of policies in connection to these two components:

* Revise the FCDA (1986) development guidelines for the city, including the basis for them -- the town and country planning laws of the country -- which currently do not allow the use of various indigenous building materials (e.g., land crete and-or mud bricks) in housing construction in the urban areas, much less in the new capital.

* Promote the use of local building materials in construction by supporting the establishment of Building Societies and Housing Co-operatives throughout the country.

* Promote the use of local building materials by encouraging the various polytechnic institutions across the country to become involved in training graduates and community members in alternative indigenous building styles.
6.2.1.5 Standards

According to results of the field survey, officials in Abuja believe that countries concerned with their progress towards modernity must enforce high standards of building and construction; and that, for Abuja, housing quality should be more important than affordability. While recognizing the validity of these beliefs, notably the desire to upgrade the quality of urban standards in the new capital, there must be an explicit understanding that, unless affordability is accepted as the determinant of housing policy, spontaneous or autonomous housing developments in the territory will not only persist but flourish. The government should, therefore, consider the following change in standards to avoid this:

* Adopting the relatively high housing density standard of the Garki District of Abuja for most of the future developments in the city.

* Rezoning the low density areas of the capital which have requisite infrastructure but have excessive land area for residential needs. Residents of these areas (i.e., Wuse, Maitama and Asokoro districts of the FCC) could take advantage of the rezoning to extend and improve their properties by constructing a second attached/detached dwelling or boys quarters.

* Opening up unserviced but surveyed lands to major developers, and then allowing for the provision of infrastructure to these areas to catch up with the development.

* Establishing in each development district of the FCC a designated low-income area where lesser standards of layout and construction should apply on such matters as: (1) minimum plot size; (2) minimum house and room size; (3) provision of indoor bathrooms and kitchens; (4) visual standards, e.g., roof treatment, fencing, painting, setbacks, etc; (5) material for and thickness of walls; (6) roofing and ceiling requirements; (7) ventilation requirements and window materials; (8) reticulation; (9) floor finishing; (10) landscaping and open space; etc.. In fact, basic housing or sites and services techniques should be pursued in these areas to the exclusion of any other strategies that do not involve “sweat equity.”

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2. At present, the minimum size of plots in Abuja is 428 m²; bedroom and kitchen size must not be less than 3,000 mm X 4,000 mm; all homes must have indoor plumbing for bathrooms and kitchens; external or internal walls cannot be made of tamped earth, clay or the like; all roof materials must be aluminum, metal sheets, copper, zinc, concrete and the like; ceiling must be provided with all roof materials; not less than three coats of oil and gloss paints must be applied on all external works; fencing materials must be made of concrete, steel and the like; etc. (FCDA 1986).
A repertoire of low-cost housing designs from which developers could choose should be kept. Designed to suit the minimum standards for space and materials, this range of house plans should accelerate approval and building procedures by doing away with the need for these plans to be considered individually.

Proven indigenous building materials should be catalogued for the purpose of both noting their availability and making them the basis for the low-income housing strategy.

6.2.1.6 Maintenance

The general lack of maintenance culture in the country, coupled with poor workmanship on finished houses in Abuja, make measures in this area both necessary and urgent. Until the termination of the ten year moratorium on direct construction by the government, the government should continue to be responsible for the overall maintenance of public housing in the city. The accompanying measures are, however, suggested to keep maintenance and the subsidy reasonable:

* A minimum service charge, not being part of rent, should be instituted to be paid by all occupants of public housing in the city. Or, individual residents should be made to pay a minimum percentage any repair work done, in which case the government should assume responsibility for works done on commonly owned/shared spaces.

* Whichever option is selected, the government should be responsible for organizing, at least every five years, an inspection of all public houses in the city to do the following: (1) flush all internal plumbing systems; (2) check all external septic tanks for leaks and malfunctions; (3) inspect all electrical wiring and fixtures; examine all roof and ceiling materials for fatigues and leaks; (4) examine all walls and staircase risers for signs of weakness; etc..

* Everyday maintenance of the houses such as sweeping the commonly owned areas and removing rubbish to the central collector bin should continue to be left up to the individual residents.

6.2.1.7 Squatter Management

The government policy of demolishing houses erected by squatters outside of the FCC should henceforth be suspended, pending the findings of an independent research body to be retained by the government to: (1) look into both the physical and economic structures
of existing squatments in the FCT; and (2) recommend a framework whereby some of the developments in the squatments could be retained and provided with basic services, while others would be removed to an alternative location. It should also be the task of this research body to provide a scenario of future squatment pressures and response options in the territory, paying close attention to those areas specifically designated as low standard housing settlements. That means the Nyanya labor camp for the present.

6.2.2 Housing Policy Enforcement

This study locates the housing problems of the new capital largely in the disposition of responsible policy officials, rather than in the soundness of the housing guidelines set in the planning stage. As such, the question that is addressed here is: what factors are likely to alter the mind-set of the officials and cause them to adopt the proposed policy changes? There are three pertinent basis for behavioral change: (1) ideal bureaucracy and scientific management theory; (2) marxist economic theory and sociology; and (3) liberal economic theory and public choice theory.

The literature based upon the ideal bureaucracy and scientific management suggests that situational or organizational factors are what influence an actor's behaviors. It is hypothesized that, with a sufficiently precise description of job functions and the delegation of powers to operate the necessary inducement/sanctions to achieve those functions (e.g., wages and threat of unemployment), actors can be induced to carry out policies for which they may have little or no favorable personal interest/dispositions.\(^3\) This suggestion is considered inappropriate for the Nigerian institutional reality, as it appears more likely to lend itself mainly to those countries with more permanent political structures and longer, therefore, more evolved institutional practices of checks and balances.

