THE CHINESE MASS CAMPAIGN IN THE POST-MAO YEARS by CHRISTOPHER PAUL FULKER B.A., The Un ivers i ty of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1982 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS i n THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES Department of P o l i t i c a l Science We accept t h i s thes i s as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA August 1991 @ Christopher Paul Fu lker , 1991 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Department of The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada Date DE-6 (2/88) i i ABSTRACT The Chinese mass campaign was o r i g i n a l l y formed i n accordance with the Maoist v i s i o n of p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n . The "mass l i n e " dictum enunciated by Mao Zedong required a r e l a t i o n s h i p of r e c i p r o c i t y between the masses and the CCP i n terms of evolving ideas, improving and amending them through discussion, and implementing decisions. In t h i s p a r t i c i p a t o r y process i t was v i t a l l y important that the masses f r e e l y and v o l u n t a r i l y express t h e i r own views. O r i g i n a l l y , the mass campaign was a p o s i t i v e , pragmatic, and commitment-filled way of completing constructive tasks, one i n which the masses themselves played an important r o l e . The v i s i o n of p a r t i c i p a t i o n p r e v a i l i n g at any given time has been a major f a c t o r i n shaping the nature of the mass campaign. Central to a consideration of the character of p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s the degree to which the masses are permitted to play t h e i r independent, active , and i n t e g r a l r o l e . Stemming from the period following the f a i l u r e of the Great Leap Forward, t h i s o r i g i n a l conception of the mass campaign was inc r e a s i n g l y corrupted by developing "bureaucratism" and "commandism" and actual mass involvement declined. With the basic tasks of s o c i a l i s t construction i i i seen as completed, the mass campaign began to be used f o r "reforming the superstructure." Moralizing, l e c t u r i n g , and behavioural modification were some of the tasks to which the mass campaign was put, as the achievement of s o c i a l s t a b i l i t y and pu b l i c cooperation became important state goals. Leadership d i s u n i t y r e s u l t e d i n the manipulation of the mass campaign f o r f a c t i o n a l ends. Since the commencement of the post-Mao reform process, Chinese so c i e t y has experienced increases i n s o c i a l disorder and i n c y n i c a l , self-centred and apathetic p u b l i c behaviour. In responding to these problems, the state has a l t e r e d the use of the mass campaign to the minimalist one of a t o o l f o r s o c i a l c o n t r o l . Leadership i n f i g h t i n g and disagreements over p o l i c y d i r e c t i o n and party " l i n e " have become e s p e c i a l l y prominent since the end of the C u l t u r a l Revolution. Mass campaigns have been commonly manipulated by i n d i v i d u a l s and factions within the leadership i n recent years; consequently, t h e i r administration and structure has become shoddy and t h e i r i d e o l o g i c a l d i r e c t i o n haphazard. Campaigns of the 198 0s have continued to di s p l a y these and other trends. Limited to use as l e c t u r i n g and moralizing t o o l s , subordinated to economic concerns, manipulated by the leadership, lacking constructive or pragmatic goals, and feat u r i n g meaningless content, they are inc r e a s i n g l y i r r e l e v a n t to the masses. T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S Abstract i i Table of Contents i v Introduction 1- 2 Identifying the Mass Campaign 3-•12 The Origins of Modern P o l i t i c a l P a r t i c i p a t i o n 13- 27 China's Developing Social Malaise 28-32 State and Public Responses to So c i a l Malaise 33- 49 P i Lin Pi Rung 50- 62 Post-Reform Campaign E f f o r t s 63- 87 Conclusion 88-89 Bibliography 90- 92 1 INTRODUCTION The mass campaign has long been a feature of p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n associated with the People's Republic of China. Although i t continues to play a l i m i t e d r o l e as a type of mobilization, both the usage and structure of the mass campaign have undergone numerous changes. The more recent of these developments have often followed established patterns of change, some of which f i r s t became evident over 3 0 years ago. Ce r t a i n l y the r o l e of the mass campaign has been debased and marginalized somewhat. In f a c t , i t has been stated that the "campaign s t y l e " i s no longer i n use i n the PRC today. This study w i l l provide evidence to show that t h i s i s not the case, and that the mass campaign continues to play a r o l e today, a l b e i t one much changed from the o r i g i n a l . The study w i l l provide answers to four questions. Is the mass campaign s t i l l i n use today? How has the structure of the mass campaign developed? What i s the new r o l e played by the mass campaign i n the post-Mao period? Why have these changes occurred? Section One of t h i s study w i l l b r i e f l y examine the accepted "standard" Mao-era mass campaign i n terms of d e f i n i t i o n , m o b i l i z a t i o n i n d i c a t o r s (also a measure of campaign t a c t i c s ) , and goals. Study of the mass campaign has always 2 been inseparably bound up with the study of mass p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n a more general sense, and the development of the modern r o l e of the mass campaign as one form of p a r t i c i p a t i o n w i l l be examined i n Section Two. This study done, i t becomes increasingly c l e a r that although the mass campaign remains i n use today, the standard model (often with p o s i t i v e , u s e f u l and e f f e c t i v e connotations) i s no longer an applicable one. This outcome i s p a r t l y due to the emergence of economic and p o l i t i c a l reforms i n recent years, and i n part the r e s u l t of continuing i n t r a - l e a d e r s h i p d i v i s i o n . These fact o r s have been compounded by s i g n i f i c a n t and growing s o c i a l problems, which w i l l be summarized i n Section Three. Section Four w i l l examine the responses of both the state and the p u b l i c to these developments, and w i l l o u t l i n e some of the ways i n which the uses and structure of the mass campaign have been a l t e r e d i n recent times to more c l o s e l y meet the changed goals of the B e i j i n g regime. The focus i n the l a t t e r part of the study w i l l be on a number of recent campaigns, both pre- and post-reform, which provide c h a r a c t e r i s t i c examples of the changed mass campaign. Even the most recent developments w i l l be seen to conform to the mass campaign i n i t s changed, post-Mao form and usage. 3 SECTION ONE - IDENTIFYING THE MASS CAMPAIGN The nature of the mass campaign and i t s development must be considered i n conjunction with that of the larger concept of mass mobilization. The mass campaign i s one method of putting the masses into action and of completing a set of tasks, but i t i s also i l l u s t r a t i v e of a rather unique approach to orchestrating p o l i t i c a l events and accomplishing p o l i t i c a l goals. The words "campaign s t y l e " are often used with respect to sundry Chinese p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s with a m o b i l i z a t i o n a l focus. Degrees of i n t e n s i t y e x i s t here, with the term "mass campaign" (or yundong) representing an event fe a t u r i n g at l e a s t some noticeable and purposeful increase i n i n t e n s i t y of m o b i l i z a t i o n a l a c t i v i t y and which i s d i r e c t e d toward the f u l f i l l m e n t of some goal. Such a very intense and serious use of t h i s p e c u l i a r ("campaign style") means of conducting a f f a i r s has become c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the country today, but i t i s not a Chinese invention. Predating Chinese experiences with mass campaigns were events i n the Soviet Union, where some campaign-type a c t i v i t y has taken place on a sporadic basis. Movements there, however, were a u t h o r i t a t i v e l y run, with the expected top-down administrative hierarchy i n c o n t r o l . Consequently, 4 perhaps, the degree of r e a l mass involvement or p a r t i c i p a t i o n was minimal and a large dose of coercion was often imposed to ensure adequate l e v e l s of compliance. These c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s are i n d i r e c t opposition to the o r i g i n a l Chinese i d e a l of a two-way transmission of views between masses and leaders. Furthermore, the frequent use of coercive power was i n sharp contrast to the p r a c t i c e of the Chinese, who have preferred the use of persuasion and discussion as methods of increasing understanding p r i o r to obtaining compliance. Other s o c i a l i s t countries, notably Vietnam, Korea and Cuba, have also u t i l i z e d elements of the "campaign s t y l e . " However, the most l i k e l y source of the Chinese experience l i e s i n the p e c u l i a r set of s o c i a l conditions e x i s t i n g i n the country at the time of the anti-Japanese struggle i n the 1930s and e a r l y 1940s. At that time, popular p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n communist-led g u e r r i l l a a c t i v i t y became linked with "...a wide-ranging community attack on r u r a l problems," under the leadership of the party.1 In such a "people's war," co-ordinated community action involved every i n d i v i d u a l . A r e l a t i o n s h i p between the CCP and the masses which was based on the former d i r e c t i n g and exercising authority over the l a t t e r would not engender amicable co-operation and goodwill. High m o b i l i z a t i o n a l needs required a new means of combining the r o l e of the people as a "boundless source of 1 Mark Selden, The Yenan Way in Revolutionary China (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 276. 5 power" and as "makers of h i s t o r y " with the party as the guiding, leading force i n society. The standard mass campaign was f i r s t employed i n party r e c t i f i c a t i o n e f f o r t s i n the l a t e 1930s and early 1940s. I t continued i n frequent use through the 1950s, reaching peak use at the time of the Great Leap Forward. Charles P. C e l l , i n h i s Revolution at Work: Mobilization Campaigns in China, c i t e s a vintage (and t y p i c a l ) d e f i n i t i o n which o r i g i n a l l y appeared i n Hongqi. This defined the mass mobi l i z a t i o n campaign i n China as an organized mobilization of c o l l e c t i v e action aimed at transforming thought patterns, class/power r e l a t i o n s h i p s and/or economic i n s t i t u t i o n s and pro d u c t i v i t y . 2 Although a good bare-bones de s c r i p t i o n , t h i s contains no mention of what (or who) constitutes the guiding or leading force i n the mass campaign. A more recent d e s c r i p t i o n h i g h l i g h t s the guiding/directing r o l e of the party: 1) " . . . i t s substantive goal i s to advance so c i a l i s m by targeting a p a r t i c u l a r obstacle and/or by promoting a p a r t i c u l a r i d e a l . " and 2) "... the procedural requirements f o r a mass campaign are that i t be organized and launched from above, led by the party and mass organizations, and that the masses be mobilized beyond t h e i r normal routines."3 2 Charles P. Cell, Revolution at Work: Mobilization Campaigns in China (New York: Academic Press, Inc., 1977), p. 7. 3 Tyrone White, "Postrevolutionary Mobilization in China: The One-Child Policy Reconsidered," World Politics, vol. 43 no. 1 (October, 1990), p. 58. 6 Neither of these d e f i n i t i o n s r e f e r s to the o r i g i n a l view of the campaign as a form of p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n which the masses are intended to play an important r o l e . I t i s i n t h i s l a t t e r regard that some major transformations have taken place i n the l a s t 30 years, and e s p e c i a l l y i n the l a s t decade-and-a-half. While the actual techniques and steps involved i n conducting a campaign have witnessed few changes, the goals of campaigns, and the fundamental b e l i e f s underlining the leadership thereof, have both been g r e a t l y a l t e r e d . Campaigns of a l l types and si z e s e x i s t , ranging from small l o c a l e f f o r t s to nationwide movements. They are a l l designed to meet a p a r t i c u l a r set of goals, which can range from the pragmatic tasks of basic construction to o b j e c t i v e l y preposterous i d e o l o g i c a l offensives. Gordon Bennett, i n h i s Yundong: Mass Campaigns in Chinese Communist Leadership, suggested a number of t y p i c a l goals which campaigns are intended to f u l f i l l . These included: 1) implementing e x i s t i n g p o l i c y 2) emulating advanced experience 3) introducing and popularizing new p o l i c i e s 4) c o r r e c t i n g deviations from important p u b l i c norms 5) r e c t i f y i n g leadership malpractices among responsible cadres or organizations 6) purging from o f f i c e i n d i v i d u a l s whose p o l i t i c a l opposition i s excessive 7) e f f e c t i n g enduring changes i n both i n d i v i d u a l a t t i t u d e s and s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s which w i l l contribute to the growth of a c o l l e c t i v e s p i r i t and support the construction of socialism.4 7 There i s a perhaps a c e r t a i n amount of ambiguity and overlap among the goals i n t h i s typology, and some of these objectives are quite d i f f u s e i n nature. On numerous occasions, disorganized campaign administration and i d e o l o g i c a l i n f i g h t i n g among the senior leadership have rendered i t d i f f i c u l t to determine what campaign goals are with any exactness. A more e a s i l y and widely applicable means of d i s t i n g u i s h i n g the various types of mass campaign i s needed. This has been done by looking at campaigns not i n terms of t h e i r goals but rather i n terms of t h e i r uses or areas of concentration. F.T.C. Yu distinguished economic campaigns, ideological campaigns, and struggle campaigns.5 Economic campaigns are those concerned with the carrying-out of pragmatic, constructive tasks. This type of campaign has become le s s common i n the years since the development of t h i s c ategorization i n 1967. Yu defined a struggle campaign as one i n which the target i s the "power base and/or c l a s s p o s i t i o n of enemy classes or groups."6 An i n d i v i d u a l or group of i n d i v i d u a l s i s struggled against. Targetted i n an ideological campaign are "non-antagonistic contradictions among the people." The combatting of these necessitates the 4 Gordon Bennett, Yundong: Mass Campaigns in Chinese Communist Leadership, U.C. Berkeley Center for Chinese Studies China Research Monograph no. 12 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), p. 46. 5 F.T.C. Yu, "Campaigns, Communication and Development in Communist China," Communication and Change in Developing Countries, eds. Daniel Lerner and Wilbur Schramm (Honolulu: East-West Center, 1967), pp. 201-202. 6 Ibid. 8 performance of such tasks as co r r e c t i n g "erroneous thinking," r a i s i n g p o l i t i c a l consciousness and a l t e r i n g c u l t u r a l and educational standards. This i s now the most common type of mass campaign because such e f f o r t s most c l o s e l y address the regime's current objectives. C e l l , w r i t i n g as of 1977, pointed out that there are no e a s i l y definable parameters to a campaign; often, no d i s t i n c t s t a r t i n g or f i n i s h i n g points seem to e x i s t . Although sundry e f f o r t s to increase p a r t i c i p a t i o n and a c t i v i t y may take place (for multitudinous reasons), these i n themselves may not be part of any coherent, organized campaign.7 The range of events which could p l a u s i b l y be categorized as "campaigns" has increased i n the recent past. In l i n e with the process of de-emphasizing ideology, the Chinese appear to use the word campaign loosely much of the time. "Campaigns" against i l l i t e r a c y , corruption, pornography, and the l i k e seem to continue on an off-and-on basis i n d e f i n i t e l y and show few c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of "true" campaigns. Confusingly, the o f f i c i a l press constantly r e f e r s to these as campaigns. What is a "true campaign," i n the 1990s? We must f a l l back on the statement that a noticeable increase i n organized m o b i l i z a t i o n a l a c t i v i t y 7 Cell, Revolution at Work, p. 7. 9 probably indicates that some s o r t of campaign e f f o r t i s i n the o f f i n g . Determining s p e c i f i c s t a r t and e s p e c i a l l y f i n i s h dates i s now an increasingly inexact process because of the i d e o l o g i c a l confusion, s e m i - i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d nature and lax d i r e c t i o n a l e f f o r t s of campaigns of the 1980s and 1990s. Many of the usual textbook i n d i c a t o r s of campaign a c t i v i t y may no longer be observable. C e l l (1977) delineated three types of i n d i c a t o r s of campaign a c t i v i t y . These were informational i n d i c a t o r s (newspaper a r t i c l e s , pamphlets, signs, banners, "mobilization meetings," targets f o r c r i t i c i s m , s t o r i e s f o r emulation and slogans); organizational i n d i c a t o r s (sending-in of outside cadres, the creation of workteams and the rearrangement/reallocation of resources and established programs and a c t i v i t i e s ) ; and mass participation i n d i c a t o r s ( s i m i l a r to organizational ones but with a much broader p u b l i c involvement: l e t t e r - w r i t i n g , after-hours p a r t i c i p a t i o n , m o b i l i z a t i o n of s p e c i a l groups and organizations, r a l l i e s , study groups and struggle and/or c r i t i c i s m sessions).8 Many of these are s t i l l common features of p o l i t i c a l events, but i n the 1990s they are not always i n d i c a t i v e of a "true" and thoroughgoing campaign e f f o r t . 8 Ibid., pp. 92-104. 