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Charēs Angelēthen : biography of a fourth-century strategos Parker, Richard Wayne 1986

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XAPHZ AITEAH0EN: BIOGRAPHY OF A FOURTH-CENTURY ATHENIAN STRATEGOS By RICHARD WAYNE PARKER B . A . , The U n i v e r s i t y o f C a l i f o r n i a , Santa B a r b a r a , 1973 M.A . , The U n i v e r s i t y o f C a l i f o r n i a , San ta B a r b a r a , 1978 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY . i n THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Depar tmen t o f C l a s s i c s , F a c u l t y o f A r t s ) We a c c e p t t h i s t h e s i s as c o n f o r m i n g t o t h e r e q u i r e d s t a n d a r d THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA Augus t 1986 <£> R i c h a r d Wayne P a r k e r , 1986 In presenting t h i s thesis i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree that the Library s h a l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of t h i s thesis for s c h o l a r l y purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by h i s or her representatives. It i s understood that copying or pu b l i c a t i o n of t h i s thesis for f i n a n c i a l gain s h a l l not be allowed without my written permission. CLASSICS Department of The University of B r i t i s h Columbia 2075 Wesbrook Place Vancouver, Canada V6T 1W5 Date - 7 Q ^ i i ABSTRACT Khares of Angele was an Athenian m i l i t a r y magistrate and mercenary soldier for over f o r t y years in the mid-fourth century B.C. For two decades between the outbreak of the Social War and the battle of Khaironeia he was Athens' pre-eminent m i l i t a r y leader. The ancient sources dealing with t h i s era of Greek history mention him with great frequency and his role in the events of his times provoked strong comments and v i v i d p ortraits from contemporary writers. In modern interpretations of fourth-century history Khares i s cited as an example of the increasing trend in the c i t y - s t a t e towards professionalism and sp e c i a l i z a t i o n . He i s commonly referred to as the quintessential example of the fourth-century mercenary adventurer, or condottiere, who increasingly oper-ated beyond the control of, and without regard f o r , his home government. These factors have often been considered important in contributing to the decline of Athens as a p o l i t i c a l power and to the breakdown in the ideal of the -i: Classical c i t y - s t a t e . Despite his long presence at the hub of the p o l i t i c a l history of the later fourth century, there has been no systematic attempt to study his career in i t s entirety for almost 140 years. Scholars who encounter this important figure in Athenian history have r e l i e d on selected, isolated incidents or on vague r : reports in the orators and other sources to form opinions about Khares, and to make generalizations about him and other m i l i t a r y and p o l i t i c a l leaders on that basis without regard to the rest of the available evidence. This study seeks to ppovide a f u l l and detailed account of the entire career of Khares inuorder =to create a balanced and complete foundation on which his role in the history of Athens and Greece in the fourth century may be f a i r l y and accurately assessed. It i s believed that a detailed survey of his i i i whole career in i t s h i s t o r i c a l , social and l i t e r a r y context w i l l contribute to a better appreciation of the relationship between m i l i t a r y magistrates and the Athenian democracy, an improved understanding of Athenian p o l i t i c s and a keener awareness of certain problems facing the city-states in this period as well as the i r representation in the sources. This study i s divided into three parts. The f i r s t part, consisting of two chapters, surveys the magisterial and m i l i t a r y career of Khares. The second part, also consisting of two chapters, examines Khares 1 relationships with other p o l i t i c a l l y active Athenians. The t h i r d part, comprising one chapter, investigates the contemporary l i t e r a r y sources that mention Khares in an a t ^ . ; tempt to determine what, i f any, motivations or bias they may have had in thei r characterizations of him. In the f i r s t part the evidence shows c l e a r l y that Khares was a popular and durable elected magistrate, accountable and obedient to his government. The evidence does not support the notion that he was a mercenary adventurer at any time while engaged in his career as strategos. In f a c t , he accepted service as a mercenary only after his days as an elected magistrate at Athens were over, and then he consistently served against the Macedonians. This a c t i v i t y f i t s the pattern of s i m i l a r l y motivated Athenian m i l i t a r y men, who resisted Macedonian domination as foreign mercenaries when their c i t y no longer could. In the second part the evidence indicates that Khares was a l l i e d with other p o l i t i c a l l y prominent Athenians only for short periods of time in order to achieve s p e c i f i c and limited p o l i t i c a l goals. He i s consistently character-ized as one of, or in cofoperation with those characterized as, the demotikoi. His career was not dependent on any of the major p o l i t i c a l figures. In the t h i r d part the severely negative po r t r a i t s of Khares are seen to have been motivated by personal animosity and p o l i t i c a l expediency. Contribut-ing to this t r a d i t i o n i s the conventional nature of ancient oratory and the i v pervasive l i t e r a r y influence over that genre exercised by Isokrates, whose malevolence can be explained on personal grounds. V CONTENTS Abstract i i Table of Contents v Preface vi Part I: X A P H Z Z T P A T H T O Z 1 Chapter 1: Khares' Early M i l i t a r y Career 3 Family and Social Status (3)...Junior Offices (7)...Khares in the Pelopo-nesos and Oropos: 366 (10)...Khares on Kerkyra (15)...Euboia and the , Khersonesos: 357 (21)...The Social War: 357 and 356 (22) Chapter 2: Khares and the Macedonians 35 Thrace and Thessaly: 353-2 (35)...Olynthos and Thrace: 349-346 (40)... The Peace of Philokrates (46)...Khaironeia and the Destruction of Thebes (53)...Khares and the anti-Macedonian Mercenaries (57)...Summary of Part I (60) Part I I : X A P H Z A H M O T I K O Z 61 Chapter 3: Khares and Aristophon.. .• 63 Introduction (63)...Mi 1itary Magistrates and the Electorate (63)...Arist-ophon of Azenia (64)...Khares and the 'Kal1istratos-group' (67)...Khares and Aristophon (70)...The T r i a l s of Timotheos and Iphikrates (73)... Khares and the Imperialists (78) Chapter 4: Khares and Demosthenes .82 Demosthenes (82)...Demosthenes, Khares and Olynthos (84)...Khares and Kephisophon Paianieus (92).Khares and the T r i a l of Aiskhines (94)... Hypereides and Phokion (100)...Liturgies (101)...Summary of Part II (102) Part I I I : DE CHARETIS MORIBUS. 104 Chapter 5: The Sources 106 Aineias and Xenophon (106)...Isokrates (111)...Demosthenes and Aiskhines (115)...Theopompos (119)...Summary (126) Conclusion and Brief Discussion of 'Proposers and Executors' of Decrees.128 Abbreviations 143 Notes 146 Bibliography 272 Appendix Testimoniorum . 291 Index Prosopographica 331 vi PREFACE This thesis i s a study of the fourth-century Athenian strategos, Khares of Angele. Khares was strategos often over a long period, almost the entire middle t h i r d of the fourth century B.C. Along with Phokion he i s the strategos most frequently mentioned in the sources on this period of Greek history. His was an era in which Athenian power and influence waned, and his role in the ci t y ' s decline was, and i s controversial. A modern treatment of Khares i s lacking, H. Cassianus' 1849 dissertation, De Charetis Atheniensis rebus gestis ac moribus, although b r i e f , was a useful c o l l e c t i o n of the sources, but i t generally f a i l e d to have much impact. At any rate, none of the standard prosopographical works (for which see the Index  Prosopographica) show any awareness of i t . The most frequently cited source; of information ion.the man aside from these works i s H.W. Parke's Greek Mercenary  Soldiers, especially the chapter e n t i t l e d "Greek Mercenary Adventurers." Parke's attitude i s i m p l i c i t in the chapter's t i t l e , but, despite the fact that his book is now over f i f t y years old, i t s influence is s t i l l pervasive. P a r t i c u l a r l y widespread i s Parke's characterization of the Athenian strategos as a "roving condottiere over whose movements his c i t y had l i t t l e control" (p.144). More recently W.K. Pritchett has devoted a chapter of his book The  Greek State at War, Part II to "The Condottieri of the Fourth Century B.C." His study focused on the a c t i v i t i e s abroad of eight fourth-century generals from several states, one of whom was Khares of Athens. Pritchett argued con-vincingly that for his entire sample the notion of the mercenary general out of control i s erroneous. Despite Pritchett's efforts old attitudes p r e v a i l . An example of this is Jack C a r g i l l ' s Second Athenian League, in which the author blames Khares almost solely for the decline of the fourth-century Athenian maritime a l l i a n c e , v i i and he does so, l i t e r a l l y , from introduction to conclusion. Other works could be cited as w e l l , such as Jennifer Roberts' Accountability in Athenian  Government, in which isolated incidents from the l i f e of Khares have been seized upon and extrapolated into patterns used to explain his entire career. A detailed study of Khares' whole career, then, i s both long overdue and needed to provide a more even foundation on which to base assessments of i t s effect on the history of Athens in the later fourth century. In addition to offering a detailed account of t h i s man's career in i t s broader p o l i t i c a l , social and l i t e r a r y context, i t i s hoped that such a study w i l l test Pritchett's conclusions about m i l i t a r y magistrates who commanded mercenary soldiers, that i t w i l l contribute to our understanding of Athenian p o l i t i c s and to the r e l a -tionship between the democracy of Athens and i t s magistrates, and that i t w i l l illuminate the process of the creation of a l i t e r a r y - h i s t o r i c a l t r a d i t i o n . The ancient sources for the l i f e of Khares have been gathered into an Appendix Testimoniorum which follows the bibliography. Each independent piece of evidence has been assigned a number from 1 to 90 prefixed by the l e t t e r T (e.g., T1, T2...T90). This has been done to simplify references and to avoid repeatedly reproducing long passages in the o r i g i n a l languages. A l i s t of testimonia may be found at the beginning of the appendix. Following the appendix is an Index Prosopographica in which references to h i s t o r i c a l persons mentioned in this thesis in several standard prosopographical works are l i s t e d . The thesis i s divided into three parts. The f i r s t concentrates on Khares 1 career as a magistrate and s o l d i e r , the second on his ' p o l i t i c a l ' career, or his relations with other p o l i t i c a l l y prominent Athenians,:arid the t h i r d on the contemporary sources mentioning Khares, in order to determine i f there i s evidence of possibly partisan bias in their reporting on his acts and character. Following the last chapter are some conclusions and a brief discussion of the v a l i d i t y of one method of determining p o l i t i c a l friendships in ancient Athens. 1 PART I; X A P H 2 Z T P A T H T O Z In t h is section we shall review Khares 1 ' o f f i c i a l ' career, that i s , his career as an Athenian magistrate and liturgy-bearer apart from his role in the city ' s internal p o l i t i c s . Khares was a soldier. He spent t h i r t y years leading Athens' forces against her enemies and another f i v e to ten struggling against Athens' enemies as a mercenary soldier. In view of the consistency between his actions as an Athenian m i l i t a r y magistrate and those as a mercenary soldier, i t does not seem inappropriate to include them a l l together in the present section, "Part I". The primary concern in this section i s to determine precisely, according to the ancient evidence, when and how many times Khares was elected or appoint-ed to o f f i c e , and exactly what he did or did not do while in o f f i c e . In this manner we may view his career as a whole, rather than extrapolate i t from salient episodes, as i s so often the case in modern scholarship. This w i l l en-able us to make a proper assessment of Khares' career and i t s impact on Athenian foreign policy as well as the history of Greece during the middle t h i r d of the fourth century B.C. Khares' m i l i t a r y career spans some f i f t y years and an account of i t would make an excessively long chapter. Therefore, the account i s divided into two chapters: one covering the events of his career through the end of the Social War, and another describing the period after that war, an era dominated by the struggle between Athens and Macedon. In addition to si g n a l l i n g an almost exclusively northern focus for Athenian diplomacy, this point seems conven-i e n t l y to divide generations of the Athenian m i l i t a r y establishment, since within a period of less than two years Khabrias, Timotheos, and Iphikrates, 2 a l l heroes of wars against the Lakedaimonians and soon to be canonized, either died or ceased ut t e r l y to influence Athenian p o l i t i c s and diplomacy. Thus, both in rel a t i o n to the l i f e of Khares and to the broader sphere of Athenian and Greek history, such a div i s i o n i s not e n t i r e l y arbitrary. Discussion of Khares' ' p o l i t i c a l ' career (those friendships and enmities with other p o l i t i c a l l y active Athenians that were not dictated by law or the duties of office) i s re-served for "Part I I " , unless i t has a direct bearing on his o f f i c i a l , magist-e r i a l career in the s t r i c t e s t sense. 3 CHAPTER ONE: KHARES1 EARLY MILITARY CAREER  Family and Social Status 1 2 Khares, son of Theokhares, of Angele was born not long after 400 B.C. His father, Theokhares, i s merely a name to us and our ignorance of other r e l -3 atives of Khares, either ancestors or descendants, i s t o t a l . This ignorance of any known r e l a t i v e has led to a commonly accepted suggestion that Khares 4 was a novus homo, a term misleadingly inappropriate to c l a s s i c a l Greek society and especially meaningless in the context of fourth-century Athens after the 5 ravages of the Peloponnesian War. Whatever the achievements of his family, or lack thereof, Khares possess-ed s u f f i c i e n t landed wealth to be included in the l i t u r g i c a l class: he was tri e r a r c h in or about 348/7, and in 344/3 he served his t r i b e as khoregos at g the Thargelia. Ancient evidence suggests that strategoi generally came (or i d e a l l y should come) from wealthy, propertied fa m i l i e s . ^ Although many scholars p assume th i s to have been the case, not a l l are convinced. One need look no further than an elder contemporary of Khares, Iphikrates, for an apparent ex-ample of a man whose wealth was reputedly acquired not from his family, but 9 in the course of his own, mainly m i l i t a r y , career. One might cast suspicion on the origin of Khares 1 wealth for two reasons: f i r s t , we have s p e c i f i c evidence that he was twice the recipient of largesse 10 from foreign powers, and second, i t has become a commonplace in modern scho-larship to characterize fourth-century m i l i t a r y leaders as condottieri and, consequently, to assume not only that men serving as mercenaries in c l a s s i c a l times behaved s i m i l a r l y to those of much later ages, but also that these class-11 i c a l "free-lances" behaved s i m i l a r l y to one another. A n e g l e c t e d p i e c e o f e v i d e n c e s u g g e s t s t h a t a K h a r e s , p r o b a b l y Khares o f A n g e l e , was a l r e a d y a t r i e r a r c h , and t h e r e f o r e a member o f t h e l i t u r g i c a l c l a s s , by o r b e f o r e 366 , t h e d a t e o f K h a r e s 1 f i r s t known s t r a t e g i a . The e v i d e n c e (T6) i s a nava l a r c h i v e , i n s c r i b e d on s t o n e , f r o m t h e e a r l y y e a r s o f t h e second A t h e n i a n League. T h i s a r c h i v e has been t r a d i t i o n a l l y a s s i g n e d a d a t e "non p o s t 3 7 0 / 6 9 " , b u t more r e c e n t l y an a t t e m p t has been made t o b r i n g t h e d a t e down t o 12 3 6 6 / 5 . The e x t a n t f r a g m e n t o f t h e a r c h i v e b e g i n s w i t h a f a i r l y l o n g e n t r y t h a t l i s t s a number o f t r i e r a r c h s who have t a k e n o u t s h i p s t o be used on a 13 k l e r o u k h i a - e x p e d i t i o n , f o l l o w e d by s e v e r a l s h o r t and s e e m i n g l y u n r e l a t e d 14 e n t r i e s , pe rhaps added h a s t i l y . One o f t h e s e s h o r t e n t r i e s b e g i n s h a l f w a y t h r o u g h l i n e 116 o f t h e document : 116 (one space i s v a c a n t between t h e p r e v i o u s e n t r y and t h e name:) K h a r e s : t h i s (man) t o o k o v e r and has s a i l e d o u t h [ a v i n g (a s h i p ' s name i n s i x l e t t e r s s t o o d h e r e ) ] 117 o f w h i c h Moskhos A n g e ( l e t h e n ) and Euthymos P a l l e ( n e u s ) [ l a c u n a o f c a . 18 l e t t e r s ] - d e m o s D e k e l e ( i u s ) , X e n o p e i t h e s P a i a ( n i e u s ) : t [ h e s e (men) t o o k ] 118 o v e r and have s a i l e d o u t h a v i n [ g ( l a c u n a o f c a . 21 l e t t e r s ) ] - o s K h o l a r g ( e u s ) , D i o k l e e s P i t h ( e u s ) (a ) m a s [ t w h i c h K a l l i s - ] 119 t r a t o s A p h i d n a i o s c o n t r i b u t e d [ T6 = IG I I 2 1 6 0 9 . 1 1 6 - 1 1 9 The f o r m u l a e f o u n d on t h i s document a re n o t e x a c t l y p a r a l l e l e d anywhere e l s e i n t h e s e r i e s o f e x t a n t nava l a r c h i v e s (1G_ I I 1 6 0 4 - 1 6 3 2 ) , n e v e r t h e l e s s i t i s s u f f i c i e n t l y c l e a r t h a t Khares i s l i s t e d as r e s p o n s i b l e f o r one o f t h e c i t y ' s s h i p s j u s t as -demos and X e n o p e i t h e s a re l i s t e d as r e s p o n s i b l e f o r a n -o t h e r . The p e r f e c t t e n s e s o f t h e v e r b ' t o s a i l o u t 1 i n l i n e s 116 and 118 ( E X T t s T i X e u x s v and s x n e n X e u x a a L v , r e s p e c t i v e l y : see T6 i n t h e Append ix T e s t i m o n -iorurn) i n d i c a t e t h a t a t t h e t i m e when t h e document was d r a f t e d ( p r e s u m a b l y a t t h e end o f t h e o f f i c i a l o r ' a r c h o n y e a r ' ) t h e s h i p s s p e c i f i e d were o u t on s e r v -i c e and had n o t y e t been r e t u r n e d . The men whose names a re l i s t e d were t o be h e l d r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e s h i p s by t h e s u c c e e d i n g board o f nava l e p i m e l e t a i . A l t h o u g h many names o c c u r on t h e nava l a r c h i v e s e r i e s , o n l y t r i e r a r c h s a re 5 l i s t e d as being responsible for the c i t y ' s ships and naval gear. The conclusion 15 that the men in question were trierarchs i s unavoidable. The Khares of the naval archive i s not i d e n t i f i e d by his demotic. This 16 is unusual but not unique. The naval archives are, in a sense, both tax and bookkeeping records and as such the men charged with keeping these records generally took great pains to provide information s u f f i c i e n t enough that persons responsible for equipment could be e a s i l y i d e n t i f i e d and thus held accountable. On the present document, however, there i s some reason to believe that the i n -17 scribing following l i n e 111 was done in haste or possibly by a new mason. The missing demotic leaves open the p o s s i b i l i t y that another Khares i s l i s t e d on the document and there are two other fourth-century trierarchs of that name: Khares Eleusinios, f i r s t attested in 322, and Khares Aixoneus, f i r s t attested on a document of 342/1, but which refers to e a r l i e r events, some as 18 early as 356. Khares of Angele i s attested as adult at some time between 378-373 (T25), was strategos in 366 (T2, T3, T4, T5) and t r i e r a r c h ca. 348 (T44), and thus i s a more l i k e l y candidate to be the t r i e r a r c h on T6. The secretary, scribe or mason, may make a mistake under any circumstances, but the omission of the demotic such as the one under discussion i s a l i t t l e more understandable 19 i f the demotic belongs to a p o l i t i c a l l y prominent man. As we shall see Khares had probably already been a taxiarkhos by 373 and was strategos in 366. Thus, i t appears not unlikely that Khares had been tr i e r a r c h as a young man, before he had had much opportunity to enrich himself by soldiering. To the preceding argument concerning Khares' social and economic status another can be added ex s i l e n t i o . Neither Isokrates, in his Symmakhikos, also known as On the Peace, (T24), Antidosis (T25) and elsewhere, nor Aiskhines, in his False Embassy (T52), nor yet Theopompos, in his Phi 1ippika (T32, T36, T62), calumniated Khares on the basis of social origin or dubiously founded wealth, although each had occasion to do so. Indeed, they accuse him, not of taking, but of giving bribes. The tenor of the sources points to a man adroit at using 6 wealth, and not to one obsessed with accumulating i t . One ought also to consider the testimony of Demosthenes (T54), albeit cautiously, when in 343 he implied that Aiskhines was pretentiously overreach-ing himself when he dared to slander a man of Khares 1 standing. In sum, i t does not seem j u s t i f i a b l e to denigrate Khares' social status and source of wealth, simply because we know of no i l l u s t r i o u s forebears, especially since his own hostile contemporaries refrained from doing so. There remains to be considered a possible relation by marriage to Khares. She was a woman named Boidion and was well known, at least to later antiquity, 20 because of a famous epigram and monument. Hesykhios of Miletos provides the f u l l e s t account of her, the epigram and the monument, which, he claimed, s t i l l stood in his own time on a promontory near Khalkedon that overlooked the Bosporos: 29 There, having lost the woman who accompanied h i m — she was smitten by d i s e a s e — he (Khares) buried her in a tomb, rai s i n g for her an alta r and a worked column on which a heifer lying down i s portrayed in marble. For so she was named and, down un t i l our own time, she i s immortalized through the inscribed verses. 30 Here are the verses: "I am not the image of the Inakhian cow, nor from me Is the sea opposite called Bosporian, For long ago the deep wrath of Hera drove her Into Pharos. I who l i e here am Athenian. I was the bedfellow of Khares; I sailed when he sailed Here, an opponent of the hulls of P h i l i p . Boidion was my name then, but now the bedfellow Of Khares delights in both continents." T70 - FGrHist 390 Hesykhios F1 #29-30 The epigram 1 s euvsTL-q;, rendered "bedfellow" in the trans l a t i o n , i s more ambiguous than Hesykhios' description of her as a yuvf] • euvsTiq i s a not un-common poetic euphemism, not only for "wife" but also for "mistress", "concu-21 bine". It would be singularly strange to find the wife of a prominent Athen-ian, or of a m i l i t a r y magistrate of any ci t y - s t a t e for that matter, sharing the hardships and hazards of active campaigning in a combat zone. Boidion cer t a i n l y did not conform to the ideal of an Athenian wife as, 7 say, described in the "'training manual* of Iskhomakhos which Xenophon relates in chapters 7-10 of his Oikonomikos. The presence of Boidion, however, in the company of a m i l i t a r y leader on campaign far from his home conforms to a rough-ly p a r a l l e l m i l i t a r y custom fa m i l i a r to the Greeks as early as the time of Homer: the concubine. In the later f i f t h and throughout the fourth centuries we hear of many prominent Athenians that consorted with h e t a i r a i , some who ac-quired a second, foreign wife abroad, and we know of more than one army cam-paigning far from home in the company of large contingents of women, at least 22 some of whom were h e t a i r a i . Theopompos (T62) asserted that Khares "carried around on campaign f l u t e g i r l s , dancers and common h e t a i r a i . " Despite his ob-session with the sexual habits of generals, p o l i t i c i a n s and statesmen, and his 23 use of i t as a rhetorical commonplace, there just may be a kernel of truth in the rhetor's words. The fact that Boidion accompanied Khares on this camp-aign, that she died and was buried abroad, may well have been the seed from which Theopompos' t y p i c a l l y l u r i d exaggeration grew. However dearly missed and commemorated, Boidion doubtlessly stood in the same relationship with her 24 "bedfellow", as did many of his soldiers: that of a mercenary. Junior Offices Apart from the in s c r i p t i o n (T6) discussed above, we have no closely dat-able evidence for Khares' career before he appears for the f i r s t time in the sources (T2, T3, T4, T5) as an Athenian strategos in 366. Yet, at that time he occupied a position of such prestige and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y as to presuppose 25 an e a r l i e r , distinguished record as a soldier and o f f i c e r . Although there was no recognized cursus honorum through which a man had to move before he was e l i g i b l e to hold the highest offices at Athens, nevertheless there were several junior m i l i t a r y offices available in which an ambitious soldier might demon-strate his a b i l i t y to command. Indeed, i t was considered advisable, i f not mandatory, to gain experience through service as a lokhagos and taxiarkhos 8 before becoming a strategos, or as a phylarkhos before becoming a hipparkhos. That Khares did f i l l one or both of the junior offices of lokhagos and 27 taxiarkhos i s implied by statements Isokrates made in his Antidosis. Isokrates composed his Antidosis about 353, shortly after the death of Timotheos, whom he eulogized in sections 101-139 of the composition. In the course of that eulogy he wrote: (115) I think that you (Athenians) would l i k e to hear, then, why some of the strategoi, who are highly thought of by you and who seem to be warlike, have not been able to capture even a v i l l a g e , while Timotheos, having neither a robust physique nor experience with roving armies, but who, rather, with you, taking part in the ci t y ' s a f f a i r s , has accomplished such great things. An account concerning these things i s contentious, but not without advantage to be t o l d . (116) For in this respect he was superior to a l l the rest, because he did not have the same opinion as you do con-cerning the a f f a i r s of the Hellenes and your a l l i e s and the management of them. For you elect strategoi, who have the sturdiest bodies and who have been many times in mercen-ary armies, as though you w i l l accomplish what i s required through them. But Timotheos made use of such men as lokhagoi and taxiarkhoi, (117) while he himself was s k i l f u l regarding a l l the things about which a good strategos must be prudent (Isokrates l i s t s the qu a l i t i e s that a general must have and shows that Timotheos had them). (121) Such then are his great and compelling q u a l i t i e s , but one might j u s t l y praise him s t i l l more for the following: for although he saw that you considered them 'the one and only', who frightened and threatened the other c i t i e s and were always s t i r r i n g up revolution among the a l l i e s , he did not comply with your opinions, nor was he w i l l i n g to harm the c i t y while acquiring a good reputation... T25 = Isokrates Antidosis 15.115-117, 121 Neither here nor elsewhere did Isokrates actually name Khares as the butt of his attacks, but that he was the object of the rhetor's scorn i s clear from the circumstantial evidence. F i r s t , Isokrates had b i t t e r l y attacked Khares just a few years e a r l i e r in the Symmakhikos (= On the Peace). Again the rhetor did not name the man, but made i t abundantly clear to his contemp-oraries that he referred to Khares. A r i s t o t l e (T23) perceived this and mentioned i t as i f i t were common knowledge. Moreover, several details in Isokrates 1 description of the anonymous strategoi whom the Athenians preferred to Timotheos suit what might have been said about Khares in 353. Khares had been 'preferred' to Timotheos on the occasion of the l a t t e r ' s t r i a l (T16, T17). From other sources Khares i s known to have had a 'robust physique' and physical courage, and Timotheos i s known to have been self-conscious about comparison 28 with Khares in just these q u a l i t i e s . Isokrates maligned the anonymous s t r a t -egoi because they had served with 'roving' and 'mercenary armies'. Like most Athenian combat generals during the fourth century, Khares did command mercen-ary forces employed by Athens several times, p a r t i c u l a r l y in the recent Social 29 War, during which his mercenary force had mutinied and compelled him to aban-30 don the main theater of war in order to provide a source of maintenance. Isokrates contrasted Timotheos' attitude towards the Hellenes and the a l l i e s with that of the anonymous strategoi. Khares had, in about 361, been the rank-ing o f f i c e r present on Kerkyra, an Athenian a l l y , when i t s garrison joined in a coup against the democratic government, and at some undetermined point Khares 31 had contemplated aiding an attempted coup on Aigina. Thus, Isokrates' des-cr i p t i o n of the anonymous strategoi in the Antidosis suits very well what an embittered detractor might have said about him in 353. Isokrates i s almost cert a i n l y exaggerating an early relationship between the two future r i v a l s , but the basic statement that Khares served under Timotheos as either taxiarkhos or lokhagos or both i s e n t i r e l y plausible. Many Athenian 32 soldiers must have seen action under Timotheos and others during the 370's. Some of them no doubt benefitted from thei r commander's tutelage, just as Phokion 33 is said to have done from Khabrias'. Khares' distinguished tenure of one or more of these junior o f f i c e s at a promising young age would go a long way in helping to explain his f i r s t appearance in the sources in 366 as strategos 34 in a post of great p e r i l and importance. Khares in the Peloponnesos and Oropos: 366 1 0 Khares f i r s t appears in a datable context during the campaigning season 35 of 366. At that time he commanded Athenian forces based in the Korinthiad. 