

THE CHINESE MASS CAMPAIGN IN THE POST-MAO YEARS

by

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ABSTRACT

The Chinese mass campaign was originally formed in accordance with the Maoist vision of political participation. The "mass line" dictum enunciated by Mao Zedong required a relationship of reciprocity between the masses and the CCP in terms of evolving ideas, improving and amending them through discussion, and implementing decisions. In this participatory process it was vitally important that the masses freely and voluntarily express their own views. Originally, the mass campaign was a positive, pragmatic, and commitment-filled way of completing constructive tasks, one in which the masses themselves played an important role.

The vision of participation prevailing at any given time has been a major factor in shaping the nature of the mass campaign. Central to a consideration of the character of participation is the degree to which the masses are permitted to play their independent, active, and integral role. Stemming from the period following the failure of the Great Leap Forward, this original conception of the mass campaign was increasingly corrupted by developing "bureaucratism" and "commandism" and actual mass involvement declined. With the basic tasks of socialist construction

seen as completed, the mass campaign began to be used for "reforming the superstructure." Moralizing, lecturing, and behavioural modification were some of the tasks to which the mass campaign was put, as the achievement of social stability and public cooperation became important state goals. Leadership disunity resulted in the manipulation of the mass campaign for factional ends.

Since the commencement of the post-Mao reform process, Chinese society has experienced increases in social disorder and in cynical, self-centred and apathetic public behaviour. In responding to these problems, the state has altered the use of the mass campaign to the minimalist one of a tool for social control. Leadership infighting and disagreements over policy direction and party "line" have become especially prominent since the end of the Cultural Revolution. Mass campaigns have been commonly manipulated by individuals and factions within the leadership in recent years; consequently, their administration and structure has become shoddy and their ideological direction haphazard.

Campaigns of the 1980s have continued to display these and other trends. Limited to use as lecturing and moralizing tools, subordinated to economic concerns, manipulated by the leadership, lacking constructive or pragmatic goals, and featuring meaningless content, they are increasingly irrelevant to the masses.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract	ii
Table of Contents	iv
Introduction	1- 2
Identifying the Mass Campaign	3-12
The Origins of Modern Political Participation	13-27
China's Developing Social Malaise	28-32
State and Public Responses to Social Malaise	33-49
<i>Pi Lin Pi Kung</i>	50-62
Post-Reform Campaign Efforts	63-87
Conclusion	88-89
Bibliography	90-92

INTRODUCTION

The mass campaign has long been a feature of political participation associated with the People's Republic of China. Although it continues to play a limited role as a type of mobilization, both the usage and structure of the mass campaign have undergone numerous changes. The more recent of these developments have often followed established patterns of change, some of which first became evident over 30 years ago. Certainly the role of the mass campaign has been debased and marginalized somewhat. In fact, it has been stated that the "campaign style" is no longer in use in the PRC today.

This study will provide evidence to show that this is not the case, and that the mass campaign continues to play a role today, albeit one much changed from the original. The study will provide answers to four questions. Is the mass campaign still in use today? How has the structure of the mass campaign developed? What is the new role played by the mass campaign in the post-Mao period? Why have these changes occurred?

Section One of this study will briefly examine the accepted "standard" Mao-era mass campaign in terms of definition, mobilization indicators (also a measure of campaign tactics), and goals. Study of the mass campaign has always

been inseparably bound up with the study of mass participation in a more general sense, and the development of the modern role of the mass campaign as one form of participation will be examined in Section Two.

This study done, it becomes increasingly clear that although the mass campaign remains in use today, the standard model (often with positive, useful and effective connotations) is no longer an applicable one. This outcome is partly due to the emergence of economic and political reforms in recent years, and in part the result of continuing intra-leadership division. These factors have been compounded by significant and growing social problems, which will be summarized in Section Three. Section Four will examine the responses of both the state and the public to these developments, and will outline some of the ways in which the uses and structure of the mass campaign have been altered in recent times to more closely meet the changed goals of the Beijing regime.

The focus in the latter part of the study will be on a number of recent campaigns, both pre- and post-reform, which provide characteristic examples of the changed mass campaign. Even the most recent developments will be seen to conform to the mass campaign in its changed, post-Mao form and usage.

SECTION ONE - IDENTIFYING THE MASS CAMPAIGN

The nature of the mass campaign and its development must be considered in conjunction with that of the larger concept of mass mobilization. The mass campaign is one method of putting the masses into action and of completing a set of tasks, but it is also illustrative of a rather unique approach to orchestrating political events and accomplishing political goals.

The words "campaign style" are often used with respect to sundry Chinese political activities with a mobilizational focus. Degrees of intensity exist here, with the term "mass campaign" (or *yundong*) representing an event featuring at least some noticeable and purposeful increase in intensity of mobilizational activity and which is directed toward the fulfillment of some goal. Such a very intense and serious use of this peculiar ("campaign style") means of conducting affairs has become characteristic of the country today, but it is not a Chinese invention.

Predating Chinese experiences with mass campaigns were events in the Soviet Union, where some campaign-type activity has taken place on a sporadic basis. Movements there, however, were authoritatively run, with the expected top-down administrative hierarchy in control. Consequently,

perhaps, the degree of real mass involvement or participation was minimal and a large dose of coercion was often imposed to ensure adequate levels of compliance. These characteristics are in direct opposition to the original Chinese ideal of a two-way transmission of views between masses and leaders. Furthermore, the frequent use of coercive power was in sharp contrast to the practice of the Chinese, who have preferred the use of persuasion and discussion as methods of increasing understanding prior to obtaining compliance.

Other socialist countries, notably Vietnam, Korea and Cuba, have also utilized elements of the "campaign style." However, the most likely source of the Chinese experience lies in the peculiar set of social conditions existing in the country at the time of the anti-Japanese struggle in the 1930s and early 1940s. At that time, popular participation in communist-led guerrilla activity became linked with "...a wide-ranging community attack on rural problems," under the leadership of the party.¹ In such a "people's war," co-ordinated community action involved every individual. A relationship between the CCP and the masses which was based on the former directing and exercising authority over the latter would not engender amicable co-operation and goodwill. High mobilizational needs required a new means of combining the role of the people as a "boundless source of

¹ Mark Selden, *The Yen'an Way in Revolutionary China* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 276.

power" and as "makers of history" with the party as the guiding, leading force in society.

The standard mass campaign was first employed in party rectification efforts in the late 1930s and early 1940s. It continued in frequent use through the 1950s, reaching peak use at the time of the Great Leap Forward. Charles P. Cell, in his *Revolution at Work: Mobilization Campaigns in China*, cites a vintage (and typical) definition which originally appeared in *Hongqi*. This defined the mass mobilization campaign in China as an

organized mobilization of collective action aimed at transforming thought patterns, class/power relationships and/or economic institutions and productivity.²

Although a good bare-bones description, this contains no mention of what (or who) constitutes the guiding or leading force in the mass campaign. A more recent description highlights the guiding/directing role of the party:

- 1) "...its substantive goal is to advance socialism by targeting a particular obstacle and/or by promoting a particular ideal." and
- 2) "...the procedural requirements for a mass campaign are that it be organized and launched from above, led by the party and mass organizations, and that the masses be mobilized beyond their normal routines."³

² Charles P. Cell, *Revolution at Work: Mobilization Campaigns in China* (New York: Academic Press, Inc., 1977), p. 7.

³ Tyrene White, "Postrevolutionary Mobilization in China: The One-Child Policy Reconsidered," *World Politics*, vol. 43 no. 1 (October, 1990), p. 58.

Neither of these definitions refers to the original view of the campaign as a form of political participation in which the *masses* are intended to play an important role. It is in this latter regard that some major transformations have taken place in the last 30 years, and especially in the last decade-and-a-half. While the actual techniques and steps involved in conducting a campaign have witnessed few changes, the goals of campaigns, and the fundamental beliefs underlining the leadership thereof, have both been greatly altered.

Campaigns of all types and sizes exist, ranging from small local efforts to nationwide movements. They are all designed to meet a particular set of goals, which can range from the pragmatic tasks of basic construction to objectively preposterous ideological offensives. Gordon Bennett, in his *Yundong: Mass Campaigns in Chinese Communist Leadership*, suggested a number of typical goals which campaigns are intended to fulfill. These included:

- 1) implementing existing policy
 - 2) emulating advanced experience
 - 3) introducing and popularizing new policies
 - 4) correcting deviations from important public norms
 - 5) rectifying leadership malpractices among responsible cadres or organizations
 - 6) purging from office individuals whose political opposition is excessive
 - 7) effecting enduring changes in both individual attitudes and social institutions which will contribute to the growth of a collective spirit and support the construction of socialism.⁴
-

There is a perhaps a certain amount of ambiguity and overlap among the goals in this typology, and some of these objectives are quite diffuse in nature. On numerous occasions, disorganized campaign administration and ideological infighting among the senior leadership have rendered it difficult to determine what campaign goals are with any exactness. A more easily and widely applicable means of distinguishing the various types of mass campaign is needed. This has been done by looking at campaigns not in terms of their goals but rather in terms of their uses or areas of concentration. F.T.C. Yu distinguished *economic* campaigns, *ideological* campaigns, and *struggle* campaigns.⁵

Economic campaigns are those concerned with the carrying-out of pragmatic, constructive tasks. This type of campaign has become less common in the years since the development of this categorization in 1967. Yu defined a *struggle* campaign as one in which the target is the "power base and/or class position of enemy classes or groups."⁶ An individual or group of individuals is struggled against. Targetted in an *ideological* campaign are "non-antagonistic contradictions among the people." The combatting of these necessitates the

4 Gordon Bennett, *Yundong: Mass Campaigns in Chinese Communist Leadership*, U.C. Berkeley Center for Chinese Studies China Research Monograph no. 12 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), p. 46.

5 F.T.C. Yu, "Campaigns, Communication and Development in Communist China," *Communication and Change in Developing Countries*, eds. Daniel Lerner and Wilbur Schramm (Honolulu: East-West Center, 1967), pp. 201-202.

6 *Ibid.*

performance of such tasks as correcting "erroneous thinking," raising political consciousness and altering cultural and educational standards. This is now the most common type of mass campaign because such efforts most closely address the regime's current objectives.

Cell, writing as of 1977, pointed out that there are no easily definable parameters to a campaign; often, no distinct starting or finishing points seem to exist. Although sundry efforts to increase participation and activity may take place (for multitudinous reasons), these in themselves may not be part of any coherent, organized campaign.⁷

The range of events which could plausibly be categorized as "campaigns" has increased in the recent past. In line with the process of de-emphasizing ideology, the Chinese appear to use the word *campaign* loosely much of the time. "Campaigns" against illiteracy, corruption, pornography, and the like seem to continue on an off-and-on basis indefinitely and show few characteristics of "true" campaigns. Confusingly, the official press constantly refers to these as campaigns. What is a "true campaign," in the 1990s? We must fall back on the statement that a noticeable increase in organized mobilizational activity

⁷ Cell, *Revolution at Work*, p. 7.

probably indicates that *some* sort of campaign effort is in the offing. Determining specific start and especially finish dates is now an *increasingly* inexact process because of the ideological confusion, semi-institutionalized nature and lax directional efforts of campaigns of the 1980s and 1990s. Many of the usual textbook indicators of campaign activity may no longer be observable.

Cell (1977) delineated three types of indicators of campaign activity. These were *informational* indicators (newspaper articles, pamphlets, signs, banners, "mobilization meetings," targets for criticism, stories for emulation and slogans); *organizational* indicators (sending-in of outside cadres, the creation of workteams and the rearrangement/reallocation of resources and established programs and activities); and *mass participation* indicators (similar to organizational ones but with a much broader public involvement: letter-writing, after-hours participation, mobilization of special groups and organizations, rallies, study groups and struggle and/or criticism sessions).⁸ Many of these are still common features of political events, but in the 1990s they are not always indicative of a "true" and thoroughgoing campaign effort.

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 92-104.

