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The Winnipeg core area initiative : a case study in urban revitalisation Stewart, Dana Gayle 1993

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THE WINNIPEG CORE AREA INITIATIVE:A CASE STUDY IN URBAN REVITALISATIONbyDANA GAYLE STEWARTB.I.D., The University of Manitoba, 1967M.C.P., The University of Manitoba, 1984A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OFTHE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OFDOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHYinTHE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIESSchool of Community and Regional PlanningWe accept this thesis as conformingto the required standardTHE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIAApril 1993© Dana Gayle Stewart, 1992Department ofIn presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanceddegree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make itfreely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensivecopying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of mydepartment or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying orpublication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my writtenpermission.(Signature) The University of British ColumbiaVancouver, CanadaDate  ,C2e_ty DE-6 (2/88)ABSTRACTInner-city revitalisation poses perhaps the most complex challenge faced by urbanplanners today. This dissertation explores the role of planning in urban restructuring byproviding a critical empirical investigation into a major Canadian tripartite planningintervention that spans a decade -- The Winnipeg Core Area Initiative (1981 to 1991). Thepurpose of the dissertation is to study the Winnipeg Core Area Initiative (CM) as aprototypical model for urban regeneration and public-policy intervention, to determine thestrengths and weaknesses of the CAI, and to evaluate the impact that this urbanintervention had over a period of ten years. Backed by a comparative analysis of urbanregeneration efforts in Great Britain and the United States, it explores the concept of"distress" in inner-city areas and attempts to answer the questions: Distress -- who canrelieve it and how? The case-study method is used for an evaluation of the CAI thatincludes content analysis of published materials produced about, and for, the Initiative andpublic-attitude surveys and newspaper reports over the period 1981 to 1991. The results ofinterviews with twenty-five "key or core players" provide qualitative data that enriches thedissertation by presenting a picture of the CAI that is missing from evaluation reportscommissioned by the tripartite partners or from published commentaries on the Initiative.This case study reveals an urban intervention strategy with objectives that wereconceptually broad and comprehensive, perhaps too much so for the level of financial andorganisational resources available and the level of public expectations that was raised.While the model was an excellent vehicle to harmonise scarce public resources andleverage private investment, this study reveals a disjunction between policy intent andpolicy implementation in attempting to balance economic development with disparity reliefefforts. This dissertation concludes that there are components of the CAI model thatprovide valuable instruction for urban restructuring but it is unlikely that the model asoriginally designed, could, or should, be replicated. The importance of this study is toprovide a broad examination of the theoretical framework behind the Winnipeg CAI as aninstrument for urban public policy that will assist future planning-and-policy formationattempts in urban revitalisation and strengthen the public and private ability to generatecomprehensive, strategic and cohesive urban policy.ivTABLE OF CONTENTSABSTRACT ^  iiTABLE OF CONTENTS ^  ivLIST OF TABLESLIST OF FIGURES ^ xiiACKNOWLEDGEMENTS  xiiiPART ICHAPTER 1. THE WINNIPEG CORE AREA INITIATIVE: A CASE STUDY1.1 Scope of Inquiry and Conceptual Framework ^  11.2 Study Objectives ^  31.3 Significance of the Research ^  61.4 Formal Problem Statement  71.5 Dissertation Design  ^71.5.1 The Case Study Data  ^ The Interviews ^ The Value of the Qualitative Data ^  11PART IfCHAPTER 2. COMPARATIVE URBAN POLICY: BRITAIN AND THEUNITED STATES2.1 Introduction ^  132.2 Cities in Distress  ^142.3 Evolving Urban Policy in the United Kingdom and the UnitedStates ^  182.4 Planning and Urban Policy in Britain and the UnitedStates: The Historical Context ^  22V2.4.1 The Late Nineteenth Century ^  232.4.2 The Early Twentieth Century  242.4.3 Post World War II ^  252.4.4 The 1960s and 1970s  272.5 Contemporary Urban Policy: Lessons from America ^ 292.6 Dereliction in Aid and the Rise of Privatism ^  302.7 Prognosis for Cities in Distress ^  332.8^The Limitations of Past Approaches to UrbanRevitalisation and the Needs for Alternate Strategies ^ 34CHAPTER 3. PLANNING AND THE URBAN DIMENSION OF ECONOMICDEVELOPMENT IN CANADA3.1 Introduction ^  393.2 Evolution of Canadian Urban Planning ^  403.2.1 Planning as a Rational, Technical Profession ^  443.2.2 Institutionalization of Urban Planning Within the LocalGovernment System ^  443.2.3 "New" Urban Politics and Planning ^  463.2.4 Implications of the Fordist Model of Development ^ 483.3 The Role of Economic Development in Local Development  493.4 Canadian Government Approach to Economic Development ^ 503.4.1 The Ministry of State for Urban Affairs ^  513.4.2 Rationale for State Intervention^  533.4.3 The Roles of the Three Levels of Government  553.5 Local Development Strategies and Policy Instruments ^ 563.6 The Seduction of the Private Sector ^  583.6.1 Public/Private Partnerships  593.6.2 Public Development Corps ^  593.7 Intergovernmental Relations  613.8 Citizenry and the Private Sector ^  62vi3.9 New Roles for Planners in Local Economic Development ^ 62PART IIICHAPTER 4. BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW OF THE WINNIPEG COREAREA INITIATIVE4.1 Introduction ^  674.2 The Political and Economic Context of the CAI ^  684.3 Winnipeg Profile ^  724.4 The Creation of the CAI ^  844.5 The Substantive Mandate of the CM ^ 874.6 The Tri--level Model^  894.6.1 CAI Delivery and Management Structure ^  924.6.1.1 Internal Structures ^  924.6.1.2 External Structures  964.6.1.3 The Financing Structure  974.6.2 The Role of the Community  984.7 CAI I & II: Programmes and Evaluations ^  1004.7.1 Agreement I ^  1004.7.2 Final Evaluations and Outputs of CAI I  1014.7.2.1 Employment and Affirmative Action Programmes ^ 1014.7.2.2 Housing and Community Improvement AreaProgrammes ^  1054.7.2.3 Community Facilities and Services Programmes ^ 1074.7.2.4 Economic Stimulus Programmes ^  1094.7.3 Agreement II ^  1134.7.4 Evaluations and Outputs of CAI II  1154.7.4.1 Economic Stimulus ^  1154.7.4.2 Housing, Community & NeighbourhoodRevitalisation  1164.7.4.3 Employment and Affirmative Action ^  1174.7.5 Summary of the Evaluations of CAI I and II  1194.8 CAI III ? ^  1204.9 The CAI: Attributes for Success ^  120viiCHAPTER 5. THE WINNIPEG CORE AREA INITIATIVE MODEL5.1 Introduction ^  1245.2 The Model as an Instrument of Public Policy ^  1255.3 Effectiveness of the Model ^  1275.4 The Public/Private Venture  1355.4.1 North of Portage Redevelopment ^  1365.4.1.1 North of Portage Development Corporation ^ 1385.4.2 The Forks Renewal Corporation  1465.5 Tri-Level Partnerships in Urban Revitalisation ^  1515.6 Replicability of the Model ^  154CHAPTER 6. PERCEPTIONS OF THE CAI6.1 Introduction ^  1586.2 Key Participant and Observer Perceptions ^  1596.2.1 The Sample ^  1606.2.2 Data Collection  1616.2.3 Ethics  1616.2.4 Research Design  1616.2.5 Data Analysis and Content Analysis ^  1626.2.6 Results of Interviews with Core Players  1636.3 Perceptions of User Groups ^  1686.3.1 User and non-user group surveys ^  1696.4 Community Inquiry Report ^  1736.5 The Angus Reid Group Survey  1786.6 The Media and the CAI ^  181CHAPTER 7. EVALUATING THE CAI AS PUBLIC POLICY FOR URBANREVITALISATION7.1 Introduction ^  186viii7.1.1 Framing the Problem ^  1877.2 Placing the CAI in the Local Political Context: CAIand Unicity ^  1897.2.1 Personalities, Local Political and Cultural Factors ^ 1937.2.2 Styles of Policy-Making^  1947.2.3 Political Commitment and the CAI ^  1947.3 The Goals of the CAI ^  1977.3.1 Integration with Existing Main Line Programmes ^ 1987.3.1.1 Economic Development ^  1987.3.1.2 Social Development  1997.3.1.3 Urban Renewal ^  2007.4 The CAI and Plan Winnipeg  2017.4.1 The History of Plan Winnipeg ^  2017.4.1.1 Plan Winnipeg: Dissolving Boundaries ^ 2047.4.2 The CAI and Comprehensive Planning ^  2077.5 The Value Systems Underlying the CAI  2107.6 The CAI Process ^  2137.6.1 The Administrative Process ^  2137.6.2 Community Involvement  2157.7 Programme Definition: Adequacy and Dependency of the CAISocial Programme Sector ^  2177.7.1 Community Services and Community Development ^ 2177.7.2 The CAI and the Aboriginal Community ^  2197.8 Implementation ^  2227.9 Environmental Change: CAI I and CAI II ^  225PART IVCHAPTER 8. LESSONS TO BE LEARNED8.1 Learning from Great Britain and the United States ^  230ix8.2 Who Can Relieve Urban Distress and How? ^  2318.3 The Role of Planning in Urban Restructuring  2358.4 Lessons from the Winnipeg Core Area Initiative ^  2378.5 Challenges for Urban Policy ^  245BIBLIOGRAPHY ^  248APPENDICESI^Case Study Interviews ^  267II Agreement Summary CAI 1  270III Evaluation Programme Core Area Agreement 1 Products Summary ^ 278IV CAI II Agreement Summary ^  280IV Letter to Potential Interviewees  281V^Questionnaire ^  283LIST OF TABLESTable Page4.1 Canadian Cities by Size, 1901-1971 744.2 Labour Force Participation and Employment, 1986 814.3 Comparison of Selected Average Incomes in Winnipeg, 1980and 1985 834.4 Housing Types and Tenure, 1986 844.5 Cost-Shared Programmes of CAI I 904.6 Cost-shared Programmes of CAI II 914.7 Implementing Jurisdictions 924.8 Distribution of Trainees CAI I 1034.9 Distribution of Placements in Employment CAI I 1034.10 Housing and Community Improvement Area Programmes FundsLevered and Employment Impact 1084.11 Community Facilities and Services Programmes FundsLevered and Employment Impact 1094.12 Investment in Core Area Projects to December 31, 1991 1146.1 Mean Ranking Totals from Interview Responses 1646.2 Ranking Responses from Case Study Interviews 1656.3 Residents' Perception of the Importance of Social Programmesversus Large-Scale Building Projects 170xiPage6.4 Comparison of Opinions of Core Area Conditions over 10to 20 Years 1716.5 Residents' Perceptions on Selected Urban Issues 1746.6 Residents' Perceptions of the Role of the Three Levelsof Government 1756.7 Perceived Success of the CAI 1766.8 The Urban Quality of Life Index 1796.9 Current and Preferred Residence Location of Winnipegers 180FigureLIST OF FIGURESxiiPage2.1 The Thatcher Government's Urban Programme Budget 204.1 1981-1986 Population Growth of Selected Profile Groupsin Winnipeg 784.2 Percentage of Inner-City Households Below the PovertyLine, 1981-1986 784.3 CAI I Agreement Structure 934.4 CAI II Organisational Chart 954.5 CAI I Employment Investment by Source 104LIST OF MAPSMap4.1 City of Winnipeg Boundaries, 1907 734.2 City of Winnipeg Boundaries, 1986 764.3 CAI Boundaries 885.1 North of Portage Redevelopment Area 1375.2 Site Plan of the North of Portage Development 1415.3 East Yard Site Plan 1475.4 Site Plan for Development of the Forks 1507.1 Original Boundaries of Unicity, 1972 1907.2 Winnipeg Area Characterisation, 1985 2037.3 Winnipeg's Urban Limit Line 205ACKNOWLEDGEMENTSThis dissertation would not have been possible without the support andencouragement of friends and colleagues. I am very grateful for their care.I would like to express my appreciation to my committee members for theirguidance and give a special acknowledgement to my advisor, Dr. Alan F.J. Artibise. Thestaff at the School of Community and Regional Planning were helpful at all times. Mytypist, Sue Law, was infinite in her patience and cheerful in her disposition -- a must fordoctoral students!I owe my deepest gratitude to my family for their enduring faith in me, butespecially to Colin who started me on the way and saw me through to the end. I dedicatethis dissertation to him.PART IChapter 1THE WINNIPEG CORE AREA INITIATIVE: A CASE STUDY1.1 Scope of Inquiry and Conceptual FrameworkThis dissertation constitutes a critical empirical investigation and analysis of amajor Canadian urban planning intervention that spans a decade -- from 1981 to 1991.The Winnipeg Core Area Initiative (CAI) has been called "an ambitious and innovativeexperiment in local economic development" (Kiernan 1987). The Initiative has been seenas a practical experiment in urban revitalisation that approached complex inter-relatedurban problems on a holistic basis. It recently won an international award as a model forurban redevelopment' and has been touted as being unique to Canadian urban planning(ibid.). The organising model included participation by all levels of government(municipal, provincial and federal), and was an example of urban policy thatsimultaneously attacked physical, social and economic problems in an attempt to reversemany of the trends endemic to deteriorating inner cities today. Although the CAI formallycame to an end in the spring of 1991, it serves as an interesting Canadian case study inurban regeneration that has been the focus of attention throughout Europe and NorthAmerica.Winnipeg is not alone in suffering from serious economic and social decline inthe inner city. A comparison with many major cities in Great Britian and the United Statesshows similar general trends in population loss, physical, social and economicdeterioration; and decentralisation and suburban expansion. The Canadian picture, despite2political and structural differences with Britain and the United States, is shaped by many ofthe same conditions influencing urban environments. Each level of government in Canadais faced with deficit situations and is hard pressed to deliver services despite mountingtaxation. 2 In an effort to streamline federal funding and provide more accurate measuresof accountability, the federal government has begun to redefine regional development(Artibise and Kiernan 1989). As a result of the global recession of the late 1970s, alllevels of government are embracing urban growth and development as a means toeconomic survival. Massive downtown redevelopment projects have been initiated inalmost every Canadian city, many established and funded by public/private developmentcorporations. In an effort to attract private capital to the cause of urban regeneration,public development corporations with an arm's-length relationship to the public sector havebeen seen as one method of accomplishing both physical regeneration and economicrevitalisation. It would seem that the Canadian government looked to British andAmerican experiences when faced with similar problems of inadequate public resources andincreasing urban problems.The plethora of programmes and policies aimed at finding a remedy to theproblems faced by decaying inner cities throughout the industrialised world have piqued theinterests of policy advisors, analysts, administrators and academics, and have produced acorresponding array of reports, journal articles, books and treatises. Armed with critiquesand commentaries, major cities in North America have experimented with a wide range ofplanning and fiscal incentives and other institutional innovations in order to find a formatfor urban policy that can combat the effects of inner-city deterioration compounded byfederal devolution in responsibility and dereliction in aid. Cities are in an up-hill battle3according to Kaplan and James (1990, 351). They claim that politics have passed cities byand that urban initiatives are not popular among politicians and the federal bureaucracy.Political impotence and economic weaknesses of cities increasingly support the public'sbelief that "good tax money is wasted on inefficient government action and/or intractableurban problems" (ibid., 353). In a desperate bid to reach some form of consensus onnational urban policy, Kaplan and James complain that the doors are opened to whateverfad is popular at the moment.Yesterday it was public/private sector partnership; today it is privatisation.Tomorrow, it will likely be an academically defined or a practitioner-defined newstyle of leadership. In this context, only the consulting industry, the university'sgrant office, and the speechmaker benefit. Cities and their residents deservebetter. (Ibid., 353.)The Winnipeg Core Area Initiative was admittedly one more example of a largeurban regeneration attempt created in the 1980s -- but one with a difference. It hadelements of both the social welfare/municipal socialism approach characteristic of earlyBritish urban policy, and the urban entrepreneurialism approach of many Americanplanning ventures. It also was a vigorous experiment in public policy that sawunprecedented co-operation from three levels of government lasting over a decade.1.2 Study Objectives The purpose of this dissertation is to study the Winnipeg CAI as a model forurban regeneration and public policy intervention. With the exception of selectedevaluations carried out for the three levels of government involved in the CAI, and publicinquiries held toward the end of the terms of CAI I and II, there has not been an overallcritique of the CAI as an instrument for urban public policy published by government, non-4government or academic sources. There is no shortage however, of material oninternational trends in urban revitalisation. Numerous studies have been carried out in theUnited Kingdom on British urban redevelopment schemes such as the Inner CitiesProgramme by contract for the Department of the Environment and by private researchagencies such as the Centre for Mass Communication Research (Sills, Taylor and Golding1988). Similarly, a proliferation of reports on American examples has been produced byfederal and state agencies along with numerous critiques and analyses of specific casestudies.' This dissertation will provide a thorough evaluation of the CAI using a casestudy method that will allow this Canadian experiment to be compared and contrasted withurban regeneration strategies in Britain and the United States.The intent behind the study of the Winnipeg CAI is to provide an analysis of themodel as an instrument of public policy (that is, to advance understanding of the modelfrom an academic perspective) and to provide an analysis for improving urbanrevitalisation policy in a broader context (that is, to improve the quality of urban policy). 4Ham and Hill (1984, 8) provide a typology of seven varieties of policy analysis; threetypes are grouped as policy studies; three as analysis for policy; and one as evaluation orimpact studies. Evaluation studies are the inter-connection between the first and secondgroups. This dissertation represents a combination of "analysis of" and "analysis for"policy. It is a study of policy content in so far as it seeks to describe and explain thegenesis and development of the CAI with limited emphasis on policy process and policyoutputs.5 Although this examination of the CAI may be of interest to policy-makers in thefuture, it was not undertaken to assist in any immediate decision-making activities.Similarly, it does not advocate specific options or ideas or processes for immediate policy5implementation. It falls, therefore, most accurately under the label of evaluation study inso far as the underlying question to be answered is: Should and could the CAI be used as amodel for future urban redevelopment efforts? In attempting to answer this question itevaluates the impact of the Initiative on the physical, social and economic environment inWinnipeg's inner city and on the population that was intended for assistance. In short, thisdissertation seeks to determine the strengths and weaknesses of the CAI and evaluate theimpact that this urban intervention had over a period of ten years.The primary objective of the study is to examine the following researchquestions:1. What were the empirical and normative assumptions underlying the tri-level partnership and the structural model of the CAI?2. What was the ideology underlying the policy framework of the CAI? Towhat degree did the CAI, as an instrument of urban public policy,integrate with existing main-line programmes and with the planning goalsof Plan Winnipeg?3. What degree of political commitment did the CAI enjoy? What roleshould various levels of government play in attempting to redress urbanproblems while stabilising and promoting regional economicdevelopment?4. What were the implicit and explicit value systems governing the decision-making behind the CAI? What was the level of community acceptance ofthe instrumental and contributive values underlying the model?5.^What process was used to implement CAI policy?66. How adequate was the programme definition and resource allocation forimplementation of the stated goals and objectives. To what degree didthe selection and implementation of programmes foster self-sufficiency ordependency?7. How successful was the implementation of CAI policy and howappropriate were the delivery mechanisms chosen? To what degree diddelivery and implementation satisfy public interest and accountability?8. What was the nature and degree of public participation in the creationand ongoing functions of the CAI?9. What were the tangible and perceived outputs or products of the CAI?Relative to the stated aims/goals, what was achieved and what were theimpacts on the immediate and larger community to which the CAI wascommitted?10.^To what degree did environmental change affect the functioning andefficiency of the CAI model over the decade?1.3 Significance of the Research The importance of this study is to provide a broad examination of the theoreticalframework behind the Winnipeg CAI as an instrument for urban public policy. In doingso, this study will challenge the assertion that the CAI was an holistic comprehensivemodel that can be used as a template for future urban regeneration. Through the collectionand analysis of objective and subjective data, this study seeks to uncover the elementswhich have contributed to the success and weakness of the Core Area Initiative and to find7answers to questions concerning the effectiveness, equity and efficiency of the CAI as amodel for urban policy. This examination will assist future planning-and-policy formationattempts in urban revitalisation and strengthen the public and private ability to generatecomprehensive, strategic and cohesive urban policy.1.4 Formal Problem StatementThis dissertation seeks to examine the problem of core area decline using theWinnipeg CAI as a prototypical model for urban revitalisation. Backed by a comparativeanalysis of urban regeneration efforts in Britain and the United States, it will explore theconcept of "distress" in inner city areas and will attempt to answer the question: Distress --who can relieve it and how?1.5 Dissertation Design The dissertation is divided into four major sections including eight chapters. Itemploys a combination of comparative library research on planning and urban re-vitalisation efforts in Britain and the United States, library research on planning and theurban development dimension of economic development in Canada, with a case study ofthe Winnipeg Core Area Initiative using published material and interview data.Part I, Chapter 1, outlines the rationale for the study, the purpose, methodologyand organisation of the dissertation.Part II, Chapter 2, introduces the notion of urban "distress" and provides acomparison of urban policy in Britain and the United States from the late-nineteenthcentury to the present with particular emphasis on policy during the Thatcher and Reagan8administration in both countries. It does so to suggest the similarities and differencesbetween planning efforts in these two countries and to place, in context, the Canadianplanning approaches outlined in the next chapter. Chapter 2 outlines the limitations of pastapproaches to urban revitalisation and underscores the need for alternative courses of actionand policy direction to alleviate urban distress. This chapter provides lessons about urbanrestructuring, some of which influenced policy formation and implementation instrumentalin the creation of the CAI, and some which, in hindsight, should have provided valuableinstruction initially, and over the years. Chapter 3 provides a general examination of therole of planning in urban policy formation and implementation. It reviews the traditionalrole of planning guided by the philosophy of technical rationality and explores the issues ofpublic values and public interest in relationship to the role of planning in the latter half ofthe twentieth century. This chapter moves on to discuss the evolution of planning as aprofessional activity in Canada and places it in a contemporary context with particularemphasis on urban development, the respective roles of the public and private sectors ineconomic development, and the changing role of planners. This chapter is importantbecause it outlines prevailing ideologies in place at the time of the creation of the CAI. Asa result of the literature reviews on urban revitalisation and urban planning and economicdevelopment in Part II, a theoretical framework is defined to guide the detailed analysis ofthe CAI case study in the following chapters.Part III, Chapter 4, stands alone in presenting the context of the CAI from itscreation in 1981 to its demise in 1991. It draws a picture of the political and socio-economic conditions that spawned the Initiative and describes the substantive mandate thatwas distinctive of the CAI. The environmental milieu that set the stage for the creation of9the Initiative is better understood in the light of discussions presented for comparison in thepreceding chapters. This chapter describes the structural model chosen to implement thegoals of the CAI and gives a brief description of the programmes and budget allocations inboth agreements. References are made to contract evaluations carried out throughout thespan of the two agreements in order to give the assessments that provided feedback andguidance to the CAI administration. It is useful to keep these assessments in mind whenthe perceptions of the general public, the media, and key individuals are compared andcontrasted in the next two chapters. It is in these two chapters, Chapters 5 and 6, that thetrue evaluation of the CAI starts to unfold. Through a careful analysis of publishedmaterials, surveys and newspaper reports, and interview data from key individuals,questions concerning the empirical and normative assumptions underlying the tripartiteinitiative are answered. It is here that conclusions as to the effectiveness of the CAI as aprototypical model for urban revitalisation are made. Chapter 6, in particular, contributes awealth of new material to the case study allowing the Initiative to be viewed from manyperspectives. Chapter 7 pulls all of the objective and subjective data into the frameworksuggested from the previous review of literature in Part II and dissects it using each of theresearch questions presented in this first chapter.Part IV, Chapter 8, returns to the comparative findings on urban revitalisationfrom British and American experiences. The lessons learned from these two countries areapplied to the analysis of the Winnipeg Core Area Initiative in attempting to answer thequestion: Urban distress; who can relieve it and how? The dissertation concludes with theanswer to a second question: Could or should the CAI model be used as a template forfuture regeneration efforts? The answer is no!101.5.1 The Case Study DataThe case-study method used for an examination of the CAI combines twomethods: (1) content analysis of published materials written on aspects of the CAI havingto do with public attitudes and perceptions including newspaper reports and public surveys;and (2) interviews with individuals who were involved in some way with the CAI. The InterviewsThis dissertation is enriched by the contributions of "key or core players";twenty-five individuals who played a role in the initial policy formation of the CAI, thosewho had senior administrative duties in implementing CAI policy, the representatives ofgovernment and non-government agencies who were engaged with the CAI on a sustainedbasis, and "observers" such as academics and critics including those associated with serviceprovision in the inner City of Winnipeg. Each of these twenty-five people was interviewedat some length and provided a major portion of the data necessary for this dissertation (seeAppendix I). Their comments are interspersed and interwoven in two ways. Firstly,material collected from a number of the interviews are used to provide chronological dataon the events and circumstances leading up to and following the creation of the WinnipegCAI. Secondly, the interviews constitute the primary source of information about theattitudes and ideologies of the major participants in the evolution of the Initiative. Assuch, the comments related to each section of this dissertation must be weighed accordingto the source. All the participants in this study expressed personal views and opinions, andtheir comments do not in any way represent government, agency or institutional statements. The Value of the Qualitative DataThe qualitative data from the case study represents a picture of the CAI that ismissing from evaluation attempts commissioned by the tripartite partners or from publishedcommentaries on the Initiative. It seeks to measure perceptions of the CAI from the pointof view of: (1) core players, observers and representatives of targeted user groups; (2)pubic opinion surveys and inquiries; and (3) the print media of newspapers. This type ofperceptual measurement using expressed attitudes, opinions, and commentaries gives avastly different picture of the effectiveness, equity and efficiency of the CAI as a model forurban intervention than could be obtained by an examination of policy documents andoutput reports. Each of the sources of data were examined for information on aspects ofthe Initiative: (1) appropriateness and effectiveness of the model; (2) ideology underlyingthe policy framework; (3) political commitment; (4) value systems; (5) process; (6)programme definition; (7) implementation and delivery; (8) public participation; and (9)environmental change throughout CAI I to CAI II.This dissertation will examine, in detail, a unique tri-level partnership for urbanrevitalisation. It does so with the hope that the strengths and weaknesses of this Canadianexperiment in urban public policy can be used to illuminate future regeneration attemptsand contribute to a widening knowledge base for urban planners.12Endnotes1. The Winnipeg Core Area Initiative was presented with a special achievement awardfor urban revitalisation by the International Downtown Association in Edmonton,Alberta, September 1990. The award, The Special Achievement Award forDowntown Management -- Model for Management, is the highest award given bythis Washington based association.2. For a thorough discussion of changes in the public policy environment caused by suchfactors as free trade, the growing federal deficit, the constitutional crisis, and theproblems faced by local and provincial governments in providing services in the faceof persistent regional disparities, see Donald J. Savoie, Regional EconomicDevelopment: Canada's Search for Solutions, 2d ed. (Toronto: University of TorontoPress, 1992).3. An example of one such anthology of case studies can be found in Susan Fainstein,Restructuring the City (New York: Longman, 1986).4. For this distinction, between "analysis of policy" and "analysis for policy," I amindebted to J. David Hulchanski for a succinct paper, "Policy Analysis: AnIntroduction to Issues, Concepts and Disputes," produced originally for students inthe School of Community and Regional Planning at the University of BritishColumbia, September 1989.5.^Evaluation of outputs from CAI I and CAI II have been carried out specifically bycontract for the CAI and for each of the tripartite partners. The reports by StewartClatworthy, noted in the bibliography and credited throughout this dissertation, areexamples of evaluation studies commissioned by the Policy Committee of the CAI.1 3PART IIChapter 2COMPARATIVE URBAN POLICY:GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES2.1 Introduction This chapter introduces the notion of "urban distress" -- a situation that is foundtoday in Canadian inner cities such as Winnipeg and the problem that the Winnipeg CoreArea Initiative attempted to redress. It examines urban revitalisation efforts in Britain andthe United States that have generally influenced the direction of Canadian urban planninginitiatives for inner cities. It traces the historical development of the ideologies inherent inplanning and urban policy from the late -nineteenth century perspective to the present day.In reviewing these planning perspectives over roughly a century of urban development andredevelopment, this chapter examines the programme and policy attempts to link economicpolicy with social policy -- an espoused goal of the CM. This chapter chronicals the risein support for privatism on the part of conservative governments on both continents and theconcomitant influence on the urban planning system. It suggests that the restructuring ofgovernment responsibilities and power and the increased role of the private sector in urbanredevelopment that arose during the Thatcher and Reagan years may have led to theerosion of urban planning and a resultant identity crisis for urban planners. In addition, itsubmits that a political redefinition of the "public good" may have accompanied changes inattitudes associated with urban restructuring initiatives. Much of the material presented inthis chapter is important to the understanding of Canadian planning approaches to urbanrevitalisation presented in the next chapter. As well, the British and American experiences14in attacking urban distress provide a useful comparison when the CAI is held up to scrutinyin later chapters.2.2 Cities in Distress Many cities in the United States and Britain are suffering from serious economicand social decline in their inner areas, what in jargon terms has been called "distress."'According to Cutciti, urban distress "results from a confluence of socioeconomic hardshipamong city residents, fiscal inadequacy of public sector institutions, and city growth ordecline in economic and/or demographic terms" (Cutciti in Kaplan and James 1990, 15).This concept of distress was invented in the United States primarily to provide some formof index by which to measure need of cities for national programme relief. It was a majorfocus of the Carter administration's urban policy initiatives but fell into disuse during theconservative Reagan administration.By whatever means distress is measured, it is clear that the concept has manydimensions. It is also clear that there is a strong cause-and-effect relationship between suchprecipitating factors as the restructuring of the urban economy and resulting urbanunemployment. These kinds of linkages concentrate the poor and disadvantaged in citiesalready hard-pressed to meet residents' needs and further lead to economic decline. Theresults of this distress can be found in many large North American and British cities; lossof population in the inner city, substantial unemployment by marginalised groups, sharpdecline in manufacturing employment in the core area, physical deterioration through ageand neglect with attendant housing disinvestment, and fiscal squeeze on local governmentin supplying educational and social services. In fact, the pervasiveness of urban distress in15large industrialised cities today leads Cameron (1990, 484) to question if urban decline is anatural phenomenon!While the United States and Britain currently experience similar symptoms ofdecline in many of their large central cities, they also share similar conditions that lead tothe distress (Home 1982; Hambleton 1989; Barnekov, Boyle and Rich 1989). There is nodoubt that the changing world economy produced a continuing shift in the balance of localeconomies away from manufacturing employment toward the service sector, especiallyproducer services (Cameron 1990). The economic decline faced by the manufacturing-related industries formerly located within the central cities profoundly affectedunemployment problems of urban residents on both continents. In addition,decentralisation of consumer and producer services from inner-city areas to urbanisedregions on the peripheries drained large numbers of white-and blue-collar workers fromurban centres. Shifts in employment patterns not only produced major changes inpopulation distributions away from city centres but also contributed to major drifts inpopulation between geographic areas on both continents (Boyle 1985). Throughout the1950s, 1960s, and 1970s manufacturing, railways, ports and warehousing declined inimportance in the United States leaving large urban areas derelict. People formerlyemployed in these centres moved on to other cities offering prospects for employment. InBritain, the continuing drift from north to south in population and economic activityvirtually deserted the six largest urban areas of the pre-1950 period in favour of seventeenfree-standing cities, small towns and rural areas producing an absolute and relative declinein employment and population in large cities.216One significant trend for some inner cities in America, and less so for a few inBritain, was the growth of the corporate and producer sectors returning to the city centre(Law et al. 1988). Growth of office space in American cities, depending on the importanceof government, finance, corporate activities and associated business services, burgeoned insuch cities as New York, Chicago, Boston, San Francisco and Los Angeles.Accompanying this trend was the phenomenon of residential and commercial gentrification(Fainstein and Fainstein 1988; Fainstein 1989). Gentrification, while positive in somerespects, further accelerated residential displacement of lower-income groups and left theremaining "underclass" unable to acquire goods and services suitable for their needs orbudgets.' In Britain, London regained its pre-eminence as a world centre of producerservices and of corporate concentrations.Thus it has attracted 74 per cent of US bank assets invested in Europe, morebranches than any other city in the world of US advertising agencies and the topUS law firms and more offices of the world's 13 biggest accountancy firms thatany other city save for Paris (Moss 1987). . . . Moreover it has become evenmore dominant in terms of controlling British economic activity since over 70per cent of the corporate headquarters of the top 100 companies are located there(Smith 1989, 224). No other British city has begun to mount any significantchallenge to London's domination, though Edinburgh and Birmingham havemade gains in a limited number of producer services. (Cameron 1990, 484.)The arguments and rationale for and against national and local urban policy forcities in distress are found in a plethora of books, journal articles, government documentsand reports. In despair one might ask if social policy can ever be reconciled witheconomic policy in reviving distressed cities or if the process of decline is inevitable andirreversible. Robin Hambleton (1989), in a comparison of urban government under PrimeMinister Thatcher and President Reagan, points out the dilemma faced by policy-makers17and policy-analysts in the "area versus residents" argument. He states that in a rigorousanalysis of British government-sponsored community development projects completed inthe 1970s, "we were clear about the need to focus attention on the economic fortunes ofthe inner areas" but were not clear about the benefits to inner city residents themselves(ibid., 363).In debates about inner city policy the tension between the objectives ofregenerating inner areas and ensuring that such regeneration benefits existinginner city residents has rarely been exposed, still less the relationship clarified. . . what does regeneration mean? Does it inevitably improve prospects for localresidents? (Hambleton 1981 in Hambleton 1989, 363.)What did become clear through studies carried out by the British Economic and SocialResearch Council in the late 1970s and early 1980s (Begg, Moore and Rhodes 1986; Beggand Eversley 1986; Begg and Moore 1987) was that "a general rise in local economicactivity does not necessarily result in a "trickle down" of employment benefits todisadvantaged groups (Hambleton 1989, 364; emphasis in original) and that the benefits ofgrowth are unevenly distributed" (ibid.). These findings were consistent with earlierstudies in the United States (Stanback 1979) that found that American "success" stories insuch cities as Boston produced a widening gulf between high-paid white-collar workers andlow-paying service jobs -- effectively "eliminating the middle band of skilled, well-paid,male blue collar jobs" (Parkinson 1987 in Hambleton 1989, 364).Such concerns have occupied the efforts of all levels of governments in Britain andthe United States for almost five decades, and it is clear that neither country has developedthe perfect mould for the regeneration of healthy cities.182.3 Evolving Urban Policy in the United Kingdom and the United States Both Britain and the United States have, since the 1960s, experimented with abroad stream of urban-planning methods and urban-policy initiatives in order to wrestlewith the problems of urban decline and growing social and economic inequality. Whilethere are major political, cultural and social differences between the two countries as wellas variations in financial, institutional and government structures, the evolution of urbanpolicy in Britain under the Conservative government of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcherwas ideologically driven and based to a large degree on the experiences of urbanregeneration in the United States. In the 1980s, both countries undertook restructuring ofinter-governmental relations as their major urban-policy strategy. In the United States therewas a shift in federal, state and local responsibilities, and in Britain a shift in central/localcontrol of power and policy. Conservative governments on both continents initiatedcentral-government attacks on local governments in attempts to reduce public expenditureand to shift the blame for cuts in services to the local levels. Both Thatcher and Reagansought to reduce central government financial support to local levels and to encourageprivatisation of public services.Prior to Prime Minister Thatcher's rise to power in 1979, British national responsesto urban restructuring were based on two assumptions: "First, policy was as much designedto provide social and welfare support services to the victims of economic change in urbanareas as it was to create wealth in those areas. Secondly, since disinvestment by theprivate sector was seen as the cause of many cities' economic decline, the public sectorwas regarded as the natural agency to lead urban reconstructions" (Parkinson 1989, 422).19The ideological shift that took place under the Conservatives in the 1980s saw the privatesector being wooed into involvement in the inner cities.Markets replaced politics as the primary response to urban decline; the values ofurban entrepreneurialism replaced those of municipal collectivism; private-sectorleadership replaced public intervention; investment in physical capital displacedinvestment in social capital; wealth creation replaced distribution of welfare; and,most ironically, a regime committed to decentralising power in fact weakenedalternative power bases. Britain's response to urban decline under Mrs. Thatchermay be characterised as the centralisation and privatisation of power. (Parkinson1989, 422.)The British urban strategy of the 1980s was based on an ideology that attempted tobreak with the traditional values underlying the post-war Welfare State. The Conservativesaimed to reduce the burden of welfare expenditures and cut the power of the trade unions.In order to achieve these goals and to create a more favourable climate for economicrecovery, the Thatcher government embarked upon a restructuring of state power andactively sought an enhanced role for the private sector in urban problems (see figure 2.1). 4Public-private partnerships and urban development corporations were Conservativeinitiatives that shared the ideological characteristics of private-sector leadership, aconcentration upon physical regeneration and a decreased role for local government.National-led partnerships such as the Business in the Community, programme and property-based construction industry initiatives such as the Phoenix Initiative and British UrbanDevelopment were largely structured after American examples. Through a wide range offinancial incentives, the relaxation of local planning control in favour of Enterprise Zones,and other institutional innovations such as City Action Teams, the Conservativegovernment profoundly affected urban policy. Nonetheless, by the end of the 1980s it wasclear, even to the Conservative government, that urban regeneration required a muchAims in inner urban areas^ Programmes contributeX directly^o indirectlyTo enhance job prospects and theability of residents to compete for themTo bring land and buildings back into useTo encourage private sector investmentTo improve housing conditionsTo encourage self-help and improvesocial fabricx X o X o X1^I^I^IXX X X X X I^I^IXX X X ^o XI^I^I I-X X o^X^o MINMOM XX20Programmes PublicExpenditure£m 1987-88 Urban Development Corporations 133 —Grants for Urban Development^30 ^Derelict Land Grant^81 ^Urban Programme 297 ^Land Registers ^Enterprise ZonesTotal^ £541Fig. 2.1. Aims, Programmes and Resources of the Thatcher Government's 1987-1988Urban Programmes Budget. Public Expenditure in £m. Adapted from G.C. Cameron, "FirstSteps in Urban Policy Evaluation in the United Kingdom." Urban Policy Evaluation(1990), 475.21broader and comprehensive approach to urban policy intervention. Indeed, it can be arguedthat many of the fiscal and institutional initiatives contributed to uneven regeneration anddistribution of benefits.The impact of Thatcherism on British society in general, and on the planningsystem specifically, was thoroughly debated by a number of British planners from 1980 to1990. Among those planners who felt that the Thatcher government launched an overtattack on the planning system was Andy Thornley. In his book, Urban Planning UnderThatcherism (1990), Thornley suggests that "urban planning has been the victim of astrategy of erosion" (ibid., preface). Thornley claims that Thatcherism "changed thelanguage of politics from 'public good' to 'individual choice' and 'entrepreneurial flair"(ibid., 2), and in doing so: (1) bowed to the inefficiencies of the market; (2) refused to dealwith demands for the protection of the environment; and (3) showed disdain for democracyand participation (ibid., 222-225). Nowhere were these characteristics so evident, saidThomley, than in Conservative strategies to bypass the formal planning system througharchitectural competitions, special development orders, and the urban developmentcorporations and in massive urban regeneration attempts such as London's Docklandsproject (Thornley 1990).Meanwhile, American attempts at urban regeneration, despite the proliferation ofprogrammes and initiatives, produced varied results. While cities such as Boston, Denver,Houston, New York and San Francisco were held up as models of American urbanrevitalisation efforts, other cities continued to deteriorate (Parkinson, Foley and Judd 1988,2). National economic policy stripped financial support to city governments, and urban22centres experienced extraordinary polarisation of deprivation and wealth. Neighbourhoodor community policy shifted from the political arena to the marketplace.Comparable efforts have been proposed or undertaken by Reagan and Thatchergovernments to reduce the scope of domestic public economic involvement inurban affairs, to deregulate industrial and commercial markets, to privatiseservice delivery (Savas 1982) and to use increasingly limited sums of money tohopefully leverage larger amounts of private sector investment. (Boyle 1985,205.)Although the commitment to privatism as an instrument of urban policy and astrategy for urban regeneration was embraced similarly in the United States and Britain, thepromotion of this ideology took place in different institutional environments. 5 "Theborrowing from U.S. program initiatives (particularly economic development programs suchas UDAG [Urban Development Action grants]) was carried out with little systematicknowledge of the U.S. record of performance and with scant regard for the consequencesof inappropriate policy transfer" (Barnekov, Boyle and Rich 1989, 222). Together, theBritish and American experience with privatism and the idea of a post-industrial imperativeproduced a failure to deal with the dislocations of urban social change, a trivialisation ofthe city as a political and economic community, and a one-dimensional image of social andeconomic progress that neglected community interests (ibid., 1989).2.4 Planning and Urban Policy in Britain and the United States: The Historical Context In examining the effect of planning in shaping contemporary urban policy, it isimportant to note the role of planning in the development of modern cities. Essentially,urban policy, shaped by urban planning ideologies, has come full circle -- from a belief in23the overall merits of growth and development, to support of a no-growth philosophy, and areturn to enthusiasm for urban growth linked to economic development. It can be arguedthat these waves of planning perspectives affected the thinking of Canadian planners inattempting to deal with inner city conditions at various times, albeit under differentpolitical, institutional, financial and conditions. The next chapter will examine thesimilarities and differences in philosophies and practices among the three countries.2.4.1 The Late-Nineteenth CenturyHistorically, planners in major cities on both continents were preoccupied with thepace and form of spatial change in large metropolitan areas and with the concomitant well-being of city residents. The growth of large cities in the late-nineteenth century wasfuelled by development pressures of an industrial age, and many planning efforts weretaken as a form of control. Health and environmental legislation was enacted as a methodto curb the worst abuses of unsanitary conditions and poor living conditions. Zoningpolicies became the method of segregating conflicting land use and undesirabledevelopment. Active economic development was a private initiative and one in whichplanners played only a reactive role by encouraging favourable development through thefunctional designation of physical space. As numerous authors have suggested (Law, et al.1988; Fainstein 1991), planning in the late-nineteenth century was a passive activity.At the end of the nineteenth century in Britain, progressive thinkers in the field ofplanning urged a more pro-active approach to shaping urban communities and revitalisingurban centres. Utopian thinkers such as Ebenezer Howard strongly influenced planningtheory and practice. Howard's Garden Cities concept' proposed a form of urban24containment whereby ideal forms of urban communities were self-contained in zonesbeyond a green belt and the existing older areas of the urban core purged of theirundesirable features and redeveloped at lower densities. The new communities weredesigned to balance population size with jobs and types of economic activity as well asproviding a range of services and amenities to their inhabitants.2.4.2 The Early Twentieth CenturyThe early twentieth century saw alternate visions of urban development in Europeand the United States. In the 1920s, Le Corbusier countered Howard's dream of the idealcity by suggesting upward, not outward, development. Howard's Garden Cities conceptwas essentially anti-urban and decentralist; Le Corbusier's strongly urban and concentrated.In his vision of the Radiant City, Le Corbusier proposed high density, tall apartmentstructures with green space between. His massive tower-block forms had a profoundinfluence on inner city architecture on both continents. In America, the City Beautifulmovement, which arose out of the Chicago Exposition of 1893, combined elements of bothdreams: clean, open cities with large monumental buildings and wide, tree-linedboulevards. While many of these utopian planning attempts succeeded at urbanbeautification, they did little to address the problems of urban decay. In some respects,and perhaps unintentionally, the newly professionalised city planning segregated physicaland social malaise.252.4.3 Post World War IIAs a result of World War II, utopian schemes came to a halt, and planning in thepost-war period resulted in emergency mop-up efforts for many years. In Britain, publicpolicy, and specifically urban policy, was directed by a post-war consensus on interveningin the public interest.What the private sector had constructed in the industrial revolution of thenineteenth century the state had to rebuild in the twentieth (Cherry 1979, 296).The urban policy experience of Britain differs most dramatically from that of theU.S. precisely because, in twentieth-century Britain, there has been a strongcountervailing tradition of direct public involvement in the shaping of urbandevelopment. Haar notes that the British pioneered the planned development ofcities while in the U.S. "planning powers, extensive as they have become, palebefore the controls instituted in Britain." (Haar 1984, xii in Barnekov, Boyle andRich 1989, 31.)Due to the urgent need for factories and houses, initial building efforts in Britaintook place on the periphery of cities outside of the large bombed-out areas. The ravages ofwar, compounded by the effects of decentralisation and urban sprawl, caused in part by theGarden Cities movement, delayed any major attempts at urban regeneration until the mid-1950s. By then, in order to achieve redevelopment on a large scale, it was clear that large-scale public intervention was necessary. British planners approached renewal with a formof comprehensive redevelopment involving major land clearance followed by land-usesegregation. New building was carried out on publicly developed land controlled by arigorous land-planning permission system. The result was two-fold: (1) a strong efforttoward decentralisation vesting powerful planning authority in the local level; and, (2) longperiods of time between designation of sites to be cleared and actual demolition and26redevelopment. Unfortunately, this time lapse contributed to further urban decay bycausing blight and neighbourhood destruction in both physical and social terms.In the middle of the 1940s, American Congress was already concerned with a post-war revitalisation strategy aimed at metropolitan central cities. Post-war programmesincluded the Housing Act of 1949 and the Urban Renewal Programme of 1954, whichmade cities the direct recipients of federal funding. Despite these and other initiatives,post-war inner-city renewal efforts in the United States did not achieve substantially moresuccess than European efforts for a variety of reasons. Redevelopment lagged in innercities where vacant land was offered to developers in the expectation that suburban-likeexpansion would occur. Although there were more mixed land-use designations for privateand public use in American cities than in Britain, investors were not overly anxious toredevelop. "Holding a supply-oriented view of urban space, planners assumed that privateinvestors would avail themselves of adequately serviced, centrally located land withoutfurther incentives" (Fainstein 1991, 22). This proved not to be the case in many instances.In addition, urban renewal efforts using the "bulldozer" approach sparked strong oppositionto the demolition and clearance model of redevelopment. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s,conservation and rehabilitation held strong appeal for neighbourhood-based environmental,preservation and anti-road lobbies. In contrast, those who enthusiastically embraced theprospects and opportunities promised by the urban- renewal programme included blackimmigrants from the Old South. Their optimism fuelled a tremendous migration to thenorthern and western metropolitan cities unprepared for drastic growth in the very areasthat were the recipients of the federal "save the city" policy. The tensions that ultimatelyexploded in the race riots of the 1960s were the unintentioned results of evolving racial and27class structure spatially structured by the programmes that were intended to revitalisedistressed cities.'2.4.4 The 1960s and 1970sBritish support for public intervention to shape urban form remained strongthroughout the 1960s. Essentially conservative attitudes reinforced planning efforts tomaintain the existing population distributions, protect the countryside from privatespeculation, and to create new planned communities along the lines of the Garden Citiesconcept at specific locations. Town planning as an activity was seen as an essentiallyneutral political concept: "a device for making the best of all worlds: individualism andsocialism; town and country; past and future; preservation and change" (Glass 1959 inBarnekov, Boyle and Rich 1989, 33). Despite occasional initiatives directed toward theprivate sector, urban policy orientation remained strongly rooted in the welfare-orientedpost-war consensus. Planning as the instrument of urban public policy focused on publichousing and infrastructure, planned urban development, and public management of growth.It was not until the late 1960s and early 1970s that disillusionment with the netresults of the British welfare state combined with growing criticism of planning failuresand the accompanying bureaucratic system produced a backlash against the paternalisticstate approach to urban development and regeneration. The magnitude of the problems oflarge urban centres compounded by a rapidly changing world economy forced the centralBritish government to re-examine the decline of urban areas from an economicperspective. 8 Urban decline became synonymous with economic decline, and the rallying28call of the Conservative Party under Margaret Thatcher focused on a renewed role for theprivate sector in inner cities.In America, the black unrest of the 1960s gave way to debate about an urban crisis(Fox 1986). Just as Margaret Thatcher was to proclaim two decades later in Britain,politicians and administrators of central cities began to portray the urban crisis as a fiscalcrisis. Declining inner-city revenues were compounded by increasing demands for servicesof all kinds. An odd dilemma occurred; despite the fact the federal programmes werechannelling increasing amounts of money into cities through the Model Cities Programmein particular, federal programmes may have compounded the fiscal crisis faced by cities ingenerating expectations and demands that could not be satisfied. The Model CitiesProgramme shifted the emphasis from urban renewal to community development. Cityplanners promoted comprehensive planning, but, by the early 1970s when the Model CitiesProgramme was well under way, it was clear that even the best-co-ordinated strategies forsocial, economic and physical development were difficult to deliver.City planners involved with Model Cities recognised almost from the outset thatthe participatory approach to neighbourhood development placed them, as whitemiddle-class professionals and cultural and political outsiders, in an untenableposition. Model Cities not only identified the problem of povertyneighbourhoods as social underdevelopment of the neighbourhood population, italso postulated in its basic assumptions that bricks and mortar were not themeans to social goals. . . . Model Cities neither emphasised physical cityplanning and redevelopment, nor suggested that professional planners andtechnical expertise should play the central role in making its strategy work at theneighbourhood level. (Fox 1986, 203.)Despair for urban centres overcame the optimism of previous decades. Writerssuch as Edward Banfield (1968), a conservative political scientist, predicted a gloomyfuture for American cities. "Attempting to 'solve' the problems of the urban crisis with29government programmes was worse than doing nothing at all," Banfield argued, for"remedial programmes heightened the tensions of the crisis without speeding its resolution"(Banfield in Fox 1986, 11). Earlier, other writers such as Jane Jacobs (1961) and HerbertGans (1962) implicitly and explicitly lambasted the planning profession for destroying theunique and attractive attributes that made inner cities work -- of "sterilising" cities withtheir hangover practises in the Garden Cities planning tradition. It appeared that neithergovernment programmes nor planning efforts proved effective at solving inner citiesproblems, and both groups took the brunt of criticism. Nonetheless, national concerns overthe urban crisis subsided throughout the Nixon administration in the early 1970s such thatby the time President Carter took office in 1976, he was able to turn a crisis approach intoone that focused on the dawn of a new post-industrial course of action for urbandevelopment. The net result was that public urban renewal efforts gave way to public-private partnerships characterised by reliance on the marketplace and extensive use of fiscalincentives. The Carter administration grounded its urban policy on the premise that inner-city deterioration was irreversible, leaving the planning profession with the dilemma ofignoring, among other things, prevailing migration trends and settlement preferences. Thisand other factors contributed to an identity crisis in the planning profession, which waseagerly searching for the right role to play in responding to the changes in urban planningin the 1960s and 1970s. 92.5 Contemporary Urban Policy: Lessons From America Britain's reliance on America to provide a model for public intervention inregeneration of cities had a precedent in social-policy formation. In the 1960s Britain's30social policy was influenced by the Johnson administration's War on Poverty programmes.It is not surprising therefore, that when faced with severe economic problems in the 1980s,Britain should again turn to the United States.The apparent economic renaissance of east-coast cities like Boston, New York,Baltimore, Pittsburg, Philadelphia as the revitalised centres of service sectoreconomies had a powerful attraction for a British Government forced to respondto the restructuring of the international economic order and the rapid decline ofits older, industrial urban areas. (Parkinson 1989, 423.)Due to basic institutional and ideological differences between the two countries,Britain could not directly use the American experience as a template for economic reformand urban regeneration (Boyle and Rich 1984). With particular respect to politicalideology, Britain and the United States adopted divergent strategies in implementing theirpolitical agendas for reform. Unlike the Thatcherite interventions in local government, theReagan administration did not find it necessary to centralise power and, instead, Americanconservative strategy led to a decentralisation and a shift of responsibility to the states andlocal governments. The American approach was not as much one of intervention as it wasof federal policy withdrawal. Under the Reagan administration, the states were thebeneficiaries of changes in political power; under Thatcher it was the central governmentthat benefited (Boyle 1985).2.6 Dereliction in Aid and the Rise of Privatism Similarities in British and American urban policy during the 1980s reflectedBritain's attempts to replicate American urban programme initiatives especially in areas ofeconomic development. Ignoring the social, political and economic contextual differences31between the two countries, as well as the documented failures of many Americandevelopment attempts, Britain embraced privatism just as the United States had doneearlier. For conservative governments on both continents, the seduction of privatism lay inthe belief that national economic renewal relied on private initiatives and public-privatepartnerships.'The seeds of support for the rise of privatism in Britain and the United States weresown by governments in the pre-Thatcher and pre-Reagan eras (Hambleton 1989). TheLabour government that preceded Margaret Thatcher's Conservative government initiatedcuts in federal expenditures and tightened government controls at the behest of theInternational Monetary Fund. During her first term in power, Margaret Thatcher developeda new system of allocating central government support through the 1980 Local GovernmentPlanning and Land Act. In addition to the creation of a central audit authority, a wholerange of programme-targeting and penalty assessments were intended ostensibly to makelocal governments more accountable. Perhaps the most controversial of the Conservativeinitiatives was the forced sale of publicly financed council homes and the opening up ofcouncil services to competitive tendering. Modeled after the American UDAGs, theThatcher government created Urban Development corporations and Urban Developmentgrants intended to enhance the role of the private sector in urban change. During theThatcher government's second term, more restrictions were placed on local governmentexpenditures with a system of "rate capping," and by 1985 new government legislationabolished a whole tier of local city governments. Thatcher's third term brought furtherradical changes in inter-governmental control and fiscal policy, especially that of the "polltax" which replaced land-based property taxes. According to Robin Hambleton (1989, 370)32the legacy of the Thatcher government urban policy can be viewed in various ways: (1) asan attack on local democracy; (2) as an attack on the welfare state; and/or, (3) as a processof costly and destabilising incrementalism. Irrespective of the point of view held,Hambleton suggests that the results are split between the opportunities presented as a resultof new strategies and initiatives in working with the private sector and the resultingchanges in the detailed arrangements for the planning of local authorities affecting housing,land-use planning, social services and the urban programme.Parallel developments in the dereliction of federal aid and the rise of privatismoccurred somewhat earlier in the United States (Hambleton 1989). With the NewFederalism Programme of 1969, Richard Nixon began to disassemble the aid system thatmany cities had become dependent upon. President Ford continued these policies, endingthe Model Cities and Urban Renewal programmes and replacing them with CommunityDevelopment Block grants. By 1978, the Carter administration halted the increases infederal aid in real-dollar terms and initiated the UDAGs, a private-sector-led version ofurban renewal that was strongly supported by the senior administration and business leadersof large cities. Reagan further diverted aid to big cities with his Omnibus BudgetReconciliation Act of 1981, and according to Peterson "cities have been one of the clearestlosers of federal funds under block grants" (Peterson et al. 1986 in Hambleton 1989, 371).This reduction in federal assistance necessitated the need for city governments to lookelsewhere for funding for new construction -- to the private sector.One consequence of the federal withdrawal was undoubtedly a growing inter-cityvariation in the allocation of redevelopment funding as between downtown andneighbourhoods, rehabilitation and new construction, poor versus middle-incomepeople, and industry versus housing. The mix depended on the balance of33political forces in any particular city. (Nathan and Doolittle 1983 in Fainstein andFainstein 1989, 53.)2.7 Prognosis for Cities in Distress Since the 1960s, Britain and the United States have been looking to each other formethods of solving the social, economic and physical problems of their inner cities. Inwhat Robin Hambleton (1989, 375) calls a "fog of initiatives," both countries haveattempted to determine who shall play the leading role in inner-city regeneration. He alsosuggests that both countries have been less than successful in tackling urban problems andthat, in many respects, "urban areas are becoming increasingly divided with extraordinaryconcentrations of deprivation and poverty in some neighbourhoods" (ibid., 382). "Forcities, in Britain and elsewhere, the 1980s has become the decade of entrepreneurial urbanmercantilism and aggressive place-marketing" (Parkinson 1989, 438).As a result of nearly a decade of Conservative initiatives and approaches to inner-city revitalisation in Britain, a conference was held in January 1988 hosted by thePolytechnic of Central London. Spearheaded by planners such as Andy Thornley, andothers who collectively like to view themselves as "radicals" (certainly with respect toThatcherism), participants at the conference shared and evaluated proposals for radical orprogressive change in theoretical and practical terms (Thornley 1990, 6). A book emergedfrom this conference, Radical Planning Initiatives (1990), edited by Thornley. In the book,case studies presented at the conference are used to trace the effects of the marketorientation of the development process in the marginalisation of the poor and leastpowerful in inner cities (Griffiths; Lloyd and Newlands; and Barnes in ibid.). A variety ofconcrete tools for change are suggested, ranging from a new approach to local economic34planning, labelled "post-Fordism" (Montgomgery and Geddes in ibid.); to control of landand the development process through such devices as "public zones" (Newman in ibid.) anddevelopment trusts (Bailey in ibid.). The underlying message shared by these planners andothers at the conference was one of putting people first.By now it will be clear that, in our view, the starting point for progressive formsof planning derives from people themselves. A purely market-driven approachdoes not do this. The motor of the market is profit and the implications andeffects of this are to ignore many social and economic needs. Placing people atthe top of the agenda provides criteria with which to evaluate the role of themarket and establish the framework of controls required. (Thornley 1990, 11.)There is no doubt that this conference, and the ensuing publication, represents themore radical or overtly collectivist response not only to Thatcherism, but also to planningin cities plagued by core-area distress -- cities like London, Liverpool, Sheffield andBirmingham. For the most part, however, these efforts were aborted before the end of the1980s; nonetheless, they represent an important set of socio-economic policy innovationsthat provide significant contrast with experiences in the United States.2.8 The Limitations of Past Approaches to Urban Revitalisation and the Need forAlternative Strategies Earlier in this chapter reference was made to Cameron, who asked if urban declinewas inevitable. The answer may be that, while not inevitable, inner-city decline is likely tocontinue, especially for those cities not in a position to stop population decline, reduceemployment, and ensure financial stability. "Inevitably there will be some winners andsome losers and the latter will include those cities where core area decline is likely tocontinue" (Law, et al. 1988, 232).35An examination of urban planning efforts in both the United States and Britainsuggests that there are limitations on the effectiveness of planning interventions inattempting to relieve urban decline. In some cases planning efforts have produced awidening gulf between "haves" and "have-nots" in cities and regions competing foreconomic recovery and social relief. Urban restructuring activities have produced unevenregeneration and distribution of benefits on both continents. In retrospect, one of thecommon dilemmas faced by planners in both countries was the perceived neglect ofcommunity interests arising from the trade-offs viewed necessary to achieve economicgoals. For the most part, "bricks and mortar" projects may have achieved physicalregeneration aims but were not the means to achieving social goals. This lesson, inparticular, raises important concerns that may have guided the architects of the CAI in theirdetermination to interweave the three basic objectives of physical, social and economicdevelopment that formed the mandate of the CAI. As Chapters 7 and 8 will show, giventhat the CAI was a bold experiment in this regard, it did achieve a degree of successlacking in other urban revitalisation attempts.This chapter concludes that there was, and is, a need for alternative strategies forurban revitalisation. In order to support the "winners" and diminish the effects on the"losers," long-term urban policies and consistencies in local government are necessary.Central government withdrawal of assistance cannot be replaced with private initiativesalone. Government intervention in some form to provide basic infrastructure and publicworks, selective subsidies for the private sector, and sound economic policiescomplemented with social programmes are needed to ensure efficiency and accountabilityin addition to equity. A close ear to the community is needed to tailor policies and36programmes to specific urban needs and community interests. New actors, newinstitutional and fiscal mechanisms, new political alliances offer hope for urbanregeneration. The Winnipeg Core Area Initiative was an urban revitalisation experimentthat had all of these features and offered an alternative strategy full of promise for theinner city of Winnipeg specifically and for urban regeneration efforts generally. Chapters 4to 7 will explore and evaluate the successes and weaknesses of the CAI as a model forurban regeneration. First, however, Chapter 3 will link the theory and practice of Canadianurban planning to economic development and give an historical perspective that willbecome pertinent in a later consideration of the CAI model.37Endnotes1. For an overview of this concept of distress in American cities see Marshall Kaplanand Franklin James, "City Need and Distress in the United States: 1970 to theMid-1980s" in The Future of National Urban Policy, edited by Marshall Kaplanand Franklin James, 13-31, Durham: Duke University Press, 1990.2. This includes the six large conurbations of London, Birmingham, Manchester,Liverpool, Newcastle, and Glasgow and the seventeen next largest cities with apopulation of about 200,000 or more (Hambleton 1989).3. The term "underclass" is used by authors such as Cohen (1983) to refer to a groupof people in urban areas who are generally unemployed, welfare-dependent andoften members of visible minorities; however this grouping may also include"those who can work but whose earnings still leave them with chronically ortemporarily inadequate incomes" and the "physically capable but unemployable"(ibid., 308-309).4. Figure 2.1 illustrates the aims, programmes and resources for the 1987-88 budgetyear in which Thatcher expected to lever private expenditure and cause privatebusiness "to make use of some of their increased profitability for social purposes"(Cameron 1990, 476).5. A number of authors, such as Boyle (1985); Parkinson, Foley and Judd (1988);Parkinson (1989); Hambleton (1989); and Thornley (1990) provide backgroundinformation on the different institutional and political settings influencing the movetoward privatism in the United States and Britain.6. Ebenezer Howard's 1902 book Garden Cities of Tomorrow (rep. London: Faberand Faber, 1906) became the bible of the Garden Cities movement. Peter Hall etal. argues that this concept was an early form of containment, and in TheContainment of Urban England (London: Allan and Unwin, 1973) discusses theimpact that Howard's philosophy had on Britain.7. For a thought-provoking critique of American neighbourhood policies, and,specifically of examples of inadvertent negative effects of selected Federalinitiatives see Marshall Kaplan "American Neighbourhood Policies: Mixed Resultsand Uneven Evaluations" in The Future of National Urban Policy, edited byMarshall Kaplan and Franklin James, 210-224, Durham: Duke University Press,1990.8. Robert Home, in the first chapter of Inner City Regeneration (1982) briefly tracesthe development of inner city policy in Britain during the ninteenth and twentiethcenturies. He claims that "inner city policy emerged as a distinct area ofgovernment activity with the Inner City White Paper in 1977" (ibid., 16). Thisnew area of concern was brought about by several factors -- one of which was theshift in perception of the nature of inner city problems from social problems toeconomic and physical problems (ibid., 16-17).389. For a review of this theoretical search to respond to change see Robert Burchelland George Sternlieb, eds., Planning Theory in the 1980s: A Search for FutureDirections (New Brunswick, New Jersey: The Centre for Urban Policy Research,Rutgers University, 1978).10. Barnekov, Boyle and Rich (1989) in their concluding chapter outline the rationaleused by both the British and Americans in supporting their commitment toprivatism.Chapter 3PLANNING AND THE URBAN DIMENSION OF ECONOMICDEVELOPMENT IN CANADA3.1 Introduction The preceding chapter has documented some of the urban revitalisationstrategies and programmes adopted by governments and planners in the United States andBritain in efforts to combat urban distress. This chapter gives a brief history of theevolution of Canadian urban planning from the late-nineteenth century to the present withspecific reference to the intellectual roots that differentiate Canadian planning from that ofthe other two countries. It situates urban planning efforts in the context of localgovernment and discusses the roles of the three levels of government with respect to urbanplanning and economic development. It also gives credit to the historical influence ofBritish and American planning philosophies on local development and explores how theideologies of privatism and urban entrepreneurialism, referred to in Chapter 2, have beentranslated into the Canadian urban environment. The importance of this review willbecome apparent in the ensuing chapters when the normative and empirical assumptionsunderlying the tri-level partnership and the structural model of the CAI are examined. Thischapter concludes with a discussion of a new role for planners in the post-Fordist period ofurban development -- a role that can be described as "public entrepreneur." It suggests thatthis role is causing a dilemma for planners faced with reconciling the need for economicdevelopment based on privatism with the needs for effectively defining "public interest andbetterment."40" 3.2 Evolution of Canadian Urban PlanningPlanning, as a professional activity in Canada, has roots in pioneering ideassurrounding the turn of the twentieth century. In many cases the intellectual foundationsfor these ideas were derived from planning experiences in Britain and the United States.Countryside-conservation, public-health and housing-reform movements in Britain and theurban-reform movements in the United States provided the ideological seeds for communityplanning efforts in Canada between 1890 and 1930. 1 From the outset, however, Canadianplanning had at least two unique characteristics that differentiate it from planning in theother two countries: it grew in response to a variety of reform movements, and, inattempting to face the challenges of those movements, planning took on a broad scope ofpublic concerns. The rapid growth and development of Canadian cities in the latenineteenth century and early twentieth led to concerns with public health, conservation ofpublic resources and inadequate housing for the poor.2 Each of these concerns spawnedpublic "movements" with key figures and varying camps of advocates and detractors.Reform was controversial and constrained by local government expenditures and legalwrangles over private rights. The results of these movements affected the manner andapproaches used by the fledgling planning community and contributed to much of theintellectual and practical heritage carried on in the Canadian planning profession today.The influence of British and American planning approaches on early Canadianplanning was certainly discernible, but laterly Canadian planning developed a breadth ofconcern that differentiated it from efforts in United States and Britain. The ChicagoExposition of 1893 and the resulting City Beautiful movement, so popular with Americanplanners, held little relevance for Canadian frontier towns and cities (Armstrong 1959, 15).41The quality and cost of urban life, including rapidly deteriorating urban housing conditions,led to the introduction, in 1909, of the Act to Establish a Commission for the Conservationof Natural Resources (ibid.). It was drafted by the Honourable Clifford Sifton, a Winnipeglawyer and Liberal Member of Parliament in the Laurier Cabinet until 1905. The scope ofthe Commission included all questions related to the better utilization of natural resourcesin Canada; in addition, "systems of demonstration farms, water power inventories, a moreconsolidated Federal health service, housing and town planning were by its later years allaccepted departmental responsibilities in Canadian Governments" (ibid., 16).One of the first permanent specialists to the Commission was Dr. CharlesHodgetts, appointed Advisor on Public Health in May 1910. He pointed out relationshipsbetween public health and housing, using, as one example, the appalling decay in the innercity of Winnipeg (ibid., 18). He said that it was "not so much the city beautiful as the cityhealthy that we want for Canada" (Hodgetts in Armstrong, ibid.). After a series ofinvestigations on planning progress made in Canada and abroad during the early 1900s,Hodgetts brought forward his definition of town planning:The primary objects of town planning may be considered under three heads:1. to encourage and facilitate thorough co-operation in the providing ofhousing accommodation for town dwellers whereby they will havesufficient light, air and space;2. to ensure the exercise of foresight in reserving plenty of space for thedevelopment of main thoroughfares when required;3. to take into account everything that helps to make town life worth living.(Hodgetts in Armstrong, ibid., 19.)42Hodgetts's definition of town planning was indeed broad and visionary. Hewent on to outline the "essentials of town planning" and suggested the role that planningcould play in the welfare of modem communities.The questions involved are more numerous and complicated than the merebuilding of a house. The various constituent parts of a modem town have tobe considered and arranged in such a manner that they will form anharmonious whole, no matter how great the whole may ultimately become. . . a plan for town extension contemplates and provides for thedevelopment of every urban, suburban, and rural area that may be built onwithin from thirty to fifty years. (Hodgetts in Hodge 1986, 90.)Not only did planning efforts have a broad mandate from the start, but theCanadian planning community also had the benefit of advice from experienced NorthAmerican and European planners. 3 The Standing Committee on Public Health, one ofseveral working committees formed by the Commission of Conservation, influenced theselection of Thomas Adams, a British planner, as the Advisor on Town Planning in 1914.Adams was a noted British planner who had early become acquainted withPatrick Geddes, Ebenezer Howard, and the Garden Cities movement. In1900 he had become Secretary of the First Garden Cities Company atLetchworth and, in 1906, a Town planning consultant. He was one of thefounders of the British Town Planning Institute and had a solid reputation asa speaker and facilitator. At the time Adams joined the CanadianCommission of Conservation he was serving as an Inspector of the LocalGovernment Board which was responsible for the administration of theBritish planning act passed in 1909.Together, the influence of Hodgetts and Adams was such that theCommission of Conservation became a major force in the development ofCanadian urban planning. (Artibise and Stelter 1981, 24.)Artibise and Stelter (1981) believe that Adams was influential in promoting thedevelopment of urban planning in several respects: (1) by pressing for provincial legislation43regulating suburban expansion; (2) by directly or indirectly planning satellite "new towns"based on British models; and, (3) by actively engaging in and promoting education inplanning (ibid., 24-25). Adams forged the way for community planning as a professionalactivity -- one that linked community concerns with improved economic values.Adams believed in an utilitarian ethic embodying a number of principles:The first is the notion of social progress, and that there will be publicconsensus about achieving it. A second principle is an emphasis on reasonto determine solutions to social problems, solutions that will lead toprogress. A third is the acceptance of government intervention to achievethe public good if the weight of objective evidence suggests that course ofactions. (Hodge 1986, 98.)These principles profoundly affected the foundation of Canadian planning in sofar as they established an administrative and legislative base for planning activities andplaced the planner in a position of protecting social values.The Commission of Conservation was dissolved in 1921, and with it "the end ofan era in Canadian planning history" (Artibise and Steller 1981, 27).The end of the Commission of Conservation did not, of course, herald anabrupt termination of planning activity in Canada. Indeed, though the life ofthe Commission was relatively short, it left a strong legacy that continuedfor many years to influence planning activity. Perhaps its importantachievement was in assuming the role of a national forum for the discussionand development of issues and ideas about resource policy and management.It stimulated argument and research into a whole range of problemsassociated with particular resources and it initiated national consideration ofpublic health and town planning problems, leading to the establishment of anational health department and a national planning association. Moresignificantly, through the work of Adams, it developed concepts of totalresource use in the field of urban planning. In short, the Commission ofConservation did more than any other institution to draw attention tointegrated resource development. (Ibid., 28.)443.2.1 Planning as a Rational, Technical ProfessionIn attempting to address physical, social and economic concerns, early Canadianplanners were supported by the use of experts and professionals in varying fields,especially medicine and law. Planning problems were believed to have rational andtechnical solutions, and the planners' repertoire of skills soon included improved methodsof data collection and the use of statistics. The merits of community planning wererecognised when planning achieved professional status under the Town Planning Act in1919. Later the same year the Town Planning Institute of Canada was established topromote wider involvement of communities in planning. The rational, technical aspect ofplanning provided legitimization for the newly created profession and garnered communitysupport for planning activities. Even today, Hodge (1986, 103) suggests that rationaldecision-making is one of the eight planning values that reflect long-standing concerns ofcommunity building.3.2.2 Institutionalization of Urban Planning Within the Local Government SystemThe civic-reform movement in the early 1900s was responsible forinstitutionalizing the planning function within the local government system in Canada.Pressure from reform groups forced local governments to establish municipal ownership ofutilities with the result that communities were faced with the responsibilities of providingcommunity-wide services. Planners, of course, were involved in the planning and deliveryof those services. At the same time, a wide-spread belief that local governments were ineptand inefficient in handling the provision of services for a rapidly growing urban populationled to special boards and commissions being established to administer certain community45services. The planning function adopted a semi-independent status responsible to localgovernment generally but administratively through the boards or commissions. By themid-1960s most of these bodies had been abolished, and local governments secured in-house planners in formalized planning departments.This trend tended to bring planning more directly under political control, atthe expense of the older system of planning commissioners or boards, whoserespectable members presumably had been above politics. In searching forplanners, both the CMHC and local departments recruited heavily in Britain.One result was that the "British takeover of planning in the 1940s wasmassive." According to one critic, the consequences of this domination byBritish planners was a planning profession preoccupied with the physicaldetails of land use and a relentless desire to centralize planning power at theexpense of the public's involvement in the process. (Artibise and Stelter1981, 30.)The situation of the planning function within the local government system hassparked wide and continued debate on the role of planning vis-d-vis local politics. Arecent article by Matthew Kiernan (1990) in Plan Canada and a vitriolic response by KentGerecke and Barton Reid in City Magazine (1990) attest to the ideological conflict facedby local government planners. Kiernan claims that the consequence of situating theplanning function within the local government apparatus is that planning operates within anarrow focus on land use, subdivision design and zoning approvals and that the result is a"powerful ethos of apolitical, anti-interventionist minimalism in municipal government" thatis reflected in planning itself (Kiernan 1990, 13). In addition, he claims that thepersistence of the notion that planning is essentially a rational, technical, professionalenterprise consequently "has been to obscure from both planners and politicians the factthat their work almost invariably does involve debatable value judgements, and that their46costs and benefits are rarely uniformly or equally distributed" (ibid., 14). The result meansthat the planning system tends to be reactive and essentially marginalized. Gerecke andReid take great exception to Kiernan's interpretation of the history of Canadian cityplanning as being inherently apolitical and argue that "the victory of the rationalist schoolwas really the victory of the right wing over the left" (Gerecke and Reid 1990, 17). 4Political or apolitical, rational or value-laden, it is clear that planning evokes as muchcontroversy today in attempting to solve community problems as it did during the heydayof the reform movements at the turn of the century.3.2.3 "New" Urban Politics and PlanningLouis Albrechts refers to the 1960s as the "golden era" whereby "plannersbelieved in a future in which social problems could be tamed and humanity liberated fromthe constraints of scarcity and greed (Albrechts 1991, 123). Planning was legitimized as amethod of decision-making based on procedural concepts or "an approach." Each of theseapproaches led to better and new programmes proffered to be the solution to a wide varietyof physical, social and economic problems. In this period, when resources seemedabundant, there was widespread belief in overall economic and social progress. Traditionaleconomic policies based on incentives, social policy based on a welfare ideology, and land-use policies secured by zoning, gave the planner the tools thought necessary to achievedesired results. Planners' activities centred around the mandate of local governments,which was seen to be "the prudent and orderly administration of physical services tosupport growth and development" (Plunkett in Kiernan 1990, 13). In doing so, plannersthemselves uncritically accepted suburban development and high-rise development as47means of achieving progress in urban planning only to find themselves squarely in themiddle of an urban protest against such growth by the end of the 1960s. Faced withsimilar situations to those of British and American planners outlined in Chapter 2,Canadian planners moved from pro-development to anti-development in the space of onedecade aided by an affluent economic environment and a new citizen-reform movement.Planning activities from the 1960s onward focused on regulating growth throughprescriptive measures such as subdivision design and zoning approvals. Public-sectoractivity aimed at the provision of infrastructure, housing and other amenities was controlledthrough land-use designations. Planners did not actively pursue an economic strategybecause it was assumed that the creation of an orderly, efficient and aesthetic physicalenvironment would spontaneously produce a positive economic one. This is not to say thatplanners ignored the economic importance of inner cities.Until the 1970s planning's justification lay in its commitment tocomprehensiveness, an orientation to the long term, protection of theenvironment, and preservation of public interest through the orderlydevelopment of land and attention to the interests of all social groups.Numerous critics have argued that these aims were never attained, thatplanning always primarily benefited business interest, and that economicadvantage has perennially constituted the real objective of planning.(Fainstein 1991, 22.)5In the 1970s the world changed. Global restructuring in the 1970s and 1980scontributed to the "crisis of conscience" felt by planners in many industrialised nationsincluding Canada. 6 In a sense, planning had become "a form of politics by other means"(Friedman 1991, 372) and the legitimization of planning as a political process to affect thesocial, economic and physical fabric of the city came into question. The age of affluencemoved to an age of austerity by the 1980s, and the planning function began the48concomitant move from urban managerialism to entrepreneurialism. This transformation ofplanning in Canada, as elsewhere, has been chronicled by numerous authors (see, forexample, Albrechts 1991; Fainstein 1989; Kiernan 1990). Fainstein describes the politicalmilieu in the United States and the United Kingdom as "conditions of competitiveinternational capitalism and conservative national regimes" (1991, 372). Albrechts supportsBeauregard's (1989) claim that "in the 1980s the state has become more ideologicallyconservative and more subservient to the needs and demands of capital, turning away fromthe simultaneous pursuit of both economic growth and welfare" (Albrechts 1991, 123).State regulation changed from Keynesian intervention to monetarist intervention, and withit the role of the planner changed.3.2.4 Implications of the Fordist Model of DevelopmentPrior to the drastic process of industrial restructuring in the 1980s, the Fordist'model of social and economic organization directly affected the physical and spatial formof urban areas. Zoning was the tool used by planners to physically differentiatemanufacturing from residential and other land uses and to spatially structure citiesdependent on transportation routes. As noted in Chapter 2, the pattern became the samefor all urban areas in industrialised countries including Canada. By the end of the 1960s,however, the limitations of the Fordist model were being felt. Traditional industries wereshut down, and urban areas were left with a legacy of pollution, congestion and urbandecay as the unanticipated result of industry-based developments being replaced by service-sector-based economies. The planners' tool-kit was no longer equipped to deal with a newurban order.49As the process of industrial restructuring was taking place, there was asimultaneous shift in the manner in which state/city governments approached citygovernance. The Keynesian welfare model of the Fordist era gave way to a newentrepreneurial mode. A new urban image emerged concomitant with an urban life-stylebased on consumerism and the acquisition of material goods. The change in bothsocioeconomic processes and state/city attitudes toward intervention and regulation posed anew dilemma for planners caught in their role as instruments of government apparatus andtheir desire to shape a new urban environment for "the public good."3.3 The Role of Economic Development in Local DevelopmentThere is a growing body of material that highlights the role of cities and townsin regional economic-development initiatives particularly after the global recession of theearly 1980s.8 In Canada, The Trudeau government of this period claimed that regionaldevelopment innovations in western Canada strengthened the economic fabric of the Westwhile enhancing the capacity of local areas to shape their own development (Axworthy1990). Recognition that the social and economic well-being of cities is directly linked tothe well-being of a larger region is not an unique Canadian perspective, however. Britishurban policy explicitly recognises such inter-dependencies. Through such researchprogrammes as the Changing Urban and Regional System (CURS) 9, British researchershave studied the spatial impact of social, economic and political change in the UnitedKingdom. Economic restructuring at the national and local levels has produced profoundconsequences for localities in England, and research has shown that no one national urbanpolicy can satisfy local interests and concerns over the long run. The British have found50that success in urban economic development rests with the cities themselves and thatgovernment policies must reflect the idiosyncratic nature of urban regions within a broaderpolicy framework. According to Philip Cooke, the director of the 1984 CURS programme,local and national economic well-being is not mutually exclusive.A society which is exposed to the presently unregulated forces of anincreasingly globalized economy while being deprived of discretion overlocal affairs, some of which involve the picking up of pieces left by globaleconomic whirlwinds, is Promethean in its predicament. The Prometheusmyth, it is worth recalling, ended with the opening of Pandora's box. (Cooke1989, 305.)3.4 Canadian Government Approach to Economic Development Just as Britain has faced the "gales of economic competition" (ibid.), Canada'straditional resource-based sectors have been buffeted by unstable commodity prices and themanufacturing sector hit with global competition on an previously unknown scale.Economic development and job creation have become critical policy issues faced by alllevels of governments. While current thinking about economic development placesincreased emphasis on local, urban-based initiatives, the traditional Canadian approach tothe problems of unemployment and regional development has been characterised by a "top-down" strategy.Chapter 2 outlined the economic circumstances facing Britain and the UnitedStates in the 1980s. Just as Britain has faced the "gales of economic competitoin" (ibid.),Canada's traditional resource-based sectors have been buffeted by unstable commodityprices and the manufacturing sector hit with global competition on a previously unknownscale. Economic development and job creation have become critical policy issues faced by51all levels of governments. While current thinking about economic development placesincreased emphasis on local, urban-based initiatives, the traditional Canadian approach tothe problems of unemployment and regional development has been characterised by a "top-down" strategy. The remainder of this chapter gives a brief history of the rationale behindCanadian economic-development policy from the late-1960s onward and is particularlyrelevant to the thinking that influenced the creators of the CAI as will be seen in thefollowing two chapters.3.4.1 The Ministry of State for Urban AffairsIn 1968, during the federal election campaign, Pierre Trudeau, the new leader ofthe Liberal Party of Canada, promised to draw attention to the problems of urban areas inCanada. Shortly after his election, Prime Minister Trudeau carried through on his electionpromise when he appointed Paul Hellyer, a prominent cabinet minister, Chair of the newlycreated Task Force on Housing and Urban Development. The aim of the task force was"to establish the requirements for and the limits of a federal role in the rapidly expandingurban society" (Rose 1980, 44). Not only was it in the interest of the Liberal Party toaddress the perceived needs of an increasingly urban society, but all parties "had theadvantage of the projections of the Gordon Commission, which reported, in 1959-1960,that Canada would be almost entirely urbanized by 1990, if not some years before (ibid.).After a series of whirlwind tours to large and small urban centres, and a fewselected rural areas in Canda, the Hellyer task force presented its findings, which includeda specific proposal to establish the federal Department of Housing and Urban Affairs (ibid.,46). The recommendations of the Hellyer task force were rejected by the prime minister52and his cabinet, resulting in the resignation of Paul Hellyer. Nonetheless, a federalministry was established in the 1970-71 session of Parliament -- the Ministry of State forUrban Affairs (MSUA). The new ministry did not have full department status, nor did itcarry the name of Housing, although it was to have responsibility for housing policy byhaving Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC) (the former name of CanadaMortgage and Housing Corporation) report to the minister.The designation of "urban affairs" was surely a far broader concept than anyof the other titles suggested. It is clear why the prime minister chose suchwording, because no level of government was possessed of the constitutionalresponsibility in a field as conceptually vague and as boundless as "urbanaffairs"; though for forty years the major constitutional responsibility in thefield of housing lay with the provincial governments. It is also clear that theterm "urban development" was reprehensible. Perhaps the Liberal Party,conscious of the significance of rural affairs, was determined not to alienateits relatively modest support in rural areas and in the Western provinces byappearing to espouse urban development. Urban affairs surely encompassedmore than simply development of our cities. (Ibid., 50.)The MSUA had a brief and tortured history. In the first year and a half itcommissioned reports by N. H. Lithwick, and by Michael Dennis and Susan Fish; bothreports were rejectec1.1° Lithwick lambasted politicians and academics for neglect of theeconomics of urbanisation -- Dennis and Fish blamed all and sundry for neglecting theneeds of low-income Canadians (Rose 1980, 53). A fall election in 1972 turned attentionaway from the controversial recommendations of these two reports, and the 1973Parliament passed a series of amendments to the National Housing Act (NHA) intended toredress a variety of problems stemming out of the former 1944 NHA. For the remainderof its term, the MSUA was inextricably linked to CMHC, and "it was not at all clear that53the Ministry of State for Urban Affairs and the CMHC were at one with each other aspolicy agency and implementation agency respectively" (ibid., 63).For the balance of the 1970s, the MSUA continued to pursue its urban agenda,doggedly attempting to focus government policy on urban issues and problems. In manyrespects the MSUA was successful. The ministry heightened research interest in urbanconditions and "added to the well-established research programmes of CMHC and theCanadian Council on Urban and Regional Research" (Artibise and Linteau 1984, 9)." Ina role reminiscent of that given to the Commission on Conservation decades earlier (that is,a role without administrative or executive powers), the MSUA supported or producedgovernment policy-oriented studies and research data bases, but lacked the mandate,administrative and financial capacity, and political support to implement any of itsrecommendations (Artibise and Kiernan 1989, 1-2). The MSUA was dismantled in the late1970s for a variety of reasons.MSUA's demise in the late 1970s, coupled with DREE/DRIE's [Departmentof Regional Economic Expansion/Department of Regional IndustrialExpansion] continued focus outside the urban areas, has meant that thefederal government has had, virtually without exception, neither theconceptual nor the programmatic instruments with which to focus on urbaneconomic development. To the extent that there has been a coherent conceptof Canadian regional development at all, it has been one which has, untilvery recently, conspicuously lacked an urban dimension. (Ibid.)3.4.2 Rationale for State InterventionTraditionally, rationale for state intervention in economic development inCanada followed a laissez-faire policy by which government activities reliedoverwhelmingly on the market itself to create opportunities for local prosperity. Localgovernments individually or together in larger regions have generally not pursued the kinds54of public investment/ownership options that have been used in other countries such asBritain. Instead, local economic development activities have been limited to strategiestoward the centre and conservative end of the policy spectrum. "Such conservative policiesreflect the tacit assumption that the market, left to its own devices, will allocate resourcesboth sectorally and spatially in a way that is both privately and socially optimal" (Gertler1990, 37).In addition to a conservative and occasionally neo-liberal attitude towardgovernment intervention in economic-development policy, it is important to acknowledgethe respective roles of the three levels of government in Canada vis-d-vis finance andeconomic-development policy. The approach and priorities adopted by the provinces to thefinancing of local governments influences the range and scope of local activities. Much oflocal revenue is derived from provincial transfer payments attached to conditional grantmechanisms. It is true that local governments can make their own decisions about raisingand spending own-source revenues, however restrictive provincial statutes regulate a hostof borrowing and spending activities thereby placing severe limitations on the powers andfreedoms of local governments. Local autonomy and the welfare of local citizens becomeissues of hot dispute amidst inter-governmental tug-of-wars over economic initiatives. Tothis end, Gertler concludes:In any event, all of these concerns underscore the importance of the as yetunderdeveloped (and under utilized) methodologies for evaluating publicactions in this general area. While traditional cost-benefit methods representa useful starting point (Bureau of Municipal Research 1982; Kitchen 1985),it is likely that such tools will need to be broadened somewhat to reflect thefull range of private and social impacts of economic development policies.Finally, such analysis will also have to come to grips with the difficultproblems of defining the "public" interest in a way that is acceptable to the55multiple levels of government in the Canadian political context. (Gertler1990, 54.)3.4.3 The Roles of the Three Levels of GovernmentIn Canada, the federal and provincial governments have been the primary actorsin establishing policy for economic development. For the most part, the senior levels havetended to establish their own goals and have spent funds themselves rather than transferringfunds to the municipalities. However, in the last decade in Canada, as in other Westerncountries, local governments are being increasingly involved in economic strategies. Thisnew role for local governments "represents a trespassing over what has traditionally beenthe policy turf of the more senior levels of government" who have viewed regionaleconomic development as their exclusive preserve (Gertler 1990, 35). Legally andconstitutionally local governments exist as creatures of provincial fiat and the formaldivision of powers between the three levels of government assigns the responsibility andthe revenue-raising ability for economic development to the provinces and the federalgovernment. Economic development and competitive inter-jurisdictional bidding foreconomic activity is, therefore, ultra vires municipal governments' powers.Historically, the role of local governments in economic development has beenpassive. According to Artibise and Kiernan (1989), "economic development consumesbarely one-third of one per cent of total municipal spending."Canadian local governments have, for the most part, studiously avoided anyactive, coherent, or interventionist role in economic development. Stymiedby a lethal combination of limited financial resources, inadequate or non-existent legal powers, and above all by an enervating ideology of anti-interventionism, Canadian urban governments have traditionally adopted aprofoundly minimalistic interpretation of their responsibilities. (Ibid., 1-3)1256For the most part, municipalities have traditionally depended upon the realproperty tax base for locally raised revenues. With the exception of earlier efforts atboosterism and the resulting competitive "beggar thy neighbour" policies to attractfootloose industry, cities in Canada have generally regarded their ability to affect theireconomic well-being as severely circumscribed. Any active role on the part ofmunicipalities has primarily been limited to the provision of infrastructure and municipalservices, the encouragement of building and development through the manipulation ofplanning and zoning devices, and other concessionary practices to woo developmentinitiatives on the part of the private sector. This passive role is, according to Gertler,"eminently compatible with the dominant ideological ethos of municipal anti-interventionism" (Gertler 1990, 42). Indeed, Gertler suggests that active local involvementin economic development would be contentious because "any intervention would arouseideological debate about the appropriateness of such actions within a predominantly privateenterprise system" (ibid., 35). The notion that cities and local governments have thepotential or even the ability to affect their own economic well-being may be contentious,but it is increasingly becoming an idea in good currency!'3.5 Local Development Strategies and Policy Instruments This notion, that city governments, despite legal and fiscal limitations, have thecapacity to improve urban conditions, has gained acceptance with the shift toward urbanentrepreneurialism. Not unlike efforts undertaken in Britain and the United States thatwere discussed in Chapter 2, some of the most-progressive Canadian cities have embraceda form of public entrepreneurialism that has resulted from a rethinking and restructuring of57the role of local government. In an attempt to activate the economic markets within theirlocality, a variety of inducements are used: training programs to increase and update skilllevels; assistance and support to entrepreneurs in establishing and expanding business;relaxation of planning controls as in enterprise zones and simplified enterprise zones;abolition or relaxation of rent controls; diversification of housing tenure, together withfinancial leverage to stimulate property development to develop confidence and attractinward investment (Solebury 1987). In attempts to attract consumers and improve thecompetitive position of a specific locality, urban regeneration attempts focus increasinglyon quality of life -- spectacle and display become symbolic of exciting urban life (Harvey1989). Post-modernist styles of architecture adorn shopping centres, stadiums and exoticeating establishments in a wide variety of cultural and physical upgrading projects that aredesigned to give the impression of vitality and to attract the consumer/resident back to thecity. Cities compete to attract key firms with capacities to give them the edge as aninformational city, or post-industrial city in which the export of services (financial,informational and knowledge-producing) becomes the economic basis for urban survival(Harvey 1989).Much of the inter-urban competition between cities for locational advantage andincreased economic well-being involves repetitive strategies. The same type ofinfrastructure and the same type of developments crop up from centre to centre: waterfrontdevelopments in Halifax, Toronto and Vancouver; stadium developments in Toronto,Montreal and Winnipeg; massive downtown shopping centres ("places") in Toronto,Winnipeg, Edmonton and Vancouver. In many cases local governments feel that there isno option but to fall in line with the latest development craze if they are to survive.