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The political inactivity of the less advantaged : the approaches of Marxism and empirical social science Paehlke, Robert 1975

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THE'POLITICAL INACTIVITY OF THE LESS ADVANTAGED: ' THE APPROACHES OF MARXISM AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE by Robert Paehlke B.A. Lehigh U n i v e r s i t y , 1963 M.A., New School f o r S o c i a l Research, 1968 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE.OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY i n the Department of P o l i t i c a l Science We accept t h i s thesis as conforming to the required s^nd/frd THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA September, 1975 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shal make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by his representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shal not be alowed without my written permission. Department of The University of British Columbia Vancouver 8, Canada Date 04y /?7S~, 6 ABSTRACT The thesis begins by outlining some of the major findings of p o l i t i c a l sociology regarding the demographic characteristics of those persons who are typically less inclined to participate i n the p o l i t i c a l process within l i b e r a l democratic systems. It has generally been found that participation i s positively related to income, education, and oc-cupational status; and that generally men and r a c i a l , ethnic and religious majorities tend as well to participate more than women and minorities. The third chapter isolates seven alternative explanations of.the relative p o l i t i c a l inactivity of the less advantaged from the recent literature of empirical social science. There i s then an attempt to show that to a considerable extent though by no means universally, the expla-nations of empirical social science can be usefully seen as f i t t i n g into a 6-part 'conservative understanding' of the non-participation of the less advantaged. Associated claims such as those which state or imply that low levels of participation have positive effects for p o l i t i -cal systems because the less advantaged are less informed or more intole-rant are critiqued by a detailed questioning of research techniques, by a gathering of empirical evidence from less familiar sources , and by doubts regarding the degree to which some researchers findings follow from their own evidence. Included as part of these sections i s an analysis of recent introductory texts in p o l i t i c a l science wherein the elements of the 'conservative understanding' mentioned above are found, i n some cases, to be badly (and erroneously) stated. Lastly, towards the close of the fourth chapter there i s some discussion and analysis of recent i American i n t e l l e c t u a l h i s t o r y i n an attempt to place i n h i s t o r i c o -s o c i a l perspective several aspects of the recent study of p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n . At several points there i s a d i s c u s s i o n of aspects of the methodology of empirical s o c i a l science and i t s r e l a t i o n s h i p to the f i n d i n g s under consideration here. Chapters 5 and 6 focus on the contrasts between, on the one hand, the analyses of empirical s o c i a l science regarding the r e l a t i v e non-par-t i c i p a t i o n of the l e s s advantaged, and on the other, the explanations of Marxists of the seeming d i s i n c l i n a t i o n of the working c l a s s i n 'late c a p i t a l i s t ' s o c i e t i e s to pursue p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y ( i n p a r t i c u l a r r e v o l u t i o n a r y s o c i a l i s t p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y ) . Chapter 5 i s o l a t e s and dev-elops 13 separate but r e l a t e d explanations found i n the w r i t i n g s of con-temporary Marxists, Chapter 6 o f f e r s a c r i t i q u e of explanations, the evidence supporting them, and aspects of the methodology underlying them. The assumptions, approaches and methods of Marxism and empirical s o c i a l science are treated comparatively. Among the conclusions reached i s the view that while Marxism i s often imprecise and generally slow to adapt to changing e m p i r i c a l conditions i t has an important capacity f o r developing explanations which are compre-hensive, integrated and t h e o r e t i c a l l y u s e f u l . A s e r i e s of suggestions are offered whereby Marxist explanations might be, at l e a s t i n part, tested e m p i r i c a l l y . The f i n a l chapter discusses some of the weaknesses of both empirical s o c i a l science and Marxism and makes some te n t a t i v e suggestions about how they might be avoided i n both t h e o r e t i c a l and d e t a i l e d i n q u i r y . i i TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Abstract - i Chapter 1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 Some Measures of the Relat i v e P o l i t i c a l I n a c t i v i t y of the Less Advantaged 30 3 The Explanations of Empirical S o c i a l Science . . . . 38 4 A C r i t i q u e of the View of Empirical S o c i a l Science 1 1 6 5 The Explanations of Marxism 215 6 A C r i t i q u e of the View of Marxism 287 7 Conclusions . . . 342 n £ *7 Bibliography i i i 1 CHAPTER 1 Whenever a living organism or c o l l e c t i v i t y loses the possi b i l i t y of being more than i t i s , i t cannot continue; i t begins to die. Poten-t i a l i t i e s , then, are an intimate and inseparable part of being. For human individuals, potentialities are manifest in a complex of biology and consciousness. There can be no real understanding of what a human individual i s without a knowledge of what she/he might become; the complex of biological and mental potentiality is an important part of any such understanding. A co l l e c t i v i t y i s less contingent upon biology than i s any one individual; but i t s existence i s no less dependent on i t s potentialities. Understanding what a society i s , then, i s pari passu understanding what i t might become."*" That understanding i s then, in turn, related less to biology than to the dynamics of social organi-zation and to societal self-consciousness about societal p o s s i b i l i t i e s . Any patterned study of human society which either does not or can-not effectively come to understand social potentialities w i l l not XIn this sentence the word 'might' i s important, ^his stress and i n my use of the word 'potentiality' I hope to indicate my view that social science can never be more than probabilistic science. And I" have doubts that in practice rather than i n principle we w i l l ever come to the point where the probabilities regarding many major questions can be expressed in the form of solvable mathematical equations or precise odds. The single most convincing d i f f i c u l t y i s , for me, the fact that the objects of study are subjects and can adjust their behavior i n the light of previous findings. In this, and perhaps other senses, the contingency of human behavior is limited — there is some element of human creativity which may well prove impossible to anticipate. I do not take this unlikelihood as grounds for not attempting to anticipate creativity, for in trying, p a r t i a l l y succeeding and communicating that success we continually advance the level at which that process begins. 2 e f f e c t i v e l y understand s o c i a l a c t u a l i t i e s . And, of course, the reverse i s also true; any patterned study of human society which does not or cannot e f f e c t i v e l y come to understand s o c i a l a c t u a l i t i e s w i l l not e f -f e c t i v e l y understand s o c i a l p o t e n t i a l i t i e s . Contemporary empirical 2 s o c i a l science has often been seen as unwilling or unable to deal ef-3 f e c t i v e l y with s o c i a l p o t e n t i a l i t y or s o c i a l change.• Is t h i s claim a correct one? If so, i n whole or i n part, what are the roots of t h i s shortcoming? Are they necessary l i m i t s of methodology broadly conceived? Are they necessary l i m i t s of methodology broadly conceived? Are there a d d i t i o n a l p l a u s i b l e explanations — for example, i s there a s o c i o - h i s - • t o r i c a l basis for some of the emphasis of contemporary empirical s o c i a l science? ' i w i l l use the term empirical s o c i a l science throughout t h i s i n q u i r y i n a quite narrow way, as a term which r e f e r s to a large body of non-Marxist s o c i a l science. I am f u l l y aware that the term used more broadly could be taken to subsume Marxism, but such a usage i n a comparative inquiry such as t h i s would for me r a i s e many questions. For example, why should we not on the contrary see a l l empirical s o c i a l science as at l e a s t p o t e n t i a l l y a subset of Marxism? I take empirical s o c i a l scienc, then, to be that portion of so-c i a l science which seeks to a t t a i n p r e c ise, i d e a l l y q u a n t i f i a b l e , measures of human s o c i a l behavior and sees those measures, and t h e i r use i n a pro-cess of disconfirming n u l l hypotheses i n ways subject to r e t e s t by other researchers, as the soundest route to the understanding of s o c i a l man. I take the term to be only somewhat broader than the term behavioral s o c i a l science i n that I might include within i t s scope more l e g a l , i n s t i -t u t i o n a l and systems studies than are sometimes considered behavioral. F i n a l l y , i n general i n t h i s inquiry I w i l l be looking at p r i m a r i l y the d i s c i p l i n e s of sociology and p o l i t i c a l science, and to a l e s s e r extent s o c i a l psychology and some aspects of economics. I did not, of course, wish to be taken to be t r y i n g to generalize beyond those bounds which I have c a r e f u l l y examined. 3 See, for example: C h r i s t i a n Bay, " P o l i t i c s and Pseudo P o l i t i c s : A C r i -t i c a l Evaluation of some Behavioral L i t e r a t u r e , " American P o l i t i c a l Science  Ree;view, LIX 1 (March, 1965), 39-51; Henry S. K a r i e l , Open Systems: Arenas  for P o l i t i c a l Action, (Itasca, 111.: F.E. Peacock Publishers, 1969); K.W. Kim, "The Limits of Behavioral Explanation i n P o l i t i c s , " Canadian Journal of Economics and P o l i t i c a l Science, XXXI (August, 1965), 315-327; Mulford Q. Sibley, "The Limitations of Behavioralism," i n James C. Charlesworth, Ed., Contemporary P o l i t i c a l A n a l y s i s , New York: The Free Press, 1967); and Jack L. Walker, "A C r i t i q u e of the E l i t i s t Theory of Democracy," American  P o l i t i c a l Review, LX, 2 (June, 1966), 285-295. 3 It is perfectly clear that there i s no purely deductive way to deal with such questions. We must directly examine some part of the 4 body of empirical literature. It i s also perfectly clear that no one effort w i l l be able to wholly answer such questions, a l l that can be hoped for i s the addition of some further c l a r i t y to earlier efforts. This I hope I w i l l be able to do by undertaking here a study of how empirical social science has come to understand and explain"* an issue which has been both of general theoretical importance and the subject of extensive empirical research. The area of research I have chosen is p o l i t i c a l participation: more particularly the relative lack of participation by socio-economically disadvantaged persons. I do not believe, however, that an examination in isolation of this one pattern i s a sufficient means of answering or clarifying the questions I have asked. I propose to look as well at an alternative attempt to understand and explain, i n this case, a particular form of p o l i t i c a l inactivity of the disadvantaged: contemporary Marxist ex-planation^) of the p o l i t i c a l inactivity of the* working class i n developed and late capitalism.^ In looking at Marxist explanations In doing so I w i l l to some extent draw as well on secondary summaries prepared by both behavioralists and their c r i t i c s (see Chapters 2 and 3). "*For a c l a r i f i c a t i o n of the particular meanings I have given these two terms in this study see below the closing section of this Chapter. ^'Late capitalism' is a term current i n Marxism which carries the im-plication that the capitalism of the contemporary West has extended i t s e l f beyond i t s 'appropriate' departure from history by a variety of devices ranging from imperialism to militarism to easy consumer credit and Keynesian economics. Accordingly, those who use this term hold the view that this formation is due or overdue for transformation and are then l e f t to account for the behavior and 'non-behavior' of the working class. Thereby those Marxists who are inclined to use this concept are, among others, of great interest in this inquiry. of this question and the forms or lack of evidence which contemporary Marxists have offered i n support of their explanations I hope that i n this comparison and contrast I can deal more effectively with my original questions. There seems to be a good prime facie case that Marxism might serve as a means of gaining further understanding of empirical social science. For example, i n terms of our opening concern, i f empirical social science could be said to underestimate the importance of and/or be unable to effectively measure the potentiality 'portion' of social r e a l i t y , Marxism could equally f a i r l y be said to look at social reality through, i f you w i l l , a potentiality prism. Marxist measures of past and present tend to be made i n terms of their a b i l i t y to serve as the basis for understanding the prospects of a transformation toward an approximated future. 7 If empirical social science tends at times to sacrifice scope and depth of explanation for precision, Marxism's forte is explanatory scope, i t s nadir conceptual c l a r i t y . Social science seeks quantified evidence and ty p i c a l i t i e s , Marxism i s more often concerned with portents and indications of possible trends. If empirical social scientists have been restricted i n their a b i l i t y to incorporate his-tor i c a l materials many Marxists have blurred the details of years for the patterns of decades and centuries. If social scientists have too often lacked theoretical grounding for detailed research projects,Marxists have often been trapped i n a spir a l of ever more abstracted and reified 7Whether or not Marx himself or many Marxists would accept this charac-terization is a complex question; I do not necessarily take i t to be 'their' view. 5 theorizing. There are further interesting differences, of course, but I w i l l offer them i n later Chapters when I can begin to deal with their complexities i n greater detail. Suffice i t to say here that Marxist analysis and empirical social science are two well-developed methods of coming to some understanding of social r e a l i t y , their perspectives can be usefully counterposed, and they each have devoted considerable attention and considerable theoretical centrality to the concrete research area within which I w i l l attempt to cl a r i f y the. limits of these two methodological perspectives. The Significance of P o l i t i c a l Participation If asked to choose one concept by which to best judge the relative presence or absence of democracy in a society's p o l i t i c s most of us would, I expect, choose "participation". If we were seeking the knowledge nec-essary to locate the means to increase the degree of democracy we would attempt to determine the varieties of individuals for whom participation i s uncommon or ineffective and the systemic-institutional, social-cultural, and individual-psychological explanations of that i n e f f e c t i -veness. Such knowledge could provide a beginning point for the posing of alternatives. How can one best get at the meaning of the concept 'participa-tion 1 ; what are i t s indicators? Are hours spent, or dollars spent, a valid measure? Is intensity of involvement — the depth of emotions f e l t , the salience of poli t i c s — a useful measure? Or wouldn't we better seek to determine the 'quality' of participation via measures of levels of p o l i t i c a l sophistication (knowledge)? Or is there a 6 dimension missing in the usual measures of participation — must we not deal with the questions of effectiveness of participation. That i s , is the essence of participation less in the quantity or quality of energy and resources expended than in the effectiveness of that ex-penditure? Surely activity utterly without effect on the social order is not f u l l participation; i t i s , depending on the intentions of the actors, either a game or a deception. A l l these are surely important matters, but on balance what should be remembered i s that there i s as well much to be gained in making separate measurements of activity and of effectiveness of activity. Each can be seen to be a part of demo-cratic participation. The question of participation then implies some need to make com-parisons among Burkean v i r t u a l representation, the dictatorship of the proletariat, Philippine electoral shoot-outs and the mass organization production of coalition government in post-war Austria. Within that complex of questions and unavailable answers we must in turn confront an often-avoided yet real conceptual-theoretical problem: does pa r t i -g cipation necessarily imply activity? More significantly, does a mere activity increase imply greater participation? If we conclude that i t does — that the concept would most usefully be taken to do so — we must realize that we have thereby lessened i t s usefulness as a necessary Not necessarily, of course, the same thing as measurable activity. 7 indicator of the presence, absence or degree of democracy. Not a l l students of participation have been f u l l y aware that they have made this assumption. We should perhaps indicate briefly at this point the importance of p o l i t i c a l participation as a part of the classical conception of democracy. An elaborate demonstration of that importance is not necessary here, the case has been well made elsewhere."^ The nature of that importance w i l l be discussed further shortly. The importance of such harkenings back, to classical democratic theory can be very easily overdrawn; I offer i t as a useful i n i t i a l context, not as canon. In this latter regard one point should be clearly made here y ^1 follow C.B. MacPherson The Real World of Democracy,(Toronto: Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 1965) on the theoretical possibility of non-liberal democracy and i t follows for me that a non-participatory democracy i s also a possibility (rarely actualized). Democracy i n i t s broadest possible conception can be a useful concept. Government of, by and for (taken one at a time) the people allows one to come to mixed conclusions in comparing the democracy of an acknowledgedly authoritarian workers' state which genuinely sought to engage i n a rapid improvement of the condition of the less advantaged majority of i t s population to another state i n which the interests of a relatively active majority chose to systematically disadvantage a minority within, or large numbers of persons outside i t s borders. "^This is very effectively dealt with i n Carole Pateman Participation  and Democratic Theory (Cambridge: At the University Press,1970), es-pecially pp. 16-44. It is also a part of many of the other 'post-behavioral' critiques of the study of p o l i t i c a l participation including Graeme Duncan and Steven Lukes, "The New Democracy," P o l i t i c a l Studies.XI (1963), pp. 156-177; Peter Bachrach, The Theory of Democratic Elitism: A Critique, (Boston: L i t t l e , Brown and Company, 1967); Lane Davis, "The Cost of Realism: Contemporary Restatements of Democracy," Western P o l i - t i c a l Quarterly f XVII (March, 1964), pp. 37-46. 8 that i s , that what might be seen as i m p l i c i t i n some of the 'post-behavioral' c r i t i q u e s of 'democratic revisionism' I would agree that none of the t h e o r i s t s of l i b e r a l democracy generally held to be c e n t r a l to the formation of the ' c l a s s i c a l ' theory of l i b e r a l democracy could be c o r r e c t l y described as unequivocal democrats.^ In f a c t none i s a consistent advocate of even the degree of p a r t i c i p a t i o n common to the contemporary Western l i b e r a l democracies. Locke, f o r example, was p r i m a r i l y concerned with the r u l e of law, l i m i t e d government, and the r i g h t of r e v o l u t i o n against tyranny. He objected to absolute monarchy, but beyond that was unclear as to the proper locus of sovereignty: "...Locke has no c l e a r view of the nature or residence of sovereignty. He speaks at one time of the supreme power of the people, or i n other words the community; he speaks at another of the supreme power of the l e g i s l a t i v e — which may, i t i s true, be the community, but also may be a body of representatives appointed by the community; and i n s t i l l another context he remarks that "where...the executive i s vested i n a s i n g l e person who has also a share i n the l e g i s l a t i v e then that s i n g l e person, i n a very t o l e r a b l e sense, may also be c a l l e d the supreme v power. "-^ " C e r t a i n l y Duncan and Lukes are c l e a r about the very l i m i t e d nature of J.S. M i l l ' s c a l l for democratic p a r t i c i p a t i o n (see p. 164 and p. 170 i n Charles A. McCoy and John Playford, A p o l i t i c a l P o l i t i c s (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1967)). They are also c l e a r that he had greater hopes f o r future p o t e n t i a l , etc. On the other hand Lane Davis seems a b i t l e s s cautious when he r e f e r s to p e r i o d i c e l e c t o r a l chores as p a r t i c i p a t i o n " . . . at best, a pale and rather p a t h e t i c version of the responsible and active p a r t i c i p a t i o n which was the a s p i r a t i o n of c l a s -s i c a l democracy" ( i n McCoy and Playford at page 193). I do not o f f e r the b r i e f discussion which now follows as a r e b u t t a l . Rather I simply wish to make cl e a r that my c r i t i q u e does not depend i n large part on 'eternal values' expressed i n democratic theory. 12 Barker, Ernest i n S o c i a l Contract (New York: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1962), p. xxv. 9 Locke did not deal with questions of suffrage, or with the patterned regular recurrence of e l e c t i o n s or popular decision-making beyond hoping that the people would overturn those tyrannies which were consistent, enduring and i n t o l e r a b l e . Further, he had l i t t l e d i f f i c u l t y accepting a s o c i a l assignment which might be c a l l e d q u a l i f i e d slavery (slaves could be owned but not murdered and, i n rare cases, s l a v i c i d e , too, was a c c e p t a b l e ) . ^ The very l i m i t e d nature of the democratic aspects of the p o l i t i c a l forms c a l l e d f o r by other o f t e n - c i t e d 17th and 18th century democratic t h e o r i s t s are also well-known. Montesquieu's separation of powers was 14 designed i n part to check the power of elected representatives. The ambivalence and ambiguity of Rousseau are well-known.^ De Tocqueville, 13 Locke, John, "Second T r e a t i s e on C i v i l Government," i n op. c i t . , pp. 15-16. For a thorough d i s c u s s i o n of the work of Locke i n t h i s context see Frank M a r i n i , "John Locke and the Revision of C l a s s i c a l Democratic Theory," Western P o l i t i c a l Quarterly, XXII (March, 1969), pp. 5-18. Marini e f f e c t i v e l y makes se v e r a l important points; f o r example he argues: "Locke's p o l i t i c a l theory bears l i t t l e resemblance to the ' c l a s s i c a l theory of the c r i t i c a l arguments. The c i t i z e n s Locke describes are not the pure, p e r f e c t l y r a t i o n a l , informed and ac i v e c i t i z e n s which the c r i t i c s found i n c l a s s i c a l theory." (The quote i s at p. 17.) The c r i t i c s to whom Marini r e f e r s are l a r g e l y b e h a v i o r a l i s t p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s . ) Marini f e e l s that Locke's viewpoint has been d i s t o r t e d i n t o a strawman and that Locke i n a c t u a l i t y i s "not at a l l democratic i n the sense that ' c l a s s i c a l democratic theory' i s usually represented as being democratic." (Also, p. 17.) In my view most of the ' c l a s s i c a l ' t h e o r i s t s are f a r les s democratic than they have been taken to be. Many empirical s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s , ^ as T j v i l l discuss-* i n Chapters 3 and 4, have i n e f f e c t taken modest b e l i e f i n human improvability as wild-eyed idealism. 14 . . Newmann, Franz, i n t r o d u c t i o n to Baron de Montesquieu, The S p i r i t of  the Laws, New York: Hafner Publishing Company, 1962, p. i x . "''"'The best evidence f o r that ambiguity i s the widely d i f f e r i n g views of Rousseau's democratic consistency. Two sharply diverging i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s are J.L. Talmon The Origins of T o t a l i t a r i a n Democracy (London: Seeker & Warburg, 1952), and Pateman, op. c i t . , Chapter 2. 10 of course, was highly fearful and even primarily concerned with the tyranny of the majority and the dangers of social leveling. And to reach nearer the time-bounds of anything we might c a l l 'classical' democratic theory J.S. M i l l i n Considerations on Representative Govern- ment i s often doubtful of popular recognition of eminence and consis-tently fearful of both citizens and representatives attempting matters 16 beyond their limited competence. M i l l i s an explicit proponent of truncated democracy; he argues for tests of literacy and arithmetic competence and for the debasement from the francise of those who are i n receipt of parish r e l i e f (and thereby make no tax contribution however small or indirect)."'"'' Finally, and probably most convincingly here i s M i l l s ' direct c a l l for weighted voting to accompany the then oncoming introduction of nearer universal (male) suffrage. He calls for the granting of multiple votes to those of greater "education" either as directly measured in a national test, or as, i n his view,approximated by occupation ("A l i k e l y to be more intelligent than a trades-18 man...") professional status or university graduation. Few, i f any, then, of the "classical" democratic theorists were sanguine about the appropriateness or even, in some cases, the eventual desirability of universal participation, or even further, i n other cases, 16 M i l l , J.S., Considerations on Representative Government,(Indianapolis : The Bobb-Merrill Company, Inc., 1958),see particularly introduction by Currin V. Shields, Ed., p. xiv and xix. "^Regarding tests of literacy, see i b i d . , p. 132; regarding the dis-enfranchisement of those receiving r e l i e f see the same source at p. 134. 1 R Ibid., pp. 135-140. 11 the eventual desirability of universal participation in even the i n d i - rect participation of the representative democracy. Yet i t i s generally held that widespread participation is the heart of any truly democratic theory. This seeming limitation i n the early statement of the theory 19 can only be understood by reference to the hi s t o r i c a l specificity of the theories. In a l l cases the theorists were semi-consciously advo-cating pieces of a more or less integratable theory of l i b e r a l democracy. In most cases the pieces each of them emphasized, whether the rule of law, the extension of suffrage, or the limitation of absolute powers can be imagined/constructed from this point in time as advocated steps towards a coherent theoretical whole. But the dimension of potentiality i s not an aspect of democratic or any other social theory merely retrospectively. Social theory can be seen as an attempt to engage in more than 'mere' explanation (logic and fact in combination) more than a communication of meaning of a hoped-20 for universal intersubjective transmissibility; i t i s an attempt to communicate understanding: explanation in concert with an evaluative, 21 prescriptive and broadly theoretical dimension. In the expression of 19 For an appreciation of the meaning of this term see C. Wright M i l l s , The Sociological Imagination, New York: Oxford University Press, 1959, pp. 143-164, and particularly p. 149. 