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3. Van Meter and Van Horn (1975, p. 476) make a similar point by suggesting that "environmental conditions [such as widespread public support for the policy] may cause implementors to execute a policy without altering their personal preferences about that policy."
The literature based upon marxist economic theory and sociology suggests that one's beliefs and behaviors will consistently tend to be determined by life experiences and social background. As Shanks (1983, p. 92) notes:

Such a pronouncement may sound trivial, but it is crucial to recognize that any two individuals will perceive a stimulus differently depending upon their experience. Common experience, therefore, provides some basis for hazarding a projection about behavior. Insofar as officials have a common experience, one can hypothesize that their perceptions of a situation will tend in the same direction.

Consequently, Sabatier and Mazmanian (1979, p. 489-90) earlier envisioned integrating this assumption into the policy process by recommending that "implementation is assigned to agencies supportive of statutory objectives that will give the new program high priority."

They make three specific suggestions, the first is to create a new agency with clear mandates which should act to free the officials from any previous organizational orientations, commitments or external loyalties. The second is to assign implementation to "a prestigious existing agency that considers the new mandate compatible with its traditional orientation and is looking for new programs." The third is to "stipulate that top implementing officials be selected from social sectors that generally support the legislation's objectives."

The FCDA was specifically created to execute the new capital, and there is no evidence that other existing agencies such as the FHA or the FMWH would likely do any better in implementing housing in the city. As a result, the last suggestion by Sabatier and Mazmanian involving the selection of top implementing officials from a pool of policy supporters is preferred for the two FCDA's departments most concerned with housing: the Department of Public Works (consisting of Architecture and Building); and the Department of Planning and Survey.

4. The federal government of Nigeria recently adopted this measure with respect to its newly established Peoples Bank, whose appointed director, Solarin, is a longtime champion of the poor and an arch critique of the government. Even though this break with tradition has attracted skeptical responses from various quarters locally, there is significant doubt that any other mainstream bureaucrat would be likely to have the concerns of the poor more in heart.
Finally, the literature based upon liberal economic and public choice theory maintains that all humans are rational in their decisions; and that, in this rational pursuit, they will consistently tend to act in their own separate best interest. In other words, they will consistently tend to do what is logical rather than illogical, and choose more rather than less. Beginning with the individuals’ assumed tendency to act rationally, it should be recalled that the survey results indicated that officials in Abuja, by and large, did not act under cognitive dissonance in terms of what they did and what they thought the wider public would rather have had them do. In fact, they perceived that the latter would have had them build a more rosy capital than they have done. In their own work, Van Meter and Van Horn (1975, p. 473) observed that “successful implementation may be frustrated when officials are not aware that they are not in full compliance with the policy” or public wish.

So, insofar as this finding is concerned, a publicity campaign aimed at changing the officials perception of public wishes should enhance compliance with the proposed policy. Even if the popular response is assumed to be interested in building a “European city,” it is unlikely this would be maintained for long when they see that it precludes their access to the city. The following foci are proposed for the publicity campaign:

* Dissemination and clarification of the new policy goals and functions in Abuja.
* Promotion of Abuja as a Nigerian city cognizant and reflective of Nigerian lifestyles and problems, rather than as a pity-free “European city in Africa.”
* Promotion of Abuja as a metropolis for all Nigerians, rather than as a haven for only civil servants.
* Promotion of local building materials as a genuine alternative to imports.
* Promotion of indigenous professionals, consultants and building contractors as a genuine, cheaper and more reliable alternative to expatriates.
* Promotion of low-cost housing techniques through emphasis on the consequences of their rejection on the proliferation of squatments in the territory.
* Promotion of the investment opportunities in Abuja, both locally and internationally.
Lastly, in respect of the liberal economic and public choice theory that individuals tend towards maximizing their own self-interest, this assumption appears to hold the greatest possibility for solving the housing problems of the new capital. Anyone who knows anything about Nigeria knows how enterprising its people can be, particularly in advancing their personal gain. Based on this researcher’s visit to Zambia and Tanzania, this is a quality that other African countries appear not to possess to the same degree. In these countries, the economies tend to be foreign dominated, and it is a normal occurrence for consumers to have money and not find the products to buy. In Nigeria, however, the economy is vibrant with intense local participation and, despite stern import restrictions, almost all goods imaginable are available in the country. Usually, the only problem is having enough money to pay for them. In any event, the suggestion that Nigerians respond perhaps too well to economic opportunities was noted by the IPA (Master plan 1979, p. 172) and is fully re-affirmed by the experience during the new capital construction period (e.g., the use of local contractors to make housing in Abuja viable within a four year period).

There are basically two ways to take advantage of this self-interest maximizing tendency in individuals to further the housing cause in Abuja. One way is to create incentives for policy officials in Abuja to do their job well or abide by the policy guidelines. Another is to simply create incentives through the open market system for individuals to get involved in the provision of housing in the city. The first option is apt to run into two difficulties, the most important is that the civil service in Nigeria is not based on merit but on politics and seniority, in that order. The other is that bureaucratic corruption being what it is, officials would most probably find ways to reap the rewards of the incentive system without necessarily having to alter their unprofessional practices. Hence, a free-market approach is preferred in articulating the pragmatic implications of the study.