•^ 58The emphasis upon tourism, the production and consumption of spectaclesand the production of ephemeral events within a given locality alreadymentioned bear all the signs of being favoured remedies for ailing urbaneconomies. Urban investments of this sort are often highly speculative.Even in the face of poor economic performance, investments in theseprojects appear to have both a social and a political attraction. To beginwith the selling of the city as a location for activity depends heavily uponthe creation of an attractive urban image. Part of what has been seen theselast two decades is the attempt to build a physical and social image of thecities suited to that competitive purpose. The orchestrated production of anurban image can, if successful, help create a sense of social solidarity, civicpride and loyalty to place and even allow the urban image to provide amental refuge in world that capitalism treats as more and more placeless(Harvey 1989 in Albrechts 1991.)3.6 The Seduction of the Private Sector The emergence of urban entrepreneurialism would not be possible without theactive participation of the private sector. Through a variety of financial and otherinducements, private corporations have been wooed into development and redevelopmentschemes that have changed the nature of urban centres in Canada as in other countries.Today, privatism is a dominant theme affecting urban policy. It stresses the social as wellas economic importance of private initiative and competition while legitimizing the publicconsequences of private action. America, and to a lesser degree Canada, has a strongtradition of private-sector guidance and initiative in urban development, and privatedecisions have played a large part in determining the physical configuration of NorthAmerican cities. Public intervention has essentially supported or facilitated privateenterprise through tax credits, location subsidies and other appeals to corporateresponsibility. More recently, urban governments have undertaken aggressive efforts to re-invigorate the private sector role in economic development including deregulation of59certain economic activities, removing or restructuring local planning controls and schemesto leverage local private investments through public/private partnerships. As the nextchapters will show, the Winnipeg Core Area Initiative adopted many of these efforts in itsattempt to kick-start the poor economic climate of the province in the 1980s.3.6.1 Public/Private PartnershipsIt is assumed by many that, if planning can stimulate investment, then jobs willfollow. In the last decade the favoured vehicle for stimulus has been some form ofpublic/private partnerships that brings local government and business leaders together inlocal economic development. The particular organisational model and programmearrangements of each partnership varies according to local circumstances. Nonetheless,each side contributes what the other cannot: governments provides public funds, taxincentives, land assemblies and major public facilities along with overall planning authorityassurances; the private developer gives substantial private capital, development andmanagement capacity. Public/private partnerships have proven to be "mixed blessings" dueto the degree of compromise required in any marriage. Critics of these partnerships arguethat instead of exploring ways in which the private sector can assist the public process ofurban regeneration, these partnerships are often used to modify policy that essentiallysubsidises private development.3.6.2 Public Development CorporationsThe quasi-autonomous development corporation has been touted as an effectivetool in delivering significant urban investment to declining inner cities. It is the commonly60used core of many public/private partnerships. Britain and the United States have useddevelopment corporations for massive urban developments such as Battery Park in NewYork and the London Docklands in England. In Canada, Toronto and Vancouver haveseen public development corporations change the face of their waterfronts. Most recentlyMontreal, Quebec City, Edmonton and Winnipeg's CAI have used them for extensiveredevelopment in their inner-city areas. One of the most attractive aspects of publicdevelopment corporations is that they are capable of turning very large derelict inner-cityareas into attractive investment opportunities for private capital due to their large capitalbudgets and substantial land holdings. However, as a dominant instrument of urban publicpolicy, development corporations are rapidly gaining their detractors. As "arm's-lengthcorporations" they are not publicly accountable. It is debatable how much localgovernment control can be exercised over the corporation once the deal has been struck.In addition, despite public planning and public resources, it is clear that market demandwill effectively shape the content and direction of local policy in so far as decisions takenby the private sector will be guided by commercial criteria. The effect on local planning isparticularly acute. Instead of a comprehensive approach to inner-city revitalisation,planning is concentrated on single-site developments. Susan Fainstein suggests thecommon theme found in large public development corporation projects underlies the basicproblem of balancing economic development with planning for the public city:Both [Battery Park City and the Docklands] involve heavy commitments ofpublic funds to create development centred around financial services andupper-income residential uses. Their exclusive character is justified in termsof multiplier effects on the economy in general, and secondarily in theirprovision of amenities to the public at large. . . . Both are run by bodiesdesigned to represent business interests, promote secrecy, and to provide noeffective vehicle for popular participation. Both demonstrate the61considerable capability of the new style of planning to actually makedevelopment happen: they also are limited by a framework which restrictsprogress to a corporate-style approach whereby the tastes and interest ofinvestors come first and the rest of the public must be content with whateverside benefits are negotiated or trickle down. (Fainstein 1991, 30.)As Chapters 7 and 8 will explicate, much of the criticism of the CAI has to do with thisvery problem.3.7 Inter-governmental Relations Despite various criticisms aimed at the new approaches to urban revitalisationand economic development, it is clear that the complexity and scope of projects beingundertaken in all major urban centres today require co-operative ventures not previouslyundertaken. In an era of fiscal restraint and economic uncertainty, no one level ofgovernment appears to have the capacity or will to take on large urban redevelopmentprojects alone, even in partnership with local business. As Chapter 2 concluded, today newfiscal mechanisms are necessary for urban revitalisation. Increasingly, inter-governmentalpartnerships are required to augment financial resources and provide programmes that cutacross areas of service delivery. As the CAI case study will show, these new partnershipsare not without enormous difficulties. The ability to adapt to inter-government co-operation is a difficult task for governments entrenched in their own bureaucracies and iseven more problematic for private interests. The planning function can accept thechallenge presented by inter-governmental opportunities or it can resign in the face ofbureaucratic red tape and inertia.623.8 Citizenry and the Private Sector In this new generation of inner-city redevelopment projects, critics such as AndyThorley (referred to in Chapter 2) point to the real danger of losing on the side of socialequity in order to gain on the side of economic growth. The issue appears to be one ofcoherence. In the push to "leverage" private investment in the short-term, comprehensivelong-term objectives tend to be compromised or fall by the wayside. The public voice isnecessary to achieve the public city. As Artibise and Kiernan state, "we do not believethat an urban economic strategy can be successfully left to the private sector; indeed, interms of regional development this can be actively harmful" (1989, 2-16). Integration ofmeaningful public participation into any model for urban regeneration is critical to ensuresensitivity to local-need priorities and for the creation of community spirit. A sense ofcommunity re-enforces investment initiatives by anchoring investment capital and byencouraging central/local political networks that serve to preserve the status of existingurban centres (McKay in Artibise and Kiernan 1989, 2-17). A vital and committed localcitizenry provides a wealth of human capital that cannot be bought. Their input into localconcerns gives shape and definition to any desired urban environment and the "principalline of causation runs from the 'livability' of the urban environment to the economic baseof the community, rather than the reverse" (Artibise and Kiernan 1989, 2-13). It will beargued in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 that this lesson was lost in the CAI process.3.9 New Roles for Planners in Local Economic DevelopmentAs the planning function has evolved and matured in the face of unprecedentedglobal economic events, especially in the last decade, the challenge for planners is equally63unprecedented. The passive, reactive role of planners acceptable in an era of relativeaffluence is no longer appropriate in a capitalist contest for urban investment andrevitalization. Planners today, as public entrepreneurs, have the difficult task of securingpublic benefit while attempting to leverage private dollars. There has recently been agrowing field of criticism directed at planners and their role in the public sector. Questionshave repeatedly been asked as to whose interests are being served by the planningprofession and whose values are being represented. The Honourable Henry G. Cisneros,Mayor of San Antonio, Texas, in a series of commentaries 14 on Michael Brook's 1988article calling for a return to an utopian view of planning, recently asked if planners "havetaken their eye off the ball" (Cisneros 1989). He underlined the need for the planningprofession to "keep first and foremost its public obligations and responsibilities." Hestressed that planners must be unbending in their efforts to share some sense of vision withthe larger society. "There must exist in each of us who calls himself or herself a plannerthat tension between how to get things done in the practical world of services delivery anda vision and a sense of idealism founded in public values" (Cisneros 1989, 78). Much ofthis criticism within and without the planning profession has to do with the effectivenessand manner in which planners influence public policies and decisions concerned with"public good and betterment." In the case study of the CAI to follow, it will be arguedthat the influence of the Winnipeg Planning Department was severely circumscribed by thepolitics of local government during the decade of the CAI and that, when faced withconflicting development pressures and short-term funding opportunities, the ability of theplanning function to integrate activities into any long-term, coherent strategy of publicinterest was constrained.64•^This chapter and the preceding one make an important contribution to theremainder of this dissertation. Through the review of literature on urban revitalisationstrategies and programmes adopted by governments in the United States and Britain andthe examination of the relationship between planning and the urban dimension of economicdevelopment in Canada, the skeleton of a framework appears that will be used in thefollowing analysis of the CAI case study. Apparent in all of the urban revitalisation andeconomic development strategies -- reviewed are the major variables of values, process,programmes and perceptions. The following chapters will use these variables, in additionto others, in an analytic framework by which the CAI will be dissected and evaluated.65Endnotes1. Gerald Hodge highlights the important developments in early community planningin Canada and gives a synopsis of the pioneering public movements in publichealth, housing reform, conservation and civic reform in his book PlanningCanadian Communities (Toronto: Metheun, 1986), 75-107.2. The impact of this period of rapid growth and expansion in Canada, forapproximately a quarter century after the 1880s, produced appalling conditions inCanadian boom towns. Cities such as Calgary and Edmonton multiplied forty timesin population during the first decade of the 1900s. Alan H. Armstrong, in "ThomasAdams and the Commission of Conservation" (Plan Canada [1], 1:14-32), describesthese conditions and the concerns faced by the Canadian Commission ofConervation (1909-1921) charged with the task of investigating, enquiring, advising,and informing the Canadian government and general public on issues of naturalresources, health, housing and town planning.3. Artibise, A.F.J. and Stelter, G., "Conservation Planning and Urban Planning: TheCanadian Commission of Conservation in Historical Perspective" (Kain 1981, 17-36),discuss Canadian planning efforts to 1900 and the influence of the Garden Cities andCity Beautiful approaches to planning in Canada around the turn of the twentiethcentury.4. Kent Gerecke wrote his Ph.D. dissertation on the history of Canadian planningwhile at the University of British Columbia. An abbreviated version can be found inThe Second City Book, ed. J. Lorimer (Toronto: James Lorimer and Co., 1977),150-161.5. Susan Fainstein refers to such authors as Altshuler (1965), Gans (1968), Harvey(1978) and Foglesong (1986) that support this premise using various arguments.Michael Brooks (1988) foresees the ultimate demise of the planning professionwhen the planner is seen only as a "facilitator" in service to the private developmentindustry. Christine Boyer (1983) suggests that this may already have happened.6. This period of self-reflection imposed upon the planning profession by changingworld events is briefly discussed in Chapter 2.7. Gramsci coined the term to refer to a model of industrial organization that wasbased on mass production of standardized consumer goods, vertical integration ofthe production process, and spatial division of labour by individual firms (Albrechts1991).8. See for example, New Roles for Cities and Towns (OECD, 1987); Clyde Weaver,Regional Development and the Local Community: Planning, Politics and SocialContext (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1984); and A.F.J. Artibise and M.Kiernan Canadian Regional Development: The Urban Dimension, (Ottawa:Economic Council of Canada, 1989).9.^The Economic and Social Research Council established CURS in 1984 to studyseven localities in Britain chosen for their variety of experience in the context ofthe broader national and international changes in social, economic and politicalrestructuring.6610. Lithwick, an urban economist and professor, had been made assistant secretary tothe MSUA. He resigned in the summer of 1971, after his report, Urban Canada:Problems and Prospects (Ottawa: CMHC, December 1970), was rejected. Lithwickclaimed that he had little reason to believe that a strong federal initiative wouldprovide direction for urban development for the duration of the century (Rose 1980,52). Michael Dennis and Susan Fish found a private publisher to produce theirrejected report, Programs in Search of a Policy: Low Income Housing in Canada(Toronto: Hakkert 1972).11. Artibise and Linteau, The Evolution of Urban Canada: An Analysis of Approachesand Interpretation (Winnipeg: Institute of Urban Studies 1984), claim that two ofthe most important projects undertaken by MSUA were the Urban Profiles Seriesand the Urban Prospects Series. The listings of these series can be found inCanada's Urban Plan (Artibise and Stelter 1981, 313-315).12. For support of this stand see Plunkett (1986); Plunkett and Betts (1978); andKiernan (1983; 1987). On the other hand, Gerecke and Reid (1990) vigorouslydisputes this thesis.13. For an explanatory approach of "boosterism" applied to the case of Winnipeg and otherprairie centres see "In Pursuit of Growth: Municipal Boosterism and UrbanDevelopment in the Canadian Prairie West, 1871-1913" in Stelter and Artibise, Shapingthe Urban Landscape: Aspects of the Canadian City Building Process, 116-147(Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1982). Artibise argues that urban leadership mustbe an integral part of any explanation of urban growth (ibid., 147).14.^Commentaries on Brook's article debating the past and future of the planningprofession also included those by Peter Marcuse, Michael Teitz and Marc Weiss(Journal of the American Planning Association 55 [1]: 78-84).PART IIIChapter 4BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW OF THE WINNIPEGCORE AREA INITIATIVE4.1 Introduction This chapter is intended to give a thorough picture of the CAI so that laterevaluation of it as an instrument for urban public policy may be appreciated in context. Itpresents the political and economic conditions that led to the creation of the CAI anddetails the circumstances that influenced the actions of the original signatories to the tri-level agreement. This environmental milieu that set the stage for the birth of the CAI isbetter understood in light of the discussions on urban planning ideologies presented inChapter 2 and on prevailing Canadian economic development theory presented in theprevious Chapter 3. In addition to a profile of Winnipeg's inner-city conditions prior tothe CAI, this chapter describes the political impetus behind the Initiative and thecircumstances and characters instrumental in its inception. It spells out the mandate of theCAI, the structural model chosen for it, and gives a brief description of the programmesand budgets in both agreements. Where available, reference is made to evaluation reportspresented to the CAI Management Board and for the Public Information Programme of theCAI. In the ensuing chapters, this dissertation will further explore and evaluate the CAImodel, its component parts, and the relative strengths and weaknesses of the CAI as aninstrument of public policy for inner-city revitalisation.684.2 The Political and Economic Context of the CAI Manitoba's economy in the 1970s was sick; it ranked eighth, ninth and tenth outof provincial economies for a number of years.' The City of Winnipeg was viewed as theengine of the Manitoba economy because the City's population represented sixty percent ofthe entire province. In order to turn around the provincial economy, the federalgovernment felt that it was necessary to make the City of Winnipeg healthy, especially thebadly deteriorated inner city. As a result, the Winnipeg Core Area Initiative was originallyjustified as a potential instrument for regional economic development by the federalgovernment; CAI I (1981-1986) was a sub-agreement of the General DevelopmentAgreement initiated in 1974 between the federal government and the Province of Manitoba,while CAI II (1987-1991) fell under the Economic and Regional Developments Agreementof 1984.Set in this political-economic context, the CAI stands out as an example ofintergovernmental collaboration and co-operation. Faced with historic federal-provincialrelations difficulties, the success of the CM appears remarkable as an example of a tri-governmental initiative. Other co-operative ventures in the form of urban "mega-projects"have been tried in Canada, but none has had the breadth and scope of the CAI.2 The CAIis an example of economic development in the broadest sense, balancing disparity-reliefefforts with those of commercially oriented physical development projects. It is also oneof the longest-lasting co-operative ventures among three levels of government spanning adecade of direct tri-governmental participation.Although the birthdate of the CAI is formally acknowledged to be September1981, the seeds of the tripartite project were sown during the mid-and late 1970s. Each69involvement in Winnipeg's core area, albeit for their own reasons. Much of the sensitivityto the socioeconomic problems of the core can be attributed to a series of research studiespublished by the Institute of Urban Studies' at the University of Winnipeg and the SocialPlanning Council of Winnipeg in the late 1970s. 4 In addition, several research reports hadbeen prepared for the City of Winnipeg development-plan review that was being conductedat that time. 5 By 1980 the time was ripe for action and the various interests of all threelevels of government were aligned to take advantage of a co-operative attack.The federal Liberal government's interests emerged from a desire to improve theprovincial economy as a whole through the Department of Regional Economic Expansion(DREE). DREE possessed a fairly broad mandate for regional economic development anddisparity relief along with a concern for the growth and plight of Winnipeg's Aboriginalpopulation. DREE had previously been involved in a diverse range of federal-provincialactivities, and by 1979 had prepared for the federal Treasury Board financial plans formajor Aboriginal, industrial and downtown redevelopment in Winnipeg. Taking advantageof the attention already focused on Winnipeg's core area, Lloyd Axworthy, then federalMinister for Employment and Immigration and local Member of Parliament, set his sightson a potential neighbourhood revitalization and rail relocation project using DREE as thevehicle for federal participation.The Province of Manitoba was involved in a number of restructuring efforts inthe mid-1970s. The Conservative government disbanded the Department of Urban Affairsin 1978 and re-assigned staff to the Department of Municipal Affairs. As an offshoot oftheir role in financing the Winnipeg development-plan review process, and as a result of aninterdepartmental review of major social programmes being delivered to the City,70provincial governmental interest in the core area grew. By 1980 it was clear that theProvince required new and expanded means and organisational structures to address inner-city problems. The focus was placed on an intergovernmental approach involving federalgovernment support for employment and training and provincial support for Plan Winnipegneighbourhood revitalisation programs. Gerry Mercier was the Minister of MunicipalAffairs, charged with the responsibility of spearheading action by the Province. 6The City of Winnipeg clearly had the most to gain from the CAI tri-levelagreement. The inner city of Winnipeg displayed many of the characteristics of urbandistress described in Chapter 2 and, by the early 1980s, did not appear to be able to reversethe pattern of decline. Despite the fact that Winnipeg was dominated by a predominantlysuburban-based council, city councillors recognised that the ability of a tri-level effort atcore area revitalisation was far beyond the financial capabilities of any one of the threepartners and held long-term benefits for all areas of the city.Over the decade that the CAI was in existence, the political milieu surroundingthe Initiative changed, and changed again. Within a month of the birth of the Initiative,one of the initial signatories, the provincial Progressive Conservative government, wasreplaced with an New Democratic Party government (NDP), which held very differentpriorities.' The early life of the CAI was on the line as the NDP debated the overallbenefits of the Agreement vis-d-vis individual programme strengths in the light of theirpolicy orientations. Nonetheless, a tri-level compromise was reached, which allowed theInitiative to proceed. Eventually, a Conservative federal government replaced the Liberalgovernment that had supported Axworthy's efforts, and a Progressive Conservativeprovincial government returned to power in 1988.71Just as the political climate changed throughout the period of the twoagreements, so did the economic climate. While all three partners recognised the economicplight of the Province and the City in the late 1970s, none of the three could anticipate theeconomic recession that would hit in the early 1980s. The global events referred to inChapter 2 and Chapter 3 changed the nature of local, regional and national problems andsolutions just at the time when that the first Initiative was gathering steam. Theparticipation of the senior level of government in the first agreement was primarily that of"banker." By 1986 the federal government did not feel that it could abandon their efforts inWinnipeg. Indeed, justification for continued participation in CAI II was due to earlyindications of a turnaround in private-sector investment despite the recession of 1982. Thefederal government felt that more support was needed to "push the economy over thehump" but that support was not without conditions. Federal bureaucrats were beingpressured about public accountability in the face of tight fiscal restraint. As a result, thesecond agreement had a much more direct "hands-on" approach through federal linedepartments and agencies. The economic climate not only affected the operating style ofthe two agreements, but it also affected eventual results of the CAI -- so much so thatwhen critics and detractors of the CAI are asked to estimate the success or failure of theInitiative, all point to the vicissitudes of the economic and political climate that prevailedthroughout the decade spanned by the two Initiatives.4.3 Winnipeg Profile Historically an important manufacturing and service centre, Winnipeg wasknown as the "gateway to the west." Partly because, in an era of steam and rail, "all of72the railways serving the burgeoning agricultural frontier converged on Winnipeg" and"because it was the first significant western urban centre," Winnipeg became thecommercial, financial and industrial centre for Western Canada in the early 1900s (Phillipsin Artibise 1981) (see map 4.1 which shows the boundaries of Winnipeg in 1907). Duringthe period 1914 to 1950, Winnipeg retained its predominance over the other primary urbanprairie concentrations -- Regina, Calgary, Edmonton and Saskatoon (Artibise 1979, 130).Winnipeg's historical and geographical advantage was parlayed by a "small, closely knitelite" with a clearly defined set of ideas about urban growth and prospects for the City(ibid.).The spirit of optimism shared by the "boosters" of Winnipeg was soon to beovershadowed by a period of slow decline for the city. Winnipeg dropped in size relativeto other major Canadian cities and in relative importance with other western cities. From1901 to 1921, Winnipeg moved from the sixth-to the third-largest Canadian city, next toMontreal and Toronto. By 1931 however, Winnipeg dropped to fourth place, a position itheld until 1971, when it dropped to fifth (see table 4.1). By 1986, the city ranked sixthand dropped a further place to seventh in the late 1980s. Winnipeg arrived at a conditionof no growth at a time when most of the other metropolitan centres in Canada weregrowing at an unprecedented rate. From a period of prosperity and importance at the turnof the century, Winnipeg was slowing down and crawling to a stand-still..11WARD 3I^I0 1I^I.7.!.4WARD 5•)/WARD 7.■ NA/RA, AvE.C.N.R. 0/4,6‘c4:'9,00zCITY OF WINNIPEG 1907_,^ /1 '■. ./-.%. 4^./004141. ■ /4/Alit.^-..^-..•••• p'''` ..., /— CITY BOUNDARIES^ MAJOR STREETS— RAILWAYS^ C.P.R. YARDSPARKS‘ 74ST. VITALELM PRKMap 4.1 City of Winnipeg Boundaries 1907. Reprinted with permission from A.F.J.Artibise, The Canadian City, ed., G. Stelter and A.F.J. Artibise (Toronto: McMillan Co.1979).73Table 4.1Rank of Selected Canadian Cities by Size, 1901-1971*Rank 1901 1911 1921 1931 1941 1951 1961 19711 Montreal Montreal Montreal Montreal Montreal Montreal Montreal Montreal2 Toronto Toronto Toronto Toronto Toronto Toronto Toronto Toronto3 Quebec Winnipeg Winnipeg Vancouver Vancouver Vancouver Vancouver Vancouver4 Ottawa Vancouver Vancouver Winnipeg Winnipeg Winnipeg Winnipeg Ottawa5 Hamilton Ottawa Hamilton Ottawa Ottawa Ottawa Ottawa Winnipeg6 Winnipeg Hamilton Ottawa Quebec Quebec Quebec Hamilton Hamilton7 Halifax Quebec Quebec Hamilton Hamilton Hamilton Quebec Edmonton8 Saint John Halifax Calgary Windsor Windsor Edmonton Edmonton Quebec9 London London London London Edmonton Windsor Calgary Calgary10 Vancouver Calgary Edmonton Calgary Halifax London London London11 Victoria Saint John Halifax Edmonton London Calgary Windsor Windsor12 Kingston Victoria Saint John Halifax Calgary Halifax Halifax Kitchener13 Brantford Regina Victoria Kitchener Kitchener Victoria Victoria Halifax14 Hull Edmonton Windsor Victoria Victoria Kitchener Kitchener Victoria15 Windsor Brantford Regina Saint John Saint John Saint John Sudbury Sudbury16 Sherbrooke Kingston Brantford ThunderBay ThunderBay Sudbury Regina Regina17 Guelph Peterborough Saskatoon Regina Regina ThunderBay ThunderBay Saskatoon18 Charlotte- Hull Verdun Sudbury Sudbury Regina Saint John ThunderBaytown Hull Saskatoon Saskatoon Saskatoon Saskatoon Saint John19 Trois-Rivieres Windsor36 - -73 Calgary Saskatoon77 Edmonton97 Regina110 SaskatoonSources: Adapted from Artibise 1977; 1979 and 1981 using Census of Canada, 1931, volume 1; Census of Canada (1921-1941) andStatistics Canada (1951-1971)* From 1921 to 1941 the populations are in some cases estimated.75Despite a prevailing belief in the stable nature of Winnipeg and its economy, EarlLevin believes that observers have missed the point that Winnipeg's condition ofpopulation equilibrium is not cyclical or temporary, but permanent (Levin 1984, 3).According to Levin, the descent of Winnipeg's importance can be traced to two milestones:(1) the opening of the Panama Canal in 1914 that signalled the "beginning of the end ofWinnipeg's role and importance as the transportation, bulk-breaking, warehousing,wholesaling, and distribution centre of western Canada"; and (2) "the discovery of theLeduc oilfield in 1947 which ensured shifts of development energy and investment capitalto Calgary and Edmonton" (ibid., 4). Not only was there an absolute decline in the annualgrowth rate, but more importantly there was a serious decline in the downtown area ofWinnipeg after World War II -- "retailing fell off, vacancy rates rose, new investment wasinfrequent, industry moved out, few new residences were constructed, demolition wassignificant, serious and petty crimes increased" (ibid., 2).At the time of the 1986 census, the City of Winnipeg was the sixth-largest city inCanada with a population of 625,304, representing fifty-eight percent of the provincialpopulation (Statistics Canada 1988) (see map 4.2 for City of Winnipeg boundaries in1986). The inner-city or core area covered approximately ten square miles, containedabout one-fifth of the city's population and one-quarter of its dwelling units, and housednearly 100,000 people (Winnipeg Core Area Initiative 1986a).Winnipeg's core area differed substantially from the rest of the city in demographicterms. Rapid suburban growth from 1941 onward left the inner area of the city home to adecreasing population in absolute terms -- a decline of twenty-five percent between 1971and 1981 alone, but an increasing population of elderly, single-parent, one-person andLj •Map 4.2 City of Winnipeg Boundaries, 1986. The City of Winnipeg, Department of Environmental Planning, 1986.77Aboriginal households, and new Canadians. From 1981 to 1986 the number of elderlyover seventy years of age grew by 11.5 percent, the Aboriginal population by 70.7 percent,the Asian immigrant population by 31.2 percent, and the number of single-parenthouseholds by 17.6 percent (see figure 4.1).Compared to the fringe areas of the city, the average household size, incidence ofmarried and dual-employed couples, number of children per family, and family incomeswere all lower in the City of Winnipeg proper including that area defined as the core area(Statistics Canada 1986b). With access to social services, transportation and low-costhousing, the core drew a rapidly growing disadvantaged population, resulting in anunemployment rate twice the city-wide average and an overall incidence of poverty 2.5times greater than that of the rest of the city (Winnipeg Core Area Initiative 1986a) (seefigure 4.2).11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111NATIVESELDERLYSINGLE PARENTASIAN IMMIGRANTSIMMIGRANTSTOTAL POPULATION780^10^20^30^40^50^60^70^80PercentFig. 4.1. 1981-1986 Population Growth of Selected Profile Groups in Winnipeg.Comparing Census 1981-1986: An Infokit, Statistics Canada 1986a.100-90-80-70-z 60---0 50-CC40-30-20-10-0^SINGLEPARENT I^1 9811986NATIVE VIS BLE^15-24 HUSBAND OTHERMINORITY YEARS OF & WIFE NO ETHNIC 25AGE CHILDREN AND OVERFig. 4.2. Percentage of Inner-City Households Below the Poverty Line, 1981-1986.Comparing Census 1981-1986: An Infokit, Statistics Canada 1986a.79Physically, the core area covered a large area of downtown that had deterioratedwith age and neglect. According to the 1981 census, forty percent of the housing stockwas formally classified as poor and needing repair. This was one of the highest incidentsof housing in poor condition relative to other Canadian cities. Additionally, 12,000households reported suffering affordability problems. Renter-occupied dwellings accountedfor a large portion of the housing stock; many of the units were owned by absenteelandlords. Over eighty-five percent of the renters with household incomes of less than$13,925 paid in excess of twenty-five percent of their monthly income in shelter costs(Winnipeg Core Area Initiative 1986a).This same area contained many turn-of-the-century commercial and warehousebuildings, largely under-utilized, and the eighty-acre Canadian National Railway East Yardssite, mainly unused. Suburban population growth and changing investment patterns leechedout the commercial value of these and other sites adjacent to the core. The historic centralbusiness district and the older neighbourhood commercial streets were most affected by thisshift to the suburbs -- their economic importance to the city was diminished significantly.Suburban development, in attracting economic activity away from the centre of thecity, affected employment opportunities for inner-city residents. The 1981 census reportedthat these residents were "one and two-thirds times more likely than the general labourforce to experience unemployment, and the Core Area labour force is significantly under-represented in managerial, teaching, clerical and sales occupations" (Winnipeg Core AreaInitiative 1986a, 2).In the larger context of distressed cities, a comparison of Winnipeg's inner city andthose of a number of other Canadian inner cities 9 displays some demographic80characteristics that set the City apart from the others. While the decline in Winnipeg'sinner-city population between 1971 and 1986 was not as severe as in other cities, thepopulation gain between 1981 and 1986 was one of the lowest. The population increasethat was realised was a result of an increase in non-family households and one-personhouseholds particularly amongst the twenty-five to forty-four age group. In addition, theincrease in single-parent families was one of the highest of all the cities surveyed and is adirect reflection of the growing Aboriginal community drawn to the inner city.Income, education and labour-force participation data showed that Winnipeg's innercity fell behind the other selected cities in growth and improvement. There were only twocities with a decrease in median income between 1970 and 1985; Winnipeg was one. Thedisparity between median incomes in Winnipeg's inner-city and non-inner-city was thegreatest of cities surveyed, due in part to the fact that the concentration of those withuniversity education was small but highly concentrated in the inner-city.' Winnipeg wasone of two cities surveyed where the university- educated population was lower in theinner city than in the non-inner city.From the beginning of the decade when the CAI was created, up to and includingthe mid-1980s, it would appear that the conditions in Winnipeg's inner city remained thesame or, in some cases, worsened. Statistics provided for the Community Inquiry IntoInner City Revitalization: Final Report (Community Inquiry Board 1990) by the SocialPlanning Council of Winnipeg and the Institute of Urban Studies (1990) show:Incidences of poverty, unemployment and lack of affordable housing were moresevere as of the mid-1980's than at the beginning of the decade. Moreover, thegaps between inner and non-inner city residents had widened on measures such asincome and employment. Among the most disadvantaged were the aboriginalpopulation and single-parent families. (Institute of Urban Studies 1990, A5.)81A significant factor in the continued economic decline of inner-city residents wasthe severity of the unemployment rates compared to the non-inner-city residents; inner-cityunemployment rose from 7.4 percent in 1981 to 12.4 percent in 1986 compared to a 2.5percent rise for non-inner-city residents. Inner city residents were less likely to have beenemployed in the previous year or to have worked for a continuous year. Hardest hit interms of labour-force participation were the Aboriginal population as a whole, butespecially youth and single parents; single parents as whole; and youth as a whole (seetable 4.2). On the other hand, visible minorities, recent immigrants and immigrants as awhole had a participation rate higher than the rest of the inner city.Table 4.2Labour Force Participation and Employment, 1986Group Participation Unemployment EmploymentRate Rate RateInner-city population 15+ 61.9% 12.4% 54.5%Non-inner-city population 15+ 69.9 7.0 65.1Inner-city aboriginal pop. 15+ 52.4 31.6 35.9Inner-city single parents 51.3 17.4 42.4Inner-city youth (15-24) 71.0 17.2 58.8Inner-city recent immigrants(15-24) 64.8 7.0 60.2Inner-city all recent immigrants n/a 10.0 n/aInner-city visible minorities n/a 10.0 n/aSources: Based on customised Statistics Canada census tables prepared for the SocialPlanning Council of Winnipeg; and Institute of Urban Studies, A Community Based NeedsConsultation of the Inner City: Summary Report (1990), Table 6, p. 19. Reported inCommunity Inquiry Board 1990, Al2.Unemployment, in addition to other factors, contributed to the fact that averageinner-city incomes were no more than three-fifths to two-thirds the incomes of non-inner82areas -- again, the most disadvantaged groups being the Aboriginal, single-parent and youthhouseholds (see table 4.3).The inner-city displayed a predictable gap in housing tenure and type whencompared to the non-inner-city areas (see table 4.4). Housing in the inner city comprisedpredominantly multi-family dwellings with two thirds of all inner-city residents beingrenters. Housing affordability for the inner city renters continued to be a problem in 1986with fifty-six percent paying twenty-five percent or more of their gross income on shelter;42.4 percent paying thirty percent or more. Single-parent, Aboriginal, elderly and youthhouseholds experienced the most severe affordability problems. This was due, in part, toloss of cheaper rental stock in the inner city available under the $200 rent range.Table 4.3Comparison of Selected Average Incomes in Winnipeg, 1980 and 1985Inner City (IC)Non-Inner City IC as %of Non-Aver.Inc. % ChangeGroup 1980 1985 % Change 1985 over 1980 IC/1985Census families $27,340 $26,680 -2.4% $41,011 +4.8% 65.1%Non-census familypersons 15+ 13,276 13,386 +0.8 16,252 -3.7 82.4All households 22,659 22,325 -1.5 36,529 +4.0 61.1Aboriginal house-holds n/a 13,913 n/a 26,609 n/a 52.3Single-parenthouseholds 19,049 16,909 -11.2. 25,798 +6.7 65.5Youth households(15-24 years) 15,561 14,038 -9.8 21,212 -4.1 66.2Seniors (65+) 17,467 19,031 +9.0 23,802 +5.4 80.0Source: Based on customized Statistics Canada census tables prepared for the Social Planning Council of Winnipeg. Reportedin Community Inquiry Board 1990, A13.84Table 4.4Housing Types and Tenure, 1986Category Inner City Non-Inner CityStructural TypeSingle detached 35.3% 65.2%Apt. 5+ storeys 24.0 10.0All others 40.7 24.8100.0 100.0TenureOwned 34.3 67.0Rented 65.7 33.0TOTAL 100.0 100.0Source: Based on customized Statistics Canada census tables prepared for the SocialPlanning Council of Winnipeg. Reported in Community Inquiry Board 1990, A16.4.4 The Creation of the CAIThe demographic, socio-economic and physical characteristics that differentiated thecore area of Winnipeg from its surrounding areas signalled a crisis in Winnipeg's innercity. The creation of the Winnipeg Core Area Initiative in 1981 was a political andprogrammatic response aimed at the revitalisation of the core with the general purpose to"plan, implement and co-ordinate programs and projects to revitalize the area and improveeconomic opportunities for its residents" (Winnipeg Core Area Initiative 1986a, 3).The political impetus for the creation of the CAI came from the federal level ofgovernment in the person of Lloyd Axworthy. Axworthy's riding included areas of thecity that were incorporated into the core-area boundaries. Axworthy was acutely aware85of the trends that had developed in the inner-city -- his institute had researched and writtenvolumes of material on the decay of the area and its attendant social problems. Herecognised an opportunity to revitalise the core area when the City was considering theSherbrook-McGregor overpass proposal in 1978. The overpass proposal was seen as analternative to relocating the CPR's marshalling rail yards which occupied a major portionof area in the inner city. Axworthy felt that the removal of the yards would be of dubiousbenefit in addition to being politically impossible and overly expensive. With the backingof federal political force, Axworthy pushed through a proposal to the City of Winnipeg andthe provincial government for a comprehensive revitalisation of Winnipeg's inner citywhereby the federal government would contribute $32 million provided that each of theother two levels would match dollars. A public announcement of the proposal was issuedin May 1980. It was under these circumstances that the CAI was originally justified by thefederal government as a potential instrument for regional economic development.Lloyd Axworthy, in one chapter of his book Towards a Just Society (Axworthy1990), discusses the CAI as a regional policy initiative of the last Trudeau governmentperiod beginning in 1980. Faced with increasing western alienation and problematicwestern energy and resource policies, the Trudeau government sought to reconcile westernCanada with a series of political and economic-development initiatives. In the periodbetween 1980 and 1984, Axworthy was the Minister of Employment and Immigration inthe Trudeau Cabinet. The new focus of regional development at the time was in localcommunity development. Axworthy had initiated a federally supported pilot programme oflocal economic development corporations through the Local Economic DevelopmentAgreements programme.86The CAI was Axworthy's demonstration project to show that the federalgovernment could be a major partner in community-level development. This was incontrast to the normal Canadian approach to economic development discussed in Chapter 3.In a personal interview (1991), Axworthy stated that he needed a "blueprint" or "cogentreason" for Trudeau in order to rationalise federal participation and funding for Winnipeg.In tandem with Herb Gray, the Minister responsible for the Department of RegionalEconomic Expansion, Axworthy worked out a strategy that was based on "good locationaltheory" to energise the core area with a targeted and co-ordinated investment strategyenough to create a critical mass of activity that would eventually spawn a second tier ofeconomic development. Axworthy states:This was not traditional urban renewal. The main rationale accepted by ourCabinet for underwriting this activity was that economic development could occurin Winnipeg only after it began tackling the deteriorating conditions of the innercity in a comprehensive way and began providing jobs for the in-migrating nativepopulation. It was felt that economic development of the city could proceed onlywith an integrated, combined effort by all levels of government to improve theenvironmental infrastructure, promote new enterprise, upgrade the level of skill ofindividuals and encourage a true sense of participation by local residents.(Axworthy 1990, 252.)Axworthy, in his interview, indicated that his model for the CAI was based on astrong community bias that he had acquired from his earlier American experiences withurban regeneration.' Even he acknowledged that the moment of creation for the CAIwas one of "pure serendipity" when he rose to the challenge presented to the three levels ofgovernment faced with the Sherbrook-McGregor overpass debate. 12 In a sense, this wasthe beginning of what has been referred to as "an unique constellation of people andevents" (Kiernan 1989) whereby intergovernmental collaboration and community87involvement were co-opted to focus on the common objective of improving the overalleconomic, social and physical environment of Winnipeg's core (see map 4.3 for the areadefined by the CAI boundaries).4.5 The Substantive Mandate of the CAI The creation of the first Winnipeg Core Area Initiative (1981-1986), and thesubsidiary agreement (1986-1991) was the experimental, and some believe far-sighted,intervention by the federal, provincial and municipal levels of government to jointlyrespond to the decline in Winnipeg's core area. In addition to investment in physicalinfrastructure, the CAI attempted to invest in human capital by targeting the needs of anincreasing number of disadvantaged groups who remain there. The CAI combined thethemes of economic development and training, with physical regeneration aimed atstrengthening inner city neighbourhoods into three basic objectives that formed the mandateof CAI I and CAI II:(1) Economic development to stimulate investment, employment and economicgrowth by focusing public investment in selected key sites in order to lever andconcentrate private investment;(2) Employment and training to enhance the educational and employmentprospects of inner city residents, particularly those belonging to majordisadvantaged groups facing chronic unemployment; and(3) Strengthening inner-city neighbourhoods to revitalize those neighbourhoodsthrough the provision of new and rehabilitated housing as well as the provision ofcommunity facilities and services. (Winnipeg Core Area Policy Committee 1981.)88The ForksThe Exchange DistrictNeighbourhood ImprovementsCore Area Initiative BoundaryNeighbourhood Main StreetsMap 4.3 CAI I Boundaries: Winnipeg Core Area Initiative, Canada-Manitoba-WinnipegTripartite Agreement for the Winnipeg Core Area (Winnipeg: Public InformationProgramme, 1981).89In the first five-year term, the CAI used a $96 million tri-level core budget for awide range of activities, over one thousand projects, strategically targeted at a ten-squaremilearea of the inner city. In 1986, the subsidiary agreement (CAI II) approved anadditional $100 million for a similarly complex array of programmes and complimentaryinitiatives (see tables 4.5 and 4.6). The rationale for renewal of the agreement was to buildon the accomplishments and lessons learned from the first agreement and to respond to theunmet demand for redevelopment. As such, the objectives of CAI II were further clarifiedand became modified versions of the original goals including:(1) Stimulating investment, employment and economic growth; (2) Supporting thephysical, economic and social revitalization of inner city neighbourhoods; and (3)Maximizing the impact of physical and social investment on core arearevitalization by providing strong central coordination amongst projects. (WinnipegCore Area Initiative 1986a)4.6 The Tri-level Model The tri-level model used as the basis for CAI I and CAI II set out the underlyingarrangement and set of principles through which the three levels of government were boundto each other and to their common goal of revitalisation. The overriding principle ofequality in decision-making and cost-sharing was one of the model's unique features. Thetwo CAI agreements provide the model, with its specific form, functions, attributes andauthority. The model attempted to approach complex urban problems on an holistic basisattacking the social, economic and physical needs of the inner city simultaneously.Programme delivery was intended to be carried out in a mutually supportive manner suchthat all programmes achieved interwoven goals within programmes individually andcollectively.90Table 4.5Cost Shared Programmes, CAI IProgrammeNumber^Programme Name Budget ($ x 1M)1^Employment and affirmative action 9.5002^Housing 13.0623^Community improvement area 5.8704^Community facilities 6.0005^Community service 5.3006^Industrial dev./small business assist. 11.9387^North Portage/Ellice revitalisation 13.18 & 3.0158^C.N.R. east yards 8.1019^Historic Winnipeg 4.90010^Neighbourhood main streets 4.40511-13 Mgt., consultation, public information 5.427Total^$96 M.Source: Adapted from Stewart Clatworthy, Summaries of the Final Evaluations: WinnipegCore Area Agreement, 1981-1986 (Management Board of the Winnipeg Core Area Initiative,February 1988).91Table 4.6Cost-Shared Programmes, CAI IISector I Entrepreneurial and strategic site development Budget ($ x 1M)Program 1^Industrial and entrepreneurial support 4.0 m2^Exchange district redevelopment 9.0 m3^East yard redevelopment 20.0 m4^Riverbank enhancement 5.0 m5^Strategic capital projects 13.0 mSubtotal 51.0 mSector II^Neighbourhood and community revitalisationProgram 6^Neighbourhood and community development 16.0 m7^Inner-city foundation 1.0 m8^Housing 10.5 m9^Training and employment 12.0 m10^Neighbourhood main st. & small business 5.0 mSubtotal 44.5 mSector III^Management and co-ordinationProgram 11^Central administration 2.8 m12 Public information and programming 1.3 m13 Evaluation 4.0 mSubtotal 4.5 mTotal $100.0 MSource: Winnipeg Core Area Initiative Canada-Manitoba Subsidiary Agreement for theDevelopment of the Winnipeg Core Area, 1986b, Schedule B.92Table 4.7Implementing JurisdictionsProgramme Jurisdiction1 Industrial and entrepreneurial support Canada2 Exchange district redevelopment Winnipeg3 East yard redevelopment Canada4 Riverbank enhancement Manitoba/Winnipeg5 Strategic capital projects Canada/Manitoba/Winnipeg6 Neighbourhood and communityrevitalisation Manitoba/Winnipeg7 Inner city foundation Winnipeg8 Housing Canada/Manitoba/Winnipeg9 Training and employment Manitoba10 Neighbourhood main streets and smallbusiness supportWinnipeg11 Central administration Canada12 Public information and programming Canada/Manitoba/Winnipeg13 Evaluation CanadaSource: Winnipeg Core Area Initiative 1986c, Canada-Manitoba-Winnipeg TripartiteAgreement for the Winnipeg Core Area, Schedule F.4.6.1 CAI Delivery and Management StructureImplementation of the CAI model's activities was through structures directly relatedto the decision-making and management within the model itself (internal structures) and tothose responsible for the co-ordination and management of activities of the three governingjurisdictions (external structure) (see table 4.7). Internal StructuresInternal structures were guided by the fundamental principle of tri-lateralism andincluded the Policy Committee, the Management Board, co-ordinators, the Core AreaOffice, and programme advisory committees (see figure 4.3). Each of the programmes hadGovernment ofCanadaGovernment ofManitobaGovernment ofWinnipegCore Area^ManagementOffice BoardAgreementCoordinatorsCanada Manitoba WinnipegProgram Managers (Implementing Jurisdictions)GovernmentDepartmentDirect DeliveryContractedDeliveryAgenciesGovernmentDepts. Compl.Progs.rPolicyCommitteeSect.EvaluationFig. 4.3. CM I Agreement Structure. Adapted from Winnipeg Core Area Initiative, Mid-Term Program Evaluations prepared by Stewart Clatworthy for the CAI Policy Committee,April 1985.9394a programme/project authorisation component that established actions and criteria fordecisions by the programme advisory committees as well as an "implementing jurisdiction"designation defining one or more levels of government directly responsible for thatprogramme's delivery.The overall management and direction of the two agreements was by the PolicyCommittee, consisting of senior representatives from the three levels of government; aprincipal federal minister, the minister of Urban Affairs for the Province, and the mayor ofthe City of Winnipeg acting on behalf of the City Council. With the exception of theStrategic Capital Programme in CAI II, the Policy Committee did not have directinvolvement in the approval of specific projects (see figure 4.4 for the CAI organisationalchart).Direct involvement was through another tri-level senior management board, whichsupplied operational supervision and management. Unanimity on all issues was required ofthe Management Board or the issue had to be raised to the attention of the PolicyCommittee. Agreement co-ordinators appointed by each of the three jurisdictions acted asinformation and liaison representatives between the Management Board and programmemanagers. The Co-ordinators Sub-Committee of the Management Board acted together toclarify jurisdictional issues and to coordinate programming and activities.The Core Area Office, whose manager chaired both the Policy Committee and theManagement Board, delivered the majority of the model's programme activities and co-ordinated the programme delivery through the various line departments of the three levelsof government. It also consulted with individuals, non-governmental organisations, privateCo-ordinatorsResource CommitteeNeighbourhood ServicesAdvisory CouncilWINNIPEG CORE AREA INITIATIVE1986-1991 AGREEMENTPolicy CommitteeManagement BoardGeneral ManagementORGANIZATIONAL CHARTSECTOR IIIArchitectural /development ManagerCommunications Sub-Committee Evaluation Sub-CommitteeI I II  I 113Program Review Committee Program Review CommitteeRiverbankEnhancementIntergovernmental Committe, Housing Sub-CommitteeHousingProgram Review CommitteeAdvisory CommitteeProgram Review CommitteeIndustrial Development11Elected Resident's CouncilNeighbourhood Facilities6.1Grant for HomeOwnershipSECTOR IIHousing DevelopmentI jHousiorHRalory)ation^grjRental UnitRepairProgram Resource Network SECTOR IAdvisory CouncilgliRenovationAdministrationIllitungradingc!dc(CARUMP)Native Program Co-ordinator Central AdministrationFig. 