10 Even i n Maoist times, a somewhat fuzzy d i v i d i n g l i n e existed between a mere event or s e r i e s of events and a campaign proper: a l l campaigns involve an increased i n t e n s i t y of a c t i v i t y beyond what i s expected i n regular work and l i v i n g routines. For example, i f fa c t o r y leaders issue a statement that production should be increased, and the matter i s p e r f u n c t o r i l y discussed i n the course of a regularized study session, i t should not be considered a campaign, even though the factory b u l l e t i n board may contain some new slogans or a r t i c l e s about r a i s i n g production. However, i f the frequency of study sessions increases, i f slogans are mounted over entrances to the factory, i f new b u l l e t i n boards are erected, i f new plans f o r mass p a r t i c i p a t i o n are l a i d i n a new and s p e c i a l e f f o r t to increase production - i f , i n short, information and a c t i v i t y i n d icate s p e c i a l e f f o r t s and heightened mass p a r t i c i p a t i o n and people are mobilized out of t h e i r normal work and/or l i v i n g patterns, then these events are a campaign. The absence of an e x p l i c i t formula means that f o r marginal sets of events there may be some disagreement over whether the events a c t u a l l y constitute a campaign.9 To determine the r e a l extent of mass p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n a m o b i l i z a t i o n a l effort/campaign, one could look f o r mention of the most t e l l i n g mass p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n d i c a t o r s - those rev e a l i n g the most d i r e c t , i n t r u s i v e and demonstrative i n d i v i d u a l a c t i v i t i e s . Small p u b l i c events, such as l o c a l meetings, where the need f o r i n d i v i d u a l involvement i s greatest, f i l l t h i s r o l e best and have been a common feature of most campaigns. A large part of any mass campaign i s the expressing of views by the p u b l i c . Ad hoc newspapers (produced by a l l kinds of groups), meetings, badges, signs, 9 Ibid. 11 banners, posters, and a l l sorts of c r i t i c i s m / s e l f - c r i t i c i s m opportunities were some of the most obvious ways i n which t h i s has been c a r r i e d out. Public gatherings can range from small neighbourhood groups reporting to a larg e r meeting to more organized l o c a l i t y , workplace or school study sessions. Larger events such as l o c a l , regional and national r a l l i e s also take place. Campaign meetings can take many forms. The most common has t y p i c a l l y been the "study" meeting, which i s us u a l l y convened a f t e r an i n i t i a l m o bilization meeting or a notable speech by a leadership f i g u r e . C r i t i c i s m / s e l f - c r i t i c i s m meetings are intended to combat targets which are among the masses and are not e x p l i c i t l y categorized as "the enemy," while those c l a s s i f i e d as "struggle" meetings are aimed at elements categorized as c l a s s enemies.10 In campaigns such as P i Lin Pi Kung, where the "bad element" i s not p h y s i c a l l y present, a c r i t i c i s m or condemnation meeting i s conducted. A l l these types of meetings can occur on an ongoing, scheduled basis, but t h e i r frequency increases during a campaign. Most of these s p e c i f i c campaign a c t i v i t i e s are infrequently used today. Compounding t h i s , changes have taken place i n general campaign administration i n the past 15 years. Among 10 Ibid., pp. 101-104. 12 these have been an increase i n slipshod and incomplete campaign task completion, i n d e c i s i o n over campaign focus, growing regional and other d i s p a r i t i e s i n a p p l i c a t i o n , and the i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n of some campaign a c t i v i t i e s . These s t r u c t u r a l changes apart, an abandonment of the o r i g i n a l Maoist t h e o r e t i c a l basis behind mass p a r t i c i p a t i o n has also taken place. Categorizing a mass campaign has been made more d i f f i c u l t than was the case during even the 1970s. 13 SECTION TWO - THE ORIGINS OF MODERN POLITICAL PARTICIPATION In attempting to assess the r o l e of the mass campaign i n China today, i t must be examined as something other than a mere mechanism or event designed to work against some target or f u l f i l l some goal. I t was devised i d e a l l y to be more than a mere device f o r p o l i c y implementation or a planned event intended to f u l f i l l some objective. Over the years i t has been used as one of many forms of p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n and mass mobilization. By looking at the nature of public p a r t i c i p a t i o n and mobilization, we can determine both what r o l e the yundong was intended to play and how that r o l e has been g r e a t l y a l t e r e d over time i n order to meet the most important of the regime's new objectives: the protection of the leading r o l e of the CCP and the preservation of s o c i a l order. Public p a r t i c i p a t i o n of a p o l i t i c a l nature i n the PRC can be effected i n three ways. One of these, under which heading the mass campaign i s usually placed, can be characterized as the official avenue of p a r t i c i p a t i o n . I l l i c i t p a r t i c i p a t i o n not sanctioned by the state constitutes another means, a l b e i t a r i s k y one, of g i v i n g access and influence. A t h i r d route i s that of informal p a r t i c i p a t i o n , including that 14 < based on interpersonal t i e s . A l l of these types of p a r t i c i p a t i o n serve d i f f e r e n t purposes and a l l have shortcomings which i n turn contribute to s o c i a l d i s a f f e c t i o n . In the PRC, a l l p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s expected to support the objectives of the party. A c l e a r d i f f e r e n c e e x i s t s between authorized, orthodox p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n and unauthorized protest. Some of the l a t t e r has recently been characterized as a "counterrevolutionary r e b e l l i o n . " This apt choice of words illuminates the s p e c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p between the party and " o f f i c i a l " p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the country. P a r t i c i p a t i o n has always been enshrined i n the "mass l i n e " and i s expected to be an i n t e g r a l part of promoting s o c i a l i s m . i l In t h i s t r a d i t i o n a l Maoist conceptualization, guidance and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n were expected to flow both up and down the power structure, with cadres acting as intermediaries, conducting the views of the masses to higher bodies of authority and also educating them, i f need be, through persuasion and discussion. Four progressive stages comprised the mass l i n e process: perception, summarization, authorization, and implementation. In the f i r s t of these, the cadres, 11 For the classic expostulation of the mass line, see Mao Zedong, "Some Questions Concerning Methods of Leadership," Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, vol. 3 (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), pp. 117-130; for a cursory outline of the permitted role of Party members, see Theodore Hsi-En Chen and Wen-Hui C. Chen, "The Three-Anti' and 'Five-Anti' Movements in Communist China," Pacific Affairs, vol. 26 no. 1 (March, 1953), pp. 3-4. 15 operating within the masses themselves, were to note the "scattered and unsystematic views" of the masses. They would then summarize these and transmit the r e s u l t s to the highest responsible authority i n the area concerned. Any necessary d i r e c t i v e s or authorizations would then be issued by that body, and f i n a l l y these i n s t r u c t i o n s would be explained and popularized among the masses " u n t i l they embrace them as t h e i r own" through implementation.12 This also applied i n terms of the evolution of i n d i v i d u a l thought. "Raising the consciousness" of the masses was seen as a process inv o l v i n g continuous r e p e t i t i o n of t h i s r e c i p r o c a l , i n t e r a c t i v e process. In t h i s never-ending progression, the party and cadres would take the lead, followed f i r s t by the most "progressive" classes and then by the le s s advanced. Through discussion, persuasion, and act i v e p a r t i c i p a t i o n by a l l , unity would be achieved: This concept of the transformation of s e l f -i n t e r e s t into p u b l i c i n t e r e s t through " c u l t i v a t i o n " was premised on the assumption that under so c i a l i s m the i n t e r e s t s of the i n d i v i d u a l and those of the c o l l e c t i v e were always i n p r i n c i p l e compatible - that i s , they merged. Merging took place by t a c i t r e c i p r o c a l agreement: the i n d i v i d u a l performed c e r t a i n services f o r the c o l l e c t i v e and the c o l l e c t i v e i n turn provided f o r the i n d i v i d u a l ' s welfare.13 12 John W. Lewis, Leadership in Communist China (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1963), pp. 70-75. 13/Wd., p. 25. 16 The education, discussion, review and re-formulation was to be never-ending; a l l "solutions" to problems (contradictions among the people) were, i n a sense, temporary ones. Public p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s n a t u r a l l y expected to take place through the CCP and i t s adjunct organs, but both the party and the p u b l i c can exert influence. The party r e a l i z e s c o n t r o l through leading and the masses " c o n t r o l " by way of participating. The masses are expected to be able to obtain influence s o l e l y through the party. Popular p a r t i c i p a t i o n , through a mass campaign conducted by the party, constitutes a form of democratic p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h i s larger sense.14 China does not possess d i r e c t voting arrangements f o r other than lower-level bodies. There are no authorized independent p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s or t r u l y independent pressure/lobby groups permitted to operate within the o f f i c i a l state structure.15 Democratic p a r t i c i p a t i o n takes place i n the public sphere, through the Chinese Communist Party. The party, with i t s mass membership, i s intended to be the instrument of mobilization f o r the population as a whole. Any permitted dissent i s expected to be r a i s e d within the confines of the CCP. Such 14 Bennett, Yundong, p. 18. 15 There were, as of 1990, eight "non-Communist parties" in the PRC which were allied with the CCP, but their scope for autonomous action was negligible. See Li Chiu-i, '"Multiparty Cooperation' Under the CCP's Leadership," Issues and Studies, vol. 26 no. 11 (November, 1990), pp. 75-85. 17 " m o b i l i z a t i o n a l democracy" has as one instrument the yundong, which should i d e a l l y l i n k i n d i v i d u a l a c t i v i s t commitment with state/party d i r e c t i o n : a Chinese yundong i s a government-sponsored e f f o r t to storm and eventually overwhelm strong but vulnerable b a r r i e r s to the progress of soc i a l i s m through intensive mass mobi l i z a t i o n of active personal commitment.16 A c t i v i t y which does not further the id e a l s and objectives of the party i s prohibited, but spontaneous voluntary a c t i v i t y i n support of party aims i s encouraged and indeed expected. The achievement of t h i s i d e a l i s considered a long-term goal, one which can only be forwarded through ongoing d i l i g e n t educational e f f o r t s . As an important means of mobi l i z a t i o n and p a r t i c i p a t i o n , i n mass l i n e theory, the mass campaign must be considered as one method of v o l u n t a r i l y and independently expressing mass opinion. The necessity of voluntary and u n s o l i c i t e d p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s rooted i n the view that the masses are the creators of hi s t o r y ; the party cannot accomplish anything alone, but must r e l y on the masses to achieve i t s goals. The party has a "leading" r o l e only because i t possesses the greater knowledge and experience. "Incorrect" mass opinions must be synthesized i n the way described e a r l i e r , through "patient persuasion and education," u n t i l u l t i m a t e l y the masses w i l l 16/b/d. 18 be primed to engage i n "conscious and voluntary a c t i o n . " Although ostensibly party-led, t h i s should be action by the masses taken of t h e i r own accord. P a r t i c i p a t i o n , although guided, should thus produce popularly-derived and executed p o l i c y . The p u b l i c ' s mere obedience i s inadequate, f o r the d i c t a t o r s h i p of the p r o l e t a r i a t i s intended to prepare the populace f o r r e a l l y fundamental s o c i a l changes. C i t i z e n s are expected to observe and be f a m i l i a r with a large number of regulations and prac t i c e s , and should e x h i b i t c i v i c -minded behaviours. They must be s o c i a l l y responsible and exercise v i g i l a n c e i n the public i n t e r e s t . More importantly, they must a c t i v e l y Jbecome involved and speak out i f a l l matters are to be f u l l y a i r e d and f u l l understanding i s to be developed. The mass campaign i s intended to play t h i s r o l e as a grassroots, voluntary and proactive method of pu b l i c mobilization and expression.17 In l i g h t of the l i m i t e d uses to which the mass campaign has been put i n the post-Mao years, t h i s i s a rather rosy and o p t i m i s t i c d e s c r i p t i o n . The mass campaign has become an institutionalized means of orthodox, acceptable, expected, and directed p u b l i c involvement. I t no longer f u l f i l l s i t s i d e a l r o l e as a means of a c t i v i s t , individually-motivated 17 For a fuller discussion of the role of voluntary and unsolicited mass activism, see James R. Townsend, Political Participation in Communist China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), pp. 72-76. 19 and committed mobilization, animated to some extent by the masses themselves. Many of the leadership figures i n the pr e - C u l t u r a l Revolution era concurred with the orthodox L e n i n i s t view that the expansion of productive forces had to keep pace with the transformation of the r e l a t i o n s of production. The res u l t a n t gradual expansion of p r o d u c t i v i t y would encourage the p u b l i c to j o i n i n larger c o l l e c t i v i t i e s f o r greater p r o f i t a b i l i t y and e f f i c i e n c y thus e f f e c t i n g the merger of p u b l i c - and s e l f - i n t e r e s t . Party devotees and members would, i n t h i s conception, be more than w i l l i n g to work o b j e c t i v e l y f o r the c o l l e c t i v e good knowing that t h e i r own personal i n t e r e s t s and those of the p u b l i c would at some point merge. The foregoing i s a b r i e f encapsulation of the t r a d i t i o n a l Maoist view of mass p a r t i c i p a t i o n , i n which there was supposed to be an e s s e n t i a l l y c i r c u l a r and r e c i p r o c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p between the masses and the e l i t e s . A f t e r 1949, t h i s system tended to become somewhat perverted. C r i t i c i s m s were voiced to the e f f e c t that the actual r o l e of the masses had l a r g e l y become l i m i t e d to echoing and supporting p o s i t i o n s formulated by the party leadership.18 In following the process of making s o c i a l l y b e n e f i c i a l behaviour compatible with the pursuit of s e l f - i n t e r e s t , i t 18 See Lowell Dittmer, "Public and Private Interests and the Participatory Ethic in China," Citizens and Groups in Contemporary China, ed. Victor C. Falkenheim (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1987), pp. 17-44. 20 became d i f f i c u l t to determine whether a given i n d i v i d u a l was motivated by revolutionary ardour or by se l f i s h n e s s and greed. Both types of behaviour could be achieved simultaneously, through the same actions. The r e s u l t was that the former atrophied, as concentration was not s u r p r i s i n g l y placed on the l a t t e r . I t was d i f f i c u l t to t e l l i f a given person was acting i n the i n t e r e s t s of the masses, the state, or the party - or merely pursuing h i s own personal goals. The C u l t u r a l Revolution r a d i c a l s , who viewed p u b l i c - and s e l f - i n t e r e s t as fundamentally i r r e c o n c i l a b l e , introduced a number of o r i g i n a l patterns of p a r t i c i p a t i o n , such as the unsigned big-character poster (dazibao), the independently-published t a b l o i d newspaper, and a degree of freedom to t r a v e l and exchange experiences (quanlian). The Shanghai commune of 1967 permitted a measure of autonomous mass action, free from the organizational intervention and contr o l of the party. During these years, the formal mass l i n e process as a method of i n t e r p r e t i n g the wishes of the masses was neglected. However, e f f o r t s were also made to eliminate the "commandism" and top-down party d i r e c t i o n which had become rampant during the L i u Shaoqi era. The c e n t r a l question a r i s i n g i n t h i s discussion of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the masses and the leaders i s : Who a c t u a l l y constitutes the leading force behind mobilization? 21 Even under Mao's leadership, two d i f f e r e n t types of mob i l i z a t i o n were detected. One of these was that i n which party members were subjected to the c r i t i c i s m s of the non-party masses ("open-door"). This i s a form of popularly-led m o b i l i z a t i o n from below, and has also been termed "storming." I t contemplates a somewhat d i r e c t i v e r o l e f o r the masses and f u l f i l l s part of the "mass l i n e " requirement of r e c i p r o c i t y i n communication between the masses and the leadership. The other model, termed "engineering," involves leadership from above by the party and has been linke d to L i u Shaoqi and a d i s t i n c t l y L e n i n i s t outlook. I t i s commonly a means of pursuing more pragmatic, s p e c i f i c , and p r a c t i c a l goals.19 As was the case i n the early 1960s, the second model of mob i l i z a t i o n seems to have f i r m l y supplanted the f i r s t i n the post-Mao years. In terms of d i r e c t i o n , the mass campaign i s now intended to be s t r i c t l y c o n t r o l l e d and administered by the party and state leadership, or moreover by those among them who are i n e f f e c t i v e control.2 0 These may be the leadership figures best able to make use of the mass campaign as a t o o l for gaining personal or f a c t i o n a l advantage, they may be ardent pursuers of reform, or they 19 See Lowell Dittmer, China's Continuous Revolution: The Post-Liberation Epoch, 1949-1981 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), p. 6. 20 Leaders have at times appeared to be attempting to manipulate mass activity for their own ends, as in the case of Deng Xiaoping during the Democracy Wall Movement of 1978-79, Hu Yaobang in 1986-87, or Zhao Ziyang in 1989. 