Even in Maoist times, a somewhat fuzzy dividing line existed between a mere event or series of events and a campaign proper:

all campaigns involve an increased intensity of activity beyond what is expected in regular work and living routines. For example, if factory leaders issue a statement that production should be increased, and the matter is perfunctorily discussed in the course of a regularized study session, it should not be considered a campaign, even though the factory bulletin board may contain some new slogans or articles about raising production. However, if the frequency of study sessions increases, if slogans are mounted over entrances to the factory, if new bulletin boards are erected, if new plans for mass participation are laid in a new and special effort to increase production - if, in short, information and activity indicate special efforts and heightened mass participation and people are mobilized out of their normal work and/or living patterns, then these events are a campaign. The absence of an explicit formula means that for marginal sets of events there may be some disagreement over whether the events actually constitute a campaign.⁹

To determine the real extent of mass participation in a mobilizational effort/campaign, one could look for mention of the most telling mass participation indicators - those revealing the most direct, intrusive and demonstrative individual activities. Small public events, such as local meetings, where the need for individual involvement is greatest, fill this role best and have been a common feature of most campaigns. A large part of any mass campaign is the expressing of views by the public. *Ad hoc* newspapers (produced by all kinds of groups), meetings, badges, signs,

⁹ *Ibid.*

banners, posters, and all sorts of criticism/self-criticism opportunities were some of the most obvious ways in which this has been carried out. Public gatherings can range from small neighbourhood groups reporting to a larger meeting to more organized locality, workplace or school study sessions. Larger events such as local, regional and national rallies also take place.

Campaign meetings can take many forms. The most common has typically been the "study" meeting, which is usually convened after an initial mobilization meeting or a notable speech by a leadership figure. Criticism/self-criticism meetings are intended to combat targets which are among the masses and are not explicitly categorized as "the enemy," while those classified as "struggle" meetings are aimed at elements categorized as class enemies.¹⁰ In campaigns such as *Pi Lin Pi Kung*, where the "bad element" is not physically present, a criticism or condemnation meeting is conducted. All these types of meetings can occur on an ongoing, scheduled basis, but their frequency increases during a campaign.

Most of these specific campaign activities are infrequently used today. Compounding this, changes have taken place in general campaign administration in the past 15 years. Among

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 101-104.

these have been an increase in slipshod and incomplete campaign task completion, indecision over campaign focus, growing regional and other disparities in application, and the institutionalization of some campaign activities. These structural changes apart, an abandonment of the original Maoist theoretical basis behind mass participation has also taken place. Categorizing a mass campaign has been made more difficult than was the case during even the 1970s.

SECTION TWO - THE ORIGINS OF MODERN POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

In attempting to assess the role of the mass campaign in China today, it must be examined as something other than a mere mechanism or event designed to work against some target or fulfill some goal. It was devised ideally to be more than a mere device for policy implementation or a planned event intended to fulfill some objective. Over the years it has been used as one of many forms of political participation and mass mobilization.

By looking at the nature of public participation and mobilization, we can determine both what role the *yundong* was intended to play and how that role has been greatly altered over time in order to meet the most important of the regime's new objectives: the protection of the leading role of the CCP and the preservation of social order.

Public participation of a political nature in the PRC can be effected in three ways. One of these, under which heading the mass campaign is usually placed, can be characterized as the *official* avenue of participation. *Illicit* participation not sanctioned by the state constitutes another means, albeit a risky one, of giving access and influence. A third route is that of *informal* participation, including that

based on interpersonal ties. All of these types of participation serve different purposes and all have shortcomings which in turn contribute to social disaffection.

In the PRC, all political participation is expected to support the objectives of the party. A clear difference exists between authorized, orthodox political participation and unauthorized protest. Some of the latter has recently been characterized as a "counterrevolutionary rebellion." This apt choice of words illuminates the special relationship between the party and "official" political participation in the country. Participation has always been enshrined in the "mass line" and is expected to be an integral part of promoting socialism.¹¹ In this traditional Maoist conceptualization, guidance and interpretation were expected to flow both up and down the power structure, with cadres acting as intermediaries, conducting the views of the masses to higher bodies of authority and also educating them, if need be, through persuasion and discussion.

Four progressive stages comprised the mass line process: perception, summarization, authorization, and implementation. In the first of these, the cadres,

¹¹ For the classic expostulation of the mass line, see Mao Zedong, "Some Questions Concerning Methods of Leadership," *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, vol. 3 (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), pp. 117-130; for a cursory outline of the permitted role of Party members, see Theodore Hsi-En Chen and Wen-Hui C. Chen, "The 'Three-Anti' and 'Five-Anti' Movements in Communist China," *Pacific Affairs*, vol. 26 no. 1 (March, 1953), pp. 3-4.

operating within the masses themselves, were to note the "scattered and unsystematic views" of the masses. They would then summarize these and transmit the results to the highest responsible authority in the area concerned. Any necessary directives or authorizations would then be issued by that body, and finally these instructions would be explained and popularized among the masses "until they embrace them as their own" through implementation.¹²

This also applied in terms of the evolution of individual thought. "Raising the consciousness" of the masses was seen as a process involving continuous repetition of this reciprocal, interactive process. In this never-ending progression, the party and cadres would take the lead, followed first by the most "progressive" classes and then by the less advanced. Through discussion, persuasion, and active participation by all, unity would be achieved:

This concept of the transformation of self-interest into public interest through "cultivation" was premised on the assumption that under socialism the interests of the individual and those of the collective were always in principle compatible - that is, they merged. Merging took place by tacit reciprocal agreement: the individual performed certain services for the collective and the collective in turn provided for the individual's welfare.¹³

¹² John W. Lewis, *Leadership in Communist China* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1963), pp. 70-75.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

The education, discussion, review and re-formulation was to be *never-ending*; all "solutions" to problems (contradictions among the people) were, in a sense, temporary ones.

Public participation is naturally expected to take place through the CCP and its adjunct organs, but both the party and the public can exert influence. The party realizes control through *leading* and the masses "control" by way of *participating*. The masses are expected to be able to obtain influence solely through the party.

Popular participation, through a mass campaign conducted by the party, constitutes a form of democratic participation in this larger sense.¹⁴ China does not possess direct voting arrangements for other than lower-level bodies. There are no authorized independent political parties or truly independent pressure/lobby groups permitted to operate within the official state structure.¹⁵ Democratic participation takes place in the *public sphere*, through the Chinese Communist Party. The party, with its mass membership, is intended to be the instrument of mobilization for the population as a whole. Any permitted dissent is expected to be raised within the confines of the CCP. Such

¹⁴ Bennett, *Yundong*, p. 18.

¹⁵ There were, as of 1990, eight "non-Communist parties" in the PRC which were allied with the CCP, but their scope for autonomous action was negligible. See Li Chiu-i, "Multiparty Cooperation' Under the CCP's Leadership," *Issues and Studies*, vol. 26 no. 11 (November, 1990), pp. 75-85.

"mobilizational democracy" has as one instrument the *yundong*, which should ideally link individual activist commitment with state/party direction:

a Chinese *yundong* is a government-sponsored effort to storm and eventually overwhelm strong but vulnerable barriers to the progress of socialism through intensive mass mobilization of active personal commitment.¹⁶

Activity which does not further the ideals and objectives of the party is prohibited, but spontaneous voluntary activity in support of party aims is encouraged and indeed expected. The achievement of this ideal is considered a long-term goal, one which can only be forwarded through ongoing diligent educational efforts. As an important means of mobilization and participation, in mass line theory, the mass campaign must be considered as one method of voluntarily and independently expressing mass opinion.

The necessity of voluntary and unsolicited participation is rooted in the view that the masses are the creators of history; the party cannot accomplish anything alone, but must rely on the masses to achieve its goals. The party has a "leading" role only because it possesses the greater knowledge and experience. "Incorrect" mass opinions must be synthesized in the way described earlier, through "patient persuasion and education," until ultimately the masses will

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

be primed to engage in "conscious and voluntary action." Although ostensibly party-led, this should be action by the masses taken of their own accord. Participation, although guided, should thus produce *popularly-derived* and executed policy.

The public's mere obedience is inadequate, for the dictatorship of the proletariat is intended to prepare the populace for really fundamental social changes. Citizens are expected to observe and be familiar with a large number of regulations and practices, and should exhibit civic-minded behaviours. They must be socially responsible and exercise vigilance in the public interest. More importantly, they must actively *become involved* and speak out if all matters are to be fully aired and full understanding is to be developed. The mass campaign is intended to play this role as a grassroots, voluntary and proactive method of public mobilization and expression.¹⁷

In light of the limited uses to which the mass campaign has been put in the post-Mao years, this is a rather rosy and optimistic description. The mass campaign has become an *institutionalized* means of orthodox, acceptable, expected, and *directed* public involvement. It no longer fulfills its ideal role as a means of activist, individually-motivated

¹⁷ For a fuller discussion of the role of voluntary and unsolicited mass activism, see James R. Townsend, *Political Participation in Communist China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), pp. 72-76.

and committed mobilization, animated to some extent by the masses themselves.

Many of the leadership figures in the pre-Cultural Revolution era concurred with the orthodox Leninist view that the expansion of productive forces had to keep pace with the transformation of the relations of production. The resultant gradual expansion of productivity would encourage the public to join in larger collectivities for greater profitability and efficiency thus effecting the *merger* of public- and self-interest. Party devotees and members would, in this conception, be more than willing to work objectively for the collective good knowing that their own personal interests and those of the public would at some point merge.

The foregoing is a brief encapsulation of the traditional Maoist view of mass participation, in which there was supposed to be an essentially circular and reciprocal relationship between the masses and the elites. After 1949, this system tended to become somewhat perverted. Criticisms were voiced to the effect that the actual role of the masses had largely become limited to echoing and supporting positions formulated by the party leadership.¹⁸ In following the process of making socially beneficial behaviour compatible with the pursuit of self-interest, it

¹⁸ See Lowell Dittmer, "Public and Private Interests and the Participatory Ethic in China," *Citizens and Groups in Contemporary China*, ed. Victor C. Falkenheim (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1987), pp. 17-44.

became difficult to determine whether a given individual was motivated by revolutionary ardour or by selfishness and greed. Both types of behaviour could be achieved simultaneously, through the same actions. The result was that the former atrophied, as concentration was not surprisingly placed on the latter. It was difficult to tell if a given person was acting in the interests of the masses, the state, or the party - or merely pursuing his own personal goals.

The Cultural Revolution radicals, who viewed public- and self-interest as fundamentally irreconcilable, introduced a number of original patterns of participation, such as the unsigned big-character poster (*dazibao*), the independently-published tabloid newspaper, and a degree of freedom to travel and exchange experiences (*quanlian*). The Shanghai commune of 1967 permitted a measure of autonomous mass action, free from the organizational intervention and control of the party. During these years, the formal mass line process as a method of interpreting the wishes of the masses was neglected. However, efforts were also made to eliminate the "commandism" and top-down party direction which had become rampant during the Liu Shaoqi era.

The central question arising in this discussion of the relationship between the masses and the leaders is: Who actually constitutes the leading force behind mobilization?

Even under Mao's leadership, two different types of mobilization were detected. One of these was that in which party members were subjected to the criticisms of the non-party masses ("open-door"). This is a form of popularly-led mobilization from below, and has also been termed "storming." It contemplates a somewhat directive role for the masses and fulfills part of the "mass line" requirement of reciprocity in communication between the masses and the leadership. The other model, termed "engineering," involves leadership from above by the party and has been linked to Liu Shaoqi and a distinctly Leninist outlook. It is commonly a means of pursuing more pragmatic, specific, and practical goals.¹⁹

As was the case in the early 1960s, the second model of mobilization seems to have firmly supplanted the first in the post-Mao years. In terms of direction, the mass campaign is now intended to be strictly controlled and administered by the party and state leadership, or moreover by those among them who are in effective control.²⁰ These may be the leadership figures best able to make use of the mass campaign as a tool for gaining personal or factional advantage, they may be ardent pursuers of reform, or they

¹⁹ See Lowell Dittmer, *China's Continuous Revolution: The Post-Liberation Epoch, 1949-1981* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), p. 6.

²⁰ Leaders have at times appeared to be attempting to manipulate mass activity for their own ends, as in the case of Deng Xiaoping during the Democracy Wall Movement of 1978-79, Hu Yaobang in 1986-87, or Zhao Ziyang in 1989.

may be genuinely committed ideologues. The goals and targets chosen must be outwardly rationalized as serving the interests of the party. At least, they must seem to be such, a fact which often results in rather disorganized campaign efforts with near-meaningless actual content. This campaign role is a very limited one.

There are a limited number of officially-accepted forms of public political participation in China today. Furthermore, the effectiveness of these is circumscribed by a number of constraints, the most obvious of which is the need to work within the confines of the Chinese Communist Party. Additionally, such popular elections as do exist are generally restricted to the selecting of members of lower-level bodies and the number of candidates permitted to stand in these contests has, until recently, been limited. Participation is viewed by many, for better or for worse, (and certainly by the leadership) as mobilization supporting the decisions and policies of the leadership and the party. Other forms of participation are largely prohibited.

