THE NORMALIZATION OF JAPAN–CHINA RELATIONS:
EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL INFLUENCES ON JAPAN'S FOREIGN POLICY-MAKING PROCESS

by

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ABSTRACT

There have been few studies that have explicitly attempted to delineate the influence of external and internal factors on Japan's foreign policy-making process. The purpose of this thesis is to examine such factors in respect to one particular foreign policy issue: the normalization of relations between Japan and China. So as not to be considered as purely idiographic research, the findings are contrasted and compared with previous research that has similarly been concerned with a 1) foreign policy issue, 2) controversial in characteristic, and 3) short-term on the temporal dimension.

After the limitations of the tripartite elite model of Japanese policy-making are outlined, an examination is then made of the influence of the United States and China in compelling Japan's decision to normalize relations with China. Internally, the role of the Liberal Democratic Party, bureaucracy, business, opposition parties, press and public opinion are assessed in respect to this and previous policy studies. Our findings here are consistent with the conclusion that the tripartite elite (the Liberal Democratic Party, bureaucracy, and business) does not necessarily hold predominant power in the policy-making process. Instead, we find that two senior leaders of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party -- Prime Minister Tanaka and Foreign Minister Ohira -- form a policy-making group which dominates this particular policy process. These politicians are supported in this role by senior
members of the bureaucracy, a pro-Peking Liberal Democratic Party Dietman, and influential members of the opposition parties. In this study, the role of business, the press and public opinion are found to be indirect and peripheral compared to the role played by the above mentioned policy-making actors.
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INTRODUCTION

It is without question that the Tanaka government's decision to normalize relations with the People's Republic of China (hereafter China) was one of the most important foreign policy decisions made by any Japanese government in the post-war era. As such, this decision seems worthy of examination both in terms of its outgrowth from the various external and internal pressures that built up against the previously held pro-Taiwan policy of the Sato government and also, of equal importance, in terms of the proximate actors that actually participated in this historic decision. In short, this study seeks to explain the 'China decision' by reference to the major forces that played a role in bringing this decision to fulfillment.

Any attempt to determine those forces, or inputs, that influenced the China decision-making process naturally falls prey to the question of the 'correct' methodological approach to be employed in the study. In this respect, Geoffrey Pearson's comment seems particularly germane:

If one were primarily interested in "systems" of world politics, one might concentrate on the processes that lead to the transformation of the system from bipolarity to multipolarity and infer [national] action as a by-product of this change. If one were primarily interested in decision-making, one might emphasize changes in the domestic environment...including leadership. Students of organization would concentrate on intra-government bargaining. Psychologists might point to changes in perception. Students of power and influence might explain it as a response to external pressures.

None of these approaches is necessarily wrong. What is striking about them is their lack of coherence.
Thus the clear necessity for us to specify, at the outset, the focus that this study will take within such a methodological setting. Here we will primarily be concerned with the 'China normalization decision-making process' in Japan, and will therefore naturally tend to concentrate upon examining the internal political changes which facilitate this decision. Yet, Pearson's references to the lack of coherence among the above approaches calls our attention to the fact that any of these approaches would only offer us a partial picture of the China decision-making process. Thus, for example, it may be quite correct for students interested in the effects of external changes on a nation's internal political processes to point to the 1971 Nixon "shocks" as the force which compelled Japan to reappraise its China policy. But students fully aware of the intricacies of Japanese factionalism would instead, no doubt, point to the exigency of replacing the Sato Cabinet with one supported by a factional coalition prepared to back the new Cabinet in its moves to normalize relations with China. Admittedly, the Nixon "shocks" may have provided some of the impetus for this change, but internal factors also played an important role. In other words, these approaches can only offer a partial explanation of a particular event when more than one important actor, or factor, plays a lead role in that event.

In order to avoid some of the pitfalls of attributing the China policy decision to one predominant actor or factors, without having examined others which may have been equally if not more important, this
study therefore examines both the external and internal influences which affected Japan's decision to normalize relations with China. In this respect, we will first consider the interpretation of the policy-making process in Japan which is generally given by students of Japanese policy-making. The quintessence of this interpretation is that a ruling elite of LDP politicians, senior bureaucrats, and big business leaders hold near exclusive power in the policy-making process. After drawing attention to the limitations of employing such a simplistic expository model to explain the Japanese policy-making process, we will then turn to a specific discussion of the China normalization process, first investigating the changes which occurred in the external environment to influence or make possible the adoption of a new China policy in Japan. Next, we will turn to analyze the role of the ruling elite in the decision-making process -- the LDP, bureaucracy, and big business -- to determine if these actors did in fact hold predominant influence in this particular case. Finding their role insufficient to fully explain the China policy decision-making process, we will then go on to discuss the important role played by certain opposition party politicians in influencing the outcome of this decision, followed lastly by a discussion of the press and public opinion. In this way, we may in our conclusion therefore hope to offer an explanation of some of the external and internal forces that played a role in influencing the 'China normalization process.'
Theoretical Perspective

The Policy-Making Process in Japan

The policy-making process in Japan is most commonly analyzed in terms of a tripartite elite model which focuses upon the leaders of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), senior bureaucrats, and leaders of big business (or zaikai). The members of this elite are considered to be a 'natural' ruling coalition sharing common values, opinions, educational experiences and social ties.

On a functional level, the members of this tripartite elite coalition are intertwined through their mutual dependence upon one another — the LDP is dependent upon the bureaucrats for expertise in drafting legislation, and upon businessmen for political contributions. Naturally, the bureaucrats in their turn are dependent upon the good will of the LDP politicians in making political decisions favourable to their ministries. For senior bureaucrats the LDP moreover offers the opportunity for them to move over into politics after retirement from the bureaucracy. Finally, the zaikai has a stake in seeing that legislation pertaining to business operations is influenced by its wishes and thus seeks favours with both LDP politicians and influential bureaucrats within the various governmental ministries.

With varying degrees of emphasis, this group is considered to hold political power and control of the policy-making process in Japan. For instance, Fukui, in this study of economic planning in post-war Japan, concludes that the tripartite coalition of LDP leaders, senior bureaucrats and big business leaders hold "the predominant,
almost exclusive," role in the policy-making process. Moreover, Thayer quite explicitly states at the beginning of an article that: "Security policy like other major policy in Japan is the product of interaction among the business federations, the bureaucracy, and the conservative politicians,...," and later asserts that: "The conservative power structure, then, is composed of three elements -- the businessman, the bureaucrat, and the politician." In the same way, Yanaga finds little to question in this latter assertion: "...organized business, the party government, and the administrative bureaucracy are the three legs of the tripod on which the Japanese political system rests." However, unlike Thayer, who comes down in favour of the predominant position of the politicians in the policy-making process, Yanaga seems to see big business in this central role:

It participates in the formulation of the legislative program, the budget, and fiscal and financial policies. Defense policy and defense production are of direct concern to business. Zaikai plays a decisive role in economic planning,...and zoning, as well as trade and tariff policy and tax structure.

In regards to the above, there is evidence from the empirical world to support the contention that one of the members of the ruling coalition holds sway in the policy-making process. Yanaga, for instance, observes in a case study of Japan's National Atomic Energy Policy that the adoption of an effective energy policy "has been due mainly to the initiatives of organized business." In contrast, Hellman's study of the peace agreement with the Soviet Union supports Thayer's emphasis upon the dominant role of the Liberal Democratic Party in the policy-
-making process. He not only found that "policy control rested overwhelmingly in the hands of the ruling party,"11 but also that "(t)he habatsu [factional] struggle became synonymous with the foreign policy-making process as political conflict revolved around the question of Soviet relations."12 In this case, except for the fishing industry, which "did play an effective role in the formation of Japanese policy,"13 big business groups were subordinate in their policy influence14 as was the bureaucracy.15

Still, Misawa quite explicitly states that it is in fact the third member of the tripartite coalition -- the bureaucracy -- that holds sway in the policy-making process, since there is a "...tendency for the decision-making power to be concentrated in bureaucratic organizations."16 Likewise, Tsurutani echoes this argument when he claims that the Foreign Ministry bureaucracy dominates the foreign policy-making process in Japan.17 Once again, there is certain evidence to suggest that one member of the coalition predominates in the policy-making process. Thus, in his study of LDP's China policy before normalization, Fukui concludes that it was the Foreign Ministry which established the guidelines for the LDP's China policy.18

Given the aforementioned interpretations of the policy-making process in Japan, it appears that there is one proposition, and at least three variants, that may help us in explaining the China normalization process:

1. That the policy-making process in Japan is dominated by a ruling coalition of leaders of the LDP, the senior bureaucrats, and leaders of big business.
a. That within this group the LDP dominates.

b. That within this group big business dominates.

c. That within this group the bureaucracy dominates.

It must be confessed that from an analytical viewpoint it is appealing to consider this coalition as one which controls the policy-making process in Japan. Such a conclusion is nevertheless premature and spurious because other actors and factors play a role in influencing this process.\(^{19}\) For instance, in respect to the role of the opposition parties in policy-making, Langdon points out that it has been the Socialists, and the support of popular pacifistic tendencies that "...has probably been the chief goad in enforcing the narrow interpretation given to permissible Japanese defense efforts."\(^{20}\) Referring again to Hellmann, he found that the Socialists played a role in supporting Hatoyama's efforts to settle the peace treaty issue.\(^{21}\) Finally, as we will see later, certain members of the opposition parties played a significant role in the decision to recognize the People's Republic of China.\(^{22}\)

Similarly, the press and public opinion play a varied role in policy-making processes, relatively impotent on some issues, yet forming an effective pressure group on others.\(^{23}\) On a general level, Langdon posits that: "Public views clearly can not control government policy but they are not ignored."\(^{24}\) In this regard, one would expect that the influence of public opinion, which as Scalapino laments is greatly influenced by the "leftist" press,\(^{25}\) would be most effective in
relation to domestic issues of direct concern to the masses. In fact, Scalapino and Masumi concur that the issues of direct concern to them "...are essentially domestic, practical, and highly personal issues." Thus, in regard to foreign policy issues, Hellmann found in one study that the general public was uninterested and ill-informed about such issues, but in another study revealed that they are nonetheless interested in issues pertaining to Japan's security arrangements, especially when they revolve around the question of Japan's security ties with the United States. As we will see later, there has also been fluctuating mass interest in the China issue in Japan.

Finally, insofar as the role of the press is concerned, Matsuyama argues that, "...undeniably, the press has become increasingly influential in the formation of Japanese foreign policy." Certainly, the study of the 1960 crisis by Whittemore and the one by Packard lend support to Matsuyama's contention. In this particular case, the influence of the press "helped switch the issue from the treaty itself to the question of Kishi's competence to lead the government." The study by Hellmann, in contrast, outlines that the press can in no way "...serve as a catalyst, providing order and clarity in what was a highly chaotic situation." In fact, Hellmann discovered that the newspapers in Japan "...did not provide the basis for clear and relevant policy discussion" since they were "...undifferentiatedly reporting all the facts in the Soviet negotiations."

The fact that actors other than those in the tripartite elite are involved in the policy-making process in Japan thus demonstrates
the limited utility of this model in attempting to explain a particular policy decision such as the Japan-China normalization process. In short, the policy-making process in Japan is too complex a process to be subsumed under a simple tripartite elite model of policy-making. Essentially, this is what Fukui argues when he outlines the reasons why the model is not applicable to particular policy-making situations: firstly, "...diversity of interests leads to divisions of opinion on specific policy issues and prevents the members of the elite from uniting and rallying behind particular policy decisions or programs; and secondly "...important policy issues usually interest and involve many individuals and groups in the society at large, far beyond the boundaries of the power elite." This point is elucidated elsewhere by Fukui when he states: "Foreign policy process in Japan is not under the rigid and exclusive control of any single group of actors or factors. It is a flexible, dynamic, and fluid process subject to vagaries of circumstances, issues and personalities." In a broader context, Rosenau concurs that "...the number and identity of the roles, both in and out of government, that are politically active at any moment in time are manifestly a consequence of the nature of the issues that the system is processing at that moment." Finally, Pempel argues that to assume "...that something in the nature of the issue under debate will trigger significantly different decision-mechanisms or processes," is a promising approach to utilize in studies of policy-making. Accordingly, it would seem appropriate to consider the issue of the normalization of Japan-China relations within such a setting.
To commence with, the policy-making process involved in the China normalization issue falls within the functional area of foreign policy. Both Langdon and Pempel suggest that a functional category is an important way to delineate issues, so that we may find that our case study of the China issue shares certain characteristics in common with those studies carried out by Packard and Hellman. This would appear to be the case, especially as all three studies are "yes" "no" decisions leaving "...little or no room for compromise, and policy-making becomes a high conflict, zero sum game for those taking opposing sides."

This suggests that a further category should deal with the characteristics of the policy; namely, whether or not the policy decision is of controversy either within or between the policy-making actors. This category is similar to the one suggested by Pempel in that his "total" policy-making involves controversy between the progressive and conservative camps. Certainly, in the case of China, the policy-making environment was highly controversial, but this controversy was most important in its intra-party, rather than in its inter-party, manifestation.

Finally, a third category that may facilitate an understanding of the particular actors that are involved in an issue is that of the temporal dimension of the issue area. In this respect numerous scholars, most notably Hermann, have pointed out the necessity of distinguishing crisis decision-making from other types of decision-making, crisis decisions being made in conditions of 1) high threat to national goals
2) short time for response 3) surprise. The point is that such decisions are considered to be sufficiently different from longer term decisions, in respect to the increase in importance of idiosyncratic and systemic variables, and the decrease in importance of societal factors, that these types of policy-making process are expected to differ substantially. Even so, Lowi argues that there is actually a similarity between crisis decision-making and acts such as recognition. But considering his argument is based on the premise that there is little immediate domestic political consequences in these decision-making acts, there seems evidence to suggest that in the case of the normalization of relations with China, this is not the case.

As a matter of fact, Fukui considers the China normalization process as an example of crisis decision-making, but fails to define precisely what he means by this. Quite clearly, he hardly meant the same as Hermann by the term, since only one of the aforementioned conditions did occur during the 'process' i.e., that of a relatively short time for response. Indeed it might be argued that none of Japan's post-war policy decisions have been made in a crisis environment. Nonetheless, despite the failure of Fukui to define the precise meaning he gives to this term, he still makes the important point that "...crisis and noncrisis are not dichotomous situations sharply distinguishable from each other but are merely two moving points on a continuum." If we take this continuum to be that of the temporal dimension, bounded on one side by crisis decisions, such as that of Korea,
and on the other with long-term slow decisions, such as the Monroney Resolution, then the China decision would be closer to the crisis end of the continuum. The point is that when important decision-making actors perceive an issue to be urgent, as in the case of China normalization Tanaka apparently did, then it is more likely that this issue will win out in the competition for scarce resources (time, energy, attention, money, manpower, and good will) which any issue must compete for.

Following from the above, then, we can see that the China decision falls within 1) the functional area of foreign policy 2) is controversial in characteristic 3) is urgent on the temporal dimension. Thus, the conclusions we draw from this study of the China normalization process may provide insights into other issues that similarly fall within these three categories.
External Environment

Introduction

Input from the external environment is an important variable to consider in any attempt to understand a foreign policy-making process. This is particularly true in respect to Japan, which is considered by some authors as a "penetrated" political system, and even among Japanese experts is considered to be greatly affected by continuity and change in the international environment. This tendency to consider Japan as peculiarly affected by the external environment led Silverstein to posit an "External Dominance" model as a useful framework to employ when examining short-term issues (less than one year), or foreign policy goals. While this framework might thus be of utility in examining the China normalization process, it is of less use in examining longer term issues because "...far from bowing to external pressures, Japan has fought any shift in its policies relating to the attainment of its long-range national goals." A foremost proponent of the "External Dominance" model is Donald C. Hellmann, who argues in his study of the Soviet Peace Treaty negotiations that:

Unless the pattern of policy formulation and leadership displayed in the Soviet negotiations is radically reversed, Japan seems destined to remain a passive actor on the international stage, reacting to, not leading events despite increasing potential for autonomous action.

Hellman echoes this position in a later article, where he suggests that: "When the Japanese have had to confront policy choices, they have responded in a stumbling manner...or have procrastinated until external..."
events compelled a decision..." In point of fact Hellmann insists that: "To an extraordinary extent during the past two decades, Japan's international role has been reactive, defined almost entirely by the outside environment....It is to the external environment, then, that one should look for stimuli."62

Japan's Early Post-War Foreign Policy

Certainly, Japan's recognition of the Republic of China (ROC) government on Taiwan in the immediate post-war illustrates that, at this time, Japan's policy-making process was peculiarly affected by external factors. It is a well-accepted fact that it was due to the pressure of the United States, in particular that of Secretary of State Dulles, that Japan signed a peace treaty with the Nationalist Chinese government on Taiwan, as the price exacted for the passage of the Japanese peace treaty through the United States Senate.63 Although Prime Minister Yoshida made an effort to leave the possibility of improving relations with China open by drafting a letter to the United States emphasizing that the peace treaty applied solely to territory under the control of the Nationalist government, successive conservative governments accepted relations with the Republic of China on the political and economic level, leading to the de jure recognition of the ROC government on Taiwan as the legitimate government of China. Of course, maintaining such a policy was in line with the United Nations' acceptance of the ROC as de jure government of China, but more importantly, it went hand in hand with Japan's relationship with the United States, especially in respect to the continuation of the United States-Japan Security Treaty, which formed
part of the United States security system aimed at 'containing' Chinese and Soviet communism. It seems clear, therefore, that from the outset the relationship between Japan and the United States did much to determine Japan's post-war China policy.

Changes in the External Environment

Commencing in the 1970s, however, a number of nascent changes in the international environment emerged, which were propitious to a major re-direction of Japan's China policy, away from a prior policy decrying the "separation of politics and economics" (seiki bunri), to one compatible with that of the Chinese doctrine of the "inseparability of politics and economics" (seikei fukabun).65

In the first place, both Canada and Italy extended diplomatic relations to China. Secondly, and of more importance, a change was in progress regarding the role of the United States in the Far East after the enunciation of the 'Nixon Doctrine' at Guam in 1969. Essentially, the tenet of this policy was that the burden of security for the area should be carried by the Asian nations themselves rather than by the United States continuing to serve as a bulwark against communism through heavy military commitment to the area.66 The declaration of the Nixon Doctrine was of particular importance as it pertained to Japan, for Prime Minister Sato signed a joint communique with President Nixon in November 1969 in which he concurred that the security interests of Japan were intimately linked with those of Taiwan and Korea. i.e., Sato agreed that the Japan would permit the United States use of military bases in Japan to defend Taiwan and
That Sato succumbed to the wishes of the United States in recognizing Japan's presumed security interests in these countries is basically the cost that Sato had to pay for the return of Okinawa to Japan.