Until a solution can be found for the widespread bureaucratic corruption and unprofessional conduct, the best policy for Nigeria, indeed for all developing countries, is a self-executing policy. It should rely less on government and more on the private sector.
CHAPTER 6: SOME FINAL THOUGHTS ON HOUSING IMPLEMENTATION IN ABUJA

Obviously, the government cannot provide housing for every individual in need of housing in Abuja, but it can create the enabling conditions, as well as make information available for individuals on how to go about meeting their own housing needs. That is why beyond evolving appropriate policies and preparing/allocating plots, the government's role in providing housing in the new capital should be restricted to promoting the right expectations and acting as a catalyst for housing actions.

By way of concluding the practical implications of the study for housing in the new capital, it should be remembered that Abuja was thought of and promoted as a “European city in Africa.” To the extent that such a disposition and manner of promotion continues to form the basis for action by policy officials in Nigeria, the leadership and opinion makers (e.g., the academics) of the country should strive to foster a more receptive climate in which the notion of low-cost housing is welcome for the new capital. In particular, they should be careful not to espouse unrealistic goals and expectations for the city which militate against less prestigious but more fitting indigenous strategies of housing delivery. For instance: would Abuja not still be a city of pride and joy with greater indigenous involvement and affordable housing standards for all? It is more than likely that a Nigerian city, conceived and built by Nigerians, for all Nigerians alike, will provide a new and more deserving kind of pride.

6.3 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NEW CAPITAL REVISITED

Almost all official documents on Abuja state its *raison d'être* as the development of an ethnically neutral city where all Nigerians could lay claim to every available right, privilege and resource on an equal footing. Implicit in this rationale is the understanding that such a city would have to ensure an equitable access for all citizens irrespective of socio-economic background. In light of this commendable intention, in the face of the disappointing housing outcomes in the city, the closing question for the dissertation moves from “what went wrong
in Abuja" to: how could the blunders made in the city have occurred in a "modern day" Nigeria? Posed differently: how could Nigerian policy officials have been so callous and naive?

An attempt to unravel this difficult question is begun by first returning to the reasons why Nigeria was attracted to the new capital idea in the first place. In Chapter 3, three impressions were favored as the more likely reasons behind the decision to finally move the capital. Among these, of crucial importance here is the reason that many Nigerians were dissatisfied with the appearance of the former capital of Lagos and the image that it gave of the country to the outside world. Out of the 36 close-ended propositions that made up part I of the survey questionnaire, the ones that attracted the second and fourth most intense responses (1.95 and 1.90) are that: (1) Abuja must not suffer any of the defects of Lagos; and (2) higher standards for housing must be enforced in Abuja in order to avoid duplicating the crowded conditions of Lagos. Overall support for the propositions among the officials interviewed was 92 and 88 per cent, respectively. (See table 5.1.)

Judging from these responses, it is clear that Abuja is essentially the product of a long search for a dramatic solution to the problem of Nigeria’s existing cities, Lagos in particular. As noted by Healey (1986, p. 123):

In many [developing] countries, a few cities have grown rapidly into multi-million metropolises, with inadequate services and layouts, and enormous problems of congestion, pollution and living conditions.... In these conditions, building a new town may be seen as an easier solution than dealing with the problems of the existing one.

Hence, far from being a progressive innovation, Abuja was a form of escapism, a refusal to recognize the urban realities of Nigeria. Noted earlier was the fact that the new capital was not just intended as an alternative to the former capital of Lagos, but rather a visionary sort of rescue from the latter’s intractable problems. This intent obviously entailed an inherent contradiction because, unless the urban problems of Lagos are recognized and planned for, successful implementation of housing in the new capital will not be achieved.

The nature of Abuja as a new capital is itself another factor which might contribute to better understanding what happened. It was suggested in the literature review (Chapter 2,
section 2.3.4) that different types of pressures are brought to bear on the policy formulation and the execution process, depending on the kind of policy that is pursued. Possibly as a result of the fact that national “political and planning objectives are more or less constant in the different countries which have promoted such projects,” it has been argued that:

The planning of new capital cities represents a special case of new town planning, and one in which international influences and cross-national transfers of ideas are very strongly exhibited: indeed the emulation of other countries has been a very widespread motive behind such projects, and new capital planning teams normally embark on a deliberate strategy of learning from other countries at a very early stage in the work (Ramsay (1986, p. 97, 94).

Since the reality of Abuja conforms to this argument, the impression is that both the disposition of officials and the housing outcomes might have been different, had Abuja been just other new town project in Nigeria. This may explain in part Nigerian officials’ behaviors but it should not, however, excuse such scandals as the new capital’s planning process being exported overseas, or the adoption of completely alien housing designs and strategies in the city.