36 During the course of the Lakonian-Boiotian War, the Boiotians and their Peloponnesian a l l i e s applied intense and relentless pressure on Spartan (and, since early in 369, Athenian) a l l i e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y those in the north-east Peloponnesos. One of the c i t i e s that suffered the most was Phleious. That c i t y withstood no less than f i v e major attacks between 369 and 366, and both Sparta and Athens had demonstrated early in the war just how important they consid-37 ered Phleious. By the summer of 366 the c i t y was surrounded by hostile neigh-bors, two of which were building threatening i n s t a l l a t i o n s against her. The Argives had captured and f o r t i f i e d Trikaranon in Phleiasian t e r r i t o r y , while the Sikyonians were in the process of building a fo r t at Thyamia, a place on 38 their border with Phleious. Xenophon admired the pluck of the Phleiasians so much that he digressed from his narrative and recounted the i r exploits in the war from the time of Epameinondas1 f i r s t invasion in 370. The a r i s t e i a of the Phleiasians comes to a v i v i d climax in the following episode: (17) How through perserverance they maintained the i r f a i t h with the i r friends i s quite clear: when they were being kept from the produce of thei r land, they lived partly by seizing things from enemy t e r r i t o r y , partly by purchasing things from Korinth, by going through many p e r i l s to get to market and obtaining a price with d i f f i c u l t y , arranging transporters with d i f f i c u l t y , and hardly finding guarantors of the pack-beasts that would carry th e i r purchases. (18) Already being wholly at a loss, they arranged for Khares to provide an escort for themselves. When they were in Phleious they begged him to help escort the i r non-combatants to Pellene, and there they l e f t them. Once they had done their marketing and had packed as many beasts of burden as was possible, they started back at night, not unaware that they would be ambushed by the enemy, but rather imagining that not having supplies was more d i f f i c u l t than f i g h t i n g . (19) So the Phleiasians set forth with Khares. When they f e l l in with the enemy they immediately got to work and, encourag-ing one another, they attacked and at the same time they 1 1 shouted for Khares to come to their r e l i e f . Once the victory had been won and the enemy driven from the i r path, they got themselves and the things they were carrying back home safely. Since they had been up during the night, they slept u n t i l past daybreak. (20) When Khares arose the cavalrymen and the best of the hop-l i t e s approached him and said, "Khares, today i t i s possible for you to achieve a very fine thing. The Sikyonians are f o r t i f y i n g a place on our borders and although they have many builders, there are not many hoplites at a l l . We cavalrymen and the sturdiest of the hoplites w i l l lead the way, but you, i f you follow with the mercenary force, w i l l perhaps find the job already finished for you or perhaps your appearance w i l l cause the rout just as in Pellene. But i f any of what we say troubles you, then s a c r i f i c e and consult the gods, for we believe that they w i l l bid you to do this even more than we do. Of this you can be sure, Khares: i f you achieve this you w i l l be f o r t i f i e d against the enemy while saving a fr i e n d l y c i t y ; you w i l l be glorious in your own country and renowned among both a l l i e s and the enemy." (21) Convinced, Khares s a c r i f i c e d while the Phleiasian cavalry-men immediately began donning the i r corselets and b r i d l i n g t h e i r horses. The hoplites made such preparations as b e f i t infantry. When they had taken up their arms and came to where he was s a c r i f i c i n g , Khares and the seer met them and informed them that the s a c r i f i c e s were good. "But wait", they said "for we too are coming out now." As soon as i t was announced, even the mercenaries ran out quickly with some divine enthusiasm. (22) When Khares began to march, the Phleiasian cavalry and infantry went before him. At f i r s t , they marched quickly, then they began to run smartly and f i n a l l y the cavalry charged at a gallop, the infantry ran as fast as they could in form-ation, and Khares followed them eagerly. It was the time of day just before sunset and they caught the enemy in the f o r t i f -i c a t i o n , some while they were bathing, some cooking or kneading bread, and some making up their beds. (23) But when they saw the determination of the attack they broke and f l e d , leaving behind a l l the i r provisions to the brave men, who dining on these things and more which came from home, poured a l i b a t i o n for the i r good fortune, sang the paian and went to sleep once sentries had been posted. When a mess-enger about Thyamia arrived there at night, the Korinthians benevolently made a proclamation for teams of pack animals and brought them f i l l e d with food into Phleious. And so long as the f o r t i f i c a t i o n was under construction there were convoys each day. T2 = Xenophon Hellenika 7.2.17-23 Diodoros also records these actions in his narration of the events of the year in which Polyzelos held o f f i c e at Athens (367/6 B.C.). His account 1 2 adds l i t t l e to Xenophon's except that he conceived of Khares' role in the battles as being the main one and he specifies the enemy as being the more formidable Argives: Khares was sent out with a force by the Athenians to help the Phleiasians, who were at war with the Argives. Beating the Argives in two battles and providing for the security of Phleious, he returned to Athens. T3 = Diodoros 15.75.3 Apart from an obviously demonstrated m i l i t a r y competence, two facts about Khares' involvement in this campaign deserve comment. F i r s t , he held a position of great r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and strategic importance (one previously held by the c i t y ' s senior s t r a t egoi), a fact that presupposes considerable exper-39 nence as well as the demos' confidence in him. Second, the forces under his command were mainly mercenaries, although there were probably c i t i z e n troops present as wel1. Within a very few days after these actions around Phleious, Khares was summoned back to A t t i c a , apparently to help deal with the urgent c r i s i s over Oropos: Oropos was seized by exiles while the Phleiasians were s t i l l f o r t i f y i n g Thyamia and while Khares was s t i l l present. When the Athenians marched out in f u l l force and sent after Khares from Thyamia, the harbor of the Sikyonians was again captured back by the c i t i z e n s and the Arkadians. However, none of the a l l i e s came to the aid of the Athenians; rather the Athenians withdrew entrusting Oropos into the hands of the Thebans pend-ing a r b i t r a t i o n . T4 = Xenophon Hellenika 7.4.1 As we learn elsewhere, the Thebans had intruded into the dispute, but ac-41 quired Oropos in the end. The loss humiliated the Athenians and they were p a r t i c u l a r l y vexed at the i r a l l i e s ' f a i l u r e to appear. Their vexation had immediate p o l i t i c a l as well as diplomatic consequences. Two prominent Athenian p o l i t i c a l leaders were held culpable and t r i e d : K a l l i s t r a t o s Aphidnaios and 1 3 42 Khabrias Aixoneus, the distinguished strategos. Both men were acquitted. One may assume that Khares arrived on the scene before a decision was made to y i e l d to the Thebans. His force was already mobilized and had no farther to travel than did the nearest Athenian a l l y that could reasonably be expected to send aid. Xenophon indicates that the Athenian decision was strong-l y influenced by the lack of a l l i e d support, and the Athenians cannot have known their a l l i e s would not come un t i l some time after Khares' a r r i v a l . Never-theless, he was not implicated in the t r i a l s of K a l l i s t r a t o s and Khabrias in any way, either as a c u l p r i t or as an a l l y of the prosecution. This fact has 4' not prevented modern scholars from inventing a role for Khares in these t r i a l s . ' It c e r t a i n l y i s true that for the next several years after 366/5 Khares drops from our view, but not before returning to his post in the Peloponnesos several weeks or even months after the c r i s i s over Oropos. The diplomatic consequence of the a f f a i r over Oropos was that the Athen-ians gave thought to their Peloponnesian interests and entered into a defen-44 sive alliance with the Arkadian league. This alliance could be made effect-ive provided only that either party was actually able to lend the other aid. So long as Argos continued loyal to the Boiotians, and Korinth and the c i t i e s of Akte to Sparta, there could be real problems of l o g i s t i c s and communication between the parties of the Arkado-Athenian a l l i a n c e . An Athenian named Demotion perceived this and proposed a solution: (4) Demotion proposed in the demos of the Athenians that, whereas the friendship with the Arkadians seemed to him to be well made, nevertheless, he said that the strategoi ought to be ordered that Korinth, too, be made safe for the demos of the Athenians. When the Korinthians heard of t h i s , they quickly sent s u f f i c i e n t garrisons of their own troops to a l l the places the Athenians were garrisoning and told them to go away, as they no longer required garrisons. The Athenians obeyed. When the Athenians from the garrisons came together into the c i t y , the Korinthians announced that, i f any of the Athenians had been wronged, they were to register a complaint in order to receive j u s t i c e . (5) This was the situation when Khares arrived with a 14 naval force at Kenkhreai. When he realized what had hap-pened, he said that he was present to bring aid since he had heard that there was a plot against the c i t y . The Korinthians praised him but nonetheless they did not re-ceive his ships into the harbor, but bade him to s a i l away. They sent away the hoplites, too, after giving them their j u s t i c e . Thus, then, the Athenians departed from Korinth. T5 = Xenophon Hellenika 7.4.4-5 No other source refers to this attempt "to make Korinth safe for the demos of the Athenians", but i t i s very l i k e l y to have taken place weeks and 45 perhaps even months later than the Oropos a f f a i r . Khares' involvement in operations at Korinth at this time reinforces the impression that he escaped the furore over Oropos unscathed. As was mentioned above, we lose sight of Khares for the next several years. Those with preconceived notions about the man have been tempted to 46 misinterpret the action at Korinth to his detriment. To combat such notions several details from the evidence must be emphasized. Khares was not acting on his own authority, but on orders which were authorized by a decree of the people. Moreover, we can compare Xenophon's text (possibly a cynical ab-breviation) of Demotion's proposal with actual examples of very similar 47 proposals from about the same time. It i s possible that Athenian inten-tions toward Korinth have been distorted by Xenophon, and, in any case, sus-picions about a "plot" against the c i t y of Korinth soon proved to be jus t -48 i f i e d , since a tyrant seized power there a few months l a t e r . There is r e a l l y no need to juggle the evidence or stretch i t beyond i t s meaning, as some have done, in order to retroject a bad reputation onto 49 Khares at t h i s early date. He disappears from the sources for several years but there i s no cogent reason nor any evidence to support the belief that 50 this represents a ' f a l l from grace' or the l i k e . 1 5 Khares on Kerkyra: 361 After a hiatus of several years, Khares resurfaces in our sources amidst controversy. In his account of the year in which Nikophemos was archon at Athens (361/0), Diodoros narrates a single episode of p o l i t i c a l history, a c o n f l i c t between Alexandros, tyrant of Pherai, and the Athenians. This con-f l i c t culminated in a humiliating defeat for the Athenians. Alexandros had come to power in Pherai following the assassination of Jason's successor. Alexandros was a l l i e d with Athens in 368, when together with an Athenian force under Autokles he had frustrated a Boiotian invasion of Thessaly. By 364, however, he had been forced into an alliance with the Boiotians, and as their a l l y he and the other Thessalians contributed troops to Epameinondas' invasion of the Peloponnesos, which ended in the battle of Mantineia. In this battle i t happened that Athenians and Thessalians actually 51 fought one another. The h o s t i l i t y between Alexandros and Athens continued, for within a few months after the battle he raided Athenian a l l i e s in the Cyclades, and ravaged Tenos. The Athenians responded m i l i t a r i l y , but we are wholly ignorant of what 52 they attempted and accomplished. Again in 361 Alexandros was raiding Athenian a l l i e s in the northern Sporades. The confrontation between his forces and the Athenians on the island of Peparethos was one of only two p o l i t i c a l events that Diodoros found worthy of record: (1) When Nikophemos was archon at Athens (361/0) G. Sulpicius and G. Li c i n i u s took over the consular o f f i c e at Rome. At this time Alexandros, the tyrant of Pherai, sent out raiding ships to the Kyklades islands. Some of them he carried by assault and became master of many prisoners, but on Peparethos he disembarked mercenary soldiers and began to besiege the c i t y . (2) But when the Athenians came to the aid of Peparethos and l e f t behind the strategos Leosthenes, Alexandros attacked them. They happened to be closely guarding Alexandros 1 soldiers, who were stationed at Panormos. But when the forces of the dynast attacked unexpectedly, they gained an incredible turn of fortune. For, not only did Alexandros safely 16 retrieve those ordered into Panormos from the greatest p e r i l , but he also captured f i v e Athenian and one Pep-arethan trireme and got possession of six hundred p r i s -oners. (3) The Athenians were exceedingly angry with Leos-thenes and they condemned him to death on a charge of be-trayal and confiscated his property. Choosing Khares as strategos, they sent him out with a naval force. This man continually avoided the enemy and wronged the a l l i e s . For s a i l i n g into Korkyra, an a l l i e d c i t y , he aroused great c i v i l disturbances in i t . Out of these many slaughters and seizures of property took place, through which the demos of the Athenians was calumniated among the a l l i e s . Khares, then, while committing other such acts of lawlessness, accomplished nothing good for his country but calumnies. T7 = Diodoros 15.95.1-3 We are fortunate to have a rather detailed account of the actual coup that took place on Kerkyra. There can be no doubt that the event described by Aineias the "Tactician" i s the same as Diodoros 1. In a section of his manual concerning plots Aineias gives the following i l l u s t r a t i o n : (13) In Korkyra there was need for an uprising of the wealthy oligarchs against the demos (Khares the Athenian was present with a garrison, and he himself consented to the uprising). It was contrived as follows. (14) Certain arkhontes of the men of the garrison applied cupping glasses to themselves and i n f l i c t e d wounds on their bodies. Bloodied, they ran out into the agora as though suffering wounds. At the same time as t h i s , those who were prepared in advance immediately brought forth their weapons, both the other soldiers and the Korkyraian plo t t e r s . (15) Since the others were unaware of the matter and they were sum-moned into the assembly, the leaders of the demos were arrested on the grounds that the uprising sprang from them. They (sc. the conspirators) arranged everything else to their own advantage. T8 = Aineias Taktikos Po l i o r c e t i c a 11.13-15 Aineias has no discernable reason to present a biased account, nor otherwise to d i s t o r t i t . Nothing in his narrative deviates from his customarily c l i n -i c a l manner. It i s perfectly clear that the garrison was integral to the plot 53 and that Khares consented to i t , although he played no direct r o l e . The whole episode stands apart from the main strands of Greek history known to us during this period, and i t presents some perplexing problems. 1 7 One would l i k e to know the answers to several questions: ( 1 ) Did Khares s a i l to Kerkyra when he had apparently been sent to succeed Leos-thenes? (2) for what purpose was the garrison in Kerkyra in the f i r s t place? (3) why would an elected Athenian magistrate become a party to such an action? Some of these questions have been answered by resorting to the image of Khares as the irresponsible and brutal condottiere, but in view of the record of Athens in t r y i n g , convicting, and punishing her magistrates, in these very 54 years, one ought to take a closer look. In answering the f i r s t question, i t would be helpful to determine i f Khares was sent to Peparethos at a l l . Diodoros 1 t r a n s i t i o n a l sentence, "This man continually avoided the enemy and wronged the a l l i e s " , does not make that very clear, although the logic of the situation described seems to demand Athenian aid to Peparethos, and Diodoros 1 phraseology may indicate that he understood Khares to have been sent to Peparethos. Otherwise one would have to posit a stupendous lapse in the historian's t r a i n of thought 55 or even a lacuna. It may be that Khares did nothing worthy of mention or, as Diodoros puts i t , he "avoided the enemy". In f a c t , there was not much to be done on Peparethos, because Alexandros' victory consisted p a r t i a l l y 56 in extricating his men. Moreover, the Athenians may have been loath to take aggressive action against an enemy who held several hundred Athenian and a l l i e d prisoners, other than to provide security for other a l l i e s in the region. The Athenians did make a diplomatic i n i t i a t i v e . In 361/0 they made an alliance with those of the Thessalians opposed to Alexandros, under the terms of which each party swore to prosecute the war against the tyrant and not to cease h o s t i l i t i e s without the consent of the other. This alliance may not have seemed to achieve much in the eyes of later observers, but at the time i t probably held out bright prospects. Athens could hope that she might, with a minimum of ef f o r t on her part, neutralize Alexandros or at least keep him occupied. In addition, Athens w i l l now have secured the alliance of an 18 important a l l y of the Boiotians. Such hopes are consistent with the pattern 57 of Athenian diplomacy during this period. Of course, there i s no evidence that Khares was involved in the negotiations that led to the a l l i a n c e , a l -though such business was a regular part of a strategos' duties and Khares 58 very shortly demonstrated his competence in negotiating agreements. However this may be, i t appears that Diodoros believed that Khares was sent out to replace Leosthenes. He gives no indication of the lapse of time, i f any, between Khares' setting out and his involvement in Kerkyra, and more importantly he gives no hint that in s a i l i n g to Kerkyra Khares was dis-obeying orders. In answering the next two questions, p a r t i c u l a r l y the one concerning . the purpose of the garrison on Kerkyra, chronology is important. C a r g i l l wishes to dislocate the Kerkyra episode from i t s context and place i t in 368, 59 but none of his arguments carry any conviction. One sympathizes with C a r g i l l ' s perplexity, but Diodoros has deliberately placed the episode in i t s present context, i t would seem. He introduces the Kerkyra account with a 'generalizing' statement: "This man continually avoided the enemy and wronged the a l l i e s " , and then proceeds to c i t e a s p e c i f i c , although undetailed, ex-ample: Kerkyra. If the event i s displaced from i t s true context, i t must be because Diodoros was following thematic, rather than chronological consid-erations. Otherwise we must admit that the historian has made a chronological s l i p of eight years for no reason whatsoever. Diodoros makes many mistakes, 60 but there i s almost always an i n t e l l i g i b l e , i f not always a good, reason. If Diodoros located the Kerkyra incident elsewhere than in i t s proper chrono-logical context, he missed the most obvious and effective place for i t : the outbreak of the Social War. After a l l , the complaint against Khares i s that he "wronged the a l l i e s " . It i s preferable to keep Diodoros' chronology i f there i s any way we can make sense of i t . Under what circumstances, then, might Kerkyra have needed the protection 1 9 of a garrison in 361? The most obvious external threat would have b e e n naval power. Athens was an a l l y and Sparta would seem to be excluded for both p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y reasons. Thebes did have naval c a p a b i l i t i e s that i n -cluded an i n s t a l l a t i o n on the Gulf of Korinth capable of supporting at least a small squadron. Furthermore, the Thebans were not without naval experience, 61 even of the Ionian Sea, by 361. Their a l l y , Alexandros of Pherai, demon-strated how much nuisance even a small navy could create among Athens' f a r -flung a l l i e s . The common peace of 362 was considered to have broken down when the Thebans moved into the Peloponnesos to work against the interests 62 of newly-found Athenian a l l i e s there. Perhaps the mere threat of Theban naval action in the West was cause (or excuse) enough for a garrison to be introduced onto the island. Against this l i n e of reasoning i s the total ab-sence in the extant sources of any independent Theban naval a c t i v i t y beyond the Gulf of Korinth, but our sources are such that a minor and uneventful Theban probe could well go unnoticed by them, and the Athenian League might have been j u s t i f i a b l y s k i t t i s h . In any event, a possible Theban threat to Kerkyra,after Epameinondas had demonstrated to his countrymen the p o s s i b i l -i t i e s of a bold naval policy, i s probably as plausible or more so than one before that time.-In the face of such a threat, i t may be that the League was primarily concerned with an internal threat to the government of Kerkyra. The island was notoriously plagued with s t a s i s , not only during the Peloponnesian War 63 but also during the recent Boiotian War of 379-371. If t h i s was a primary concern, then the coup, aided by Athenian m i l i t a r y authorities i s doubly sur-p r i s i n g . The garrison w i l l have abetted what i t was supposed to prevent, and the uprising was aimed against a democracy. Athens had generally sup-ported democratic movements during the 370s and this action on Kerkyra was a vi o l a t i o n of both the l e t t e r and the spir-it of agreements between Athens and 64 her League in general and Kerkyra in p a r t i c u l a r . As to the motives for 2 0 Khares 1 complicity in the coup one can only guess. It may be that the govern-ment of Kerkyra began to show signs that i t wanted to exercise the autonomy guaranteed a l l states by the terms of the common peace, and that Athens f e l t that she must retain the loyalty of the island at any price. If so, i t didn't 65 work, for Kerkyra became hostil e to Athens at some point between 361 and 353. No satisfactory reason has been advanced to answer the question, why Khares, an elected representative of Athens, participated (albeit i n d i r e c t l y ) in this action; one can only guess. One answer, however, can be rejected with a f a i r degree of confidence: that Khares was acting on his own i n i t i a t i v e . The government of Athens approved of the deed and accepted r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . That this i s so i s implied by Diodoros' words (T8), "the demos of the Athenians was calumniated among the a l l i e s " ; the demos, not Khares. This impression is reinforced by the utter silence in the sources about any outcry, t r i a l or punishment against Khares. It i s true that he drops from the view of our, sources for the next three or four years, but when he reappears he does so as a soldier in great demand and as a serious r i v a l to Timotheos and I p h i k r a t e s . ^ At this point i t i s perhaps not out of place to mention b r i e f l y another instance of Khares' involvement in a revolution in a foreign state. A r i s t o t l e , in his P o l i t i c s , discusses the motivations for revolution under various con-s t i t u t i o n s . He observes that some revolutions against oligarchic states arise from people who have consumed their own substance by extravagant l i v i n g and . cites this i l l u s t r a t i o n : "...and in Aigina the man who accomplished the deed with Khares, t r i e d to change the constitution for just such a reason" (T9 = A r i s t o t l e P o l i t i c s 1306a 4-6). Clearly, there i s not enough information given here to do other than make an informed guess at the date and context of this event. Aigina was not a League a l l y , rather as a staunch Spartan a l l y she had serv-ed as a base for Peloponnesian naval forces and p i r a t i c a l raiders,.during; both 2 1 the Korinthian and Boiotian Wars. It i s possible to imagine an Athenian attempt to bring Aigina under her influence during the h o s t i l i t i e s of the Boiotian War of 379-71, but perhaps a more plausible occasion for this i n -cident is sometime when Spartan influence, both on land and sea, had ebbed. Both the period just after the Arkado-Athenian alliance of 366 and that after the battle of Mantineia, when Sparta was l e f t out of the general peace, come readily to mind. In the one period Athens showed herself ready to "make Korinth safe for the demos of the Athenians" even though she was a l l i e d with Sparta, while in the other period Athens c l e a r l y was prepared to usurp Spartan influence even in the Peloponnesos. Moreover, the raid of Alexan-dros on the Peiraieus may have prompted Athens to sanction such a project. But even the decades following 360 are probably not out of the question and the ft 7 date and context must remain obscure. Euboia and the Khersonesos: 357 If there was any controversy surrounding the coup on Kerkyra, i t had no lasting effect on Khares 1 career, since he was soon afterwards exercising com-mands of great importance and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . In 357 stasis broke out in Euboia and i t induced both the Boiotians and the Athenians to intervene there. Although there were no major battles, Athens managed to bring several, perhaps a l l , of the c i t i e s on the island back into alliance with h e r . ^ In this cam-paign Khares commanded a force of mercenaries for Athens and his performance must have been commendable, because immediately after the successful con-clusion of h o s t i l i t i e s he and his troops were dispatched to the Hellespont in order to press Athenian claims to the Khersonesos. The evidence for this is found in a speech of Demosthenes: But once the ambassadors sailed out i t happened that, what with them wasting time and being unwilling to accomplish anything plain and honest for you, the business was drawn out to such a point, that we went out on a r e l i e f expedition to Euboia and Khares came back with the mercenaries. When you had made him strategos autokrator, he s a i l e d out to the Khersonesos. Thus, again he (sc. Kharidemos) drafts an agreement with Khares while Athenodoros and the kings were present. It i s t h i s one here, the best and most j u s t of them a l l . -T10 = Demosthenes Against Aristokrates , 23.173 Sestos in the Khersonesos had been l o s t ca. 360 and subsequent attempts by the s t r a t e g o i , Kephisodotos and l a t e r , Khabrias, to coerce or persuade the Thracian kings to return i t had been f r u s t r a t e d by Kharidemos, according 69 to the speaker of t h i s oration. It i s p a r t i c u l a r l y noteworthy that the demos held Khares in such confidence that they invested him with the powers of an autokrator, that i s , a strategos with f u l l authority to negotiate a binding agreement on behalf of them.