THE WINNIPEG CORE AREA INITIATIVE:
A CASE STUDY IN URBAN REVITALISATION

by

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ABSTRACT

Inner-city revitalisation poses perhaps the most complex challenge faced by urban planners today. This dissertation explores the role of planning in urban restructuring by providing a critical empirical investigation into a major Canadian tripartite planning intervention that spans a decade -- The Winnipeg Core Area Initiative (1981 to 1991). The purpose of the dissertation is to study the Winnipeg Core Area Initiative (CAI) as a prototypical model for urban regeneration and public-policy intervention, to determine the strengths and weaknesses of the CAI, and to evaluate the impact that this urban intervention had over a period of ten years. Backed by a comparative analysis of urban regeneration efforts in Great Britain and the United States, it explores the concept of "distress" in inner-city areas and attempts to answer the questions: Distress -- who can relieve it and how? The case-study method is used for an evaluation of the CAI that includes content analysis of published materials produced about, and for, the Initiative and public-attitude surveys and newspaper reports over the period 1981 to 1991. The results of interviews with twenty-five "key or core players" provide qualitative data that enriches the dissertation by presenting a picture of the CAI that is missing from evaluation reports commissioned by the tripartite partners or from published commentaries on the Initiative. This case study reveals an urban intervention strategy with objectives that were conceptually broad and comprehensive, perhaps too much so for the level of financial and organisational resources available and the level of public expectations that was raised. While the model was an excellent vehicle to harmonise scarce public resources and leverage private investment, this study reveals a disjunction between policy intent and policy implementation in attempting to balance economic development with disparity relief.
efforts. This dissertation concludes that there are components of the CAI model that provide valuable instruction for urban restructuring but it is unlikely that the model as originally designed, could, or should, be replicated. The importance of this study is to provide a broad examination of the theoretical framework behind the Winnipeg CAI as an instrument for urban public policy that will assist future planning-and-policy formation attempts in urban revitalisation and strengthen the public and private ability to generate comprehensive, strategic and cohesive urban policy.
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I owe my deepest gratitude to my family for their enduring faith in me, but especially to Colin who started me on the way and saw me through to the end. I dedicate this dissertation to him.
Chapter 1

THE WINNIPEG CORE AREA INITIATIVE: A CASE STUDY

1.1 Scope of Inquiry and Conceptual Framework

This dissertation constitutes a critical empirical investigation and analysis of a major Canadian urban planning intervention that spans a decade -- from 1981 to 1991. The Winnipeg Core Area Initiative (CAI) has been called "an ambitious and innovative experiment in local economic development" (Kiernan 1987). The Initiative has been seen as a practical experiment in urban revitalisation that approached complex inter-related urban problems on a holistic basis. It recently won an international award as a model for urban redevelopment\(^1\) and has been touted as being unique to Canadian urban planning (ibid.). The organising model included participation by all levels of government (municipal, provincial and federal), and was an example of urban policy that simultaneously attacked physical, social and economic problems in an attempt to reverse many of the trends endemic to deteriorating inner cities today. Although the CAI formally came to an end in the spring of 1991, it serves as an interesting Canadian case study in urban regeneration that has been the focus of attention throughout Europe and North America.

Winnipeg is not alone in suffering from serious economic and social decline in the inner city. A comparison with many major cities in Great Britain and the United States shows similar general trends in population loss, physical, social and economic deterioration; and decentralisation and suburban expansion. The Canadian picture, despite
The plethora of programmes and policies aimed at finding a remedy to the problems faced by decaying inner cities throughout the industrialised world have piqued the interests of policy advisors, analysts, administrators and academics, and have produced a corresponding array of reports, journal articles, books and treatises. Armed with critiques and commentaries, major cities in North America have experimented with a wide range of planning and fiscal incentives and other institutional innovations in order to find a format for urban policy that can combat the effects of inner-city deterioration compounded by federal devolution in responsibility and dereliction in aid. Cities are in an up-hill battle
according to Kaplan and James (1990, 351). They claim that politics have passed cities by and that urban initiatives are not popular among politicians and the federal bureaucracy. Political impotence and economic weaknesses of cities increasingly support the public’s belief that "good tax money is wasted on inefficient government action and/or intractable urban problems" (ibid., 353). In a desperate bid to reach some form of consensus on national urban policy, Kaplan and James complain that the doors are opened to whatever fad is popular at the moment.

Yesterday it was public/private sector partnership; today it is privatisation. Tomorrow, it will likely be an academically defined or a practitioner-defined new style of leadership. In this context, only the consulting industry, the university's grant office, and the speechmaker benefit. Cities and their residents deserve better. (Ibid., 353.)

The Winnipeg Core Area Initiative was admittedly one more example of a large urban regeneration attempt created in the 1980s -- but one with a difference. It had elements of both the social welfare/municipal socialism approach characteristic of early British urban policy, and the urban entrepreneurialism approach of many American planning ventures. It also was a vigorous experiment in public policy that saw unprecedented co-operation from three levels of government lasting over a decade.

1.2 Study Objectives

The purpose of this dissertation is to study the Winnipeg CAI as a model for urban regeneration and public policy intervention. With the exception of selected evaluations carried out for the three levels of government involved in the CAI, and public inquiries held toward the end of the terms of CAI I and II, there has not been an overall critique of the CAI as an instrument for urban public policy published by government, non-
government or academic sources. There is no shortage however, of material on international trends in urban revitalisation. Numerous studies have been carried out in the United Kingdom on British urban redevelopment schemes such as the Inner Cities Programme by contract for the Department of the Environment and by private research agencies such as the Centre for Mass Communication Research (Sills, Taylor and Golding 1988). Similarly, a proliferation of reports on American examples has been produced by federal and state agencies along with numerous critiques and analyses of specific case studies.  

This dissertation will provide a thorough evaluation of the CAI using a case study method that will allow this Canadian experiment to be compared and contrasted with urban regeneration strategies in Britain and the United States.

The intent behind the study of the Winnipeg CAI is to provide an *analysis of* the model as an instrument of public policy (that is, to advance understanding of the model from an academic perspective) and to provide an *analysis for* improving urban revitalisation policy in a broader context (that is, to improve the quality of urban policy).  

Ham and Hill (1984, 8) provide a typology of seven varieties of policy analysis; three types are grouped as policy studies; three as analysis for policy; and one as evaluation or impact studies. Evaluation studies are the inter-connection between the first and second groups. This dissertation represents a combination of "analysis of" and "analysis for" policy. It is a study of policy content in so far as it seeks to describe and explain the genesis and development of the CAI with limited emphasis on policy process and policy outputs. Although this examination of the CAI may be of interest to policy-makers in the future, it was not undertaken to assist in any immediate decision-making activities. Similarly, it does not advocate specific options or ideas or processes for immediate policy
implementation. It falls, therefore, most accurately under the label of evaluation study in so far as the underlying question to be answered is: Should and could the CAI be used as a model for future urban redevelopment efforts? In attempting to answer this question it evaluates the impact of the Initiative on the physical, social and economic environment in Winnipeg’s inner city and on the population that was intended for assistance. In short, this dissertation seeks to determine the strengths and weaknesses of the CAI and evaluate the impact that this urban intervention had over a period of ten years.

The primary objective of the study is to examine the following research questions:

1. What were the empirical and normative assumptions underlying the tri-level partnership and the structural model of the CAI?

2. What was the ideology underlying the policy framework of the CAI? To what degree did the CAI, as an instrument of urban public policy, integrate with existing main-line programmes and with the planning goals of Plan Winnipeg?

3. What degree of political commitment did the CAI enjoy? What role should various levels of government play in attempting to redress urban problems while stabilising and promoting regional economic development?

4. What were the implicit and explicit value systems governing the decision-making behind the CAI? What was the level of community acceptance of the instrumental and contributive values underlying the model?

5. What process was used to implement CAI policy?
6. How adequate was the *programme definition* and *resource allocation* for implementation of the stated goals and objectives. To what degree did the selection and implementation of programmes foster self-sufficiency or dependency?

7. How successful was the *implementation* of CAI policy and how appropriate were the *delivery mechanisms* chosen? To what degree did delivery and implementation satisfy public interest and accountability?

8. What was the nature and degree of *public participation* in the creation and ongoing functions of the CAI?

9. What were the *tangible and perceived outputs* or products of the CAI? Relative to the stated aims/goals, what was achieved and what were the impacts on the immediate and larger community to which the CAI was committed?

10. To what degree did *environmental change* affect the functioning and efficiency of the CAI model over the decade?

1.3 Significance of the Research

The importance of this study is to provide a broad examination of the theoretical framework behind the Winnipeg CAI as an instrument for urban public policy. In doing so, this study will challenge the assertion that the CAI was an holistic comprehensive model that can be used as a template for future urban regeneration. Through the collection and analysis of objective and subjective data, this study seeks to uncover the elements which have contributed to the success and weakness of the Core Area Initiative and to find
answers to questions concerning the effectiveness, equity and efficiency of the CAI as a model for urban policy. This examination will assist future planning-and-policy formation attempts in urban revitalisation and strengthen the public and private ability to generate comprehensive, strategic and cohesive urban policy.

1.4 Formal Problem Statement

This dissertation seeks to examine the problem of core area decline using the Winnipeg CAI as a prototypical model for urban revitalisation. Backed by a comparative analysis of urban regeneration efforts in Britain and the United States, it will explore the concept of "distress" in inner city areas and will attempt to answer the question: Distress -- who can relieve it and how?

1.5 Dissertation Design

The dissertation is divided into four major sections including eight chapters. It employs a combination of comparative library research on planning and urban revitalisation efforts in Britain and the United States, library research on planning and the urban development dimension of economic development in Canada, with a case study of the Winnipeg Core Area Initiative using published material and interview data.

Part I, Chapter 1, outlines the rationale for the study, the purpose, methodology and organisation of the dissertation.

Part II, Chapter 2, introduces the notion of urban "distress" and provides a comparison of urban policy in Britain and the United States from the late-nineteenth century to the present with particular emphasis on policy during the Thatcher and Reagan
administration in both countries. It does so to suggest the similarities and differences between planning efforts in these two countries and to place, in context, the Canadian planning approaches outlined in the next chapter. Chapter 2 outlines the limitations of past approaches to urban revitalisation and underscores the need for alternative courses of action and policy direction to alleviate urban distress. This chapter provides lessons about urban restructuring, some of which influenced policy formation and implementation instrumental in the creation of the CAI, and some which, in hindsight, should have provided valuable instruction initially, and over the years. Chapter 3 provides a general examination of the role of planning in urban policy formation and implementation. It reviews the traditional role of planning guided by the philosophy of technical rationality and explores the issues of public values and public interest in relationship to the role of planning in the latter half of the twentieth century. This chapter moves on to discuss the evolution of planning as a professional activity in Canada and places it in a contemporary context with particular emphasis on urban development, the respective roles of the public and private sectors in economic development, and the changing role of planners. This chapter is important because it outlines prevailing ideologies in place at the time of the creation of the CAI. As a result of the literature reviews on urban revitalisation and urban planning and economic development in Part II, a theoretical framework is defined to guide the detailed analysis of the CAI case study in the following chapters.

Part III, Chapter 4, stands alone in presenting the context of the CAI from its creation in 1981 to its demise in 1991. It draws a picture of the political and socio-economic conditions that spawned the Initiative and describes the substantive mandate that was distinctive of the CAI. The environmental milieu that set the stage for the creation of
the Initiative is better understood in the light of discussions presented for comparison in the preceding chapters. This chapter describes the structural model chosen to implement the goals of the CAI and gives a brief description of the programmes and budget allocations in both agreements. References are made to contract evaluations carried out throughout the span of the two agreements in order to give the assessments that provided feedback and guidance to the CAI administration. It is useful to keep these assessments in mind when the perceptions of the general public, the media, and key individuals are compared and contrasted in the next two chapters. It is in these two chapters, Chapters 5 and 6, that the true evaluation of the CAI starts to unfold. Through a careful analysis of published materials, surveys and newspaper reports, and interview data from key individuals, questions concerning the empirical and normative assumptions underlying the tripartite initiative are answered. It is here that conclusions as to the effectiveness of the CAI as a prototypical model for urban revitalisation are made. Chapter 6, in particular, contributes a wealth of new material to the case study allowing the Initiative to be viewed from many perspectives. Chapter 7 pulls all of the objective and subjective data into the framework suggested from the previous review of literature in Part II and dissects it using each of the research questions presented in this first chapter.

Part IV, Chapter 8, returns to the comparative findings on urban revitalisation from British and American experiences. The lessons learned from these two countries are applied to the analysis of the Winnipeg Core Area Initiative in attempting to answer the question: Urban distress; who can relieve it and how? The dissertation concludes with the answer to a second question: Could or should the CAI model be used as a template for future regeneration efforts? The answer is no!
1.5.1 The Case Study Data

The case-study method used for an examination of the CAI combines two methods: (1) content analysis of published materials written on aspects of the CAI having to do with public attitudes and perceptions including newspaper reports and public surveys; and (2) interviews with individuals who were involved in some way with the CAI.

1.5.1.1 The Interviews

This dissertation is enriched by the contributions of "key or core players"; twenty-five individuals who played a role in the initial policy formation of the CAI, those who had senior administrative duties in implementing CAI policy, the representatives of government and non-government agencies who were engaged with the CAI on a sustained basis, and "observers" such as academics and critics including those associated with service provision in the inner City of Winnipeg. Each of these twenty-five people was interviewed at some length and provided a major portion of the data necessary for this dissertation (see Appendix I). Their comments are interspersed and interwoven in two ways. Firstly, material collected from a number of the interviews are used to provide chronological data on the events and circumstances leading up to and following the creation of the Winnipeg CAI. Secondly, the interviews constitute the primary source of information about the attitudes and ideologies of the major participants in the evolution of the Initiative. As such, the comments related to each section of this dissertation must be weighed according to the source. All the participants in this study expressed personal views and opinions, and their comments do not in any way represent government, agency or institutional statements.
1.5.1.2 The Value of the Qualitative Data

The qualitative data from the case study represents a picture of the CAI that is missing from evaluation attempts commissioned by the tripartite partners or from published commentaries on the Initiative. It seeks to measure perceptions of the CAI from the point of view of: (1) core players, observers and representatives of targeted user groups; (2) pubic opinion surveys and inquiries; and (3) the print media of newspapers. This type of perceptual measurement using expressed attitudes, opinions, and commentaries gives a vastly different picture of the effectiveness, equity and efficiency of the CAI as a model for urban intervention than could be obtained by an examination of policy documents and output reports. Each of the sources of data were examined for information on aspects of the Initiative: (1) appropriateness and effectiveness of the model; (2) ideology underlying the policy framework; (3) political commitment; (4) value systems; (5) process; (6) programme definition; (7) implementation and delivery; (8) public participation; and (9) environmental change throughout CAI I to CAI II.

This dissertation will examine, in detail, a unique tri-level partnership for urban revitalisation. It does so with the hope that the strengths and weaknesses of this Canadian experiment in urban public policy can be used to illuminate future regeneration attempts and contribute to a widening knowledge base for urban planners.
Endnotes

1. The Winnipeg Core Area Initiative was presented with a special achievement award for urban revitalisation by the International Downtown Association in Edmonton, Alberta, September 1990. The award, The Special Achievement Award for Downtown Management -- Model for Management, is the highest award given by this Washington based association.

2. For a thorough discussion of changes in the public policy environment caused by such factors as free trade, the growing federal deficit, the constitutional crisis, and the problems faced by local and provincial governments in providing services in the face of persistent regional disparities, see Donald J. Savoie, *Regional Economic Development: Canada's Search for Solutions*, 2d ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992).

3. An example of one such anthology of case studies can be found in Susan Fainstein, *Restructuring the City* (New York: Longman, 1986).

4. For this distinction, between "analysis of policy" and "analysis for policy," I am indebted to J. David Hulchanski for a succinct paper, "Policy Analysis: An Introduction to Issues, Concepts and Disputes," produced originally for students in the School of Community and Regional Planning at the University of British Columbia, September 1989.

5. Evaluation of outputs from CAI I and CAI II have been carried out specifically by contract for the CAI and for each of the tripartite partners. The reports by Stewart Clatworthy, noted in the bibliography and credited throughout this dissertation, are examples of evaluation studies commissioned by the Policy Committee of the CAI.
Chapter 2

COMPARATIVE URBAN POLICY:

GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES

2.1 Introduction

This chapter introduces the notion of "urban distress" -- a situation that is found today in Canadian inner cities such as Winnipeg and the problem that the Winnipeg Core Area Initiative attempted to redress. It examines urban revitalisation efforts in Britain and the United States that have generally influenced the direction of Canadian urban planning initiatives for inner cities. It traces the historical development of the ideologies inherent in planning and urban policy from the late-nineteenth century perspective to the present day. In reviewing these planning perspectives over roughly a century of urban development and redevelopment, this chapter examines the programme and policy attempts to link economic policy with social policy -- an espoused goal of the CAI. This chapter chronicals the rise in support for privatism on the part of conservative governments on both continents and the concomitant influence on the urban planning system. It suggests that the restructuring of government responsibilities and power and the increased role of the private sector in urban redevelopment that arose during the Thatcher and Reagan years may have led to the erosion of urban planning and a resultant identity crisis for urban planners. In addition, it submits that a political redefinition of the "public good" may have accompanied changes in attitudes associated with urban restructuring initiatives. Much of the material presented in this chapter is important to the understanding of Canadian planning approaches to urban revitalisation presented in the next chapter. As well, the British and American experiences
in attacking urban distress provide a useful comparison when the CAI is held up to scrutiny in later chapters.

2.2 Cities in Distress

Many cities in the United States and Britain are suffering from serious economic and social decline in their inner areas, what in jargon terms has been called "distress." According to Cutciti, urban distress "results from a confluence of socioeconomic hardship among city residents, fiscal inadequacy of public sector institutions, and city growth or decline in economic and/or demographic terms" (Cutciti in Kaplan and James 1990, 15). This concept of distress was invented in the United States primarily to provide some form of index by which to measure need of cities for national programme relief. It was a major focus of the Carter administration's urban policy initiatives but fell into disuse during the conservative Reagan administration.

By whatever means distress is measured, it is clear that the concept has many dimensions. It is also clear that there is a strong cause-and-effect relationship between such precipitating factors as the restructuring of the urban economy and resulting urban unemployment. These kinds of linkages concentrate the poor and disadvantaged in cities already hard-pressed to meet residents' needs and further lead to economic decline. The results of this distress can be found in many large North American and British cities; loss of population in the inner city, substantial unemployment by marginalised groups, sharp decline in manufacturing employment in the core area, physical deterioration through age and neglect with attendant housing disinvestment, and fiscal squeeze on local government in supplying educational and social services. In fact, the pervasiveness of urban distress in
large industrialised cities today leads Cameron (1990, 484) to question if urban decline is a natural phenomenon!

While the United States and Britain currently experience similar symptoms of decline in many of their large central cities, they also share similar conditions that lead to the distress (Home 1982; Hambleton 1989; Barnekov, Boyle and Rich 1989). There is no doubt that the changing world economy produced a continuing shift in the balance of local economies away from manufacturing employment toward the service sector, especially producer services (Cameron 1990). The economic decline faced by the manufacturing-related industries formerly located within the central cities profoundly affected unemployment problems of urban residents on both continents. In addition, decentralisation of consumer and producer services from inner-city areas to urbanised regions on the peripheries drained large numbers of white-and blue-collar workers from urban centres. Shifts in employment patterns not only produced major changes in population distributions away from city centres but also contributed to major drifts in population between geographic areas on both continents (Boyle 1985). Throughout the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s manufacturing, railways, ports and warehousing declined in importance in the United States leaving large urban areas derelict. People formerly employed in these centres moved on to other cities offering prospects for employment. In Britain, the continuing drift from north to south in population and economic activity virtually deserted the six largest urban areas of the pre-1950 period in favour of seventeen free-standing cities, small towns and rural areas producing an absolute and relative decline in employment and population in large cities.
One significant trend for some inner cities in America, and less so for a few in Britain, was the growth of the corporate and producer sectors returning to the city centre (Law et al. 1988). Growth of office space in American cities, depending on the importance of government, finance, corporate activities and associated business services, burgeoned in such cities as New York, Chicago, Boston, San Francisco and Los Angeles. Accompanying this trend was the phenomenon of residential and commercial gentrification (Fainstein and Fainstein 1988; Fainstein 1989). Gentrification, while positive in some respects, further accelerated residential displacement of lower-income groups and left the remaining "underclass" unable to acquire goods and services suitable for their needs or budgets. In Britain, London regained its pre-eminence as a world centre of producer services and of corporate concentrations.

Thus it has attracted 74 per cent of US bank assets invested in Europe, more branches than any other city in the world of US advertising agencies and the top US law firms and more offices of the world’s 13 biggest accountancy firms that any other city save for Paris (Moss 1987). . . . Moreover it has become even more dominant in terms of controlling British economic activity since over 70 per cent of the corporate headquarters of the top 100 companies are located there (Smith 1989, 224). No other British city has begun to mount any significant challenge to London’s domination, though Edinburgh and Birmingham have made gains in a limited number of producer services. (Cameron 1990, 484.)

The arguments and rationale for and against national and local urban policy for cities in distress are found in a plethora of books, journal articles, government documents and reports. In despair one might ask if social policy can ever be reconciled with economic policy in reviving distressed cities or if the process of decline is inevitable and irreversible. Robin Hambleton (1989), in a comparison of urban government under Prime Minister Thatcher and President Reagan, points out the dilemma faced by policy-makers
and policy-analysts in the "area versus residents" argument. He states that in a rigorous analysis of British government-sponsored community development projects completed in the 1970s, "we were clear about the need to focus attention on the economic fortunes of the inner areas" but were not clear about the benefits to inner city residents themselves (ibid., 363).

In debates about inner city policy the tension between the objectives of regenerating inner areas and ensuring that such regeneration benefits existing inner city residents has rarely been exposed, still less the relationship clarified . . . what does regeneration mean? Does it inevitably improve prospects for local residents? (Hambleton 1981 in Hambleton 1989, 363.)

What did become clear through studies carried out by the British Economic and Social Research Council in the late 1970s and early 1980s (Begg, Moore and Rhodes 1986; Begg and Eversley 1986; Begg and Moore 1987) was that "a general rise in local economic activity does not necessarily result in a "trickle down" of employment benefits to disadvantaged groups (Hambleton 1989, 364; emphasis in original) and that the benefits of growth are unevenly distributed" (ibid.). These findings were consistent with earlier studies in the United States (Stanback 1979) that found that American "success" stories in such cities as Boston produced a widening gulf between high-paid white-collar workers and low-paying service jobs -- effectively "eliminating the middle band of skilled, well-paid, male blue collar jobs" (Parkinson 1987 in Hambleton 1989, 364).

Such concerns have occupied the efforts of all levels of governments in Britain and the United States for almost five decades, and it is clear that neither country has developed the perfect mould for the regeneration of healthy cities.
2.3 Evolving Urban Policy in the United Kingdom and the United States

Both Britain and the United States have, since the 1960s, experimented with a broad stream of urban-planning methods and urban-policy initiatives in order to wrestle with the problems of urban decline and growing social and economic inequality. While there are major political, cultural and social differences between the two countries as well as variations in financial, institutional and government structures, the evolution of urban policy in Britain under the Conservative government of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was ideologically driven and based to a large degree on the experiences of urban regeneration in the United States. In the 1980s, both countries undertook restructuring of inter-governmental relations as their major urban-policy strategy. In the United States there was a shift in federal, state and local responsibilities, and in Britain a shift in central/local control of power and policy. Conservative governments on both continents initiated central-government attacks on local governments in attempts to reduce public expenditure and to shift the blame for cuts in services to the local levels. Both Thatcher and Reagan sought to reduce central government financial support to local levels and to encourage privatisation of public services.

Prior to Prime Minister Thatcher's rise to power in 1979, British national responses to urban restructuring were based on two assumptions: "First, policy was as much designed to provide social and welfare support services to the victims of economic change in urban areas as it was to create wealth in those areas. Secondly, since disinvestment by the private sector was seen as the cause of many cities' economic decline, the public sector was regarded as the natural agency to lead urban reconstructions" (Parkinson 1989, 422).
The ideological shift that took place under the Conservatives in the 1980s saw the private sector being wooed into involvement in the inner cities.

Markets replaced politics as the primary response to urban decline; the values of urban entrepreneurialism replaced those of municipal collectivism; private-sector leadership replaced public intervention; investment in physical capital displaced investment in social capital; wealth creation replaced distribution of welfare; and, most ironically, a regime committed to decentralising power in fact weakened alternative power bases. Britain's response to urban decline under Mrs. Thatcher may be characterised as the centralisation and privatisation of power. (Parkinson 1989, 422.)

The British urban strategy of the 1980s was based on an ideology that attempted to break with the traditional values underlying the post-war Welfare State. The Conservatives aimed to reduce the burden of welfare expenditures and cut the power of the trade unions. In order to achieve these goals and to create a more favourable climate for economic recovery, the Thatcher government embarked upon a restructuring of state power and actively sought an enhanced role for the private sector in urban problems (see figure 2.1).

Public-private partnerships and urban development corporations were Conservative initiatives that shared the ideological characteristics of private-sector leadership, a concentration upon physical regeneration and a decreased role for local government. National-led partnerships such as the Business in the Community, programme and property-based construction industry initiatives such as the Phoenix Initiative and British Urban Development were largely structured after American examples. Through a wide range of financial incentives, the relaxation of local planning control in favour of Enterprise Zones, and other institutional innovations such as City Action Teams, the Conservative government profoundly affected urban policy. Nonetheless, by the end of the 1980s it was clear, even to the Conservative government, that urban regeneration required a much
### Aims in inner urban areas

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<td>297</td>
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broader and comprehensive approach to urban policy intervention. Indeed, it can be argued that many of the fiscal and institutional initiatives contributed to uneven regeneration and distribution of benefits.

The impact of Thatcherism on British society in general, and on the planning system specifically, was thoroughly debated by a number of British planners from 1980 to 1990. Among those planners who felt that the Thatcher government launched an overt attack on the planning system was Andy Thornley. In his book, *Urban Planning Under Thatcherism* (1990), Thornley suggests that "urban planning has been the victim of a strategy of erosion" (ibid., preface). Thornley claims that Thatcherism "changed the language of politics from 'public good' to 'individual choice' and 'entrepreneurial flair'" (ibid., 2), and in doing so: (1) bowed to the inefficiencies of the market; (2) refused to deal with demands for the protection of the environment; and (3) showed disdain for democracy and participation (ibid., 222-225). Nowhere were these characteristics so evident, said Thornley, than in Conservative strategies to bypass the formal planning system through architectural competitions, special development orders, and the urban development corporations and in massive urban regeneration attempts such as London's Docklands project (Thornley 1990).

Meanwhile, American attempts at urban regeneration, despite the proliferation of programmes and initiatives, produced varied results. While cities such as Boston, Denver, Houston, New York and San Francisco were held up as models of American urban revitalisation efforts, other cities continued to deteriorate (Parkinson, Foley and Judd 1988, 2). National economic policy stripped financial support to city governments, and urban
centres experienced extraordinary polarisation of deprivation and wealth. Neighbourhood or community policy shifted from the political arena to the marketplace.

Comparable efforts have been proposed or undertaken by Reagan and Thatcher governments to reduce the scope of domestic public economic involvement in urban affairs, to deregulate industrial and commercial markets, to privatise service delivery (Savas 1982) and to use increasingly limited sums of money to hopefully leverage larger amounts of private sector investment. (Boyle 1985, 205.)

Although the commitment to privatisation as an instrument of urban policy and a strategy for urban regeneration was embraced similarly in the United States and Britain, the promotion of this ideology took place in different institutional environments.\(^5\) "The borrowing from U.S. program initiatives (particularly economic development programs such as UDAG [Urban Development Action grants]) was carried out with little systematic knowledge of the U.S. record of performance and with scant regard for the consequences of inappropriate policy transfer" (Barnekov, Boyle and Rich 1989, 222). Together, the British and American experience with privatisation and the idea of a post-industrial imperative produced a failure to deal with the dislocations of urban social change, a trivialisation of the city as a political and economic community, and a one-dimensional image of social and economic progress that neglected community interests (ibid., 1989).

2.4 Planning and Urban Policy in Britain and the United States: The Historical Context

In examining the effect of planning in shaping contemporary urban policy, it is important to note the role of planning in the development of modern cities. Essentially, urban policy, shaped by urban planning ideologies, has come full circle -- from a belief in
the overall merits of growth and development, to support of a no-growth philosophy, and a
return to enthusiasm for urban growth linked to economic development. It can be argued
that these waves of planning perspectives affected the thinking of Canadian planners in
attempting to deal with inner city conditions at various times, albeit under different
political, institutional, financial and conditions. The next chapter will examine the
similarities and differences in philosophies and practices among the three countries.

2.4.1 The Late-Nineteenth Century

Historically, planners in major cities on both continents were preoccupied with the
pace and form of spatial change in large metropolitan areas and with the concomitant well-
being of city residents. The growth of large cities in the late-nineteenth century was
fuelled by development pressures of an industrial age, and many planning efforts were
taken as a form of control. Health and environmental legislation was enacted as a method
to curb the worst abuses of unsanitary conditions and poor living conditions. Zoning
policies became the method of segregating conflicting land use and undesirable
development. Active economic development was a private initiative and one in which
planners played only a reactive role by encouraging favourable development through the
functional designation of physical space. As numerous authors have suggested (Law, et al.
1988; Fainstein 1991), planning in the late-nineteenth century was a passive activity.

At the end of the nineteenth century in Britain, progressive thinkers in the field of
planning urged a more pro-active approach to shaping urban communities and revitalising
urban centres. Utopian thinkers such as Ebenezer Howard strongly influenced planning
theory and practice. Howard’s Garden Cities concept proposed a form of urban
containment whereby ideal forms of urban communities were self-contained in zones beyond a green belt and the existing older areas of the urban core purged of their undesirable features and redeveloped at lower densities. The new communities were designed to balance population size with jobs and types of economic activity as well as providing a range of services and amenities to their inhabitants.

2.4.2 The Early Twentieth Century

The early twentieth century saw alternate visions of urban development in Europe and the United States. In the 1920s, Le Corbusier countered Howard’s dream of the ideal city by suggesting upward, not outward, development. Howard’s Garden Cities concept was essentially anti-urban and decentralist; Le Corbusier’s strongly urban and concentrated. In his vision of the Radiant City, Le Corbusier proposed high density, tall apartment structures with green space between. His massive tower-block forms had a profound influence on inner city architecture on both continents. In America, the City Beautiful movement, which arose out of the Chicago Exposition of 1893, combined elements of both dreams: clean, open cities with large monumental buildings and wide, tree-lined boulevards. While many of these utopian planning attempts succeeded at urban beautification, they did little to address the problems of urban decay. In some respects, and perhaps unintentionally, the newly professionalised city planning segregated physical and social malaise.
2.4.3 Post World War II

As a result of World War II, utopian schemes came to a halt, and planning in the post-war period resulted in emergency mop-up efforts for many years. In Britain, public policy, and specifically urban policy, was directed by a post-war consensus on intervening in the public interest.

What the private sector had constructed in the industrial revolution of the nineteenth century the state had to rebuild in the twentieth (Cherry 1979, 296). The urban policy experience of Britain differs most dramatically from that of the U.S. precisely because, in twentieth-century Britain, there has been a strong countervailing tradition of direct public involvement in the shaping of urban development. Haar notes that the British pioneered the planned development of cities while in the U.S. "planning powers, extensive as they have become, pale before the controls instituted in Britain." (Haar 1984, xii in Barnekov, Boyle and Rich 1989, 31.)

Due to the urgent need for factories and houses, initial building efforts in Britain took place on the periphery of cities outside of the large bombed-out areas. The ravages of war, compounded by the effects of decentralisation and urban sprawl, caused in part by the Garden Cities movement, delayed any major attempts at urban regeneration until the mid-1950s. By then, in order to achieve redevelopment on a large scale, it was clear that large-scale public intervention was necessary. British planners approached renewal with a form of comprehensive redevelopment involving major land clearance followed by land-use segregation. New building was carried out on publicly developed land controlled by a rigorous land-planning permission system. The result was two-fold: (1) a strong effort toward decentralisation vesting powerful planning authority in the local level; and, (2) long periods of time between designation of sites to be cleared and actual demolition and
redevelopment. Unfortunately, this time lapse contributed to further urban decay by causing blight and neighbourhood destruction in both physical and social terms.

In the middle of the 1940s, American Congress was already concerned with a post-war revitalisation strategy aimed at metropolitan central cities. Post-war programmes included the Housing Act of 1949 and the Urban Renewal Programme of 1954, which made cities the direct recipients of federal funding. Despite these and other initiatives, post-war inner-city renewal efforts in the United States did not achieve substantially more success than European efforts for a variety of reasons. Redevelopment lagged in inner cities where vacant land was offered to developers in the expectation that suburban-like expansion would occur. Although there were more mixed land-use designations for private and public use in American cities than in Britain, investors were not overly anxious to redevelop. "Holding a supply-oriented view of urban space, planners assumed that private investors would avail themselves of adequately serviced, centrally located land without further incentives" (Fainstein 1991, 22). This proved not to be the case in many instances. In addition, urban renewal efforts using the "bulldozer" approach sparked strong opposition to the demolition and clearance model of redevelopment. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, conservation and rehabilitation held strong appeal for neighbourhood-based environmental, preservation and anti-road lobbies. In contrast, those who enthusiastically embraced the prospects and opportunities promised by the urban-renewal programme included black immigrants from the Old South. Their optimism fuelled a tremendous migration to the northern and western metropolitan cities unprepared for drastic growth in the very areas that were the recipients of the federal "save the city" policy. The tensions that ultimately exploded in the race riots of the 1960s were the unintentioned results of evolving racial and
class structure spatially structured by the programmes that were intended to revitalise distressed cities.\textsuperscript{7}

2.4.4 The 1960s and 1970s

British support for public intervention to shape urban form remained strong throughout the 1960s. Essentially conservative attitudes reinforced planning efforts to maintain the existing population distributions, protect the countryside from private speculation, and to create new planned communities along the lines of the Garden Cities concept at specific locations. Town planning as an activity was seen as an essentially neutral political concept: "a device for making the best of all worlds: individualism and socialism; town and country; past and future; preservation and change" (Glass 1959 in Barnekov, Boyle and Rich 1989, 33). Despite occasional initiatives directed toward the private sector, urban policy orientation remained strongly rooted in the welfare-oriented post-war consensus. Planning as the instrument of urban public policy focused on public housing and infrastructure, planned urban development, and public management of growth.

It was not until the late 1960s and early 1970s that disillusionment with the net results of the British welfare state combined with growing criticism of planning failures and the accompanying bureaucratic system produced a backlash against the paternalistic state approach to urban development and regeneration. The magnitude of the problems of large urban centres compounded by a rapidly changing world economy forced the central British government to re-examine the decline of urban areas from an economic perspective.\textsuperscript{8} Urban decline became synonymous with economic decline, and the rallying
call of the Conservative Party under Margaret Thatcher focused on a renewed role for the private sector in inner cities.

In America, the black unrest of the 1960s gave way to debate about an urban crisis (Fox 1986). Just as Margaret Thatcher was to proclaim two decades later in Britain, politicians and administrators of central cities began to portray the urban crisis as a fiscal crisis. Declining inner-city revenues were compounded by increasing demands for services of all kinds. An odd dilemma occurred; despite the fact the federal programmes were channelling increasing amounts of money into cities through the Model Cities Programme in particular, federal programmes may have compounded the fiscal crisis faced by cities in generating expectations and demands that could not be satisfied. The Model Cities Programme shifted the emphasis from urban renewal to community development. City planners promoted comprehensive planning, but, by the early 1970s when the Model Cities Programme was well under way, it was clear that even the best-co-ordinated strategies for social, economic and physical development were difficult to deliver.

City planners involved with Model Cities recognised almost from the outset that the participatory approach to neighbourhood development placed them, as white middle-class professionals and cultural and political outsiders, in an untenable position. Model Cities not only identified the problem of poverty neighbourhoods as social underdevelopment of the neighbourhood population, it also postulated in its basic assumptions that bricks and mortar were not the means to social goals. . . . Model Cities neither emphasised physical city planning and redevelopment, nor suggested that professional planners and technical expertise should play the central role in making its strategy work at the neighbourhood level. (Fox 1986, 203.)

Despair for urban centres overcame the optimism of previous decades. Writers such as Edward Banfield (1968), a conservative political scientist, predicted a gloomy future for American cities. "Attempting to 'solve' the problems of the urban crisis with
government programmes was worse than doing nothing at all," Banfield argued, for "remedial programmes heightened the tensions of the crisis without speeding its resolution" (Banfield in Fox 1986, 11). Earlier, other writers such as Jane Jacobs (1961) and Herbert Gans (1962) implicitly and explicitly lambasted the planning profession for destroying the unique and attractive attributes that made inner cities work -- of "sterilising" cities with their hangover practises in the Garden Cities planning tradition. It appeared that neither government programmes nor planning efforts proved effective at solving inner cities problems, and both groups took the brunt of criticism. Nonetheless, national concerns over the urban crisis subsided throughout the Nixon administration in the early 1970s such that by the time President Carter took office in 1976, he was able to turn a crisis approach into one that focused on the dawn of a new post-industrial course of action for urban development. The net result was that public urban renewal efforts gave way to public-private partnerships characterised by reliance on the marketplace and extensive use of fiscal incentives. The Carter administration grounded its urban policy on the premise that inner-city deterioration was irreversible, leaving the planning profession with the dilemma of ignoring, among other things, prevailing migration trends and settlement preferences. This and other factors contributed to an identity crisis in the planning profession, which was eagerly searching for the right role to play in responding to the changes in urban planning in the 1960s and 1970s.9

2.5 Contemporary Urban Policy: Lessons From America

Britain’s reliance on America to provide a model for public intervention in regeneration of cities had a precedent in social-policy formation. In the 1960s Britain’s
social policy was influenced by the Johnson administration's War on Poverty programmes. It is not surprising therefore, that when faced with severe economic problems in the 1980s, Britain should again turn to the United States.

The apparent economic renaissance of east-coast cities like Boston, New York, Baltimore, Pittsburg, Philadelphia as the revitalised centres of service sector economies had a powerful attraction for a British Government forced to respond to the restructuring of the international economic order and the rapid decline of its older, industrial urban areas. (Parkinson 1989, 423.)

Due to basic institutional and ideological differences between the two countries, Britain could not directly use the American experience as a template for economic reform and urban regeneration (Boyle and Rich 1984). With particular respect to political ideology, Britain and the United States adopted divergent strategies in implementing their political agendas for reform. Unlike the Thatcherite interventions in local government, the Reagan administration did not find it necessary to centralise power and, instead, American conservative strategy led to a decentralisation and a shift of responsibility to the states and local governments. The American approach was not as much one of intervention as it was of federal policy withdrawal. Under the Reagan administration, the states were the beneficiaries of changes in political power; under Thatcher it was the central government that benefited (Boyle 1985).

2.6 Dereliction in Aid and the Rise of Privatism

Similarities in British and American urban policy during the 1980s reflected Britain's attempts to replicate American urban programme initiatives especially in areas of economic development. Ignoring the social, political and economic contextual differences
between the two countries, as well as the documented failures of many American
development attempts, Britain embraced privatism just as the United States had done
earlier. For conservative governments on both continents, the seduction of privatism lay in
the belief that national economic renewal relied on private initiatives and public-private
partnerships.10

The seeds of support for the rise of privatism in Britain and the United States were
sown by governments in the pre-Thatcher and pre-Reagan eras (Hambleton 1989). The
Labour government that preceded Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative government initiated
cuts in federal expenditures and tightened government controls at the behest of the
International Monetary Fund. During her first term in power, Margaret Thatcher developed
a new system of allocating central government support through the 1980 Local Government
Planning and Land Act. In addition to the creation of a central audit authority, a whole
range of programme-targeting and penalty assessments were intended ostensibly to make
local governments more accountable. Perhaps the most controversial of the Conservative
initiatives was the forced sale of publicly financed council homes and the opening up of
council services to competitive tendering. Modeled after the American UDAGs, the
Thatcher government created Urban Development corporations and Urban Development
grants intended to enhance the role of the private sector in urban change. During the
Thatcher government’s second term, more restrictions were placed on local government
expenditures with a system of ”rate capping,” and by 1985 new government legislation
abolished a whole tier of local city governments. Thatcher’s third term brought further
radical changes in inter-governmental control and fiscal policy, especially that of the "poll
tax" which replaced land-based property taxes. According to Robin Hambleton (1989, 370)
the legacy of the Thatcher government urban policy can be viewed in various ways: (1) as an attack on local democracy; (2) as an attack on the welfare state; and/or, (3) as a process of costly and destabilising incrementalism. Irrespective of the point of view held, Hambleton suggests that the results are split between the opportunities presented as a result of new strategies and initiatives in working with the private sector and the resulting changes in the detailed arrangements for the planning of local authorities affecting housing, land-use planning, social services and the urban programme.