The Change in the United States China Policy

While the changes outlined above indicate that the international system was gradually transforming its configuration, the event which clearly adumbrated that Japan would shortly be compelled to reconsider its policy towards China was when Washington extended official contacts to Peking. This commenced when Henry Kissenger made a secret visit to China in June, 1971, followed by the announcement on July 15th that President Nixon would visit China. From the Japanese point of view, the lack of any prior consultation informing them of this change in United States policy was a 'stab in the back' and a personal loss of face for Prime Minister Sato. In point of fact, it was the Sato government itself that received the blame for "...the intolerable loss of face and humiliation suffered by the entire nation."

As a result of the absence of any prior consultation concerning the realignment of the United States' China policy in violation of previous understandings between the two countries, the Japanese government's confidence in its ally was naturally undermined. Most certainly the first of the Nixon 'shocks' considerably weakened the basis of Japan's post-war foreign policy which had been established on the premise of close ties between Japan and the United States. When to this was added the "shocks" on the economic level,
the presumed special relationship between Japan and the United States was brought seriously into question. In fact, while Nixon and Kissinger were "...paying homage rhetorically to the supreme importance of the alliance, in their personal approaches and private statements, [they] raised substantial doubts about their true attitudes toward Japan." Finally, the Nixon "shocks" implied that the "...Sato government could not justify its China policy as it had before under the pretext of the pressure and constraints placed on it by the United States."71

Despite these moves on the part of the United States, the Sato government was still prepared to be the only important power to back the United States in its attempt to prevent the seating of the Peking government in the United Nations. This was done by proposing a draft resolution for the dual representation system in which both the Taipei and Peking governments would hold a seat in the United Nations, and by co-sponsoring the "important question" resolution of the United States which required a two-thirds majority of the General Assembly before Taiwan could lose its seat. Needless to say, it was at the October 1971 meeting of the United Nations that the U.S. proposal was defeated and the Albanian 'sole government' motion was adopted by the Assembly, thereby giving the China seat in the United Nations to the Peking government.72

Still, it had not been at all certain that Japan would be prepared to co-sponsor the United States resolution in the United Nations. This was particularly true after the Foreign Ministry indicated to Secretary
of State Rogers that it was uncertain whether or not Japan would back the United States in the United Nations and, of more importance, after Foreign Minister Fukuda and LDP factions leaders Takeo Miki and Yosuhiro Nakasone stated publicly that they were not in favour of attempting to try and keep a seat for Taiwan in the United Nations.

Prime Minister Sato was prepared to concede to the principle of 'one China' but not to act in a way that might threaten the safety of Taiwan's seat in the United Nations, or Japan's continuing political and commercial interests on the island. Evidently at this time Sato was under pressure from the United States to continue the previously upheld pro-Taiwan position in the UN. In the words of Fukui:

Apart from his concern about the impact of Japan's negative action on the attitudes of Australia, New Zealand, etc., which the U.S. apparently emphasized, he was obviously worried about possible impact on the U.S. attitude on the textile problem, which was entering the final and critical phase, and the actual reversion of Okinawa, which was scheduled for next spring.

As a matter of fact, it was revealed a few days before Sato finally announced the decision that Japan would co-sponsor the U.S. resolution that for "administrative reasons" there had been a delay in the presentation of the Okinawa pact agreement to the U.S. Senate, although it was denied that the U.S. was trying to pressure Japan into following its policy in the UN. Nevertheless, the Japanese government submitted, and thereby clearly illustrated that Japan's policy-making process was under important and obvious constraints from the United States.
Although the United States had backed Taiwan in the United Nations it became evident after Nixon's visit to China in February 1972 that there had been a change in American policy in respect to the Taiwan government. This is illustrated in the Shanghai communique by the fact that the U.S. government no longer upheld the position it had established at the outbreak of the Korean war; namely, that the status of Taiwan "must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan [signed in 1951], or consideration by the U.N.," but now virtually admitted that Taiwan is a part of Chinese territory: "the U.S. acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Straits maintain that there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The U.S. government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves." The Chinese side, it is understood, gave an unwritten promise that it would not use force to regain Taiwan in exchange for the above U.S. declaration and its commitment to reduce American forces in Taiwan. In spite of this, Kissinger continued to say that the U.S. was still committed to its security treaty with Taiwan, as did the President in the State of the World Report for 1972.

Insofar as Prime Minister Sato and his successor Tanaka were concerned, however, the Sino-American detente and the accompanying communique implied that the commitment that Sato had earlier made to Nixon in the 1969 communique, namely that Taiwan is important to Japan's security, had been seriously undermined by the change in circumstances brought about by these events. In Tanaka's words: "The Taiwan clause
stated the understanding by the then top leaders of the two countries on the situation in that area. Since then, the situation has undergone drastic changes. Fortunately, for the present, the possibility of an armed dispute actually arising over this area hardly exists. Accordingly, the above-mentioned understanding has changed.⁷⁹ After the normalization of relations with China, Tanaka went even further by declaring that: "The U.S. and China are no longer in a situation where they cannot have talks with each other. Consequently such a situation (as the invoking of the U.S. – Japan Security Treaty) can be avoided, and there is no possibility of such a situation arising."⁸⁰

The meeting in August 1972 between Prime Minister Tanaka and President Nixon in Hawaii indicated nevertheless, that the United States did not share in the Japanese government's interpretation of the "Taiwan clause," and still considered the application of the security treaty to Taiwan an important element of the United States – Japan Security Treaty.⁸¹ Even though at this meeting there was no specific reference to the "Taiwan Clause" and Tanaka only concurred with Nixon that Japan would continue to support the security treaty, the continued "...American insistence on the application of the security treaty to Taiwan in spite of its detente with China suggests that the Far East clauses remain for the U.S. the most prized part of the treaty."⁸² Naturally, in this context the moves made by the Tanaka government to normalize relations with China were perfectly understandable to the American leaders who had initiated the detente with China.⁸³ In short, they allowed the Tanaka government a 'free hand'
in dealing with China, but only because this was compatible with the
new balance of power diplomacy of Nixon and Kissinger.

Chinese Foreign Policy Outputs

Besides considering the effect of the United States-China
policy on the development of Sino-Japanese relations, it is of course
also important to examine the effect of the foreign policy outputs of
the Chinese government on this relationship. In this respect the most
important outputs pertain to the Chinese government’s attitudes toward
1) the United States-Japan Security treaty and revival of Japanese
militarism, 2) the Sato government, and 3) the Tanaka government.

Chinese Attitudes Towards the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and
Japanese Militarism

It was natural for the Chinese government to assume a negative
attitude towards the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty which was expressly
constructed for the purpose of combatting Chinese and Soviet communism.
From the Chinese point of view, the Security Treaty was designed to aid
the revival of Japanese militarism. Concern over the revival of
militarism was expressed as early as 1950, and then periodically through
the 1960s, but it was after the release of the Sato-Nixon joint commu-
nique in 1969 that Chinese concern became particularly noticeable. As
Emmerson describes it:

Publication of the Sato-Nixon communique
produced shock waves in Peking....The focus
was on the revival of Japanese militarism,
alleged by the Chinese to be revealed by the
reference in the communique to security, par-
ticularly to the tying together of Japan's
security with that of South Korea and the
"Taiwan area." The Peking People's Daily
attacked the Sato-Nixon agreements as a 'criminal plot of the United States and Japanese reactionaries,' and Chou En-lai cited the communique as proof of Sato's ambition to revive Japanese militarism and build another 'Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.'

The Chinese government continued to express anti-Japanese propaganda and reference to the revival of militarism through press releases and official statements during 1970 and 1971. After October '71, however, there was a gradual decline in reference to Japanese militarism and a discontinuation in official reference to this question after the visit of Nixon to China. One of the reasons for this change in Chinese attitude resulted from the development of more cordial relations between the United States and China. A further, perhaps more crucial reason in terms of the realignment of the bipolar world, was the fact that the Soviet Union precipitated China in its overtures to Japan by expressing a preparedness to negotiate a peace treaty with Japan and allow its participation in the development of Siberian resources. So that now, instead of concentrating upon the revival of militarism and abrogation of the security treaty, the Chinese government aimed at preventing a rapprochement between the USSR and Japan.

As Yao makes clear:

In the early stages of the CCP foreign policy change, the undermining of the alliance between the United States and Japan was one of its chief diplomatic goals. Later on, when Moscow was doing her utmost to attract Japan, the CCP ceased criticizing the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and Japanese militarism and started to do all it could to stop rapprochement between the USSR and Japan.
Not only did the Chinese government cease from making inflammatory statements concerning the United States - Japan Security Treaty and revival of Japanese militarism, but Nakamura suggests that there may have been a clearance from Peking for the continuing presence of U.S. forces in Taiwan as a "deterrent" against any moves by the Soviet Union. In any event, the development of a new Chinese attitude towards Japan, in respect to the revival of militarism and the U.S. - Japan Security Treaty, represented a necessary step that had to be taken before normalization of Japan-China relations could proceed.

**Chinese Attitudes Towards the Sato Government's Evolving China Policy**

Although the Chinese government had at first been expectant that Sato would initiate moves to improve Sino-Japanese relations, it soon became apparent that he was not going to step beyond the confines of the previous LDP government's "two-China" policy favouring Taiwan politically. Indeed, his strong anti-communist bias and adoption of policies appertaining to such a prejudice, ineluctably led to the creation of a pronounced sense of distrust and suspicion between the Chinese and Japanese governments. Concomittantly, Sato was continually charged with reviving Japanese militarism and assisting in U.S. imperialistic designs in Asia. The extent to which the Chinese government was opposed to dealing with the Sato government is demonstrated by the fact that Sato was considered one of the "four main enemies" of the People's Republic.

Regardless of the fact that the Chinese government was
unprepared to deal with him. Prime Minister Sato at the beginning of the 1970s began to indicate a more positive posture towards the Chinese government, symptomatic of an evolving new China policy. In his 1970 annual policy speech, for instance, he hinted there was a possibility that government to government contacts could be established with China. Moreover, after the United States initiated its "ping-pong diplomacy", Sato attempted to bring about official contacts between the Japanese and Chinese governments. In this respect, in April 1971 he tried to establish a line of communication through the efforts of the chairman of the newly appointed LDP China Committee, Noda, who agreed to visit China on behalf of the Prime Minister. However, "...the plan aborted due to the lack of response from the Chinese side. Noda nevertheless drafted in June a three-part proposal for normalization, which explicitly recognized the PRC as the legitimate government of China, and Taiwan as part of Chinese territory but did not deny the validity of the 1952 peace treaty between Japan and the Republic of China.

Along the lines of this draft by Noda, LDP Secretary General Hori drew up a secret letter to the Peking government in early October, and requested the left-wing Tokyo Governor Minobe to deliver the letter for him. In this letter, which was approved by Prime Minister Sato and Foreign Minister Fukuda, Hori expressed a desire to visit China to begin negotiations and ostensibly accepted the first two of China's three principles -- that Peking is the legitimate government of China and that Taiwan is a part of Chinese territory -- and conveyed that the third principal -- the abrogation of the Japan-ROC peace treaty --
would be met through negotiations between the two governments.  

The necessity for Sato to replace his moribund China policy had become particularly manifest after the July '71 announcement of President Nixon's impending visit to China. The Chinese, however, were still unprepared to negotiate with the Sato government as Premier Chou considered that neither Prime Minister Sato nor the Hori letter could be trusted. In specific reference to the letter, Chou indicated that his government could not accept the conditions outlined by Hori because he had not clarified Japan would abrogate the peace treaty with Taiwan or that Peking was the sole government of China. Another reason for Chou's rejection of the Hori letter probably resulted from Japan's anti-Peking posture in the United Nations. Whatever may have been the true reason for the rejection of the letter by China, the point was that by sending the letter under the name of the LDP secretary general "its rejection by the PRC would not directly hurt" either Sato or his choice for the next presidency, Fukuda.

Even before this letter was delivered by Governor Minobe in early November 1971, Sato had made a speech in October in which he acknowledged for the first time that the Peking government was the legitimate government of China and expressed his hope that the question of Taiwan would be resolved "through negotiations between the parties concerned." By March 1972 this policy stance had been incorporated into the Sato government's "unified view" on the China problem, which Foreign Minister Fukuda presented to the House of Representatives Budget Committee at this time.
The expression of this unified view removed the formal obstacle to normalization of Sino-Japanese relations by recognizing the Peking government's claim to sovereignty over China and hence by implication over Taiwan. The continued Chinese refusal to have any dealings with the Sato government, nonetheless, reveals that the real obstacle to the improvement of Sino-Japanese relations was Sato himself, or more precisely the Chinese government's attitude towards the Prime Minister. Thus, upon his return from China in late April 1972 one of the contenders for the next presidency, Takeo Miki, declared: "I regret to say that it is difficult to restore Japan-China diplomatic relations under the Sato government. It is the task of the new government." Fundamentally, the Chinese government's refusal to have any dealings with the Sato government attested it was not merely difficult but well high impossible for normalization of relations to be achieved while Sato was in power. Sato "no doubt would have desired to have the China problem resolved" before the end of his term in office, but the maintenance of a rigid attitude on the part of the Chinese government meant that the normalization of relations had to await the inauguration of the next LDP cabinet.

With regard to the above, the Chinese government had conveyed to the various missions visiting China that it would cooperate in establishing relations once Sato was removed from office. When the Komeito mission visited China in May 1972, for example, Chou stated that: "we will welcome the New Prime Minister visiting China as long as he makes an effort to bring about the realization of the three principles." Likewise, when the pro-Peking LDP Dietman Furui visited Peking at
about the time he "...received an impression that China would give considerable latitude and flexibility to the concrete application of the three principles and would not attach any condition other than the three principles." Indeed, Chou clarified that two possible problem areas — war reparations and the 1969 Sato-Nixon communique — would not stand in the way of normalizing relations. We are thus driven to conclude that without the replacement of the Sato cabinet with one that not only satisfied the intra-party requirements (so far as factional considerations were concerned), but also met with the approval of the Chinese government, Japan could hardly have normalized its relations with China.

**Chinese Attitudes Towards the Tanaka Government**

Upon the inauguration of the new Cabinet on July 7th, 1972, Tanaka made it clear that his government intended to normalize Japan's relations with China. In contradistinction to its attitude towards the Sato government, the Chinese government expressed that it was willing to cooperate with Tanaka in carrying out this historic task. For example, when Tanaka declared at his inauguration that: "I would like to promote the normalization of diplomatic relations. The time is ripe," Chou responded by saying: "I welcome the statement." Thus, so long as the Tanaka government was prepared to meet the conditions of the three principles, the normalization of relations with China would be able to proceed smoothly.

In the above respect Tanaka had only directly stated that he "understood" the three principles outlined by the Chinese government
as the basis for normalization of Sino-Japanese relations. Yet a number of statements made by the previous Sato government, his own government, and his Foreign Minister, Ohira conveyed the impression that the new government already accepted the three principles as the basis of its negotiating posture with the Chinese government. In the first place, as was mentioned previously, the Sato government had earlier accepted the Peking government as the legitimate government of China and thereby fulfilled the conditions of one of the three principles. The second principle had been admitted through a number of "leaks" to the press by the Tanaka government. Finally, Foreign Minister Ohira had admitted to the third principle at the beginning of August when he declared that the treaty with the ROC would lose its validity when relations between Japan and China were established. Accordingly, the acceptance of the three principles by the Tanaka government combined with the cooperative and flexible attitude of the Chinese government presaged that the normalization of relations would only be a matter of time.

Conclusion:

In this discussion, it should be made clear that from the early post-war years Japan's China policy has been affected by its relationship with the United States. While the recognition of China by the International community (as signified by its seating in the United Nations) played a part in compelling Japan to move towards recognition of China, it was probably the earlier Nixon "shock" that forced Japan to do so more than any other external factor. Kim echoes this argument
when he states that: "The epoch-making event was possible due more to the Nixon 'shock' of 1971 than to any other single factor."\textsuperscript{111}

Such an interpretation of the influence of the external environment on the foreign policy-making process in Japan implies that the "External Dominance" model may be of utility in examining short-term controversial foreign policy issues such as the China issue. Indeed, the fact that Japan continued in its subordinate relationship with the United States was signified by the Japanese government's decision to follow the policy of supporting Taiwan in the United Nations, despite the failure of the Nixon administration to consult or even advise Japan of the change in U.S. China policy.

At the same time, it is also important to note the influence of Chinese foreign policy outputs on Japan's foreign policy-making process. In this respect, it should be clear from the above that moves to establish contacts with China by the United States, and the normalization of relations carried out by Japan, were only possible because of the friendly posture taken by the Peking government towards these two countries. The reasons for China's change in policy towards Japan are outlined by Omori:

Following the end of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and particularly after the fall of Lin Piao, power had been regained by the old leaders who recognized the need to restore relations with Japan as a means, among other things, of achieving the targets of China's fourth 5 year plan. Further, the normalization of relations between the two countries would strengthen Prime Minister Chou En-lai's own position. Further, the Soviet Union, having regained its international voice
as a result of the U.S.-Soviet summit talks in Moscow and having achieved great diplomatic successes vis-à-vis West Europe, was now shifting the weight of its diplomatic effort to Asia. China, through the Sino-American summit talks in Peking, is contributing indirectly to the speed up of the withdrawal of American forces from Asia, but fears the Soviet Union's advances in Asia as a renewal of that threat once posed by the U.S. In order to prevent the growth of Soviet influence in Asia, it is necessary for the Chinese to normalize and stabilize its relations with Japan.  

The fact that China adopted a new foreign policy for these reasons should amply demonstrate that it was the influence of both Chinese and American foreign policy outputs that compelled Japan to establish relations with the PRC, the new U.S. China policy being the most direct and tangible influence. Thus, we would agree that in regard to short-term issues such as Japan's normalization of relations with China, Japan's foreign policy-making process is affected by change in the external environment. However, as we shall see in the following discussion of internal influences on Japan's foreign policy-making process, external influences were not the only forces that played a role in bringing about the normalization of Japan-China relations.
Internal Environment

Introduction

In respect to the internal political environment of Japan, we will be primarily concerned with identifying and assessing the influence of the various policy-making actors on the China normalization process. It is argued by some, as mentioned at the outset of this paper, that the tripartite elite coalition plays a decisive if not all-encompassing role in Japan's policy-making process. Since we are here discussing a controversial and urgent (short-term) foreign policy issue we can thus test the proposition, and propositional variants that were culled from the pertinent literature (pp. 6-7), to determine their applicability in analyzing the role of the tripartite elite in this policy-making process. After analyzing the role of the elite (LDP, bureaucracy and business), we will then proceed to discuss the role of the opposition parties, press and public opinion in the China policy-making process.

The LDP's China Policy

Since the merger of the Liberal and Democratic parties in 1955, until the resignation of Sato in July 1972, the LDP followed the Foreign Ministry's view that diplomatic relations should only be extended to the ROC government in Taiwan while the Peking government should be isolated diplomatically though not economically. This policy of the "separation of economics and politics" came under increasing criticism by pro-Peking elements in the party during the 1960s. Consequently, a number of groups were organized on a cross-
factional basis to pressure the Sato government into adopting a more flexible attitude towards the Peking government.