^ Nor was the demos disappointed, since the speaker of the Against Aristokrates characterized Khares 1 agreement as "the best and most j u s t " , that i s , the most advantageous to Athens. A fragment of an i n s c r i p t i o n recording the agreement i s preserved. It makes clear that the Thracian kings recognized the Hellenic c i t i e s in the Khersonesos as free and autonomous ( a l l i e s ? ) of the Athenians, although those c i t i e s were apparently l i a b l e to pay t r i b u t e to the kings. Despite r e i i n -quishing t h e i r claims to the c i t i e s of the Khersonesos, the kings may not have a c t u a l l y surrendered them or committed themselves to fo r c i n g the unwill-ing to comply with the agreement. Sestos had to be recovered by force in 353/2 (T38), and i t i s possible that Khares remained in the region in order 71 to restore any r e c a l c i t r a n t c i t i e s to de facto Athenian c o n t r o l . The Social War: 357 and 356 How long Khares remained in the Khersonesos i s not known, nor i s i t known exactly when or why the Social War broke out. If Khares was s t i l l in the Khersonesos when the war erupted, that f a c t would help explain why he was dispatched to prosecute the war when other s o l d i e r s l i k e Iphikrates, Timotheos and Khabrias were presumably available. The immediate causes of the war are quite obscure, despite the unsub-73 stantiated suspicions that, somehow, Khares was responsible. As a matter of f a c t , the ancient writers are surprisingly s i l e n t on the war's causes. The most direct contemporary statement was that made by Demosthenes in his speech On Behalf of the Freedom of the Rhodians delivered in 351: (3) For the Khians and the Byzantines and Rhodians charge us with plotting against them, and for this reason they joined against us in this late war; but the one who presided over this business w i l l be shown to be Mausolos. He claims to be a friend of the Rhodians but i s robbing them of their freedom, while those who put themselves forward as a l l i e s , the Khians and Byzantines, have not given aid in their misfortunes... (15) For, begrudging you the recovery of what was yours, they lost their own freedom... Demosthenes On Behalf of the Freedom of the Rhodians, 15.3,15 Several modern analyses of the war's causes have been made, but in no case has any evidence for Khares' direct c u l p a b i l i t y been advanced, except 74 for the Hypothesis to Isokrates' speech Symmakhikos or On the Peace: Khares was sent to enslave Amphipolis, which was at that time autonomous and on i t s own, since the Lakedaimonians were in a bad way after Leuktra and the Athenians were weak. This man, in the bel i e f that he could capture i t easily at any time, and wishing to restore th e i r ancient power to the Athenians, attacked the Khians and Rhodians and the other a l l i e s . Accordingly, they revolted and Khares was defeated so that he was at a loss what must be done thereafter. For i f he withdrew from them and came into Amphipolis, they would come right up to At t i k a in r e t a l i a t i o n . When the Athenians heard t h i s , they asked for a truce and immediately the Khians and the Rhodians along with the others agreed. And this i s the Social War. T12 = Hypothesis to Isokrates Symmakhikos 8 This account i s wholly at variance with nearly everything else we do know about the Social War and demonstrates a fundamental lack of understand-ing of the war's immediate context, as well as ignorance of several key as-pects of the c o n f l i c t . Its author envisioned a situation in which Khares was o r d e r e d t o make war on A m p h i p o l i s , b u t chose r a t h e r t o a t t a c k h i s own a l l i e s ( f o r no a p p a r e n t reason) i n o r d e r t o r e s t o r e t o A thens her f o r m e r power . I n f a c t , A thens had been engaged f o r t h e p a s t t e n y e a r s i n a s t r u g g l e t o r e -g a i n two p a r t i c u l a r l y c o v e t e d p o s s e s s i o n s w h i c h had been he rs i n t h e f i f t h 75 c e n t u r y , A m p h i p o l i s and t h e K h e r s o n e s o s . I t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t Khares was o r d e r e d t o renew t h e s t r u g g l e f o r A m p h i p o l i s as a f o l l o w - u p t o h i s o p e r a t i o n s i n t h e K h e r s o n e s o s , b u t o t h e r e v i d e n c e l e a d s us t o b e l i e v e t h a t A thens s u s -pended her m i l i t a r y e f f o r t s a g a i n s t A m p h i p o l i s i n t h e e x p e c t a t i o n t h a t she 7 6 m i g h t a c q u i r e t h e p l a c e i n n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h P h i l i p o f Macedon. The a u t h o r o f t h e h y p o t h e s i s i n d i c a t e s no awareness o f t h e r o l e s t h a t K h a b r i a s , I p h i k r a t e s , T i m o t h e o s o r Mauso los p l a y e d i n t h e w a r , l e t a l o n e t h e campaign i n A s i a . H is s t a t e m e n t t h a t Khares a t t a c k e d t h e a l l i e s i s a t v a r i -ance w i t h a l l o t h e r known a c c o u n t s o f t h e w a r , w h i c h make t h e s e n d i n g o f an A t h e n i a n f l e e t under Khares (and K h a b r i a s ) a consequence o f t h e a l l i e d r e v o l t M o r e o v e r , t h e o t h e r s o u r c e s w h i c h t r e a t t h e S o c i a l War i n any d e t a i l , Nepos ( T 1 4 , T17) and D i o d o r o s ( T 1 3 , T 1 6 , T 2 6 ) , show a m a n i f e s t l a c k o f sympathy f o r K h a r e s , b u t do n o t make use o f t h e damning i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t t h e h y p o t h e s i c o n t a i n s . ^ When we compare t h e e v i d e n c e o f t h e o t h e r s o u r c e s and t h e i r s i l e n c e on K h a r e s 1 a l l e g e d c u l p a b i l i t y , we must c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e h y p o t h e s i s 78 i s w o r t h l e s s ; we do n o t know t h e i m m e d i a t e cause o f t h e S o c i a l War. We a re n o t much b e t t e r i n f o r m e d about t h e c o u r s e o f t h e war t h a n we a re abou t t h e i m m e d i a t e c a u s e s . The most e x t e n s i v e a c c o u n t o f t h e w a r ' s o u t b r e a k and e a r l y s t a g e s i s t h a t o f D i o d o r o s . I m m e d i a t e l y f o l l o w i n g h i s n a r r a t i o n o f t h e a f f a i r on E u b o i a ( w h i c h he d a t e s 3 5 8 / 7 ) , he c o n t i n u e s w i t h a d e s c r i p -t i o n o f t h e S o c i a l War ' s f i r s t a c t i o n : ( 2 ) . . . The B o i o t i a n s , t h e n , mak ing t h e i r r e t u r n home, k e p t q u i e t . ( 3 ) But t h e A t h e n i a n s , s i n c e t h e Kh ians and Rhod ians and Koans and a l s o t h e B y z a n t i n e s had r e v o l t e d , became i n v o l v e d i n t h e s o - c a l l e d S o c i a l War, w h i c h l a s t e d t h r e e y e a r s . Choos ing Khares and K h a b r i a s as s t r a t e g o i , t h e y s e n t them away w i t h a f o r c e . These men s a i l e d f o r K h i o s and e n c o u n t e r e d a l l i e s come t o t h e a i d o f t h e K h i a n s f r o m t h e B y z a n t i n e s and t h e Rhod ians and Koans a n d , f u r t h e r m o r e f r o m M a u s o l o s , t h e d y n a s t o f K a r i a . M a r s h a l l i n g t h e i r f o r c e , t h e y began b e s i e g i n g t h e c i t y by l a n d and s e a . So, K h a r e s , l e a d -i n g t h e f o o t army on l a n d a t t a c k e d t h e w a l l s and was f i g h t i n g i t o u t a g a i n s t t h o s e p o u r i n g o u t f r o m t h e c i t y a g a i n s t h i m . K h a b r i a s , m e a n w h i l e , s a i l e d t o t h e h a r b o r , engaged i n a m i g h t y s e a - b a t t l e a n d , when h i s s h i p was b r o k e n up by r a m s , was o v e r -whe lmed. ( 4 ) Some o f h i s men, t h e n , l e a p e d o n t o t h e o t h e r s h i p s and were saved i n t i m e b u t h e , e x c h a n g i n g a g l o r i o u s d e a t h f o r d e f e a t , was wounded w h i l e s t r u g g l i n g on b e h a l f o f h i s s h i p and d i e d . T13 = D i o d o r o s 1 6 . 7 . 2 - 4 We a r e f o r t u n a t e t o have a n o t h e r v e r s i o n o f t h i s b a t t l e a g a i n s t w h i c h t o check t h e a c c u r a c y o f D i o d o r o s , namely t h a t o f C o r n e l i u s Nepos. Nepos, w h i l e he has g r e a t e r d e t a i l i n h i s v e r s i o n o f t h e b a t t l e , has a more n a r r o w f o c u s , i n k e e p i n g w i t h h i s b i o g r a p h i c a l a i m s : ( 1 ) K h a b r i a s , m o r e o v e r , d i e d i n t h e S o c i a l War i n t h e f o l l o w i n g manner : The A t h e n i a n s were a t t a c k i n g K h i o s . K h a b r i a s was p r e s e n t i n t h e f l e e t as a p r i v a t e c i t i z e n , b u t he s u r p a s s e d i n a u t h o r i t y a l l t h o s e who were m a g i s t r a t e s and t h e s o l d i e r s l o o k e d t o h im more t h a n t o t h o s e i n command. ( 2 ) T h i s h a s t e n e d h i s d e a t h . Fo r when he was eager t o be t h e f i r s t t o e n t e r t h e h a r b o r and he o r d e r e d h i s helmsman t o g u i d e t h e s h i p t h e r e , he caused h i s own d e s t r u c t i o n . F o r , a l t h o u g h he p e n -e t r a t e d t h e h a r b o r , t h e o t h e r s h i p s d i d n o t f o l l o w . Because o f t h i s he was s u r r o u n d e d by an o n s e t o f t h e enemy a n d , a l t h o u g h he f o u g h t most b r a v e l y , h i s s h i p was s t r i c k e n by a ram and began t o s i n k . ( 3 ) A l t h o u g h had he t h r o w n h i m s e l f i n t o t h e s e a , he c o u l d have e s c a p e d , s i n c e t h e f l e e t o f t h e A t h e n i a n s was coming up i n s u p p o r t t o p i c k up t h e men who were sw imming , he p r e f e r r e d t o d i e r a t h e r t h a n t o t h r o w away h i s arms and l e a v e t h e s h i p i n w h i c h he had t r a v e l l e d . The o t h e r s p r e f e r r e d n o t t o do t h a t and t h e y r e a c h e d s a f e t y by sw imming . But h e , j u d g i n g an h o n o r a b l e d e a t h p r e f e r a b l e t o a base l i f e , was k i l l e d by t h e weapons o f t h e enemy w h i l e f i g h t i n g h a n d - t o - h a n d . T14 = Nepos C h a b r i a s 4 . 1 - 3 Excep t f o r t h e d e t a i l o f K h a b r i a s 1 o f f i c i a l p o s i t i o n , t h e two a c c o u n t s do n o t c o n t r a d i c t one a n o t h e r and agree on t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s s u r r o u n d i n g h i s 79 d e a t h . T o g e t h e r t h e y p r o v i d e us w i t h a t l e a s t a s k e l e t o n o u t l i n e o f t h e m i l i t a r y operations. As Diodoros understood the war, the rebels were already on in a state of revolt when the Athenians dispatched a force against them. Evidently, both sides regarded Khios as the key to the war, since that i s where the Athenians came upon the a l l i e s of the Khians gathering, both those from the other rebels and those from Mausolos of Karia. Although we are not told so, the Athenians must have gained an i n i t i a l superiority, for both of 81 our sources envision a siege or an attack on the c i t y of Khios. Khares, perhaps s t i l l in command of his mercenary force, attacked on land and met determined resistence, while the naval force in which Khabrias served t r i e d to force i t s way into the harbor. Unfortunately, both sources focus on this op naval attack, p a r t i c u l a r l y on the 'last stand' of Khabrias. Khabrias rashly advanced ahead of the main Athenian force and was cut off from i t . His ship was disabled and he died f i g h t i n g . Just at the point where we would l i k e to know more precisely the results of the battle we are instead treated to a dramatic vignette of the great man's death and an en-comium of him. Neither source gives any information about the consequences of the Athenian f a i l u r e or about the subsequent movements of the two sides. S t r i c t l y on the evidence, one might conclude that only a single Athenian ship was lost and that the defeat consisted in a loss of morale which followed the f a i l u r e and the death of a famous soldier. This was the decisive defeat 83 of the Athenian f l e e t , according to modern l i t e r a t u r e . We are at a loss to say what happened next, although the Athenians a l -most cert a i n l y must have given up the attack on Khios. We know that between the battle of Khios and that of Embata the rebels achieved naval superiority in the eastern Aegean, while the Athenians assumed a defensive posture gar-84 risoning some of the islands of their a l l i e s . Another factor that i n f l u -enced Athenian strategy was war on a new front with a new enemy, P h i l i p of Macedon. Between the time when the Athenians returned from Euboia and the beginning of the new A t t i c year, 356/5, P h i l i p had captured both Amphipolis and Krenides. Such energy alarmed P h i l i p ' s neighbors and three of them, representing Thracians, Paionians and I l l y r i a n s , formed a c o a l i t i o n against Macedon. Khares was in the general region of these a f f a i r s and he must have been paying attention to them, for he helped negotiate an alliance between 86 the c o a l i t i o n and Athens, which was sworn at Athens in July of 356. Ap-parently, the situation in the region of Thrace was so important to the Athenians that they assigned to the negotiations the commander of their largest mobilized force, despite the fact that he was engaged in the sup-pression of a major revolt. In the end, the c o a l i t i o n was smashed before i t accomplished anything, but to the Athenians at the time the alliance with the three kings must have seemed l i k e a promising and economical alternative 87 to s p l i t t i n g the c i t y ' s strained resources between two different wars. Khares, then, was probably in the northern Aegean at the beginning of the new A t t i c year, 356/5 when the Athenians decided to make a major e f f o r t in order to force a decisive confrontation with the rebels. We are dependent on the same two sources, Diodoros and Nepos, for this second major action of the Social War. Diodoros gives the following version in his account of the year 356/5: (1) In Hellas the Khians and Rhodians and Koans, and furthermore the Byzantines, continued fighti n g the Social War against the Athenians; both sides made great preparations in the hope of de-ciding the war in a sea-battle. The Athenians had sent out ahead previously Khares with s i x t y ships, but at this time they manned another s i x t y and appointed as strategoi the most distinguished of the c i t i z e n s , Iphikrates and Timotheos. They sent them out to continue the war against the rebellious a l l i e s in common with Khares. (2) The Khians and Rhodians and Byzantines with t h e i r a l l i e s manned one hundred ships and ravaged Imbros and Lemnos, Athenian posses-sions, but campaigning against Samos with a great force they wast-ed the country and began besieging the c i t y by land and sea. Also, by maltreating many other islands that were under the Athenians, they gathered money for the necessities of war. (3) Once a l l the strategoi of the Athenians were gathered together, they f i r s t applied themselves to besieging the c i t y of the Byzan-tines. After t h i s , when the Khians and t h e i r a l l i e s abandoned the siege of Samos and turned to the r e l i e f of the Byzantines, a l l of the f l e e t s were gathered together around the Hellespont. When the sea-battle was about to take place, a great wind f e l l upon them and hindered th e i r plan of action. (4) But when Khares wished to f i g h t a sea-battle despite nature and those around Iphikrates and Timotheos were opposed because of the magnitude of the swell, Khares, c a l l i n g upon the soldiers as witnesses, calumniated his colleagues as t r a i t o r s and wrote to the demos about them, how they had deliberately l e f t the sea-battle. The Athenians were very angry and, having put Iphikrates and Timotheos on t r i a l , they fined them many talents and removed them from their o f f i c e as strategoi. T16 - Diodoros 16.21.1-4 Nepos, in his l i f e of Timotheos, provides another version of this campaign and, although he is manifestly more interested in i t s biographical aspects, his version adds a few s i g n i f i c a n t details to and discrepancies from Diodoros 1 (1) When he (sc. Timotheos) was old and had ceased to hold magi-straci e s , the Athenians began to be pressed on a l l sides by war. Samos rebelled, the Hellespont had defected, P h i l i p the Macedonian, already at this time powerful, was contriving many things. When Khares was put up against him, he was not thought a s u f f i c i e n t de-fence. (2) Menestheus was made commander, the son of Iphikrates, son-in-law of Timotheos, and i t was decreed that he set out to the war. To him were given as advisors two men pre-eminent in wisdom and experience, his father and his father-in-law, because there was such prestige in these men that there was great hope that what had been lost could be recovered through them. (3) When they had set out for Samos and Khares, once thei r a r r i v a l was known, set out for the same place with his own troops, in order that nothing be seen to be done while he was absent, i t happened that a great storm arose when they were nearing the i s -land. Judging i t advantageous to avoid the storm, the two old generals held their f l e e t at anchor. (4) But he (sc. Khares), employing rash judgement, did not y i e l d to the prestige of his elders, just as i f fortune were in his own hand. He reached his destination and sent a message to Timotheos and Iphikrates to follow him there. Then, when the battle had gone badly and many ships had been l o s t , he retreated to the place from which he had set out and sent an o f f i c i a l note to Athens, that he could have easily captured Samos i f he had not been de-serted by Timotheos and Iphikrates. (5) The people, being impulsive, suspicious, and for that reason, f i c k l e , h o s t i l e and envious (the men charged were powerful), sum-moned them home. They were accused of betrayal. On this charge Timotheos was convicted and his fine was levied at one hundred talents. Compelled by the odium of his ungrateful c i t y , he took himself off to Khalkis. T17 = Cornelius Nepos Timotheos 3.1-5 For the most part, these two versions of the campaign can be reconciled to provide a reasonably clear picture of i t . As suggested above, Khares was probably in the northern Aegean already. The rebels, now enjoying naval superiority, launched a major offensive. They f i r s t concentrated the i r efforts against s t r i c t l y Athenian possessions, Imbros, Lemnos and, l a t e r , OQ Samos, where they l a i d siege to the c i t y . Then, needing money to finance 89 the war, they began to harass Athenian a l l i e s . Athens, responded by making an extraordinary e f f o r t . She sent out a f l e e t of s i x t y ships, ordered that i t l i n k up with Khares 1 force, which was of equal s i z e , and that the combined force bring about a decisive engagement. The Athenians were committing to battle the largest number of ships since the last days of the Peloponnesian War and entrusted part of the command to two old strategoi, who had the great-90 est prestige of those s t i l l a l i v e . At this point the picture becomes some-what confused. According to Nepos, the force under Timotheos, Iphikrates and Menestheus proceeded to Samos, where Khares joined them only because he feared they  might accomplish something without him. Diodoros, on the other hand, main-tains that the two forces f i r s t linked up and then attacked Byzantion, with the apparent intention of drawing the rebels away from the i r siege of Samos at least this i s what he records as actually happening. This discrepancy is compounded when the sources give the location of the battle. Nepos im-agines i t to have taken place off Samos, while Diodoros puts i t "'around the II 91 Hellespont'. Both sources are probably mistaken, for Polyainos (T18) gives 92 the battle's location as Embata, in the s t r a i t s between Khios and Erythrai. There are several reasons for preferring Diodoros 1 version to Nepos' up to this point. Most scholars are inclined to agree with Polyainos on the location of the battle and to accept that Diodoros is being very lax in his geographical terminology, because of the earlier, strategic prominence of Khios and Diodoros1 vague indications that the Khians were the leaders of the rebel 93 movement. Moreover, had the Athenians sailed into hostile waters divided, as Nepos suggests, they would have been violating a cardinal military prin-ciple by giving their adversaries an opportunity to fight either Athenian squadron at a great superiority, and, by defeating i t , to render the Athenians numerically inferior. There is also reason to believe that some operations 94 during the Social War did take place in the Hellespont, as Diodoros asserts. Furthermore, i f we were simply to assume that Nepos had made a mental error, and wrote "Samos" when he meant "Khios" at the three places in the text where the name occurs, his version would be easily reconcilable with the other 95 sources. Both sources agree that there was a storm and that there was a differ-ence of opinion over whether a battle could be fought. They also agree that Khares acted rashly: "contrary to nature" (T16) or "employing rash 96 judgement... as i f fortune were in his hand" (T17). To be sure, i t is too much to expect to discover precisely at what stage in the action the storm arose. Diodoros implied that a course of action (npoatpeCTiq) had already been plotted, while Nepos portrayed Khares as in a position to inform the others by message to follow him. Both sources imply that the Athenian com-mand was divided (equally, according to Diodoros) between the reinforcing strategoi and Khares, and in both sources Khares accusedihis col leagues, not of refusing to engage, but of withdrawing from the battle: "they... le f t the sea-battle" (Diodoros); " i f he had not been deserted" (Nepos). The older 97 men exercised caution, while Khares, perhaps already engaged, did not. In any case, the Athenians lost their chance to defeat the rebels in a sea-battle and there were bitter recriminations. Both sources expl i c i t l y 3 1 state that Khares sent an o f f i c i a l note to the demos that accused his c o l -leagues of "betrayal". The demos deposed and recalled Timotheos, Iphikrates and Menestheus, charged and t r i e d them. The courts upheld Khares' version of the events, for the three strategoi were not reinstated, and Timotheos 98 was found g u i l t y . How well-advised their caution was, we are not l i k e l y to discover, but, no doubt, the salient point of Khares' accusation could be * 99 summed up in single word: v&vau|iaxr||j,ca. Khares in Asia Minor: 356/5 When the other strategoi were deposed and not reinstated, Khares took command of the entire force: (1) Taking over the leadership of the entire expedition and being eager to relieve the Athenians of the expense, Khares attempted a desperate endeavor. For Artabazos had revolted from the king and, with a few soldiers, was about to f i g h t i t out against satraps commanding seventy thousand soldiers. When Khares, with his entire force, became his a l l y and conquered the force of the king, Artabazos granted him a great deal of money in payment o f 0 his gratitude, from which i t was possible to provide opsonion for the entire force. (2) The Athenians, on the other hand, at f i r s t welcomed Khares' action, but l a t e r , when the king sent ambassadors and denounced Khares, they had the opposite opinion. For a story was spread abroad that the king announced he would make war on the Athenians with three hundred ships in alliance with Athens' enemies. So, under this threat the demos decided to resolve the war against the rebels. Upon finding them also eager for peace, they e a s i l y came to terms with them. T26 = Diodoros 16.22.1-2 This "desperate endeavor" immediately follows the narrative of the battle of Embata and the punishment of Timotheos and Iphikrates in Diodoros' account. Fortunately, we can add a number of s i g n i f i c a n t and revealing details to our knowledge of this campaign from a series of ancient, scholarly comments to Demosthenes' speeches. A scholion that attempts to explain a phrase in Demosthenes' F i r s t 3 2 P h i l i p p i c gives us details we would hardly have guessed at, had we only Diodoros to re l y on. The orator's words "not for me a myriad, or even two, of mercenaries, nor these 'epistolary' forces, but l e t i t be one from the c i t y and one that w i l l obey and follow any strategos or strategoi you choose, be he X, Y or Z," (4.19) are explained thus: When the king of the Persians ordered the satraps along the sea-board to disband their mercenary forces because of the great expenditures of money, the satraps released the soldiers. These numbered about ten thousand and they came to Khares, the strategos of the Athenians, who had a mercenary force, and made him their leader. Artabazos, the Persian, had revolted from the king and was at war with him. He sent to Khares, i n v i t i n g him to bring his army across into the t e r r i t o r y of the king. So, when the soldiers were compelling Khares either to supply them or they would go away to one who paid, he brought the army across under compulsion and engaging twenty thousand Persians, most of them mounted under the command of Tithraustes, he defeated them. He even wrote to the Athenians about the ten thousand, that he had won a battle that was a s i s t e r of Marathon. They bade Khares through l e t t e r s to hire others, too. So the rhetor means 'let us not, through a l e t t e r , order the strategoi to hire ten or twenty thousand mercen-aries .' T27 = Scholion to Demosthenes 4.19 A scrap of papyrus, thought to be a fragment of a commentary on an orator, complements nicely the scholion's account: [He (sc. Khares) was maki]ng war against the king and, invading Phrygia, he ravaged the t e r r i t o r y of Tithraustes u n t i l an embassy from Athens came preventing him from making war on the royal satraps. Then, having made peace between Tithraustes and Artabazos, he went down to the sea and pay[... T29 = Papyrus Fragmente FGrHist 105 F4 (Papyrus Erzherzog Rainer) F i n a l l y , we can sketch in a few details with information provided by a series of scholia to Demosthenes' Third Olynthiac. The orator says, "but you, the demos, hamstrung and stripped of money and a l l i e s , have taken the part of an assistant and an appendage, content i f these men (sc. the p o l i t -i c a l leaders) share out with you the Theoric fund or grant you a procession at the Boedromia; and most courageous of a l l , you s t i l l owe them your own 3 3 thanks" (3.31). The scholiast(s) explain: (146a) "BoTdia": This refers to Khares. For having crossed over into Asia to Artabazos and having sacked Lampsakos and Sigeion with his mercenary forces, he sent to the Athenians c a t t l e , which they distributed among the t r i b e s . (146b) "Bo'idia": "Boedromia" i s another reading. For they say that, when Khares sent the s p o i l , i t was the Boedromia. The word "boidia" i s a diminutive in A t t i c contraction. (147) "Most uncourageous of a l l " : "most courageous" i s another reading, in order that i t be i r o n i c ; some, who are unaware of i t , made the present reading. He says 'you s t i l l owfigthanks' because they say that they crowned Khares for the s p o i l . T30 = Scholia to Demosthenes 3.31 (146a, 146b, 147 D i l t s ) No other source contradicts what the scholia and papyrus fragment have to say, nor i s there any information in them that i s inherently i l l o g i c a l , suspicious or d i f f i c u l t to believe, unless i t i s a question of the figures 104 involved in the battle. The picture that emerges from these scraps of evidence does not chal-lenge the basic accuracy of Diodoros' condensation, but i t does throw the campaign in Asia Minor wholly into a different l i g h t . A mass of unemployed (Greek, certainly) mercenaries marched down to the coast of Asia Minor. It is only natural that they sought employment where there were l i k e l y to be rewards. The Athenians were at war with states whose t e r r i t o r i e s could be 105 expected to y i e l d valuable booty. It was undoubtedly not d i f f i c u l t to persuade the unemployed soldiers to j o i n Khares' mercenaries with merely the prospect of the spoils of war. As soon as a more rewarding offer presented i t s e l f , however, Khares was faced with a mutiny, not just of the newly ac-106 quired mercenaries, but probably of his own mercenary force as well. The scholion (T27) i s quite e x p l i c i t that Khares was compelled ( d v a y x a ^ o v T c o v , a v a y x a a 9 e t q ) to act as he did. It i s doubtful whether the demos approved of Khares' action beforehand, although t h e i r recent experience of Persia suggests that they were probably not unprepared to consider such a strategy i f the opportunity arose. In any event, with an army that was probably the largest led by an Athenian since the Peloponnesian War Khares won a victory that was indeed the sister of Marathon, tactically speaking, but that was strategically a twin of the mercenaries' victory at KounaxaJ^ The demos certainly gave its belated approval. Both Diodoros (T26) and the scholion to Demosthenes 4.19 (T27) make i t clear that the Athenians en-thusiastically received the news of the battle and repented only under the threat of the great king. It is equally clear that Khares' purpose in under-taking the expedition was to further the interests of Athens and not simply to enrich himself and his men. Artabazos' grant of money was used to pro-109 vide the soldiers with opsonion, money for provisions ( 6\|/xovia£ea9ca). From 110 the spoil of Lampsakos and Sigeion Khares sent a drove of possibly 300 cattle to the Athenians to help them celebrate the Boedromia (T30). Neither is there any question of the strategos being out of the city's control, for we hear of letters being sent, not only from the strategos to Athens, but also from Athens to the strategos. Moreover, when the Athenians • did decide that their interests required Khares' withdrawal and they had sent an embassy to so inform him, he withdrew, having arranged a cessation 111 of h o s t i l i t i e s between his erstwhile ally, Artabazos, and Tithraustes. The majority of Athenians did not hold Khares liable for their failure in the war, i t seems. He was voted a crown for his efforts (T30), and he was 112 elected strategos again for 354/3 (T34, T35). Thus, there is no basis for the frequent assertion in the modern literature that he laid low in his 113 "feste Sigeion". CHAPTER TWO: KHARES AND THE MACEDONIANS Thrace and Thessaly: 353-2 Athens made peace with her rebellious a l l i e s , but remained at war with Macedon. Pydna and Poteidaia