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The Normalization of Japan-China relations : external and internal influences on Japan’s foreign policy-making… Hook, Glen Dawson 1989

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THE NORMALIZATION OF JAPAN-CHINA RELATIONS; EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL INFLUENCES ON JAPAN'S FOREIGN POLICY-MAKING PROCESS  by Glenn Dawson Hook B.A.,  U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Columbia, 1973  A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS  I n t h e Department of Political  Science  We accept t h i s t h e s i s as conforming t o r e q u i r e d ^standard  THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA September, 1974  the  In p r e s e n t i n g t h i s t h e s i s  in p a r t i a l  f u l f i l m e n t o f the requirements  an advanced degree at the U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, the L i b r a r y s h a l l make i t  freely available for  I agree  thesis  f o r s c h o l a r l y purposes may be granted by the Head o f my Department It  of this thesis for financial written  i s understood t h a t copying or  Department The U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Vancouver 8, Canada  Date  Columbia  or  publication  g a i n s h a l l not be a l l o w e d w i t h o u t my  permission.  that  reference and s t u d y .  I f u r t h e r agree t h a t permission f o r e x t e n s i v e copying o f t h i s  by h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s .  for  ABSTRACT  There have been few s t u d i e s t h a t have e x p l i c i t l y  attempted  t o d e l i n e a t e the i n f l u e n c e o f e x t e r n a l and i n t e r n a l f a c t o r s on Japan's f o r e i g n policy-making process.  The purpose o f t h i s t h e s i s i s  to  examine such f a c t o r s i n r e s p e c t t o one p a r t i c u l a r f o r e i g n p o l i c y issue:  t h e n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f r e l a t i o n s between Japan and China.  So  as n o t t o be c o n s i d e r e d as p u r e l y i d i o g r a p h i c r e s e a r c h , the  findings  are c o n t r a s t e d and compared w i t h p r e v i o u s r e s e a r c h t h a t has  similarly  been concerned w i t h a 1) f o r e i g n p o l i c y i s s u e , 2) c o n t r o v e r s i a l characteristic, After  in  and 3) s h o r t - t e r m on the t e m p o r a l d i m e n s i o n .  the l i m i t a t i o n s o f t h e t r i p a r t i t e e l i t e model o f Japanese p o l -  i c y i r a a k i n g i a r e , o u t l i n e d , an e x a m i n a t i o n i s t h e n made o f t h e i n f l u e n c e o f the U n i t e d S t a t e s and China i n c o m p e l l i n g J a p a n ' s d e c i s i o n t o n o r m a l i z e r e l a t i o n s w i t h China.  Internally,  the r o l e of the L i b e r a l  Democratic P a r t y , b u r e a u c r a c y , b u s i n e s s , o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s , p r e s s and p u b l i c o p i n i o n a r e assessed i n r e s p e c t to t h i s and p r e v i o u s studies.  Our f i n d i n g s h e r e a r e c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e c o n c l u s i o n  the t r i p a r t i t e e l i t e  policy that  ( t h e L i b e r a l Democratic P a r t y , b u r e a u c r a c y , and  b u s i n e s s ) does n o t n e c e s s a r i l y h o l d predominant power i n t h e p o l i c y making p r o c e s s .  I n s t e a d , we f i n d t h a t two s e n i o r l e a d e r s o f the r u l i n g  L i b e r a l Democratic P a r t y — Ohira —  Prime M i n i s t e r Tanaka and F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r  form a p o l i c y - m a k i n g group w h i c h dominates t h i s  p o l i c y process.  particular  These p o l i t i c i a n s a r e s u p p o r t e d i n t h i s r o l e by s e n i o r  i i  members o f t h e b u r e a u c r a c y , a p r o - P e k i n g L i b e r a l Democratic P a r t y Dietman, and i n f l u e n t i a l members o f the o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s .  In  this  s t u d y , t h e r o l e o f b u s i n e s s , the press and p u b l i c o p i n i o n a r e found t o be i n d i r e c t and p e r i p h e r a l compared t o t h e r o l e p l a y e d by t h e above mentioned p o l i c y - m a k i n g a c t o r s .  iii  TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Abstract  i i  Acknowledgements  . . .  .vii  I.  Introduction .  1  II.  Theoretical Perspective  4  The P o l i c y - M a k i n g Process i n Japan  . . . . . . . . .  I I I . E x t e r n a l Environment  4 13  Introduction.  13  J a p a n ' s E a r l y Post-War F o r e i g n P o l i c y  . . .  Changes i n t h e E x t e r n a l Environment  14 15  The Change i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s - C h i n a P o l i c y  . .  Chinese F o r e i g n P o l i c y Outputs  16 21  Chinese A t t i t u d e s Towards t h e U . S . - J a p a n S e c u r i t y T r e a t y and Japanese M i l i t a r i s m  . . .  21  . . . . . .  23  Chinese A t t i t u d e s Towards t h e Sato Governments E v o l v i n g China P o l i c y Conclusion  28  I V . I n t e r n a l Environment  31  Introduction  31  The LDP's China P o l i c y  . . . . .  The 1972 P r e s i d e n t i a l E l e c t i o n  31 '34  The LDP P o l i c y - M a k i n g Group  37  C r e a t i n g a Consensus W i t h i n t h e LDP  41  The LDP M i s s i o n s to China and Taiwan  47  Conclusion  49 iv  Page The Bureaucracy  52  Introduction  52  Inter- and Intra-Ministry Conflict  Concerning  Japan's China Policy  52  The Foreign Ministry Policy-Making Group  54  Conclusion  55  The Business Community  58  Introduction  58  Differences i n the Business Community's Attitude Towards China  58  "Friendly Firm" Trade and Memorandum Trade  61  The Reaction of the Business Community to Chou's "Four Conditions" and Changes i n the External Environment  62  Conclusion  68  The Opposition Parties  71  Introduction  71  Japan Communist Party  71  Japan S o c i a l i s t Party  72  The Komeito  75  Democratic S o c i a l i s t Party  78  Conclusion  79  The Press and Public Opinion  82  Introduction  82  v  Page The Press . . .  8 2  Public Opinion  8 5  Conclusion V. IV. IIV.  Conclusion  . . . .  Footnotes Bibliography  .  vi  •  1  8  8  9  2  9  6  2  5  ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS  For a d v i c e and encouragement i n t h e p r e p a r a t i o n o f t h i s I would l i k e to thank my a d v i s o r , P r o f e s s o r Frank Langdon, of  thesis, the  Department o f P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e , U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Columbia. Thanks a r e a l s o due t o H a r u h i r o F u k u i , o f t h e Department o f  Political  S c i e n c e , U n i v e r s i t y o f C a l i f o r n i a a t Santa B a r b a r a , f o r p e r m i s s i o n t o quote f r o m an u n p u b l i s h e d paper he d e l i v e r e d a t the Annual Meeting o f the A s s o c i a t i o n f o r A s i a n S t u d i e s , B o s t o n , A p r i l 1-3,  vii  1974.  1  INTRODUCTION It  i s w i t h o u t q u e s t i o n t h a t the Tanaka government's d e c i s i o n t o  n o r m a l i z e r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e P e o p l e ' s R e p u b l i c o f China  (hereafter  China) was one o f t h e most i m p o r t a n t f o r e i g n p o l i c y d e c i s i o n s made by any Japanese government i n the p o s t - w a r e r a .  As sucfy t h i s  decision  seems w o r t h y o f e x a m i n a t i o n b o t h i n terms o f i t s o u t g r o w t h f r o m t h e v a r i o u s e x t e r n a l and i n t e r n a l p r e s s u r e s t h a t b u i l t up a g a i n s t  the  p r e v i o u s l y h e l d p r o - T a i w a n p o l i c y o f the Sato government and a l s o , o f equal i m p o r t a n c e , i n terms o f t h e p r o x i m a t e a c t o r s t h a t a c t u a l l y ticipated i n this h i s t o r i c decision.  i  In short,  par-  t h i s s t u d y Li  i  seeks to e x p l a i n the China d e c i s i o n by r e f e r e n c e t o t h e major that played a r o l e i n b r i n g i n g t h i s decision to  forces  fulfillment.  Any a t t e m p t t o determine those f o r c e s , or i n p u t s , t h a t  influenced  t h e Chinaddec-ision-making process n a t u r a l l y f a l l s p r e y to t h e q u e s t i o n o f t h e ' c o r r e c t ' m e t h o d o l o g i c a l approach t o be employed i n t h e s t u d y . I n t h i s r e s p e c t , G e o f f r e y Pearson's comment seems p a r t i c u l a r l y germane: I f one were p r i m a r i l y i n t e r e s t e d i n " s y s t e m s " o f w o r l d p o l i t i c s , one m i g h t c o n c e n t r a t e on the processes t h a t l e a d t o the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f t h e system f r o m b i p o l a r i t y t o m u l t i p o l a r i t y and i n f e r [ n a t i o n a l ] a c t i o n as a b y - p r o d u c t o f t h i s change. I f one were p r i m a r i l y i n t e r e s t e d i n d e c i s i o n m a k i n g , one m i g h t emphasize changes i n the domestic environment... including leadership. Students o f o r g a n i z a t i o n would c o n c e n t r a t e on i n t r a - g o v e r n m e n t b a r g a i n i n g . P s y c h o l o g i s t s m i g h t p o i n t t o changes i n perception. Students o f power and i n f l u e n c e m i g h t e x p l a i n i t as a response t o e x t e r n a l pressures. None o f these approaches i s n e c e s s a r i l y wrong. What i s s t r i k i n g about them i s t h e i r l a c k of coherence.^ -  2  Thus t h e c l e a r n e c e s s i t y f o r us t o s p e c i f y , a t t h e o u t s e t , t h e focus t h a t t h i s s t u d y w i l l take w i t h i n such a m e t h o d o l o g i c a l s e t t i n g .  Here  we w i l l p r i m a r i l y be concerned w i t h the 'China n o r m a l i z a t i o n d e c i s i o n making p r o c e s s ' i n Japan, and w i l l t h e r e f o r e n a t u r a l l y tend t o concent r a t e upon examining the i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c a l changes w h i c h this decision.  Y e t , Pearson's r e f e r e n c e s to the l a c k o f  facilitate coherence  among the above approaches c a l l s our a t t e n t i o n t o t h e f a c t t h a t any o f these approaches would o n l y o f f e r us a p a r t i a l p i c t u r e o f  the  China d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s .  qaite  Thus, f o r example, i t may be  c o r r e c t f o r s t u d e n t s i n t e r e s t e d i n t h e e f f e c t s o f e x t e r n a l changes on a n a t i o n ' s i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c a l processes t o p o i n t t o t h e 1971 Nixon " s h o c k s " as the f o r c e which compelled Japan t o r e a p p r a i s e i t s policy.  China  But s t u d e n t s f u l l y aware o f t h e i n t r i c a c i e s o f Japanese  f a c t i o n a l i s m would i n s t e a d , n o d o u b t ^ p o i n t to t h e exigency o f  replacing  t h e Sato Cabinet w i t h one s u p p o r t e d by a f a c t i o n a l c o a l i t i o n p r e p a r e d to' back the new Cabinet i n i t s moves t o n o r m a l i z e r e l a t i o n s w i t h China. Admittedly,  the Nixon " s h o c k s " may have p r o v i d e d some o f the impetus  f o r t h i s change, b u t i n t e r n a l f a c t o r s a l s o p l a y e d an i m p o r t a n t I n o t h e r w o r d s , these approaches can o n l y o f f e r a p a r t i a l  role.  explanation  o f a p a r t i c u l a r event when more than one i m p o r t a n t actor^ or f a c t o r a lead r o l e i n that  y  plays  event.  I n o r d e r t o a v o i d some o f t h e p i t f a l l s o f a t t r i b u t i n g t h e China p o l i c y d e c i s i o n to one predominant a c t o r o r f a c t o r s , w i t h o u t examined o t h e r s which may have been e q u a l l y i f  having  n o t more i m p o r t a n t ,  this  3  s t u d y t h e r e f o r e examines b o t h the e x t e r n a l and i n t e r n a l  influences  .which a f f e c t e d Japan's d e c i s i o n to n o r m a l i z e r e l a t i o n s w i t h China. I n t h i s r e s p e c t , we w i l l f i r s t  consider the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of  the  p o l i c y - m a k i n g process i n Japan w h i c h i s g e n e r a l l y g i v e n by s t u d e n t s o f Japanese p o l i c y - m a k i n g .  The q u i n t e s s e n c e o f t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  t h a t a r u l i n g e l i t e o f LDP p o l i t i c i a n s ,  is  s e n i o r b u r e a u c r a t s , and b i g  business l e a d e r s ^ h o l d near e x c l u s i v e power i n t h e p o l i c y - m a k i n g process.  A f t e r drawing a t t e n t i o n t o the l i m i t a t i o n s o f employing such  a s i m p l i s t i c e x p o s i t o r y model t o e x p l a i n the Japanese p o l i c y - m a k i n g p r o c e s s , we w i l l t h e n t u r n t o a s p e c i f i c d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e China n o r m a l i z a t i o n p r o c e s s , f i r s t i n v e s t i g a t i n g the changes which o c c u r r e d i n the e x t e r n a l environment t o i n f l u e n c e o r make p o s s i b l e t h e a d o p t i o n o f a new China p o l i c y i n Japan.  N e x t , we w i l l t u r n t o analyze t h e r o l e  of the r u l i n g e l i t e i n t h e d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g process — c r a c y , and b i g b u s i n e s s —  to determine i f  these a c t o r s d i d i n  h o l d predominant i n f l u e n c e i n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r case. role insufficient  the LDP, b u r e a u -  t o f u l l y e x p l a i n the China p o l i c y  Finding  fact  their  decision-making  p r o c e s s , we w i l l then go on t o d i s c u s s t h e i m p o r t a n t r o l e p l a y e d by certain opposition party p o l i t i c i a n s  i n i n f l u e n c i n g t h e outcome o f  t h i s d e c i s i o n , f o l l o w e d l a s t l y by a d i s c u s s i o n o f the press and p u b l i c opinion.  I n t h i s way, we may i n our c o n c l u s i o n t h e r e f o r e hope t o  offer  an e x p l a n a t i o n o f some o f the e x t e r n a l and i n t e r n a l f o r c e s t h a t p l a y e d a r o l e i n i n f l u e n c i n g the ' C h i n a n o r m a l i z a t i o n p r o c e s s . '  4  Theoretical Perspective The P o l i c y - M a k i n g Process i n Japan The p o l i c y - m a k i n g process i n Japan i s most commonly analyzed i n terms o f a t r i p a r t i t e e l i t e model w h i c h focuses upon the l e a d e r s o f the r u l i n g L i b e r a l Democratic P a r t y  (LDP), s e n i o r  and l e a d e r s o f b i g b u s i n e s s ( o r z a i k a i ) .  bureaucrats,  The members o f t h i s  elite.  r  are c o n s i d e r e d to be a ' n a t u r a l ' r u l i n g c o a l i t i o n s h a r i n g common v a l u e s , o p i n i o n s , e d u c a t i o n a l experiences and s o c i a l  ties.  On a f u n c t i o n a l l e v e l , the members o f t h i s t r i p a r t i t e  elite  c o a l i t i o n are i n t e r t w i n e d t h r o u g h t h e i r m u t u a l dependence upon one another —  the LDP i s dependent upon the b u r e a u c r a t s f o r  expertise  i n d r a f t i n g l e g i s l a t i o n j and upon businessmen f o r p o l i t i c a l  contribu-  2 tions.  Naturally,  t h e b u r e a u c r a t s i n t h e i r t u r n a r e dependent upon  the good w i l l o f t h e LDP p o l i t i c i a n s i n making p o l i t i c a l favourable to t h e i r m i n i s t r i e s . over o f f e r s  decisions  For s e n i o r b u r e a u c r a t s the LDP more-  the o p p o r t u n i t y f o r them t o move over i n t o p o l i t i c s  r e t i r e m e n t f r o m the b u r e a u c r a c y .  Finally,  after  the z a i k a i has a s t a k e  seeing t h a t l e g i s l a t i o n p e r t a i n i n g to business o p e r a t i o n s i s  in  influenced  by i t s wishes and thus seeks f a v o u r s w i t h b o t h LDP p o l i t i c i a n s  and 3  i n f l u e n t i a l b u r e a u c r a t s w i t h i n t h e v a r i o u s governmental m i n i s t r i e s . W i t h v a r y i n g degrees o f emphasis, t h i s group i s c o n s i d e r e d t o h o l d p o l i t i c a l power and c o n t r o l o f the p o l i c y - m a k i n g process Japan.  in  For i n s t a n c e , Fukuij i n t h i s s t u d y of economic p l a n n i n g i n p o s t -  war Japanjconcludes t h a t the t r i p a r t i t e c o a l i t i o n o f LDP l e a d e r s , s e n i o r b u r e a u c r a t s and b i g business l e a d e r s h o l d " t h e p r e d o m i n a n t ,  5  almost e x c l u s i v e " r o l e i n the p o l i c y - m a k i n g p r o c e s s .  Moreover,  Thayer q u i t e e x p l i c i t l y s t a t e s a t t h e b e g i n n i n g o f an a r t i c l e " S e c u r i t y p o l i c y l i k e o t h e r major p o l i c y i n Japan i s the  that:  product o f  i n t e r a c t i o n among the business f e d e r a t i o n s , the b u r e a u c r a c y , and t h e c o n s e r v a t i v e p o l i t i c i a n s , . . . , " ^ and l a t e r a s s e r t s t h a t : v a t i v e power s t r u c t u r e ,  t h e n , i s composed o f t h r e e elements —  businessman, the b u r e a u c r a t , and t h e p o l i t i c i a n . " Yanaga f i n d s l i t t l e  "The c o n s e r -  6  the  I n t h e same way,  to question i n t h i s l a t t e r a s s e r t i o n :  "...organized  b u s i n e s s , t h e p a r t y government, and t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e bureaucracy a r e the t h r e e l e g s o f the t r i p o d on w h i c h the Japanese p o l i t i c a l rests."  system  However, u n l i k e Thayer, who comes down i n f a v o u r o f t h e p r e g dominant p o s i t i o n o f the p o l i t i c i a n s i n the p o l i c y - m a k i n g p r o c e s s , 7  Yanaga seems to see b i g business i n t h i s c e n t r a l  role:  I t p a r t i c i p a t e s i n the f o r m u l a t i o n of the l e g i s l a t i v e program, the b u d g e t , and f i s c a l and f i n a n c i a l p o l i c i e s . Defense p o l i c y and defense p r o d u c t i o n a r e o f d i r e c t concern t o business. Zaikai plays a decisive r o l e i n economic p l a n n i n g , . . . and z o n i n g , as w e l l as t r a d e and t a r i f f p o l i c y and t a x s t r u c t u r e . 9  I n regards  t o t h e above, t h e r e i s evidence f r o m the. e m p i r i c a l  w o r l d t o s u p p o r t the c o n t e n t i o n t h a t one o f the members o f the c o a l i t i o n h o l d s sway i n the p o l i c y - m a k i n g p r o c e s s .  ruling  Yanaga, f o r  instance,  observes i n a case s t u d y o f Japan's N a t i o n a l Atomic Energy P o l i c y  that  the a d o p t i o n o f an e f f e c t i v e energy p o l i c y "has been due m a i n l y to the i n i t i a t i v e s of organized b u s i n e s s . " " ^  I n c o n t r a s t , Hellman's  o f the peace agreement w i t h the S o v i e t Union s u p p o r t s T h a y e r ' s  study emphasis  upon the dominant r o l e o f t h e L i b e r a l Democratic P a r t y i n t h e p o l i c y -  6  -making p r o c e s s .  He n o t o n l y found t h a t " p o l i c y c o n t r o l r e s t e d o v e r -  w h e l m i n g l y i n t h e hands o f t h e r u l i n g party,""'""'" b u t a l s o t h a t habatsu [ f a c t i o n a l ]  "(t)he  s t r u g g l e became synonomous w i t h the f o r e i g n p o l i c y -  making process as p o l i t i c a l c o n f l i c t r e v o l v e d around t h e q u e s t i o n o f Soviet r e l a t i o n s . "  12  I n t h i s case, except f o r the f i s h i n g  industry,  which " d i d p l a y an e f f e c t i v e r o l e i n t h e f o r m a t i o n o f Japanese p o l i c y , " 14 b i g business groups were s u b o r d i n a t e i n t h e i r p o l i c y i n f l u e n c e ^  as  was t h e bureaucracy."'""' S t i l l , Misawa q u i t e e x p l i c i t l y s t a t e s t h a t i t t h i r d member o f t h e t r i p a r t i t e c o a l i t i o n —  is in fact  the bureaucracy —  the that  h o l d s sway i n t h e p o l i c y - m a k i n g p r o c e s s ^ s i n c e t h e r e i s a " . . . t e n d ency f o r the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g power t o be c o n c e n t r a t e d i n b u r e a u c r a t i c organizations."''"^  L i k e w i s e , T s u r u t a n i echoes t h i s argument when he  c l a i m s t h a t t h e F o r e i g n M i n i s t r y b u r e a u c r a c y dominates t h e f o r e i g n p o l i c y - m a k i n g process i n Japan."*"  7  Once a g a i n , t h e r e i s  certain  evidence t o suggest t h a t one member o f t h e c o a l i t i o n predominates the p o l i c y - m a k i n g p r o c e s s .  in  Thus, i n h i s s t u d y o f LDP's China p o l i c y  b e f o r e n o r m a l i z a t i o n , F u k u i concludes t h a t i t was the F o r e i g n M i n i s t r y 18 which e s t a b l i s h e d the g u i d e l i n e s f o r the LDP's China p o l i c y . Given t h e aforementioned i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f t h e p o l i c y - m a k i n g process i n Japan, i t appears t h a t t h e r e i s one p r o p o s i t i o n ^ a n d a t  least  t h r e e v a r i a n t s ^ t h a t may h e l p us i n e x p l a i n i n g t h e China n o r m a l i z a t i o n process: 1.  That t h e p o l i c y - m a k i n g process i n Japan i s dominated by a r u l i n g c o a l i t i o n o f l e a d e r s o f the LDP, the s e n i o r b u r e a u c r a t s , and l e a d e r s of b i g b u s i n e s s .  13  7  a.  That w i t h i n t h i s group t h e LDP d o m i n a t e s .  b.  That w i t h i n t h i s group b i g b u s i n e s s dominates.  c.  That w i t h i n t h i s group t h e bureaucracy dominates.  I t must be confessed t h a t f r o m an a n a l y t i c a l v i e w p o i n t i t  is  a p p e a l i n g to c o n s i d e r t h i s c o a l i t i o n as one w h i c h c o n t r o l s t h e p o l i c y making process i n Japan.  Such a c o n c l u s i o n i s n e v e r t h e l e s s  and s p u r i o u s because o t h e r a c t o r s and f a c t o r s p l a y a r o l e i n  premature influenc-  19 ing t h i s process.  For i n s t a n c e , i n r e s p e c t t o t h e r o l e o f the oppo-  s i t i o n p a r t i e s i n p o l i c y - m a k i n g , Langdon p o i n t s o u t t h a t i t has been t h e S o c i a l i s t s , and t h e s u p p o r t o f p o p u l a r p a c i f i s t i c  tendencies  that  " . . . h a s p r o b a b l y been the c h i e f goad i n e n f o r c i n g t h e narrow i n t e r p r e 20 t a t i o n g i v e n t o p e r m i s s i b l e Japanese defense e f f o r t s . " Referring a g a i n t o Hellmann, he found t h a t t h e S o c i a l i s t s p l a y e d a r o l e i n sup21 p o r t i n g Hatoyama's e f f o r t s  t o s e t t l e t h e peace t r e a t y  issue.  F i n a l l y , as we w i l l see l a t e r , c e r t a i n members o f the o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s p l a y e d a s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e i n t h e d e c i s i o n t o r e c o g n i z e the P e o p l e ' s 22 Republic o f C h i n a , Similarly,  the press and p u b l i c o p i n i o n p l a y a v a r i e d r o l e  in  p o l i c y - m a k i n g p r o c e s s e s , r e l a t i v e l y i m p o t e n t on some i s s u e s , y e t f o r m i n g 23 an e f f e c t i v e p r e s s u r e group on o t h e r s . On a g e n e r a l l e v e l , Langdon posits that: " P u b l i c views c l e a r l y can n o t c o n t r o l government p o l i c y 24 b u t they are n o t i g n o r e d . " I n t h i s r e g a r d , one would expect t h a t the i n f l u e n c e o f p u b l i c o p i n i o n , w h i c h as Scalapino laments i s g r e a t l y i n f l u e n c e d by the " l e f t i s t " p r e s s ,  25  would be most e f f e c t i v e  in  8  r e l a t i o n t o domestic i s s u e s o f d i r e c t concern t o t h e masses. fact,  S c a l a p i n o and Masumi concur t h a t t h e i s s u e s o f d i r e c t  .to them " . . . a r e e s s e n t i a l l y d o m e s t i c , p r a c t i c a l , and h i g h l y  In concern  personal  26 issues."  Thus, i n r e g a r d t o f o r e i g n p o l i c y i s s u e s , Hellmann found  i n one s t u d y t h a t the g e n e r a l p u b l i c was u n i n t e r e s t e d and i l l - i n f o r m e d 27 about such i s s u e s ,  b u t i n another s t u d y r e v e a l e d t h a t they a r e none-  t h e l e s s i n t e r e s t e d i n i s s u e s p e r t a i n i n g to Japan's s e c u r i t y ^ " * a r r a n g e m e n t s , E s p e c i a l l y when they r e v o l v e around the q u e s t i o n o f J a p a n ' s 29 s e c u r i t y t i e s w i t h the U n i t e d S t a t e s . As we w i l l see l a t e r , t h e r e  30  has a l s o been f l u c t u a t i n g mass i n t e r e s t i n the China i s s u e i n Japan. F i n a l l y , i n s o f a r as the r o l e o f t h e press i s concerned, Matsuyama argues t h a t j " . . . u n d e n i a b l y ,  the press has become i n c r e a s i n g l y i n f l u e n t i a l 31 i n t h e f o r m a t i o n o f Japanese f o r e i g n p o l i c y . " C e r t a i n l y , t h e study 32 33 o f the 1960 c r i s i s by whittemore^ and t h e one by Packard' l e n d supp o r t t o Matsuyama's c o n t e n t i o n . I n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r case, the i n f l u e n c e of the p r e s s " h e l p e d s w i t c h t h e i s s u e f r o m t h e t r e a t y i t s e l f t o t h e 34 q u e s t i o n o f K i s h i ' s competence t o l e a d . t h e g o v e r n m e n t . . . " study by Hellmann, i n c o n t r a s t , o u t l i n e s  The  t h a t the p r e s s can i n no way  " . . . s e r v e as a c a t a l y s t , p r o v i d i n g o r d e r and c l a r i t y i n what was a 35 highly chaotic s i t u a t i o n . "  I n f a c t , Hellmann d i s c o v e r e d t h a t  the  newspapers i n Japan " . . . d i d n o t p r o v i d e the b a s i s f o r c l e a r and r e l e v a n t p o l i c y d i s c u s s i o n " s i n c e they were r e p o r t i n g a l l the f a c t s i n the Soviet  "...undifferentiatingly 36  negotiations."  The f a c t t h a t a c t o r s o t h e r than those i n the t r i p a r t i t e  elite  are i n v o l v e d i n the p o l i c y - m a k i n g process i n Japan thus demonstrates  9  the l i m i t e d u t i l i t y  o f t h i s model i n a t t e m p t i n g t o e x p l a i n a p a r t i c u l a r  p o l i c y d e c i s i o n such as the Japan-China n o r m a l i z a t i o n  process.  In  s h o r t , the p o l i c y - m a k i n g p r o c e s s i n Japan i s too complex a p r o c e s s to be subsumed under a simple t r i p a r t i t e e l i t e model o f p o l i c y - m a k i n g . Essentially,  t h i s i s what Fiikui argues when he o u t l i n e s the reasons  why the model i s n o t a p p l i c a b l e t o p a r t i c u l a r p o l i c y - m a k i n g s i t u a t i o n s : firstly,  " . . . d i v e r s i t y of i n t e r e s t s leads  to d i v i s i o n s o f o p i n i o n on  s p e c i f i c p o l i c y i s s u e s and p r e v e n t s the members o f the e l i t e  from  u n i t i n g and r a l l y i n g b e h i n d p a r t i c u l a r p o l i c y d e c i s i o n s o r programs; and  s e c o n d l y "...important p o l i c y i s s u e s u s u a l l y i n t e r e s t and i n v o l v e  many i n d i v i d u a l s and groups i n the s o c i e t y a t l a r g e , f a r beyond the  37 boundaries o f the power e l i t e . " by EukuijWhen he s t a t e s :  This point i s elucidated  elsewhere  " F o r e i g n p o l i c y p r o c e s s i n Japan i s n o t under  the r i g i d and e x c l u s i v e c o n t r o l o f any s i n g l e group o f a c t o r s o r f a c t o r s . It i s a flexible,  dynamic, and f l u i d p r o c e s s s u b j e c t  to v a g a r i e s  of c i r -  i»38 cumstances, i s s u e s and p e r s o n a l i t i e s .  I n a broader context,  Rosenau  concurs t h a t " . . . t h e number and i d e n t i t y o f the r o l e s , b o t h i n and out of government, t h a t a r e r p b H t i c a l l y a c t i v e a t any moment i n time a r e manifestly  a consequence of t h e n a t u r e of t h e i s s u e s t h a t the system  39 i s processing  a t t h a t moment."  F i n a l l y , Pempel argues t h a t t o a s -  sume " . . . t h a t something i n the n a t u r e o f the i s s u e under debate w i l l  40 t r i g g e r s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t decision-mechanisms o r  processes,"  i s a p r o m i s i n g approach to u t i l i z e i n s t u d i e s o f p o l i c y - m a k i n g . Accordingly, normalization  i t would seem a p p r o p r i a t e  to c o n s i d e r  o f Japan-China r e l a t i o n s withinKS.uch  the i s s u e o f the a setting.  10  To commence w i t h , the p o l i c y - m a k i n g process i n v o l v e d i n China n o r m a l i z a t i o n i s s u e f a l l s w i t h i n t h e f u n c t i o n a l a r e a o f 41 policy.  Both Langdon  the foreign  42 and Pempel  suggest t h a t a f u n c t i o n a l  category  i s an i m p o r t a n t way t o d e l i n e a t e i s s u e s , so t h a t we may f i n d t h a t our case s t u d y oflrthe China i s s u e shares c e r t a i n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s i n common w i t h those s t u d i e s c a r r i e d o u t by Packard and Hellman.  T h i s would  appear t o be t h e . case,.es.peciallyyas a l l t h r e e s t u d i e s a r e " y e s " " n o " d e c i s i o n s l e a v i n g " . . . l i t t l e o r no room f o r compromise, and p o l i c y making becomes a h i g h c o n f l i c t ,  zero sum game f o r those t a k i n g o p -  "43 posing sides. ; T h i s suggests t h a t a f u r t h e r c a t e g o r y should d e a l w i t h c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of  the p o l i c y ; namely, whether or n o t t h e p o l i c y  d e c i s i o n i s o f c o n t r o v e r s y e i t h e r w i t h i n , o r between^the actors.  the  policy-making  T h i s c a t e g o r y i s s i m i l a r to;theonesuggested by Pempel i n  that  h i s " t o t a l " p o l i c y - m a k i n g i n v o l v e s c o n t r o v e r s y between t h e p r o g r e s s i v e 44 and c o n s e r v a t i v e camps.  C e r t a i n l y j i n the case o f C h i n a j t h e  policy-  making environment was h i g h l y c o n t r o v e r s i a l , b u t t h i s c o n t r o v e r s y was most i m p o r t a n t i n i t s i n t r a - p a r t y , r a t h e r than i n i t s  inter-partyj  manifestation. F i n a l l y , a t h i r d c a t e g o r y t h a t may f a c i l i t a t e an u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e p a r t i c u l a r a c t o r s t h a t a r e i n v o l v e d i n an i s s u e i s t h a t o f t e m p o r a l dimension o f t h e i s s u e a r e a . 45 v  most n o t a b l y Hermann,  the  I n t h i s r e s p e c t numerous s c h o l a r s ,  have p o i n t e d o u t t h e n e c e s s i t y o f  distinguishing  c r i s i s d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g f r o m o t h e r types o f d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g ,  crisis  d e c i s i o n s b e i n g made i n c o n d i t i o n s o f 1) h i g h t h r e a t t o n a t i o n a l g o a l s  11  2) s h o r t t i m e f o r response 3) s u r p r i s e .  The p o i n t i s t h a t such  d e c i s i o n s a r e considered t o be s u f f i c i e n t l y d i f f e r e n t f r o m l o n g e r term decisions^ i n r e s p e c t t o the i n c r e a s e i n importance o f  idiosyn-  c r a t i c and s y s t e m i c v a r i a b l e s , and the decrease i n importance o f s o c i e t a l f a c t o r s , t h a t these types o f p o l i c y - m a k i n g process a r e expected t o d i f f e r s u b s t a n t i a l l y .  Even s o , Lowi argues t h a t t h e r e  is  a c t u a l l y a s i m i l a r i t y between c r i s i s d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g and a c t s such 47 . as r e c o g n i t i o n . I s t s i s o n s i d e r i n g h i s argument i s based on t h e premise t h a t t h e r e i s l i t t l e  immediate domestic p o l i t i c a l  i n these d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g a c t s , h- .  -  consequences  t h e r e seems evidence t o s u g -  gest t h a t i n the case o f t h e n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f r e l a t i o n s w i t h China, t h i s i s n o t the case.  48  As a m a t t e r o f f a c t , F u k u i c o n s i d e r s t h e China n o r m a l i z a t i o n process as an example o f c r i s i s d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g , b u t f a i l s  to  define  49 p r e c i s e l y what he means by t h i s .  Q u i t e c l e a r l y , he h a r d l y meant  t h e same as Hermann by t h e term^ s i n c e o n l y one o f t h e a f o r e m e n t i o n e d c o n d i t i o n s d i d occur d u r i n g the ' p r o c e s s ' i . e . , short time f o r r e s p o n s e . I n d e e d  t h a t of a r e l a t i v e l y  i t m i g h t be argued t h a t none o f  J a p a n ' s p o s t - w a r p o l i c y d e c i s i o n s have been made i n a c r i s i s ment.^"'"  environ-  N o n e t h e l e s s , d e s p i t e t h e f a i l u r e o f F u k u i t o d e f i n e the  p r e c i s e meaning he g i v e s t o t h i s t e r m , he s t i l l makes t h e i m p o r t a n t point that " . . . c r i s i s  and n o n c r i s i s are n o t dichotomous  situations  s h a r p l y d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e f r o m each o t h e r b u t a r e merely two moving p o i n t s 52 on a continuum'.'  I f we take t h i s continuum to be t h a t o f the  temporal  . dimension,bounded on one s i d e by c r i s i s d e c i s i o n s s u c h as t h a t o f Korea^ f  12  and on the o t h e r w i t h l o n g - t e r m  slow decisions^ such as t h e Monroney  ' 54 Resolution,  t h e n t h e China d e c i s i o n would be c l o s e r to the  end o f t h e continuum.  The p o i n t i s t h a t when i m p o r t a n t  crisis  decision-  making a c t o r s p e r c e i v e an i s s u e to be u r g e n t , as i n the case o f n o r m a l i z a t i o n Tanaka a p p a r e n t l y d i d , then i t  i s more l i k e l y  i s s u e w i l l w i n o u t i n the c o m p e t i t i o n f o r scarce r e s o u r c e s  China  that  this  (time,  energy, a t t e n t i o n , money, manpower, and good w i l l ) w h i c h any i s s u e must compete  for.  F o l l o w i n g f r o m the above, t h e n , we can see t h a t t h e China d e c i s i o n f a l l s w i t h i n 1) the f u n c t i o n a l area o f f o r e i g n p o l i c y 2) controversial i n characteristic  is  3) i s u r g e n t on the t e m p o r a l d i m e n s i o n .  Thus, the c o n c l u s i o n s we draw f r o m t h i s s t u d y o f t h e China n o r m a l i z a t i o n process may p r o v i d e i n s i g h t s i n t o o t h e r i s s u e s t h a t f a l l w i t h i n these t h r e e  categories.  similarly  13  E x t e r n a l Environment Introduction I n p u t from t h e e x t e r n a l environment i s an i m p o r t a n t  variable  to c o n s i d e r i n any a t t e m p t to understand a f o r e i g n p o l i c y - m a k i n g process.  This i s p a r t i c u l a r l y t r u e i n r e s p e c t to Japan, w h i c h i s  considered by some a u t h o r s as a " p e n e t r a t e d " p o l i t i c a l s y s t e m , ^  6  and  even among Japanese e x p e r t s i s c o n s i d e r e d t o be g r e a t l y a f f e c t e d by c o n t i n u i t y and change i n t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l e n v i r o n m e n t . "*  7  This  ten-  dency to c o n s i d e r Japan as p e c u l i a r l y a f f e c t e d by t h e e x t e r n a l e n v i r o n m e n t l e d S i l v e r s t e i n t o p o s i t an " E x t e r n a l Dominance" model as a u s e f u l framework to employ when examining s h o r t - t e r m i s s u e s  (less  58 than one y e a r ) , or f o r e i g n p o l i c y g o a l s .  W h i l e t h i s framework m i g h t  thus be o f u t i l i t y i n examining t h e China n o r m a l i z a t i o n p r o c e s s , i s o f l e s s use i n examining l o n g e r term i s s u e s because " . . . f a r bowing t o e x t e r n a l p r e s s u r e s , Japan has f o u g h t any s h i f t i n  it  from  its  p o l i c i e s r e l a t i n g to the attainment of i t s long-range n a t i o n a l g o a l s . " ^ A foremost proponent o f the " E x t e r n a l Dominance" model i s Donald C. Hellmann, who argues i n h i s s t u d y o f the S o v i e t Peace T r e a t y negotiations  that: Unless t h e p a t t e r n of p o l i c y f o r m u l a t i o n and leadership displayed i n the Soviet negotiations i s r a d i c a l l y r e v e r s e d , Japan seems d e s t i n e d t o remain a p a s s i v e a c t o r on t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l s t a g e , r e a c t i n g t o , n o t l e a d i n g events d e s p i t e i n c r e a s i n g p o t e n t i a l f o r autonomous a c t i o n . ^ °  • Hellman echoes t h i s p o s i t i o n i n a l a t e r a r t i c l e w h e r e he s u g g e s t s - n  that:  "When the Japanese have had t o c o n f r o n t p o l i c y c h o i c e s , they have  responded i n a s t u m b l i n g m a n n e r . . . o r have p r o c r a s t i n a t e d u n t i l  external  14  events compelled a d e c i s i o n . . . "  I n p o i n t o f f a c t Hellmann  insists  t h a t : "To an e x t r a o r d i n a r y e x t e n t d u r i n g t h e p a s t two decades, J a p a n ' s i n t e r n a t i o n a l r o l e has been r e a c t i v e , d e f i n e d almost e n t i r e l y by the o u t s i d e e n v i r o n m e n t . . . . I t i s to the e x t e r n a l e n v i r o n m e n t , t h e n ,  that  62 one s h o u l d l o o k f o r  stimuli."  J a p a n ' s E a r l y Post-war F o r e i g n P o l i c y C e r t a i n l y , Japan's r e c o g n i t i o n o f t h e R e p u b l i c o f China (ROC) government on Taiwan i n t h e immediate p o s t - w a r i l l u s t r a t e s  that,at  t h i s t i m e , J a p a n ' s p o l i c y - m a k i n g process was p e c u l i a r l y a f f e c t e d by external factors.  M, -t .<v\>. Lain J I t !  i s a well-accepted fact that  it  was due to the p r e s s u r e of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , i n p a r t i c u l a r t h a t o f S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e D u l l e s , t h a t Japan signed a peace t r e a t y w i t h t h e Nationalist  Chinese government on Taiwan^as the p r i c e exacted f o r  the  passage o f the Japanese peace t r e a t y through the U n i t e d States Senate. A l t h o u g h Prime M i n i s t e r Yoshida made an e f f o r t  to leave t h e p o s s i b i l i t y  o f i m p r o v i n g r e l a t i o n s w i t h China open by d r a f t i n g a l e t t e r t o t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s emphasizing t h a t the peace t r e a t y a p p l i e d s o l e l y 64 t e r r i t o r y under the c o n t r o l o f the N a t i o n a l i s t government,  to  suc-  c e s s i v e c o n s e r v a t i v e governments accepted r e l a t i o n s w i t h the Rep u b l i c c o f China on the p o l i t i c a l and economic l e v e l , l e a d i n g t o t h e de j u r e r e c o g n i t i o n o f t h e ROC government on Taiwan as the government o f China.  legitimate  Of c o u r s e , m a i n t a i n i n g such a p o l i c y was i n  line  w i t h the U n i t e d N a t i o n s ' acceptance o f the ROC as de j u r e government o f C h i n a , b u t more i m p o r t a n t l y ^ i t went hand i n hand w i t h J a p a n ' s r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , e s p e c i a l l y i n r e s p e c t to the cont i n u a t i o n o f the U n i t e d States-Japan S e c u r i t y Treaty^ w h i c h formed  15  p a r t o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s s e c u r i t y system aimed a t Chinese and S o v i e t communism.  It  seems c l e a r ,  'containing'  therefore,  that  from  the o u t s e t the r e l a t i o n s h i p between Japan and t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s  did  much to determine J a p a n ' s p o s t - w a r China p o l i c y . Changes i n the E x t e r n a l Environment Commencing i n the 1970s, however, a number o f nascent changes i n t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l environment emerged,which were p r o p i t i o u s t o a major r e - d i r e c t i o n of Japan's China p o l i c y , away from a p r i o r  policy  d e c r y i n g the " s e p a r a t i o n o f p o l i t i c s and economics" ( s e i k i b u n r i ) , t o one c o m p a t i b l e w i t h t h a t o f t h e Chinese d o c t r i n e o f t h e " i n s e 65 p a r a b i l i t y o f p o l i t i c s and economics" ( s e i k e i f u k a b u n ) . I n the f i r s t p l a c e , b o t h Canada and I t a l y extended d i p l o m a t i c relations  to China.  