2 2 may be genuinely committed ideologues. The goals and targets chosen must be outwardly r a t i o n a l i z e d as serving the in t e r e s t s of the party. At l e a s t , they must seem to be such, a f a c t which often r e s u l t s i n rather disorganized campaign e f f o r t s with near-meaningless actual content. This campaign r o l e i s a very l i m i t e d one. There are a l i m i t e d number of o f f i c i a l l y - a c c e p t e d forms of pub l i c p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n China today. Furthermore, the effectiveness of these i s circumscribed by a number of constraints, the most obvious of which i s the need to work within the confines of the Chinese Communist Party. A d d i t i o n a l l y , such popular e l e c t i o n s as do e x i s t are generally r e s t r i c t e d to the s e l e c t i n g of members of lower-l e v e l bodies and the number of candidates permitted to stand i n these contests has, u n t i l recently, been l i m i t e d . P a r t i c i p a t i o n i s viewed by many, f o r better or f o r worse, (and c e r t a i n l y by the leadership) as mob i l i z a t i o n supporting the decisions and p o l i c i e s of the leadership and the party. Other forms of p a r t i c i p a t i o n are l a r g e l y prohibited. Even so, involvement i n formal organizations and a c t i v i t i e s can present opportunities f o r exerting influence as well as for being subjected to i t . Local work and residence u n i t p a r t i c i p a t i o n has been viewed as "...an i n t e g r a l form of national p a r t i c i p a t i o n . " 2 1 Among the peasantry, mass 23 meetings and work teams present opportunities not only to receive d i r e c t i o n but also chances to provide input and make decisions. Mass organizations such as poor and lower-middle peasant associations (pinxiazhongnong xiehui) and the brigade-level women's federation (funu lianhehui) have some capacity to be used i n t h i s way, even though t h e i r ostensible purpose i s to mobilize support f o r the regime. Such other opportunities f o r input as e x i s t are l a r g e l y informal i n nature. These have the drawback of not being adequate f o r the obtaining of many objectives, e s p e c i a l l y those such as access to overseas educational opportunities, which require the co-operation of the state. P e t i t i o n s , dazibao, the w r i t i n g of l e t t e r s of protest and the use of foreign media attention are some of these. A c t i v i t i e s of more dubious (and probably i l l e g a l ) repute such as corruption, s t r i k e s and slow-downs, the o f f e r i n g of bribes, withholding goods and services and f a l s e reporting have also taken place.22 Informal a c t i v i t i e s are sometimes quite nebulous i n nature. The power to influence decision-making and the occupying of a l e g a l l y - d e f i n e d p o s i t i o n of authority are often of l e s s e r importance i n China than are factors such as guanxi, p o s i t i o n s held by one's supporters, or perhaps even 21 John Burns, "Political Participation of Peasants in China," Citizens and Groups in Contemporary China, pp. 91-121. 22/o/d., p. 105. 24 f i n a n c i a l c l o u t . Other interpersonal f a c t o r s which come into play can include an i n d i v i d u a l ' s l o c a l i t y or kinship (surname) t i e s , epitomized i n the " f i v e kinds of personal r e l a t i o n s h i p s , " or vrutong guanxi: same surname, same lineage, same v i l l a g e , same school, and same workplace. However, spontaneous mass activism of the C u l t u r a l Revolution type i s now, of course, discouraged.23 Disruption or any spontaneous popular disorder would seem to evoke sheer t e r r o r i n the leadership. This has been made e s p e c i a l l y evident since the death of Mao by the p r o l i f e r a t i o n of moralizing campaigns, law and order b l i t z e s , and propagandizing against any behaviour which c a r r i e s even a whiff of autonomous action. Lowell Dittmer points out that the r o l e of p a r t i c i p a t i o n today i n some ways resembles that of the early 1960s, with increasing emphasis on amending personal behaviour and the manufacturing of regime legitimacy.24 However, he sees the modern r o l e of the party as that of an intermediary or broker between c o l l e c t i v e , group, and i n d i v i d u a l i n t e r e s t s . In very recent mass campaigns (against "bourgeois l i b e r a l i z a t i o n " and " s p i r i t u a l p o l l u t i o n " ) , one notes a degree of xenophobia and populism which are holdovers from Maoist times. The 23 Evidence of this was provided by the 1980 revision of the state constitution eliminating the "four big" popular rights (sida) "to speak out freely, air views freely, hold great debates, and write dazibao." More recently, China's first "Law on Mass Rallies and Demonstrations" was passed to control such events; see Stephen Uhalley, Jr., "Structural Political Reform in Mainland China: Before and After Tienanmen," Issues and Studies, vol. 26 no. 7 (July, 1990), p. 53. 24 Dittmer, "Public and Private Interests," pp. 40-43. 25 character of mass p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s undoubtedly changing, but apparently not i n a consistent and c l e a r d i r e c t i o n . P r i o r to the mid-1950s, the mass campaign was used as i t was devised to be used: f o r the f u l f i l l m e n t of pragmatic tasks of s o c i a l i s t construction, the achieving of committed and co-operative p u b l i c mobilization to t h i s end, and as one component of the mass l i n e concept of r e c i p r o c a l communication between the leaders and the masses. From that period u n t i l the advent of the C u l t u r a l Revolution, a gradual process of imposing a more s t a r k l y L e n i n i s t , top-down administration took place. Accompanying t h i s was a growing use of the mass campaign as a tool f o r reforming the superstructure. Campaigns were used f o r the promotion of the regime's p o l i t i c a l legitimacy through the manipulation of p u b l i c a t t i t u d e s and b e l i e f s . In the ea r l y 1960s, problems such as a u t h o r i t a r i a n d e c i s i o n -making, top-down "commandism," and burgeoning bureaucracy were perceived as growing threats. These had t h e i r roots e a r l y i n PRC h i s t o r y . Immediately a f t e r the establishment of the PRC i n 1949, a number of problems within the Communist Party became apparent. The new government had several pressing tasks which had to be accomplished as quickly as possible and which could not wait f o r the imposition of a new system of administration with l a r g e l y 2 6 new personnel. Land reform, economic improvement, and p o l i t i c a l consolidation were paramount among these. In addition, "counterrevolutionary landlords," "bandits," and " N a t i o n a l i s t s p e c i a l agents" had to be fought. A major problem was the shortage of s k i l l e d and experienced cadres, which led to the use of force and coercion, e s p e c i a l l y i n s i t u a t i o n s where understaffing necessitated i t . S u f f i c i e n t explanations, small-group discussions, explanation of advantages and other such techniques perfected i n e a r l i e r times were often notably absent, with the r e s u l t that the expected rapport with the common people was not always forthcoming. Inexperience was also notable among cadres and administrators at the higher l e v e l s , where u n r e a l i s t i c quotas and expectations were compounded by excessive regulation and paperwork. I t was feared that what was c a l l e d "bureaucratism" and "commandism" were causing the new administration to look d i s t i n c t l y l i k e the o l d one. These trends, which continued and were l a t e r to be link e d to L i u Shaoqi, were temporarily halted during the e a r l y years of the C u l t u r a l Revolution. The emphasis i n t h i s l a t t e r period, often seen as one vast mass campaign i n i t s e l f , was on allowing greater and more spontaneous popular p a r t i c i p a t i o n . Such spontaneity was achieved through the employment of several means of p a r t i c i p a t i o n , one of which was the mass campaign. The types and uses of p a r t i c i p a t i o n 27 encouraged and permitted during d i f f e r e n t time periods are e s p e c i a l l y revealing. These differences i n the nature of permitted p a r t i c i p a t i o n are an a i d i n determining i d e o l o g i c a l turning-points and thus help i n d i s t i n g u i s h i n g one era i n post-1949 China from another. The C u l t u r a l Revolution witnessed many novel means of p a r t i c i p a t i o n , notable among which were the p r o v i n c i a l mass uprisings, the Shanghai commune, the Red Guard movement and the various ad hoc opposition groups which c r i t i c i z e d the organized revolutionary committees. The then rather i n e f f e c t u a l state of the party committees also speaks volumes about the changed nature of mass p a r t i c i p a t i o n at t h i s time. Likewise, the post-Cultural Revolution reform measures such as the May Seventh Cadre Schools, administrative down-sizing and retrenchment and some devolution of economic authority back to the provinces evidenced a change i n the d i s t r i b u t i o n of power among the leaders and the led. This was an exceptional period, featuring r a p i d changes i n the accepted view of mass p a r t i c i p a t i o n . While these "improvements" were to be eroded somewhat during the c o n f l i c t s between reformers and r a d i c a l s of the mid-1970s, a major change of d i r e c t i o n d i d not occur again u n t i l the r e -emergence of Deng Xiaoping a f t e r the Third Plenum of 1978. SECTION THREE - CHINA'S DEVELOPING SOCIAL MALAISE The massive show of p u b l i c d i s i n t e r e s t which has greeted most recent campaign e f f o r t s i s r e f l e c t i v e of a more general malaise among the population over the l i m i t e d and i n e f f e c t i v e opportunities f o r input provided by o f f i c i a l channels. China remains a b a s i c a l l y r e s t r i c t i v e s ociety i n which the opportunities f o r upward mob i l i t y and f i n a n c i a l advancement, and the rewards f o r same, remain very l i m i t e d . Often, the p o t e n t i a l rewards which can be gleaned from engaging i n i l l e g a l , b o r d e r l i n e - i l l e g a l or informal a c t i v i t y v a s t l y outweigh that remuneration which i s normally meted out f o r j u s t plodding along. The same applies to those who choose, or are able, to take advantage of the economic l i b e r a l i z a t i o n of recent years. Today, unless he i s corrupt, the i n d i v i d u a l who remains s t o l i d l y working at h i s appointed post f o r years achieves at best a modest measure of s e c u r i t y . The r e a l l y f i n a n c i a l l y successful, apart from the unpunished cri m i n a l element, are those who have taken advantage of economic l i b e r a l i z a t i o n and engaged i n entrepreneurial a c t i v i t i e s designed to s a t i s f y some unmet pu b l i c need. The post-Mao process of economic reform has had both p o s i t i v e and adverse s o c i a l consequences. Ongoing reform 29 e f f o r t s of recent years have had the e f f e c t of reducing s o c i a l cohesiveness, creating unemployment and redundancy, and increasing the income gap e x i s t i n g between r i c h and poor. D e c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n , the reorganization of township government and economic authority, and lack of f i n a n c i a l incentives f o r cadre work have re s u l t e d i n a lessening of the g r i p of both party and state on the l i v e s of r u r a l inhabitants.25 For b e n e f i c i a r i e s of reform, such greater freedom has brought a measure of independence, which i n turn further lessens the state's hold on t h e i r l i v e s . Conversely, the needed s o c i a l safety net i s becoming dangerously t h i n f o r those unable to p r o f i t from the new p o l i c i e s . Both the gains i n personal freedom and the economic problems created have undoubtedly contributed to recent increases i n crime and d i s o r d e r l y behaviour. Jurgen Domes, i n h i s The Government and Politics of the PRC: A Time of Transition, concurs with the views of Tyrene White regarding the e f f e c t s of (especially) economic change on Chinese society.26 Both a u t h o r i t i e s view recent changes as having been most noticeable i n the r u r a l areas. Among the reforms, the imposition of the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y system, and the reduction i n the r o l e of the c o l l e c t i v e are c i t e d as 25 The growth of informal economic activities in recent years has had the effect of causing a significant loss of central government revenue. See Michael D. Swaine, "China Faces the 1990's: A System in Crisis," Problems of Communism, vol. 39 no. 3 (May-June, 1990), pp. 24-26. 26 Jurgen Domes, The Government and Politics of the PRC: A Time of Transition (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1985), pp. 214-219. See also note 3. 30 having permitted not only more freedom but also greater divergence i n income l e v e l i n r u r a l areas. The unintended consequences of reform having contributed to the creation of what i s i n e f f e c t a cl a s s society i n China, the country i s now beset with s o c i a l problems. Some of these are corruption and p r i v i l e g e among cadres, embezzlement and bribery, unemployment (somewhat ameliorated by featherbedding), female i n f a n t i c i d e , and an upsurge i n often v i o l e n t crime, including smuggling, robbery, and tax evasion. Reform has also brought about higher p u b l i c expectations: Rampant s o c i a l disorder was a legacy of the Cu l t u r a l Revolution and was also fueled by the post-1978 emphasis on improved material l i f e as people, usually youths, who were unemployed or holding marginal jobs turned to crime to obtain the consumer goods appearing i n abundance. The opening to the West further r a i s e d t h e i r a s p i r a t i o n s f o r material goods and a more diverse l i f e s t y l e , r e s u l t i n g mostly i n the pursuit of i n d i v i d u a l pleasure and only oc c a s i o n a l l y i n v o l v i n g c r i m i n a l a c t i v i t i e s - with many of the most f l a g r a n t offenders the pampered o f f s p r i n g of hi g h - l e v e l cadres (gaogan zidi). In large part young people j u s t wanted to be spared the incessant p o l i t i c i z a t i o n and chaperoning the Party imposed on t h e i r lives.27 Party cadres were themselves often involved i n many unsavoury a c t i v i t i e s . Favouritism, bribery, and the use of pu b l i c funds f o r p r i v a t e construction are a l l s a i d to have occurred ( i n connection with housing). Other improprieties 27 Thomas B. Gold, "'JUST IN TIME!' China Battles Spiritual Pollution on the Eve of 1984," Asian Survey, vol. 24 no. 9 (September, 1984), p. 950. 31 have included the use of one's p o s i t i o n f o r personal gain, the i l l e g a l p r o v i s i o n of l a v i s h dinners, extortion of luxury goods from those returning to China from abroad, use of p u b l i c funds f o r overseas c a l l s , g i f t s , and banquets, and arranged educational opportunities f o r family members.28 Infractions such as these were a l l r e a d i l y v i s i b l e to the general p u b l i c , and provided examples f o r emulation. The party l a i d the blame f o r the upsurge i n crime at the feet of the "chaotic years of the C u l t u r a l Revolution" and the r e s u l t a n t u n d i s c i p l i n e d youth and on "bourgeois influences." But O r v i l l e S c h e l l more exactly places the blame: people were no longer t i e d to t h e i r r e g i s t e r e d address, or hukou, by the need f o r government coupons f o r grain, o i l , and cotton products. With new wealth and peasant-run free markets everywhere, such coupons were no longer indispensable. People could buy what they needed wherever they wanted, and were thus freed from the t i g h t l y organized system that once held them f i r m l y i n place. Criminals could move about with ease.29 Other factors a f f e c t i n g the regime's m o b i l i s a t i o n a l powers have included bureaucratic obstructionism, the a t t r a c t i o n to the party of mere opportunists rather than committed 28 Bruce J. Dickson, "Conflict and Non-Compliance in Chinese Politics: Party Rectification, 1983-87," Pacific Affairs, vol. 63 no. 2 (Summer, 1990), pp. 186-187. 29 Orville Schell, To Get Rich is Glorious: China in the 80s (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), p. 47. 32 devotees, and the desire of CCP members themselves f o r p r e d i c t a b i l i t y . The continuing ineffectiveness of mass campaigns i s not s u r p r i s i n g i n t h i s atmosphere of d i s i n t e r e s t . Compounding t h i s problem i s that those same campaigns bear l i t t l e r e l a t i o n to r e a l goals or problems, such as improving production, constructing p u b l i c works, or r e c t i f y i n g corruption and malpractices among the leadership. In recent times, only the One-Child campaign comes to mind as a pragmatic campaign of the l a t t e r type, carrying r e a l , o b j e c t i v e l y thought-out benefits e a s i l y defendable as s o c i a l l y necessary. Even t h i s campaign e f f o r t has been al t e r e d under the pressure of r u r a l reform measures and regional d i s p a r i t i e s i n campaign a p p l i c a t i o n . A concentration on obscurely-derived c r i t i c i s m and the promotion of p u b l i c moral rec t i t u d e have become more common as campaign subject matter since the early 1960s, and the number of pragmatic, p o s i t i v e , problem-solving e f f o r t s has correspondingly declined. 33 SECTION FOUR - STATE AND PUBLIC RESPONSES TO SOCIAL MALAISE The People's Republic faces problems of s o c i e t a l d i s i n t e r e s t as well as of s o c i a l i l l s (the l a t t e r exacerbated by r a d i c a l s o c i a l and economic reform). In terms of yundong, the state has responded, f i r s t l y , by choosing as a paramount goal the con t r o l of undesirable p u b l i c behaviour and s o c i a l disorder. These are now being attacked through the use of mass campaigns which are bent on encouraging "correct" deportment, ensuring a law-abiding, orderly society and providing p o s i t i v e and negative behavioural models as popular examples. This change of campaign emphasis has been a gradual one, but i t has been ongoing since at l e a s t the ea r l y 1960s. Secondly, the mass campaign has undergone s t r u c t u r a l changes. The i n t e r n a l conduct of the mass campaign i t s e l f has experienced a l t e r a t i o n s , some i n response to the needs of reform, and others due to p e r s i s t e n t leadership d i v i s i o n over goals and part " l i n e . " Related to t h i s has been a further response to disorder - a more general a p p l i c a t i o n of repression and reassertion of s o c i a l c o n t r o l . As has become usual i n recent years, the pu b l i c posture i n the face of a l l 34 these state t a c t i c s remains one l a r g e l y of c y n i c a l non-cooperation and s e l f - i n t e r e s t . Despite Deng Xiaoping's famous statement of August 1980, the mass campaign is s t i l l i n use today.30 However, even though continuing to e x i s t i n a new guise and f u l f i l l i n g a new r o l e , i t i s a pale shadow of the successful campaigns of the 1940s or 1950s. What has been lack i n g r e c e n t l y i s the drive, sense of purpose, spontaneity and enthusiasm of the e a r l i e r events. I t would seem that the r o l e of the "masses" has been taken out of the "mass campaign." In the e a r l i e r ( e s p e c i a l l y pre-1953) campaign e f f o r t s , great i n t e g r a t i v e e f f e c t s were achieved. Numerous benefits accrued to the new regime: mass experience of organization and nationwide co-ordinated action, the dissemination of a mass p o l i t i c a l language (including new slogans, newly-coined terms and other propagandizing items),31 and an hi t h e r t o unavailable opportunity f o r many previously powerless groups within Chinese society to p a r t i c i p a t e i n the new and i n i t i a l l y popular Communist p o l i t i c a l system.32 As the 30 Deng's speech of August 18,1980 appears in Beijing Review, no. 40 (October 3, 1983), pp. 14-22. 