4.4. CAI Organization Chart: Internal document reprinted, with permission, from J. August, Winnipeg Core Area Office96investors and public agencies on behalf of the Initiative. The Core Area Office provided asecretariat function to the Policy Committee, Management Board and other committees.Programme advisory committees consisting of governmental and non-governmentrepresentatives planed and selected projects implemented through the cost-sharing model.These committees were the major vehicle for direct citizen involvement and represented thepoint at which the programme "deliverers" and the programme "users" had an opportunityto interact.Programme managers represented the final programme delivery responsibility ofeach government jurisdiction to which their programme was assigned. Programmemanagers operated within their implementing jurisdictions to government departments viadirect delivery of programmes, contract delivery agents, and government departmentsdelivering complementary programs.Evaluation of the entire agreement including delivery structure was done on aregular basis by contractual external evaluators. External StructuresIn order for the tri-level model to operate in a co-ordinated manner it was necessarythat each level of government communicate and respond within their own sphere andbetween that of the other two. To facilitate this, each jurisdiction designated a singledepartment to be the principal line department responsible for decision-making, action orreaction to the varied activities arising from the tripartite model. The Government ofCanada's responsibilities were managed in the second agreement through WesternDiversification. The provincial government was represented through Urban Affairs with an97Interdepartmental Committee providing support when the activities of other departmentswere required. The Department of Environmental Planning co-ordinated the activities forthe City of Winnipeg, however, when an issue involved more than one municipaldepartment, any one or all, of the senior bodies may have been called upon; the Board ofCommissioners, the Planning and Community Services Committee, or City Council. The Financing StructureIn addition to equality in decision-making, the tri-level model required that eachgovernment partner have an equal share in the financing of the CAI's programmes. Thismeant that each level of government had a direct financial and therefore legal interest inevery programme. However, the nature and degree of financial commitment changedbetween the first and second agreements. In CAI I, each level had a one-third share in thecost of every programme, whereas in CAI II there was a variable cost-sharing ratio usedthroughout the range of programmes. In the first agreement, the federal obligation was metthrough DREE which had, as a mandate of regional, disparity relief. In the secondagreement, seven departments shared financial obligations according to the nature anddegree that specific programmes fell within their mandate. The City of Winnipeg and theManitoba government shared equally in the difference left by the federal government ineach programme. This change in the fmancial structure between CAI I and CAI II causedcertain bureaucratic shifts to occur in so far as the federal government tended to play a"hands off" role in the first agreement, whereas there was more direct involvement by allseven departments in CAI II.984.6.2 The Role of the CommunityThe community of Winnipeg in general, and the resident and businessrepresentatives of the core area in particular, were invited to have input into the proposedCAI before it was signed in 1981. This is not to suggest, however, that communityinvolvement was solicited in the development of the model's strategy or managementsystem. Perhaps it was the complexity of the CAI Agreement structure and the desire tohave programmes in place to take advantage of this unexpected source of funding thatcould be used to explain the lack of community involvement in these important earlystages of the Initiative. Nonetheless, each level of government undertook a series ofinformal meetings with inner-city service agencies to solicit ideas related to potentialprogramming. There was also substantial interest-group lobbying of the Policy Committeein attempts to secure support for various proposed capital projects such as the Chinatowndevelopment. During the five-year term of the first agreement, the Public InformationProgramme allowed a budget of $1,700,000 for promotional and public education oroutreach activities intended to raise public visibility for the model. Public hearings wereheld toward the end of Agreement I to determine priorities for the renewal of the CAI. Inaddition, several public-attitude and perception studies were carried out during the 1981-1986 term, giving the programme managers a feeling for the effectiveness of programmesfrom a variety of community perspectives.In CAI II, community involvement was most apparent in the interest-group lobbyingof the Policy Committee members. The new Strategic Capital Programme was believed tobe a direct result of these lobbying efforts for major capital project assistance dollars.Meaningful community involvement did occur in the delivery of programmes, either at the99programme-submission stage, or through community representation on the programmeadvisory committees. In the second agreement, the public relations activities were reducedsomewhat and the budget dropped to $1.3 million. Initiatives went to support publiceducation related to the continued and ongoing benefits of the CAI and downtownrevitalisation, and to fund informal hearings to assess community reaction.Throughout the CAI I, and to a lesser degree in CAI II, citizen participation wasencouraged in specific programme areas. Community groups and service organizations,especially Aboriginal groups, were funded in order to help them have input into variousprogrammes. For a variety of reasons, several community initiatives proposed by LloydAxworthy did not materialize. In a personal interview (March 1991) Axworthy expressedregret that community participation and empowerment was weak, especially as the CAIbecame more bureaucratised. In CAI I, Axworthy pushed for a community developmentcorporation, which did not materialise and, in the second CAI, he recommended a form ofdowntown development bank to facilitate community organizations to "do their own thing"-- this also was rejected. Assisted by Axworthy's department, the Native DowntownDevelopment Corporation was specifically funded, but Axworthy claimed that it "did notwork out." The business communities in targeted areas of the core had varying degrees ofsuccess in participation in the small business and key site-development programmes. Localdevelopment corporations were set up to assist in decisions related to dispersal ofprogramme resources.Overall, throughout the decade spanned by CAI I and CAI II, community involvementpeaked and waned with the most significant input at the Programme Advisory Committeelevel. A more thorough assessment of the community role in the CAI and an evaluation of100the CAI's ability and desire to respond to community interests will be undertaken in thelast two chapters of this dissertation. Meanwhile, it is sufficient to say that communityinvolvement in the initiation and implementation of this urban revitalisation strategy waslow.4.7 CAI I and CAI II: Programmes and Evaluations 4.7.1 Agreement IThe overall goals of the CAI were interwoven through thirteen cost-sharedprogrammes organized into three sectors. Sector 1, through five programmes, addressedemployment and training opportunities, housing and community improvement, andcommunity services, facility expansion and upgrading. Sector 2, through five moreprogrammes, addressed economic growth and development and employment creation.Sector 3 had three programmes dealing with the management and delivery of theAgreement (see Appendix II for programme names, budget and expenditures, and summaryof results).In addition to the thirteen programmes that were cost-shared equally by the threelevels of government out of the first $96 million budget, there were complementaryprogrammes that involved additional funding. The primary source of complementaryfunding came from the Canada Employment and Immigration Commission, the CanadaMortgage and Housing Corporation and the Manitoba Housing and Renewal Corporation.In addition to these major sources, funding was obtained from numerous department withinall three levels of government, non-government and non-profit organizations, and privatebusinesses.1014.7.2 Final Evaluations and Outputs of CAI IEvaluation reports were prepared by external consultants throughout the operatingtime of Agreement 1 (see Appendix III for a complete listing of evaluation products).There were evaluation assessments carried out from 1982 to 1983 on selected programmes,a base-line study on conditions within the core area in 1986, and mid-term evaluationsfrom 1984 through 1985. Four thematic evaluations were carried out in 1986. Finalevaluations covered the four major programme areas in 1987 as well as two management-information systems reports. A summary of the final evaluations was prepared for theManagement Board and the Policy Committee in 1988 (Winnipeg Core Area Initiative1988). The Management Board received the final evaluation from the contractedconsultant and, while not necessarily agreeing with all of the conclusions, forwarded themto the Policy Committee. The evaluations covered: Employment and Affirmative Action,Housing and Community Improvement Areas, Community Services and Facilities, andEconomic Stimulus!'4.71.1 Employment and Affirmative Action ProgrammesThe Employment and Affirmative Action Programmes consisted of five sub-programmes, one of which was the result fo a specially-created Training and EmploymentAgency. As of March 31, 1987 the five sub-programmes provided training opportunitiesfor 1,413 individuals and job placement for 634 individuals in permanent employment(Winnipeg Core Area Initiative 1988). This represented roughly forty percent of the CAI IAgreement's target for training and approximately twenty percent of the target for jobplacement. While these results were assessed by the consultant to be of "modest success"102(their lack of success was due, in part, to the recession starting in 1982) the results weredisappointing in attempting to integrate these programmes with other programmes of theAgreement. For example, job placement in the construction industry as a result of theHousing and Community Improvement Areas Programme was very low because of analready high unemployment rate faced by the housing industry in the early 1980s. Despitethis, each of five sub-programmes achieved some degree of success in increasing theparticipation of core-area residents with special needs. Tables 4.8 and 4.9 show that themajority of the programme's benefits accrued to core area residents (81.4% of the traineesand 79.4% of the job placements went to core area residents) with less than grade eleveneducation and to those groups targetted by the Agreement (for example native core arearesidents). It was the Training and Employment Agency that was responsible for ninety-three percent of the training opportunities and eighty-two percent of the placementpositions.In terms of project investment in the Employment and Affirmative ActionProgrammes, the cost-shared Agreement funds constituted the significant majority of totalinvestment (sixty-two percent). Other government programme resources, particularly theCanadian Employment and Immigration Commission (CEIC) and provincial complementaryprogrammes supplied the bulk of the funding ($8.3 million), with investment by themunicipal government and the private sector being minimal (see figure 4.5). As discussedin the later chapters of this dissertation, Lloyd Axworthy was particularly disappointed inthe lack of contribution by the City of Winnipeg and the private sector in the areas of jobtraining and placement. With few exceptions (for example Western Glove Manufacturing103Table 4.8Distribution of Trainees by Target Group Characteristics (CAI I)Target Group Characteristic^ Percent of Trainees Core Residents^ 81.4%Unemployed 80.4%o 11 Grades Education 19.6%Native^ 45.3%Immigrant 22.9%Single Parent 25.1%Youth^ 27.1%Disabled 2.9%Source: Adapted from Winnipeg Core Area Initiative, Mid-Term Program Evaluationsprepared by Stewart Clatworthy for the CAI Policy Committee, April 1985.Table 4.9Distribution of Placements in Employment by Target Group Characteristics (CAI I)Target Group Characteristic^Percent of Trainees Core Residents^ 79.4%Unemployed 80.7511 Grades Education 24.6%Native^ 37.7%Immigrant 17.1%Single Parent 22.5%Youth^ 24.8%Disabled 1.6%Source: Adapted from Winnipeg Core Area Initiative, Mid-Term Program Evaluationsprepared by Stewart Clatworthy for the CAI Policy Committee, April 1985.Municipal1.5%104Fig. 4.5. Distribution of Investment to the Employment Program by Investment to March31, 1987. S. Clatworthy, Summaries of the Final Evaluations: Winnipeg Core AreaAgreement 1981-1986. Prepared for the Management Board, February 1988, A13.Note: Data for Training and Employment Agency to August 31, 1987105Company), the private sector neither contributed funding to this programme nor providedpermanent job placements at the end of the programme period.The final evaluation points out that these programmes initiated very little new jobcreation within the core area. The programme did, however, prepare core-area residents foremployment within the existing labour market and contributed to a redistribution of jobs,especially to the high-needs population groups. Nonetheless, "unemployment among thecore area residents remains roughly twice that of the non-core residents," and "employmentconditions continue to lag well behind those of non-core residents" (A17). It would also befair to say that the employment placements achieved did little to contribute to the originalaim of increasing opportunities for core-area residents in managerial, clerical and otherwhite-collar jobs.4.71.2 Housing and Community Improvement Area ProgrammesThe Core Area Initiative from the outset determined that neighbourhoodrevitalisation was critical to the broader redevelopment strategy of the core area. TheHousing and Community Improvement Area Programmes were devoted specifically to re-establishing "viable and stable neighbourhoods" and "encouraging return migration to thearea" (B1). The final evaluation suggests a high degree of success in this sector, so muchso that the Initiative "represents one of the largest and most ambitious neighbourhoodsrevitalisation efforts undertaken in a Canadian city" (B4). Resident attitudes andperceptions, measured at various times through Agreement I, reflect more positive attitudesto programs in this area than to any other sectors of the Agreement.106Of all of the major programme areas in the Initiative, the Housing and CommunityImprovement Area Programmes are rated as the most successful. Complementary fundingfrom the federal and provincial governments was more extensive than anticipated, andnearly all the programme goals were achieved or exceeded. As of December 1986, thehome-repair programme had assisted 6,177 households, exceeding its target. 14 Thehousing programme produced 484 new housing units; 300 hundred owner-occupied and184 non-profit units. It acquired and renovated or converted 209 units. Structuralinspections resulted in improvements of 1,100 units. The benefits from these programmesdid meet the goals of assisting those with housing deficiencies, especially the elderly andlow-income households, and the Aboriginal population.Research studies carried out in the late 1970s by the Institute of Urban Studies atthe University of Winnipeg and by the Province of Manitoba in work on the City ofwinnipeg development-plan review (referred to earlier in this chapter) and co-operativeurban research doncuted earlier with the MSUA (referred to in the previous chapter)highlighted the long-standing trends that contributed to the decline of Winnipeg's core areaneighbourhoods and to the inner-city residential base. The sheer volume of projects neededto substantially improve the inner city was large, however a 1.2 percent increase in unitsadded to the housing stock within the boundary was considered by the evaluator to besignificant, because this area had lost "close to 2,000 units during the previous 15 years"(B7). Improvements through renovation or partial renovation were made to about thirty-nine percent of housing stock identified as needing repair in the 1981 census. Though the400 units of subsidised housing was small relative to need, the Non-Profit Housing107Programme made a substantial contribution to the affordability problem of moderatelypriced family accommodation.Subsidy stacking of the Agreement and complementary programmes were seen asthe reason for the success of this sector. Debate continues as to whether the investment inthis sector would have occurred without the Agreement. Private investments contributed$58.949 million, largely made possible through government loans and loan guarantees.Federal and provincial contributions were substantial, while direct municipal contributionswere modest.The employment impact of the Housing and Community Improvement AreaProgrammes was important (see table 4.10). Much of the success of the Employment andAffirmative Action Programme can be traced to programme-delivery and management-related jobs and to construction employment from this programme.4.71.3 Community Facilities and Services ProgrammesThe ultimate objective of these programmes within the Initiative was "to providefinancial contributions toward the cost of new or expanded community facilities andservices required during the life of the Agreement to facilitate the participation of core-arearesidents in social, multi-cultural and economic development opportunities" (C2). Theoperational goals of the programmes under this sector, as with all the other programmes ofthe Initiative, were based upon objectives of relieving disparities for core residents,removing barriers and providing services and facilities that were unique to the needs ofcore residents. The evaluations indicated that these broad objectives were met; however,the programmes were "somewhat less than successful in providing for facilities and108Table 4.10Housing and Community Improvement Area ProgrammesFunds Levered and Employment ImpactProgram Programme Name Dollars EmploymentNumber Levered Years2.1 and 2.2 Home Repair $20m private 100 person yrs2.3 Home Ownership $18m compl. 250 person yrs2.4.1 to .4 Non-Profit 46 trained &2.4.3 Wpg Rehab. Corp $5.9m compl. employed2.4.5 to .6 Non-Profit Assist. $11.7m compl. 164 person yrs2.5 CARUMP $5.9m compl. 211 person yrs150 person yrsSource: Adapted from Final Status Report: Programme Activities to September 30, 1987under the 1981-1986 Core Agreement (Winnipeg Core Area Initiative, 1988), 24-31.services which directly remove barriers to employment or which develop new opportunitiesfor employment for core residents" (C5) (see table 4.11).In accessing resources from outside the Agreement, this sector achievedconsiderable success, particularly from the private sector. Of the $24.6 million in externalfunds, $16.2 million came from the private sector, while $8.3 million was from governmentgrants and subsidies. Private foundations, service organizations and project sponsorscontributed to the private investment pool. Again, only a portion (fifty-two percent) of theplacements through this programme went to core residents; however, many of the projectswere expected to be ongoing when the Agreement funds expired, theoretically opening thedoors of opportunity to core residents.109Table 4.11Community Facilities and Services ProgrammesFunds Levered and Employment ImpactProgram Programme Name Dollars EmploymentNumber Levered Impact3 Comm. Improv. Areas $1.5m compl. 94 person years4 Comm. Facilities $26m compl. 384 person years5 Comm. Services $3.0m compl. 271 employmentsSource: Adapted from Final Status Report: Programme Activities to September 30, 1987under the 1981-1986 Core Agreement (Winnipeg Core Area Initiative 1988), 34- Economic Stimulus ProgrammesCentral to Agreement I were the objectives of enhanced economic growth anddevelopment, increased employment, and the physical improvement of the core area. TheEconomic Stimulus Programmes were to meet this objective through "targeted delivery ofgoods and services to "key sites" (Dl). The overall objectives of Sector II were toencourage new economic growth and employment opportunities and to stimulate privateinvestment in key sites. The programmes did achieve considerable success when measuredby dollars leveraged by the Agreement. These programmes stimulated over $50 million inkey-site investment by private and non-profit sources, and were especially successful in theNorth Ellice area, the Exchange District and Chinatown. Evaluation suggested only"modest" achievements in the Logan, Osborne, Provencher, Selkirk and Main St. areas.The Management Board, in their response to the final evaluation in this Sector disagreedwith the evaluation and felt that it was "overly critical of the successes and outputs of theSmall Business Assistance Programme, North Ellice and Neighbourhood Main StreetsDevelopment" (D3).110The evaluation of this sector's programmes was the most extensive of the finalevaluations. A synopsis of the main programmes revealed the following:1. Industrial Development: Programme 6.8 (budget $4 million). Key siteconcentration in the Logan area failed in its initial programme design and experiencedfailure in implementation and timing. The programmes intended job-creation target waswell below initial projections, produced jobs outside the designated key sites, and did notmeet job-content targets. There was one notable success in the industrial developmentprogramme -- Western Glove Works Ltd., a manufacturer of jeans and casual wear. Thefirm relocated, expanded and spent an additional $1.5 million on computerisation andautomation as a result of a $1.7 million CAI grant. It produced 197 jobs, of which fortywere affirmative-action placements. The plant was used as an affirmative action trainingfacility and a day care centre for forty children.2. DRIE Complementary Programs. These programmes were more cost-effectiveand efficient than the Core Area Industrial Development Programme but achieved moresuccess with already existing businesses.3. Small Business Assistance: Programme 6.9 (budget $2.82 million). Thisprogramme provided financial contributions and counselling/referral services to smallbusinesses in nine key site areas: (1) Heritage; (2) Logan; (3) Selkirk; (4) North Portage;(5) Provencher; (6) Main Street; (7) Chinatown; (8) Osborne Street; and (9) adjacent areasto key sites. For the most part, restaurant and night-club facilities received the largestamounts of funding and promised the creation of the most jobs (for example the RorieStreet Marble Club, a disco, was awarded $25,000 toward the cost of a $340,000renovation with twenty-five jobs to be created). This programme may have stemmed the111tide of further decline for small businesses in the core; however, "an unintended effect mayhave been a diversion of investment from the surrounding areas outside the key sites,resulting in a 'patchwork' of improved and 'depleted' zones" (D7). It appears that thephysical upgrading of businesses was moderately successful; however many of these firmsindicated that they would have had to make these improvements sooner or later.Management assistance and business planning was not addressed adequately.4. North Ellice - Programme 6.9 (budget $3,014,500). This programme was mostsuccessful with respect to physical redevelopment by replacing "virtually all of the derelecthousing units" (D8) and by creating streetscaping. Newly constructed or renovated housingand extensive works projects associated with the extension of Central Park contributed toapproximately 273 person-years of construction employment and approximately 17.6percent of complementary funding, primarily delivered through CMHC. The area was notlarge enough, however, to reverse general out-migration trends, change tenure types, orattract new residential construction.5. Historic Winnipeg: Programme 9 (budget $4.9 million). This programme madesignificant progress in the physical preservation of designated structures. The retail baseand attendant tourism attraction has yet to be measured; however, the positive perceptionsof non-residents toward the Exchange District has been a major breakthrough. TheExchange District was established to encourage ongoing participation of businesses in thearea.6. Neighbourhood Main Streets: Programme 10 (budget $4,405,000). Thisprogramme had mixed success, and the evaluator felt that there was only incrementalchange in the "more removed" Selkirk and Provencher key sites, little achievement in the112Main Street site, and site-specific success in the higher potential, politically visibleChinatown and Osborne areas. Again, the physical renewal of buildings, streetscaping, andoutdoor spaces were viewed positively, but there was little evidence to suggest a change incommercial activity, a change in consumer purchasing patterns, or stabilisation ofneighbourhoods. The dependency issue was raised with respect to the Chinatown area inso far as it had not become self-sustaining as planned. Flaws with many of theprogrammes appeared to be related to mismatched and unrealistic objectives, inadequatefunding, and negative citizen participation through the resident Local DevelopmentCorporations. There was no consensus by the private sector as to the most effectiveincentive for investment.4.7.3 Agreement IIBased on the considerable success of Agreement I, and drawing on lessons learnedfrom it, the CAI was renewed for an additional five years: 1986 to 1991. Funding of thetripartite Agreement set an additional maximum expenditure for each level of governmentat $33 million. The overall goal was similar to that of the first agreement -- to revitalizethe city centre and surrounding areas, and in doing so bring people back to the centre,making it a good place to live and work. The objectives of Agreement II were similar to,and integrated in the same way as, those of Agreement I. The Agreement was organizedagain into three sectors: Sector I -- Entrepreneurial and Strategic Site Development; SectorII -- Neighbourhood and Community Revitalisation; and Sector III -- Management and Co-ordination. These three sectors again comprised thirteen sub-programmes. The physicalboundaries for the second agreement were extended somewhat to take into consideration re-113focused programme objectives and political considerations (see Appendix IV forprogrammes, budgets and expenditures as of March 31, 1992).In addition to the cost-shared programmes of Agreement II, complementaryprogrammes and funding were undertaken by: the federal government through EmploymentServices (Canada Employment and Immigration Commission), Housing (CMHC),Community Involvement (Secretary of State), Cultural Involvement (Department ofCommunications), Industrial Development/Tourism (DRIE); and the provincial governmentthrough Manitoba Jobs Fund, Manitoba Housing and Renewal, Manitoba RiverbankRenewal, Manitoba Business Development and Tourism, and Provincial Facilities. Theminimum total expenditure provided by this complementary funding was expected to be$36.8 million (see table 4.12).Table 4.12Investment in Core Area Projects (as of December 31, 1991)114Other federal funds * $ 17,136,320Other provincial funds * 10,040,909Other municipal funds * 9,654,576Total other government funds 36,831,807Repayable government loans 36,207,430Private 57,351,286Total $130 390 523* In addition to Core Area Initiative cost-shared funds.Source: Final Status Report of Programs and Projects to December 31, 1991 (WinnipegCore Area Initiative 1992) iii-iv.The renewed agreement made some shifts of focus as a result of the first agreement.The Training and Employment Programme, through its own agency, was the only majorprogramme carried on within the employment sector but created an affirmative actionstrategy and a steering committee to monitor and oversee measures across the breadth ofthe Agreement (intended to account for one of the weaknesses of the first agreement). Thenew Neighbourhood and Community Development Programme was intended to build uponthe success of the former programme but focused more in key neighbourhoods within thecore area boundary. The former Community Facilities and Services Programme was rolledinto the Neighbourhood and Community Development Programme, providing a totalprogramme budget of $16 million. The Economic Stimulus Programmes of Agreement I,which received the most criticism from the final evaluation, were to be more tailored,focused and co-ordinated, and directly delivered through the Core Area Initiative Office.1154.7.4 Evaluations and Outputs of CAI IIAs was the case for CAI I, evaluations were done throughout the agreement period;however, they took the form of programme progress-and-status reports. The finalevaluations of CAI II had not been prepared, although there was an evaluation of thetripartite model produced in October 1990 (Clatworthy and Leskiw 1990).'5 Thefollowing is a brief summary of the outputs of the first and renewed agreements accordingto Clatworthy's model report as of June 1990 in the three theme areas: (1) economicstimulus; (2) housing, community and neighbourhood development; and (3) affirmativeaction. Economic StimulusThe economic stimulus initiatives took the form of incentives and assistance forindustrial and commercial expansion, business marketing and promotion for local anddowntown districts, and financial and planning assistance for new and existing private andnon-profit entrepreneurs and corporations. Included in this package of programmes wasassistance in support of the formation of major redevelopment corporations including theNorth Portage Development and the Forks Renewal Corporation. There was also assistanceavailable for municipal infrastructure improvement in selected commercial districts.Combined, the first and second agreements produced:1. assistance to 630 individual projects;2. $87.5 million of cost-shared Agreement funds;3. a total value of economic stimulus projects of >$400 million including NorthPortage and the Forks Renewal;1164. approximately $242 million of private sector resources;5. the creation of roughly 4,440 person-years of construction employment and2,250 permanent jobs. (Clatworthy and Leskiw 1990, 87-89.)Despite the highly visible success of some of these initiatives, critics have claimedthat this sector failed to meet its initial objective of attracting manufacturing and high-technology industry. As well, it failed to secure large-scale affirmative-action hiring ofcore-area residents in permanent jobs created under the economic developmentprogrammes. Lloyd Axworthy, in his interview (March 1991), suggested that this was onehis largest disappointments. Housing, Community and Neighbourhood RevitalisationThe Housing, Community and Neighbourhood Revitalisation sector produced highlyvisible contributions to inner city revitalisation, especially in the housing, and thecommunity and neighbourhood physical-improvement projects. Grants, forgivable loansand planning assistance contributed to repair, renovation, conversion and purchase ofexisting housing, as well as direct assistance for new construction. Similarly, grants andother forms of assistance provided support for municipal infrastructure, community-basedfacilities and services, social and recreation services and a new education/servicesprogramme directed at inner-city children and youth. Combined, CAI I and CAI IIproduced:1. construction or conversion of more than 1,250 units of housing and renovationof more than 7,000 units;2. $137 million of housing projects undertaken with $17 million of tripartite support;1173. government funding of $60 million and private-sector investment of more than$61 million;4. 397 community- and neighbourhood-revitalisation projects, including 297projects sponsored by community-based groups or organizations;5. 100 projects involving municipally owned facilities or infrastructure;6. $62 million of projects in the community- and neighbourhood- revitalisationprogramme sector, with $19 million being cost-shared trilaterally7. roughly $17 million if government funding and $26 million in privateinvestment;8. the community- and neighbourhood-revitalisation sector contributed to morethan 540 person-years of construction employment and 558 non-constructionjobs primarily in the social-service area. (Clatworthy and Leskiw 1990, 89-92.)The visible aspects of the housing- and neighbourhood-revitalisation sectors receivedmuch positive response in resident and non-resident attitudes and is one positive aspectunderlined in the Community Inquiry Into Inner-City Revitalisation: Final Report(Community Inquiry Board 1990). One of the major concerns of both the social-servicedelivery agencies, and latently governments, is the dependencies for ongoing financialsupport that have been created in the community by the CAI assistance to date. Employment and Affirmative ActionWhile employment and affirmative action was an inherent element in many of theprogramme elements of CAI I and II, specific initiatives were designed to reduce barriersto employment and training for core-area residents. These included occupational training118programmes; adult pre-employment, literacy and language training; employment preparationservices; and assistance with job placement. These activities were in support of the CEICregular activities. As of June 1990, the Employment and Affirmative Action programmingproduced:1. roughly $25.7 million for 125 employment/training projects valued at $38.3million;2. $11.7 million of government funding and $5.8 million of private resources;3. more than 3,260 training opportunities for inner city residents with specialneeds;4. 1,700 individuals that completed training programmes and greater than 1,110graduates placed in employment. (Clatworthy and Leskiw 1990, 92-93.)There is no doubt that the two CAI agreements produced tangible benefits for anumber of core area residents. The Community Inquiry Report (Community Inquiry Board1990, 5) specifically commends the CAI for success in the education and training fields, somuch so that in the event of there not being a third CAI, the report recommends using theCAI model for a future community-based employment agency. The major disappointmentin the Employment and Affirmative Action sector perhaps has to do with raisedexpectations. Without attributing fault, both CAI I and CAI II may have raised the hopesand expectations of Winnipegers' for employment beyond the level that could realisticallybe delivered given the nature of the local and national economic climate, the politicalmilieu of Winnipeg, and the historical stability of the Winnipeg business community.1194.7.5 Summary of the Evaluations of CAI I and CAI IIIn many cases the real "products" of the two agreements defy measurement. Thelong-term economic effects of programmes are difficult to measure because of the shortperiod of time elapsed and the scale of both agreements. In some cases, agreementobjectives were not clearly defined nor were there pre-existing scales of measurement forcomparison. For example, in attempting to measure if the CAI was successful in drawingresidents back to the core area, there was a small population gain from 1984 to 1986 forthe first time in fifteen years; however, there were no records taken of the type of peoplewho came back, or their retention factor. It is possible that the gain may well have been ina further increase of disadvantaged groups, and the gain, in and of itself, could not bemeasured as positive or negative. However, the community-services and employment-training areas were viewed by residents and non-residents as a direct success of the CAI,despite the fact the long-term effects of these programmes will not be known for sometime. The one quantifiable area of housing activity "scooped a large amount out ofOttawa" (Clatworthy 1989), and according to Roy Nichol of CMHC (R. Nichol 1991) thissector benefited substantially in the second agreement from unspent federal dollars atgovernment year end. While the focusing of government dollars was substantial, it isunknown if the tri-level agreements were any more successful than would have been thecase if an equal number of dollars had been obtained from one source. It is clear that themain role of the CAI was political legitimation. With the exception of the large, visibleprojects such as North Portage, most of the programmes were, in effect, in one way oranother through one of the levels of government before either of the agreements weresigned. How much new money was generated by CAI is a matter of great speculation.120Certainly, however, the Initiative focused attention and spending on one cause -- the corearea.4.8 CAI III ? The second agreement formally ended on March 31, 1991 amidst much speculationas to the probability of a renewal. 16 Jake Epp, the Federal Minister responsible for thetripartite agreement, indicated as early as November of 1990 that the Government ofCanada intended to freeze spending on any new initiatives related to the core area untilthere could be public hearings into the potential benefits of a third agreement. Amoratorium is in effect while each level of government reviews its priorities and carefullyscrutinises the strengths and weaknesses of the Initiative over the decade. Publicaccountability is very much in the forefront of each government's concern.4.9 The CAI: Attributes for Success The Core Area Initiative was a practical experiment in urban revitalisation thatapproached complex interrelated urban problems on an holistic basis. Although the tri-level co-operation and delivery is touted as being unique to Canadian planning, thesimultaneous attack on physical, social and economic problems is perhaps morenoteworthy. The accomplishments of the various CAI programmes were extensive, albeitincremental in some respects. The initial investment of $96 million leveraged andcatalysed over a half a billion dollars in public and private investment (Kiernan 1987, 26),which could not have been accomplished without the focused integration by all theparticipants on the single cause of the core area. In terms of public policy, this single121focus was the key to convincing both the public and private sectors that this project was ahighly visible, cohesive project worthy of continued investment.The following chapters will discuss, in detail, the strengths and weaknesses of thestructural model of the CAI and will present a critique of the Initiative based on publishedreports, newspaper coverage, public opinion surveys and interviews with key individualswho were associated with the Initiative at various times during the decade. Thiscompilation of data will provide a unique glimpse of the CAI not found in other studies.5.^The City of Winnipeg prepared internal reports such as Opportunities forRedevelopment of the . .R. East Yards: A Report Prepared by the Task ForceEstablished by the Board of Commissioners (March 17, 1975), and DowntownRevitalization: Background to the Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on DowntownAlternatives (June 1977). These, and other reports, were augmented by work fromexternal consultants, such as Wardrop and Associates, C.N.R. East YardsRedevelopment: Servicing Report (February 1978). Meanwhile, the federalgovernment through various departments, were also examining developmentpotential in Winnipeg. See, for example, G.B. Woolsey, Historic Resources of theRed-Assiniboine: A Preliminary Analysis of their Interpretive and DevelopmentPotential (Ottawa: Parks Canada 1975).122Endnotes1. Elaine Heinicke, Director of Major Initiatives for Western Economic Diversification,in her interview on March 7, 1991, outlined the rationale and structural arrangementsfor the two core Agreements.2. Artibise and Kiernan in their Local Development Paper No. 12, entitled CanadianRegional Development: The Urban Dimension (1989) cite seven case studies ofregional development initiatives including the CAI. These include Toronto'sHarbourfront; Granville Island, Vancouver; The Halifax Waterfront; Montreal'sVieux Port; Quebec's Vieux Port; and Vancouver's B.C.Place.3. It should be remembered that Lloyd Axworthy is the former director of the Institutefor Urban Studies and much of the material describing the physical, economic andsocial malaise of the core was collected during his tenure.4. See, for example, reports done by the Social Planning Council of Winnipeg,Community Development and the Core Area of Winnipeg: A Response to the UnitedWay (1978) and Housing Conditions in Winnipeg: The Identification of HousingProblems and High-Need Groups (1979). The Institute of Urban Studies, Universityof Winnipeg, produced several reports throughout the 1970s including LloydAxworthy, Winnipeg's Core Area: An Assessment of Conditions Affecting LawEnforcement (1975) and Christine McKee, Towards a Planning Strategy for OlderNeighbourhoods (1977).6. A memorandum of understanding was signed on September 22, 1980, by LloydAxworthy, Minister of Employment and Immigration, Government of Canada; GerryMercier, Minister for Urban Affairs, Province of Manitoba; and Bill Norrie, Mayor,City of Winnipeg. Public announcement of the proposed tri-level Agreement wasproduced by the CAI Policy Committee: Proposed Winnipeg Core Area Initiative(Winnipeg, June 1981).7. Eugene Kostyra, the newly elected Minister of Urban Affairs, in charge of the CAIfor the provincial partnership, stressed his government's unease with the programmeweighting and priorities reflected in the CAI I as it had been signed before histenure. The N.D.P. seriously considered abandoning the whole agreement but feltthat the overall economic and political benefits outweighed the individual concernsof parties.1238. For a detailed account of the early development of the City of Winnipeg, see A.F.J.Artibise, Gateway City: Documents on the City of Winnipeg, 1873-1913 (Winnipeg:The Manitoba Record Society in association with the University of Manitoba Press,1979) and A.F.J. Artibise, Winnipeg: An Illustrated History (Toronto: James Lorimerand Co. and National Museum of Man, National Museums of Canada, 1977).9. The Institute of Urban Studies, University of Winnipeg, compared data on 13 selectedCanadian metropolitan areas including Winnipeg from 1971 to 1986. A brief summaryof the data was presented in their September 1990 Newsletter (Charette 1990).10. The inner city of Winnipeg includes the site of the University of Winnipeg,Winnipeg's second-largest university, as well as the Health Sciences complex which isthe medical campus for the University of Manitoba.11. Axworthy's M.A. and Ph.D. were from Princeton University. His time spent in theUnited States and his familiarity with the American Local Development Committeesand Urban Development Committees strongly influenced his desire for grassrootsparticipation.12. This occurred at a meeting in the spring of 1980 called by Sister MacNamara at herRossbrook House, a drop-in centre for street youths. Local citizen activists werepressuring Axworthy, Mayor Norrie from the City, and provincial MLA Gerry Mercierto take a stand on the relocation of the CPR's marshalling yard. These yards, whichoccupied 300 acres of strategic inner-city land, were unquestionably a large contributorto the urban blight of the area.13. The following material is a brief summation of Stewart Clatworthy's 1988 report to theManagement Board and the Policy Committee in 1988. The page references are givenfrom the alphabetical numbering system of this report.14. Complementary funding was especially important to the success of this programme. Inaddition to the $6.181 million alloted to this programme, CMHC provided $25 millionin complementary federal RRAP funds.15. Stewart Clatworthy, in a personal communication in May, 1992, indicated that the CAIII did not have the resources to complete the evaluation component of the Agreement.The evaluation programme was "out of sync" with the rest of the programming,leaving considerable unfinished work by the time the funds ran out.16. As of June 1992, indications are that any further intergovernmental revitalisationefforts in Winnipeg will focus on the Main Street area of the core. It seems unlikelythat there will be a third Core Area Agreement based on the tripartite model of equalcost-sharing and decision-making as was designed for CM I and II.124Chapter 5THE WINNIPEG CORE AREA INITIATIVE MODEL5.1 Introduction This chapter examines the CAI model itself, separate from the policies andprogrammes of the Initiative as a whole. The tripartite model, which forms the foundationof the Winnipeg Core Area Agreement, was the underlying arrangement and set ofprinciples that bound the three levels of government together in the revitalisation plan forthe core area of the City of Winnipeg. The model provided the structural framework forthe Agreement, and the legal structure and authority for implementation. Chapter 2outlined some of the limitations of past approaches to urban revitalisation and concludedwith a need for alternate strategies -- new institutional and fiscal mechanisms, new politicalalliances. It can be argued that the CAI model "fits the bill." The model has been toutedas being unique to Canadian planning by Matthew Kiernan (Kiernan 1987) and others;however, it is really the overriding principle of equality in decision-making and cost-sharing that could arguably be considered "unique." Nonetheless, the CAI model has anoverall design that differentiates it from other urban revitalisation models making it worthyof further examination.This chapter specifically addresses the first three research questions posed inChapter 1 of this dissertation. It outlines the basic assumptions underlying the CAI model-- assumptions that were based on the belief that solutions to problems of inner-citydistress in Winnipeg could only be found with inter-governmental co-operation and sharingof resources. It examines the ideologies underlying the policy frameworks of the tri-levelpartners at the time of the creation of the Initiative and under changing political125environments. It suggests the degree of political commitment held by the partners overtime and outlines the roles and perspectives taken by each during the two agreements;CAI I 1981-1986, and CAI II 1986-1991. This chapter assesses the effectiveness of theCAI as an instrument of public policy for urban revitalisation and concludes that themodel, as it was purposively designed, cannot and should not be replicated as such forother urban redevelopment projects. There are elements of the model however, that canprovide invaluable instruction for future urban revitalisation attempts.5.2 The Model as an Instrument of Public PolicyHogwood and Gunn (1988) attempt to define public policy at the outset of theirbook, Policy Analysis for the Real World. In a series of categorisations of the way theterm policy is used and the contexts in which it often occurs, they summarize theirdiscussion with the following definition:Any public policy is subjectively defined by an observer as being such and isusually perceived as comprising a series of patterns of related decisions towhich many circumstances and personal, group, and organizational influenceshave contributed. The policy-making process involves many sub-processesand may extend over a considerable period of time. The aims or purposesunderlying a policy are usually identifiable at a relatively early stage in theprocess but these may change over time and, in some cases, may be definedonly retrospectively. The outcomes of policies require to be studied and,where appropriate, compared and contrasted with the policy-makers'intentions. Accidental or deliberate inaction may contribute to a policyoutcome. The study of policy requires an understanding of behaviour,especially behaviour involving interaction within and among organizationalmemberships. For a policy to be regarded as 'public policy' it must to somedegree have been generated or at least processed within the framework ofgovernmental procedures, influences and organizations. (Ibid., 23-24.)126Hogwood and Gunn also identify some characteristics that apply to any issuebefore it reaches, or is even brought to, the agenda floor of any corporation or government(ibid., 68). They suggest that an issue must have reached crisis proportions such that itcan no longer be ignored, that it must have achieved some degree of particularity, that itmust have some emotive or human-aspect angle such that it can attract media attention,that it must have wide impact that may involve some "pocketbook" issues, that it raisesquestions of power and legitimacy, and that it must be fashionable in some way that isoften difficult to explain but easy to recognise.Using this definition of public policy and accepting the circumstances requiredto bring an issue to the forefront as a public-policy issue, it is apparent from the historyand evolution of the CAI over ten years, that the CAI model and its companion agreementsrepresented a concerted and enduring attempt at urban public policy-making. Indeed,Kiernan lauds the creation of the CAI as an unusual multi-governmental urbancollaboration with results that commend both the substance and the delivery model.That signing launched an experiment in urban policy-making which wasarguably the most ambitious and comprehensive ever undertaken in NorthAmerica. And, despite the somewhat idiosyncratic political circumstancessurrounding its genesis, it is an experiment with important implications forthe manner in which both urban policy and economic development will bepursued elsewhere in this country in the 1990s, and perhaps beyond. (Kiernan1987, 25.)A decade after the creation of the CAI, the question remains as to how effectiveand important this experiment was and to what degree can, or should, the model bereplicated for use in urban revitalisation efforts elsewhere.1275.3 Effectiveness of the Model The Winnipeg Core Area Agreement tripartite model was specifically designedfor extensive intervention and involvement in the process of revitalisation of ten squaremiles of the inner city of Winnipeg.' The area consists of relatively contiguousneighbourhoods housing a population one-sixth the size of the city as whole. The modelwas established to bring together the three levels of government in a manner that wouldbind them equally in decision-making and dollar-sharing. The premise behind the tri-levelmodel was that the scope and breadth of redevelopment to be undertaken was beyond thecapacity of any one single level of government. Indeed, this collective ability, when alllevels of government were faced with fiscal restraint, and programme and mandaterestrictions, contributed to considerable initial consensus, good will and flexibility in theearly years of the first agreement.The tripartite model as it was designed provided an effective tool for marryingthe three levels of government in a collective effort with a concentrated focus. The legalrequirements of the model and the structural emphasis on co-operative negotiations meantongoing unanimity in goal definition, problem-solving and consensus building. Numerousparticipants in the process point to the frustrations caused by these requirements; however,it is generally acknowledged that the net results of redevelopment activities were greaterthan would have been the case under another model. Full inter-governmental negotiationand decision-making throughout the implementation process re-enforced the focuscontinually back on the issue at hand -- Winnipeg's inner-city problems and prospects. Inaddition, equal participation by the three partners resulted in the breadth and range ofprogramming that has been seen as an element of the model's success. This extensive128range gave each partner the opportunity to meet some of its own priorities while promotinga sense of ownership in the model. A by-product of the process was increased inter-governmental co-ordination and understanding of jurisdictional interests.From the outset, the roles and functions of each of the tri-level partners wereoperated in a trial-and-error fashion, due in part to the novelty of the collaboration and tothe individual perspectives brought to the table by the original signatories. 