Secondly, and o f more i m p o r t a n c e , a change was  i n p r o g r e s s r e g a r d i n g the r o l e o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s i n the Far East a f t e r t h e e n u n c i a t i o n o f the ' N i x o n D o c t r i n e ' a t Guam i n 1969. sentially,  the t e n e t o f t h i s p o l i c y was t h a t t h e burden o f  Es-  security  f o r the area s h o u l d be c a r r i e d by t h e A s i a n n a t i o n s themselves r a t h e r t h a n by the U n i t e d States c o n t i n u i n g to serve as a b u l w a r k a g a i n s t 66 communism t h r o u g h heavy m i l i t a r y commitment t o the a r e a .  The  d e c l a r a t i o n o f t h e Nixon D o c t r i n e was o f p a r t i c u l a r importance as p e r t a i n e d to Japan, f o r Prime M i n i s t e r . S a t o signed a j o i n t  it  communique  w i t h P r e s i d e n t Nixon i n November 1969 i n w h i c h he concurred t h a t  the  s e c u r i t y i n t e r e s t s o f Japan were i n t i m a t e l y l i n k e d w i t h those o f Taiwan and Korea,  i.e.,  Sato agreed t h a t t h e Japan would p e r m i t  U n i t e d States use o f m i l i t a r y bases i n Japan t o defend Taiwan and  the  16  Korea a g a i n s t communist r e g i m e s . " '  That Sato succumbed to t h e wishes  - o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s i n r e c o g n i z i n g J a p a n ' s presumed s e c u r i t y i n t e r e s t s these c o u n t r i e s i s b a s i c a l l y t h e c o s t t h a t Sato had to pay f o r the  return  o f Okinawa t o Japan. The Change i n the U n i t e d S t a t e s China P o l i c y W h i l e the changes o u t l i n e d above i n d i c a t e . } t h a t t h e system was g r a d u a l l y t r a n s f o r m i n g i t s c o n f i g u r a t i o n ,  international  the event which  c l e a r l y adumbrated t h a t Japan would s h o r t l y be compelled t o i t s p o l i c y towards China^ was when.Wia^s h'i-n-g  tSocn-ti  reconsider  extended  official  c o n t a c t s t o P e k i n g . This commenced when Henry Kissenger made a s e c r e t visit  to China i n . J u n e , 1 9 7 1 , f o l l o w e d by t h e announcement on J u l y  1 5 t h t h a t P r e s i d e n t Nixon would v i s i t  China.  From the Japanese p o i n t  o f v i e w , t h e l a c k o f any p r i o r c o n s u l t a t i o n i n f o r m i n g them o f  this  change i n U n i t e d S t a t e s p o l i c y was a ' s t a b i n t h e b a c k h a n d a p e r s o n a l l o s s o f f a c e f o r Prime M i n i s t e r Sato. Sato government i t s e l f  I n p o i n t o f f a c t j i t was the  t h a t r e c e i v e d the blame f o r " . . . t h e  intolerable 68  l o s s o f f a c e and h u m i l i a t i o n s u f f e r e d by the e n t i r e n a t i o n . " As a r e s u l t o f t h e absence o f any p r i o r c o n s u l t a t i o n  concerning  the r e a l i g n m e n t o f the U n i t e d States' China p o l i c y i n v i o l a t i o n o f 69 p r e v i o u s u n d e r s t a n d i n g s between t h e two c o u n t r i e s ,  t h e Japanese  government's c o n f i d e n c e i n i t s a l l y was n a t u r a l l y undermined.  Most  c e r t a i n l y the f i r s t o f t h e Nixon " s h o c k s " c o n s i d e r a b l y weakened the b a s i s o f J a p a n ' s p o s t - w a r f o r e i g n p o l i c y which had been e s t a b l i s h e d on the premise of c l o s e t i e s between Japan and the U n i t e d S t a t e s . When to t h i s was added t h e " s h o c k s " on t h e economic l e v e l , -T-^ • -  in  •  17  the presumed s p e c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p Between Japan and t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s was b r o u g h t s e r i o u s l y i n t o q u e s t i o n . ^ * 7  I n f a c t , w h i l e Nixon and  K i s s i n g e r were " . . . p a y i n g homage r h e t o r i c a l l y  t o t h e supreme i m p o r -  tance o f t h e a l l i a n c e , i n t h e i r p e r s o n a l approaches and p r i v a t e tements,  [ t h e y ] r a i s e d s u b s t a n t i a l doubts about t h e i r  "toward Japan."  Finally,  true  sta-  attitudes  the Nixon " s h o c k s " i m p l i e d t h a t t h e  "...Sato  government c o u l d n o t j u s t i f y i t s China p o l i c y as i t had b e f o r e under the p r e t e x t o f t h e p r e s s u r e and c o n s t r a i n t s p l a c e d on i t by t h e U n i t e d States."  7 1  D e s p i t e these moves on t h e p a r t o f the U n i t e d S t a t e s , . t h e Sato government was s t i l l prepared t o be the o n l y i m p o r t a n t power t o back t h e U n i t e d States i n i t s a t t e m p t to p r e v e n t t h e s e a t i n g o f t h e Peking government i n the U n i t e d N a t i o n s .  T h i s was done by p r o p o s i n g a d r a f t  r e s o l u t i o n f o r t h e d u a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n system i n w h i c h b o t h the T a i p e i and Peking governments would h o l d a seat i n the U n i t e d N a t i o n s , and by c o - s p o n s o r i n g the " i m p o r t a n t q u e s t i o n " r e s o l u t i o n o f the U n i t e d S t a t e s w h i c h r e q u i r e d a t w o - t h i r d s m a j o r i t y o f t h e General Assembly b e f o r e Taiwan c o u l d l o s e i t s s e a t .  Needless t o say, i t was a t the October  1971 meeting o f t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s t h a t t h e U.S. p r o p o s a l was d e f e a t e d and the A l b a n i a n ' s o l e government' m o t i o n was adopted by t h e Assembly, thereby g i v i n g the China seat i n the U n i t e d N a t i o n s t o t h e Peking government. Still,  7 2  i t had n o t been a t a l l c e r t a i n t h a t Japan would be prepared  to co-sponsor t h e U n i t e d States r e s o l u t i o n i n t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s . was . . p a r t i c u l a r l y - - t r u e : a f t e r t h e F o r e i g n M i n i s t r y i n d i c a t e d to  This  Secretary  18  o f S t a t e Rogers t h a t i t was u n c e r t a i n whether or n o t Japan would back 73 the United States i n the United Nations  and, o f more i m p o r t a n c e ,  aft  F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r Fukuda and LDP f a c t i o n s l e a d e r s Takeo M i k i and Y o s u h i r o Nakasone s t a t e d p u b l i c l y t h a t t h e y were not i n f a v o u r o f  at74  t e m p t i n g t o t r y and keep a seat f o r Taiwan i n the U n i t e d N a t i o n s . Tnsol-r :. :v Prime M i n i s t e r Sato-msi msieelrf cd, -Va was p r e p a r e d t o concede to the p r i n c i p l e . o f  'one China)'' b u t n o t t o a c t i n a way  t h a t m i g h t t h r e a t e n t h e s a f e t y o f Taiwan's seat i n the U n i t e d Nations^ or J a p a n ' s c o n t i n u i n g p o l i t i c a l and commercial i n t e r e s t s on t h e  island  E v i d e n t l y a t t h i s t i m e Sato was under p r e s s u r e f r o m the U n i t e d S t a t e s t o c o n t i n u e t h e p r e v i o u s l y u p h e l d p r o - T a i w a n p o s i t i o n i n the UN.  In  the words o f F u k u i : Apart f r o m h i s concern about the impact o f Japan's n e g a t i v e a c t i o n on the a t t i t u d e s o f A u s t r a l i a , New Zealand, e t c . , which the U.S. a p p a r e n t l y emphasized, he was o b v i o u s l y w o r r i e d about p o s s i b l e impact on the U.S. a t t i t u d e on t h e t e x t i l e p r o b l e m , which was e n t e r i n g the f i n a l and c r i t i c a l phase, and t h e .j. a c t u a l r e v e r s i o n o f Okinawa, w h i c h was scheduled f o r n e x t s p r i n g . As a m a t t e r o f f a c t ^ i t was r e v e a l e d a few days b e f o r e Sato f i n a l l y nounced t h e d e c i s i o n t h a t Japan would co-sponsor t h e U.S.  an-  resolution  t h a t f o r " a d m i n i s t r a t i v e r e a s o n s " t h e r e had been a delay i n t h e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e Okinawa p a c t agreement t o the U.S. Senate, a l t h o u g h i t was denied t h a t t h e U.S. was t r y i n g to p r e s s u r e Japan i n t o i n g i t s p o l i c y i n the U N .  7 6  follow-  N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e Japanese government  s u b m i t t e d , and t h e r e b y c l e a r l y i l l u s t r a t e d t h a t Japan's  policy-making  process was under i m p o r t a n t and obvious c o n s t r a i n t s f r o m t h e U n i t e d States.  19  A l t h o u g h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s had backed Taiwan i n t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s i t became e v i d e n t a f t e r N i x o n ' s v i s i t  t o China i n February 1972 t h a t  t h e r e had been a change i n American p o l i c y i n r e s p e c t t o t h e Taiwan government.  This i s i l l u s t r a t e d i n t h e Shanghai communique by the  f a c t t h a t the U.S. government no l o n g e r upheld t h e p o s i t i o n i t  had  e s t a b l i s h e d a t t h e o u t b r e a k o f the Korean w a r ; namely, t h a t the s t a t u s o f Taiwan "must a w a i t the r e s t o r a t i o n o f s e c u r i t y i n t h e P a c i f i c , a peace s e t t l e m e n t w i t h Japan [ s i g n e d i n 1 9 5 1 ] , o r c o n s i d e r a t i o n by the U i N . , " b u t now v i r t u a l l y a d m i t t e d t h a t Taiwan i s a p a r t o f Chinese territory:  " t h e U.S. acknowledges t h a t a l l Chinese on e i t h e r s i d e o f  the Taiwan S t r a i t s m a i n t a i n t h a t t h e r e i s b u t one China and t h a t Taiwan i s a p a r t o f China. tion.  The U.S. government does n o t c h a l l e n g e t h a t p o s i -  I t r e a f f i r m s i t s i n t e r e s t i n a p e a c e f u l s e t t l e m e n t o f the Taiwan  q u e s t i o n by the Chinese t h e m s e l v e s . "  is  under-  s t o o d , gave an u n w r i t t e n promise t h a t i t would n o t use f o r c e t o  regain  7 7  The Chinese s i d e , i t  Taiwan i n exchange>for t h e above U.S. d e c l a r a t i o n and i t s  commitment  78 t o reduce American f o r c e s i n Taiwan. c o n t i n u e d to say t h a t the U.S. was s t i l l  I n s p i t e of t h i s ,  Kissinger  committed t o i t s  security  t r e a t y w i t h Taiwan, as d i d the P r e s i d e n t i n t h e S t a t e o f . t h e World Report f o r 1972. I n s o f a r as Prime M i n i s t e r Sato and h i s successor Tanaka were c o n c e r n e d , however, t h e Sino-American d e t e n t e and the accompanying commun i q u e i m p l i e d t h a t t h e commitment t h a t Sato had e a r l i e r made t o Nixon i n the 1969 communique, namely t h a t Taiwan i s i m p o r t a n t t o Japan's s e c u r i t y , had been s e r i o u s l y undermined by t h e change i n b r o u g h t about by these e v e n t s . I n Tanaka's w o r d s :  circumstances  "The Taiwan clause  20  s t a t e d the u n d e r s t a n d i n g by t h e then top l e a d e r s o f the two c o u n t r i e s on the s i t u a t i o n i n t h a t a r e a . d r a s t i c changes.  Fortunately,  Since t h e n , t h e s i t u a t i o n has undergone f o r the present,  the p o s s i b i l i t y o f an  armed d i s p u t e a c t u a l l y a r i s i n g over t h i s area h a r d l y e x i s t s .  Accord-  79 ingly,  t h e above-mentioned u n d e r s t a n d i n g has changed."  After  the  n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f r e l a t i o n s w i t h C h i n a , Tanaka went even f u r t h e r by declaring that:  "The U.S. and China a r e no l o n g e r i n a s i t u a t i o n where  they cannot have t a l k s w i t h each o t h e r .  Consequently such a s i t u a t i o n  (as the i n v o k i n g o f t h e U.S. - Japan S e c u r i t y T r e a t y ) can be a v o i d e d , gQ and t h e r e i s ho p o s s i b i l i t y o f such a s i t u a t i o n  arising."  The m e e t i n g i n August 1972 between Prime M i n i s t e r Tanaka and P r e s i d e n t Nixon i n Hawaii i n d i c a t e d  .ne-vertbE-j.es ~ , t h a t the U n i t e d  S t a t e s d i d n o t share i n the Japanese government's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n t h e "Taiwan clause^" and s t i l l  c o n s i d e r e d the a p p l i c a t i o n o f  of  the  s e c u r i t y t r e a t y t o Taiwan an i m p o r t a n t element o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s 81 Japan S e c u r i t y T r e a t y .  -  Even though a t t h i s m e e t i n g t h e r e was no  s p e c i f i c r e f e r e n c e t o t h e "Taiwan Clause" and Tanaka o n l y  concurred  w i t h Nixon t h a t Japan would c o n t i n u e t o s u p p o r t t h e s e c u r i t y t h e c o n t i n u e d " . . . A m e r i c a n i n s i s t e n c e on the a p p l i c a t i o n o f s e c u r i t y t r e a t y to Taiwan i n s p i t e o f i t s  treaty, the  d e t e n t e w i t h China suggests  t h a t t h e Far East clauses remain f o r the U.S.  the most p r i z e d p a r t  of  82 the t r e a t y . " government t o  Naturally,  i n t h i s c o n t e x t the moves made by the Tanaka  n o r m a l i z e r e l a t i o n s w i t h China were p e r f e c t l y  under-  s t a n d a b l e t o the American l e a d e r s who had i n i t i a t e d t h e d e t e n t e w i t h 83 China.  In short,  they a l l o w e d the Tanaka government a ' f r e e h a n d '  21  i n d e a l i n g w i t h C h i n a , b u t o n l y because t h i s was c o m p a t i b l e w i t h  the  new b a l a n c e o f power diplomacy o f Nixon and K i s s i n g e r . Chinese F o r e i g n P o l i c y Outputs Besides c o n s i d e r i n g the e f f e c t o f t h e U n i t e d States* China p o l i c y on the development o f Sino-Japanese r e l a t i o n s , i t  i s of  course  a l s o i m p o r t a n t t o examine the e f f e c t o f t h e f o r e i g n p o l i c y o u t p u t s o f t h e Chinese government on t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p .  I n t h i s r e s p e c t the most  i m p o r t a n t o u t p u t s p e r t a i n t o t h e Chinese government's a t t i t u d e s  toward  1) the U n i t e d S t a t e s - Japan S e c u r i t y t r e a t y and r e v i v a l o f Japanese m i l i t a r i s m , 2) the Sato government, and 3) t h e Tanaka government. Chinese A t t i t u d e s Towards t h e U.S. - Japan S e c u r i t y T r e a t y and Japanese M i l i t a r i s m I t was n a t u r a l f o r the Chinese government t o assume a n e g a t i v e a t t i t u d e towards t h e U.S. - Japan S e c u r i t y T r e a t y which was e x p r e s s l y c o n s t r u c t e d f o r the purpose o f c o m b a t t i n g Chinese and S o v i e t communism. From the Chinese p o i n t o f view the S e c u r i t y T r e a t y was designed t o a i d ?  ;".  t h e r e v i v a l o f Japanese m i l i t a r i s m .  Concern over t h e r e v i v a l o f  m i l i t a r i s m was expressed as e a r l y as 1950^and then p e r i o d i c a l l y  through  the 1960s, b u t i t was a f t e r the r e l e a s e o f t h e S a t o - N i x o n j o i n t communique i n 1969 t h a t Chinese concern became p a r t i c u l a r l y n o t i c e a b l e . Emmerson d e s c r i b e s  it:  P u b l i c a t i o n o f t h e S a t o - N i x o n communique produced shock waves i n P e k i n g . . . . T h e focus was on the r e v i v a l o f Japanese m i l i t a r i s m , a l l e g e d by t h e Chinese t o be r e v e a l e d by t h e r e f e r e n c e i n the communique t o s e c u r i t y , p a r t i c u l a r l y t o the t y i n g t o g e t h e r o f Japan's s e c u r i t y w i t h t h a t o f South Korea and t h e "Taiwan a r e a . " The Peking P e o p l e ' s D a i l y  As  22  a t t a c k e d t h e Sato-Nixon agreements as a ' c r i m i n a l p l o t o f t h e U n i t e d States and Japanese r e a c t i o n a r i e s , ' and Chou E n - l a i c i t e d the communique as p r o o f o f S a t o ' s a m b i t i o n to r e v i v e Japanese m i l i t a r i s m and b u i l d another ' G r e a t e r East A s i a CoP r o s p e r i t y Sphere. '"84 The Chinese government c o n t i n u e d t o express a n t i - J a p a n e s e propaganda and r e f e r e n c e to the r e v i v a l o f m i l i t a r i s m t h r o u g h press r e l e a s e s and 85 o f f i c i a l statements d u r i n g 1970 and 1 9 7 1 .  A f t e r October ' 7 1 , how-  e v e r , t h e r e was a g r a d u a l d e c l i n e i n r e f e r e n c e t o Japanese m i l i t a r i s m and a d i s c o n t i n u a t i o n i n o f f i c i a l r e f e r e n c e t o t h i s q u e s t i o n a f t e r t h e 86 v i s i t o f Nixon t o China. One o f the reasons f o r t h i s change i n Chinese a t t i t u d e r e s u l t e d f r o m the development o f more c o r d i a l r e l a 87 t i o n s between t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and China.  A f u r t h e r , perhaps more  c r u c i a l reason i n terms o f the r e a l i g n m e n t o f t h e b i p o l a r w o r l d , was t h e f a c t t h a t the S o v i e t Union p r e c i p i t a t e d China i n i t s o v e r t u r e s Japan, by e x p r e s s i n g a preparedness t o n e g o t i a t e a peace t r e a t y  to  with  88 Japan  and a l l o w i t s p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the development' o f  Siberian  89 resources.  So t h a t n o w . i n s t e a d o f c o n c e n t r a t i n g upon t h e r e v i v a l  o f m i l i t a r i s m and a b r o g a t i o n o f the s e c u r i t y t r e a t y ,  the Chinese g o v e r n -  ment aimed a t p r e v e n t i n g a rapprochement between the USSR and Japan. As Yao makes c l e a r : I n the e a r l y stages o f t h e CCP f o r e i g n p o l i c y change, t h e undermining o f t h e a l l i a n c e between the U n i t e d S t a t e s and Japan was one of i t s c h i e f d i p l o m a t i c g o a l s . L a t e r o n , when Moscow was doing h e r utmost t o a t t r a c t Japan, the CCP ceased c r i t i c i z i n g t h e U.S. - Japan S e c u r i t y T r e a t y and Japanese m i l i t a r i s m and s t a r t e d t o do a l l i t c o u l d to s t o p rapprochement.between t h e USSR and Japan.90  23  Not o n l y d i d t h e Chinese government cease f r o m making i n f l a m m a t o r y statements concerning t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s - Japan S e c u r i t y T r e a t y and r e v i v a l o f Japanese m i l i t a r i s m , b u t Nakamura suggests t h a t t h e r e may have been a c l e a r a n c e f r o m Peking f o r the c o n t i n u i n g presence o f U.S. f o r c e s i n Taiwan as a " d e t e r r e n t " a g a i n s t any moves by the S o v i e t 91 -Union.  I n any e v e n t , the development o f a new Chinese a t t i t u d e  towards  Japan, i n r e s p e c t t o t h e r e v i v a l o f m i l i t a r i s m and t h e U.S. - Japan S e c u r i t y T r e a t y , r e p r e s e n t e d a necessary step t h a t had to be taken b e f o r e n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f Japan-China r e l a t i o n s c o u l d p r o c e e d . Chinese A t t i t u d e s Towards t h e Sato Government's E v o l v i n g China Policy A l t h o u g h t h e Chinese government had a t f i r s t been e x p e c t a n t Sato would i n i t i a t e moves to improve Sino-Japanese r e l a t i o n s , i t  that soon  became apparent t h a t he was n o t going to s t e p beyond the c o n f i n e s  of  t h e p r e v i o u s LDP government's " t w o - C h i n a " p o l i c y f a v o u r i n g Taiwan p o l i 92 tically.  I n d e e d , h i s s t r o n g a n t i - c o m m u n i s t b i a s and a d o p t i o n o f  p o l i c i e s a p p e r t a i n i n g - t o such a .]p;r.ie-J.usd'i5tG=ej, i n e l u c t a b l y l e d t o the t  c r e a t i o n o f a pronounced sense o f d i s t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n between t h e Chinese and Japanese governments.^ C o n c o m i t t a n t l y , Sato was c o n t i n u a l l y charged w i t h r e v i v i n g Japanese m i l i t a r i s m and a s s i s t i n g i n U.S. i m p e r i a l i s t i c designs i n A s i a .  The e x t e n t t o o w h i c h t h e Chinese g o v e r n -  ment was opposed t o d e a l i n g w i t h the Sato government i s  demonstrated  by the f a c t t h a t Sato was c o n s i d e r e d one o f t h e " f o u r main enemies" 93 of the People's Republic. Regardless o f the f a c t t h a t the Chinese government was  24  unprepared t o d e a l w i t h him,/: Prime . . M i n i s t e r . Sato a t the b e g i n n i n g o f the 1970s began t o i n d i c a t e a more p o s i t i v e p o s t u r e towards t h e Chinese government symptomatic o f an e v o l v i n g new China p o l i c y . y  I n h i s 1970  annual p o l i c y speech, f o r i n s t a n c e , he h i n t e d t h e r e was a p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t government t o government c o n t a c t s c o u l d be e s t a b l i s h e d w i t h C h i n a . Moreover, a f t e r the U n i t e d S t a t e s i n i t i a t e d i t s  "ping-pong diplomacy",  Sato a t t e m p t e d to b r i n g about o f f i c i a l c o n t a c t s between the Japanese and Chinese governments.  If. t h i n t h i s ^ r e s p e c t e , i n A p r i l 1971 he t r i e d  to e s t a b l i s h a l i n e o f communication t h r o u g h the e f f o r t s o f the  chair-  man o f the newly a p p o i n t e d LDP China Committee, Noda, who agreed t o visit  China on b e h a l f o f the Prime M i n i s t e r .  However, " . . . t h e  a b o r t e d due to t h e l a c k of response f r o m the Chinese s i d e .  plan  Noda n e v e r -  t h e l e s s d r a f t e d i n June a t h r e e - p a r t p r o p o s a l f o r n o r m a l i z a t i o n , w h i c h e x p l i c i t l y r e c o g n i z e d the PRC as t h e l e g i t i m a t e government o f China, and Taiwan as p a r t o f Chinese t e r r i t o r y b u t d i d n o t deny t h e v a l i d i t y 05  o f the 1952 peace t r e a t y between Japan and the Republic o f China. Along the l i n e s o f t h i s d r a f t by Noda^LDP S e c r e t a r y General H o r i drew up a s e c r e t l e t t e r  t o the Peking government i n e a r l y October^ and  r e q u e s t e d the l e f t - w i n g Tokyo Governor Minobe, t o d e l i v e r t h e f o r him.  letter  I n t h i s l e t t e r , w h i c h was approved by Prime M i n i s t e r  and F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r Fukuda, H o r i expressed a d e s i r e to v i s i t t o b e g i n n e g o t i a t i o n s and o s t e n s i b l y accepted t h e f i r s t three p r i n c i p l e s —  Sato China  two o f  t h a t Peking i s the l e g i t i m a t e government o f  and t h a t Taiwan i s a p a r t o f Chinese t e r r i t o r y — the t h i r d p r i n c i p a l —  China's China  and conveyed t h a t  t h e a b r o g a t i o n o f t h e Japan-ROC peace t r e a t y  —  25  would be met t h r o u g h n e g o t i a t i o n s between t h e two governments.  96  The n e c e s s i t y f o r Sato to r e p l a c e h i s moribund China p o l i c y had become p a r t i c u l a r l y m a n i f e s t a f t e r the J u l y N i x o n ' s impending v i s i t  to China.  ' 7 1 announcement o f P r e s i d e n t  The Chinese, however, were  still  unprepared to n e g o t i a t e w i t h t h e Sato government as Premier Chou considered t h a t n e i t h e r Prime M i n i s t e r  Sato n o r t h e H o r i l e t t e r  could  97 be t r u s t e d .  I n s p e c i f i c r e f e r e n c e t o the l e t t e r , Chou -indicated  that  h i s government c o u l d n o t accept the c o n d i t i o n s o u t l i n e d by H o r i because he had n o t c l a r i f i e d Japan would abrogate t h e peace t r e a t y w i t h Taiwan 98 o r t h a t Peking was t h e s o l e government o f China. Another reason f o r Chou's r e j e c t i o n o f the H o r i l e t t e r p r o b a b l y r e s u l t e d f r o m J a p a n ' s a n t i 99 Peking p o s t u r e i n t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s .  Whatever may have been the t r u e  reason f o r the r e j e c t i o n o f the l e t t e r by China, t h e p o i n t was t h a t by sending the l e t t e r under the name o f t h e LDP s e c r e t a r y g e n e r a l  "its  r e j e c t i o n by the PRC would n o t d i r e c t l y h u r t " e i t h e r Sato o r h i s f o r the next presidency,  choice  Fukuda. ^ 1  Even b e f o r e t h i s l e t t e r was d e l i v e r e d by Governor Minobe i n e a r l y November 1 9 7 1 , Sato had made a speech i n October i n which he acknowledged f o r the f i r s t  t i m e t h a t t h e Peking government was the l e g i t i m a t e g o v e r n -  ment o f China and expressed h i s hope t h a t t h e q u e s t i o n o f Taiwan would be r e s o l v e d " t h r o u g h n e g o t i a t i o n s between t h e p a r t i e s concerned.""'"^"'" By March 1972 t h i s p o l i c y stance had been i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o the Sato government's " u n i f i e d v i e w " on t h e China p r o b l e m , which F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r Fukuda p r e s e n t e d to the House o f R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s Budget Committee a t +uthxs +• t i m e . 102  26  The e x p r e s s i o n o f t h i s u n i f i e d view removed t h e f o r m a l o b s t a c l e to n o r m a l i z a t i p n o f Sino-Japanese r e l a t i o n s by r e c o g n i z i n g t h e Peking government's c l a i m t o s o v e r e i g n t y over China and hence by i m p l i c a t i o n over Taiwan-  The c o n t i n u e d Chinese r e f u s a l t o have any d e a l i n g s w i t h  the Sato g o v e r n m e n t , n o n e t h e l e s s s r e v a a l s a  t h a t the r e a l o b s t a c l e to t h e  improvement o f Sino-Japanese r e l a t i o n s was Sato h i m s e l f ,  o r more p r e c i s e l y  the Chinese government's a t t i t u d e towards t h e Prime M i n i s t e r .  Thus, upon  h i s r e t u r n f r o m China i n l a t e A p r i l 1972 one o f t h e contenders f o r  the  n e x t p r e s i d e n c y , Takeo M i k i , d e c l a r e d : " I r e g r e t t o say t h a t i t  dif-  ficult  is  to r e s t o r e Japan-China d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s under t h e Sato g o v e r n 103  ment.  It  i s t h e t a s k o f t h e new government."  Fundamentally,  the  Chinese government's r e f u s a l t o have any d e a l i n g s w i t h t h e Sato government a t t e s t e d i t was n o t m e r e l y d i f f i c u l t b u t w e l l h i g h i m p o s s i b l e f o r n o r m a l i z a t i o n of r e l a t i o n s  to be achieved w h i l e Sato was i n power.  Sato "no  doubt would have d e s i r e d to have t h e China problem r e s o l v e d " b e f o r e t h e 104 end o f h i s term i n o f f i c e ,  b u t t h e maintenance o f a r i g i d  attitude  on the p a r t o f the Chinese government meant t h a t t h e n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f r e l a t i o n s had t o a w a i t t h e i n a u g u r a t i o n o f t h e n e x t LDP c a b i n e t . Wi'itheregard~tr> t h e t a b o v e , t h e - Chinese government had conveyed t o the v a r i o u s m i s s i o n s v i s i t i n g China t h a t i t would cooperate i n e s t a b l i s h i n g r e l a t i o n s once Sato was removed f r o m o f f i c e .  When the Komeito  m i s s i o n v i s i t e d China i n May 1972, f o r example, Chou s t a t e d t h a t : "we w i l l welcome the New Prime M i n i s t e r v i s i t i n g China as l o n g as he makes an e f f o r t  to b r i n g about the r e a l i z a t i o n o f the t h r e e p r i n c i p l e s .  L i k e w i s e , when t h e p r o - P e k i n g LDP Dietman F u r u i v i s i t e d Peking a t  27  about  t h e t i m e he  " . . . r e c e i v e d an i m p r e s s i o n t h a t China would g i v e  c o n s i d e r a b l e l a t i t u d e and f l e x i b i l i t y  t o t h e c o n c r e t e a p p l i c a t i o n of  t h e t h r e e p r i n c i p l e s and would n o t a t t a c h any c o n d i t i o n o t h e r the t h r e e p r i n c i p l e s . " problem areas — —  106  than  I n d e e d , Chou c l a r i f i e d t h a t two p o s s i b l e  war r e r e p a f a t i o n s and t h e 1969 S a t o - N i x o n communique  would n o t s t a n d i n the way o f n o r m a l i z i n g r e l a t i o n s . " ^  7  We a r e  thus d r i v e n to conclude t h a t w i t h o u t t h e replacement o f the Sato c a b i n e t w i t h one t h a t n o t o n l y s a t i s f i e d t h e i n t r a - p a r t y  requirements  (so f a r as f a c t i o n a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s were c o n c e r n e d ) , b u t a l s o met w i t h t h e a p p r o v a l o f t h e Chinese government, Japan c o u l d h a r d l y have n o r m a l i z e d i t s r e l a t i o n s w i t h China. Chinese A t t i t u d e s Towards the Tanaka Government Upon t h e i n a u g u r a t i o n o f t h e new Cabinet on J u l y 7 t h , 1972, Tanaka made i t  c l e a r t h a t h i s government i n t e n d e d t o n o r m a l i z e J a p a n ' s  r e l a t i o n s w i t h China.  I n c o n t r a d i s t i n c t i o n to i t s a t t i t u d e  towards  the Sato government, t h e Chinese government expressed t h a t i t was w i l l i n g to cooperate w i t h Tanaka i n c a r r y i n g o u t t h i s h i s t o r i c  task.  example^when Tanaka d e c l a r e d a t h i s i n a u g u r a t i o n t h a t : " I would  like  to promote the n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s .  For  The t i m e i s 108  r i p e , " Chou responded by s a y i n g :  " I welcome the s t a t e m e n t . "  Thus,  so l o n g as t h e Tanaka government was prepared to meet the c o n d i t i o n s o f the t h r e e p r i n c i p l e s ,  the n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f r e l a t i o n s w i t h China  would be a b l e to proceed s m o o t h l y . I n t h e above r e s p e c t Tanaka had o n l y d i r e c t l y s t a t e d t h a t he " u n d e r s t o o d " t h e t h r e e p r i n c i p l e s o u t l i n e d by the Chinese government  28  as the b a s i s f o r n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f Sino-Japanese r e l a t i o n s .  Yet a  number o f statements made by t h e p r e v i o u s Sato government, h i s own government, and h i s F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r , O h i r a conveyed t h e i m p r e s s i o n t h a t the new government a l r e a d y accepted the t h r e e p r i n c i p l e s as the b a s i s o f i t s n e g o t i a t i n g p o s t u r e w i t h the Chinese government. f i r s t p l a c e , as was mentioned p r e v i o u s l y ,  t h e Sato government had  e a r l i e r accepted t h e Peking government as the l e g i t i m a t e o f China and t h e r e b y f u l f i l l e d principles.  I n the  government  the c o n d i t i o n s o f one o f t h e t h r e e  The second p r i n c i p l e had been admitted^;. • t h r o u g h a  number o f " l e a k s " t o the p r e s s by t h e Tanaka government.  Finally,  F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r O h i r a had a d m i t t e d t o t h e t h i r d p r i n c i p l e a t  the  b e g i n n i n g o f August when he d e c l a r e d t h a t the t r e a t y w i t h the ROC would l o o s e i t s v a l i d i t y when r e l a t i o n s between Japan and China were 109 established.  Accordingly,  the acceptance o f the t h r e e  principles  by the Tanaka government combined w i t h t h e c o o p e r a t i v e and f l e x i b l e a t t i t u d e o f the Chinese government presaged t h a t the n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f r e l a t i o n s would o n l y be a m a t t e r o f  time.  Conclusion: l i i ^ a , i i . - ' - d i s c u s s d © i i .d.s~a6:-u;ld:A makes i t !  ;  clear t h a t from the e a r l y  p o s t - w a r y e a r s J a p a n ' s China p o l i c y has been a f f e c t e d by i t s s h i p w i t h the U n i t e d S : t a t e s .  11  ^  relation-  W h i l e t h e r e c o g n i t i o n o f China by t h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l community (as s i g n i f i e d by i t s s e a t i n g i n t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s ) p l a y e d a p a r t i n c o m p e l l i n g Japan t o move towards  recognition  o f China, i t was p r o b a b l y t h e e a r l i e r Nixon " s h o c k " t h a t f o r c e d Japan t o do so more than any o t h e r e x t e r n a l f a c t o r .  Kim echoes t h i s  argument  29  when he s t a t e s t h a t : "The epoch-making event was p o s s i b l e due more to the Nixon ' s h o c k ' o f 1971 t h a n t o any o t h e r s i n g l e  factor."Hl  Such an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e i n f l u e n c e o f t h e e x t e r n a l e n v i ronment on the f o r e i g n p o l i c y - m a k i n g process i n Japan i m p l i e s  that  the " E x t e r n a l Dominance" model may be o f u t i l i t y i n examining short-r term c o n t r o v e r s i a l f o r e i g n p o l i c y i s s u e s such as t h e China i s s u e . I n d e e d , the f a c t t h a t Japan c o n t i n u e d i n i t s s u b o r d i n a t e  relationship  w i t h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s was s i g n i f i e d by the Japanese government's d e c i s i o n to f o l l o w the p o l i c y o f s u p p o r t i n g Taiwan i n t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s , d e s p i t e the f a i l u r e o f t h e Nixon a d m i n i s t r a t i o n t o  consult  or even a d v i s e Japan o f t h e change i n U.S. China p o l i c y . At the same t i m e , i t  i s a l s o i m p o r t a n t t o n o t e the i n f l u e n c e o f  Chinese f o r e i g n p o l i c y o u t p u t s on J a p a n ' s f o r e i g n p o l i c y - m a k i n g p r o cess.  I n this respect, i t  s h o u l d be c l e a r t h - - ,, from the above t h a t  moves t o e s t a b l i s h c o n t a c t s w i t h China by t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s j and t h e n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f r e l a t i o n s c a r r i e d o u t by Japan^were o n l y p o s s i b l e because o f t h e f r i e n d l y p o s t u r e t a k e n by the Peking government towards these two c o u n t r i e s .  The reasons f o r C h i n a ' s change i n p o l i c y  towards Japan are o u t l i n e d by Omori: F o l l o w i n g the end o f the Great P r o l e t a r i a n C u l t u r a l R e v o l u t i o n and p a r t i c u l a r l y a f t e r t h e f a l l o f L i n Piao,power had been r e g a i n e d by the o l d l e a d e r s who r e c o g n i z e d t h e need t o r e s t o r e r e l a t i o n s w i t h Japan as a means, . i among o t h e r t h i n g s , o f a c h i e v i n g t h e t a r g e t s o f C h i n a ' s f o u r t h 5 year p l a n . F u r t h e r , the n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f r e l a t i o n s between t h e two c o u n t r i e s would s t r e n g t h e n Prime M i n i s t e r Chou E n - l a i ' s own p o s i t i o n . F u r t h e r , the S o v i e t Union, having regained i t s i n t e r n a t i o n a l voice  30  as a r e s u l t o f t h e U.S. S o v i e t summit t a l k s i n Moscow and h a v i n g achieved g r e a t d i p l o m a t i c s u c cesses v i s - a - v i s West Europe, was now s h i f t i n g the w e i g h t o f i t s d i p l o m a t i c e f f o r t t o A s i a . C h i n a , t h r o u g h the Sino-American summit t a l k s i n Peking, i s c o n t r i b u t i n g i n d i r e c t l y to the speed up o f the w i t h d r a w a l o f American f o r c e s from A s i a , but fears the Soviet Union's advances i n A s i a as a renewal o f t h a t t h r e a t once posed by t h e U.S. I n order to prevent t h e growth o f S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e i n A s i a , i t i s necessary f o r t h e Chinese t o n o r m a l i z e and 1 T9  s t a b i l i z e i t s r e l a t i o n s w i t h Japan.- -- -"* 1  1  The f a c t t h a t China adopted a new f o r e i g n p o l i c y f o r these reasons should amply demonstrate t h a t i t was the i n f l u e n c e o f b o t h Chinese and American f o r e i g n p o l i c y o u t p u t s t h a t compelled Japan t o  establish  r e l a t i o n s w i t h the PRC, the new U.S. China p o l i c y b e i n g t h e most and t a n g i b l e i n f t l u L e n c^e.,  Tfeus.,. - ;  5  direct  we would agree t h a t i n r e g a r d  t o s h o r t - t e r m i s s u e s such as J a p a n ' s n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f r e l a t i o n s  with  China, Japan's f o r e i g n p o l i c y - m a k i n g process i s a f f e c t e d by change i n the e x t e r n a l environment.  However, as we s h a l l see i n t h e  following  • d i s c u s s i o n o f i n t e r n a l ^ c r / j l i n f l u e n c e s on Japan's f o r e i g n p o l i c y -making p r o c e s s , e x t e r n a l i n f l u e n c e s were n o t t h e o n l y f o r c e s t h a t .:. p l a y e d a r o l e i n b r i n g i n g about the n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f Japan-China relations.  31  I n t e r n a l Environment Introduction I n r e s p e c t t o t h e i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c a l environment of Japan, we w i l l be p r i m a r i l y concerned w i t h i d e n t i f y i n g and a s s e s s i n g t h e i n f l u e n c e o f t h e v a r i o u s p o l i c y - m a k i n g a c t o r s on the China n o r m a l i z a t i o n process.  I t i s argued by some, as mentioned a t t h e o u t s e t o f  this  paper, t h a t the t r i p a r t i t e e l i t e c o a l i t i o n plays a d e c i s i v e i f not encompassing r o l e i n Japan's p o l i c y - m a k i n g p r o c e s s . d i s c u s s i n g a c o n t r o v e r s i a l and u r g e n t  all-  Since we a r e here  (short-term) foreign policy  issue  we can thus t e s t t h e p r o p o s i t i o n ^ a n d p r o p o s i t i o n a l v a r i a n t s t h a t were c u l l e d f r o m the p e r t i n e n t l i t e r a t u r e plicability  (pp. 6 - 7 ) j to determine t h e i r a p -  i n analyzing the r o l e of the t r i p a r t i t e e l i t e i n  policy-making process.  After analyzing the r o l e of the e l i t e  this (LDP,  bureaucracy and b u s i n e s s ) , we w i l l t h e n proceed to d i s c u s s t h e r o l e o f the o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s , press and p u b l i c o p i n i o n i n t h e China p o l i c y making p r o c e s s . The LDP's China P o l i c y Since t h e merger o f t h e L i b e r a l and Democratic p a r t i e s i n 1955, u n t i l t h e r e s i g n a t i o n o f Sato i n J u l y 1972, t h e LDP f o l l o w e d the F o r e i g n M i n i s t r y ' s view t h a t d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s s h o u l d o n l y be extended t o t h e ROC government i n Taiwan w h i l e t h e Peking government 113 should be i s o l a t e d d i p l o m a t i c a l l y though n o t e c o n o m i c a l l y .  This  p o l i c y o f t h e " s e p a r a t i o n o f economics and p o l i t i c s " came under i n c r e a s i n g c r i t i c i s m by p r o - P e k i n g elements i n t h e p a r t y d u r i n g t h e 1960s.  Consequently, a number o f groups were o r g a n i z e d on a c r o s s -  32  f a c t i o n a l b a s i s t o p r e s s u r e t h e Sato government i n t o a d o p t i n g a more f l e x i b l e a t t i t u d e towards the Peking government. These p r o - P e k i n g groups were o r g a n i z e d s e p a r a t e l y from the o f f i c i a l f o r e i g n p o l i c y organs such as t h e I n v e s t i g a t i n g Committee on F o r e i g n A f f a i r s and t h e F o r e i g n A f f a i r s d i v i s i o n w h i c h , b e i n g dominated by the mainstream f a c t i o n s , n a t u r a l l y s u p p o r t e d t h e c o n t i n u a t i o n o f p r o - T a i w a n Sato government's p o l i c y .  the  A f t e r e a r l i e r endeavours t o  o r g a n i z e i n t r a - p a r t y p r e s s u r e groups had ended i n t h e i r  disbandenment  under p r e s s u r e f r o m t h e p r o - T a i w a n p a r t y l e a d e r s h i p , p r o - P e k i n g LDPers (drawn l a r g e l y f r o m the Fujuyama, Kono, Matsumura, M i k i , and Ono f a c t i o n s ) o r g a n i z e d i n 1965 the A f r o - A s i a n Study Groupj as a r i v a l to t h e mainstream p r o - T a i w a n A s i a n Problems Study Group,which had been o r g a n i z e d i n 11&;  December 1964. -x . 19Thet; l e a d i n g spokesmen o f t h e p r o - P e k i n g o r g a n i z a t i o n such as F u r u i , Matsumura, Tagawa, and Utsunomiya c r i t i c i z e d p r o - T a i w a n p o l i c y o f t h e Sato government.  