f e l l to P h i l i p while the Athenians were en-gaged in the Social War, and Methone, the last remaining Athenian foothold in Macedonia, was besieged and taken after peace had been made with the a l l i e s . The Athenians were exhausted and they mounted rather feeble r e s i s -tance. The loss of these possessions increased the importance of Neapolis, Athens' a l l y in Thrace. Neapolis i t s e l f may have come under pressure from 2 the Macedonians. It i s here, in the spring of 353, that Khares i s next met He was there on guard and watching the movements of P h i l i p , who was accomp-anying his a l l y and xenos, Pammenes, on a march towards the Hellespont. After th e i r victory at Neon, the Boiotians were sending Pammenes and an army 3 to help Khares' erstwhile a l l y , Artabazos. Khares was shadowing these enemies of Athens and keeping the demos informed of their movements: For when P h i l i p came into Maroneia, he (Kharidemos) sent Apollonid to him, giving assurances to him and Pammenes. And had not Amadokos, the man controlling the t e r r i t o r y , forbidden P h i l i p to set foot there, nothing would have stood in the way of our being at war with both the Kardians and Kersobleptes. And that I speak the truth, take the l e t t e r of Khares. T34 = Demosthenes Against Aristokrates 23.183 On the return march P h i l i p ravaged the t e r r i t o r i e s of Athenian a l l i e s and apparently feared that Khares might attack the naval squadron accompany-ing him on his march through Thrace: 3 6 P h i l i p , having overrun the t e r r i t o r y of Abdera and Maroneia, was returning with many ships, and leading a land army. Khares was lying in wait around Neapolis with twenty triremes. P h i l i p , having selected from his ships the four best s a i l e r s , f i l l e d them with his best rowers, those at the i r peak of both strength and s k i l l , and he gave them an order to s a i l out in front of the entire squad-ron and to s a i l by Neapolis, keeping not far from the shore. They did so and Khares launched his twenty ships intending to take the four. But the four, being swift and having the best rowers, quick-ly sped into the open sea. While the ships with Khares were eager-ly pursuing, P h i l i p safely sailed past Neapolis unnoticed, but Khares did not even capture the four ships. T35 = Polyainos Strategemata 4.2.22 Thus Khares missed an opportunity to i n f l i c t a reverse on P h i l i p ' s infant 4 navy, although he eagerly desired to do so. At about the same time as these events in Thrace, the situation in Central Greece took a s t a r t l i n g turn. The Sacred War had festered for a couple of years now, but with the Boiotian defeat of the Phokians in 354 i t seemed as i f the war was a l l but over. The Boiotians were so confident of this that they sent Pammenes to Asia Minor. A new leader of the Phokians emerged, however: Onomarkhos. He revived the fortunes of the Phokians and soon placed the Boiotians and the i r friends on the defensive. This was ac-complished by means of a new weapon: the sacred treasures of Apollo. With this new weapon Onomarkhos hired a multitude of mercenaries, dis-tributed money to the a l l i e s of Phokis, bribed their foremost men, and even purchased the friendship or neutrality of some of his enemies, notably the Thessalians. The sources abound with l u r i d tales about the seizure of an-cient treasures dedicated in the heroic age and the i r use by the Phokian and other leaders as bribes and l o v e - g i f t s , but i t i s also clear that the money 5 financed a number of offensives by the a l l i e s of Phokis. Khares received a share of t h i s money and he put i t to good use for Athens: In the composition of Theopompos e n t i t l e d "On the money plundered from Delphi" he says, "to Khares the Athenian through Lysandros s i x t y talents from which Khares feasted the Athenians in the agora, making victory s a c r i f i c e s for the battle against the mercenaries 3 7 of P h i l i p , whom Adaios, nicknamed Alektryon ("Cock") commanded." (=Theopompos FGrHist 115 F249) Herakleides the writer of comedies also mentions him thus: Catching P h i l i p ' s Cock/ Crowing too early and wandering about/ he butchered him, for he had not yet a crest./ Butchering one, many, indeed, of the Athenians/did Khares feast once/ So generous was he. (Herakleides FAC Edmonds F2) Douris relates the same things as well. (=Douris FGrHist 76 F35) T36 = Athenaios Deipnosophistai 12 532D-E (= Theopompos FGrHist 115 F249; Herakleides FAC Edmonds F2; Douris FGrHist 76 F35) This victory has l e f t no trace in the h i s t o r i c a l sources, but i t must have been newsworthy in i t s own time for another comic writer also mentioned i t : P h i l i p ' s Cock: this i s used in the case of those boasting on small successes. For Alektryon ("Cock") was a certain strategos of P h i l i p , whom, so they say, Khares the Athenian k i l l e d . , Heraklen-des the comie; mentions him; Antiphanes does too. T37 = Zenobios 6,34 (Corpus Paroemiographorum) ( = Antiphanes FAC Edmonds. F303) Regrettably, neither the time nor the place of this victory i s known, although the time i s l i k e l y to have been between the winter of 354/3 and Onomarkhos' death early in the summer of 352, and the most attractive sug-gestion for the location i s near Krenides.'7 The transaction between the Phokians and Khares may have gone something l i k e t h i s : the Phokians gave money to Khares and other a l l i e s so that they might re c r u i t mercenary troops; the recruited mercenaries were then to be used for whatever purpose the re-crui t e r saw f i t , perhaps only u n t i l they were needed again by the Phokians themselves; the a l l i e d generals used t h e i r mercenaries for various actions that were of benefit to their own c i t i e s ; Khares was able, either with the spoils from his campaign or from money unexpended, to celebrate his success g by providing his countrymen with a public feast. In any event, there i s certainly a connection between the g i f t s of money and ambitious m i l i t a r y expeditions. Khares is not one of those v i s i t e d by divine vengeance for temple-robbing, and his scrupulous use of the Phokians' largesse may, in part, be the reason for that. It has been suggested above that the money distributed to the a l l i e s of Phokis was not so much personal bribe-money, but funds to finance operations of mutual benefit to Phokis and her a l l i e s . It i s surely no coincidence that immediately after the r i s e of Onomarkhos, both Athens and Sparta undertook ambitious and successful campaigns. The Lakedaimonians successfully attack-in ed Argos and the Athenians conquered the Khersonesos. Khares led the Athen-ian e f f o r t : Khares, the strategos of the Athenians, having sailed into the Hellespont and having captured Sestos, slaughtered those of m i l i t a r y age and sold the rest into slavery. But when Kersobleptes, the son of Kotys, owing both to alienation from P h i l i p and friendship with the Athenians, put into the hands of the Athenians the c i t i e s in the Khersonesos except Kardia, the demos sent out kleroukhoi into the c i t i e s . T38 = Diodoros 16.34.3-4 Sestos had defied the Athenians for several years and one would l i k e to know how Khares succeeded where so many others had f a i l e d . A stratagem recorded by Frontinus may f i l l in the picture somewhat: Khares, general of the Athenians, was about to attack a c i t y s i t -uated on the coast. With his f l e e t hidden behind a certain prom-ontory, he ordered his swiftest ship to s a i l past the enemy guards. It was seen, and, when a l l the ships that were keeping guard over the harbor raced to the pursuit, Khares, having sailed into the undefended harbor with the rest of the f l e e t , also captured the c i t y . T39 = Frontinus Strategemata 3.10.8 There are two reasons for believing that this stratagem refers to the capture of Sestos. F i r s t , Sestos i s the only c i t y situated on the coast that Khares is known to have captured with a f l e e t . Second, the harsh treatment of Sestos, once i t was captured, implies strongly that i t was captured by storm and not 11 surrendered. Khares had learned the lesson taught to him by P h i l i p . The capture of Sestos almost immediately put the entire Khersonesos, except Kardia, into Athenian hands. It was the most s i g n i f i c a n t Athenian victory in over a decade. The exandrapodismos of Sestos stands out as one of Athens' more brutal acts during the period of the Second League, especially in comparison with the treatment of Samos a decade e a r l i e r . Sestos, however, was neither a Leagu a l l y nor was i t in the same category as Samos. The Athenians were as ob-sessed with the Khersonesos as they were with Amphipolis and for the same i ? reason: i t was "theirs" just as Lemnos, Skyros and Imbros were. Moreover, 13 control of the region was considered v i t a l to the Athenians. The town had revolted and preferred a barbarian master to an Athenian one. It had also cost the Athenians much effo r t and f r u s t r a t i o n , and i t s inhabitants paid the price for t h i s . A comparison of other examples of exandrapodismos during this period and under the e a r l i e r Athenian democracy assures one that such a punishment was generally decided by the government, and not by the f i e l d commander; the plan may even have been pre-meditated, for kleroukhoi were being sent more and more to important Athenian possessions. The atrocity 14 cannot be l a i d solely at the feet of Khares and his soldiers. It has been pointed out supra that there i s a coincidence between Onomarkhos' d i s t r i b u t i o n of money and aggressive actions on the part of his a l l i e s , for th e i r own benefit. Phokian largesse also may have benefitted themselves. In the spring of 352 a decisive battle was fought by the Phokians against the Macedonians and the i r Thessalian a l l i e s . Nearly 45,000 men met in Phthiotis and engaged in the so-called Battle of Krokos Fields. The Phokians were badly defeated, routed, and many were trapped against the sea in the Gulf of Pagasai. Diodoros describes the i r f l i g h t : But when those around Onomarkhos were fleeing into the sea and Khares the Athenian was s a i l i n g by f o r t u i t o u s l y with many triremes, there was a great slaughter of the Phokians. For the f u g i t i v e s , discarding th e i r panoplies, swam for i t to the triremes; among them was Onomarkhos himself. In the end over 6,000 of the Phokians and their mercenaries were destroyed, among them the strategos 4 0 himself, and not less than 3,000 were captured. P h i l i p c r u c i f i e d Onomarkhos; the rest he threw into the sea on the grounds that they were temple-robbers. T40 = Diodoros 16.35.5-6 It i s very d i f f i c u l t to believe that Khares could bring "many triremes" into the Gulf of Pagasai, just when 45,000 men were facing each 15 other with deadly intent, "fortuitously" (TUXLXOX;). T n e f a c t that the Gulf of Pagasai i s somewhat off the beaten path for the Athenians,combined with Onomarkhos1 recent largesse to Khares makes i t unlikely, although i t is not implausible that Khares was on his way to or from the Khersonesos and 16 arrived to give whatever assistance he could. How many ( i f any) Phokians and mercenaries saved themselves by swimming to the Athenian ships Diodoros does not say, although less than half of the Phokian army i s accounted for in his casualty figures. Perhaps the fact that Khares had "many triremes" was added to emphasize the capacity of a potential rescue e f f o r t . In any 17 case, the Phokians did not lack mercenaries during the next several years. Olynthos and Thrace: 349-346 Several Athenian m i l i t a r y ventures were undertaken between the disaster in Phthiotis and the siege of Olynthos: an expedition to Thermopylai at the end of 353/2, some a c t i v i t y in Thrace in the winter of 352/1, a kleroukhia-expedition to Samos in that same year, an u n o f f i c i a l (?) involvement in the defence of Egypt against a Persian invasion ca. 351, and a foray into Megara 18 in 350/49. Where Khares was amidst this a c t i v i t y i s not known, but Thrace 19 is a very good guess. There i s a series of stratagems in which Khares i s the main figure, but which provides almost no clues about thei r date or exact context. Three of the stratagems come from Polyainos and a fourth from Frontinus. Two of them s p e c i f i c a l l y mention Thrace and three of the four portray Khares as being 41 in hostile t e r r i t o r y . The stratagems may or may not belong to the same cam-paign or series of campaigns, but this i s as good a point as any to discuss them. Khares, noticing spies in the camp, stationed a guard outside the palisade and gave the order that each man was to take hold of the man next to him and not release him u n t i l he told who he was and of which unit. So, then, i t turned out that the spies were cap-tured since they were unable to t e l l their d i v i s i o n , company, mess-mate or watch-word. T47 = Polyainos Strategemata 3.13.1 In the dead of winter in Thrace, Khares, seeing the soldiers spar-ing th e i r tunics and shrinking from doing what was necessary, pas-sed a message around to them to exchange tunics with one another. Once this was done, each man, no longer sparing another person's clothing, was readier to do what was ordered. T48 = Polyainos Strategemata 3.13.2 Khares was leading an army away from Thrace. The Thracians were attacking and were breaking down the rearguard. But he, wishing to draw off the enemy and to get through safely, spied a suspicious place and mounted some of his trumpeters on horses and sent a few cavalrymen with them; he ordered them to ride around i t by the quickest way possible and, coming from behind the enemy to sound the signal for battle. They sounded i t , and the pursuing Thracians, thinking i t was an ambush, broke their formation and departed in f l i g h t . But Khares made a safe retreat. T49 = Polyainos Strategemata 3.13.3 Khares, general of the Athenians, when he was expecting reinforce-ments and was afraid that in the meanwhile the enemy might assault his camp in contempt of his present weakness, ordered several of those he had to be sent out at night by the rear of the camp, and to return to camp by a route where they would be conspicuous to the enemy and offer the appearance of new forces a r r i v i n g . And so, with pretended reinforcements, he was safe u n t i l he could be provided with those he was expecting. T50 = Frontinus Strategemata 2.12.3 It becomes immediately clear that, without another personality or s p e c i f i c locale i t i s v i r t u a l l y impossible to say with much certainty what the context of these episodes i s . One suspects that the enemy is no one very notable, 4 2 or else the stratagems would be doubly worthy of inclusion in their respect-ive c o l l e c t i o n s . Two of the stratagems (T48, T49) mention Thrace, three imply operations in host i l e t e r r i t o r y (T47, T49, T50 and, since Thrace i s hosti l e in T49, one suspects i t is also so in T48), in three of them Khares is in a f o r t i f i e d camp or outnumbered ( a l l but T48) and T48 takes place in winter. A l l involve a land campaign. What are the p o s s i b i l i t i e s , based on the known facts of Khares' career? The 360s seem to be ruled out, because Khares is not known to have been either in Thrace or occupying a f o r t i f i e d camp. Likewise, the years from 357-355 are out of the question, because during them Khares commanded considerable forces and was unlikely to have been so seriously outnumbered. The period around 353-2 (and u n t i l 349?) i s a d i s t i n c t p o s s i b i l i t y . Khares was in the region, perhaps early in both 353 and 349, and one can imagine a certain amount of m i l i t a r y a c t i v i t y in securing the Khersonesos for the new kleroukhia. Another p o s s i b i l i t y i s the time after the f a l l of Olynthos, when the Macedon-ians were rapidly absorbing the remaining independent places in Thrace before the Peace of Philokrates. The period between 343-0, when Khares was stationed in Thracian waters, i s remotely possible, but he w i l l have wanted to be care-20 f u l not to break the peace as his caution in the summer of 340 shows. Of these periods, that around 353-2 is decidedly the most plausible. It i s not very l i k e l y that any of these actions was very s i g n i f i c a n t in i t s e l f , but together they show that the man could, on occasion, be resource-f u l and that he was not always on the receiving end of m i l i t a r y t r i c k e r y . The Olynthians, meanwhile, had made peace with the Athenians, possibly as early as 352. When i t became clear to them in 349 that there would be 21 h o s t i l i t i e s with Macedon, they turned to Athens for even closer t i e s . Thanks to the scholarly erudition of Dionysios of Halikarnassos an unusually detailed 22 account of Athenian e f f o r t s to save Olynthos i s preserved: 43 The Philosopher himself (sc. A r i s t o t l e ) thus c l e a r l y shows that the tekhnai (sc. the Rhetoric) were written by him after the Olynthian War. This war took place when Kallimakhos was archon (349/8), as Philokhoros makes clear in the sixth book of his Atthis writing thus verbatim: "Kallimakhos Pergasethen--in this man's term of o f f i c e , since the Olynthians were at war with P h i l i p and had sent an embassy to Athens, the Athenians made an alliance with them and they also sent as a r e l i e f force two thousand peltasts, the t h i r t y triremes with Khares and eight that they manned in addition." (= Philokhoros FGrHist 328 F49) Then r e l a t i n g a few things that happened in between, he has t h i s : "At about the same time, since the Khalkidians in Thrace were being pressed by the war and had sent an embassy to Athens, the Athenians sent to them Kharidemos, the strategos in the Hellespont. With eighteen triremes, four thousand peltasts and one hun-dred f i f t y cavalry, he came into Pallene and B o t t i a i a along with the Olynthians and ravaged the country." (= Philokhoros FGrHist 328 F50) Then about the t h i r d r e l i e f force he says t h i s : "But when the Olynthians again sent ambassadors to Athens and begged them not to allow themselves to be overwhelmed, but rather to send in ad-d i t i o n to the existing forces a r e l i e f force, not of mercenaries but of Athenians themselves, the demos sent to them another seventeen triremes, two thousand c i t i z e n hoplites, three hundred cavalry in horse transports, and as strategos of the entire exped-i t i o n , Khares." (= Philokhoros FGrHist 328 F51) Dionysios of Halikarnassos Ad Ammaeum 9 (= Philokhoros FGrHist 328 F49-51) It i s d i f f i c u l t to grasp precisely what the Athenians accomplished, or what strategies either the Olynthians or P h i l i p pursued. It seems that the 23 f i r s t Athenian force sailed f a i r l y early in the archon-year and that the second force, diverted from the Hellespont, helped the Olynthians counter-attack against Macedonian t e r r i t o r y and against Khalkidic League t e r r i t o r y 24 that had already capitulated. Evidently, P h i l i p spent most of 349/8 in cap-turing or winning over the smaller c i t i e s in the Khalkidic League, before 25 undertaking the siege and capture of Olynthos in the late summer of 348. Khares did not remain in Olynthos throughout the entire campaign, since i t was he who led the t h i r d force composed of c i t i z e n s . Despite modern assertions to the contrary, there i s no evidence whatsoever that either Khares or Kharidemos was recalled or replaced or otherwise kept from pursuing his nr duties. Philokhoros e x p l i c i t l y states that the two e a r l i e r forces remained 44 in the theater of war, at least u n t i l the time of the th i r d embassy. Surely, one or the other of the two strategoi he names exercised direct command of these forces. There i s simply no time for the r e c a l l , t r i a l or dismissal 27 of either strategos. The t h i r d Athenian r e l i e f force under Khares probably set out in the 28 summer of 348, but i t did not arrive in time to help the Olynthians: ...nevertheless the Athenians sent aid of forty ships and the strategos Khares. Since he was held up by a storm, while Euthykrates and Lasthenes betrayed Olynthos; P h i l i p razed the place, but cap-tured the other c i t i e s . , The Athenians made the survivors c i t i z e n s . -T42 = Souda S_.v_. -Kapavoq (K 356) The clear indication i s that the r e l i e f force was delayed by bad weather, 29 possibly the Etesian Winds. Only one source hints at any c u l p a b i l i t y on the part of Khares and the Athenians, and that source's testimony i s neither convincing nor unequivocal. It i s a gloss on a passage in the Panathenaikos of Aristeides, a rhetorician active in the second century A.D.: By "Khalkidians" he means Olynthians. Olynthos i s a part of the Khalkidians. He says "as far as she could", seeing that they (sc. the Athenians) sent to them Khares, the strategos for aid. But when he arrived too la t e , P h i l i p sacked Olynthos, on whose behalf Demosthenes spent many fine speeches, in order that i t be saved. (Some MSS read, instead of the words underlined: But he, having come too 1 ate, lost Olynthos.) T43 = Scholia to Aristeides Panathenaikos (= Dindorf 179, 8-9) The reading " P h i l i p sacked Olynthos" i s c l e a r l y more accurate than "he (sc. Khares) lost Olynthos", since there were already Athenian forces on the scene and since Olynthos was not Khares' to "lose". The scholia add nothing to what can be gathered from the notice in the Souda. Neither Aiskhines (T52) nor any other of the detractors of Khares mentions his c u l p a b i l i t y in the f a l l of Olynthos, and that i s not surprising because Olynthos was betrayed. The Athenians cannot have known that treachery was imminent or else they would not have committed so many citizen-troops in the summer of 348. The enemy may have been closing in around Olynthos when the th i r d embassy reach-ed Athens, but that was no reason for undue urgency, at least not for those who were acquainted with the history of Olynthos. The c i t y had defied the combined might of the Peloponnesian League and Macedon t h i r t y years e a r l i e r , and had held out for two years with the enemy under their walls, before f i n -31 a l l y coming to terms. Before the present war was over, Athens had com-mitted almost 8,500 men (including 2,450 c i t i z e n s ) , and perhaps as many as 73 triremes to the Olynthian cause; she cannot reasonably have been expected to do much more, nor could she be expected to predict treachery. The demand for Athenian naval forces during the simultaneous campaigns in the Khalkidike and Euboia put a strain on Athenian resources. A request was made for volunteer trierarchs and several men did volunteer. Khares may have been one of them, since i t was at just about this time that he was registered on the naval archives as a t r i e r a r c h . This was not the act of a 32 rapacious condottiere, but of a responsible and concerned p o l i t i c a l leader. There i s some speculation that Khares' role in the Olynthian War was controversial. This view i s based on a remark quoted by A r i s t o t l e : And Kephisodotos, when Khares was hastening to render his euthynai for the Olynthian War, became vexed, saying that he was trying to render his euthynai while holding the demos in a chokehold. T45 = A r i s t o t l e Rhetoric (3.10) 1411a 6-9 3 3 Presumably, Kephisodotos was vexed because Khares had been re-elected and in his eagerness to get back into the f i e l d was trying to hasten the process of rendering his euthynai. In this way he could be said-to have the demos in a chokehold. At any rate, Khares was strategos continually from 349/8 through 347/6. 3 4 The war between Athens and Macedon continued with Athens attempting to organize an alliance of Greek states against Macedon, while Macedon was harassing Athenian overseas possessions. In p a r t i c u l a r Macedonian pressure was applied in the region of the Khersonesos and Propontis, against both Athenian and Thracian in t e r e s t s there. By 346 the s i t u a t i o n was dete r i o r a t i n g r a p i d l y . The Athenian commander tr y i n g to help Kersobleptes was Khares: Hear, then, the l e t t e r of Khares, which he sent at that time to the demos, that Kersobleptes had l o s t his kingdom and P h i l i p had captured Hieron Oros on the 24th of Elaphebolion. But Demosthenes was serving as proedros that month, while being one of the ambas-sadors on the 25th... You hear that i t was decreed on the t h i r d of Mounikhion. How many days e a r l i e r had Kersobleptes l o s t his kingdom before I l e f t ? As Khares the strategos says, i t was the month before, i f indeed Elaphebolion comes before Mounikhion! T46 = Aiskhines Parapresbeias ("On the False Embassy") 2.90,92 Khares and his force were not able to prevent the loss of Hieron Oros, a place on the western coast of the Propontis. Apparently a l l he could manage to do was to keep the demos informed of t h e i r enemy's a c t i v i t i e s . Subsequently, events in Central Greece persuaded Athens to make the Peace of Philokrates, 35 and l i t t l e i s heard of Athenian arms for the next few years. The Peace of Philokrates During the next few years of uneasy peace, l i t t l e i s heard of Athenian arms and nothing of Khares. There was p o l i t i c a l i n - f i g h t i n g at Athens between prominent policy-makers, mainly the ambassadors who negotiated the peace. The i n - f i g h t i n g also involved some of the s t r a t e g o i , and Khares' part in the "War 36 for Amphipolis" became a topic of discussion. There i s nothing to indicate that he f e l l from favor or withdrew from public l i f e ; there i s simply no e v i -dence for the a c t i v i t i e s of any of the strategoi from 346-344. We may be confident that Khares was in Athens for at least part of t h i s period, be-cause he served as khoregos f o r his t r i b e , Pandionis, and Akamantis at the Thargelia of 344/3, and was v i c t o r i o u s with the boys' c h o r u s . ^ In this same year, 344/3, the Hellenes were invited to share in the con-quest of Egypt with the king of Persia. Thebes, Argos and some of the c i t i e s of Asia Minor accepted the i n v i t a t i o n , and supplied the king with what 39 proved to be the decisively effective mercenary force. Athens and Sparta pub l i c l y refused, but private individuals from both of these states did take 40 part in the campaign. In the following year (343/2) growing Athenian concerns about the am-bitions of P h i l i p were reflected in the dispatch of new kleroukhoi to the 3 41 Khersonesos under the strategos Diopeithes. It i s also about this same time that Khares was again on duty in Thracian waters. Two pieces of evidence place him in Thasos and Ainos. One i s contained in a scholion to a speech 42 delivered in spring 342 (343/2) the other in a speech delivered after 344/3. The additional evidence that Khares was in command of a naval force in Thracian waters in 341/0 makes i t quite l i k e l y that he was on duty there each year from 343/2-340/39.43 The speaker of On Halonesos (Dem. 7), probably Hegesippos of Sounion (also known as 1 K r o b y l o s ' ) , 4 4 denigrated P h i l i p ' s offer to share with Athens the task of p a t r o l l i n g the sea against pirates as simply an opportunity to demonstrate Athenian naval weakness and to corrupt her a l l i e s . At one point the speaker alluded to a recent, and apparently well-known, event: ...and not only are exiles conveyed from himself to Thasos through your strategoi, but other islands are being appropriated, since he i s sending out people to s a i l along with your strategoi, as though they were intending to share in the guardianship of the sea. (Dem. 7.15) A scholiast explains this passage thus: For, some of the Thasians were proven to be about to betray a f f a i r s to P h i l i p ; they were exiled from the c i t i z e n s . These people P h i l i p restored after persuading those around Khares. T64 = Scholion to Demosthenes 7.15 The allusion i s very obscure and there are no other facts that might aid in determining the context, or the value of the scholiast's information. The scholiast certainly did not simply deduce what he wrote from the speech. That the exiles were 'Phi 1ippizing' might have been guessed, but that Khares conveyed them back to Thasos requires information independent of the speech. Whether or not the scholiast has referred his independent information appro-45 p r i a t e l y to explain this allusion in the speech cannot be known. In any event, there i s no reason to believe that this obscure business alienated Thasos from Athens. On the contrary, Thasos hosted enemies of P h i l i p in 341. In the speech Against Theokrines, numbered 58 in the Demosthenic corpus, the speaker t r i e d to characterize his opponent, Theokrines, as a bold-faced sycophant. As an example of the defendant's sycophancy, the prosecutor cites the alienation of Ainos: For they say that the Ainians no longer pay any attention to our c i t y , and this has occurred because of Theokrines here. For being harassed by his sycophancy in those times, when some were leaning towards P h i l i p and some towards Athens, and learning that the decree that Thoukydides proposed, the one about the syntaxis, had been i n -dicted as u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l — e a r l i e r Kharinos had indicted i t — a n d when no progress was being made, but the demos was w i l l i n g that the Ainians pay the syntaxis that they had agreed upon with Khares the strategos, then this damned fellow undertook to do the same as the t r a i t o r Kharinos. Learning t h i s , they did what was forced upon them; they chose the least of the e v i l s before them. And what must we imagine them to have suffered'at the hands of those bringing indictments here, i f they found i