20 This term is most clearly discussed i n Arnold Brecht, P o l i t i c a l Theory (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1959), especially pp. 113-116. 21 J Just as explanation might be described as something more than description, understanding might be described as something more than explanation. The something more in each case, i t seems to me, i s some greater involvement of and/or appreciation by a subject. Explanation can be seen as a description which 'makes sense,' understanding a f u l l appreciation of an explanation or set of explanations. (On the relationship between description and explana-tion see Michael Scriven in Herbert Feigl and Grover Maxwell, Eds., Min-nesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. I l l (Minneapolis: Uni-versity of Minnesota P r e s s , 1962), pp. 174-176.) 12 the understandings of s o c i a l theory are, at l e a s t i m p l i c i t l y , p o s s i -b i l i s t i c p r e d ictions f o r major dimensions of the s o c i a l order and thereby p r u d e n t i a l modes for i n d i v i d u a l a c t i o n . S o c i a l theory i n c o r -porates explanations of empirical r e a l i t y i n t o a form which allows them to be not merely measures of s o c i a l behavior but i n turn measured by the making of h i s t o r y . I am now to a point where I may more meaningfully take up the matter deferred above, namely, the nature of the importance of p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n to c l a s s i c a l democratic theory. The c l a s s i c a l l i b e r a l democratic t h e o r i s t s have been 'shown by h i s t o r y ' generally to have constructed perspectives which, however progressively p r e s c r i p t i v e they might have been i n t h e i r h i s t o r i c context, now seem at most minimalist 22 f o r the democraciesoof the Adyaneed.West; P o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n , i n s p i t e of the tentativeness and l i m i t s of the a s s e r t i o n , was seen as the primary component of democracy, thereby i t was an end f o r societ y and, as w e l l , the means of further advance: both i n d i v i d u a l human develop-ment and, thereby, further s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l advance: greater democra-t i z a t i o n . This c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of p a r t i c i p a t i o n and democracy was most f u l l y and c l e a r l y developed by J.S. M i l l ; i n t h i s assessment I follow 23 24 Lane Davis and e s p e c i a l l y Graeme Duncan and Steven Lukes. As I do not of course assert that h i s t o r y i s u n i l i n e a r i n t h i s (or any other) regard. That my statement i s more or less c r e d i b l e i n s p i t e of the r i s e of c e n t r a l i z e d bureaucracies of a l l d e s criptions gives further weight to the modesty of early democrats' estimates of human p a r t i c i p a -tory p o s s i b i l i t i e s . Neither do I underestimate the d i v e r s i t y of democratic t h e o r y , c l a s s i c or otherwise. That the more r a d i c a l democrats such as the L e v e l l e r s are not more prominent i n 'our' contemporary conception of what the main body of c l a s s i c a l democratic theory 'jLs_' i n d i c a t e s to some extent the complexity of issues of h i s t o r i c a l s p e c i f i c i t y . 23 Davis, op. c i t . Duncan and Lukes, op. c i t . 13 Duncan and Lukes have put i t : "Although he (J.S. Mill) feared that an enfran-chised working class would misuse i t s powers and suggested certain safeguards to secure the author-it y of the enlightened, he had great faith in the c i v i l i z i n g effects of p o l i t i c a l participation i t -s e l f . He described the franchise as 'a potent instrument of mental improvement' and followed Tocqueville i n explaining the conscientious citizenship of the Americans by their democratic institutions. Self-government is i n this sense self-sustaining: through the possession of legal rights men became capable of properly exercising them "25 M i l l , then, not only saw democratization as h i s t o r i c a l l y evolutionary, but saw i t s evolution —* through the vehicle of participation — as at least i n part self-advancing. Thus i t is the case that one cannot speak simply of a single 'classical democratic theory' which is unqualifiedly democratic. And further one can easily be struck at how many of those theorists generally taken to be the most important articulators of the traditions on which our institutions are founded ex p l i c i t l y reject even f u l l i n - direct suffrage and, i n fact, accept, j u s t i f y or construct institutional instruments which, in effect or by conscious design, restrain p a r t i c i -pation. They can be reasonably seen to be par t i a l formulators of 'classical democratic theory' only when considered in historic context. They are certainly then not merely articulators of 'universal democratic ideals', rather they are more crucially articulators of levels of demo-cratic awareness appropriate to their current or impending historic I b i d . , i n A p o l i t i c a l P o l i t i c s , op. c i t . , p. 164. 14 situations. M i l l is a significant departure i n democratic theory in great part because he i s at least partially self-conscious about the evolutionary process having taken and taking place both in individuals and i n the social order. Through him we can see participation not 26 merely as a (or even the) key aspect of democraticization, but even more importantly we can begin to see participation as an at least po-tential h i s t o r i c a l force: an active agency of individual and social transformation. A Definition of Participation In addition to the above attempt to convey an impression of the meaning and significance of p o l i t i c a l participation, I would l i k e as well to attempt to delineate a reasonably precise definition of the concept. I can begin with a tentative acceptance of Myron Weiner's usage: "...I shall use the concept of p o l i t i c a l participa-tion to refer to any voluntary action, successful or unsuccessful, organized or unorganized, episodic or continuous, employing legitimate or illegitimate methods intended to influence the choice of public policies, the administration of public a f f a i r s , or the choice of po-l i t i c a l leaders at any level of government, local or national. In this definition there i s a clear choice for activity over effect — i n making such a choice as I noted above, i t i s clear that something is lost: participation is thereby less demanding a measure of demo-cracy. But the gains in this usage i n the relative ease of judging whether or not any given empirical event i s an instance of p o l i t i c a l 26 This, of course, i s an important 'merely.' 27 Weiner, Myron, " P o l i t i c a l Participation: Crisis of the P o l i t i c a l Pro-cess," in Leonard Binder et a l . , Crises and Sequences in P o l i t i c a l De- velopment, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1971), p. 164. 15 participation are very important. One must simply verify that (1) an action has occurred, (2) that i t was voluntary, (3) that i t had a specific intent to influence the choice of public po l i t i c s [and/or] the administration of public affairs [and/or] the choice of p o l i t i c a l leaders at any level of government, local or national. Of the three aspects of the definition I have isolated i t seems to me that 'voluntariness' i s the least problematic. Weiner comments that "(I)nvoluntary acts, such as serving i n the armed forces (through conscription) or paying taxes, are excluded. Belonging to organizations 28 or attending mass r a l l i e s under government orders i s also excluded." The phrase 'under government orders' i s very vague and even perhaps Cold War-ish. Are those attending Castro's speeches 'under government orders' i f they came in an army vehicle from the countryside? Are American schoolteachers and schoolchildren who "take time out" to see the President or the Pope pass by i n a limousine? What of activity beyond mere card-holding i n an involuntary association such as a trade union in the U..S.S.R.? What of involuntary union membership i n a legally supported closed-shop situation in a l i b e r a l democracy? What, lastly here, of obedience to a conscription law in the face of widespread ex-p l i c i t l y p o l i t i c a l disobedience? But a l l of these questions merely i n -dicate complexity and c a l l for caution and subtlety. They do not cause any fundamental problems for this inquiry. More d i f f i c u l t are questions relating to matters of the intention-a l i t y and explicitness of actions. Weiner notes, 2 8 I b i d . 16 " . . . ( f o r our purposes) p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s defined as a c t i o n , i n c l u d i n g verbal a c t i o n , not simply at t i t u d e s or subjective f e e l i n g s . In a l l p o l i t i c a l systems people have a t t i t u d e s towards government and p o l i t i c s , but unless there i s some a c t i o n i t would be inappropriate to use the term " p a r t i c i p a t i o n " . A l i e n a t i o n i s an act of p a r t i c i p a t i o n only i f i t i s v e r b a l l y expressed." In a consideration of these matters one quite quickly must come to deal with a concept c e n t r a l to Marxist p o l i t i c a l thought: p o l i t i c a l con-sciousness. One must also, as do Marxists and others, consider as w e l l d i s t i n c t i o n s between the perspectives of the actor and the observer. Can one t o t a l l y 'trade' consciousness f o r e x p l i c i t action? What of conscious i n a c t i o n conceived as passive re s i s t a n c e ; e.g., not buying a given product or i n t e n t i o n a l l y not voting or s i l e n t l y not performing expected s o c i a l , p o l i t i c a l or economic duties . Further, what q u a l i f i e s , to use Weiner's example, as a v e r b a l expression of a l i e n a t i o n ? One can hardly expect consciousness s u f f i c i e n t to cause an utterance l i k e 'My gosh, I'm alienated' to be commonplace^and even i f they were they might be no more than a s o c i a l r i t u a l . To be more s p e c i f i c then — the p o l i -t i c a l nature of a given act such as p a r t i c i p a t i o n by a Black American i n a l o o t i n g r i o t or by a worker i n a union or a neighborly d i s c u s s i o n of women's -.rights.'-over coffee could be seen to depend on both the degree of p o l i t i c a l consciousness of the p a r t i c i p a n t and the h i s t o r i c a l l y s p e c i f i c context of the i n c i d e n t . That i s , under c e r t a i n circumstances p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n r a c i a l l y - b a s e d l o o t i n g could have enormous p o l i t i c a l I b i d . 17 effect even i f the consciousness of those effects was very, very unclear in the mind of the participant. The rioter might not be aware of f e l t oppression and might have no knowledge of the p o l i t i c a l system beyond an a b i l i t y to differentiate between police and non-police. Thus I would argue that many acts, perhaps especially the acts of the dis-advantaged, might usefully be 'granted some latitude' w±th regard to the conscious intentionality i f their, i f you w i l l , objective ef-30 feet is clearly p o l i t i c a l . On the other hand, and here Weiner's definition might also have d i f f i c u l t y : what of a case where an act has less obvious 'objective' p o l i t i c a l effect but might be a very clear element of socio-political intentionality. Let us examine here the case of women informally dis-cussing women's rights. Is the disadvantaged status of women a public policy? Is i t p o l i t i c a l i f i t is neither an issue i n an election nor an identifiable practice with public administration? What i f at least one of the women saw her actions as a conscious choice of p o l i t i c a l tactics to avoid the politico-legal route? What we would have ihen i s an instance of p o l i t i c a l intention manifesting i t s e l f i n an indirectly p o l i t i c a l manner. The same judgement, whatever i t might be, would also be useful in considering most trade union activity. Such activity can be seen as an option to more acts more obviously and directly p o l i t i c a l . Thus i t might be preferable to am£nd Weiner's definition to a broad-ening such as the following. P o l i t i c a l participation i s any conscious or quasi-conscious action or conscious non-action which in i t s historic 30 This is a Marxist usage of the term objective. It can be taken by a l l to mean at least an observer rather than an actor view. 18 context is directly or indirectly p o l i t i c a l in i t s effect and/or intent. This greatly broadens the definition, but does not I hope leave i t utterly unbounded. It allows for consideration of more of the actions of the disadvantaged whose level of p o l i t i c a l consciousness i s generally 'lower' than those whose place in society and polity is more assured. However, whatever definition might be preferable i t i s the case that most empirical studies have centered on concrete, v i s i b l e , intentionally, directly p o l i -t i c a l acts as voting,electoral campaigning, making donations to candi-dates or p o l i t i c a l parties, discussing p o l i t i c s with friends, and con-tacting public o f f i c i a l s . Marxist writers have tended to more often i n -clude some more indirect activities such as trade union organizing and, of course, such non-electoral act i v i t i e s as demonstrations and revolu-tionary or quasi-revolutionary activity. For the most part I w i l l not belabor the question of definition i n my explication of the writings of either group; I merely note that this matter i s worth keeping i n mind as we proceed. In choosing to use the term ' p o l i t i c a l participation' I have self-consciously rejected such related terms as p o l i t i c a l involvement/ non-involvement, p o l i t i c a l apathy/interest and p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y / i n -activity. Some of my doubts about the term include the impression that p o l i t i c a l participation seems to carry with i t a subtle implication that there are channels available for carrying on an activity i f only individual or groups w i l l choose to use them. The concept 'participation' 19' carries with i t a notion that there i s a process already going on that is somehow other than systematically limiting and exclusionary. The notion of p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y / i n a c t i v i t y , for example, would be more neutral i n this matter. There i s even, I think, at least in common usage of the concept ( p o l i t i c a l participation) an implication that the individuals and groups carrying on this activity together are doing so i n an at-least quasi-cooperative fashion; that i s that in 'participation' there is some sharing by a l l with a l l . Each of these three conceptually car-ried intimations i s i n contradistinction to the Marxist view of the functioning of liberal-democratic p o l i t i c a l systems. Since this inquiry w i l l focus on these systems this seems a heavy burden for a central con-cept to carry into what I hope w i l l be an open inquiry into the relative merits and shortcomings of the two perspectives. However, many of the other possible terms also carry certain dis-advantages. Most obviously the concept participation 'has' a whole body of literature conducted under i t s heading; to seek a separate term usable throughout this inquiry i s to run the risk of altering the meaning of the original statement. A l l of the matters we cited i n the preceding paragraph may well be part of what those who use the term wish to convey. To avoid altering meanings i n various sections of this inquiry I w i l l simply use the term ' p o l i t i c a l participation' when I am dealing with empirical social science. And i n these sections I w i l l avoid using other characterizations to which p o l i t i c a l scientists have been prone, for example, p o l i t i c a l involvement or p o l i t i c a l apathy. Neither of these terms (or their opposites) could with ease be used as Weiner uses 20 participation; they carry far too many moral and psychological im-plications extraneous to our discussion to be useful in this analytic context. In the protions of this study in which I examine the Marxist perspective on 'participation' there might be d i f f i c u l t i e s i f I were to attempt to 'impose' a term where i t had not been used — even though, as I w i l l discuss again shortly below, much of the Marxist literature i s directed at very similar phenomena. The single most commonly used Marxian concept which relates closely to the p o l i t i c a l science concept of participation is " p o l i t i c a l consciousness". Clearly, what i s meant by the term i s different from what i s meant by 'po l i t i c a l participation'; most exp l i c i t l y i t does not signify only 'activity'. On the face of i t i t represents a 'state of mind'. How-ever, just as Marxists found i t necessary to create the concept of praxis from the separate notbns of theory (mind) and practice (action), p o l i t i c a l consciousness implies p o l i t i c a l activity. The implication is seen to be a necessary one in many historical contexts. Further, while, p o l i t i c a l consciousness can be and has been analytically separated as a (or the) cause or effect of p o l i t i c a l activity, in some usage i t virtua l l y subsumes what p o l i t i c a l science would describe as p o l i t i c a l participation — much as I argued above that p o l i t i c a l participation should be broadened to subsume at least some aspects of p o l i t i c a l con-sciousness (and historical circumstance). In sum, the terms p o l i t i c a l participation and p o l i t i c a l consciousness are most surely not inter-changeable, but observations about'the presence, absence or character 21 of one of them could, i f valid, be seen to say something about the presence, absence or character of the other. But the concepts are dissimilar enough i n intent to suggest that i n this study i t would be best in the sections which attempt" to identify and c l a r i f y the Marxist understanding of political'participation' to use only the term p o l i t i c a l consciousness. It w i l l also be useful and convenient at this point to make mention of two additional possible confusions with regard to the term p o l i t i c a l consciousness as used by Marxists. At times the term is used with reference to individual p o l i t i c a l consciousness, but more often i t refers to either the class consciousness of a social class or to the p o l i t i c a l consciousness of a social class. In general at this point I think we need only introduce a general rule of thumb — references to consciousness or p o l i t i c a l consciousness refer to class,social groupings or even whole societies and not to individuals unless context clearly indicates that to be .the case; references to p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i -pation would more li k e l y be to individuals unless otherwise specified. Some of the problems caused for comparative study by this difference i n approach w i l l be discussed further as we proceed. The second confusion which may be troublesome at times i s the varying use of the term p o l i t i c a l consciousness to refer either to (a) the coming, of an individual or class, to a very general awareness of the socio-political world or their (one's) disadvantaged position within i t , or (b) coming to a quite explicit and detailed p o l i t i c a l viewpoint, namely that of revolutionary Marxism or at least to an 'awareness' of 22'; the (presumed) need for a revolutionary social transformation of a Marxian variety. The latter, of course, could simply be seen as a 'higher level' of the former — however i t i s sometimes the case that i t is d i f f i c u l t for the reader to discern which i s being discussed. Forewarned readers w i l l , I hope, be less prone to confusion., I would like to indicate that in the latter portions of this inquiry I w i l l use a third term: p o l i t i c a l activity (inactivity). This i s a term which I hope, i n as neutral a way as possible, subsumes both p o l i t i c a l participation as generally used by p o l i t i c a l scientists and p o l i t i c a l consciousness as generally used by Marxists. And, ; the term can be taken to include as well the massive variety of other expressions — especially i n Marxist usage — e.g., mass action, praxis, p o l i t i c a l movement, advances i n class solidarity and so forth. It Is not offered as a means of fusing (and thereby confusing) the two separate concepts. It i s merely taken as a convenient usage in cases when I must refer to those phenomena to which either or both of the concepts might apply and wish to indicate 31 that I am doing so from outside both perspectives. Comparing P o l i t i c a l Science and Marxism' Having resolved for the moment doubts raised by central termi-nology l e t me then face an even more fundamental doubt, namely, the central enterprise of this project. That i s , can p o l i t i c a l science and 31 •I w i l l attempt to use the term only when I am, as in the t i t l e of this inquiry,, speaking at once of both concepts. 23 Marxism be meaningfully and u s e f u l l y compared and contrasted with regard to t h e i r respective views on what i s taken to be one question? Do they, to be p e r f e c t l y c l e a r , ever ask the same question? Could i t not be the case with regard to the ' p o l i t i c a l i n a c t i v i t y of the l e s s advantaged' that what one sees as p o l i t i c a l the other doesn't, and that they never look at any common groupings, or, f o r that matter, tha t^ftbtf-n" would charge that the other's categories were f a l s e and/or meaningless? There i s , I think, some credence i n each of these doubts. For example, some Marxists would surely say that n o n - p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n liberal-democratic p o l i t i c s i s a p o s i t i v e sign of p o l i t i c a l conscious-ness. Further, l i k e l y a l l Marxists (and l i k e l y , of course, some non-Marxists) would say that under some conditions, some kinds of non-par-t i c i p a t i o n i n liberal-democratic p o l i t i c s would be c l e a r signs of p o l i -t i c a l consciousness. I t i s equally true too that many empirical s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s would not h e s i t a t e to equate an acceptance of Marxism or a 'following' of Marxists with a d e n i a l of p o l i t i c s i t s e l f . This problem, I think, i s l a r g e l y d e a l t with f o r our purposes i n an acceptance of Weiner's d e f i n i t i o n of p a r t i c i p a t i o n : but t h i s by no means helps us regarding the wider problem of comparison of the perhaps uncomparable. Each of these developed patterns of understanding of the p o l i t i c a l i n a c t i v i t y of the less advantaged address themselves to questions to some degree oblique to ' p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y ' i n i t s f u l l e s t conceptual sense. That i s , some of the b e h a v i o r a l i s t s considered speak almost e x c l u s i v e l y of e l e c t o r a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n — even of voting p a r t i c i p a t i o n — and t h e i r under-standing often does not pretend to be more broad than that. Others have 24 dealt with other forms of p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y , e.g., interest groups or, more recently,violence, but have less often made any systematic effort 32 to relate their findings to democratic theory. On the other side the Marxists' understanding i s usually of the non-participation of the working class33 ±n a particular kind of p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y : activity that i s class self-conscious and self-interested, ' l e f t ' i n i t s inten-tions and effects and, l i k e l y , outside 'normal' p o l i t i c s . These, of course, are not the only relevant qualitative differences in the two enterprises. P o l i t i c a l science, and particularly behavioral These are not the grounds on which I give non-electoral studies some-what less consideration; rather I have limited myself to the question of the relative non-participation of the disadvantaged and only discuss these other studies when they consider or are relevant to that issue. Some are; and some of these are discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. One ex-ample of the kind of study that must be l e f t unconsidered i s H. Eulau et a l . , "The Role of the Representative: Some Empirical Observations on the Theory of Edmund Burke," American P o l i t i c a l Science Review, 53 (September, 1959), pp. 742-56. While i t clearly relates effectively to an aspect of democratic theory (whether a representative i s a 'delegate' or a 'trustee') i t does not relate either overall or more especially to the one question to which I must restrict myself. 33 Some p o l i t i c a l scientists refer to the 'less educated', some to the manual workers (occupational strata), some to the poor, and many to 'the marginal' (some combination of the previous three). Marxists gen-erally speak of the working class, but sometimes mean by that an entity-fur sich (class), sometimes one an sich (strata). To confuse matters further 'marginality' at times broadens to include as well sex and rural/urban factors. Further, Marxists generally are highly variant i n the percentage of the population appropriately included in the working class or strata (from 20-85%). And f i n a l l y there are innumerable d i f -ferences among p o l i t i c a l scientists with regard to defining class ac-cording to property, l i f e style, work style or individual subjective at-tribution of class. I w i l l discuss many matters relating to these ques-tions throughout this study, particularly in Chapter 5. Suffice i t to say here that I w i l l in general discussion adopt the broad, loose and more or less neutral term 'the less advantaged' and note that . I am looking at patterned understanding more than at detailed explanations, and that many of these problems of variation tend to 'wash out' at long range. 