THE POLITICAL INACTIVITY OF THE LESS ADVANTAGED:
THE APPROACHES OF MARXISM AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE

by

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ABSTRACT

The thesis begins by outlining some of the major findings of political sociology regarding the demographic characteristics of those persons who are typically less inclined to participate in the political process within liberal democratic systems. It has generally been found that participation is positively related to income, education, and occupational status; and that generally men and racial, ethnic and religious majorities tend as well to participate more than women and minorities.

The third chapter isolates seven alternative explanations of the relative political inactivity of the less advantaged from the recent literature of empirical social science. There is then an attempt to show that to a considerable extent though by no means universally, the explanations of empirical social science can be usefully seen as fitting into a 6-part 'conservative understanding' of the non-participation of the less advantaged. Associated claims such as those which state or imply that low levels of participation have positive effects for political systems because the less advantaged are less informed or more intolerant are critiqued by a detailed questioning of research techniques, by a gathering of empirical evidence from less familiar sources, and by doubts regarding the degree to which some researchers findings follow from their own evidence. Included as part of these sections is an analysis of recent introductory texts in political science wherein the elements of the 'conservative understanding' mentioned above are found, in some cases, to be badly (and erroneously) stated. Lastly, towards the close of the fourth chapter there is some discussion and analysis of recent
American intellectual history in an attempt to place in historico-sociopolitical perspective several aspects of the recent study of political participation. At several points there is a discussion of aspects of the methodology of empirical social science and its relationship to the findings under consideration here.

Chapters 5 and 6 focus on the contrasts between, on the one hand, the analyses of empirical social science regarding the relative non-participation of the less advantaged, and on the other, the explanations of Marxists of the seeming disinclination of the working class in 'late capitalist' societies to pursue political activity (in particular revolutionary socialist political activity). Chapter 5 isolates and develops 13 separate but related explanations found in the writings of contemporary Marxists. Chapter 6 offers a critique of explanations, the evidence supporting them, and aspects of the methodology underlying them. The assumptions, approaches and methods of Marxism and empirical social science are treated comparatively.

Among the conclusions reached is the view that while Marxism is often imprecise and generally slow to adapt to changing empirical conditions it has an important capacity for developing explanations which are comprehensive, integrated and theoretically useful. A series of suggestions are offered whereby Marxist explanations might be, at least in part, tested empirically. The final chapter discusses some of the weaknesses of both empirical social science and Marxism and makes some tentative suggestions about how they might be avoided in both theoretical and detailed inquiry.
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CHAPTER 1

Whenever a living organism or collectivity loses the possibility of being more than it is, it cannot continue; it begins to die. Potentialities, then, are an intimate and inseparable part of being. For human individuals, potentialities are manifest in a complex of biology and consciousness. There can be no real understanding of what a human individual is without a knowledge of what she/he might become; the complex of biological and mental potentiality is an important part of any such understanding. A collectivity is less contingent upon biology than is any one individual; but its existence is no less dependent on its potentialities. Understanding what a society is, then, is pari passu understanding what it might become.¹ That understanding is then, in turn, related less to biology than to the dynamics of social organization and to societal self-consciousness about societal possibilities.

Any patterned study of human society which either does not or cannot effectively come to understand social potentialities will not

¹In this sentence the word 'might' is important. This stress and in my use of the word 'potentiality' I hope to indicate my view that social science can never be more than probabilistic science. And I have doubts that in practice rather than in principle we will ever come to the point where the probabilities regarding many major questions can be expressed in the form of solvable mathematical equations or precise odds. The single most convincing difficulty is, for me, the fact that the objects of study are subjects and can adjust their behavior in the light of previous findings. In this, and perhaps other senses, the contingency of human behavior is limited -- there is some element of human creativity which may well prove impossible to anticipate. I do not take this unlikelihood as grounds for not attempting to anticipate creativity, for in trying, partially succeeding and communicating that success we continually advance the level at which that process begins.
effectively understand social actualities. And, of course, the reverse is also true; any patterned study of human society which does not or cannot effectively come to understand social actualities will not effectively understand social potentialities. Contemporary empirical social science has often been seen as unwilling or unable to deal effectively with social potentiality or social change. Is this claim a correct one? If so, in whole or in part, what are the roots of this shortcoming? Are they necessary limits of methodology broadly conceived? Are there additional plausible explanations -- for example, is there a socio-historical basis for some of the emphasis of contemporary empirical social science?

2 I will use the term empirical social science throughout this inquiry in a quite narrow way, as a term which refers to a large body of non-Marxist social science. I am fully aware that the term used more broadly could be taken to subsume Marxism, but such a usage in a comparative inquiry such as this would for me raise many questions. For example, why should we not on the contrary see all empirical social science as at least potentially a subset of Marxism?

I take empirical social science, then, to be that portion of social science which seeks to attain precise, ideally quantifiable, measures of human social behavior and sees those measures, and their use in a process of disconfirming null hypotheses in ways subject to retest by other researchers, as the soundest route to the understanding of social man. I take the term to be only somewhat broader than the term behavioral social science in that I might include within its scope more legal, institutional and systems studies than are sometimes considered behavioral.

Finally, in general in this inquiry I will be looking at primarily the disciplines of sociology and political science, and to a lesser extent social psychology and some aspects of economics. I did not, of course, wish to be taken to be trying to generalize beyond those bounds which I have carefully examined.

It is perfectly clear that there is no purely deductive way to deal with such questions. We must directly examine some part of the body of empirical literature.\(^4\) It is also perfectly clear that no one effort will be able to wholly answer such questions, all that can be hoped for is the addition of some further clarity to earlier efforts. This I hope I will be able to do by undertaking here a study of how empirical social science has come to understand and explain\(^5\) an issue which has been both of general theoretical importance and the subject of extensive empirical research. The area of research I have chosen is political participation: more particularly the relative lack of participation by socio-economically disadvantaged persons.

I do not believe, however, that an examination in isolation of this one pattern is a sufficient means of answering or clarifying the questions I have asked. I propose to look as well at an alternative attempt to understand and explain, in this case, a particular form of political inactivity of the disadvantaged: contemporary Marxist explanation(s) of the political inactivity of the working class in developed and late capitalism.\(^6\) In looking at Marxist explanations

\(^4\) In doing so I will to some extent draw as well on secondary summaries prepared by both behavioralists and their critics (see Chapters 2 and 3).

\(^5\) For a clarification of the particular meanings I have given these two terms in this study see below the closing section of this Chapter.

\(^6\) 'Late capitalism' is a term current in Marxism which carries the implication that the capitalism of the contemporary West has extended itself beyond its 'appropriate' departure from history by a variety of devices ranging from imperialism to militarism to easy consumer credit and Keynesian economics. Accordingly, those who use this term hold the view that this formation is due or overdue for transformation and are then left to account for the behavior and 'non-behavior' of the working class. Thereby those Marxists who are inclined to use this concept are, among others, of great interest in this inquiry.
of this question and the forms or lack of evidence which contemporary Marxists have offered in support of their explanations I hope that in this comparison and contrast I can deal more effectively with my original questions.

There seems to be a good prime facie case that Marxism might serve as a means of gaining further understanding of empirical social science. For example, in terms of our opening concern, if empirical social science could be said to underestimate the importance of and/or be unable to effectively measure the potentiality 'portion' of social reality, Marxism could equally fairly be said to look at social reality through, if you will, a potentiality prism. Marxist measures of past and present tend to be made in terms of their ability to serve as the basis for understanding the prospects of a transformation toward an approximated future. If empirical social science tends at times to sacrifice scope and depth of explanation for precision, Marxism's forte is explanatory scope, its nadir conceptual clarity. Social science seeks quantified evidence and typicalities, Marxism is more often concerned with portents and indications of possible trends. If empirical social scientists have been restricted in their ability to incorporate historical materials many Marxists have blurred the details of years for the patterns of decades and centuries. If social scientists have too often lacked theoretical grounding for detailed research projects, Marxists have often been trapped in a spiral of ever more abstracted and reified

7 Whether or not Marx himself or many Marxists would accept this characterization is a complex question; I do not necessarily take it to be 'their' view.
theorizing. There are further interesting differences, of course, but I will offer them in later Chapters when I can begin to deal with their complexities in greater detail. Suffice it to say here that Marxist analysis and empirical social science are two well-developed methods of coming to some understanding of social reality, their perspectives can be usefully counterposed, and they each have devoted considerable attention and considerable theoretical centrality to the concrete research area within which I will attempt to clarify the limits of these two methodological perspectives.

The Significance of Political Participation

If asked to choose one concept by which to best judge the relative presence or absence of democracy in a society's politics most of us would, I expect, choose "participation". If we were seeking the knowledge necessary to locate the means to increase the degree of democracy we would attempt to determine the varieties of individuals for whom participation is uncommon or ineffective and the systemic-institutional, social-cultural, and individual-psychological explanations of that ineffectiveness. Such knowledge could provide a beginning point for the posing of alternatives.

How can one best get at the meaning of the concept 'participation'; what are its indicators? Are hours spent, or dollars spent, a valid measure? Is intensity of involvement -- the depth of emotions felt, the salience of politics -- a useful measure? Or wouldn't we better seek to determine the 'quality' of participation via measures of levels of political sophistication (knowledge)? Or is there a
dimension missing in the usual measures of participation — must we not deal with the questions of effectiveness of participation. That is, is the essence of participation less in the quantity or quality of energy and resources expended than in the effectiveness of that expenditure? Surely activity utterly without effect on the social order is not full participation; it is, depending on the intentions of the actors, either a game or a deception. All these are surely important matters, but on balance what should be remembered is that there is as well much to be gained in making separate measurements of activity and of effectiveness of activity. Each can be seen to be a part of democratic participation.

The question of participation then implies some need to make comparisons among Burkean virtual representation, the dictatorship of the proletariat, Philippine electoral shoot-outs and the mass organization production of coalition government in post-war Austria. Within that complex of questions and unavailable answers we must in turn confront an often-avoided yet real conceptual-theoretical problem: does participation necessarily imply activity? More significantly, does a mere activity increase imply greater participation? If we conclude that it does — that the concept would most usefully be taken to do so — we must realize that we have thereby lessened its usefulness as a necessary

\[\text{\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{8}} Not necessarily, of course, the same thing as measurable activity.}\]
indicator of the presence, absence or degree of democracy. Not all students of participation have been fully aware that they have made this assumption.

We should perhaps indicate briefly at this point the importance of political participation as a part of the classical conception of democracy. An elaborate demonstration of that importance is not necessary here, the case has been well made elsewhere. The nature of that importance will be discussed further shortly. The importance of such harkenings back to classical democratic theory can be very easily overdrawn; I offer it as a useful initial context, not as canon.

In this latter regard one point should be clearly made here,

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9 I follow C.B. MacPherson The Real World of Democracy, (Toronto: Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 1965) on the theoretical possibility of non-liberal democracy and it follows for me that a non-participatory democracy is also a possibility (rarely actualized). Democracy in its broadest possible conception can be a useful concept. Government of, by and for (taken one at a time) the people allows one to come to mixed conclusions in comparing the democracy of an acknowledgedly authoritarian workers' state which genuinely sought to engage in a rapid improvement of the condition of the less advantaged majority of its population to another state in which the interests of a relatively active majority chose to systematically disadvantage a minority within, or large numbers of persons outside its borders.

that is, that what might be seen as implicit in some of the 'post-behavioral' critiques of 'democratic revisionism' I would agree that none of the theorists of liberal democracy generally held to be central to the formation of the 'classical' theory of liberal democracy could be correctly described as unequivocal democrats. In fact none is a consistent advocate of even the degree of participation common to the contemporary Western liberal democracies. Locke, for example, was primarily concerned with the rule of law, limited government, and the right of revolution against tyranny. He objected to absolute monarchy, but beyond that was unclear as to the proper locus of sovereignty:

"...Locke has no clear view of the nature or residence of sovereignty. He speaks at one time of the supreme power of the people, or in other words the community; he speaks at another of the supreme power of the legislative -- which may, it is true, be the community, but also may be a body of representatives appointed by the community; and in still another context he remarks that "where...the executive is vested in a single person who has also a share in the legislative then that single person, in a very tolerable sense, may also be called the supreme power.""

11 Certainy Duncan and Lukes are clear about the very limited nature of J.S. Mill's call for democratic participation (see p. 164 and p. 170 in Charles A. McCoy and John Playford, Apolitical Politics (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1967)). They are also clear that he had greater hopes for future potential, etc. On the other hand Lane Davis seems a bit less cautious when he refers to periodic electoral chores as participation"...at best, a pale and rather pathetic version of the responsible and active participation which was the aspiration of classical democracy" (in McCoy and Playford at page 193). I do not offer the brief discussion which now follows as a rebuttal. Rather I simply wish to make clear that my critique does not depend in large part on 'eternal values' expressed in democratic theory.

Locke did not deal with questions of suffrage, or with the patterned regular recurrence of elections or popular decision-making beyond hoping that the people would overturn those tyrannies which were consistent, enduring and intolerable. Further, he had little difficulty accepting a social assignment which might be called qualified slavery (slaves could be owned but not murdered and, in rare cases, slavicide, too, was acceptable).\(^{13}\)

The very limited nature of the democratic aspects of the political forms called for by other often-cited 17th and 18th century democratic theorists are also well-known. Montesquieu's separation of powers was designed in part to check the power of elected representatives.\(^{14}\) The ambivalence and ambiguity of Rousseau are well-known.\(^{15}\) De Tocqueville,

\(^{13}\) Locke, John, "Second Treatise on Civil Government," in _op. cit._, pp. 15-16. For a thorough discussion of the work of Locke in this context see Frank Marini, "John Locke and the Revision of Classical Democratic Theory," _Western Political Quarterly_, XXII (March, 1969), pp. 5-18. Marini effectively makes several important points; for example he argues: "Locke's political theory bears little resemblance to the 'classical theory of the critical arguments. The citizens Locke describes are not the pure, perfectly rational, informed and active citizens which the critics found in classical theory." (The quote is at p. 17.) The critics to whom Marini refers are largely behavioralist political scientists.) Marini feels that Locke's viewpoint has been distorted into a strawman and that Locke in actuality is "not at all democratic in the sense that 'classical democratic theory' is usually represented as being democratic." (Also, p. 17.) In my view most of the 'classical' theorists are far less democratic than they have been taken to be. Many empirical social scientists, as I will discuss in Chapters 3 and 4, have in effect taken modest belief in human improvability as wild-eyed idealism.


\(^{15}\) The best evidence for that ambiguity is the widely differing views of Rousseau's democratic consistency. Two sharply diverging interpretations are J.L. Talmn _The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy_ (London: Secker & Warburg, 1952), and Pateman, _op. cit._, Chapter 2.
of course, was highly fearful and even primarily concerned with the tyranny of the majority and the dangers of social leveling. And to reach nearer the time-bounds of anything we might call 'classical' democratic theory J.S. Mill in Considerations on Representative Government is often doubtful of popular recognition of eminence and consistently fearful of both citizens and representatives attempting matters beyond their limited competence. Mill is an explicit proponent of truncated democracy; he argues for tests of literacy and arithmetic competence and for the debasement from the franchise of those who are in receipt of parish relief (and thereby make no tax contribution however small or indirect). Finally, and probably most convincingly here is Mills' direct call for weighted voting to accompany the then oncoming introduction of nearer universal (male) suffrage. He calls for the granting of multiple votes to those of greater "education" either as directly measured in a national test, or as, in his view, approximated by occupation ("A banker... is likely to be more intelligent than a tradesman....") professional status or university graduation.

Few, if any, then, of the "classical" democratic theorists were sanguine about the appropriateness or even, in some cases, the eventual desirability of universal participation, or even further, in other cases,

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17. Regarding tests of literacy, see ibid., p. 132; regarding the disenfranchisement of those receiving relief see the same source at p. 134.

18. Ibid., pp. 135-140.
the eventual desirability of universal participation in even the indirect participation of the representative democracy. Yet it is generally held that widespread participation is the heart of any truly democratic theory. This seeming limitation in the early statement of the theory can only be understood by reference to the historical specificity of the theories. In all cases the theorists were semi-consciously advocating pieces of a more or less integratable theory of liberal democracy. In most cases the pieces each of them emphasized, whether the rule of law, the extension of suffrage, or the limitation of absolute powers can be imagined/constructed from this point in time as advocated steps towards a coherent theoretical whole.

But the dimension of potentiality is not an aspect of democratic or any other social theory merely retrospectively. Social theory can be seen as an attempt to engage in more than 'mere' explanation (logic and fact in combination), more than a communication of meaning of a hoped-for universal intersubjective transmissibility; it is an attempt to communicate understanding: explanation in concert with an evaluative, prescriptive and broadly theoretical dimension. In the expression of

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19 For an appreciation of the meaning of this term see C. Wright Mills, The Sociological Imagination, New York: Oxford University Press, 1959, pp. 143-164, and particularly p. 149.

20 This term is most clearly discussed in Arnold Brecht, Political Theory (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1959), especially pp. 113-116.

21 Just as explanation might be described as something more than description, understanding might be described as something more than explanation. The something more in each case, it seems to me, is some greater involvement of and/or appreciation by a subject. Explanation can be seen as a description which 'makes sense,' understanding a full appreciation of an explanation or set of explanations. (On the relationship between description and explanation see Michael Scriven in Herbert Feigl and Grover Maxwell, Eds., Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. III (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1962), pp. 174-176.)
the understandings of social theory are, at least implicitly, possibilistic predictions for major dimensions of the social order and thereby prudential modes for individual action. Social theory incorporates explanations of empirical reality into a form which allows them to be not merely measures of social behavior but in turn measured by the making of history.

I am now to a point where I may more meaningfully take up the matter deferred above, namely, the nature of the importance of political participation to classical democratic theory. The classical liberal democratic theorists have been 'shown by history' generally to have constructed perspectives which, however progressively prescriptive they might have been in their historic context, now seem at most minimalist for the democracies of the Advanced West. \(^{22}\) Political participation, in spite of the tentativeness and limits of the assertion, was seen as the primary component of democracy, thereby it was an end for society and, as well, the means of further advance: both individual human development and, thereby, further socio-political advance: greater democratization. This characterization of participation and democracy was most fully and clearly developed by J.S. Mill; in this assessment I follow Lane Davis \(^{23}\) and especially Graeme Duncan and Steven Lukes. \(^{24}\) As

\(^{22}\) I do not of course assert that history is unilinear in this (or any other) regard. That my statement is more or less credible in spite of the rise of centralized bureaucracies of all descriptions gives further weight to the modesty of early democrats' estimates of human participatory possibilities. Neither do I underestimate the diversity of democratic theory, classic or otherwise. That the more radical democrats such as the Levellers are not more prominent in 'our' contemporary conception of what the main body of classical democratic theory 'is' indicates to some extent the complexity of issues of historical specificity.

\(^{23}\) Davis, \textit{op. cit.}

\(^{24}\) Duncan and Lukes, \textit{op. cit.}
Duncan and Lukes have put it:

"Although he (J.S. Mill) feared that an enfranchised working class would misuse its powers and suggested certain safeguards to secure the authority of the enlightened, he had great faith in the civilizing effects of political participation itself. He described the franchise as 'a potent instrument of mental improvement' and followed Tocqueville in explaining the conscientious citizenship of the Americans by their democratic institutions. Self-government is in this sense self-sustaining: through the possession of legal rights men became capable of properly exercising them...."

Mill, then, not only saw democratization as historically evolutionary, but saw its evolution -- through the vehicle of participation -- as at least in part self-advancing.

Thus it is the case that one cannot speak simply of a single 'classical democratic theory' which is unqualifiedly democratic. And further one can easily be struck at how many of those theorists generally taken to be the most important articulators of the traditions on which our institutions are founded explicitly reject even full indirect suffrage and, in fact, accept, justify or construct institutional instruments which, in effect or by conscious design, restrain participation. They can be reasonably seen to be partial formulators of 'classical democratic theory' only when considered in historic context. They are certainly then not merely articulators of 'universal democratic ideals', rather they are more crucially articulators of levels of democratic awareness appropriate to their current or impending historic

25 Ibid., in Apolitical Politics, op. cit., p. 164.
situations. Mill is a significant departure in democratic theory in
great part because he is at least partially self-conscious about the
evolutionary process having taken and taking place both in individuals
and in the social order. Through him we can see participation not
merely\(^{26}\) as a (or even the) key aspect of democraticization, but even
more importantly we can begin to see participation as an at least po­
tential historical force: an active agency of individual and social
transformation.

A Definition of Participation

In addition to the above attempt to convey an impression of the
meaning and significance of political participation, I would like as
well to attempt to delineate a reasonably precise definition of the
concept. I can begin with a tentative acceptance of Myron Weiner's usage:

"...I shall use the concept of political participa­
tion to refer to any voluntary action, successful or
unsuccessful, organized or unorganized, episodic or
continuous, employing legitimate or illegitimate methods
intended to influence the choice of public policies, the
administration of public affairs, or the choice of po­
litical leaders at any level of government, local or
national."\(^{27}\)

In this definition there is a clear choice for activity over effect --
in making such a choice as I noted above, it is clear that something
is lost: participation is thereby less demanding a measure of demo­
cracy. But the gains in this usage in the relative ease of judging
whether or not any given empirical event is an instance of political

\(^{26}\) This, of course, is an important 'merely.'

\(^{27}\) Weiner, Myron, "Political Participation: Crisis of the Political Pro­
cess," in Leonard Binder et al., Crises and Sequences in Political De­
p. 164.
participation are very important. One must simply verify that (1) an action has occurred, (2) that it was voluntary, (3) that it had a specific intent to influence the choice of public politics [and/or] the administration of public affairs [and/or] the choice of political leaders at any level of government, local or national.

Of the three aspects of the definition I have isolated it seems to me that 'voluntariness' is the least problematic. Weiner comments that "(I)nvoluntary acts, such as serving in the armed forces (through conscription) or paying taxes, are excluded. Belonging to organizations or attending mass rallies under government orders is also excluded."28 The phrase 'under government orders' is very vague and even perhaps Cold War-ish. Are those attending Castro's speeches 'under government orders' if they came in an army vehicle from the countryside? Are American schoolteachers and schoolchildren who "take time out" to see the President or the Pope pass by in a limousine? What of activity beyond mere card-holding in an involuntary association such as a trade union in the U.S.S.R.? What of involuntary union membership in a legally supported closed-shop situation in a liberal democracy? What, lastly here, of obedience to a conscription law in the face of widespread explicitly political disobedience? But all of these questions merely indicate complexity and call for caution and subtlety. They do not cause any fundamental problems for this inquiry.

More difficult are questions relating to matters of the intentionality and explicitness of actions. Weiner notes,

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28 Ibid.
"...(for our purposes) political participation is defined as action, including verbal action, not simply attitudes or subjective feelings. In all political systems people have attitudes towards government and politics, but unless there is some action it would be inappropriate to use the term "participation". Alienation is an act of participation only if it is verbally expressed."  

In a consideration of these matters one quite quickly must come to deal with a concept central to Marxist political thought: political consciousness. One must also, as do Marxists and others, consider as well distinctions between the perspectives of the actor and the observer. Can one totally 'trade' consciousness for explicit action? What of conscious inaction conceived as passive resistance; e.g., not buying a given product or intentionally not voting or silently not performing expected social, political or economic duties. Further, what qualifies, to use Weiner's example, as a verbal expression of alienation? One can hardly expect consciousness sufficient to cause an utterance like 'My gosh, I'm alienated' to be commonplace, and even if they were they might be no more than a social ritual. To be more specific then — the political nature of a given act such as participation by a Black American in a looting riot or by a worker in a union or a neighborly discussion of women's rights over coffee could be seen to depend on both the degree of political consciousness of the participant and the historically specific context of the incident. That is, under certain circumstances participation in racially-based looting could have enormous political

29 Ibid.
effect even if the consciousness of those effects was very, very unclear in the mind of the participant. The rioter might not be aware of felt oppression and might have no knowledge of the political system beyond an ability to differentiate between police and non-police. Thus I would argue that many acts, perhaps especially the acts of the disadvantaged, might usefully be 'granted some latitude' with regard to the conscious intentionality if their, if you will, objective effect is clearly political.

On the other hand, and here Weiner's definition might also have difficulty: what of a case where an act has less obvious 'objective' political effect but might be a very clear element of socio-political intentionality. Let us examine here the case of women informally discussing women's rights. Is the disadvantaged status of women a public policy? Is it political if it is neither an issue in an election nor an identifiable practice with public administration? What if at least one of the women saw her actions as a conscious choice of political tactics to avoid the politico-legal route? What we would have then is an instance of political intention manifesting itself in an indirectly political manner. The same judgement, whatever it might be, would also be useful in considering most trade union activity. Such activity can be seen as an option to more acts more obviously and directly political.

Thus it might be preferable to amend Weiner's definition to a broadening such as the following. Political participation is any conscious or quasi-conscious action or conscious non-action which in its historic

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30 This is a Marxist usage of the term objective. It can be taken by all to mean at least an observer rather than an actor view.
context is directly or indirectly political in its effect and/or intent. This greatly broadens the definition, but does not I hope leave it utterly unbounded. It allows for consideration of more of the actions of the disadvantaged whose level of political consciousness is generally 'lower' than those whose place in society and polity is more assured. However, whatever definition might be preferable it is the case that most empirical studies have centered on concrete, visible, intentionally, directly political acts as voting, electoral campaigning, making donations to candidates or political parties, discussing politics with friends, and contacting public officials. Marxist writers have tended to more often include some more indirect activities such as trade union organizing and, of course, such non-electoral activities as demonstrations and revolutionary or quasi-revolutionary activity. For the most part I will not belabor the question of definition in my explication of the writings of either group; I merely note that this matter is worth keeping in mind as we proceed.

In choosing to use the term 'political participation' I have self-consciously rejected such related terms as political involvement/non-involvement, political apathy/interest and political activity/inactivity. Some of my doubts about the term include the impression that political participation seems to carry with it a subtle implication that there are channels available for carrying on an activity if only individual or groups will choose to use them. The concept 'participation'
carries with it a notion that there is a process already going on that is somehow other than systematically limiting and exclusionary. The notion of political activity/inactivity, for example, would be more neutral in this matter. There is even, I think, at least in common usage of the concept (political participation) an implication that the individuals and groups carrying on this activity together are doing so in an at-least quasi-cooperative fashion; that is that in 'participation' there is some sharing by all with all. Each of these three conceptually carried intimations is in contradistinction to the Marxist view of the functioning of liberal-democratic political systems. Since this inquiry will focus on these systems this seems a heavy burden for a central concept to carry into what I hope will be an open inquiry into the relative merits and shortcomings of the two perspectives.

However, many of the other possible terms also carry certain disadvantages. Most obviously the concept participation 'has' a whole body of literature conducted under its heading; to seek a separate term usable throughout this inquiry is to run the risk of altering the meaning of the original statement. All of the matters we cited in the preceding paragraph may well be part of what those who use the term wish to convey. To avoid altering meanings in various sections of this inquiry I will simply use the term 'political participation' when I am dealing with empirical social science. And in these sections I will avoid using other characterizations to which political scientists have been prone, for example, political involvement or political apathy. Neither of these terms (or their opposites) could with ease be used as Weiner uses
participation; they carry far too many moral and psychological im-
plications extraneous to our discussion to be useful in this analytic
context.

In the portions of this study in which I examine the Marxist
perspective on 'participation' there might be difficulties if I were
to attempt to 'impose' a term where it had not been used -- even
though, as I will discuss again shortly below, much of the Marxist
literature is directed at very similar phenomena. The single most
commonly used Marxian concept which relates closely to the political
science concept of participation is "political consciousness".
Clearly, what is meant by the term is different from what is meant by
'political participation'; most explicitly it does not signify only
'activity'. On the face of it it represents a 'state of mind'. How-
ever, just as Marxists found it necessary to create the concept of
praxis from the separate notions of theory (mind) and practice (action),
political consciousness implies political activity. The implication
is seen to be a necessary one in many historical contexts. Further,
while political consciousness can be and has been analytically separated
as a (or the) cause or effect of political activity, in some usage it
virtually subsumes what political science would describe as political
participation -- much as I argued above that political participation
should be broadened to subsume at least some aspects of political con-
sciousness (and historical circumstance). In sum, the terms political
participation and political consciousness are most surely not inter-
changeable, but observations about the presence, absence or character
of one of them could, if valid, be seen to say something about the presence, absence or character of the other. But the concepts are dissimilar enough in intent to suggest that in this study it would be best in the sections which attempt to identify and clarify the Marxist understanding of political participation to use only the term political consciousness.

It will also be useful and convenient at this point to make mention of two additional possible confusions with regard to the term political consciousness as used by Marxists. At times the term is used with reference to individual political consciousness, but more often it refers to either the class consciousness of a social class or to the political consciousness of a social class. In general at this point I think we need only introduce a general rule of thumb -- references to consciousness or political consciousness refer to class, social groupings or even whole societies and not to individuals unless context clearly indicates that to be the case; references to political participation would more likely be to individuals unless otherwise specified. Some of the problems caused for comparative study by this difference in approach will be discussed further as we proceed.

The second confusion which may be troublesome at times is the varying use of the term political consciousness to refer either to (a) the coming, of an individual or class, to a very general awareness of the socio-political world or their (one's) disadvantaged position within it, or (b) coming to a quite explicit and detailed political viewpoint, namely that of revolutionary Marxism or at least to an 'awareness' of
the (presumed) need for a revolutionary social transformation of a Marxian variety. The latter, of course, could simply be seen as a 'higher level' of the former -- however it is sometimes the case that it is difficult for the reader to discern which is being discussed. Forewarned readers will, I hope, be less prone to confusion.

Finally, here, I would like to indicate that in the latter portions of this inquiry I will use a third term: political activity (inactivity). This is a term which I hope, in as neutral a way as possible, subsumes both political participation as generally used by political scientists and political consciousness as generally used by Marxists. And, the term can be taken to include as well the massive variety of other expressions -- especially in Marxist usage -- e.g., mass action, praxis, political movement, advances in class solidarity and so forth. It is not offered as a means of fusing (and thereby confusing) the two separate concepts. It is merely taken as a convenient usage in cases when I must refer to those phenomena to which either or both of the concepts might apply and wish to indicate that I am doing so from outside both perspectives.  

Comparing Political Science and Marxism

Having resolved for the moment doubts raised by central terminology let me then face an even more fundamental doubt, namely, the central enterprise of this project. That is, can political science and

31 I will attempt to use the term only when I am, as in the title of this inquiry, speaking at once of both concepts.
Marxism be meaningfully and usefully compared and contrasted with regard to their respective views on what is taken to be one question? Do they, to be perfectly clear, ever ask the same question? Could it not be the case with regard to the 'political inactivity of the less advantaged' that what one sees as political the other doesn't, and that they never look at any common groupings, or, for that matter, that both would charge that the other's categories were false and/or meaningless?

There is, I think, some credence in each of these doubts. For example, some Marxists would surely say that non-participation in liberal-democratic politics is a positive sign of political consciousness. Further, likely all Marxists (and likely, of course, some non-Marxists) would say that under some conditions, some kinds of non-participation in liberal-democratic politics would be clear signs of political consciousness. It is equally true too that many empirical social scientists would not hesitate to equate an acceptance of Marxism or a 'following' of Marxists with a denial of politics itself. This problem, I think, is largely dealt with for our purposes in an acceptance of Weiner's definition of participation: but this by no means helps us regarding the wider problem of comparison of the perhaps uncomparable.

Each of these developed patterns of understanding of the political inactivity of the less advantaged address themselves to questions to some degree oblique to 'political activity' in its fullest conceptual sense. That is, some of the behavioralists considered speak almost exclusively of electoral participation -- even of voting participation -- and their understanding often does not pretend to be more broad than that. Others have
dealt with other forms of political activity, e.g., interest groups or, more recently, violence, but have less often made any systematic effort to relate their findings to democratic theory. On the other side, the Marxists' understanding is usually of the non-participation of the working class in a particular kind of political activity: activity that is class self-conscious and self-interested, 'left' in its intentions and effects and, likely, outside 'normal' politics.

These, of course, are not the only relevant qualitative differences in the two enterprises. Political science, and particularly behavioral

32 These are not the grounds on which I give non-electoral studies somewhat less consideration; rather I have limited myself to the question of the relative non-participation of the disadvantaged and only discuss these other studies when they consider or are relevant to that issue. Some are; and some of these are discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. One example of the kind of study that must be left unconsidered is H. Eulau et al., "The Role of the Representative: Some Empirical Observations on the Theory of Edmund Burke," American Political Science Review, 53 (September, 1959), pp. 742-56. While it clearly relates effectively to an aspect of democratic theory (whether a representative is a 'delegate' or a 'trustee') it does not relate either overall or more especially to the one question to which I must restrict myself.

33 Some political scientists refer to the 'less educated', some to the manual workers (occupational strata), some to the poor, and many to the marginal (some combination of the previous three). Marxists generally speak of the working class, but sometimes mean by that an entity für sich (class), sometimes one an sich (strata). To confuse matters further 'marginality' at times broadens to include as well sex and rural/urban factors. Further, Marxists generally are highly variant in the percentage of the population appropriately included in the working class or strata (from 20-85%). And finally there are innumerable differences among political scientists with regard to defining class according to property, life style, work style or individual subjective attribution of class. I will discuss many matters relating to these questions throughout this study, particularly in Chapter 5. Suffice it to say here that I will in general discussion adopt the broad, loose and more or less neutral term 'the less advantaged' and note that I am looking at patterned understanding more than at detailed explanations, and that many of these problems of variation tend to 'wash out' at long range.
political science, has generally maintained that its enterprise is and should be politically neutral. For Marxism, of course, the task is not merely to understand the world but to change it, political neutrality is seen to be neither possible, nor desirable. This is something which greatly affects every aspect of inquiry. More narrowly, with regard to our particular area of concern it is generally the case that Marxists are attempting to explain why almost no one 'really' participates while behavioral political scientists are often trying to explain why there are (and sometimes trying to justify why there should be) differentials in the degree and kind of participation between various statistical categories of individuals. Finally here, though the differences may be endless, Marxists derive their conclusions on the matter at hand largely from and for Western Europe, political scientists largely from and for America. Both on this point lapse on occasion into unworthy overgeneralization and each might well come a bit nearer to understanding the other if they exchanged loci.

Having stated all these doubts I can say at this point no more than that they all should be taken as cautions to be heeded both by myself and by the reader. I will attempt throughout to acknowledge and to clarify and assess the importance of these differences of perspective and intent. Further whatever the differences in the two enterprises there remains a certain overarching commonality: both political science and Marxism have a deep theoretical commitment to explaining the relative inactivity (relative in both cases both to other social groups and to what might be

34 As has, of course, liberal democratic theory.
desired and/or expected) of the less advantaged in the liberal democracies of the advanced capitalist nations. Further both have committed considerable efforts — in each case by some of their most widely respected practitioners — to explaining these phenomena. On balance I take it to be a useful project to, with some interpreting, transposing and this acknowledgement of differences, presume that the two perspectives can be usefully taken to be dealing with roughly the same question. It is my hope that an inquiry into the conclusions and methods of each can offer some wider understanding to the other.

EXPLANATION AND UNDERSTANDING: A PRELIMINARY NOTE

The goal of science is generally taken to be explanation by means of generalizations called theories or laws and both political science and Marxism make claims to being sciences. I will not at this point try to elaborate or assess these claims, but I will attempt to clarify here my usage of some of the terminology within which I will deal with these issues. I will attempt to adopt usage which will be acceptable to both Marxists and political scientists.

It is perhaps best to begin with the elemental particle of science: the fact.

"Facts" are taken herein to be in all cases evidence with empirical referents. Evidence implies both the theoretical ordering of some part of the universe and some stated method of factual determination. I am fully comfortable with David Easton's definition of a fact as "...a particular ordering of reality in terms of a theoretical interest."  

I see his justification of this definition as one of the grounds for undertaking this study:

"It is obviously impossible literally to describe an event however long we might take or however limited the event in time and space. There is an infinite level of detail possible about any event. The aspect of the event selected for description as the facts about it, is determined by the prior interest of the observer; the selection is made in light of a frame of reference that fixes the order and relevance of the facts. When raised to the level of consciousness this frame of reference is what we call a theory." (p. 53)

A theory can perhaps best be seen in turn as an instrument able to produce useful explanations. Explanations are answers to 'how can it be' or 'why' questions; that is they communicate either possibility or necessity. For the most part I will use the term explanation to refer to predominantly causal empirical explanations and theories rather than explanations which are predominantly subjective-normative. Causal explanation might, of course, include reference to the values held and purposes intended by the actors whose behavior is being explained. This sort of thing fits well within Arnold Brecht's guidelines for "What Scientific Method Can Do Regarding Values" and it is that model which I accept as being the clearest statement of the position of political science.

In adopting such a usage I do not, at this point at least, wish to go so far as to accept the view that facts and values can be usefully seen as two tidy categories. Rather I am simply at this point


accepting that most who write on political activity, participation or consciousness, most of the time see themselves as dealing in the modalities of empirical research, empirical generalization, empirically-based theory, historical and/or dialectical materialism, and thereby, for different but not altogether dissimilar reasons, avoid at least normative-subjectivist grammatical constructions. I accept at least then that one can in principle and often in practice analytically distinguish between causal and value theory. But I then must immediately add my agreement with Easton that in practice each is involved with the other.

I am, however, most interested in isolating the overall, wider understandings of political activity-inactivity expressed or implied by on the one hand political science and on the other hand Marxism. I take the term 'understanding' to refer to those forms of theory and explanation which as fully and generally as possible offer an integrated grasp of a subject of study in both its normative and causal aspects. Understanding is often expressed in a mode which fuses explanation and evaluation. I will attempt as a part of the process of analyzing the view(s) of political science and Marxism on the subject of the political inactivity of the disadvantaged to delineate some characteristics of their respective understandings of this question. I will also attempt

38 The correctness of such an intention will be dealt with at some length elsewhere in this inquiry.

39 Easton, op. cit., particularly pp. 219-232.
to determine what, if any, are the relationships between those understandings and on the one hand the more detailed explanations and findings contained in their respective bodies of literature on the subject and on the other hand their respective methodologies.
CHAPTER 2

Before I proceed to the explanations used in empirical social science for the relative non-participation of the less advantaged, I would like very briefly to illustrate the extent of that relative non-participation. In doing so, hopefully, I will also clarify a bit more the bounds of meaning for the term "less advantaged." In this chapter I simply want to indicate some findings which illustrate lesser participation for several categories of disadvantaged persons, in several political systems, for several different measures of political activity, at several different points in time. Many readers will be familiar with this material and if this is the case, can freely proceed to the more detailed and analytic considerations which begin in the following chapter. For those who are not, this chapter, hopefully, will provide a useful additional introduction to later discussions and analysis.

The measures of advantage/disadvantage I will illustrate briefly here are occupational status, income, education, sex, and race.

Occupation

Basel, Switzerland, 1908, Voter Turnout: \(^1\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Voter Turnout</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Labourers</td>
<td>49.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merchants, Manufacturers</td>
<td>63.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officials and Canton employees</td>
<td>70.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Basel, Switzerland, 1911, Voter Turnout:

Workers 66.8%
Salaried, artisans 71.1%
Professionals, officials, owners 77.5%

Selected Nations, 1960s, Multifactor Participation Scale:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>England</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>USA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled and Farming</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled and Semi-skilled</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Business and White Collar</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional and Managerial</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Great Britain, 1966, Level of Interest in Politics:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Working Class</th>
<th>Middle Class</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very Interested</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interested</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not really interested</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not at all interested</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

2. Tingsten, p. 120.

3. Di Palma, Guiseppi, Apathy and Participation, (New York: The Free Press, 1970), p. 144. The multifactor participation scale, which will be used several times shortly below, includes such factors as voting, interest, attention, knowledge, attempts to influence local and national politics, talking with others about politics, and following accounts of political events.

Elmira, New York, 1948, Voter Turnout: 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Business and White Collar</th>
<th>Wage Workers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>21-24</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-34</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-54</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54+</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Income

Copenhagen, Denmark, 1913, Voting Turnout: 6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income Level</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Free Professionals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>800-1000 Crowns</td>
<td>67.3%</td>
<td>67.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000-1200</td>
<td>76.5</td>
<td>67.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1200-1500</td>
<td>74.7</td>
<td>69.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1500-3000</td>
<td>81.2</td>
<td>72.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3000-6000</td>
<td>86.7</td>
<td>75.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6000+</td>
<td>86.8</td>
<td>80.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>800-1000</td>
<td>65.2</td>
<td>54.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000-1200</td>
<td>76.5</td>
<td>59.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1200-1500</td>
<td>82.0</td>
<td>67.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1500-2000</td>
<td>79.8</td>
<td>65.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000+</td>
<td>82.9</td>
<td>65.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


6Tingsten, p. 147.
Selected Nations, 1960s, Multifactor Participation Scale:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>England</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>USA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low Income</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7.5%</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8.8%</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10.4%</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Income</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

New Haven, Connecticut, 1961, General Participation in Local Political Affairs:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Highly Inactive</th>
<th>Highly Active</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under $2000 per annum</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$2000-$5000</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$5000-$8000</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over $8000</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Education

United States, 1952 and 1956 Elections, Presidential Vote Participation:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Some GS</th>
<th>GS</th>
<th>Some HS</th>
<th>HS</th>
<th>Some College</th>
<th>College</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-South</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>93%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

7 Di Palma, p. 144.
United States, 1950s, Stated Attempts to Influence Others:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>GS</th>
<th>HS</th>
<th>College</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ohio Community, 1924, Voting Participation:

- College 78.1%
- High School 69.6%
- Elementary 57.2%
- None 34.9%

Selected Nations, 1960s, Multifactor Participation Scale:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>England</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>USA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elementary or less</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some college</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

West Germany, 1966, Level of Interest in Politics:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Primary Education</th>
<th>Secondary Education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Less</td>
<td>More</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very deeply/deeply</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rather Interested</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat Interested</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hardly Interested</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not at all Interested</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---


10 Tingsten, p. 158

11 Di Palma, p. 143.

12 Rush and Althoff, p. 102.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Norway, Selected Years, National Voting:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>67.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>76.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>81.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Norway, Selected Years, Voting in Local Elections:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Iceland, Selected Years, Voting in National Elections:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Estonia, Selected Years, Voting in Referenda:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

13 Tingsten, p. 14
14 Tingsten, p. 15.
15 Tingsten, p. 20.
Selected Nations, 1960s, Multifactor Participation Scale:  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>England</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>USA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

West Germany, 1966, Interest in Politics:  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very deeply/deeply</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rather interested</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat interested</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not at all interested</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Race  

U.S., 1960s, Multifactor Participation Scale:  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Unadjusted for Other Socio-economic Factors</th>
<th>Adjusted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Negro</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Races</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

U.S., 1950s, Voter Turnout:  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Law Governing Suffrage</th>
<th>Restrictive Moderate</th>
<th>Restrictive Moderate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Voted in all elections</td>
<td>3        10</td>
<td>26       34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voted in most elections</td>
<td>0        10</td>
<td>22       19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voted in some elections</td>
<td>12       20</td>
<td>24       19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never voted</td>
<td>85       60</td>
<td>28       28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

17 Di Palma, p. 134.  
18 Rush and Althoff, p. 102  
19 Di Palma, p. 183  
20 Campbell, et al., p. 278
The figures presented above are meant merely to indicate the general tendency of those who are less advantaged in occupational status, income, education, sex and race to participate less in politics. This tendency holds in many political systems, for a variety of historical times, and for a wide variety of forms and measures of participation. This is not to say that it is universal, nor that its degree is either constant or consistent. On the contrary I will argue below that the variations are highly significant and that those wishing to understand political participation should examine these variations more closely. For example, I would suggest a close look at recent tendencies in the relative political participation by women to determine if the rapidly changing attitudes of women in many cultures have decreased sexual differences in participation.

This chapter is meant to show no more than the roughest of outlines of the bounds of the phenomena with which I will deal throughout this study. I leave to those later chapters the attempts to discuss variations, explain the sources of differences, and to analyze the attempts of others to explain them.
CHAPTER 3

I

In this chapter I will attempt to offer a very brief summary of the methods, findings and conclusions of empirically oriented political science with regard to the relative non-participation of the disadvantaged. This is, I think, a necessary, if a bit tedious, exercise. It has been done before for the full range of political participation research, but the most recent of these studies was published in 1968; the most complete with regard to the particular sub-question with which we are concerned in 1959. Clearly some updating of the pattern of methods, findings and conclusions is needed before we proceed further and deal with the so-called post-behavioral critique of that literature. I will begin my next chapter with the critical presentation of that critique and will utilize much of the material in this chapter in that exercise and as well in the more elaborately analytical questions which are then raised but for the moment here left implicit. The present chapter is in general a presentation which is critical largely only in the sense of criticizing the connection between conclusions and the data presented.


in the particular study in question. The next chapter will draw in a wider range of extra-textual matters.

The structure of this chapter is largely chronological, I have proceeded in this way because I plan in the next and later chapters to draw conclusions which depend in part on the development of empirically based explanations of the relative inactivity of the less advantaged over time and, as well, in relation to specific historical periods. However, at another point in the later chapters, I will need as well an analytic summary of these explanations (and at that point I will refer the reader back to this section). I offer this summary now so that the reader might consider it in the course of the next two chapters as the data accumulates in other formats.

The various explanations offered within empirical social science are listed under seven headings. The first and second headings are perhaps the most commonly put forth, especially, as we will see, in the period 1950-65. I will discuss these elements of explanation at length when I consider what I will call the conservative understanding of the relative inactivity of the less advantaged. The next two elements (3) and (4), are also put forward quite often; the latter of them has been used with much greater frequency in the last few years than in the pre-1965 period. Explanations (5) and (6) are clearly of lesser importance and are less often explicitly stated. Item (7) has only very rarely been mentioned by empirical social scientists; the two or three instances which will be cited later in this chapter are all quite recent (post-1965). In contrast we will see that explanations of this nature
are central to Marxists.

The seven alternative explanations of low participation by the less advantaged are:

1. The less advantaged tend to be uninformed, irrational, uninterested or simply ignorant.

2. Non-participation in some cases is a sign of a general feeling of satisfaction with the functioning of the political system.

3. Low socio-economic status is often related to life experiences which are not conducive to attitudes, such as political efficacy or feelings of citizen duty, which are supportive of at least some forms of participation.

4. There are a variety of structural constraints to the active participation of the less advantaged; for example, in some systems a marked lack of organized political structures.

5. The effects of some other demographic variables with the more central measures of lack of advantage (income, race, sex, occupation and education). For example, young adults and the elderly tend to be somewhat less well-off than other age groups and tend as well, for other and obvious reasons, to participate less.

6. Some non-participants are expressing consciously some anti-system feelings by withdrawing their support.

7. The political system is actually unresponsive to the less advantaged or may, in some cases, actually permit or encourage acts of repression of some of the less advantaged.
My summary discussion of the empirical literature, which follows now, has three parts: the first is a brief critical extraction of the relevant material from the three summaries mentioned above; the second a more detailed critical look at several selected major studies; and the third an up-dated literature survey for the years 1969-1973 with some emphasis on changes in approach and on the evolution of methodology. This summary is not meant to be comprehensive, but rather to offer a sufficient basis for later comments and comparisons.
There can be little doubt that in the United States and in most developed Western democracies in most times and circumstances there has been a consistent tendency toward a positive relationship between socio-economic advantage and political participation. Woodward and Roper found that the socio-economic groups which scored the highest on a composite index of political participation were: Executives, Professionals, Stockholders, those in the "A" Economic Level, and those college-educated; those groups which scored the lowest were Laboring people, Housewives, those with only grade school education, Negroes and those in the "P" (lowest) economic level. As Milbrath puts it, citing twenty-eight confirming studies:

"One of the most thoroughly substantiated propositions in all of social science is that persons near the center of society are most likely to participate in politics than persons near the periphery."\(^4\)

and further he observes that:

"(N)o matter how class is measured, studies consistently show that higher-class persons are more likely to participate in politics than lower-class persons."

McClosky, however, is somewhat more careful and precise in his generalization than is Milbrath; he states:


\(^4\)Milbrath, p. 113; 'periphery' incorporates SES, length of time at a given residence, amount of group activity, urban-rural residence and integration into the community. (p. 111)

\(^5\)Milbrath, p. 115.
"In general, participation tends to be higher among the better-educated, members of the higher occupational and income groups, the middle-aged the dominant ethnic and religious groups, men (as opposed to women), settled residents, urban dwellers, and members of voluntary associations. It should be emphasized, however, that the correlations between participation and some of these variables are low and unstable and that they may vary from one cultural-political context to another. Thus, education and socio-economic status and participation correlate strongly in the United States but weakly in Norway...."\(^6\)

He further cautions that "the variables in this category are so broad as to be fairly limited in their explanatory power," and that "(S)ince the relevant variables are subject to interaction effects, the same demographic factors may have dramatically different consequences in different political-cultural contexts."\(^7\) Finally, in this regard he notes situations of opposite findings with regard to ethnic minorities and rural vs. urban variables and reports the conclusion of Campbell and Valen that the disparity in the correlations between occupational level and participation in Norway and the United States results at least in part from greater class consciousness and class organization in the Norwegian as opposed to the American working class.\(^8\)

The findings then are as consistent as one gets in the multivariate world of social phenomena. The limited exceptions must temper the generalizations but can additionally be used as a route to a partial explanation of the relationship via indicating some factors which aren't part of the explanation. If we are to get at what indeed are the explanations for

\(^6\)McClosky, p. 256.

\(^7\)Both observations, p. 256.

\(^8\)Pp. 256-7.
non-participation we can usefully begin by looking briefly at those offered by Milbrath, Lane and McClosky.

Within the main body of his book Milbrath makes few attempts at explaining class participation differentials beyond offering some first-order psychological explanations. One example here will suffice:

"It is easy to understand why rich people would be more likely to give money than poor people; it is not so clear why they should be more likely to wear a button or display a sticker. The data do not suggest a likely interpretation, but one can speculate that publically identifying one's partisan or candidate preference requires high self-esteem, and high-income persons are more likely to have high self-esteem. It was suggested by another scholar that higher-income persons are not only more likely to give money, but they also are likely to initiate direct contacts with public officials (Lane, 1959), which again suggests high self-esteem." (p. 121)

He does not seem to consider such obvious possibilities as the simple straightforward rejection of strong commitments to any candidate by some lower-income persons regardless of levels of self-esteem. He offers no evidence of the self-esteem/non-participation relationship. Further, neither he nor Lane in the original suggest the obvious, though difficult to demonstrate, possibility that official accessibility is related more to the ability to contribute money than to the self-esteem levels of the supplicant. Rather, and generally for Milbrath, shortcomings are seen to lie with and in the individual rather than with or in historically conditioned systemic variables. This position is an important part of the understanding of non-participation common to many, especially "earlier" behavioralists which I will discuss further below.
Milbrath, generally, is far less adept than either McClosky or Lane in incorporating systemically, socially and historically relevant variables into his overall assessment of research findings. However, he does report without comment or emphasis a variety of findings of significance in these regards. For example the following:

"...in countries with status polarized party systems...political participation, especially voting turnout, is higher in communes which are homogeneous in politics, socio-economic status, and economic activity...." (p. 119)

"In societies with residential segregation by SES, the normal tendency for high SES persons to be more likely to participate is reduced." (p. 119)

"As industrialization progressed more persons with middle-class origins were elected to the Federal Assembly." (p. 120)

and,

"...no relationships (was found) between depressions and voting turnout." (p. 120)

If these appear random here it is because they appear so in Milbrath.

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Milbrath presents his data in such a way that he does not distinguish between the relative significance of the various findings, nor does he explicitly temper broad generalizations by discussing modifying findings. This is perhaps then a style of presentation problem of a style which is useful as a "catalog" of bald findings, a guide to the literature and not an analysis thereof. A more appropriate criticism, relevant to later discussions, might be the emphasis of space and location he seems to give to oft-times trivial, "purely" psychological, findings. For example, (p. 39) he reports the finding that "persons with a positive attraction to politics are more likely to receive stimuli about politics and to participate more." A good deal of his Chapter III "Political Participation as a Function of Personal Factors" is of that order; it stands of course, less perhaps as witness to Milbrath's shortcomings as to the excessive psychologism of early behavioral explanations of political participation.
I am not attempting to build a comprehensive summary of explanations, but merely to offer material illustrative for later discussion.

In general, the earlier summarization of research on participation by Robert Lane shows greater explanatory inclination than does Milbrath. Lane is usually far from the simplistic psychologism to which Milbrath sometimes seems prone. As Lane puts it elsewhere,

"If you ask a man why he believes what he does, why he is a liberal or a conservative..., he is likely to tell you about the world and not about himself...."...He might say...that he sees things that way because things are that way. "These two ways of explaining a belief, by referring outward to the world and inward to tell of the self, are complementary features of a total explanation for the simple reason that belief is inevitably an interaction between self and world...."

Thus disadvantaged persons might well have low feelings of political efficacy for the to Milbrath (and Almond & Verba) largely unconsidered cause that the political system systematically rejects their influence or would if 'it' were given the opportunity. Likewise Milbrath's low income citizen without the ego-wherewithal to put on a bumper-sticker might be disinclined not because he doesn't understand but precisely because he does understand the way things really are.

In Political Life, Lane's first explanation and most of the others

10 Robert E. Lane Political Thinking and Consciousness (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1969) pp. 1-2. "The world in my view, as I hope will become clearer below, has more explanatory power than 'the self'. Lane is more inclined than I am to evenly balanced dualism; his acknowledgment of the existence of the world is, however, refreshing.

11 See below
which follow his question "Why are social status and political participation so closely linked in the United States?" suffer from few of the defects which I will later identify as an understanding of participation common to many behavioralists. The explanations selected by Lane in this brief chapter (written 15 years ago) indicate that behavioral research had even by that time seemed to have generated the basis for considerable explanatory power. Lane's analysis begins strongly,

"The gains from governmental policy for lower income groups must be collective gains, gains granted to classes or groups of people, which may or may not accrue to any one individual. In contrast to this, a large category of middle-income persons, businessmen, are in a position to gain some specific individual advantage from government....As a consequence, the relationship between political effort and personal gain is usually closer for businessmen than for working-class people." (p. 221)

He then itemizes and stresses the means differentials between rich and poor: money, and the fact that the worker's "individual social and occupational position (do not) likely give him, as an individual, much influence over government actions." "Poor people can exert influence only by collective action...." (p. 221)

Lane then offers eleven additional possible explanations for the participation differentials of relative advantage. However, many of these explanations are, as I will show shortly below, separable from the basic findings of the behavioral research which he has considered. They are not, in most cases, demonstrated by that research but rather, post hoc, 'make sense of it.' These comments are not meant as a criticism of either Lane or behavioral methodology. Rather I merely want to make clear at this point a distinction between a 'report of findings' which
in some cases, might be said to, with an original research question, offer explanations, and an 'explanation of findings'; the former is the research at hand, the latter can be usefully seen as a link between that research and some wider understanding external, though related, to the research. That is, research findings make sense in terms of and in relation to that wider understanding. For example, Milbrath, as was noted, rarely attempted explanations of findings; when he did he generally did not go beyond first-order psychological explanations. However, and here we begin to deal with an additional concept; in his final chapter Milbrath 'jumps past' explanations of findings into a presentation of an 'understanding,' again, an overview, an appreciation; necessarily general, theoretical, speculative and value-relevant.