t preferable to receive a garrison, revolt from you and pay heed to barbarians? I think that you alone are able to bear the wickedness of these men, but no one else of the Hellenes. T65 = Demosthenes Against Theokrines 58.37-8 Clearly, for some a l l i e s , there was a fate worse than Khares. In 342 P h i l i p began campaigning in Thrace again, and at about the same time f r i c t i o n developed between the Athenian s e t t l e r s in the Khersonesos and Kardia, P h i l i p ' s a l l y . Eventually, Diopeithes raided Macedonian Thrace after 49 48 Philip supported Kardia with troops. There was a discussion in Athens about 49 removing Diopeithes and sending another strategos in his place. Khares may have continued at his post in Thasos during these events, but by the spring of 340 he was himself in the Khersonesos in command of an Athenian squadron, monitoring Philip's movements and trying to alert Byzantion to the approach-50 mg menace. Khares was in the Khersonesos at the very end of the Attic month of Anthesterion. Less than two weeks earlier a conference had been held at 51 Athens, in order to put together a League of Greek states to oppose Macedon. In addition, the Athenians had recently been in contact with the Persians, 52 and were continuing to develop their contacts. There is some evidence that Khares and other Athenian strategoi were operating on and near Lesbos at about this time, perhaps doing one or both of collecting syntaxeis and defining the boundaries between Persian and Athenian spheres of influence in the after-53 math of Hermias of Atarneus' f a l l . There are two pieces of evidence for Khares' presence on Lesbos, both of disputed date. One of them is contained in a stratagem related by Polyainos: Wh n Khares was besiegi g Aristonymos in Methymna, he sent an em-bassy to Memnon asking him not to aid Aristonymos. He (sc. Memnon) answered that he would aid him with a l l his might, for he was an ancestral friend and xenos, and that he would be there with all his soldiers on the next night. Khares disdained this when the ambas-sadors announced i t , on the grounds that i t was impossible for a great and slow army to be there on the next night. But Memnon, having travelled five stades by road and having embarked 1,200 soldiers into boats at dusk, gave them an order, that, whenever they had disembarked and come into the akropolis, they were to light a beacon-fire and attack the enemy. When these things were done, the attack in the dark appeared unexpectedly, but the beacon-fire, once l i t , turned Khares to fli g h t , as i f Memnon had seized the akropolis with his f u l l force. T69 = Polyainos Strategemata 5.44.3 The anecdote contains no clear indication of date, but the time between ca. 342-340 makes the best sense for a number of reasons. Memnon and Khares had been a l l i e s when the two had both been in the region during the Social War. Shortly thereafter, Memnon was driven into e x i l e with his brother-in-law, Artabazos and was restored ca. 342, as part of the great king's reward for his 54 brother Mentor's services in the reconquest of Egypt. When Khares and Memnon were again in the same general region at the same time, in 333, Memnon enjoyed a great naval superiority over the Macedonians and a l l others, while Khares lacked any o f f i c i a l standing from which he might send and receive an embassy, or from which he might expect e f f e c t i v e l y to warn Memnon off from aiding Aristonymos. Moreover, Khares was c l e a r l y co-operating with Memnon's successors in 332, and i t i s less l i k e l y that he was entrusted with command in 332, i f 55 he had been hostile and ' p i r a t i c a l ' in the previous year. This interpret-ation i s corroborated by a document on which Khares, Phokion, a Persian Orontes, syntaxeis from Lesbos, the A t t i c month Thargelion, and the archon Nikomakhos (341/0) are a l l mentioned (T68). The document in question unequivocally refers to the "thesmothetai in the archonship of Nikomakhos", and the name of a proposer, Polykrates son of Polykrates, i s preserved (T68, fragment a lines 12 and 2, respectively). It also mentions dealings involving one Orontes, apparently a Persian, and the Athenian strategoi Khares, Kharidemos, Phokion and Proxenos. Despite every indication that the document is to be dated in the very late 340s, previous students of i t have disregarded the indications of date solely on the basis of a desire to id e n t i f y the Orontes mentioned on i t with the famous satrap of 56 Armenia. The satrap Orontes was already ruling Armenia and married to a daughter of king Artaxerxes by 401, and he was an important participant i n : a) the suppression of Kyros' revolt in that year; b) the suppression of Euagoras, king of Kypros ca. 385; c) the great Revolt of the Satraps ca. 362-57 1. It i s generally f e l t that this Orontes cannot have been active in the West, or, indeed, a l i v e , as late as 341/0, and for this reason e a r l i e r dates, such 58 as 361/0 and 349/8, have been suggested for the document. 5 1 Such views are wrongheaded. There i s nothing in the document.that helps to i d e n t i f y the Orontes named on i t , except to suggest that he was a dynast. Other Persian dynasts of that name are known, however, and one would do well to exercise s i m i l a r caution in i d e n t i f y i n g t h i s Persian as W.E. Thompson ad-vises in the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of Athenians; to rephrase Thompson, "Tot Persis idem .,59 nomen erat. On the other hand, there are abundant reasons to accept the document in the context of 341/0. Epigraphically, there i s simply no obstacle to the l a t e r 60 date, rather emendation i s needed to support either of the e a r l i e r dates. Turning to the prosopographical data one finds that, of the six Athenians named on the document, f i v e can be p o s i t i v e l y and p r e c i s e l y i d e n t i f i e d , while the sixth may be i d e n t i f i e d with a c i t i z e n p o l i t i c a l l y active ca. 341-0. Hist-o r i c a l l y speaking, the dealings between Athens and th i s Persian dynast, Orontes, f i t comfortably into the context of r e l a t i o n s between the Athenians and Persia in 341-0. Athens had recently been in contact with, and had receiv-ed help from, Persia. Moreover, when P h i l i p attacked the grain-convoy in the summer of 340, Khares was consulting with the royal generals, one of whom was 62 a fellow Athenian. There i s no reason why the Athenians cannot have conduct-ed business with the Persian dynast, Orontes, in 341-0, and one may r e l y on the information provided by T68 without resorting to conjecture and emendation. Whatever the case may be about Orontes and the Athenian s t r a t e g o i , Khares was watching the Macedonians as they approached the Khersonesos in the summer of 340. The Macedonian army escorted a naval force through the Hellespont, and despite the fac t that Athenian land and naval forces were present, neither 63 side engaged in active h o s t i l i t i e s . In f a c t , i t does not appear that war broke out between Athens and Macedon f or some time. There i s no evidence that Athens aided Perinthos, and a state of war was not provoked u n t i l P h i l i p 64 seized the Athenian grain convoy in the late summer. There are several pieces of evidence f o r Khares' sojourn in the Bosporos, but only one seems to hav  understood the s i t u a t i o n . It i s the commentary of Didymos, who drew on Philokhoros, Theopompos and others: 52 The war of the. Athenians against the Macedonians was kindled by a l l the other matters in which P h i l i p offended the Athenians while pretending to keep the peace, but especially the campaign against Byzantion and Perinthos. He was vying to bring the c i t i e s over for two reasons: to deprive the Athenians of the i r grain convoy, and so that they might not have coastal c i t i e s , getting the jump on him in having anchorages and places of refuge for the war against him. But ( i t was kindled) most when he accomplished a very lawless deed, seizing the boats of the merchants at Hieron, 230 of them accord-ing to Philokhoros, but 180 according to Theopompos, from which he gathered 700 talents. These things were done in the year before, in the archonship of Theophrastos (340/39) who was archon after Nikomakhos (341/0), as others recount, but in particular Philokhoros says t h i s : "And Khares went away to a gathering of the royal strategoi, leaving the ships in Hieron so that they might escort the boats from the Pontos. P h i l i p , seeing that Khares was not pre-sent, f i r s t t r i e d sending ships to seize the boats. But being unable to force the issue, he shipped soldiers onto the other side against Hieron and he became master of the boats. They were not less than 230 in a l l . He deemed them enemy property, broke them up and used the wood for his siege-machines, and he came into the possession of much money, grain and hides." T71 = Didymos Commentary on Demosthenes 10.34-11.5 (= Philokhoros FGrHist 328 F162] From this evidence i t seems that the Athenians and Khares avoided becoming actively engaged in the sieges u n t i l very late in the summer, perhaps Sept-ember, and that P h i l i p deliberately provoked them into war. Khares 1 mission was not to aid the Byzantines, but to convoy the grainships, although he was c l e a r l y taking counsel with those who were actively engaged in r e s i s t i n g P h i l i p . 6 5 It was probably only now that the Athenians declared war, and that Khares engaged in h o s t i l i t i e s : ...Khares the strategos of the Athenians came with forty ships for the alliance with Byzantion in the war against P h i l i p . He seized a height on the Propontis that l i e s between Khrysopolis and Khalkedon, and there he dropped anchor and made t r i a l of the war. T70 - Hesykhios of Miletos FGrHist 390 F1 §28 Khares 1 force was reinforced by another under Phokion, but perhaps f i r s t he 66 won a minor naval victory. Although Plutarch does not seem to have under-stood the situation at Byzantion, he may preserve some evidence of f r i c t i o n between the Byzantines and Athenians: But when P h i l i p came into the Hellespont with his whole force nourishing hopes that he would win the Khersonesos, Perinthos and Byzantion at the same time, and the Athenians were eager to send help, the rhetores strove to send out the strategos Khares. He s a i l e d , but accomplished nothing worthy of his force, nor did the c i t i e s receive his f l e e t , but he wandered around, suspected by a l l , exacting money from the a l l i e s and despised by the enemy. The demos kindled by the rhetores, became angry and repented for having sent aid to the Byzantines. Phokion, r i s i n g up, said that they must not be angry with the d i s t r u s t f u l a l l i e s , but at the distrusted stratego "For these men make you frightening even to those who cannot save themselves without you." Then the demos was moved by t h i s speech and changed i t s mind. It bade Phokion himself to take a second force and go to'the aid of the a l l i e s in the Hellespont. That made the greatest contribution towards saving Byzantion. T73 = Plutarch Phokion 14.2-3 Plutarch c l e a r l y did not understand the precise context in which Phokion was sent f o r t h from Athens with another f l e e t . Phokion had been otherwise occupie in 341/0, and Khares, as has been seen above, was in the Hellespont before P h i l i p a rrived. It may be that Plutarch has misunderstood the true nature,, of Khares 1 mission in the Bosporos, and the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the sending 67 of the two forces. In any event, during the siege of Byzantion and P h i l i p ' s withdrawal, i t i s Phokion's e x p l o i t s , rather than Khares', that are handed 68 down in the t r a d i t i o n . Nevertheless, there i s nothing to indicate that Khares was held responsible f o r the disaster at Hieron or his conduct in the war; his e l e c t i o n as strategos f o r 339/8 and perhaps 338/7 confirm t h i s . The Athenians had good reasons to send Phokion with Athenian reinforcements to 69 Byzantion, and those reasons had l i t t l e to do with Khares. Khaironeia and the Destruction of Thebes In the l a t e f a l l of 339 an Amphiktyonic army with P h i l i p of Macedon as i t s hegemon marched into Phokis and seized E l a t e i a . There was an immediate competition f o r a l l i a n c e with the Boiotian League, which Athens and her a l l i e s won, thanks to Demosthenes.^ The Athenians sensibly made a number of conces-sions to the Boiotians, as Aiskhines made clear in his review (3.142-3) of the terms of the al l i a n c e : the Athenians were to recognize Theban ( i . e . , Boiotian League) hegemony over a l l the c i t i e s of Boiotia, they undertook to meet a l l naval expenses and two-thirds of other expenses, they agreed to share command at sea, while on land the Boiotians probably retained ultimate control. Under the circumstances these concessions were certainly a bargain for Athens. 7 1 The major expense of the campaign on land was undoubtedly the money to hire a great force of mercenaries. This force was to be stationed at the Gravia Pass to protect Amphissa, while the c i t i z e n armies held the Parapotamoi 72 Pass to cover Khaironeia and the entrance into Boiotia. Apparently, the command structure paired m i l i t a r y leaders from each of the two major powers, for the sources mention two Athenian strategoi and two Boiotarkhoi s p e c i f i c -a l l y associated with the force at Khaironeia, and another strategos and Boiotarkhos associated only with the mercenary force; the Athenians Lysikles and Stratokles, and the Thebans Timolaos and Theagenes are associated with the forces and battle of Khaironeia, Khares and the Theban Proxenos are 73 associated with the mercenary force. After they were several months in these positions, P h i l i p suddenly struck at the mercenary force, having f i r s t deceived Khares and Proxenos with P h i l i p was campaigning against the t e r r i t o r y of Amphissa. The Athenians and Thebans seized the pass beforehand and the way through i t was d i f f i c u l t . P h i l i p deceived the enemy by sending a false l e t t e r to Antipatros in Macedonia, saying that he was putting off the campaign against Amphissa and hastening to Thrace, because he learned that there was a revolt there. The courier went through the pass. The strategoi, Khares and Proxenos, captured him and, reading the l e t t e r , believed i t s contents and ceased guarding the pass. But P h i l i p burst into the place and seized i t since i t was deserted and unguarded. When the strategoi turned back, he defeated them and became master of Amphissa. T77 = Polyainos Strategemata 4.2.8 The defeat was serious, more so for considerations of morale and diplomacy than s t r i c t l y m i l i t a r y ones. The c i t i z e n forces f e l l back a few miles to a new p o s i t i o n in order to be able to cover a Macedonian invasion by way of either the Kephissos v a l l e y , or the route along the Gulf of Korinth. What became of the two defeated commanders of the mercenaries i s quite obscure, although i t i s very d i f f i c u l t to imagine that they were allowed to play any 74 substantial r o l e in the command of the undefeated force at Khaironeia. The ancient testimony on the f i n a l b a t t l e , at Khaironeia, i s very spotty and disappointing. Diodoros, the main narrative source, i s t y p i c a l l y b r i e f and i s f a r more interested in Demosthenes' ro l e in the negotiations between the demos of Athens and that of Thebes. He does r e l a t e that Khares and Lysikles were sent into B o i o t i a after the Boiotian a l l i a n c e was concluded (T76), but t h i s was late in 339. He describes, however, none of the preliminary skirmishing, nor the defeat at Amphissa; rather, he delights in the verbal 75 duel between Python, P h i l i p ' s envoy, and Demosthenes. Instead of giving the deployment of the armies and so f o r t h , Diodoros launches into a comparison of the r e l a t i v e merits of the generals of the Athenians and P h i l i p : Among the Athenians the best of t h e i r strategoi had died, Iphikrates, Khabrias, and also Timotheos, while of those remain-ing Khares held f i r s t place, but he did not even excel ordinary i n d i v i d u a l s in the energy and counsel required of a general. T78 = Diodoros 16.85.7 Whether or not Diodoros even thought of Khares as having a part in the b a t t l e is wholly unclear. In f a c t , the only piece of evidence that s p e c i f i c a l l y associates Khares with the b a t t l e of Khaironeia i s the witty rejoinder at-tributed to Demades by Stobaios: Demades the rhetor, having been taken prisoner in the b a t t l e of Khaironeia by P h i l i p , and being introduced to him while he was drunkenly exulting "Where i s the n o b i l i t y and d i g n i t y of the c i t y of the Athenians?", (sc. he replied) "You would know, king, the power of the c i t y had P h i l i p commanded the Athenians and Khares the Macedonians." T79 = Stobaios Florilegium 54.47 A l l the other evidence points to Lysikles and Stratokles as strategoi at Khaironeia along with t h e i r Theban counterparts. It i s l i k e l y that neither 7 ft Khares nor Proxenos played any s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e in the b a t t l e . Many of those who have believed that Khares was involved in the f i n a l b a t t l e have drawn inferences about his behaviour following the b a t t l e : he f a i l e d to return to Athens and took refuge in his private r e t r e a t , Sigeion, or he managed to f o i s t the blame for the defeat onto the unfortunate L y s i k l e s . There were repercussions f e l t by some i n d i v i d u a l s , to be sure, and Lysikles was one of them, but the inferences about Khares are both unfounded and 'creative', to say the l e a s t . The orthodox Athenian view soon became one which blamed the calamity on the v e n a l i t y and turpitude of the Theban l e a d e r s . 7 7 Moreover, there i s some p o s i t i v e evidence that Khares was in Athens and regarded as p o l i t i c a l l y i n f l u e n t i a l in 335. Af t e r Alexander destroyed Thebes in that year, Athens t r i e d to m o l l i f y him with an embassy. As a means of humbling the c i t y and insuring her future d o c i l i t y Alexander demanded that the demos hand over to him those p o l i t i c a l leaders whom he f e l t to be most h o s t i l e 78 to Macedon. In the end only one man was e x i l e d , Kharidemos. There were two d i f f e r e n t t r a d i t i o n s in antiquity about p r e c i s e l y which men Alexander demanded: Then straightaway, Alexander sent to Athens a demand for ten of the demagogoi, as Idomeneus and Douris have said, but, as the major-i t y and the most r e l i a b l e say, rather these eight: Demosthenes, Polyeuktos, Ephialtes, Lykourgos, Moirokles, Demon, Kallisthenes, Kharidemos. Plutarch Demosthenes 23.4 But t h i s passage in Plutarch i s the only evidence for the 'eight-name' trad-i t i o n . A l l other ancient testimony on t h i s subject followed a l i s t that con-tained more than eight, and probably ten, names. The f u l l e s t representatives of the 'ten-name' t r a d i t i o n are Arrian and 79 the Souda: In a l l else he answered in a fr i e n d l y fashion to the embassy, but writing a l e t t e r to the demos he demanded those around Demosthenes and Lykourgos; he also demanded Hypereides, Polyeuktos, Khares, Kharidemos, Ephialtes, Diotimos and Moirokles. These men he held responsible for the c i t y ' s disaster at Khaironeia, for the ins u l t s at the death of P h i l i p as well as those against himself and P h i l i p . He revealed them as being no less to blame for the revolt of the Thebans than those of the Thebans who fomented the revolt. T80 = Arrian Anabasis 1.10.4-5 Having been victorious (sc. in the Lamian War) he (sc. Antipatros) demanded the ten rhetores whom the Athenians surrendered: Demosthenes Hypereides, Lykourgos, Polyeuktos, Ephialtes, Thrasyboulos, Khares, Kharidemos, Diotimos, Patrokles (some MSS read Prokles) and Kassandro T81 = Souda _s._y_. 'AvTLTiaxpoq (A2704) Other sources representing the 'ten-name' t r a d i t i o n are Diodoros (17.15.1), Plutarch (Phokion 17.2), probably Justin (11.4.10-12) and perhaps the author 80 of the Plutarchean Vitae Decern Oratorum (Mor. 848E). Despite the odds against him, Plutarch (Demosthenes) may well be r i g h t , but i t can be demon-strated that in addition to Idomeneus and Douris, Ptolemy endorsed the 'ten-81 name' t r a d i t i o n . In other words, a contemporary source, who was in an especially privileged position to know about such things, believed that Khares was present and i n f l u e n t i a l at Athens in 335. Khares and the anti-Macedonian Mercenaries Several of these men named on one or the other of the l i s t s turned up in Asia Minor a few months later as mercenaries in the service of Persia. They joined a considerable number of anonymous Athenians in the armies opposing the Macedonians. A large number of Athenians were taken prisoner at the Granikos. Thrasyboulos and Ephialtes distinguished themselves at the siege of Halikarnassos. Kharidemos was at the court of Dareios himself, and he angled for the position made vacant by Memnon's death in 333. Athenodoros the Imbrian, an acquaintance of both Kharidemos and Khares from their days in Thrace, was held prisoner in Sardis, and the Athenian Demokrates preferred 82 suicide to surrendering to the Macedonians in 331. Among these p o l i t i c a l l y motivated re s i s t e r s was Khares. Like Kharidemos and others, Khares probably f l e d Athens after the sack of Thebes, for he was in Sigeion when Alexander crossed into Asia in the spring of 334: When Alexander was going up to I l i o n Menoitios, his p i l o t , crowned him with a golden crown and for this reason, too, Khares the Athen-ian came, as well as certain others, some Hellenes and some natives (a lacuna here * * *) but some (say?) that he also crowned the grave of Akhilleus, but they say that Hephaistion crowned the grave of Patroklos. T82 = Arrian Anabasis 1.12.1 Khares had c l e a r l y not committed himself publicly to the Persian cause but he was certa i n l y in a good position to monitor events as they unfolded before he committed himself irrevocably (and dare one guess that he was keeping 83 Athens informed of the state of things in his area?). It i s not known i f Khares took part in Memnon's counter-offensive in 84 spring of 333, but he had joined the Persians by the following year. In the spring of 332 the Macedonians under Hegelokhos and Amphoteros were retaking the islands which Memnon had captured the previous year. Khares was command-ing the Persian garrison at Mitylene: (Hegelokhos reported) that he had taken Mitylene which was held by Khares, and the other c i t i e s on Lesbos and that he had brought them over by an agreement. T83 = Arrian Anabasis 3.2.6 From here the Macedonians crossed over to Mitylene which had been recently occupied by Khares the Athenian and held with a garrison of 2,000 Persians. But, when he was unable to endure a siege, he 59 handed t h e c i t y o v e r on t h e c o n d i t i o n t h a t he be a l l o w e d t o go away u n h a r g g d . He s e t o u t f o r I m b r o s ; t h e Macedonians s p a r e d t h e s u r r e n d -e r e d . T84 = Q. C u r t i u s Rufus H i s t o r y o f A l e x a n d e r t h e G r e a t 4 . 5 . 2 2 Khares c o n t i n u e d t o seek ways t o oppose Macedon. He was i n command o f a m e r c e n a r y f o r c e a t T a i n a r o n : And c o n c e r n i n g t h e s t r a t e g o i whom A l e x a n d e r demanded, he ( s c . H y p e r e i d e s ) spoke a g a i n s t * * * ( a l a c u n a h e r e ) * * * and c o n c e r n i n g t h e t r i r e m e s . He c o u n s e l e d a g a i n s t d i s b a n d i n g t h e m e r c e n a r y f o r c e a t T a i n a r o n t h a t Khares l e d , b e i n g w e l l d i s p o s e d t o w a r d t h e s t r a t e g o s . T85 = P l u t a r c h M o r a l i a 848E ( V i t a e Decern O r a t o r u m : H y p e r e i d e s ) The d a t e o f t h i s command i n u n c e r t a i n . Most d a t e i t t o t h e p e r i o d j u s t b e f o r e t h e Lamian War, b u t some have r e a l i z e d t h a t t h e war o f A g i s o f S p a r t a i s more l i k e l y . Khares had opposed P h i l i p and A l e x a n d e r f o r most o f h i s c a r e e r and when he d i e d , p e r h a p s a l i t t l e b e f o r e t h e e x i l e o f Demosthenes, he was remembered as one o f t h e d e m o t i k o i , as Demosthenes w r i t e s : I f e a r t h a t you may become b e r e f t o f t h o s e who speak on y o u r b e -h a l f ( i . e . , t h e d e m o s ) , e s p e c i a l l y s i n c e o f t h e d e m o t i k o i some f a t e , t i m e and a f i t t i n g end have t a k e n away, such as N a u s i k l e s , K h a r e s , D i o t i m o s , M e n e s t h e u s , Eudoxos and a l s o E u t h y d i k o s , E p h i a l t e s and L y k o u r g o s , w h i l e o t h e r s you have t h r o w n o u t , j u s t as K h a r i d e m o s , P h i l o k l e s and m y s e l f . T86 = Demosthenes E p i s t u l a 3 . 3 1 L i k e t h e o c t o g e n a r i a n A g e s i l a o s , Khares had c o n t i n u e d , even i n t o h i s ex t reme o l d a g e , t o "work t r u s t i l y and f a i t h f u l l y on b e h a l f o f t h e demos o f t h e A t h e n i a n s , as f a r as i t was i n h i s c o n t r o l " ( T 5 4 ) . He f e l l f a r s h o r t o f t h e h e r o i c canon o f h i s c o l l e a g u e s and c o n t e m p o r a r i e s , I p h i k r a t e s , K h a b r i a s and T i m o t h e o s , b u t Demosthenes was s u r e l y r i g h t t o g r a n t h im a p l a c e among t h e d e m o t i k o i . ^ 7 6 0 Summary of Part I Khares was a member of the l i t u r g i c a l class at Athens and probably came from a family that could afford to bear such l i t u r g i e s . He served as an Athenian m i l i t a r y magistrate f o r nearly f o r t y years, t h i r t y of them at the rank of strategos. There i s evidence to document that he was strategos cer-t a i n l y or very probably in sixteen of those years. This constitutes good evidence of his popularity at Athens,- and that conclusion i s supported by ancient evidence. There i s no evidence that he was convicted of wrongdoing as a magistrate, nor that he went into self-imposed e x i l e between magis-t r a c i e s . There i s good evidence, however, that he followed regular procedures for communication with, and obtaining instructions from, the home government. It was only after his career as a magistrate was ended at Athens, that he took service as a mercenary. This mercenary service i s p o l i t i c a l l y consis-tent, i . e . , anti-Macedonian, and i t f i t s into a pattern of Athenian resistance to Macedon af t e r the founding of the League of Korinth. The label of condot- t i e r e does not f i t him, as f a r as that term i s used and understood. 6 1 PART I I : : '.XAPHZ AHMOT IK OZZ-In the previous chapters Khares 1 long career as an Athenian m i l i t a r y magistrate and, l a t e r , as a mercenary soldier fi g h t i n g against the Macedon-ians, has been reviewed. There i t was seen that the Athenians entrusted him with the i r most important elective o f f i c e repeatedly over a period of t h i r t y years. Fourteen or more tenures of the o f f i c e of strategos can be documented during this period, and there i s reason to believe that more would be dis-1 covered, were the evidence f u l l e r . This record of electoral success bears ample witness to the man's popularity among his fellow c i t i z e n s , p a r t i c u l a r l y when one considers how precarious public l i f e in ancient Athens could be. According to one recent d e f i n i t i o n of ancient p o l i t i c a l leaders, Khares' long career should qualify him as one of Athens' most prominent p o l i t i c i a n s 2 during the middle t h i r d of the fourth century B.C. Regardless of ancient or modern assessments of his character, or s k i l l as a general, i t i s quite evident that Khares was one of his c i t y ' s more enduring and popular public figures. The ancient sources admit as much. Theopompos (T62) conceded that the Athenians loved Khares more than other c i t i z e n s ; Nepos (T33) excluded him from the same class as Timotheos, Konon, Khabrias and Iphikrates, but confessed, sed tamen Athenis et honoratus et  potens; and Demosthenes (T54) reminded the Athenians that, although t r i e d in every manner, Khares had always been found to have acted t r u s t i l y and l o y a l l y on th e i r behalf. In view of Khares' obvious d u r a b i l i t y and popularity as a public figure at Athens, i t seems j u s t i f i a b l e to investigate his relations with other Athenians, that i s , his ' p o l i t i c a l career'. By th i s term i s meant the un-o f f i c i a l activity that a politician undertook, that which he was not obliged to do ex o f f i c i o . What elements or persons in the state supported or opposed him, and what elements did he in turn oppose or support? Who were Khares' supporters and a l l i e s , enemies and rivals? How long and to what extent were they such, and how did he maintain his position in the state for so long? These are the questions to which some answers will be sought. Modern students of the fourth century B.C. focus their attention on two salient associations between Khares and other prominent Athenians. One is with the rhetor Aristophon Azenieus, a man especially influential in the late 360s and 350s, the other with the famous orator Demosthenes, who be-3 gan to achieve prominence in the mid-340s. Between 352 and 349 Khares' ca-reer is a blank; this is also a period when Aristophon's influence apparent-ly waned, and during which Demosthenes began to thrust himself into the fore-front of Athenian pol i t i c a l l i f e . The hiatus in Khares1 career provides a convenient place at which to divide this account, and so a chapter will be devoted to the early period and another to the later. Such a division does not in any way imply that Khares is believed to have been allied to one man or one group during the one period, and another in the other period, a l -though generally there does seem to have been a 'changing of the guard', 4 when a new generation of pol i t i c a l leaders came forth. This investigation will attempt to proceed, as much as possible, without reliance on preconceived notions about pol i t i c a l leaders, po l i t i c a l groups, their programs and goals, or on unexamined c r i t e r i a upon which pol i t i c a l a l -liance o r enmity is determined. It is hoped thereby to test the validity of some traditional and current methods and models upon which modern concept-5 ions about Athenian pol i t i c a l l i f e are based. 