These pro-Peking groups were organized separately from the official foreign policy organs, such as the Investigating Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Foreign Affairs division which, being dominated by the mainstream factions, naturally supported the continuation of the pro-Taiwan Sato government's policy. After earlier endeavours to organize intra-party pressure groups had ended in their disbandenment under pressure from the pro-Taiwan party leadership, pro-Peking LDPers (drawn largely from the Fujuyama, Kono, Matsumura, Miki, and Ono factions) organized in 1965 the Afro-Asian Study Group, as a rival to the mainstream pro-Taiwan Asian Problems Study Group, which had been organized in December 1964. The leading spokesmen of the pro-Peking organization such as Furui, Matsumura, Tagawa, and Utsunomiya criticized the pro-Taiwan policy of the Sato government. This criticism was carried out in the Diet, within party circles, and when these politicians visited China to discuss Memorandum Trade. This latter activity in particular meeting with the disapproval of the Sato Cabinet.

In 1968 a further informal party organ was created in the form of the Discussion Group for New Policy, which drew its membership from across the LDP factions. The Discussion Group's China Committee was headed by A Ichiro Fujiyama, who later became one of the most outspoken critics of the Sato government's China policy, and the leader of the Dietmen's League for the Normalization of Japanese-Chinese Relations, which was organized in 1970 with the participation of over a quarter of LDP
politicians, as well as members of the opposition parties.  

While Fujiyama did not take such an avowedly pro-Peking stand until 1970, Takeo Miki, a contender in the 1972 presidential election, sharply criticized the Sato government's China policy after he left the Sato Cabinet in 1968, and had, by 1971, come to recognize the Peking government's claim to be the sole legitimate government of China. Nakasone, who also had hopes of the presidency, followed Miki in recognizing the Peking government's claim. Lastly, Ohira, who became the Foreign Minister in the Tanaka Cabinet, called on Sato to move away from his pro-Taiwan China policy, and deal with the China problem in terms of a "one China" formula.

In addition to the mounting criticism of the Sato government's China policy from the pro-Peking groups within the party, and the above mentioned prominent LDP politicians, young LDP Dietmen in the Showa Society also pressed the government to move away from its pro-Taiwan policy. With the Nixon announcements, and the seating of Peking in the United Nations, the moderate elements within the party also began to recognize that the party's China policy was anachronistic and needed to be made "compatible" with the new changes in the international environment. By the time Tanaka was elected, this gradual but ineluctable movement towards a pro-Peking policy within the LDP had come to replace the previous pro-Taiwan orientation as the dominant view within the party. Consequently, from now on the pro-Taiwan members of the ruling party were fighting a rear guard action to try and protect Japan's relations with Taiwan, economically if not politically.
The 1972 Presidential Election

The election of the new Premier, Kakuei Tanaka, was the single most important domestic event facilitating the normalization of relations between Japan and China. The resignation of Sato in early July, and his replacement by a prime minister backed by a factional coalition prepared to normalize relations with China, at the cost of severing diplomatic relations with Taiwan, made the normalization of relations a foregone conclusion. Hence, as Langdon postulates: "...a change in party leadership is likely to result in a change in foreign policy."

Besides Tanaka, who won the LDP presidential election and thus became the new Prime Minister of Japan, there were also several other contenders for this important post. Initially, there were five prominent LDP politicians seeking the presidency -- Takeo Miki, Yasuhiro Nakasone, Masayoshi Ohira (replacing Shigesaburo Maeo as the previous candidate for the Ikeda faction), Takeo Fukuda, and Kakuei Tanaka -- with the fight shaping up to be between Tanaka, and Sato's own choice for the presidency, Fukuda. Both Tanaka and Fukuda had by late 1971 built up a factional following of their own making them eligible for fighting the internal factional battle for LDP presidency. The other contenders all had factional followings in their own right.

Before Sato's resignation in early July, Nakasone pulled out of the presidential race in favour of Tanaka. The remaining contenders divided into two camps: in one camp Fukuda, and in the other an anti-Fukuda coalition formed of the Tanaka-Ohira and Miki factions. The anti-Fukuda coalition was based on a specific policy agreement between the
three faction leaders. In the first place, there was an agreement that: "If one among the three persons remains (placing first or second) then all of us will cooperate. In the case of two of us remaining, we will have an open election. In the case of two of us remaining, the action of the third candidate will not be bounded." Second, and of greater importance, the three leaders made a specific policy agreement expressing an "understanding that the People's Republic of China government is the sole legitimate government representing China," and furthermore agreed that: "Normalization of Japan-China relations is now the demand of the entire nation. We will enter into negotiations with a view to concluding a peace treaty with the People's Republic of China." As Kim correctly points out: "The implication of this policy statement were profound. First, the new Japanese government accepted the first one of the three principles demanded by the Chinese Communists. Second, it also implied that the Tanaka government was accepting indirectly the third principle put forward by the Chinese communists, for the new Japanese government's intention to seek a peace treaty with Peking implied the Japanese intention to do away with the existing peace treaty with Taipei." Clearly, therefore, the China issue was an important variable in this presidential election. Indeed, Hellmann correctly suggests that: "...issues, particularly international issues, come to be considered not only as to their merits as policy but as to their worth in advancing the party position of faction leaders as well." In this instance, it was undoubtedly to advance his own party position
that Tanaka made an agreement with the other factional leaders concerning the China policy.

Apart from this more opportunistic concern, there were nevertheless certain differences over China policy that distinguished Tanaka and the other coalition members from Fukuda. For the most part, Fukuda did not hold such a flexible, forward-looking position on the China issue as did the other contenders for the presidency. In particular, Fukuda was closely associated with the foreign policy position of Sato, so that his policy pronouncements on the China issue did not go beyond acceptance of Peking as the legitimate government of China. What must of course be remembered here, is that Fukuda had been circumscribed in his China policy pronouncements preceding the presidential election by the fact that he was Minister of Foreign Affairs, a Ministry renowned for its negative attitude towards the PRC. 125

Since Tanaka was the Minister of the MITI, he did not suffer the above disadvantage and was, for example, able to move away from the tight restrictions of the "Yoshida letter" by allowing the use of Export-Import Bank funds for China, upon completion of contracts and presentation of applications. Similarly, Tanaka benefited from making the China policy agreement with Miki, a pro-Peking Dietman who had declared his acceptance of the three principles, and thus the necessity of abrogating the Japan-ROC peace treaty. Finally, through such emissaries as Komeito Chairman Takeiri, and the maverick pro-Peking LDP Dietman, Furui, Tanaka let it be known that if elected LDP president (and hence Prime Minister of Japan), he would establish diplomatic relations with China. 126
The above is still not meant to suggest that before his election Tanaka was outspokenly in favour of normalizing relations with the PRC. As a matter of fact, both Tanaka and Ohira were cautious in their policy pronouncements on the China issue. While Furui advised Chou that the Tanaka-Ohira duo would work for normalization, neither of the two made a specific commitment to abide by the three principles in carrying this out. In this respect, Furui was probably correct when he suggested that the reason Tanaka "hardly touched on" the China problem, and Ohira "did not show clear and concrete views," was that their campaign strategy aimed at winning the support of the pro-Taiwan right wing members of the party as well as those clearly in favour of the Peking government. 127

Undoubtedly, this tactic paid off, because, when it came to the presidential election held on July 5th 1972, Tanaka gained enough support to make him LDP president and thus Prime Minister of Japan. This he did on the second ballot, since none of the candidates were able to gain the simple majority needed to win on the first ballot, Tanaka winning 156 votes to Fukuda's 150, with Ohira 101 and Miki 69. 128 The agreement made between Tanaka and the other members of the anti-Fukuda coalition (Miki and Ohira) now came into play so that on the second ballot Tanaka gained the support of these factions to win the presidency over Fukuda by 282 votes to 190 votes. 129 With his election to the prime ministership, Tanaka could now proceed to fulfill his promise to normalize Japan-China relations.

The LDP Policy-Making Group

The roots of the small LDP policy-making group which came to
dominate the decision-making process go back to the China policy agreement that was drawn up between Miki, Ohira, and Tanaka before the LDP presidential election took place in July. Miki was far more outspoken and demanding in his call for normalization of relations than were either Tanaka or Ohira, who tended to be much more pragmatic and cautious politicians, and it was thus at the insistence of Miki that the explicit commitment to normalize relations with China was made by these three prominent LDP politicians. This difference in political style and strategy between the Tanaka-Ohira duo and Miki, together with the fact that as Deputy Prime Minister Miki was not as intimately connected with decisions pertaining to foreign policy as were the Foreign Minister and Prime Minister, consequently meant that Miki became isolated from the core of the policy-making group which was dominated by the Tanaka-Ohira duo. Hence, "the command core of the policy-making group which emerged in July was thus a duo, rather than a trio, which place considerable premium on deliberation, discretion, and pragmatism."\(^{130}\)

Within this group, the Prime Minister apparently made the major decisions in respect to the normalization of relations, such as the decision to issue a joint àccommunique instead of a joint formula to settle either problem, but Ohira was a necessary element in the decision-making team.\(^{131}\) Indeed, Tanaka quite frankly admitted that he knew nothing about diplomacy, and would leave the arrangements for the China visit to be made by Foreign Minister Ohira.\(^{132}\) The Tanaka-Ohira duo thus worked closely together as a team that was dedicated to bringing about the realization of the Japanese government's visit to China for
the purpose of normalizing relations with the Peking government.

Although the duo naturally had the support of the pro-Peking politicians within the party, they worked without the active participation of these individuals in the policy-making process. Except, that is, for the participation of the pro-Peking maverick politician, Furui, who acted both as a pressure on the duo to carry out the normalization of relations and also as an intermediary between the Chinese and Japanese governments.

Since 1959 Furui had made active efforts to promote the restoration of relations between Japan and China and had made a number of visits to Peking during this time, three of them occurring shortly before the Tanaka visit to China. In December 1971, Furui had visited China to participate in the negotiations for Memorandum Trade and, at this time, indicated to the Chinese officials that he would like to again visit China in the following May, with the thought in mind that there would be political changes taking place in Japan at about this time that would have important consequences for the development of relations between the two countries. Before this trip was carried out Furui met with "...Ohira a number of times from around February and exchanged views on the China problem. At a certain time before my departure, we included Tanaka in our talks. On the other hand, I talked with Foreign Minister Fukuda, a number of times extremely secretly at his request. Immediately before my departure, I met Takeo Miki and Yasuhiro Nakasone, too."\textsuperscript{134}

Furui returned from his May visit with the conviction that the
Chinese side would be more than willing to deal with the post-Sato Cabinet in discussing normalization of relations between Japan and China, and would furthermore adopt a flexible attitude in their dealings with this Cabinet. By the time of Furui's next visit in September, the Tanaka Cabinet had been formed with Ohira, perhaps due to Furui's recommendation, taking up the post of Foreign Minister. This time Furui was accompanied by two other pro-Peking LDP politicians, Shunichi Matsumoto and Seiichi Tagawa, who thereby peripherally entered the policy-making group.

On this visit, which occurred about two weeks before the Tanaka mission left for Peking, Furui clearly played the role of intermediary between the Tanaka-Ohira team and the Chinese government, for he carried with him a revised draft plan of Japan's proposed joint-communique which had been agreed to by the duo and the ad hoc policy-making group of the Foreign Ministry. The Chinese response to the proposed communique was taken to Foreign Minister Ohira by China Division Head, Hashimoto, who carried Furui's report of the meeting between him and Chinese officials back to Tokyo when he returned to Japan with the LDP delegation, he was on. When Furui himself arrived in Tokyo, he held a final meeting with Ohira before the Foreign Minister left with Tanaka for China.

In his own estimation, Furui saw himself as partly responsible for formulating the schedule for the Tanaka-Ohira visit to China, as well as being an influence on deciding the final form that the joint communique took. Certainly, it would seem clear from the above discussion that this maverick LDP politician did play a perhaps indispensable role in
the normalization process. Still, as Fukui points out, he could only play such an important role in this dynamic, fluid decision-making process because of his maverick position within the LDP which allowed him to act without the usual LDP factional constraints. Similarly, the personal ties that he had developed with Chinese officials made his role as intermediary all the more possible. While this would suggest that the role he played in the decision-making process was undoubtedly atypical, it may nevertheless be that the formulation of an ad hoc policy-making group is frequently employed in Japanese politics to solve policy problems. Thus, this insight may offer us guidance in the development of a framework for studying the policy-making process in Japan.

Creating a Consensus Within the LDP

A major task that Tanaka faced in proceeding to normalize relation with China was that of developing a consensus within the LDP. Insofar as it pertains to our discussion here, Hellmann identifies two characteristics of consensus decision-making which may be present in the development of a group consensus: 1) a formal show of unanimity, and 2) participatory consultation. In the latter regard, Hellmann apparently considers this as a strategy to minimize costs in reaching decisions with the opposition parties, but it is an equally important strategy to employ in reaching decisions within the LDP when the issue at stake is highly controversial, as in the case of normalization of relations with China.

In order to bring about a consensus within the LDP on a new China policy
Tanaka specifically created an LDP Council for the Normalization of Japan-China Relations (hereafter Normalization Council) which was open to both pro-Peking and pro-Taipei LDP Dietmen. This council was organized on the 24th July 1972 with an initial membership of 249, rising quickly to over 300. In order to facilitate China discussion within the Council, a Standing Managers Council of 58 members was organized to meet twice weekly. In addition, there was a Secretariat composed of China experts and weekly meetings between the Chairman, Zentaro Kosaka and his Vice-Chairmen.

In recognition of the fact that the main problem in normalizing relations with China was now not so much with the attitude of the Chinese government, as it was with developing a consensus within the party, Chairman Kosaka stated that: "...the organ will make efforts to form a consensus in the party to facilitate the government's moves, without our meddling too much." In a broader context, Hellmann concurs that: "Each major postwar foreign policy decision has been accompanied by protracted consultation among various faction leaders, reflecting an effort to reach consensual agreement." But in this particular case, perhaps because the issue was ideological in nature, the consultation was broadened to encompass a major proportion of the LDP Dietmen.

The obvious difficulty in attempting to generate a consensus within the party was that of promoting the necessary accommodation between the pro-Taiwan and pro-Peking LDP Dietmen, particularly as such pro-Taiwan "hawks" from the Diplomatic Problems Discussion Council as
Okinori Kaya, Hirokichi Nadao, and Naokichi Kitazawa joined the Normalization Council. Although the pro-Taiwan minority members of the Council were generally prepared to accept the establishment of relations with Peking, they were fighting against the "Mainstream" to try and prevent the severing of diplomatic relations with Taiwan. The only area upon which common agreement had been reached after numerous proposals and counter proposals had been submitted by pro-Peking and pro-Taiwan members, was on the general level that normalization of relations would take place and that Tanaka would visit China. This was decided on August 2nd by Chairman Kosaka and the Vice-Chairmen, agreed to by the Normalization Council on August 9th, and accepted as party policy on August 22nd. After the de facto approval of Tanaka's visit, and the Chairmen's Meeting on the 2nd August, the government announced its basic policy on China the following day:

In the event that agreement is reached between Japan and China on the problem of normalization of relations between the two countries and diplomatic relations are established, Japan as a natural consequence, would not be able to maintain its diplomatic ties with the Republic of China. In this case, both trade and economic relations with the Republic of China and our other practical relations will likely be resolved in a realistic manner.144

This was the first time that the Tanaka government stipulated that Taiwan would be abandoned, although it was already taken for granted by the pro-Peking members of the Council and, more importantly by the Tanaka government, that diplomatic relations with the Taiwan regime would necessarily be severed upon establishing relations with the PRC.
To the pro-Taiwan group, however, the maintenance of diplomatic relations with the ROC was seen as being of prime importance throughout the Council meetings, exemplifying that they still thought in terms of a "two-Chinas" policy as the solution to the political problem of diplomatic relations. Quite clearly, such a position could be acceptable neither to the Chinese government nor to the pro-Peking LDP members of the Normalization Council. In order to gain a consensus within the party, something which Tanaka recognized as an essential prerequisite to normalization, it was necessary to draft any resolution the Council passed in sufficiently broad and ambiguous enough terms to allow accommodation of the divergent views within the party. That such a course of action was taken is clearly indicated by the text of the resolution that was finally adopted in late August on the normalization of relations with China.

Initially, the conflict between the pro-Peking and pro-Taiwan members of the Normalization Council seemed as if it would force the council to go beyond the September 10th 1972 deadline that the Tanaka Cabinet had set for reaching a consensus within the party. At the prompting of Tanaka, however, the Normalization Council came to an agreement on five general principles that were to guide the Tanaka government in normalizing relations with China, the decision being made on August 24th.

After modification of these principles because of pressure from pro-Taiwan "hawks" such as Masayuki Fujio, Ichiro Nakagawa, and Michio Watanabe, the five principles came to read as follows:

2) Respect for different political, social and other systems and non-interference in the internal affairs of the other nation. Relations with other friendly nations also should be respected.

3) Non-use of force or the threat of force.

4) Expansion of economic and cultural exchanges. Neither side should take discriminatory action.

5) Cooperation in the promotion of peace and prosperity in Asia.

