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The Normalization of Japan-China relations : external and internal influences on Japan’s foreign policy-making… Hook, Glen Dawson 1989

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THE NORMALIZATION OF JAPAN-CHINA RELATIONS; EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL INFLUENCES ON JAPAN'S FOREIGN POLICY-MAKING PROCESS by Glenn Dawson Hook B.A., U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Columbia, 1973 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS I n the Department o f P o l i t i c a l Science We accept t h i s t hes i s as conforming to the r e q u i r e d ^standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA September, 1974 In p resen t ing t h i s t hes i s in p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t o f the requirements f o r an advanced degree at the U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree that the L i b r a r y sha l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r reference and study. I f u r t h e r agree t h a t permission fo r ex tens ive copying o f t h i s thes is f o r scho la r l y purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by h is r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . I t is understood that copying or p u b l i c a t i o n o f t h i s thes is f o r f i n a n c i a l gain sha l l not be al lowed w i thout my w r i t t e n permiss ion. Department The U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Columbia Vancouver 8, Canada Date ABSTRACT There have been few s tud ies t h a t have e x p l i c i t l y a t tempted to d e l i n e a t e the i n f l u e n c e o f e x t e r n a l and i n t e r n a l f a c t o r s on Japan's f o r e i g n po l i cy -mak ing process. The purpose o f t h i s t h e s i s i s to examine such f a c t o r s i n respect to one p a r t i c u l a r f o r e i g n p o l i c y i s s u e : the n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f r e l a t i o n s between Japan and China. So as not to be considered as p u r e l y i d i o g r a p h i c research , the f i n d i n g s are con t ras ted and compared w i t h p rev ious research t h a t has s i m i l a r l y been concerned w i t h a 1) f o r e i g n p o l i c y i s s u e , 2) c o n t r o v e r s i a l i n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c , and 3) s h o r t - t e r m on the temporal d imension. A f t e r the l i m i t a t i o n s o f the t r i p a r t i t e e l i t e model o f Japanese p o l -i cy i raak ing ia re ,ou t l i ned , an examinat ion i s then made o f the i n f l u e n c e o f the Un i ted States and China i n compel l ing Japan's d e c i s i o n to normal ize r e l a t i o n s w i t h China. I n t e r n a l l y , the r o l e o f the L i b e r a l Democratic P a r t y , bureaucracy, bus iness , o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s , press and p u b l i c o p i n i o n are assessed i n respect to t h i s and prev ious p o l i c y s t u d i e s . Our f i n d i n g s here are c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the conc lus ion t h a t the t r i p a r t i t e e l i t e ( the L i b e r a l Democratic P a r t y , bureaucracy, and bus iness) does not n e c e s s a r i l y ho ld predominant power i n the p o l i c y -making process. I n s t e a d , we f i n d t h a t two sen io r leaders o f the r u l i n g L i b e r a l Democratic Par ty — Prime M i n i s t e r Tanaka and Fore ign M i n i s t e r Ohira — form a po l i cy -mak ing group which dominates t h i s p a r t i c u l a r p o l i c y process. These p o l i t i c i a n s are supported i n t h i s r o l e by sen io r i i members o f the bureaucracy, a pro-Pek ing L i b e r a l Democratic Pa r t y Dietman, and i n f l u e n t i a l members o f the o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s . I n t h i s s tudy , the r o l e o f bus iness , the press and p u b l i c o p i n i o n are found to be i n d i r e c t and p e r i p h e r a l compared t o the r o l e p layed by the above mentioned po l i cy -mak ing a c t o r s . i i i TABLE OF CONTENTS Page A b s t r a c t i i Acknowledgements . . . . v i i I . I n t r o d u c t i o n . 1 I I . T h e o r e t i c a l Pe rspec t i ve 4 The Po l i cy -Mak ing Process i n Japan . . . . . . . . . 4 I I I . E x t e r n a l Environment 13 I n t r o d u c t i o n . 13 Japan 's E a r l y Post-War Fore ign P o l i c y . . . 14 Changes i n the E x t e r n a l Environment 15 The Change i n the Un i ted S ta tes -Ch ina P o l i c y . . 16 Chinese Fore ign P o l i c y Outputs 21 Chinese A t t i t u d e s Towards the U.S.-Japan S e c u r i t y T rea ty and Japanese M i l i t a r i s m . . . 21 Chinese A t t i t u d e s Towards the Sato Governments Evo lv ing China P o l i c y . . . . . . 23 Conclus ion 28 I V . I n t e r n a l Environment 31 I n t r o d u c t i o n 31 The LDP's China P o l i c y . . . . . 31 The 1972 P r e s i d e n t i a l E l e c t i o n ' 34 The LDP Po l i cy -Mak ing Group 37 Crea t ing a Consensus W i t h i n the LDP 41 The LDP Miss ions to China and Taiwan 47 Conclus ion 49 i v Page The Bureaucracy 52 Introduction 52 Inter- and Intra-Ministry Conflict Concerning Japan's China Policy 52 The Foreign Ministry Policy-Making Group 54 Conclusion 55 The Business Community 58 Introduction 58 Differences in the Business Community's Attitude Towards China 58 "Friendly Firm" Trade and Memorandum Trade 61 The Reaction of the Business Community to Chou's "Four Conditions" and Changes i n the External Environment 62 Conclusion 68 The Opposition Parties 71 Introduction 71 Japan Communist Party 71 Japan Socialist Party 72 The Komeito 75 Democratic Socialist Party 78 Conclusion 79 The Press and Public Opinion 82 Introduction 82 v Page The Press . . . 8 2 P u b l i c Opin ion 8 5 Conclus ion 8 8 V. Conclusion . . . . 9 2 IV . Footnotes 9 6 I I V . B i b l i o g r a p h y . • 1 2 5 v i ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS For adv ice and encouragement i n the p r e p a r a t i o n o f t h i s t h e s i s , I would l i k e to thank my a d v i s o r , Pro fessor Frank Langdon, of the Department o f P o l i t i c a l Science, U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Columbia. Thanks are a lso due to Haruhi ro F u k u i , of the Department o f P o l i t i c a l Science, U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a a t Santa Barbara, f o r permiss ion to quote f rom an unpubl ished paper he d e l i v e r e d a t the Annual Meet ing o f the A s s o c i a t i o n f o r Asian S tud ies , Boston, A p r i l 1-3, 1974. v i i 1 INTRODUCTION I t i s w i t h o u t ques t i on t h a t the Tanaka government's d e c i s i o n t o normal ize r e l a t i o n s w i t h the People 's Republ ic o f China ( h e r e a f t e r China) was one of the most impor tan t f o r e i g n p o l i c y dec is ions made by any Japanese government i n the post -war e r a . As sucfy t h i s d e c i s i o n seems wor thy o f examinat ion bo th i n terms of i t s outgrowth f rom the va r ious e x t e r n a l and i n t e r n a l pressures t h a t b u i l t up aga ins t the p r e v i o u s l y he ld pro-Taiwan p o l i c y o f the Sato government and a l s o , o f equal impor tance, i n terms o f the prox imate ac to rs t h a t a c t u a l l y p a r -t i c i p a t e d i n t h i s h i s t o r i c d e c i s i o n . I n s h o r t , t h i s s tudy Li i i seeks to e x p l a i n the China d e c i s i o n by re fe rence to the major fo rces t h a t p layed a r o l e i n b r i n g i n g t h i s d e c i s i o n to f u l f i l l m e n t . Any at tempt to determine those f o r c e s , or i n p u t s , t h a t i n f l u e n c e d the Chinaddec-ision-making process n a t u r a l l y f a l l s prey to the ques t ion of the ' c o r r e c t ' methodo log ica l approach to be employed i n the s tudy . I n t h i s r e s p e c t , Geof f rey Pearson's comment seems p a r t i c u l a r l y germane: I f one were p r i m a r i l y i n t e r e s t e d i n "systems" o f w o r l d p o l i t i c s , one might concent ra te on the processes t h a t lead to the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f the system f rom b i p o l a r i t y t o m u l t i p o l a r i t y and i n f e r [ n a t i o n a l ] a c t i o n as a by -p roduc t o f t h i s change. I f one were p r i m a r i l y i n t e r e s t e d i n d e c i s i o n -making, one might emphasize changes i n the domestic e n v i r o n m e n t . . . i n c l u d i n g l e a d e r s h i p . Students of o r g a n i z a t i o n would concent ra te on in t ra -government b a r g a i n i n g . Psycho log is ts might p o i n t to changes i n p e r c e p t i o n . Students of power and i n f l u e n c e might e x p l a i n i t as a response to e x t e r n a l p ressures . None o f these approaches i s n e c e s s a r i l y wrong. What i s s t r i k i n g about them i s t h e i r l ack of coherence.^ -2 Thus the c l e a r necess i t y f o r us to s p e c i f y , a t the o u t s e t , the focus t h a t t h i s study w i l l take w i t h i n such a methodo log ica l s e t t i n g . Here we w i l l p r i m a r i l y be concerned w i t h the 'China n o r m a l i z a t i o n d e c i s i o n -making p rocess ' i n Japan, and w i l l t h e r e f o r e n a t u r a l l y tend to concen-t r a t e upon examining the i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c a l changes which f a c i l i t a t e t h i s d e c i s i o n . Y e t , Pearson's re ferences to the lack o f coherence among the above approaches c a l l s our a t t e n t i o n to the f a c t t h a t any of these approaches would on ly o f f e r us a p a r t i a l p i c t u r e o f the China dec is ion-making process. Thus, f o r example, i t may be qaite c o r r e c t f o r s tudents i n t e r e s t e d i n the e f fec ts o f e x t e r n a l changes on a n a t i o n ' s i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c a l processes t o p o i n t to the 1971 Nixon "shocks" as the f o r c e which compelled Japan to reappra ise i t s China p o l i c y . But s tudents f u l l y aware of the i n t r i c a c i e s o f Japanese f a c t i o n a l i s m would ins tead ,no doub t^po in t to the exigency o f r e p l a c i n g the Sato Cabinet w i t h one supported by a f a c t i o n a l c o a l i t i o n prepared to' back the new Cabinet i n i t s moves to normal ize r e l a t i o n s w i t h China. A d m i t t e d l y , the Nixon "shocks" may have p rov ided some o f the impetus f o r t h i s change, bu t i n t e r n a l f a c t o r s a lso p layed an impor tan t r o l e . I n o ther words, these approaches can on ly o f f e r a p a r t i a l exp lana t i on of a p a r t i c u l a r event when more than one impor tan t actor^ or f a c t o r y p lays a lead r o l e i n t h a t event . I n order to avo id some of the p i t f a l l s o f a t t r i b u t i n g the China p o l i c y d e c i s i o n to one predominant ac to r or f a c t o r s , w i t h o u t hav ing examined o thers which may have been equa l l y i f not more i m p o r t a n t , t h i s 3 study t h e r e f o r e examines bo th the e x t e r n a l and i n t e r n a l i n f l u e n c e s .which a f f e c t e d Japan's d e c i s i o n to normal ize r e l a t i o n s w i t h China. I n t h i s r e s p e c t , we w i l l f i r s t consider the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the po l i cy -mak ing process i n Japan which i s g e n e r a l l y g iven by s tudents of Japanese p o l i c y - m a k i n g . The quintessence of t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s t h a t a r u l i n g e l i t e o f LDP p o l i t i c i a n s , sen io r b u r e a u c r a t s , and b i g business leaders^ho ld near exc lus i ve power i n the po l i cy -mak ing process. A f t e r drawing a t t e n t i o n to the l i m i t a t i o n s of employing such a s i m p l i s t i c expos i t o ry model t o e x p l a i n the Japanese po l i cy -mak ing process, we w i l l then t u r n t o a s p e c i f i c d i scuss ion o f the China n o r -m a l i z a t i o n process , f i r s t i n v e s t i g a t i n g the changes which occurred i n the e x t e r n a l environment to i n f l u e n c e or make p o s s i b l e the adopt ion of a new China p o l i c y i n Japan. Next , we w i l l t u r n to analyze the r o l e of the r u l i n g e l i t e i n the dec is ion-making process — the LDP, bureau-c racy , and b i g b u s i n e s s — to determine i f these ac to rs d i d i n f a c t ho ld predominant i n f l u e n c e i n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r case. F ind ing t h e i r r o l e i n s u f f i c i e n t to f u l l y e x p l a i n the China p o l i c y dec is ion-making process , we w i l l then go on to d iscuss the impor tan t r o l e p layed by c e r t a i n o p p o s i t i o n p a r t y p o l i t i c i a n s i n i n f l u e n c i n g the outcome of t h i s d e c i s i o n , f o l l o w e d l a s t l y by a d i scuss ion of the press and p u b l i c o p i n i o n . I n t h i s way, we may i n our conc lus ion t h e r e f o r e hope to o f f e r an exp lana t ion o f some of the e x t e r n a l and i n t e r n a l fo rces t h a t p layed a r o l e i n i n f l u e n c i n g the 'China n o r m a l i z a t i o n p r o c e s s . ' 4 T h e o r e t i c a l Perspec t i ve  The Po l i cy -Mak ing Process i n Japan The po l i cy -mak ing process i n Japan i s most commonly analyzed i n terms o f a t r i p a r t i t e e l i t e model which focuses upon the leaders of the r u l i n g L i b e r a l Democratic Par ty (LDP), sen ior bu reauc ra ts , and leaders of b i g business (or z a i k a i ) . The members o f t h i s e l i t e . r are considered to be a ' n a t u r a l ' r u l i n g c o a l i t i o n sha r ing common v a l u e s , o p i n i o n s , educa t iona l experiences and s o c i a l t i e s . On a f u n c t i o n a l l e v e l , the members of t h i s t r i p a r t i t e e l i t e c o a l i t i o n are i n t e r t w i n e d through t h e i r mutua l dependence upon one another — the LDP i s dependent upon the bureaucrats f o r e x p e r t i s e i n d r a f t i n g l e g i s l a t i o n j and upon businessmen f o r p o l i t i c a l c o n t r i b u -2 t i o n s . N a t u r a l l y , the bureaucra ts i n t h e i r t u r n are dependent upon the good w i l l o f the LDP p o l i t i c i a n s i n making p o l i t i c a l dec is ions favourab le to t h e i r m i n i s t r i e s . For sen io r bureaucrats the LDP more-over o f f e r s the o p p o r t u n i t y f o r them to move over i n t o p o l i t i c s a f t e r r e t i r e m e n t f rom the bureaucracy. F i n a l l y , the z a i k a i has a stake i n seeing t h a t l e g i s l a t i o n p e r t a i n i n g to business opera t ions i s i n f l u e n c e d by i t s wishes and thus seeks favours w i t h bo th LDP p o l i t i c i a n s and 3 i n f l u e n t i a l bureaucra ts w i t h i n the v a r i o u s governmental m i n i s t r i e s . With v a r y i n g degrees of emphasis, t h i s group i s considered t o ho l d p o l i t i c a l power and c o n t r o l o f the po l i cy -mak ing process i n Japan. For i n s t a n c e , Fukui j i n t h i s s tudy of economic p lann ing i n p o s t -war Japanjconcludes t h a t the t r i p a r t i t e c o a l i t i o n of LDP l e a d e r s , sen io r bureaucra ts and b i g business leaders ho ld " t h e predominant , 5 almost e x c l u s i v e " r o l e i n the po l i cy -mak ing process . Moreover, Thayer q u i t e e x p l i c i t l y s ta tes a t the beg inn ing o f an a r t i c l e t h a t : " S e c u r i t y p o l i c y l i k e o ther major p o l i c y i n Japan i s the product o f i n t e r a c t i o n among the business f e d e r a t i o n s , the bureaucracy, and the conserva t i ve p o l i t i c i a n s , . . . , " ^ and l a t e r asser ts t h a t : "The conser-v a t i v e power s t r u c t u r e , then , i s composed o f th ree elements — the businessman, the b u r e a u c r a t , and the p o l i t i c i a n . " 6 I n the same way, Yanaga f i n d s l i t t l e to ques t i on i n t h i s l a t t e r a s s e r t i o n : " . . . o r g a n i z e d bus iness , the p a r t y government, and the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e bureaucracy are the th ree legs o f the t r i p o d on which the Japanese p o l i t i c a l system r e s t s . " 7 However, u n l i k e Thayer, who comes down i n favour of the p r e -g dominant p o s i t i o n of the p o l i t i c i a n s i n the po l i cy -mak ing p rocess , Yanaga seems to see b i g business i n t h i s c e n t r a l r o l e : I t p a r t i c i p a t e s i n the f o r m u l a t i o n of the l e g i s l a t i v e program, the budget , and f i s c a l and f i n a n c i a l p o l i c i e s . Defense p o l i c y and defense p r o d u c t i o n are o f d i r e c t concern to bus iness . Z a i k a i p lays a d e c i s i v e r o l e i n economic p l a n n i n g , . . . and zon ing , as w e l l as t rade and t a r i f f p o l i c y and tax s t r u c t u r e . 9 I n regards t o the above, there i s evidence f rom the. e m p i r i c a l w o r l d to suppor t the c o n t e n t i o n t h a t one o f the members of the r u l i n g c o a l i t i o n holds sway i n the po l i cy -mak ing process. Yanaga, f o r i n s t a n c e , observes i n a case study o f Japan's N a t i o n a l Atomic Energy P o l i c y t ha t the adopt ion o f an e f f e c t i v e energy p o l i c y "has been due main ly to the i n i t i a t i v e s of organized b u s i n e s s . " " ^ I n c o n t r a s t , Hel lman's study of the peace agreement w i t h the Sov ie t Union suppor ts Thayer 's emphasis upon the dominant r o l e o f the L i b e r a l Democratic Par ty i n the p o l i c y -6 -making process . He n o t on ly found t h a t " p o l i c y c o n t r o l r e s t e d over -whelmingly i n the hands of the r u l i n g party,""'""'" bu t a lso t h a t " ( t ) h e habatsu [ f a c t i o n a l ] s t r u g g l e became synonomous w i t h the f o r e i g n p o l i c y -making process as p o l i t i c a l c o n f l i c t revo lved around the ques t ion o f 12 Sov ie t r e l a t i o n s . " I n t h i s case, except f o r the f i s h i n g i n d u s t r y , 13 which " d i d p l a y an e f f e c t i v e r o l e i n the f o r m a t i o n o f Japanese p o l i c y , " 14 b i g business groups were subord ina te i n t h e i r p o l i c y i n f l u e n c e ^ as was the bureaucracy."'""' S t i l l , Misawa q u i t e e x p l i c i t l y s t a t e s t h a t i t i s i n f a c t the t h i r d member o f the t r i p a r t i t e c o a l i t i o n — the bureaucracy — t h a t ho lds sway i n the po l i cy -mak ing process^s ince the re i s a " . . . t e n d -ency f o r the dec is ion-making power to be concent ra ted i n b u r e a u c r a t i c o rgan iza t ions . " ' ' " ^ L i kew ise , Tsu ru tan i echoes t h i s argument when he c la ims t h a t the Fore ign M i n i s t r y bureaucracy dominates the f o r e i g n po l i cy -mak ing process i n Japan."*"7 Once aga in , the re i s c e r t a i n evidence to suggest t h a t one member o f the c o a l i t i o n predominates i n the po l i cy -mak ing process . Thus, i n h i s study o f LDP's China p o l i c y b e f o r e n o r m a l i z a t i o n , Fukui concludes t h a t i t was the Fore ign M i n i s t r y 18 which e s t a b l i s h e d the g u i d e l i n e s f o r the LDP's China p o l i c y . Given the aforement ioned i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f the po l i cy -mak ing process i n Japan, i t appears t h a t there i s one p r o p o s i t i o n ^ a n d a t l e a s t th ree va r ian ts^ t h a t may he lp us i n e x p l a i n i n g the China n o r m a l i z a t i o n process: 1 . That the po l i cy -mak ing process i n Japan i s dominated by a r u l i n g c o a l i t i o n o f leaders o f the LDP, the sen io r bu reauc ra t s , and leaders of b i g bus iness . 7 a . That w i t h i n t h i s group the LDP dominates. b. That w i t h i n t h i s group b i g business dominates. c. That w i t h i n t h i s group the bureaucracy dominates. I t must be confessed t h a t f rom an a n a l y t i c a l v i e w p o i n t i t i s appeal ing to consider t h i s c o a l i t i o n as one which c o n t r o l s the p o l i c y -making process i n Japan. Such a conc lus ion i s never the less premature and spur ious because o ther ac to rs and f a c t o r s p lay a r o l e i n i n f l u e n c -19 i ng t h i s p rocess . For i n s t a n c e , i n respect to the r o l e o f the oppo-s i t i o n p a r t i e s i n p o l i c y - m a k i n g , Langdon p o i n t s out t h a t i t has been the S o c i a l i s t s , and the support o f popu lar p a c i f i s t i c tendencies t h a t " . . . h a s probably been the c h i e f goad i n e n f o r c i n g the narrow i n t e r p r e -20 t a t i o n g iven to p e r m i s s i b l e Japanese defense e f f o r t s . " R e f e r r i n g aga in to Hellmann, he found t h a t the S o c i a l i s t s p layed a r o l e i n sup-21 p o r t i n g Hatoyama's e f f o r t s to s e t t l e the peace t r e a t y i s s u e . F i n a l l y , as we w i l l see l a t e r , c e r t a i n members o f the o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s p layed a s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e i n the d e c i s i o n to recognize the People 's 22 Republ ic o f China, S i m i l a r l y , the press and p u b l i c o p i n i o n p l a y a v a r i e d r o l e i n po l i cy -mak ing processes, r e l a t i v e l y impotent on some i s s u e s , y e t forming 23 an e f f e c t i v e pressure group on o t h e r s . On a genera l l e v e l , Langdon p o s i t s t h a t : " P u b l i c views c l e a r l y can not c o n t r o l government p o l i c y 24 bu t they are not i g n o r e d . " I n t h i s rega rd , one would expect t h a t the i n f l u e n c e o f p u b l i c o p i n i o n , which as Scalapino laments i s g r e a t l y 25 i n f l u e n c e d by the " l e f t i s t " p ress , would be most e f f e c t i v e i n 8 r e l a t i o n to domestic issues o f d i r e c t concern to the masses. I n f a c t , Scalapino and Masumi concur t h a t the issues of d i r e c t concern .to them " . . . a r e e s s e n t i a l l y domest ic , p r a c t i c a l , and h i g h l y persona l 26 i s s u e s . " Thus, i n regard to f o r e i g n p o l i c y i s s u e s , Hellmann found i n one study t h a t the genera l p u b l i c was u n i n t e r e s t e d and i l l - i n f o r m e d 27 about such i s s u e s , bu t i n another s tudy revea led t h a t they are none-the less i n t e r e s t e d i n issues p e r t a i n i n g to Japan's secur i ty^" * a r range-m e n t s , E s p e c i a l l y when they revo lve around the ques t ion of Japan's 29 s e c u r i t y t i e s w i t h the Un i ted S ta tes . As we w i l l see l a t e r , the re 30 has a lso been f l u c t u a t i n g mass i n t e r e s t i n the China i ssue i n Japan. F i n a l l y , i n s o f a r as the r o l e o f the press i s concerned, Matsuyama argues t h a t j " . . . u n d e n i a b l y , the press has become i n c r e a s i n g l y i n f l u e n t i a l 31 i n the f o r m a t i o n o f Japanese f o r e i g n p o l i c y . " C e r t a i n l y , the study 32 33 of the 1960 c r i s i s by whit temore^ and the one by Packard' lend sup-p o r t to Matsuyama's c o n t e n t i o n . I n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r case, the i n f l u e n c e of the press "helped sw i t ch the issue f rom the t r e a t y i t s e l f to the 34 ques t i on of K i s h i ' s competence to l e a d . t h e gove rnmen t . . . " The study by Hel lmann, i n c o n t r a s t , o u t l i n e s t h a t the press can i n no way " . . . s e r v e as a c a t a l y s t , p r o v i d i n g order and c l a r i t y i n what was a 35 h i g h l y c h a o t i c s i t u a t i o n . " I n f a c t , Hellmann d iscovered t h a t the newspapers i n Japan " . . . d i d no t p rov ide the bas is f o r c l ea r and r e l e v a n t p o l i c y d i s c u s s i o n " s ince they were " . . . u n d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g l y 36 r e p o r t i n g a l l the f a c t s i n the Sov ie t n e g o t i a t i o n s . " The f a c t t h a t ac to rs o ther than those i n the t r i p a r t i t e e l i t e are i n v o l v e d i n the po l i cy -mak ing process i n Japan thus demonstrates 9 the l i m i t e d u t i l i t y of t h i s model i n attempting to explain a p a r t i c u l a r p o l i c y d e c i s i o n such as the Japan-China normalization process. In short, the policy-making process i n Japan i s too complex a process to be subsumed under a simple t r i p a r t i t e e l i t e model of policy-making. E s s e n t i a l l y , t h i s i s what Fiikui argues when he outlines the reasons why the model i s not applicable to p a r t i c u l a r policy-making s i t u a t i o n s : f i r s t l y , " . . . d i v e r s i t y of i n t e r e s t s leads to d i v i s i o n s of opinion on s p e c i f i c p o l i c y issues and prevents the members of the e l i t e from un i t i n g and r a l l y i n g behind p a r t i c u l a r p o l i c y decisions or programs; and secondly "...important p o l i c y issues usually i n t e r e s t and involve many i n d i v i d u a l s and groups i n the society at large, f a r beyond the 37 boundaries of the power e l i t e . " This point i s elucidated elsewhere by EukuijWhen he st a t e s : "Foreign p o l i c y process i n Japan i s not under the r i g i d and exclusive control of any s i n g l e group of actors or f a c t o r s . I t i s a f l e x i b l e , dynamic, and f l u i d process subject to vagaries of c i r -i»38 cumstances, issues and p e r s o n a l i t i e s . In a broader context, Rosenau concurs that "...the number and i d e n t i t y of the r o l e s , both i n and out of government, that a r e r p b H t i c a l l y a c t i v e at any moment i n time are manifestly a consequence of the nature of the issues that the system 39 i s processing at that moment." F i n a l l y , Pempel argues that to as-sume "...that something i n the nature of the issue under debate w i l l 40 t r i g g e r s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t decision-mechanisms or processes," i s a promising approach to u t i l i z e i n studies of policy-making. Accordingly, i t would seem appropriate to consider the issue of the normalization of Japan-China r e l a t i o n s withinKS.uch a s e t t i n g . 10 To commence w i t h , the po l i cy -mak ing process i n v o l v e d i n the China n o r m a l i z a t i o n issue f a l l s w i t h i n the f u n c t i o n a l area of f o r e i g n 41 42 p o l i c y . Both Langdon and Pempel suggest t ha t a f u n c t i o n a l category i s an impor tan t way to d e l i n e a t e i s s u e s , so t h a t we may f i n d t h a t our case study oflrthe China issue shares c e r t a i n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s i n common w i t h those s tud ies c a r r i e d out by Packard and Hel lman. This would appear to be the . case,.es.pecial lyyas a l l t h ree s tud ies are " y e s " "no" dec is ions l e a v i n g " . . . l i t t l e or no room f o r compromise, and p o l i c y -making becomes a h i g h c o n f l i c t , zero sum game f o r those t a k i n g op-"43 posing s i d e s . ; This suggests t h a t a f u r t h e r category should dea l w i t h the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f the p o l i c y ; namely, whether or not the p o l i c y d e c i s i o n i s of cont roversy e i t h e r w i t h i n , o r between^the po l i cy -mak ing a c t o r s . This category i s s i m i l a r to;theonesuggested by Pempel i n t h a t h i s " t o t a l " po l i cy -mak ing i nvo l ves con t roversy between the p rog ress i ve 44 and conserva t i ve camps. C e r t a i n l y j i n the case o f Ch ina j the p o l i c y -making environment was h i g h l y c o n t r o v e r s i a l , bu t t h i s con t roversy was most impor tan t i n i t s i n t r a - p a r t y , r a t h e r than i n i t s i n t e r - p a r t y j m a n i f e s t a t i o n . F i n a l l y , a t h i r d category t h a t may f a c i l i t a t e an understanding o f the p a r t i c u l a r ac to rs t ha t are i nvo l ved i n an issue i s t h a t o f the temporal dimension o f the i ssue area . I n t h i s respect numerous s c h o l a r s , 45 v most n o t a b l y Hermann, have p o i n t e d out the necess i t y o f d i s t i n g u i s h i n g c r i s i s dec is ion-making f rom o ther types o f dec is ion-mak ing , c r i s i s dec is ions be ing made i n c o n d i t i o n s o f 1) h igh t h r e a t to n a t i o n a l goals 11 2) s h o r t t ime f o r response 3) s u r p r i s e . The p o i n t i s t h a t such dec is ions are considered to be s u f f i c i e n t l y d i f f e r e n t f rom longer term decis ions^ i n respect to the inc rease i n importance of i d i o s y n -c r a t i c and systemic v a r i a b l e s , and the decrease i n importance of s o c i e t a l f a c t o r s , t h a t these types o f po l i cy -mak ing process are ex-pected to d i f f e r s u b s t a n t i a l l y . Even so , Lowi argues t h a t there i s a c t u a l l y a s i m i l a r i t y between c r i s i s dec is ion-mak ing and acts such 47 . as r e c o g n i t i o n . I s t s i s o n s i d e r i n g h i s argument i s based on the premise t h a t there i s l i t t l e immediate domestic p o l i t i c a l consequences i n these dec is ion-making a c t s , h- . - there seems evidence t o sug-gest t h a t i n the case o f the n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f r e l a t i o n s w i t h China, 48 t h i s i s not the case. As a mat te r o f f a c t , Fuku i considers the China n o r m a l i z a t i o n process as an example of c r i s i s dec is ion-mak ing , bu t f a i l s to d e f i n e 49 p r e c i s e l y what he means by t h i s . Qui te c l e a r l y , he h a r d l y meant the same as Hermann by the term^ s ince on ly one o f the aforement ioned c o n d i t i o n s d i d occur du r i ng the ' p rocess ' i . e . , t h a t of a r e l a t i v e l y shor t t ime f o r r e s p o n s e . I n d e e d i t might be argued t h a t none o f Japan's pos t -war p o l i c y dec is ions have been made i n a c r i s i s e n v i r o n -ment.^"'" Nonetheless, desp i te the f a i l u r e o f Fukui to de f i ne the p r e c i s e meaning he g ives to t h i s te rm, he s t i l l makes the impor tan t p o i n t t h a t " . . . c r i s i s and n o n c r i s i s are not dichotomous s i t u a t i o n s sharp ly d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e f rom each o ther bu t are merely two moving p o i n t s 52 on a continuum'.' I f we take t h i s continuum to be tha t o f the temporal . dimension,bounded on one s ide by c r i s i s d e c i s i o n s f s u c h as t h a t of Korea^ 12 and on the o ther w i t h l o n g - t e r m slow decisions^ such as the Monroney ' 54 R e s o l u t i o n , then the China d e c i s i o n would be c l o s e r to the c r i s i s end o f the cont inuum. The p o i n t i s t h a t when impor tan t d e c i s i o n -making ac to rs perce ive an issue to be u r g e n t , as i n the case of China n o r m a l i z a t i o n Tanaka apparen t l y d i d , then i t i s more l i k e l y t h a t t h i s issue w i l l w in out i n the c o m p e t i t i o n f o r scarce resources ( t i m e , energy, a t t e n t i o n , money, manpower, and good w i l l ) which any issue must compete f o r . Fo l low ing f rom the above, then , we can see t h a t the China d e c i s i o n f a l l s w i t h i n 1) the f u n c t i o n a l area of f o r e i g n p o l i c y 2) i s c o n t r o v e r s i a l i n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c 3) i s u rgent on the temporal d imension. Thus, the conclus ions we draw f rom t h i s study o f the China n o r m a l i z a -t i o n process may p rov ide i n s i g h t s i n t o o ther issues t h a t s i m i l a r l y f a l l w i t h i n these th ree c a t e g o r i e s . 13 E x t e r n a l Environment I n t r o d u c t i o n I n p u t f rom the e x t e r n a l environment i s an impor tan t v a r i a b l e to cons ider i n any at tempt to understand a f o r e i g n po l i cy -mak ing process . This i s p a r t i c u l a r l y t r u e i n respect to Japan, which i s considered by some authors as a " p e n e t r a t e d " p o l i t i c a l s y s t e m , ^ 6 and even among Japanese exper ts i s considered to be g r e a t l y a f f e c t e d by c o n t i n u i t y and change i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l environment. "*7 This t e n -dency to consider Japan as p e c u l i a r l y a f f e c t e d by the e x t e r n a l en-v i ronment l ed S i l v e r s t e i n to p o s i t an " E x t e r n a l Dominance" model as a u s e f u l framework to employ when examining s h o r t - t e r m issues ( l ess 58 than one y e a r ) , or f o r e i g n p o l i c y goa l s . Whi le t h i s framework might thus be of u t i l i t y i n examining the China n o r m a l i z a t i o n process , i t i s of less use i n examining longer term issues because " . . . f a r f rom bowing to e x t e r n a l p ressures , Japan has fought any s h i f t i n i t s p o l i c i e s r e l a t i n g to the a t ta inment o f i t s long- range n a t i o n a l g o a l s . " ^ A foremost proponent o f the " E x t e r n a l Dominance" model i s Donald C. Hellmann, who argues i n h i s study o f the Soviet Peace Treaty n e g o t i a t i o n s t h a t : Unless the p a t t e r n of p o l i c y f o r m u l a t i o n and leadersh ip d isp layed i n the Sov ie t n e g o t i a t i o n s i s r a d i c a l l y reve rsed , Japan seems des t ined to remain a pass ive a c t o r on the i n t e r n a t i o n a l s tage , r e a c t i n g t o , not l ead ing events desp i te i n c r e a s i n g p o t e n t i a l f o r autonomous a c t i o n . ^ ° • Hellman echoes t h i s p o s i t i o n i n a l a t e r a r t i c l e n w h e r e he sugges ts - -t h a t : "When the Japanese have had to c o n f r o n t p o l i c y cho ices , they have responded i n a s tumbl ing manner . . . o r have p r o c r a s t i n a t e d u n t i l e x t e r n a l 14 events compelled a d e c i s i o n . . . " I n p o i n t o f f a c t Hellmann i n s i s t s t h a t : "To an e x t r a o r d i n a r y ex ten t du r ing the past two decades, Japan's i n t e r n a t i o n a l r o l e has been r e a c t i v e , de f ined almost e n t i r e l y by the ou ts ide e n v i r o n m e n t . . . . I t i s to the e x t e r n a l environment, t h e n , t h a t 62 one should look f o r s t i m u l i . " Japan's Ear ly Post-war Fore ign P o l i c y C e r t a i n l y , Japan's r e c o g n i t i o n o f the Republ ic o f China (ROC) government on Taiwan i n the immediate post-war i l l u s t r a t e s t h a t , a t t h i s t ime,Japan 's po l i cy -mak ing process was p e c u l i a r l y a f f e c t e d by e x t e r n a l f a c t o r s . M, -t !.