25 p o l i t i c a l science, has generally maintained that i t s enterprise i s and should be p o l i t i c a l l y n e u t r a l . For Marxism, of course, the task i s not merely to understand the world but to change i t , p o l i t i c a l n e u t r a l -i t y i s seen to be neither p o s s i b l e , nor d e s i r a b l e . This i s something which g r e a t l y a f f e c t s every aspect of i n q u i r y . More narrowly, with regard to our p a r t i c u l a r area of concern i t i s generally the case that Marxists are attempting to explain why almost no one ' r e a l l y ' p a r t i c i p a t e s while behavioral p o l i t i c a l s c i e n c i s t s are often t r y i n g to explain why there are (and sometimes tr y i n g to j u s t i f y why there should be) d i f f e r e n t i a l s i n the degree and kind of p a r t i c i p a t i o n between various s t a t i s t i c a l categories of i n d i v i d u a l s . F i n a l l y here, though the di f f e r e n c e s may be endless, Marxists derive t h e i r conclusions on the matter at hand l a r g e l y from and f o r Western Europe, p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s l a r g e l y from and f o r America. Both on t h i s point lapse on occasion i n t o unworthy overgeneralization and each might w e l l come a b i t nearer to understanding the other i f they exchanged l o c i . Having stated a l l these doubts I can say at this point no more than that they a l l should be taken as cautions to be heeded both by myself and by the reader. I w i l l attempt throughout to acknowledge and to c l a r i f y and assess the importance of these di f f e r e n c e s of perspective and i n t e n t . Further whatever the differences i n the two enterprises there remains a 34 c e r t a i n overarching commonality: both p o l i t i c a l science and Marxism have a deep t h e o r e t i c a l commitment to explaining the r e l a t i v e i n a c t i v i t y ( r e l a t i v e i n both cases both to other s o c i a l groups and to what might be 34 As has, of course, l i b e r a l democratic theory. 26 desired and/or expected) of the l e s s advantaged i n the l i b e r a l demo-cracies of the advanced c a p i t a l i s t nations. Further both have committed considerable e f f o r t s — i n each case by some of t h e i r most widely respected p r a c t i t i o n e r s — to explaining these phenomena. On balance I take i t to be a u s e f u l project to, with some i n t e r p r e t i n g , transposing and t h i s acknowledgement of d i f f e r e n c e s , presume that the two perspectives can be u s e f u l l y taken to be dealing with roughly the same question. It i s my hope that an inqui r y i n t o the conclusions and methods of each can o f f e r some wider understanding to the other. EXPLANATION AND UNDERSTANDING: A PRELIMINARY NOTE The goal of science i s generally taken to be explanation by means of generalizations c a l l e d theories or laws and both p o l i t i c a l science and Marxism make claims to being sciences. I w i l l not at t h i s point t r y to elaborate or assess these claims, but I w i l l attempt to c l a r i f y here my usage of some of the terminology w i t h i n which I w i l l deal with these issues. I w i l l attempt to adopt usage which w i l l be acceptable to both Marxists and p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s . I t i s perhaps best to begin with the elemental p a r t i c l e of science: the f a c t . "Facts" are taken herein to be i n a l l cases evidence with empirical referents. Evidence implies both the t h e o r e t i c a l ordering of some part of the universe and some stated method of f a c t u a l determination. I am f u l l y comfortable with David Easton's d e f i n i t i o n of a f a c t as "...a 35 p a r t i c u l a r ordering of r e a l i t y i n terms of a t h e o r e t i c a l i n t e r e s t . " 35 David Easton, The P o l i t i c a l System (New York: A l f r e d A. Knopf, 1953), p. 53. 27 I see his j u s t i f i c a t i o n of this definition as one of the grounds for undertaking this study: "It is obviously impossible l i t e r a l l y to describe an event however long we might take or however limited the event in time and space. There i s an in f i n i t e level of detail possible about any event. The aspect of the event selected for description as the facts about i t , is determined by the prior interest of the observer; the selection i s made in light of a frame of reference that fixes the order and relevance of the facts. When raised to the level of consciousness this frame of ref-erence is what we c a l l a theory." (p. 53) A theory can perhaps best be seen i n turn as an instrument able to 36 produce useful explanations. Explanations are answers to 'how can i t be' or 'why' questions; that i s they communicate either possibility or necessity. For the most part I w i l l use the term explanation to refer to predominantly causal empirical explanations and theories rather than explanations which are predominantly subjective-normative. Causal explanation might, of course, include reference to the values held and purposes intended by the actors whose behavior i s being explained. This sort of thing f i t s well within Arnold Brecht's guidelines for "what Scientific Method Can Do Regarding Values" and i t i s that model which I accept as being the clearest statement of the position of p o l i t i c a l 37 seience. In adopting such a usage I do not, at this point at least, wish to go so far as to accept the view that facts and values can be use-f u l l y seen as two tidy categories. Rather I am simply at this point See Eugene J. Meehan, Explanation i n Social Science: A System Para- digm (Homewood, I l l i n o i s : The Dorsey Press, 1968), p. 53. 37 Arnold Brecht, P o l i t i c a l Theory: The Foundations of Twentieth-Century  P o l i t i c a l Thought (Princeton: Princeton University Press,1959), pp.121-26. 28 accepting that most who write on p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y , participation or consciousness, most of the time see themselves as dealing i n the modalities of empirical research, empirical generalization, empirically-based theory, histo r i c a l and/or dialectical materialism, and thereby, for different but not altogether dissimilar reasons, avoid at least 38 normative-subjectivist grammatical constructions. I accept at least then that one can in principle and often in practice analytically dis-tinguish between causal and value theory. But I then must immediately add my agreement with Easton that i n practice each i s involved with the other. I am, however, most interested i n isolating the overall, wider understandings of p o l i t i c a l activity-inactivity expressed or implied by on the one hand p o l i t i c a l science and on the other hand Marxism. I take the term 'understanding' to refer to those forms of theory and ex-planation which as fu l l y and generally as possible offer an integrated grasp of a subject of study i n both i t s normative and causal aspects. Understanding is often expressed i n a mode which fuses explanation and evaluation. I w i l l attempt as a part of the process of analyzing the view(s) of p o l i t i c a l science and Marxism on the subject of the p o l i t i c a l inactivity of the disadvantaged to delineate some characteristics of their respective understandings of this question. I w i l l also attempt The correctness of such an intention w i l l be dealt with at some length elsewhere in this inquiry. 39 Easton, op. c i t . , particularly pp. 219-232. 29 to determine what, i f any, are the relationships between those under-standings and on the one hand the more detailed explanations and findings contained i n their respective bodies of literature on the subject and on the other hand their respective methodologies. 30 CHAPTER 2 Before I proceed to the explanations used in empirical social science for the relative non-participation of the less advantaged, I would li k e very briefly to i l l u s t r a t e the extent of that relative non-partici-pation. In doing so, hopefully, I w i l l also c l a r i f y a b i t more the bounds of meaning for the term "less advantaged." In this chapter I simply want to indicate some findings which i l l u s t r a t e lesser participa-tion for several categories of disadvantaged persons, i n several p o l i -t i c a l systems, for several different measures of p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y , at several different points in time. Many readers w i l l be familiar with this material and i f this i s the case, can freely proceed to the more detailed and analytic considerations which begin i n the following chapter. For those who are not, thls'Cchapter,, hopefully., w i l l provide a useful additional introduction to later discussions and analysis. The measures of advantage/disadvantage I w i l l i l l u s t r a t e briefly here are occupational status, income, education, sex, and race. Occupation Basel, Switzerland, 1908, Voter Turnout:''' Labourers 49.6% Merchants, Manufacturers 63.6% Officials and Canton employees 70.0% Tingsten, Herbert, P o l i t i c a l Behavior, Studies in Election Statistics (Totowa, N.J.:' The Bedminster Press, 1963), p. 120. 31 Basel, Switzerland, 1911, Voter Turnout: Workers 66.8% Salaried, artisans 71.1 Professionals, o f f i c i a l s , owners 77.5 Selected Nations, 1960s, Multifactor Participation Scale: England Germany Italy USA Unskilled and Farming 5.6% 6.1% 3.3% 4.9% Skilled and Semi-skilled 7.0 7.1 4.7 7.0 Small Business and White Collar 8.3 7.9 5.6 9.5 Professional and Managerial 10.1 9.6 7.3 10.8 Great Britain, 1966, Level 4 of Interest in P o l i t i c s : Working Class Middle Class Very Interested 14% 17% Interested 30 52 Not really interested 38 22 Not at a l l interested 18 9 'Tingsten, p. 120. *Di Palma, Guiseppi, Apathy and Participation, (New York: The Free Press. 1970), p. 144. The multifactor participation scale, which w i l l be used several times shortly below, includes such factors as voting, interest, attention,knowledge, attempts to influence local and national p o l i t i c s , talking with others about p o l i t i c s , and following accounts of p o l i t i c a l events. Rush, Michael, and Althoff, P h i l l i p , An Introduction to P o l i t i c a l  Sociology, (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, Ltd., 1971), p. 102. 32 Elmira, New York, 1948, Voter Turnout: Age Business and White Collar Wage Workers 21-24 25-34 35-54 54+ 74% 75 85 80 35% 65 79 82 Income Copenhagen, Denmark, 1913, Voting Turnout: Free Professionals- 800-1000 Crowns 1000-1200 " 1200-1500 1500-3000 3000-6000 6000+ " Men 67.3% 76.5 74.7 81.2 86.7 86.8 Women 67.9% 67.4 69.7 72.8 75.7 80.0 Workers 800-1000 1000-1200 1200-1500 1500-2000 2000+ 65.2 76.5 82.0 79.8 82.9 Lipset, S.M. P o l i t i c a l Man, (Garden City, New York: Company, Inc., 1963), p. 221. ^Tingsten, p. 147. 54.0 59.0 67.5 65.0 65.4 Doubleday & 33 Selected Nations, 1960s, M u l t i f a c t o r P a r t i c i p a t i o n S c a l e : 7 Low Income England Germany I t a l y USA 5.7% 5.2 3.7% 5.2% 6.3 5.8 4.5 6.2 7.5 6.7 5.0 7.0 8.8 7.5 6.1 7.2 10.4 8.1 6.5 8.7 8.8 7.9 9.6 High Income New Haven, Connecticut, 1961, General P a r t i c i p a t i o n i n Local P o l i t i c a l A f f a i r s : 8 Highly Inactive Highly A c t i v e Under $2000 per annum 82% 4% $2000-$5000 71 17 $5000-$8000 59 20 Over $8000 42 38 Education United States, 1952 and 1956 E l e c t i o n s , P r e s i d e n t i a l Vote P a r t i c i p a t i o n : Some GS GS Some HS HS Some College College Non-South 70% 68% 77% 87% 92% 93% South 32 50 50 63 80 85 9 7 D i Palma, p. 144. g Dahl, Robert,' Who Governs? (New Haven, Yale U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1961), p. 283. 9 Campbell, Angus et a l . , The American Voter, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1960), p. 477. 34 g United States, 1950s, Stated Attempts to Influence Others: GS HS College GS HS College Yes 20% 29% 45% 19% 27% 34% No 80 71 55 81 73 66 Ohio Community, 1924, Voting Participation:"*"^ College 78.1% High School 69.6 Elementary 57.2 None 34.9 Selected Nations, 1960s, Multifactor Participation Scale England Germany Italy USA Elementary or less 6.4% 6.9% 3.4% 5.9% Secondary 7.7 9.2 6.0 8.1 Some college 10.0 11.0 9.2 10.7 12 West Germany, 1966, Level of Interest in P o l i t i c s : Primary Education Secondary Education Less More Less More Very deeply/deeply 6% 13% 19% 26% Rather Interested 11 23 29 43 Somewhat Interested 22 27 25 12 Hardly Interested 21 20 13 14 Not at a l l Interested 40 17 14 5 9 Campbell, Angus, et a l . , The American Voter, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1960), p. 477. "^Tingsten, p. 158 1 : LDi Palma, p. 143. 12 Rush and Althoff, p. 102. Sex 13 Norway, Selected Years, National Voting: Men Women 1909 67.5% 55.3% 1924 76.4 64.0 1933 81.8 71.2 14 Norway, Selected Years, Voting in Local Elections: Men Women 1910 59.8% 36.9% 1925 69.9 56.2 1934 76.8 65.0 Iceland, Selected Years, Voting in National Elections:'' Men Women 1916 69.1% 30.2% 1927 81.5 62.5 1933 80.4 63.2 16 Estonia, Selected Years, Voting in Referenda: Men Women 1923 68.4% 64.8% 1933 82.9 73.9 13 Tingsten, p. 14 14 Tingsten, p. 15. 1 5Tingsten, p. 20. "^Tingsten, p. 26. Selected Nations, 1960s, Multifactor Participation Scale England Germany Italy USA Female 6.1% 6.1% 3.1% 7.1% Male 8.0 8.6 5.8 8.7 18 West Germany, 1966, Interest in P o l i t i c s : Men Women Very deeply/deeply 16% 8% Rather interested 28 14 Somewhat interested 17 20 Notatall interested 11 37 36 17 Race 19 U.S., 1960s, Multifactor Participation Scale: Unadjusted for Other Socio-economic Factors Adjusted Negro 5.7% 7.1% Other Races 8.3 8.2 20 U.'S., 1950s, Voter Turnout: Negroes White... Law Governing Suffrage Restrictive Moderate Restrictive Moderate Voted in a l l elections 3 10 26 34 Voted in most elections 0 10 22 19 Voted in some elections 12 20 24 19 Never voted 85 60 28 28 ^ 7Di Palma, p. 134. 1 8Rush and Althoff, p. 102 Di Palma, p. 183 on Campbell, et a l . , p. 278 37 The figures presented above are meant merely to indicate the general tendency of those who are less advantaged in occupational status, income, education, sex and race to participate less in p o l i t i c s . This tendency holds in many p o l i t i c a l systems, for a variety of histo r i c a l times, and for a wide variety of forms and measures of par-ticipation. This is not to say that i t is universal, nor that i t s degree is either constant or consistent. On the contrary I w i l l argue below that the variations are highly significant and that those wishing to understand p o l i t i c a l participation should examine these variations more closely. For example, I would suggest a close look at recent tendencies in the relative p o l i t i c a l participation by women to deter-mine i f the rapidly changing attitudes of women in many- cultures have decreased sexual differences i n participation. This chapter is meant to show no more than the roughest of outlines of the bounds of the phenomena with which I w i l l deal through-out this study. I leave to those later chapters the attempts to dis-cuss variations, explain the sources of differences, and to analyze the attempts of others to explain them. 38 CHAPTER 3 I In this chapter I w i l l attempt to offer a very brief summary of the methods, findings and conclusions of empirically oriented p o l i t i c a l science with regard to the relative non-participation of the disadvantaged This i s , I think, a necessary, i f a b i t tedious, exercise. It has been done before for the f u l l range of p o l i t i c a l participation research, but the most recent of these studies was published i n 1968;"*" the most com-plete with regard to the particular sub-question with which we are con-2 cerned i n 1959. Clearly some updating of the pattern of methods, findings and conclusions i s needed before we proceed further and deal with the so-called post-behavioral critique of that literature. I w i l l begin my next chapter with the c r i t i c a l presentation of that critique and w i l l u t i l i z e much of the material in this chapter in that exercise and as well i n the more elaborately analytical questions which are then raised but for the moment here l e f t implicit. The present chapter i s i n general a presentation which i s c r i t i c a l largely only i n the sense of c r i t i c i z i n g the connection between conclusions and the data presented "Tlerbert McClosky, " P o l i t i c a l Participation," i n The International Ency- clopedia of the Social Sciences, 1968 edition, vol. 12, pp. 252-265. 2 Robert E. Lane, P o l i t i c a l L i f e , (New York: The Free Press, 1959), es-pecially Chapter 16, pp. 220-234. The third study i s Lester W. Milbrath, P o l i t i c a l Participation (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1965). There is also, of course, the earlier summarization by S.M. Lipset, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Alan Barton, and Juan Linz entitled "The Psychology of Voting: An Analysis of P o l i t i c a l Behavior," in Handbook of Social Psychology, G. Lindzey, Ed., Volume II (Cambridge: Addison-Wesley, 1954) pp. 1124-70, updated as chapter 6 of S.M. Lipset, P o l i t i c a l Man, (Garden City: Double-day & Company, Inc., 1960) pp. 183-229. 39 in the particular study i n question. The next chapter will .draw in a wider range of extra-textual matters. The structure of this chapter is largely chronological, I have proceeded i n this way because I plan i n the next and later chapters to d r a w conclusions which depend i n part on the development of empirically based explanations of the relative inactivity of the less advantaged over time and, as well, in relation to specific h i s t o r i c a l periods. However, at another point in the later chapters, I w i l l need as well an analytic summary of these explanations (and at that point I w i l l refer the reader back to this section). I offer this summary now so that the reader might consider i t in the course of the next two chapters as the data accumulates i n other formats. The various explanations offered within empirical social science are l i s t e d under seven headings. The f i r s t and second headings are perhaps the most commonly put forth, especially, as we w i l l see, i n the period 1950-65. I will discuss these elements of explanation at length when I consider what I w i l l c a l l the conservative understanding of the relative inactivity of the less advantaged. The next two ele-ments (3) and (4), are also put forward quite often; the latter of them has been used with much greater frequency in the last few years than i n the pre-1965 period. Explanations (5) and (6) are clearly of lesser importance and are less often e x p l i c i t l y stated. Item (7) has only very rarely been mentioned by empirical social scientists; the two or three instances which w i l l be cited later i n this chapter are a l l quite recent (post-1965). In contrast we w i l l see that explanations of this nature 40 are central to Marxists. The seven alternative explanations of low participation by the less advantaged are: (1) The less advantaged tend to be -uninformed, i r r a t i o n a l , uninterested or simply ignorant. (2) Non-participation i n some cases is a sign of a general feeling of satisfaction with the functioning of the p o l i t i c a l system. (3) Low socio-economic status i s often related to l i f e experiences which are not conducive to attitudes, such as p o l i t i c a l efficacy or feelings of citizen duty, which are supportive of at least some forms of participation. (4) There are a variety of structural constraints to the active par-ticipation of the less advantaged; for example, i n some systems a marked lack of organized p o l i t i c a l structures. (5) The effects of some other demographic variables with the more central measures of lack of advantage (income, race, sex, occupation and education). For example, young adults and the elderly tend to be somewhat less well-off than other age groups and tend as well, for other and obvious reasons, to participate less. (6) Some non-participants are expressing consciously some anti-system feelings by withdrawing their support. (7) The p o l i t i c a l system i s actually unresponsive to the less advantaged or may, in some cases, actually permit or encourage acts of repression of some of the less advantaged. 41 My summary discussion of the empirical literature, which follows now, has three parts: the f i r s t i s a brief c r i t i c a l extraction of the relevant material from the three summaries mentioned above; the second a more detailed c r i t i c a l look at several selected major studies; and the third an up-dated literature survey for the years 1969-1973 with some emphasis on changes in approach and on the evolution of methodology. This sum-mary i s not meant to be comprehensive, but rather to offer a sufficient basis for later comments and comparisons. 42 II There can be l i t t l e doubt that in the United States and i n -most developed Western democracies i n most times and circumstances there has been a consistent tendency toward a positive relationship between socio-economic advantage and p o l i t i c a l participation. Woodward and Roper found that the socio-economic groups which scored the highest on a composite index of p o l i t i c a l participation were: Executives, Professionals, Stock-holders, those in the "A" Economic Level, and those college-educated; those groups which scored the lowest were Laboring people, Housewives, those with only grade school education, Negroes and those in the ";P" 3 (lowest) economic level. As Milbrath puts i t , citing twenty-eight con-forming studies: "One of the most thoroughly substantiated proposi-tions in a l l of social science i s that persons near the center of society are most l i k e l y to participate in p o l i t i c s than persons near the periphery."^ and further he observes that: "(N)onatter how class is measured, studies consis-tently show that higher-class persons are more lik e l y to participate i n p o l i t i c s than lower-class persons." McClosky, however, i s somewhat more careful and precise i n his generali-zation than i s Milbrath; he states: 3 Julian L. Woodward and Elmo Roper, " P o l i t i c a l Activity of American Cit-izens," American P o l i t i c a l Science Review, 44 (1950), p. 877 reported i n Lane, p. 221. 4 Milbrath, p. 113; 'periphery' incorporates SES, length of time at a given residence, amount of group activity, urban-rural residence and integration into the community. (p. I l l ) 5Milbrath, p. 115. 43 "In general, p a r t i c i p a t i o n tends to be higher among the better-educated, members of the higher occupational and income groups, the middle-aged the dominant ethnic and r e l i g i o u s groups, men (as opposed to women), s e t t l e d r e s i d e n t s , urban dwellers, and members of -voluntary a s s o c i a t i o n s . " I t should be emphasized, however, that the c o r r e l a t i o n s between p a r t i c i p a t i o n and some of these v a r i a b l e s are low and unstable and that they may vary from one c u l t u r a l - p o l i t i c a l context to another. Thus, education and socio-economic status and p a r t i c i p a t i o n c o r r e l a t e strongly i n the "United States but weakly i n Norway...."** He further cautions that "the v a r i a b l e s i n t h i s category are so broad as to be f a i r l y l i m i t e d i n t h e i r explanatory power," and that "(S)ince the relevant v a r i a b l e s are subject to i n t e r a c t i o n e f f e c t s , the same demo-graphic factors may have dramatically d i f f e r e n t consequences i n d i f f e r e n t p o l i t i c a l - c u l t u r a l c ontexts." 7 F i n a l l y , i n t h i s regard he notes s i t u a t i o n s of opposite findings with regard to ethnic m i n o r i t i e s and r u r a l vs. urban v a r i a b l e s and reports the conclusion of Campbell and Valen that the d i s -p a r i t y i n the c o r r e l a t i o n s between occupational l e v e l and p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n Norway and the United States r e s u l t s at l e a s t i n part from greater class consciousness and class organization i n the Norwegian as opposed to g the American working c l a s s . The findings then are as consistent as one gets i n the m u l t i v a r i a t e world of s o c i a l phenomena. The l i m i t e d exceptions must temper the gener-a l i z a t i o n s but can a d d i t i o n a l l y be used as a route to a p a r t i a l explanation of the r e l a t i o n s h i p v i a i n d i c a t i n g some fa c t o r s which aren't part of the explanation. If we are to get at what indeed are the explanations f o r McClosky, p. 256. 7Both observations, p. 256. 8Pp. 256-7. 44 n o n - p a r t i c i p a t i o n we can u s e f u l l y begin by looking b r i e f l y at those o f -fered by M i l b r a t h , Lane and McClosky, Within the main body of h i s book M i l b r a t h makes few attempts at ex-p l a i n i n g c l a s s p a r t i c i p a t i o n d i f f e r e n t i a l s beyond o f f e r i n g some f i r s t -order psychological explanations. One example here w i l l s u f f i c e : " I t i s easy to understand why r i c h people would be more l i k e l y to give money than poor people; i t i s not so c l e a r why they should be more l i k e l y to wear a button or d i s p l a y a s t i c k e r . The data do not suggest a l i k e l y i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , but one can speculate that p u b l i c a l l y i d e n t i f y i n g one's p a r t i s a n or candidate preference requires high self-esteem, and high-income persons are more l i k e l y to have high self-esteem. I t was sug-gested by another scholar that higher-income persons are not only more l i k e l y to give money, but they also are l i k e l y to i n i t i a t e d i r e c t con-t a c t s with p u b l i c o f f i c i a l s (Lane, 1959), which again suggests high self-esteem." (p. 121) He does not seem to consider such obvious p o s s i b i l i t i e s as the simple straightforward r e j e c t i o n of strong commitments to any candidate by some lower-income persons regardless of l e v e l s of self-esteem. He o f f e r s no evidence of the self-esteem/non-participation r e l a t i o n s h i p . Further, neither he nor Lane i n the o r i g i n a l suggest the obvious, though d i f -f i c u l t to demonstrate, p o s s i b i l i t y that o f f i c i a l a c c e s s i b i l i t y i s r e l a t e d more to the a b i l i t y to contribute money than to the self-esteem l e v e l s of the supplicant. Rather, and generally f o r M i l b r a t h , shortcomings are seen to l i e with and i n the i n d i v i d u a l rather than with or i n h i s t o r i c -a l l y conditioned systemic v a r i a b l e s . This p o s i t i o n i s an important part of the understanding of n o n - p a r t i c i p a t i o n common to many, e s p e c i a l l y " e a r l i e r " b e h a v i o r a l i s t s which I w i l l discuss fu r t h e r below. 45 M i l b r a t h , generally, i s far les s adept than e i t h e r McClosky or Lane i n incorporating systemically, s o c i a l l y and h i s t o r i c a l l y relevant v a r i a b l e s into h i s o v e r a l l assessment of research findangs.^ However, he does report without comment or emphasis a v a r i e t y of fi n d i n g s of s i g -n i f i c a n c e i n these regards. For example the fo l l o w i n g : " . . . i n countries with status p o l a r i z e d party s y s t e m s . . . p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n , especially-v o t i n g turnout, i s higher i n communes which are homogeneous i n p o l i t i c s , socio-economic status, and economic a c t i v i t y . . . . " (p. 119) "In s o c i e t i e s with r e s i d e n t i a l segregation by SES, the normal tendency f o r high SES persons to be more l i k e l y to p a r t i c i p a t e i s reduced." (p. 119) "As i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n progressed more persons with middle-class o r i g i n s were elected to the Federal Assembly." (p. 120) and, " r e l a t i o n s h i p s (was found) between de-pressions and voting turnout." (p. 120) If these appear random here i t i s because they appear so i n Mi l b r a t h . M i l b r a t h presents his data i n such a way that he does not d i s t i n g u i s h between the r e l a t i v e s i g n i f i c a n c e of the various f i n d i n g s , nor does he e x p l i c i t l y temper broad generalizations by discussing modifying f i n d i n g s . This i s perhaps then a s t y l e of presentation problem of a s t y l e which i s us e f u l as a "catalog" of bald f i n d i n g s , a guide to the l i t e r a t u r e and not an a n a l y s i s thereof. A more appropriate c r i t i c i s m , relevant to l a t e r d i s -cussions, might be the emphasis of space and l o c a t i o n he seems to give to oft-times t r i v i a l , "purely" p s y c h o l o g i c a l , f i n d i n g s . For example, (p. 39) he reports the f i n d i n g that "persons with a p o s i t i v e a t t r a c t i o n to p o l i t i c s are more l i k e l y to receive s t i m u l i about p o l i t i c s and to p a r t i c i p a t e more." A good deal of h i s Chapter I II " P o l i t i c a l P a r t i c i p a t i o n as a Function of Personal Factors" i s of that order; i t stands of course, l e s s perhaps as witness to Milbrath's shortcomings as to the excessive psychologism of early behavioral explanations of p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n . 