63 CHAPTER THREE: KHARES AND ARISTOPHON Introduction As far as can be ascertained from the ancient evidence, Khares' early 'political career' was dominated by a single, controversial pol i t i c a l conflict. This conflict manifested i t s e l f in the accusation and t r i a l of the men who were his colleagues in the battle of Embata, Timotheos, Iphikrates, and Menestheus. Aristophon Azenieus played a prominent part in their prosecution. In this chapter the evidence for Khares' pol i t i c a l activity during this early period will be examined, and special attention will be paid to his enmity with Timotheos and Iphikrates, his association with Aristophon, and his con-jectured relationship with other prominent Athenians during the period before Embata. Fi r s t , however, some general considerations pertaining to the re-lationship between elected magistrates and the people need to be discussed. Military Magistrates and the Electorate In the preceding two chapters i t has been shown that Khares was made strategos many times by the Athenians, and that he probably served in other, lesser military magistracies as well. The major military magistracies in Athens were elective, while the vast majority of offices under the demo-i cracy were f i l l e d by sortition. This means that men pursuing military careers in Athens were dependent upon popular support in order to continue their position in government. They needed this popular support on a f a i r l y con-sistent and regular basis, more so, at any rate, than did the rhetores. This was neither more nor less true for Khares than for other Athenian military magistrates. A l l t h i s i s obvious, to be sure, but i t i s worthwhile to remem-ber how much and in what ways these magistrates were dependent upon popular support, and to emphasize that, at least in this regard, Khares was just l i k e other Athenians who served the c i t y in a m i l i t a r y r o l e , and not d i s s i m i l i s  horum (T33). There are s u f f i c i e n t examples to suggest that popular support began with one's family or, at least, with family traditions of participation in public l i f e . Nothing i s known of Khares' family, l e t alone the i r t r a d i t i o n s , a l -though one suspects that i t was s u f f i c i e n t l y well-placed for him to cbntem-2 plate a public l i f e at a f a i r l y young age. A certain amount of t r i b a l sup-port for Khares can probably be assumed from the sneer of Isokrates, that Timotheos had used such men (as Khares) as lokhagoi and taxiarkhoi (T25). Both of these offices depended, at least in part, on t r i b a l approval, i f not 3 outright t r i b a l support. This assumption of t r i b a l approval and support i s confirmed by Khares' appointment as khoregos of the boys' chorus of his t r i b e , Pandionis, and Akamantis at the Thargelia of 344/3 (T51). 4 Khares' t r i b e considered him f i t both to lead them on the b a t t l e f i e l d , while s t i l l a young man, and to represent them at a public, f e s t i v a l competition, when he was a 5 mature adult. It i s a l l but certain that by the time Khares was standing for the strategia the election of strategoi was the business, not of the t r i b e , but of the whole people. Clearly, he was not only popular enough to be elected strategos again and again, but he was also consistently selected as the man who would f i g h t for the c i t y ' s interests. He was not one of those strategoi whose o f f i c i a l duties consisted c h i e f l y of 'strutting in the public proces-sions', but a fighti n g general. 7 Aristophon of Azenia Aristophon Azenieus was a p a r t i c u l a r l y long-lived Athenian p o l i t i c a l leader, who seems to have achieved prominence at Athens in the late 360s and to have participated in the c i t y ' s business continuously for the next 25 years. He and Khares are frequently i d e n t i f i e d as the kingpins of a 'hard-l i n e ' faction in Athenian diplomacy or "le partie imperialiste." Aristophon is believed to have been the dominant p o l i t i c a l leader between the decline of Kal1istratos, who went into e x i l e in 361, and the emergence of a p o l i t i c a l group dominated by Euboulos and Diophantos, which rose to prominence after g the Social War. Because of Aristophon's prominence and his long-lasting pa r t i c i p a t i o n in Athenian p o l i t i c s and diplomacy, i t w i l l be useful to review his career. Aristophon was born before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War. He was f i r s t active p o l i t i c a l l y , as far as i t i s known, in the restoration of the 11 democracy in 403. Thereafter not a word about him i s heard for some forty 12 years. He emerges again in the year 363/2, when he moved a decree concern-ing a settlement with a re c a l c i t r a n t League a l l y , the c i t y of Ioulis on Keos, 13 and was perhaps also strategos. In the following year (late summer 362) he moved another decree authorizing an expeditionary force to s a i l to Tenos, 14 the Khersonesos and the Propontis to deal with problems in those places. In 361, after Leosthenes had been defeated on Peparethos, Aristophon prosecuted some of the trierarchs in Leosthenes' command. Leosthenes, himself, was accused and convicted in absentia and i t was approximately this time when 15 K a l l i s t r a t o s Aphidnaios, too, went into e x i l e . During the Social War Aristophon was involved in efforts to improve Athens' m i l i t a r y preparedness, especially in the f i s c a l sphere, and after Em-bata he joined Khares in the prosecution of Iphikrates, Timotheos and Menestheus, 16 The t r i a l was famous. In the years following the Social War one hears less frequently about Aristophon, although i t i s known that he continued to be pol-i t i c a l l y active u n t i l at least 342. He spoke against the Peace of Philokrates, 17 opposed Euboulos, and persisted in making and carrying public proposals. 6 6 He died between 340 and 330. 1 8 Any attempt to assess Aristophon's influence during the early period of Khares' career must also take into account other p o l i t i c a l groups. The most extensive and i n f l u e n t i a l modern analysis of p o l i t i c a l groups in this period 19 is that of R. Sealey. In attempting to understand the career of K a l l i s t r a t o s of Aphidna and the period following the Social War, Sealey has offered a re-construction of p o l i t i c a l groups in Athens. In addition to the p o l i t i c a l groups centered around K a l l i s t r a t o s , Sealey reconstructs those around Aristo-phon, Timotheos and Euboulos as well. Because of widespread influence of 20 Sealey's treatment, i t i s necessary to outline his views here. In Sealey's reconstruction Aristophon has two main a l l i e s . One i s Autokles Euonymeus, who accompanied Demostratos, the son of (an) Aristophon, on the embassy to Sparta in 371 and delivered there a speech strongly c r i t i c a l 21 of the Lakedaimonians. Autokles was strategos in 368/7 and was sent to Thessaly with an army to aid the Thessalians against the Boiotians. This expedition represents a s l i g h t divergence in Athenian policy at the time. In 370/69, 369/8 and 367/6 Athens sent forces into the Peloponnesos to aid their a l l i e s there. These forces were led by Iphikrates, Khabrias and Timomakhos, respectively, a l l associates of K a l l i s t r a t o s at some time or 22 other. Autokles was also dispatched to Tenos and the Hellespont with a force in 362/1, an- expedition authorized by a decree proposed by Aristophon. Eight months later Autokles was deposed; he and Aristophon were each prosecuted 23 by Hypereides, but when and exactly for what i s unknown. Aristophon's other main a l l y i s Khares. According to Sealey, Khares' assignment to the command of the Peloponnesos in 366 (as well as Timotheos' command in the eastern Aegean) represents a diminishing of K a l l i s t r a t o s ' i n -24 fluence, the return of Timotheos and r i s e of Aristophon. The fact that K a l l i s t r a t o s and Khabrias were prosecuted over the Oropos a f f a i r , but Khares w s no , and the fact that th y wer  acquitted, but Khares disappears for several years, leads Sealey to suggest a rivalry between the two groups. Some have even suggested that either Khares, or Khabrias and Kallistratos, 25 contrived to foist the blame on each other. It is assumed that Khares and Aristophon w e r e associates, not only because of their cooper-ation in the t r i a l s of Iphikrates, Timotheos and Menestheus (T18), but also because Aristophon took actions in 361 that benefitted Khares: Aristophon prosecuted Leosthenes' trierarchs and, conjecturally, Leosthenes himself; Leosthenes' replacement was Khares and Aristophon had spoken on behalf of Khares for pay (T19). 2 6 This, then, is a generally accepted reconstruction of the "notorious" and "lasting friendship" between Khares and Aristophon that is "well-attest--27 ed". In fact, i t can be demonstrated that the association between the two was neither lasting, well-attested nor any more notorious than that between, e.g., Kallistratos and Iphikrates or between Aiskhines and Euboulos or any 28 other ancient, Athenian pol i t i c a l liaison one cares to name. The evidence for cooperation between Khares and Aristophon in an attack on Timotheos and Iphikrates does exist and the t r i a l was famous, perhaps even "notorious", but there is no other direct evidence for an association between the two. The remaining evidence for hos t i l i t y towards the 'Kallistratos-group', for an earlier (than 356) association with Aristophon, or for similarities between the two in policy and attitude, is purely circumstantial and, in some cases, tendentious. It will be necessary to review the evidence for relations be-tween Khares and 1) the 'Kallistratos-group', 2) Aristophon, 3) Timotheos, and f i n a l l y , for similarities in attitude and policy between Khares and other Athenian p o l i t i c a l leaders. Khares and the 'Kallistratos-group' There is simply no evidence for hostility between Khares (or Aristophon) and Kallistratos or any of his associates. Kallistratos' relative, Timomakhos Akharneus, was strategos in the Peloponnesos in 367/6 during Epameinondas' invasion (mainly into Akhaia) and, admittedly, his performance was cri t i c i z e d 29 by Xenophon, who was prone to quibbles about strategy and tactics. There is no good reason, however, to believe that the Athenians shared Xenophon's c r i t -icism of Timomakhos or that Khares replaced, rather than succeeded, him. In fact, one finds that the command of Athenian forces in the Peloponnesos re-volved, i.e., that i t was not held twice consecutively by any one man. Iphikr-ates held the command in the winter of 370/69 and was cri t i c i z e d by Xenophon, yet in the following year he was given an important command in the northern 30 Aegean. Khabrias performed laudably in the Peloponnesos in 369/8, but did not return the next time Athenian forces were sent there. The same is true of Khares. In fact, the names of seven senior commanders who served in the Peloponnesos between 370 and 362 are known, and none of them served more than 31 once. According to Sealey, Kallistratos began to lose influence as a result of the loss of Oropos and the gains made by Timotheos on Samos and the Hellespont, yet both of these things happened well after Khares was elected and assigned to the command in the Peloponnesos. Thus there is no reason to view his appointment to that position as a blow against Kallistratos. On the contrary, i f peace and alliance with Sparta and other enemies of Boiotia in the Peloponnesos were the policy of Kallistratos, then one might infer that 32 he approved of all the commanders sent there between 370/69 and 366. In-terestingly enough, i t was in the years of Kallistratos' alleged decline that Khares disappears from the sources. Kallistratos and Khabrias were caught in the storm over Oropos in 366, Khares was not. Presumably, Khabrias was i n i t i a l l y sent out with an Athen-ian force, while Khares was recalled from Phleious. As has been argued in chapter one, Khares almost certainly arrived at Oropos before the Athenian decision to yield to the Thebans, pending arbitration, was made. It is un-clear what role Kallistratos played, except that is must have been an o f f i c i a l one. The fact that Khares avoided any immediate entanglement in this a f f a i r need not have s i n i s t e r implications. The prosecutors of Khabrias and K a l l i s -tratos are known; at least one of them was an inveterate enemy of Khabrias, and none of them can be shown to have had any connection, either at t h i s time 34 or l a t e r , with Khares. Moreover, a major factor in the Athenians' anger over the Oropos a f f a i r was the fact that the i r a l l i e s had not reciprocated the i r m i l i t a r y aid. The Athenians had sent four armies to the Peloponnesos in the past four years, and they may have vented the i r rage on those responsible for such an unprofitable alliance as much as those who f a i l e d to regain 35 Oropos. Khares had just returned to Athens, victorious. Oropos was not his show. There is no reason to suspect that he, on the one hand, or the other two men, on the other, foisted the blame on each other in an act of " s e l f -preservation". 3 6 There i s a t r a d i t i o n of enmity between Khares and Timotheos, Iphikrates, and Phokion, as well as indications of h o s t i l i t y between him and Euboulos, 37 Aiskhines and Kephisodotos ek Kerameon. Between him and K a l l i s t r a t o s and Khabrias there i s none. Instead, there i s one, admittedly highly circum-s t a n t i a l , indication of favorable feeling towards Khabrias. Khabrias was a member of Khares' force that sailed to Khios in 357. He went as a private c i t i z e n , perhaps as a t r i e r a r c h . As Nepos reports (T14), Khabrias "surpassed in authority a l l those who were magistrates, and the soldiers looked to him more than to those in command." Perhaps Khares concur-red in this estimate of him, since Khabrias i s represented by the sources as either leading or taking the most prominent part in the attack on the har-39 bor of the Khians. One cannot be certain that Khabrias* role was an o f f i c i a l one, but on at least one other occasion strategoi gave special assignments 40 to trierarchs who were former stategoi. Khabrias had an opportunity to retrieve his recently tarnished reputation in the attack on the harbor. If he was in an o f f i c i a l position of authority, then whoever put him in i t was 7 0 41 doing him a favor. Khares and Aristophon The only argument on which even a circumstantial case can be made for an early connection between Khares and Aristophon, centers on the fiasco on Peparethos in 361. Aristophon prosecuted Leosthenes' tr i e r a r c h s , the strategos himself was t r i e d and condemned in absentia, and Khares replaced him; ergo, Khares benefitted from Aristophon's actions and must have been a friend. To accept t h i s argument one must assume both that Aristophon pros-ecuted the strategos as well as the t r i e r a r c h s , and that he influenced the decision on which strategos to send out as his replacement. There i s evidence for neither. In l i g h t of the plethora of l i t i g a t i o n in the years around 362 u n t i l 359, i t i s very d i f f i c u l t to be confident in the f i r s t assumption. During that time at least fourteen high-ranking m i l i t a r y o f f i c e r s , rhetores and 42 tr i e r a r c h s , in addition to those of Leosthenes, were prosecuted. The names of f i v e of the prosecutors are known. The most l i t i g i o u s of them, Apollodoros, was c l e a r l y engaged in a series of lawsuits that seem to have been f i n a n c i a l l y 43 motivated. Aristophon carried a motion authorizing an expeditionary force to s a i l to Tenos, the Khersonesos, Propontis and the Bosporos in September of 362. Autokles sailed out as strategos of t h i s force, but after eight months he was deposed from o f f i c e and replaced by Menon Potamios, who was succeeded 44 in the new year by Timomakhos Akharneus. Timomakhos was apparently suc-ceeded by Kephisodotos in the following year, 360/59. Kephisodotos, l i k e his 45 three successive predecessors was prosecuted. Leosthenes was " l e f t behind" on Peparethos, perhaps in the spring of 361. After his defeat, he was deposed 46 and replaced by Khares. There seems to be no discernable p o l i t i c a l pattern here. Aristophon prosecuted the t r i e r a r c h s , who had leased out their t r i e r -7 1 archies. Apollodoros prosecuted Autokles, Menon, and Timomakhos aft e r having served under each of them as a t r i e r a r c h . He also prosecuted Kallippos Aixoneus, another t r i e r a r c h in t h i s force. Kephisodotos was prosecuted by the r e l a t i v e l y obscure Euthykles Thriasios whose only other known p o l i t i c a l act was to attack Kharidemos, the very man who had caused Kephisodotos so 47 much trouble. Amidst such a forensic f r e e - f o r - a l l , one i s j u s t i f i e d in hesi t a t i n g to assume that Aristophon prosecuted Leosthenes. There i s another very good reason f o r r e j e c t i n g t h i s circumstantial evidence f o r a r e l a t i o n -ship between Khares (or Autokles) and Aristophon at t h i s early date. The ent i r e reconstruction depends on the assumption that Aristophon influenced the decision to replace Leosthenes with Khares. It i s taken f o r granted that the proposer of a decree (and Leosthenes must have been deposed by some decree before he was t r i e d ) was a p o l i t i c a l a l l y of the strategos a c t u a l l y sent out to enforce the decree.. In. f a c t , t h i s assumption i s untested, and i s unprovable. No systematic attempt to test t h i s assumption's v a l i d i t y has been made to date, nor can one be made here. Nevertheless, some preliminary observations to such a study w i l l be appended to the conclusion following chapter f i v e . They strongly suggest that the se l e c t i o n of a strategos was not made at the same time as the proposal of the decree, that the evidence independently corroborat-ing p o l i t i c a l a l l i a n c e s between proposers and executors of decrees i s scant, and that there i s a l o g i c a l pattern in the assignment of strategoi to part-i c u l a r tasks, a pattern that indicates mundane, p r a c t i c a l c r i t e r i a weighed more heavily on the decision-makers than did cronyism or nepotism. It i s time now to turn to the d i r e c t evidence f o r an association between Aristophon and Khares. There are p r e c i s e l y three pieces of evidence that ex-p l i c i t l y connect the two men. One i s an anecdote in Polyainos' Strategemata (T18), the second i s a scholion to Aiskhines' speech Against Timarkhos (T19) and the t h i r d i s a passage from Demosthenes' speech On the Khersonesos (T55). The anecdote related by Polyainos concerns a courtroom stratagem used by 48 Iphikrates during his t r i a l for betrayal at the battle of Embata. Iphikrates was being prosecuted on a charge of betrayal; Aristophon and Khares were prosecuting. The accusation was that, being able to destroy the enemy around Embata, he did not engage them in the sea-battle. Seeing the court i n c l i n i n g toward the prosecution, he stopped his speech and somehow revealed his sword to the jurymen. Fearing that he had armed his entire h e t a i r i a and surrounded the court, they a l l voted an acquittal for him. After his success, when someone asked how he had diverted the jurymen, he said, "I would be a fool to be strategos on behalf of the Athenians, but not to be one on my own behalf against them." T18 = Polyainos Strategemata 3.9.29 The anecdote patently refers to the t r i a l which took place as a consequence of the Athenian defeat in 356 and of Khares 1 public accusation of his c o l -leagues. The second piece of evidence for "la s t i n g friendship" between Khares and Aristophon, the scholion to Aiskhines, i s frequently cited as proof that, 49 on some previous occasion, also, Aristophon spoke on Khares 1 behalf. In fac t , almost without doubt i t refers to the very same series of t r i a l s . The scholiast explains Aiskhines 1 reference to Aristophon (1.64) with the follow-ing information: Aristophon i s r i d i c u l e d as speaking on behalf of Khares for pay, and as having escaped 75 indictments for unconstitutional procedure, and as having wreaked many e v i l s on the inhabitants of Keos due to his avarice, when he was strategos there. For this he was i n -dicted; he was convicted on a charge of unconstitutional procedure by Hypereides. Hypereides says that he was nicknamed 'Ardettos' because of his frequently foreswearing himself there. Neverthe-less, Aristophon survived for 100 years less nine months. T19 = Scholion to Aiskhines 1.64 (= Hypereides F40 Jensen) This scholion i s cited as a fragment of a lost speech of Hypereides. It does, indeed, contain a fragment of Hypereides, but the scholion i s a compendium of information about Aristophon that has been gleaned from a col l e c t i o n of the orators. The scholiast has cited three examples from the orators in which 51 Aristophon i s r i d i c u l e d . F i r s t , Aristophon was r i d i c u l e d for having spoken on behalf of Khares for money. This charge against Aristophon and Khares became notorious, because the defendants at the Embata-trials had made i t 52 part of the i r defence. The charge was picked up and repeated by several contemporaries: Isokrates alluded to i t ca. 355 (T24, §50, cf. T23), Aiskhines 53 in 343 (T52 §71) and Theopompos (T62) in perhaps the same context. The scholiast's second example of r i d i c u l e of Aristophon i s already known to us from Aiskhines 3.194, where i t perhaps originated, as well as from the 54 scholia to Demosthenes' speeches. The t h i r d example of r i d i c u l e of Aristophon is obviously from a speech of Hypereides no longer extant. The scholiast provides the occasion for which Hypereides prosecuted Aristophon, his actions 55 as a strategos on Keos, perhaps in 363/2 and ci t e s what i s apparently the, 56 r i d i c u l e or joke that Hypereides actually used in his speech. The scholiast i s certainly mistaken about the results of Hypereides' prosecution, because the orator himself admits in his speech on behalf of Euxenippos (3.28) that 57 Aristophon escaped by only two votes. The scholiast caps his explanation by the observation that Aristophon lived to be ninety-nine years old, a fact 58 that cannot have been known u n t i l after 340. The scholion i s not without value, but with the exception of the 'Ardettos' joke of Hypereides and i t s context, one could have assembled this information today by c u l l i n g the extant c o l l e c t i o n of the orators. Thus, the mention of cooperation between Khares and Aristophon i s not bound to the same context as Hypereides' prosecution 59 of the l a t t e r . The T r i a l s of Timotheos and Iphikrates Thus far i t has been seen that the evidence for cooperation between Khares and Aristophon cannot be pushed back any further than the date of their combined attack on Timotheos, Iphikrates and Menestheus. It may well be that the i r alliance was newly contrived for the s p e c i f i c purpose of neutralizing Timotheos and the others. One can never know with certainty what Khares 1 motives were: self-preservation, mean-spirited r i v a l r y , or gen-uine outrage at being l e f t in the lurch. Likewise, Aristophon i s not known to have had any hostil e encounters with any of the accused. Timotheos and Iphikrates had suffered setbacks that affected the i r pop-60 u l a r i t y . But in what was perhaps an attempt to regain influence they formed an alliance with one another. A threatened lawsuit against Iphikrates was withdrawn by Timotheos and instead he gave his daughter to Menestheus, 61 Iphikrates' son. When the three of them, father, son and father-in-law, sailed out in charge of the reinforcements sent to jo i n Khares, they had an opportunity to recoup a l l the i r lost p o l i t i c a l favor. Instead, their pop-u l a r i t y plummeted when they f a i l e d to engage in the battle of Embata and Khares sent home an o f f i c i a l complaint and accusation. Aristophon took the lead 62 in the prosecution, but he does not seem to have lacked helpers. Confusion about the date and the legal process under which the strategoi were indicted surrounds the t r i a l s . In one t r a d i t i o n the t r i a l s occur during 63 the war, in another after the war, in 354/3. In addition to these divergent t r a d i t i o n s , the sources mention two different processes: an im-peachment procedure {iiaayyeXiaz}, and the magistrate's audit upon termination 64 of o f f i c e (sueCvat,). M.H. Hansen has devoted a monograph to the former process and has studied the t r i a l s of Timotheos, Iphikrates and Menestheus, 65 in p a r t i c u l a r . His conclusions are that the t r i a l s were held during the 66 war and that they were " eloayy&\iai-.in form but zhdvvav in substance". Nevertheless, there i s a t r a d i t i o n of a face-to-face encounter between Khares, on the one hand, and Timotheos and Iphikrates, on the other. The con-text of th i s encounter is vague, but i t involves a physical comparison of the 67 men in an o f f i c i a l or, at least, public setting. It w i l l be worthwhile, then, to review the evidence for the t r i a l s and to determine i f this encount-er i s conn ct d with, or can shed any new l i g h t on the t r i a l s . 75 The evidence for Aristophon as prosecutor i s f u l l , but, although Khares' involvement in the attack i s well documented, his participation in the pros-68 ecution i s not. The sp e c i f i c charge was betrayal (npoSocta); Timotheos was convicted for "betraying the ships for money from the Khians and Rhod-69 ians". The process(es) employed were eisangelia and euthynai. It i s part-i c u l a r l y interesting that this apparent c o n f l i c t in the t r a d i t i o n i s not the result of two different sources; rather both processes are cited by two different authors. 7 0 Diodoros (T16) and Nepos (T17) imply that the t r i a l took place d i r e c t l y after the accusation and r e c a l l of the strategoi and 71 Dionysios (Lysias 12 p480) seems to confirm t h i s . Elsewhere, however, 72 Dionysios (Deinarkhos 13 p668) dates Timotheos' euthynai to 354/3. This date would support the situation represented by Polyainos (T18), in which Khares, too, was present in the prosecution. The results of the t r i a l s are agreed 73 upon, on the whole. Iphikrates and Menestheus were acquitted , but Timotheos was convicted, fined and, when he was unable or unwilling to pay, he ret i r e d 74 to Khalkis and died soon after. There were charges that Khares had induced 75 Aristophon to undertake the prosecutions for money and Khares' actions were brought up in the course of the t r i a l s , since A r i s t o t l e , in a discussion on Metaphor, reports a saying of Iphikrates: "For the path of my words i s through the middle of Khares' deeds" (T22 = A r i s t o t l e Rhetoric 1411b 1-3). 