the  T h i s c r i t i c i s m was c a r r i e d  o u t i n t h e D i e t , w i t h i n p a r t y c i r c l e s , a n d when these p o l i t i c i a n s China t o d i s c u s s Memorandum T r a d e . This l a t t e r a c t i v i t y i n  visited  particular  mte-ting w i t h t h e d i s a p p r o v a l o f t h e Sato C a b i n e t . I n 1968 a f u r t h e r i n f o r m a l p a r t y organ was c r e a t e d i n the f o r m o f the D i s c u s s i o n Group f o r New P o l i c y , which drew i t s membership f r o m across the LDP f a c t i o n s .  The D i s c u s s i o n Groups China Committee was  headed by A i i c h i r o F u j i y a m a , who l a t e r became one o f the most, outspoken c r i t i c s o f t h e Sato government's China p o l i c y , and t h e l e a d e r o f t h e D i e t men's League f o r t h e N o r m a l i z a t i o n o f Japanese-Chinese R e l a t i o n s , which was o r g a n i z e d i n 1970 w i t h the p a r - t i c i p a t i o n o f over a q u a r t e r o f LDP  33  p o l i t i c i a n s ^ a s w e l l as members o f the o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s . W h i l e Fujiyama d i d n o t t a k e such an avowedly p r o - P e k i n g s t a n d u n t i l 1970, Takeo M i k i , a contender i n the 1972 p r e s i d e n t i a l  election,  s h a r p l y c r i t i c i z e d t h e Sato government's China p o l i c y a f t e r he l e f t the Sato Cabinet i n 1968 and had^by 1971jCome t o r e c o g n i z e the Peking );  government's c l a i m t o be the s o l e l e g i t i m a t e government o f China. Nakasone, who a l s o had hopes o f t h e p r e s i d e n c y , f o l l o w e d M i k i r e c o g n i z i n g t h e Peking government's c l a i m .  in  L a s t l y , O h i r a , who became  the F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r i n t h e Tanaka C a b i n e t , c a l l e d on Sato to move away f r o m h i s p r o - T a i w a n China p o l i c y ^ a n d d e a l w i t h t h e China problem i n terms o f a "one China" formula."''"'"^ I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e mounting c r i t i c i s m o f t h e Sato government's China p o l i c y f r o m t h e p r o - P e k i n g groups w i t h i n the p a r t y , and t h e above mentioned prominent LDP p o l i t i c i a n s , young LDP Dietmen i n t h e Showa S o c i e t y a l s o pressed t h e government to move away from i t s policy.  pro-Taiwan  W i t h the Nixon announcements^ and t h e s e a t i n g o f Peking i n the  U n i t e d N a t i o n s , the moderate elements w i t h i n the p a r t y a l s o began t o r e c o g n i z e t h a t t h e p a r t y ' s China p o l i c y was a n a c h r o n i s t i c and needed to be made " c o m p a t i b l e " w i t h t h e new changes i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l e n vironment.  7  By t h e time Tanaka was e l e c t e d , t h i s g r a d u a l b u t i n -  e l u c t a b l e movement towards a p r o - P e k i n g p o l i c y w i t h i n t h e LDP had come t o r e p l a c e the p r e v i o u s p r o - T a i w a n o r i e n t a t i o n as the dominant view w i t h i n the p a r t y .  Consequently, f r o m now on the p r o - T a i w a n members  o f the r u l i n g p a r t y were f i g h t i n g a r e a r guard a c t i o n t o t r y and p r o t e c t Japan's r e l a t i o n s w i t h Taiwan, e c o n o m i c a l l y i f n o t  politically.  34  The 1972 P r e s i d e n t i a l  Election  The e l e c t i o n of t h e new P r e m i e r , Kakuei Tanaka, was  the s i n g l e  most i m p o r t a n t domestic event f a c i l i t a t i n g the n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f  relations  118 between Japan and China..  The r e s i g n a t i o n o f Sato i n e a r l y J u l y ,  and  h i s replacement by a prime m i n i s t e r backed b y i a u f a c t i o n a l c o a l i t i o n p r e pared t o n o r m a l i z e r e l a t i o n s w i t h China^at the c o s t o f s e v e r i n g d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s w i t h Taiwan, made the n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f r e l a t i o n s a f o r e gone c o n c l u s i o n .  Hence, as Langdon p o s t u l a t e s :  " . . . a change i n p a r t y 119  l e a d e r s h i p i s l i k e l y to r e s u l t i n a change i n f o r e i g n  policy."  Besides Tanaka, who won t h e LDP p r e s i d e n t i a l e l e c t i o n and thus became the new Prime M i n i s t e r o f Japan, t h e r e were a l s o s e v e r a l o t h e r contenders f o r t h i s i m p o r t a n t p o s t .  Initially,  t h e r e were f i v e  prominent LDP p o l i t i c i a n s s e e k i n g t h e p r e s i d e n c y —  Takeo M i k i ,  Y a s u h i r o Nakasone, Masayoshi O h i r a ( r e p l a c i n g Shigesaburo Maeo as t h e p r e v i o u s c a n d i d a t e f o r t h e I k e d a f a c t i o n ) , Takeo Fukuda, and Kakuei Tanaka —  w i t h t h e f i g h t shaping up t o be between Tanaka^and S a t o ' s  own choice f o r t h e p r e s i d e n c y , Fukuda.  Both Tanaka and Fukuda had by  l a t e 1971 b u i l t up a f a c t i o n a l f o l l o w i n g o f t h e i r own making them , 1 2 i e l i g i b l e f o r f i g h t i n g t h e i n t e r n a l f a c t i o n a l b a t t l e f o r LDP p r e s i d e n c y . The o t h e r contenders a l l had f a c t i o n a l f o l l o w i n g s i n t h e i r own r i g h t . B e f o r e S a t o ' s r e s i g n a t i o n i n e a r l y J u l y , Nakasone p u l l e d o u t o f the p r e s i d e n t i a l r a c e i n f a v o u r o f Tanaka. d i v i d e d i n t o two camps:  The r e m a i n i n g  contenders  i n one camp Fukuda, and i n t h e o t h e r an a n t i -  Fukuda c o a l i t i o n formed o f t h e Tanaka-Ohira and M i k i f a c t i o n s .  The a n t i -  Fukuda c o a l i t i o n was based on a s p e c i f i c p o l i c y agreement between t h e  35  three f a c t i o n leaders. that:  I n t h e f i r s t p l a c e , t h e r e was an agreement  " I f one among t h e t h r e e persons remains ( p l a c i n g f i r s t o r second)  then a l l o f us w i l l c o o p e r a t e .  I n t h e case o f two o f us r e m a i n i n g , we  w i l l have an open e l e c t i o n .  t h e case  have an opea e l e c t i o n -  T  of''CT.T;  j£ as reuiaini•-•.'..  I n t h e case o f two o f us r e m a i n i n g , t h e a c t i o n -  ' 121 o f the t h i r d c a n d i d a t e w i l l n o t be bounded. Second, and o f  greater  i m p o r t a n c e , the t h r e e l e a d e r s made a s p e c i f i c p o l i c y agreement  expressing  an " u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t t h e P e o p l e ' s R e p u b l i c o f China government i s  the  s o l e l e g i t i m a t e government r e p r e s e n t i n g C h i n a , " and f u r t h e r m o r e agreed that:  " N o r m a l i z a t i o n o f Japan-China r e l a t i o n s i s now t h e demand of  entire nation.  We w i l l e n t e r i n t o n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h a view to  the  concluding  122 a peace t r e a t y w i t h the P e o p l e ' s R e p u b l i c o f C h i n a . . . . " mco.rr e_ctlypoints o u t : :  profound.  First,  As Kim  ,'• .•  "The i m p l i c a t i o n o f t h i s p o l i c y statement were  the new Japanese government accepted t h e f i r s t one o f  the t h r e e p r i n c i p l e s demanded by t h e Chinese Communists.  Second,  a l s o i m p l i e d t h a t t h e Tanaka government was a c c e p t i n g i n d i r e c t l y  it the  t h i r d p r i n c i p l e p u t f o r w a r d by t h e Chinese communists, f o r t h e new Japanese government's i n t e n t i o n t o seek a peace t r e a t y w i t h Peking i m p l i e d t h e Japanese i n t e n t i o n t o do away w i t h the e x i s t i n g peace t r e a t y i 223 with Taipei."  Clearly,  t h e r e f o r e , t h e 'China i s s u e was an i m p o r t a n t  variable in this presidential election. gests t h a t :  I n d e e d , Hellmann c o r r e c t l y  sug-  " . . . i s s u e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s s u e s , come t o be  considered n o t o n l y as t b - t h e i r m e r i t s as p o l i c y b u t as to t h e i r w o r t h 124 i n advancing t h e p a r t y p o s i t i o n o f f a c t i o n l e a d e r s as w e l l . " t h i s i n s t a n c e , i t was undoubtedly t o advance h i s own p a r t y  In  position  36  t h a t Tanaka made an agreement w i t h t h e o t h e r f a c t i o n a l l e a d e r s c o n c e r n i n g the China p o l i c y . A p a r t from t h i s more o p p o r t u n i s t i c c o n c e r n , t h e r e were n e v e r t h e l e s s c e r t a i n d i f f e r e n c e s over China p o l i c y t h a t d i s t i n g u i s h e d Tanaka and t h e o t h e r c o a l i t i o n members from Fukuda.  For t h e most p a r t , Fukuda d i d n o t  h o l d such a f l e x i b l e , f o r w a r d - l o o k i n g p o s i t i o n on the China i s s u e as d i d the o t h e r contenders f o r the p r e s i d e n c y .  In particular,  Fukuda was  c l o s e l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e f o r e i g n p o l i c y p o s i t i o n o f Sato, ; s o . t h a t h i s p o l i c y pronouncements on t h e China i s s u e d i d n o t go beyond a c c e p t ance o f Peking as the l e g i t i m a t e government o f China.  What must o f  course be remembered h e r e ^ i s t h a t Fukuda had been c i r c u m s c r i b e d i n h i s China p o l i c y pronouncements p r e c e d i n g t h e p r e s i d e n t i a l e l e c t i o n by the f a c t t h a t he was M i n i s t e r o f F o r e i g n A f f a i r s , a M i n i s t r y renowned f o r 125 i t s n e g a t i v e a t t i t u d e towards the PRC. Since Tanaka was the M i n i s t e r o f t h e M I T I , he d i d n o t s u f f e r  the  above disadvantage and was f o r example, a b l e to move away f r o m the  tight  ;  r e s t r i c t i o n s o f t h e "Yoshida l e t t e r " by a l l o w i n g t h e use o f  Export-  I m p o r t Bank funds f o r China, upon c o m p l e t i o n o f c o n t r a c t s and p r e s e n t a t i o n of a p p l i c a t i o n s .  S i m i l a r l y , Tanaka b e n e f i t e d from making the  China p o l i c y agreement w i t h M i k i , a p r o - P e k i n g Dietman who had d e c l a r e d h i s acceptance o f the t h r e e p r i n c i p l e s , and thus the n e c e s s i t y o f a b r o g a t i n g the Japan-ROC peace t r e a t y .  Finally,  t h r o u g h such e m i s s a r i e s  as Komeito Chairman T a k e i r i , and t h e maverick p r o - P e k i n g LDP Dietman, F u r u i , Tanaka l e t i t be known t h a t i f  e l e c t e d LDP p r e s i d e n t  (and hence  Prime M i n i s t e r o f J a p a n ) , he would e s t a b l i s h d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s China.  with  37  The above i s s t i l l n o t meant t o suggest t h a t b e f o r e h i s  election  Tanaka was o u t s p o k e n l y i n f a v o u r o f n o r m a l i z i n g r e l a t i o n s w i t h the PRC^ As a m a t t e r o f f a c t , b o t h Tanaka and O h i r a were c a u t i o u s i n p o l i c y pronouncements on t h e China i s s u e .  their  While F u r u i advised Chou t h a t  the Tanaka-Ohira duo would work f o r n o r m a l i z a t i o n , n e i t h e r o f t h e two made a s p e c i f i c commitment t o abide by the t h r e e p r i n c i p l e s i n this out.  carrying  I n t h i s r e s p e c t , F u r u i was p r o b a b l y c o r r e c t when he suggested.-  t h a t the reason Tanaka " h a r d l y touched o n " t h e i C h i n a problem, and O h i r a " d i d n o t show c l e a r and c o n c r e t e views;," was t h a t t h e i r campaign s t r a t e g y aimed a t w i n n i n g t h e s u p p o r t o f t h e p r o - T a i w a n r i g h t wing members o f  the  127 p a r t y as w e l l as those c l e a r l y i n f a v o u r o f t h e Peking government. Undoubtedly, t h i s t a c t i c p a i d o f f , becausejWhen i t  came t o the  p r e s i d e n t i a l e l e c t i o n h e l d on J u l y 5 t h 1972, Tanaka gained enough s u p p o r t t o make him LDP p r e s i d e n t and thus Prime M i n i s t e r o f Japan. on the second b a l l o t ,  T h i s he d i d  s i n c e none o f t h e candidates were a b l e to g a i n t h e  s i m p l e m a j o r i t y needed to^win on t h e f i r s t b a l l o t , Tanaka w i n n i n g 156 128 v o t e s to Fukuda's 150, w i t h O h i r a 101 and M i k i 69.  The agreement  made between Tanaka and t h e o t h e r members oftthe a n t i - F u k u d a  coalition  ( M i k i and O h i r a ) now came i n t o p l a y so t h a t on t h e second b a l l o t Tanaka gained t h e s u p p o r t o f these f a c t i o n s 129 by 282 v o t e s to 190 v o t e s .  tojwin  t h e p r e s i d e n c y over Fukuda  With h i s e l e c t i o n to t h e prime m i n i s t e r -  s h i p , Tanaka c o u l d now proceed t o f u l f i l l h i s promise t o n o r m a l i z e Japan-China r e l a t i o n s . The LDP P o l i c y - M a k i n g Group The r o o t s o f the s m a l l LDP p o l i c y - m a k i n g group w h i c h came t o  38  dominate t h e d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g process go back to the China p o l i c y a g r e e ment t h a t was drawn up between M i k i , O h i r a , and Tanaka b e f o r e t h e LDP p r e s i d e n t i a l e l e c t i o n took p l a c e i n J u l y .  M i k i was f a r more outspoken  and demanding i n h i s c a l l f o r n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f r e l a t i o n s t h a n were e i t h e r Tanaka or O h i r a , who tended t o be much more p r a g m a t i c and c a u t i o u s politicians,  and i t was thus a t the i n s i s t e n c e o f M i k i t h a t t h e  explicit  commitment to n o r m a l i z e r e l a t i o n s w i t h China was made by these t h r e e p r o m i n e n t LDP p o l i t i c i a n s .  This d i f f e r e n c e i n p o l i t i c a l s t y l e and  s t r a t e g y between t h e Tanaka-Ohira duo and M i k i , t o g e t h e r w i t h the f a c t t h a t as Deputy Prime M i n i s t e r M i k i was n o t as i n t i m a t e l y connected w i t h d e c i s i o n s p e r t a i n i n g t o f o r e i g n p o l i c y as were the F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r and Prime M i n i s t e r ,  consequently meant t h a t M i k i became i s o l a t e d f r o m t h e  core o f t h e p o l i c y - m a k i n g group w h i c h was dominated by the TanakaO h i r a duo.  Hence, " t h e command core o f t h e p o l i c y - m a k i n g group which  emerged i n J u l y was thus a duo, r a t h e r t h a n a t r i o , w h i c h p l a c e c o n 130 s i d e r a b l e premium on d e l i b e r a t i o n , d i s c r e t i o n , and p r a g m a t i s m . " W i t h i n t h i s group, t h e Prime M i n i s t e r a p p a r e n t l y made t h e major d e c i s i o n s i n r e s p e c t t o t h e n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f r e l a t i o n s , such as t h e d e c i s i o n to issuelazjiointacommunique i n s t e a d of a j o i n t  formula to  ':s'etit-lei.ther.probL<emr,\;, b u t O h i r a was a necessary element i n the d e c i s i o n -  al making team. I n d e e d , Tanaka q u i t e f r a n k l y a d m i t t e d t h a t lie knew n o t h i n g about diplomacy, and would l e a v e t h e arrangements f o r t h e China 132 visit  t o be made by F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r O h i r a .  The Tanaka-Ohira duo  thus worked c l o s e l y t o g e t h e r as a team t h a t was d e d i c a t e d t o b r i n g i n g about the r e a l i z a t i o n o f t h e Japanese government's v i s i t  t o China f o r  39  t h e purpose o f n o r m a l i z i n g r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e Peking government. A l t h o u g h t h e duo n a t u r a l l y had t h e s u p p o r t o f t h e p r o - P e k i n g p o l i t i c i a n s w i t h i n the p a r t y ,  they worked w i t h o u t t h e a c t i v e p a r -  t i c i p a t i o n o f these i n d i v i d u a l s i n t h e p o l i c y - m a k i n g p r o c e s s .  Ex-  c e p t , t h a t i s , f o r t h e p a r t i c i p a t i o n o f t h e p r o - P e k i n g maverick p o l i t i c i a n , F u r u i , who a c t e d b o t h as a p r e s s u r e on the duo to c a r r y o u t the n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f r e l a t i o n s and a l s o as an i n t e r m e d i a r y between 133 the Chinese and Japanese governments. Since 1959 F u r u i had made a c t i v e e f f o r t s  to promote t h e r e s t o r a -  t i o n o f r e l a t i o n s between Japan and China and had made a number o f v i s i t s t o Peking d u r i n g t h i s t i m e , t h r e e o f them o c c u r r i n g b e f o r e the Tanaka v i s i t  t o China.  shortly  I n December 1 9 7 1 , F u r u i had v i s i t e d  China to p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s f o r Memorandum Trade and, a t t h i s t i m e , i n d i c a t e d t o t h e Chinese o f f i c i a l s  t h a t he would l i k e to .  a g a i n v i s i t China i n the f o l l o w i n g May, w i t h the t h o u g h t i n mind t h a t t h e r e would jbe p o l i t i c a l changes t a k i n g p l a c e i n Japan a t about  this  time t h a t would have i m p o r t a n t consequences f o r t h e development o f r e l a t i o n s between t h e two c o u n t r i e s .  Before t h i s t r i p was c a r r i e d o u t  F u f u i met w i t h " . . . O h i r a a number o f times from around February and exchanged views on t h e China p r o b l e m .  A t a c e r t a i n time b e f o r e my  d e p a r t u r e , we i n c l u d e d Tanaka i n our t a l k s ,  ©ft .fchetother hand,  I  t a l k e d w i t h F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r Fukuda, a number o f times e x t r e m e l y secretly at his request.  Immediately b e f o r e my d e p a r t u r e , I met Takeo 13 A M i k i and Y a s u h i r o Nakasone, t o o . " F u r u i r e t u r n e d f r o m h i s May v i s i t w i t h t h e c o n v i c t i o n t h a t t h e  40  Chinese s i d e would be more than w i l l i n g t o d e a l w i t h t h e p o s t - S a t o Cabinet i n d i s c u s s i n g n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f r e l a t i o n s between Japan and C h i n a , and would f u r t h e r m o r e adopt a f l e x i b l e a t t i t u d e i n dealings w i t h t h i s Cabinet.  their  By the t i m e o f F u r u i ' s n e x t v i s i t  in  September, the Tanaka Cabinet had been formed w i t h O h i r a , perhaps due t o F u r u i ' s recommendation, t a k i n g up t h e p o s t of F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r .  This  t i m e F u r u i was accompanied by two o t h e r p r o - P e k i n g LDP p o l i t i c i a n s , S h u n i c h i Matsumoto and S e i i c h i Tagawa, who thereby p e r i p h e r a l l y  entered  the p o l i c y - m a k i n g g r o u p . On t h i s v i s i t , which o c c u r r e d about two weeks b e f o r e t h e Tanaka mission l e f t f o r Peking, Furui c l e a r l y played the r o l e of  intermediary  between the Tanaka-Ohira team and t h e Chinese g o v e r n m e n t , f o r he c a r r i e d w i t h him a r e v i s e d d r a f t p l a n o f J a p a n ' s proposed j o i n t - c o m m u n i q u e which had been agreed to by t h e duo and t h e ad hoc p o l i c y - m a k i n g group o f  the  135 Foreign M i n i s t r y .  The Chinese response t o t h e proposed communique  was taken to F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r O h i r a by _China D i v i s i o n Head, Hashimoto, who c a r r i e d F u r u i ' s r e p o r t o f t h e meeting between him and Chinese o f f i c i a l s back to Tokyo when he r e t u r n e d t o Japan w i t h t h e LDP d e l e g a t i o n , he was on.  When F u r u i h i m s e l f a r r i v e d i n Tokyo, he h e l d a f i n a l meeting  w i t h O h i r a b e f o r e t h e F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r l e f t w i t h Tanaka f o r China. I n h i s own e s t i m a t i o n , F u r u i saw h i m s e l f as p a r t l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r m u l a t i n g t h e schedule f o r the Tanaka-Ohira v i s i t  to China^as w e l l as  b e i n g an i n f l u e n c e on d e c i d i n g t h e f i n a l form t h a t t h e j o i n t took.  for  communique  C e r t a i n l y , i t would seem c l e a r from the above d i s c u s s i o n  that  t h i s maverick LDP p o l i t i c i a n d i d p l a y a perhaps i n d i s p e n s a b l e r o l e  in  41  the n o r m a l i z a t i o n p r o c e s s .  S t i l l , as Fukui p o i n t s o u t , he c o u l d o n l y  p l a y such an i m p o r t a n t r o l e i n t h i s dynamic, f l u i d  decision-making  process because o f h i s maverick p o s i t i o n w i t h i n the LDP w h i c h a l l o w e d 136 him t o a c t w i t h o u t the u s u a l LDP f a c t i o n a l c o n s t r a i n t s . the p e r s o n a l t i e s t h a t he had developed w i t h h i s r o l e as i n t e r m e d i a r y a l l the more po'ssible.  Similarly,  Chinese o f f i c i a l s made W h i l e t h i s would suggest  t h a t the r o l e he p l a y e d i n t h e d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g process was undoubtedly a t y p i c a l , i t may n e v e r t h e l e s s be t h a t t h e f o r m u l a t i o n o f an ad hoc p o l i c y - m a k i n g group  i s f r e q u e n t l y employed i n Japanese p o l i t i c s 137  s o l v e p o l i c y problems.  to  Thus, t h i s i n s i g h t may o f f e r us guidance i n  the development o f a framework f o r s t u d y i n g the p o l i c y - m a k i n g process i n Japan. C r e a t i n g a Consensus W i t h i n the LDP A major t a s k t h a t Tanaka f a c e d i n p r o c e e d i n g t o n o r m a l i z e w i t h China was t h a t o f d e v e l o p i n g a consensus w i t h i n the LDP. as i t p e r t a i n s to our d i s c u s s i o n h e r e , Hellmann i d e n t i f i e s  relation Insofar  two c h a r a c t e r -  i s t i c s o f consensus d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g which may be p r e s e n t i n t h e d e v e l o p ment o f a group consensus: 1) a f o r m a l show o f u n a n i m i t y , and 2) p a r t i 138 cipatory consultation. I n t h e l a t t e r r e g a r d , Hellmann a p p a r e n t l y c o n s i d e r s t h i s as a s t r a t e g y t o m i n i m i z e c o s t s i n r e a c h i n g d e c i s i o n s w i t h 139 the o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s ,  but i t  i s an e q u a l l y i m p o r t a n t s t r a t e g y  to  employ i n r e a c h i n g d e c i s i o n s w i t h i n t h e LDP when t h e i s s u e a t s t a k e i s h i g h l y c o n t r o v e r s i a l , as i n t h e case of n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f r e l a t i o n s  with  China. I n o r d e r t o b r i n g about a consensus w i t h i n t h e LDP on a new China policy  42  Tanaka s p e c i f i c a l l y c r e a t e d an LDP C o u n c i l f o r t h e N o r m a l i z a t i o n o f Japan-China R e l a t i o n s  ( h e r e a f t e r N o r m a l i z a t i o n C o u n c i l ) w h i c h was open  t o b o t h p r o - P e k i n g and p r o - T a i p e i LDP Dietmen.  T h i s c o u n c i l was o r g a n i z e d  on the 2 4 t h J u l y 1972 w i t h an i n i t i a l membership o f 249, r i s i n g  quickly  140 to over 300.  I n o r d e r to f a c i l i t a t e China d i s c u s s i o n w i t h i n t h e  C o u n c i l , a Standing Managers C o u n c i l o f 58 members was o r g a n i z e d t o meet twice weekly.  I n a d d i t i o n , t h e r e was a S e c r e t a r i a t composed o f  China  e x p e r t s and weekly meetings between t h e Chairman, Zentaro Kosaka and h i s Vice-Chairmen. "'" 14  I n r e c o g n i t i o n o f t h e f a c t t h a t the main problem i n n o r m a l i z i n g r e l a t i o n s w i t h China was now n o t so much w i t h t h e a t t i t u d e o f  the  Chinese government,as i t was w i t h d e v e l o p i n g a consensus w i t h i n t h e p a r t y , Chairman Kosaka s t a t e d t h a t :  " . . . t h e organ w i l l make e f f o r t s  to f o r m a consensus i n the p a r t y to f a c i l i t a t e t h e government's moves, 142 w i t h o u t our meddling too much." curs t h a t : f  I n a broader c o n t e x t , Hellmann c o n -  "Each major postwar f o r e i g n p o l i c y d e c i s i o n has been accom-  p a n i e d by p r o t r a c t e d c o n s u l t a t i o n among v a r i o u s f a c t i o n l e a d e r s , '143 r e f l e c t i n g an e f f o r t  t o reach consensual agreement.  But i n  this  p a r t i c u l a r case, perhaps because the i s s u e was i d e o l o g i c a l i n n a t u r e , t h e c o n s u l t a t i o n was broadened t o encompass a major p r o p o r t i o n o f  the  LDP Dietmen. The obvious d i f f i c u l t y  i n a t t e m p t i n g to generate a consensus  w i t h i n the p a r t y was t h a t o f p r o m o t i n g t h e necessary accommodation between the pro-Taiwan and p r o - P e k i n g LDP Dietmen, p a r t i c u l a r l y as such pro-Taiwan "hawks" f r o m t h e D i p l o m a t i c Problems D i s c u s s i o n C o u n c i l as  43  O k i n o r i Kaya, H i r o k i c h i Nadao, and N a o k i c h i Kitazawa j o i n e d Normalization Council.  the  A l t h o u g h the p r o - T a i w a n m i n o r i t y members  o f t h e C o u n c i l were g e n e r a l l y p r e p a r e d t o accept the e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f r e l a t i o n s w i t h P e k i n g , they were f i g h t i n g a g a i n s t t h e " M a i n s t r e a m " t o t r y and p r e v e n t t h e s e v e r i n g o f d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s w i t h Taiwan. The o n l y a r e a upon which common agreement had been reached a f t e r numerous - p r o p o s a l s and counter p r o p o s a l s had been s u b m i t t e d by p r o - P e k i n g and p r o Taiwan members,was on the g e n e r a l l e v e l t h a t n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f would t a k e p l a c e and t h a t Tanaka would v i s i t  China.  relations  T h i s was decided  on August 2nd by Chairman Kosaka and t h e V i c e - C h a i r m e n , agreed to by the N o r m a l i z a t i o n C o u n c i l on August 9 t h , a n d accepted as p a r t y p o l i c y on August 22nd.  A f t e r the de f a c t o a p p r o v a l o f Tanaka's v i s i t ^ a n d  the  Chairmen's Meeting on t h e 2nd August, the government announced i t s b a s i c p o l i c y on China the f o l l o w i n g day: I n t h e event t h a t agreement i s reached between Japan and China on t h e problem o f n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f r e l a t i o n s between t h e two c o u n t r i e s and d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s a r e e s t a b l i s h e d , Japan as a n a t u r a l consequence, w o u l d n o t be a b l e t o m a i n t a i n i t s d i p l o m a t i c t i e s w i t h the Republic o f China. I n t h i s case, b o t h t r a d e and economic r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e Republic o f China and our o t h e r p r a c t i c a l r e l a t i o n s w i l l l i k e l y be r e s o l v e d i n a r e a l i s t i c manner.-'44  T h i s was t h e f i r s t  t i m e t h a t t h e Tanaka government s t i p u l a t e d  that  Taiwan would be abandoned, a l t h o u g h i t was a l r e a d y t a k e n f o r g r a n t e d by the p r o - P e k i n g members o f the C o u n c i l and, more i m p o r t a n t l y by the Tanaka government, t h a t d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e Taiwan regime would n e c e s s a r i l y be severed upon e s t a b l i s h i n g r e l a t i o n s w i t h the PRC.  44  To the p r o - T a i w a n g r o u p , however, t h e maintenance o f d i p l o m a t i c t i o n s w i t h the ROC was seen as b e i n g o f prime importance the C o u n c i l m e e t i n g s , e x e m p l i f y i n g t h a t they s t i l l  rela-  throughout  thought i n terms  of a " t w o - C h i n a s " p o l i c y as t h e s o l u t i o n t o the p o l i t i c a l problem o f diplomatic relations.  Q u i t e c l e a r l y , such a p o s i t i o n c o u l d be a c -  c e p t a b l e n e i t h e r t o the Chinese government nor t o t h e p r o - E e k i n g LDP members o f t h e N o r m a l i z a t i o n C o u n c i l .  I n o r d e r t o g a i n a consensus  w i t h i n the p a r t y , something w h i c h ^ T a n a k a i r e c o g n i z e d i a s an e s s e n t i a l • p.r e r e q t i i s ± t e r t o i n t o x w a . Jni z : a t i o n , . .  =  i t . w a s n e c e.s'is^a.r yo tor--:..  dor a c f . t any r e s o l u t i o n t h e C o u n c i l passed i n s u f f i c i e n t l y broad and ambiguous enough terms to a l l o w accommodation o f the d i v e r g e n t views w i t h i n the p a r t y .  That such a course o f a c t i o n was t a k e n i s  clearly  i n d i c a t e d by t h e t e x t o f t h e r e s o l u t i o n t h a t was f i n a l l y adopted i n  late  August on the n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f r e l a t i o n s w i t h China. Initially,  t h e c o n f l i c t between t h e p r o - P e k i n g and p r o - T a i w a n  members o f t h e N o r m a l i z a t i o n C o u n c i l seemed as i f  i t would f o r c e the  c o u n c i l to go beyond t h e September 1 0 t h 1972 d e a d l i n e t h a t the Tanaka 145 Cabinet had s e t f o r r e a c h i n g a consensus w i t h i n t h e p a r t y . 146 p r o m p t i n g o f Tanaka,  At t h e  however, t h e N o r m a l i z a t i o n C o u n c i l came t o an  agreement on f i v e g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e s t h a t were to guide t h e Tanaka government i n n o r m a l i z i n g r e l a t i o n s w i t h China, t h e d e c i s i o n b e i n g made on August,  24th.  A f t e r m o d i f i c a t i o n o f these p r i n c i p l e s because o f p r e s s u r e f r o m p r o - T a i w a n "hawks" such as Masayuki F u j i o , I c h i r o Nakagawa, and M i c h i o 147 Watanabe, the f i v e p r i n c i p l e s came t o read as f o l l o w s :  45  1)  N o r m a l i z i n g r e l a t i o n s on t h e b a s i s o f the U n i t e d N a t i o n s c h a r t e r and t h e 10 Bandung p r i n c i p l e s o f p e a c e f u l c o e x i s t e n c e adopted by t h e A f r o - A s i a n Conference i n 1955 i n Bandung, I n d o n e s i a .  2)  Respect f o r d i f f e r e n t p o l i t i c a l , s o c i a l and o t h e r systems and n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e i n t h e i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s of the other n a t i o n . Relations w i t h other f r i e n d l y n a t i o n s a l s o should be r e s p e c t e d .  3)  Non-use o f f o r c e or the t h r e a t o f  4)  Expansion o f economic and c u l t u r a l exchanges. N e i t h e r s i d e should t a k e d i s c r i m i n a t o r y action..'  5)  Cooperation i n t h e p r o m o t i o n o f peace and prosperity i n Asia.  force.  A l t h o u g h t h e p r o - T a i w a n members o f the C o u n c i l s t a t e d t h a t  these  p r i n c i p l e s s i m p l y echoed the 1954 Chou-Nehru p r i n c i p l e s o f peace,  they  were o f a g e n e r i c enough n a t u r e t o a l l o w a "consensus" t o be reached w i t h i n the Council.  However, one source o f c o n t e n t i o n , a n d one t o w h i c h  t h e p r o - T a i w a n members o f the C o u n c i l s p e c i f i c a l l y obj ectecL, was a p r o v i s o t o the f i v e p r i n c i p l e s s t a t i n g :  "There was a s t r o n g o p i n i o n  t h a t i n view o f t h e deep r e l a t i o n s between Japan and Taiwan s u f f i c i e n t 148 c o n s i d e r a t i o n should be g i v e n t o m a i n t a i n i n g these r e l a t i o n s . " Most c e r t a i n l y , t h e i n s e r t i o n o f such a p r o v i s o was i n the  first  p l a c e i n t e n d e d t o m o l l i f y t h e p r o - T a i w a n members o f the C o u n c i l , b u t t h i s phrase met w i t h t h e i r o b j e c t i o n s because i t was  not  considered  t o be as " p o s i t i v e " a s t a t e m e n t as should be i n s e r t e d , g i v e n J a p a n ' s 149 e x i s t i n g r e l a t i o n s w i t h Taiwan. Taiwan members o f the C o u n c i l the  Through t h e p r e s s u r e o f t h e p r o p r o v i s o was t h e r e f o r e m o d i f i e d  b e f o r e i t was f o r m a l l y adopted by the LDP's E x e c u t i v e C o u n c i l on 8 t h September t o r e a d :  " I n v i e w o>f: the c l o s e r e l a t i o n s h i p between Japan  46  and the Republic o f China, n e g o t i a t i o n s should be conducted g i v i n g s u f f i c i e n t c o n s i d e r a t i o n t o the c o n t i n u a t i o n of t h a t  relationship.""'""^  Of c o u r s e , even w i t h t h i s m o d i f i c a t i o n t h e r e s t i l l  remained  the q u e s t i o n o f whether t h e " c o n t i n u a t i o n o f t h a t r e l a t i o n s h i p " would i n c l u d e the c o n t i n u a t i o n o f d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s , s i n c e t h e E x e c u t i v e Board l e f t  t h i s d e l i c a t e q u e s t i o n t o Tanaka's own decision."'""'"'"  Given  the views expressed i n t h e government's b a s i c p o l i c y on C h i n a , n e v e r t h e l e s s seems q u i t e obvious Tanaka c o u l d n o t p o s s i b l y d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s w i t h i n t h i s scope.  it  include  That i s why when t h e p r o -  Taiwan members o f t h e N o r m a l i z a t i o n C o u n c i l pressed Chairman Kosaka t o g i v e a d e f i n i t e answer r e g a r d i n g the q u e s t i o n o f whether  diplomatic  r e l a t i o n s w o u l d be m a i n t a i n e d , he gave t h e e v a s i v e answer t h a t the c o n t i n u a t i o n o f p r e v i o u s r e l a t i o n s " . . . m e a n t f a v o u r a b l e r e l a t i o n s between Japan and the ROC s i n c e the c o n c l u s i o n o f t h e Japan-ROC t r e a t y  in  152 1952."  Prime M i n i s t e r Tanaka gave h i s f u l l s u p p o r t to Chairman  Kosaka, t h i s b e i n g regarded as " a n i n d i r e c t c l a r i f i c a t i o n o f h i s [Tanaka's] i n t e n t i o n of not accepting the pro-Taiwan f a c t i o n s  assertions,  w h i c h leads to t h e ' t w o Chinas' and t h e 'one China - one Taiwan' p »153 position. I n any e v e n t , the i n s e r t i o n o f t h e p r e v i o u s l y mentioned p r o v i s o was enough t o m o l l i f y t h e p r o - T a i w a n members o f the N o r m a l i z a t i o n C o u n c i l and t h e r e b y g a i n a "consensus" w i t h i n the LDP.  But t h i s  con-  sensus was o b v i o u s l y more an agreement to d i s a g r e e than i t was a r e f l e c t i o n o f the m o d i f i c a t i o n and accommodation o f ideas t o c r e a t e a common agreement —  a consensus —  on e x a c t l y what procedure should be  47  taken i n n o r m a l i z i n g r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e PRC.  Certainly,  the process  employed i n a t t e m p t i n g to g a i n a consensus w i t h i n t h e p a r t y was i n l i n e w i t h t h e e a r l i e r s u g g e s t i o n t h a t t h i s would i n v o l v e a f o r m a l show o f u n a n i m i t y and p a r t i c i p a t o r y c o n s u l t a t i o n , b u t t h e i m p o r t a n t p o i n t t h a t " . . . b e c a u s e t h e facade o f consensus has t o be m a i n t a i n e d , d e c i s i o n s are n o t easy t o a r r i v e a t i n d i f f i c u l t  is  clear-cut  cases, w i t h the r e s u l t  t h a t the s o l u t i o n takes the f o r m o f an e x t r e m e l y vague f o r m u l a w h i c h 154 becomes the cause o f g r e a t e r c o n f u s i o n a f t e r w a r d s . " instance,  In  this  the vague f o r m u l a adopted l e d the p r o - T a i w a n LDP Dietmen to  c o n s i d e r t h a t d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s would be m a i n t a i n e d w i t h Taiwan, whereas t h e dominant p r o - P e k i n g LDPers r e a l i z e d t h a t i t d i d n o t . is hardly surprising, therefore,  It  that a f t e r diplomatic relations  with  Taiwan were s e v e r e d , the p r o - T a i w a n "hawks" w i t h i n t h e p a r t y f e l t  that  t h e y had been deceived by the Tanaka government. The LDP M i s s i o n s t o China and Taiwan A f t e r the f o r m a l r e q u i r e m e n t s of consensus had been reached and the f i v e p r i n c i p l e s f o r n o r m a l i z a t i o n adopted by the LDP, the Tanaka Cabinet d i s p a t c h e d t o Peking on the 1 4 t h September 1972 a 23-man m i s s i o n headed by Chairman Kosaka, and t o T a i p e i on the 1 7 t h September a 17-man m i s s i o n headed by former F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r S h i i n a . ^ 1  6  Since  t h e r e were numerous LDP p o l i t i c i a n s who wanted to j o i n the Kosaka m i s s i o n , they were chosen from v a r i o u s f a c t i o n s on t h e b a s i s o f s t r e n g t h and i n f l u e n c e w i t h i n t h e r u l i n g p a r t y .  For t h e S h i i n a m i s s i o n ,  however, the t a s k was t o r e c r u i t enough members who were w i l l i n g v i s i t T a i p e i on an o f f i c i a l LDP m i s s i o n .  their  to  48  The express purpose f o r w h i c h t h e Kosaka m i s s i o n was s e n t t o Peking was t o make p r e p a r a t i o n s f o r the f o r t h c o m i n g v i s i t o f Prime M i n i s t e r Tanaka. stated  I n h i s meeting w i t h Chinese  officials Kosaka %  t h a t c e r t a i n elements w i t h i n t h e LDP were concerned over  the q u e s t i o n o f J a p a n ' s r e l a t i o n s w i t h Taiwan a f t e r n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f r e l a t i o n s w i t h China.  Since the Chinese s i d e expressed an u n d e r s t a n d -  i n g o f Tanaka's i n t r a - p a r t y p r o b l e m s , t h i s d i d n o t p r e v e n t the f i l l m e n t o f Kosaka's  task."*"'  ful-  7  Such a f a v o u r a b l e a t t i t u d e was nonetheless t h r e a t e n e d by t h e a c t i v i t i e s o f t h e S h i i n a m i s s i o n w h i c h had t h e t h a n k l e s s t a s k o f  ex-  p l a i n i n g Japan's new China p o l i c y and s e e k i n g t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f s o o n - t o - b e abandoned ROC government.  the  I n p a r t i c u l a r , what was a g g r a v a t -  i n g t o t h e Chinese government^and what made e x p l i c i t  the question t h a t  the N o r m a l i z a t i o n C o u n c i l had m a i n t a i n e d as vague, was S h i i n a ' s t i o n t h a t : "Our c o u n t r y d e s i r e s t o m a i n t a i n e x i s t i n g r e l a t i o n s  declarawith  158 Taiwan i n c l u d i n g d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s . "  N a t u r a l l y t h e Japanese  government i n t e n d e d to m a i n t a i n i t s l u c r a t i v e t r a d e and f i n a n c i a l t i e s w i t h Taiwan, b u t , as was emphasized p r e v i o u s l y ,  i t had p a r t i c u -  l a r l y a v o i d e d making a s p e c i f i c agreement t o m a i n t a i n d i p l o m a t i c l a t i o n s d u r i n g the N o r m a l i z a t i o n C o u n c i l m e e t i n g s .  re-  When t h e Chinese  government summoned Kosaka t o a m i d n i g h t meeting t o demand an e x p l a n a t i o n o f t h e S h i i n a s t a t e m e n t , he made a p o i n t o f s a y i n g t h a t r e l a t i o n s w i t h Taiwan would be s e v e r e d :  diplomatic  " T h e . . . L D P ' s p o l i c y f o r Japan-  China d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s remains unchanged.  When n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f  Japan-China d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s i s c a r r i e d o u t ,  the diplomatic  relations  49  [ w i t h Taiwan] w i l l n a t u r a l l y be s e v e r e d .  I cannot understand the  159 Shiina statement at a l l . "  The government, b e i n g more concerned  w i t h m a i n t a i n i n g i n t r a - p a r t y harmony than i n a s s u r i n g the Chinese s i d e o f Japan's good i n t e n t i o n s , s i m p l y s t a t e d t h a t S h i i n a ' s  remarks  " w i l l n o t be i n t h e l e a s t a f f e c t t h e government's p o l i c y f o r n o r m a l . ^. ,,160 izatxon. Although the Shiina v i s i t  thus c r e a t e d an embarrassing  situation  f o r the Tanaka Government, i t more i m p o r t a n t l y c a r r i e d o u t one o f  the  p r e p a r a t i o n s t h a t Tanaka p e r c e i v e d as e s s e n t i a l f o r n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f Japan-China r e l a t i o n s .  I n a d d i t i o n , S h i i n a ' s s t a t e m e n t t o t h e Taiwan  govemimtiiMri&'tegditiiaY-whileithe.Tanaka Cabinet m i g h t abandon i t ,  t h e r e was  s t i l l a s t r o n g s e n t i m e n t i n f a v o u r o f t h e ROC w i t h i n t h e r u l i n g  party.  