46 I am not attempting to build a comprehensive summary of explanations, but merely to offer material i l l u s t r a t i v e for later discussion. In general, the earlier summarization of research on participa-tion by Robert Lane shows greater explanatory inclination than does Milbrath. Lane i s usually far from the simplistic psychologism to which Milbrath sometimes seems prone. As Lane puts i t elsewhere, "If you ask a man why he believes what he does, why he is a l i b e r a l or a conservative..., he i s li k e l y to t e l l you about the world and not about himself...."...He might say...that he sees things that way because things are that way. "These two ways of explaining a belief, by referring outward to the world and inward to t e l l of the self, are complementary features of .a total explanation for the simple reason that belief i s inevitably an i n -teraction between self and world.... "^ Thus disadvantaged persons might well have low feelings of p o l i t i c a l ef-ficacy for the to Milbrath (and Almond & Verba)'''"'' largely unconsidered cause that the p o l i t i c a l system systematically rejects their influence or would i f ' i t ' were given the opportunity. Likewise Milbrath's low income citizen without the ego-wherewithal to put on a bumper-sticker might be disinclined not because he doesn't understand but precisely because he does understand the way things really are. In P o l i t i c a l L i f e , Lane's f i r s t explanation and most of the others Robert E. Lane P o l i t i c a l Thinking and Consciousness (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1969) pp. 1-2. "The world i n my view, as I hope w i l l become clearer below, has more explanatory power than 'the s e l f . Lane is more inclined than I am to evenly balanced dualism; his acknowledgment of the existence of the world is, however, refreshing. See below 47 which follow his question "Why are social status and p o l i t i c a l participa-tion so closely linked in the United States?" suffer from few of the defects which I w i l l later identify as an understanding of participation common to many behavioralists. The explanations selected by Lane in this brief chapter (written 15 years ago) indicate that behavioral research had even by that time seemed to have generated the basis for considerable explanatory power. Lane's analysis begins strongly, "The gains from governmental policy for lower income groups must be collective gains, gains granted to classes or groups of people, which may or may not accrue to any one individual. In contrast to this, a large category of middle-income persons, business-men, are i n a position to gain some specific i n d i v i -dual advantage from government....As a consequence, the relationship between p o l i t i c a l effort and per-sonal gain is usually closer for businessmen than for working-class people." (p. 221) He then itemizes and stresses the means differentials between rich and poor: money, and the fact that the worker's "individual social and oc-cupational position (do not) l i k e l y give him, as an individual, much influence over government actions." "Poor people can exert influence only by collective action...." (p. 221) Lane then offers eleven additional possible explanations for the participation differentials of relative advantage. However, many of these explanations are, as I w i l l show shortly below, separable from the basic findings of the behavioral research which he has considered. They are not, i n most cases, demonstrated by that research but rather, post hoc, 'make sense of i t . ' These comments are not meant as a criticism of either Lane or behavioral methodology. Rather I merely want to make clear at this point a distinction between a 'report of findings' which 48 i n some cases, might be said to, with an original research question, of-fer explanations, and an 'explanation of findings'; the former i s the research at hand, the latter can be usefully seen as a link between that research and some wider understanding external, though related, to the 12 research. That is,research findings make sense i n terms of and i n relation to that wider understanding. For example, Milbrath, as was noted, rarely attempted explanations of findings; when he did he generally did 13 not go beyond first-order psychological explanations. However, and here we begin to deal with an additional concept; i n his f i n a l chapter Milbrath 'jumps past' explanations of findings into a presentation of an 'under-standing,' again, . an overview, an appreciation; necessarily general, theoretical, speculative and value-relevant. To be more clear about what i n actual practice an understanding looks l i k e , l et us consider here a shortened statement of Milbrath's f i n a l " two paragraphs: "Recapitulation of the foregoing argument, i n brief form, may help the reader to see where i t i s leading. (1) Most citizens i n any p o l i t i c a l society do not liv e up to the classical demo-cratic prescription to be interested i n , informed about, and active i n p o l i t i c s . (2) Yet, demo-cratic governments and societies continue to func-t i o n adequately. (3) It i s a fact that high participation i s not required for successful democracy. (4) Howeyer, to insure responsiveness 1 o This i s only a preliminary comment, further discussion of the relation-ship between explanation and understanding w i l l be offered in succeeding chapters. 13 Most Marxists would, of course, consider a l l psychological explanations as easily reduceable to social explanations. I w i l l discuss this a b i t further i n Chapters 5 and 6. 49 of o f f i c i a l s , i t is essential that a sizable per-centage of citizens participate i n choosing their public o f f i c i a l s . (5) Maintaining open channels of communication i n the society also helps to insure responsiveness of o f f i c i a l s to public demands. (6) Moderate levels of participation by the mass of citizens help to balance citizen roles as participants and as obedient subjects. (7) Moderate levels of participation also help balance p o l i t i c a l systems which must be both responsive and powerful enough to act (8) Fur-thermore, moderate participation levels are helpful in maintaining a balance between con-sensus and cleavage i n society.(9) High p a r t i c i -pation levels would actually be detrimental to society i f they tended to p o l i t i c i z e a large per-centage of social relationships. (10) Constitu-tional democracy is most l i k e l y to flourish i f only a moderate proportion of social relationships (areas of l i f e ) are governed by p o l i t i c a l consider-ations. (11) Moderate or low participation levels by the general public place a special burden or responsibility on p o l i t i c a l elites for the success-f u l functioning of constitutional democracy. (12) Elites must adhere to democratic norms and rules of the game and have a live-and-let-live attitude toward their opponents. (13) A society with wide-spread apathy could easily be dominated by an un-scrupulous e l i t e ; only continuous vigilance by at least a few concerned citizens can prevent tyranny. (14) E l i t e recruitment and training i s an especially important function. (15) To help insure f i n a l control of the p o l i t i c a l system by the public, i t i s essential to maintain an open communications system, to keep gladiator ranks open to make i t easy for citizens to become active should they so choose, to continue moral admonishment for citizens to become active, and to keep alive the democratic myth of citizen competence." (pp. 153-4) This statement i s not an explanatory link to a wider understanding; i t is a presentation of the elements of an understanding particularly un-grounded i n empirical research. Not one of the fifteen assertions follow from or are even, in any obvious way, related to the findings reported i n the book. Milbrath, of course, i s aware of this and asserts i n a masterful understatement: 50 "It would be d i f f i c u l t to prove the va l i d i t y of the above argument with research findings. For lack of evidence, many of the asserted relationships must remain hypothetical for the time being." (p. 154) Points (6) and (14) are largely tautological; point (11) i s a truism, and point (2) i s meaningless; those remaining are a l l so general as to exceed the scope of any research conducted to that date or, for that matter, for the foreseeable future. None can be demonstrated without broad cross-cultural and h i s t o r i c a l comparisons being made. It i s not my purpose to systematically critique these assertions here, merely 14 to c l a r i f y my terminology in the context of the pertinent data. If an understanding such as that offered by Milbrath can be said to be largely ungrounded i n empirical findings, what of the more findings-related explanations presented by Lane in P o l i t i c a l Life. Earlier I sug-gested that Lane's explanations were of a form analytically separable from the empirical research whose conclusions they were presented to explain. The wider setting on which his explanations are based i s a general socio-political understanding which i s i n turn strongly grounded in a wealth of empirical research. In trying to explain why the less advantaged tend to participate less Lane considers eleven possible explanations: (1) differentials of leisure time and uncommitted energy are seen as having an ambiguous relation owing to empirical data showing lower 14 In general, I prefer that such statements be made a part of most studies especially those which seek to order a large corpus of research findings. Whatever the weaknesses of this or other versions of this understanding, they opened up discussion of issues which more recently have been less often discussed. Implicit consensus i s not a route to effective research. This, too, w i l l be considered again i n later chapters. 51 voter turnout among the retired in contrast to other elderly; showing lower voter turnout among well-paid long-hour workers than among lower-paid shorter-hour workers in the same city i n the same year; the especially low involvement of the unemployed; and the general information that "the executive or professional man...perhaps carries his occupational burdens with him rather more than the manual or c l e r i c a l worker — he i s more preoccupied." (p. 223) Thus "general understanding" offers an explanation and empirical data and impressions combine to offer a variety of qualifications; differentials of economic security are seen to be less ambiguous. Lane concludes that "On the whole, i t seems ju s t i f i a b l e to say that, the lack of financial worry which i s generally associated with a better income provides one cause for substantial socio-economic class differences i n p o l i t i c a l activity." (p. 225) This conclusion is largely based on studies which showed a relationship between feeling quite secure financially and feeling p o l i t i c a l l y effective. I am, however, very skeptical of this form of explanation; here may well be many intervening variables between the two feelings in question, most-particularly a 'reality' variable. That • i s , those who are financially secure are p o l i t i c a l l y effective, not because theyfeel well-off, but rather because they are well-off. Further, this view must be tempered by Lipset's well-documented assertion that those of insecure income tend to be more politicized to the l e f t (and that many of these same groups tend as well to higher voting rates). 15S.M. Lipset, P o l i t i c a l Man (Garden City: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1960) pp. 243-248 and 224-225 52 (3) the higher stake i n government policy f e l t by those who own property — the policy benefits attendant to prosperity are more visi b l e and this, as Lane sees i t , is suggested (but not proved) by "the fact that the proportion of the working class vote Repu-blican i s larger than the proportion of the middle-class who vote Democratic." (p. 226) (4) the differential distribution of the complex of attitudes of self-confidence — this i s the quite well documented variation i n f e e l -ings of p o l i t i c a l effectiveness and i s commonly taken to be i n turn related to and caused by lack of education and status. This finding i s rarely explained by differentials in responsiveness by public o f f i c i a l s or by p o l i t i c a l systems. The remaining seven explanatory factors are similar i n nature and effect and include differentials i n child-rearing (unclear as to degree or effect); differentials i n role expectations and 'sense of responsibility 1 for nation af f a i r s ; variations in distribution of cross-pressures (espe-c i a l l y the tendency to identify with interests and values of higher classes than one's own); differentials of effect of inter-strata contact; d i f -ferentials i n distribution of p o l i t i c a l l y relevant s k i l l s ; and differen-16 t i a l s in distribution of feelings of social alienation. Were we to treat a l l eleven variables in the detail we treated the f i r s t four we might come to the following general indicative and very tentative conclusions: (1) Much of the data used as evidence i s reasonably well-founded Lane, pp. 226-234 53 empirically. There are some exceptions to this, e.g.,Lane's mention of the "the fringe movements - which draw...the lower socio-economic classes." On this and other matters in Lane's list see Chapter 3, section I I . (2) With a l l of the variables considered, the empirical actualities are 'mixed' (e.g., differentials i n child-rearing practices (pp. 227-8), free-time availability) and/or of 'mixed' effects (e.g., differen-t i a l s i n feelings of alienation or feelings of economic security). (3) There i s very limited consideration given to historic and systemic variations"'"7 and more especially actual systemically-rooted effects (e.g., the possibility of ju s t i f i a b l e differences i n self-confidence with regard to system accessibility). Further here, because of this there i s a general tendency to offer explanations of a limited level of generalization (that i s many of the explanations offered could themselves be explained by such variables as systematic (in both senses of the word) discouragement of participation by the ideological apparatus of society — from schools, from media, etc., — or by broad historico-systemic variables such as centralization of power or bureau-cratization which might tend to deny access to real power to a l l but ' a very few citizens). Such variables are, of course, far more d i f f i -cult to identify, measure and understand and lend themselves far less to study using empirical methodology. Even i f I am correct i n the assertions of this paragraph, i t does not follow directly, of 17 In fairness Lane's question relates to class-relative participation in the United States only. Elsewhere, e.g., Milbrath and others to be discussed below, there i s a lesser appreciation of 'American exception-alism 1 and a correspondingly greater tendency to over-generalization. 54 course, that any lesser or greater relative commitment of i n t e l -lectual energy should be relegated -to any given approach. It simply means that, i f (and we w i l l deal with that ' i f at length throughout this inquiry) this is the case, there must be'means found either to use approaches other than those customary to empirical inquiry or traditional forms of empirical inquiry must be modified to gain that higher order of generalization. (4) Lane, and here he is typical of many of the empirical social scien-t i s t s whom I w i l l look at, has a tendency (less pronounced than i n many) to overlook the f u l l meaning and effect of social class. One example here w i l l suffice for the moment: 18 "This study finds that active p o l i t i c a l roles are rarely assumed by Class I (upper class) i n -dividuals, but instead such persons delegate (emphasis added) this function to those at an intermediate level of society who serve their interests in return for various psychic (and sometimes economic) rewards. Financial p a r t i -cipation, on the other hand, is more appropriate for Class I persons....On the other hand, the lower economic groups tend to delegate (emphasis added) then, p o l i t i c a l responsibilities to those who have somewhat more education and somewhat more income than they themselves some ex-tent, perhaps, this may explain the pragmatic similarity of the major parties." ( P o l i t i c a l  L i f e , p. 229) The arrangements, both described by the word 'delegate', are qualitati-^ vely different, one akin to a "hiring", the other to an "abdication". Class behaviors are profoundly variant and i t is only rarely that they Bernard R. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee, Voting (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954). 55 can be effectively described using the same language. This is a relatively t r i v i a l example of an appreciation of Marxism not usually common i n empirical social science. It is meant simply as a warning to be wary of overgeneralization in this regard. To this point I have concerned myself with more or less quantitative differences i n participation between social strata (and the explanations of those differences). 14any have asserted that there exist, as well, a variety of qualitative differences. More specifically here i t i s often argued that less advantaged groups and strata have been shown to be more i l l i b e r a l , less tolerant, less knowledgeable about p o l i t i c a l issues, more prone to authoritarian, demagogic p o l i t i c a l leaders and movements, and, in general, less inclined to attitudes and behaviors conducive to the support of l i b e r a l democracy. This view i s another, and crucial element in Milbrath and others' understanding of differentials in participation. It is largely this range of findings which allow c r e d i b i l i t y to the view that increased participation can be (or, even, w i l l be) a threat to democracy (or, more obscurely, "democratic s t a b i l i t y " ) . Throughout this study I w i l l at many points critique largely p o l i t i c a l science's explanations for and understanding of the quantitative aspects of participation differentials the grounds on which I object to the treatment of the qualitative differences are different. I do not accept that in this case the data f u l l y j u s t i f y the reports of  findings. I propose to critique these reports on three grounds: 56 (1) that the conclusions are often on their face grossly over-drawn from the given data; (2) that the methodologies employed i n specific cases are somewhat more limited than they are taken to be by the researchers and others; (3) that there i s a wealth of less commonly cited empirical material which indicates that the results i n these matters are far more mixed 19 than they are often taken to be. These are very broad generalizations and do not mean to imply that the claims i n matters of qualitative participation are utterly groundless. There i s a wide range of. 'grounding' dependent of course on the kind and degree of claim made. Reasonably well supported (generally) i s the r e l -ationship between issue familiarity and education; almost totally un-reliable i n my view is the claim that there i s a strong relationship between "class" and "authoritarian personality." The earliest and probably s t i l l the most influential of the a r t i -cles which attempt to base this view firmly i n the findings of empirical social science is S.M. Lipset's "Working-class Authoritarianism" which 20 f i r s t appeared in 1955.. Lipset, of course, was quite aware of the "'This aspect of the critique w i l l be presented i n Chapter 4, Part II as the data are also useful to an additional point which cannot usefully be made u n t i l that time. Readers might skip ahead and look at that section at this time as well. 20 An early version of this paper was f i r s t presented at a Congress for Cultural Freedom conference on "The Future of Liberty" held i n Milan, Italy,in September, 1955. While this i s evidence for absolutely nothing, i t perhaps can be noted i n passing that both the Congress and Encounter, a quotation from which Lipset opens his discussion, were funded extensively by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. This i n i t s e l f says nothing about the validity of his argument; since I do i n the next chapter discuss the Cold War in relation to some aspects of the ex-planation of empirical social science, I thought i t pertinent to mention this here. 57 p o l i t i c a l implications of the argument he was attempting to document. In several places in the a r t i c l e he laments this i n his findings as a sad truth which must nevertheless be faced and elsewhere in his writings he makes the following reference: "As early as 1928, the American p o l i t i c a l scientist W.B. Munro argued that increased participation might threaten the workings of democracy since non-voting was largely located among the most ignorant part of the electorate."21 Lipset's claims are well enough known to need no presentation here. The best single critique of Lipset's a r t i c l e i s that presented by S.M. 22 Mil l e r and Frank Reissman. Miller and Reissman conclude their c r i -tique i n this way: The sad and complex truth seems to be that no class has a monopoly on pro- or anti-democratic attitudes. Neither class, we believe, i s psy-chologically authoritarian, but both classes have values which could be turned i n the direction of p o l i t i c a l authoritarianism under certain conditions."23 In building to this conclusion, they offer a variety of tempered c r i t i -cisms; especially pertinent here are the following: (1) One of Lipset's major bases for asserting the relative authorita-rianism of the working-class is the response to a p o l l taken i n "S.M. Lipset, P o l i t i c a l Man, p. 228 referring to W.B. Munro, "Is the Slacker Vote a Menace?", National Municipal Review, 17 (1928), pp. 80-86. Munro, of course, i s hardly the earliest to doubt the capacities of the masses; few before, however, were dignified (?) by the t i t l e ' p o l i t i c a l ' scientist. ^S.M. Miller and Frank Reissman, "'Working Class Authoritarianism': A Critique of Lipset," British Journal of Sociology,(Sept.1961),pp.263-76. 2 3 I b i d . , pp. 271-2. 58 West Germany in 1953. The actual question asked was: "Do you think that i t would be better i f there were one party, several parties, or no party?" The detailed results of that p o l l are presented broken down by occupation arid under the following headings: "Several parties," "One Party," "No Party," and "No Opinion." Ten pages later i n the study, Lipset represents the data under one such heading "Per Cent Favoring the Existence of Several Parties," and therein there i s a moderate difference in response indicated. However, i n "Miller and Reissman's words: "Comparison of the two classes i s d i f f i c u l t , however, because the 'no opinion' responses are particularly high among the working-class groups. If we take favourable attitudes towards the 'one-party' or 'no party' alternatives as better indi-r cators of possible authoritarianism (than the non-selection of the multi-party system choice) then i t appears that these choices are minority positions within the working class. (Among semi-skilled workers, 35 per cent favour either a one-party or no-party situation; among unskilled workers, 38 per cent, and among skilled workers, 27 per cent, roughly the same percentage found among small businessmen and lower white collar groups)." (p. 265) Even i f the response Lipset derived via the arrangement of the data had been as sharp as he took i t to be, there are real doubts about the use-fulness of this one question as a basis for any broad conclusion about --let alone one which seems at times to place a whole social group cross-culturally on the extreme pole of an authoritarianism — democratic con-tinuum. Miller and Reissman argue: "Criticism of or doubt about the practice of multi-party systems or other democratic i n s t i -tutions may indicate the need for the imagin-ative development of new approaches and prac-tices rather than serving as an indication of 59 anti-democratic attitudes." (p. 266) (2) A second of the studies which Lipset offers as supportive is that 24 of Samuel A. Stouffer (Communism, Conformity and C i v i l Liberties) wherein "community leaders" were found more committed to c i v i l l iberties than were the "general public." Miller and Reissman suggest the possibility that the middle-class (including the com-munity leaders) might appear more tolerant because they are less punitive rather than because they are more committed to c i v i l l i b e r t i e s . They do not pretend that this 'explains away' the response, merely that i t puts i t in a different light. I would add here that the further possibility that "community leaders" are more conscious of the need to publicly espouse the "conventional wisdom" might produce further limitations on generalizations from these findings. Further there also may be differentials in the differences between "measurable attitudes" and "situational behaviors." (Both these factors w i l l be developed below). Fin-ally here Miller and Reissman note a finding by Bordua regarding 25 class differences on questions similar to those asked by Stouffer: "Bordua offers an intriguing finding concerning the determinants of intolerance and authorita-rianism. If religion is held constant, class 24 Samuel A. Stouffer, Communism, Conformity and C i v i l Liberties, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1966) f i r s t published i n 1955. We w i l l consider this work further shortly below. 25 Reference i s to David Joseph Bordua Authoritarianism and Intolerance, A Study of High School Students, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Department of Social Relations, Harvard University, 1956, p. 228 (cited in footnote 9 df Miller and Reissman, p. 274). 60 differentials in p o l i t i c a l tolerance and authori-tarianism are insignificant." (3) Miller and Reissman also present a critique of Lipset's use of F-scale based data on the grounds that such scales have limited ap-p l i c a b i l i t y to the working class. This can be related to one of -my above comments on Lane. One empirical basis for this claim i s from an earlier study by Reissman who found that working-class respondents low on authoritarianism did not have more 'people-oriented' responses to an independent open-ended question than did those who were high on authoritarianism. However, middle-class respondents who had scored high on the 'authoritarian' scale did have a response significantly different from those who scored low. One gets the impression then that the 'authoritarianism' scale 26 -might -measure something different in the different class groups. (4) Lipset uses to a considerable extent differentials i n child-rearing practices as a basis for arguing for working-class intolerance. Miller and Reissman sharply tenuate the usefulness of his claims 27 by a re-examination of the very studies which Lipset cites. What we are l e f t with i n the way of evidence after a l l this is l i t t l e more than the following from Lipset: "The poorer strata everywhere are more l i b e r a l or l e f t i s t on economic issues; they favour more wel-fare state measures, higher wages....But when liberalism i s defined in non-economic terms — as the support of c i v i l l i b e r t i e s , internation-alism, etc., — the correlation i s reversed. The Study cited (on page 268) i s Frank Reissman Worker's Attitudes Towards  Participation and Leadership, unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1955. I w i l l offer further doubts about the F-scale below and in the next chapter. 