To be more clear about what in actual practice an understanding looks like, let us consider here a shortened statement of Milbrath's final two paragraphs:

"Recapitulation of the foregoing argument, in brief form, may help the reader to see where it is leading. (1) Most citizens in any political society do not live up to the classical democratic prescription to be interested in, informed about, and active in politics. (2) Yet, democratic governments and societies continue to function adequately. (3) It is a fact that high participation is not required for successful democracy. (4) However, to insure responsiveness

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12 This is only a preliminary comment, further discussion of the relationship between explanation and understanding will be offered in succeeding chapters.

13 Most Marxists would, of course, consider all psychological explanations as easily reducible to social explanations. I will discuss this a bit further in Chapters 5 and 6.
of officials, it is essential that a sizable percentage of citizens participate in choosing their public officials. (5) Maintaining open channels of communication in the society also helps to insure responsiveness of officials to public demands. (6) Moderate levels of participation by the mass of citizens help to balance citizen roles as participants and as obedient subjects. (7) Moderate levels of participation also help balance political systems which must be both responsive and powerful enough to act. (8) Furthermore, moderate participation levels are helpful in maintaining a balance between consensus and cleavage in society. (9) High participation levels would actually be detrimental to society if they tended to politicize a large percentage of social relationships. (10) Constitutional democracy is most likely to flourish if only a moderate proportion of social relationships (areas of life) are governed by political considerations. (11) Moderate or low participation levels by the general public place a special burden or responsibility on political elites for the successful functioning of constitutional democracy. (12) Elites must adhere to democratic norms and rules of the game and have a live-and-let-live attitude toward their opponents. (13) A society with widespread apathy could easily be dominated by an unscrupulous elite; only continuous vigilance by at least a few concerned citizens can prevent tyranny. (14) Elite recruitment and training is an especially important function. (15) To help insure final control of the political system by the public, it is essential to maintain an open communications system, to keep gladiator ranks open to make it easy for citizens to become active should they so choose, to continue moral admonishment for citizens to become active, and to keep alive the democratic myth of citizen competence."

(pp. 153-4)

This statement is not an explanatory link to a wider understanding; it is a presentation of the elements of an understanding particularly ungrounded in empirical research. Not one of the fifteen assertions follow from or are even, in any obvious way, related to the findings reported in the book. Milbrath, of course, is aware of this and asserts in a masterful understatement:
"It would be difficult to prove the validity of the above argument with research findings. For lack of evidence, many of the asserted relationships must remain hypothetical for the time being." (p. 154)

Points (6) and (14) are largely tautological; point (11) is a truism, and point (2) is meaningless; those remaining are all so general as to exceed the scope of any research conducted to that date or, for that matter, for the foreseeable future. None can be demonstrated without broad cross-cultural and historical comparisons being made. It is not my purpose to systematically critique these assertions here, merely to clarify my terminology in the context of the pertinent data.14

If an understanding such as that offered by Milbrath can be said to be largely ungrounded in empirical findings, what of the more findings-related explanations presented by Lane in Political Life. Earlier I suggested that Lane's explanations were of a form analytically separable from the empirical research whose conclusions they were presented to explain. The wider setting on which his explanations are based is a general socio-political understanding which is in turn strongly grounded in a wealth of empirical research.

In trying to explain why the less advantaged tend to participate less Lane considers eleven possible explanations:

(1) differentials of leisure time and uncommitted energy are seen as having an ambiguous relation owing to empirical data showing lower

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14In general, I prefer that such statements be made a part of most studies especially those which seek to order a large corpus of research findings. Whatever the weaknesses of this or other versions of this understanding, they opened up discussion of issues which more recently have been less often discussed. Implicit consensus is not a route to effective research. This, too, will be considered again in later chapters.
voter turnout among the retired in contrast to other elderly; showing lower voter turnout among well-paid long-hour workers than among lower-paid shorter-hour workers in the same city in the same year; the especially low involvement of the unemployed; and the general information that "the executive or professional man...perhaps carries his occupational burdens with him rather more than the manual or clerical worker -- he is more preoccupied." (p. 223) Thus "general understanding" offers an explanation and empirical data and impressions combine to offer a variety of qualifications;

(2) differentials of economic security are seen to be less ambiguous. Lane concludes that "On the whole, it seems justifiable to say that the lack of financial worry which is generally associated with a better income provides one cause for substantial socio-economic class differences in political activity." (p. 225) This conclusion is largely based on studies which showed a relationship between feeling quite secure financially and feeling politically effective. I am, however, very skeptical of this form of explanation; here may well be many intervening variables between the two feelings in question, most particularly a 'reality' variable. That is, those who are financially secure are politically effective, not because they feel well-off, but rather because they are well-off. Further, this view must be tempered by Lipset's well-documented assertion that those of insecure income tend to be more politicized to the left (and that many of these same groups tend as well to higher voting rates). 15

(3) the higher stake in government policy felt by those who own property — the policy benefits attendant to prosperity are more visible and this, as Lane sees it, is suggested (but not proved) by "the fact that the proportion of the working class vote Republican is larger than the proportion of the middle-class who vote Democratic." (p. 226)

(4) the differential distribution of the complex of attitudes of self-confidence — this is the quite well documented variation in feelings of political effectiveness and is commonly taken to be in turn related to and caused by lack of education and status. This finding is rarely explained by differentials in responsiveness by public officials or by political systems.

The remaining seven explanatory factors are similar in nature and effect and include differentials in child-rearing (unclear as to degree or effect); differentials in role expectations and 'sense of responsibility' for nation affairs; variations in distribution of cross-pressures (especially the tendency to identify with interests and values of higher classes than one's own); differentials of effect of inter-strata contact; differentials in distribution of politically relevant skills; and differentials in distribution of feelings of social alienation.16 Were we to treat all eleven variables in the detail we treated the first four we might come to the following general indicative and very tentative conclusions:

(1) Much of the data used as evidence is reasonably well-founded

16 Lane, pp. 226–234
empirically. There are some exceptions to this, e.g., Lane's mention of the "the fringe movements which draw...the lower socio-economic classes." On this and other matters in Lane's list see Chapter 3, section II.

(2) With all of the variables considered, the empirical actualities are 'mixed' (e.g., differentials in child-rearing practices (pp. 227-8), free-time availability) and/or of 'mixed' effects (e.g., differentials in feelings of alienation or feelings of economic security).

(3) There is very limited consideration given to historic and systemic variations\(^\text{17}\) and more especially actual systemically-rooted effects (e.g., the possibility of justifiable differences in self-confidence with regard to system accessibility). Further here, because of this there is a general tendency to offer explanations of a limited level of generalization (that is many of the explanations offered could \underline{themselves} be explained by such variables as systematic (in both senses of the word) discouragement of participation by the ideological apparatus of society -- from schools, from media, etc., -- or by broad historico-systemic variables such as centralization of power or bureaucratization which \underline{might} tend to deny access to real power to all but a very few citizens). Such variables are, of course, far more difficult to identify, measure and understand and lend themselves far less to study using empirical methodology. Even if I am correct in the assertions of this paragraph, it does not follow directly, of

\[\text{17 In fairness Lane's question relates to class-relative participation in the United States only. Elsewhere, e.g., Milbrath and others to be discussed below, there is a lesser appreciation of 'American exceptionalism' and a correspondingly greater tendency to over-generalization.}\]
course, that any lesser or greater relative commitment of intellectual energy should be relegated to any given approach. It simply means that, if (and we will deal with that 'if' at length throughout this inquiry) this is the case, there must be means found either to use approaches other than those customary to empirical inquiry or traditional forms of empirical inquiry must be modified to gain that higher order of generalization.

(4) Lane, and here he is typical of many of the empirical social scientists whom I will look at, has a tendency (less pronounced than in many) to overlook the full meaning and effect of social class. One example here will suffice for the moment:

"This study finds that active political roles are rarely assumed by Class I (upper class) individuals, but instead such persons delegate (emphasis added) this function to those at an intermediate level of society who serve their interests in return for various psychic (and sometimes economic) rewards. Financial participation, on the other hand, is more appropriate for Class I persons....On the other hand, the lower economic groups tend to delegate (emphasis added) then, political responsibilities to those who have somewhat more education and somewhat more income than they themselves possess...to some extent, perhaps, this may explain the pragmatic similarity of the major parties." (Political Life, p. 229)

The arrangements, both described by the word 'delegate', are qualitatively different, one akin to a "hiring", the other to an "abdication".

Class behaviors are profoundly variant and it is only rarely that they

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can be effectively described using the same language. This is a relatively trivial example of an appreciation of Marxism not usually common in empirical social science. It is meant simply as a warning to be wary of overgeneralization in this regard.

To this point I have concerned myself with more or less quantitative differences in participation between social strata (and the explanations of those differences). Many have asserted that there exist, as well, a variety of qualitative differences. More specifically here it is often argued that less advantaged groups and strata have been shown to be more illiberal, less tolerant, less knowledgeable about political issues, more prone to authoritarian, demagogic political leaders and movements, and, in general, less inclined to attitudes and behaviors conducive to the support of liberal democracy. This view is another, and crucial element in Milbrath and others' understanding of differentials in participation. It is largely this range of findings which allow credibility to the view that increased participation can be (or, even, will be) a threat to democracy (or, more obscurely, "democratic stability").

Throughout this study I will at many points critique largely political science's explanations for and understanding of the quantitative aspects of participation differentials the grounds on which I object to the treatment of the qualitative differences are different. I do not accept that in this case the data fully justify the reports of findings. I propose to critique these reports on three grounds:
(1) that the conclusions are often on their face grossly over-drawn from the given data;

(2) that the methodologies employed in specific cases are somewhat more limited than they are taken to be by the researchers and others;

(3) that there is a wealth of less commonly cited empirical material which indicates that the results in these matters are far more mixed than they are often taken to be. 19

These are very broad generalizations and do not mean to imply that the claims in matters of qualitative participation are utterly groundless. There is a wide range of 'grounding' dependent of course on the kind and degree of claim made. Reasonably well supported (generally) is the relationship between issue familiarity and education; almost totally unreliable in my view is the claim that there is a strong relationship between "class" and "authoritarian personality."

The earliest and probably still the most influential of the articles which attempt to base this view firmly in the findings of empirical social science is S.M. Lipset's "Working-class Authoritarianism" which first appeared in 1955. 20 Lipset, of course, was quite aware of the

19 This aspect of the critique will be presented in Chapter 4, Part II as the data are also useful to an additional point which cannot usefully be made until that time. Readers might skip ahead and look at that section at this time as well.

20 An early version of this paper was first presented at a Congress for Cultural Freedom conference on "The Future of Liberty" held in Milan, Italy, in September, 1955. While this is evidence for absolutely nothing, it perhaps can be noted in passing that both the Congress and Encounter, a quotation from which Lipset opens his discussion, were funded extensively by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. This in itself says nothing about the validity of his argument; since I do in the next chapter discuss the Cold War in relation to some aspects of the explanation of empirical social science, I thought it pertinent to mention this here.
political implications of the argument he was attempting to document.

In several places in the article he laments this in his findings as a sad truth which must nevertheless be faced and elsewhere in his writings he makes the following reference:

"As early as 1928, the American political scientist W.B. Munro argued that increased participation might threaten the workings of democracy since non-voting was largely located among the most ignorant part of the electorate."21

Lipset's claims are well enough known to need no presentation here. The best single critique of Lipset's article is that presented by S.M. Miller and Frank Reissman.22 Miller and Reissman conclude their critique in this way:

The sad and complex truth seems to be that no class has a monopoly on pro- or anti-democratic attitudes. Neither class, we believe, is psychologically authoritarian, but both classes have values which could be turned in the direction of political authoritarianism under certain conditions."23

In building to this conclusion, they offer a variety of tempered criticisms; especially pertinent here are the following:

(1) One of Lipset's major bases for asserting the relative authoritarianism of the working-class is the response to a poll taken in

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21 S.M. Lipset, Political Man, p. 228 referring to W.B. Munro, "Is the Slacker Vote a Menace?", National Municipal Review, 17 (1928), pp. 80-86. Munro, of course, is hardly the earliest to doubt the capacities of the masses; few before, however, were dignified (?) by the title 'political' scientist.


23 Ibid., pp. 271-2.
West Germany in 1953. The actual question asked was: "Do you think that it would be better if there were one party, several parties, or no party?" The detailed results of that poll are presented broken down by occupation and under the following headings: "Several parties," "One Party," "No Party," and "No Opinion." Ten pages later in the study, Lipset represents the data under one such heading "Per Cent Favoring the Existence of Several Parties," and therein there is a moderate difference in response indicated. However, in Miller and Reissman's words:

"Comparison of the two classes is difficult, however, because the 'no opinion' responses are particularly high among the working-class groups. If we take favourable attitudes towards the 'one-party' or 'no party' alternatives as better indicators of possible authoritarianism (than the non-selection of the multi-party system choice) then it appears that these choices are minority positions within the working class. (Among semi-skilled workers, 35 per cent favour either a one-party or no-party situation; among unskilled workers, 38 per cent, and among skilled workers, 27 per cent, roughly the same percentage found among small businessmen and lower white collar groups)." (p. 265)

Even if the response Lipset derived via the arrangement of the data had been as sharp as he took it to be, there are real doubts about the usefulness of this one question as a basis for any broad conclusion about -- let alone one which seems at times to place a whole social group cross-culturally on the extreme pole of an authoritarianism -- democratic continuum. Miller and Reissman argue:

"Criticism of or doubt about the practice of multi-party systems or other democratic institutions may indicate the need for the imaginative development of new approaches and practices rather than serving as an indication of
anti-democratic attitudes." (p. 266)

(2) A second of the studies which Lipset offers as supportive is that of Samuel A. Stouffer (**Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties**) wherein "community leaders" were found more committed to civil liberties than were the "general public." Miller and Reissman suggest the possibility that the middle-class (including the community leaders) might appear more tolerant because they are less punitive rather than because they are more committed to civil liberties. They do not pretend that this 'explains away' the response, merely that it puts it in a different light. I would add here that the further possibility that "community leaders" are more conscious of the need to publicly espouse the "conventional wisdom" might produce further limitations on generalizations from these findings. Further there also may be differentials in the differences between "measurable attitudes" and "situational behaviors." (Both these factors will be developed below). Finally here Miller and Reissman note a finding by Bordua regarding class differences on questions similar to those asked by Stouffer:25

"Bordua offers an intriguing finding concerning the determinants of intolerance and authoritarianism. If religion is held constant, class

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24 Samuel A. Stouffer, **Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties**, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1966) first published in 1955. We will consider this work further shortly below.

differentials in political tolerance and authoritar­
ianism are insignificant."

(3) Miller and Reissman also present a critique of Lipset's use of F-
scale based data on the grounds that such scales have limited ap­
plicability to the working class. This can be related to one of
my above comments on Lane. One empirical basis for this claim is
from an earlier study by Reissman who found that working-class
respondents low on authoritarianism did not have more 'people-
oriented' responses to an independent open-ended question than
did those who were high on authoritarianism. However, middle-
class respondents who had scored high on the 'authoritarian' scale
did have a response significantly different from those who scored
low. One gets the impression then that the 'authoritarianism' scale
might measure something different in the different class groups.26

(4) Lipset uses to a considerable extent differentials in child-rearing
practices as a basis for arguing for working-class intolerance.
Miller and Reissman sharply tenuate the usefulness of his claims
by a re-examination of the very studies which Lipset cites.27

What we are left with in the way of evidence after all this is
little more than the following from Lipset:

"The poorer strata everywhere are more liberal or
leftist on economic issues; they favour more wel­
fare state measures, higher wages....But when
liberalism is defined in non-economic terms --
as the support of civil liberties, internation­
alism, etc., -- the correlation is reversed. The

26 Study cited (on page 268) is Frank Reissman Worker's Attitudes Towards
Participation and Leadership, unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Columbia
University, 1955. I will offer further doubts about the F-scale below
and in the next chapter.

27 Miller and Reissman, pp. 269-70.
more well-to-do are more liberal, the poorer are more intolerant. 28

In support of this categorical assertion Lipset cites but two studies. 29

On a re-reading of these sources it is found that Smith, to whom he refers in both cases, did not deal with class levels at all, rather his data was concerned with relative information (and in one case education) levels. In the first of these studies, Smith used no civil liberties questions, merely indicators of "internationalism." In the second on questions regarding women's rights (equal pay for equal work), Anti-Semitism, and greater power for the U.N. it was found that there was no relation between liberalism-conservatism and either education or information levels. On only two questions (one on women and one on freedom of the press) was there any 'expected' difference on even the information level variable. Lipset's broad conclusion hardly seems supported by the data reported.

Lipset's study was critiqued here at length because it has been most often in turn been cited as the empirical grounding for doubts about the effects on democracy attendant to a rise in the participation of the relatively less advantaged. Other studies commonly referred to in this regard include that by Stouffer, and those done later by Prothro and

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28 Lipset, Political Man, p. 92

Grigg\textsuperscript{30}, by McClosky\textsuperscript{31} and the several major U.S. presidential years voting studies.\textsuperscript{32} In the following section of this chapter, we will discuss their and some other major findings on participation, in all cases both with regard to quantitative and qualitative strata differentials in participation. In some cases, we will offer comments on the generalizability of those findings.

III

The first of the studies to be considered briefly here is that by Samuel Stouffer mentioned above in our discussion of Lipset. Stouffer's study is a careful and intelligently conceived piece of research. The research was conducted in the summer of 1954 in the hope of providing some information for those "responsible citizens" who were taking a "sober second look" at McCarthyism and the Communist threat. As Stouffer put

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it in his first chapter:

"...so today do some alarmed citizens feel that the country cannot risk the luxury of full civil liberties for nonconformists. But there are others who disagree. They are convinced that our protection from Communist espionage and sabotage can be safely entrusted to the F.B.I. and other branches of an alert government, and that the diminishing risks of conversion of other Americans to Communism can be met by an alert public opinion." (p. 14)

Lest such words seem shocking to the reader, and they might well have been at the time -- the whole work was quite bold in its assumption that tolerance was a good thing, Stouffer felt constrained to add immediately that:

"the stark fact remains that for unknown years the free Western world must live under a menacing shadow. Vigilance cannot be relaxed against either peril from without or varieties of perils from within."

I think an appreciation of the times -- the fieldwork was done while the Army-McCarthy hearings were being conducted -- is necessary to appreciate that any of the findings of this or any other such study should hardly be taken prima facie as immutable. The tone of the comments, and Stouffer himself can be presumed to be a relatively enlightened "community leader," would hardly be appropriate today -- their tone is unmistakably paranoid, time has shown the F.B.I. more inclined to and adept at domestic espionage than has been the "menacing shadow."

These comments do not in any way devalue Stouffer's findings, they merely place the whole study in an historic context. The study utilized a large national random sample and a somewhat smaller and quite carefully derived selected sample of "community leaders" in middle-sized American cities. The community leaders were composed of mayors, school board
presidents, library board presidents, Republican and Democratic County Chairmen, labour union and Chamber of Commerce presidents, newspaper editors, and leaders of specified social, patriotic and civic organizations. Newspaper editors were the editors of the largest paper if there was more than one paper and so forth, thus assuming a prestigious group to be compared against the population at large. The findings indicated a considerable difference in level of tolerance between the "leaders" and the "general public". The extent of the difference is most apparent in the differences in scores on the "scale of willingness to tolerate nonconformists." The average number of "Community Leaders" "relatively more tolerant" on the scale was 66%; the average of the population cross-section for the same cities 32%. The bulk of the cross-section (50% of the total) fell into the category of "in between" relatively tolerant and relatively intolerant. When one examines the details of Stouffer's Guttman Scale construction contained in the appendix, it becomes apparent that one of the two questions depending on religious tolerance must be answered 'liberally' in order for the respondent to be placed in the "relatively more tolerant" category. 33 This is especially

33 To "qualify" for the "relatively more tolerant" category, a respondent must be in either rank group 5 or rank group 4; to qualify for rank group four, the respondent must give the tolerant response to 2 out of 3 of the following:
"Should an admitted Communist be put in jail, or not?"
"There are always some people whose ideas are considered bad or dangerous by other people. For instance, somebody who is against all churches and religion."
"If such a person wanted to make a speech in your city (town, community) against churches and religion, should he be allowed to speak, or not?"
and lastly,
"If some people in your community suggested that a book he wrote against churches and religion should be taken out of your public library, would you favor removing this book or not?" (pp. 263-4)
unfortunate as no control for religion was utilized. (Recall the comments of Miller and Reissman discussed above.) The one religious question for which data was produced separately showed the sharpest difference between "leader" response and "cross-section" response (of the four questions detailed in this way). Also indicative is the considerable differences found between "church-goers" and "non-church-goers" (pp. 140-152).

This does not refute that there is a considerable leader-citizen relative difference on this scale it merely indicates that there are at least two reasons for not taking the degree of difference to be anything like "66"-"32." The combining of categories is quite arbitrary and it would make just as much sense to combine rank groups 0, 1 and 2 on the one hand and groups 3, 4 and 5 on the other. (This would, as well, lessen the weighting of the "religious" factor as it is between groups 3 and 4 that respondents are divided by this particular factor.) Or, one could look at a combined category of those "relatively moderately or highly tolerant" (rank groups 2, 3, 4, 5) and the numerical balance is then:

"leaders" 95%
"cross-section" 82%

Such a grouping makes no more or less sense than any other. Again, however, this does not dispel the fact that the responses differ, but it certainly modifies the sorts of generalizations that might be made therefrom. However, a further consideration is also worth mentioning here with regard

25 (continued from previous page) The Guttman Scale had a coefficient of reproduceability of .96. Figures are then presented in most of the book grouped into three categories "more tolerant", "in-between" and "less tolerant." The religious question might have been the dividing line for the more Catholic lower status and educational categories.
to the degree of differences between the "leaders" and the national cross-section. There is, I think, one weakness in the handling of the two separate samples. In Stouffer's words:

"The leaders...were not told that they were chosen as representative of a particular group, but rather that they were chosen simply as "prominent members of the community." In this way, it was hoped their responses would come in terms of their individual opinions rather than the "official line" of their particular group -- labor, business, Republican... or whatever." (p. 246)

People called on as "prominent members of the community" would, it would seem, be more likely (than if they had been otherwise addressed) to be inclined to answer as they would think the "community" would have it rather than as they themselves candidly felt. It might well be the case that "leaders" are more inclined than ordinary citizens to speak as they think others would want to hear them even if they were not reminded of their "respectability."

Finally, we come to the finding in the Stouffer study which bears on the kind of meanings which Milbrath, Lipset and others have read into the whole study. The overwhelming bulk of the data presented relate to the "leader" vs. "cross-section" dichotomy which in itself says very little about whole-strata or any kind of class categories (the "leaders" are a very particular sub-group). The relevant finding is a breakdown by education of the national cross-sectional sample (I have inserted a total of the "tolerant" extreme and the "in-between" positions):
This finding should not be minimized; there was in mid-1950s America a significant difference by education with regard to measurable attitudes of willingness to tolerate certain kinds of non-conformity.

There was, however, a far less sharp strata difference on another. This was the scale scores of the national cross-section on the perceptions of an internal communist threat. The highest percentage "seeing a relatively great threat" was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education Level</th>
<th>Less Tolerant</th>
<th>In-Between</th>
<th>More Tolerant</th>
<th>Combination 2 &amp; 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>College Graduates</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some College</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H.S. Graduates</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some High School</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade School</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>Some H.S.</th>
<th>H.S. Graduate</th>
<th>Some College</th>
<th>College Graduate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>More Interested in Issues</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>See Relatively Great Threat</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-Between</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>See Relatively Little Threat</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N =</td>
<td>792</td>
<td>576</td>
<td>758</td>
<td>319</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Less Interested in Issues |
| See Relatively Great Threat | 19 | 26 | 22 | 28 | 22 |
| In-Between | 62 | 56 | 54 | 47 | 47 |
| See Relatively Little Threat | 19 | 18 | 24 | 25 | 31 |
| N = | 1050 | 446 | 440 | 141 | 68 |
It is unfortunate that the data were not broken down by other measures of social strata. There is one, but only very indirect, indication of occupational (or class) breakdown in the study. That is in the attitudes of local labor union leaders on the 'tolerance scale' and on four of the particular questions within that scale. On the tolerance scale the union leaders scored "62%", the average of community leaders "66%". One of the larger differences was on the religious tolerance question; on tolerance of suspected communists there was no difference. The labour leaders were not in this case (see p. 245) distant and perhaps bureaucratic labor "executives," but elected local leaders whose attitudes should not too often be drastically different from those of their rank-and-file members. Labor union members, then, may have been more tolerant than non-members, not less. This is, of course, highly speculative, but does indicate that Stouffer's study singly is not conclusive evidence of 'working-class authoritarianism.' In sum, Stouffer's study does contain some evidence of the potential for strata-based differences in the "quality" of participation, it's results are not so clear-cut in this regard as they are generally taken to be. Evidence on the other side of the scale of this question then weighs relatively heavier than it has for Lipset and others.

There are several other important studies bearing on the potential for "qualitative" participation that should be briefly considered here. The first is the well-known study by Prothro and Grigg, who consider a wider range of questions than did Stouffer and who did break down response by income (and a variety of other variables). They considered ten specifics
of democratic principle characterized as: "only informed vote, only taxpayers vote, bar Negro from office, bar Communist from office, AMA right to block voting, allow anti-religious speech, allow socialist speech, allow communist speech, bar Negro from candidacy, and bar Communist from candidacy," (p. 243, Cnudde and Neubauer). The difference by education was considerable, the difference by income was far less sharp with the largest gap on the religious question (with no differentiation made with regard to religious background). The average difference for the nine questions (excluding that on free religious speech) was 7%. The overall response (Prothro and Grigg were primarily concerned with the absence of consensus) indicated no strong overall conformity to specific democratic norms. This contrasted with an almost universal agreement on more general democratic norms, for example, the right to free speech. All groups supported the general statements. Prothro and Grigg's conclusion most relevant to our concern here is the following:

"Education, but not community (Ann Arbor or Tallahassee) or income, held up consistently as a basis of disagreement when other factors were controlled. We accordingly conclude that endorsement of democratic principles is not a function of class as much (of which income is also a criterion), but of greater acquaintance with the logical implications of the broad democratic principles." (p. 248)

Again it seems it is not appropriate to take this study as hard evidence of anything approaching a hypothetical working-class authoritarianism. The most supportive possible interpretation for those who wish to demonstrate the "undemocraticness" of the less advantaged is as follows: persons of lower income levels in certain locales in the United States, without controlling for religion which might well make a difference,
tended in the 1950s to show a somewhat (from -1% to 20% only in the case of religious speech averaging 8.5%) greater likelihood of showing in a readily measurable way, attitudes which can be characterized as less democratic. Further, if this difference were controlled for difference in education, it would presumably decline further in significance.

Another of the careful, effective, and often cited studies of this nature is that by Herbert McClosky. McClosky's central concern is similar to that of Prothro and Grigg; he is interested primarily in the degree of consensus on the various aspects of democratic ideology between a group identified as the "political influentials" and the general public. His findings are not applicable, at least not without great caution, to more generalized or other social divisions. As he puts it at the outset of his article:

"I mean them ("political influentials" and other terms of similar meaning) to refer to those people who occupy themselves with public affairs to an unusual degree, such as government officials, elected office holders, active party members, publicists, officers of voluntary associations, and opinion leaders. The terms do not apply to any definable social class or the usual sense, nor to a particular status group or profession. . . . Articulates" or "influentials" can be found scattered throughout the society, at all income levels, in all classes, occupations, ethnic groups, and communities, although some segments of the population will doubtless yield a higher proportion of them than others." (p. 363)

Some of the basic findings include the following:

"On 'totalitarianism,' a scale measuring the readiness to subordinate the rights of others to the pursuit of

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34 Page references are to American Political Science Review article of 1964, op. cit.
some collective political purpose, only 9.7 per cent of the political actives score high compared with 33.8 per cent of the general population." (p. 364)

"On a scale of willingness to flout the rules of political integrity, the proportions are 12.2 per cent and 30.6 per cent respectively." (p. 364)

However, on "responses to items expressing support for a series of general statements of free speech and opinion, there is not a great discernable difference (as is the case for Prothro and Grigg with regard to general assertions.) For example: "I believe in free speech for all no matter what their views might be": influentials 86.9%; general electorate 88.9%. (p. 366) On some more specific applications of free speech and fundamental rights differences emerged, but on others there were none, e.g., "no matter what crime a person is accused of, he should never be convicted unless he has been given the right to face and question his accusers: influentials, 90.1%; general electorate, 88.1%.

Particularly interesting are the findings on "social and ethnic equality" questions which showed no difference on three questions and only a small difference on two and on "economic equality" which showed the general electorate considerably more "democratic" than the influentials. Probably most interesting when considered in the light of our rather than McClosky's concerns are the following (grouped by McClosky under the heading of "expressions of political cynicism") (p. 371):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Influentials</th>
<th>General Electorate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Both major parties in this country are controlled by the wealthy and are run for their benefit</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Most politicians can be trusted to do what they think is best for the country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Political Influentials</th>
<th>General Electorate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Most politicians can be trusted to do what they think is best for the country</td>
<td>77.1</td>
<td>58.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The laws of this country are supposed to benefit all of us equally, but the fact is that they're almost all &quot;rich man's laws&quot;</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A poor man doesn't have the chance he deserves in the law courts</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>42.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One can very easily interpret all of these responses as indicating that, in one sense at least the general electorate is more "democratic" than are the influentials. That is, there seems to be a healthy distrust of authority expressed and a general streak of egalitarianism and inclination to due process. What could be of clearer benefit to democracy than an apparent doubt that its present actuality is not living up to its democratic potentialities? It would be most interesting to try these kinds of questions -- and a variety of variations on them -- in a sample to be stratified by occupation and/or income. Perhaps a scale of "democratic cynicism" could be developed.

Even, perhaps, more intriguing is the following response which elicited the widest differential in the study:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item (grouped under 'political futility')</th>
<th>Influentials</th>
<th>Electorate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nothing I ever do seems to have any effect upon what happens in politics</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>61.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Needless to say "political influentials" could hardly respond otherwise, nor likely could a realistic general public. It would be interesting to see how this question fared in an income or occupational breakdown and it would be useful to attempt to develop the line of question further. For example, attempt to discuss levels of desire for greater influence, levels of belief that "people like oneself should have more political
effect," and relative levels of belief in equality of influence. I am convinced that the range "democratic" attitudes has not been fully explored and that questions pursued to date have had a tendency to get responses which skew "against" the less advantaged. Further I suspect (and will present some indications in the next chapter) that question-phrasing carries a good deal more weight than is often considered to be the case.

I have, to this point, looked briefly at some of the most central of the studies of differentials in "qualitative" participation and, via several of the best secondary analyses, at some of the basic data on differentials in quantitative participation. I would like to turn now to look critically at three generally excellent works which within their broad research and analysis present findings and come to conclusions which encompass in single works both aspects of participation. As earlier, I have chosen these works as they seem to be representative of the discipline, have been widely referred to, and are still widely accepted in many regards.

The first work to be briefly considered here is Voting by Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee. Its methodology and locus, repeated-interview "panel" study of 1000 Elmira, New York citizens in the 1948 U.S. Presidential elections, are too well-known to need any elaboration. What I primarily want to do here is to itemize and comment on some of the most relevant findings and then look at the speculative conclusions which Berelson comes to in his well-known final chapter. The selected relevant findings are as follows:
(1) 26% of Republican voters interviewed and 32% of Democratic voters interviewed felt that "Jews are generally dishonest in business dealings;" while 43% of the Republicans and 31% of the Democrats believed that "Negroes are generally lazy and ignorant." (p. 190)

(2) "Not only do many of the so-called isolationist and hypernationalist attitudes form a common cluster with some illiberal civil rights opinions, but both sets of attitudes rest partly on certain personality characteristics rather than on political considerations as such. For example, people who feel that they "have to struggle for everything in life" are more likely than their counterparts to be anti-Semitic (37 to 23 %) or anti-foreign-born (42 to 25%). Thus it may be that opinions on such style issues are in good part expressive or symbolic of matters of personal temperament and private experience having little or nothing to do with the realities of the issues..."issues of frustration"...attract opposition from, among others, frustrated personalities found in all parts of the population." (p. 191)

(3) A neuroticism index ("admittedly a crude and inadequate measure of 'neuroticism'") p. 373, appendix B) was constructed from one four-part question with each part scoring equally: agreement with the following is taken as the measure of neuroticism:

I have to struggle for everything I get in life.
Prison is too good for sex criminals; they should be publicly whipped.
A lot of people around here ought to be put in their place.
I often find myself worrying about the future.

Most people were found to be at least a little neurotic.
(4) "The 'joiners' the better-educated, the better-off, the men, the less troubled (as measured by neuroticism index) — these are the people who pay most attention to the political campaign as presented through newspaper, magazines, and radio." (p. 241)

(5) "Less than half the voters agreed with their own party's position on major Position issues like Taft-Hartley and price control." (p. 213)

(6) "Party preference does not particularly affect the voter's perception of where the candidates stand on the issues." (p. 233)

(7) "Partisans tend to perceive the candidates stand on the issues as favorable to their own stand." (p. 233, seems to contradict (6))

(8) "Only about one-third of the voters are highly accurate in their perception of where the candidates stand on the issues" and "accuracy of perception is affected by communication exposure, education, interest and cross-pressures...." (p. 233)

(9) Consistent and concentrated media exposure was found to be conditioned by... membership in community organization, education, class, sex, and (crudely) freedom from personality disorders. (p. 241)

What might reasonably be concluded from these findings (given a proper appreciation of methods underlying them)? Is it that a lot of people are neurotic, and ignorant and don't pay proper attention? I think not. The "admittedly crude" index of neuroticism — except perhaps for the second of the four questions does not appear to me to measure anything except perhaps differing social realities. Some life situations, likely most in 1940-America were perfectly reasonable grounds for struggle and worry. A case could just as easily be made that those
who didn't agree with two or three of the assertions were "neurotic." Clearly many people in Elmira, New York, in 1948 had a bigoted view of the world. Many persons were unable to correctly identify three or four out of four candidate issue positions. A reading of the "evidence" of what those positions "objectively were" (presented in a condensed form to the voters, not available in 1948) left this reader unable to get the "right" (yes-no) answer on but two of the four pairs. In the heat of campaigns, without television coverage, given the very small ideological differences in American politics and the exceptional issue obscuring "non-stand" of candidate Dewey whom everyone in New York State, at least, "knew" was honest, and tough and fair, I find it most impressive that the scores on this measure were above those of random selection. That is, misperceptions might abound for reasons other than "lack of attention" and "lack of attention" might be present for reasons other than "inability" to conform to the citizens' democratic expectations of (unnamed) "democratic theorists."

But those, of course, are precisely the kinds of conclusions which Berelson tends to draw in his final chapter. For example,

"If the democratic system depended solely on the qualifications of the individual voter, then it seems remarkable that democracies have survived through the centuries, After examining the detailed data on how individuals misperceive political reality or respond to irrelevant social influences, one wonders how a democracy ever solves its political problems.... Where the rational citizen seems to abdicate, nevertheless angels seem to tread." (p. 311)

I fail to see anywhere in the hard data of this study any evidence which

35 Noted carefully by the authors themselves.
might justify such a "conclusion." That many voters did not agree with "their party's" stand on a given "issue" (in this case price controls and Taft-Hartley) might be a reflection of, for example: (1) that there are other issues they see as more important (or as in many cases they agreed on one but not the other); (2) that their reasonable perception that American parties are mixed bags allows them to conclude that no issue stance by any candidate is a "sure thing" or anything like it; (3) that other people in their party were saying other things and they thought it a possibility that those others might in the end prevail; (4) that as they (a large majority) were not in a union, they did not care about Taft-Hartley however much the media and others who make "issues" did; (5) that they were in a union and still didn't care; (6) that they cared about prices, but saw "price controls" as a gimmick though they generally trusted Truman; (7) that they voted for "the man" and not "the party" as the parties were historically indistinguishable; and any one of innumerable other judgements more important and certainly no less "rational" or "intelligent" criteria Berelson has seemingly established. Further here, it is most interesting to note that despite Truman's victory, the Taft-Hartley act was not repealed; nor for that matter was it even amended. This is not only further evidence that there are never issue-mandates in American politics, but further it could be said that the voters were more astute in their "ignorance" than the observers in their "sophistication."

There is no doubt that the findings of the study in these matters are interesting, but to claim that the above statement is somehow based
on "detailed data" is patently absurd. This statement has been critiqued elsewhere on a variety of grounds and there is no need to develop arguments further; nowhere, were Berelson's broad conclusions been counterposed to his data and methods, and it might be profitable for this to be developed further. Suffice it to say here that Berelson goes on from the above point which does not follow from the relevant data he presents, to make a number of statements which have no referents at all within his study. That is, of course, no grounds for not making them. I will offer here only brief excerpts as they will be discussed further below and in that context, it would be helpful that it be clear that there is no data in the study which relates to them in any but the most remote manner. (The summary of findings which offered above was the result of an attempt to locate the most relevant items.)

"For political democracy to survive, other features are required: the intensity of conflict must be limited, the rate of change must be restrained, stability in the social and economic structure must be maintained, a pluralistic social organization must exist, and a basic consensus must find together the contending parties." (p. 313)

"We need some people who are active in a certain respect, others in the middle, and still others who are passive." (p. 314)

And,

"How could a mass democracy work if all the people were deeply involved in politics? Lack of interest by some people is not without benefits, too....Extreme interest goes with extreme partisanship (some evidence presented in study) and might culminate in rigid fanaticism that could destroy democratic

36 See my next chapter, Part I, for several examples of these critiques.
processes if generalized throughout the community." (p. 314)

The *American Voter* by Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes is far less inclined to draw in its conclusions unwarranted generalizations. Some of the relevant findings include:

1. "In a time of depolarization, the behavior of the involved voter becomes less and less distinct from that of the apathetic, with respect to the class axis." (p. 355)

2. "...most of the evidence for class voting within each group is contributed by voters whose class identification is congruent with occupation." (p. 372)

3. The relationship between education and voting participation was found to be:

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<td>77</td>
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<td>South</td>
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4. Relationship of Education to Sense of Political Efficacy:

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And further, in general "sense of political efficacy" and "sense of citizen duty," showed strong relationships with education on the one hand and with vote turnout on the other (pp. 478-480).
(5) A considerable relationship, though far less a one than that in previous point was demonstrated to exist between education and turnout, attempts to influence others and a variety of other forms of participation.

(6) There are several fascinating findings with regard to "authoritarianism" reported. The authors employed a battery of ten authoritarian items, five of which were in the traditional "agree" form and five of which were reversed in their direction. The authors conclude:

A comparison of responses to the two halves of the battery is disturbing, because people who look like "high authoritarians" where agreement means an authorial response tend to look like "low authoritarians" on the reversed items. In other words, there is a negative correlation between the two halves of the battery rather than the strong positive correlation that should emerge if people were responding to the content of the questions rather than their form. A single "response set" seems to underlie a great many answers to items of the usual authoritarianism scale." (p. 512)

There follows an excellent discussion of the issue which includes data indicating that with reversed questions even education and authoritarianism are positively related, but that in effect little can be concluded with confidence about the relationship between education and authoritarianism. (On balance, if there is any relationship, whatever it is and that is far from certain, it does not hold for class though the "usual conclusions for education may remain the case to a slight extent only.) (I will deal further with this matter in Chapter 4.)

(7) Sixteen of the "more prominent" issues in the campaign of 1956 were chosen and it was found that from 10% to 30% of the electorate had
no opinion on them, an additional 10% to 39% held an opinion, but
didn't know what the government was doing on them. (p. 174).

(8) The different levels of issue familiarity varied quite strongly
with level of education. (p. 175)

(9) Only from 18% to 36% of citizens perceived party differences on
various issues. However, from 45% to 78% held an issue opinion and
knew what the government was doing. The authors did not, however,
relate this sharp difference to the possibility that it is a result
of lack of presentation of party positions or the possibility that
there were no real differences. They stressed rather lack of voter
attentiveness. There is also nothing doubting the nature of a poli-
tical system in which people do not seem to care what positions the
parties took. The concern is merely for the "capacity to discri-
minate between the policy stands of the parties." (p. 186)

The American Voter can still be seen as an example of sound
empirical social science research: careful, intelligent, at times ima-
ginative, and generally perceptive in interpretation of data. There are
simply no elaborate and unwarranted conclusions drawn. For the most part,
the authors stay altogether away from the matters in which Berelson in-
volved himself. They do conclude that there is a "substantial lack of
familiarity with policy questions." (p. 542) and further,

"Our measures have shown the public's understanding
of policy issues to be poorly developed even though
these measures usually have referred to a general
problem which might be the subject of legislation
or (in the area of foreign affairs) executive action,
rather than to particular bills or acts." (p. 542)'

They also conclude that relatively few persons have developed consistent
patterns of "liberal" or "conservative" beliefs. They add,
"Our failure to locate more than a trace of 'ideological' thinking in the protocols of our surveys emphasizes the general impoverishment of political thought in a large proportion of the electorate. "...Very few of our respondents have shown a sensitive understanding of the positions of the parties on current policy issues. Even among those people who are relatively familiar with issues presented in our surveys -- and our test of familiarity has been an easy one -- there is little agreement as to where the two parties stand....

"We have, then, the portrait of an electorate almost wholly without detailed information about decision-making in government." (p. 544)

They conclude then that policy-makers in America thereby have a lot of latitude on specifics, but neither then celebrate nor condemn that degree of latitude. In their discussion of the lack of awareness of party differences, they note in passing that the parties are similar, but on the whole their attitude is one of doubt about the capabilities of the electorate rather than about the quality of institutions. But to their credit they offered neither sweeping condemnations of the masses (beyond those quoted), nor idle praise of the system or its enlightened leadership. Their expression of concern, thus, was not on the whole inappropriate or unrelated to their narrower findings. They nowhere suggest that the system might work better if some citizens involved themselves even less.

The last study to be considered here, though weak in many ways, is methodologically elaborate and quite expensive. Its methods and detailed findings are widely known and I won't elaborate them further at this point.

I will simply offer some critique of their broad conclusions as their final chapter, in a comparative political context, contains conclusions remarkably parallel to those offered by Berelson ten years earlier. The conclusions in The Civic Culture have, in my view, as little foundation
in the findings of their respective study as did the comments at the conclusion of Voting. I include it here as a second example of the quite well-developed understanding of the non-participation of the disadvantaged for which I will elaborate as a model early in Chapter 4.

Based on their findings of greater general social trust, of greater political awareness, of greater feelings of political competence, and of a greater proclivity to form ad hoc political groups, Almond and Verba conclude that Great Britain and especially the United States seem to have a political culture more conducive to participation in democratic processes than do Germany, Italy or Mexico. However, they also find that even in Great Britain and the United States there are many individuals who must be classified as "subjects" or "parochials". They then conclude that there is such a thing as a "civic culture", that is, a culture that is just the right admixture of the participant, the subject and the parochial to produce the ideal "democratic political culture". They then explain that an excessively participant culture puts too much pressure on political elites to allow those elites to perform "effectively". An excessively subject and/or parochial culture does not exert enough pressure to maintain "responsiveness" of elites. They do not say what exactly is the necessary "mix" of types that is needed to create a "civic culture" but we are led to the impression that it is not far from what they measured in the United States and Britain.

The full impact of what they seem to be saying comes when one considers, first the characteristics necessary for an individual to be
categorized as a "participant" and second, the reason for the authors' use of only local government orientations in calculating their scale:

"If a scale based on the national government had been used, too many respondents would have fallen into the lower categories of subjective competence, and the scale would not have been useful to discriminate among the various types of citizens". (p. 232)

In other words, it seems that a society in which over half of the population feel they might try to influence their local government, or in which more than 7 to 12% of them actually had tried in the past, or in which a somewhat lower percentage than this felt that they might do so or did so with respect to national government, "stable democracy" might well be threatened. Not only however, is it necessary that not many more than 21% of the citizenry attempt to influence elite decisions, it is also necessary that a larger number think they can influence them, but never try:

"These two gaps -- between a high perception of potential influence and a lower level of actual influence, and between a high frequency of obligation to participate and the actual importance and amount of participation -- help explain how a democratic political culture can act to maintain a balance between governmental elite power and governmental elite responsiveness (or its complement, a balance between non-elite activity and influence and non-elite passivity and non-influence)." (p. 480-481)

I stress this point because the authors themselves consider it important (the title of the book and the entire concluding chapter revolve around it) and because it leads us to assumptions made by the

37 Participants, who, at a minimum, believe they would attempt to influence their local government in some way (slightly over 1/2 in the U.S. and Britain), and at a maximum, actually have tried in some way (7% in Britain, 21% in the U.S.)
authors. The first of these assumptions is obvious from the preceding discussion: namely, that Britain and America represent the ideals of stability and of democracy. How else could they state that participation beyond what these nations had achieved is a threat to democracy and stability, when no empirical basis is presented regarding democracies which have "fallen" due to too much participation of the type dealt with in this study. Nor is any evidence presented that the amount of participation in these countries poses a threat of any kind or degree, or for that matter, what amount or kind of participation might conceivably be threatening. No consideration is given to the possibility that additional participation would not result in the downfall of stable democracy.

Throughout the study one finds evidence of an assumption not only that the "civic culture" is an ideal, but that those countries which have not yet attained it are striving and tending toward it. The pervasive influence of the civic-culture-as-an-ideal can be seen when one considers that there are dozens of correlations inquiring into the source of "subject competence" (the belief in one's ability to influence) but nowhere in the study is there any inquiry into either the sources of the will to participate, or into any possible relationship between the belief in influence and actual opportunities to have influence. The latter of these, it might be argued reasonably, is beyond the scope of this particular study, but measurements were made of "how many persons actually did try to influence the government" but no attempt was made to correlate this aspect of participant culture with any of the sources studied with regard to the "competence" aspect. Thus concern is focused on the source of the assumed
greater need for perceived influence not on the assumed lesser need for actual influence. Regarding the civic-culture-as-a-trend, we feel the following single example to be sufficient. After finding that Germans are politically well-informed and have a favorable orientation to the output side of their political system, Almond and Verba discover the seemingly contrary findings that overall "system affect" is low and orientation to input participation goes little beyond a vote which is seen as no more than obligatory. How they avoid the apparent conclusion that a failure of system output could well be exceedingly threatening to German "democratic stability" is very revealing:

"In Germany [and Italy], though there is some opportunity to participate and though there are respondents who consider themselves competent to do so, this participation has not led to a greater sense of participation with the political system. Thus the positive relationship between subject competence and system affect found among Germans with secondary education or better becomes important. It suggests that the ability to participate is beginning to be translated into attachment to the political system (our emphasis) among those who have attained some higher educational level." (p. 251)

Clearly there is no reason whatever to assume that high school graduates are creating a trend to democracy. There is no evidence presented here that such feelings are actually increasing among high school graduates or the population at large.

Many of the weaknesses present in Almond and Verba's conclusions flow from their failure to develop a coherent theory. They are making broad generalizations without performing first the necessary tasks of definition. These criticisms are equally applicable to the later
Both works deal over and over again with "democratic stability" but in neither is there any attempt to define "democracy," "stability," or "participation"; the difficulties which flow from this become clear when we examine a few quotes from the two works:

"And this balance, as we have said, is needed for successful democracy (our emphasis): there must be involvement in politics if there is to be the sort of participation necessary for democratic decision-making; yet the involvement must not be so intense as to endanger stability." (A. & V., p. 296)

"Everything being equal, the sense of ability to participate in politics appears to increase the legitimacy and lead to political stability.

"[But]...high levels of participation may have un-stabilizing effects on a system. But the sense of competence, especially when coupled with a somewhat lower fulfillment of this competence, does play an important role in political stability." (A. & V., p. 253)

"The most potent kind of commitment that political elites can arouse is to the political system per se -- that is, a commitment to it over and above its actual performance. It is only such a rain-or-shine commitment that will allow a system to survive the many kinds of crises that are likely to arise during processes of rapid social change." (P. & V., pp. 259-530)

What is a "successful democracy"? Cannot one have both "instability" and "democracy"? At what point has one lost "stability"? That is, what characteristics of a type of "political system" must change to make it another type of "system"? If a "system" has a "crisis" doesn't that indicate that it might need changes? Just what kind of "participation" will threaten "stability"? For example, has the French "political system" changed?

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since 1870 been "stable"? We would suggest further that if one were to
define a democratic system as one with majority rule with a maintenance
of the right of minorities to exist and express themselves, the way is
left open for considerable change and "instability" without endangering
"system stability." Finally, would not a system which "participation"
would threaten, rather than "stable", be more aptly described as
"immobile"?

Finally here, Almond and Verba upon the discovery that "citizen
participation" was universally lower among women and those of lower edu-
cation conclude that this phenomenon "spreads slowly". It spreads from
the more easily politicized to those more difficult to bring into pol-
itical life". (emphasis ours) (p. 221) This statement not only provides
an assumed direction for change as mentioned above, but perhaps even more
significantly indicates that Almond and Verba see non-participation as
resulting from flaws in individuals, not from any weakness in the pol-
iticalsystem. Perhaps this attitude has something to do with their over-
whelming concern with "political competence," defined as a belief in
one's concern with actual ability to influence the system. The system,
they assume, somehow strives to get a reluctant citizenry to participate
and any failure on their part to believe that they can participate is
serious indeed and one must seek within individuals for reasons to explain
it. The uneducated are those who are more difficult to bring into pol-
itical life", they are not those who have been unable to force effective
entrance into the political system, and certainly not those who have been
kept from access to the political system.
In a similar vein Almond and Verba make lengthy inquiry into what kind of political partisanship it is that limits the ability of all but Americans to heavily engage in the formation of informal, ad hoc political groupings. They conclude,

"...as long as positive attachment to their party is not coupled with a negative reaction to those of an opposition party, their ability to form political groups does not appear to be impaired". (p. 293)

"It is only when partisanship becomes so intense as to involve rejection on personal grounds, of those of opposing political views that the state of partisanship in a nation may be said to limit the ability of citizens to cooperate with each other in political affairs". (p. 194)

The American ability to get together with a random group of neighbors or fellow-citizens is seen as impaired by the intense political partisanship present in other nations. Clearly implicit in their remarks however is that somehow that American way is more democratic, more a natural, healthy thing. This kind of reasoning assumes that the issues about which people seek to exercise their democratic rights are the kind of problems that lend themselves to solution by small, informal groups of neighbors. Are not political parties groups? Are they not citizens cooperating with each other? The only serious difference is that informal groups of the type Almond and Verba are concerned with can do little more than demand new traffic lights, while political parties are groups concerned with taking power. Is it not possible, for some societies at least, that the needs of the citizens cannot be fulfilled with anything less than forming a group which can take over the powers of the state.
Before concluding this chapter and turning to a broader and more systematic inquiry into the question raised in my critical summaries here, I would like to briefly look at the most recent empirical studies of political participation. To try to come to something of an overview of recent trends in the study of and conclusions about participation, I surveyed the major relevant journals for the five-year period 1968-1972. Some of the substantive findings from these studies will be integrated into the analysis presented in the next chapter. Here, I will merely offer a few brief and impressionistic generalizations from that survey and summarize some of the findings of those studies which add usefully to the composite I have developed thus far in this chapter.

What in general can be said to characterize political participation research during the period in question? I would venture the following with a caution to the reader that my comments are no more than impressions:

(1) In this period there are very few, if any, examples in the research literature of that understanding of participation common to such earlier researchers as Berelson, Milbrath and Almond and Verba. In general there seem to be very few attempts within the research

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40 To reach such claims as firm conclusions would require more years than have as yet elapsed from the beginnings of systematic empirical research on political participation and, as well, a far more careful and methodical search of the whole literature of the whole period. I expect such self-consciousness would be most useful, but is beyond my needs at this point.
literature to incorporate research findings into any broad understanding. (In contrast to this, as will be shown in the next chapter, statements of this understanding abound in a large number of recent texts in a wide variety of subfields in the discipline including American politics, American political parties, public opinion and other subject areas.)

(2) There has been a considerable evolution in methodology which has seen developments going well beyond mere correlations between broad socio-economic demographic variables and composite indices of participation. One direction of increasing methodological sophistication used with enormous success is the study of the participation by Black citizens in the American South by Matthews and Prothro. The authors in that study, by subdividing the various aspects of participation which earlier were largely only considered collectively and for the nation-as-a-whole, by narrowing their focus to county by county comparisons, and by looking closely — in a particular context at a particular aspect of disadvantage, were able to produce compelling results. (I will discuss this study further below.)

Other useful findings were gained by subdividing customarily lumped occupational groupings — down to even the varying politics characteristic of the several disciplines of academic professionals.  

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42 See Gary M. Halter "The Effects of the Hatch Act on the Political Participation of Federal Employees," Midwest Journal of Political Science, XVI (November, 1972) pp. 723-29 wherein it is shown that governmental employees participate out of proportion to the broader occupational groups within which they are usually 'lumped'. See also Henry A. Turner and continued on next page
This practice I will argue later -- if properly conceived -- has considerable usefulness in that it allows for the 'contextualization' of empirical research.

A second clear trend in research methodology is towards the wider use of such sophisticated analytic techniques as path analysis and multiple classification analysis (MCA). There have been several attempts using these techniques to determine the relative independent effects of education, occupation and income on measures of participation. Even more interesting though is the broader conclusion that can be drawn from the findings here that a very considerable portion of variance is not explained even when all the usual demographic variables are combined. (I will discuss below as well the limited meaning of 'explanation' in analysis of variance.)

(3) In general, there seems to be a small decline in interest in political participation. Further, there have been few, if any, "break throughs" in explanatory power. The changes in perspective on the subject from the fundamentals summarized by Lane in 1959 could be characterized as incremental.