31 An accomplishment reminiscent of the efforts of the Nationalists during the 1920s to popularize a 1,000-character newspaper vocabulary for propagandizing purposes among urban illiterates. 32 See Alan P.LLiu, Communications and National Integration in Communist China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971). Liu views the date 1953 as important because it was at that point that the regime's emphasis was shifted from class struggle to patriotism/nationalism and the creation of political legitimacy, a change mirrored in campaign content. 35 regime's emphasis became more concerned with development of the superstructure than of the base, t h i s euphoria began to d i s s i p a t e . Gradually, a f t e r t h i s e a r l y period of success, other campaigns (such as that c a l l i n g f o r the emulation of L e i Feng) t a r g e t t i n g negative p u b l i c behaviour began to emerge: Though these campaigns emphasized c l a s s hatred and love of Communist c o l l e c t i v i s m , no r e a l target group was designated to be struggled against. Instead the people's voluntary emulation was emphasized. The most p l a u s i b l e reason f o r t h i s moderate s t y l e of p o l i t i c a l penetration was the growing i n e f f e c t u a l i t y of the m i l i t a n t type of mass campaigns that had dominated the pre-1953 period. This loss of effectiveness came not suddenly but gradually, over the years. I t i s an i r o n i c development that, as the Chinese people's national i d e n t i t y was heightened by Communist propaganda, disillusionment with the Communist regime and p o l i t i c a l apathy also grew s t e a d i l y among the people, also as a r e s u l t of the regime's propaganda.3 3 I t i s not s u r p r i s i n g that a large element of genuine, intimate p u b l i c involvement, r e q u i r i n g i n t e r a c t i v e behaviour, the taking of i n d i v i d u a l action and the v o i c i n g of opinion, has been missing f o r years. Even mere participation - a p h y s i c a l presence at a mass r a l l y or the reading of the necessary l i t e r a t u r e - has received l i t t l e mention recentl y . Many campaigns of recent times have been colourless proclamations empty of most p u b l i c input save that of o f f i c i a l party personnel, bureau o f f i c i a l s , and l o c a l bodies. More s i g n i f i c a n t l y , campaign objectives have 33 Ibid., pp. 97-98. 36 become much more ameliorative and conservative, l e s s v i s i o n a r y , and more co r r e c t i v e i n nature than constructive.34 Referring p a r t i c u l a r l y to the urban sec t i o n of the population, Jurgen Domes provides not only a r a t i o n a l e f o r recent campaigns attacking apathy and cynicism, but also some of t h e i r flavour: None of these (groups within the urban population) seems to be w i l l i n g to render a c t i v e support f o r the Party's p o l i c i e s or to believe i n the o f f i c i a l doctrines of the r u l i n g e l i t e . . . S i n c e the spring of 1981, the a u t h o r i t i e s have t r i e d to counter such a t t i t u d e s with an increase i n p o l i t i c a l i n d o c t r i n a t i o n i n the schools and with large-scale propaganda campaigns s t r e s s i n g p a t r i o t i s m and good behavior. These campaigns are conducted under the slogan of Five-Speak, Four-Beauty, Three Warm Loves (wujiang simei sanreai), exhorting the young generation to speak about c i v i l i z a t i o n , speak about politeness, speak about p u b l i c order, speak about health, speak about v i r t u e ; have beauty i n the heart, have beauty i n the speech, have beauty i n the environment, have beauty i n the behavior; warm love f o r the Party, warm love f o r socialism, warm love f o r the fatherland. The success of such endeavors i s s t i l l i n doubt. Since 1981, the month of March has been e s p e c i a l l y dedicated to t h i s campaign under the name of " c i v i l i z a t i o n - a n d -p oliteness month" (wenming limaoyue).35 This type of state response has as paramount goals the protection of the leading r o l e of the CCP, the preservation 34 See Bennett, Yundong, p. 33, in which the author concurs with this view, seeing yundong as moving "...away from great transformations in the economic 'base' toward changes in the organizational, intellectual, and cultural 'superstructure'...the yundong have more intensively emphasized the need for constant vigilance against backsliding on accomplishments already registered...yundong tasks have more often included calls for shifts in personal attitude and inner character..." 35/0/0*., p. 227. 37 of s o c i a l order, and the f a c i l i t a t i n g of economic reform and modernization.36 Undoubtedly, the protect i o n of the i n t e r e s t s of the dominant leadership f a c t i o n , and the promotion of t h e i r " l i n e " are also concerns of great importance. These are the overriding objectives of the leadership of the PRC today, and t h e i r f u l f i l l m e n t i s aided by appropriate use of the mass campaign. Through responding to the pressures of s o c i a l change, some of the administrative and m o b i l i z a t i o n a l p r a c t i c e s of recent campaigns have become more structured, planned and routine. Tyrene White found, i n her study of the One-Child campaign, that " v i r t u a l l y a l l " of the normal i n d i c a t o r s of campaign a c t i v i t y took place.37 However, t h i s d i d not turn out to be a standard campaign, and i t reveals one impact of reform on the running of a recent mass campaign. White found that the t a c t i c s used i n t h i s campaign were affec t e d by the pressures created as a r e s u l t of the "ongoing process of r u r a l reform." A number of changes to "standard" campaign administration took place as t h i s institutionalized mobilization evolved.38 The language of 36 The present state of affairs has many characteristics of "neo-authoritarianism," discussed in Mark P. Petracca and Mong Xiong, "The Concept of Chinese Neo-Authoritarianism: An Exploration and Democratic Critique," Asian Survey, vol. 30 no. 11 (November, 1990), pp. 1099-1117. 37 White, "Postrevolutionary Mobilization," pp. 58-59. 38 Ibid., pp. 60-64. 38 mass mobilization became les s s t r i d e n t and les s i n s i s t e n t . Cadres were instructed to avoid the use of coercion. E f f o r t s were made to construct an organizational framework which would allow a more routine administration and implementation. A l l of these p r a c t i c e s mitigated against the "movement" nature of a t r u l y grassroots p u b l i c event. At the same time, other national concerns began to take precedence over the One-Child campaign. The state responded by t r y i n g to make the best use of i t s now-limited effect i v e n e s s . Co-operation and voluntary compliance became evident as the preferred means of continuing the campaign: family planning was declared to be a fundamental state p o l i c y : the government stressed the ob l i g a t i o n of Chinese c i t i z e n s to engage i n family planning, and made e f f o r t s to b u i l d an organizational structure f o r routine administration. Yet the gap between o f f i c i a l family planning targets and the capacity of the formal party/state apparatus to reach them undermined e f f o r t s to re g u l a r i z e grassroots implementation.39 To conduct a campaign under t h i s type of systematized, almost bureaucratic format ( " i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d mobilization") means veering dangerously f a r away from the o r i g i n a l idea of a yundong as a force f o r mass public grassroots activism. That i d e a l v i s i o n of a mass campaign has indeed been l a r g e l y abandoned since the C u l t u r a l Revolution. White argues, however, that mobilization i t s e l f 39 Ibid., p. 62. 39 has not been abandoned i n China today, but has undergone changes making i t a more orderly, routine, and d i r e c t e d means of promoting reform while maintaining p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y . Some of the d i s t i n g u i s h i n g c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of t h i s new pattern which arose out of the state's i n a b i l i t y to maintain meaningful and e f f e c t i v e implementation at the l e v e l of the general r u r a l population are outl i n e d as follows: I n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d mobilization i s a var i a n t form of implementation, which involves p e r i o d i c , f u n c t i o n a l l y defined m o b i l i z a t i o n e f f o r t s that 1)temporarily i n t e n s i f y coercive and normative incentives; 2)vary from region to region i n timing, i n t e n s i t y , and scope; 3 ) l a s t f o r l i m i t e d , predictable periods of time[often s p e c i f i e d at the outset]; 4)have as t h e i r primary goal behavioral c o n t r o l or " p r a c t i c a l r e s u l t s , " not a t t i t u d i n a l or c u l t u r a l change; 5) have a diminished scope of mass p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n favor of narrow mobilizations of the target population; and 6) u t i l i z e extensive propaganda to shape p u b l i c sentiment, but discourage d i s r u p t i v e m o b i l i z a t i o n a l a c t i v i t i e s beyond the target population i n order to insulate the project from economic production and other reform i n i t i a t i v e s . 4 0 Thus, one s t r u c t u r a l response has been to make the administration of the mass campaign more routine, more systematized and more i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d (and l e s s l i k e a "true" campaign?). While i t i s l i k e l y that t h i s " i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d m obilization" i s a development which i s most obviously applicable i n the case of the One-Child AO Ibid., pp. 62-63. 40 campaign, a l l recent e f f o r t s have featured s t r u c t u r a l modifications. There has been a second type of s t r u c t u r a l response. In the more recent campaigns, lax administration, poor i n t r a - p a r t y communication and uncertainty over the p o l i t i c a l l i n e have become the norm, rendering campaign coverage and effectiveness doubtful at best.41 This most recent trend i s obvious i n the campaigns against "bourgeois l i b e r a l i z a t i o n " and " s p i r i t u a l p o l l u t i o n " and i n the most recent CCP r e c t i f i c a t i o n d rive. I t i s not s o l e l y an outcome of recent s o c i a l trends and reform-influenced problems; continuing d i v i s i o n s within the leadership have also played a part. These l a t t e r developments, obviously a f f e c t i n g recent campaign e f f o r t s , w i l l be examined i n d e t a i l elsewhere. Campaign conduct, has been a l t e r e d i n response to s o c i a l change. Changes i n the use of the mass campaign, intended to encourage s o c i a l order, are a l l i e d to the recent stepped-up use of anti-crime "campaigns." These have featured the predictable crackdowns, p u b l i c mass r a l l i e s and executions, p u b l i c i z e d capture of s e l e c t major criminals, e f f o r t s at "re-education" of u n i v e r s i t y students, r e i n i n g i n of s e l e c t 41 Dickson, "Conflict and Non-Compliance," pp. 182-185. 41 reform measures, and use of those perpetrating p a r t i c u l a r l y egregious offenses as public examples. I t i s obvious that, having been put to new uses, the structure of these "campaigns" has also been gre a t l y a l t e r e d . Use as an instrument of p u b l i c i n s t r u c t i o n , moral l e c t u r i n g , and s o c i a l c o n t r o l i s a reactive and r e s t r i c t e d way of wielding a t o o l o r i g i n a l l y intended to be a p o s i t i v e and constructive instrument of p a r t i c i p a t i o n . Often, state responses ("campaigns?" or "crackdowns?") are somewhat hard to d i s t i n g u i s h from one another. In attacking increases i n crime, the state has not acted to cor r e c t the underlying causes, but has made an e f f o r t to restore p u b l i c order.42 In one instance, t h i s came i n the form of a "campaign" against crime which i n some ways resembled a media b l i t z . One authority, O r v i l l e S c h e l l , was i n China at such a time: In January of 1982, the Party launched a nationwide anti-crime campaign. Chinese newspapers, which once were f i l l e d with slogans and long t h e o r e t i c a l t r a c t s , became so peppered with l u r i d accounts of crime and corruption that at times they read l i k e t a b l o i d s ; the object of such news s t o r i e s was not to t i t i l l a t e or to s e l l papers but to warn offenders that c r i m i n a l a c t i v i t y would be severely dealt with. Honqgi deplored the existence of *elements h o s t i l e to the s o c i a l i s t system,' who xrob the state of property, k i l l and maim the nation's workers at t h e i r posts, hijack, rape women, t r a f f i c i n women and chi l d r e n , 42 Many campaigns appear to be directed at alleviating symptoms of social distress rather than causes. See Bennett, Yundong, p. 58. tyrannize others, (and) trample upon the masses'.43 This "campaign" was notable because, unlike e a r l i e r and p r o t o t y p i c a l mass campaigns, much of the intimate p u b l i c involvement (as apart from merely p a r t i c i p a t i n g by being p h y s i c a l l y present at a campaign event) and other organizational i n d i c a t o r s were lacking. Apart from a number of mass r a l l i e s and public executions, the "campaign" featured speeches by the leaders, posters of wanted or executed i n d i v i d u a l s , press accounts, and, according to Schell's experiences, a r a l l y of schoolchildren and an a n t i -crime e x h i b i t i o n . One of the s i d e - e f f e c t s of recent pressures on the regime has been to blu r the d i s t i n c t i o n between a "true" mass campaign and an ongoing propaganda offensive. In July, 1983, the party's Central Commission fo r D i s c i p l i n e Inspection issued a s p e c i a l report e n t i t l e d "On the Work of S t r i k i n g at Serious Crimes i n the Economic F i e l d . " I t was at t h i s point that Jurgen Domes noted that an anti-crime campaign commenced: In mid-July 1983, a new nationwide campaign against rampant crime began, but i t was also dir e c t e d against what the e l i t e c a l l s " l o a f i n g , economic crimes, and counterrevolutionary a c t i v i t i e s . " In the context of t h i s new campaign, I c o l l e c t e d reports about 347 immediately executed death sentences from seventeen administrative 43 Schell, To Get Rich is Glorious, pp. 36-40. 43 uni t s during the period from J u l y 16 to September 14, 1983, alone.44 I f t h i s language and these actions are t y p i c a l of a modern "campaign," then both the nature and use of the yundong have been r a d i c a l l y changed. That September, a revised c r i m i n a l code was promulgated making i t easier and f a s t e r to prosecute those suspected of crimes. The purpose of these a c t i v i t i e s was not to bring about proper behaviour by p o s i t i v e example, to promote s o c i a l i s t construction, to spur production, or to contribute to the growth of the c o l l e c t i v e s p i r i t . Perhaps the objective of t h i s anti-crime e f f o r t f i t s one of the campaign goals outlined by Gordon Bennett i n Y u n d o n g . . . , v i z . , "to correct deviations from important public norms." The sole use to which such campaigns are put now seems to be the promotion of p u b l i c order and moral l e c t u r i n g . How has the p u b l i c responded to t h i s type of st a t e - i n s p i r e d and s t a t e - l e d campaign e f f o r t ? Both the t a c t i c s and goals of recent campaigns, which mirror those of the regime i t s e l f , have been r e s t r i c t i v e and p r o h i b i t i v e . The most prominent recent campaign, against "bourgeois l i b e r a l i z a t i o n , " was i t s e l f concocted l a r g e l y as a cor r e c t i v e response by the state (or elements of the leadership) to the events of December 1986 and January 1987. 44 Domes, The Government and Politics of the PRC, p. 226. 44 Such upheavals show us that legitimate opportunities f o r p a r t i c i p a t i o n of any sort may be too l i m i t e d i n the eyes of at l e a s t some sectors of the Chinese population. Disturbances are one public response to the perceived lack of e f f i c a c y , repressiveness and lack of opportunity e x i s t i n g i n Chinese society i n recent years. Despite occasional violence of t h i s type, i t would seem that p u b l i c disenchantment today i s more commonly manifested as cynicism and non-participation ("going through the motions"). This i s an o l d and continuing pattern of behaviour. I t has contributed to the ineffectiveness of recent mass campaigns, but i n turn i t i s p a r t l y a response to years of subjection to campaign t a c t i c s and exhortations. I t i s almost c e r t a i n l y true to say that the Chinese people are now overwhelmingly more interested i n the well-being of themselves and t h e i r f a m i l i e s / f r i e n d s before the concerns of the state. This has been another of the pu b l i c ' s responses to t h e i r s o c i a l condition, a l l i e d to the growing c y n i c a l non-participation seen i n recent years. I n i t i a l l y , the Chinese communists attempted to structure t h e i r society i n such a way that the c i t i z e n ' s p a t r i o t i c , s o c i a l i s t altruism could be brought e a s i l y to the fore. The demands placed on the c i t i z e n r y by s o c i a l i s t s ociety would e f f e c t i v e l y subjugate the i n d i v i d u a l ' s pursuance of h i s own s e l f i s h i n t e r e s t s . This would allow a l l to make meaningful 45 contributions to society without any segment of the population having to make personal s a c r i f i c e s to do so. However, these earnest e f f o r t s , extending through the 1950s, to create a "new s o c i a l i s t man" have f a i l e d . Leadership exhortations, Domes f e e l s , are l a r g e l y met with cynicism, passive dissent, and even resistance. R i s i n g expectations remain u n f u l f i l l e d , e s p e c i a l l y among lower- and middle-level workers. The r e s u l t i s at best a s e l f - c e n t r e d passive acquiescence: Those peasants who p r o f i t from the new r u r a l s o c i e t a l p o l i c i e s can be expected to support them, although only f o r the sake of t h e i r personal i n t e r e s t and under the condition that these p o l i c i e s are not changed. Yet such support i s mostly not expressed i n p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s but i n making the utmost use of a l l chances f o r an improvement of i n d i v i d u a l l i v i n g conditions.4 5 This s e l e c t i v e support i s not part of a new pattern of behaviour i n China. Careful consideration of the nature and extent of one's p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n , educational options and career choices has been de rigeur f o r years. The occurrence of t h i s pragmatic weighing of involvement and of choices has been documented as f a r back as the early 1950s.46 I t was c e r t a i n l y apparent by the e a r l y 1960s and the time of the 1963-64 S o c i a l i s t Education Campaign. Michel Oksenberg, w r i t i n g i n 1968, noted that some of the 45 Ibid., p. 230. 