Parallel developments in the dereliction of federal aid and the rise of privatism occurred somewhat earlier in the United States (Hambleton 1989). With the New Federalism Programme of 1969, Richard Nixon began to disassemble the aid system that many cities had become dependent upon. President Ford continued these policies, ending the Model Cities and Urban Renewal programmes and replacing them with Community Development Block grants. By 1978, the Carter administration halted the increases in federal aid in real-dollar terms and initiated the UDAGs, a private-sector-led version of urban renewal that was strongly supported by the senior administration and business leaders of large cities. Reagan further diverted aid to big cities with his Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, and according to Peterson "cities have been one of the clearest losers of federal funds under block grants" (Peterson et al. 1986 in Hambleton 1989, 371). This reduction in federal assistance necessitated the need for city governments to look elsewhere for funding for new construction -- to the private sector.

One consequence of the federal withdrawal was undoubtedly a growing inter-city variation in the allocation of redevelopment funding as between downtown and neighbourhoods, rehabilitation and new construction, poor versus middle-income people, and industry versus housing. The mix depended on the balance of
political forces in any particular city. (Nathan and Doolittle 1983 in Fainstein and Fainstein 1989, 53.)

2.7 Prognosis for Cities in Distress

Since the 1960s, Britain and the United States have been looking to each other for methods of solving the social, economic and physical problems of their inner cities. In what Robin Hambleton (1989, 375) calls a "fog of initiatives," both countries have attempted to determine who shall play the leading role in inner-city regeneration. He also suggests that both countries have been less than successful in tackling urban problems and that, in many respects, "urban areas are becoming increasingly divided with extraordinary concentrations of deprivation and poverty in some neighbourhoods" (ibid., 382). "For cities, in Britain and elsewhere, the 1980s has become the decade of entrepreneurial urban mercantilism and aggressive place-marketing" (Parkinson 1989, 438).

As a result of nearly a decade of Conservative initiatives and approaches to inner-city revitalisation in Britain, a conference was held in January 1988 hosted by the Polytechnic of Central London. Spearheaded by planners such as Andy Thornley, and others who collectively like to view themselves as "radicals" (certainly with respect to Thatcherism), participants at the conference shared and evaluated proposals for radical or progressive change in theoretical and practical terms (Thornley 1990, 6). A book emerged from this conference, Radical Planning Initiatives (1990), edited by Thornley. In the book, case studies presented at the conference are used to trace the effects of the market orientation of the development process in the marginalisation of the poor and least powerful in inner cities (Griffiths; Lloyd and Newlands; and Barnes in ibid.). A variety of concrete tools for change are suggested, ranging from a new approach to local economic
planning, labelled "post-Fordism" (Montgomery and Geddes in ibid.); to control of land and the development process through such devices as "public zones" (Newman in ibid.) and development trusts (Bailey in ibid.). The underlying message shared by these planners and others at the conference was one of putting people first.

By now it will be clear that, in our view, the starting point for progressive forms of planning derives from people themselves. A purely market-driven approach does not do this. The motor of the market is profit and the implications and effects of this are to ignore many social and economic needs. Placing people at the top of the agenda provides criteria with which to evaluate the role of the market and establish the framework of controls required. (Thornley 1990, 11.)

There is no doubt that this conference, and the ensuing publication, represents the more radical or overtly collectivist response not only to Thatcherism, but also to planning in cities plagued by core-area distress -- cities like London, Liverpool, Sheffield and Birmingham. For the most part, however, these efforts were aborted before the end of the 1980s; nonetheless, they represent an important set of socio-economic policy innovations that provide significant contrast with experiences in the United States.

2.8 The Limitations of Past Approaches to Urban Revitalisation and the Need for Alternative Strategies

Earlier in this chapter reference was made to Cameron, who asked if urban decline was inevitable. The answer may be that, while not inevitable, inner-city decline is likely to continue, especially for those cities not in a position to stop population decline, reduce employment, and ensure financial stability. "Inevitably there will be some winners and some losers and the latter will include those cities where core area decline is likely to continue" (Law, et al. 1988, 232).
An examination of urban planning efforts in both the United States and Britain suggests that there are limitations on the effectiveness of planning interventions in attempting to relieve urban decline. In some cases planning efforts have produced a widening gulf between "haves" and "have-nots" in cities and regions competing for economic recovery and social relief. Urban restructuring activities have produced uneven regeneration and distribution of benefits on both continents. In retrospect, one of the common dilemmas faced by planners in both countries was the perceived neglect of community interests arising from the trade-offs viewed necessary to achieve economic goals. For the most part, "bricks and mortar" projects may have achieved physical regeneration aims but were not the means to achieving social goals. This lesson, in particular, raises important concerns that may have guided the architects of the CAI in their determination to interweave the three basic objectives of physical, social and economic development that formed the mandate of the CAI. As Chapters 7 and 8 will show, given that the CAI was a bold experiment in this regard, it did achieve a degree of success lacking in other urban revitalisation attempts.

This chapter concludes that there was, and is, a need for alternative strategies for urban revitalisation. In order to support the "winners" and diminish the effects on the "losers," long-term urban policies and consistencies in local government are necessary. Central government withdrawal of assistance cannot be replaced with private initiatives alone. Government intervention in some form to provide basic infrastructure and public works, selective subsidies for the private sector, and sound economic policies complemented with social programmes are needed to ensure efficiency and accountability in addition to equity. A close ear to the community is needed to tailor policies and
programmes to specific urban needs and community interests. New actors, new institutional and fiscal mechanisms, new political alliances offer hope for urban regeneration. The Winnipeg Core Area Initiative was an urban revitalisation experiment that had all of these features and offered an alternative strategy full of promise for the inner city of Winnipeg specifically and for urban regeneration efforts generally. Chapters 4 to 7 will explore and evaluate the successes and weaknesses of the CAI as a model for urban regeneration. First, however, Chapter 3 will link the theory and practice of Canadian urban planning to economic development and give an historical perspective that will become pertinent in a later consideration of the CAI model.
Endnotes


2. This includes the six large conurbations of London, Birmingham, Manchester, Liverpool, Newcastle, and Glasgow and the seventeen next largest cities with a population of about 200,000 or more (Hambleton 1989).

3. The term "underclass" is used by authors such as Cohen (1983) to refer to a group of people in urban areas who are generally unemployed, welfare-dependent and often members of visible minorities; however this grouping may also include "those who can work but whose earnings still leave them with chronically or temporarily inadequate incomes" and the "physically capable but unemployable" (ibid., 308-309).

4. Figure 2.1 illustrates the aims, programmes and resources for the 1987-88 budget year in which Thatcher expected to lever private expenditure and cause private business "to make use of some of their increased profitability for social purposes" (Cameron 1990, 476).

5. A number of authors, such as Boyle (1985); Parkinson, Foley and Judd (1988); Parkinson (1989); Hambleton (1989); and Thornley (1990) provide background information on the different institutional and political settings influencing the move toward privatism in the United States and Britain.

6. Ebenezer Howard’s 1902 book Garden Cities of Tomorrow (rep. London: Faber and Faber, 1906) became the bible of the Garden Cities movement. Peter Hall et al. argues that this concept was an early form of containment, and in The Containment of Urban England (London: Allan and Unwin, 1973) discusses the impact that Howard’s philosophy had on Britain.


8. Robert Home, in the first chapter of Inner City Regeneration (1982) briefly traces the development of inner city policy in Britain during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. He claims that "inner city policy emerged as a distinct area of government activity with the Inner City White Paper in 1977" (ibid., 16). This new area of concern was brought about by several factors -- one of which was the shift in perception of the nature of inner city problems from social problems to economic and physical problems (ibid., 16-17).

10. Barnekov, Boyle and Rich (1989) in their concluding chapter outline the rationale used by both the British and Americans in supporting their commitment to privatism.
Chapter 3

PLANNING AND THE URBAN DIMENSION OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN CANADA

3.1 Introduction

The preceding chapter has documented some of the urban revitalisation strategies and programmes adopted by governments and planners in the United States and Britain in efforts to combat urban distress. This chapter gives a brief history of the evolution of Canadian urban planning from the late-nineteenth century to the present with specific reference to the intellectual roots that differentiate Canadian planning from that of the other two countries. It situates urban planning efforts in the context of local government and discusses the roles of the three levels of government with respect to urban planning and economic development. It also gives credit to the historical influence of British and American planning philosophies on local development and explores how the ideologies of privatism and urban entrepreneurialism, referred to in Chapter 2, have been translated into the Canadian urban environment. The importance of this review will become apparent in the ensuing chapters when the normative and empirical assumptions underlying the tri-level partnership and the structural model of the CAI are examined. This chapter concludes with a discussion of a new role for planners in the post-Fordist period of urban development -- a role that can be described as "public entrepreneur." It suggests that this role is causing a dilemma for planners faced with reconciling the need for economic development based on privatism with the needs for effectively defining "public interest and betterment."
3.2 Evolution of Canadian Urban Planning

Planning, as a professional activity in Canada, has roots in pioneering ideas surrounding the turn of the twentieth century. In many cases the intellectual foundations for these ideas were derived from planning experiences in Britain and the United States. Countryside-conservation, public-health and housing-reform movements in Britain and the urban-reform movements in the United States provided the ideological seeds for community planning efforts in Canada between 1890 and 1930.¹ From the outset, however, Canadian planning had at least two unique characteristics that differentiate it from planning in the other two countries: it grew in response to a variety of reform movements, and, in attempting to face the challenges of those movements, planning took on a broad scope of public concerns. The rapid growth and development of Canadian cities in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth led to concerns with public health, conservation of public resources and inadequate housing for the poor.² Each of these concerns spawned public "movements" with key figures and varying camps of advocates and detractors. Reform was controversial and constrained by local government expenditures and legal wrangles over private rights. The results of these movements affected the manner and approaches used by the fledgling planning community and contributed to much of the intellectual and practical heritage carried on in the Canadian planning profession today.

The influence of British and American planning approaches on early Canadian planning was certainly discernible, but laterly Canadian planning developed a breadth of concern that differentiated it from efforts in United States and Britain. The Chicago Exposition of 1893 and the resulting City Beautiful movement, so popular with American planners, held little relevance for Canadian frontier towns and cities (Armstrong 1959, 15).
The quality and cost of urban life, including rapidly deteriorating urban housing conditions, led to the introduction, in 1909, of the Act to Establish a Commission for the Conservation of Natural Resources (ibid.). It was drafted by the Honourable Clifford Sifton, a Winnipeg lawyer and Liberal Member of Parliament in the Laurier Cabinet until 1905. The scope of the Commission included all questions related to the better utilization of natural resources in Canada; in addition, "systems of demonstration farms, water power inventories, a more consolidated Federal health service, housing and town planning were by its later years all accepted departmental responsibilities in Canadian Governments" (ibid., 16).

One of the first permanent specialists to the Commission was Dr. Charles Hodgetts, appointed Advisor on Public Health in May 1910. He pointed out relationships between public health and housing, using, as one example, the appalling decay in the inner city of Winnipeg (ibid., 18). He said that it was "not so much the city beautiful as the city healthy that we want for Canada" (Hodgetts in Armstrong, ibid.). After a series of investigations on planning progress made in Canada and abroad during the early 1900s, Hodgetts brought forward his definition of town planning:

The primary objects of town planning may be considered under three heads:

1. to encourage and facilitate thorough co-operation in the providing of housing accommodation for town dwellers whereby they will have sufficient light, air and space;

2. to ensure the exercise of foresight in reserving plenty of space for the development of main thoroughfares when required;

3. to take into account everything that helps to make town life worth living. (Hodgetts in Armstrong, ibid., 19.)
Hodgetts's definition of town planning was indeed broad and visionary. He went on to outline the "essentials of town planning" and suggested the role that planning could play in the welfare of modern communities.

The questions involved are more numerous and complicated than the mere building of a house. The various constituent parts of a modern town have to be considered and arranged in such a manner that they will form an harmonious whole, no matter how great the whole may ultimately become . . . a plan for town extension contemplates and provides for the development of every urban, suburban, and rural area that may be built on within from thirty to fifty years. (Hodgetts in Hodge 1986, 90.)

Not only did planning efforts have a broad mandate from the start, but the Canadian planning community also had the benefit of advice from experienced North American and European planners. The Standing Committee on Public Health, one of several working committees formed by the Commission of Conservation, influenced the selection of Thomas Adams, a British planner, as the Advisor on Town Planning in 1914.

Adams was a noted British planner who had early become acquainted with Patrick Geddes, Ebenezer Howard, and the Garden Cities movement. In 1900 he had become Secretary of the First Garden Cities Company at Letchworth and, in 1906, a Town planning consultant. He was one of the founders of the British Town Planning Institute and had a solid reputation as a speaker and facilitator. At the time Adams joined the Canadian Commission of Conservation he was serving as an Inspector of the Local Government Board which was responsible for the administration of the British planning act passed in 1909.

Together, the influence of Hodgetts and Adams was such that the Commission of Conservation became a major force in the development of Canadian urban planning. (Artibise and Stelter 1981, 24.)

Artibise and Stelter (1981) believe that Adams was influential in promoting the development of urban planning in several respects: (1) by pressing for provincial legislation
regulating suburban expansion; (2) by directly or indirectly planning satellite "new towns" based on British models; and, (3) by actively engaging in and promoting education in planning (ibid., 24-25). Adams forged the way for community planning as a professional activity -- one that linked community concerns with improved economic values.

Adams believed in an utilitarian ethic embodying a number of principles:

The first is the notion of social progress, and that there will be public consensus about achieving it. A second principle is an emphasis on reason to determine solutions to social problems, solutions that will lead to progress. A third is the acceptance of government intervention to achieve the public good if the weight of objective evidence suggests that course of actions. (Hodge 1986, 98.)

These principles profoundly affected the foundation of Canadian planning in so far as they established an administrative and legislative base for planning activities and placed the planner in a position of protecting social values.

The Commission of Conservation was dissolved in 1921, and with it "the end of an era in Canadian planning history" (Artibise and Stelter 1981, 27).

The end of the Commission of Conservation did not, of course, herald an abrupt termination of planning activity in Canada. Indeed, though the life of the Commission was relatively short, it left a strong legacy that continued for many years to influence planning activity. Perhaps its important achievement was in assuming the role of a national forum for the discussion and development of issues and ideas about resource policy and management. It stimulated argument and research into a whole range of problems associated with particular resources and it initiated national consideration of public health and town planning problems, leading to the establishment of a national health department and a national planning association. More significantly, through the work of Adams, it developed concepts of total resource use in the field of urban planning. In short, the Commission of Conservation did more than any other institution to draw attention to integrated resource development. (Ibid., 28.)
3.2.1 Planning as a Rational, Technical Profession

In attempting to address physical, social and economic concerns, early Canadian planners were supported by the use of experts and professionals in varying fields, especially medicine and law. Planning problems were believed to have rational and technical solutions, and the planners’ repertoire of skills soon included improved methods of data collection and the use of statistics. The merits of community planning were recognised when planning achieved professional status under the Town Planning Act in 1919. Later the same year the Town Planning Institute of Canada was established to promote wider involvement of communities in planning. The rational, technical aspect of planning provided legitimization for the newly created profession and garnered community support for planning activities. Even today, Hodge (1986, 103) suggests that rational decision-making is one of the eight planning values that reflect long-standing concerns of community building.

3.2.2 Institutionalization of Urban Planning Within the Local Government System

The civic-reform movement in the early 1900s was responsible for institutionalizing the planning function within the local government system in Canada. Pressure from reform groups forced local governments to establish municipal ownership of utilities with the result that communities were faced with the responsibilities of providing community-wide services. Planners, of course, were involved in the planning and delivery of those services. At the same time, a wide-spread belief that local governments were inept and inefficient in handling the provision of services for a rapidly growing urban population led to special boards and commissions being established to administer certain community
services. The planning function adopted a semi-independent status responsible to local
government generally but administratively through the boards or commissions. By the
mid-1960s most of these bodies had been abolished, and local governments secured in-
house planners in formalized planning departments.

This trend tended to bring planning more directly under political control, at
the expense of the older system of planning commissioners or boards, whose
respectable members presumably had been above politics. In searching for
planners, both the CMHC and local departments recruited heavily in Britain.
One result was that the "British takeover of planning in the 1940s was
massive." According to one critic, the consequences of this domination by
British planners was a planning profession preoccupied with the physical
details of land use and a relentless desire to centralize planning power at the
expense of the public's involvement in the process. (Artibise and Stelter
1981, 30.)

The situation of the planning function within the local government system has
sparked wide and continued debate on the role of planning vis-à-vis local politics. A
recent article by Matthew Kiernan (1990) in Plan Canada and a vitriolic response by Kent
Gerecke and Barton Reid in City Magazine (1990) attest to the ideological conflict faced
by local government planners. Kiernan claims that the consequence of situating the
planning function within the local government apparatus is that planning operates within a
narrow focus on land use, subdivision design and zoning approvals and that the result is a
"powerful ethos of apolitical, anti-interventionist minimalism in municipal government" that
is reflected in planning itself (Kiernan 1990, 13). In addition, he claims that the
persistence of the notion that planning is essentially a rational, technical, professional
enterprise consequently "has been to obscure from both planners and politicians the fact
that their work almost invariably does involve debatable value judgements, and that their
costs and benefits are rarely uniformly or equally distributed" (ibid., 14). The result means that the planning system tends to be reactive and essentially marginalized. Gerecke and Reid take great exception to Kiernan's interpretation of the history of Canadian city planning as being inherently apolitical and argue that "the victory of the rationalist school was really the victory of the right wing over the left" (Gerecke and Reid 1990, 17). Political or apolitical, rational or value-laden, it is clear that planning evokes as much controversy today in attempting to solve community problems as it did during the heyday of the reform movements at the turn of the century.

3.2.3 "New" Urban Politics and Planning

Louis Albrechts refers to the 1960s as the "golden era" whereby "planners believed in a future in which social problems could be tamed and humanity liberated from the constraints of scarcity and greed (Albrechts 1991, 123). Planning was legitimized as a method of decision-making based on procedural concepts or "an approach." Each of these approaches led to better and new programmes proffered to be the solution to a wide variety of physical, social and economic problems. In this period, when resources seemed abundant, there was widespread belief in overall economic and social progress. Traditional economic policies based on incentives, social policy based on a welfare ideology, and land-use policies secured by zoning, gave the planner the tools thought necessary to achieve desired results. Planners' activities centred around the mandate of local governments, which was seen to be "the prudent and orderly administration of physical services to support growth and development" (Plunkett in Kiernan 1990, 13). In doing so, planners themselves uncritically accepted suburban development and high-rise development as
means of achieving progress in urban planning only to find themselves squarely in the middle of an urban protest against such growth by the end of the 1960s. Faced with similar situations to those of British and American planners outlined in Chapter 2, Canadian planners moved from pro-development to anti-development in the space of one decade aided by an affluent economic environment and a new citizen-reform movement.

Planning activities from the 1960s onward focused on regulating growth through prescriptive measures such as subdivision design and zoning approvals. Public-sector activity aimed at the provision of infrastructure, housing and other amenities was controlled through land-use designations. Planners did not actively pursue an economic strategy because it was assumed that the creation of an orderly, efficient and aesthetic physical environment would spontaneously produce a positive economic one. This is not to say that planners ignored the economic importance of inner cities.

Until the 1970s planning’s justification lay in its commitment to comprehensiveness, an orientation to the long term, protection of the environment, and preservation of public interest through the orderly development of land and attention to the interests of all social groups. Numerous critics have argued that these aims were never attained, that planning always primarily benefited business interest, and that economic advantage has perennially constituted the real objective of planning. (Fainstein 1991, 22.)

In the 1970s the world changed. Global restructuring in the 1970s and 1980s contributed to the "crisis of conscience" felt by planners in many industrialised nations including Canada. In a sense, planning had become "a form of politics by other means" (Friedman 1991, 372) and the legitimization of planning as a political process to affect the social, economic and physical fabric of the city came into question. The age of affluence moved to an age of austerity by the 1980s, and the planning function began the
concomitant move from urban managerialism to entrepreneurialism. This transformation of planning in Canada, as elsewhere, has been chronicled by numerous authors (see, for example, Albrechts 1991; Fainstein 1989; Kiernan 1990). Fainstein describes the political milieu in the United States and the United Kingdom as "conditions of competitive international capitalism and conservative national regimes" (1991, 372). Albrechts supports Beauregard's (1989) claim that "in the 1980s the state has become more ideologically conservative and more subservient to the needs and demands of capital, turning away from the simultaneous pursuit of both economic growth and welfare" (Albrechts 1991, 123). State regulation changed from Keynesian intervention to monetarist intervention, and with it the role of the planner changed.

3.2.4 Implications of the Fordist Model of Development

Prior to the drastic process of industrial restructuring in the 1980s, the Fordist\(^7\) model of social and economic organization directly affected the physical and spatial form of urban areas. Zoning was the tool used by planners to physically differentiate manufacturing from residential and other land uses and to spatially structure cities dependent on transportation routes. As noted in Chapter 2, the pattern became the same for all urban areas in industrialised countries including Canada. By the end of the 1960s, however, the limitations of the Fordist model were being felt. Traditional industries were shut down, and urban areas were left with a legacy of pollution, congestion and urban decay as the unanticipated result of industry-based developments being replaced by service-sector-based economies. The planners' tool-kit was no longer equipped to deal with a new urban order.
As the process of industrial restructuring was taking place, there was a simultaneous shift in the manner in which state/city governments approached city governance. The Keynesian welfare model of the Fordist era gave way to a new entrepreneurial mode. A new urban image emerged concomitant with an urban life-style based on consumerism and the acquisition of material goods. The change in both socioeconomic processes and state/city attitudes toward intervention and regulation posed a new dilemma for planners caught in their role as instruments of government apparatus and their desire to shape a new urban environment for "the public good."

3.3 The Role of Economic Development in Local Development

There is a growing body of material that highlights the role of cities and towns in regional economic-development initiatives particularly after the global recession of the early 1980s. In Canada, The Trudeau government of this period claimed that regional development innovations in western Canada strengthened the economic fabric of the West while enhancing the capacity of local areas to shape their own development (Axworthy 1990). Recognition that the social and economic well-being of cities is directly linked to the well-being of a larger region is not an unique Canadian perspective, however. British urban policy explicitly recognises such inter-dependencies. Through such research programmes as the Changing Urban and Regional System (CURS), British researchers have studied the spatial impact of social, economic and political change in the United Kingdom. Economic restructuring at the national and local levels has produced profound consequences for localities in England, and research has shown that no one national urban policy can satisfy local interests and concerns over the long run. The British have found
that success in urban economic development rests with the cities themselves and that
government policies must reflect the idiosyncratic nature of urban regions within a broader
policy framework. According to Philip Cooke, the director of the 1984 CURS programme,
local and national economic well-being is not mutually exclusive.

A society which is exposed to the presently unregulated forces of an
increasingly globalized economy while being deprived of discretion over
local affairs, some of which involve the picking up of pieces left by global
economic whirlwinds, is Promethean in its predicament. The Prometheus
myth, it is worth recalling, ended with the opening of Pandora's box. (Cooke
1989, 305.)

3.4 Canadian Government Approach to Economic Development

Just as Britain has faced the "gales of economic competition" (ibid.), Canada's
traditional resource-based sectors have been buffeted by unstable commodity prices and the
manufacturing sector hit with global competition on a previously unknown scale.
Economic development and job creation have become critical policy issues faced by all
levels of governments. While current thinking about economic development places
increased emphasis on local, urban-based initiatives, the traditional Canadian approach to
the problems of unemployment and regional development has been characterised by a "top-
down" strategy.

Chapter 2 outlined the economic circumstances facing Britain and the United
States in the 1980s. Just as Britain has faced the "gales of economic competition" (ibid.),
Canada's traditional resource-based sectors have been buffeted by unstable commodity
prices and the manufacturing sector hit with global competition on a previously unknown
scale. Economic development and job creation have become critical policy issues faced by
all levels of governments. While current thinking about economic development places
increased emphasis on local, urban-based initiatives, the traditional Canadian approach to
the problems of unemployment and regional development has been characterised by a "top-
down" strategy. The remainder of this chapter gives a brief history of the rationale behind
Canadian economic-development policy from the late-1960s onward and is particularly
relevant to the thinking that influenced the creators of the CAI as will be seen in the
following two chapters.

3.4.1 The Ministry of State for Urban Affairs

In 1968, during the federal election campaign, Pierre Trudeau, the new leader of
the Liberal Party of Canada, promised to draw attention to the problems of urban areas in
Canada. Shortly after his election, Prime Minister Trudeau carried through on his election
promise when he appointed Paul Hellyer, a prominent cabinet minister, Chair of the newly
created Task Force on Housing and Urban Development. The aim of the task force was
"to establish the requirements for and the limits of a federal role in the rapidly expanding
urban society" (Rose 1980, 44). Not only was it in the interest of the Liberal Party to
address the perceived needs of an increasingly urban society, but all parties "had the
advantage of the projections of the Gordon Commission, which reported, in 1959-1960,
that Canada would be almost entirely urbanized by 1990, if not some years before (ibid.).

After a series of whirlwind tours to large and small urban centres, and a few
selected rural areas in Canada, the Hellyer task force presented its findings, which included
a specific proposal to establish the federal Department of Housing and Urban Affairs (ibid.,
46). The recommendations of the Hellyer task force were rejected by the prime minister
and his cabinet, resulting in the resignation of Paul Hellyer. Nonetheless, a federal ministry was established in the 1970-71 session of Parliament -- the Ministry of State for Urban Affairs (MSUA). The new ministry did not have full department status, nor did it carry the name of Housing, although it was to have responsibility for housing policy by having Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC) (the former name of Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation) report to the minister.

The designation of "urban affairs" was surely a far broader concept than any of the other titles suggested. It is clear why the prime minister chose such wording, because no level of government was possessed of the constitutional responsibility in a field as conceptually vague and as boundless as "urban affairs"; though for forty years the major constitutional responsibility in the field of housing lay with the provincial governments. It is also clear that the term "urban development" was reprehensible. Perhaps the Liberal Party, conscious of the significance of rural affairs, was determined not to alienate its relatively modest support in rural areas and in the Western provinces by appearing to espouse urban development. Urban affairs surely encompassed more than simply development of our cities. (Ibid., 50.)

The MSUA had a brief and tortured history. In the first year and a half it commissioned reports by N. H. Lithwick, and by Michael Dennis and Susan Fish; both reports were rejected. Lithwick lambasted politicians and academics for neglect of the economics of urbanisation -- Dennis and Fish blamed all and sundry for neglecting the needs of low-income Canadians (Rose 1980, 53). A fall election in 1972 turned attention away from the controversial recommendations of these two reports, and the 1973 Parliament passed a series of amendments to the National Housing Act (NHA) intended to redress a variety of problems stemming out of the former 1944 NHA. For the remainder of its term, the MSUA was inextricably linked to CMHC, and "it was not at all clear that
the Ministry of State for Urban Affairs and the CMHC were at one with each other as policy agency and implementation agency respectively” (ibid., 63).

For the balance of the 1970s, the MSUA continued to pursue its urban agenda, doggedly attempting to focus government policy on urban issues and problems. In many respects the MSUA was successful. The ministry heightened research interest in urban conditions and "added to the well-established research programmes of CMHC and the Canadian Council on Urban and Regional Research" (Artibise and Linteau 1984, 9). In a role reminiscent of that given to the Commission on Conservation decades earlier (that is, a role without administrative or executive powers), the MSUA supported or produced government policy-oriented studies and research data bases, but lacked the mandate, administrative and financial capacity, and political support to implement any of its recommendations (Artibise and Kiernan 1989, 1-2). The MSUA was dismantled in the late 1970s for a variety of reasons.

MSUA’s demise in the late 1970s, coupled with DREE/DRIE’s [Department of Regional Economic Expansion/Department of Regional Industrial Expansion] continued focus outside the urban areas, has meant that the federal government has had, virtually without exception, neither the conceptual nor the programmatic instruments with which to focus on urban economic development. To the extent that there has been a coherent concept of Canadian regional development at all, it has been one which has, until very recently, conspicuously lacked an urban dimension. (Ibid.)

3.4.2 Rationale for State Intervention

Traditionally, rationale for state intervention in economic development in Canada followed a laissez-faire policy by which government activities relied overwhelmingly on the market itself to create opportunities for local prosperity. Local governments individually or together in larger regions have generally not pursued the kinds
of public investment/ownership options that have been used in other countries such as Britain. Instead, local economic development activities have been limited to strategies toward the centre and conservative end of the policy spectrum. "Such conservative policies reflect the tacit assumption that the market, left to its own devices, will allocate resources both sectorally and spatially in a way that is both privately and socially optimal" (Gertler 1990, 37).

In addition to a conservative and occasionally neo-liberal attitude toward government intervention in economic-development policy, it is important to acknowledge the respective roles of the three levels of government in Canada vis-à-vis finance and economic-development policy. The approach and priorities adopted by the provinces to the financing of local governments influences the range and scope of local activities. Much of local revenue is derived from provincial transfer payments attached to conditional grant mechanisms. It is true that local governments can make their own decisions about raising and spending own-source revenues, however restrictive provincial statutes regulate a host of borrowing and spending activities thereby placing severe limitations on the powers and freedoms of local governments. Local autonomy and the welfare of local citizens become issues of hot dispute amidst inter-governmental tug-of-wars over economic initiatives. To this end, Gertler concludes:

In any event, all of these concerns underscore the importance of the as yet underdeveloped (and under utilized) methodologies for evaluating public actions in this general area. While traditional cost-benefit methods represent a useful starting point (Bureau of Municipal Research 1982; Kitchen 1985), it is likely that such tools will need to be broadened somewhat to reflect the full range of private and social impacts of economic development policies. Finally, such analysis will also have to come to grips with the difficult problems of defining the "public" interest in a way that is acceptable to the
multiple levels of government in the Canadian political context. (Gertler 1990, 54.)

3.4.3 The Roles of the Three Levels of Government

In Canada, the federal and provincial governments have been the primary actors in establishing policy for economic development. For the most part, the senior levels have tended to establish their own goals and have spent funds themselves rather than transferring funds to the municipalities. However, in the last decade in Canada, as in other Western countries, local governments are being increasingly involved in economic strategies. This new role for local governments "represents a trespassing over what has traditionally been the policy turf of the more senior levels of government" who have viewed regional economic development as their exclusive preserve (Gertler 1990, 35). Legally and constitutionally local governments exist as creatures of provincial fiat and the formal division of powers between the three levels of government assigns the responsibility and the revenue-raising ability for economic development to the provinces and the federal government. Economic development and competitive inter-jurisdictional bidding for economic activity is, therefore, *ultra vires* municipal governments' powers.

Historically, the role of local governments in economic development has been passive. According to Artibise and Kiernan (1989), "economic development consumes barely one-third of one per cent of total municipal spending."

Canadian local governments have, for the most part, studiously avoided any active, coherent, or interventionist role in economic development. Stymied by a lethal combination of limited financial resources, inadequate or non-existent legal powers, and above all by an enervating ideology of anti-interventionism, Canadian urban governments have traditionally adopted a profoundly minimalistic interpretation of their responsibilities. (Ibid., 1-3.)
For the most part, municipalities have traditionally depended upon the real property tax base for locally raised revenues. With the exception of earlier efforts at boosterism and the resulting competitive "beggar thy neighbour" policies to attract footloose industry, cities in Canada have generally regarded their ability to affect their economic well-being as severely circumscribed. Any active role on the part of municipalities has primarily been limited to the provision of infrastructure and municipal services, the encouragement of building and development through the manipulation of planning and zoning devices, and other concessionary practices to woo development initiatives on the part of the private sector. This passive role is, according to Gertler, "eminently compatible with the dominant ideological ethos of municipal anti-interventionism" (Gertler 1990, 42). Indeed, Gertler suggests that active local involvement in economic development would be contentious because "any intervention would arouse ideological debate about the appropriateness of such actions within a predominantly private enterprise system" (ibid., 35). The notion that cities and local governments have the potential or even the ability to affect their own economic well-being may be contentious, but it is increasingly becoming an idea in good currency.13

3.5 Local Development Strategies and Policy Instruments

This notion, that city governments, despite legal and fiscal limitations, have the capacity to improve urban conditions, has gained acceptance with the shift toward urban entrepreneurialism. Not unlike efforts undertaken in Britain and the United States that were discussed in Chapter 2, some of the most-progressive Canadian cities have embraced a form of public entrepreneurialism that has resulted from a rethinking and restructuring of
the role of local government. In an attempt to activate the economic markets within their locality, a variety of inducements are used: training programs to increase and update skill levels; assistance and support to entrepreneurs in establishing and expanding business; relaxation of planning controls as in enterprise zones and simplified enterprise zones; abolition or relaxation of rent controls; diversification of housing tenure, together with financial leverage to stimulate property development to develop confidence and attract inward investment (Solebury 1987). In attempts to attract consumers and improve the competitive position of a specific locality, urban regeneration attempts focus increasingly on quality of life -- spectacle and display become symbolic of exciting urban life (Harvey 1989). Post-modernist styles of architecture adorn shopping centres, stadiums and exotic eating establishments in a wide variety of cultural and physical upgrading projects that are designed to give the impression of vitality and to attract the consumer/resident back to the city. Cities compete to attract key firms with capacities to give them the edge as an informational city, or post-industrial city in which the export of services (financial, informational and knowledge-producing) becomes the economic basis for urban survival (Harvey 1989).

Much of the inter-urban competition between cities for locational advantage and increased economic well-being involves repetitive strategies. The same type of infrastructure and the same type of developments crop up from centre to centre: waterfront developments in Halifax, Toronto and Vancouver; stadium developments in Toronto, Montreal and Winnipeg; massive downtown shopping centres ("places") in Toronto, Winnipeg, Edmonton and Vancouver. In many cases local governments feel that there is no option but to fall in line with the latest development craze if they are to survive.
The emphasis upon tourism, the production and consumption of spectacles and the production of ephemeral events within a given locality already mentioned bear all the signs of being favoured remedies for ailing urban economies. Urban investments of this sort are often highly speculative. Even in the face of poor economic performance, investments in these projects appear to have both a social and a political attraction. To begin with the selling of the city as a location for activity depends heavily upon the creation of an attractive urban image. Part of what has been seen these last two decades is the attempt to build a physical and social image of the cities suited to that competitive purpose. The orchestrated production of an urban image can, if successful, help create a sense of social solidarity, civic pride and loyalty to place and even allow the urban image to provide a mental refuge in world that capitalism treats as more and more placeless (Harvey 1989 in Albrechts 1991.)

3.6 The Seduction of the Private Sector

The emergence of urban entrepreneurialism would not be possible without the active participation of the private sector. Through a variety of financial and other inducements, private corporations have been wooed into development and redevelopment schemes that have changed the nature of urban centres in Canada as in other countries. Today, privatism is a dominant theme affecting urban policy. It stresses the social as well as economic importance of private initiative and competition while legitimizing the public consequences of private action. America, and to a lesser degree Canada, has a strong tradition of private-sector guidance and initiative in urban development, and private decisions have played a large part in determining the physical configuration of North American cities. Public intervention has essentially supported or facilitated private enterprise through tax credits, location subsidies and other appeals to corporate responsibility. More recently, urban governments have undertaken aggressive efforts to re-invigorate the private sector role in economic development including deregulation of
certain economic activities, removing or restructuring local planning controls and schemes to leverage local private investments through public/private partnerships. As the next chapters will show, the Winnipeg Core Area Initiative adopted many of these efforts in its attempt to kick-start the poor economic climate of the province in the 1980s.

3.6.1 Public/Private Partnerships

It is assumed by many that, if planning can stimulate investment, then jobs will follow. In the last decade the favoured vehicle for stimulus has been some form of public/private partnerships that brings local government and business leaders together in local economic development. The particular organisational model and programme arrangements of each partnership varies according to local circumstances. Nonetheless, each side contributes what the other cannot: governments provides public funds, tax incentives, land assemblies and major public facilities along with overall planning authority assurances; the private developer gives substantial private capital, development and management capacity. Public/private partnerships have proven to be "mixed blessings" due to the degree of compromise required in any marriage. Critics of these partnerships argue that instead of exploring ways in which the private sector can assist the public process of urban regeneration, these partnerships are often used to modify policy that essentially subsidises private development.

3.6.2 Public Development Corporations

The quasi-autonomous development corporation has been touted as an effective tool in delivering significant urban investment to declining inner cities. It is the commonly
used core of many public/private partnerships. Britain and the United States have used development corporations for massive urban developments such as Battery Park in New York and the London Docklands in England. In Canada, Toronto and Vancouver have seen public development corporations change the face of their waterfronts. Most recently Montreal, Quebec City, Edmonton and Winnipeg's CAI have used them for extensive redevelopment in their inner-city areas. One of the most attractive aspects of public development corporations is that they are capable of turning very large derelict inner-city areas into attractive investment opportunities for private capital due to their large capital budgets and substantial land holdings. However, as a dominant instrument of urban public policy, development corporations are rapidly gaining their detractors. As "arm's-length corporations" they are not publicly accountable. It is debatable how much local government control can be exercised over the corporation once the deal has been struck. In addition, despite public planning and public resources, it is clear that market demand will effectively shape the content and direction of local policy in so far as decisions taken by the private sector will be guided by commercial criteria. The effect on local planning is particularly acute. Instead of a comprehensive approach to inner-city revitalisation, planning is concentrated on single-site developments. Susan Fainstein suggests the common theme found in large public development corporation projects underlies the basic problem of balancing economic development with planning for the public city:

Both [Battery Park City and the Docklands] involve heavy commitments of public funds to create development centred around financial services and upper-income residential uses. Their exclusive character is justified in terms of multiplier effects on the economy in general, and secondarily in their provision of amenities to the public at large. . . . Both are run by bodies designed to represent business interests, promote secrecy, and to provide no effective vehicle for popular participation. Both demonstrate the
considerable capability of the new style of planning to actually make
development happen: they also are limited by a framework which restricts
progress to a corporate-style approach whereby the tastes and interest of
investors come first and the rest of the public must be content with whatever
side benefits are negotiated or trickle down. (Fainstein 1991, 30.)

As Chapters 7 and 8 will explicate, much of the criticism of the CAI has to do with this
very problem.

3.7 Inter-governmental Relations

Despite various criticisms aimed at the new approaches to urban revitalisation
and economic development, it is clear that the complexity and scope of projects being
undertaken in all major urban centres today require co-operative ventures not previously
undertaken. In an era of fiscal restraint and economic uncertainty, no one level of
government appears to have the capacity or will to take on large urban redevelopment
projects alone, even in partnership with local business. As Chapter 2 concluded, today new
fiscal mechanisms are necessary for urban revitalisation. Increasingly, inter-governmental
partnerships are required to augment financial resources and provide programmes that cut
across areas of service delivery. As the CAI case study will show, these new partnerships
are not without enormous difficulties. The ability to adapt to inter-government co-
operation is a difficult task for governments entrenched in their own bureaucracies and is
even more problematic for private interests. The planning function can accept the
challenge presented by inter-governmental opportunities or it can resign in the face of
bureaucratic red tape and inertia.
3.8 Citizenry and the Private Sector

In this new generation of inner-city redevelopment projects, critics such as Andy Thorley (referred to in Chapter 2) point to the real danger of losing on the side of social equity in order to gain on the side of economic growth. The issue appears to be one of coherence. In the push to "leverage" private investment in the short-term, comprehensive long-term objectives tend to be compromised or fall by the wayside. The public voice is necessary to achieve the public city. As Artibise and Kiernan state, "we do not believe that an urban economic strategy can be successfully left to the private sector; indeed, in terms of regional development this can be actively harmful" (1989, 2-16). Integration of meaningful public participation into any model for urban regeneration is critical to ensure sensitivity to local-need priorities and for the creation of community spirit. A sense of community re-enforces investment initiatives by anchoring investment capital and by encouraging central/local political networks that serve to preserve the status of existing urban centres (McKay in Artibise and Kiernan 1989, 2-17). A vital and committed local citizenry provides a wealth of human capital that cannot be bought. Their input into local concerns gives shape and definition to any desired urban environment and the "principal line of causation runs from the 'livability' of the urban environment to the economic base of the community, rather than the reverse" (Artibise and Kiernan 1989, 2-13). It will be argued in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 that this lesson was lost in the CAI process.