What were some of the more important findings in these recent studies (I include here also several books published during this period):

42 continued Charles B. Spalding "Political Attitudes and Behavior of Selected Academically-affiliated Professional Groups," Polity I (Spring, 1969) pp. 309-36 they support and follow Peter H. Rossi's call for "pointedly designed studies of crucial populations, rather than shotgun designs." They found sharp gradations in partisanship though not in participation rates.
Alford and Scoble produced an important refinement in the findings with regard to, on the one hand, the "quantity" and "quality" of participation and on the other "leadership" and "education." They were most interested in determining the relative effects (association) of holding leadership positions versus having some college education on political interest, political information levels, political activity, and tolerance of political deviance. They see their study as following from the voting studies and from those by McClosky and Stouffer discussed above. They compare a sample of the general electorate (Wisconsin, 1962) to a selected group of governmental, party and organizational leaders. Their first finding that those who are office-holders tend to be relatively politically active (more so than a random educated group) is hardly surprising. More interesting is the fairly limited effect education alone seems to have within either the leader group or the general sample in such matters as issue interest and attempts to contact someone about a political problem. Also interesting are the sharper differences found, by education, for interest in local decision-making, knowing neighborhood party activist, and high organizational office-holding. (pp. 262-64)

The study has a fairly tidy general conclusion:

"By simultaneously controlling for both leadership and education, we have established (1) that

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leadership is far more important than education with regard to almost every single measure we have of sheer "quantity" or "volume" of political activity, but (2) that education is far more important than leadership concerning the "content", "quality" or "direction" of political behavior...." (p. 271)

Sadly, two of the "best" (in terms of greatest difference by education) measures of "quality" of participation are "implicit" (e.g., an insult to your honor and should not be forgotten) and "explicit" (e.g., Foreigners have too much influence in national politics) authoritarianism measured by three "agree" statements each. How, even at the date of the original study (1962) the authors could have proceeded in that manner is inexplicable. (See e.g., my discussion of The American Voter, 1960 above.) They report a strong association between education and "authoritarianism" which cannot be taken as much more than "docility" with regard to abstract and fuzzy assertions. To score as other than authoritarian, respondents had to disagree with all of the assertions made; any lapse of attention and bingo you're a Nazi. For example "what this country needs is a few strong leaders, and less talk in Congress": a failure to oppose this remark might have signified no more than a concern that someone do something about anything. Anyone who did not actively disagree with this statement "Regardless of any mistakes he may have made, Senator Joseph McCarthy woke this country up to the danger of Communism" was taken as one who did not qualify as low in pro-McCarthy sentiments. A less aggressive and verbal person might well have responded to only the earlier part of the statement, or have been lost in its overall ambiguity.

I should add here that I expect that Alford and Scoble might
have measured some educational difference, but I doubt that a "fairest" test would have gotten responses anything like they report; nor could they in any case fairly ascribe the characteristics as they did. The only "quality" measure which on first glance showed a high educational difference is not linked to "response-set" is the first "tolerance of deviant ideas" wherein there is a religious toleration question and no control for religion. Further, on closer inspection, we find that three items are used in this test, one of which requires a "disagree" answer and all of which must be answered "correctly" to score other than as intolerant. Thereby, the whole score is again linked to a possible response-set which itself is, again, sharply correlated with education. On two other factors, "pro-Negro" sentiment and favoring of restricted local electorates, there were small or no differences by education. The finding that "leaders" regardless of education level do not differ markedly from the random citizenry on these variables is not quite so threatened by our above critique and does provide a bit of counterbalance to the findings of Stouffer and McClosky in that regard. (That is, overall, there was little or no difference between the response of leaders at a given education level and the general population with regard to "quality" variables. There may not be a response-set if education is thus controlled -- although this, of course, must be checked if the finding is to hold up.)

44 All of the above discussion is related primarily to page 270.
(2) Hamilton in an examination of the San Francisco referendum on Vietnam and data on attitudes with regard to the Korean War concludes the following:

"Studies of public reactions in two wartime contexts show that preferences for "tough" policy alternatives are most frequently among the following groups: the highly educated, high status occupations, those with high incomes, younger persons, and those paying much attention to newspapers and magazines." (p. 439 or p. 442).

This finding is significant as Lipset in "Working-class Authoritarianism" and others who later depended on the article use foreign policy "liberality"-"illiberality" as a significant part of their demonstration that the less advantaged are not saviours, but rather are "devils", dangerous to democratic and perhaps even human survival. It is further supported by the later findings of Howard Schuman.

(3) Form and Rytina in a study of the ideological views of rich and poor found that in general the poor saw the American political system as elitist rather than pluralist, but saw pluralism as desirable. More advantaged respondents tended to see the system as already pluralist but were generally inclined to the view that it shouldn't be too much so. This surely adds another dimension to the relative distribution

of "democratic values" among social strata. It could be argued that Form and Rytina's questions got nearer to the heart of democracy: a process moving towards the equalization of political power and that on this important measure the less advantaged score "better" than the more advantaged.

The same authors have also produced a recent and excellent book which I will mention here merely for having located in another context yet another stark contrast to the above:

"In contrast to low-status persons, we expect better educated and wealthier persons to endorse innovation and 'progress'; to be more liberal on civil rights and civil liberties issues, to be more 'public-regarding' in their attitudes toward government, to support the development of 'amenities' such as recreational or cultural facilities, and to favor 'reform' in government."^48

Clearly for the authors of that statement innovation, 'progress' 'public-regardingness' and so forth, have a quite particular meaning.

(4) Olsen ^49 found that with socio-economic status controlled Black Americans are more active than whites in both voluntary association participation and voting participation. He further found that this difference has tended to become more pronounced in the period 1957 to 1968. There is then at least one form of disadvantage which under certain circumstances

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may promote social and political participation.

(5) A further refinement of the data on strata differences in the quantity of participation is found in a study by Angus Campbell. He finds that the spread is sharpest when the overall turnout is lowest. That is when there is a turnout "surge," as in a Presidential year, the added voters are disproportionately the disadvantaged. The sharpest differences in voting participation by status occur in primary elections where total turnout is lowest. The author makes little attempt to relate his finding to broader considerations. A related study, this one by Howard Hamilton, found that:

"The association of turnout and social status was far greater (in municipal) than in presidential elections, with a low-high ratio of 1 to 2 compared with 5 to 7 ..." (p. 1140)

(6) Far more important than the previous additions is the imaginative study conducted by Gerald Johnson. He first notes that by socioeconomic status, income, education and communications variables, the State of West Virginia predictably would, among the states, have very low electoral turnout. But in fact for a composite turnout percentage in all Presidential since 1920, West Virginia placed sixth of the 50 states. He then demonstrates the inadequacy of two previous attempts to explain this deviant case.

I will briefly relate these previous attempts because their

failure is instructive. Thomas R. Dye had suggested that it could be explained as "...perhaps voting in Appalachia is one form of recreation in an otherwise drab environment." But Johnson points out voter participation in West Virginia exceeds that of other Appalachian states and counties. Milbrath (p. 119) argued that West Virginians turn out in greater numbers than might be expected in part because the state had been industrialized for some time, but now, though in decline, the effect of earlier period "remains". Johnson counters that high turnout in West Virginia pre-dates industrialization. Johnson seems to claim that mining is somehow not industrialization; I would counter that that is true in one sense only, and that "class solidaristic" occupations like mining have pronounced political effects as Lipset demonstrated in Political Man. Nevertheless, Johnson's contention that the West Virginia deviant case has not been explained must be taken in general to stand.

Johnson, to be brief, finds first that within West Virginia there is a "moderately strong" negative correlation between affluence and voting participation (using aggregate data by county). He then looks for the historical period in which West Virginia began to deviate from other equivalent socio-economic states in its region and fixes the

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time as 1892-1920 the same time as when the state was "an open battleground in the effort to unionize its miners." (p. 772)

Johnson concludes further that:

"...comparing West Virginia and Virginia counties that share almost identical socio-economic environments but exhibit strikingly different political participation patterns, the influence of the organizational variable...appears to be substantial." (p. 772)

and more generally he concludes,

"...political participation in West Virginia is more a function of variations in political style, culture, and history than a system of policy outputs or socio-economic attributes." (p. 770)

That is the specific historic event of the unionization movement, the context in which it occurred and its ongoing "cultural" effects seem to be the most crucial determinant of political participation in this case.

What is most impressive about this study is that it begins to integrate contextual-historical factors and empirical methods. Each provides support to the other rather than acting as is often the case to blur out the other. It should be noted here as well that both inadequate attempts at explanation related to failures to adequately contextualize, to actual errors of localization and dating of fact. I believe that in general this has been a weakness to date in empirical research generally and will discuss this point at several junctures throughout the chapters which follow. This particular study, and others I will discuss below, offers explanations which are satisfying at least in part because they integrate easily

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55 Milbrath, op. cit., p. 119.
into the context of historical matrix rather than being 'merely' seemingly valid generalizations (as in the case of the findings related in the previous point on "surge" effects on class voting). Again, I will develop this further below.

Finally, the Johnson study with the findings about Black Americans reported in point (4) above, are examples which might be usefully taken to be building towards a pattern of explanations of situations wherein the major theme (the non-participation of the less advantaged) is not operational. Any patterns which might be found to emerge here are potentially of great usefulness toward understanding why it is that the wider rule to which they are exceptions is the case. It could also be useful therapy, in some cases, for those who wished to either advance or retard that effectiveness of that social "rule."

(7) Another study whose findings are most important is that by Nie, Powell and Prewitt. The authors are concerned that:

"In spite of the consistency...of findings across many studies...we know little about the connections between social structure and political participation. With few exceptions the literature on individual participation is notable for low level generalizations (the better educated citizen talks about politics more regularly), and the absence of systematic and comprehensive theory." (p. 362)

They then apply a causal analysis technique (path analysis) to the

Almond-Verba five nation study data in an attempt to explore the theoretical assumptions by "showing the relationships between socio-economic attributes, intervening attitudinal characteristics and of political participation." (p. 362)

They find that their two best explanatory variables, social status and organizational involvement, "operate through quite different causal paths in their impact on political participation." (p. 811)

"Virtually all of the relationship between social and political participation is explained by the intervening linking attitude variables. The high social status citizen does not just participate in politics; he does so only when he has the attitudes such as efficacy and attentiveness which are postulated as intervening variables." (p. 811)

However, much of the relationship between organizational involvement and participation (about 60%) cannot be explained by any known intervening variable -- it is a "direct link" that "does not pass through" social class or the attitudinal variables.\(^{56a}\) (The other variables in the model include sense of citizen duty, political information, perceived impact of government, political efficacy (feeling of), and political attentiveness.)

Overall the social characteristic of organizational involvement has a greater effect than socio-economic status in all five countries in the study. This is important especially when coupled with the previous finding and the authors are not unaware of the political potential of their finding:

\(^{56a}\) In some other contexts the existence of certain forms of feudal or quasi-feudal relationships seem to also act to increase levels of participation. In these cases greater dominance (greater disadvantage) may have an effect quite contrary to the negative effect we have taken to be generally the case. (See for example: David J. Elkins, "Regional Contexts of Political Participation: Some Illustrations from South India," Canadian Political Science Review, V (June, 1972), pp. 167-187 or Carl H. Lande, Leaders, Factions and Parties, (New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies Monographs, 1965).
"...organizational involvement may represent an alternative channel for political participation for socially disadvantaged groups. The rural peasant, the industrial laborer, the disadvantaged black may become politically active through his organizational involvement even though he may otherwise lack the status resources for political participation." (p. 819)

and,

"...obviously major changes in the status structure, involving occupation, education and income patterns, are extremely difficult to bring about. We suspect that the organizational structure may be susceptible to more direct and short-term manipulation." (p. 819)

This conclusion is well-supported by the historic link established by Johnson above, by the theoretical arguments of, for example, Gad Horowitz and by the well-known fact that in highly class-mobilized post-World War II Austria, the correlation between social status and participation does not hold.57

Nie et al, then through simulation analysis come to the following additional and complementary conclusions:

"(1) The higher the total organization level, the less the lower class is under-represented...

"(2) The higher the correlation between status and organizational membership, the more under-represented the lower class. A correlation of 15 increases under-representation in these cases by at least one-half....

"(3) The smaller the size of the lower class, the more it is, relatively, under-represented...."

(p. 822)

The lower class is most severely underrepresented in the United States than in Germany, Britain, Italy or Mexico. In all of the

the other four countries there have been deliberate attempts to organize the less advantaged (by the political parties or by, as the authors neglect to mention, the government of L. Cardenas in 1930s Mexico).

It might be queried then here as to why the many American parties that attempted to mobilize America's less advantaged have been peculiarly unsuccessful. I think that this sort of question is most important here and the authors offer a footnote with a brief list of factors but do not elaborate it.

There are, of course, innumerable explanations, most of which no doubt offer some part of the total explanation. Perhaps most significant are such factors as: (1) the uncommonly large divisions historically among America's less advantaged: the varieties of the foreign-born and racial and religious differences, (2) the frontier thesis, (3) the historic absence of an aristocracy and corresponding democratic ethos, and probably most important though not mentioned by the authors: a consistent and most timely tradition of political repression (elite libertarian enlightenment notwithstanding). That the authors do not pursue their deviant case very far is not critical, it is enough to present empirical findings which lend themselves effectively to such linkings to historical analysis.

(8) Bennett and Klecka pursue an approach similar to that of Nie, Powell

and Prewitt with results that are only somewhat less significant to our inquiry. Their opening concern is stated thusly (they are speaking of quantitative participation variables):

"However, even after all of the research which has accumulated on the subject, scholars remain uncertain whether the observed relation between level of education and political participation is due mainly to the education process itself, or should be attributed to the fact that education is intimately linked to occupation and income (which are themselves closely related to participation)." (p. 358)

They wish to look at the relative independent and interactive effects of these several variables and apply the multiple classification analysis (MCA) technique to the Survey Research Center data on the 1964, 1966 and 1968 U.S. national elections. They also break down the various aspects of political participation from their more common use in a single index. They find that for all three elections studied, educational experience was the strongest predictor by far of political efficacy and "that even when the concurrent effects of occupation and income (were) taken into account, education retain(ed) its powerful impact upon politically efficacious beliefs." (p. 381) To a lesser extent, but still, education alone was also the strongest predictor of such things as influence attempts and political involvement. But for voting participation, going to the polls, education retained little of this direct effect, occupation was the stronger predictor.

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60 See John R. Robinson et al., Measures of Political Attitudes (Ann Arbor: Survey Research Center, Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, 1968), pp. 423-440 for a listing of most of the combined indices of participation used to that date.
More important though is the following finding:

"In the three elections studied here, even when all three dimensions of socio-economic status are taken together, it is not possible to explain more than 19% of the variance in any one aspect of participation." (p. 382)

In most cases, less than 10% of the variance was "explained."

This last finding is particularly significant if we take into account the supportive finding of the previous study wherein it was concluded that organizational involvement was a more significant variable than socio-economic status. This weakness is compounded when we consider that in most multivariate causal analysis techniques it is assumed that there is unidirectionality of effect, that there are no further intervening variables and so forth. These assumptions tend to generate maximum "explanatory" (I believe this form of explanation remains as much correlative as causative) power. These methods thus are effective in that they provide some indication of their own limits, or at least, the bounds to which they have evolved.

(9) A finding which may be interestingly coupled particularly with the Johnson and Nie et al. studies above is that by Langton and

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61 For a clear listing of the assumptions of path analysis, see Nie et al., op. cit., p. 811. Paul Burstein in his article "Social Structure and Individual Political Participation in 5 Countries," American Journal of Sociology 77, (May, 1972) pp. 1087-1110 comes to similar conclusions regarding status as a predictor of participation and the greater effectiveness of media and organizational involvement. His accompanying verbal explanation, to wit, that status is less effective as it is "further back in time" is not, however, very satisfying.
Rains. These authors found, again using analysis of variance techniques, that having an efficacious family background accounted for four times more movement along the efficacy scale than did either the effects of peer groups or of schools. This finding was especially valid for working class and middle class youth and less effective for upper class youth. In combination with the other studies, we might advance the notion that an historically established pattern of involvement can be transmitted through the family to continue intergenerationally these higher levels of political efficacy and political participation. This, one might hypothesize, would be further supported by the ongoing existence of class-institutional outlets for that inclination to participation.

One further study which can be usefully integrated into this pattern is that of Gertzog who conducted a unique intervention into the real world of politics for research purposes. Gertzog encouraged a local democratic party organization to selectively use a voter activation drive and thereby established in a given campaign a "control" and an "experimental" group with no differences save organizational activity. He predicted the turnout using aggregate data for the control and experimental polls (data used included education, percent of owner-occupied dwellings, etc.) The voter activation activities —


a single drive -- increased turnout by 2% of total vote enough to make the difference in the election. This study provides a bit of real-world evidence for the effectiveness of direct organizational activity. When 'combined' with those other studies, it may question, I believe, explanations of status differentials in quantitative participation which focus solely on a negative interpretation of individual attributes of the less advantaged.

(11) Finally here, I believe that this conclusion -- this alternative understanding -- is given considerable further support by three further recent studies which come to similar conclusions. The first of these studies is by Michael Parenti. Parenti is bothered by the 'pluralist' view of community power and the participation of the less advantaged; he discusses Dahl and Polsby:

"'Most people use their political resources scarcely at all,' some not even bothering to vote; hence they never fully convert their "potential influence" into "actual influence." They do not exert themselves because they feel no compelling need to participate. To assume that citizens, especially of the lower class, should be politically active is, Polsby says, to make 'the inappropriate and arbitrary assignment of upper and middle-class values to all actors in the community.' There are 'personal withdrawal' and habitual reasons for lower-class withdrawal having nothing to do with political life."  

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Parenti then notes Polsby's view that non-participation, the absence of demand for change is best understood as natural and as a sign of the 'good health' of the system. Parenti then looks at actual examples of political issues and the related participation of the less advantaged from their own perspective within those activities. His setting is a Newark New Jersey ghetto and his issues are education, a demand for a traffic light, and an electoral campaign. He relates examples of intense involvement and sustained personal commitment on the part of many citizens in the area (in response to an initial organizational impetus from a few white student activists). He also reports considerable initial feelings of cynicism, hopelessness and doubt on the part of many. He shows that considerable activity met consistent rebuffs on even the most minor issues and that those rebuffs showed that all avenues of appeal: city council, landlords, police and others "displayed a remarkable capacity to move in the same direction against (these) rather modest lower-class demands."

(p. 519) The activists were alternately harassed, ignored, arrested and disqualified by the proper channels and authorities. From the point of view of the disadvantaged, non-involvement can be seen less as not mere incapacity and indifference on their part, but as a rational response to a patterned, unresistant and class-biased system.

Form and Huber attempted in another study to probe beneath

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the low feelings of political efficacy of the less advantaged (by income and by race) and found that these groups generally believed that they did not have influence on either the political process or elected officials. They, after studying these and further attitudes in depth, conclude:

"Thus for the blacks, feelings of political inefficacy result from a realistic appraisal of how the political system works." (p. 685)

And further that:

"[L]ikewise, the assumption that psychological attitudes, such as a sense of efficacy and citizen duty, explain why people participate politically involves a bias in favor of existing conditions because people are thought to be 'free' to act as they choose." (p. 686)

Those who conclude that the less advantaged are somehow not democratic, have somehow personally 'failed' democratic theory, are assuming that the political market is a free one. The study by Parenti and that by Savitch demonstrate reasonably well that one cannot fairly assume that that is the case; the system is not one which is equally open to all. Savitch, in looking at another set of issues and issue-involvement of the poor documents in his cases numerous closures which he groups under the headings of systemic biases. He discusses how they operate in concrete cases. He concludes with a discussion of the cycle of powerlessness which is the manifestation of, for some groups, realistic eventual conclusion that political activity is futile. The result is quiescence, which is not, as Polsby would have it, evidence that the system is functioning well.

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Perhaps the best way to conclude this survey is to summarize briefly here the explanations offered in the recent and excellent study by Verba and Nie. In many ways this book is the most methodologically advanced study of participation carried out to date; and, at least as important for our purposes here, its primary focus is on explaining the relative inactivity of the disadvantaged. The explanations the authors offer are closely linked to their empirical findings. On the whole, the study supports the view that social science can be a cumulative and self-correcting enterprise. The explanations presented by Verba and Nie could provide a good backdrop against which to consider the explanations of Marxism.

Verba and Nie divide participation into four separate modes: campaign activity, voting, communal activity and particularized contacting. They derive these modes from a factor analysis of fifteen participation variables. Communal activity is "composed of all the acts of participation that take place in a participatory setting devoid of the counter-participants that characterize electoral involvement" (p. 69). This component includes five activities, such as working with others on local problems and contacting of leaders regarding social problems. This factor correlates negatively in a consistent way with partisan campaign variables and show a near zero relationship with voting. Efforts at personalized contacting are attempts to gain solutions to particular

problems by contacting local, state, or national leaders. This factor has no strong relationship with any other aspect of participation. Persons participating in this way are neither more or less likely to be those who vote; they do tend a bit to be other than those who engage in partisan campaign activities (although it is possible that some who are active campaigners might be disinclined to volunteer such information). The authors locate a small (4% of sample) 'group' of citizens who engage only in particularized contacting and characterize them as parochial activists. Other groups are then identified as generally inactive (22%), voting specialists (21%), communalists (20%), campaigners (15%), and complete activists (11%).

This breakdown of participation into several distinct modes produces interesting results when the authors turn to consider the relationship between participation and indicators of relative socio-economic advantage. Lower socio-economic levels, women and Blacks are overrepresented among the inactives; lower socio-economic levels are overrepresented among voting specialists and the parochial participants category, but Blacks are overrepresented in that latter category. Upper socio-economic groups are overrepresented in the other three categories, but Blacks and Catholics are also overrepresented in the 'campaigners' category. Communalists are particularly common in rural areas and small towns. Socio-economic status is measured by education, income and proportion of white collar employment.

The effect of socio-economic status is less pronounced in voting participation than it is for campaign or communal activities. It has
almost no effect on particularized contacting. A simple path analysis shows that the effects of socio-economic status are enhanced by the greater tendency of members of those groups to be characterizable by greater civic orientations (citizen duty, political efficacy, and so forth).

The authors then proceed to see what changes occur in the effects of SES on participation when SES is adjusted for other factors such as age, race, organizational involvement and political party activation. The authors, unfortunately and in contrast to their stated intents, do not determine what of socio-economic differences are in actuality the effects of age differences. (That is the old and the young are both the least prosperous and the least active.) They merely find that when one controls for SES voting rises continuously with age rather than declining in late middle and old age. (Overall participation does not decline until age 65 and then not greatly when SES is controlled.) These findings could be reordered to show that SES differences are in part age differences.

This study is particularly useful in its findings about Black Americans. Blacks were found to be far more commonly in the partisan (campaign activist) and complete activist groups than their SES might predict. For example, Blacks in the 4th sextile of SES have a mean participation score of +22, while white at that same level have a score of -4, Blacks in the highest SES rank have a score of +98, white +56. In the context of their consideration of race, the authors state:

If a deprived group is to use political participation to its advantage, it must participate in politics
more than one would expect, given its level of education, income or occupation. It must somehow bypass the processes that lead those with higher social status to participate more and those with lower status to participate less.... ...group consciousness may substitute for the higher social status that impels citizens into political participation. It may represent an alternative mechanism for mobilizing citizens to political activity." (pp. 150-51)

In their discussion of race, the authors present a most pertinent, sharp and clear finding. In response to a series of open-ended questions on groups that were in conflict in their community or problems they faced in their personal life, community or nation those Black respondents who mentioned race were far more likely to be politically involved than were those who did not. In fact, those who did not mention race were far below the mean black levels of participation, those who did, even once, were well above the mean white participation level (thereby overcoming the effects of racial SES differentials). Group self-consciousness can be a route to political activation.

With regard to organizational involvement, Verba and Nie come to the following conclusion:

"...organizations increase the political gap, for the simple reason that those who come from advantaged groups are more likely to be organizationally active. Upper-status groups are, to begin with, more politically active. They are also more active in organizations. And, because the latter type of activity has an independent effect in increasing political activity...their advantage in political activity over the lower groups is increased." (p. 208)

The authors immediately add that this is not inevitable and that in countries where socialist movements have given disadvantaged groups a better organizational base, "organizational affiliation and activity do
not exacerbate political inequalities as in the United States, but act rather to mediate the standard socio-economic model." (p. 208)
Organizations are seen then to be an important 'potential' "source for reducing the participation gap."

In their study of party partisanship Verba and Nie find that strongly conservative attitudes have an independent effect, increasing participation of the well-off even beyond that which their SES might produce. And, "(P)olitical beliefs appear to play no such role among strong Democrats." (p. 227) The authors do not seem able to explain this difference, one can only speculate that it may be the seeming resistance of the American political system to strong leftward change.

With regard to the community context of participation, the authors find that the growth of cities and suburbs and the decline of small and middle-sized relatively autonomous communities has over time a negative impact on participation. They further find that over time (1952-1970) the correlation between class and participation has tended to increase in America. They are very cautious about extending that trend line into the future and again cite the recent rise in Black consciousness and political activity.

All in all, the Nie and Verba study perhaps more than any other steers away from many of the pitfalls which I will discuss in the next chapter. The study incorporates a variety of contextual factors, trend factors, and effectively segments the variety of status and participation elements. Empirical social science can have considerable explanatory power with regard to our area of concern.
I have critically set out something of the pattern of findings of empirical political studies regarding the participation of the less advantaged, and we are now prepared to more effectively consider directly an additional series of questions. Many of these matters were left implicit or only considered indirectly or in passing in the last chapter. To begin with, is there or has there been a patterned understanding of the 'quantity' and 'quality' of the participation of the less advantaged? If so, and I believe that there has been such a pattern, how widespread has its acceptance been among those studying political participation? Can we delineate elements from which it is generally composed? Which of those elements are most subject to question and on what grounds? Is, and I believe this is a critical and profoundly difficult question, that pattern of understanding methodologically rooted? What additional and/or alternative roots might that understanding have? Finally, and this reveals something of my conclusions to the preceding questions, how in turn might that understanding inhibit the process of research on these questions and the further evolution of appropriate empirical methodologies?

I

The questions just posed are not the sort of questions which lend themselves to clear and clean answers; at best, it can only be hoped to offer tentative claims grounded in indicative support. One must also
gratefully utilize all prior considerations which can be depended upon. Luckily here, there are several excellent critical studies to be utilized as a point of departure; we do not have to begin from the beginning. Our beginning point can be found in the broad critiques of the so-called post-behavioralists who have made many points relevant to our inquiry in varyingly relevant contexts. Collectively, they might be taken as having identified and sketched the outlines of an understanding of political participation common to much of the behavioral inquiry into that subject which preceded them. I will use a discussion of their work as a means of clarifying the elements of that understanding.

Perhaps the central theme of the 'post-behavioral' critiques with regard to the question of participation is the assertion that the advocates of 'new democracy':

"...reject outright the old democratic vision of a community of participating members, in its various forms. Not only are the stated reasons for such a rejection inadequate; it can still reasonably be argued that the realization of this vision, in one form or another, remains a desirable goal of social and political activity."


2 The advocates of the 'new democracy,' elsewhere called advocates of revisionist or elitist democracy, or more neutrally 'contemporary democratic theorists' are, as will be clarified shortly below, such writers as Berelson, Milbrath, Dahl et al. The quotation from Duncan and Lukes may be found in McCoy and Playford, op. cit., at page 162.
I have already commented above that I do not share the view of some of the post-behavioralists regarding the content of the 'old democratic vision.' But that point aside, there can be little doubt that many, if not most, of the researchers who studied and wrote on political participation, political attitudes and voting behavior in the period 1950-1965 developed, or had, a wide range of doubts about the desirability of increasing the political participation of the less advantaged. These doubts were contrary to, if nothing else, the conventional wisdom of the time. But more importantly for our purposes, these doubts, when elaborated, provided a value context within which those explanations of inactivity which center on the inadequacies of the inactive make sense. Duncan and Lukes offer a lucid critique both of this context and of the explanations consistent and commonly associated with it. For example, explanations based on apathy, lack of information or irrationality.

Regarding the latter they point out that in the view of both Plamenatz and Schumpeter there is a "distinction between what men do and their awareness of the significance of their actions." (Apolitical Politics, p. 167) Rational 'doing' can coexist with an irrational or at least inarticulate understanding of that action. Inarticulate becomes the operant term for Duncan and Lukes when one is calling to question interview-based evidence. Men may be condemned by "inarticulateness or private language to seem less reasonable than they are." (p. 167) This questioning of the explanatory limits of findings (in which we will engage further below) is not, however, the major theme of the 'post-behavioral' reply
to revisionism of democratic theory.

The major thrust of the dispute can be seen set out in two passages, the first from Robert Dahl (as quoted by Duncan and Lukes); the second from Duncan and Lukes themselves,

"...we must conclude that the classic assumptions about the need for citizen participation in democracy were, at the very least, inadequate. If one regards political equality in the making of decisions as a kind of limit to be achieved, then it is axiomatic that this limit could only be arrived at with the complete participation of every adult citizen. Nevertheless, what we call 'democracy' (Duncan and Luke's emphasis) -- that is, a system of decision-making in which the leaders are more or less responsive to the preferences of non-leaders -- does seem to operate with a relatively low level of citizen participation. Hence it is inaccurate to say that one of the necessary conditions for 'democracy' is extensive citizen participation."
(p. 168)

Duncan and Lukes reply:

"Not only is Dahl's definition of democracy extremely loose (in what political system are leaders not more or less responsible to non-leaders?) but the rejection of the classical requirement of participation rests upon an obvious redefinition of democracy, in which what are taken for present day facts supplant the ideal."
(p. 168)

Dahl here (though not elsewhere) and others have declined to see that the concept 'democracy' carries both empirical and normative referents.


4This must be qualified: Dahl, in his essay, "Power Pluralism and Democracy: A Modest Proposal," APSA 1964 annual meeting as discussed in Bachrach op. cit., p. 85, it is argued that to espouse an impossible political equality as a major democratic aim is to further cynicism toward democracy. He thus may accept a meaning which implies the rightness of equality so long as it does not imply 'too much' of it.
The position can be characterized (probably caricatured I concede) as one of 'the best I can see, is the best that can be.' When we involve an appreciation of the writings of Marcuse and other Marxists to this 'rhyme' the words 'I can' will take on several layers of meaning. For me, the operant word in the Dahl quote is 'preferences' -- alternatives are not often conceived of by contemporary America's disadvantaged and when they are, they are usually neither concrete, nor political. In fairness we should note that Dahl might agree and Lane, for example, clearly believes that this is not something to celebrate. I see low participation as profoundly tragic, historically conditioned, institutionally rooted, and to be properly taken as evidence that democracy in the system in question is not thoroughgoing. The belief that democracy does "seem to operate" regardless of low participation levels can, if widespread, have repressive effects. Duncan and Lukes put it well in arguing that one might legitimately call the United States a democracy, but it doesn't follow from that legitimacy that participation is no longer central to the theory of democracy. (p. 171) Some theories might be utopian, the rest of their paper may be summarized to say, and thereby can be "condemned by historical forces to sterility" (p. 171, Marx credited), but the centrality of participation to democratic theory is not such a case.

A variety of other statements are noted by Duncan and Lukes which carry Dahl's 'revisions' a step further, from the acceptance of apathy to a belief in its necessity to something near to its celebration. Berelson's view that apathy serves as a 'cushion' to 'absorb the intense action of
highly motivated partisans', is that kind of statement, Berelson sees apathy as positively necessary to the continuation of democracy. This was discussed in the previous chapter. It could also be remembered here that in the 1952 American elections (on which Voting was based), most 'highly motivated partisans' were hiding from the 'intense action' of official political repression and the 'apathy cushion' which gained election to the White House provided for precious little 'absorption'.

Lane Davis points out that the re-stated theory of democracy has potential as self-fulfilling prophecy.

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5 An article by W.H. Morris-Jones went even further in arguing that apathy is "a more or less effective counterforce to those fanatics who constitute the real danger to political democracy." ("In Defence of Apathy", Political Studies, 11 (1963), 156-177. As Dennis Wrong argues (in "The Perils of Political Moderation", Commentary, 27 (January, 1959), pp. 1-8). 'Moderation' requires no more than that one be committed to peaceful submission to 'final' verdicts -- it doesn't require watering down or self-censorship of unlikely views. Intense partisanship is not fanaticism. Indifference is a far graver threat to democracy. I would here criticism of Duncan and Lukes who state (p. 184) that the 'new democracy' offers "No middle way...between the concentration camp and a cautious conservatism." This point is relevant to the varying viewpoints on the collapse of the Weimar Republic and to the sixth element of the conservative understanding discussed below. Highly pertinent here is Phillip Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics", in David Apter Ideology and Discontent (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1964, pp. 206-261).

6 This point perhaps is even more clearly made by Maure L. Goldschmidt in his "Democratic Theory and Contemporary Political Science," in a caution to an interesting attempt to link Edmond Burke and The Civic Culture: "In contrast to classical democratic theory, they see democracy as already achieved; the main problem, therefore is to preserve it. Classical democratic theory, on the other hand, sees democracy as a never-ending process of achieving, as dynamic striving for the goals of liberty, equality and fraternity and for a continuous concern with the improvements of the means of achievement." (Apolitical Politics, pp. 118-9).
"Unlike predictions about what may happen and what may work, predictions about what may not are likely to foreclose the continued persistent efforts which may eventually succeed in achieving the 'impossible'."\textsuperscript{7}

Mercifully then for democracy much of the literature of political science is only rarely popular reading material. What is significant about this consideration becomes apparent when one realizes that some of those who argue from the mere detection of widespread apathy to its permanence and desirability also believe that the underprivileged can only be aroused by belief in victories which are rapid, certain and final. That adds up to immutability with a vengeance: informing persons seen to be unresponsive without certainties that their apathy itself is a certainty. In this context, Davis' later observation that the 'realist model' is little concerned with democracy's effects on individual development seems heavily understated.

Jack L. Walker in his "A Critique of the Elitist Theory of Democracy", added another facet to the criticism of essentially the same body of theory:\textsuperscript{8}

"Besides these normative shortcomings the elitist theory has served as an inadequate guide to empirical research, providing an unconvincing explanation of widespread political apathy in American society and leading political scientists to ignore manifestations of discontent not directly related to the political system. Few studies have been conducted of the use of force, or informal illegitimate coercion in the American political system, and little attention has been directed to the great social movements which have marked American society in the last one hundred years."\textsuperscript{9}

\textsuperscript{7} Apolitical Politics, p. 192

\textsuperscript{8} He later (American Political Science Review LX, (June, 1966), p. 391) conceded that his label 'elitist theory' was inappropriate.

\textsuperscript{9} Apolitical Politics, p. 218.
Walker argues effectively that mobilization, movements and conflict have had a positive effect on American democracy especially in their ability to broaden the political agenda.

Finally here, let us look at Bachrach's *The Theory of Democratic Elitism* which is perhaps the single most comprehensive statement of the 'post-behavioral' critique. I take it to have effectively shown that a large number of political scientists have "With (their) disenchantment with the common man, (reversed) the classical view of the elite-mass relationship...: it is the common man, not the elite, who is chiefly suspected of endangering freedom, and it is the elite, not the common man, who is looked upon as the chief guardian of the system." (p. 32) This places in larger perspective the acceptance of apathy. So too does Bachrach's widely applicable comment that many political scientists have been "in error in implying that because a political system is a viable and stable one, it is therefore also adequately contributing to the growth and well-being of ordinary men and women who live under it." (p. 35)

In all, the 'post-behavioralist' critiques, identify thirty studies.

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which could be said express parts or all of an understanding of political participation which was considerably in revision of what is, in many of them, characterized as the 'classical view.' The majority of the revisionists are political scientists who have been extensively involved in empirical research on the subject. As one can see shortly below, this understanding is even more common to the textbooks of American political science, American political parties, and introductions to public opinion research. Many elements of this understanding were referred to in the previous chapter and in the above discussion in this chapter.

I would like at this point to attempt to spell out the elements of this viewpoint and show that they compose an integrated whole, a particular

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appreciation of the character and import of the political participation of the less advantaged (or, in many cases, of 'the average citizen').

A partial itemization of what I take to be an understanding can be derived from a consideration of an exchange between Robert Dahl and Jack Walker regarding the original article by Walker which I have cited above. Dahl is bothered by many ambiguities in Walker's article and asks

"whether (a) he (Walker) rejects the survey evidence on such matters as participation and the distribution of democratic norms; or (b) he accepts the evidence (contingently, which is all anyone can properly do with empirical data) but rejects the explanations of Key, Truman and others; or (c) he accepts both the evidence and the explanation but denies that they describe (or prescribe) a desirable state of affairs in a democracy."

He assumes, regarding Walker, that '(a)' is not the case, that if (b) is the case there is an obligation on Walker to develop a new theory. If (c) is the case he is in agreement. Dahl also states regarding (a) that "...it (the finding) cannot be rewritten to fit our hopes." I would argue that what is at issue is not a matter of accepting the truth of the behavioral findings, rather it is a matter of understanding what they mean.

Dahl, as is his custom, in his reply to Walker. clarifies a wide variety of matters and zeros in most effectively on many weaknesses. He rightly notes that Walker has played the role of Procrustes in fitting his "elitist" bed with behavioralists of a broad variety of

sizes and shapes. He forces Walker (in a rejoinder) to think far more clearly about the pattern of thought which Walker has taken to be a 'model'.

As Walker puts it:

"The doctrines with which I was concerned were: (1) the belief that the political inactivity of the average citizen is a more or less permanent aspect of his behavior, not an artifact of the social and political systems; (2) the related belief that political inactivity is a sign of satisfaction with the operation of the political system, a form of passive consent; (3) the belief that political apathy is not seriously dysfunctional in a democratic system, and, on the part of some writers, the belief that widespread apathy may be a prerequisite for the successful functioning of the system; (4) the belief that agreement on democratic norms among political leaders is more important than consensus among the common citizens for achieving political stability; (5) an overriding concern with maintaining the stability of democratic systems."

(p. 391)

I will use this summary by Walker as a starting point to sketch

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12 To avoid having to apply this label to myself, I want to be clear; I do not claim or intend to demonstrate that any one researcher would unqualifiedly adhere to all the elements of the understanding which I identify here. Nor would I assert that all would accept any one element. I want simply to portray the kind of understanding that would likely be derived by a reader of either the twenty-six works cited above, or any number of other works, or almost any current American politics text. I would say that at the date that the 'post-behavioralists' were writing, and even today, there are very few efforts in the literature of mainstream political science to refute any of these elements and very many efforts to sustain them. Few, if any, of these elements I would add here and will discuss further below can be derived solely from the findings of empirical research.

an outline of the understanding of class-associated differentials in participation common to what has been to date the mainstream of political science.

Walker's fourth point seems a statement with which I would not take great issue, but am thankful that it and any detailed consideration of his fifth point lie largely beyond the bounds of our concern in this study. His first point, it seems to me, for my purposes unnecessarily confounds questions of permanence and questions of causal source. I would sever the point into two separate assertions:

1. the belief that the political inactivity of the less advantaged is a more or less permanent aspect of their behavior;
2. the belief that the non-participation of the less advantaged is somehow more properly seen as an individual problem 'with' the socio-political system. The 'system' is assumed to be 'open.'

Walker's points (2) and (3) become my points (3) and (4); his last two points are dropped. I would add as a corollary to the point which is now (4) the following additional point: (5) Both of these positions are seen to follow from, among other things, the empirical findings that the less advantaged are generally less interested, less knowledgeable, less supportive of non-economic liberalism, and/or less tolerant.

Dahl, however, does more than clarify, he corrects the 'indictment' against his writings and makes clear that he and many others of
the 'accused' have on occasion made remarks to the contrary of the above model. For example, he notes that he himself in his Preface to Democratic Theory has said, "(D)emocracy is a goal, not an achievement. As well he reminds Walker that Berelson's chapter on voting also made several statements which less clearly conform to Walker's assertions. But he included among them "Only the doctrinaire would depreciate that moderate indifference (Dahl's emphasis) facilitates compromise." (Berelson, pp. 314-15; Dahl, p. 300). I would agree that the complexity of Dahl's thinking may not have been given proper credit and will comment shortly below on what I take to be a 'non-malevolent' source of this problem. Considering the excerpt from Berelson and the fact that Dahl chose to use it as rebuttal, and recalling much of the discussion from my previous chapter, it might be useful to consider an additional point for the schematic:

(6) the belief that the ability to compromise and/or be tolerant of others is inextricably linked to an absence of intense belief.

This view is rarely stated explicitly, it is put forward in a vague, implied and general form. In that form, it is clearly false; among one's bag of intense beliefs might be an intense belief in tolerance and compromise. I simply do not believe that it is correct to badly state that indifference facilitates compromise and imply thereby that somehow it is a boon to democracy. My point is simply that this is a complex issue often glossed over.

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14 Recall particularly the discussion of Lipset and my note in this chapter above which cites the writing of Dennis Wrong.

15 Dahl has elsewhere explicitly 'strongly disagreed' with the necessary association of on the one hand, high rates of political participation in
This brings us to a bit of digression on a dilemma — Dahl offers a series of excerpts from his and others work to rebut Walker. I believe that he does show that Walker's tone was at times unjustified and his language incautious. But a critical study cannot, of course, begin with the quotation of endless amounts of material. There is no evidence that the quotations chosen by Walker and others were of points not stressed by their authors. Nor were there serious alterations of meaning by removal from context. That these same persons also made moderating or contrary remarks should have in fairness been noted, but there are limits to the extent that this can be done.  

Finally here I would question Dahl on three interrelated matters not simply as detailed critique of his article but as matters important in a remolding of the understanding of political apathy. First, Dahl asserts that Berelson and others simply seek to explain how, despite the gap between a hypothetical normative democratic theory and actual behavior in Elmira, the "system does function." That phraseology it seems to me is precisely what the critics have objected to — if

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15 continued democratic systems and, on the other, instability. But within the same paragraph here considered he is reminding us of that place where "apathy was encouraged only in the concentration camps." I don't think such comments are any fairer than, for example, the 'elitist' label to which Dahl objects.

16 Specifically here Dahl (on p. 300) calls on Walker to pin down accusations to specific phases ("I find it curious that Professor Walker was unable to cite anything more precise than the whole chapter") and shortly thereafter (p. 301) is dismayed because "(L)ike many other writers on politics including Rousseau, Lipset's writings contain statements which, quoted out of context, might seem to offer faint confirmation, for the interpretation offered...." One cannot fairly condemn both for quoting too little and for referring to too much.
democracy has as part of its definition certain standards and a real-world political system does not meet them then that system is by definition not functioning fully as a democracy. That no system has ever functioned in that way does not call for a devaluation of the standard any more than does the failure of most persons to 'measure up' for the devaluation of the 'foot'.

Second, Dahl argues that Walker misconstrues the descriptive assertions of the behavioralists as normative assertions. He adds that he "would not argue that every writer cited by Professor Walker has always tried to maintain this distinction or, if he did, has always succeeded; but I do think it is a serious misunderstanding to interpret these writers as essentially normative theorists." I don't believe that Walker did that, but I will spare the reader further elaboration on that point. What I do wish to get across here is the claim (it will

17I am quite aware that 'foot' is known as 'an empirical measure' and democracy is known as 'a normative standard'. But I would argue that all words have both empirical and normative referents and that the difference is in the 'degree of mix.' Further it is not simply the empirical 'side' of democracy which has empirical referents, but the normative 'side' as well. Within words like democracy -- and such words are crucial to any theoretical understanding -- are fusions of the desirable and the actual, the past, present and the future. How else can we make such links? Marxists have tended to obliterate the desirable by imposing too great a level of certainty on the future. Behavioralists have tended to obliterate the past and the future in the certainty of present findings (precisely -- at least in part -- because they reduce the meanings of words, carefully, and then in attempting 'understandings' forget they have done so). I am going to argue below (in my concluding chapter) that neither empirical research nor 'normative theory' can proceed effectively when divorced so thoroughly from one another and note here that being self-conscious about the meaning of words and not thereby rejecting aspects of their meaning as inconvenient is perhaps the best starting point for cooperation.
have to remain such for the moment) that it may be the case both that assertion of necessity and immutability are in many contexts inseparable at least in effect from assertions of good/evil and that dealing with words like 'democracy' (and again we must deal with them) cannot be done in other than an, on balance, normative mode.

Lastly, Dahl I think unknowingly points out a shift in the commonly accepted understanding of the meaning of participation bound up in the concept of democracy. Dahl is right in his assessment that "...writers from the earliest times have understood that popular regimes, like all regimes, would inevitably have leaders -- that is to say, men of more authority, and very likely more power and influence than ordinary citizens" (p. 297). These writers I am sure he would agree were 'ahead of their time' in the degree to which they believed in the possibility and desirability of equality of effective participation (see my Introduction here). Why then, if it is the case that even these writers never favored or believed in the possibility of outright equality, does he, with other contemporaries with whom he is in general agreement, feel compelled to scale downward the 'excessive optimism' of the claims of classical normative theory? It is not, I believe, the claims of said classical theory that are seen to be 'excessive' (capable of generating cynicism) but rather it is the contemporary meaning embodied in the term. I would argue -- and admittedly this involves a considerable act of faith -- that the meaning has not shifted randomly but has a basis in the potentialities which are coming into being in the economically advanced nations for the first time in human history. Just as totalitarian
possibilities are new to our century so too are real democratic prospects. The measured levels of participation can only now grow to match the gradient of optimism which has grown into the common understanding of 'democracy'. Our level of economic development (etc.) can be seen to allow for an alteration of the range of democratic prospects analogous to the alteration in the range of prospects attendant to the development of, for example, nuclear power. That range might be characterized as running from total disaster to considerable real advance.  

To sum up then the following are the six elements of this understanding of the relative non-participation of the less advantaged:

1. The belief that the political inactivity of the less advantaged is a more or less permanent aspect of their behavior.

2. The belief that the non-participation of the less advantaged is somehow more properly seen as a problem 'with' individuals rather than a problem 'with' the socio-political system. The system is assumed to be 'open'.

3. The belief that political inactivity is a sign of satisfaction with the operation of the system, a form of passive consent.

4. Either (a) the belief that political apathy is not seriously dysfunctional in a democratic system, or (b), on the part of some writers, the belief that widespread apathy may be a prerequisite for the successful functioning of the system.

18 I will deal with the issues raised in these three matters further at several points in later chapters.
(5) Many of those who hold either of these beliefs believe that such a view follows from, among other things, clear empirical findings that the less advantaged are generally less interested in and less knowledgeable about things political, less supportive of non-economic liberalism, and/or generally less tolerant.

(6) The belief that the ability to compromise and/or be tolerant of others is inextricably linked to an absence of intense belief. Often related to these concerns, as Walker noted, is an overriding concern with maintenance of the stability of democratic systems — generally based on the view that liberal democracy is an extremely fragile entity. For want of a better characterization, I will refer hereinafter to the conservative understanding. 19

Examples of many of these views were related in the previous chapter and the 'post-behavioralist' critiques have spelled out many more. Again, I do not maintain that all of these views are present in any one study, nor that any of the writers I have or will discuss would necessarily hold any one of them. I could, however, offer many examples for each of them from many of the mainstream writers of political science, 19

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19 The term is 'methodologically neutral', that is, it does not imply that this understanding is somehow necessarily associated with any particular approach to the study of politics. This understanding can, as well, easily be seen as within the tradition of conservatism from Burke to Oakeshott which accepts hierarchy easily, is comfortable with the present, eschews extremism, doubts the capacities of common men, accepts limits to human development, abhors conflict and disorder, and welcomes quietude.
especially in the period 1950-1965. I will in the interest of conciseness, however, merely add here one clear example of each.

The first of these elements is most often a matter of omission of contrary cases or neglect of the potentiality dimension. It is something implicit in whole studies, for example, those which might begin 'as is well known SES or education have consistently been shown to be correlated with rates of political participation' and then go on to study some detail of that relationship without noting that the relationship is neither universal nor invariant in degree. Here is one example of a quite explicit sweeping generalization:

"No matter how class is measured, studies consistently show that higher-class persons are more likely to participate in politics than lower-class persons. (...) citations) This proposition has been confirmed in at least six countries."20

Elsewhere in the study one may find some studies cited with regard to fluctuations, but they are given no emphasis and the broad generalization is not qualified.

The openness of the system is widely asserted. For example in 1956, Robert Dahl wrote:

"The full assimilation of Negroes into the normal system already has occurred in many northern states ..."21

and:

"...any active and legitimate group will make itself heard effectively at some stage in the process of decision." (p. 150)

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20 Milbrath, p. 116.

He argues in *Who Governs?* that involvement in politics is just not natural to most men and women:

"At the focus of most men's lives are primary activities involving food, sex, love, family, work, play...-- not politics --...Instead of asking why citizens are not interested, concerned, and active, the task is to explain why a few citizens are." (p. 279)

And later,

"...most citizens operate with a very small fund of political information; often the lack of elementary information required even to be aware of in consistencies between their views and what is actually happening in the political system...." (p. 319)

Further here Dahl's whole discussion of the 'use of political resources' (e.g., pp.271-75) centers on subjective reasons for non-utilization rather than any possible system-based ones.

The third element is found, for example, in Lipset:

"Although the kinds of causes of apathy and non-voting vary for different historical periods and for differing sections of the population, it is possible that non-voting is now, at least in the Western democracies, a reflection of the stability of the system, a response to the decline of major social conflicts, and an increase in cross-pressures, particularly those affecting the working-class." (*Political Man*, p. 185)

And it is perhaps even more clearly found in Greenstein, or Almond and Verba as discussed in the previous chapter. The increase in cross-pressures to which Lipset refers are generally the increasing income levels of blue collar workers, a view which has generally not been supported by more recent research. 22

The fourth element I have already presented is from the writings of Milbrath and Berelson, but there are other examples available. For example,

"However, the three studies do seem in agreement in suggesting that concord...flows from simple disinterest in politics." (Burdick and Brodbeck, p. 146)

The author (Eugene Burdick) goes on to support this view and suggest that a theory of concord (something he sees as crucial to political theory and political systems) be developed which bases itself "on the assumption of passivity and low information on the part of most voters."

(p. 146) He shows no sign of concern that this finding — which he takes to be a more or less permanent condition — is any threat to democracy. In that same volume, Talcott Parsons speaks of an "indifference reaction" (among apathetic and unknowledgeable 'floaters'), which provides an "element of flexibility necessary to allow sufficient shifts of votes to permit a two-party system to function effectively without introducing unduly disruptive elements into the system." (p. 104)

This feeling of comfort with participation differentials is widespread in the literature, the absence of concern almost universal for some time, and the building of apathy into a basis of the continuation or establishment democratic stability (or civil order) explicit in Berelson, Morris-Jones, Almond and Verba, Milbrath and others, and common as well in some

23 Particularly instructive is Almond and Verba's claim that, "...an intense emotional involvement in politics endangers the balance between activity and passivity, for that dependence stems from the low salience of politics." This assertion clearly links together the fifth and sixth elements of the conservative understanding. It can be found in the excerpt from The Civic Culture in Eric A. Nordlinger Politics and Society:

(continued on nextpage)
of the literature of political development.

There are fewer writers who hold thoroughlygoingly to the fifth element in the conservative understanding; Milbrath is one of the most explicit and he is cited above. Innumerable authors, however, in a wide variety of contexts, remind us of the findings of Lipset, Stouffer, Prothro and Grigg and McClosky and assert that those who desire progress should back off from any millenialist faith in the masses and/or remember that those who are in charge are more likely carriers of democratic tradition. I will illustrate this element at length in my discussion of textbooks shortly below.

The last point too has already been discussed and identified to some extent and is present in a wide range of writings. Here, for example, is a comment from Almond and Verba,

"...such intense involvement tends to 'raise the stakes' of politics: to foster the sort of mass, messianic movements that lead to democratic instability."\(^{24}\)

This view is often linked to a strong concern with that instability and in some cases, to references to Weimar Germany, but nowhere is there any systematic empirical evidence which links the two (intensity of involvement and democratic instability) on either an individual or a systemic level.

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23 continued Studies in Comparative Political Sociology (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970) p. 172. The latter sections of Almond and Verba and the final chapter of Voting are, with Milbrath and Morris-Jones, perhaps the most complete of the empirically linked statements of the conservative understanding. These two are also among the most commonly reproduced elsewhere.

24 Ibid.
What sorts of evidence or analytic argument would be necessary to demonstrate the truth of these six elements of the conservative understanding? Are these beliefs empirically demonstrable? Must non-demonstrable assumptions be made to sustain them? I will not, at this point, develop any elaborate discussion of what a proper empirical measure is or of the effectiveness of the distinction between subjective-normative claims and objective-empirical claims. I will simply look very briefly at each of the elements of this understanding and note first that they are highly interdependent; the weakening of any one element affects all the others to some extent and in most cases, challenges quite effectively at least one other element.25

The first proposition is one that can quite readily be disproven. Over time and cross-culturally relatively high political inactivity of the disadvantaged is, as we have seen, quite common. There are many exceptions here, some of which will be cited below. Even if the exceptions were rarer permanence would not be implied by the data, permanence cannot be proven. There are a large number of questions related to this belief which have only rarely been given sufficient attention. For example, what are the trends over time with regard to the participation of the less advantaged? What institutional patterns tend to promote relatively higher participation

25 For example, if either element, (2) or element (5) are not sustained, proposition (4) is on very weak ground. If (3) is not the case and it is rather the case that, for example, the inactive are decidedly not satisfied with the operation of the system and feel they are systematically excluded, one might want to examine institutional access within the system rather than individuals tolerance or level of detailed system-participation-relevant political knowledge.
of the disadvantaged? Are those institutional patterns generally increasing in frequency, or likely to increase in frequency? Are those parties which tend to activate the less advantaged generally 'on the rise'? Under what conditions are they advancing? Are those conditions likely to develop further (largely a speculative matter that can only be hinted at)? Generally, what is needed is a far wider range of institutional, cultural and other contextual circumstances and a comparison of the relationship of the participation differentials to those varying circumstances, and, if that were not enough, far more time is needed to determine what, if any, trends exist and how those trends relate to the variant circumstances. All we have thus far are scattered returns largely for Post-World War II developed Western democracies, a very historically specific setting. (When many of the understandings discussed were elaborated, this was even more clearly the case). What of atypical, even non-recurring circumstances, e.g., the mid-term, pre-coup elections in Chile, or the coming elections in Portugal? What of non-electoral participation? What of in-depth studies of individuals who participate sharply more than socio-economic variables might predict? Are the factors which motivated them likely to be more widespread or intense in the future?

All of these questions are essentially empirical -- though many may not lend themselves readily to quantitative research. There is also a more speculative realm of inquiry which can contribute substantially to this aspect of an understanding of the relationship between social disadvantage and political participation. If one takes this to be a highly
important concern (a normative 'assumption') one might seek to imagine circumstances or institutions or procedures which have never existed before, which might exist now and which would tend (and here empirical evidence can provide 'cues') to promote higher participation by the less advantaged.

The second is essentially a perspective rather than something about which final conclusions on one side or the other can ever be drawn. That is, it will generally be the case that individual's attributes could be seen to determine (explain) their behaviors, but are not those attributes in turn conditioned by institutional arrangements, ideology, systemic factors of all kinds? Surely, though, on the other hand, won't there always be some aspects of variation in individual behavior that cannot be explained solely by variations in life-conditions set down by cultures, institutions or procedures? In almost all cases, both are true at the same time and I doubt that there are empirical means of finally determining which should be given primary emphasis. I will discuss this and related questions in greater detail below.