<v\>. Lain J I t i s a we l l - accep ted f a c t t h a t i t was due to the pressure of the Uni ted S ta tes , i n p a r t i c u l a r t h a t o f Secretary of S ta te D u l l e s , t h a t Japan signed a peace t r e a t y w i t h the N a t i o n a l i s t Chinese government on Taiwan^as the p r i c e exacted f o r the passage of the Japanese peace t r e a t y through the Uni ted States Senate. Al though Prime M i n i s t e r Yoshida made an e f f o r t to leave the p o s s i b i l i t y o f improving r e l a t i o n s w i t h China open by d r a f t i n g a l e t t e r to the Uni ted States emphasizing tha t the peace t r e a t y app l i ed s o l e l y to 64 t e r r i t o r y under the c o n t r o l o f the N a t i o n a l i s t government, suc-cessive conserva t i ve governments accepted r e l a t i o n s w i t h the Re-p u b l i c c o f China on the p o l i t i c a l and economic l e v e l , l ead ing to the de j u r e r e c o g n i t i o n o f the ROC government on Taiwan as the l e g i t i m a t e government o f China. Of course, m a i n t a i n i n g such a p o l i c y was i n l i n e w i t h the Un i ted Na t i ons ' acceptance o f the ROC as de j u r e government o f China, bu t more i m p o r t a n t l y ^ i t went hand i n hand w i t h Japan's r e l a -t i o n s h i p w i t h the Un i ted S ta tes , e s p e c i a l l y i n respect to the con-t i n u a t i o n o f the Uni ted States-Japan Secur i t y Treaty^ which formed 15 p a r t of the Un i ted States s e c u r i t y system aimed a t ' c o n t a i n i n g ' Chinese and Sov ie t communism. I t seems c l e a r , t h e r e f o r e , t ha t f rom the ou tse t the r e l a t i o n s h i p between Japan and the Uni ted States d id much to determine Japan's post -war China p o l i c y . Changes i n the E x t e r n a l Environment Commencing i n the 1970s, however, a number of nascent changes i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l environment emerged,which were p r o p i t i o u s to a major r e - d i r e c t i o n of Japan's China p o l i c y , away from a p r i o r p o l i c y decry ing the " s e p a r a t i o n o f p o l i t i c s and economics" ( s e i k i b u n r i ) , to one compat ib le w i t h t h a t o f the Chinese d o c t r i n e o f the " i n s e -65 p a r a b i l i t y of p o l i t i c s and economics" ( s e i k e i fukabun) . I n the f i r s t p l a c e , bo th Canada and I t a l y extended d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s to China. Secondly, and o f more impor tance, a change was i n progress regard ing the r o l e o f the Uni ted States i n the Far East a f t e r the e n u n c i a t i o n o f the 'N ixon D o c t r i n e ' a t Guam i n 1969. Es-s e n t i a l l y , the t e n e t o f t h i s p o l i c y was t h a t the burden o f s e c u r i t y f o r the area should be c a r r i e d by the Asian na t ions themselves r a t h e r than by the Uni ted States c o n t i n u i n g to serve as a bulwark aga ins t 66 communism through heavy m i l i t a r y commitment to the a rea . The d e c l a r a t i o n of the Nixon Doc t r i ne was o f p a r t i c u l a r importance as i t pertained to Japan, f o r Prime M i n i s t e r . S a t o signed a j o i n t communique w i t h Pres ident Nixon i n November 1969 i n which he concurred t h a t the s e c u r i t y i n t e r e s t s of Japan were i n t i m a t e l y l i n k e d w i t h those of Taiwan and Korea, i . e . , Sato agreed t h a t the Japan would permi t the Uni ted States use of m i l i t a r y bases i n Japan to defend Taiwan and 16 Korea aga ins t communist r e g i m e s . " ' That Sato succumbed to the wishes - o f the Un i ted States i n recogn iz ing Japan's presumed s e c u r i t y i n t e r e s t s i n these c o u n t r i e s i s b a s i c a l l y the cost t h a t Sato had to pay f o r the r e t u r n of Okinawa to Japan. The Change i n the Uni ted States China P o l i c y Whi le the changes o u t l i n e d above ind ica te . } t h a t the i n t e r n a t i o n a l system was g r a d u a l l y t rans fo rming i t s c o n f i g u r a t i o n , the event which c l e a r l y adumbrated t h a t Japan would s h o r t l y be compelled to recons ider i t s p o l i c y towards China^ was when.Wia^s h'i-n-g tSocn-ti extended o f f i c i a l contacts to Pek ing. This commenced when Henry Kissenger made a secre t v i s i t to China i n . J u n e , 1971, f o l l o w e d by the announcement on J u l y 15th t ha t P res iden t Nixon would v i s i t China. From the Japanese p o i n t of v i e w , the l a c k o f any p r i o r c o n s u l t a t i o n i n f o r m i n g them of t h i s change i n Un i ted States p o l i c y was a ' s t a b i n the b a c k h a n d a persona l loss of face f o r Prime M i n i s t e r Sato. I n p o i n t o f f a c t j i t was the Sato government i t s e l f t h a t rece ived the blame f o r " . . . t h e i n t o l e r a b l e 68 loss o f face and h u m i l i a t i o n s u f f e r e d by the e n t i r e n a t i o n . " As a r e s u l t o f the absence o f any p r i o r c o n s u l t a t i o n concerning the rea l ignment of the Uni ted States' China p o l i c y i n v i o l a t i o n of 69 prev ious understandings between the two c o u n t r i e s , the Japanese government's conf idence i n i t s a l l y was n a t u r a l l y undermined. Most c e r t a i n l y the f i r s t o f the Nixon "shocks" cons iderab ly weakened the bas is o f Japan's post -war f o r e i g n p o l i c y which had been e s t a b l i s h e d on the premise of c lose t i e s between Japan and the Uni ted S ta tes . When to t h i s was added the "shocks" on the economic l e v e l , -T-^ • - • 17 the presumed s p e c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p Between Japan and the Un i ted States was brought s e r i o u s l y i n t o ques t ion . 7 ^* I n f a c t , w h i l e Nixon and K iss inge r were " . . . p a y i n g homage r h e t o r i c a l l y to the supreme impor-tance o f the a l l i a n c e , i n t h e i r persona l approaches and p r i v a t e s t a -tements, [ t h e y ] r a i s e d s u b s t a n t i a l doubts about t h e i r t r u e a t t i t u d e s " toward Japan . " F i n a l l y , the Nixon "shocks" i m p l i e d t h a t the " . . . S a t o government could not j u s t i f y i t s China p o l i c y as i t had be fo re under the p r e t e x t o f the pressure and c o n s t r a i n t s p laced on i t by the Un i ted S t a t e s . " 7 1 Despi te these moves on the p a r t of the Un i ted States, . the Sato government was s t i l l prepared to be the on ly impor tan t power to back the Uni ted States i n i t s at tempt to p revent the sea t i ng o f the Peking government i n the Un i ted Na t i ons . This was done by propos ing a d r a f t r e s o l u t i o n f o r the dua l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n system i n which bo th the T a i p e i and Peking governments would h o l d a seat i n the Un i ted Na t ions , and by co-sponsor ing the " i m p o r t a n t q u e s t i o n " r e s o l u t i o n o f the Un i ted States which r e q u i r e d a t w o - t h i r d s m a j o r i t y o f the General Assembly be fo re Taiwan could lose i t s sea t . Needless to say, i t was a t the October 1971 meet ing o f the Uni ted Nat ions t h a t the U.S. p roposa l was defeated and the A lban ian ' s o l e government' mot ion was adopted by the Assembly, thereby g i v i n g the China seat i n the Un i ted Nat ions to the Peking - 7 2 government. S t i l l , i t had no t been a t a l l c e r t a i n t h a t Japan would be prepared to co-sponsor the Uni ted States r e s o l u t i o n i n the Uni ted Na t ions . This was . .par t icu lar ly - - t r u e : a f t e r the Fore ign M i n i s t r y i n d i c a t e d to Secretary 18 of S ta te Rogers t h a t i t was u n c e r t a i n whether or no t Japan would back 73 the Un i ted States i n the Un i ted Nat ions and, o f more impor tance, a f t Fore ign M i n i s t e r Fukuda and LDP f a c t i o n s leaders Takeo M i k i and Yosuhiro Nakasone s t a t e d p u b l i c l y t h a t they were not i n favour o f a t -74 tempt ing to t r y and keep a seat f o r Taiwan i n the Uni ted Na t ions . Tnsol-r :. :v Prime M i n i s t e r Sato-msi msieelrf cd, -Va was prepared to concede to the p r i n c i p l e . o f 'one China)'' bu t no t to act i n a way t h a t might t h r e a t e n the s a f e t y o f Taiwan's seat i n the Uni ted Nations^ or Japan's con t i nu ing p o l i t i c a l and commercial i n t e r e s t s on the i s l a n d E v i d e n t l y at t h i s t ime Sato was under pressure f rom the Uni ted States to cont inue the p r e v i o u s l y upheld pro-Taiwan p o s i t i o n i n the UN. I n the words o f F u k u i : Apart f rom h i s concern about the impact o f Japan's negat ive a c t i o n on the a t t i t u d e s o f A u s t r a l i a , New Zealand, e t c . , which the U.S. apparent ly emphasized, he was obv ious ly w o r r i e d about p o s s i b l e impact on the U.S. a t t i t u d e on the t e x t i l e problem, which was e n t e r i n g the f i n a l and c r i t i c a l phase, and the .j. a c t u a l r e v e r s i o n of Okinawa, which was scheduled f o r next s p r i n g . As a mat te r of fact^ i t was revea led a few days be fo re Sato f i n a l l y an-nounced the d e c i s i o n t h a t Japan would co-sponsor the U.S. r e s o l u t i o n t h a t f o r " a d m i n i s t r a t i v e reasons" there had been a delay i n the p r e -s e n t a t i o n o f the Okinawa pact agreement to the U.S. Senate, a l though i t was denied t h a t the U.S. was t r y i n g to pressure Japan i n t o f o l l o w -ing i t s p o l i c y i n the U N . 7 6 Never the less , the Japanese government submi t ted , and thereby c l e a r l y i l l u s t r a t e d t h a t Japan's po l i cy -mak ing process was under impor tan t and obvious c o n s t r a i n t s f rom the Un i ted S ta tes . 19 Al though the Uni ted States had backed Taiwan i n the Un i ted Nat ions i t became ev iden t a f t e r N ixon 's v i s i t to China i n February 1972 t h a t there had been a change i n American p o l i c y i n respect to the Taiwan government. This i s i l l u s t r a t e d i n the Shanghai communique by the f a c t t ha t the U.S. government no longer upheld the p o s i t i o n i t had es tab l i shed a t the outbreak of the Korean war; namely, t h a t the s t a t u s of Taiwan "must awai t the r e s t o r a t i o n o f s e c u r i t y i n the P a c i f i c , a peace se t t l emen t w i t h Japan [s igned i n 1951] , o r c o n s i d e r a t i o n by the U i N . , " bu t now v i r t u a l l y admi t ted t h a t Taiwan i s a p a r t of Chinese t e r r i t o r y : " t h e U.S. acknowledges t h a t a l l Chinese on e i t h e r s ide of the Taiwan S t r a i t s m a i n t a i n t h a t the re i s bu t one China and t h a t Taiwan i s a p a r t o f China. The U.S. government does not chal lenge t h a t p o s i -t i o n . I t r e a f f i r m s i t s i n t e r e s t i n a peace fu l se t t l emen t of the Taiwan ques t ion by the Chinese t h e m s e l v e s . " 7 7 The Chinese s i d e , i t i s under-s t o o d , gave an u n w r i t t e n promise t h a t i t would not use f o r c e to r e g a i n Taiwan i n exchange>for the above U.S. d e c l a r a t i o n and i t s commitment 78 to reduce American fo rces i n Taiwan. I n s p i t e of t h i s , K i s s i n g e r cont inued to say t h a t the U.S. was s t i l l committed to i t s s e c u r i t y t r e a t y w i t h Taiwan, as d id the Pres iden t i n the State o f . t h e World Report f o r 1972. I n s o f a r as Prime M i n i s t e r Sato and h i s successor Tanaka were con-cerned, however, the Sino-American detente and the accompanying commu-nique i m p l i e d t h a t the commitment t h a t Sato had e a r l i e r made to Nixon i n the 1969 communique, namely t ha t Taiwan i s impor tan t to Japan's s e c u r i t y , had been s e r i o u s l y undermined by the change i n circumstances brought about by these even ts . I n Tanaka's words: "The Taiwan clause 20 s t a t e d the understanding by the then top leaders of the two coun t r i es on the s i t u a t i o n i n t h a t a rea . Since then , the s i t u a t i o n has undergone d r a s t i c changes. F o r t u n a t e l y , f o r the p r e s e n t , the p o s s i b i l i t y o f an armed d ispu te a c t u a l l y a r i s i n g over t h i s area h a r d l y e x i s t s . Accord-79 i n g l y , the above-mentioned understanding has changed." A f t e r the n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f r e l a t i o n s w i t h China, Tanaka went even f u r t h e r by d e c l a r i n g t h a t : "The U.S. and China are no longer i n a s i t u a t i o n where they cannot have t a l k s w i t h each o t h e r . Consequently such a s i t u a t i o n (as the i n v o k i n g o f the U.S. - Japan Secu r i t y T rea ty ) can be avo ided, gQ and there i s ho p o s s i b i l i t y o f such a s i t u a t i o n a r i s i n g . " The meet ing i n August 1972 between Prime M i n i s t e r Tanaka and Pres iden t Nixon i n Hawaii i n d i c a t e d .ne-vertbE-j.es ~ , t h a t the Uni ted States d i d not share i n the Japanese government's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the "Taiwan clause^" and s t i l l considered the a p p l i c a t i o n o f the s e c u r i t y t r e a t y t o Taiwan an impor tan t element o f the Un i ted States -81 Japan S e c u r i t y T rea ty . Even though a t t h i s meet ing there was no s p e c i f i c re fe rence to the "Taiwan Clause" and Tanaka only concurred w i t h Nixon t h a t Japan would cont inue to suppor t the s e c u r i t y t r e a t y , the cont inued " . . . A m e r i c a n i n s i s t e n c e on the a p p l i c a t i o n o f the s e c u r i t y t r e a t y to Taiwan i n s p i t e o f i t s detente w i t h China suggests t h a t the Far East clauses remain f o r the U.S. the most p r i z e d p a r t o f 82 the t r e a t y . " N a t u r a l l y , i n t h i s con tex t the moves made by the Tanaka government to normal ize r e l a t i o n s w i t h China were p e r f e c t l y under-s tandable to the American leaders who had i n i t i a t e d the detente w i t h 83 China. I n s h o r t , they a l lowed the Tanaka government a ' f r e e hand' 21 i n dea l i ng w i t h China, bu t on ly because t h i s was compat ib le w i t h the new balance of power diplomacy o f Nixon and K i s s i n g e r . Chinese Fore ign P o l i c y Outputs Besides cons ide r ing the e f f e c t o f the Uni ted States* China p o l i c y on the development o f Sino-Japanese r e l a t i o n s , i t i s o f course a lso impor tan t to examine the e f f e c t o f the f o r e i g n p o l i c y outputs o f the Chinese government on t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p . I n t h i s respect the most impor tan t ou tputs p e r t a i n to the Chinese government's a t t i t u d e s toward 1) the Un i ted States - Japan Secur i t y t r e a t y and r e v i v a l o f Japanese m i l i t a r i s m , 2) the Sato government, and 3) the Tanaka government. Chinese A t t i t u d e s Towards the U.S. - Japan Secur i t y Treaty and Japanese M i l i t a r i s m I t was n a t u r a l f o r the Chinese government to assume a nega t i ve a t t i t u d e towards the U.S. - Japan S e c u r i t y Treaty which was express ly cons t ruc ted f o r the purpose o f combatt ing Chinese and Soviet communism. From the Chinese p o i n t o f view ? the Secur i t y Treaty was designed to a i d ;". the r e v i v a l o f Japanese m i l i t a r i s m . Concern over the r e v i v a l o f m i l i t a r i s m was expressed as e a r l y as 1950^and then p e r i o d i c a l l y through the 1960s, bu t i t was a f t e r the re lease o f the Sato-Nixon j o i n t commu-nique i n 1969 t h a t Chinese concern became p a r t i c u l a r l y n o t i c e a b l e . As Emmerson descr ibes i t : P u b l i c a t i o n o f the Sato-Nixon communique produced shock waves i n P e k i n g . . . . T h e focus was on the r e v i v a l of Japanese m i l i t a r i s m , a l l eged by the Chinese to be revealed by the re fe rence i n the communique to s e c u r i t y , p a r -t i c u l a r l y to the t y i n g together of Japan's s e c u r i t y w i t h t ha t o f South Korea and the "Taiwan a r e a . " The Peking People 's D a i l y 22 a t tacked the Sato-Nixon agreements as a ' c r i m i n a l p l o t of the Un i ted States and Japanese r e a c t i o n a r i e s , ' and Chou E n - l a i c i t e d the communique as p roo f o f Sato 's amb i t i on to r e v i v e Japanese m i l i t a r i s m and b u i l d another 'Grea te r East Asia Co-P r o s p e r i t y Sphere. '"84 The Chinese government cont inued to express ant i -Japanese propaganda and re fe rence to the r e v i v a l of m i l i t a r i s m through press re leases and 85 o f f i c i a l statements du r i ng 1970 and 1971. A f t e r October ' 7 1 , how-ever , there was a gradual d e c l i n e i n re fe rence to Japanese m i l i t a r i s m and a d i s c o n t i n u a t i o n i n o f f i c i a l re fe rence to t h i s ques t ion a f t e r the 86 v i s i t o f Nixon to China. One o f the reasons f o r t h i s change i n Chinese a t t i t u d e r e s u l t e d f rom the development o f more c o r d i a l r e l a -87 t i o n s between the Un i ted States and China. A f u r t h e r , perhaps more c r u c i a l reason i n terms o f the rea l ignment o f the b i p o l a r w o r l d , was the f a c t t h a t the Soviet Union p r e c i p i t a t e d China i n i t s over tu res to Japan, by expressing a preparedness to n e g o t i a t e a peace t r e a t y w i t h 88 Japan and a l l ow i t s p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the development' o f S i b e r i a n 89 resources. So t h a t now. ins tead of concen t ra t i ng upon the r e v i v a l of m i l i t a r i s m and ab roga t ion o f the s e c u r i t y t r e a t y , the Chinese govern-ment aimed a t p reven t i ng a rapprochement between the USSR and Japan. As Yao makes c l e a r : I n the e a r l y stages o f the CCP f o r e i g n p o l i c y change, the undermining o f the a l l i a n c e between the Un i ted States and Japan was one of i t s c h i e f d ip loma t i c goa ls . La te r on, when Moscow was doing her utmost to a t t r a c t Japan, the CCP ceased c r i t i c i z i n g the U.S. - Japan Secu r i t y Treaty and Japanese m i l i t a r i s m and s t a r t e d to do a l l i t cou ld to stop rapprochement.between the USSR and Japan.90 23 Not on ly d i d the Chinese government cease f rom making in f lammatory statements concerning the Un i ted States - Japan S e c u r i t y Treaty and r e v i v a l o f Japanese m i l i t a r i s m , bu t Nakamura suggests t h a t t he re may have been a c learance f rom Peking f o r the c o n t i n u i n g presence o f U.S. fo rces i n Taiwan as a " d e t e r r e n t " aga ins t any moves by the Sov ie t 91 -Union. I n any event , the development o f a new Chinese a t t i t u d e towards Japan, i n respect to the r e v i v a l of m i l i t a r i s m and the U.S. - Japan Secu r i t y T r e a t y , represented a necessary step t h a t had to be taken be fo re n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f Japan-China r e l a t i o n s could proceed. Chinese A t t i t u d e s Towards the Sato Government's Evo lv ing China P o l i c y Al though the Chinese government had a t f i r s t been expectant t h a t Sato would i n i t i a t e moves to improve Sino-Japanese r e l a t i o n s , i t soon became apparent t h a t he was not going to step beyond the conf ines o f the prev ious LDP government's " two-Ch ina" p o l i c y f a v o u r i n g Taiwan p o l i -92 t i c a l l y . Indeed, h i s s t rong ant i -communist b ias and adopt ion of p o l i c i e s apper ta in ing- to such a t.]p;r.ie-J.usd'i5tG=ej, i n e l u c t a b l y l e d to the c r e a t i o n o f a pronounced sense of d i s t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n between the Chinese and Japanese governments.^ Concomi t tan t l y , Sato was c o n t i n u a l l y charged w i t h r e v i v i n g Japanese m i l i t a r i s m and a s s i s t i n g i n U.S. i m -p e r i a l i s t i c designs i n A s i a . The ex ten t toowhich the Chinese govern-ment was opposed t o dea l i ng w i t h the Sato government i s demonstrated by the f a c t t h a t Sato was considered one o f the " f o u r main enemies" 93 of the People 's Republ ic . Regardless o f the f a c t t h a t the Chinese government was 24 unprepared to deal w i t h him,/: Prime . .Minister . Sato a t the beg inn ing o f the 1970s began to i n d i c a t e a more p o s i t i v e pos ture towards the Chinese government y symptomatic of an e v o l v i n g new China p o l i c y . I n h i s 1970 annual p o l i c y speech, f o r i n s t a n c e , he h i n t e d the re was a p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t government to government contacts could be e s t a b l i s h e d w i t h China. Moreover, a f t e r the Uni ted States i n i t i a t e d i t s "p ing-pong d ip lomacy" , Sato at tempted to b r i n g about o f f i c i a l contac ts between the Japanese and Chinese governments. I f . t h i n t h i s ^ r e s p e c t e , i n A p r i l 1971 he t r i e d to e s t a b l i s h a l i n e o f communication through the e f f o r t s o f the c h a i r -man o f the newly appointed LDP China Committee, Noda, who agreed to v i s i t China on b e h a l f of the Prime M i n i s t e r . However, " . . . t h e p lan aborted due to the l ack of response f rom the Chinese s i d e . Noda never -the less d r a f t e d i n June a t h r e e - p a r t p roposa l f o r n o r m a l i z a t i o n , which e x p l i c i t l y recognized the PRC as the l e g i t i m a t e government o f China, and Taiwan as p a r t o f Chinese t e r r i t o r y bu t d i d no t deny the v a l i d i t y 0 5 o f the 1952 peace t r e a t y between Japan and the Republ ic of China. Along the l i n e s of t h i s d r a f t by Noda^LDP Secretary General H o r i drew up a secre t l e t t e r to the Peking government i n e a r l y October^ and requested the l e f t - w i n g Tokyo Governor Minobe, to d e l i v e r the l e t t e r f o r h im. I n t h i s l e t t e r , which was approved by Prime M i n i s t e r Sato and Fore ign M i n i s t e r Fukuda, H o r i expressed a des i re to v i s i t China to beg in n e g o t i a t i o n s and o s t e n s i b l y accepted the f i r s t two o f China 's th ree p r i n c i p l e s — t h a t Peking i s the l e g i t i m a t e government o f China and t h a t Taiwan i s a p a r t of Chinese t e r r i t o r y — and conveyed t h a t the t h i r d p r i n c i p a l — the abrogat ion o f the Japan-ROC peace t r e a t y — 25 96 would be met through n e g o t i a t i o n s between the two governments. The necess i t y f o r Sato to rep lace h i s moribund China p o l i c y had become p a r t i c u l a r l y man i fes t a f t e r the J u l y ' 71 announcement of Pres iden t N ixon 's impending v i s i t to China. The Chinese, however, were s t i l l unprepared to n e g o t i a t e w i t h the Sato government as Premier Chou considered t h a t n e i t h e r Prime M i n i s t e r Sato nor the H o r i l e t t e r could 97 be t r u s t e d . I n s p e c i f i c re fe rence to the l e t t e r , Chou - indicated t h a t h i s government cou ld not accept the c o n d i t i o n s o u t l i n e d by H o r i because he had not c l a r i f i e d Japan would abrogate the peace t r e a t y w i t h Taiwan 98 or t h a t Peking was the so le government o f China. Another reason f o r Chou's r e j e c t i o n o f the H o r i l e t t e r probably r e s u l t e d f rom Japan's a n t i -99 Peking pos ture i n the Uni ted Na t ions . Whatever may have been the t r u e reason f o r the r e j e c t i o n o f the l e t t e r by China, the p o i n t was t h a t by sending the l e t t e r under the name of the LDP sec re ta ry genera l " i t s r e j e c t i o n by the PRC would no t d i r e c t l y h u r t " e i t h e r Sato o r h i s choice f o r the next p res idency , F u k u d a . 1 ^ Even b e f o r e t h i s l e t t e r was d e l i v e r e d by Governor Minobe i n e a r l y November 1971, Sato had made a speech i n October i n which he acknowledged f o r the f i r s t t ime t h a t the Peking government was the l e g i t i m a t e govern-ment o f China and expressed h i s hope t h a t the ques t ion o f Taiwan would be reso lved " th rough n e g o t i a t i o n s between the p a r t i e s concerned.""'"^"'" By March 1972 t h i s p o l i c y stance had been i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o the Sato government's " u n i f i e d v iew" on the China prob lem, which Fore ign M i n i s t e r Fukuda presented to the House o f Representat ives Budget Committee at +u- +• 102 thxs t ime. 26 The express ion o f t h i s u n i f i e d view removed the fo rma l obs tac le to n o r m a l i z a t i p n o f Sino-Japanese r e l a t i o n s by recogn iz ing the Peking government's c la im to sovere ign ty over China and hence by i m p l i c a t i o n over Taiwan- The cont inued Chinese r e f u s a l to have any dea l ings w i t h the Sato government ,nonethelesssrevaalsa t h a t the r e a l obs tac le to the improvement o f Sino-Japanese r e l a t i o n s was Sato h i m s e l f , or more p r e c i s e l y the Chinese government's a t t i t u d e towards the Prime M i n i s t e r . Thus, upon h i s r e t u r n f rom China i n l a t e A p r i l 1972 one o f the contenders f o r the next p res idency , Takeo M i k i , d e c l a r e d : " I r e g r e t to say t h a t i t i s d i f -f i c u l t to r e s t o r e Japan-China d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s under the Sato govern-103 ment. I t i s the task of the new government." Fundamental ly , the Chinese government's r e f u s a l to have any deal ings w i t h the Sato government a t t e s t e d i t was not merely d i f f i c u l t bu t w e l l h i g h imposs ib le f o r normal -i z a t i o n o f r e l a t i o n s to be achieved w h i l e Sato was i n power. Sato "no doubt would have des i red to have the China problem r e s o l v e d " be fo re the 104 end of h i s term i n o f f i c e , bu t the maintenance of a r i g i d a t t i t u d e on the p a r t o f the Chinese government meant t h a t the n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f r e l a t i o n s had to awai t the i n a u g u r a t i o n o f the next LDP c a b i n e t . Wi'itheregard~tr> the tabove , the - Chinese government had conveyed to the va r ious miss ions v i s i t i n g China t h a t i t would cooperate i n e s t a b l i s h -i ng r e l a t i o n s once Sato was removed f rom o f f i c e . When the Komeito miss ion v i s i t e d China i n May 1972, f o r example, Chou s t a t e d t h a t : "we w i l l welcome the New Prime M i n i s t e r v i s i t i n g China as long as he makes an e f f o r t to b r i n g about the r e a l i z a t i o n o f the th ree p r i n c i p l e s . L i kew ise , when the pro-Pek ing LDP Dietman Furu i v i s i t e d Peking a t 27 about the t ime he " . . . r e c e i v e d an impress ion t h a t China would g ive cons iderab le l a t i t u d e and f l e x i b i l i t y to the concrete a p p l i c a t i o n of the th ree p r i n c i p l e s and would no t a t t a c h any c o n d i t i o n o ther than 106 the th ree p r i n c i p l e s . " Indeed, Chou c l a r i f i e d t h a t two p o s s i b l e problem areas — war r e r e p a f a t i o n s and the 1969 Sato-Nixon communique — would no t s tand i n the way of no rma l i z i ng r e l a t i o n s . " ^ 7 We are thus d r i v e n to conclude t h a t w i t h o u t the replacement o f the Sato cab inet w i t h one t h a t no t on ly s a t i s f i e d the i n t r a - p a r t y requirements (so f a r as f a c t i o n a l cons ide ra t ions were concerned), bu t a lso met w i t h the approva l o f the Chinese government, Japan could h a r d l y have normal ized i t s r e l a t i o n s w i t h China. Chinese A t t i t u d e s Towards the Tanaka Government Upon the i n a u g u r a t i o n o f the new Cabinet on J u l y 7 t h , 1972, Tanaka made i t c l e a r t h a t h is government in tended to normal ize Japan's r e l a t i o n s w i t h China. I n c o n t r a d i s t i n c t i o n to i t s a t t i t u d e towards the Sato government, the Chinese government expressed t h a t i t was w i l l i n g to cooperate w i t h Tanaka i n c a r r y i n g out t h i s h i s t o r i c t ask . For example^when Tanaka dec lared a t h i s i n a u g u r a t i o n t h a t : " I would l i k e to promote the n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s . The t ime i s 108 r i p e , " Chou responded by s a y i n g : " I welcome the s ta temen t . " Thus, so long as the Tanaka government was prepared to meet the c o n d i t i o n s o f the th ree p r i n c i p l e s , the n o r m a l i z a t i o n of r e l a t i o n s w i t h China would be ab le to proceed smoothly. I n the above respect Tanaka had on ly d i r e c t l y s t a t e d t h a t he "unders tood" the th ree p r i n c i p l e s o u t l i n e d by the Chinese government 28 as the bas is f o r n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f Sino-Japanese r e l a t i o n s . Yet a number o f statements made by the p rev ious Sato government, h i s own government, and h i s Fore ign M i n i s t e r , Ohi ra conveyed the impress ion t h a t the new government a l ready accepted the th ree p r i n c i p l e s as the bas is o f i t s n e g o t i a t i n g pos ture w i t h the Chinese government. I n the f i r s t p l a c e , as was mentioned p r e v i o u s l y , the Sato government had e a r l i e r accepted the Peking government as the l e g i t i m a t e government of China and thereby f u l f i l l e d the c o n d i t i o n s of one o f the th ree p r i n c i p l e s . The second p r i n c i p l e had been admitted^;. • through a number of " l e a k s " to the press by the Tanaka government. F i n a l l y , Fore ign M i n i s t e r Ohi ra had admi t ted to the t h i r d p r i n c i p l e a t the beg inn ing o f August when he dec lared t h a t the t r e a t y w i t h the ROC would loose i t s v a l i d i t y when r e l a t i o n s between Japan and China were 109 e s t a b l i s h e d . A c c o r d i n g l y , the acceptance o f the th ree p r i n c i p l e s by the Tanaka government combined w i t h the coopera t ive and f l e x i b l e a t t i t u d e o f the Chinese government presaged t h a t the n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f r e l a t i o n s would on ly be a mat te r o f t i m e . Conc lus ion: lii^a , i i . - ' -d ! i scussd©i i .d.s~a6:-u;l;d:A makes i t c l e a r t h a t f rom the e a r l y post -war years Japan's China p o l i c y has been a f f e c t e d by i t s r e l a t i o n -ship w i t h the Un i ted S : ta tes . 1 1 ^ Whi le the r e c o g n i t i o n of China by the I n t e r n a t i o n a l community (as s i g n i f i e d by i t s s e a t i n g i n the Uni ted Nat ions) p layed a p a r t i n compel l ing Japan to move towards r e c o g n i t i o n o f China, i t was probably the e a r l i e r Nixon "shock" t h a t f o rced Japan to do so more than any o ther e x t e r n a l f a c t o r . Kim echoes t h i s argument 29 when he s t a t e s t h a t : "The epoch-making event was p o s s i b l e due more to the Nixon 'shock ' o f 1971 than to any o ther s i n g l e f a c t o r . " H l Such an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the i n f l u e n c e o f the e x t e r n a l e n v i -ronment on the f o r e i g n po l i cy -mak ing process i n Japan i m p l i e s t h a t the " E x t e r n a l Dominance" model may be of u t i l i t y i n examining short-r term c o n t r o v e r s i a l f o r e i g n p o l i c y issues such as the China i s s u e . Indeed, the f a c t t ha t Japan cont inued i n i t s subord inate r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h the Un i ted States was s i g n i f i e d by the Japanese government 's d e c i s i o n to f o l l o w the p o l i c y o f suppor t i ng Taiwan i n the Un i ted Na t ions , desp i te the f a i l u r e o f the Nixon a d m i n i s t r a t i o n t o consu l t or even advise Japan of the change i n U.S. China p o l i c y . At the same t i m e , i t i s a lso impor tan t to note the i n f l u e n c e of Chinese f o r e i g n p o l i c y outputs on Japan's f o r e i g n po l i cy -mak ing p r o -cess. I n t h i s r e s p e c t , i t should be c l e a r th-- ,, f rom the above t h a t moves to e s t a b l i s h contac ts w i t h China by the Un i ted Sta tes j and the n o r m a l i z a t i o n of r e l a t i o n s c a r r i e d out by Japan^were on ly p o s s i b l e because o f the f r i e n d l y posture taken by the Peking government towards these two c o u n t r i e s . The reasons f o r China's change i n p o l i c y towards Japan are o u t l i n e d by Omori: Fo l l ow ing the end o f the Great P r o l e t a r i a n C u l t u r a l Revo lu t ion and p a r t i c u l a r l y a f t e r the f a l l o f L i n Piao,power had been regained by the o l d leaders who recognized the need to r e s t o r e r e l a t i o n s w i t h Japan as a means, . i among o ther t h i n g s , o f ach iev ing the t a r g e t s o f China's f o u r t h 5 year p l a n . F u r t h e r , the n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f r e l a t i o n s between the two coun t r i es would s t reng then Prime M i n i s t e r Chou E n - l a i ' s own p o s i t i o n . F u r t h e r , the Soviet Union, having regained i t s i n t e r n a t i o n a l vo i ce 30 as a r e s u l t o f the U.S. Soviet summit t a l k s i n Moscow and hav ing achieved great d i p l o m a t i c suc-cesses v i s - a - v i s West Europe, was now s h i f t i n g the weight of i t s d i p l o m a t i c e f f o r t to A s i a . China, through the Sino-American summit t a l k s i n Pek ing , i s c o n t r i b u t i n g i n d i r e c t l y to the speed up o f the w i thd rawa l of American fo rces f rom A s i a , bu t fears the Sov ie t Un ion 's ad-vances i n As ia as a renewal o f t h a t t h r e a t once posed by the U.S. I n order to prevent the growth of Soviet i n f l u e n c e i n A s i a , i t i s necessary f o r the Chinese to normal ize and 1 T9 s t a b i l i z e i t s r e l a t i o n s w i t h Japan.-1--1-"* The f a c t t h a t China adopted a new f o r e i g n p o l i c y f o r these reasons should amply demonstrate t h a t i t was the i n f l u e n c e of bo th Chinese and American f o r e i g n p o l i c y ou tpu ts t h a t compelled Japan to e s t a b l i s h r e l a t i o n s w i t h the PRC, the new U.S. China p o l i c y be ing the most d i r e c t and t a n g i b l e inft luLe n c^e., Tfeus.,. - ; 5 we would agree t h a t i n regard to s h o r t - t e r m issues such as Japan's n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f r e l a t i o n s w i t h China, Japan's f o r e i g n po l i cy -mak ing process i s a f f e c t e d by change i n the e x t e r n a l environment. However, as we s h a l l see i n the f o l l o w i n g •d iscussion o f i n t e r n a l^cr / j l i n f l u e n c e s on Japan's f o r e i g n p o l i c y --making process, e x t e r n a l i n f l u e n c e s were not the on ly fo rces t h a t .:. p layed a r o l e i n b r i n g i n g about the n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f Japan-China r e l a t i o n s . 31 I n t e r n a l Environment I n t r o d u c t i o n I n respect t o the i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c a l environment of Japan, we w i l l be p r i m a r i l y concerned w i t h i d e n t i f y i n g and assessing the i n -f l uence o f the va r ious po l i cy -mak ing ac to rs on the China n o r m a l i z a t i o n process . I t i s argued by some, as mentioned a t the ou tse t of t h i s paper, t h a t the t r i p a r t i t e e l i t e c o a l i t i o n p lays a d e c i s i v e i f not a l l -encompassing r o l e i n Japan's po l i cy -mak ing process . Since we are here d iscuss ing a c o n t r o v e r s i a l and urgent ( s h o r t - t e r m ) f o r e i g n p o l i c y issue we can thus t e s t the p ropos i t i on^and p r o p o s i t i o n a l v a r i a n t s t h a t were c u l l e d f rom the p e r t i n e n t l i t e r a t u r e (pp. 6-7) j to determine t h e i r ap-p l i c a b i l i t y i n ana lyz ing the r o l e o f the t r i p a r t i t e e l i t e i n t h i s po l i cy -mak ing process . A f t e r ana lyz ing the r o l e o f the e l i t e (LDP, bureaucracy and b u s i n e s s ) , we w i l l then proceed to discuss the r o l e of the o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s , press and p u b l i c o p i n i o n i n the China p o l i c y -making process . The LDP's China P o l i c y Since the merger of the L i b e r a l and Democratic p a r t i e s i n 1955, u n t i l the r e s i g n a t i o n o f Sato i n J u l y 1972, the LDP fo l l owed the Fore ign M i n i s t r y ' s v iew tha t d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s should on ly be ex-tended to the ROC government i n Taiwan w h i l e the Peking government 113 should be i s o l a t e d d i p l o m a t i c a l l y though not economica l ly . This p o l i c y of the " s e p a r a t i o n o f economics and p o l i t i c s " came under i n c r e a s i n g c r i t i c i s m by pro-Pek ing elements i n the p a r t y d u r i n g the 1960s. Consequently, a number o f groups were organized on a c ross -32 f a c t i o n a l bas is to pressure the Sato government i n t o adopt ing a more f l e x i b l e a t t i t u d e towards the Peking government. These pro-Pek ing groups were organized separa te l y from the o f f i c i a l f o r e i g n p o l i c y organs such as the I n v e s t i g a t i n g Committee on Fore ign A f f a i r s and the Fore ign A f f a i r s d i v i s i o n wh ich , be ing dominated by the mainstream f a c t i o n s , n a t u r a l l y supported the c o n t i n u a t i o n of the pro-Taiwan Sato government's p o l i c y . A f t e r e a r l i e r endeavours to organize i n t r a - p a r t y pressure groups had ended i n t h e i r disbandenment under pressure f rom the pro-Taiwan p a r t y l e a d e r s h i p , p ro-Pek ing LDPers (drawn l a r g e l y f rom the Fujuyama, Kono, Matsumura, M i k i , and Ono f a c t i o n s ) organized i n 1965 the A f ro -As ian Study Groupj as a r i v a l to the mainstream pro-Taiwan Asian Problems Study Group,which had been organized i n 11&; December 1964. -x . 