3.9 New Roles for Planners in Local Economic Development

As the planning function has evolved and matured in the face of unprecedented global economic events, especially in the last decade, the challenge for planners is equally
unprecedented. The passive, reactive role of planners acceptable in an era of relative affluence is no longer appropriate in a capitalist contest for urban investment and revitalization. Planners today, as public entrepreneurs, have the difficult task of securing public benefit while attempting to leverage private dollars. There has recently been a growing field of criticism directed at planners and their role in the public sector. Questions have repeatedly been asked as to whose interests are being served by the planning profession and whose values are being represented. The Honourable Henry G. Cisneros, Mayor of San Antonio, Texas, in a series of commentaries on Michael Brook's 1988 article calling for a return to an utopian view of planning, recently asked if planners "have taken their eye off the ball" (Cisneros 1989). He underlined the need for the planning profession to "keep first and foremost its public obligations and responsibilities." He stressed that planners must be unbending in their efforts to share some sense of vision with the larger society. "There must exist in each of us who calls himself or herself a planner that tension between how to get things done in the practical world of services delivery and a vision and a sense of idealism founded in public values" (Cisneros 1989, 78). Much of this criticism within and without the planning profession has to do with the effectiveness and manner in which planners influence public policies and decisions concerned with "public good and betterment." In the case study of the CAI to follow, it will be argued that the influence of the Winnipeg Planning Department was severely circumscribed by the politics of local government during the decade of the CAI and that, when faced with conflicting development pressures and short-term funding opportunities, the ability of the planning function to integrate activities into any long-term, coherent strategy of public interest was constrained.
This chapter and the preceding one make an important contribution to the remainder of this dissertation. Through the review of literature on urban revitalisation strategies and programmes adopted by governments in the United States and Britain and the examination of the relationship between planning and the urban dimension of economic development in Canada, the skeleton of a framework appears that will be used in the following analysis of the CAI case study. Apparent in all of the urban revitalisation and economic development strategies -- reviewed are the major variables of values, process, programmes and perceptions. The following chapters will use these variables, in addition to others, in an analytic framework by which the CAI will be dissected and evaluated.
Endnotes


2. The impact of this period of rapid growth and expansion in Canada, for approximately a quarter century after the 1880s, produced appalling conditions in Canadian boom towns. Cities such as Calgary and Edmonton multiplied forty times in population during the first decade of the 1900s. Alan H. Armstrong, in "Thomas Adams and the Commission of Conservation" (Plan Canada [1], 1:14-32), describes these conditions and the concerns faced by the Canadian Commission of Conservation (1909-1921) charged with the task of investigating, enquiring, advising, and informing the Canadian government and general public on issues of natural resources, health, housing and town planning.

3. Artibise, A.F.J. and Stelter, G., "Conservation Planning and Urban Planning: The Canadian Commission of Conservation in Historical Perspective" (Kain 1981, 17-36), discuss Canadian planning efforts to 1900 and the influence of the Garden Cities and City Beautiful approaches to planning in Canada around the turn of the twentieth century.


5. Susan Fainstein refers to such authors as Altshuler (1965), Gans (1968), Harvey (1978) and Foglesong (1986) that support this premise using various arguments. Michael Brooks (1988) foresees the ultimate demise of the planning profession when the planner is seen only as a "facilitator" in service to the private development industry. Christine Boyer (1983) suggests that this may already have happened.

6. This period of self-reflection imposed upon the planning profession by changing world events is briefly discussed in Chapter 2.

7. Gramsci coined the term to refer to a model of industrial organization that was based on mass production of standardized consumer goods, vertical integration of the production process, and spatial division of labour by individual firms (Albrechts 1991).


9. The Economic and Social Research Council established CURS in 1984 to study seven localities in Britain chosen for their variety of experience in the context of the broader national and international changes in social, economic and political restructuring.
10. Lithwick, an urban economist and professor, had been made assistant secretary to the MSUA. He resigned in the summer of 1971, after his report, *Urban Canada: Problems and Prospects* (Ottawa: CMHC, December 1970), was rejected. Lithwick claimed that he had little reason to believe that a strong federal initiative would provide direction for urban development for the duration of the century (Rose 1980, 52). Michael Dennis and Susan Fish found a private publisher to produce their rejected report, *Programs in Search of a Policy: Low Income Housing in Canada* (Toronto: Hakkert 1972).

11. Artibise and Linteau, *The Evolution of Urban Canada: An Analysis of Approaches and Interpretation* (Winnipeg: Institute of Urban Studies 1984), claim that two of the most important projects undertaken by MSUA were the Urban Profiles Series and the Urban Prospects Series. The listings of these series can be found in *Canada’s Urban Plan* (Artibise and Stelter 1981, 313-315).

12. For support of this stand see Plunkett (1986); Plunkett and Betts (1978); and Kiernan (1983; 1987). On the other hand, Gerecke and Reid (1990) vigorously disputes this thesis.

13. For an explanatory approach of "boosterism" applied to the case of Winnipeg and other prairie centres see "In Pursuit of Growth: Municipal Boosterism and Urban Development in the Canadian Prairie West, 1871-1913" in Stelter and Artibise, *Shaping the Urban Landscape: Aspects of the Canadian City-Building Process*, 116-147 (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1982). Artibise argues that urban leadership must be an integral part of any explanation of urban growth (ibid., 147).

14. Commentaries on Brook’s article debating the past and future of the planning profession also included those by Peter Marcuse, Michael Teitz and Marc Weiss (*Journal of the American Planning Association* 55 [1]: 78-84).
4.1 Introduction

This chapter is intended to give a thorough picture of the CAI so that later evaluation of it as an instrument for urban public policy may be appreciated in context. It presents the political and economic conditions that led to the creation of the CAI and details the circumstances that influenced the actions of the original signatories to the tri-level agreement. This environmental milieu that set the stage for the birth of the CAI is better understood in light of the discussions on urban planning ideologies presented in Chapter 2 and on prevailing Canadian economic development theory presented in the previous Chapter 3. In addition to a profile of Winnipeg’s inner-city conditions prior to the CAI, this chapter describes the political impetus behind the Initiative and the circumstances and characters instrumental in its inception. It spells out the mandate of the CAI, the structural model chosen for it, and gives a brief description of the programmes and budgets in both agreements. Where available, reference is made to evaluation reports presented to the CAI Management Board and for the Public Information Programme of the CAI. In the ensuing chapters, this dissertation will further explore and evaluate the CAI model, its component parts, and the relative strengths and weaknesses of the CAI as an instrument of public policy for inner-city revitalisation.
4.2 The Political and Economic Context of the CAI

Manitoba's economy in the 1970s was sick; it ranked eighth, ninth and tenth out of provincial economies for a number of years.¹ The City of Winnipeg was viewed as the engine of the Manitoba economy because the City's population represented sixty percent of the entire province. In order to turn around the provincial economy, the federal government felt that it was necessary to make the City of Winnipeg healthy, especially the badly deteriorated inner city. As a result, the Winnipeg Core Area Initiative was originally justified as a potential instrument for regional economic development by the federal government; CAI I (1981-1986) was a sub-agreement of the General Development Agreement initiated in 1974 between the federal government and the Province of Manitoba, while CAI II (1987-1991) fell under the Economic and Regional Developments Agreement of 1984.

Set in this political-economic context, the CAI stands out as an example of intergovernmental collaboration and co-operation. Faced with historic federal-provincial relations difficulties, the success of the CAI appears remarkable as an example of a tri-governmental initiative. Other co-operative ventures in the form of urban "mega-projects" have been tried in Canada, but none has had the breadth and scope of the CAI.² The CAI is an example of economic development in the broadest sense, balancing disparity-relief efforts with those of commercially oriented physical development projects. It is also one of the longest-lasting co-operative ventures among three levels of government spanning a decade of direct tri-governmental participation.

Although the birthdate of the CAI is formally acknowledged to be September 1981, the seeds of the tripartite project were sown during the mid-and late 1970s. Each
involvement in Winnipeg's core area, albeit for their own reasons. Much of the sensitivity to the socioeconomic problems of the core can be attributed to a series of research studies published by the Institute of Urban Studies\(^3\) at the University of Winnipeg and the Social Planning Council of Winnipeg in the late 1970s.\(^4\) In addition, several research reports had been prepared for the City of Winnipeg development-plan review that was being conducted at that time.\(^5\) By 1980 the time was ripe for action and the various interests of all three levels of government were aligned to take advantage of a co-operative attack.

The federal Liberal government’s interests emerged from a desire to improve the provincial economy as a whole through the Department of Regional Economic Expansion (DREE). DREE possessed a fairly broad mandate for regional economic development and disparity relief along with a concern for the growth and plight of Winnipeg’s Aboriginal population. DREE had previously been involved in a diverse range of federal-provincial activities, and by 1979 had prepared for the federal Treasury Board financial plans for major Aboriginal, industrial and downtown redevelopment in Winnipeg. Taking advantage of the attention already focused on Winnipeg’s core area, Lloyd Axworthy, then federal Minister for Employment and Immigration and local Member of Parliament, set his sights on a potential neighbourhood revitalization and rail relocation project using DREE as the vehicle for federal participation.

The Province of Manitoba was involved in a number of restructuring efforts in the mid-1970s. The Conservative government disbanded the Department of Urban Affairs in 1978 and re-assigned staff to the Department of Municipal Affairs. As an offshoot of their role in financing the Winnipeg development-plan review process, and as a result of an interdepartmental review of major social programmes being delivered to the City,
provincial governmental interest in the core area grew. By 1980 it was clear that the Province required new and expanded means and organisational structures to address inner-city problems. The focus was placed on an intergovernmental approach involving federal government support for employment and training and provincial support for Plan Winnipeg neighbourhood revitalisation programs. Gerry Mercier was the Minister of Municipal Affairs, charged with the responsibility of spearheading action by the Province.6

The City of Winnipeg clearly had the most to gain from the CAI tri-level agreement. The inner city of Winnipeg displayed many of the characteristics of urban distress described in Chapter 2 and, by the early 1980s, did not appear to be able to reverse the pattern of decline. Despite the fact that Winnipeg was dominated by a predominantly suburban-based council, city councillors recognised that the ability of a tri-level effort at core area revitalisation was far beyond the financial capabilities of any one of the three partners and held long-term benefits for all areas of the city.

Over the decade that the CAI was in existence, the political milieu surrounding the Initiative changed, and changed again. Within a month of the birth of the Initiative, one of the initial signatories, the provincial Progressive Conservative government, was replaced with an New Democratic Party government (NDP), which held very different priorities.7 The early life of the CAI was on the line as the NDP debated the overall benefits of the Agreement vis-à-vis individual programme strengths in the light of their policy orientations. Nonetheless, a tri-level compromise was reached, which allowed the Initiative to proceed. Eventually, a Conservative federal government replaced the Liberal government that had supported Axworthy’s efforts, and a Progressive Conservative provincial government returned to power in 1988.
Just as the political climate changed throughout the period of the two agreements, so did the economic climate. While all three partners recognised the economic plight of the Province and the City in the late 1970s, none of the three could anticipate the economic recession that would hit in the early 1980s. The global events referred to in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 changed the nature of local, regional and national problems and solutions just at the time when that the first Initiative was gathering steam. The participation of the senior level of government in the first agreement was primarily that of "banker." By 1986 the federal government did not feel that it could abandon their efforts in Winnipeg. Indeed, justification for continued participation in CAI II was due to early indications of a turnaround in private-sector investment despite the recession of 1982. The federal government felt that more support was needed to "push the economy over the hump" but that support was not without conditions. Federal bureaucrats were being pressured about public accountability in the face of tight fiscal restraint. As a result, the second agreement had a much more direct "hands-on" approach through federal line departments and agencies. The economic climate not only affected the operating style of the two agreements, but it also affected eventual results of the CAI -- so much so that when critics and detractors of the CAI are asked to estimate the success or failure of the Initiative, all point to the vicissitudes of the economic and political climate that prevailed throughout the decade spanned by the two Initiatives.

4.3 Winnipeg Profile

Historically an important manufacturing and service centre, Winnipeg was known as the "gateway to the west." Partly because, in an era of steam and rail, "all of
the railways serving the burgeoning agricultural frontier converged on Winnipeg" and "because it was the first significant western urban centre," Winnipeg became the commercial, financial and industrial centre for Western Canada in the early 1900s (Phillips in Artibise 1981) (see map 4.1 which shows the boundaries of Winnipeg in 1907). During the period 1914 to 1950, Winnipeg retained its predominance over the other primary urban prairie concentrations -- Regina, Calgary, Edmonton and Saskatoon (Artibise 1979, 130). Winnipeg's historical and geographical advantage was parlayed by a "small, closely knit elite" with a clearly defined set of ideas about urban growth and prospects for the City (ibid.).

The spirit of optimism shared by the "boosters" of Winnipeg was soon to be overshadowed by a period of slow decline for the city. Winnipeg dropped in size relative to other major Canadian cities and in relative importance with other western cities. From 1901 to 1921, Winnipeg moved from the sixth-to the third-largest Canadian city, next to Montreal and Toronto. By 1931 however, Winnipeg dropped to fourth place, a position it held until 1971, when it dropped to fifth (see table 4.1). By 1986, the city ranked sixth and dropped a further place to seventh in the late 1980s. Winnipeg arrived at a condition of no growth at a time when most of the other metropolitan centres in Canada were growing at an unprecedented rate. From a period of prosperity and importance at the turn of the century, Winnipeg was slowing down and crawling to a stand-still.
### Table 4.1
#### Rank of Selected Canadian Cities by Size, 1901-1971*

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<td>Regina</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>110</td>
<td>Saskatoon</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Adapted from Artibise 1977; 1979 and 1981 using Census of Canada, 1931, volume 1; Census of Canada (1921-1941) and Statistics Canada (1951-1971)

* From 1921 to 1941 the populations are in some cases estimated.
Despite a prevailing belief in the stable nature of Winnipeg and its economy, Earl Levin believes that observers have missed the point that Winnipeg's condition of population equilibrium is not cyclical or temporary, but permanent (Levin 1984, 3). According to Levin, the descent of Winnipeg's importance can be traced to two milestones: (1) the opening of the Panama Canal in 1914 that signalled the "beginning of the end of Winnipeg's role and importance as the transportation, bulk-breaking, warehousing, wholesaling, and distribution centre of western Canada"; and (2) "the discovery of the Leduc oilfield in 1947 which ensured shifts of development energy and investment capital to Calgary and Edmonton" (ibid., 4). Not only was there an absolute decline in the annual growth rate, but more importantly there was a serious decline in the downtown area of Winnipeg after World War II -- "retailing fell off, vacancy rates rose, new investment was infrequent, industry moved out, few new residences were constructed, demolition was significant, serious and petty crimes increased" (ibid., 2).

At the time of the 1986 census, the City of Winnipeg was the sixth-largest city in Canada with a population of 625,304, representing fifty-eight percent of the provincial population (Statistics Canada 1988) (see map 4.2 for City of Winnipeg boundaries in 1986). The inner-city or core area covered approximately ten square miles, contained about one-fifth of the city's population and one-quarter of its dwelling units, and housed nearly 100,000 people (Winnipeg Core Area Initiative 1986a).

Winnipeg's core area differed substantially from the rest of the city in demographic terms. Rapid suburban growth from 1941 onward left the inner area of the city home to a decreasing population in absolute terms -- a decline of twenty-five percent between 1971 and 1981 alone, but an increasing population of elderly, single-parent, one-person and
Map 4.2 City of Winnipeg Boundaries, 1986. The City of Winnipeg, Department of Environmental Planning, 1986.
Aboriginal households, and new Canadians. From 1981 to 1986 the number of elderly over seventy years of age grew by 11.5 percent, the Aboriginal population by 70.7 percent, the Asian immigrant population by 31.2 percent, and the number of single-parent households by 17.6 percent (see figure 4.1).

Compared to the fringe areas of the city, the average household size, incidence of married and dual-employed couples, number of children per family, and family incomes were all lower in the City of Winnipeg proper including that area defined as the core area (Statistics Canada 1986b). With access to social services, transportation and low-cost housing, the core drew a rapidly growing disadvantaged population, resulting in an unemployment rate twice the city-wide average and an overall incidence of poverty 2.5 times greater than that of the rest of the city (Winnipeg Core Area Initiative 1986a) (see figure 4.2).

Physically, the core area covered a large area of downtown that had deteriorated with age and neglect. According to the 1981 census, forty percent of the housing stock was formally classified as poor and needing repair. This was one of the highest incidents of housing in poor condition relative to other Canadian cities. Additionally, 12,000 households reported suffering affordability problems. Renter-occupied dwellings accounted for a large portion of the housing stock; many of the units were owned by absentee landlords. Over eighty-five percent of the renters with household incomes of less than $13,925 paid in excess of twenty-five percent of their monthly income in shelter costs (Winnipeg Core Area Initiative 1986a).

This same area contained many turn-of-the-century commercial and warehouse buildings, largely under-utilized, and the eighty-acre Canadian National Railway East Yards site, mainly unused. Suburban population growth and changing investment patterns leached out the commercial value of these and other sites adjacent to the core. The historic central business district and the older neighbourhood commercial streets were most affected by this shift to the suburbs -- their economic importance to the city was diminished significantly.

Suburban development, in attracting economic activity away from the centre of the city, affected employment opportunities for inner-city residents. The 1981 census reported that these residents were "one and two-thirds times more likely than the general labour force to experience unemployment, and the Core Area labour force is significantly under-represented in managerial, teaching, clerical and sales occupations" (Winnipeg Core Area Initiative 1986a, 2).

In the larger context of distressed cities, a comparison of Winnipeg's inner city and those of a number of other Canadian inner cities displays some demographic
characteristics that set the City apart from the others. While the decline in Winnipeg’s inner-city population between 1971 and 1986 was not as severe as in other cities, the population gain between 1981 and 1986 was one of the lowest. The population increase that was realised was a result of an increase in non-family households and one-person households particularly amongst the twenty-five to forty-four age group. In addition, the increase in single-parent families was one of the highest of all the cities surveyed and is a direct reflection of the growing Aboriginal community drawn to the inner city.

Income, education and labour-force participation data showed that Winnipeg’s inner city fell behind the other selected cities in growth and improvement. There were only two cities with a decrease in median income between 1970 and 1985; Winnipeg was one. The disparity between median incomes in Winnipeg’s inner-city and non-inner-city was the greatest of cities surveyed, due in part to the fact that the concentration of those with university education was small but highly concentrated in the inner-city. Winnipeg was one of two cities surveyed where the university-educated population was lower in the inner city than in the non-inner city.

From the beginning of the decade when the CAI was created, up to and including the mid-1980s, it would appear that the conditions in Winnipeg’s inner city remained the same or, in some cases, worsened. Statistics provided for the Community Inquiry Into Inner City Revitalization: Final Report (Community Inquiry Board 1990) by the Social Planning Council of Winnipeg and the Institute of Urban Studies (1990) show:

Incidences of poverty, unemployment and lack of affordable housing were more severe as of the mid-1980’s than at the beginning of the decade. Moreover, the gaps between inner and non-inner city residents had widened on measures such as income and employment. Among the most disadvantaged were the aboriginal population and single-parent families. (Institute of Urban Studies 1990, A5.)
A significant factor in the continued economic decline of inner-city residents was the severity of the unemployment rates compared to the non-inner-city residents; inner-city unemployment rose from 7.4 percent in 1981 to 12.4 percent in 1986 compared to a 2.5 percent rise for non-inner-city residents. Inner city residents were less likely to have been employed in the previous year or to have worked for a continuous year. Hardest hit in terms of labour-force participation were the Aboriginal population as a whole, but especially youth and single parents; single parents as whole; and youth as a whole (see table 4.2). On the other hand, visible minorities, recent immigrants and immigrants as a whole had a participation rate higher than the rest of the inner city.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Participation Rate</th>
<th>Unemployment Rate</th>
<th>Employment Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inner-city population 15+</td>
<td>61.9%</td>
<td>12.4%</td>
<td>54.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-inner-city population 15+</td>
<td>69.9</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>65.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inner-city aboriginal pop. 15+</td>
<td>52.4</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>35.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inner-city single parents</td>
<td>51.3</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>42.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inner-city youth (15-24)</td>
<td>71.0</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>58.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inner-city recent immigrants (15-24)</td>
<td>64.8</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>60.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inner-city all recent immigrants</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inner-city visible minorities</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Unemployment, in addition to other factors, contributed to the fact that average inner-city incomes were no more than three-fifths to two-thirds the incomes of non-inner
areas -- again, the most disadvantaged groups being the Aboriginal, single-parent and youth households (see table 4.3).

The inner-city displayed a predictable gap in housing tenure and type when compared to the non-inner-city areas (see table 4.4). Housing in the inner city comprised predominantly multi-family dwellings with two thirds of all inner-city residents being renters. Housing affordability for the inner city renters continued to be a problem in 1986 with fifty-six percent paying twenty-five percent or more of their gross income on shelter; 42.4 percent paying thirty percent or more. Single-parent, Aboriginal, elderly and youth households experienced the most severe affordability problems. This was due, in part, to loss of cheaper rental stock in the inner city available under the $200 rent range.
Table 4.3
Comparison of Selected Average Incomes in Winnipeg, 1980 and 1985

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Inner City (IC)</th>
<th>Non-Inner City</th>
<th>IC as % of Non-IC/1985</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>% Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Census families</td>
<td>$27,340</td>
<td>$26,680</td>
<td>-2.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-census family persons 15+</td>
<td>13,276</td>
<td>13,386</td>
<td>+0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All households</td>
<td>22,659</td>
<td>22,325</td>
<td>-1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aboriginal households</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>13,913</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single-parent households</td>
<td>19,049</td>
<td>16,909</td>
<td>-11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth households (15-24 years)</td>
<td>15,561</td>
<td>14,038</td>
<td>-9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seniors (65+)</td>
<td>17,467</td>
<td>19,031</td>
<td>+9.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|                              | 1980            | 1985           | % Change               |
|                              | 1980 as % of 1985 | % Change over 1980 |                      |
|                              | $41,011         | +4.8%          | 65.1%                  |
|                              | 16,252          | -3.7           | 82.4                   |
|                              | 36,529          | +4.0           | 61.1                   |
|                              | 26,609          | n/a            | 52.3                   |
|                              | 25,798          | +6.7           | 65.5                   |
|                              | 21,212          | -4.1           | 66.2                   |
|                              | 23,802          | +5.4           | 80.0                   |

The demographic, socio-economic and physical characteristics that differentiated the core area of Winnipeg from its surrounding areas signalled a crisis in Winnipeg's inner city. The creation of the Winnipeg Core Area Initiative in 1981 was a political and programmatic response aimed at the revitalisation of the core with the general purpose to "plan, implement and co-ordinate programs and projects to revitalize the area and improve economic opportunities for its residents" (Winnipeg Core Area Initiative 1986a, 3).

The political impetus for the creation of the CAI came from the federal level of government in the person of Lloyd Axworthy. Axworthy's riding included areas of the city that were incorporated into the core-area boundaries. Axworthy was acutely aware
of the trends that had developed in the inner-city -- his institute had researched and written volumes of material on the decay of the area and its attendant social problems. He recognised an opportunity to revitalise the core area when the City was considering the Sherbrook-McGregor overpass proposal in 1978. The overpass proposal was seen as an alternative to relocating the CPR's marshalling rail yards which occupied a major portion of area in the inner city. Axworthy felt that the removal of the yards would be of dubious benefit in addition to being politically impossible and overly expensive. With the backing of federal political force, Axworthy pushed through a proposal to the City of Winnipeg and the provincial government for a comprehensive revitalisation of Winnipeg's inner city whereby the federal government would contribute $32 million provided that each of the other two levels would match dollars. A public announcement of the proposal was issued in May 1980. It was under these circumstances that the CAI was originally justified by the federal government as a potential instrument for regional economic development.

Lloyd Axworthy, in one chapter of his book *Towards a Just Society* (Axworthy 1990), discusses the CAI as a regional policy initiative of the last Trudeau government period beginning in 1980. Faced with increasing western alienation and problematic western energy and resource policies, the Trudeau government sought to reconcile western Canada with a series of political and economic-development initiatives. In the period between 1980 and 1984, Axworthy was the Minister of Employment and Immigration in the Trudeau Cabinet. The new focus of regional development at the time was in local community development. Axworthy had initiated a federally supported pilot programme of local economic development corporations through the Local Economic Development Agreements programme.
The CAI was Axworthy's demonstration project to show that the federal
government could be a major partner in community-level development. This was in
contrast to the normal Canadian approach to economic development discussed in Chapter 3.
In a personal interview (1991), Axworthy stated that he needed a "blueprint" or "cogent
reason" for Trudeau in order to rationalise federal participation and funding for Winnipeg.
In tandem with Herb Gray, the Minister responsible for the Department of Regional
Economic Expansion, Axworthy worked out a strategy that was based on "good locational
theory" to energise the core area with a targeted and co-ordinated investment strategy
enough to create a critical mass of activity that would eventually spawn a second tier of
economic development. Axworthy states:

This was not traditional urban renewal. The main rationale accepted by our
Cabinet for underwriting this activity was that economic development could occur
in Winnipeg only after it began tackling the deteriorating conditions of the inner
city in a comprehensive way and began providing jobs for the in-migrating native
population. It was felt that economic development of the city could proceed only
with an integrated, combined effort by all levels of government to improve the
environmental infrastructure, promote new enterprise, upgrade the level of skill of
individuals and encourage a true sense of participation by local residents.
(Axworthy 1990, 252.)

Axworthy, in his interview, indicated that his model for the CAI was based on a
strong community bias that he had acquired from his earlier American experiences with
urban regeneration. Even he acknowledged that the moment of creation for the CAI
was one of "pure serendipity" when he rose to the challenge presented to the three levels of
government faced with the Sherbrook-McGregor overpass debate. In a sense, this was
the beginning of what has been referred to as "an unique constellation of people and
events" (Kiernan 1989) whereby intergovernmental collaboration and community
involvement were co-opted to focus on the common objective of improving the overall economic, social and physical environment of Winnipeg's core (see map 4.3 for the area defined by the CAI boundaries).

4.5 The Substantive Mandate of the CAI

The creation of the first Winnipeg Core Area Initiative (1981-1986), and the subsidiary agreement (1986-1991) was the experimental, and some believe far-sighted, intervention by the federal, provincial and municipal levels of government to jointly respond to the decline in Winnipeg's core area. In addition to investment in physical infrastructure, the CAI attempted to invest in human capital by targeting the needs of an increasing number of disadvantaged groups who remain there. The CAI combined the themes of economic development and training, with physical regeneration aimed at strengthening inner city neighbourhoods into three basic objectives that formed the mandate of CAI I and CAI II:

1. Economic development to stimulate investment, employment and economic growth by focusing public investment in selected key sites in order to lever and concentrate private investment;

2. Employment and training to enhance the educational and employment prospects of inner city residents, particularly those belonging to major disadvantaged groups facing chronic unemployment; and

3. Strengthening inner-city neighbourhoods to revitalize those neighbourhoods through the provision of new and rehabilitated housing as well as the provision of community facilities and services. (Winnipeg Core Area Policy Committee 1981.)
In the first five-year term, the CAI used a $96 million tri-level core budget for a wide range of activities, over one thousand projects, strategically targeted at a ten-square mile area of the inner city. In 1986, the subsidiary agreement (CAI II) approved an additional $100 million for a similarly complex array of programmes and complimentary initiatives (see tables 4.5 and 4.6). The rationale for renewal of the agreement was to build on the accomplishments and lessons learned from the first agreement and to respond to the unmet demand for redevelopment. As such, the objectives of CAI II were further clarified and became modified versions of the original goals including:

(1) Stimulating investment, employment and economic growth; (2) Supporting the physical, economic and social revitalization of inner city neighbourhoods; and (3) Maximizing the impact of physical and social investment on core area revitalization by providing strong central coordination amongst projects. (Winnipeg Core Area Initiative 1986a)

4.6 The Tri-level Model

The tri-level model used as the basis for CAI I and CAI II set out the underlying arrangement and set of principles through which the three levels of government were bound to each other and to their common goal of revitalisation. The overriding principle of equality in decision-making and cost-sharing was one of the model's unique features. The two CAI agreements provide the model, with its specific form, functions, attributes and authority. The model attempted to approach complex urban problems on an holistic basis attacking the social, economic and physical needs of the inner city simultaneously. Programme delivery was intended to be carried out in a mutually supportive manner such that all programmes achieved interwoven goals within programmes individually and collectively.
Table 4.5
Cost Shared Programmes, CAI I

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programme Number</th>
<th>Programme Name</th>
<th>Budget ($ x 1M)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Employment and affirmative action</td>
<td>9.500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>13.062</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Community improvement area</td>
<td>5.870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Community facilities</td>
<td>6.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Community service</td>
<td>5.300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Industrial dev./small business assist.</td>
<td>11.938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>North Portage/Ellice revitalisation</td>
<td>13.18 &amp; 3.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>C.N.R. east yards</td>
<td>8.101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Historic Winnipeg</td>
<td>4.900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Neighbourhood main streets</td>
<td>4.405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-13</td>
<td>Mgt., consultation, public information</td>
<td>5.427</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$96 M.</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Stewart Clatworthy, Summaries of the Final Evaluations: Winnipeg Core Area Agreement, 1981-1986 (Management Board of the Winnipeg Core Area Initiative, February 1988).
Table 4.6
Cost-Shared Programmes, CAI II

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector I Entrepreneurial and strategic site development</th>
<th>Budget ($ x 1M)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Program 1 Industrial and entrepreneurial support</td>
<td>4.0 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Exchange district redevelopment</td>
<td>9.0 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 East yard redevelopment</td>
<td>20.0 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Riverbank enhancement</td>
<td>5.0 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Strategic capital projects</td>
<td>13.0 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>51.0 m</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector II Neighbourhood and community revitalisation</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Program 6 Neighbourhood and community development</td>
<td>16.0 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Inner-city foundation</td>
<td>1.0 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Housing</td>
<td>10.5 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Training and employment</td>
<td>12.0 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Neighbourhood main st. &amp; small business</td>
<td>5.0 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>44.5 m</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector III Management and co-ordination</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Program 11 Central administration</td>
<td>2.8 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Public information and programming</td>
<td>1.3 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Evaluation</td>
<td>4.0 m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>4.5 m</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total $100.0 M

Source: Winnipeg Core Area Initiative Canada-Manitoba Subsidiary Agreement for the Development of the Winnipeg Core Area, 1986b, Schedule B.
Table 4.7
Implementing Jurisdictions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programme</th>
<th>Jurisdiction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Industrial and entrepreneurial support</td>
<td>Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Exchange district redevelopment</td>
<td>Winnipeg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 East yard redevelopment</td>
<td>Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Riverbank enhancement</td>
<td>Manitoba/Winnipeg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Strategic capital projects</td>
<td>Canada/Manitoba/Winnipeg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Neighbourhood and community revitalisation</td>
<td>Manitoba/Winnipeg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Inner city foundation</td>
<td>Winnipeg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Housing</td>
<td>Canada/Manitoba/Winnipeg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Training and employment</td>
<td>Manitoba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Neighbourhood main streets and small business support</td>
<td>Winnipeg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Central administration</td>
<td>Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Public information and programming</td>
<td>Canada/Manitoba/Winnipeg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Evaluation</td>
<td>Canada</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Winnipeg Core Area Initiative 1986c, Canada-Manitoba-Winnipeg Tripartite Agreement for the Winnipeg Core Area, Schedule F.

4.6.1 CAI Delivery and Management Structure

Implementation of the CAI model’s activities was through structures directly related to the decision-making and management within the model itself (internal structures) and to those responsible for the co-ordination and management of activities of the three governing jurisdictions (external structure) (see table 4.7).

4.6.1.1 Internal Structures

Internal structures were guided by the fundamental principle of tri-lateralism and included the Policy Committee, the Management Board, co-ordinators, the Core Area Office, and programme advisory committees (see figure 4.3). Each of the programmes had
Fig. 4.3. CAI I Agreement Structure. Adapted from Winnipeg Core Area Initiative, Mid-Term Program Evaluations prepared by Stewart Clatworthy for the CAI Policy Committee, April 1985.
a programme/project authorisation component that established actions and criteria for
decisions by the programme advisory committees as well as an "implementing jurisdiction"
designation defining one or more levels of government directly responsible for that
programme's delivery.

The overall management and direction of the two agreements was by the Policy
Committee, consisting of senior representatives from the three levels of government; a
principal federal minister, the minister of Urban Affairs for the Province, and the mayor of
the City of Winnipeg acting on behalf of the City Council. With the exception of the
Strategic Capital Programme in CAI II, the Policy Committee did not have direct
involvement in the approval of specific projects (see figure 4.4 for the CAI organisational
chart).

Direct involvement was through another tri-level senior management board, which
supplied operational supervision and management. Unanimity on all issues was required of
the Management Board or the issue had to be raised to the attention of the Policy
Committee. Agreement co-ordinators appointed by each of the three jurisdictions acted as
information and liaison representatives between the Management Board and programme
managers. The Co-ordinators Sub-Committee of the Management Board acted together to
clarify jurisdictional issues and to coordinate programming and activities.

The Core Area Office, whose manager chaired both the Policy Committee and the
Management Board, delivered the majority of the model's programme activities and co-
ordinated the programme delivery through the various line departments of the three levels
of government. It also consulted with individuals, non-governmental organisations, private
WINNIPEG CORE AREA INITIATIVE
1986-1991 AGREEMENT

ORGANIZATIONAL CHART

Board
The Forks renewal Corporation

Policy Committee
Management Board
General Management

Co-ordinators
Operations Management

Central Administration

Program Review Committee
The Exchange District Redevelopment
Industrial Development
Program Resource Network
Entrepreneurial Support

Program Review Committee
Riverbank Enhancement

Program Review Committee
Strategic Capital Projects

Intergovernmental Committee
Neighbourhood Community Development

Elected Residents Council
Neighbourhood Facilities

Resource Committee
Neighbourhood Services

Advisory Council
Community Services & Facilities

Advisory Council
Education Support Services

Housing Sub-Committee
Housing

Housing Sub-Committee
Grant for Home Ownership

Housing Sub-Committee
Housing Development Stimulus

Housing Sub-Committee
Housing Renovation (CAHRF)

Advisory Committee
Employment and Training

Advisory Committee
Neighbourhood Main Streets & Small Business

Evaluation Sub-Committee

Evaluation Sub-Committee
Public Information and Programming

Fig. 4.4. CAI Organization Chart: Internal document reprinted, with permission, from J. August, Winnipeg Core Area Office
investors and public agencies on behalf of the Initiative. The Core Area Office provided a
secretariat function to the Policy Committee, Management Board and other committees.

Programme advisory committees consisting of governmental and non-government
representatives planned and selected projects implemented through the cost-sharing model.
These committees were the major vehicle for direct citizen involvement and represented the
point at which the programme "deliverers" and the programme "users" had an opportunity
to interact.

Programme managers represented the final programme delivery responsibility of
each government jurisdiction to which their programme was assigned. Programme
managers operated within their implementing jurisdictions to government departments via
direct delivery of programmes, contract delivery agents, and government departments
delivering complementary programs.

Evaluation of the entire agreement including delivery structure was done on a
regular basis by contractual external evaluators.

4.6.1.2 External Structures

In order for the tri-level model to operate in a co-ordinated manner it was necessary
that each level of government communicate and respond within their own sphere and
between that of the other two. To facilitate this, each jurisdiction designated a single
department to be the principal line department responsible for decision-making, action or
reaction to the varied activities arising from the tripartite model. The Government of
Canada's responsibilities were managed in the second agreement through Western
Diversification. The provincial government was represented through Urban Affairs with an
Interdepartmental Committee providing support when the activities of other departments were required. The Department of Environmental Planning co-ordinated the activities for the City of Winnipeg, however, when an issue involved more than one municipal department, any one or all, of the senior bodies may have been called upon; the Board of Commissioners, the Planning and Community Services Committee, or City Council.

4.6.1.3 The Financing Structure

In addition to equality in decision-making, the tri-level model required that each government partner have an equal share in the financing of the CAI’s programmes. This meant that each level of government had a direct financial and therefore legal interest in every programme. However, the nature and degree of financial commitment changed between the first and second agreements. In CAI I, each level had a one-third share in the cost of every programme, whereas in CAI II there was a variable cost-sharing ratio used throughout the range of programmes. In the first agreement, the federal obligation was met through DREE which had, as a mandate of regional, disparity relief. In the second agreement, seven departments shared financial obligations according to the nature and degree that specific programmes fell within their mandate. The City of Winnipeg and the Manitoba government shared equally in the difference left by the federal government in each programme. This change in the financial structure between CAI I and CAI II caused certain bureaucratic shifts to occur in so far as the federal government tended to play a "hands off" role in the first agreement, whereas there was more direct involvement by all seven departments in CAI II.
4.6.2 The Role of the Community

The community of Winnipeg in general, and the resident and business representatives of the core area in particular, were invited to have input into the proposed CAI before it was signed in 1981. This is not to suggest, however, that community involvement was solicited in the development of the model’s strategy or management system. Perhaps it was the complexity of the CAI Agreement structure and the desire to have programmes in place to take advantage of this unexpected source of funding that could be used to explain the lack of community involvement in these important early stages of the Initiative. Nonetheless, each level of government undertook a series of informal meetings with inner-city service agencies to solicit ideas related to potential programming. There was also substantial interest-group lobbying of the Policy Committee in attempts to secure support for various proposed capital projects such as the Chinatown development. During the five-year term of the first agreement, the Public Information Programme allowed a budget of $1,700,000 for promotional and public education or outreach activities intended to raise public visibility for the model. Public hearings were held toward the end of Agreement I to determine priorities for the renewal of the CAI. In addition, several public-attitude and perception studies were carried out during the 1981-1986 term, giving the programme managers a feeling for the effectiveness of programmes from a variety of community perspectives.

In CAI II, community involvement was most apparent in the interest-group lobbying of the Policy Committee members. The new Strategic Capital Programme was believed to be a direct result of these lobbying efforts for major capital project assistance dollars. Meaningful community involvement did occur in the delivery of programmes, either at the
programme-submission stage, or through community representation on the programme advisory committees. In the second agreement, the public relations activities were reduced somewhat and the budget dropped to $1.3 million. Initiatives went to support public education related to the continued and ongoing benefits of the CAI and downtown revitalisation, and to fund informal hearings to assess community reaction.

Throughout the CAI I, and to a lesser degree in CAI II, citizen participation was encouraged in specific programme areas. Community groups and service organizations, especially Aboriginal groups, were funded in order to help them have input into various programmes. For a variety of reasons, several community initiatives proposed by Lloyd Axworthy did not materialize. In a personal interview (March 1991) Axworthy expressed regret that community participation and empowerment was weak, especially as the CAI became more bureaucratised. In CAI I, Axworthy pushed for a community development corporation, which did not materialise and, in the second CAI, he recommended a form of downtown development bank to facilitate community organizations to "do their own thing" -- this also was rejected. Assisted by Axworthy's department, the Native Downtown Development Corporation was specifically funded, but Axworthy claimed that it "did not work out." The business communities in targeted areas of the core had varying degrees of success in participation in the small business and key site-development programmes. Local development corporations were set up to assist in decisions related to dispersal of programme resources.

Overall, throughout the decade spanned by CAI I and CAI II, community involvement peaked and waned with the most significant input at the Programme Advisory Committee level. A more thorough assessment of the community role in the CAI and an evaluation of
the CAI's ability and desire to respond to community interests will be undertaken in the last two chapters of this dissertation. Meanwhile, it is sufficient to say that community involvement in the initiation and implementation of this urban revitalisation strategy was low.

4.7 CAI I and CAI II: Programmes and Evaluations

4.7.1 Agreement I

The overall goals of the CAI were interwoven through thirteen cost-shared programmes organized into three sectors. Sector 1, through five programmes, addressed employment and training opportunities, housing and community improvement, and community services, facility expansion and upgrading. Sector 2, through five more programmes, addressed economic growth and development and employment creation. Sector 3 had three programmes dealing with the management and delivery of the Agreement (see Appendix II for programme names, budget and expenditures, and summary of results).