Of c o u r s e , t h e e x t e n t t o w h i c h t h e Tanaka government c o u l d go i n  this  r e s p e c t would n o t extend t o the maintenance of d i p l o m a t i c  relations,  s i n c e t h e l u c r a t i v e Taiwan t r a d e was c e r t a i n l y n o t to be s a c r i f i c e d f o r t h e sake o f p o l i t i c a l r e a s o n s ; hence, the " s e p a r a t i o n o f and economics" w o u l d t h i s t i m e be a p p l i e d t o T a i p e i , r a t h e r  politics than  P e k i n g , when d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s between Japan and China came i n t o effect. Conclusion: The above d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e LDP members o f t h e t r i p a r t i t e  elite  s u p p o r t s the p r o p o s i t i o n a l v a r i a n t t h a t t h e LDP h o l d s predominant sway i n t h e p o l i c y - m a k i n g process i n Japan.  Yet w h i l e p r o - P e k i n g p a r t y p o l i -  t i c i a n s were an obvious s t r i c t u r e upon t h e Sato government's  China  p o l i c y and a necessary p i l l a r i n Tanaka's p r e s i d e n t i a l e l e c t i o n ,  their  50  r o l e i n the p o l i c y - m a k i n g process was i n d i r e c t and p e r i p h e r a l . S i m i l a r l y , o t h e r p a r t y members, and even t h e Cabinet as a f u n c t i o n i n g u n i t , d i d not p a r t i c i p a t e i n the policy-making process.  Instead, a  s m a l l c o r e group o f s e n i o r LDP p o l i t i c i a n s —  specifically  Prime  M i n i s t e r Tanaka and F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r O h i r a —  emerged f r o m t h i s  larger  aggregate as the dominant f o r c e w i t h i n t h e China d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s , supported i n t h i s r o l e by a l o n e LDPer, F u r u i , and as we s h a l l see l a t e r ,  a s m a l l group o f F o r e i g n M i n i s t r y o f f i c i a l s and c e r t a i n o p -  position party p o l i t i c i a n s .  Thus, i t  i s n o t s i m p l y the LDP w h i c h  h o l d s predominant sway i n t h e p o l i c y - m a k i n g p r o c e s s , b u t ^  specifically  i m p o r t a n t members o f t h e LDP C a b i n e t . What i s o f s i g n i f i c a n c e h e r e , i s t h a t Tanaka and O h i r a appear have f u n c t i o n e d as t h e p o l i c y - m a k i n g team w i t h o u t any d i r e c t o r c o n s t r a i n t f r o m the LDP f a c t i o n s . o r p o l i c y g r o u p s .  to  support  Any n e g a t i v e  c o n s t r a i n t s t h a t c o u l d have r e s t r i c t e d the duo were e s s e n t i a l l y c o n t a i n e d w i t h i n t h e N o r m a l i z a t i o n C o u n c i l , which was dominated by p r o Peking p o l i t i c i a n s f r o m f a c t i o n s t h a t supported Tanaka i n h i s  election.  W h i l e b o t h Tanaka.and O h i r a emphasized to a l l concerned t h a t they would n o t proceed w i t h the n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f r e l a t i o n s w i t h o u t p a r t y i n the f o r m o f a consensus to n o r m a l i z e r e l a t i o n s ,  approval  t h i s d e c i s i o n was  a c t u a l l y made b e f o r e t h e "agreement to d i s a g r e e " consensus was reached w i t h i n t h e ' p a r t y organ.  I n d e e d , the d i v i s i o n a l o n g i d e o l o g i c a l and  p o l i c y l i n e s was so acute i t was i m p o s s i b l e t o g a i n a p a r t y consensus i n a more s p e c i f i c f o r m than the one adopted.  Hence, the p o l i c y  ac-  commodation t h a t d i d t a k e p l a c e was o b v i o u s l y p e r i p h e r a l and c a r r i e d out away f r o m t h e l o c u s o f d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g power.  51  A l t h o u g h t h e r e are s i m i l a r i t i e s between t h i s study and  those  c a r r i e d out by Hellmann-.ahd Packard i n terms of d e a l i n g w i t h  "yes"  "no"  c o n t r o v e r s i a l and  short-term  the f o r e i g n p o l i c y i s s u e a r e a , revealed  ( l e s s than one  the other  two  year) d e c i s i o n i n  studies  the dominant r o l e of the f a c t i o n s i n the  process. "'"  T h i s d i f f e r e n c e may  16  nevertheless  decision-making  r e v o l v e around the f a c t  u n l i k e Hatoyama at the time of the S o v i e t peace t r e a t y or K i s h i a t the time of the 1960 strong by  Security Treaty  t h a t Tanaka,  negotiations,  crisis,  enjoyed  support of the "Mainstream" f a c t i o n s w i t h i n the p a r t y ,  e n a b l i n g him  to a t t e n d  to the n o r m a l i z a t i o n  the  there-  o f Japan-China  rela-  t i o n s w i t h o u t f e a r o f l o s i n g the support of the f a c t i o n a l c o a l i t i o n which p l a c e d  him  i n power p r e c i s e l y because he  be a b l e to s p e e d i l y n o r m a l i z e r e l a t i o n s w i t h Tanaka gained the p r e s i d e n c y  ( u n l i k e Fukuda) would China.  The  fact  on a p o l i c y commitment i m p l y i n g  he would  n o r m a l i z e r e l a t i o n s w i t h China i f e l e c t e d , o b v i o u s l y meant t h a t was  f r e e to d e l e g a t e  to--Kosaka ,roneeo.f i h i s i s t a u D c h m s u p p o r t e r s  sponsibiliity.'nof m o l l i f y i n g thetprosTaiwante'lemenfscw.-ithi-ri sthereby  fcreatec^pfacadesof-^nsensus.,.  T h i s d o v e t a i l s w i t h the  that  he  ; nthe r e -  the - party,Wand suggestion  t h a t consensus, l i k e f a c t i o n a l i s m , i s not a s i g n i f i c a n t f o r c e i n a short-term  and  c o n t r o v e r s i a l f o r e i g n p o l i c y i s s u e i f _ the Prime M i n i s t e r  enjoys the s t r o n g b a c k i n g o f the LDP  factions.  I f he  does not,  then  the  weakness of h i s i n t r a - p a r t y p o s i t i o n n e c e s s i t a t e s he r e a c h a consensus (under the i n f l u e n c e and he may  r e s t r i c t i o n of the f a c t i o n s ) i n o r d e r  m a i n t a i n h i s p o s i t i o n as p a r t y P r e s i d e n t  that  and Prime M i n i s t e r .  T h i s means t h a t the Prime M i n i s t e r i s l i m i t e d i n h i s d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  52  power when he does n o t enjoy t h e s t r o n g b a c k i n g o f a preponderance o f factions  (or i d e o l o g i c a l o r p o l i c y groups w i t h i n t h e p a r t y )  but,  when he does enjoy t h i s s u p p o r t , he can o p e r a t e w i t h o u t f e a r o f l i m i t i n g influence.  their  A c c o r d i n g l y , a major caveat t o n o t e here i s  t h e i s s u e area does n o t n e c e s s a r i l y d e l i n e a t e the s a l i e n c y  that  of  f a c t i o n a l i s m or consensus i n a c o n t r o v e r s i a l and s h o r t - t e r m f o r e i g n p o l i c y issue area. The Bureaucracy --^Introduction A f o r e i g n p o l i c y issue n a t u r a l l y f a l l s w i t h i n the  juristictional  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o f t h e Japanese M i n i s t r y o f F o r e i g n A f f a i r s Foreign M i n i s t r y ) .  (hereafter  I n t h i s r e s p e c t , a number o f F o r e i g n M i n i s t r y  b u r e a u c r a t s n a t u r a l l y came t o p l a y an i m p o r t a n t  (though s u b o r d i n a t e )  r o l e i n the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g process p e r t a i n i n g t o J a p a n ' s o f r e l a t i o n s w i t h China.  normalization  Before p r o c e e d i n g t o d i s c u s s t h e n a t u r e o f  the m i n i s t e r i a l group's p a r t i c i p a t i o n I n t h i s policy-making process, however, we w i l l f i r s t be concerned w i t h examining c e r t a i n o f  the  i n t e r and i n t r a m i n i s t r y c o n f l i c t s o f o p i n i o n which s u r f a c e d d u r i n g the p e r i o d p r i o r t o the n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f Japan-China r e l a t i o n s . I n t e r and I n t r a M i n i s t r y C o n f l i c t Concerning Japan's China P o l i c y The b u r e a u c r a c y , l i k e the LDP, has been d i v i d e d i n i t s  stand-  162 p o i n t on the China i s s u e . t i o n a l Trade and I n d u s t r y Affairs  Specifically,  the M i n i s t r y of  Interna-  ( M I T I ) and t h e Japanese M i n s i t r y o f  Foreign  ( F o r e i g n M i n i s t r y ) have g i v e n d i v e r s i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s t o the 163 q u e s t i o n o f J a p a n ' s r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e Peking government. The M I T I ,  53  b e i n g n a t u r a l l y concerned w i t h the development o f J a p a n ' s w o r l d t r a d e , has urged the expansion o f t r a d e r e l a t i o n s w i t h China ( w h i l e m a i n t a i n i n g t r a d e w i t h Taiwan) and t h e improvement of the p o l i t i c a l c l i m a t e between these two c o u n t r i e s .  Thus, t h e MITI has been i n favour o f a l l o w i n g the  use o f E x p o r t - I m p o r t Bank funds f o r t h e e x p o r t o f i n d u s t r i a l p l a n t s China.  In contraposition,  to  t h e p r e d o m i n a t i n g v i e w i n ItheeForeign M i n i s t r y  has been i n f a v o u r o f a p r o - T a i w a n p o l i c y , and has thus seen eye t o eye w i t h the Sato government i n u p h o l d i n g the "Yoshida l e t t e r "  (re-  s t r i c t i n g t h e use o f these f u n d s ) , t h i s n e g a t i v e p o s t u r e b e i n g m a i n 164 t a i n e d u n t i l t h e b e g i n n i n g of 1972. I n s p i t e o f t h e i n f l u e n c e o f t h i s view i n d e t e r m i n i n g J a p a n ' s China p o l i c y , a m i n o r i t y w i t h i n the F o r e i g n M i n i s t r y , as r e p r e s e n t e d by the China D i v i s i o n and A s i a n B u r e a u , ^ haveC'ehall'ehged t h e p r o 1  Taiwan p o s t u r e t a k e n by t h e more p o w e r f u l UN and American bureaus by 166 c a l l i n g f o r a f o r w a r d - l o o k i n g p o l i c y towards P e k i n g .  This c o n -  f l i c t o f o p i n i o n w i t h i n t h e m i n i s t r y s u r f a c e d when t h e q u e s t i o n o f C h i n a ' s s e a t i n g i n t h e U n i t e d Nations came up i n 1 9 7 1 .  In  this  i n s t a n c e , w h i l e t h e China D i v i s i o n and A s i a n Bureau were i n f a v o u r o f Peking and t h e "one China" f o r m u l a f o r a d o p t i o n by Japan a t  the  U n i t e d N a t i o n s , the American and UN bureaus i n s i s t e d upon c o n t i n u i n g t o back the U n i t e d S t a t e s i n s u p p o r t o f t h e Taiwan government."*^  7  W i t h the f a i l u r e o f t h i s a t t e m p t t o keep Taiwan i n the U n i t e d Nations the p r o - T a i w a n groups w i t h i n the Japanese F o r e i g n M i n i s t r y ,  together  w i t h Prime M i n i s t e r Sato, came under i n c r e a s i n g c r i t i c i s m f o r m a i n t a i n i n g such a p o l i c y a t an obvious t i m e o f f l u x i n t h e . 168 environment. t  international  54  A more i m p o r t a n t i n s t a n c e i n w h i c h t h e presence o f such d i s a c c o r d ant views w i t h i n the F o r e i g n M i n i s t r y s u r f a c e d , ' . occurred j u s t p r i o r t o n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f Japan-China r e l a t i o n s .  the  T h i s c o u l d have proved t o be  a s t r i c t u r e upon t h e p o l i c y - m a k i n g process s i n c e t h e LDP was n e c e s s a r i l y dependent upon the e x p e r t i s e o f t h e bureaucracy f o r a s s i s t a n c e i n such tasks as t h e d r a f t i n g o f a Japan-China j o i n t communique.  However, d e -  s p i t e the presence o f p r o - T a i w a n and a n t i - P e k i n g views w i t h i n  the  169 Foreign M i n i s t r y ,  e s p e c i a l l y among m i d d l e l e v e l b u r e a u c r a t s ,  d i d n o t prove t o be an impediment t o t h e n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f  this  relations  because these b u r e a u c r a t s l a c k e d e f f e c t i v e access t o t h e m a t r i x o f decision-making process.  the  I n d e e d , the s m a l l , ad hoc p o l i c y group w h i c h  performed t h e F o r e i g n M i n i s t r y ' s r o l e i n t h e d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g process was i s o l a t e d even f r o m the i n f l u e n c e o f s e n i o r members o f t h e F o r e i g n Ministry'."'" ^ 7  Consequently, t h i s group c o u l d adapt t o t h e dynamic  p o l i c y - m a k i n g environment w i t h o u t t h e n e c e s s i t y o f compromising w i t h those b u r e a u c r a t s who c o n t i n u e d t o be i n f a v o u r o f m a i n t a i n i n g  diplo-  m a t i c r e l a t i o n s w i t h Taiwan."'" "'" 7  The F o r e i g n M i n i s t r y P o l i c y - M a k i n g Group The core o f the ad hoc p o l i c y - m a k i n g group w h i c h came t o dominate t h e China d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g process w i t h i n t h e M i n i s t r y was composed o f T r e a t i e s D i v i s i o n Head Kuriyama, T r e a t i e s Bureau D i r e c t o r Takashima, A s i a Bureau D i r e c t o r Y o s h i d a , and China D i v i s i o n Head Hashimoto who worked c l o s e l y t o g e t h e r and w i t h the Tanaka-Ohira duo under t h e g e n e r a l 172 s u p e r v i s i o n o f F o r e i g n V i c e - M i n i s t e r Hogen.  W h i l e t h i s form o f  k n i t p o l i c y group w o r k i n g on a c o n t r o v e r s i a l p o l i t i c a l i s s u e i s  small  not o  55  unusual i n the Japanese government, " t h e e x t e n t t o which t h e f o u r men k e p t a l l - i m p o r t a n t s e c r e t s to themselves, Hogen and O h i r a was p r o b a b l y extraordinary.  There was a sense among these and o t h e r h i g h r a n k i n g  f i c i a l s a t t h a t t i m e t h a t they were f i g h t i n g f o r p o l i t i c a l s u r v i v a l t h e a f t e r m a t h o f the Nixon shocks and t h e UN f i a s c o .  ofin  A t the same t i m e ,  Tanaka made i t u n m i s t a k a b l y c l e a r t h a t he would n o t t o l e r a t e breach o f 173 c o n f i d e n c e o r any o t h e r b l u n d e r on t h e p a r t o f t h e  officials."  T h i s group p l a y e d an e s s e n t i a l b u t n e v e r t h e l e s s secondary r o l e a-vis  t h e Tanaka-Ohira duo i n t h e f o r e i g n p o l i c y - m a k i n g p r o c e s s .  vis-  In  l i n e w i t h t h e i r f u n c t i o n as b u r e a u c r a t s , t h e F o r e i g n M i n i s t r y g r o u p , w i t h Kuriyama t a k i n g t h e l e a d , went t o g r e a t l e n g t h s t o t r y and draw up a d r a f t communique t h a t would be a c c e p t a b l e t o b o t h t h e Chinese and 174 Japanese governments.  I n t h i s endeavour they were a i d e d by the f e e d -  back f r o m the Chinese government Komeito Chairman T a k e i r i ^ and t h e LDP m a v e r i c k F u r u i , w e r e a b l e to g a i n f r o m t h e i r t a l k s w i t h Chinese when they v i s i t e d P e k i n g .  officials  I n t h e end, however, even the f i n a l f o r m o f  the communique was t o be decided by Tanaka when he made h i s v i s i t  to  China. Conclusion: A f t e r t h e p u b l i c a t i o n o f Graham A l l i s o n ' s The Essence o f D e c i s i o n : E x p l a i n i n g t h e Cuban M i s s i l e C r i s i s ^ ~ i  >  d e s c r i b e d by Stephen Krasner as  a " p a t h b r e a k i n g enterprise,""'"'''^ and the works a l o n g s i m i l a r l i n e s by Morton H a l p e r i n , " ' "  77  the bureaucratic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of f o r e i g n p o l i c y  d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g has gained i n c r e a s i n g c u r r e n c y w i t h i n t h e f o r e i g n policy literature.  As was noted e a r l i e r ,  Tsuruntani applies  this  56  p e r s p e c t i v e i n h i s d i s c u s s i o n o f Japanese f o r e i g n p o l i c y - m a k i n g b u t , as we d i s c o v e r e d , the r o l e o f the bureaucracy i n t h e China n o r m a l i z a t i o n process was s u b o r d i n a t e t o that- o f members o f t h e r u l i n g LDP, i n t h i s i n s t a n c e the Tanaka-Ohira duo.  In fact,  the policy-making  group w h i c h developed t o cope w i t h t h e China i s s u e was c l e a r l y f r o m the bureaucracy i t s e l f ,  divorced  a l l o w i n g t h i s group t o be much more  f l e x i b l e and r e s p o n s i v e t o t h e needs o f a dynamic p o l i c y - m a k i n g situation. I t would seem t h a t t h e use o f t h i s s m a l l , ad hoc p o l i c y - m a k i n g group unhindered by the r i g i d i t y o f t h e f o r m a l h i e r a r c h i c a l  bureaucratic  s e t t i n g , undermines c e r t a i n o f t h e assumptions upon which T s u r u t a n i p r e d i c a t e s h i s argument; namely, t h a t t h e l o w e r echelon o f the F o r e i g n 178 M i n i s t r y dominates t h e : f o r e i g n p o l i c y - m a k i n g process^ and t h a t F o r e i g n 179 M i n i s t r y b u r e a u c r a t s are u n i n n o v a t i v e .  Undoubtedly, i n r o u t i n e l o n g -  term d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g , the lower echelons w i t h i n t h e f o r e i g n m i n i s t r y  play  a d e c i s i v e r o l e i n the p o l i c y - m a k i n g p r o c e s s , b u t our e x a m i n a t i o n o f  the  r o l e o f t h e bureaucracy i n the s h o r t - t e r m and c o n t r o v e r s i a l China i s s u e i n d i c a t e s t h a t such d e c i s i o n s a r e h a r d l y l e f t t o f o l l o w the 180 system i n which the lower echelon dominate.  ringisei  L i k e w i s e , one o f  the  major p r e r e q u i s i t e s f o r t h e F o r e i g n M i n i s t r y group i n v o l v e d i n the China d e c i s i o n must s u r e l y have been t h e i r i n n o v a t i v e a b i l i t y and c a p a c i t y a c t d e c i s i v e l y w i t h o u t the h i n d r a n c e o f f o r m a l b u r e a u c r a t i c Once i t  to  requirements.  i s u n d e r s t o o d , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t a c o n t r o v e r s i a l and s h o r t - t e r m  i s s u e i s n o t decided a t t h e lower l e v e l s o f t h e bureaucracy t h r o u g h a process o f " o s m o s i s " , T s u r u t a n i ' s c r i t i c i s m o f b u r e a u c r a t i c i n e r t i a  in  57  Japan does n o t n e c e s s a r i l y A further point  to  apply. c-o n s a d e r  i s t h a t the p r o x i m a t e a c t o r s  i n t h e China p o l i c y - m a k i n g process d i f f e r e d as a r e s u l t o f the change i n the temporal dimension o f the China i s s u e . a l o n g t e r m (though s t i l l  Now, i n s t e a d o f i t  being  c o n t r o v e r s i a l ) i s s u e i n w h i c h the s t a t u s quo  was m a i n t a i n e d by the F o r e i g n M i n i s t r y , t h e China i s s u e , w h i l e m a i n t a i n i n g i t s controversial characteristic,  a t the same t i m e became a s h o r t - t e r m  ( u r g e n t ) i s s u e on t h e t e m p o r a l d i m e n s i o n .  Thus, t h e f a c t o r s  (e.g.,  u n i n n o v a t i v e , r i g i d i t y ) which T s u r u t a n i d e p i c t s as i m p i n g i n g upon the e f f e c t i v e f o r m u l a t i o n o f Japanese f o r e i g n p o l i c y d i d n o t come i n t o play, because a s m a l l ad hoc group was formed and s e p a r a t e d f r o m such i n h i b i t i n g f o r c e s , to f u n c t i o n i n t h e dynamic, f l u i d environment t h e  decision-'-  making^process "had; become t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o . What we a r e s u g g e s t i n g h e r e , t h e n , i s t h a t the metamorphosis o f t h e China p o l i c y - m a k i n g process f r o m a . l o n g - t e r m and c o n t r o v e r s i a l i s s u e t o a s h o r t - t e r m and c o n t r o v e r s i a l ?  i s s u e , b r o u g h t about a s i t u a t i o n i n which t h e LDP p o l i c y - m a k i n g g r o u p , supported by t h e F o r e i g n M i n i s t r y p o l i c y - m a k i n g g r o u p , became the major component o f t h e d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s .  I n o t h e r w o r d s , t h e temporal  dimension may thus determine t h e s a l i e n c y o f t h e bureaucracy i n J a p a n ' s f o r e i g n policy-making process.  Needless to say, T s u r u t a n i ' s c l a i m t h a t  the F o r e i g n M i n i s t r y dominate t h e f o r e i g n p o l i c y - m a k i n g process i n Japan i s b r o u g h t s e r i o u s l y i n t o q u e s t i o n , by our d i s c u s s i o n h e r e .  181  58  The Business Community Introduction I n the r e a l m o f economic p o l i c y - m a k i n g the b u s i n e s s  community  "  it  i s n a t u r a l l y a s i g n i f i c a n t , i f n o t decisive^ i n f l u e n c e on t h e p o l i c y 182 making process i n Japan. its  I n a f o r e i g n p o l i c y i s s u e a r e a , however,  i n f l u e n c e may n o t be as g r e a t , s i n c e Hellmann d i s c o v e r e d i n h i s  s t u d y o f the S o v i e t peace t r e a t y n e g o t i a t i o n s t h a t t h e b u s i n e s s com183 m u n i t y ' s o v e r a l l i n f l u e n c e was v e r y l i m i t e d . important c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  There i s here one  i n w h i c h t h e Hellmann f i n d i n g s d i f f e r  from  the p r e s e n t study o f t h e China n o r m a l i z a t i o n p r o c e s s ; namely, i n  the  former case t h e b u s i n e s s community d i d n o t view t h e S o v i e t Union as a p o t e n t i a l market f o r Japanese goods, whereas i n the l a t t e r  case t h e r e  was an " e v e r p r e s e n t l u r e o f a market w i t h hundreds o f m i l l i o n s  of  184 customers^"  and a b e l i e f among c e r t a i n elements o f t h e Japanese 185  b u s i n e s s community t h a t China was J a p a n ' s " n a t u r a l " t r a d e  partner.  This i m p l i e s t h a t t h e b u s i n e s s community m i g h t have been more concerned w i t h i n f l u e n c i n g t h e p o l i c y - m a k i n g process p e r t a i n i n g t o t h e n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f Japan-China r e l a t i o n s  than was t h e case i n Hellmann'STstudy o f  S o v i e t peace t r e a t y n e g o t i a t i o n s .  However, t h e e x p e c t a t i o n o f  t r a d e w i t h China i s n o t shared by a l l s e c t o r s o f t h e b u s i n e s s so t h a t t h e r e are c e r t a i n d i f f e r e n c e s ing attitudes  the  increased community,  i n the b u s i n e s s community r e g a r d -  towards the Peking government, and t h e q u e s t i o n o f n o r m a l 186  i z a t i o n of r e l a t i o n s between Japan and China. D i f f e r e n c e s i n the Business Community's A t t i t u d e Towards China I n the f i r s t p l a c e , w h i l e sweeping r e f e r e n c e i s made t o a Japanese  59  " b u s i n e s s community" t h e r e a r e c e r t a i n d i f f e r e n c e s r e g a r d i n g China p o l i c y between t h e Kansai ( o r Osaka based) business groups and the Kanto ( o r Tokyo based) g r o u p s ,  187  the former g e n e r a l l y h a v i n g been 188  more f a v o u r a b l e t o n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f r e l a t i o n s  than the  • For i n s t a n c e , t h e Kansai businessmen h o l d more p o s i t i v e  latter. expectations  o f the China market accompanied by a f e e l i n g o f n o s t a l g i a f o r market among the prer-war business l e a d e r s who " . . . f r e q u e n t l y  that attributed  the d e c l i n e o f Kansai business to the l o s s o f the China market and hope »189 t o r e c o v e r t h e l o s t ground by once a g a i n r e v i v i n g the China m a r k e t . T h i s p o s i t i v e a t t i t u d e i s f u r t h e r i l l u s t r a t e d by t h e f a c t t h a t i n the Kansai area were t h e f i r s t  industries  t o r e c o g n i z e t h e "Four C o n d i t i o n s "  o f t r a d e o u t l i n e d by Chou E n - L a i i n 1970, t h e l e a d i n g combine b e i n g 190 Sumitomo.  Moreover, Chairman Y o s h i s h i g e A s h i h a r a o f t h e Kansai  F e d e r a t i o n o f Economic O r g a n i z a t i o n s p l a i n l y came o u t i n f a v o u r o f e a r l y r e s t o r a t i o n o f d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s through summit diplomacy 191 by O h i r a and Tanaka. F i n a l l y , Osaka business l e a d e r s preceded^  192  a s i m i l a r group from Tokyo i n v i s i t i n g China i n September o f 1 9 7 1 . Indeed, i t  does n o t seem unusual t h a t t h e r e s h o u l d be c o n t r a s t i n g  t i t u d e s between the Kanto and Kansai business groups s i n c e 193  at-  their  t r a d i t i o n a l r i v a l r y dates t o p r e - w a r days. Another d i s t i n c t i o n t h a t should be mentioned here p e r t a i n s t o t h e degree o f r e l i a n c e an i n d u s t r y has on t r a d e w i t h China. in particular,  Two i n d u s t r i e s  t h e chemical f e r t i l i z e r and s t e e l i n d u s t r i e s , have a 194  h i g h l e v e l o f dependance upon m a i n t a i n i n g t r a d e w i t h C h i n a : chemical f e r t i l i z e r  i n d u s t r y has been l a r g e l y dependent upon  The China  60  s i n c e 1967-1968, as a r e s u l t o f an i n c r e a s e i n domestic  fertilizer  p r o d u c t i o n , t o g e t h e r w i t h a decrease i n d o m e s t i c , Korean and Taiwan demand f o r t h i s p r o d u c t .  195  For t h e s t e e l i n d u s t r y ,  t h e China market  w-a=s'ae o f renewed i n t e r e s t a f t e r 1957, when an aagreement was reached t o e x p o r t i r o n and s t e e l to China i n r e t u r n f o r t h e i m p o r t a t i o n o f an 196 equivalent  (monetary) amount o f i r o n o r e and s t e e l .  Despite the  a b r o g a t i o n o f t h i s agreement by t h e Chinese s i d e , l e a d i n g t h e s t e e l i n d u s t r y to ban e x p o r t s t o China, t h e n e c e s s i t y o f p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n the China market due t o a slump i n demand f o r Japanese s t e e l ,  combined  w i t h an i n c r e a s e i n s t e e l p r o d u c t i o n , f o r c e d t h e i n d u s t r y to  follow  the l e a d o f Nippon Kokkan (Japan S t e e l Tube) which resumed e x p o r t s  to  197 ' China i n 1961.  From t h i s t i m e on t h e s t e e l i n d u s t r y has f o l l o w e d  the same p a t h as the chemical f e r t i l i z e r p r o p o r t i o n of i t s e x p o r t s to China. fertilizer  industries'  i n d u s t r y i n expanding t h e  As a r e s u l t , t h e s t e e l and  r e l i a n c e upon t h i s market i n c r e a s e d a n d , as  a n a t u r a l outgrOwthcQ^ t h i s t r e n d , t h e i r a t t i t u d e towards the Peking government became more p o s i t i v e than o t h e r elements o f t h e business community, which gained t h e i r economic v i a b i l i t y f r o m o t h e r market outlets. A f i n a l n o t e w o r t h y p o i n t c o n c e r n i n g t h e a t t i t u d i n a l v a r i a n c e over China p o l i c y w i t h i n t h e business community, p e r t a i n s t o t h e  difference  i n s i z e and economic v i a b i l i t y o f those companies p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n t h e China t r a d e .  A p a r t from the above mentioned l a r g e i n d u s t r i e s , and t o a  l e s s e r e x t e n t those i n d u s t r i e s i n machinery and t e x t i l e  production,  w h i c h s i n c e 1963 have p a r t i c i p a t e d i n t h e China t r a d e t h r o u g h "Memorandum  61  T r a d e , " a l a r g e p r o p o r t i o n o f t h e companies i n v o l v e d i n t h i s  trade  a r e s m a l l " F r i e n d l y f i r m ^ " which depend upon t h e China t r a d e  for  survival.  These " F r i e n d l y f i r m s " have n a t u r a l l y been i n f a v o u r o f  t h e Peking government and have a c t i v e l y p a r t i c i p a t e d i n the p r o m o t i o n o f Japan-China r e l a t i o n s . " F r i e n d l y F i r m " Trade and Memorandum Trade ]  " F r i e n d l y f i r m " t r a d e has been c a r r i e d o u t between Japan and  China s i n c e 1960 when, due t o the S i n o - S o v i e t c o n f l i c t and t h e f a i l u r e o f t h e Great Leap f o r w a r d , Chou E n - L a i resumed t r a d e w i t h 198 Japan a f t e r i t had been l a r g e l y dormant f o r t h e p r e c e d i n g two y e a r s . The s m a l l e c o n o m i c a l l y weak " F r i e n d l y f i r m s " p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n t h e China t r a d e were also?joined by the.'"dummies" o f some o f t h e l a r g e r c o r p o r a t i o n s w h i c h were anxious t o p a r t i c i p a t - e e i n t h i s m a r k e t .  To q u a l i f y  they o n l y needed t o be d e s i g n a t e d as " f r i e n d l y " by the Japan-China Trade Promotion C o u n c i l . I n 1963 a f u r t h e r channel o f t r a d e was opened i n the f o r m o f Memorandum T r a d e , which was i n i t i a t e d by t h e l a t e LDP Dietman Takasaki Tatsunosuke and L i a o Cheng-chih.  Unlike "Friendly f i r m "  trade,  Memorandum Trade " . . . c o n t a i n e d a s e m i - o f f i c i a l element as i t was a c cepted by l e a d e r s o f the LDP and was expected t o be p a r t i a l l y 199 by the g o v e r n m e n t - c o n t r o l l e d E x p o r t - I m p o r t Bank,"  financed  As was p r e v i o u s l y  s t a t e d , however, t h e Sato government d i d n o t a l l o w t h e dispersement of E x p o r t - I m p o r t Bank funds f o r use i n the China t r a d e a f t e r t h e "Yoshida letter' was n ,  written.  As P a r k . n o t e s , i t  soon became obvious to the f i r m s  participating  62  i n Memorandum Trade t h a t the ascendency o f Sato to t h e p r e m i e r s h i p had been accompanied by a d e c l i n e i n t h i s t y p e o f t r a d e i n f a v o u r o f firm" t r a d e . C e r t a i n l y  "friendly  S a t o ' s p r o - T a i w a n p o l i c y and g e n e r a l a n t i -  Peking o r i e n t a t i o n were a h i n d r a n c e t o t h e development o f smooth t r a d e r e l a t i o n s between Japan and China, p a r t i c u l a r l y s i n c e he v i s i t e d Taiwan i n 1967 and p a r t i c i p a t e d i n t h e U . S . ' s s e c u r i t y designs f o r t h e area 7  t h r o u g h t h e S a t o - N i x o n communique i n 1969.  N e v e r t h e l e s s , the l a r g e  companies t h a t were a b l e to t a k e p a r t i n China t r a d e t h r o u g h  their  "dummy" companies were n o t p a r t i c u l a r l y a f f e c t e d by S a t o ' s China p o l i c y , because they were s t i l l a b l e t o take some advantage o f t h e l u c r a t i v e 201 Taiwan t r a d e .  I n d e e d , except f o r those i n d u s t r i e s  t h a t were i n  s p e c i f i c need o f the China t r a d e , the a t t i t u d e expressed by the business community t h r o u g h such o r g a n i z a t i o n s as Keidanren ( F e d e r a t i o n of Economic A s s o c i a t i o n s ) and N i k k e i r e n (Japan F e d e r a t i o n o f Employers A s s o c i a t i o n ) , was g e n e r a l l y f a v o u r a b l e t o . t h e c o n t i n u a t i o n o f S a t o ' s p r o - T a i w a n p o l i c y s e p a r a t i n g p o l i t i c s and economics.  At the b e g i n n i n g o f the 1970s, how-  e v e r , a number o f events o c c u r r e d w h i c h g r a d u a l l y b r o u g h t about a change i n the business community's a t t i t u d e towards t h e Sato government's p r o Taiwan China p o l i c y . The R e a c t i o n o f t h e Business Community to Chou's "Four C o n d i t i o n s " and Changes i n the E x t e r n a l Environment On A p r i l 19th 1970, Chou E n - l a i e n u n c i a t e d t h e " f o u r  conditions"  t h a t were h e n c e f o r t h t o govern C h i n a ' s t r a d i n g r e l a t i o n s w i t h Japan. Under these " c o n d i t i o n s " c e r t a i n Japanese companies were t o be excluded f r o m the China t r a d e : 1 ) " e n t e r p r i s e s w h i c h are p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n t r a d e and  63  economic c o o p e r a t i o n designed t o a s s i s t Taiwan and t h e R e p u b l i c o f K o r e a ; 2) e n t e r p r i s e s w h i c h have i n v e s t e d i n Taiwan and t h e ROK; 3) e n t e r p r i s e s w h i c h are e x p o r t i n g arms t o V i e t n a m , Laos, and Cambodia; 4) U.S. j o i n t e n t e r p r i s e s i n J a p a n f  2 0 2  Q u i t e o b v i o u s l y , t h e enun-  c i a t i o n o f these ^conditions meant t h a t those s e c t o r s o f the b u s i n e s s community t h a t had a heavy dependence on the China m a r k e t ,  together  w i t h d e a l i n g s i n c o n t r a v e n t i o n o f the " f o u r c o n d i t i o n s " , needed t o come t o a d e c i s i o n as t o whether or n o t they s h o u l d abide by Chou's dfetmra ncdis; Xor,'-  .  One company i n p a r t i c u l a r ,  Sumitomo Kagaku, had t o  reach a q u i c k d e c i s i o n s i n c e i t was c o n s i d e r e d by t h e Chinese t r a d e authorities  t o be the " t y p i c a l v i o l a t o r " o f Chou's  '.'conditionsalong 203  w i t h M i t s u b i s h i Jukogyo, T e i k o k u J i n k e n and Asahi Dow Chemicals. C o n s i d e r i n g t h a t Sumitomo Kagaku's two major e x p o r t i t e m s t o China were s t e e l and f e r t i l i z e r , and t h a t over h a l f of t h e company's y e a r l y o f f e r t i l i z e r went cite©tthe China m a r k e t , i t  output  i s not s u r p r i s i n g t h a t 20 A  q u i c k l y decided t o accept the " f o u r c o n d i t i o n s ' . "  it  This was p a r t i c u -  l a r l y the case s i n c e t h e president<of the company c o n s i d e r e d t h e r e were b r i g h t e r o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r b u s i n e s s i n China^due t o U.S. c o n t r o l of 205 Taiwan market l e a v i n g " l i t t l e " f o r Japanese i n t e r e s t s . 206 I n s o f a r as the s t e e l companies a r e concerned,  except f o r  the  the  l a r g e s t s t e e l company, New Japan S t e e l ( S h i n Nihon S e i t e t s u ) , which resulted f r o m t h e merger o f F u j i and Yawata, the f o u r o t h e r major  steel  companies w h i c h Chou E n - l a i a l s o s p e c i f i c a l l y r e q u e s t e d t o a b i d e by the "four conditions" — Industry  Japan S t e e l Tube (Nihon K o k a n ) , Sumitomo M e t a l  (Sumitomo K i n z o k u ) , Kawasaki I r o n and S t e e l (Kawasaki S e i t e t s u ) ,  64  and Kobe S t e e l (Kobe Seiko) —  a l l f o l l o w e d the l e a d o f Sumitomo and  accepted the " f o u r c o n d i t i o n s . "  I n t h e case o f New Japan Steely the  company f i n a l l y d e c l a r e d i t s acceptance o f t h e s e /  .• " c o n d i t i o n s " on t h e  l a s t day o f the S p r i n g Canton Trade f a i r on 14th A p r i l 1970, o n l y later clarify^through  the Chairman o f t h e Board, Nagano, t h a t  to  "invest-  ment i n Taiwan and p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e Japan-ROC C o o p e r a t i o n Committee w i l l be c o n s i d e r e d when t h e problems a r i s e , " thereby h i n t i n g t h a t i t was 207 a c c e p t i n g the  four conditions" with "conditions attached."  e v e n t , the Chinese s i d e r e f u s e d t o accept New Japan S t e e l ' s  A t any interpreta-  t i o n o f Chou E n - l a i ' s " f o u r conditions^" and t h e r e f o r e d i d n o t s i g n any 208 c o n t r a c t s w i t h the company a t t h e Canton Trade F a i r .  Considering  t h e importance o f New Japan S t e e l as t h e l e a d i n g c o r p o r a t i o n o f steel industry,  the  t h e membership and c o o p e r a t i o n i n t h e Japan-ROK Co-  o p e r a t i o n Committee and t h e Japan-ROC C o o p e r a t i o n Committee  by C h a i r -  man Nagano^and h i s company's i n v e s t m e n t i n these c o u n t r i e s , and f i n a l l y Naganois c l o s e r e l a t i o n s h i p to and s u p p o r t o f Prime M i n i s t e r S a t o , i t  is  n o t s u r p r i s i n g t h a t f r o m h e r e a f t e r New Japan S t e e l " . . . b e c a m e the p i v o t p o i n t around w h i c h b o t h t h e Japan-ROC Cooperation Committee and such p r o Chinese groups as t h e Japan I n t e r n a t i o n a l Trade Promotion A s s o c i a t i o n p u t 209 great pressure i n order to win i t  over t o t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e s i d e s . "  The l a s t s e c t o r o f the business community p a r t i c u l a r l y  affected  by the e n u n c i a t i o n o f the " f o u r c o n d i t i o n s " was t r a d i n g f i r m s w i t h "dummies" p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n the China " f r i e n d l y "  trade.  Once a g a i n j  c e r t a i n companies were prepared t o abide by Chou E n - l a i ' s w h i l e o t h e r s r e f u s e d t o do s o .  "conditions"  Such "dummy" f i r m s as Meiwa I n d u s t r y  65  ( a f f i l i a t e d w i t h M i t s u b i s h i T r a d i n g ) , Keimei T r a d i n g ( a f f i l i a t e d  with  M i t s u i Bussan), New Japan T r a d i n g ( a f f i l i a t e d w i t h I t o h Chemical T r a d i n g ) , and Wako T r a d i n g ( a f f i l i a t e d w i t h Marubeni I i d a ) , f a i l e d t o secure c o n t r a c t s a t t h e Canton Trade F a i r due to t h e i r delay i n a c c e p t i n g t h e 210  "four conditions."  I n t h e case o f Wako T r a d i n g , however, t h e company  s h o r t l y a f t e r w a r d s decided to a b i d e by the " c o n d i t i o n s " and t h e r e f o r e severed i t s c a p i t a l and p e r s o n n e l t i e s w i t h Marukeni I i d a .  The p r e s i d e n t  o f the company a l s o c a l l e d f o r the r e s i g n a t i o n o f t h e Sato government 211 " i n o r d e r t o improve Japan-China r e l a t i o n s . " The tendency f o r s e c t i o n s o f the Japanese business community t o abide by the " f o u r c o n d i t i o n s " became more pronounced a f t e r a number o f changes o c c u r r e d i n t h e e x t e r n a l environment',,  In particular,  the  moves by the U n i t e d S t a t e s to improve i t s r e l a t i o n s w i t h I;China, such as the r e s u m p t i o n o f U.S.-China ambassadorial t a l k s i n Warsaw, the easing o f t r a d e r e s t r i c t i o n s between overseas s u b s i d i a r i e s and China, and t h e p r o p o s a l f o r c u l t u r a l exchange between China and t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , f o r c e d a r e - e v a l u a t i o n o f the stance t o be adopted i n r e s p e c t t o the " f o u r cond i t i o n s " and o f Japan-China r e l a t i o n s . China v i s i t  W i t h t h e announcement o f N i x o n ' s  i n J u l y 1971 and h i s v i s i t i n February 1972, t h e r e was a  more widespread agreement among those companies i n v o l v e d i n t r a d e w i t h China t h a t they should accept Chou's " f o u r c o n d i t i o n s " and promote n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f Japan-China r e l a t i o n s .  Even those companies w i t h heavy  t i e s i n the American market were now prepared t o adopt a more f a v o u r a b l e a t t i t u d e a f t e r these moves by the Nixon a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . Undoubtedly, t h e f e a r of c o n t i n u i n g r e c e s s i o n a t home w h i c h began  66  i n 1970 and was p r o l o n g e d by the U.S. economic measures i n August 1 9 7 1 , andj a l s o the f e a r o f U.S.and European c o m p e t i t i o n i n the China m a r k e t , prompted the business community ( e s p e c i a l l y t h e auto-makers Toyota and Nissan) t o come o u t i n f a v o u r of t h e e a r l y n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f Japan212 China r e l a t i o n s .  Thus, " p r e s s u r e to dump Taiwan...mounted  Japanese i n d u s t r i a l i s t s who f e l t  t h a t s p e c i a l e f f o r t s were needed t o  p r e s e r v e and expand t h e p o t e n t i a l l y v a s t China market a g a i n s t 213 U.S. c o m p e t i t i o n . "  from  Above a l l , t h i s  change i n b u s i n e s s  likely  attitude  r e s u l t e d f r o m the f a c t t h a t t h e b u s i n e s s community had " a c t e d f o r so l o n g on the b a s i s t h a t Japan f o l l o w s every s t e p taken by the U . S . " , 1  t h a t they were " c o n f i d e n t t h a t by moving w i t h P r e s i d e n t Nixon they 214 were heading i n the d i r e c t i o n t h e government was bound to I t was s h o r t l y a f t e r  follow."  the announcement o f N i x o n ' s impending v i s i t  t o China t h a t New Japan S t e e l f i n a l l y agreed t o accept the " f o u r c o n d i t i o n s " of t r a d e .  I n a d d i t i o n , t h e Chairman o f the Board Nagano,  who was a l s o P r e s i d e n t o f t h e Japan Chamber o f Commerce, and another top z a i k a i l e a d e r , P r e s i d e n t Kikawada o f Tokyo Denryoku, who was a l s o P r e s i d e n t o f t h e Committee f o r Economic Development, came o u t i n f a v o u r o f c l o s e r r e l a t i o n s between Japan and China.  