Moreover, this excuse concerning the nature of new capital projects looses appeal when events in Abuja are compared with those in Dodoma, another new African capital announced in Tanzania in 1973 for reasons similar to those cited for Abuja (Potts 1984). In the case of Dodoma, the Tanzanian government held an extended national debate on the issue. And even though a team of (Canadian) foreign planners was contracted to prepare the master plan for the city, it was pointed out that the Tanzanian government made it unambiguous to the foreign planners that it was “not concerned with building a city that looked like a western city;” that it wanted the capital explicitly “designed to be harmonious with the ideal of Tanzania; a modern African capital city that symbolizes the pride of Tanzanians and the philosophy of Tanzanian socialism” (Moore 1982, p. 85-6). Consequently, the following differences have been noted in the planning and implementation styles adopted for the city:
CHAPTER 6: SOME FINAL THOUGHTS ON HOUSING IMPLEMENTATION IN ABUJA

(1) The Dodoma planning team did not work under the time constraints faced by the IPA at Abuja. (2) The Tanzanians insisted that a considerable amount of the planning should be done in Tanzania, which led to a long period of on site work prior to the initiation of the planning. (3) While the Tanzanians were also unrealistic about what their city should look like, they realized that a modern urban form would take an extended period of time to construct. (4) Consistent with life in Africa, the Tanzanian government insisted that the planners design a low, not high, density urban form (paraphrased -- Moore 1982, p. 85-6).

Based on the field work experience in Dodoma, four elements of the city’s appearance distinguish it from Abuja: (1) the humble housing and infrastructure construction; (2) consistent with life in Africa, the attempt to provide each dwelling with its own “shamba” or garden; (3) the adoption of self-help housing strategies; (4) predominance of non-civil servants in the city itself; and (5) proliferation of informal housing. Though the latter two aspects are probably due to the fact that Dodoma existed as a small colonial town before it was made the capital. Evidence of these observations can be seen in appendix II on the housing types found in the city.

Finally, the system variables operating in Nigeria are another set of factors that help to enhance comprehension of what happened. Recall the underlying assumption/metahypothesis of the study concerning the generalizability of implementation frameworks across various settings. This hypothesis maintained that sub-optimal policy performance needs to be understood within its unique political/institutional context; and that, for field applications, theories, paradigms or models (as forms of generalizations derived from particularities) have to be reconciled once again with the particularities. Otherwise, a researcher on the developing world can easily fall into the trap described by Qadeer (1986, p. 85): “The spread of superficial modernism makes it possible to find some evidence of the existence of structures and patterns that bear resemblance to Western practices. Yet such structures serve different functions and have unsuspecting meanings in Third World contexts.” Hence, despite the finding from the study that the generic model of implementation by Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) applies in Abuja, four distinct Nigerian system variables were considered for their possible unique impacts on housing provision in the city. The following evidence from this
study appears to support the hypothesis that only partial, superficial, inoperative or, perhaps, even inconsequential observations/predictions will result if this contextualizing of theories is ignored.

First, the consideration of the pervasiveness of nepotism and ethnic politics in Nigeria suggested that this factor may have prompted both the decision to export the planning of the new capital overseas, as well as the designed ineptness of the FCDA (e.g., wrong people in wrong jobs/contracts). The argument presented was that the northern Hausa-dominated decision making system may have been unwilling to entrust the planning/implementation of the new capital to an indigenous class of professionals dominated by non-Northerners. The rental housing market in the new capital was also suggested to have been adversely affected by the infusion of ethnic politics. The evidence presented showed that residential plot allocation in the city is heavily skewed in favor of applicants from northern Nigeria who, in comparison to applicants from the south, have a smaller middle class necessary to stimulate private construction in the city, and who have generally displayed limited interest in migrating to the FCT.

Second, the consideration of political and economic instability in the country revealed several impacts. It showed that a super "fast track" strategy of planning and implementation was adopted for the new capital to the detriment of: (1) good planning, (2) quality control during construction and (3) financial accountability. The FCDA's supervisory role was shown to have been greatly weakened by the numerous interruptions in the organizational leadership of the agency (viz. changes in government). These interruptions had often meant that planning projects which went out to the foreign consultants under one permanent secretary had to be settled under another. Because "most government officials are never certain about their political future," it was suggested that they tended towards corruption by "trying to make as much money as possible before the fateful day." Finally, it was noted that the collapse of the international oil economy led to the abandonment of 19 per cent of the overall housing starts in the new capital.
Third, the consideration of the factor of imitation culture suggested that Nigerian officials' disposition to support western housing standards only formed part of a country wide general preference for western consumption patterns. It was, however, suggested that this preference for western consumption habits is not peculiar to Nigeria, but forms a much more general process in developing countries which can only be understood within the context of global tendencies that further it.

Finally, the consideration of bureaucratic corruption and unprofessional conduct, perhaps the most pervasive phenomenon in the country, suggested that western solutions for the new capital were favored over indigenous alternatives. The main argument presented to support this claim was that western consultants and firms could compensate responsible local officials with valuable foreign exchange gratuities. The rejection of self-help housing in the city was argued as being related to the fact that such methods could not provide for large, lucrative contracts. Housing contracts in the city were noted to have been awarded mainly to friends and inexperienced contractors at inflated prices. Lastly, it was noted that, altogether, unethical practices in Abuja added a minimum of 25 per cent to the cost of housing in the city.

In closing, figure 2.11 is reintroduced as figure 6.1 to present a summative illustration of these factors and their impact on housing provision in the new capital. As this figure suggests, it seems highly unlikely that Abuja will ever become a city free of squatters and pity; a city no longer manifesting the contradictions of its predecessor, Lagos, which is epitomized, inter alia, by its marked contrasts between modern skyscrapers and traditional shacks. The only major difference with Abuja is that urban standards in the city far surpass those of other Nigerian cities. But then in other ”Nigerian cities,” civil servants live along with non-civil servants, and the majority of housing and related services are affordable by the average citizen.
Figure 6.1: An Elaboration of the Van Horn and Van Meter Model of Policy Implementation for Housing in Abuja

Source: Table 2.11.
In an extensive study of Brazil's new capital at Brasilia, Epstein (1973) sees "the contrast between the planned area of apartment houses and the squatter settlements and satellite towns, almost a caricature of the social structure of Brazil as a whole." In similar ways, occurrences in Abuja involving non-affordable housing costs and the exclusion of non-civil servants, seem almost a demonstration of Nigerian politics, contradictions and dispositions toward distribution of the fruits of development. A critic once posited that there are possibly two Abujas: that seen through Western eyes and that seen through Nigerian eyes. For the Westerner, Abuja was a bundle of naivetes, an orgy of maladministration but, nevertheless, a ripe opportunity to make a "quick profit."