Even so, involvement in formal organizations and activities can present opportunities for exerting influence as well as for being subjected to it. Local work and residence unit participation has been viewed as "...an integral form of national participation."²¹ Among the peasantry, mass

meetings and work teams present opportunities not only to receive direction but also chances to provide input and make decisions. Mass organizations such as poor and lower-middle peasant associations (*pinxiazhongnong xiehui*) and the brigade-level women's federation (*funu lianhehui*) have some capacity to be used in this way, even though their ostensible purpose is to mobilize support for the regime.

Such other opportunities for input as exist are largely *informal* in nature. These have the drawback of not being adequate for the obtaining of many objectives, especially those such as access to overseas educational opportunities, which require the co-operation of the state. Petitions, *dazibao*, the writing of letters of protest and the use of foreign media attention are some of these. Activities of more dubious (and probably illegal) repute such as corruption, strikes and slow-downs, the offering of bribes, withholding goods and services and false reporting have also taken place.²²

Informal activities are sometimes quite nebulous in nature. The power to influence decision-making and the occupying of a legally-defined position of authority are often of lesser importance in China than are factors such as *guanxi*, positions held by one's supporters, or perhaps even

21 John Burns, "Political Participation of Peasants in China," *Citizens and Groups in Contemporary China*, pp. 91-121.

22 *Ibid.*, p. 105.

financial clout. Other interpersonal factors which come into play can include an individual's locality or kinship (surname) ties, epitomized in the "five kinds of personal relationships," or *wutong guanxi*: same surname, same lineage, same village, same school, and same workplace.

However, spontaneous mass activism of the Cultural Revolution type is now, of course, discouraged.²³ Disruption or any spontaneous popular disorder would seem to evoke sheer terror in the leadership. This has been made especially evident since the death of Mao by the proliferation of moralizing campaigns, law and order blitzes, and propagandizing against any behaviour which carries even a whiff of autonomous action. Lowell Dittmer points out that the role of participation today in some ways resembles that of the early 1960s, with increasing emphasis on amending personal behaviour and the manufacturing of regime legitimacy.²⁴ However, he sees the modern role of the party as that of an intermediary or broker between collective, group, and individual interests. In very recent mass campaigns (against "bourgeois liberalization" and "spiritual pollution"), one notes a degree of xenophobia and populism which are holdovers from Maoist times. The

²³ Evidence of this was provided by the 1980 revision of the state constitution eliminating the "four big" popular rights (*sida*) "to speak out freely, air views freely, hold great debates, and write *dazibao*." More recently, China's first "Law on Mass Rallies and Demonstrations" was passed to control such events; see Stephen Uhalley, Jr., "Structural Political Reform in Mainland China: Before and After Tienanmen," *Issues and Studies*, vol. 26 no. 7 (July, 1990), p. 53.

²⁴ Dittmer, "Public and Private Interests," pp. 40-43.

character of mass participation is undoubtedly changing, but apparently not in a consistent and clear direction.

Prior to the mid-1950s, the mass campaign was used as it was devised to be used: for the fulfillment of pragmatic tasks of socialist construction, the achieving of committed and co-operative public mobilization to this end, and as one component of the mass line concept of reciprocal communication between the leaders and the masses. From that period until the advent of the Cultural Revolution, a gradual process of imposing a more starkly Leninist, top-down administration took place. Accompanying this was a growing use of the mass campaign as a tool for reforming the superstructure. Campaigns were used for the promotion of the regime's political legitimacy through the manipulation of public attitudes and beliefs.

In the early 1960s, problems such as authoritarian decision-making, top-down "commandism," and burgeoning bureaucracy were perceived as growing threats. These had their roots early in PRC history. Immediately after the establishment of the PRC in 1949, a number of problems within the Communist Party became apparent. The new government had several pressing tasks which had to be accomplished as quickly as possible and which could not wait for the imposition of a new system of administration with largely

new personnel. Land reform, economic improvement, and political consolidation were paramount among these.

In addition, "counterrevolutionary landlords," "bandits," and "Nationalist special agents" had to be fought. A major problem was the shortage of skilled and experienced cadres, which led to the use of force and coercion, especially in situations where understaffing necessitated it. Sufficient explanations, small-group discussions, explanation of advantages and other such techniques perfected in earlier times were often notably absent, with the result that the expected rapport with the common people was not always forthcoming. Inexperience was also notable among cadres and administrators at the higher levels, where unrealistic quotas and expectations were compounded by excessive regulation and paperwork. It was feared that what was called "bureaucratism" and "commandism" were causing the new administration to look distinctly like the old one.

These trends, which continued and were later to be linked to Liu Shaoqi, were temporarily halted during the early years of the Cultural Revolution. The emphasis in this latter period, often seen as one vast mass campaign in itself, was on allowing greater and more spontaneous popular participation. Such spontaneity was achieved through the employment of several means of participation, one of which was the mass campaign. The types and uses of participation

encouraged and permitted during different time periods are especially revealing. These differences in the nature of permitted participation are an aid in determining ideological turning-points and thus help in distinguishing one era in post-1949 China from another.

The Cultural Revolution witnessed many novel means of participation, notable among which were the provincial mass uprisings, the Shanghai commune, the Red Guard movement and the various *ad hoc* opposition groups which criticized the organized revolutionary committees. The then rather ineffectual state of the party committees also speaks volumes about the changed nature of mass participation at this time. Likewise, the post-Cultural Revolution reform measures such as the May Seventh Cadre Schools, administrative down-sizing and retrenchment and some devolution of economic authority back to the provinces evidenced a change in the distribution of power among the leaders and the led.

This was an exceptional period, featuring rapid changes in the accepted view of mass participation. While these "improvements" were to be eroded somewhat during the conflicts between reformers and radicals of the mid-1970s, a major change of direction did not occur again until the re-emergence of Deng Xiaoping after the Third Plenum of 1978.

SECTION THREE - CHINA'S DEVELOPING SOCIAL MALAISE

The massive show of public disinterest which has greeted most recent campaign efforts is reflective of a more general malaise among the population over the limited and ineffective opportunities for input provided by official channels. China remains a basically restrictive society in which the opportunities for upward mobility and financial advancement, and the rewards for same, remain very limited. Often, the potential rewards which can be gleaned from engaging in illegal, borderline-illegal or informal activity vastly outweigh that remuneration which is normally meted out for just plodding along. The same applies to those who choose, or are able, to take advantage of the economic liberalization of recent years. Today, unless he is corrupt, the individual who remains stolidly working at his appointed post for years achieves at best a modest measure of security. The really financially successful, apart from the unpunished criminal element, are those who have taken advantage of economic liberalization and engaged in entrepreneurial activities designed to satisfy some unmet public need.

The post-Mao process of economic reform has had both positive and adverse social consequences. Ongoing reform

efforts of recent years have had the effect of reducing social cohesiveness, creating unemployment and redundancy, and increasing the income gap existing between rich and poor. Decollectivization, the reorganization of township government and economic authority, and lack of financial incentives for cadre work have resulted in a lessening of the grip of both party and state on the lives of rural inhabitants.²⁵ For beneficiaries of reform, such greater freedom has brought a measure of independence, which in turn further lessens the state's hold on their lives. Conversely, the needed social safety net is becoming dangerously thin for those unable to profit from the new policies. Both the gains in personal freedom and the economic problems created have undoubtedly contributed to recent increases in crime and disorderly behaviour.

Jurgen Domes, in his *The Government and Politics of the PRC: A Time of Transition*, concurs with the views of Tyrene White regarding the effects of (especially) economic change on Chinese society.²⁶ Both authorities view recent changes as having been most noticeable in the rural areas. Among the reforms, the imposition of the responsibility system, and the reduction in the role of the collective are cited as

²⁵ The growth of informal economic activities in recent years has had the effect of causing a significant loss of central government revenue. See Michael D. Swaine, "China Faces the 1990's: A System in Crisis," *Problems of Communism*, vol. 39 no. 3 (May-June, 1990), pp. 24-26.

²⁶ Jurgen Domes, *The Government and Politics of the PRC: A Time of Transition* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1985), pp. 214-219. See also note 3.

having permitted not only more freedom but also greater divergence in income level in rural areas. The unintended consequences of reform having contributed to the creation of what is in effect a class society in China, the country is now beset with social problems. Some of these are corruption and privilege among cadres, embezzlement and bribery, unemployment (somewhat ameliorated by featherbedding), female infanticide, and an upsurge in often violent crime, including smuggling, robbery, and tax evasion. Reform has also brought about higher public expectations:

Rampant social disorder was a legacy of the Cultural Revolution and was also fueled by the post-1978 emphasis on improved material life as people, usually youths, who were unemployed or holding marginal jobs turned to crime to obtain the consumer goods appearing in abundance. The opening to the West further raised their aspirations for material goods and a more diverse life style, resulting mostly in the pursuit of individual pleasure and only occasionally involving criminal activities - with many of the most flagrant offenders the pampered offspring of high-level cadres (*gaogan zidi*). In large part young people just wanted to be spared the incessant politicization and chaperoning the Party imposed on their lives.²⁷

Party cadres were themselves often involved in many unsavoury activities. Favouritism, bribery, and the use of public funds for private construction are all said to have occurred (in connection with housing). Other improprieties

²⁷ Thomas B. Gold, "JUST IN TIME! China Battles Spiritual Pollution on the Eve of 1984," *Asian Survey*, vol. 24 no. 9 (September, 1984), p. 950.

have included the use of one's position for personal gain, the illegal provision of lavish dinners, extortion of luxury goods from those returning to China from abroad, use of public funds for overseas calls, gifts, and banquets, and arranged educational opportunities for family members.²⁸ Infractions such as these were all readily visible to the general public, and provided examples for emulation.

The party laid the blame for the upsurge in crime at the feet of the "chaotic years of the Cultural Revolution" and the resultant undisciplined youth and on "bourgeois influences." But Orville Schell more exactly places the blame:

people were no longer tied to their registered address, or *hukou*, by the need for government coupons for grain, oil, and cotton products. With new wealth and peasant-run free markets everywhere, such coupons were no longer indispensable. People could buy what they needed wherever they wanted, and were thus freed from the tightly organized system that once held them firmly in place. Criminals could move about with ease.²⁹

Other factors affecting the regime's mobilisational powers have included bureaucratic obstructionism, the attraction to the party of mere opportunists rather than committed

²⁸ Bruce J. Dickson, "Conflict and Non-Compliance in Chinese Politics: Party Rectification, 1983-87," *Pacific Affairs*, vol. 63 no. 2 (Summer, 1990), pp. 186-187.

²⁹ Orville Schell, *To Get Rich is Glorious: China in the 80s* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), p. 47.

devotees, and the desire of CCP members themselves for predictability.

The continuing ineffectiveness of mass campaigns is not surprising in this atmosphere of disinterest. Compounding this problem is that those same campaigns bear little relation to real goals or problems, such as improving production, constructing public works, or rectifying corruption and malpractices among the leadership. In recent times, only the One-Child campaign comes to mind as a pragmatic campaign of the latter type, carrying real, objectively thought-out benefits easily defensible as socially necessary. Even this campaign effort has been altered under the pressure of rural reform measures and regional disparities in campaign application. A concentration on obscurely-derived criticism and the promotion of public moral rectitude have become more common as campaign subject matter since the early 1960s, and the number of pragmatic, positive, problem-solving efforts has correspondingly declined.

SECTION FOUR - STATE AND PUBLIC RESPONSES TO SOCIAL MALAISE

The People's Republic faces problems of societal disinterest as well as of social ills (the latter exacerbated by radical social and economic reform). In terms of *yundong*, the state has responded, firstly, by choosing as a paramount goal the control of undesirable public behaviour and social disorder. These are now being attacked through the use of mass campaigns which are bent on encouraging "correct" deportment, ensuring a law-abiding, orderly society and providing positive and negative behavioural models as popular examples. This change of campaign emphasis has been a gradual one, but it has been ongoing since at least the early 1960s.

Secondly, the mass campaign has undergone structural changes. The internal conduct of the mass campaign itself has experienced alterations, some in response to the needs of reform, and others due to persistent leadership division over goals and part "line." Related to this has been a further response to disorder - a more general application of repression and reassertion of social control. As has become usual in recent years, the public posture in the face of all

these state tactics remains one largely of cynical non-cooperation and self-interest.

Despite Deng Xiaoping's famous statement of August 1980, the mass campaign is still in use today.³⁰ However, even though continuing to exist in a new guise and fulfilling a new role, it is a pale shadow of the successful campaigns of the 1940s or 1950s. What has been lacking recently is the drive, sense of purpose, spontaneity and enthusiasm of the earlier events. It would seem that the role of the "masses" has been taken out of the "mass campaign."