W i t h t h e move of  two i m p o r t a n t z a i k a i l e a d e r s to a more p o s i t i v e China p o l i c y ,  these the l a c k  o f consensus between t h e LDP and b u s i n e s s o b v i o u s l y became more pronounced. I n d e e d , Sato was s a i d " t o have been i n f u r i a t e d by Nagano and t h e b e h a v i o u r 216 of the business l e a d e r s . "  Now t h a t New Japan S t e e l had j o i n e d o t h e r  companies i n c a l l i n g f o r an improvement i n the p o l i t i c a l c l i m a t e between Japan and C h i n a , the " p i v o t p o i n t " was i n c l i n e d towards -jfiavoufing  67  n o r m a l i z a t i o n of  relations.  By the t i m e o f t h e s e a t i n g o f t h e P e o p l e ' s R e p u b l i c i n the U n i t e d N a t i o n s , " . . . t h e e n t i r e b u s i n e s s community s h i f t e d  their  p o s i t i o n and s t a r t e d c a l l i n g f o r e a r l y r e s u m p t i o n o f d i p l o m a t i c  rela-  217 t i o n s between Japan and C h i n a . "  Even t h e a n t i - P e k i n g P r e s i d e n t of  the K e i d a n r e n , Uemura, who was hesi'feantd i n making a s t a t e m e n t on t h e China q u e s t i o n due t o the d i v i s i o n o f o p i n i o n among Keidanren members, d e c l a r e d i n December 1971 t h a t : "once China has been a d m i t t e d t o t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s , we must expect e a r l y r e s u m p t i o n o f normal r e l a t i o n s 218 w i t h China."  By May 1972 Uemura had c a r r i e d o u t a complete v o l t e -  f a c e and was openly i n f a v o u r o f t h e speedy n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f Japan219 China r e l a t i o n s . The main groups t h a t f a c e d d i f f i c u l t y  i n the t i m i n g of  their  change to a p o l i c y i n f a v o u r o f Peking were those t r a d i n g companies w i t h "dummies" o p e r a t i n g i n t h e China m a r k e t .  A f t e r h o l d i n g back on  r e c o g n i z i n g t h e " f o u r c o n d i t i o n s " u n t i l June 1972, P r e s i d e n t Wakasugi o f M i t s u i Bussan^and P r e s i d e n t F u j i n o o f M i t s u b i s h i  Shoji^announced  t h e i r acceptance o f these " c o n d i t i o n s I n t h e case o f M i t s u b i s h i  Shoji,  P r e s i d e n t F u j i n o accompanied h i s announcement w i t h the news t h a t  the  M i t s u b i s h i group would be sending a t r a d e m i s s i o n to China.  Paralleling  t h e LDP, t h e M i t s u b i s h i Group a t t h e same t i m e d i s p a t c h e d Chairman Kono Fumihiko o f M i t s u b i s h i Jukybgyo to Taiwan, o s t e n s i b l y on b u s i n e s s , b u t a c t u a l l y t o w i n t h e a p p r o v a l o f Taiwan on t h e course t h a t  "...  Mitsubishi  220 was t a k i n g . "  T h i s was a necessary course o f a c t i o n t o t a k e s i n c e  M i t s u b i s h i , a l o n g w i t h M i t s u i , m a i n t a i n e d heavy t r a d e and' f i n a n c i a l  ties  68  w i t h the ROC.  By . a l l o w i n g M i t s u b i s h i  (and s h o r t l y t h e r e a f t e r  Mitsui)  to d i s p a t c h a t r a d e m i s s i o n t o China, t h e Peking government was o b v i o u s l y p e r m i t t i n g a more f l e x i b l e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e " f o u r  conditions."  This no doubt r e f l e c t e d t h e f a c t t h a t China was i n need of the t e c h n o l o g y and s k i l l s o f such g i a n t companies to h e l p i n i t s  industrial  economic  221 development. Now t h a t these two i n d u s t r i a l "hawks" had j o i n e d t h e o t h e r i m p o r t a n t l e a d e r s o f the z a i k a i i n f a v o u r o f n o r m a l i z a t i o n , t h e r e was s t r o n g s u p p o r t f o r any move t h a t Prime M i n i s t e r Tanaka would t a k e t o b r i n g t h i s about.  I n s h o r t , t h e i m p o r t a n t elements o f t h e business  community c o u l d be c o u n t e d ' o n t o s u p p o r t Tanaka i n h i s d e s i r e  to  n o r m a l i z e Japan-China r e l a t i o n s . Conclusion: From the aforementioned d i s c u s s i o n we can s e e . t h a t t h e business community was n o t a u n i f i e d group seeking a common China p o l i c y , was i n s t e a d a community composed o f a v a r i e t y o f p o l i c y p o s i t i o n s different  at  times w h i c h were i n t i m a t e l y l i n k e d t o t h e r e s p e c t i v e companies  'depen deneed&nj£ r  but  o  r  e x p e c t a t i o n s of t r a d e i n t h e China m a r k e t . }  Any i d e a  o f a u n i f i e d b u s i n e s s community as one o f t h e p i l l a r s o f t h e g o v e r n i n g system i n Japan c a l l s f o r m o d i f i c a t i o n a f t e r t h i s e x a m i n a t i o n o f China n o r m a l i z a t i o n p r o c e s s . he s t a t e s :  the  I t o h i n d i r e c t l y s u p p o r t s t h i s p o i n t when  " A l t h o u g h t i e s between b u s i n e s s and t h e r u l i n g p a r t y a r e  e x t e n s i v e , they a r e a l s o d i f f u s e .  The d i v e r s i t y o f b u s i n e s s  interests  and t h e i r uneven i n f l u e n c e on the r u l i n g p a r t y make vague and i m p r e c i s e the d e t a i l s o f t h e i r i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s , and the exact e x t e n t o f b u s i n e s s  69  i n f l u e n c e on the p o l i c y - m a k i n g o f t h e LDP i s h a r d t o  determine."  222  Of c o u r s e , t h i s does n o t mean t h a t t h e i n f l u e n c e o f business o p i n i o n was n o t i m p o r t a n t i n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r case, y e t t h i s was i n d i r e c t and d i f f u s e ^ r a t h e r than d i r e c t and t a n g i b l e .  influence There was  no p r o o f o f any d i r e c t c o o p e r a t i o n between the p r o - P e k i n g LDPers and 223 b u s i n e s s i n r e s p e c t to s t r a t e g y and f i n a n c i n g .  I n s t e a d , the b u s i n e s s  community f o l l o w e d a s i m i l a r p a t t e r n t o t h a t d i s c o v e r e d by Hellmann i n h i s study o f t h e S o v i e t peace t r e a t y n e g o t i a t i o n s : . . . t h e businessmen d i d n o t p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h e d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g process t h r o u g h t h e i r u s u a l c h a n n e l s , t h e i r c l o s e f i n a n c i a l and p e r s o n a l t i e s w i t h the c o n s e r v a t i v e p a r t y . Rather, access was sought as an o p i n i o n g r o u p , by means o f conferences and p u b l i c s t a t e m e n t s . I n i t s r o l e as an o p i n i o n group t h e business community was composed o f c e r t a i n elements t h a t were d e f i n i t e l y i n f a v o u r o f n o r m a l i z a t i o n s , w h i l e some o f the most i m p o r t a n t e l e m e n t s , f o r example K e i d a n r e n . were among t h e l a s t to come o u t i n f a v o u r o f n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f  relations.  Yet i n the end a l l i m p o r t a n t s e c t o r s o f t h e z a i k a i decided i n f a v o u r o f n o r m a l i z a t i o n ^ so t h a t the government was g i v e n a c l e a r i n d i c a t i o n  that  t h e LDP's f i n a n c i a l p a t r o n s were i n f a v o u r o f Tanaka's p l a n t o extend 225 diplomatic relations  to China.  I n a s s e s s i n g the r o l e o f t h e business community i n the China normalization process, i t  i s i n a c c u r a t e b o t h to assume t h a t  c i r c l e s "had f o r c e d government l e a d e r s to r e s t o r e d i p l o m a t i c  industrial relations  226 w i t h China,"  or t h a t b u s i n e s s merely c r e a t e d a " p s y c h o l o g i c a l  setting  f a v o u r a b l e t o and s u p p o r t i v e o f t h e d e c i s i o n s made by t h e p o l i t i c i a n s 227 and b u r e a u c r a t s . "  R a t h e r , i t was more under p r e s s u r e f r o m the b i g  70  business community t h a t the LDP moved t o n o r m a l i z e r e l a t i o n s .  In  p r e s s i n g ^ f o r t h e a d o p t i o n o f a f o r w a r d - l o o k i n g p o l i c y on China,  it  may be argued t h a t the business community had a g r e a t e r i n f l u e n c e on t h e p o l i c y - m a k i n g process thanrHellmann d i s c o v e r e d , b u t c e r t a i n l y n o t as g r e a t as w o u l d have been t h e case i f  the p o l i c y q u e s t i o n p e r t a i n e d  t o a l o n g - t e r m u n c o n t r o v e r s i a l economic i s s u e .  In short,  the i n f l u e n c e  o f the b u s i n e s s community i s p r o b a b l y g r e a t e s t where the c o n n e c t i o n between the i s s u e a r e a and economic p o l i c y i s g r e a t e s t . concur w i t h Hellmann t h a t " . . . i t  We would thus  i s a m i s t a k e to b e l i e v e t h a t b u s i n e s s -  men a r e f u l l y i n t e g r a t e d i n t o the process o f f o r e i g n p o l i c y - m a k i n g o r to assume t h a t t h e i r o p i n i o n s u l t i m a t e l y p r e v a i l on a l l t h e major Business i n f l u e n c e i s  limited...."  229  issues.  71  The O p p o s i t i o n P a r t i e s Introduction The o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s i n Japan ( e x c e p t t h e Japan Communist P a r t y ) began t o c a l l f o r the speedy n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f r e l a t i o n s  between  the Japanese and Chinese governments by t h e time t h a t t h e Tanaka g o v e r n ment was formed i n J u l y 1972.  However, t h e o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s  (Japan  S o c i a l i s t P a r t y , Komeito, Democratic S o c i a l i s t P a r t y ) were n o t  consistent  i n t h e t i m i n g o f t h e i r agreement w i t h the Chinese government's  conditions  f o r n o r m a l i z a t i o n , r e f l e c t i n g c e r t a i n d i f f e r e n c e s i n i d e o l o g y and f o r e i g n p o l i c y o r i e n t a t i o n among these p a r t i e s , a l t h o u g h a l l agreed to the c o n d i diicns>bef6.r;ecthe r e s i g n a t i o n o f t h e Sato government.  B e f o r e examining  the t i m i n g and c h a r a c t e r o f these o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s ' p o l i c y , we w i l l f i r s t  change i n China  d i s c u s s t h e Japan Communist P a r t y ' s i s o l a t i o n  t h e p o l i c y - m a k i n g processes  from  pP^taininggtD;nieinprniaK  Japan Communist P a r t y A l t h o u g h t h e Japan Communist P a r t y  (JCP) has c o n s i s t e n t l y  maintained  a "one China" p o l i c y and c a l l e d f o r the a b r o g a t i o n o f t h e J a p a n - R e p u b l i c o f China Peace T r e a t y , t h e JCP remained t h e o n l y p o l i t i c a l p a r t y i n Japan i s o l a t e d f r o m the movement c a l l i n g f o r the n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f relations.  Japan-China  This p a r a d o x i c a l s i t u a t i o n r e s u l t s from the f a c t t h a t  since  1966, when a disagreement arose between t h e JCP and the Chinese Communist P a r t y (CCP), t h e p a r t y became i n c r e a s i n g l y e s t r a n g e d f r o m the Chinese government which c o n s i d e r e d t h e r u l i n g c l i q u e o f t h e JCP as one o f  the  230 "enemies" o f China.  W i t h the s e v e r i n g o f what were p r e v i o u s l y  f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s , the JCP was a b l e to improve i t s e l e c t o r a l  fortunes  72  by e s t a b l i s h i n g i t s e l f  as an " i n d e p e n d e n t " communist p a r t y , b u t  a l s o meant t h a t the p a r t y became c u t o f f of communication w i t h t h e PRC government.  f r o m any e f f e c t i v e  it  channel  N a t u r a l l y , w i t h the p a r t y  l a c k i n g any e f f e c t i v e channels o f communication i t  could h a r d l y play  an i n t e r m e d i a r y r o l e between the Tanaka government and the PRC d u r i n g the n o r m a l i z a t i o n p r o c e s s .  Thus, t h e JCP was " r e l e g a t e d t o the  p o s i t i o n o f b y s t a n d e r " d u r i n g t h e n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f r e l a t i o n s between 231 Japan and China.  JgpanjSocialist  Party  Since 1957 the Japan S o c i a l i s t P a r t y (JSP) has been i n t h e  forefront  i n s u p p o r t i n g C h i n a ' s "one China" p o l i c y p o s i t i o n and demanding the i m p r o 232 vement o f Japan-China r e l a t i o n s .  The breakdown i n t h e c l o s e r e l a t i o n -  s h i p between t h e Japan Communist P a r t y and t h e Chinese Communist P a r t y w h i c h o c c u r r e d i n 1966, o f f e r e d t h e S o c i a l i s t s an o p p o r t u n i t y to take over the dominant p o s i t i o n i n t h e movement f o r n o r m a l i z a t i o n of JapanChina r e l a t i o n s w h i c h up u n t i l t h i s t i m e had been under the i n f l u e n c e o f the JCP.  The S o c i a l i s t Chairman a t the t i m e , Kozo S a s a k i , was a  p r o - P e k i n g l e a d e r who had gained h i s p o s i t i o n i n the p a r t y t h r o u g h t h e b a c k i n g o f the r a d i c a l l e f t - w i n g f a c t i o n o f t h e p a r t y , t h e Heiwa D o s h i k a i , whose members were even more f a v o u r a b l e t o a p r o - P e k i n g p o l i c y than was 233 Chairman S a s a k i .  W i t h t h e s u p p o r t of t h i s g r o u p , Sasaki was a b l e to  convince the more n e u t r a l or p r o - S o v i e t elements w i t h i n the p a r t y  that  i t would be t o t h e advantage o f t h e JSP to c a p t u r e t h e l e a d e r s h i p o f n o r m a l i z a t i o n movement.  Accordingly,  the JSP c r e a t e d t h e Japan-China  the  73  F r i e n d s h i p A s s o c i a t i o n t o r e p l a c e t h e now disbanded JCP c o n t r o l l e d Japan I n t e r n a t i o n a l Trade Promotion A s s o c i a t i o n , and became i n c r e a s i n g l y p r o - P e k i n g i n i t s China p o l i c y pronouncements. antly,  Concomit-  the p a r t y became the l e a d i n g p a r t i c i p a n t i n " p e o p l e ' s  and C h i n a ' s c h i e f a l l y among Japanese p o l i t i c a l  diplomacy"  parties.  A l t h o u g h Sasaki had been a b l e t o convince t h e p r o - S o v i e t  factions  w i t h i n the p a r t y t h a t i t would be t o t h e u l t i m a t e b e n e f i t o f the JSP to t a k e over t h e n o r m a l i z a t i o n movement, p a r t i c u l a r l y whemisuch: i s s u e s as e x t e n d i n g d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s to China and expanding Japan-China t r a d e gained p o p u l a r s u p p o r t , i t soon became c l e a r t h e r e was f a c t i o n a l  in-  f i g h t i n g between the p r o - P e k i n g and p r o - S o v i e t elements i n the p a r t y 234 over t h e China p o l i c y adopted by t h e JSP.  As a r e s u l t ,  the p a r t y ' s  China p o l i c y pronouncements were c o n s t a n t l y c i r c u m s c r i b e d by the need t o c o n s i d e r the r e a c t i o n o f the p r o - S o v i e t members o f t h e p a r t y . A f t e r t h e r e s i g n a t i o n o f Sasaki i n 1967 t h e JSP came under t h e l e a d e r s h i p o f t h e more moderate chairman, S e i i c h i Katsumata, and then i n 1969 under t h a t o f t h e p r e s e n t c h a i r m a n , Tomomi N a r i t a .  W h i l e these  l e a d e r s were n o t as p r o - P e k i n g as t h e p r e v i o u s chairman, S a s a k i ,  they  - s t i l l made e f f o r t s t o promote Japan-China r e l a t i o n s by c r i t i c i z i n g Sato government's  the  China p o l i c y i n t h e D i e t , and by o r g a n i z i n g e x t r a -  p a r l i a m e n t a r y d e m o n s t r a t i o n s o f s t u d e n t s , workers and concerned c i t i z e n s (such as t h e N a t i o n a l Conference f o r t h e R e s t o r a t i o n o f  Japanese-Chinese  D i p l o m a t i c R e l a t i o n s , w h i c h was o r g a n i z e d i n December 1 9 7 0 ) .  At the  same t i m e , ex-chairman Sasaki c o n t i n u e d t o p l a y an i n f l u e n t i a l r o l e t h e p r o m o t i o n o f Japan-China r e l a t i o n s , perhaps even more  in  influential  74  t h a n the p a r t y i t s e l f , which c o u l d o n l y a c t as a s t r i c t u r e upon t h e Sato government's China p o l i c y . I n t h e f i r s t p l a c e , Sasaki was i n s t r u m e n t a l i n b r i n g i n g about t h e despatch o f t h e l o n g delayed 5 t h m i s s i o n of t h e JSP. to China, when he a c t e d as an i n t e r m e d i a r y between Chairman N a r i t a and t h e Chinese government.  I n the communique w h i c h r e s u l t e d f r o m t h e v i s i t o f the  f i c i a l m i s s i o n i n November 1970, t h e JSP pledged t o c o n t i n u e i t s  of-  efforts  f o r n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f r e l a t i o n s between Japan and China w i t h those f o r c e s 235 " t r u l y " i n f a v o u r o f t h i s cause.  T h i s n a t u r a l l y excluded the JCP.  Secondly, and more s i g n i f i c a n t l y ,  Sasaki p l a y e d an i n t e r m e d i a r y  r o l e i m m e d i a t e l y p r i o r t o Tanaka's v i s i t t o C h i n a , o n l y t h i s time was between the r u l i n g p a r t y and t h e Chinese government.  it  Before leaving  f o r Peking i n l a t e J u l y Sasaki v i s i t e d Tanaka t o make.sure t h a t he i n tended to n o r m a l i z e r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e PRC. would make every e f f o r t  Tanaka assured him t h a t he  to n o r m a l i z e r e l a t i o n s and would n o t p l o t 236  the autonomy o f an independent Taiwan.  for  P r e c e d i n g Chairman T a k e i r i o f  t h e Komeito i n a s i m i l a r i n t e r m e d i a r y r o l e , Sasaki v i s i t e d China and no doubt made c l e a r t o t h e Chinese government t h e Tanaka government i n t e n d e d t o c a r r y out the n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f r e l a t i o n s and would be prepared t o 237 accept an i n v i t a t i o n from Chou E n - l a i to v i s i t China.  After  his  r e t u r n from China, Sasaki s t a t e d i n an i n t e r v i e w w i t h the M a i n i c h i Shimbun t h a t the Chinese s i d e would welcome a v i s i t f r o m the Tanaka government and would be f l e x i b l e i n d e a l i n g w i t h such an o f f i c i a l m i s s i o n , 238 even i n r e s p e c t to t h e t h r e e p r i n c i p l e s .  L a t e r , he made a v i s i t  Tanaka and O h i r a and urged them to v i s i t Peking d u r i n g September.  to  75  A l t h o u g h Tanaka and O h i r a d i d n o t g i v e Sasaki d e f i n i t e  confirmation  t h a t they w o u l d f o l l o w such a t i m e t a b l e , ' S a s a k i became s t r e n g t h e n e d  in  239 h i s c o n v i c t i o n t h a t the two i n t e n d e d t o v i s i t  -China.  In short,  a member o f t h e o p p o s i t i o n came to p l a y a r o l e i n t h e p o l i c y - m a k i n g process:  f i r s t l y by a c t i n g as an i n t e r m e d i a r y between t h e  Chinese  and Japanese governments; and secondly by a c t i n g as a p r e s s u r e on t h e Tanaka-Ohira duo t o c a r r y o u t t h e speedy n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f  Japan-China  relations. The Komeito I n c o n t r a s t to the JCP and the JSP the Komeito, f o r t h e most p a r t o f t h e 1960s, f o l l o w e d a moderate p o l i c y i n r e s p e c t t o China, v i e w i n g the n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f r e l a t i o n s i n t h e g e n e r a l c o n t e x t o f i t s  foreign  p o l i c y which c a l l s f o r a n e u t r a l i s t p o l i c y f o r Japan f r e e from the i n 240 f l u e n c e of the U n i t e d S t a t e s ,  ao andt i t was n o t u n t i l 1969 t h a t  the Komeito would even go so f a r as to admit t o t h e "one China" f o r m u l a . From t h i s t i m e o n , however, t h e p a r t y came t o p l a y an i n c r e a s i n g l y  active  r o l e i n t h e p r o m o t i o n o f Japan-China r e l a t i o n s . I n the f i r s t p l a c e , t h e Komeito e s t a b l i s h e d t h e Japan-China N o r m a l i z a t i o n C o n s u l t a t i v e C o u n c i l on December 1 3 t h 1970, w h i c h a p p e a l e d : L e t us have a movement f o r n o r m a l i z i n g r e l a t i o n s permeate among the p e o p l e , c o r r e c t our c o u n t r y ' s p o s t u r e toward C h i n a , and open up a way t o normalization of diplomatic r e l a t i o n s . ^ A l t h o u g h t h e above c o u n c i l was composed o f about 200 members drawn f r o m 4  p r o - P e k i n g s c h o l a r s and p r o m i n e n t i n d i v i d u a l s , i t s s u p p o r t base d i d n o t extend much beyond those who u s u a l l y backed t h e Komeito  electorally.  Secondly, i n t h e f o l l o w i n g June Komeito Chairman, T a k e i r i ,  242  issued  76  a p u b l i c s t a t e m e n t i n which he f o r t h e f i r s t  time d e c l a r e d he was i n  f a v o u r o f the a b r o g a t i o n o f the Japan-Republic o f China Peace T r e a t y . Shortly thereafter,  t h e Chairman made a v i s i t  Chou complimented h i m :  243  t o China where Premier  "You have c o r r e c t f v i e w s as t o how d i p l o m a t i c  r e l a t i o n s between Japan and China can be r e s t o r e d . "  244  At the same t i m e ,  t h e Komeito d e l e g a t i o n agreed t o the t h r e e p o l i t i c a l p r i n c i p l e s when a 245 j o i n t communique was i s s u e d a t t h e end o f t h e i r v i s i t .  Upon the  r e t u r n o f the Komei m i s s i o n t h e JSP r e c o g n i z e d t h a t the Komeito "made a f u l l s c a l e advance as f o r c e s w h i c h promote the r e s t o r a t i o n o f Japan246 China d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s . " To the . F o r e i g n M i n i s t r y , i t was a s i g n t o expr.essdconcern over t h e c o n t i n u a t i o n o f t h i s same k i n d o f  opposition  247 p a r t y diplomacy.  Such concern was n a t u r a l , f o r w i t h t h e v i s i t  of  the Komei m i s s i o n t o China t h e r e was a b r o a d e n i n g o f t h e channels o f communication between Japan and China beyond t h a t o f i d e o l o g i c a l compatibility,  a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c p r e s e n t when t h e s e ' channels*, were - l a r g e l y .  :  'dpmihate'dPby t h e JSP. F i n a l l y , T a k e i r i became o f i n c r e a s i n g importance as an i n t e r m e d i a r y between the Japanese and Chinese governments.  Not o n l y d i d T a k e i r i meet  w i t h the Chinese l e a d e r s a t t h e t i m e o f the f i r s t Komei m i s s i o n b u t ,  after  the v i s i t o f the second m i s s i o n i n May 1972 Chou E n - l a i communicated a s e c r e t message to t h e Komeito Chairman t h r o u g h one o f t h e m i s s i o n members, Ninomiya, i n f o r m i n g him t h a t t h e Chinese government was prepared t o  invite  Tanaka t o Peking t o n e g o t i a t e the n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f r e l a t i o n s w i t h o u t would-be Tanaka Cabinet a g r e e i n g t o the t h r e e p o l i t i c a l p r i n c i p l e s f e a r i n g t h a t theywwould be p o l i t i c a l l y  embarrassed by the Chinese  or  the  77  government's a c t i o n s .  248  T a k e i r i a t t e m p t e d t o persuade Tanaka t o  r e p l y d i r e c t l y t o Chou's J O £f'ex,  i n d i c a t i n g he was prepared t o a c t  as an i n t e r m e d i a r y i n t h i s t a s k , b u t Tanaka r e f u s e d t o do so and l e f t it  t o T a k e i r i to p r e p a r e a response t o t h e Chinese s i d e .  This response  took  the f o r m o f a t w e n t y - p o i n t p r o p o s a l w h i c h T a k e i r i c a r r i e d t o Peking on h i s v i s i t  t h e r e i n ."late August, w i t h o u t e i t h e r a p p r o v a l or d i s 249  a p p r o v a l by Prime M i n i s t e r Tanaka or F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r O h i r a . A f t e r a d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e T a k e i r i p r o p o s a l , t h e Chinese s i d e came f o r ward w i t h a f l e x i b l e c o u n t e r - p r o p o s a l o f t e n p o i n t s w h i c h , w i t h a number of m o d i f i c a t i o n s agreed t o by Chou, was communicated t o Tanaka, O h i r a , and F u r u i by Masaki and Okubo when t h e minutes o f the  Chou-Takeiri  meetings were handed o v e r t o t h e LDP p o l i t i c i a n s by these two Komeito 250 251 Dietmen. Subsequently t h e y were g i v e n t o t h e F o r e i g n M i n i s t r y . A l t h o u g h t h e Komeito had been moderate i n i t s p o l i c y pronouncements on  China d u r i n g the 1960s, i t  seems c l e a r f r o m the above t h a t  p r i o r t o the n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f r e l a t i o n s t h e Komeito, and i n  particular  Chairman T a k e i r i , came t o p l a y an i n c r e a s i n g l y i n f l u e n t i a l r o l e i n the China n o r m a l i z a t i o n p r o c e s s .  I n d e e d , Omori l i k e n s the r o l e o f  Takeiri  t o t h a t o f Henry K i s s i n g e r , a c t i n g as an i n t e r m e d i a r y t o b r i n g about a 252 meeting between t h e l e a d e r s o f these r e s p e c t i v e c o u n t r i e s .  Perhaps  T a k e i r i saw h i m s e l f i n t h i s r o l e , because he d e c l a r e d t o F u r u i b e f o r e v i s i t i n g China:  " I w i l l e x t r a c t China's views.  Then I w i l l hand t h e 253  b a t o n t o you and ask you t o take c a r e of t h e r e s t . "  I n performing  an i n t e r m e d i a r y r o l e and a c t i n g as a p r e s s u r e on t h e Tanaka-Ohira duo, T a k e i r i thereby j o i n e d Sasaki  as an a c t o r i n t h e p o l i c y - m a k i n g p r o c e s s .  78  Democratic S o c i a l i s t  Party  The Democratic S o c i a l i s t P a r t y (DSP) was e s t a b l i s h e d i n 1960 after  the r i g h t w i n g N i s h i o f a c t i o n and elements ef. t h e c e n t r i s t 254  Kawakami f a c t i o n s p l i n t e r e d away f r o m the l e f t - w i n g dominated JSP. From these more moderate r o o t s t h e DSP, l i k e the Komeito, upheld a China p o l i c y ((in fundamental c o n t r a d i c t i o n t o t h e Chinese government's :  p o s i t i o n t o "one C h i n a " ' ) , b e i n g i n f a v o u r o f a "one China, one Taiwan" p o l i c y even a f t e r t h e Komeito had changed i t s China p o l i c y Becoming i n c r e a s i n g l y i s o l a t e d i n i t s  stance.  China p o l i c y pronouncements  after  the move by the Komeito and t h e Nixon announcements, the DSP i n August 1971 i n d i c a t e d t h a t i t  too was p r e p a r e d t o f o l l o w the Komeito  jumping on t h e China bandwagon.  in  The Chairman o f t h e DSP, Kasuga, thus  met w i t h the China-Japan F r i e n d s h i p A s s o c i a t i o n Deputy Chairman Wang Kuo-hua and expressed a w i s h t o v i s i t the f i r s t  China.  At t h i s m e e t i n g , w h i c h was  t o occur between t h e DSP and Chinese o f f i c i a l s , Kasuga went  f u r t h e r t h a n t h e p a r t y ' s b a s i c p o l i c y pronouncements on China by d e c l a r i n g i n response t o Wang's statement ( c o n c e r n i n g t h e s t a t u s of T a i w a n ) , " t h e Taiwan problem i s an i n t e r n a l a f f a i r o f China, and I 255 e a r n e s t l y hope f o r a p e a c e f u l s e t t l e m e n t " o f t h a t  issue.  By the t i m e t h a t the DSP f o l l o w e d on t h e h e e l s o f t h e JSP and Komeito i n d e s p a t c h i n g a m i s s i o n t o China, t h e p a r t y had moved away f r o m i t s p r e v i o u s China p o l i c y , w h i c h was s i m i l a r t o t h a t o f the LDP, and j o i n e d t h e o t h e r o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s i n c a l l i n g f o r t h e e a r l y n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f r e l a t i o n s w i t h China.  The DSP now proposed t h a t  Japan-ROC Peace T r e a t y s h o u l d be c o n s i d e r e d n u l l and v o i d and must  the  79  be t e r m i n a t e d b e f o r e r e s t o r a t i o n o f Japan-China r e l a t i o n s c o u l d t a k e 256  place. 1  T h i s a b r u p t change i n t h e DSP's China p o l i c y was n o t  supported  by t h e d i s s i d e n t elements i n the p a r t y such as E k i Sone, who c r i t i c i z e d the p o l i c y statements on China made by Kasuga a t h i s m e e t i n g w i t h Wang 257 Kuo-hua and those made by t h e Kasuga m i s s i o n t o China.  The p e r s i s t e n c e  o f t h i s a n t i - P e k i n g a t t i t u d e w i t h i n the p a r t y p r e v e n t e d the development o f a n t i n t r a - p a r t y consensus i n f a v o u r o f n o r m a l i z a t i o n .  However, i t  did  n o t p r e v e n t the mainstream w i t h i n the p a r t y f r o m i n d i c a t i n g i t would coo p e r a t e w i t h t h e Tanaka government i n s u p r a - p a r t i s a n d i p l o m a c y . w i t h the DSP j o i n i n g t h e JSP and Komeito i n c a l l i n g f o r diplomacy, a l l the o p p o s i t i o n s p a r t i e s were i n f a v o u r o f  Thus,  supra-partisan normalizing  r e l a t i o n s w i t h China. Conclusion: It parties  seems c l e a r f r o m t h e above d i s c u s s i o n t h a t the o p p o s i t i o n ( e x c e p t t h e JCP) a l l p l a y e d a r o l e i n i n f l u e n c i n g the Tanaka  government's d e c i s i o n t o q u i c k l y n o r m a l i z e r e l a t i o n s w i t h the PRC.  In  f a c t , b o t h Chou and Tanaka remarked on t h e e f f o r t s o f the JSP and 258 Komeito i n s u p r a - p a r t i s a n d i p l o m a c y .  I n this respect, i t  is  necessary t o d i s t i n g u i s h between t h e a c t i v i t i e s o f t h e p a r t i e s and t h a t o f t h r e e p r o m i n e n t i n d i v i d u a l s w i t h i n these p a r t i e s :  themselves ex-chair-  man o f t h e JSP, S a s a k i , and t h e p r e s e n t chairmen o f the Komeito and DSP, T a k e i r i and Kasuga. I n the case o f t h e p a r t i e s - themselves, t h e i r main i n f l u e n c e on the p o l i c y - m a k i n g process was i n d i r e c t and d i f f u s e ,  through  criticism  80  o f t h e p r e v i o u s Sato government's p o l i c y b o t h w i t h i n and o u t s i d e  the  D i e t , and as f o r c e s t h a t c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e development of a s o c i e t a l consensus i n f a v o u r o f n o r m a l i z i n g Japan-China r e l a t i o n s .  In addition,  t h e p a r t i e s were g e n e r a l l y b e h i n d the a c t i v i t i e s o f t h e o p p o s i t i o n party politicians in their efforts  to b r i n g t h e n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f  r e l a t i o n s closer to r e a l i z a t i o n . W i t h r e g a r d to t h e a c t i v i t i e s o f T a k e i r i , Sasaki and to a l e s s e r e x t e n t Kasuga, these p o l i t i c i a n s ,  e s p e c i a l l y T a k e i r i , became a p a r t  of  t h e p o l i c y - m a k i n g process t h a t developed t o n o r m a l i z e Japan-China relations.  I n d e e d , these i n d i v i d u a l s p l a y e d an even more i m p o r t a n t  role  i n t h i s process t h a n d i d members o f the r u l i n g p a r t y , e x c e p t i n g Tanaka, O h i r a , and F u r u i , because they a c t u a l l y became p a r t o f t h e p o l i c y making group i n t h e i r r o l e as i n t e r m e d i a r i e s between t h e two g o v e r n ments.  What i s o f i n t e r e s t here i s t h a t i t  should be the l e a d e r o f  the moderate Komeito, T a k e i r i , r a t h e r than t h e ex-chairman o f t h e wing S o c i a l i s t P a r t y , S a s a k i , t h a t came t o p l a y t h e most  left-  significant  r o l e i n the event. For y e a r s Sasaki had v i s i t e d China and r e t u r n e d to Japan c a l l i n g f o r t h e n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f r e l a t i o n s whereas T a k e i r i , i n c o n t r a s t , had o n l y r e c e n t l y r e c o g n i z e d t h e "one China" f o r m u l a and v i s i t e d t h e m a i n l a n d f o r the f i r s t  time.  I n f a c t , T a k e i r i had been h e s i t a n t to  visit  China i n J u l y f o r " f e a r o f becoming a s e c o n d - f i d d l e t o S a s a k i , who c u t 259 a spectacular f i g u r e i n China."  That T a k e i r i came t o p l a y an even  more i m p o r t a n t r o l e t h a n Sasaki when he made t h i s v i s i t ,  illustrates  he n o t o n l y enjoyed the t r u s t of t h e Tanaka-Ohira duo more t h a n d i d  81  S a s a k i , b u t a l s o t h a t t h e Chinese government  was p r e p a r e d t o d e a l  w i t h him i n o r d e r t o f a c i l i t a t e t h e n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f Japan-China relations. The c o o p e r a t i o n between these o p p o s i t i o n p a r t y p o l i t i c i a n s  and  the mainstream o f t h e LDP demonstrates t h a t t h e o p p o s i t i o n need n o t be p e r p e t u a l l y i s o l a t e d f r o m the p o l i c y - m a k i n g process i n Japan.  In  this  s h o r t - t e r m c o n t r o v e r s i a l f o r e i g n p o l i c y issue the opposition partook i n s u p r a - p a r t i s a n diplomacy f o r the f i r s t  t i m e s i n c e t h e chairman o f  t h e JSP, Mosaburo S u z u k i , e x e r t e d p r e s s u r e upon Prime M i n i s t e r Hatoyama t o n e g o t i a t e a peace t r e a t y w i t h t h e S o v i e t U n i o n .  The s i m i l a r  charac-  t e r i s t i c and t e m p o r a l dimension o f these i s s u e s may thus be an i m p o r t a n t v a r i a b l e i n a t t e m p t i n g t o d e l i n e a t e t h e r o l e o f t h e o p p o s i t i o n i n the , . , . 260 policy-making process.  82  The Press and P u b l i c  Opinion  Introduction The press and p u b l i c o p i n i o n are o b v i o u s l y n o t as d i r e c t i n  their  i n f l u e n c e on the p o l i c y - m a k i n g process as are p r o x i m a t e a c t o r s such as the LDP and b u r e a u c r a c y .  S t i l l , they do p l a y a r o l e i n  influencing  t h e d e c i s i o n - m a k e r s and d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g environment o f t h e f o r e i g n p o l i c y arena.  A c c o r d i n g l y , we w i l l d i s c u s s t h e r o l e o f t h e p r e s s  in  the China n o r m a l i z a t i o n p r o c e s s , f o l l o w e d by t h a t o f p u b l i c o p i n i o n . The Press I t is d i f f i c u l t  i f notuimpossible to d e l i n e a t e the exact  influence  t h a t t h e p r e s s has on t h e p o l i c y - m a k i n g p r o c e s s , whether i n r e s p e c t  to  i t s i n f l u e n c e on t h e p o l i c y - m a k e r s t h e m s e l v e s , or i n r e s p e c t to i t s  in-  f l u e n c e on p u b l i c o p i n i o n , w h i c h i n t u r n i n f l u e n c e s the p o l i c y - m a k i n g process.  As Whittemore noted i n h i s s t u d y o f the press and t h e  Security Treaty c r i s i s :  "The exact r o l e o f the newspapers i n  p u b l i c opinion i s probably impossible to appraise.  The e f f e c t  forming the  press has i n any c o u n t r y i s i n d i s t i n c t and a d e f i n i t e assessment of 1 . n261 i t s w e i g h t cannot be g i v e n . .  i  D e s p i t e t h i s l i m i t a t i o n , Hellmann p o s t u l a t e s t h a t t h e media i n f l u e n c e s t h e ' p o l i c y - m a k i n g process i n two ways:  f i r s t l y , by p r o v i d i n g  ' t h e p o l i c y - m a k e r s w i t h a d a y - t o - d a y image o f p u b l i c i n t e r e s t i n each i s s u e by r e p o r t i n g o v e r t a c t i o n s and statements c o n c e r n i n g p o l i c y and by e v a l u a t i n g i n d i v i d u a l q u e s t i o n s i n e d i t o r i a l s and s p e c i a l commentar i e s . . . " and secondly "as the p r i m a r y source o f i n f o r m a t i o n f o r  the  p u b l i c they a r e a b l e t o c o n d i t i o n the n a t u r e o f p u b l i c response to p a r t i c u l a r i s s u e s t h r o u g h t h e k i n d o f coverage accorded them.  By  83  e s t a b l i s h i n g t h e focus o f a t t e n t i o n t h e press i n d i r e c t l y  determines  how t h e p u b l i c w i l l p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h e p o l i c y f o r m u l a t i o n p r o c e s s . "  262  T h i s l a t t e r p o i n t i s e s p e c i a l l y r e l e v a n t to a d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e China i s s u e , s i n c e M i y o s h i d i s c o v e r e d c e r t a i n newspapers i n Japan e s t a b l i s h e d a " u n i t e d f r o n t " c a l l i n g f o r the n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f r e l a t i o n s  with  263 China.  Quite obviously,  t h i s meant t h e p r e s s i n Japan surrended  i t s o b j e c t i v i t y i n f a v o u r or p r o m o t i n g a p o l i t i c a l c l i m a t e  conducive  t o the e x t e n s i o n of d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s t o China. To s t a r t w i t h , M i y o s h i p o i n t s o u t t h a t d e s p i t e t h e a t t e m p t o f t h e Shimbun Kyokai ([Japan]Newspaper P u b l i s h e r ' s A s s o c i a t i o n )  t o reach  an agreement w i t h the A l l - C h i n a J o u r n a l i s t s A s s o c i a t i o n on the exchange o f newsmen between Japan and China, t h e Chinese s i d e were unprepared t o make any agreement i n which o n l y t h e Shimbun Kyokai was i n v o l v e d . I n s t e a d , they i n s i s t e d any d i s c u s s i o n s p e r t a i n i n g to t h e exchange o f newsmen must be c a r r i e d o u t t h r o u g h t h e t r a d e o f f i c e e s t a b l i s h e d as a r e s u l t o f the t r a d e n e g o t i a t i o n s between L i a o Cheng-chih, P r e s i d e n t o f t h e China-Japan F r i e n d s h i p A s s o c i a t i o n , and Tatsunosuke T a k a s a k i , a member of the r u l i n g LDP, which had e s t a b l i s h e d Memorandum Trade between China and Japan i n 1962.  I t was t h r o u g h t h i s s t r u c t u r e  that  an exchange o f newsmen was c a r r i e d o u t i n September 1964, t h e p a r t i c i p a t i n g companies b e i n g A s a h i , M a i n i c h i , Y o m i u r i , S a n k e i , Nihon K e i z a i , K i s h i N i h o n , Kyodo, Japan B r o a d c a s t i n g C o r p o r a t i o n , and Tokyo B r o a d c a s t i n g System.  Since these companies agreed to an exchange of news-  men i n t h i s manner, " . . . t h e r e i s no denying t h e s t e r n f a c t t h a t  the  L-T s t r u c t u r e was n o t e s t a b l i s h e d by Shimbun Kyokai and t h a t i t was  84  i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o t h e framework o f the L-T agreement concluded by p o l i t i c i a n s and t r a d e r s . "  2 6 4  An i m p o r t a n t p o i n t to n o t e i n trhdrs-  • r e g a r d i s t h a t Memorandum  Trade was c a r r i e d o u t on t h e c o n d i t i o n t h a t those p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n such t r a d e accepted t h e t h r e e " p o l i t i c a l p r i n c i p l e s " e n u n c i a t e d by Chou En265 l a i i n 1960.  I n s o f a r as t h e press i s concerned, i t appears  that  t h e r e was an agreement " p r o v i d i n g t h a t newsmen should be exchanged on 266 t h e premise o f a c c e p t i n g t h e  Chinese s i d e p o l i t i c a l  principles."  A l t h o u g h M a i n i c h i was n o t p r e p a r e d t o accept Chou's t h r e e  "political  p r i n c i p l e s , " o t h e r companies such as Nihon K e i z a i accepted these c o n ditions.  I n o t h e r words, those companies t h a t agreed t o abide by  Chou's d i c t a t e s c o u l d use t h e i r i n f l u e n c e t o c r e a t e a p o l i t i c a l  climate  f a v o u r a b l e t o t h e n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f Japan-China r e l a t i o n s . I n p o i n t o f f a c t even M a i n i c h i was i n f a v o u r o f a p r o - P e k i n g p o l i c y d u r i n g S a t o ' s r e i g n i n power, and f o l l o w e d t h e o t h e r newspapers i n c a l l i n g f o r the speedy n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f r e l a t i o n s .  Accordingly,  the most i n f l u e n t i a l elements o f t h e Japanese media took a p r o - P e k i n g viewpoint i n t h e i r discussion of Japan's-China p o l i c y .  Indeed, p r o -  Peking newsmen and e d i t o r s e s t a b l i s h e d the Sino-Japanese Press S o c i e t y i n December 1971 t o a s s i s t i n p r o m o t i n g t h e n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f Japan267 China r e l a t i o n s .  