27 Miller and Reissman, pp. 269-70. 61 more well-to-do are more l i b e r a l , the poorer are more intolerant. 29 In support of this categorical assertion Lipset cites but two studies. On a re-reading of these sources i t i s found that Smith, to whom he refers in both cases, did not deal with class levels at a l l , rather his data was concerned with relative information (and i n one case education) levels. In the f i r s t of these studies, Smith used no c i v i l liberties questions, merely indicators of "internationalism." In the second on questions regarding women's rights (equal pay for equal work), Anti-Semitism, and greater power for the U.N. i t was found that there was no relation between liberalism-conservatism and either education or inform-ation levels. On only two questions (one on women and one on freedom of the press) was there any 'expected' difference on even the information level variable. Lipset's broad conclusion hardly seems supported by the data reported. Lipset's study was critiqued here at length because i t has been most often i n turn been cited as the empirical grounding for doubts about the effects on democracy attendant to a rise in the participation of the relatively less advantaged. Other studies commonly referred to in this regard include that by Stouffer, and those done later by Prothro and 28 Lipset, P o l i t i c a l 'Man, p. 92 29 G.H. Smith, "Liberalism and Level of Information," Journal of Educa- tional Psychology, 39 (1948), pp. 65-82; and "The Relation of 'Enlight-enment' to Liberal-Conservative Opinions," Journal of Social Psychology, 28 (1948), pp. 3-17. 62 Grigg , by McClosky and the several major U.S. presidential years 32 voting studies. In the following section of this chapter, we w i l l discuss their and some other major findings on participation, i n a l l cases both with regard to quantitative and qualitative strata differentials i n participation. In some cases, we w i l l offer comments on the generaliza-b i l i t y of those findings. I l l The f i r s t of the studies to be considered br i e f l y here i s that by Samuel Stouffer mentioned above i n our discussion of Lipset. Stouffer's study i s a careful and intelligently conceived piece of research. The research was conducted i n the summer of 1954 i n the hope of providing some information for those "responsible citizens" who were taking a "sober second look" at McCarthyism and the Communist threat. As Stouffer put James W. Prothro and Charles M. Grigg, "Fundamental Principles of Democracy: Bases for Agreement and Disagreement," Journal of P o l i t i c s , 22 (May, 1960) pp. 276-94; reprinted in Charles F. Cnudde and Deane E. Neubauer, Empirical Democratic Theory (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1969) pp. 236-51. 31 Herbert McClosky, "Consensus and Ideology i n American P o l i t i c s , " Amer- ican P o l i t i c a l Science Review, 58 (June, 1964), pp. 361-82; also reprinted in Cnudde and Neubauer, pp. 268-302. Also relevant is Herbert McClosky, Paul J. Hoffman and Rosemary O'Hara, "Issue Conflict and Consensus Among Party Leaders and Followers," American P o l i t i c a l Science Review, 54 (June, 1960), pp. 406-427. 32 Particularly Bernard R. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld and William N. McPhee, Voting (University of Chicago Press, 1954) and Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. M i l l e r and Donald E. Stokes The American Voter, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1960). 63 i t i n his f i r s t chapter: " today do some alarmed citizens feel that the country cannot risk the luxury of f u l l c i v i l liberties for nonconformists. But there are others who disagree. They are convinced that our protection from Communist espionage and sabotage can be safely entrusted to the F.B.I, and other branches of• an alert government, and that the diminishing risks of conversion of other Americans to Communism can be met by an alert public opinion." (p. 14) Lest such words seem shocking to the reader, and they might well have been at the time — the whole work was quite bold i n i t s assumption that tolerance was a good thing, Stouffer f e l t constrained to add immediately that: "the stark fact remains that for unknown years the free Western world must l i v e under a menacing shadow. Vigilance cannot be relaxed against either p e r i l from without or varieties of perils from.within." I think an appreciation of the times — the fieldwork was done while the Army-McCarthy hearings were being conducted — i s necessary to appreciate that any of the findings of this or any other such study should hardly be taken prima facie as immutable. The tone of the comments, and Stouffer himself can be presumed to be a relatively enlightened "community leader," would hardly be appropriate today — their tone i s unmistakably paranoid, time has shown the F.B.I, more inclined to and adept at domestic espionage than has been the "menacing shadow." These comments do not in any way devalue Stouffer's findings, they merely place the whole study i n an historic context. The study u t i l i z e d a large national random sample and a somewhat smaller and quite carefully derived selected sample of "community leaders" i n middle-sized American ci t i e s . The community leaders were composed of mayors, school board 64 presidents, library board presidents, Republican and Democratic County Chairmen, labour union and Chamber of Commerce presidents, newspaper editors, and leaders of specified social, patriotic and civic organiza-tions. Newspaper editors were the editors of the largest paper i f there was more than one paper and so forth, thus assuming a prestigious group to be compared against the population at large. The findings indicated a considerable difference i n level of tolerance between the "leaders" and the "general public". The extent of the difference is most apparent i n the differences in scores on the "scale of willingness to tolerate nonconformists." The average number of "Community Leaders" "relatively more tolerant" on the scale was 66%; the average of the population cross-section for the same cit i e s 32%. The bulk of the cross-section (50% of the total) f e l l into the category of " i n between" relatively tolerant and relatively intolerant. When one examines the details of Stouffer's Guttman Scale construction contained i n the appendix, i t becomes apparent that one of the two questions depending on religious tolerance must be answered 'li b e r a l l y ' i n order'for the respondent to be placed i n 33 the "relatively more tolerant" category. - This i s especially To "qualify" for the "relatively more tolerant" category, a respondent must be i n either rank group 5 or rank group 4; to qualify for rank group four, the respondent must give the tolerant response to 2 out of 3 of the following: "Should an admitted Communist be put in j a i l , or not?" "There are always some people whose ideas are considered bad or dangerous by other people. For instance, somebody who i s against a l l churches and religion. "If such a person wanted to make a speech in your city (town, community) against churches and religion, should he be allowed to speak, or not?" and l a s t l y , "If some people i n your community suggested that a book he wrote against churches and religion should be taken out of your public library, would you favor removing this book or not?" (pp. 263-4) (continued on following page) 65 unfortunate as no control for religion was u t i l i z e d . (Recall the comments of Miller and Reissman discussed above*) The one religious question for which data was produced separately showed the sharpest difference between "leader" response and "cross-section" response (of the four questions detailed i n this way). Also indicative i s the considerable differences found between "church-goers" and "non-church-goers" (pp. 140-152). This does not refute that there i s a considerable leader-citizen relative difference on this scale i t merely indicates that there are at least two reasons for not taking the degree of difference to be anything l i k e "66"-"32." The combining of categories is quite arbitrary and i t would make just as much sense to combine rank groups 0, 1 and 2 on the one hand and groups 3, 4 and 5 on the other. (This would, as well,lessen the weighting of the "religious" factor as i t is between groups 3 and 4 that respondents are divided by this particular factor.) Or, one could look at a combined category of those "relatively moderately or highly tolerant" (rank groups 2, 3, 4, 5) and the numerical balance i s then: "leaders" 95% "cross-section" 82% Such a grouping makes no more or less sense than any other. Again, however, this does not dispel the fact that the responses d i f f e r , but i t certainly modifies the sorts of generalizations that might be made therefrom. How-ever, a further consideration i s also worth mentioning here with regard 25 (continued from previous page) The Guttman Scale had a coefficient of reproduceability of .96. Figures are then presented i n most of thejbook grouped into three categories "more tolerant","in-between" and "less tolerant." The r e l i -gious question might have been the dividing line for the more Catholic lower status and educational categories. 66 to the degree of differences between the "leaders" and the national cross-section. There i s , I think, one weakness in the handling of the two separate samples. In Stouffer's words: "The leaders...were not told that they were chosen as representative of a particular group, but rather that they were chosen simply as "prominent members of the community." In this way, i t was hoped their responses would come i n terms of their individual opinions rather than the " o f f i c i a l l i n e " of their particular group — labor, business, Republican... or whatever." (p. 246) People called on as "prominent members of the community" would, i t would seem,be more l i k e l y (than i f they had been otherwise addressed) to be inclined to answer as they would think the "community" would have i t rather than as they themselves candidly f e l t . I t might well be the case that "leaders" are more inclined than ordinary citizens to speak as they think others would want to hear^.them even i f they were not reminded of their "respectability." Finally, we come to the finding i n the Stouffer study which bears on the kind of meanings which Milbrath, Lipset and others have read into the whole study. The overwhelming bulk of the data presented relate to the "leader" vs. "cross-section" dichotomy which in i t s e l f says very l i t t l e about whole-strata or any kind of class categories (the "leaders" are a very particular sub-group). The relevant finding i s a breakdown by educa-tion of the national cross-sectional sample (I have inserted a total of the "tolerant" extreme and the "in-between" positions): 67 Less Tolerant In-Between More Tolerant Combination 2 & 3 College Graduates 5 29 65 95 Some College 9 38 53 91 H.S. Graduates 12 46 42 85 Some High School 17 54 29 81 Grade School 22 62 16 78 This finding should not be minimized; there was in mid-1950s America a significant difference by education with regard to measurable attitudes of willingness to tolerate certain kinds of non-conformity. There was, however., a far less sharp strata difference on another, This was the scale scores of the national cross-section on the perceptions of an internal communist threat. The highest percentage "seeing a r e l -atively great threat" was as follows: Grade Some H.S. Some College School H.S. Graduate College Graduate More Interested in.Issues See Relatively Great Threat 37 40 40 35 28 In-Between 47 42 45 46 46 See Relatively L i t t l e Threat 16 18 15 19 26 N = 792 576 758 319 308 Less Interested in Issues • -See Relatively Great Threat 19 26 22 28 22 In-Between 62 56 54 47 47 See Relatively L i t t l e Threat 19 18 24 25 31 N = 1050 446 440 141 68 68 It is unfortunate that the data were not broken down by other measures of social strata. There is one, but only very indirect, indication of occupational (or class) breakdown in the study. That is in the attitudes of local labor union leaders on the 'tolerance scale' and on four of the particular questions within that scale. On the tolerance scale the union leaders scored "62%", the average of commu-nity leaders "66%". One of the larger differences was on the religious tolerance question; on tolerance of suspected communists there was no difference. The labour leaders were not in this case (see p. 245) distant and perhaps bureaucratic labor "executives," but elected local leaders whose attitudes should not too often be drastically different from those of their rank-and-file members. Labor union members, then, may have been more tolerant than non-members, not less. This i s , of course, highly speculative, but does indicate that Stouffer's study singly is not conclusive evidence of 'working-class authoritarianism.' In sum, Stouffer's study does contain some evidence of the potential for strata-based differences in the "quality" of participation, i t ' s results are not so clear-cut in this regard as they are generally taken to be. Evidence on the other side of the scale of this question then weighs relatively heavier than i t has for Lipset and others. There are several other important studies bearing on the potential for "qualitative" participation that should be b r i e f l y considered here. The f i r s t is the well-known study by Prothro and Grigg, who consider a wider range of questions than did Stouffer and who did break down response by income (and a variety of other variables). They considered ten specifics 69 of democratic principle characterized as: "only informed vote, only taxpayers vote, bar Negro from office, bar Communist from office, AMA right to block voting, allow anti-religious speech, allow socialist speech, allow communist speech, bar Negro from candidacy, and bar Communist from candidacy," (p. 243, Cnudde and Neubauer). The difference by education was considerable, the difference by income was far less sharp with the largest gap on the religious question (with no differentiation made with regard to religious background). The average difference for the nine questions (excluding that on free religious speech) was 7%. The overall response (Prothro and Grigg were primarily concerned with the absence of consensus) indicated no strong overall conformity to specific democratic norms. This contas ted with an almost univeral agreement on more general democratic norms, for example, the right to free speech. A l l groups supported the general.statements. Prothro and Grigg's conclusion most relevant to our concern here is the following: "Education, but not community (Ann Arbor or Talla-hasee) or income, held up consistently as a basis of disagreement when other factors were controlled. We accordingly conclude that endorsement of demo-cratic principles is not a function of class as much (of which income is also a criterion), but of greater acquaintance with the logical implications of the broad democratic principles." (p. 248) Again i t seems i t i s not appropriate to take this study as hard evidence of anything approaching a hypothetical working-class authoritarianism. The most supportive possible interpretation for those who wish to dem-onstrate the "undemocraticness" of the less advantaged i s as follows: persons of lower income levels in certain locales in the United States, without controlling for religion which might well make a difference, 70 tended in the 1950s to show a somewhat (from -1% to 20% only in the case of religious speech averaging 8.5%) greater likelihood of showing i n a readily measurable way, attitudes which can be characterized as less democratic. Further, i f this difference were controlled for difference in education, i t would presumably decline further in significance. Another of the careful, effective, and often cited studies of this 34 nature i s that by Herbert McClosky. McClosky's central concern i s similar to that of Prothro and Grigg; he is interested primarily i n the degree of consensus on the various aspects of democratic ideology between a group identified as the " p o l i t i c a l influentials" and the general public. His findings are not applicable, at least not without great caution, to more generalized or other social divisions. As he puts i t at the out-set of his a r t i c l e : "I mean them ("political influentials" and other terms of similar meaning) to refer to those people who occupy themselves with public affairs to an unusual degree, such as government o f f i c i a l s , elected office holders, active party members, publicists, of-ficers of voluntary associations, and opinion leaders. The terms do not apply to any definable social class or the usual sense, nor to a particular status group or profession...."Articulates" or "influentials" can be found scattered throughout the society, at a l l i n -come levels, in a l l classes, occupations, ethnic groups, and communities, although some segments of the population w i l l doubtless yield a higher porportion of them than others." (p. 363) Some of the basic findings include the following: "On 'totalitarianism,' a scale measuring the readiness to subordinate the rights of others to the pursuit of Page references are to American P o l i t i c a l Science Review art i c l e of 1964, op. c i t . 71 some collective p o l i t i c a l purpose, only 9.7 per cent of the p o l i t i c a l actives score high compared with 33.8 per cent of the general population." (p. 364) "On a scale of willingness to flout the rules of pol-i t i c a l integrity, the proportions are 12.2 per cent and 30.6 per cent respectively." (p. 364) However, on "responses to items expressing support for a series of general statements of free speech and opinion, there i s not a great discernable difference (as i s the case for Prothro and Grigg with regard to general assertions.) For example: "I believe i n free speech for a l l no matter what their views might be": influentials 86.9%; general electorate 88.9%. (p. 366) On some more specific applications of free speech and fundamental rights differences emerged, but on others there were none, e.g., "no matter what crime a person i s accused of, he should never be convicted unless he has been given the right to face and question his accusers: influentials, 90.1%; gen-eral electorate, 88.1%. Particularly interesting are the findings on "social and ethnic equality" questions which showed no difference on three questions and only a small difference on two and on "economic equality" which showed the general electorate considerably more "democratic" than the i n f l u -entials. Probably most interesting when considered in the light of our rather than McClosky's concerns are the following (grouped by McClosky under the heading of "expressions of p o l i t i c a l cynicism") (p. 371): P o l i t i c a l Influentials General Electorate Both major parties in this country are controlled by the wealthy and are run for their benefit 7.9 32.1 Item P o l i t i c a l General Influentials Electorate Most politicians can be trusted to do what they think i s best for the country 77.1 58.9 The laws of this country are supposed to benefit a l l of us equally, but the fact i s that they're almost a l l "rich man's laws" 8.4 33.3 A poor man doesn't have the chance he deserves i n the law courts 20.3 42.9 One can very easily interpret a l l of these responses as indicating that, are the influentials. That i s , there seems to be a healthy distrust of authority expressed and a general streak of egalitarianism and inclina-tion to due process. What could be of clearer benefit to democracy than an apparent doubt that i t s present actuality i s not l i v i n g up to i t s democratic potentialities? It would be most interesting to try these kinds of questions — and a variety of variations on them —> i n a sample to be s t r a t i f i e d by occupation and/or income. Perhaps a scale of "democratic cynicism" could be developed. Even, perhaps, more intriguing i s the following response which elic i t e d the widest differential i n the study: Item (grouped under ' p o l i t i c a l f u t i l i t y ' ) Influentials Electorate Nothing I ever do seems to have any effect upon what happens in p o l i t i c s 8.4 61.5 Needless to say " p o l i t i c a l influentials" could hardly respond otherwise, nor l i k e l y could a r e a l i s t i c general public. It would be interesting to see how this question fared i n an income or occupational breakdown and i t would be useful to attempt to develop the line of question further. For example, attempt to discuss levels of desire for greater influence, levels of belief that "people li k e oneself should have more p o l i t i c a l i n one sense at least the general electorate i s more "democratic" than 73 effect," and relative levels of belief i n equality of influence. I am convinced that the range "democratic" attitudes has not been f u l l y ex-plored and that questions pursued to date have had a tendency to get responses which skew "against" the less advantaged. Further I suspect (and w i l l present some indications i n the next chapter) that question-phrasing carries a good deal more weight than i s often considered to be the case. I have, to this point, looked b r i e f l y at some of the most central of the studies of differentials i n "qualitative" participation and, via several of the best secondary analyses, at some of the basic data on differentials in quantitative participation. I would l i k e to turn now to look c r i t i c a l l y at three generally excellent works which within their broad research and analysis present findings and come to conclusions which encompass in single works both aspects of participation. As earlier, I have chosen these works as they seem to be representative of the discipline, have been widely referred to, and are s t i l l widely accepted i n many regards. The f i r s t work to be brie f l y considered here i s Voting by Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee. Its methodology and locus, repeated-interview "panel" study of 1000 Elmira, New York citizens in the 1948 U.S. Pres-idential elections, are too well-known to need any elaboration. What I primarily want to do here is to itemize and comment on some of the most relevant findings and then look at the speculative conclusions which Berelson comes to in his well-known f i n a l chapter. The selected r e l -evant findings are as follows: 74 26% of Republican voters interviewed and 32% of Democratic voters interviewed f e l t that "Jews are generally dishonest in business dealings;" while 43% of the Republicans and 31% of the Democrats believed that "Negroes are generally lazy and ignorant." (p. 190) "Not only do many of the so-called isolationist and hypernational-i s t attitudes form a common cluster with some i l l i b e r a l c i v i l rights opinions, but both sets of attitudes rest partly on certain person-a l i t y characteristics rather than on p o l i t i c a l considerations as such. For example, people who feel that they "have to struggle for everything in l i f e " are more l i k e l y than their counterparts to be anti-Semitic (37 to 23 %) or anti-foreign-born (42 to 25%). Thus i t may be that opinions on such style issues are in good part expressive or symbolic of matters of personal temperament and private experience having l i t t l e or nothing to do with the r e a l i t i e s of the issues..."issues of frustration"...attract opposition from, among others, frustrated personalities found in a l l parts of the population." (p. 191) A neuroticism index ("admittedly a crude and inadequate measure of 'neuroticism'" p. 373, appendix B) was constructed from one four-part question with each part scoring equally: agreement with the following is taken as the measure of neuroticism: I have to struggle for everything I get in l i f e . Prison i s too good for sex criminals; they should be publicly whipped. A lot of people around here ought to be put in their place. I often find myself worrying about the future. Most people were found to be at least a l i t t l e neurotic. 75 (4) "The 'joiners' the better-educated, the better-off, the men, the less troubled (as measured by neuroticism index) — these are the people who pay most attention to the p o l i t i c a l campaign as presented through newspaper, magazines, and radio." (p. 241) (5) "Less than half the voters agreed with their own party's position on major Position issues l i k e Taft-Hartley and price control." (p. 213) (6) "Party preference does not particularly affect the voter's perception of where the candidates stand on the issues." (p. 233) (7) "Partisans tend to perceive the candidates stand on the issues as favorable to their own stand." (p. 233, seems to contradict (6)) (8) "Only about one-third of the voters are highly accurate i n their perception of where the candidates stand on the issues" and "ac-curacy of perception i s affected by communication exposure, education,interest and cross-pressures...." (p. 233) (9) Consistent and concentrated media exposure was found to be con-^  ditioned by...membership in community organization, education, class, sex, and (crudely) freedom from personality disorders. (p, 241) What might reasonably be concluded from these findings (given a proper appreciation of methods underlying them)?. Is i t that a lot of people are neurotic, and ignorant and don't pay proper attention? I think not. The "admittedly crude" index of neuroticism — except per- haps for the second of the four questions does not appear to me to measure anything except perhaps d i f f e r i n g social r e a l i t i e s . Some l i f e situations, l i k e l y most in 1940-America were perfectly reasonable grounds for struggle and worry. A case could just as easily be made that those 76 who didn't agree with two or three of the assertions were "neurotic." Clearly many people i n Elmira, New York, i n 1948 had a bigoted view of the world. Many persons were unable to correctly identify three or four out of four candidate issue positions. A reading of the "evidence" of what those positions "objectively were" (presented i n a condensed form to the voters ,, „ not available Ain 1948.(p. 217) l e f t this reader unable to get the right" (yes-no) answer on but two of the four pairs. In the heat of campaigns, without television coverage, given the very•-smaM- ideological differences in American po l i t i c s and the exceptional issue obscuring "non-stand" of 35 candidate Dewey whom everyone in New York State, at least, "knew" was honest, and tough and f a i r , I find i t most impressive that the scores on this measure were above those of random selection. That i s , misperceptions might abound for reasons other than "lack of attention" and "lack of at-tention" might be present for reasons other than " i n a b i l i t y " to conform to the citizens' democratic expectations of (unnamed) "democratic theorists." But those, of course, are precisely the kinds of conclusions which Berelson tends to draw in his f i n a l chapter. For example, "If the democratic system depended solely on the qualifications of the individual voter, then i t seems remarkable that democracies have survived through the centuries, After examining the detailed data on how individuals misperceive p o l i t i c a l reality or respond to irrelevant social influences, one wonders how a democracy ever solves i t s p o l i t i c a l problems.... Where the rational citizen seems to abdicate, never-theless angels seem to tread." (p. 311) I f a i l to see anywhere i n the hard data of this study any evidence which Noted carefully by the authors themselves. 