19Thet; l ead ing spokesmen o f the p ro-Pek ing o r g a n i z a -t i o n such as F u r u i , Matsumura, Tagawa, and Utsunomiya c r i t i c i z e d the pro-Taiwan p o l i c y o f the Sato government. This c r i t i c i s m was c a r r i e d out i n the D i e t , w i t h i n p a r t y c i r c l e s , a n d when these p o l i t i c i a n s v i s i t e d China to d iscuss Memorandum Trade. This l a t t e r a c t i v i t y i n p a r t i c u l a r mte-ting w i t h the d i sapp rova l o f the Sato Cabinet . I n 1968 a f u r t h e r i n f o r m a l p a r t y organ was created i n the form o f the Discuss ion Group f o r New P o l i c y , which drew i t s membership f rom across the LDP f a c t i o n s . The D iscuss ion Groups China Committee was headed by A i i c h i r o Fuj iyama, who l a t e r became one of the most, outspoken c r i t i c s o f the Sato government 's China p o l i c y , and the leader of the D i e t -men's League f o r the Norma l i za t i on o f Japanese-Chinese R e l a t i o n s , which was organized i n 1970 w i t h the p a r - t i c i p a t i o n o f over a qua r te r o f LDP 33 p o l i t i c i a n s ^ a s w e l l as members of the o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s . Whi le Fujiyama d id no t take such an avowedly p ro-Pek ing stand u n t i l 1970, Takeo M i k i , a contender i n the 1972 p r e s i d e n t i a l e l e c t i o n , sharp ly c r i t i c i z e d the Sato government's China p o l i c y a f t e r he l e f t the Sato Cabinet i n 1968 ) ;and had^by 1971jCome to recognize the Peking government 's c la im to be the so le l e g i t i m a t e government o f China. Nakasone, who a lso had hopes of the p res idency , f o l l owed M i k i i n recogn iz ing the Peking government's c l a i m . L a s t l y , O h i r a , who became the Fore ign M i n i s t e r i n the Tanaka Cabinet , c a l l e d on Sato to move away f rom h i s pro-Taiwan China po l i cy^and dea l w i t h the China problem i n terms o f a "one China" formula."''"'"^ I n a d d i t i o n to the mounting c r i t i c i s m o f the Sato government's China p o l i c y f rom the pro-Pek ing groups w i t h i n the par ty , and the above mentioned prominent LDP p o l i t i c i a n s , young LDP Dietmen i n the Showa Socie ty a lso pressed the government to move away from i t s pro-Taiwan p o l i c y . With the Nixon announcements^ and the sea t ing o f Peking i n the Uni ted Na t ions , the moderate elements w i t h i n the p a r t y a lso began to recognize t h a t the p a r t y ' s China p o l i c y was a n a c h r o n i s t i c and needed to be made "compat ib le " w i t h the new changes i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l en-v i ronment . 7 By the t ime Tanaka was e l e c t e d , t h i s gradual but i n -e l u c t a b l e movement towards a pro-Pek ing p o l i c y w i t h i n the LDP had come to rep lace the prev ious pro-Taiwan o r i e n t a t i o n as the dominant view w i t h i n the p a r t y . Consequently, f rom now on the pro-Taiwan members o f the r u l i n g p a r t y were f i g h t i n g a rea r guard a c t i o n to t r y and p r o t e c t Japan's r e l a t i o n s w i t h Taiwan, economical ly i f not p o l i t i c a l l y . 34 The 1972 P r e s i d e n t i a l E l e c t i o n The e l e c t i o n of the new Premier , Kakuei Tanaka, was the s i n g l e most impor tan t domestic event f a c i l i t a t i n g the n o r m a l i z a t i o n of r e l a t i o n s 118 between Japan and China.. The r e s i g n a t i o n o f Sato i n e a r l y J u l y , and h i s replacement by a prime m i n i s t e r backed b y i a u f a c t i o n a l c o a l i t i o n p r e -pared to normal ize r e l a t i o n s w i t h China^at the cost o f sever ing d i p l o -mat ic r e l a t i o n s w i t h Taiwan, made the n o r m a l i z a t i o n of r e l a t i o n s a f o r e -gone conc lus ion . Hence, as Langdon p o s t u l a t e s : " . . . a change i n p a r t y 119 leadersh ip i s l i k e l y to r e s u l t i n a change i n f o r e i g n p o l i c y . " Besides Tanaka, who won the LDP p r e s i d e n t i a l e l e c t i o n and thus became the new Prime M i n i s t e r o f Japan, there were a lso s e v e r a l o the r contenders f o r t h i s impor tan t p o s t . I n i t i a l l y , there were f i v e prominent LDP p o l i t i c i a n s seeking the pres idency — Takeo M i k i , Yasuhiro Nakasone, Masayoshi Ohi ra ( r e p l a c i n g Shigesaburo Maeo as the prev ious candidate f o r the Ikeda f a c t i o n ) , Takeo Fukuda, and Kakuei Tanaka — w i t h the f i g h t shaping up to be between Tanaka^and Sato 's own choice f o r the p res idency , Fukuda. Both Tanaka and Fukuda had by l a t e 1971 b u i l t up a f a c t i o n a l f o l l o w i n g of t h e i r own making them , 1 2 i e l i g i b l e f o r f i g h t i n g the i n t e r n a l f a c t i o n a l b a t t l e f o r LDP pres idency . The o ther contenders a l l had f a c t i o n a l f o l l o w i n g s i n t h e i r own r i g h t . Before Sato 's r e s i g n a t i o n i n e a r l y Ju ly , Nakasone p u l l e d out o f the p r e s i d e n t i a l race i n favour o f Tanaka. The remaining contenders d i v i d e d i n t o two camps: i n one camp Fukuda, and i n the o ther an a n t i -Fukuda c o a l i t i o n formed o f the Tanaka-Ohira and M i k i f a c t i o n s . The a n t i -Fukuda c o a l i t i o n was based on a s p e c i f i c p o l i c y agreement between the 35 th ree f a c t i o n l e a d e r s . I n the f i r s t p l a c e , the re was an agreement t h a t : " I f one among the th ree persons remains ( p l a c i n g f i r s t or second) then a l l o f us w i l l cooperate. I n the case o f two of us rema in ing , we w i l l have an open e l e c t i o n . T the case o f ' ' C T . T ; j£ as reuiaini•-•.'.. have an opea e l e c t i o n - I n the case o f two o f us rema in ing , the - a c t i o n ' 121 of the t h i r d candidate w i l l not be bounded. Second, and of g rea te r impor tance, the th ree leaders made a s p e c i f i c p o l i c y agreement express ing an "unders tand ing t h a t the People 's Republ ic o f China government i s the so le l e g i t i m a t e government r e p r e s e n t i n g Ch ina , " and fu r thermore agreed t h a t : " N o r m a l i z a t i o n o f Japan-China r e l a t i o n s i s now the demand of the e n t i r e n a t i o n . We w i l l en ter i n t o n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h a view to conclud ing 122 a peace t r e a t y w i t h the People 's Republ ic o f C h i n a . . . . " As Kim ,'• .• mco.rr :e_ctlypoints o u t : "The i m p l i c a t i o n o f t h i s p o l i c y statement were p ro found . F i r s t , the new Japanese government accepted the f i r s t one o f the th ree p r i n c i p l e s demanded by the Chinese Communists. Second, i t a lso i m p l i e d t h a t the Tanaka government was accep t ing i n d i r e c t l y the t h i r d p r i n c i p l e put fo rward by the Chinese communists, f o r the new Japanese government's i n t e n t i o n to seek a peace t r e a t y w i t h Peking i m p l i e d the Japanese i n t e n t i o n to do away w i t h the e x i s t i n g peace t r e a t y i 223 w i t h T a i p e i . " C l e a r l y , t h e r e f o r e , the 'China issue was an impor tan t v a r i a b l e i n t h i s p r e s i d e n t i a l e l e c t i o n . Indeed, Hellmann c o r r e c t l y sug-gests t h a t : " . . . i s s u e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s s u e s , come to be considered not on ly as t b - t h e i r mer i t s as p o l i c y bu t as to t h e i r wor th 124 i n advancing the p a r t y p o s i t i o n o f f a c t i o n leaders as w e l l . " I n t h i s i n s t a n c e , i t was undoubtedly to advance h i s own p a r t y p o s i t i o n 36 t h a t Tanaka made an agreement w i t h the o the r f a c t i o n a l leaders concern-i n g the China p o l i c y . Apar t f rom t h i s more o p p o r t u n i s t i c concern, there were never the less c e r t a i n d i f f e r e n c e s over China p o l i c y t h a t d i s t i n g u i s h e d Tanaka and the o ther c o a l i t i o n members from Fukuda. For the most p a r t , Fukuda d i d not ho ld such a f l e x i b l e , f o r w a r d - l o o k i n g p o s i t i o n on the China issue as d i d the o ther contenders f o r the p res idency . I n p a r t i c u l a r , Fukuda was c l o s e l y assoc ia ted w i t h the f o r e i g n p o l i c y p o s i t i o n o f Sato, ; so. t h a t h i s p o l i c y pronouncements on the China issue d i d not go beyond accept -ance o f Peking as the l e g i t i m a t e government o f China. What must of course be remembered he re^ i s t h a t Fukuda had been c i rcumscr ibed i n h i s China p o l i c y pronouncements preceding the p r e s i d e n t i a l e l e c t i o n by the f a c t t h a t he was M i n i s t e r o f Fore ign A f f a i r s , a M i n i s t r y renowned f o r 125 i t s negat ive a t t i t u d e towards the PRC. Since Tanaka was the M i n i s t e r o f t h e M I T I , he d i d no t s u f f e r the above disadvantage and was ; f o r example, able to move away f rom the t i g h t r e s t r i c t i o n s o f the "Yoshida l e t t e r " by a l l o w i n g the use o f Expor t -Import Bank funds f o r China, upon complet ion o f c o n t r a c t s and p resen ta -t i o n of a p p l i c a t i o n s . S i m i l a r l y , Tanaka b e n e f i t e d from making the China p o l i c y agreement w i t h M i k i , a p ro-Pek ing Dietman who had dec lared h i s acceptance o f the th ree p r i n c i p l e s , and thus the necess i t y o f abrogat ing the Japan-ROC peace t r e a t y . F i n a l l y , through such emissar ies as Komeito Chairman T a k e i r i , and the maverick pro-Pek ing LDP Dietman, F u r u i , Tanaka l e t i t be known t h a t i f e l e c t e d LDP p r e s i d e n t (and hence Prime M i n i s t e r o f Japan) , he would e s t a b l i s h d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s w i t h China. 37 The above i s s t i l l no t meant to suggest t h a t b e f o r e h i s e l e c t i o n Tanaka was outspokenly i n favour o f n o r m a l i z i n g r e l a t i o n s w i t h the PRC^ As a mat te r o f f a c t , both Tanaka and Ohi ra were caut ious i n t h e i r p o l i c y pronouncements on the China i s s u e . Whi le Fu ru i advised Chou t h a t the Tanaka-Ohira duo would work f o r n o r m a l i z a t i o n , n e i t h e r o f the two made a s p e c i f i c commitment to abide by the th ree p r i n c i p l e s i n c a r r y i n g t h i s o u t . I n t h i s r e s p e c t , Fu ru i was probably c o r r e c t when he suggested.-t h a t the reason Tanaka " h a r d l y touched on" the iChina problem, and Ohira " d i d not show c lea r and concrete views;," was t h a t t h e i r campaign s t r a t e g y aimed a t w inn ing the support of the pro-Taiwan r i g h t wing members o f the 127 p a r t y as w e l l as those c l e a r l y i n favour o f the Peking government. Undoubtedly, t h i s t a c t i c pa id o f f , becausejWhen i t came to the p r e s i d e n t i a l e l e c t i o n he ld on J u l y 5 th 1972, Tanaka gained enough support to make him LDP p r e s i d e n t and thus Prime M i n i s t e r o f Japan. This he d i d on the second b a l l o t , s ince none o f the candidates were able to gain the s imple m a j o r i t y needed to^win on the f i r s t b a l l o t , Tanaka winn ing 156 128 votes to Fukuda's 150, w i t h Ohira 101 and M i k i 69. The agreement made between Tanaka and the o ther members oftthe ant i -Fukuda c o a l i t i o n (M ik i and Ohi ra) now came i n t o p lay so t h a t on the second b a l l o t Tanaka gained the support o f these f a c t i o n s tojwin the pres idency over Fukuda 129 by 282 votes to 190 vo tes . With h i s e l e c t i o n to the pr ime m i n i s t e r -s h i p , Tanaka could now proceed to f u l f i l l h i s promise to normal ize Japan-China r e l a t i o n s . The LDP Po l icy -Mak ing Group The r o o t s o f the smal l LDP po l i cy -mak ing group which came to 38 dominate the dec is ion-making process go back to the China p o l i c y agree-ment t h a t was drawn up between M i k i , O h i r a , and Tanaka be fo re the LDP p r e s i d e n t i a l e l e c t i o n took p lace i n J u l y . M i k i was f a r more outspoken and demanding i n h i s c a l l f o r n o r m a l i z a t i o n of r e l a t i o n s than were e i t h e r Tanaka or O h i r a , who tended to be much more pragmat ic and caut ious p o l i t i c i a n s , and i t was thus a t the i n s i s t e n c e of M i k i t h a t the e x p l i c i t commitment to normal ize r e l a t i o n s w i t h China was made by these th ree prominent LDP p o l i t i c i a n s . This d i f f e r e n c e i n p o l i t i c a l s t y l e and s t r a t e g y between the Tanaka-Ohira duo and M i k i , toge ther w i t h the f a c t t h a t as Deputy Prime M i n i s t e r M i k i was not as i n t i m a t e l y connected w i t h dec is ions p e r t a i n i n g to f o r e i g n p o l i c y as were the Fore ign M i n i s t e r and Prime M i n i s t e r , consequently meant t h a t M i k i became i s o l a t e d f rom the core of the po l i cy -mak ing group which was dominated by the Tanaka-Ohira duo. Hence, " t h e command core of the po l i cy -mak ing group which emerged i n J u l y was thus a duo, r a t h e r than a t r i o , which p lace con-130 s i d e r a b l e premium on d e l i b e r a t i o n , d i s c r e t i o n , and pragmat ism." W i t h i n t h i s group, the Prime M i n i s t e r apparen t l y made the major dec is ions i n respect to the n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f r e l a t i o n s , such as the d e c i s i o n to issuelazj iointacommunique ins tead of a j o i n t fo rmula to ':s'etit-lei.ther.probL<emr,\;, but Ohi ra was a necessary element i n the d e c i s i o n -a l making team. Indeed, Tanaka q u i t e f r a n k l y admi t ted t h a t l ie knew no th ing about diplomacy, and would leave the arrangements f o r the China 132 v i s i t to be made by Fore ign M i n i s t e r Oh i ra . The Tanaka-Ohira duo thus worked c l o s e l y together as a team t h a t was ded icated to b r i n g i n g about the r e a l i z a t i o n o f the Japanese government 's v i s i t to China f o r 39 the purpose of no rma l i z i ng r e l a t i o n s w i t h the Peking government. A l though the duo n a t u r a l l y had the support o f the pro-Pek ing p o l i t i c i a n s w i t h i n the p a r t y , they worked w i t h o u t the a c t i v e p a r -t i c i p a t i o n o f these i n d i v i d u a l s i n the po l i cy -mak ing process. Ex-cept , t h a t i s , f o r the p a r t i c i p a t i o n o f the pro-Pek ing maverick p o l i -t i c i a n , F u r u i , who acted bo th as a pressure on the duo to ca r ry out the n o r m a l i z a t i o n of r e l a t i o n s and a lso as an in te rmed ia ry between 133 the Chinese and Japanese governments. Since 1959 Furu i had made a c t i v e e f f o r t s to promote the r e s t o r a -t i o n o f r e l a t i o n s between Japan and China and had made a number o f v i s i t s t o Peking d u r i n g t h i s t ime , th ree o f them o c c u r r i n g s h o r t l y be fo re the Tanaka v i s i t to China. I n December 1971, F u r u i had v i s i t e d China to p a r t i c i p a t e i n the n e g o t i a t i o n s f o r Memorandum Trade and, a t t h i s t ime, i n d i c a t e d to the Chinese o f f i c i a l s t h a t he would l i k e to . again v i s i t China i n the f o l l o w i n g May, w i t h the thought i n mind t h a t there would jbe p o l i t i c a l changes t a k i n g p lace i n Japan a t about t h i s t ime t h a t would have impor tan t consequences f o r the development o f r e l a t i o n s between the two c o u n t r i e s . Before t h i s t r i p was c a r r i e d out F u f u i met w i t h " . . . O h i r a a number of t imes from around February and exchanged views on the China problem. At a c e r t a i n t ime be fo re my depa r tu re , we inc luded Tanaka i n our t a l k s , ©ft .fchetother hand, I t a l k e d w i t h Fore ign M i n i s t e r Fukuda, a number o f t imes ext remely s e c r e t l y a t h i s reques t . Immediately be fo re my d e p a r t u r e , I met Takeo 13 A M i k i and Yasuhiro Nakasone, t o o . " Fu ru i r e t u r n e d f rom h i s May v i s i t w i t h the c o n v i c t i o n t h a t the 40 Chinese s ide would be more than w i l l i n g to dea l w i t h the pos t -Sa to Cabinet i n d i scuss ing n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f r e l a t i o n s between Japan and China, and would fu r thermore adopt a f l e x i b l e a t t i t u d e i n t h e i r dea l ings w i t h t h i s Cabinet . By the t ime o f F u r u i ' s next v i s i t i n September, the Tanaka Cabinet had been formed w i t h O h i r a , perhaps due to F u r u i ' s recommendation, t a k i n g up the post of Fore ign M i n i s t e r . This t ime Furu i was accompanied by two o the r p ro-Pek ing LDP p o l i t i c i a n s , Shunichi Matsumoto and S e i i c h i Tagawa, who thereby p e r i p h e r a l l y entered the po l i cy -mak ing group. On t h i s v i s i t , which occurred about two weeks be fo re the Tanaka miss ion l e f t f o r Pek ing, Fu ru i c l e a r l y p layed the r o l e o f i n te rmed ia ry between the Tanaka-Ohira team and the Chinese government , for he c a r r i e d w i t h him a rev i sed d r a f t p l a n o f Japan 's proposed jo int -communique which had been agreed to by the duo and the ad hoc po l i cy -mak ing group o f the 135 Fore ign M i n i s t r y . The Chinese response to the proposed communique was taken to Fore ign M i n i s t e r Ohi ra by _China D i v i s i o n Head, Hashimoto, who c a r r i e d F u r u i ' s r e p o r t o f the meet ing between him and Chinese o f -f i c i a l s back to Tokyo when he re tu rned to Japan w i t h the LDP d e l e g a t i o n , he was on. When Furu i h imse l f a r r i v e d i n Tokyo, he he ld a f i n a l meet ing w i t h Ohi ra be fo re the Fore ign M i n i s t e r l e f t w i t h Tanaka f o r China. I n h i s own e s t i m a t i o n , Fu ru i saw h imse l f as p a r t l y respons ib le f o r f o r m u l a t i n g the schedule f o r the Tanaka-Ohira v i s i t to China^as w e l l as be ing an i n f l u e n c e on dec id ing the f i n a l form t h a t the j o i n t communique took. C e r t a i n l y , i t would seem c l e a r from the above d i scuss ion t h a t t h i s maver ick LDP p o l i t i c i a n d i d p lay a perhaps ind ispensab le r o l e i n 41 the n o r m a l i z a t i o n process. S t i l l , as Fukui p o i n t s o u t , he could on ly p lay such an impor tan t r o l e i n t h i s dynamic, f l u i d dec is ion-making process because of h i s maverick p o s i t i o n w i t h i n the LDP which a l lowed 136 him t o ac t w i t h o u t the usual LDP f a c t i o n a l c o n s t r a i n t s . S i m i l a r l y , the persona l t i e s t h a t he had developed w i t h Chinese o f f i c i a l s made h i s r o l e as i n te rmed ia ry a l l the more po'ssible. Whi le t h i s would suggest t h a t the r o l e he p layed i n the dec is ion-making process was undoubtedly a t y p i c a l , i t may never the less be t h a t the f o r m u l a t i o n o f an ad hoc po l i cy -mak ing group i s f r e q u e n t l y employed i n Japanese p o l i t i c s to 137 so lve p o l i c y problems. Thus, t h i s i n s i g h t may o f f e r us guidance i n the development of a framework f o r s tudy ing the po l i cy -mak ing process i n Japan. Creat ing a Consensus W i t h i n the LDP A major task t h a t Tanaka faced i n proceeding t o normal ize r e l a t i o n w i t h China was t h a t o f developing a consensus w i t h i n the LDP. I n s o f a r as i t p e r t a i n s to our d i scuss ion he re , Hellmann i d e n t i f i e s two c h a r a c t e r -i s t i c s of consensus dec is ion-mak ing which may be present i n the develop-ment o f a group consensus: 1) a fo rma l show o f unan im i t y , and 2) p a r t i -138 c i p a t o r y c o n s u l t a t i o n . I n the l a t t e r r e g a r d , Hellmann apparen t l y considers t h i s as a s t r a t e g y to minimize costs i n reach ing dec is ions w i t h 139 the o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s , bu t i t i s an equa l l y impor tan t s t r a t e g y to employ i n reach ing dec is ions w i t h i n the LDP when the issue a t s take i s h i g h l y c o n t r o v e r s i a l , as i n the case of n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f r e l a t i o n s w i t h China. I n order to b r i n g about a consensus w i t h i n the LDP on a new China policy 42 Tanaka s p e c i f i c a l l y c reated an LDP Counc i l f o r the Norma l i za t i on o f Japan-China Re la t ions ( h e r e a f t e r No rma l i za t i on Counc i l ) which was open to bo th pro-Pek ing and p r o - T a i p e i LDP Dietmen. This c o u n c i l was organized on the 24th J u l y 1972 w i t h an i n i t i a l membership o f 249, r i s i n g q u i c k l y 140 to over 300. I n order to f a c i l i t a t e China d i scuss ion w i t h i n the Counc i l , a Standing Managers Counc i l o f 58 members was organized to meet tw ice weekly . I n a d d i t i o n , there was a S e c r e t a r i a t composed of China exper ts and weekly meetings between the Chairman, Zentaro Kosaka and h i s Vice-Chairmen. 1 4 " ' " I n r e c o g n i t i o n o f the f a c t t h a t the main problem i n n o r m a l i z i n g r e l a t i o n s w i t h China was now no t so much w i t h the a t t i t u d e o f the Chinese government,as i t was w i t h deve lop ing a consensus w i t h i n the p a r t y , Chairman Kosaka s t a t e d t h a t : " . . . t h e organ w i l l make e f f o r t s to form a consensus i n the p a r t y to f a c i l i t a t e the government 's moves, 142 w i t h o u t our meddl ing too much." I n a broader c o n t e x t , Hellmann con-curs tha t f : "Each major postwar f o r e i g n p o l i c y d e c i s i o n has been accom-panied by p r o t r a c t e d c o n s u l t a t i o n among va r ious f a c t i o n l e a d e r s , '143 r e f l e c t i n g an e f f o r t to reach consensual agreement. But i n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r case, perhaps because the i ssue was i d e o l o g i c a l i n n a t u r e , the c o n s u l t a t i o n was broadened to encompass a major p r o p o r t i o n o f the LDP Dietmen. The obvious d i f f i c u l t y i n a t tempt ing to generate a consensus w i t h i n the p a r t y was tha t of promot ing the necessary accommodation between the pro-Taiwan and pro-Pek ing LDP Dietmen, p a r t i c u l a r l y as such pro-Taiwan "hawks" f rom the D ip lomat ic Problems Discuss ion Counc i l as 43 O k i n o r i Kaya, H i r o k i c h i Nadao, and Naokich i Kitazawa j o i n e d the N o r m a l i z a t i o n Counc i l . A l though the pro-Taiwan m i n o r i t y members of the Counci l were g e n e r a l l y prepared to accept the es tab l ishment of r e l a t i o n s w i t h Pek ing, they were f i g h t i n g aga ins t the "Mainstream" to t r y and prevent the sever ing o f d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s w i t h Taiwan. The on ly area upon which common agreement had been reached a f t e r numerous - proposals and counter proposals had been submi t ted by pro-Pek ing and p r o -Taiwan members,was on the genera l l e v e l t h a t n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f r e l a t i o n s would take p lace and t h a t Tanaka would v i s i t China. This was decided on August 2nd by Chairman Kosaka and the Vice-Chairmen, agreed to by the Norma l i za t i on Counci l on August 9 th ,and accepted as p a r t y p o l i c y on August 22nd. A f t e r the de f a c t o approval o f Tanaka's v i s i t ^ a n d the Chairmen's Meet ing on the 2nd August, the government announced i t s bas ic p o l i c y on China the f o l l o w i n g day: I n the event t ha t agreement i s reached between Japan and China on the problem of n o r m a l i z a t i o n of r e l a t i o n s between the two coun t r i es and d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s are e s t a b l i s h e d , Japan as a n a t u r a l consequence, would not be ab le to m a i n t a i n i t s d i p l o m a t i c t i e s w i t h the Republ ic of China. I n t h i s case, bo th t rade and economic r e l a t i o n s w i t h the Republ ic of China and our o ther p r a c t i c a l r e l a t i o n s w i l l l i k e l y be reso lved i n a r e a l i s t i c manner.- '- 4 4 This was the f i r s t t ime tha t the Tanaka government s t i p u l a t e d t h a t Taiwan would be abandoned, a l though i t was a l ready taken f o r granted by the pro-Pek ing members o f the Counci l and, more i m p o r t a n t l y by the Tanaka government, t h a t d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s w i t h the Taiwan regime would n e c e s s a r i l y be severed upon e s t a b l i s h i n g r e l a t i o n s w i t h the PRC. 44 To the pro-Taiwan group, however, t he maintenance of d i p l o m a t i c r e l a -t i o n s w i t h the ROC was seen as being o f pr ime importance throughout the Counc i l meet ings, exemp l i f y i ng t h a t they s t i l l thought i n terms of a " two-Chinas" p o l i c y as the s o l u t i o n to the p o l i t i c a l problem of d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s . Qui te c l e a r l y , such a p o s i t i o n could be ac-ceptab le n e i t h e r to the Chinese government nor to the pro-Eek ing LDP members o f the Norma l i za t i on Counc i l . I n order t o ga in a consensus w i t h i n the p a r t y , something which^Tanakairecognizedias an e s s e n t i a l • p.r ereqt i is ± t e r to i n t o x w a . Jni z : a t i o n , . . = i t . w a s n e c e.s'is^a.r yo tor--:.. dor a c f . t any r e s o l u t i o n the Counci l passed i n s u f f i c i e n t l y broad and ambiguous enough terms to a l l ow accommodation o f the d i ve rgen t views w i t h i n the p a r t y . That such a course o f a c t i o n was taken i s c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e d by the t e x t of the r e s o l u t i o n t h a t was f i n a l l y adopted i n l a t e August on the n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f r e l a t i o n s w i t h China. I n i t i a l l y , the c o n f l i c t between the pro-Pek ing and pro-Taiwan members of the Norma l i za t i on Counc i l seemed as i f i t would f o r c e the c o u n c i l to go beyond the September 10th 1972 deadl ine t h a t the Tanaka 145 Cabinet had set f o r reach ing a consensus w i t h i n the p a r t y . At the 146 prompt ing o f Tanaka, however, the Norma l i za t i on Counci l came to an agreement on f i v e genera l p r i n c i p l e s t h a t were to guide the Tanaka government i n no rma l i z i ng r e l a t i o n s w i t h China, the d e c i s i o n be ing made on August, 24 th . A f t e r m o d i f i c a t i o n o f these p r i n c i p l e s because o f pressure f rom pro-Taiwan "hawks" such as Masayuki F u j i o , I c h i r o Nakagawa, and Michio 147 Watanabe, the f i v e p r i n c i p l e s came to read as f o l l o w s : 45 1) Normal iz ing r e l a t i o n s on the bas is of the Uni ted Nat ions c h a r t e r and the 10 Bandung p r i n c i p l e s of peace fu l coex is tence adopted by t h e A f r o - A s i a n Conference i n 1955 i n Bandung, Indones ia . 2) Respect f o r d i f f e r e n t p o l i t i c a l , s o c i a l and o ther systems and n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e i n the i n t e r n a l a f -f a i r s o f t h e o ther n a t i o n . Re la t i ons w i t h o ther f r i e n d l y na t ions a lso should be respected. 3) Non-use o f f o r c e or the t h r e a t o f f o r c e . 4) Expansion of economic and c u l t u r a l exchanges. Ne i the r s ide should take d i s c r i m i n a t o r y action.. ' 5) Cooperat ion i n the promot ion o f peace and p r o s p e r i t y i n A s i a . Al though the pro-Taiwan members o f the Counci l s t a t e d t h a t these p r i n c i p l e s s imply echoed the 1954 Chou-Nehru p r i n c i p l e s o f peace, they were o f a gener ic enough nature to a l l o w a "consensus" to be reached w i t h i n the Counc i l . However, one source o f con ten t ion ,and one to which the pro-Taiwan members o f the Counci l s p e c i f i c a l l y obj ectecL, was a p rov iso to the f i v e p r i n c i p l e s s t a t i n g : "There was a s t rong o p i n i o n t h a t i n view o f the deep r e l a t i o n s between Japan and Taiwan s u f f i c i e n t 148 c o n s i d e r a t i o n should be g iven to m a i n t a i n i n g these r e l a t i o n s . " Most c e r t a i n l y , the i n s e r t i o n o f such a p rov i so was i n the f i r s t p lace in tended t o m o l l i f y the pro-Taiwan members o f the C o u n c i l , bu t t h i s phrase met w i t h t h e i r o b j e c t i o n s because i t was not considered to be as " p o s i t i v e " a statement as should be i n s e r t e d , g iven Japan's 149 e x i s t i n g r e l a t i o n s w i t h Taiwan. Through the pressure o f the p r o -Taiwan members of the Counci l the p rov i so was t h e r e f o r e mod i f i ed be fo re i t was f o r m a l l y adopted by the LDP's Execut ive Counc i l on 8 th September to read : " I n v iew o>f: the c lose r e l a t i o n s h i p between Japan 46 and the Republ ic of China, n e g o t i a t i o n s should be conducted g i v i n g s u f f i c i e n t c o n s i d e r a t i o n t o the c o n t i n u a t i o n o f t h a t r e l a t i o n s h i p . " " ' " " ^ Of course, even w i t h t h i s m o d i f i c a t i o n there s t i l l remained the ques t i on of whether the " c o n t i n u a t i o n o f t h a t r e l a t i o n s h i p " would i n c l u d e the c o n t i n u a t i o n o f d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s , s ince the Execut ive Board l e f t t h i s d e l i c a t e ques t i on to Tanaka's own decision."'""'"'" Given the views expressed i n the government 's bas ic p o l i c y on China, i t never the less seems q u i t e obvious Tanaka could not p o s s i b l y i n c l u d e d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s w i t h i n t h i s scope. That i s why when the p r o -Taiwan members o f the Norma l i za t i on Counc i l pressed Chairman Kosaka to g ive a d e f i n i t e answer regard ing the ques t ion o f whether d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s would be ma in ta ined , he gave the evasive answer t h a t the con-t i n u a t i o n o f p rev ious r e l a t i o n s " . . . m e a n t favourab le r e l a t i o n s between Japan and the ROC s ince the conc lus ion o f the Japan-ROC t r e a t y i n 152 1952." Prime M i n i s t e r Tanaka gave h i s f u l l support to Chairman Kosaka, t h i s be ing regarded as "an i n d i r e c t c l a r i f i c a t i o n o f h i s [Tanaka's] i n t e n t i o n o f not accept ing the pro-Taiwan f a c t i o n s a s s e r t i o n s , which leads to the ' two Chinas' and the 'one China - one Taiwan' p »153 p o s i t i o n . I n any event , the i n s e r t i o n o f the p r e v i o u s l y mentioned p rov iso was enough t o m o l l i f y the pro-Taiwan members o f the Norma l i za t i on Counci l and thereby ga in a "consensus" w i t h i n the LDP. But t h i s con-sensus was obv ious ly more an agreement to d isagree than i t was a r e f l e c t i o n of the m o d i f i c a t i o n and accommodation o f ideas to c rea te a common agreement — a consensus — on e x a c t l y what procedure should be 47 taken i n no rma l i z ing r e l a t i o n s w i t h the PRC. C e r t a i n l y , the process employed i n a t tempt ing to ga in a consensus w i t h i n the p a r t y was i n l i n e w i t h the e a r l i e r suggest ion t h a t t h i s would i n v o l v e a fo rma l show of unan imi ty and p a r t i c i p a t o r y c o n s u l t a t i o n , but the impor tan t p o i n t i s t h a t " . . . b e c a u s e the facade o f consensus has to be ma in ta ined , c l e a r - c u t dec is ions are not easy to a r r i v e a t i n d i f f i c u l t cases, w i t h the r e s u l t t h a t the s o l u t i o n takes the form o f an extremely vague formula which 154 becomes the cause of g rea te r con fus ion a f t e r w a r d s . " I n t h i s i n s t a n c e , the vague formula adopted l e d the pro-Taiwan LDP Dietmen to consider t h a t d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s would be mainta ined w i t h Taiwan, whereas the dominant pro-Pek ing LDPers r e a l i z e d t h a t i t d i d n o t . I t i s h a r d l y s u r p r i s i n g , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t a f t e r d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s w i t h Taiwan were severed, the pro-Taiwan "hawks" w i t h i n the p a r t y f e l t t h a t they had been deceived by the Tanaka government. The LDP Missions to China and Taiwan A f t e r the fo rma l requirements of consensus had been reached and the f i v e p r i n c i p l e s f o r n o r m a l i z a t i o n adopted by the LDP, the Tanaka Cabinet d ispatched to Peking on the 14th September 1972 a 23-man miss ion headed by Chairman Kosaka, and to T a i p e i on the 17th September a 17-man miss ion headed by former Fore ign M i n i s t e r S h i i n a . 1 ^ 6 Since there were numerous LDP p o l i t i c i a n s who wanted to j o i n the Kosaka m i s s i o n , they were chosen from va r ious f a c t i o n s on the bas is o f t h e i r s t r e n g t h and i n f l u e n c e w i t h i n the r u l i n g p a r t y . For the Sh i ina m i s s i o n , however, the task was to r e c r u i t enough members who were w i l l i n g t o v i s i t T a i p e i on an o f f i c i a l LDP m i s s i o n . 48 The express purpose f o r which the Kosaka m iss ion was sent to Peking was to make p repa ra t i ons f o r the fo r thcoming v i s i t o f Prime M i n i s t e r Tanaka. I n h i s meeting w i t h Chinese o f f i c i a l s % K o s a k a s t a t e d t h a t c e r t a i n elements w i t h i n the LDP were concerned over the ques t ion o f Japan's r e l a t i o n s w i t h Taiwan a f t e r n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f r e l a t i o n s w i t h China. Since the Chinese s ide expressed an unders tand-i n g o f Tanaka's i n t r a - p a r t y problems, t h i s d i d no t p reven t the f u l -f i l l m e n t of Kosaka's task."