C o n s i d e r i n g t h a t t h e p r e s s was g e n e r a l l y  in  f a v o u r of d e v e l o p i n g f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e Peking government, it  seems n a t u r a l t o assume t h a t i t would i n f l u e n c e p u b l i c o p i n i o n t o  take a p o s i t i v e a t t i t u d e towards n o r m a l i z i n g r e l a t i o n s w i t h China. I n deed, Scalapino argues t h a t :  "TheainfluenceibfotheipressdonUapanese  p u b l i e c o p i n i o n and a l s o on p o l i t i c a l c i r c l e s i s s u b s t a n t i a l , as the  85  p o l l i n g d a t a i n d i c a t e s , e s p e c i a l l y i n t h e arena o f f o r e i g n p o l i c y . " L i k e w i s e , Matsuyama agrees t h a t " . . . u n d e n i a b l y ,  the p r e s s has become  i n c r e a s i n g l y i n f l u e n t i a l i n t h e f o r m a t i o n o f Japanese f o r e i g n p o l i c y , " and goes on t o s t a t e f u r t h e r t h a t :  " . . . t h e press —  o n l y the p r e s s  —  269 can have e f f e c t i v e i n f l u e n c e upon f o r e i g n p o l i c y i n J a p a n . . . " I t would seem, t h e r e f o r e ,  t h a t t h e p r e s s would have some i n f l u e n c e  on t h e p o l i c y - m a k i n g process i n r e s p e c t to J a p a n ' s China p o l i c y .  How-  e v e r , t h i s i n f l u e n c e would n o t be as much o f a d i r e c t i n f l u e n c e upon the p o l i c y - m a k i n g process as i t would be a c o n t r i b u t i n g f a c t o r i n the general "mood-building" i n favour of normalization of r e l a t i o n s .  In  any e v e n t , the i n f l u e n c e o f t h e p r e s s i n t h e Japan-China n o r m a l i z a t i o n process was q u i t e d i f f e r e n t  f r o m i t s r o l e i n the S o v i e t peace t r e a t y  n e g o t i a t i o n s , where the press " . . . s c r u p u l o u s l y avoided a p o s i t i v e i n the p o l i c y - f o r m u l a t i o n process, r e f u s i n g to lend e d i t o r i a l 270 to any f i r m p o l i c y p o s i t i o n . "  role  support  I n t h e case o f C h i n a , the press a c t e d  as a c a t a l y s t g i v i n g d i r e c t i o n t o p o l i c y - m a k e r s and p u b l i c o p i n i o n . Public  Opinion  D u r i n g the 1960s a number o f p u b l i c o p i n i o n p o l l s  demonstrated  t h a t c e r t a i n elements o f _ t h e Japanese p o p u l a t i o n were d i s s a t i s f i e d the China p o l i c y pursued by t h e Sato government.  T h i s was p a r t i c u l a r l y  the case i n r e s p e c t to s u p p o r t e r s o f t h e S o c i a l i s t P a r t y , b u t even among the LDP s u p p o r t e r s t h e r e was . d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n over the r u l i n g p a r t y ' s China p o l i c y .  with  This p o i n t i s i l l u s t r a t e d by t h e surveys  86  c a r r i e d o u t by Mendel.  The respondents answered t h e f o l l o w i n g  question  Today Japan has d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e R e p u b l i c o f China on Taiwan, b u t n o t w i t h Comm u n i s t China. Should Japan r e c o g n i z e and e s t a b l i s h r e l a t i o n s w i t h Communist China o r is.; p r e s e n t p o l i c y b e t t e r ? T o t a l Sample  LDP  Socialist  1966  1968  1968  1968  Recognize  44  47  36  58  S t a t u s quo  14  17  22  14  D o n ' t know  42  36  42  28  From those among the sample who d e c l a r e d they were i n f a v o u r o f r e c o g n i z i n g t h e PRC, Mendel then asked: Then what should we do about r e l a t i o n s w i t h N a t i o n a l i s t China — c o n t i n u e o r c a n c e l them? T o t a l Sample  Continue Cancel Don'ct know  LDP  Socialist  1966  1968  1968  1968  76  85  87  85  6  3  2  3  18  12  11  12  Thus, w h i l e a g r e a t e r p r o p o r t i o n of s o c i a l i s t s u p p o r t e r s were i n • f a v o u r o f r e c o g n i z i n g t h e PRC, they s t i l l d i d n o t see t h i s as going h a n d . i n hand w i t h t h e s e v e r i n g o f r e l a t i o n s w i t h the Taiwan r e g i m e . I n f a c t , b o t h s o c i a l i s t and LDP s u p p o r t e r s saw the c o n t i n u a t i o n o f relations with Nationalist by t h e government, i f  China as t h e p o l i c y t h a t should be adopted  r e l a t i o n s w i t h China were e s t a b l i s h e d .  This o p i n i o n i n f a v o u r o f n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f r e l a t i o n s mounted r a p i d l y d u r i n g 1970 and 1971.  For example, i n A p r i l 1970 a survey  87 by the M a i n i c h i Shimbun r e v e a l e d t h a t 16% o f those i n t e r v i e w e d were i n f a v o u r o f " i m m e d i a t e " n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f r e l a t i o n s and 47% were i n M  f a v o u r o f n o r m a l i z a t i o n as soon as p o s s i b l e . "  272  Later, i n June 1970, 273  64% o f those i n t e r v i e w e d were i n f a v o u r of n o r m a l i z a t i o n , "  and by t h e  f o l l o w i n g June 73% were i n f a v o u r o f n o r m a l i z i n g r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e PRC.  2 7 4  Thus, t h e r e was a growing s e n t i m e n t i n Japan t o e s t a b l i s h r e l a t i o n s w i t h China, which a f t e r  the a d m i s s i o n o f China i n t o the U n i t e d 275  Nations, "...mounted r a p i d l y i n favour of recognizing P e k i n g . "  Now,  t h e r e was an i n c r e a s i n g movement towards h a s t e n i n g the n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f r e l a t i o n s as was i n d i c a t e d i n a January p o l l by t h e Tokyo Shimbun^where 45.8% o f those i n t e r v i e w e d c a l l e d f o r "immediate r e c o g n i t i o n o f the 276 Chinese government and p r o m o t i o n o f d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s . A survey by t h e Asahi Shimbun a t t h e same t i m e found t h a t 59% o f those q u e s t i o n e d 277 were i n f a v o u r o f " h a s t e n i n g " t h e n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f  relations.  I n the above Asahi Shimbun p o l l t h e q u e s t i o n o f J a p a n ' s w i t h Taiwan was a l s o s u r v e y e d .  I n c o n t r a s t w i t h the e a r l i e r  relations findings  by Mendel, t h e r e was now an i n c r e a s i n g number o f people who r e a l i z e d maintenance of r e l a t i o n s w i t h Taiwan may n o t be c o m p a t i b l e w i t h e s t a b l i s h i n g r e l a t i o n s w i t h China.  I n t h i s i n s t a n c e , t h e r e was ah almost  e q u a l spread between those t h a t were i n f a v o u r o f " d i s s o l u t i o n " o f J a p a n ' s r e l a t i o n s w i t h Taiwan and those t h a t were a g a i n s t t h i s move, 34% coming 278 o u t i n f a v o u r o f d i s s o l u t i o n and 32% a g a i n s t t h i s move.  However,  t h i s survey d i d n o t make s p e c i f i c t h e q u e s t i o n o f e x a c t l y what r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h Taiwan was under q u e s t i o n , l e a v i n g i t determine i f  to t h e respondent  t h i s meant s o l e l y d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s ,  r e l a t i o n s , or b o t h .  to  t r a d e and f i n a n c i a l  When t h i s q u e s t i o n was made s p e c i f i c i n a J u l y 1972  88  survey by the Sankei Shimbun, i t was found t h a t o n l y 5.5% were i n f a v o u r o f s e v e r i n g " e v e r y " t i e w i t h Taiwan, w h i l e t h e l a r g e s t p r o p o r t i o n of those i n t e r v i e w e d , 72%, were i n f a v o u r o f m a i n t a i n i n g t r a d e t i e s  with  279 Taiwan. The above survey a l s o demonstrated t h a t t h e r e was a d e f i n i t e increase i n popular support f o r hastening the establishment of t i o n s a f t e r t h e i n a u g u r a t i o n o f t h e Tanaka C a b i n e t . 82% o f those  In this  rela-  survey,  interviewed favoured " h a s t e n i n g " the establishment 280  diplomatic relations.  of  Thus, when he moved t o n o r m a l i z e r e l a t i o n s  with  China, Tanaka c o u l d be assured he had p o p u l a r s u p p o r t i n c a r r y i n g o u t this  task.  Conclusion: There a r e obvious l i m i t a t i o n s i n r e s p e c t t o p u b l i c o p i n i o n p o l l s t h a t may l e a d t o ajbias i n  t h e r e s u l t s due t o such f a c t o r s as the t i m e  o f s u r v e y , i n t e r v i e w t e c h n i q u e s , and s u b t l e d i f f e r e n c e s i n q u e s t i o n s asked o f t h e r e s p o n d e n t s .  W h i l e t h e p o l l s t a k e n on t h e q u e s t i o n o f  J a p a n ' s r e l a t i o n s w i t h China were c e r t a i n l y n o t i d e a l i n s o f a r as b e i n g a b l e t o make comparisons over .time, they n e v e r t h e l e s s i n d i c a t e d a c e r t a i n increase i n p u b l i c sentiment i n favour of normalization of Japan-China r e l a t i o n s .  Of c o u r s e , as w i t h t h e q u e s t i o n o f the p r e s s '  i n f l u e n c e on the p o l i c y - m a k i n g p r o c e s s , i t  i s also d i f f i c u l t  t o assess  the i n f l u e n c e of p u b l i c o p i n i o n on t h e d e c i s i o n t o n o r m a l i z e  relations  w i t h China. I n t h i s r e s p e c t , I t o h argues t h a t any a b i l i t y  that public  opinion  may have i n i n f l u e n c i n g t h e p o l i c y - m a k i n g process r e v o l v e s around t h r e e factors:  89  1)  P u b l i c o p i n i o n c r e a t e s t h e g e n e r a l mood i n w h i c h decision-makers operate;  2)  o p i n i o n p o l l s on s p e c i f i c f o r e i g n - a f f a i r s may have some impact on p o l i c y - m a k e r s ;  3)  p u b l i c o p i n i o n as a r t i c u l a t e d by v a r i o u s f r i e n d s h i p s o c i e t i e s ( e . g . , t h e Japan-China F r i e n d s h i p S o c i e t y ) , t r a d e p r o m o t i o n g r o u p s , and p r o m i n e n t i n d i v i d u a l s , as w e l l as mass media, tend to i n crease any p o t e n t i a l i n f l u e n c e . °  issues  W i t h r e g a r d t o the f i r s t p o i n t , i t i s c l e a r t h a t p u b l i c o p i n i o n  in  f a v o u r o f n o r m a l i z a t i o n developed b e f o r e i t was p o s s i b l e to c a r r y  this  t a s k o u t due t o t h e c o n t i n u a t i o n i n power o f Prime M i n i s t e r Sato.  Thus,  by the time Tanaka gained the primeerninistership t h e r e was a s t r o n g " g e n e r a l mood" i n f a v o u r o f e a r l y n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f r e l a t i o n s .  Indeed,  a t the time o f the China p o l i c y agreement between Tanaka, O h i r a , and M i k i t h e r e was an e x p l i c i t r e c o g n i t i o n o f t h e f a c t t h a t  "normalisation  o f d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s between Japan and China has now become p u b l i c . . ,,282 opinion.... N e x t , p u b l i c o p i n i o n p o l l s were c o n s i s t e n t i n r e f l e c t i n g a demand f o r the e a r l y n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f r e l a t i o n s by t h e Tanaka government, w i t h the p r o p o r t i o n o f those i n f a v o u r o f such a move i n c r e a s i n g as t h e t i m e o f Tanaka's v i s i t  approached.  I n s o f a r as Scalapino and Masumi are c o n -  c e r n e d , p o l i t i c i a n s do indeed pay a t t e n t i o n t o t h e response o f the p u b l i c i n t h e p o l l s conducted so t h a t p u b l i c o p i n i o n i n f a v o u r o r n o r m a l i z a t i o n 283 may have p r o v i d e d . csomex.-i o f t h e impetus t o c a r r y out this. task.. On t h e o t h e r h a n d , Hellman a s s e r t s " . . . p o s t - w a r Japanese p r i m e m i n i s t e r s have i n f a c t p a i d l i t t l e a t t e n t i o n to p u b l i c o p i n i o n on the 284 major f o r e i g n p o l i c y i s s u e s . "  A l t h o u g h Hellmann f i n d s s u p p o r t  t h i s a s s e r t i o n i n . h i s own study o f t h e S o v i e t peace t r e a t y  for  negotiations,  90  our p r e s e n t study o f the China n o r m a l i z a t i o n process would seem t o i n d i c a t e Prime M i n i s t e r Tanaka may have p a i d some a t t e n t i o n t o t h e demand f o r n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f Japan-China r e l a t i o n s .  One c r u c i a l v a r i a b l e h e r e  i s t h a t t h e press d i d n o t p l a y a s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e i n shaping p u b l i c o p i n i o n i n f a v o u r o f the Japanese government's p o s t u r e i n t h e S o v i e t peace t r e a t y n e g o t i a t i o n s , whereas i t o f Japan-China r e l a t i o n s .  d i d i n t h e case o f  normalization  I n any e v e n t , a number o f a u t h o r s agree t h a t  p u b l i c o p i n i o n p l a y e d a s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e i n p r e s s u r i n g t h e Tanaka government i n t o n o r m a l i z i n g r e l a t i o n s w i t h P e k i n g .  For example,  Scalapino s u p p o r t s t h i s statement when he d e c l a r e s p u b l i c o p i n i o n was a "...significant  p r e s s u r e upon t h e new Tanaka government t o reach an 285  agreement w i t h Peking q u i c k l y — - wise, Q  u r e s n l  even a t c o n s i d e r a b l e c o s t . "  Like-  assures us " . . . t h e impetus f o r Tanaka's Peking v i s i t was  p r o v i d e d by the consensus o f p u b l i c o p i n i o n i n Japan which has a l w a y s - 286 "played a n n i m p o r t a n t r o l e i n Japanese p o l i t i c a l l i f e . "  Hence,  it  would appear t h a t i n c e r t a i n circumstances p u b l i c o p i n i o n may have c e r t a i n i n f l u e n c e on p o l i c y - m a k i n g process i n Japan. F i n a l l y , i n r e s p e c t t o I t o h ' s t h i r d p o i n t concerning t h e i n f l u e n c e 28 7 of a r t i c u l a t e d opinion,  we have a l r e a d y p o i n t e d o u t t h a t the media was  d e f i n i t e l y i n f a v o u r o f a n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f Japan-China r e l a t i o n s . a d d i t i o n , we saw i n our d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e LDP t h a t i n t r a - p a r t y  In  pressure  groups and prominent LDP p o l i t i c i a n s attempted t o i n f l u e n c e the p o l i c y making process i n f a v o u r o f P e k i n g .  Finally,  t h e r e were such groups  as the Komeito sponsored P e o p l e ' s C o u n c i l f o r t h e N o r m a l i z a t i o n o f Japan-China r e l a t i o n s t h a t j o i n e d i n c a l l i n g f o r a more p o s i t i v e  91  a t t i t u d e towards the Peking government.  Of c o u r s e , t h e r e was  s t r o n g s e n t i m e n t i n f a v o u r o f Taiwan among c e r t a i n elements o f  still arti-  c u l a t e o p i n i o n , ( e . g . , A s i a Problems Research G r o u p ) , b u t Tanaka gained s u p p o r t f r o m t h e above groups i n the saj\& moves he made to n o r m a l i z e Japan-China r e l a t i o n s . When i t  comes t o t h e p r e s s u r e o f these groups on t h e a c t u a l  d e c i s i o n to n o r m a l i z e r e l a t i o n s w i t h China, however, they o n l y p l a y e d t h e r o l e o f g e n e r a l p u b l i c o p i n i o n informing t h e background which the Tanaka government n o r m a l i z e d r e l a t i o n s .  .against  This i s because  the ad hoc p o l i c y - m a k i n g group which came t o dominate t h e  'China  d e c i s i o n ' was a [ s m a l l , t i g h t - k n i t group w h i c h d i d n o t a l l o w t h e i n f l u e n c e o f these groups or t h a t o f g e n e r a l p u b l i c o p i n i o n t o e n t e r "...directly  i n t o t h e t i g h t l y i n s u l a t e d and c o n t r o l l e d process o f  d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g i n t h e s m a l l a c t i o n group o f p o l i t i c i a n s and b u r e a u 288 crats."  While p u b l i c o p i n i o n and a r t i c u l a t e d o p i n i o n may have  p r o v i d e d some g e n e r a l i n p u t i n t o the p o l i c y - m a k i n g process i n terms o f i t p r o v i d i n g a f a v o u r a b l e background f o r t h e p o l i c y - m a k i n g g r o u p , the f a c t t h a t t h i s group operated i n t h e above manner would seem t o i n d i c a t e t h a t such f a v o u r a b l e o p i n i o n was n o t o n l y i n s u f f i c i e n t  to  b r i n g about the n o r m a l i z a t i o n of Japan-China r e l a t i o n s , b u t perhaps a l s o unnecessary.  92  CONCLUSION I t i s e v i d e n t f r o m our a n a l y s i s o f t h e p o l i c y - m a k i n g process p e r t a i n i n g t o t h e n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f Japan-China r e l a t i o n s t h a t  external  and i n t e r n a l f a c t o r s a f f e c t J a p a n ' s f o r e i g n - p o l i c y making p r o c e s s . This does n o t , o f c o u r s e , mean t h a t a l l t h e i n t e r n a l and e x t e r n a l f a c t o r s t h a t p l a y e d a r o l e i n the ' C h i n a d e c i s i o n ' were p r e s e n t e d i n t h i s s t u d y , o r t h a t we can g i v e " w e i g h t " t o t h e r e l e v a n t  factors  we have discussed b u t , g i v e n the a d m i t t e d l y isica-rteus e m p i r i c a l d a t a c o n c e r n i n g Japanese p o l i c y - m a k i n g i n g e n e r a l , and f o r e i g n p o l i c y - m a k i n g in particular,  the most s a l i e n t aspects o f the China n o r m a l i z a t i o n p r o -  cess appear t o have been examined i n t h i s '  study.  From the d a t a a l r e a d y a v a i l a b l e on' p o l i c y - m a k i n g i n Japan, a  t h e o r e t i c a l framework was c u l l e d i n o r d e r t o p r o v i d e a h e u r i s t i c for explaining a particular China r e l a t i o n s .  case s t u d y —  device  the n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f Japan-  To analyze t h i s problem i n the framework we employed  adds to our u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f f o r e i g n p o l i c y - m a k i n g , b u t i t begs t h e c r i t i c a l q u e s t i o n :  nevertheless  Can t h i s s t u d y o f the China n o r m a l i z a t i o n  process p r o v i d e any i n s i g h t s t h a t might f a c i l i t a t e a broader  conceptual-  i z a t i o n o f p o l i c y - m a k i n g i n Japan? To a v o i d t h e charge t h a t we s i m p l y c o n s i d e r e d t h i s case i d i o g r a p h i c a l l y , i n s t e a d of n o m o t h e t i c a l l y ,  t h e China n o r m a l i z a t i o n process  was a n a l y z e d i n r e s p e c t t o i t b e i n g i n t h e f u n c t i o n a l area o f policy,  foreign  c o n t r o v e r s i a l i n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c , and s h o r t - t e r m on the  dimension.  temporal  I n t h i s a t t e m p t t o e x p l i c a t e a framework w i t h i n w h i c h t o  study the ' C h i n a d e c i s i o n , '  t h e r e are s t i l l c e r t a i n c r i t i c i s m s  may be l e v e l l e d a g a i n s t s t u d y i n g an i s s u e w i t h i n t h i s  setting.  that  93  I n the f i r s t p l a c e , i t m i g h t be argued t h a t t h e a c t o r s i n v o l v e d  in  a f o r e i g n p o l i c y i s s u e a r e n o t s u b s t a n t i a l l y d i f f e r e n t f r o m those i n v o l v e d i n a domestic i s s u e .  I n d e e d , our f i n d i n g s i n r e s p e c t to t h e  predominant r o l e o f t h e LDP i s s u p p o r t e d by H a r a r i ' s study of  labour  289 l e g i s l a t i o n i n Japan.  However, what s t i l l makes a f u n c t i o n a l  f e r e n c e between these i s s u e areas s i g n i f i c a n t ,  i s that i t gives a  d i r e c t i o n a l f o c u s t o examine t h e e x t e r n a l i n f l u e n c e s a f f e c t i n g policy-making process.  dif-  the  I n s h o r t , one would expect t h a t e x t e r n a l i n -  f l u e n c e s a r e n o t as s a l i e n t i n s t u d i e s p e r t a i n i n g s o l e l y to domestic p o 1 i cy-mak i n g . A more s e r i o u s c r i t i c i s m may be l e v e l l e d i n r e s p e c t t o  consider-  i n g the China n o r m a l i z a t i o n process i n a c a t e g o r y based on t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c ' o j f the p o l i c y . i s c o n t r o v e r s i a l or not? if  I n o t h e r w o r d s , how do we decide i f  an i s s u e  Once a g a i n , t h e answer seems q u i t e s i m p l e :  t h e r e i s s t r o n g i n t e r - or i n t r a - p a r t y , o p p o s i t i o n t o t h e government's  policy,  then t h e i s s u e i s c o n t r o v e r s i a l .  A r t i c u l a t e and g e n e r a l p u b l i c  o p i n i o n may a l s o express o p p o s i t i o n t o the government's p o l i c y , and t h i s may heat the f i r e o f t h e c o n t r o v e r s y , b u t t h e e f f e c t o f i n t e r - and i n t r a - p a r t y o p p o s i t i o n i s the most s a l i e n t p o i n t h e r e . F i n a l l y , a p o i n t o f c o n t e n t i o n may be r a i s e d i n r e s p e c t t o t h e t e m p o r a l dimension o f the i s s u e .  As n o t e d , s h o r t - t e r m ( u r g e n t )  d e c i s i o n s a r e c o n s i d e r e d t o be those o f one year or l e s s .  policy  Hence,  it  may be argued t h a t t h i s i s e i t h e r " t o o l o n g , " or " t o o s h o r t , " a p e r i o d . C e r t a i n l y , what i s . n e e d e d here a r e f u r t h e r s t u d i e s o f f o r e i g n p o l i c y making across the t e m p o r a l ' d i m e n s i o n , so t h a t we may make a more a c c u r a t e assessment o f the d i f f e r i n g i n f l u e n c e s on the p o l i c y - m a k i n g  94  process t h a t occur over t i m e . However, t h e p o i n t i s t h a t we s p e c i f i e d the framework w i t h i n which t h e ' C h i n a d e c i s i o n ' was a n a l y z e d . d i t i o n , we made i t  I n ad-  c l e a r t h a t Prime M i n i s t e r Tanaka p e r c e i v e d t h e  i s s u e as s h o r t - t e r m . When we summarize t h i s s t u d y ' s f i n d i n g s , t h e n , i t i s to do so by r e f e r e n c e t o s p e c i f i c i s s u e c a t e g o r i e s . only f a c i l i t a t e  possible  This might not  the d e l i n e a t i o n o f f a c t o r s t h a t may be s i g n i f i c a n t  i n s i m i l a r s h o r t - t e r m and c o n t r o v e r s i a l f o r e i g n p o l i c y i s s u e s b u t , o f equal i m p o r t a n c e , m i g h t a l s o be u s e f u l i n examining i s s u e s f a l l w i t h i n d i f f e r e n t issue categories. number o f t h e more s i g n i f i c a n t  that  With t h i s p o i n t i n mind, a  f i n d i n g s of t h i s study, together w i t h  a number o f p o s t u l a t e s t h a t may be r e l e v a n t i n f u t u r e p o l i c y r e s e a r c h , are presented below: 1)  I n p u t f r o m the e x t e r n a l environment i s an important v a r i a b l e to consider i n a s h o r t term c o n t r o v e r s i a l f o r e i g n p o l i c y i s s u e , b u t i s n o t as s a l i e n t i n i n f l u e n c i n g Japan's l o n g - t e r m f o r e i g n p o l i c y , goals ( e . g . , economic prosperity).  2)  Senior l e a d e r s o f the LDP s u p p o r t e d by s e n i o r b u r e a u c r a t s tend t o e x e r c i s e t h e predominant influence i n short-term controversial issues. Conversely, t h e f o r m a l p a r t y organs and the b u r e a u c r a t i c o r g a n i z a t i o n s a r e expected t o p l a y a more p r o m i n e n t r o l e i n l o n g - t e r m issues. This w i l l probablyibe.esp^iaiLV theecase for routine (non-controversial) issues.  3)  Business i n f l u e n c e i s m i n i m a l i n s h o r t - t e r m controversial foreign policy issues. The more u r g e n t the d e c i s i o n , the l e s s l i k e l y t h a t business w i l l g a i n d i r e c t access t o i n f l u e n c e t h e p o l i c y - m a k i n g p r o c e s s . Business i n f l u e n c e i s undoubtedly g r e a t e s t i n the economic policy-making process.  95 4)  The r o l e o f t h e o p p o s i t i o n i n t h i s s t u d y was somewhat a t y p i c a l . T h i s seems p a r t i c u l a r l y t r u e given that opposition p a r t i e s , gain t h e i r l e g i t i m a c y and c r e d i b i l i t y from o p p o s i n g , r a t h e r t h a n s u p p o r t i n g , the government's p o l i c y . Hence i n the f u t u r e , the r o l e of the o p p o s i t i o n w i l l p r o b a b l y be t h a t of government c r i t i c , b o t h i n s i d e and o u t s i d e t h e N a t i o n a l D i e t .  5)  The press and p u b l i c o p i n i o n are i n d i r e c t i n fluences i n short-term c o n t r o v e r s i a l f o r e i g n policy decisions. The i n f l u e n c e o f the press and p u b l i c o p i n i o n i s perhaps most s a l i e n t and d i r e c t i n c o n t r o v e r s i a l i s s u e s , o r domestic i s s u e s , b u t even t h i s i n f l u e n c e i s p r o b a b l y i n d i r e c t and p e r i p h e r a l to the policy-making process.  While t h i s l i s t  is illustrative,  r a t h e r than e x h a u s t i v e , i t  does  g i v e some i n d i c a t i o n of t h e u t i l i t y o f - c o n s i d e r i n g an i s s u e i n terms o f its functional, characteristic,  and t e m p o r a l dimensions.  This may h e l p  us t o b u i l d a b r i d g e between a b s t r a c t g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s and e m p i r i c a l d a t a . Perhaps most i m p o r t a n t l y i t  teaches us t o use any framework w i t h c a u t i o n ,  remembering t h a t our main t a s k i s t h a t o f e x p l a n a t i o n , n o t t h a t defending a p a r t i c u l a r  theoretical position.  of  I n other words, w h i l e  the  above approach i s u s e f u l f o r examining f o r e i g n p o l i c y - m a k i n g i n Japan, t h i s does n o t suggest i t w i l l be o f a i d i n u n d e r s t a n d i n g a l l making i s s u e s .  Nevertheless, i t  policy-  i s a f r u i t f u l b e g i n n i n g from w h i c h t o  expand our knowledge of Japanese f o r e i g n p o l i c y - m a k i n g .  96  FOOTNOTES "'"Geoffrey Pearson, "What does the -academic have to c o n t r i b u t e t o p o l i c y - m a k i n g , " I n t e r n a t i o n a l P e r s p e c t i v e s , (November-December 1 9 7 3 ) , p. 43. 2 For a d i s c u s s i o n of the LDP's dependence on z a i k a i p o l i t i c a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s , see Frank Langdon, "The P o l i t i c a l C o n t r i b u t i o n s o f B i g Business i n J a p a n , " A s i a n Survey, V o l . 3, No. 10 ( A p r i l 1 9 6 3 ) , p p . 465-73. 3 For a s i m i l a r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n see, f o r example, H a r u k i r o F u k u i , " F o r e i g n P o l i c y - M a k i n g i n Japan: Case S t u d i e s f o r E m p i r i c a l T h e o r y , " prepared f o r d e l i v e r y a t t h e 1974 Annual Meeting o f t h e A s s o c i a t i o n f o r Asian S t u d i e s , B o s t o n , A p r i l 1-3, 1974, pp. 5 - 6 . H e r e a f t e r t h i s w i l l be r e f e r r e d t o as F u k u i , " F o r e i g n P o l i c y - M a k i n g i n J a p a n . " T l a r u h i r o F u k u i , "Economic P l a n n i n g i n Postwar Japan: A Case Study i n P o l i c y - M a k i n g , " A s i a n Survey, V o l . 12, No. 4 ( A p r i l 1 9 7 2 ) , p. 348. A l s o see F u k u i ' s e a r l i e r b o o k - l e n g t h s t u d y o f LDP p o l i c y making, P a r t y i n Power: The Japanese L i b e r a l - D e m o c r a t s and P o l i c y Making , B e r k e l e y and Los A n g e l e s : U n i v e r s i t y o f C a l i f o r n i a P r e s s , 1970, p a r t i c u l a r l y pp. 162-67. I n h i s l a t e s t s t u d y , Fukui m o d i f i e s his p r e v i o u s l y held p o s i t i o n concerning the r o l e of the t r i p a r t i t e e l i t e i n p o l i c y - m a k i n g , a l t h o u g h he s t i l l sees i t b e i n g i m p o r t a n t as the "Support base" of t h e ad hoc p o l i c y - m a k i n g group t h a t develops to cope w i t h p o l i c y - m a k i n g i n Japan. See " F o r e i g n P o l i c y - M a k i n g i n J a p a n , " pp. 7 - 8 , 20, 63-86. I n a d d i t i o n t o those a u t h o r s mentioned i n t h e t e x t , the f o l l o w i n g a u t h o r s and works g i v e examples o f the i m p l i c i t o r exp l i c i t assumption about t h e r e l e v a n c e o f t h e t r i p a r t i t e e l i t e i n t h e Japanese p o l i c y - m a k i n g p r o c e s s . I v a n P. H a l l , "Japanese I n t e l l e c t u a l s , " Survey, V o l . 18, No. 4 (Autumn 1 9 7 2 ) , pp. 76-79; C h i h i r o Hosoya, " C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of t h e F o r e i g n P o l i c y D e c i s i o n - M a k i n g System i n J a p a n , " World P o l i t i c s , V o l . 26, No. 3 ( A p r i l 1 9 7 4 ) , p. 368; Robert A. S c a l a p i n o and Junnosuke Masami, P a r t i e s and P o l i t i c s i n Contemporary Japan, B e r k e l e y and Los A n g e l e s : U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a P r e s s , 1962, pp. 9 3 - 9 4 . For a d i s c u s s i o n of the r e l e v a n t Japanese language works see F u k u i , " F o r e i g n P o l i c y - M a k i n g i n J a p a n , " pp. 6 - 7 . For a c r i t i q u e of t h i s approach and an i n d i c a t i o n o f i t s l i m i t a t i o n s see F u k u i , " F o r e i g n P o l i c y - M a k i n g i n J a p a n , " p p . 4 - 2 3 ; J o e l S i l v e r s t e i n , " S t u d i e s i n Japanese P o l i c y - M a k i n g : Assessing t h e S t a t e o f the A f t , " Ohio U n i v e r s i t y , u n p u b l i s h e d monograph. " ' N a t h a n i e l B. Thayer, " C o n s e r v a t i v e P a r t y L e a d e r s h i p , " Forecast f o r Japan: S e c u r i t y i n the 1970s, Ed. James W i l l i a m M o r l e y , P r i n c e t o n , N.J.: P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1972, p. 85. Also see Thayer, How the C o n s e r v a t i v e Rule Japan, P r i n c e t o n , N . J . : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1969, chapters 3 and 8. See p a r t i c u l a r l y p. 70 where he quotes the then V i c e speaker o f the House o f C o u n c i l l o r s , Kenzo Kono, as i n p a r t s a y i n g : "The businessmen have i n f l u e n c e over t h e p o l i t i c i a n s , the p o l i t i c i a n s "  97  c o n t r o l t h e b u r e a u c r a c y , and t h e b u r e a u c r a t s keep t h e businessmen i n line. I t ' s a n a t u r a l system o f checks and b a l a n c e s . " ^Thayer, " C o n s e r v a t i v e P a r t y L e a d e r s h i p , " p.  108.  ^ C h i t o s h i Yanaga, B i g Business i n Japanese P o l i t i c s , New Haven and London: Y a l e U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1968, p. 28. See a l s o Yanaga, i b i d , p. 307. g Thayer, " C o n s e r v a t i v e P a r t y L e a d e r s h i p , " p. 108. Also see h i s How the Conservatives Rule Japan, p. 228; Frank Langdon, " J a p a n ' s F o r e i g n P o l i c y - M a k i n g P r o c e s s , " Japan i n World P o l i t i c s , Ed. Young C. Kim, Washington, D . C . : I n s t i t u t e f o r A s i a n S t u d i e s , 1972, p p . 1-20; Nathan Newby W h i t e , "An A n a l y s i s o f J a p a n ' s China P o l i c y Under the L i b e r a l Democrats," B e r k e l e y U n i v e r s i t y o f C a l i f o r n i a , u n p u b l i s h e d Ph.D. d i s s e r t a t i o n . 9 Yanaga, B i g Business i n Japanese P o l i t i c s , p p . 6 3 - 6 4 . Also see chapter 3 i n t h e same book. Fukui concurs i n i n t e r p r e t i n g Yanaga's p o s i t i o n as g i v i n g t h e dominant or predominant r o l e i n p o l i c y - m a k i n g to business. See F u k u i , " F o r e i g n P o l i c y - M a k i n g i n J a p a n , " p p . 6 - 7 . Yanaga sees t h e dominant p o s i t i o n o f t h e z a i k a i p a r t i c u l a r l y i n r e s p e c t to economic m a t t e r s . See Yanaga, i b i d . , p p . 307-309, 314. For o t h e r views on the importance o f b u s i n e s s i n t h e p o l i c y - m a k i n g process see, f o r example: Robert ' G u l l a i n , The Japanese C h a l l e n g e , New Y o r k : L i p p i n c o t t , 1970; F u k u i , P a r t y i n Power, pp. 144-70; -Ehud H a r a r i , The P o l i t i c s o f Labour L e g i s l a t i o n i n Japan, B e r k e l e y , Los A n g e l e s , London: U n i v e r s i t y o f C a l i f o r n i a P r e s s , 1973, pp. 1 4 6 - 4 8 ; Robert A. Scalapino and Junnosuke Masumi, P a r t i e s and P o l i t i c s i n Contemporary J a p a n , B e r k e l e y and Los A n g e l e s : U n i v e r s i t y o f C a l i f o r n i a P r e s s , 1962, pp. 8 8 - 8 9 ; S i l v e r s t e i n , op. c i t . , p. 9; Thayer, How the Conservatives Rule Japan, pp. 5 8 - 7 1 ; Warren M. T s u n e i s h i , Japanese P o l i t i c a l S t y l e , New Y o r k : Harper and Row, 1966, p. 165. For an e x p l i c i t l y new l e f t v i e w p o i n t see t h e work by John H a l l i d a y and Gavan McCormack, Japanese I m p e r i a l i s m Today, London: Monthly Review P r e s s , 1973. I n p a r t i c u l a r r e f e r e n c e t o business i n f l u e n c e i n the LDP's China p o l i c y see c h a p t e r 4. For a d i s c u s s i o n o f c e r t a i n o f the l i m i t a t i o n s o f business i n f l u e n c e i n Japan, see Frank Langdon, "The A t t i t u d e s o f the Business Community," F o r e c a s t f o r Japan, Ed. James M o r l e y ; Frank Langdon, " B i g Business i n Japan: The Case o f C e n t r a l Bank R e f o r m , " American P o l i t i c a l Science Review (APSR), V o l . 55, No.33(September, 1 9 6 1 ) , pp. 527-38. A l s o see A . J . Heidenheimer and F.C. Langdon, Business A s s o c i a t i o n s and t h e F i n a n c i n g o f P o l i t i c a l P a r t i e s , The Hague: M a r t i n u s N i j h o f f , 1968, pp. 1 7 0 - 7 2 , 204-205; Yanaga, B i g Business i n Japanese P o l i t i c s , pp. 284-85. "^Yanaga, B i g Business i n Japanese P o l i t i c s , p. 178. A l s o see Yanaga, i b i d . , pp. 155, 1 6 1 , 176, 198, 202-206, 225, 2 3 0 - 3 1 . 2 4 7 - 5 1 , 261. See a l s o H a l l i d a y and McCormack, op. c i t . , chapter 4. For a d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e r e l e v a n t Japanese language works see F u k u i , " F o r e i g n P o l i c y - M a k i n g i n J a p a n , " pp. 1 1 - 1 2 .  98  Donald Hellmann, Japanese F o r e i g n P o l i c y and Domestic P o l i t i c s : The Peace Agreement w i t h the S o v i e t U n i o n , B e r k e l e y and Los A n g e l e s , U n i v e r s i t y o f C a l i f o r n i a , 1969, p. 4 1 . H e r e a f t e r r e f e r r e d t o as Hellmann, Peace Agreement. 12 Hellmann, Peace Agreement, p. 56; f o r o t h e r a u t h o r s who n o t e the i n f l u e n c e o f f a c t i o n a l i s m on p o l i c y - m a k i n g see, f o r example, F u k u i , " F o r e i g n P o l i c y - M a k i n g i n J a p a n , " pp. 8 - 9 ; P a c k a r d , op. c i t . , p p . 7 2 - 8 1 , 347; Scalapino and Masumi, o p . c i t . , c h . V; f o r s t u d i e s t h a t p o i n t o u t the absence o f f a c t i o n a l c o n f l i c t on p o l i c y - m a k i n g , see, f o r example F u k u i , P a r t y i n Power, Ch. 7; H a r a r i y , „ o p . c i t . , p p . 177-180. For a d i s c u s s i o n o f LDP f a c t i o n s p a r t i c u l a r l y as they p e r t a i n to the China i s s u e see F u k u i , P a r t y i n Power, Ch. 9 ; Frank Langdon, e s p e c i a l l y "Japanese L i b e r a l Democratic F a c t i o n a l D i s c o r d on China P o l i c y , " P a c i f i c A f f a i r s , V o l . 4 1 , No. 3 ( F a l l 1 9 6 8 ) , p p . 403-15. For the b e s t d i s c u s s i o n on the major works on the r o l e o f f a c t i o n a l i s m i n Japanese p o l i t i c s and an a t t e m p t a t c l a s s i f i c a t i o n see Roger W. Benjamin and Kan O r i , "Some Aspects o f P o l i t i c a l P a r t y I n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n i n J a p a n , " u n p u b l i s h e d monograph, U.B.C. l i b r a r y , 1970, pp. 1 - 1 1 . 13 Hellmann,Peace T r e a t y , p. 130. 14 Hellmann, Peace T r e a t y , pp. 98, 129. "'""'Hellmann, Peace T r e a t y , p p . 24, 135, 142. S h i g e o Misawa, "An O u t l i n e o f t h e P o l i c y - M a k i n g Process i n J a p a n , " Japanese P o l i t i c s - An I n s i d e View, Ed. H i r o s h i I t o h , I t h a c a and London: C o r n e l l U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1973, p. 27. See a l s o H a r a r i , op. c i t . , pp. 9 0 - 9 3 ; Nobutaka I k e , Japanese P o l i t i c s , New Y o r k : Alfred A. Knopf I n c . , 1957, p. 124. For a d i s c u s s i o n o f c e r t a i n i n h e r e n t o r g a n i z a t i o n a l weaknesses i n t h e bureaucracy see H a r u h i r o F u k u i , " B u r e a u c r a t i c Power i n J a p a n , " Japan and A u s t r a l i a : Two S o c i e t i e s and t h e i r I n t e r a c t i o n , Ed. P e t e r Drysdale and Hironobu K i t a o j i , O x f o r d : Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press ( f o r t h c o m i n g ) . 1 6  T a k e t s u g u T s u r u t a n i , "The Causes o f P a r a l y s i s , " F o r e i g n P o l i c y , No. 14 ( S p r i n g 1 9 7 4 ) , pp. 1 2 6 - 4 1 . For an e x c e l l e n t c r i t i c i s m o f t h i s a r t i c l e , see t h e f o l l o w i n g a r t i c l e i n t h e same i s s u e by Edwin 0 . Reischauer, " T h e i r S p e c i a l S t r e n g t h s , " pp. 142-53. 17  18  See F u k u i , P a r t y i n Power, Ch. 9.  19 As Fukui p o i n t s o u t , " F o r e i g n P o l i c y - M a k i n g i n J a p a n , " p. 2 1 , " I n most p o l i c y - m a k i n g s i t u a t i o n s p r e s s u r e f r o m o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s , mass media and the g e n e r a l p u b l i c are j u s t as p o w e r f u l as those coming from w i t h i n the e l i t e . " 20 Frank Langdon, J a p a n ' s F o r e i g n P o l i c y , Vancouver: U n i v e r s i t y . of B r i t i s h Columbia P r e s s , 1973, p. 34. For o t h e r d i s c u s s i o n s p e r t a i n i n g t o  99  the r o l e o f the o p p o s i t i o n i n p o l i c y - m a k i n g s e e , f o r example, Hans Baerswald, " J a p a n , " Case S t u d i e s i n Comparative P o l i t i c s : A s i a , Ed. L u c i a n W. Pye, B o s t o n : L i t t l e , Brown & Son, 1970, p p . 1 6 - 8 3 ; H a r a r i , op. c i t . , p a r t i c u l a r l y p. 178; P a c k a r d , op, c i t . , p p . 1 6 - 2 5 , 8 2 - 8 3 , For a g e n e r a l d i s c u s s i o n o f the o p p o s i t i o n ' s f o r e i g n p o l i c y p e r s p e c t i v e , see J . A . A . S t o c k w i n , " F o r e i g n P o l i c y P e r s p e c t i v e s o f the Japanese L e f t : C o n f r o n t a t i o n or Consensus?" P a c i f i c A f f a i r s , V o l . 42, No. 4 ( W i n t e r 1 9 6 9 - 1 9 7 0 ) , pp. 435-445, and by the same a u t h o r , "The Japanese Opposition: P o l i t i c a l I r r e l e v a n c e or Wave o f t h e F u t u r e , " A u s t r a l i a n O u t l o o k , V o l . 25, No. 2 (August 1 9 7 1 ) , pp. 181-197. 21 Hellmann, S o v i e t Peace T r e a t y , p p . 114-17, 120, 1 5 1 . 22 See pp. 7 1 - 8 1 . ,. Also see F u k u i , " F o r e i g n P o l i c y - M a k i n g i n J a p a n , " pp. 38-42. 23 See F u k u i , " F o r e i g n P o l i c y - M a k i n g i n J a p a n , " pp. 1 5 - 1 6 . 24 Frank Langdon, " J a p a n ' s F o r e i g n P o l i c y - M a k i n g P r o c e s s , " p. 15. See a l s o Douglas H. Mendel, J r . , The Japanese People and F o r e i g n P o l i c y , B e r k e l e y : U n i v e r s i t y o f C a l i f o r n i a P r e s s , 1 9 6 1 ; and a l s o h i s 'Japanese Views o f S a t o ' s F o r e i g n P o l i c y , t h e C r e d i b i l i t y Gap," A s i a n Survey, V o l . 7, No. 7 ( J u l y 1 9 6 7 ) , pp. 444-56. 25 Robert S c a l a p i n o , A s i a and the Major Powers: Implications f o r the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Order, S t a n f o r d : Hoover I n s t i t u t e , S t a n f o r d , 1972, p. 1 1 . 26 Scalapino and Masumi, op. c i t . , p. 45. On a more g e n e r a l l e v e l James Rosenau c o n c u r s . See James N. Rosenau, The S c i e n t i f i c Study o f F o r e i g n P o l i c y , New Y o r k : Free P r e s s , 1 9 7 1 , pp. 418-19. 27 Hellmann, Peace T r e a t y , p p . 8 4 - 8 7 . 28 Donald Hellmann, Japan: I t s Domestic P o l i t i c s and F o r e i g n P o l i c y , American E n t e r p r i s e I n s t i t u t e , R e p r i n t No. 19, 1973. See a l s o P a c k a r d , op. c i t . , p p . 3 5 - 4 0 , 45, 1 4 7 - 5 2 , 3 2 7 - 3 1 , 344. 29s * - o ~ s < - f > ~-f *-;. ~- 1 9 . 1 S i l v e r s t e i r i , o p — c i t . " pp. 1 2 - 1 3 . 3 0  S e e pp. 85-88.  "*Yukio Matsuyama, "Japanese Press and J a p a n ' s F o r e i g n P o l i c y , " J o u r n a l o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s , V o l . 26, No. 1 , p. 147. 