2 The politicaland fiscal milieu at the time of development of the model was very different from thatexisting in the later years of the Initiative. The fact that the CAI was designed prior to therecession of the early 1980s contributed much to the flexibility of the participants. Overtime, and especially with the signing of the second agreement in 1986, many changesaffected the environment of the model -- changes in political figures, jurisdictionalpriorities and boundaries, and management personnel. There appears to be generalconsensus that time and environmental change caused the functioning of the secondagreement to be less flexible and acutely concerned with public accountability. Althoughthe model was not specifically designed to cope with change, it is quite remarkable that itwas capable of doing so.The recession that hit the North American economy in the early 1980s could nothave come at a worse time for the CAI. Just as programmes were being implemented andpublic expectations raised, the downturn in the Canadian economy severely affectedgovernment policy and operating styles. Fiscal restraint and public accountability becamethe watchword of all levels of government and greatly influenced the functioning of themodel.129Changes in the Winnipeg and inner-city economy during the early years of thefirst agreement had profound effects on the delivery capability of several of the model'sprogrammes, especially those dependent upon private-sector investment. It can be arguedthat an undetermined number of dollars obtained from the first agreement was spent oncombatting the effects of the 1982 recession. Certainly, the tax base of the inner city wastoo small to pay for the level of social services required, and, even by 1986, private-sectorinvestment in Winnipeg was considered too fragile for the federal government to riskpulling out of a second agreement. Throughout the 1980s, changes in the City'semployment base away from traditional manufacturing jobs, coupled with high generalunemployment, eroded the effects proposed by the linkage of programmes with job creationand training/affirmative-action elements. In fact, the job-training component inadvertentlycontributed to the unemployment level due to the recession by placing newly-trainedworkers into areas of the labour force most heavily affected by unemployment (Clatworthyand Leskiw 1992). As a result of economic circumstances, among other factors, theoriginal goals of the model for increased employment opportunities and expansion ofindustrial, commercial and residential development did not meet initial expectations.Changes in all three levels of government throughout the decade also hadsignificant effects on the functioning of the model. The local level perhaps experienced theleast change -- the mayor remained the only original signatory from the first agreement.City Council changed with elections, as did the boundaries of the area designated as "thecore." Changes at the provincial and federal levels had more significant effects. Indeed, asnoted in Chapter 4, shortly after the signing of the first agreement in 1981, the newlyelected NDP government had severe reservations concerning the model, and came close to130pulling out of the Agreement altogether.' The Logan industrial site, one of the initial keysites selected for economic development, proved to be a major source of ideologicalconflict between parties and one of the most contentious issues covered by the media. Thereluctant co-operation of the NDP in the Agreement brought with it a price -- a major re-alignment of the model's industrial and economic development strategy and a re-priorization of resource allocations to a number of the model's programmes. Change at thefederal level in 1982 similarly affected the economic development strategies of the firstagreement. Lloyd Axworthy's original concept of using the CAI as a demonstrationproject for community-level development facilitated through DREE experienced a shift infocus and transfer of responsibilities for the model to Western Diversification via DRIE.The result was a diffusion of activities among five departments. With this change came arestructuring of federal financial responsibilities and an increased concern by the provincialand federal governments in having the model's programmes conform to line departmentmandates and budget priorities. The result was that elements of flexibility and adaptabilityassociated with the initial operating style of the model became constrained.Much of the success of the CAI is generally credited to the originators of themodel and the personnel who piloted the Initiative through the infancy stage. By 1985however, numerous personnel changes at the level of Management Board and Agreementco-ordinators, coupled with changes in political leaderships, resulted in the departure ofmost of the originators and key personnel who designed and had a vested interest in themodel. This contributed to a loss of continuity and a reduction in a sense of ownership atall levels of operation, and it is generally agreed that the presence and guiding spirit of theCore Area Office may have been the only stabilising influence in the last years of the131second agreement. However, critics have suggested that it was the divesting ofresponsibility for programme delivery and day-to-day operations to the Core Area Officethat created a "fourth-level" bureaucracy, thereby further contributing to a sense of loss ofownership of the model for the three primary partners.Matthew Kiernan extols the breadth and scope of the activities undertaken bythe CAI with its tri-governmental partnership -- a scale unmatched (he claims), byrevitalisation efforts in either North America or Europe (Kiernan 1990). Financing of theprogramme activities of the model came from the equal coast-shared arrangements in theagreements, complementary programme initiatives undertaken by various governmentdepartments, and leveraging of private dollars. The financial scale of the Initiative waslarge -- so much so that "the $96 million provided for the initial term of the modelrepresented the largest budget for a single programming initiative ever seen in Winnipeg"(Clatworthy and Leskiw 1990, 51). Nonetheless, it begs the question, "How much isenough?" Over the decade, the three levels of government pumped $266 million into theinner-city.Individuals involved with the development and implementation of the model,however, clearly recognized the financial limitations of the model andexpressed concerns that the model could never produce the level of impactanticipated by the public. (Clatworthy and Leskiw 1990, 52.)In addition to tri-level contractual dollars, Kiernan suggests:Through skilful exploitation of the initial CAI and its sister agreements, theCity of Winnipeg was able to parlay a municipal investment of some $54million into more than three-quarters of a billion dollars worth of public andprivate sector investment in the economic, physical, and social rejuvenation ofWinnipeg's disadvantaged inner city . . . multiplying its investment by afactor of nearly fourteen times." (Kiernan 1990, 20.)132Gerecke and Reid calls this a "shell game," claiming that a more realistic picture from theEconomic Council of Canada shows a $266 million public investment leveraged $240million private investment -- a leverage factor of just less than one (Gerecke and Reid1990, 19). Even these figures are called into question by Gerecke and Reid because theycall the authors, Michael Dector and Jeffrey Koval, partisan and unable to objectively judgebecause of a pro-CAI bias. It would appear that each of the CAI partners and otheragencies involved in certain aspects of the Initiative kept financial data consistent withtheir own vested interests. The result, therefore, is that there is no one source that is ableto give the whole financial picture including the effect of various subsidies andinducements used for certain programmes. To date, there has been no public documentissued by the CAI Management Board giving an assessment of the impact or quantum ofinvestment dollars leveraged by the model over the ten-year period of operation. 4In attempting to evaluate the effectiveness of the CAI model with respect tofinancial impact, it is necessary to keep in mind the geographical size of the targeted area(ten square miles), and the size of the population considered to be in need (twenty percentof the city's population). Although events surrounding the creation of the CAI focused onan area adjacent to the downtown and the CPR tracks, political interests caused thegeographical boundary of the designated "core area" to extend to several adjacent inner-cityand older neighbourhoods generally acknowledged to be in need of help. Despite generalopinion that the size of the area designated for revitalisation was too large at the outset,extension of initial boundaries occurred. Clearly, there was already a gap betweenfinancial resources and perceived need; however, several of the model's programmes wereextended to newly targeted areas. Critics of the CAI have suggested that the resources133available should have been concentrated in those areas deemed most in need; however, thecommunity-level development initiative, inherent in the model and so close to the heart andspirit of its originators, responded to community pressure.The CAI model held at the outset the goal of a comprehensive attack on a litanyof urban problems. This comprehensive feature linking physical, social and economicstrategies proved to be both a strength and a weakness of the model. In some respects themedia hype linking these aims raised expectations beyond the capabilities of anyrevitalisation model to deliver. This feature also added a degree of complexity to theintegration and co-ordination functions of the Initiative. New programming arising out ofthe second agreement further added to the breadth and comprehensiveness of the CAI, insome cases causing competitive activities lacking thought and timing.Perhaps the most obvious shortcoming related to the implementation of the CAImodel was in the policy planning and formulation function. Policy formation proved to bead hoc in nature in response to specific priorities or concerns of one or more levels ofgovernment. Policy formulation and planning received attention at the initial design andcreation stage of the CAI and at points prior to the end of the terms of the agreements.Planning at the front end of the first agreement was substantial and creative, andoriginators of the model such as Lloyd Axworthy, Gerry Mercier and David Sanders 5seemed to have a clear consensus on the nature of the model necessary to achieve theirperceived goals. The normative and empirical assumptions behind further developments asthe Initiative matured were built on "best guesses" of delivery agents or negotiations ofnumerous departmental representatives. Bureaucrats from all levels of government,constrained by jurisdictional interests and mandates, were anxious to take advantage of the134perceived successes in programming of CAI I. Success in programme areas of the firstagreement created a vicious circle of calls for continuation of programmes leading to afurther dependence without in-depth evaluation of policy outcomes. However, one of themost serious failures of the model was the inability to turn programme successes intopolicy legislation. This was most apparent in the field of the housing, community andneighbourhood revitalisation sector and the employment and affirmative action strategy.Debate continues as to the label that best characterizes the CAI model -- rationalcomprehensive versus incremental "muddling through." Peter Diamant (1992), to this daygives lectures to city planning students at the University of Manitoba, making the case forboth sides of the debate. Diamant claims that the initial development of the model was adecisively rational process, due in part to the academic background of Lloyd Axworthy andDavid Sanders. However, he also suggests that a great deal of inter-governmental "talking"throughout the latter part of the 1970s contributed to the understanding, enthusiasm andgood will engendered in the efforts of the Joint Liaison Committee and the numerous sub-committees as they tried to put together a strategy for a model suitable for the complicatedtask of urban revitalisation. Diamant suggests that the CAI "didn't just plop out" -- that itemerged in an incremental and experimental manner as a result of a late 1970s attempt atstrategic planning to tie the federal and provincial governments into Plan Winnipeg. ThePlanning Department of the City had asked for help in the mid-1970s from the MSUA.Four or five years of activities allowed people to know each other and contacts to be madethat were instrumental in the creation of the CAI. Diamant claims that, following thedemise of the MSUA, when the provincial Department of Urban Affairs was disbanded bythe Lyon government, much strategic planning was lost. Clatworthy concurred. He135suggested in a personal interview (December 1989) that policy definition and directiondisintegrated as the Initiative progressed and that policy direction, in the absence of aunified policy statement, varied between three interpretations or one, watered down forconsensus. Clatworthy called the policy outcomes of the model "policy by default."5.4 The Public/Private Venture Chapter 2 presented attempts of British and American governments to deal withthe pervasive problems of urban revitalisation and the concomitant shifts in thinkingregarding the respective roles of governments and the private sector in the transformationof urban areas. Chapter 3 discussed the changing role of planners as a result of these shiftsin urban revitalisation philosophy and examined the consequences of public/privatepartnerships attempting to capture "the logic of the bottom line" (Fainstein 1991, 25). CarlBellone (1988) commented on these new entrepreneurial activities undertaken by manyAmerican cities and the new role expectations for local governments as a consequence.Traditionally, we expect that the role of local government is to provide thoseservices that the private sector cannot perform because they are not profitable, theyare by definition public services (such as police and fire protection), they arerevenue dispersing functions (such as grants to the arts), or they are non-profitmonopolies for the public good. We also expect that the level of public services ina community is determined by public needs as perceived by locally elected officialswith some state and federal constraints. Lastly, we expect that local governmentsraise revenue through various forms of taxation, while they may occasionally end ayear with a surplus, they are not profit making activities. (Ibid., 72.)Bellone suggests that increasingly these traditional expectations for citygovernments are being re-focused to come to grips with the perceived necessity for fiscalsolvency and a new attitude toward co-operation with the private sector.136The City of Winnipeg, backed by tripartite funding made possible through CAII, followed American and British experiments with urban entrepreneurialism by spinningoff two public/private partnerships out of the CAI agreements; the North of PortageDevelopment Corporation and the Forks Renewal Corporation. Both ventures operatesimilarly; however, each has a specific focus and mandate; the North Portage DevelopmentCorporation is a "mixed" retail/commercial and residential development while the ForksRenewal Corporation is primarily a public amenity development.5.4.1 North of Portage RedevelopmentIn order to encourage new commercial and residential investment in thedowntown area of Winnipeg, the first core area agreement determined to undertake a majorredevelopment of the North Portage area (see map 5.1). A preliminary budget of$13,179,977 was allotted to undertake three major tasks (Winnipeg Core Area Initiative1988, 71). Firstly, land was acquired and cleared within an area bounded by EdmontonStreet, Ellice Avenue, Hargrave Street and Portage Avenue at a cost of $8.45 million.Secondly, land that was assembled by the CAI was, in turn, sold to Air Canada for theconstruction of a $65-million new Air Canada building. Part of the arrangement made withAir Canada was the provision of a public "window" park opening onto Portage Avenuebetween Hargrave and Carlton streets. The park was constructed on land acquired by theCAI, and built with $444,000 (plus land) from the CAI, $95,000 from Air Canada, and$40,000 from the City of Winnipeg. Thirdly, the North Portage Development Corporationwas established to take responsibility for planning, co-ordinating and implementing overalldevelopment for the area."Km'ay= UNDER EXPROPRIATIONTO BE TRANSFEREDTO CORPORATION- • - NORTH PORTAGE AREAMap 5.1 North of Portage Redevelopment Area: Reprinted with permission from Kent Smith, North Portage DevelopmentCorporation.1385.4.1.1 North of Portage Development CorporationThe North of Portage Development Corporation was established on December16, 1983, under an Unanimous Shareholders' Agreement, signed by representatives of thethree CAI partners (North of Portage Development Corporation 1984, 11). 6 The North ofPortage redevelopment programme had targeted the badly deteriorated north side of PortageAvenue for several mixed-use projects that were to be developed and managed by theCorporation. The area bounded by Balmoral Street, Notre Dame Avenue, Hargrave Streetand Portage Avenue had previously been a prosperous retail and commercial strip in thecentral business district of downtown. The north side of Portage Avenue had deterioratedmore seriously than the adjacent area on the south side of Portage Avenue anchored by theT. Eaton Company and the Hudson's Bay Company. The north side showed a precipitousdrop in retail sales, from sixty percent of the retail trade in 1960 to twenty percent in 1981(Smith 1992). By March 1983, two reports were prepared for the comprehensivedevelopment of North Portage -- The North of Portage Development Proposal, March 1983and the North of Portage Development Proposal, April 6, 1983. In early May 1983, thetripartite partners committed, in principle, up to $20 million each for redevelopment guidedby a tri-level administrative task force whose aim was to review and makerecommendations for the North of Portage area. As a result of the two previous proposals,and a review submitted by the Board of Commissioners to the City, all three partnersagreed to participate in a review of plans for the development of the area, and the taskforce was named by mid-May 1983.7139The Administrative Task Force was given sixty days to establish a conceptualplan and a financial plan, and to make redevelopment proposal recommendations.Specifically, the objectives of the Task Force were:1. to stimulate job creation and increased employment activity in thedevelopment area with an emphasis on quick-start projects;2. to encourage the participation of the private sector tocomplement public projects in the development in order tostimulate new private investment;3. to maximize overall investment through a mix of recreational,cultural, commercial and residential uses compatible with PlanWinnipeg and with the needs that may be identified through thepublic consultation process;4. to identify specific components to attract more people to theNorth of Portage area and to enhance the economic and socialviability of the downtown area. (North of Portage DevelopmentCorporation 1984.)To accomplish the enormous task in so short a time, the Task Force movedsimultaneously in two directions: it retained professional site planners and analysts toprovide technical reports; and it undertook a consultative process with key organisations,interested parties and representatives of the public. In total, it met with thirtyorganisations, received over fifty written presentations, listened to nine interestedorganisations and held a two-day forum (North of Portage Administrative Task Force1984). The Task Force received advice from redevelopment planners assessing otherprojects in North American centres, and Board members, on the advice of the Urban LandInstitute in Washington, D.C., visited redevelopment projects in Minneapolis, Milwaukee,Philadelphia and Louisville, Kentucky (Smith 1992). The Task Force also reviewed anumber of comprehensive development proposals:1401. The (original) March 1983 Proposal: a major plan involving a sportsplex,retail, commercial, housing and institutional elements.2. The Winnipeg Jets and Fairweather Properties Proposal: a majorplan including an "omniplex," retail, housing, commercial andinstitutional elements.3. The Winnipeg Developers Consortium: a major plan involving threecomponents: a Northside Place, housing and cultural centre.4. The NORPO Group: two alternate plans involving a sportsplex, retailcommercial, housing and institutional elements.5.^The Task Force Group (under the direction of the Task Force): a varietyof options as part of the deliberations of the Task Force. (North of PortageAdministrative Task Force 1984, 1.)Based on the oral and written presentations, analyses of the comprehensiveproposal alternatives, and professional planning advice, the Task Force recommended amixed-use development that would address many of the problems identified in the areaincluding a need for safety, recreation, improved housing stock, office and retail space (seemap 5.2). The existing retail establishments were to be linked by a major new complex --Portage Place. Complementary developments were to include: (1) the Urban Village in theVaughan Street area; (2) a housing complex between Kennedy and Edmonton; (3) SciencePlace on the former St. Paul's College site; and (4) the North of Ellice Neighbourhood.Included in these areas were plans for a weather-protected pedestrian skywalk, a majorhigh-quality hotel, renovation and conversion of the existing YM-YWCA building, the newUnion Centre and a Royal Winnipeg Ballet facility, and the Science Centre/Park.', • CAINE: 800TH .—... BIBLE:coLLEcF'CANADA s:tENTAE ..••141Map 5.2 Site Plan for the North of Portage Development: Reprinted with permission fromKent Smith, North Portage Development Corporation.142Phase I of the proposed plan was to be undertaken in a five year period from1983 to 1988, and elements of a "quick start" programme aimed at funding andemployment opportunities were to have first priority. The final concept included:extensive revitalisation through a program which involves a dynamic andimaginative combination of commercial, residential, educational, cultural andentertainment facilities enhanced by public amenities, improvements inpedestrian and vehicular access, public transit and in the social and aestheticenvironment generally. The North Portage Development Corporation shallimplement this development strategy through a combination of investments bythe Corporation, the private sector, institutions and government. Not onlywill these investments lead to the revitalisation of a key area of downtownWinnipeg but it is anticipated that they will yield substantial economicbenefits in both the short and long term. (North of Portage DevelopmentCorporation 1984, 3.)Kent Smith, General Manager of the North of Portage Development Corporation,commented on the unanimity expressed by the Task Force with regard to the type ofredevelopment desired (Smith 1992). He said that there was no question in the minds ofthe Task Force members, the CAI partners or the general public that the redevelopmentwas to be a "bricks and mortar" project. There was also no debate about the need forprivate-sector development, just the type of development, that is, festive market versusretail. Recognising that major new office space could not be filled profitably, there was anincreased emphasis placed on a residential component. As of 1990, North of PortageDevelopment Corporation produced:1. 200,000 square feet of retail space in Portage Place;2. three residential complexes with a total of 665 units: Place Promenade, amarket rental housing unit; Kiwanis Chateau and Fred Douglas Place, both"lease for life" seniors housing projects;3. 280,000 square feet of office space in One Canada Centre;4. an option location and pad for a major hotel;5.^20,000 square feet of street-level retail on two new pedestrian-orientedstreets;1436. the Canadian Institute of Industrial Technology Building (federalgovernment);7. an Imax Theatre at Portage Place;8. the Portage Place YM-YWCA redevelopment;9. streetscaping, the Central Park Extension, community facilities anddaycare;10. the Prairie Theatre Exchange;11. public amenity space and all-weather sky-walk connections;12. eleven acres of land assembly;13. parking with 1,900 underground stalls and additional surface parking;14. $7 million of roadway and service improvements. (North of PortageDevelopment Corporation, 1991.)The relative success of the North of Portage Development Corporation is not ofissue here. However, two elements specifically related to the CAI model are important tonote: firstly, the financial relationship and impact made by the Corporation as an offshootof the CAI; and secondly, the structural arm's-length relationship between the Corporationand the CAI.North of Portage Development Corporation was specifically set up to wooprivate investment back to downtown Winnipeg. The Task Force set a target ratio of two-to-one for private and non-profit dollars to be leveraged through the spending of $76million. It reached that goal, with $250 million from the private sector (Smith 1992). Inthe late 1980s, the Board of Directors amended that goal to a three-to-one ratio, and withrecent developments (Annual Reports 1990 and 1991) the Corporation appears to bereaching that goal as well. It is clear that the CAI could never have achieved this degreeof financial impact without private-sector participation, and one could debate whether theCAI was an appropriate body to carry out such a task in the first place. According to KentSmith, the City was a weak partner in any economic development strategy because Councilnever had a sense of what they wanted downtown (Smith 1992). However, there was144general consensus that something -- anything -- was needed.' It was a "bleak time" in theearly 1980s in Winnipeg, according to Smith, and the Task Force was left with a relativedegree of freedom in selecting the type and scope of development. These circumstancesalso gave the tripartite partners some latitude in offering incentives to the private sector --land write-downs or write-offs, parking and property tax incentives to name a few. Thesources of capital financing included $22 million from each of the tripartite partners, $5million from Programme 7 of the CAI I Agreement, and $5 million borrowed from theNorth Portage Corporation. In addition, the Corporation had the authority to borrowadditional funds to an overall maximum of $20 million during the five-year Phase I (Northof Portage Development Corporation 1984, 6). Kent Smith, currently General Manager ofthe North of Portage Development Corporation, called this whole package "new dealdollars." The expectations of the North Portage Board were high in 1984:The Board anticipates that its investments will generate over $150 million inprivate and institutional investment, more than 7,000 person years inconstruction employment; 3,000 permanent new jobs, directly or indirectly;and direct fiscal benefits to all three levels of government in both the shortand long term. (North of Portage Development Corporation 1984, 6.)The 1991 Annual Report of the Corporation showed income before depreciationand amortization of $460,000 as of March 1991, down from $1,426,000 the previous year.Over $1 million in operating loss was attributed to the Cityscape Residence Corporation,the owner of Place Promenade and subsidiary of the Corporation.° Nonetheless, theCorporation continued to maintain financially self-sufficient operations, and with recentsuccess in leasing the South Side of Portage Avenue and Place Promenade, combined withthe completion of the YM/YWCA facility and newly signed agreements with private sector145corporations, the North Portage venture may have a positive long-term financial impact onWinnipeg's downtown (see map 5.3).The relationship between the CAI and the North Portage venture is similar tomany pubic/private arrangements spawned in Britain and the United States in response tourban revitalisation efforts. The arm's-length model of the Corporation carries with itcertain pros and cons (Smith 1992). The Development Corporation is run by a board often directors, drawn from the community at large, none of whom hold civil-service orpolitical appointments. A general manager and six full-time staff carry on the day-to-dayactivities of the Corporation. This structure was seen to be necessary to allow theCorporation to function effectively in the private sector unhampered by partisan politics orconflicts of interest. However, the Corporation is constantly faced with questions of publicaccountability. Smith pointed out the difficulty in negotiating with the private sector in the"fishbowl of the public environment" necessitated by the public component of thepartnership. Two features have contributed to the Corporation's success to date despite thebalancing act required to satisfy the "public interest" and "the bottom line." The firstfeature is the very specific nature of the Corporation's mandate, the Corporation had verytight guidelines for development in terms of the purpose and scope of their work, aproscribed area and timed priorities, and clear goals with respect to the public and privatedomains. Secondly, the financial plan gave "clear marching orders"; it was not a policy-making document, therefore there was a guide by which to measure success. In summary,Smith felt that the public/private partnership worked "quite well," but that compromiseshad to be made -- "the whole is greater than the sum of the parts" (Smith 1992).1465.4.2 The Forks Renewal CorporationThe Forks Renewal Corporation, established in July 1987, was an off-shoot ofthe North of Portage Development venture. The area included for development was alarge, historic, river-front site at the junction of the Red and Assiniboine rivers. It includedthe local Canadian National Railway (CN) main line and the CN Union Station (called theEast Yards site), along with commercial properties, major transportation routes, and a ParksCanada National Historic Park (see Map 5.3). The site, over ninety acres, was one that allthree CAI partners wanted to see redeveloped, despite the difficulty in dealing with CN.CAI I identified the redevelopment of the CN East Yards site as a priority in itsearly programming (see map 5.4). CAI I had earmarked the site as a capital project;however, negotiations with CN did not progress as planned in the early 1980s. As a result,a combined budget of $5.1 million was allocated through Programme 8.1-8.5 (CN EastYards -- $4,251,000) and Programme 8.6 (Compensation for Land Acquisition --$2,900,000) in order to move the project along. (Winnipeg Core Area Initiative 1988, 76).To facilitate the acquisition of the ninety-acre area, a tri-level task force was established inthe spring of 1986 to review issues pertaining to site planning, to prepare a concept planand a financial plan, and to make recommendations for implementation including therespective roles of public and private investment. The report of the task force was madepublic in December 1986 and the Concept Plan and the Financial Plan was approved by thetripartite partners by the spring of 1987 (ibid.).BROADWAY^YORK^ST.MARY GRAHAMAVE. AVE.^AVE.I^II^II IIMAIN ST.miceaan xroolx,coaDocrooc---TACHE DOCKNORWOODBRIDGEroiCkle.147EAST YARD AREA1 GARAGE2 TRAINING/FITNESS3 JOHNSON TERMINAL4 B & B BUILDING RERMEM CN MAIN LINELAND OWNED BY THE FORKS RENEWAL CORP.LAND RETAINED BY CNPARKS CANADA SITE— ^ EAST YARD AREAMap 5.3 East Yard Site Plan: Reprinted with permission of Inter-Group, Winnipeg 1992.148In May 1987, an interim board was established to receive recommendations forthe area that was to be known as The Forks. Jake Epp, Minister responsible for WesternDiversification at the time of CAI II, was supportive of redevelopment for the site, andprecipitated a deal that traded federal lands in Vancouver, coveted by CN, in return fornegotiations on the Forks site. The difference in value of the two sites ($4 million) wasvested in seventeen acres that were bought by the City in the end, with investment goinginto the Forks redevelopment (Diakiw 1992). The interim board originally undertook aland exchange agreement that provided for fifty-six acres to be transferred to a tri-leveldevelopment corporation, seventeen to be retained by CN (ultimately sold to the City), andeight to be owned by the City. Nine acres had been transferred to Parks Canada for theriverbank park earlier (Winnipeg Core Area Initiative 1988, 76).The tri-level Forks Renewal Corporation was established by the UnanimousShareholders Agreement of July 29, 1987. The Corporation was responsible to a nine-member board with Nick Diakiw, a former civic official, President and Chief ExecutiveOfficer of the Corporation.' The Corporation undertook an extensive public consultationprocess, with over 140 written submissions, in an effort to prepare the Phase I Concept andFinancial Plan. The Plan, accepted by the tripartite partners in November 1987, called fora "meeting place -- a special and distinct all-season gathering and recreations place at thejunction of the Red and Assiniboine Rivers" (The Forks Renewal Corporation 1987).The Forks Renewal Corporation has a very different mandate from the North ofPortage Development Corporation. The extensive consultation process that led to thecreation of a "meeting place" theme led to a mixed-use development with a special anddistinctive environment and culture (see map 5.5).1491. a nine-acre Parks Canada National Historic Park including a riverbankwalkway;2. a public food market and crafts outlets;3. the Assiniboine Riverfront Quay, including year-round recreation;4. archaeological developments at the Fort Gibraltar II/Fort Garry I site;5. a multi-cultural meeting place and historical/cultural interpretive facilities;6. a Red River marina;7.^a proposed Native social and cultural activity place.(The Forks Renewal Corporation 1987).Financing of the Corporation was through grants retained from CAI II($687,425); $20 million from Programme 3 of the CAI II (East Yards Development -- theForks); and $2,181,681 from private investment (Winnipeg Core Area Initiative 1992, 3-1).Of the $20 million, $12,466,500 was allocated for capital costs, including the site clearingand rail relocation; road access, parking and municipal services; landscaping and siteenhancement; and major function assistance. An additional $1,274,791 was given to coverland carrying costs for the period between 1987 and 1991 "because the Forks RenewalCorporation is responsible for the carrying costs of the undeveloped lands which primarilyconsist of the City of Winnipeg property taxes" (ibid., 3-4). Under the Strategic CapitalProgramme 5, CAI II provided an additional $5 million for the creation of the ForksMarket. The initial shareholders' funding, in addition to other public-sector capitalassistance, was to result in an additional private, institutional and other investment inexcess of $100 million by the end of Phase I (1992). The mandate given the Corporationwas to achieve financial self-sufficiency within a "reasonable" period of time (The ForksRenewal Corporation 1987, 7). This condition of self-sufficiency continues to pose aproblem for the Corporation according to Nick Daikiw (Daikiw 1992). The City ofWinnipeg is currently requiring $700,000 in taxes for the undeveloped portion of the landBROADWAYFORT GARRYCURLING CLUBYORK^ST.MARY GRAHAMAVE. AVE.^AVE.^_„^MAIN ST.4111111"^NORWOODBRIDGECOMMEMORATIVEPOINTAMPHITHEATRErAc/CATHEDRALMAJOR GATHERING PLACESACTIVITY NODEGATEWAY PORTALVIEW/ORIENTATIONEXISTING BUILDINGS1 HISTORIC PARK ENTRANCE2 THE FORKS FOCUS3 NORTH ASSINIBOINE4 CENTRAL SITE5 SOUTH PROVECHER BRIDGE6 NORTH PROVENCHER BRIDGE7 UNION STATION8 SOUTH POINT9 RAIL BRIDGE10 RED RIVER FOCUS 150Map 5.4 Site Plan for the Development of the Forks: Reprinted with permission of Inter-Group, Winnipeg 1992.151held by the Corporation, an unreasonable charge according to Daikiw, preventing theCorporation from achieving the goal of financial self-sufficiency in the short term.Unlike the North of Portage Development Corporation, the Forks Renewalventure is viewed more as a public-amenity site, and, as a result, public input into thenature, scope, timing, and scale of redevelopment has been extensive and controversial.The public consultation programme for Phase II starting in 1992 involved surveys,workshops, four advisory committees, a jury of citizens, and specialised community input.Negotiations with Winnipeg's Aboriginal community for one section of the site, purportedto contain Native burial grounds, took over one year. Heritage planning has been a majorpriority, because the site contains significant archaeological resources. Criticisms havebeen directed at the timing of the redevelopment efforts at the Forks, and the nature of theprojects undertaken have incurred the wrath of "green" activists; however, in a short periodof time the Forks Renewal Corporation has certainly met its objective of providing an all-season "meeting place" for Winnipeggers.5.5 Tri-Level Partnerships in Urban RevitalisationChapter 3 reviewed the roles of the three levels of government with respect tofinance and economic development policy. Traditionally, the powers and competence ofthe municipal government to act on issues of social and economic well-being have beenlimited -- both legally and in areas of jurisdiction. Municipal government, by default, in asense, is greatly concerned with land and the servicing of land. In an effort to retain andincrease a tax base -- the major source of revenue for a city -- municipal governments arepreoccupied with development. Development is vital to a city and its residents. In periods152of high prosperity and employment, municipal governments focus their energies on urbangrowth and development, leaving the pockets of economic and social distress to be dealtwith by the senior levels of government.Chapter 4 gave a brief profile of the City of Winnipeg and a rationale forgovernment involvement in the CAI. An important feature of Winnipeg's development inthe Canadian and prairie context is the inescapable fact that the City has been faced with asituation of slow growth and no growth for a long period of time. As is normal in periodsof slow growth, the senior levels of government step in and play a larger role in economicand social programming, usually attempting to stimulate short-term development andprivate investment in order to carry a city over a period of recession. This was the casefor Winnipeg at the outset of CAI I. Certainly, the federal government's participation inthe CAI was intended to be a short-term activity (Heinicke 1991).In retrospect, the tri-level model was undoubtedly a brave, and not-so-untypicalresponse, to Winnipeg's deteriorating condition. None of the three partners anticipated adecade of co-operative involvement in the urban revitalisation process (Heinicke 1991).Neither did observers and critics such as Earl Levin in the early years of the Core AreaInitiative.The Initiative will fail to revitalize the core. Neither will the North Portageproject revitalize the core. Certainly it will markedly change the characterand activities in the three or four blocks which are redeveloped. But theeffect of the change will not be felt for any great distance beyond theboundaries of the project. The area of downtown deterioration is tooextensive, and its nature too complex, and the redevelopment proposed is toosmall in scale and too simple in its structure for it to be able to generate astrong surge of new vitality throughout the entire downtown. I do not believethat the deteriorated condition of the core area is a localized phenomenon,particular to that part of the city, and that it is therefore amenable torevitalisation by merely pressing new public monies into that location. The153condition of the core area is symptomatic of a much more deep-seated andendemic malaise from which the city as a whole is suffering. The malaise isthe condition of no growth.One of the first steps is to recognize that the normal forces at work in agrowth economy are not operative here in Winnipeg. We cannot look todevelopment to provide the source of urban vitality which other cities enjoy,and which even we enjoyed in another time. (Levin 1984, 5-8.)Levin went on to state that the capacity of the City of Winnipeg to revitalise thecore area was limited -- especially in a permanent situation of no growth. He stated thattwo conditions had to be met in order to achieve such a goal, a new kind of partnershipbetween the city and other governments, and between the public sector generally and theprivate sector were necessary; this new partnership would introduce new activities intoWinnipeg's economy and provide some growth energy (ibid., 8).The unanticipated result of CAI I for Levin, and others, was the renewal of theCAI Agreement in 1986. The tri-level model did create a new partnership agreementbetween governments and between the public and private sectors -- but to what avail?There is no doubt that the model produced tangible results that could not be accomplishedby any one level of government alone. However, until the results of the 1991 census arepublished in 1993, it seems unlikely that the model substantially reversed thesocioeconomic conditions of the core area. It certainly did not produce a new pattern ofgrowth and development in the City. Meanwhile, the tripartite partners have folded theirtents and set their sights elsewhere, leaving observers to wonder what lessons have beenlearned.1545.6 Replicability of the Model The CAI tripartite model has been the subject of much attention in NorthAmerica and throughout the world (Kiernan 1989). As a three-way partnership forplanning and delivering urban and economic redevelopment, it is not unique, even inManitoba. Other agreements, such as the Canada-Manitoba Northern DevelopmentAgreement, have focused on large geographical areas, and programmes such as theNeighbourhood Improvement Programme of the 1970s have run in all provinces includingManitoba. Equality and unanimity of decision-making and equality in cost-sharing do,however, distinguish the CAI model from all others. After ten years of operation, it isdebatable as to whether this model could, or should, be replicated.The tripartite model evolved with positive and negative consequences. There isgeneral consensus that the styles of operation and implementation in the first agreementwere more flexible and perhaps more open to experiment than in CAI II. Depending uponone's point of view, this ability to innovate and manoeuvre could be a positive feature, butprogramme and public accountability become difficult to measure or to justify. Thenegotiation process engendered by the condition of unanimity in decision-making similarlyproduced positive and negative consequences. On the positive side, this condition requiredthe three partners to "walk in the others' shoes" and undoubtedly contributed to increasedappreciation for, and understanding of, other partners' concerns and priorities. However,conflict arising out of the requirement to negotiate produced compromises that may nothave been in the best interests of the whole and often reduced the model's effectiveness.The breadth and scope of the model's programme activities have been seen as a positivefeature; however, it is generally acknowledged that the scale of the intervention was too155large and the budget allocation too small. Perhaps the most disappointing feature of themodel was the lack of ability to generate substantive urban policy or to a develop long-term planning strategy. It is unfortunate that when the model was flourishing with creativeenergy, many trial projects were generated that could have initiated policy changes,however incremental. For a variety of reasons this did not occur and the opportunitieswere lost.It is unlikely that the model per se should or could be replicated. The "uniqueconstellation of events and personalities" leading up to the creation of the CAI and the"environmental milieu" that provided the context during the decade are time- and location-specific. Elements of the CAI model, however, can provide lessons for new urbanrevitalisation efforts in other times and places. These will be explored more fully in thediscussion section of this dissertation.156Endnotes1. Tripartite agreements have been constructed for a range of specific-purpose projectsin Canada -- one of the first such arrangements was created for the development ofThe Pas, Manitoba. For the most part, the agreements are for a short duration andoperate through the line departments of each jurisdiction.2. Chapter 4 gives a brief synopsis of the "constellation of events" surrounding thecreation of the CAI and a profile of some of the personalities associated with it.3. Eugene Kostyra indicated in a personal interview (1991) that the NDP had a basicphilosophical problem with the overall goals of the CAI. They believed that the mixof aims was weighted too heavily toward infrastructure and business/economicdevelopment and not enough toward social concerns and citizen participation.4. The Final Status Report to September 31, 1987 (Winnipeg Core Area Initiative1988) does, however, list each programme area and notes the value ofcomplementary funding and private investments giving a ratio of dollars leveragedby the CAI Agreements.5. These were three of the members of the Joint Liaison Committee that met in thespring of 1980 and drew up the Memorandum of Understanding that created the CAIin September 1980. The City was represented by Mayor Norrie, Nick Daikiw(currently President and C.E.O. of the Forks Renewal Corp.) and David Henderson;the Province by Gerry Mercier, James Eldridge, David Sanders (Deputy Minister ofUrban Affairs and chair) and Peter Diamant (secretary); and the federal governmentby Jean Edmonds (Director General of DREE), Lloyd Axworthy and designates.6. The original Board of Directors was made up of ten members, three appointed byeach level of government and one chairman. In December 1983, they were I.H.Asper, N.W. Baker, L. Bell, E. Blackman, J. Brice, H. Goddard, A.V. Mauro, C.McKee, D.G. Unruh, and A. Naimark as Chair (North of Portage DevelopmentCorporation 1984).7. The Task Force was made up of the following officials: Canada -- J.C. Mackay,Chair, (ITC/DREE), D. Cringan (EIC); Manitoba -- M. Decter and D. Sanders; andWinnipeg -- N. Daikiw and D. Henderson. Decter, Sanders, Diakiw and Hendersonall had various and continuing roles with the CAI itself (North of PortageAdministrative Task Force 1983).8. Along with otherproposed projects that did not materialise, the Union Centre andRoyal Winnipeg Ballet facility were built at other locations. The ScienceCentre/Park could not be accommodated due to space constraints.9. Kent Smith, in his interview (June 1992) showed one of a series of cartoons run bythe Winnipeg Free Press in 1983 calling for "something" to be done for North ofPortage.10. Gerecke and Reid (1990) make reference to this loss due to a mortgage default onthe residential property. They suggest that Kiernan sweeps this under the table in anattempt to support public/private development corporations such as the NorthPortage Development.15711. The Board of Directors as of October, 1989 were Sheryl MacDonald; Ted Murphy,Charlette Duguay, Donald Leitch, Roy Parkhill, John Bulman, Richard Frost, ElaineHeinicke representing the federal government, and G. Campbell MacLean asChairperson (The Forks Renewal Corporation 1989 Annual Report).Chapter 6PERCEPTIONS OF THE CORE AREA INITIATIVE6.1 Introduction This dissertation constitutes an empirical investigation into the nature and efficacy ofthe Winnipeg Core Area Initiative as a case study for future efforts in urban revitalisation.To paraphrase and reiterate the volumes of data presented in numerous reports doneinternally for the CAI, or by external consultants and commentators, would not do this"innovative experiment" (Kiernan 1987) justice. The two core area agreements were a partof an ongoing process lasting a decade -- a decade of political, social, physical andeconomic change. To give depth and meaning to the study of the CAI, perceptions,attitudes and opinions were gathered from a variety of sources, including: personalinterviews with key individuals, user and non-user group surveys and public attitude polls,the Angus Reid Group survey; community-inquiry presentations; and, print media coverage.Examination of this wide range of material provides answers to the fourth set of researchquestions asked at the beginning of this dissertation -- questions having to do with thevalue systems of the decision-makers of the CAI and of the level of community acceptanceof these values. In addition, this material contributes answers from the point of view ofthe community (both core and non-core area residents) to research questions 5 to 9concerning process, programme definition, resource allocation, implementation and deliverymechanisms, public participation and perceived impacts on the immediate and largercommunity. Because this chapter deals with perceptions of the CAI, only the results of thecase study interviews regarding perceptions are presented here. A more thoroughdiscussion and analysis of the broader interview data is presented in the next chapter.1596.2 Key Participant and Observer PerceptionsIn an attempt to measure the relative success and weakness of the CAI I and IIgenerally, and specifically with regard to policy, programming and implementationimplications for urban revitalisation, personal interviews were conducted with key people,or "core players," who had an influential role in the history and evolution of the CAI. Thepeople contacted for interview represented persons with varying roles' and included:administrators and staff of the CAI I and II at various points in time; politicians;government representatives of the three signatories to both agreements; governmentbureaucrats; business leaders and executives of the North of Portage DevelopmentCorporation and the Forks Renewal Corporation; representatives of non-governmentorganizations; and observers (see Appendix I). The interviews provide a major portion ofdata on which the case study of the Winnipeg Core Area Initiative is built. They areimportant in two respects. Firstly, they are an important source in piecing togetherretrospectively the chronological unfolding of events preceding the creation of the CAI and,as well, events that took place over the decade of both agreements. Secondly, theyconstitute the primary source of attitudes, perceptions and ideologies of major participantsand observers in the evolution of the CAI. They represent a different perspective from thetangible "hardware" measures found in reports documenting the output statistics of thevarious programmes. These interviews provide a much more comprehensive and profoundunderstanding of the CAI as a case study than would have been possible from a review ofliterature alone. Each person who agreed to be interviewed gave generously of their time.At a minimum, the interviews lasted one hour, many took longer, and several of theparticipants were re-contacted in person or by telephone.160There is no doubt that the results of the interviews yielded an unusually richbody of both factual and impressionistic data. Limitations, of course, have to be placed onthe degree of importance attached to specific recollections given by each individual? Bothtime, and the propensity of individuals to "romanticise" certain events, can lead toquestions of reliability of information; however, every attempt was made to verifyinformation of a factual nature, cross-referencing it with written and other oral accounts ofthe situation. Individual perceptions and impressions were recorded as such, and wereattributed to the respondents where permission for publication was given.6.2.1 The SampleA list was drawn of individuals who had been involved in either, or both, the CAI Iand CAI II. Emphasis for selection was placed on individuals who played a role in theinitial policy formation of the CAI, those who had senior administrative duties inimplementing CAI policy, and representatives of government and non-government agencieswho had been engaged with the CAI on a continuing or sustained basis. Also includedwere "observers" -- those people who had commented upon the Initiative from an academicor professional viewpoint over time. In the first stage of each interview, respondents wereasked if they could provide names of other people whom they viewed as importantpotential respondents, thus contributing to a "snowball" technique in generating the sample.Thirty-seven individuals were contacted resulting in twenty-five interviews (67.5 percent)carried out primarily in the spring of 1991.1616.2.2 Data CollectionThe Dillman Total Design Method (Dillman 1978) was used for data collection.Initial contact was made with individuals through a letter explaining the nature and purposeof the study (see Appendix IV for an example of a contact letter). The letter was followedby a telephone call, using a standardized text, to verify interest of the individual to beinterviewed and to set an interview time. At least five attempts were made to contact eachindividual before the name was dropped from the contact sheet. Interviews took place atthe participant's place of business or home, when desired.6.2.3 EthicsPotential participants in the case study were informed of the nature of the study andtheir right to withdraw at any time. They were asked if any, or all, of their interview wasconsidered to be confidential or if any information was to be recorded in an anonymousmanner. None of the respondents requested that their interview remain confidential -- onlyone respondent asked that sections of the comments be open-ended responses recordedanonymously.6.2.4 Research DesignTwo methods were used to collect and record objective and subjective data from thecase-study participants. Firstly, each participant was given an oral questionnaire containingcategories of questions that required perceptions or judgements on nine subject areas:1. Question 100: a judgement as to whether or not the Core Area Initiativegenerally could be judged a success (CAI I and II together);1622. Question 101: a judgement of the success of CAI I;3. Question 102: a judgement of the success of CAI II;4. Question 103: rating of the overall goals of the Initiative;5. Question 104: rating of the range of programming;6. Question 105: a judgement of the political effectiveness of the Initiative;7. Question 106: rating of the CAI as a tool of public policy;8. Question 107: a judgement of the administrative effectiveness of the CAI model;9. Question 108: a judgement of the value of the CAI for the targeted user groups.(See Appendix V for a copy of the questionnaire.)These questions required the participants to rank their evaluation of each question, using aLikert scale based on a one-to-five ranking scale. The researcher circled each responsecategory. Questions given a rank of "1" were to indicate a "poor" evaluation, and "5" as"good" evaluation. Secondly, verbatim notes were handwritten by the researcher forresponses to open-ended questions. A procedure was followed whereby a pattern ofidentical questions were given to each participant and specific questions were added,tailored to an individual's involvement with the CAI. A decision to tape record theinterviews was dropped as hesitancy was expressed by the first few respondents concerningthe need for a tape recorder.6.2.5 Data Analysis and Content AnalysisData from the twenty' questionnaire sheets were recorded, taking the rankingresponse to each question and calculating a mean response number from the ranking scaleof one to five. In some cases where the respondents could not make a judgement, a "no163response" was calculated as a non-answer. Content analysis was used to analyse theresponses to the open-ended questions. The introduction to the next chapter outlines thecategories that responses were grouped under when all of the interview data was reviewedand the content analysed.6.2.6 Results of Interviews with Core PlayersResults from the ordered response questionnaires (20 out of 25 interviews) indicatethat the majority (sixteen of those interviewed felt that the CAI (both I and II) generallywas a success (see table 6.1 for the mean rankings given by the twenty respondents).There was only one respondent who felt that the CAI was a failure; three others could notsay either way (see Table 6.2 for individual responses). When the CAI I was compared tothe CAI II, the first agreement was ranked higher with a mean ranking of 3.77 over a 3.0ranking for CAI II. There was one respondent who did not compare the two agreements.The overall goals of the CAI received the highest ranking of all the questions (3.81) withonly one person choosing not to respond to this question. The range of programmesoffered throughout the two agreements received a mean ranking of 3.66, however five ofthe respondents did not feel they could evaluate the range of programmes as they hadintimate knowledge of only specific ones. Respondents judged the political success of theCAI in the moderate range (mean ranking, 3.47). One respondent chose not164Table 6.1Mean Ranking Totals From Interview ResponsesQuestionNo. ofResponsesTotalScoreMean Ranking(out of 5)100* A Success 17 -101 CAI I 18 68 3.77102 CAI II 18 54 3.0103 Overall goals 19 72.5 3.81104 Programmes 15 55 3.66105 Politically 19 66 3.47106 Public Policy 16 56 3.5107 Administratively 19 63 3.31108 For the users 16 51.5 3.21* Note: Question 100: 16 yes; 1 no; 3 n/a.** Note: A score of 1 indicates a negative or poor ranking; 5 indicates a positive ranking.to make a judgement. When respondents were asked their opinion of the CAI as a tool forpublic policy, the mean ranking was 3.5; however, four people declined to rank thisquestion. Administratively the CAI was ranked in the moderate range. The Initiative wasalsoconsidered a moderate success when the targeted user groups were considered -- themean ranking was 3.21. Taken together, the respondents generally viewed the CAIpositively. None of the respondents ranked any of the questions with a "poor" (1)response, while several gave "good" (5) responses to some of the questions.Table 6.2Ranking Responses* From Case Study InterviewsQuestion1 100^A success?1.Yes^xxnax2. No2 3^4Person Interviewed **5^6^7^8^9x^x^x^xxx10 11^12 13 14 x^x^na x15na16x17xxxx18 19 20TOTALSCORE161101 CAI I 3 4 4 4 4 3 3 2 3 4.5 4^4^na 4 5 3.5 4 5 na 4 68102 CAI II 2 4 2.5 2.5 3.5 3 3 2 4 4 2.5 2.5 na 4 2 2.5 3 4 na 3 54103 Overallgoals 3 4 5 4 4 4 2 2 3.5 5 5^4^3^2.5 na 4 4 4.5 4.5 4.5 72.5104 Pro-grammes 3 4 na 3 4 na 5 3 2.5 4 na^na 3.5 3 na 4 4 4 4 4 55105 Politically 4 4.5 4 2.5 4 na 2.5 3 4 4 2^5^4^3 2 4 3 3 4 3.5 66106 Publicpolicy 5 2.5 4 3 na na 3 2 4 4.5 na^2.5 3.5 3 na 4 3 4 4 4 56107 Admin. 3 3 5 4 3 na 4.5 3 2.5 4 3.5 3^2^3 2 4.5 3.5 4 3.5 4 63108 For theusers na 4 4 3.5 4 na 2 1 4 3 2.5 2.5 na 4 na 2 4 3.5 3.5 4 51.5* Note: Likert scale: 1=negative; 5=positive; na=no answer.