Although the pro-Taiwan members of the Council stated that these principles simply echoed the 1954 Chou-Nehru principles of peace, they were of a generic enough nature to allow a "consensus" to be reached within the Council. However, one source of contention, and one to which the pro-Taiwan members of the Council specifically objected, was a proviso to the five principles stating: "There was a strong opinion that in view of the deep relations between Japan and Taiwan sufficient consideration should be given to maintaining these relations."^148

Most certainly the insertion of such a proviso was in the first place intended to mollify the pro-Taiwan members of the Council, but this phrase met with their objections because it was not considered to be as "positive" a statement as should be inserted, given Japan's existing relations with Taiwan. Through the pressure of the pro-Taiwan members of the Council the proviso was therefore modified before it was formally adopted by the LDP's Executive Council on 8th September to read: "In view of the close relationship between Japan
and the Republic of China, negotiations should be conducted giving sufficient consideration to the continuation of that relationship.\(^\text{150}\)

Of course, even with this modification there still remained the question of whether the "continuation of that relationship" would include the continuation of diplomatic relations, since the Executive Board left this delicate question to Tanaka's own decision.\(^\text{151}\) Given the views expressed in the government's basic policy on China, it nevertheless seems quite obvious Tanaka could not possibly include diplomatic relations within this scope. That is why when the pro-Taiwan members of the Normalization Council pressed Chairman Kosaka to give a definite answer regarding the question of whether diplomatic relations would be maintained, he gave the evasive answer that the continuation of previous relations "...meant favourable relations between Japan and the ROC since the conclusion of the Japan-ROC treaty in 1952."\(^\text{152}\) Prime Minister Tanaka gave his full support to Chairman Kosaka, this being regarded as "an indirect clarification of his [Tanaka's] intention of not accepting the pro-Taiwan factions assertions, which leads to the 'two Chinas' and the 'one China - one Taiwan' position."\(^\text{153}\)

In any event, the insertion of the previously mentioned proviso was enough to mollify the pro-Taiwan members of the Normalization Council and thereby gain a "consensus" within the LDP. But this consensus was obviously more an agreement to disagree than it was a reflection of the modification and accommodation of ideas to create a common agreement -- a consensus -- on exactly what procedure should be
taken in normalizing relations with the PRC. Certainly, the process employed in attempting to gain a consensus within the party was in line with the earlier suggestion that this would involve a formal show of unanimity and participatory consultation, but the important point is that "...because the façade of consensus has to be maintained, clear-cut decisions are not easy to arrive at in difficult cases, with the result that the solution takes the form of an extremely vague formula which becomes the cause of greater confusion afterwards."154 In this instance, the vague formula adopted led the pro-Taiwan LDP Dietmen to consider that diplomatic relations would be maintained with Taiwan, whereas the dominant pro-Peking LDPers realized that it did not. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that after diplomatic relations with Taiwan were severed, the pro-Taiwan "hawks" within the party felt that they had been deceived by the Tanaka government.155

The LDP Missions to China and Taiwan

After the formal requirements of consensus had been reached and the five principles for normalization adopted by the LDP, the Tanaka Cabinet dispatched to Peking on the 14th September 1972 a 23-man mission headed by Chairman Kosaka, and to Taipei on the 17th September a 17-man mission headed by former Foreign Minister Shiina.156 Since there were numerous LDP politicians who wanted to join the Kosaka mission, they were chosen from various factions on the basis of their strength and influence within the ruling party. For the Shiina mission, however, the task was to recruit enough members who were willing to visit Taipei on an official LDP mission.
The express purpose for which the Kosaka mission was sent to Peking was to make preparations for the forthcoming visit of Prime Minister Tanaka. In his meeting with Chinese officials, Kosaka stated that certain elements within the LDP were concerned over the question of Japan's relations with Taiwan after normalization of relations with China. Since the Chinese side expressed an understanding of Tanaka's intra-party problems, this did not prevent the fulfillment of Kosaka's task.157

Such a favourable attitude was nonetheless threatened by the activities of the Shiina mission which had the thankless task of explaining Japan's new China policy and seeking the understanding of the soon-to-be abandoned ROC government. In particular, what was aggravating to the Chinese government, and what made explicit the question that the Normalization Council had maintained as vague, was Shiina's declaration that: "Our country desires to maintain existing relations with Taiwan including diplomatic relations." Naturally the Japanese government intended to maintain its lucrative trade and financial ties with Taiwan, but, as was emphasized previously, it had particularly avoided making a specific agreement to maintain diplomatic relations during the Normalization Council meetings. When the Chinese government summoned Kosaka to a midnight meeting to demand an explanation of the Shiina statement, he made a point of saying that diplomatic relations with Taiwan would be severed: "The...LDP's policy for Japan-China diplomatic relations remains unchanged. When normalization of Japan-China diplomatic relations is carried out, the diplomatic relations
[with Taiwan] will naturally be severed. I cannot understand the Shiina statement at all." The government, being more concerned with maintaining intra-party harmony than in assuring the Chinese side of Japan's good intentions, simply stated that Shiina’s remarks "will not be in the least affect the government's policy for normalization." 

Although the Shiina visit thus created an embarrassing situation for the Tanaka Government, it more importantly carried out one of the preparations that Tanaka perceived as essential for normalization of Japan-China relations. In addition, Shiina’s statement to the Taiwan government indicated that while the Tanaka Cabinet might abandon it, there was still a strong sentiment in favour of the ROC within the ruling party. Of course, the extent to which the Tanaka government could go in this respect would not extend to the maintenance of diplomatic relations, since the lucrative Taiwan trade was certainly not to be sacrificed for the sake of political reasons; hence, the "separation of politics and economics" would this time be applied to Taipei, rather than Peking, when diplomatic relations between Japan and China came into effect.

Conclusion:

The above discussion of the LDP members of the tripartite elite supports the propositional variant that the LDP holds predominant sway in the policy-making process in Japan. Yet while pro-Peking party politicians were an obvious stricture upon the Sato government's China policy and a necessary pillar in Tanaka's presidential election, their
role in the policy-making process was indirect and peripheral. Similarly, other party members, and even the Cabinet as a functioning unit, did not participate in the policy-making process. Instead, a small core group of senior LDP politicians — specifically Prime Minister Tanaka and Foreign Minister Ohira — emerged from this larger aggregate as the dominant force within the China decision-making process, supported in this role by a lone LDPer, Furui, and as we shall see later, a small group of Foreign Ministry officials and certain opposition party politicians. Thus, it is not simply the LDP which holds predominant sway in the policy-making process, but specifically important members of the LDP Cabinet.

What is of significance here, is that Tanaka and Ohira appear to have functioned as the policy-making team without any direct support or constraint from the LDP factions or policy groups. Any negative constraints that could have restricted the duo were essentially contained within the Normalization Council, which was dominated by pro-Peking politicians from factions that supported Tanaka in his election. While both Tanaka and Ohira emphasized to all concerned that they would not proceed with the normalization of relations without party approval in the form of a consensus to normalize relations, this decision was actually made before the "agreement to disagree" consensus was reached within the party organ. Indeed, the division along ideological and policy lines was so acute it was impossible to gain a party consensus in a more specific form than the one adopted. Hence, the policy accommodation that did take place was obviously peripheral and carried out away from the locus of decision-making power.
Although there are similarities between this study and those carried out by Hellmann and Packard in terms of dealing with "yes" "no" controversial and short-term (less than one year) decision in the foreign policy issue area, the other two studies nevertheless revealed the dominant role of the factions in the decision-making process. This difference may revolve around the fact that Tanaka, unlike Hatoyama at the time of the Soviet peace treaty negotiations, or Kishi at the time of the 1960 Security Treaty crisis, enjoyed the strong support of the "Mainstream" factions within the party, thereby enabling him to attend to the normalization of Japan-China relations without fear of losing the support of the factional coalition which placed him in power precisely because he (unlike Fukuda) would be able to speedily normalize relations with China. The fact that Tanaka gained the presidency on a policy commitment implying he would normalize relations with China if elected, obviously meant that he was free to delegate to Kosaka, among others, the responsibility of mollifying the pro-Taiwan elements within the party, and thereby create a facade of consensus. This dovetails with the suggestion that consensus, like factionalism, is not a significant force in a short-term and controversial foreign policy issue if the Prime Minister enjoys the strong backing of the LDP factions. If he does not, then the weakness of his intra-party position necessitates he reach a consensus (under the influence and restriction of the factions) in order that he may maintain his position as party President and Prime Minister. This means that the Prime Minister is limited in his decision-making
power when he does not enjoy the strong backing of a preponderance of factions (or ideological or policy groups within the party) but, when he does enjoy this support, he can operate without fear of their limiting influence. Accordingly, a major caveat to note here is that the issue area does not necessarily delineate the saliency of factionalism or consensus in a controversial and short-term foreign policy issue area.

The Bureaucracy

Introduction

A foreign policy issue naturally falls within the jurisdictional responsibility of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (hereafter Foreign Ministry). In this respect, a number of Foreign Ministry bureaucrats naturally came to play an important (though subordinate) role in the decision-making process pertaining to Japan's normalization of relations with China. Before proceeding to discuss the nature of the ministerial group's participation in this policy-making process, however, we will first be concerned with examining certain of the inter and intra ministry conflicts of opinion which surfaced during the period prior to the normalization of Japan-China relations.

Inter and Intra Ministry Conflict Concerning Japan's China Policy

The bureaucracy, like the LDP, has been divided in its standpoint on the China issue. Specifiably, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) and the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Foreign Ministry) have given divergent interpretations to the question of Japan's relations with the Peking government. The MITI,
being naturally concerned with the development of Japan's world trade, has urged the expansion of trade relations with China (while maintaining trade with Taiwan) and the improvement of the political climate between these two countries. Thus, the MITI has been in favour of allowing the use of Export-Import Bank funds for the export of industrial plants to China. In contraposition, the predominating view in the Foreign Ministry has been in favour of a pro-Taiwan policy, and has thus seen eye to eye with the Sato government in upholding the "Yoshida letter" (restricting the use of these funds), this negative posture being maintained until the beginning of 1972. 

In spite of the influence of this view in determining Japan's China policy, a minority within the Foreign Ministry, as represented by the China Division and Asian Bureau, have challenged the pro-Taiwan posture taken by the more powerful UN and American bureaus by calling for a forward-looking policy towards Peking. This conflict of opinion within the ministry surfaced when the question of China's seating in the United Nations came up in 1971. In this instance, while the China Division and Asian Bureau were in favour of Peking and the "one China" formula for adoption by Japan at the United Nations, the American and UN bureaus insisted upon continuing to back the United States in support of the Taiwan government. With the failure of this attempt to keep Taiwan in the United Nations the pro-Taiwan groups within the Japanese Foreign Ministry, together with Prime Minister Sato, came under increasing criticism for maintaining such a policy at an obvious time of flux in the international environment.
A more important instance in which the presence of such disaccordant views within the Foreign Ministry surfaced, occurred just prior to the normalization of Japan-China relations. This could have proved to be a stricture upon the policy-making process since the LDP was necessarily dependent upon the expertise of the bureaucracy for assistance in such tasks as the drafting of a Japan-China joint communique. However, despite the presence of pro-Taiwan and anti-Peking views within the Foreign Ministry, especially among middle level bureaucrats, this did not prove to be an impediment to the normalization of relations because these bureaucrats lacked effective access to the matrix of the decision-making process. Indeed, the small, ad hoc policy group which performed the Foreign Ministry's role in the decision-making process was isolated even from the influence of senior members of the Foreign Ministry. Consequently, this group could adapt to the dynamic policy-making environment without the necessity of compromising with those bureaucrats who continued to be in favour of maintaining diplomatic relations with Taiwan.

The Foreign Ministry Policy-Making Group

The core of the ad hoc policy-making group which came to dominate the China decision-making process within the Ministry was composed of Treaties Division Head Kuriyama, Treaties Bureau Director Takashima, Asia Bureau Director Yoshida, and China Division Head Hashimoto who worked closely together and with the Tanaka-Ohira duo under the general supervision of Foreign Vice-Minister Hogen. While this form of small knit policy group working on a controversial political issue is not
unusual in the Japanese government, "the extent to which the four men kept all-important secrets to themselves, Hogen and Ohira was probably extraordinary. There was a sense among these and other high ranking officials at that time that they were fighting for political survival in the aftermath of the Nixon shocks and the UN fiasco. At the same time, Tanaka made it unmistakably clear that he would not tolerate breach of confidence or any other blunder on the part of the officials."173

This group played an essential but nevertheless secondary role vis-à-vis the Tanaka-Ohira duo in the foreign policy-making process. In line with their function as bureaucrats, the Foreign Ministry group, with Kuriyama taking the lead, went to great lengths to try and draw up a draft communique that would be acceptable to both the Chinese and Japanese governments.174 In this endeavour they were aided by the feedback from the Chinese government Komeito Chairman Takeiri, and the LDP maverick Furui, were able to gain from their talks with Chinese officials when they visited Peking. In the end, however, even the final form of the communique was to be decided by Tanaka when he made his visit to China.

Conclusion:

After the publication of Graham Allison's *The Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 175 described by Stephen Krasner as a "path breaking enterprise,"176 and the works along similar lines by Morton Halperin,177 the bureaucratic interpretation of foreign policy decision-making has gained increasing currency within the foreign policy literature. As was noted earlier, Tsuruntani applies this
perspective in his discussion of Japanese foreign policy-making but, as we discovered, the role of the bureaucracy in the China normalization process was subordinate to that of members of the ruling LDP, in this instance the Tanaka-Ohira duo. In fact, the policy-making group which developed to cope with the China issue was clearly divorced from the bureaucracy itself, allowing this group to be much more flexible and responsive to the needs of a dynamic policy-making situation.

It would seem that the use of this small, ad hoc policy-making group unhindered by the rigidity of the formal hierarchical bureaucratic setting, undermines certain of the assumptions upon which Tsurutani predicates his argument; namely, that the lower echelon of the Foreign Ministry dominates the foreign policy-making process and that Foreign Ministry bureaucrats are uninnovative. Undoubtedly, in routine long-term decision-making, the lower echelons within the foreign ministry play a decisive role in the policy-making process, but our examination of the role of the bureaucracy in the short-term and controversial China issue indicates that such decisions are hardly left to follow the ringisei system in which the lower echelon dominate. Likewise, one of the major prerequisites for the Foreign Ministry group involved in the China decision must surely have been their innovative ability and capacity to act decisively without the hindrance of formal bureaucratic requirements. Once it is understood, therefore, that a controversial and short-term issue is not decided at the lower levels of the bureaucracy through a process of "osmosis", Tsurutani's criticism of bureaucratic inertia in
Japan does not necessarily apply.

A further point to consider is that the proximate actors in the China policy-making process differed as a result of the change in the temporal dimension of the China issue. Now, instead of it being a long term (though still controversial) issue in which the status quo was maintained by the Foreign Ministry, the China issue, while maintaining its controversial characteristic, at the same time became a short-term (urgent) issue on the temporal dimension. Thus, the factors (e.g., uninnovative, rigidity) which Tsurutani depicts as impinging upon the effective formulation of Japanese foreign policy did not come into play, because a small ad hoc group was formed and separated from such inhibiting forces, to function in the dynamic, fluid environment the decision-making process had become transformed into. What we are suggesting here, then, is that the metamorphosis of the China policy-making process from a long-term and controversial issue, to a short-term and controversial issue, brought about a situation in which the LDP policy-making group, supported by the Foreign Ministry policy-making group, became the major component of the decision-making process. In other words, the temporal dimension may thus determine the saliency of the bureaucracy in Japan's foreign policy-making process. Needless to say, Tsurutani's claim that the Foreign Ministry dominate the foreign policy-making process in Japan is brought seriously into question by our discussion here.
The Business Community

Introduction

In the realm of economic policy-making the business community is naturally a significant, "if not decisive," influence on the policy-making process in Japan. In a foreign policy issue area, however, its influence may not be as great, since Hellmann discovered in his study of the Soviet peace treaty negotiations that the business community's overall influence was very limited. There is here one important characteristic in which the Hellmann findings differ from the present study of the China normalization process; namely, in the former case the business community did not view the Soviet Union as a potential market for Japanese goods, whereas in the latter case there was an "ever present lure of a market with hundreds of millions of customers," and a belief among certain elements of the Japanese business community that China was Japan's "natural" trade partner. This implies that the business community might have been more concerned with influencing the policy-making process pertaining to the normalization of Japan-China relations than was the case in Hellmann's study of the Soviet peace treaty negotiations. However, the expectation of increased trade with China is not shared by all sectors of the business community, so that there are certain differences in the business community regarding attitudes towards the Peking government, and the question of normalization of relations between Japan and China.

Differences in the Business Community's Attitude Towards China

In the first place, while sweeping reference is made to a Japanese
"business community" there are certain differences regarding China policy between the Kansai (or Osaka based) business groups and the Kanto (or Tokyo based) groups, the former generally having been more favourable to normalization of relations than the latter.

For instance, the Kansai businessmen hold more positive expectations of the China market accompanied by a feeling of nostalgia for that market among the pre-war business leaders who "...frequently attributed the decline of Kansai business to the loss of the China market and hope to recover the lost ground by once again reviving the China market." This positive attitude is further illustrated by the fact that industries in the Kansai area were the first to recognize the "Four Conditions" of trade outlined by Chou En-Lai in 1970, the leading combine being Sumitomo. Moreover, Chairman Yoshishige Ashihara of the Kansai Federation of Economic Organizations plainly came out in favour of early restoration of diplomatic relations through summit diplomacy by Ohira and Tanaka. Finally, Osaka business leaders preceded a similar group from Tokyo in visiting China in September of 1971. Indeed, it does not seem unusual that there should be contrasting attitudes between the Kanto and Kansai business groups since their traditional rivalry dates to pre-war days.

Another distinction that should be mentioned here pertains to the degree of reliance an industry has on trade with China. Two industries in particular, the chemical fertilizer and steel industries, have a high level of dependance upon maintaining trade with China: The chemical fertilizer industry has been largely dependent upon China.
since 1967-1968, as a result of an increase in domestic fertilizer production, together with a decrease in domestic, Korean and Taiwan demand for this product.\textsuperscript{195} For the steel industry, the China market was of renewed interest after 1957, when an agreement was reached to export iron and steel to China in return for the importation of an equivalent (monetary) amount of iron ore and steel.\textsuperscript{196} Despite the abrogation of this agreement by the Chinese side, leading the steel industry to ban exports to China, the necessity of participating in the China market due to a slump in demand for Japanese steel, combined with an increase in steel production, forced the industry to follow the lead of Nippon Kokkan (Japan Steel Tube) which resumed exports to China in 1961.\textsuperscript{197} From this time on the steel industry has followed the same path as the chemical fertilizer industry in expanding the proportion of its exports to China. As a result, the steel and fertilizer industries' reliance upon this market increased and, as a natural outgrowth of this trend, their attitude towards the Peking government became more positive than other elements of the business community, which gained their economic viability from other market outlets.

A final noteworthy point concerning the attitudinal variance over China policy within the business community pertains to the difference in size and economic viability of those companies participating in the China trade. Apart from the above mentioned large industries, and to a lesser extent those industries in machinery and textile production, which since 1963 have participated in the China trade through "Memorandum
Trade," a large proportion of the companies involved in this trade are small "Friendly firms" which depend upon the China trade for survival. These "Friendly firms" have naturally been in favour of the Peking government and have actively participated in the promotion of Japan-China relations.

"Friendly Firm" Trade and Memorandum Trade

"Friendly firm" trade has been carried out between Japan and China since 1960 when, due to the Sino-Soviet conflict and the failure of the Great Leap forward, Chou En-Lai resumed trade with Japan after it had been largely dormant for the preceding two years. The small economically weak "Friendly firms" participating in the China trade were also joined by the "dummies" of some of the larger corporations which were anxious to participate in this market. To qualify they only needed to be designated as "friendly" by the Japan-China Trade Promotion Council.

In 1963 a further channel of trade was opened in the form of Memorandum Trade, which was initiated by the late LDP Dietman Takasaki Tatsunosuke and Liao Cheng-chih. Unlike "Friendly firm" trade, Memorandum Trade "...contained a semi-official element as it was accepted by leaders of the LDP and was expected to be partially financed by the government-controlled Export-Import Bank." As was previously stated, however, the Sato government did not allow the dispersement of Export-Import Bank funds for use in the China trade after the "Yoshida letter" was written.

As Park notes, it soon became obvious to the firms participating
in Memorandum Trade that the ascendency of Sato to the premiership had been accompanied by a decline in this type of trade in favour of "friendly firm" trade.200 Certainly Sato's pro-Taiwan policy and general anti-Peking orientation were a hindrance to the development of smooth trade relations between Japan and China, particularly since he visited Taiwan in 1967, and participated in the U.S.'s security designs for the area through the Sato-Nixon communique in 1969. Nevertheless, the large companies that were able to take part in China trade through their "dummy" companies were not particularly affected by Sato's China policy, because they were still able to take some advantage of the lucrative Taiwan trade.201 Indeed, except for those industries that were in specific need of the China trade, the attitude expressed by the business community through such organizations as Keidanren (Federation of Economic Associations) and Nikkeiren (Japan Federation of Employers Association), was generally favourable to the continuation of Sato's pro-Taiwan policy separating politics and economics. At the beginning of the 1970s, however, a number of events occurred which gradually brought about a change in the business community's attitude towards the Sato government's pro-Taiwan China policy.