46 A ritualization of behaviour in response to campaigns has been noted as far back as 1953. See Harry Harding, Organizing China: The Problem of Bureaucracy 1949-1976 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1981), p. 58. 46 c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of what he c a l l e d a "ladder of success" were present by the mid-1950s, and he went on to describe the s e l e c t i v e use made by the p u b l i c of p o l i t i c a l p a rticipation.47 The nature of p u b l i c involvement i n a mass campaign i s p a r t i a l l y dependent on the degree to which the p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n d i v i d u a l s can use t h e i r involvement to maximize personal advantage. Oksenberg discerned a number of career stages through which Chinese passed. The f i r s t of these, encountered i n adolescence, was that i n which one must decide on how to meet the demands constantly thrust upon him by the p o l i t i c a l system. At t h i s time, a young person must decide to what extent and with what degree of enthusiasm he wished to p a r t i c i p a t e i n p o l i t i c a l l i f e , and would also recognize that c e r t a i n goals would be made more or les s a t t a inable depending on h i s degree of co-operation and p a r t i c i p a t i o n . Choice of career, the s e l e c t i o n of an acceptable balance between the achieving of personal ambition and cooperation with state and s o c i e t a l goals, and considerations of job se c u r i t y would come into play l a t e r i n l i f e . At t h i s l a t e r stage, the seeking of a measure of r e l a t i v e immunity from 47 Michel Oksenberg, The Institutionalisation of the Chinese Communist Revolution: The Ladder of Success on the Eve of the Cultural Revolution," The China Quarterly, no. 36 (October-December, 1968), pp. 61-92. 47 the necessity of p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n and consequences became the paramount goal. Certain objectives and ambitions were more e a s i l y r e a l i z e d than others. Some goals, including the gaining of p o l i t i c a l power and the attainment of a high status p o s i t i o n within communist society had to be pursued within the system, while others, such as se c u r i t y and peer group respect, were only obtainable outside i t . I t i s important to note that informal means of p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n are us u a l l y rather parochial i n t h e i r a p p l i c a t i o n . Engaging i n p a r t i c i p a t i o n through o f f i c i a l channels i s s t i l l necessary f o r the attainment of a large number of important personal objectives, such as the acquiring of state-funded educational opportunities abroad. The use of party membership i t s e l f as a means of personal advancement has become evident i n the loudly-proclaimed poor q u a l i t y of party members and the never-ending need fo r a cleansing of the ranks. Faced with a m u l t i p l i c i t y of c o n f l i c t i n g demands and goals, Chinese c i t i z e n s became what might be c a l l e d i n j a i l parlance " i n s t i t u t i o n p o l i t i c i a n s , " learning to modify t h e i r behaviour i n such ways as to best secure or advance t h e i r p o s i t i o n , and di s p l a y i n g j u s t s u f f i c i e n t enthusiasm as was necessary to get by. Often, however, such behaviour not unnaturally contradicted the aims of the state. Oksenberg, at the conclusion of h i s 48 a r t i c l e , summed up the e f f e c t of t h i s behaviour on the small group and on the mass campaign: Two things i n p a r t i c u l a r l e d to the loss of the mob i l i z a t i o n p o t e n t i a l of campaigns. F i r s t was that they were a l l conducted o r g a n i z a t i o n a l l y i n much the same way. As the populace learned to a n t i c i p a t e the steps of a campaign, they could take appropriate counter-measures. Second, while Party bureaucrats i n i t i a l l y welcomed the campaign fo r the increased power i t gave them over remnant KMT bureaucrats and the general populace, the Party bureaucrats gradually came to d i s l i k e the campaign f o r the disruptions and increased pressures i t brought to t h e i r lives.48 This i s one further reason f o r the regime's e f f o r t s to co n t r o l the nature of pu b l i c p a r t i c i p a t i o n and mobilization.49 The personal desire of many functionaries f o r stable and predictable l i v e s i s paramount. On a larger scale, the requirement that mass campaigns not hinder economic a c t i v i t i e s or production probably dates from the time of the Great Leap Forward. I t has c e r t a i n l y been put forward i n recent years as necessary not only to smooth the path of economic reform, but also to avoid C u l t u r a l Revolution-type disorder.50 Robert Benewick writes concerning the consequently very r e s t r i c t e d modern idea of mob i l i z a t i o n that 48 Ibid., pp. 90-91. 49 The mass campaign has also been claimed to be of use in eliminating the possibility of the privileged using the economic/social system for private gain. See Bennett, Yundong, p. 18. 50 A related idea was recently advanced by Suzanne Ogden, who writes that the mass political campaign has been one of the "...most effective means to control economic deviance" and a means of targeting "politically based economic corruption." See Suzanne Ogden, China's Unresolved Issues: Politics, Development, and Culture (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1989), p. 286. For the present leadership a legacy of the highly p o l i t i c i s e d Maoist period - p a r t i c u l a r l y the Hundred Flowers and A n t i - R i g h t i s t campaigns, the Great Leap Forward and the C u l t u r a l Revolution -i s the need to ensure s t a b i l i t y and promote economic development. This increases the pressure to d i r e c t and control the purpose, p r a c t i c e and pace of p a r t i c i p a t i o n . . . t h e dominant emphasis has been mobi l i z a t i o n f o r support, l e g i t i m a t i o n and p o l i c y implementation...participation i s characterized by i t s s e l e c t i v e , directed, c o n t r o l l e d and l a r g e l y c o l l e c t i v e nature.51 This d e s c r i p t i o n of the almost desperate need of the regime (or factions within the leadership) to exercise s o c i a l control and to thoroughly regulate p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s r e f l e c t e d i n the modern use of the "mass campaign" as a leadership-wielded administrative t o o l f o r p u b l i c i n s t r u c t i o n and admonishment. 51 Robert Benewick, "Political Participation," Reforming the Revolution: China in Transition, eds. Robert Benewick and Paul Wingrove (London: MacMillan Education, 1988), p. 52. 50 SECTION FIVE - PI LIN PI KUNG During the period following the C u l t u r a l Revolution, and extending up u n t i l the beginnings of reform i n 1978, the number of campaigns conducted was rather low. I t i s l i k e l y that t h i s was i n part the r e s u l t of the i n t e r n a l leadership d i v i s i o n s which existed at t h i s time between the advocates of a return to C u l t u r a l Revolution p o l i c i e s and those promoting reform measures. More importantly, having j u s t come through a period of extreme d i s r u p t i o n (often i n t h e i r personal l i v e s ) , the reform elements i n p a r t i c u l a r were desirous of avoiding any type of d i s o r d e r l y , spontaneous, or overzealous a c t i v i t y . Two t r u l y major nation a l campaigns which occurred during t h i s period were the campaign to c r i t i c i z e L i n Biao and Confucius and the campaign to c r i t i c i z e the "Gang of Four." Both were run i n a rather haphazard and unpredictable fashion and both revolved around struggle between the two competing f a c t i o n s of the time. The e f f o r t to c r i t i c i z e L i n Biao and Confucius followed on the heels of other, l e s s concrete, c r i t i c i s m campaigns. This campaign featured a number of the changes which have since become t y p i c a l of more recent campaign developments. One of these, r e f l e c t i n g the divorce from r e a l i t y which has characterized recent campaigns, was the choice of obscure and p e c u l i a r targets: i n d i v i d u a l s who had been dead f o r some years. Curious i d e o l o g i c a l l a b e l s were attached to them. 51 Great e f f o r t s were made to r e l a t e c r i t i c i s m of these targets to r e a l l i f e s o c i a l i s t concerns. Soon a f t e r h i s death i n September 1971, L i n Biao was condemned as an " u l t r a - L e f t i s t " as part of a campaign to c r i t i c i z e "Swindlers l i k e L i u Shaoqi." In retrospect, i t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note that L i u Shaoqi was found to be an " u l t r a - L e f t i s t " during t h i s campaign, as L i u has more commonly been seen as a " R i g h t i s t . " This acrobatic feat was accomplished by s t a t i n g that the C u l t u r a l Revolution had caused the "Swindlers" to use u l t r a - L e f t means to accomplish t h e i r aim of c a p i t a l i s t restoration.52 These l a b e l l i n g s p a r a l l e l e d f a c t i o n a l maneuverings among the top CCP leadership. By the l a t t e r part of 1972, the " C u l t u r a l Revolutionaries," most notably Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan, were working to temper c r i t i c i s m of u l t r a - L e f t i s m . This f a c t i o n was opposed by the "Veteran Revolutionaries," prominent among whom was Zhou E n l a i . L i n Biao was targetted i n t h i s l a t t e r process, was found to have engaged i n a "counterrevolutionary r e v i s i o n i s t l i n e , " and was l a b e l l e d an " u l t r a - R i g h t i s t " as e a r l y as June 1972. Countering t h i s a c t i v i t y , Renmin Ribao p r i n t e d a number of a r t i c l e s on October 14, 1972, which r e i n f o r c e d the e f f o r t s against u l t r a - L e f t i s m . These were pr i n t e d on the express 52 William A. Joseph, The Critique of Ultra-Leftism in China, 1958-1981 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984), pp. 126-127. 52 d i r e c t i o n s of Zhou Enlai.53 A back-and-forth struggle continued within the leadership f o r many months, f i n a l l y culminating i n August 1973 with the e c l i p s e of open c r i t i c i s m of u l t r a - L e f t i s m and the s h i f t i n g of i n t r a - p a r t y struggle to other fields.54 Thus, Zhou's P o l i t i c a l Report to the 10th Party Congress of August 1973 became of necessity a compromise statement between the two competing f a c t i o n s . In the summer of 1973 a r t i c l e s against Confucius and Confucianism began to appear, but i t was not u n t i l a f t e r the 10th Party Congress that these were linked with c r i t i c i s m of L i n . Thus the campaign began i n earnest. The most s i g n i f i c a n t feature of the campaign was hidden. I t provided the occasion f o r a struggle between the two camps within the CCP, the r a d i c a l s and the reformers. On a more s u p e r f i c i a l l e v e l , examination of the actual content of the campaign revealed l i t t l e that was o b j e c t i v e l y meaningful and relevant. In terms of outwardly-visible campaign targets, P i Lin Pi Rung featured a l i n k i n g of two targetted i n d i v i d u a l s who were, at face value, unrelated; however, t h e i r l a b e l l i n g was i n d i c a t i v e of the hidden, all-important struggle going on among the e l i t e . 53 Ibid., pp. 130-131. 54 Ibid., p. 137. 53 The goal(s) and target(s) of t h i s campaign were confusing and unpredictable. This was r e l a t e d to both the existence of leadership struggles and to the choice of improbable and s u p e r f i c i a l outward targets. P i Lin Pi Kong made use of h i s t o r i c a l a l l e g o r y as a means of c r i t i c i z i n g current trends and i n d i v i d u a l s without d i r e c t l y naming them. This i s a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y Chinese approach, but one which also leaves room f o r imprecision i n the matter of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . One such i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , provided by Merle Goldman, suggests that the campaign was o r i g i n a l l y intended to h a l t the gradual r e t r e a t from C u l t u r a l Revolution i d e a l s and pra c t i c e s and to c r i t i c i z e the recent reinstatements of ce r t a i n i n d i v i d u a l s who had been displaced at that time.55 Even a f t e r the 1973 Congress, the r e s u l t s of the f a c t i o n a l b a t t l e were inconclusive. The campaign p e r i o d i c a l l y featured c a l l s f o r continued retreat from C u l t u r a l Revolution p o l i c i e s . 5 6 Thus, some of the attendant goals of the campaign now were to increase c e n t r a l i z a t i o n , r e h a b i l i t a t e party o f f i c i a l s , downplay the m i l i t a r y , and to give further attention to economic development. This l i n e of c r i t i c i s m , c o - e xisting with the ongoing opposition to "ultra-Rightism," led ultimately to the c r i t i c i s m of the Gang of Four i n 1976-79. Other l a t e r campaigns stemmed from 55 Merle Goldman, "China's Anti-Confucian Campaign, 1973-74," The China Quarterly, no. 63 (September, 1975), pp. 435-462. 56 Joseph, The Critique of Ultra-Leftism, p. 144. 54 the continuing e f f o r t s of the " C u l t u r a l Revolutionaries;" one such was the 1976 campaign to c r i t i c i z e Deng Xiaoping (Pi Deng). Merle Goldman, w r i t i n g i n 1975, summarized the approach used then i n c r i t i c i z i n g C u l t u r a l Revolution trends: the dominant tone of the campaign has been to use h i s t o r i c a l figures and incidents to promote c e n t r a l i z a t i o n , i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n , i d e o l o g i c a l unity, and production - not to foment the struggle, d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n and revolutionary fervour associated with the C u l t u r a l Revolution.57 The actual subject matter of the campaign was quite remote from everyday l i f e . Two h i s t o r i c a l f i g u r e s , Ch'in Shih Huang and h i s advisor L i Ssu, were touted as heroes, they having united China p o l i t i c a l l y and i d e o l o g i c a l l y and provided strong c e n t r a l leadership f o r a f r a c t i o u s country. These two i n d i v i d u a l s were, of course, analogues of Mao Zedong and Zhou E n l a i ; other such stand-ins included Lu Pu-wei (Lin Biao) and Wang An-shih (Mao Zedong or Zhou E n l a i ) . Contributing to confusion among observers, none of these connections were anywhere stated e x p l i c i t l y . Ch'in Shih Huang was further credited with resolute leadership and h i s propensity f o r book-burning and f o r burying scholars a l i v e was explained as a means of c r i t i c i z i n g those promoting old ways and o l d r u l e s (the Confucian scholars), rather than as 57 Ibid., p. 436. 55 a n t i - i n t e l l e c t u a l a c t i v i t y . 5 8 Confucius himself was condemned as a supporter of the e x i s t i n g slave-owning society and as an opponent of the r i s i n g forces of feudalism. The Confucian scholars c r i t i c i z e d were analogous to the C u l t u r a l Revolution ideologues who were a main target of the campaign. The debate between these scholars and the L e g a l i s t s was obviously intended to p a r a l l e l the struggle between the advocates of C u l t u r a l Revolution p o l i c i e s (exemplified by L i n Biao) and t h e i r opponents. Confucianism and Confucius himself were linked with Marxist theory as well as with L i n Biao. In t h i s way, attempts were made to show d i r e c t relevance to modern l i f e : What manner of man was Confucius, who was revered by China's reactionary r u l i n g c l a s s as "the sage" for more than 2 , 0 0 0 years? Lenin pointed out: "The c a t e g o r i c a l requirement of Marxist theory i n in v e s t i g a t i n g any s o c i a l question i s that i t be examined within definite h i s t o r i c a l l i m i t s . " To analyse Confucius from the h i s t o r i c a l - m a t e r i a l i s t viewpoint, one must put him i n the context of the cl a s s struggle of h i s time and see which c l a s s standpoint he took and which c l a s s h i s ideology served.59 L i n Biao was portrayed as a sort of modern-day exponent of outdated, reactionary views: 58 The glorification of Ch'in Shih Huang apparently predates the start of the campaign itself, a publication entitled Ch'in Shih Huang having appeared in Beijing in May, 1972. Communist approval of Ch'in Shih Huang can be found even earlier: see Li Ming-hua, "The Maoists' Reversal of the Historical Verdict on Ch'in Shih Huang," Issues and Studies, vol. 10 no. 6 (March, 1974), pp. 55-68. 59 Yang Jungkuo, "Confucius - a Thinker Who Stubbornly Supported the Slave System," Selected Articles Criticizing Lin Piao and Confucius, vol. 1 (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1974), p. 1. 