**Persons interviewed: Although none of the interviewees requested anonimity, the rankings are not identified with theindividual respondent.166The open-ended section of the interviews generated a wealth of rich information.Uniform questions were asked of all case-study participants. Respondents were askedquestions regarding their perceptions and attitudes toward the ideology behind the creationof the CAI, the overall goals of both agreements, the political commitment backing theInitiative, the community and prevailing values underlying the CAI, public-policyorientation, planning policy, programme definition and implementation, the consistencyandhomogeneity of the public-policy structure inherent in the CAI, the immediateantecedents of the CAI as public urban policy, the nature and degree of environmentalchange over the decade of the CAI, and attitudes toward the expansion of the planningmodel from an open-systems perspective.Results of the open-ended section of the interviews will be discussed in detail inChapter 7; however, some observations can be made here. A major question asked of allthe core players interviewed had to do with the perceived impact of the Core AreaInitiative on Winnipeg. With the one exception of the person who rated the CAI as afailure in the ordered response questionnaires, all respondents agreed that the CAI did notadd to continuing decline in the core area. Each person interviewed pointed to the changeevident in the city today when compared to 1981. While not contributing to what isperceived to be, by many, a case of continued deterioration, core players were divided onthe positive contributions of the CAI. Elaine Heinicke, Director of Western EconomicDiversification, felt that the CAI did its job in stabilising, and perhaps reversing, the severedecline of the core. She stated "Today's core could probably have been worse [without theCAW (Heinicke 1991). Brij Mathur, Director of the Institute of Urban Studies at theUniversity of Winnipeg, claimed that while the CAI may have not actually contributed to167the decline of the core area, it certainly did not reverse it, and, if anything, it polarized thedecline for some groups (Mathur 1991). Mayor Norrie, understandably, felt that the CAIcontributed positively to the City. He stated that, while the CAI did not meet all the goalsenvisioned at the beginning, "the face of the city is different, and the quality of life isbetter" (Norrie 1991).A telephone interview in 1992 with Stewart Clatworthy added an interestingperspective to this debate. With the hindsight of time, Clatworthy felt that the rate ofdecline in Winnipeg's inner-city population may actually have been dramatically reduced.He claimed that the timing of the 1986 census caught the inner city in particular state thatmay not be reflected in the results of the 1991 census. A number of the housing units thathad been cleared to make way for new projects were not occupied on the 1986 census day.In particular, two of the large developments, the North of Portage DevelopmentCorporation's housing project and Martin Bergin's private development behind the HotelFort Garry, had not been completed for occupancy. Figures do indicate, however, that the1980s saw a population increase in the inner city for the first time in four decades,attributable in part to an in-migration of Aboriginal people (Clatworthy 1992).Much of the value of the CAI and its programmes was judged by the level ofexpectations that were raised from the inception of the first agreement and at the renewalof CAI II. As Jim August, General Manager of the CAI for much of the first and secondagreements, claimed, the high expectations were a mixed blessing (August 1989). It wasnecessary, he says, to raise the expectations of Winnipeggers initially to make them realisethe possibilities for revitalisation of their city, but in some cases, the expectations becameso high they could not be met. Others echoed that thought, especially members of the168Planning Department who felt that they should "jump on the bandwagon" and takeadvantage of the rush of enthusiasm while the money lasted. In a sense, the dollars thatflowed as a result of the CAI were totally unexpected from a long-range planningperspective, and the planners "winged it" in order to match long-wished-for dollars withlong-needed projects (B. Nichol 1991).The reverse side of the coin of high expectations is the issue of dollar commitment tothe CAI. There is no doubt that the tri-level bank account added significantly to the CAIimpact. Jim August was quick to point out, however, that the CAI budget added to only asmall piece of the Winnipeg economy (August 1989). In addition, many of thoseinterviewed pointed out that at least twenty percent of the CAI budget went to landexpropriation. One of the case-study participants (anonymous) also suggested that moremoney was poured into public-works projects, such as the Bishop Grandin interchange,than was allocated to the CAI. Nonetheless, all the study participants were reticent toguess what the inner-city area of Winnipeg could have become without the benefits of tri-level funding during the recession of the 1980s. Greg Selinger summed this feeling up bysaying that the tripartite venture provided Winnipeg with a "cushion for the '80s" (Selinger1991).6.3 Perceptions of User Groups As indicated in Chapter 4, public hearings were held toward the end of Agreement Ito determine priorities for renewal of the CAI. A major household survey was carried outin 1983-84 (Results Group 1986) and repeated in 1987-88 (not published). These surveyswere carried out with households within the defined core area boundaries. According to169Stewart Clatworthy (1992), the data from the two surveys have not been compared, and, infact, the data from the later survey have yet to be analysed due to the termination offunding. Public-attitude surveys of core area and non-core-area residents were conductedfor the Public Information Programme of the CAI by the Results Group in 1985 and againin 1989 (Results of both surveys are shown in Results Group 1989).6.3.1. User and Non-User Group SurveysThe two surveys done by the Results Group were intended to "develop anunderstanding of attitudes, opinions, perceptions and knowledge regarding the core arearevitalisation in general, and about the WCAI and its programs specifically. . . . toencourage public awareness, support, and involvement in the WCAI's activities and .. .[to] encourage program take-up within selected target groups" (Results Group 1989, 1).The findings presented in the 1989 report are particularly interesting because it waspossible to measure the shift in public attitude on twenty-three selected urban issues overapproximately four years and between the two agreements. Both studies reported on theopinions and attitudes of core-and non-core area residents (defined as user and non-usergroups) especially with respect to perceptions of downtown Winnipeg, the importance ofarea revitalisation, and awareness of the CAI. Not surprisingly, those who were mostclosely associated with the core area had the highest degree of awareness. The large-scaleredevelopment projects such as North Portage Development, the Forks development, andhistoric renovations in the Exchange District were most readily identified by all Winnipegresidents who had heard of the Initiative. While the "bricks and mortar" projects such ashousing renovation, streetscaping and historic renovation were most identifiable (ibid., 9),170study participants felt strongly about the importance of social programmes as well. In fact,the opinion that more support was needed for social programmes increased in the 1989study by core and non-core resident alike (see table 6.3).Table 6.3Residents' Perception of the Importance of Social Programmes versusLarge-Scale Building ProjectsCore Area Non-Core Area1987 1989 Resident ResidentBase Size 900 400 200 200Programs to help residents 60% 65% 67% 65%Large-scale building projects 27% 19% 16% 20%Both equally 10% 13% 14% 12%Don't know 3% 3% 3% 3%Source: Reprinted with permission from J. August, Quantitative and Qualitative Study ofOpinions and Attitudes Regarding Core Area Revitalisation and the Winnipeg Core AreaInitiative: A Summary (Winnipeg: Results Group, 1989)Almost one-third of the 1989 participants (especially those under fifty-five years of age)believed the needs of the Aboriginal people were not being adequately addressed.In general, participants from small business, community groups and residents feltpositively about the CAI and it's role in generating new interest in the downtown. Mostrespondents responded favourably about the Core Area Office, its staff, and services.Despite recognition of the efforts undertaken by the CAI in almost a decade, a ratherdisturbing perception by some Winnipeggers persisted in 1989. While there was a slightpositive shift in public perception concerning the relative conditions in the core area in1711989 compared to ten or twenty years previous, about 20 percent of the Winnipeggersinterviewed felt that conditions had deteriorated (see table 6.4).Table 6.4Residents' Perceptions of Core Area Conditions Over 10-20 Years1987 1989Core AreaResidentNon-Core AreaResidentBase Size 900 400 200 200Worse 28% 20% 22% 20%Much the same 20% 18% 18% 19%Better 43% 51% 52% 50%Don't know 9% 11% 8% 11%Source: Reprinted with permission from J. August, Quantitative and Qualitative Study ofOpinions and Attitudes Regarding Core Area Revitalisation and the Winnipeg Core AreaInitiative: A Summary (Winnipeg: Results Group, 1989).Criticisms of the CAI were directed toward the major large developments, especiallythe North Portage and Forks developments, which were seen to be too costly and contraryto needs of the core. Negative feelings were expressed concerning the political direction ofproject and funding decisions, again seen to be contrary to core needs.This criticism ties in with the second major negative perception of the WCAI, thatof government control. Many participants, particularly architects, contractors, anddevelopers, and representatives of core area community groups, feel that the WCAIis largely politically driven and forced to make funding decisions for projectswithout any real choice. That is, many of these participants feel that the WCAI,particularly under the second agreement, is run by political appointees, and ismaking project decisions for political reasons, rather than to fulfil real needs in thecore area. (Ibid., 10.)172Related to the feelings that the CAI was politically driven was the perception that theInitiative was not focused enough in its mandate. While responding positively to thebreadth of programmes offered, study participants criticised the CAI for not being able toconcentrate its efforts. It wastrying to be all things to all people by giving a lot of organizations and businessesa little money, and also by supporting high profile and large scale developmentswhich were felt by many to run contrary to the real needs within the core area.(Ibid., 10.)The issue of communication and visibility of the CAI was especially important interms of programme take-up. Small-business participants, developers and contractorsconcluded that any future involvement with the CAI was problematic for the simple reasonthat they did not know what programmes were available to them, and, that they felt thatmoney would be funnelled into large projects such as the Forks (ibid., 12).Crime and safety were uppermost on the minds of study participants. Fear ofpersonal safety in the core area caused eighty-five percent of the respondents in the 1989study to rate crime-prevention efforts as a high priority. This issue may also have beenimportant in perceptions of the downtown image and tourism:The majority of core and non-core residents alike seem to believe that downtownWinnipeg imparts only a moderately good image to tourists. As well, fewer thanone third of Winnipeg residents believe that downtown is good at attracting newbusinesses.[There is] some degree of recognition among members of the general public thatthere have been physical improvements made in Winnipeg's core area, in terms ofits general appearance and the housing. There is also seen to have been someimprovement with respect to shopping. On the more negative side, crime andparking are both seen to have gotten worse over the past eight or nine years. (Ibid.,4.) (See Table 6.5 for a synopsis of residents' perceptions.)173Many Winnipeggers were aware that the CAI was funded by both private andgovernment sources, but only one-quarter were aware of the federal government's role (seeTable 6.6). This perception was extremely important in setting the operating tone of thesenior level of government in the second agreement. The lack of knowledge andappreciation of Winnipeggers for the federal role in the CAI caused hard feelings and alack of enthusiasm for renewed efforts in the city.In general however, the perception of Winnipegers was positive in 1989 (see table6.7).Overall, most participants feel that the WCAI will be remembered for havingchanged the face of downtown. While most people feel the WCAI will beremembered for the physical restoration and development projects it supported,they also feel that the social programs run by the WCAI will, in the end, be themost important aspect of the WCAI's accomplishments. (Ibid., 13.)6.4 Community Inquiry ReportIn 1990, a community inquiry' was established to receive reports from communityorganizations and individuals concerning the revitalisation efforts of the Winnipeg CoreArea Initiative. It received ninety briefs from non-profit and volunteer agencies,professional associations and numerous other groups. Many of the submissions were from,or representing, individuals who daily live in the core area and who were recipients of CAIgrants of some kind. A synopsis of the presentations to the Inquiry Board (CommunityInquiry Board 1990) suggested that the CAI was perceived to have made a positivecontribution to the inner city of Winnipeg over the decade of the two CAI agreements. Itoutlined, however, serious concerns for the future. While calling for continued tripartitecommitment to the core area, the community inquiry recognised the conflicting nature of174Table 6.5Residents' Perceptions on Selected. Urban Issues (1989)Relative Importanceof Selected Urban IssuesTotal Core AreaResidentNon-Core AreaResidentBase Size*400 200 200Mean Rating Mean Rating Mean RatingEfforts to reduce crime in the core area 9.0 9.0 9.0Efforts to fix up Main Street 8.1 8.3 8.1Efforts to improve the employmentrate among core-area residents8.1 8.4 8.1Efforts to improve core-area housing 7.9 8.0 7.9Efforts to improve parking 7.9 7.4 8.0Affirmative-Action programmes 7.8 8.2 7.7Efforts to improve the physicalappearance of the core area7.8 8.1 7.7Assistance to small business 7.5 7.5 7.5Efforts to expand core area industriesor attract new business to the core area7.3 7.2 7.3Development of the river banks 7.2 7.2 7.2Improvements to the south side ofPortage Ave. 7.2 6.7 7.2Development in the CN East Yards 7.0 7.0 7.0Assistance to community and ethnicorganizations 6.5 6.9 6.4*Ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 means that the issue is not at allimportant and 10 means that the issue is very important.Source: Reprinted with permission from J. August, Quantitative and Qualitative Study ofOpinions and Attitudes Regarding Core Area Revitalisation and the Winnipeg Core AreaInitiative: A Summary (Winnipeg: Results Group, 1989).175Table 6.6Residents' Perceptions of the Role of the Three Levels of Government in the CAIPerception of Levels ofGovernment Involved in theWCAI (Question 21)Total1985Core Area1989^ResidentNon-CoreAreaResidentBase Size* 620 257 126 151Local, provincial and federal 29 20 27 19Local and provincial 27 31 22 33Provincial and federal 6 4 7 4Local and federal 2 1 3 1Local/civic only 16 11 13 11Provincial only 10 14 13 15Federal only 1 1 1 1Don't know 10 16 14 17*Asked only of those respondents who claimed to be aware of the Winnipeg CAI and whoare aware that the Winnipeg CAI is at least partly a government venture.Source: Reprinted with permission from J. August, Quantitative and Qualitative Study ofOpinions and Attitudes Regarding Core Area Revitalisation and the Winnipeg Core AreaInitiative: A Summary (Winnipeg: Results Group, 1989).176Table 6.7Perceived Success of the CAIPerceived Successof the WCAITotal1985 1989Core AreaResident1985^1989Non-Core AreaResident1985^1989Base Size* 707 310%320%144%387%166%Very successful 5 9 7 9 5 8Somewhat successful 64 73 69 73 63 71Not very successful 19 13 18 12 20 13Don't know 11 6 7 6 12 8*Asked only of those respondents who claimed to be aware of the WCAI.Source: Reprinted with permission from J. August, Quantitative and Qualitative Study ofOpinions and Attitudes Regarding Core Area Revitalisation and the Winnipeg Core AreaInitiative: A Summary (Winnipeg: Results Group, 1989).public/private interests and priorities and goals, and suggested that "planning is perceivedto have been dominated by narrow interests reflecting a one-sided, largely commercial orcorporate vision of what Winnipeg should be" (ibid.). The Inquiry heard calls for "openingup the planning processes to public participation, thus acknowledging the legitimacy ofalternative visions and building a broader consensus on future directions" (ibid., 14). Someof the criticisms that arose from the inquiry were focused on the pervasive problem oflocal accountability. Issues of uneven benefits and increased inequality resulting from CAIpolicy and programmes were raised. Concerns were expressed in four main areas:priorities, scope, long-term development and stability of projects/services and177administration (ibid., 10). In some respects the breadth and scope inherent in the mandateof the CAI, seen as a strength by some, produced weakness as well -- "in short, that theCAI has resulted in something for almost everyone" (ibid., 9). This observation, inparticular, reiterates comments by the Results Group in their 1989 study.A summary of the Inquiry's findings is presented at the beginning of the Final Report(ibid., 4). Briefly, the basic message presented to the sponsors of the report, the UrbanFutures Circle, Inter-Agency Group, indicated that a four-part consensus emerged out of thecommunity consultation process:1. continue the tripartite commitment to inner-city revitalisation;2. give priority to initiatives that foster community and individual empowermentand that directly improve the conditions in which inner city residents live;3. be more open, flexible and accountable in program delivery;4. better relate overall public policy and programmes to inner-city revitalisation.(Ibid., 4).The report went on to give recommendations on the nature of weaknesses in specificprogrammes and delivery structures but did not stop at criticism. It recognised theuntapped potential of inner-city agencies and individuals for effecting change in creativeways.It is evident that CAI assistance has allowed many 'what ifs' to come to fruition anddemonstrate their value to both users and the broader community. Moreover, theseendeavours have become part of a network on which other agencies depend to fillservice gaps and provide complementary support to inner city residents.The high level of expertise apparent during presentations to the Inquiry also can beattributed, at least in part, to the opportunities which the CAI has provided forgroups to establish themselves and to develop, implement and manageproject/services. (Ibid., 5.)1786.5 The Angus Reid Group Survey More recently, in 1991, the Angus Reid Group carried out a public-opinion survey of4,000 urban residents in eight of Canada's largest cities s (Angus Reid Group 1991).Although this survey was not specifically designed to query Winnipegers about the CAI,many of the variables examined were issues that had been probed in the 1985 and 1989Results Group studies. The Angus Reid Group survey attempted to measure and comparecertain quality of life variables and opinions on a variety of issues, including downtown,crime and safety, housing and other issues, as well as policies and priorities for the future(see table 6.8). Winnipeggers ranked housing as the highest positive attribute contributingto quality of life in their city -- the highest ranking given to the housing variable byresidents of all the cities surveyed. This was due, no doubt, to the perception thatWinnipeg boasts one of the most affordable housing markets of major cities in Canada(obviously these survey participants were not amongst the low-income renter group in thecore area having to spend over forty percent of their income on shelter). However,Winnipeg's residents gave its downtown the lowest ranking among the eight cities.Residents specifically gave low marks for cultural and recreational amenities and formunicipal services and infrastructure. Crime and parking were also negative features cited.These rankings highlight the earlier findings of the Results Group surveys. It would appearthat the downtown "mega-projects" spawned by CAI public/private partnerships, despite themillions of dollars funnelled to them by three levels of governments, did not meet thewants, desires and priorities of Winnipeggers, relative to residents of other cities in thesurvey. Public-opinion surveys of this nature have their obvious shortcomings; however,the results of the 1991 survey with regard to downtown Winnipeg are particularlyTable 6.8The Urban Quality of Life IndexVan Cal Edm Wpg Tor Ott Mtl HfxBASE 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500The economy +5 +8 +3 -5 -2 -2 -6 -2Physical environment + 6 + 7 - 4 - 7 - 7 + 5 -10 + 8Social harmony -4 +6 +4 +5 -9 +4 -10 +5Crime & safety -1 +5 +1 -4 -3 +2 -2 -2Cultural/recreationalamenities- 1 + 6 + 2 - 2 + 7 0 7 - 8Downtown 0 0 - 5 - 8 + 6 + 2 0 + 1Housing -6 +1 0 +10 -7 +5 +2 +1Transportation - 6 + 4 + 2 - 1 + 4 + 2 - 4 - 4services &infrastructure0 + 6 - 3 - 5 + 5 + 2 - 6 + 2Municipal politics + 9 + 6 - 2 -13 - 2 - 2 + 6 + 1Lack of stress -10 +11 + 2 + 6 -11 + 3 - 8 + 7Attachment to City + 4 +10 + 2 - 1 -11 - 1 -10 + 6Overall quality oflife index- 4 +70 + 2 -25 -30 +10 -52 +15Overall quality oflife ranking5 1 4 6 7 3 8 2Source: Adapted from Angus Reid Group, 1991.179180disappointing in light of ten years of core-area initiatives. It should be remembered thatthe aim of the Housing and Community Improvement Area Programme Sector was tostabilise inner-city neighbourhoods and encourage return migration to the area; the aim ofthe Economic Stimulus Programmes to enhance economic growth and development,increased employment and the physical improvement of the core area of downtown. Thissurvey indicated that Winnipeg has a downtown / inner city that people want to leave -- fornewer suburbs! (see table 6.9)Table 6.9Current and Preferred Residence Location of WinnipegersAvg%Current Residence LocationDowntown or InnerVan%Cal%Edm%Wpg%Tor%Ott%Mtl%Hfx%City 22 17 14 13 19 26 32 21 24Older Suburb 45 43 45 39 43 52 45 41 37New Suburb 32 36 41 45 37 21 22 35 38Preferred Residence LocationDowntown or InnerCity 22 22 16 11 12 26 30 20 26Older Suburb 39 40 40 34 40 42 39 37 31New Suburb 36 33 40 51 45 28 26 40 38Ratio, Preferred toCurrent LocationDowntown or InnerCity 1.0 1.3 1.1 0.8 0.6 1.0 0.9 1.0 1.1Older Suburb 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.8New Suburb 1.1 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.0Source: Adapted from Angus Reid Group, 1991.1816.6 The Media and the CAI The Results Group study indicated that the news media was a major source of publicinformation concerning the CAI and its activities (Results Group 1987, 7). Specifically,the main source of media information was from newspaper sources, which provided "twiceas much as any other source of information (ibid., 7). Jim August, General Manager of theCM, felt that media attention often focused on the negative aspects of the CAL but that in1984 a shift in media attention occurred.'There is no doubt that early media attention focused on the Initiative ranged fromsupportive and "newsworthy" to outrightly critical. An unpublished paper, "MediaPortrayal of the Winnipeg Core Area Initiative,' reviewed 214 articles in the WinnipegFree Press and the Winnipeg Sun dating from 1980 to 1990. It examined 164 headlines,ten in-depth articles, and forty articles dealing with the Logan "issue" specifically. Manyof the observations highlighted in the public-opinion surveys and the public CommunityInquiry referred to earlier were reflected in the print media.In the early years of the CAI I, the Winnipeg Free Press and the Winnipeg Sun wereoutrightly critical or sceptical. Much of the print-media attention reflected a concern bycity councillors about the lack of information about various aspects of CAI programmes oron their inability to influence allocation of monies to a particular cause. Oddly enough, theCAI was criticised for spending too much of the limited tax base of Winnipeg on socialprogrammes and not enough on revitalising the physical infrastructure on the core area (thereverse of later criticisms).A dominant theme in the early years was heard from residents and business ownerslocated in the core area. Each group felt that the CAI was not in their interests, that182politics and secrecy played a dominant role in decision-making, and that the recipients ofCAI programming had little opportunity for input.The media itself did little to inform the public about actual programmes -- perhapsthose types of articles were considered "too dry" or uninteresting for readers. Singer(1991, 8) reported that "approximately 10 percent of the 134 articles contained actualdescriptions of the programs run by the CAI." However, many of the articles quotedindividuals directly connected to the CAI or politicians making self-congratulatory remarks.Wranglings by City Council were often the focus of reports along with dire warnings byMayor Bill Norrie on the consequences of not making decisions.Of significance in Singer's review of ten years of headlines and articles in the twonewspapers is the omission of reference to programmes for, or stories about, Aboriginalpeople. "There were only three articles [out of 134] that had some mention of Natives (2.2percent)" (ibid., 8). This is not surprising, of course. Everyone associated with the CAIfrom Lloyd Axworthy to representative groups at the Community Inquiry, lamented theabysmal lack of attention given to programming aimed at Aboriginal needs.Early negative public attitude toward the CAI was undoubtedly shaped by reportsassociated with the Logan Industrial Park project.' If community-level empowerment wasa desired feature of the Initiative, the two newspapers certainly contributed to the fracas.Peter Diamant (1992), formerly Deputy Minister of Urban Affairs, indicated that the Loganproject was badly handled by both the City and the Province at the start, but that the mediacoverage exacerbated the situation. The Logan project was intended to provide a key sitefor economic stimulus and employment, but in order for the site to be developed, a core-area neighbourhood had to be substantially razed. Coverage by the print media included183heart-rendering stories about residents faced with expropriation and battles with CityCouncil. Mayor Norrie at one point promised that each homeowner would receive "ahouse for a house" (Bannister 1981). In the end (mid-December 1981), over a year and ahalf after the battle over Logan began, the City's Executive Policy Committee approved ascaled-down version of the industrial park juxtaposed with parts of the oldneighbourhood.9 The media "fishbowl" that was cited in causing the failure of the LoganIndustrial Park was also the tool used by the Logan community to retain theirneighbourhood (Johnson 1985).The print media could not have helped but affect Winnipegers' attitudes toward theCAI. m Criticisms by city councillors, haggling by policy and decision-making bodies,daily stories about core-area residents, must have contributed to readers' convictionsconcerning the CAI and its functioning. Nonetheless, over time, the tone of newspaperreporting proved more positive. As the CAI was able to chronicle successes inprogramming, and politicians and bureaucrats were able to receive credit at ribbon-cuttingceremonies, the newspapers reported more positively on an intermittent basis. Relativelyfree of controversy, the CAI received less media attention in the latter years of the secondagreement. As numerous observers, including Stewart Clatworthy, suggested, mediainterest in the CAI "ran out of gas" (Clatworthy 1992). From an early stance of criticalpessimism, the media tended to parallel the political appeal of the CAI, until the point ofpotential termination of CAI II. At both times when the continuation of the tripartiteagreements were threatened, the print media tended to favour "the underdog.' Thedemise of the Core Area Initiative in 1991 was treated with according respect and remorsein the final months of the second agreement -- an about-face from a decade earlier.184Endnotes1. See Appendix 1 for the list of persons contacted for interview, their position or roleplayed with respect to the CAI I and II, and the status of their interview.2. For a thorough discussion of the value and limitations experienced when conductingqualitative research of this nature, see Steven Taylor and Robert Bogdan, Introduction toQualitative Research Methods: The Search for Meanings, 2d ed., (New York: Wiley andSons, 1984).3. Although there were twenty-five completed interviews, only twenty participants completedthe oral questionnaire. Five of the respondents preferred to discuss each of the statementsin detail as opposed to choosing an ordered response.4. The voluntary 10 member Community Inquiry Board, chaired by Dr. Tom Carter of theUniversity of Winnipeg, was set up in March of 1990.5. The Angus Reid Group's Urban Canada Study examined the attitudes and opinions ofurban residents living in Halifax, Montreal, Ottawa, Toronto, Winnipeg, Calgary, Edmontonand Vancouver.6. Early coverage by the Winnipeg Free Press was overtly hostile, due no doubt to MayorNorrie's lack of political foresight in expropriating the site of the Winnipeg Free Press fora park running from Central Park to Portage Avenue.7. This study was carried out by Leslie E. Singer. The Core Area Office, however, did keepclippings of all print media published during the 1980-1990 period and "had a feeling formedia coverage of the CAI" (August, 1989).8. Greg Selinger, formerly on Winnipeg City Council, chronicled the fight over the Loganneighbourhood in an unpublished paper entitled "Strategic Policy and Plan Making: TheNorth Logan Community Fights Back," presented at the Canadian Urban and HousingStudies Conference on February 18, 1988. Selinger graduated from, and taught in, theInner City Social Work Program at the University of Manitoba.9. See, for example, A. Blicq, "A Neighbourhood in Transition: Darkest Days Behind It,North Logan Lives Again" Winnipeg Free Press (October 15, 1984) 5.10. Gleitman refers to this as the "primacy effect" in his book, Psychology (New York: W.W. Morton and Co., 1986) which discusses the psychological phenomenon of forminginitial impressions from first information received.11. Prior to the formal termination of the CAI, press reports tried to plight the cause of arenewed CAI, for example, David Walker, "Ottawa Must Play Active Role in Core Area"Winnipeg Free Press (November 15, 1990). At the beginning of 1991, when the CAI IIwas coming to a close, media reports started to question specific costs, for example, RadhaKrishnan Thampi, "Forks $85,888 'Profit' Queried," Winnipeg Free Press (January 24,1991). By March 1991, a more focused CAI was being urged, George Nikides, "TighterFocus Urged for CAI," Winnipeg Free Press (March 6, 1991). Once the CAI Agreement185came to an end, a retrospective series of articles appeared, decrying the gap felt by itstermination, for example, Nick Martin, "Area on Brink of Glory," "Disaster: NearlyRefurbished Point Douglas Feared Slipping Once More" and "Ottawa Blamed for CoreArea Decay: Federal Rehabilitation Funds Dry Up, Leaving Inner-City Areas toDeteriorate," Winnipeg Free Press (July 6, 1992).Chapter 7EVALUATING THE CAI AS PUBLIC POLICY FOR URBAN REVITALISATION7.1 IntroductionIn Chapter 6, brief reference was made to some of the open-ended responses bykey individuals in this case study. This was done to amplify and put into context theresponses given to the rank-ordered questions on the respondents' perception of theInitiative. It will be the task of this chapter to expatiate on and appraise the large body ofmaterial that was gleaned from the content analysis of the open-ended section of the casestudy interviews.Chapter 6 also outlined the method used to collect and note the respondents'remarks made during the interviews. When the written transcripts were reviewedindividually, and as a whole, each of the comments were categorised under headings thateither related to the researc questions listed in Chapter 1 or under additional headings thatsurfaced with repeated refinements of the content. This chapter will discuss the pertinentmaterial, firstly by grouping comments that have to do with the way in which the problemsof Winnipeg's inner city were viewed and defined by the key players in the Initiative.This will include the policy frames used to view Winnipeg's urban situation, the localpolitical conditions and personalities in place at the time of the creation of the CAI(including the Unicity form of local government), the styles of policy-making chosen andthe political commitment by the three partners. Secondly, the goals of the CAI will bediscussed, independently, and in the light of their integration with main line departmentinterests and priorities in economic development, social development and urban renewaland in consideration of the City's comprehensive planning goals and Plan Winnipeg.187Thirdly, this chapter provides a thorough analysis of the responses to each of the researchquestions having to do with the implicit and explicit value systems underlying the CAI, theadministrative processes used and the community involvement in the Initiative, programmedefinition, especially the adequacy of and dependencies created by the social programmes,the CAI and the Aboriginal community, the implementation component of the Initiative,and lastly, the CAI and environmental change.7.1.1 Framing the Problem Books and articles dealing with urban planning frequently cite Edward Banfield,author of The Unheavenly City (1968) and The Unheavenly City Revisited (1974) for thedistinction that he has made between urban conditions and urban problems. Robert Wasteis one such author who uses Banfield's distinction in his course on policy analysis.Banfield argues that many so-called urban problems (e.g., high crime,poverty, high-density housing, gridlocked highways, and associated slowcommuter times) may actually be urban conditions. . . . If an item is viewedas a condition of urban life, it is not really appropriate for it to emerge as acentral issue for policymakers since it is inherently insolvable; suchproblems do not properly belong in the policy arena. If, on the other hand,items are seen as problems (read: solvable conditions residents are willing totax themselves for in order to pay for attempted resolutions), then the itemsare appropriate for policymakers to consider and may well travel through theseven stages of the policy cycle. (Waste 1989, 33-34.)Waste goes on to discuss the political ethos of communities whereby heacknowledges that different communities perceive given circumstances in different ways,that is, not all communities would agree on whether a given item represents a condition ora problem. This can lead to differences in the time needed to incubate a policy issue, andthe type of policy seen, and chosen, by public officials for resolution of the problem.188Thus, the time involved for the problem to ripen into a bona fide publicissue (and, at a more basic level whether the given condition is even definedas a solvable problem) depends on the type of community in which it arises,the way in which the condition/problem is viewed by that community, thepresence or absence of skilled policy entrepreneurs, and -- . . . the leadershipor problem-solving style of the mayor and chief policy figures. (Ibid., 34.It is generally agreed that the policy-making process' begins with an awarenessof a "problem" or "issue" on which existing policies have failed to find a solution, even atan "satisficing" level. An issue is identified in some way as meriting attention or action,placed on the public-policy agenda, perceived by various interested parties, explored, andgiven some provisionally acceptable definition in terms of its likely causes, componentsand consequences (Hogwood and Gunn 1988, 108). Definition of the "problem" isdependent upon what Etzioni (1976) has described as "approaches," Young (1977) as"assumptive worlds," and Baker (1977) as "policy frames." This concept of "policy frames"is important to the discussion of the CAI because it sets the context for the way in whichthe "problem" of Winnipeg's inner city was viewed in the late 1970s and early 1980s.Chapter 4 chronicled the evolution of the CAI, and in doing so suggested views,or "policy frames," of the core-area problem by the three partners in the tripartiterevitalization effort. The federal government, through DREE, DRIE, and WesternDiversification, saw Winnipeg's problem as an economic one, a "sick economy" (Heinicke1991). (To be fair, the government also was concerned about the large urban Aboriginalcommunity in Winnipeg). The provincial government, at least at the beginning stages,shared with the City an economic, social and physical perspective (Diamant 1992). TheCity itself was particularly concerned with the physical deterioration in the core, especiallyin the area of the CP marshalling yards, and with the decimation of the downtown business189centre caused, in part, by suburban expansion. The three-pronged attack (economic, socialand physical), therefore, chosen as the potential solution to the ills of Winnipeg's core area,is reflective of the manner in which the problem was viewed, to varying degrees, by thekey players.The following section in this chapter includes comments by the key playersobtained from the open-ended questions of the case-study interviews. These commentsrepresent the subjective viewpoints of the individuals in response to questions on thecontext, functioning and perceived success and failure of various aspects of CAI I and II(see Chapter 6 for a synopsis of the interview schedule).7.2 Placing the CAI in the Local Political Context: CAI and UnicityIn order to understand the perspective taken with regard to Winnipeg's inner-cityproblems, it is necessary to place the CAI within the context of the local political milieu.The CAI was undertaken during a ten-year period in which a supposedly radical form oflocal government had been created a decade earlier.' Unicity, as it was created underlegislation proposed by the provincial NDP government in January 1972, originallyconsisted of the fifty-member Greater Winnipeg City Council, which was responsible foran urban population of approximately seventeen miles in diameter (Artibise, 186); (see map7.1 for the original boundaries of Unicity).With the formation of Unicity in 1972, Winnipeg thus became the firstmajor Canadian city to move beyond the stage of split-level metropolitangovernment to a single administration for its entire metropolitan area.ST.JAMES-ASSINIBOIAPORTAGE AVE.ROSSERWINNIPEGSPRINGFIELDFORTGARRYTACHE'MACDONALDRICHOTST.BONIFACEMap 7.1 Original Boundaries of Unicity, 1972: Reprinted with permission from A.F.J.Artibise, Winnipeg: An Illustrated History (Toronto: James Lorimer and Co., and NationalMuseum of Man, National Museum of Canada).190191The concept of Unicity as it was spelled out in the legislation creating a newcity enhanced two fundamental principles. First, the new council had thepower to unify all services under a single administration. Second, a systemof thirteen community committees were created through which individualscould achieve a greater sense of involvement with the processes of urbangovernment. (Ibid.)Throughout the 1970s, City Council underwent minor political change despitethe policy structure imposed by community committees and resident advisory groups thatwere intended to shape planning and policy-making at the "grassroots" level. The businessinterests of the previous years re-formed into the Independent Citizens Elections Committee(ICEC) and held the balance of power challenged by a small group of independentcouncillors elected from the former suburbs (ibid., 188). Artibise stated that "this couldsuggest that in the future the old class polarization may be superseded by an alignmentpitting the old city of Winnipeg against the former suburbs" (ibid.). Indeed, this statementproved to be prophetic. The strategy of the NDP government in creating Unicity in theearly 1970s -- an intended shift in emphasis away from relying on private developers forrebuilding downtown areas, proved futile. According to David Walker in The GreatWinnipeg Dream: The Re-Development of Portage and Main, "as the ICEC representedbusiness interest, particularly the development industry, Unicity turned out to be a moresuitable organization for controlling the city than was possible under the old fragmentedsystem" (1979, 159).The second reform aim of the NDP government included a strategy to integrateplanning into city council decision-making in order to deal with development in the contextof a total urban development strategy. Facing the significant power of the developmentlobby at City Hall, this strategy also proved impotent. The successful development of the192Trizec complex at the corner of Portage and Main presents a case study of the power of thedevelopment industry in downtown Winnipeg, according to David Walker (1979). ThePlanning Department, faced with balancing the dual goals of rationality and moral purpose,fought City Council, which was in turn faced with a shortage in tax dollars and a tightpolitical squeeze (ibid., 169). City Council opted for the easiest way out -- theredevelopment of the corner of Portage and Main on the grounds of proposed tax revenuesthat would be generated by the Trizec complex. The planners lost; lacking moral andfinancial support, they "failed to deal with the realities of city politics" (ibid., 166).The study of the Trizec deal showed how various business interests dealtwith Unicity council. This case was chosen purposely in a city wherepoliticians were under pressure to reverse the trend of physical decline in thecentral business district. . . . The city was expected to act with convincingleadership so council came up with its grand scheme for Portage and Main.Consistent with its historical role, city council has contributed severalmillions of dollars in the hope that this will be a successful investment andthat the downtown will remain a strong commercial zone. Although thisarea obviously requires continuous capital re-investment, this public decisionwhen analyzed in light of Unicity's meagre housing, public transit and socialservice programmes illustrates how the traditional fusion of interests betweenthe city and the business community has survived into the seventies andcontinues to influence government decisions. Put differently, leading civicpoliticians made little distinction between public and private interest. TheCity of Winnipeg designed and carried out this large scale public worksproject to assist private development on the unchallenged assumption that itwas in the public interest. (Ibid., 171.)The scene was set and the pattern established, therefore, when the first CAIagreement came into being in the 1980s. City Council had an unbroken history of dealingwith the development community, an unshakable belief in development as the cure forlocal economic problems, and a weak tradition in supporting a comprehensive planningagenda.1937.2.1 Personalities, Local Political and Cultural FactorsEarlier mention has been made of the "constellation of events and characters"surrounding the birth of the CAI. Waste (1989, 143) claims that personality factors, thepresence and influence of zealots, advocates, climbers, conservers, statesmen, leaders,entrepreneurs, and crusaders, to name a few, have an effect on the process and substance ofpolicy-making. There is no doubt that the period surrounding the creation of the CAI wasrife with personality factors contributing to the flurry of activity generated by the tripartitemarriage. Of particular importance was the leadership shown by many of the originators ofthe CAI during the late 1970s and early 1980s. Lloyd Axworthy had federal political cloutand a working knowledge of Winnipeg's inner-city problems. Gerry Mercier, DavidSanders and Peter Diamant were skilled statesmen who had built up years of contacts andtrust for the Province. Mayor Norrie, backed by a contingent of Council supporters, mayhave lacked the veteran experience of former mayor Steven Juba, but he knew how tomanipulate City Council and media to take advantage of the "thirty-three-cent dollar."The way had been paved for the CAI by years of groundwork attempting to co-opt the federal government through MSUA in an arrangement to join the Province with theCity in revisions to the Winnipeg Development Plan. Winnipeg, like other cities, had acultural and institutional heritage and set of community standards peculiar to itself, makingit difficult for non-Winnipeggers to understand the nuances of operating in the City. Muchof the good will, trust and working relationships established between the three levels ofgovernment in the years preceding the creation of the CAI was instrumental in bringing theCAI to fruition.1947.2.2 Styles of Policy-MakingThe styles of policy-making reflected in the initial phase of the CAI, and in therenewed Agreement, were arguably as diverse as the actors involved. Tom Yauk, CityCommissioner of Planning and Community, who was instrumental in the early years of theCAI, called it "muddling through" (Yauk 1991). Peter Diamant made the case for both arational style and an incremental one (Diamant 1992). Tom Carter, former Director of theInstitute for Urban Studies, University of Winnipeg, acknowledged that, while some policy-making was substantive, particularly in the housing area, much of it was symbolic, due tolack of resources necessary to effect change. Many saw the reflexive and incrementalnature of CAI policy-making as a benefit, especially in the early years of the firstagreement (August 1989). An environment where modification and fine-tuning could occurwas considered a boon to an experimental project such as the CAI. As the Initiativeprogressed, however, the various bureaucracies became entrenched, and policy-making(some would argue there was none) became rigid, in line with departmental priorities.7.2.3 Political Commitment and the CAIThere is no doubt that the CAI enjoyed the political commitment of the tripartitepartners in the early years despite the misgivings of the NDP in 1981. During the first fewyears, placing the Initiative on the public agenda (that is, causing the local problems of thecore area to become part of the public discourse of Winnipeggers), posed a tricky andsensitive task. Jim August (1991) recalled the difficulty in balancing the need to elicitinterest and enthusiasm from politicians on all three levels -- to "sell the CAI," with theconcern for containing the expectations within reasonable limits.195The first flush of success felt by the federal Liberals was dampened when theCAI became mired in controversy surrounding the Logan Industrial Site. As a result,according to Jim August (1992), the CAI was not included in any of Lloyd Axworthy'spress for over a year before the Liberals lost in 1984. Although Lloyd Axworthy remainsa member of parliament for the same riding, his active involvement and the spirit that heengendered in the CAI dissipated over time. The current minister for WesternDiversification, Jake Epp, displays none of Axworthy's enthusiasm for the CAI, appearedonly to be interested in the Forks Development as a visible federal project in CAI II, andhas repeatedly stated that a new tripartite arrangement would be on a limited basis, if at all.This seems to be quite in keeping with observations made by Hogwood and Gunnconcerning policy succession and policy termination.This interest [in the analytical issues and practical problems involved interminating programmes] can be seen to have at least two strands: (a) thelogical outcome of an adverse evaluation of a programme is that theprogramme ought to be replaced; (b) a political climate of budgetretrenchment raises the possibility of government withdrawal from someexisting activities, or alteration of those activities to a less costly form. Onething which does emerge from the termination literature is that completeterminations of programmes are rare; i.e. some replacement is normallyprovided. (1988, 241.)Both of these scenarios appear to hold true for the federal governmentcommitment. As noted in Chapter 4, public accountability was called into question at thepoint of renewal of the first agreement, resulting in much tighter control by federal linedepartments and an increased bureaucratization of the CAI process. The issue ofaccountability, coupled with severe budget retrenchment in all aspects of federal spending,was used to justify a reduced interest in the CAI toward the end of Agreement II. Elaine196Heinicke indicated that both the federal government and the Province had to look at otherareas of the Province (southern Manitoba) as future priority areas (Heinicke 1991).The provincial government, sandwiched between the federal and local levels,took varying postures and held varying degrees of commitment, depending upon thepolitical party in power and other concerns throughout the Province. Because the City ofWinnipeg represents such a large proportion of the population of the Province as a whole,the provincial government could not afford to ignore the CAI or the leveraging of dollars;however, much of their initial enthusiasm waned over time.The City of Winnipeg had the most to gain from the CAI and virtually nothingto lose. Despite political differences between Mayor Norrie and City Council and thepervasive inner city/outer city conflict, the local level of government backed the CAIgenerally (Norrie 1991). One could debate the altruistic motives of some councillors;nonetheless, Jim August believed the CAI forced the City to look at some areas and issuesthat they refused to look at before (August 1992). Back-room decision-making by themayor (Kostyra 1991), and numerous sessions in which the Mayor "rammed through"projects (Selinger 1991) using a sixteen out of twenty-nine vote majority, caused somealienation of Council and made for tough negotiating most of the time. Politicalcommitment varied with the issue, as is the case with most local governments.Various phrases have been used to describe the political commitment toward theCAI by the end of the second agreement -- "had its time," "things got tired," "ran out ofsteam." Peter Diamant, a self-confessed incrementalist, felt that the CAI was good in theshort term and that as the model became more and more institutionalized it was appropriatethat the Initiative should wind down. No initiative can, or should, sustain that level of197attention and energy in the long run. Ten years was perhaps more than hoped for,according to Diamant (1991).7.3 The Goals of the CAIThe mix of physical, economic and social objectives inherent in the goals of theCAI have been considered one of the Initiative's unique aspects. While this point isdebatable in the light of other North American examples of urban regeneration, the explicitinterweaving of the goals throughout the programming in both agreements is noteworthy.Mayor Norrie claimed that the initial concept of blending an urban renewal effort withsocial concerns and job training was an attempt to recognise that the problems of the corewere interrelated (Norrie 1991). However, the actual mix, or more importantly theweightings of the goals at any given time, proved to be a frustration and a politicalnightmare. The NDP constantly fought the battle against "bricks and mortar" projects andthe development industry (Kostyta 1991), while the Social Planning Council of Winnipegfound the social initiative was "never up to the job" (Sale 1991). Tim Sale pointed out thatthe idea of leveraging of private dollars was fine for physical and economic programmesbut was impossible to implement in social areas. This problem of implementation appearedto be the key variable in the whole process of the CAI. Many observers, including BrijMathur, Eugene Kostyra and Jim Beaulieu agreed that there were missing links betweenthe objectives and implementation. The broad scope of the CAI goals, touted by Kiernanand others, was seen by some, such as Tom Yaulc, as "being too comprehensive, too opento politics, too broad" (Yank 1991).1987.3.1 Integration with Existing Main Line Programmes7.3.1.1 Economic DevelopmentAs outlined in Chapter 4, the federal government's primary rationalisation for itsinitial and renewed participation in the Winnipeg Core Area Agreement was regionaleconomic development. Many factors contributed to the weak success achieved in thisarea, not the least of which was the 1982 recession. While Elaine Heinicke claimed thatthe CAI couldn't solve the local, or for that matter the provincial, economy, she claimedthat lack of expected progress had to be put into the context of the recession (Heinicke1991). Other observers were less generous in attributing local economic- developmentfailure to national and global economic forces. Tom Carter, Jim August and LloydAxworthy all lamented the lack of corporate support and blamed a reluctant local businesscommunity for poor economic development in Winnipeg. It is generally agreed that thelack of a downtown business strategy hampered early economic stimulus activities, causingAxworthy's desire for a "critical mass" of high-skill developments to fizzle out.Axworthy's dream of creating a downtown financial centre that would spin off a secondtier of economic activity never materialised (Axworthy 1991). Other large developments,such as the athletic complex and hotel proposed by a local consortium in the early 1980s,were "shot down by City Council politics" (ibid.). In the long run, the initial goals ofattracting manufacturing and high technology were a disappointment.While large-scale hopes for an economic turn-around in Winnipeg fell flat,smaller initiatives suffered a mixed fate. Although the output for the economic stimulusactivities were substantial in person-years of employment, job-training programmes metwith a lack of corporate support for affirmative-action hiring. A repeated theme heard by199the Community Committee Inquiry was the need for greater support for community-basedeconomic development and greater integration of small, self-help economic activities withexisting local economic development strategies (Community Inquiry Board 1990, 23).7.3.1 2 Social DevelopmentWhile some of the positive aspects of the social-service programme side of theCAI were related to innovative programme proposals, the issue of long-term fundingdependency arose time and time again. Pilot projects in particular found themselves inprecarious financial circumstances when faced with termination of funding at the end ofAgreement II. Jim August (1989) made it patently clear from the outset of bothagreements that funding under any of the CAI programmes was not intended to be longterm and that inner-city groups and agencies must be prepared to achieve self-sufficiency ifthey were to survive over time. Some agencies with established operating support used theCAI as an opportunity to experiment with one-time projects or pilot projects thatessentially became a supplementary source of funding. Nonetheless, many groups were notsuccessful in securing ongoing operating support and folded. Either way, criticism waslevelled at the CAI for not creating stronger linkages between projects and government-linedepartments.One of the most vexing, and in the long run insolvable, problems faced by theCAI in meeting its social agenda was the structural change needed in pursuing reform ofthe systemic problems facing inner-city residents -- problems of poverty, unemploymentand lack of education. The Community Inquiry reported:200It is evident that the attention paid to issues such as these [overall publicspending priorities, employment, income security, immigration, Aboriginalaffairs, and urban planning] will determine in large part whether CM-typeagreements result in fundamental changes in inner city conditions or provideonly short-term relief. (Community Inquiry Board 1990.)This short-term approach to intractable inner-city problems was seen as aparticular weakness of the CAI because the opportunities for social-service agencies torealize their objectives were hampered by lack of integration with government-linedepartments and long-term commitments for stable funding. Urban RenewalTri-level involvement was not a new feature of urban and neighbourhoodrenewal efforts in Winnipeg. The former Neighbourhood Improvements Programme (NT)and Community Improvements Programmes (CIP) of the 1970s used a combination ofresources to deliver physical revitalisation projects integrated with social services. Whilethe housing and neighbourhood-improvement-sector programmes of the CAI wereundoubtedly a major strength of the Initiative, critics such as Tom Yauk suggested that theformer NIPs and CIPs were more successful (Yauk 1991). Again, this appears to have todo with integration of efforts within an overall long-term planning context. Residentinvolvement and decentralisation of decision-making and implementation were featuresfavourably regarded in submissions to the Community Inquiry and were ones foundwanting in the short-term CAI programmes.32017.4 The CAI and Plan Winnipeg One of the major weaknesses expressed concerning the CAI as an urbanrevitalisation plan was the lack of integration with an overall planning strategy for the Cityof Winnipeg. Critics of the CAI in this regard admit a dilemma. Plan Winnipeg, the 1986official development plan for the City, was principally a containment plan that did notaddress the social problems of the core area and avoided the problems associated withMain Street altogether (Carter 1991). Despite the broad goals of the Initiative itself, theurban revitalisation thrust of the CAI was not framed within a vision or planning contextfor the City. This lack of "vision" for the development of Winnipeg generally, and for theinner city in particular, was seen by many as the "anchor" missing from the whole scheme.7.4.1 The History of Plan WinnipegAdopted in 1986 between the two CAI agreements, Plan Winnipeg was intendedas a long-range development plan for the City. It emerged as a result of a process begunin 1975 to review the former 1968 Greater Winnipeg. Development Plan (GWD Plan).Significantly, the GWD Plan was a product of the former Metro government and designedin a period of unrestrained optimism for the growth of Winnipeg. As a result, the planfocused on outward growth and attempted to distribute that growth throughout the thirteenmunicipalities comprising the City.Plan Winnipeg was based on a review of the former GWD Plan. Usingforecasting techniques for population growth, housing demand and employment, plannersconcluded that forecasts for Winnipeg had been overly optimistic and proceeded to revisegrowth projections downward (Mathur 1989, 6). 