In addition to the thirteen programmes that were cost-shared equally by the three levels of government out of the first $96 million budget, there were complementary programmes that involved additional funding. The primary source of complementary funding came from the Canada Employment and Immigration Commission, the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation and the Manitoba Housing and Renewal Corporation. In addition to these major sources, funding was obtained from numerous department within all three levels of government, non-government and non-profit organizations, and private businesses.
4.7.2 Final Evaluations and Outputs of CAI I

Evaluation reports were prepared by external consultants throughout the operating time of Agreement 1 (see Appendix III for a complete listing of evaluation products). There were evaluation assessments carried out from 1982 to 1983 on selected programmes, a base-line study on conditions within the core area in 1986, and mid-term evaluations from 1984 through 1985. Four thematic evaluations were carried out in 1986. Final evaluations covered the four major programme areas in 1987 as well as two management-information systems reports. A summary of the final evaluations was prepared for the Management Board and the Policy Committee in 1988 (Winnipeg Core Area Initiative 1988). The Management Board received the final evaluation from the contracted consultant and, while not necessarily agreeing with all of the conclusions, forwarded them to the Policy Committee. The evaluations covered: Employment and Affirmative Action, Housing and Community Improvement Areas, Community Services and Facilities, and Economic Stimulus.13

4.7.2.1 Employment and Affirmative Action Programmes

The Employment and Affirmative Action Programmes consisted of five sub-programmes, one of which was the result of a specially-created Training and Employment Agency. As of March 31, 1987 the five sub-programmes provided training opportunities for 1,413 individuals and job placement for 634 individuals in permanent employment (Winnipeg Core Area Initiative 1988). This represented roughly forty percent of the CAI I Agreement’s target for training and approximately twenty percent of the target for job placement. While these results were assessed by the consultant to be of "modest success"
(their lack of success was due, in part, to the recession starting in 1982) the results were disappointing in attempting to integrate these programmes with other programmes of the Agreement. For example, job placement in the construction industry as a result of the Housing and Community Improvement Areas Programme was very low because of an already high unemployment rate faced by the housing industry in the early 1980s. Despite this, each of five sub-programmes achieved some degree of success in increasing the participation of core-area residents with special needs. Tables 4.8 and 4.9 show that the majority of the programme's benefits accrued to core area residents (81.4% of the trainees and 79.4% of the job placements went to core area residents) with less than grade eleven education and to those groups targetted by the Agreement (for example native core area residents). It was the Training and Employment Agency that was responsible for ninety-three percent of the training opportunities and eighty-two percent of the placement positions.

In terms of project investment in the Employment and Affirmative Action Programmes, the cost-shared Agreement funds constituted the significant majority of total investment (sixty-two percent). Other government programme resources, particularly the Canadian Employment and Immigration Commission (CEIC) and provincial complementary programmes supplied the bulk of the funding ($8.3 million), with investment by the municipal government and the private sector being minimal (see figure 4.5). As discussed in the later chapters of this dissertation, Lloyd Axworthy was particularly disappointed in the lack of contribution by the City of Winnipeg and the private sector in the areas of job training and placement. With few exceptions (for example Western Glove Manufacturing
Table 4.8
Distribution of Trainees by Target Group Characteristics (CAI I)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target Group Characteristic</th>
<th>Percent of Trainees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Core Residents</td>
<td>81.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>80.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; 11 Grades Education</td>
<td>19.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native</td>
<td>45.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrant</td>
<td>22.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single Parent</td>
<td>25.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth</td>
<td>27.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disabled</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Winnipeg Core Area Initiative, Mid-Term Program Evaluations prepared by Stewart Clatworthy for the CAI Policy Committee, April 1985.

Table 4.9
Distribution of Placements in Employment by Target Group Characteristics (CAI I)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target Group Characteristic</th>
<th>Percent of Trainees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Core Residents</td>
<td>79.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>80.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; 11 Grades Education</td>
<td>24.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native</td>
<td>37.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrant</td>
<td>17.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single Parent</td>
<td>22.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth</td>
<td>24.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disabled</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Winnipeg Core Area Initiative, Mid-Term Program Evaluations prepared by Stewart Clatworthy for the CAI Policy Committee, April 1985.

Note: Data for Training and Employment Agency to August 31, 1987
Company), the private sector neither contributed funding to this programme nor provided permanent job placements at the end of the programme period.

The final evaluation points out that these programmes initiated very little new job creation within the core area. The programme did, however, prepare core-area residents for employment within the existing labour market and contributed to a redistribution of jobs, especially to the high-needs population groups. Nonetheless, "unemployment among the core area residents remains roughly twice that of the non-core residents," and "employment conditions continue to lag well behind those of non-core residents" (A17). It would also be fair to say that the employment placements achieved did little to contribute to the original aim of increasing opportunities for core-area residents in managerial, clerical and other white-collar jobs.

4.7.2.2 Housing and Community Improvement Area Programmes

The Core Area Initiative from the outset determined that neighbourhood revitalisation was critical to the broader redevelopment strategy of the core area. The Housing and Community Improvement Area Programmes were devoted specifically to re-establishing "viable and stable neighbourhoods" and "encouraging return migration to the area" (B1). The final evaluation suggests a high degree of success in this sector, so much so that the Initiative "represents one of the largest and most ambitious neighbourhoods revitalisation efforts undertaken in a Canadian city" (B4). Resident attitudes and perceptions, measured at various times through Agreement I, reflect more positive attitudes to programs in this area than to any other sectors of the Agreement.
Of all of the major programme areas in the Initiative, the Housing and Community Improvement Area Programmes are rated as the most successful. Complementary funding from the federal and provincial governments was more extensive than anticipated, and nearly all the programme goals were achieved or exceeded. As of December 1986, the home-repair programme had assisted 6,177 households, exceeding its target. The housing programme produced 484 new housing units; 300 hundred owner-occupied and 184 non-profit units. It acquired and renovated or converted 209 units. Structural inspections resulted in improvements of 1,100 units. The benefits from these programmes did meet the goals of assisting those with housing deficiencies, especially the elderly and low-income households, and the Aboriginal population.

Research studies carried out in the late 1970s by the Institute of Urban Studies at the University of Winnipeg and by the Province of Manitoba in work on the City of Winnipeg development-plan review (referred to earlier in this chapter) and co-operative urban research conducted earlier with the MSUA (referred to in the previous chapter) highlighted the long-standing trends that contributed to the decline of Winnipeg’s core area neighbourhoods and to the inner-city residential base. The sheer volume of projects needed to substantially improve the inner city was large, however a 1.2 percent increase in units added to the housing stock within the boundary was considered by the evaluator to be significant, because this area had lost "close to 2,000 units during the previous 15 years" (B7). Improvements through renovation or partial renovation were made to about thirty-nine percent of housing stock identified as needing repair in the 1981 census. Though the 400 units of subsidised housing was small relative to need, the Non-Profit Housing
Programme made a substantial contribution to the affordability problem of moderately priced family accommodation.

Subsidy stacking of the Agreement and complementary programmes were seen as the reason for the success of this sector. Debate continues as to whether the investment in this sector would have occurred without the Agreement. Private investments contributed $58.949 million, largely made possible through government loans and loan guarantees. Federal and provincial contributions were substantial, while direct municipal contributions were modest.

The employment impact of the Housing and Community Improvement Area Programmes was important (see table 4.10). Much of the success of the Employment and Affirmative Action Programme can be traced to programme-delivery and management-related jobs and to construction employment from this programme.

4.7.2.3 Community Facilities and Services Programmes

The ultimate objective of these programmes within the Initiative was "to provide financial contributions toward the cost of new or expanded community facilities and services required during the life of the Agreement to facilitate the participation of core-area residents in social, multi-cultural and economic development opportunities" (C2). The operational goals of the programmes under this sector, as with all the other programmes of the Initiative, were based upon objectives of relieving disparities for core residents, removing barriers and providing services and facilities that were unique to the needs of core residents. The evaluations indicated that these broad objectives were met; however, the programmes were "somewhat less than successful in providing for facilities and
Table 4.10
Housing and Community Improvement Area Programmes
Funds Levered and Employment Impact

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program Number</th>
<th>Programme Name</th>
<th>Dollars Levered</th>
<th>Employment Years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.1 and 2.2</td>
<td>Home Repair</td>
<td>$20m private</td>
<td>100 person yrs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>Home Ownership</td>
<td>$18m compl.</td>
<td>250 person yrs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4.1 to .4</td>
<td>Non-Profit</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>46 trained &amp;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4.3</td>
<td>Wpg Rehab. Corp</td>
<td>$5.9m compl.</td>
<td>employed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4.5 to .6</td>
<td>Non-Profit Assist.</td>
<td>$11.7m compl.</td>
<td>164 person yrs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>CARUMP</td>
<td>$5.9m compl.</td>
<td>211 person yrs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


services which directly remove barriers to employment or which develop new opportunities for employment for core residents" (C5) (see table 4.11).

In accessing resources from outside the Agreement, this sector achieved considerable success, particularly from the private sector. Of the $24.6 million in external funds, $16.2 million came from the private sector, while $8.3 million was from government grants and subsidies. Private foundations, service organizations and project sponsors contributed to the private investment pool. Again, only a portion (fifty-two percent) of the placements through this programme went to core residents; however, many of the projects were expected to be ongoing when the Agreement funds expired, theoretically opening the doors of opportunity to core residents.
Table 4.11
Community Facilities and Services Programmes
Funds Levered and Employment Impact

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program Number</th>
<th>Programme Name</th>
<th>Dollars Levered</th>
<th>Employment Impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Comm. Improv. Areas</td>
<td>$1.5m compl.</td>
<td>94 person years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Comm. Facilities</td>
<td>$26m compl.</td>
<td>384 person years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Comm. Services</td>
<td>$3.0m compl.</td>
<td>271 employments</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


4.7.2.4 Economic Stimulus Programmes

Central to Agreement I were the objectives of enhanced economic growth and development, increased employment, and the physical improvement of the core area. The Economic Stimulus Programmes were to meet this objective through "targeted delivery of goods and services to "key sites" (D1). The overall objectives of Sector II were to encourage new economic growth and employment opportunities and to stimulate private investment in key sites. The programmes did achieve considerable success when measured by dollars leveraged by the Agreement. These programmes stimulated over $50 million in key-site investment by private and non-profit sources, and were especially successful in the North Ellice area, the Exchange District and Chinatown. Evaluation suggested only "modest" achievements in the Logan, Osborne, Provencher, Selkirk and Main St. areas. The Management Board, in their response to the final evaluation in this Sector disagreed with the evaluation and felt that it was "overly critical of the successes and outputs of the Small Business Assistance Programme, North Ellice and Neighbourhood Main Streets Development" (D3).
The evaluation of this sector's programmes was the most extensive of the final evaluations. A synopsis of the main programmes revealed the following:

1. Industrial Development: Programme 6.8 (budget $4 million). Key site concentration in the Logan area failed in its initial programme design and experienced failure in implementation and timing. The programmes intended job-creation target was well below initial projections, produced jobs outside the designated key sites, and did not meet job-content targets. There was one notable success in the industrial development programme -- Western Glove Works Ltd., a manufacturer of jeans and casual wear. The firm relocated, expanded and spent an additional $1.5 million on computerisation and automation as a result of a $1.7 million CAI grant. It produced 197 jobs, of which forty were affirmative-action placements. The plant was used as an affirmative action training facility and a day care centre for forty children.

2. DRIE Complementary Programs. These programmes were more cost-effective and efficient than the Core Area Industrial Development Programme but achieved more success with already existing businesses.

3. Small Business Assistance: Programme 6.9 (budget $2.82 million). This programme provided financial contributions and counselling/referral services to small businesses in nine key site areas: (1) Heritage; (2) Logan; (3) Selkirk; (4) North Portage; (5) Provencher; (6) Main Street; (7) Chinatown; (8) Osborne Street; and (9) adjacent areas to key sites. For the most part, restaurant and night-club facilities received the largest amounts of funding and promised the creation of the most jobs (for example the Rorie Street Marble Club, a disco, was awarded $25,000 toward the cost of a $340,000 renovation with twenty-five jobs to be created). This programme may have stemmed the
tide of further decline for small businesses in the core; however, "an unintended effect may have been a diversion of investment from the surrounding areas outside the key sites, resulting in a ‘patchwork’ of improved and ‘depleted’ zones" (D7). It appears that the physical upgrading of businesses was moderately successful; however many of these firms indicated that they would have had to make these improvements sooner or later. Management assistance and business planning was not addressed adequately.

4. North Ellice - Programme 6.9 (budget $3,014,500). This programme was most successful with respect to physical redevelopment by replacing "virtually all of the derelect housing units" (D8) and by creating streetscaping. Newly constructed or renovated housing and extensive works projects associated with the extension of Central Park contributed to approximately 273 person-years of construction employment and approximately 17.6 percent of complementary funding, primarily delivered through CMHC. The area was not large enough, however, to reverse general out-migration trends, change tenure types, or attract new residential construction.

5. Historic Winnipeg: Programme 9 (budget $4.9 million). This programme made significant progress in the physical preservation of designated structures. The retail base and attendant tourism attraction has yet to be measured; however, the positive perceptions of non-residents toward the Exchange District has been a major breakthrough. The Exchange District was established to encourage ongoing participation of businesses in the area.

6. Neighbourhood Main Streets: Programme 10 (budget $4,405,000). This programme had mixed success, and the evaluator felt that there was only incremental change in the "more removed" Selkirk and Provencher key sites, little achievement in the
Main Street site, and site-specific success in the higher potential, politically visible Chinatown and Osborne areas. Again, the physical renewal of buildings, streetscaping, and outdoor spaces were viewed positively, but there was little evidence to suggest a change in commercial activity, a change in consumer purchasing patterns, or stabilisation of neighbourhoods. The dependency issue was raised with respect to the Chinatown area in so far as it had not become self-sustaining as planned. Flaws with many of the programmes appeared to be related to mismatched and unrealistic objectives, inadequate funding, and negative citizen participation through the resident Local Development Corporations. There was no consensus by the private sector as to the most effective incentive for investment.

4.7.3 Agreement II

Based on the considerable success of Agreement I, and drawing on lessons learned from it, the CAI was renewed for an additional five years: 1986 to 1991. Funding of the tripartite Agreement set an additional maximum expenditure for each level of government at $33 million. The overall goal was similar to that of the first agreement -- to revitalize the city centre and surrounding areas, and in doing so bring people back to the centre, making it a good place to live and work. The objectives of Agreement II were similar to, and integrated in the same way as, those of Agreement I. The Agreement was organized again into three sectors: Sector I -- Entrepreneurial and Strategic Site Development; Sector II -- Neighbourhood and Community Revitalisation; and Sector III -- Management and Coordination. These three sectors again comprised thirteen sub-programmes. The physical boundaries for the second agreement were extended somewhat to take into consideration re-
focused programme objectives and political considerations (see Appendix IV for
programmes, budgets and expenditures as of March 31, 1992).

In addition to the cost-shared programmes of Agreement II, complementary
programmes and funding were undertaken by: the federal government through Employment
Services (Canada Employment and Immigration Commission), Housing (CMHC),
Community Involvement (Secretary of State), Cultural Involvement (Department of
Communications), Industrial Development/Tourism (DRIE); and the provincial government
through Manitoba Jobs Fund, Manitoba Housing and Renewal, Manitoba Riverbank
Renewal, Manitoba Business Development and Tourism, and Provincial Facilities. The
minimum total expenditure provided by this complementary funding was expected to be
$36.8 million (see table 4.12).
Table 4.12
Investment in Core Area Projects (as of December 31, 1991)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Other federal funds *</td>
<td>$17,136,320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other provincial funds *</td>
<td>10,040,909</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other municipal funds *</td>
<td>9,654,576</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total other government funds</strong></td>
<td><strong>36,831,807</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repayable government loans</td>
<td>36,207,430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private</td>
<td>57,351,286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$130,390,523</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* In addition to Core Area Initiative cost-shared funds.


The renewed agreement made some shifts of focus as a result of the first agreement. The Training and Employment Programme, through its own agency, was the only major programme carried on within the employment sector but created an affirmative action strategy and a steering committee to monitor and oversee measures across the breadth of the Agreement (intended to account for one of the weaknesses of the first agreement). The new Neighbourhood and Community Development Programme was intended to build upon the success of the former programme but focused more in key neighbourhoods within the core area boundary. The former Community Facilities and Services Programme was rolled into the Neighbourhood and Community Development Programme, providing a total programme budget of $16 million. The Economic Stimulus Programmes of Agreement I, which received the most criticism from the final evaluation, were to be more tailored, focused and co-ordinated, and directly delivered through the Core Area Initiative Office.
4.7.4 Evaluations and Outputs of CAI II

As was the case for CAI I, evaluations were done throughout the agreement period; however, they took the form of programme progress-and-status reports. The final evaluations of CAI II had not been prepared, although there was an evaluation of the tripartite model produced in October 1990 (Clatworthy and Leskiw 1990). The following is a brief summary of the outputs of the first and renewed agreements according to Clatworthy’s model report as of June 1990 in the three theme areas: (1) economic stimulus; (2) housing, community and neighbourhood development; and (3) affirmative action.

4.7.4.1 Economic Stimulus

The economic stimulus initiatives took the form of incentives and assistance for industrial and commercial expansion, business marketing and promotion for local and downtown districts, and financial and planning assistance for new and existing private and non-profit entrepreneurs and corporations. Included in this package of programmes was assistance in support of the formation of major redevelopment corporations including the North Portage Development and the Forks Renewal Corporation. There was also assistance available for municipal infrastructure improvement in selected commercial districts. Combined, the first and second agreements produced:

1. assistance to 630 individual projects;
2. $87.5 million of cost-shared Agreement funds;
3. a total value of economic stimulus projects of >$400 million including North Portage and the Forks Renewal;
4. approximately $242 million of private sector resources;
5. the creation of roughly 4,440 person-years of construction employment and 2,250 permanent jobs. (Clatworthy and Leskiw 1990, 87-89.)

Despite the highly visible success of some of these initiatives, critics have claimed that this sector failed to meet its initial objective of attracting manufacturing and high-technology industry. As well, it failed to secure large-scale affirmative-action hiring of core-area residents in permanent jobs created under the economic development programmes. Lloyd Axworthy, in his interview (March 1991), suggested that this was one of his largest disappointments.

4.7.4.2 Housing, Community and Neighbourhood Revitalisation

The Housing, Community and Neighbourhood Revitalisation sector produced highly visible contributions to inner city revitalisation, especially in the housing, and the community and neighbourhood physical-improvement projects. Grants, forgivable loans and planning assistance contributed to repair, renovation, conversion and purchase of existing housing, as well as direct assistance for new construction. Similarly, grants and other forms of assistance provided support for municipal infrastructure, community-based facilities and services, social and recreation services and a new education/services programme directed at inner-city children and youth. Combined, CAI I and CAI II produced:

1. construction or conversion of more than 1,250 units of housing and renovation of more than 7,000 units;
2. $137 million of housing projects undertaken with $17 million of tripartite support;
3. government funding of $60 million and private-sector investment of more than $61 million;
4. 397 community- and neighbourhood-revitalisation projects, including 297 projects sponsored by community-based groups or organizations;
5. 100 projects involving municipally owned facilities or infrastructure;
6. $62 million of projects in the community- and neighbourhood-revitalisation programme sector, with $19 million being cost-shared trilaterally
7. roughly $17 million if government funding and $26 million in private investment;
8. the community- and neighbourhood-revitalisation sector contributed to more than 540 person-years of construction employment and 558 non-construction jobs primarily in the social-service area. (Clatworthy and Leskiw 1990, 89-92.)

The visible aspects of the housing- and neighbourhood-revitalisation sectors received much positive response in resident and non-resident attitudes and is one positive aspect underlined in the Community Inquiry Into Inner-City Revitalisation: Final Report (Community Inquiry Board 1990). One of the major concerns of both the social-service delivery agencies, and latently governments, is the dependencies for ongoing financial support that have been created in the community by the CAI assistance to date.

4.7.4.3 Employment and Affirmative Action

While employment and affirmative action was an inherent element in many of the programme elements of CAI I and II, specific initiatives were designed to reduce barriers to employment and training for core-area residents. These included occupational training
programmes; adult pre-employment, literacy and language training; employment preparation services; and assistance with job placement. These activities were in support of the CEIC regular activities. As of June 1990, the Employment and Affirmative Action programming produced:

1. roughly $25.7 million for 125 employment/training projects valued at $38.3 million;
2. $11.7 million of government funding and $5.8 million of private resources;
3. more than 3,260 training opportunities for inner city residents with special needs;
4. 1,700 individuals that completed training programmes and greater than 1,110 graduates placed in employment. (Clatworthy and Leskiw 1990, 92-93.)

There is no doubt that the two CAI agreements produced tangible benefits for a number of core area residents. The Community Inquiry Report (Community Inquiry Board 1990, 5) specifically commends the CAI for success in the education and training fields, so much so that in the event of there not being a third CAI, the report recommends using the CAI model for a future community-based employment agency. The major disappointment in the Employment and Affirmative Action sector perhaps has to do with raised expectations. Without attributing fault, both CAI I and CAI II may have raised the hopes and expectations of Winnipeggers' for employment beyond the level that could realistically be delivered given the nature of the local and national economic climate, the political milieu of Winnipeg, and the historical stability of the Winnipeg business community.
4.7.5 Summary of the Evaluations of CAI I and CAI II

In many cases the real "products" of the two agreements defy measurement. The long-term economic effects of programmes are difficult to measure because of the short period of time elapsed and the scale of both agreements. In some cases, agreement objectives were not clearly defined nor were there pre-existing scales of measurement for comparison. For example, in attempting to measure if the CAI was successful in drawing residents back to the core area, there was a small population gain from 1984 to 1986 for the first time in fifteen years; however, there were no records taken of the type of people who came back, or their retention factor. It is possible that the gain may well have been in a further increase of disadvantaged groups, and the gain, in and of itself, could not be measured as positive or negative. However, the community-services and employment-training areas were viewed by residents and non-residents as a direct success of the CAI, despite the fact the long-term effects of these programmes will not be known for some time. The one quantifiable area of housing activity "scooped a large amount out of Ottawa" (Clatworthy 1989), and according to Roy Nichol of CMHC (R. Nichol 1991) this sector benefited substantially in the second agreement from unspent federal dollars at government year end. While the focusing of government dollars was substantial, it is unknown if the tri-level agreements were any more successful than would have been the case if an equal number of dollars had been obtained from one source. It is clear that the main role of the CAI was political legitimation. With the exception of the large, visible projects such as North Portage, most of the programmes were, in effect, in one way or another through one of the levels of government before either of the agreements were signed. How much new money was generated by CAI is a matter of great speculation.
Certainly, however, the Initiative focused attention and spending on one cause -- the core area.

4.8 CAI III?

The second agreement formally ended on March 31, 1991 amidst much speculation as to the probability of a renewal. Jake Epp, the Federal Minister responsible for the tripartite agreement, indicated as early as November of 1990 that the Government of Canada intended to freeze spending on any new initiatives related to the core area until there could be public hearings into the potential benefits of a third agreement. A moratorium is in effect while each level of government reviews its priorities and carefully scrutinises the strengths and weaknesses of the Initiative over the decade. Public accountability is very much in the forefront of each government's concern.

4.9 The CAI: Attributes for Success

The Core Area Initiative was a practical experiment in urban revitalisation that approached complex interrelated urban problems on an holistic basis. Although the tri-level co-operation and delivery is touted as being unique to Canadian planning, the simultaneous attack on physical, social and economic problems is perhaps more noteworthy. The accomplishments of the various CAI programmes were extensive, albeit incremental in some respects. The initial investment of $96 million leveraged and catalysed over a half a billion dollars in public and private investment (Kiernan 1987, 26), which could not have been accomplished without the focused integration by all the participants on the single cause of the core area. In terms of public policy, this single
focus was the key to convincing both the public and private sectors that this project was a highly visible, cohesive project worthy of continued investment.

The following chapters will discuss, in detail, the strengths and weaknesses of the structural model of the CAI and will present a critique of the Initiative based on published reports, newspaper coverage, public opinion surveys and interviews with key individuals who were associated with the Initiative at various times during the decade. This compilation of data will provide a unique glimpse of the CAI not found in other studies.
Endnotes

1. Elaine Heinicke, Director of Major Initiatives for Western Economic Diversification, in her interview on March 7, 1991, outlined the rationale and structural arrangements for the two core Agreements.

2. Artibise and Kiernan in their Local Development Paper No. 12, entitled Canadian Regional Development: The Urban Dimension (1989) cite seven case studies of regional development initiatives including the CAI. These include Toronto’s Harbourfront; Granville Island, Vancouver; The Halifax Waterfront; Montreal’s Vieux Port; Quebec’s Vieux Port; and Vancouver’s B.C. Place.

3. It should be remembered that Lloyd Axworthy is the former director of the Institute for Urban Studies and much of the material describing the physical, economic and social malaise of the core was collected during his tenure.

4. See, for example, reports done by the Social Planning Council of Winnipeg, Community Development and the Core Area of Winnipeg: A Response to the United Way (1978) and Housing Conditions in Winnipeg: The Identification of Housing Problems and High-Need Groups (1979). The Institute of Urban Studies, University of Winnipeg, produced several reports throughout the 1970s including Lloyd Axworthy, Winnipeg’s Core Area: An Assessment of Conditions Affecting Law Enforcement (1975) and Christine McKee, Towards a Planning Strategy for Older Neighbourhoods (1977).

5. The City of Winnipeg prepared internal reports such as Opportunities for Redevelopment of the C.N.R. East Yards: A Report Prepared by the Task Force Established by the Board of Commissioners (March 17, 1975), and Downtown Revitalization: Background to the Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Downtown Alternatives (June 1977). These, and other reports, were augmented by work from external consultants, such as Wardrop and Associates, C.N.R. East Yards Redevelopment: Servicing Report (February 1978). Meanwhile, the federal government through various departments, were also examining development potential in Winnipeg. See, for example, G.B. Woolsey, Historic Resources of the Red-Assiniboine: A Preliminary Analysis of their Interpretive and Development Potential (Ottawa: Parks Canada 1975).

6. A memorandum of understanding was signed on September 22, 1980, by Lloyd Axworthy, Minister of Employment and Immigration, Government of Canada; Gerry Mercier, Minister for Urban Affairs, Province of Manitoba; and Bill Norrie, Mayor, City of Winnipeg. Public announcement of the proposed tri-level Agreement was produced by the CAI Policy Committee: Proposed Winnipeg Core Area Initiative (Winnipeg, June 1981).

7. Eugene Kostyra, the newly elected Minister of Urban Affairs, in charge of the CAI for the provincial partnership, stressed his government’s unease with the programme weighting and priorities reflected in the CAI I as it had been signed before his tenure. The N.D.P. seriously considered abandoning the whole agreement but felt that the overall economic and political benefits outweighed the individual concerns of parties.

9. The Institute of Urban Studies, University of Winnipeg, compared data on 13 selected Canadian metropolitan areas including Winnipeg from 1971 to 1986. A brief summary of the data was presented in their September 1990 Newsletter (Charette 1990).

10. The inner city of Winnipeg includes the site of the University of Winnipeg, Winnipeg's second-largest university, as well as the Health Sciences complex which is the medical campus for the University of Manitoba.

11. Axworthy's M.A. and Ph.D. were from Princeton University. His time spent in the United States and his familiarity with the American Local Development Committees and Urban Development Committees strongly influenced his desire for grassroots participation.

12. This occurred at a meeting in the spring of 1980 called by Sister MacNamara at her Rossbrook House, a drop-in centre for street youths. Local citizen activists were pressuring Axworthy, Mayor Norrie from the City, and provincial MLA Gerry Mercier to take a stand on the relocation of the CPR's marshalling yard. These yards, which occupied 300 acres of strategic inner-city land, were unquestionably a large contributor to the urban blight of the area.

13. The following material is a brief summation of Stewart Clatworthy's 1988 report to the Management Board and the Policy Committee in 1988. The page references are given from the alphabetical numbering system of this report.

14. Complementary funding was especially important to the success of this programme. In addition to the $6.181 million allotted to this programme, CMHC provided $25 million in complementary federal RRAP funds.

15. Stewart Clatworthy, in a personal communication in May, 1992, indicated that the CAI II did not have the resources to complete the evaluation component of the Agreement. The evaluation programme was "out of sync" with the rest of the programming, leaving considerable unfinished work by the time the funds ran out.

16. As of June 1992, indications are that any further intergovernmental revitalisation efforts in Winnipeg will focus on the Main Street area of the core. It seems unlikely that there will be a third Core Area Agreement based on the tripartite model of equal cost-sharing and decision-making as was designed for CAI I and II.
Chapter 5
THE WINNIPEG CORE AREA INITIATIVE MODEL

5.1 Introduction

This chapter examines the CAI model itself, separate from the policies and programmes of the Initiative as a whole. The tripartite model, which forms the foundation of the Winnipeg Core Area Agreement, was the underlying arrangement and set of principles that bound the three levels of government together in the revitalisation plan for the core area of the City of Winnipeg. The model provided the structural framework for the Agreement, and the legal structure and authority for implementation. Chapter 2 outlined some of the limitations of past approaches to urban revitalisation and concluded with a need for alternate strategies -- new institutional and fiscal mechanisms, new political alliances. It can be argued that the CAI model "fits the bill." The model has been touted as being unique to Canadian planning by Matthew Kiernan (Kiernan 1987) and others; however, it is really the overriding principle of equality in decision-making and cost-sharing that could arguably be considered "unique." Nonetheless, the CAI model has an overall design that differentiates it from other urban revitalisation models making it worthy of further examination.

This chapter specifically addresses the first three research questions posed in Chapter 1 of this dissertation. It outlines the basic assumptions underlying the CAI model -- assumptions that were based on the belief that solutions to problems of inner-city distress in Winnipeg could only be found with inter-governmental co-operation and sharing of resources. It examines the ideologies underlying the policy frameworks of the tri-level partners at the time of the creation of the Initiative and under changing political
environments. It suggests the degree of political commitment held by the partners over time and outlines the roles and perspectives taken by each during the two agreements; CAI I 1981-1986, and CAI II 1986-1991. This chapter assesses the effectiveness of the CAI as an instrument of public policy for urban revitalisation and concludes that the model, as it was purposively designed, cannot and should not be replicated as such for other urban redevelopment projects. There are elements of the model however, that can provide invaluable instruction for future urban revitalisation attempts.

5.2 The Model as an Instrument of Public Policy

Hogwood and Gunn (1988) attempt to define public policy at the outset of their book, *Policy Analysis for the Real World*. In a series of categorisations of the way the term *policy* is used and the contexts in which it often occurs, they summarize their discussion with the following definition:

Any public policy is subjectively defined by an observer as being such and is usually perceived as comprising a series of patterns of related decisions to which many circumstances and personal, group, and organizational influences have contributed. The policy-making process involves many sub-processes and may extend over a considerable period of time. The aims or purposes underlying a policy are usually identifiable at a relatively early stage in the process but these may change over time and, in some cases, may be defined only retrospectively. The outcomes of policies require to be studied and, where appropriate, compared and contrasted with the policy-makers' intentions. Accidental or deliberate inaction may contribute to a policy outcome. The study of policy requires an understanding of behaviour, especially behaviour involving interaction within and among organizational memberships. For a policy to be regarded as 'public policy' it must to some degree have been generated or at least processed within the framework of governmental procedures, influences and organizations. (Ibid., 23-24.)
Hogwood and Gunn also identify some characteristics that apply to any issue before it reaches, or is even brought to, the agenda floor of any corporation or government (ibid., 68). They suggest that an issue must have reached crisis proportions such that it can no longer be ignored, that it must have achieved some degree of particularity, that it must have some emotive or human-aspect angle such that it can attract media attention, that it must have wide impact that may involve some "pocketbook" issues, that it raises questions of power and legitimacy, and that it must be fashionable in some way that is often difficult to explain but easy to recognise.

Using this definition of public policy and accepting the circumstances required to bring an issue to the forefront as a public-policy issue, it is apparent from the history and evolution of the CAI over ten years, that the CAI model and its companion agreements represented a concerted and enduring attempt at urban public policy-making. Indeed, Kiernan lauds the creation of the CAI as an unusual multi-governmental urban collaboration with results that commend both the substance and the delivery model.

That signing launched an experiment in urban policy-making which was arguably the most ambitious and comprehensive ever undertaken in North America. And, despite the somewhat idiosyncratic political circumstances surrounding its genesis, it is an experiment with important implications for the manner in which both urban policy and economic development will be pursued elsewhere in this country in the 1990s, and perhaps beyond. (Kiernan 1987, 25.)

A decade after the creation of the CAI, the question remains as to how effective and important this experiment was and to what degree can, or should, the model be replicated for use in urban revitalisation efforts elsewhere.
5.3 Effectiveness of the Model

The Winnipeg Core Area Agreement tripartite model was specifically designed for extensive intervention and involvement in the process of revitalisation of ten square miles of the inner city of Winnipeg. The area consists of relatively contiguous neighbourhoods housing a population one-sixth the size of the city as whole. The model was established to bring together the three levels of government in a manner that would bind them equally in decision-making and dollar-sharing. The premise behind the tri-level model was that the scope and breadth of redevelopment to be undertaken was beyond the capacity of any one single level of government. Indeed, this collective ability, when all levels of government were faced with fiscal restraint, and programme and mandate restrictions, contributed to considerable initial consensus, good will and flexibility in the early years of the first agreement.

The tripartite model as it was designed provided an effective tool for marrying the three levels of government in a collective effort with a concentrated focus. The legal requirements of the model and the structural emphasis on co-operative negotiations meant ongoing unanimity in goal definition, problem-solving and consensus building. Numerous participants in the process point to the frustrations caused by these requirements; however, it is generally acknowledged that the net results of redevelopment activities were greater than would have been the case under another model. Full inter-governmental negotiation and decision-making throughout the implementation process re-enforced the focus continually back on the issue at hand -- Winnipeg’s inner-city problems and prospects. In addition, equal participation by the three partners resulted in the breadth and range of programming that has been seen as an element of the model’s success. This extensive
range gave each partner the opportunity to meet some of its own priorities while promoting a sense of ownership in the model. A by-product of the process was increased inter-governmental co-ordination and understanding of jurisdictional interests.

From the outset, the roles and functions of each of the tri-level partners were operated in a trial-and-error fashion, due in part to the novelty of the collaboration and to the individual perspectives brought to the table by the original signatories. The political and fiscal milieu at the time of development of the model was very different from that existing in the later years of the Initiative. The fact that the CAI was designed prior to the recession of the early 1980s contributed much to the flexibility of the participants. Over time, and especially with the signing of the second agreement in 1986, many changes affected the environment of the model -- changes in political figures, jurisdictional priorities and boundaries, and management personnel. There appears to be general consensus that time and environmental change caused the functioning of the second agreement to be less flexible and acutely concerned with public accountability. Although the model was not specifically designed to cope with change, it is quite remarkable that it was capable of doing so.

The recession that hit the North American economy in the early 1980s could not have come at a worse time for the CAI. Just as programmes were being implemented and public expectations raised, the downturn in the Canadian economy severely affected government policy and operating styles. Fiscal restraint and public accountability became the watchword of all levels of government and greatly influenced the functioning of the model.
Changes in the Winnipeg and inner-city economy during the early years of the first agreement had profound effects on the delivery capability of several of the model's programmes, especially those dependent upon private-sector investment. It can be argued that an undetermined number of dollars obtained from the first agreement was spent on combatting the effects of the 1982 recession. Certainly, the tax base of the inner city was too small to pay for the level of social services required, and, even by 1986, private-sector investment in Winnipeg was considered too fragile for the federal government to risk pulling out of a second agreement. Throughout the 1980s, changes in the City's employment base away from traditional manufacturing jobs, coupled with high general unemployment, eroded the effects proposed by the linkage of programmes with job creation and training/affirmative-action elements. In fact, the job-training component inadvertently contributed to the unemployment level due to the recession by placing newly-trained workers into areas of the labour force most heavily affected by unemployment (Clatworthy and Leskiw 1992). As a result of economic circumstances, among other factors, the original goals of the model for increased employment opportunities and expansion of industrial, commercial and residential development did not meet initial expectations.

Changes in all three levels of government throughout the decade also had significant effects on the functioning of the model. The local level perhaps experienced the least change -- the mayor remained the only original signatory from the first agreement. City Council changed with elections, as did the boundaries of the area designated as "the core." Changes at the provincial and federal levels had more significant effects. Indeed, as noted in Chapter 4, shortly after the signing of the first agreement in 1981, the newly elected NDP government had severe reservations concerning the model, and came close to
pulling out of the Agreement altogether. The Logan industrial site, one of the initial key sites selected for economic development, proved to be a major source of ideological conflict between parties and one of the most contentious issues covered by the media. The reluctant co-operation of the NDP in the Agreement brought with it a price -- a major realignment of the model's industrial and economic development strategy and a re-prioritization of resource allocations to a number of the model's programmes. Change at the federal level in 1982 similarly affected the economic development strategies of the first agreement. Lloyd Axworthy's original concept of using the CAI as a demonstration project for community-level development facilitated through DREE experienced a shift in focus and transfer of responsibilities for the model to Western Diversification via DRIE. The result was a diffusion of activities among five departments. With this change came a restructuring of federal financial responsibilities and an increased concern by the provincial and federal governments in having the model's programmes conform to line department mandates and budget priorities. The result was that elements of flexibility and adaptability associated with the initial operating style of the model became constrained.

Much of the success of the CAI is generally credited to the originators of the model and the personnel who piloted the Initiative through the infancy stage. By 1985 however, numerous personnel changes at the level of Management Board and Agreement co-ordinators, coupled with changes in political leaderships, resulted in the departure of most of the originators and key personnel who designed and had a vested interest in the model. This contributed to a loss of continuity and a reduction in a sense of ownership at all levels of operation, and it is generally agreed that the presence and guiding spirit of the Core Area Office may have been the only stabilising influence in the last years of the
second agreement. However, critics have suggested that it was the divesting of responsibility for programme delivery and day-to-day operations to the Core Area Office that created a "fourth-level" bureaucracy, thereby further contributing to a sense of loss of ownership of the model for the three primary partners.

Matthew Kiernan extols the breadth and scope of the activities undertaken by the CAI with its tri-governmental partnership -- a scale unmatched (he claims), by revitalisation efforts in either North America or Europe (Kiernan 1990). Financing of the programme activities of the model came from the equal coast-shared arrangements in the agreements, complementary programme initiatives undertaken by various government departments, and leveraging of private dollars. The financial scale of the Initiative was large -- so much so that "the $96 million provided for the initial term of the model represented the largest budget for a single programming initiative ever seen in Winnipeg" (Clatworthy and Leskiw 1990, 51). Nonetheless, it begs the question, "How much is enough?" Over the decade, the three levels of government pumped $266 million into the inner-city.

Individuals involved with the development and implementation of the model, however, clearly recognized the financial limitations of the model and expressed concerns that the model could never produce the level of impact anticipated by the public. (Clatworthy and Leskiw 1990, 52.)

In addition to tri-level contractual dollars, Kiernan suggests:

Through skilful exploitation of the initial CAI and its sister agreements, the City of Winnipeg was able to parlay a municipal investment of some $54 million into more than three-quarters of a billion dollars worth of public and private sector investment in the economic, physical, and social rejuvenation of Winnipeg's disadvantaged inner city . . . multiplying its investment by a factor of nearly fourteen times." (Kiernan 1990, 20.)
Gerecke and Reid calls this a "shell game," claiming that a more realistic picture from the Economic Council of Canada shows a $266 million public investment leveraged $240 million private investment -- a leverage factor of just less than one (Gerecke and Reid 1990, 19). Even these figures are called into question by Gerecke and Reid because they call the authors, Michael Dector and Jeffrey Koval, partisan and unable to objectively judge because of a pro-CAI bias. It would appear that each of the CAI partners and other agencies involved in certain aspects of the Initiative kept financial data consistent with their own vested interests. The result, therefore, is that there is no one source that is able to give the whole financial picture including the effect of various subsidies and inducements used for certain programmes. To date, there has been no public document issued by the CAI Management Board giving an assessment of the impact or quantum of investment dollars leveraged by the model over the ten-year period of operation.4

In attempting to evaluate the effectiveness of the CAI model with respect to financial impact, it is necessary to keep in mind the geographical size of the targeted area (ten square miles), and the size of the population considered to be in need (twenty percent of the city’s population). Although events surrounding the creation of the CAI focused on an area adjacent to the downtown and the CPR tracks, political interests caused the geographical boundary of the designated "core area" to extend to several adjacent inner-city and older neighbourhoods generally acknowledged to be in need of help. Despite general opinion that the size of the area designated for revitalisation was too large at the outset, extension of initial boundaries occurred. Clearly, there was already a gap between financial resources and perceived need; however, several of the model’s programmes were extended to newly targeted areas. Critics of the CAI have suggested that the resources
available should have been concentrated in those areas deemed most in need; however, the community-level development initiative, inherent in the model and so close to the heart and spirit of its originators, responded to community pressure.

The CAI model held at the outset the goal of a comprehensive attack on a litany of urban problems. This comprehensive feature linking physical, social and economic strategies proved to be both a strength and a weakness of the model. In some respects the media hype linking these aims raised expectations beyond the capabilities of any revitalisation model to deliver. This feature also added a degree of complexity to the integration and co-ordination functions of the Initiative. New programming arising out of the second agreement further added to the breadth and comprehensiveness of the CAI, in some cases causing competitive activities lacking thought and timing.