Whether or not the system is 'open' or 'responsive' is largely determined by one's definition of 'open': there are few circumstances in which many would claim that any system was totally open or totally closed to anyone. But with empathy\textsuperscript{26} and relatively informal observation techniques one can get an empirically grounded point of view on the degree to which the system will respond to any particular demand of any particular

\textsuperscript{26}For an excellent discussion of participant-observer techniques, see Henry Kariel, \textit{Open Systems} (Itasca, Ill.: F.E. Peacock, 1969).
Choosing random or otherwise representative events is, of course, a highly complex and challenging task. To weaken the assumption of general openness common to many who ascribe to the conservative understanding is not, however, an extremely difficult task. One needs only to demonstrate that such is not the case in several instances for several different disadvantaged groups at several different times. Or for that matter, for the United States, one might combine a reading of The Federalist to determine the intent of the system's designers and such particular issues as universal public medical insurance (polls since the 1920s have consistently shown a majority in favor of such a policy which seems little nearer to accomplishment today than it did then).

The third element is something that could quite easily be determined but to my knowledge has not been resolved even though the data are available. Are those who do not participate higher or lower on the variety of system performance evaluation criteria that might (and have) been used? Many of the questions used to measure "feelings of political efficacy" or "sense of citizen competence" are just as much measuring citizen evaluation of the system. Consider the following typical items:

"Suppose a law were being considered...that you considered to be unjust or harmful. What do you think you could do?"

"If you made an effort to change the law, how likely is it that you would succeed?"

For many respondents these questions say nothing about how they feel about themselves, their abilities or their "competence," it must be plain and simple a judgement about whether or not ordinary people can influence
that system. There is, of course, a widely found association between negative responses to such questions and low levels of political participation. There further have been numerous studies where the less advantaged have been shown to be less satisfied with the functioning of the political and/or economic system(s) (hardly a surprising finding). This is only limited by the fact that the association is aggregated; all that is needed to develop the matter further and perhaps sufficiently is the reworking of presently available data.

The fourth element is open to empirical evidence but not evidence of the kind with which it has been to date associated. To draw conclusions about the operation of systems, one must develop systems-related concepts, for example -- when is or isn't a system 'democratic,' when is or isn't a system 'stable,' and when is or isn't a system 'democratically stable,' if that is something greater or less than the sum of the other two. One must then take measures of total participation in the system, of mean participation intensity, or relative levels of peak intensity for the most intense quartile, decile, etc., and of relative quality of participation on several measures (knowledge, tolerance, and so forth). And then one must determine the relationship of the two sets of data on the system level. That is, one must show cases where democracy has been weakened, damaged or destroyed by the variables in question.

I think one could make the case that on many occasions in history qualitative aspects of participation have seriously damaged democracy -- the clearest single case might be bigotry on the part of white Americans over the past century or more which for all but the past few years
systematically disenfranchised a particular and proportionately large racial group. Other cases would include the suffrage unextended on the basis of property or sex, or the armed intervention into the political process by the constitutionally established military or police apparatus of the state. But I know of no clear historic case of either of the following:

(1) The demise of any democratic political system, however defined, from a quantitative excess of participation on the part of the less advantaged sectors of that society.

(2) The overthrow of any elected government by the activity of the less advantaged sectors of society. (Many systems have failed, it might be argued, because of the relative inactivity of those sectors — particularly by their failure to be sufficiently intolerant to take up arms against antidemocratic sectors of the elite.)

Only one Communist regime has come to power where there was a previously functioning democracy (Czechoslovakia, 1948). That takeover could hardly be said to have been a mass uprising. The only possible case wherein some elements in the mass of the population were participant in the downfall of a democratic regime is the case of the rise of Naziism in Weimar Germany. This was surely not solely the result of the activities of the less advantaged sectors, surely not supported by the organized working class, and surely was linked to heavy funding of sectors of the elite. Further, there was no clear pattern of class support and further still any rise in participation was surely more an effect of the rise of Fascism than a cause. The horror of Fascism should not be taken as ground
for doubting all things which existed in the same time and place. It could easily be argued that if the less advantaged in Germany gained greater access to the system earlier than they did, that is participated more and sooner, Fascism would have been less likely. Germany, as well, could hardly have been said to have had an established democratic tradition; that is 1930-Germany was a particular and atypical situation — albeit one of great import and foreboding — it must be understood and not forgotten. But surely one cannot fixate either social analysis or social policy in that one time and place.

If one avoids such fixations, one is left to return to the earlier thread of this argument and conclude that this element of the conservative understanding is one which can only be resolved by historical comparative data using systems as one's unit of analysis, and that the general thrust of that evidence may well be against the view that apathy is supportive of democratic stability. I am well aware, of course, that no such case has even begun to have been validly established either here or elsewhere and that all such analyses are fraught with difficulties. I simply want to make it clear that the contrary case has surely not been established and that it cannot be established on the basis of the kinds of data with which it has most often been associated.

The fifth element is, of course, intimately related to the fourth. Even if the fourth cannot be proven by the data of the fifth, there is no doubt that if the fifth is empirically true, that it is a matter for serious concern. I do not believe, however, that the evidence in this matter is nearly so strong nor, when valid, so general, as it is often
taken to be. Further, even if the case were as consistent, strong and meaningful as could be imagined by the most firmly conservative analyst, it would not follow that the 'solution' to the 'problem' would be the welcoming of relative apathy among the less advantaged as a group.

There is a distinct possibility, and some evidence (see Section II below), that increased participation advances the 'quality' of participation. That is, the causal arrow may run in the opposite direction than it has been usually taken to run. Participation may well produce increments of knowledge, tolerance rather than (or in addition to) lack of knowledge, interest and so forth producing apathy. Common sense, for whatever it is worth, would indicate that there is likely some kind of syndrome effect here and the only way out of it is increased politicization.

The sixth and final element in the conservative understanding is one which needs considerable analytic attention; we need a great deal of concept development here. We need to sort out several concepts: inclination to compromise, likelihood of compromising, limited tolerance, pure tolerance, and intensity of belief. Further we should determine if these things are related to each other in a linear way. That is, I would claim -- though know of no formal empirical evidence -- that intensity, conceived in mathematical terminology is a skip function. Strongly held political views are not necessarily associated with, for example, an inability to compromise, at least they would not be related in a linear

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way. A change from disinterest to concern is a qualitatively different thing from a change from tolerance to intolerance. I believe that this question is one that could usefully be tested empirically. But in that testing, it should be remembered that even if there were some association, it might be the case that those in whom there are such associations (between intensity and intolerance) could unlearn that association in becoming conscious of it and of history. To date, alas, there has been too little of the analytic background, little or no pertinent empirical research, and none of the kind of necessary follow-up I have suggested here.

To sum up this section then, four of the six elements of the conservative understanding either cannot be demonstrated empirically or have little or no basis in the findings of empirical research to date. These are the second, third, fourth and sixth elements. The other two are at best overstated. (I will present further doubts below with regard to the fifth.) I hope I have not constructed this understanding merely for the pleasure of taking it down. Many of its elements are quite common in the literature and I hope I have contributed a bit to self-awareness about what political science as a discipline asserts. I also hope to proceed from here to say something further about a theoretical appreciation of the substantive questions regarding class differentials in participation. And in and through doing that, to better appreciate the limits of two of the several methodologies appropriate to that inquiry.

II

To focus one's attention on the limitations of a methodology, one must ask difficult questions. Perhaps the best one of those questions
to face at this point is this: is the conservative understanding in any way rooted in behavioral methodology? This might seem at first a peculiar question since if it is the case, as I have just tried to show, that this understanding does not follow from the empirical findings of behavioralist researchers, then how could it be possible that that understanding could be said in any way to derive from that methodology?

In the first instance, one might be able to build a reasonably strong case of 'guilt by association.' That is most of the people who put the various elements of the understanding forward were strong and often skillful users of empirical research methods. Admittedly that's not proof, but surely it is as much an empirical 'cue' as in any other correlation. (The causal arrow could plausibly run in either direction; and there are, in the social world, always innumerable hidden intervening variables.) Second, most of those who raised the strongest rebuttals, the 'post-behavioralists,' were less often known for or inclined to empirical research. (The most notable exception is Walker.) Third, this particular issue does not stand in isolation; it related quite closely (as I will discuss further shortly) to other debates in the discipline, for example, to the questions of pluralism and

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community power.\textsuperscript{29}

In that debate, the more thoroughgoing behavioral researchers, those disinclined to reputation, to mobilization of bias, and to non-decisions, came to more conservative conclusions. Was their methodology -- or at least their choice of techniques -- unrelated to their findings? They dealt only with issues that were raised to the level of visibility and decision and generally avoided power potential and the anticipation of that potential. They did not consider matters which were never raised, nor why they were not raised. (That infinite regresses do not lend themselves readily to empirical research does not necessarily deny all of them.) In human affairs what is at any given place and moment is a precious small portion of what might be in any other moment. Further, to what extent is what does or doesn't happen in New Haven determined in New Haven? Ant to what extent is it determined at any given time independently of how it was determined in the past (both substantively and procedurally)? Doesn't the range of unconsidered possibilities say something about political power?

Fourth, and last for the moment, what of the location of some of the most complete statements of the conservative understanding in the concluding chapters of leading empirical studies or summaries thereof?

And what of the claims by many that their revisions of classical democratic theory (or what they saw to be classical democratic theory) were empirically based? All of these four points together must count for something. Let us allow for the moment that they do and carry the discussion hopefully to a higher level. (I think that higher level is further called for by the tone of many of the basic texts of empirical political science to be discussed shortly below.)

Crucial to a full realization of the view that there is no simple causal connection is the fact that many empirical researchers do not ascribe to the conservative understanding. Most notable here are McClosky and Lane. McClosky explicitly counters the first element in the conservative understanding:

"It should be emphasized, however, that the correlations between participation and some of these (stratal) variables are low and unstable and they may vary from one cultural-political context to another. Thus, education and socio-economic status and participation correlate strongly in the United States, but weakly in Norway." \( ^{31} \)

McClosky goes on in this discussion to cite several other exceptions. He also absorbs into his summary of the findings on political participations both a statement of what I have called the conservative understanding and a summary of what might be called the 'post-behavioral' understanding. He presents them as equally credible possibilities.

Lane presents in his 1959 work, thus pre-dating the 'post-behavioralist' critique what might be taken as an expression of a liberal

\( ^{30} \) McClosky, "Political Participation," \textit{op. cit.}

\( ^{31} \) \textit{Ibid.}, p. 256.
understanding. I will here offer a brief critical discussion of that understanding, but clearly it cannot be characterized as one which is comfortable with the political apathy of the disadvantaged. Again, Lane effectively makes several points which were much later made a part of the 'post-behavioral' case. For example, he explicitly criticizes the tendency to overgeneralize from the association of heightened participation and the onset of totalitarianism in 1923-1930 Austria and in 1930-1933, Germany. He states,


"Because high participation under the stimulus of one set of conditions is associated with revolutionary pressures, or does create dangerous electoral tension, it does not follow that high participation caused by other factors has the same meaning." (p. 347)

And later,

"We cannot resist the expression of emotion in politics because of the frightening experience of historical parallels." (p. 357)

Essentially the same point is made (eight years later) by Bachrach in a critique of what he takes to be Lasswell's assumption that 'an increase in the power potential of the mass enhances the probability of autocracy.' Bachrach goes on to cite several examples in which such an increase produced quite the contrary results. He mentions the American Revolution, the Chartist movement in England, the early stages of the New Deal, the Popular Front in France, and I would add: the original campaign to gain widespread suffrage in Belgium, the Civil Rights Movement in America, the election of S. Allende in Chile, and many other cases. Lane, on the other hand offers a variety of cases which he sees to be examples of the 'risks' of any focusing on the

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34 Bachrach, pp. 71-72.

35 This is no longer so easy a case as when this line was first written two years ago. But surely here, while the less advantaged were in this instance a credit to democratic values, major elements of the elite were not. This case is now also interesting as a systems-level test of the effectiveness of democratic political culture, 'civic' or otherwise.

36 Lane, in fairness, should be 'credited' with being quite willing to undertake these risks in an honest, though very cautious manner.
goal of higher participation rather than the means: Huey Long's charisma, the dramatic and polarized choice of two parties with dogmatic (Marxist and Christian) cores, the Australian system of fines for non-voting and a properly cautious reference to the Almond view of Communism as neurosis. This kind of unsystematic (and often ad hominem) cataloguing on Lane's part and on mine only suggests that a good deal of research is in order on this question. Again, at a minimum it is clear that an uncritical preoccupation with Nazi Germany on this matter should not smother attempts to proceed with further analysis; the question must be seen as an open one.

Lane stresses the importance of widespread participation to democracy and is seriously concerned that the disadvantaged gain an increased voice in American politics through a more active involvement (his stress, however, is on effects while the stress in Bachrach et al. is on self-development). A democratic system, Lane states, needs 'intelligence' on what he describes with A.D. Lindsay's nice phrase,

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37 Given the composition of his sample in this study, Almond might more validly have concluded that those who leave Communist movements have emotional problems. See The Appeals of Communism (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1954).

38 A systematic study of the kinds of politics associated with both high voter turnout and sharp increases in voter turnout should be conducted as a beginning. The effects of social movements have also been insufficiently analyzed by political scientists. (The reasons are well accounted for by Robert Dahl, "Reply...", op. cit., pp. 304-5). Further problems can be envisioned in operationalizing 'kinds of politics' in this case. Lane seems, for example, to see class consciousness as something to be classed with religions tension as somehow a wrong way to go about advancing participation (p. 350). I will consider this last point again below.

39 Almost Qualifies as a 'pretty' phrase in Hemingway's sense in the concluding line of The Sun Also Rises. Would that the world be so genteel.
'where the shoe pinches.' He effectively criticizes Berelson for "failing to account for the concentration of indifferents and non-participants in lower status groups" and then proceeding with a discussion (Berelson's concluding chapter) "as though the indifferents were randomly selected." (p. 346)

Lane's primary concern is with coming to grips with the variety of the means by which participation can be increased and trying to determine what negative side effects might be associated with them. His approach is an excellent one, but he has a tendency to not look carefully for potential positive side effects of participation (beyond the improved democratic functioning via 'intelligence' as mentioned above). He lists a wide range of negative side effects and at times, as we will discuss below, does overstate them. However, most of his points are extremely well-taken and illustrate that one shouldn't need to conjure the vision of Bolsheviks (or Nazis) gone mad in the streets to restrain any latter-day Sorel who might claim that any increase in activity is preferable to the stupefaction of indifference. Two of Lane's cautions here are worth noting: (1) In local elections (U.S.) the highest participant group is a "machine-dominated clique working for...jobs, favors, contracts and protection...." (p. 343) and (2) one very likely way to effect an increase in voter turnout and in other political activities is to increase stress on 'charismatic' factors in

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40 I'm not sure how Sorel should be taken regarding Bolsheviks, at the time of his total rejection of indifference there were no Bolsheviks by that name, when there were, he was not the same man. See George Sorel, Reflections on Violence (New York: Collier Books, 1961)
candidates.

Lane, in sharp contrast to other students of participation, concerns himself with spelling out thirteen means of increasing participation: some are 'simply' matters of electoral mechanics (equalize the relative weight of votes); others focus on a variety of institutions ( politicize social institutions, raise the stakes in electoral contest, strengthen political parties). His cautions are relatively restrained, e.g., regarding raising the electoral stakes:

"The enhanced stakes would have the effect of making the acceptance by the defeated of the victors and their policies a more difficult matter. If the stakes were great enough, that tension which Francis Wilson described as depriving the constitution of its value might develop into a reality and, in any event, might spill over into ancillary areas of group conflict such that community harmony all up and down the line would be jeopardized." (p. 354)

Again I should stress that in spite of his cautious circumspec-
tions, Lane is quite resolute in his assertion that we should proceed.
He gets to serious problems not often elaborated by political scientists, the discouragement (by 'culture') of strong group identification and the 'encouragement' to seeking solutions in individual terms are dis-
cussed. He even comes to seeing apathy as somehow systemically in-
duced:

"...people take their self-images from their social situations, from the reflections of themselves they see in such cues as forms of address, minor courtesies, and postures of attention accorded to them by others.

41 by 'even comes to' I do not mean to necessarily imply correctness, merely uniqueness.
The police, the civil servants, the court house politicians are very likely to reflect these cues, as well as in formal policy, the political power of the persons with whom they are dealing. Officials know who is a "constituent" and who is not. And others in the community know and respond to who has power and uses it." (p. 339)

He is not to my mind aware of how varied and deep such 'cues' can be; how they can be so pervasive and so effective as to eliminate from the agenda serious contests for power. Lane himself immediately after arguing for the 'increased esteem of the depressed groups' in a staggeringly dated section on politicizing the female role states:

"...it is too seldom remembered in the American society that working girls and career women... are often borrowing their time...capacity for relaxed play...from their children to whom it rightfully belongs...rise in juvenile delinquency...homosexuality...." (p. 355 emphasis added.)

There is both class and sex bias in this passage. Class cues are a subject well worth an enormous amount of research by students of politics, we could start by looking at our own writing and our own universities before proceeding to those officials bodies which deal with a broad public among the disadvantaged (for example, health and welfare services and public schools).

Lane, then, has an understanding of stratal participation differentials which differs considerably from that which was (is in the case of textbooks) dominant in the field at the time that he wrote and for some time after. Another behavioralist who felt compelled to reply to elements of the conservative understanding was, of course, V.O. Key. His book

The Responsible Electorate presented "(T)he perverse and unorthodox argument...that the voters are not fools;" some of his findings herein follow shortly. And of these who seem to accept much of that understanding many who often write in other than the 'behavioral mood' are also present. For example, Mayo, Sartori and Plamenatz; although none of the three would accept all of the elements of the understanding, Sartori for one comes close. Needless to say, of course, innumerable aristocrats and others who pre-date the behavioral enterprise considerably would have felt quite comfortable with its tenets. But all of this is far too indirect evidence; the best approach to demonstrating clearly that an empirical, quantitative approach to the study of political participation is not the source of the conservative understanding is to show that that approach can produce evidence contrary to that understanding. I will offer and interpret in this section several examples of such findings. I will include in this listing examples of methodological self-correction; that is, findings about techniques on which elements of that understanding were seen to rest.

Let us first look at some studies related to 'authoritarianism':

(1) B.M. Bass first noted a tendency to rank as more authoritarian those persons whose response-set was positive. There are reasons and findings which lead to an expectation of an association between 'acquiescence' (yes-response set) and the disadvantaged sectors of the population. Thus most of the 250 studies listed by Christie

and Cook\textsuperscript{44} may well be invalid, with regard to any findings relevant to the conservative understanding.

(2) R. Christie with Marie Jahoda\textsuperscript{45} have edited a collection of articles many of which argue that the F-scale was not a valid measure of 'authoritarianism'.

(3) C.D. Farris\textsuperscript{46} did a study which found no significant relationship between 'authoritarianism' as measured on the F-scale and political attitudes and behavior within a low education sample.

(4) In any case, relatively few studies have found the less advantaged to be dramatically more authoritarian. For example, Janowitz and Marvick\textsuperscript{47} found the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(Manual)</th>
<th>(Non-manual)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lower Class</td>
<td>Middle Class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Authoritarianism</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{44}R. Christie and P. Cook, "A guide to published literature relating to the authoritarian personality through 1956", Journal of Psychology, 1958, pp. 171-99. This list is also Lipset's crucial footnote 16, Political Man, p. 96.


\textsuperscript{46}C.D. Farris, "Authoritarianism as a Political Variable", Journal of Politics, 1956, pp. 61-82.

The existence of a relationship was statistically significant, but hardly dramatic. Some studies have found a pattern, but more have found class to be inversely related to F-scale score. One example of a finding supportive of Lipset's view is a study by MacKinnon and Centers. 48

These factors, when considered with the matters expressed in the last chapter regarding Lipset's 'working-class authoritarians,' surely should remove at least this aspect of support from the fifth element of the conservative understanding. It is highly doubtful that one can meaningfully say that "authoritarianism" is something that individuals carry around with them. Being acquiescent with opinion interviewers cannot be taken as a valid measure of likelihood of supporting Fascism, or any real-world political position or movement. If that weren't sufficient, there is the finding by Farris which shows that the less educated are less likely to carry any such question response inclination through into other political attitudes and behaviors. Even considering all of these factors, one has the additional fact that the relationship between relative advantage and high F-scale scores is neither consistent, nor generally strong.

There are also many findings which call into the reliability and generalizability of the more narrow findings of strata-related

differences in liberality and tolerance.

(1) Regarding racial prejudice as a form of 'illiberality' or intolerance, Michael Rogin cites findings which show that with education level controlled, lower income Americans are more willing to accept Blacks as neighbors or fellow-workers than are 'middle-class' or 'upper-class' respondents. Further, within the lower class education seems to have no effect. Moreover (he reports) "at every educational level the lower class is more willing to accept Negroes as fellow workers." (p. 99) The center of the 1964 Wallace vote in Wisconsin was found by Rogin to be in the wealthy upper middle-class sections of Milwaukee.

(2) In another study, Rogin found the Wisconsin working-class not to be the basis of (Joseph) McCarthy's support.

(3) Stouffer in his earlier well-known study of American Soldiers found the following attitudes (behavioral intentions) with regard to a Negro moving into respondents' neighborhood (by SES):

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Below average</th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>Above average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Treat as others</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't Care</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depends</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Move Out</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Move Them Out</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(4) After reporting that both the lower-income and the upper-income groups slightly higher on ethnocentrism than middle-income persons and finding salesmen and policemen the most prejudiced by occupation and busdrivers and government workers the least, Frankel-Brunswick \(^{52}\) concludes:

"These relationships, however, are so tenuous as to support the hypothesis that economic factors as such are not closely related to ethnocentrism so far as individuals are concerned."

(5) Eldersveld, \(^{53}\) in his study of Detroit and Detroit area political

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\(^{53}\) Samuel J. Eldersveld, *Political Parties: A Behavioral Analysis* (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1964), pp.192-93. Even, perhaps, stronger doubts about the Stouffer findings are implicit in an excellent study by Howard J. Ehrlich entitled "Instrument Error and the Study of Prejudice," *Social Forces*, 43 (December, 1964) pp. 197-206. Ehrlich finds that many respondents felt that forced response answers on these matters did not allow them to express accurately what they felt. He found that standard questions in this area forced respondents to depart from the usual way in which they conceptualized the matters at hand. He concluded, "(G)iven the only moderate correlations that have been obtained between most measures of prejudice and other variables, it is clear that the magnitude of the differences observed in this study is sufficient to radically alter such correlations," (p. 197)
leaders and party activists, found results that the generalizability of the McClosky or Stouffer findings that leaders are more progressive in non-economic issue-areas than is the population at large. He found Republican district chairmen, executive board members, precinct chairmen and "loyalists" to be considerably less supportive of civil rights than a random sample of area citizenry. Further, the more active and higher placed the member of the "elite", the less supportive of civil rights. Democratic party leaders and activists tended to hold a view very near to that of the public at large.

Foreign policy attitudes are sometimes considered a part of the concern that the less advantaged and/or the non-participants are a potential threat to liberal democratic stability. The less advantaged are believed to be less progressive, less liberal on foreign policy matters than are the more established sectors of society. There is seen to be a causal link between, on the one hand, ignorance level with regard to foreign policy matters, and on the other, aggressiveness. 54

A study by W.A. Gamson 55 calls much of this into question. For example,

54 See, for example, Gabriel A. Almond, The American People & Foreign Policy (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Co. 1950). Martin Kriesberg "Dark Areas of Ignorance," in Lester Markel (Ed.) Public Opinion and Foreign Policy (New York: Harper, 1949), and James N. Rosenau, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy (New York: Random House, 1961). Not all these studies make this particular argument but all are highly dubious regarding mass competence with regard to foreign policy. Lipset includes foreign policy aggressiveness as part of his case for authoritarianism of the working class.

he shows that those who favor decreasing America's involvement in the
Korean War were far more often from among those who scored low on foreign
policy knowledge tests. He also notes a 1954 finding which indicated
that those with less education were more inclined to believe that the
U.S. should try to agree with the Russians on eliminating atomic
weapons.

There have been foreign policy issues on which at certain times
the less advantaged have tended to be less liberal. For example, sup­
port of the United Nations in the post-World War II period. However,
for both the Korean and Vietnam wars findings quite consistently showed
either no difference in aggressiveness by occupation or income-level,
or that the more advantaged were the more aggressive. 56

Some who worry about the affects of mass foreign policy attitudes
worry that the less advantaged are both too aggressive and too isola­
nist, that is that they would be more likely to opt for either extreme
and to do so in an inconsistent and too changeable manner. Roper 57

56 See Hamilton, op. cit., Schuman, op. cit., and Patricia Dolbeare "The
Social Correlates of Attitudes towards the Vietnam War," Unpublished
manuscript, University of Wisconsin Sociology Department. Also see
Political Science Review, LXI (June, 1967) pp. 317-33 who report "Res­
pondents with high information scores were more likely to favor escalation
and less likely to favor de-escalation. The correlations are small -- a
correlation of .12 between information and escalation and -.19 between
information and de-escalation" (p. 326). They further found no relation­
ship between Vietnam War policy preferences on the one hand and income,
education, or occupation on the other.

57 Elmo Roper, "American Attitudes on World Organization," Public Opinion
Quarterly, Fall, 1953, p. 401.
found no economic level differences on isolationism or on support for a wide variety of internationalist options.

Also in the area of foreign policy knowledge and 'enlightenment', comes the following point for consideration prior to drawing any wide generalizations from attitude survey data in this area (both questions were asked in 1944 of a large random sample):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>No Opinion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Do you think we ought to start talking now about the kind of peace we want after the war&quot;?</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Which of these seem better to you -- for us to win the war first and then start thinking about peace, or start talking now about the kind of peace we want after the war?&quot;</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Finally here, I would mention an excellent article by William R. Caspary\(^{58}\) in which he effectively demonstrates that what he terms the 'mood theory' of foreign policy public opinion as stated by Almond and accepted by many others\(^{59}\) is erroneous. He quotes Almond:

"The characteristic response to questions of foreign policy is one of indifference. A foreign


policy crisis, short of the immediate threat of war may transform indifference to vague apprehension, to fatalism, to anger; but the reaction is still a mood." (p. 53)

And further he notes that Almond doubts that the "public" can provide stable support for international commitments:

"Because of the superficial attitudes toward world politics...a temporary Russian tactical withdrawal may produce strong tendencies toward demobilisation and the reassertion of the primacy of private and domestic values." (P. 55)

He then analyzes trend data on the NORC poll questions on a range of foreign policy issues and on levels of attention or interest in foreign policy. He concludes:

"The Mood Theory was summarized at the start of this paper as having a premise -- generally low and unstable attention to foreign affairs -- and a conclusion -- unstable support for foreign policy commitments. Empirical evidence has been presented in these pages to show that both the premise and the conclusion are false." (p. 546)

If it is becoming increasingly less clear that empirical data do indeed support the view that the less advantaged are aggressive, unreliable, authoritarian and illiberal, what of their relative level of support for democratic (as opposed to 'liberal') norms? Dennis has recently found that income and occupation -- when partialled for education, do not correlate with the "Voting Duty" and "Efficacy of Elections" factors he has derived from a factor analysis of 19 electoral system support questions. The factor he calls "Approval of the Electoral Process" does correlate positively with income (Partial r .10, significant

at .05 level), but not with occupation. When one looks at the rotated factor matrix of individual items, however, one finds that the two items identified under this heading are:

"It is impossible for most voters to make informed and intelligent decisions when they go to the polls."

and,

"Our political system would work a lot better if our leaders were chosen on the basis of merit in competitive examinations rather than by elections. (p. 824)

I fear these questions confound a bit faith in the electorate, faith in the mechanism of voting, faith in educational technology, and belief that correct information is available. Given the very low correlation it might be worth sorting that all out, or simply realizing that the relationship is small and of far from obvious import.

There is a somewhat stronger relationship between all three variables and education — that is, persons with more education — when income and occupation, sex, etc. are controlled — are more likely to disagree with such statements as:

(Statement 17)  "A person should only vote in an election if he cares about how it is going to come out."

and agree with,

(Statement 10)  "The way people vote is the main thing that decides how things are run in this country." (p. 824)

But, Dennis finds, there is no relationship between either "Approval of the Electoral Process" and "Efficacy of Elections" and voter turnout; only voting duty is effective. What these mean then, although Dennis does not take notice of it, is that some of the less educated respondents
were turning out in spite of their acceptance of Statement 10 and others were not, presumably, "because" of their tendency to not accept Statement 17. The electoral process for some has limited effect (a realistic view), but some vote in any case; others, contrary to the more educated, tend not to vote when they are indifferent about the particular result. All in all, I think this study demonstrates that the less advantaged are no less likely to support electoral democracy generally; they may be less inclined only to ritual adherence to social norms, their non-voting a reflection of actualities of party choice in the U.S.

One study which gets away from the American context presents sharply different and at times astonishing results. It is a rarely cited study and has not, to my knowledge, been followed up. Hennessey using data collected in Italy, investigates class, party and four attitudinal variables: support of democratic norms, sense of political efficacy, degree of political involvement, and level of support for the political party system. On support for democratic norms and social class, he found the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Democratic Norms</th>
<th>Class</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Least Supportive</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most Supportive</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This finding is significant at the .001 level (Kendall's tau = .16).

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Intriguingly, the political left generally scored better than the political right; the grouping which included the Communist did better on such matters as protection of minority rights than did supporters of the Christian Democrats. What these results do for the Civic Culture and for the belief that the less advantaged have a greater propensity for authoritarian movements (Lipset) is interesting. When one couples the relatively more democratic attitudes of Italian Communist Party membership with that party's non-seizure of power immediately after World War II, a time when most agree, that they would have had little difficulty, one realizes that one should not make quick assumptions about authoritarianism -- for individuals, for social groups, or for political parties whatever their stated ideology.

Another study which causes wonder regarding the validity of questions purporting to measure matters so general and complex as support of democratic norms is that by LaPalombara and Waters. They had the honesty to show that their use of standard questions in these matters produced a result in which 54% of those who were classed as 'democratic' could also be classed, on the basis of other questions in the survey, as 'pro-fascist.'

To this point, I have presented matters relating to differences on particular attitudes or clusters of attitudes. All of these materials have related to the fifth element of the conservative understanding (only

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it and the second could be significantly replied to by the sorts of empirical data that are available). Before I look briefly at a few materials bearing on quantitative participation and the second element of the understanding, I would like to consider two matters broader than any particular attitude. The matters are: first, voter rationality and second, the relationship of attitudes (regarding racial prejudice) and behavior. Empirical research has a great deal to add in both these matters and both begin to throw even wider doubts on the conservative understanding.

The best known demonstration of voter rationality is V.O. Key's The Responsible Electorate. Therein Key looked at data from U.S. Presidential elections between 1936 and 1960 comparing attitudes of "switchers" to attitudes of "standpatters" and concludes that of those who supported the party in power, those at odds with policy of 'ins' were most likely to defect. These correlations were often very high, while those in agreement with the policy position of the 'ins' tended to continue to vote for them. Those who supported the 'outs' were similarly inclined to tend to vote as policy-based rationality would dictate. Many of the persons with no position on a given issue had strong opinions on another. Party loyalty (standpatters) often tends to overshadow disagreement on some particular issue -- those who voted "party" were less inclined to switch when they disagreed at a given time than those who

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"floated". When the data are looked at in these ways — especially considering that the electorate is judging retrospectively — the broad conclusions come to by Berelson and cited regularly since, seem greatly weakened if not unfounded. Given the record of the American "elite" on doing after an election what it appears they intend to do, one can hardly expect rational voters to base their judgement on other than the record, nor to bother to study carefully the verbal behavior of candidates.

The assertion that the average voter — or the less advantaged voter — is not attentive or informed may at times be true when it is the researcher or the politician who is deciding which issues are most important. When the voters themselves are deciding what is salient, the result can be altogether different. One study reports that when Ivan Allen Jr., a wealthy white businessman who was clearly not an all-out integrationist, was the candidate against Lester Maddox in 1961 for Mayor of Atlanta, the vote in Black Precinct 7-D was Allen 2003, Maddox 4. There were five white voters living in the district (one of whom may well have been embarrassed). The average education and income level in Black Atlanta are not high, nor likely and justifiably was political efficacy. Nevertheless, the degree of organization, attentiveness, information and communication was, in this case, truly staggering. Numerous other examples of sensitivity, sometimes to seemingly imperceptible differences, can be found among Black voters on the race issue.

A further study of voter rationality by Shapiro concluded:

"The evidence adduced above...suggests that for our sample and with respect to our referent sample of voters, voting choices are rational." (p. 118)

Shapiro used a factor analytic model of eight party variables, seven personality quality variables, seven issue variables and seven 'inter-personal cue variables' and sought to avoid "...presuppositions about the particular values and substantive information relevant to decisions." (p. 1118) He included both economic and socio-psychological factors and both the inductive and deductive aspects of rationality. The study was complexly and carefully conceived and the finding convincing.

Finally here, Eldersveld in *Political Parties* reported a finding significant particularly with regard to the conclusions in *Voting*. Eldersveld found that of Detroit party precinct leaders, 22% of Democrats and 48% of Republicans felt that on the issues, there were no differences between the parties. An additional 20% of Democrats and 24% of Republican leaders felt that the parties were differed only in organization and campaign techniques, that there were no issues in the last campaign, or that candidate personality was the only issue in the last campaign. Thus a majority of those who were actively, loyally and, presumably, attentively involved in the political campaign were no different in their judgement than were the voters whose behavior was such as to cause doubt in their capacity

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to carry the processes of democracy. The 'angels' were no different than the mass. The electoral contests in many of the areas wherein these activists were involved were closely contested.

Curiously Eldersveld refuses to face clearly what he might have found. He does not seriously consider the possibility that the parties are not in fact any different, and that voter indifference to issue pronouncements involves considerably more political perceptiveness than does the judgement by political scientists that they are uninformed, uninterested and ignorant. Eldersveld states in, what seems to me a strange non sequitur:

"Despite the "Tweedledum-Tweedledee Theory" of American politics (that there are no real issue and ideological differences between the two parties), it is indeed peculiar to find such a large number of party leaders advancing this perception in precincts of intensive party combat." (p. 309)

He then goes on to offer several lame attempts at explanation, e.g., that many of the leaders might not have "lived long in the Detroit area," or that they were perfunctorily in the position of district leader. He then doubts that these leaders were "in close contact with their political world." One wonders what thorough evidence he has that the parties are not indistinguishable; before party activists are presumed to be somehow uninformed.

The other question to be dealt with at this point is far less decisive in its effects on the conservative understanding. However, it raises a large number of questions which call for considerable research effort related to the understanding of political attitudes and participation. There is considerable body of relevant literature developing in the area of the relationship between attitudes and behavior which should be applied
to our concerns in this inquiry. There has been some highly imaginative research conducted, dating back at least to 1934, which has a considerable bearing. For example, the earliest study that I know of, that by LaPiere, consisted of, first, a trip around the United States with a Chinese couple stopping at a series of restaurants and overnight accommodations and second, of a follow-up questionnaire. It was found that 93% of the restaurants and 92% of the sleeping places indicated in response to the questionnaire that they would not accept members of the Chinese race as guests. In the course of the previous trip, only one of those same facilities actually refused service. In a similar study about twenty years later, Kutner, Wilkins and Yarrow got a similar response with a mixed group of white and Negro women.

Many other studies have demonstrated similar gaps between stated attitude and overt behavior or between different forms of overt behavior. For example, between stated prejudice and dealing with store personnel, between workplace behavior in coal mines and behavior outside of the work


67 Bernard Kutner, Carol Wilkins and Penny Yarrow, "Verbal Attitudes and Overt Behavior Involving Racial Prejudice," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 47 (1952), pp. 649-52. This study avoided some of the many problems in the earlier one: for example, the follow-up letters were informal with the sentence "since some of them are colored, I wondered whether you would object to this coming?" added seemingly as an afterthought. Most never replied and denied to follow-up telephone calls that they had ever received the letter.

situation, between prejudice test scores and social behavior in imaginatively contrived situations, and between stated prejudice and actual behavior when a Black moved into a neighborhood. In this latter case, the overt behavior was in some cases seemingly more prejudiced than the stated attitude, and in other cases less.

All of this, it would seem to me, points to a serious need to determine if there are social or economic correlates to differences in the relationship between stated attitudes and overt behavior. This becomes especially relevant when one considers the view of Saenger:

"Within each income group the more educated appear to be less prejudiced... (this could come by) greater exposure to intergroup education, or by greater familiarity with the American creed which inhibits the expression of prejudice. To the extent that ignorance creates fear of the unknown, to that extent education may counteract prejudicial tendencies. On the other hand, it is possible that


those more familiar with the American creed are more capable of giving correct 'unprejudicial' answers in response to questionnaires. (emphasis added)."

One should also consider here the further possibility that the more advantaged may have an easier time being attitudinally less prejudiced because the chances of their being put to the test in overt behavior situations are far more remote. This is suggested by the conclusion to a study by Linn:

"Discrepant behavior in a negative direction (racially liberal attitudes which are inconsistent with subsequent discriminatory behavior) will increase if the liberal attitudes represent an unstable position (the lacking of actual experience and reality-testing) and if the level of social involvement with the attitude object (in the overt behavior test) is high." (p. 364, last parenthetical remark added for clarity.)

Linn also suggested, with regard to the DeFleur and Westie study, that as the subjects

"...were young college girls who had only recently been exposed to the norms and values of the liberal university subculture...a large number of them...had already begun to play their university social role as a racial liberal." (p. 363)

Education, as has been shown, is the most effective variable, perhaps the only significantly effective advantage variable, with regard to racial attitudes. Could it not be the case that much of whatever, if any, differences exist are at the verbal level only? And what of other differences with regard to 'learning the liberal social creed'? Surely a good deal of additional research is called for here and surely the case of the relative tolerance levels of the less advantaged is even less clear. Less frequently cited empirical research, I think, has
shown, that the empirical grounding of the qualitative aspects of the conservative understanding is highly questionable at best.

I will turn now to look very briefly at the quantitative aspects of the conservative understanding. There is little doubt here that the less advantaged do participate less. There are, however, some exceptions which have not always been given sufficient emphasis. Several generalizations can be made here. Typically the differentials in voting by occupational status groupings is notably smaller in Europe than in North America. Typically also, even in the United States, unionized workers are significantly more likely to vote than non-unionized workers at comparable status and income levels. Where there is a party actively seeking to mobilize the less advantaged, differentials tend to be lessened or erased. Where workers are a higher percentage of the electorate in a given area, the differentials tend to be smaller. Where workers are in isolated occupations (miners, fishermen, lumbering, etc.) turnout tends to be higher.

If one looks at the statistics in Tingsten's classic study Political Behavior, one is struck at how frequently the occupational differences are very small. For example, in Basel-Stadt in 1911, the following difference: Social Class III (workers, workers in Cantonal Service, and workers in cooperative service) 66.8%, merchants, brokers, 68.7%, Directors and heads of firms 73.7%, engineers, architects, chemists 69.9% and so forth. In Danzig (1927), the overall differences seem even

smaller, even reversed — "in independent occupation" 90.5%, free professionals 82.1%, skilled workers 87.9%, unskilled workers 89.3%.

In Copenhagen (1913) officials — the highest category — 87.7%, free professions 82.2%, workers 87.1%. In Vienna (1923) workers 94.0%, lawyers, doctors, technicians, etc. 86.9%, public service administration 92.4%.

Tingsten also reports, using figures from Switzerland, "that on the whole the voting frequency rises with the relative strength of the group (workers) in the district." (p. 126) In *Political Man* Lipset reported that Berlin working-class districts turn out at over 90%. He attributes this and the high turnout of workers in France to the active role of Socialist and Communist parties in organizing sport and social clubs, workers cooperative housing, the trade union movement and youth groups. Party concern for and interest in workers is demonstrated tangibly even when governmental power has not been attained. This can be especially effective in solidaristic communities wherein there is little mixing of classes.

Lipset goes on to say:

"Districts within cities which are homogeneous, either largely working class or middle class in Vienna, Amsterdam, Basel, Berlin, Helsinki, parts of Britain, and Norway have a much higher vote than those with a "mixed" population as various studies from 1920-57 have reported." (p. 216)

He also reports that among miners voting turnout is typically higher than occupational status alone might predict.
Allart and Bruun \(^{73}\) report that in Sweden there is a high correlation between Communist party strength and percentage turnout. They also found that in Finland generally, workers are more likely to vote than are white-collar professionals. Campbell and Valen \(^{74}\) found that in the United States education and socio-economic status correlate highly with participation, but in Norway they do not. They conclude that this is in large part explained by the relatively higher level of political organization in the Norwegian working class. All in all, it can be said that much of whatever tendency exists to overdraw the size and universality of stratal differences on voting, turnout may well relate to an over-dependence on American data sources.

Lastly here, I would like to indicate a few empirical findings which touch generally on the overall nature of the conservative understanding. One interesting finding is found in Eldersveld’s Political Parties: \(^{75}\)

**Characteristics Among Respondents with Favorable Recruitment Attitudes**

(Democratic Party)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Favorable Recruitment Attitudes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Highly Exposed to Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional-managerial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled Workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi- and unskilled</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\(^{75}\) Op. cit., p. 446.
Results are responses to the question 'Would you encourage your son to enter politics?' Semi- and unskilled workers are quite favorably inclined unless they had had some exposure to the party. Contrastingly, higher status persons were encouraged by their exposure to the party. One can only get the impression that the experience of the less advantaged within the Democratic Party is less favorable than that of the more advantaged. The disinclination to participation this seems to indicate, at least for some Americans, is not a matter of inattention and ignorance, but real experience. It is one, admittedly modest, indication that the problem is not merely one of individuals, but is also one of the functioning of institutions.

The view within the conservative understanding that low participation rates can be taken as a sign of satisfaction with the system seems to fly in the face of the findings that, for example and obviously, the less advantaged are less satisfied generally. But consider too again the sharp correlations between political cynicism, political efficacy, political trust, and so forth and participation. What is consistently shown is that those who are less active politically are less likely to believe that the system is fair, that its leaders are trustworthy, that its decisions can be altered by "people like themselves." Almond and Verba and others put a meaning on these findings which assumes that they are not simply accurate perceptions of differential treatment. Every sign indicates that non-participation reflects cynicism, doubt and/or hopelessness rather than contentedness.

Further, there is considerable evidence that participation can have positive effects on further participation and can improve as well the quality of that participation. For example, Merton and others looked at a New Jersey shipyard workers housing project which was forced to incorporate as a town. Workers had to take all civic positions including library board memberships, school board and so forth. They tended thereafter to be far more active in electoral politics as well. Lipset in his study of Saskatchewan attributes the activist and highly democratic politics of wheat farmers in part to their participation in community leadership roles. Solomon and others reported, incidentally, that during civil rights protests in Atlanta and Cambridge (Maryland) crime rates in Negro communities dropped substantially. Solidaristic political action, it might be hypothesized, reduces individual solutions to frustration. Class solidarity (which promotes participation) also seems to have some effect on attitudes towards minorities. Hatt

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79 Frederic Solomon et al. "Civil Rights Activity and the Reduction of Crime Among Negroes," *Archives of General Psychiatry*, 12 (March, 1965), pp. 227-36, reported in Walker, *op. cit.*, p. 209. Walker also reports that participants in civil rights sit-ins scored very low on "authoritarianism" questions in part calling to question the dangers of "excess activism." Similar findings are also the case for American anti-war activists of the 1960s.

reports that feelings towards minorities tend to vary directly with attitudes toward the lower classes and inversely with attitudes toward the upper classes. Other studies \(^81\) have found that at least some forms of participation vary as much with parental participation levels as with socio-economic status. It would seem then that participation, if effective, might tend to be self-perpetuating as well as "self-improving." All of this seems to cast considerable doubt on the insistence by some who advance the conservative understanding of participation that one must fear the effects of the activation of the uninvolved. Political activity and class consciousness might be one of the best ways to lessen some of the negative traits which some believe to be atypically characteristic of non-participators.

Lastly here, I would like to offer one more example of my view that support for democracy has much to do with the kinds of questions that are put to respondents. Huber and Form\(^82\) offer the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income</th>
<th>Race</th>
<th>All Organizations Should be Run by Representative Democracy</th>
<th>Corporations should be Run Democratically</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>Black</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>White</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>Black</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>White</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rich</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (all respondents)</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>34</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\(^82\) *Op. cit.*, p. 147
In contrast to Prothro and Grigg here, it is the middle class and the rich who seem not to carry their general democratic views over to specific applications.

In sum, it seems that empirical research using common methodologies can produce findings which tend to indicate results quite counter to the conservative understanding. I conclude both that that understanding has not been conclusively demonstrated empirically, and that the adoption of an empirical, quantitative mode of data gathering does not dictate a particular set of broad conclusions. The roots of the conservative understanding are not, straightforwardly in any case, methodological.

III

If it is the case that the conservative understanding is not for the most part based on empirical evidence, can one usefully make any statement about the source of this point of view? It is my view that this understanding is ideologically rooted. Having made that statement, I hasten to add that such an "explanation" of a point of view cannot refute that point of view, nor can it ever be more than a speculative claim, nor, further, can it ever be more than a partial explanation. All broad generalizations about the social world are at least to some extent,
ideologically conditioned and there is nothing which is purely ideological. Understandings, patterns of ideas, can be usefully seen to have several dimensions: including an empirical dimension, a normative-subjective dimension, and an ideological dimension. I think we have seen that the conservative understanding has a 'thin' empirical dimension. In the first instance, its mode of framing the language of its construction is such that empirical data are oblique to many of its elements. In the second instance, it can be shown to be overstated by the empirical data which may be martialled against those of its elements which are sensitive to such forms of evidence. I believe it has as well an ideological dimension which should not be avoided.

I take the definition of ideology to be: 'an integrated pattern of ideas (a) socially conditioned in a way such that its roots can be located in an historically specific context and (b) having intentional or unintentional, potential or actual, social effects.' This definition derives in part from Marx, Mannheim, and Daniel Bell. The socio-historic character of the concept, the view that all ideas even the most abstract are grounded in time and place and class is one of Marx's many contributions to social science:

"What (Marx and Engels)...call 'ideology' includes not only the theory of knowledge and politics, but also metaphysics, ethics, religion and indeed any 'form of consciousness' which expresses the basic attitudes or commitments of a social class."

Mannheim attempted to clear from the concept the negativity which it carried in Marx's usage. This is useful I think in that the recognition of the ideological character of all viewpoints implies that one is attempting to remove some part of oneself from history, from society and from class background to the greatest possible extent. One is trying to be 'objective,' knowing full well that such a position can never fully be achieved. To be utterly free, one would need a perfect knowledge of self and of society, past, present and future. (Mannheim, of course, held back from the thorough relativism of this view.) In Mannheim's words:

"We speak of a particular and a total conception of ideology. Under the first, we include all those utterances the 'falsity' of which is due to an intentional or unintentional, conscious, semi-conscious, or unconscious, deluding of one's self or of others, taking place on a psychological level and structurally resembling lies....Since suspicion of falsification is not included in the total conception of ideology, the use of the term 'ideology' in the sociology of knowledge has no moral or denunciatory intent. It points rather to a research interest which leads to the raising of the question when and where social structures come to express themselves in the structure of assertions, and in what sense the former concretely determine the latter."\(^{84}\)

What I am interested in here is whether the conservative understanding can be usefully seen to be a body of beliefs representative of an historically specific group, class or epoch.\(^{85}\)

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\(^{85}\) For a further discussion of this point and the whole subject of the meaning of ideology see Arne Naess, *Democracy, Ideology and Objectivity*, (Oslo: Oslo University Press, 1956).
I am also interested in the potential social effect of those beliefs. That is, I take ideology to be "the conversion of ideas into social levers." I do not believe that that conversion is commonly intentional or conscious; I am interested in effects, not intents. It is precisely un-intentionality and the limited nature of consciousness that enhances the potential for social effectiveness.

Obviously this is not the sort of intellectual realm in which one readily builds 'tight cases.' I mean to be no more than suggestive here and will leave further elaboration to historians of ideas at such time as there is sufficient distance from the events and writings at hand. I would like to show here, however, that the beliefs expressed in the conservative understanding are in part and in a sense particular to American intellectuals of the mid-twentieth century. In so doing, I want to indicate as well that understandings such as the one with which we are dealing here have a dimension which is analytically distinguishable from both the empirical and the normative-subjective dimensions and I will later (in my final chapter) take this up again, in a more general way relating such concerns to a comparative methodological analysis.

One of the most obvious dimensions of the body of research findings within which the conservative understanding has been presented and elaborated is the considerable degree to which it has been dependent on data collected in an American context. This fact has, in turn, had

several effects which I have mentioned at times above. Participation in American politics is participation in a context which is in many ways distinctive. The degree to which the less advantaged in America are inclined to participate to a relatively lesser extent is noticeably greater than is the case in most European political systems. This, in turn, can be attributed to a variety of ways in which the American political culture and American political institutions are distinctive. Most notable are perhaps the following:

(1) The relatively lower levels of class self-consciousness among Americans;  

(2) The relatively greater uniformity of levels of general satisfaction across American stratal lines;  

(3) The atypically high ethnic, racial and religious heterogeneity of the American less advantaged (in comparison to other socio-economically developed democracies);  

(4) The high absolute levels of economic prosperity in America;  

(5) The distinctive historico-cultural effects of the absence of a land-based aristocracy and the long-term availability of a relatively egalitarian frontier 'escape-valve' for social discontent;  

88 See Inkeles, op. cit.  
(6) The pragmatic, non-programmatic, brokerage nature of American politics and parties;

(7) The atypical subtlety and complexity of the distinctions between the two parties;

(8) The most unusual continuity of merely two parties;

(9) The absence of a party voting in the legislature and the regional nature of political party structure;\(^90\)

(10) The historic absence of a major party which self-consciously attempted to mobilize the less advantaged (and the rapid suppression of minor parties which began that attempt).\(^91\)

It becomes very difficult to understand how generalizations about democratic theory can be based on data from this one nation without at least some discussion of the above matters.

Further, for the most part, data collection took place within a particular era in the history of that particular nation. It is of course very difficult to briefly characterize the events or tone of a period in the history of nation and I will not attempt to do so in this short space. I will only mention two or three matters which might be pertinent to the kinds of inquiries with which I have been concerned here. Firstly, the period was very much dominated by the birth and rise of the Cold War. In retrospect, we can see that in many ways the late 1940s and the 1950s

\(^{90}\text{If this point needs a reference, see particularly Frank J. Sorauf, }\text{Political Parties in the American System, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1964).}\)

\(^{91}\text{See again Weinstein, }\text{op. cit.; by far the most significant was the American Socialist Party from the turn of the century until the early 1920s.}\)
in America were quite taken up with official and semi-official fears concerning ways of thinking "foreign" to "the" American way of life. Further, the period was marked by a decline in strata-related political cleavages.  

But perhaps as important as the atypicality of the context within which the data was gathered is the socio-historical context within which the data gatherers were imbedded. Virtually all of the scholars who have been cited herein as holding the part or all of the conservative understanding are American. That understanding can be seen to effectively integrate with the assertions of the pluralist nature of American politics and the welcoming of the alleged end of ideology.


93 See William E. Connolly, The Bias of Pluralism, (New York: Atherton Press, 1969) for a collection of critical articles. Further consider in this context E.E. Schattschneider's remark that: "The flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upperclass accent. Probably about 90 percent of the people cannot get into the pressure system." The veto-power within interest group liberalism (pluralism) is of little concern to the majority who are not so represented. Much of the writing of the pluralists is in part the expression of a view of the world seen through upper and upper middle class (1950s) American eyes. See The Semi-sovereign People (New York, 1960).

94 For the original statements and a variety of critiques and replies, see Chaim Waxman, The End of Ideology Debate (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1969). Lipset's remark that "the fundamental political problems of the industrial revolution have been solved," Political Man, p. 442) was made in the context of the announcement of the arrival of the end of ideology. It parallels well the assertion of the conservative understanding that low participation can be seen as a sign of contentment.
The conservative understanding was in this period not manifest merely within the study of political participation within the discipline of political science. I will offer here one striking parallel to serve as an example; there are many others readily available. The historian, Walker T.K. Nugent, writing in 1962, noted a distinct pattern in historians' attitudes towards the American populism of the late nineteenth century. For fifty years, historians had viewed with general favor, but:

"In the 1950, however, some historians and other writers concerned with the threats to American traditions they saw posed by the Cold War and by McCarthyism took another look at populism. To them it appeared to be a late nineteenth-century eruption of the same pathological condition that produced the Wisconsin senator...." (p. 3)

and later Nugent writes,

"It must have been with some dismay that a student in the 1950s who had been nurtured on this view of the Populists as an injured, honest, alert citizenry striving only for economic fair play and democratic treatment arrived in graduate school only to find that such an approach had suddenly become hopelessly out of date. As irresponsible disturbers of the peace, the Populists were in disgrace. The employment of certain behavioral science concepts was revealing that they had been neurotic, anxious, ethnocentric, anti-Semitic, and fear-ridden and that their kind of democracy was noxious since it later produced McCarthy. They had not been torchbearers of democracy but incipient fascists." (p. 5)

Nugent summarizes the large numbers of 1950's 'revisionist' studies which tended to see the Populists as 'monsters' and then spends the bulk

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of his book 'revising the revisionists' to a more balanced view of populism in Kansas. He makes a quite convincing case that on the whole the Populists were far more tolerant than the negativism of 1950's historians would have it. Political science has been far less quick to look retrospectively and critically at its own recent past. I know of no systematic study of the political science of the 1950s as it relates to the sociocultural conditions of the time. Historians are quick to delve into historiography and sociologists into the sociology of sociology; political scientists generally seem disinclined to the politics of political science. Perhaps the best contemporary historical overview of the roots of the perspective of the American intellectuals of the early Cold War era is Christopher Lasch's The Agony of the American Left. I will not present much of Lasch's analysis but invite the reader to consider the book in this context. I offer here only several of his most pertinent broad observations:

"Since the First World War, the social critic in America, deprived of the advantages of the sustained tradition of criticism that would have evolved in connection with a broad movement for radical change, tends to present his ideas 'as extremely personal judgements upon the state of society.'" (p. 46)

It is against this background which American scholars of the 1940s and 1950s in part reacted in seeking to build an empirically-based defense of America's political reality. Further, there was a justifiable reaction to the fact that:

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"...when the new left wing shattered the Socialist party and substituted for long-term efforts to revolutionize American consciousness a mystique of immediate revolution...." (p. 50)

Accompanying this mystique was an utterly unfounded faith in the American working class and it is to this blind faith that the disinclination to the democratic wholesomeness of the less advantaged can be seen as a response. It is further, of course, a response to the events of a particular era in world history of the 1930s and 1940s: particularly the rise of an at least partially popularly based Fascism, the Nazi-Soviet Pact, the horrors of Stalinism and so forth. Those who put forth the conservative understanding were part of an era in which intellectuals were party to "...a wholesale defection...from social criticism." (p. 58)

Lasch notes that:

"In the fifties...Dwight MacDonald expressed an undeniable truth when he observed that 'in terms of mass action,...our problems appear insoluble.'" (p. 59)

This characteristic of an era, especially prevalent in America, was at one and the same time manifest in the findings of empirical social scientists studying participation and manifest in their appreciation of those findings. Political scientists who asserted elements of the conservative understanding, given the limited and mixed nature of their findings, could too be seen to be suffering from a low level of political efficacy.