*" ' 7 Such a favourab le a t t i t u d e was nonetheless threatened by the a c t i v i t i e s o f the S h i i n a m iss ion which had the thank less task o f ex-p l a i n i n g Japan's new China p o l i c y and seeking the unders tand ing o f the soon- to-be abandoned ROC government. I n p a r t i c u l a r , what was aggrava t -i n g t o the Chinese government^and what made e x p l i c i t the q u e s t i o n t h a t the Norma l i za t i on Counci l had mainta ined as vague, was S h i i n a ' s d e c l a r a -t i o n t h a t : "Our count ry des i res to ma in ta in e x i s t i n g r e l a t i o n s w i t h 158 Taiwan i n c l u d i n g d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s . " N a t u r a l l y the Japanese government in tended to ma in ta in i t s l u c r a t i v e t rade and f i n a n c i a l t i e s w i t h Taiwan, b u t , as was emphasized p r e v i o u s l y , i t had p a r t i c u -l a r l y avoided making a s p e c i f i c agreement to m a i n t a i n d i p l o m a t i c r e -l a t i o n s d u r i n g the N o r m a l i z a t i o n Counci l meet ings. When the Chinese government summoned Kosaka to a midn ight meeting to demand an exp lana-t i o n of the Sh i ina s ta tement , he made a p o i n t of say ing t h a t d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s w i t h Taiwan would be severed: "The . . .LDP 's p o l i c y f o r Japan-China d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s remains unchanged. When n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f Japan-China d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s i s c a r r i e d o u t , the d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s 49 [ w i t h Taiwan] w i l l n a t u r a l l y be severed. I cannot understand the 159 Sh i ina statement a t a l l . " The government, be ing more concerned w i t h m a i n t a i n i n g i n t r a - p a r t y harmony than i n assur ing the Chinese s ide of Japan's good i n t e n t i o n s , s imply s t a t e d t h a t S h i i n a ' s remarks " w i l l n o t be i n the l e a s t a f f e c t the government 's p o l i c y f o r norma l -. ^. ,,160 i z a t x o n . Al though the Sh i ina v i s i t thus created an embarrassing s i t u a t i o n f o r the Tanaka Government, i t more i m p o r t a n t l y c a r r i e d out one o f the p repara t ions t h a t Tanaka perce ived as e s s e n t i a l f o r n o r m a l i z a t i o n of Japan-China r e l a t i o n s . I n a d d i t i o n , S h i i n a ' s statement to the Taiwan govemimtiiMri&'tegditiiaY-whileithe.Tanaka Cabinet might abandon i t , there was s t i l l a s t rong sent iment i n favour o f the ROC w i t h i n the r u l i n g p a r t y . Of course, the e x t e n t to which the Tanaka government could go i n t h i s respect would not extend t o the maintenance of d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s , s ince the l u c r a t i v e Taiwan t rade was c e r t a i n l y no t to be s a c r i f i c e d f o r the sake of p o l i t i c a l reasons; hence, the " s e p a r a t i o n o f p o l i t i c s and economics" would t h i s t ime be app l i ed to T a i p e i , r a t h e r than Pek ing , when d ip loma t i c r e l a t i o n s between Japan and China came i n t o e f f e c t . Conc lus ion: The above d i s c u s s i o n o f the LDP members o f the t r i p a r t i t e e l i t e supports the p r o p o s i t i o n a l v a r i a n t t h a t the LDP holds predominant sway i n the po l i cy -mak ing process i n Japan. Yet w h i l e p ro-Pek ing p a r t y p o l i -t i c i a n s were an obvious s t r i c t u r e upon the Sato government 's China p o l i c y and a necessary p i l l a r i n Tanaka's p r e s i d e n t i a l e l e c t i o n , t h e i r 50 r o l e i n the po l i cy -mak ing process was i n d i r e c t and p e r i p h e r a l . S i m i l a r l y , o ther p a r t y members, and even the Cabinet as a f u n c t i o n i n g u n i t , d i d no t p a r t i c i p a t e i n the po l i cy -mak ing process . I n s t e a d , a smal l core group o f sen io r LDP p o l i t i c i a n s — s p e c i f i c a l l y Prime M i n i s t e r Tanaka and Fore ign M i n i s t e r Ohi ra — emerged f rom t h i s l a r g e r aggregate as the dominant f o r c e w i t h i n the China dec is ion-making p r o -cess, supported i n t h i s r o l e by a lone LDPer, F u r u i , and as we s h a l l see l a t e r , a smal l group of Fore ign M i n i s t r y o f f i c i a l s and c e r t a i n op-p o s i t i o n p a r t y p o l i t i c i a n s . Thus, i t i s no t s imply the LDP which holds predominant sway i n the po l i cy -mak ing process , but^ s p e c i f i c a l l y impor tan t members o f the LDP Cabinet . What i s o f s i g n i f i c a n c e h e r e , i s t h a t Tanaka and Ohi ra appear to have f u n c t i o n e d as the po l i cy -mak ing team w i t h o u t any d i r e c t suppor t or c o n s t r a i n t f rom the LDP f a c t i o n s . o r p o l i c y groups. Any negat ive c o n s t r a i n t s t h a t could have r e s t r i c t e d the duo were e s s e n t i a l l y con-t a i n e d w i t h i n the Norma l i za t i on C o u n c i l , which was dominated by p r o -Peking p o l i t i c i a n s f rom f a c t i o n s t h a t supported Tanaka i n h i s e l e c t i o n . Whi le b o t h Tanaka.and Ohira emphasized to a l l concerned t h a t they would not proceed w i t h the n o r m a l i z a t i o n of r e l a t i o n s w i t h o u t p a r t y approval i n the form o f a consensus to normal ize r e l a t i o n s , t h i s d e c i s i o n was a c t u a l l y made be fo re the "agreement to d i sag ree" consensus was reached w i t h i n t h e ' p a r t y organ. Indeed, the d i v i s i o n a long i d e o l o g i c a l and p o l i c y l i n e s was so acute i t was imposs ib le to ga in a p a r t y consensus i n a more s p e c i f i c form than the one adopted. Hence, the p o l i c y ac -commodation t h a t d i d take p lace was obv ious ly p e r i p h e r a l and c a r r i e d out away f rom the locus o f dec is ion-mak ing power. 51 Although there are s i m i l a r i t i e s between t h i s study and those c a r r i e d out by Hellmann-.ahd Packard i n terms of dealing with "yes" "no" c o n t r o v e r s i a l and short-term (less than one year) d e c i s i o n i n the f o r e i g n p o l i c y issue area, the other two studies nevertheless revealed the dominant r o l e of the f a c t i o n s i n the decision-making process. 1 6"'" This d i f f e r e n c e may revolve around the f a c t that Tanaka, unlike Hatoyama at the time of the Soviet peace treaty negotiations, or K i s h i at the time of the 1960 Security Treaty c r i s i s , enjoyed the strong support of the "Mainstream" f a c t i o n s within the party, there-by enabling him to attend to the normalization of Japan-China r e l a -tions without fear of l o s i n g the support of the f a c t i o n a l c o a l i t i o n which placed him i n power p r e c i s e l y because he (unlike Fukuda) would be able to speedily normalize r e l a t i o n s with China. The f a c t that Tanaka gained the presidency on a p o l i c y commitment implying he would normalize r e l a t i o n s with China i f elected, obviously meant that he was free to delegate to--Kosaka ,roneeo.f ihisistauDchmsupporters ; nthe r e -sponsibiliity.'nof m o l l i f y i n g thetprosTaiwante'lemenfscw.-ithi-ri the - party,Wand sthereby fcreatec^pfacadesof-^nsensus.,. This dovetails with the suggestion that consensus, l i k e f actionalism, i s not a s i g n i f i c a n t force i n a short-term and c o n t r o v e r s i a l foreign p o l i c y issue if_ the Prime Minister enjoys the strong backing of the LDP f a c t i o n s . I f he does not, then the weakness of h i s i n t r a - p a r t y p o s i t i o n necessitates he reach a consensus (under the influence and r e s t r i c t i o n of the f a c t i o n s ) i n order that he may maintain his p o s i t i o n as party President and Prime Mi n i s t e r . This means that the Prime M i n i s t e r i s l i m i t e d i n h i s decision-making 52 power when he does no t enjoy the s t rong back ing o f a preponderance o f f a c t i o n s (or i d e o l o g i c a l or p o l i c y groups w i t h i n the p a r t y ) b u t , when he does enjoy t h i s suppor t , he can operate w i t h o u t f e a r o f t h e i r l i m i t i n g i n f l u e n c e . A c c o r d i n g l y , a major caveat to note here i s t h a t the issue area does not n e c e s s a r i l y d e l i n e a t e the s a l i e n c y o f f a c t i o n a l i s m or consensus i n a c o n t r o v e r s i a l and s h o r t - t e r m f o r e i g n p o l i c y issue area . The Bureaucracy - - ^ I n t r o d u c t i o n A f o r e i g n p o l i c y issue n a t u r a l l y f a l l s w i t h i n the j u r i s t i c t i o n a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o f the Japanese M i n i s t r y o f Fore ign A f f a i r s ( h e r e a f t e r Fore ign M i n i s t r y ) . I n t h i s r e s p e c t , a number of Fore ign M i n i s t r y bureaucrats n a t u r a l l y came to p lay an impor tan t ( though subord ina te ) r o l e i n the dec is ion-making process p e r t a i n i n g to Japan's n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f r e l a t i o n s w i t h China. Before proceeding to discuss the na tu re o f the m i n i s t e r i a l g roup 's p a r t i c i p a t i o n I n t h i s po l i cy -mak ing process , however, we w i l l f i r s t be concerned w i t h examining c e r t a i n of the i n t e r and i n t r a m i n i s t r y c o n f l i c t s o f o p i n i o n which sur faced dur ing the p e r i o d p r i o r to the n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f Japan-China r e l a t i o n s . I n t e r and I n t r a M i n i s t r y C o n f l i c t Concerning Japan's China P o l i c y The bureaucracy, l i k e the LDP, has been d i v i d e d i n i t s s tand -162 p o i n t on the China i ssue . S p e c i f i c a l l y , the M i n i s t r y of I n t e r n a -t i o n a l Trade and I n d u s t r y (MITI) and the Japanese M i n s i t r y of Fore ign A f f a i r s (Fore ign M i n i s t r y ) have g iven d i v e r s i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s to the 163 ques t ion of Japan's r e l a t i o n s w i t h the Peking government. The M I T I , 53 be ing n a t u r a l l y concerned w i t h the development of Japan's w o r l d t r a d e , has urged the expansion o f t rade r e l a t i o n s w i t h China ( w h i l e m a i n t a i n i n g t rade w i t h Taiwan) and the improvement of the p o l i t i c a l c l i m a t e between these two c o u n t r i e s . Thus, the MITI has been i n favour o f a l l o w i n g the use of Expor t - Impor t Bank funds f o r the expor t o f i n d u s t r i a l p l a n t s to China. I n c o n t r a p o s i t i o n , the predominat ing v iew i n ItheeForeign M i n i s t r y has been i n favour o f a pro-Taiwan p o l i c y , and has thus seen eye to eye w i t h the Sato government i n upho ld ing the "Yoshida l e t t e r " ( r e -s t r i c t i n g the use of these f u n d s ) , t h i s negat ive posture be ing main-164 ta ined u n t i l the beg inn ing of 1972. I n s p i t e of the i n f l u e n c e o f t h i s view i n de te rmin ing Japan's China p o l i c y , a m i n o r i t y w i t h i n the Fore ign M i n i s t r y , as represented by the China D i v i s i o n and Asian B u r e a u , 1 ^ haveC'ehall'ehged the p r o -Taiwan pos ture taken by the more power fu l UN and American bureaus by 166 c a l l i n g f o r a f o r w a r d - l o o k i n g p o l i c y towards Pek ing. This con-f l i c t o f o p i n i o n w i t h i n the m i n i s t r y sur faced when the ques t ion of China's sea t i ng i n the Un i ted Nat ions came up i n 1971. I n t h i s i n s t a n c e , w h i l e the China D i v i s i o n and As ian Bureau were i n favour of Peking and the "one China" fo rmula f o r adopt ion by Japan a t the Un i ted Na t ions , the American and UN bureaus i n s i s t e d upon c o n t i n u i n g t o back the Uni ted States i n suppor t o f the Taiwan government."*^ 7 With the f a i l u r e o f t h i s at tempt to keep Taiwan i n the Uni ted Nat ions the pro-Taiwan groups w i t h i n the Japanese Fore ign M i n i s t r y , together w i t h Prime M i n i s t e r Sato, came under i n c r e a s i n g c r i t i c i s m f o r main-t a i n i n g such a p o l i c y a t an obvious t ime o f f l u x i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l . t 168 environment. 54 A more impor tan t ins tance i n which the presence of such d i s a c c o r d -ant views w i t h i n the Fore ign M i n i s t r y sur faced, ' . occurred j u s t p r i o r to the n o r m a l i z a t i o n of Japan-China r e l a t i o n s . This cou ld have proved to be a s t r i c t u r e upon the po l i cy -mak ing process s ince the LDP was n e c e s s a r i l y dependent upon the e x p e r t i s e o f the bureaucracy f o r ass is tance i n such tasks as the d r a f t i n g o f a Japan-China j o i n t communique. However, de-s p i t e the presence of pro-Taiwan and a n t i - P e k i n g views w i t h i n the 169 Fore ign M i n i s t r y , e s p e c i a l l y among midd le l e v e l bu reauc ra ts , t h i s d i d not prove to be an impediment to the n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f r e l a t i o n s because these bureaucra ts lacked e f f e c t i v e access to the m a t r i x of the dec is ion-making process. Indeed, the s m a l l , ad hoc p o l i c y group which performed the Fore ign M i n i s t r y ' s r o l e i n the dec is ion-making process was i s o l a t e d even f rom the i n f l u e n c e o f sen io r members o f the Fore ign Min is t ry ' . " ' " 7 ^ Consequently, t h i s group cou ld adapt to the dynamic po l i cy -mak ing environment w i t h o u t the necess i t y of compromising w i t h those bureaucrats who cont inued to be i n favour o f m a i n t a i n i n g d i p l o -mat ic r e l a t i o n s w i t h Taiwan."'"7"'" The Fore ign M i n i s t r y Po l i cy -Mak ing Group The core of the ad hoc po l i cy -mak ing group which came to dominate the China dec is ion-making process w i t h i n the M i n i s t r y was composed o f T rea t i es D i v i s i o n Head Kuriyama, T r e a t i e s Bureau D i r e c t o r Takashima, As ia Bureau D i r e c t o r Yoshida, and China D i v i s i o n Head Hashimoto who worked c l o s e l y toge ther and w i t h the Tanaka-Ohira duo under the genera l 172 s u p e r v i s i o n o f Fore ign V i c e - M i n i s t e r Hogen. Whi le t h i s form o f sma l l k n i t p o l i c y group work ing on a c o n t r o v e r s i a l p o l i t i c a l i ssue i s not o 55 unusual i n the Japanese government, " t h e ex ten t t o which the f o u r men kept a l l - i m p o r t a n t secre ts to themselves, Hogen and Ohi ra was probably e x t r a o r d i n a r y . There was a sense among these and o ther h igh rank ing o f -f i c i a l s a t t h a t t ime t h a t they were f i g h t i n g f o r p o l i t i c a l s u r v i v a l i n the a f te rmath o f the Nixon shocks and the UN f i a s c o . At the same t i m e , Tanaka made i t unmistakably c lea r t h a t he would no t t o l e r a t e breach of 173 conf idence or any o the r b lunder on the p a r t o f the o f f i c i a l s . " This group p layed an e s s e n t i a l but never the less secondary r o l e v i s -a - v i s the Tanaka-Ohira duo i n the f o r e i g n po l i cy -mak ing process. I n l i n e w i t h t h e i r f u n c t i o n as bureaucra ts , the Fore ign M i n i s t r y group, w i t h Kuriyama t a k i n g the l e a d , went t o g rea t leng ths to t r y and draw up a d r a f t communique t h a t would be acceptab le to bo th the Chinese and 174 Japanese governments. I n t h i s endeavour they were a ided by the f e e d -back f rom the Chinese government Komeito Chairman T a k e i r i ^ and the LDP maver ick Furu i ,were able to ga in f rom t h e i r t a l k s w i t h Chinese o f f i c i a l s when they v i s i t e d Pek ing. I n the end, however, even the f i n a l form o f the communique was to be decided by Tanaka when he made h i s v i s i t to China. Conclus ion: A f t e r the p u b l i c a t i o n of Graham A l l i s o n ' s The Essence o f D e c i s i o n : Exp la in ing the Cuban M i s s i l e C r i s i s i ^ ~> descr ibed by Stephen Krasner as a "pa th b reak ing enterpr ise,"" ' " ' ' '^ and the works a long s i m i l a r l i n e s by Morton H a l p e r i n , " ' " 7 7 the b u r e a u c r a t i c i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f f o r e i g n p o l i c y dec is ion-making has gained i n c r e a s i n g currency w i t h i n the f o r e i g n p o l i c y l i t e r a t u r e . As was noted e a r l i e r , Tsurun tan i app l ies t h i s 56 p e r s p e c t i v e i n h i s d i s c u s s i o n o f Japanese f o r e i g n po l i cy -mak ing b u t , as we d i scove red , the r o l e o f the bureaucracy i n the China n o r m a l i z a -t i o n process was subord inate t o that- o f members o f the r u l i n g LDP, i n t h i s i ns tance the Tanaka-Ohira duo. I n f a c t , the po l i cy -mak ing group which developed to cope w i t h the China issue was c l e a r l y d ivo rced f rom the bureaucracy i t s e l f , a l l o w i n g t h i s group to be much more f l e x i b l e and responsive to the needs o f a dynamic po l i cy -mak ing s i t u a t i o n . I t would seem t h a t the use o f t h i s s m a l l , ad hoc po l i cy -mak ing group unhindered by the r i g i d i t y o f the fo rma l h i e r a r c h i c a l b u r e a u c r a t i c s e t t i n g , undermines c e r t a i n o f the assumptions upon which Tsu ru tan i p red ica tes h i s argument; namely, t h a t the lower echelon o f the Fore ign 178 M i n i s t r y dominates the : f o r e i g n po l i cy -mak ing process^ and t h a t Fore ign 179 M i n i s t r y bureaucrats are u n i n n o v a t i v e . Undoubtedly, i n r o u t i n e l o n g -term dec is ion-making, the lower echelons w i t h i n the f o r e i g n m i n i s t r y p lay a d e c i s i v e r o l e i n the po l i cy -mak ing process , bu t our examinat ion o f the r o l e o f the bureaucracy i n the s h o r t - t e r m and c o n t r o v e r s i a l China i ssue i n d i c a t e s t h a t such dec is ions are h a r d l y l e f t to f o l l o w the r i n g i s e i 180 system i n which the lower echelon dominate. L i kew ise , one o f the major p r e r e q u i s i t e s f o r the Fore ign M i n i s t r y group i n v o l v e d i n the China d e c i s i o n must s u r e l y have been t h e i r i n n o v a t i v e a b i l i t y and capac i ty to a c t d e c i s i v e l y w i t h o u t the h indrance of fo rma l b u r e a u c r a t i c requ i rements . Once i t i s unders tood, t h e r e f o r e , t ha t a c o n t r o v e r s i a l and s h o r t - t e r m issue i s not decided a t the lower l e v e l s o f the bureaucracy through a process of "osmos is" , T s u r u t a n i ' s c r i t i c i s m o f b u r e a u c r a t i c i n e r t i a i n 57 Japan does not n e c e s s a r i l y app ly . A f u r t h e r p o i n t to c-o n s a d e r i s t h a t the prox imate ac to rs i n the China po l i cy -mak ing process d i f f e r e d as a r e s u l t o f the change i n the temporal dimension of the China i ssue . Now, i ns tead o f i t be ing a long term (though s t i l l c o n t r o v e r s i a l ) i ssue i n which the s ta tus quo was main ta ined by the Fore ign M i n i s t r y , the China i s s u e , w h i l e ma in ta in ing i t s c o n t r o v e r s i a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c , a t the same t ime became a s h o r t - t e r m (u rgen t ) i ssue on the temporal d imension. Thus, the f a c t o r s ( e . g . , u n i n n o v a t i v e , r i g i d i t y ) which Tsu ru tan i dep i c t s as imp ing ing upon the e f f e c t i v e f o r m u l a t i o n of Japanese f o r e i g n p o l i c y d i d not come i n t o play, because a smal l ad hoc group was formed and separated f rom such i n h i b i t -i n g fo rces , to f u n c t i o n i n the dynamic, f l u i d environment the d e c i s i o n - ' -making^process "had; become t ransformed i n t o . What we are suggest ing here , then , i s t h a t the metamorphosis o f the China po l i cy -mak ing process f rom a . l o n g - t e r m and c o n t r o v e r s i a l i s sue ? to a s h o r t - t e r m and c o n t r o v e r s i a l issue, brought about a s i t u a t i o n i n which the LDP po l i cy -mak ing group, supported by the Fore ign M i n i s t r y po l i cy -mak ing group, became the major component of the dec is ion-making process. I n o ther words, the temporal  dimension may thus determine the s a l i e n c y o f the bureaucracy i n Japan's f o r e i g n po l i cy -mak ing process. Needless to say, T s u r u t a n i ' s c l a im t h a t the Fore ign M i n i s t r y dominate the f o r e i g n po l i cy -mak ing process i n Japan 181 i s brought s e r i o u s l y i n t o quest ion, by our d i scuss ion here . 58 The Business Community I n t r o d u c t i o n I n the realm o f economic p o l i c y - m a k i n g the business community it " i s n a t u r a l l y a s i g n i f i c a n t , i f no t decisive^ i n f l u e n c e on the p o l i c y -182 making process i n Japan. I n a f o r e i g n p o l i c y i ssue area , however, i t s i n f l u e n c e may not be as g r e a t , s ince Hellmann d iscovered i n h i s study o f the Soviet peace t r e a t y n e g o t i a t i o n s t h a t the business com-183 m u n i t y ' s o v e r a l l i n f l u e n c e was very l i m i t e d . There i s here one impor tan t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c i n which the Hellmann f i n d i n g s d i f f e r f rom the present study o f the China n o r m a l i z a t i o n process; namely, i n the former case the business community d i d n o t v iew the Soviet Union as a p o t e n t i a l market f o r Japanese goods, whereas i n the l a t t e r case there was an "ever p resent l u r e o f a market w i t h hundreds o f m i l l i o n s o f 184 customers^" and a b e l i e f among c e r t a i n elements o f the Japanese 185 business community t h a t China was Japan's " n a t u r a l " t rade p a r t n e r . This i m p l i e s t h a t the business community might have been more concerned w i t h i n f l u e n c i n g the po l i cy -mak ing process p e r t a i n i n g t o the n o r m a l i z a -t i o n of Japan-China r e l a t i o n s than was the case i n Hellmann'STstudy o f the Sov ie t peace t r e a t y n e g o t i a t i o n s . However, the e x p e c t a t i o n o f increased t rade w i t h China i s no t shared by a l l sec to rs o f the business community, so t h a t the re are c e r t a i n d i f f e r e n c e s i n the business community r e g a r d -i n g a t t i t u d e s towards the Peking government, and the ques t ion of normal -186 i z a t i o n of r e l a t i o n s between Japan and China. D i f f e rences i n the Business Community's A t t i t u d e Towards China I n the f i r s t p l a c e , w h i l e sweeping re fe rence i s made to a Japanese 59 "business community" there are c e r t a i n d i f f e r e n c e s regard ing China p o l i c y between the Kansai (or Osaka based) business groups and the 187 Kanto (or Tokyo based) groups, the former g e n e r a l l y having been 188 more favourab le to n o r m a l i z a t i o n of r e l a t i o n s than the l a t t e r . • For i n s t a n c e , the Kansai businessmen ho ld more p o s i t i v e expec ta t ions o f the China market accompanied by a f e e l i n g o f n o s t a l g i a f o r t h a t market among the prer-war business leaders who " . . . f r e q u e n t l y a t t r i b u t e d the dec l ine o f Kansai business to the loss of the China market and hope »189 to recover the l o s t ground by once again r e v i v i n g the China market . This p o s i t i v e a t t i t u d e i s f u r t h e r i l l u s t r a t e d by the f a c t t h a t i n d u s t r i e s i n the Kansai area were the f i r s t to recognize the "Four C o n d i t i o n s " o f t rade o u t l i n e d by Chou En-Lai i n 1970, the l e a d i n g combine be ing 190 Sumitomo. Moreover, Chairman Yoshish ige Ashihara of the Kansai Federa t ion o f Economic Organ izat ions p l a i n l y came out i n favour of e a r l y r e s t o r a t i o n o f d ip loma t i c r e l a t i o n s through summit diplomacy 191 by Ohira and Tanaka. F i n a l l y , Osaka business leaders preceded^ 192 a s i m i l a r group from Tokyo i n v i s i t i n g China i n September o f 1971. Indeed, i t does not seem unusual t h a t t he re should be c o n t r a s t i n g a t -t i t u d e s between the Kanto and Kansai business groups s ince t h e i r 193 t r a d i t i o n a l r i v a l r y dates to pre-war days. Another d i s t i n c t i o n t h a t should be mentioned here p e r t a i n s to the degree o f r e l i a n c e an i n d u s t r y has on t rade w i t h China. Two i n d u s t r i e s i n p a r t i c u l a r , the chemical f e r t i l i z e r and s t e e l i n d u s t r i e s , have a 194 h igh l e v e l o f dependance upon m a i n t a i n i n g t rade w i t h China: The chemical f e r t i l i z e r i n d u s t r y has been l a r g e l y dependent upon China 60 s ince 1967-1968, as a r e s u l t o f an inc rease i n domestic f e r t i l i z e r p r o d u c t i o n , together w i t h a decrease i n domest ic , Korean and Taiwan 195 demand f o r t h i s p roduc t . For the s t e e l i n d u s t r y , the China market w-a=s'ae of renewed i n t e r e s t a f t e r 1957, when an aagreement was reached to expor t i r o n and s t e e l to China i n r e t u r n f o r the i m p o r t a t i o n of an 196 e q u i v a l e n t (monetary) amount o f i r o n ore and s t e e l . Despi te the abroga t ion o f t h i s agreement by the Chinese s i d e , l ead ing the s t e e l i n -dus t ry to ban expor ts to China, the necess i t y of p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n the China market due to a slump i n demand f o r Japanese s t e e l , combined w i t h an increase i n s t e e l p r o d u c t i o n , fo rced the i n d u s t r y to f o l l o w the lead o f Nippon Kokkan (Japan S tee l Tube) which resumed expor ts to 197 ' China i n 1961. From t h i s t ime on the s t e e l i n d u s t r y has fo l l owed the same path as the chemical f e r t i l i z e r i n d u s t r y i n expanding the p r o p o r t i o n of i t s expor ts to China. As a r e s u l t , t h e s t e e l and f e r t i l i z e r i n d u s t r i e s ' r e l i a n c e upon t h i s market increased and, as a n a t u r a l outgrOwthcQ^ t h i s t r e n d , t h e i r a t t i t u d e towards the Peking government became more p o s i t i v e than o the r elements o f the business community, which gained t h e i r economic v i a b i l i t y f rom other market o u t l e t s . A f i n a l noteworthy p o i n t concerning the a t t i t u d i n a l va r iance over China p o l i c y w i t h i n the business community, p e r t a i n s to the d i f f e r e n c e i n s i z e and economic v i a b i l i t y o f those companies p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n the China t r a d e . Apart f rom the above mentioned l a r g e i n d u s t r i e s , and to a l esse r ex ten t those i n d u s t r i e s i n machinery and t e x t i l e p r o d u c t i o n , which s ince 1963 have p a r t i c i p a t e d i n the China t rade through "Memorandum 61 T rade , " a l a r g e p r o p o r t i o n o f the companies i n v o l v e d i n t h i s t rade are smal l " F r i e n d l y f i r m ^ " which depend upon the China t rade f o r s u r v i v a l . These " F r i e n d l y f i r m s " have n a t u r a l l y been i n favour o f the Peking government and have a c t i v e l y p a r t i c i p a t e d i n the promot ion o f Japan-China r e l a t i o n s . " F r i e n d l y F i rm" Trade and Memorandum Trade ] " F r i e n d l y f i r m " t rade has been c a r r i e d out between Japan and China s ince 1960 when, due to the S ino-Sov ie t c o n f l i c t and the f a i l u r e of the Great Leap fo rward , Chou En-Lai resumed t rade w i t h 198 Japan a f t e r i t had been l a r g e l y dormant f o r the preceding two y e a r s . The smal l economical ly weak " F r i e n d l y f i r m s " p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n the China t rade were also?joined by the.'"dummies" o f some of the l a r g e r co rpo ra -t i o n s which were anxious to p a r t i c i p a t - e e i n t h i s market . To q u a l i f y they on ly needed to be designated as " f r i e n d l y " by the Japan-China Trade Promotion Counc i l . I n 1963 a f u r t h e r channel of t rade was opened i n the form of Memorandum Trade, which was i n i t i a t e d by the l a t e LDP Dietman Takasaki Tatsunosuke and L iao Cheng-chih. Un l i ke " F r i e n d l y f i r m " t r a d e , Memorandum Trade " . . . c o n t a i n e d a s e m i - o f f i c i a l element as i t was ac-cepted by leaders o f the LDP and was expected to be p a r t i a l l y f i nanced 199 by the government -con t ro l led Expor t - Impor t Bank," As was p r e v i o u s l y s t a t e d , however, the Sato government d i d not a l l o w the dispersement of Expor t - Impor t Bank funds f o r use i n the China t rade a f t e r the "Yoshida l e t t e r ' n , w a s w r i t t e n . As P a r k . n o t e s , i t soon became obvious to the f i r m s p a r t i c i p a t i n g 62 i n Memorandum Trade t h a t the ascendency o f Sato to the p remiersh ip had been accompanied by a d e c l i n e i n t h i s type o f t rade i n favour of " f r i e n d l y f i r m " t r a d e . C e r t a i n l y Sato 's pro-Taiwan p o l i c y and genera l a n t i -Peking o r i e n t a t i o n were a h indrance to the development o f smooth t rade r e l a t i o n s between Japan and China, p a r t i c u l a r l y s ince he v i s i t e d Taiwan i n 1967 7and p a r t i c i p a t e d i n the U.S . ' s s e c u r i t y designs f o r the area through the Sato-Nixon communique i n 1969. Never the less , the l a r g e companies t h a t were ab le to take p a r t i n China t rade through t h e i r "dummy" companies were no t p a r t i c u l a r l y a f f e c t e d by Sato 's China po l i cy , because they were s t i l l ab le to take some advantage of the l u c r a t i v e 201 Taiwan t r a d e . Indeed, except f o r those i n d u s t r i e s t h a t were i n s p e c i f i c need o f the China t r a d e , the a t t i t u d e expressed by the business community through such o r g a n i z a t i o n s as Keidanren (Federa t ion of Economic Assoc ia t i ons ) and N i k k e i r e n (Japan Federa t ion o f Employers A s s o c i a t i o n ) , was g e n e r a l l y favourab le t o . t h e c o n t i n u a t i o n o f Sato 's pro-Taiwan p o l i c y separa t ing p o l i t i c s and economics. At the beg inn ing of the 1970s, how-ever , a number o f events occurred which g r a d u a l l y brought about a change i n the business community's a t t i t u d e towards the Sato government 's p r o -Taiwan China p o l i c y . The React ion of the Business Community to Chou's "Four Cond i t i ons" and  Changes i n the E x t e r n a l Environment On A p r i l 19th 1970, Chou E n - l a i enunciated the " four c o n d i t i o n s " t h a t were hence fo r th to govern China 's t r a d i n g r e l a t i o n s w i t h Japan. Under these " c o n d i t i o n s " c e r t a i n Japanese companies were to be excluded f rom the China t r a d e : 1 ) "en te rp r i ses which are p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n t rade and 63 economic coopera t ion designed to a s s i s t Taiwan and the Republ ic o f Korea; 2) e n t e r p r i s e s which have inves ted i n Taiwan and the ROK; 3) e n t e r p r i s e s which are e x p o r t i n g arms to Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia; 4) U.S. j o i n t e n t e r p r i s e s i n J a p a n f 2 0 2 Qu i te o b v i o u s l y , the enun-c i a t i o n of these ^condit ions meant t ha t those sec to rs o f the business community t h a t had a heavy dependence on the China market , together w i t h dea l ings i n c o n t r a v e n t i o n of the " f o u r c o n d i t i o n s " , needed to come to a d e c i s i o n as to whether or no t they should abide by Chou's dfetmra ncdis; Xor,'- . One company i n p a r t i c u l a r , Sumitomo Kagaku, had to reach a qu ick d e c i s i o n s ince i t was considered by the Chinese t rade a u t h o r i t i e s to be the " t y p i c a l v i o l a t o r " o f Chou's ' . ' c o n d i t i o n s a l o n g 203 w i t h M i t s u b i s h i Jukogyo, Teikoku J inken and Asahi Dow Chemicals. Consider ing t h a t Sumitomo Kagaku's two major expor t i tems to China were s t e e l and f e r t i l i z e r , and t h a t over h a l f of the company's y e a r l y ou tpu t o f f e r t i l i z e r went cite©tthe China market , i t i s not s u r p r i s i n g t h a t i t 20 A q u i c k l y decided to accept the " f o u r c o n d i t i o n s ' . " This was p a r t i c u -l a r l y the case s ince the president<of the company considered there were b r i g h t e r o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r business i n China^due to U.S. c o n t r o l of the 205 Taiwan market l e a v i n g " l i t t l e " f o r Japanese i n t e r e s t s . 206 I n s o f a r as the s t e e l companies are concerned, except f o r the l a r g e s t s t e e l company, New Japan S tee l (Shin Nihon S e i t e t s u ) , which resulted f rom the merger of F u j i and Yawata, the f o u r o the r major s t e e l companies which Chou E n - l a i a lso s p e c i f i c a l l y requested to abide by the " f o u r c o n d i t i o n s " — Japan S tee l Tube (Nihon Kokan), Sumitomo Meta l I n d u s t r y (Sumitomo K inzoku) , Kawasaki I r o n and S tee l (Kawasaki S e i t e t s u ) , 64 and Kobe S tee l (Kobe Seiko) — a l l f o l l o w e d the lead of Sumitomo and accepted the " f o u r c o n d i t i o n s . " I n the case of New Japan Steely the company f i n a l l y dec lared i t s acceptance of t hese / .• " c o n d i t i o n s " on the l a s t day of the Spr ing Canton Trade f a i r on 14th A p r i l 1970, on ly to l a t e r c l a r i f y ^ t h r o u g h the Chairman o f the Board, Nagano, t h a t " i n v e s t -ment i n Taiwan and p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the Japan-ROC Cooperat ion Committee w i l l be considered when the problems a r i s e , " thereby h i n t i n g t h a t i t was 207 accept ing the f o u r c o n d i t i o n s " w i t h " c o n d i t i o n s a t t a c h e d . " At any event , the Chinese s ide re fused to accept New Japan S t e e l ' s i n t e r p r e t a -t i o n of Chou E n - l a i ' s " f o u r condit ions^" and t h e r e f o r e d i d no t s i g n any 208 con t rac ts w i t h the company a t the Canton Trade F a i r . Consider ing the importance of New Japan S tee l as the l e a d i n g c o r p o r a t i o n of the s t e e l i n d u s t r y , the membership and coopera t ion i n the Japan-ROK Co-o p e r a t i o n Committee and the Japan-ROC Cooperat ion Committee by Cha i r -man Nagano^and h i s company's investment i n these c o u n t r i e s , and f i n a l l y Naganois c lose r e l a t i o n s h i p to and support of Prime M i n i s t e r Sato, i t i s not s u r p r i s i n g t h a t f rom h e r e a f t e r New Japan S tee l " . . .became the p i v o t p o i n t around which bo th the Japan-ROC Cooperat ion Committee and such p r o -Chinese groups as the Japan I n t e r n a t i o n a l Trade Promotion A s s o c i a t i o n pu t 209 g rea t pressure i n order to w in i t over to t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e s i d e s . " The l a s t sec to r o f the business community p a r t i c u l a r l y a f f e c t e d by the e n u n c i a t i o n o f the " f o u r c o n d i t i o n s " was t r a d i n g f i r m s w i t h "dummies" p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n the China " f r i e n d l y " t r a d e . Once a g a i n j c e r t a i n companies were prepared to abide by Chou E n - l a i ' s " c o n d i t i o n s " w h i l e o thers re fused to do so. Such "dummy" f i r m s as Meiwa I n d u s t r y 65 ( a f f i l i a t e d w i t h M i t s u b i s h i T r a d i n g ) , Keimei Trading ( a f f i l i a t e d w i t h M i t s u i Bussan), New Japan Trading ( a f f i l i a t e d w i t h I t o h Chemical T r a d i n g ) , and Wako Trading ( a f f i l i a t e d w i t h Marubeni I i d a ) , f a i l e d to secure con-t r a c t s a t the Canton Trade F a i r due to t h e i r delay i n accep t ing the 210 " f o u r c o n d i t i o n s . " I n the case o f Wako T rad ing , however, the company s h o r t l y a f te rwards decided to abide by the " c o n d i t i o n s " and t h e r e f o r e severed i t s c a p i t a l and personnel t i e s w i t h Marukeni I i d a . The p r e s i d e n t o f the company a lso c a l l e d f o r the r e s i g n a t i o n o f the Sato government 211 " i n order to improve Japan-China r e l a t i o n s . " The tendency f o r sec t ions o f the Japanese business community to abide by the " f o u r c o n d i t i o n s " became more pronounced a f t e r a number o f changes occurred i n the e x t e r n a l environment ' , , I n p a r t i c u l a r , the moves by the Uni ted States to improve i t s r e l a t i o n s w i t h I;China, such as the resumpt ion of U.S.