Perhaps the most obvious shortcoming related to the implementation of the CAI model was in the policy planning and formulation function. Policy formation proved to be ad hoc in nature in response to specific priorities or concerns of one or more levels of government. Policy formulation and planning received attention at the initial design and creation stage of the CAI and at points prior to the end of the terms of the agreements. Planning at the front end of the first agreement was substantial and creative, and originators of the model such as Lloyd Axworthy, Gerry Mercier and David Sanders seemed to have a clear consensus on the nature of the model necessary to achieve their perceived goals. The normative and empirical assumptions behind further developments as the Initiative matured were built on "best guesses" of delivery agents or negotiations of numerous departmental representatives. Bureaucrats from all levels of government, constrained by jurisdictional interests and mandates, were anxious to take advantage of the
perceived successes in programming of CAI I. Success in programme areas of the first
agreement created a vicious circle of calls for continuation of programmes leading to a
further dependence without in-depth evaluation of policy outcomes. However, one of the
most serious failures of the model was the inability to turn programme successes into
policy legislation. This was most apparent in the field of the housing, community and
neighbourhood revitalisation sector and the employment and affirmative action strategy.

Debate continues as to the label that best characterizes the CAI model -- rational
comprehensive versus incremental "muddling through." Peter Diamant (1992), to this day
gives lectures to city planning students at the University of Manitoba, making the case for
both sides of the debate. Diamant claims that the initial development of the model was a
decisively rational process, due in part to the academic background of Lloyd Axworthy and
David Sanders. However, he also suggests that a great deal of inter-governmental "talking"
throughout the latter part of the 1970s contributed to the understanding, enthusiasm and
good will engendered in the efforts of the Joint Liaison Committee and the numerous sub-
committees as they tried to put together a strategy for a model suitable for the complicated
task of urban revitalisation. Diamant suggests that the CAI "didn't just plop out" -- that it
emerged in an incremental and experimental manner as a result of a late 1970s attempt at
strategic planning to tie the federal and provincial governments into Plan Winnipeg. The
Planning Department of the City had asked for help in the mid-1970s from the MSUA.
Four or five years of activities allowed people to know each other and contacts to be made
that were instrumental in the creation of the CAI. Diamant claims that, following the
demise of the MSUA, when the provincial Department of Urban Affairs was disbanded by
the Lyon government, much strategic planning was lost. Clatworthy concurred. He
suggested in a personal interview (December 1989) that policy definition and direction
disintegrated as the Initiative progressed and that policy direction, in the absence of a
unified policy statement, varied between three interpretations or one, watered down for
consensus. Clatworthy called the policy outcomes of the model "policy by default."

5.4 The Public/Private Venture

Chapter 2 presented attempts of British and American governments to deal with
the pervasive problems of urban revitalisation and the concomitant shifts in thinking
regarding the respective roles of governments and the private sector in the transformation
of urban areas. Chapter 3 discussed the changing role of planners as a result of these shifts
in urban revitalisation philosophy and examined the consequences of public/private
partnerships attempting to capture "the logic of the bottom line" (Fainstein 1991, 25). Carl
Bellone (1988) commented on these new entrepreneurial activities undertaken by many
American cities and the new role expectations for local governments as a consequence.

Traditionally, we expect that the role of local government is to provide those
services that the private sector cannot perform because they are not profitable, they
are by definition public services (such as police and fire protection), they are
revenue dispersing functions (such as grants to the arts), or they are non-profit
monopolies for the public good. We also expect that the level of public services in
a community is determined by public needs as perceived by locally elected officials
with some state and federal constraints. Lastly, we expect that local governments
raise revenue through various forms of taxation, while they may occasionally end a
year with a surplus, they are not profit making activities. (Ibid., 72.)

Bellone suggests that increasingly these traditional expectations for city
governments are being re-focused to come to grips with the perceived necessity for fiscal
solvency and a new attitude toward co-operation with the private sector.
The City of Winnipeg, backed by tripartite funding made possible through CAI I, followed American and British experiments with urban entrepreneurialism by spinning off two public/private partnerships out of the CAI agreements; the North of Portage Development Corporation and the Forks Renewal Corporation. Both ventures operate similarly; however, each has a specific focus and mandate; the North Portage Development Corporation is a "mixed" retail/commercial and residential development while the Forks Renewal Corporation is primarily a public amenity development.

5.4.1 North of Portage Redevelopment

In order to encourage new commercial and residential investment in the downtown area of Winnipeg, the first core area agreement determined to undertake a major redevelopment of the North Portage area (see map 5.1). A preliminary budget of $13,179,977 was allotted to undertake three major tasks (Winnipeg Core Area Initiative 1988, 71). Firstly, land was acquired and cleared within an area bounded by Edmonton Street, Ellice Avenue, Hargrave Street and Portage Avenue at a cost of $8.45 million. Secondly, land that was assembled by the CAI was, in turn, sold to Air Canada for the construction of a $65-million new Air Canada building. Part of the arrangement made with Air Canada was the provision of a public "window" park opening onto Portage Avenue between Hargrave and Carlton streets. The park was constructed on land acquired by the CAI, and built with $444,000 (plus land) from the CAI, $95,000 from Air Canada, and $40,000 from the City of Winnipeg. Thirdly, the North Portage Development Corporation was established to take responsibility for planning, co-ordinating and implementing overall development for the area.
Map 5.1 North of Portage Redevelopment Area: Reprinted with permission from Kent Smith, North Portage Development Corporation.
5.4.1.1 North of Portage Development Corporation

The North of Portage Development Corporation was established on December 16, 1983, under an Unanimous Shareholders’ Agreement, signed by representatives of the three CAI partners (North of Portage Development Corporation 1984, 11). The North of Portage redevelopment programme had targeted the badly deteriorated north side of Portage Avenue for several mixed-use projects that were to be developed and managed by the Corporation. The area bounded by Balmoral Street, Notre Dame Avenue, Hargrave Street and Portage Avenue had previously been a prosperous retail and commercial strip in the central business district of downtown. The north side of Portage Avenue had deteriorated more seriously than the adjacent area on the south side of Portage Avenue anchored by the T. Eaton Company and the Hudson’s Bay Company. The north side showed a precipitous drop in retail sales, from sixty percent of the retail trade in 1960 to twenty percent in 1981 (Smith 1992). By March 1983, two reports were prepared for the comprehensive development of North Portage -- The North of Portage Development Proposal, March 1983 and the North of Portage Development Proposal, April 6, 1983. In early May 1983, the tripartite partners committed, in principle, up to $20 million each for redevelopment guided by a tri-level administrative task force whose aim was to review and make recommendations for the North of Portage area. As a result of the two previous proposals, and a review submitted by the Board of Commissioners to the City, all three partners agreed to participate in a review of plans for the development of the area, and the task force was named by mid-May 1983.
The Administrative Task Force was given sixty days to establish a conceptual plan and a financial plan, and to make redevelopment proposal recommendations. Specifically, the objectives of the Task Force were:

1. to stimulate job creation and increased employment activity in the development area with an emphasis on quick-start projects;
2. to encourage the participation of the private sector to complement public projects in the development in order to stimulate new private investment;
3. to maximize overall investment through a mix of recreational, cultural, commercial and residential uses compatible with Plan Winnipeg and with the needs that may be identified through the public consultation process;
4. to identify specific components to attract more people to the North of Portage area and to enhance the economic and social viability of the downtown area. (North of Portage Development Corporation 1984.)

To accomplish the enormous task in so short a time, the Task Force moved simultaneously in two directions: it retained professional site planners and analysts to provide technical reports; and it undertook a consultative process with key organisations, interested parties and representatives of the public. In total, it met with thirty organisations, received over fifty written presentations, listened to nine interested organisations and held a two-day forum (North of Portage Administrative Task Force 1984). The Task Force received advice from redevelopment planners assessing other projects in North American centres, and Board members, on the advice of the Urban Land Institute in Washington, D.C., visited redevelopment projects in Minneapolis, Milwaukee, Philadelphia and Louisville, Kentucky (Smith 1992). The Task Force also reviewed a number of comprehensive development proposals:
1. The (original) March 1983 Proposal: a major plan involving a sportsplex, retail, commercial, housing and institutional elements.

2. The Winnipeg Jets and Fairweather Properties Proposal: a major plan including an "omniplex," retail, housing, commercial and institutional elements.

3. The Winnipeg Developers Consortium: a major plan involving three components: a Northside Place, housing and cultural centre.

4. The NORPO Group: two alternate plans involving a sportsplex, retail commercial, housing and institutional elements.

5. The Task Force Group (under the direction of the Task Force): a variety of options as part of the deliberations of the Task Force. (North of Portage Administrative Task Force 1984, 1.)

Based on the oral and written presentations, analyses of the comprehensive proposal alternatives, and professional planning advice, the Task Force recommended a mixed-use development that would address many of the problems identified in the area including a need for safety, recreation, improved housing stock, office and retail space (see map 5.2). The existing retail establishments were to be linked by a major new complex -- Portage Place. Complementary developments were to include: (1) the Urban Village in the Vaughan Street area; (2) a housing complex between Kennedy and Edmonton; (3) Science Place on the former St. Paul's College site; and (4) the North of Ellice Neighbourhood. Included in these areas were plans for a weather-protected pedestrian skywalk, a major high-quality hotel, renovation and conversion of the existing YM-YWCA building, the new Union Centre and a Royal Winnipeg Ballet facility, and the Science Centre/Park.
Map 5.2 Site Plan for the North of Portage Development: Reprinted with permission from Kent Smith, North Portage Development Corporation.
Phase I of the proposed plan was to be undertaken in a five year period from 1983 to 1988, and elements of a "quick start" programme aimed at funding and employment opportunities were to have first priority. The final concept included:

extensive revitalisation through a program which involves a dynamic and imaginative combination of commercial, residential, educational, cultural and entertainment facilities enhanced by public amenities, improvements in pedestrian and vehicular access, public transit and in the social and aesthetic environment generally. The North Portage Development Corporation shall implement this development strategy through a combination of investments by the Corporation, the private sector, institutions and government. Not only will these investments lead to the revitalisation of a key area of downtown Winnipeg but it is anticipated that they will yield substantial economic benefits in both the short and long term. (North of Portage Development Corporation 1984, 3.)

Kent Smith, General Manager of the North of Portage Development Corporation, commented on the unanimity expressed by the Task Force with regard to the type of redevelopment desired (Smith 1992). He said that there was no question in the minds of the Task Force members, the CAI partners or the general public that the redevelopment was to be a "bricks and mortar" project. There was also no debate about the need for private-sector development, just the type of development, that is, festive market versus retail. Recognising that major new office space could not be filled profitably, there was an increased emphasis placed on a residential component. As of 1990, North of Portage Development Corporation produced:

1. 200,000 square feet of retail space in Portage Place;
2. three residential complexes with a total of 665 units: Place Promenade, a market rental housing unit; Kiwanis Chateau and Fred Douglas Place, both "lease for life" seniors housing projects;
3. 280,000 square feet of office space in One Canada Centre;
4. an option location and pad for a major hotel;
5. 20,000 square feet of street-level retail on two new pedestrian-oriented streets;
6. the Canadian Institute of Industrial Technology Building (federal government);
7. an Imax Theatre at Portage Place;
8. the Portage Place YM-YWCA redevelopment;
9. streetscaping, the Central Park Extension, community facilities and daycare;
10. the Prairie Theatre Exchange;
11. public amenity space and all-weather sky-walk connections;
12. eleven acres of land assembly;
13. parking with 1,900 underground stalls and additional surface parking;
14. $7 million of roadway and service improvements. (North of Portage Development Corporation, 1991.)

The relative success of the North of Portage Development Corporation is not of issue here. However, two elements specifically related to the CAI model are important to note: firstly, the financial relationship and impact made by the Corporation as an offshoot of the CAI; and secondly, the structural arm’s-length relationship between the Corporation and the CAI.

North of Portage Development Corporation was specifically set up to woo private investment back to downtown Winnipeg. The Task Force set a target ratio of two-to-one for private and non-profit dollars to be leveraged through the spending of $76 million. It reached that goal, with $250 million from the private sector (Smith 1992). In the late 1980s, the Board of Directors amended that goal to a three-to-one ratio, and with recent developments (Annual Reports 1990 and 1991) the Corporation appears to be reaching that goal as well. It is clear that the CAI could never have achieved this degree of financial impact without private-sector participation, and one could debate whether the CAI was an appropriate body to carry out such a task in the first place. According to Kent Smith, the City was a weak partner in any economic development strategy because Council never had a sense of what they wanted downtown (Smith 1992). However, there was
general consensus that something -- anything -- was needed. It was a "bleak time" in the early 1980s in Winnipeg, according to Smith, and the Task Force was left with a relative degree of freedom in selecting the type and scope of development. These circumstances also gave the tripartite partners some latitude in offering incentives to the private sector -- land write-downs or write-offs, parking and property tax incentives to name a few. The sources of capital financing included $22 million from each of the tripartite partners, $5 million from Programme 7 of the CAI I Agreement, and $5 million borrowed from the North Portage Corporation. In addition, the Corporation had the authority to borrow additional funds to an overall maximum of $20 million during the five-year Phase I (North of Portage Development Corporation 1984, 6). Kent Smith, currently General Manager of the North of Portage Development Corporation, called this whole package "new deal dollars." The expectations of the North Portage Board were high in 1984:

The Board anticipates that its investments will generate over $150 million in private and institutional investment, more than 7,000 person years in construction employment; 3,000 permanent new jobs, directly or indirectly; and direct fiscal benefits to all three levels of government in both the short and long term. (North of Portage Development Corporation 1984, 6.)

The 1991 Annual Report of the Corporation showed income before depreciation and amortization of $460,000 as of March 1991, down from $1,426,000 the previous year. Over $1 million in operating loss was attributed to the Cityscape Residence Corporation, the owner of Place Promenade and subsidiary of the Corporation. Nonetheless, the Corporation continued to maintain financially self-sufficient operations, and with recent success in leasing the South Side of Portage Avenue and Place Promenade, combined with the completion of the YM/YWCA facility and newly signed agreements with private sector
corporations, the North Portage venture may have a positive long-term financial impact on Winnipeg's downtown (see map 5.3).

The relationship between the CAI and the North Portage venture is similar to many public/private arrangements spawned in Britain and the United States in response to urban revitalisation efforts. The arm's-length model of the Corporation carries with it certain pros and cons (Smith 1992). The Development Corporation is run by a board of ten directors, drawn from the community at large, none of whom hold civil-service or political appointments. A general manager and six full-time staff carry on the day-to-day activities of the Corporation. This structure was seen to be necessary to allow the Corporation to function effectively in the private sector unhindered by partisan politics or conflicts of interest. However, the Corporation is constantly faced with questions of public accountability. Smith pointed out the difficulty in negotiating with the private sector in the "fishbowl of the public environment" necessitated by the public component of the partnership. Two features have contributed to the Corporation's success to date despite the balancing act required to satisfy the "public interest" and "the bottom line." The first feature is the very specific nature of the Corporation's mandate, the Corporation had very tight guidelines for development in terms of the purpose and scope of their work, a proscribed area and timed priorities, and clear goals with respect to the public and private domains. Secondly, the financial plan gave "clear marching orders"; it was not a policy-making document, therefore there was a guide by which to measure success. In summary, Smith felt that the public/private partnership worked "quite well," but that compromises had to be made -- "the whole is greater than the sum of the parts" (Smith 1992).
5.4.2 The Forks Renewal Corporation

The Forks Renewal Corporation, established in July 1987, was an off-shoot of the North of Portage Development venture. The area included for development was a large, historic, river-front site at the junction of the Red and Assiniboine rivers. It included the local Canadian National Railway (CN) main line and the CN Union Station (called the East Yards site), along with commercial properties, major transportation routes, and a Parks Canada National Historic Park (see Map 5.3). The site, over ninety acres, was one that all three CAI partners wanted to see redeveloped, despite the difficulty in dealing with CN.

CAI I identified the redevelopment of the CN East Yards site as a priority in its early programming (see map 5.4). CAI I had earmarked the site as a capital project; however, negotiations with CN did not progress as planned in the early 1980s. As a result, a combined budget of $5.1 million was allocated through Programme 8.1-8.5 (CN East Yards -- $4,251,000) and Programme 8.6 (Compensation for Land Acquisition -- $2,900,000) in order to move the project along. (Winnipeg Core Area Initiative 1988, 76).

To facilitate the acquisition of the ninety-acre area, a tri-level task force was established in the spring of 1986 to review issues pertaining to site planning, to prepare a concept plan and a financial plan, and to make recommendations for implementation including the respective roles of public and private investment. The report of the task force was made public in December 1986 and the Concept Plan and the Financial Plan was approved by the tripartite partners by the spring of 1987 (ibid.).
EAST YARD AREA

1 GARAGE
2 TRAINING/FITNESS
3 JOHNSON TERMINAL
4 B & B BUILDING

LAND OWNED BY THE FORKS RENEWAL CORP.
LAND RETAINED BY CN
PARKS CANADA SITE
CN MAIN LINE
EAST YARD AREA

Map 5.3 East Yard Site Plan: Reprinted with permission of Inter-Group, Winnipeg 1992.
In May 1987, an interim board was established to receive recommendations for the area that was to be known as The Forks. Jake Epp, Minister responsible for Western Diversification at the time of CAI II, was supportive of redevelopment for the site, and precipitated a deal that traded federal lands in Vancouver, coveted by CN, in return for negotiations on the Forks site. The difference in value of the two sites ($4 million) was vested in seventeen acres that were bought by the City in the end, with investment going into the Forks redevelopment (Diakiw 1992). The interim board originally undertook a land exchange agreement that provided for fifty-six acres to be transferred to a tri-level development corporation, seventeen to be retained by CN (ultimately sold to the City), and eight to be owned by the City. Nine acres had been transferred to Parks Canada for the riverbank park earlier (Winnipeg Core Area Initiative 1988, 76).

The tri-level Forks Renewal Corporation was established by the Unanimous Shareholders Agreement of July 29, 1987. The Corporation was responsible to a nine-member board with Nick Diakiw, a former civic official, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Corporation. The Corporation undertook an extensive public consultation process, with over 140 written submissions, in an effort to prepare the Phase I Concept and Financial Plan. The Plan, accepted by the tripartite partners in November 1987, called for a "meeting place -- a special and distinct all-season gathering and recreations place at the junction of the Red and Assiniboine Rivers" (The Forks Renewal Corporation 1987).

The Forks Renewal Corporation has a very different mandate from the North of Portage Development Corporation. The extensive consultation process that led to the creation of a "meeting place" theme led to a mixed-use development with a special and distinctive environment and culture (see map 5.5).
1. a nine-acre Parks Canada National Historic Park including a riverbank walkway;
2. a public food market and crafts outlets;
3. the Assiniboine Riverfront Quay, including year-round recreation;
4. archaeological developments at the Fort Gibraltar II/Fort Garry I site;
5. a multi-cultural meeting place and historical/cultural interpretive facilities;
6. a Red River marina;
7. a proposed Native social and cultural activity place.

(The Forks Renewal Corporation 1987).

Financing of the Corporation was through grants retained from CAI II ($687,425); $20 million from Programme 3 of the CAI II (East Yards Development -- the Forks); and $2,181,681 from private investment (Winnipeg Core Area Initiative 1992, 3-1).

Of the $20 million, $12,466,500 was allocated for capital costs, including the site clearing and rail relocation; road access, parking and municipal services; landscaping and site enhancement; and major function assistance. An additional $1,274,791 was given to cover land carrying costs for the period between 1987 and 1991 "because the Forks Renewal Corporation is responsible for the carrying costs of the undeveloped lands which primarily consist of the City of Winnipeg property taxes" (ibid., 3-4). Under the Strategic Capital Programme 5, CAI II provided an additional $5 million for the creation of the Forks Market. The initial shareholders’ funding, in addition to other public-sector capital assistance, was to result in an additional private, institutional and other investment in excess of $100 million by the end of Phase I (1992). The mandate given the Corporation was to achieve financial self-sufficiency within a "reasonable" period of time (The Forks Renewal Corporation 1987, 7). This condition of self-sufficiency continues to pose a problem for the Corporation according to Nick Daikiw (Daikiw 1992). The City of Winnipeg is currently requiring $700,000 in taxes for the undeveloped portion of the land.
Map 5.4 Site Plan for the Development of the Forks: Reprinted with permission of Inter-Group, Winnipeg 1992.
held by the Corporation, an unreasonable charge according to Daikiw, preventing the Corporation from achieving the goal of financial self-sufficiency in the short term.

 Unlike the North of Portage Development Corporation, the Forks Renewal venture is viewed more as a public-amenity site, and, as a result, public input into the nature, scope, timing, and scale of redevelopment has been extensive and controversial. The public consultation programme for Phase II starting in 1992 involved surveys, workshops, four advisory committees, a jury of citizens, and specialised community input. Negotiations with Winnipeg's Aboriginal community for one section of the site, purported to contain Native burial grounds, took over one year. Heritage planning has been a major priority, because the site contains significant archaeological resources. Criticisms have been directed at the timing of the redevelopment efforts at the Forks, and the nature of the projects undertaken have incurred the wrath of "green" activists; however, in a short period of time the Forks Renewal Corporation has certainly met its objective of providing an all-season "meeting place" for Winnipeggers.

5.5 Tri-Level Partnerships in Urban Revitalisation

 Chapter 3 reviewed the roles of the three levels of government with respect to finance and economic development policy. Traditionally, the powers and competence of the municipal government to act on issues of social and economic well-being have been limited -- both legally and in areas of jurisdiction. Municipal government, by default, in a sense, is greatly concerned with land and the servicing of land. In an effort to retain and increase a tax base -- the major source of revenue for a city -- municipal governments are preoccupied with development. Development is vital to a city and its residents. In periods
of high prosperity and employment, municipal governments focus their energies on urban
growth and development, leaving the pockets of economic and social distress to be dealt
with by the senior levels of government.

Chapter 4 gave a brief profile of the City of Winnipeg and a rationale for
government involvement in the CAI. An important feature of Winnipeg's development in
the Canadian and prairie context is the inescapable fact that the City has been faced with a
situation of slow growth and no growth for a long period of time. As is normal in periods
of slow growth, the senior levels of government step in and play a larger role in economic
and social programming, usually attempting to stimulate short-term development and
private investment in order to carry a city over a period of recession. This was the case
for Winnipeg at the outset of CAI I. Certainly, the federal government’s participation in
the CAI was intended to be a short-term activity (Heinicke 1991).

In retrospect, the tri-level model was undoubtedly a brave, and not-so-untypical
response, to Winnipeg’s deteriorating condition. None of the three partners anticipated a
decade of co-operative involvement in the urban revitalisation process (Heinicke 1991).
Neither did observers and critics such as Earl Levin in the early years of the Core Area
Initiative.

The Initiative will fail to revitalize the core. Neither will the North Portage
project revitalize the core. Certainly it will markedly change the character
and activities in the three or four blocks which are redeveloped. But the
effect of the change will not be felt for any great distance beyond the
boundaries of the project. The area of downtown deterioration is too
extensive, and its nature too complex, and the redevelopment proposed is too
small in scale and too simple in its structure for it to be able to generate a
strong surge of new vitality throughout the entire downtown. I do not believe
that the deteriorated condition of the core area is a localized phenomenon,
particular to that part of the city, and that it is therefore amenable to
revitalisation by merely pressing new public monies into that location. The
condition of the core area is symptomatic of a much more deep-seated and endemic malaise from which the city as a whole is suffering. The malaise is the condition of no growth.

One of the first steps is to recognize that the normal forces at work in a growth economy are not operative here in Winnipeg. We cannot look to development to provide the source of urban vitality which other cities enjoy, and which even we enjoyed in another time. (Levin 1984, 5-8.)

Levin went on to state that the capacity of the City of Winnipeg to revitalise the core area was limited -- especially in a permanent situation of no growth. He stated that two conditions had to be met in order to achieve such a goal, a new kind of partnership between the city and other governments, and between the public sector generally and the private sector were necessary; this new partnership would introduce new activities into Winnipeg's economy and provide some growth energy (ibid., 8).

The unanticipated result of CAI I for Levin, and others, was the renewal of the CAI Agreement in 1986. The tri-level model did create a new partnership agreement between governments and between the public and private sectors -- but to what avail? There is no doubt that the model produced tangible results that could not be accomplished by any one level of government alone. However, until the results of the 1991 census are published in 1993, it seems unlikely that the model substantially reversed the socioeconomic conditions of the core area. It certainly did not produce a new pattern of growth and development in the City. Meanwhile, the tripartite partners have folded their tents and set their sights elsewhere, leaving observers to wonder what lessons have been learned.
5.6 Replicability of the Model

The CAI tripartite model has been the subject of much attention in North America and throughout the world (Kiernan 1989). As a three-way partnership for planning and delivering urban and economic redevelopment, it is not unique, even in Manitoba. Other agreements, such as the Canada-Manitoba Northern Development Agreement, have focused on large geographical areas, and programmes such as the Neighbourhood Improvement Programme of the 1970s have run in all provinces including Manitoba. Equality and unanimity of decision-making and equality in cost-sharing do, however, distinguish the CAI model from all others. After ten years of operation, it is debatable as to whether this model could, or should, be replicated.

The tripartite model evolved with positive and negative consequences. There is general consensus that the styles of operation and implementation in the first agreement were more flexible and perhaps more open to experiment than in CAI II. Depending upon one’s point of view, this ability to innovate and manoeuvre could be a positive feature, but programme and public accountability become difficult to measure or to justify. The negotiation process engendered by the condition of unanimity in decision-making similarly produced positive and negative consequences. On the positive side, this condition required the three partners to "walk in the others' shoes" and undoubtedly contributed to increased appreciation for, and understanding of, other partners' concerns and priorities. However, conflict arising out of the requirement to negotiate produced compromises that may not have been in the best interests of the whole and often reduced the model's effectiveness. The breadth and scope of the model's programme activities have been seen as a positive feature; however, it is generally acknowledged that the scale of the intervention was too
large and the budget allocation too small. Perhaps the most disappointing feature of the model was the lack of ability to generate substantive urban policy or to develop long-term planning strategy. It is unfortunate that when the model was flourishing with creative energy, many trial projects were generated that could have initiated policy changes, however incremental. For a variety of reasons this did not occur and the opportunities were lost.

It is unlikely that the model *per se* should or could be replicated. The "unique constellation of events and personalities" leading up to the creation of the CAI and the "environmental milieu" that provided the context during the decade are time- and location-specific. Elements of the CAI model, however, can provide lessons for new urban revitalisation efforts in other times and places. These will be explored more fully in the discussion section of this dissertation.
Endnotes

1. Tripartite agreements have been constructed for a range of specific-purpose projects in Canada -- one of the first such arrangements was created for the development of The Pas, Manitoba. For the most part, the agreements are for a short duration and operate through the line departments of each jurisdiction.

2. Chapter 4 gives a brief synopsis of the "constellation of events" surrounding the creation of the CAI and a profile of some of the personalities associated with it.

3. Eugene Kostyra indicated in a personal interview (1991) that the NDP had a basic philosophical problem with the overall goals of the CAI. They believed that the mix of aims was weighted too heavily toward infrastructure and business/economic development and not enough toward social concerns and citizen participation.

4. The Final Status Report to September 31, 1987 (Winnipeg Core Area Initiative 1988) does, however, list each programme area and notes the value of complementary funding and private investments giving a ratio of dollars leveraged by the CAI Agreements.

5. These were three of the members of the Joint Liaison Committee that met in the spring of 1980 and drew up the Memorandum of Understanding that created the CAI in September 1980. The City was represented by Mayor Norrie, Nick Daikiw (currently President and C.E.O. of the Forks Renewal Corp.) and David Henderson; the Province by Gerry Mercier, James Eldridge, David Sanders (Deputy Minister of Urban Affairs and chair) and Peter Diamant (secretary); and the federal government by Jean Edmonds (Director General of DREE), Lloyd Axworthy and designates.

6. The original Board of Directors was made up of ten members, three appointed by each level of government and one chairman. In December 1983, they were I.H. Asper, N.W. Baker, L. Bell, E. Blackman, J. Brice, H. Goddard, A.V. Mauro, C. McKee, D.G. Unruh, and A. Naimark as Chair (North of Portage Development Corporation 1984).

7. The Task Force was made up of the following officials: Canada -- J.C. Mackay, Chair, (ITC/DREE), D. Cringan (EIC); Manitoba -- M. Decter and D. Sanders; and Winnipeg -- N. Daikiw and D. Henderson. Decter, Sanders, Daikiw and Henderson all had various and continuing roles with the CAI itself (North of Portage Administrative Task Force 1983).

8. Along with other proposed projects that did not materialise, the Union Centre and Royal Winnipeg Ballet facility were built at other locations. The Science Centre/Park could not be accommodated due to space constraints.


10. Gerecke and Reid (1990) make reference to this loss due to a mortgage default on the residential property. They suggest that Kiernan sweeps this under the table in an attempt to support public/private development corporations such as the North Portage Development.
11. The Board of Directors as of October, 1989 were Sheryl MacDonald; Ted Murphy, Charlette Duguay, Donald Leitch, Roy Parkhill, John Bulman, Richard Frost, Elaine Heinicke representing the federal government, and G. Campbell MacLean as Chairperson (The Forks Renewal Corporation 1989 Annual Report).
6.1 Introduction

This dissertation constitutes an empirical investigation into the nature and efficacy of the Winnipeg Core Area Initiative as a case study for future efforts in urban revitalisation. To paraphrase and reiterate the volumes of data presented in numerous reports done internally for the CAI, or by external consultants and commentators, would not do this "innovative experiment" (Kiernan 1987) justice. The two core area agreements were a part of an ongoing process lasting a decade -- a decade of political, social, physical and economic change. To give depth and meaning to the study of the CAI, perceptions, attitudes and opinions were gathered from a variety of sources, including: personal interviews with key individuals, user and non-user group surveys and public attitude polls, the Angus Reid Group survey; community-inquiry presentations; and, print media coverage. Examination of this wide range of material provides answers to the fourth set of research questions asked at the beginning of this dissertation -- questions having to do with the value systems of the decision-makers of the CAI and of the level of community acceptance of these values. In addition, this material contributes answers from the point of view of the community (both core and non-core area residents) to research questions 5 to 9 concerning process, programme definition, resource allocation, implementation and delivery mechanisms, public participation and perceived impacts on the immediate and larger community. Because this chapter deals with perceptions of the CAI, only the results of the case study interviews regarding perceptions are presented here. A more thorough discussion and analysis of the broader interview data is presented in the next chapter.
6.2 Key Participant and Observer Perceptions

In an attempt to measure the relative success and weakness of the CAI I and II generally, and specifically with regard to policy, programming and implementation implications for urban revitalisation, personal interviews were conducted with key people, or "core players," who had an influential role in the history and evolution of the CAI. The people contacted for interview represented persons with varying roles and included: administrators and staff of the CAI I and II at various points in time; politicians; government representatives of the three signatories to both agreements; government bureaucrats; business leaders and executives of the North of Portage Development Corporation and the Forks Renewal Corporation; representatives of non-government organizations; and observers (see Appendix I). The interviews provide a major portion of data on which the case study of the Winnipeg Core Area Initiative is built. They are important in two respects. Firstly, they are an important source in piecing together retrospectively the chronological unfolding of events preceding the creation of the CAI and, as well, events that took place over the decade of both agreements. Secondly, they constitute the primary source of attitudes, perceptions and ideologies of major participants and observers in the evolution of the CAI. They represent a different perspective from the tangible "hardware" measures found in reports documenting the output statistics of the various programmes. These interviews provide a much more comprehensive and profound understanding of the CAI as a case study than would have been possible from a review of literature alone. Each person who agreed to be interviewed gave generously of their time. At a minimum, the interviews lasted one hour, many took longer, and several of the participants were re-contacted in person or by telephone.
There is no doubt that the results of the interviews yielded an unusually rich body of both factual and impressionistic data. Limitations, of course, have to be placed on the degree of importance attached to specific recollections given by each individual. Both time, and the propensity of individuals to "romanticise" certain events, can lead to questions of reliability of information; however, every attempt was made to verify information of a factual nature, cross-referencing it with written and other oral accounts of the situation. Individual perceptions and impressions were recorded as such, and were attributed to the respondents where permission for publication was given.

6.2.1 The Sample

A list was drawn of individuals who had been involved in either, or both, the CAI I and CAI II. Emphasis for selection was placed on individuals who played a role in the initial policy formation of the CAI, those who had senior administrative duties in implementing CAI policy, and representatives of government and non-government agencies who had been engaged with the CAI on a continuing or sustained basis. Also included were "observers" -- those people who had commented upon the Initiative from an academic or professional viewpoint over time. In the first stage of each interview, respondents were asked if they could provide names of other people whom they viewed as important potential respondents, thus contributing to a "snowball" technique in generating the sample. Thirty-seven individuals were contacted resulting in twenty-five interviews (67.5 percent) carried out primarily in the spring of 1991.
6.2.2 Data Collection

The Dillman Total Design Method (Dillman 1978) was used for data collection. Initial contact was made with individuals through a letter explaining the nature and purpose of the study (see Appendix IV for an example of a contact letter). The letter was followed by a telephone call, using a standardized text, to verify interest of the individual to be interviewed and to set an interview time. At least five attempts were made to contact each individual before the name was dropped from the contact sheet. Interviews took place at the participant’s place of business or home, when desired.

6.2.3 Ethics

Potential participants in the case study were informed of the nature of the study and their right to withdraw at any time. They were asked if any, or all, of their interview was considered to be confidential or if any information was to be recorded in an anonymous manner. None of the respondents requested that their interview remain confidential -- only one respondent asked that sections of the comments be open-ended responses recorded anonymously.

6.2.4 Research Design

Two methods were used to collect and record objective and subjective data from the case-study participants. Firstly, each participant was given an oral questionnaire containing categories of questions that required perceptions or judgements on nine subject areas:

1. Question 100: a judgement as to whether or not the Core Area Initiative generally could be judged a success (CAI I and II together);
2. Question 101: a judgement of the success of CAI I;

3. Question 102: a judgement of the success of CAI II;

4. Question 103: rating of the overall goals of the Initiative;

5. Question 104: rating of the range of programming;

6. Question 105: a judgement of the political effectiveness of the Initiative;

7. Question 106: rating of the CAI as a tool of public policy;

8. Question 107: a judgement of the administrative effectiveness of the CAI model;


(See Appendix V for a copy of the questionnaire.)

These questions required the participants to rank their evaluation of each question, using a Likert scale based on a one-to-five ranking scale. The researcher circled each response category. Questions given a rank of "1" were to indicate a "poor" evaluation, and "5" as "good" evaluation. Secondly, verbatim notes were handwritten by the researcher for responses to open-ended questions. A procedure was followed whereby a pattern of identical questions were given to each participant and specific questions were added, tailored to an individual's involvement with the CAI. A decision to tape record the interviews was dropped as hesitancy was expressed by the first few respondents concerning the need for a tape recorder.

6.2.5 Data Analysis and Content Analysis

Data from the twenty-third questionnaire sheets were recorded, taking the ranking response to each question and calculating a mean response number from the ranking scale of one to five. In some cases where the respondents could not make a judgement, a "no
response" was calculated as a non-answer. Content analysis was used to analyse the responses to the open-ended questions. The introduction to the next chapter outlines the categories that responses were grouped under when all of the interview data was reviewed and the content analysed.

6.2.6 Results of Interviews with Core Players

Results from the ordered response questionnaires (20 out of 25 interviews) indicate that the majority (sixteen of those interviewed felt that the CAI (both I and II) generally was a success (see Table 6.1 for the mean rankings given by the twenty respondents). There was only one respondent who felt that the CAI was a failure; three others could not say either way (see Table 6.2 for individual responses). When the CAI I was compared to the CAI II, the first agreement was ranked higher with a mean ranking of 3.77 over a 3.0 ranking for CAI II. There was one respondent who did not compare the two agreements.

The overall goals of the CAI received the highest ranking of all the questions (3.81) with only one person choosing not to respond to this question. The range of programmes offered throughout the two agreements received a mean ranking of 3.66, however five of the respondents did not feel they could evaluate the range of programmes as they had intimate knowledge of only specific ones. Respondents judged the political success of the CAI in the moderate range (mean ranking, 3.47). One respondent chose not
Table 6.1
Mean Ranking Totals From Interview Responses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>No. of Responses</th>
<th>Total Score</th>
<th>Mean Ranking (out of 5)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100* A Success</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101 CAI I</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>3.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>102 CAI II</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>103 Overall goals</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>72.5</td>
<td>3.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>104 Programmes</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>3.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105 Politically</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>3.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>106 Public Policy</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>107 Administratively</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>3.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>108 For the users</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>51.5</td>
<td>3.21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Note: Question 100: 16 yes; 1 no; 3 n/a.
** Note: A score of 1 indicates a negative or poor ranking; 5 indicates a positive ranking.

to make a judgement. When respondents were asked their opinion of the CAI as a tool for public policy, the mean ranking was 3.5; however, four people declined to rank this question. Administratively the CAI was ranked in the moderate range. The Initiative was also considered a moderate success when the targeted user groups were considered -- the mean ranking was 3.21. Taken together, the respondents generally viewed the CAI positively. None of the respondents ranked any of the questions with a "poor" (1) response, while several gave "good" (5) responses to some of the questions.
Table 6.2
Ranking Responses* From Case Study Interviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Person Interviewed **</th>
<th>TOTAL SCORE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100 A success?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Yes</td>
<td>x x na x x x x x</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. No</td>
<td>x x na x na x x x x x</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101 CAI I</td>
<td>3 4 4 4 4 3 3 2 3 4.5</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>102 CAI II</td>
<td>2 4 2.5 2.5 3.5 3 3 2 4 4</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>103 Overall goals</td>
<td>3 4 5 4 4 4 2 2 3.5 5</td>
<td>72.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>104 Programmes</td>
<td>3 4 na 3 4 na 5 3 2.5 4</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105 Politically</td>
<td>4 4.5 4 2.5 4 na 2.5 3 4 4</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>106 Public policy</td>
<td>5 2.5 4 3 na na 3 2 4 4.5</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>107 Admin.</td>
<td>3 3 5 4 3 na 4.5 3 2.5 4</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>108 For the users</td>
<td>na 4 4 3.5 4 na 2 1 4 3</td>
<td>51.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Note: Likert scale: 1=negative; 5=positive; na=no answer.

**Persons interviewed: Although none of the interviewees requested anonymity, the rankings are not identified with the individual respondent.
The open-ended section of the interviews generated a wealth of rich information. Uniform questions were asked of all case-study participants. Respondents were asked questions regarding their perceptions and attitudes toward the ideology behind the creation of the CAI, the overall goals of both agreements, the political commitment backing the Initiative, the community and prevailing values underlying the CAI, public-policy orientation, planning policy, programme definition and implementation, the consistency and homogeneity of the public-policy structure inherent in the CAI, the immediate antecedents of the CAI as public urban policy, the nature and degree of environmental change over the decade of the CAI, and attitudes toward the expansion of the planning model from an open-systems perspective.

Results of the open-ended section of the interviews will be discussed in detail in Chapter 7; however, some observations can be made here. A major question asked of all the core players interviewed had to do with the perceived impact of the Core Area Initiative on Winnipeg. With the one exception of the person who rated the CAI as a failure in the ordered response questionnaires, all respondents agreed that the CAI did not add to continuing decline in the core area. Each person interviewed pointed to the change evident in the city today when compared to 1981. While not contributing to what is perceived to be, by many, a case of continued deterioration, core players were divided on the positive contributions of the CAI. Elaine Heinicke, Director of Western Economic Diversification, felt that the CAI did its job in stabilising, and perhaps reversing, the severe decline of the core. She stated "Today's core could probably have been worse [without the CAI]" (Heinicke 1991). Brij Mathur, Director of the Institute of Urban Studies at the University of Winnipeg, claimed that while the CAI may have not actually contributed to
the decline of the core area, it certainly did not reverse it, and, if anything, it polarized the
decline for some groups (Mathur 1991). Mayor Norrie, understandably, felt that the CAI
contributed positively to the City. He stated that, while the CAI did not meet all the goals
envisioned at the beginning, "the face of the city is different, and the quality of life is
better" (Norrie 1991).

A telephone interview in 1992 with Stewart Clatworthy added an interesting
perspective to this debate. With the hindsight of time, Clatworthy felt that the rate of
decline in Winnipeg’s inner-city population may actually have been dramatically reduced.
He claimed that the timing of the 1986 census caught the inner city in particular state that
may not be reflected in the results of the 1991 census. A number of the housing units that
had been cleared to make way for new projects were not occupied on the 1986 census day.
In particular, two of the large developments, the North of Portage Development
Corporation’s housing project and Martin Bergin’s private development behind the Hotel
Fort Garry, had not been completed for occupancy. Figures do indicate, however, that the
1980s saw a population increase in the inner city for the first time in four decades,
attributable in part to an in-migration of Aboriginal people (Clatworthy 1992).