56 In the course of the present c r i t i c i s m of L i n Piao and Confucius, the study of the contention between these two schools [Confucian and L e g a l i s t ] i n feudal society w i l l help us deepen the c r i t i c i s m of L i n Piao's counter-revolutionary r e v i s i o n i s t l i n e and c o n s p i r a t o r i a l methods and at the same time help expose the roots of h i s reactionary world outlook.60 L i n was the embodiment of C u l t u r a l Revolution e v i l : The bourgeois c a r e e r i s t , conspirator, double-dealer, renegade and t r a i t o r L i n Piao was an out-and-out devotee of Confucius. Like a l l rea c t i o n a r i e s i n Chinese h i s t o r y when on the verge of e x t i n c t i o n , he revered Confucius and opposed the L e g a l i s t School, and attacked Chin Shih Huang, the f i r s t emperor of the Chin Dynasty (221-207 B.C.). He used the doctrines of Confucius and Mencius as a reactionary i d e o l o g i c a l weapon i n h i s p l o t t i n g to usurp Party leadership, seize state power and restore capitalism.61 The opening of the campaign was s i g n a l l e d by an a r t i c l e written by Yang Jungkuo which appeared on November 12, 1972, i n Hongqi.62 I t was d i f f i c u l t to determine, i n t h i s e a r l y phase, whether the target time period was that of the Cu l t u r a l Revolution or of the preceding L i u Shaoqi era. This was not s u r p r i s i n g , considering the uncertainty which existed among the leadership over the i d e o l o g i c a l d i r e c t i o n which the campaign was intended to follow. Who was i n 60 Lo Szuting, "Evolution of the Debate Between the Confucians and Legalists as Seen from Wang An-shih's Reform," Selected Articles Criticizing Lin Piao and Confucius, vol. 1, pp. 186-187. 61 See "Publisher's Note," Selected Articles. 62 Another source dates the start of the campaign as July 13,1972, when the Guangming Ribao published an article by Beijing University's Che Chun entitled "Viewing the Reactionary Nature of the Theory of Genius from the Angle of History of Philosophy." See Wang Hsueh-wen, "The Development of the Maoists' Criticism of Confucius Movement," Issues and Studies vol. 10 no. 6 (March 1974), pp. 32-54. 57 control? Few a r t i c l e s were published and l i t t l e of any substance occurred u n t i l the campaign began i n earnest a f t e r the 10th Party Congress i n August 1973. Some time a f t e r t h i s , a pattern of reaction to the trends (decentralization, regionalism, d i s u n i t y , chaotic administration) of the C u l t u r a l Revolution gradually began to co-exist and compete with the c r i t i q u e of L i n as an " u l t r a - R i g h t i s t . " How was the campaign c a r r i e d out? As can r e a d i l y be seen from the content, i t was a more e s o t e r i c campaign than many preceding, more pragmatic events. I t d i d not have the i n s t r u c t i o n a l aim of s o c i a l improvement that the S o c i a l i s t Education Movement had had. I t supplied no p o s i t i v e or r e a l i s t i c models f o r emulation. I t d i d not have the tangible, r e a l l i f e , concrete goals r e l a t e d to b u i l d i n g a s o c i a l i s t s ociety that the c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n campaigns had possessed. I f l o c a l meetings were held i n large numbers, t h i s was a f a c t going l a r g e l y unreported. At f i r s t glance, P i Lin Pi Rung would also appear to have had l e s s of an impact on everyday l i f e , being a rather abstract, l i t e r a r y , and ethereal undertaking.63 I t was l i k e l y that the only r e a l e f f e c t on the p u b l i c was the necessity of (hopefully e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l y ) attending a few campaign events. To stress the need f o r a c t i v i t y , Renmin Ribao. February 2, 1974, warned that 63 An official campaign theme song existed, comprising a quote from Mao Zedong: "Practice Marxism and not revisionism; unite and don't split; be open and above board, and don't intrigue and conspire." 58 Whether one i s active or i n a c t i v e towards t h i s c a r d i n a l issue of c r i t i c i z i n g L i n Biao and Confucius i s a t e s t f o r every leading comrade.64 The vast majority of the discourse connected with P i Lin Pi Kong seems to have merely taken place i n books, journals, and newspapers. Mainly a r e s t r i c t e d l i t e r a r y and h i s t o r i c a l debate, the campaign was d i r e c t e d ostensibly against problems i n the superstructure. The commencement of the campaign coincided with the p u b l i c a t i o n of a number of works by writers such as Yang Jungkuo and Che Chun at B e i j i n g University, but numerous school publications from other educational i n s t i t u t i o n s also included anti-Confucian works. Support f o r t h i s emphasis on reforming the superstructure was not u n i v e r s a l , as s i g n i f i c a n t leadership d i v i s i o n s existed. During the 10th Party Congress of August 24-28, 1973, Zhou E n l a i spoke of the need fo r emphasizing planning and c e n t r a l i z e d leadership, and stressed that " . . . i t i s the party that exercises o v e r a l l leadership."65 Wang Hungwen spoke of the need to concentrate on c l a s s struggle i n the superstructure (including the realm of culture) and to 64 Wang Hsueh-wen, "The Maoists' Deepened Struggle to Criticize Un Piao and Confucius," Issues and Studies, vol. 10 no. 9 (June, 1974), p. 5. 65 See "Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation (July-September, 1973)," The China Quarterly no. 56 (October-December, 1973), pp. 807-809. 59 r e l a t e t h i s to the s o c i a l i s t economic base. Wang mentioned the need f o r transforming " . . . a l l those parts of the superstructure that do not conform to the s o c i a l i s t economic base and carry out many great p o l i t i c a l revolutions such as the Great P r o l e t a r i a n C u l t u r a l Revolution."66 Even more s i g n i f i c a n t l y , he noted that c u l t u r a l revolutions would have to be a r e c u r r i n g phenomenon.67 Wang, of course, had r i s e n to power during the C u l t u r a l Revolution and was to achieve a d d i t i o n a l fame as a member of the "Gang of Four," which was i t s e l f to become a campaign target i n l a t e r years. Following the c l o s i n g of the Congress, i n s t r u c t i o n s were issued c a l l i n g f o r a l l sorts of organizations, f a c t o r i e s , communes, and schools to form " C r i t i c i z i n g - C o n f u c i u s Groups." Prominent i n t e l l e c t u a l s were encouraged and/or required to engage i n i n t e l l e c t u a l s e l f - c r i t i c i s m regarding past adherence to Confucianism.68 "Sent-down" educated youth were also required to p a r t i c i p a t e i n both c r i t i c i s m and s e l f - c r i t i c i s m . The r o l e of the cadre was important i n i n i t i a t i n g such c r i t i c i s m sessions, and they were exhorted to "stand i n the forefr o n t of the struggle." 66 Wang Hsueh-wen, "The Development of the Maoists' Criticism of Confucius Movement," Issues and Studies, vol. 10 no. 6 (March, 1974), p. 40. Since this time, the number of purely constructive, economic campaign efforts has continued to be negligible. 67 See "Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation (July - September, 1973)," The China Quarterly no. 56 (October-December, 1973), p. 809. 68 One example, cited in Wang Hsueh-wen, "The Development of the Maoists'Criticism of Confucius Movement," Issues and Studies, vol. 10 no. 6 (March, 1974), pp. 41-42, was the then nearly 80-year old Feng Yu-lan's "Criticism of Confucius and Self-criticism of My Previous Worship of Confucianism." 60 There e x i s t s some evidence of large-scale organized m o b i l i z a t i o n a l a c t i v i t y , e s p e c i a l l y that occurring i n the case of major, orchestrated p u b l i c events, but mass involvement at the most i n t r u s i v e , basic, l o c a l l e v e l was e i t h e r very sporadic or went e n t i r e l y unreported. As had become usual by t h i s time, authorized a c t i v i t y took place e n t i r e l y through the formal mass organizations. The party committees, located i n a l l parts of the country and i n a l l types of unit, were charged with the "promotion" of the movement. P r o v i n c i a l , municipal, and regional committees p a r t i c i p a t e d . Committees i n several u n i v e r s i t i e s mobilized t h e i r e n t i r e schools i n discussion and, s i m i l a r l y , workers' conferences took place i n numerous i n d u s t r i a l units and federations of labour unions. Various m i l i t a r y d i s t r i c t s and regions also held c r i t i c i s m r a l l i e s and, as at the above conferences, senior o f f i c e - h o l d e r s were present to speak. Province-wide mobilization r a l l i e s were conducted by the various Communist Youth League branches i n t h e i r respective provinces, sometimes two or three times. A d d i t i o n a l l y , poor and lower-middle peasants' associations and women's associations have been noted as having held meetings. A number of p r o v i n c i a l and municipal revolutionary committees also staged c r i t i c i s m sessions. While i l l u s t r a t i v e of numerous campaign c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , the actual t a c t i c s employed masked s i g n i f i c a n t r i f t s within the 61 CCP. Perhaps consequently, the widespread m o b i l i z a t i o n a l e f f o r t was, according to sources on Taiwan, not e n t i r e l y successful. One author, K'ung Te-liang, provides numerous examples, as of March 1974, of f a i l u r e on the part of the responsible party bodies to conduct any meetings. He a t t r i b u t e s t h i s , and the f a i l u r e of various o f f i c i a l s to appear, to the leadership of the CCP Central Committee and the various responsible l o c a l organs (including the m i l i t a r y d i s t r i c t or region commanders and commissars) being i n the hands of the C u l t u r a l Revolution faction.69 This may be a reasonable f i n d i n g , and there i s copious evidence f o r the existence of such camps. The r o l e of factions and power groups i n the campaign has been examined by P a r r i s Chang, who found that, as of early 1974, the campaign was s t i l l the scene of an inconclusive b a t t l e between the established conservative forces and the r a d i c a l , pro-Cultural Revolution elements.70 This assessment pointedly reveals the imprecision which hampers attempts to analyze such campaigns. Other, l a t e r , discussions have viewed t h i s stage of P i Lin Pi Kong as one of planned attack on the legacy of the C u l t u r a l Revolution and i t s "new-born things." 69 K'ung Te-liang, "The Maoist Mobilization for Criticizing Lin Piao and Confucius," Issues and Studies, vol. 10 no. 10 (July, 1974), pp. 46-49. 70 Parris Chang, "The Anti-Lin Piao and Confucius Campaign: Its Meaning and Purposes," Asian Survey, vol. 14 no. 10 (October, 1974), p. 876. 62 This uncertainty makes i t apparent that leadership d i v i s i o n r e s u l t e d i n the campaign being used by d i f f e r e n t groups to promote d i f f e r i n g views. P i Lin Pi Rung can be seen as ushering i n an era witnessing t h i s frequent use of campaigns as t o o l s by leadership f a c t i o n s . The s h i f t i n g and contending has undoubtedly contributed to the absurd, confusing, and sometimes n e g l i g i b l e outward content of recent campaigns. S E C T I O N S I X - P O S T - R E F O R M C A M P A I G N E F F O R T S Since the removal from power of Hua Guofeng, the most recent campaign e f f o r t s have witnessed an ac c e l e r a t i o n of the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s j u s t noted. In p a r t i c u l a r , confusion over goals, leadership disunity, a lack of relevance to r e a l d a i l y l i f e , and an increase i n moralizing and p u b l i c i n s t r u c t i o n continued to take place. At l e a s t three campaigns (for CCP r e c t i f i c a t i o n , against " s p i r i t u a l p o l l u t i o n , " and against "bourgeois l i b e r a l i z a t i o n " ) have overlapped each other since the ea r l y 1980s. E a r l i e r i t was noted that one s t r u c t u r a l change i n campaign conduct, due at l e a s t i n part to leadership d i s u n i t y over i d e o l o g i c a l objectives and targets, was a trend toward imperfection, lack of d i r e c t i o n , and sloppiness in the administration of some recent campaigns. Another s t r u c t u r a l change was found to be a growing " i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d m o b ilization." Evidence of both of these can be found i n the 1980s. In the case of the P i Lin Pi Kung campaign, which had few concrete, p u b l i c l y - s t a t e d and obvious targets or goals, i t was d i f f i c u l t to determine eith e r where the campaign was going or what the extent of leadership i d e o l o g i c a l d i s u n i t y was. Many of the s p e c i f i c t a c t i c s used (such as obscure 64 l i t e r a r y c r i t i c i s m ) were estranged from r e a l l i f e . The campaigns of the 1980s have evidenced continuing chaotic administration, confusion over goals, lack of e f f e c t i v e c e n t r a l c o n t r o l , and d i s p a r i t i e s i n coverage and effecti v e n e s s . D i v i s i o n within the top ranks of the leadership has been a feature a f f e c t i n g (or orchestrating?) a l l recent campaign e f f o r t s . Moralizing has been c a r r i e d to new heights and with campaign goals and targets so varied and vague, campaigns have tended to run on in t o one another. Internal p o l i t i c a l i n f i g h t i n g aside, what are the outward goals of the newest campaigns? What are they intended to accomplish? The campaign against " s p i r i t u a l p o l l u t i o n " coincided with the early stages of the 1983-7 party r e c t i f i c a t i o n campaign, the crackdown ("campaign") on crime, and with a period of growing l i t e r a r y , a r t i s t i c and i n t e l l e c t u a l l i b e r a l i z a t i o n and experimentation. These, and the l a t e r e f f o r t s against "bourgeois l i b e r a l i z a t i o n " and the " s i x e v i l s , " can a l l be linked c h r o n o l o g i c a l l y i n terms of goals. A l l were " c a t c h - a l l " campaigns, t a c k l i n g a v a r i e t y of perceived s o c i a l problems. With the possi b l e exception of the a t y p i c a l One-Child campaign, these recent campaigns have not been intended to promote any outwardly-visible tangible cause or forward an objective. Despite the la b e l s attached to them ( " s p i r i t u a l p o l l u t i o n , " "bourgeois l i b e r a l i z a t i o n " ) , the r e a l targets have c o n s i s t e n t l y been those s o c i a l problems, including disorder, corruption, and 65 challenges to CCP leadership, which are seen as most threatening. Since Hua Guofeng's departure and h i s replacement by the Deng Xiaoping forces, the main emphasis has been on achieving " s o c i a l i s t modernization and construction" and not on combatting c l a s s enemies and c l a s s c o n f l i c t . Adherence to the "Four Cardinal P r i n c i p l e s , " i n c l u d i n g the supremacy of party leadership, i s also to be promoted. Concentration i s now to be on the "forces of production," the "four modernizations," and the advancement of Chinese so c i e t y through economic and i n f r a s t r u c t u r a l reform.71 By the early 1980s, opposition to the new " l i n e " and debate about the merits of the new p o l i c i e s connected with i t were seen as threatening by the leadership. Many of the s o c i a l problems China was experiencing were exacerbated by outside forei g n influences. Although c r i t i c i s m of "bourgeois l i b e r a l i z a t i o n " had been occurring s p o r a d i c a l l y since 1978, only now was t h i s f o r e i g n - i n s p i r e d decadence allowed to become an object of campaign attack. There was a perceived need f o r a r t and l i t e r a t u r e to "serve the people" and promote socialism, as well as a need to adhere to nati o n a l t r a d i t i o n s i n written works. There was s a i d to be "too much 71 This has been characterized as the emergence of a new "line," and leadership struggles since 1978 have been seen as basically supportive of this new approach and merely factional in nature. See Ramon H. Myers, "Does the CCP Have a 'Line'?," Changes in China: Party, State, and Society, ed. Leng Shao-chuan (Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 1989), pp. 17-37. 66 w r i t i n g about the dark side," and some were c r i t i c i z e d as advocates of Western modernist thought. Such people, i t was said, "think that creative work has no need f o r t h e o r e t i c a l guidance, and some c a l l f o r 'self-expression' as the highest objective of l i t e r a t u r e and art."72 The growth of Western humanism i n wr i t i n g was deplored and c a l l s were made f o r a return to s o c i a l i s t realism. An i n f l u x of Western music, videotapes, dancing, f i l m s and books began entering China i n the e a r l y 1980s. A l l e g o r i c a l and p o l i t i c a l l y c r i t i c a l works by Chinese writers, such as Zhang Xiaotian's Clustered Grass on the Prairie and the writings of Wang Ruoshui i n Renmin Ribao began to appear. These a l l became targets of the campaign. The commencement of the assault against " s p i r i t u a l p o l l u t i o n " was s i g n a l l e d by media attacks against target i n d i v i d u a l s and by Deng's speech at the Second Plenum of the 12th Central Committee, held October 11-12, 1983. The attack on s p i r i t u a l p o l l u t i o n was c l e a r l y leadership-approved at t h i s early stage. Deng defined: the substance of S p i r i t u a l P o l l u t i o n as disseminating a l l v a r i e t i e s of corrupt and decadent ideologies of the bourgeoisie and other e x p l o i t i n g classes and disseminating sentiments of d i s t r u s t towards the s o c i a l i s t and communist cause and to the Communist Party leadership.73 72 Renmin Ribao, October 31,1983, p. 1. 67 Asserting the need fo r stronger party leadership, he c a l l e d f o r more de c i s i v e s o c i a l guidance. Deng Liqun delineated four categories of s p i r i t u a l p o l l u t i o n : spreading things that are obscene, barbarous or reactionary; vulgar t a s t e i n a r t i s t i c performances; e f f o r t s to seek personal gain, and indulgence i n individualism, anarchism, and l i b e r a l i s m ; as well as w r i t i n g a r t i c l e s or d e l i v e r i n g speeches that run counter to the country's s o c i a l system.74 In response, a c a t c h - a l l campaign of r e a c t i o n to t h i s generally unsatisfactory s o c i a l state was i n i t i a t e d . The paramount goal of t h i s was to suppress the most serious emerging threats to the authority of the CCP (or that of groups or f a c t i o n s within the party). No p r a c t i c a l or constructive aims were present, although there was the p r o v i s i o n of a number of further examples of correct s o c i a l i s t behaviour f o r public emulation. I f some p o s i t i v e improvement r e q u i r i n g true and deep p u b l i c commitment with an element of spontaneity was intended as a goal, surely e f f o r t s would have been made to induce w i l l i n g mass cooperation without recourse to s e l e c t i v e , r e t a l i a t o r y c r i t i c i s m and a f l o o d of negative examples. 