The Reaction of the Business Community to Chou's "Four Conditions" and Changes in the External Environment

On April 19th 1970, Chou En-lai enunciated the "four conditions" that were henceforth to govern China's trading relations with Japan. Under these "conditions" certain Japanese companies were to be excluded from the China trade: 1) "enterprises which are participating in trade and
economic cooperation designed to assist Taiwan and the Republic of Korea; 2) enterprises which have invested in Taiwan and the ROK; 3) enterprises which are exporting arms to Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia; 4) U.S. joint enterprises in Japan. Quite obviously, the enunciation of these conditions meant that those sectors of the business community that had a heavy dependence on the China market, together with dealings in contravention of the "four conditions", needed to come to a decision as to whether or not they should abide by Chou's demands. One company in particular, Sumitomo Kagaku, had to reach a quick decision since it was considered by the Chinese trade authorities to be the "typical violator" of Chou's "conditions," along with Mitsubishi Jukogyo, Teikoku Jinken and Asahi Dow Chemicals. Considering that Sumitomo Kagaku's two major export items to China were steel and fertilizer, and that over half of the company's yearly output of fertilizer went to the China market, it is not surprising that it quickly decided to accept the "four conditions." This was particularly the case since the president of the company considered there were brighter opportunities for business in China due to U.S. control of the Taiwan market leaving "little" for Japanese interests.

Insofar as the steel companies are concerned, except for the largest steel company, New Japan Steel (Shin Nihon Seitetsu), which resulted from the merger of Fuji and Yawata, the four other major steel companies which Chou En-lai also specifically requested to abide by the "four conditions" -- Japan Steel Tube (Nihon Kokan), Sumitomo Metal Industry (Sumitomo Kinzoku), Kawasaki Iron and Steel (Kawasaki Seitetsu),
and Kobe Steel (Kobe Seiko) -- all followed the lead of Sumitomo and accepted the "four conditions." In the case of New Japan Steel, the company finally declared its acceptance of these "conditions" on the last day of the Spring Canton Trade Fair on 14th April 1970, only to later clarify, through the Chairman of the Board, Nagano, that "investment in Taiwan and participation in the Japan-ROC Cooperation Committee will be considered when the problems arise," thereby hinting that it was accepting the "four conditions" with "conditions attached." At any event, the Chinese side refused to accept New Japan Steel's interpretation of Chou En-lai's "four conditions" and therefore did not sign any contracts with the company at the Canton Trade Fair. Considering the importance of New Japan Steel as the leading corporation of the steel industry, the membership and cooperation in the Japan-ROK Cooperation Committee and the Japan-ROC Cooperation Committee by Chairman Nagano, and his company's investment in these countries, and finally Nagano's close relationship to and support of Prime Minister Sato, it is not surprising that from hereafter New Japan Steel "...became the pivot point around which both the Japan-ROC Cooperation Committee and such pro-Chinese groups as the Japan International Trade Promotion Association put great pressure in order to win it over to their respective sides." 

The last sector of the business community particularly affected by the enunciation of the "four conditions" was trading firms with "dummies" participating in the China "friendly" trade. Once again, certain companies were prepared to abide by Chou En-lai's "conditions" while others refused to do so. Such "dummy" firms as Meiwa Industry
(affiliated with Mitsubishi Trading), Keimei Trading (affiliated with Mitsui Bussan), New Japan Trading (affiliated with Itoh Chemical Trading), and Wako Trading (affiliated with Marubeni Iida), failed to secure contracts at the Canton Trade Fair due to their delay in accepting the "four conditions." In the case of Wako Trading, however, the company shortly afterwards decided to abide by the "conditions" and therefore severed its capital and personnel ties with Marubeni Iida. The president of the company also called for the resignation of the Sato government "in order to improve Japan-China relations."

The tendency for sections of the Japanese business community to abide by the "four conditions" became more pronounced after a number of changes occurred in the external environment. In particular, the moves by the United States to improve its relations with China, such as the resumption of U.S.-China ambassadorial talks in Warsaw, the easing of trade restrictions between overseas subsidiaries and China, and the proposal for cultural exchange between China and the United States, forced a re-evaluation of the stance to be adopted in respect to the "four conditions" and of Japan-China relations. With the announcement of Nixon's China visit in July 1971 and his visit in February 1972, there was a more widespread agreement among those companies involved in trade with China that they should accept Chou's "four conditions" and promote normalization of Japan-China relations. Even those companies with heavy ties in the American market were now prepared to adopt a more favourable attitude after these moves by the Nixon administration.

Undoubtedly, the fear of continuing recession at home which began
in 1970 and was prolonged by the U.S. economic measures in August 1971, and, also the fear of U.S. and European competition in the China market, prompted the business community (especially the auto-makers Toyota and Nissan) to come out in favour of the early normalization of Japan-China relations. Thus, "pressure to dump Taiwan...mounted from Japanese industrialists who felt that special efforts were needed to preserve and expand the potentially vast China market against likely U.S. competition." Above all, this change in business attitude resulted from the fact that the business community had "acted for so long on the basis that Japan follows every step taken by the U.S.", that they were "confident that by moving with President Nixon they were heading in the direction the government was bound to follow."  

It was shortly after the announcement of Nixon's impending visit to China that New Japan Steel finally agreed to accept the "four conditions" of trade. In addition, the Chairman of the Board Nagano, who was also President of the Japan Chamber of Commerce, and another top zaikai leader, President Kikawada of Tokyo Denryoku, who was also President of the Committee for Economic Development, came out in favour of closer relations between Japan and China. With the move of these two important zaikai leaders to a more positive China policy, the lack of consensus between the LDP and business obviously became more pronounced. Indeed, Sato was said "to have been infuriated by Nagano and the behaviour of the business leaders." Now that New Japan Steel had joined other companies in calling for an improvement in the political climate between Japan and China, the "pivot point" was inclined towards favouring
normalization of relations.

By the time of the seating of the People's Republic in the United Nations, "...the entire business community shifted their position and started calling for early resumption of diplomatic relations between Japan and China." Even the anti-Peking President of the Keidanren, Uemura, who was hesitant in making a statement on the China question due to the division of opinion among Keidanren members, declared in December 1971 that: "once China has been admitted to the United Nations, we must expect early resumption of normal relations with China." By May 1972 Uemura had carried out a complete volte-face and was openly in favour of the speedy normalization of Japan-China relations.

The main groups that faced difficulty in the timing of their change to a policy in favour of Peking were those trading companies with "dummies" operating in the China market. After holding back on recognizing the "four conditions" until June 1972, President Wakasugi of Mitsui Bussan and President Fujino of Mitsubishi Shoji announced their acceptance of these "conditions." In the case of Mitsubishi Shoji, President Fujino accompanied his announcement with the news that the Mitsubishi group would be sending a trade mission to China. Paralleling the LDP, the Mitsubishi Group at the same time dispatched Chairman Kono Fumihiko of Mitsubishi Jukyogyo to Taiwan, ostensibly on business, "... but actually to win the approval of Taiwan on the course that Mitsubishi was taking." This was a necessary course of action to take since Mitsubishi, along with Mitsui, maintained heavy trade and financial ties
with the ROC. By allowing Mitsubishi (and shortly thereafter Mitsui) to dispatch a trade mission to China, the Peking government was obviously permitting a more flexible interpretation of the "four conditions." This no doubt reflected the fact that China was in need of the industrial technology and skills of such giant companies to help in its economic development.  

Now that these two industrial "hawks" had joined the other important leaders of the zaikai in favour of normalization, there was strong support for any move that Prime Minister Tanaka would take to bring this about. In short, the important elements of the business community could be counted on to support Tanaka in his desire to normalize Japan-China relations.

Conclusion:

From the aforementioned discussion we can see that the business community was not a unified group seeking a common China policy, but was instead a community composed of a variety of policy positions at different times which were intimately linked to the respective companies' dependence or expectations of trade in the China market. Any idea of a unified business community as one of the pillars of the governing system in Japan calls for modification after this examination of the China normalization process. Itoh indirectly supports this point when he states: "Although ties between business and the ruling party are extensive, they are also diffuse. The diversity of business interests and their uneven influence on the ruling party make vague and imprecise the details of their interrelationships, and the exact extent of business
influence on the policy-making of the LDP is hard to determine."

Of course, this does not mean that the influence of business opinion was not important in this particular case, yet this influence was indirect and diffuse, rather than direct and tangible. There was no proof of any direct cooperation between the pro-Peking LDPers and business in respect to strategy and financing. Instead, the business community followed a similar pattern to that discovered by Hellmann in his study of the Soviet peace treaty negotiations:

...the businessmen did not participate in the decision-making process through their usual channels, their close financial and personal ties with the conservative party. Rather, access was sought as an opinion group, by means of conferences and public statements.

In its role as an opinion group the business community was composed of certain elements that were definitely in favour of normalizations, while some of the most important elements, for example Keidanren, were among the last to come out in favour of normalization of relations. Yet in the end all important sectors of the zaikai decided in favour of normalization, so that the government was given a clear indication that the LDP's financial patrons were in favour of Tanaka's plan to extend diplomatic relations to China.

In assessing the role of the business community in the China normalization process, it is inaccurate both to assume that industrial circles "had forced government leaders to restore diplomatic relations with China," or that business merely created a "psychological setting favourable to and supportive of the decisions made by the politicians and bureaucrats." Rather, it was more under pressure from the big
business community that the LDP moved to normalize relations.\textsuperscript{228} In pressing for the adoption of a forward-looking policy on China, it may be argued that the business community had a greater influence on the policy-making process than Hellmann discovered, but certainly not as great as would have been the case if the policy question pertained to a long-term uncontroversial economic issue. In short, the influence of the business community is probably greatest where the connection between the issue area and economic policy is greatest. We would thus concur with Hellmann that "...it is a mistake to believe that businessmen are fully integrated into the process of foreign policy-making or to assume that their opinions ultimately prevail on all the major issues. Business influence is limited..."\textsuperscript{229}
The Opposition Parties

Introduction

The opposition parties in Japan (except the Japan Communist Party) began to call for the speedy normalization of relations between the Japanese and Chinese governments by the time that the Tanaka government was formed in July 1972. However, the opposition parties (Japan Socialist Party, Komeito, Democratic Socialist Party) were not consistent in the timing of their agreement with the Chinese government's conditions for normalization, reflecting certain differences in ideology and foreign policy orientation among these parties, although all agreed to the conditions before the resignation of the Sato government. Before examining the timing and character of these opposition parties' change in China policy, we will first discuss the Japan Communist Party's isolation from the policy-making processes pertaining to the normalization of Japan-China relations.

Japan Communist Party

Although the Japan Communist Party (JCP) has consistently maintained a "one China" policy and called for the abrogation of the Japan-Republic of China Peace Treaty, the JCP remained the only political party in Japan isolated from the movement calling for the normalization of Japan-China relations. This paradoxical situation results from the fact that since 1966, when a disagreement arose between the JCP and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the party became increasingly estranged from the Chinese government which considered the ruling clique of the JCP as one of the "enemies" of China. With the severing of what were previously friendly relations, the JCP was able to improve its electoral fortunes.
by establishing itself as an "independent" communist party, but it also meant that the party became cut off from any effective channel of communication with the PRC government. Naturally, with the party lacking any effective channels of communication it could hardly play an intermediary role between the Tanaka government and the PRC during the normalization process. Thus, the JCP was "relegated to the position of bystander" during the normalization of relations between Japan and China.  

Japan Socialist Party

Since 1957 the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) has been in the forefront in supporting China's "one China" policy position and demanding the improvement of Japan-China relations. The breakdown in the close relationship between the Japan Communist Party and the Chinese Communist Party which occurred in 1966, offered the Socialists an opportunity to take over the dominant position in the movement for normalization of Japan-China relations which up until this time had been under the influence of the JCP. The Socialist Chairman at the time, Kozo Sasaki, was a pro-Peking leader who had gained his position in the party through the backing of the radical left-wing faction of the party, the Heiwa Doshikai, whose members were even more favourable to a pro-Peking policy than was Chairman Sasaki. With the support of this group, Sasaki was able to convince the more neutral or pro-Soviet elements within the party that it would be to the advantage of the JSP to capture the leadership of the normalization movement. Accordingly, the JSP created the Japan-China
Friendship Association to replace the now disbanded JCP controlled Japan International Trade Promotion Association, and became increasingly pro-Peking in its China policy pronouncements. Concomitantly, the party became the leading participant in "people's diplomacy" and China's chief ally among Japanese political parties.

Although Sasaki had been able to convince the pro-Soviet factions within the party that it would be to the ultimate benefit of the JSP to take over the normalization movement, particularly when such issues as extending diplomatic relations to China and expanding Japan-China trade gained popular support, it soon became clear there was factional infighting between the pro-Peking and pro-Soviet elements in the party over the China policy adopted by the JSP. As a result, the party's China policy pronouncements were constantly circumscribed by the need to consider the reaction of the pro-Soviet members of the party.

After the resignation of Sasaki in 1967 the JSP came under the leadership of the more moderate chairman, Seiichi Katsumata, and then in 1969 under that of the present chairman, Tomomi Narita. While these leaders were not as pro-Peking as the previous chairman, Sasaki, they still made efforts to promote Japan-China relations by criticizing the Sato government's China policy in the Diet, and by organizing extra-parliamentary demonstrations of students, workers and concerned citizens (such as the National Conference for the Restoration of Japanese-Chinese Diplomatic Relations, which was organized in December 1970). At the same time, ex-chairman Sasaki continued to play an influential role in the promotion of Japan-China relations, perhaps even more influential.
than the party itself, which could only act as a stricture upon the Sato government's China policy.

In the first place, Sasaki was instrumental in bringing about the despatch of the long delayed 5th mission of the JSP to China, when he acted as an intermediary between Chairman Narita and the Chinese government. In the communique which resulted from the visit of the official mission in November 1970, the JSP pledged to continue its efforts for normalization of relations between Japan and China with those forces "truly" in favour of this cause. This naturally excluded the JCP.

Secondly, and more significantly, Sasaki played an intermediary role immediately prior to Tanaka's visit to China, only this time it was between the ruling party and the Chinese government. Before leaving for Peking in late July Sasaki visited Tanaka to make sure that he intended to normalize relations with the PRC. Tanaka assured him that he would make every effort to normalize relations and would not plot for the autonomy of an independent Taiwan. Preceding Chairman Takeiri of the Komeito in a similar intermediary role, Sasaki visited China and no doubt made clear to the Chinese government the Tanaka government intended to carry out the normalization of relations and would be prepared to accept an invitation from Chou En-lai to visit China. After his return from China, Sasaki stated in an interview with the Mainichi Shimbun that the Chinese side would welcome a visit from the Tanaka government and would be flexible in dealing with such an official mission, even in respect to the three principles. Later, he made a visit to Tanaka and Ohira and urged them to visit Peking during September.
Although Tanaka and Ohira did not give Sasaki definite confirmation that they would follow such a timetable, Sasaki became strengthened in his conviction that the two intended to visit China.\(^239\) In short, a member of the opposition came to play a role in the policy-making process: firstly by acting as an intermediary between the Chinese and Japanese governments; and secondly by acting as a pressure on the Tanaka-Ohira duo to carry out the speedy normalization of Japan-China relations.

**The Komeito**

In contrast to the JCP and the JSP the Komeito, for the most part of the 1960s, followed a moderate policy in respect to China, viewing the normalization of relations in the general context of its foreign policy which calls for a neutralist policy for Japan free from the influence of the United States,\(^240\) so it was not until 1969 that the Komeito would even go so far as to admit to the "one China" formula. From this time on, however, the party came to play an increasingly active role in the promotion of Japan-China relations.

In the first place, the Komeito established the Japan-China Normalization Consultative Council on December 13th 1970, which appealed:

> Let us have a movement for normalizing relations permeate among the people, correct our country's posture toward China, and open up a way to normalization of diplomatic relations.\(^241\)

Although the above council was composed of about 200 members drawn from pro-Peking scholars and prominent individuals, its support base did not extend much beyond those who usually backed the Komeito electorally.\(^242\)

Secondly, in the following June Komeito Chairman, Takeiri, issued
a public statement in which he for the first time declared he was in favour of the abrogation of the Japan–Republic of China Peace Treaty. Shortly thereafter, the Chairman made a visit to China where Premier Chou complimented him: "You have correct views as to how diplomatic relations between Japan and China can be restored." At the same time, the Komeito delegation agreed to the three political principles when a joint communique was issued at the end of their visit. Upon the return of the Komei mission the JSP recognized that the Komeito "made a full scale advance as forces which promote the restoration of Japan–China diplomatic relations." To the Foreign Ministry, it was a sign to express a concern over the continuation of this same kind of opposition party diplomacy. Such concern was natural, for with the visit of the Komei mission to China there was a broadening of the channels of communication between Japan and China beyond that of ideological compatibility, a characteristic present when these channels were largely dominated by the JSP.

Finally, Takeiri became of increasing importance as an intermediary between the Japanese and Chinese governments. Not only did Takeiri meet with the Chinese leaders at the time of the first Komei mission but, after the visit of the second mission in May 1972 Chou En-lai communicated a secret message to the Komeito Chairman through one of the mission members, Ninomiya, informing him that the Chinese government was prepared to invite Tanaka to Peking to negotiate the normalization of relations without the would-be Tanaka Cabinet agreeing to the three political principles or fearing that they would be politically embarrassed by the Chinese
government's actions. Takeiri attempted to persuade Tanaka to reply directly to Chou's offer, indicating he was prepared to act as an intermediary in this task, but Tanaka refused to do so and left it to Takeiri to prepare a response to the Chinese side. This response took the form of a twenty-point proposal which Takeiri carried to Peking on his visit there in late August, without either approval or disapproval by Prime Minister Tanaka or Foreign Minister Ohira. After a discussion of the Takeiri proposal, the Chinese side came forward with a flexible counter-proposal of ten points which, with a number of modifications agreed to by Chou, was communicated to Tanaka, Ohira, and Furui by Masaki and Okubo when the minutes of the Chou-Takeiri meetings were handed over to the LDP politicians by these two Komeito Dietmen. Subsequently they were given to the Foreign Ministry.