77 might j u s t i f y such a "conclusion." That-many vot e r s d i d not agree with " t h e i r party's" stand on a given " i s s u e " ( i n t h i s case p r i c e controls and Taft-Hartley) might be a r e f l e c t i o n of, f o r example: (1) that there are other issues they see as more important (or as i n many cases they agreed on one but not the other); (2) that t h e i r reasonable per-ception that American p a r t i e s are mixed bags allows them to conclude that no issue stance by any candidate i s a "sure thing" or anything l i k e i t ; (3) that other people i n t h e i r party were saying other things and they thought i t a p o s s i b i l i t y that those others might i n the end p r e v a i l ; (4) that as they (a large majority) were not i n a union, they did not care about Taft-Hartley however much the media and others who make "is s u e s " d i d ; (5) that they were i n a union and s t i l l didn't care; (6) that they cared about p r i c e s , but saw " p r i c e c o n t r o l s " as a gimmick though they generally trusted Truman; (7) that they voted f o r "the man" and not "the party" as the p a r t i e s were h i s t o r i c a l l y i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e ; and any one of innumerable other judgements more important and c e r t a i n l y no le s s " r a t i o n a l " or " i n t e l l i g e n t " c r i t e r i a Berelson has seemingly established. Further here, i t i s most i n t e r e s t i n g to note that despite Truman's v i c t o r y , the Taft-Hartley act was hot repealed; nor f o r that matter was i t even amended. This is not only fur t h e r evidence that there are never issue-mandates i n American p o l i t i c s , but further i t could be sa i d that the voters were more astute i n t h e i r "ignorance" than the observers i n t h e i r " s o p h i s t i c a t i o n . " There i s no doubt that the findings ofthe study i n these matters are i n t e r e s t i n g , but to claim thatthe above statement i s somehow based 78 on "detailed data" is patently absurd. This statement has been critiqued 36 elsewhere on a variety of grounds and there i s no need to develop arguments further; nowhere, were Berelson's broad conclusions been counter-posed to his data and methods, and i t might be profitable for this to be developed further. Suffice i t to say here that Berelson goes on from the above point which does not follow from the relevant data he presents, to make a number of statements which have no referents at a l l within his study. That i s , of course, no grounds for not making them. I w i l l offer here only brief excerpts as they w i l l be discussed further below and in that context, i t would be helpful that i t be clear that there i s no data i n the study which relates to them in any but the most remote manner. (The summary of findings which offered above was the result of an at-tempt to locate the most relevant items.) "For p o l i t i c a l democracy to survive, other features are required: the intensity of conflict must be limited, the rate of change must be restrained, s t a b i l i t y in the social and economic structure must be maintained, a p l u r a l i s t i c social organization must exist, and a basic consensus must find tog-ether the contending parties." (p. 313) "We need some people who are active i n a certain respect, others in the middle, and s t i l l others who are passive." (p. 314) And, "How could a mass democracy work i f a l l the people were deeply involved in politics? Lack of interest by some people i s not without benefits, too....Ex-treme interest goes with extreme partisanship (some evidence presented i n study) and might culminate in r i g i d fanaticism that could destroy democratic See my next chapter, Part I, for several examples of these critiques. 79 processes i f generalized throughout the community." (p. 314) The American Voter by Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes i s far less inclined to draw i n i t s conclusions unwarranted generalizations. Some of the relevant findings include: (1) "In a time of depolarization, the behavior of the involved voter becomes less and less distinct from that of the apathetic, with respect to the class axis." (p. 355) (2) "...most of the evidence for class voting within each group i s con-tributed by voters whose class identification i s congruent with oc-cupation." (p. 372) (3) The relationship between education and voting participation was found to be: Some Some Grade School Grade School HS HS Some College College Non-south 70 68 77 87 92 93 South 32 50 50 63 80 85 (4) Relationship of Education to Sense of P o l i t i c a l Efficacy: Non-South South Sense of P.E. GS HS College GS HS College High 21 43 75 10 33 71 Medium 25 32 19 16 33 16 Low 54 25 6 74 14 13 And further, i n general "sense of p o l i t i c a l efficacy" and "sense of citizen duty," showed strong relationships with education on the one hand and with vote turnout on the other (pp. 478-480). 80 A considerable relationship, though far less a one than that i n previous point was demonstrated to exist between education and turnout, attempts to influence others and a variety of other forms of participation. There are several fascinating findings with regard to "authoritar-ianism" reported. The authors employed a battery of ten authoritar-ian items, five of which were i n the traditional "agree" form and five of which were reversed i n their direction. The authors conclude: A. comparison of responses to the two halves of the battery is disturbing, because people who look l i k e "high authoritarians" where agreement means an au-thorial! response tend to look like "low authoritar-ians" on the reversed items. In other words, there is a negative correlation between the two halves of the battery rather than the strong positive correlation that should emerge i f people were responding to the con-tent of the questions rather than their form. A single "response set" seems to underlie a great many answers to items of the usual authoritarianism scale." (p. 512) There follows an excellent discussion of the issue which includes data indicating that with reversed questions even education and au-thoritarianism are positively related, but that in effect l i t t l e can be concluded with confidence about the relationship between education and authoritarianism. (On balance, i f there i s any relationship, whatever i t is and that is far from certain, i t does not hold for class though the "usual conclusions for education may remain the case to a slight extent only.) (I w i l l deal further with this matter i n Chapter 4.) Sixteen of the "more prominent" issues i n the campaign of 1956 were chosen and i t was found that from 10% to 30% of the electorate had 81 no opinion on them, an additional 10% to 39% held an opinion, but didn't know what the government was doing on them. (p. 174). (8) The different levels of issue familiarity varied quite strongly with level of education. (p. 175) (9) Only from 18% to 36% of citizens perceived party differences on various issues. However, from 45% to 78% held an issue opinion and knew what the government was doing. The authors did not, however, relate this sharp difference to the possi b i l i t y that i t i s a result of lack of presentation of party positions or the possibility that there were no real differences. They stressed rather lack of voter attentiveness. There i s also nothing doubting the nature of a p o l i -t i c a l system i n which people do not seem to care what positions the parties took. The concern i s merely for the "capacity to d i s c r i -minate between the policy stands of the parties." (p. 186) The American Voter can s t i l l be seen as an example of sound empirical social science research: careful, intelligent, at times ima-ginative, and generally perceptive i n interpretation of data. There are simply no elaborate and unwarranted conclusions drawn. For the most part, the authors stay altogether away from the matters i n which Berelson i n -volved himself. They do conclude that there i s a "substantial lack of familiarity with policy questions." (p. 542) and further, "Our measures have shown the public's understanding of policy issues to be poorly developed even though these measures usually have referred to a general problem which might be the subject of legislation or (in the area of foreign affairs) executive action, rather than to particular b i l l s or acts." (p. 542)' They also conclude that relatively few persons have developed consistent patterns of " l i b e r a l " or "conservative" beliefs. They add, 82 "Our failure to locate more than a trace of 'ideological' thinking in the protocols of our surveys emphasizes the general impoverishment of p o l i t i c a l thought in a large proportion of the electorate. "..."Very few of our re- -spondents have shown a sensitive understanding of the positions of the parties on current policy issues. Even among those people who are relatively familiar with issues presented in our surveys — and our test of fa-mi l i a r i t y has been an easy one — there i s l i t t l e agrees ment as to where the two parties stand.... "We have, then, the portrait of an electorate a l -most wholly without detailed information about decision-^ making in government." (p. 544) They conclude then that policy-makers in America thereby have a lot of latitude on specifics, but neither then celebrate nor condemn that degree of latitude. In their discussion of the lack of awareness of party d i f ^ ferences, they note in passing that the parties are similar, but on the vhole their attitude is one of doubt about the capabilities of the electorate rather ' than about the quality of institutions. But to their credit they offered neither sweeping condemnations of the masses (beyond those quoted), nor idle praise of the system or i t s enlightened leadership. Their expression of concern, thus, was not on the whole inappropriate or unrelated to their narrower findings. They nowhere suggest that the system might work better i f some citizens involved themselves even less. The last study to be considered here, though weak in many ways., i s methodologically elaborate and quite expensive. Its methods and detailed findings are widely known and I won't elaborate them further at this point. I w i l l simply offer some critique of their broad conclusions as their f i n a l chapter, in a comparative p o l i t i c a l context, contains conclusions remarkably parallel to those offered by Berelson ten years earlier. The conclusions in The Civic Culture have, in my view, as l i t t l e foundation 83 i n the findings of their respective study as did the comments at the con-clusion of Voting^. I include i t here as a second example of the quite well-developed understanding of the non-participation of the disadvantaged for which I w i l l elaborate as a model early in Chapter 4, Based on their findings of greater general social trust, of greater p o l i t i c a l awareness, of greater feelings of p o l i t i c a l competence, and of a greater proclivity to form ad hoc p o l i t i c a l groups, Almond and Verba conclude that Great Britain and especially the United States seem to have a p o l i t i c a l culture more conducive to participation in democratic pro-cesses than do Germany, Italy or Mexico. However, they also find that even in Great Britain and the United States there are many individuals who must be classified as "subjects" or "parochials". They then conclude that there is such a thing as a " c i v i c culture", that i s , a culture that is just the right admixture of the participant, the subject and the paro-chial to produce the ideal "democratic p o l i t i c a l culture". They then explain that an excessively participant culture puts too much pressure on p o l i t i c a l elites to allow those elites to perform "effectively". An excessively subject and/or parochial culture does not exert enough pres-sure to maintain "responsiveness" of el i t e s . They do not say what exactly is the necessary "mix" of types that is needed to create a "civi c culture" but we are led to the impression that i t is not far from what they measured in the United States and Britain. The f u l l impact of what they seem to be saying comes when one con-siders, f i r s t the characteristics necessary for an individual to be 84 categorized as a " p a r t i c i p a n t " J / and second, the reason for the authors' use of only l o c a l government orien t a t i o n s i n c a l c u l a t i n g t h e i r s c a l e : " j j l f a scale based on the n a t i o n a l government had been used, too many respondents would have f a l l e n i n t o the lower categories of subjective competence, and the scale would not have been u s e f u l to d i s c r i m -inate among the various types of c i t i z e n s " . (p. 232) In other words, i t seems that a s o c i e t y i n which over h a l f of the population f e e l they might t r y to i n f l u e n c e t h e i r l o c a l government, or i n which more than 7 to 12% of them a c t u a l l y had t r i e d i n the past, or i n which a somewhat lower percentage than t h i s f e l t that they might do so or did so with respect to n a t i o n a l government, "stable democracy" might we l l be threatened. Not only however, i s i t necessary that not many more than 21% of the c i t i z e n r y attempt to influence e l i t e decisions, i t i s also necessary that a larger number think they can influence them, but never t r y : "These two gaps — between a high perception of p o t e n t i a l influence and a lower l e v e l of a c t u a l i n f l u e n c e , and between a high frequency of o b l i g a t i o n to p a r t i c i p a t e and the a c t u a l importance and amount of p a r t i c i p a t i o n —; help explain how a democratic p o l i t i c a l c ulture can act to maintain a balance between governmental e l i t e power and governmental e l i t e responsiveness (or i t s complement, a balance between n o n - e l i t e a c t i v i t y and influence and n o n - e l i t e p a s s i v i t y and non-influence)." (p. 480-481) I stress t h i s point because the authors themselves consider i t important (the t i t l e of the book and the e n t i r e concluding chapter revolve around i t ) and because i t leads us to assumptions made by the Participants,.:. who, at a minimum, be l i e v e they would attempt to influence t h e i r l o c a l government i n some way ( s l i g h t l y over % i n the U.S. and B r i t a i n ) , and at a maximum, a c t u a l l y have t r i e d i n some way (7% i n B r i t a i n , 21% i n the U.S.) 85 authors. The f i r s t of these assumptions i s obvious from the preceding discussion: namely, that Britain and America represent the ideals of sta b i l i t y and of democracy. How else could they state that participation beyond what these nations had achieved is a threat to democracy and st a b i l i t y , when no empirical basis i s presented regarding democracies which have "fallen" due to too much participation of the type dealt with in this study. Nor i s any evidence presented that the amount of participation in these countries poses a threat of any kind or degree, or for that matter, what amount or kind of participation might conceivably be threatening. No consideration is given to the possibility that additional participation would not result in the downfall of stable democracy. Throughout the study one finds evidence of an assumption not only that the "civic culture" is an ideal, but that those countries which have not yet attained i t are striving and tending toward i t . The pervasive influence of the civic-culture-as-an-ideal can be seen when one considers that there are dozens of correlations inquiring into the source of "subject competence" (the belief i n one's a b i l i t y to influence) but nowhere i n the study i s there any inquiry into either the sources of the w i l l to p a r t i c i -pate, or into any possible relationship between the belief i n influence and actual opportunities to have influence. The latter of these, i t might be argued reasonably, i s beyond the scope of this particular study, but measurements were made of "how many persons actually did try to influence the government" but no attempt was made to correlate this aspect of par-ticipant culture with any of the sources studied with regard to the "com-petence" aspect. Thus concern i s focused on the source of the assumed 86 greater need for perceived influence not on the assumed lesser need for actual influence. Regarding the civic-culture-as-a-trend, we feel the following single example to be sufficient. After finding that Germans are p o l i t i c a l l y well-informed and have a favorable orientation to the output side of their p o l i t i c a l system, Almond and Verba discover the seemingly contrary findings that overall "system affect" i s low and orientation to input participation goes l i t t l e beyond a vote which is se< as no more than obligatory. How they avoid the apparent conclusion that failure of system output could well be exceedingly threatening to German "democratic s t a b i l i t y " i s very revealing: "In Germany {and I t a l y ] , though there i s some opportunity to participate and though there are respondents who con-sider themselves competent to do so, this participation has not led to a greater sense of participation with the p o l i t i c a l system. Thus the positive relationship between subject competence and system affect found among Germans with secondary education or better becomes important. It suggests that the a b i l i t y to participate i s beginning  to be translated into attachment to the p o l i t i c a l system (our emphasis) among those who have attained some higher educational level." (p. 251) Clearly there i s no reason whatever to assume that high school graduates are creating a trend to democracy. There is no evidence presented here that such feelings are actually increasing among high school graduates or the population at large. Many of the weaknesses present in Almond and Verba's conclusions flow from their failure to develop a coherent theory. They are making broad generalizations without performing f i r s t the necessary tasks of definition. These criticisms are equally applicable to the later 87 collection edited by Pye and Verba. 38 Both works deal over and oyer again with "democratic s t a b i l i t y " but in neither i s there any attempt to define "democracy," " s t a b i l i t y , " or "participation"; the d i f f i c u l t i e s which flow from this become clear when we examine a few quotes from the two works: "And this balance, as we have said, is needed for successful democracy (our emphasis): there must be involvement in pol i t i c s i f there is to be the sort of participation necessary for democratic decision-making; yet the involvement must not be so intense as to endanger s t a b i l i t y . " (A. & V., p. 296) "Everything being equal, the sense of a b i l i t y to participate i n pol i t i c s appears to increase the legitimacy and lead to p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y . " [But] ...high levels of participation may have un-stabilizing effects on a system. But the sense of competence, especially when coupled with a somewhat lower fulfillment of this competence, does play an important role i n p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y . " (A. & "V., "The most potent kind of commitment that p o l i t i c a l elites can arouse i s to the p o l i t i c a l system per se — that i s , a commitment to i t over and above i t s actual performance. It i s only such a rain-or-shine commitment that w i l l allow a system to survive the many kinds of crises that are l i k e l y to arise during processes of rapid social change." (P. & V., pp. 259-530) What i s a "successful democracy"? Cannot one have both " i n s t a b i l i t y " and "democracy"? At what point has one lost "stability"? That i s , what characteristics of a type of " p o l i t i c a l system" must change to make i t indicate that i t might need changes? Just what kind of "participation" w i l l threaten "stability"? For example, has the French " p o l i t i c a l system" p. 253) another type of "system"? If a "system" has a " c r i s i s " doesn't that Lucien Pye and Sidney Verba, P o l i t i c a l Culture and P o l i t i c a l Development, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965. 88 since 1870 been "stable"? We would suggest further that i f one were to define a democratic system as one with majority rule with a maintenance of the right of minorities to exist and express themselves, the way i s l e f t open for considerable change and " i n s t a b i l i t y " without endangering "system s t a b i l i t y . " Finally, would not a system which "participation" would threaten, rather than "stable", be more aptly described as "immobile"? Finally here, Almond and Verba upon the discovery that "citizen participation" was universally lower among women and those of lower edu-cation conclude that this phenomenon "spreads slowly". It spreads from the more easily politicized to those more d i f f i c u l t to bring into pol- i t i c a l l i f e " . (emphasis ours) (p. 221) This statement not only provides an assumed direction for change as mentioned above, but perhaps even more significantly indicates that Almond and Verba see non-participation as resulting from flaws i n individuals, not from any weakness i n the pol-iticalsystem. Perhaps this attitude has something to do with their over-whelming concern with " p o l i t i c a l competence," defined as a belief i n one's concern with actual a b i l i t y to influence the system. The system, they assume, somehow strives to get a reluctant citizenry to participate and any failure on their part to believe that they can participate i s serious indeed and one must seek within individuals for reasons to explain i t . The uneducated are those who are more d i f f i c u l t to bring into pol-i t i c a l l i f e " , they are not those who have been unable to force effective entrance into the p o l i t i c a l system, and certainly not those who have been kept from access to the p o l i t i c a l system. 89 In a similar vein Almond and Verba make lengthy inquiry into what kind of p o l i t i c a l partisanship i t is that limits the a b i l i t y of a l l but Americans to heavily engage in the formation of informal, ad hoc pol-i t i c a l groupings. They conclude, ", long as positive attachment to their party i s not coupled with a negative reaction to those of an opposition party, their a b i l i t y to form p o l i t i c a l groups does not appear to be impaired". (p. 293) "It is only when partisanship becomes so intense as to involve rejection on personal grounds, of those of opposing p o l i t i c a l views that the state of partisan-ship in a nation may be said to li m i t the a b i l i t y of citizens to cooperate with each other i n p o l i t i c a l affairs", (p. 194) The American a b i l i t y to get together with a random group of neighbors or fellow-citizens is seen as impaired by the intense p o l i t i c a l partisanship present in other nations. Clearly implicit i n their remarks however i s that somehow that American way i s more democratic, more a natural, healthy thing. This kind of reasoning assumes that the issues about which people seek to exercise their democratic rights are the kind of problems that lend themselves to solution by small, informal groups of neighbors. Are not p o l i t i c a l parties groups? Are they not citizens cooperating with each other? The only serious difference i s that informal groups of the type Almond and Verba are concerned with can do l i t t l e more than demand new t r a f f i c lights, while p o l i t i c a l parties are groups concerned with taking power. Is i t not possible, for some societies at least, that the needs of the citizens cannot be f u l f i l l e d with anything less than forming a group which can take over the powers of the state. 90 rv Before concluding this- chapter and turning to a Broader and more systematic inquiry into the question raised in my c r i t i c a l summaries here, I would li k e to briefly look at the most recent empirical studies of p o l i t i c a l participation. To try to come to something of an overview of recent trends in the study of and conclusions about participation, I 39 surveyed the major relevant journals for the five-year period 1968-1972. Some of the substantive findings from these studies w i l l be i n -tegrated into the analysis presented in the next chapter. Here, I w i l l merely offer a few brief and impressionistic generalizations from that survey and summarize some of the findings of those studies which, add usefully to the composite I have developed thus far in this chapter. What in general can1 be said to characterize p o l i t i c a l participation research, during the period in question? I would venture the following with 40 a caution to the reader that my comments; are no more than impressions: Cl) In this period there are very few, i f any, examples in the research literature of that understanding of participation common to such earlier researchers as Berelson, Milbrath. and Almond and Verba. In general there seem to be very few attempts within the research American Journal of Sociology, American P o l i t i c a l Science Review, Amer-ican Sociological Review, Journal of P o l i t i c s , Midwest Journal of P o l i t i c a l Science, Polity, Public Opinion Quarterly and the Western P o l i t i c a l Quarter 40 To reach such claims as firm conclusions would require more years than have as yet elapsed from the Beginnings of systematic empirical research on p o l i t i c a l participation and, as well, a far more careful and methodical search of the whole literature of the whole period. I expect such self-consciousness would Be most useful, But i s Beyond my needs at this point. 91 literature to incorporate research findings into any broad under-standing. (In contrast to this, as w i l l be shown in the next chap-ter, statements of this understanding abound in a large number of recent texts in a wide variety of subfields in the discipline i n -cluding American p o l i t i c s , American p o l i t i c a l parties, public opinion and other subject areas.) (2) There has been a considerable evolution in methodology which has seen developments going well beyond mere correlations between broad socio-economic demographic variables and composite indices of p a r t i -cipation. One direction of increasing methodological sophistication used with enormous success is the study of the participation by 41 Black citizens in the American South by Matthews and Prothro. The authors in that study,by subdividing the various aspects of par-ticipation which earlier were largely only considered collectively and for the nation-as-a-whole, by narrowing their focus to county by county comparisons, and by looking closely — in a particular context at a particular aspect of disadvantage, were able to produce compelling results. (I w i l l discuss this study further below.) Other useful findings were gained by subdividing customarily lumped occupational groupings — down to even the varying p o l i t i c s charac-42 t e r i s t i c of the several disciplines of academic professionals. ^"4)onald R. Matthews and James W. Prothro Negroes and the New Southern  Pol i t i c s (New York: Harcourt, Brace, & World, Inc., 1966). 