73 See Beijing Review, no. 42 (October 17,1983), centrefold document pages, for the English text of Deng's speech to the Plenum of Oct. 11-12,1983. 74 Renmin Ribao, November 3,1983, p. 1. 68 Despite t h i s , attempts were made to l i n k the campaign's l i t e r a r y c r i t i c i s m to r e a l l i f e . The promotion of " s o c i a l i s t s p i r i t u a l c i v i l i z a t i o n , " as contrasted to Western material c i v i l i z a t i o n , encompassed s p e c i a l s o c i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s f o r the writer. They were to engage i n " s o c i a l i s t realism," to avoid w r i t i n g s o l e l y f o r monetary gain, and were to be held responsible f o r the e f f e c t s of t h e i r w r i t i n g on society. As representatives of p u b l i c morality, they were expected to remain above debasement, opportunism and corruption. Through consideration of " s o c i a l i s t s p i r i t u a l c i v i l i z a t i o n , " the category of l i t e r a r y issues came to include within i t s o c i a l , p h i l o s o p h i c a l , and moral problems.75 The b u i l d i n g of " s o c i a l i s t s p i r i t u a l c i v i l i z a t i o n " had been named as a necessary p r e r e q u i s i t e to the achievement of the Four Modernizations i n early 1981. A separate drive promoting " s o c i a l i s t s p i r i t u a l c i v i l i z a t i o n " had commenced at l e a s t as f a r back as the spring of 1982. This has contributed to the d i f f i c u l t i e s i n separating one campaign e f f o r t from another. I t was at t h i s time that the wujiang simei sanreai were f i r s t put forward as a moral code to be followed.76 75 Wendy Larson, "Realism, Modernism, and the Anti-'Spiritual Pollution' Campaign in China," Modem China, vol. 15 no. 1 (January 1989), pp. 41-43. 76 This is summarily described in Dittmer, China's Continuous Revolution, p. 262. 69 The report of the 12th Party Congress, held i n September, 1982, outlined the outward targets of t h i s e a r l i e r d r ive. C i v i l i z a t i o n was seen to have both a material and a s p i r i t u a l aspect, with the l a t t e r encompassing "the development of education, science, c u l t u r a l knowledge and the enhancement of people's ideology, p o l i t i c s , and morality." The report s a i d that I f the great task of b u i l d i n g a s o c i a l i s t s p i r i t u a l c i v i l i z a t i o n guided by communist ideology i s overlooked, people w i l l f a l l i nto a one-sided understanding of socialism and d i r e c t t h e i r attention e x c l u s i v e l y to the b u i l d i n g of material c i v i l i z a t i o n or even to the p u r s u i t of material gains.77 The party required cadres to become "more revolutionary, better educated and more p r o f e s s i o n a l l y competent," and c a l l e d f o r the development of "national i d e a l s , morality, culture and a sense of d i s c i p l i n e . " 7 8 These c a l l s became c e n t r a l goals of the l a t e r campaign against " s p i r i t u a l p o l l u t i o n . " Sub-bodies and regional party committees met a f t e r the October, 1983, Second Plenum to study the meeting's works and c a l l e d f o r g e t t i n g the campaign underway. Media e d i t o r i a l s and a r t i c l e s served the purpose of l e g i t i m i z i n g c r i t i c i s m of, i n p a r t i c u l a r , t h e o r e t i c a l , l i t e r a r y and a r t i s t i c workers. Members of the 77 See excerpts from Hongqi, issue dated November 19,1982, published in Beijing Review, vol. 25 no. 45 (November 8, 1982), pp. 13-17. 78 Ibid. 70 pu b l i c t r a f f i c k i n g i n pornography f i r s t became a target at t h i s time. Other targets included party t h e o r e t i c i a n s , party and non-party l i t e r a r y and a r t figu r e s , and the cadres i n charge of them. As with the p u b l i c denunciations i n the Pi Lin Pi Kung campaign, the famous led the way. The e l d e r l y Zhou Yang, chairman of the All-China Federation of L i t e r a r y and Art C i r c l e s , was one of those who had urged writers to write honestly. As a supporter of Wang Ming during the 1930s, Zhou was f o r some time out of favour with important elements of the CCP hierarchy. Despite t h i s , he rose to become minister of cultur e during the 1950s. Severely v i c t i m i z e d during the C u l t u r a l Revolution, he was at that time paraded through the str e e t s with an incriminating placard t i e d around h i s neck. In subsequent years Zhou was returned to a comfortable p o s i t i o n as an e l d e r l y l i t e r a r y statesman, but during the campaign against s p i r i t u a l p o l l u t i o n was subjected to e d i t o r i a l c r i t i c i s m s f o r h i s encouragement of t r u t h f u l w r i t i n g and h i s 1983 discussion of humanism and alienation.79 This i s a standard method of attacking perceived excesses taking place during times of "open-ness. 1 1 I t t y p i c a l l y 79 At the heart of Zhou's article "A Discussion of Certain Theoretical Problems in Marxism" was his belief that the talented were alienated from socialist society because of its lack of humanism, which problem is in turn derived from an improper overconcentration on class struggle. See Renmin Ribao, March 16,1983. involves i d e n t i f y i n g and p u b l i c l y l a b e l l i n g those seen as being out of l i n e and conducting a p u b l i c i t y campaign against them, l a r g e l y through the media. This was done i n l a t e 1983. Authors who were i d e n t i f i e d as having written offensive pieces were also c r i t i c i z e d p u b l i c l y and a number, Wang Ruoshui among them, l o s t t h e i r jobs. Again l i k e the P i Lin Pi Kung campaign, t h i s was a mainly l i t e r a r y e f f o r t , with minimal d i s r u p t i o n to mass d a i l y a c t i v i t i e s . Speeches by leadership figures at a l l l e v e l s were given i n a l l sorts of fora, at meetings of o f f i c i a l organizations, at party meetings, and at interviews i n the press. Prominent targets accepted some blame p u b l i c l y . Certain groups were to receive more i d e o l o g i c a l education. One mass meeting was held at B e i j i n g U n i v e r s i t y and i s o l a t e d meetings of o f f i c i a l mass organizations also took place during t h i s short campaign. However, r e a l , intimate mass involvement was probably non-existent. In an excellent and informative small a r t i c l e , Charles Webb conveys something of the atmosphere surrounding the campaign, which coincided with the "campaign" on law and order: Posters went up, the odd speech was made, and "the masses were morally armed f o r the Struggle." I t was, i n some quarters, suggested that i t was a bad thing f o r the Chinese to associate with foreigners. Cheap, trashy imitations of Western culture were frowned upon; socialism was to be upheld. The r e s u l t s was rather pleasant. For a time, i t was unfashionable f o r the Shanghai s t r e e t spivs to hang about i n tight-hipped, f l a r e d jeans. Zhao Ziyang exchanged badly cut western s u i t s with 7 2 awkward t i e s f o r w e l l - t a i l o r e d Chinese jackets. And, by and large, the Chinese laughed. C e r t a i n l y they d i d i n Shanghai. L i f e went on, no-one took the campaign seriously, and i t flopped.80 A number of celebrated cases occurred where foreigners were requested to hand over pornography. In Lanzhou, the Gansu Armed People's P o l i c e Force guided "cadres and f i g h t e r s i n reading good books and singing revolutionary songs" to prevent a recurrence of unhealthy tendencies that had l e d some of them to "wear mustaches and whiskers, sing unhealthy songs, be u n d i s c i p l i n e d and not keep t h e i r minds on t h e i r work and want to be demobilized and permitted to return home at an ea r l y date."81 Why would such, at face value, preposterous shortcomings be the focus of such national p u b l i c i t y e f f o r t s unless they were intended to be exemplary of undesirable behaviour? I t i s l i k e l y that those i n con t r o l among the leadership had a need not only to combat unhealthy s o c i a l tendencies, but also to be seen doing so. The l a t t e r portion of 1983 witnessed much discussion, moralizing t a l k and s p i r i t -r a i s i n g but l i t t l e concrete action by the pub l i c , to whom the campaign was supposedly directed. Indeed, the major campaign weapon was "active i d e o l o g i c a l struggle" ( j i j i di sixiang douzheng) which indicated merely a continuing objective, restrained and sensible c r i t i c i s m . Denials were 80 Charles Webb, "China: An Outsider's Inside View," Asian Affairs, vol. 17 (o.s. vol. 73) part I (February, 1986), pp. 57-63. 81 Gold, "JUST IN TIME," pp. 957-958. 73 issued to the e f f e c t that what was going on was not a campaign, but was merely a "commonplace task." Other t a c t i c s of t h i s sort included the introduction of a v a r i e t y of s i m p l i s t i c but well-intentioned new models (the "advanced persons") f o r emulation: i n t e l l e c t u a l s such as Jiang Zhuying and Luo J i a n f u , m i l i t i a member Zhu Boru and the handicapped Zhang Haidi. "National S o c i a l i s t Ethics and Courtesy Month", which was i n s t i t u t e d o r i g i n a l l y i n 1982, was continued (held every March), and " c i v i l i t y v i l l a g e s " were established i n the countryside as l a r g e r - s c a l e examples of correct p u b l i c behaviour. "Five-good f a m i l i e s " were promoted. Such a family would: be d i l i g e n t at work and study, consider family members and neighbours, p r a c t i c e family planning and pay attention to children's education, observe the law and be d i s c i p l i n e d , and e x h i b i t courteous p u b l i c behaviour.82 I t was quite apparent that there was no one guiding hand at work, as " s p i r i t u a l p o l l u t i o n " became a category encompassing a vast array of items chosen f o r attack. Excesses began to occur as the range of targets expanded to include more than mere l i t e r a r y and a r t i s t i c l i c e n s e . The campaign quickly got out of hand and became a drive against many sacrosanct aspects of the ongoing modernization 82 An excellent discussion of many of these activities is provided in Chang Ching-li, "Promotion of Socialist Spiritual Civilization on the Chinese Mainland," Issues and Studies, vol. 19 no. 8 (August, 1983), pp. 23-40. 74 program.83 With the campaign c i r c l e widening and taking an u l t r a - L e f t i s t , xenophobic d i r e c t i o n , i t began to be used as a cover to attack those i n p r i v i l e g e d positions.84 In November, 1983, e f f o r t s were made to define the l i m i t s of the attack, and cautions were issued reminding the overzealous that some youth behaviours (such as the wearing of longer h a i r s t y l e s ) were not evidence of s p i r i t u a l p o l l u t i o n . By l a t e December, and c e r t a i n l y by the end of January, the movement appeared to have been put on hold. The end of the campaign r e f l e c t e d a number of the Deng regime's p r i o r i t i e s . Economic modernization and reform was sought, along with the preservation of CCP power. True p u r i f i c a t i o n was also an objective, but the cost of the s o c i a l l y d i v i s i v e campaign was too high i n terms of s t a b i l i t y . L i b e r a l i z a t i o n was something to be avoided, but i t has been s a i d that Deng f a i l e d to d i f f e r e n t i a t e modernization from Westernization.85 In the campaign against " s p i r i t u a l p o l l u t i o n , " leadership d i s u n i t y was not centred on the same d i v i s i o n s as existed at the time of the campaign to c r i t i c i z e L i n Biao and Confucius. There has been no su b s t a n t i a l c o n f l i c t over 83 Because of the adverse effects of the campaign on economic reform, the field of discussion was explicitly limited to ideological and literary matters in November, 1983. See Dittmer, China's Continuous Revolution, pp. 262-263. 84 Gold, "JUST IN TIME!,'" p. 973. 85to/d., pp. 973-974. 75 party " l i n e " i n recent years. Although leadership f i g u r e s may s t i l l be classed as moderates and conservatives, i t i s d i f f i c u l t to document that an i d e o l o g i c a l c o n f l i c t e x i s t s now between reformists and C u l t u r a l Revolutionary r a d i c a l s . Some senior leaders, such as Deng Xiaoping, Hu Qiaomu, Deng Liqun, Peng Zhen, Wang Zhen, and Yu Q i u l i are seen as merely more r e s i s t a n t to a r a p i d opening-up to the world than are others. One view recently put forward sees the larger arena of disagreement not as c o n f l i c t over the continuation of reform i t s e l f , but as dispute over personal power and f a c t i o n a l issues.86 Beginning simultaneously with the movement against " s p i r i t u a l p o l l u t i o n , " and extending i n t o 1987, a CCP r e c t i f i c a t i o n campaign was conducted. The problems which plagued Chinese society i n general also existed i n the party i t s e l f , which had a membership of around f o r t y m i l l i o n at t h i s time. A d d i t i o n a l l y , with the new emphasis on modernization, and on i n f r a s t r u c t u r a l and economic reform, a large portion of the membership was becoming of dubious i d e o l o g i c a l q u a l i t y . "Nine types" of party members were distinguished i n the 1983 "Decision on Party Consolidation." These included three types of party member whose detractions were deemed serious 86 This view is put forward in Ramon H. Myers, "Does the CCP Have a 'Line'?," pp. 33-34. 76 enough by the Central Committee to warrant removal from the party: "...persons who have r i s e n to prominence by following the counterrevolutionary cliques of L i n Piao and Chiang Ch'ing i n ' r e b e l l i o n , ' those who have been s e r i o u s l y f a c t i o n a l i s t i n t h e i r ideas, and those who have indulged i n beating, smashing and l o o t i n g . " 8 7 "Three impurities," i n ideology, i n work s t y l e , and i n organization, would also be sought out.88 C u l t u r a l Revolution-era members were mostly "red" rather than "expert." The Third Plenum of 1978, at which the Four Modernizations were put forward, s h i f t e d party work emphasis from c l a s s struggle to s o c i a l i s t modernization, which required b e t t e r - t r a i n e d and s k i l l e d cadres. I d e o l o g i c a l l y out-of-step, some of the e x i s t i n g cadres and members were not believed to be sympathetic to the economic and p o l i t i c a l reforms going on. Remnant C u l t u r a l Revolution influences were also blamed f o r other troubles. With a massive (and opportunistic?) membership, routine party work was l i k e l y being done i n a rather cursory fashion. Uncertainty over the i d e o l o g i c a l , p o l i t i c a l , and organizational l i n e of the party contributed to the doubtful merit of new members. Many basic questions of ideology had been glossed over i n 87 Hsuan Mo, "Party Consolidation: Teng's Final Struggle?," Issues and Studies vol. 20 no. 1 (January, 1984), pp. 16-17. 88 Ibid. 77 recent years while the party had concentrated on economic reforms and f i g h t i n g economic crime. O f f i c i a l l y , four reasons were given f o r the r e c t i f i c a t i o n . These were: to unify a l l party members i d e o l o g i c a l l y with the Central Committee (to promote a c l e a r understanding of current l i n e and p o l i c i e s ) , to r e c t i f y party work s t y l e by acting i n the i n t e r e s t of the masses, to strengthen party d i s c i p l i n e ( p a r t i c u l a r l y the norm of democratic-centralism), and to expel those party members who do not achieve the f i r s t three goals.89 Seemingly intended to be a t i g h t l y - c o n t r o l l e d e f f o r t , the r e c t i f i c a t i o n was to be a "top-down" e f f o r t , s t r i c t l y closed-door i n nature. The drive commenced with an e x p l i c i t statement at the same Second Plenum of the 12th Central Committee which launched the assault on " s p i r i t u a l p o l l u t i o n . " The l a t t e r campaign, conceived i n response to f a c t i o n a l pressures within the leadership, constituted the "mass" or p u b l i c aspect of a general (masses and party) attack on unsatisfactory conditions. The Central Committee statement made i t c l e a r that, even though the 'correct' opinions of non-party members would be sought, on no account should the past erroneous p r a c t i c e of " l e t t i n g the masses consolidate the Party" or 89 Dickson, "Conflict and Non-Compliance," pp. 174-175. 78 l e t t i n g non-Party members decide issues i n the Party be repeated.90 This was an attempt to avoid the disorder and loss of cont r o l evident i n previous r e c t i f i c a t i o n s . I t also showed that any r o l e of the masses as a cleansing, "storming" force continued to be o f f i c i a l l y frowned upon. The party's Central D i s c i p l i n e Inspection Commission (CDIC) was, f o r the f i r s t time, involved i n a r e c t i f i c a t i o n campaign, with the job of providing negative examples to r e i n f o r c e c o r r e c t behaviour i n party members. An a d d i t i o n a l body, the Central Commission f o r Guiding Party R e c t i f i c a t i o n (CCGPR) was set up s p e c i f i c a l l y to conduct the o v e r a l l campaign e f f o r t . A l l these measures were aimed at permitting the CCP to maintain s t r i c t control over i t s own i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s . A s i m i l a r desire f o r i n t e r n a l regulation i n the party arose a f t e r the f a i l u r e of the Great Leap Forward. In terms of CCP organization, the period of the ea r l y 1960s has often been compared with the post-1978 era. I t was during the years 1958-66 that the imposition of con t r o l commission organs on i n t e r n a l party a f f a i r s , the abandoning of "open-door" r e c t i f i c a t i o n , and an emphasis on organization and order, r u l e s and routine f i r s t became apparent.91 90 From "The Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Party Consolidation" of Oct. 11, 1983. See Beijing Review, vol. 26 no. 42 (October 17,1983), centrefold document pages. 91 Charles Neuhauser, "The Chinese Communist Party in the 1960s: Prelude to the Cultural Revolution," The China Quarterly, no. 32 (October-December, 1967), pp. 14-19. 