In the earlier (especially pre-1953) campaign efforts, great integrative effects were achieved. Numerous benefits accrued to the new regime: mass experience of organization and nationwide co-ordinated action, the dissemination of a mass political language (including new slogans, newly-coined terms and other propagandizing items),³¹ and an hitherto unavailable opportunity for many previously powerless groups within Chinese society to participate in the new and initially popular Communist political system.³² As the

³⁰ Deng's speech of August 18, 1980 appears in *Beijing Review*, no. 40 (October 3, 1983), pp. 14-22.

³¹ An accomplishment reminiscent of the efforts of the Nationalists during the 1920s to popularize a 1,000-character newspaper vocabulary for propagandizing purposes among urban illiterates.

³² See Alan P.L. Liu, *Communications and National Integration in Communist China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971). Liu views the date 1953 as important because it was at that point that the regime's emphasis was shifted from class struggle to patriotism/nationalism and the creation of political legitimacy, a change mirrored in campaign content.

regime's emphasis became more concerned with development of the superstructure than of the base, this euphoria began to dissipate. Gradually, after this early period of success, other campaigns (such as that calling for the emulation of Lei Feng) targetting negative public behaviour began to emerge:

Though these campaigns emphasized class hatred and love of Communist collectivism, no real target group was designated to be struggled against. Instead the people's voluntary emulation was emphasized. The most plausible reason for this moderate style of political penetration was the growing ineffectuality of the militant type of mass campaigns that had dominated the pre-1953 period. This loss of effectiveness came not suddenly but gradually, over the years. It is an ironic development that, as the Chinese people's national identity was heightened by Communist propaganda, disillusionment with the Communist regime and political apathy also grew steadily among the people, also as a result of the regime's propaganda.³³

It is not surprising that a large element of genuine, intimate public involvement, requiring interactive behaviour, the taking of individual action and the voicing of opinion, has been missing for years. Even mere participation - a physical presence at a mass rally or the reading of the necessary literature - has received little mention recently. Many campaigns of recent times have been colourless proclamations empty of most public input save that of official party personnel, bureau officials, and local bodies. More significantly, campaign objectives have

³³ *Ibid.*, pp. 97-98.

become much more ameliorative and conservative, less visionary, and more corrective in nature than constructive.³⁴

Referring particularly to the urban section of the population, Jurgen Domes provides not only a rationale for recent campaigns attacking apathy and cynicism, but also some of their flavour:

None of these (groups within the urban population) seems to be willing to render active support for the Party's policies or to believe in the official doctrines of the ruling elite...Since the spring of 1981, the authorities have tried to counter such attitudes with an increase in political indoctrination in the schools and with large-scale propaganda campaigns stressing patriotism and good behavior. These campaigns are conducted under the slogan of Five-Speak, Four-Beauty, Three Warm Loves (*wujiang simei sanreai*), exhorting the young generation to speak about civilization, speak about politeness, speak about public order, speak about health, speak about virtue; have beauty in the heart, have beauty in the speech, have beauty in the environment, have beauty in the behavior; warm love for the Party, warm love for socialism, warm love for the fatherland. The success of such endeavors is still in doubt. Since 1981, the month of March has been especially dedicated to this campaign under the name of "civilization-and-politeness month" (*wenming limaoyue*).³⁵

This type of state response has as paramount goals the protection of the leading role of the CCP, the preservation

34 See Bennett, *Yundong*, p. 33, in which the author concurs with this view, seeing yundong as moving "...away from great transformations in the economic 'base' toward changes in the organizational, intellectual, and cultural 'superstructure'...the yundong have more intensively emphasized the need for constant vigilance against backsliding on accomplishments already registered...yundong tasks have more often included calls for shifts in personal attitude and inner character..."

35 *Ibid.*, p. 227.

of social order, and the facilitating of economic reform and modernization.³⁶ Undoubtedly, the protection of the interests of the dominant leadership faction, and the promotion of their "line" are also concerns of great importance. These are the overriding objectives of the leadership of the PRC today, and their fulfillment is aided by appropriate use of the mass campaign.

Through responding to the pressures of social change, some of the administrative and mobilizational practices of recent campaigns have become more structured, planned and routine. Tyrene White found, in her study of the One-Child campaign, that "virtually all" of the normal indicators of campaign activity took place.³⁷ However, this did not turn out to be a standard campaign, and it reveals one impact of reform on the running of a recent mass campaign.

White found that the tactics used in this campaign were affected by the pressures created as a result of the "ongoing process of rural reform." A number of changes to "standard" campaign administration took place as this *institutionalized mobilization* evolved.³⁸ The language of

³⁶ The present state of affairs has many characteristics of "neo-authoritarianism," discussed in Mark P. Petracca and Mong Xiong, "The Concept of Chinese Neo-Authoritarianism: An Exploration and Democratic Critique," *Asian Survey*, vol. 30 no. 11 (November, 1990), pp. 1099-1117.

³⁷ White, "Postrevolutionary Mobilization," pp. 58-59.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 60-64.

mass mobilization became less strident and less insistent. Cadres were instructed to avoid the use of coercion. Efforts were made to construct an organizational framework which would allow a more routine administration and implementation. All of these practices mitigated against the "movement" nature of a truly grassroots public event.

At the same time, other national concerns began to take precedence over the One-Child campaign. The state responded by trying to make the best use of its now-limited effectiveness. Co-operation and voluntary compliance became evident as the preferred means of continuing the campaign:

family planning was declared to be a fundamental state policy: the government stressed the obligation of Chinese citizens to engage in family planning, and made efforts to build an organizational structure for routine administration. Yet the gap between official family planning targets and the capacity of the formal party/state apparatus to reach them undermined efforts to regularize grassroots implementation.³⁹

To conduct a campaign under this type of systematized, almost bureaucratic format ("institutionalized mobilization") means veering dangerously far away from the original idea of a *yundong* as a force for mass public grassroots activism. That ideal vision of a mass campaign has indeed been largely abandoned since the Cultural Revolution. White argues, however, that *mobilization* itself

³⁹ *ibid.*, p. 62.

has not been abandoned in China today, but has undergone changes making it a more orderly, routine, and directed means of promoting reform while maintaining political stability. Some of the distinguishing characteristics of this new pattern which arose out of the state's inability to maintain meaningful and effective implementation at the level of the general rural population are outlined as follows:

Institutionalized mobilization is a variant form of implementation, which involves periodic, functionally defined mobilization efforts that 1)temporarily intensify coercive and normative incentives; 2)vary from region to region in timing, intensity, and scope; 3)last for limited, predictable periods of time[often specified at the outset]; 4)have as their primary goal behavioral control or "practical results," not attitudinal or cultural change; 5) have a diminished scope of mass participation in favor of narrow mobilizations of the target population; and 6) utilize extensive propaganda to shape public sentiment, but discourage disruptive mobilizational activities beyond the target population in order to insulate the project from economic production and other reform initiatives.⁴⁰

Thus, one structural response has been to make the administration of the mass campaign more routine, more systematized and more institutionalized (and less like a "true" campaign?). While it is likely that this "institutionalized mobilization" is a development which is most obviously applicable in the case of the One-Child

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 62-63.

campaign, all recent efforts have featured structural modifications.

There has been a second type of structural response. In the more recent campaigns, lax administration, poor intra-party communication and uncertainty over the political line have become the norm, rendering campaign coverage and effectiveness doubtful at best.⁴¹

This most recent trend is obvious in the campaigns against "bourgeois liberalization" and "spiritual pollution" and in the most recent CCP rectification drive. It is not solely an outcome of recent social trends and reform-influenced problems; continuing divisions within the leadership have also played a part. These latter developments, obviously affecting recent campaign efforts, will be examined in detail elsewhere.

Campaign conduct, has been altered in response to social change. Changes in the use of the mass campaign, intended to encourage social order, are allied to the recent stepped-up use of anti-crime "campaigns." These have featured the predictable crackdowns, public mass rallies and executions, publicized capture of select major criminals, efforts at "re-education" of university students, reining in of select

⁴¹ Dickson, "Conflict and Non-Compliance," pp. 182-185.

reform measures, and use of those perpetrating particularly egregious offenses as public examples. It is obvious that, having been put to new uses, the structure of these "campaigns" has also been greatly altered. Use as an instrument of public instruction, moral lecturing, and social control is a reactive and restricted way of wielding a tool originally intended to be a positive and constructive instrument of participation.

Often, state responses ("campaigns?" or "crackdowns?") are somewhat hard to distinguish from one another. In attacking increases in crime, the state has not acted to correct the underlying causes, but has made an effort to restore public order.⁴² In one instance, this came in the form of a "campaign" against crime which in some ways resembled a media blitz. One authority, Orville Schell, was in China at such a time:

In January of 1982, the Party launched a nationwide anti-crime campaign. Chinese newspapers, which once were filled with slogans and long theoretical tracts, became so peppered with lurid accounts of crime and corruption that at times they read like tabloids; the object of such news stories was not to titillate or to sell papers but to warn offenders that criminal activity would be severely dealt with. Hongqi deplored the existence of 'elements hostile to the socialist system,' who 'rob the state of property, kill and maim the nation's workers at their posts, hijack, rape women, traffic in women and children,

⁴² Many campaigns appear to be directed at alleviating symptoms of social distress rather than causes. See Bennett, *Yundong*, p. 58.

tyrannize others, (and) trample upon the masses'.⁴³

This "campaign" was notable because, unlike earlier and prototypical mass campaigns, much of the intimate public involvement (as apart from merely participating by being physically present at a campaign event) and other organizational indicators were lacking. Apart from a number of mass rallies and public executions, the "campaign" featured speeches by the leaders, posters of wanted or executed individuals, press accounts, and, according to Schell's experiences, a rally of schoolchildren and an anti-crime exhibition. One of the side-effects of recent pressures on the regime has been to blur the distinction between a "true" mass campaign and an ongoing propaganda offensive.

In July, 1983, the party's Central Commission for Discipline Inspection issued a special report entitled "On the Work of Striking at Serious Crimes in the Economic Field." It was at this point that Jurgen Domes noted that an anti-crime campaign commenced:

In mid-July 1983, a new nationwide campaign against rampant crime began, but it was also directed against what the elite calls "loafing, economic crimes, and counterrevolutionary activities." In the context of this new campaign, I collected reports about 347 immediately executed death sentences from seventeen administrative

⁴³ Schell, *To Get Rich is Glorious*, pp. 36-40.

units during the period from July 16 to September 14, 1983, alone.⁴⁴

If this language and these actions are typical of a modern "campaign," then both the nature and use of the *yundong* have been radically changed. That September, a revised criminal code was promulgated making it easier and faster to prosecute those suspected of crimes.

The purpose of these activities was not to bring about proper behaviour by positive example, to promote socialist construction, to spur production, or to contribute to the growth of the collective spirit. Perhaps the objective of this anti-crime effort fits one of the campaign goals outlined by Gordon Bennett in *Yundong...*, viz., "to correct deviations from important public norms." The sole use to which such campaigns are put now seems to be the promotion of public order and moral lecturing.

How has the public responded to this type of state-inspired and state-led campaign effort? Both the tactics and goals of recent campaigns, which mirror those of the regime itself, have been restrictive and prohibitive. The most prominent recent campaign, against "bourgeois liberalization," was itself concocted largely as a corrective response by the state (or elements of the leadership) to the events of December 1986 and January 1987.

⁴⁴ Domes, *The Government and Politics of the PRC*, p. 226.

Such upheavals show us that legitimate opportunities for participation of any sort may be too limited in the eyes of at least some sectors of the Chinese population.

Disturbances are one public response to the perceived lack of efficacy, repressiveness and lack of opportunity existing in Chinese society in recent years. Despite occasional violence of this type, it would seem that public disenchantment today is more commonly manifested as cynicism and non-participation ("going through the motions"). This is an old and continuing pattern of behaviour. It has contributed to the ineffectiveness of recent mass campaigns, but in turn it is partly a response to years of subjection to campaign tactics and exhortations.

It is almost certainly true to say that the Chinese people are now overwhelmingly more interested in the well-being of themselves and their families/friends before the concerns of the state. This has been another of the public's responses to their social condition, allied to the growing cynical non-participation seen in recent years.