-China ambassadorial t a l k s i n Warsaw, the easing o f t rade r e s t r i c t i o n s between overseas s u b s i d i a r i e s and China, and the p roposa l f o r c u l t u r a l exchange between China and the Uni ted States, f o r c e d a r e - e v a l u a t i o n o f the stance to be adopted i n respect to the " f o u r con-d i t i o n s " and of Japan-China r e l a t i o n s . Wi th the announcement of N ixon 's China v i s i t i n J u l y 1971 and h i s v i s i t i n February 1972, there was a more widespread agreement among those companies i nvo l ved i n t rade w i t h China t h a t they should accept Chou's " f o u r c o n d i t i o n s " and promote n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f Japan-China r e l a t i o n s . Even those companies w i t h heavy t i e s i n the American market were now prepared to adopt a more favourab le a t t i t u d e a f t e r these moves by the Nixon a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . Undoubtedly, the fea r of con t i nu ing recess ion a t home which began 66 i n 1970 and was prolonged by the U.S. economic measures i n August 1971, andj a lso the f e a r o f U.S.and European compet i t i on i n the China market , prompted the business community ( e s p e c i a l l y the auto-makers Toyota and Nissan) to come out i n favour of the e a r l y n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f Japan-212 China r e l a t i o n s . Thus, "p ressure to dump Taiwan.. .mounted f rom Japanese i n d u s t r i a l i s t s who f e l t t h a t s p e c i a l e f f o r t s were needed to preserve and expand the p o t e n t i a l l y vas t China market aga ins t l i k e l y 213 U.S. c o m p e t i t i o n . " Above a l l , t h i s change i n business a t t i t u d e r e s u l t e d f rom the f a c t t h a t the business community had "ac ted f o r so long on the bas is t h a t Japan f o l l o w s every s tep taken by the 1 U . S . " , t ha t they were " c o n f i d e n t t ha t by moving w i t h Pres iden t Nixon they 214 were heading i n the d i r e c t i o n the government was bound to f o l l o w . " I t was s h o r t l y a f t e r the announcement o f N ixon 's impending v i s i t to China t h a t New Japan S tee l f i n a l l y agreed to accept the " f o u r con-d i t i o n s " of t r a d e . I n a d d i t i o n , the Chairman of the Board Nagano, who was a lso Pres iden t o f the Japan Chamber o f Commerce, and another top z a i k a i l e a d e r , Pres iden t Kikawada o f Tokyo Denryoku, who was a lso Pres iden t o f the Committee f o r Economic Development, came out i n favour o f c loser r e l a t i o n s between Japan and China. Wi th the move of these two impor tan t z a i k a i leaders to a more p o s i t i v e China p o l i c y , the l ack o f consensus between the LDP and business obv ious ly became more pronounced. Indeed, Sato was s a i d " t o have been i n f u r i a t e d by Nagano and the behaviour 216 o f the business l e a d e r s . " Now t h a t New Japan S tee l had j o i n e d o the r companies i n c a l l i n g f o r an improvement i n the p o l i t i c a l c l i m a t e between Japan and China, the " p i v o t p o i n t " was i n c l i n e d towards -jf iavoufing 67 n o r m a l i z a t i o n of r e l a t i o n s . By the t ime of the sea t i ng of the People 's Republ ic i n the Un i ted Na t ions , " . . . t h e e n t i r e business community s h i f t e d t h e i r p o s i t i o n and s t a r t e d c a l l i n g f o r e a r l y resumpt ion o f d i p l o m a t i c r e l a -217 t i o n s between Japan and Ch ina . " Even the a n t i - P e k i n g Pres iden t of the Keidanren, Uemura, who was hesi'feantd i n making a statement on the China ques t ion due to the d i v i s i o n o f o p i n i o n among Keidanren members, dec lared i n December 1971 tha t : "once China has been admi t ted to the Uni ted Na t ions , we must expect e a r l y resumpt ion o f normal r e l a t i o n s 218 w i t h Ch ina . " By May 1972 Uemura had c a r r i e d out a complete v o l t e -face and was openly i n favour o f the speedy n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f Japan-219 China r e l a t i o n s . The main groups t h a t faced d i f f i c u l t y i n the t i m i n g o f t h e i r change to a p o l i c y i n favour of Peking were those t r a d i n g companies w i t h "dummies" o p e r a t i n g i n the China market . A f t e r h o l d i n g back on recogn iz ing the " f o u r c o n d i t i o n s " u n t i l June 1972, P res iden t Wakasugi o f M i t s u i Bussan^and Pres iden t Fu j i no o f M i t s u b i s h i Shoji^announced t h e i r acceptance of these " c o n d i t i o n s I n the case o f M i t s u b i s h i S h o j i , P res iden t Fu j ino accompanied h i s announcement w i t h the news t h a t the M i t s u b i s h i group would be sending a t rade m iss ion to China. P a r a l l e l i n g the LDP, the M i t s u b i s h i Group a t the same t ime d ispatched Chairman Kono Fumihiko o f M i t s u b i s h i Jukybgyo to Taiwan, o s t e n s i b l y on bus iness , " . . . bu t a c t u a l l y t o w i n the approval o f Taiwan on the course t h a t M i t s u b i s h i 220 was t a k i n g . " This was a necessary course o f a c t i o n to take s ince M i t s u b i s h i , a long w i t h M i t s u i , ma in ta ined heavy t rade and' f i n a n c i a l t i e s 68 w i t h the ROC. By .a l low ing M i t s u b i s h i (and s h o r t l y t h e r e a f t e r M i t s u i ) to d i spa tch a t rade m iss ion t o China, the Peking government was obv ious ly p e r m i t t i n g a more f l e x i b l e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the " f o u r c o n d i t i o n s . " This no doubt r e f l e c t e d the f a c t t h a t China was i n need of the i n d u s t r i a l technology and s k i l l s o f such g i a n t companies to he lp i n i t s economic 221 development. Now t h a t these two i n d u s t r i a l "hawks" had j o i n e d the o ther i m -p o r t a n t leaders of the z a i k a i i n favour o f n o r m a l i z a t i o n , there was s t rong support f o r any move t h a t Prime M i n i s t e r Tanaka would take to b r i n g t h i s about . I n s h o r t , the impor tan t elements of the business community could be counted 'on t o suppor t Tanaka i n h i s d e s i r e to normal ize Japan-China r e l a t i o n s . Conc lus ion: From the aforement ioned d i scuss ion we can s e e . t h a t the business community was not a u n i f i e d group seeking a common China p o l i c y , b u t was i n s t e a d a community composed o f a v a r i e t y of p o l i c y p o s i t i o n s a t d i f f e r e n t t imes which were i n t i m a t e l y l i n k e d to the r e s p e c t i v e companies 'depen rdeneed&nj£ o r expec ta t ions of t rade i n } the China market . Any idea o f a u n i f i e d business community as one of the p i l l a r s o f the govern ing system i n Japan c a l l s f o r m o d i f i c a t i o n a f t e r t h i s examinat ion of the China n o r m a l i z a t i o n p rocess . I t o h i n d i r e c t l y supports t h i s p o i n t when he s t a t e s : "A l though t i e s between business and the r u l i n g p a r t y are e x t e n s i v e , they are also d i f f u s e . The d i v e r s i t y o f business i n t e r e s t s and t h e i r uneven i n f l u e n c e on the r u l i n g p a r t y make vague and imprec ise the d e t a i l s of t h e i r i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s , and the exact ex ten t of business 69 222 i n f l u e n c e on the po l i cy -mak ing of the LDP i s hard to d e t e r m i n e . " Of course, t h i s does not mean t h a t the i n f l u e n c e o f business o p i n i o n was not impor tan t i n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r case, y e t t h i s i n f l u e n c e was i n d i r e c t and d i f fuse^ r a t h e r than d i r e c t and t a n g i b l e . There was no p roo f of any d i r e c t coopera t ion between the pro-Pek ing LDPers and 223 business i n respect to s t r a t e g y and f i n a n c i n g . I n s t e a d , the business community f o l l owed a s i m i l a r p a t t e r n to t h a t d iscovered by Hellmann i n h i s study o f the Sov ie t peace t r e a t y n e g o t i a t i o n s : . . . t h e businessmen d id not p a r t i c i p a t e i n the dec is ion-making process through t h e i r usua l channels, t h e i r c lose f i n a n c i a l and persona l t i e s w i t h the conserva t i ve p a r t y . Rather , access was sought as an o p i n i o n group, by means o f conferences and p u b l i c s ta tements . I n i t s r o l e as an o p i n i o n group the business community was composed of c e r t a i n elements t h a t were d e f i n i t e l y i n favour o f n o r m a l i z a -t i o n s , w h i l e some of the most impor tan t e lements, f o r example Keidanren. were among the l a s t to come out i n favour o f n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f r e l a t i o n s . Yet i n the end a l l impor tan t sec to rs o f the z a i k a i decided i n favour o f n o r m a l i z a t i o n ^ so t h a t the government was g iven a c l e a r i n d i c a t i o n t h a t the LDP's f i n a n c i a l pa t rons were i n favour o f Tanaka's p lan to extend 225 d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s to China. I n assessing the r o l e of the business community i n the China n o r m a l i z a t i o n process, i t i s i naccu ra te bo th to assume tha t i n d u s t r i a l c i r c l e s "had fo rced government leaders to r e s t o r e d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s 226 w i t h Ch ina , " or t h a t business merely c reated a " p s y c h o l o g i c a l s e t t i n g favourab le to and suppor t i ve o f the dec is ions made by the p o l i t i c i a n s 227 and b u r e a u c r a t s . " Rather , i t was more under pressure f rom the b i g 70 business community t h a t the LDP moved to normal ize r e l a t i o n s . I n p ress ing ^ f o r the adopt ion o f a f o r w a r d - l o o k i n g p o l i c y on China, i t may be argued t h a t the business community had a g rea te r i n f l u e n c e on the po l i cy -mak ing process thanrHel lmann d iscovered , bu t c e r t a i n l y n o t as g rea t as would have been the case i f the p o l i c y ques t ion p e r t a i n e d to a l o n g - t e r m u n c o n t r o v e r s i a l economic i s s u e . I n s h o r t , the i n f l u e n c e of the business community i s probably g r e a t e s t where the connect ion between the i ssue area and economic p o l i c y i s g r e a t e s t . We would thus concur w i t h Hellmann t h a t " . . . i t i s a mistake to b e l i e v e t h a t bus iness-men are f u l l y i n t e g r a t e d i n t o the process o f f o r e i g n po l i cy -mak ing or to assume t h a t t h e i r op in ions u l t i m a t e l y p r e v a i l on a l l the major i s s u e s . 229 Business i n f l u e n c e i s l i m i t e d . . . . " 71 The Oppos i t ion P a r t i e s  I n t r o d u c t i o n The o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s i n Japan (except the Japan Communist P a r t y ) began to c a l l f o r the speedy n o r m a l i z a t i o n of r e l a t i o n s between the Japanese and Chinese governments by the t ime t h a t the Tanaka govern-ment was formed i n J u l y 1972. However, the o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s (Japan S o c i a l i s t P a r t y , Komeito, Democratic S o c i a l i s t P a r t y ) were no t c o n s i s t e n t i n the t i m i n g of t h e i r agreement w i t h the Chinese government 's c o n d i t i o n s f o r n o r m a l i z a t i o n , r e f l e c t i n g c e r t a i n d i f f e r e n c e s i n ideo logy and f o r e i g n p o l i c y o r i e n t a t i o n among these p a r t i e s , a l though a l l agreed to the c o n d i -diicns>bef6.r;ecthe r e s i g n a t i o n o f the Sato government. Before examining the t i m i n g and charac ter of these o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s ' change i n China p o l i c y , we w i l l f i r s t d iscuss the Japan Communist P a r t y ' s i s o l a t i o n f rom the po l i cy -mak ing processes pP^taininggtD;nieinprniaK Japan Communist P a r t y Al though the Japan Communist Par ty (JCP) has c o n s i s t e n t l y main ta ined a "one China" p o l i c y and c a l l e d f o r the ab roga t i on of the Japan-Republ ic o f China Peace T r e a t y , the JCP remained the on ly p o l i t i c a l p a r t y i n Japan i s o l a t e d f rom the movement c a l l i n g f o r the n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f Japan-China r e l a t i o n s . This pa radox i ca l s i t u a t i o n r e s u l t s f rom the f a c t t h a t s ince 1966, when a disagreement arose between the JCP and the Chinese Communist Par ty (CCP), the p a r t y became i n c r e a s i n g l y estranged f rom the Chinese government which considered the r u l i n g c l i q u e of the JCP as one of the 230 "enemies" of China. Wi th the sever ing o f what were p r e v i o u s l y f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s , the JCP was ab le to improve i t s e l e c t o r a l f o r tunes 72 by e s t a b l i s h i n g i t s e l f as an " independent" communist p a r t y , bu t i t a lso meant t h a t the p a r t y became cu t o f f f rom any e f f e c t i v e channel of communication w i t h the PRC government. N a t u r a l l y , w i t h the p a r t y l a c k i n g any e f f e c t i v e channels of communication i t could h a r d l y p lay an i n t e r m e d i a r y r o l e between the Tanaka government and the PRC d u r i n g the n o r m a l i z a t i o n process . Thus, the JCP was " r e l e g a t e d to the p o s i t i o n of bys tander" du r ing the n o r m a l i z a t i o n of r e l a t i o n s between 231 Japan and China. J g p a n j S o c i a l i s t Par ty Since 1957 the Japan S o c i a l i s t Par ty (JSP) has been i n the f o r e f r o n t i n suppor t i ng China 's "one China" p o l i c y p o s i t i o n and demanding the impro-232 vement of Japan-China r e l a t i o n s . The breakdown i n the c lose r e l a t i o n -ship between the Japan Communist Par ty and the Chinese Communist Par ty which occurred i n 1966, o f f e r e d the S o c i a l i s t s an o p p o r t u n i t y to take over the dominant p o s i t i o n i n the movement f o r n o r m a l i z a t i o n of Japan-China r e l a t i o n s which up u n t i l t h i s t ime had been under the i n f l u e n c e o f the JCP. The S o c i a l i s t Chairman a t the t ime , Kozo Sasak i , was a pro-Pek ing leader who had gained h i s p o s i t i o n i n the p a r t y through the back ing of the r a d i c a l l e f t - w i n g f a c t i o n of the p a r t y , the Heiwa D o s h i k a i , whose members were even more favourab le to a pro-Pek ing p o l i c y than was 233 Chairman Sasaki . Wi th the support of t h i s group, Sasaki was able to convince the more n e u t r a l or p r o - S o v i e t elements w i t h i n the p a r t y t h a t i t would be t o the advantage of the JSP to capture the leadersh ip o f the n o r m a l i z a t i o n movement. A c c o r d i n g l y , the JSP created the Japan-China 73 Fr iendsh ip A s s o c i a t i o n t o rep lace the now disbanded JCP c o n t r o l l e d Japan I n t e r n a t i o n a l Trade Promotion A s s o c i a t i o n , and became i n -c r e a s i n g l y p ro-Pek ing i n i t s China p o l i c y pronouncements. Concomit-a n t l y , the p a r t y became the l ead ing p a r t i c i p a n t i n "peop le ' s d ip lomacy" and China 's c h i e f a l l y among Japanese p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s . Al though Sasaki had been ab le to convince the p r o - S o v i e t f a c t i o n s w i t h i n the p a r t y t h a t i t would be to the u l t i m a t e b e n e f i t o f the JSP to take over the n o r m a l i z a t i o n movement, p a r t i c u l a r l y whemisuch: issues as extending d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s to China and expanding Japan-China t rade gained popular suppor t , i t soon became c l e a r there was f a c t i o n a l i n -f i g h t i n g between the pro-Pek ing and p r o - S o v i e t elements i n the p a r t y 234 over the China p o l i c y adopted by the JSP. As a r e s u l t , the p a r t y ' s China p o l i c y pronouncements were c o n s t a n t l y c i rcumscr ibed by the need to cons ider the r e a c t i o n of the p r o - S o v i e t members o f the p a r t y . A f t e r the r e s i g n a t i o n o f Sasaki i n 1967 the JSP came under the leadersh ip of the more moderate chairman, S e i i c h i Katsumata, and then i n 1969 under t h a t o f the p resent chairman, Tomomi N a r i t a . Whi le these leaders were not as pro-Pek ing as the prev ious chairman, Sasak i , they - s t i l l made e f f o r t s to promote Japan-China r e l a t i o n s by c r i t i c i z i n g the Sato government 's China p o l i c y i n the D i e t , and by o r g a n i z i n g e x t r a -pa r l i amen ta ry demonstrat ions o f s t u d e n t s , workers and concerned c i t i z e n s (such as the N a t i o n a l Conference f o r the R e s t o r a t i o n o f Japanese-Chinese D ip lomat i c R e l a t i o n s , which was organized i n December 1970) . At the same t ime, ex-chairman Sasaki cont inued to p lay an i n f l u e n t i a l r o l e i n the promot ion o f Japan-China r e l a t i o n s , perhaps even more i n f l u e n t i a l 74 than the p a r t y i t s e l f , which cou ld on ly ac t as a s t r i c t u r e upon the Sato government's China p o l i c y . I n the f i r s t p l a c e , Sasaki was i n s t r u m e n t a l i n b r i n g i n g about the despatch of the long delayed 5 th m iss ion of the JSP. to China, when he acted as an i n te rmed ia ry between Chairman N a r i t a and the Chinese government. I n the communique which r e s u l t e d f rom the v i s i t o f the o f -f i c i a l m iss ion i n November 1970, the JSP pledged to cont inue i t s e f f o r t s f o r n o r m a l i z a t i o n of r e l a t i o n s between Japan and China w i t h those fo rces 235 " t r u l y " i n favour o f t h i s cause. This n a t u r a l l y excluded the JCP. Secondly, and more s i g n i f i c a n t l y , Sasaki p layed an i n te rmed ia ry r o l e immediately p r i o r to Tanaka's v i s i t to China, on ly t h i s t ime i t was between the r u l i n g p a r t y and the Chinese government. Before l e a v i n g f o r Peking i n l a t e J u l y Sasaki v i s i t e d Tanaka to make.sure t h a t he i n -tended to normal ize r e l a t i o n s w i t h the PRC. Tanaka assured him t h a t he would make every e f f o r t to normal ize r e l a t i o n s and would not p l o t f o r 236 the autonomy o f an independent Taiwan. Preceding Chairman T a k e i r i o f the Komeito i n a s i m i l a r i n te rmed ia ry r o l e , Sasaki v i s i t e d China and no doubt made c lea r to the Chinese government the Tanaka government in tended to c a r r y out the n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f r e l a t i o n s and would be prepared t o 237 accept an i n v i t a t i o n from Chou E n - l a i to v i s i t China. A f t e r h i s r e t u r n from China, Sasaki s t a t e d i n an i n t e r v i e w w i t h the M a i n i c h i Shimbun t h a t the Chinese s ide would welcome a v i s i t f rom the Tanaka government and would be f l e x i b l e i n dea l i ng w i t h such an o f f i c i a l m i s s i o n , 238 even i n respect to the th ree p r i n c i p l e s . L a t e r , he made a v i s i t to Tanaka and Ohi ra and urged them to v i s i t Peking du r ing September. 75 Al though Tanaka and Ohi ra d i d no t g i ve Sasaki d e f i n i t e c o n f i r m a t i o n t h a t they would f o l l o w such a t i m e t a b l e , ' S a s a k i became st rengthened i n 239 h i s c o n v i c t i o n t h a t the two in tended to v i s i t -China. I n s h o r t , a member o f the o p p o s i t i o n came to p lay a r o l e i n the po l i cy -mak ing p rocess : f i r s t l y by a c t i n g as an i n te rmed ia ry between the Chinese and Japanese governments; and secondly by a c t i n g as a pressure on the Tanaka-Ohira duo to ca r ry out the speedy n o r m a l i z a t i o n of Japan-China r e l a t i o n s . The Komeito I n c o n t r a s t to the JCP and the JSP the Komeito, f o r the most p a r t o f the 1960s, f o l l o w e d a moderate p o l i c y i n respect to China, v iew ing the n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f r e l a t i o n s i n the genera l con tex t o f i t s f o r e i g n p o l i c y which c a l l s f o r a n e u t r a l i s t p o l i c y f o r Japan f r e e from the i n -240 f luence of the Uni ted S ta tes , ao andt i t was not u n t i l 1969 t h a t the Komeito would even go so f a r as to admit to the "one China" f o r m u l a . From t h i s t ime on , however, t he p a r t y came to p lay an i n c r e a s i n g l y a c t i v e r o l e i n the promot ion of Japan-China r e l a t i o n s . I n the f i r s t p l a c e , the Komeito e s t a b l i s h e d the Japan-China Norma l i za t i on Consu l ta t i ve Counc i l on December 13th 1970, which appealed: Let us have a movement f o r no rma l i z i ng r e l a t i o n s permeate among the peop le , c o r r e c t our c o u n t r y ' s pos ture toward China, and open up a way to n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s . 4 ^ Al though the above c o u n c i l was composed o f about 200 members drawn f rom pro-Pek ing scho lars and prominent i n d i v i d u a l s , i t s suppor t base d i d no t 242 extend much beyond those who u s u a l l y backed the Komeito e l e c t o r a l l y . Secondly, i n the f o l l o w i n g June Komeito Chairman, T a k e i r i , issued 76 a p u b l i c s tatement i n which he f o r the f i r s t t ime dec lared he was i n 243 favour o f the ab roga t ion o f the Japan-Republ ic o f China Peace T rea ty . S h o r t l y t h e r e a f t e r , the Chairman made a v i s i t to China where Premier Chou complimented h im: "You have c o r r e c t f v i e w s as to how d i p l o m a t i c 244 r e l a t i o n s between Japan and China can be r e s t o r e d . " At the same t i m e , the Komeito d e l e g a t i o n agreed to the th ree p o l i t i c a l p r i n c i p l e s when a 245 j o i n t communique was issued a t the end o f t h e i r v i s i t . Upon the r e t u r n of the Komei m iss ion the JSP recognized t h a t the Komeito "made a f u l l sca le advance as fo rces which promote the r e s t o r a t i o n of Japan-246 China d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s . " To the .Foreign M i n i s t r y , i t was a s i g n to expr.essdconcern over the c o n t i n u a t i o n o f t h i s same k i n d o f o p p o s i t i o n 247 p a r t y diplomacy. Such concern was n a t u r a l , f o r w i t h the v i s i t o f the Komei m iss ion to China there was a broadening of the channels of communication between Japan and China beyond t h a t of i d e o l o g i c a l compa-t i b i l i t y , a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c p resent when these ' channels*, were - l a r g e l y . : 'dpmihate'dPby the JSP. F i n a l l y , T a k e i r i became o f i n c r e a s i n g importance as an i n te rmed ia ry between the Japanese and Chinese governments. Not on ly d i d T a k e i r i meet w i t h the Chinese leaders a t the t ime of the f i r s t Komei m iss ion b u t , a f t e r the v i s i t o f the second miss ion i n May 1972 Chou E n - l a i communicated a sec re t message to the Komeito Chairman through one o f the miss ion members, Ninomiya, i n f o r m i n g him t h a t the Chinese government was prepared to i n v i t e Tanaka to Peking to n e g o t i a t e the n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f r e l a t i o n s w i t h o u t the would-be Tanaka Cabinet agreeing to the th ree p o l i t i c a l p r i n c i p l e s or f e a r i n g tha t theywwould be p o l i t i c a l l y embarrassed by the Chinese 77 248 government's a c t i o n s . T a k e i r i at tempted to persuade Tanaka to r e p l y d i r e c t l y to Chou's J O £f'ex, i n d i c a t i n g he was prepared to ac t as an i n te rmed ia ry i n t h i s t a s k , b u t Tanaka re fused to do so and l e f t i t to T a k e i r i to prepare a response to the Chinese s i d e . This response took the form o f a t w e n t y - p o i n t p roposa l which T a k e i r i c a r r i e d to Peking on h i s v i s i t t he re i n ."late August, w i t h o u t e i t h e r approva l or d i s -249 approva l by Prime M i n i s t e r Tanaka or Fore ign M i n i s t e r O h i r a . A f t e r a d i scuss ion o f the T a k e i r i p r o p o s a l , the Chinese s ide came f o r -ward w i t h a f l e x i b l e coun te r -p roposa l o f ten p o i n t s wh ich , w i t h a number of m o d i f i c a t i o n s agreed to by Chou, was communicated to Tanaka, O h i r a , and Fu ru i by Masaki and Okubo when the minutes of the Chou-Take i r i meetings were handed over to the LDP p o l i t i c i a n s by these two Komeito 250 251 Dietmen. Subsequently they were g i ven to the Fore ign M i n i s t r y . Al though the Komeito had been moderate i n i t s p o l i c y pronounce-ments on China dur ing the 1960s, i t seems c lea r f rom the above tha t p r i o r to the n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f r e l a t i o n s the Komeito, and i n p a r t i c u l a r Chairman T a k e i r i , came to p lay an i n c r e a s i n g l y i n f l u e n t i a l r o l e i n the China n o r m a l i z a t i o n process. Indeed, Omori l i k e n s the r o l e o f T a k e i r i to t h a t o f Henry K i s s i n g e r , a c t i n g as an i n te rmed ia ry to b r i n g about a 252 meeting between the leaders o f these r e s p e c t i v e c o u n t r i e s . Perhaps T a k e i r i saw h imse l f i n t h i s r o l e , because he dec la red to Fu ru i be fo re v i s i t i n g China: " I w i l l e x t r a c t China 's v iews. Then I w i l l hand the 253 ba ton t o you and ask you to take care of the r e s t . " I n per fo rming an i n te rmed ia ry r o l e and a c t i n g as a pressure on the Tanaka-Ohira duo, T a k e i r i thereby j o i n e d Sasaki as an ac to r i n the po l i cy -mak ing process. 78 Democratic S o c i a l i s t Par ty The Democratic S o c i a l i s t Par ty (DSP) was e s t a b l i s h e d i n 1960 a f t e r the r i g h t wing N ish io f a c t i o n and elements ef. the c e n t r i s t 254 Kawakami f a c t i o n s p l i n t e r e d away f rom the l e f t - w i n g dominated JSP. From these more moderate roo ts the DSP, l i k e the Komeito, upheld a China : po l i cy ((in fundamental c o n t r a d i c t i o n to the Chinese government 's p o s i t i o n to "one China" ' ) ,being i n favour o f a "one China, one Taiwan" p o l i c y even a f t e r the Komeito had changed i t s China p o l i c y s tance. Becoming i n c r e a s i n g l y i s o l a t e d i n i t s China p o l i c y pronouncements a f t e r the move by the Komeito and the Nixon announcements, the DSP i n August 1971 i n d i c a t e d t h a t i t too was prepared to f o l l o w the Komeito i n jumping on the China bandwagon. The Chairman o f the DSP, Kasuga, thus met w i t h the China-Japan Fr iendsh ip A s s o c i a t i o n Deputy Chairman Wang Kuo-hua and expressed a wish to v i s i t China. At t h i s meet ing,which was the f i r s t to occur between the DSP and Chinese o f f i c i a l s , Kasuga went f u r t h e r than the p a r t y ' s bas ic p o l i c y pronouncements on China by d e c l a r i n g i n response to Wang's statement (concern ing the s t a t u s of Ta iwan) , " t h e Taiwan problem i s an i n t e r n a l a f f a i r o f China, and I 255 e a r n e s t l y hope f o r a peace fu l s e t t l e m e n t " of t h a t i s s u e . By the t ime t h a t the DSP f o l l o w e d on the hee ls o f the JSP and Komeito i n despatching a miss ion to China, the p a r t y had moved away f rom i t s p rev ious China p o l i c y , which was s i m i l a r to t h a t o f the LDP, and j o i n e d the o ther o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s i n c a l l i n g f o r the e a r l y n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f r e l a t i o n s w i t h China. The DSP now proposed t h a t the Japan-ROC Peace Treaty should be considered n u l l and v o i d and must 79 be te rminated be fo re r e s t o r a t i o n o f Japan-China r e l a t i o n s could take 1 256 p l a c e . This abrupt change i n the DSP's China p o l i c y was no t suppor ted by the d i s s i d e n t elements i n the p a r t y such as Ek i Sone, who c r i t i c i z e d the p o l i c y statements on China made by Kasuga a t h i s meet ing w i t h Wang 257 -Kuo-hua and those made by the Kasuga miss ion to China. The p e r s i s t e n c e of t h i s a n t i - P e k i n g a t t i t u d e w i t h i n the p a r t y prevented the development o f a n t i n t r a - p a r t y consensus i n favour o f n o r m a l i z a t i o n . However, i t d i d not p revent the mainstream w i t h i n the p a r t y f rom i n d i c a t i n g i t would co-operate w i t h the Tanaka government i n s u p r a - p a r t i s a n dip lomacy. Thus, w i t h the DSP j o i n i n g the JSP and Komeito i n c a l l i n g f o r s u p r a - p a r t i s a n diplomacy, a l l the o p p o s i t i o n s p a r t i e s were i n favour of n o r m a l i z i n g r e l a t i o n s w i t h China. Conc lus ion : I t seems c l e a r f rom the above d i s c u s s i o n t h a t the o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s (except the JCP) a l l p layed a r o l e i n i n f l u e n c i n g the Tanaka government 's d e c i s i o n to q u i c k l y normal ize r e l a t i o n s w i t h the PRC. I n f a c t , bo th Chou and Tanaka remarked on the e f f o r t s of the JSP and 258 Komeito i n s u p r a - p a r t i s a n dip lomacy. I n t h i s r e s p e c t , i t i s necessary to d i s t i n g u i s h between the a c t i v i t i e s o f the p a r t i e s themselves and t h a t o f th ree prominent i n d i v i d u a l s w i t h i n these p a r t i e s : e x - c h a i r -man o f the JSP, Sasak i , and the present chairmen o f the Komeito and DSP, T a k e i r i and Kasuga. I n the case o f the par t ies - themselves, t h e i r main i n f l u e n c e on the po l i cy -mak ing process was i n d i r e c t and d i f f u s e , through c r i t i c i s m 80 o f the prev ious Sato government 's p o l i c y bo th w i t h i n and o u t s i d e the D i e t , and as fo rces t h a t c o n t r i b u t e d to the development of a s o c i e t a l consensus i n favour o f no rma l i z i ng Japan-China r e l a t i o n s . I n a d d i t i o n , the p a r t i e s were g e n e r a l l y behind the a c t i v i t i e s o f the o p p o s i t i o n p a r t y p o l i t i c i a n s i n t h e i r e f f o r t s to b r i n g the n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f r e l a t i o n s c l o s e r to r e a l i z a t i o n . Wi th regard to the a c t i v i t i e s o f T a k e i r i , Sasaki and to a lesser ex ten t Kasuga, these p o l i t i c i a n s , e s p e c i a l l y T a k e i r i , became a p a r t o f the po l i cy -mak ing process t h a t developed to normal ize Japan-China r e l a t i o n s . Indeed, these i n d i v i d u a l s p layed an even more impor tan t r o l e i n t h i s process than d id members o f the r u l i n g p a r t y , except ing Tanaka, O h i r a , and F u r u i , because they a c t u a l l y became p a r t o f the p o l i c y -making group i n t h e i r r o l e as i n t e r m e d i a r i e s between the two govern-ments. What i s o f i n t e r e s t here i s t h a t i t should be the leader of the moderate Komeito, T a k e i r i , r a t h e r than the ex-chairman of the l e f t -wing S o c i a l i s t P a r t y , Sasak i , t h a t came to p lay the most s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e i n the event . For years Sasaki had v i s i t e d China and re tu rned to Japan c a l l i n g f o r the n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f r e l a t i o n s whereas T a k e i r i , i n c o n t r a s t , had on ly r e c e n t l y recognized the "one China" formula and v i s i t e d the main-land f o r the f i r s t t ime. I n f a c t , T a k e i r i had been h e s i t a n t to v i s i t China i n J u l y f o r " f e a r o f becoming a s e c o n d - f i d d l e t o Sasak i , who cu t 259 a spec tacu la r f i g u r e i n Ch ina . " That T a k e i r i came to p l a y an even more impor tan t r o l e than Sasaki when he made t h i s v i s i t , i l l u s t r a t e s he not on ly enjoyed the t r u s t of the Tanaka-Ohira duo more than d i d 81 Sasak i , bu t a lso t h a t the Chinese government was prepared to dea l w i t h him i n order to f a c i l i t a t e the n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f Japan-China r e l a t i o n s . The coopera t ion between these o p p o s i t i o n p a r t y p o l i t i c i a n s and the mainstream of the LDP demonstrates t h a t the o p p o s i t i o n need not be p e r p e t u a l l y i s o l a t e d f rom the po l i cy -mak ing process i n Japan. I n t h i s s h o r t - t e r m c o n t r o v e r s i a l f o r e i g n p o l i c y issue the o p p o s i t i o n par took i n s u p r a - p a r t i s a n diplomacy f o r the f i r s t t ime s ince the chairman o f the JSP, Mosaburo Suzuk i , exer ted pressure upon Prime M i n i s t e r Hatoyama to n e g o t i a t e a peace t r e a t y w i t h the Sov ie t Union. The s i m i l a r charac-t e r i s t i c and tempora l dimension o f these issues may thus be an impor tan t v a r i a b l e i n a t tempt ing to d e l i n e a t e the r o l e o f the o p p o s i t i o n i n the , . , . 260 po l i cy -mak ing process . 82 The Press and Pub l i c Opin ion  I n t r o d u c t i o n The press and p u b l i c o p i n i o n are obv ious ly not as d i r e c t i n t h e i r i n f l u e n c e on the po l i cy -mak ing process as are prox imate ac to rs such as the LDP and bureaucracy. S t i l l , they do p l a y a r o l e i n i n f l u e n c i n g the decis ion-makers and dec is ion-making environment o f the f o r e i g n p o l i c y arena. A c c o r d i n g l y , we w i l l d iscuss the r o l e o f the press i n the China n o r m a l i z a t i o n p rocess , f o l l o w e d by t h a t o f p u b l i c o p i n i o n . The Press I t i s d i f f i c u l t i f notuimpossible to d e l i n e a t e the exact i n f l u e n c e t h a t the press has on the p o l i c y - m a k i n g p rocess , whether i n respect to i t s i n f l u e n c e on the po l icy -makers themselves, or i n respect to i t s i n -f l uence on p u b l i c o p i n i o n , which i n t u r n i n f l u e n c e s the po l i cy -mak ing process. As Whittemore noted i n h i s study of the press and the S e c u r i t y Treaty c r i s i s : "The exact r o l e o f the newspapers i n fo rming p u b l i c o p i n i o n i s probably imposs ib le to appra ise . The e f f e c t the press has i n any count ry i s i n d i s t i n c t and a d e f i n i t e assessment of . i 1 . n261 i t s weight cannot be g i v e n . Despi te t h i s l i m i t a t i o n , Hellmann p o s t u l a t e s t h a t the media i n -f luences t h e ' p o l i c y - m a k i n g process i n two ways: f i r s t l y , by p r o v i d i n g ' the po l icy -makers w i t h a day- to-day image o f p u b l i c i n t e r e s t i n each issue by r e p o r t i n g o v e r t a c t i o n s and statements concerning p o l i c y and by e v a l u a t i n g i n d i v i d u a l quest ions i n e d i t o r i a l s and s p e c i a l commenta-r i e s . . . " and secondly "as the pr imary source of i n f o r m a t i o n f o r the p u b l i c they are ab le to c o n d i t i o n the na tu re of p u b l i c response to p a r t i c u l a r issues through the k i n d o f coverage accorded them. By 83 e s t a b l i s h i n g the focus of a t t e n t i o n the press i n d i r e c t l y determines 262 how the p u b l i c w i l l p a r t i c i p a t e i n the p o l i c y f o r m u l a t i o n p r o c e s s . " This l a t t e r p o i n t i s e s p e c i a l l y r e l e v a n t to a d i scuss ion of the China i s s u e , s ince Miyosh i d iscovered c e r t a i n newspapers i n Japan e s t a b l i s h e d a " u n i t e d f r o n t " c a l l i n g f o r the n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f r e l a t i o n s w i t h 263 China. Qui te o b v i o u s l y , t h i s meant the press i n Japan surrended i t s o b j e c t i v i t y i n favour or promot ing a p o l i t i c a l c l ima te conducive to the ex tens ion of d ip lomat i c r e l a t i o n s to China. To s t a r t w i t h , Miyoshi p o i n t s out t h a t d e s p i t e the at tempt of the Shimbun Kyokai ([Japan]Newspaper P u b l i s h e r ' s A s s o c i a t i o n ) to reach an agreement w i t h the A l l - C h i n a J o u r n a l i s t s A s s o c i a t i o n on the exchange of newsmen between Japan and China, the Chinese s ide were unprepared to make any agreement i n which on ly the Shimbun Kyokai was i n v o l v e d . I n s t e a d , they i n s i s t e d any d iscuss ions p e r t a i n i n g to the exchange o f newsmen must be c a r r i e d out through the t rade o f f i c e e s t a b l i s h e d as a r e s u l t of the t rade n e g o t i a t i o n s between L iao Cheng-chih, P res iden t o f the China-Japan Fr iendsh ip A s s o c i a t i o n , and Tatsunosuke Takasak i , a member of the r u l i n g LDP, which had e s t a b l i s h e d Memorandum Trade between China and Japan i n 1962. I t was through t h i s s t r u c t u r e t h a t an exchange o f newsmen was c a r r i e d out i n September 1964, the p a r t i c i -p a t i n g companies be ing Asah i , M a i n i c h i , Y o m i u r i , Sankei , Nihon K e i z a i , K i s h i Nihon, Kyodo, Japan Broadcast ing Corpo ra t i on , and Tokyo Broad-c a s t i n g System. Since these companies agreed to an exchange of news-men i n t h i s manner, " . . . t h e r e i s no denying the s t e r n f a c t t h a t the L-T s t r u c t u r e was n o t e s t a b l i s h e d by Shimbun Kyokai and t h a t i t was 84 i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o the framework of the L-T agreement concluded by p o l i t i c i a n s and t r a d e r s . " 2 6 4 An impor tan t p o i n t to note i n trhdrs- • regard i s t h a t Memorandum Trade was c a r r i e d out on the c o n d i t i o n t h a t those p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n such t rade accepted the three " p o l i t i c a l p r i n c i p l e s " enunciated by Chou En-265 l a i i n 1960. I n s o f a r as the press i s concerned, i t appears t h a t t he re was an agreement " p r o v i d i n g t h a t newsmen should be exchanged on 266 the premise of accept ing the Chinese s ide p o l i t i c a l p r i n c i p l e s . " A l though M a i n i c h i was n o t prepared t o accept Chou's t h r e e " p o l i t i c a l p r i n c i p l e s , " o ther companies such as Nihon K e i z a i accepted these con-d i t i o n s . I n o ther words, those companies t h a t agreed to abide by Chou's d i c t a t e s could use t h e i r i n f l u e n c e to c rea te a p o l i t i c a l c l ima te favourab le t o the n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f Japan-China r e l a t i o n s . I n p o i n t o f f a c t even M a i n i c h i was i n favour o f a p ro-Pek ing p o l i c y du r i ng Sato 's r e i g n i n power, and f o l l o w e d the o the r newspapers i n c a l l i n g f o r the speedy n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f r e l a t i o n s . A c c o r d i n g l y , the most i n f l u e n t i a l elements of the Japanese media took a pro-Pek ing v i e w p o i n t i n t h e i r d i s c u s s i o n o f Japan 's -China p o l i c y . Indeed, p r o -Peking newsmen and e d i t o r s e s t a b l i s h e d the Sino-Japanese Press Soc ie ty i n December 1971 to a s s i s t i n promot ing the n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f Japan-267 China r e l a t i o n s . Consider ing t h a t the press was g e n e r a l l y i n favour of develop ing f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s w i t h the Peking government, i t seems n a t u r a l to assume t h a t i t would i n f l u e n c e p u b l i c o p i n i o n to take a p o s i t i v e a t t i t u d e towards no rma l i z i ng r e l a t i o n s w i t h China. I n -deed, Scalapino argues t h a t : "Thea in f luence ib fo the ip ressdonUapanese p u b l i e c o p i n i o n and a lso on p o l i t i c a l c i r c l e s i s s u b s t a n t i a l , as the 85 p o l l i n g data i n d i c a t e s , e s p e c i a l l y i n the arena o f f o r e i g n p o l i c y . " L i kew ise , Matsuyama agrees t h a t " . . . u n d e n i a b l y , the press has become i n c r e a s i n g l y i n f l u e n t i a l i n the f o r m a t i o n o f Japanese f o r e i g n p o l i c y , " and goes on to s t a t e f u r t h e r t h a t : " . . . t h e press — on ly the press — 269 can have e f f e c t i v e i n f l u e n c e upon f o r e i g n p o l i c y i n J a p a n . . . " I t would seem, t h e r e f o r e , t h a t the press would have some i n f l u e n c e on the po l i cy -mak ing process i n respect to Japan's China p o l i c y . How-ever , t h i s i n f l u e n c e would n o t be as much o f a d i r e c t i n f l u e n c e upon the po l i cy -mak ing process as i t would be a c o n t r i b u t i n g f a c t o r i n the genera l "mood-bu i l d ing " i n favour o f n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f r e l a t i o n s . I n any event , the i n f l u e n c e of the press i n the Japan-China n o r m a l i z a t i o n process was q u i t e d i f f e r e n t f rom i t s r o l e i n the Soviet peace t r e a t y n e g o t i a t i o n s , where the press " . . . s c r u p u l o u s l y avoided a p o s i t i v e r o l e i n the p o l i c y - f o r m u l a t i o n process , r e f u s i n g to lend e d i t o r i a l suppor t 270 to any f i r m p o l i c y p o s i t i o n . " I n the case o f China, the press acted as a c a t a l y s t g i v i n g d i r e c t i o n to po l i cy -makers and p u b l i c o p i n i o n . Pub l i c Opin ion Dur ing the 1960s a number o f p u b l i c o p i n i o n p o l l s demonstrated t h a t c e r t a i n elements o f_ the Japanese p o p u l a t i o n were d i s s a t i s f i e d w i t h the China p o l i c y pursued by the Sato government. This was p a r t i c u l a r l y the case i n respect to suppor ters o f the S o c i a l i s t P a r t y , bu t even among the LDP suppor ters there was . d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n over the r u l i n g p a r t y ' s China p o l i c y . This p o i n t i s i l l u s t r a t e d by the surveys 86 c a r r i e d out by Mendel. The respondents answered the f o l l o w i n g ques t i on Today Japan has d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s w i t h the Republ ic o f China on Taiwan, bu t no t w i t h Com-munis t China. Should Japan recognize and e s t a b l i s h r e l a t i o n s w i t h Communist China or is.; p resent p o l i c y b e t t e r ? T o t a l Sample LDP S o c i a l i s t 1966 1968 1968 1968 Recognize 44 47 36 58 Status quo 14 17 22 14 Don ' t know 42 36 42 28 From those among the sample who dec lared they were i n favour o f recogn iz ing the PRC, Mendel then asked: Then what should we do about r e l a t i o n s w i t h N a t i o n a l i s t China — cont inue or cancel them? T o t a l Sample LDP S o c i a l i s t 1966 1968 1968 1968 Continue 76 85 87 85 Cancel 6 3 2 3 Don'ct know 18 12 11 12 Thus, w h i l e a g r e a t e r p r o p o r t i o n of s o c i a l i s t suppor ters were i n • favour o f recogn iz ing the PRC, they s t i l l d i d no t see t h i s as going h a n d . i n hand w i t h the sever ing o f r e l a t i o n s w i t h the Taiwan regime. I n f a c t , bo th s o c i a l i s t and LDP suppor ters saw the c o n t i n u a t i o n of r e l a t i o n s w i t h N a t i o n a l i s t China as the p o l i c y t ha t should be adopted by the government, i f r e l a t i o n s w i t h China were e s t a b l i s h e d . This o p i n i o n i n favour of n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f r e l a t i o n s mounted r a p i d l y dur ing 1970 and 1971. For example, i n A p r i l 1970 a survey 87 by the M a i n i c h i Shimbun revea led t h a t 16% of those i n t e r v i e w e d were i n favour of " immediate" n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f r e l a t i o n s and 47% were i n M 272 favour of n o r m a l i z a t i o n as soon as p o s s i b l e . " Later, i n June 1970, 273 64% of those i n te rv iewed were i n favour of n o r m a l i z a t i o n , " and by the f o l l o w i n g June 73% were i n favour o f n o r m a l i z i n g r e l a t i o n s w i t h the P R C . 