3  32  Edward P. W h i t t e m o r e , The Press i n Japan Today - - A Case Study, Columbia: U n i v e r s i t y o f South C a r o l i n a , 1 9 6 1 , e s p e c i a l l y pp. 81-87. 3 3  P a c k a r d , op. c i t . ,  pp. 246-47, 280-82.  34 Packard, op. c i t . ,  p.  246.  100  35 36 37  Hellmann, Peace T r e a t y , p. 107. I b i d . . , emphasis i n t h e o r i g i n a l . F u k u i , " F o r e i g n P o l i c y - M a k i n g i n J a p a n , " pp. 2 0 - 2 1 .  38  F u k u i , " B u r e a u c r a t i c Power i n J a p a n , " p. 40. A l s o see F u k u i , P a r t y i n Power, p. 5. 39 Rosenau, The S c i e n t i f i c Study o f F o r e i g n P o l i c y , p. 406. ^ T . J . P.empel, " P a t t e r n s o f Japanese P o l i c y - M a k i n g : Higher E d u c a t i o n , " paper prepared f o r d e l i v e r y a t the 1974 Annual Meeting o f the A s s o c i a t i o n f o r A s i a n S t u d i e s , B o s t o n , A p r i l 1-3, 1974, p. 2. See a l s o Robert A. D a h l , Who Governs, New Haven: Y a l e U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1961, e s p e c i a l l y pp. 332 f f . ; F u k u i , " F o r e i g n P o l i c y - M a k i n g i n J a p a n , " pp. 72 f f . ; C-harles F. Hermann, " P o l i c y C l a s s i f i c a t i o n : A Key t o the Comparative Study o f F o r e i g n P o l i c y , " The A n a l y s i s o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l P o l i t i c s , Eds.James Rosenau, V i n c e n t D a v i s , Maurice A. E a s t , New Y o r k : Free P r e s s , 1972, p p . 58-79; W i l l i a m Zimmerman, " I s s u e Area dnd F o r e i g n P o l i c y ^ P r o c e s s , " American P o l i t i c a l Science Review, V o l . 67, No. 4 (December 1 9 7 3 ) , pp. 1204-12. 4  41 Langdon, p e r s o n a l communication to a u t h o r . 42 Pempel, op. c i t . , p. 2. However, Pempel a l s o notes t h a t though discussing f o r e i g n p o l i c y l i m i t s decision-making to a p a r t i c u l a r f u n c t i o n a l a r e a , t h e r e i s "no reason t o assume t h a t a l l f o r e i g n p o l i c y d e c i s i o n s a r e f o r m u l a t e d and expressed i n a s i m i l a r manner." p. 3. See a l s o F u k u i , " F o r e i g n P o l i c y - M a k i n g i n J a p a n , " pp. 7 2 - 7 3 . 43 Pempel, op. c i t . , p. 6. 44 Pempel, op. c i t . , p. 9. See a l s o Reischauer, op. c i t . , p. 148, who concurs t h a t the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g process d i f f e r s a c c o r d i n g t o whether t h e i s s u e i s c o n t r o v e r s i a l o r n o t , s i n c e the consensual d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g process known as r i n g i s e i i s used " . . . f o r v e r y r o u t i n e m a t t e r s , n o t f o r c o n t r o v e r s i a l p r o b l e m s . " For a m p l i f i c a t i o n o f the concept o f r i n g i s e i , see i c d t a t i o n 180. 45 See Charles F. Hermann, I n t e r n a t i o n a l C r i s e s : I n s i g h t s from B e h a v i o u r a l Research, New Y o r k : Free P r e s s , 1972. For an a t t e m p t t o d i s t i n g u i s h between s h o r t - a n d l o n g - t e r m i s s u e s on Japan see T s u r u t a n i , op. c i t . , pp. 1 3 9 - 1 4 1 ; S i l v e r s t e i n , op. c i t . , e s p e c i a l l y p p . 31-33. 46 Charles F. Hermann, I n t e r n a t i o n a l C r i s e s : I n s i g h t s from B e h a v i o u r a l Research, p. 187. 47 Theodore J . E o w i , "Making Democracy Safe f o r t h e W o r l d : National P o l i t i c s , " Domestic Sources o f F o r e i g n P o l i c y , Ed. James Rosenau, New Y o r k : Free P r e s s , 1967, p.- 324.  101  48  See p p . 41-47. Zimmermann, op. c i t . , p. 1207 makes another •comment on P o w i ' s h y p o t h e s i s : "The a s s e r t i o n t h a t c r i s i s p o l i t i c s does n o t have domestic p o l i t i c a l consequences seems, however, s u f f i c i e n t l y b i z a r r e — i n the era o f t h e f i f t e e n - m i n u t e war t h e consequences may be f e l t i n the v e r y s h o r t r u n — t o w a r r a n t an a l t e r n a t i v e h y p o t h e s i s . " 49  pp.  F u k u i , " F o r e i g n P o l i c y - M a k i n g i n J a p a n ; " S i l v e r s t e i n , op. 31-32.  cit.,  "^The d i s t i n c t i o n appears t o be t h a t Hermann i s t h i n k i n g i n p a r t i c u l a r about e x t e r n a l c r i s e s , whereas Fukui i s t h i n k i n g o f i n t e r n a l c r i s e s b r o u g h t about by e x t e r n a l e v e n t s . For example, Hermann s t a t e s a t the b e g i n n i n g o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l C r i s e s : I n s i g h t s from Behavioural Research, p. 1 1 , t h a t "An a b r u p t i n c r e a s e i n the l i k e l i h o o d o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l v i o l e n c e o r war i s the most common systemic d e f i n i t i o n o f c r i s i s i n t h e remainder o f t h i s v o l u m e . " On the o t h e r hand, Fukui s t a t e s i n " F o r e i g n P o l i c y - M a k i n g i n Japan," p. 83, t h a t : " The k i n d o f c r i s i s I had i n mind and I b e l i e v e t o be p a r t i c u l a r l y i m p o r t a n t i n the Japanese c o n t e x t i s . . . d o m e s t i c c r i s i s caused by a f o r e i g n p o l i c y i s s u e . This i s the sense i n w h i c h , f o r example, t h e 1960 . S e c u r i t y T r e a t y " c r i s i s " was p e r c e i v e d as such i n J a p a n . " ^^"Masataka Kosaka suggests f u r t h e r t h a t i n t h e f u t u r e t h e r e w i l l not " . . . b e many c r i s i s issues i f any where q u i c k and b o l d d e c i s i o n s a r e n e e d e d . " See " O p t i o n s f o r J a p a n ' s F o r e i g n P o l i c y , " London: I n s t i t u t e f o r S t r a t e g i c S t u d i e s , A d e l p h i Papers, No. 9 7 , 1973, p. 19. 52  F u k u i , " F o r e i g n P o l i c y - M a k i n g i n J a p a n , " p.  76.  53 Glenn D. P a i g e , The Korean D e c i s i o n : June 2 4 - 3 0 , 1950, New Free P r e s s , 1968. 54 James A. Robinson, Congress and F o r e i g n P o l i c y - M a k i n g : A Study i n L e g i s l a t i v e I n f l u e n c e and I n i t i a t i v e , Homewood, 1 1 1 . : Dorsey P r e s s , 1962.  York:  ^^As i s noted i n the book by Bauer e t a l . , "Any g i v e n i s s u e must compete w i t h o t h e r i s s u e s f o r t h e scarce resources w h i c h determine the outcome: t i m e , energy, a t t e n t i o n , money, manpower, and good w i l l . ' See R.A. Bauer, I de Sola P o o l , and R.A. D e x t e r , " ' A m e r i c a n Business and P u b l i c P o l i c y , New Y o r k : A t h e r t o n P r e s s , 1968, p. 480. 1  56 See James N. Rosenau, " P r e - T h e o r i e s and Theories o f F o r e i g n P o l i c y , " Approaches to Comparative and I n t e r n a t i o n a l P o l i t i c s , Ed. R. B a r r y F a r r e l l , Evanston: N o r t h w e s t e r n U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1966, p. 65. For a m o d i f i c a t i o n o f Rosenau's d e f i n i t i o n see Wolfram F. H a n r e i d e r , West German F o r e i g n P o l i c y 1949-1963, I n t e r n a t i o n a l Pressures and Domestic Response, S t a n f o r d : S t a n f o r d U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1967, p p . 229230. For a view o f Japan as an i n t e r - p e n e t r a t e d p o l i t i c a l system see Frank Langdon, " J a p a n ' s F o r e i g n P o l i c y - M a k i n g P r o c e s s , " p. 1 .  102  See e s p e c i a l l y Donald C. Hellmann's f o l l o w i n g w o r k s : "Japan i n the Postwar East A s i a n I n t e r n a t i o n a l System," McLean, V i r g i n i a : Research A n a l y s i s C o r p o r a t i o n , 1969: The C o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h R e a l p o l i t i k , " F o r e c a s t f o r Japan, Ed. J . E . M o r l e y . Also see Asahi t h e S t a f f , The P a c i f i c R i v a l s : A Japanese View o f Japanese-American R e l a t i o n s , New York and Tokyo: W e a t h e r h i l l / A s a h i , 1972; Zbigniew B r z e z i n s k i , The F r a g i l e Blossom, New Y o r k : Harper and Row, 1972; Frank C. Langdon, Japan's F o r e i g n P o l i c y , p a r t i c u l a r l y , p . X I I . 58  S i l v e r s t e i n , op. c i t . , p. 3 1 .  59 S i l v e r s t e i n , op. c i t . , p. 30; Reischauer, op. c i t . , p. 1 5 1 , For a d i s c u s s i o n o f these l o n g - t e r m goals see Langdon, Japan's F o r e i g n P o l i c y , e s p e c i a l l y pp. 1-57; W i l l i a m J . Sebald and C. Nelson S p i n k s , Japan: P r o s p e c t s , Options and O p p o r t u n i t i e s , Washington: American E n t e r p r i s e I n s t i t u t e , 1967, p. 7 1 . ^ H e l l m a n n , Peace T r e a t y , pp. 1-28-. ' - . 3 - 1 5 8 . See a l s o Hellmann, J'Japan's R e l a t i o n s w i t h Communist C h i n a , " Asian Survey, V o l . 4 , No. 10 (October 1 9 6 4 ) , p. 1087; H e r b e r t P a s s i n , "The F u t u r e , " The U n i t e d S t a t e s and Japan, Ed. H e r b e r t P a s s i n , Englewood C l i f f s , N . J . : Prentice-Hall 1966, p. 142. H e l l m a n n , " J a p a n : I t s Domestic P o l i t i c s and F o r e i g n P o l i c y , " p. 7. See a l s o Frank C. Langdon, Japan's F o r e i g n P o l i c y - M a k i n g P r o c e s s , " p. 1 ; C h i t o s h i Yanaga, Japanese People and P o l i t i c s , New Y o r k : John W i l e y and Sons, 1956, p. 308. 61  • • 62 Donald C. Hellmann, "The C o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h R e a l p o l i t i k , " Forecast f o r Japan, p. 135. C o n t r a s t w i t h M a r t i n E. W e i n s t e i n ' s a r t i c l e i n the same volume, " S t r a t e g i c Thought and t h e U.S.-Japan A l l i a n c e , " pp. 35-84. 63 D u l l e s v i s i t e d Japan t o p r e s s u r e Prime M i n i s t e r Yoshida t o r e c o g n i z e the ROC government on Taiwan a f t e r 56 members o f the Senate s i g n e d the f o l l o w i n g l e t t e r t o t h e P r e s i d e n t : " P r i o r t o t h e admission o f the Japanese t r e a t y t o t h e Senate we d e s i r e t o make i t c l e a r t h a t we would c o n s i d e r t h e r e c o g n i t i o n o f Communist China by Japan o r the n e g o t i a t i o n o f a! b i l a t e r a l t r e a t y w i t h t h e Chinese Communist regime t o be adverse t o the b e s t i n t e r e s t s o f t h e people o f b o t h Japan and the U n i t e d S t a t e s . " Congressional Records, V o l . 9 8 , No. 42, March 14, 1952, p. 2363. For a s h o r t b u t i n f o r m a t i v e d i s c u s s i o n o f D u l l e s p r e s s u r e on Prime M i n i s t e r Y o s h i d a , see Asahi s t a f f , The P a c i f i c R i v a l s , pp. 397-400. For f u r t h e r more d e t a i l e d d i s c u s s i o n see a l s o Gerald C u r t i s , "The D u l l e s - Y o s h i d a N e g o t i a t i o n s on t h e San F r a n c i s c o Peace T r e a t y , " Columbia Essays i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s 1966j p. 4 2 , New York: Columbia U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1967; Lawrence O l s o n , Japan i n P o s t war A s i a , New Y o r k : P r a e g e r , 1970, pp. 74-75. From a Japanese p e r s p e c t i v e see Shigeharu Matsumoto, "Japan and China: Domestic and  103  F o r e i g n I n f l u e n c e s on J a p a n ' s P o l i c y , " P o l i c i e s Towards C h i n a : Views f r o m S i x C o n t i n e n t s , Ed. A.M. H a l p e r n , New Y o r k : M c G r a w - H i l l , 1965, p. 130. For a view w h i c h does n o t accept t h e t h e s i s t h a t Japan r e c o g n i z e d t h e R e p u b l i c o f China due to U n i t e d States p r e s s u r e see Bernard C. Cohen, The P o l i t i c a l Process and F o r e i g n P o l i c y : The Making o f t h e Japanese Peace S e t t l e m e n t , P r i n c e t o n , N . J . : Princeton University P r e s s , 1957. Cohen argues t h a t : "The Yoshida government had indeed been disposed to make peace w i t h the N a t i o n a l i s t g o v e r n m e n t . . . " , p. 1 5 1 . Also see i b i d . , p. 150. As w e l l as c o n t r a s t i n g Cohen w i t h t h e a u t h o r s mentioned above, see S h i g e r u Y o s h i d a , The Yoshida Memoirs, The S t o r y o f Japan i n C r i s i s , London: Heinemann, 1 9 6 1 , p p . 253-263. For t h e B r i t i s h view r e g a r d i n g Japan's r i g h t to decide f o r h e r s e l f w h i c h government t o r e c o g n i z e , see Anthony Eden, The Memories o f Anthony Eden: F u l l C i r c l e , Cambridge: R i v e r s i d e P r e s s , 1960, pp. 2 0 - 2 2 . 64 This i s the " f i r s t " o f t h e Yoshida l e t t e r s w h i c h was signed by Prime M i n i s t e r Yoshida i n 1951. T h i s s h o u l d n o t be confused w i t h another l e t t e r whidr.'iYoshida s i g n e d i n 1964 i n r e f e r e n c e t o r e s t r i c t i n g the use o f E x p o r t - I m p o r t Bank funds t o e x p o r t p l a n t s to C h i n a . For a d i s c u s s i o n o f the 1951 l e t t e r , see e s p e c i a l l y Cohen, "The P o l i t i c a l Process and F o r e i g n P o l i c y , " pp* ,150-54. For r e f e r e n c e s c o n c e r n i n g the 1964 Yoshida l e t t e r , see f n . 93. ^ T h e p o l i c y o f " s e p a r a t i o n o f p o l i t i c s and economics" w h i c h Japan f o l l o w e d u n t i l t h e n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f r e l a t i o n s was based on the premise t h a t i n the p o l i t i c a l w o r l d Japan extended o f f i c i a l d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s t o "one China" — t h e ROC government on Taiwan — b u t was q u i t e prepared t o t r a d e w i t h Peking as w e l l as Taiwan. W i t h t h e t r a n s f e r o f d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s to t h e Peking government t h e r e has now been a r o l e r e v e r s a l , w i t h t h e " s e p a r a t i o n o f p o l i t i c s and economics" p o l i c y b e i n g a p p l i e d t o Taiwan. For a d i s c u s s i o n o f C h i n a ' s methods o f emphasizing to the Japanese t h e " i n s e p a r a b i l i t y o f p o l i t i c s and Economics", see Chae-Jin Lee, "The P o l i t i c s o f Sino-Japanese Trade R e l a t i o n s , 1 9 6 3 - 1 9 6 8 , " P a c i f i c A f f a i r s , V o l . 4 1 , No.2 (Summer 1 9 6 9 ) , pp. 129-144. For a more t e c h n i c a l d i s c u s s i o n o f the development o f t r a d e r e l a t i o n s between Japan and C h i n a , see Dan F. Henderson and Tasuku Matsuo, " J a p a n ' s Trade R e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e P e o p l e ' s R e p u b l i c o f C h i n a , " f o r t h c o m i n g i n an e d i t e d book by V i c t o r L i , Washington U n i v e r s i t y Press. 66  Frank C. Langdon, Japan's F o r e i g n P o l i c y , pp. 121-22.  ^ F o r the t e x t o f t h e S a t o - N i x o n communique, see New York Times, November 22, 1969. 7  68 F u k u i , " F o r e i g n P o l i c y - M a k i n g i n J a p a n , " p. 26. See a l s o , C h r i s t i a n Science M o n i t o r , 2 4 / 9 / 7 1 . 69 This was i n c l e a r v i o l a t i o n o f the Rusk-Ohira t a l k s of 1964 expressing t h a t : " b o t h n a t i o n s , Japan and t h e U n i t e d States w i l l h o l d  104  - c o n s u l t a t i o n s i n advance i n case t h e r e seems t o be an i m p o r t a n t change on the China p r o b l e m . " See Shukan Minsha, 2 4 t h December, 1972. (All r e f e r e n c e s t o Japanese language newspapers are taken f r o m t r a n s l a t i o n s by the American Embassy, Tokyo P o l i t i c a l S e c t i o n T r a n s l a t i o n S e r v i c e Branch, D a i l y Summary-of Japanese P r e s s ) . L i k e w i s e , i t had been agreed j u s t a few years p r e v i o u s l y i n the S a t o - N i x o n communique t h a t t h e r e was a m u t u a l c o n s u l t a t i o n agreement between the two c o u n t r i e s . See "textYofkcommunique i'nvNeweYorkgTimes, 22 November, 1969. ^For a d i s c u s s i o n o f a number o f hypotheses c o n c e r n i n g t h e p o s s i b l e e x p l a n a t i o n f o r the Nixon " s h o c k s " ( f i r s t , t h e announcement i n J u l y o f N i x o n ' s China v i s i t w i t h o u t p r i o r c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h American a l l i e s and second t h e announcement i n August o f a new economic p o l i c y aimed a t f o r c i n g a r e v a l u a t i o n o f t h e y e n ) , see Graham T. A l l i s o n , "American F o r e i g n P o l i c y and J a p a n , " D i s c o r d i n the P a c i f i c : > C h a l lenges t o the Japanese-American A l l i a n c e , Ed. Henry Rosovsky, New Y o r k : The American Assembly, Columbia U n i v e r s i t y , 1972, pp. 7-46. 7(  R o b e r t A. S c a l a p i n o , " P e r s p e c t i v e s on Modern Japanese F o r e i g n P o l i c y , " u n p u b l i s h e d monograph. 7 1  72  The v o t i n g on the A l b a n i a n R e s o l u t i o n was 76 f o r ; 35 a g a i n s t ; 17 a b s t e n t i o n s ; 3 absentees. Taken f r o m S h i n k i c h i E t o , "Japan and China - A iNew S t a g e , " Problems o f Communism, V o l . 1 1 , No. 6 (NovemberDecember, 1 9 7 2 ) , p. 6. 73 Rathy Sawhny, "Japan a t t h e C r o s s r o a d s , " I n d i a n Q u a r t e r l y , V o l . 28, No. 1 (January-March 1 9 7 2 ) , p. 64. See a l s o F u k u i , " F o r e i g n P o l i c y Making i n J a p a n , " p. 30. 74 I t i s a l s o i n t e r e s t i n g t o n o t e t h a t F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r Fukuda had n o t committed Japan t o f o l l o w t h e American p o l i c y i n the U n i t e d N a t i o n s when he v i s i t e d the U n i t e d States t o a t t e n d t h e J o i n t US-Japan Committee on Trade and Economic A f f a i r s . See H a r u h i r o F u k u i , " B u r e a u c r a t i c Power i n J a p a n , " Japan and A u s t r a l i a : Two S o c i e t i e s and t h e i r I n t e r a c t i o n , Eds.Peter Drysdale and Hironobu K i t a o j i , O x f o r d : Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, forthcoming. 7  ^ F u k u i , " F o r e i g n P o l i c y - M a k i n g i n J a p a n , " p.  30.  76 Sawhny, op. c i t . , p. 64. Of c o u r s e , as M a r t i n Weinsten p o i n t s o u t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s would n o t have been as p r e p a r e d t o r e t u r n Okinawa i f i t had n o t been f o r the scaledown i n the Vietnam war. See M a r t i n W e i n s t e i n , "The S t r a t e g i c Balance i n East A s i a , " C u r r e n t H i s t o r y , V o l . 65, No. 387 (November 1 9 7 3 ) , p. 193. For a f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n o f the q u e s t i o n o f Okinawa r e v e r s i o n , see Langdon, J a p a n ' s F o r e i g n P o l i c y , p p . 126-32. For a f u l l e r d i s c u s s i o n , see Akio Watanabe, The Okinawa Problem: • A Chapter i n Japan-U.S. R e l a t i o n s , Melbourne: Melbourne U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1970, Chapter 7.  105  Roderick MacFarquar, " N i x o n ' s China P i l g r i m a g e , " The World Today, V o l . 28, No. 4 ( A p r i l 1 9 7 2 ) , p. 154. MacFarquar a l s o p o i n t s o u t t h a t t h i s was a l s o a m o d i f i c a t i o n o f K i s s i n g e r ' s 1971 p r e s s r e l e a s e : " I t i s our judgement t h a t the f u t u r e r e l a t i o n s h i p between the P e o p l e ' s R e p u b l i c and Taiwan s h o u l d be worked o u t between Taiwan and the People's Republic. For the f u l l t e x t o f t h e "Shanghai Communique,* see U.S. Department o f S t a t e , Department o f S t a t e B u l l e t i n , V o l . 52, No. 1708, 2 0 / 3 / 7 2 , p p . 435-38. Thomas W. Robinson, "The View f r o m P e k i n g : C h i n a ' s P o l i c i e s Towards the U n i t e d S t a t e s , the S o v i e t Union and J a p a n , " Pacific A f f a i r s , V o l . 45, No. 3 ( F a l l 1 9 7 2 ) , p. 352. See a l s o Sankei Shimbun, 3 September, 1972. 79 Reply t o q u e s t i o n n a i r e s u b m i t t e d by Komeito Upper House Member Nakao, Tokyo Shimbun, 31 J u l y 1972. 80 Asahi Shimbun, 1 October 1972, emphasis added. 81 A l t h o u g h no such clause appears i n the a c t u a l US-Japan S e c u r i t y T r e a t y , t h i s phrase has come t o be used t o mean t h a t the U n i t e d S t a t e s can use m i l i t a r y bases i n Japan to p r o t e c t Taiwan f r o m any communist threat. The t r e a t y s t a t e s i n a r t i c l e 1 t h a t U n i t e d S t a t e s " . . . f o r c e s may be u t i l i z e d t o c o n t r i b u t e t o t h e maintenance o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l peace and s e c u r i t y i n t h e Far E a s t . . . " For a b r i e f d i s c u s s i o n - o f t h e d i f f e r e n t Japanese government's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the scope o f the Far East Clause,see Young C. Kim, " J a p a n ' s S e c u r i t y P o l i c y D e b a t e , " Japan i n World P o l i t i c s , Ed. Young C. Kim, p. 63; Langdon, Japan's F o r e i g n Policy, p. XIV. For the t e x t o f the S e c u r i t y T r e a t y , see P a c k a r d , op. c i t . , p p . 355-357. For f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n p e r t a i n i n g t o t h e q u e s t i o n o f i n v o k i n g t h e s e c u r i t y t r e a t y f o r the p r o t e c t i o n o f Taiwan, see the speech g i v e n by Prime M i n i s t e r Tanaka to t h e Lower House P l e n a r y Session on 3 1 / 1 0 / 7 2 , Asahi Shimbun, 1 / 1 1 / 7 2 ; Sankei Shimbun, 3 / 9 / 7 2 ; Tokyo Shimbun, 1 / 1 0 / 7 2 ; and d i s c u s s i o n between Prime M i n i s t e r Tanaka and Dietman I s h i b a s h i Asahi Shimbun, 2 / 1 1 / 7 2 , evening e d i t i o n . 82 Frank C. Langdon, Japan's F o r e i g n P o l i c y , p. 200. W h i l e i t c o u l d be argued t h a t t h i s demonstrates the U n i t e d S t a t e s i s s t i l l p r e p a r e d t o d i s s o l v e t h e c o l d war s e c u r i t y s t r u c t u r e o f which the U . S . Japan s e c u r i t y t r e a t y forms an i n t r i n s i c p a r t , i t i s i n f a c t p r e c i s e l y because the s e c u r i t y t r e a t y i s n o t s i m p l y a legacy o f t h e c o l d war s e c u r i t y s t r u c t u r e b u t a c r u c i a l element i n the new b a l a n c e o f power framework i n which Japan p l a y s a r o l e as one o f the f o u r p o l e s i n A s i a , t h a t t h e s e c u r i t y t r e a t y i s so i m p o r t a n t t o the U n i t e d S t a t e s . 83 As Henry K i s s i n g e r s t a t e d c o n c e r n i n g J a p a n ' s i n t e n t i o n t o n o r m a l i z e r e l a t i o n s w i t h China *.., " I w i l l a b s o l u t e l y n o t oppose i t . R a t h e r , I ' w i l l take t h e s i d e o f p r o m o t i n g i t . " Nihon K e i z a i "Shimbun, 9/9/72. 78  1  106 84  John K. Emmerson, Arms, Yen and Power: The Japanese Dilemma, New Y o r k : D u n e l l e n , 1 9 7 1 , p. 214. See a l s o , Kansas C i t y S t a r , 1 3 / 8 / 7 1 . 85 See W i l l i a m S a y w e l l , " J a p a n ' s Role i n the P a c i f i c and C h i n a ' s Response," I n t e r n a t i o n a l J o u r n a l , V o l . 26, No. 3 (Summer 1 9 7 1 ) , p. 508. Saywell bases h i s a n a l y s i s on a c o n t e n t a n a l y s i s o f t h e Peking Review. 86 E t o , "Japan and China - A New S t a g e ? " , p. 4. Eto bases h i s a n a l y s i s on a c o n t e n t a n a l y s i s o f J e n - m i n - J i h - p a o ( P e k i n g ) . Also see F u k u i , " P o l i c y - M a k i n g i n J a p a n , " p. 25. 87 For an a n a l y s i s o f t h i s p o i n t , see K o j i Nakamura, "China and Soviet R e l a t i o n s : T r e a d i n g the S i b e r i a n T i g h t r o p e , " i n _ S p e c i a l Report on Japan 1973, Far E a s t e r n Economic Review (FEER), No. 19 ( 1 4 / 5 / 7 3 ) , p. 6. 88 The problem i n coming t o an agreement w i t h t h e S o v i e t Union r e g a r d i n g t h e peace t r e a t y r e v o l v e s around the t e r r i t o r i a l q u e s t i o n o f s o v e r e i g n t y over the Habomais, S h i k o t a n , the Southern K u r i l e s ( K u n a s h i r i , and E t o r o f u ) . This q u e s t i o n was n e a r l y s o l v e d a t the t i m e o f the peace t r e a t y n e g o t i a t i o n s i n 1956, b u t as Hellmann makes c l e a r , an agreement "was n o t r e a c h e d : " F i r s t , the Habomais and S h i k o t a n were t o be claimed u n c o n d i t i o n a l l y as i n h e r e n t l y Japanese, and most i m p o r t a n t l y , t h e r e t u r n o f these i s l a n d s was t o be c o n s i d e r e d s a t i s f a c t o r y grounds f o r a treaty. Second, p r i o r i t y was a t t a c h e d t o the Southern K u r i l e s , which were demanded f o r ' h i s t o r i c a l . r e a s o n s ' b u t were n o t deemed e s s e n t i a l f o r an o v e r a l l s e t t l e m e n t . F i n a l l y , t h e N o r t h e r n K u r i l e s and Southern S a k h a l i n were claimed s i m p l y f o r b a r g a i n i n g p u r p o s e s . Consequently, when on August 5, the S o v i e t s suddenly m o d i f i e d t h e i r p r o p o s a l s and o f f e r e d t h e r e t u r n o f t h e Habomais and S h i k o t a n as w e l l as a c c e p t a b l e c o n d i t i o n s f o r a l l o t h e r o u t s t a n d i n g i s s u e s , an agreement seemed imminent. Howe v e r , a t t h i s p o i n t , the Japanese government a b r u p t l y r e v i s e d i t s p o s i t i o n , and extended the minimum t e r r i t o r i a l c l a i m t o i n c l u d e the Southern K u r i l e s . The r e v i s i o n s u r p r i s e d and angered t h e Russians, who i n d i g n a n t l y branded the new c o n d i t i o n s t o t a l l y u n a c c e p t a b l e . Hellmann, Peace T r e a t y , p. 59. Japan has m a i n t a n i e d i t s i n s i s t e n c e upon r e g a i n i n g the above t e r r i t o r i e s . Emmerson, op. c i t . , pp. 230-37. Now Japan i s r e c e i v i n g s u p p o r t f r o m China i n t h i s b i d . See FEER, No. 18 ( 7 / 5 / 7 3 ) , p. 5; Japan Times, 1 1 / 1 0 / 7 3 . See Derek D a v i s , "Year o f A s i a ' s G i a n t s " FEER, V o l . 82, No. 52 ( 3 1 / 1 2 / 7 3 ) , p. 29. For Prime M i n i s t e r Tanaka's v i e w , see A s a h i Shimbun, 1 / 1 0 / 7 2 ) . There i s t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t the t e r r i t o r i a l q u e s t i o n between Japan and China may prove a h i n d r a n c e t o the agreement on a Japan-China peace t r e a t y t o o , p a r t i c u l a r l y s i n c e t h i s r e v o l v e s around t h e q u e s t i o n o f s o v e r e i g n t y over t h e o i l - r i c h Senkaku i s l a n d s . However, s h o r t l y a f t e r t h e passage o f t h e c o n t r o v e r s i a l Japan-China a i r accord t h r o u g h the D i e t , f o r m e r F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r O h i r a s t a t e d t h a t he saw no " i n s u r m o u n t a b l e b a r r i e r s " t o t h e c o n c l u s i o n o f a peace t r e a t y . See Japan Times Weekly, 2 5 / 5 / 7 4 . 11  107  89  For a d i s c u s s i o n o f the n a t u r a l - r e s o u r c e s p o t e n t i a l of S i b e r i a , see Time, No. 15 (9 A p r i l 1 9 7 3 ) , p p . 30-39. For a s h o r t d i s c u s s i o n o f the p o s s i b i l i t y o f Japan's c o o p e r a t i o n i n t h e S i b e r i a n v e n t u r e , see t h e •Kcbhomis't • >. No. 6815, p. 44. Japan and t h e S o v i e t Union have now a c t u a l l y signed a memorandum on t h e j o i n t d e v e l o p ment o f c o k i n g c o a l i n s o u t h e r n Y a k u t s k . See Japan Times Weekly, 11 May 1974. See a l s o Japan Times Weekly, 18 May, 1974. For a broader d i s c u s s i o n o f r e c e n t t r e n d s i n Japanese-Soviet R e l a t i o n s , see E l i z a b e t h Pond, "Japan and R u s s i a : The View f r o m T o k y o , " F o r e i g n A f f a i r s , V o l . 52, No. 1 (October 1 9 7 2 ) , pp. 141-52. 90  Meng-hsuan Yap, "The Change i n P e i p i n g ' s F o r e i g n P o l i c y 19691 9 7 3 , " Issues and S t u d i e s , V o l . 10, No. 5 (February 1 9 7 4 ) , p. 60. K o j i Nakamura, "Who's T r e a t y " , FEER, V o l . 77, No. 35 (26 August 1 9 7 2 ) , p. 12. 9 1  92 For a comprehensive d i s c u s s i o n o f S a t o ' s p o l i c i e s towards China w h i l e i n o f f i c e , see Gregory C l a r k , "Sino-Japanese R e l a t i o n s : An A n a l y s i s , " A u s t r a l i a n O u t l o o k , V o l . 25, No. 1 ( A p r i l 1 9 7 1 ) , pp. 58-68. The j u s t i f i c a t i o n s t h a t Sato advanced f o r t h e c o n t i n u a t i o n o f r e l a t i o n s w i t h Taiwan were b a s i c a l l y a r e i t e r a t i o n o f those a d vanced by Prime M i n i s t e r s s i n c e Yoshida:T", " 1 ) Japan concluded a peace t r e a t y w i t h the government o f N a t i o n a l i s t China i n 1952 w h i c h was generous toward t h e Japanese; 2) t h e N a t i o n a l i s t Chinese government was r e c o g n i z e d as t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f China i n t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s and m a i n t a i n e d d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s w i t h the m a j o r i t y o f the UN members; 3) the Japanese Government s h o u l d n o t a n t a g o n i z e the U n i t e d S t a t e s by i n i t i a t i n g a d r a s t i c measure such as r e c o g n i t i o n of Communist China because Japanese-American r e l a t i o n s h i p was more i m p o r t a n t than J a p a n ' s r e l a t i o n s w i t h any o t h e r n a t i o n ; 4) the t i m e was n o t r i p e under the circumstances f o r e s t a b l i s h i n g a d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h Communist C h i n a . " See Hong N. Kim, "The ' N i x o n Shock' and Japan's Emerging New China P o l i c y , " West V i r g i n i a U n i v e r s i t y , u n p u b l i s h e d d r a f t , p. 6. 93 Japan Times, 7 / 4 / 7 0 . For r e f e r e n c e t o S a t o ' s w e l l known a n t i communist a t t i t u d e s , see C h r i s t i a n Science M o n i t o r , 2 4 / 9 / 7 1 ; Gregory C l a r k , op. c i t . , p. 63; S a y w e l l , op. c i t . , p. 512; Y o m i u r i Shimbun, 2 3 / 4 / 7 0 . For a more g e n e r a l d i s c u s s i o n , see M i l d r e d C. V r e e l a n d , "Communist China and J a p a n : , A Study o f Chinese P e r c e p t i o n s and P o l i c i e s , " Japan i n World " P o l i t i c s " , Ed. Young C. Kim; Emmerson, op. c i t . , p p . 2 1 9 - 2 2 2 . For r e f e r e n c e t o t h e u n f r i e n d l y p o l i c i e s t h a t t h e Sato government p r o m u l g a t e d , see f o r example Tokyo Shimbun, 2 3 / 7 / 7 2 , w h i c h p o i n t s o u t t h a t Sato h a b i t u a l l y r e t r a c t e d any f o r w a r d - l o o k i n g p o l i c y on China; Matsumoto, "Our Neighbour C h i n a , " Japan Q u a r t e r l y , V o l . 18, No. 2 ( A p r i l - J u n e , 1 9 7 1 ) , p. 152, where Matsumoto discusses the Sato g o v e r n m e n t ' s b a c k i n g o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s p r o - T a i w a n p o l i c y i n the U n i t e d  108  N a t i o n s . One o f t h e most i m p o r t a n t a n t i - C h i n e s e p o l i c i e s t h a t the Sato government adopted was t h a t o f t h e "Yoshida l e t t e r . " This was -a l e t t e r w r i t t e n i n 1964 by t h e f o r m e r Prime M i n i s t e r t o m o l l i f y the Taiwan government a f t e r E x p o r t - I m p o r t Bank c r e d i t s had been used t o sponsor a p l a n t e x p o r t to China. Since t h a t t i m e the Sato g o v e r n ment s t o o d by the "Yoshida l e t t e r " u n t i l 1972 when i t was i n d i c a t e d by the Japanese government t h a t c r e d i t s would be a v a i l a b l e f o r p l a n t e x p o r t t o China on a p p l i c a t i o n . For the b e s t d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e i m mediate e f f e c t o f the "Yoshida l e t t e r " on t h e development o f t r a d e r e l a t i o n s between Japan and China, see "Communist China Cancels B i g C o n t r a c t s due t o Yoshida L e t t e r , " Japan F o r e i g n Trade News, No. 165, 1965, p. 1 1 . For a l a t e r s t u d y , see Gene R. H s i a o , "The P o l e of Trade i n C h i n a ' s Diplomacy w i t h S a p a n , " The Dynamics o f C h i n a ' s F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s , Ed. Jerome A. Cohen, Cambridge: Harvard U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1970, pp. 4 1 - 4 5 . For t h e change o f p o l i c y i n 1972, see Nihon K e i z a i Shimbun, March 18, 1972. 94  Asahi Shimbun, February 2, 1970, evening e d i t i o n .  95 F u k u i , " P o l i c y - M a k i n g i n J a p a n , " p. 27. A l s o see A s a h i Shimbun, 2 8 / 4 / 7 2 . Japan Times, 1 6 / 1 0 / 7 1 ; E i j i Tominomori, " S a t o ' s L e g a c y , " Japan Q u a r t e r l y , V o l . 19, No. 2 ( A p r i l - J u n e 1 9 7 2 ) , p. 156. T h i s d r a f t p a i d a t t e n t i o n t o the " t h r e e p r i n c i p l e s " which China upheld as the b a s i s f o r n o r m a l i z a t i o n of r e l a t i o n s : 1) The P e o p l e ' s R e p u b l i c o f China i s the s o l e l e g i t i m a t e government o f China; 2) Taiwan i s an i n t e g r a l p a r t of t h e P e o p l e ' s Republic o f China; 3) The Japan-Republic o f China peace t r e a t y i s " i l l e g a l and must t h e r e f o r e be a b r o g a t e d . " Sato a l s o made h i s own e f f o r t s t o t r y and b e g i n n e g o t i a t i o n s b u t was r e b u f f e d by the Chinese s i d e . See Japan Times, 2 9 / 7 / 7 1 . 96 New York Times, 2 1 / 1 1 / 7 1 . 9 7  A s a h i Shimbun, 1 5 / 1 1 / 7 1 .  98 I b i d . , Japan Times Weekly, 99  20/11/71.  F u k u i , " F o r e i g n P o l i c y - M a k i n g i n Japan," p. 100 , Ibid.  28.  T  1 0 1  N e w York Times,  20/10/71.  W o l f Mendl, "Japan and C h i n a , " Survey, V o l . 18, No. 4 (Autumn 1 9 7 2 ) , p. 70. 1 0 2  103 A s a h i Shimbun, 2 7 / 4 / 7 2 . Moreover, t h e Chinese government was n o t even prepared to make any ambassadorial c o n t a c t w h i l e Sato remained i n power; hence, they r e f u s e d t o a t t e n d r e c e p t i o n s such as those a t I n t e r n a t i o n a l Environment Conference a t Stockholm and t h e UNCTAD meeting i n Santiago. See M a i n i c h i Shimbun, 1 7 / 7 / 7 2 .  109  " ^ L e e W. F a r n s w o r t h , "Japan 1972: New Faces and New F r i e n d s , " A s i a n Survey, V o l . 13, No. 1 (January 1 9 7 3 ) , p. 113. "^"Sfomiuri Shimbun, 1 6 / 5 / 7 2 ; M a i n i c h i Shimbun, 1 7 / 5 / 7 2 . 106 Yoshimi F u r u i , " I n s i d e S t o r y o f N o r m a l i z a t i o n o f S i n o Janapese D i p l o m a t i c R e l a t i o n s , Chuo Koron, i n Summaries o f S e l e c t e d Japanese Magazines, American Embassy, Tokyo P o l i t i c a l s e c t i o n t r a n s l a t i o n Branch, January 1973, p. 49 1 0 7  A s a h i Shimbun, 1 7 / 5 / 7 2 .  108 Sankei Shimbun, 1 2 / 7 / 7 2 . T h i s attitudeawasdinc-marked c o n t r a s t t o the Chinese a t t i t u d e towards t h e Sato government, s i n c e "even i f Sato accepted the t h r e e b a s i c p r i n c i p l e s as t h e b a s i s o f opening t a l k s w i t h u s , we s h a l l n o t accept Sato as a n e g o t i a t i n g p a r t n e r . However, any successor o f Sato w i l l be welcome i n Peking as l o n g as he accepts t h e t h r e e b a s i c p r i n c i p l e s . " FEER, No. 47 ( 2 0 / 1 1 / 7 1 ) , p. 12. 109 Eto, "Japan and C h i n a : A New S t a g e , " p. 7. "Tiong N. Kim, "The ' N i x o n Shock' and J a p a n ' s Emerging New China P o l i c y , " West V i r g i n i a U n i v e r s i t y , u n p u b l i s h e d m a n u s c r i p t , p. 11,  18.  "'"^Kei Wakaizami argues t h a t even J a p a n ' s " p o l i c y towards China was no e x c e p t i o n t o the p a s s i v e c h a r a c t e r o f Japan's d i p l o m a c y . Japan was the l a s t o f / A m e r i c a ' s major a l l i e s to p a r t f r o m t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s on the q u e s t i o n o f Taiwan arid China, h a v i n g f a i t h f u l l y f o l l o w e d U.S. p o l i c y s i n c e the w a r . " See " J a p a n ' s r o l e i n a New World O r d e r , " E o r e i g n A f f a i r s , V o l . 5 1 , No. 2 (January 1 9 7 3 ) , p. 310. See a l s o R.M.V. C o l l i c k , "The 'New' Japanese F o r e i g n P o l i c y , " The World Today (February 1 9 7 3 ) , p. 84; Nihon K e i z a i , 1 0 / 7 / 7 2 ; Sankei Shimbun, 1 0 / 7 / 7 2 . 112 Shigeo Omori, "Two Tasks f o r T a n a k a , " Japan Q u a r t e r l y , V o l . 19, 4 (October-December 1 9 7 2 ) , p. 407. 113 F u k u i , P a r t y i n Power, pp. 260-62. This s e c t i o n c o n c e r n i n g t h e LDP's China p o l i c y i s l a r g e l y based on the f o l l o w i n g w o r k s : Fukui, P a r t y i n Power, pp. 227-62; Langdon, "Japanese L i b e r a l Democratic F a c t i o n a l D i s c o r d on China P o l i c y , " pp. 403-15; Sadako Ogata, "Japanese A t t i t u d e s Towards C h i n a , " A s i a n Survey, V o l . 5, No. 8 (August 1 9 6 5 ) , pp. 389-98; Yung H. P a r k , "The P o l i t i c s o f t h e China D e c i s i o n : O b s e r v a t i o n s on Japanese F o r e i g n P o l i c y - M a k i n g , " a paper p r e p a r e d f o r p r e s e n t a t i o n a t the annual meeting o f t h e A s i a n Studies on t h e P a c i f i c Coast, San Diego, June, 1974; Nathan N. W h i t e , op. c i t . No.  ''"'^Ogata, "Japanese A t t i t u d e s Towards J a p a n , " p. 395. For a comprehensive and d e t a i l e d d i s c u s s i o n c o n c e r n i n g the development o f the v a r i o u s p r o - P e k i n g and p r o - T a i w a n Groups i n the LDP, see Nathan Newby W h i t e , op. c i t . , pp. 391 f f .  110  K a r l D i x o n , "Japanese P o l i t i c a l P a r t y R e o r g a n i z a t i o n - Progress and P r o s p e c t s , " u n p u b l i s h e d m a n u s c r i p t , U.B.C. l i b r a r i e s , pp. 1-2. Dixon a l s o notes t h a t the LDP went so f a r as to take d i s c i p l i n a r y a c t i o n a g a i n s t Fujiyama f o r s i g n i n g a v i t r i o l i c j o i n t communique w i t h the Chinese i n October 1971. 116  P a r k , op. c i t . ,  pp. 1 5 - 1 7 .  ^ ^ T h e i d e a o f c o m p a t i b i l i t y i s t a k e n f r o m Wolfram F. H a n r e i d e r , West German F o r e i g n P o l i c y 1949-1963, S t a n f o r d : S t a n f o r d U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1967, e s p e c i a l l y p. 7. See a l s o Wolfram F. H a n r e i d e r , "Comp a t i b i l i t y and Consensus: A P r o p o s a l f o r the Conceptual Linkage o f E x t e r n a l and I n t e r n a l Dimensions o f F o r e i g n P o l i c y , " Comparative F o r e i g n P o l i c y T h e o r e t i c a l Essays, Ed. Wolfram F. H a n r e i d e r , New Y o r k : McKay & C o . , 1 9 7 1 , pp. 242-64; e s p e c i a l l y p. 2 6 1 . 118 S t o c k w i n comments t h a t " . . . t h e change i n l e a d e r s h i p was c l e a r l y the one event which broke the l o g - j a m over r e l a t i o n s w i t h C h i n a . " See J . A . A . S t o c k w i n , " C o n t i n u i t y and Change i n Japanese F o r e i g n P o l i c y , " P a c i f i c A f f a i r s , V o l . 46, No. 1 ( S p r i n g 1 9 7 3 ) , p. 83. For a d i s c u s s i o n o f some o f t h e d i f f e r e n c e t h a t d i s t i n g u i s h Tanaka f r o m p r e c e d i n g LDP Prime M i n i s t e r s , see Emerson Chapin, "Men and P o l i t i c s i n P o s t - S a t o J a p a n , " J o u r n a l o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s , V o l . 26, No. 1 ( 1 9 7 2 ) , pp. 167-78. 119 Langdon, "LDP F a c t i o n a l D i s c o r d on China P o l i c y , " p. 406. 120 The a c t u a l f o r m a l c r e a t i o n of t h e Tanaka f a c t i o n d i d n o t t a k e p l a c e u n t i l 1 2 / 9 / 7 2 b e i n g c a l l e d Nananoka-kai ( 7 t h Day A s s o c i a t i o n ) , coming s l i g h t l y a f t e r the f o r m a t i o n o f the a n t i - m a i n s t r e a m Fukuda f a c t i o n Y o k a - k a i ( 8 t h Day A s s o c i a t i o n ) . 121 Y o m i u r i Shimbun, 3 / 7 / 7 2 . 1 ?2 Asahi Shimbun, 3 / 7 / 7 2 . 123 Kim, "The N i x o n 'Shocks' and J a p a n ' s Emerging Now China P o l i c y , " p. 14. 124 H e l l m a n , Peace T r e a t y , p. 18. 125 Ogata, "The Business Community and F o r e i g n P o l i c y , " t o be p u b l i s h e d by U n i v e r s i t y o f C a l i f o r n i a P r e s s , under t h e e d i t o r s h i p o f Robert A. S c a l a p i n o , p. 4 1 . 126 Tanaka was g r e e t e d w i t h a p o s i t i v e response f r o m t h e Chinese side i n this respect. T h i s was i n c o n t r a s t t o Fukuda, who was a p p a r e n t l y c o n s i d e r e d a persona non g r a t a i n P e k i n g . See P a r k , op. c i t . , p. 28.  Ill 127  F u r u i , op. c i t . ,  p.  49.  128 For a d i s c u s s i o n o f the e l e c t i o n , see F a r n s w o r t h , op. c i t . , pp. 113-14. 129 I b i d . , p. 114. 130 F u k u i , " F o r e i g n P o l i c y - M a k i n g i n J a p a n , " p p . 33 and 34. 