For a section of the Nigerians, there is criticism or even outrage over what transpired, but a tacit acceptance that the events represented a unique Nigerian way of life. After all, "dash makes the system" and the system is "man know man." For another group of Nigerians, Abuja was simply a "modern-day resource frontier" where the strong and the enterprising made their fortunes; a once in a life time opportunity to partake in sharing the national cake or petrodollars, based on the infamous "kill and divide" or "I chop you chop" rule of fair play. But for most members of these two groups, Abuja was also something quite different: a long awaited opportunity to join the western world overnight. It is with this last group of Nigerians that this study was concerned. For them, the following final words are offered: A functional traditional Nigerian city is infinitely more admirable than a non-functional western-type Nigerian city. The non-western society which scorns traditional cities because they are not necessarily attractive or pleasing and idealizes western-type cities because they connote progress towards modernity, will have neither functional traditional cities nor functional modern cities. Neither its cities nor its ideals will prove livable.
As for both western and Nigerian critics, they should not forget that:

What occurred at Abuja was more in the tradition of Nigeria than the decision to build a capital city. The economy operates on the basis of a few very privileged Nigerians sharing the riches of the country counter-balanced by millions lowly-paid. Oil has heightened the differences between rich and poor, not altered the system. Control of government funds and the ability to direct the flow of money towards those to whom you belong has always been a mark of success in Nigeria. Tapping into the flow of government funds is tacitly accepted, if not published, as a natural perk of position. The transitory nature of power only heightens commissions and finders’ fees. Abuja was no exception (AJ 1985, p. 78).

More than being a symbol of Nigeria's aspirations for unity and development, the new capital was an avenue for privileged members of the society to both spend the country's newly acquired oil wealth and build an urban haven for themselves where they can enjoy the amenities of a modern community without the nuisance of the "common man."

6.4. CONTRIBUTION OF STUDY TO KNOWLEDGE AND THEORY

The study makes several contributions toward an enriched understanding of the implementation process. First, beyond confirming the main hypothesis that the process of implementation is ultimately bound up with the disposition of policy officials based on their expectations for the policy, the study demonstrates that the wider framework proposed by Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) is an effective way of focusing research on factors contributing to policy performance and the imperfect correspondence between policy goals and outcomes. It further demonstrates that the essentially western model of implementation applies with equal, if not more, validity to the developing world where past explanations for the problems of implementation have tended to focus on such variables as: (1) financial resources; (2) administrative and technical know-how; (3) imported theories and technologies; and (4) indigenous regime or political characteristics. Findings from the study demonstrate clearly that the housing problems of the city, particularly those of affordability and exclusion of non-civil servants, have less to do with these factors than with the predisposition of the policy officials to build a high-class, western-type administrative capital.
Second, the study comprehensively reviews scholarship in the field of policy implementation and provides original classifications for the different strands of theory advanced to explain the implementation problem. Third, it demonstrates the difficulty, if not impossibility, of separating the process of implementation from that of policy making, especially in the context of developing countries where policy making is shown to occur during execution. Fourth, to the extent that little has been known about Nigerian officials' preferences and dispositions toward the Abuja project, the study fills this gap in knowledge. Fifth, it provides both new and current empirical information on housing in the new capital.

Finally, by adopting the double answer format (i.e., "own" and "popular" response) in the survey design, the study provides an innovation in terms of methodology. (See appendix 1.) In comparison to the conventional survey approach of requiring interviewees to only give a single response to questions, the two response strategy adopted for this study has two significant advantages: (1) it provides a lower and upper bound within which the likely response might be hypothesized; and (2) it provides an indication to what extent the officials feel they are in compliance with the public's wishes. Using this method, the validity of responses to the survey questions was ascertained. Also ascertained was the fact that officials in Abuja did not act under any cognitive dissonance in terms of what they did and what they thought the wider public would rather have had them do. A possible third advantage of the innovation is that it may provide an indication of what the wider feeling in society might be without having to expand the population sample to include the general public. However, the validity of this assumption requires further studies.
REFERENCES


REFERENCES


Draft Master Plan for the Capital City (1978). A report submitted to the FCDA by the IPA.