2 7 4 Thus, there was a growing sent iment i n Japan to e s t a b l i s h r e l a -t i o n s w i t h China, which a f t e r the admission of China i n t o the Uni ted 275 Na t i ons , " . . . m o u n t e d r a p i d l y i n favour o f r e c o g n i z i n g P e k i n g . " Now, there was an i n c r e a s i n g movement towards has ten ing the n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f r e l a t i o n s as was i n d i c a t e d i n a January p o l l by the Tokyo Shimbun^where 45.8% of those i n t e r v i e w e d c a l l e d f o r " immediate r e c o g n i t i o n o f the 276 Chinese government and promot ion o f d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s . A survey by the Asahi Shimbun a t the same t ime found t h a t 59% of those quest ioned 277 were i n favour of " h a s t e n i n g " the n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f r e l a t i o n s . I n the above Asahi Shimbun p o l l the ques t i on o f Japan's r e l a t i o n s w i t h Taiwan was a lso surveyed. I n c o n t r a s t w i t h the e a r l i e r f i n d i n g s by Mendel, the re was now an i n c r e a s i n g number o f people who r e a l i z e d maintenance of r e l a t i o n s w i t h Taiwan may not be compat ib le w i t h e s t a -b l i s h i n g r e l a t i o n s w i t h China. I n t h i s i n s t a n c e , there was ah almost equal spread between those t h a t were i n favour of " d i s s o l u t i o n " of Japan's r e l a t i o n s w i t h Taiwan and those t h a t were aga ins t t h i s move, 34% coming 278 out i n favour of d i s s o l u t i o n and 32% aga ins t t h i s move. However, t h i s survey d i d not make s p e c i f i c the ques t ion o f e x a c t l y what r e l a t i o n -sh ip w i t h Taiwan was under q u e s t i o n , l e a v i n g i t to the respondent to determine i f t h i s meant s o l e l y d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s , t rade and f i n a n c i a l r e l a t i o n s , or b o t h . When t h i s ques t ion was made s p e c i f i c i n a J u l y 1972 88 survey by the Sankei Shimbun, i t was found t h a t on ly 5.5% were i n favour of sever ing "eve ry " t i e w i t h Taiwan, w h i l e the l a r g e s t p r o p o r t i o n of those i n t e r v i e w e d , 72%, were i n favour o f m a i n t a i n i n g t rade t i e s w i t h 279 Taiwan. The above survey a lso demonstrated t h a t there was a d e f i n i t e inc rease i n popu lar suppor t f o r has ten ing the estab l ishment of r e l a -t i o n s a f t e r the i n a u g u r a t i o n o f the Tanaka Cabinet . I n t h i s survey , 82% of those i n te rv iewed favoured " h a s t e n i n g " the estab l ishment of 280 d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s . Thus, when he moved to normal ize r e l a t i o n s w i t h China, Tanaka could be assured he had popu lar suppor t i n c a r r y i n g out t h i s task . Conclus ion: There are obvious l i m i t a t i o n s i n respect to p u b l i c o p i n i o n p o l l s t h a t may lead to ajbias i n the r e s u l t s due to such f a c t o r s as the t ime o f survey , i n t e r v i e w techn iques , and s u b t l e d i f f e r e n c e s i n quest ions asked o f the respondents . Whi le the p o l l s taken on the ques t ion o f Japan's r e l a t i o n s w i t h China were c e r t a i n l y no t i d e a l i n s o f a r as be ing ab le to make comparisons over .time, they never the less i n d i c a t e d a c e r t a i n increase i n p u b l i c sent iment i n favour o f n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f Japan-China r e l a t i o n s . Of course, as w i t h the ques t ion o f the p r e s s ' i n f l u e n c e on the po l i cy -mak ing process , i t i s a lso d i f f i c u l t to assess the i n f l u e n c e of p u b l i c o p i n i o n on the d e c i s i o n to normal ize r e l a t i o n s w i t h China. I n t h i s r e s p e c t , I t o h argues t h a t any a b i l i t y t h a t p u b l i c o p i n i o n may have i n i n f l u e n c i n g the p o l i c y - m a k i n g process revo lves around th ree f a c t o r s : 89 1) Pub l i c o p i n i o n creates the genera l mood i n which decis ion-makers opera te ; 2) o p i n i o n p o l l s on s p e c i f i c f o r e i g n - a f f a i r s issues may have some impact on p o l i c y - m a k e r s ; 3) p u b l i c o p i n i o n as a r t i c u l a t e d by va r ious f r i e n d -ship s o c i e t i e s ( e . g . , the Japan-China Fr iendsh ip S o c i e t y ) , t rade promot ion groups, and prominent i n d i v i d u a l s , as w e l l as mass media, tend to i n -crease any p o t e n t i a l i n f l u e n c e . ° Wi th regard to the f i r s t p o i n t , i t i s c l e a r t h a t p u b l i c o p i n i o n i n favour o f n o r m a l i z a t i o n developed be fo re i t was p o s s i b l e to ca r ry t h i s task out due to the c o n t i n u a t i o n i n power o f Prime M i n i s t e r Sato. Thus, by the t ime Tanaka gained the primeerninistership there was a s t rong "genera l mood" i n favour of e a r l y n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f r e l a t i o n s . Indeed, a t the t ime o f the China p o l i c y agreement between Tanaka, O h i r a , and M i k i there was an e x p l i c i t r e c o g n i t i o n o f the f a c t t h a t " n o r m a l i s a t i o n of d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s between Japan and China has now become p u b l i c . . ,,282 o p i n i o n . . . . Next , p u b l i c o p i n i o n p o l l s were c o n s i s t e n t i n r e f l e c t i n g a demand f o r the e a r l y n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f r e l a t i o n s by the Tanaka government, w i t h the p r o p o r t i o n o f those i n favour o f such a move i n c r e a s i n g as the t ime o f Tanaka's v i s i t approached. I n s o f a r as Scalapino and Masumi are con-cerned, p o l i t i c i a n s do indeed pay a t t e n t i o n to the response o f the p u b l i c i n the p o l l s conducted so t h a t p u b l i c o p i n i o n i n favour o r n o r m a l i z a t i o n 283 may have p r o v i d e d . csomex.-i o f the impetus t o ca r ry out this. task. . -On the o ther hand, Hellman asser t s " . . . p o s t - w a r Japanese pr ime m i n i s t e r s have i n f a c t pa id l i t t l e a t t e n t i o n to p u b l i c o p i n i o n on the 284 major f o r e i g n p o l i c y i s s u e s . " A l though Hellmann f i n d s support f o r t h i s a s s e r t i o n i n . h i s own study o f the Sov ie t peace t r e a t y n e g o t i a t i o n s , 90 our present study o f the China n o r m a l i z a t i o n process would seem to i n -d i c a t e Prime M i n i s t e r Tanaka may have pa id some a t t e n t i o n to the demand f o r n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f Japan-China r e l a t i o n s . One c r u c i a l v a r i a b l e here i s t h a t the press d i d not p lay a s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e i n shaping p u b l i c o p i n i o n i n favour o f the Japanese government 's pos tu re i n the Soviet peace t r e a t y n e g o t i a t i o n s , whereas i t d i d i n the case o f n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f Japan-China r e l a t i o n s . I n any event , a number of authors agree t h a t p u b l i c o p i n i o n p layed a s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e i n p r e s s u r i n g the Tanaka government i n t o no rma l i z ing r e l a t i o n s w i t h Pek ing. For example, Scalapino supports t h i s statement when he dec lares p u b l i c o p i n i o n was a " . . . s i g n i f i c a n t pressure upon the new Tanaka government to reach an 285 agreement w i t h Peking q u i c k l y — even a t cons iderab le c o s t . " L i k e -- w i s e , Q u r e s n l assures us " . . . t h e impetus f o r Tanaka's Peking v i s i t was prov ided by the consensus o f p u b l i c o p i n i o n i n Japan which has a lways- -286 "played annimportant r o l e i n Japanese p o l i t i c a l l i f e . " Hence, i t would appear t h a t i n c e r t a i n circumstances p u b l i c o p i n i o n may have c e r t a i n i n f l u e n c e on po l i cy -mak ing process i n Japan. F i n a l l y , i n respect to I t o h ' s t h i r d p o i n t concerning the i n f l u e n c e 28 7 o f a r t i c u l a t e d o p i n i o n , we have a l ready po in ted out t h a t the media was d e f i n i t e l y i n favour o f a n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f Japan-China r e l a t i o n s . I n a d d i t i o n , we saw i n our d i scuss ion o f the LDP t h a t i n t r a - p a r t y pressure groups and prominent LDP p o l i t i c i a n s at tempted to i n f l u e n c e the p o l i c y -making process i n favour o f Pek ing. F i n a l l y , there were such groups as the Komeito sponsored People 's Counci l f o r the N o r m a l i z a t i o n o f Japan-China r e l a t i o n s t h a t j o i n e d i n c a l l i n g f o r a more p o s i t i v e 91 a t t i t u d e towards the Peking government. Of course, the re was s t i l l s t r o n g sent iment i n favour o f Taiwan among c e r t a i n elements o f a r t i -c u l a t e o p i n i o n , ( e . g . , As ia Problems Research Group), bu t Tanaka gained support f rom the above groups i n the saj\& moves he made to normal ize Japan-China r e l a t i o n s . When i t comes to the pressure of these groups on the a c t u a l d e c i s i o n to normal ize r e l a t i o n s w i t h China, however, they on ly p layed the r o l e of genera l p u b l i c o p i n i o n informing the background .against which the Tanaka government normal ized r e l a t i o n s . This i s because the ad hoc po l i cy -mak ing group which came to dominate the 'China d e c i s i o n ' was a [ s m a l l , t i g h t - k n i t group which d i d no t a l l o w the i n -f l uence o f these groups or t h a t of genera l p u b l i c o p i n i o n to enter " . . . d i r e c t l y i n t o the t i g h t l y i n s u l a t e d and c o n t r o l l e d process of dec is ion-making i n the smal l a c t i o n group o f p o l i t i c i a n s and bureau-288 c r a t s . " While p u b l i c o p i n i o n and a r t i c u l a t e d o p i n i o n may have prov ided some genera l i n p u t i n t o the po l i cy -mak ing process i n terms o f i t p r o v i d i n g a favourab le background f o r the po l i cy -mak ing group, the f a c t t ha t t h i s group operated i n the above manner would seem to i n d i c a t e t h a t such favourab le o p i n i o n was not on ly i n s u f f i c i e n t to b r i n g about the n o r m a l i z a t i o n of Japan-China r e l a t i o n s , bu t perhaps a lso unnecessary. 92 CONCLUSION I t i s ev ident f rom our ana lys i s of the po l i cy -mak ing process p e r t a i n i n g to the n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f Japan-China r e l a t i o n s t h a t e x t e r n a l and i n t e r n a l f a c t o r s a f f e c t Japan's f o r e i g n - p o l i c y making process. This does n o t , o f course , mean t h a t a l l the i n t e r n a l and e x t e r n a l f a c t o r s t h a t p layed a r o l e i n the 'China d e c i s i o n ' were presented i n t h i s s tudy , o r t h a t we can g ive " w e i g h t " to the r e l e v a n t f a c t o r s we have discussed b u t , g iven the a d m i t t e d l y isica-rteus e m p i r i c a l data concerning Japanese po l i cy -mak ing i n g e n e r a l , and f o r e i g n po l i cy -mak ing i n p a r t i c u l a r , the most s a l i e n t aspects o f the China n o r m a l i z a t i o n p r o -cess appear to have been examined i n t h i s s tudy . ' From the data a l ready a v a i l a b l e on' po l i cy -mak ing i n Japan, a t h e o r e t i c a l framework was c u l l e d i n order to p rov ide a h e u r i s t i c device f o r e x p l a i n i n g a p a r t i c u l a r case study — the n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f Japan-China r e l a t i o n s . To analyze t h i s problem i n the framework we employed adds to our understanding o f f o r e i g n p o l i c y - m a k i n g , bu t i t never the less begs the c r i t i c a l q u e s t i o n : Can t h i s s tudy o f the China n o r m a l i z a t i o n process p rov ide any i n s i g h t s t h a t might f a c i l i t a t e a broader concep tua l -i z a t i o n of po l i cy -mak ing i n Japan? To avoid the charge tha t we s imply considered t h i s case i d i o g r a -p h i c a l l y , i n s t e a d of n o m o t h e t i c a l l y , the China n o r m a l i z a t i o n process was analyzed i n respect t o i t be ing i n the f u n c t i o n a l area of f o r e i g n p o l i c y , c o n t r o v e r s i a l i n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c , and s h o r t - t e r m on the temporal d imension. I n t h i s a t tempt to e x p l i c a t e a framework w i t h i n which to study the 'China d e c i s i o n , ' the re are s t i l l c e r t a i n c r i t i c i s m s t h a t may be l e v e l l e d aga ins t s tudy ing an i ssue w i t h i n t h i s s e t t i n g . 93 I n the f i r s t p l a c e , i t might be argued t h a t the ac to rs i n v o l v e d i n a f o r e i g n p o l i c y i ssue are not s u b s t a n t i a l l y d i f f e r e n t f rom those i n -vo lved i n a domestic i s s u e . Indeed, our f i n d i n g s i n respect to the predominant r o l e o f the LDP i s supported by H a r a r i ' s study of labour 289 l e g i s l a t i o n i n Japan. However, what s t i l l makes a f u n c t i o n a l d i f -fe rence between these issue areas s i g n i f i c a n t , i s t h a t i t g ives a d i r e c t i o n a l focus t o examine the e x t e r n a l i n f l u e n c e s a f f e c t i n g the po l i cy -mak ing process. I n s h o r t , one would expect t h a t e x t e r n a l i n -f luences are n o t as s a l i e n t i n s tud ies p e r t a i n i n g s o l e l y to domestic p o 1 i cy-mak i n g . A more ser ious c r i t i c i s m may be l e v e l l e d i n respect to cons ide r -i ng the China n o r m a l i z a t i o n process i n a category based on the charac- t e r i s t i c ' o j f the p o l i c y . I n o ther words, how do we decide i f an i ssue i s c o n t r o v e r s i a l or not? Once aga in , the answer seems q u i t e s imp le : i f the re i s s t rong i n t e r - or i n t r a - p a r t y , o p p o s i t i o n to the government 's p o l i c y , then the issue i s c o n t r o v e r s i a l . A r t i c u l a t e and genera l p u b l i c o p i n i o n may a lso express o p p o s i t i o n to the government 's p o l i c y , and t h i s may heat the f i r e o f t he con t rove rsy , bu t the e f f e c t of i n t e r - and i n t r a - p a r t y o p p o s i t i o n i s the most s a l i e n t p o i n t he re . F i n a l l y , a p o i n t o f c o n t e n t i o n may be r a i s e d i n respec t t o the temporal dimension o f the i s s u e . As no ted , s h o r t - t e r m (u rgen t ) p o l i c y dec is ions are considered to be those o f one year or l e s s . Hence, i t may be argued t h a t t h i s i s e i t h e r " t oo l o n g , " or " t oo s h o r t , " a p e r i o d . C e r t a i n l y , what is .needed here are f u r t h e r s tud ies of f o r e i g n p o l i c y -making across the tempora l 'd imens ion , so t h a t we may make a more accura te assessment o f the d i f f e r i n g i n f l u e n c e s on the po l i cy -mak ing 94 process t h a t occur over t i m e . However, the p o i n t i s t ha t we s p e c i f i e d the framework w i t h i n which the 'China d e c i s i o n ' was analyzed. I n a d -d i t i o n , we made i t c l ea r t h a t Prime M i n i s t e r Tanaka perce ived the issue as s h o r t - t e r m . When we summarize t h i s s t u d y ' s f i n d i n g s , t hen , i t i s p o s s i b l e to do so by re fe rence to s p e c i f i c i ssue c a t e g o r i e s . This might not on ly f a c i l i t a t e the d e l i n e a t i o n o f f a c t o r s t h a t may be s i g n i f i c a n t i n s i m i l a r s h o r t - t e r m and c o n t r o v e r s i a l f o r e i g n p o l i c y issues b u t , o f equal impor tance, might a lso be u s e f u l i n examining issues t h a t f a l l w i t h i n d i f f e r e n t issue c a t e g o r i e s . Wi th t h i s p o i n t i n mind, a number o f the more s i g n i f i c a n t f i n d i n g s of t h i s s tudy , together w i t h a number of p o s t u l a t e s t ha t may be r e l e v a n t i n f u t u r e p o l i c y research , are presented below: 1) Inpu t f rom the e x t e r n a l environment i s an impor tan t v a r i a b l e to consider i n a s h o r t -term c o n t r o v e r s i a l f o r e i g n p o l i c y i s s u e , bu t i s no t as s a l i e n t i n i n f l u e n c i n g Japan's l ong - te rm f o r e i g n pol icy , goals ( e . g . , economic p r o s p e r i t y ) . 2) Senior leaders o f the LDP supported by sen io r bureaucra ts tend to exerc ise the predominant i n f l u e n c e i n s h o r t - t e r m c o n t r o v e r s i a l i ssues . Conversely, the fo rma l p a r t y organs and the b u r e a u c r a t i c o r g a n i z a t i o n s are expected to p l a y a more prominent r o l e i n l ong - te rm i ssues . This w i l l probablyibe.esp^iaiLV theecase f o r r o u t i n e ( n o n - c o n t r o v e r s i a l ) i s s u e s . 3) Business i n f l u e n c e i s min imal i n s h o r t - t e r m c o n t r o v e r s i a l f o r e i g n p o l i c y i s s u e s . The more urgent the d e c i s i o n , the less l i k e l y t h a t business w i l l ga in d i r e c t access to i n f l u e n c e the po l i cy -mak ing process . Business i n f l u e n c e i s undoubtedly g r e a t e s t i n the economic po l i cy -mak ing p rocess . 95 4) The r o l e o f the o p p o s i t i o n i n t h i s study was somewhat a t y p i c a l . This seems p a r t i c u l a r l y t r u e g iven t h a t o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s , g a i n t h e i r l e g i t i m a c y and c r e d i b i l i t y f rom opposing, r a t h e r than s u p p o r t i n g , the government 's p o l i c y . Hence i n the f u t u r e , the r o l e o f the o p p o s i t i o n w i l l p robably be t h a t of government c r i t i c , bo th i n -s ide and ou ts ide the N a t i o n a l D i e t . 5) The press and p u b l i c o p i n i o n are i n d i r e c t i n -f luences i n s h o r t - t e r m c o n t r o v e r s i a l f o r e i g n p o l i c y d e c i s i o n s . The i n f l u e n c e o f the press and p u b l i c o p i n i o n i s perhaps most s a l i e n t and d i r e c t i n c o n t r o v e r s i a l i s s u e s , or domestic i s s u e s , bu t even t h i s i n f l u e n c e i s probably i n d i r e c t and p e r i p h e r a l to the p o l i c y - m a k i n g process . Whi le t h i s l i s t i s i l l u s t r a t i v e , r a t h e r than exhaus t i ve , i t does g ive some i n d i c a t i o n of the u t i l i t y of -cons ider ing an i ssue i n terms o f i t s f u n c t i o n a l , c h a r a c t e r i s t i c , and temporal dimensions. This may he lp us to b u i l d a b r i d g e between a b s t r a c t g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s and e m p i r i c a l d a t a . Perhaps most i m p o r t a n t l y i t teaches us to use any framework w i t h c a u t i o n , remembering t h a t our main task i s t h a t of e x p l a n a t i o n , no t t h a t o f defending a p a r t i c u l a r t h e o r e t i c a l p o s i t i o n . I n o ther words, w h i l e the above approach i s u s e f u l f o r examining f o r e i g n po l i cy -mak ing i n Japan, t h i s does not suggest i t w i l l be of a i d i n understanding a l l p o l i c y -making i ssues . Never the less , i t i s a f r u i t f u l beg inn ing from which to expand our knowledge of Japanese f o r e i g n p o l i c y - m a k i n g . 96 FOOTNOTES "'"Geoffrey Pearson, "What does the -academic have to c o n t r i b u t e to p o l i c y - m a k i n g , " I n t e r n a t i o n a l P e r s p e c t i v e s , (November-December 1973) , p. 43. 2 For a d i scuss ion of the LDP's dependence on z a i k a i p o l i t i c a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s , see Frank Langdon, "The P o l i t i c a l C o n t r i b u t i o n s of B ig Business i n Japan , " Asian Survey, V o l . 3, No. 10 ( A p r i l 1963) , pp . 465-73. 3 For a s i m i l a r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n see, f o r example, Haruk i ro Fuku i , "Fore ign Po l icy -Mak ing i n Japan: Case Studies f o r E m p i r i c a l Theory , " prepared f o r d e l i v e r y a t the 1974 Annual Meeting o f the A s s o c i a t i o n f o r Asian S t u d i e s , Boston, A p r i l 1-3, 1974, pp. 5-6. Herea f te r t h i s w i l l be r e f e r r e d to as F u k u i , "Fore ign Po l i cy -Mak ing i n Japan. " T laruh i ro Fuku i , "Economic P lann ing i n Postwar Japan: A Case Study i n P o l i c y - M a k i n g , " Asian Survey, V o l . 12, No. 4 ( A p r i l 1972) , p. 348. Also see F u k u i ' s e a r l i e r book- leng th study o f LDP p o l i c y -making, Par ty i n Power: The Japanese L ibera l -Democrats and P o l i c y - Making , Berkeley and Los Angeles: U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a Press , 1970, p a r t i c u l a r l y pp. 162-67. I n h i s l a t e s t s tudy , Fukui mod i f i es h i s p r e v i o u s l y he ld p o s i t i o n concerning the r o l e o f the t r i p a r t i t e e l i t e i n p o l i c y - m a k i n g , a l though he s t i l l sees i t be ing impor tan t as the "Support base" of the ad hoc po l i cy -mak ing group t h a t develops to cope w i t h po l i cy -mak ing i n Japan. See "Fore ign Po l i cy -Mak ing i n Japan , " pp. 7-8 , 20, 63-86. I n a d d i t i o n to those authors mentioned i n the t e x t , the f o l l o w i n g authors and works g i ve examples o f the i m p l i c i t o r ex-p l i c i t assumption about the re levance o f the t r i p a r t i t e e l i t e i n the Japanese po l i cy -mak ing process . Ivan P. H a l l , "Japanese I n t e l l e c t u a l s , " Survey, V o l . 18, No. 4 (Autumn 1972) , pp. 76-79; Ch ih i ro Hosoya, " C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the Fore ign P o l i c y Decis ion-Making System i n Japan, " World P o l i t i c s , V o l . 26, No. 3 ( A p r i l 1974), p. 368; Robert A. Scalapino and Junnosuke Masami, P a r t i e s and P o l i t i c s i n Contemporary Japan, Berkeley and Los Angeles: U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a Press , 1962, pp. 93-94. For a d i s c u s s i o n of the r e l e v a n t Japanese language works see Fuku i , "Fore ign Po l icy-Mak ing i n Japan, " pp. 6-7. For a c r i t i q u e of t h i s approach and an i n d i c a t i o n of i t s l i m i t a t i o n s see Fuku i , "Fore ign Po l i cy -Mak ing i n Japan, " pp. 4-23; J o e l S i l v e r s t e i n , "S tud ies i n Japanese P o l i c y - M a k i n g : Assessing the Sta te of the A f t , " Ohio U n i v e r s i t y , unpubl ished monograph. " 'Nathaniel B. Thayer, "Conservat ive Par ty L e a d e r s h i p , " Forecast  f o r Japan: S e c u r i t y i n the 1970s, Ed. James W i l l i a m Mor ley , P r i n c e t o n , N . J . : P r i nce ton U n i v e r s i t y Press , 1972, p. 85. Also see Thayer, How the  Conservat ive Rule Japan, P r i n c e t o n , N . J . : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y Press , 1969, chapters 3 and 8. See p a r t i c u l a r l y p. 70 where he quotes the then Vice speaker o f the House of C o u n c i l l o r s , Kenzo Kono, as i n p a r t s a y i n g : "The businessmen have i n f l u e n c e over the p o l i t i c i a n s , the p o l i t i c i a n s " 97 c o n t r o l the bureaucracy, and the bureaucra ts keep the businessmen i n l i n e . I t ' s a n a t u r a l system o f checks and b a l a n c e s . " ^Thayer, "Conservat ive Par ty Leade rsh ip , " p. 108. ^ C h i t o s h i Yanaga, B ig Business i n Japanese P o l i t i c s , New Haven and London: Yale U n i v e r s i t y Press , 1968, p. 28. See a lso Yanaga, i b i d , p. 307. g Thayer, "Conservat ive Par ty L e a d e r s h i p , " p. 108. Also see h i s How the Conservat ives Rule Japan, p. 228; Frank Langdon, "Japan's Fore ign Po l icy-Mak ing P rocess , " Japan i n World P o l i t i c s , Ed. Young C. Kim, Washington, D.C.: I n s t i t u t e f o r Asian S t u d i e s , 1972, pp. 1-20; Nathan Newby Whi te , "An Ana lys is of Japan's China P o l i c y Under the L i b e r a l Democrats," Berkeley U n i v e r s i t y o f C a l i f o r n i a , unpubl ished Ph.D. d i s s e r t a t i o n . 9 Yanaga, B ig Business i n Japanese P o l i t i c s , pp. 63-64. Also see chapter 3 i n the same book. Fukui concurs i n i n t e r p r e t i n g Yanaga's p o s i t i o n as g i v i n g the dominant or predominant r o l e i n po l i cy -mak ing to bus iness . See Fuku i , "Fore ign Po l i cy -Mak ing i n Japan, " pp. 6-7. Yanaga sees the dominant p o s i t i o n of the z a i k a i p a r t i c u l a r l y i n respect to economic m a t t e r s . See Yanaga, i b i d . , pp . 307-309, 314. For o ther views on the importance of business i n the po l i cy -mak ing process see, f o r example: Robert ' G u l l a i n , The Japanese Chal lenge, New York : L i p p i n c o t t , 1970; Fuku i , Par ty i n Power, pp. 144-70; -Ehud H a r a r i , The P o l i t i c s o f Labour L e g i s l a t i o n i n Japan, Berke ley , Los Angeles, London: U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a Press, 1973, pp. 146-48; Robert A. Scalapino and Junnosuke Masumi, P a r t i e s and P o l i t i c s i n Con- temporary Japan, Berkeley and Los Angeles: U n i v e r s i t y o f C a l i f o r n i a Press, 1962, pp. 88-89; S i l v e r s t e i n , op. c i t . , p. 9; Thayer, How the  Conservat ives Rule Japan, pp. 5 8 - 7 1 ; Warren M. T s u n e i s h i , Japanese  P o l i t i c a l S t y l e , New York : Harper and Row, 1966, p. 165. For an ex-p l i c i t l y new l e f t v iewpo in t see the work by John H a l l i d a y and Gavan McCormack, Japanese I m p e r i a l i s m Today, London: Monthly Review Press, 1973. I n p a r t i c u l a r re fe rence t o business i n f l u e n c e i n the LDP's China p o l i c y see chapter 4. For a d i s c u s s i o n of c e r t a i n o f the l i m i -t a t i o n s o f business i n f l u e n c e i n Japan, see Frank Langdon, "The A t t i t u d e s o f the Business Community," Forecast f o r Japan, Ed. James Mor ley ; Frank Langdon, "B ig Business i n Japan: The Case o f Cen t ra l Bank Reform," American P o l i t i c a l Science Review (APSR), V o l . 55, No.33(September, 1961) , pp. 527-38. Also see A . J . Heidenheimer and F.C. Langdon, Business  Assoc ia t ions and the F inanc ing o f P o l i t i c a l P a r t i e s , The Hague: Mar t inus N i j h o f f , 1968, pp. 170-72, 204-205; Yanaga, Big Business i n Japanese  P o l i t i c s , pp. 284-85. "^Yanaga, B ig Business i n Japanese P o l i t i c s , p. 178. A lso see Yanaga, i b i d . , pp. 155, 161 , 176, 198, 202-206, 225, 230-31 . 247-51 , 261. See a lso H a l l i d a y and McCormack, op. c i t . , chapter 4. For a d i s -cussion of the r e l e v a n t Japanese language works see Fuku i , "Fore ign Po l icy-Mak ing i n Japan , " pp. 11-12. 98 Donald Hel lmann, Japanese Fore ign P o l i c y and Domestic P o l i t i c s : The Peace Agreement w i t h the Sov ie t Union, Berkeley and Los Angeles, U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a , 1969, p. 4 1 . He rea f te r r e f e r r e d to as Hel lmann, Peace Agreement. 12 Hel lmann, Peace Agreement, p. 56; f o r o ther authors who note the i n f l u e n c e o f fact ional ism on po l i cy -mak ing see, f o r example, F u k u i , "Fo re ign Po l i cy -Mak ing i n Japan , " pp. 8 -9 ; Packard, op. c i t . , pp. 7 2 - 8 1 , 347; Scalapino and Masumi, o p . c i t . , ch . V; f o r s tud ies t h a t p o i n t ou t the absence o f f a c t i o n a l c o n f l i c t on p o l i c y - m a k i n g , see, f o r example F u k u i , Par ty i n Power, Ch. 7; H a r a r i y , „ o p . c i t . , pp. 177-180. For a d i s -cuss ion of LDP f a c t i o n s p a r t i c u l a r l y as they p e r t a i n to the China issue see Fuku i , Par ty i n Power, Ch. 9; Frank Langdon, e s p e c i a l l y "Japanese L i b e r a l Democratic F a c t i o n a l D iscord on China P o l i c y , " P a c i f i c A f f a i r s , V o l . 4 1 , No. 3 ( F a l l 1968), pp. 403-15. For the bes t d i s c u s s i o n on the major works on the r o l e of f a c t i o n a l i s m i n Japanese p o l i t i c s and an at tempt a t c l a s s i f i c a t i o n see Roger W. Benjamin and Kan O r i , "Some Aspects o f P o l i t i c a l Par ty I n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n i n Japan , " unpubl ished monograph, U.B.C. l i b r a r y , 1970, pp. 1 -11 . 13 Hellmann,Peace T r e a t y , p. 130. 14 Hellmann, Peace T rea ty , pp. 98, 129. "'""'Hellmann, Peace T r e a t y , pp. 24, 135, 142. 1 6 S h i g e o Misawa, "An O u t l i n e o f the Po l i cy -Mak ing Process i n Japan, " Japanese P o l i t i c s - An I n s i d e View, Ed. H i r o s h i I t o h , I t h a c a and London: C o r n e l l U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1973, p. 27. See a lso H a r a r i , op. c i t . , pp. 90-93; Nobutaka I k e , Japanese P o l i t i c s , New York : A l f r e d A. Knopf I n c . , 1957, p. 124. For a d i s c u s s i o n o f c e r t a i n i n h e r e n t o r g a n i z a t i o n a l weaknesses i n the bureaucracy see Haruh i ro Fuku i , "Bureau-c r a t i c Power i n Japan, " Japan and A u s t r a l i a : Two S o c i e t i e s and t h e i r  I n t e r a c t i o n , Ed. Peter Drysdale and Hironobu K i t a o j i , Ox fo rd : Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press ( f o r t h c o m i n g ) . 1 7 T a k e t s u g u T s u r u t a n i , "The Causes o f P a r a l y s i s , " Fore ign P o l i c y , No. 14 (Spr ing 1974) , pp. 126-41 . For an e x c e l l e n t c r i t i c i s m o f t h i s a r t i c l e , see the f o l l o w i n g a r t i c l e i n the same issue by Edwin 0. Reischauer, " T h e i r Spec ia l S t r e n g t h s , " pp. 142-53. 18 See Fuku i , Par ty i n Power, Ch. 9. 19 As Fukui p o i n t s o u t , "Fo re ign Po l i cy -Mak ing i n Japan, " p. 2 1 , " I n most po l i cy -mak ing s i t u a t i o n s pressure f rom o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s , mass media and the genera l p u b l i c are j u s t as power fu l as those coming f rom w i t h i n the e l i t e . " 20 Frank Langdon, Japan's Fore ign P o l i c y , Vancouver: U n i v e r s i t y . o f B r i t i s h Columbia Press, 1973, p. 34. For o ther d iscuss ions p e r t a i n i n g to 99 the r o l e of the o p p o s i t i o n i n po l i cy -mak ing see, f o r example, Hans Baerswald, " Japan , " Case Studies i n Comparative P o l i t i c s : A s i a , Ed. Luc ian W. Pye, Boston: L i t t l e , Brown & Son, 1970, pp. 16-83; H a r a r i , op. c i t . , p a r t i c u l a r l y p. 178; Packard, op, c i t . , pp. 16-25, 82-83, For a genera l d i s c u s s i o n o f the o p p o s i t i o n ' s f o r e i g n p o l i c y p e r s p e c t i v e , see J .A .A. Stockwin, "Fo re ign P o l i c y Perspect ives o f the Japanese L e f t : C o n f r o n t a t i o n or Consensus?" P a c i f i c A f f a i r s , V o l . 42, No. 4 (Winter 1969-1970), pp. 435-445, and by the same au tho r , "The Japanese Opposi-t i o n : P o l i t i c a l I r r e l e v a n c e or Wave of the F u t u r e , " A u s t r a l i a n Out look , V o l . 25, No. 2 (August 1971) , pp. 181-197. 21 Hel lmann, Sov ie t Peace T r e a t y , pp. 114-17, 120, 151. 22 See pp. 7 1 - 8 1 . ,. Also see Fuku i , "Fo re ign Po l icy -Mak ing i n Japan, " pp. 38-42. 23 See Fuku i , "Fo re ign Po l i cy -Mak ing i n Japan, " pp. 15-16. 