4 In addition to a long-range development202plan, the review process was to identify an urban strategy complete with plans of actionand methods for implementation aided by the provincial and federal governments(Henderson 1990, 3). In 1979, as a result of the termination of the Ministry of State forUrban Affairs at the federal level and the restructuring of the Department of Urban Affairsat the provincial level, the two senior governments withdrew from the planning reviewprocess. The net result was that Plan Winnipeg "wound up as a set of policies andobjectives without specific programs for action, and with little reference to an urbanstrategy" (ibid.).5The major objectives of Plan Winnipeg focused on the development or use ofland in the City and its "additional zone," and on the physical, social and economicenvironment and the transportation system (City of Winnipeg 1981); (see map 7.2 for thearea included in Plan Winnipeg). In a "vision" statement for the City, city- developmentpolicy was to be guided by seven predominant concerns: (1) revitalising olderneighbourhoods; (2) managing suburban growth; (3) developing downtown; (4) promotingeconomic development; (5) protecting the environment; (6) providing essential services;and (7) improving transportation (ibid.). In order to accomplish some of these goals, PlanWinnipeg was to work in tandem with NIP and CIP, the Residential RehabilitationAssistance Program, the Action Area Programmes and the Core Area ResidentialUpgrading and Maintenance Programme through the CAI, the North of PortageDevelopment Corporation and the Forks Project (ibid.). Significantly, a statement by theCity, made prior to the adoption of Plan Winnipeg in 1986, cautioned that any developmentof new programmes "and the possible renewal of existing programs, particularly thoseunder the Core Area Initiative, should be undertaken within the policy context of Plan•e•ADDITIONAL ZONE POLICY AREASPLAN WINNIPEG POLICY AREA ^BOOMBWIll RURAL AREASAREAS OF LIMITED URBAN EXPANSION----- ADDITIONAL ZONE BOUNDARYCITY OF WINNIPEG BOUNDARYMap 7.2 Winnipeg Area Characterisation 1985: The City of Winnipeg, Department of Environmental Planning, July 1985.204Winnipeg" (City of Winnipeg 1983, 14).An important feature of the long-term strategy for managing suburban growthwas the concept of the "urban limit line" (see map 7.3). This line was to establish aboundary limit for the provision of new trunk services in order "to reduce suburban sprawl,ensure cost-effective use of the City's infrastructure investment, and maintain farm land inagricultural service" (ibid., 16). The urban limit was seen as a long-term proposition --"not subject to short term influences" (ibid.). Adjacent to the line were areas designated asex-urban municipalities, including an "additional zone" or buffer between ruralmunicipalities and the city boundary. Plan Winnipeg: Dissolving BoundariesDespite the good intentions of the planners involved in creating Plan Winnipeg,"something went amiss." If a report card were used to calculate the grades forachievement, Plan Winnipeg would receive a failing grade. As early as three years afterthe adoption of the plan, Winnipeg City Council was being faced with request after requestto extend the urban-limit line and ignore the advice of planners. While the planningdepartment estimated 11,500 serviced building lots available for house-building and 2,307hectares of vacant land designated residential in the master plan -- all within the urban-limit line, the pro-development lobby was pushing for expansion of residentialdevelopment, particularly in the St. James-Assiniboia and South Transcona areas of thecity. The "Gang of 18," as the business-interest group at City Hall were now called by theWinnipeg Free Press, argued that the "city should let the belts out a few notches and allowURBAN LIMIT LINEMap 7.3 Winnipeg's Urban Limit Line: The City of Winnipeg, Department of Environmental Planning, October 1989.206controlled growth to occur where there is demand -- especially in small spots where theysay the belts are pinching for no good reason" (Winnipeg Free Press, September 10, 1989).On September 12, 1989, in an effort reminiscent of the Trizec deal a decade earlier, CityCouncil agreed to a joint venture with Genstar Development Co. to develop 800 buildinglots in the southwest end of the city in order to capture a potential profit of $8.5 millionover five years. This was in addition to a similar joint venture signed by the City andGenstar in 1986 for the development of 80 acres of land in roughly the same area(Winnipeg Free Press, September 12, 1989.) Meanwhile, of course, the aim of inner-cityrevitalisation, endorsed by Plan Winnipeg and cornerstone of the CAI, was further buriedin the unending inner city / outer city conflict. While developers such as Brian Fenske,President of the Manitoba Homebuilders' Association called for freedom of choice,"if (some) [developments] are across an imaginary line the bureaucrats havedrawn, we don't care," Fenske said. "We can't be responsible for what citybureaucrats have determined would be a logical stopping point for growth.If the people want it and developers want it, then the city should be saying"What are the problems associated with it and how do we fix it?" (Ibid.)Inner-city residents were having to suffer the burden of new services while their owninfrastructure was crumbling.If the city cannot afford to maintain the rebuild the existing equipment, itcertainly should not consider building more. New buried services simplyadd to the problem. The council has chased after quick profit by developingland in Lindenwoods and Whyte Ridge. Those developments producedtraffic jams on the St. James Bridge so that the council decided to build anew bridge at Moray Street. Then the council was astonished to discoverthat the profits from development -- including the city's share on city-ownedland [the Genstar joint venture property mentioned previously] -- soondisappeared into servicing costs. The paper profits rolled in and yet thetaxes kept rising. (Editor, Winnipeg Free Press, October 12, 1989.)207By February 1991, the pervasive influence of the development lobby finallycrushed any vestige of the containment option in Plan Winnipeg. Pressed bydisenfranchised residents of the small hamlet of Headingly west of the city boundary(outside the urban-limit line, but inside the additional zone) who were unsatisfied withmunicipal services and high taxes, and pushed by a developer wishing to extend St. James-Assiniboia beyond the urban limit in the direction of Headingly, City Council bowed todemocratic principles and allowed a referendum, which eventually saw Headingly breakaway from Winnipeg. The whole issue of provincial urban policy and municipal authoritycrumpled at the feet of city planners, and with them the aims of the 1986 Plan Winnipeg.7.4.2 The CAI and Comprehensive PlanningWhile the new Plan Winnipeg (on the drawing boards during the latter part ofthe second CAI agreement) is intended as a long-term development plan and broader thanthe previous 1986 land-use plan, it was not concrete at the time of the CAI II and did nothave consensus from the largely suburban-based City Council (B. Nichol 1991). In arecent Winnipeg Free Press article (May 17, 1992), Gerecke acknowledged the limitationsof the 1986 plan.The analytical pessimism of the 1986 Plan Winnipeg with its puzzlingquestions about Winnipeg economic future, its inflated populationprojections and the "artificial" urban limit line are gone. Instead we have aromp through the essentials of good government that Winnipeg is striving toprovide, an introduction to the language and concern of sustainability andsome desire for a healthy city. (Gerecke 1992, A7.)208Unfortunately, in Gerecke's opinion the proposed Plan Winnipeg has glaring weaknessesalso. He identifies four major deficiencies: (1) the plan does not provide adequatedirection; (2) it is a plan of rhetoric not action; (3) it is a management plan; and (4) therehas been no public participation in its preparation.Several of the deficiencies attributed by Gerecke to the proposed Plan Winnipegwere, to some degree, seen as CAI weaknesses in terms of a planning strategy. Lack ofdirection, no comprehensive planning policy, an ad hoc approach, were all terms used todescribe the CAI with respect to planning (Reader 1991). This ad hoc planning approach,"the usual way things get done in Winnipeg, nothing finished" (B. Nichol 1991) producedwhat some have called "projectitis" (ibid.). Some of the planning interventions were seenas good (Portage Place) and some bad; however, there lacked a cohesive whole, such thatsome projects (the Forks and Market Square) competed with each other to the extent thatthe City could not afford.Part of the reason given for the apparent lack of direction faced by the CAI wasthe nature of Unicity. Due to the structure of the Unicity legislation, decision-makingtheoretically is undertaken using a "grass roots" approach whereby the PlanningDepartment deals with Council through community committees at the local, andpredominantly suburban level. Every planning decision taken during the decade of the CAIwas theoretically debated by twenty-nine councillors representing electoral areas of Unicity(B. Nichol 1991).The rhetorical nature of the commitment to downtown redevelopment shown byWinnipeg City Council was patently evident in the explicit and implicit subsidies given tothe suburbs, according to Tim Sale (1991). Sale, formerly the Executive Director of the209Social Planning Council of Winnipeg, claimed that the CAI was not only not meshed withany downtown redevelopment plan, but also ended up with competing interests (Sale 1991).The net effect was to displace urban decay westward out from the city centre. Sale hotlyproclaimed that there was an absolute failure on the part of the City to stem suburbanpopulation growth and deliberate falsification by the City as to the projected populationfigures supporting that growth.' Additionally, the lack of property re-assessment duringthe 1980s in Winnipeg led to a "direct subsidy" and a "happy constellation of interestssupporting the suburbs" (Sale 1991). 7The lack of public participation in the preparation of the proposed PlanWinnipeg lamented by Kent Gerecke was similarly reflected in the Community Inquiryhearings into the CAI.In addition, this "planning" is perceived to have been dominated by narrowinterests reflecting a one-sided, largely commercial or corporate vision ofwhat Winnipeg should be. There were calls to open up planning processesto public participation, thus acknowledging the legitimacy of alternativevisions and building a broader consensus on future directions. (CommunityInquiry Board 1990, 14.)This divergence of visions and interests was reflected in comments made byTom Yauk (1991) when he said that the CAI was an "awful planning tool" because of toomany participants and too many hidden agendas. Yauk, along with others, felt that theformer NIP model was a better model for community involvement. Tom Simms (1991)stated that front-end community work didn't go into the CAI. Through NIP, he claimed,generic neighbourhood funds were directed with resident committees making the processmore responsive and relevant to the community. Simms felt that decentralised funds and210local agencies proved to be a better planning approach giving more ownership to thecommunity concerned.7.5 The Value Systems Underlying the CAI The CAI has been described as "an urban policy innovation" (Kiernan 1985, 23)in its response to the problems of the core area of Winnipeg. As noted previously, whatpolicy-makers define as a problem and how they frame the policy issue will determine thenature of the policy chosen to do the job. Embedded in the policy-framing process are thevalues brought individually by the decision-makers to the policy-making process in additionto the value-systems represented in the community to be served. Chapter 2 presents athorough discussion of the relationship between "values" and "facts" and outlines thedilemma faced by planners and politicians in their attempts to identify the "public good."Policy-makers, be they politicians or their advisors, use a selection of facts in framing anypolicy issue and, in doing so, are influenced by their value judgements as to what isrelevant and what is the most appropriate course of action to remedy a problem."Politics is the system we have for attaching values to facts" (Weiss inHogwood and Gunn 1988, 113). The acuity of this observation is particularly relevant withrespect to the CAI. The point at which the "conditions" of Winnipeg became viewed as"problems" with treatable solutions and the approach taken with the model of the CAI werecoloured by the value judgements of the policy-makers in the three levels of governmentsin the late 1970s and early 1980s. Several of the originators of the CAI (Axworthy,Diamant, Norrie) suggested that a rational model was used in framing the policy inherent211in the CM, but, as Leach suggests, this approach does not guarantee that remedies chosenfor a particular problem represent the "public good."Leach has explored the association between "rationality" and values andsuggests: the rational model does not necessarily carry with it anyassumptions of a unified public interest, or any spurious attempts to generateharmony between conflicting interests. There is no way a rational approachcan say what values should be inserted into a particular piece of policymaking. Nor can it say on what value criteria alternative policies should beanalyzed. He argues that the "rational" approach, far from coating the policyprocess with "value free" analysis, can be used to expose the implications ofthe value judgements which are made. (Leach in Hambleton 1989, 174emphasis in original.)The policy judgements that were made both at the time of the creation of theCAI and throughout the ensuing decade predictably were the cause of controversy andongoing public debate. Although one could take each individual programme under the twoagreements and tally up the relative merits of each visa vis the public interest, there weretwo predominant areas of value conflict apparent throughout the term of the CAI. The firsthad to do with "the corporatist" model of the CAI (Gerecke and Reid 1990); the secondwith the inner city / outer city dichotomy.Gerecke and Reid (ibid.) in their stock-taking of Matthew Kiernan's unabashedsupport of the CAI (ibid.) lay out the opposing sides of the value conflict inherent in theCAI model.In short, the four elements of the Kiernan CAI model should be seen fortheir true meaning: arm's length development corporations meansundemocratic development; public/private partnerships means subsidies todevelopers; intergovernmental coordination means opportunistic planningand pork barrelling; and aggressive development means urban renewalreborn. (Emphases in original.)212At best we may say that city planning today is polarized around corporateplanning, which Kiernan represents, and planning for community and humanneeds -- a social and environmental planning based in communities. (Ibid.,22).Gerecke and Reid represent the antithesis of Kiernan's philosophy. Perhaps amore moderate synopsis of the "corporatist" versus the "community" debate was offered byTom Carter, Chair of the Community Inquiry hearings. Carter said that the communityinquiry showed that people thought that the values emphasised by the CAI were that of thebusiness community through such projects as North Portage, the Forks, and store-frontenhancement. He said that while you cannot neglect the business community because youneed jobs in the end (you cannot be "politically naive"), you have to satisfy the variousinterest of the community. "Urban revitalization means different things to different people"(Carter 1991).The issue of inner city / outer city politics has been noted previously; however,the deep rift between the two ideologies of centrality and suburban growth was never facedsquarely on a policy front. Bob Nichol from the City Planning Department best summedup the approach taken by the City during the tenure of the CAI: "The suburban bias issupported by no disincentives to living in the suburbs -- the underlying assumption is thatcentrality is not at a premium" (B. Nichol 1991).2137.6 The CAI Process 7.6.1 The Administrative ProcessTo better understand the tensions that developed between such competinginterests as the pro-development and anti-suburban lobbies that operated during the decadeof CAI I and II, and the concerns of the three levels of government in their outward desireto reflect local public interests, it is necessary to appreciate the intricacies of theadministrative arrangements of the tri-level model. Not only were outside forces constantlyexerting pressure on individual partners in the Agreement, but internal pressures withineach level of government also kept each partner cognizant of line-department priorities.The administrative process inherent in the CAI model was implemented throughinterconnecting layers of bureaucracy. At the most senior level of decision-making was thePolicy Committee, which was responsible for overall management and policy. The federaland provincial ministers received their authority from their respective Cabinet and TreasuryBoard; however, the City Council of Winnipeg retained local authority, with the mayoracting as a representative of Council. All decisions reached by the Policy Committee wererequired to be unanimous. This extraordinary condition led to some particularly difficultnegotiations. Nick Daikiw, the first acting co-ordinator of the CAI, marvelled at theduration of the CAI considering this condition of trilateral unanimity (Daikiw 1992). InCAI II, the Policy Committee took over responsibility for approval of all projects underconsideration for support from the Strategic Capital Programme. This is the only instancewhere this level had direct connection with the approval of projects, and as such it receivedconsiderable lobbying from proposed grant recipients.214The next layer included the Management Board and/or Programme Advisorybodies. The Management Board was responsible for the administration and supervision ofall programmes and projects cost-shared by the three levels of government. Again,decisions were required to be unanimous. Perhaps this was one reason why the Board wasseen to have too much discretionary control by the two senior levels of government(Beaulieu 1991). In an effort to reach unanimity, the parties often conceded on issues ofless concern while holding out for jurisdictional priorities. Particularly in the firstagreement, the federal level found the process "operationally difficult," according to ElaineHeinicke (Heinicke 1991). Obviously the federal-level bureaucrats, used to orchestrating aprogramme, had difficulty in sharing control equally with the two other levels. The City ofWinnipeg, however, often had to confirm decisions with the City's Committee of Planningand Community Services. Nonetheless, it was suggested by many of those interviewed thatCity Council was often faced with decisions s'a fait accomplis when the mayor had taken aposition at the Policy Committee level that bypassed subsequent layers of decision-maldng. 8 In practice, however, a sub-committee of the Management Board wasresponsible for scrutinising and recommending programmes and other issues to the Boardand, although it did not have direct decision-making authority, it had considerable power inso far as it was the vehicle through which all issues and matters were recommended to theBoard or the Policy Committee.The Core Area Office, under the direction of the general manager, provided theoverall liaison and co-ordination of projects as well as the majority of the programmedelivery contracted to them by implementing jurisdictions. It served as the secretariat to allthe levels and, in the view of many of those interviewed, was in a key position in the215whole scheme of things. The CAI office has been variously praised and condemned forthis role, with some (Carter 1991) suggesting that it added another layer of bureaucracyand others (Heinicke 1991) claiming that it had too much power. In some cases there wasa duplication of overhead, some things were done through the CAI Office that theshareholders could do (Beaulieu 1991). The Province had this concern for CAI II more sothan with the first agreement (Heinicke 1991). It felt that the CAI Office should have beenan orchestrator and not directly involved with the delivery of programmes. It is clear thatthe two senior levels of government had considerable difficulty delegating authority to sucha body.7.6.2 Community InvolvementPerhaps the acknowledgement in a memo from Peter Diamant in 1981 (thenSenior Urban Policy Co-ordinator for Urban Affairs) to David Sanders (Deputy Minister)with a copy to the newly elected Minister for Urban Affairs, Eugene Kostyra, sums up thelevel of citizen involvement in CAI.The complaints and issues raised regarding the Logan programs are generallyjustified and the result of no consultation with, and input in, the Logan arearesidents six months ago, when the programs were announced. Divergentviews regarding the viability of the neighbourhood, both apparentlysupported by surveys, and the divergent approaches to economicdevelopment, education, and employment training in the area, demonstratethe complexity of the problem. The lack of open, straight forwardconsultation with the residents and businesses in the area six months ago hasmade the balancing of these divergent views and the finding of anappropriate solution to the Logan area now more difficult. (Diamant,Minutes, Core Area Agreement Meeting, December 5, 1981.)216Despite the acknowledged desire of Lloyd Axworthy for active communityinvolvement (Axworthy 1991), the level of community input into decision-making wasnon-existent at the planning and formulation stage of the CAI, and low and ill-conceivedthroughout the duration of the Initiative. Perhaps the idea of actually implementing citizeninvolvement in the process was too much to bear for the tripartite partners, given theweight of the collaborative effort place upon them by the CAI Agreement.Many of the core players interviewed commented on this lack of citizenparticipation (Carter, Kostyra, Mathur, Sale, Selinger, to name a few). Eugene Kostyra(1991) felt that it had much to do with the way the CAI Agreement was originallystructured; others, such as Tom Simms (1991), felt that the bureaucracy did not reflect thepriority or needs of inner-city residents. He felt that the "internal hoops" of the systemconcentrated too much power at the bureaucratic level and lacked communityaccountability and opportunity for citizen input. Simms used a term coined by SisterMacNamara -- "inner city tourists" -- in reference to bureaucrats, especially at the locallevel.Tom Carter, Chair of the Community Inquiry, presented a more balanced viewof the citizen-involvement issue. He said that the Inquiry showed that there were "somepretty experienced" people in the community who had an untapped wealth of localknowledge and experience (Carter 1991).They have other [other than money], equally valuable resources in theirexperiences, their understanding of the kinds of interventions that can bestachieve lasting impact, and the human effort and expertise that they canapply to implementation. (Community Inquiry Board 1990, 18.)217Nonetheless, Carter acknowledged that the community groups did not alwaystake advantage of opportunities for involvement. 9 He said that there was not enough efforton the part of community groups to get together and network; in many cases they were toobusy or too concerned with their own priorities (Carter 1991). However, perhapscommunity groups and individuals felt a lack of concern for local issues in the face ofmega-projects such as Portage Place and the Forks, and a sense of hopelessness in the faceof continued suburban development.7.7 Programme Definition: Adequacy and Dependency of the CAI Social Programme Sector 7.7.1 Community Services and Community DevelopmentThe issue of integration of economic, physical and social CAI programmes withmain-line departments has been noted previously; however, the area of programmedefinition specifically with regard to social and support services bears scrutiny. Criticismsdirected toward the CAI by those concerned with the everyday welfare of inner cityresidents inevitably concern the "bricks and mortar" priorities seen by service providers asthe root cause of poor social-programme definition and inadequate resource allocation.Suhad Bisharat, Organizational Co-ordinator of the Manitoba Anti-poverty Organization,gave examples of the unmet needs of her clients.A housing study done with Manitoba Housing and Renewal Corporationshowed vacant units in the downtown area (near Portage Place). The priceof rents is not a problem, people need other things in a price range they canafford, like a co-op food store. Portage Place doesn't meet their needs.Support for babysitting and bus fare were missing for some to take upemployment and training opportunities. Money was wasted on physicalthings like riverbanks. (Bisharat 1991.)218This theme was repeated by Patrick Faulkner, CAI Programme Manager,Community Services and Facilities Neighbourhood and Community Development (Faulkner1991). He felt that the social distress in the inner city was complex and that the needswere never directly assessed or an adequate strategy designed to attack the systemicproblems of the core. He called the CAI a "paint by number" approach to social problems,using a "move 'em up and move 'em out" tactic. The Programme 6 sector of the CAI II,through four sub-programmes, had a budget of $16 million for social issues aimed at thehighest needs areas of the core. This allocation was "a drop in the bucket" that providedfragile, remedial arm's-length programmes that were poorly staffed and out of touch withthe real power brokers." The major players -- child welfare, social allowances,corrections, drug- and alcohol-abuse-education agencies -- were not included in theplanning for the social-service and development programmes, and therefore the CAIprogramme delivery was on the fringe of existing institutional delivery agencies. Faulknerstressed the need for long-term institution building for core area residents but asked thequestion, "How do you build institutions for people who are disenfranchised?"To be fair, the CAI was never intended to be an anti-poverty programme; theintervention was not powerful enough to create change (Sale 1991). It did, however,"provide ladders of opportunity" for some (Selinger 1991). "It [the CAI] learned a lotabout how to take people who are marginal and learned how to break out of poverty, itanimated quite a number of small grass roots groups, it politicized a lot of communities ofinterest to become advocates for the urban interest, it caused citizen groups to ask foraccountability" (Sale 1991).2197.7.2 The CAI and the Aboriginal CommunityAboriginal peoples represent one of the fastest-growing population groups livingin the core area of Winnipeg. In 1986, 42.4 percent of the city's Aboriginal populationlived in the inner city comprising ten percent of the core-area population. A large numberof these people were migrants to the area from rural areas or reserves where theyexperienced a much different socioeconomic and cultural environment (Statistics Canada1986). An historical background presented to the Urban Futures Community Inquiry onJune 6, 1990, by the Ma Mawi Wi Chi Itata Centre Inc. portrays a graphic picture of theconditions that many of these people experience.The circumstances of Winnipeg's Aboriginal population have beenprofoundly shaped by the lack of culturally relevant services and the absenceof a positive and visible public image promoting pride, identity, and integrityin the Native community. Most of the population faces adverse, extreme,and critical social and economic conditions, the historical roots of which arewell documented.The systemic destruction of the Aboriginal institutions, customs and ways oflife, including social supports, traditional economies and the cultural spiritualvalues that define these occurred over the last century and continues today.It continues through a myriad of non-Aboriginal agencies and systemsthoughtlessly mandated to provide services on one hand or another toAboriginal "clients." This pervading mentality infers that the larger societyand its systems view the Aboriginal community "as a problem." Generally,the larger society fails to recognize the strengths of the Aboriginalcommunity and, indeed, the communitys' interest, right, and its capability inidentifying its own needs and solutions to concerns, problems, and issues. Agreat number of non-Aboriginal agencies have been unable to meet the needsof the Native community and subsequently a cycle of dependency andpowerlessness has been created, rather than one of self-reliance andcommunity empowerment. (Ma Mawi Wi Chi Itata Centre Inc. 1991, 3-4.)The distress of the urban Aboriginal population in Winnipeg was highlighted bymany of the key players interviewed for this study. Both Patrick Faulkner (1991) and220Eugene Kostyra (1991) felt that this group represented the population in greatest need ofassistance. Lloyd Axworthy stated that the lack of ability of the CAI to substantially effectchange for these people was his most serious regret (Axworthy 1991). He felt that the lackof Aboriginal infrastructure, particularly in the early 1980s, and the very fragile nature oftheir support systems, made them dependent on heavy funding with little appreciableadvancement. He contrasted the Aboriginal population with other migrant-populationgroups, such as the Filipinos, Portuguese and the Indo-Chinese, who came to the inner cityand appeared to fare relatively better, especially if they had familial support and supportfrom their ethnic community.The Ma Mawi Wi Chi Itata Centre brief to the Community Inquiry does,however, acknowledge some of the positive developments that the Aboriginal communityachieved with the support of the CAI. In fact, the creation of the Centre came as a resultof a process that began in 1982 and was funded by the CAI I. A group of Aboriginalwomen organizes a Native-controlled child-and-family service, the Winnipeg Coalition onNative Child Welfare, "to stop the loss of Aboriginal children and the destruction offamilies and our community" (Ma Mawi Wi Chi Itata Centre Inc. 1990, 4). The Ma MawiWi Chi Itata Centre continues to house this group and provides assessment, support andadvocacy services to Aboriginal children and families in the urban community. A numberof other programmes housed and administered by the Centre received a small amount ofCAI funding ($100,000): the Bail Supervision Programme, the Youth Programme, YouthDrama Project, Youth Exchange Project, Youth Economic Development Strategy Workshopand the Urban Native Feasibility Centre Study, as well as a homemaker-trainingprogramme. The staff of over sixty full-time personnel are exclusively Aboriginal.221The Ma Mawi brief pointed out improved understanding and relations betweenthe Aboriginal population and Core Area staff as a result of the increased consultativeprocess incurred through negotiations on CAI projects. It nonetheless noted inadequateAboriginal representation in the CAI process, and "no permanent elements of structuralreform of service delivery mechanisms has been evidenced by the existence of the Core"[CAI] (ibid., 7). While the brief acknowledged the "cosmetic improvement" from the"bricks and mortar" initiatives of CAI, it suggested that the economic benefit of theseimprovements profited developers and people from outside the core area and that theworkforce Aboriginal component met less than targeted goals. Indeed, in terms ofemployment and training, the Ma Mawi brief chastised the three signatories of the CAI."The three levels of government and also the three largest employees have accepted few ofthe "graduates" of the various training initiatives undertaken. . . . Significantaccomplishments in this area [in training and placement] cannot be ascribed to the CoreArea Initiative" (ibid., 9).The Community Inquiry received briefs from numerous other groups concernedabout Aboriginal needs in the inner city. Many underlined the capacity and desire ofAboriginal people to design and deliver their own programmes. Proposals to the Inquiryoutlined many unmet needs and future projects that should be considered by any newinner-city initiative, including education training and services, economic developmentpartnerships, child-care facilities, Native language and other cultural development needs,long-term health services, family-violence shelters and youth programmes. The key to animproved future for Aboriginal people was seen to be long-term funding and other support222mechanisms. There were repeated calls for the active re-establishment of the Inner CityFoundation envisioned by Lloyd Axworthy.7.8 Implementation Robin Hambleton, in his book Rethinking Policy Planning (1986), distinguishedbetween policy and implementation, suggesting that the rational model of planning thatdominated planning theory for two decades, viewed the two as separate, that is,implementation came after policy. He suggested that it is often difficult to distinguishbetween the two because implementation of much policy is dependent upon action bygroups that are relatively autonomous from those making policy and therefore bargainingand negotiation becomes extremely important.It is appropriate to consider implementation as a policy/action continuum inwhich an interactive and negotiative process is taking place over timebetween those seeking to put policy into effect and those upon whom actiondepends. (Hambleton, 1989, 38.)This observation could not have been more pertinent than in the case of theCAI. The tripartite conditions for policy-making and the number of departments, agenciesand contracted individuals involved in implementation of programmes made theimplementation of the CAI interactive indeed.Hambleton (1986) suggested that there are five factors that shape the policy-implementation process: (1) the policy message; (2) administrative arrangements; (3)perspectives and ideologies; (4) resources; and (5) power and politics (ibid., 39). Animportant relationship exists between the policy message and implementation becauseclarity leads to policy objectives being met while ambiguity of policy objectives may result223from uncertainty or may be fostered deliberately to leave room for negotiation. StewartClatworthy, in his evaluation of the tripartite model, notes that the most senior level ofCAI structure, the Policy Committee, "performed well in situations involving conflictresolution and implementation (including project approvals) . . . and provided sufficientdirection to enable implementation to proceed at the lower levels (Clatworthy and Leskiw1990, 77). However, Clatworthy noted:There is widespread agreement that Policy Committee has not often engagedin the process of substantive policy or direction setting. Most directionsetting has occurred within the context of specific project opportunities orproject related problems which could not be resolved by lower levels of themanagement system. Policy Committee decisions were often described as`deal-based' involving project trade-offs among the participants and to someextent sacrifices of internal jurisdictional interests and policy positions.(ibid., 77.) .. .Concerns about Policy Committee's role in the model related almost entirelyto issues of project specific decision-making, where many observersperceived a lack of consistency and conflict between political pressure(interest) and the intent and goals of the model. (Ibid., 78.)It was the Management Board that was primarily responsible for implementationof the CAI model. Here, the absence of a clear policy message on many implementationissues required interpretation within, and without, the internal structures of the agreementsand brings into question the complexity of administrative arrangements of the CAI. This isalso related to the last three factors referred to by Hambleton -- perspective and ideologiesresources and power and politics. Over the course of implementing the CAI, decision-making changed focus from the original objectives of the model to the variousjurisdictional issues or interests prevalent at any given time. With this change came agreater emphasis on fiscal control, greater administrative control on activities, less room for224manoeuvring, and "more energy . . . expended at lower levels of the model's managementsystem (that is, coordinators and programme levels) on issue clarification and at the higherlevels (the Policy Committee) for purposes of conflict resolution" (Clatworthy and Leskiw1990, 79).The Agreement Co-ordinators Sub-Committee provided the direct link betweenthe CAI programmes and implementing jurisdictions and senior management. In CAI I,their functions were not precisely defined and, as a result, much of their activity wasdiscretionary and negotiated. In CAI II, however, their functions were formalised, but anydirect authority for decision-making was concentrated in lead departments. This producedconsiderable frustration and contributed to more need of conflict resolution by theManagement Board.The Core Area Office provided secretariat, communications, advocacy andprogramme-delivery functions. This was an unique arrangement compared to other inter-governmental agreements, giving a significant level of responsibility and authority forimplementation of the CAI to this office. Over time, this delivery function was questionedespecially by the senior levels of government who resented their lack of control over thedelivery of programmes ostensibly under their jurisdictions. In addition, the ability of theCore Area Office to successfully promote inter-programme co-ordination was less thansuccessful.The programme advisory committees were designed to provide local input andgive a sense of "rationalisation" for decisions related to projects. In CAI II, theseprogramme committees consisted of one citizen and one jurisdictional representativeappointed by each level of government. Although these committees were not directly225responsible for implementing policy through programmes, their input was seen as necessaryto provide appropriate scrutiny for the choice of projects undertaken and the resourcesallocated.7.9 Environmental Change: CAI I and CAI II Fundamental changes occurred in the funding and participation levels of thetripartite partners between CAI I and CAI II. Equal cost-sharing (one-third) in allprogramming was an obligation of each level of government in the first CAI. In 1986,however, a major shift in funding and responsibility occurred, with the renewed agreement.Although each partner was responsible for a total package equal to one-third of the CAIfunding, the actual cost-sharing and participation by each level of government varied acrossprogrammes. Nonetheless, the minimum financial obligation was ten percent of eachprogramme's budget.This change to a variable cost-sharing, and therefore the direct participatory role,of each level of government, occurred in response to the restructuring of DREE during thetenure of the first agreement. The regional development mandate of DREE wasconsiderably broader that its successor (DRIE), and had more flexible money for sub-agreements (Heinicke 1991). Federal participation in CAI II originally came through sevendifferent departments with seven different federal ministers signing CAI II. Despite thechange in the financing structure, equality of decision-making remained a condition of thesecond tripartite model. The system of budgeting and accounting understandably becamemore complex for CAI II. Although this change was rationalised by the federal level ofgovernment on the grounds of public accountability (Heinicke 1991) various key players226interviewed suggested that accountability did not improve and that the system becameclogged in bureaucracy.On the positive side, the restructuring of CAI II produced some residualbenefits, particularly in the area of housing. For example, the role of CMHC allowed formore of a "stakeholder interest" in the second agreement (Reader 1991). In CAI I, CMHCfocused its attention on Winnipeg's inner city but did not contribute any new, unplanneddollars. However, new money ($2.5 million) became available to CAI II at the end ofsome budget years when unspent national funds became available (ibid.).Changes in the operating nature of CAI II affected the policy and planningfunctions of the CAI model. Changes in the level and nature of political involvementcaused increased policy uncertainty in CAI II. Where CAI I was more open to experimentand negotiation, CAI II placed a greater reliance on formal procedures and jurisdictionalpriorities. In addition, CAI II was hampered by the level of expectations (and henceincreased dependencies) built up by CAI I on the part of service delivery agents and thecommunity as a whole, and by the more rigid interests and operating styles of the partnersafter 1986. This, in turn, tended to reduce the range of options available for creativeproblem-solving, frustrated the players involved at all levels, and may be one added reasonwhy public participation became almost non-existent.It should be noted that all the persons interviewed for this case study inretrospect ranked CAI I more highly than they did CAI II. There is no doubt that a certaindegree of "romanticising" influenced perceptions of the first agreement. The experimentalnature of CAI I and the enthusiasm for the venture engendered in the attitudes of theoriginal participants account for part of this perspective; nonetheless, it should be noted227that the continuation of the Initiative, however constrained, was imperative for many of theinitial activities of the CAI to reach fruition.228Endnotes1. Ham and Hill (1984, 12) discuss their concept of policy as a "course of action"involving five characteristics: a decision network; a series of decisions; a dynamicprocess; the decision to do nothing; and, action without decision. All thesecharacteristics are apparent in vanous stages or degrees throughout the two CAIagreements.2. Unicity, an intended form of "grassroots" government structure, replaced the formerMetropolitan Corporation of Greater Winnneg on January 1, 1972. The earlierMetro government had been in place from March 1960 and included "an areacomposed of seven cities, five suburban municipalities, and one town: a total ofthirteen municipalities, with the City of Winnipeg forming the centre" (Artibise,1977 184).3. There appears to be consensus, among the key planners interviewed, that the NIPsand CIPs, administered at a site-specific local level and including a requirement ofcitizen involvement, were more successful because they gave the local communityownership of their problems and solutions. Tom Yauk, now City Commissioner, isthe former administrator of this programme at the local level.4. A report by the City of Winnipeg Planning Department, Plan Winnipeg andEconomic Trends, November 1990, makes reference to this downward adjustment inprojections. Specifically, population projections extended to the year 2006 in the1987 Plan Wmnipeg Review suggest "modest" growth from a 1986 census base of594,600 to a projection of 642,4130 in the year 2006 (City of Winnipeg 1990, 1).5. For a range of views on Plan Winnipeg see Brij Mathur, "Time to Rethink PlanWinnipeg," in the Institute of Urban Studies Newsletter, December 1989; PeterDiamant, "Planning in Winnipeg: A Challenge for the Future;" and DavidHenderson, "Plan Winnipeg: Its Mandate and Purpose," in the Social PlanningCouncil of Winnipeg Newsletter, September 1990.6. During the early 1980s the City of Winnipeg boasted population projections of850,000 people giving credence to planning projects that supported suburbanexpansion and capital-works projects. Sale (1991) claims that the interests of the"concrete pourers(Works and Operations Branch) gravitated toward suburbandevelopment. These are the same inflated population projections referred to byGerecke (1992).7. Tim Sale (1991) argued that the city assessor's office had been instructed not to re-assess during the late 1970s and early 1980s. This was in contravention of the Cityof Winnipeg Act, which required re-assessment every three years. The lack of re-assessment contributed, in Sale's opinion, to a direct subsidy of the suburbs. Thisseems to have been supported by figures calculated by Harvey Stevens, SeniorResearch Associate of the Social Planning Council of Winnipeg, who concluded thata number of suburban school divisions were under-assessed compared to the innercity by the time a re-assessment was carried out in 1984 (Stevens 1990, 10).8. In Chapter 5 it was noted that the mayor used the press to pressure errantcouncillors into decision-making when he could not get consensus or could not co-opt council votes.2299. This had also been the case when citizen involvement had been planned for theproposed Plan Winnipeg. David Henderson, formerly Commissioner of Planning andCommunity Services, stated that although there was opportunity for public inputthrough informal meetings and formal hearings, public interest was low,contributing to a loss of commitment by elected officials (Henderson 1990, 3).10. The social-services programming areas of CAI II alone had 48 projects inProgramme 6.1 for projects such as playgrounds, parks, community centres anddaycares; 63 projects in Programme 6.3 for neighbourhood services such ascommunity development, health and recreation; 157 projects in the communityservices and facilities sector, and 42 projects in the educational support area(Winnipeg Core Area Initiative 1992).PART IV^ 2-3Chapter 8LESSONS TO BE LEARNED8.1 Introduction The Winnipeg CAI was one of the larger urban redevelopment projectsundertaken in Canada in the last two decades and certainly one that was remarkable for itsactive long-term tri-level partnership. As of March 1991, the partnership formally came toan end. This dissertation has examined the predicament and transformation of the innercity of Winnipeg prior to, during, and after the intervention of the CAI. It has placed thisCanadian experiment in urban revitalisation within the context of the general trendsaffecting urban areas in Britain and the United States. The analysis is situated in thecontext of international and ideological trends in urban revitalisation, particularly the moveaway from policies directed to social welfare enhancement to those more focussed oneconomic infrastructural improvements, and within the debate over the role of planning as arational (value-free) process.The CAI was a unique partnership of the three levels of government with abroad mandate to tackle the serious economic and social problems of inner-city Winnipeg --problems, which in kind, if not in specific substance, are faced by so many Western cities.It has used the CAI as a Canadian case study, particularly because of the tripartitepartnership and the comprehensive nature of the Initiative's objectives -- physical, socialand economic regeneration. It has done so in the hope that the urban-policy effects can beused to illuminate future urban regeneration efforts.231It will be recalled that one of the objectives of this dissertation was to study theWinnipeg Core Area Initiative as a model for urban regeneration and public policyintervention. While this was an academic goal, a more prescriptive goal was to use theanalysis to contribute towards the improvement of revitalisation policy in general. In doingso, this dissertation attempted to answer the question: Urban distress -- who can relieve itand how? This theme was explored through a comparison of urban revitalisation activitiesin Britain and the United States in Chapter 2 and was further examined in the ensuingchapters explicating the efforts of the CAI.8.2 Who Can Relieve Urban Distress and How? Part I of this dissertation has shown many similar trends affecting the core areasof major cities in Britain and the United States. Both countries have experimented with awide range of programmes and policy options to combat growing "distress" in inner-cityareas. Some cities have been more successful than others in reversing decline. Somecities, lacking a combination of fiscal resources, jurisdictional authority, public and privatecommitment and ability, or political leadership, continue in a downward spiral of decay.On both continents the amount of revitalisation activity has varied between cities, but, onceparticular policies or strategies are shown to be successful, they are picked up withenthusiasm by other urban regions. Examples include: waterfront developments; rapid-transit systems; improved public transportation and car parking; new mixed-usedevelopments with office/commercial and residential projects; and, more so in the UnitedStates, public/private ventures favouring commercial development.232Chapter 2 questioned whether the process of decentralisation and the decline ofthe core is an inevitable process for some cities. It suggested that in the larger context ofrevitalisation there will be "winners" and "losers." What happens will depend on the valuesof people in a community, whether transmitted through politicians and public policy, orthrough incremental actions by individuals, developers and business interests.To what extent can inner-city decay be stopped and problems resolved? Britishand American urban revitalisation efforts offer some lessons to be learned. The politicalstructure of an area can be a significant factor affecting decentralisation and, hence, thedeterioration of inner cities. The resources available to large authorities, augmented bymetropolitan area planning, have solved some of the inner city / outer city rivalries byplanning growth for outer areas while maintaining the importance of the core. British andAmerican revitalisation programmes have shown that a forceful and long-term interventionis required for success. Short-term, narrow, poorly funded approaches are doomed toultimate failure.New economies need new political approaches to economic development.Public/private partnerships and quasi-independent development agencies have provensuccessful in the United States, not without costs and compromises, as Susan Fainsteinpoints out (1989). Private-sector involvement has an important role to play in urbanrevitalisation nonetheless, and investment is more likely to be forthcoming and appropriatewhen planned at the early stage. Public-private development corporations, particularly inthe United States, have produced good results when they are given specific objectives andarm's-length independence backed by public funds and incentives. In many cases, and on a233strategic location basis, they have proven more successful than public bodies in urbanredevelopment.British planning techniques involving radical planning and community activismhave produced some major innovations in local socioeconomic policy that stand in contrastto American and Canadian examples. Radical planning, or popular planning (Thomley1990), stresses the role of the public and public accountability in meeting community andsocial objectives rather than corporate and profit-making goals. The result is a concomitantrestructuring of planning practice that, of necessity, takes place on -- or beyond, the fringeof the statutory planning system. Intrinsic to these examples of radical British attempts aturban restructuring is the idea of identifying and responding to "public interest" -- asChapter 3 of this dissertation points out, a pressing problem faced by planners today.Lessons taken from the books of British and American planning suggest that akey ingredient in any successful urban revitalisation effort is the degree to which problemsare defined and objectives spelled out. When objectives are specific -- for example,stopping population decline, stabilising the retail sector -- some cities have achievedconsiderable success. According to Knight and Gappert, cities will have to make thetransformation from accidental growth to intentional development (1984, 70). ChristopherLaw and others suggest that what is needed is a system of "urban intelligence" wherebycity authorities become aware of changes in an area, monitor a wide range of indicators,and devise a strategy to create the type of intervention and revitalisation