Initially, the Chinese communists attempted to structure their society in such a way that the citizen's patriotic, socialist altruism could be brought easily to the fore. The demands placed on the citizenry by socialist society would effectively subjugate the individual's pursuance of his own selfish interests. This would allow all to make meaningful

contributions to society without any segment of the population having to make personal sacrifices to do so. However, these earnest efforts, extending through the 1950s, to create a "new socialist man" have failed. Leadership exhortations, Domes feels, are largely met with cynicism, passive dissent, and even resistance. Rising expectations remain unfulfilled, especially among lower- and middle-level workers. The result is at best a self-centred passive acquiescence:

Those peasants who profit from the new rural societal policies can be expected to support them, although only for the sake of their personal interest and under the condition that these policies are not changed. Yet such support is mostly not expressed in political activities but in making the utmost use of all chances for an improvement of individual living conditions.⁴⁵

This selective support is not part of a new pattern of behaviour in China. Careful consideration of the nature and extent of one's political participation, educational options and career choices has been *de rigeur* for years. The occurrence of this pragmatic weighing of involvement and of choices has been documented as far back as the early 1950s.⁴⁶ It was certainly apparent by the early 1960s and the time of the 1963-64 Socialist Education Campaign. Michel Oksenberg, writing in 1968, noted that some of the

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 230.

⁴⁶ A ritualization of behaviour in response to campaigns has been noted as far back as 1953. See Harry Harding, *Organizing China: The Problem of Bureaucracy 1949-1976* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1981), p. 58.

characteristics of what he called a "ladder of success" were present by the mid-1950s, and he went on to describe the selective use made by the public of political participation.⁴⁷

The nature of public involvement in a mass campaign is partially dependent on the degree to which the participating individuals can use their involvement to maximize personal advantage. Oksenberg discerned a number of career stages through which Chinese passed. The first of these, encountered in adolescence, was that in which one must decide on how to meet the demands constantly thrust upon him by the political system. At this time, a young person must decide to what extent and with what degree of enthusiasm he wished to participate in political life, and would also recognize that certain goals would be made more or less attainable depending on his degree of co-operation and participation.

Choice of career, the selection of an acceptable balance between the achieving of personal ambition and cooperation with state and societal goals, and considerations of job security would come into play later in life. At this later stage, the seeking of a measure of relative immunity from

⁴⁷ Michel Oksenberg, "The Institutionalisation of the Chinese Communist Revolution: The Ladder of Success on the Eve of the Cultural Revolution," *The China Quarterly*, no. 36 (October-December, 1968), pp. 61-92.

the necessity of political participation and consequences became the paramount goal.

Certain objectives and ambitions were more easily realized than others. Some goals, including the gaining of political power and the attainment of a high status position within communist society had to be pursued within the system, while others, such as security and peer group respect, were only obtainable outside it. It is important to note that informal means of political participation are usually rather parochial in their application. Engaging in participation through official channels is still necessary for the attainment of a large number of important personal objectives, such as the acquiring of state-funded educational opportunities abroad. The use of party membership itself as a means of personal advancement has become evident in the loudly-proclaimed poor quality of party members and the never-ending need for a cleansing of the ranks. Faced with a multiplicity of conflicting demands and goals, Chinese citizens became what might be called in jail parlance "institution politicians," learning to modify their behaviour in such ways as to best secure or advance their position, and displaying just sufficient enthusiasm as was necessary to get by.

Often, however, such behaviour not unnaturally contradicted the aims of the state. Oksenberg, at the conclusion of his

article, summed up the effect of this behaviour on the small group and on the mass campaign:

Two things in particular led to the loss of the mobilization potential of campaigns. First was that they were all conducted organizationally in much the same way. As the populace learned to anticipate the steps of a campaign, they could take appropriate counter-measures. Second, while Party bureaucrats initially welcomed the campaign for the increased power it gave them over remnant KMT bureaucrats and the general populace, the Party bureaucrats gradually came to dislike the campaign for the disruptions and increased pressures it brought to their lives.⁴⁸

This is one further reason for the regime's efforts to control the nature of public participation and mobilization.⁴⁹ The personal desire of many functionaries for stable and predictable lives is paramount. On a larger scale, the requirement that mass campaigns not hinder economic activities or production probably dates from the time of the Great Leap Forward. It has certainly been put forward in recent years as necessary not only to smooth the path of economic reform, but also to avoid Cultural Revolution-type disorder.⁵⁰ Robert Benewick writes concerning the consequently very restricted modern idea of mobilization that

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 90-91.

⁴⁹ The mass campaign has also been claimed to be of use in eliminating the possibility of the privileged using the economic/social system for private gain. See Bennett, *Yundong*, p. 18.

⁵⁰ A related idea was recently advanced by Suzanne Ogden, who writes that the mass political campaign has been one of the "...most effective means to control economic deviance" and a means of targetting "politically based economic corruption." See Suzanne Ogden, *China's Unresolved Issues: Politics, Development, and Culture* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1989), p. 286.

For the present leadership a legacy of the highly politicised Maoist period - particularly the Hundred Flowers and Anti-Rightist campaigns, the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution - is the need to ensure stability and promote economic development. This increases the pressure to direct and control the purpose, practice and pace of participation...the dominant emphasis has been mobilization for support, legitimation and policy implementation...participation is characterized by its selective, directed, controlled and largely collective nature.⁵¹

This description of the almost desperate need of the regime (or factions within the leadership) to exercise social control and to thoroughly regulate participation is reflected in the modern use of the "mass campaign" as a leadership-wielded administrative tool for public instruction and admonishment.

⁵¹ Robert Benewick, "Political Participation," *Reforming the Revolution: China in Transition*, eds. Robert Benewick and Paul Wingrove (London: MacMillan Education, 1988), p. 52.

SECTION FIVE - PI LIN PI KUNG

During the period following the Cultural Revolution, and extending up until the beginnings of reform in 1978, the number of campaigns conducted was rather low. It is likely that this was in part the result of the internal leadership divisions which existed at this time between the advocates of a return to Cultural Revolution policies and those promoting reform measures. More importantly, having just come through a period of extreme disruption (often in their personal lives), the reform elements in particular were desirous of avoiding any type of disorderly, spontaneous, or overzealous activity. Two truly major national campaigns which occurred during this period were the campaign to criticize Lin Biao and Confucius and the campaign to criticize the "Gang of Four." Both were run in a rather haphazard and unpredictable fashion and both revolved around struggle between the two competing factions of the time.

The effort to criticize Lin Biao and Confucius followed on the heels of other, less concrete, criticism campaigns. This campaign featured a number of the changes which have since become typical of more recent campaign developments. One of these, reflecting the divorce from reality which has characterized recent campaigns, was the choice of obscure and peculiar targets: individuals who had been dead for some years. Curious ideological labels were attached to them.

Great efforts were made to relate criticism of these targets to real life socialist concerns.

Soon after his death in September 1971, Lin Biao was condemned as an "ultra-Leftist" as part of a campaign to criticize "Swindlers like Liu Shaoqi." In retrospect, it is interesting to note that Liu Shaoqi was found to be an "ultra-Leftist" during this campaign, as Liu has more commonly been seen as a "Rightist." This acrobatic feat was accomplished by stating that the Cultural Revolution had caused the "Swindlers" to use ultra-Left *means* to accomplish their aim of capitalist restoration.⁵²

These labellings paralleled factional maneuverings among the top CCP leadership. By the latter part of 1972, the "Cultural Revolutionaries," most notably Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan, were working to temper criticism of ultra-Leftism. This faction was opposed by the "Veteran Revolutionaries," prominent among whom was Zhou Enlai. Lin Biao was targetted in this latter process, was found to have engaged in a "counterrevolutionary revisionist line," and was labelled an "ultra-Rightist" as early as June 1972. Countering this activity, *Renmin Ribao* printed a number of articles on October 14, 1972, which reinforced the efforts against ultra-Leftism. These were printed on the express

⁵² William A. Joseph, *The Critique of Ultra-Leftism in China, 1958-1981* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984), pp. 126-127.

directions of Zhou Enlai.⁵³ A back-and-forth struggle continued within the leadership for many months, finally culminating in August 1973 with the eclipse of open criticism of ultra-Leftism and the shifting of intra-party struggle to other fields.⁵⁴ Thus, Zhou's Political Report to the 10th Party Congress of August 1973 became of necessity a compromise statement between the two competing factions.

In the summer of 1973 articles against Confucius and Confucianism began to appear, but it was not until after the 10th Party Congress that these were linked with criticism of Lin. Thus the campaign began in earnest. The most significant feature of the campaign was hidden. It provided the occasion for a struggle between the two camps within the CCP, the radicals and the reformers. On a more superficial level, examination of the actual content of the campaign revealed little that was objectively meaningful and relevant. In terms of outwardly-visible campaign targets, *Pi Lin Pi Kung* featured a linking of two targetted individuals who were, at face value, unrelated; however, their labelling was indicative of the hidden, all-important struggle going on among the elite.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, pp. 130-131.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 137.

The goal(s) and target(s) of this campaign were confusing and unpredictable. This was related to both the existence of leadership struggles and to the choice of improbable and superficial outward targets. *Pi Lin Pi Kong* made use of historical allegory as a means of criticizing current trends and individuals without directly naming them. This is a characteristically Chinese approach, but one which also leaves room for imprecision in the matter of interpretation. One such interpretation, provided by Merle Goldman, suggests that the campaign was originally intended to halt the gradual retreat from Cultural Revolution ideals and practices and to criticize the recent reinstatements of certain individuals who had been displaced at that time.⁵⁵

Even after the 1973 Congress, the results of the factional battle were inconclusive. The campaign periodically featured calls for *continued retreat* from Cultural Revolution policies.⁵⁶ Thus, some of the attendant goals of the campaign now were to increase centralization, rehabilitate party officials, downplay the military, and to give further attention to economic development. This line of criticism, co-existing with the ongoing opposition to "ultra-Rightism," led ultimately to the criticism of the Gang of Four in 1976-79. Other later campaigns stemmed from

⁵⁵ Merle Goldman, "China's Anti-Confucian Campaign, 1973-74," *The China Quarterly*, no. 63 (September, 1975), pp. 435-462.

⁵⁶ Joseph, *The Critique of Ultra-Leftism*, p. 144.

the continuing efforts of the "Cultural Revolutionaries;" one such was the 1976 campaign to criticize Deng Xiaoping (*Pi Deng*).

Merle Goldman, writing in 1975, summarized the approach used then in criticizing Cultural Revolution trends:

the dominant tone of the campaign has been to use historical figures and incidents to promote centralization, institutionalization, ideological unity, and production - not to foment the struggle, decentralization and revolutionary fervour associated with the Cultural Revolution.⁵⁷

The actual subject matter of the campaign was quite remote from everyday life. Two historical figures, Ch'in Shih Huang and his advisor Li Ssu, were touted as heroes, they having united China politically and ideologically and provided strong central leadership for a fractious country. These two individuals were, of course, analogues of Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai; other such stand-ins included Lu Puwei (Lin Biao) and Wang An-shih (Mao Zedong or Zhou Enlai). Contributing to confusion among observers, none of these connections were anywhere stated explicitly. Ch'in Shih Huang was further credited with resolute leadership and his propensity for book-burning and for burying scholars alive was explained as a means of criticizing those promoting old ways and old rules (the Confucian scholars), rather than as

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 436.

anti-intellectual activity.⁵⁸ Confucius himself was condemned as a supporter of the existing slave-owning society and as an opponent of the rising forces of feudalism. The Confucian scholars criticized were analogous to the Cultural Revolution ideologues who were a main target of the campaign. The debate between these scholars and the Legalists was obviously intended to parallel the struggle between the advocates of Cultural Revolution policies (exemplified by Lin Biao) and their opponents.

Confucianism and Confucius himself were linked with Marxist theory as well as with Lin Biao. In this way, attempts were made to show direct relevance to modern life:

What manner of man was Confucius, who was revered by China's reactionary ruling class as "the sage" for more than 2,000 years? Lenin pointed out: "The categorical requirement of Marxist theory in investigating any social question is that it be examined within definite historical limits." To analyse Confucius from the historical-materialist viewpoint, one must put him in the context of the class struggle of his time and see which class standpoint he took and which class his ideology served.⁵⁹

Lin Biao was portrayed as a sort of modern-day exponent of outdated, reactionary views:

⁵⁸ The glorification of Ch'in Shih Huang apparently predates the start of the campaign itself, a publication entitled *Ch'in Shih Huang* having appeared in Beijing in May, 1972. Communist approval of Ch'in Shih Huang can be found even earlier: see Li Ming-hua, "The Maoists' Reversal of the Historical Verdict on Ch'in Shih Huang," *Issues and Studies*, vol. 10 no. 6 (March, 1974), pp. 55-68.

⁵⁹ Yang Jungkuo, "Confucius - a Thinker Who Stubbornly Supported the Slave System," *Selected Articles Criticizing Lin Biao and Confucius*, vol. 1 (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1974), p. 1.