24 Frank Langdon, "Japan's Fore ign Po l i cy -Mak ing P rocess , " p. 15. See a lso Douglas H. Mendel, J r . , The Japanese People and Fore ign  P o l i c y , Berke ley : U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a Press , 1961; and a lso h i s 'Japanese Views o f Sato 's Fore ign P o l i c y , the C r e d i b i l i t y Gap," Asian  Survey, V o l . 7, No. 7 ( Ju ly 1967) , pp. 444-56. 25 Robert Sca lap ino, As ia and the Major Powers: I m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Order, S t a n f o r d : Hoover I n s t i t u t e , S t a n f o r d , 1972, p. 1 1 . 26 Scalapino and Masumi, op. c i t . , p. 45. On a more genera l l e v e l James Rosenau concurs. See James N. Rosenau, The S c i e n t i f i c Study o f  Fore ign P o l i c y , New York : Free Press, 1971, pp. 418-19. 27 Hel lmann, Peace T r e a t y , pp. 84-87. 28 Donald Hel lmann, Japan: I t s Domestic P o l i t i c s and Fore ign  P o l i c y , American E n t e r p r i s e I n s t i t u t e , Repr in t No. 19, 1973. See a lso Packard, op. c i t . , pp. 35-40, 45, 147-52, 327-31 , 344. 29s * - o ~ s < - f > - ~-f *-;. ~- 1 9 . 1 -S i l v e r s t e i r i , op— c i t . " pp. 12-13. 3 0 S e e pp. 85-88. 3"*Yukio Matsuyama, "Japanese Press and Japan's Fore ign P o l i c y , " Jou rna l of I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s , V o l . 26, No. 1 , p. 147. 32 Edward P. Whit temore, The Press i n Japan Today - - A Case Study, Columbia: U n i v e r s i t y o f South C a r o l i n a , 1961, e s p e c i a l l y pp. 81-87. 3 3 P a c k a r d , op. c i t . , pp. 246-47, 280-82. 34 Packard, op. c i t . , p. 246. 100 35 Hel lmann, Peace T r e a t y , p. 107. 36 I b i d . . , emphasis i n the o r i g i n a l . 37 Fuku i , "Fo re ign Po l icy -Mak ing i n Japan, " pp. 2 0 - 2 1 . 38 Fuku i , "Bureauc ra t i c Power i n Japan, " p. 40. Also see F u k u i , Par ty i n Power, p. 5. 39 Rosenau, The S c i e n t i f i c Study of Fore ign P o l i c y , p. 406. 4 ^ T . J . P.empel, "Pa t te rns o f Japanese P o l i c y - M a k i n g : Higher E d u c a t i o n , " paper prepared f o r d e l i v e r y a t the 1974 Annual Meeting of the A s s o c i a t i o n f o r Asian S tud ies , Boston, A p r i l 1-3, 1974, p. 2. See a lso Robert A. Dah l , Who Governs, New Haven: Yale U n i v e r s i t y Press , 1961, e s p e c i a l l y pp. 332 f f . ; Fuku i , "Fo re ign Po l i cy -Mak ing i n Japan , " pp. 72 f f . ; C-harles F. Hermann, " P o l i c y C l a s s i f i c a t i o n : A Key to the Comparative Study o f Fore ign P o l i c y , " The Ana lys is o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l  P o l i t i c s , Eds.James Rosenau, V incent Dav is , Maurice A. East , New York : Free Press, 1972, pp. 58-79; W i l l i a m Zimmerman, " I ssue Area dnd Fore ign P o l i c y ^ P r o c e s s , " American P o l i t i c a l Science Review, V o l . 67, No. 4 (December 1973) , pp. 1204-12. 41 Langdon, persona l communication to a u t h o r . 42 Pempel, op. c i t . , p. 2. However, Pempel a lso notes t h a t though d iscuss ing f o r e i g n p o l i c y l i m i t s dec is ion-making t o a p a r t i c u l a r f u n c t i o n a l a rea , there i s "no reason to assume t h a t a l l f o r e i g n p o l i c y dec is ions are fo rmu la ted and expressed i n a s i m i l a r manner." p. 3. See a lso F u k u i , "Fo re ign Po l i cy -Mak ing i n Japan , " pp. 72-73. 43 Pempel, op. c i t . , p. 6. 44 Pempel, op. c i t . , p. 9. See a lso Reischauer, op. c i t . , p. 148, who concurs t h a t the dec is ion-making process d i f f e r s accord ing to whether the issue i s c o n t r o v e r s i a l or n o t , s ince the consensual d e c i -s ion-making process known as r i n g i s e i i s used " . . . f o r very r o u t i n e m a t t e r s , no t f o r c o n t r o v e r s i a l p rob lems. " For a m p l i f i c a t i o n o f the concept of r i n g i s e i , see i cd ta t i on 180. 45 See Charles F. Hermann, I n t e r n a t i o n a l C r i s e s : I n s i g h t s f rom  Behav ioura l Research, New York : Free Press , 1972. For an at tempt to d i s t i n g u i s h between shor t -and long - te rm issues on Japan see T s u r u t a n i , op. c i t . , pp. 139-141; S i l v e r s t e i n , op. c i t . , e s p e c i a l l y pp. 31-33. 46 Charles F. Hermann, I n t e r n a t i o n a l C r i s e s : I n s i g h t s f rom  Behav ioura l Research, p. 187. 47 Theodore J . Eowi , "Making Democracy Safe f o r the Wor ld : N a t i o n a l P o l i t i c s , " Domestic Sources o f Fore ign P o l i c y , Ed. James Rosenau, New York: Free Press, 1967, p.- 324. 101 48 See pp. 41-47. Zimmermann, op. c i t . , p. 1207 makes another •comment on Powi 's h y p o t h e s i s : "The a s s e r t i o n t h a t c r i s i s p o l i t i c s does not have domestic p o l i t i c a l consequences seems, however, s u f f i c i e n t l y b i z a r r e — i n the era o f the f i f t e e n - m i n u t e war the consequences may be f e l t i n the very shor t run — to war ran t an a l t e r n a t i v e h y p o t h e s i s . " 49 F u k u i , "Fore ign Po l icy -Mak ing i n Japan ; " S i l v e r s t e i n , op. c i t . , pp. 31-32. "^The d i s t i n c t i o n appears to be t h a t Hermann i s t h i n k i n g i n p a r t i c u l a r about e x t e r n a l c r i s e s , whereas Fukui i s t h i n k i n g o f i n t e r n a l c r i s e s brought about by e x t e r n a l events . For example, Hermann s ta tes at the beg inn ing o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l C r i s e s : I n s i g h t s f rom Behav ioura l Research, p. 1 1 , t h a t "An abrupt increase i n the l i k e l i h o o d o f i n t e r -n a t i o n a l v i o l e n c e or war i s the most common systemic d e f i n i t i o n o f c r i s i s i n the remainder o f t h i s vo lume." On the o ther hand, Fukui s t a t e s i n "Fore ign Po l icy-Mak ing i n Japan," p. 83, t h a t : " The k i n d o f c r i s i s I had i n mind and I b e l i e v e to be p a r t i c u l a r l y impor tan t i n the Japanese con tex t i s . . . d o m e s t i c c r i s i s caused by a f o r e i g n p o l i c y i s s u e . This i s the sense i n wh ich , f o r example, the 1960 . S e c u r i t y Treaty " c r i s i s " was perce ived as such i n Japan . " ^^"Masataka Kosaka suggests f u r t h e r t h a t i n the f u t u r e there w i l l not " . . . b e many c r i s i s issues i f any where qu ick and bo ld dec is ions are needed." See "Opt ions f o r Japan's Fore ign P o l i c y , " London: I n s t i t u t e f o r S t r a t e g i c S tud ies , Ade lph i Papers, No. 97, 1973, p. 19. 52 Fuku i , "Fore ign Po l i cy -Mak ing i n Japan , " p. 76. 53 Glenn D. Paige, The Korean D e c i s i o n : June 24-30, 1950, New York : Free Press, 1968. 54 James A. Robinson, Congress and Fore ign P o l i c y - M a k i n g : A  Study i n L e g i s l a t i v e I n f l u e n c e and I n i t i a t i v e , Homewood, 111. : Dorsey Press , 1962. ^^As i s noted i n the book by Bauer e t a l . , "Any g iven issue must compete w i t h o ther issues f o r the scarce resources which determine the outcome: t ime , energy, a t t e n t i o n , money, manpower, and good w i l l . 1 ' See R.A. Bauer, I de Sola Poo l , and R.A. Dex te r , " 'Amer i can Business  and P u b l i c P o l i c y , New York: A the r ton Press , 1968, p. 480. 5 6 See James N. Rosenau, "Pre-Theor ies and Theories o f Fore ign P o l i c y , " Approaches to Comparative and I n t e r n a t i o n a l P o l i t i c s , Ed. R. Barry F a r r e l l , Evanston: Northwestern U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1966, p. 65. For a m o d i f i c a t i o n o f Rosenau's d e f i n i t i o n see Wolfram F. Hanre ider , West German Fore ign P o l i c y 1949-1963, I n t e r n a t i o n a l Pressures and  Domestic Response, S t a n f o r d : S tan fo rd U n i v e r s i t y Press , 1967, pp. 229-230. For a view of Japan as an i n t e r - p e n e t r a t e d p o l i t i c a l system see Frank Langdon, "Japan's Fore ign Po l i cy -Mak ing Process , " p. 1 . 102 See e s p e c i a l l y Donald C. Hel lmann's f o l l o w i n g works : "Japan i n the Postwar East As ian I n t e r n a t i o n a l System," McLean, V i r g i n i a : Research Ana lys is Co rpo ra t i on , 1969: The C o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h Rea l -p o l i t i k , " Forecast f o r Japan, Ed. J . E . Mor ley . Also see Asahi the S t a f f , The P a c i f i c R i v a l s : A Japanese View of Japanese-American Re la- t i o n s , New York and Tokyo: W e a t h e r h i l l / A s a h i , 1972; Zbigniew B r z e z i n s k i , The F r a g i l e Blossom, New York : Harper and Row, 1972; Frank C. Langdon, Japan's Fore ign P o l i c y , p a r t i c u l a r l y , p . X I I . 58 S i l v e r s t e i n , op. c i t . , p. 3 1 . 59 S i l v e r s t e i n , op. c i t . , p. 30; Reischauer, op. c i t . , p. 151 , For a d i s c u s s i o n o f these l ong - te rm goals see Langdon, Japan's Fore ign  P o l i c y , e s p e c i a l l y pp. 1-57; W i l l i a m J . Sebald and C. Nelson Spinks, Japan: Prospec ts , Options and O p p o r t u n i t i e s , Washington: American E n t e r p r i s e I n s t i t u t e , 1967, p. 7 1 . ^ H e l l m a n n , Peace T r e a t y , pp. 1-28-. ' - .3-158. See a lso Hellmann, J 'Japan's Re la t ions w i t h Communist C h i n a , " Asian Survey, V o l . 4 , No. 10 (October 1964) , p. 1087; Herber t Pass in , "The F u t u r e , " The Uni ted States  and Japan, Ed. Herber t Pass in , Englewood C l i f f s , N . J . : P r e n t i c e - H a l l 1966, p. 142. 6 1 H e l l m a n n , "Japan: I t s Domestic P o l i t i c s and Fore ign P o l i c y , " p. 7. See a lso Frank C. Langdon, Japan's Fore ign Po l i cy -Mak ing Process , " p. 1 ; Ch i tosh i Yanaga, Japanese People and P o l i t i c s , New York : John Wi ley and Sons, 1956, p. 308. • • 62 Donald C. Hellmann, "The C o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h R e a l p o l i t i k , " Forecast f o r Japan, p. 135. Contrast w i t h M a r t i n E. W e i n s t e i n ' s a r t i c l e i n the same volume, " S t r a t e g i c Thought and the U.S.-Japan A l l i a n c e , " pp. 35-84. 63 Du l les v i s i t e d Japan to pressure Prime M i n i s t e r Yoshida to recognize the ROC government on Taiwan a f t e r 56 members o f the Senate s igned the f o l l o w i n g l e t t e r t o the P r e s i d e n t : " P r i o r to the admission of the Japanese t r e a t y to the Senate we des i re to make i t c l e a r t h a t we would consider the r e c o g n i t i o n of Communist China by Japan or the n e g o t i a t i o n of a! b i l a t e r a l t r e a t y w i t h the Chinese Communist regime to be adverse to the best i n t e r e s t s of the people o f both Japan and the Un i ted S t a t e s . " Congressional Records, V o l . 98, No. 42, March 14, 1952, p. 2363. For a sho r t but i n f o r m a t i v e d i scuss ion of Dul les pressure on Prime M i n i s t e r Yoshida, see Asahi s t a f f , The P a c i f i c R i v a l s , pp. 397-400. For f u r t h e r more d e t a i l e d d i scuss ion see a lso Gerald C u r t i s , "The Dul les-Yosh ida Nego t ia t i ons on the San Franc isco Peace T r e a t y , " Columbia Essays i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s 1966j p. 42, New York : Columbia U n i v e r s i t y Press , 1967; Lawrence Olson, Japan i n Pos t - war A s i a , New York : Praeger , 1970, pp. 74-75. From a Japanese p e r s p e c t i v e see Shigeharu Matsumoto, "Japan and China: Domestic and 103 Fore ign In f l uences on Japan's P o l i c y , " P o l i c i e s Towards China: Views  f rom Six Con t inen ts , Ed. A.M. Ha lpern , New York : McGraw-Hi l l , 1965, p. 130. For a view which does not accept the t h e s i s t h a t Japan r e c o -gnized the Republ ic o f China due to Uni ted States pressure see Bernard C. Cohen, The P o l i t i c a l Process and Fore ign P o l i c y : The Making o f the  Japanese Peace Set t lement , P r i n c e t o n , N . J . : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1957. Cohen argues t h a t : "The Yoshida government had indeed been disposed to make peace w i t h the N a t i o n a l i s t g o v e r n m e n t . . . " , p. 151. Also see i b i d . , p. 150. As w e l l as c o n t r a s t i n g Cohen w i t h the authors mentioned above, see Shigeru Yoshida, The Yoshida Memoirs, The Story  o f Japan i n C r i s i s , London: Heinemann, 1961, pp. 253-263. For the B r i t i s h view regard ing Japan's r i g h t to decide f o r h e r s e l f which govern-ment to recogn ize , see Anthony Eden, The Memories o f Anthony Eden: F u l l C i r c l e , Cambridge: R ive rs ide Press , 1960, pp. 20-22. 64 This i s the " f i r s t " of the Yoshida l e t t e r s which was signed by Prime M i n i s t e r Yoshida i n 1951. This should not be confused w i t h another l e t t e r whidr.'iYoshida s igned i n 1964 i n re fe rence to r e s t r i c t i n g the use of Expor t - Impor t Bank funds to expor t p l a n t s to China. For a d i scuss ion o f the 1951 l e t t e r , see e s p e c i a l l y Cohen, "The P o l i t i c a l Process and Fore ign P o l i c y , " pp* ,150-54. For re ferences concerning the 1964 Yoshida l e t t e r , see f n . 93. ^ T h e p o l i c y o f " s e p a r a t i o n of p o l i t i c s and economics" which Japan f o l l o w e d u n t i l the n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f r e l a t i o n s was based on the premise t h a t i n the p o l i t i c a l wo r ld Japan extended o f f i c i a l d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s to "one China" — the ROC government on Taiwan — b u t was q u i t e prepared to t rade w i t h Peking as w e l l as Taiwan. Wi th the t r a n s f e r o f d ip loma t i c r e l a t i o n s to the Peking government there has now been a r o l e r e v e r s a l , w i t h the " s e p a r a t i o n o f p o l i t i c s and economics" p o l i c y be ing a p p l i e d to Taiwan. For a d i scuss ion o f China's methods o f emphasizing to the Japanese the " i n s e p a r a b i l i t y o f p o l i t i c s and Economics", see Chae-Jin Lee, "The P o l i t i c s o f Sino-Japanese Trade R e l a t i o n s , 1963-1968," P a c i f i c A f f a i r s , V o l . 4 1 , No.2 (Summer 1969) , pp. 129-144. For a more t e c h n i c a l d i s c u s s i o n of the development o f t rade r e l a t i o n s between Japan and China, see Dan F. Henderson and Tasuku Matsuo, "Japan's Trade Re la t ions w i t h the People 's Republ ic o f C h i n a , " fo r thcoming i n an e d i t e d book by V i c t o r L i , Washington U n i v e r s i t y Press. 66 Frank C. Langdon, Japan's Fore ign P o l i c y , pp. 121-22. ^ 7 For the t e x t o f the Sato-Nixon communique, see New York Times, November 22, 1969. 68 Fuku i , "Fo re ign Po l i cy -Mak ing i n Japan , " p. 26. See a l s o , C h r i s t i a n Science Mon i to r , 2 4 / 9 / 7 1 . 69 This was i n c lea r v i o l a t i o n of the Rusk-Ohira t a l k s of 1964 express ing t h a t : "bo th n a t i o n s , Japan and the Un i ted States w i l l ho ld 104 - c o n s u l t a t i o n s i n advance i n case the re seems to be an impor tan t change on the China p rob lem. " See Shukan Minsha, 24th December, 1972. ( A l l re ferences to Japanese language newspapers are taken f rom t r a n s l a t i o n s by the American Embassy, Tokyo P o l i t i c a l Sec t ion T r a n s l a t i o n Serv ice Branch, D a i l y Summary-of Japanese P r e s s ) . L i kew ise , i t had been agreed j u s t a few years p r e v i o u s l y i n the Sato-Nixon communique t h a t the re was a mutual c o n s u l t a t i o n agreement between the two c o u n t r i e s . See "textYofkcommunique i'nvNeweYorkgTimes, 22 November, 1969. 7 ( ^For a d i s c u s s i o n o f a number o f hypotheses concerning the p o s s i b l e exp lana t i on f o r the Nixon "shocks" ( f i r s t , the announcement i n J u l y o f N ixon 's China v i s i t w i t h o u t p r i o r c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h American a l l i e s and second the announcement i n August of a new economic p o l i c y aimed a t f o r c i n g a r e v a l u a t i o n of the y e n ) , see Graham T. A l l i s o n , "American Fore ign P o l i c y and Japan, " D iscord i n the P a c i f i c : > Chal- lenges to the Japanese-American A l l i a n c e , Ed. Henry Rosovsky, New York : The American Assembly, Columbia U n i v e r s i t y , 1972, pp. 7-46. 7 1 R o b e r t A. Sca lap ino, "Perspec t ives on Modern Japanese Fore ign P o l i c y , " unpubl ished monograph. 72 The v o t i n g on the A lban ian Reso lu t ion was 76 f o r ; 35 a g a i n s t ; 17 a b s t e n t i o n s ; 3 absentees. Taken f rom S h i n k i c h i E to , "Japan and China - A iNew Stage, " Problems o f Communism, V o l . 1 1 , No. 6 (November-December, 1972) , p. 6. 73 Rathy Sawhny, "Japan a t the Crossroads, " I n d i a n Q u a r t e r l y , V o l . 28, No. 1 (January-March 1972), p. 64. See a lso Fuku i , "Fo re ign P o l i c y -Making i n Japan, " p. 30. 74 I t i s a lso i n t e r e s t i n g to note t h a t Fore ign M i n i s t e r Fukuda had not committed Japan to f o l l o w the American p o l i c y i n the Uni ted Nat ions when he v i s i t e d the Uni ted States to a t tend the J o i n t US-Japan Committee on Trade and Economic A f f a i r s . See Haruhi ro Fuku i , "Bu reauc ra t i c Power i n Japan, " Japan and A u s t r a l i a : Two S o c i e t i e s and t h e i r I n t e r a c t i o n , Eds.Peter Drysdale and Hironobu K i t a o j i , Ox fo rd : Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, f o r thcoming . 7 ^ F u k u i , "Fore ign Po l icy -Mak ing i n Japan, " p. 30. 76 Sawhny, op. c i t . , p. 64. Of course, as M a r t i n Weinsten p o i n t s out the Un i ted States would no t have been as prepared t o r e t u r n Okinawa i f i t had not been f o r the scaledown i n the Vietnam war. See M a r t i n W e i n s t e i n , "The S t r a t e g i c Balance i n East A s i a , " Current H i s t o r y , V o l . 65, No. 387 (November 1973), p. 193. For a f u r t h e r d i scuss ion o f the ques t ion o f Okinawa r e v e r s i o n , see Langdon, Japan's Fore ign P o l i c y , pp . 126-32. For a f u l l e r d i s c u s s i o n , see Akio Watanabe, The Okinawa Problem: • A Chapter i n Japan-U.S. R e l a t i o n s , Melbourne: Melbourne U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1970, Chapter 7. 105 Roderick MacFarquar, "N ixon ' s China P i l g r i m a g e , " The World  Today, V o l . 28, No. 4 ( A p r i l 1972), p. 154. MacFarquar a lso p o i n t s ou t t h a t t h i s was a lso a m o d i f i c a t i o n o f K i s s i n g e r ' s 1971 press r e l e a s e : " I t i s our judgement t h a t the f u t u r e r e l a t i o n s h i p between the People 's Republ ic and Taiwan should be worked out between Taiwan and the Peop le 's Repub l ic . For the f u l l t e x t o f the "Shanghai Communique,* see U.S. Department o f S t a t e , Department o f S ta te B u l l e t i n , V o l . 52, No. 1708, 20 /3 /72 , pp. 435-38. 7 8Thomas W. Robinson, "The View f rom Pek ing : China's P o l i c i e s Towards the Uni ted S ta tes , the Soviet Union and Japan, " P a c i f i c  A f f a i r s , V o l . 45, No. 3 ( F a l l 1972) , p. 352. See a lso Sankei Shimbun, 3 September, 1972. 79 Reply to ques t ionna i re submi t ted by Komeito Upper House Member Nakao, Tokyo Shimbun, 31 J u l y 1972. 80 Asahi Shimbun, 1 October 1972, emphasis added. 81 Al though no such clause appears i n the a c t u a l US-Japan Secu r i t y T rea ty , t h i s phrase has come to be used to mean t h a t the Uni ted States can use m i l i t a r y bases i n Japan to p r o t e c t Taiwan f rom any communist t h r e a t . The t r e a t y s ta tes i n a r t i c l e 1 t h a t Uni ted States " . . . f o r c e s may be u t i l i z e d to c o n t r i b u t e to the maintenance of i n t e r n a t i o n a l peace and s e c u r i t y i n the Far E a s t . . . " For a b r i e f d iscuss ion- o f the d i f -f e r e n t Japanese government's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the scope of the Far East Clause,see Young C. Kim, "Japan's S e c u r i t y P o l i c y Debate, " Japan  i n World P o l i t i c s , Ed. Young C. Kim, p. 63; Langdon, Japan's Fore ign  P o l i c y , p. XIV. For the t e x t o f the S e c u r i t y T r e a t y , see Packard, op. c i t . , pp. 355-357. For f u r t h e r d i scuss ion p e r t a i n i n g to the ques t ion o f i n v o k i n g the s e c u r i t y t r e a t y f o r the p r o t e c t i o n o f Taiwan, see the speech g iven by Prime M i n i s t e r Tanaka to the Lower House Plenary Session on 31/10/72, Asahi Shimbun, 1 /11/72; Sankei Shimbun, 3 /9 /72 ; Tokyo Shimbun, 1 /10/72; and d i scuss ion between Prime M i n i s t e r Tanaka and Dietman I s h i b a s h i Asahi Shimbun, 2 /11 /72 , evening e d i t i o n . 82 Frank C. Langdon, Japan's Fore ign P o l i c y , p. 200. Whi le i t could be argued t h a t t h i s demonstrates the Un i ted States i s s t i l l prepared to d i s s o l v e the c o l d war s e c u r i t y s t r u c t u r e o f which the U.S.-Japan s e c u r i t y t r e a t y forms an i n t r i n s i c p a r t , i t i s i n f a c t p r e c i s e l y because the s e c u r i t y t r e a t y i s not s imply a legacy o f the co ld war s e c u r i t y s t r u c t u r e bu t a c r u c i a l element i n the new balance o f power framework i n which Japan p lays a r o l e as one of the f o u r po les i n A s i a , t h a t the s e c u r i t y t r e a t y i s so impor tan t to the Un i ted S ta tes . 83 As Henry K iss inge r s t a t e d concerning Japan's i n t e n t i o n to normal ize r e l a t i o n s w i t h China1*.., " I w i l l a b s o l u t e l y no t oppose i t . Rather, I ' w i l l take the s ide of promot ing i t . " Nihon K e i z a i "Shimbun, 9 / 9 / 7 2 . 106 84 John K. Emmerson, Arms, Yen and Power: The Japanese Dilemma, New York : Dune l len , 1971, p. 214. See a l s o , Kansas C i t y S t a r , 1 3 / 8 / 7 1 . 85 See W i l l i a m Saywel l , "Japan's Role i n the P a c i f i c and China 's Response," I n t e r n a t i o n a l J o u r n a l , V o l . 26, No. 3 (Summer 1971) , p. 508. Saywel l bases h i s ana lys i s on a content ana lys i s o f the Peking Review. 86 E to , "Japan and China - A New Stage?", p. 4. Eto bases h i s ana lys i s on a content ana lys i s o f Jen-min-J ih-pao (Pek ing) . Also see Fuku i , "Po l i cy -Mak ing i n Japan, " p. 25. 87 For an ana lys i s o f t h i s p o i n t , see K o j i Nakamura, "China and Soviet R e l a t i o n s : Treading the S i b e r i a n T i g h t r o p e , " i n _ S p e c i a l Report on Japan 1973, Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER), No. 19 ( 1 4 / 5 / 7 3 ) , p. 6. 88 The problem i n coming to an agreement w i t h the Sov ie t Union regard ing the peace t r e a t y revo lves around the t e r r i t o r i a l ques t ion of sovere ign ty over the Habomais, Sh iko tan , the Southern K u r i l e s ( K u n a s h i r i , and E t o r o f u ) . This ques t ion was n e a r l y solved a t the t ime of the peace t r e a t y n e g o t i a t i o n s i n 1956, bu t as Hellmann makes c l e a r , an agreement "was no t reached: " F i r s t , the Habomais and Shikotan were to be claimed u n c o n d i t i o n a l l y as i n h e r e n t l y Japanese, and most i m p o r t a n t l y , the  r e t u r n o f these i s l a n d s was to be considered s a t i s f a c t o r y grounds f o r a  t r e a t y . Second, p r i o r i t y was a t tached to the Southern K u r i l e s , which were demanded f o r ' h i s t o r i c a l . r e a s o n s ' bu t were no t deemed e s s e n t i a l f o r an o v e r a l l s e t t l e m e n t . F i n a l l y , the Nor thern K u r i l e s and Southern Sakhal in were claimed s imply f o r b a r g a i n i n g purposes. Consequently, when on August 5, the Soviets suddenly mod i f i ed t h e i r proposals and o f f e r e d the r e t u r n o f the Habomais and Shikotan as w e l l as acceptab le c o n d i t i o n s f o r a l l o ther ou ts tand ing i ssues , an agreement seemed imminent. How-ever , a t t h i s p o i n t , the Japanese government a b r u p t l y r e v i s e d i t s p o s i t i o n , and extended the minimum t e r r i t o r i a l c l a i m to i n c l u d e the Southern K u r i l e s . The r e v i s i o n s u r p r i s e d and angered the Russians, who i n d i g n a n t l y branded the new c o n d i t i o n s t o t a l l y unacceptab le . 1 1 Hel lmann, Peace T r e a t y , p. 59. Japan has main tan ied i t s i n s i s t e n c e upon r e g a i n i n g the above t e r r i t o r i e s . Emmerson, op. c i t . , pp. 230-37. Now Japan i s r e c e i v i n g suppor t f rom China i n t h i s b i d . See FEER, No. 18 ( 7 / 5 / 7 3 ) , p. 5; Japan Times, 11 /10/73. See Derek Dav is , "Year o f A s i a ' s G i a n t s " FEER, V o l . 82, No. 52 ( 3 1 / 1 2 / 7 3 ) , p. 29. For Prime M i n i s t e r Tanaka's v iew, see Asahi Shimbun, 1 /10 /72 ) . There i s the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t the t e r r i t o r i a l q u e s t i o n between Japan and China may prove a h indrance to the agreement on a Japan-China peace t r e a t y t o o , p a r t i c u l a r l y s ince t h i s revo lves around the ques t ion of sovere ign ty over the o i l - r i c h Senkaku i s l a n d s . However, s h o r t l y a f t e r the passage o f the c o n t r o v e r s i a l Japan-China a i r accord through the D i e t , former Fore ign M i n i s t e r Ohi ra s t a t e d tha t he saw no " insurmountab le b a r r i e r s " to the conc lus ion of a peace t r e a t y . See Japan Times Weekly, 25 /5 /74 . 107 89 For a d i scuss ion o f the n a t u r a l - resources p o t e n t i a l o f S i b e r i a , see Time, No. 15 (9 A p r i l 1973) , pp. 30-39. For a s h o r t d i scuss ion o f the p o s s i b i l i t y of Japan's coopera t ion i n the S i b e r i a n v e n t u r e , see the •Kcbhomis't • >. No. 6815, p. 44. Japan and the Sov ie t Union have now a c t u a l l y signed a memorandum on the j o i n t deve lop-ment of coking coa l i n southern Yakutsk. See Japan Times Weekly, 11 May 1974. See a lso Japan Times Weekly, 18 May, 1974. For a broader d i scuss ion of recen t t rends i n Japanese-Soviet R e l a t i o n s , see E l i z a -be th Pond, "Japan and Russ ia : The View from Tokyo, " Fore ign A f f a i r s , V o l . 52, No. 1 (October 1972) , pp. 141-52. 90 Meng-hsuan Yap, "The Change i n P e i p i n g ' s Fore ign P o l i c y 1969-1973," Issues and S tud ies , V o l . 10, No. 5 (February 1974) , p. 60. 9 1 K o j i Nakamura, "Who's T r e a t y " , FEER, V o l . 77, No. 35 (26 August 1972) , p. 12. 92 For a comprehensive d i scuss ion of Sato 's p o l i c i e s towards China w h i l e i n o f f i c e , see Gregory C l a r k , "Sino-Japanese Re la t ions : -An A n a l y s i s , " A u s t r a l i a n Out look , V o l . 25, No. 1 ( A p r i l 1971) , pp. 58-68. The j u s t i f i c a t i o n s t h a t Sato advanced f o r the c o n t i n u a t i o n of r e l a t i o n s w i t h Taiwan were b a s i c a l l y a r e i t e r a t i o n of those ad-vanced by Prime M i n i s t e r s s ince Yoshida:T", "1 ) Japan concluded a peace t r e a t y w i t h the government o f N a t i o n a l i s t China i n 1952 which was generous toward the Japanese; 2) the N a t i o n a l i s t Chinese government was recognized as the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f China i n the Un i ted Nat ions and mainta ined d ip loma t i c r e l a t i o n s w i t h the m a j o r i t y of the UN members; 3) the Japanese Government should not antagonize the Un i ted States by i n i t i a t i n g a d r a s t i c measure such as r e c o g n i t i o n of Com-munist China because Japanese-American r e l a t i o n s h i p was more impor tan t than Japan's r e l a t i o n s w i t h any o ther n a t i o n ; 4) the t ime was not r i p e under the circumstances f o r e s t a b l i s h i n g a d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h Communist Ch ina . " See Hong N. Kim, "The 'N ixon Shock' and Japan's Emerging New China P o l i c y , " West V i r g i n i a U n i v e r s i t y , un -pub l i shed d r a f t , p. 6. 93 Japan Times, 7 /4 /70 . For re fe rence to Sato 's w e l l known a n t i -communist a t t i t u d e s , see C h r i s t i a n Science Mon i to r , 2 4 / 9 / 7 1 ; Gregory C l a r k , op. c i t . , p. 63; Saywel l , op. c i t . , p. 512; Yomiur i Shimbun, 23 /4 /70 . For a more genera l d i s c u s s i o n , see M i l d r e d C. Vree land, "Communist China and Japan : , A Study o f Chinese Percept ions and P o l i c i e s , " Japan i n World "Po l i t i c s " , Ed. Young C. Kim; Emmerson, op. c i t . , pp.219-222. For re fe rence to the u n f r i e n d l y p o l i c i e s t h a t the Sato government promulgated, see f o r example Tokyo Shimbun, 23 /7 /72 , which p o i n t s out t h a t Sato h a b i t u a l l y r e t r a c t e d any f o r w a r d - l o o k i n g p o l i c y on China; Matsumoto, "Our Neighbour Ch ina , " Japan Q u a r t e r l y , V o l . 18, No. 2 ( A p r i l - J u n e , 1971) , p. 152, where Matsumoto discusses the Sato govern-ment 's backing o f the Uni ted States pro-Taiwan p o l i c y i n the Uni ted 108 Na t ions . One of the most impor tan t an t i -Ch inese p o l i c i e s t h a t the Sato government adopted was t h a t of the "Yoshida l e t t e r . " This was -a l e t t e r w r i t t e n i n 1964 by the former Prime M i n i s t e r t o m o l l i f y the Taiwan government a f t e r Expor t - Impor t Bank c r e d i t s had been used to sponsor a p l a n t expor t to China. Since t h a t t ime the Sato govern-ment stood by the "Yoshida l e t t e r " u n t i l 1972 when i t was i n d i c a t e d by the Japanese government t h a t c r e d i t s would be a v a i l a b l e f o r p l a n t expor t to China on a p p l i c a t i o n . For the bes t d i scuss ion o f the i m -mediate e f f e c t o f the "Yoshida l e t t e r " on the development o f t rade r e l a t i o n s between Japan and China, see "Communist China Cancels Big Contracts due to Yoshida L e t t e r , " Japan Fore ign Trade News, No. 165, 1965, p. 1 1 . For a l a t e r s tudy , see Gene R. Hsiao, "The Pole of Trade i n China 's Diplomacy w i t h Sapan," The Dynamics o f China 's  Fore ign R e l a t i o n s , Ed. Jerome A. Cohen, Cambridge: Harvard U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1970, pp. 41-45. For the change o f p o l i c y i n 1972, see Nihon  K e i z a i Shimbun, March 18, 1972. 94 Asahi Shimbun, February 2, 1970, evening e d i t i o n . 95 F u k u i , "Po l i cy -Mak ing i n Japan , " p. 27. Also see Asahi Shimbun, 28 /4 /72 . Japan Times, 1 6 / 1 0 / 7 1 ; E i j i Tominomori, " S a t o ' s Legacy," Japan Q u a r t e r l y , V o l . 19, No. 2 ( A p r i l - J u n e 1972) , p. 156. This d r a f t p a i d a t t e n t i o n to the " t h r e e p r i n c i p l e s " which China upheld as the bas is f o r n o r m a l i z a t i o n of r e l a t i o n s : 1) The People 's Republ ic o f China i s the so le l e g i t i m a t e government o f China; 2) Taiwan i s an i n t e g r a l p a r t of the Peop le 's Republ ic of China; 3) The Japan-Republ ic of China peace t r e a t y i s " i l l e g a l and must t h e r e f o r e be ab roga ted . " Sato a lso made h i s own e f f o r t s to t r y and beg in n e g o t i a t i o n s but was r e b u f f e d by the Chinese s i d e . See Japan Times, 2 9 / 7 / 7 1 . 96 New York Times, 2 1 / 1 1 / 7 1 . 9 7 A s a h i Shimbun, 1 5 / 1 1 / 7 1 . 98 I b i d . , Japan Times Weekly, 2 0 / 1 1 / 7 1 . 99 Fuku i , "Fore ign Po l icy -Mak ing i n Japan," p. 28. 100 T , I b i d . 1 0 1 N e w York Times, 2 0 / 1 0 / 7 1 . 1 0 2 W o l f Mendl, "Japan and Ch ina , " Survey, V o l . 18, No. 4 (Autumn 1972) , p. 70. 103 Asahi Shimbun, 27 /4 /72 . Moreover, the Chinese government was not even prepared to make any ambassadorial contac t w h i l e Sato remained i n power; hence, they re fused to a t t end recep t ions such as those a t I n t e r -n a t i o n a l Environment Conference a t Stockholm and the UNCTAD meeting i n Sant iago. See M a i n i c h i Shimbun, 17 /7 /72 . 109 " ^ L e e W. Farnswor th , "Japan 1972: New Faces and New F r i e n d s , " Asian Survey, V o l . 13, No. 1 (January 1973) , p. 113. "^"Sfomiuri Shimbun, 1 6 / 5 / 7 2 ; M a i n i c h i Shimbun, 17 /5 /72 . 106 Yoshimi F u r u i , " I n s i d e Story o f N o r m a l i z a t i o n o f S ino-Janapese D ip lomat ic R e l a t i o n s , Chuo Koron, i n Summaries o f Selected  Japanese Magazines, American Embassy, Tokyo P o l i t i c a l s e c t i o n t r a n s -l a t i o n Branch, January 1973, p. 49 1 0 7 A s a h i Shimbun, 17 /5 /72 . 108 Sankei Shimbun, 12 /7 /72 . This att i tudeawasdinc-marked c o n t r a s t to the Chinese a t t i t u d e towards the Sato government, s ince "even i f Sato accepted the th ree bas i c p r i n c i p l e s as the bas is o f opening t a l k s w i t h us , we s h a l l n o t accept Sato as a n e g o t i a t i n g p a r t n e r . However, any successor o f Sato w i l l be welcome i n Peking as long as he accepts the th ree bas ic p r i n c i p l e s . " FEER, No. 47 ( 2 0 / 1 1 / 7 1 ) , p. 12. 109 Eto , "Japan and China: A New Stage, " p. 7. 1 1 ,"Tiong N. Kim, "The 'N ixon Shock' and Japan's Emerging New China P o l i c y , " West V i r g i n i a U n i v e r s i t y , unpubl ished manuscr ip t , p. 18. " ' "^Kei Wakaizami argues t h a t even Japan's " p o l i c y towards China was no except ion to the pass ive charac ter o f Japan's d ip lomacy. Japan was the l a s t of /America 's major a l l i e s to p a r t f rom the Uni ted States on the ques t ion o f Taiwan arid China, having f a i t h f u l l y f o l l owed U.S. p o l i c y s ince the w a r . " See "Japan's r o l e i n a New World Orde r , " Eoreign A f f a i r s , V o l . 5 1 , No. 2 (January 1973) , p. 310. See a lso R.M.V. C o l l i c k , "The 'New' Japanese Fore ign P o l i c y , " The World Today (February 1973) , p. 84; Nihon K e i z a i , 1 0 / 7 / 7 2 ; Sankei Shimbun, 1 0 / 7 / 7 2 . 112 Shigeo Omori, "Two Tasks f o r Tanaka," Japan Q u a r t e r l y , V o l . 19, No. 4 (October-December 1972) , p. 407. 113 F u k u i , Par ty i n Power, pp. 260-62. This s e c t i o n concerning the LDP's China p o l i c y i s l a r g e l y based on the f o l l o w i n g works : Fuku i , Par ty i n Power, pp. 227-62; Langdon, "Japanese L i b e r a l Democratic F a c t i o n a l D iscord on China P o l i c y , " pp. 403-15; Sadako Ogata, "Japanese A t t i t u d e s Towards China, "As ian Survey, V o l . 5, No. 8 (August 1965) , pp. 389-98; Yung H. Park, "The P o l i t i c s o f the China D e c i s i o n : Observat ions on Japanese Fore ign P o l i c y - M a k i n g , " a paper prepared f o r p r e s e n t a t i o n a t the annual meeting o f the Asian Studies on the P a c i f i c Coast, San Diego, June, 1974; Nathan N. Whi te , op. c i t . ' '" '^Ogata, "Japanese A t t i t u d e s Towards Japan , " p. 395. For a comprehensive and d e t a i l e d d iscuss ion concerning the development o f the va r ious pro-Pek ing and pro-Taiwan Groups i n the LDP, see Nathan Newby Whi te , op. c i t . , pp. 391 f f . 110 K a r l D ixon, "Japanese P o l i t i c a l Par ty Reorgan iza t ion - Progress and P r o s p e c t s , " unpubl ished manuscr ip t , U.B.C. l i b r a r i e s , pp. 1-2. Dixon a lso notes t h a t the LDP went so f a r as to take d i s c i p l i n a r y a c t i o n aga ins t Fuj iyama f o r s i g n i n g a v i t r i o l i c j o i n t communique w i t h the Chinese i n October 1971. 116 Park, op. c i t . , pp. 15-17. ^ ^ T h e idea of c o m p a t i b i l i t y i s taken f rom Wolfram F. Hanre ider , West German Fore ign P o l i c y 1949-1963, S t a n f o r d : S tan fo rd U n i v e r s i t y Press , 1967, e s p e c i a l l y p. 7. See a lso Wolfram F. Hanre ider , "Com-p a t i b i l i t y and Consensus: A Proposal f o r the Conceptual Linkage o f Ex te rna l and I n t e r n a l Dimensions o f Fore ign P o l i c y , " Comparative  Fore ign P o l i c y T h e o r e t i c a l Essays, Ed. Wolfram F. Hanre ider , New York : McKay & Co. , 1971, pp. 242-64; e s p e c i a l l y p. 261. 118 Stockwin comments t h a t " . . . t h e change i n leadersh ip was c l e a r l y the one event which broke the log - jam over r e l a t i o n s w i t h Ch ina . " See J .A .A. Stockwin, " C o n t i n u i t y and Change i n Japanese Foreign P o l i c y , " P a c i f i c A f f a i r s , V o l . 46, No. 1 (Spr ing 1973) , p. 83. For a d i scuss ion of some of the d i f f e r e n c e t h a t d i s t i n g u i s h Tanaka f rom preceding LDP Prime M i n i s t e r s , see Emerson Chapin, "Men and P o l i t i c s i n Post-Sato Japan, " Journa l o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s , V o l . 26, No. 1 (1972) , pp. 167-78. 119 Langdon, "LDP F a c t i o n a l Discord on China P o l i c y , " p. 406. 