REFERENCES


REFERENCES


REFERENCES


REFERENCES


APPENDIX I: QUESTIONNAIRE ON ABUJA AND NAMES OF INTERVIEWEES

(Part I)

PLEASE NOTE EACH QUESTION REQUIRES TWO RESPONSES

. YOUR OWN RESPONSE

. YOUR ESTIMATION ON WHAT THE POPULAR RESPONSE MIGHT BE.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>QUESTION</th>
<th>STRONGLY DISAGREE</th>
<th>NO OPINION</th>
<th>AGREE</th>
<th>STRONGLY AGREE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. It is possible to avoid squatters in Abuja.</td>
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<td>2. It is necessary for Abuja to have native type houses and neighborhood layouts for it to be a Nigerian City.</td>
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<td>3. Every Nigerian should have a right to housing</td>
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<td>4. One of the major goals of government in Abuja is to provide affordable housing for people of all income levels, especially the low income population.</td>
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<td>5. Housing in Abuja is the most visible symbol of achievement.</td>
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<td>6. Higher standards for housing must be enforced in Abuja in order to avoid duplicating the crowded conditions of Lagos.</td>
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<td>7. Nigerians basically support the building of Abuja.</td>
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<td>8. There is lack/manpower skilled in the use of local building materials.</td>
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<td>9. The government has the obligation to provide complete housing for all its workers in Abuja.</td>
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<td>10. Money is not a major factor in explaining the housing problems of Abuja.</td>
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<td>11. Nigeria at the beginning of the Abuja project was a wealthy country.</td>
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APPENDIX I: QUESTIONNAIRE ON ABUJA AND NAMES OF INTERVIEWEES

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Own Response</th>
<th>Popular Response</th>
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<tr>
<td>12. In the long run it costs more to build cheaply because low-cost housing require a good deal of maintenance and becomes obsolete in a short time.</td>
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<td>13. High-density development in Abuja would contradict the City's image as Nigeria's visible symbol of modernity.</td>
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<td>14. There is enough space at Abuja for a comfortable low density of development.</td>
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<tr>
<td>15. Countries concerned with their progress toward modernity must enforce high standards of building and construction.</td>
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<td>16. The problem with self-help housing is that the poor do not have the necessary resources to build and improve their own shelter.</td>
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<tr>
<td>17. People should be free to build to the best of their ability regardless of resulting housing quality.</td>
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<td>18. It is not necessary for Abuja to be planned and built by Nigerians for it to be a Nigerian city.</td>
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<tr>
<td>19. Local traditional building materials are not as durable, and of the same quality, as imported materials.</td>
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<td>20. For Abuja housing quality is more important than affordability.</td>
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<td>21. The underlying reasons for Abuja is more political than either economic, cultural or social.</td>
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<td>22. Abuja should be a proud reflection of Nigeria's wealth and power.</td>
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<tr>
<td>23. Any manifestations of poverty in Abuja should be eradicated at all cost.</td>
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APPENDIX I: QUESTIONNAIRE ON ABUJA AND NAMES OF INTERVIEWEES

24. Nigeria, as an advanced country, should have a capital comparable to those of other advanced countries.

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<th>STRONGLY DISAGREE</th>
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25. The work of planning and constructing the new capital was not within Nigeria's indigenous technical capability.

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26. The government has the obligation to participate in providing housing for all levels of people in Abuja.

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27. It is easy for low-cost housing estates to turn into slums.

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28. Abuja should be mainly an administrative center.

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29. Abuja must not suffer any of the defects of Lagos.

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30. Low-cost housing is often poorly designated and unsightly.

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32. "Low-cost housing, "basic housing," self-help housing," "sites and services schemes", "appropriate technology" and other concepts of the sort are all part of a ploy by the west to make developing countries comfortable with backward conditions.

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33. Attitudinal changes to encourage a more "Nigerian" city is a must for a successful housing strategy in Abuja.

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34. Housing policy in Abuja was adopted by a military government concerned with impressive design and construction, not with ensuring propriety and affordability.

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35. Abuja is truly intended for all Nigerians alike.

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36. There was never any serious plan to provide housing in Abuja for low income people who are not in the civil service.

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<th>STRONGLY DISAGREE</th>
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Part II

Please answer as fully as possible.

37. What major problems do you see with housing in Abuja?

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38. What causes do you associate with these problems?

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39. What possible solutions do you envision?

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________
APPENDIX I: QUESTIONNAIRE ON ABUJA AND NAMES OF INTERVIEWEES

NAMES AND TITLES OF INTERVIEWEES IN NIGERIA

1. Mr. F. Abot (Assistant Lecturer)  
   Department of Geography and Regional Planning  
   University of Benin  
   Benin City

2. Dr. S.I. Abumere (Senior Lecturer and Author of several articles on Abuja)  
   Department of Geography  
   University of Ibadan  
   Ibadan

3. Mr. A. Adejuwon (Assistant Director, current Federal Liaison for Abuja and former member of the Special Committee on New National Housing Policy - 1985)  
   Office of Planning and Budget  
   The Presidency  
   Ikoyi, Lagos.

4. Mrs. O. Adekoya (Deputy Surveyor-General of the Federation)  
   Federal Survey Department  
   Federal Ministry of Works and Housing  
   Tafawa Balewa Square, Lagos

5. Mr. B.O. Adigun (Assistant Chief Town Planning Officer)  
   Department of Planning and Survey  
   Federal Capital Development Authority Secretariat  
   Garki, Abuja

6. Mr. O. Akinghade (Principal Personnel Assistant)  
   Federal Ministry of Internal Affairs  
   Abuja

7. Mr. L. Anwunah (Principal Personnel Officer)  
   Personnel Department  
   Local Government, Abuja

8. Mr. M. Aruwa (Deputy Director)  
   Estate and Quartering  
   Federal Capital Development Authority Secretariat  
   Garki, Abuja

9. Mr. Atuegbu (Assistant Lecturer)  
   Department of Geography and Regional Planning  
   University of Benin  
   Benin City

10. Mr. S. Awoniyi (Principal Town Planning Officer)  
    Department of Planning and Survey  
    Federal Capital Development Authority Secretariat  
    Garki, Abuja
APPENDIX I: QUESTIONNAIRE ON ABUJA AND NAMES OF INTERVIEWEES

11. Mr. J. Bala (Director)  
    Department of Planning and Survey  
    Federal Capital Development Authority Secretariat  
    Garki, Abuja.