42 See Gary M. Halter "The Effects of the Hatch Act on the P o l i t i c a l Par-ticipation of Federal Employees," Midwest Journal of P o l i t i c a l Science, XVI (November, 1972) pp. 723-29 wherein i t is shown that governmental em-ployees participate out of proportion to the broader occupational ; groups within which they are usually 'lumped'. See also Henry A. Turner and continued on next page 92 This practice I w i l l argue later — i f properly conceived — has considerable usefulness in that i t allows for the 'contextualiza-tion' of empirical research. A second clear trend i n research methodology i s towards the wider use of such sophisticated analytic techniques as path analysis and multiple classification analysis (MCA). There have been several attempts using these techniques to determine the r e l -ative independent effects of education, occupation and income on measures of participation. Even more interesting though i s the broader conclusion that can be drawn from the findings here that a very considerable portion of variance is not explained even when a l l the usual demographic variables are combined. (I w i l l discuss below as well the limited meaning of 'explanation' in analysis of variance.) (3) In general, there seems to be a small decline i n interest i n pol-i t i c a l participation. Further, there have been few, i f any, "break throughs" in explanatory power. The changes i n perspective on the subject from the fundamentals summarized by Lane i n 1959 could be charact-erized as incremental. What were some of the more important findings in these recent studies (I include here also several books published during this period): 4 2continued Charles B. Spalding " P o l i t i c a l Attitudes and Behavior of Selected Academically-affiliated Professional Groups," Polity I (Spring, 1969) pp. 309-36 they support and follow Peter H. Rossi's c a l l for "pointedly designed studies of crucial po ulations, rather than shotgun designs." They found sharp gradations in partisanship though not in par-ticipation rates. 93 (1) A l f o r d and S c o b l e 4 J produced an important refinement i n the f i n d i n g s with regard to, on the one hand, the "quantity" and " q u a l i t y " of p a r t i c i p a t i o n and on the other "leadership" and "education." They were most interested i n determining the r e l a t i v e e f f e c t s (associa-tion) of holding leadership p o s i t i o n s versus having some college education on p o l i t i c a l i n t e r e s t , p o l i t i c a l information l e v e l s , p o l -i t i c a l a c t i v i t y , and tolerance of p o l i t i c a l deviance. They see t h e i r study as following from the voting studies and from those by McClosky and Stouffer discussed above. They compare a sample of the general ele c t o r a t e (Wisconsin, 1962) to a selected group of governmental, party and o r g a n i z a t i o n a l leaders. Their f i r s t f i n d i n g that those who are o f f i c e - h o l d e r s tend to be r e l a t i v e l y p o l i t i c a l l y a c t i v e (more so than a random educated group) i s hardly s u r p r i s i n g . More i n t e r e s t i n g i s the f a i r l y l i m i t e d e f f e c t education alone seems to have w i t h i n e i t h e r the leader group or the general sample i n such matters as issue i n t e r e s t and attempts to contact someone about a p o l i t i c a l problem. Also i n t e r e s t i n g are the sharper differences found, by education, for i n t e r e s t i n l o c a l decision-making, knowing neighborhood party a c t i v i s t , and high o r g a n i z a t i o n a l o f f i c e - h o l d i n g , (pp. 262-64) The study has a f a i r l y t i d y general conclusion; "By simultaneously c o n t r o l l i n g f o r both leader-ship and education, we have established (1) that Robert R. A l f o r d and Harry M. Scoble, "Community Leadership, Education, and P o l i t i c a l Behavior," American S o c i o l o g i c a l Review, 33 ( A p r i l , 1968) pp. 259-72. 94 leadership i s far more important than education with regard to almost every single -measure we have of sheer "quantity" or "volume" of p o l i t i c a l act-i v i t y , but (2) that education i s far more important than leadership concerning the "content"/'quality" or "direction" of p o l i t i c a l behavior...." (p. 271) Sadly, two of the "best"(in terms of greatest difference by education) measures of "quality" of participation are "implicit" (e.g., an insult to your honor and should not be forgotten) and "e x p l i c i t " (e.g., Foreigners have too much influence i n national politics) authorita-rianism measured by three "agree" statements each. How, even at the date of the original study (1962) the authors could have proceeded in that manner i s inexplicable. (See e.g., my discussion of The  American Voter, 1960 above.) They report a strong association between education and "authoritarianism" which cannot be taken as much more than "docility" with regard to abstract and fuzzy assertions. To score as other than authoritarian,respondents had to disagree with a l l of the assertions made; any lapse of attention and bingo you're a Nazi. For example "what this country needs i s a few strong leaders, and less talk i n Congress": a failure to oppose this remark might have signified no more than a concern that someone do something about anything. Anyone who did not actively disagree with this statement "Regardless of any mistakes he may have made, Senator Joseph McCarthy woke this country up to the danger of Communism" was taken as one who did not qualify as low in pro-McCarthy sentiments. A less aggressive and verbal person might well have responded to only the earlier part of the statement, or have been lost in i t s overall ambiguity. I should add here that I expect that Alford and Scoble might 95 have measured some educational difference, but I doubt that a "fairer" test would have gotten responses anything li k e they report; nor could they in any case f a i r l y ascribe the characteristics as they did. The only "quality" measure which on f i r s t glance showed a high educational difference riot linked to "response-set" i s the f i r s t "tolerance of deviant ideas" wherein there is a religious toleration question and no control for religion. Further, on closer inspection, we find that three items are used in this test, one of which requires a "disagree" answer and a l l of which must be answered "correctly" to score other than as intolerant. Thereby, the whole score is again linked to a possible response-set which i t s e l f i s , again, sharply correlated with education. On two other factors, "pro-Negro" sen-timent and favoring of restricted local electorates, there were small or no differences by education. 4 4 The finding that "leaders" regard-less of education level do not differ markedly from the random c i t i -zenry on these variables is not quite so threatened by our above critique and does provide a bit of counterbalance to the findings of Stouffer and McClosky i n that regard. (That i s , overall, there was l i t t l e or no difference between the response of leaders at a given education level and the general population with regard to "quality" variables. There may not be a response-set i f education i s thus controlled — although this, of course, must be checked i f the finding is to hold up.) *A11 of the above discussion is related primarily to page 270. 96 45 (2) Hamilton i n an examination of the San Francisco referendum on "Vietnam and data on attitudes with regard to the Korean War concludes the following: "Studies of public reactions in two wartime contexts show that preferences for "tough" policy alternatives are most frequently among the following groups: the highly educated, high status occupations, those with high incomes, younger persons, and those paying much attention to newspapers and magazines." (p. 439 or p. 442). This finding is significant as Lipset i n "Working-class Authoritaria-nism" and others who later depended on the a r t i c l e use foreign policy " l i b e r a l i t y " - " i l l i b e r a l i t y " as a significant part of their demon-stration that the less advantaged are not saviours, but rather are "devils", dangerous to democratic and perhaps even human survival. 46 It is further supported by the later findings of Howard Schuman. (3) Form and Rytina^ i n a study of the ideological views of rich and poor found that in general the poor saw the American p o l i t i c a l system as e l i t i s t rather than p l u r a l i s t , but saw pluralism as desirable. More advantaged respondents tended to see the system as already pluralist but were generally inclined to the view that i t shouldn't be too much so. This surely adds another dimension to the relative distribution 45 Richard F. Hamilton, "A Research Note on the Mass Support for 'Tough' Military Alternatives," American Sociological Review, 33 (June, 1968), pp. 439-45. 46 Howard Shuman, 'Two Sources of Antiwar Sentiment in America," American  Journal of Sociology, 78 (November, 1972) pp. 513-36. 47 William H. Form and Joan Huber Rytina, "Ideological Beliefs on the Distribution of Power i n the U.S., " American Sociological Review, 34 (February, 1969), pp. 19-31. 97 of "democratic values" among social strata. It could be argued that Form and Rytina's questions got nearer to the heart of demo-cracy: a process moving towards the equalization of p o l i t i c a l power and that on this important measure the less advantaged score "better" than the more advantaged. The same authors have also produced a recent and excellent book which I w i l l mention here merely for having located in another context yet another stark contrast to the above: "In contrast to low-status persons, we expect better educated and wealthier persons to endorse innovation and 'progress'; to be more l i b e r a l on c i v i l rights and c i v i l liberties issues, to be more 'public-regarding' i n their attitudes toward government, to support the development of 'amenities' such as recreational or cultural f a c i l i t i e s , and to favor 'reform' i n government."^8 Clearly for the authors of that statement innovation, 'progress' 'public-regardingness' and so forth, have a quite particular meaning. 49 (4) Olsen found that with socio-economic status controlled Black Americans are more active than whites i n both yoluntary association participation and voting participation. He further found that this difference has tended to become more pronounced i n the period 1957 to 1968. There i s then at least one form of disadvantage which under certain circumstances Joan Huber and William H. Form, Income and Ideology: An Analysis of  the American P o l i t i c a l Formula, (New York: The Free Press, 1973) p. 121 quoting Robert Crain and Donald B. Rosenthal "Community status as a dim-ension of local decision-making," American Sociological Review 32 (December, 1967), pp. 970-84. Marvin E. Olsen, "Social and P o l i t i c a l Participation of Blacks," Amer- ican Sociological Review, 38 (August, 1970)^pp. 682-97. 98 may promote social and p o l i t i c a l participation. (5) A further refinement of the data on strata differences i n the quan-ti t y of participation is found in a study by Angus C a m p b e l l . H e finds that the spread is sharpest when the overall turnout is lowest. That is when there is a turnout "surge," as i n a Presidential year, the added voters are disproportionately the disadvantaged. The sharpest differences in voting participation by status occur i n primary elections where total turnout is lowest. The author makes l i t t l e attempt to relate his finding to broader considerations. A related study, this one by Howard Hamilton, found that; "The association of turnout and social status was far greater (in municipal) than i n presidential elections, with a low-high ratio of 1 to 2 compared with 5 to 7 " (p. 1140) (6) Ear more important than the previous additions is the imaginative 52 study conducted by Gerald Johnson. He f i r s t notes that by socio-economic status, income, education and communications variables, the State of West Virginia predictably would, among the states, have very low electoral turnout. But i n fact for a composite turnout percentage in a l l Presidential since 1920, West Virginia placed sixth of the 50 states. He then demonstrates the inadequacy of two previous attempts to explain this deviant case. I w i l l b r i e f l y relate these previous attempts because their Angus Campbell, "Surge and Decline: A Study of Electoral Change," Public  Opinion Quarterly 24 (F a l l , 1960), pp. 397-418. "^Howard D. Hamilton, "The Municipal "Voter: Voting and Non-voting in City Elections," American P o l i t i c a l Science Review,LXV (December,1971),pp.1135-1140• 52 Gerald W. Johnson, "Research Note on P o l i t i c a l Correlates of Voter Parti-cipation: A Deviant Case Analysis," American P o l i t i c a l Science Review,LXV (September, 1971), pp. 768-76. 99 failure is instructive. Thomas R. Dye had suggested that i t could be explained as "...perhaps voting i n Appalachia is one form of 53 recreation in an otherwise drab environment." But Johnson points out voter participation in West Virginia exceeds that of other 54 Appalachian states and counties. Milbrath (p. 119) argued that West Virginians turn out i n greater numbers than might be expected in part because the state had been industrialized for some time, but now, though in decline, the effect of earlier period "remains". Johnson counters that high turnout i n West Virginia pre-dates indus-t r i a l i z a t i o n . Johnson'seems to claim that mining i s somehow not indus^ t r i a l i z a t i o n ; I would counter that that i s true i n one sense only, and that "class s o l i d a r i s t i c " occupations l i k e mining have pronounced p o l i t i c a l effects as Lipset demonstrated in P o l i t i c a l Man. Never-^ theless, Johnson's contention that the West Virginia deviant case has not been explained must be taken i n general to stand, Johnson, to be brief, finds f i r s t that within West Virginia there i s a "moderately strong" negative correlation between affluence and voting participation (using aggregate data by county). He then looks for the historical period in which West Virginia began to deviate from other equivalent socio-economic states in i t s region and fixes the 53 Thomas R. Dye P o l i t i c s , Economics and the Public: Policy Outcomes i n  the American States (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1966) p. 63, quoted i n Johnson, p. 769. 54 ti Here Johnson credits and cites Leonard G. R i t t , Presidential "Voting Pat-terns in Appalachia...." (Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, The Univer-sity of Tennessee, Knoxville, 1967). 100 time as 1892-1920 the same time as when the state was "an open battleground i n the effort to unionize i t s miners." (p. 772) Johnson concludes further that: "...comparing West Virginia and Virginia counties that share almost identical socio-economic envi-ronments but exhibit strikingly different p o l i t i c a l participation patterns, the influence of the organ-izational variable...appears to be substantial." (p. 772) and more generally he concludes, " . . . p o l i t i c a l participation in West Virginia i s more a function of variations in p o l i t i c a l style, culture, and history than a system of policy out-puts or socio-economic attributes." (p. 770) That is the specific historic event of the unionization movement, the context i n which i t occurred and i t s ongoing "cultural" effects seem to be the most crucial determinant of p o l i t i c a l participation in this case. What is most impressive about this study i s that i t begins to integrate, contextual-historical factors and empirical methods.-Each provides support to the other rather than acting as i s often the case to blur out the other. It should be noted here as well that both inadequate attempts at explanation related to failures to adequately contextualize, to actual errors of localization and dating of fact. I believe that i n general this has been a weakness to date in empirical research generally and w i l l discuss this point at several junctures throughout the chapters which follow. This par-ticular study}and others I w i l l discuss below, offers explanations which are satisfying at least in part because they integrate easily "^Milbrath, op. c i t . , p. 119. 101 into the context of historical matrix rather than being 'merely' seemingly valid generalizations (as in the case of the findings related in the previous point on "surge" effects on class voting). Again, I w i l l develop this further below. Finally, the Johnson study with the findings about Black Americans reported i n point (4) above, are examples which might be usefully taken to be building towards a pattern of explanations of situations wherein the major theme (the non-participation of the less advantaged) i s not operational. Any patterns which might be found to emerge here are potentially of great usefulness toward understanding why i t i s that the wider rule to which they are ex-ceptions is the case. It could also be useful therapy, i n some cases, for those who wished to either advance or retard that ef-fectiveness of that social "rule." (7) Another study whose findings are most important is that by Nie, Powell and Prewitt."^ The authors are concerned that: "In spite of the consistency...of findings across many studies...we know l i t t l e about the connections between social structure and p o l i t i c a l participation. With few exceptions the literature on individual participation is notable for low level generalizations (the better educated citizen talks about pol i t i c s more regularly), and the absence of systematic and comprehensive theory." (p. 362) They then apply a causal analysis technique (path analysis) to the Normal H. Nie, G. Bingham Powell; Jr., and Kenneth Prewitt, "Social Structure and P o l i t i c a l Participation: Developmental Relationships," in 2 Parts in American P o l i t i c a l Science Review, LXIII (June and Septemh 1969) pp. 361-78 and 808-32. 102 Almond-Verba five nation study data in an attempt to explore the theoretical assumptions by "showing the relationships between socio-economic attributes, intervening attitudinal characteristics and of p o l i t i c a l participation." (p. 362) They find that their two best explanatory variables, social status and organizational involvement, "operate through quite d i f f e -rent causal paths in their impact on p o l i t i c a l participation." (p. 811) "Virtually a l l of the relationship between social and p o l i t i c a l participation is explained by the intervening linking attitude variables. The high social status citizen does not just participate in po l i t i c s ; he does so only when he has the attitudes such as efficacy and attentiveness which are pos-tulated as intervening variables." (p. 811) However, much of the relationship between organizational involvement and participation (about 60%) cannot be explained by any known inter-vening variable — i t i s a "direct link" that "does not pass through" 56a social class or the attitudinal variables. (The other variables in the model include sense of citizen duty, p o l i t i c a l information, perceived impact of government, p o l i t i c a l efficacy (feeling of), and p o l i t i c a l attentiveness.) Overall the social characteristic of organizational involve-ment has a greater effect than socio-economic status in a l l five countries in the study. This is important especially when coupled with the previous finding and the authors are not unaware of the p o l i t i c a l potential of their finding: In some other contexts the existence of certain forms of feudal or quasi-feudal relationships seem to also act to increase levels of p a r t i c i -pation. In these cases greater dominance (greater disadvantage) may have an effect quite contrary to the negative effect we have taken to be gene-rally the case. (See for example: David J. Elkins, "Regional Contexts of P o l i t i c a l Participation: Some Illustrations from South India," Canadian P o l i t i c a l Science Review, V (June, 1972), pp. 167-187 or Carl H. Lande, Leaders, Factions and Parties, (New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies Monographs, 1965). 103 "...organizational involvement may represent an a l t e r n a t i v e channel for p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n for s o c i a l l y disadvantaged groups. The r u r a l peasant, the i n d u s t r i a l laborer, the disadvan-taged black may become p o l i t i c a l l y a c t i v e through his o r g a n i z a t i o n a l involvement even though he may otherwise lack the status resources for p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n . " (p. 819) and, "...obviously major changes i n the status s t r u c t u r e , i n v o l v i n g occupation, education and income patterns, are extremely d i f f i c u l t to bring about. We suspect that the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l structure may be susceptible to more d i r e c t and short-term manipulation." (p. 819) This conclusion i s well-supported by the h i s t o r i c l i n k established by Johnson above, by the t h e o r e t i c a l arguments of, for example, Gad Horowitz and by the well-known f a c t that i n highly class-mobilized post-World War II A u s t r i a , the c o r r e l a t i o n between s o c i a l status and p a r t i c i p a t i o n does not hold,~^ Nie et a l . then through simulation analysis come to the fol= lowing a d d i t i o n a l and complementary conclusions: "(1) The higher the t o t a l organization l e v e l , the l e s s the lower cl a s s i s under-represented..., "(2) The higher the c o r r e l a t i o n between status and o r g a n i z a t i o n a l membership, the more under-repre-sented the lower c l a s s . A c o r r e l a t i o n of 15 i n - r creases under-representation i n these cases by at l e a s t one-half.... "(3) The smaller the s i z e of the lower c l a s s , the more i t i s , r e l a t i v e l y , under-represented...." (p. 822) The lower class i s most severely underrepresented i n the United States than i n Germany, B r i t a i n , I t a l y or Mexico. In a l l of the Gad Horowitz, "Toward the Democratic Class Struggle," i n Trevor Lloyd and Jack McLeod (Eds.), Agenda 1970, Toronto: U n i v e r s i t y of Toronto Press 1968). For useful readings on A u s t r i a see William T. Bluhm, Building an  Austrian Nation,(New Haven: Yale Un i v e r s i t y Press,1973) and Kurt L. S h e l l The Transformation of Austrian Socialism (New York: State Uni-v e r s i t y of New York, 1962) . 104 the other four countries there have been deliberate attempts to organize the less advantaged (by the p o l i t i c a l parties or by, as the authors neglect to mention, the government of L. Cardenas i n 1930s Mexico). It might be queried then here as to why the many American parties that attempted to mobilize America's less advantaged have been peculiarly unsuccessful. I think that this sort of question is most important here and the authors offer a footnote with a brief l i s t of factors but do not elaborate i t . There are, of'course, innumerable explanations, most of which no doubt offer some part of the total explanation. Perhaps most significant are such factors as: (1) the uncommonly large divisions historically among America's less advantaged: the varieties of the foreign-born and ra c i a l and religious differences, (2) the frontier thesis, (3) the historic absence of an aristocracy and corresponding democratic ethos, and probably most important though not mentioned by the authors: a consistent and most timely tradition of p o l i t i c a l 58 repression (elite libertarian enlightenment notwithstanding). That the authors do not pursue their deviant case very far is not c r i t i c a l , i t is enough to present empirical findings which lend themselves ef-fectively to such linkings to histor i c a l analysis. 59 (8) Bennett and Klecka pursue an approach similar to that of Nie, Powell 58 See especially James A. Weinstein The Decline of Socialism in America  1912-1925 (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967). 59 Stephan E. Bennett and William Klecka "Social Status and P o l i t i c a l Par-ticipation: A Multivariate Analysis of Predictive Power," Midwest Journal  of P o l i t i c a l Science, XIV (August, 1970) pp. 355-382. 105 and Prewltt with results that are only somewhat less significant to our inquiry. Their opening concern is stated thusly (they are speaking of quantitative participation variables): "However, even after a l l of the research which has accumulated on the subject, scholars remain uncertain whether the observed relation between level of education and p o l i t i c a l participation is due mainly to the education process i t s e l f , or should be attributed to the fact that educa-tion is intimately linked to occupation and i n -come (which are themselves closely related to participation)." (p. 358) They wish to look at the relative independent and interactive ef-fects of these several variables and apply the multiple c l a s s i f i -cation analysis (MCA) technique to the Survey Research Center data on the 1964, 1966 and 1968 U.S. national elections. They also break down the various aspects of p o l i t i c a l participation from their 60 more common use in a single index. They find that for a l l three elections studied, educational experience was the strongest predictor by far of p o l i t i c a l efficacy and "that even when the concurrent ef-fects of occupation and income (were) taken into account, education retain (ed) i t s powerful impact upon p o l i t i c a l l y efficacious beliefs (p. 381) To a lesser extent, but still,education alone was also the strongest predictor of such things as influence attempts and pol-i t i c a l involvement. But for voting participation, going to the polls education retained l i t t l e of this direct effect, occupation was the stronger predictor. See John R. Robinson et a l . Measures of P o l i t i c a l Attitudes (Ann Arbor: Survey Research Center, Institute for Social REsearch, University of Michigan, 1968), pp. 423-440 for a l i s t i n g of most of the combined indices of participation used to that date. 106 More important though i s the following finding: "In the three elections studied here, even when a l l three dimensions of socio-economic status are taken together, i t i s not possible to ex-plain more than 19% of the variance i n any one aspect of participation." (p. 382) In most cases, less than 10% of the variance was "explained." This last finding i s particularly significant i f we take into account the supportive finding of the previous study wherein i t was concluded that organizational involvement was a more significant variable than socio-economic status. This weakness i s compounded when we consider that in most inultivariatE causal analysis techniques i t i s assumed that there i s unidirectional!ty of effect, that there 61 are no further intervening variables and so forth. These assump-tions tend to generate maximum "explanatory" (I believe this form of explanation remains as much correlative as.causative) power. These methods thus are effective in that they provide some indica-tion of their own limits, or at least, the bounds to which they have evolved. (9) A finding which may be interestingly coupled particularly with the Johnson and Nie et a l . studies above is that by Langton and """For a clear l i s t i n g of the assumptions of path analysis, see Nie et a l . , op. c i t . , p. 811. Paul Burstein i n his a r t i c l e "Social Structure and Individual P o l i t i c a l Participation in 5 Countries," American Journal of  Sociology 77, (May, 1972) pp. 1087-1110 comes to similar conclusions re-garding status as a predictor of participation and the greater effective-ness of media and organizational involvement. His accompanying verbal ex-planation, to wit, that status i s less effective as i t i s "further back in time" is not, however, very satisfying. 107 Rains."