131 F u r u i , op. c i t . , p. 5 1 . 132 F u r u i , op,. c i t . , p. 52. 133 See F u r u i ' s s t o r y o f h i s c o n t r i b u t i o n t o t h i s d e c i s i o n , op. cit. The f o l l o w i n g d i s c u s s i o n i s based on F u r u i ' s a r t i c l e . F u r u i , op. c i t . ,  p.  48.  135 For a d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e i d e a t h a t h t h e p o l i c y - m a k i n g process i n Japan i s f r e q u e n t l y dominated by an ad hoc p o l i c y - m a k i n g g r o u p , see F u k u i , " F o r e i g n P o l i c y - M a k i n g i n J a p a n , " p p . 19-23 e s p e c i a l l y . For a d i s c u s s i o n o f the F o r e i g n M i n i s t r y ad hoc group i n t h e China p o l i c y making p r o c e s s , see the n e x t s e c t i o n . F u r u i , op. c i t . ,  p.  48.  137 F u k u i , " F o r e i g n P o l i c y - M a k i n g i n J a p a n , " pp. 1 9 - 2 3 . I n t h i s r e s p e c t Fukui f a i l s t o make a d i s t i n c t i o n t h a t may be i m p o r t a n t , namely whether or n o t the p o l i c y i s s u e i s u r g e n t o r n o t . We would suggest t h a t t h i s f o r m a t i o n o f a s m a l l ad hoc group may be employed i n u r g e n t b u t n o t i n l o n g - t e r m d e c i s i o n . T h i s would seem congruent w i t h K a l H o l s t i ' s hypothesis: "The more c r i t i c a l o r u r g e n t a s i t u a t i o n i s p e r c e i v e d t o bey,, t h e fewer people w i l l become d i r e c t l y i n v o l v e d i n d e f i n i n g the s i t u a t i o n , choosing responses, and s e l e c t i n g g o a l s . " See K a l J . H o l s t i , International Politics: A Framework f o r A n a l y s i s , Englewood C l i f f s , N.J.: P r e n t i c e - H a l l , 1972 (second e d i t i o n ) , p. 394. 138 S i l v e r s t e i n , op. c i t . , p. 19. P e r s o n a l communication between Hellmann and S i l v e r s t e i n . Fur f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e Japanese consensus d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s , see e s p e c i a l l y P e t e r F. D r u c k e r , "What we can l e a r n f r o m Japanese Management," Harvard Business Review, V o l . 49, No. 2 ( M a r c h - A p r i l 1971), pp. 110-22; C h i h i r o Hosoya, World P o l i t i c s , V o l . 26, No. 3 ( A p r i l 1 9 7 4 ) , pp. 364-69; Chie Nakane, Japanese S o c i e t y , London, Weidenfeld and N i c o l s o n , 1970, e s p e c i a l l y p. 145; P a c k a r d , op. c i t . , pp. 347-48; James W. W h i t e , " T r a d i t i o n and P o l i t i c s i n S t u d i e s o f Contemporary J a p a n , " World P o l i t i c s , V o l . 26, No. 3 ( A p r i l 1 9 7 4 ) , p p . 412-13. For a c r i t i c i s m o f t h e consensus d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s , see T s u r u t a n i , op. c i t . , and r e p l y by Reischauer, op. c i t . For a d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f consensus i n b r o a d e r c o n t e x t s , see Wolfram F.  112  H a n r e i d e r , " C o m p a t i b i l i t y and Consensus: A P r o p o s a l f o r the Conceptual Linkage o f E x t e r n a l and I n t e r n a l . Dimensions o f F o r e i g n P o l i c y , " Comparative F o r e i g n P o l i c y . T h e o r e t i c a l Essays, Ed. Wolfram F. H a n r e i d e r , New Y o r k : McKay Co., 1 9 7 1 , pp. 242-64,; For an a p p l i c a t i o n of the c o n c e p t s developed i n t h i s a r t i c l e , see Wolfram F. H a n r e i d e r , West German F o r e i g n P o l i c y 1949-1963: I n t e r n a t i o n a l Pressures and Domestic Responses, S t a n f o r d , C a l . : S t a n f o r d U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1967. Roger H i l s m a n , "The F o r e i g n - P o l i c y Consensus:, An I n t e r i m Research R e p o r t , " J o u r n a l o f C o n f l i c t R e s o l u t i o n , V o l . 3 (December 1 9 5 9 ) , pp. 361-382. 139  S i l v e r s t e i n , op. c i t . ,  p.  19.  "''^See Tokyo Shimbun, 2 7 / 7 / 7 2 f o r d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e aspects and membership i n t h e N o r m a l i z a t i o n C o u n c i l . 1 4 1  technical  Ibid.  1A 2 M a i n i c h i Shimbun, 1 6 / 7 / 7 2 . Chief Cabinet S e c r e t a r y N i k a i d o a l s o c a l l e d f o r t h e need o f d e v e l o p i n g a consensus w i t h i n t h e p a r t y . See Asahi Shimbun, 1 7 / 7 / 7 2 . Moreover, F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r O h i r a and Prime M i n i s t e r Tanaka c o n t i n u a l l y emphasized t h e need o f d e v e l o p i n g an i n t r a - p a r t y consensus. See, f o r example, Y o m i u r i Shimbun, 8 / 7 / 7 2 . I n f a c t , a t the f i r s t meeting of the N o r m a l i z a t i o n C o u n c i l on 2 4 / 7 / 7 2 the t e n p o i n t s f o r n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f Japan-China r e l a t i o n s were . -. p r e s e n t e d by Prime M i n i s t e r Tanaka. P o i n t S i x and p o i n t Seven s t a t e d respectively: 6) " F o r t h e success o f t h i s case, a consensus and s t r o n g s u p p o r t o f the r u l i n g LDP a r e n e c e s s a r y . " 7)"This Council i s aimed a t r e a l i z i n g an i n t r a - p a r t y c o n s e n s u s . . . . " T h i s c l e a r l y demons t r a t e s how i m p o r t a n t Tanaka p e r c e i v e d t h e development o f an i n t r a p a r t y consensus t o b e . See Y o m i u r i Shimbun, 2 4 / 7 / 7 2 , evening e d i t i o n . 143 Hellmann, Peace T r e a t y , p. 19. Hosoya's c o n t r a s t w i t h the Nixon v i s i t to China i s a l s o germane h e r e : " N i x o n , f o r example, was a b l e t o make the announcement o f h i s f o r t h c o m i n g v i s i t to P e k i n g , w h i c h o b v i o u s l y marked an a b r u p t change i n p o l i c y , w i t h o u t l e n g t h y p r i o r c o n s u l t a t i o n s w i t h p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r s and t h e r e s t o f the g o v e r n ment b u r e a u c r a c y . A move o f t h i s s o r t s i m p l y l i e s beyond t h e competence o f a Japanese Prime M i n i s t e r , who, b e f o r e r e a c h i n g a f i n a l d e c i s i o n on any s u b s t a n t i a l change i n Japan's f o r e i g n p o l i c y , must make an e x h a u s t i v e e f f o r t t o c o n s u l t a wide spectrum o f Japanese l e a d e r s h i p i n p o l i t i c s , b u s i n e s s , a n d t h e bureaucracy i n o r d e r t o o b t a i n the f u l l e s t range o f s u p p o r t f o r any e v e n t u a l d e c i s i o n . " See Hosoya, op. c i t . , p. 368. " ^ \ > m o r i , op. c i t . ,  pp. 408-409.  See a l s o Asahi Shimbun, 1 6 / 8 / 7 2 .  145 The pro-Taiwan members o f t h e N o r m a l i z a t i o n C o u n c i l adopted a number o f t a c t i c s , such as h e c k l i n g and c a l l i n g f o r a n o n - c o n f i d e n c e v o t e i n Chairman Kosoka, to t r y and p r o t e c t Taiwan. See, f o r example, Nihon K e i z a i Shimbun, 2 / 9 / 7 2 ; Asahi Shimbun, 5 / 9 / 7 2 . o f importance h e r e  113  was the a c t i v i t y o f such pro-Taiwan LDPers as M i c h i o Watanabe, Masayuki F u j i o , K o i c h i Hamada, I c h i r o Nakagawa, who l a t e r came t o f o r m p a r t o f the S e i r a n k a i w h i c h was a c t i v e i n t r y i n g t o p r e v e n t the a i r p a c t a g r e e ment between Japan and China. For the b e s t d i s c u s s i o n c o n c e r n i n g t h e S e i r a n k a i , see J . V i c t o r Koschmann, "Hawks on t h e D e f e n s i v e : The S e i r a n k a i , " Japan I n t e r p r e t e r , V o l . 8, No. 4 ( W i n t e r 1 9 7 4 ) , pp. 4 6 7 - 7 7 . For a survey o f LDP o p i n i o n on the government's h a n d l i n g o f t h e China n o r m a l i z a t i o n process and t h e Japan-China a i r a c c o r d , see Nihon K e i z a i Shimbun, 5 / 1 0 / 7 3 . One o f t h e f i n d i n g s o f t h i s survey was t h a t o f t h e LDP members s u p p o r t i n g the e s t a b l i s h m e n t of r e l a t i o n s w i t h the PRC, 33% " c l a r i f i e d c r i t i c a l views on the procedures o r method taken by the government f o r t h i s p u r p o s e , e s p e c i a l l y those r e l a t e d t o the Taiwan problem. I t can be s a i d t h a t t h i s f a c t i s i n d i c a t i v e o f t h e reason why the LDP was i n v o l v e d i n heated d i s c u s s i o n s on Japan-China r e l a t i o n s w h i c h even t h r e a t e n e d t o cause t h e s p l i t o f t h e p a r t y , w h i l e o n l y a few members were s t r o n g l y opposed to the r e s t o r a t i o n o f d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s . " 1 4 6  A s a h i Shimbun, 1 / 9 / 7 2 .  147 J a p a n Times, 2 5 / 8 / 7 2 . See a l s o i b i d , 3 0 / 9 / 7 2 ; 6 / 9 / 7 2 ; Japan Times Weekly, 1 6 / 7 / 7 2 ; Nihon K e i z a i Shimbun, 1 0 / 7 / 7 2 . H /  9/9/72;  148 Japan Times, 3 0 / 8 / 7 2 . The pro-Taiwan LDPers were c o n t i n u a l and b i t t e r i n t h e i r c r i t i c i s m s of Foreign M i n i s t e r Ohira i n p a r t i c u l a r , who made a number o f statements i n d i c a t i n g Taiwan would be abandoned. See, f o r i n s t a n c e , Y o m i u r i Shimbun, 3 0 / 8 / 7 2 . 149  Japan Times, 150_, . , Ibid. 1 5 1  30/8/72.  J a p a n Times, 2 3 / 8 / 7 2 ; Japan Times Weekly,  30/8/72.  1 5? Tokyo Shimbun, 1 3 / 9 / 7 2 . 153 Asahi Shimbun, 5 / 9 / 7 2 . I n d e e d , Tanaka a l s o r e s i s t e d t h e p r e s s u r e o f t h e o l d - g u a r d i n t h e p a r t y such as K i s h i , Funada, and I s h i i who v i s i t e d t h e Prime M i n i s t e r t o t r y and persuade h i m n o t t o abandon Taiwan. See Yamato Shimbun, 3 0 / 9 / 7 2 . "^^^Masataka Kosaka, " O p t i o n s f o r Japan's F p r e i g n P o l i c y , " London: A d e l p h i Papers No. 9 7 , I n s t i t u t e f o r S t r a t e g i c S t u d i e s , p. 18. ^~^See, f o r example, Sankei Shimbun, 1 2 / 1 / 7 4 ; M a i n i c h i Shimbun, 1 0 / 2 / 7 4 . T h i s went hand i n hand w i t h a f e e l i n g t h a t d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s were e s t a b l i s h e d b e f o r e consensus was r e a c h e d . S a n k e i , 1 2 / 1 / 7 4 . "*"^For a l i s t of the Dietmen who accompanied Kosaka t o China, see Sankei Shimbun, 9 / 9 / 7 2 .  114  See the i n t e r v i e w w i t h Chairman Kosaka a f t e r h i s r e t u r n f r o m P e k i n g , Y o m i u r i Shimbun, 2 0 / 9 / 7 2 . Also Nihon K e i z a i Shimbun, 1 9 / 9 / 7 2 , (evening e d i t i o n ) . 158  Asahi Shimbun, 2 0 / 9 / 7 2 , evening e d i t i o n , emphasis added. When q u e s t i o n e d r e g a r d i n g t h i s s t a t e m e n t S h i i n a s t a t e d t h a t : "I e x p l a i n e d t o t h e Taiwan s i d e t h e c o n t e n t s o f t h e R e s o l u t i o n adopted by the LDP Japan-China D i p l o m a t i c R e l a t i o n s N o r m a l i z a t i o n C o n s u l t a t ive Council. I t i s n o t t h a t I c l a r i f i e d t h e Government's view and my own view as t h e S p e c i a l e n v o y . " 159. Sankei Shimbun, 2 0 / 9 / 9 2 , evening e d i t i o n . ^ S t a t e m e n t made by Chief Cabinet S e c r e e t a r N i k a i d o , Tokyo Shimbun, 2 0 / 9 / 7 2 , evening e d i t i o n . 16  16 T Hellmann, Peace T r e a t y , pp. 56, 73; Packard, op. c i t . , pp. 65 f f . I n t h i s l a t t e r r e g a r d , a l s o see Scalapino and Masumi, op. c i t . 162 F u k u i , P a r t y i n Power, Ch. 9; F u k u i , " B u r e a u c r a t i c Power i n J a p a n , " Japan and A u s t r a l i a : Two S o c i e t i e s and t h e i r I n t e r a c t i o n s , Ed. P e t e r Drysdale and Hironubu K i t a o j i , O x f o r d : Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1974, f o r t h c o m i n g . See a l s o Hans Baerswald, " J a p a n , " A s i a i n t h e . , I n t e r n a t i o n a l System, Ed. Wayne Cox, Leo Rose, and Gavin Boyd, Cambridge, M a s s . : Winthrop P u b l i s h e r s , 1972, pp. 32-60. There was a l s o c o n f l i c t between t h e Finance M i n i s t r y and the MITI s h o r t l y b e f o r e n o r m a l i z a t i o n s over t h e q u e s t i o n o f China t a r i f f s , see M a i n i c h i Shimbun, 2 2 / 9 / 7 2 . 163 See, f o r example, A s a h i S t a f f , The P a c i f i c R i v a l s , p p . 324-27. 332-335. 164 Henderson and Matsuo, op. c i t . , p. 8. For a d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e M I T I ' s e f f o r t s cto expand t r a d e a f t e r n o r m a l i z a t i o n seemed c e r t a i n t o o c c u r , see Tokyo Shimbun, 1 4 / 7 / 7 2 . ^ F u k u i , P a r t y i n Power, pp. 260-64; Langdon, " J a p a n ' s F o r e i g n P o l i c y - M a k i n g P r o c e s s , " Japan i n World P o l i t i c s , Ed. Young C. Kim, p. 9; Nihon K e i z a i Shimbun, 1 / 8 / 7 2 . 1 6  166 P a r k , op. c i t . , p. 16. Another reason t h a t p r o b a b l y c o n t r i b u t e s t o the c o n f l i c t o f o p i n i o n w i t h i n t h e F o r e i g n M i n i s t r y r e s u l t s f r o m the f a c t t h a t t h e heads of the v a r i o u s d i v i s i o n s w i t h i n the M i n i s t r y take a s y m p a t h e t i c a t t i t u d e towards the c o u n t r i e s they d e a l w i t h , thus a l l o w i n g the p o s s i b i l i t y o f c o n f l i c t between these d i v i s i o n s . T h i s s y m p a t h e t i c a t t i t u d e i s p a r t i c u l a r l y t r u e o f t h e China D i v i s i o n , where t h e Head, Hashimoto, " . . . p l e a d e d w i t h p a s s i o n f o r a f o r w a r d - l o o k i n g p o l i c y towards the PRC. See F u k u i , " F o r e i g n P o l i c y Making i n J a p a n ' s F o r e i g n M i n i s t r y , " p r e p a r e d f o r p r e s e n t a t i o n on Japan's F o r e i g n P o l i c y , K a u a i , H a w a i i , 1 4 - 1 7 / 1 / 7 4 , p. 18.  115  167  Japan Times Weekly,  2/1/71.  168 Sato had f o l l o w e d t h e a d v i c e o f s e n i o r members o f the b u r e a u c r a c y i n d e c i d i n g t o f o l l o w a p r o - T a i w a n p o l i c y , though S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e Rogers may have i n f l u e n c e d him i n t h i s r e s p e c t . See Asahi Shimbun, 2 3 / 9 / 7 1 , Sawhny, op. c i t . , p. 64. 1 6 9  1 7  K o k u m i n Shimbun, 5 / 1 2 / 7 2 .  ^ F u k u i , " F o r e i g n P o l i c y - M a k i n g i n J a p a n , " p. 5 1 .  "*"Before t h e f o r m a t i o n o f t h i s group i n l a t e J u l y , t h e b u r e a u c r a t s had been a c t i v e i n examining a number o f q u e s t i o n s t h a t would e v e n t u a l l y need t o be answered when n o r m a l i z i n g r e l a t i o n s w i t h China; 1) whether or n o t t o f u l l y accept P e k i n ' s t h r e e p r i n c i p l e s f o r n o r m a l i z a t i o n , 2) how t o d e a l w i t h the q u e s t i o n o f the U.S. Japan S e c u r i t y T r e a t y , 3) what f o r m t h e " t e r m i n a t i o n o f w a r " s h o u l d t a k e i n the j o i n t communique. However, t h e F o r e i g n M i n i s t r y d i d n o t have any c o n t a c t w i t h the Chinese government u n t i l a f t e r c o n t a c t s were made by F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r O h i r a on 22nd J u l y . T h i s meant t h a t these q u e s t i o n s were r e s o l v e d w i t h o u t any feedback f r o m t h e Chinese s i d e , so t h a t the b u r e a u c r a t s were l a r g e l y i n v o l v e d i n a " . . . t h e o r e t i c a l e x e r c i s e , t h e e f f e c t and u t i l i t y o f w h i c h was q u i t e u n c e r t a i n i n t h e absence o f feedback f r o m Peking t h r o u g h a r e l i a b l e c h a n n e l . I n s h o r t , they were m o s t l y s p e c u l a t i n g i n a s i t u a t i o n f u l l o f u n c e r t a i n t i e s , r a t h e r t h a n engaged i n normal p o l i c y - m a k i n g a c t i v i t i e s i n a f a m i l i a r p o l i t i c a l and b u r e a u c r a t i c c o n t e x t . " See,Fukui, "Foreign P o l i c y Making i n J a p a n , " p. 4 4 - 4 6 , Japan Times Weekly, 2 9 / 7 / 7 2 ; Asahi Shimbun, 23/7/72. 17  172 This p a r t c o n c e r n i n g t h e F o r e i g n M i n i s t r y p o l i c y - m a k i n g group r e l i e s ;on the i n t e r v i e w m a t e r i a l c o n t a i n e d i n F u k u i , " F o r e i g n P o l i c y Making i n J a p a n , " pp. 43 f f . This i s e s p e c i a l l y important i n respect t o the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f the ad hoc p o l i c y - m a k i n g g r o u p , s i n c e a v a i l a b l e newspaper sources o n l y p o i n t o u t t h a t a China P o l i c y C o u n c i l o r Leaders Group was e s t a b l i s h e d w i t h the p a r t i c i p a t i o n ( i n a d d i t i o n t o those mentioned i n the t e x t ) o f A c t i n g American A f f a i r s Bureau D i r e c t o r GeneralaTachibanairsPubli'crlnformationreBureau^DifectordOwada, European and Oceanic A f f a i r s Bureau D i r e c t o r General Owada, and Consular and E m i g r a t i o n A f f a i r s Department D i r e c t o r G e n e r a l , Endo ( t h e l a t t e r two b e i n g China e x p e r t s ) . Besides the f a c t t h a t s m a l l ad hoc groups are u s u a l l y formed w i t h i n the F o r e i g n M i n i s t r y to d e a l w i t h p o l i c y p r o b l e m s , one of the reasons f o r the exact n a t u r e o f t h i s p o l i c y group i s p o s s i b l y t h a t t h e r e was a f e a r of c o n f l i c t d e v e l o p i n g between these b u r e a u c r a t s on t h e p a r t o f F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r O h i r a . See Nihon K e i z a i Shimbun, 1/8/72. See a l s o Y o m i u r i Shimbun, 2 3 / 7 / 7 2 . Another i m p o r t a n t p o i n t i s t h a t the F o r e i g n M i n i s t r y i s d i v i d e d i n terms o f 1) f u n c t i o n a l and 2) geographic a r e a s . Hence, the A s i a Bureau D i r e c t o r and the China D i v i s i o n Head had an obvious r o l e i n the p o l i c y - m a k i n g p r o c e s s . In  116  r e g a r d to t h e p a r t i c i p a t i o n of the T r e a t i e s Bureau D i v i s i o n Head and Bureau D i r e c t o r , Fukui notes t h a t : "The T r e a t i e s Bureau [ u n l i k e t h e o t h e r b u r e a u s ] tends t o g e t i n v o l v e d i n a l l k i n d s o f i s s u e s d e a l t w i t h by the F o r e i g n M i n i s t r y . . . . " See F u k u i , " F o r e i g n P o l i c y - M a k i n g i n J a p a n ' s F o r e i g n M i n i s t r y , " p. 6. For d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e ad hoc p o l i c y g r o u p , see i b i d . , pp. 6 - 7 , 36-37. 173 F u k u i , " F o r e i g n P o l i c y - M a k i n g i n J a p a n , " p. 47. Foreign V i c e - M i n i s t e r Hogen s i m p l y p l a y e d t h e p a r t o f s u p e r v i s o r o f t h i s p o l i c y - m a k i n g team. His r o l e was s i m i l a r t o F u k u i ' s more g e n e r a l comment t h a t the V i c e - M i n i s t e r though f o r m a l l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r p o l i c y i s n o t always an a c t i v e l e a d e r o f t h e team, o f t e n now even an a c t i v e p a r t i c i p a n t i n i t s work. See F u k u i , " P o l i c y - M a k i n g o f J a p a n ' s F o r e i g n M i n i s t r y , " p. 8. "* ^For a d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e development of Japan's stance upon t h e n a t u r e and c o n t e n t o f t h e j o i n t communique, see F u k u i , " F o r e i g n P o l i c y - M a k i n g i n J a p a n , " p p . 44 f f . ; M a i n i c h i Shimbun, 1 2 / 9 / 7 2 . For a c o n v e n i e n t r e f e r e n c e t o the c o n t e n t o f the j o i n t communique i n i t s f i n a l f o r m , see E t o , "japan and China - A New S t a g e / p . 13. 7  "*" ^Graham A l l i s o n , Essence of D e c i s i o n : E x p l a i n i n g t h e Cuban M i s s i l e C r i s i s , B o s t o n : L i t t l e , Brown, 1 9 7 1 . For c r i t i q u e o f t h e b u r e a u c r a t i c p o l i c y - m a k i n g m o d e l , see c i t a t i o n 176. 7  Q u o t e d i n Desmond J . B a l l , "The B l i n d Men and t h e E l e p h a n t : A C r i t i q u e of B u r e a u c r a t i c P o l i t i c s T h e o r y , " A u s t r a l i a n O u t l o o k , V o l . 28, N o . l ( A p r i l 1 9 7 4 ) , p. 7 1 . For a f u r t h e r c r i t i q u e o f t h i s a p p r o a c h , see Robert J . A r t , " B u r e a u c r a t i c P o l i t i c s and American F o r e i g n P o l i c y ; A C r i t i q u e , " P o l i c y S c i e n c e , V o l . 4 (December 1 9 7 3 ) , pp. 467-90; Harvey S t a r r , " ' O r g a n i z a t i o n a l P r o c e s s ' as an I n f l u e n c e on N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y P o l i c y , " I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s , V o l . 4 , No. 2 (November 1 9 7 2 ) , pp. 176-86, 217. 1 7 6  " * S e e , f o r example, Graham T. A l l i s o n and Morton H." H a l e p e r i n , "Bureaucratic P o l i t i c s : A Paradigm and Some P o l i c y I m p l i c a t i o n s , " Theory and P o l i c y i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s , Ed. Raymond T a n t e r and R i c h a r d Ullmann, P r i n c e t o n , N . J . : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1972, pp. 40-80. 77  178  T s u r u t a n i , op. c i t . ,  pp. 131-32.  179 I b i d . , pp. 129-130; K u b o t a , Higher C i v i l Servants i n P o s t war Japan, P r i n c e t o n , N . J . : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1969, pp. 172-176. 180 R i n g i s e i r e f e r s t o " a system whereby a d m i n i s t r a t i v e p l a n s and d e c i s i o n s a r e made.(through t h e c i r c u l a t i o n o f a document c a l l e d ringisho. The r i n g i s h o i s i n i t i a l l y d r a f t e d by a l o w - r a n k i n g o f f i c i a l . . . t h e r e a f t e r t h e r i n g i s h o i s d i s c u s s e d and examined s e p a r a t e l y by t h e  117  o f f i c i a l s o f a l l r e l e v a n t bureaus and d i v i s i o n s . . . t h e h i g h e s t e x e c u t i v e i s expected t o approve i t w i t h o u t change o r m o d i f i c a t i o n because o f t h i s l o n g process o f p r i o r s c r u t i n y by lower o f f i c i a l s . " See K i y o a k i T s u j i , " D e c i s i o n - M a k i n g i n t h e Japanese Government: A Study o f R i n g i s e i , " P o l i t i c a l Development i n Modern Japan, Ed. Robert E. Ward, P r i n c e t o n , N . J . : 1968, p. 458. T s u j i ' s i s t h e b e s t d i s c u s s i o n o f r i n g i s e i . For a s h o r t e r ^ d i s c u s s i o n , see Nakane, op. c i t . , p. 65. For a d i s c u s s i o n o f r i n g i s e i ' i n t h e bureaucracy i m m e d i a t e l y p r i o r t o t h e second w o r l d w a r , see Hosoya, op. c i t . , pp. 363 f f . For an e x c e l l e n t d i s c u s s i o n q u e s t i o n i n g the view t h a t r i n g i s e i i s a t t r i b u t a b l e t o t h e c o n t i n u a t i o n of t r a d i t i o n a l Japanese s o c i a l v a l u e s , see Bernard S. S i l b e r m a n , " R i n g e s e i T r a d i t i o n a l Values or O r g a n i z a t i o n a l I m p e r a t i v e s i n the Japanese C i v i l Service: 1868-1945," The J o u r n a l o f A s i a n S t u d i e s , V o l . 32, No. 2, .(February 1 9 7 3 ) , pp. 251-64. For a d i s c u s s i o n p e r t a i n i n g t o J a p a n ' s F o r e i g n M i n i s t r y , see F u k u i , " P o l i c y - M a k i n g i n J a p a n ' s F o r e i g n M i n i s t r y , " p. 1 2 . 181  See a l s o , Reischauer, op. c i t . ,  p.  147.  182 Hellmann, Peace T r e a t y , p. 125. See a l s o T s u n e i s h i , op. c i t . , p. 148; F u k u i , P a r t y i n Power, p. 145. 183 Hellmann, Peace T r e a t y , p. 129. 184 David G. Brown, "Chinese Economic Leverage i n Sino-Japanese R e l a t i o n s , " A s i a n Survey, V o l . 12, No. 9 {September 1 9 7 2 ) , p. 766. See a l s o R.M.V. C o l l i c k , "The 'New' Japanese F o r e i g n P o l i c y , " The World Today, V o l . 29, No. 2 (February 1 9 7 3 ) , p. 83. T h i s seems e s p e c i a l l y t r u e i n view o f the.tdep.ressLon i n Japan f r o m 1970, w h i c h was f u e l l e d by N i x o n ' s economic measures a g a i n s t Japan. See, Alexander K. Young, " J a p a n ' s Trade w i t h China: Impact o f the Nixon V i s i t , " The World Today, V o l . 28, No. 8 (August 1 9 7 2 ) , pp. 342-50. 185 Brown, op. c i t . , p. 766. 186 For an e l a b o r a t i o n o f t h e p o i n t s c o n t a i n e d i n t h i s s e c t i o n , see Sadako Ogata, "The Business Community and F o r e i g n P o l i c y : Process heading t o Japan's R e c o g n i t i o n o f the P e o p l e ' s R e p u b l i c o f C h i n a , " f o r t h c o m i n g i n an e d i t e d book by Robert S. S c a l a p i n o , U n i v e r s i t y o f C a l i f o r n i a Press. 187 F u k u i , P a r t y i n Power, pp.  244-46.  Ibxd. 189 T h i s p o s i t i v e a t t i t u d e on t h e p a r t o f Kansai business i s i l l u s t r a t e d by an o p i n i o n p o l l " . . . o f 94 business l e a d e r s who responded to t h e Koydft News Agency q u e s t i o n n a i r e i n t h e summer o f 1 9 7 1 . To t h e q u e s t i o n whether Japan s h o u l d r e c o g n i z e China b e f o r e the U n i t e d S t a t e s ,  118  o n l y 19, p e r cent o f t h e Tokyo b u s i n e s s l e a d e r s answered " y e s , " i n c o n t r a s t to 26.2 p e r cent o f Osaka and Nagoya. A l s o , to t h e q u e s t i o n whether Japan should s t a r t n e g o t i a t i n g f o r t h e r e s u m p t i o n o f d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s i m m e d i a t e l y under t h e Sato government, 46.2 p e r c e n t o f t h e Tokyo l e a d e r s answered i n t h e a f f i r m a t i v e to t h e 61.9 p e r c e n t o f Osaka and Nagoya. Also i n terms o f e s t i m a t i n g t h e f u t u r e o f t h e China m a r k e t , 69 per cent f Kansai and Nagoya l e a d e r s expected i t t o grow to a t o t a l volume o f 1.5 to 2 b i l l i o n i n f i v e years w h i l e 57.9 p e r cent o f the Tokyo l e a d e r s gave s i m i l a r c o n s i d e r a t i o n . " Ogata, "The Business Comm u n i t y and F o r e i g n P o l i c y , " pp. 23-24. 0  190 Ogata, "The Business Community and F o r e i g n P o l i c y , " p. 22. The "Four C o n d i t i o n s " were b a s i c a l l y t h a t businesses p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n the China market must n o t d e a l w i t h 1) Taiwan, 2) South K o r e a , 3) South Vietnam, 4) a l l y themselves w i t h U.S. c a p i t a l . See Dan Fenno Henderson and Tasuku Matsuo, op. c i t . , p. 2. 7  Nihon K e i z a i Shimbun,  8/7/72.  192 F u k u i , " F o r e i g n P o l i c y - M a k i n g i n J a p a n , " p. 53. For Tokyo groups v i s i t , see Asahi Shimbun, 2 3 / 1 1 / 7 1 . 193 Ogata, "The Business Community and F o r e i g n P o l i c y , " p. 23. 194 B r z e z i n s k i notes t h a t a major expansion i n Japan-China t r a d e would b e n e f i t t h e s t e e l , s h i p b u i l d i n g , a u t o , f e r t i l i z e r and chemical industries. See Zbigniew B r z e z i n s k i , The F r a g i l e Blossom, New Y o r k : Harper and Row, 1972, p. 89. 195 Nihon K e i z a i Shimbun, 1 7 / 4 / 7 0 ; Nihon K e i z a i Shimbun, 3 0 / 9 / 7 2 ; N a t h a n i e l Newby W h i t e , op. c i t . , pp. 618 f f . 196 Y o m i u r i Shimbun, 2 7 / 2 / 5 8 . 197 N a t h a n i e l Newby W h i t e , op. c i t . , p. 608. 198 Chae-Jin Lee, "The P o l i t i c s o f Sino-Japanese Trade R e l a t i o n s , 1963-1968;" P a c i f i c A f f a i r s , V o l . 42, No. 2 (Summer 1 9 6 9 ) , pp. 129-30. To be d e s i g n a t e d as " f r i e n d l y , " f i r m s had t o agree t o Chou's t h r e e " p o l i t i c a l principles" 1) n o t t o view China as an enemy; 2) n o t t o o b s t r u c t n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f Japan-China r e l a t i o n s ; 3) n o t t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n the p l o t t o c r e a t e two Chinas. See Langdon, Japan's F o r e i g n P o l i c y , p. 176. 199 See, op. c i t . , p. 1 3 1 . 1  ^ ^ P a r k , op. c i t . , p. 1 1 . For an e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e f l u c t u a t i o n s i n " F r i e n d l y F i r m " t r a d e and Memorandum T r a d e , see T o s h i a k i Kaminogo, "What's Happening Among Japanese F r i e n d l y F i r m s , " Summaries o f S e l e c t e d Japanese Magazines, American Embassy, Tokyo P o l i t i c a l S e c t i o n T r a n s l a t i o n S e r v i c e s Branch, January 1973, pp. 2 9 - 4 2 . See Kaminogo, op. c i t . , p. 35.  119  201 For a l i s t o f Japanese companies i n v e s t i n g i n Taiwan and a d e s c r i p t i o n o f these i n v e s t m e n t s , see Yamamoto Shimbun, 1 6 / 1 0 / 7 2 . 70?  Y o m i u r i Shimbun, 2 8 / 4 / 7 0 .  203  Ogata, "The Business Community and F o r e i g n P o l i c y , " p. 204 ., ... I b x d . , p. 17.  16.  T U  205 ,., I b i d . , p. 17. 206 For a comment on t h e e a r l i e r e x p e c t a t i o n s the S t e e l I n d u s t r y h e l d o f i n c r e a s e d t r a d e w i t h China, see Nihon Kogyo, 1 7 / 4 / 7 0 . T  207  M a i n i c h i Shimbun, 1 5 / 5 / 7 0 .  208 Nihon K e i z a i Shimbun, Evening e d i t i o n 2 2 / 5 / 7 0 . For a d i s c u s s i o n o f the o t h e r s t e e l companies t h a t d i d n o t secure c o n t r a c t s a t the Trade F a i r , see Tokyo Shimbun, 2 4 / 4 / 7 0 . 209 Ogata, "The Business Community and F o r e i g n P o l i c y , " p. 18. 210 Nihon K e i z a i Shimbun, 1 2 / 5 / 7 0 . 211 Asahi Shimbun, 2 5 / 5 / 7 0 ; Ogata, "The Business Community and F o r e i g n P o l i c y , " p. 20. 212 Nihon K e i z a i Shimbun, 1 3 / 1 2 / 7 2 ; C o l l i c k , "The 'New' Japanese F o r e i g n P o l i c y , " p. 83; John H a l l i d a y and Gavan McCormack, "Japan and A m e r i c a : A n t a g o n i s t i c A l l i e s , " New L e f t Review, No. 77 ( J a n u a r y February 1 9 7 3 ) , p. 7 1 . 213 Rathy Sawhny, "Japan a t t h e C r o s s r o a d s , " I n d i a n Q u a r t e r l y , V o l . 28, No. 1 (January-March 1 9 7 2 ) , p. 64. 21A Ogata, "The Business Community and F o r e i g n P o l i c y , " p p . 4 5 - 4 6 . 215  Asahi Shimbun,  3/9/71.  216 Ogata, "The Business Community and F o r e i g n P o l i c y , " p. 3 1 ; Japan Times Weekly, 3 0 / 1 0 / 7 1 . 217 Ogata, "The Business Community and F o r e i g n P o l i c y , " p. 37. ^ " * " I b i d . , p. 8  37.  219 Asahi Shimbun, 2 4 / 5 / 7 2 . W i t h the change o f a t t i t u d e by Uemura the Keidanren now came i n l i n e w i t h the p o l i c y adopted by K e i z a i Doyukai (Japan Committee f o r Economic Development), which had p r e s e n t e d a  120  f o r w a r d - l o o k i n g p o l i c y on China i n 1970, d e c l a r i n g t h a t Japan s h o u l d " . . . p l a y an i m p o r t a n t r o l e i n t h e s o l u t i o n o f t h e East-West problem c e n t e r e d on the Communist China q u e s t i o n . " See Nikkan Kogyo, 2 0 / 4 / 7 0 . I t was the K e i z a i Doyukai r a t h e r than Keidanren t h a t was an a c t i v e promoter o f Japan-China r e l a t i o n s . For an e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e g e n e r a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s and f u n c t i o n o f these two o r g a n i z a t i o n s , see Gerald L. C u r t i s , " O r g a n i z a t i o n a l Leadership i n J a p a n ' s Business Community," J o u r n a l o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s , V o l . 26, No. 1 (1972, p p . 179-85. 220  Ogata, "The Business Community and F o r e i g n P o l i c y , " p.  39.  221 E t o , "Japan and C h i n a : — A New S t a g e , " p. 2; Kaminogo," op. c i t . p.am38i;'' Sankei Shimbun, 7 / 9 / 7 2 . 222 I t o h , Japanese P o l i t i c s : An I n s i d e View, p. 10. 223 Ogata, "The Business Community and F o r e i g n P o l i c y , " p. 48. 224 Hellmann,. Peace T r e a t y , p. 94. c f . P e r r y P i c k e r t , "The F o r e i g n P o l i c y o f Japan I n c o r p o r a t e d , " Japan Q u a r t e r l y , V o l . 2 1 , No. 1 ( J a n u a r y March 1 9 7 4 ) , p. 83. 225 The LDP may n o t c o n t i n u e t o g a i n t h e same e x t e n s i v e f i n a n c i a l s u p p o r t t h a t has c h a r a c t e r i z e d i t s r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h business so f a r . A f t e r the e x c e s s i v e f i n a n c i a l o u t p u t by b u s i n e s s i n t h e J u l y 1974 Upper House e l e c t i o n s , i n t h e u n f u l f i l l e d hope o f b o l s t e r i n g the LDP's s e a t p o s i t i o n i n t h i s house, b u s i n e s s d e c l a r e d t h r o u g h such a s s o c i a t i o n s as Keidanren t h a t i t w i l l no l o n g e r g i v e such l a r g e c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o t h e LDP c o f f e r s . See New York Times, 1 0 / 9 / 7 4 . 226 Nihon K e i z a i Shimbun, 1 / 1 1 / 7 2 , emphasis added; H a l l i d a y and . McCormack, Japanese I m p e r i a l i s m Today, Ch. 4. 227 F u k u i , " F o r e i g n P o l i c y - M a k i n g i n J a p a n , " p. 56. 228 See a l s o S c a l a p i n o , American-Japanese R e l a t i o n s i n a Changing E r a , p. 39. 229 Hellmann, Peace T r e a t y , p. 22. 230 Robert S c a l a p i n o , The Japanese Communist Movement 1920-1966, B e r k e l e y and Los Angeles, U n i v e r s i t y o f C a l i f o r n i a P r e s s , 1966, Ch. 6. P a u l Langer, Communism i n Japan, S t a n f o r d , C a l . : HooverI-Dinstitute P r e s s , 1972, p p . 73-75. 231. "  Japan Times Weekly,  7/9/72.  232 See J . A . A . S t o c k w i n , The Japanese S o c i a l i s t P a r t y and N e u t r a l i s m , M e l b o u r n e : Melbourne U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1968, p p . 9 0 - 9 1 .  121  233  Ibid.,  Ch. 10.  234 A l l a n B. C o l e , Geroge 0 . T o t t e n and C e c i l H. Uyehara, S o c i a l i s t P a r t i e s i n Post-War Japan, New Haven and London: Y a l e U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1966, pp. 227-29. 235 Japan Times, 4 / 8 / 7 0 ; Asahi Shimbun, 3 / 1 1 / 7 0 . 2 3 6  T o k y o Shimbun, 2 3 / 7 / 7 2 .  237 F u r u i , op. c i t . ,  p. 42.  238 M a i n c h i Shimbun, 1 5 / 7 / 7 2 . The f l e x i b l e p o s t u r e of t h e Chinese government was i l l u s t r a t e d by i t s w i l l i n g n e s s t o a l l o w "some amount o f t i m e " f o r t h e s e t t l e m e n t o f t h e Taiwan p r o b l e m . . 239 Tokyo Shimbun, 2 3 / 7 / 7 2 . 240 Komei Shimbun, 7 / 4 / 6 8 . 241 n f o m i u r i Shimbun, 1 4 / 2 / 7 0 . 242 Japan Times, 1 4 / 1 2 / 7 0 . For a l i s t o f i n d i v i d u a l s who j o i n e d t h e c o u n c i l , see Komei Shimbun, 1 4 / 1 2 / 7 0 . 243 Japan Times, 9 / 6 / 7 1 . 244 Komei Shimbun, 3 0 / 6 / 7 1 . 245 Kim, op. c i t . , p. 9. 246 For t h e o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s statements c o n c e r n i n g t h e K o m e i t o ' s a c t i v i t i e s , see Sankei Shimbun, 3 / 7 / 7 1 . 247 Nihon K e i z a i Shimbun, 3 / 7 / 7 1 . 248 F u k u i , " F o r e i g n P o l i c y - M a k i n g i n J a p a n , " pp. 40-46. Citation 198 l i s t s the t h r e e " p o l i t i c a l p r i n c i p l e s . " Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. 252 253  Omori, op. c i t . , p. 409. F u r u i , op. c i t . ,  p.  50.  See a l s o Nihon K e i z a i Shimbun, 3 1 / 7 / 7 2 .  122  254  Cole e_t_al. , op. c i t . , pp. 74, 119.  255 Sankei Shimbun, 3 0 / 8 / 7 1 , e v e n i n g e d i t i o n . The p a r t y ' s b a s i c p o l i c y on the China i s s u e was: 1) China i s one; 2) C h i n ' a admission t o t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s w i l l be promoted; and 3) the DSP does n o t approve t h e r e v e r s e i m p o r t a n t i t e m q u e s t i o n i n t h e U.S. 256 Nihon K e i z a i Shimbun, 1 4 / 4 / 7 2 ; S c a l a p i n o , American-Japanese R e l a t i o n s on a Changing E r a , p. 73fl. 257 Tokyo Shimbun, 2 1 / 5 / 7 2 . E k i Sone had l o s t o u t i n the 1971 f i g h t f o r t h e chairmanship of t h e DSP. See Dixon "Japanese P o l i t i c a l P a r t y R e o r g a n i z a t i o n , " p. 6. 2 5 8  N i h o n K e i z a i Shimbun, 1 9 / 9 / 7 2 .  259 260  F u r u i , op. c i t . ,  p.  50.  For a d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e t a c t i c s the o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s have developed t o i n c r e a s e t h e i r i n f l u e n c e on t h e p o l i c y - m a k i n g process i n Japan, see J . A . A . S t o c k w i n , "The Japanese O p p o s i t i o n : P o l i t i c a l I r r e l e v a n c e or Wave o f t h e F u t u r e , " A u s t r a l i a n O u t l o o k , V o l . 25, No. 2 (August 1 9 7 1 ) , pp. 181-87. 261 Edward P. W h i t t e m o r e , The Press i n Japan Today: A Case S t u d y , Columbia: U n i v e r s i t y o f South C a r o l i n a P r e s s , 1 9 7 1 , p. 7. For a broader e x a m i n a t i o n o f the r o l e o f the press i n the f o r e i g n p o l i c y making p r o c e s s , see Bernard C. Cohen, The Press and F o r e i g n P o l i c y , P r i n c e t o n , N . J . : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1963. For a d i s c u s s i o n p e r t i n e n t t o Japan, see A r t h u r W. B u r k e , The Government o f Japan, New York: C r o w e l l , 1963. H e l l m a n n , Peace T r e a t y , p. 105. 2 6 2  263 T h i s e x a m i n a t i o n o f the r o l e o f t h e p r e s s i n t h e China n o r m a l i z a t i o n process i s based on t h e a r t i c l e by Osamu M i y o s h i , "The Press has thus Y i e l d e d t o P e k i n g , " Summaries o f S e l e c t e d Japanese Magazines, American Embassy, Tokyo P o l i t i c a l S e c t i o n T r a n s l a t i o n S e r v i c e s B r a n c h , J u l y 1972, pp. 1 4 - 3 1 . For a s h o r t e x t r a c t o f t h i s a r t i c l e , see Osamu M i y o s h i , "How t h e Japanese Press Y i e l d e d t o P e k i n g , " Survey, V o l . 18, No. 4 (85) Autumn 1972, pp. 103-125. That M i y o s h i i s c o r r e c t i n h i s a n a l y s i s appears to be c o n f i r m e d by an i n t e r v i e w between Sam Jameson and Dietmen S e i i c h i Tagawa and t h e S e c r e t a r y General of the Newspaper P u b l i s h e r ' s A s s o c i a t i o n i n Japan, Susumi E j i r i . In this interview Tagawa and E j i r i a d m i t t e d t o Jameson t h a t t h e r e were s e c r e t d i s c u s s i o n s w i t h t h e Chinese s i d e t o b r i n g about an exchange o f newsmen. See Los Angeles Times, 1 4 / 4 / 7 2 . I n d e e d , i n t h e Survey a r t i c l e M i y o s h i quotes a F o r e i g n News E d i t o r o f a Japanese newspaper as s a y i n g : "To d i s p a t c h a c o r r e s p o n d e n t t o Peking takes precedence over t h e freedom o f the p r e s s . I b i d . , p. 140.  123  264 . , M i y o s h i , op. e x t . 265 See c i t a t i o n 198. 266,,. M i y o s h i , op. c i t . 267 Shao-hsien Chu, " P e i p i n g - J a p a n R e l a t i o n s a f t e r the Rapprochement , " 2ssjiej3_and_S^ V o l . 1 0 . . No. 2.(November 1 9 7 3 ) , p. 10. 268 S c a l a p i n o , American-Japanese R e l a t i o n s i n a Changing E r a , p. 78. 269 Yukio Matsuyama, "Japanese Press and Japan's F o r e i g n P o l i c y , " J o u r n a l o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s , v o l . 26, No. 1 ( 1 9 7 2 ) , p. 146. 270 Hellmann, Peace T r e a t y , p. 1 5 1 . M  271 Douglas H. Mendel, "Japanese O p i n i o n on Key F o r e i g n P o l i c y I s s u e s , " A s i a n Survey, V o l . 9, No. 8 (August 1 9 6 9 ) , p p . 633-34. 2 7 2  M a i n c h i Shimbun, 3 0 / 4 / 7 0 .  273 Asahi Shimbun, 2 3 / 6 / 7 0 . 274 275 276 2 7 7  A s a h i Shimbun^ 3 / 6 / 7 1 . C h r i s t i a n Science M o n i t o r ,  30/9/72.  Tokyo Shimbun, 4 / 1 / 7 2 , evening e d i t i o n .  A s a h i Shimbun,  3/1/72.  278 ,., Ibid T  2 7 9  S a n k e i Shimbun, 2 8 / 7 / 7 2 . Ibid.  281 282 2 8 3  I t o h , op. c i t . ,  p.  184.  M a i n i c h i Shimbun, 1 6 / 7 / 7 2 .  S c a l a p i n o and Masumi, op.  cit.  284 H e l l m a n , Peace T r e a t y , p.  13.  285 S c a l a p i n o , A s i a and t h e Major Powers: I m p l i c a t i o n s f o r the I n t e r n a t i o n a l O r d e r , S t a n f o r d ; Hoover I n s t i t u t e P r e s s , 1972, p. 16. 286 K h a l i d a Q u r e s h i . "The Far E a s t e r n D e t e n t e : The N o r m a l i z a t i o n o f Sino-Japanese R e l a t i o n s , " P a k i s t a n H o r i z o n , V o l . 26, No. 2 ( 1 9 7 3 ) , p. 60.  124  ^°'FOT a d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between " a r t i c u l a t e " and " g e n e r a l " p u b l i c o p i n i o n , see Bernard C. Cohen, The P o l i t i c a l Process and F o r e i g n P o l i c y : The Making o f the Japanese Peace S e t t l e m e n t , Princeton, N.J.: 1957; Hellmann, Peace T r e a t y . 288 F u k u i , "Foreign Policy-Making i n Japan," p. 289 H a r a r x , op.  cit.  58.  125  BIBLIOGRAPHY A l l e n , G. 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