12. Mr. A.A. Ejeh (Principal Town Planning Officer)  
    Department of Planning and Survey  
    Federal Capital Development Authority Secretariat  
    Garki, Abuja

13. Mr. A.D. Ekerelle (Senior Land Surveyor)  
    Department of Planning and Survey  
    Federal Capital Development Authority Secretariat  
    Garki, Abuja

14. Mr. G.O. Enukorah (Principal Secretary)  
    Ministry of Information and Culture  
    Lagos

15. Mr. E.I. Eteng (Assistant General Manager)  
    Land and Estate Services Division  
    Federal Housing Authority  
    Festac Town, Lagos

16. Mr. H.N. Ezenwa (Chief Planning Officer)  
    Office of Planning and Budgeting  
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APPENDIX I: QUESTIONNAIRE ON ABUJA AND NAMES OF INTERVIEWEES

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26. Mr. L.O. Nweke (Personnel Officer)  
Federal Ministry of Internal Affairs  
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27. Mr. O. Obi (Principal Planning Officer)  
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The Presidency  
Ikoyi, Lagos

28. Mr. M.E. Obiegbu (Principal Lecturer)  
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Institute of Management and Technology  
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29. Dr. S.O. Oduola (Acting Director and former member of TAP)  
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Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research (NISER)  
University of Ibadan  
Ibadan

30. Mr. F. Okechukwu (Senior Estate Surveyor)  
Estate and Quartering  
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APPENDIX I: QUESTIONNAIRE ON ABUJA AND NAMES OF INTERVIEWEES

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34. Mr. S.A. Olajide (Assistant Chief Town Planner)  
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35. Dr. S.B. Oni (Senior Lecturer)  
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36. Dr. A.A. Owosekun (Director)  
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Were the housing guidelines for Abuja premised on a sound theory of affordable shelter? According to the literature review (Chapter 2), apart from a good idea poorly implemented, the other primary reason for a sub-optimal policy performance is the adoption of programs and projects that are not based on a valid causal connection between program goals and the means prescribed for attaining them. The following is an attempt to address this concern.

**Diagnosis of the Housing Challenge**

While the master plan prepared by the IPA does not present specific designs and formulas for housing in the new capital, it does set forth the major challenges. As made evident in discussing the housing goals of the city in Chapter 4, these challenges surround the issues of costs or the ability of households to afford the quality of houses provided. The IPA pointed out that, even with interest-free mortgage financing and 25 per cent of income devoted to housing, 90 per cent of the civil servants could not afford to buy the housing that was constructed in 1978 without heavy government subsidies (Master plan 1979, p. 174). It stated that such a housing program, which was based on "needs" translated into arbitrary and inaffordable standards, would meet with little success. An effective housing strategy for the new capital, while explicitly recognizing the need to improve the quality of life in the city, should be realistic from a financial viewpoint and be tailored to the ability of households to afford that quality.

The IPA premised their housing guidelines for the new capital on three elements. The first was the income distribution of residents to be attracted to the city (i.e., the fact that 88 per cent of the city's potential residents would earn a gross annual income of N1,200 or below). The second was the fundamental problems of housing delivery which Nigeria has in common with other developing countries:
APPENDIX II: CONTENT ANALYSIS OF THE ABUJA HOUSING PLAN

(1) Failure to mobilize all available financial resources, including both private and public sectors.

(2) Setting of unrealistic standards of housing quality not matched to the experience, desires and capabilities of the population to be served.

(3) Failure to give access to credit to the population -- both producer and consumer-to-be-served.

(4) Inability to preserve and use properly located and easily developed land in an efficient manner.

(5) Building industry shortcomings represented by such equally unsatisfactory options as high-priced foreign contractors and imported materials versus inexperienced small-scale builders with an uncertain supply of indigenous materials.

(6) Preoccupation with building technology rather than delivery of affordable housing (Master plan 1979, p. 172).

The last element included certain positive indigenous attributes which can be used in dealing with some of the previously mentioned problems: (1) available indigenous raw materials; (2) an aggressive private sector; (3) a willingness to “use” foreign expertise while building indigenous capability; and (4) available land and national capital resources” (Master plan 1979, p. 172)

Plan to Solve the Housing Challenge

The IPA assumed that housing cost is the sum of the cost of land, infrastructure (at 25-45 per cent of total costs), and construction and management (at 50-60 per cent of total cost). Land in the FCT belongs to the government and, thus, was not a major cost factor. Based on this, the IPA presented seven major arguments (techniques) to help bring housing costs in Abuja within an affordable range:

(1) **Planning.** An efficient “layout” plan can reduce costs by increasing the number of houses which share a given quantity of infrastructure services (i.e., utilities, roads and drainage, etc.).

(2) **Materials.** Sixty per cent of construction and management costs are attributable to materials but, by substituting with locally produced materials, cost reductions up to 30 per cent can be achieved.
(3) **Subsystem Mix.** As an alternative to complete housing, cost reductions can be effected by omitting portions of the houses which are superfluous and which can be later upgraded by residents (e.g., no interior doors, reduced level of finish floors, walls, cupboards and ceilings, limited fixtures, etc.).