*" These authors found, again using analysis of variance techniques, that having an efficacious family background ac-counted for four times more movement along the efficacy scale than did either the effects of peer groups or of schools. This finding was especially valid for working class and middle class youth and less effective for upper class youth. In combination with the other studies, we might advance the notion that an h i s t o r i c a l l y established pattern of involvement can be transmitted through the family to continue intergenerationally these higher levels .... of p o l i t i c a l efficacy and p o l i t i c a l participation. This,one might hypothesize,would be further supported by the ongoing existence of class-institutional outlets for that inclination to participation. (10) One further study which can be usefully integrated into this pat-63 tern i s that of Gertzog who conducted a unique intervention into the real world of p o l i t i c s for research purposes. Gertzog encouraged a local democratic party organization to selectively use a voter activation drive and thereby established in a given campaign a "control" and an "experimental" group with no differences save organizational activity. He predicted the turnout using aggregate data for the control and experimental polls (data used included education, percent of owner-occupied dwellings, etc.) The voter activation a c t i v i t i e s — 62 Kenneth P. Langton and David A. Kains, "The Relative Influence of the Family, Peer Group and School as the Development of P o l i t i c a l Efficacy," Western P o l i t i c a l Quarterly, XXII (December, 1969), pp. 813-826, 63 Irwin N. Gertzog, "The Electoral Consequences of a Local Party Organiz-ations Registration Campaign," Polity IV (Winter, 1970) pp.247-264. 108 a single drive -- increased turnout by 2% of total vote enough to make the difference in the election. This study provides a bit of real-world evidence for the effectiveness of direct organizational activity. When 'combined" with those other studies, i t may question, I believe, explanations of status differentials in quantitative par-^ ticipation which focus solely on a negative interpretation of i n -dividual attributes of the less advantaged. (11): Finally here, I believe that this conclusion — this alternative un-derstanding — is given considerable further support by three fur^ ther recent studies which come to similar conclusions. The f i r s t of these studies is by Michael P a r e n t i . ^ Parenti i s bothered by the 'pluralist' view of community power and the participation of the less advantaged; he discusses Dahl and Polsby: "'Most people use their p o l i t i c a l resources scarcely at a l l , ' some not even bothering to vote; hence they never f u l l y convert their "potential influence" into "actual influence." They do not exert themselves because they feel no compelling need to participate. To assume that citizens, especially of the lower class, should be p o l i t i c a l l y active i s , Polsby says, to make 'the inappropriate and arbitrary as-signment of upper and middle-class values to a l l actors in the community.' There are 'personal withdrawal' and habitual reasons for lower-class withdrawal having nothing to do with p o l i t i c a l l i f e . " 6 5 Michael Parenti, "Power and. Pluralism: A View from the Bottom," Journal of P o l i t i c s , XXXII (August, 1970), pp. 501-530, ^ 5 Parenti, p. 505-6 quoting Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961) and Nelson Polsby, Community Power and  P o l i t i c a l Theory (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963). 109 Parent! then notes Polsby's view that non-participation, the absence of demand for change i s best understood as natural and as a sign of the 'good health' of the system. Parent! then looks at actual ex-amples of p o l i t i c a l issues and the related participation of the less advantaged from their own perspective within those a c t i v i t i e s . His setting is a Newark New Jersey ghetto and his issues are education, a demand for a t r a f f i c light, and an electoral campaign. He relates examples of intense involvement and sustained personal commitment on the part of many citizens in the area (in response to an i n i t i a l organizational impetus from a few white student ac t i v i s t s ) . He also reports considerable i n i t i a l feelings of cynicism, hopelessness and doubt on the part of many. He shows that considerable activity met consistent rebuffs on even the most minor issues and that those rebuffs showed that a l l avenues of appeal: city council, landlords, police and others "displayed a remarkable capacity to move in the same direction against (these) rather modest lower-class demands." (p. 519) The activists were alternately harassed, ignored, arrested and disqualified by the proper channels and authorities. From the point of view of the disadvantaged, non-involvement can be seen less as not mere incapacity and indifference on their part, but as a rational response to a patterned, unresistant and class-biased system. 66 Form and Huber . attempted in another study to probe beneath William H. Form and Joan Huber, "Ideology, Race and the Ideology of P o l i t i c a l Efficacy," Journal of P o l i t i c s , 33 (August, 1971), pp. 659-688. 110 the low feelings of p o l i t i c a l efficacy of the less advantaged (by income and by race) and found that these groups generally believed that they did not have influence cn either the p o l i t i c a l process or elected o f f i c i a l s . They, after studying these and further attitudes in depth, conclude: "Thus for the blacks, feelings of p o l i t i c a l i n -efficacy result from a r e a l i s t i c appraisal of how the p o l i t i c a l system works." (p. 685) And further that: "fljikewise, the assumption that psychological at-titudes, such as a sense of efficacy and citizen duty, explain why people participate p o l i t i c a l l y involves a bias in favor of existing conditions because people are thought to be 'free' to act as they choose." (p. 686) Those who conclude that the less advantaged are somehow not democratic, have somehow personally 'failed' democratic theory, are assuming that the p o l i t i c a l market i s a free one. The study by Parenti and that by Savitch^ demonstrate reasonably well that one cannot f a i r l y assume that that i s the case; the system i s not one which i s equally open to a l l . Savitch, i n looking at another set of issues and issue-involvement of the poor documents in his cases numerous closures which he groups under the headings of systemic biases. He discusses how they operate i n concrete cases. He con^ eludes with a discussion of the cycle of powerlessness which i s the manifestation of, for some groups, r e a l i s t i c eventual conclusion that p o l i t i c a l activity i s f u t i l e . The result i s quiescence, which is not, as Polsby would have i t , evidence that the system i s functioning well. ^Howard V. Savitch, "Powerlessness i n an Urban Ghetto," Polity 5, (Fa l l , 1972), pp.19-56. I l l Perhaps the best way to conclude this survey i s to summarize briefly here the explanations offered in the recent and excellent study 68 by Verba and Nie. In many ways this book i s the most methodologically advanced study of participation carried out to date; and, at least as important for our purposes here, i t s primary focus is on explaining the relative inactivity of the disadvantaged. The explanations the authors offer are closely linked to their empirical findings. On the whole, the study supports the view that social science can be a cumulative and self-correcting enterprise. The explanations presented by Verba and Nie could provide a good backdrop against which to consider the expla-nations of Marxism. Verba and Nie divide participation into four separate modes: campaign activity, voting, communal activity and particularized con-tacting. They derive these modes from a factor analysis of fifteen par-ticipation variables. Communal activity i s "composed of a l l the acts of participation that take place i n a participatory setting devoid of the counter-participants that characterize electoral involvement" (p. 69). This component includes five a c t i v i t i e s , such as working with others on local problems and contacting of leaders regarding social problems. This factor correlates negatively i n a consistent way with partisan campaign variables and show a near zero relationship with voting. Efforts at personalized contacting are attempts to gain solutions to particular Sidney Verba and Norman H. Nie, Participation in America (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1972). 112 problems by contacting local, state, or national leaders. This factor has no strong relationship with any other aspect of participation. Persons participating in this way are neither more or less l i k e l y to be those who vote; they do tend a b i t to be other than those who engage in partisan campaign actities (although i t is possible that some who are active campaigners might be disinclined to volunteer such informa-tion). The authors locate a small (4% of sample) 'group' of citizens who engage only in particularized contacting and characterize them as parochial activists. Other groups are then identified as generally inactive (22%), voting specialists (21%), communalists (20%), campaigners (15%), and complete activists (11%). This breakdown of participation into several distinct modes produces interesting results when the authors turn to consider the relationship between participation and indicators of relative socio-economic advan-tage. Lower socio-economic levels, women and Blacks are overrepresented among the inactives; lower socio-economic levels are overrepresented among voting specialists and the parochial participants category, but Blacks are overrepresented in that latter category. Upper socio-economic groups are overrepresented in the other three categories, but Blacks and Catho-l i c s are also overrepresented in the 'campaigners' category. Communalists are particularly common in rural areas and small towns. Socio-economic status is measured by education, income and proportion of white collar employment. The effect of socio-economic status is less pronounced in voting participation than i t is for campaign or communal ac t i v i t i e s . It has 113 almost no effect on particularized contacting. A simple path analysis shows that the effects of socio-economic status are enhanced by the greater tendency of members ofthose groups to be characterizable by greater civic orientations (citizen duty, p o l i t i c a l efficacy, and so forth). The authors then proceed to see what changes occur in the effects of SES on participation when SES i s adjusted for other factors such as age, race, organizational involvement and p o l i t i c a l party activation. The authors, unfortunately and i n contrast to their stated intents, do not determine what of socio-economic differences are in actuality the effects of age differences. (That i s the old and the young are both the least prosperous and the least active.) They merely find that when one controls for SES voting rises continuously with age rather than declining in late middle and old age. (Overall participation does not decline u n t i l age 65 and then not greatly when SES i s controlled.) These findings could be reordered to show that SES differences are i n part age differences. This study is particularly useful i n i t s findings about Black Americans. Blacks were found to be far more commonly in the partisan (campaign activist) and complete activist groups than their SES might predict. For example, Blacks i n the 4th sextile of SES have a mean par-ticipation score of +22, while white at that same level have a score of -4, Blacks in the highest SES rank have a score of +98, white +56. In the context of their consideration of race, the authors state: If a deprived group is to use p o l i t i c a l participation to i t s advantage, i t must participate in p o l i t i c s 114 more than one would expect, given i t s level of education, income or occupation. It must somehow bypass the processes that lead those with higher social status to participate more and those with lower status to participate less group consciousness may substitute for the higher social status that impels citizens into p o l i t i c a l participation. It may represent an alternative mechanism for mobilizing citizens to p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y . " (pp. 150-51) In their discussion of a race, the authors present a most pertinent, sharp and clear finding. In response to a series of open-ended questions on groups that were i n c o n f l i c t i n t h e i r community or problems they faced i n their personal l i f e , community or nation those Black respondents who mentioned race were far'more l i k e l y to be p o l i t i c a l l y involved than were those who did not. In fact, those who did not mention race were far below the mean black levels of participation, those who did, even once, were well above the mean white participation level (thereby overcoming the effects of racial SES differentials). Group self-consciousness can be a route to p o l i t i c a l activation. With regard to organizational involvement, Verba and Nie come to the following conclusion: "...organizations increase the p o l i t i c a l gap, for the simple reason that those who come from advan-taged groups are more l i k e l y to be organizationally active. Upper-status groups are, to begin with, more p o l i t i c a l l y active. They are also more active in organizations. And, because the latter type of activity has an independent effect in increasing p o l i t i c a l activity... their advantage i n p o l i t i c a l activity over the lower groups i s increased." (p. 208) The authors immediately add that this is not inevitable and that in countries where socialist movements have given disadvantaged groups a better organizational base, "organizational a f f i l i a t i o n and activity do 115 not exacerbate p o l i t i c a l inequalities as i n the United States, but act rather to mediate the standard socio-economic model." (p. 208) Organizations are seen then to be an important 'potential' "source for reducing the participation gap." In their study of party partisanship Verba and Nie find that strongly conservative attitudes have an independent effect, increasing participation of the well-off even beyond that which their SES might produce. And, " ( P ) o l i t i c a l beliefs appear to play no such r o l e among strong Democrats." (p. 227) The authors do not seem able to explain this difference, one can only speculate that i t may be the seeming resistance of the American p o l i t i c a l system to strong leftward change. With regard to the community context of participation, the authors find that the growth of cities and suburbs and the decline of small and roildle-sized relatively autonomous communities has over time a negative impact on participation. They further find that over time (1952-1970) the correlation between class and participation has tended to increase in America. They are very cautious about extending that trend line into the future and again cite the recent rise in Black consciousness and p o l i t i c a l activity. A l l in a l l , the Nie and Verba study perhaps more than any other steers away from many of the p i t f a l l s which T w i l l discuss in the next chapter. The study incorporates a variety of contextual factors, trend factors, and effectively segments the variety of status and participation elements. Empirical social science can have considerable explanatory power with regard to our area of concern. 116 CHAPTER 4 I have c r i t i c a l l y set out something of the pattern of findings of empirical p o l i t i c a l studies regarding the participation cf the less ad-vantaged, and we are now prepared to more effectively consider directly an additional series of questions. Many of these matters were l e f t im-p l i c i t or only considered indirectly or i n passing i n the last chapter. To begin with, i s there or has there been a patterned understanding of the 'quantity' and 'quality' of the participation of the less advantaged? If so, and I believe that there has been such a pattern, how widespread has i t s acceptance been among those studying p o l i t i c a l participation? Can we delineate elements from which i t i s generally composed? Which of those elements are most subject to question and on what grounds? Is, and I believe this i s a c r i t i c a l and profoundly d i f f i c u l t question, that pattern of understanding methodologically rooted? What additional and/ or alternative roots might that understanding have? Finally, and this reveals something of my conclusions to the preceding questions, how i n turn might that understanding inhibit the process of research on these questions and the further evolution of appropriate empirical methodologies? I The questions just posed are not the sort of questions which lend themselves to clear and clean answers; at best, i t can only be hoped to offer tentative claims grounded in indicative support. One must also 117 gratefully u t i l i z e a l l prior considerations which can be depended upon. Luckily here, there are several excellent c r i t i c a l studies to be util i z e d as a point of departure; we do not have to begin from the beginning. Our beginning point can be found in the broad critiques of the so-called post^ behavioralists''" who have made many points relevant to our Inquiry in varyingly relevant contexts. Collectively, they might be taken as having identified and sketched the outlines of an understanding of p o l i t i c a l par-ticipation common to much of the behavioral inquiry into that subject which preceded them. I w i l l use a discussion of their work as a means of clarifying the elements of that understanding, Perhaps the central theme of the 'post-behavioral' critiques with regard to the question of participation i s the assertion that the advocates of i j ,2 new democracy : "...reject outright the old democratic vision of a community of participating members, i n i t s various forms. Not only are the stated reasons for such a rejection inadequate; i t can s t i l l reasonably be argued that the realization of this vision, i n one form or another, remains a desirable goal of social and pol-i t i c a l a c t i v i t y . " P a r t i c u l a r l y useful are Pateman, four of the essays i n McCoy and Play-ford and Bachrach, a l l op. c i t . , and also worth mentioning though a l l less centrally and directly concerned with the questions at hand here are: Christian Bay "Po l i t i c s and Pseudo-politics," American P o l i t i c a l  Science Review, LIX (June, 1965) pp. 39-51; Steven W. Rousseas and James Farganis, "American Pol i t i c s and the End of Ideology," Brit i s h Journal of Sociology, 14 ( Dec. 1963) pp. 347-360; and to some extent E.E. Schattschneider, The Semi-Sovereign People (New York, 1960). 2 The advocates of the 'new democracy,' elsewhere called advocates of revisionist or e l i t i s t democracy, or more neutrally 'contemporary demo-cratic theorists' are, as w i l l be c l a r i f i e d shortly below, such writers as Berelson, Milbrath, Dahl et a l . The quotation from Duncan and Lukes may be found in McCoy and Playford, op. c i t . , at page 162. 118 I have already commented above that I do not share the view of some of the post-behavioralists regarding the content of the 'old democratic vision.' But that point aside, there can be l i t t l e doubt that many, i f not most, of the researchers who studied and wrote on p o l i t i c a l par-ticipation, p o l i t i c a l attitudes and voting behavior in the period 1950-1965 developed, or had, a wide range of doubts about the desirability of increasing the p o l i t i c a l participation of the less advantaged. These doubts were contrary to, i f nothing else, the conventional wisdom of the time. But more importantly for our purposes, these doubts,when elaborated, provided a value context within which those explanations of inactivity which center on the inadequacies of the inactive make sense. Duncan and Lukes offer a lucid critique both of this context and of the explanations consistent and commonly associated with i t . For example, explanations based on apathy, lack of information or i r r a t i o n a l i t y . Regarding the latter they point out that in the view of both Plamenatz and Schumpeter there is a "distinction between what men do and their aware-ness of the significance of their actions." (Apolitical P o l i t i c s , p. 167) Rational 'doing' can coexist with an irrational or at least inarticulate understanding of that action. Inarticulate becomes the operant term for Duncan and Lukes when one is calling to question interview-based evi-dence. Men may be condemned by "inarticulateness or private language to seem less reasonable than they are." (p. 167) This questioning of the explanatory limits of findings (in which we w i l l engage further below) is not, however, the major theme of the 'post-behavioral' reply 119 to revisionism of democratic theory. The major thrust of the dispute can be seen set out i n two pas-sages, the f i r s t from Robert Dahl (as quoted by Duncan and Lukes); the second from Duncan and Lukes themselves, "...we must conclude that the classic assumptions about the need for citizen participation in demo-cracy were, at the very least, inadequate. If one regards p o l i t i c a l equality in the making of decisions as a kind of limit to be achieved, then i t is axiom-; atic that this limit could only be arrived at with the complete participation of every adult citizen. Nevertheless, what we c a l l 'democracy' (Duncan and Luke's emphasis) — that i s , a system of decision-; -making in which the leaders are more or less responsive to the preferences of non-leaders — does seem to operate with a relatively low level of citizen participation. Hence i t is inaccurate to say that one of the necessary conditions for 'democracy' is extensive citizen participation," (p. 168)3 Duncan and Lukes reply: "Not only i s Dahl's definition of democracy extremely loose (in what p o l i t i c a l system are leaders not more or less responsible to non-leaders?) but the rejection of the classical requirement of participation rests upon an obvious redefinition of democracy, in which what are taken for present day facts supplant the ideal." (p. 168) Dahl here (though not elsewhere) and others have declined to see that the concept 'democracy' carries both empirical and normative referents From Dahl's on "Hierarchy, Democracy and Bargaining i n P o l i t i c s and Economics," (in Heinz Eulau et al.) (Eds.) P o l i t i c a l Behavior (Glencoe The Free Press, 1954) p. 87, 4 This must be qualified: Dahl, in his essay, "Power Pluralism and De-mocracy: A Modest Proposal," APSA 1964 annual meeting as discussed in Bachrach op. c i t . , p. 85, i t is argued that to espouse an impossible p o l i t i c a l equality as a major democratic aim i s to further cynicism toward democracy. He thus may accept a meaning which implies the Tightness of equality so long as i t does not imply 'too much' of i t . 120 The position can be characterized (probably caricatured I concede) as one of 'the best I can see, is the best that can be.' When we involve an appreciation of the writings of Marcuse and other Marxists to this 'rhyme' the words 'I can' w i l l take on several layers of meaning. For me, the operant word i n the Dahl quote is 'preferences' — alternatives are not often conceived of by contemporary America's disadvantaged and when they are, they are usually neither concrete, nor p o l i t i c a l . In fairness we should note that Dahl might agree and Lane, for example, clearly . believes that this is not something to celebrate. I see low participation as profoundly tragic, h i s t o r i c a l l y conditioned, i n s t i t u -tionally rooted, and to be properly taken as evidence that the system i n question i s not thoroughgoing. The belief that democracy does "seem to operate" regardless of low participation levels can, i f widespread, have repressive effects. Duncan and Lukes put i t well i n arguing that one might legitimately c a l l the United States a democracy, but i t doesn't follow from that legitimacy that participation i s no longer central to the theory of democracy. (p. 171) Some theories might be U t o p i a n , the rest of their paper may be summarized to say, and thereby can be "condemned by histori c a l forces to s t e r i l i t y " (p. 171, Marx credited), but the centrality of participation to democratic theory is not such a case. A variety of other statements are noted by Duncan and Lukes which carry Dahl's 'revisions' a step further, from the acceptance of apathy to a belief in i t s necessity to something near to i t s celebration. Berelson's view that apathy serves as a 'cushion' to 'absorb the intense action of 121 highly motivated partisans',, i s that kind of statement, Berelson sees apathy as p o s i t i v e l y necessary to the continuation of democracy. This was discussed i n the previous chapter. I t could also be remembered here that i n the 1952 American e l e c t i o n s (on which Voting was based), most 'highly motivated partisans' were hi d i n g from the 'intense a c t i o n ' of o f f i c i a l p o l i t i c a l repression and the 'apathy cushion' which gained e l e c t i o n to the White House provided for precious l i t t l e 'absorption'."* Lane Davis points out that the re-stated theory of democracy has p o t e n t i a l as s e l f - f u l f i l l i n g prophecy.^ JAn a r t i c l e by W.H. llorr i s - J o n e s went even further i n arguing that apathy i s "a more or le s s e f f e c t i v e counterforce to those f a n a t i c s who c o n s t i t u t e the r e a l danger to p o l i t i c a l democracy." ("In Defence of Apathy", P o l i t i c a l Studies, 11 (1963), 156-177. As Dennis Wrong argues ( i n "The P e r i l s of P o l i t i c a l Moderation". Commentary, 27 (January, 1959), pp. 1-8). 'Moderation' requires no more than that one be committed to peaceful submission to ' f i n a l ' v e r d i c t s — i t doesn't require watering down or self-censorship of u n l i k e l y views. Intense partisanship i s not fanaticism. Indifference i s a f a r graver threat to democracy. I would here c r i t i c i s m of Duncan and Lukes who state (p. 184) that the 'new democracy' o f f e r s "No middle way...between the concentration camp and a cautious conservatism." This point i s relevant to the varying view-points on the collapse of the Weimar Republic and to the s i x t h element of the conservative understanding discussed below. Highly pertinent here i s P h i l l i p Converse, "The Nature of B e l i e f Systems i n Mass P u b l i c s " , i n David Apter Ideology and Discontent (Glencoe : The Free Press, 1964, pp. 206-261). 6 This point perhaps i s even more c l e a r l y made by Maure L. Goldschmidt i n h i s "Democratic Theory and Contemporary P o l i t i c a l Science," i n a caution to an i n t e r e s t i n g attempt to l i n k Edmond Burke and The C i v i c  Culture: "In contrast to c l a s s i c a l democratic theory,they see democracy as already achieved; the main problem,therefore i s to preserve i t . C l a s s i c a l democratic theory, on the other hand, sees democracy as a never-ending process of achieving, as dynamic s t r i v i n g f o r the goals of l i b e r t y , equality and f r a t e r n i t y and f o r a continuous concern with the improvements of the means of achievement." ( A p o l i t i c a l P o l i t i c s , pp. 118-9). 122 "Unlike predictions about what may happen and what may work, predictions about what may not are l i k e l y to foreclose the continued persistent efforts which ^ may eventually succeed in achieving the 'impossible'." Mercifully then for democracy much of the literature of p o l i t i c a l science is only rarely popular reading material. What i s significant about this consideration becomes apparent when one realizes that some of those who argue from the mere detection of widespread apathy to i t s permanence and desirability also believe that the underprivileged can only be aroused by belief i n victories which are rapid, certain and f i n a l . That adds up to immutability with a vengeance: informing persons seen t