Some of Lasch's comments bear even more pertinently on the matters discussed in this analysis. Consider Lasch's argument that:
"...whereas the elitism of European intellectuals expressed itself in a cult of charismatic leadership, the American variety based its distrust of the masses precisely on their susceptibility to extreme political solutions; that is to the same utopianism which the Europeans attached as a vice of deluded intellectuals. Thus a neat twist of logic permitted those who opposed McCarthyism to argue that McCarthyism was itself a form of populism. This condemned it sufficiently in the eyes of a generation that tended to confuse intellectual values with the interests of intellectuals as a class..." (p. 69)

To avoid criticizing those in power in a time and place when there is no organized opposition to the established order must have considerable appeal to students of society. This is particularly true when those students 'as a class' are rising in economic benefits, power and prestige. At such a juncture, it might well be comfortable to be able to favorably distinguish oneself from the populus at large. In criticizing Sidney Hook's consistent support of a wide range of activities in the name of anticommunism of the early Cold War era Lasch observes,

"Hook's whole line of argument, with its glorification of experts and its attack on amateurs, reflected one of the dominant values of the modern intellectual -- his acute sense of himself as a professional with a vested interest in technical solutions to political problems." (p. 85)

Further,

"Only when they win acceptance for pure research do intellectuals establish themselves as masters in their own house....Moreover, the more intellectual purity identifies itself with 'value-free' investigations, the more it empties itself of political content and the easier it is for public officials to tolerate it." (p. 95)

I am not of the view that empirical research is necessarily "safe" research. However I think it is the case that the conservative
understanding of political participation was not taking place in isolation from a particular era in American intellectual history. Social science has socio-political roots and socio-political effects.

In concluding this section I would like to briefly consider one way in which political science can be ideological in the sense of being politically effective. Namely, I would like to show and illustrate the degree to which the conservative understanding is present in the basic textbooks of American political science. This presentation also serves, as I noted above, as a further illustration of the frequency with which that understanding pervades the discipline. Where the conservative understanding has declined in prevalence in association with research findings it remains common in the texts. Further, it is far more straightforwardly present in the texts than was generally the case in the more careful and qualified analysis common in presentations of research. To begin with I will look at ten more or less randomly selected texts in American government. I will deal with them in

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97 I do not mean to imply that either the roots or the effects are direct. There is no easy way to determine cause and effect in either direction. For example, to see individual characteristics of the less advantaged as the basis for their social condition and social behavior is a view integral (logically related) to an upper or middle class perspective. (It is empirically class-associated as well; see Huber and Form, op. cit. p. 101.) Political scientists one can assume to be for the most part middle or upper-middle class in origin, occupation, income and outlook. However, it does not follow that that their class position is the source of their seemingly easy acceptance of that outlook. However, only a consciousness of such a possibility can advance any approximation of unbiased research, analysis and explanation.

98 I did attempt to include those which I knew to be very widely used.
alphabetical order except for the more recently issued text by Dye and Ziegler which I will treat a bit more extensively and last.

After an initial warm-up chapter (what is government, etc.) Adrian and Press in their second chapter turn to "The American Idea of Democracy," and within a page are writing under the subheading "Classical Democratic Theory." The classical theory is summed up in two sentences one of which is from Schumpeter, and the authors then write (referring to Schumpeter's one-line summary of Rousseau):

"This description of democracy has been and still is widely accepted in America, although it is not an accurate description of how democracy works. It is based on the assumption that man is an informed political participant. (their emphasis) It accords with the deeply held beliefs of our people. Yet as we shall see, it does not serve to describe the actual phenomena that we can -- and every day do -- observe and measure in the real political world."

(p. 29)

This is the first substantive theme set out in the book -- "man" presumably the world over past, present and future is not an informed participant and we "measure" this "every day." The authors go on:

"Some Americans believe their fellow citizens should not openly question the unarticulated

99 Charles R. Adrian and Charles Press, The American Political Process, second edition, (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1968). In all cases I will use the most recent available edition; all of these books are appearing well after the post-behavioral critique of participation studies. I will excerpt from this book more extensively than most which follow in the interest of keeping this exercise relatively short. Others of the texts are as explicit as Adrian and Press.

100 Schumpeter, op. cit., is perhaps the most articulate and clear statement of conservative democratic theory available, possibly excepting Burke. His view of participation is consistent with the conservative understanding.
assumptions upon which the fundamental institutions of the society are based. Some Americans consider it presumptious, if indeed not subversive, to suggest that people do not always make political decisions on a rational basis or that the citizen does not need to hold rational and informed opinions in order to vote effectively. The authors reject this cultural impediment, for they believe that empirical observation, rather than unquestioned acceptance of such assumptions, should be the basis for the study of political science." (pp. 29-30)

Who the "some Americans" are who seek to label conservatism subversive, the authors do not say. This is as close however as the authors come to granting that a debate on this subject has occurred within the discipline.

With the three paragraphs mentioned above (two quoted) Adrian and Press have concluded the statement of "Classical Democratic Theory" and then turn to "The Limitations of Classical Theory" I will mention only the following:

"For many reasons the defenders of the classic theory of democracy relied on an unsatisfactory theory of actual political behavior, a theory that is unsatisfactory because:

1. It assumes that people are quite fully informed concerning political events and issues. In fact, however, the attentive public is small. The rational-man theory implicitly assumes that information is free....

2. The rational-man theory assumes that citizens make their choices on the basis of rational conclusions drawn from the evidence. But people often ignore even that information which is easily available, depending instead on party label, personality, or propaganda." "...." (p. 30)

The subtlety and complexity of empirical findings have little impact here; the authors' summary of Rousseau, Locke, Mill or whomever is no less than a travesty. Under f high pity the authors quot
a travesty. Under foreign policy the authors quote from Almond and they later spend a 40-page chapter with a one-sided view a few lines of which are excerpted here:

"Social scientists, historians, and journalists have been studying the voter in his native habitat for years. They have observed that he is characterized by inertia, short memory, lack of information, ambivalence, emotionalism, ethnocentrism, pluralistic views, and skepticism." (p. 242)

"The civic leader, the well-educated citizen, the editor, the person who makes politics an avocation -- opinion leaders and members of what have been called the "attentive publics" -- can be considered a reasonable approximation of the informed, rational, man who is pictured as the typical citizen in the ideal model of democracy." (p. 244)

"Both political and non-political leaders in democratic societies tend to have more tolerant personalities than do non-leaders. It is likely that persons with highly authoritarian personalities cannot succeed as leaders in American groups...." (p. 269)

"There are fewer authoritarian personalities among the middle and upper ranges of the middle class than among the lower middle class and the working class." (p. 269)

"Nonleaders who are psychologically deviant are often apolitical non-participants, though they may take out some of their frustrations in rioting or picketing on behalf of unpopular causes." (p. 277)

"The problems of democracy can be overcome -- and in the past have been overcome -- by the assumption of responsible leadership by public officeholders...." (p. 278)

Politics and Voters ("adapted to serve the needs of introductory courses in American government and political science"), stresses

101 Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy, op. cit., the authors' excerpt a negative view of ordinary citizens foreign policy views.
the actuality and desirability of the non-mandate character of American elections (they "sustain our political system" (p. 54)). Further, "... no one can say with any confidence that the election of Lyndon Johnson in 1964 was a popular mandate either for or against, say, Federal support of school teachers' salaries or increased military involvement in Viet Nam." (p. 55, emphasis added.) Vietnam notwithstanding, they in the next paragraph proceed to offer as a 'threatening contrary' the situation whereby "In some nations politics is likely a matter of life and death...." (p. 55) Much to the contrary of that unpleasant situation, American elections are taken to be "...a time to reaffirm loyalty in the faith of one's fathers." (Continuing, "few Americans feel their personal life will be substantially altered by the outcome of an election, and indeed society does seem to carry on afterward much as it did before." (emphasis added) These statements express a comfort with an apathetic and ineffective politics. In addition, interestingly, crucial issues such as Vietnam are taken to be indiscernible from such matters as Federal support of school teachers' salaries as proper matters for popular concern and decision).

Following these points Bone and Ranney offer three pages of analysis which caricature the position of Dahl and others to an extent to which the 'post-behavioral' critics could not have imagined. The analysis begins with the average citizens' shortfall with regard to the demands of classical theory and after touching all elements of the conservative understanding, ends:

"....Yet this stability never becomes ossification."
"...the voters low-pressure concern with politics impels no
election losers to start revolutions against the winners and drives
no winners to start shooting the losers. Rather the atmosphere of
limited ambiguity it creates about the meaning of elections permits
public officials and interest groups leaders to conduct the between-
elections negotiation, bargaining, and compromise that are the very
essence of American pluralism.

"It comes down to this: The typical American voter does not
constitute the only sour note to an otherwise harmonious governing
system. He is entirely in tune with the constitution, the political
parties, and all the other institutions which make our way of govern­
ment what it is.

"That way unquestionably bears only a family resemblance to the
designs and dreams of the great classical democratic theorists. Yet it
works. (Their emphasis) And, incurable pragmatists that we are, we are
not likely to want or make any change in it -- including reforming our
voting behavior -- until we think it has stopped working." (p. 58)
And, in case the point was missed the chapter then closes with one
final line:

"That time is not yet."
And, a "Review Question":

"1. How unhealthy for American democracy is the persistent low
turnout in so many elections? What if anything do you feel should be
done about it?" The sources for these remarks are footnoted presumably
without ironic intent to, among other sources, the Walker/Dahl exchange.
Burns and Peltason present a less straightforward statement of the conservative understanding than Adrian and Press, but do state:

"Even when sex, age, education and income are controlled, the chronic nonvoter more characteristically than the voter is a person with a sense of inadequacy, more inclined to accept authority, more concerned with personal and short-range issues, less sympathetic to democratic norms, and less tolerant of those who differ from himself." (p. 255)

They offer in support of this statement a reference to Lane's *Political Life* (p. 342); their summary of that reference involves considerable distortion and a bit of imagination. What they say is, simply, not what Lane said. They also summarize:

"How serious is the low rate of voting? Does it indicate that our democratic system is in danger and should we encourage perhaps even force everyone to vote? No, answer many authorities. F.G. Wilson suggests that it is not a low rate of voting that signals a danger for a democratic system, but a high rate. A pioneering Swedish student of voting behavior concluded after a survey of voting studies around the world that a high turnout warns of such intense differences among groups that the democratic system may be destroyed. A measure of nonvoting, it is argued, is a sign of widespread satisfaction, indicating that many people generally accept the status quo and have more interesting things to do than to get involved in politics." (p. 257)

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104 There are at least ten distortions all towards the conservative understanding, e.g., the acceptance of authority is not for nonvoters, but rather the hyper-disinterested, not for all groups, but for middle class college students in Wisconsin, circa 1950; and the authors omit the third of three items Lane reports as true with socio-economic variables constant (Burns and Peltason find six) that nonvoters are more likely to be dissatisfied with their communities and their occupations.
This view is elaborated a bit further with stress on the inclination of "uninformed apathetics" to authoritarianism, intolerance and demagogues. The Swedish pioneer to whom they refer is Tingsten who couched his statement far more carefully and whose statistics indicate higher than American turnout in case after case where democracy was decidedly not being threatened. As well, he said explicitly on the very pages cited by the authors that turnout in America and Britain should be considered differently in this regard. 105

Carr, Bernstein and Murphy 106 state:

"the nonvoter is usually relatively uneducated and unintelligent, and hardly disposed to tolerate coldly rational analysis or to indulge in it himself."

They go on 107 and conclude:

"The picture of the American citizen that the voting studies develop is not one that would overjoy ardent apologists for democracy; and it is a disquieting picture for those theorists who argue that stable democratic government must rest on a well-informed, highly active citizen body." (p. 208)

The rest of the texts to be considered vary to some extent on the degree to which they make an explicit statement of the conservative understanding. Those least inclined to it are those most inclined to an

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105 Tingsten, op. cit., p. 226.
107 See particularly pages 200-209; in fairness it should be noted that the authors do mention, for example, that non-voting is sometimes a function of registration procedures.
in institutional perspective; for the most part they seem unaware of empirical research, or at least do not include it. Those whose emphasis is on public policy do contain some elements but do not stress them. Redford et al. is clearly more a mix of the conservative and a more liberal understanding of non-participation though it too doubts the abilities of the general public.

Two other texts deserve a bit more attention here, the first is by Irish and Prothro who state:

"Discussions of democracy tend to overlook the functional nature of apathy for the system....We usually assume that verbal positions represent a higher level -- a more "democratic" stance -- than nonverbal behavior. But something close to the opposite may also be true: Many people who express undemocratic principles in response to questioning are too apathetic to act on these principles in concrete situations. And in most cases, fortunately for the democratic system, those with the most undemocratic principles are also those

108 I refer here particularly to John H. Ferguson and Dean E. McHenry, The American Federal Government, 9th edition, (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1967) and the classic William H. Young, Ogg & Ray's Essentials of American National Government, 10th edition, (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969). This work, which is largely an excellent exposition of the American Constitution notes, somewhat obscurely, the issues under discussion here and explicitly chooses to leave them as questions, (e.g., "Until they (nonvoters) are adequately prepared may it not do more harm than good to pry them loose from their apathy?") See pages 91 and 104.


who are least likely to act." (4th edition, pp. 78-79)

The studies which I cited above dating back to 1933 suggest that the "usual assumption" is probably more often the case. There is no granting by the authors that the more active might be as intolerant in behavior though not verbally or that activation could have a positive effect on the inactive or on the system. The authors go on to democratic hope only in the tolerance of the elite or the apathy of the mass. They go on to make quite clearly the conservative revision of democratic theory (4th edition, pp. 85-88). They offer one distinctive addition:

"...democracy does not depend upon a nation of political men (because of) the specialization and division of labor through which modern society operates: a high level of political power and knowledge are required in only a relatively few specialists. Just as we do not expect everyone to know how to make shoes...." (p. 86)

However, I cannot find these views in the 5th edition of this text, nor can I locate the following in the fourth:

"With lower-status schools de-emphasizing politics as group conflict and encouraging a passive attitude, we would expect lower-status people to participate in politics less than those of higher status. And that is precisely what happens." (p. 123)

"The lack of a socialist party with an avowedly class appeal and the general muting of class differences by the American system as a whole help further to explain the bias of the system toward more activity by those of higher status." (p. 174)

There are new or extended discussions of adult socialization, structural

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112 The reference here is to the excellent study by Edgar Litt, "Civic Education, Community Norms, and Political Indoctrination," American Sociological Review, 28 (February, 1963), pp. 69-75. Litt does a comparative analysis of the ideology of schools teaching different stratal groups.
factors and participation, and violence as a form of political participation. There has been a considerable transition in the overall tone of the text. Perhaps we are seeing the beginnings of a multiplication of perspectives on political participation reaching into the strongest bastion of the conservative understanding.

However, the same year (1971) saw the publication of a new and very clear assertion of the conservative understanding in a new text by Dye and Ziegler. The authors have written this text to "challenge the prevailing, pluralistic view of democracy in America," rather their view is, self-described, 'neo-elitist;' they accept the characterization which, for example, Walker conceded was unfair. In their preface, the authors state that they disagree, one of them

"...believes that, through radical resocialization and a restructuring of educational, economic, and governmental institutions, the anti-democratic sentiments of the masses can be changed." (p.vii)

And,

"In contrast, the other author values an enlightened leadership system capable of acting decisively to preserve individual freedom, human dignity, and the values of life, liberty, and property. He believes that a well-ordered society governed by educated and resourceful elites is preferable to the instability of mass society." (p. vii)

In many ways the book is clearly not conservative in the usual sense of the word: it is clearly critical of American foreign policy and readily accepts considerable portions of such writers as Domhoff, Wright, Mills, and Gabriel Kolko. However, its views on participation

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are quite clearly of the pattern we have located so often above. In a chapter entitled "Elites and Masses: The Shaky Foundations of Democracy," the authors make the most explicit, consistent and clear statement of the conservative understanding of participation available, for example,

"...it is important to keep in mind that although the masses may have anti-democratic attitudes, they are also inclined to avoid political activity. And those with the most dangerous attitudes are the least involved in politics." (p. 137)

"The apathy of the masses acts to counterbalance the radically conservative and potentially irrational nature of their values. It takes an unusual leader, such as George Wallace, to raise them from their apathy." (p. 139)

They include everything in defense of these kinds of conclusions and offer no balancing data, the forces of goodness, light and good upbringing are all that preserves order against what is potentially a hateful, seething mob. They make a variety of assertions which are utterly without foundation and rarely, if ever, included in other texts. One example will suffice:

"There is no doubt, for example, that the child-rearing patterns of the lower classes are substantially more authoritarian than those of the middle and upper classes." (p. 131)

The findings regarding class distribution of childrearing patterns are actually either ambiguous, inconsistent, or indicate low levels of association.\footnote{See Uriel Bronfenbrenner, "Socialization and Social Class Through Space and Time," in S.M. Lipset and R. Bendix (Eds.) Class, Status, and Power, 2nd edition, (New York: The Free Press, 1966), pp. 363-75.}

Before concluding this section, I would like to mention a few
textbooks on other than "introduction to American politics" which express elements of the conservative understanding. Most clear among the public opinion texts is that by Erikson and Luttbeg. Many American political parties texts carry the theme. Ranney and Kendall are concerned with consensus, and about the relation of intensity of popular beliefs and the survival of democracy. But Edward Banfield goes further and develops an understanding that democracy would, if carried through, necessarily destroy itself by reducing "the power available for government." This disaster would result from demands for a maximization of government by "reasonable discussion of the common good." He argues for the importance of support built by 'log rolling', deals, patronage, and even corruption to the existence of a democratic system. These forms of participation are seen as essential to democracy; other forms are seen to carry grave dangers. Power based totally on democratic popular support seems to Banfield to be worth nothing to 'democracy': "...the logical culmination of democratic reform, viz., the elimination of all undemocratic sources of power, 

115 Robert S. Erickson and Normal R. Luttbeg, American Public Opinion: Its Origins, Content and Impact, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.), 1973. See particularly chapters 1, 4, 6, 7, and 10; the concern over mass attitudes and participation is the central theme of the book, on the whole, it: at times though not generally, it tends to a liberal view similar to that of Lane.


would render government -- and therefore the preservation of society -- impossible." If leaders need at least the quantity of popularly un-checked (or unsupported?) power they now hold, one must assume that present levels of indifference are seen by Banfield to be tolerable, if not minimal. In his stressed and re-stressed assessment that unintended changes of important consequence "for, say, the family, religion of the business firm," are likely to be set in motion by changes in the party system "even a seemingly trivial one," he is in factual, though not evaluative, agreement with many Marxists.

Lastly, here there is one other study of American political parties, Greenstein's The American Party System and the American People which again uses 'voter performance' (commitment to democratic ground rules, political activism, and information levels) to discredit 'direct democracy':

"The findings reported here should not be forgotten....They afford us a notion, which will be reinforced by later portions of the discussion, of what politics may be like when a crude, direct-democracy approach to the problems of government is adopted, an approach which conceives of politics in terms of the simple transformation of public attitudes into public policy."

He then argues that participation and rationality are far lower in both party-free and multifactional politics and that it is regrettable that therein responsibility cannot be pinned down. He then concludes that

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in a stable party system, e.g., the American, voters may achieve moderate rationality and a "profound effect on government" (p. 102). The implication is that rationality and participation are higher in America than in other developed democracies, a curious view for someone so versed in the field.

Thus in a range of widely used texts, the conservative understanding remains, for the most part, a common theme, frequently presented without qualification or reservation. From often carefully conducted research flow mixed, complex and particular findings. Related to those findings are more generalized conclusions which are often quite loose and from those conclusions in turn is derived, in some texts, a point of view which is sufficiently removed from that original research to cause one to wonder if it does not, despite the claims to an empirical grounding derive from altogether different sources.

IV

We are now to a point where I believe I can begin to intelligently ask some important questions. We have seen what it is empirical research has clearly shown with regard to political participation. It has shown at the least that voter participation rarely exceeds 90% and in the United States is more commonly on the order of 60% or less. It has shown that quite consistently through time and cross-nationally the less
advantaged tend to vote less often. There are even sharper gaps in some aspects of participation which go beyond voting. Empirical research has generated enough such findings so that we might begin to isolate some of the cultural, institutional-structural and other contextual circumstances which seem to be associated with the considerable variations in that differential. It has shown that the less educated tend to know less of the specifics of the politics of the society within which they live. And it further has shown that there tends, in post-World War II America, to be some low level association between measures of social advantage and some matters associated with attitudes supportive of liberal democracy. The findings here are, however, mixed and complex. Further, the less advantaged seem to more consistently and clearly, and on a cross-national basis, to be inclined to doubt that even democratic political systems are open to their influence.

There is more than this, of course, but not nearly so much that we can begin to sustain or refute statements approaching a broad explanatory level that we might then begin to relate effectively to something which might be characterized as an understanding. It is clear, however, that there is a widespread desire among researchers to move to that level. Further, I would argue that not only should we move towards attempts at conclusions approaching that level, but that we must if our research is to be meaningful and effective. I say this because I believe that only in attempting to derive the several possible understandings which remain consistent with our empirical findings can we appreciate what we have found and how we found it. Only at the level of an articulated understanding
can we begin to connect our research to the value-relevant terms we think in which social ideologies are rooted. David Easton, some twenty years ago, wrote:

"(there is a)...close relation between analysis and observation, on the one side, and moral outlook on the other....Self-clarification (is necessary and) requires more than a simple self-questioning with regard to one's preferences.

"As anyone who has attempted seriously to elaborate his moral views will readily perceive, the attainment of moral clarity, sufficient to allow a person to affirm a particular position, can be achieved only at the end of a long process of moral inquiry. Such a process is not easily understood or learned, no more easily in fact than the canons and procedures of scientific method; and it requires the same creative insight that the discovery of causal relations demands of the most fruitful empirical research...."

And later, in conclusion,

"...the theorist cannot check the impact of his moral views on his theory unless he is thoroughly aware of the nature of those views." (p. 232)

To make any sense of what we have "found" in empirical research, we must (a) have asked theoretically grounded questions and (b) been able to make explanatory linkages in our data. To effectively perform either of those tasks requires the self-awareness that Easton speaks of. That in turn, as I hope is apparent from my discussion thus far of empirical social science and participation, requires in a very profound way a knowledge of the values which pervade one's time and place (social, cultural and geographic). I hope that I have also shown that political science

sometimes tended to be consistently weak in this regard.

Explanations in social science are always satisfying in a double sense, in terms of one's data and in terms of one's understanding of the social world. I believe that on the whole with regard to political participation the explanations presented by empirical social science have been less than they might be because we have not been very self-conscious about our understanding of our subject, about values and about the ideology which bounds our understanding. Our explanations have been weak -- but we have not been aware how weak. Not appreciating the shortcomings of what we have done to date has, in turn, restrained us from moving very quickly to adapt and redirect our methodology. All of this is stated of course in bald and general terms; hopefully, in turning to more specific matters clarity will lessen its harshness.

Can we pose research questions which improve our explanatory power regarding participation? If so, what kinds of empirical findings would bring us nearer to explanations which could be more effectively related to an understanding of the political participation of the less advantaged? And, how has the conservative understanding, in turn, tended to incline us away from such explanations?

(1) The conservative understanding has tended to guide research towards seeking explanations rooted in the differential attitudes and behavior of individuals rather than towards differentials in institutional structural contexts. 120 We have expended our energies in probing for

120 One of the best examples to date of fitting participation differentials to institutional-structural differences is the study of Black
maximal differences in attitudes and in other 'things which people carry around in their heads.' We have only very rarely, if ever, tried to systematically, for example, relate the variance in participation differentials to such factors as the presence or absence of a working class mobilizing party, the universality of media-denial of class, or relative class differentials in political education within the schools. Structural differences may be able to explain as much or more of the variance as do those things which we have looked at.

(2) The conservative understanding appreciates class differentials in quantitative or qualitative participation as only to be expected and thereby either likely invariant through time and space, or not a variance which is important to explain. We have tended not to look at the striking differences in response to different aspects or phrasings of democratic quality variables. They are crucial both to an understanding of our own methods and to an understanding of participation. Even more important perhaps, we have shied away from comparing those differentials cross-nationally and over time. (This tendency to 'expect' class differentials of course is reinforced in this regard by the tendency to seek 'individual' rather than structural explanations for these behaviors, one needn't

120 continued from previous page political participation in the American south by Matthews and Prothro (op. cit.). Their explanations, white resistance and intimidation varying curvilinearly with percentage of Blacks in the population, are far more satisfying than explanations in terms of political efficacy across stratal lines. That is, is it really very useful to find that American Blacks are more disinclined to 'civic duty' and less politically 'self-confident,' 'interested,' or 'knowledgeable'? That begs the question unless one is satisfied that one can explain differentials in behavior solely by attributes of the individuals involved. The question is begged just as much for most other less advantaged persons.
look elsewhere -- there are enough individuals here to provide a large N.

(3) We have tended to take findings of very low level stratal based differences as theoretically important in part perhaps because they were supportive of the conservative understanding. This has in turn caused a tendency to shy away from other sources of difference: e.g., variations in workplace conditions, cross-national and individual variations in class consciousness, or variations in historically specific objective and subjective class conditions (e.g., levels of racial or technological job displacement).

(4) We have been unimaginative in our 'causal arrow' applications because of a variety of assumptions. For example, we have not looked effectively enough at the impact on qualitative participation of increments in quantitative participation. Also, we have not often appreciated the possibility that actual participation is the source of feelings of efficacy.

(5) Further, we have rarely considered or investigated the possibility, the extent to which and ways in which, all developed democracies might be systematically biased against the participation of the less advantaged. We have just assumed they are 'more or less' open.

(6) We have not considered broad historical trends in participation and sought to relate them to possible sources of discouragement of participation. For example, and admittedly, empirical measures are not developed here (but which is cause and which is effect there?), could not participation be related in some way to the massiveness of social

121 We should perhaps attempt to devise means of studying the results of highly effective participation incidents on the later political activity of the participants.
decision-making? (That is, is it not possible that the kinds of things the less advantaged might want are not within the decision-making realm of elected office-holders — municipal or national, that the relevant economic units are outside their scope of their political and/or geographic control). These are particularly difficult matters to study, but if low levels of participation are natural, good, or a sign of contentedness, there is little motivation to begin to develop methods of data generation and/or analysis. Why with generally rising education, income and occupational status have participation rates declined over the past century (particularly in the U.S.)?

(7) The conservative understanding is related to an era in American history which had a tendency to reject as vague and dangerous several qualities of the social analysis of its forebearers: the spinning of overarching social theories, a perceived millenialism, and a socially critical posture. There has always, of course, been this tendency in American social thought, but it was perhaps more pronounced in an era which seemingly had to come to grips with Fascism, Stalinism, Freud and the rise of the nuclear age. In the field of political participation, research explanations which seem to be critical of any institution have been eschewed and theory has been as often assumed as based on research findings and as often accepted as debated.

(8) And lastly for the moment, though I will consider these and related matters further in my final chapter, the conservative understanding tends to disincline researchers to looking for potentialities. What complex of conditions have produced a highly politically active working class? What
characteristics are associated with highly atypical participators among the less advantaged? And, more important, what institutional-structural or historically specific contextual factors have been associated with atypically high quantitative or qualitative participation? A differing understanding might incline us to look for atypicalities in ever more subtle ways: to be more actively interested in fleeting moments, in the intricacies of attitude-behavior differences, in anomalous localities, however small. If one is comfortable with present realities, one is less concerned to seek signs or even glimmers of change.

Within the immediately preceding discussion, another important consideration emerged — or rather perhaps reappeared. Is it not the case that many of the weaknesses discussed here are related to what are usually conceded to be methodological shortcomings of empirical, or more particularly, quantitative methods? For example, sample surveys do not lend themselves to quick use, behavioralism has been characterized as that method which takes the individual as the basic unit of analysis, and behavioral research is an enterprise which focuses better on commonalities, not the historically specific. I will discuss these matters further below; at this point I must note that under some circumstances the conservative understanding and behavioral methodology can be mutually reinforcing. Generally I believe, and I hope I have shown, that this is

\[122\] However, we should recall that in section II of this chapter, we saw clearly that there is a mass of behavioral evidence which contradicts elements of the conservative understanding. The relationship then is clearly a complex one and I fear that one-sided and simple conclusions cannot be drawn.
by no means a matter of methodological inevitability. If there is, a
causal arrow can be placed primarily (I doubt causation is utterly uni-
directional except in cases like falling out of windows and broken legs)
from understanding to methodology more than vice versa. The leading
intervening variable in the case of understanding may well have been
matters largely particular to America and to the historical era 1930-
1950 wherein nearly all the founders and practitioners came of political
age.

Perhaps the best way to appreciate more fully the weaknesses and
strengths of the explanations and methods of empirical research is to
look at an understanding, which is almost diametrically opposed to the
conservative understanding of participation differentials, that of
Marxism. In so doing, we remove ourselves to a very considerable ex-
tent from the cultural place and the methodology with which we have
been dealing thus far. In so doing, as I suggested in my introduction,
perhaps we can better appreciate through contrast some things about
empirical social science, which are not so obvious in direct observation.
CHAPTER 5

I

Marxist explanations of the relative political inactivity of the less advantaged differ considerably from those of empirical social science. This is surely not surprising given the fundamental differences in approach; before we proceed we should begin to discuss a few of those differences.

One of the most obvious differences is in the units of analysis; Marxism's focus is on social systems and on groups (classes) as elements of whole systems. There is rarely, if ever, any attempt to base analysis on the measured attitudes or behavior of individuals. When the position or behavior of classes are considered that unit is conceived most often in its relation to the socio-politico-economic system as a whole rather than as the analytic composite of fundamentally separate individuals.

Another major distinguishing feature of Marxism is the emphasis on comparative historical specificity. There is a constant attempt to define the uniqueness of a particular locus in time and space rather than a greater emphasis on building up towards universal generalizations. Several universals are accepted as generally true from the outset and analysis most often seeks to apply and interpret those generalizations to and within specific historical circumstances. One of those universals accepted by all Marxists is that nothing is constant and unchanging, all things -- attitudes, ideas, concepts, structures, behaviors, institutions -- can only be understood and explained within a wider understanding of any given time, place, level of development of productive forces and structure of productive relationships. This view is not, of course,
unique to Marxism; what is distinctive is the overriding emphasis which it receives and the thoroughgoingness with which it is pursued.

The accepted universals of Marxist theory are more specific than a mere assertion of change. Change is taken to be in a given direction (towards the socialization of all means of social production). Change is taken to have one fundamental driving force (the forces -- processes, instruments, technologies -- of production). The bulk of change is taken to proceed in a given style (revolution -- rapid, thoroughgoing and relatively rare transformations of the social order). And change in each epoch is taken to have a given historical agent -- in the epoch of capitalism the agent is the industrial proletariat.\(^1\) Carrying such an elaborate set of givens\(^2\) is of course contrary to the tenets of empirical social science. Any Marxist explanation presupposes at least this much.

Several other basic differences which can and should be noted at the outset of our inquiry include the following:

1. Within a Marxist mode of analysis there can be no recourse to psychological explanations as end explanations -- all behaviors have roots which are material and social.

2. In Marxist analysis, individuals have no fundamental role in historical change -- social classes are the sole subjects of history. Individuals...
even classes) swim against the current of social forces with little effect. Their movement is significant only perhaps relative to other swimmers and never, except in the very short-term, can they even keep even with the current. Minor changes and individual behaviors are of little account; very few matters are not mere matters of detail.

(3) Marxists doubt that any science can be historically neutral; the objective of Marxist science is to advance the revolutionary transformation of the capitalist order. There must be a constant interplay between revolutionary theory and revolutionary practice. The test of political theory is in the unfolding events of the everyday political world.

There are many more differences, but I will defer them, and further consideration of those mentioned thus far here, until the final two chapters. Let us turn now to the comparison of empirical and Marxist explanations of the political inactivity of the less advantaged.

II

There is a matter which I touched on in Chapter I which should be developed a bit further here; namely the double meaning which political inactivity in a liberal democratic context carries for Marxists. For some Marxists, and particularly for many Marxist-Leninists, the working-class, to the extent that it is fully politically conscious, has a tendency to reject any and all aspects of the liberal democratic system as a sham. This
rejection is for these analysts something to be expected, something which need not be explained. What needs to be explained is in a sense the opposite form of behavior -- the absence of revolutionary consciousness, part of which is an acceptance of liberal democratic political channels. Thus, for some of the Marxists (in some contexts) what is being explained is pant is not non-participation, but the failure to reject liberal democratic participation for more active, direct conflictual forms of political activity and political consciousness.

This is something which must be kept in mind as we proceed here, but it is not, however, a serious obstacle to the comparison of Marxist explanations of the lack of political consciousness within the working class to empirical social science's explanations of the tendency among the less advantaged to participate less within the liberal democratic framework. In the first place, those who empirically studied participation and sought to explain the strata-based differentials were concerned with a wide variety of activities many of which would be common to both liberal democratic and revolutionary participation, however defined. For example, talking about politics, attempting to win others over to one's point of view, joining any party, attending any political meeting and so forth. More significant perhaps are the qualifications of the Marxist rejection of liberal democratic participation as a positive measure of political consciousness. Many Marxists would simply not accept that view; most Marxists, most of the time have, when legally allowed to do so, participated in liberal democratic electoral politics. Many do not see these activities as sufficient to those transformations of the social order which they see as necessary; but some do. In any
case, most, I think it is fair to say, see political activation as something of a continuum; political activity of whatever nature being generally seen as an advance over political inactivity. Political activity within the liberal democratic system (this includes trade unionism and extra-parliamentary participation as well as electorally-centred activities) is seen for the most part by Marxists as a means of activating workers towards a fuller political consciousness. Some Marxists would see that sum of activities as sufficient, many more would argue that extraparliamentary organization, mobilization and general political consciousness would have to be raised to a level sufficient to at least neutralize the power of the military-judicial apparatus of the state. A large number would argue that neutralization is impossible, the state is irretrievably and utterly at the service of the ruling class, and meaningful political power will only be actualized when the state apparatus is defeated in a military battle by an organized agency of the working class or, in a few cases, by the more or less spontaneous self-activity of the mass of the population. But even within this latter group of Marxist, many, perhaps most in recent years, would see involvement even in electoral politics as a strategically necessary part of the development of a mass political consciousness. Nearly all Marxists, even Marxist-Leninists, would see electoral participation as at least tactically useful in this regard.

The explanations offered by the Marxists would, for the most part then, be seen by them to apply to political activity in general of which electoral activity is a part. Some of their explanations of the disinclination to electoral activity will be put in terms of a reasoned rejection
of that activity either in general or under particular circumstances. These latter explanations are in a sense of a different order, but it will be clear in the discussion that this is the case, and one need not be a Marxist to accept them, in whole or in part, as valid explanations of behavior. Finally, whatever the basis on which a given argument is put forward, whatever its intended applications, it might, as well, be usefully applied by others to explain related behaviors. The reasons offered as explanations for a class not coming to a full Marxist-Leninist consciousness might, as well, be usefully added by others even to the explanation of the tendency of the less advantaged to vote less often and surely to any wider conception of political participation.

Many Marxists, particularly some orthodox Leninists, make only minimal attempts to explain the inactivity of the working class owing to a perspective which idiosyncratic ways resembles the conservative understanding. Lenin himself wrote,

"...without the 'dozen' tried and talented leaders (and talented men are not born by the hundred), professionally trained, schooled by long experience and working in perfect harmony, no class in modern society is capable of conducting a determined struggle.... I assert (1) that no movement can be durable without a stable organization of leaders to maintain continuity; (2) that the more widely the masses are spontaneously drawn into the struggle and form the basis of the movement and participate in it, the more necessary it is to have such an organization and the more stable it must be (for it is much easier for demagogues to sidetrack the more backward sections of the masses; (3) that the organization must consist chiefly of persons engaged in revolutionary activities as a profession."4

4V.I. Lenin, What Is to be Done?, (New York: International Publishers, 1969), p. 118 and p. 121. Lenin adds to these three factors two which (continued on following sheet)
Elsewhere in that same work, he stated quite emphatically that,

"The history of all countries shows that the working class, exclusively by its own effort, is able to develop only trade-union consciousness, i.e., the conviction that it is necessary to combine in unions, fight the employers, and strive to compel the government to pass necessary labor legislation, etc. The theory of socialism, however, grew out of the philosophic, historical, and economic theories elaborated by educated representatives of the propertied classes, by intellectuals. By their social status, the founders of modern scientific socialism, Marx and Engels, themselves belonged to the bourgeoisie intelligentsia. In the very same way, in Russia, the theoretical doctrine of Social-Democracy arose altogether independently of the spontaneous growth of the working-class movement; it arose as a natural and inevitable outcome of the development of thought among the revolutionary socialist intelligentsia." (pp. 31-2)

Socialist political consciousness comes from outside of the working class and from outside the 'spontaneous' struggle of the workers; the workers are only effectively politicized by a party organization, of a party composed of intellectuals and professional revolutionaries.

"Hence our task, the task of Social-Democracy, is to combat sponteneity, to divert the working-class' movement from this spontaneous, trade-unionist striving to come under the wing of the bourgeoisie, and to bring it under the wing of revolutionary Social-Democracy." (p. 41)

Lenin's development of the view that the workers must be lead by

4 continued from previous page — the more membership in the revolutionary party is confined to professionals the better equipped it is to deal with the police and, thereby, the greater would be the number of people from the working class who could join the movement. This is not to say that they would initiate or lead it, nor does it reduce the firmness of Lenin's view that the vanguard party is necessary under all conditions (at least all pre-1900 conditions).
others, that without revolutionary theory (and a vanguard party) there could be no revolutionary movement, was met by sharp replies from other Marxist revolutionaries. There are many Marxists who are not also social democrats who would reject the use of a vanguard party, and many others who would reject it under most conditions or accept it only in non-Leninist forms. I do not wish to devote much space to this reply to Lenin, but I do not want to leave untouched the commonly held view that Lenin's 'conservatism' on this question was or is universal among revolutionary Marxists. Rosa Luxemburg in her Leninism or Marxism? (1904) wrote:

"The activity of the party organization, the growth of the proletarian's awareness of the objectives of the struggle and the struggle itself, are not difficult things separated chronologically and mechanically. They are only different aspects of the same process. Except for the general principles of the struggle, there do not exist for the Social Democracy detailed sets of tactics which a Central Committee can teach the party membership in the same way as troops are instructed in their training camps....

"For this reason Social Democratic centralism cannot be based on the mechanical subordination of the party membership to the leading party center."

(p. 88)

Further,

"The indispensable conditions for the realization of Social-Democratic centralism are: 1. The existence of a large contingent of workers educated in the political struggle. 2. The possibility for the workers to develop their own political activity through direct influence on public life, in a party press, and public congresses, etc." (p. 89)

For Luxemburg the working class is fully capable of making its own

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revolution and further any revolution made in its name by some separate entity is a fundamentally false transformation. She concludes,

"...The working class demands the right to make its mistakes and learn in the dialectic of history."

"Let us speak plainly. Historically, the errors committed by a truly revolutionary movement are infinitely more fruitful than the infallibility of the cleverest Central Committee." (p. 108)

Luxemburg also critiqued the Russian Revolution on largely the same grounds and throughout warned that Leninism was something historically particular to the authoritarian and underdeveloped conditions of Tsarist Russia not, as Lenin would have it, a set of general principles. Other well-known Marxists offered similar critiques of Lenin's view and argued strenuously that power in the transition from capitalism to socialism must remain in the hands of the workers themselves and not be displaced or coopted into the hands of a revolutionary party or the state. Most notable among these other critics were Anton Pannekoek, Karl Korsch, and Hermann Gorter.

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6 See the first half of the joint publication, op. cit., the pamphlet The Russian Revolution, written in 1918.
7 See particularly Anton Pannekoek, Workers Councils, (Cambridge, Mass.: Root and Branch, 1970). Therein Pannekoek in rebuttal to Lenin states: "The insight needed cannot be obtained as instruction of an ignorant mass by learned teachers, possessors of science...It can only be acquired by self-education, strenuous self-activity." (p. 99) Also quoted by Stanley Aronowitz in "Left-Wing Communism: The Reply to Lenin," in Dick Howard and Karl E. Klare (Eds.), The Unknown Dimensions (New York, Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1972). Aronowitz further reports that, "Pannekoek warned against the 'one-sided teaching of doctrines,' that 'can only serve to breed obedient followers,'" (p. 177)
A parallel to Lenin's view that working class inactivity (low level of consciousness) was something to be expected is the view of many Chinese Communists in power. In a widely promoted pamphlet by Lin Piao is the following statement:

"Taking the entire globe, if North America and Western Europe can be called 'the cities of the world', then Asia, Africa and Latin America constitute 'the rural areas of the world.' Since World War II, the proletarian revolutionary movement has for various reasons been temporarily held back in the North American and West European capitalist countries, while the people's revolutionary movement in Asia, Africa and Latin America has been growing vigorously. In a sense, the contemporary world revolution also presents a picture of the encirclement of cities by rural areas. In the final analysis, the whole cause of world revolution hinges on the revolutionary struggles of the Asian (etc.) peoples who make up the overwhelming majority of the world's population." (p. 49)

His explanation of the inactivity of the Western working class goes no further than the assertion that there exist "various reasons" for this behavior. This failure to offer explanations for working class quietude is common among Marxists in power who seem to have a considerable inability to understand the internal politics of the nations of the developed West. This seeming reluctance is not however the case among the Marxists in the developed West, particularly those not following an orthodox line or the discipline of an orthodox party. For them the quietude within advanced capitalism is the basic question and in their works are found the best Marxist explanations of the inactivity of the less advantaged.


11 It can, of course, be argued that much of what is discussed here is a necessary concomitant of all industrial societies. Certainly that is (continued on following sheet)
I have placed the explanations which they put forth under thirteen headings; within the material grouped under each heading there is often considerable overlap with other headings, most of these arguments are closely interrelated and mutually supportive. Many of the elements of explanation discussed here are also a part of non-Marxist explanations; however, only within Marxism are they primary factors. In some cases I have included here some discussion of questions which might be pursued in empirical study; these threads will come together a bit more when I develop the question of the possibility of empirically studying Marxist explanations in the next chapter.

Finally, before proceeding, I should add that some of the explanations here were presented in contexts of other, varyingly relevant, questions, than the question to which I relate them. In effect, some of the explanations I have adapted to the question at hand. In effect, what we in part have then is how Marxism or how a Marxist might explain the inactivity of the less advantaged. In most cases these explanations actually were offered directly to our question. In those few cases where I have developed themes which were not in their original statement directed to precisely this question, it should be clear to the careful reader.

III

The first element in a Marxist explanation of the tendency to a lower level of working class political consciousness or activity than might be hoped for or expected lies in the conditions of work in advanced capitalist society. Marxists, and André Gorz in particular, have a good grasp of the destructiveness to human potential of manual work in contemporary industrial society. He has an empathy not evidenced by even the most "liberal" explanations of non-Marxists (e.g., Robert Lane who considers it important that the working class does not in fact work longer hours than many sectors of the middle class, but does not ask what was done in those hours). Gorz argues that workers are stunted in both knowledge and responsibility. It is not a question of sweat-shop exhaustion (though one should consider too the vast number of women workers in hospitals, laundries, and clothing manufacturing factories who then go home to children and housework) it is more a matter of boredom, of crushed curiosity, of no work-related need or possibility of growth, of learning, or of development of self-image. Gorz makes a further case -- with only isolated documentation -- that management is fully aware that it is crucial to avoid a worker's developing "...skills superior to those which his specialized job requires."

Gorz suggests that there may be some tendency to working class authoritarianism but sees it as derivative from the "despotic, authoritarian society with a military discipline" which "persists behind the gates of

Page references here are to Strategy for Labour, op. cit.
factories." (p. 35) Clearly, there is a broad area for research here into the relationship of workplace situation and political attitudes and participation. 

Empirical social science has devoted too little attention to the political structure of the workplace and the character of the factory as a socializing experience.

Gorz relates the absence of fulfillment in the work situation, the absence of workers control over what is produced and how, and the absence of tolerable work style to wage demands:

"Wage demands are more often motivated by a revolt against the workers' condition itself than by a revolt against the rate of economic exploitation of labor power. These demands translate the desire to be paid as much as possible for time being lost, the life being wasted...." (p. 37)

It is less, he argues, that workers are entranced by money and what it can buy than that they are institutionally unable to ask for anything else:


One additional exception is William R. Torbert's recent Being for the Most Part Puppets (Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman Publishing Company, 1973) which relates to some extent job structure, leisure pursuits and political activity. He finds a statistically significant relationship between job structure and political activity. The study can be taken to be suggestive of a range of questions to be pursued. One of the lacks in the study is that there is no attempt to determine the effects of any negative aspects which might have been common to all the workplace situations studied.
management is far less reluctant to offer sizeable wage and benefits offers than they are to concede any ground on 'management prerogatives,' the structure of the workplace; or decision-making. This makes unions and workers less inclined to push such matters in the bargaining process. Union leaders often as well see such demands as a potential role-threat, either because they might feel ill-equipped to deal with such unfamiliar matters or because workplace democracy might weaken their distinctive position. All of this deserves to be pursued further — especially where experiments are being tried. Over the longer term, we should try to observe the effects of distinctive workplace arrangements on political attitudes and participation.

There are many other Marxists who treat workplace conditions and their political effects in a manner similar to that of Gorz. But to avoid repetition here, I prefer to look briefly at an unusual, interesting and suggestive study — not, in any sense, Marxist in methodology, though Marxist in conception and publication. The study is a series of 40 personal accounts of work and its meaning, written by workers in 40 different jobs, edited by Ronald Fraser.\(^\text{14}\) In his introduction, Fraser quotes Marx making a point developed later by Gorz:

"The worker feels himself at home only outside his work and feels absent from himself in his work. He feels at home when he is not working, and not at home when he is working. His work is not freely consented to, but is a constrained, forced labour. Work is thus not a satisfaction of a need, but only a means to satisfy needs outside work." (p. 8, volume 1)

Fraser stresses in his introduction his view that there is a pointed

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silence in the everyday world about the meaning of work in people's lives.

"We spend the greater part of our lives working, yet rarely find time to think what our jobs mean to us. The repression is curious, as though a vital sector of our lives were incommunicable, or perhaps not worth communicating." (p. 7)

An advanced political consciousness in the Marxist sense requires that people think politically in relation to their work and their social position as determined by that work. But perhaps it is the case that Marx's understanding of the working class' appreciation of the negativity of work did not proceed far enough -- perhaps was not sufficiently psychological -- he underestimated the capacity of human beings to repress, even the major part of their lives. Work and the effects of work on one's life may only be rarely thought about, especially in socio-political terms. Shorter work weeks make this all the easier. That which is rarely faced, is repressed, unconsidered, only barely within one's consciousness and is thereby something which is only marginally accessible to ordinary empirical procedures.

Most of the accounts of work are tales of boredom, indifference to daily risk to health (e.g., coal mining), powerlessness, utter lack of control of every minute of one's day, and, to be sure, occasional satisfactions and personal relationships on the job. Consistent too is an unarticulated feeling of a desire to have some influence over what it is one makes, how well it is made, who can use it and the processes by which it is made. There is no description of how the authors of each account were chosen, likely they are among the more articulate on these issues; it would be worth following up several of the points made by each in interviews with a random sample of persons in the same occupation. (It could
be effective to elicit responses to the points made by these authors.)

The work experience of most people is clearly not supportive of participatory, or for that matter, even hopeful attitudes. Tedium is exhausting and stultifying; forty or more hours of it in a week — especially when it is a seeming certainty that it will last for one's whole life — is not easy to face. Organizations which promise incremental economic changes, but which remind one of one's class and one's life, are not always eagerly accepted.

A second element of Marxist explanation is intimately related to the first and has already been alluded to in one excerpt from Gorz. This is the tendency of workers to focus on the paycheck, on consumption as the meaning in their lives, as what is important. Work has no meaning in itself and is not something to be often thought about, or thus, reflected on in a politically relevant way. One's life begins at punching out time and one's satisfactions are not in the hope of meaningful labour, but in goods. Gorz offers further consideration of a consumption-centered social order and its effect on political activity:

"...monopoly capitalism can play on the passive and individual needs of consumption, can propose ever more complicated and sophisticated modes of satisfaction, develop the need to escape, sell the means of forgetting, of distracting oneself from the pressures of industrial organization, means of dreaming that one is human -- because there is no chance of actually becoming such -- by the acquisition of prefabricated symbols of humanity."

(p. 72)

Perhaps an empirical study of snowmobile ownership and political participation should be done.

Gorz goes on to say:
"...it is practically impossible for organs of information and education to fight against commercial propaganda so long, at least, as they address a dispersed and atomized public...collective needs cannot be substantially defined except collectively."
(p. 95).

Many workers go through their workplace lives with their minds elsewhere and in their non-work lives are privatized to the extent that they are primarily attuned to the extra-familial social order by means of commercial media. Collective needs cannot be 'sold,' as Gorz sees it, to isolated individuals -- working-class solidarity jingles do not produce street marches or general strikes. Marx could not have imagined the passivity of mid-twentieth century consumer-oriented existence, nor how readily a highly developed productive system can occupy endless hours of worker time at minuscule cost.

In effect, under this heading we have already three explanations of why political consciousness is lower than might be expected (1) the character of contemporary commercial propaganda and the impossibility (or at least great difficulty) of communicating collective needs in a similar or, given the habits, it establishes, effectively competing manner; (2) the ready availability and general development of the means of forgetting; and (3) the saturation of individual lives with those individual messages and individual-centered goods to the necessary exclusion of collective activities, collective wants and collective goods.

Other Marxist authors \(^{15}\) have seen capitalism as fundamentally a

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\(^{15}\) The article to which I refer directly here is Dave Gilbert, Bob Gottlieb and Susan Sutheim, "Consumption: Domestic Capitalism," in Massimo Teodori, (Ed.), The New Left: A Documentary History (Indianapolis: The...
system which channels basic human needs into commodity form. Recent writers have argued that this is in turn related to the simultaneous rise in discretionary income and the rise in the proportion of fixed to flexible costs. That is, under capitalism investment is a fixed cost and workers are a flexible cost, they can be laid off. Any consumer income above that needed to meet basic needs must be spent and to assure return, on investment means must increasingly be found to assure that it is spent. That is

"the basis for creating and manipulating consumer needs in using and redirecting real human needs, associating them with a given commodity. Thus the needs for sex, love, personal identity and creativity ...are used to sell products become an alien power outside himself; at the same time, his own (socially formed) inner needs are turned against him, to make him desire those same alien products.

"The logical extension of this process is man-defined and delimited by the commodities outside himself. Man becomes defined by what he has, not what he does...."

(pp. 430-31)

The roots of consumer fetishism run deep. Political quietude is based not so much on comfort as on the substitution of material goods for felt basic needs. Discomfort with boredom, powerlessness and so forth which might result in collective demands are displaced by the promise of incremental access to material goods. More thoroughgoing, general changes only rarely come to mind when the culture, the everyday reality of working people, is displaced by the "material goods" scene.

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The argument, of course, derives in part from Marx and his claim that capitalism converts all values to market values. Gilbert, Gottlieb and Sutheim in their article go on to suggest that there is revolutionary potential in the developments which they discuss. I believe that that part of their argument is generally unconvincing, although developments as broad as we are discussing can well have some effects which advance and some effects which retard political activation.
people is absorbed by material commodities and their glorification.  

The third element in a Marxist explanation is so commonplace and well-known in North America that I will not develop it greatly here. It is made up of a large body of research — often overstated or associated with mechanistic causation models — which attempts to demonstrate that the dominant culture of capitalist society is bourgeois culture and that the ideological apparatus of that society is controlled by the bourgeoisie. During the 1960s, it is likely the case that every major university in North America had the corporate connections of its Board of Governors 'laid bare.' The economic dependency of media on large corporate advertisers has been shown, as has the class make-up of local school-boards. Also discussed have been the structure of the publishing industry, including the recent take-overs of many major book publishers and producers of education materials by massive international corporations, e.g., Random House by the Radio Corporation of America, the massive impact of upper-class controlled major foundations on social research and social action, and even the monied support of Protestant fundamentalism. All of this gives somewhat tangible flesh to Marx's assertion that everywhere in every epoch the dominant ideology is the ideology of the ruling class. All of this research does not, of course, in itself prove the assertion of control or bias; owner-

16 For a further Marxist discussion of the extent and significance of advertising, market research, and so forth, see Baran and Sweezy, op. cit., pp. 112-141. This chapter is entitled "The Absorption of Surplus: The Sales Effort," and in it Baran and Sweezy make the point that it is not only the effect of these activities which are necessary to support the economic system, but given their sheer size, these activities in themselves go a considerable way towards absorbing surplus value. (The term 'surplus value' will be defined shortly below.)
ship or ultimate legal control are not the sole determinants of content. Random House seems to have published more Left authors since the takeover by R.C.A. than before (they sell well), and most of the investigators of Boards of Governors were students or faculty in those same universities. On the other hand; proof that a culture is not monolithic is not a demonstration that a relatively small group is not predominant.

Curiously, in a sense it is only relatively recently that Marxists have come to see ideology as the primary field in which at least the initial political battles within a capitalist order must be fought. Many Marxists have been prone to either the view that ideology followed class position in a mechanical way (proletarians are automatically predisposed to Marxism), or, secondly, the view that when a working class is 'bought off' one merely need wait for the impending economic collapse or, lastly, the need to leave advanced consciousness to the vanguard party. These views are increasingly unacceptable more recently. Gramsci and Lukács were among the most influential in moving Marxism towards a stress on the importance of the achievement of class consciousness. Gorz states clearly,

"The cultural battle for a new conception of man, of life, education, work, and civilization, is the precondition for the success of all battles for socialism because it establishes their meaning." (p. 132)

Marxists, I believe, are more frequently coming to the view that the

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economic base is not the sole determinant of social change; the cultural superstructure can have considerable weight in slowing or in making possible the social transformation which they expect. The cultural power of the advantaged is a powerful force in the dampening of class consciousness; the mass nature of modern media and their ever more narrow control can only tend to enhance this effect.

In considering this point, I will excerpt some brief sections from Ralph Miliband's *The State in Capitalist Society* which deal with the role of the media, especially newspapers, in advanced capitalist societies.

"The ideological function of the media is obscured by many features of cultural life in these systems, for instance the absence of state dictation, the existence of debate and controversy, the fact that conservatism is not a tight body of thought and that its looseness makes possible variations and divergencies within its framework, and much else as well. But obscured though it may be, the fact remains that the mass media in advanced capitalist societies are mainly intended to perform a highly 'functional' role; they too are both the expression of a system of domination, and a means of reinforcing it.