desired -- bold butrealistic (1988, 234).Canadian authors have made significant contributions to the analysis of urbandistress. Alan Artibise and Matthew Kiernan (1989) pick up on the need for "urban234intelligence" suggested by Law when they maintain that city governments "are quitecapable of improving urban conditions significantly . . . [because] many of the majorproblems -- in health, safety, culture, education, economic development, recreation, andhousing, to name but a few areas -- are all within the power of the city to solve or at leastalleviate" (ibid., 2-12). They claim that the livability of the urban environment affects theeconomic base of the community in so far as jobs follow people, not, as has been widelyheld, the reverse.Other Canadian examples of efforts to "dissect" distress and contribute to urbanrestructuring have been undertaken by a number of authors.' Some, such as WilliamCoffey (1991), have analysed the growth of the service sector as a phenomenon that hasmarked a significant change in the economies of developed countries, and specifically onethat has profoundly changed urban economies. P. W. Daniels (1992) suggests a range ofpolicies and environmental conditions needed to support a strong tertiary industry inmetropolitan areas. In addition to investment in physical infrastructure, Daniels sees theneed to invest carefully in social infrastructure and human capital. Various fiscal andphysical planning policies and an emphasis on strategic planning were seen by Daniels asmethods and tools for attracting economic and social well-being back to metropolitan areas.While much has been made of the negative consequences of inner-citygentrification, David Ley (1993), from the University of British Columbia, studied sixCanadian inner cities and concluded that if cities are intending to attract the high-orderservices and the tertiary industries claimed by Coffey and Daniels to be critical foreconomic viability today, then a residential market for the new middle class in the innercity is important. Ley identifies the major social challenges of the 1990s to be the235preservation of rapidly disappearing stocks of affordable housing and the inequities ofsocial polarization in our cities (ibid., 252). Thomas Hutton and Craig Davis, also from theUniversity of British Columbia, expand upon the findings of the previous Canadianresearchers by identifying components important to the sustainable development of cities inan economic perspective (1990). Hutton and Davis suggest that there are ample precedentsfor cities inclined to a pro-active stance in framing strategies to address the challenges ofrestructuring, but that there is a need to integrate economic, social and environmentalattributes within an overall strategic approach (ibid., 51).8.3 The Role of Planning in Urban Restructuring Throughout this dissertation reference has been made to changes in inner-citypolicy on this continent and abroad, changes that have resulted from a shift in identifyinginner-city problems from a social perspective (urban deprivation, poverty) to an economicand physical perspective (industrial decline and environmental decay). Concomitant withthis shift in viewpoint has come the expectation that agencies expected to play a major rolein solving these problems come from the private and mixed-sector area. Due to resourcelimitations, and because of the way inner-city problems are defined today, governmentshave been more willing to experiment with a range of administrative arrangements andpump-priming activities. Changes in planning practice have accompanied the more radicalexperiments in urban restructuring -- particularly in Britain.An important lesson to be learned from all the examples of urban restructuringdiscussed in this dissertation is that there are costs as well as benefits -- "winners" and236"losers." While revitalisation can bring an urban renaissance, it can also bring social,economic and spatial segregation.Chapter 3 of this dissertation examined the role of planning in the economicdevelopment of urban areas. It noted that urban policy has come full circle -- from a beliefin the overall merits of growth and development, to support of a no-growth philosophy, anda return to a recognition of the needs for growth and capital. The replacement of theFordist model has brought with it new modes of operation for planners. Planners areincreasingly being drawn into the role of public entrepreneur. Planners are required tobecome more heavily involved in the development process, and, as a result, there is a new,or re- emphasis on the political role of planners.Chapter 3 also examined the traditional role of planning in shaping urbandevelopment. It concluded that, today, planners are caught in the dilemma of attempting toreconcile a diversity of human needs in a complex society. In the tug-of-war between localeconomic development and local concerns, the problems of balancing efficiency with equityand justice often find the planner in a position of differentiating between value relevanceand values and problems. If a planner is to recognise and re-affirm human values as thekeystone of successful urban revitalisation, it is necessary to reconcile a model of societalaction based on privatism that is non-rational, with a planning system that aspires torationality. This amounts to a tall order for the planning profession.There is no turning back the clock. Today privatism is the dominant themeaffecting urban policy -- but with economic gain must come social accountability. Alongwith the benefits that private initiatives and competition can bring come the publicconsequences of private and mixed-sector actions. A successful public city, of necessity,237means a strong public voice and meaningful public participation. Under thesecircumstances, planners have a broad and increasingly important spectrum of activities.This dissertation underlines the need for planners to equip themselves with a new tool-kit --one that will allow them to play a significant role in the future developments of livableurban areas.8.4 Lessons from the CAI A stated objective of this dissertation was to examine contrasting models ofurban revitalisation in other countries, specifically Britain and the United States, with aCanadian model - the CAI. The rationale behind this approach was to put the efforts of theCAI, which had been held in high regard by some in the planning community (for example,Matthew Kiernan), into context with other regeneration attempts and to evaluate theInitiative keeping in mind lessons asked at the beginning of the dissertation: Should andcould the CAI be used as a model for future urban redevelopment efforts? The answerconcerning replicability of the model was resolved at the end of Chapter 5 -- the answerwas no!This dissertation set out ten research questions relating specifically to the CAI.These questions had to do with the empirical and normative assumptions underlying theCAI model, the ideology behind the policy framework, the political commitment towardsthe Initiative and the respective roles of government in this case study of urban andeconomic development. Concerning the characteristics of the CAI, questions were raisedabout process, the adequacy of programme definition and resource allocations, theimplementation of CAI policy and the appropriateness of delivery mechanisms. As an238urban intervention, questions were raised about the nature and degree of public participationin the enterprise and the tangible and perceived outputs of Initiative, especially with respectto the impacts on the community. Lastly, there was a question concerning the degree ofenvironmental change and the effects on the functioning and efficiency of the Initiative overa period of a decade.Based on a large amount of published material and the rich contribution of theinterview data, this dissertation provides a useful and original contribution to ourunderstanding of the complexities of the Winnipeg Core Area Initiative and its contributionto urban revitalisation. The value of the interview data should not be underestimated.Considerable effort has been made to deconstruct (although Derridian methods have notexplicitly been used) the understandings of the key participants to reveal the goals,ideologies and perceived successes and failures of the CAI. From the interviews and theanalysis of published material, much can be learned concerning the long-range effect of theCAI model.From the outset, it should be noted that city problems are deeply resistant tochange -- even by innovative initiatives. Winnipeg's problems are no exception to this rule.Examination of the objectives of the CAI show that the urban intervention intended in themandate was backed by a strong, vigorous strategy, broad in scope, that enjoyed areasonable degree of political commitment by all three partners. The objectives wereconceptually broad and comprehensive, too much so for the level of financial andorganisational resources available and the level of public expectations that were raised. Theattempt to deliver "something for almost everyone" was hampered by the size of the areatargeted for revitalisation and by the depth of physical, social and economic decay239experienced in the inner city during four previous decades. Nonetheless, the range ofinterventions and the requirement of interweaving physical, social and economic objectivesthroughout all programmes gave a synergy to the Initiative that is missing in otherCanadian revitalisation attempts. Throughout CAI I, interpretation and implementation ofthe Initiative's objectives were experimental and funding flexible. This ability tomanoeuvre was an important element missing from CAI II as public accountability andbureaucratic priorities took precedence over community-based needs.Inter-governmental co-operation through the tri-level model was the key to thesustained and concentrated focus on Winnipeg's inner city. Without the tripartite agreementit is doubtful that any one of the levels could have resisted the transitory influences thataffect political priorities and budgets. The model was an excellent vehicle to harmonisescarce public resources and leverage private investment. The trilateral partnership gavelegitimacy to the long-term efforts needed for the scope of the CAI work and gave securityto the private sector being wooed into co-operation in the venture. While the model wascumbersome and frustrating for many of the participants in the process, it broadened thehuman resource base and expanded the system. The requirement for unanimity in decision-making and funding forced government interaction and enhanced understanding of tri-levelconcerns. The model has been criticised for providing a facade behind which each levelcould hide. On the one hand, each level of government may have used the CAI tolegitimise its activities and levels of involvement, that is, to let themselves "off the hook,"especially for long-term programmes. While there is little specific evidence to suggest this,it is clear that some social-service dependency shifted from established long-term needs toshort-term solutions ending with the CAI. However, one could argue that government240resources were spent more wisely when culled through the inter-governmental negotiationprocess and that concerns of each level could not be ignored or dismissed.The opportunity to experiment with a tri-level attack for urban revitalisationraises the question of what role each level of government should play. In the early years,the federal government played a facilitative and "banker role" but became increasinglyinvolved as the Initiative evolved. In addition to the public accountability rationale used tosupport this revised role, it could be argued that the City, in particular, did not appear tohave firm objectives or a vision of what they wanted for the core area. This wasparticularly evident in their inability to mesh downtown redevelopment with an urbanstrategy under Plan Winnipeg. The municipal government had the opportunity to assesslocal needs and set priorities according to their "urban intelligence"; however, the politicalmilieu of City Council and the structure of the Unicity government did not allow for fulladvantage to be taken at times.The continuing tension surrounding the issue of "bricks and mortar" versus socialdevelopment was one that the CAI could not resolve, despite initial desire to do so. Theinterweaving of social, physical and economic goals was a direct and conceptually boldattempt to balance economic development with disparity relief. Much urban policy fails tomake the connection between the economic and the social elements of redevelopment andignores the importance of the links between social well-being and economic performance.The weakness by the CAI in this respect seemed to be found in implementation of policy,not so much in lack of policy direction. The gap between symbolic policy and substantivepolicy was readily apparent as the Initiative progressed.241The administrative responsibility and the delivery structure for individualprogramme elements of the Initiative was part of a complicated chain of command. Wherethe responsibility was vested closest to the programme's users, more effective andresponsive implementation of policy resulted. The use of advisory committees wasvaluable in identifying pressing community needs and innovative community programmes.Where programme delivery involved multiple agencies and bureaucratic structures, forexample in areas of social-welfare programming, results varied. Two lessons are of note,however. Firstly, it was shown from the Community Inquiry hearings that the localcommunity had an untapped wealth of knowledge and organisational skills necessary toidentify and deliver certain types of programming. Secondly, when elements of innovativeprogrammes proved successful, it was the bureaucrats and politicians that failed to promotelegislation for policy change. One of the greatest failings of the CAI was that it was weakat using the experience of the inner city to make creative legislation to build policycommitment that could be transformed into legislation. Some form of advocacy/legislativecomponent was missing from the Initiative.The gap between policy intent and policy implementation was equally weak inthe area of citizen participation. Perhaps it was the complexity of the CAI model and itscumbersome procedures that can be seen as an excuse for the low level of communityparticipation. It can be argued, however, that the structural arrangements of the model weredesigned for community input only after the fact and that opportunities for significant inputwere used to legitimise the Initiative at points of anticipated renewal of the agreements.Direct community participation in the day-to-day functioning of the Initiative was minimalor non-existent.242The CAI provided a new and valuable role for the private sector in theredevelopment of the inner city. Prior to the CAI, private investment in the core area hadostensibly disappeared, with the exception of support from established philanthropic firmssuch as the Richardsons. While the actual dollar value of investment leveraged by the CAImay never be known, it is clear that the Initiative bolstered confidence in the private-investment community and re-focused private spending in the core. Unfortunately, the job-training and placement objectives of the Initiative were not embraced with enthusiasm bythe private sector, perhaps the private sector was more willing to invest in capital andphysical infrastructure than in human resources. If so, this is an area where "carrots andsticks" may have to be judiciously used to support policy objectives. The establishment ofthe two development corporations, the North of Portage Development Corporation and theForks Renewal Corporation, did much to bring revived interest back to the inner city andprovide stimulus for downtown redevelopment, notwithstanding their modest financialsuccess to date.Leadership -- political and administrative -- was a critical variable evident in thefirst CAI and missing from the second. The vision, determination and enthusiasm evidentat the creation of the CAI can be credited to a handful of persons under a unique set ofcircumstances. The constellation of events and characters involved in the creation of theCAI were, no doubt, time- and location-specific. The endurance of the initiative over tenyears is a result of three levels of government and an untold number of individualscommitted to the original purpose of the CAI.In retrospect, the one key ingredient responsible for the level of success that theCAI can boast is the creation of a special-purpose entity to act as a vehicle for urban243revitalisation. The creation of the CAI as a prototypical model required new and innovativelegislation and structural arrangements without precedence in Canada. The design of theCore Area Office to act as the store-front operation for the Initiative proved to be a strokeof genius. This office galvanised creative spirit and energy and brought the Initiative to thecommunity where it belonged.On the basis of the analysis of the CAI case study data, it is clear that the CAI,as a prototypical model for urban revitalisation, enjoyed some degree of success in certainareas while falling short in others. This study has shown that the objectives of theInitiative were too broad and the efforts too widespread. In many respects this lack offocus, an attempt to provide something for everyone, meant that the Initiative was notrepresentative of core needs and did not adequately address inner-city interests andconcerns. While the tripartite model had certain advantages, it can be argued that the CAIwas a case of funding in search of leadership. The need for unanimity in decision-makingoften watered down efforts or brought compromises with only half-hearted results. Whilethe CAI has been criticised as a corporatist model, the lack of success in meeting the goalof economic development ironically can be attributed to a lack of corporate support, areluctant local business community and lack of a downtown business strategy. It was aFordist model in a post-Fordist economy. With respect to social development, the CAIintervention was not strong enough to effect the structural change necessary to come togrips with systemic problems of poverty. While many of the physical goals of the Initiativewere met, especially in the housing and community development area, the lack of a visionfor the City impeded efforts of the planning department to use the CAI as a lever foractivities to mould a comprehensive redevelopment strategy for the inner area. With a244heritage of suburban expansion and an intense rivalry between inner-city and outer-cityfactions, the planning department was impotent in the face of local politics. The result wasthat planning focused on single sites and uncoordinated projects that often competed withone another.This dissertation contends that while the CAI was a noteworthy tri-levelexperiment in urban revitalisation, it fell short of its goals and its promises. Revitalisationof a core area -- any core area -- takes years of efforts and co-ordination of planning andresources. It is an on-going process. The CAI model was time- and location-specific.There were, however, components of the CAI model that provide valuable lessons for urbanrestructuring efforts.This case study cannot conclude without asking one more question: What hasbeen learned about the long-term effectiveness of the CAI in relieving inner-city distressgenerally and specifically in the case of Winnipeg's core area? For planners, the lessonthat should be underlined is the need for a new political epistemology of planning.Inherent in this concept is the recognition by planners and politicians alike that planning isnot a non-political, value-free science. Implicit in the calls for a restructuring and re-orienting of the epistemological basis of planning is the recognition that a revised attitudeto the role of values in planning is necessary. What is required is a framework that allowsand provides for a role for both public and private values, and rationality, and allowsplanners themselves, their clients, politicians and members of the community to understandand assess the ethical and political consequences of planning decisions and actions."Planning is still concerned with the creation of legitimate conditions for public consensus"(Kartez 1989, 452). Recognition and affirmation of human values are instrumental for245human understanding, for planning human environments, and for public policy formationand implementation.This examination of the CAI as a tool for urban redevelopment has providedlessons for policy-makers as well. Continue to look to tri-level initiatives for a concertedattack on the problems underlying urban distress! In doing so, however, priority must begiven to policies that foster community and individual empowerment. In reflecting true"public interest," there will be ample opportunities for active public participation so thatcommunity members can identify local needs, problems, and solutions in order to improvethe conditions in which inner-city residents live.8.5 Challenges for Urban Policy The challenge for urban policy today is in developing plausible urban futuresthat are realistically and politically sustainable. Developments in the last fifteen yearssuggest at least three probable "knowns" affecting inner cities: (1) the economic health ofcities is tied to national and world economies; (2) the urban-rural shift predominant in the1960s and 1970s has reversed toward an "urban renaissance"; and (3) social development istied inextricably to economic development. The solutions to inner city "distress" lies in amix between well-tried systems and new-found action. There are numerous examples ofsuccess, but more needs to be done to understand the impact of change on our inner cities,and to create new instruments for implementing and integrating economic, social andphysical redevelopment. This will require a re-focusing of skills and thinking, a re-orientation of planning practice, an increase in understanding through research and246technology transfer, and a renewed commitment of public values toward a sustainable urbanenvironment.The broader message of this research is that efficiency and equity should not beseen as polar alternatives on a policy continuum. The revitalisation of the core area -- anycore area -- takes years of effort. There is a need for long-term, coherent policiessupported by consistency and homogeneity of government policy. In the case of largeurban regeneration efforts such as the Winnipeg CAI, there is a need for long-term fundingsupport and facilitation from senior levels of government in areas of basic infrastructure,public works and public welfare. Such support is necessary to augment and amplify scarcehuman and financial resources and to promote private-investor confidence. 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Journal of the American Institute of Planners (Oct.:) 387-397.Kiernan, M. J. 1985. "Coordination for the City Core." Policy Options (September): 23-25.. 1987. "Intergovernmental Innovation: Winnipeg's Core Area Initiative." PlanCanada 27 (March): 23-31.. 1990. "Urban Planning in Canada: A Synopsis and Some Future Considerations."Plan Canada 30(1): 11-22.Lawless, P. 1983. "Section on Planning in Parties, Policy and Election. One: The Tories."Critical Social Policy 8:34-35.259Ley, D. 1993. "Gentrification in Recession: Social Change in Six Canadian Inner Cities,1981-1986." Urban Geography (13)3: 230-256.Marcuse, P. 1976. "Professional Ethics and Beyond: Values in Planning." Journal of theAmerican Institute of Planners 42(July): 264-274.^. 1989. "Who/What Decides What Planners Do?" Journal of the American PlanningAssociation 55(1): 79-81.McAuslan, P. 1981. "Local Government and Resource Allocation in England: ChangingIdeology, Unchanging Law." Urban Law and Policy 4.McCloskey, D. N. 1983. "Rhetoric in Economics." Journal of Economic Literature 21:481-517.Miller, E. F. 1972. "Positivism, Historicism, and Political Inquiry." American PoliticalScience Review 66 (Sept.): 796-817.Moss, M. L. 1987. "Telecommunications, World Cities and Urban Policy." Urban Studies24: 534-546.Parkinson, M. 1989. "The Thatcher Government's Urban Policy, 1979-1989." TownPlanning Review 60(4): 421-440.Plunkett, T. J. 1986. "The Need for Local Parties." Policy Options 6(7), 26-28.Solebury, W. 1987. "Urban Policy in the 1980s: The Issues and Arguments." The Planner(June): 18-22.Teitz, M. B. 1989. "The Uses and Misuses of History." Journal of the American PlanningAssociation 55(1): 81-82.Webber, M. 1983. "The Myth of Rationality: Development Planning Reconsidered."Environment and Planning B 10(1): 89-99.Weiss, M. A. 1989. "Planning History: What Story? What Meaning? What Future?"Journal of the American Planning Association 55(1): 82-84.Young, K. 1977. "Values in the Policy Process." Policy and politics 5: 1-22.Government PublicationsCuciti, P. 1978. Need and responsiveness of Federal Grants Programs. Washington D.C.:Congressional Budget Office.260Statistics Canada. 1986a. Comparing Census 1981-1986: An InfoKit. Ottawa: Ministry ofSupply and Services.^. 1986b. Catalogue No. 95-173 Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services.^. 1988. Catalogue No. 84-205. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services.Winnipeg Core Area Initiative. 1981. Canada-Manitoba-Winnipeg Tripartite Agreement forthe Winnipeg Core Area. Winnipeg: Public Information Program.^. 1985. Mid-term Program Evaluations: Winnipeg Core Area Agreement ExecutiveSummaries and Response to Recommendations. Winnipeg: Policy Committee of theWinnipeg Core Area Initiative.^. 1986a. Canada-Manitoba-Winnipeg Tripartite Agreement for the Development ofthe Winnipeg Core Area, 1986-1991. Winnipeg: Public Information Program.^. 1986b. Canada-Manitoba-Winnipeg Subsidiary Agreement for the Development ofthe Winnipeg Core Area, Schedule B. Winnipeg: Public Information Program.^. 1986c. Canada-Manitoba-Winnipeg Tripartite Agreement for the Winnipeg CoreArea, Schedule F. Winnipeg: Public Information Program.^. 1988. Final Status Report: Programme Activities to September 30, 1987, Under the1981-1986 Core Area Agreement. Winnipeg: Public Information Programme.. 1992. Final Status Report of Programs and Projects to December 31, 1991.Winnipeg: Public Information Program.Newspaper and Newsletter ArticlesBannister, G. and Rubin, J. Clause Rejected in Core Plan. Winnipeg Free Press, September15, 1981.Blicq, A., A Neighbourhood in Transition: Darkest Days Behind It, North Logan LivesAgain: Winnipeg Free Press, October 15, 1984.Charette, C. Winnipeg's Inner City in Relation to Other Canadian Cities. Institute of UrbanStudies Newsletter: Winnipeg, Manitoba. 2-4, 1990.Diamant, P. Planning in Winnipeg: A Challenge for the Future. Social Planning Council ofWinnipeg Newsletter (2) 1:5-12, 1990.Editor. Winnipeg's Choice of Cities. Winnipeg Free Press, October 12, 1989.261Gerecke, K. A weak vision of Winnipeg. Winnipeg Free Press, May 17, 1992.Henderson, D. 1990. Plan Winnipeg: Its Mandate and Purpose. Social Planning Council ofWinnipeg Newsletter 2(1) 1-3.Johnson, E. Core area report card: Looking at Initiatives: Successes and failures. WinnipegSun, April 12, 1985.MacDonald, D.I. Headingly "Rescue" Raises Many Questions: Provincial Urban Policy StillUnclear" Winnipeg Free Press, February 5, 1992.Martin N., Area on Brink of Glory, Disaster: Nearly Refurbished Point Douglas FearedSlipping Once More. Winnipeg Free Press, July 6, 1992.^. Ottawa Blamed for Core Area Decay: Federal Rehabilitation Funds Dry Up,Leaving Inner-City Areas to Deteriorate. Winnipeg Free Press, July 6, 1992.Mathur, B. Time to Rethink Plan Winnipeg. Institute of Urban Studies Newsletter 29(December, 1989): 5-7.McFarland, J. Planning Strategy: Plan Winnipeg Due for Review. Winnipeg Free Press,September 10, 1989.Nikides, G. Tighter Focus Urged for CAI. Winnipeg Free Press, March 6, 1991.Stevens, H. 1990. Winnipeg's Residential Property Assessment -- How Fair Is It? SocialPlanning Council of Winnipeg (2) 1:10.Thampi, I.K. Genstar, City Link Up: Partners to go Halves on 800 Lots. Winnipeg FreePress, September 12, 1989.. Forks $85,888 "Profit" Queried. Winnipeg Free Press, January 24, 1991.Walker, D. Ottawa Must Play Active Role in Core Area. Winnipeg Free Press, November15, 1990.Interviews August, J. 1989. Interview by author.. 1991. Interview by author.^. 1992. Interview by author.Axworthy, L. 1991. Interview by author.Beaulieu, 1991. Interview by author.Bisharat, 1991. Interview by author.Carter, T. 1991. Interview by author.Clatworthy, S. 1989. Interview by author.^. 1992. Telephone communication with author.Daikiw, N. 1992. Interview by author.Davidson-Jury, 1991. Interview by author.Diamant, P. 1989. Interview by author.^. 1991. Interview by author.^. 1992. Interview by author.Faulkner, 1991. Interview by author.Heinicke, E. 1991. Interview by author.Helgason, W. 1991. Interview with author.Kiernan, M. J. 1989. Interview with author.Kostyra, E. 1991. Interview by author.Mathur, B. 1991. Interview by author.Nichol, B. 1991. Interview by author.Nichol, R. 1991. Interview by author.Norrie, B. 1991. Interview by author.Reader, R. 1991. Interview by author.Sale, T. 1991. Interview by author.Selinger, G. 1991. Interview by author.262263Simms, T. 1991. Interview by author.Smith, K. 1992. Interview by author.Walder, M. 1991. Interview by author.Yauk, T. 1991. Interview by author.OtherBoyle, R. and Rich, D. 1984. In Pursuit of the Private City: A Comparative Assessment ofUrban Policy Orientations in Britain and the United States. Strathclyde Papers onPlanning, Glasgow: University of Strathclyde.Coffey, W. J. 1991. High Order Services in the Ottawa Region: Location Factors andElements of Development Strategy. Paper prepared for the North American Meetingsof the Regional Science Association International, New Orleans, Louisiana, November,1991.Gerecke, K. 1971. The Practice of Urban Planning in Canada. M.A. thesis. University ofBritish Columbia.Gerecke, K. 1974. Toward a New Model for Urban Planning. Ph.D. dissertation. Universityof British Columbia.Henderson, D. Plan Winnipeg: Its Mandate and Purpose, in the Social Planning Council ofWinnipeg Newsletter, September 1990.Hulchanski, J. D. 1989. Policy Analysis: An Introduction to Issues, Concepts, and Disputes.Draft paper, Vancouver: School of Community and Regional Planning, University ofBritish Columbia.Hutton, T. 1989. A Profile of Vancouver's Service Sector. Paper presented to the"Metropolis '90" Special Workshop on Tertiary Industries and MetropolitanDevelopment. Plymouth, June.Hutton, T., and H. C. Davis. 1990. Prospects for Vancouver's Sustainable Development:An Economic Perspective. Vancouver: University of British Columbia.Ma Mawi Wi Chi Itata Centre Inc. 1990. Inner City Revitalization for the 1990s: A Briefpresented to the Urban Futures Community Inquiry.Selinger, G. 1988. Strategic Policy and Plan Making: The North Logan Community FightsBack. The Canadian Urban and Housing Studies Conference, Winnipeg, Feb. 18, 1988,Inner City Social Work Program, University of Manitoba.264Singer, L. E. 1991. Media Portrayal of the Winnipeg Core Area Initiative.Occasional PapersLevin, E. 1984. Beyond the Core Area Initiative: Prospects for Downtown Winnipeg. Paperpresented to the Beyond Core Area Initiative Conference, March 1, University ofWinnipeg. Winnipeg: Institute of Urban Studies.Reports Angus Reid Group. 1991. Urban Study Canada. Winnipeg: Angus Reid Group.Axworthy, L. 1975. Winnipeg's Core Area: An Assessment of Conditions Affecting LawEnforcement. Winnipeg: Institute of Urban Studies, University of Winnipeg.City of Winnipeg. 1975. Opportunities for Redevelopment of the C.N.R. East Yards: AReport Prepared by the Task Force Established by the Board of Commissioners.Winnipeg.^. 1977. Downtown revitalization: Background to the report of the Ad Hoc Committeeon Downtown Alternatives. Winnipeg: Department of Environmental Planning, DistrictPlans Branch.^. 1981. Plan Winnipeg: Introduction to the Greater Winnipeg Development PlanReview. Winnipeg Planning Department.^. 1983. Plan Winnipeg. Winnipeg: Public Information Services.^. 1990. Plan Winnipeg and Economic Trends. Winnipeg: Planning Department.Clatworthy, S. 1988. Summaries of the final evaluations: Winnipeg Core Area Agreement,1981-1986. Winnipeg: Management Board of the Winnipeg Core Area Initiative.Clatworthy, S., and Leskiw, C. 1990. The Evaluation of the Winnipeg Core AreaAgreement Tripartite Model. Winnipeg: Management Board of the Winnipeg Core AreaInitiative.Community Inquiry Board 1990. Community Inquiry into Inner City Revitalisation: FinalReport. Winnipeg: Urban Futures Circle Inter-Agency Group.Daniels, P. W. 1992. Changes and Transition in Metropolitan Areas: The Role of TertiaryIndustries. Final Report. Part V: Principal Findings. Tertiary Industries Working Group,World Association of the Major Metropolises.265Diamant, P. 1981. Minutes of the Core Area Management Meeting. Winnipeg Core AreaInitiative.Institute of Urban Studies 1990. A Community Based Needs Consultation of the InnerCity: Summary Report. Winnipeg.Lithwick, N. H. 1970. Urban Canada: Problems and Prospects. Ottawa: Central Mortgageand Housing Corporation.McKee, C. 1977. Towards a Planning Strategy for Older Neighbourhoods. Winnipeg:Institute of Urban Studies, University of Winnipeg.North of Portage Administrative Task Force. 1983. Technical Report: North of PortageAdministrative Task Force. Winnipeg.^. 1984. North of Portage: A Development Proposal. Winnipeg.North of Portage Development Corporation. 1984. Final Concept and Financial Plan forNorth Portage Redevelopment. North Portage Development Corporation.^. 1990. 1990 Annual Report. Winnipeg.^. 1991. 1991 Annual Report. Winnipeg.Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 1987. New Roles forCities and Towns: Local Initiatives for Employment Creation. Paris: OECDPublications.Results Group. 1986. Conditions Within Winnipeg's Core Area. Winnipeg: Winnipeg CoreArea Initiative.^. 1989. Qualitiative and Quantitative Study of Opinions and Attitudes RegardingCore Area Revitalisation and the Winnipeg Core Area Initiative. Winnipeg: WinnipegCore Area Initiative.Social Planning Council of Winnipeg. 1978. Community Development and the Core Areaof Winnipeg: A Response to the United Way.^. 1979. Housing Conditions in Winnipeg: The Identification of Housing Problemsand High-Need Groups.The Forks Renewal Corporation. 1987. Phase 1: Concept and Financial Plan. Report toShareholders by Board of Directors, The Forks Renewal Corporation, November 12,1987.. 1989. 1989 Annual Report. Winnipeg.266Wardrop, W. L. 1978. C.N.R. East Yards Redevelopment: Servicing Report. Winnipeg:Wardrop and Associates.Winnipeg Core Area Initiative Policy Committee. 1981. Proposed Winnipeg Core AreaInitiative.Woolsey, G. B. 1975. Historic Resources of the Red-Assiniboine: A Preliminary Analysisof their Interpretive and Development Potential. Ottawa: Parks Canada.267APPENDIX ICASE STUDY INTERVIEWSCore Player^Title^ContactAdministrators and Staff: Jim August^General Manager, CAI^interviewedStewart Clatworthy^Programme Evaluator/Consultant interviewedPatrick Faulkner^Program Mgr., CAI Office^interviewedPoliticians: Bill Norrie^Mayor, City of Wpg^interviewedPeter Diamant^Wpg.City Council (former CAI& UA)^interviewedGreg Selinger^Wpg. City Council interviewedLloyd Axworthy^Federal Cabinet Minister(originator CAI)^interviewedJake Epp^Minister for Western Diversification(federal)^cancelledJames Ernst^Minister Urban Affairs(provincial)^refusedGary Filmon^Premier of Manitoba^referredDavid Walker^Member of Parliament^not availableGovernment Representatives of Signatories and Bureaucrats: Elaine Heinicke^Director, Western EconomicDiversification^interviewed268Joanne Davidson-Jury^Federal Mgr. CAI^interviewedRon Reader^Fed./ Prov. RelationsOfficer, C.M.H.C.^interviewedRoy Nichol^Prov. Director, C.M.H.C.^interviewedJim Beaulieu^Deputy Minister, Urban Affairs(provincial)^interviewedMarilyn Walder^Manager, Urban Revitalization,Urban Affairs^interviewedEugene Kostyra^Regional Director, C.U.P.E(former U.A. Minister)^interviewedBob Nichol^District Planning Co-ordinator,Wpg. Planning Dept.^interviewedTom Yauk^Commissioner of Planningand Comm. Services^interviewedJames Eldridge^Deputy Minister,Intergovernmental Affairs not availableDoug Kalscics^Chief Planner, City of Wpg.^referredLen Volpnfjord^Chief Planner, City ofVictoria (formerly Wpg.)^not availableLinda Kerr^City Solicitor^refusedDevelopment Corps & Business LeadersNick Daikiw^Pres. & C.E.O. Forks Renewal Corp.(1st G.M. CAI)^interviewedKent Smith^Manager, N. Portage Dev. Corp. interviewedDr. Joe Du Pres. Chinatown Centre^not availableObservers:Matthew Kiernan^Consultant (formerly CAI mgr)^interviewedTom CarterBrijesh MathurKent GereckeDavid SandersProfessor, U. of Wpg. (Chair,Community Inquiry)Director, Inst. of Urban Studies,U. of Wpg.Professor, U. of Man.(critic and editor)Consultant (formerly Ministerof Urban Affairs)interviewedinterviewednot availablenot available269NGO's: Tom Simms^Member, Urban Futures GroupTim Sale Consultant (formerly Chair,Social Planning Coun.)Wayne Helgason^Ma Mawi Wi Chi Itata CentreSuhad Bisharat^Exec. Dir., Man. Anti-PovertyAssoc.interviewedinterviewedinterviewedinterviewed270APPENDIX IIAGREEMENT SUMMARY CAI IPROGRAM NAME AND NUMBERBUDGETTOTAL EXPEN-DITURES RESULTSSector ICOMMUNITY RESPONSE $^600,000 $^594,079 - 27 jobs createdProgram 1.1 - Approximately $111,000 generated in complementary fundsTRAINING AND EMPLOYMENT AGENCY 10,015,000 10,015,000 - 861 persons completed trainingProgram 1.2 - 680 trainees employed (79%)- Approximately $8.3 million generated in complementaryfunds (primarily from CEIC)EDUCATION DEVELOPMENTProgram 1.3 1,900,000 1,900,000 - 61 educational projects assigned- Employment for 45 permanent and 6 term positions created- Approximately $840,000 generated in complementary fundsINNER CITY SOCIAL WORK PROJECTProgram 1.4.1 2,070,000 2,070,000 - 43 students graduated with a Bachelor of Social WorkDegreeINNER CITY NURSING PROJECTProgram 1.4.2 115,000 115,000 - 12 students completed either an RN or an LPN diplomaHOME REPAIR 6,181,000 5,972,697 - Approximately 5,948 inner city dwelling units repairedProgram 2.1,2.2 (4,038 owner-occupied; 1,910 rental)- 979 homeowners received additional loan forgivenessassistance- Approximately $20 million levered in private funds (33:1ratio)- Approximately 100 person years of employment (relating toexpanding RRAP delivery capacity) createdcon271cont'dPROGRAM NAME AND NUMBERBUDGETTOTAL EXPEN-DITURES RESULTS- Approximately 850 person years of constructionemployment generatedGRANT FOR HOME OWNERSHIP 2,000,000 2,000,000 - 305 grants to new infill dwellingsProgram 2.3 - 186 grants to first-time purchasers of existing dwellings- At least 250 person years of construction employmentgenerated- An estimated $18 million generated in complementaryfunding (9:1 ratio)EXPANDED NON-PROFIT ASSISTANCE - 800,000 800,000 - 18 homes purchased and renovatedKINEW HOUSINGProgram 2.4.1, 2.4.2 and 2.4.4- 250 major repairs (roofing, insulation, foundation, electrical,plumbing) as well as 118 additional homes repaired- 46 persons trained and employedEXPANDED NON-PROFIT HOUSING - 500,000 500,000 - 36 new dwelling units constructedWINNIPEG HOUSING REHABILITATIONCORPORATION- 25 housing units created from building conversion, as wellas an additional 20 units through Charles-Cathedral HousingProgram 2.4.3 Cooperative- 59 units renovated- Approximately $5.9 million levered in complementary funds(12.6:1 ratio)- Approximately 164 person years of constructionemployment generated272cont'dPROGRAM NAME AND NUMBERBUDGETTOTAL EXPEN-DITURES RESULTSNON-PROFIT HOUSING ASSISTANCEProgram 2.4.5, 2.4.6CORE AREA RESIDENTIAL UPGRADINGAND MAINTENANCE PROJECT(CARUMP)Program 2.5725,0001,311,320725,0001,311,320- Construction or conversion of 185 units of housing,renovation of 30 units- Approximately 211 person years of constructionemployment generated- Approximately $11.7 million levered in complementaryfunds (18:1 ratio)- 4,746 dwelling units in 1,518 buildings have been inspected,with 1,185 Maintenance and Occupancy By-law Orders toRepair Issued; 654 orders have been forwarded to theenforcement system- 498 tenants have received intensive services from a SocialWorker and/or Home Support Teacher, 557 tenants have beenassisted in completing public housing applications; 310families have been relocated, the majority to housing of betterquality- An estimated 150 person years of construction employmentexpected273cont'dPROGRAM NAME AND NUMBERBUDGETTOTAL EXPEN-DITURES RESULTS- An estimated $5.9 million generated in complementaryfunds (4.5:1 ratio)LOGAN - CPR REHOUSING 344,680 342,962 - 18 homes have been relocated, reconnected to serviceProgram 2.6 (hydro, etc.) and received basic landscaping in the NorthLogan residential areaSALVATION ARMY MEN'S SOCIAL 1,200,000 1,200,000 - New facility under constructionSERVICE CENTRE - 68 person years of construction employment generatedProgram 2.7 - $4 8 million generated in complementary funding (4:1 ratio)- 89 community improvement projects undertakenCOMMUNITY IMPROVEMENT AREASProgram 35,870,000 5,552,221 - Approximately 94 person years of construction employmentgenerated- Approximately $1.5 million generated in complementaryfunds- 54 community facility projects assistedCOMMUNITY FACILITIESProgram 46,000,000 5,598,503 - 384 person years of employment created in constructionindustry- $26 million in complementary funds levered (4.6:1 ratio)- 81 community service projects assisted- Employment generated for 271 persons, includingCOMMUNITY SERVICES 5,300,000 5,300,000 occupational training for 156 individualsProgram 5 - $3.0 million generated in complementary fundsSECTOR II - Work to renovate homes and construct new housing in theresidential area east of Salter is completeLOGAN DEVELOPMENTProgram 6.1 - 6.65,118,000* 5,112,117 - Local residents and business people formed a communitydevelopment corporation to work with the Core Area Initiativeand the Province in relocating tenants, planning anddeveloping new and renovated housing and businesscont'dPROGRAM NAME AND NUMBERBUDGETTOTAL EXPEN-DITURES RESULTS- 74 households received disturbance support and 46households received rental support- Land acquired for the Logan housing developmentand industrial development (Program 6.8)- Municipal services upgraded (watermaininstallation, street construction, sidewalkconstruction, lane construction, street lighting,boulevards and park area)INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT 4,000,000 3,249,176 - 16 development projects assistedProgram 6.8 - 386 direct jobs to be created including 136 personstrained through affirmative action programs (seeProgram 1.2)- Approximately 126 person years of constructionemployment generated- $7.010 million levered in private sector investment(3.3:1 ratio)SMALL BUSINESS ASSISTANCE 2,820,000 2,647,686 - 174 small businesses assistedProgram 6.9 - Approximately 516 jobs created as well as 147person years of construction employment generated- Approximately $9.2 million levered (mainlyprivate sector funds), a 4:1 ratioNORTH OF PORTAGE REDEVELOPMENTProgram 7.1 - 7.513,179,977* 13,174,906 - Acquisition of properties within area slated forredevelopment construction of park area (AirCanada "Window") fronting on Portage Avenue- Establishment of North Portage DevelopmentCorporation, responsible for planning, coordinatingand implementing a multi-million dollar program(including Portage Place) of development for theareaoes not include an additionalallocated oug^gram 25.6.274275cont'dPROGRAM NAME AND NUMBERBUDGETTOTAL EXPEN-DITURES RESULTS- Approximately 4,000 permanent jobs will have beencreated or transferred to the area- Approximately 4,200 person years of constructionemployment will have been generated- Total investment in area expected to exceed $300million (private sector investment ratio of 3:1)NORTH OF ELLICE NEIGHBOURHOODREVITALIZATIONProgram 7.63,014,500 3,014,500 - 258 units of housing (141 market; 117 non-profit)constructed or renovated (with an additional 63 unitsunder program 2.4.3)- Central Park extended and extensive area streetscapingcompleted- Approximately 273 person years of constructionemployment generated- Approximately $17.6 million in complementary fundslevered (10:1 ratio) on housing and facilities projectsCN EAST YARD 4,251,000* 4,250,950 - Initial acquisition of privately-owned lands undertakenProgram 8.1 - 8.5 - Preliminary concept and financial plan prepared andapproved by Canada, Manitoba and Winnipeg- Numerous public hearings and meetings held to obtainideas from the community, organizations and developers- The Forks Renewal Corporation establishedCOMPENSATION FOR LAND 3,850,000 3,695,506 - See Programs 6.1 - 6.8, 7.1 - 7.5 and 8.1 - 8.5ACQUISITIONProgram 8.6oes not Inc u e an additionaF 750,000 allocatedoug^gram N.6276cont'dPROGRAM NAME AND NUMBERBUDGETTOTAL EXPEN-DITURES RESULTSHERITAGE 4,900,000 3,992,600 - 54 private sector projects assisted (33 buildings)Program 9 - Major non-profit arts centre established- Enhanced image of the District through street-scapingand promotion, including the establishment of a businessassociation (The Exchange District Association) toencourage ongoing participation of businesses in thearea's development and promotion- Approximately 109 person years of constructionemployment generated- Approximately $5.1 million levered in private sectorinvestment (5.1:1 ratio)NEIGHBOURHOOD MAIN STREETS 4,405,000 4,336,018 - $13.3 million Chinatown development completedDEVELOPMENT - 15 storefront improvements completed on ProvencherProgram 10 Boulevard- Streetscaping project and 32 storefronts completed onSelkirk Avenue- Riverborne Development Association established andactive in promoting interests of area businesses andresidents- 16 storefront improvements completed on MainStreet- Approximately $2 million generated in complementaryfundsSECTOR III- Approximately 50 person years of constructionemployment generatedMANAGEMENT AND CONSULTATION 2,900,000 2,900,000 - The office functioned as a secretariat to PolicyProgram 11 Committee, Management Board and Co-ordinators,provided the overall liaison, co-ordination and planningsupport required to implement the Core Area Agreement,and delivered programs under the Agreement on behalf ofthe responsible imple- menting jurisdictionsoes not include an aadIItonal 1, 9UU,000oca^oug Program &O.0277cont'dPROGRAM NAME AND NUMBERBUDGETTOTAL EXPEN-DITURES RESULTSPUBLIC INFORMATIONProgram 121,700,000 1,699,164 - Over 100 community groups and events assisted throughthe provision of promotional materials or consultation- Educational assistance on core area redevelop-mentprovided to over 100 research projects throughinformational materials, slide shows and presenta-tion or bus tours- Public presentations to over 250 business andcommunity interest groups in Winnipeg as well as severalnational and international organizations- 2 major educational and resource forums developed tobenefit core area groups and organizations- Public consultation process implemented on renewal ofthe Core Area Agreement - Gas Station Theatreconstructed- BIZ task force establishedEVALUATION 826,500 815,555 - Increased awareness of the Winnipeg Core InitiativeProgram 13 (83% according to survey undertaken)- Mid-term evaluation for all programs and an executivesummary completed- Review of Agreement's management system completed- 4 thematic evaluations completed- 4 final program evaluations completedTOTAL $95,896,0977 $92 884 960ote:alance of unexpended o sm the amoun W1 used^rogram S.•Source: Winnipeg Core Area Initiative (1988). Final Status Report Programme Activities to September 30, 1987 Under the 1981-1986 Core AreaAgreement. Winnipeg Core Area Initiative.Product^ Completion DateData Bases and Resource MaterialsSpecial Census Tabulations^ April 1986Building Permit Data Base July 1986Business Assessment Data January 1987Program Monitoring System Data On-goingDocumentation for Evaluation Program Data Bases^ On-goingAtlas of Core Area Conditions^ September 1987Evaluation AssessmentsA Plan for Evaluating the Winnipeg Core Area Agreement^November 1982Employment and Affirmative Action Evaluation Assessment June 1983Housing and Neighbourhood Improvement Evaluation Assessment^September 1983Community Services and Facilities Evaluation Assessment^December 1983Sector 2 (Key Site) Program Evaluation Assessment September 1983Baseline StudiesConditions Within Winnipeg's Core Area^ April 1986Mid-term EvaluationsEmployment and Affirmative Action Program: Mid-term Evaluation^October 1984Housing and Community Improvement Area Programs: Mid-term Evaluation February 1985Community Facilities and Services Programs: Mid-term Evaluation^September 1984Mid-term Evaluation of the Winnipeg Core Area Initiative - IndustrialDevelopment/Small Business Assistance Program^ January 1985North Ellice Neighbourhood Revitalization Program: Mid-Term Evaluation^February 1985Management Review: Core Area Initiative Agreement June 1984Historic Winnipeg Development Program: Mid-term Evaluation (ExecutiveSummary)^ March 1985Neighbourhood Main Streets Program: Mid-term Evaluation (ExecutiveSummary) March 1985Mid-term Program Evaluations: Winnipeg Core Area Agreement (ExecutiveSummaries and Response to Recommendations)^ April 1985Thematic EvaluationsEvaluation of Community Involvement in the Winnipeg Core AreaAgreement^ January 1986An Interim Assessment of Investment to Projects Under the Winnipeg CoreArea Agreement March 1985An Evaluation of the Winnipeg Core Area Agreement - Employment andAffirmative Action Initiative^ October 1986Issues Concerning the Management and Delivery of the Winnipeg Core AreaAgreement^ December 1986Final Program EvaluationsEmployment and Affirmative Action Impacts and Cost-Effectiveness^August 1987Housing and Community Improvement Impacts^ June 1987cont'd278APPENDIX IIIEVALUATION PROGRAMME CORE AREA AGREEMENT IPRODUCTS SUMMARYProduct Completion DateCommunity Services and Facilities Impacts June 1987Sector Two Programs September 1987Management Information System ReportsA Concept Plan for Management Information Under the Renewed WinnipegCore Area Agreement April 1987Data Content and Procedures for Collecting Project Level ManagementInformation Under the Renewed Core Area Agreement June 1987Source: Winnipeg Core Area Initiative (1988) Final Status Report: Programme Activities to September 30,1987 under the 1981-1986 Core Area Agreement, 92.279280APPENDIX IVCM II AGREEMENT SUMMARYProgram Name and Number^ Original^Revised (MarchBudget 31, 1992)Industrial and Entrepreneurial Support1.1 Industrial Development^ $ 2,000,000^$ 1,581,0001.2 Entrepreneurial Support 2,000,000 1,395,0004,000,000^2,976,000The Exchange District Redevelopment^ 9,000,000^6,580,000East Yards Redevelopment^ 20,000,000^20,931,000Riverbank Enhancement 5,000,000^6,150,000Strategic Capital^ 13,000,000^15,109,000Neighbourhood and Community Development6.1 Neighbourhood Facilities^ 5,000,000^5,360,0006.2 Neighbourhood Services 3,000,000 3,000,0006.3 Community Services and Facilities^ 6,000,000^5,850,0006.4 Education Support Services 2,000,000 2,000,00016,000,000^16,210,000Inner City Foundation^ 1,000,000 --Housing8.1 Core Area Initiative Grant for Home Ownership^2,500,000^1,698,0008.2 Housing Development Stimulus^ 2,750,000 1,932,1378.3 Core Area Home Renovation Program (CAHRP)^1,750,000^2,209,3828.4 Core Area Rental Unit Repair/Forgiveness 1,250,000 2,261,8318.5 Home Renovation/Administration^ 750,000^850,0008.6 Core Area Residential Upgrading and Maintenance^1,500,000 1,548,650Program (CARUMP)^ 10,500,000^10,500,000Employment and Training 12,000,000^12,054,000Neighbourhood Main Streets and Small Business Support^5,000,000^5,440,000ServicesCentral Administration^ 2,800,000^2,440,000Public Information and Programming^ 1,300,000^1,300,000Evaluation^ 400,000^310,000TOTAL $100 000 000^$100 000 000Wmmpeg Core Area^ v^- ' , ' ^status Report o ograms an Projects:^- C^ore' —^' - Area Agreement, Winnipeg Core Area Initiative.281APPENDIX VMarch 26, 1991100-136 Portsmouth Blvd.Winnipeg, M.B.R3P 1B6Mr.941 North Dr.Winnipeg, M.B.R3T 0A9.Dear Mr.I am conducting a study of the Winnipeg Core Area Initiative (WCAI) for my doctoraldissertation in the School of Community and Regional Planning at the University of BritishColumbia. Dr. Alan Arubise is my principal advisor.My study is specifically interested in the WCAI as an instrument of urban public policy.The purpose is to study the WCAI as a model for urban regeneration and public policyintervention in inner city revitalization. The importance of this study is to provide a broadexamination of the theoretical frame work behind the Initiative. In doing so, it seeks touncover the elements which have contributed to the weakness and success of the Initiativeby collecting and analysing objective and subjective data obtained from interviews of keyparticipants in CAI I and II. It is hoped that answers will be found to many questionsconcerning the effectiveness, equity and efficiency of the CAI as a model for urban policy.It is further hoped that this examination will assist planning and policy formation attemptsin the future and strengthen the public and private ability to generate comprehensive,strategic and cohesive urban policy.I hope to interview approximately 20 individuals who have been, or currently are involvedin either/or both the CAI I and II. Emphasis for selection will be placed on individualswho played a role in the initial policy formation of the CAI, those who have had senioradministrative duties in implementing CAI policy, and representatives of government andnon-government agencies who have been engaged with the CAI on a continuing orsustained basis.I would like to interview you as one of the key people involved during the early years ofthe CAI. I believe your views on the CAI would be of importance to my work from anacademic point of view and your involvement in areas of social concern would contributean important perspective in my attempt to evaluate the Initiative and the role it has playedin the evolution of the inner city over the last ten years.282I will contact your office number the week of March 18, 1991. If you would be willing tosee me, I will arrange an appointment at your convenience. The interview would takeapproximately one half hour or longer according to your wishes. All private informationthat you give me would remain confidential. No personal names will be used in thedissertation or in any publication of the results without your expressed approval.I hope that you will be interested in my study. It is through projects of this nature that theacademic body of knowledge in urban planning can be tested and challenged and yourassistance in this study is an important element. If you have any questions before I contactyou, please call either my office number (474-8054) or my home (895-7024).Sincerely,Dana G. Stewart283APPENDIX VII am going to ask you to rate or rank eight of the WCAI.Name100* CAI I 1 2 3 4 5102^CAI II 1 2 3 4 5103^Overall Goals 1 2 3 4 5104^Programmes 1 2 3 4 5105^Politically 1 2 3 4 5106^CAI as a tool of public policy 1 2 3 4 5107^Administratively 1 2 3 4 5108^For the "users" 1 2 3 4 5Open-ended questions asked of all respondents:1. Can you tell me what role you played or how you were associated with the WCAI?2. Let's go back over the topics that you have just ranked - would you like to discuss anyor all of them in more detail?3. What other aspects of the WCAI do you have a special knowledge of or is there anissue that you would like to discuss further?4. Are there any sources of information (such as monographs or papers) that you wouldsuggest for me.5. Are there any people that you think I should interview or contact for furtherinformation?* Three digits were arbitrarily chosen to allow sorting of the responses for content analysis.


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