Much of the value of the CAI and its programmes was judged by the level of
expectations that were raised from the inception of the first agreement and at the renewal
of CAI II. As Jim August, General Manager of the CAI for much of the first and second
agreements, claimed, the high expectations were a mixed blessing (August 1989). It was
necessary, he says, to raise the expectations of Winnipeggers initially to make them realise
the possibilities for revitalisation of their city, but in some cases, the expectations became
so high they could not be met. Others echoed that thought, especially members of the
Planning Department who felt that they should "jump on the bandwagon" and take advantage of the rush of enthusiasm while the money lasted. In a sense, the dollars that flowed as a result of the CAI were totally unexpected from a long-range planning perspective, and the planners "winged it" in order to match long-wished-for dollars with long-needed projects (B. Nichol 1991).

The reverse side of the coin of high expectations is the issue of dollar commitment to the CAI. There is no doubt that the tri-level bank account added significantly to the CAI impact. Jim August was quick to point out, however, that the CAI budget added to only a small piece of the Winnipeg economy (August 1989). In addition, many of those interviewed pointed out that at least twenty percent of the CAI budget went to land expropriation. One of the case-study participants (anonymous) also suggested that more money was poured into public-works projects, such as the Bishop Grandin interchange, than was allocated to the CAI. Nonetheless, all the study participants were reticent to guess what the inner-city area of Winnipeg could have become without the benefits of tri-level funding during the recession of the 1980s. Greg Selinger summed this feeling up by saying that the tripartite venture provided Winnipeg with a "cushion for the '80s" (Selinger 1991).

6.3 Perceptions of User Groups

As indicated in Chapter 4, public hearings were held toward the end of Agreement I to determine priorities for renewal of the CAI. A major household survey was carried out in 1983-84 (Results Group 1986) and repeated in 1987-88 (not published). These surveys were carried out with households within the defined core area boundaries. According to
Stewart Clatworthy (1992), the data from the two surveys have not been compared, and, in fact, the data from the later survey have yet to be analysed due to the termination of funding. Public-attitude surveys of core area and non-core-area residents were conducted for the Public Information Programme of the CAI by the Results Group in 1985 and again in 1989 (Results of both surveys are shown in Results Group 1989).

6.3.1. User and Non-User Group Surveys

The two surveys done by the Results Group were intended to "develop an understanding of attitudes, opinions, perceptions and knowledge regarding the core area revitalisation in general, and about the WCAI and its programs specifically. . . . to encourage public awareness, support, and involvement in the WCAI's activities and . . . [to] encourage program take-up within selected target groups" (Results Group 1989, 1). The findings presented in the 1989 report are particularly interesting because it was possible to measure the shift in public attitude on twenty-three selected urban issues over approximately four years and between the two agreements. Both studies reported on the opinions and attitudes of core-and non-core area residents (defined as user and non-user groups) especially with respect to perceptions of downtown Winnipeg, the importance of area revitalisation, and awareness of the CAI. Not surprisingly, those who were most closely associated with the core area had the highest degree of awareness. The large-scale redevelopment projects such as North Portage Development, the Forks development, and historic renovations in the Exchange District were most readily identified by all Winnipeg residents who had heard of the Initiative. While the "bricks and mortar" projects such as housing renovation, streetscaping and historic renovation were most identifiable (ibid., 9),
study participants felt strongly about the importance of social programmes as well. In fact, the opinion that more support was needed for social programmes increased in the 1989 study by core and non-core resident alike (see table 6.3).

Table 6.3
Residents’ Perception of the Importance of Social Programmes versus Large-Scale Building Projects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1987</th>
<th>1989</th>
<th>Core Area Resident</th>
<th>Non-Core Area Resident</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Base Size</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programs to help residents</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large-scale building projects</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both equally</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Reprinted with permission from J. August, Quantitative and Qualitative Study of Opinions and Attitudes Regarding Core Area Revitalisation and the Winnipeg Core Area Initiative: A Summary (Winnipeg: Results Group, 1989)

Almost one-third of the 1989 participants (especially those under fifty-five years of age) believed the needs of the Aboriginal people were not being adequately addressed.

In general, participants from small business, community groups and residents felt positively about the CAI and it’s role in generating new interest in the downtown. Most respondents responded favourably about the Core Area Office, its staff, and services.

Despite recognition of the efforts undertaken by the CAI in almost a decade, a rather disturbing perception by some Winnipeggers persisted in 1989. While there was a slight positive shift in public perception concerning the relative conditions in the core area in
1989 compared to ten or twenty years previous, about 20 percent of the Winnipeggers interviewed felt that conditions had deteriorated (see table 6.4).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1987</th>
<th>1989</th>
<th>Core Area Resident</th>
<th>Non-Core Area Resident</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Base Size</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worse</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Much the same</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Reprinted with permission from J. August, Quantitative and Qualitative Study of Opinions and Attitudes Regarding Core Area Revitalisation and the Winnipeg Core Area Initiative: A Summary (Winnipeg: Results Group, 1989).

Criticisms of the CAI were directed toward the major large developments, especially the North Portage and Forks developments, which were seen to be too costly and contrary to needs of the core. Negative feelings were expressed concerning the political direction of project and funding decisions, again seen to be contrary to core needs.

This criticism ties in with the second major negative perception of the WCAI, that of government control. Many participants, particularly architects, contractors, and developers, and representatives of core area community groups, feel that the WCAI is largely politically driven and forced to make funding decisions for projects without any real choice. That is, many of these participants feel that the WCAI, particularly under the second agreement, is run by political appointees, and is making project decisions for political reasons, rather than to fulfil real needs in the core area. (Ibid., 10.)
Related to the feelings that the CAI was politically driven was the perception that the Initiative was not focused enough in its mandate. While responding positively to the breadth of programmes offered, study participants criticised the CAI for not being able to concentrate its efforts. It was trying to be all things to all people by giving a lot of organizations and businesses a little money, and also by supporting high profile and large scale developments which were felt by many to run contrary to the real needs within the core area. (Ibid., 10.)

The issue of communication and visibility of the CAI was especially important in terms of programme take-up. Small-business participants, developers and contractors concluded that any future involvement with the CAI was problematic for the simple reason that they did not know what programmes were available to them, and, that they felt that money would be funnelled into large projects such as the Forks (ibid., 12).

Crime and safety were uppermost on the minds of study participants. Fear of personal safety in the core area caused eighty-five percent of the respondents in the 1989 study to rate crime-prevention efforts as a high priority. This issue may also have been important in perceptions of the downtown image and tourism:

The majority of core and non-core residents alike seem to believe that downtown Winnipeg imparts only a moderately good image to tourists. As well, fewer than one third of Winnipeg residents believe that downtown is good at attracting new businesses.

[There is] some degree of recognition among members of the general public that there have been physical improvements made in Winnipeg’s core area, in terms of its general appearance and the housing. There is also seen to have been some improvement with respect to shopping. On the more negative side, crime and parking are both seen to have gotten worse over the past eight or nine years. (Ibid., 4.) (See Table 6.5 for a synopsis of residents’ perceptions.)
Many Winnipeggers were aware that the CAI was funded by both private and government sources, but only one-quarter were aware of the federal government's role (see Table 6.6). This perception was extremely important in setting the operating tone of the senior level of government in the second agreement. The lack of knowledge and appreciation of Winnipeggers for the federal role in the CAI caused hard feelings and a lack of enthusiasm for renewed efforts in the city.

In general however, the perception of Winnipeggers was positive in 1989 (see table 6.7).

Overall, most participants feel that the WCAI will be remembered for having changed the face of downtown. While most people feel the WCAI will be remembered for the physical restoration and development projects it supported, they also feel that the social programs run by the WCAI will, in the end, be the most important aspect of the WCAI's accomplishments. (Ibid., 13.)

6.4 Community Inquiry Report

In 1990, a community inquiry was established to receive reports from community organizations and individuals concerning the revitalisation efforts of the Winnipeg Core Area Initiative. It received ninety briefs from non-profit and volunteer agencies, professional associations and numerous other groups. Many of the submissions were from, or representing, individuals who daily live in the core area and who were recipients of CAI grants of some kind. A synopsis of the presentations to the Inquiry Board (Community Inquiry Board 1990) suggested that the CAI was perceived to have made a positive contribution to the inner city of Winnipeg over the decade of the two CAI agreements. It outlined, however, serious concerns for the future. While calling for continued tripartite commitment to the core area, the community inquiry recognised the conflicting nature of
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relative Importance of Selected Urban Issues</th>
<th>Total Mean Rating</th>
<th>Core Area Resident Mean Rating</th>
<th>Non-Core Area Resident Mean Rating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Efforts to reduce crime in the core area</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efforts to fix up Main Street</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efforts to improve the employment rate among core-area residents</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efforts to improve core-area housing</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efforts to improve parking</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affirmative-Action programmes</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efforts to improve the physical appearance of the core area</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistance to small business</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efforts to expand core area industries or attract new business to the core area</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development of the river banks</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improvements to the south side of Portage Ave.</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development in the CN East Yards</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistance to community and ethnic organizations</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 means that the issue is not at all important and 10 means that the issue is very important.

Source: Reprinted with permission from J. August, Quantitative and Qualitative Study of Opinions and Attitudes Regarding Core Area Revitalisation and the Winnipeg Core Area Initiative: A Summary (Winnipeg: Results Group, 1989).
Table 6.6
Residents' Perceptions of the Role of the Three Levels of Government in the CAI

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perception of Levels of Government Involved in the WCAI (Question 21)</th>
<th>Total 1985</th>
<th>Core Area Resident 1989</th>
<th>Non-Core Area Resident 1989</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Base Size*</td>
<td>620</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local, provincial and federal</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local and provincial</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial and federal</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local and federal</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local/civic only</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial only</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal only</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Asked only of those respondents who claimed to be aware of the Winnipeg CAI and who are aware that the Winnipeg CAI is at least partly a government venture.

Source: Reprinted with permission from J. August, Quantitative and Qualitative Study of Opinions and Attitudes Regarding Core Area Revitalisation and the Winnipeg Core Area Initiative: A Summary (Winnipeg: Results Group, 1989).
Table 6.7
Perceived Success of the CAI

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perceived Success of the WCAI</th>
<th>Total 1985</th>
<th>Total 1989</th>
<th>Core Area Resident 1985</th>
<th>Core Area Resident 1989</th>
<th>Non-Core Area Resident 1985</th>
<th>Non-Core Area Resident 1989</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Base Size*</td>
<td>707</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>387</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very successful</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat successful</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not very successful</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Asked only of those respondents who claimed to be aware of the WCAI.

Source: Reprinted with permission from J. August, Quantitative and Qualitative Study of Opinions and Attitudes Regarding Core Area Revitalisation and the Winnipeg Core Area Initiative: A Summary (Winnipeg: Results Group, 1989).

public/private interests and priorities and goals, and suggested that "planning is perceived to have been dominated by narrow interests reflecting a one-sided, largely commercial or corporate vision of what Winnipeg should be" (ibid.). The Inquiry heard calls for "opening up the planning processes to public participation, thus acknowledging the legitimacy of alternative visions and building a broader consensus on future directions" (ibid., 14). Some of the criticisms that arose from the inquiry were focused on the pervasive problem of local accountability. Issues of uneven benefits and increased inequality resulting from CAI policy and programmes were raised. Concerns were expressed in four main areas: priorities, scope, long-term development and stability of projects/services and
administration (ibid., 10). In some respects the breadth and scope inherent in the mandate of the CAI, seen as a strength by some, produced weakness as well -- "in short, that the CAI has resulted in something for almost everyone" (ibid., 9). This observation, in particular, reiterates comments by the Results Group in their 1989 study.

A summary of the Inquiry's findings is presented at the beginning of the Final Report (ibid., 4). Briefly, the basic message presented to the sponsors of the report, the Urban Futures Circle, Inter-Agency Group, indicated that a four-part consensus emerged out of the community consultation process:

1. continue the tripartite commitment to inner-city revitalisation;
2. give priority to initiatives that foster community and individual empowerment and that directly improve the conditions in which inner city residents live;
3. be more open, flexible and accountable in program delivery;
4. better relate overall public policy and programmes to inner-city revitalisation. (Ibid., 4).

The report went on to give recommendations on the nature of weaknesses in specific programmes and delivery structures but did not stop at criticism. It recognised the untapped potential of inner-city agencies and individuals for effecting change in creative ways. It is evident that CAI assistance has allowed many 'what ifs' to come to fruition and demonstrate their value to both users and the broader community. Moreover, these endeavours have become part of a network on which other agencies depend to fill service gaps and provide complementary support to inner city residents.

The high level of expertise apparent during presentations to the Inquiry also can be attributed, at least in part, to the opportunities which the CAI has provided for groups to establish themselves and to develop, implement and manage project/services. (Ibid., 5.)
6.5 The Angus Reid Group Survey

More recently, in 1991, the Angus Reid Group carried out a public-opinion survey of 4,000 urban residents in eight of Canada’s largest cities (Angus Reid Group 1991).

Although this survey was not specifically designed to query Winnipegers about the CAI, many of the variables examined were issues that had been probed in the 1985 and 1989 Results Group studies. The Angus Reid Group survey attempted to measure and compare certain quality of life variables and opinions on a variety of issues, including downtown, crime and safety, housing and other issues, as well as policies and priorities for the future (see table 6.8). Winnipeggers ranked housing as the highest positive attribute contributing to quality of life in their city -- the highest ranking given to the housing variable by residents of all the cities surveyed. This was due, no doubt, to the perception that Winnipeg boasts one of the most affordable housing markets of major cities in Canada (obviously these survey participants were not amongst the low-income renter group in the core area having to spend over forty percent of their income on shelter). However, Winnipeg’s residents gave its downtown the lowest ranking among the eight cities. Residents specifically gave low marks for cultural and recreational amenities and for municipal services and infrastructure. Crime and parking were also negative features cited. These rankings highlight the earlier findings of the Results Group surveys. It would appear that the downtown "mega-projects" spawned by CAI public/private partnerships, despite the millions of dollars funnelled to them by three levels of governments, did not meet the wants, desires and priorities of Winnipeggers, relative to residents of other cities in the survey. Public-opinion surveys of this nature have their obvious shortcomings; however, the results of the 1991 survey with regard to downtown Winnipeg are particularly
Table 6.8
The Urban Quality of Life Index

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BASE</th>
<th>Van 500</th>
<th>Cal 500</th>
<th>Edm 500</th>
<th>Wpg 500</th>
<th>Tor 500</th>
<th>Ott 500</th>
<th>Mtl 500</th>
<th>Hfx 500</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The economy</td>
<td>+5</td>
<td>+8</td>
<td>+3</td>
<td>-5</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>-6</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical environment</td>
<td>+6</td>
<td>+7</td>
<td>-4</td>
<td>-7</td>
<td>-7</td>
<td>+5</td>
<td>-10</td>
<td>+8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social harmony</td>
<td>-4</td>
<td>+6</td>
<td>+4</td>
<td>+5</td>
<td>-9</td>
<td>+4</td>
<td>-10</td>
<td>+5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime &amp; safety</td>
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Source: Adapted from Angus Reid Group, 1991.
disappointing in light of ten years of core-area initiatives. It should be remembered that
the aim of the Housing and Community Improvement Area Programme Sector was to
stabilise inner-city neighbourhoods and encourage return migration to the area; the aim of
the Economic Stimulus Programmes to enhance economic growth and development,
increased employment and the physical improvement of the core area of downtown. This
survey indicated that Winnipeg has a downtown / inner city that people want to leave -- for
newer suburbs! (see table 6.9)

Table 6.9
Current and Preferred Residence Location of Winnipegers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Avg</th>
<th>Van</th>
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<th>Edm</th>
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<th>Tor</th>
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</table>

Source: Adapted from Angus Reid Group, 1991.
6.6 The Media and the CAI

The Results Group study indicated that the news media was a major source of public information concerning the CAI and its activities (Results Group 1987, 7). Specifically, the main source of media information was from newspaper sources, which provided "twice as much as any other source of information (ibid., 7). Jim August, General Manager of the CAI, felt that media attention often focused on the negative aspects of the CAI, but that in 1984 a shift in media attention occurred.6

There is no doubt that early media attention focused on the Initiative ranged from supportive and "newsworthy" to outrightly critical. An unpublished paper, "Media Portrayal of the Winnipeg Core Area Initiative,"7 reviewed 214 articles in the Winnipeg Free Press and the Winnipeg Sun dating from 1980 to 1990. It examined 164 headlines, ten in-depth articles, and forty articles dealing with the Logan "issue" specifically. Many of the observations highlighted in the public-opinion surveys and the public Community Inquiry referred to earlier were reflected in the print media.

In the early years of the CAI I, the Winnipeg Free Press and the Winnipeg Sun were outrightly critical or sceptical. Much of the print-media attention reflected a concern by city councillors about the lack of information about various aspects of CAI programmes or on their inability to influence allocation of monies to a particular cause. Oddly enough, the CAI was criticised for spending too much of the limited tax base of Winnipeg on social programmes and not enough on revitalising the physical infrastructure on the core area (the reverse of later criticisms).

A dominant theme in the early years was heard from residents and business owners located in the core area. Each group felt that the CAI was not in their interests, that
politics and secrecy played a dominant role in decision-making, and that the recipients of CAI programming had little opportunity for input.

The media itself did little to inform the public about actual programmes -- perhaps those types of articles were considered "too dry" or uninteresting for readers. Singer (1991, 8) reported that "approximately 10 percent of the 134 articles contained actual descriptions of the programs run by the CAI." However, many of the articles quoted individuals directly connected to the CAI or politicians making self-congratulatory remarks. Wranglings by City Council were often the focus of reports along with dire warnings by Mayor Bill Norrie on the consequences of not making decisions.

Of significance in Singer's review of ten years of headlines and articles in the two newspapers is the omission of reference to programmes for, or stories about, Aboriginal people. "There were only three articles [out of 134] that had some mention of Natives (2.2 percent)" (ibid., 8). This is not surprising, of course. Everyone associated with the CAI from Lloyd Axworthy to representative groups at the Community Inquiry, lamented the abysmal lack of attention given to programming aimed at Aboriginal needs.

Early negative public attitude toward the CAI was undoubtedly shaped by reports associated with the Logan Industrial Park project. If community-level empowerment was a desired feature of the Initiative, the two newspapers certainly contributed to the fracas. Peter Diamant (1992), formerly Deputy Minister of Urban Affairs, indicated that the Logan project was badly handled by both the City and the Province at the start, but that the media coverage exacerbated the situation. The Logan project was intended to provide a key site for economic stimulus and employment, but in order for the site to be developed, a core-area neighbourhood had to be substantially razed. Coverage by the print media included
heart-rendering stories about residents faced with expropriation and battles with City Council. Mayor Norrie at one point promised that each homeowner would receive "a house for a house" (Bannister 1981). In the end (mid-December 1981), over a year and a half after the battle over Logan began, the City’s Executive Policy Committee approved a scaled-down version of the industrial park juxtaposed with parts of the old neighbourhood. The media "fishbowl" that was cited in causing the failure of the Logan Industrial Park was also the tool used by the Logan community to retain their neighbourhood (Johnson 1985).

The print media could not have helped but affect Winnipegers’ attitudes toward the CAI. Criticisms by city councillors, haggling by policy and decision-making bodies, daily stories about core-area residents, must have contributed to readers’ convictions concerning the CAI and its functioning. Nonetheless, over time, the tone of newspaper reporting proved more positive. As the CAI was able to chronicle successes in programming, and politicians and bureaucrats were able to receive credit at ribbon-cutting ceremonies, the newspapers reported more positively on an intermittent basis. Relatively free of controversy, the CAI received less media attention in the latter years of the second agreement. As numerous observers, including Stewart Clatworthy, suggested, media interest in the CAI "ran out of gas" (Clatworthy 1992). From an early stance of critical pessimism, the media tended to parallel the political appeal of the CAI, until the point of potential termination of CAI II. At both times when the continuation of the tripartite agreements were threatened, the print media tended to favour "the underdog." The demise of the Core Area Initiative in 1991 was treated with according respect and remorse in the final months of the second agreement -- an about-face from a decade earlier.
Endnotes

1. See Appendix 1 for the list of persons contacted for interview, their position or role played with respect to the CAI I and II, and the status of their interview.


3. Although there were twenty-five completed interviews, only twenty participants completed the oral questionnaire. Five of the respondents preferred to discuss each of the statements in detail as opposed to choosing an ordered response.

4. The voluntary 10 member Community Inquiry Board, chaired by Dr. Tom Carter of the University of Winnipeg, was set up in March of 1990.

5. The Angus Reid Group's *Urban Canada Study* examined the attitudes and opinions of urban residents living in Halifax, Montreal, Ottawa, Toronto, Winnipeg, Calgary, Edmonton and Vancouver.

6. Early coverage by the *Winnipeg Free Press* was overtly hostile, due no doubt to Mayor Norrie's lack of political foresight in expropriating the site of the Winnipeg Free Press for a park running from Central Park to Portage Avenue.

7. This study was carried out by Leslie E. Singer. The Core Area Office, however, did keep clippings of all print media published during the 1980-1990 period and "had a feeling for media coverage of the CAI" (August, 1989).


11. Prior to the formal termination of the CAI, press reports tried to plight the cause of a renewed CAI, for example, David Walker, "Ottawa Must Play Active Role in Core Area" *Winnipeg Free Press* (November 15, 1990). At the beginning of 1991, when the CAI II was coming to a close, media reports started to question specific costs, for example, Radha Krishnan Thampi, "Forks $85,888 'Profit' Queried," *Winnipeg Free Press* (January 24, 1991). By March 1991, a more focused CAI was being urged, George Nikides, "Tighter Focus Urged for CAI," *Winnipeg Free Press* (March 6, 1991). Once the CAI Agreement
came to an end, a retrospective series of articles appeared, decrying the gap felt by its
termination, for example, Nick Martin, "Area on Brink of Glory," "Disaster: Nearly
Refurbished Point Douglas Feared Slipping Once More" and "Ottawa Blamed for Core
Area Decay: Federal Rehabilitation Funds Dry Up, Leaving Inner-City Areas to
Chapter 7

EVALUATING THE CAI AS PUBLIC POLICY FOR URBAN REVITALISATION

7.1 Introduction

In Chapter 6, brief reference was made to some of the open-ended responses by key individuals in this case study. This was done to amplify and put into context the responses given to the rank-ordered questions on the respondents' perception of the Initiative. It will be the task of this chapter to expatiate on and appraise the large body of material that was gleaned from the content analysis of the open-ended section of the case study interviews.

Chapter 6 also outlined the method used to collect and note the respondents' remarks made during the interviews. When the written transcripts were reviewed individually, and as a whole, each of the comments were categorised under headings that either related to the research questions listed in Chapter 1 or under additional headings that surfaced with repeated refinements of the content. This chapter will discuss the pertinent material, firstly by grouping comments that have to do with the way in which the problems of Winnipeg's inner city were viewed and defined by the key players in the Initiative. This will include the policy frames used to view Winnipeg's urban situation, the local political conditions and personalities in place at the time of the creation of the CAI (including the Unicity form of local government), the styles of policy-making chosen and the political commitment by the three partners. Secondly, the goals of the CAI will be discussed, independently, and in the light of their integration with main line department interests and priorities in economic development, social development and urban renewal and in consideration of the City's comprehensive planning goals and Plan Winnipeg.
Thirdly, this chapter provides a thorough analysis of the responses to each of the research questions having to do with the implicit and explicit value systems underlying the CAI, the administrative processes used and the community involvement in the Initiative, programme definition, especially the adequacy of and dependencies created by the social programmes, the CAI and the Aboriginal community, the implementation component of the Initiative, and lastly, the CAI and environmental change.

7.1.1 Framing the Problem

Books and articles dealing with urban planning frequently cite Edward Banfield, author of *The Unheavenly City* (1968) and *The Unheavenly City Revisited* (1974) for the distinction that he has made between urban conditions and urban problems. Robert Waste is one such author who uses Banfield’s distinction in his course on policy analysis.

Banfield argues that many so-called urban problems (e.g., high crime, poverty, high-density housing, gridlocked highways, and associated slow commuter times) may actually be urban conditions. . . . If an item is viewed as a condition of urban life, it is not really appropriate for it to emerge as a central issue for policymakers since it is inherently insolvable; such problems do not properly belong in the policy arena. If, on the other hand, items are seen as problems (read: solvable conditions residents are willing to tax themselves for in order to pay for attempted resolutions), then the items are appropriate for policymakers to consider and may well travel through the seven stages of the policy cycle. (Waste 1989, 33-34.)

Waste goes on to discuss the political ethos of communities whereby he acknowledges that different communities perceive given circumstances in different ways, that is, not all communities would agree on whether a given item represents a condition or a problem. This can lead to differences in the time needed to incubate a policy issue, and the type of policy seen, and chosen, by public officials for resolution of the problem.
Thus, the time involved for the problem to ripen into a bona fide public issue (and, at a more basic level whether the given condition is even defined as a solvable problem) depends on the type of community in which it arises, the way in which the condition/problem is viewed by that community, the presence or absence of skilled policy entrepreneurs, and -- . . . the leadership or problem-solving style of the mayor and chief policy figures. (Ibid., 34.

It is generally agreed that the policy-making process\(^1\) begins with an awareness of a "problem" or "issue" on which existing policies have failed to find a solution, even at an "satisficing" level. An issue is identified in some way as meriting attention or action, placed on the public-policy agenda, perceived by various interested parties, explored, and given some provisionally acceptable definition in terms of its likely causes, components and consequences (Hogwood and Gunn 1988, 108). Definition of the "problem" is dependent upon what Etzioni (1976) has described as "approaches," Young (1977) as "assumptive worlds," and Baker (1977) as "policy frames." This concept of "policy frames" is important to the discussion of the CAI because it sets the context for the way in which the "problem" of Winnipeg's inner city was viewed in the late 1970s and early 1980s.

Chapter 4 chronicled the evolution of the CAI, and in doing so suggested views, or "policy frames," of the core-area problem by the three partners in the tripartite revitalization effort. The federal government, through DREE, DRIE, and Western Diversification, saw Winnipeg's problem as an economic one, a "sick economy" (Heinicke 1991). (To be fair, the government also was concerned about the large urban Aboriginal community in Winnipeg). The provincial government, at least at the beginning stages, shared with the City an economic, social and physical perspective (Diamant 1992). The City itself was particularly concerned with the physical deterioration in the core, especially in the area of the CP marshalling yards, and with the decimation of the downtown business
centre caused, in part, by suburban expansion. The three-pronged attack (economic, social
and physical), therefore, chosen as the potential solution to the ills of Winnipeg’s core area,
is reflective of the manner in which the problem was viewed, to varying degrees, by the
key players.

The following section in this chapter includes comments by the key players
obtained from the open-ended questions of the case-study interviews. These comments
represent the subjective viewpoints of the individuals in response to questions on the
context, functioning and perceived success and failure of various aspects of CAI I and II
(see Chapter 6 for a synopsis of the interview schedule).

7.2 Placing the CAI in the Local Political Context: CAI and Unicity

In order to understand the perspective taken with regard to Winnipeg’s inner-city
problems, it is necessary to place the CAI within the context of the local political milieu.
The CAI was undertaken during a ten-year period in which a supposedly radical form of
local government had been created a decade earlier. Unicity, as it was created under
legislation proposed by the provincial NDP government in January 1972, originally
consisted of the fifty-member Greater Winnipeg City Council, which was responsible for
an urban population of approximately seventeen miles in diameter (Artibise, 186); (see map
7.1 for the original boundaries of Unicity).

With the formation of Unicity in 1972, Winnipeg thus became the first
major Canadian city to move beyond the stage of split-level metropolitan
government to a single administration for its entire metropolitan area.
The concept of Unicity as it was spelled out in the legislation creating a new city enhanced two fundamental principles. First, the new council had the power to unify all services under a single administration. Second, a system of thirteen community committees were created through which individuals could achieve a greater sense of involvement with the processes of urban government. (Ibid.)

Throughout the 1970s, City Council underwent minor political change despite the policy structure imposed by community committees and resident advisory groups that were intended to shape planning and policy-making at the "grassroots" level. The business interests of the previous years re-formed into the Independent Citizens Elections Committee (ICEC) and held the balance of power challenged by a small group of independent councillors elected from the former suburbs (ibid., 188). Artibise stated that "this could suggest that in the future the old class polarization may be superseded by an alignment pitting the old city of Winnipeg against the former suburbs" (ibid.). Indeed, this statement proved to be prophetic. The strategy of the NDP government in creating Unicity in the early 1970s -- an intended shift in emphasis away from relying on private developers for rebuilding downtown areas, proved futile. According to David Walker in *The Great Winnipeg Dream: The Re-Development of Portage and Main*, "as the ICEC represented business interest, particularly the development industry, Unicity turned out to be a more suitable organization for controlling the city than was possible under the old fragmented system" (1979, 159).

The second reform aim of the NDP government included a strategy to integrate planning into city council decision-making in order to deal with development in the context of a total urban development strategy. Facing the significant power of the development lobby at City Hall, this strategy also proved impotent. The successful development of the
Trizec complex at the corner of Portage and Main presents a case study of the power of the development industry in downtown Winnipeg, according to David Walker (1979). The Planning Department, faced with balancing the dual goals of rationality and moral purpose, fought City Council, which was in turn faced with a shortage in tax dollars and a tight political squeeze (ibid., 169). City Council opted for the easiest way out -- the redevelopment of the corner of Portage and Main on the grounds of proposed tax revenues that would be generated by the Trizec complex. The planners lost; lacking moral and financial support, they "failed to deal with the realities of city politics" (ibid., 166).

The study of the Trizec deal showed how various business interests dealt with Unicity council. This case was chosen purposely in a city where politicians were under pressure to reverse the trend of physical decline in the central business district. . . . The city was expected to act with convincing leadership so council came up with its grand scheme for Portage and Main.

Consistent with its historical role, city council has contributed several millions of dollars in the hope that this will be a successful investment and that the downtown will remain a strong commercial zone. Although this area obviously requires continuous capital re-investment, this public decision when analyzed in light of Unicity's meagre housing, public transit and social service programmes illustrates how the traditional fusion of interests between the city and the business community has survived into the seventies and continues to influence government decisions. Put differently, leading civic politicians made little distinction between public and private interest. The City of Winnipeg designed and carried out this large scale public works project to assist private development on the unchallenged assumption that it was in the public interest. (Ibid., 171.)

The scene was set and the pattern established, therefore, when the first CAI agreement came into being in the 1980s. City Council had an unbroken history of dealing with the development community, an unshakable belief in development as the cure for local economic problems, and a weak tradition in supporting a comprehensive planning agenda.
7.2.1 Personalities, Local Political and Cultural Factors

Earlier mention has been made of the "constellation of events and characters" surrounding the birth of the CAI. Waste (1989, 143) claims that personality factors, the presence and influence of zealots, advocates, climbers, conservers, statesmen, leaders, entrepreneurs, and crusaders, to name a few, have an effect on the process and substance of policy-making. There is no doubt that the period surrounding the creation of the CAI was rife with personality factors contributing to the flurry of activity generated by the tripartite marriage. Of particular importance was the leadership shown by many of the originators of the CAI during the late 1970s and early 1980s. Lloyd Axworthy had federal political clout and a working knowledge of Winnipeg’s inner-city problems. Gerry Mercier, David Sanders and Peter Diamant were skilled statesmen who had built up years of contacts and trust for the Province. Mayor Norrie, backed by a contingent of Council supporters, may have lacked the veteran experience of former mayor Steven Juba, but he knew how to manipulate City Council and media to take advantage of the "thirty-three-cent dollar."

The way had been paved for the CAI by years of groundwork attempting to co-opt the federal government through MSUA in an arrangement to join the Province with the City in revisions to the Winnipeg Development Plan. Winnipeg, like other cities, had a cultural and institutional heritage and set of community standards peculiar to itself, making it difficult for non-Winnipeggers to understand the nuances of operating in the City. Much of the good will, trust and working relationships established between the three levels of government in the years preceding the creation of the CAI was instrumental in bringing the CAI to fruition.
7.2.2 Styles of Policy-Making

The styles of policy-making reflected in the initial phase of the CAI, and in the renewed Agreement, were arguably as diverse as the actors involved. Tom Yauk, City Commissioner of Planning and Community, who was instrumental in the early years of the CAI, called it "muddling through" (Yauk 1991). Peter Diamant made the case for both a rational style and an incremental one (Diamant 1992). Tom Carter, former Director of the Institute for Urban Studies, University of Winnipeg, acknowledged that, while some policy-making was substantive, particularly in the housing area, much of it was symbolic, due to lack of resources necessary to effect change. Many saw the reflexive and incremental nature of CAI policy-making as a benefit, especially in the early years of the first agreement (August 1989). An environment where modification and fine-tuning could occur was considered a boon to an experimental project such as the CAI. As the Initiative progressed, however, the various bureaucracies became entrenched, and policy-making (some would argue there was none) became rigid, in line with departmental priorities.

7.2.3 Political Commitment and the CAI

There is no doubt that the CAI enjoyed the political commitment of the tripartite partners in the early years despite the misgivings of the NDP in 1981. During the first few years, placing the Initiative on the public agenda (that is, causing the local problems of the core area to become part of the public discourse of Winnipeggers), posed a tricky and sensitive task. Jim August (1991) recalled the difficulty in balancing the need to elicit interest and enthusiasm from politicians on all three levels -- to "sell the CAI," with the concern for containing the expectations within reasonable limits.
The first flush of success felt by the federal Liberals was dampened when the CAI became mired in controversy surrounding the Logan Industrial Site. As a result, according to Jim August (1992), the CAI was not included in any of Lloyd Axworthy's press for over a year before the Liberals lost in 1984. Although Lloyd Axworthy remains a member of parliament for the same riding, his active involvement and the spirit that he engendered in the CAI dissipated over time. The current minister for Western Diversification, Jake Epp, displays none of Axworthy's enthusiasm for the CAI, appeared only to be interested in the Forks Development as a visible federal project in CAI II, and has repeatedly stated that a new tripartite arrangement would be on a limited basis, if at all. This seems to be quite in keeping with observations made by Hogwood and Gunn concerning policy succession and policy termination.

This interest [in the analytical issues and practical problems involved in terminating programmes] can be seen to have at least two strands: (a) the logical outcome of an adverse evaluation of a programme is that the programme ought to be replaced; (b) a political climate of budget retrenchment raises the possibility of government withdrawal from some existing activities, or alteration of those activities to a less costly form. One thing which does emerge from the termination literature is that complete terminations of programmes are rare; i.e. some replacement is normally provided. (1988, 241.)

Both of these scenarios appear to hold true for the federal government commitment. As noted in Chapter 4, public accountability was called into question at the point of renewal of the first agreement, resulting in much tighter control by federal line departments and an increased bureaucratization of the CAI process. The issue of accountability, coupled with severe budget retrenchment in all aspects of federal spending, was used to justify a reduced interest in the CAI toward the end of Agreement II. Elaine
Heinicke indicated that both the federal government and the Province had to look at other areas of the Province (southern Manitoba) as future priority areas (Heinicke 1991).

The provincial government, sandwiched between the federal and local levels, took varying postures and held varying degrees of commitment, depending upon the political party in power and other concerns throughout the Province. Because the City of Winnipeg represents such a large proportion of the population of the Province as a whole, the provincial government could not afford to ignore the CAI or the leveraging of dollars; however, much of their initial enthusiasm waned over time.

The City of Winnipeg had the most to gain from the CAI and virtually nothing to lose. Despite political differences between Mayor Norrie and City Council and the pervasive inner city/outer city conflict, the local level of government backed the CAI generally (Norrie 1991). One could debate the altruistic motives of some councillors; nonetheless, Jim August believed the CAI forced the City to look at some areas and issues that they refused to look at before (August 1992). Back-room decision-making by the mayor (Kostyra 1991), and numerous sessions in which the Mayor "rammed through" projects (Selinger 1991) using a sixteen out of twenty-nine vote majority, caused some alienation of Council and made for tough negotiating most of the time. Political commitment varied with the issue, as is the case with most local governments.

Various phrases have been used to describe the political commitment toward the CAI by the end of the second agreement -- "had its time," "things got tired," "ran out of steam." Peter Diamant, a self-confessed incrementalist, felt that the CAI was good in the short term and that as the model became more and more institutionalized it was appropriate that the Initiative should wind down. No initiative can, or should, sustain that level of
attention and energy in the long run. Ten years was perhaps more than hoped for, according to Diamant (1991).

7.3 The Goals of the CAI

The mix of physical, economic and social objectives inherent in the goals of the CAI have been considered one of the Initiative's unique aspects. While this point is debatable in the light of other North American examples of urban regeneration, the explicit interweaving of the goals throughout the programming in both agreements is noteworthy. Mayor Norrie claimed that the initial concept of blending an urban renewal effort with social concerns and job training was an attempt to recognise that the problems of the core were interrelated (Norrie 1991). However, the actual mix, or more importantly the weightings of the goals at any given time, proved to be a frustration and a political nightmare. The NDP constantly fought the battle against "bricks and mortar" projects and the development industry (Kostyta 1991), while the Social Planning Council of Winnipeg found the social initiative was "never up to the job" (Sale 1991). Tim Sale pointed out that the idea of leveraging of private dollars was fine for physical and economic programmes but was impossible to implement in social areas. This problem of implementation appeared to be the key variable in the whole process of the CAI. Many observers, including Brij Mathur, Eugene Kostyra and Jim Beaulieu agreed that there were missing links between the objectives and implementation. The broad scope of the CAI goals, touted by Kiernan and others, was seen by some, such as Tom Yauk, as "being too comprehensive, too open to politics, too broad" (Yauk 1991).
7.3.1 Integration with Existing Main Line Programmes

7.3.1.1 Economic Development

As outlined in Chapter 4, the federal government’s primary rationalisation for its initial and renewed participation in the Winnipeg Core Area Agreement was regional economic development. Many factors contributed to the weak success achieved in this area, not the least of which was the 1982 recession. While Elaine Heinicke claimed that the CAI couldn’t solve the local, or for that matter the provincial, economy, she claimed that lack of expected progress had to be put into the context of the recession (Heinicke 1991). Other observers were less generous in attributing local economic-development failure to national and global economic forces. Tom Carter, Jim August and Lloyd Axworthy all lamented the lack of corporate support and blamed a reluctant local business community for poor economic development in Winnipeg. It is generally agreed that the lack of a downtown business strategy hampered early economic stimulus activities, causing Axworthy’s desire for a "critical mass" of high-skill developments to fizzle out. Axworthy’s dream of creating a downtown financial centre that would spin off a second tier of economic activity never materialised (Axworthy 1991). Other large developments, such as the athletic complex and hotel proposed by a local consortium in the early 1980s, were "shot down by City Council politics" (ibid.). In the long run, the initial goals of attracting manufacturing and high technology were a disappointment.

While large-scale hopes for an economic turn-around in Winnipeg fell flat, smaller initiatives suffered a mixed fate. Although the output for the economic stimulus activities were substantial in person-years of employment, job-training programmes met with a lack of corporate support for affirmative-action hiring. A repeated theme heard by
the Community Committee Inquiry was the need for greater support for community-based economic development and greater integration of small, self-help economic activities with existing local economic development strategies (Community Inquiry Board 1990, 23).

7.3.1.2 Social Development

While some of the positive aspects of the social-service programme side of the CAI were related to innovative programme proposals, the issue of long-term funding dependency arose time and time again. Pilot projects in particular found themselves in precarious financial circumstances when faced with termination of funding at the end of Agreement II. Jim August (1989) made it patently clear from the outset of both agreements that funding under any of the CAI programmes was not intended to be long term and that inner-city groups and agencies must be prepared to achieve self-sufficiency if they were to survive over time. Some agencies with established operating support used the CAI as an opportunity to experiment with one-time projects or pilot projects that essentially became a supplementary source of funding. Nonetheless, many groups were not successful in securing ongoing operating support and folded. Either way, criticism was levelled at the CAI for not creating stronger linkages between projects and government-line departments.

One of the most vexing, and in the long run insolvable, problems faced by the CAI in meeting its social agenda was the structural change needed in pursuing reform of the systemic problems facing inner-city residents -- problems of poverty, unemployment and lack of education. The Community Inquiry reported:
It is evident that the attention paid to issues such as these [overall public spending priorities, employment, income security, immigration, Aboriginal affairs, and urban planning] will determine in large part whether CAI-type agreements result in fundamental changes in inner city conditions or provide only short-term relief. (Community Inquiry Board 1990.)