In the course of the present criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius, the study of the contention between these two schools [Confucian and Legalist] in feudal society will help us deepen the criticism of Lin Piao's counter-revolutionary revisionist line and conspiratorial methods and at the same time help expose the roots of his reactionary world outlook.⁶⁰

Lin was the embodiment of Cultural Revolution evil:

The bourgeois careerist, conspirator, double-dealer, renegade and traitor Lin Piao was an out-and-out devotee of Confucius. Like all reactionaries in Chinese history when on the verge of extinction, he revered Confucius and opposed the Legalist School, and attacked Chin Shih Huang, the first emperor of the Chin Dynasty (221-207 B.C.). He used the doctrines of Confucius and Mencius as a reactionary ideological weapon in his plotting to usurp Party leadership, seize state power and restore capitalism.⁶¹

The opening of the campaign was signalled by an article written by Yang Jungkuo which appeared on November 12, 1972, in *Hongqi*.⁶² It was difficult to determine, in this early phase, whether the target time period was that of the Cultural Revolution or of the preceding Liu Shaoqi era. This was not surprising, considering the uncertainty which existed among the leadership over the ideological direction which the campaign was intended to follow. Who was in

60 Lo Szuting, "Evolution of the Debate Between the Confucians and Legalists as Seen from Wang An-shih's Reform," *Selected Articles Criticizing Lin Piao and Confucius*, vol. 1, pp. 186-187.

61 See "Publisher's Note," *Selected Articles*.

62 Another source dates the start of the campaign as July 13, 1972, when the *Guangming Ribao* published an article by Beijing University's Che Chun entitled "Viewing the Reactionary Nature of the Theory of Genius from the Angle of History of Philosophy." See Wang Hsueh-wen, "The Development of the Maoists' Criticism of Confucius Movement," *Issues and Studies* vol. 10 no. 6 (March 1974), pp. 32-54.

control? Few articles were published and little of any substance occurred until the campaign began in earnest after the 10th Party Congress in August 1973. Some time after this, a pattern of reaction to the trends (decentralization, regionalism, disunity, chaotic administration) of the Cultural Revolution gradually began to co-exist and compete with the critique of Lin as an "ultra-Rightist."

How was the campaign carried out? As can readily be seen from the content, it was a more esoteric campaign than many preceding, more pragmatic events. It did not have the instructional aim of social improvement that the Socialist Education Movement had had. It supplied no positive or realistic models for emulation. It did not have the tangible, real life, concrete goals related to building a socialist society that the collectivization campaigns had possessed. If local meetings were held in large numbers, this was a fact going largely unreported. At first glance, *Pi Lin Pi Kung* would also appear to have had less of an impact on everyday life, being a rather abstract, literary, and ethereal undertaking.⁶³ It was likely that the only real effect on the public was the necessity of (hopefully enthusiastically) attending a few campaign events. To stress the need for activity, Renmin Ribao, February 2, 1974, warned that

⁶³ An official campaign theme song existed, comprising a quote from Mao Zedong: "Practice Marxism and not revisionism; unite and don't split; be open and above board, and don't intrigue and conspire."

Whether one is active or inactive towards this cardinal issue of criticizing Lin Biao and Confucius is a test for every leading comrade.⁶⁴

The vast majority of the discourse connected with *Pi Lin Pi Kong* seems to have merely taken place in books, journals, and newspapers.

Mainly a restricted literary and historical debate, the campaign was directed ostensibly against problems in the superstructure. The commencement of the campaign coincided with the publication of a number of works by writers such as Yang Jungkuo and Che Chun at Beijing University, but numerous school publications from other educational institutions also included anti-Confucian works.

Support for this emphasis on reforming the superstructure was not universal, as significant leadership divisions existed. During the 10th Party Congress of August 24-28, 1973, Zhou Enlai spoke of the need for emphasizing planning and centralized leadership, and stressed that "...it is the party that exercises overall leadership."⁶⁵ Wang Hungwen spoke of the need to concentrate on class struggle in the superstructure (including the realm of culture) and to

64 Wang Hsueh-wen, "The Maoists' Deepened Struggle to Criticize Lin Piao and Confucius," *Issues and Studies*, vol. 10 no. 9 (June, 1974), p. 5.

65 See "Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation (July-September, 1973)," *The China Quarterly* no. 56 (October-December, 1973), pp. 807-809.

relate this to the socialist economic base. Wang mentioned the need for transforming "...all those parts of the superstructure that do not conform to the socialist economic base and carry out many great political revolutions such as the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution."⁶⁶ Even more significantly, he noted that cultural revolutions would have to be a recurring phenomenon.⁶⁷ Wang, of course, had risen to power during the Cultural Revolution and was to achieve additional fame as a member of the "Gang of Four," which was itself to become a campaign target in later years.

Following the closing of the Congress, instructions were issued calling for all sorts of organizations, factories, communes, and schools to form "Criticizing-Confucius Groups." Prominent intellectuals were encouraged and/or required to engage in intellectual self-criticism regarding past adherence to Confucianism.⁶⁸ "Sent-down" educated youth were also required to participate in both criticism and self-criticism. The role of the cadre was important in initiating such criticism sessions, and they were exhorted to "stand in the forefront of the struggle."

⁶⁶ Wang Hsueh-wen, "The Development of the Maoists' Criticism of Confucius Movement," *Issues and Studies*, vol. 10 no. 6 (March, 1974), p. 40. Since this time, the number of purely constructive, economic campaign efforts has continued to be negligible.

⁶⁷ See "Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation (July - September, 1973)," *The China Quarterly* no. 56 (October-December, 1973), p. 809.

⁶⁸ One example, cited in Wang Hsueh-wen, "The Development of the Maoists' Criticism of Confucius Movement," *Issues and Studies*, vol. 10 no. 6 (March, 1974), pp. 41-42, was the then nearly 80-year old Feng Yu-lan's "Criticism of Confucius and Self-criticism of My Previous Worship of Confucianism."

There exists some evidence of large-scale organized mobilizational activity, especially that occurring in the case of major, orchestrated public events, but mass involvement at the most intrusive, basic, local level was either very sporadic or went entirely unreported. As had become usual by this time, authorized activity took place entirely through the formal mass organizations. The party committees, located in all parts of the country and in all types of unit, were charged with the "promotion" of the movement. Provincial, municipal, and regional committees participated. Committees in several universities mobilized their entire schools in discussion and, similarly, workers' conferences took place in numerous industrial units and federations of labour unions. Various military districts and regions also held criticism rallies and, as at the above conferences, senior office-holders were present to speak. Province-wide mobilization rallies were conducted by the various Communist Youth League branches in their respective provinces, sometimes two or three times. Additionally, poor and lower-middle peasants' associations and women's associations have been noted as having held meetings. A number of provincial and municipal revolutionary committees also staged criticism sessions.

While illustrative of numerous campaign characteristics, the actual tactics employed masked significant rifts within the

CCP. Perhaps consequently, the widespread mobilizational effort was, according to sources on Taiwan, not entirely successful. One author, K'ung Te-liang, provides numerous examples, as of March 1974, of failure on the part of the responsible party bodies to conduct any meetings. He attributes this, and the failure of various officials to appear, to the leadership of the CCP Central Committee and the various responsible local organs (including the military district or region commanders and commissars) being in the hands of the Cultural Revolution faction.⁶⁹ This may be a reasonable finding, and there is copious evidence for the existence of such camps. The role of factions and power groups in the campaign has been examined by Parris Chang, who found that, as of early 1974, the campaign was still the scene of an inconclusive battle between the established conservative forces and the radical, pro-Cultural Revolution elements.⁷⁰ This assessment pointedly reveals the imprecision which hampers attempts to analyze such campaigns. Other, later, discussions have viewed this stage of *Pi Lin Pi Kong* as one of planned attack on the legacy of the Cultural Revolution and its "new-born things."

69 K'ung Te-liang, "The Maoist Mobilization for Criticizing Lin Piao and Confucius," *Issues and Studies*, vol. 10 no. 10 (July, 1974), pp. 46-49.

70 Parris Chang, "The Anti-Lin Piao and Confucius Campaign: Its Meaning and Purposes," *Asian Survey*, vol. 14 no. 10 (October, 1974), p. 876.

This uncertainty makes it apparent that leadership division resulted in the campaign being used by different groups to promote differing views. *Pi Lin Pi Kung* can be seen as ushering in an era witnessing this frequent use of campaigns as tools by leadership factions. The shifting and contending has undoubtedly contributed to the absurd, confusing, and sometimes negligible outward content of recent campaigns.

SECTION SIX - POST-REFORM CAMPAIGN EFFORTS

Since the removal from power of Hua Guofeng, the most recent campaign efforts have witnessed an acceleration of the characteristics just noted. In particular, confusion over goals, leadership disunity, a lack of relevance to real daily life, and an increase in moralizing and public instruction continued to take place.

At least three campaigns (for CCP rectification, against "spiritual pollution," and against "bourgeois liberalization") have overlapped each other since the early 1980s. Earlier it was noted that one structural change in campaign conduct, due at least in part to leadership disunity over ideological objectives and targets, was a trend toward imperfection, lack of direction, and sloppiness in the administration of some recent campaigns. Another structural change was found to be a growing "institutionalized mobilization." Evidence of both of these can be found in the 1980s.

In the case of the *Pi Lin Pi Kung* campaign, which had few concrete, publicly-stated and obvious targets or goals, it was difficult to determine either where the campaign was going or what the extent of leadership ideological disunity was. Many of the specific tactics used (such as obscure

literary criticism) were estranged from real life. The campaigns of the 1980s have evidenced continuing chaotic administration, confusion over goals, lack of effective central control, and disparities in coverage and effectiveness. Division within the top ranks of the leadership has been a feature affecting (or orchestrating?) all recent campaign efforts. Moralizing has been carried to new heights and with campaign goals and targets so varied and vague, campaigns have tended to run on into one another.

Internal political infighting aside, what are the outward goals of the newest campaigns? What are they intended to accomplish? The campaign against "spiritual pollution" coincided with the early stages of the 1983-7 party rectification campaign, the crackdown ("campaign") on crime, and with a period of growing literary, artistic and intellectual liberalization and experimentation. These, and the later efforts against "bourgeois liberalization" and the "six evils," can all be linked chronologically in terms of goals. All were "catch-all" campaigns, tackling a variety of perceived social problems. With the possible exception of the atypical One-Child campaign, these recent campaigns have not been intended to promote any outwardly-visible tangible cause or forward an objective. Despite the labels attached to them ("spiritual pollution," "bourgeois liberalization"), the real targets have consistently been those social problems, including disorder, corruption, and

challenges to CCP leadership, which are seen as most threatening.

Since Hua Guofeng's departure and his replacement by the Deng Xiaoping forces, the main emphasis has been on achieving "socialist modernization and construction" and not on combatting class enemies and class conflict. Adherence to the "Four Cardinal Principles," including the supremacy of party leadership, is also to be promoted. Concentration is now to be on the "forces of production," the "four modernizations," and the advancement of Chinese society through economic and infrastructural reform.⁷¹

By the early 1980s, opposition to the new "line" and debate about the merits of the new policies connected with it were seen as threatening by the leadership. Many of the social problems China was experiencing were exacerbated by outside foreign influences. Although criticism of "bourgeois liberalization" had been occurring sporadically since 1978, only now was this foreign-inspired decadence allowed to become an object of campaign attack. There was a perceived need for art and literature to "serve the people" and promote socialism, as well as a need to adhere to national traditions in written works. There was said to be "too much

⁷¹ This has been characterized as the emergence of a new "line," and leadership struggles since 1978 have been seen as basically supportive of this new approach and merely factional in nature. See Ramon H. Myers, "Does the CCP Have a 'Line'?", *Changes in China: Party, State, and Society*, ed. Leng Shao-chuan (Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 1989), pp. 17-37.

writing about the dark side," and some were criticized as advocates of Western modernist thought. Such people, it was said, "think that creative work has no need for theoretical guidance, and some call for 'self-expression' as the highest objective of literature and art."⁷² The growth of Western humanism in writing was deplored and calls were made for a return to socialist realism.

An influx of Western music, videotapes, dancing, films and books began entering China in the early 1980s. Allegorical and politically critical works by Chinese writers, such as Zhang Xiaotian's *Clustered Grass on the Prairie* and the writings of Wang Ruoshui in Renmin Ribao began to appear. These all became targets of the campaign.