7 6 Evidence for an encounter between Khares and Timotheos and Iphikrates may solve the impasse. It consists of two anecdotes from Plutarch (T20, T21), a passage from Isokrates' Antidosis (T25) and a scholion to Homer's IIiad (Book 13.289-91). In Plutarch's essay on Whether the State Ought to be Governed by an Old Man the following anecdote i s related: ...the rhetores at Athens were stripping down Khares the son of Theokhares against Timotheos and Iphikrates; being robust and at his physical peak, they regarded such a man as worthy to be strategos of the Athenians. But Timotheos said, "By the gods, no. But, rather, such a man i s f i t to carry the bed of the strategos. The strategos must be one who 'looks both forward and behind and by no misfortune 76 is disturbed with respect to considerations concerning what is advantageous1". T20 = Plutarch Moralia 788D77 In the introduction to his l i f e of Pelopidas, Plutarch provides another vignette: Therefore, Timotheos rightly said once, when Khares was displaying to the Athenians some scars on his body and his shield pierced by a spear-point, "I was quite ashamed because a missile f e l l near me when I was besieging Samos, on the grounds that I was behaving more foolishly than befits the strategos and leader of such a force". T21 = Plutarch Pelopidas 2.3 7 8 These two anecdotes show several common elements. They envision Khares as being in physical proximity to one or both of Timotheos and Iphikrates, they picture Khares displaying his body publicly, and a self-conscious Timotheos asserting qualities that are important for a strategos to have, other than physical fortitude. The mention of rhetores in T20 and 'the Athenians' in T21 makes i t clear that the encounter was public and strongly implies that its. was also o f f i c i a l . The mention of Timotheos and Iphikrates in T20 suggests that its context is the period when these two were a l l i e s , while T21 clearly dates to the period after the capture of Samos in 365. The similarities in the contexts of these two anecdotes suggest that they refer to the same oc-casion. One is immediately reminded of the passage in Isokrates' Antidosis (T25), where the orator defensively admits that Timotheos was not physically robust and castigates the Athenians for preferring to him, as their strategoi, men who "have the most sturdy bodies and who have many times been in mercenary 79 armies". It seems that this encounter was memorable. Under what circumstances might Khares have disrobed in the presence of Timotheos and Iphikrates in order to display his robust and scarred body? One context comes immediately to mind: the election of magistrates. In his 7 7 Coriolanus 14-15 Plutarch narrates an incident at Rome in which a candidate for the consulship was expected to disrobe and display to the electorate wounds acquired in the service of his country. Xenophon relates a convers-ation between an unsuccessful candidate for strategos and Sokrates. The un-lucky candidate complains that the Athenians have preferred someone else, 80 despite his own numerous wounds. Whether this was a genuine and regular election ploy at Athens is uncertain. It is very d i f f i c u l t to find a context in the careers of Khares, Timotheos and Iphikrates when such an encounter might have taken place before the Athenian voters. In Athens a strategos could be re-elected again and again and service abroad would make i t impos-sible to canvass the voters each year. Moreover, there is evidence that 81 physical presence at the elections was rarely, i f ever, required. A second context for such an encounter is at a t r i a l . The orators em-ployed various stratagems in the courtroom, which included bringing in family members, providing supporters with costumes, and demonstrating the proofs of 82 one's service to the city. It seems that this last stratagem was used by Iphikrates himself. A scholiast to Homer's IIiad, Book 13 line 289-291 quotes a passage from Lysias: "Lysias, too, presents Iphikrates saying, 'I have wounds, not of others coming against me, but I myself going against 83 them.'" The scholiast's mention of Lysias makes i t possible to narrow the choice of contexts for this remark to three specific occasions: Iphikrates' attack on Timotheos in 373, his speech against Harmodios in 371, and his de-84 fence against the charge of betrayal during the Social War. The defensive tone of Iphikrates' words and the focus on wounds makes the last context a 85 decided favorite. There is no tradition of speech-making at elections in Athens, yet the context of this encounter produced a number of memorable sayings and was perhaps famous for Iphikrates' 'Lysianic' speech. A courtroom encounter in which Khares and Iphikrates displayed their wounds, while Timotheos self-78 consciously t r i e d to deflect attention from his body, or lack of wounds, w i l l accommodate al 1 the evidence. The obvious context for such an encounter i s the 86 dispute over the battle of Embata. If the context for Khares' encounter with his two colleagues i s the t r i a l over the Embata a f f a i r , then the case for a t r i a l after the war becomes stronger. Euthynai could be postponed for a long time, but i t i s quite un-87 certain i f the same i s true for e i s a n g e l i a i . Cawkwell has argued that the 88 t r i a l s of Timotheos and Iphikrates were do delayed. It may be that the sources are to be taken l i t e r a l l y , and that there were two rounds of t r i a l s , an eisangelia during the war and euthynai a year or so after the war, and that i t was only then, that Timotheos was convicted. In either case, i t does appear that the evidence for h o s t i l i t y between Khares, and Timotheos and Iphikrates, as well as for friendship between him and Aristophon derives from a single, famous p o l i t i c a l c o n f l i c t that was fought out during and just after the Social War. Thus, there i s no proof that Khares had a prior a l l i a n c e with the l a t t e r , or lasting h o s t i l i t y with the * 89 former. Khares and the Imperialists After the time of these famous t r i a l s there i s only one piece of object-ive evidence that can be construed as i n d i r e c t l y l i n k i n g Khares and Aristophon. That evidence has as i t s context the deliberations in the Athenian ekklesia on the r e c a l l of Diopeithes, Athens' strategos in the Khersonesos, in the early part of 341. In the course of the deliberations Demosthenes made a speech arguing against any action that might cause the Athenian force in the Khersonesos to disband. Those who did favor some such action are character-ized by Demosthenes as "spit e f u l persons bent on ruining the state": That such men e x i s t , although t e r r i b l e , i s not so t e r r i b l e as that you, who are s i t t i n g here, are so predisposed that, should anyone 79 come up and say that Diopeithes is the cause of all our i l l s , or Khares or Aristophon or whomever of the citizens someone might name, you would immediately agree and clamor that he spoke rightly. But i f ever someone comes forward and speaks the truth that, "you are talking rubbish, Athenians: the man responsible for all our i l l s and these troubles is Philip. For i f he were keeping quiet, the city would have no problem," you cannot argue that this is not true. T55 = Demosthenes On the Khersonesos 8.30-1 Demosthenes implies that in 341 the Athenians were in such a state that they could be persuaded to blame their i l l s on Diopeithes, Khares, Aristophon 90 or anyone else, in his opinion wrongly. Demosthenes does not make i t clear why these three p o l i t i c a l leaders are singled out. He does not say that they have acted in concert, nor does he imply that they necessarily share attitudes or tendencies. They are simply mentioned as hypothetically vulnerable to 91 censure in 341 B.C. A cause for this vulnerability can be found. Aside from the present passage, the sources do not connect Diopeithes 92 with Khares, Aristophon or Demosthenes, nor is Aristophon known to be connected in any way with Demosthenes. These four pol i t i c a l leaders had in common the fact that they had all been the victims of attack within the past four years, perhaps from the same quarter. The intense pol i t i c a l strug-gle that took place in the wake of the Peace of Philokrates is properly the subject of the following chapter. At this point the concern is with demon-strating that, in 341, Khares was no more associated with Aristophon than was Demosthenes or Diopeithes, so one need only touch on the points of the strug-gle pertinent to them. In the scramble to distance themselves from the peace, its supporters blamed one another or the strategoi. In 343 Aiskhines publicly blamed Khares 93 (T52) as part of his defence. He was supported by Euboulos. Demosthenes defended Khares (T54) and attacked Euboulos in the course of his prosecution 94 of Aiskhines. Euboulos had clashed with Aristophon in the past and the two were a t odds a f t e r t h e peace (and pe rhaps o v e r i t ) . Now, i n 3 4 1 , D i o p e i t h e s came under a t t a c k and was d e f e n d e d by Demosthenes. From what q u a r t e r t h i s a t t a c k came i s n o t known, a l t h o u g h Demosthenes and A i s k h i n e s s t r u g g l e d a g a i n s t 96 one a n o t h e r i n t h e f o l l o w i n g y e a r and f o r t h e n e x t d e c a d e . I t seems, t h e n , t h a t Demosthenes and h i s p o l i c i e s had enemies common t o K h a r e s , A r i s t o p h o n , and D i o p e i t h e s . T h a t t h e s e men p r e s e n t e d a common f r o n t t o such a t t a c k s , one c a n n o t s a y . I n h i s h y p o t h e t i c a l l i s t (T55) o f p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r s who m i g h t be v u l n -e r a b l e t o c e n s u r e i n 3 4 1 , Demosthenes d i d n o t a s s o c i a t e t h o s e l e a d e r s w i t h one a n o t h e r i n any c o n c r e t e way. N e v e r t h e l e s s , some modern s c h o l a r s a rgue t h a t A r i s t o p h o n , Khares and p e r h a p s o t h e r s s h o u l d be g rouped t o g e t h e r on t h e b a s i s o f s h a r e d a t t i t u d e s and p o l i c i e s . T h i s p o l i t i c a l t e n d e n c y , i t i s m a i n t a i n e d , r e p r e s e n t s " t h e i m p e r i a l i s t s " , who f o u g h t t h e a l l i e s , r e s i s t e d t h e peace and were f o r p r e s e r v i n g A t h e n i a n hegemony. A g a i n s t t h i s g roup o f i m p e r i a l i s t s were r a n g e d t h e ' m o d e r a t e s ' , " t h o s e w h o . . . opposed e x t r e m e d e m o c r a c y , i m p e r i a l 97 98 ism o r s i m p l y w a r " and f a v o r e d f i n a n c i a l r e t r e n c h m e n t . T h i s modera te o p p o s i t i o n i n c l u d e d E u b o u l o s , A i s k h i n e s , P h o k i o n , t h e i r f r i e n d s and a s s o c i a t e s J . de R o m i l l y s t r i v e s t o d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t t h i s m o d e r a t e o p p o s i t i o n ' s i d e a l s were e x p r e s s e d by A i s k h i n e s , Xenophon and I s o k r a t e s and s h a r e d by Theopompos. She n o t e s t h a t t h e s e men ( e x c e p t f o r t h e l a s t ) were somehow a l l c o n n e c t e d w i t h Eubou los and t h a t t h e y s h a r e d m o r a l i z i n g t e n d e n c i e s and espoused common t h e m e s : t o m i n i m i z e e x p e n d i t u r e s , d e p l o r e t h e use o f m e r c e n a r i e s , d e s i r e peace 99 and g i v e up i m p e r i a l i s m . A t l e a s t two o f t h e s e a u t h o r s c o n t r a s t e d Khares most u n f a v o r a b l y w i t h T i m o t h e o s ( T 2 5 , T 5 2 ) . A g a i n s t t h e s e v i e w s i t has r e c e n t l y been a rgued t h a t t h e i m p u l s e o f t h e a l l i e s t o r e v o l t had l e s s t o do w i t h A t h e n i a n a g g r e s s i o n t h a n w i t h l o c a l am-b i t i o n s and f o r e i g n i n t e r f e r e n c e . ^ 0 0 I t has a l s o been a rgued t h a t t h e e v i -dence on w h i c h i s based t h e n o t i o n t h a t Eubou los and A r i s t o p h o n s t o o d f o r 101 peace and w a r , r e s p e c t i v e l y , i s n o t s a t i s f a c t o r y . M o r e o v e r , w h i l e i t does seem certain that Euboulos devoted much attention to fi n a n c i a l matters, one cannot be confident that Aristophon opposed such measures. Most of Aristophon 1s fin a n c i a l p o l i c i e s must be viewed in the context of the Social War, when there may have been something l i k e a national consensus to finance the war by any means available. A comparison of the Social War a c t i v i t i e s of other Athenians, Androtion for example, should be a caution against construing fund-raising 102 a c t i v i t i e s at that time as indications of p o l i t i c a l attitude. What Khares' attitude was i s not known. In general, his actions are indistinguishable from those of other strategoi with respect to war, peace and imperialism. It i s d i f f i c u l t to see how Khabrias, Iphikrates and Timotheos, "who brought into the synedrion 75 c i t i e s " (T52), were any less 'imperial-103 i s t i c ' than Khares was. F i n a l l y , i t i s quite extraordinary that during the 'time of Euboulos', who allegedly pursued a p a c i f i c p o l i c y , the Athenians sent out substantial expeditions to Thrace, Thessaly and against Sestos ( a l l led by Khares), and another very large expedition to Thermopylai, which was certa i n l y approved by 104 the associates of Euboulos. Furthermore, in 349 and 348 Athens committed nearly 8,500 men and over f i f t y ships to the defence of Olynthos, while sup-porting a serious ef f o r t in Euboia at the same time. Khares commanded twice 105 in these years. It i s quite clear that his popularity transcended the r i s e and decline of the ci t y ' s most i n f l u e n t i a l rhetores, men l i k e K a l l i s t r a t o s , Aristophon, Euboulos and Demosthenes. Far from being an adjunct to one or the other of these p o l i t i c a l groups, he was probably an independent p o l i t i c a l force in his own rig h t . At any rate, his success did not depend on them. CHAPTER FOUR: KHARES AND DEMOSTHENES Demosthenes It has been argued in the previous chapter that Khares 1 cooperation with Aristophon was short-lived and was probably an ad hoc arrangement for the purpose of neutralizing Timotheos and Iphikrates. The evidence for Khares 1 association with Demosthenes is much f u l l e r , and i t seems to indicate a f a i r l y lengthy friendship. Demosthenes was an advocate of aid to Olynthos and Khares was one of those eventually selected to lead the Athenian ef f o r t in that region. Some ancient writers believed that Demosthenes was c h i e f l y responsible for the three r e l i e f expeditions that sailed to Olynthos 1 rescue. Demosthenes defended Khares by name in 343 (T54), and again in 341 he spoke defensively about Khares, although in a general, hypothetical context (T55). In the f i n a l war with Macedon, which Demosthenes strongly supported, Khares played an important part. Several sources regarded him as one of "those 3 around Demosthenes". Hypereides, a longtime a l l y of Demosthenes was euvocoq 4 towards Khares, probably around 331, and Demosthenes himself remembered 5 Khares with nostalgia after his death. Plutarch seems to have been especially impressed by the relationship between the two men and mentions i t on several occasions: In both of them, then, (sc. Demosthenes and Cicero) there existed equally the power of leading the people and being a statesman, so that even those who had authority over arms and armies had need of them: Khares, Diopeithes, and Leosthenes of Demosthenes, while of Cicero, Pompeius and the young Caesar... T56 = Plutarch Cicero 52(3).1 Those, then, t r a v e l l i n g different roads help one another not at a l l , but those following different kinds of liv e s turn away envy and, rather, work together with one another as Demosthenes and Khares, and again Aiskhines and Euboulos, and Hypereides and Leosthenes; some speaking among the people and producing decrees while others were strategoi and men of deeds. T57 = Plutarch Moralia ("de fraterno amore") 486D Seeing that the men who at that time busied themselves with the commonwealth had divided among themselves as though by l o t the m i l i t a r y and the speaker's platform, the l a t t e r speaking among the people and producing decrees only, of which Euboulos was one as well as Aristophon, Demosthenes, Lykourgos and Hypereides- too, while Diopeithes and Menestheus and Leosthenes and Khares advanced themselves by being strategoi and fighti n g wars... T58 = Plutarch Phokion 7.37 For Plutarch as well as other later writers Demosthenes and Khares were g p o l i t i c a l associates. It w i l l be the business of this chapter to examine this association in order to determine i t s inception, extent and possible influence on Athenian foreign policy. Evidence of Khares' friendship and h o s t i l i t y or r i v a l r y with other prominent Athenians in this period w i l l also be investigated. Demosthenes' early career i s well documented and illuminated by both ancient and modern scholars and there does not seem to be any evidence that i t i s especially relevant to the career of Khares, at least u n t i l he began 9 to address the people of Athens in his own r i g h t . This i s partly because much of the evidence for this early period comes from speeches written to be 10 delivered by others. It i s not at a l l clear where Demosthenes, himself, stood in terms of p o l i t i c s during these early years, but the common opinion is that he sided with Euboulos and opposed Aristophon, and then late r became 11 an opponent of Euboulos. However this may be, i t i s rather clear that by 351 Demosthenes was a proponent of a 'forward' foreign policy and had per-12 haps already run afoul of Euboulos and his associates. This i s about the time when the f i r s t awareness of the strategos Khares as a p o l i t i c a l leader 13 may be discerned in the speeches of Demosthenes. 8 4 Demosthenes, Khares and Olynthos Ph i l i p ' s decisive victory at the battle of the Krokos Fields caused many a Greek to take notice of him. The Athenians showed that they took him seriously when they sent Nausikles to Thermopylai with over 5,000 troops. The young Demosthenes found in P h i l i p both a menace against whom his country-14 men needed alerting and an issue on which to erect his own p o l i t i c a l career. From the year 351 u n t i l the end of his career, his chief p o l i t i c a l concern was r e s i s t i n g the Macedonians. It i s precisely at the beginning of th i s period ( p a r t i c u l a r l y 351-349/8) that allusions to the strategos Khares began to find t h e i r way into the speeches of the orator; at least this i s the 15 opinion of several ancient writers. 16 In his F i r s t P h i l i p p i c (4), delivered in the early part of 351, Demosthenes made a proposal for prosecuting the war with Macedon. Besides putting forth a concrete plan of action, the orator spent much of his ef f o r t berating his countrymen both with respect to their w i l l and to the methods they had employed. One of the features of the contemporary system he de-cried, and one which was c l e a r l y a controversial subject, was the employment 17 of mercenary soldiers. The Athenians were relying heavily on mercenaries in t h e i r campaigns abroad and the custom of requiring the strategos to pro-vide pay from plunder for the i r maintenance had led to abuses and embarrass-18 ments. In the course of his arguments for requiring that one quarter of the proposed force be citizen-troops, Demosthenes made several topical allusions to the existing system. Various readers have imagined them to be references to i d e n t i f i a b l e events and persons. In p a r t i c u l a r , there have 19 been suggestions that Khares i s being referred to. Demosthenes proposed a standing force be established in these words: ...I say, Athenians, that you should ready some force that w i l l continuously make war and harm him. Not for me a myriad or even two of mercenaries nor these 'epistolary' forces but rather one (com-8 5 posed of men) of the c i t y and one that w i l l obey and follow that man or men you elect as strategoi, however obscure they may be. I also bid you to provide maintenance for this force. Demosthenes 4.19 Demosthenes went on to propose the size and composition of his force and as evidence of the need for a mixed army of mercenaries and c i t i z e n s he said t h i s : ...I hear that once before, the c i t y maintained a mercenary force in Korinth which Polystratos led and also Iphikrates, Khabrias and some others and that you yourselves served alongside them. I also know from hearing i t , that these mercenaries, marshalled together with you, defeated the Lakedaimonians, and so did you with them. But ever since mercenary forces have campaigned for you on th e i r own, they defeat friends and a l l i e s , while our enemies have become greater. They take one look at the c i t y ' s war and off they s a i l to Artabazos and wherever else and the strategos, nat-u r a l l y , follows, for he cannot command, i f he does not pay them. Demosthenes 4.24 = T28 The reference to Artabazos fs-.a clear allusion to Khares' campaign in Asia 20 in 355. Nevertheless, the orator was careful to exonerate the anonymous strategos and throughout the speech he avoided remarks which might be con-strued as offensive to the m i l i t a r y magistrates; he placed the blame on 21 the home administration of the m i l i t a r y . There is l i t t l e room for doubt to whom the h i s t o r i c a l exemplum refers, but i t i s not so clear what the orator's attitude towards the strategos was. Demosthenes caref u l l y avoided making per-22 sonal slurs in these early symbouleutic speeches delivered by himself. 23 Rather, he r a i l e d against the demos at large. In short, i t appears that, while Demosthenes was aware of the past and recent history of his c i t y and Khares' role in i t , he revealed l i t t l e about his personal attitudes towards him or any of the magistrates. Instead of casting blame, he implied he was w i l l i n g to co-operate with them to improve Athens' a b i l i t y to defend her inter-ests. Further attempts to read hidden allusions to p o l i t i c a l leaders into this 24 speech or others of the period prior to the Olynthian c r i s i s are highly spec-ulative. In 351 Demosthenes had made a reference to Athens' experiences in the Social War. In contrasting the successes of an e a r l i e r generation which employed mixed armies of cit i z e n s and mercenaries with the f a i l u r e s of his own generation with purely mercenary forces, the orator cited as an example the army that "sailed away to Artabazos" and the strategos who followed i t because he could not command, i f he could not pay., This allusion was understood by -the orator's audience and by readers of a later generation as referring to Khares' campaign into Asia Minor in 356/5, and few today would disagree. Whether the allusion was meant as c r i t i c i s m of the strategos, an apology for him, or simply as an h i s t o r i c a l exemplum i s quite debatable. That i t implies a friendship between the orator and the strategos i s very dubious. When, in 349, P h i l i p threatened Olynthos and that c i t y asked Athens for an al l i a n c e , Demosthenes added his voice to those advising support for the new and endangered a l l y . Three speeches made by Demosthenes, the Olynthiacs, are preserved. In them he proposed that Athens commit m i l i t a r y resources to the Olynthians' struggle against the Macedonians. We have i t on good authority that Athens sent three separate forces to the beleaguered c i t y . The coincidence of the three preserved speeches and the l i k e number of r e l i e f expeditions has lured many a scholar, ancient and modern, into making a connection between them. This theory of a connection between the speeches and the r e l i e f forces needs examining, not the least because of the common assumption that a p o l i t i c a l relationship must exist between the pro-poser and executor of decrees in democratic Athens. Dionysios, probably Philokhoros, and others believed that Demosthenes persuaded the Athenians to send the r e l i e f expeditions to Olynthos, one 26 speech for each force. A majority of Athenians obviously did favor such a policy, but i t i s not known who was actually recorded as the of-f i c i a l proponent of any of the expeditions. To be sure, Demosthenes spoke in favor of such a policy, but others did so as well. There are, however, some very good reasons for doubting that the three Olynthiacs in fact corresponded to the three debates on the expeditions, or that any of Demosthenes' proposals was implemented, at least in the form in which i t i s presented in the extant speeches. The f i r s t reason has to do with the chronology of the speeches. It can be determined with a f a i r degree of certainty when the f i r s t and t h i r d expeditions were sent out, and i t i s also known that Athens' invasion of Euboia took place between them. Demosthenes' utter silence about Euboia in a l l three speeches strongly suggests that they were delivered before the Athenians intervened there, p a r t i c u l a r l y since Demosthenes claimed 28 later that he did speak against the Euboian expedition. Thus, i t i s un-l i k e l y that any one of the Olynthiacs inspired the t h i r d r e l i e f expedition. Another reason for doubting that each speech inspired an expedition is that Demosthenes' sp e c i f i c proposals were not adopted. In Olynthiac 1 he urged that two separate forces be sent: one to harass P h i l i p ' s coast-l i n e and another to help the Olynthians d i r e c t l y (1.17-18). As far as i t i s known, this was not done. Demosthenes also repeatedly advised that c i t i z e n -29 forces be sent out to Olynthos. This was not done u n t i l the t h i r d force was sent, when i t had been s p e c i f i c a l l y requested by the Olynthians themselves (T41). But the fact remains that Demosthenes did speak on behalf of sending aid to Olynthos. Perhaps his orations carried the day for one or more of the expeditions, or they may have cleared the way for some more prominent 30 statesman to succeed in carrying a motion for aid. Even i f one grants this there i s s t i l l no reason to imagine that Demosthenes or any other rhetor exer cised undue influence in deciding which men to send out as commanders of the r e l i e f forces. In fact, that decision was almost certainly made on the basis of existing m i l i t a r y circumstances, as Philokhoros makes clear. His words (T41) leave no doubt that both Khares and Kharidemos were already on duty: "They (sc. the Athenians) sent as help two thousand peltasts and thirty triremes, the ones with Khares and eight which they manned in addition... they sent Kharidemos, strategos in the Hellespont, who had eighteen triremes, 4,000 peltasts and 150 cavalrymen." Khares and Kharidemos were not chosen because the promoters of the p o l i c y o f aiding Olynthos preferred them, or were their friends and a l l i e s . They were not selected over Phokion, Molossos and Hegesileos because they favored a policy of fighting far from Athens, while 31 the latter favored fighting in Euboia. They were sent because they com-manded already mobilized forces; they were probably in the general vicinity; they were familiar with Thrace and Thracian dynasts who might be potential a l l i e s ; they were familiar with the enemy; and they commanded forces composed of mercenary peltasts, the sort of troops that the Athenians were willing to commit at the time. Plutarch's glorification of Phokion makes i t hard for some to believe that the Athenians preferred Kharidemos and Khares to their "ablest" general, but, over and above the practical considerations listed above, i t must be noted that Phokion's career was singularly undistinguished until his campaign on Euboia, and he may also have been inexperienced with the type of troops sent 32 to the Olynthians. In the event, the Athenian decision was not i l l -considered, since, when the trouble on Euboia broke out, a citizen army could be easily and quickly transported across the Hollows of Euboia and, at least 33 while under the command of the competent Phokion, was successful. The fact that Demosthenes or others proposed aid to Olynthos cannot be taken, of i t -self, as proof of a relationship between them and the strategoi who were 34 eventually sent to do the job. Yet, there are several possible allusions to Khares in the Olynthiacs that have led some to consider the two men were associated at the time Demosthenes delivered the speeches. These allusions deserve to be looked at in detail. 89 In his Second Olynthiac Demosthenes t r i e d to persuade his fellow citizens that aiding Olynthos was in their own interest, and that they should serve on the campaign in person. At one point he said: I am amazed at this and in addition to t h i s , that none of you, Athenians, i s able to calculate how long you have been at war with P h i l i p and what you have been doing while this time has gone by. For, to be sure, you know t h i s , that while you are delaying, hoping some others w i l l act, blaming one another, s i t t i n g in judgement, hoping again, that i s , doing nearly the same things that you are now doing, the entire time has passed. Demosthenes 2.25 The scholiast offers these explanations of the passage: "Some others": That i s , the mercenaries and Khares and Kharidemos. " S i t t i n g in judgement": This refers to Khares. In order that he may not seem to apologize on his behalf, he conceals the suspicion by generality. Sending after the strategoi, they used to put them on t r i a l . T59 = Scholia to Demosthenes 2.25 (173, 175 D i l t s ) A few paragraphs further on the orator said: Why do you think, Athenians, that a l l the strategoi you send out to this war find private wars? — i f i t i s necessary to speak the truth even about the strategoi. Because here, the prizes for which the war i s fought are yours ( i f Amphipolis i s taken you w i l l gain immediately) but the p e r i l s are theirs and there i s no pay. But there the p e r i l s are less and the spoils belong to the leaders and the soldiers; Lampsakos, Sigeion and the ships which they plunder. Demosthenes 2.28 On this passage the scholiast remarks: "Private (wars)": By "private" he means ones which they, themselves, wage priv a t e l y , apart from the c i t y . He i s probably hinting at Khares. T31 = Scholion to Demosthenes 2.28 (189 D i l t s ) In the Third Olynthiac Demosthenes contrasted the successes of Athens under A r i s t e i d e s and M i l t i a d e s w i t h t h e c o n t e m p o r a r y f a i l u r e s under t h e p r e -35 s e n t (anonymous) l e a d e r s . I n t h e o l d d a y s , he s a y s , t h e demos was m a s t e r o f p o l i c y and d i s p e n s e d honors t o i t s l e a d e r s b u t now, when o£ no\uTeu6(j.evoL c o n t r o l e v e r y t h i n g , t h e demos i s c o n t e n t " i f t h e y hand o v e r some o f t h e T h e o r i c Monies o r p u t on a B o e d r o m i a . And what i s most man ly o f a l l i s t h a t you add t h a n k s f o r what i s y o u r o w n . " ( 3 . 3 1 ) The s c h o l i a s t e x p l a i n e d t h i s passage by n o t i n g t h a t Boedromia ( o r t h e a l t e r n a t e r e a d i n g b o T d i a ) a l l u d e d t o t h e f a c t t h a t Khares s e n t home a d r o v e o f c a t t l e f r o m t h e s p o i l s o f Lampsakos and S i g e i o n and t h a t t h e c a t t l e were d i s t r i b u t e d among t h e t r i b e s a t a c e l e b r a t i o n o f t h e B o e d r o m i a , f o r w h i c h b e n e f i c e n c e Khares was c r o w n e d . A l i t t l e l a t e r i n t h e speech Demosthenes u rged t h e A t h e n i a n s t o s e r v e i n p e r s o n : There i s no way t h a t I have s a i d t h a t what b e l o n g s t o t h o s e who a c t o u g h t t o be d i s t r i b u t e d t o t h o s e who do n o t h i n g , nor t h a t we o u g h t t o be i n a c t i v e , i d l e and h e l p l e s s , because we l e a r n t h a t t h e m e r c e n a r i e s o f s o - a n d - s o a re v i c t o r i o u s . For t h i s i s happen ing now. And I d o n ' t c e n s u r e one who does what i s n e c e s s a r y on b e h a l f o f y o u , b u t r a t h e r , I t h i n k t h a t you s h o u l d d o , on b e h a l f o f y o u r -s e l v e s , t h e s e t h i n g s f o r w h i c h you honor o t h e r s . . . " Demosthenes 3 . 