(4) **Infrastructure.** An initial substantial cost reduction can be achieved by adopting appropriate or cost-effective technology in providing things like sewerage and transportation infrastructure. However, additional cost reductions can be achieved by lowering road paving and width standards, and reducing the quantity of finished road drainage channels.

(5) **Self-help.** The biggest urban housing problems occur in relation to the lowest 50-60 per cent of urban families. Given basic-housing or access to serviced land, security of tenure and access to credit, the experience from several developing countries is that this strata of urbanites can be relied upon to build and/or improve their dwelling.

(6) **Technology.** Sophistication in housing designs and construction methods, which rely on foreign labor and materials, are unlikely to reduce costs. For example, the widely used prefabricated component building systems should be discouraged, as this system is appropriate for only 10-15 per cent of the FCC households.

(7) **Housing Types.** Despite the need to provide living standards which avoid the problems of overcrowding experienced in other Nigerian cities, housing types for the new capital must stay within the range of economic affordability for all income groups by maintaining realistic standards. With respect to the low-income housing, several options should be pursued including: (1) minimal site and services; (2) core housing of various plots and house sizes; and (3) rooming houses (paraphrased -- Master plan 1979, p. 174-6).

Illustrated in appendix II, table 1 are some of the cost implications of these choices. This table shows that the cheapest housing strategy for the new capital is one that combines the options of indigenous material, self-help labor and shared infrastructure. Appendix II, figure 1 discloses the major conceptual issues considered by the IPA in recommending housing guideline for the new capital.
APPENDIX II, Table 1: Building Construction and Infrastructure Costs (Naira per Square Meter of Housing)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Building Standards</th>
<th>Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Standard Urban Construction</td>
<td>N130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduced Internal Finish</td>
<td>N107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimal with W.C. and Shower</td>
<td>N90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-help/Indigenous Material</td>
<td>N60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Infrastructure Standards</th>
<th>Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>N45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paved Roads/ Surface Drainage</td>
<td>N32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unpaved Roads/ Reduced Surface Drainage</td>
<td>N22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shared Infrastructure</td>
<td>N13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Master plan 1979.
APPENDIX II: CONTENT ANALYSIS OF THE ABUJA HOUSING PLAN

APPENDIX II, FIGURE 1: HOUSING DELIVERY SYSTEM MODEL

Source: Master plan 1979.
Content Validity of the Housing Plan Guideline

Expertise in housing is probably not required to conclude that the aforementioned guidelines satisfy the theoretical maxims for producing adequate low-cost shelter. This should hardly be surprising, but it goes to reinforce this researcher’s personal belief that: the developing world is not short of good ideas, but it is deficient in the ability to implement these ideas. What might appear surprising is that the initiative for low-cost housing proposals should come from the expatriates (Temple and Temple 1989, p. 240). However, the reason for this fact is simple. Unlike the indigenous professionals, the expatriate planners do not have any personal stake in the housing quality produced. They do not have to live in these houses nor worry about the country’s prestige and long-term future. Moreover, many of the expatriates in the field of development planning often bring with them a philosophical love affair for the poor, along with their visions of how best to assist this group. Analysis in Chapter 5 confirmed that, in the case of Abuja, the foreign planners, not the indigenous professionals and officials, were the ones to press for low-cost housing.

Nevertheless, given the fact that "the IPA planners acted without cognizance of Nigerian lifestyles," and that they were "organized according to political constraints and personal ideology, not planning theory" (Moore 1982, p. 50, 58), instances of professional impropriety in planning the new capital were to be expected. Moreover, in a frantic chase after high consultancy fees, which the army chiefs were indifferent to, it is only to be expected that professional discipline would dissolve, leading to such professional misdeeds as those mentioned in Chapter 4 under housing design and layout. Those improprieties included transposing buildings designed for elsewhere to Abuja, with seemingly little attempt to suit the designs to Nigerian lifestyle and climate.
APPENDIX III: HOUSING TYPES IN TANZANIA'S NEW CAPITAL AT DODOMA

LIFE IN THE CITY CENTER OF DODOMA. NOTE ROADS UNTARRED WITH ASPHALT.

Source: Field Research 1988-89.
HOUSING FOR THE HIGHEST CIVIL SERVANT INCOME GROUP IN DODOMA BY THE CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (CDA). NOTE THE MODESTY OF THESE HOUSES WHEN COMPARED TO HOUSING IN ABUJA FOR A SIMILAR INCOME GROUP.

Source: Field Research 1988-89.
APPENDIX III: HOUSING TYPES IN TANZANIA'S NEW CAPITAL AT DODOMA

LOW-INCOME HOUSING PROVIDED IN DODOMA BY THE NATIONAL HOUSING COMMISSION. HOUSING BUILT BY THE TANZANIA RAILWAY CORPORATION FOR ITS WORKERS IN DODOMA. NOTE THE GREEN SURROUNDING (MAIZE FARMS).

Source: Field Research 1988-89.
APPENDIX III: HOUSING TYPES IN TANZANIA'S NEW CAPITAL AT DODOMA

BASIC HOUSING EFFORTS IN DODOMA BY THE CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (CDA).

Source: Field Research 1988-89.
APPENDIX III: HOUSING TYPES IN TANZANIA'S NEW CAPITAL AT DODOMA

SQUATMENTS IN THE CHANG'OMBE AREA OF DODOMA.

Source: Field Research 1988-89.