"But whatever their endless differences of every kind, most newspapers in the capitalist world have one crucial characteristic in common, namely their strong, often their passionate hostility to anything further to the Left than the milder forms of social-democracy, and quite commonly to these milder forms as well....

"At the core of the commitment lies a general acceptance of prevailing modes of thought concerning the economic and social order and a specific acceptance of the capitalist system, even though sometimes qualified as natural and desirable." (p. 221)

Miliband does not say that these media are on all matters monolithic in outlook, he is very careful to say:

"As has also been stressed repeatedly in preceding chapters, this profoundly conformist outlook admits of
But what he does assert is that on several broad matters they are strikingly solidaristic in outlook. In my view, the most politically significant of these solidarities is the following:

"Similarly, and consistently, the press for the most part has always been a deeply committed anti-trade union force. Not, it should be said, that newspapers in general oppose trade unions as such. Not at all. They only oppose trade unions, in the all too familiar jargon, which, in disregard of the country's welfare and of their members' own interests, greedily and irresponsibly seek to achieve short-term gains which are blindly self-defeating. In other words, newspapers love trade unions so long as they do badly the job for which they exist. Like governments and employers, newspapers profoundly deplore strikes, and the larger the strike the greater the hostility: woe to trade union leaders who encourage or fail to prevent such manifestly unsocial, irresponsible and obsolete forms of behaviour. The rights and wrongs of any dispute are of minor consequence; what counts is the community, the consumer, the public, which must be protected, whatever the cost, against the actions of men who blindly obey the summons of misguided and, most likely, evil-intentioned leaders."

(p. 222)

It would be very interesting to do a content analysis of press response to trade union actions; I believe that such an analysis would sustain Miliband's assertion. Thence, well sometimes, reinforce solidarity among organized workers, but as in most advanced nations, this occurs for only a decided minority of the working class. The political effect over the long-term and in general must be divisive of class consciousness. The effects of this divisiveness undoubtedly must spill over into the more general political effectiveness of the less advantaged.

But to many Marxists ideological dominance or even hegemony is less
decisive an inhibitor of class consciousness and political activation than is the repressive potential of the state. The courts, the police, the military and the bureaucracy are not seen to be neutral in class or political struggles. As Miliband puts it:

"...they (Marx and Engels) never departed from the view that in capitalist society the state was above all the coercive instrument of a ruling class, itself defined in terms of ownership and control of the means of production." (p. 5)

However, Miliband notes that this is the general view but that "Marx...never attempted a systematic study of the state." (p. 5) Miliband concurs in this view but develops a quite subtle and complex contemporary analysis of the role of the state. As he puts it most generally:

"In order to meet (increased pressure), the state then exercises a second option (the first being mild reform), namely repression; or rather, reform and repression are tried simultaneously. These are not alternative options but complementary ones. However, as reform reveals itself incapable of subduing pressure and protest, so does the emphasis shift towards repression, coercion, police power, law and order, the struggle against subversion, etc. Faced as they are with intractable problems, those who control the levers of power find it increasingly necessary further to erode those features of 'bourgeois democracy' through which popular pressure is exercised. The power of representative institutions must be further reduced and the executive more effectively insulated against them. The independence of trade unions must be whittled away, and trade union rights, notably the right to strike, must be further surrounded by new and more stringent inhibitions. The state must arm itself with more extensive and more efficient means of repression, seek to define more stringently the area of 'legitimate' dissent and opposition, and strike fear in those who seek to go beyond it." (pp. 271-72)

I discussed earlier the timely and effective repression of the American Socialist Party which included denial of postal mailing privileges, deportations of activists and denial of seats to legitimately elected
legislators, both state and national. Miliband also discusses the political attitudes of the upper-levels civil service in France, England and America and especially the political character of the military officers corps. Miliband feels is becoming more pronounced as the state expands its activist role:

"This interchangeability between government service of one kind or another and business is particularly characteristic of the new breed of 'technocrats' who have been spawned by the economic interventionism of the 'neo-capitalist' state, and who wield considerable influence and power in a variety of departments, planning organizations, regulatory boards, financial and credit institutions, nationalized industries and services; and it also applies to the even newer breed of international 'technocrats' who man the supranational institutions which have come into being as a result of the internationalization of advanced capitalism."

(p. 125)

This interchangeability was, of course, also demonstrated by C. Wright Mills in *The Power Elite*. In itself, this demonstration should not be taken to be a demonstration of the existence of a unified elite. But coupling this with the Outbursts of Political Repression in the Interests of the Status Quo, with some general knowledge that such repression could bespeak forms which utterly destroy liberal democracy, must have some dampening effect on a political activism of a radical character.

The effects need not often be direct. The most important aspects, as Miliband points out, may be "the role of the state in (the) process of political socialization."

He does not, however, elaborate how indirectly

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this process might operate. How many political activists elsewhere learned a lesson of hopelessness from the events in Chile? How many 'realists' in the working-class leadership of other countries will now be more likely to 'take it slowly' if in power? How many anticipate foot-dragging in the upper civil service? How often has this 'anticipation' split the unity of the disadvantaged? How many has this driven to the conclusion that all politics and all politicians are essentially the same? Even if it is not the case, as many or most Marxists would have it, that ultimately the state will side with the ruling class in every case, the fact that it clearly has in some cannot be utterly without socializing effects.

The tendency to uniformity and solidarity among and in support of established powers stands in sharp contrast to a fifth element of explanation of inactivity of the disadvantaged offered by Marxism. This element is the many forms of division within the ranks of the disadvantaged. Gorz points out that only as a collective entity -- a cohesive group of community -- one bent on winning the right of self-government, could the disadvantaged act effectively in such an effort. They have not done so, he argues, because

"The poor of affluent societies are not ordinarily representative of their class. Social origin, education, race, age, geography, etcetera divide them."

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20 Again Miliband does not see uniformity as monolithic:

"For indoctrination to occur it is not necessary that there should be monopolistic control and the prohibition of opposition: it is only necessary that ideological competition should be so unequal as to give a crushing advantage to one side against the other. And this is precisely the position which obtains in advanced capitalist societies." (p. 182)
They are in no condition to organize themselves into cohesive groups. But less poor sectors of the population can organize -- all those who work manually or intellectually as actual or potential groups in the factories, offices, or universities." (p. ix)

Michael Harrington, not a Marxist, effectively demonstrated that the one-third of Americans who are the least well-off are precisely those who are the most divided. They are divided into groups: including the aged, women workers, ethnic minorities, and those living in pockets of rural, isolated poverty. These groups are known in new-left jargon as the 'underclass'. They often are unable to contact each other or even to know how common their condition is to others within their group. Given this fact, it is easy for them to perceive general social problems as personal problems: to doubt their individual abilities, to see their conditions in terms of past personal errors. But not only are they separated within each group, but the groups are separated -- their problems are not seen as problems common to all of them and related, as Marxists would see it, to the inability of the capitalist system to fully utilize human potential, to allow the maximization of surplus value extraction. Further all these elements have been for the most part cut off from the organized working class.

It is these groups -- the poor -- that are the least politically active. Even in the United States, trade union members are more likely to participate politically than are non-trade union members; they are far more inclined to involvement than almost all of the poor (the only exception might be the recent tendency of some Blacks to be highly active

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21 Michael Harrington, The Other America (Baltimore; Penguin Books, 1962)
in some circumstances). This very large minority is separated from that
group with which in combination it might stand as a majority. And what
in turn are the particular circumstances of that group?

An important factor in the understanding of the manual working
class can be taken from what in Baran and Sweezy is a passing comment:

The answer of traditional Marxian orthodoxy -- that
the industrial proletariat must eventually rise in
revolution against its capitalist oppressors -- no
longer carries conviction. Industrial workers are
a diminishing minority of the American working-class,
and their organized cores in the basic industries
have to a large extent been integrated into the sys­
tem as consumers....They are not, as they were in
Marx's day, the system's special victims, though they
suffer...more than some, less than others. (emphasis
mine, p. 363)

The first underlined portion is of greatest concern here. Industrial
workers as a group are in numerical decline in America (and much of
Western Europe) -- are they not then as a group historically unique in a
significant way? Their class position is threatened by modernity as it
never has been before: for a time, more machines had meant more jobs
which workers were capable of doing, even if a particular job or plant or
industry might have been threatened. This is no longer the case. What
are the political effects of this change? That the kind of work a manual
worker did was once the basis for our technological society gives precious
little psychic support to a worker whose job today only exists because he
is willing to work for marginally less than the cost of that mechanical
replacement which is already in use in higher-wage areas. That his son
might go to university is only satisfying in one sense, it is in another
a reminder of his obsolescence. Not voting could be in part an act of
defiance (as, in part, is the rejection of school bonds referend a- as
numerous studies have shown.\textsuperscript{22} In some cases it could be a complaint with all slickness, modernity, and progress. This explanation is historically conditioned and is particularly true, we might expect, for America in the past twenty years. (And that is the locus of the overwhelming bulk of empirical participation studies.) Perhaps the explanation of working class apathy lies only in small parts in such things as "lack of education," and "apathy," and in some sense too in real articulate realization by workers of the historically specific position of the manual worker in contemporary America. Such things are easily confused; lack of individual self-confidence might have similar historically social roots and might be seen as another reflection of class condition.

And this condition of easy replacement might have, in turn, impact on the unity of organized manual workers with the several groups composing the "poor." A class under siege, whose individual existences are threatened by machine replacement are likely to be easily divided from other groups seeking to enter their declining ranks: foreign workers (in Europe), minority-group members, women, and the displaced rural poor. Further, an individual who might see himself as capable of less than a machine is not

going to be confident about his ability to enter political competition with those who build or own machines. And those who can imagine themselves as in any way above that condition will be unlikely to feel a solidarity with those within or below it. The less advantaged are a disparate and socially divided group, those divisions are an ongoing pressure against class consciousness and political activation.

The sixth element in a Marxist explanation of lack of political consciousness is really an extension of the fifth; it was alluded to in the above paragraph. It is contained in the many discussions (and versions) of the distinction between the old and the new working class. For some the 'new working class' are white collar workers whose work is becoming ever more routinized, ever more mass in setting, and ever more dead-ended in terms of social mobility. They point to the rapid growth and militance of white collar unions as revitalizing labour ranks. There is much evidence in support of this view and it would be interesting to study what changes occur in political consciousness or political activity in any such groups which moved towards the ranks of labour or increased in militance. However, to whatever extent this tendency to proletarianization and politicization of white collar sectors may be beginning, this process has not generally proceeded very far (e.g., see unionization as a percentage of white collar employment). A brief set of explanations for low political involvement of the less advantaged could flow from what has to date been, from a Marxian point of view, a false division of the working class. The manual working class has been isolated by the extensions of the trivial symbols of management power (dress, hours, absence of physically exhausting work, air conditioning, papers, pencils, words, forms,
etc.) to a large group of workers. Consciousness of the manual workers lagged as they were kept as a minority by the lack of consciousness of low-level white-collar workers, who seemed for many years hopelessly quiescent. Clerical workers in banks and insurance companies, etc. suffered wages barely, if at all, above the legal minimum wage, and worked under rigid authority seemingly without complaint. (This is especially true in North America where, generally, those who mutter union are still summarily dismissed). Hence an individual condition which might be in decline, both manual and white collar workers could be pressured towards lesser political consciousness. The former from the discouragement of seemingly permanent minority status, the latter from cross-pressures of status and income.

But there is another, more complex, definition and analysis associated with the term 'new working class.' Serge Mallet and Alain Touraine speak of three phases in the character of industrial development within each of which is a different working class. The first phase is that of small capitalist enterprises — wherein workers know a whole trade, are paid pièce-rate — are artisans except that they no longer own either their tools or their products. Political consciousness came fairly easily under such conditions — the workers all understood the operations of the section of industry within which they worked. This was an age of syndicalism which has largely passed. The second phase has been dominant in the developed world for much of this century: this is mass assembly-

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line industry. Each worker learns the use of "one machine, which does part of one job in one specific branch of one given industry."25 This is Marx's classic proletariat which will politicize because of the mass and hyperequalitarian nature of its work situation. However, while that was true it was also true that the assembly line was deadening — the pride of accomplishment and sureness of ability of the earlier era was gone. The majority of manual workers are in most places still of this character — they are trade-union organized, they tend to orient toward the parliamentary political process rather than the workplace, and their union movement tends to be bureaucratized and distant from the rank and file. The 'new working class' is characteristic of a third phase of industrial development: automation. Workers tend to be highly trained, the machinery complex and changing; the workers' tasks are adjustment and repair, and the work often variable. Most such workers need post-secondary 'junior college' training; and Mallet includes engineers and others in this category. Mallet argues that this group is characterized by company-wide rather than trade unions and that this will produce a less bureaucratic unionism and a far greater concern with all aspects of the particular corporation. This combined with the greater overview of such workers, and their ability to see themselves as, within a small group, actually running the industrial process, will tend to produce renewed and extended direct demands for control of the industrial process. This, in turn, could have a complex effect on participation:

25 Howard in Klare and Howard, p. 394.
"The absenteeism of the citizens which today is deplored by all those democratic bleeding hearts (bonnes consciences démocratiques) is compensated by the development of a spirit of responsibility in socio-economic organizations. This is probably the most interesting aspect, and that having the most important consequences, in the evolution of Company Unionism. It leads us, in effect, to revise fundamentally the entirety of our political habits and our conception of the exercise of democracy."26

One need not accept the implicit hypothesis that greater direct demands for power in the industrial process inhibit the more orthodox political forms of participation to see some relevance for participation in the analytic breakdown of the working class over time (the evolutionary nature of working class consciousness). There is no certainty of what the political effects of these three phases are, that is something which could be studied empirically. Also we should remember (recalling Trotsky's concept of combined and developed and applying it here) that at this time all three phases now exist simultaneously within developed economies and this could well be a source of division within the working class.
For example, does the pre-political character of craft unions promote a cross-pressure or a lessened class consciousness? Is the so-called new working class more militant and active? Or does it merely see itself as an upward-mobile elite, thereby feeling cross-pressured? does the new working class have a greater overview of the industrial process, does it feel more able to manage industry, is it less inclined to ordinary politics?
Finally, here there is another matter commonly related to this discussion: the increasing dependence of advanced capitalism on non-

26 Howard, op. cit., at p. 399 quoting Mallet, op. cit., p. 245.
productive workers. As Howard, discussing Mallet, puts it:

"...because of the increasing investment in constant capital (plant, equipment, and the like) and the decreasing investment in variable capital (labor-power), capitalism will necessarily have to cut its circulation (distribution) costs in order to increase its profit while at the same time, and for the same reasons, capitalism also will have to produce more and more goods in order to pay for its continued expansion, and it will, therefore, need an ever larger force of nonproductive laborers whose only task is distribution." (Klare and Howard, p. 392)

This large and growing sector of the work-force is in a peculiar position vis-à-vis the rest of the working class. Gilbert, Gottlieb and Sutheim in discussing sales, advertising, accounting and clerical workers state:

"The question of consciousness here is blurred by ambiguous class position (class based on the relation to the means of production). These workers sell their labor power on the market, yet do not directly create value. Essentially, their function is to help the capitalists appropriate surplus value (realize profits)." (Teodori, p. 434)

This is a further form of division within the ranks of wage earners and further relegates manual workers or the poor into a minority position. Whether the greater industrial organization of clerical workers will tend to increase their class consciousness in the fact of such a seemingly fundamental division is unknown (and doubtless highly variant). Knowing to what extent such workers feel consciously complicit in consumer society or whether they are tending to increasing alienation or cynicism in the fact of revelations of low product quality or planned obsolescence would be helpful to any understanding of the potential for feelings of solidarity with manual workers, technical workers or the poor. This would be an interesting occupational sector to study further, especially to seek occupational
variations of attitudes within it. The increasing size of this sector seemingly casts some doubt about any argument that all segments of a new working class defined in terms of white collar versus manual workers are potentially susceptible to radical politicization. The potentials for a wider unity are seemingly thereby limited and this could then be a further limitation on solidarity and activation.

The seventh element in a Marxist explanation of inactivity relates as well to a division within the ranks of the less advantaged. However, it is not as in the previous two matters a cleavage which tends to divide a potentially unified class into subgroupings, rather it is a matter of divisions within the lives of individual workers. To establish the meaning of this element and part of its significance here, let us look at the analysis of Michael Mann:

"The values of the countries with which I am dealing remain today identifiably capitalist to the extent that they remain committed to a liberal market view of ethics and society. According to this view, freedom and justice are best secured by 'breaking down' man's needs and activities into separate segments (work, consumption, politics, etc.) and providing each one with a separate market in which individuals can express their preferences and realize their needs.... What is meant by 'the end of ideology,' therefore, is the acceptance by the mass of the people of this instrumental and segmented structure. Industrial or political behaviour is characterized by the separation of each sector, and implicit (though probably non-normative) acceptance of 'the laws of the market' regulating each sector. This is what I shall term the ideology of hegemonic capitalism."

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"Marxists are well aware that the segmentation of life in capitalist society constitutes an obstacle to the realization of class consciousness. For the latter to develop, the worker must make 'connections' between his work and family life and between his industrial and his political activity." (p. 19)

I will deal briefly here with segmentation in general and then consider industrial versus political activity in my next point.

Full class consciousness and thereby the corresponding need for thoroughgoing and sustained political activity requires in a Marxist view that the less advantaged be able to see the interrelationships between all elements of their lives and to conceive those lives in totality as qualitatively other than they are. For example, they must see that the common structure of the working male and home and child-centered female — is not inevitable, but is a function of a particular organization of industry and society. They should see that this specialization relates at least in part to a need for efficiency dictated by the need for profit. They should see too that it relates to a tendency within capitalism to overproduction and thereby an inability to absorb the workforce all who might want to work. They should see that workers are deprived of their full humanity by their powerlessness regarding the work process and the social order and, thereby, are conditioned to a proneness to fear any deprivation of 'manliness' or 'femininity,' those distorted forms of humanity which are supportive rather than destructive of the productive process. All in all, they must see family life and work life as interrelated and only in understanding those interrelationships can they come to imagine their lives and the social order in qualitatively different ways. Similarly, they must see the relationship between family...
structures and consumption patterns, work and consumption patterns and so forth. The tendency of our culture to separate these realms is then a hindrance to consciousness and activation.

The eighth element is the complex matter of the institutionalization of industrial conflict and includes studies of the political roots and effects of that process. This process, of course, has been identified by many non-Marxists, most prominently Ralf Dahrendorf. However, Marxists see its origins and effects in distinctive ways. Trade unions, in a Marxist view, tend towards economism — that is, wage and benefit demands rather than challenge to the socio-economic order, an order of which they are structurally a part. As we discussed above, if workers-controlled the enterprise there would be no function for trade unions or trade union leaders; economic issues are more easily a part of the collective bargaining process than are control issues. As Mann puts it,

"...whereas economic rewards in the capitalist enterprise can be collective, job creativity-control rewards are largely distributive. The economic interests of rival parties can in principle be served by increasing the total reward available for share-out by collective cooperation. By contrast, there tends to be a fixed amount of work control available for distribution, and for one party to increase control the other must necessarily lose some of its control. It is evidently easier to obtain a working solution to conflict on the former than on the latter issue....What we call the institutionalization of industrial conflict is nothing more or less than the narrowing down of conflict to aggressive economism and defensive control. This has been taken to its furthest point by contemporary American trade unions...." (p. 21)

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"Defensive control" is a matter of formalizing de facto arrangements made on the factory floor which allow workers greater flexibility and creativity in the production process. Ordinarily, these are comparatively minor matters and are often traded back in the bargaining process in exchange for further economic gains. This latter aspect of the bargaining process is consistent with the general recent trend to base bargaining on productivity. This trend is increasingly the case as more and more corporations produce on a world scale — absolute gains are not granted; only if more is produced is the wage benefit package advanced. Thereby, it becomes a part of the interest of trade union to aid management's drive for higher productivity per labor hour — to cooperate in time study operations, to promote efficiency, to quickly quell sporadic outbursts — in short, to adopt in management's perspective. All of this tends to dampen class consciousness and to turn militants into renegades and saboteurs. The capital intensive industrial machine is smoothed — high investment, at the second phase of industrialization, demands smoothness, regularity, and cooperation and the pattern of industrial bargaining tends to assure it. Workers are rewarded collectively for quietude and allow themselves individually to be supervised to the minute detail of action — arrival, break and departure timed in seconds, and bodily motion for eight hours a day watched and controlled to the smallest nuance. The artisan lost ownership of the tools of work in the initial industrial revolution, but collectively resisted control; in the second phase the workers' own organization is integrated into the industrial machine. Finally, bargaining becomes a highly developed skill and the union organization often
becomes hierarchical, specialized and skilled as management it is a parallel organization whose leadership has a lifestyle, educational level (albeit sometimes self-education), even a salary scale nearer to that of management than that of union members.

This whole process would seem, analytically, to have effects which might inhibit political self-activation. All matters in one's life and work are left to experts, one learns to cooperate, even to obey, one learns that those in power, in unions, management and elsewhere are much the same, and that 'we' are 'all in this together.' Resistance is seemingly only possible through negative responses, individual, anomic, and isolated behaviors, e.g., secret damage to products or machines. The kind of solidaristic, positive behavior that could spill over into political consciousness is discouraged by the high level of institutionalization of conflict.

Finally here, recently several Marxist historians -- especially in America -- have been rewriting the history of the origins of both trade unionism and liberalism. The term 'corporate liberalism' became the cutting edge of the American New Left in the 1960s -- liberalism became not a somewhat too moderate potential ally of radicals, but rather the ideology of the very powerful. Corporate liberalism was seen to be a point of view that was sufficiently sophisticated and subtly versed in the art of cooptation as, for example, to have actively cooperated in the formation of the trade union movement. Previously, of course, trade unionism was seen simply by the Left as worker-initiated, capitalist-resisted and in the end a victory for the common man. Many recent

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studies in the history of the American union movement, largely by Marxists, have made a quite effective case that corporate leaders in many instances were highly supportive of unionism. Whether the owners of capital saw their words and actions as enlightened generosity, Christian good will, or in coldly rational terms (as a means to smooth out spontaneous outbursts, to organize the workplace, and to place an upper limit on demands) doubtless varied among the individuals involved. Whatever they thought they were doing, there was a rise in labor’s absolute, if not relative, share of land and evolution towards all the above-mentioned "coldly rational” matters. It could be argued that there have been several other "coldly rational" benefits to the evolving capitalist industrial system. One might be the distribution of income to workers—seemingly against the interest of the capitalists—which in the longer term gave an equilibrium to the system by lessening the tendency to overproduction and stagnation. The welfare state and even national planning are also seen as largely initiated by and/or in the interests of corporate liberalism in part for the same reasons: surplus value absorption and industrial coordination and smoothness necessary

30 Among the best studies here are: Section 1 ("American Corporate Liberalism, 1900-1948") of James Weinstein and David W. Eakins (Eds.), For a New America (New York: Random House, 1970); and Ronald Radosh and Murray Rothbard, (Eds.) A New History of Leviathan: Essays on the Rise of the American Corporate State (New York: Dutton, 1972); and in general works by William A. Williams, Martin J. Sklar, James Weinstein, Ronald Radosh, and others. Interestingly, the sharpest replies on these issues come from Marxists in the IJPUSA, for example, historian Philip S. Poner. For a differing picture of labor history, see the four volumes published thus far in his History of the Labor Movement in the United States (New York: International Publishers, 1947-1965 and continuing).
to protect monopoly investment. In the political arena big business and big labor can be seen to operate in considerable harmony of interests which relates to their evolving in plant cooperation pattern. This cooperation these historians have found is at its highest level in such matters as foreign policy.\textsuperscript{31}

It can be argued that this whole political spillover from the institutionalization of industrial conflict generates strongly against widespread class consciousness and produces an almost non-competitive politics. Both of these factors might tend to, in turn, promote low levels of participation among the disadvantaged. Many major differences have been "settled" and the remaining matters are limited, the procedures are structured and settled, and all is institutionalized into patterns of decision which utterly exclude ordinary workers. There is then a double effect on activation: both quietude and elitism, both in the workplace and directly in the political sphere, generate against participation. Much of this discussion and nearly all of the historical research here relate particularly to America. This can be taken as an example of historically specific Marxist studies (others of which will be discussed shortly below). It is in America, of course, that the relative participation of the disadvantaged is at its lowest.

There is another aspect of the contemporary Western political process which interrelates with and reinforces corporate liberal/trade union cooperation. This I take as the ninth element in a Marxist

\textsuperscript{31}See particularly the excellent and detailed study by Ronald Radosh, \textit{American Labor and U.S. Foreign Policy} (New York: Random House, 1969).
explanation and it can be characterized as the incrementalism of avoiding collective solutions. Gorz, referring to the deep need for greater self-control and self-fulfillment in contemporary industrial society, writes:

"The demand for the satisfaction of these needs, which cannot be expressed in market terms, necessarily takes on political and collective forms; and the satisfaction of these collective needs, precisely because it cannot be procured except by public services belonging to the collectivity, constitutes a permanent challenge to the laws and spirit of the capitalist system."

(p. 83)

Whether or not it is the case that public needs necessarily lie outside a capitalist market and a liberal democratic polity, it is the case that few such demands are presently expressed economically or politically. The problem of, in Galbraith's words, "public squalor within private affluence" has been often discussed and, while it is significant, need not be detailed again here. We might usefully, however, consider the question in its relation to political participation.

Consider for example, the possibility of a demand arising for an across the board reduction in the work week and a proportional selective reduction in GNP. Obviously, such a scheme would produce dislocation problems; obviously, a lot of people hate their days off. But many would like such a change, I believe. Only a very few individuals can privately make such a work arrangement, almost no single corporation or industry could make it, and perhaps not even any one country could enact it. 33 That is the point. It looks fine ...  

32 By means of, for example, the elimination or reduction of advertising, market research, product multiplication, annual automobile models, auto use within large cities, some appliances, and some increase in corporate tax rates producing a weeding out of their bureaucracies, office buildings and private jets. If this were on the agenda, how many would be inclined against?
country could enact it. That is the point. This looks increasingly, considering structural unemployment, environmental damage and other matters, like a notion less than mad, yet it is mad to propose it programmatically. The collectivity it encompasses (the developed West and beyond) lies beyond the bounds of political expression. But this alone is not what prevents it from being raised. When people are atomized and face the market alone, only with the most marginal portion of their annual income might they "choose" to purchase an electric knife sharpener. The extra day off from stifling labor is not an option; it is presently quite beyond conception. The working man is unlikely to "not want" an item so badly that he is willing to begin the overthrow of Western civilization to trade it for a time. The market and the public sphere, economics and politics, are locked in an unfair competition. There is no established habit of collective solutions sufficient to allow for anything so seemingly "drastic." Most people likely understand, or at least suspect, that the economic system could not cope with such a demand, however desirable it might in itself be to many or even most individuals. Another example will make the general point more clear.

Consider that the market dominance of social life has such great impact on both individual perspectives and individual living arrangements that the "accidental individual" is as far from being able to become a "social individual" as he might have been in the Lockean/ Jeffersonian world of the independent peasantry. Persons are, for

33 Consider here the effect on balance of payments problems and so forth. Perhaps only the U.S. could overcome their short fall; by selling off heavy foreign investments in Europe and/or Canada and elsewhere.
example, often unable to live without private cars. Having once committed
themselves to purchase and upkeep, they find it far cheaper to use that
car than to use public transport. Public transport is never permitted
to get good enough for many to escape initial ownership -- that kind of
limited blockage is relatively easy for highway-auto-rubber-steel-oil
lobby. Individual arrangements in the marketplace become for many,
the only conceivable arrangements; a massive rebuilding of the trans-
portation system is not widely considered because as less adequate in-
dividual solution has already pre-empted the political (collective) pos-
sibilities. Under such a situation, how can sufficient pressure be
mounted to offset the weight of those who are psychologically, economically
"locked in" to an acknowledgedly wasteful system? (An interesting
study here would be of auto workers attitudes toward public transpor-
tation.) The political agenda is severely limited by the omnipresence,
dominance and seeming permanence of individual "need-fulfillment" within
the marketplace. Collective, political demands rarely get much hearing
until such time as an obvious crisis on the order of the total draining of all
liquid fossil fuels in the space of a century or another such disaster.

Political apathy is not simply a matter of citizen preference for
private life over public life, individual over collective solutions.
In the first instance, such tendencies are intimately related to the
structure of the economic system. In the second, democratic political
systems reflect that market model; the American system particularly was
designed to make collective decision-making almost impossible. Many
empirical researchers, it should be recalled, argue that inclination to
private life is somehow natural. Marxists see this aspect of behavior as largely a side effect of capitalist market arrangements.

I will close the discussion here with a further quote from a more recent article by Gorz:

"The fact is that most of the population experiences some aspect of impoverishment: e.g., environmental impoverishment through degradation, pollution, destruction or corporate appropriation of light, space, water, air; impoverishment through the degradation of urban living conditions, through the increasing cost of transportation both in terms of money and of time, to such a degree that the genuine disposable daily free time of suburbanites nowadays has been calculated to be not greater than (sic) 150 years ago. Impoverishment also in health conditions and in education, since the backwardness of school education in comparison to socially necessary knowledge is increasing sharply. And impoverishment as regards culture, genuine popular culture having been all but destroyed by its commercial substitute....

"However, all these aspects of social impoverishment cannot give rise to new radical demands as long as they are experienced by each individual isolatedly or by an atomized mass of city dwellers. Nor can they be translated into radical demands by neighborhood committees devoid of any class basis, or by voters looking to the state for institutional and legislative solutions. Radicalization of demands can take place only when and where the effects of impoverishment can be related directly to their ultimate cause, this cause being the logic of capitalist accumulation and the structural power of capital to impose its logic onto the methods, the priorities, the organization and the technology of production: in other words, the social needs bred by capitalist development can find an anti-capitalist translation and effectiveness only in the places of work where the power and logic of capital can be attacked directly on a class basis."

The first of the two examples used in the previous point touches here non matter additional to the main issue: (the difficulty of raising collective solutions in the face of a liberal state and a capitalist

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34 Andre Gorz, "The Working Class and Revolution in the West," Liberation, 16 (September, 1971) pp.31-37. In the awkward sentence in the first quoted paragraph should be inserted a phrase like, 'the urban dwellers of' at point where I have placed sic.
This new point, which might be called the evolution of a highly integrated world political economy, can be in turn separated into two matters: one, the tenth element, could be called a trend towards a more issueless politics, and the other, the eleventh element, the domestic political effects of imperialism. I believe that these two points are among the most important and characteristic aspects of a Marxist explanation of political inactivity.

The argument that the international integration of the political economy of the capitalist West has generated an issueless politics of little concern to anyone, especially anyone who would require the prospect of major socio-economic changes to justify the expenditure of energy politically, has been most effectively put by Michael Kidron. Kidron, viewing Britain primarily, though his observations may well be nearly as true for much or all of the developed West, observes that Parliament has lost nearly all its initiative and discretion, that contemporary politics is not so much too complex, as many have argued, but rather has been relocated away from the possibility of popular control. This is not due simply to a benignly necessary professionalization, but rather to a concentration of power and an outmoding of institutions so severe that the possibility of public participation is all but eliminated.

"International integration has reduced to a shadow. the scope for truly national policies and this shadow is itself fixed in a complex of international treaty obligations." (p. 102)

"...the size of the state sector and its committal of resources for years in advance nullifies most of what Parliament used to do in controlling the Government's purse strings." (p. 103)

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35 Kidron, op. cit.
Almost nothing, he observes, is done in open discussion. He characterizes western politics as in a condition of nearly universal coalition or "implicit coalition". But,

"Most important of all is the growing estrangement between politics and voting -- political agnosticism is spreading: in 1951, twenty per cent of people thought that it mattered little or not at all which party was in power; by 1959, the proportion had grown to thirty-eight per cent; and by 1964, to forty-nine per cent." (p. 106, figures are for Britain)

Further,

"...critics of established bi-partisan assumptions make...little headway at the polls whether they champion causes in which the electorate is more radical than Parliament (wage freeze or Vietnam, for example) or more conservative (homosexual law reform or corporal punishment, for example)." (p. 107)

In addition to these aspects of the problem, Kidron notes, for Britain, a "steady drift of welfare (e.g., health insurance) from public to private provenance." In short,

"a big factor in the withdrawal of mass public interest is its decreasing relevance for the attainment of direct, felt reforms." (p. 108)

(In the U.S. of course many of the items he discusses have not yet been publicly provided. European Left parties, he argues, have failed to grasp all this -- they simply tried to substitute professionals for "...the enthusiastic volunteers of (their) reformist heyday." (p. 107) The problem, and this is a vital part of Kidron's perspective, has been that the Left has acted very wrongly in proceeding on the assumption of Parliament's freedom to manoeuvre. The working class is increasingly, in his view, losing interest in politics; in support he cites massive declines in labor,
socialist and communist party memberships across Europe during the 1950s and 1960s (though simultaneously they were typically getting a larger than ever vote). The momentary encounter at the polls becomes less and less meaningful as people vote more and more without firm commitment.

In sum, Kidron sees the cause of indifference as one of the long-term process which has left almost all basic decisions to be made by select international secret dealings. What remainss are details and they hold little interest for the average citizen. The cause is not complexity, but rather the locus of power: the massive structure of international capitalism, and the seeming acceptance of all its preconditions and assumptions by all electoral contenders for power, including social democratic and even the Communist parties.

This argument expressed by Kidron is in a sense a specific and current variant of the more general Marxist theme, namely that people are disinclined to participate because most decisions are simply not made within the political process, let alone in the electoral process. Only the details about which interests or individuals will get what incremental benefits are resolved therein. Lane and Banfield noted, from sharply varying evaluative perspectives, that persons with concrete stakes, most often businessmen, are more inclined to participate. If these decisions left to the private sphere were on the political agenda, the Marxist perspective would imply, more people would participate and short of that, the questions resolved in that process are, for most people, moot. Baran and Sweezy give this some further contemporary meaning in trying to demonstrate for example, that the decision
to have high military budgets or to stimulate consumer demand rather
than doing a variety of other things such as building public transporta-
tion or reducing productive levels, is a decision which necessarily fol-
lows from the economic structure of our society. Not simply or even
primarily because of the political power of corporations (media control,
political funds, etc.), but rather because the survival of the economic
system depends on decisions of a certain character. The economic system
in their view is thoroughly integrated and massively fragile. Whether
or not it is so fragile as Baran and Sweezy seem to believe, is not crucial
(I do not believe it is), it remains the case that many matters which on
their face might stimulate interest in the electoral process are a threat
"to the economy" and therefore very difficult to get into the forums of
public debate.

The argument in such a general form would be far more difficult to
carry much further in that form. It is not nearly so effective as Kidron's
more specific development of the theme which might more easily be seen to
vary from time to time and place to place. There is, too, another such

36 In their discussion of military versus domestic spending Baran and
Sweezy overplay such important considerations as these. They improve
in their discussion of 'American uniqueness: for discussion of the causes
and nature of the 'extreme' constitutional protection of 'minorities' from
majoritarianism (See Baran and Sweezy, op. cit. 55 pp.) 55-58.

37 For example, "...advertising in all its aspects cannot be meaningfully
dealt with as some undesirable excrescence on the economic system which
would be removed if 'we' would only make up our minds to get rid of it.
The very offspring of monopoly capitalism, the inevitable by-product
of the decline of price competition in advertising constitutes as much
an integral part of the system as the giant corporation itself." (p.122)
"...the economic importance of advertising lies not primarily in its
reallocation of consumer's expenditures among different commodities but
in its effect on the magnitude of aggregate effective demand...." (p.
124). (Both the above are from Baran and Sweezy, op. cit.)
concrete variation on the theme which might be usefully further developed in relation to class consciousness and/or political participation and that is the matter which is called the fiscal crisis of the state. Revenue shortfalls in selected areas are seen to be in part a result of the growing national and global mobility of capital. Capital goes where the tax deal and regulatory deal is best and localities must bid against one another to attract industry; one effect is a general decrease in the percentage of total taxation which falls on the corporate sector. This, in turn, has two positive mobilizing effects: the rapid spread of unionization among civil servants and other state employees and the potential for taxpayer revolts among small property owners and wage earners. It also has a negative effect on political activation; one similar, though not so one-sided, as the matter described by Kidron. The internationalization of the economy and the ability of corporations to "blackmail" governments (one corporation is free to choose among thousands of governmental jurisdictions) effectively removes a whole range of fiscal and thereby policy alternatives from the political agenda. Governmental jurisdiction A cannot raise corporate taxes (sometimes cannot even levy corporate taxes), and cannot increase the quality of public services very far beyond that to which the most desperate of locations can accommodate themselves. Many of these policies which might mobilize the less advantaged are impossibilities.


39 This can be less the case for some capital intensive industries, for some industries needing particularly skilled workers, for those which extract scarce or selectively located raw materials, or those particularly dependent on special transportation or communications facilities. Nevertheless, capital mobility has clearly been consistently advancing for several centuries.
Under such circumstances quietude can easily be quite common, this is especially the case for "depressed" regions. It would be most interesting to study the relative participation rates of such areas and to somehow develop a measure of relative local vulnerability to corporate reallocative threats (actual threats would be difficult to detect, but that is not an imperative measure as one might reasonably assume that there are considerable 'anticipation' effects). I believe that this whole aspect of explanation could be greatly developed.

This latter process has except in the recent case of oil been almost universally successful in the Third World, and is a crucial aspect of imperialism. I do not need to develop here the detailed Marxist position on the nature and importance of imperialism, that is readily available in innumerable sources. I simply want to consider very briefly what Marxists see to be the political effects of the imperialist process on the politics

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40 One might for example measure worker consciousness of industry departure potential, or desire for additional industry, even developing scales of how much and what workers in a region might be willing to concede to attract or retain industry. This could then be related to measures of class consciousness and political activity differentials.

of the metropolitan nations. The assertion that working class quietude in the developed nations can in part be explained by workers sharing in imperial "super-profits" has been a central theme in Marxist literature since Lenin, who wrote:

"Imperialism has the tendency to create privilege sections also among the workers, and to detach them from the broad masses of the proletariat." (p. 283)

Concerning this point, Lenin presents, for example, statistics regarding immigrants from less advanced areas dominating the bottom sectors of the American working class at the turn of the century. In speaking of this he writes:

"It must be observed that...the tendency of imperialism to split the workers, to strengthen opportunism among them and to cause temporary decay in the working class movement, revealed itself much earlier than the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries...." (p. 283)

Further, on England he quotes Engels who wrote (in a letter to Kautsky in 1882):

""You ask me what the English workers think about colonial policy....The workers gaily share the feast of England's monopoly of the world market and the colonies."" (p. 284)

More generally Lenin wrote:

"...enthusiasm over the prospects of imperialism, furious defense of it and painting it in the brightest colours -- such are signs of the times. Imperialist ideology also penetrates the working class. No Chinese Wall separates it from other classes." (p. 285)

"The receipt of high monopoly profits by the

42 All page references here are to Lenin's "Imperialism", op. cit.
capitalists in one of the numerous branches of industry, in one of the numerous countries, etc., makes it economically possible for them to bribe certain sections of the workers, and for a time a considerable minority of them, and win them to the side of the bourgeoisie of a given industry or given nation against all others. The intensification of antagonisms between imperialist nations for the division of the world increases this urge. And so there is created that bond between imperialism and opportunism...." (p. 301)

Thus, in Lenin's view imperialist operations can "buy off" (temporarily) much of the working class of the developed nations. (It is intriguing that it was never fully appreciated how near this view tended to a massive refutation of Marx -- if capitalists will buy off using imperialist profits, what is to prevent them from protecting themselves at every threatening juncture in such a manner? Far-sighted capitalists could not be trapped either into an overproduction syndrome or into impoverishing workers to the point of massive disruption. Lenin might be seen ironically as a precursor of Keynes or of full-blown corporate liberalism).

In any case, the notion of imperialism as a process has evolved into a view of global division of labor with near whole nations proletarianized on one end and near whole nations bourgeois on the other. This theme (most often in less extreme form) was carried on by Stalin, Khrushchev, Mao and innumerable other strategists of Third World guerilla warfare and has been equally as common in the developed nations. It, not surprisingly, reached its most extreme form in mid-twentieth century America -- where the only radical hope was often taken to be outside America's borders, the only radical task suicidal and/or terrorist attacks on America's imperial war-making capacities. Only very recently (post-1968 France) has there been the beginning of a turnabout in this view, which is now more commonly seen
as a self-fulfilling prophesy. As André Gorz put it:

"But how can this struggle be effective if we start from the assumption that the white laboring masses are the beneficiaries of imperialist exploitation and looting? How can anti-imperialist and socialist revolutions in the so-called Third World win mass support in the Metropolis if we start from the postulate that socialist revolution is necessary to defeat hunger and misery abroad, but that the oppressed and hungry masses' liberation in the Third World demands that the white laboring masses become poorer than they are?"

Many current Marxists, then, believe that earlier Marxists exaggerated the quieting effects of imperialism in the developed world, but all still see it as a powerful explanatory factor in this regard.

I have taken the twelfth element of Marxist explanation to be the whole range of matters which can be conveniently placed under the heading of historical specificity. This is not, as are other elements, one explanation but rather a multiplicity of matters united in a common method of proceeding. In the interest of brevity, I will look here mainly at just the one issue of imperialism and its effects on the domestic politics of the metropolitan powers. Let us first look at two excellent analyses of the development of working class politics in Britain. In the first of these Tom Nairn writes of three great phases of rebellion:


"The first -- and most revolutionary -- coincided with the long process of industrialization itself, from the closing decades of the eighteenth century until nearly the middle of the nineteenth. The second phase occurred some time after the high-point of British imperialist success, when the empire had begun to alter in character and decline in the face of competition from Germany, France and America: that is, from the close of the 19th century and through the First World War, until the General Strike of 1926. The third is occurring now, and accompanies the degeneration and crisis of the whole system." (p. 5)

And then notes,

"Between the first and the second of these periods of active struggle there lay an era of defeat. This time of collapse and frustration, from the 1840s until the 1880s, was decisive for the whole later pattern of the class-struggle. During it, British conservatism finally crystallized into a durable social order still perfectly recognizable today...." (p. 5)

"The reason for the extraordinarily formative influence of this period is that in it the exhausted quiescence of the class struggle coincided with the maximum florescence of British society in the world outside. While at home, the workers had been defeated and anaesthetized, and the bourgeoisie had settled into its heritage, abroad the power of Britain's economic system penetrated into every corner of the globe. Benefiting from its early start in the Industrial Revolution, British capitalism extended into a natural empire...which was not yet seriously threatened by rivals. In this unique conjuncture, the British economic revolution was carried outwards successfully while a social counter-revolution triumphed at its head and heart. The latter provided a stable basis for the former; the former gave the necessary external conditions for the latter, the prosperity and security that the conservative hegemony demanded." (p. 5)

Nairn then examines the interaction of foreign and domestic developments over a period of a century and a half; in so doing, he is highly sensitive to the nuances of timing and institutional-structural development, and to the profound effects of both on contemporary political reality.
To convey some of the flavor of this discussion, I will excerpt some sections from the concluding part of his article:

"The régime consolidated its success by attempting to integrate the subjugated working class more totally inside the conservative hegemony. Most accounts of this process focus upon its economic aspect. That is, upon the way in which a vital part of the proletariat was somehow 'bought off' by the system, in the shape of the higher wages and better conditions which imperialism made possible...." (p. 32)

"There is no question of the significance of this economic factor: it was certainly a necessary condition of 'integration'. But it must also be pointed out that it could only work in the way it did because of a number of wider social factors. After all, higher wages and improved material conditions in themselves do not necessarily imply a trend towards conservatism or satisfaction with the status quo...." (p. 32)

"In Britain, these economic changes took place under the most favourable circumstances for the status quo. The labour aristocracy flourished in the aftermath of class defeat, when the working class could only look back at a series of débacles and it seemed that all other alternatives were futile. For, even more important than this negative outlook, the society which had won the class war now possessed the most formidable battery of cultural weapons with which to follow up its victory. It was singularly well equipped to form the 'expectations' of the new stratum in a way convenient to itself. The labour aristocracy was a natural victim. Its whole tendency was to distinguish itself sharply from the 'unskilled' mass, but not so sharply from the lower middle-class strata above it. "The boundaries of the labour aristocracy were fluid on one side of its territory (i.e., the middle-class side), but they were precise on another. An "artisan" or "craftsman" was not under any circumstances to be confused with a "labourer"!" Across such fluid boundaries, the apparatus of British conservatism could of course work freely: the ideology of bourgeois 'self-help', the dogmas of free-trade liberalism enshrined in the Liberal Party, the various brands of respectability offered by the dissenting Christian sects, the temperance movement, the prevailing respect for hierarchy and 'knowing one's place' (especially if it was not quite the lowest), and so on. It was even
possible to accede to the ultimate accolade, the condi-
tion of being a 'gentleman'...." (pp. 31-33)

"The point is, surely, that the ambient conditions of
British conservatism were such that it never had to
rely simply upon the crude (and highly uncertain)
technique of 'buying; or 'bribing' part of the working
class. These economic metaphors conjure up an image
offélite of Judases betraying their class for a few
pieces of silver; and as such, they represent a gross
underestimation of the positive power of British
conservatism...." (p. 33)

"Thus, class defeat and imperialist triumph had led to
the successful absorption of part of the working class
into conservatism. This, in turn, delayed the political
development of the workers for decades more; it ensured
an effective hiatus in mass political consciousness for
nearly 30 years, between the collapse of Chartism and
the revival of socialist agitation in the 1880's.

"British socialism was thus late, of course, in rela-
tionship to other countries. Her major socialist move-
ment, the Labour Party, did not exist effectively until
after 1900, remained a minor party with very limited
ambitions and power until 1914, and received its present
form and constitution only in 1918 -- that is, some
decades after the social-democratic parties of the con-
tinent. It was late too, in the sense that:in Britain
it followed the rise of trade-unionism rather than
preceding or accompanying it -- hence, it was inevitably
depthly affected (and indeed lastingly conditioned) by
their economism and conservatism of outlook. British
'democratic socialism' was forced to grow in the shadow
of the trade unions, dependent on their finances, over-
awed by their prestige, its room for political manoeuvre
and theoretical development constricted at every turn by
their caution and traditionalism.

"But there is a third, even more important, sense in
which the advent of British socialism was 'late'. It was
tragically late in relationship to the whole evolution
of British society, in relationship to the whole under-
lying imperial-conservative nexus. For by 1900, the long
secular decline of this system was already under way....
This long and grim rearguard action was to constitute the
universe of the Labour Party....It has confronted an era
of grudging retreat, of penny-pinching and postponement,
of nostalgia and half-heartedness, of slow disintegration
and sad frustration, where today is invariably sacrificed
so that tomorrow can be a little more like yesterday.
The Labour Party set out to build a new world in the crumbling mansion of British conservative-imperial hegemony. It has ended up as chief caretaker of the ruins." (pp. 34-35).

Thus we see that, in Nairn's view the sequence of events particular to Britain had great influence on the character, structure and effectiveness of the British Labour Party. It acquired certain characteristics which, again in Nairn's view tended to make it a far less effective socialist force than it might have been. In the recent period, this analysis fits together with that of Kidron discussed above. Under such conditions, given such a character (though even Nairn would agree, I believe, that this character is 'historically conditioned' not 'historically determined'), one could see difficulties for the Labour Party in building or sustaining a militant, active, committed body of supporters.

Another article worth noting here contains in a sense the converse of the Nairn article, it seeks to show — the distinctive character of American imperialism and the extent to which that imperialism is rooted in the specific historic development of the United States. This provides an interesting parallel to Nairn's discussion and reinforces an important dimension of explanation in which Marxists are generally adept: the importance of interrelating all aspects of historic development. If imperialism retards class consciousness, whatever forces advance and condition imperialism have an important effect on that consciousness, which in turn then might affect those forces and imperialism.

American imperialism for the author of this article, G.S. Jones, is characterized by two distinctive features: (1) its non-territorial character, and (2) its possession of a formally anti-imperialist ideology.

He goes on to discuss the history of the formation of American imperialism with an aim to demonstrating "how far (that) characteristic modern form of American imperialism...is (a) product resulting from the particularity of American historical development." (p. 63) He sees American imperialism as, in part, a product of the availability of frontier space:

"The United states was then already structurally an imperialist state at the moment of its foundation. The foundation of the United States was in no sense an anti-imperialist or even an anti-colonial revolution. If anything the American Revolution accelerated the development of American Imperialism by freeing westward expansion from the controls imposed by the British. Westward expansion and settlement at the expense of the Indians was eventually to secure the United States the crucial advantage of possessing the largest single domestic market in the world. But already at the time of the Revolution, its political advantages were realised. The famous Turner thesis was understood from the beginning by the more sophisticated American politicians. Madison, for instance, in his Federalist Papers, clearly understood the purpose of the frontier - for by the almost indefinite provision of cheap land further and further to the West, the dangers of class warfare resulting from unequal distribution of property, could be postponed. Just as an expanding internal frontier in Sweden had resulted in relatively weak instruments of feudal domination, so it was hoped that the Western frontier would act as the self-perpetuating safeguard of property and democracy in America." (p. 65)

And later,

"The expansion of the frontier by trade into South America and the Pacific in the 1880s and early 1890s was increasingly associated with idea of an ever expanding commercial frontier which would alleviate discontent at home. Frederick Turner in the 1890s produced his famous frontier thesis of American Democracy. His ideas heavily influenced both Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson (who considered himself to be carrying Turner's ideas into practice). Turner regarded commercial expansion as the magic escape route from his otherwise depressing conclusions. The march
to the Pacific would not stop at the shore line. Turner saw the necessity of continued expansion, and for strong government support of enterprising capitalists. 'Once fully afloat on the sea of world wide economic interests', he wrote, 'we shall develop political interests....'" (p. 73)

And finally here,

"The three major depression periods coincided with outbreaks of industrial violence perhaps unmatched in other capitalist countries of the period — the railway strike of 1877, the Chicago Haymarket riot of 1886, and the Pullman Strike and Coxey's march of the unemployed upon Washington in the 1890s. Madison's prediction that class war would follow the closing of the frontier seemed to be coming true.

"The aftermath of the Civil War thus produced an economic substructure that impelled a fully fledged modern imperialism. The victory over the Southern planters ensured that the nature of imperial expansion would not generally follow the European pattern of formal political domination over vast colonial areas — except within the borders of the United States itself. There was no prominent military-agrarian class vying for proconsular employment. The new American empire was to be a strictly bourgeois product. It would both solve the problem of surplus disposal and reduce discontent at home. The open class conflict unleashed by the industrial depressions from the 1870s to the 1890s swung the vast majority of the anxious middle class behind a policy of informal but careful planned economic domination in Asia and Latin America." (pp. 71-72)

Again, the articles by Nairn and by Jones are in many ways typical of Marxist explanations. I will discuss the general characteristics of those explanations shortly below.

Before doing so, I want to deal here with one final element in the Marxist explanation, self-criticism. That is, many Marxists see political quietude in part as a result of past errors in Marx's theory and practice.
Quietude is taken to be a product of incorrect Marxist-Leninist political action. It, further, is taken as evidence that history has 'disproven' the correctness of past praxis. A few brief examples will suffice here. The first is again from Aronowitz' discussion of the so-called Council Communists (here Pannekoek): 46

"After 1925 the Trotskyists began to criticize the Stalin regime for its departure from Leninist principles. The Council Communists disagreed, seeing a continuum. They argued that Bolshevism had 'solved the historical problems of the bourgeois revolution in feudal capitalist Russia with the aid of the proletariat as the active fighting instrument... Marxism-Leninism is not Marxism, but a filling of the Marxist terminology adapted to the needs of the bourgeois revolution in Russia.' The Bolsheviks were seen as a 'revolutionary, petit bourgeois and Jacobinical intelligentsia' that transformed the proletariat into an object, rather than the subject, of the revolutionary process. They reduced the workers to instruments of the Communist Party, justifying this by their theory of the party." (p. 177)

This view is reiterated in modified form and updated by Gorz: 47

"...some central aspects of the Leninist theory of the party no longer hold true in advanced capitalist societies. To begin with, the theory that the working class, left to itself, cannot go beyond trade unionistic demands, is clearly refuted by what has been going on in Great Britain, Italy and France during the last years....

"This revolt against alienation and oppression, this demand for self-rule, self-government from below, direct democracy and quality, is clearly incompatible with a theory of the vanguard as formulated by Lenin under very different conditions.... This concept of the party is openly rejected nowadays by students as well as by young workers as a kind of political paternalism and authoritarianism

46 Aronowitz, op. cit.

47 Gorz, op. cit.
which is bound to degenerate into dictatorship
over and not of the proletariat." (p. 37)

All of this is summed up in *Strategy for Labour* where Gorz writes:

"...there is not and there cannot be a socialist society which the working class movements of the advanced capitalist nations may take as a model." (p. 19)

From this perspective Gorz evolves a strategy of radical reforms:

"Instead of dichotomizing the future from the present -- future power and present impotence, like Good and Evil -- what must be done is to bring the future into the present, to make power tangible now by means of actions which demonstrate to the workers their positive struggle..." (p. 11)

This is a strategy which sharply differs from much of earlier Marxist waiting for revolutionary conditions to ripen; it is a proposal to, if you will, advance feelings of political efficacy through successful confrontation with power and through the exercise of the increments of power won. Earlier Marxists had often felt that reforms 'within the system' necessarily strengthened the ability of capitalism to avoid collapse.

This view is complicated by a related point made by Gabriel Kolko:

"The intellectual and political heritage of Marxism did not prepare the left in America and Europe for the complexities of the twentieth century, if only because, exegetical citations notwithstanding, Marxism and all its later varieties and schools prior to World War I accepted a paralyzing and debilitating

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48 A non-reformist reform for Gorz is one which permanently changes the relative distribution of power between classes. See Gorz, *Strategy for Labour*, pp. 7-8 for more detailed explanation and examples. The quote in the text also comes from this source.