The commencement of the assault against "spiritual pollution" was signalled by media attacks against target individuals and by Deng's speech at the Second Plenum of the 12th Central Committee, held October 11-12, 1983. The attack on spiritual pollution was clearly leadership-approved at this early stage. Deng defined:

the substance of Spiritual Pollution as disseminating all varieties of corrupt and decadent ideologies of the bourgeoisie and other exploiting classes and disseminating sentiments of distrust towards the socialist and communist cause and to the Communist Party leadership.⁷³

⁷² *Renmin Ribao*, October 31, 1983, p. 1.

Asserting the need for stronger party leadership, he called for more decisive social guidance. Deng Liqun delineated four categories of spiritual pollution: spreading things that are obscene, barbarous or reactionary; vulgar taste in artistic performances; efforts to seek personal gain, and indulgence in individualism, anarchism, and liberalism; as well as writing articles or delivering speeches that run counter to the country's social system.⁷⁴

In response, a catch-all campaign of reaction to this generally unsatisfactory social state was initiated. The paramount goal of this was to suppress the most serious emerging threats to the authority of the CCP (or that of groups or factions *within* the party). No practical or constructive aims were present, although there was the provision of a number of further examples of correct socialist behaviour for public emulation. If some positive improvement requiring true and deep public commitment with an element of spontaneity was intended as a goal, surely efforts would have been made to induce willing mass cooperation without recourse to selective, retaliatory criticism and a flood of negative examples.

⁷³ See *Beijing Review*, no. 42 (October 17, 1983), centrefold document pages, for the English text of Deng's speech to the Plenum of Oct. 11-12, 1983.

⁷⁴ *Renmin Ribao*, November 3, 1983, p. 1.

Despite this, attempts were made to link the campaign's literary criticism to real life. The promotion of "socialist spiritual civilization," as contrasted to Western material civilization, encompassed special social responsibilities for the writer. They were to engage in "socialist realism," to avoid writing solely for monetary gain, and were to be held responsible for the effects of their writing on society. As representatives of public morality, they were expected to remain above debasement, opportunism and corruption. Through consideration of "socialist spiritual civilization," the category of literary issues came to include within it social, philosophical, and moral problems.⁷⁵

The building of "socialist spiritual civilization" had been named as a necessary prerequisite to the achievement of the Four Modernizations in early 1981. A separate drive promoting "socialist spiritual civilization" had commenced at least as far back as the spring of 1982. This has contributed to the difficulties in separating one campaign effort from another. It was at this time that the *wujiang simei sanreai* were first put forward as a moral code to be followed.⁷⁶

⁷⁵ Wendy Larson, "Realism, Modernism, and the Anti-'Spiritual Pollution' Campaign in China," *Modern China*, vol. 15 no. 1 (January 1989), pp. 41-43.

⁷⁶ This is summarily described in Dittmer, *China's Continuous Revolution*, p. 262.

The report of the 12th Party Congress, held in September, 1982, outlined the outward targets of this earlier drive. Civilization was seen to have both a material and a spiritual aspect, with the latter encompassing "the development of education, science, cultural knowledge and the enhancement of people's ideology, politics, and morality." The report said that

If the great task of building a socialist spiritual civilization guided by communist ideology is overlooked, people will fall into a one-sided understanding of socialism and direct their attention exclusively to the building of material civilization or even to the pursuit of material gains.⁷⁷

The party required cadres to become "more revolutionary, better educated and more professionally competent," and called for the development of "national ideals, morality, culture and a sense of discipline."⁷⁸

These calls became central goals of the later campaign against "spiritual pollution." Sub-bodies and regional party committees met after the October, 1983, Second Plenum to study the meeting's works and called for getting the campaign underway. Media editorials and articles served the purpose of legitimizing criticism of, in particular, theoretical, literary and artistic workers. Members of the

⁷⁷ See excerpts from *Hongqi*, issue dated November 19, 1982, published in *Beijing Review*, vol. 25 no. 45 (November 8, 1982), pp. 13-17.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

public trafficking in pornography first became a target at this time. Other targets included party theoreticians, party and non-party literary and art figures, and the cadres in charge of them.

As with the public denunciations in the *Pi Lin Pi Kung* campaign, the famous led the way. The elderly Zhou Yang, chairman of the All-China Federation of Literary and Art Circles, was one of those who had urged writers to write honestly. As a supporter of Wang Ming during the 1930s, Zhou was for some time out of favour with important elements of the CCP hierarchy. Despite this, he rose to become minister of culture during the 1950s. Severely victimized during the Cultural Revolution, he was at that time paraded through the streets with an incriminating placard tied around his neck. In subsequent years Zhou was returned to a comfortable position as an elderly literary statesman, but during the campaign against spiritual pollution was subjected to editorial criticisms for his encouragement of truthful writing and his 1983 discussion of humanism and alienation.⁷⁹

This is a standard method of attacking perceived excesses taking place during times of "open-ness." It typically

⁷⁹ At the heart of Zhou's article "A Discussion of Certain Theoretical Problems in Marxism" was his belief that the talented were alienated from socialist society because of its lack of humanism, which problem is in turn derived from an improper overconcentration on class struggle. See *Renmin Ribao*, March 16, 1983.

involves identifying and publicly labelling those seen as being out of line and conducting a publicity campaign against them, largely through the media. This was done in late 1983. Authors who were identified as having written offensive pieces were also criticized publicly and a number, Wang Ruoshui among them, lost their jobs.

Again like the *Pi Lin Pi Kung* campaign, this was a mainly literary effort, with minimal disruption to mass daily activities. Speeches by leadership figures at all levels were given in all sorts of fora, at meetings of official organizations, at party meetings, and at interviews in the press. Prominent targets accepted some blame publicly. Certain groups were to receive more ideological education. One mass meeting was held at Beijing University and isolated meetings of official mass organizations also took place during this short campaign. However, real, intimate mass involvement was probably non-existent. In an excellent and informative small article, Charles Webb conveys something of the atmosphere surrounding the campaign, which coincided with the "campaign" on law and order:

Posters went up, the odd speech was made, and "the masses were morally armed for the Struggle." It was, in some quarters, suggested that it was a bad thing for the Chinese to associate with foreigners. Cheap, trashy imitations of Western culture were frowned upon; socialism was to be upheld. The results was rather pleasant. For a time, it was unfashionable for the Shanghai street spivs to hang about in tight-hipped, flared jeans. Zhao Ziyang exchanged badly cut western suits with

awkward ties for well-tailored Chinese jackets. And, by and large, the Chinese laughed. Certainly they did in Shanghai. Life went on, no-one took the campaign seriously, and it flopped.⁸⁰

A number of celebrated cases occurred where foreigners were requested to hand over pornography. In Lanzhou, the Gansu Armed People's Police Force guided "cadres and fighters in reading good books and singing revolutionary songs" to prevent a recurrence of unhealthy tendencies that had led some of them to "wear mustaches and whiskers, sing unhealthy songs, be undisciplined and not keep their minds on their work and want to be demobilized and permitted to return home at an early date."⁸¹

Why would such, at face value, preposterous shortcomings be the focus of such national publicity efforts unless they were intended to be exemplary of undesirable behaviour? It is likely that those in control among the leadership had a need not only to combat unhealthy social tendencies, but also to be seen doing so. The latter portion of 1983 witnessed much discussion, moralizing talk and spirit-raising but little concrete action by the public, to whom the campaign was supposedly directed. Indeed, the major campaign weapon was "active ideological struggle" (*jiji di sixiang douzheng*) which indicated merely a continuing objective, restrained and sensible criticism. Denials were

80 Charles Webb, "China: An Outsider's Inside View," *Asian Affairs*, vol. 17 (o.s. vol. 73) part I (February, 1986), pp. 57-63.

81 Gold, "JUST IN TIME," pp. 957-958.

issued to the effect that what was going on was not a campaign, but was merely a "commonplace task."

Other tactics of this sort included the introduction of a variety of simplistic but well-intentioned new models (the "advanced persons") for emulation: intellectuals such as Jiang Zhuying and Luo Jianfu, militia member Zhu Boru and the handicapped Zhang Haidi. "National Socialist Ethics and Courtesy Month", which was instituted originally in 1982, was continued (held every March), and "civility villages" were established in the countryside as larger-scale examples of correct public behaviour. "Five-good families" were promoted. Such a family would: be diligent at work and study, consider family members and neighbours, practice family planning and pay attention to children's education, observe the law and be disciplined, and exhibit courteous public behaviour.⁸²

It was quite apparent that there was no one guiding hand at work, as "spiritual pollution" became a category encompassing a vast array of items chosen for attack. Excesses began to occur as the range of targets expanded to include more than mere literary and artistic license. The campaign quickly got out of hand and became a drive against many sacrosanct aspects of the ongoing modernization

⁸² An excellent discussion of many of these activities is provided in Chang Ching-li, "Promotion of Socialist Spiritual Civilization on the Chinese Mainland," *Issues and Studies*, vol. 19 no. 8 (August, 1983), pp. 23-40.

program.⁸³ With the campaign circle widening and taking an ultra-Leftist, xenophobic direction, it began to be used as a cover to attack those in privileged positions.⁸⁴ In November, 1983, efforts were made to define the limits of the attack, and cautions were issued reminding the overzealous that some youth behaviours (such as the wearing of longer hairstyles) were not evidence of spiritual pollution. By late December, and certainly by the end of January, the movement appeared to have been put on hold.

The end of the campaign reflected a number of the Deng regime's priorities. Economic modernization and reform was sought, along with the preservation of CCP power. True purification was also an objective, but the cost of the socially divisive campaign was too high in terms of stability. Liberalization was something to be avoided, but it has been said that Deng failed to differentiate modernization from Westernization.⁸⁵

In the campaign against "spiritual pollution," leadership disunity was not centred on the same divisions as existed at the time of the campaign to criticize Lin Biao and Confucius. There has been no substantial conflict over

⁸³ Because of the adverse effects of the campaign on economic reform, the field of discussion was explicitly limited to ideological and literary matters in November, 1983. See Dittmer, *China's Continuous Revolution*, pp. 262-263.

⁸⁴ Gold, "JUST IN TIME!," p. 973.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 973-974.

party "line" in recent years. Although leadership figures may still be classed as moderates and conservatives, it is difficult to document that an ideological conflict exists now between reformists and Cultural Revolutionary radicals. Some senior leaders, such as Deng Xiaoping, Hu Qiaomu, Deng Liqun, Peng Zhen, Wang Zhen, and Yu Qiuli are seen as merely more resistant to a rapid opening-up to the world than are others. One view recently put forward sees the larger arena of disagreement not as conflict over the continuation of reform itself, but as dispute over personal power and factional issues.⁸⁶

Beginning simultaneously with the movement against "spiritual pollution," and extending into 1987, a CCP rectification campaign was conducted. The problems which plagued Chinese society in general also existed in the party itself, which had a membership of around forty million at this time. Additionally, with the new emphasis on modernization, and on infrastructural and economic reform, a large portion of the membership was becoming of dubious ideological quality.

"Nine types" of party members were distinguished in the 1983 "Decision on Party Consolidation." These included three types of party member whose detractions were deemed serious

⁸⁶ This view is put forward in Ramon H. Myers, "Does the CCP Have a 'Line'?", pp. 33-34.

enough by the Central Committee to warrant removal from the party: "...persons who have risen to prominence by following the counterrevolutionary cliques of Lin Piao and Chiang Ch'ing in 'rebellion,' those who have been seriously factionalist in their ideas, and those who have indulged in beating, smashing and looting."⁸⁷ "Three impurities," in ideology, in work style, and in organization, would also be sought out.⁸⁸

Cultural Revolution-era members were mostly "red" rather than "expert." The Third Plenum of 1978, at which the Four Modernizations were put forward, shifted party work emphasis from class struggle to socialist modernization, which required better-trained and skilled cadres. Ideologically out-of-step, some of the existing cadres and members were not believed to be sympathetic to the economic and political reforms going on. Remnant Cultural Revolution influences were also blamed for other troubles. With a massive (and opportunistic?) membership, routine party work was likely being done in a rather cursory fashion. Uncertainty over the ideological, political, and organizational line of the party contributed to the doubtful merit of new members. Many basic questions of ideology had been glossed over in

⁸⁷ Hsuan Mo, "Party Consolidation: Teng's Final Struggle?," *Issues and Studies* vol. 20 no. 1 (January, 1984), pp. 16-17.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

recent years while the party had concentrated on economic reforms and fighting economic crime.