79 The chief c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the r e c t i f i c a t i o n seems to have been i t s ine f f e c t i v e n e s s . Problems abounded, many of which were due to the confusion which existed over the emphasis and goals of the campaign. The primary objective of the regime at t h i s time was, of course, the ongoing modernization and reform program. Party r e c t i f i c a t i o n could not be allowed to i n t e r f e r e with t h i s d r i v e . This campaign i n p a r t i c u l a r suffered from a number of f a u l t s , most notably shoddy administration and l u c k l u s t r e implementation. To encourage members to improve t h e i r work s t y l e , the need f o r the provi s i o n of s e l e c t i v e incentives was recognized. However, these d i d not prove a t t r a c t i v e enough. Model rewards f o r good work were becoming redundant when compared to the p o t e n t i a l benefits to be derived from engaging i n corruption and abuse of power.92 Furthermore, improvements i n work s t y l e were only c a l l e d f o r on the flimsy basis that i f they were achieved, a l l would benefit from the c o l l e c t i v e goals of r e c t i f i c a t i o n . I d e o l o g i c a l d i s u n i t y among the leadership was evidenced by the s h i f t i n g focus of the campaign. This was most obvious i n the two c o n f l i c t i n g p r i o r i t i e s of economic production and party r e c t i f i c a t i o n . The campaign was one i n which part-time p a r t i c i p a t i o n was encouraged so as not to disrupt 92 Ibid., p. 176. 80 production. The demands of production and the necessity of attending to one's work detracted from the campaign's effectiveness - a ready excuse was provided to some to avoid r e c t i f i c a t i o n . One of the reasons f o r the campaign was to acquire more s k i l l e d cadres f o r economic reform purposes. Indeed, economic performance was used as an outright i n d i c a t o r of campaign success, and economic reform was continuously taking precedence over r e c t i f i c a t i o n matters. An e f f e c t i v e campaign t y p i c a l l y includes a blend of persuasion and coercion, but l i t t l e of the l a t t e r was evident i n the r e c t i f i c a t i o n . Only 0.4% of the CCP membership was removed as a r e s u l t of t h i s campaign. With leniency stressed i n the r e c t i f i c a t i o n , the p o s s i b i l i t y of being expelled was not high. Consequently, lack of enthusiasm on the part of members was perhaps not su r p r i s i n g . Lack of communication was another major problem area. Coordination between the CDIC and the CCGPR was not always i n evidence, and communication between the CCGPR and the loca l - a r e a cadres was poor. This r e s u l t e d i n many r u r a l party organs s u c c e s s f u l l y avoiding the campaign. Some party organs were slow to begin r e c t i f i c a t i o n . The CCGPR i t s e l f was handicapped by the fa c t that i t had not been amply supplied with authority by those at the party helm. The 81 o f f i c i a l four goals of the campaign contradicted each other, r e f l e c t i n g i d e o l o g i c a l confusion: when a cadre was confronted with the dilemma of how, or whether, to implement an unpopular p o l i c y , the requirements to "serve the people" and to obey the chain of command ( i . e . , obey democratic centralism) contradicted one another.93 Such d i f f i c u l t i e s contributed to poor communication and to the lack of information so necessary to the c e n t r a l a u t h o r i t i e s i n a h i e r a r c h i c a l l y - s t r u c t u r e d campaign of t h i s type. How much genuine membership p a r t i c i p a t i o n , of the type expected i n an extra-party mass campaign, was required? The top-down campaign structure c e r t a i n l y mitigated against any i n i t i a t i v e - t a k i n g on the part of lower-level bodies. The subordinating of the campaign to the needs of production allowed some, perhaps many, to avoid r e c t i f i c a t i o n i n whole or i n part. One large meeting, the "8,000 cadres conference," was held i n January, 1986, but small c r i t i c i s m meetings of the standard type are nowhere mentioned as having been i n widespread use. Most importantly, the necessary w i l l and i d e o l o g i c a l commitment to achieve a thorough-going cleansing was lacking. 93 Ibid., p. 175. 82 In December 1986 and January 1987, there were s i g n i f i c a n t outbursts of student-led discontent i n several major Chinese c i t i e s . F e a r f u l of a return of the chaos of the C u l t u r a l Revolution, and of a possible linkage between student unrest and worker discontent, the leadership launched a further campaign reminiscent of the drive against " s p i r i t u a l p o l l u t i o n . " Ever worried about the s o c i a l e f f e c t s of economic reform, the conservative forces within the CCP Central Committee orchestrated a "campaign" against "bourgeois l i b e r a l i z a t i o n . " Ostensibly l i m i t e d to being a party r e c t i f i c a t i o n , i t was once again conducted i n the p u b l i c sphere l a r g e l y through the media and operated against prominent i n t e l l e c t u a l targets. I n i t i a l l y attacking things Western, i t was l a t e r couched as a struggle between the s o c i a l i s t road and the c a p i t a l i s t road, and was r e f l e c t i v e of another i d e o l o g i c a l showdown taking place within the leadership.94 As before, the problem was l a b e l l e d (in t h i s case as "bourgeois l i b e r a l i z a t i o n " ) but most worrying i n r e a l i t y was the challenge to CCP leadership. "Bourgeois l i b e r a l i z a t i o n " was viewed as " . . . r e f u t i n g socialism, advocating capitalism, and...refuting the party's leadership," and party organizations were c a l l e d upon to "progress i n u n i f y i n g 94 Robin Munro, "Political Reform, Student Demonstrations and the Conservative Backlash," Reforming the Revolution: China in Transition, pp. 63-80. 83 thought," revealing the existence of i d e o l o g i c a l d i s u n i t y even within the CCP i t s e l f . 9 5 The campaign was formally l i m i t e d i n scope and emphasis to the party i t s e l f , t a r g e t t i n g expressly "the erroneous thought of attempting to get r i d of the leadership of the Communist Party and to refute s o c i a l i s m . " I t was to avoid contending with p o l i c i e s on economic reform, "explorations of l i t e r a r y or a r t i s t i c s t y l e s and techniques," and "the d a i l y l i f e of the people."96 I t was not to a f f e c t r u r a l areas or non-party i n t e l l e c t u a l s , although i n t h i s case the l a t t e r were to be asked f o r input. The necessary guiding force was to be the R e c t i f i c a t i o n Commission of the CCP Central Committee. Patience and leniency were c a l l e d f o r i n t h i s e f f o r t , which despite a p p l i c a t i o n i n the p u b l i c sphere was i n f a c t a s t r i c t l y - c o n t r o l l e d party r e c t i f i c a t i o n . Only the t r u l y unrepentant were to be dealt with severely. This would occur only a f t e r target i n d i v i d u a l s had s u c c e s s f u l l y negotiated l o c a l c r i t i c i s m sessions, and the i n v e s t i a g t i o n s of the Central Propaganda Department and the "party centre." The most p a r t i c u l a r l y egregious offenders would be " r e s o l u t e l y t r a n s f e r r e d to other posts." The o v e r a l l tone 95 "Circular of the CCP Central Committee on Issues of the Current Anti-bourgeois Liberalization Movement (Zhongfa no. 4, January 28,1987)," Chinese Law and Government, vol. 21 no. 1 (Spring, 1988), p. 30. 96 Ibid., p. 31. 84 was one of gentle, reasoned debate: "reasoning i n a gentle and calm way," "normal debate, c r i t i c i s m , and counter-c r i t i c i s m " , and " p o s i t i v e education" were to be the primary methods u t i l i z e d i n the campaign.97 Yet, the campaign was to have some impact on the non-party a f f a i r s as w e l l . C a l l s were made f o r state media, and broadcasts to follow a "correct p o l i t i c a l and i d e o l o g i c a l d i r e c t i o n . " Problems of l i t e r a r y and c u l t u r a l errors were to be l e f t to the respective watchdog bodies, but action was expected to be taken by them. Considerable attention was to be devoted to the "clean-up" of newspapers and p e r i o d i c a l s and to the obtaining of acceptable leaders, e d i t o r s and reporting s t a f f . This was not the f i r s t time that "bourgeois l i b e r a l i z a t i o n " had become a catchword, although the meaning of the term had now changed s l i g h t l y . In the spring of 1981, a People's L i b e r a t i o n Army (PLA)-inspired campaign to c r i t i c i z e a m i l i t a r y writer, Bai Hua, had commenced. C r i t i c i s m of the writer, who had produced a screenplay e n t i t l e d " B i t t e r Love" (Kulian), was also c a l l e d f o r at the 6th Plenum of the CCP Central Committee, held i n June, 1981. This campaign, which evolved i n t o a f u l l condemnation of "bourgeois l i b e r a l i z a t i o n " (zichan j i e j i ziyouhua), continued into the 97 Ibid., pp. 31-33. 85 summer of that year.98 I t i s by no means c e r t a i n that the "campaign" against bourgeois l i b e r a l i z a t i o n i s a c t u a l l y over. Despite the paucity of c l a s s i c a l m obilization i n d i c a t o r s , "bourgeois l i b e r a l i z a t i o n " has remained i n the o f f i c i a l vocabulary r i g h t up u n t i l the present. Whether i t s t i l l bears any resemblance to a true campaign i s debatable, and use of the term i s now l i m i t e d to use i n the newest drive on s o c i a l disorder. Since the suppression of the pro-democracy protests i n June 1989, the party has conducted campaign-style e f f o r t s to detect and punish those who p a r t i c i p a t e d therein. These measures have included a propaganda campaign, p u b l i c i z e d a r r e s t s and prosecutions, a party p u r i f i c a t i o n campaign, and the a p p l i c a t i o n of t r a d i t i o n a l campaign-style methods. The l a t t e r involved confessions, c r i t i c i s m meetings, and a l i m i t e d number of l o c a l u n i t - l e v e l gatherings and workteam assignments. These e f f o r t s met with l i t t l e success, being hampered by the existence of pu b l i c sympathy toward aspects of the protests, lack of enthusiasm and cooperation, and a pu b l i c "conspiracy of s i l e n c e . " 9 9 98 Dittmer, China's Continuous Revolution, pp. 261-262. 99 Hong Shi, "China's Political Development After Tienanmen: Tranquility by Default," Asian Survey, vol. 30 no. 12 (December, 1990), pp. 1206-1217. 86 The f a i l u r e of these bald attempts at outright punishment has, according to one author, l e d the party to develop a more sophisticated p o l i c y emphasizing s t a b i l i t y and economic development, as well as r e c o n c i l i a t i o n and renewed c a l l s to perfect the system under CCP leadership.100 However, the move i n t h i s new d i r e c t i o n has done l i t t l e to correct the grievous loss of p o l i t i c a l legitimacy suffered by the regime i n 1989. A drive against the " s i x e v i l s , " the most prominent of which are corruption and pornography, has been taking place since the summer of 1989. A separate "campaign" against corruption had already been i n i t i a t e d i n l a t e 1988. While the language i s always couched i n "campaign" terms, the content of these e f f o r t s e x h i b i t s fewer c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of a genuine campaign than was the case with the anti-crime moves of 1983. V i r t u a l l y no mass a c t i v i t y i s occurring. Much of t h i s was mere reaction to the events of early 1989. As early as Ju l y 1989, the emphasis was already s t a r t i n g to be placed on " p l a i n l i v i n g and hard work," as well as on patriotism, socialism, independence and s e l f - r e l i a n c e . 1 0 1 A d d i t i o n a l l y , "bourgeois l i b e r a l i z a t i o n " has been renewed as 100 Ibid. The author feels that this new policy direction has made passivity a possible course of action for protestors, resulting in the current unexpected political tranquility. 101 See Deng Xiaoping's speech, "Communique of the Fourth Plenary Session of the 13th CCP Central Committee," Beijing Review, vol. 32 no. 27 (July 3-9,1989), p. 14. 87 a catch-word denoting many Western values. Deng himself i s perhaps the most vehement opponent of l i b e r a l i z a t i o n , a p o s i t i o n he has himself acknowledged.102 Whether to secure t h e i r own po s i t i o n s , to promote socialism, to protect the leading r o l e of the CCP, or to a i d the reform process, China's senior leaders remain e s p e c i a l l y apprehensive about the possible return of s o c i a l disorder. This has come to include " l i b e r a l i z a t i o n , " which Deng has said i s "always bourgeois," never being s o c i a l i s t i n nature.103 With such a leadership i n charge, and with a u t h o r i t a r i a n methods of s o c i a l c o n t r o l continuing to be resorted to, any future r o l e f o r "mass" p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s l i k e l y to be a l i m i t e d one. 102 "Deng Xiaoping on Upholding the Four Cardinal Principles and Combatting Bourgeois Liberalization," Beijing Review vol. 32 no. 29 (July 17-13, 1989), p. 21. 103 Ibid. Here, Deng dates the emergence of "bourgeois liberalization" to the period following the overthrow of the Gang of Four (1980) and states that the "four big popular rights" (sida) "...amount(ed) to a form of turmoil." CONCLUSION The search f o r the sources of change i n the modern mass campaign i s not an easy one. Numerous facto r s - in v o l v i n g administrative, s o c i a l , and leadership concerns - have impinged on the mass campaign. Nonetheless, the direction of change has been rather constant. Trends seen to be occurring as f a r back as the ear l y 1950s can s t i l l be observed i n evidence today. Perhaps i t i s also safe to conclude that some of the same s t r u c t u r a l problems which have plagued the administration of the PRC since 1949 remain today. The "mass" campaign has been e f f e c t i v e l y s i d e l i n e d . I t is s t i l l i n use, but i n l i t t l e more than name only. C e r t a i n l y i t has never been as i r r e l e v a n t to the masses as i t i s now. The o r i g i n a l l y - c o n c e i v e d i d e a l r o l e of the yundong has been corrupted to the point that i t i s no longer a r e a l means of p a r t i c i p a t i o n at a l l , but i s merely a t o o l - f o r leadership posturing, f o r routine task completion, or f o r maintaining s o c i a l s t a b i l i t y . Because of a lack of commitment on the part of those administering i t , or because of a plethora of more urgent p r i o r i t i e s and problems, campaigns have become indeterminate, haphazard and nebulous i n terms of t h e i r structure and administration. Their content has likewise suffered from irrelevance, having become a second p r i o r i t y 89 to new regime goals. Campaigns have become intermingled with ongoing propaganda assaults to the extent that c l e a r l y d e f i n i n g a "mass campaign" i s becoming d i f f i c u l t . With these developments accelerating i n very recent times, a meaningful future r o l e f o r the "mass campaign" appears very much i n doubt. BIBLIOGRAPHY (Authored Works) Benewick, Robert. " P o l i t i c a l P a r t i c i p a t i o n . "R e f o r m i n g the Revolution: China in Transition, edited by Robert Benewick and Paul Wingrove. London: MacMillan Education, 1988. Bennett, Gordon. Yundong: Mass Campaigns in Chinese Communist Leadership. U.C. Berkeley Center f o r Chinese Studies China Research Monograph no. 12. Berkeley: Un i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a Press, 1976. Burns, John. " P o l i t i c a l P a r t i c i p a t i o n of Peasants i n China. Citizens and Groups in Contemporary China, edited by V i c t o r C. Falkenheim. Ann Arbor, Michigan: U n i v e r s i t y of Michigan Press, 1987. C e l l , Charles P. Revolution at Work: Mobilization Campaigns in China. New York: Academic Press, Inc., 1977) Chang C h i n g - l i . 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The Government and P o l i t i c s of the PRC: A Time of Transition. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1985 91 Gold, Thomas B. "'JUST IN TIME!' China Battles S p i r i t u a l P o l l u t i o n on the Eve of 1984."Asian Survey 24:947-974. Goldman, Merle. "China's Anti-Confucian Campaign, 1973-74." The China Quarterly 63:435-462. Harding, Harry. Organizing China: The Problem of Bureaucracy 1949-1976. Stanford: Stanford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1981. Hong Shi. "China's P o l i t i c a l Development A f t e r Tienanmen: T r a n q u i l i t y by Default."Asian Survey 30:1206-1217. Hsuan Mo. "Party Consolidation: Teng's F i n a l Struggle?" Issues and Studies 20:12-25. Joseph, William A. The Critique of Ultra-Leftism in China, 1958-1981. Stanford: Stanford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1984. K'ung Te-liang. "The Maoist M o b i l i z a t i o n f o r C r i t i c i z i n g L i n Piao and Confucius." I s s u e s and Studies 10:46-49. Larson, Wendy. 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Munro, Robin. " P o l i t i c a l Reform, Student Demonstrations and the Conservative Backlash. "R e f o r m i n g the Revolution: China in Transition, edited by Robert Benewick and Paul Wingrove. London: MacMillan Education, 1988. Myers, Ramon H. "Does the CCP Have a 'Line'?" Changes in China: Party, State, and Society, edited by Leng Shao-chuan. Lanham, Maryland: Uni v e r s i t y Press of America, 1989. 92 Neuhauser, Charles. "The Chinese Communist Party i n the 1960s: Prelude to the C u l t u r a l Revolution." The China Quarterly 32:14-19. Ogden, Suzanne. China's Unresolved Issues: P o l i t i c s , Development, and Culture. Englewood C l i f f s , N.J.: Prentice-H a l l , Inc., 1989. Oksenberg, Michel. "The I n s t i t u t i o n a l i s a t i o n of the Chinese Communist Revolution: The Ladder of Success on the Eve of the C u l t u r a l Revolution." The China Quarterly 36:61-92. Petracca, Mark P. and Mong Xiong "The Concept of Chinese Neo-Authoritarianism: An Exploration and Democratic C r i t i q u e . " A s i a n Survey 30:1099-1117. S c h e l l , O r v i l l e . To Get Rich i s Glorious: China in the 80s. New York: Pantheon Books, 1984. Selden, Mark. The Yenan Way in Revolutionary China. Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard University Press, 1971. Swaine, Michael D. "China Faces the 1990's: A System i n C r i s i s . " Problems of Communism 39:20-35. Townsend, James R. P o l i t i c a l Participation in Communist China. Berkeley: University of C a l i f o r n i a Press, 1968. Uhalley, Stephen J r . "Structural P o l i t i c a l Reform i n Mainland China: Before and A f t e r Tienanmen."Issues and Studies 26: Wang Hsueh-wen. "The Development of the Maoists' C r i t i c i s m of Confucius Movement." Issues and Studies 10:32-54. Wang Hsueh-wen. "The Maoists' Deepened Struggle to C r i t i c i z e L i n Piao and Confucius." I s s u e s and Studies 10:2-18. Webb, Charles. 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The Chinese mass campaign in the post-Mao years Fulker, Christopher Paul 1991
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