49 Gabriel Kolko, "The Decline of American Radicalism in the Twentieth Century," in Weinstein and Eakins, *op. cit.*., pp. 197-220. There are also matters in this extended quote which I will refer back to from early in the next chapter.
optimism which was inherited from the intellectual tradition of the idea of Progress. Defeat as a possibility of long-term, even permanent duration was never entertained, and a social theory that cannot consider this option is not merely intellectually unsatisfactory but misleading as a basis of political analysis and action. Ignoring the intellectual issue of possessing an accurate account of past events, mechanistic optimism led socialists to slight the negative consequences of action or inaction in relation to desired goals, and to try to fit every major event of political and economic development into a pattern of inevitable progression that justified optimism. Such determinism led to quietism, even celebration and opportunism, as socialists everywhere welcomed the events that led to their undoing. Never was it considered that societies have options to succeed and to fail in the attainment of desired goals, and that the precarious relationship of means to ends warranted continuous concern. Social democracy and bolshevism alike, sharing the premises of historical liberalism, avoided considering the possibility of tragic history, a viewpoint that might be based on secular premises but which placed, as the price of success, a greater burden on superior thought and appropriate social action at critical junctures in history. The need for decisive action in unpredictable situations had no meaningful place in either socialist, or, after 1918, bolshevik political strategy, since the normal evolution of things did not warrant it, and for this reason the paralysis of the left in the face of reaction before World War I or between the two world Wars is quite explicable." (pp. 198-199)

Lastly, Ralph Miliband brings together in a few short paragraphs most of the points made previously in this self-critique and within that process poses, I believe, one of the major reasons for the limited character of political activation of the less advantaged. He places the blame squarely on the internal structure of Communist parties (though it could be argued that it might well apply to all political parties). He puts another facet onto Gorz' call for radical reforms: the revolutionary
party itself must in its own structures provide a large part of the vision of the future to date largely unmanifest for the less advantaged of the Western democracies. The only test of this claim that can be made is for some party to take up this challenge.

"The failure of social democracy would present much less sombre perspectives if the traditional alternatives to social democratic parties, namely Communist ones, were not themselves, with hardly any exception, afflicted by certain profound weaknesses, of which the gravest is their lack of genuine internal democracy.

"A serious revolutionary party, in the circumstances of advanced capitalism, has to be the kind of 'hegemonic' party of which Gramsci spoke, which means that it must be capable of 'creating a unity, not only of economic and political aims, but an intellectual and moral unity, posing all the issues which arise, not on the corporative level but on the 'universal' level, and 'coordinated concretely with the general interests of subordinate groups.' But the creation of such a party is only possible in conditions of free discussion and internal democracy, of flexible and responsive structures.

"Nor is this essential only as a means of obviating ideological anaemia and political sclerosis. It is equally essential as a demonstration of the kind of social and political order which such a party seeks to bring into being. It is in its own present structures, in its own present modes of behaviour, attitudes, and habits that it must prefigure the society to which it aspires. For it is only by so doing that it can convince the vast majority of the population whose support it requires that its purpose is not to replace one system of domination by another, conceivably worse. If socialist democracy is its aspiration for tomorrow, so must internal socialist democracy be its rule today. Mere proclamations of future intentions are not enough." (pp. 274-275)
In concluding this chapter I will very briefly summarize here some of the ways in which the Marxist explanations of political inactivity contrast with those offered thus far by those engaged in empirical research on political participation. Many Leninists would accept some aspects of the conservative explanation; namely that inactivity of the disadvantaged is a result of their being uninformed and disinterested. On the whole though, Marxists, including Leninists, would hasten to add further explanations rooted in the socio-economic system to their doubts about ordinary individuals. Absent too is the view that inactivity is a reflection of a general satisfaction with the socio-political order. Also the use of psychological characteristics, e.g., feelings of general or political efficacy as explanations in themselves, is also largely absent.

There are, however, some parallels in the patterns of explanation. Both Marxism and empirical social science give considerable weight to lack of organizational strength. It is seen as very important by Marxists and is, in turn, elaborately explained by them in terms of such things as the media dominance of the more advantaged, the general importance of economic power in the political process, and the many forms of division among the less advantaged. Explanations in terms of structural constraints are also very well developed in the Marxist literature. In fact, for example, explanations in terms of peripherality date back to Marx himself who wrote:

"The small holding peasants form a vast mass, the members of which live in similar conditions, but without entering into manifold relations with one another. Their mode of production isolates them from one another instead of bringing them into mutual intercourse. The

*Prior to reading this section it would be helpful to refer back to Chapter 3, section I.

Many Marxists would see Leninist 'conservatism' as a betrayal of a thoroughgoing Marxism. All Marxist would reject most of the formulations of this view which we have seen associated with empirical studies.
isolation is increased by France's bad means of commu-
nication and by the poverty of the peasants. (...) 
Each individual peasant family is almost self-suf-
cient...and thus acquires its means of life more 
through exchange with nature than through intercourse 
with society."

"In so far as millions of families live under 
economic conditions of existence that separate their 
mode of life, their interests, and their culture 
from those of other classes and put them in hostile 
opposition to the latter, they form a class. In so 
far as there is merely local interconnection among 
these small-holding peasants and the identity of 
their interests begets no community, no national 
bond, and no political organization among them, they 
do not form a class."54

Contemporary Marxists would, of course, argue that this view is now seen 
to have applicability only under some circumstances, that is, when whole 
nations are transformed by imperialism, the peasantry must and can be 
mobilized. Nevertheless, Marx's observations seem surprisingly 
modern for mid-nineteenth century writing and are a useful illustration 
of the roots of Marxist structural explanations of political quietude. 
All Marxist explanations are, at least in a sense, structural; I merely 
mean to emphasize here that under this heading we can find an agreement 
of emphasis between Marxism and empirical social science which cannot 
be found to such an extent under any other.

There are two other explanations sometimes mentioned by empirical 
social scientists, particularly those who could be characterized as 
offering a 'liberal' explanation, which are common as well to Marxism. 
The explanations are those which for empirical social science were 
identified as system unresponsiveness up to and perhaps including re-
pression and the life experiences component of attitudinal explanations.

54Lewis S. Feuer (Ed.) Marx and Engels: Basic Writings on Politics and 
Marxists of course are not reluctant to characterize system behavior as repressive and it is the emphasis on repression and the importance of directly challenging the state apparatus which often most clearly separate Marxist from non-Marxist socialists. Marxist see repression as a generalized rather than a particularized phenomenon. In empirical social science the study by Matthews and Prothro identifies what might be repression of a particular group. The very recent empirical studies of system unresponsiveness which I discussed in Chapter 3 were largely conducted self-consciously in response to the political science "mainstream" (and by, in the case of Parenti at least, researchers thoroughly familiar with Marxist analysis). What is then an uncharacteristic explanation in empirical social science is probably the most thoroughly developed aspect of the Marxist explanation. Under the heading of unresponsiveness we might include such explanations as the economic centralization which undermines the decision-making power of parliaments and even erodes the sovereignty of nations and their capacity to make internal decisions, the tendency toward working-class quietude in those metropolitan nations which make major gains from imperialism, the all-pervasiveness of market place individualism, and again the power and one-sidedness of the means of mass education and communication. Actual repression by the state apparatus of liberal democracies is also seen to be particularized only in the sense that it is 'held in reserve' by the dominant classes and used only when their power seems to them seriously threatened.

Life experiences -- especially work experiences, but as well, for example, oppression based on sex and race -- are seen by Marxists to
the participatory inclinations and capacities of the working class. Workplace structures are examined in great detail with those empirical social scientists who discuss at all, regarding the boredom and lack of creativity of most work, but as well and with great emphasis, Marxists examine the hierarchy of the workplace setting, control over the design of the product produced, control over work location and conditions, control over the pace of work, control over the secondary effects of the industry, e.g., pollution or resource depletion, and control over the quality of the product. Again what is an incident and occasional part of the body of explanation in empirical social science is a central and well-developed analytic argument in Marxism.

Finally, let us look at an explanation which empirical social science has found to be the case for a few low participators: abstinence as an expression of anti-system feelings including non-voting as a conscious act of withdrawal of system support. This factor is also rarely emphasized by Marxists; and this silence is on the surface at least surprising. I believe that the best way to account for this lack of emphasis is to realize again that what Marxists are explaining in most instances is a phenomenon wider than non-voting. If pressed on that particular issue they would likely make such an assertion but that issue is not the major focus of their concern. Further it is not valid in most political systems because in most systems there are Marxist candidates. Where there are not, there has either been legal repression which then becomes the more fundamental explanation of there is a thoroughgoing quietude which demands quite different explanations than

52 See, for example, Lipset Political Man, pp. 198-200 as one of the exceptions.
"ERROR IN NUMERATION ONLY"
what is the opposite situation: quietude with regard to overall system disaffection. In effect there are few analysts of any perspective who see this factor, one which is moving large numbers of people and I see no reason to disagree here with this assessment.

In concluding this chapter I would also like to discuss briefly a few even broader differences between the explanations offered by Marxism and those offered by empirical social science. To begin with, as has been mentioned at several points, Marxism places far greater emphasis on structural and system-oriented explanations than has empirical social science. Explanations rooted in the absence or presence of individual characteristics of the disadvantaged are nearly altogether absent in Marxism. To the extent that individual or group 'shortcomings' are discussed, they are seen as totally derivative from fundamental flaws in the social structure and thereby not of great explanatory import. Some of the methodological roots of this characteristic will be discussed in the next chapter; it will suffice for the present to merely make this observation. The further observation might also be made here that there is a current tendency in the empirical study of relative inactivity to be more concerned as well with structural explanations.

Secondly, the first order concern of Marxism with historical specificity has meant that Marxism has been relatively quick to seek explanations of inactivity which are comparative both historically and cross-culturally. The seeking of valid generalizations and universals is overshadowed by the attempt to locate and explain the uniqueness of
particular situations. Obviously generalization and the analysis of exceptional situations are intellectual processes which are interrelated and interdependent. I suspect that the difference of emphasis lies in the fact that Marxism carries with it an elaborate body of what from the viewpoint of social science must be seen as assumptions about the operation of the physical and social universe. (Marxism would call these matters laws, but the evidence for many of them, as will be partially shown in the next chapter, is very limited.) To illustrate the depth of the difference, consider that even the matter at hand here — the widespread quietude of the working-class of the developed West — is often explained as if it were an exceptional circumstance. That is, it is 'exceptional' in that it flies in the face of the fundamental tenets of historical and dialectical materialism. It most decidedly is not a matter which can be taken to be simply a reasonably reliable empirical generalization for which a partially valid explanation might be that that is the way such people are. Analysis and explanation are imperative and in a sense are the means by which theory is sustained in the face of empirical reality. Empirical reality is constantly forced into a perspective wherein its limits in time and space are probed. This process is not unique to Marxism; I believe, however, that the degree to and frequency with which it occurs is.

Related to the second characteristic of Marxist explanation is then another: the importance of theory as the basis of Marxist method and Marxist explanation. All of the Marxist explanations which were elaborated in this chapter can be seen to be derivative from the basic
Marxist-Leninist model of the functioning of the capitalist system. For example, Marx and Engels asserted in *The German Ideology* and elsewhere that the dominant ideology of any era is the ideology of the dominant social class. This 'guide' (in the form of an overstated generalization) is the initiator of careful analytic and empirical examinations of means and of effects in specific socio-historical contexts. These data can then be related to a wide variety of questions including that of the relative inactivity of the disadvantaged. Marxism is in the first instance deductive. Empirical social science on the whole -- and this can only be an impressionistic matter -- has been far more an inductive process.

Fourthly, what is taken to be the political universe is greatly expanded from that commonly accepted in political science. Marxism is a general science of society and history, its explanations do not adhere to disciplinary boundaries. Explanations of inactivity in the political process quickly cross into workplace experience, corporate structure, and a variety of aspects and effects of the economic market. Marxism further often gives explanations based on historical or sociological analysis; for example the historic impact of imperialism or the contemporary class structure. Again it is interesting that the empirical social sciences more and more are interpenetrating in this manner; this may be especially true of political science.

Finally here it must be noted that all Marxist explanations have a self-conscious activist dimension. Marx asserted the task of 'philosophy' is not to merely understand the world but to change it.
Every Marxist explanation implies a need to alter the present social reality. Further, many of its explanations are easily developed into strategies or even tactics for changing the social world. Perhaps much of Marxism's dependence on the empirical social world might derive from its usefulness as a political testing ground for the conclusions derived from studying it. 'Hypotheses' are tested in a process of action in the social world. Just as it is seen to be impossible to act effectively without understanding, it is a tenet of Marxism that one cannot understand fully without acting. It might be said that this factor adds a further dimension to the Marxist concern with the question of political activity.
CHAPTER 6

In this chapter I hope to proceed from the analytic summary of Marxist explanations presented in the last chapter to a further consideration of how Marxism has dealt with political inactivity. As I did in the elaborated consideration of the explanations of empirical social science, I will look here at Marxist explanations in a context of (1) a Marxist understanding of the political inactivity of the less advantaged, (2) Marxist methodology, and (3) the historico-political context within which the explanations considered were presented.

One observation should be made here immediately: the conservative understanding applied only a part of empirical social science (albeit, for the period 1950-1965, to what might well have been the dominant portion of those who studied the subject empirically). The understanding which I will attribute to Marxism is applicable to most Marxists though it is less often directly stated by any of them -- it, simply, is fundamentally a part of their whole outlook. This is not to say I see Marxism as a monolithic perspective. As I have tried to show as a part of my presentation of Marxist explanation, and as is generally known, Marxism is a very broad political and methodological umbrella. However, I think it is fair to say that where behavioralism shares some methodological presuppositions -- it is somewhat more than a 'mood' -- Marxism as part of its minimum corpus shares a somewhat wider range of political views. It is unusual and difficult for empirical social scientists to express a 'political' viewpoint in the context of their research (and the statements of the conservative understanding might
be criticized on that ground). This is not the case in Marxism where from the viewpoint of empirical social science, the subjective and the objective could be said to be either fused or confused. Some very basic political assumptions are shared by those who see themselves as Marxist scholars and this sharing is somehow more necessary that it is within empirical social science.

I

When the explanations of Marxism and empirical social science were contrasted at the conclusion of the last chapter, it was found that they differed considerably although at times the difference was one of emphasis. When one attempts to itemize a Marxist understanding of the inactivity of the less advantaged which parallels the six points which were set out for the conservative understanding the viewpoint is clearly a polar opposite. The six elements which most Marxists might accept could, I believe, be stated as follows:

(1) The belief that the political inactivity of the less advantaged is a product of a variety of historically specific conditions which will, should, and must be overcome.

(2) The belief that the political inactivity of the less advantaged is a product of identifiable conditions specific to the social order

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1 That it could be criticized from the point of view of some empirical social scientists, I, as I have said above, approve of the practice of relating one's findings to such a perspective, however imprecise that procedure might have to be in many cases. In this particular case, as I argued in Chapters II and III, the practice need not have to be as imprecise and inaccurate as it was.
of capitalism and liberal democracy. That system is seen to be 'in the last analysis' a closed system without a revolutionary transformation of power relations.

(3) The belief that political inactivity might be a sign of either the rejection of the political system or of one or more of many existent forms of repression within that system.

(4) The belief that political progress requires a high level of political consciousness and activity on the part of the less advantaged.

(5) The belief that any tendency to low knowledgeable or tolerance has historically specific roots and may, if part of a conscious rejection of the limits of the political system, be part of the means of overcoming those shortcomings.

(6) The belief that certain forms of intolerance are necessary to political progress.

Related to these views is an overriding view that liberal democratic capitalist systems are fundamentally and 'correctly' unstable and inadequate.

There are few exceptions among Marxists to this overall point of view. One exception to the first element might be noted here: the view among orthodox Leninists that within a capitalist system the working class cannot attain more than trade union consciousness and that organizational ability and a theoretical overview must come in large measure from those outside the less advantaged groups. Also exceptional, of course, is much of the political practice within Communist regimes in power. The Marxist explanations of (apologies for) repressive post-revolutionary practice are well-known and legions and we needn't develop them here.
What is important here is that some aspects of this understanding seem to fly in the face of empirical evidence, even and perhaps especially historical evidence, the sort most commonly a part of Marxist explanation. For example, since political inactivity is not notably greater in non-liberal democratic, non-capitalist systems, how can that 'system' be said to explain inactivity? Further there has been little sign that liberal democracy is unstable in a systemic sense within advanced capitalist systems. Governments may be unstable, but there is little sign that socialist revolutions are common or pending within these forms of social order. There is further no solid evidence that many of those who are inactive are consciously rejecting the system.

That any of this understanding or that any of the Marxist explanations can be said to have been demonstrated depends very much on what sorts of evidence one is willing to accept. Thus, before we can proceed much farther with this discussion, we must discuss to some extent here the methodology and epistemology of Marxism.

II

Perhaps one of the best ways to begin to get at something of a broad view of Marxist methods is to consider how Marxists view empirical social science and its methods. This is perhaps very indirect; we are looking here at part of what Marxists think their methods are not. However, the ground here is highly abstract and in such matters clarity may
only be available in a process of comparison and contrast. A further and more important reason for proceeding this way at the outset is that, as will be shown shortly, methodological self-consciousness is not a strong aspect of Marxism and thus our best route to some perspective on its methods may well be an indirect one.

An interesting point of departure here is the observation that quite consistently some Marxists with whom we have dealt here take behavioral social science sufficiently seriously to feel that their work is at least in part an answer to that body of literature. This is a very recent and still atypical tendency in Marxism. Earlier very few were aware of empirical social science, and still I know of only a handful who are familiar with it in any detail.2

André Gorz in his preface to an American edition of his major work discusses what he believes to be a widespread, profound and growing need of many individuals in Western capitalist societies to find satisfaction and meaning in the work they do. These needs, as was discussed in the previous chapter, are such that they cannot be met without participation in decisions regarding what is produced, how it is produced, and to which human/social needs are given priority. But, he states

> These qualitative needs are not easily perceived. They are far less immediate than pain or hunger. As forcefully shown by Herbert Marcuse (in One Dimensional Man) they can be repressed and blurred by propaganda, indoctrination, and fun into some vague feeling of dissatisfaction and emptiness.” (p. x)

Some particular citations will follow; here I merely want to observe that this awareness centers largely in Britain, the United States, and especially Eastern Europe. One worthwhile source which should be mentioned here is Peter Berger (Ed.), Marxism and Sociology: Views from Eastern Europe (New York: Appleton-Century Crofts, 1969).

Again all page references are to Strategy for Labor unless otherwise noted.
The crucial needs to be met, again in Gorz' view are self-fulfillment and self-determination — these are needs of the 'human man' no longer those of the 'human animal'. The resolution of these needs is no longer obvious:

"Hunger calls for food to eat. But what does emptiness, boredom, dissatisfaction with life and with the world call for?" (p. x)

Gorz feels that these needs might be met, but that

"...this possibility is not automatically perceived; the very existence of 'free needs' depends on the social individuals ability to win consciousness of his potential freedom." (p. x)

This leads us to Gorz' central observation on the methods of empirical social science:

"This is why empirical sociologists tend to question the existence of these new and higher needs. The empirical individual is so conditioned by social and cultural patterns by indoctrination, values, and ways of reasoning that he cannot generally formulate what he feels."

Gorz, then, is conscious of empirical social science and seeks to understand why its findings differ from his firm beliefs. In so doing I take it that he gives some credit to the claim of social science to be

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4 Gorz later in discussing 'technocracy': "It shares this conservatism with all technicians insofar as they are empiricists. Conductor of an apparatus which interests him only for its smooth and efficient functioning, the technician cares a great deal more for the instrument than for the ends it serves. He lives from the beginning in a ready-made rationality with predetermined purposes which his work and his education do not lead him to question. The only truth is, for him, smooth functioning; and he sees value only in immediately applicable propositions. The rest is utopia." (p. 123) This can be taken as an additional comment on empirical social science and with the above statement it is very akin to the discussion of Marcuse's view which is elaborated shortly below.
scientific. This not altogether hostile attention should encourage non-Marxists regarding the prospects of a dialogue. Many, more orthodox, Marxists have been more inclined to dismiss empirical social science with a series of tired phrases.

Two of the other major works which we have considered above also directly address themselves to empirical social science. Baran and Sweezy, who open their book with a consideration of social science, praise the improved techniques and training of empirical social scientists, particularly economists, and then condemn what they take to be a celebration of American society and politics by that same social science. They, with perhaps a touch of paranoia, assert

"One can even say that social scientists, assuring us for so long that all was for the best in what they took to be the best of all possible worlds, did what they could to keep us from looking reality in the face." (p. 2)

But they are then willing to ask:

"How can we account for the paradox of more and better trained social scientists failing ever more glaringly to explain social reality?" (p. 2)

They only partially account for it with assertions regarding economic control of research and/or universities, but they quickly close that discussion in saying "...it would be both wrong and libelous to leave the matter there."

They argue rather that the problem lies in inherent limitations in the outlook and methodology of the social sciences. For example, they feel that an increasing specialization and compartmentalization creates a condition such that a view of society as a whole, "the chief preoccu-
pation of the great social thinkers, since it transcends all the specialities...simply disappears from the purview of social science. It is taken for granted and ignored." Accordingly they chose the epigraph for their book from Hegel, "The truth is the whole." Large truths they argue must be "pursued in their own right". (p. 3) They grant the usefulness of 'smaller truths' and acknowledge that they have borrowed liberally from the findings of social science (largely economics). They therefore "would be the last to belittle them".

In Marcuse's One-dimensional Man, "behavioral, operational" social science is central to his argument that contemporary developed societies have become "one-dimensional". For Marcuse, the trend to one-dimensionality (the absence of possibilities for critical reason):

"may be related to a development in scientific method: operationalism in the physical, behaviorism in the social sciences. The common feature is a total empiricism in the treatment of concepts; their meaning is restricted to the representation of particular operations and behavior." (p. 12)

Concepts become synonymous with their corresponding set of operations (means of measurement). He quotes physicist P.W. Bridgeman's description (I believe approvingly) of the future of scientific thought as one in which:

...we shall no longer permit ourselves to use as tools in our thinking concepts of which we cannot give an adequate account in terms of operations.6

Marcuse asserts that such modes of thought are today predominant in philosophy, sociology, psychology, and other fields; he sees this as a denial, "the transcending elements of Reason." In short,

"The insistence on operational and behavioral concepts turns against the efforts to free thought and behavior..."

"The insistence on operational and behavioral concepts turns against the efforts to free thought and behavior from the given reality and for the suppressed alternatives." (p. 16)

"Given reality" for Marcuse is not true reality. That this assertion and the following appear to the "contemporary" mind as quasi-mystical would be taken by Marcuse as further evidence of one-dimensionality.

"In the equation, Reason = Truth = Reality, which joins the subjective and the objective world into one antagonistic unity, Reason is the subversive power, the 'power of the negative' that establishes, as theoretical and practical Reason, the truth for men and things -- that is, the conditions in which men and things become what they really are."\(^7\)

Here we have logical positivism's polar opposite: the subjective, the ought; what for the ought; what for positivism is pure observer-self, becomes for Marcuse reality humanity somehow different from what it could be. This view which Marcuse asserts, it might be observed, is embodied in our use of language (thereby perhaps denying the one-dimensionality seen by Marcuse);

human acts are not commonly taken to be those which are statistically representative of the acts of homo sapiens.

Marcuse's view is in many ways an extreme one; he seems almost to distrust any need or attempt to merely explain the world as it is. There are less methodological Marxist writings wherein this inclination is, perhaps unintentionally, adhered to. However it should be added here that this weakness has, in turn, been pointed out by other Marxists. For example, in discussing the abstractness of Nicos Poulantzas'\(^7\)

\(^7\) Ibid., p. 123. This is, of course, more Hegel than Marx.
important recent work on the (capitalist) state Miliband notes:

"...the book hardly contains any reference at all to an actual capitalist state anywhere. Poulantzas says at the beginning of the work that 'I shall also take into consideration, not simply in research but also in exposition, concrete capitalist social formations,' But he doesn't....He seems to me to have an absurdly exaggerated fear of empiricist contamination ('Out, out damned fact')...."

Poulantzas follows very much in the hypertheoretical and obscure style of his mentor Louis Althusser. It is also interesting to note here that Marx himself, Engels in particular, and almost all Marxists—even many of the most unorthodox are intensely concerned not so much to avoid 'hyperfactualism', but to avoid being seen to be involved with the 'opposite' anathema: utopianism. This dual avoidance and some of its effects will be discussed in the concluding chapter which follows shortly.

Perhaps the most widely cited Marxist discussion which deals with the methods of empirical social science is the succinct essay "The Commitment of the Intellectual," by Paul A. Baran. Baran argues strongly

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against 'ethical neutrality' in the social sciences. At one point he wonders about the possibility that it is impossible to deduce "by means of evidence and logic alone any statements concerning what is good or what is bad or what contributes to, rather than militates against, human welfare." He then replies to this concern as follows:

"Whatever force there may be in this argument, it is actually beside the point. It can be readily granted that there is no possibility of arriving at a judgement on what is good or bad for human advancement which would be absolutely valid regardless of time and space. But such an absolute, universally applicable judgement might be called a false target, and the insistence on its indispensability is an aspect of a reactionary ideology. The truth is that what constitutes an opportunity for human progress, for improvement in the lot of men and also what is conducive or inimical to its realization, differs in the course of history from one period to the next, and from one part of the world to another. .... .... at no time has there been a possibility, or, for that matter, a necessity to arrive at absolutely valid solutions; at all times there is a challenge to use mankind's accumulated wisdom, knowledge, and experience to attain as close as possible an approximation to what constitutes the best solution under the prevailing conditions." (pp.10-11)

Baran then argues that "'ethically neutral' minders of their own business" dodge their responsibility as persons who have the education and 'know-how' to attain a worthwhile overview of socio-historical conditions and possibilities. He does not accept, in effect, the rightness of allowing a sharp value-fact dichotomy in social analysis. He holds that:

"An intellectual is (thus) in essence a social critic, a person whose concern is to identify, to analyze, and in this way to help overcome the obstacles barring the way to the attainment of a better, more humane, and more rational social order." (p. 14)

This viewpoint is a direct and fundamental differentiation from some basic suppositions of empirical social science, of the basic suppositions of empirical social science.
What then, can we conclude regarding Marxism’s view of itself from this brief look at its view of empirical social science? I think it is fair to assume that that which it sees as weaknesses in empirical social science it takes to be strengths of Marxism. Firstly here, Marxists suspect that there is much within the human make-up of the less advantaged which is at this juncture in history vague and repressed; it is not sufficiently self-conscious to be detected clearly by empirical research, yet is nonetheless real and important. The first question which might be asked in reply to this view is: if these dissatisfactions are not sufficiently articulated in the minds of the less advantaged to be measured, how likely is it that these detectable though not measurable tendencies might affect their behavior? Another point which should be made is that this matter, even if it were the case (and there is no way to surely demonstrate that it is), would not be grounds for claiming that there is any permanent flaw in empirical social science. It might be true either that further sophistication of observational techniques might locate the ‘missing links’ or more simply that no one has yet even looked for them.

Secondly, empirical social science is seen as too divided to perceive social truths only visible in the study of the interplay of all aspects of society over time. This critique too is at least in part off the mark if only because it is the case that empirical social science has in recent years been quite rapidly moving towards multidisciplinary, interdisciplinary and cross-disciplinary studies. Thirdly, empirical social science is, in its single-minded concern with the world-as-it-is, somehow incapable of critical power and thereby both supportive of the
established order and socially irresponsible. All of these criticisms are highly abstract and it is most interesting to note that very few Marxists, to my knowledge have offered any methodological critique which is more concrete or specific. Nevertheless, I believe we now have a bit of a perspective on what Marxists see as important and distinctive about their approach to social knowledge. This should be made more clear in a more direct look at what Marxists take to be the basis of their methodology.

12 I will look somewhat further into this critique in my last chapter. Most Marxists feel as Baran that this is related to the attempt of social science to attain value-neutral findings. It is far less often — and I think curiously — linked to such other tendencies which Marxists might see within the methodology of empirical social science such as atheoretical inclinations, ahistorical inclinations, methodological individuation, or an excessive inclination to quantification and thereby reductionism. None of these matters are discussed at any length in for example Istvan Meszaros' "Ideology and Social Science," in the Socialist Register 1970 (London: Merlin Press, 1972). Meszaros does however reaffirm the Marxist rejection of "neutrality". After a discussion of Weber in which he argues that Weber's writing had an ideological character, Meszaros states:

"The question remains though: is this the result of personal failure, or is it inherent in the method itself? In other words: is the programme itself valid, irrespective of its ideologically biased realization by Weber himself?

"The answer seems to me to be negative for the fundamental reason that the instruments and methods of social analysis can never be radically neutral with regard to their object." (p. 46)

Meszaros' article will be one of those discussed further in the last chapter.
What then do Marxists see as the nature of their own methodology, a methodology which presumably avoids the weaknesses they see in empirical social science? Most Marxist writing on methodology seems to be either thoroughly orthodox or abstractly obscure or both. Perhaps the best introductory consideration of these matters is with the former rather than the latter. There are few writings more orthodox than two booklets by the British Communist philosopher Maurice Cornforth; the first Materialism and the Dialectical Method and the second Historical Materialism. Dialectical materialism is seen to be the philosophical-epistemological heart of Marxism; its virtues and powers have been praised from Engels to the present. It is seen to contain the basic laws of development which describe (some even say 'guide') all in the natural, historical and intellectual realms. Historical materialism is taken to be the more detailed application of dialectical materialism to human history. We should perhaps begin then with a brief look at the 'basis' of Marxism, dialectics. (Materialism is summed up by Cornforth to three propositions, (1) briefly, everything which exists arises on the basis of material causes, (2) objective reality exists outside and independent of the mind which is itself a product of material processes, and (3) the world and its laws are knowable.) Motion and change are universals and dialectics is taken to be both a conclusion (laws of change) and a method (means of apprehending change). Above the laws of dialectics are two assumptions that everything is constantly in a process of change and that all things are somehow interrelated. Beyond that there are three laws of
dialectics:

(1) The law of the transformation of quantitative into qualitative change:

"All change has a quantitative aspect, that is, an aspect of mere increase or decrease which does not alter the nature of that which changes. But quantitative change, increase or decrease, cannot go on indefinitely. At a certain point it always leads to a qualitative change; and at that critical point (or 'nodal point,' as Hegel called it) the qualitative change takes place relatively suddenly, by a leap, as it were." (p. 82)

The classic examples here are the heating of water to a boil and the revolutionary overthrow of capitalism; the modern update is the 'critical mass' of nuclear explosions.

(2) The law of the unity and struggle of opposites (also called at times the law of contradiction or the law of interpretation of opposites).

"A suggestive but incomplete formulation of this law was given by Stalin in his Dialectical and Historical Materialism:

'Contrary to metaphysics, dialectics holds that internal contradictions are inherent in all things and phenomena of nature, for all have their negative and positive sides, a past and a future, something dying away and something developing; and that the struggle between these opposites, the struggle between the old and the new, between that which is dying away and that which is being born, between that which is disappearing and that which is developing, constitutes the internal content of the process of development, the internal content of the transformation of quantitative changes into qualitative changes.

The dialectical method therefore holds that the process of development from the lower to the higher takes place not as a harmonious unfolding

13See also Frederick Engels, The Dialectics of Nature or Anti-Dühring in numerous available editions. Marx himself spent little time on these matters. Page references here are to Cornforth, Materialism and the Dialectical Method.
of phenomena, but as a disclosure of the contradic-
tions inherent in things and phenomena, as a 'struggle' of opposite tendencies which operate on the basis of these contradictions.'

To understand development, to understand how and why quantitative changes lead to qualitative changes, to understand how and why the transition takes place from an old qualitative state to a new qualitative state, we have to understand the contradictions inherent in each thing and process we are considering, and how a "struggle" of opposite tendencies arises on the basis of these contradictions." (pp. 86-87)

It is now customary to add very quickly something on the order of the following:14

"We can never deduce what will happen in any particular case, or how a particular process can be controlled, from the universal idea of contradiction. As has already been stressed, the dialectical method does not consist in applying some preconceived scheme to the interpretation of everything, but consists in basing conclusions only on the "concrete analysis of concrete conditions".

Each kind of process has its own dialectic, which can be grasped only by the detailed study of that particular process...

....We cannot learn either the laws of physics or the laws of society if we try to deduce them from the universal idea of contradiction. We can learn them from by investigating physical and social processes. Physical movements and the movement of people in society are quite different forms of movement, and so the contradictions studied by social science are different, and work out in a different way, from those studied by physics. Social and physical processes are similar in that each contains contradictions, but dissimilar in the contradictions each contains." (pp. 95-96)

14 Generally reference here is made to Mao Tse-tung's essay "On Contra-
diction" wherein he made the distinction between "the universality" and the "particularity" of contradiction. (See Cornforth, p. 95)
(3) The law of the negation of the negation. Dialectical negation emphasizes that development is progressive and proceeds from one stage through the arising of an opposite which overcomes the original and eventually is itself overcome. The negation of the negation is not a return to the point of original, but the resolution of contradictions such that the process has evolved to a higher level. (see Cornforth, pp. 116-117). The classic examples are primitive communism-class society — communism-and seed — and fruit. The latter example is so obviously both selective and dubious in any case that it (and the third law) are not given a lot of attention these days.

It is not often understood that the 'laws of dialectics' are patterned as a reply to Aristotle's laws of formal logic and as such do quite sharply distinguish Marxism from 'ordinary' scientific method and scientific explanation. Filipov\textsuperscript{15} cites Hegel and Engels in this regard:

"According to the dialecticians, the basic shortcoming of logic lies in its laws, which are supposedly slavish silhouettes of stable things and cannot be applied to processes, to movement, to change, to life, or to anything that demands any significant flexibility of thought. Hegel maintained, for example, that formal-logical and rational thinking 'is inflexible and one-sided' and 'consistently leads to destructive and ruinous results.' Engels likewise maintained that in formal logic 'things and their mental images, ideas, are isolated, to be considered after the other apart from each other, rigid, fixed objects of investigation given once for all.'" (p. 15)

\textsuperscript{15}Alexander Philipov (usually spelled Filipov), Logic and Dialectic in the Soviet Union (New York: Research Program on the U.S.S.R., 1952)
Filipov's introductory sentence is, I feel, overstated; however, it is clearly the case that many 'dialecticians' have on some occasions harshly condemned logic itself.

The three basic laws of logic it can be recalled are: (1) the law of identity (A is A), (2) the law of contradiction (A cannot be simultaneously A and not-A) and (3) the law of the excluded middle (A thing is either A or not-A, and a third alternative does not exist). To the first law it is replied that nothing is the same, that all things are both the same and different. To the second law it is replied that the absence of contradiction is only the case for things which are static and lifeless; whenever there is change (elsewhere they argue this is always the case) there is contradiction. To the third law, it is replied that it is inapplicable to cases where A is in a transition stage in its development. In brief the laws of dialectics are taken to be applicable to a universe in which the only stable rule is that all things are in flux. Formal logic is seen, by Hegel and by most Marxists who have written on the subject (very few), to be unable to cope with such a universe.

There are several important criticisms of dialectical materialism which should be mentioned here. Filipov writes:

"Non-dialectical philosophy fully recognizes the laws of formal logic, but considers them only as a set of rules required for consistent thinking and valid inference. Dialectic, on the other hand, offers its principles as universal ontological laws, and in establishing them it completely repudiates the principles of formal logic." (p. 4)

Dialectical laws clearly have a character and status within Marxism which

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is very different from the character and status of logic within non-dialectical philosophy and science. Within Marxism the laws of dialectics, as Filipov implies, are not so much rules of procedure as conclusions. As universally general conclusions they, Marxists would have it, can also serve as guides to some notion of what to look for in any particular situation. This view too has been countered as well, especially by Sidney Hook\textsuperscript{17} who when he identifies seven distinct meanings of dialectic in Engels' writings includes and critiques several which are relevant here. At many points Engels sees dialectic as a universal and he quotes Engels who states that the dialectic is "the science of the general laws of motion and development of nature, human society and the state."\textsuperscript{18} Hook points out that this is not the case on the most obvious level, regarding a matter admitted by Engels, namely that non-dialectical thinking exists. As a 'guide' then the laws of dialectics are no more than suggestive.

Hook,\textsuperscript{19} however, maintains that as a guide dialectic is less than suggestive, rather it is irrelevant; he states that,

"to the extent that it can be intelligibly stated, it consists either of a series of common-places, completely irrelevant to the work of science, or of downright falsities and absurdities." (p. 201)


\textsuperscript{19}Page references are to "Science and Dialectical Materialism," op. cit.
And further that,

"It is obvious that a doctrine which holds that all things are dialectically interrelated cannot be a logical guide to any scientific inquiry or experiment which holds that some things are irrelevant to any particular phenomena we are exploring. (p. 201)

This does not however seem to refute the possibility that some of the time attempting to consider phenomena under study as if they were dialectically composed or interrelated can help to suggest explanations which are convincing in themselves or suggestive with regard to a need for empirical testing. That is, even though it is clearly less than it claims to be (it is surely not a complete method), it may be part of a useful alternative perspective.

Before extending this critique, however, we should very briefly look at the rest of what Marxists take to be their 'method.' Historical materialism, the general development of dialectical materialism in the sphere of human society and history, is again less a method than a language and a theory. Historical materialism is often equated with 'scientific socialism' and its central propositions have been repeated in innumerable summaries. One of the most concise of these is Maurice Cornforth's Historical Materialism. There he states:

"Marx and Engels based socialism on a scientific understanding of the laws of development of society and of the class struggle." (p. 11)

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Among its central propositions are the following:

(1) Power in any social order is the possession of the ruling class; the ruling class is defined as that social formation which controls the means of economic production.

(2) Whichever social class controls the means of production also controls both the state apparatus (the legal system and the physical means of coercion) and the ideological apparatus of society (the educational, intellectual and communications systems).

(3) In every hitherto existing society there has arisen a class which is antagonistic class whose needs are resisted by the ruling class.

(4) The ruling class and its opposition are determined by the relations of production (the social rules of relationships within the workplace and with regard to the social product).

(5) The relations of production are determined by the forces of production (the level and structure of the technical means of producing economically valued goods).

(6) At some point the forces of production are resisted in their further development by the relations of production which arose originally to further their advance.

(7) At that point, the disadvantaged class can attain full self-consciousness and overturn the social order and appropriate the means of production to meet its needs and in so doing advance the possibility that the forces of production can more fully develop to meet the social needs of the whole society.

(8) The above are social laws which operate some say wholly, others say
generally, outside the realm of human intentions.

(9) The basis of these laws is in the meeting of human material needs:

"Historical materialism finds the key to the laws of development of society in 'the simple fact that mankind must first of all eat, drink, have shelter and clothing, before it can pursue politics, science, art, religion, etc.' (Engels, "Speech at the Graveside of Karl Marx")." (Cornforth, p. 35)

(10) No individual can affect history (social development) without the support of a class.

(11) No qualitative social change can occur unless a new class gains control of the bureaucratic and military apparatus of the state.

(12) The forces of production and the relations of production establish for all individuals a set of interests and these interests determine the nature of all religious, political, philosophical, moral and aesthetic ideas.

(13) Under capitalism there is a massive advance in the forces of production (the social capacity to produce material goods).

(14) The overwhelming majority of people are proletarianized -- they cease to own or control any element of the means of production. Artisans are displaced by factory production, factories unite into industries, industries into cartels (multi-national corporations); small producers are replaced in sector after sector. Capitalist social relations spread into all sectors including distribution and agriculture.

(15) All social relationships tend to be transformed into market relationships.
(16) The capitalist market economy is unstable and tends to overproduction largely because producers produce considerably more than they receive as compensation for their work.

(17) The proletariat is politicized by its having been brought together into ever more massive forms of production and social organization. It eventually becomes impossible not to see that proletarians their problems are social problems and that the only solution is a common and universal solution.

There is much more to the theory but these are its basic outlines, some of those which have not been clearly refuted by events largely unanticipated by Marx and Engels; those about which there is little controversy within Marxism. This model of historical development is constantly interrelated with actual historical development and tested in political practice. This interplay is the heart of the Marxist method and the source of whatever strengths Marxist explanation has.

But that granted it must be added that historical materialism is a theory so general, comprehensive, and well-integrated that it has on many occasions served to retard the apprehension of an empirical reality which has developed in unanticipated ways. If empirical social science could be accused sometimes taking the world-as-it-is to be the world-as-it-should-be, Marxism could be accused of taking the world-as-it-should-be to be the world-as-it-is. If empirical social science has been slow to develop critical theorizing because it is too immersed in a hypercertain measurable present, Marxism has been slow to grasp the measurable present because it has been immersed in a hypercertain critical theorizing.
We are now to a point where in continuing we will again take up as well the concerns with which the first section of this chapter closed: why are some aspects of the Marxist understanding seemingly contrary to or somehow logically unrelated to empirical reality? In dealing with this question we can attempt now to interrelate the same matters which were discussed in chapter 3: understanding, explanation, methodology and aspects of the historico-social setting of the analysts in question. It is my view that as with empirical social science Marxist explanations and understandings are historically and methodologically conditioned, but again as with empirical social science, are not rigidly determined by this interrelationship. In turn, at least a portion of the effect on explanation is a result of the effects on Marxist methodology of its historico-political settings. And, as well, both the explanations of the inactivity of the less advantaged and the methods used in studying this question can be seen to have been affected by the Marxist understanding of this issue. I will try to sort out some of these interactions as concisely as possible in the few pages which follow. I will do so under three headings: (1) the effects on Marxist methodology of its original and contemporary historico-political settings, (2) the effects of these settings and this historically conditioned method on
the Marxist understanding of the inactivity of the less advantaged,
(3) the possible effects of the Marxist understanding on the Marxist
explanations of the inactivity of the less advantaged and on Marxist
methods of producing those explanations. This discussion will, of
course, be no more than suggestive; a thorough examination of any one
of these headings would need to be at least book length.

First the study of political participation which produced the ex-
planations and the understanding, which I outlined in chapters 3 and 4
took place in a time and space very delimited relative to that of Marxism;
accordingly I will have to be very selective here. Regarding the locus
of the original theory, mid-nineteenth century Western Europe, there are
a few observations which it might be useful to make. First, Marxist
notions about the role of the state were set down in a context prior to
the granting generally of anything approaching even universal male
suffrage. 21 Most was written then prior to the organization of mass
electorally-oriented parties of the working class. The class composi-
tion of the British or any other parliament of that time was not mixed,
nor were to any great extent the attitudes of their members with regard

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21 The suffrage was extended to most male non-slaves in the United States
in 1830 but this was uncommon; the first lowering of property quali-
fications in England came in 1832, but the largest change occurred with
the third Reform Bill of 1885, well after Marx's death. Nevertheless,
at various times Marx and/or Engels granted some credence to the pos-
sibility of peaceful transitions to socialism in Holland and England.
Marx in the writing of Capital spoke favorably of and relied on the
reports of the British factory inspectors, who were, of course, part
of the 'apparatus' of a capitalist state.
to, for example, capitalism (except to the extent, of course, that some yet preferred feudalism). It is little wonder then that the theoretical model of the capitalist socio-political order that has served as the heart of Marxist study since seems too inflexible to so many today with regard to judgements about the role of the state, about class domination of the ideological apparatus, about the nearly flat assertion that only revolutionary transformations would have any significant effect and so forth.

Second, Marx's and Engels' belief in the relative 'ease' and 'naturalness' of a revolutionary transformation was conditioned by the comparative weakness of the nineteenth as opposed to the twentieth century military-police apparatus of the state; there were few standing armies and, of course, weaponry distribution was far less one-sided than it is today even in the most backward of societies.

Third, Marx assumed that the proletariat was destined to become the overwhelming majority of the population. He was correct in his assumptions (for many societies) about rural depopulation and/or industrialization and about the increasing proportion of production and distribution that would be in the hands of large industrial capitalist-owned organizations. However, while he did anticipate to some extent automation, he did not seemingly consider that this would reduce the relative proportion of workers employed within these monopoly sectors of the economy. The independent middle-class has not shrunk all that much. And, more important and generally unanticipated (although doubtless some hints are available in his vast writings), is the rise and continued growth of a distinctive, well-paid, white collar middle-class which
has largely been loyal to established order in almost every way. And still more important, this section of the population has shared in the control, and to some extent the ownership, of the industrial corporation via the joint-stock company which Marx had noted in its very beginnings but apparently had not considered significant. Needless to say Marx did not anticipate that huge sections of the population would be engaged in 'non-productive' labor whose primary functions would be 'national defense' and 'internal security' or functions solely dependent on the continuation of a capitalist arrangement of production and exchange (sales, finance, insurance, advertising, market research, product development and so forth). Their attitudes cannot be expected to be straightforwardly those of the proletariat. For all these reasons (and more) much of the theoretical understanding of the original theory is limited in many complex ways.

Fourth, and last here, Marx did not anticipate the effects of his own theory on the ruling class. He did not fully incorporate

22 Obviously not all aspects of these occupations are utterly determined by capitalist character of production, but most are. Consider, for example, the over 200 persons employed by General Motors to research the sound made by the closing of a car door.

23 Nor does his theory, stated in rigid terms, allow for his own insights. That is, how is it that members of the upper-middle class (Engels owned a factory) could get outside of the ideological blinkers of their class? What is it which distinguishes them from the overwhelming majority which cannot? Is there not more of an historical role for the individual than Marxist theory might allow? Did Stalin's personality affect Soviet Russia or was Stalin a necessary product of the Leninist system operant in a less-developed nation? And while we are concerned with the relationship between base (economics and superstructure (politics, ideas, etc.)) do not socialist states dominate economies? Which did come first, the protestant ethic or the rise of capitalism? All of these matters can be recalled when I discuss below the rigidity of Marxist theory.
into his dialectical understanding of social evolution the possibility that capitalists would concede partial ground to avoid totally losing control of the situation. Thus the labor movement, the welfare state and other aspects of contemporary liberal democratic states have in part taken account of and co-opted working class discontent and organizational strength.

Marxist theory of course is an evolving theory and has gradually moved to incorporate these changes into its understanding of contemporary society. But it, given the rigid and universalist terms in which the original theory was stated (at least in part a function of conditions as they existed), has been at times very slow to adjust its viewpoint. Some of those slownesses and their effects will be discussed shortly.

Before turning to that discussion, I want to make one further point here. Marxism was born following an era of grand theoretical breakthrough in humanity's understanding of the physical universe, and in the midst of similar breakthroughs regarding the biological universe (Marx, in fact, wanted to dedicate Das Kapital to Charles Darwin). Marxism's beginnings were conceived in the mind of a man whose education followed the teachings of one of the most spectacularly sweeping and comprehensive analysts of human history (Hegel). Marx 'stood Hegel on his head,' inverted his idealist causational structure, but

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24 See, for example, Robert W. Tucker's Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961) for an examination of the relationship between Marx, Hegel, Kant and others. I have many serious reservations about this book but I will spare the reader from that discourse here.
did not escape his, one might say, disinclination to tentativeness. Marx and Engels, too, were reacting to the hyperutopianism of the French socialists and true to the dialectical materialism their socialism is proclaimed to be totally without a utopian dimension. It might be said regarding this that they protest too much and thereby belie the fundamentally teleological nature of their understanding of history. The world necessarily will be as it ought to be. The desire becomes scientifically determined destiny and indications are read as unidirectional certainties. William James' faith ladder was climbed to an upper, millenialist rung.

These characteristics have tended to encourage a character in the Marxist theoretical model, on which the Marxist method has depended, which could be called a general inflexibility; it is a model only slowly pervious to altering empirical realities. Many Marxists have been complementing this characteristic by selective perception and application of changes which have unfolded in the empirical world. When many Marxists have made a case for preserving or changing the theory they have presented the empirical evidence in ways which are essentially 'politically' selective rather than involving random samples.

One example of this pattern can be found in the work by Gorz which I have cited several times before. At several points Gorz makes very broad statements and then demonstrates his point with a few examples; these examples, it might be argued, are in actuality atypical -- or at

the least are not randomly chosen from the universe to which he generalizes:

"In short, to those who argue that the trade unions' institutional integration within the Capitalist logic and the Capitalist system proves that the working class itself is integrated, it has to be objected that the trade union integration does not prove a thing. On the contrary, whenever and wherever the workers have a chance to assemble freely, to discuss things at length, to self-organize, to decide the methods and the content of their struggle, their demands tend to go far beyond normal trade union demands. They tend to attack not only the rate of exploitation but look for ways to attack the very mechanism of exploitation in its various aspects and, ultimately, the despotic and centralized power structure of the Capitalist division of labor.

Quite a number of remarkable strikes that have recently occurred in France and Italy would deserve to be described in this regard. What was refused during these strikes was, e.g., the wage scales and the allocation of jobs and of machines. In one instance at least that I know of, young workers effectively refused job evaluation by swapping and reallocating jobs and machines among themselves in order to prove the arbitrariness of wage differentials. Work speed-ups were refused collectively at the Pirelli plant in Torino, e.g., by throwing out engineers, supervisors and job analysts and by having the whole complex plant of 5000 workers run smoothly and clock-wise at a reduced speed that workers had determined on their own. At the gigantic Fiat plant in Torino, one key demand is the outright abolition of so-called unskilled work and the automatic promotion to skilled work of any worker having worked on the assembly lines or on simple machines for a maximum of two years. Other demands it's worthwhile mentioning relate to the rotation of jobs, to the enlargement of jobs, to the recognition of equal qualifications and equal pay to all workers of a shop, etc." (p. 34), emphasis added)

The strikes it would seem were chosen because they were "remarkable" in this case, exceptional in particular ways; the bounds of the universe are not made clear (all workers or all workers free to discuss things at length, if the latter, how is this defined, etc.). Further even if
the universe could be taken to be bounded with sufficient clarity what
evidence is there that the cases chosen are typical (if a random sample
isn't possible the cases should, it would seem, be chosen on some basis
other than that they fit the conclusion); it is not even made clear in
this particular case what reason we might have for believing that the cases
discussed are cases which lie within the bounds of the universe of which
they are taken to be exemplary.

I do not want to be taken to be arguing that all analysis must be
patterned on the most common forms of statistical analysis. I believe
that this would close out far too many matters which must be scrutinized
and, in fact, I am convinced that empirical social science uses such
methods to excess. What I am arguing is that Gorz hitook a procedure
which can really do no more than disprove that a contrary case is uni-
versally true and used it to suggest one of several things (often without
making it clear which of them is being claimed). The several things in-
clude (1) that one had located a generalized condition contrary to the
original 'hypothesis,' (2) that one had located a trend or the early
beginnings of a trend that (3) one had located a possibility, a poten-
tiality. If one is asserting the first case, one is obliged to demonstrate
that one's examples are typicalities. If one is asserting the second

26 I have not given more than one example here myself largely because I am not
trying here to demonstrate that my example from Gorz is the case for all
or most Marxists; (I do believe that this pattern of weaknesses in proce-
dure is not uncommon. Another example occurs on the very same page in
Gorz and other failures to clarify the generalizability of one's examples
can also be found, for example, on both sides of the debate over the
'revolutionary potential' of the new working class. Further, such ten-
dencies have also been discussed above regarding the laws of dialectical
materialism.)

(continued on following page)
case one should attempt to show that one's examples are typical with regard to matters of an increasing incidence which can be expected to continue, perhaps at an increasing rate. If one is asserting the third case, one should also consider the additional question how generalized a potentiality one has located. However, to demonstrate initially that potentiality exists, one really only needs one example (or even a good analytic case with no examples). One then might seek in practice to realize the potentiality in social action (or seek to avoid it), or simply offer one's case that the (desirable) potentiality exists and trust that if it is real enough one's communications about it will be listened to and acted upon by others.  

These are some aspects of some of the effects of the rigidity with which the original Marxist model was set out. There was little 'tentativeness' or 'limitedness' about many of the assertions of Marx and Engels ('All history is the history of class struggle' means more

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continued from previous page

What I do hope to be doing in my discussion of this one case is to illustrate one of the many ways in which a theoretical model might avoid the modifications suggested by changing empirical reality. The classic case of avoidance, of course, is the long, long delay over the realization that the working class had not, as Marx had seemingly in places suggested, become absolutely more impoverished as capitalism evolved. What I suspect is the more common means of such avoidance has been already mentioned; namely, the simple isolation of one's model in a cloud of hyperabstract theorizing.

One, of course, has to consider -- as Marx did not fully -- that the social channels of communication in most social orders will tend to make one's arguments more readily available to the elite than to the less advantaged.
than there has always been a class struggle going on somewhere). This original characteristic was historically conditioned as I have briefly indicated above and there are characteristics in the contemporary setting of Marxism which further reinforce that tendency. Not the least of these characteristics is the institutionalization of the theory within Marxist movements whose membership is self-selected in part by the appeal of this characteristic of the theory. A further important, though a speculative, contemporary pressure towards inflexibility is related to the fact that this Marxist movement has come power in societies which had not begun to approach the necessary minimum level of economic development needed to sustain a fully socialist or communist society. And, it might be said, that it has not come to power in those which have developed in part because it came to power prematurely in some which hadn't. The dominant forms of its evolved theory, then, have been formulated in settings short of those within which its more tolerant and imaginative aspects might have developed more fully. Those regimes which have developed the versions of its theory which are often seen to be the most authoritative, further, are in power in societies which in no case had any significant prior experience of liberal-democratic practice of any kind. Further, for that matter, few of those had a developed working-class, old or new; most were fundamentally feudal at the time Marxists came to power. These factors one might expect, might well have hindered the growth of theoretical flexibility.

To complicate this issue even a bit further, we are here demonstrating the roots of Marxist inflexibility using essentially a Marxist methodology (the tracing of 'interestedness' through time and space). This is, of course, an exceedingly loose use of the term 'Marxism.'
Finally here this matter may be more concretely a product of the widespread adoption and institutionalization of a Leninist interpretation and development of Marxism. The leadership of hierarchical vanguard parties can easily become isolated from the perspective of even their own membership, not to mention those masses seen to be unable to attain truth on their own. When these parties practice democratic centralism as it has been practiced in most cases (with little or no allowance for internal factions or tendencies) it is not likely that new ways of thinking, new ways of relating theory to changing reality, will be widespread within the organization.

(2 and 3) My discussion of the second and third points at the beginning of this section will be brief and can be offered as one. The Marxist understanding of the inactivity of the disadvantaged can be logically deduced from the Marxist historical-theoretical model of the capitalist politico-economic social order. This is a very different situation from that of empirical social science which lacks any single widely accepted general theory. The Marxist understanding is to a great extent an intimate part of its theory -- a theory which is 'on the level of' understanding both because it is sufficiently general and because it is value-relevant by virtue of its overriding teleological character. (To continue to maintain that a global communism is a necessary outcome of human history given the numerous ways in which the Marxist analysis of the development of capitalist political economy has been shown inaccurate over the past century reflects an immanentist even metaphysical perspective. That it is yet a possible outcome few would deny, that pure communism, withered away state and all, is a desirable outcome I, for one, would
accept; that it is a certain outcome is hardly demonstrable. An excellent case could be made, I think, that it seems less likely an eventuality now than it might reasonably have 80 or 100 years ago. 29

The various elements of the Marxist understanding as was mentioned above seem to conflict with the empirical reality of the ongoing stability of liberal democracy even within unstable capitalist economies. This is not to say that this is necessarily an eternal condition but it is to say that it seems more flexible a condition than Marxist theory or the Marxist understanding might imply. To believe that full political consciousness has not been attained so long as a Marxist political consciousness -- as Marxism now stands -- has not been attained (as at least the first three elements of the Marxist understanding imply) may well be the heart of the inflexibility of Marxist theory and method of which I spoke earlier. If one's understanding is ineffective in changing the world, one elaborates the model rather than qualitatively altering it. The elements of the Marxist understanding together do not seem to allow for the possibility that the sum of all the possible explanations of inactivity rooted in the shortcomings of the liberal democratic capitalist system is, however important, insufficient. Again this is especially true if inactivity is defined to include the absence of an explicitly Marxist political consciousness. However, unless one grants that

29 Most Marxists would, of course, deny that Marxism is teleological or that it mattered one way or the other that communism was 'desirable'. The lessened likelihood mentioned is a result of such factors as the rise of massive state military power, the wider sharing of control or at least the possibility of perceived control and the continued functioning of liberal democracy to the point where it commonly incorporates Marxist parties as minority or even near majority elements within the system.
possibility it is impossible for Marxism to feel much weight from even a millenium of popular rejection. It becomes a closed and unresponsive system. This tendency to closure in the Marxist understanding of political inactivity limits to some extent its explanatory power.