Officially, four reasons were given for the rectification. These were: to unify all party members ideologically with the Central Committee (to promote a clear understanding of current line and policies), to rectify party work style by acting in the interest of the masses, to strengthen party discipline (particularly the norm of democratic-centralism), and to expel those party members who do not achieve the first three goals.⁸⁹

Seemingly intended to be a tightly-controlled effort, the rectification was to be a "top-down" effort, strictly closed-door in nature. The drive commenced with an explicit statement at the same Second Plenum of the 12th Central Committee which launched the assault on "spiritual pollution." The latter campaign, conceived in response to factional pressures within the leadership, constituted the "mass" or public aspect of a general (masses and party) attack on unsatisfactory conditions. The Central Committee statement made it clear that, even though the 'correct' opinions of non-party members would be sought,

on no account should the past erroneous practice of "letting the masses consolidate the Party" or

⁸⁹ Dickson, "Conflict and Non-Compliance," pp. 174-175.

letting non-Party members decide issues in the Party be repeated.⁹⁰

This was an attempt to avoid the disorder and loss of control evident in previous rectifications. It also showed that any role of the masses as a cleansing, "storming" force continued to be officially frowned upon. The party's Central Discipline Inspection Commission (CDIC) was, for the first time, involved in a rectification campaign, with the job of providing negative examples to reinforce correct behaviour in party members. An additional body, the Central Commission for Guiding Party Rectification (CCGPR) was set up specifically to conduct the overall campaign effort.

All these measures were aimed at permitting the CCP to maintain strict control over its own internal affairs. A similar desire for internal regulation in the party arose after the failure of the Great Leap Forward. In terms of CCP organization, the period of the early 1960s has often been compared with the post-1978 era. It was during the years 1958-66 that the imposition of control commission organs on internal party affairs, the abandoning of "open-door" rectification, and an emphasis on organization and order, rules and routine first became apparent.⁹¹

⁹⁰ From "The Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Party Consolidation" of Oct. 11, 1983. See *Beijing Review*, vol. 26 no. 42 (October 17, 1983), centrefold document pages.

⁹¹ Charles Neuhauser, "The Chinese Communist Party in the 1960s: Prelude to the Cultural Revolution," *The China Quarterly*, no. 32 (October-December, 1967), pp. 14-19.

The chief characteristic of the rectification seems to have been its ineffectiveness. Problems abounded, many of which were due to the confusion which existed over the emphasis and goals of the campaign. The primary objective of the regime at this time was, of course, the ongoing modernization and reform program. Party rectification could not be allowed to interfere with this drive.

This campaign in particular suffered from a number of faults, most notably shoddy administration and lucklustre implementation. To encourage members to improve their work style, the need for the provision of selective incentives was recognized. However, these did not prove attractive enough. Model rewards for good work were becoming redundant when compared to the potential benefits to be derived from engaging in corruption and abuse of power.⁹² Furthermore, improvements in work style were only called for on the flimsy basis that if they were achieved, all would benefit from the collective goals of rectification.

Ideological disunity among the leadership was evidenced by the shifting focus of the campaign. This was most obvious in the two conflicting priorities of economic production and party rectification. The campaign was one in which part-time participation was encouraged so as not to disrupt

⁹² *Ibid.*, p. 176.

production. The demands of production and the necessity of attending to one's work detracted from the campaign's effectiveness - a ready excuse was provided to some to avoid rectification. One of the reasons for the campaign was to acquire more skilled cadres for economic reform purposes. Indeed, economic performance was used as an outright indicator of campaign success, and economic reform was continuously taking precedence over rectification matters.

An effective campaign typically includes a blend of persuasion and coercion, but little of the latter was evident in the rectification. Only 0.4% of the CCP membership was removed as a result of this campaign. With leniency stressed in the rectification, the possibility of being expelled was not high. Consequently, lack of enthusiasm on the part of members was perhaps not surprising.

Lack of communication was another major problem area. Coordination between the CDIC and the CCGPR was not always in evidence, and communication between the CCGPR and the local-area cadres was poor. This resulted in many rural party organs successfully avoiding the campaign. Some party organs were slow to begin rectification. The CCGPR itself was handicapped by the fact that it had not been amply supplied with authority by those at the party helm. The

official four goals of the campaign contradicted each other, reflecting ideological confusion:

when a cadre was confronted with the dilemma of how, or whether, to implement an unpopular policy, the requirements to "serve the people" and to obey the chain of command (i.e., obey democratic centralism) contradicted one another.⁹³

Such difficulties contributed to poor communication and to the lack of information so necessary to the central authorities in a hierarchically-structured campaign of this type.

How much genuine membership participation, of the type expected in an extra-party mass campaign, was required? The top-down campaign structure certainly mitigated against any initiative-taking on the part of lower-level bodies. The subordinating of the campaign to the needs of production allowed some, perhaps many, to avoid rectification in whole or in part. One large meeting, the "8,000 cadres conference," was held in January, 1986, but small criticism meetings of the standard type are nowhere mentioned as having been in widespread use. Most importantly, the necessary will and ideological commitment to achieve a thorough-going cleansing was lacking.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, p. 175.

In December 1986 and January 1987, there were significant outbursts of student-led discontent in several major Chinese cities. Fearful of a return of the chaos of the Cultural Revolution, and of a possible linkage between student unrest and worker discontent, the leadership launched a further campaign reminiscent of the drive against "spiritual pollution." Ever worried about the social effects of economic reform, the conservative forces within the CCP Central Committee orchestrated a "campaign" against "bourgeois liberalization." Ostensibly limited to being a party rectification, it was once again conducted in the public sphere largely through the media and operated against prominent intellectual targets. Initially attacking things Western, it was later couched as a struggle between the socialist road and the capitalist road, and was reflective of another ideological showdown taking place within the leadership.⁹⁴

As before, the problem was labelled (in this case as "bourgeois liberalization") but most worrying in reality was the challenge to CCP leadership. "Bourgeois liberalization" was viewed as "...refuting socialism, advocating capitalism, and...refuting the party's leadership," and party organizations were called upon to "progress in unifying

⁹⁴ Robin Munro, "Political Reform, Student Demonstrations and the Conservative Backlash," *Reforming the Revolution: China in Transition*, pp. 63-80.

thought," revealing the existence of ideological disunity even within the CCP itself.⁹⁵

The campaign was formally limited in scope and emphasis to the party itself, targetting expressly "the erroneous thought of attempting to get rid of the leadership of the Communist Party and to refute socialism." It was to avoid contending with policies on economic reform, "explorations of literary or artistic styles and techniques," and "the daily life of the people."⁹⁶ It was not to affect rural areas or non-party intellectuals, although in this case the latter were to be asked for input. The necessary guiding force was to be the Rectification Commission of the CCP Central Committee.

Patience and leniency were called for in this effort, which despite application in the public sphere was in fact a strictly-controlled party rectification. Only the truly unrepentant were to be dealt with severely. This would occur only after target individuals had successfully negotiated local criticism sessions, and the investigations of the Central Propaganda Department and the "party centre." The most particularly egregious offenders would be "resolutely transferred to other posts." The overall tone

⁹⁵ "Circular of the CCP Central Committee on Issues of the Current Anti-bourgeois Liberalization Movement (Zhongfa no. 4, January 28, 1987)," *Chinese Law and Government*, vol. 21 no. 1 (Spring, 1988), p. 30.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

was one of gentle, reasoned debate: "reasoning in a gentle and calm way," "normal debate, criticism, and counter-criticism", and "positive education" were to be the primary methods utilized in the campaign.⁹⁷

Yet, the campaign was to have some impact on the non-party affairs as well. Calls were made for state media, and broadcasts to follow a "correct political and ideological direction." Problems of literary and cultural errors were to be left to the respective watchdog bodies, but action was expected to be taken by them. Considerable attention was to be devoted to the "clean-up" of newspapers and periodicals and to the obtaining of acceptable leaders, editors and reporting staff.

This was not the first time that "bourgeois liberalization" had become a catchword, although the meaning of the term had now changed slightly. In the spring of 1981, a People's Liberation Army (PLA)-inspired campaign to criticize a military writer, Bai Hua, had commenced. Criticism of the writer, who had produced a screenplay entitled "Bitter Love" (*Kulian*), was also called for at the 6th Plenum of the CCP Central Committee, held in June, 1981. This campaign, which evolved into a full condemnation of "bourgeois liberalization" (*zichan jieji ziyoushua*), continued into the

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 31-33.

summer of that year.⁹⁸

It is by no means certain that the "campaign" against bourgeois liberalization is actually over. Despite the paucity of classical mobilization indicators, "bourgeois liberalization" has remained in the official vocabulary right up until the present. Whether it still bears any resemblance to a true campaign is debatable, and use of the term is now limited to use in the newest drive on social disorder.

Since the suppression of the pro-democracy protests in June 1989, the party has conducted campaign-style efforts to detect and punish those who participated therein. These measures have included a propaganda campaign, publicized arrests and prosecutions, a party purification campaign, and the application of traditional campaign-style methods. The latter involved confessions, criticism meetings, and a limited number of local unit-level gatherings and workteam assignments. These efforts met with little success, being hampered by the existence of public sympathy toward aspects of the protests, lack of enthusiasm and cooperation, and a public "conspiracy of silence."⁹⁹

⁹⁸ Dittmer, *China's Continuous Revolution*, pp. 261-262.

⁹⁹ Hong Shi, "China's Political Development After Tiananmen: Tranquility by Default," *Asian Survey*, vol. 30 no. 12 (December, 1990), pp. 1206-1217.

The failure of these bald attempts at outright punishment has, according to one author, led the party to develop a more sophisticated policy emphasizing stability and economic development, as well as reconciliation and renewed calls to perfect the system under CCP leadership.¹⁰⁰ However, the move in this new direction has done little to correct the grievous loss of political legitimacy suffered by the regime in 1989.

A drive against the "six evils," the most prominent of which are corruption and pornography, has been taking place since the summer of 1989. A separate "campaign" against corruption had already been initiated in late 1988. While the language is always couched in "campaign" terms, the content of these efforts exhibits fewer characteristics of a genuine campaign than was the case with the anti-crime moves of 1983. Virtually no mass activity is occurring.

Much of this was mere reaction to the events of early 1989. As early as July 1989, the emphasis was already starting to be placed on "plain living and hard work," as well as on patriotism, socialism, independence and self-reliance.¹⁰¹ Additionally, "bourgeois liberalization" has been renewed as

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.* The author feels that this new policy direction has made passivity a possible course of action for protestors, resulting in the current unexpected political tranquility.

¹⁰¹ See Deng Xiaoping's speech, "Communique of the Fourth Plenary Session of the 13th CCP Central Committee," *Beijing Review*, vol. 32 no. 27 (July 3-9, 1989), p. 14.

a catch-word denoting many Western values. Deng himself is perhaps the most vehement opponent of liberalization, a position he has himself acknowledged.¹⁰²

Whether to secure their own positions, to promote socialism, to protect the leading role of the CCP, or to aid the reform process, China's senior leaders remain especially apprehensive about the possible return of social disorder. This has come to include "liberalization," which Deng has said is "always bourgeois," never being socialist in nature.¹⁰³ With such a leadership in charge, and with authoritarian methods of social control continuing to be resorted to, any future role for "mass" participation is likely to be a limited one.

¹⁰² "Deng Xiaoping on Upholding the Four Cardinal Principles and Combatting Bourgeois Liberalization," *Beijing Review* vol. 32 no. 29 (July 17-13, 1989), p. 21.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.* Here, Deng dates the emergence of "bourgeois liberalization" to the period following the overthrow of the Gang of Four (1980) and states that the "four big popular rights" (*sida*) "...amount(ed) to a form of turmoil."

CONCLUSION

The search for the sources of change in the modern mass campaign is not an easy one. Numerous factors - involving administrative, social, and leadership concerns - have impinged on the mass campaign. Nonetheless, the *direction* of change has been rather constant. Trends seen to be occurring as far back as the early 1950s can still be observed in evidence today. Perhaps it is also safe to conclude that some of the same structural problems which have plagued the administration of the PRC since 1949 remain today.

The "mass" campaign has been effectively sidelined. It is still in use, but in little more than name only. Certainly it has never been as irrelevant to the masses as it is now. The originally-conceived ideal role of the *yundong* has been corrupted to the point that it is no longer a real means of participation at all, but is merely a tool - for leadership posturing, for routine task completion, or for maintaining social stability. Because of a lack of commitment on the part of those administering it, or because of a plethora of more urgent priorities and problems, campaigns have become indeterminate, haphazard and nebulous in terms of their structure and administration. Their content has likewise suffered from irrelevance, having become a second priority

to new regime goals. Campaigns have become intermingled with ongoing propaganda assaults to the extent that clearly defining a "mass campaign" is becoming difficult.

With these developments accelerating in very recent times, a meaningful future role for the "mass campaign" appears very much in doubt.

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