Although the Komeito had been moderate in its policy pronouncements on China during the 1960s, it seems clear from the above that prior to the normalization of relations the Komeito, and in particular Chairman Takeiri, came to play an increasingly influential role in the China normalization process. Indeed, Omori likens the role of Takeiri to that of Henry Kissinger, acting as an intermediary to bring about a meeting between the leaders of these respective countries. Perhaps Takeiri saw himself in this role, because he declared to Furui before visiting China: "I will extract China's views. Then I will hand the baton to you and ask you to take care of the rest." In performing an intermediary role and acting as a pressure on the Tanaka-Ohira duo, Takeiri thereby joined Sasaki as an actor in the policy-making process.
Democratic Socialist Party

The Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) was established in 1960 after the rightwing Nishio faction and elements of the centrist Kawakami faction splintered away from the left-wing dominated JSP. From these more moderate roots the DSP, like the Komeito, upheld a China policy (in fundamental contradiction to the Chinese government's position to "one China"), being in favour of a "one China, one Taiwan" policy even after the Komeito had changed its China policy stance. Becoming increasingly isolated in its China policy pronouncements after the move by the Komeito and the Nixon announcements, the DSP in August 1971 indicated that it too was prepared to follow the Komeito in jumping on the China bandwagon. The Chairman of the DSP, Kasuga, thus met with the China-Japan Friendship Association Deputy Chairman Wang Kuo-hua and expressed a wish to visit China. At this meeting, which was the first to occur between the DSP and Chinese officials, Kasuga went further than the party's basic policy pronouncements on China by declaring in response to Wang's statement (concerning the status of Taiwan), "the Taiwan problem is an internal affair of China, and I earnestly hope for a peaceful settlement" of that issue.

By the time that the DSP followed on the heels of the JSP and Komeito in despatching a mission to China, the party had moved away from its previous China policy, which was similar to that of the LDP, and joined the other opposition parties in calling for the early normalization of relations with China. The DSP now proposed that the Japan-ROC Peace Treaty should be considered null and void and must
be terminated before restoration of Japan-China relations could take place. 256

This abrupt change in the DSP's China policy was not supported by the dissident elements in the party such as Eki Sone, who criticized the policy statements on China made by Kasuga at his meeting with Wang Kuo-hua and those made by the Kasuga mission to China. 257 The persistence of this anti-Peking attitude within the party prevented the development of antintra-party consensus in favour of normalization. However, it did not prevent the mainstream within the party from indicating it would cooperate with the Tanaka government in supra-partisan diplomacy. Thus, with the DSP joining the JSP and Komeito in calling for supra-partisan diplomacy, all the opposition parties were in favour of normalizing relations with China.

Conclusion:

It seems clear from the above discussion that the opposition parties (except the JCP) all played a role in influencing the Tanaka government's decision to quickly normalize relations with the PRC. In fact, both Chou and Tanaka remarked on the efforts of the JSP and Komeito in supra-partisan diplomacy. 258 In this respect, it is necessary to distinguish between the activities of the parties themselves and that of three prominent individuals within these parties: ex-chairman of the JSP, Sasaki, and the present chairmen of the Komeito and DSP, Takeiri and Kasuga.

In the case of the parties themselves, their main influence on the policy-making process was indirect and diffuse, through criticism
of the previous Sato government's policy both within and outside the Diet, and as forces that contributed to the development of a societal consensus in favour of normalizing Japan-China relations. In addition, the parties were generally behind the activities of the opposition party politicians in their efforts to bring the normalization of relations closer to realization.

With regard to the activities of Takeiri, Sasaki and to a lesser extent Kasuga, these politicians, especially Takeiri, became a part of the policy-making process that developed to normalize Japan-China relations. Indeed, these individuals played an even more important role in this process than did members of the ruling party, excepting Tanaka, Ohira, and Furui, because they actually became part of the policy-making group in their role as intermediaries between the two governments. What is of interest here is that it should be the leader of the moderate Komeito, Takeiri, rather than the ex-chairman of the left-wing Socialist Party, Sasaki, that came to play the most significant role in the event.

For years Sasaki had visited China and returned to Japan calling for the normalization of relations whereas Takeiri, in contrast, had only recently recognized the "one China" formula and visited the mainland for the first time. In fact, Takeiri had been hesitant to visit China in July for "fear of becoming a second-fiddle to Sasaki, who cut a spectacular figure in China." That Takeiri came to play an even more important role than Sasaki when he made this visit, illustrates he not only enjoyed the trust of the Tanaka-Ohira duo more than did
Sasaki, but also that the Chinese government was prepared to deal with him in order to facilitate the normalization of Japan-China relations.

The cooperation between these opposition party politicians and the mainstream of the LDP demonstrates that the opposition need not be perpetually isolated from the policy-making process in Japan. In this short-term controversial foreign policy issue the opposition partook in supra-partisan diplomacy for the first time since the chairman of the JSP, Mosaburo Suzuki, exerted pressure upon Prime Minister Hatoyama to negotiate a peace treaty with the Soviet Union. The similar characteristic and temporal dimension of these issues may thus be an important variable in attempting to delineate the role of the opposition in the policy-making process. 260
The Press and Public Opinion

Introduction

The press and public opinion are obviously not as direct in their influence on the policy-making process as are proximate actors such as the LDP and bureaucracy. Still, they do play a role in influencing the decision-makers and decision-making environment of the foreign policy arena. Accordingly, we will discuss the role of the press in the China normalization process, followed by that of public opinion.

The Press

It is difficult if not impossible to delineate the exact influence that the press has on the policy-making process, whether in respect to its influence on the policy-makers themselves, or in respect to its influence on public opinion, which in turn influences the policy-making process. As Whittemore noted in his study of the press and the Security Treaty crisis: "The exact role of the newspapers in forming public opinion is probably impossible to appraise. The effect the press has in any country is indistinct and a definite assessment of its weight cannot be given." 261

Despite this limitation, Hellmann postulates that the media influences the policy-making process in two ways: firstly, by providing the policy-makers with a day-to-day image of public interest in each issue by reporting overt actions and statements concerning policy and by evaluating individual questions in editorials and special commentaries..." and secondly "as the primary source of information for the public they are able to condition the nature of public response to particular issues through the kind of coverage accorded them. By
establishing the focus of attention the press indirectly determines how the public will participate in the policy formulation process."262 This latter point is especially relevant to a discussion of the China issue, since Miyoshi discovered certain newspapers in Japan established a "united front" calling for the normalization of relations with China.263 Quite obviously, this meant the press in Japan surrendered its objectivity in favour or promoting a political climate conducive to the extension of diplomatic relations to China.

To start with, Miyoshi points out that despite the attempt of the Shimbun Kyokai ([Japan]Newspaper Publisher's Association) to reach an agreement with the All-China Journalists Association on the exchange of newsmen between Japan and China, the Chinese side were unprepared to make any agreement in which only the Shimbun Kyokai was involved. Instead, they insisted any discussions pertaining to the exchange of newsmen must be carried out through the trade office established as a result of the trade negotiations between Liao Cheng-chih, President of the China-Japan Friendship Association, and Tatsunosuke Takasaki, a member of the ruling LDP, which had established Memorandum Trade between China and Japan in 1962. It was through this structure that an exchange of newsmen was carried out in September 1964, the participating companies being Asahi, Mainichi, Yomiuri, Sankei, Nihon Keizai, Kishi Nihon, Kyodo, Japan Broadcasting Corporation, and Tokyo Broadcasting System. Since these companies agreed to an exchange of newsmen in this manner, "...there is no denying the stern fact that the L-T structure was not established by Shimbun Kyokai and that it was
incorporated into the framework of the L-T agreement concluded by politicians and traders.\textsuperscript{264}

An important point to note in this regard is that Memorandum Trade was carried out on the condition that those participating in such trade accepted the three "political principles" enunciated by Chou En-lai in 1960.\textsuperscript{265} Insofar as the press is concerned, it appears that there was an agreement "providing that newsmen should be exchanged on the premise of accepting the Chinese side political principles."\textsuperscript{266} Although \textit{Mainichi} was not prepared to accept Chou's three "political principles," other companies such as \textit{Nihon Keizai} accepted these conditions. In other words, those companies that agreed to abide by Chou's dictates could use their influence to create a political climate favourable to the normalization of Japan-China relations.

In point of fact even \textit{Mainichi} was in favour of a pro-Peking policy during Sato's reign in power, and followed the other newspapers in calling for the speedy normalization of relations. Accordingly, the most influential elements of the Japanese media took a pro-Peking viewpoint in their discussion of Japan's-China policy. Indeed, pro-Peking newsmen and editors established the Sino-Japanese Press Society in December 1971 to assist in promoting the normalization of Japan-China relations.\textsuperscript{267} Considering that the press was generally in favour of developing friendly relations with the Peking government, it seems natural to assume that it would influence public opinion to take a positive attitude towards normalizing relations with China. Indeed, Scalapino argues that: "The influence of the press on Japanese public opinion and also on political circles is substantial, as the
polling data indicates, especially in the arena of foreign policy." Likewise, Matsuyama agrees that "...undeniably, the press has become increasingly influential in the formation of Japanese foreign policy," and goes on to state further that: "...the press -- only the press -- can have effective influence upon foreign policy in Japan..." It would seem, therefore, that the press would have some influence on the policy-making process in respect to Japan's China policy. However, this influence would not be as much of a direct influence upon the policy-making process as it would be a contributing factor in the general "mood-building" in favour of normalization of relations. In any event, the influence of the press in the Japan-China normalization process was quite different from its role in the Soviet peace treaty negotiations, where the press "...scrupulously avoided a positive role in the policy-formulation process, refusing to lend editorial support to any firm policy position." In the case of China, the press acted as a catalyst giving direction to policy-makers and public opinion.

Public Opinion

During the 1960s a number of public opinion polls demonstrated that certain elements of the Japanese population were dissatisfied with the China policy pursued by the Sato government. This was particularly the case in respect to supporters of the Socialist Party, but even among the LDP supporters there was dissatisfaction over the ruling party's China policy. This point is illustrated by the surveys
carried out by Mendel. The respondents answered the following question:

Today Japan has diplomatic relations with the Republic of China on Taiwan, but not with Communist China. Should Japan recognize and establish relations with Communist China or is present policy better?

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<th>Total Sample</th>
<th>LDP</th>
<th>Socialist</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1966</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>1968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recognize</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status quo</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>42</td>
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From those among the sample who declared they were in favour of recognizing the PRC, Mendel then asked:

Then what should we do about relations with Nationalist China — continue or cancel them?

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<th>Total Sample</th>
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<tr>
<td>Continue</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cancel</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus, while a greater proportion of socialist supporters were in favour of recognizing the PRC, they still did not see this as going hand in hand with the severing of relations with the Taiwan regime. In fact, both socialist and LDP supporters saw the continuation of relations with Nationalist China as the policy that should be adopted by the government, if relations with China were established.

This opinion in favour of normalization of relations mounted rapidly during 1970 and 1971. For example, in April 1970 a survey
by the *Mainichi Shimbun* revealed that 16% of those interviewed were in favour of "immediate" normalization of relations and 47% were in favour of normalization" as soon as possible." Later, in June 1970, 64% of those interviewed were in favour of normalization, and by the following June 73% were in favour of normalizing relations with the PRC.

Thus, there was a growing sentiment in Japan to establish relations with China, which after the admission of China into the United Nations, "...mounted rapidly in favour of recognizing Peking." Now, there was an increasing movement towards hastening the normalization of relations as was indicated in a January poll by the *Tokyo Shimbun* where 45.8% of those interviewed called for "immediate recognition of the Chinese government and promotion of diplomatic relations." A survey by the *Asahi Shimbun* at the same time found that 59% of those questioned were in favour of "hastening" the normalization of relations.

In the above *Asahi Shimbun* poll the question of Japan's relations with Taiwan was also surveyed. In contrast with the earlier findings by Mendel, there was now an increasing number of people who realized maintenance of relations with Taiwan may not be compatible with establishing relations with China. In this instance, there was an almost equal spread between those that were in favour of "dissolution" of Japan's relations with Taiwan and those that were against this move, 34% coming out in favour of dissolution and 32% against this move. However, this survey did not make specific the question of exactly what relationship with Taiwan was under question, leaving it to the respondent to determine if this meant solely diplomatic relations, trade and financial relations, or both. When this question was made specific in a July 1972
survey by the *Sankei Shimbun*, it was found that only 5.5% were in favour of severing "every" tie with Taiwan, while the largest proportion of those interviewed, 72%, were in favour of maintaining trade ties with Taiwan.  

The above survey also demonstrated that there was a definite increase in popular support for hastening the establishment of relations after the inauguration of the Tanaka Cabinet. In this survey, 82% of those interviewed favoured "hastening" the establishment of diplomatic relations. Thus, when he moved to normalize relations with China, Tanaka could be assured he had popular support in carrying out this task.

**Conclusion:**

There are obvious limitations in respect to public opinion polls that may lead to biases in the results due to such factors as the time of survey, interview techniques, and subtle differences in questions asked of the respondents. While the polls taken on the question of Japan's relations with China were certainly not ideal insofar as being able to make comparisons over time, they nevertheless indicated a certain increase in public sentiment in favour of normalization of Japan-China relations. Of course, as with the question of the press' influence on the policy-making process, it is also difficult to assess the influence of public opinion on the decision to normalize relations with China.

In this respect, Itoh argues that any ability that public opinion may have in influencing the policy-making process revolves around three factors:
1) Public opinion creates the general mood in which decision-makers operate;

2) opinion polls on specific foreign-affairs issues may have some impact on policy-makers;

3) public opinion as articulated by various friendship societies (e.g., the Japan-China Friendship Society), trade promotion groups, and prominent individuals, as well as mass media, tend to increase any potential influence.

With regard to the first point, it is clear that public opinion in favour of normalization developed before it was possible to carry this task out due to the continuation in power of Prime Minister Sato. Thus, by the time Tanaka gained the prime ministership there was a strong "general mood" in favour of early normalization of relations. Indeed, at the time of the China policy agreement between Tanaka, Ohira, and Miki there was an explicit recognition of the fact that "normalisation of diplomatic relations between Japan and China has now become public opinion...."

Next, public opinion polls were consistent in reflecting a demand for the early normalization of relations by the Tanaka government, with the proportion of those in favour of such a move increasing as the time of Tanaka's visit approached. Insofar as Scalapino and Masumi are concerned, politicians do indeed pay attention to the response of the public in the polls conducted so that public opinion in favour or normalization may have provided some of the impetus to carry out this task.

On the other hand, Hellman asserts "...post-war Japanese prime ministers have in fact paid little attention to public opinion on the major foreign policy issues." Although Hellmann finds support for this assertion in his own study of the Soviet peace treaty negotiations,
our present study of the China normalization process would seem to indicate Prime Minister Tanaka may have paid some attention to the demand for normalization of Japan-China relations. One crucial variable here is that the press did not play a significant role in shaping public opinion in favour of the Japanese government's posture in the Soviet peace treaty negotiations, whereas it did in the case of normalization of Japan-China relations. In any event, a number of authors agree that public opinion played a significant role in pressuring the Tanaka government into normalizing relations with Peking. For example, Scalapino supports this statement when he declares public opinion was a "...significant pressure upon the new Tanaka government to reach an agreement with Peking quickly -- even at considerable cost."²⁸⁵ Likewise, Qureshi assures us "...the impetus for Tanaka's Peking visit was provided by the consensus of public opinion in Japan which has always played an important role in Japanese political life."²⁸⁶ Hence, it would appear that in certain circumstances public opinion may have certain influence on policy-making process in Japan.

Finally, in respect to Itoh's third point concerning the influence of articulated opinion,²⁸⁷ we have already pointed out that the media was definitely in favour of a normalization of Japan-China relations. In addition, we saw in our discussion of the LDP that intra-party pressure groups and prominent LDP politicians attempted to influence the policy-making process in favour of Peking. Finally, there were such groups as the Komeito sponsored People's Council for the Normalization of Japan-China relations that joined in calling for a more positive
attitude towards the Peking government. Of course, there was still strong sentiment in favour of Taiwan among certain elements of articulate opinion, (e.g., Asia Problems Research Group), but Tanaka gained support from the above groups in the same moves he made to normalize Japan-China relations.

When it comes to the pressure of these groups on the actual decision to normalize relations with China, however, they only played the role of general public opinion in forming the background against which the Tanaka government normalized relations. This is because the ad hoc policy-making group which came to dominate the 'China decision' was a small, tight-knit group which did not allow the influence of these groups or that of general public opinion to enter "...directly into the tightly insulated and controlled process of decision-making in the small action group of politicians and bureaucrats." While public opinion and articulated opinion may have provided some general input into the policy-making process in terms of it providing a favourable background for the policy-making group, the fact that this group operated in the above manner would seem to indicate that such favourable opinion was not only insufficient to bring about the normalization of Japan-China relations, but perhaps also unnecessary.
CONCLUSION

It is evident from our analysis of the policy-making process pertaining to the normalization of Japan-China relations that external and internal factors affect Japan's foreign-policy making process. This does not, of course, mean that all the internal and external factors that played a role in the 'China decision' were presented in this study, or that we can give "weight" to the relevant factors we have discussed but, given the admittedly scarce empirical data concerning Japanese policy-making in general, and foreign policy-making in particular, the most salient aspects of the China normalization process appear to have been examined in this study.

From the data already available on policy-making in Japan, a theoretical framework was culled in order to provide a heuristic device for explaining a particular case study -- the normalization of Japan-China relations. To analyze this problem in the framework we employed adds to our understanding of foreign policy-making, but it nevertheless begs the critical question: Can this study of the China normalization process provide any insights that might facilitate a broader conceptualization of policy-making in Japan?

To avoid the charge that we simply considered this case idiosyncratically, instead of nomothetically, the China normalization process was analyzed in respect to it being in the functional area of foreign policy, controversial in characteristic, and short-term on the temporal dimension. In this attempt to explicate a framework within which to study the 'China decision,' there are still certain criticisms that may be levelled against studying an issue within this setting.
In the first place, it might be argued that the actors involved in a foreign policy issue are not substantially different from those involved in a domestic issue. Indeed, our findings in respect to the predominant role of the LDP is supported by Harari's study of labour legislation in Japan. However, what still makes a functional difference between these issue areas significant, is that it gives a directional focus to examine the external influences affecting the policy-making process. In short, one would expect that external influences are not as salient in studies pertaining solely to domestic policy-making.

A more serious criticism may be levelled in respect to considering the China normalization process in a category based on the characteristic of the policy. In other words, how do we decide if an issue is controversial or not? Once again, the answer seems quite simple: if there is strong inter- or intra-party opposition to the government's policy, then the issue is controversial. Articulate and general public opinion may also express opposition to the government's policy, and this may heat the fire of the controversy, but the effect of inter- and intra-party opposition is the most salient point here.

Finally, a point of contention may be raised in respect to the temporal dimension of the issue. As noted, short-term (urgent) policy decisions are considered to be those of one year or less. Hence, it may be argued that this is either "too long," or "too short," a period. Certainly, what is needed here are further studies of foreign policy-making across the temporal dimension, so that we may make a more accurate assessment of the differing influences on the policy-making
process that occur over time. However, the point is that we specified the framework within which the 'China decision' was analyzed. In addition, we made it clear that Prime Minister Tanaka perceived the issue as short-term.