This short-term approach to intractable inner-city problems was seen as a particular weakness of the CAI because the opportunities for social-service agencies to realize their objectives were hampered by lack of integration with government-line departments and long-term commitments for stable funding.

7.3.1.3 Urban Renewal

Tri-level involvement was not a new feature of urban and neighbourhood renewal efforts in Winnipeg. The former Neighbourhood Improvements Programme (NIP) and Community Improvements Programmes (CIP) of the 1970s used a combination of resources to deliver physical revitalisation projects integrated with social services. While the housing and neighbourhood-improvement-sector programmes of the CAI were undoubtedly a major strength of the Initiative, critics such as Tom Yauk suggested that the former NIPs and CIPs were more successful (Yauk 1991). Again, this appears to have to do with integration of efforts within an overall long-term planning context. Resident involvement and decentralisation of decision-making and implementation were features favourably regarded in submissions to the Community Inquiry and were ones found wanting in the short-term CAI programmes.
7.4 The CAI and Plan Winnipeg

One of the major weaknesses expressed concerning the CAI as an urban revitalisation plan was the lack of integration with an overall planning strategy for the City of Winnipeg. Critics of the CAI in this regard admit a dilemma. Plan Winnipeg, the 1986 official development plan for the City, was principally a containment plan that did not address the social problems of the core area and avoided the problems associated with Main Street altogether (Carter 1991). Despite the broad goals of the Initiative itself, the urban revitalisation thrust of the CAI was not framed within a vision or planning context for the City. This lack of "vision" for the development of Winnipeg generally, and for the inner city in particular, was seen by many as the "anchor" missing from the whole scheme.

7.4.1 The History of Plan Winnipeg

Adopted in 1986 between the two CAI agreements, Plan Winnipeg was intended as a long-range development plan for the City. It emerged as a result of a process begun in 1975 to review the former 1968 Greater Winnipeg Development Plan (GWD Plan). Significantly, the GWD Plan was a product of the former Metro government and designed in a period of unrestrained optimism for the growth of Winnipeg. As a result, the plan focused on outward growth and attempted to distribute that growth throughout the thirteen municipalities comprising the City.

Plan Winnipeg was based on a review of the former GWD Plan. Using forecasting techniques for population growth, housing demand and employment, planners concluded that forecasts for Winnipeg had been overly optimistic and proceeded to revise growth projections downward (Mathur 1989, 6). In addition to a long-range development
plan, the review process was to identify an urban strategy complete with plans of action and methods for implementation aided by the provincial and federal governments (Henderson 1990, 3). In 1979, as a result of the termination of the Ministry of State for Urban Affairs at the federal level and the restructuring of the Department of Urban Affairs at the provincial level, the two senior governments withdrew from the planning review process. The net result was that Plan Winnipeg "wound up as a set of policies and objectives without specific programs for action, and with little reference to an urban strategy" (ibid.).

The major objectives of Plan Winnipeg focused on the development or use of land in the City and its "additional zone," and on the physical, social and economic environment and the transportation system (City of Winnipeg 1981); (see map 7.2 for the area included in Plan Winnipeg). In a "vision" statement for the City, city-development policy was to be guided by seven predominant concerns: (1) revitalising older neighbourhoods; (2) managing suburban growth; (3) developing downtown; (4) promoting economic development; (5) protecting the environment; (6) providing essential services; and (7) improving transportation (ibid.). In order to accomplish some of these goals, Plan Winnipeg was to work in tandem with NIP and CIP, the Residential Rehabilitation Assistance Program, the Action Area Programmes and the Core Area Residential Upgrading and Maintenance Programme through the CAI, the North of Portage Development Corporation and the Forks Project (ibid.). Significantly, a statement by the City, made prior to the adoption of Plan Winnipeg in 1986, cautioned that any development of new programmes "and the possible renewal of existing programs, particularly those under the Core Area Initiative, should be undertaken within the policy context of Plan
Map 7.2 Winnipeg Area Characterisation 1985: The City of Winnipeg, Department of Environmental Planning, July 1985.
An important feature of the long-term strategy for managing suburban growth was the concept of the "urban limit line" (see map 7.3). This line was to establish a boundary limit for the provision of new trunk services in order "to reduce suburban sprawl, ensure cost-effective use of the City's infrastructure investment, and maintain farm land in agricultural service" (ibid., 16). The urban limit was seen as a long-term proposition -- "not subject to short term influences" (ibid.). Adjacent to the line were areas designated as ex-urban municipalities, including an "additional zone" or buffer between rural municipalities and the city boundary.

7.4.1.1 Plan Winnipeg: Dissolving Boundaries

Despite the good intentions of the planners involved in creating Plan Winnipeg, "something went amiss." If a report card were used to calculate the grades for achievement, Plan Winnipeg would receive a failing grade. As early as three years after the adoption of the plan, Winnipeg City Council was being faced with request after request to extend the urban-limit line and ignore the advice of planners. While the planning department estimated 11,500 serviced building lots available for house-building and 2,307 hectares of vacant land designated residential in the master plan -- all within the urban-limit line, the pro-development lobby was pushing for expansion of residential development, particularly in the St. James-Assiniboia and South Transcona areas of the city. The "Gang of 18," as the business-interest group at City Hall were now called by the Winnipeg Free Press, argued that the "city should let the belts out a few notches and allow
Map 7.3 Winnipeg's Urban Limit Line: The City of Winnipeg, Department of Environmental Planning, October 1989.
controlled growth to occur where there is demand -- especially in small spots where they say the belts are pinching for no good reason" (Winnipeg Free Press, September 10, 1989).

On September 12, 1989, in an effort reminiscent of the Trizec deal a decade earlier, City Council agreed to a joint venture with Genstar Development Co. to develop 800 building lots in the southwest end of the city in order to capture a potential profit of $8.5 million over five years. This was in addition to a similar joint venture signed by the City and Genstar in 1986 for the development of 80 acres of land in roughly the same area (Winnipeg Free Press, September 12, 1989.) Meanwhile, of course, the aim of inner-city revitalisation, endorsed by Plan Winnipeg and cornerstone of the CAI, was further buried in the unending inner city / outer city conflict. While developers such as Brian Fenske, President of the Manitoba Homebuilders' Association called for freedom of choice,

"if (some) [developments] are across an imaginary line the bureaucrats have drawn, we don’t care," Fenske said. "We can’t be responsible for what city bureaucrats have determined would be a logical stopping point for growth. If the people want it and developers want it, then the city should be saying "What are the problems associated with it and how do we fix it?" (Ibid.)

Inner-city residents were having to suffer the burden of new services while their own infrastructure was crumbling.

If the city cannot afford to maintain the rebuild the existing equipment, it certainly should not consider building more. New buried services simply add to the problem. The council has chased after quick profit by developing land in Lindenwoods and Whyte Ridge. Those developments produced traffic jams on the St. James Bridge so that the council decided to build a new bridge at Moray Street. Then the council was astonished to discover that the profits from development -- including the city’s share on city-owned land [the Genstar joint venture property mentioned previously] -- soon disappeared into servicing costs. The paper profits rolled in and yet the taxes kept rising. (Editor, Winnipeg Free Press, October 12, 1989.)
By February 1991, the pervasive influence of the development lobby finally crushed any vestige of the containment option in Plan Winnipeg. Pressed by disenfranchised residents of the small hamlet of Headingly west of the city boundary (outside the urban-limit line, but inside the additional zone) who were unsatisfied with municipal services and high taxes, and pushed by a developer wishing to extend St. James-Assiniboia beyond the urban limit in the direction of Headingly, City Council bowed to democratic principles and allowed a referendum, which eventually saw Headingly break away from Winnipeg. The whole issue of provincial urban policy and municipal authority crumpled at the feet of city planners, and with them the aims of the 1986 Plan Winnipeg.

7.4.2 The CAI and Comprehensive Planning

While the new Plan Winnipeg (on the drawing boards during the latter part of the second CAI agreement) is intended as a long-term development plan and broader than the previous 1986 land-use plan, it was not concrete at the time of the CAI II and did not have consensus from the largely suburban-based City Council (B. Nichol 1991). In a recent Winnipeg Free Press article (May 17, 1992), Gerecke acknowledged the limitations of the 1986 plan.

The analytical pessimism of the 1986 Plan Winnipeg with its puzzling questions about Winnipeg economic future, its inflated population projections and the "artificial" urban limit line are gone. Instead we have a romp through the essentials of good government that Winnipeg is striving to provide, an introduction to the language and concern of sustainability and some desire for a healthy city. (Gerecke 1992, A7.)
Unfortunately, in Gerecke's opinion the proposed Plan Winnipeg has glaring weaknesses also. He identifies four major deficiencies: (1) the plan does not provide adequate direction; (2) it is a plan of rhetoric not action; (3) it is a management plan; and (4) there has been no public participation in its preparation.

Several of the deficiencies attributed by Gerecke to the proposed Plan Winnipeg were, to some degree, seen as CAI weaknesses in terms of a planning strategy. Lack of direction, no comprehensive planning policy, an ad hoc approach, were all terms used to describe the CAI with respect to planning (Reader 1991). This ad hoc planning approach, "the usual way things get done in Winnipeg, nothing finished" (B. Nichol 1991) produced what some have called "projectitis" (ibid.). Some of the planning interventions were seen as good (Portage Place) and some bad; however, there lacked a cohesive whole, such that some projects (the Forks and Market Square) competed with each other to the extent that the City could not afford.

Part of the reason given for the apparent lack of direction faced by the CAI was the nature of Unicity. Due to the structure of the Unicity legislation, decision-making theoretically is undertaken using a "grass roots" approach whereby the Planning Department deals with Council through community committees at the local, and predominantly suburban level. Every planning decision taken during the decade of the CAI was theoretically debated by twenty-nine councillors representing electoral areas of Unicity (B. Nichol 1991).

The rhetorical nature of the commitment to downtown redevelopment shown by Winnipeg City Council was patently evident in the explicit and implicit subsidies given to the suburbs, according to Tim Sale (1991). Sale, formerly the Executive Director of the
Social Planning Council of Winnipeg, claimed that the CAI was not only not meshed with any downtown redevelopment plan, but also ended up with competing interests (Sale 1991). The net effect was to displace urban decay westward out from the city centre. Sale hotly proclaimed that there was an absolute failure on the part of the City to stem suburban population growth and deliberate falsification by the City as to the projected population figures supporting that growth. Additionally, the lack of property re-assessment during the 1980s in Winnipeg led to a "direct subsidy" and a "happy constellation of interests supporting the suburbs" (Sale 1991).

The lack of public participation in the preparation of the proposed Plan Winnipeg lamented by Kent Gerecke was similarly reflected in the Community Inquiry hearings into the CAI.

In addition, this "planning" is perceived to have been dominated by narrow interests reflecting a one-sided, largely commercial or corporate vision of what Winnipeg should be. There were calls to open up planning processes to public participation, thus acknowledging the legitimacy of alternative visions and building a broader consensus on future directions. (Community Inquiry Board 1990, 14.)

This divergence of visions and interests was reflected in comments made by Tom Yauk (1991) when he said that the CAI was an "awful planning tool" because of too many participants and too many hidden agendas. Yauk, along with others, felt that the former NIP model was a better model for community involvement. Tom Simms (1991) stated that front-end community work didn’t go into the CAI. Through NIP, he claimed, generic neighbourhood funds were directed with resident committees making the process more responsive and relevant to the community. Simms felt that decentralised funds and
local agencies proved to be a better planning approach giving more ownership to the community concerned.

7.5 The Value Systems Underlying the CAI

The CAI has been described as "an urban policy innovation" (Kiernan 1985, 23) in its response to the problems of the core area of Winnipeg. As noted previously, what policy-makers define as a problem and how they frame the policy issue will determine the nature of the policy chosen to do the job. Embedded in the policy-framing process are the values brought individually by the decision-makers to the policy-making process in addition to the value-systems represented in the community to be served. Chapter 2 presents a thorough discussion of the relationship between "values" and "facts" and outlines the dilemma faced by planners and politicians in their attempts to identify the "public good."

Policy-makers, be they politicians or their advisors, use a selection of facts in framing any policy issue and, in doing so, are influenced by their value judgements as to what is relevant and what is the most appropriate course of action to remedy a problem.

"Politics is the system we have for attaching values to facts" (Weiss in Hogwood and Gunn 1988, 113). The acuity of this observation is particularly relevant with respect to the CAI. The point at which the "conditions" of Winnipeg became viewed as "problems" with treatable solutions and the approach taken with the model of the CAI were coloured by the value judgements of the policy-makers in the three levels of governments in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Several of the originators of the CAI (Axworthy, Diamant, Norrie) suggested that a rational model was used in framing the policy inherent
in the CAI, but, as Leach suggests, this approach does not guarantee that remedies chosen for a particular problem represent the "public good."

Leach has explored the association between "rationality" and values and suggests: the rational model does not necessarily carry with it any assumptions of a unified public interest, or any spurious attempts to generate harmony between conflicting interests. There is no way a rational approach can say what values should be inserted into a particular piece of policy making. Nor can it say on what value criteria alternative policies should be analyzed. He argues that the "rational" approach, far from coating the policy process with "value free" analysis, can be used to expose the implications of the value judgements which are made. (Leach in Hambleton 1989, 174 emphasis in original.)

The policy judgements that were made both at the time of the creation of the CAI and throughout the ensuing decade predictably were the cause of controversy and ongoing public debate. Although one could take each individual programme under the two agreements and tally up the relative merits of each vis à vis the public interest, there were two predominant areas of value conflict apparent throughout the term of the CAI. The first had to do with "the corporatist" model of the CAI (Gerecke and Reid 1990); the second with the inner city / outer city dichotomy.

Gerecke and Reid (ibid.) in their stock-taking of Matthew Kiernan's unabashed support of the CAI (ibid.) lay out the opposing sides of the value conflict inherent in the CAI model.

In short, the four elements of the Kiernan CAI model should be seen for their true meaning: arm's length development corporations means undemocratic development; public/private partnerships means subsidies to developers; intergovernmental coordination means opportunistic planning and pork barrelling; and aggressive development means urban renewal reborn. (Emphases in original.)
At best we may say that city planning today is polarized around corporate planning, which Kiernan represents, and planning for community and human needs -- a social and environmental planning based in communities. (Ibid., 22).

Gerecke and Reid represent the antithesis of Kiernan's philosophy. Perhaps a more moderate synopsis of the "corporatist" versus the "community" debate was offered by Tom Carter, Chair of the Community Inquiry hearings. Carter said that the community inquiry showed that people thought that the values emphasised by the CAI were that of the business community through such projects as North Portage, the Forks, and store-front enhancement. He said that while you cannot neglect the business community because you need jobs in the end (you cannot be "politically naive"), you have to satisfy the various interest of the community. "Urban revitalization means different things to different people" (Carter 1991).

The issue of inner city / outer city politics has been noted previously; however, the deep rift between the two ideologies of centrality and suburban growth was never faced squarely on a policy front. Bob Nichol from the City Planning Department best summed up the approach taken by the City during the tenure of the CAI: "The suburban bias is supported by no disincentives to living in the suburbs -- the underlying assumption is that centrality is not at a premium" (B. Nichol 1991).
7.6 The CAI Process

7.6.1 The Administrative Process

To better understand the tensions that developed between such competing interests as the pro-development and anti-suburban lobbies that operated during the decade of CAI I and II, and the concerns of the three levels of government in their outward desire to reflect local public interests, it is necessary to appreciate the intricacies of the administrative arrangements of the tri-level model. Not only were outside forces constantly exerting pressure on individual partners in the Agreement, but internal pressures within each level of government also kept each partner cognizant of line-department priorities.

The administrative process inherent in the CAI model was implemented through interconnecting layers of bureaucracy. At the most senior level of decision-making was the Policy Committee, which was responsible for overall management and policy. The federal and provincial ministers received their authority from their respective Cabinet and Treasury Board; however, the City Council of Winnipeg retained local authority, with the mayor acting as a representative of Council. All decisions reached by the Policy Committee were required to be unanimous. This extraordinary condition led to some particularly difficult negotiations. Nick Daikiw, the first acting co-ordinator of the CAI, marvelling at the duration of the CAI considering this condition of trilateral unanimity (Daikiw 1992). In CAI II, the Policy Committee took over responsibility for approval of all projects under consideration for support from the Strategic Capital Programme. This is the only instance where this level had direct connection with the approval of projects, and as such it received considerable lobbying from proposed grant recipients.
The next layer included the Management Board and/or Programme Advisory bodies. The Management Board was responsible for the administration and supervision of all programmes and projects cost-shared by the three levels of government. Again, decisions were required to be unanimous. Perhaps this was one reason why the Board was seen to have too much discretionary control by the two senior levels of government (Beaulieu 1991). In an effort to reach unanimity, the parties often conceded on issues of less concern while holding out for jurisdictional priorities. Particularly in the first agreement, the federal level found the process "operationally difficult," according to Elaine Heinicke (Heinicke 1991). Obviously the federal-level bureaucrats, used to orchestrating a programme, had difficulty in sharing control equally with the two other levels. The City of Winnipeg, however, often had to confirm decisions with the City’s Committee of Planning and Community Services. Nonetheless, it was suggested by many of those interviewed that City Council was often faced with decisions s’a fait accomplis when the mayor had taken a position at the Policy Committee level that bypassed subsequent layers of decision-making. In practice, however, a sub-committee of the Management Board was responsible for scrutinising and recommending programmes and other issues to the Board and, although it did not have direct decision-making authority, it had considerable power in so far as it was the vehicle through which all issues and matters were recommended to the Board or the Policy Committee.

The Core Area Office, under the direction of the general manager, provided the overall liaison and co-ordination of projects as well as the majority of the programme delivery contracted to them by implementing jurisdictions. It served as the secretariat to all the levels and, in the view of many of those interviewed, was in a key position in the
whole scheme of things. The CAI office has been variously praised and condemned for this role, with some (Carter 1991) suggesting that it added another layer of bureaucracy and others (Heinicke 1991) claiming that it had too much power. In some cases there was a duplication of overhead, some things were done through the CAI Office that the shareholders could do (Beaulieu 1991). The Province had this concern for CAI II more so than with the first agreement (Heinicke 1991). It felt that the CAI Office should have been an orchestrator and not directly involved with the delivery of programmes. It is clear that the two senior levels of government had considerable difficulty delegating authority to such a body.

7.6.2 Community Involvement

Perhaps the acknowledgement in a memo from Peter Diamant in 1981 (then Senior Urban Policy Co-ordinator for Urban Affairs) to David Sanders (Deputy Minister) with a copy to the newly elected Minister for Urban Affairs, Eugene Kostyra, sums up the level of citizen involvement in CAI.

The complaints and issues raised regarding the Logan programs are generally justified and the result of no consultation with, and input in, the Logan area residents six months ago, when the programs were announced. Divergent views regarding the viability of the neighbourhood, both apparently supported by surveys, and the divergent approaches to economic development, education, and employment training in the area, demonstrate the complexity of the problem. The lack of open, straightforward consultation with the residents and businesses in the area six months ago has made the balancing of these divergent views and the finding of an appropriate solution to the Logan area now more difficult. (Diamant, Minutes, Core Area Agreement Meeting, December 5, 1981.)
Despite the acknowledged desire of Lloyd Axworthy for active community involvement (Axworthy 1991), the level of community input into decision-making was non-existent at the planning and formulation stage of the CAI, and low and ill-conceived throughout the duration of the Initiative. Perhaps the idea of actually implementing citizen involvement in the process was too much to bear for the tripartite partners, given the weight of the collaborative effort place upon them by the CAI Agreement.

Many of the core players interviewed commented on this lack of citizen participation (Carter, Kostyra, Mathur, Sale, Selinger, to name a few). Eugene Kostyra (1991) felt that it had much to do with the way the CAI Agreement was originally structured; others, such as Tom Simms (1991), felt that the bureaucracy did not reflect the priority or needs of inner-city residents. He felt that the "internal hoops" of the system concentrated too much power at the bureaucratic level and lacked community accountability and opportunity for citizen input. Simms used a term coined by Sister MacNamara -- "inner city tourists" -- in reference to bureaucrats, especially at the local level.

Tom Carter, Chair of the Community Inquiry, presented a more balanced view of the citizen-involvement issue. He said that the Inquiry showed that there were "some pretty experienced" people in the community who had an untapped wealth of local knowledge and experience (Carter 1991).

They have other [other than money], equally valuable resources in their experiences, their understanding of the kinds of interventions that can best achieve lasting impact, and the human effort and expertise that they can apply to implementation. (Community Inquiry Board 1990, 18.)
Nonetheless, Carter acknowledged that the community groups did not always take advantage of opportunities for involvement. He said that there was not enough effort on the part of community groups to get together and network; in many cases they were too busy or too concerned with their own priorities (Carter 1991). However, perhaps community groups and individuals felt a lack of concern for local issues in the face of mega-projects such as Portage Place and the Forks, and a sense of hopelessness in the face of continued suburban development.

7.7 Programme Definition:

Adequacy and Dependency of the CAI Social Programme Sector

7.7.1 Community Services and Community Development

The issue of integration of economic, physical and social CAI programmes with main-line departments has been noted previously; however, the area of programme definition specifically with regard to social and support services bears scrutiny. Criticisms directed toward the CAI by those concerned with the everyday welfare of inner city residents inevitably concern the "bricks and mortar" priorities seen by service providers as the root cause of poor social-programme definition and inadequate resource allocation. Suhad Bisharat, Organizational Co-ordinator of the Manitoba Anti-poverty Organization, gave examples of the unmet needs of her clients.

A housing study done with Manitoba Housing and Renewal Corporation showed vacant units in the downtown area (near Portage Place). The price of rents is not a problem, people need other things in a price range they can afford, like a co-op food store. Portage Place doesn't meet their needs. Support for babysitting and bus fare were missing for some to take up employment and training opportunities. Money was wasted on physical things like riverbanks. (Bisharat 1991.)
This theme was repeated by Patrick Faulkner, CAI Programme Manager, Community Services and Facilities Neighbourhood and Community Development (Faulkner 1991). He felt that the social distress in the inner city was complex and that the needs were never directly assessed or an adequate strategy designed to attack the systemic problems of the core. He called the CAI a "paint by number" approach to social problems, using a "move 'em up and move 'em out" tactic. The Programme 6 sector of the CAI II, through four sub-programmes, had a budget of $16 million for social issues aimed at the highest needs areas of the core. This allocation was "a drop in the bucket" that provided fragile, remedial arm's-length programmes that were poorly staffed and out of touch with the real power brokers. The major players -- child welfare, social allowances, corrections, drug- and alcohol-abuse-education agencies -- were not included in the planning for the social-service and development programmes, and therefore the CAI programme delivery was on the fringe of existing institutional delivery agencies. Faulkner stressed the need for long-term institution building for core area residents but asked the question, "How do you build institutions for people who are disenfranchised?"

To be fair, the CAI was never intended to be an anti-poverty programme; the intervention was not powerful enough to create change (Sale 1991). It did, however, "provide ladders of opportunity" for some (Selinger 1991). "It [the CAI] learned a lot about how to take people who are marginal and learned how to break out of poverty, it animated quite a number of small grass roots groups, it politicized a lot of communities of interest to become advocates for the urban interest, it caused citizen groups to ask for accountability" (Sale 1991).
7.7.2 The CAI and the Aboriginal Community

Aboriginal peoples represent one of the fastest-growing population groups living in the core area of Winnipeg. In 1986, 42.4 percent of the city’s Aboriginal population lived in the inner city comprising ten percent of the core-area population. A large number of these people were migrants to the area from rural areas or reserves where they experienced a much different socioeconomic and cultural environment (Statistics Canada 1986). An historical background presented to the Urban Futures Community Inquiry on June 6, 1990, by the Ma Mawi Wi Chi Itata Centre Inc. portrays a graphic picture of the conditions that many of these people experience.

The circumstances of Winnipeg’s Aboriginal population have been profoundly shaped by the lack of culturally relevant services and the absence of a positive and visible public image promoting pride, identity, and integrity in the Native community. Most of the population faces adverse, extreme, and critical social and economic conditions, the historical roots of which are well documented.

The systemic destruction of the Aboriginal institutions, customs and ways of life, including social supports, traditional economies and the cultural spiritual values that define these occurred over the last century and continues today. It continues through a myriad of non-Aboriginal agencies and systems thoughtlessly mandated to provide services on one hand or another to Aboriginal "clients." This pervading mentality infers that the larger society and its systems view the Aboriginal community "as a problem." Generally, the larger society fails to recognize the strengths of the Aboriginal community and, indeed, the communitys’ interest, right, and its capability in identifying its own needs and solutions to concerns, problems, and issues. A great number of non-Aboriginal agencies have been unable to meet the needs of the Native community and subsequently a cycle of dependency and powerlessness has been created, rather than one of self-reliance and community empowerment. (Ma Mawi Wi Chi Itata Centre Inc. 1991, 3-4.)

The distress of the urban Aboriginal population in Winnipeg was highlighted by many of the key players interviewed for this study. Both Patrick Faulkner (1991) and
Eugene Kostyra (1991) felt that this group represented the population in greatest need of assistance. Lloyd Axworthy stated that the lack of ability of the CAI to substantially effect change for these people was his most serious regret (Axworthy 1991). He felt that the lack of Aboriginal infrastructure, particularly in the early 1980s, and the very fragile nature of their support systems, made them dependent on heavy funding with little appreciable advancement. He contrasted the Aboriginal population with other migrant-population groups, such as the Filipinos, Portuguese and the Indo-Chinese, who came to the inner city and appeared to fare relatively better, especially if they had familial support and support from their ethnic community.

The Ma Mawi Wi Chi Itata Centre brief to the Community Inquiry does, however, acknowledge some of the positive developments that the Aboriginal community achieved with the support of the CAI. In fact, the creation of the Centre came as a result of a process that began in 1982 and was funded by the CAI I. A group of Aboriginal women organizes a Native-controlled child-and-family service, the Winnipeg Coalition on Native Child Welfare, "to stop the loss of Aboriginal children and the destruction of families and our community" (Ma Mawi Wi Chi Itata Centre Inc. 1990, 4). The Ma Mawi Wi Chi Itata Centre continues to house this group and provides assessment, support and advocacy services to Aboriginal children and families in the urban community. A number of other programmes housed and administered by the Centre received a small amount of CAI funding ($100,000): the Bail Supervision Programme, the Youth Programme, Youth Drama Project, Youth Exchange Project, Youth Economic Development Strategy Workshop and the Urban Native Feasibility Centre Study, as well as a homemaker-training programme. The staff of over sixty full-time personnel are exclusively Aboriginal.
The Ma Mawi brief pointed out improved understanding and relations between the Aboriginal population and Core Area staff as a result of the increased consultative process incurred through negotiations on CAI projects. It nonetheless noted inadequate Aboriginal representation in the CAI process, and "no permanent elements of structural reform of service delivery mechanisms has been evidenced by the existence of the Core" [CAI] (ibid., 7). While the brief acknowledged the "cosmetic improvement" from the "bricks and mortar" initiatives of CAI, it suggested that the economic benefit of these improvements profited developers and people from outside the core area and that the workforce Aboriginal component met less than targeted goals. Indeed, in terms of employment and training, the Ma Mawi brief chastised the three signatories of the CAI. "The three levels of government and also the three largest employees have accepted few of the "graduates" of the various training initiatives undertaken. . . . Significant accomplishments in this area [in training and placement] cannot be ascribed to the Core Area Initiative" (ibid., 9).

The Community Inquiry received briefs from numerous other groups concerned about Aboriginal needs in the inner city. Many underlined the capacity and desire of Aboriginal people to design and deliver their own programmes. Proposals to the Inquiry outlined many unmet needs and future projects that should be considered by any new inner-city initiative, including education training and services, economic development partnerships, child-care facilities, Native language and other cultural development needs, long-term health services, family-violence shelters and youth programmes. The key to an improved future for Aboriginal people was seen to be long-term funding and other support
mechanisms. There were repeated calls for the active re-establishment of the Inner City Foundation envisioned by Lloyd Axworthy.

7.8 Implementation

Robin Hambleton, in his book *Rethinking Policy Planning* (1986), distinguished between policy and implementation, suggesting that the rational model of planning that dominated planning theory for two decades, viewed the two as separate, that is, implementation came after policy. He suggested that it is often difficult to distinguish between the two because implementation of much policy is dependent upon action by groups that are relatively autonomous from those making policy and therefore bargaining and negotiation becomes extremely important.

It is appropriate to consider implementation as a policy/action continuum in which an interactive and negotiative process is taking place over time between those seeking to put policy into effect and those upon whom action depends. (Hambleton, 1989, 38.)

This observation could not have been more pertinent than in the case of the CAI. The tripartite conditions for policy-making and the number of departments, agencies and contracted individuals involved in implementation of programmes made the implementation of the CAI interactive indeed.

Hambleton (1986) suggested that there are five factors that shape the policy-implementation process: (1) the policy message; (2) administrative arrangements; (3) perspectives and ideologies; (4) resources; and (5) power and politics (ibid., 39). An important relationship exists between the policy message and implementation because clarity leads to policy objectives being met while ambiguity of policy objectives may result
from uncertainty or may be fostered deliberately to leave room for negotiation. Stewart Clatworthy, in his evaluation of the tripartite model, notes that the most senior level of CAI structure, the Policy Committee, "performed well in situations involving conflict resolution and implementation (including project approvals) . . . and provided sufficient direction to enable implementation to proceed at the lower levels (Clatworthy and Leskiw 1990, 77). However, Clatworthy noted:

There is widespread agreement that Policy Committee has not often engaged in the process of substantive policy or direction setting. Most direction setting has occurred within the context of specific project opportunities or project related problems which could not be resolved by lower levels of the management system. Policy Committee decisions were often described as 'deal-based' involving project trade-offs among the participants and to some extent sacrifices of internal jurisdictional interests and policy positions. (ibid., 77.) . . .

Concerns about Policy Committee's role in the model related almost entirely to issues of project specific decision-making, where many observers perceived a lack of consistency and conflict between political pressure (interest) and the intent and goals of the model. (Ibid., 78.)

It was the Management Board that was primarily responsible for implementation of the CAI model. Here, the absence of a clear policy message on many implementation issues required interpretation within, and without, the internal structures of the agreements and brings into question the complexity of administrative arrangements of the CAI. This is also related to the last three factors referred to by Hambleton -- perspective and ideologies resources and power and politics. Over the course of implementing the CAI, decision-making changed focus from the original objectives of the model to the various jurisdictional issues or interests prevalent at any given time. With this change came a greater emphasis on fiscal control, greater administrative control on activities, less room for
manoeuvring, and "more energy . . . expended at lower levels of the model's management system (that is, coordinators and programme levels) on issue clarification and at the higher levels (the Policy Committee) for purposes of conflict resolution" (Clatworthy and Leskiw 1990, 79).

The Agreement Co-ordinators Sub-Committee provided the direct link between the CAI programmes and implementing jurisdictions and senior management. In CAI I, their functions were not precisely defined and, as a result, much of their activity was discretionary and negotiated. In CAI II, however, their functions were formalised, but any direct authority for decision-making was concentrated in lead departments. This produced considerable frustration and contributed to more need of conflict resolution by the Management Board.

The Core Area Office provided secretariat, communications, advocacy and programme-delivery functions. This was an unique arrangement compared to other inter-governmental agreements, giving a significant level of responsibility and authority for implementation of the CAI to this office. Over time, this delivery function was questioned especially by the senior levels of government who resented their lack of control over the delivery of programmes ostensibly under their jurisdictions. In addition, the ability of the Core Area Office to successfully promote inter-programme co-ordination was less than successful.

The programme advisory committees were designed to provide local input and give a sense of "rationalisation" for decisions related to projects. In CAI II, these programme committees consisted of one citizen and one jurisdictional representative appointed by each level of government. Although these committees were not directly
responsible for implementing policy through programmes, their input was seen as necessary to provide appropriate scrutiny for the choice of projects undertaken and the resources allocated.

7.9 Environmental Change: CAI I and CAI II

Fundamental changes occurred in the funding and participation levels of the tripartite partners between CAI I and CAI II. Equal cost-sharing (one-third) in all programming was an obligation of each level of government in the first CAI. In 1986, however, a major shift in funding and responsibility occurred, with the renewed agreement. Although each partner was responsible for a total package equal to one-third of the CAI funding, the actual cost-sharing and participation by each level of government varied across programmes. Nonetheless, the minimum financial obligation was ten percent of each programme's budget.

This change to a variable cost-sharing, and therefore the direct participatory role, of each level of government, occurred in response to the restructuring of DREE during the tenure of the first agreement. The regional development mandate of DREE was considerably broader than its successor (DRIE), and had more flexible money for sub-agreements (Heinicke 1991). Federal participation in CAI II originally came through seven different departments with seven different federal ministers signing CAI II. Despite the change in the financing structure, equality of decision-making remained a condition of the second tripartite model. The system of budgeting and accounting understandably became more complex for CAI II. Although this change was rationalised by the federal level of government on the grounds of public accountability (Heinicke 1991) various key players
interviewed suggested that accountability did not improve and that the system became clogged in bureaucracy.

On the positive side, the restructuring of CAI II produced some residual benefits, particularly in the area of housing. For example, the role of CMHC allowed for more of a "stakeholder interest" in the second agreement (Reader 1991). In CAI I, CMHC focused its attention on Winnipeg's inner city but did not contribute any new, unplanned dollars. However, new money ($2.5 million) became available to CAI II at the end of some budget years when unspent national funds became available (ibid.).

Changes in the operating nature of CAI II affected the policy and planning functions of the CAI model. Changes in the level and nature of political involvement caused increased policy uncertainty in CAI II. Where CAI I was more open to experiment and negotiation, CAI II placed a greater reliance on formal procedures and jurisdictional priorities. In addition, CAI II was hampered by the level of expectations (and hence increased dependencies) built up by CAI I on the part of service delivery agents and the community as a whole, and by the more rigid interests and operating styles of the partners after 1986. This, in turn, tended to reduce the range of options available for creative problem-solving, frustrated the players involved at all levels, and may be one added reason why public participation became almost non-existent.

It should be noted that all the persons interviewed for this case study in retrospect ranked CAI I more highly than they did CAI II. There is no doubt that a certain degree of "romanticising" influenced perceptions of the first agreement. The experimental nature of CAI I and the enthusiasm for the venture engendered in the attitudes of the original participants account for part of this perspective; nonetheless, it should be noted
that the continuation of the Initiative, however constrained, was imperative for many of the initial activities of the CAI to reach fruition.
Endnotes

1. Ham and Hill (1984, 12) discuss their concept of policy as a "course of action" involving five characteristics: a decision network; a series of decisions; a dynamic process; the decision to do nothing; and, action without decision. All these characteristics are apparent in various stages or degrees throughout the two CAI agreements.

2. Unicity, an intended form of "grassroots" government structure, replaced the former Metropolitan Corporation of Greater Winnipeg on January 1, 1972. The earlier Metro government had been in place from March 1960 and included "an area composed of seven cities, five suburban municipalities, and one town; a total of thirteen municipalities, with the City of Winnipeg forming the centre" (Artibise, 1977 184).

3. There appears to be consensus, among the key planners interviewed, that the NIPs and CIPs, administered at a site-specific local level and including a requirement of citizen involvement, were more successful because they gave the local community ownership of their problems and solutions. Tom Yauk, now City Commissioner, is the former administrator of this programme at the local level.

4. A report by the City of Winnipeg Planning Department, Plan Winnipeg and Economic Trends, November 1990, makes reference to this downward adjustment in projections. Specifically, population projections extended to the year 2006 in the 1987 Plan Winnipeg Review suggest "modest" growth from a 1986 census base of 594,600 to a projection of 642,400 in the year 2006 (City of Winnipeg 1990, 1).


6. During the early 1980s the City of Winnipeg boasted population projections of 850,000 people giving credence to planning projects that supported suburban expansion and capital-works projects. Sale (1991) claims that the interests of the "concrete pourers" (Works and Operations Branch) gravitated toward suburban development. These are the same inflated population projections referred to by Gerecke (1992).

7. Tim Sale (1991) argued that the city assessor's office had been instructed not to re-assess during the late 1970s and early 1980s. This was in contravention of the City of Winnipeg Act, which required re-assessment every three years. The lack of re-assessment contributed, in Sale's opinion, to a direct subsidy of the suburbs. This seems to have been supported by figures calculated by Harvey Stevens, Senior Research Associate of the Social Planning Council of Winnipeg, who concluded that a number of suburban school divisions were under-assessed compared to the inner city by the time a re-assessment was carried out in 1984 (Stevens 1990, 10).

8. In Chapter 5 it was noted that the mayor used the press to pressure errant councillors into decision-making when he could not get consensus or could not co-opt council votes.
9. This had also been the case when citizen involvement had been planned for the proposed Plan Winnipeg. David Henderson, formerly Commissioner of Planning and Community Services, stated that although there was opportunity for public input through informal meetings and formal hearings, public interest was low, contributing to a loss of commitment by elected officials (Henderson 1990, 3).

10. The social-services programming areas of CAI II alone had 48 projects in Programme 6.1 for projects such as playgrounds, parks, community centres and daycares; 63 projects in Programme 6.3 for neighbourhood services such as community development, health and recreation; 157 projects in the community services and facilities sector, and 42 projects in the educational support area (Winnipeg Core Area Initiative 1992).
Chapter 8
LESSONS TO BE LEARNED

8.1 Introduction

The Winnipeg CAI was one of the larger urban redevelopment projects undertaken in Canada in the last two decades and certainly one that was remarkable for its active long-term tri-level partnership. As of March 1991, the partnership formally came to an end. This dissertation has examined the predicament and transformation of the inner city of Winnipeg prior to, during, and after the intervention of the CAI. It has placed this Canadian experiment in urban revitalisation within the context of the general trends affecting urban areas in Britain and the United States. The analysis is situated in the context of international and ideological trends in urban revitalisation, particularly the move away from policies directed to social welfare enhancement to those more focussed on economic infrastructural improvements, and within the debate over the role of planning as a rational (value-free) process.

The CAI was a unique partnership of the three levels of government with a broad mandate to tackle the serious economic and social problems of inner-city Winnipeg -- problems, which in kind, if not in specific substance, are faced by so many Western cities. It has used the CAI as a Canadian case study, particularly because of the tripartite partnership and the comprehensive nature of the Initiative’s objectives -- physical, social and economic regeneration. It has done so in the hope that the urban-policy effects can be used to illuminate future urban regeneration efforts.
It will be recalled that one of the objectives of this dissertation was to study the Winnipeg Core Area Initiative as a model for urban regeneration and public policy intervention. While this was an academic goal, a more prescriptive goal was to use the analysis to contribute towards the improvement of revitalisation policy in general. In doing so, this dissertation attempted to answer the question: Urban distress -- who can relieve it and how? This theme was explored through a comparison of urban revitalisation activities in Britain and the United States in Chapter 2 and was further examined in the ensuing chapters explicating the efforts of the CAI.

8.2 Who Can Relieve Urban Distress and How?

Part I of this dissertation has shown many similar trends affecting the core areas of major cities in Britain and the United States. Both countries have experimented with a wide range of programmes and policy options to combat growing "distress" in inner-city areas. Some cities have been more successful than others in reversing decline. Some cities, lacking a combination of fiscal resources, jurisdictional authority, public and private commitment and ability, or political leadership, continue in a downward spiral of decay. On both continents the amount of revitalisation activity has varied between cities, but, once particular policies or strategies are shown to be successful, they are picked up with enthusiasm by other urban regions. Examples include: waterfront developments; rapid-transit systems; improved public transportation and car parking; new mixed-use developments with office/commercial and residential projects; and, more so in the United States, public/private ventures favouring commercial development.
Chapter 2 questioned whether the process of decentralisation and the decline of the core is an inevitable process for some cities. It suggested that in the larger context of revitalisation there will be "winners" and "losers." What happens will depend on the values of people in a community, whether transmitted through politicians and public policy, or through incremental actions by individuals, developers and business interests.

To what extent can inner-city decay be stopped and problems resolved? British and American urban revitalisation efforts offer some lessons to be learned. The political structure of an area can be a significant factor affecting decentralisation and, hence, the deterioration of inner cities. The resources available to large authorities, augmented by metropolitan area planning, have solved some of the inner city / outer city rivalries by planning growth for outer areas while maintaining the importance of the core. British and American revitalisation programmes have shown that a forceful and long-term intervention is required for success. Short-term, narrow, poorly funded approaches are doomed to ultimate failure.