3 5 - 6 The s c h o l i a s t e x p l a i n s : "Of s o - a n d - s o " : Tha t i s , t h o s e o f K h a r e s . " I do n o t c e n s u r e " : S i n c e he c a l u m n i a t e d t h e m e r c e n a r y f o r c e above . F o r , Khares used a m e r c e n a r y f o r c e . I t i s as i f he were s a y i n g " I p r a i s e K h a r e s , who a lways l a b o r s , even w i t h m e r c e n a r i e s , b u t i n f a c t , I p r e f e r s o l d i e r s f r o m t h e c i t y . " T60 = S c h o l i a t o Demosthenes 3 . 3 5 - 6 ( 1 6 5 , 166 D i I t s ) I t must be a d m i t t e d t h a t Demosthenes d i d , i n d e e d , r e f e r t o e v e n t s i n w h i c h Khares was a p a r t i c i p a n t , b u t t h i s does n o t n e c e s s a r i l y i m p l y any e x -p l i c i t r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e two men. The s c h o l i a s t ' s guess a t 2 . 2 5 may or may not be r i g h t . Nevertheless Demosthenes was c e r t a i n l y r e f e r r i n g to Khares 1 campaign in Asia a few paragraphs l a t e r when he mentioned Lampsakos and Sigeion. The a l l u s i o n , however, i s more in the nature of 'current events which are c i t e d to demonstrate the weaknesses of current Athenian m i l i t a r y administration. Again in the Third Olynthiac (§31) the s c h o l i a s t f a c i l e l y explains two alternate readings with a s l i g h t v a r i a t i o n on the d e t a i l s of Khares' beneficence. There i s some reason to believe that a p a r t i c u l a r l y sumptuous Boedromia was held before the time of t h i s speech and one of the oo s c h o l i a s t ' s explanations may be more or less correct. Even i f t h i s i s so, i t implies nothing about a supposed friendship or enmity between the orator and the strategos, since such an a l l u s i o n i s no more than a topos designed to 39 appeal to the demos. F i n a l l y , at the end of the speech Demosthenes retreat ed somewhat from his denunciations of the m i l i t a r y system, by excusing those who t o i l on behalf of the c i t y . The s c h o l i a s t c l e a r l y believed that the orator was avoiding the censure of a p a r t i c u l a r strategos, Khares. Again, even i f t h i s i s so (and i t need not be since most Athenian campaigns f a r from home in t h i s period were waged by mercenary f o r c e s ) , i t t e l l s no more than that t h i s s t i l l f a i r l y i n s i g n i f i c a n t rhetor provided himself with a l i t t l e insurance in the prospect of the day when he would be one of O L no\LTeo6u,svoi, and would need the goodwill of those m i l i t a r y men w i l l i n g to f i g h t the c i t y ' s enemies. In sum there i s no firm basis for hypothesizing a friendship between the very prominent strategos and the f a i r l y minor rhetor at t h i s time. Demosthenes refers to current events as proofs of the correctness of his views. He objects to the present m i l i t a r y administration and points out i t s weaknesses, while at the same time avoiding remarks which might irrevocably 4 0 offend important and i n f l u e n t i a l m i l i t a r y magistrates. 92 Khares and Kephisophon Paianieus Before moving on to a discussion of Khares' involvement in the Peace of Philokrates and Aiskhines' t r i a l for parapresbeia, the most unequivocal p o l i t i c a l relationship between Khares and another prominent Athenian ought to be considered. In 343 Aiskhines (T52) named as one of the friends and companions of Khares, Kephisophon Paianieus. If Aiskhines' characterization of the i r relationship was accurate, they were bound by t i e s stronger than mere p o l i t i c a l expediency and s e l f - i n t e r e s t . This i s the only known case of a man «. 41 who was a <pt\oq xoa £.Ta£poq of Khares. Kephisophon represents the t h i r d generation of a family honored with public o f f i c e under the restored democracy. His father was grammateus of the boule when the decree of Aristoteles proclaimed the formation of the second 42 Athenian League in 378/7. His grandfather, Kephisophon, was also grammateus of the boule in 403/2 and proposed a decree on behalf of the Samians in that 43 year. He was also tamias of the goddess in 398/7 and had married into a family which was both wealthy and p a r t i c u l a r l y distinguished by m i l i t a r y 44 o f f i c e in the period of the fifth-century "empire". Thus,Kephisophon carried on a family t r a d i t i o n of commitment to the democracy and involvement 45 in the c i t y ' s a f f a i r s . Kephisophon's stance on matters of policy i s somewhat confused by the existence of an equally prominent and distinguished strategos, Kephisophon 46 Aphidnaios. It appears that he was especially active in the ekklesia in the 340s. None of the in s c r i p t i o n a l evidence about him i s very revealing, but his involvement in the Peace of Philokrates, and perhaps in the wrangles 47 which followed i t , i s quite in t r i g u i n g . Before the negotiations leading up to the Peace next to nothing i s known 48 about Kephisophon. His involvement in Athenian p o l i t i c s and diplomacy i s 9 3 known mainly from allusions to him in two speeches of Demosthenes. When, in 330, Demosthenes was defending his own role in the making of the peace, he claimed that the supporters of Philokrates 1 proposal were Euboulos and Kephisophon (18.21). Later in the speech he again defended himself against the charges (of Aiskhines, 3.62-82) that he had proposed decrees that sup-; ported Philokrates and his peace-initiatives, and that, l a t e r , he had quibbled about the Athenian strongholds in Thrace. Demosthenes asserted, "and yet you said that my speaking about these things threw us into enmity, while the decrees concerned with these places were r e a l l y Euboulos' and Aristophon's and Diopeithes 1, not mine" (18.70). Just a l i t t l e later in the same speech Demos-thenes provided a kaleidoscopic review of Athenian relations with P h i l i p in the course of which he produced a co l l e c t i o n of decrees to demonstrate that he was not the one responsible for them: "This decree was moved by Euboulos, not I, and the next by Aristophon, then Hegesippos, then Aristophon again, then Philokrates, then Kephisophon, then them a l l . But I have nothing to do with these. Read them." (18.75). Unfortunately, there i s no way to know the pre-cise contents of the decrees, their true chronology, or i f the p o l i c i e s pro-posed were even vaguely similar to one another. If one were to take Demos-thenes at his word, then there was quite a consensus regarding the need for a cessation of h o s t i l i t i e s with Macedon, and consequently one should exer-cise caution when trying to assign leaders to p o l i t i c a l groups on such bases. After the f a l l of Olynthos i t no doubt seemed wise to many Athenians to consider peace, and one should not be surprised i f a l l the p o l i t i c a l lead-ers mentioned in Demosthenes 18.70,75 did, at some point or another, support negotiations with Macedon. The fact that some may have later opposed the 49 / f i n a l document, or denounced the peace (especially after P h i l i p ended the 50 Sacred War), does not prove that they never supported diplomatic contacts and negotiations. The situation in 346 became very f l u i d with much sh i f t i n g and dodging among Athenian p o l i t i c a l leaders, especially those with a desire 94 51 to survive. There i s no good reason to assign Kephisophon, the friend of 52 Khares, to the supporters of Euboulos. Reluctant support for a peace was probably widespread and may have made for strange bedfellows. In any case, since there is no good reason to believe that Khares and Demosthenes were associates at the time, or that Khares and Euboulos were yet 53 enemies, and l i t t l e reason to think that the strategos and Aristophon were s t i l l working closely together, one i s not permitted to infer much about Khares 1 attitude from any of these relationships. It may be noted that the friend and companion of the "im p e r i a l i s t " Khares was one of those who rec-ognized the need for a cessation of h o s t i l i t i e s with Macedon, and that he was probably a p o l i t i c a l leader of roughly equal stature with Aristophon, Euboulos, Philokrates and Hegesippos. It i s worth adding that, by the time of Aiskhines' t r i a l in 343, Euboulos and Kephisophon were at odds, since the former had prosecuted the l a t t e r at 54 some point before the t r i a l on a charge of mishandling sacred monies. This may have been due to the f a l l o u t from the peace. In any event, at that time Aiskhines was being supported by Euboulos and Phokion, and was also, no doubt, hostile to Khares and Kephisophon. Khares and the T r i a l of Aiskhines Once P h i l i p penetrated Thermopylai in the summer of 346, the Athenians realized that they had been hoodwinked and that the peace of Philokrates was a hindrance and not a help in thei r struggle against P h i l i p . There began to be recriminations against those considered most responsible for the peace and there was l i k e l y a rather vigorous scramble, on the part of those who feared they might be blamed, to distance themselves from the peace and imp-l i c a t e others who had been instrumental in making i t . In pa r t i c u l a r , Philo-55 krates himself and Aiskhines were the targets of, at the least, Demosthenes. At the same time there was an attempt to f o i s t the blame for the mess onto 9 5 56 some of the strategoi. Proxenos Aphidnaios, who was strategos with a f l e e t off Euboia in 346, was prosecuted and apparently condemned before the time 57 of Aiskhines 1 t r i a l in 343. By the time of Aiskhines 1 t r i a l , Khares' rol e , too, was called into question. It was perhaps in an atmosphere similar to this that he had some d i f f i c u l t i e s at his euthynai following the siege of Olynthos: And Kephisodotos, when Khares was hastening to render his euthynai for the Olynthian War, was angry, saying that he was trying to render his euthynai while holding the demos in a chokehold. T45 - A r i s t o t l e Rhetoric 1411a 6-9 (3.10) Whether or not this incident was in some way a precursor of the situation following the Peace of Philokrates, or simply r e f l e c t s an unrelated, or private 58 feud, i s unknown. At any rate there was most cert a i n l y an attempt in 343 to blame the conditions of the peace on the conduct of the war by Khares. When Aiskhines was brought to t r i a l to account for his part in the making of the Peace of Philokrates one of his lines of defence was to show that Athens' poor m i l i t a r y showing in the war against P h i l i p necessitated the kind of terms which had been accepted. In particular he charged that Khares' mishandling of the war was largely to blame in these words: (70) But I wish to remind you also of the circumstances under which you took counsel. For we made a beginning of the war for Amphipolis, but i t happened that our strategos in the war lost seventy-five a l l i e d c i t i e s which Timotheos the son of Konon ac-quired and introduced into the synedrion. (You see, I prefer to speak right out and to save myself by speaking at the same time fre e l y and t r u t h f u l l y ; i f you feel otherwise, do what you l i k e with me, for I would not r e s t r i c t myself).. (71) Taking one hundred and f i f -ty triremes from their sheds he did not bring them back, and the accusers of Khares always point this out to you in court; he also spent f i f t e e n hundred talents not on the soldiers but upon the fraudulence of the leaders, runaways l i k e Deiares and Deipyros and Polyphontes gathered together from a l l Hellas (and this i s apart from the mercenaries around the speaker's platform and the ekklesia), who while they were exacting from the poor islanders s i x t y talents each year as syntaxeis kept on plundering the Hellenes and their boats from the open sea. (72) But instead of the hegemony of the Hellenes and the i r respect our c i t y was defiled with the reputation of Mouse-island and her pirates while P h i l i p , based in Macedonia, contested with us no longer for Amphipolis but now for Lemnos, Imbros and Skyros, our own possessions. Our c i t i z e n s were abandoning the Khersonesos, which i s agreed to be Athenian t e r r i t o r y . You were compelled to c a l l special sessions of the ekklesia in fear and up-roar, more even than are required by law. (73) Our a f f a i r s were so perilous and precarious that Kephisophon Paianieus, one of the friends and companions of Khares, was compelled to draft a decree that Antiokhos, who was in charge of the dispatch boats, should s a i l out as quickly as possible and seek out the strategos, who had been put in command of our force, and, i f he should find him anywhere, he should say that the demos of the Athenians was surprised to learn that P h i l i p was marching on the Khersonesos, an Athenian posses-sion, while the Athenians did not know the whereabouts of the strategos or his force which they had sent out. And that I speak the truth hear the decree, and remember the war and blame not the ambassadors for the peace, but the leaders of our arms. T52 = Aiskhines (On the Embassy) 2.70-3 Whatever the truth of Aiskhines' claims i t i s quite clear that he i s tr y -ing to arouse some sentiment or resentment of the demos against the m i l i t a r y leaders, and Khares in p a r t i c u l a r . His supporters at the t r i a l were the rhetor 60 Euboulos and two strategoi, Phokion and his own brother Philokhares. In f a c t , Euboulos rose to speak just after Aiskhines and i t seems quite plausible that he, too, made similar remarks about Khares. This t r i a l or the maneuver-ing which took place between 346-343 seems to be the best context in which to place Euboulos' disparaging comments about Khares: Thus, Euboulos in the law courts used against Khares what Platon said against Arkhibios, that "the admission of being wicked had increased in the c i t y " T53 = A r i s t o t l e Rhetoric 1376a (1.15) 6 1 The prosecutor in this t r i a l , Demosthenes, found i t advisable to defend 62 the reputation of Khares : Someone just now came up to me in front of the court t e l l i n g me a very strange thing, that Aiskhines was preparing to accuse Khares and that he hoped in t h i s way and with these topics to deceive you. I do not place too much emphasis upon the fact that, although judged in every way, Khares has been found to be working t r u s t i l y and f a i t h f u l l y on your behalf, as far as i t was in his control, but that i t was through the influence of those who ruin our af-f a i r s for money that he f a i l e d on many occasions. I shall pass this over. For, l e t us suppose that Aiskhines w i l l t e l l the truth about him. It's quite a joke that a fellow of his i l k denounces that strategos. T54 = Demosthenes (On the Embassy) 19.332 This, then, i s the f i r s t real indication that Demosthenes and Khares were supporting one another. Demosthenes could simply have said (as he does) " I f some strategos has wronged you (sc. the demos), i t has nothing to do with the present euthynai. For what strategos lost Halos or the Phokians, Doriskos or Kersobleptes? Who lost Hieron Oros, Thermopylai? Who gave P h i l i p an open path right up to A t t i c a through our friends and a l l i e s ? Who made Koron-eia, Orkhomenos and Euboia hostile? et cetera" (19.334). The fact that he defended the strategos by name indicates that he wanted to contain the damage done to Khares' prestige and that therefore Khares was a person on whom i t was worthwhile to spend some e f f o r t . Whether or not one can say that Khares now belonged to the Demosthenes-group or Demosthenes to the Khares-group i s doubtful. Euboulos had prosecuted Kephisophon by the time of the t r i a l and i t might be better to imagine that the 'group' which Demosthenes represented and that of Khares and Kephisophon found that they had much in common in the p o l i t i c a l climate which followed the peace of Philokrates. There is no evidence that Khares was strategos in the years 346/5 through 344/3, and one might infer that his appearance as khoregos in 344/3 points to his 63 not being strategos in that year. There i s also evidence that Aiskhines was much honored in these very years, since (1) he had successfully prosecut-ed Timarkhos Sphettios, an associate of both Demosthenes and the prominent 64 brothers from Sounion, Hegesippos and Hegesandros, (2) his brother had been elected strategos for 346/5, 345/4, and 344/3 and (3) another brother 65 had served as an ambassador to the king of Persia. Khares may have found i t greatly to his advantage to cooperate with the rapidly r i s i n g Demosthenes. When this alliance took place i s unknown but i t may have been 66 in existence as early as the t r i a l of Timarkhos. 9 8 The relationship or co-operation between Khares and Demosthenes may have continued for some time although one cannot point to any other s p e c i f i c occasion on which they were known to have made common cause. Demosthenes named Khares in his speech On the Khersonesos (T55), but with ref-erence to what, precisely, i s unclear. In the summer of 343 Athens had re-inforced the Khersonesos with kleroukhoi under the strategos Diopeithes and over the course of the next two years considerable f r i c t i o n developed between 67 the Athenians there and the c i t y of Kardia. By 341 P h i l i p had aided his a l l y Kardia with troops and there was a public discussion about r e c a l l i n g the strategos and his force. Demosthenes argued against this course of action. He complained that the home authorities were not providing the proper maintenance, that this was the cause of the alleged abuses of Diopeithes and that sending another strategos would solve nothing (§§24-29). One of his arguments was that malcontents and those trying to ruin the state were behind the attempt to r e c a l l Diopeithes: That such men ex i s t , although t e r r i b l e , i s not so t e r r i b l e as that you, who are s i t t i n g here, are so predisposed that, should anyone come up and say that Diopeithes i s the cause of a l l our i l l s , or Khares or Aristophon or whomever of the cit i z e n s someone might name, you would immediately agree and clamor that he spoke r i g h t l y . But i f ever someone comes forward and speaks the truth that, "you are talking rubbish, Athenians: the man responsible for a l l our i l l s and these troubles i s P h i l i p . For i f he were keeping quiet, the c i t y would have no problem," you cannot argue that this i s not true. T55 = Demosthenes On the Khersonesos 8.30-1 Demosthenes was certa i n l y trying to defend the basic policy that Diopeithes had been ordered to carry out, but he did not make i t clear why Aristophon and Khares might have been s i m i l a r l y vulnerable. A clue may be provided by the notice of the author of the Plutarchean Vitae Decern Oratorum (Mor. 845F), who relates that Demosthenes spoke advising the people to maintain the mer-cenary force on Thasos. It may be that the mercenary force on Thasos was the force that Khares commanded there in 343/2,^ and that Khares had been l i a b l e 99 to the same sort of p o l i t i c a l pressure that Diopeithes came under now. That Aristophon could have been in the same position i s hard to believe, given his advanced age at this late date. Nevertheless, i t may be that attempts to lay the blame for Athenian misfortunes came from the same quarter, and that they were perceived by Demosthenes as attacks on the Athenian policy of main-taining forces in advanced positions. After this there i s no certain point of contact between Khares and Demosthenes. Demosthenes and others may have continued to support the dis-position and i n i t i a t i v e s of their strategoi in the f i e l d , but there i s no 69 clear-cut evidence of anything more than statutory co-operation. That i s , Khares was again strategos in 343/2, and from 341/0-338/7,70 but there i s no evidence that Demosthenes or any other p o l i t i c a l leader made any special arrangements or pleas to procure assignments for him. As strategos in the Khersonesos in 341/0 Khares was the most sensible choice (since he was on the spot) to shadow P h i l i p ' s movements around the Hellespont and to keep Athens informed of the sit u a t i o n . It was perhaps Demosthenes who advised sending re-71 inforcements to Byzantion under Khares' r i v a l , Phokion. In the same way, there were good reasons why Khares was selected to command at Amphissa in the Khaironeia campaign of 339 and 338. No other Athenian strategos had as much combat experience, especially against the Macedonians. Khares had commanded large armies, and was highly experienced 72 with mercenaries (which i s precisely the command that he was given in 339/8). Although i t i s strange that not men l i k e Nausikles, Kephisophon Aphidnaios, Phaidros Sphettios or Phokion himself, but the non-entities Lysikles and Stratokles were given the command of the citizens at Khaironeia, there i s no reason to suspect that "cronyism" played any great role in the selection of the strategoi who commanded in this campaign. Diodoros was probably right when he said that the Athenians put in command the best that they had (T78). After the defeat at Khaironeia i t was s t i l l possible to think of Demos-thenes and Khares as on fr i e n d l y terms, or at least adhering to similar p r i n c i p l e s . Khares was widely believed to have been "one of those around 73 Demosthenes" and in the t h i r d l e t t e r of Demosthenes the orator lamented the loss of the demotikoi, one of whom was Khares (T86). 7 4 Hypereides and Phokion There are no s o l i d grounds for believing that associates of Demosthenes were necessarily associates of Khares, except Hypereides. He gained a con-vi c t i o n against Philokrates a l i t t l e before Demosthenes prosecuted 75 Aiskhines in 343. He was chosen to represent Athens (in place of Aiskhines) 7 6 before the Amphiktyones concerning possession of Delos, and he proposed a motion to crown Demosthenes.77 He i s generally believed to have been a l l i e d with Demosthenes for most of his career, but th i s need not mean they had the 78 same friends and enemies. At some time after Khares l e f t Athens during the reign of Alexander, Hypereides "advised against disbanding the mercenary force 79 at Tainaron which Khares led, being well-disposed to the strategos." This gives very l i t t l e on which to base much of a relationship and, regardless when one f i n a l l y decides to date this incident, one can say that the champion-ing of Khares' force f i t s in much better with Hypereides' o v e r a l l policy than i t does with any special relationship with the strategos Khares. 8^ As for other men who were d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y attested as associates of Demosthenes a circumstantial case could be made for some commonality of 81 82 interest with Thrasyboulos Erkhieus, Kal1isthenes, and other even more 83 obscure persons. These relationships, however, are based on highly inferen-84 t i a l grounds and perhaps even on bad method. On the other side there i s a t r a d i t i o n that Khares and Phokion were r i v a l s . When Khares sailed to the Hellespont in 340, the grain ships were 1 0 1 attacked by P h i l i p and the demos decided either to reinforce or replace him, Phokion made a disparaging remark that Plutarch r e l a t e s 8 5 : When the Athenians were eager to aid Byzantion, the rhetores strove to send Khares as strategos and he, having sailed there, accomplished nothing worthy of his force, nor did the c i t i e s receive his f l e e t , but he wandered about suspected by a l l , c o l l e c t i n g money from the a l l i e s and being despised by the enemy. The demos, incited by the orators, became angry and repented of having sent aid to Byzantion. Phokion rose up and said that there was no reason to be angry at their a l l i e s , who distrusted, but rather at those of the strategoi who were distrusted, "for these men make you feared even by those who cannot save themselves without you". T73 = Plutarch Phokion 14.2-3 Another anecdote from the same source relates the following riposte: While he (sc. Phokion) had a nature which was gentle and kind, the expression on his face seemed sullen and hard to deal with so that anyone not accustomed to him did not eas i l y converse with him alone. For that reason once, when Khares made the Athenians laugh about his eyebrows, he said, "this eyebrow has grieved none of you, but the laughter of these people has caused the c i t y to shed many a tear" T74 = Plutarch Phokion 5.1 Such a r i v a l r y i s credible and perhaps expected between colleagues, pa r t i c u l a r -l y since they were on opposite sides in the t r i a l of Aiskhines, but Phokion 86 proved to be very dangerous indeed to the demotikoi in times of c r i s i s . Liturgies Khares 1 public benefactions to the c i t y of Athens have been touched on in the preceding discussions, but a very brief review i s in order since benefactions were exploited for p o l i t i c a l and legal purposes. It has been pointed out that he performed the trierarchy, probably twice, and that he 87 provided the c i t y with a chorus of boys at the Thargelia. It has not, per-haps, been s u f f i c i e n t l y emphasized that Khares performed other public bene-factions, by adorning religious and other celebrations. He twice enhanced 1 0 2 public celebrations by providing feasts. Just after the Social War, he pro-vided a kreanomia for the Boedromia from the spoils of his campaign in Asia Minor (T30). Again, after his victory over the mercenaries of P h i l i p a few years l a t e r , he feasted the Athenians in the agora from his v i c t o r y - s a c r i f i c e s (T36). One may view such acts with cynicism, but they are not at a l l out of the ordinary for a strategos; others did much the same, Khabrias, for ex-88 ample. Thus, these are not the acts of a brigand trying to buy forgive-ness, but a regular and recognized deployment of success to g l o r i f y the c i t y and, at the same time, invest in some p o l i t i c a l goodwill. An interesting aspect of these attempts to acquire public goodwill i s the desire to secure a memorial of that favor. Khares was crowned for his Social-War benefaction (T30), which was the result of "the Sister of Marathon" (T27). Here one can see what was probably an attempt to obtain a lasting symbol of his success and the people's gratitude. Khares w i l l surely have seen the statues of Timotheos, Iphikrates and Khabrias, and his hyperbolic description of the victory in Asia was, perhaps, an attempt to capture the Athenian imagination, and thereby enshrine his name both in bronze and in 89 words. Unfortunately for him, he could not jo i n the t r i a d of great Athenian 90 heroes: the last age of Athenian greatness was over. Summary of Part II In the preceding discussions Khares' relationship with several prominent Athenian p o l i t i c a l leaders has been examined. It has been seen that there i s no reason to think him an enemy of K a l l i s t r a t o s , Khabrias and their assoc-iates. If anything, he cooperated with them. His cooperation with Aristophon can be documented for the t r i a l s of Timotheos and Iphikrates, but neither before nor after them. Likewise, his h o s t i l i t y with Iphikrates and Timotheos cannot be shown to have existed before the battle of Embata. It has been suggested that Khares' association with Demosthenes does not 1 0 3 predate the l a t t e r ' s p o l i t i c a l c o n f l i c t with Aiskhines, but that an apparent-ly f r i e n d l y feeling continued to e x i s t , at least by Demosthenes for Khares, un t i l after the strategos' death. There i s also evidence that this assoc-iation was not constant, for at some point Demosthenes promoted Phokion at the expense of Khares. Aiskhines, Euboulos and Phokion were a l l h o s t i l e to Khares, but again this h o s t i l i t y i s concentrated on the occasion of Aiskhines' t r i a l . The r i v a l r y with Phokion may have been enduring, but i f the truth be known, a l i s t of those to whom Phokion was hosti l e would be a long one. It has also been seen that Hypereides, generally pursuing goals similar to Demosthenes, also spoke on behalf of Khares. Another point that has been made is that Khares was very popular with the demos. In addition to his repeated success with the voters, there i s positive evidence that Athenian j u r i e s f a i l e d to convict him, although he was t r i e d " in every way" (T54). He performed a f u l l range of public bene-factions and l i t u r g i e s and was pu b l i c l y honored for them. 104 PART I I I : DE CHARETIS MORIBUS d i s s i m i l i s quidem Chares horum et f a c t i s et moribus. Thus Cornelius Nepos (T33) apologized for naming Khares in the company of Konon, Iphikrates, Timotheos and Khabrias, Athens' great, fourth-century mi 1itary heroes. Nepos' near-contemporary, Diodoros, reported that Khares "accomplished nothing good for his country, but only calumnies" (T7), and later lamented that, by the time the Athenians faced P h i l i p of Macedon at Khaironeia, "the best of their strategoi had died: Iphikrates, Khabrias, and Timotheos, too, but of those remaining the foremost, Khares, did not surpass the ordinary individual in strategic counsel or vigor" (T78). A century e a r l i e r than Nepos or Diodoros, Polybios (T63) contrasted Athenian policy 'under Kleon and Khares' most un-favorably with that 'under Perikles and Aristeides.' Khares' colleagues were enshrined in a canon of Athenian heroes; he joined the ranks of Athenian i v i l l a i n s . This t r a d i t i o n of Khares' v i l l a i n y prevails in modern scholarshi