When we summarize this study's findings, then, it is possible to do so by reference to specific issue categories. This might not only facilitate the delineation of factors that may be significant in similar short-term and controversial foreign policy issues but, of equal importance, might also be useful in examining issues that fall within different issue categories. With this point in mind, a number of the more significant findings of this study, together with a number of postulates that may be relevant in future policy research, are presented below:

1) Input from the external environment is an important variable to consider in a short-term controversial foreign policy issue, but is not as salient in influencing Japan's long-term foreign policy goals (e.g., economic prosperity).

2) Senior leaders of the LDP supported by senior bureaucrats tend to exercise the predominant influence in short-term controversial issues. Conversely, the formal party organs and the bureaucratic organizations are expected to play a more prominent role in long-term issues. This will probably be especially the case for routine (non-controversial) issues.

3) Business influence is minimal in short-term controversial foreign policy issues. The more urgent the decision, the less likely that business will gain direct access to influence the policy-making process. Business influence is undoubtedly greatest in the economic policy-making process.
4) The role of the opposition in this study was somewhat atypical. This seems particularly true given that opposition parties gain their legitimacy and credibility from opposing, rather than supporting, the government's policy. Hence in the future, the role of the opposition will probably be that of government critic, both inside and outside the National Diet.

5) The press and public opinion are indirect influences in short-term controversial foreign policy decisions. The influence of the press and public opinion is perhaps most salient and direct in controversial issues, or domestic issues, but even this influence is probably indirect and peripheral to the policy-making process.

While this list is illustrative, rather than exhaustive, it does give some indication of the utility of considering an issue in terms of its functional, characteristic, and temporal dimensions. This may help us to build a bridge between abstract generalizations and empirical data. Perhaps most importantly it teaches us to use any framework with caution, remembering that our main task is that of explanation, not that of defending a particular theoretical position. In other words, while the above approach is useful for examining foreign policy-making in Japan, this does not suggest it will be of aid in understanding all policy-making issues. Nevertheless, it is a fruitful beginning from which to expand our knowledge of Japanese foreign policy-making.
FOOTNOTES

1 Geoffreý Pearson, "What does the academic have to contribute to policy-making," International Perspectives, (November-December 1973), p. 43.


3 For a similar interpretation see, for example, Harukiro Fukui, "Foreign Policy-Making in Japan: Case Studies for Empirical Theory," prepared for delivery at the 1974 Annual Meeting of the Association for Asian Studies, Boston, April 1-3, 1974, pp. 5-6. Hereafter this will be referred to as Fukui, "Foreign Policy-Making in Japan."


control the bureaucracy, and the bureaucrats keep the businessmen in line. It's a natural system of checks and balances."


17 Taketsugu Tsurutani, "The Causes of Paralysis," *Foreign Policy*, No. 14 (Spring 1974), pp. 126-41. For an excellent criticism of this article, see the following article in the same issue by Edwin O. Reischauer, "Their Special Strengths," pp. 142-53.


19 As Fukui points out, "Foreign Policy-Making in Japan," p. 21, "In most policy-making situations pressure from opposition parties, mass media and the general public are just as powerful as those coming from within the elite."

20 Frank Langdon, *Japan's Foreign Policy*, Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1973, p. 34. For other discussions pertaining to


27 Hellmann, Peace Treaty, pp. 84-87.


30 See pp. 85-88.


34 Packard, op. cit., p. 246.
36 Ibid., emphasis in the original.
41 Langdon, personal communication to author.
42 Pempel, *op. cit.*, p. 2. However, Pempel also notes that though discussing foreign policy limits decision-making to a particular functional area, there is "no reason to assume that all foreign policy decisions are formulated and expressed in a similar manner." p. 3. See also Fukui, "Foreign Policy-Making in Japan," pp. 72-73.
44 Pempel, *op. cit.*, p. 9. See also Reischauer, *op. cit.*, p. 148, who concurs that the decision-making process differs according to whether the issue is controversial or not, since the consensual decision-making process known as ringisei is used "...for very routine matters, not for controversial problems." For amplification of the concept of ringisei, see *op. cit.* 180.
48 See pp. 41-47. Zimmermann, op. cit., p. 1207 makes another comment on Powi's hypothesis: "The assertion that crisis politics does not have domestic political consequences seems, however, sufficiently bizarre--in the era of the fifteen-minute war the consequences may be felt in the very short run--to warrant an alternative hypothesis."

49 Fukui, "Foreign Policy-Making in Japan;" Silverstein, op. cit., pp. 31-32.

50 The distinction appears to be that Hermann is thinking in particular about external crises, whereas Fukui is thinking of internal crises brought about by external events. For example, Hermann states at the beginning of International Crises: Insights from Behavioural Research, p. 11, that "An abrupt increase in the likelihood of international violence or war is the most common systemic definition of crisis in the remainder of this volume." On the other hand, Fukui states in "Foreign Policy-Making in Japan," p. 83, that: "The kind of crisis I had in mind and I believe to be particularly important in the Japanese context is...domestic crisis caused by a foreign policy issue. This is the sense in which, for example, the 1960 'Security Treaty crisis' was perceived as such in Japan."

51 Masataka Kosaka suggests further that in the future there will not "...be many crisis issues if any where quick and bold decisions are needed." See "Options for Japan's Foreign Policy," London: Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Papers, No. 97, 1973, p. 19.

52 Fukui, "Foreign Policy-Making in Japan," p. 76.


55 As is noted in the book by Bauer et al., "Any given issue must compete with other issues for the scarce resources which determine the outcome: time, energy, attention, money, manpower, and good will." See R.A. Bauer, I de Sola Pool, and R.A. Dexter, "American Business and Public Policy, New York: Atherton Press, 1968, p. 480.


Silverstein, op. cit., p. 31.


Dulles visited Japan to pressure Prime Minister Yoshida to recognize the ROC government on Taiwan after 56 members of the Senate signed the following letter to the President: "Prior to the admission of the Japanese treaty to the Senate we desire to make it clear that we would consider the recognition of Communist China by Japan or the negotiation of a bilateral treaty with the Chinese Communist regime to be adverse to the best interests of the people of both Japan and the United States." Congressional Records, Vol. 98, No. 42, March 14, 1952, p. 2363. For a short but informative discussion of Dulles pressure on Prime Minister Yoshida, see Asahi staff, The Pacific Rivals, pp. 397-400. For further more detailed discussion see also Gerald Curtis, "The Dulles-Yoshida Negotiations on the San Francisco Peace Treaty," Columbia Essays in International Affairs 1966, p. 42, New York: Columbia University Press, 1967; Lawrence Olson, Japan in Postwar Asia, New York: Praeger, 1970, pp. 74-75. From a Japanese perspective see Shigeharu Matsumoto, "Japan and China: Domestic and

64 This is the "first" of the Yoshida letters which was signed by Prime Minister Yoshida in 1951. This should not be confused with another letter which Yoshida signed in 1964 in reference to restricting the use of Export-Import Bank funds to export plants to China. For a discussion of the 1951 letter, see especially Cohen, "The Political Process and Foreign Policy," pp. 150-54. For references concerning the 1964 Yoshida letter, see fn. 93.

65 The policy of "separation of politics and economics" which Japan followed until the normalization of relations was based on the premise that in the political world Japan extended official diplomatic relations to "one China" -- the ROC government on Taiwan -- but was quite prepared to trade with Peking as well as Taiwan. With the transfer of diplomatic relations to the Peking government there has now been a role reversal, with the "separation of politics and economics" policy being applied to Taiwan. For a discussion of China's methods of emphasizing to the Japanese the "inseparability of Politics and Economics", see Chae-Jin Lee, "The Politics of Sino-Japanese Trade Relations, 1963-1968," *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 41, No. 2 (Summer 1969), pp. 129-144. For a more technical discussion of the development of trade relations between Japan and China, see Dan F. Henderson and Tasuku Matsuo, "Japan's Trade Relations with the People's Republic of China," forthcoming in an edited book by Victor Li, Washington University Press.


69 This was in clear violation of the Rusk-Ohira talks of 1964 expressing that: "both nations, Japan and the United States will hold
consultations in advance in case there seems to be an important change on the China problem." See Shukan Minsha, 24th December, 1972. (All references to Japanese language newspapers are taken from translations by the American Embassy, Tokyo Political Section Translation Service Branch, Daily Summary of Japanese Press). Likewise, it had been agreed just a few years previously in the Sato-Nixon communique that there was a mutual consultation agreement between the two countries. See Shukan Minsha, November 22, 1969.

For a discussion of a number of hypotheses concerning the possible explanation for the Nixon "shocks" (first, the announcement in July of Nixon's China visit without prior consultation with American allies and second the announcement in August of a new economic policy aimed at forcing a revaluation of the yen), see Graham T. Allison, "American Foreign Policy and Japan," Discord in the Pacific: Challenges to the Japanese-American Alliance, Ed. Henry Rosovsky, New York: The American Assembly, Columbia University, 1972, pp. 7-46.


The voting on the Albanian Resolution was 76 for; 35 against; 17 abstentions; 3 absentees. Taken from Shinkichi Eto, "Japan and China - A New Stage," Problems of Communism, Vol. 11, No. 6 (November-December, 1972), p. 6.


It is also interesting to note that Foreign Minister Fukuda had not committed Japan to follow the American policy in the United Nations when he visited the United States to attend the Joint US-Japan Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs. See Haruhiro Fukui, "Bureaucratic Power in Japan," Japan and Australia: Two Societies and their Interaction, Eds. Peter Drysdale and Hironobu Kitaoji, Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming.


Sawhny, op. cit., p. 64. Of course, as Martin Weinsten points out the United States would not have been as prepared to return Okinawa if it had not been for the scaledown in the Vietnam war. See Martin Weinstein, "The Strategic Balance in East Asia," Current History, Vol. 65, No. 387 (November 1973), p. 193. For a further discussion of the question of Okinawa reversion, see Langdon, Japan's Foreign Policy, pp. 126-32. For a fuller discussion, see Akio Watanabe, The Okinawa Problem: A Chapter in Japan-U.S. Relations, Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1970, Chapter 7.


80 *Asahi Shimbun*, 1 October 1972, emphasis added.

81 Although no such clause appears in the actual US-Japan Security Treaty, this phrase has come to be used to mean that the United States can use military bases in Japan to protect Taiwan from any communist threat. The treaty states in article 1 that United States "...forces may be utilized to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East..." For a brief discussion of the different Japanese government's interpretation of the scope of the Far East Clause, see Young C. Kim, "Japan's Security Policy Debate," *Japan in World Politics*, Ed. Young C. Kim, p. 63; Langdon, *Japan's Foreign Policy*, p. XIV. For the text of the Security Treaty, see Packard, *op. cit.*, pp. 355-357. For further discussion pertaining to the question of invoking the security treaty for the protection of Taiwan, see the speech given by Prime Minister Tanaka to the Lower House Plenary Session on 31/10/72, *Asahi Shimbun*, 1/11/72; *Sankei Shimbun*, 3/9/72; *Tokyo Shimbun*, 1/10/72; and discussion between Prime Minister Tanaka and Dietman Ishibashi *Asahi Shimbun*, 2/11/72, evening edition.

82 Frank C. Langdon, *Japan's Foreign Policy*, p. 200. While it could be argued that this demonstrates the United States is still prepared to dissolve the cold war security structure of which the U.S.-Japan security treaty forms an intrinsic part, it is in fact precisely because the security treaty is not simply a legacy of the cold war security structure but a crucial element in the new balance of power framework in which Japan plays a role as one of the four poles in Asia, that the security treaty is so important to the United States.

83 As Henry Kissinger stated concerning Japan's intention to normalize relations with China: "I will absolutely not oppose it. Rather, I will take the side of promoting it." *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, 9/9/72.


88 The problem in coming to an agreement with the Soviet Union regarding the peace treaty revolves around the territorial question of sovereignty over the Habomais, Shikotan, the Southern Kuriles (Kunashiri, and Etorofu). This question was nearly solved at the time of the peace treaty negotiations in 1956, but as Hellmann makes clear, an agreement was not reached: "First, the Habomais and Shikotan were to be claimed unconditionally as inherently Japanese, and most importantly, the return of these islands was to be considered satisfactory grounds for a treaty. Second, priority was attached to the Southern Kuriles, which were demanded for 'historical reasons' but were not deemed essential for an overall settlement. Finally, the Northern Kuriles and Southern Sakhalin were claimed simply for bargaining purposes. Consequently, when on August 5, the Soviets suddenly modified their proposals and offered the return of the Habomais and Shikotan as well as acceptable conditions for all other outstanding issues, an agreement seemed imminent. However, at this point, the Japanese government abruptly revised its position, and extended the minimum territorial claim to include the Southern Kuriles. The revision surprised and angered the Russians, who indignantly branded the new conditions totally unacceptable." Hellmann, Peace Treaty, p. 59. Japan has maintained its insistence upon regaining the above territories. Emmerson, op. cit., pp. 230-37. Now Japan is receiving support from China in this bid. See FEER, No. 18 (7/5/73), p. 5; Japan Times, 11/10/73. See Derek Davis, "Year of Asia's Giants" FEER, Vol. 82, No. 52 (31/12/73), p. 29. For Prime Minister Tanaka's view, see Asahi Shimbun, 1/10/72). There is the possibility that the territorial question between Japan and China may prove a hindrance to the agreement on a Japan-China peace treaty too, particularly since this revolves around the question of sovereignty over the oil-rich Senkaku islands. However, shortly after the passage of the controversial Japan-China air accord through the Diet, former Foreign Minister Ohira stated that he saw no "insurmountable barriers" to the conclusion of a peace treaty. See Japan Times Weekly, 25/5/74.


For a comprehensive discussion of Sato's policies towards China while in office, see Gregory Clark, "Sino-Japanese Relations: An Analysis," *Australian Outlook*, Vol. 25, No. 1 (April 1971), pp. 58-68. The justifications that Sato advanced for the continuation of relations with Taiwan were basically a reiteration of those advanced by Prime Ministers since Yoshida: 1) Japan concluded a peace treaty with the government of Nationalist China in 1952 which was generous toward the Japanese; 2) the Nationalist Chinese government was recognized as the representative of China in the United Nations and maintained diplomatic relations with the majority of the UN members; 3) the Japanese Government should not antagonize the United States by initiating a drastic measure such as recognition of Communist China because Japanese-American relationship was more important than Japan's relations with any other nation; 4) the time was not ripe under the circumstances for establishing a diplomatic relationship with Communist China." See Hong N. Kim, "The 'Nixon Shock' and Japan's Emerging New China Policy," West Virginia University, unpublished draft, p. 6.

Japan Times, 7/4/70. For reference to Sato's well known anti-communist attitudes, see Christian Science Monitor, 24/9/71; Gregory Clark, *op. cit.*, p. 63; Saywell, *op. cit.*, p. 512; Yomiuri Shimbun, 23/4/70. For a more general discussion, see Mildred C. Vreeland, "Communist China and Japan: A Study of Chinese Perceptions and Policies," *Japan in World Politics*, Ed. Young C. Kim; Emmerson, *op. cit.*, pp.219-222. For reference to the unfriendly policies that the Sato government promulgated, see for example *Tokyo Shimbun*, 23/7/72, which points out that Sato habitually retracted any forward-looking policy on China; Matsumoto, "Our Neighbour China," *Japan Quarterly*, Vol. 18, No. 2 (April-June, 1971), p. 152, where Matsumoto discusses the Sato government's backing of the United States pro-Taiwan policy in the United
Nations. One of the most important anti-Chinese policies that the Sato government adopted was that of the "Yoshida letter." This was a letter written in 1964 by the former Prime Minister to mollify the Taiwan government after Export-Import Bank credits had been used to sponsor a plant export to China. Since that time the Sato government stood by the "Yoshida letter" until 1972 when it was indicated by the Japanese government that credits would be available for plant export to China on application. For the best discussion of the immediate effect of the "Yoshida letter" on the development of trade relations between Japan and China, see "Communist China Cancels Big Contracts due to Yoshida Letter," Japan Foreign Trade News, No. 165, 1965, p. 11. For a later study, see Gene R. Hsiao, "The Pole of Trade in China's Diplomacy with Japan," The Dynamics of China's Foreign Relations, Ed. Jerome A. Cohen, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970, pp. 41-45. For the change of policy in 1972, see Nihon Keizai Shimbun, March 18, 1972.


95 Fukui, "Policy-Making in Japan," p. 27. Also see Asahi Shimbun, 28/4/72. Japan Times, 16/10/71; Eiji Tominomori, "Sato's Legacy," Japan Quarterly, Vol. 19, No. 2 (April-June 1972), p. 156. This draft paid attention to the "three principles" which China upheld as the basis for normalization of relations: 1) The People's Republic of China is the sole legitimate government of China; 2) Taiwan is an integral part of the People's Republic of China; 3) The Japan-Republic of China peace treaty is "illegal and must therefore be abrogated." Sato also made his own efforts to try and begin negotiations but was rebuffed by the Chinese side. See Japan Times, 29/7/71.


97 Asahi Shimbun, 15/11/71.


100 Ibid.


103 Asahi Shimbun, 27/4/72. Moreover, the Chinese government was not even prepared to make any ambassdorial contact while Sato remained in power; hence, they refused to attend receptions such as those at International Environment Conference at Stockholm and the UNCTAD meeting in Santiago. See Mainichi Shimbun, 17/7/72.

Yomiuri Shimbun, 16/5/72; Mainichi Shimbun, 17/5/72.


Asahi Shimbun, 17/5/72.

Sankei Shimbun, 12/7/72. This attitude marked contrast to the Chinese attitude towards the Sato government, since "even if Sato accepted the three basic principles as the basis of opening talks with us, we shall not accept Sato as a negotiating partner. However, any successor of Sato will be welcome in Peking as long as he accepts the three basic principles." FEER, No. 47 (20/11/71), p. 12.


Hong N. Kim, "The 'Nixon Shock' and Japan's Emerging New China Policy," West Virginia University, unpublished manuscript, p. 18.

Kei Wakaizami argues that even Japan's "policy towards China was no exception to the passive character of Japan's diplomacy. Japan was the last of America's major allies to part from the United States on the question of Taiwan and China, having faithfully followed U.S. policy since the war." See "Japan's role in a New World Order," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 51, No. 2 (January 1973), p. 310. See also R.M.V. Collick, "The 'New' Japanese Foreign Policy," The World Today (February 1973), p. 84; Nihon Keizai, 10/7/72; Sankei Shimbun, 10/7/72.


Ogata, "Japanese Attitudes Towards Japan," p. 395. For a comprehensive and detailed discussion concerning the development of the various pro-Peking and pro-Taiwan Groups in the LDP, see Nathan Newby White, op. cit., pp. 391 ff.

Park, op. cit., pp. 15-17.


Stockwin comments that "...the change in leadership was clearly the one event which broke the log-jam over relations with China." See J.A.A. Stockwin, "Continuity and Change in Japanese Foreign Policy," Pacific Affairs, Vol. 46, No. 1 (Spring 1973), p. 83. For a discussion of some of the difference that distinguish Tanaka from preceding LDP Prime Ministers, see Emerson Chapin, "Men and Politics in Post-Sato Japan," Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 26, No. 1 (1972), pp. 167-78.