New economies need new political approaches to economic development. Public/private partnerships and quasi-independent development agencies have proven successful in the United States, not without costs and compromises, as Susan Fainstein points out (1989). Private-sector involvement has an important role to play in urban revitalisation nonetheless, and investment is more likely to be forthcoming and appropriate when planned at the early stage. Public-private development corporations, particularly in the United States, have produced good results when they are given specific objectives and arm's-length independence backed by public funds and incentives. In many cases, and on a
strategic location basis, they have proven more successful than public bodies in urban redevelopment.

British planning techniques involving radical planning and community activism have produced some major innovations in local socioeconomic policy that stand in contrast to American and Canadian examples. Radical planning, or popular planning (Thornley 1990), stresses the role of the public and public accountability in meeting community and social objectives rather than corporate and profit-making goals. The result is a concomitant restructuring of planning practice that, of necessity, takes place on -- or beyond, the fringe of the statutory planning system. Intrinsic to these examples of radical British attempts at urban restructuring is the idea of identifying and responding to "public interest" -- as Chapter 3 of this dissertation points out, a pressing problem faced by planners today.

Lessons taken from the books of British and American planning suggest that a key ingredient in any successful urban revitalisation effort is the degree to which problems are defined and objectives spelled out. When objectives are specific -- for example, stopping population decline, stabilising the retail sector -- some cities have achieved considerable success. According to Knight and Gappert, cities will have to make the transformation from accidental growth to intentional development (1984, 70). Christopher Law and others suggest that what is needed is a system of "urban intelligence" whereby city authorities become aware of changes in an area, monitor a wide range of indicators, and devise a strategy to create the type of intervention and revitalisation desired -- bold but realistic (1988, 234).

Canadian authors have made significant contributions to the analysis of urban distress. Alan Artibise and Matthew Kiernan (1989) pick up on the need for "urban
intelligence" suggested by Law when they maintain that city governments "are quite
capable of improving urban conditions significantly . . . [because] many of the major
problems -- in health, safety, culture, education, economic development, recreation, and
housing, to name but a few areas -- are all within the power of the city to solve or at least
alleviate" (ibid., 2-12). They claim that the livability of the urban environment affects the
economic base of the community in so far as jobs follow people, not, as has been widely
held, the reverse.

Other Canadian examples of efforts to "dissect" distress and contribute to urban
restructuring have been undertaken by a number of authors.¹ Some, such as William
Coffey (1991), have analysed the growth of the service sector as a phenomenon that has
marked a significant change in the economies of developed countries, and specifically one
that has profoundly changed urban economies. P. W. Daniels (1992) suggests a range of
policies and environmental conditions needed to support a strong tertiary industry in
metropolitan areas. In addition to investment in physical infrastructure, Daniels sees the
need to invest carefully in social infrastructure and human capital. Various fiscal and
physical planning policies and an emphasis on strategic planning were seen by Daniels as
methods and tools for attracting economic and social well-being back to metropolitan areas.

While much has been made of the negative consequences of inner-city
gentrification, David Ley (1993), from the University of British Columbia, studied six
Canadian inner cities and concluded that if cities are intending to attract the high-order
services and the tertiary industries claimed by Coffey and Daniels to be critical for
economic viability today, then a residential market for the new middle class in the inner
city is important. Ley identifies the major social challenges of the 1990s to be the
preservation of rapidly disappearing stocks of affordable housing and the inequities of 
social polarization in our cities (ibid., 252). Thomas Hutton and Craig Davis, also from the 
University of British Columbia, expand upon the findings of the previous Canadian 
researchers by identifying components important to the sustainable development of cities in 
an economic perspective (1990). Hutton and Davis suggest that there are ample precedents 
for cities inclined to a pro-active stance in framing strategies to address the challenges of 
restructuring, but that there is a need to integrate economic, social and environmental 
attributes within an overall strategic approach (ibid., 51).

8.3 The Role of Planning in Urban Restructuring

Throughout this dissertation reference has been made to changes in inner-city 
policy on this continent and abroad, changes that have resulted from a shift in identifying 
inner-city problems from a social perspective (urban deprivation, poverty) to an economic 
and physical perspective (industrial decline and environmental decay). Concomitant with 
this shift in viewpoint has come the expectation that agencies expected to play a major role 
in solving these problems come from the private and mixed-sector area. Due to resource 
limitations, and because of the way inner-city problems are defined today, governments 
have been more willing to experiment with a range of administrative arrangements and 
pump-priming activities. Changes in planning practice have accompanied the more radical 
experiments in urban restructuring -- particularly in Britain.

An important lesson to be learned from all the examples of urban restructuring 
discussed in this dissertation is that there are costs as well as benefits -- "winners" and
"losers." While revitalisation can bring an urban renaissance, it can also bring social, economic and spatial segregation.

Chapter 3 of this dissertation examined the role of planning in the economic development of urban areas. It noted that urban policy has come full circle -- from a belief in the overall merits of growth and development, to support of a no-growth philosophy, and a return to a recognition of the needs for growth and capital. The replacement of the Fordist model has brought with it new modes of operation for planners. Planners are increasingly being drawn into the role of public entrepreneur. Planners are required to become more heavily involved in the development process, and, as a result, there is a new, or re- emphasise on the political role of planners.

Chapter 3 also examined the traditional role of planning in shaping urban development. It concluded that, today, planners are caught in the dilemma of attempting to reconcile a diversity of human needs in a complex society. In the tug-of-war between local economic development and local concerns, the problems of balancing efficiency with equity and justice often find the planner in a position of differentiating between value relevance and values and problems. If a planner is to recognise and re-affirm human values as the keystone of successful urban revitalisation, it is necessary to reconcile a model of societal action based on privatism that is non-rational, with a planning system that aspires to rationality. This amounts to a tall order for the planning profession.

There is no turning back the clock. Today privatism is the dominant theme affecting urban policy -- but with economic gain must come social accountability. Along with the benefits that private initiatives and competition can bring come the public consequences of private and mixed-sector actions. A successful public city, of necessity,
means a strong public voice and meaningful public participation. Under these circumstances, planners have a broad and increasingly important spectrum of activities. This dissertation underlines the need for planners to equip themselves with a new tool-kit -- one that will allow them to play a significant role in the future developments of livable urban areas.

8.4 Lessons from the CAI

A stated objective of this dissertation was to examine contrasting models of urban revitalisation in other countries, specifically Britain and the United States, with a Canadian model - the CAI. The rationale behind this approach was to put the efforts of the CAI, which had been held in high regard by some in the planning community (for example, Matthew Kiernan), into context with other regeneration attempts and to evaluate the Initiative keeping in mind lessons asked at the beginning of the dissertation: Should and could the CAI be used as a model for future urban redevelopment efforts? The answer concerning replicability of the model was resolved at the end of Chapter 5 -- the answer was no!

This dissertation set out ten research questions relating specifically to the CAI. These questions had to do with the empirical and normative assumptions underlying the CAI model, the ideology behind the policy framework, the political commitment towards the Initiative and the respective roles of government in this case study of urban and economic development. Concerning the characteristics of the CAI, questions were raised about process, the adequacy of programme definition and resource allocations, the implementation of CAI policy and the appropriateness of delivery mechanisms. As an
urban intervention, questions were raised about the nature and degree of public participation in the enterprise and the tangible and perceived outputs of Initiative, especially with respect to the impacts on the community. Lastly, there was a question concerning the degree of environmental change and the effects on the functioning and efficiency of the Initiative over a period of a decade.

Based on a large amount of published material and the rich contribution of the interview data, this dissertation provides a useful and original contribution to our understanding of the complexities of the Winnipeg Core Area Initiative and its contribution to urban revitalisation. The value of the interview data should not be underestimated. Considerable effort has been made to deconstruct (although Derridian methods have not explicitly been used) the understandings of the key participants to reveal the goals, ideologies and perceived successes and failures of the CAI. From the interviews and the analysis of published material, much can be learned concerning the long-range effect of the CAI model.

From the outset, it should be noted that city problems are deeply resistant to change -- even by innovative initiatives. Winnipeg’s problems are no exception to this rule. Examination of the objectives of the CAI show that the urban intervention intended in the mandate was backed by a strong, vigorous strategy, broad in scope, that enjoyed a reasonable degree of political commitment by all three partners. The objectives were conceptually broad and comprehensive, too much so for the level of financial and organisational resources available and the level of public expectations that were raised. The attempt to deliver "something for almost everyone" was hampered by the size of the area targeted for revitalisation and by the depth of physical, social and economic decay.
experienced in the inner city during four previous decades. Nonetheless, the range of interventions and the requirement of interweaving physical, social and economic objectives throughout all programmes gave a synergy to the Initiative that is missing in other Canadian revitalisation attempts. Throughout CAI I, interpretation and implementation of the Initiative's objectives were experimental and funding flexible. This ability to manoeuvre was an important element missing from CAI II as public accountability and bureaucratic priorities took precedence over community-based needs.

Inter-governmental co-operation through the tri-level model was the key to the sustained and concentrated focus on Winnipeg's inner city. Without the tripartite agreement it is doubtful that any one of the levels could have resisted the transitory influences that affect political priorities and budgets. The model was an excellent vehicle to harmonise scarce public resources and leverage private investment. The trilateral partnership gave legitimacy to the long-term efforts needed for the scope of the CAI work and gave security to the private sector being wooed into co-operation in the venture. While the model was cumbersome and frustrating for many of the participants in the process, it broadened the human resource base and expanded the system. The requirement for unanimity in decision-making and funding forced government interaction and enhanced understanding of tri-level concerns. The model has been criticised for providing a facade behind which each level could hide. On the one hand, each level of government may have used the CAI to legitimise its activities and levels of involvement, that is, to let themselves "off the hook," especially for long-term programmes. While there is little specific evidence to suggest this, it is clear that some social-service dependency shifted from established long-term needs to short-term solutions ending with the CAI. However, one could argue that government
resources were spent more wisely when culled through the inter-governmental negotiation process and that concerns of each level could not be ignored or dismissed.

The opportunity to experiment with a tri-level attack for urban revitalisation raises the question of what role each level of government should play. In the early years, the federal government played a facilitative and "banker role" but became increasingly involved as the Initiative evolved. In addition to the public accountability rationale used to support this revised role, it could be argued that the City, in particular, did not appear to have firm objectives or a vision of what they wanted for the core area. This was particularly evident in their inability to mesh downtown redevelopment with an urban strategy under Plan Winnipeg. The municipal government had the opportunity to assess local needs and set priorities according to their "urban intelligence"; however, the political milieu of City Council and the structure of the Unicity government did not allow for full advantage to be taken at times.

The continuing tension surrounding the issue of "bricks and mortar" versus social development was one that the CAI could not resolve, despite initial desire to do so. The interweaving of social, physical and economic goals was a direct and conceptually bold attempt to balance economic development with disparity relief. Much urban policy fails to make the connection between the economic and the social elements of redevelopment and ignores the importance of the links between social well-being and economic performance. The weakness by the CAI in this respect seemed to be found in implementation of policy, not so much in lack of policy direction. The gap between symbolic policy and substantive policy was readily apparent as the Initiative progressed.
The administrative responsibility and the delivery structure for individual programme elements of the Initiative was part of a complicated chain of command. Where the responsibility was vested closest to the programme’s users, more effective and responsive implementation of policy resulted. The use of advisory committees was valuable in identifying pressing community needs and innovative community programmes. Where programme delivery involved multiple agencies and bureaucratic structures, for example in areas of social-welfare programming, results varied. Two lessons are of note, however. Firstly, it was shown from the Community Inquiry hearings that the local community had an untapped wealth of knowledge and organisational skills necessary to identify and deliver certain types of programming. Secondly, when elements of innovative programmes proved successful, it was the bureaucrats and politicians that failed to promote legislation for policy change. One of the greatest failings of the CAI was that it was weak at using the experience of the inner city to make creative legislation to build policy commitment that could be transformed into legislation. Some form of advocacy/legislative component was missing from the Initiative.

The gap between policy intent and policy implementation was equally weak in the area of citizen participation. Perhaps it was the complexity of the CAI model and its cumbersome procedures that can be seen as an excuse for the low level of community participation. It can be argued, however, that the structural arrangements of the model were designed for community input only after the fact and that opportunities for significant input were used to legitimise the Initiative at points of anticipated renewal of the agreements. Direct community participation in the day-to-day functioning of the Initiative was minimal or non-existent.
The CAI provided a new and valuable role for the private sector in the redevelopment of the inner city. Prior to the CAI, private investment in the core area had ostensibly disappeared, with the exception of support from established philanthropic firms such as the Richardsons. While the actual dollar value of investment leveraged by the CAI may never be known, it is clear that the Initiative bolstered confidence in the private-investment community and re-focused private spending in the core. Unfortunately, the job-training and placement objectives of the Initiative were not embraced with enthusiasm by the private sector, perhaps the private sector was more willing to invest in capital and physical infrastructure than in human resources. If so, this is an area where "carrots and sticks" may have to be judiciously used to support policy objectives. The establishment of the two development corporations, the North of Portage Development Corporation and the Forks Renewal Corporation, did much to bring revived interest back to the inner city and provide stimulus for downtown redevelopment, notwithstanding their modest financial success to date.

Leadership -- political and administrative -- was a critical variable evident in the first CAI and missing from the second. The vision, determination and enthusiasm evident at the creation of the CAI can be credited to a handful of persons under a unique set of circumstances. The constellation of events and characters involved in the creation of the CAI were, no doubt, time- and location-specific. The endurance of the initiative over ten years is a result of three levels of government and an untold number of individuals committed to the original purpose of the CAI.

In retrospect, the one key ingredient responsible for the level of success that the CAI can boast is the creation of a special-purpose entity to act as a vehicle for urban
revitalisation. The creation of the CAI as a prototypical model required new and innovative legislation and structural arrangements without precedence in Canada. The design of the Core Area Office to act as the store-front operation for the Initiative proved to be a stroke of genius. This office galvanised creative spirit and energy and brought the Initiative to the community where it belonged.

On the basis of the analysis of the CAI case study data, it is clear that the CAI, as a prototypical model for urban revitalisation, enjoyed some degree of success in certain areas while falling short in others. This study has shown that the objectives of the Initiative were too broad and the efforts too widespread. In many respects this lack of focus, an attempt to provide something for everyone, meant that the Initiative was not representative of core needs and did not adequately address inner-city interests and concerns. While the tripartite model had certain advantages, it can be argued that the CAI was a case of funding in search of leadership. The need for unanimity in decision-making often watered down efforts or brought compromises with only half-hearted results. While the CAI has been criticised as a corporatist model, the lack of success in meeting the goal of economic development ironically can be attributed to a lack of corporate support, a reluctant local business community and lack of a downtown business strategy. It was a Fordist model in a post-Fordist economy. With respect to social development, the CAI intervention was not strong enough to effect the structural change necessary to come to grips with systemic problems of poverty. While many of the physical goals of the Initiative were met, especially in the housing and community development area, the lack of a vision for the City impeded efforts of the planning department to use the CAI as a lever for activities to mould a comprehensive redevelopment strategy for the inner area. With a
heritage of suburban expansion and an intense rivalry between inner-city and outer-city factions, the planning department was impotent in the face of local politics. The result was that planning focused on single sites and uncoordinated projects that often competed with one another.

This dissertation contends that while the CAI was a noteworthy tri-level experiment in urban revitalisation, it fell short of its goals and its promises. Revitalisation of a core area -- any core area -- takes years of efforts and co-ordination of planning and resources. It is an on-going process. The CAI model was time- and location-specific. There were, however, components of the CAI model that provide valuable lessons for urban restructuring efforts.

This case study cannot conclude without asking one more question: What has been learned about the long-term effectiveness of the CAI in relieving inner-city distress generally and specifically in the case of Winnipeg’s core area? For planners, the lesson that should be underlined is the need for a new political epistemology of planning. Inherent in this concept is the recognition by planners and politicians alike that planning is not a non-political, value-free science. Implicit in the calls for a restructuring and re-orienting of the epistemological basis of planning is the recognition that a revised attitude to the role of values in planning is necessary. What is required is a framework that allows and provides for a role for both public and private values, and rationality, and allows planners themselves, their clients, politicians and members of the community to understand and assess the ethical and political consequences of planning decisions and actions.

"Planning is still concerned with the creation of legitimate conditions for public consensus" (Kartez 1989, 452). Recognition and affirmation of human values are instrumental for
human understanding, for planning human environments, and for public policy formation and implementation.

This examination of the CAI as a tool for urban redevelopment has provided lessons for policy-makers as well. Continue to look to tri-level initiatives for a concerted attack on the problems underlying urban distress! In doing so, however, priority must be given to policies that foster community and individual empowerment. In reflecting true "public interest," there will be ample opportunities for active public participation so that community members can identify local needs, problems, and solutions in order to improve the conditions in which inner-city residents live.

8.5 Challenges for Urban Policy

The challenge for urban policy today is in developing plausible urban futures that are realistically and politically sustainable. Developments in the last fifteen years suggest at least three probable "knowns" affecting inner cities: (1) the economic health of cities is tied to national and world economies; (2) the urban-rural shift predominant in the 1960s and 1970s has reversed toward an "urban renaissance"; and (3) social development is tied inextricably to economic development. The solutions to inner city "distress" lies in a mix between well-tried systems and new-found action. There are numerous examples of success, but more needs to be done to understand the impact of change on our inner cities, and to create new instruments for implementing and integrating economic, social and physical redevelopment. This will require a re-focusing of skills and thinking, a re-orientation of planning practice, an increase in understanding through research and
technology transfer, and a renewed commitment of public values toward a sustainable urban environment.

The broader message of this research is that efficiency and equity should not be seen as polar alternatives on a policy continuum. The revitalisation of the core area -- any core area -- takes years of effort. There is a need for long-term, coherent policies supported by consistency and homogeneity of government policy. In the case of large urban regeneration efforts such as the Winnipeg CAI, there is a need for long-term funding support and facilitation from senior levels of government in areas of basic infrastructure, public works and public welfare. Such support is necessary to augment and amplify scarce human and financial resources and to promote private-investor confidence. There is no one single solution, no one magic formula, that can be used as a template for urban revitalisation. The Winnipeg Core Area Initiative has shown an admirable degree of success and provides lessons for future regeneration initiatives.
Endnotes

1. For example, see Coffey (1991); Coffey and Polese (1985; 1989); David Ley (1993); and Hutton (1989); Hutton and Davis (1990); and Hutton and Ley (1991).
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____. 1989. Qualitative and Quantitative Study of Opinions and Attitudes Regarding Core Area Revitalisation and the Winnipeg Core Area Initiative. Winnipeg: Winnipeg Core Area Initiative.


## APPENDIX I

### CASE STUDY INTERVIEWS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Core Player</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Contact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Administrators and Staff:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jim August</td>
<td>General Manager, CAI</td>
<td>interviewed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stewart Clatworthy</td>
<td>Programme Evaluator/Consultant</td>
<td>interviewed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrick Faulkner</td>
<td>Program Mgr., CAI Office</td>
<td>interviewed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Politicians:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bill Norrie</td>
<td>Mayor, City of Wpg</td>
<td>interviewed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter Diamant</td>
<td>Wpg.City Council (former CAI &amp; UA)</td>
<td>interviewed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greg Selinger</td>
<td>Wpg. City Council</td>
<td>interviewed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lloyd Axworthy</td>
<td>Federal Cabinet Minister (originator CAI)</td>
<td>interviewed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jake Epp</td>
<td>Minister for Western Diversification (federal)</td>
<td>cancelled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Ernst</td>
<td>Minister Urban Affairs (provincial)</td>
<td>refused</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gary Filmon</td>
<td>Premier of Manitoba</td>
<td>referred</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Walker</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
<td>not available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Government Representatives of Signatories and Bureaucrats:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elaine Heinicke</td>
<td>Director, Western Economic Diversification</td>
<td>interviewed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Position/Title</td>
<td>Status</td>
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<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joanne Davidson-Jury</td>
<td>Federal Mgr. CAI</td>
<td>interviewed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ron Reader</td>
<td>Fed./ Prov. Relations Officer, C.M.H.C.</td>
<td>interviewed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roy Nichol</td>
<td>Prov. Director, C.M.H.C.</td>
<td>interviewed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jim Beaulieu</td>
<td>Deputy Minister, Urban Affairs (provincial)</td>
<td>interviewed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marilyn Walder</td>
<td>Manager, Urban Revitalization, Urban Affairs</td>
<td>interviewed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eugene Kostyra</td>
<td>Regional Director, C.U.P.E (former U.A. Minister)</td>
<td>interviewed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bob Nichol</td>
<td>District Planning Co-ordinator, Wpg. Planning Dept.</td>
<td>interviewed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tom Yauk</td>
<td>Commissioner of Planning and Comm. Services</td>
<td>interviewed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Eldridge</td>
<td>Deputy Minister, Intergovernmental Affairs</td>
<td>not available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doug Kalscics</td>
<td>Chief Planner, City of Wpg.</td>
<td>referred</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Len Volpnfjord</td>
<td>Chief Planner, City of Victoria (formerly Wpg.)</td>
<td>not available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linda Kerr</td>
<td>City Solicitor</td>
<td>refused</td>
</tr>
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**Development Corps & Business Leaders**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Position/Title</th>
<th>Status</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nick Daikiw</td>
<td>Pres. &amp; C.E.O. Forks Renewal Corp. (1st G.M. CAI)</td>
<td>interviewed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kent Smith</td>
<td>Manager, N. Portage Dev. Corp.</td>
<td>interviewed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Joe Du</td>
<td>Pres. Chinatown Centre</td>
<td>not available</td>
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**Observers:**

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<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position/Title</th>
<th>Status</th>
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<tr>
<td>Matthew Kiernan</td>
<td>Consultant (formerly CAI mgr)</td>
<td>interviewed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Position</td>
<td>Availability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tom Carter</td>
<td>Professor, U. of Wpg. (Chair, Community Inquiry)</td>
<td>interviewed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brijesh Mathur</td>
<td>Director, Inst. of Urban Studies, U. of Wpg.</td>
<td>interviewed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kent Gerecke</td>
<td>Professor, U. of Man. (critic and editor)</td>
<td>not available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Sanders</td>
<td>Consultant (formerly Minister of Urban Affairs)</td>
<td>not available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>NGO's:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tom Simms</td>
<td>Member, Urban Futures Group</td>
<td>interviewed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tim Sale</td>
<td>Consultant (formerly Chair, Social Planning Coun.)</td>
<td>interviewed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wayne Helgason</td>
<td>Ma Mawi Wi Chi Itata Centre</td>
<td>interviewed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suhad Bisharat</td>
<td>Exec. Dir., Man. Anti-Poverty Assoc.</td>
<td>interviewed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROGRAM NAME AND NUMBER</td>
<td>BUDGET</td>
<td>TOTAL EXPENDITURES</td>
</tr>
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<td>-------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Sector I</strong></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| COMMUNITY RESPONSE      | $ 600,000 | $ 594,079         | - 27 jobs created  
- Approximately $111,000 generated in complementary funds |
| Program 1.1             |         |                    |         |
| TRAINING AND EMPLOYMENT AGENCY | 10,015,000 | 10,015,000 | - 861 persons completed training  
- 680 trainees employed (79%)  
- Approximately $8.3 million generated in complementary funds (primarily from CEIC) |
| Program 1.2             |         |                    |         |
| EDUCATION DEVELOPMENT   | 1,900,000 | 1,900,000         | - 61 educational projects assigned  
- Employment for 45 permanent and 6 term positions created  
- Approximately $840,000 generated in complementary funds |
| Program 1.3             |         |                    |         |
| INNER CITY SOCIAL WORK PROJECT | 2,070,000 | 2,070,000 | - 43 students graduated with a Bachelor of Social Work Degree |
| Program 1.4.1           |         |                    |         |
| INNER CITY NURSING PROJECT | 115,000 | 115,000          | - 12 students completed either an RN or an LPN diploma |
| Program 1.4.2           |         |                    |         |
| HOME REPAIR             | 6,181,000 | 5,972,697         | - Approximately 5,948 inner city dwelling units repaired (4,038 owner-occupied; 1,910 rental)  
- 979 homeowners received additional loan forgiveness assistance  
- Approximately $20 million levered in private funds (33:1 ratio)  
- Approximately 100 person years of employment (relating to expanding RRAP delivery capacity) created |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROGRAM NAME AND NUMBER</th>
<th>BUDGET</th>
<th>TOTAL EXPENDITURES</th>
<th>RESULTS</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GRANT FOR HOME OWNERSHIP</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
<td>- Approximately 850 person years of construction employment generated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program 2.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- 305 grants to new infill dwellings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- 186 grants to first-time purchasers of existing dwellings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- At least 250 person years of construction employment generated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- An estimated $18 million generated in complementary funding (9:1 ratio)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXPANDED NON-PROFIT ASSISTANCE -</td>
<td>800,000</td>
<td>800,000</td>
<td>- 18 homes purchased and renovated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KINNEW HOUSING Program 2.4.1, 2.4.2 and 2.4.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- 250 major repairs (roofing, insulation, foundation, electrical, plumbing) as well as 118 additional homes repaired</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- 46 persons trained and employed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXPANDED NON-PROFIT HOUSING -</td>
<td>500,000</td>
<td>500,000</td>
<td>- 36 new dwelling units constructed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WINNIPEG HOUSING REHABILITATION CORPORATION</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- 25 housing units created from building conversion, as well as an additional 20 units through Charles-Cathedral Housing Cooperative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program 2.4.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- 59 units renovated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Approximately $5.9 million levered in complementary funds (12.6:1 ratio)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Approximately 164 person years of construction employment generated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROGRAM NAME AND NUMBER</td>
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<td>TOTAL EXPENDITURES</td>
<td>RESULTS</td>
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</table>
| NON-PROFIT HOUSING ASSISTANCE Program 2.4.5, 2.4.6 | 725,000 | 725,000 | - Construction or conversion of 185 units of housing, renovation of 30 units  
- Approximately 211 person years of construction employment generated  
- Approximately $11.7 million levered in complementary funds (18:1 ratio) |
| CORE AREA RESIDENTIAL UPGRADING AND MAINTENANCE PROJECT (CARUMP) Program 2.5 | 1,311,320 | 1,311,320 | - 4,746 dwelling units in 1,518 buildings have been inspected, with 1,185 Maintenance and Occupancy By-law Orders to Repair Issued; 654 orders have been forwarded to the enforcement system  
- 498 tenants have received intensive services from a Social Worker and/or Home Support Teacher; 557 tenants have been assisted in completing public housing applications; 310 families have been relocated, the majority to housing of better quality  
- An estimated 150 person years of construction employment expected |
<table>
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<th>RESULTS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LOGAN - CPR REHOUSING</td>
<td>344,680</td>
<td>342,962</td>
<td>- An estimated $5.9 million generated in complementary funds (4.5:1 ratio)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program 2.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- 18 homes have been relocated, reconnected to service (hydro, etc.) and received basic landscaping in the North Logan residential area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SALVATION ARMY MEN'S SOCIAL SERVICE CENTRE</td>
<td>1,200,000</td>
<td>1,200,000</td>
<td>- New facility under construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program 2.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- 68 person years of construction employment generated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- $4.8 million generated in complementary funding (4:1 ratio)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- 89 community improvement projects undertaken</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Approximately 94 person years of construction employment generated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Approximately $1.5 million generated in complementary funds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMMUNITY IMPROVEMENT AREAS</td>
<td>5,870,000</td>
<td>5,552,221</td>
<td>- 54 community facility projects assisted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program 3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- 384 person years of employment created in construction industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- $26 million in complementary funds levered (4.6:1 ratio)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMMUNITY FACILITIES</td>
<td>6,000,000</td>
<td>5,598,503</td>
<td>- 81 community service projects assisted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program 4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Employment generated for 271 persons, including occupational training for 156 individuals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- $3.0 million generated in complementary funds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMMUNITY SERVICES</td>
<td>5,300,000</td>
<td>5,300,000</td>
<td>- Work to renovate homes and construct new housing in the residential area east of Salter is complete</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program 5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Local residents and business people formed a community development corporation to work with the Core Area Initiative and the Province in relocating tenants, planning and developing new and renovated housing and business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECTOR II</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>LOGAN DEVELOPMENT</td>
<td>5,118,000*</td>
<td>5,112,117</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROGRAM NAME AND NUMBER</td>
<td>BUDGET</td>
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<td>RESULTS</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT</td>
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</table>
| Program 6.8             | 4,000,000 | 3,249,176  | - 74 households received disturbance support and 46 households received rental support  
|                         |         |                   | - Land acquired for the Logan housing development and industrial development (Program 6.8)  
|                         |         |                   | - Municipal services upgraded (watermain installation, street construction, sidewalk construction, lane construction, street lighting, boulevards and park area)  
| SMALL BUSINESS ASSISTANCE |        |                   |         |
| Program 6.9             | 2,820,000 | 2,647,686  | - 16 development projects assisted  
|                         |         |                   | - 386 direct jobs to be created including 136 persons trained through affirmative action programs (see Program 1.2)  
|                         |         |                   | - Approximately 126 person years of construction employment generated  
|                         |         |                   | - $7.010 million levered in private sector investment (3.3:1 ratio)  
| NORTH OF PORTAGE REDEVELOPMENT | 13,179,977* | 13,174,906 | - Acquisition of properties within area slated for redevelopment construction of park area (Air Canada "Window") fronting on Portage Avenue  
| Program 7.1 - 7.5       |         |                   | - Establishment of North Portage Development Corporation, responsible for planning, coordinating and implementing a multi-million dollar program (including Portage Place) of development for the area  

* Does not include an additional $200,000 allocated through Program 8.6.
cont’d

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROGRAM NAME AND NUMBER</th>
<th>BUDGET</th>
<th>TOTAL EXPENDITURES</th>
<th>RESULTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| NORTH OF ELLICE NEIGHBOURHOOD REVITALIZATION Program 7.6  | 3,014,500 | 3,014,500 | - Approximately 4,000 permanent jobs will have been created or transferred to the area  
- Approximately 4,200 person years of construction employment will have been generated  
- Total investment in area expected to exceed $300 million (private sector investment ratio of 3:1)  |
| CN EAST YARD Program 8.1 - 8.5  | 4,251,000* | 4,250,950 | - Initial acquisition of privately-owned lands undertaken  
- Preliminary concept and financial plan prepared and approved by Canada, Manitoba and Winnipeg  
- Numerous public hearings and meetings held to obtain ideas from the community, organizations and developers  
- The Forks Renewal Corporation established  |
| COMPENSATION FOR LAND ACQUISITION Program 8.6  | 3,850,000 | 3,695,506 | - See Programs 6.1 - 6.8, 7.1 - 7.5 and 8.1 - 8.5  |

* Does not include an additional $750,000 allocated through Program 8.6
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROGRAM NAME AND NUMBER</th>
<th>BUDGET</th>
<th>TOTAL EXPENDITURES</th>
<th>RESULTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| HERITAGE Program 9                      | 4,900,000 | 3,992,600          | - 54 private sector projects assisted (33 buildings)  
- Major non-profit arts centre established  
- Enhanced image of the District through street-scaping and promotion, including the establishment of a business association (The Exchange District Association) to encourage ongoing participation of businesses in the area’s development and promotion  
- Approximately 109 person years of construction employment generated  
- Approximately $5.1 million levered in private sector investment (5.1:1 ratio) |
| NEIGHBOURHOOD MAIN STREETS DEVELOPMENT Program 10 | 4,405,000 | 4,336,018          | - $13.3 million Chinatown development completed  
- 15 storefront improvements completed on Provencher Boulevard  
- Streetscaping project and 32 storefronts completed on Selkirk Avenue  
- Riverborne Development Association established and active in promoting interests of area businesses and residents- 16 storefront improvements completed on Main Street  
- Approximately $2 million generated in complementary funds  
- Approximately 50 person years of construction employment generated |
| SECTOR III                              | 2,900,000 | 2,900,000          | - The office functioned as a secretariat to Policy Committee, Management Board and Co-ordinators, provided the overall liaison, co-ordination and planning support required to implement the Core Area Agreement, and delivered programs under the Agreement on behalf of the responsible implementing jurisdictions |

*Does not include an additional $2,900,000 allocated through Program 8.6.*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROGRAM NAME AND NUMBER</th>
<th>BUDGET</th>
<th>TOTAL EXPENDITURES</th>
<th>RESULTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| PUBLIC INFORMATION      | 1,700,000 | 1,699,164         | - Over 100 community groups and events assisted through the provision of promotional materials or consultation  
- Educational assistance on core area redevelopment provided to over 100 research projects through informational materials, slide shows and presentation or bus tours  
- Public presentations to over 250 business and community interest groups in Winnipeg as well as several national and international organizations  
- 2 major educational and resource forums developed to benefit core area groups and organizations  
- Public consultation process implemented on renewal of the Core Area Agreement - Gas Station Theatre constructed- BIZ task force established |
| EVALUATION              | 826,500  | 815,555           | - Increased awareness of the Winnipeg Core Initiative (83% according to survey undertaken)  
- Mid-term evaluation for all programs and an executive summary completed  
- Review of Agreement’s management system completed  
- 4 thematic evaluations completed  
- 4 final program evaluations completed |
| TOTAL                   | $95,896,097 | $92,884,960      |         |

Note: The balance of unexpended dollars in the amount of $3,012,107 will be used for Program 8.6

## APPENDIX III

### EVALUATION PROGRAMME CORE AREA AGREEMENT I

#### PRODUCTS SUMMARY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Product</th>
<th>Completion Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Data Bases and Resource Materials</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Census Tabulations</td>
<td>April 1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building Permit Data Base</td>
<td>July 1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business Assessment Data</td>
<td>January 1987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program Monitoring System Data</td>
<td>On-going</td>
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<tr>
<td>Documentation for Evaluation Program Data Bases</td>
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<tr>
<td>Atlas of Core Area Conditions</td>
<td>September 1987</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Evaluation Assessments</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>A Plan for Evaluating the Winnipeg Core Area Agreement</td>
<td>November 1982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment and Affirmative Action Evaluation Assessment</td>
<td>June 1983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing and Neighbourhood Improvement Evaluation Assessment</td>
<td>September 1983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Services and Facilities Evaluation Assessment</td>
<td>December 1983</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sector 2 (Key Site) Program Evaluation Assessment</td>
<td>September 1983</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Baseline Studies</strong></td>
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<td>Conditions Within Winnipeg’s Core Area</td>
<td>April 1986</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Mid-term Evaluations</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Employment and Affirmative Action Program: Mid-term Evaluation</td>
<td>October 1984</td>
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<tr>
<td>Housing and Community Improvement Area Programs: Mid-term Evaluation</td>
<td>February 1985</td>
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<tr>
<td>Community Facilities and Services Programs: Mid-term Evaluation</td>
<td>September 1984</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mid-term Evaluation of the Winnipeg Core Area Initiative - Industrial Development/Small Business Assistance Program</td>
<td>January 1985</td>
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<tr>
<td>North Ellice Neighbourhood Revitalization Program: Mid-Term Evaluation Management Review: Core Area Initiative Agreement</td>
<td>February 1985</td>
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<tr>
<td>Historic Winnipeg Development Program: Mid-term Evaluation (Executive Summary)</td>
<td>June 1984</td>
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<tr>
<td>Neighbourhood Main Streets Program: Mid-term Evaluation (Executive Summary)</td>
<td>March 1985</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mid-term Program Evaluations: Winnipeg Core Area Agreement (Executive Summaries and Response to Recommendations)</td>
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<td><strong>Thematic Evaluations</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Evaluation of Community Involvement in the Winnipeg Core Area Agreement</td>
<td>January 1986</td>
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<tr>
<td>An Interim Assessment of Investment to Projects Under the Winnipeg Core Area Agreement</td>
<td>March 1985</td>
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<tr>
<td>An Evaluation of the Winnipeg Core Area Agreement - Employment and Affirmative Action Initiative</td>
<td>October 1986</td>
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<tr>
<td>Issues Concerning the Management and Delivery of the Winnipeg Core Area Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Final Program Evaluations</strong></td>
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<td>Employment and Affirmative Action Impacts and Cost-Effectiveness</td>
<td>August 1987</td>
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<td>Housing and Community Improvement Impacts</td>
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<td>Sector Two Programs</td>
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<td><strong>Management Information System Reports</strong></td>
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<td>A Concept Plan for Management Information Under the Renewed Winnipeg</td>
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<td>Core Area Agreement</td>
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<td>Data Content and Procedures for Collecting Project Level Management</td>
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<td>Information Under the Renewed Core Area Agreement</td>
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## APPENDIX IV
### CAI II AGREEMENT SUMMARY

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<tr>
<th>Program Name and Number</th>
<th>Original Budget</th>
<th>Revised (March 31, 1992)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>1.1 Industrial Development</td>
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<td>1.2 Entrepreneurial Support</td>
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<tr>
<td>4,000,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Exchange District Redevelopment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Riverbank Enhancement</td>
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<td>Strategic Capital</td>
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<td>Neighbourhood and Community Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>6.1 Neighbourhood Facilities</td>
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<tr>
<td>6.2 Neighbourhood Services</td>
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<td>6.3 Community Services and Facilities</td>
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<td>6.4 Education Support Services</td>
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<td>16,000,000</td>
<td>16,210,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Inner City Foundation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Housing</td>
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<td>8.1 Core Area Initiative Grant for Home Ownership</td>
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<td>8.2 Housing Development Stimulus</td>
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<td>8.3 Core Area Home Renovation Program (CAHPR)</td>
<td>1,750,000</td>
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<td>8.4 Core Area Rental Unit Repair/Forgiveness</td>
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<td>8.5 Home Renovation/Administration</td>
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<td>8.6 Core Area Residential Upgrading and Maintenance Program (CARUMP)</td>
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<td>10,500,000</td>
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<td>Central Administration</td>
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<td>Public Information and Programming</td>
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<td>Evaluation</td>
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<td>310,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>$100,000,000</td>
<td>$100,000,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

March 26, 1991
100-136 Portsmouth Blvd.
Winnipeg, M.B.
R3P 1B6

Mr. _____________
941 North Dr.
Winnipeg, M.B.
R3T 0A9.

Dear Mr. _____________:

I am conducting a study of the Winnipeg Core Area Initiative (WCAI) for my doctoral dissertation in the School of Community and Regional Planning at the University of British Columbia. Dr. Alan Arubise is my principal advisor.

My study is specifically interested in the WCAI as an instrument of urban public policy. The purpose is to study the WCAI as a model for urban regeneration and public policy intervention in inner city revitalization. The importance of this study is to provide a broad examination of the theoretical framework behind the Initiative. In doing so, it seeks to uncover the elements which have contributed to the weakness and success of the Initiative by collecting and analysing objective and subjective data obtained from interviews of key participants in CAI I and II. It is hoped that answers will be found to many questions concerning the effectiveness, equity and efficiency of the CAI as a model for urban policy. It is further hoped that this examination will assist planning and policy formation attempts in the future and strengthen the public and private ability to generate comprehensive, strategic and cohesive urban policy.

I hope to interview approximately 20 individuals who have been, or currently are involved in either/or both the CAI I and II. Emphasis for selection will be placed on individuals who played a role in the initial policy formation of the CAI, those who have had senior administrative duties in implementing CAI policy, and representatives of government and non-government agencies who have been engaged with the CAI on a continuing or sustained basis.

I would like to interview you as one of the key people involved during the early years of the CAI. I believe your views on the CAI would be of importance to my work from an academic point of view and your involvement in areas of social concern would contribute an important perspective in my attempt to evaluate the Initiative and the role it has played in the evolution of the inner city over the last ten years.
I will contact your office number the week of March 18, 1991. If you would be willing to see me, I will arrange an appointment at your convenience. The interview would take approximately one half hour or longer according to your wishes. All private information that you give me would remain confidential. No personal names will be used in the dissertation or in any publication of the results without your expressed approval.

I hope that you will be interested in my study. It is through projects of this nature that the academic body of knowledge in urban planning can be tested and challenged and your assistance in this study is an important element. If you have any questions before I contact you, please call either my office number (474-8054) or my home (895-7024).

Sincerely,

Dana G. Stewart
APPENDIX VI

Name ________________________________________

I am going to ask you to rate or rank eight of the WCAI.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CAI I</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CAI II</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Overall Goals</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Programmes</td>
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<tr>
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<td>2</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Politically</td>
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<td>105</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CAI as a tool of public policy</td>
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<tr>
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<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Administratively</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>For the &quot;users&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>108</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Open-ended questions asked of all respondents:

1. Can you tell me what role you played or how you were associated with the WCAI?
2. Let's go back over the topics that you have just ranked - would you like to discuss any or all of them in more detail?
3. What other aspects of the WCAI do you have a special knowledge of or is there an issue that you would like to discuss further?
4. Are there any sources of information (such as monographs or papers) that you would suggest for me.
5. Are there any people that you think I should interview or contact for further information?

* Three digits were arbitrarily chosen to allow sorting of the responses for content analysis.