120 The a c t u a l fo rmal c r e a t i o n of the Tanaka f a c t i o n d i d not take p lace u n t i l 12 /9 /72 be ing c a l l e d Nananoka-kai (7 th Day A s s o c i a t i o n ) , coming s l i g h t l y a f t e r the f o rma t i on o f the an t i -ma ins t ream Fukuda f a c t i o n Yoka-ka i ( 8 t h Day A s s o c i a t i o n ) . 121 Yomiur i Shimbun, 3 /7 /72 . 1 ?2 Asahi Shimbun, 3 /7 /72 . 123 Kim, "The Nixon 'Shocks' and Japan's Emerging Now China P o l i c y , " p. 14. 124 Hel lman, Peace T r e a t y , p. 18. 125 Ogata, "The Business Community and Foreign P o l i c y , " to be pub l i shed by U n i v e r s i t y o f C a l i f o r n i a Press, under the e d i t o r s h i p o f Robert A. Sca lap ino, p. 4 1 . 126 Tanaka was greeted w i t h a p o s i t i v e response f rom the Chinese s ide i n t h i s respec t . This was i n c o n t r a s t to Fukuda, who was apparen t ly considered a persona non g r a t a i n Pek ing. See Park, op. c i t . , p. 28. I l l 127 F u r u i , op. c i t . , p. 49. 128 For a d i scuss ion o f the e l e c t i o n , see Farnswor th , op. c i t . , pp. 113-14. 129 I b i d . , p. 114. 130 Fuku i , "Fore ign Po l i cy -Mak ing i n Japan , " pp. 33 and 34. 131 F u r u i , op. c i t . , p. 5 1 . 132 F u r u i , op,. c i t . , p. 52. 133 See F u r u i ' s s t o r y of h i s c o n t r i b u t i o n to t h i s d e c i s i o n , op. c i t . The f o l l o w i n g d i s c u s s i o n i s based on F u r u i ' s a r t i c l e . F u r u i , op. c i t . , p. 48. 135 For a d i scuss ion of the idea t h a t h t h e po l i cy -mak ing process i n Japan i s f r e q u e n t l y dominated by an ad hoc po l i cy -mak ing group, see Fuku i , "Fo re ign Po l i cy -Mak ing i n Japan, " pp. 19-23 e s p e c i a l l y . For a d i scuss ion o f the Fore ign M i n i s t r y ad hoc group i n the China p o l i c y -making process, see the next s e c t i o n . F u r u i , op. c i t . , p. 48. 137 Fuku i , "Fore ign Po l i cy -Mak ing i n Japan, " pp. 19-23. I n t h i s respect Fukui f a i l s to make a d i s t i n c t i o n t h a t may be i m p o r t a n t , namely whether or no t the p o l i c y issue i s u rgent o r n o t . We would suggest t h a t t h i s f o r m a t i o n of a smal l ad hoc group may be employed i n urgent bu t not i n l ong- te rm d e c i s i o n . This would seem congruent w i t h Ka l H o l s t i ' s h y p o t h e s i s : "The more c r i t i c a l o r u rgen t a s i t u a t i o n i s perce ived to bey,, the fewer people w i l l become d i r e c t l y i n v o l v e d i n d e f i n i n g the s i t u a t i o n , choosing responses, and s e l e c t i n g g o a l s . " See Ka l J . H o l s t i , I n t e r n a t i o n a l P o l i t i c s : A Framework f o r A n a l y s i s , Englewood C l i f f s , N . J . : P r e n t i c e - H a l l , 1972 (second e d i t i o n ) , p. 394. 138 S i l v e r s t e i n , op. c i t . , p. 19. Personal communication between Hellmann and S i l v e r s t e i n . Fur f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n o f the Japanese con-sensus dec is ion-making process, see e s p e c i a l l y Peter F. Drucker , "What we can l e a r n f rom Japanese Management," Harvard Business Review, V o l . 49, No. 2 (March -Apr i l 1971), pp. 110-22; Ch ih i ro Hosoya, World P o l i t i c s , V o l . 26, No. 3 ( A p r i l 1974), pp. 364-69; Chie Nakane, Japanese S o c i e t y , London, Weidenfeld and N i c o l s o n , 1970, e s p e c i a l l y p. 145; Packard, op. c i t . , pp. 347-48; James W. Whi te , " T r a d i t i o n and P o l i t i c s i n Studies o f Contemporary Japan, " World P o l i t i c s , V o l . 26, No. 3 ( A p r i l 1974) , pp. 412-13. For a c r i t i c i s m o f the consensus dec is ion-making process , see T s u r u t a n i , op. c i t . , and r e p l y by Reischauer, op. c i t . For a d i scuss ion o f the a p p l i c a t i o n o f consensus i n broader c o n t e x t s , see Wolfram F. 112 Hanre ider , " C o m p a t i b i l i t y and Consensus: A Proposal f o r the Conceptual Linkage o f E x t e r n a l and I n t e r n a l . Dimensions of Fore ign P o l i c y , " Comparative Fore ign P o l i c y . T h e o r e t i c a l Essays, Ed. Wolfram F. Hanre ider , New York: McKay Co., 1971, pp. 242-64,; For an a p p l i c a t i o n of the con-cepts developed i n t h i s a r t i c l e , see Wolfram F. Hanre ider , West German  Fore ign P o l i c y 1949-1963: I n t e r n a t i o n a l Pressures and Domestic  Responses, S t a n f o r d , C a l . : S tan fo rd U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1967. Roger Hi lsman, "The F o r e i g n - P o l i c y Consensus:, An I n t e r i m Research Repor t , " J o u r n a l  of C o n f l i c t R e s o l u t i o n , V o l . 3 (December 1959) , pp. 361-382. 139 S i l v e r s t e i n , op. c i t . , p. 19. "' '^See Tokyo Shimbun, 27/7/72 f o r d i s c u s s i o n o f the t e c h n i c a l aspects and membership i n the Norma l i za t i on Counc i l . 1 4 1 I b i d . 1A 2 M a i n i c h i Shimbun, 16 /7 /72 . Chief Cabinet Secretary Nika ido a lso c a l l e d f o r the need o f developing a consensus w i t h i n the p a r t y . See Asahi Shimbun, 17 /7 /72 . Moreover, Fore ign M i n i s t e r Ohi ra and Prime M i n i s t e r Tanaka c o n t i n u a l l y emphasized the need o f deve lop ing an i n t r a - p a r t y consensus. See, f o r example, Yomiur i Shimbun, 8 / 7 / 7 2 . I n f a c t , a t the f i r s t meeting of the N o r m a l i z a t i o n Counci l on 24/7/72 the ten p o i n t s f o r n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f Japan-China r e l a t i o n s were . - . presented by Prime M i n i s t e r Tanaka. Po in t S ix and p o i n t Seven s t a t e d r e s p e c t i v e l y : 6) "For the success o f t h i s case, a consensus and s t ro n g support o f the r u l i n g LDP are necessary . " 7 ) " T h i s Counci l i s aimed a t r e a l i z i n g an i n t r a - p a r t y c o n s e n s u s . . . . " Th is c l e a r l y demon-st rates how impor tan t Tanaka perce ived the development o f an i n t r a -p a r t y consensus to be. See Yomiur i Shimbun, 24 /7 /72 , evening e d i t i o n . 143 Hellmann, Peace T r e a t y , p. 19. Hosoya's c o n t r a s t w i t h the Nixon v i s i t to China i s a lso germane h e r e : "N ixon , f o r example, was ab le to make the announcement o f h i s fo r thcoming v i s i t to Pek ing , which obv ious ly marked an abrupt change i n p o l i c y , w i t h o u t l eng thy p r i o r c o n s u l t a t i o n s w i t h p o l i t i c a l leaders and the r e s t o f the govern-ment bureaucracy. A move o f t h i s s o r t s imply l i e s beyond the competence o f a Japanese Prime M i n i s t e r , who, be fo re reach ing a f i n a l d e c i s i o n on any s u b s t a n t i a l change i n Japan's f o r e i g n p o l i c y , must make an exhaust-i v e e f f o r t to consu l t a wide spectrum o f Japanese leadersh ip i n p o l i -t i c s , bus iness,and the bureaucracy i n order to o b t a i n the f u l l e s t range o f support f o r any eventua l d e c i s i o n . " See Hosoya, op. c i t . , p. 368. " ^ \ > m o r i , op. c i t . , pp. 408-409. See a lso Asahi Shimbun, 1 6 / 8 / 7 2 . 145 The pro-Taiwan members o f the Norma l i za t i on Counci l adopted a number of t a c t i c s , such as h e c k l i n g and c a l l i n g f o r a non-conf idence vo te i n Chairman Kosoka, to t r y and p r o t e c t Taiwan. See, f o r example, Nihon K e i z a i Shimbun, 2 / 9 / 7 2 ; Asahi Shimbun, 5 / 9 / 7 2 . o f importance here 113 was the a c t i v i t y o f such pro-Taiwan LDPers as Mich io Watanabe, Masayuki F u j i o , K o i c h i Hamada, I c h i r o Nakagawa, who l a t e r came to form p a r t of the Se i ranka i which was a c t i v e i n t r y i n g to p revent the a i r pact agree-ment between Japan and China. For the bes t d i s c u s s i o n concerning the S e i r a n k a i , see J . V i c t o r Koschmann, "Hawks on the Defens ive : The S e i r a n k a i , " Japan I n t e r p r e t e r , V o l . 8, No. 4 (Winter 1974) , pp. 467-77. For a survey o f LDP o p i n i o n on the government's h a n d l i n g o f the China n o r m a l i z a t i o n process and the Japan-China a i r accord , see Nihon K e i z a i  Shimbun, 5 /10/73. One o f the f i n d i n g s o f t h i s survey was t h a t o f the LDP members suppor t i ng the es tab l ishment of r e l a t i o n s w i t h the PRC, 33% " c l a r i f i e d c r i t i c a l views on the procedures or method taken by the government f o r t h i s purpose, e s p e c i a l l y those r e l a t e d to the Taiwan problem. I t can be s a i d t h a t t h i s f a c t i s i n d i c a t i v e o f the reason why the LDP was i n v o l v e d i n heated d iscuss ions on Japan-China r e l a t i o n s which even threatened to cause t h e s p l i t o f the p a r t y , w h i l e on ly a few mem-bers were s t r o n g l y opposed to the r e s t o r a t i o n o f d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s . " 1 4 6 A s a h i Shimbun, 1 /9 /72. 147 H / J a p a n Times, 25 /8 /72 . See a lso i b i d , 3 0 / 9 / 7 2 ; 6 / 9 / 7 2 ; 9 / 9 / 7 2 ; Japan Times Weekly, 1 6 / 7 / 7 2 ; Nihon K e i z a i Shimbun, 1 0 / 7 / 7 2 . 148 Japan Times, 30 /8 /72 . The pro-Taiwan LDPers were c o n t i n u a l and b i t t e r i n t h e i r c r i t i c i s m s o f Fore ign M i n i s t e r Ohi ra i n p a r t i c u l a r , who made a number o f statements i n d i c a t i n g Taiwan would be abandoned. See, f o r i n s t a n c e , Yomiur i Shimbun, 30 /8 /72 . 149 Japan Times, 30 /8 /72 . 150_, . , I b i d . 1 5 1 J a p a n Times, 23 /8 /72 ; Japan Times Weekly, 30 /8 /72 . 1 5? Tokyo Shimbun, 13 /9 /72 . 153 Asahi Shimbun, 5 /9 /72 . Indeed, Tanaka a lso r e s i s t e d the pressure o f the o l d - g u a r d i n the p a r t y such as K i s h i , Funada, and I s h i i who v i s i t e d the Prime M i n i s t e r to t r y and persuade him not to abandon Taiwan. See Yamato Shimbun, 30 /9 /72 . "^^^Masataka Kosaka, "Opt ions f o r Japan's Fpre ign P o l i c y , " London: Ade lph i Papers No. 97, I n s t i t u t e f o r S t r a t e g i c S tud ies , p. 18. ^~^See, f o r example, Sankei Shimbun, 1 2 / 1 / 7 4 ; M a i n i c h i Shimbun, 10 /2 /74 . This went hand i n hand w i t h a f e e l i n g t h a t d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s were e s t a b l i s h e d b e f o r e consensus was reached. Sankei , 1 2 / 1 / 7 4 . "*"^For a l i s t of the Dietmen who accompanied Kosaka to China, see Sankei Shimbun, 9 / 9 / 7 2 . 114 See the i n t e r v i e w w i t h Chairman Kosaka a f t e r h i s r e t u r n f rom Pek ing , Yomiur i Shimbun, 20 /9 /72 . Also Nihon K e i z a i Shimbun, 1 9 / 9 / 7 2 , (evening e d i t i o n ) . 158 Asahi Shimbun, 20 /9 /72 , evening e d i t i o n , emphasis added. When quest ioned regard ing t h i s s tatement Sh i ina s t a t e d t h a t : " I exp la ined to the Taiwan s ide t h e contents o f the Reso lu t i on adopted by the LDP Japan-China D ip lomat ic Re la t ions Norma l i za t i on C o n s u l t a t -i v e Counc i l . I t i s not t h a t I c l a r i f i e d the Government's v iew and my own view as the Spec ia l envoy." 159. Sankei Shimbun, 20 /9 /92 , evening e d i t i o n . 1 6 ^ S t a t e m e n t made by Chief Cabinet Secreetar N i k a i d o , Tokyo  Shimbun, 20 /9 /72 , evening e d i t i o n . 16 T Hellmann, Peace T rea ty , pp. 56, 73; Packard, op. c i t . , pp. 65 f f . I n t h i s l a t t e r r e g a r d , a lso see Scalapino and Masumi, op. c i t . 162 Fuku i , Par ty i n Power, Ch. 9; Fuku i , " B u r e a u c r a t i c Power i n Japan, " Japan and A u s t r a l i a : Two S o c i e t i e s and t h e i r I n t e r a c t i o n s , Ed. Peter Drysdale and Hironubu K i t a o j i , Ox fo rd : Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1974, fo r thcoming . See a lso Hans Baerswald, " Japan , " As ia  i n t h e . , I n t e r n a t i o n a l System, Ed. Wayne Cox, Leo Rose, and Gavin Boyd, Cambridge, Mass. : Winthrop P u b l i s h e r s , 1972, pp. 32-60. There was a lso c o n f l i c t between the Finance M i n i s t r y and the MITI s h o r t l y b e f o r e n o r m a l i z a t i o n s over t h e ques t i on o f China t a r i f f s , see M a i n i c h i  Shimbun, 22 /9 /72 . 163 See, f o r example, Asahi S t a f f , The P a c i f i c R i v a l s , pp. 324-27. 332-335. 164 Henderson and Matsuo, op. c i t . , p. 8. For a d i s c u s s i o n of the M I T I ' s e f f o r t s cto expand t rade a f t e r n o r m a l i z a t i o n seemed c e r t a i n to occur , see Tokyo Shimbun, 1 4 / 7 / 7 2 . 1 6 ^ F u k u i , Par ty i n Power, pp. 260-64; Langdon, "Japan's Fo re ign -Po l i cy -Mak ing P rocess , " Japan i n World P o l i t i c s , Ed. Young C. Kim, p. 9; Nihon K e i z a i Shimbun, 1 /8 /72 . 166 Park, op. c i t . , p. 16. Another reason t h a t probably c o n t r i -butes to the c o n f l i c t o f o p i n i o n w i t h i n the Fore ign M i n i s t r y r e s u l t s f rom the f a c t t h a t the heads of the v a r i o u s d i v i s i o n s w i t h i n the M i n i s t r y take a sympathet ic a t t i t u d e towards the coun t r i es they deal w i t h , thus a l l o w i n g the p o s s i b i l i t y o f c o n f l i c t between these d i v i -s i o n s . This sympathet ic a t t i t u d e i s p a r t i c u l a r l y t r u e o f the China D i v i s i o n , where the Head, Hashimoto, " . . . p l e a d e d w i t h pass ion f o r a f o r w a r d - l o o k i n g p o l i c y towards the PRC. See Fuku i , "Fore ign P o l i c y -Making i n Japan's Fore ign M i n i s t r y , " prepared f o r p r e s e n t a t i o n on Japan's Fore ign P o l i c y , Kaua i , Hawa i i , 14 -17 /1 /74 , p. 18. 115 167 Japan Times Weekly, 2 / 1 / 7 1 . 168 Sato had fo l l owed the adv ice o f sen io r members o f the bureau-cracy i n dec id ing to f o l l o w a pro-Taiwan p o l i c y , though Secretary o f S ta te Rogers may have i n f l u e n c e d him i n t h i s respec t . See Asahi Shimbun, 2 3 / 9 / 7 1 , Sawhny, op. c i t . , p. 64. 1 6 9 K o k u m i n Shimbun, 5 /12/72. 1 7 ^ F u k u i , "Fore ign Po l i cy -Mak ing i n Japan , " p. 5 1 . 1 7"*"Before the f o rma t i on of t h i s group i n l a t e J u l y , the bureau-c r a t s had been a c t i v e i n examining a number o f ques t ions t h a t would e v e n t u a l l y need t o be answered when n o r m a l i z i n g r e l a t i o n s w i t h China; 1) whether or no t to f u l l y accept P e k i n ' s th ree p r i n c i p l e s f o r normal -i z a t i o n , 2) how to deal w i t h the ques t i on o f the U.S. Japan Secu r i t y T r e a t y , 3) what form the " t e r m i n a t i o n o f war" should take i n the j o i n t communique. However, the Fore ign M i n i s t r y d i d no t have any contac t w i t h the Chinese government u n t i l a f t e r contac ts were made by Fore ign M i n i s t e r Ohira on 22nd J u l y . This meant t h a t these quest ions were reso lved w i t h o u t any feedback f rom the Chinese s i d e , so t ha t the bureaucrats were l a r g e l y i n v o l v e d i n a " . . . t h e o r e t i c a l e x e r c i s e , the e f f e c t and u t i l i t y o f which was q u i t e u n c e r t a i n i n the absence of feedback f rom Peking through a r e l i a b l e channel . I n s h o r t , they were most ly s p e c u l a t i n g i n a s i t u a t i o n f u l l o f u n c e r t a i n t i e s , r a t h e r than engaged i n normal po l i cy -mak ing a c t i v i t i e s i n a f a m i l i a r p o l i t i c a l and b u r e a u c r a t i c c o n t e x t . " See,Fukui , "Fo re ign P o l i c y -Making i n Japan, " p. 44-46, Japan Times Weekly, 29 /7 /72 ; Asahi Shimbun, 23 /7 /72 . 172 This p a r t concerning the Fore ign M i n i s t r y po l i cy -mak ing group r e l i e s ;on the i n t e r v i e w m a t e r i a l conta ined i n Fuku i , "Fo re ign P o l i c y -Making i n Japan, " pp. 43 f f . This i s e s p e c i a l l y impor tan t i n respect to the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f the ad hoc po l i cy -mak ing group, s ince a v a i l a b l e newspaper sources on ly p o i n t out t h a t a China P o l i c y Counci l o r Leaders Group was e s t a b l i s h e d w i t h the p a r t i c i p a t i o n ( i n a d d i t i o n to those mentioned i n the t e x t ) o f A c t i n g American A f f a i r s Bureau D i r e c t o r GeneralaTachibanairsPubl i 'cr lnformationreBureau^DifectordOwada, European and Oceanic A f f a i r s Bureau D i r e c t o r General Owada, and Consular and Emigra t ion A f f a i r s Department D i r e c t o r General , Endo ( the l a t t e r two be ing China e x p e r t s ) . Besides the f a c t t h a t sma l l ad hoc groups are u s u a l l y formed w i t h i n the Fore ign M i n i s t r y to dea l w i t h p o l i c y problems, one of the reasons f o r the exact na tu re o f t h i s p o l i c y group i s p o s s i b l y t h a t the re was a fear of c o n f l i c t develop ing between these bureaucra ts on the p a r t of Fore ign M i n i s t e r O h i r a . See Nihon K e i z a i Shimbun, 1 /8 /72 . See a lso Yomiur i Shimbun, 23 /7 /72 . Another impor tan t p o i n t i s t h a t the Fore ign M i n i s t r y i s d i v i d e d i n terms of 1) f u n c t i o n a l and 2) geographic a reas . Hence, the As ia Bureau D i r e c t o r and the China D i v i s i o n Head had an obvious r o l e i n the po l i cy -mak ing process . I n 116 regard to the p a r t i c i p a t i o n of the T r e a t i e s Bureau D i v i s i o n Head and Bureau D i r e c t o r , Fukui notes tha t : "The T r e a t i e s Bureau [ u n l i k e the o the r bureaus] tends to get i n v o l v e d i n a l l k inds o f issues d e a l t w i t h by the Fore ign M i n i s t r y . . . . " See Fuku i , "Fore ign Po l i cy -Mak ing i n Japan's Fore ign M i n i s t r y , " p. 6. For d i s c u s s i o n o f the ad hoc p o l i c y group, see i b i d . , pp. 6-7 , 36-37. 173 Fuku i , "Fo re ign Po l i cy -Mak ing i n Japan , " p. 47. Fore ign V i c e - M i n i s t e r Hogen s imply p layed the p a r t o f superv i so r o f t h i s po l i cy -mak ing team. His r o l e was s i m i l a r to F u k u i ' s more genera l comment t ha t the V i c e - M i n i s t e r though f o r m a l l y respons ib le f o r p o l i c y i s not always an a c t i v e leader o f t he team, o f t e n now even an a c t i v e p a r t i c i p a n t i n i t s work. See Fuku i , "Po l i cy -Mak ing of Japan's Fore ign M i n i s t r y , " p. 8. "* 7^For a d i scuss ion of the development of Japan's stance upon the na tu re and content o f the j o i n t communique, see F u k u i , "Fo re ign Po l icy -Mak ing i n Japan, " pp. 44 f f . ; M a i n i c h i Shimbun, 12 /9 /72 . For a convenient re fe rence t o the content of the j o i n t communique i n i t s f i n a l fo rm, see E t o , " japan and China - A New S t a g e / p . 13. "*"7^Graham A l l i s o n , Essence of D e c i s i o n : E x p l a i n i n g the Cuban  M i s s i l e C r i s i s , Boston: L i t t l e , Brown, 1971. For c r i t i q u e o f the b u r e a u c r a t i c po l i cy -mak ing model , see c i t a t i o n 176. 1 7 6 Q u o t e d i n Desmond J . B a l l , "The B l i n d Men and the E lephant : A C r i t i q u e of Bureaucra t i c P o l i t i c s Theory , " A u s t r a l i a n Out look , V o l . 28, N o . l ( A p r i l 1974), p. 7 1 . For a f u r t h e r c r i t i q u e o f t h i s approach, see Robert J . A r t , "Bu reauc ra t i c P o l i t i c s and American Fore ign P o l i c y ; A C r i t i q u e , " P o l i c y Science, V o l . 4 (December 1973) , pp. 467-90; Harvey S t a r r , " ' O r g a n i z a t i o n a l Process ' as an I n f l u e n c e on N a t i o n a l Secur i t y P o l i c y , " I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s , V o l . 4 , No. 2 (November 1972) , pp. 176-86, 217. "* 7 7 See, f o r example, Graham T. A l l i s o n and Morton H." H a l e p e r i n , "Bu reauc ra t i c P o l i t i c s : A Paradigm and Some P o l i c y I m p l i c a t i o n s , " Theory and P o l i c y i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s , Ed. Raymond Tanter and Richard Ul lmann, P r i n c e t o n , N . J . : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y Press , 1972, pp. 40-80. 178 T s u r u t a n i , op. c i t . , pp. 131-32. 179 I b i d . , pp. 129-130; Kubota, Higher C i v i l Servants i n Pos t - war Japan, P r i n c e t o n , N . J . : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y Press , 1969, pp. 172-176. 180 R i n g i s e i r e f e r s to "a system whereby a d m i n i s t r a t i v e p lans and dec is ions are made.(through the c i r c u l a t i o n o f a document c a l l e d r i n g i s h o . The r i n g i s h o i s i n i t i a l l y d r a f t e d by a l ow- rank ing o f f i c i a l . . . t h e r e a f t e r the r i n g i s h o i s d iscussed and examined separa te l y by the 117 o f f i c i a l s o f a l l r e l e v a n t bureaus and d i v i s i o n s . . . the h ighes t execu t i ve i s expected t o approve i t w i t h o u t change or m o d i f i c a t i o n because o f t h i s long process o f p r i o r s c r u t i n y by lower o f f i c i a l s . " See K i y o a k i T s u j i , "Decis ion-Making i n the Japanese Government: A Study o f R i n g i s e i , " P o l i t i c a l Development i n Modern Japan, Ed. Robert E. Ward, P r i n c e t o n , N . J . : 1968, p. 458. T s u j i ' s i s the bes t d i scuss ion o f r i n g i s e i . For a s h o r t e r ^ d i s c u s s i o n , see Nakane, op. c i t . , p. 65. For a d i scuss ion o f r i n g i s e i ' i n the bureaucracy immediately p r i o r to the second wor ld war , see Hosoya, op. c i t . , pp. 363 f f . For an e x c e l l e n t d i scuss ion q u e s t i o n -ing the view t h a t r i n g i s e i i s a t t r i b u t a b l e to the c o n t i n u a t i o n of t r a -d i t i o n a l Japanese s o c i a l v a l u e s , see Bernard S. S i lberman, "R ingese i -T r a d i t i o n a l Values or O r g a n i z a t i o n a l Impera t ives i n the Japanese C i v i l Se rv i ce : 1868-1945," The Journa l o f As ian S tud ies , V o l . 32, No. 2, .(February 1973) , pp. 251-64. For a d i s c u s s i o n p e r t a i n i n g to Japan's Fore ign M i n i s t r y , see Fuku i , "Po l i cy -Mak ing i n Japan's Fore ign M i n i s t r y , " p. 12. 181 See a l s o , Reischauer, op. c i t . , p. 147. 182 Hellmann, Peace T r e a t y , p. 125. See a lso T s u n e i s h i , op. c i t . , p. 148; Fuku i , Par ty i n Power, p. 145. 183 Hellmann, Peace T r e a t y , p. 129. 184 David G. Brown, "Chinese Economic Leverage i n Sino-Japanese R e l a t i o n s , " Asian Survey, V o l . 12, No. 9 {September 1972) , p. 766. See a lso R.M.V. C o l l i c k , "The 'New' Japanese Fore ign P o l i c y , " The  World Today, V o l . 29, No. 2 (February 1973) , p. 83. This seems e s p e c i a l l y t r u e i n view o f the.tdep.ressLon i n Japan f rom 1970, which was f u e l l e d by N ixon 's economic measures aga ins t Japan. See, Alexander K. Young, "Japan 's Trade w i t h China: Impact of the Nixon V i s i t , " The World Today, V o l . 28, No. 8 (August 1972) , pp. 342-50. 185 Brown, op. c i t . , p. 766. 186 For an e l a b o r a t i o n o f the p o i n t s conta ined i n t h i s s e c t i o n , see Sadako Ogata, "The Business Community and Fore ign P o l i c y : Process heading to Japan's Recogni t ion of the People 's Republ ic o f Ch ina , " fo r thcoming i n an ed i ted book by Robert S. Sca lap ino , U n i v e r s i t y o f C a l i f o r n i a Press. 187 Fuku i , Par ty i n Power, pp. 244-46. I b x d . 189 This p o s i t i v e a t t i t u d e on the p a r t of Kansai business i s i l -l u s t r a t e d by an o p i n i o n p o l l " . . . o f 94 business leaders who responded to the Koydft News Agency q u e s t i o n n a i r e i n the summer o f 1971. To the ques t ion whether Japan should recognize China be fo re the Uni ted S t a t e s , 118 on ly 19, per cent o f the Tokyo business leaders answered " y e s , " i n c o n t r a s t to 26.2 per cent o f Osaka and Nagoya. A l s o , to the ques t ion whether Japan should s t a r t n e g o t i a t i n g f o r the resumpt ion of d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s immediately under the Sato government, 46.2 per cent o f the Tokyo leaders answered i n the a f f i r m a t i v e to the 61.9 per cent o f Osaka and Nagoya. Also i n terms o f e s t i m a t i n g the f u t u r e o f the China market , 69 per cent 0 f Kansai and Nagoya leaders expected i t to grow to a t o t a l volume o f 1.5 to 2 b i l l i o n i n f i v e years w h i l e 57.9 per cent o f the Tokyo leaders gave s i m i l a r c o n s i d e r a t i o n . " Ogata, "The Business Com-muni ty and Fore ign P o l i c y , " pp. 23-24. 190 Ogata, "The Business Community and Fore ign P o l i c y , " p. 22. The "Four Cond i t i ons" were b a s i c a l l y t h a t businesses p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n the China market must not dea l w i t h 1) Taiwan, 2) South Korea, 3) South Vietnam, 4) a l l y themselves w i t h U.S. c a p i t a l . See Dan Fenno Henderson and Tasuku Matsuo, op. c i t . , p. 2. 7 Nihon K e i z a i Shimbun, 8 /7 /72 . 192 Fuku i , "Fo re ign Po l i cy -Mak ing i n Japan, " p. 53. For Tokyo groups v i s i t , see Asahi Shimbun, 2 3 / 1 1 / 7 1 . 193 Ogata, "The Business Community and Fore ign P o l i c y , " p. 23. 194 B r z e z i n s k i notes t h a t a major expansion i n Japan-China t rade would b e n e f i t the s t e e l , s h i p b u i l d i n g , a u t o , f e r t i l i z e r and chemical i n d u s t r i e s . See Zbigniew B r z e z i n s k i , The F r a g i l e Blossom, New York : Harper and Row, 1972, p. 89. 195 Nihon K e i z a i Shimbun, 17 /4 /70 ; Nihon K e i z a i Shimbun, 3 0 / 9 / 7 2 ; Na than ie l Newby Whi te , op. c i t . , pp. 618 f f . 196 Yomiur i Shimbun, 27 /2 /58 . 197 Na than ie l Newby Whi te , op. c i t . , p. 608. 198 Chae-Jin Lee, "The P o l i t i c s o f Sino-Japanese Trade R e l a t i o n s , 1963-1968;" P a c i f i c A f f a i r s , V o l . 42, No. 2 (Summer 1969) , pp. 129-30. To be designated as " f r i e n d l y , " f i r m s had to agree to Chou's th ree " p o l i t i c a l p r i n c i p l e s " 1 1) not to view China as an enemy; 2) not to o b s t r u c t n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f Japan-China r e l a t i o n s ; 3) not to p a r t i c i p a t e i n the p l o t to c reate two Chinas. See Langdon, Japan's Fore ign P o l i c y , p. 176. 199 See, op. c i t . , p. 131 . ^ ^ P a r k , op. c i t . , p. 1 1 . For an examinat ion of the f l u c t u a t i o n s i n " F r i e n d l y F i rm" t rade and Memorandum Trade, see Tosh iak i Kaminogo, "What 's Happening Among Japanese F r i e n d l y F i r m s , " Summaries o f Selected Japanese Magazines, American Embassy, Tokyo P o l i t i c a l Sec t ion T r a n s l a -t i o n Services Branch, January 1973, pp. 29-42. See Kaminogo, op. c i t . , p. 35. 119 201 For a l i s t of Japanese companies i n v e s t i n g i n Taiwan and a d e s c r i p t i o n o f these inves tments , see Yamamoto Shimbun, 16 /10 /72 . 70? Yomiur i Shimbun, 28 /4 /70 . 203 Ogata, "The Business Community and Fore ign P o l i c y , " p. 16. 2 0 4 T U . , ... I b x d . , p. 17. 2 0 5 T , . , I b i d . , p. 17. 206 For a comment on the e a r l i e r expec ta t ions the S tee l I n d u s t r y he ld of increased t rade w i t h China, see Nihon Kogyo, 17 /4 /70 . 207 M a i n i c h i Shimbun, 15 /5 /70 . 208 Nihon K e i z a i Shimbun, Evening e d i t i o n 22 /5 /70 . For a d i scuss ion of the o ther s t e e l companies t h a t d i d n o t secure con t rac t s a t the Trade F a i r , see Tokyo Shimbun, 24 /4 /70 . 209 Ogata, "The Business Community and Fore ign P o l i c y , " p. 18. 210 Nihon K e i z a i Shimbun, 12 /5 /70 . 211 Asahi Shimbun, 25 /5 /70 ; Ogata, "The Business Community and Fore ign P o l i c y , " p. 20. 212 Nihon K e i z a i Shimbun, 13 /12 /72 ; C o l l i c k , "The 'New' Japanese Fore ign P o l i c y , " p. 83; John H a l l i d a y and Gavan McCormack, "Japan and America: A n t a g o n i s t i c A l l i e s , " New L e f t Review, No. 77 (January-February 1973) , p. 7 1 . 213 Rathy Sawhny, "Japan a t the Crossroads, " I n d i a n Q u a r t e r l y , V o l . 28, No. 1 (January-March 1972), p. 64. 21A Ogata, "The Business Community and Fore ign P o l i c y , " pp. 45-46. 215 Asahi Shimbun, 3 / 9 / 7 1 . 216 Ogata, "The Business Community and Fore ign P o l i c y , " p. 3 1 ; Japan Times Weekly, 3 0 / 1 0 / 7 1 . 217 Ogata, "The Business Community and Fore ign P o l i c y , " p. 37. ^"*" 8 Ib id. , p. 37. 219 Asahi Shimbun, 24 /5 /72 . Wi th the change o f a t t i t u d e by Uemura the Keidanren now came i n l i n e w i t h the p o l i c y adopted by K e i z a i Doyukai (Japan Committee f o r Economic Development), which had presented a 120 f o r w a r d - l o o k i n g p o l i c y on China i n 1970, d e c l a r i n g t h a t Japan should " . . . p l a y an impor tan t r o l e i n the s o l u t i o n o f the East-West problem centered on the Communist China q u e s t i o n . " See Nikkan Kogyo, 20 /4 /70 . I t was the K e i z a i Doyukai r a t h e r than Keidanren t h a t was an a c t i v e promoter o f Japan-China r e l a t i o n s . For an examinat ion o f the genera l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s and f u n c t i o n o f these two o r g a n i z a t i o n s , see Gerald L. C u r t i s , " O r g a n i z a t i o n a l Leadership i n Japan's Business Community," Jou rna l of I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s , V o l . 26, No. 1 (1972, pp. 179-85. 220 Ogata, "The Business Community and Fore ign P o l i c y , " p. 39. 221 E to , "Japan and C h i n a : — A New Stage, " p. 2; Kaminogo," op. c i t . p.am38i;'' Sankei Shimbun, 7 /9 /72 . 222 I t o h , Japanese P o l i t i c s : An I n s i d e View, p. 10. 223 Ogata, "The Business Community and Fore ign P o l i c y , " p. 48. 224 Hellmann,. Peace T r e a t y , p. 94. c f . Per ry P i c k e r t , "The Fore ign P o l i c y o f Japan I n c o r p o r a t e d , " Japan Q u a r t e r l y , V o l . 2 1 , No. 1 (January-March 1974) , p. 83. 225 The LDP may not cont inue to ga in the same ex tens ive f i n a n c i a l support t ha t has cha rac te r i zed i t s r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h business so f a r . A f t e r the excessive f i n a n c i a l ou tput by business i n the J u l y 1974 Upper House e l e c t i o n s , i n the u n f u l f i l l e d hope o f b o l s t e r i n g the LDP's seat p o s i t i o n i n t h i s house, business dec la red through such a s s o c i a t i o n s as Keidanren t h a t i t w i l l no longer g i ve such l a r g e c o n t r i b u t i o n s to the LDP c o f f e r s . See New York Times, 1 0 / 9 / 7 4 . 226 Nihon K e i z a i Shimbun, 1 /11/72, emphasis added; H a l l i d a y and . McCormack, Japanese I m p e r i a l i s m Today, Ch. 4. 227 F u k u i , "Fo re ign Po l i cy -Mak ing i n Japan, " p. 56. 228 See a lso Sca lap ino, American-Japanese Re la t ions i n a Changing  E ra , p. 39. 229 Hellmann, Peace T r e a t y , p. 22. 230 Robert Sca lap ino, The Japanese Communist Movement 1920-1966, Berkeley and Los Angeles, U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a Press, 1966, Ch. 6. Paul Langer, Communism i n Japan, S t a n f o r d , Cal . : HooverI-Dinsti tute Press , 1972, pp. 73-75. 231. " Japan Times Weekly, 7 /9 /72 . 232 See J .A .A . Stockwin, The Japanese S o c i a l i s t Par ty and N e u t r a l - i sm, Melbourne: Melbourne U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1968, pp. 9 0 - 9 1 . 121 233 I b i d . , Ch. 10. 234 A l l a n B. Cole, Geroge 0. To t ten and C e c i l H. Uyehara, S o c i a l i s t P a r t i e s i n Post-War Japan, New Haven and London: Yale U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1966, pp. 227-29. 235 Japan Times, 4 / 8 / 7 0 ; Asahi Shimbun, 3 /11 /70. 2 3 6 T o k y o Shimbun, 23 /7 /72 . 237 F u r u i , op. c i t . , p. 42. 238 Mainchi Shimbun, 15 /7 /72 . The f l e x i b l e pos tu re of the Chinese government was i l l u s t r a t e d by i t s w i l l i n g n e s s to a l l ow "some amount o f t ime" f o r the se t t l emen t o f the Taiwan p rob lem. . 239 Tokyo Shimbun, 23 /7 /72 . 240 Komei Shimbun, 7 /4 /68 . 241 n f o m i u r i Shimbun, 14 /2 /70 . 242 Japan Times, 14 /12/70. For a l i s t o f i n d i v i d u a l s who j o i n e d the c o u n c i l , see Komei Shimbun, 14 /12 /70 . 243 Japan Times, 9 / 6 / 7 1 . 244 Komei Shimbun, 3 0 / 6 / 7 1 . 245 Kim, op. c i t . , p. 9. 246 For the o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s statements concerning the Komei to 's a c t i v i t i e s , see Sankei Shimbun, 3 / 7 / 7 1 . 247 Nihon K e i z a i Shimbun, 3 / 7 / 7 1 . 248 F u k u i , " F o r e i g n Po l i cy -Mak ing i n Japan , " pp. 40-46. C i t a t i o n 198 l i s t s the th ree " p o l i t i c a l p r i n c i p l e s . " I b i d . I b i d . I b i d . 252 Omori, op. c i t . , p. 409. See a lso Nihon K e i z a i Shimbun, 3 1 / 7 / 7 2 . 253 F u r u i , op. c i t . , p. 50. 122 254 Cole e_t_al. , op. c i t . , pp. 74, 119. 255 Sankei Shimbun, 30 /8 /71 ,even ing e d i t i o n . The p a r t y ' s bas ic p o l i c y on the China i ssue was: 1) China i s one; 2) Ch in 'a admission to the Un i ted Nat ions w i l l be promoted; and 3) the DSP does not approve the reverse impor tan t i t e m q u e s t i o n i n the U.S. 256 Nihon K e i z a i Shimbun, 1 4 / 4 / 7 2 ; Sca lap ino , American-Japanese  Re la t ions on a Changing Era , p. 73fl. 257 Tokyo Shimbun, 21 /5 /72 . Ek i Sone had l o s t out i n the 1971 f i g h t f o r the chairmanship of the DSP. See Dixon "Japanese P o l i t i c a l Par ty Reorgan iza t ion , " p. 6. 2 5 8 N i h o n K e i z a i Shimbun, 19 /9 /72 . 259 F u r u i , op. c i t . , p. 50. 260 For a d i s c u s s i o n o f the t a c t i c s the o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s have developed to increase t h e i r i n f l u e n c e on the po l i cy -mak ing process i n Japan, see J .A .A .S tockw in , "The Japanese O p p o s i t i o n : P o l i t i c a l I r -re levance or Wave o f the F u t u r e , " A u s t r a l i a n Out look , V o l . 25, No. 2 (August 1971) , pp. 181-87. 261 Edward P. Whi t temore, The Press i n Japan Today: A Case Study, Columbia: U n i v e r s i t y o f South Caro l ina Press , 1971, p. 7. For a broader examinat ion of the r o l e o f the press i n the f o r e i g n p o l i c y -making process, see Bernard C. Cohen, The Press and Fore ign P o l i c y , P r i n c e t o n , N . J . : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y Press , 1963. For a d i s c u s s i o n p e r t i n e n t to Japan, see A r t h u r W. Burke, The Government o f Japan, New York : C r o w e l l , 1963. 2 6 2 H e l l m a n n , Peace T r e a t y , p. 105. 263 This examinat ion of the r o l e o f the press i n the China normal -i z a t i o n process i s based on the a r t i c l e by Osamu M i y o s h i , "The Press has thus Y ie lded to P e k i n g , " Summaries o f Selected Japanese Magazines, American Embassy, Tokyo P o l i t i c a l Sec t ion T r a n s l a t i o n Services Branch, J u l y 1972, pp. 14 -31 . For a sho r t e x t r a c t o f t h i s a r t i c l e , see Osamu M i y o s h i , "How the Japanese Press Y ie lded to P e k i n g , " Survey, V o l . 18, No. 4 (85) Autumn 1972, pp. 103-125. That Miyosh i i s c o r r e c t i n h i s ana lys i s appears to be conf i rmed by an i n t e r v i e w between Sam Jameson and Dietmen S e i i c h i Tagawa and the Secretary General of the Newspaper P u b l i s h e r ' s A s s o c i a t i o n i n Japan, Susumi E j i r i . I n t h i s i n t e r v i e w Tagawa and E j i r i admi t ted to Jameson t h a t there were secre t d iscuss ions w i t h the Chinese s ide to b r i n g about an exchange of newsmen. See Los  Angeles Times, 14 /4 /72 . Indeed, i n the Survey a r t i c l e Miyosh i quotes a Fore ign News E d i t o r o f a Japanese newspaper as s a y i n g : "To d i s p a t c h a correspondent to Peking takes precedence over the freedom of the press . I b i d . , p. 140. 123 264 M . , M i y o s h i , op. e x t . 265 See c i t a t i o n 198. 266,,. M i y o s h i , op. c i t . 267 Shao-hsien Chu, "Pe ip ing-Japan Re la t ions a f t e r the Rapproche-ment , " 2ssjiej3_and_S^ V o l . 10. . No. 2.(November 1973) , p. 10. 268 Sca lap ino, American-Japanese Re la t ions i n a Changing Era , p. 78. 269 Yukio Matsuyama, "Japanese Press and Japan's Fore ign P o l i c y , " Jou rna l o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s , v o l . 26, No. 1 (1972) , p. 146. 270 Hel lmann, Peace T rea ty , p. 151. 271 Douglas H. Mendel, "Japanese Opin ion on Key Fore ign P o l i c y I s s u e s , " Asian Survey, V o l . 9, No. 8 (August 1969) , pp. 633-34. 2 7 2 M a i n c h i Shimbun, 30 /4 /70 . 273 Asahi Shimbun, 23 /6 /70 . 274 Asahi Shimbun^ 3 / 6 / 7 1 . 275 C h r i s t i a n Science Mon i to r , 30 /9 /72 . 276 Tokyo Shimbun, 4 / 1 / 7 2 , evening e d i t i o n . 2 7 7 A s a h i Shimbun, 3 /1 /72 . 2 7 8 T , . , I b i d 2 7 9 S a n k e i Shimbun, 28 /7 /72 . 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