The actual formal creation of the Tanaka faction did not take place until 12/9/72 being called Nananoka-kai (7th Day Association), coming slightly after the formation of the anti-mainstream Fukuda faction Yoka-kai (8th Day Association).

Yomiuri Shimbun, 3/7/72.

Asahi Shimbun, 3/7/72.


Hellman, Peace Treaty, p. 18.

Ogata, "The Business Community and Foreign Policy," to be published by University of California Press, under the editorship of Robert A. Scalapino, p. 41.

Tanaka was greeted with a positive response from the Chinese side in this respect. This was in contrast to Fukuda, who was apparently considered a persona non grata in Peking. See Park, op. cit., p. 28.
127 Furui, op. cit., p. 49.
128 For a discussion of the election, see Farnsworth, op. cit., pp. 113-14.
129 Ibid., p. 114.
130 Fukui, "Foreign Policy-Making in Japan," pp. 33 and 34.
131 Furui, op. cit., p. 51.
132 Furui, op. cit., p. 52.
133 See Furui's story of his contribution to this decision, op. cit. The following discussion is based on Furui's article.
134 Furui, op. cit., p. 48.
135 For a discussion of the idea that the policy-making process in Japan is frequently dominated by an ad hoc policy-making group, see Fukui, "Foreign Policy-Making in Japan," pp. 19-23 especially. For a discussion of the Foreign Ministry ad hoc group in the China policy-making process, see the next section.
136 Furui, op. cit., p. 48.
137 Fukui, "Foreign Policy-Making in Japan," pp. 19-23. In this respect Fukui fails to make a distinction that may be important, namely whether or not the policy issue is urgent or not. We would suggest that this formation of a small ad hoc group may be employed in urgent but not in long-term decision. This would seem congruent with Kal Holsti's hypothesis: "The more critical or urgent a situation is perceived to be, the fewer people will become directly involved in defining the situation, choosing responses, and selecting goals." See Kal J. Holsti, International Politics: A Framework for Analysis, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972 (second edition), p. 394.

139 Silverstein, op. cit., p. 19.

140 See Tokyo Shimbun, 27/7/72 for discussion of the technical aspects and membership in the Normalization Council.

141 Ibid.

142 Mainichi Shimbun, 16/7/72. Chief Cabinet Secretary Nikaido also called for the need of developing a consensus within the party. See Asahi Shimbun, 17/7/72. Moreover, Foreign Minister Ohira and Prime Minister Tanaka continually emphasized the need of developing an intra-party consensus. See, for example, Yomiuri Shimbun, 8/7/72. In fact, at the first meeting of the Normalization Council on 24/7/72 the ten points for normalization of Japan-China relations were presented by Prime Minister Tanaka. Point Six and point Seven stated respectively: 6) "For the success of this case, a consensus and strong support of the ruling LDP are necessary." 7) "This Council is aimed at realizing an intra-party consensus...." This clearly demonstrates how important Tanaka perceived the development of an intra-party consensus to be. See Yomiuri Shimbun, 24/7/72, evening edition.

143 Hellmann, Peace Treaty, p. 19. Hosoya's contrast with the Nixon visit to China is also germane here: "Nixon, for example, was able to make the announcement of his forthcoming visit to Peking, which obviously marked an abrupt change in policy, without lengthy prior consultations with political leaders and the rest of the government bureaucracy. A move of this sort simply lies beyond the competence of a Japanese Prime Minister, who, before reaching a final decision on any substantial change in Japan's foreign policy, must make an exhaustive effort to consult a wide spectrum of Japanese leadership in politics, business, and the bureaucracy in order to obtain the fullest range of support for any eventual decision." See Hosoya, op. cit., p. 368.

144 Omori, op. cit., pp. 408-409. See also Asahi Shimbun, 16/8/72.

145 The pro-Taiwan members of the Normalization Council adopted a number of tactics, such as heckling and calling for a non-confidence vote in Chairman Kosoka, to try and protect Taiwan. See, for example, Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 2/9/72; Asahi Shimbun, 5/9/72. Of importance here
was the activity of such pro-Taiwan LDPers as Michio Watanabe, Masayuki Fujio, Koichi Hamada, Ichiro Nakagawa, who later came to form part of the Seirankai which was active in trying to prevent the air pact agreement between Japan and China. For the best discussion concerning the Seirankai, see J. Victor Koschmann, "Hawks on the Defensive: The Seirankai," Japan Interpreter, Vol. 8, No. 4 (Winter 1974), pp. 467-77. For a survey of LDP opinion on the government's handling of the China normalization process and the Japan-China air accord, see Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 5/10/73. One of the findings of this survey was that of the LDP members supporting the establishment of relations with the PRC, 33% "clarified critical views on the procedures or method taken by the government for this purpose, especially those related to the Taiwan problem. It can be said that this fact is indicative of the reason why the LDP was involved in heated discussions on Japan-China relations which even threatened to cause the split of the party, while only a few members were strongly opposed to the restoration of diplomatic relations."

146 Asahi Shimbun, 1/9/72.
147 Japan Times, 25/8/72. See also ibid, 30/9/72; 6/9/72; 9/9/72; Japan Times Weekly, 16/7/72; Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 10/7/72.
148 Japan Times, 30/8/72. The pro-Taiwan LDPers were continual and bitter in their criticisms of Foreign Minister Ohira in particular, who made a number of statements indicating Taiwan would be abandoned. See, for instance, Yomiuri Shimbun, 30/8/72.
149 Japan Times, 30/8/72.
150 Ibid.
151 Japan Times, 23/8/72; Japan Times Weekly, 30/8/72.
152 Tokyo Shimbun, 13/9/72.
153 Asahi Shimbun, 5/9/72. Indeed, Tanaka also resisted the pressure of the old-guard in the party such as Kishi, Funada, and Ishii who visited the Prime Minister to try and persuade him not to abandon Taiwan. See Yamato Shimbun, 30/9/72.
155 See, for example, Sankei Shimbun, 12/1/74; Mainichi Shimbun, 10/2/74. This went hand in hand with a feeling that diplomatic relations were established before consensus was reached. Sankei, 12/1/74.
156 For a list of the Dietmen who accompanied Kosaka to China, see Sankei Shimbun, 9/9/72.
See the interview with Chairman Kosaka after his return from Peking, Yomiuri Shimbun, 20/9/72. Also Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 19/9/72, (evening edition).

Asahi Shimbun, 20/9/72, evening edition, emphasis added. When questioned regarding this statement Shina stated that: "I explained to the Taiwan side the contents of the Resolution adopted by the LDP Japan-China Diplomatic Relations Normalization Consultative Council. It is not that I clarified the Government's view and my own view as the Special envoy."

Sankei Shimbun, 20/9/92, evening edition.

Statement made by Chief Cabinet Secretary Nikaido, Tokyo Shimbun, 20/9/72, evening edition.

Hellmann, Peace Treaty, pp. 56, 73; Packard, op. cit., pp. 65 ff. In this latter regard, also see Scalapino and Masumi, op. cit.


See, for example, Asahi Staff, The Pacific Rivals, pp. 324-27, 332-335.

Henderson and Matsuo, op. cit., p. 8. For a discussion of the MITI's efforts to expand trade after normalization seemed certain to occur, see Tokyo Shimbun, 14/7/72.


Park, op. cit., p. 16. Another reason that probably contributes to the conflict of opinion within the Foreign Ministry results from the fact that the heads of the various divisions within the Ministry take a sympathetic attitude towards the countries they deal with, thus allowing the possibility of conflict between these divisions. This sympathetic attitude is particularly true of the China Division, where the Head, Hashimoto, "...pleaded with passion for a forward-looking policy towards the PRC. See Fukui, "Foreign Policy-Making in Japan's Foreign Ministry," prepared for presentation on Japan's Foreign Policy, Kauai, Hawaii, 14-17/1/74, p. 18.
Sato had followed the advice of senior members of the bureau­
cracy in deciding to follow a pro-Taiwan policy, though Secretary of
State Rogers may have influenced him in this respect. See Asahi
Shimbun, 23/9/71, Sawhny, op. cit., p. 64.

Kokumin Shimbun, 5/12/72.


Before the formation of this group in late July, the bureau­
crats had been active in examining a number of questions that would
eventually need to be answered when normalizing relations with China;
1) whether or not to fully accept Pekin's three principles for normal­
ization, 2) how to deal with the question of the U.S. Japan Security
Treaty, 3) what form the "termination of war" should take in the
joint communique. However, the Foreign Ministry did not have any
contact with the Chinese government until after contacts were made
by Foreign Minister Ohira on 22nd July. This meant that these
questions were resolved without any feedback from the Chinese side,
so that the bureaucrats were largely involved in a "...theoretical
exercise, the effect and utility of which was quite uncertain in the
absence of feedback from Peking through a reliable channel. In short,
they were mostly speculating in a situation full of uncertainties,
rather than engaged in normal policy-making activities in a familiar
political and bureaucratic context." See,Fukui, "Foreign Policy-
Making in Japan," p. 44-46, Japan Times Weekly, 29/7/72; Asahi Shimbun,
23/7/72.

This part concerning the Foreign Ministry policy-making group
relies on the interview material contained in Fukui, "Foreign Policy-
Making in Japan," pp. 43 ff. This is especially important in respect
to the characteristics of the ad hoc policy-making group, since
available newspaper sources only point out that a China Policy Council
or Leaders Group was established with the participation (in addition to
those mentioned in the text) of Acting American Affairs Bureau Director
General Tachibana, Public Information Bureau Director General Owada, European
and Oceanic Affairs Bureau Director General Owada, and Consular and
Emigration Affairs Department Director General Endo (the latter two
being China experts). Besides the fact that small ad hoc groups are
usually formed within the Foreign Ministry to deal with policy problems,
one of the reasons for the exact nature of this policy group is possibly
that there was a fear of conflict developing between these bureaucrats
on the part of Foreign Minister Ohira. See Nihon Keizai Shimbun,
1/8/72. See also Yomiuri Shimbun, 23/7/72. Another important point is
that the Foreign Ministry is divided in terms of 1) functional and 2)
geographic areas. Hence, the Asia Bureau Director and the China
Division Head had an obvious role in the policy-making process. In
regard to the participation of the Treaties Bureau Division Head and Bureau Director, Fukui notes that: "The Treaties Bureau [unlike the other bureaus] tends to get involved in all kinds of issues dealt with by the Foreign Ministry...." See Fukui, "Foreign Policy-Making in Japan's Foreign Ministry," p. 6. For discussion of the ad hoc policy group, see ibid., pp. 6-7, 36-37.

173 Fukui, "Foreign Policy-Making in Japan," p. 47. Foreign Vice-Minister Hogen simply played the part of supervisor of this policy-making team. His role was similar to Fukui's more general comment that the Vice-Minister though formally responsible for policy is not always an active leader of the team, often now even an active participant in its work. See Fukui, "Policy-Making of Japan's Foreign Ministry," p. 8.

174 For a discussion of the development of Japan's stance upon the nature and content of the joint communique, see Fukui, "Foreign Policy-Making in Japan," pp. 44 ff.; Mainichi Shimbun, 12/9/72. For a convenient reference to the content of the joint communique in its final form, see Eto, "Japan and China - A New Stage," p. 13.

175 Graham Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, Boston: Little, Brown, 1971. For critique of the bureaucratic policy-making model, see citation 176.


178 Tsurutani, op. cit., pp. 131-32.


180 Ringisei refers to "a system whereby administrative plans and decisions are made through the circulation of a document called ringisho. The ringisho is initially drafted by a low-ranking official ... thereafter the ringisho is discussed and examined separately by the
officials of all relevant bureaus and divisions...the highest executive is expected to approve it without change or modification because of this long process of prior scrutiny by lower officials." See Kyoaki Tsuji, "Decision-Making in the Japanese Government: A Study of Ringisei," Political Development in Modern Japan, Ed. Robert E. Ward, Princeton, N.J.: 1968, p. 458. Tsuji's is the best discussion of ringisei. For a shorter discussion, see Nakane, op. cit., p. 65. For a discussion of ringisei in the bureaucracy immediately prior to the second world war, see Hosoya, op. cit., pp. 363 ff. For an excellent discussion questioning the view that ringisei is attributable to the continuation of traditional Japanese social values, see Bernard S. Silberman, "Ringesei - Traditional Values or Organizational Imperatives in the Japanese Civil Service: 1868-1945," The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 32, No. 2, (February 1973), pp. 251-64. For a discussion pertaining to Japan's Foreign Ministry, see Fukui, "Policy-Making in Japan's Foreign Ministry," p. 12.

181 See also, Reischauer, op. cit., p. 147.
183 Hellmann, Peace Treaty, p. 129.
185 Brown, op. cit., p. 766.
187 Fukui, Party in Power, pp. 244-46.
188 Ibid.
189 This positive attitude on the part of Kansai business is illustrated by an opinion poll "...of 94 business leaders who responded to the Koyd News Agency questionnaire in the summer of 1971. To the question whether Japan should recognize China before the United States,
only 19 percent of the Tokyo business leaders answered "yes," in contrast to 26.2 percent of Osaka and Nagoya. Also, to the question whether Japan should start negotiating for the resumption of diplomatic relations immediately under the Sato government, 46.2 percent of the Tokyo leaders answered in the affirmative to the 61.9 percent of Osaka and Nagoya. Also in terms of estimating the future of the China market, 69 percent of Kansai and Nagoya leaders expected it to grow to a total volume of 1.5 to 2 billion in five years while 57.9 percent of the Tokyo leaders gave similar consideration." Ogata, "The Business Community and Foreign Policy," pp. 23-24.

190 Ogata, "The Business Community and Foreign Policy," p. 22. The "Four Conditions" were basically that businesses participating in the China market must not deal with 1) Taiwan, 2) South Korea, 3) South Vietnam, 4) ally themselves with U.S. capital. See Dan Fenno Henderson and Tasuku Matsuo, op. cit., p. 2.

191 *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, 8/7/72.


196 *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 27/2/58.

197 Nathaniel Newby White, op. cit., p. 608.


199 See, op. cit., p. 131.

For a list of Japanese companies investing in Taiwan and a description of these investments, see *Yamamoto Shimbun*, 16/10/72.


206. For a comment on the earlier expectations the Steel Industry held of increased trade with China, see *Nihon Kogyo*, 17/4/70.


208. *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, Evening edition 22/5/70. For a discussion of the other steel companies that did not secure contracts at the Trade Fair, see *Tokyo Shimbun*, 24/4/70.


219. *Asahi Shimbun*, 24/5/72. With the change of attitude by Uemura the Keidanren now came in line with the policy adopted by *Keizai Doyukai* (Japan Committee for Economic Development), which had presented a
forward-looking policy on China in 1970, declaring that Japan should "...play an important role in the solution of the East-West problem centered on the Communist China question." See Nikkan Kogyo, 20/4/70. It was the Keizai Doyukai rather than Keidanren that was an active promoter of Japan-China relations. For an examination of the general characteristics and function of these two organizations, see Gerald L. Curtis, "Organizational Leadership in Japan's Business Community," Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 26, No. 1 (1972, pp. 179-85.

221 Eto, "Japan and China:— A New Stage," p. 2; Kaminogo, "op. cit., p. 38; Sankei Shimbun, 7/9/72.
225 The LDP may not continue to gain the same extensive financial support that has characterized its relationship with business so far. After the excessive financial output by business in the July 1974 Upper House elections, in the unfulfilled hope of bolstering the LDP's seat position in this house, business declared through such associations as Keidanren that it will no longer give such large contributions to the LDP coffers. See New York Times, 10/9/74.
226 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 1/11/72, emphasis added; Halliday and McCormack, Japanese Imperialism Today, Ch. 4.
227 Fukui, "Foreign Policy-Making in Japan," p. 56.
228 See also Scalapino, American-Japanese Relations in a Changing Era, p. 39.
229 Hellmann, Peace Treaty, p. 22.
231 Japan Times Weekly, 7/9/72.
233 Ibid., Ch. 10.


235 Japan Times, 4/8/70; Asahi Shimbun, 3/11/70.

236 Tokyo Shimbun, 23/7/72.

237 Furui, op. cit., p. 42.

238 Mainchi Shimbun, 15/7/72. The flexible posture of the Chinese government was illustrated by its willingness to allow "some amount of time" for the settlement of the Taiwan problem.

239 Tokyo Shimbun, 23/7/72.

240 Komei Shimbun, 7/4/68.

241 Yomiuri Shimbun, 14/2/70.

242 Japan Times, 14/12/70. For a list of individuals who joined the council, see Komei Shimbun, 14/12/70.

243 Japan Times, 9/6/71.

244 Komei Shimbun, 30/6/71.

245 Kim, op. cit., p. 9.

246 For the opposition parties statements concerning the Komeito's activities, see Sankei Shimbun, 3/7/71.

247 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 3/7/71.

248 Fukui, "Foreign Policy-Making in Japan," pp. 40-46. Citation 198 lists the three "political principles."

249 Ibid.

250 Ibid.

251 Ibid.

252 Omori, op. cit., p. 409. See also Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 31/7/72.

253 Furui, op. cit., p. 50.
Cole *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 74, 119.

Sankei *Shimbun*, 30/8/71, evening edition. The party's basic policy on the China issue was: 1) China is one; 2) China's admission to the United Nations will be promoted; and 3) the DSP does not approve the reverse important item question in the U.S.


*Nihon Keizai Shimbum*, 19/9/72.

Furui, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

For a discussion of the tactics the opposition parties have developed to increase their influence on the policy-making process in Japan, see J.A.A. Stockwin, "The Japanese Opposition: Political Irrelevance or Wave of the Future," *Australian Outlook*, Vol. 25, No. 2 (August 1971), pp. 181-87.


This examination of the role of the press in the China normalization process is based on the article by Osamu Miyoshi, "The Press has thus Yielded to Peking," Summaries of Selected Japanese Magazines, American Embassy, Tokyo Political Section Translation Services Branch, July 1972, pp. 14-31. For a short extract of this article, see Osamu Miyoshi, "How the Japanese Press Yielded to Peking," *Survey*, Vol. 18, No. 4 (85) Autumn 1972, pp. 103-125. That Miyoshi is correct in his analysis appears to be confirmed by an interview between Sam Jameson and Dietmen Seijich Tagawa and the Secretary General of the Newspaper Publisher's Association in Japan, Susumi Ejiri. In this interview Tagawa and Ejiri admitted to Jameson that there were secret discussions with the Chinese side to bring about an exchange of newsmen. See *Los Angeles Times*, 14/4/72. Indeed, in the *Survey* article Miyoshi quotes a Foreign News Editor of a Japanese newspaper as saying: "To dispatch a correspondent to Peking takes precedence over the freedom of the press." *Ibid.*, p. 140.
Miyoshi, op. cit.

See citation 198.

Miyoshi, op. cit.


Hellmann, Peace Treaty, p. 151.


Mainchi Shimbun, 30/4/70.

Asahi Shimbun, 23/6/70.

Asahi Shimbun, 3/6/71.

Christian Science Monitor, 30/9/72.

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Ibid.

Itoh, op. cit., p. 184.

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MISCELLANEOUS