Might it not be the case that part of the explanation of the 'inactivity' of the less advantaged is in part a function of a real though limited and certainly not universal power sharing within liberal democratic systems? Might it not be the case that liberal democratic systems have granted a real though limited possibility of autonomous individual and collective self-expression in cultural, political and philosophical spheres? This does not weaken any particular Marxist explanation of inactivity but it does call to question whether the total package is sufficient. The package of Marxist explanations implies that massive systemic effort is needed to keep the working class from the view that the political game is rigged. If that game is less than utterly rigged, then perhaps some inactivity results from comforts in the system rather merely in its flaws.

Finally here, it should again be stated clearly what is part of Marxism's strength: its capacity for developing explanations, its comprehensive, integrated, and critical theory of the whole of history and particularly the capitalist social order, is also part of its greatest weakness: its slowness to incorporate changes in the 'detail' of the

30 For example, one needn't abandon total rejection of a capitalist economic order to grant that a popular tradition of civil libertarianism is not only a progressive step 'over feudalism' but in fact is a condition which should be an ongoing part of any progressive social order. Few Marxists, even Trotskyists who are of course explicitly and consistently anti-Stalinists, will grant this forthrightly.
empirical social world into its overall theory. In the last section of this chapter I would like to consider how the particular explanations which it has developed might be strengthened, might be given an empirical dimension. In effect, the question is how might Marxism be operationalized? A further question, which cannot be answered very well until there have been more attempts to carry through on the first, is: could the results of such testing be effectively reincorporated into Marxist theory?

IV

It is really only when one tries to consider how one might attempt to locate empirical support for the explanations offered by Marxists that one finds how different their procedures are from those of empirical social science. They have only very rarely made concrete and specific attempts to link differentials in inactivity or political consciousness (cross-nationally, cross-class, historically, or individually) with differentials in the explanatory factors they have (or easily could have) related to this phenomenon. One of the clearest exceptions to this criticism is Nairn's attempt to trace the domestic effects of British imperialism, and even there it is never clear on what grounds Nairn is so sure the British working-class is less active than any other working-class. (Nor is it clear to which working-class it is being
compared.) This can, of course, be partially accounted for that what is being explained are not the differential per se but a perceived generalized inactivity of the less advantaged of all Western liberal democracies. But this surely begs the question. If the explanation put forward cannot be isolated as a factor or a characteristic which has real and measurable effect in the sector of the universe where the dependent variable (inactivity) is more common mustn't one abandon one's argument? The question is so obvious to empirical researchers it is doubtless a mystery to them that Marxists do not always and in every case proceed in this fashion. There are reasons why this is not in all cases a first-order procedural question for Marxists.

Such reasons might include the following (some of these matters have been mentioned as well in other contexts):

(1) Many Marxist explanations are at a high level of generality wherein it is difficult to find variations or exceptional cases. (For example, the argument that working class consciousness is hindered by capitalist control of the media might be, unless operationally defined, almost a truism.)

(2) Units of analysis being most often systemic and/or class structure in a given system there is never a large N and thereby many statistical techniques are precluded.

(3) Marxists are also very much inclined to look at particular situations, comparing many aspects of that particular case to their generalized multi-faceted theory. This contrasts to procedures in which one dependent variable is isolated and an attempt is made to link it generally to a limited number of variables presumed to be independent.
(4) A logically satisfying relationship to a general theory is taken to be a far more important aspect of explanation than is any one or several empirical measured comparisons. The theoretical dependence is so great that usually no quantitative measures are attempted.

(5) Empirical measures of all kinds will have little significance in Marxist analysis until they are available in time sequence and thereby able to establish trends. The capturing of 'moments' (and loci) which cannot be compared to other 'moments' (and loci) is of little interest.

(6) The general theory provides a variety of criteria for significance such that many factors of great importance are among the factors which, while measurable in principle, are obviously extremely difficult to actually measure in practice. For example: how might one measure economic market dominance of social value through time? Or the economic or social impact of imperialism? Perhaps the classic case to consider here might be the determination in a valid and reliable way of the locus of political power. Surely, most would agree both that there is more to it than an undisguised researcher might likely be able to observe, but that it is very hard to be very precise about what it is that can't be observed. There is potential power as surely as nearly everyone proceeds in ways which anticipate that potential. Measuring the potential or the anticipation is an extraordinarily difficult matter. Marxists are more inclined to rely on explanations which rely on aspects of their theory, which are important internally to that theory, and which externally have
been found to be important with regard to other questions. The most important matters have in the past often been found to be hidden or unquantifiable.

(7) The more important test is political effectiveness not conclusions drawn 'in the abstract.'

All of this is, of course, not to say that Marxist explanations or similar matters have never been operationalized or could not be. It is to say that from a Marxist viewpoint at least much would be lost by making empirical tests one's only or primary criterion for accepting an explanation.

Perhaps the best way to clarify much of what has preceded immediately above and generally in this chapter is to consider a few ways in which one might try to operationalize and test each of the explanations offered by the Marxists. In so doing, I will also try to comment a bit on any reduction that occurs in the theoretical relevance of concepts, or in the generality of explanation. I will also try to point out some of the problems of operationalization particular to each case.

(1) Workplace conditions, including the extremely hierarchical structure of all aspects of decision-making in most factories are clearly extremely complex matters to test operationally. One might locate a factory in which hierarchy is extreme and workers have no shop-floor input or room for flexibility of procedure and thereby provoke consciousness. Studies have shown, for example, that assembly-line workers are generally more radical politically than other workers; (though they don't necessarily participate more politically). Or such

31I will reconsider here the thirteen Marxist explanations which were presented originally in the previous chapter.
conditions might provoke a progressive and active union, e.g., the United Automobile Workers in both the United States and Canada, and in so doing mean that workers are indeed involved in some aspects of workplace decision-making. Again, for example, the UAW is training shopfloor workers in the operation of noise and pollution meters for in-plant use. Further it might be the case that a given management adopts an open and encouraging attitude toward workers' involvement in decision-making and accompanies it with a we're-all-in-this-together and/or professional-ethic attitude campaign. There are, of course, a variety of operant profit-sharing schemes, suggestion rewards schemes, and so forth in industry. Any of these things might tend to discourage political consciousness and/or political participation by subjecting workers to pressures towards separating themselves in political life from workers generally.

What these matters indicate, I believe, is that it would be a very difficult matter indeed to separate a sample of industrial locations into "more participatory" and "less participatory" groups and look then at the political behavior within one or the other. Much effect might come from simply the knowledge -- even vague impression -- of what conditions of work are like for people 'like oneself' regardless of what one's particular conditions are like. The greatest effect might come from how one's conditions came to improve, e.g., was it via collective demands from below producing change. If so, are those presently benefitting aware of that history? (Tests of knowledge of labor history among workers might prove interesting here and generally.) Those with bad conditions might well be conditioned to a great extent in their response by the prospects for change and their perception of them -- in a poor
area where industry is in decline "undemocratic" work conditions might have the opposite effect from a prosperous, labor-short area. Political effect might also vary individually with workers' skill level and so forth.

In sum, it would seem that the best empirical tests would involve a series of before and after situations where a variety of different changes in workplace structure coming about in a variety of different contexts are studied. I don't think any other kind of study would often be either valid or reliable. Clearly what is involved here is an incredible research task which can only be accomplished over a very long period of time within which one must keep aware of changes in general setting.

(2) Marxists make the point that people relate to the capitalist marketplace as atomized individuals and thereby I expect might be interested in a study which attempted to locate the relationship of, on the one hand, political activity and political attitudes, and on the other, consumption habits and attitudes. Are persons who buy an atypically expensive car for those of their income, family size, location and so far more or less politically conscious and active than those who don't? What of those who spend atypically large amounts of money on highly advertized sundries or patent low-budget status symbols? Are they seeking and/or finding privatistic solutions and thereby 'avoiding' collective solutions? Or are they individuals who carry a deep status need which spills over in both buying habits and politics? This would not be a difficult study to carry out, if access were found to the
studies already gathering data on measures of buying and whatever social and psychological variables are being checked, one would only need to affix a few rider questions to have a large selection of 'controls.' One might expect that there exists in market research firms that there are data banks which might make those of all political science pale by volume comparison. Some of it might be made useful in new ways.

I don't, however, believe that a failure to turn up any relationships here would necessarily exclude the possibility that this factor was operant nevertheless. That is it might be the case that the effect is either highly generalized or very subtle or both. That is, it might be a matter of the accumulated effects of the thousands and thousands of semi-perceived messages being a modest and general decline in the ability to imagine collective means of meeting one's felt needs. This would be an extremely difficult matter to pin down in any ordinary questionnaire procedure. Further, one cannot gain much from cross-cultural studies as, e.g., comparing by advertising frequency or regulations (Italy, for example, only allows advertising during a half-hour evening time slot) as there are not enough cases to allow for the screening out of the other sources of difference in the dependent variable. One could do studies over time but, alas, no one is claiming that there is so direct and clear an effect as an effect on voter turnout. Aside from the attitude surveys suggested above, the best prospect for a real measure here would be the unlikely eventuality of bans on all forms of advertising in a mixed sample of nations.

(3) The ideological apparatus might more neutrally, if one chose
to be neutral, be called sources of political culture. How might the Marxist view of these institutions (that they are systematically biased) be tested empirically? How might the effects of this bias (if found) on political inactivity be tested empirically? One could do a content analysis — following some guidelines available in Marxist literature, some of which were mentioned in chapter 5 — of media and of the various levels of education. One could study variations in the political messages of churches according to the class make-up of the congregation (North American Protestant fundamentalism is often quite explicitly political).

This could be studied using individual, class, regional or systemic units of analysis. There is a real problem on all three levels of sorting out the causal arrow. One could, for example, search for locales in North America where the press is explicitly pro-labor (there are none to my knowledge, but one must assume there are a few). One could then try to measure working-class political consciousness in that community and typicality of working-class political activity levels. But even if one found high levels, one would have no basis for saying which caused which unless there were historic lines of demarcation such that one factor clearly preceded the other. In all likelihood, one might hypothesize, there would have to be an exceedingly high level of trade union membership and working-class political activity to sustain a pro-labor press given the ordinary economic basis of the newspaper industry.

It is well-known and several empirical social scientists have mentioned as well that the less advantaged are affected by schools, media, church, and other cross-pressures, while the more advantaged are rarely so affected. It might well be useful to both Marxists and non-Marxists to have available a series
of detailed studies and measures of the degree to which this is the case. One might include a look at university curricula for labor history courses, or, for that matter, for students from working-class backgrounds. How available are the research and teaching abilities of universities to the less advantaged? What affects might this have on political participation? Are there atypical cases which might be studied with regard to political effect?

On a systemic level, it might be hypothesized that there is cross-nationally a positive relationship between uniformity of anti-labor, anti-socialist media perspective and the relative organizational strength of the left. If this were shown not to be generally the case or that there were some marked exceptions, one would indeed have interesting findings to account for. If, on the other hand, it were generally found to be the case one alas would not have demonstrated much with regard to causal direction. What one presumably would have found is a syndrome. What might be most interesting is the pattern of relationships. (How much organizational strength is necessary for there to be a change in general pattern? Does media ever lead a change in consciousness to the left? What percentage of the privately-owned and/or private advertiser dependent media are more sympathetic, silent, or whatever with regard to labor or working-class politics?) All in all this is an area in which careful and detailed research is notable by its absence among Marxists or among those inclined to a more quantitative methodology.

(4) The actual and potential role of the state military, police, and judicial apparatus as a partial (biased) intervenor in the political
process may well be untestable in any very direct way. This is in large part due to the ability of this proposition to transform itself into an 'infinite regress' form of argument. That is, that the military has not intervened will not be taken as evidence of state neutrality: it will simply be argued that the basic interests of the ruling elite have not been threatened. This argument might be developed in any situation short of the return of the guillotine for the contemporary version of the aristocracy. On the other hand, it might well be true that there does exist a series of measures within the constitutional rules which would provoke the military of any liberal-democratic state into unconstitutional action. This cannot be demonstrated with certainty one way or the other, especially as it is likely that the level of tolerance will vary markedly from one nation to another and one time to another and no general set of conditions could be elaborated. The matter is further complicated by the obvious fact that in most nations this is not a 'simple' internal matter. The actual or potential military intervention often is external. For example, many Canadians suspect that there are quite clear bounds to their freedom of action and that at some point the United States would use military force to prevent what it perceived to be a threat to its vital interests. All in all, the reality of this threat is highly speculative and elusive.

This is not to say, however, that this question could not be approached using the techniques of empirical social science in a more limited or a more indirect fashion. For example, studies could be conducted to see if and in what ways court decisions might vary by class
background of defendants. One might also attempt to construct "true life" experiments to determine whether those sections of the bureaucracy which deal with persons of varying social positions do so in an even manner and, if not, in what ways their treatment varies. It would be unreasonable to hypothesize that any one or two slights or inequities might be sufficient to affect the political activity levels of the individuals so affected (and it would be likely variant as to how those who were affected would react). But it has already been shown (and is as well almost obvious) that there is some relationship between general belief in government responsiveness and inclination to political participation. Studies of the degree to which elements of the state are biased on an individual or even a policy level might add an 'element of reality' to sometimes only attitudinal studies of 'political efficacy' and 'civic duty' and so forth.

Finally here there is a dimension of this question which is readily open to study which has not to my knowledge ever been treated. That is, to what extent are people sensitive to the 'military' factor in politics? Is there much variation in expectation of coups or other less drastic forms of intervention cross-nationally, by party or by class? Or, how many Canadians, for example, would anticipate various forms of American intervention under various scenarios? One could also check as to whether or not these attitudes related in any patterned

32 I believe the study by Parenti, op. cit., is one example of how this might be done. I believe that it might be possible to ethically involve police, judges, civil servants or others involuntarily in experiments so long as individual identities remained anonymous. Obviously, though, this is a very tricky matter.
way to levels of individual or systemic political activity. Obviously, a hypothesis that fear of coup d'état is the cause of many non-voting decisions is unlikely to be sustained. However, any demonstration that this enters anyone's consciousness at all would in itself be an interesting addition to our knowledge in this area. Of course it might be the case that almost no one ever considers such possibilities, or would even entertain the notion when it was suggested by an interviewer. I, for one, would find that too an interesting result and would wish to probe further or at least test it in other, more polarized, domestic or international climates.

(5) This element of the Marxist explanation, the divisions within the working-class, is one about which there is already available a considerable body of empirical data. Some of the data on cross-pressured non-voting would be highly pertinent, as are materials which combine the relationship of political participation as it is affected by combinations of factors, e.g., sex and class (occupation) or race and class. These materials have not to my knowledge been utilized by Marxists, nor has any empirical researcher sought directly to relate them to Marxist theory. In general it might be quite interesting to attempt to study occupational groups and subgroups in categories that could be related to Marxist class categories. In that way one might in the long term see develop an important link, in the concept of class between the individual and the systemic units of analysis.

33One of the 'myths' of Marxism which might be weakened in this might be that there is potential for solitary action of all or most of those individuals who do not own a share of the means of production. A more interesting breakdown might be 'working-class' and 'underclass' with each subdivided in ways suggested in the discussion under items 5 and 6 in Chapter 4, section III above.
Much of the comment on the previous point could be applied as well to this, the division between the 'old and the 'new' working class. As well it would seem that here is a clear opportunity to develop in both Marxism and empirical social science a greater ability to anticipate some outlines of coming trends in patterns of political consciousness and activity. It can be readily established that certain forms and styles of occupation are sharply on the rise in developed economies. If one is confident that one has located a new and growing pattern of work styles, one could weight relatively heavily any findings within this group. Do these individuals within these groups share political attitudes? Under what circumstances do they act in concert politically? Under what circumstances are they particularly active or inactive? Again these sorts of data could be related to more analytic structural, and historic considerations of the dynamic of evolution of the new working class within the politico-economic system.

Any tendency of a capitalist system to cause individuals, particularly less advantaged individuals to 'segmentalize' their lives and thereby somehow be to some extent depoliticized might be be at least partially tested. But this is a notion which can only be described as somewhat hazy in its usual context. One could study the ability of individuals to understand some of the relationships between work life and family life by means of sort of open-ended, individualized, judgementally-scored interviews (or via reactions to stories or films which contained such connections). One could study this for several class groups and also test for association with measures of political participation. One could also test to see if this phenomenon is more or less
pronounced in non-capitalist contexts (I would be prepared to hypothesize no relationship here). All in all however I doubt this is among the richer elements for empirical exploration. Further again here, the only possible test of the Marxist assertion would be for there to be a rapid increase in the ability to make such connections. The test is in the politicization which follows. Here the recent increase in self-consciousness of many North American women could be studied in terms of any possible coordinate decline in segmentalization and increase in various forms of political activity.

(8) The effects of the institutionalization of industrial conflict on political activity and class self-consciousness might be studied empirically through the judicious use of case studies. The cases should be chosen — not as is often the case in Marxism — on very carefully stated grounds. The best method might be the seeking of cases most likely to disconfirm one's hypothesis with a careful argument being made as to why the particular cases chosen are seen to be of such a nature. (This procedure can, of course, be 'too effective' and eliminate all those cases which might confirm; one might then seek as well 'typical' cases.)

The question to be looked at would be the levels of political consciousness and political activity outside the workplace of workers in several 'stages' of labor-management relations. The 'stages' might be non-unionized, in the midst of a unionizing or initial strike, in a stage of long-established unionism, and in a strike situation in a long established union. Ideally one could do a test, re-test for the first
two or the last two 'stages' or study matched pairs of situations nearly alike but for differences whose effect one is seeking to measure. In these studies one should look not only for a gradient of effect on a large number but as well for marked effects on a small number.

Again, however, one has not really dealt with the basic contention of the Marxists. Here the contention is that in general the relationship between management and labor has been in part tranquilized by virtue of union bureaucratization, state-imposed procedures and restrictions, and established procedures in collective bargaining. This condition is not permanent but it is restraining of worker militance, of political consciousness and of political activity (in contrast to the potential political activity of the industrial proletariat and some other sectors). It is difficult to imagine how this assertion could be either demonstrated or refuted in any precise, certainly any quantitative way. One could attempt correlations of working-class voting activity over time comparing it to the general level of labor unrest. This might be worth doing but it would still likely be argued that the measures one would have would tend to represent surface spurts and that the trends are 'deeper' and more 'general' than such a statistic as the number of workers on strike might measure. Any general rise in participation in the face of this trend, even if it is merely a 'trend', is far too easy to explain. And it as well, as such an approach, it might be replied, could refute as well that there is any relationship at all between education and political participation. (Over 80 years, educational levels in America have risen sharply by any known measure
yet voting participation has declined.)

(9) - (11) these three elements may well be, as I argued in the last chapter, among the more central in the Marxist explanation of the political inactivity of the less advantaged. This is particularly true of the latter two of the three, the issuelessness of politics in the advanced capitalist nations in an era of global economic integration (10) and the effects of imperialism on the domestic politics of the metropolitan states (11). The ninth element was roughly characterized as the market dominance of socio-political life. I find it very difficult to conceive how any of these three matters might be effectively dealt with quantitatively or even in non-quantitatively 'retestable' ways.

There are however some useful studies which might be undertaken which would elaborate them and perhaps give them a somewhat more precise character. For example, one could devise schemes to do an ideological (left-right) content analysis on the variation in legislation passed by 'left' parties in power and by 'right' parties in power. This might also be contrasted with their platforms. These studies could be done for a variety of nations over the past 80 or so years in which socialist or social democratic parties have been a force. The hypothesis would be that it has made a decreasing difference over time as to which party has won elections. (This is essentially, of course, one assertion of those who asserted that we had reached an end of ideology; what they might have actually detected though not measured was an end to parliamentary manifestations of significant political differences.)

However, any quantification involved in this study would be
judgemental and it is unlikely that one could generate really reliable measures. To compensate in part, one might also cite party membership figures as indicative or do questionnaires over time to see if there is any increasing impression that the parties are alike or that parliament does nothing one way or the other. But none of these indicators are clearcut tests of the claim that people are inactive because in fact their activity has little or no real effect. Perhaps the more reliable route to some conclusion might lie in giving up on linking the asserted claim of no difference and the measured fact of disinterest and concentrating on some evidence for the no difference hypothesis. This could be attempted through the study of decisions, original intents and grounds for actual decisions. One might attempt to interview party leaders prior to taking power and after with a promise of 20 or 30 years of researcher silence.

All of this is difficult, but maybe more promising than studies which might be devised for either of the other two elements being considered here. The reasons in all three cases are largely those asserted earlier in this section, particularly the level of generality of the claims, and their systemic nature. Only perceptions of their existence might be measured at the individual level and this is far too indirect in these cases at least. It might even be argued that in two of these cases (9) and (10), these matters will discourage political activity only to the extent that they are not perceived or understood by the general public. In the case of the effects of imperialism on the domestic politics of metropolitan states over long periods of time one is operating with a
quite limited universe and an incredible complex of relevant variables (the holding of legal colonies, the delayed holding of legal colonies, level of foreign investment, profits related to foreign as opposed to domestic economic activity, offsetting costs of colonial maintenance, the benefits of offsetting cost expenditures on the domestic economy, the delayed domestic economic effects of foreign gains, the delayed political effects of domestic economic activity so generated and so forth, ad infinitum). All of these questions are quite contentious within Marxism and, of course, generally as well. One must conclude in the end, I expect, that these are important matters, there is some analytic evidence that there is some effect here, but we are unable to determine its extent in any precise way.

The twelfth Marxist explanation was as much a method as a specific explanation in itself; as such I will deal with it indirectly in the next chapter. The final explanation, Marxist tactical and strategic errors, is interesting and empirical studies might be usefully undertaken were it not for the closed nature of the political parties which express its viewpoints. That is, one could never measure variations in opinion within the Party. However, the parties themselves might be treated as a unit of analysis with comparisons made cross-nationally or over time.

While obviously there are real limitations on the possibility of operationalizing Marxist explanations to the point where research would be generally acceptable to empirical social scientists, it is clear that there is a considerable amount of potentially useful work that could be
done. An important question then is why have few Marxists seemed inclined to doing it? The best answer may well be the combination of factors listed earlier in this section which might be stated in summary in an even more general form. On the whole, Marxists are most concerned with the development of whole social systems through time. This being the case, their conceptual apparatus is then necessarily abstract; some might even say, not unfairly in all cases, that many of its concepts and explanations are amorphous and even vague. To achieve the level of generality they are looking for they fuse individuals into systemically meaningful categories. If one's first order of concern is to understand how and when macroscopic change might occur, one will be little inclined to understand the details of 'momentary' moods or behaviors on 'minor' matters. One achieves concreteness in studying particular systemic cases through time and as a whole. The primary test of one's conclusions is their effectiveness in, at one and the same time, explaining the world and changing it. Given this approach, whatever its merits, one can easily arrive at an epistemology which allows for an elaborate theory well insulated from a real need for precise information about individuals or much real need for scaling down to careful testing the real meaning of one's concepts and assertions in the immediate present. And more important, and at times frightening, one gets a politics which reflects those shortcomings; the present has been callously traded for the future and the individual has been lost in the collectivity.
CHAPTER 7

What I hope to do in this concluding chapter is to make some tentative comments, based on the preceding analysis, about some of the very broadest differences and similarities between Marxism and what I have called empirical social science. I am interested at this point primarily in methodological and epistemological matters, but what I say will be at some points related to and have other implications for the substantive question of concern here, the political inactivity of the less advantaged. Clearly the level of generality of the comparison and contrast here is such that this analysis will not reach more than suggestive conclusions. Hopefully what is put forward here will be more understandable than it might have been without the elaborate discussion which has preceded. Hopefully too, it will give some clear guidance about where this inquiry might go from here, and what ways there are which Marxism and empirical social science might usefully interact in the future. To begin this discussion I will recall in summary a few important points from the earlier chapters.

I

By what process, in broad outlines, has empirical social science explained the relative inactivity of the less advantaged? It has very precisely located the demographic variables associated with various specific
indicators of non-participation within the liberal democratic political process. In this it has taken the individual as its basic unit of analysis. It has studied aggregates of individuals in categories such as relative income, formal education level, occupational status, political knowledgeability, sex, ethnic and religious background and broad attitudinal perspective. It has studied the interplay between these categories in great detail. It has then offered a variety of further explanations which have attempted to make sense of its particular findings. A good deal of this explanation, particularly during the period 1950-1965 in the United States where this approach first gained widespread acceptance among students of politics and political sociology, was made in terms of an understanding consistent with some of the historically major propositions of conservatism. This understanding was widely accepted and held a central place in American political science during this period. Some aspects of it were to be faced with empirical evidence which could be taken as contrary. In part it was initially accepted on insufficient grounds.

More recently this overall viewpoint on the issue has been less generally accepted. Its decline could as well be explained by political changes in America as by any qualitative shift in specific research findings. There has as well been a methodological evolution towards techniques which are dealing more and more effectively with structural and contextual variables and whose approach is more and more comparative on a cross-national basis. Demographic variables have been found recently to be less immutable than some earlier researchers seemed to presume in their
broadest conclusions. (I am thinking here of the changing pattern of participation by Black Americans.) Organizational and structural variables have been found to be more important than some of the 'psychological' variables originally seen as relatively more important. Still there has been little inclination to explain political inactivity in terms of systemic factors. There has been some tendency to accept present-measured individual behaviors as immutable and there, at times, was little hesitation in being critical about the behavior of the less advantaged. There, further, has been little effective self-consciousness about the effects of the ideological perspective of researchers in the field. Further, there has been a minimum of effort devoted to drawing imaginative prescriptive, critical conclusions about the contemporary functioning of liberal democratic systems.

In contrast, Marxism, beginning its inquiry on the basis of a presuppositions of the explicitly political and ideological nature of its inquiry, sought to explain how the political system-as-a-whole operated to hinder the actualization of a theoretically projected reality in the concrete empirical world. All of its explanations were based on a particular critical appreciation of the functioning of the political system. It has almost never concerned itself with any attempt to treat individual units of analysis. The theoretical model of the functioning of the political system has maintained itself in the face of unexpected changes in the world through a variety of built-in inflexibilities including conceptual vagueness, hypergeneralization, and quite straightforward and rigid assumptions of universal patterns-of-change processes. Marxists have
quite consistently sacrificed the precision more readily available in individual units of analysis, contemporary settings, and operationalizable concepts, for broad apprehensions about the behavior of whole systems through long periods of time. Their conclusions are often unanswerable to any form of disproof except perhaps through system behavior in the often indeterminate, distant future. Marxism too has often been insensitive to the historical and methodological roots of some of its conclusions. The Marxist understanding of political inactivity can be readily derived from its theory but its theory is in some aspects extra-empirical or, at least, in many aspects, so generalized as to defy the possibility of careful proof. There are however a variety of ways in which its explanations and aspects of its theory might be in part operationalized and tested, but its proponents have been disinclined to such efforts.

II

While there are then qualitative differences between Marxism and empirical social science on the levels of methodology and technique, there are several important agreements on the level of epistemology. Both are materialist in intention and reject in principle extra-empirical, extra-rational evidence and argument. (Marxism, again, rejects some of the narrower stringencies of what I have associated here with the label 'empirical social science,' but accepts empiricism in principle on the
Each believes that it both should be and to a great extent is in these research efforts free from any systematic bias in favor of established elites. (Marxism, of course, openly adopts a bias both in favor of the less advantaged and against the established order within capitalist societies.) Both in principle reject claims to knowledge which are based on authoritative definitions of social reality.¹ (Marxists often lapse on this and cite the observations of Marx or Lenin as if the sources should be evidence of the truth of the argument being put forth.) Finally both claim that objective knowledge of the empirical world is possible at least to the extent that it can be so very nearly approximated that it should be consistently and continuously sought. Neither openly concerns itself to any great extent with the way the world ought to be and both believe that 'subjectivity' can be identified and isolated, and criticized as a disturbing presence in the process of inquiry.

The differences between them in method, in technique and especially in questions asked and conclusions reached about the political world have been so great that these similarities are often lost sight of.

¹In this observation and the previous one, I am indebted in part to Alvin Gouldner, "A Reply to Martin Shaw: Whose Crisis?" New Left Review, #71 (January-February, 1972), pp. 89-96. In this chapter the discussion has been greatly aided by many sources, particularly the above article and, as well, Michael Polanyi, op. cit.; Arnold Brecht, Political Theory, op. cit.; Henry Kariel, Open Systems, op. cit.; Frank Cunningham, Objectivity in Social Science (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973); Robert W. Friedrichs, "Dialectical Sociology: Toward a Resolution of the Current 'Crisis' in Western Sociology," British Journal of Sociology 23 (1972), pp. 263-274; and Lucio Colletti, From Rousseau to Lenin: Studies in Ideology and Society, (London: New Left Books, 1972), particularly the essay: "Marxism: Science or Revolution."
Many in empirical social science have dismissed Marxist research as window-dressing for sectarian politics or as a series of mostly and merely unoperationalizable assertions which cannot be disproven. Many Marxists have dismissed empirical social science as at worst justification for the established capitalist order or at best a trivialization of social inquiry which avoids all meaningful and/or critical issues. Far more commonly practitioners of each have blithely and utterly ignored the efforts of the other. Through selection processes in terms of reading matter very few Marxists are familiar with the techniques or the results of empirical social science as a whole. The same is true with regard to the familiarity of most empirical social scientists with regard to Marxist techniques and literature. There are separate sets of journals for Marxist studies which rarely publish non-Marxists and rarely, though perhaps a bit less rarely, are Marxists published in the major journals of empirical social science. It is unlikely that there are ever many submissions from the 'other camp.'

2 I know of only one recent article by a non-Marxist empirical social scientist in a major Marxist publication; that is the article by A. Gouldner, op. cit. Gouldner in that article, writing with regard to a review of his work by Martin Shaw (op. cit.) states

"The most fundamental difficulty of Shaw's position, then, is that it premises a Marxism-in-being that can presumably be counterposed to the non-being of Academic Sociology. This conception of the matter is essentially a positivistic one, implying as it does that Marxism now exists as a 'thing' to which we may flee, as a kind of place to go, as a space already carved out and liberated and waiting for us as a haven." (p. 96)

I may be a bit guilty here of seeing Marxism and empirical social science as somewhat more distinct than they in reality are. (I trust I do not (continued on following page)
although this is of course only impressionistic — that while many, even most North American academic departments of political science, economics, and especially sociology have Marxist members the interaction on intellectual and research levels generally remains limited.

Marxism and empirical social science then are in practice largely separate worlds of discourse which sometimes, at least in the case which we have chosen in this inquiry, study, in ways central to their whole enterprise, questions which are very similar. And, again, they do so in ways which are based on some shared epistemological presuppositions. Further throughout this discourse we have seen several ways in which some of their techniques and insights might be usefully related to the methods and findings of the other. We then must face a question: is it merely historical circumstance which separates them, could they be somehow integrated into a unified study of man in society? That is, might it not be the case that the major reason that there has been less interplay is the Cold War? Empirical social science is most strongly rooted in the English-speaking capitalist liberal-democracies and has developed

\(^2\)continued from previous page

conform to Gouldner's more central point; I do not believe nor have anywhere intended to imply that 'Marxism' is a single and/or fixed 'place to go.'

There are several researchers whose work easily fall into both Marxism and empirical social science, most are Marxist economists, some others were cited in Chapter 5. One work which would be classed by most as empirical social science but raises and answers in an extremely effective manner a variety of questions central to Marxist inquiry: this work is Richard F. Hamilton's Class and Politics in the United States (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1972). An example (one of very few that I have come across) of a Marxist work using considerable quantitative non-economic data is Albert Szymanski, "Trends in the American Class Structure," Socialist Revolution, No. 10 (July-August, 1972), pp. 101-122. The best known researcher who most successfully blends both is perhaps the American sociologist Maurice Zeitlin.
and evolved to a very great extent in post-World War II America. Marxism to a considerable extent has been under the custodianship of the Soviet Union and the political parties over which it has held considerable influence since the 1920s. The monolithic aspects of both are now in the wane: empirical techniques increasingly have practitioners in other cultures and Marxism is divided into literally hundreds of national versions, differing sects, and 'independent' individuals and schools within whom and which it has been blended with phenomenology, existentialism, Christianity, ecology, a renewed Hegelianism and innumerable other perspectives. The Cold War is clearly in decline perhaps especially among Western intellectuals. Will we not now see a coming together of Marxism and empirical social science?

Obviously if I personally did not expect that there would be something to be gained in such interaction I would not have undertaken this inquiry in anything like its present form and tone. However, it is my view that there is a necessary division between the two. Necessary in a double sense. In the first instance, I believe that some of the differences which separate them are irreconcilable. And in the second, I believe that they can be more useful to each other and indeed, if kept clearly distinct, can more greatly aid understanding than if too often they somehow were able to integrate (that is, agree consistently on substantive and methodological issues). I will discuss the first of these points further here, but the second will be treated more implicitly in much of the remaining discussion.

The differences which I see as irreconcilable between Marxism and
empirical social science have already been discussed to some extent in the previous chapter and in the review with which this chapter began. I only hope to clarify them a bit more here. The differences are methodological and involve in a sense unstated epistemological premises.

Every form of inquiry in seeking understanding attempts to locate evidence, grounds for its conclusions, primarily by screening out elements and aspects of the universe. To attain even very broad understanding the universe must somehow be arrested, there must be I suppose some means of closure to further knowledge. In general I believe it is fair to say that Marxism in the end has attained this closure in the theoretical apprehension of the social universe. When the theory, which includes conclusions even about the ultimate end of social organization, is contradicted by contrary data of various kinds from the empirical world some aspects of it in the long term may be adjusted. But its broadest outlines are such that they are untouchable or nearly untouchable by unanticipated turns and trends in social evolution. Most Marxists I expect would be uncomfortable with this conclusion and at least on the surface it weakens their claims to being scientific so long as science is taken to be empirical (however broadly defined). Empirical social science has achieved closure of the social universe in precisely the opposite way; it has for the most part eschewed broad, critical or future projected theory for conceptual reductionism and apprehension of the universe in operationalizable, ideally quantifiable, units. All questions about which reasonably sure conclusions (that is those intersubjectively transmissible and re-verified) could not be drawn have
simply not been considered; they have been either ignored or indefinitely postponed. Many empirical researchers I expect would be uncomfortable with this conclusion and at least on the surface it weakens their claims to being scientific, so long as science includes attaining a theoretical grasp of the universe. Obviously in innumerable instances this summary perspective overgeneralizes; empirical social science is not atheoretical as Marxism is not non-empirical. I simply believe we can most clearly understand the gap between them by thinking of them in this way.

Science is both theory-seeking and based on a need to accurately record the empirical world. At a thousand junctures and in myriad ways those attempting to do science must choose to emphasize one or the other. The enterprise has two poles which are at one and the same time interdependent and mutually exclusive. Marxism can be understood as one form of science within which the practitioners have quite consistently chosen to emphasize one pole. Empirical social science is a form which has quite consistently chosen to emphasize the other. It may be the case that Marxists can and will choose to operationalize some of their concepts and empirically test some of their theory-based explanations. It also may be the case that empirical social science may indeed build up an integrated theory of society and history from what is now a disparate collection of findings and empirically-based explanations. But in both cases the distance to be travelled is enormous.

It might be the case that the social world could be better understood from a ground in some ways external to both. Each could
benefit from the critiques of the other. Those versed primarily in the techniques and findings of empirical social science could take apart the assertions of Marxists a piece at a time. They might choose a pattern of Marxist assertions, attempt to operationalize its elements as disinterestedly as possible, to challenge the vague meanings of the Marxist conceptual apparatus, to operationalize and test its explanations, and attempt to cast doubt on its assertions with the location and accumulation of accurate empirical measurement of the social world. Marxists might critique in concrete cases the claims of empirical social science to disinterestedness in method and conclusion by fitting empirical social science itself into an historical and social framework. They might, as well, constantly offer systemically based, historically sweeping counter-explanations to every set of individually-rooted, relatively socio-historically fixed patterns of explanation developed by empirical social scientists. This process of interchange it would seem could be a means of strengthening both enterprises.

What the ground might be on which one might stand which is somehow external to both I don't believe has yet been found; it may well not exist. But I believe it is possible to shift from one perspective to the other, to put on a whole conceptual apparatus, set of methods and body of conclusions as if it were a mental garment. That very few have tried it says something about its difficulty, but also might be explained in other ways, particularly historically. But how one might find a means of choosing between them when their findings are contradictory is surely unknown at this point. It might be useful here, however, to look briefly at some aspects of social inquiry which might be seen at least in a sense external to both.
III.

Before considering some elements of a perspective external to both Marxism and empirical social science, I would like to begin here with an additional methodological suggestion for use within those separate perspectives. If one were to consider the explanation and understandings of Marxism and attempt to locate discrepancies between those claims and the empirical world, one would, I expect, be struck by how self-interested and ideological Marxism was. Impressionistically I find it striking how a perspective so attuned to locating interestedness and assaying and assailing its varied and subtle effects can be unable to turn its own methods and sensitivity on itself. For example, why is it that Marxists have not turned to studies using the individual as a unit of analysis, if only as a supplement to their other techniques and methods? Could it not be in part related (and I would certainly not argue that it was more than a part) to the impossibility of using those techniques within most Marxist regimes (or at least most such regimes or all such regimes most of the time)? Would not the acceptance of questionnaire-techniques even for most unorthodox Marxists imply more than they have ordinarily been prepared to sustain in at least two ways: first, it implies politically a clearer and more straightforward break with the dictatorship of the proletariat and, secondly, it implies an admission

3It would seem to me to imply either a total rejection or, at the least, a conviction that those forms it has taken to date are either excessive or temporary and regrettable. In any case one must be committed to avoidance if possible and to careful consideration of all possible alternative paths to the social change one intends and/or expect.
of at least the possibility that often 'assumptions' of false consciousness are themselves false consciousness. There is a lot of room for self-deception in an enterprise whose hypotheses are often of a form only susceptible to disproof at an inderminate future time. And at the same time that in turn is not to say that such an approach is not a necessary component of a thorough social understanding. What I would propose then is turning the sociology of knowledge against its most proficient practitioners. This proposal would surely be in part supported by consistent findings that individuals are not as they should be according to Marxist theory, especially since Marxists have typically asserted the 'should be' in a more empirical form.

But one as well must turn the same game 'against' empirical social science. As was seen in Chapter 4 empirical social science is quite vulnerable to interestedness, to being subject in varied ways, some subtle and some not so subtle, to the Zeitgeist of its socio-political locus. Few would deny this, yet few empirical social scientists have taken up the sociology of knowledge to complement their other methods and techniques, or to allow it to become an integral part of (research) question formation. But further in Chapter 4 it was seen that the findings of empirical social science can have as well, at least potentially (I didn't attempt to measure) real political effect. A thorough empirical social science must find ways to measure both the sources of bias and the real political effects of its own findings. That science has a responsibility, I believe, both to measure those effects and to control not manipulatively but as openly as is socially and personally possible.
What then is there which is independent of both empirical social science and Marxism that is worth considering here? 'Independent of' is a very strong phrase in such a context, perhaps a better and more careful phrase might be 'not usually emphasized within' or 'not usually considered to be a part of'. Perhaps the easiest way to very briefly define some of these areas (most are far from being clearly defined enough to be called methods) is to note them in a list. The order of the list is random, at its conclusion I will make a few comments about what all of these areas or perspectives share.

(1) Existentialism -- a philosophical perspective wherein it is presumed that individual human existence precedes human essence; that is, that human beings are either socially determined or self-determined ('free'). It has been described as an attempt to come to grips with the absence of gods, with the 'fact' that man is fundamentally alone, forlorn and separate, needing to be somehow joined to something beyond himself and yet doomed to face death and most of life separate and estranged. It is an attempt to understand and describe, in highly generalized fashion, the human condition. It is not, nor does it claim to be, an objective or scientific perspective; its very meaning is subjective and its understanding is communicated primarily in subjective, literary, modes. It is largely a mood, but one which is highly pervasive in the twentieth century West and as such its perspective might contribute "independently" to a fuller understanding of such a question as political inactivity. (For example, consider
Sartre's observation that much of alienation stems from the fact of the interchangeability of the men who run machines.)

However, I will forego here any accounts of fictional or real dramas of political-apolitical choosing, but I do want to note briefly here Sartre's Search for a Method. In that work Sartre indicates that he now sees existentialism as a subset of Marxism. He writes, speaking of existentialism:

"It is a parasitical system living in the margin of Knowledge, which at first it opposed but into which today it seeks to be integrated." (p. 8)

The work is described by Barnes, in her introduction as "the search for a method by which the existentialist Marxist may hope to understand both individual persons and history." (p. ix) Sartre seeks an integration with Marxism, but clearly not one in which the "margin" has no effect on "knowledge." Consider the following:

"As soon as there will exist for everyone a margin of real freedom beyond the production of life, Marxism will have lived out its span; a philosophy of freedom will take its place." (p. 34)

He is attempting, and I for one hope he succeeds, to bring Marxism to a greater appreciation of the unique human individual and to the possibility of its own demise. However, that demise seems to be one which is somehow consistent with the freedom in the Marxist conception of the withering away of the states (which includes in some conceptions

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the 'end of philosophy').

(2) Phenomenological analysis -- closely related to existentialism, phenomenology seeks an intuitive 'penetration' of the inner life of other persons; it seeks, with all metaphysical and epistemological presuppositions "suspended," apprehension and understanding. It seeks to know what is 'essential' about an individual or about a situation rather than to merely locate and explain 'matters of fact.'

(3) Empathy -- loosely speaking, a method, where the observer thoroughly identifies him or herself with the subject under study; it closely relates in many ways to phenomenology. Along these lines Kurt H. Wolff calls for 'surrender' which he describes as,

"total involvement, suspension of received notions, pertinence of everything, identification, risk of being hurt. To 'surrender' means to take as fully, to meet as immediately, as possible: not to select, not to believe that one can know quickly what is to be understood and acted on, hence what one's experience means, not to suppose that one can do justice to the experience with one's received feeling and thin thinking; to meet it as much as possible in its originality, its itself-ness." 6

Kariel describes empathy as moving as close to a phenomena as one can without losing oneself; he argues that we must "seek to balance self-conscious detachment with selfless attachment." 7 Kariel also

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7 On following page.
eloquently advocates the wider use of participant-observer techniques in social scientific investigation. I believe as well that far more can be observed in some situations in this way than by any technique which presumes a greater separateness between observer and observed. Many techniques of empirical social science, while precise, exclude the possibility of observing a variety of subtleties which are accessible only to observers who are unobtrusively in the midst of social events, a fully accepted part of those events. And if there are 'sides' in the event, the observer must for some forms of observation appear to be on the side of the observed and for others actually be on their side.

(4) Verstehen -- a method advocated by Max Weber and others for use throughout the social sciences wherein the social scientific observer transposes into the experience of observed persons by empathy and intuition. One explains an activity first in terms of the values of the actors and then, perhaps, in terms of values external to the actors. This technique whatever it might be called is often seen to

7 from previous page Kariel, p. 104. Empathy could be useful in any mode of analysis including empirical social science and Marxism. In empirical social science at least some of the questions to be asked in attitude surveys should be questions the respondents have asked themselves, or at least will make considerable sense when posed. Often, I expect, questions are asked which relate to matters of low salience or are foreign to the respondents way of thinking. Nevertheless many times answers to such questions are given and one has to assume that they are of low reliability and easily vulnerable to cues in the framing of the question, response set or other distorting factors. Even if not distorted such answers must be of limited usefulness especially with regard to the likelihood that the attitude would have significant effect on situational behavior. Within Marxism empathy might provide some counter to the effects of using only class and system units of analysis and might also help in providing more thorough explanations of deviations from theoretically anticipated behaviors. On empathy; participant-observation, the duality of meaning in the term knowing (konnen vs. wissen), and other matters pertinent to our discussion here see Robert Merton's recent and excellent essay "Insiders and Outsiders" A Chapter in the Sociology of Knowledge," American Journal of Sociology, 78 (1972), pp. 9-47.
distinguish the social from the natural sciences wherein measures, statistical regularities, and 'straightforward' explanation are sufficient.  

(5) Intuition — an inherently unformalizeable process by which the human mind comes to apprehend the importance and correctness of an explanation or set of explanations of events in the natural or social world. Michael Polyani argues that intuition is an essential part of the scientific method. He argues, specifically with regard to the laws of physics and more generally as well, that

("We cannot truly account for our acceptance of such theories without endorsing our acknowledgement of a beauty that exhilarates and a profundity that entrances us. Yet the prevailing conception of science, based on the disjunction of subjectivity and objectivity, seeks — and must seek at all costs — to eliminate from science such passionate, personal, human appraisals of theories, or at least to minimize their function to that of a negligible by-play." (p.16)

All science as Polyani sees it has a rational and personal core. The 'act of knowing' in his view "includes an appraisal and this personal coefficient, which shapes all factual knowledge, bridges in doing so the disjunction between subjectivity and objectivity" (p. 17) Explanations are acceptable not merely because of the data presented in defense of them, but as well they are evaluated "rationally" in terms of the whole experience of the individual who originally conceives them or by whom they are apprehended.


9Polyani, op. cit.
(6) Normative analysis -- the progress or processes by which all human beings rank individual and social acts according to standards of desirability, success of goodness. Many Marxists and many empirical social scientists agree that normative standards cannot be derived from facts. Marxist certainty about the fundamentals of the future has eliminated for many interest in normative analysis. But Kolakowski for one states that,

"...rules of moral behavior cannot be derived from any theory of historical progress, and...no such theory can justifiably be used as a pretext for the violation of certain rules of whose validity we are otherwise convinced."

Many, including this writer, would however assert that normative analysis is a necessary and desirable part of all social inquiry in at least four major sphere: (1) as the underlying basis of all inquiry, that is, one cannot know even whether or not one should ask questions without some normative commitments; (2) as an important part of choosing which questions are worth asking; (3) as a major part of the process (of which (2) is a part) of formulating a general theoretical understanding of the social world; and (4) as a part of an unavoidable decision about what to do or not do with one's findings. Normative inquiry it seems to me is an unavoidable part of scientific inquiry in which the scientist, and especially the social scientist, must engage as an on-going part of his or her study.

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10 *Marxism and Beyond*, op. cit., p. 173. I have already referred at an earlier point to Arnold Brecht's list what can or cannot be said about values within scientific method. I only need to reiterate here that in Brecht's view (and mine) there is much more that can be said about values within and by means of scientific inquiry than is often taken to be the case. Michael Scriven goes perhaps even further than Brecht; see his "Explanations, Predictions, and Laws," in H. Feigl and G. Maxwell, Eds., *Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science*, vol. III, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1962), pp. 170-230.
This latter claim has I believe been shown by some of the findings of this inquiry to be especially necessary in the study of the social world. We have seen that both one's methods and one's conclusions can be importantly affected by prevailing ideological perspectives. We cannot appreciate those effects unless we can, individually or collectively (as a community of intellectuals, scholars, and/or scientists), at least in part detach ourselves from prevailing values. The process of achieving detachment involves a complex interplay of self-knowledge and social understanding; a process often compounded within the social sciences. It is not likely to succeed often if two of the major elements in the community (Marxism and empirical social science) rarely contend directly.  

There is too here a second matter no less critical: the findings of social science, if they are in any way new or important additions to understanding, will necessarily affect both the subjects of inquiry and the inquirer. We have seen that the findings of empirical social science in the case we looked at found their way into the social world. And many argue that some of the silences of empirical social science are even more important. Marxists, of course, consider social effect both the

11 Robert Merton concludes "Insiders and Outsiders..." (op. cit.) in this way: "Insiders and Outsiders in the domain of knowledge, unite. You have nothing to lose but your claims. You have a world of understanding to win." For further discussion of the compounding of these issues in the social sciences see Fritz Machlup, "Are the Social Sciences Really Inferior?" in Maurice Natanson, Ed., Philosophy of the Social Sciences, (New York: Random House, 1963), pp. 158-182.

12 See, for example, Euben, "Political Science and Political Silence," op. cit., and Gouldner, "A Reply to Martin Shaw: Whose Crisis?" op. cit.
purpose and the test of their studies. I believe that both these matters have generally been given too little attention within empirical social science. Within Marxist inquiry, I believe that the Marxist commitment to this perspective has often flagged, at a minimum when it comes to the analysis of Marxist regimes in power.

What then might we conclude about what these six aspects of inquiry share and what they imply for the future relationship between empirical social science and Marxism? All these areas have built into their approach matters not often openly a part of either empirical social science or Marxism. Their advocates and practitioners generally believe that subjectivity should play a greater role in social inquiry than it has within Marxism and empirical social science. There is seen to be a need for introspective, critical, whole persons to look somehow at the whole of society. They are concerned with the interface between self-knowledge and social knowledge. They further carry with them no implications that individual human behavior is in any way immutable, nor that human social development is somehow thoroughly contingent on past patterns of behavior, on the structure of its institutions, or on the 'directional flow' of its history. This is not to say that either empirical social science or Marxism need be seen to carry thoroughly deterministic perspectives. It is to say, however, that in contrast and in general the ground external to both might well view man's social future as more open to social creativity of varieties which may not, at least in practice, be anticipated.

What, again, might this be seen to imply for empirical social
science, Marxism and the relationship between them? It seems to me that it carries several implications which can be discussed under two headings.

First, to understand social reality one must understand oneself and one's place in the social world; all social inquiry then proceeds in a broadly dialectical manner.12 Part of attaining the self-consciousness necessary to maximize the effectiveness of one's research involves at least from time to time overviewing oneself, one's society and one's approach to understanding both. This can only be accomplished effectively in a process of comparison with others, other societies and other approaches. The process must involve both suspended disbelief and critical imagination. Both empirical social science and Marxism I believe have hesitated to become fully engaged in this process.

Second, any new increment of the understanding of social (or for that matter natural) reality that is gained necessarily carries with it profound responsibilities. The findings of all social science have social effect and could, it might be conjectured, have far greater effect if those who engaged in inquiry were more fully conscious of the potential of their studies and conclusions. Since there will be some effect it seems to me it is irresponsible not to choose the values, the systems, the groups, and/or the individuals which one's efforts benefit. And, as well, one should attempt to anticipate some of the implications of the forms, locations, styles and means by which one's results are made known.13

13 One study which might be usefully engaged in here is one which examines in a broad way the communications channels of typical Western academic institutions (particularly on the output side). I believe that such studies could go a long way towards meeting both concerns under discussion here (the social constraints on social science research and social effects of social science research). Are there not more ways in which the university might somewhat more directly provide help to the less advantaged, or, for that matter, the majority?
I do not believe that a commitment to abstract Truth is sufficient (though I believe it is necessary and primary.) \(^\text{14}\) In considering the case study with which this inquiry was concerned several examples come to mind. What might be the effect of some greater effort among empirical social scientists to locate situations wherein the quantity and quality of the political activity of the less advantaged was maximized (or merely advanced) and then actively, though of course openly and prudently, insert these findings into the political arena? What if further they tried to clarify the characteristics of high participation situations \(^\text{15}\) and imaginatively suggested how such conditions might be brought about more generally? And finally, and perhaps most important, what if they more actively and openly choose to whom to communicate their findings, carefully justified this concern and allowed it to affect their choice of research questions?

In brief, we should come to view both empirical social science and Marxism as methods in the service of self-conscious, explicit and openly chosen value premises. Polyani called Marxism a "prophetic idealism spurning all reference to ideals." More Marxists may come to see that they too have been making real choices which were not utterly contingent. And those empirical social scientists who state they work only to further knowledge must face the question, knowledge for whom?

\(^\text{14}\) I believe that Marxism's weakness here is the opposite to that of empirical social science -- a tendency to be too partisan, to lose in the name of commitment the ability to be self-critical and consistently socially critical. Empirical social science tends to lose both in circumspection and an illusion of a socially-neutral objectivity.

\(^\text{15}\) Among the best on this subject is still S.M. Lipset; see his S.M. Lipset, et al., Union Democracy (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1956) and S.M. Lipset, Agrarian Socialism, op. cit.
Herbert Marcuse in *One-Dimensional Man* writes of mimesis, the immediate identification of an individual with his society:

"The immediate, automatic identification (which may have been characteristic of primitive forms of association) reappears in high industrial civilization; its new "immediacy", however, is the product of a sophisticated, scientific management and organization. In this process, the "inner" dimension of the mind in which opposition to the status quo can take root is whittled down. The loss of this dimension, in which the power of negative thinking — the critical power of Reason — is at home, is the ideological counterpart to the very material process in which advanced industrial society silences and reconciles opposition." (p. 11)

To the extent that they imply that history is other than open-ended or that individuals cannot be other than they have been at any given point in time or for all time, either empirical social science or Marxism can serve to repress an awareness of human freedom. Freedom and sound enquiry are advanced by knowing both what is necessary and what is relatively less contingent.

The study of society is a key part of the Zeitgeist; those of us engaged in that study could never choose to see that their enterprise is contingent in innumerable and subtle ways. Or we can actively and continuously seek to get outside our own efforts and overview the enterprise in which we are engaged. Only in so doing may we choose whether we will knowingly reinforce a given mood or whether we will expose and criticize it. I believe that we can only avoid choosing by avoiding an understanding of how our studies are conditioned. To debunk, identify systemic shortcomings in the face of systemic ideals, to illuminate the particularity of social reality and explain the roots of that particularity is not a preaching enterprise. We needn't preach, we
simply need to be, individually and collectively, more self-conscious, to clarify the nature of the social world by understanding our own place in it.

To be very clear about what I am saying, it is this: we should work towards a dialectically participatory social science. We must avoid the partitivost to which Marxism has in some times and some places been prone, but that avoidance need not be 'at all costs.' In choosing our research questions, in maintaining a continuing commitment to understand the roots and effects of our methods and findings, and in far more actively involving ourselves in seeking new channels for communicating our conclusions we can become more actively engaged in the social process. In doing so we do not deny scientific commitments, we enhance them; only in choosing to deny the possibility of an immutable human nature can we participate in an evolving understanding of an evolving humanity. We will not fully understand participation, or most other social phenomena, unless we too participate.

I should at this point again recommend the articles by Robert Friederichs, op. cit., and Lucio Colletti, op. cit.
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